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 ^OFCAIIFOB
 
 RECENTLY PUBLISHED— 
 
 BY THE >iAME AUTHOR. 
 
 EECENT TENDENCIES IN ETHICS. 
 
 Three Lectures to Clergy. 
 Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 " These teachers of others could not have been better taught. 
 Professor Sorley is a clear and logical thinker who expresses 
 hioiself with admirable lucidity and force." — Spectator. 
 
 "A very admirable specimen of a most useful kind of litera- 
 ture The task is performed in a masterly way. The work 
 
 possesses in a high degree the qualities appropriate to its kind : 
 breadth of treatment, clearness of style, concentration upon 
 main issues, and a truly remarkable ease and simplicity in the 
 manner of presenting them." — Mind. 
 
 " Interessante eigene Gedanken und Anregungen bilden den 
 Schluss des in hohem Grade 'aktuellen' Buches." — Allgemeine 
 ZeituMj. 
 
 EDITED BY PROFESSOR SORLEY. 
 THE 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OE MODERN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 With Other Lectures and Essays. 
 By the late Professor ROBERT ADAMSON. 
 2 vols, demy 8vo, 18s. net. 
 
 "The volumes are certainly the monument of a mind rarely 
 equipped for philosojihic thought, and their publication is a real 
 service to English philosophy at the present time." — Times. 
 
 "Contaiu the expression of a very remarkable and interesting 
 
 development of thought The lectures are invariably insti'uc- 
 
 tive, and are full of keenly critical remarks." — Athciuvum. 
 
 " Professor Sorley deserves the reader's gratitude for the re- 
 markable editorial skill with which he has prepared the work for 
 
 the press This book is one to be very carefully read and 
 
 pondered by all who are concerned in the living problems of 
 philosophy. " — Hibbcrt Journal. 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS, Edinburgh and London.
 
 THE 
 
 ETHICS OF NATUKALISM 
 
 c
 
 THE 
 
 ETHICS OF NATURALISM 
 
 A CRITICISM 
 
 - • • • J J • - • • 
 
 BY 
 
 W. E. SOELEY 
 
 KNIOHTBRIDOE PROFESSOa OF MORAL PHILOSOPHV 
 IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 
 
 SECOHD EDITION, REVISED 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 
 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON 
 
 M C M I V 
 
 78930 
 
 All Rights reserved
 
 • « €. « . 
 
 • • mat* 
 
 * • * • e • !• 
 
 • • • « 4 t ■
 
 I ooS 
 
 9,11 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The chief purpose of this work is to arrive at an 
 exact estimate of the ethical significance of the 
 theory of evohition. The form in which this theory 
 has impressed itself upon contemporary thought is 
 mainly due to certain researches in biology ; but its 
 influence has not been restricted to the biological 
 sciences. It has shed new light on psychology and 
 on the sciences of society. In this way it has 
 much to say concerning the development of morality. 
 This also is within the scope of evolution. But at 
 this point it is necessary to consider whether our 
 interpretation of evolution may not have been too 
 exclusively determined by observation of a limited 
 group of facts. We must ask whether the factors 
 of biological evolution are adequate to the explana- 
 tion of moral development. 
 
 A still more important question than this is raised 
 in the application of evolutiun to ethics. In strict-
 
 VI PKEFACE. 
 
 ness, the theory of evolution is simply an explanation 
 of an order of sequent facts or processes. It is 
 purely historical. We might know all that there is 
 to be known about the origin and growth of moral 
 institutions and ideas, and yet be unable to dis- 
 tinguish between good and evil or to set up a 
 standard for right conduct. And this is the funda- 
 mental problem of ethics. The question which it 
 has to answer is not a question of history at all, 
 but of worth or goodness. In attempting to deal 
 with this question, evolution has been pressed into 
 alliance with the more general theory which is now 
 known as Naturalism. In alliance with Naturalism 
 it professes to be a complete philosophy, and has 
 made a special claim to have revolutionised ethics 
 and set that science on a new basis. It has been 
 my purpose, accordingly, to examine this claim, and 
 to discuss the ethical bearings of Naturalism, both 
 in its earlier forms, before evolution came to its aid, 
 and in its later and more impressive developments. 
 The book is called " a criticism " ; but it is the 
 criticism of a theory rather than of writers ; and an 
 effort has been made to overlook no aspect of the 
 theory which may appear to have ethical significance. 
 The first edition of this book was published in 
 1885, and was founded on a course of Shaw Fellow-
 
 PREFACE. Vll 
 
 ship Lectures given in the University of Edinburgh 
 in the preceding year. The call for a new edition 
 has led to a careful revision of the whole argument, 
 as well as to the incorporation of references to 
 recent literature. The chief changes and additions 
 which have been made are the following : a more 
 positive definition of Naturalism has been given in 
 chapter i. ; a great part of chapter iv. has been re- 
 written, chiefly on account of the fresh light thrown 
 upon Shaftesbury's philosophy by the publication of 
 his ' Philosophical Regimen ' in 1900 ; chapter v. 
 appears now for the first time ; a section on the 
 factors of moral development has been added to 
 chapter vi. ; a few pages on the psychology of 
 pleasure and pain in chapter viii. have been re- 
 written ; short discussions of some recent contri- 
 butions to evolutionist ethics have been added to 
 chapter ix. ; and the concluding chapter has been 
 rewritten and considerably shortened. Apart from 
 these modifications, and from frequent minor changes 
 in expression, the argument of the whole book re- 
 mains unaltered both as a whole and in detail. 
 
 ^Y. E. SOKLEY. 
 Cambridge, A^igust 1904.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 1. Connexion of ethics with theoretical philosophy 
 
 (a) Dependence of ethical on general points of view 
 
 (b) Ethics necessary to a complete philosophy 
 
 2. The enquiry into the ethical end 
 
 (fl) Fundamental . . • • • 
 
 {b) Implies a new point of view . 
 
 (c) Distinct from other ethical questions . 
 
 (o) From the enquiry into the methods of ethics 
 (fi) From moral psychology and sociology 
 
 3. Scope of the present enquiry 
 
 Definition of Naturalism . . • • 
 
 PAOE 
 1 
 
 2 
 4 
 6 
 6 
 
 7 
 10 
 11 
 14 
 15 
 17 
 
 PAET I. 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EGOISM, 
 
 Subjective Naturalism 
 Psychological Hedonism 
 
 22 
 23
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 1. Its theory of action ambiguous 
 
 Referring to — 
 
 (rt) Actual consequences of action 
 
 (b) Or its expected consequence . 
 
 (c) Or its present characteristics 
 
 2. Ethical inferences from this theory . 
 
 3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism 
 
 4. Possible objections considered 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 27 
 28 
 33 
 39 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 1. Difference of the standpoints of individual and State 
 
 2. Connexion between egoism and utilitarianism according to 
 
 Bentham ..... 
 
 (a) Utilitarian conduct not a political duty 
 (6) Nor a moral duty 
 
 (c) Nor insisted on as a religious duty 
 
 (d) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics 
 
 3. Exhaustive character of Bentham's treatment from his point 
 
 of view .... 
 (rt) The religious sanction (Paley) . 
 
 (5) Limits of the political sanction 
 
 (c) Uncertainty of the social sanction 
 
 (d) And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the 
 
 social .... 
 
 4. Mill's defence of utilitarianism 
 
 (a) Distinction of kinds of j^leasure 
 
 (6) Ambiguities in his proof 
 
 5. Actual transition to utilitarianism . 
 
 (a) Recognition of sympathy 
 {b) The idea of equality , 
 
 6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical con 
 
 nexion .... 
 
 7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological 
 
 hedonism 
 
 43 
 
 47 
 49 
 50 
 51 
 
 52 
 
 54 
 55 
 57 
 
 57 
 
 59 
 60 
 61 
 63 
 65 
 67 
 73 
 
 77 
 
 78
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 XI 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 
 
 1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the op 
 
 ponents of ethical hedonism 
 
 2. The non-hedonistic theory of action ' natural affection ' 
 
 3. The theory of the moral sense 
 
 (a) As a separate sensitive faculty (Huteheson) 
 
 (b) As an internal law (Butler) 
 
 4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theoi-y . 
 
 81 
 89 
 101 
 102 
 112 
 115 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 
 
 Objective Naturalism ..... 
 
 1. Pre-evolutionist conceptions of ' nature ' and natural law 
 
 2. Influence of this conception on the English moralists 
 
 3. Ambiguity of the term ' natural ' . 
 
 4. Mill's criticism of the morality of nature . 
 
 . 117 
 
 ' 118 
 
 . 120 
 
 . 127 
 
 . 130 
 
 2. 
 
 PAET II. 
 
 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
 OF MORALITY. 
 
 General characteristics of the theory of evolution . . 138 
 An assertion of the unity of life .... 140 
 
 Primarily historical, but suggests ethical application . 141 
 
 Distinction of historical and ethical aspects , . 144 
 
 The development of morality . . . .147 
 
 («) Historical psychology . . . . .147 
 
 Its difficulties . . . . .149 
 
 Its result . . . . . .156 
 
 (6) Development of society . . . .157
 
 Xll 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 3. The factors of moral development 
 (a) Natural selection 
 (6) Subjective selection 
 (c) Social selection 
 
 159 
 160 
 162 
 163 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 
 
 Bearing of the theory of evolution 
 
 1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition 
 
 Origin and validity .... 
 Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism 
 
 2. On egoism : relation of egoism to altruism 
 
 (a) Social nature of the individual 
 
 (b) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism 
 
 (a) Continued existence of competition . 
 (/3) Different and conflicting degrees of altruism 
 (7) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive 
 (S) Comparative weakness of altruistic feelings 
 
 (c) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism . 
 
 Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism 
 Nor of ethical hedonism . 
 
 3. On utilitarianism .... 
 
 Modification of the utilitarian method 
 
 And of its principle 
 
 Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism 
 
 (a) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal 
 
 (6) As a theory of consequences 
 
 (c) As related solely to sensibility . 
 
 169 
 
 170 
 172 
 176 
 177 
 178 
 185 
 185 
 186 
 187 
 189 
 191 
 191 
 194 
 196 
 197 
 199 
 199 
 199 
 203 
 205 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 
 
 1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism . . . 208 
 
 (a) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of 
 
 life ....... 208 
 
 (&) From interpreting life by pleasure . . . 209
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 xm 
 
 2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure 
 
 3. Consideration of the olijection.s which may be taken to this 
 
 argument ..... 
 
 (a) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain 
 (a) From the negative nature of pleasure 
 (^) From the facts of human life 
 (6) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to 
 pleasure ..... 
 (o) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument 
 ((3) Tiie pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery 
 (aa) The hypothesis of the unconscious 
 {bb) The nature of volition 
 {cc) The facts of human progress • 
 Individual progress 
 Social progress 
 
 4. Pleasure and pain as modes of human experience . 
 
 (rt) Their subjectivity .... 
 (h) The conditions of pleasure and pain . 
 (c) Application of the theory of evolution 
 
 211 
 
 212 
 213 
 
 2U 
 215 
 
 216 
 217 
 220 
 220 
 221 
 223 
 223 
 225 
 229 
 229 
 233 
 239 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 The independent contribution of evolution to ethics 
 
 1. Adaptation to environment 
 (a) As the end for present conduct 
 
 Opposed to progress 
 Does not fully represent evolution 
 (6) As describing the ultimate condition of life 
 Resultant absolute code 
 (a) Abstract principles of social relation 
 (i8) Personal end only defined as adaptation 
 (7) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness 
 (c) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end 
 
 2. End suggested by the tendency to variation 
 (a) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preserva 
 
 tion ..... 
 
 243 
 245 
 249 
 250 
 251 
 252 
 254 
 254 
 255 
 256 
 264 
 267 
 
 268
 
 XIV 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 (h) Standard for measuring development found in com 
 plexity of act and motive 
 
 (o) Antinomy between social and individual ends 
 (|8) Psychological defects . 
 3. Development or increase of life as the end 
 
 (a) Subjective standard : most persistant impulses 
 
 Cannot define life without an objective standai-d 
 (6) Objective standard : defined in two ways . 
 (o) Conformity to the type 
 
 Which can be reduced to — 
 (jS) Abundance and vaiiety of vital power . 
 That is, to the subjective standard 
 Summary as to the evolutionist end . ... 
 
 (a) Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends 
 (h) Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible 
 (c) No independent ethical ideal . 
 
 274 
 277 
 279 
 283 
 289 
 293 
 294 
 295 
 
 299 
 302 
 305 
 305 
 306 
 307 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 1. Summary: two distinct kinds of ethical enquiry . 
 
 (a) Evolution of moral ideas and institutions 
 The limits of natural selection in — 
 (a) Conflict of ideas .... 
 (/3) Conflict of groups .... 
 (7) Conflict of individuals 
 {b) The meaning and standard of goodness 
 The problems of history and of validity 
 
 2. The interpretation of evolution 
 
 Huxley's opposition of the ethical and cosmic processes 
 
 The naturalistic interpretation 
 
 The interpretation on the basis of idealism 
 
 310 
 311 
 
 313 
 316 
 317 
 320 
 321 
 327 
 328 
 330 
 331 
 
 Index 
 
 334
 
 THE ETHICS OF NATUEALISM. 
 
 dllAPTER I. 
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 Every great system of philosophy seeks to include i- connex- 
 ion of ethics 
 within its scope an interpretation not merely of with theo- 
 
 the course of the world, but also of the judgments sophy/^^'°' 
 and ideals of worth which accompany our con- 
 templation of it, and direct our own share in its 
 progress. No philosophical doctrine is complete 
 which neglects the characteristic facts and con- 
 ceptions of ethics. And, on the other hand, 
 enquiries into the nature of goodness remain 
 inadequate until brought into connexion with the 
 general theory of reality. It is true that moralists 
 have often attempted to do without metaphysics, 
 or to keep their views on morality apart from their 
 metaphysical theory. They have started with in- 
 tuitions of right and wrong, or with the feelings of 
 approbation and disapprobation, or with ideals of 
 
 A
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 (a) Depend- 
 ence of 
 ethical on 
 general 
 points of 
 view : 
 
 (a) teleolo- 
 gical, 
 
 0) jural, 
 
 worth ; and, in the analysis and application of 
 the facts of the moral consciousness, the work of 
 ethical science may have seemed to be completed. 
 But the facts of the moral consciousness, or moral 
 experience, form a part of the wider experience 
 which has to be interpreted by metaphysics : so 
 that no final severance of ethical from metaphysical 
 enquiry is possible. 
 
 Their close connexion is shown in the history 
 of thought. The Naturalism or Idealism which 
 marks a speculative system determines the char- 
 acter of its ethical doctrine, whilst moralists have 
 been divided into schools by reason of their differ- 
 ences on such questions as the relation of pleasure 
 to desire, or the nature of conscience, which are 
 primarily questions of psychological analysis. And 
 it is not special controversies only that are affected 
 in this way. The scope of ethical science as a 
 whole is differently conceived as the philosophical 
 standpoint changes. Thus, not for one school 
 only, but for a whole period in the history of 
 reflexion, ethics was regarded as an enquiry into 
 the highest good. Opposed schools agreed in look- 
 ing from this point of view, however much they 
 might differ from one another in defining the 
 nature of that highest good. At other times, ac- 
 cording to the prevailing view, to investigate and 
 systematise the rules of conduct has exhausted the 
 scope of ethics — controversies being carried on as
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 3 
 
 to the nature of those rules, and their source in 
 external authority or in the internal revelation of 
 conscience. Again, ethical enquiry has been ap- 
 parently identified with the analysis and history (y)<nipir- 
 of the moral affections and sentiments ; while a 
 purely descriptive point of view seems to be some- 
 times adopted, and ethics held to be an investiga- 
 tion of the motives and results of action, and of 
 the forms, customary and institutional, in which 
 those results find permanent expression. 
 
 Tiiese different ways of looking at the whole 
 subject proceed from points of view whose effects 
 are not confined to ethics, but may be followed 
 out along other lines of investigation. They corre- 
 spond to ideas which dominate different types of 
 thought, and form different philosophical stand- 
 points. The first starts from a teleological con- 
 ception of human nature, as an organism con- 
 sciously striving towards its end. The second 
 assimilates ethics to a system of legal enactments, 
 and is connected with the jural conceptions of 
 theology and law. The two last are concerned to 
 show that the subject-matter of ethics are facts 
 which have to be treated by the ordinary inductive 
 and historical methods. These different points of 
 view, however, may be regarded as complementary 
 rather than as conflicting, although their complete to be con- 
 
 iiGCtcci bv 
 
 synthesis must be worked out in the region of philosophy, 
 general philosophy, and not on purely ethical
 
 4 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 ground. Philosophy has thus to deal with the 
 notions which determine the scope and character 
 of ethical thought; and in this way it must be 
 practical as well as speculative. If it is the 
 business of philosophy to bring into rational order 
 the material supplied by experience, cosmical and 
 anthropological, it cannot be without bearing on the 
 function of man as a source of action in the world. 
 The question. What are the ends man ought to 
 pursue ? is not merely as natural as the question. 
 What can a man know of the world and of him- 
 self ? But the two questions are inseparably con- 
 nected. To know man is to know him not only as 
 a thinking but also as an active being; while to 
 solve the problem of the ends of man implies 
 knowledge both of his nature and of the sphere 
 of his activity. 
 (&) Ethics Whatever may be the difficulty of connecting 
 trcompfete ethics with metaphysics, it remains true that the 
 philosophy, philosophy — whether metaphysical or not — in 
 which our most comprehensive view of the world 
 finds its reasoned expression, cannot neglect that 
 aspect of things in which man is related to his 
 surroundings as a source of action. Eecent ethical 
 literature is itself a proof of this fact. In its 
 speculative developments, both realistic and ideal- 
 istic, the philosophy of the present day has made 
 the endeavour to connect its conceptions of the 
 world of thought and nature with the ends con-
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 5 
 
 templated as to be realised in the realm of action. 
 The conception of 'reality' is not the same as 
 that of goodness ' or ' worth ' ; ' is ' does not imply 
 ' ou»ht to be.' But the connexion of the two con- 
 ceptions has to be investigated not merely in order 
 that human activity may be shown to be rational, 
 but that reason itself may be justified by leaving 
 nothing outside its sphere. 
 
 We must not, therefore, begin by drawing a line 
 of absolute separation between the first two of the 
 three questions in which, as Kant says,^ all the 
 interests^^of our reason centre. The ' What ought 
 I to do ? ' of ethics is for ever falling back on the 
 ' What can I know ? ' of metaphysics. The ques- 
 tion of practice must be treated throughout in 
 connexion with the question of knowledge. If 
 we use Kant's distinction between speculative and 
 practical reason, we must always bear in mind 
 that it is the same reason which is in one reference 
 speculative, in another practical.- We are not at 
 liberty to assume with Butler ^ that " morality . . . 
 must be somewhat plain and easy to be under- 
 stood: it must appeal to what we call common- 
 sense." Nor may we presuppose, as Hutcheson 
 did,'^ that it is a subject "about which a little 
 
 1 Werke, ed. Harteustein (1867), iii. 532. 
 
 2 Cf. Kant, Werke, iv. 237. 
 
 ** Sermons, v., towards the end. 
 
 ■• Essay on the Passions and Affections, p. iv.
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 2. The en- 
 quiry into 
 the ethical 
 end 
 
 (ft) funda- 
 mental, 
 
 reflection will discover the truth." The question 
 must be looked upon not so much as one of im- 
 mediate practical as of scientific interest, and 
 reason is to be regarded as the only court of 
 appeal. 
 
 The form just quoted, in which Kant states the 
 problem, is not altogether free from ambiguity. 
 ' What ought I to do ? ' may be taken to signify. 
 What means should I adopt for the attainment of 
 some end presupposed, perhaps unconsciously, as 
 the end to be sought ? But it is evident, not only 
 that this is not what Kant himself meant by the 
 question, but that, as thus put, it necessarily im- 
 plies a further and deeper question. Not the dis- 
 covery of the means, but the determination of the 
 end itself — the end which cannot be interpreted 
 as a mere means to some further end — is the 
 fundamental question of ethics. It is only by 
 misconception that this can be thought to be a 
 trivial question. To say, as a recent scientific 
 writer does,^ " That happiness in one disguise or 
 another is the end of human life is common ground 
 for all the schools," is either to ignore what the 
 schools have taught,- or else to use the word 
 
 ^ W. H. Rolph, Biologische Probleme, zugleich als Versuch zur 
 Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik, 2ud ed., p. 21. 
 
 2 Not to mention Kaut, the consistent opponent of every 
 eudsemonistic principle, or the doctrines of a political idealist 
 such as Mazzini (see Life and "Writings (1867), iv. 223), reference 
 may be made to W. K. Clifford, who looks from the scientific
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 7 
 
 ' happiness ' merely as another name for the 
 highest good. But, even were it still the case, as 
 it was in the time of Aristotle, that nearly all men 
 were agreed as to the name of the highest good, 
 and that the common people and the cultured alike 
 called it happiness, the difference as to what they 
 meant by the term w^uld still remain. To say 
 that the ethical end is happiness is, to use Locke's 
 terminology, a " trifling proposition " ; for in so 
 doing we merely give it a name ^ — and one which 
 the controversies of philosophy have surrounded 
 with confusion. That the end is happiness in any 
 definite sense, for example, as the greatest balance 
 of pleasure over pain, may be perfectly true, but 
 stands very much in need of proof. That happi- 
 ness is the highest ethical end can be assumed as 
 true only when 'happiness' is nothing more than an 
 abbreviated expression for ' the highest ethical end.' 
 
 A difficulty of a more radical kind meets us, at (!-) implies a 
 the very outset of our enquiry, in the distinctively view, 
 ethical notion expressed by the word ' ought.' 
 Various attempts have been made to surmount or 
 circumvent this difficulty ; and some of these will 
 come under consideration in the sequel. The very 
 
 point of view, and yet holds timt " happiness is not to be desired 
 for its own sake." — Lectures and Essays (1879), ii. 121, 173. 
 
 1 " Auch dieser BegriU" [Gliickseligkeit] ist an sich ein bloss 
 formaler, der jede beliebige materiale Bestimmuug zuUisst." — 
 Zeller, Ueber Begritf und Begriinduug der sittlicheu Gesetze 
 in Vortriige und Abhandlungeu, iii. 209.
 
 8 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 notion of conscious activity contains the idea of 
 bringing about something which does not yet exist. 
 It involves a purpose and selects the means for 
 fulfilling that purpose. The notion 'ought/ it is 
 true, means more than this : it implies an obligation 
 to pursue a definite end or conform to definite 
 rules, regarded generally as coming from an authori- 
 tative source. In this clear and full sense, ' ought- 
 ness' or duty is a comparatively recent notion, 
 foreign to the classical period of Greek ethics. The 
 force and definiteness belonging to the modern 
 conception are due to the juridical aspect which the 
 Stoic philosophy, Eoman law, and Christian theology 
 combined to impress upon morality. But even the 
 notion of purpose or end implies a ' preference ' of 
 the end sought : the state to be realised is looked 
 upon as ' better ' or ' more to be desired ' than the 
 existing state. We may ask for the reason of this 
 superior desirableness ; but the answer must soon 
 fall back upon the assertion of something held to 
 be desirable in itself. The question which we are 
 always asking, and cannot help asking, 'Why is such 
 and such an end to be pursued by me ? ' or ' Why 
 ought I to follow such and such a course of 
 conduct ? ' must soon lead to the assertion of an 
 ultimate end, an end whose worth or goodness does 
 not depend upon any further result, but is intrinsic. 
 the transi- This end, therefore, is not to be sought for some 
 ulterior end, nor desired simply as a means to 
 
 tion to which
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 9 
 
 satisfy some other desire. But it is still necessary reqnireB m- 
 
 vestigation ; 
 
 to enquire into the way in which the end, held to 
 be intrinsically good or worthy of attainment, 
 stands related to the constitution of man and his 
 environment. And the question to which I would 
 draw attention, as the fundamental problem of 
 ethics, is, "What is that which men have variously 
 called happiness, the highest good, the ethical end ? 
 and, in particular. How is the determination of this 
 ethical end connected with the conceptions arrived 
 at by theoretical philosophy ? No assumption is 
 made, at starting, as to the nature of this end, or 
 the manner of arriving at it. It may be a transient 
 state of feeling, or a permanent type of character ; 
 or it may by its very nature defy exact definition, 
 — the idea itself being perfected as its realisation is 
 progressively approached. In any case it requires 
 to be brought into connexion with the ultimate 
 conceptions about reality. 
 
 This question of the ethical end or of the good 
 is thus fundamental in ethics, and with it all 
 other ethical questions are related in such a way 
 that they depend upon it for their full under- 
 standing. But it is easy to see that this question 
 does not cover the whole field, and that the other 
 points of view already referred to have a legitimate 
 application. Ethics has not only to determine the 
 end, but to apply it to practice, and so to decide 
 as to what is right or wrong in particular actions.
 
 10 
 
 THE ETHICAL PEOBLEM. 
 
 (c) distinct 
 from other 
 ethical 
 questions : 
 
 and virtuous or vicious in character. And, in addi- 
 tion to the two question thus implied — the question 
 as to the ethical end, and that as to the application 
 of it to practical affairs — there is another depart- 
 ment of enquiry which has had a place assigned 
 to it in most ethical systems, and which has a right 
 to be regarded as belonging to ethics. We may 
 investigate the place, in the individual and the 
 community respectively, both of the sentiments 
 and ideas and of the social institutions and customs 
 through which morality is manifested ; and this 
 enquiry covers the twofold ground of what may 
 be called moral psychology and moral sociology. 
 Of these three questions, the first forms the sub- 
 ject of enquiry in the following pages. It seems to 
 me that a great part of the obscurity which sur- 
 rounds ethical argument is due to confounding these 
 different questions. It is true that no one of them 
 is without bearing on the others ; but it is none the 
 less necessary^ in discussing any one of them, to 
 keep its distinctness from those others well in view. 
 In enquiring into the nature and grounds of the 
 ethical end, I do not intend to develop a code of 
 rules for practical conduct or a theory of human 
 virtue ; nor shall I attempt to trace the origin and 
 nature of moral sentiments and ideas, or of the 
 social institutions and customs connected with mor- 
 ality. If these subjects have to be introduced at
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 11 
 
 all, it will be only in so far as they may be thought 
 to decide, or tend to decide, the question more im- 
 mediately in view. 
 
 Thus it forms no part of the present enquiry to (a) from en- 
 
 . p T /!■ quiry into 
 
 follow out the application to conduct or diilerent the methods 
 ethical ends, or to exhibit the different practical °^°'^'<^''- 
 systems to which dififerent ends naturally lead. It 
 might seem indeed, at first sight, as if the develop- 
 ment of their practical consequences might solve 
 the question as to the nature of the ends them- 
 selves. If we assume certain possible and primd 
 facie reasonable ethical ends, and then see what 
 codes of morality they will yield, surely (it may be 
 thought) that one which affords the most consistent 
 and harmonious code for the guidance of life will 
 be the end to be sought in preference to all others. 
 But, in order that the criticism of the ' methods ' of Limitation 
 ethics may be able to answer the question as to the enquiry 
 end or principle of ethics, certain conditions would 
 first have to be complied with. In the first place, (f!a)from 
 it would be necessary that the ends or principles investigat- 
 whose applications to conduct were to be examined |J!fiaUe°f 
 should not be uncritically accepted from the fluetu- 'i-'^tives, 
 ating morality of common - sense nor from the 
 commonplaces of the schools, but should be shown 
 to be "alternatives between which the human 
 mind" is "necessarily forced to choose when it 
 attempts to frame a complete synthesis of prac-
 
 12 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 tical maxims, and to act in a perfectly rational 
 manner." ^ 
 (66) from Even whcre this requisite is complied with, it 
 
 more tlian i i -n • •^ ^ 
 
 one self-con- would Still rcmam possible, in the second place, 
 ijeiug that two or more of the assumed principles might 
 
 possible, yield systems of practical rules perfectly self-con- 
 sistent, and yet inconsistent with one another.^ 
 It would be very hard indeed to show that both 
 the theory of Egoistic Hedonism, and what is gener- 
 ally called Utilitarianism, do not succeed in doing 
 so : and thus the examination of methods is not of 
 itself sufficient to settle the question of the end 
 of conduct. And since — to quote Professor Sidg- 
 wick^ — it is "a fundamental postulate of ethics 
 that so far as two methods conflict, one or other of 
 them must be modified or rejected," it follows that 
 the criticism of methods leads naturally up to an 
 independent criticism of principles, unless indeed 
 it can be shown that one method only yields a 
 consistent code of practical rules. 
 (cc) from its Evcn in this case, however, if it led to the adop- 
 tion of the end in question, it must be borne in 
 
 ^ Sidgwick, Methods of EtWcs, book i. chap. i. § 5, 3d ed., p. 
 11 ; 6th ed., p. 12 (where the word 'rational' is replaced by 'con- 
 sistent'). 
 
 - " The rule, ' Let every one care for me,' is quite as simple 
 and, in a logical point of view, defines conduct as consistently and 
 reasonably as the rule, ' Love your neighbour as yourself.' " — Sir 
 Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics (1882), p. 73. 
 
 3 Methods of Ethics, L i. 3, 6th ed., p. 6. 
 
 assumption
 
 sistent 
 rules. 
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM, 13 
 
 mind that the postulate would be implied that the that the tme 
 
 end must 
 
 true ethical end must be able to yield a consistent give per- 
 and harmonious system of rules for practical life. '^^ ^ '^°"' 
 Without altogether denying this postulate, it yet 
 seems to me that it stands in need of qualification. 
 For in different circumstances, and at different 
 stages of individual and social development, the 
 application of the same ethical end may naturally 
 produce different and conflicting courses of conduct. 
 We must not start with any such assumption as 
 that the rationality of the end consists in some sort 
 of mathematical equality which ignores alike the 
 different environments with which one age and 
 another surround successive generations, and the 
 different functions which one individual and an- 
 other have to perform in the social whole. We 
 must leave open the possibility that particular 
 kinds of action which are right now may be wrong 
 in another age ; we must allow that everybody may 
 not count for one, and that some people may count 
 for more than one; we must admit that we may 
 have sometimes to do to others what we would not 
 that others should do to us. The only consistency 
 we have a right to demand must leave room for 
 such a variety of different conditions as to be, by 
 itself, a very imperfect guide. 
 
 From the difficulty of complying with the above 
 conditions, it seems practically impossible for the 
 criticism of ethical methods to decide the question
 
 14 
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 (/S') distinct 
 from moral 
 psychology 
 and socio- 
 logy. 
 
 of the ethical end. Even if the application to con- 
 duct of every important end has been taken account 
 of, we are met with the difficulty that two or more 
 mutually antagonistic though self-consistent prac- 
 tical codes may perhaps have been developed, while 
 we are not even justified in assuming that inability 
 to yield a system which will fit the complex cir- 
 cumstances of life in a perfectly harmonious manner 
 is sufficient ground for rejecting an end shown in 
 some other way to be reasonable. 
 
 The last department of ethics referred to — that 
 which has to do with the origin and nature of 
 moral sentiments and social customs — has a bear- 
 ing on the question of the end of conduct in some 
 respects more important than the investigation of 
 ethical methods. For, whereas the latter expressly 
 assumes certain ends as jprimd facie reasonable, the 
 former enquiry, on the contrary, is frequently held 
 to be able, without presupposing any ethical rela- 
 tions whatever, to trace the way in which, from 
 primitive feelings and customs, morality itself has 
 been evolved. The psychological side of ethical 
 enquiry has always occupied an important place 
 with English moralists. At times, indeed, the 
 question of the ' moral faculty ' has excited so 
 much interest as to divert attention from the 
 nature of morality itself. Moral truth has been 
 supposed to be something known and indisputable, 
 the only question being how we come to know it.
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 15 
 
 But the psychology of ethics, reinforced by the 
 knowledge sociology gives of the development of 
 morality, rises now to larger issues. It attempts 
 to show tiie genesis of the moral from the non- 
 moral, to account thus for the origin of ethical 
 ideas, and even to determine what kinds of ends 
 are to be striven after. In this way, a theory of 
 the origin and growth of moral sentiments and 
 institutions is made to render important help to 
 more than one of the theories which will fall to be 
 considered in the sequel. 
 
 Tlie present enquiry is concerned with the way 3. Present 
 in which we may determine either the end of umited 
 human conduct, or the criterion which distinguishes 
 good from evil. But I do not propose to offer an 
 exhaustive investigation of all the theories which 
 have been or may be started in solution of the 
 problem. On the contrary, I will begin by exclud- 
 ing from the enquiry all theories which proceed ou 
 the assumption that the moral code depends upon 
 arbitrary law or convention : ^ not because I con- 
 
 ^ The difference between Aristotle and Kant in ethics is some- 
 times expressed (see Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitriige zur Phil., 
 iii. 171 ff. ) as if it consisted in the fact that the former investi- 
 gated human nature in order to find its t«aoj, whereas the latter 
 sought the standard of action in a transcendental ground. There 
 is reason for this distinction in Kant's manner of statement. 
 But both may be regarded as investigating human nature. 
 Their difl'erence rather consists in the diffei-ent position and 
 function assigned to reason in man. It is because Kant is for 
 the moment looking upon reason as something distinct from
 
 16 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 tend that all such theories are prima facie un- 
 reasonable, but because it is at any rate the more 
 to theories obvious course to scck to determine the function of 
 
 depending . , , . . . . . 
 
 on the an organism by studying its inner constitution, and 
 stXtion°'^' its relation to the world of which it is a part. For 
 this reason I shall not take into consideration the 
 views of the basis of ethics which find it in positive 
 law either divine or human. It is not necessary 
 for me to deny that the source of all moral obliga- 
 tion may be the will of God, or the commands of 
 the sovereign, or the opinion of society, and that 
 the highest moral ideal may be obedience to such a 
 rule. But theories of this kind make ethics merely 
 an application of positive theology, or of legisla- 
 tion, or of social sentiment, and seem only to have 
 an appropriate place when we have failed to find 
 an independent basis for action. 
 
 The question which remains to be put may be 
 expressed in these terms : Can we find in human 
 nature (taken either alone or in connexion with its 
 environment) any indications of the end of human 
 conduct, or, in other words, of the principle on 
 which human beings ' ought ' to act ? and if so, in 
 
 human nature that he says that " the gi'ouud of obligation is to 
 be sought, not in the nature of man or in the circumstances in 
 the world in which he is placed, but a priori simj^ly in the notions 
 of pure reason" (Werke, iv. 237). His "metaphysical" view of 
 ethics, however, follows from the rational constitution of the 
 human subject and his experience, and does not depend on any 
 source that really " transcends " the reason of man.
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 17 
 
 what direction do these indications point, and what 
 is their significance ? The answer to this question 
 will thus necessarily depend on the view we take 
 of the constitution of man and his relation to his 
 environment. And the special problem before us 
 is the ethical consequences of one only of the two 
 main views into which philosophical opinion, at 
 present as in the past, is divided. 
 
 These two views may be designated Eealism or and here to 
 Naturalism and Idealism or Spiritualism ; and it is Naturalism. 
 with the former alone that the present enquiry is 
 concerned. In modern thought the theory now com- 
 monly called Naturalism may be said to occupy 
 the position and to carry on the traditions of the 
 theory of Materialism which, in its strict meaning, 
 is no longer prominent in philosophical controversy. 
 Naturalism, as the theory is held to-day, does Meaning of 
 not assert that material atoms and their motion 
 constitute the sole reality. As regards ultimate 
 reality it professes that it has nothing to say; it 
 deals with phenomena only. But, in its interpre- 
 tation both of the world and of man, it carries 
 on the opposition to Idealism. The completest 
 account of the world as a whole which is possible 
 is held to be the description of it in physical 
 terms : the spiritual factor in reality is held to 
 be dependent, if not illusory. And the explana- 
 tion given of man's life is similar. The psychology 
 now associated with Naturalism is essentially the 
 
 B
 
 18 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 
 
 same as that which Democritus in the ancient 
 world and Hobbes in the modern set forth as a 
 suitable outwork of their materialistic theory of 
 reality. Sensory impressions leave certain residua 
 behind them called ideas ; and these, as Hume put 
 it, by " a kind of attraction, which in the mental 
 world will be found to have as extraordinary effects 
 as in the natural," ^ are held to give rise to the 
 whole content of consciousness. Naturalism is 
 thus a psychological as well as a cosmological 
 theory, and may be tested by its adequacy to 
 explain the mind of man as well as by its com- 
 petency as an account of the world. " As long as 
 association of ideas (or sensory residua) is held to 
 explain judgment and conscience, so long" (it has 
 been said) "may naturalism stand." ^ 
 
 ^ Treatise of Human Nature, book i. part i. sect. iv. , ed. Selby- 
 Bigge, p. 12. 
 
 - "Ward, art. " Natui-alism, " Encyclopaedia Britannica, 10th ed., 
 vol. xxxi. p. 88b. To this article reference may also be made for 
 the history of the term. Its usage both in philosophy and in 
 literature has undergone considerable modifications. The literarj- 
 use is related to the philosoiiliical, but not closely enough to 
 require examination here, nor to justify the classification of the 
 first edition of the present work under ' Schone Literatur und 
 Kunst ' in a German book-catalogue. As a philosophical term 
 ' naturalism ' has been used for a theory such as Bruno's, in which 
 God is identified with nature (cf. Adamson, Development of 
 Modern Philosophy, ii. 44) ; but its earliest usage as a technical 
 term seems to have had reference to the acceptance of a ' religion 
 of nature' (cf. Lechler, Engl. Deismus, p. 31). It thus came to 
 be used in the Deistic controversy as opposed to Supernaturalism, 
 and in this way even to be identified with Rationalism. This
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 19 
 
 Into this theory of Naturalism, as well as into 
 the corresponding but opposed theory of Idealism, 
 the historical turn of thought which has charac- 
 terised recent enquiry has introduced a profound 
 modification. On the basis of Naturalism, we may Naturalism, 
 either look upon man as an individual distinct viauaiistic 
 from other individuals, as was done by Epicurus 
 and Hobbes and the materialists of the eighteenth 
 century, or we may consider the race as itself an 
 organism, apart from which the individual is unin- or historical, 
 telligible, and look upon human nature as having 
 become what it now is through a long process of 
 interaction between organism and environment, in 
 which social as well as psychical and physical 
 factors have influenced the result. This is the 
 view to the elaboration of wliicli Comte and Dar- 
 win and Spencer have in different ways contri- 
 
 usage survives in the term 'Natural Theology,' where 'natural' 
 means ' rational ' as opposed to ' revelational.' But the substantive 
 'naturalism' is no longer used as implj'ing 'rationalism.' It 
 means simply the theory explained above : that the description 
 of the world in physical terms, and of mind in terms of sensation 
 and association, is (not necessarily the ultimate truth but) the 
 most adequate account of things of which human reason is 
 capable. As the early usage of the term cited by Lechler is 
 from an unpublished work, so also its earliest use as equivalent 
 to materialism which I have seen is in a work of two hundred 
 years ago only recently printed — The Pliilosophical Regimen of 
 Shaftesbury (wiitten between 1698 and 1712, and first published 
 in 1900). In this work (p. 21) the author contrasts his own 
 theory with that of the atomists, to whom he refers as persons 
 " who count themselves naturalists."
 
 20 THE ETHICAL PKOBLEM. 
 
 buted.^ What makes the historical method of 
 importance philosophically, is not the mere fact 
 that it traces a sequence of events in time, but the 
 fact that, by doing so, it is able to look upon each 
 link in the chain of events as necessarily connected 
 with every other, and thus to regard as a system 
 — or, rather, as an organism — what previous 
 empirical theories had left without any principle 
 of unity. 
 Idealism A similar movement of thought has introduced 
 
 viduaiistic ^ like modification into the Idealist theory. 
 According to older views (represented by the 
 doctrine of ' innate ideas,' and by the ethical 
 theory of Intuitionism), the individual reason is 
 mysteriously charged with certain a 2JTi(y)'i prin- 
 ciples which are to us laws of knowledge and of 
 action ; whereas the form of Idealism which is 
 now in the ascendant resembles the theory of 
 natural evolution in this, that as the latter finds 
 the race more real than the individual, and the 
 individual to exist only in the race, so the former 
 or universal- looks upou the individual reason as but a finite 
 manifestation of the universal reason, and attempts 
 to show the principles or constitutive elements of 
 this universal reason or consciousness in their 
 logical or necessary connexion — leaving open to 
 empirical investigation the way in which they 
 
 ^ Comte, by connecting ethics with biology ; Darwin and 
 Spencer, by the doctrine of evolution.
 
 THE ETHICAL PROBLEM. 21 
 
 have gradually disclosed themselves in the in- 
 dividual human subject, and in the expression of 
 the collective life of the race. Thus, as the Ethics 
 of Naturalism is divided into an individualistic 
 and an historical view, a similar distinction might 
 be made in Idealist Ethics, though in this case it 
 would be more difficult to follow out the distinc- 
 tion in detail ; and many ethical systems cannot 
 be said to have kept consistently either to one side 
 of it or to the other. 
 
 In the following discussion I shall investigate 
 the ethical theory which is founded on the basis of 
 Naturalism — working out and criticising in some- 
 what greater detail that form of the theory which, 
 from the agreement it lays claim to with the 
 results of modern science, plays a leading part in 
 contemporary philosophical thought, and exercises 
 no inconsiderable influence upon the popular con- 
 sciousness of morality.
 
 22 
 
 PART I. 
 THE IKDIYIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EGOISM, 
 
 !N'atukalism is a doctrine both of man and of the 
 universe. And, before the theory of evolution had 
 given a clue to the unity of life and the connexion 
 of man with nature, its ethical doctrine was most 
 commonly worked out in dependence upon an 
 analysis of the impulses and activity of the 
 individual man. 
 Subjective Tliis ' subjectivc naturalism/ as it has been 
 called,! though it has been stated in various ways, 
 tends to recognise but one kind of mental content — 
 sensations and their mental residua or ideas, and 
 but one principle of connexion — the laws of asso- 
 
 ^ Ward, Ency. Brit., vol. xxxi. p. 88a,
 
 EGOISM. 23 
 
 elation. On this theory the attempt has often 
 been made to explain knowledge and rational 
 principles ; and conduct and moral principles are 
 held to be explicable by the same method. Accord- 
 ing to it, sensation and the association of ideas 
 must, in the long run, be adequate for the explana- 
 tion of the moral consciousness. The function of 
 reason and conscience in determining ends and 
 directing conduct cannot be allowed any such 
 independence as would compel the acceptance of 
 a rational, idealist, or spiritual account of man. 
 
 Accordingly, if this theory is to work, reason Psychoiogi- 
 
 , - . . cal hedon- 
 
 or conscience cannot itself be regarded as givmg ism. 
 the principle for directing conduct, or as deter- 
 mining its end. The end must therefore be sought 
 either in the feelings of pleasure and pain which 
 accompany both sensory and motor presentations, 
 — perceptions, that is to say, and actions, — or in 
 the more complex, or apparently more complex, 
 emotions of the mind. And the latter may 
 either be themselves reducible to feelings of 
 pleasure or pain accompanying presentations 
 directly pleasurable or painful, and thence 
 transferred by association to other presentations, 
 or they may be regarded as somehow motives 
 to action which may be followed on their own 
 account. The Individualistic Theory, therefore, 
 is not necessarily hedonistic. It admits of a 
 twofold view of the ' natural ' man : one which
 
 24 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 looks upon him as in essence a pleasure-seeking, 
 pain-avoiding animal ; another which regards him 
 as having a variety of impulses, some of which 
 are not directed to his own pleasure or avoidance 
 of pain. 
 
 1. Its theory The former view — psychological hedonism, as it 
 is called — claims to be an exhaustive analysis of 
 the motives of human conduct, perfectly general 
 indeed, but yet valid for every case of action. It 
 denies the possibility of a man acting from any 
 other principle than desire of pleasure or aversion 
 from pain. The theory is, that it is a psycho- 
 logical law that action is motived by pleasure and 
 pain, and that nothing else has motive-power over 
 it. If, then, one pleasure (or avoidance of pain) is 
 chosen in preference to another, it must be either 
 by chance — an alternative which has no ethical 
 significance, no significance, that is, for the guid- 
 ance of voluntary conduct, — or because the one 
 course promises, or seems to promise, the attain- 
 ment of a greater balance of pleasure than the 
 other, or is actually at the time more pleasant 
 than that other. Thus the view that pleasure is 
 the only motive of human action is really identical, 
 for ethical ' purposes, with the theory loosely ex- 
 pressed in the law that action follows the grecdest 
 
 ambiguous, pleasure.^ I say ' loosely expressed ' ; for the law 
 
 ^ Meaning by 'greatest pleasure,' gi-eatest balance of pleasure 
 over pain, and including the meaning ' least pain.' It is the ex-
 
 EGOISM. 25 
 
 as thus stated really admits of three quite different 
 interpretations, not always distinguished with the referring to 
 precision which the subject requires. 
 
 (a) In the first place, the law might mean that oo actual 
 
 ' _ conse- 
 
 action always follows the course which, as a matter quencesof 
 
 3,ctjioii 
 
 of fact, will in the long run bring the greatest 
 balance of pleasure to the agent. It is evident 
 that there is no ground in experience for main- 
 taining this view. Yet it is a fair interpretation 
 of the 'law' of psychological hedonism, as com- 
 monly stated ; and it is at least an admissible sup- 
 position that this meaning of the phrase has not 
 been without effect upon the uses to which the 
 law has been put by some of its upholders. The 
 
 second interpretation of the law — namely (6), that or (b) its ex- 
 pected con- 
 action is always in the direction which seems to sequences, 
 
 the agent most likely to bring him the greatest 
 
 balance of pleasure, whether it actually brings it 
 
 or not — is the sense in which it appears to have 
 
 been most commonly taken when expressed with 
 
 any degree of accuracy. It is in this sense that 
 
 — in language which ascribes greater consistency to 
 
 men's conduct than it usually displays — ' interest ' 
 
 is asserted by the author of the ' Systeme de la 
 
 pression in tei-ms of feeling of the statement sometimes pre- 
 ferred, that "action follows the line of least resistance" — a 
 statement to which no exception can be taken, nor any import- 
 ance allowed, till it be translated into definite psychological 
 language.
 
 26 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 nature ' to be " tLe sole motive of human action," ^ 
 The same view is adopted by Bentham ; ^ and both 
 James Mill and John^] Stuart Mill identify desire 
 with pleasure, or an ' idea ' of pleasure, in terms 
 which are sufficiently sweeping, if not very care- 
 fully weighed ; ^ while the will is said to follow 
 desire, or only to pass out of its power when 
 coming under the sway of habit.* Still another 
 
 ^ "Ainsi lorsque nous disons que I'interH est I'unique mobile 
 des actions humaines, nous voulons indiquer par Ik que chaque 
 homme travaille a sa maniere a son propre bonheur, qu'il place 
 dans quelqu'objet soit visible, soit cache, soit r^el, soit imagin- 
 aire, et que tout le systeme de sa conduite tend k I'obtenir." — 
 Systeme de la nature (1781), i. 268, 
 
 ■^ " On the occasion of every act he exercises, every human 
 being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his 
 view of the case taken by him at the moment, will be in the 
 highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness." — 
 Constitutional Code, book i. § 2 ; Works, ix. 5. The continued 
 existence of the species is, Bentham thinks, a conclusive proof 
 of this proposition. 
 
 ^ Thus, according to James Mill, "the terms 'idea of pleasure' 
 and ' desire ' are but two names ; the thing named, the state of 
 consciousness is one and the same. The word Desu'e is com- 
 monly used to mark the idea of a pleasurable sensation when the 
 future is associated with it,"— Analysis of the Phenomena of the 
 Human Mind, J. S. Mill's edit., ii. 192 ; cf. Fragment on Mac- 
 kintosh (1835), p. 389 f. To the same effect J. S. Mill says : 
 " Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and 
 thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, 
 or rather two parts of the same phenomenon ; in strictness of 
 language, two different modes of naming the same psychological 
 fact." — Utilitarianism, 7th ed., p, 58. 
 
 * " Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion 
 of its parent only to come under that of habit." — Utilitarianism, 
 p. 60,
 
 istics. 
 
 EGOISM. 27 
 
 meaning may, however, be given to the 'law' of 
 psychological hedonism, according to which the 
 doubtful reference to the manifold pleasures and 
 pains, contemplated as resulting from an action, is 
 cot rid of, and (c), the agent is asserted always to or (c) its 
 
 . . , . ,, present 
 
 choose that action or forbearance which is actually ciiaracter- 
 most pleasant, or least painful, to him at the time- 
 taking account, of course, of imaginative pleasures 
 and pains, as well as of those which are imme- 
 diately connected with the senses. It is in this 
 interpretation of its law that psychological hedon- 
 ism seems to be most capable of defence, and in 
 this sense it has been more than once stated and 
 defended.^ 
 
 1 Thu3 Jonathan Edwards says : " When I say that the Will is 
 as the greatest apparent good, or (as I have explained it) that 
 volition has always for its object the thing which appears most 
 agreesible, it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and 
 needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate 
 object of the act of volition, and not some object to which the 
 act of will has only an indirect and remote respect." — On the 
 Freedom of the Will, part i. § 2 ; Works, i. 133. The matter 
 is put still more clearly by the late Alfred Barratt : " Action 
 does not always follow knowledge. Of course not : but the 
 doctrine [Hedonism] does not require that it should ; for it 
 says, not that we follow what is our greatest possible pleasure, 
 or what we know or ' think ' to be so, but what at the moment 
 of action is most desired." — Mind, vol. ii. 173 ; cf. Physical 
 Ethics, p. 52 S. So Sir L. Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 47 : 
 " It is more accurate to say that my conduct is determined by 
 the pleasantest judgment, than to say that it is determined by 
 my judgment of what is pleasantest." The negative side of the 
 same view was expressed by Locke in his doctrine that action
 
 28 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 2. Ethical 
 inferences 
 from the 
 theory, 
 
 (a) in its first 
 meaning. 
 
 The ethics of the form of Naturalism which is 
 now under examination must be inferred from the 
 ' law ' that human action follows the greatest 
 pleasure, in one or other of the above meanings 
 which that law admits of. The law is the datum or 
 premiss from which we are to advance to an ethi- 
 cal conclusion. The 'right' is to be evolved from 
 the pleasurable ; and the pleasurable, consequently, 
 cannot be made to depend upon the right. It is 
 certainly true of the conduct of most men, " that 
 our prospect of pleasure resulting from any course 
 of conduct may largely depend on our conception 
 of it as right or otherwise." ^ But this presupposes 
 that there is a right independent of one's own 
 pleasure, and therefore does not apply to an ethics 
 based on the simple theory of human nature put 
 forward by psychological hedonism. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to discuss the first alter- 
 native {a), as no psychologist would seriously main- 
 tain it. A society composed of men constituted 
 in the way it supposes men to be constituted, would 
 be a collection of rational egoists, omniscient in 
 all that concerned the results of action, and each 
 adopting unerringly at every moment the course 
 of conduct which would increase his own pleasure 
 
 is moved by the most pressing uneasiness (Essay, II. xxi. 29, 31), 
 and distinguished by him from the former view (h), that the 
 "greater visible good" is the motive (II. xxi. 35, 44). 
 ^ Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 6th ed., p. 40.
 
 EGOISM. 29 
 
 the most. The conduct of any member of such a 
 society could only be modified when — and would 
 always be modified when — the modified conduct 
 actually brought pleasurable results to the agent : 
 never so as to make him prefer the public good 
 to his own. 
 
 The second alternative (b) admits of such modi- (!/)init3 
 fication taking place only when it seems to the meaning 
 individual that this modified action will bring 
 him a greater balance of pleasure or smaller 
 balance of pain than any other course of action. 
 Under this theory an individual might indeed 
 prefer the public good or another man's good to 
 his own, but only through his being deceived as to 
 the actual results of his course of action. Ethics 
 as determining an end for conduct is put out of 
 court : though the statesman or the educator may 
 modify the actions of others by providing appro- 
 priate motives. If the " two sovereign masters, 
 pain and pleasure," " determine what we shall do," 
 it is hardly necessary for them also " to point out 
 what we ought to do." ^ The end is already given 
 
 ^ Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. i. , Works, 
 i. 1. With this statement may be compared the assertion of 
 Helvetius : " II semble que, dans I'univers moral comme dans 
 I'uuivers phj-sique, Dieu n'est mis qu'un seul principe dans tons 
 ce qui a 6t4. ... II semble qu'il ait dit pareillement h, 
 rhomme : . . . Je te mets sous la garde du plaisir et de la 
 douleur : I'un et I'autre veilleront Ji tes pensees, h, tes actions ; 
 engeudreront tes passions, exciteront tes aversions, tes amities, 
 tes tendresses, tes fureurs ; allumeront tes desirs, tes craiutes, tes
 
 30 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 in the nature of action, though an enlightened 
 
 understanding will teach men how the greatest 
 
 private balance of pleasure may be obtained. We can 
 
 ethics and , , ... i i i • 
 
 legislation, ohIj get at a rule prescribing an end by changing 
 our point of view from the individual to the state. 
 It is best for the state that each individual should 
 aim at the common happiness ; but, when we talk 
 of this as a moral duty for the individual, all we 
 can mean is that the state will punish a breach of 
 it. In the words of Helvetius,^ " pain and pleasure 
 are the bonds by which we can always unite per- 
 sonal interest to the interest of the nation. . . . 
 The sciences of morals and legislation can be only 
 deductions from this simple principle." According 
 to Bentham's psychology, a man is necessitated by 
 his mental and physical nature to pursue at every 
 moment, not the greatest happiness of the greatest 
 number, but what seems to him his own greatest 
 happiness. And what the legislator has to do is, 
 by judiciously imposed rewards and punishments, 
 especially the latter, to make it for the greatest 
 happiness of each to pursue the greatest happiness 
 
 esperances, te devoileront des -Veritas ; te plongeront dans des 
 eiTeurs ; et apres t'avoir fait enfanter mille systemes absui-des et 
 diffdrens de morale et de legislation, te deeouvriront un jour les 
 principes simples, au developpement desquels est attache I'ordre 
 et le bonheur du monde moral." — De Tesprit, III. x, CEuvres 
 (ed. of 1818), i. 293. 
 
 ^ De I'homme, concl. gen., ffiuvres, ii. 608.
 
 EGOISM. 31 
 
 of all.i As distinguished from this ' art of legisla- 
 tion/ ' private ethics ' consists only of prudential 
 rules prescribing the best means to an end pre- 
 determined by nature as the only possible end of 
 human action : it " teaches how each man may 
 dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive 
 to his own happiness." ^ 
 
 The consequences to the theory of action of the Win'ts 
 
 ^ , *' third 
 
 third alternative (c) are similar : it only states the meaning. 
 law with more appearance of psychological accuracy. 
 If a man always follows that course of action which 
 will give him at the time the greatest (real and 
 imaginative) satisfaction, it is impossible for us to 
 infer from his nature an ethical law prescribing 
 some other end, without admitting a fundamental 
 contradiction in human nature ; while to say that 
 he ought to seek the end he always does and 
 cannot help seeking, is unnecessary and even 
 unmeaning. Modification of character may of 
 course be still brought about, since the kinds of 
 action in which an individual takes pleasure may 
 be varied almost indefinitely. But the motive 
 made use of in this educative process must be 
 personal pleasure ; and the end the legislator has 
 
 ^ Cf. Systems de la nature, i. 120 : " La politique devrait etre 
 I'art de r^gler les passions des hommes et de les diriger vers le 
 bien de la society." 
 
 - Bentham, op. cit., chap. xix. (xvii. in the reprint of 1879), 
 § 20 ; Works, i. 148.
 
 32 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOEY. 
 
 in view in his work must be the same,^ though 
 it is often quietly assumed that for him personal 
 pleasure has become identified with the wider 
 interests of the community. 
 Result of The different significations of which it admits 
 
 guity. show that the psychological law that action follows 
 
 the greatest pleasure is by no means so clear as it 
 may at first sight appear. Probably it is the very 
 ambiguity of the law that has made it appear to 
 provide a basis for an ethical system. When it is 
 said that greatest pleasure is the moral end of 
 action, this 'greatest pleasure' is looked upon as 
 the greatest possible balance of pleasurable over 
 painful states for the probable duration of life : on 
 the egoistic theory, of the life of the individual ; 
 on the utilitarian theory, of the aggregate lives of 
 all men or even of all sentient beings. But when 
 it is said that the greatest pleasure is, as a matter of 
 fact, always the motive of action, it is obvious that 
 ' greatest pleasure ' has changed its signification. 
 For if the same meaning were kept to, not only 
 would the psychological law as thus stated be 
 openly at variance with facts, but its validity 
 would render the moral precept unnecessary. It 
 is even unmeaning to say that a man ' ought ' to 
 do that which he always does and cannot help 
 doing."^ On the other hand, if the double meaning 
 
 ^ Cf. Bentham, Works, ix. 5. 
 
 2 Sidg^vick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 6th ed,, p. 41 ; cf.
 
 EGOISM. 33 
 
 of the phrase had been clearly stated, we should at 
 once have seen the hiatus in the proof of egoistic Etwcai 
 hedonism — the gap between the present (or appa- ^^'^ °"**™* 
 rent) pleasure for which one does act, and the 
 greatest pleasure of a lifetime for which one ought 
 to act — as well as the additional difficulty of passing 
 from egoism to utilitarianism. If greatest apparent 
 pleasure — or greatest present pleasure — is by an 
 inexorable law of human nature always sought, 
 how can it be shown that we ought to sacrifice the 
 apparent to the real — the present pleasure that is 
 small to the greater future pleasure? If the in- 
 dividual necessarily pursues his own pleasure, how 
 can we show that he ought to subordinate it to 
 the pleasures of the 'greatest number' ? 
 
 It is a matter of fact, however, that the psychol- 3. Transition 
 ogists who maintain that action follows the greatest [o°S'tf '° 
 pleasure — meaning by that, greatest apparent or ^""'^'''^ 
 
 ^ " ° ^^ hedonism. 
 
 greatest present pleasure — have in their ethics Right action 
 
 T ,, , . . ,. , will imply 
 
 made the transition to an enlightened Egoism, or 
 even to Utilitarianism. The nature of the transi- 
 tion thus requires \ to be more clearly pointed out. 
 If the former interpretation of the law of psycho- 
 logical hedonism could be accepted, and a man's 
 motive for action were always what seemed to 
 him likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on 
 
 Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 9 : "To a being who is simply 
 a result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws 
 is unmeaning." 
 
 C
 
 34 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 (a) correct 
 estimate of 
 conse- 
 quences of 
 action, 
 
 (b) and cor- 
 responding 
 strength of 
 feeling. 
 
 the whole, ethics — what Bentham calls 'private 
 ethics' — could be reduced (as Bentham finally 
 reduces it) to certain maxims of prudence. To be 
 fully acquainted with the sources of pleasure and 
 pain, and to estimate them correctly, would imply 
 possession of the highest (egoistic) morality. If 
 men could be made to estimate rightly the con- 
 stituents of their greatest pleasure, then right action 
 on their part — that is to say, the pursuit of their 
 greatest pleasure — would (according to Beutham's 
 psychology) follow as a matter of course. But 
 conduct is not so purely an affair of the intellect 
 as this would make it. Indeed, Bentham's psy- 
 chological assumption requires only to be plainly 
 stated for its inconsistency with the facts of human 
 action to become apparent. The " video meliora 
 proboque, deteriora sequor " expresses too common 
 an experience to be so easily explained away. The 
 impulses by which action is governed are not always 
 in accordance with what the intellect decides to be 
 best on a survey of the whole life and its varied 
 chances. In judging the consequences of action, 
 a future good is compared with a present, regard- 
 less of the mere difference of time by which they 
 are separated. But the springs which move the 
 will are often at variance with the decisions of the 
 understanding ; and many men are unable to resist 
 the strength of the impulse to act for the pleasure 
 of the moment, though they foresee that a greater
 
 EGOISM. 35 
 
 future satisfaction would follow from present self- 
 denial. 
 
 It would seem, then, that the facts of experience 
 are sufficient to show that a man's conduct does not 
 always follow the course which he thinks likely 
 to brinf,' him the greatest pleasure on the whole. 
 But the view that a man always acts for what is 
 most pleasant — or least painful — at the time can- 
 not be dismissed so easily. It is not enough simply 
 to point to the facts of human action in order to 
 show that this hypothesis is inconsistent with 
 them. If we instanced the self-restraint in which 
 many men pass their lives from day to day, it might 
 perhaps be answered that there is a persistent idea 
 of duty, or love of reputation, or fear of social 
 stigma, the repression of which would be more 
 painful than the restraint it puts upon other im- 
 pulses. Even the martyr who deliberately parts 
 with life itself for the sake of an ideal, may be said 
 to choose death as the least painful course open to 
 him at the time. It should be borne in mind, 
 however, that the most thorough psychologist of 
 Bentham's school — the late Professor Bain — refused 
 to admit this line of defence for psychological 
 hedonism, and held that, in actions such as those 
 referred to, men are really carried out of the circle 
 of their self-regarding desires.^ But my present 
 
 1 The Emotions and the Will, 3d and 4th eds., p. 296 : "We 
 must face the seeming paradox — that there are, in the human
 
 36 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 The postu- 
 late that 
 action can 
 be rational- 
 ised 
 
 involves 
 these con- 
 ditions, 
 
 purpose is not to discuss the merits of any such 
 psychological theory, but rather to investigate its 
 ethical consequences. And for this purpose the 
 question requires to be put, how a passage is 
 effected from psychological hedonism to an egoistic 
 — and even to a utilitarian — theory of ethics. 
 
 If a man always acts for his greatest present 
 pleasure, real and imaginary, it seems a far step to 
 say that he ' ought ' to act — or in any way to 
 expect that he will act — at each moment for the 
 greatest sum of pleasure attainable in the probable 
 duration of his life. But on reflexion, this may 
 turn out to follow if we postulate that conduct 
 can be rationalised. What is meant by this ego- 
 istic 'ought' may be said to be simply that to 
 the eye of reason the pleasure of any one moment 
 cannot be regarded as more valuable than the 
 equal pleasure of any other moment, if it is equally 
 certain ; and that therefore to act as if it were is to 
 act unreasonably. Man fails in acting up to reason 
 
 mind, motives that pull against our happiness. It will not do to 
 say that because we act so and so, therefore our greatest haiDpiness 
 lies in that course. This begs the very question in dispute. The 
 theory of disinterested action, in the only form that I can con- 
 ceive it, supposes that the action of the will and the attainment 
 of happiness do not square throughout. There is an exceptional 
 comer, not very large in the mass of men, where motive and 
 happiness come into conflict. When once we allow this, human 
 action becomes intelligible ; there needs no sti-aining to account 
 for the extreme instances of disinterested conduct, the greatest 
 nobility of virtue."
 
 EGOISM. 37 
 
 in this sense, because his action is not motived by 
 reason, but directly by pleasure and pain ; and 
 not by a mere estimate of pleasure and pain, but 
 by pleasure and pain themselves. The psycho- 
 logical hedonist must maintain that the estimates 
 of future pleasure and pain only become motives 
 by being not merely recognised (intellectually) but 
 felt (emotionally) — that is, by themselves becoming 
 pleasurable or painful. If the egoist calls any 
 action irrational, it cannot be because the motive 
 which produced it was not the greatest pleasure 
 in consciousness at the time. It can only be on 
 the ground that the greatest pleasure in conscious- 
 ness at the time was likely to lead to a sacrifice of 
 greater pleasure in the future; and this must be 
 due either to intellectual misapprehension or to 
 the imagined fruition of future pleasure not being 
 strong enough to outweigh the pleasure which 
 comes from a present stimulus, and to the imagined 
 fruition of the more distant being weaker ^ than 
 that of the less distant pleasure. It is owing to 
 a defect of the imagination on a man's part that 
 even with complete information he does not act 
 ' up to his lights ' — irrational action being partly 
 a consequence of insufficient acquaintance with the 
 normal results of conduct, partly due to defective 
 imagination. Were a man's imagination of future 
 
 ^ And weaker iu a greater degree than would be justified bj- the 
 superior certainty of the nearer plejisure. 
 
 78930
 
 38 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOEY. 
 
 pleasure and pain as strong as his experience of 
 present pleasure and pain, and did he correctly 
 appreciate the results of his conduct, then his 
 action would, of psychological necessity, harmonise 
 with the precepts of egoistic hedonism. 
 
 Egoistic hedonism may therefore, in a certain 
 sense, be said to be a ' reasonable ' end of conduct 
 on the theory of psychological hedonism ; it is the 
 end which will be made his own by that ideally 
 perfect man whose intellect can clearly see the 
 issues of conduct, and whose imagination of the 
 future causes of sensibility is so vivid that the 
 pleasure or pain got from anticipating them is as 
 great as if they were present, or only less lively in 
 proportion as there is a risk of their not being 
 realised. Conversely it would seem that only that 
 the latter of man Can act ' reasonably ' in whom imagination of 
 
 wliicli 
 
 pleasure (or of pain) is already of equal strength 
 with the actual experience of it. But, if the 
 ' pleasures of the imagination ' are as strong as 
 those of actual fruition, the latter obviously be- 
 come superfluous ; and it follows that the ideally 
 perfect man is left without any motive to aim at 
 the real thing, since he can obtain as much pleasure 
 by imagining it. The cultured hedonist must, it 
 would seem, be able to — 
 
 " Hold a fire in his hand 
 By thinking on the frosty Caucasus, 
 Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite 
 By bare imagination of a feast."
 
 EGOISM. 39 
 
 So far as feeling or motive to action goes, no differ- h inconsist- 
 
 PI.,, 1 . 1 . ei't with 
 
 ence must exist for him between reality and imag- the nature 
 ination. And thus, although we may admit that, action!"**'^^ 
 on this psychological basis, conduct when rational- 
 ised will agree with that prescribed by egoistic 
 hedonism, yet it can only be rationalised by a de- 
 velopment of the strength of the imagination, which 
 would make the feeling which it brings with it 
 as strong as that which accompanies a real object, 
 and hence take away the motive for the pursuit of 
 the latter. The discrepancy between representa- 
 tion and presentation, which is necessary for the 
 state of desire, is no longer present. Hedonism 
 vindicates its rationality only on conditions which 
 imply the futility of action altogether. It is not 
 merely that the attainment of the hedonistic end in 
 practical conduct implies a strength of imagination 
 of which no one is capable ; but the conditions of 
 acting both rationally and hedouistically, are con- 
 ditions which would paralyse all activity. 
 
 The foregoing argument may perhaps be objected 4. Possible 
 
 objections 
 
 to on two grounds. On the one hand, it may be to preceding 
 said that it ignores the vast complexity of human '*'"="'"'^" • 
 motive, and treats action as if it were a simple and 
 abstract thing. On the other hand, we may be 
 reminded of the fact that, while all men act for 
 pleasure, the moral quality of their conduct does 
 not depend on this fact, but on the kind of things 
 in which they take pleasure.
 
 40 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOEY. 
 
 (a) complex- 
 ity of mo- 
 tive ; but it 
 is psycho- 
 logical he- 
 donism 
 which ig- 
 nores this : 
 
 (6) diflfer- 
 ence in kind 
 of pleasur- 
 able objects; 
 
 So far as the former objection is concerned, it 
 seems to me that the fault lies with the psycho- 
 logical theory of human action, the ethical conse- 
 quences of which are under investigation. It is 
 this theory which asserts that, however interwoven 
 the threads of impulse, aversion, and habit may be, 
 their most complex relations can be reduced to the 
 formula, ' greatest pleasure, or least pain, prevails.' 
 It is not necessary, indeed, that every action should 
 be the conscious pursuit of a pleasurable object 
 already before the mind in idea. But the theory, 
 if consistently carried out, implies that the action 
 which follows in the line of a previously formed 
 habit, does so because the discomfort or pain of 
 breaking through the habit would be sufficient to 
 counterbalance any satisfaction that might result. 
 The objection, therefore, of excessive simplicity or 
 ' abstractness,' is one which cannot have greater 
 force than when urged against the theory of 
 psychological hedonism. 
 
 Further — and this is the second objection — the 
 above analysis may be considered by some not to 
 have taken sufficient account of the difference in 
 the objects in which a human being can take 
 pleasure, and of the fact that the moral quality of 
 men differs, not according as they act for pleasure 
 or not, but according to the kind of actions and 
 sufferances in which they find pleasure. There 
 can be no doubt of the importance of this distinc-
 
 EGOISM. 41 
 
 tion for questions of practical morals. The man in 
 whom " selfishness takes the shape of benevolence," 
 as it did in Bentham, is infinitely better than the 
 man in whom it retains the form of selfishness. 
 But the consideration is important just because it 
 goes on the implied assumption that the hedonistic 
 is not the chief aspect of conduct, and that there is 
 a difference between courses of action more funda- 
 mental than the pleasurable or painful feeling 
 attendant on them. If the principles on which the but this in- 
 
 . volves a ref- 
 
 objection is founded were consistently adhered to erenceto 
 and followed out, they would make not pleasure, e^elhan" 
 but something else — that, namely, by which pleas- Pleasure, 
 ures differ from one another in kind — the ethical 
 standard.^ But if, in ultimate analysis, it is the 
 pleasure felt or expected that moves to action, it 
 would seem that there is no way in which the con- 
 clusion of the preceding argument can be avoided. 
 If pleasure is the motive, it must be qiid pleasure — 
 that is to say, either the greatest apparent pleasure, 
 or the greatest present pleasure, is the motive. If 
 difference of quality be admitted, we are introducing 
 a determining factor other than pleasure. Certain 
 kinds of pleasure may be better than others for the 
 race or for the state. But these differences must ^^licii psy- 
 
 cliological 
 
 be reducible to terms of individual pleasure ad- hedonism 
 mitting of purely quantitative comparisons, before admit of 
 
 ^ Cf. Kaut, Ki-itik der praktischeu Vernunft, Anal. i. § 3, 
 Werke, v. 23, 24, Abbott's transl., pp. 109, 110.
 
 42 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 they become motives to action.^ From the point 
 of view of the whole, we may say that one action 
 leads to a greater sum of pleasure than another. 
 But, in judging the action of individuals, all that we 
 can say of it is, that to one man one class of actions 
 gives pleasure, to another another: each man is 
 equally following the course of action which either 
 (a) will bring, or (h) seems to him likely to bring, 
 the- greatest pleasure, or (c) is actually most pleas- 
 ant at the time. From the nature of the individual 
 we can evolve no end beyond egoistic hedonism. 
 And even this end can only be made his at each 
 occurrence of action (assuming the first alternative 
 (a) to be incorrect) by enlightening his intellect so 
 that (h) will correspond with the actual greatest 
 pleasure, or by also enlivening his imagination of 
 future pleasures and pains so that (c) will corre- 
 spond with it ; and this, as has been shown, could 
 only be effected under conditions which are incon- 
 sistent with the principles of human action. 
 
 1 Cf. J. Grote, Utilitarian Philosophy, p. 20 note : " One kind 
 of pleasure may be, systematically, to be preferred to another, 
 but it must be because the pleasures classified under it generally 
 exceed those under the other in intensity, or some other of the 
 elements of value."
 
 43 
 
 CHAPTEH III. 
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 
 
 It still remains possible, of course, to fix an ethical i- Different 
 
 . standpoints 
 
 end in some other way than by studymg individual ofindividuai 
 
 human nature. We may, for instance, looking from "" 
 
 the point of view of the community, fix its greatest 
 
 happiness, instead of his own, as the individual's 
 
 end. But the difficulty then arises of persuading 
 
 the individual — or, indeed, making it possible for 
 
 him — to regard this impersonal goal as the end of 
 
 his conduct. For this purpose, Bentham seemed to 
 
 look to the exercise of administrative control which, 
 
 by a system of rewards and punishments, will make 
 
 the greatest happiness of the individual coincide 
 
 so far as possible with that of the community .^ 
 
 ^ Professor Bain distinguishes with greater clearness than his 
 predecessors, first, legal duty, or that the contravention of which 
 ia punished by the ministers of the state ; secondly, moral duty, 
 enforced by the unofficial punishment of social disapprobation ; 
 and thirdly, tiie conduct which society leaves to individual choice, 
 without censuring either its commission or omission. Moral dutj' 
 is further distinguished by him from the meritorious, or conduct 
 which society encourages by approval, without censuring its 
 omission.
 
 44 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 J. S. Mill, on the other hand, with his eyes turned 
 to the subjective springs of action, saw in the 
 gradual growth of sympathetic pleasures and 
 pains the means by which an individual's de- 
 sires would cease to conflict with those of his 
 neighbours. 
 
 It is in some such way that the transition is 
 made from Egoism to Utilitarianism, The trans- 
 ition is made : Bentham and his school are an 
 evidence of the fact. But it is not therefore 
 logical. It is, indeed, important to notice that 
 we only pass from the one theory to the other 
 by departing from our original individualistic 
 point of view. Having already fixed an end for 
 conduct regardless of the difference between the 
 individual at the time of acting and at subsequent 
 times, we proceed to take the much longer step of 
 ignoring the difference between the agent and other 
 individuals. The question is no longer. What is 
 good or desirable for the person who is acting ? 
 but, What is best on the whole for all those whom 
 his action may affect — that is to say, for the 
 community ? 
 
 But while it is comparatively easy to see how 
 this transition is effected as a matter of fact, it 
 is difficult to establish any logical connexion be- 
 tween its different stages. If man's nature is 
 correctly explained by the theory of psychological 
 hedonism (which is necessarily egoistic), it is hard
 
 THE TRA.NSITIOX TO UTILITARIANISM. 45 
 
 to see how any considerations can be brought 
 forward fitted to convince him that it is reasonable 
 for him to seek the happiness of the community 
 rather than his own. Only that conduct, it may 
 seem, can be reasonable which directs and perfects 
 the natural striving of each organism towards its 
 own pleasure. 
 
 We may, of course, let our point of view shift through 
 from the individual to the social ' organism.' And state to in- 
 in this case, if the ' natural ' end of each human ^"■^•*'^"'- 
 being is his own greatest pleasure, the end of the 
 community, or organised body of pleasure-seekers, 
 will naturally be concluded to be the greatest 
 aggregate pleasure of its members. Thus, if we 
 can hypostatise the community, and treat it as an 
 individual with magnified but human wants and 
 satisfactions, then, for this leviathan, the ethical 
 end will correspond to what is called Utilitarian- 
 ism or Universalistic Hedonism. But, when we Difference 
 remember that the community is made up of units one's own 
 distinct from one another in feeling and action, the thrpiwsure 
 difficulty arises of establishing it as the natural end, of others 
 or as a reasonable end, for each of these units to 
 strive after the greatest pleasure of all. For it is 
 evident that the pursuit of the greatest aggregate 
 pleasure may often interfere with the attainment 
 by the individual of his own greatest pleasure. On 
 the other hand, the self-seeking action of the indi- 
 vidual may no doubt lead to a loss of pleasure on
 
 46 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOEY. 
 
 the whole ; but then it is not his own pleasure that 
 is lost, only other people's. To the ' impartial 
 spectator ' — as to the community — it may seem 
 irrational that a small increase in the pleasure of 
 one unit should be allowed at the expense of a 
 loss of greater pleasure on the part of other units. 
 But it seems irrational only because the impartial 
 spectator naturally puts himself in the place of 
 the community; and neither takes account of the 
 fact that to the individual agent there is a funda- 
 mental difference between his own pleasure and 
 any one else's pleasure : for him the former is, 
 and the latter is not, pleasure at all.^ 
 
 ^ Mr Gurney's attempt (Mind, O.S., vii. 349 £f.) to rationalise 
 the utilitarian 'ought' depends upon the assumption that the 
 individual feels a desire (not only for his own, but) for other 
 people's pleasure (p. 352). From the point of view of the psy- 
 chological hedonist, however, this desu-e is only secondary and 
 derivative, depending upon the fact that it increases the pleasure 
 of the subject. " Your pleasure," the psychological hedonist 
 would say, " is desired by me qud my pleasure." If, on the other 
 hand, it is admitted that the individual has other ends than his 
 own pleasure, there seems no ground in psj^chological fact for 
 limiting these ends to something aimed at because pleasurable to 
 others. From this point of view the first step in the establish- 
 ment of an etlaical theory would be an attempt to find a principle 
 of unity in the various ends actually aimed at by individuals, 
 and recognised by them as 'good.' This is made by Professor 
 Sidgwick, who, after taking account of the view which regards 
 cognition of truth, contemplation of beauty, free or virtuous 
 action, as in some measure preferable alternatives to pleasure or 
 happiness, maintains that " we can only justify to ourselves the 
 importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering 
 its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 47 
 
 This fundamental difference seems to be over- overlooked 
 
 1 • 1 1 • T 1 '" arguing 
 
 looked when the attempt is made to argue logically from egoism 
 from egoistic psychology (or even from egoistic a^g^'"'^"' 
 ethics) to utilitarianism. Indeed, the hiatus in 
 logical proof is often only concealed by a confusion 
 of standpoints ; and J. S. Mill, while emphasising 
 the distinction between modern Utilitarianism and 
 the older Epicureanism, has even allowed his 
 official 'proof of utilitarianism — such proof, that 
 is, as he thinks the principle of Utility to be sus- 
 ceptible of — to rest on the ambiguity between 
 individual and social happiness.^ 
 
 This ambiguity does not seem to have been con- 2. counex- 
 
 1 -11 1 -r-> 1 -r~i 1 '°'^ between 
 
 sistently avoided even by Bentham. lor the most egoism and 
 part, indeed, nothing can exceed the clearness with IfnJ'accord'- 
 which he recognises the twofold and possibly con- '"^' *» ^en- 
 flicting interests involved in almost every action. 
 There is the interest of the agent, and the interest 
 of others whom his action may affect. And he 
 also holds that, in the case of divergence of interests, 
 the individual will act for his own. " The happi- 
 ness of the individuals," he says,^ "of whom a 
 community is composed, — that is, their pleasures 
 
 sentient beings " (Methods of Ethics, 6th ed., p. 400). But Sidg- 
 wick's Utilitarianism depends on a Rational view of human nature 
 which is beyond the scope of the present discussion. See belpw, 
 p. 78. 
 
 ^ Cf. Utilitarianism, especially pp. 53, 57. 
 
 * Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iii. § 1 ; Works, 
 i. 14.
 
 48 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 and their security, — is the end, and the sole end, 
 which the legislator ought to have in view — the 
 sole standard in conformity to which each indi- 
 vidual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, 
 to be made to fashion his conduct. But whether 
 it be this or anything else that is to be done, there 
 is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made 
 to do it, but either pain or pleasure " — that is, of 
 course, his own pain or pleasure. Here, then, 
 ethical Utilitarianism and psychological Egoism 
 are both plainly involved. A man, it is said, can 
 only pursue general happiness by its being identical 
 with his own happiness. And as it is evident, and 
 admitted, that these two happinesses often diverge 
 in the courses of action naturally leading to them, 
 a man can only be beneficent, rather than selfish, 
 through some artificial arrangement which makes 
 beneficence to be for his interest : ^ in plain lan- 
 guage (since rewards are only of exceptional ap- 
 plicability), through his being punished for not 
 being beneficent.^ There is no 'natural identity' 
 of interests ; their ' artificial identification ' can 
 
 ^ As Paley put it, with characteristic plainness of .statement, 
 " We can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain 
 or lose something by." — Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. 
 chap. ii. 
 
 ^ Cf. Bain, Emotions, p. 264 : " I consider that the proper 
 meaning or import of these terms [Morality, Duty, Obligation, or 
 Right] refers to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of 
 punishment."
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 49 
 
 only be brought about by the sanction of the 
 law.i 
 
 At the same time, as Bentham clearly shows, (") utiiitari- 
 many cases of action cannot be safely touched by political 
 the legislator's art. Such cases " unmeet for "*'"' 
 punishment" include not only the actions which 
 are beneficial or neutral in their results, but also 
 actions hurtful to the community, though they 
 may elude such vigilance as the state can contrive, 
 or their restraint by punishment inflicted by the 
 state may constitute a greater evil (that is, in- 
 convenience), than the offence.^ Probity may be 
 exacted by the " persons stated and certain " who 
 happen to be political superiors : except in rare 
 instances, positive heneficence can not. Utilitarian 
 conduct, therefore, is not a " political duty " because 
 it is not fully enforced by definite punishment. 
 The "art of legislation" is indeed said to teach 
 " how a multitude of men, composing a community, 
 may be disposed to pursue that course which upon 
 the whole is the most conducive to the happiness 
 of the whole community, by means of motives to 
 be applied by the legislator." ^ But the means here 
 indicated are such as cannot fully compass the 
 
 ^ Compare the interesting discussion of the 'natural' and 
 'artificial' identification of interests in Halevy, Formation du 
 Radicalisme philosophique, i. 13 ff. , and elsewhere. 
 
 "^ Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. xix. 
 (xvii.), § 9 ff. ; Works, i. 144 ff. 
 
 3 Ibid., § 20, p. 14S. 
 
 D
 
 moral duty, 
 
 50 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 attainment of the end. For the motives applied 
 by the legislator either cannot reach a large part 
 of the extra-regarding conduct of individuals, or 
 could only reach it by entailing greater evils than 
 those they would be used to prevent. 
 (?/)nora But if Utilitarian conduct is not a political duty, 
 
 it may be thought that it is at least a moral 
 duty. Now a moral duty is said by Bentham i to 
 be " created by a kind of motive which, from the 
 imcertainty of the j^ersons to apply it, and of the 
 species and degree in which it will be applied, has 
 hardly yet got the name of punishment : by various 
 mortifications resulting from the ill-will of persons 
 '2«icertain and variable, — the community in general ; 
 that is, such individuals of that community as he 
 whose duty is in question shall happen to be con- 
 nected with," In plain language, then, moral duty 
 simply means the ill-will of a man's neighbours 
 which follows his conduct in so far as that conduct 
 affects them disagreeably. Such ill - will on the 
 part of a man's neighbours may result from success 
 or from failure on his part, from a breach of eti- 
 quette, from refusal to sacrifice to the caprice of 
 those neighbours the wider good of the society 
 whom his conducts affects (but to whom it may be 
 
 1 Fragment on Government, chap. v. ; Works, i. 293. Cf. 
 Principles of Morals and Legislation, oh. iii. § 5, p. 14, where 
 the Moral (or Popular) Sanction is said to proceed from ' ' such 
 chance persons in the community as the person in question may 
 happen in the course of liis life to have concerns with."
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 51 
 
 unknown), from deception or from telling the truth. 
 In a word, the duty — that is, the punishment — is 
 entirely uncertain : not only as regards the persons 
 applying it, its nature and its amount, but also as 
 regards the kind of actions to which it applies. 
 They will be actions unpleasant to the people who 
 inflict the punishment, but not necessarily hurtful 
 to the common weal : since the immediate effects 
 of an action are easily recognised, while its wider 
 and more lasting consequences are not so apparent 
 and do not appeal so surely to the interest of those 
 who are cognisant of the action and immediately 
 affected by it. Moral duty, therefore, as Bentham 
 defines it, depending on, or rather being identical 
 with, the ill-will of one's neighbours, is indefinite 
 and limited in its nature, and can command or 
 sanction no such definite and wide-reaching rule 
 for conduct as the rule that a man should always 
 seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
 of people whom his action may affect. 
 
 Utilitarian conduct, therefore, is neither a 
 political duty nor a moral duty; nor does Ben- 
 tham follow Paley in insisting upon it as a oonorin- 
 
 , , . , , .1 sisted on as 
 
 religious duty " created by punishment ; by punish- a religious 
 ment expected at the hands of a person certain — ^"*^' 
 the Supreme Being." And " if he persists in 
 asserting it to be a duty — but without meaning 
 it to be understood that it is on any one of these 
 three accounts that he looks upon it as such — all
 
 52 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 he then asserts is his own internal sentiment; all 
 he means then is that he feels himself jpleasecl or 
 displeased at the thoughts of the point of conduct 
 in question, but without being able to tell v:hy. In 
 this case he should e'en say so ; and not seek to 
 give an undue influence to his own single suffrage, 
 by delivering it in terms that purport to declare 
 the voice either of God, or of the law, or of the 
 people." ^ 
 
 This plain piece of advice which Bentham gives 
 to Blackstone is not often neglected by himself. 
 The motive, he once said, of his own exceptional 
 devotion to the interests of the community was 
 that it pleased him. " I am a selfish man," he 
 wrote, " as selfish as any man can be. But in me, 
 somehow or other, so it happens, selfishness has 
 taken the shape of benevolence."- But when the 
 matter is thus brought back from the regions of 
 (d)norsuffi- political, moral, and religious duty, to the in- 
 motived in dividual ground of 'private ethics,' we have still 
 ethics^ ^^ refer to Bentham's own discussion of the ques- 
 tion, " What motives (independent of such as legis- 
 lation and religion may chance to furnish) can 
 one man have to consult the happiness of 
 another ? " ^ Bentham at once replies — and in- 
 deed the answer on his principles is obvious 
 
 ^ Bentham, Fragment on Government, loc, cit. 
 
 ^ Works, xi. 95 ; cf. J. Grote, Utilitarian Philosophj", p. 137. 
 
 3 Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. xix. (xvii. ), § 7 fi".
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 53 
 
 enough — that there is no motive which always 
 continues adequate. But yet there are, he says, 
 "no occasions in which a man has not some 
 motives for consulting the happiness of other 
 men." Such are ' the purely - social motive of 
 sympathy or benevolence,' and 'the semi-social 
 motives of love of amity and love of reputation.' 
 A man is directly moved to promote the happiness 
 of others through the sympathetic feelings which 
 make the happiness of others in some degree 
 pleasurable to himself ; and he is indirectly moved 
 to promote their happiness through his desire for 
 their friendship and good opinion. So far, there- 
 fore, it is quite true that ' private ethics '—or what 
 Bentham regards as such — " concerns every member 
 — that is, the happiness and the actions of every 
 member of any community that can be proposed." ^ 
 It certainly concerns their happiness, but only in 
 so far as this is a means to the happiness of the 
 agent. So that when Bentham says that "there 
 is no case in which a private man ought not to 
 direct his own conduct to the production of his 
 own happiness and of that of his fellow-creatures," 
 he should rather say that a man wilP only direct 
 his conduct to the happiness of his fellow-creatures 
 
 1 Loc. cit., § 8, p. 144. 
 
 2 'Ought' is inappropriate here according to Beutham's prin- 
 ciples, since there is no question of punishment inflicted by a 
 political or social or religious superior.
 
 54 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 in SO far as such action leads to his own happiness, 
 which can Private ethics, therefore, has to do with the happi- 
 
 1)6 rcducGcl 
 
 topnideiice. ness of others only so far as this reacts on the 
 happiness of self; or, as Bentham ultimately de- 
 fines it, in terms to which no exception can be 
 taken: "Private ethics teaches how each man 
 may dispose himself to pursue the course most 
 conducive to his own happiness by means of such 
 motives as offer of themselves." ^ 
 
 8. Ben- Under Bentham 's hands ' private ethics ' is thus 
 
 tham's treat- 
 ment ex- reduced to prudence, at the same time that the 
 
 from Ms author has failed to show why the general happi- 
 pomtof j^ggg ig ^Q i^g aimed at by the individual as a 
 religious or political or moral duty. Nor is this 
 failure due to any lack of skill in following out 
 the consequences which his premisses involved. 
 The arguments used against him have thus an 
 equally valid application to all who adopt the 
 same general line of thought. For Bentham 
 appears to have seen as clearly as any of his 
 disciples the difficulty of bringing the egoistic 
 basis of his theory of human nature into harmony 
 with the universal reference required by his ethics. 
 And the criticism already offered of the way in 
 which Bentham attempts to bring about this con- 
 nexion may be shown not to be restricted to his 
 special way of putting the case. 
 
 1 Loe. cit., § 20, p. 148.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITAEL^:^'ISM. 55 
 
 It is necessary to remember that throughout 
 this chapter we are looking from the individual's 
 point of view, and enquiring how far it is possible 
 to work from it in the direction of utilitarianism. 
 Now it is admitted that, in pursuing his own 
 happiness, he is sometimes led, and may be led 
 on the whole, to neglect the general happiness, 
 A sufficient reason for following the latter — or an 
 obligation to promote it — can therefore only come 
 either from the supreme power or from one's fellow- 
 men, and from the latter either as organised 
 in the State, and expressing themselves by its 
 constituted authorities, or else by the vaguer 
 method of social praise and blame. Bentham's 
 classification of the possible sources or kinds of 
 duty into religious, political, and moral (or popular) 
 is therefore a natural consequence of the indi- 
 vidualistic system. 
 
 The first of these possible sources of duty is (fOTUere- 
 indeed only mentioned by Bentham, and then tion, 
 passed by. And yet it might seem that the 
 religious sanction is a more efficient motive- 
 power than the social, while it applies to regions 
 of conduct which legal enactment cannot reach. 
 Without question, the operation of such a motive 
 is capable of bringing egoistic conduct into har- 
 mony with utilitarianism, or with any other 
 principle of action to which the sanction may 
 be attached. " Private happiness is our motive,
 
 56 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY, 
 
 relied on by and the wiU of God our rule," says Paley ; ^ and 
 in this case such conduct will be obligatory as the 
 rule may arbitrarily determine ; while, whatever 
 it may be, there will be a strong enough motive 
 to follow it. The whole fabric of a moral phil- 
 osophy such as Paley's, therefore, rests on two 
 theological propositions — that God has ordained 
 the general happiness as the rule of human con- 
 duct, and that He will punish in another life those 
 who disregard that rule. The basis of morality is 
 laid in a divine command enforced by a divine 
 threat. Perhaps it will be generally agreed that 
 Bentham acted wisely in not laying stress on this 
 application of the ' religious sanction.' Even 
 those least inclined to theological agnosticism 
 would reject any such rough-and-ready solution 
 inverts the of the problem which deals with the relation of 
 tween ethics morality to the divine nature. Paley's method 
 of treatment, they would say, inverts the relation 
 in which theism stands to morality. The divine 
 will cannot be thus arbitrarily connected with the 
 moral law. It can be conceived to approve and 
 sanction such an object as the happiness of man- 
 kind only when God is first of all regarded as a 
 moral being, and the happiness of mankind as an 
 object of moral action. If any relation of conse- 
 quence can be asserted between them, the general 
 
 ^ Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. iii. 
 
 and the- 
 ology.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 57 
 
 happiness is to be regarded as a moral duty first, 
 and only afterwards as a religious duty. 
 
 When he comes to the political sanction, Ben- (?>) Limits of 
 
 . the political 
 
 tham's treatment wants nothing in respect of sanction, 
 fulness, and even those who do not agree with 
 his estimate of the infelicific character of many 
 existing institutions and enactments will admit 
 that even the best-intentioned legislator cannot 
 make utilitarian conduct a political duty. We 
 must bear in mind here, also, the effect" which 
 individual desires and opinions have not only on 
 social judgments, but also on statute - law. In 
 arfruinK on the relation of the individual to the 
 State, we are too ready to forget that the State 
 is represented by a legislator or body of legis- 
 lators, and that we can never assume that in 
 their case private interest has already become 
 identified with the larger interests of the com- 
 munity.^ For were this the case, the accusation 
 of class-legislation or sinister interest would not 
 be heard so often as it is. 
 
 A modern disciple of Bentham would thus be C) uncer- 
 
 , , . . -r, 1 1 • 1 (> 1 tainty of the 
 
 compelled, just as Bentham Inmselt was, to make 
 
 ^ This is clearly recognised by Beutham : " The actual end [as 
 distinguished from the right and proper end] of government is," 
 he says, " in every political community, the greatest happiness of 
 those, whether one or many, by whom the powers of government 
 are exercised." — Constitutional Code, book i., Introd., § 2 
 Works, ix. 5.
 
 58 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 social sane- Utilitarianism neither a political nor religious but 
 a ' moral ' duty, enforced by and founded on the 
 shifting and uncertain punishments or sanctions 
 of society — what Bain describes as " the unofficial 
 expressions of disapprobation and the exclusion 
 from social good offices." ^ But as a logical proof 
 of utilitarianism, this means is, if possible, weaker 
 than the preceding ; for social opinion, though of 
 somewhat wider applicability than legal enact- 
 ment, has probably been, for the most part, in 
 even less exact correspondence than it with the 
 general happiness. The social sanction is strict 
 on indifferent points of etiquette, does not con- 
 sult the general interests of mankind on points 
 of honour, and is lenient towards acts that the 
 utilitarian moralist condemns.^ 
 
 1 The Emotions and the Will, p. 264. 
 
 2 Cf. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 287. Professor 
 Bain says (Emotions, p. 276 n.), " we ought to have a written 
 code of public morality, or of the duties imposed by society, over 
 and above what parliament imposes, and this should not be a 
 loosely written moral treatise, but a strict enumeration of what 
 society requires under pain of punishment by excommunication 
 or otherwise, — the genuine offences that are not passed over." 
 This would certainly be very desirable, were it not from the 
 natui'e of the case impracticable. Popular judgment as to a 
 man's conduct, — what society imposes, — is one of the things 
 most difi&cult to predict : it is under the influence of most 
 heterogeneous causes, personal, industrial, religious, political, &c. 
 I do not think, for instance, that any one could safely under- 
 take to describe exactly the kind of actions which will infallibly 
 call forth the censure of British public opinion, or that of the 
 smaller and intersecting groups into wliich society is divided.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 59 
 
 Professor Bain, however, advances from the (d) and of 
 
 IT II' i -i 1 J.- the internal 
 
 external disapprobation to an internal sanction — sanction so 
 looking upon conscience as one of the powers gun^of^tht 
 which inflicts punishment, and lies at the source social, 
 of the feeling of obligation.^ ]Uit, if conscience 
 is only ' an ideal resemblance of public authority, 
 growing up in the same individual mind, and 
 working to the same end,' it can, as little as its 
 archetype, point to the maxim of utilitarianism. 
 According to Bain, it is through this sentiment — 
 at first a mere imitation of external authority — 
 that the individual becomes a law to himself, on 
 recognising the utilities that led to the imposition 
 of the law.2 But on this theory, in so far as con- 
 science continues to point to the conduct impressed 
 upon it by its external pattern, it fails to corre- 
 spond with the utilitarian maxim. If, on the 
 other hand, it is modified by the comprehensive 
 and unselfish view of the effects of conduct which 
 utilitarianism demands, it must be at the expense 
 of correcting its original edicts, and so far dis- 
 crediting its authoritative claims. 
 
 The 'social sanction' would be of much greater vaiueoftue 
 service if used to show how a solidarity is brought Jioif ' 
 about between the interests and feelings of the 
 
 1 The 'syinpatlietic' sanction was also recognised by Bentham 
 in his later writings; see Works, i. 14, iii. 290, vii. 116; cf. 
 Stephen, The English Utilitarians, i. 245 n., and Hal^vy, Forma- 
 tion du Kadicalisme philosophique, i. 28-1. 
 
 - Emotions, p. 288.
 
 60 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 individual and those of his neighbours, from which 
 the utilitarian maxim may be arrived at by a 
 generalisation of his principle of conduct as 
 apart from modified by the social impulse. But this would 
 of°utiiitari-° iiot constitutc a logical justification of utilitari- 
 anism, anism : it would show how the principle has been 
 arrived at, but it would not give a sufficient reason 
 to the individual for adopting it. And this is 
 really the tendency of much utilitarian discussion 
 — of Bain's theory of conscience as a reflex of the 
 external order, of George Grote's analysis of the 
 moral sentiment, and of Mill's account of the pro- 
 gressive identification of the individual's feelings 
 with those of his neighbours through the gradual 
 increase of sympathetic pleasures and pains : for it 
 was to this source that Mill looked for the practical 
 solution of the antinomy between his psychological 
 and ethical theories, though he himself tried to 
 pass from one position to the other by means of 
 the * highway in the air ' constructed by his own 
 logic. 
 
 4. Miirs 
 defence of 
 utilitarian- 
 ism : 
 
 Mill's attempt to pass by a logical method from 
 psychological hedonism to utilitarianism is an in- 
 structive commentary on the difficulties which 
 beset the transition. His work may be described 
 as a vindication of the utilitarian morality, first, 
 from the charge of sensualism ; and secondly, from 
 that of selfishness. And it is largely owing to his
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. Gl 
 
 polemic that utilitarianism is no longer looked 
 upon as either a sensual or a selfish theory. It 
 is not sensual, unless, indeed, the pleasures of most 
 men are of a sensual kind. So far from bein« 
 
 a 
 
 selfish, it is almost stoical in the subordination of 
 individual desires it enjoins. But Mill wished to 
 do more than clear the character of utilitarian 
 ethics. He wished to show a logical reason for 
 
 O 
 
 utilitarians pursuing elevated pleasures rather 
 than base ones, and to demonstrate the connexion 
 of his moral imperative with the principles laid 
 down for human motives by the school to which 
 he belonged. In both these respects his failure is 
 conspicuous. 
 
 In the former endeavour, he went against Ben- (rodistinc- 
 tham by attempting to draw a distinction in kind of°pieasure 
 amongst pleasures — a distinction not reducible to 
 quantitative measurement. A higher degree of 
 quality in the pleasure sought was to outweigh any 
 difference in its amount or quantity. With this 
 modification, utilitarianism is made to require a 
 subordination of the lower or sensuous nature to 
 the higher or intellectual nature. Pleasure, indeed, 
 is still the end ; but the ' higher ' pleasure takes 
 precedence over the 'lower/ irrespective of the 
 amount of pleasant feeling that results. Pleasure 
 is still the standard, but not the ultimate standard ; 
 for a further appeal has to be made to the criterion 
 that distinguishes one pleasure from another, not
 
 62 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 as merely greater or less, but as higher or lower. 
 As is well known, Mill did not look either to the 
 action or to the feeling itself for this criterion. To 
 have done so would have implied an acknowledg- 
 ment that pleasure was no longer regarded as the 
 determined ultimate standard. He found the criterion of 
 ^^yau 101- superiority simply in the opinion people of ex- 
 perience have about the relative desirability of 
 various sorts of pleasure. But such a criterion 
 only pushes the final question of the standard 
 one step farther back. Those people of experience 
 to whom Mill refers — who have tried both kinds 
 of pleasure, and prefer one of them^ — can they 
 give no reason for, no account of, their preference ? 
 If so, to trust them is to appeal to blind authority, 
 and to relinquish anything like a science of ethics. 
 But, if Mill's authorities can reflect on their 
 feelings, as well as feel, they can only tell ns one 
 or other of two things. Either the so-called 
 'higher' pleasure is actually, as pleasure, so pre- 
 ferable to that called 'lower,' that the smallest 
 amount of the one would be more pleasurable than 
 the largest amount of the other ; or else the higher 
 is called higher, and is to be preferred to the lower 
 — even although the latter may be greater as 
 pleasure — because of a quality belonging to it 
 
 ■■ I have spoken, for simplicity's sake, as if there were two 
 kinds of pleasure easily distinguishable. But the question is 
 really much more complicated.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 63 
 
 over and above its character as pleasant feeling, either can 
 The former verdict would be in the first place to difference 
 paradoxical, and, in the second place, would give p,^ I'g" d"*to^' 
 up Mill's case, by reducing quality to a quauti- no»-hedon- 
 
 istic stan- 
 
 tative standard. Besides, it would be no valid dard: 
 ground of preference for men in general ; since 
 the pleasure of various actions and states differs 
 according to the susceptibility of the subject. 
 According to the latter verdict, the character- 
 istic upon which the distinction of quality de- 
 pends, and not pleasure itself, becomes the ethical 
 standard.^ 
 
 In respect of his main contention, that utili- (b)ambigui- 
 tarianism is a theory of beneficence, and not of proof of 
 prudence or of selfishness, j\Iill emphasised even ''^'i'^"*"" 
 more strongly than Bentham had done the dis- 
 tinction between the egoism which seeks its own 
 things, and the utilitarianism according to which 
 everybody counts for one, and nobody for more 
 than one. But, when he attempted to connect 
 this doctrine logically with the psychological pos- 
 tulates of his school, he committed a double error. 
 In the first place, he confused the purely psycho- 
 logical question of the motives that infiuence 
 
 ^ Hence Mill's distinction of pleasure in quality has not been 
 adopted by later utilitarians — e.fj., Sidgwick, Bain. The latter's 
 "decided opinion is that he [Mill] ought to have resolved all 
 the so-called nobler or higher pleasures into the single circum- 
 stance of including, with the agent's pleasure, the pleasure of 
 others." — Bain's J. S. Mill : a Criticism, p. 113. 
 
 ism.
 
 64 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 human conduct with the ethical question of the 
 end to which conduct ought to be directed ; and, 
 in the second place, he disregarded the difference 
 of end there may be for society as a collective 
 whole, and for each member of the society individ- 
 ually. " There is in reality," he says,^ " nothing 
 desired except happiness " ; and this psychological 
 proposition is too hastily identified with the ethical 
 principle that happiness alone is desirable, or what 
 ought to be desired and pursued. Moreover, "no 
 reason," he says, " can be given why the general 
 happiness is desirable, except that each person, so 
 far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his 
 own happiness." And this admission, which seems 
 as good as saying that no reason at all can be given 
 why the individual should desire the general happi- 
 ness, is only held to be a sufficient reason for it, 
 though the assumption that what is good for all as 
 an aggregate is good for each member of the aggre- 
 gate : " that each person's happiness is a good to 
 that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a 
 good to the aggregate of all persons." - 
 
 Imperfect 
 colierence 
 of ethical 
 and theo- 
 retical phil- 
 osophy. 
 
 It may appear strange to offer the preceding as 
 the logical basis of an ethical principle which has 
 had so wide and, on the whole, beneficial an in- 
 fluence as utilitarianism. The explanation is to be 
 found in the want of full coherence which often 
 ^ Utilitarianism, p. 57. ^ Ibid., p. 53.
 
 THE TKANSITION TO UTILITAKIANIS.M. G5 
 
 exists, and is nowhere commoner than in English 
 ethics, between an author's practical view of life 
 and the foundation of psychology or metaphysics 
 with which it is connected. It would certainly be 
 wrong to imagine that Bentham's self-denying 
 labours rested on a confusion of standpoints, or 
 that Mill's moral enthusiasm had no other support 
 than a logical quibble. To both of them, and to 
 many others, utilitarianism was an ethical creed 
 whose potent influence upon their lives was scarcely 
 connected with any attempt to justify it logically. 
 Such reasons in its favour as they adduced were 
 rather after-thoughts for the defence of their creed 
 than the foundations on which it was built. 
 
 The formula of utilitarianism cannot be expressed 5. Actual 
 
 . n • f. • 1 • transition to 
 
 as the conclusion or a syllogism or 01 an inductive utilitarian- 
 inference. It seems rather to have been arrived '*™' 
 at by the production — or the recognition — of a 
 sympathetic or 'altruistic' sentiment, which was 
 made to yield a general principle for the guidance 
 of conduct. This process involves two steps, which 
 are consecutive and complementary, although the 
 positions they connect are not necessarily related. 
 The first step is to overcome the selfish principle of 
 action in the individual ; the second to generalise 
 and obtain a principle for the non-selfish action 
 that results. Mill seems to be the only recent 
 writer who, in making this transition, adheres 
 strictly to the psychological hedonism distinctive 
 
 E
 
 66 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 of his school. He anticipates that the influence of 
 education will so increase the feeling of unity 
 between one man and his neighbours, that finally 
 individual action will become merged in altruistic 
 or social action. " The social state," he says, " is at 
 once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to 
 man, that, except in some unusual circumstances, 
 or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never 
 conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a 
 body." 1 This is perfectly true, but does not imply 
 the suppression of selfishness. A man " never con- 
 ceives himself otherwise than as a member of a 
 body " ; but it does not follow from this that he 
 will subordinate his own interests to the interests 
 of the other members when the two clash. In 
 cases of conflict the individual often tends to 
 sacrifice the good of his neighbours to his own 
 good ; and he may do so although he fully recog- 
 nises the social consequences of action, and the 
 necessity for him of the social order, just because 
 he still remains at the ethical standpoint which 
 treats private good as superior to public. It is 
 true, as Mill contends, that, " in an improving state 
 of the human mind, the influences are constantly 
 on the increase, which tend to generate in each 
 
 ^ Utilitarianism, p. 46. But no statement of the sociality of 
 man could be more explicit or satisfactory than that of Butler, 
 Sermons, i. Cf. also Hume, Human Nature, II. ii. 5, ed. Selby- 
 Bigge, p. 363.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 67 
 
 individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; 
 which feeling, if perfect, would make him never 
 think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for 
 himself, in the benefits of which they are not 
 included." ^ But this is not sufficient to connect 
 the two antagonistic poles of Mill's system. It 
 starts with assuming the notion of an 'improving 
 state ' of the human mind, as determined accord- 
 ing to an ethical standard not yet arrived at ; and 
 it gives no valid account of the means by which 
 the improvement is to be brought about. It is 
 prophetic of a time when the motives of human 
 nature will have been so modified that the antag- 
 onism between self and others will be no longer 
 felt ; but it offers no practical solution of the 
 antinomy suited to present circumstances. 
 
 The basis of the ethical sentiment by which the (a)recogni- 
 
 , . 1 . • (. J 1 1 1 • tion of Sym- 
 
 desires and actions or a man are to be brought into pathy 
 harmony with those of his fellows is investigated 
 in a more thorough manner by Bain and by George 
 Grote. But both these writers stand on a some- 
 what difrerent platform from the strict psycho- 
 logical hedonism which Mill never relinquished. 
 Thus Grote enumerates as " elementary tendencies 
 of the mind," which ethical sentiment presupposes, 
 and out of which it is compounded, self-regarding 
 tendencies, sympathetic tendencies, benevolent 
 affections, malevolent affections, and (though in a 
 
 ^ Utilitarianism, p, 48.
 
 68 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 smaller degree) love and hatred of those who cause 
 pleasure and pain to others ; ^ and this without 
 interpreting sympathy, in the way that Mill does, 
 as having for its end the pleasures which come 
 with the gratification of the sympathetic impulse, 
 or the removal of the pain caused by its restraint. 
 As Bain argues, this position of Mill's " is tenable 
 only on the ground that the omission of a dis- 
 interested act that we are inclined to, would give 
 us so much pai7i that it is on the whole for our 
 comfort that we should make the requisite sacri- 
 fice. There is plausibility in this supposition." 
 But "the doctrine breaks down when we try it 
 upon extreme cases. . . . All that people usually 
 suffer from stifling a generous impulse is too slight 
 and transient to be placed against any important 
 as disinter- Sacrifice." ^ In recognising sympathy as a ' purely 
 Bain' ^ disinterested' impulse,^ Bain breaks loose at an 
 important point from the psychology of Bentham. 
 He is indeed only kept from a complete break 
 with it by the position he ascribes to sympathy 
 as outside of the ordinary sphere of voluntary 
 action. Above all things, it would seem to be 
 necessary that nothing should conflict with " our 
 character as rational beings, which is to desire 
 
 1 Fragments on Ethical Subjects (1876), p. 6. 
 
 2 The Emotions and the Will, p. 295. 
 
 ■' Ibid., p. Ill ; cf. Mind, O.S., viii. 55 : " The'important ex- 
 ceptions to the law of Pleasure and Pain are (1) Fixed Ideas, (2) 
 Habits, and (3) Disinterested action for others."
 
 THE TEANSITION TO UTILITAIIIANISM. G9 
 
 everything exactly according to its pleasure-value." ^ 
 But sympathy obviously " clashes with the regular 
 outgoings of the will in favour of our pleasures " : 
 so that it ought to be placed outside voluntary 
 action ; and Bain has " always been disposed to 
 regard sympathy as a remarkable and crowning 
 instance of the Fixed Idea,"- although "it is a 
 safer and more likely assumption that, in the 
 operation of sympathy, there is a habit of sociabil- 
 ity, engendered by long hereditary usage, of acting 
 gregariously with our fellows." ^ 
 
 It is owing to its exclusion from the normal without bc- 
 
 1 • i"g applied 
 
 operation of voluntary conduct that sympathetic todetennine 
 appropriation of the feelings of others has little J^Y ""* 
 or no place assigned it by Bain, when he goes 
 on* to describe the way in which the moral 
 opinions of men have actually originated. They 
 have, he holds, a twofold source — one arising from 
 the necessity for public security, the other of 
 sentimental origin. The former makes society 
 ordain those acts and services required for its own 
 preservation. The latter leads to the confusion of 
 this necessary element in morality with the senti- 
 mental likes and dislikes which may be character- 
 istic of different people. These are " mixed up in 
 one code with the imperative duties that hold 
 
 1 Emotions, p. 438. - Ibid., p. 121. 
 
 * The Senses and the Intellect, 4th ed., p. 362. 
 
 * Emotions, p. 271 ff.
 
 70 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 society together " ; and it is only when " we dis- 
 entangle this complication, and refer each class of 
 duties to their proper origin," that we can " obtain 
 a clear insight into the foundations of morality." ^ 
 Morality, therefore, is that which is imposed by 
 society for its own preservation and security, and 
 which is sanctioned by the punishments of society 
 either in its "public judicial acts," or "by the 
 unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the 
 exclusion from social good offices." ^ Of this ex- 
 ternal law the moral sense or conscience is merely 
 a subjective mirror or copy. The duty of unselfish- 
 ness is not connected with the disinterested impulse 
 of sympathy, but is traced to the external order of 
 society, which has found it necessary to restrain 
 the self-seeking action of individuals — a restraint 
 which has come to be transferred to the consciences 
 of the members of the society. 
 
 Bain's theory falls back in this way upon ex- 
 ternal authority, just as Bentham's did ; and, for 
 the same reasons, they are neither of them able to 
 prescribe the utilitarian principle of conduct. But, 
 in his assertion of the disinterested nature of sym- 
 pathy, Bain has introduced — though he has not 
 himself utilised — a fruitful principle, which may 
 appear to give an adequate explanation of the 
 moral sentiment, and to offer an escape from ethical 
 as well as from psychological egoism. 
 
 1 Emotions, p. 273. ^ jbid., p. 264.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM, 71 
 
 This element of sympathy is most fully recog- and by 
 nised in the instructive analysis of ethical sentiment 
 by the late George Grote. At the same time, Grote 
 does not, like Adam Smith, for instance, attempt to 
 evolve the material characteristics of approbation 
 and disapprobation from this source. The mere 
 putting of one's self in the place of a spectator — 
 or in that of the patient — instead of in that of the 
 agent, is only a formal change, which will modify 
 our judgments or feelings without accounting for 
 their actual content. But a uniform formal ele- 
 ment in all ethical sentiment is, according to Grote, 
 a man's " constant habit of viewing and judging of 
 circumstances around him," both from the point of 
 view of the agent and from that of the patient.^ 
 This twofold position is occupied by every individ- 
 ual. He is an agent, and in that position his own 
 interests and feelings are separate from, and often 
 at variance with, those of others. But he is also a 
 patient in respect of the actions of others, and in 
 that position his interests and his feelings are com- 
 monly in unison with those o." the majority. Hence 
 a man is led constantly to adopt ideally the point 
 of view which is not actually his own at the time, 
 so that " the idea of the judgment which others 
 will form becomes constantly and indissolubly as- 
 sociated with the idea of action in the mind of 
 every agent." In every community certain actions 
 
 ^ Fragments on Ethical Subjects, p. 8 f.
 
 72 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 are visited with the admiration, esteem, and pro- 
 tection of the society; certain other actions with 
 the opposite feelings and results: so that there 
 arises " an association in my mind of a certain line 
 of conduct on the part both of myself and of any 
 other individual agent, with a certain sentiment 
 resulting from such conduct, and excited by it, in 
 the minds of the general public around us. It is 
 a sentiment of regulated social recijjrocity as be- 
 tween the agent and the society amongst which 
 he lives." And this sentiment, when enforced by 
 a sanction, constitutes, in his view, the complete 
 form of ethical sentiment. 
 
 As a complete explanation of the normal senti- 
 ments and judgments of men, this theory does not 
 seem to be above criticism. It requires not only 
 an association between every personal action and 
 the feelings — sympathetically imagined by the 
 agent — with which the action will be regarded by 
 others, but it also implies that this association has 
 become so inseparable that the feeling appears as 
 an individual or personal one, distinguished by the 
 subject from those other sentiments which he has 
 when he deliberately imagines himself as in the 
 position of others. But the view is referred to here 
 as illustrating a point which we find in Mill, and, 
 in a different way, in Bain : that the first real step 
 towards the utilitarian standard is to make the 
 individual pass somehow or other to a standpoint
 
 THE TKAKSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 73 
 
 outside his own nature. In Mill this is done mainly 
 by the assertion of the social nature of man, in 
 Grote by showing how a moral sentiment may be 
 arrived at by the combined action of sympathy and 
 association. 
 
 The further influence required in the transition coTiie idea 
 to utilitarianism is the idea of equality. The best 
 expression of utilitarian doctrine followed soon after 
 the assertion of the equal rights of men which 
 signalised the politics of the end of the eighteenth 
 century in the French and American revolutions.^ 
 Bentham was affected by the spirit of this movement 
 more than he knew, however far he might be from 
 accepting its abstractions about natural rights. In 
 his hands, too, utilitarianism was a political rather 
 than an ethical doctrine. 'Everybody to count 
 for one and nobody for more than one ' is the rule 
 for interpreting the phrase, ' the greatest happiness 
 of the greatest number.' "Without this assertion of necessmy to 
 
 1 T -1 • 1 • regulate 
 
 the necessity of an equal distribution, there is no sympathy ; 
 safeguard against sympathy being restricted and 
 partial in its operation. Indeed the feeling of 
 sympathy in itself is naturally strongest towards 
 those with whom one is in most frequent relation, 
 or connected by numerous associative ties ; and, if 
 left to itself, it might therefore be expected to give 
 rise to the extended selfishness of class or family 
 
 1 Although the formula had been stated by Hutcheson, Inquiry 
 (1725), p. 164.
 
 74 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 interest, only relieved by a spasmodic humani- 
 tarianism. This tendency is corrected by the 
 dogma of human equality, which had been for- 
 mulated as a juridical maxim in the Eoman Jus 
 Gentium, but afterwards passed into a political 
 creed, and found vent in the literature of the 
 eighteenth century and in the public events which 
 marked its close. 
 
 The change which this notion of human equality 
 passed through has been traced by Sir Henry 
 Maine. " Where the Eoman jurisconsult had 
 written 'sequales sunt,' meaning exactly what he 
 said, the modern civilian wrote ' all men are equal ' 
 in the sense of ' all men ought to be equal.' The 
 peculiar Eoman idea that natural law co-existed 
 with civil law and gradually absorbed it, had 
 evidently been lost sight of, or had become un- 
 intelligible, and the words that had at most con- 
 veyed a theory concerning the origin, composition, 
 and development of human institutions, were begin- 
 ning to express the sense of a great standing wrong 
 influence of Suffered by mankind." 1 Now Bentham, however 
 
 Bentw" ^^^ ^^® ^^y ^'^^^^ ^^^^ ^^0'^ trusting to the system 
 of 'natural law,'^ was certainly not beyond the 
 influence of the idea of human equality which it 
 carried in its train ; and, from his own point of 
 view, he laboured to defend it. In assimilating 
 
 ^ Ancient Law, 8th ed., p. 93. 
 
 2 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. ii. § 14 n.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 75 
 
 this idea, utilitarianism has preserved one of the 
 best results of the old ' law of nature,' without the 
 ambiguity with which it had formerly been used,^ 
 
 * The ambiguity of the phrase is explained in an interesting 
 way in Sir H. Maine's account of the change from its juridical to 
 a political or ethical meaning. In some writers it seems to have 
 a third and still ditferent signification. We must thus distinguish 
 (1) the juridical meaning, originating in the Roman "law common 
 to all nations," which had arisen through the " constant levelling 
 or removal of irregularities which went on wherever the prtctorian 
 system was applied to the cases of foreign litigants," modified 
 subsequently by the Greek conception of 1(t6t7]s. (2) The 
 political meaning, that all men ought to be equal, arose from 
 the preceding. But its notion of " ought " seems often to depend 
 on an idea of the constitution of nature according to which all 
 men are actually born equal — not only in rights, soon to be 
 obscured by human convention, but also in power or faculty, 
 afterwards unec^uallj' developed by education. Hence (3) the 
 natural meaning. The doctrines of evolution and heredity have 
 made this view seem as strange to us now as it would have done 
 to the Romans from whom it was illegitimately derived. Yet at 
 one time it seems to have been assumed, almost without question, 
 that there is but little difference in the natural endowments of 
 different men. This assumption lay at the basis of Hobbes's 
 political theory — Leviathan, I. xiii. p. 60, — was stated in a more 
 guarded form by Locke — On Education, § 1 ; Works, ed. of 1824, 
 i. 6, — and adopted almost without qualification by Helvdtius, who, 
 carrying out Locke' .s metaphor of the soul as at birth a tabula 
 rasa, afterwards written over with the pen of experience, says : 
 "Quintilien, Locke, et moi, disons : L'inegalite des esprits est 
 I'efiet d'une cause connue, et cette cause est la difference de 
 I't^ducation " — the causes of the existing inequality being after- 
 wards stated as twofold : first, the ditference of environment, 
 which may be called chance ; and secondly, the difference of 
 strength in the desire for instruction. — De I'homme, II. i., III. 
 i., IV. xxii. ; ffiuvres, ii. 71, 91, 280. (Quintilian's statement, 
 however, is even more guarded than Locke's. Cf. Opera, ed. 
 Spalding, i. 47.) Similar expressions may be found in Adam
 
 76 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 if in a sense which admits of a somewhat narrow 
 and abstract interpretation. 
 
 It is true that this does not give exactly the 
 result which is usually described as utilitarianism. 
 I have spoken of the notion of equality as the 
 regulator of sympathy — a canon in accordance with 
 which the sympathetic impulse is to be guided. 
 Sympathy impels us to relieve the pains and in- 
 crease the pleasures of our fellow-men. The prin- 
 ciple of equality dictates that this sympathetic 
 activity is to be directed to the happiness of all 
 men equally. Every one whom our conduct may 
 be made to affect is to count as a unit, and a unit 
 onlv. The distribution is not to be according to 
 kinship of blood or social ties : though it is so much 
 more in our power to promote the happiness of 
 those closely connected with us, that it may fairly 
 occupy a larger share of our thought and energy 
 than the happiness of other people does. Utili- 
 tarianism carries the application of the principle 
 of equality still farther, by looking upon self as a 
 unit whose happiness is to be regarded as of exactly 
 equal value with that of any one else. With every 
 individual reduced to the same ethical worth, happi- 
 ness is declared to be the end of moral action, and 
 equality of distribution to be the rule for deciding 
 between the claims of competing individuals. 
 
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, book i. chap, ii., and Godwin, Political 
 Justice, book ii. chap, iii., 2d ed., i. 145 f.
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 77 
 
 It seems to me, accordingly, that utilitarianism e. The two 
 
 ^ •' sides of 
 
 is a theory compounded out of two quite different utilitarian 
 
 ^ •! 11 • rii ii theory not 
 
 elements. On the one side the basis oi the theory logicaiiy 
 has been laid by Bentham and Mill in a natural- <=°""«<=ted. 
 istic psychology which looks upon pleasure as the 
 only object of desire. To this there is superadded 
 the idea of equality, which is the distinctively 
 ethical element in the theory. But it is only by 
 confusion that the idea of equality — which Ben- 
 tham expresses by the proposition that the happi- 
 ness of one man is to count for no more than the 
 happiness of another — can be supposed to be de- 
 rived from the same theory of human nature as 
 that which identifies pleasure and desire. Utili- 
 tarianism only becomes a practicable end for 
 individual conduct when psychological hedonism 
 has been given up. It is futile to say that one 
 ought to pursue the greatest happiness of the 
 greatest number, unless it is possible for the 
 individual to act for something else than his own 
 pleasure — that is, for an end which is for him 
 not pleasure at all. In a word, utilitarianism, 
 while maintaining that the only thing worth de- 
 siring is pleasure, must at the same time admit 
 that pleasure is not the only object that can be 
 or is desired : otherwise, it can never advance 
 from the egoistic to the universalistic form. 
 
 This view receives confirmation from the way 
 in which the utilitarian doctrine was defended by
 
 78 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 Professor Sidgwick. In the ' Methods of Ethics,' 
 the tradition of Bentham is expressly united with 
 the doctrines of Butler and Clarke. Professor 
 Sidgwick agreed with Bentham, and the long line 
 of moralists from Epicurus downwards, in main- 
 taining the doctrine of ethical hedonism, that 
 pleasure is the only thing ultimately desirable; 
 but, with Butler, he rejected the psychological 
 hedonism, according to which pleasure is the 
 only object of desire. So far from these two 
 positions being inconsistent, it is only through 
 the second that the first can be held in its 
 universalistic form. The problem is, however, 
 how to unite them. In Professor Sidgwick's 
 theory, they are connected by the application 
 of the ethical maxims of benevolence and equity, 
 which an exhaustive examination of ethical intu- 
 itions has left standing as axioms of the practical 
 reason. Though utilitarianism, therefore, is still 
 adhered to, it is on an expressly Piational ground, 
 not on the basis of Naturalism. 
 
 7. Summary In this and the previous chapter, I have looked 
 consequen- ^^ humau uaturc from the point of view of psycho- 
 cesofpsy- wical hedouism, and have endeavoured to show 
 
 chological o J 
 
 hedonism: what cthical principles that theory leads to, or is 
 consistent with. The theory does not deny that 
 there is a great diversity of capacities and interests 
 in man. But it holds that, so far as concerns
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 79 
 
 conduct, Lhey admit of being brought under one 
 general law — tliat every action is subject to the 
 rule of the ' two sovereign masters, pleasure and 
 pain,' It is evident, therefore, that if ethics is 
 to be connected at all with psychology — if what 
 ought to be done is in any degree what can be 
 done — the end of conduct must be hedonistic. 
 The psychological fact cannot indeed be without 
 more ado turned into a moral imperative. Yet 
 this much may be admitted, that, if this interpre- 
 tation of action leaves room for ethics at all, the 
 end prescribed can be nothing else than pleasure, 
 or the avoidance of pain. 
 
 The question, therefore, was how to determine oonoiogi- 
 the pleasure which is to be sought? And I have k!„w^ir''' 
 tried to show, in the present chapter, that utili- |!f,||'.^'^"*°" 
 tarianism does not admit of being logically arrived 
 at from this point of view. It may indeed, under 
 certain circumstances,^ be the guide of political or 
 social enactments; but these can only be made 
 to bear upon the conduct of individuals by the 
 sanctions which the State or Society has at its 
 command. The individual can have as his maxim 
 of conduct an end which corresponds with utili- 
 tarianism in two events only: when he is so 
 
 ^ That is, when (1) the legislature accurately expresses the 
 average feeling of all the members of the State, or (2) the legis- 
 lators happen to be fully intelligent people in whom 'selfislmess' 
 has taken the shape of benevolence.
 
 of rational 
 egoism 
 
 80 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 constituted as to find his pleasure in the greatest 
 aggregate pleasure of mankind, or when the po- 
 litical and social sanctions are so complete and 
 searching as to make his individual interest and 
 the collective interest coincide. The former event 
 is, unfortunately, too rare to be taken into account 
 in establishing a theory ; the latter would imply 
 an interference with individual liberty so im- 
 practicable that it is not contemplated even in 
 the most comprehensive of socialistic schemes. 
 (b) admits Hedonism in psychology, therefore, means egoism 
 in ethics. But even this theory, as the previous 
 chapter has shown, has its own difficulties to 
 meet. The antagonism of individual and universal 
 has not yet been got rid of. The difficulty is no 
 longer caused by the conflict between one man 
 and his neighbours : it is the difference between 
 the feeling and action of a moment, and the sum 
 of feelings and actions which makes up a lifetime. 
 It is true that, if we admit that pleasure is the only 
 thing worth pursuing, and that by ' pleasure ' a man 
 means ' his own pleasure,' there is so far no reason 
 for preferring the pleasure of one moment to that 
 of another, except as more certain or of greater 
 amount or degree ; ^ but this is to start with ascrib- 
 
 ^ Propinquity, also, was held by Bentham to be au independent 
 ground of distinction and preference. — Principles of Morals and 
 Legislation, chap. iv. sect. 2. The explanation of its presence in 
 his list is probably the fact that Bentham's classitication was 
 derived from suggestions in Beccaiia (Dei Delitti e delle Pene,
 
 THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM. 81 
 
 ing a value to pleasure, and not with the simple 
 fact that pleasure is desired. If psychological 
 hedonism is our starting-point — and we give to 
 the theory the interpretation that has the greatest 
 verisimilitude — it is the greatest present pleasure 
 that rules. And, although the man of reflexion only under 
 will no doubt attempt to estimate the future conditions. 
 pleasure at its true value in comparison with the 
 pleasure actually present, this can never have full 
 effect upon his will. It has been shown, indeed, 
 that the realisation of egoistic hedonism is not 
 merely unattainable from the point of view of 
 psychological hedonism, but that it would involve 
 conditions inconsistent with the nature of desire. 
 
 1764). Beccaria, as a jurist, had to take account uot of reason- 
 able grounds of preference only, but of any conditions which affect 
 conduct ; and the degree of strength which ' propinquity ' gives to 
 a motive is not entirely due to the greater certainty entailed by 
 that proi)inquity. — See Mind, April 1904, p. '270 f. 
 
 F
 
 82 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT, 
 
 1. Auiii- Psychological hedonism possesses the merit of 
 siichaspsy- offering a simple and uniform theory of mental 
 hedonTs'in ^ction. It may admit conflicting accounts of the 
 kinds of action and sufferance which actually give 
 men pleasure and pain, — a point on which, for 
 example, Hobbes and J. S. Mill differ widely. 
 But it has one general formula for the relation of 
 feeling to action, which has been precise and clear 
 enough to attract many psychologists. The ethical 
 consequences of the theory have, indeed, turned 
 out — if the argument of the preceding chapters 
 is valid — to be neither so obvious nor so satisfac- 
 tory as its adherents have commonly supposed. 
 But it must nevertheless be admitted that, if 
 psychology shows pleasure to be, as a matter of 
 fact, the constant end of action, it will be useless — 
 even if it is not impossible — for ethics to prescribe 
 any other end.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 83 
 
 The opponents of ethical hedonism have thus notreppued 
 uniformly insisted that the theory which makes ponentsof 
 pleasure the end and motive of all conscious activity ^0"^^^ ^ 
 is imperfect; and this psychological question has 
 been the battlefield of many of the controversies, 
 at any rate, of English ethics. Psychological he- 
 donism has not, however, been confronted by the 
 English moralists with an opposed theory of equal 
 simplicity, nor can the controversy be said to 
 have led to a thorough analysis of action. The 
 psychological investigation has, in most cases, been 
 carried no farther than the ethical interests at 
 stake seemed to require; and the predominance 
 of these interests has perhaps prevented the en- 
 quiry from being carried out with complete free- 
 dom from preconception on either side. 
 
 A uniform theory under which our various par- 
 ticular desires might be brought may, indeed, be 
 said to have been suggested by Butler. He meets 
 the hedonistic proposition that all desire is for 
 personal pleasure, by the doctrine that no particu- 
 lar desire has pleasure as its end, since all pleas- 
 ure presupposes a previous desire in the satisfac- 
 tion of which it consists.^ This theory, which may 
 have been derived from Plato,^ and was afterwards 
 
 ^ "The very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presup- 
 poses particular passions or appetites ; since the very idea of 
 interest or happiness consists in this, that au appetite or affection 
 eujoj'S its object." — Sermons, Pref. ; cf. Serm. xi. 
 
 2 Fhil., 31 tf. ; cf. Gorg., 495 f. ; Rep., ix. 585.
 
 84 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOEY. 
 
 used by Schopenhauer to prove the negative nature 
 of pleasure and consequent worthlessness of life, 
 is, however, a generalisation which cannot be made 
 to include all the facts which require to be taken 
 into account.^ Many pleasures occur independently 
 of any precedent desire. And what Butler had to 
 show — and was really concerned to show — was 
 that desire was not exclusively directed to objects 
 thus independently found to be pleasureable : the 
 contradictory, that is to say, and not the contrary, 
 of psychological hedonism, 
 in maintain- For this purposc Butlci' pointed to the whole 
 ^ftyofnon- class of affectious which, although they may also 
 activit^*"' tend to private interest, have an immediate refer- 
 ence to the good of others ; and, in addition to 
 these, he contended for an original principle of 
 benevolence towards others in human nature, as 
 well as of self-love or care for one's own interests 
 and happiness. This latter, he held, so far from 
 being the sole principle of action, implied the exist- 
 ence of a number of particujar passions and affec- 
 tions, directed immediately to external objects — the 
 satisfaction of these desires giving pleasure, though 
 pleasure was not the end at which they aimed. 
 Voluntary action is thus not brought under any 
 common rubric ; for, at the same time that the 
 calm principle of self-love is directed to the 
 agent's greatest pleasure, the object of hunger, for 
 1 Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 2, 6th ed., p. 44.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 85 
 
 example, is said to be not pleasure but food, that 
 of benevolence not personal pleasure but the good 
 of others. 
 
 The attempt to give unity to the non-hedonistic Non-hedon- 
 view of desire has come from a different quarter, generalised 
 Uninfluenced by the exigencies of ethical contro- ^yHerbait, 
 versy, which formed the entire motive of Butler's 
 investigation, Herbart and his school have worked 
 out a theory of desire, which has many points of 
 similarity with that of Butler. However much 
 they may difler from the English moralist — of 
 whose existence they are mostly ignorant — they 
 are at one with him in rejecting the maxim of 
 psychological hedonism, nihil appctimus nisi siib 
 specie honi ; and their differences from him are 
 largely due to their having gone further in their 
 analysis of the facts, and endeavoured to bring them 
 under a general principle. 
 
 Butler's view of the object of desire is distin- 
 guished from the Herbartian chiefly in two respects. 
 In the first place, he identifies that object with the 
 external or real thing, whereas Herbart is careful 
 to point out that it is a presentation or idea. In 
 the second place, while Butler is content to pos- 
 tulate an original tendency of our nature towards 
 certain objects, Herbart attempts to get behind this 
 tendency, and explain the phenomena of striving 
 from the interaction of presentations. Over and 
 above the ordinary hypothesis of natural realism,
 
 86 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 Butler's theory implies a sort of pre-established 
 harmony between our active tendencies and things 
 outside the mind, in virtue of which some of these 
 things do, while others do not, attract our desires. 
 from the Hcrbart, ou the other hand, attempts nothing less 
 ideas to self- than a Complete genetic account of mental pheno- 
 lea Lsation. j^gj^g^^ explaining the facts of presentation, desire, 
 and feeling through *' the persistence of presenta- 
 tions in consciousness and their rise into clearer 
 consciousness."^ The phenomena of desire and 
 feeling are both accounted for by this mechanism 
 of impelling and inhibiting forces.^ 
 
 It would be beyond the scope of this essay to 
 examine the above view of the active side of mental 
 phenomena. For present purposes it is enough to 
 draw attention to the fact that the common de- 
 duction of the phenomena of desire and will from 
 the feelings of pleasure and pain is not the only 
 ' scientific ' theory of human action, and that it 
 is rejected on its merits by writers who have no 
 inclination towards what the psychological hedonist 
 would call the mystical doctrine of free-will. It 
 
 ^ Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 104, Werke, vi. 74 ; 
 cf. Waitz, Lelirbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, § 40, 
 l>. 418 : "It is not difficult to recognise the basis of desire in the 
 presentations brought forward by reproduction, and, at the same 
 time, held back by an inhibition." 
 
 ^ With Herbart's doctrine may be compared H. Spencer's 
 view of the genesis of feeling and voluntary action, Principles of 
 Psychology, 2nd ed., partiv. chaps, viii. and is.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 87 
 
 is of interest to note, too, that Bain, in wliose 
 
 works the traditions of psychological hedonism 
 
 find their most careful expression, has modified the 
 
 doctrine so as to allow of desire of pleasure and 
 
 avoidance of pain explaining less than had been 
 
 formerly required of them. Outside the circle of This tend- 
 ency recog- 
 hedonistically-determined motives, he recognises the ni.sed in tiin 
 
 influence of the presentation or idea as a self-realis- nxedldeaa. 
 ing element in the individual consciousness, apart 
 from its pleasurable or painful characteristics.^ 
 These ' fixed ideas,' as Bain calls them, tend both 
 to persist in the mind, and to project themselves 
 into action, independently of pleasure and pain — 
 or at least with a force which is out of proportion 
 to the pleasure they bring. By means of this 
 doctrine he was accustomed to explain " the great 
 fact of our nature denominated sympathy, fellow- 
 feeling, pity, compassion, disinterestedness "i^ al- 
 though he latterly acknowledged the explanation 
 to be insufficient, and admitted "a habit of soci- 
 ability, engendered by long hereditary usage." ^ 
 To the same category of fixed idea belongs (he 
 held) "much of the ambition and the aspirations 
 of human beings. ... A certain notion — say of 
 power, wealth, grandeur — has fixed itself in our 
 mind and keeps a persistent hold there." It is 
 
 ^ Cf. note to James Mill's Analysis, ii. 383 f. 
 ^ The Senses and the Intellect, 3rd ed., p. 344 ; cf. Lleutal and 
 Moral Science, pp. 90, 91. See above, p. 68 f. 
 3 The Senses and the Intellect, 4th ed. (1894), p. 362.
 
 88 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 asserted, indeed, that the action of such fixed 
 ideas "perverts the regular operation of the will 
 which would lead us to renounce whatever is hope- 
 less or not worth the cost," ^ And, certainly, their 
 admission among mental phenomena seems to im- 
 ply the superposition of a new theory of action 
 upon the old theory of psychological hedonism. 
 There is no disguising the importance of the modi- 
 fication thus introduced. The name ' fixed idea ' is 
 misleading if it be taken to imply that persistency 
 and tendency to action are properties belonging to 
 a certain class of ideas only. Bain's doctrine is 
 founded on the hypothesis of the identity of the 
 nervous centres which function in representation 
 and in sensation,^ and might, therefore, be ex- 
 pected to hold of all representations or ideas. The 
 characteristics of persistency, and of tendency to 
 action, would, in this view, be normal character- 
 istics of presentations, though they might belong 
 in an unusual degree to some ideas from the rela- 
 tion these hold to the dominant cluster of ideas 
 in the individual consciousness. And, if we thus 
 attribute to all ideas without exception the ten- 
 dency to self-realisation, and recognise — as we 
 must — the relation of mutual assistance or in- 
 hibition which ideas bear to one another in virtue 
 
 1 The Senses and the Intellect, 3rd ed., p. 344 f. ; 4th ed., p. 
 362 f. 
 
 ^ For a criticism of this hypothesis, cf. J. Ward, Mind, N.S., 
 iii. 510 ff.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 89 
 
 of their being ' presented ' to the same subject, 
 we have granted the material out of which, in 
 Herbart's skilful ' Mechanik des Geistes,* the pheno- 
 mena of feeling and desire are woven. 
 
 The view of individual human nature, which 2. The non- 
 hedonistic 
 holds that not all its desires are directed to per- theory of 
 
 sonal pleasure, thus claims consideration. "With ' 
 its less restricted theory of action, this doctrine 
 may seem to offer a larger means of determining 
 the appropriate end of human conduct. In par- 
 ticular, the suggestion naturally occurs that the 
 ethical end will, on this theory, be something else 
 than pleasure : ^ although there is no contradiction 
 in holding that, while other objects than pleasure 
 are actually desired, there is nothing else which 
 can be held to be ultimately desirable, or the 
 tendency to which can be said to have moral 
 worth. 
 
 The ethical barrenness of psychological hedonism Difficulty of 
 has been seen to result from its narrow and inllex- vn'rimis°im.^ 
 
 various im- 
 
 ible view of human nature. But theories such as F"'*!^^ *' 
 
 implies, 
 
 those now to be considered have, in an ethical 
 regard, to overcome a difficulty of another kind, 
 
 ^ " If there be any principles or afifections in the mind of man 
 distinct from self-love, that the things those principles tend 
 towards, or the objects of those affections are, each of them in 
 themselves eligible to be pursued upon its own account, and to be 
 rested in as an end, is implied in the very idea of such principle 
 or affection." — Butler, Sermons, Pref.
 
 90 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOKY. 
 
 arising from the variety of impulses which they 
 recognise. The objects to which these impulses 
 or desires relate have as yet received no further 
 characterisation than that they are objects of 
 desire. And the difficulty of finding a principle by 
 which some order of precedence or worth amongst 
 them may be determined is just, in other words, 
 the difficulty of obtaining a moral standard. 
 
 The question does not ordinarily arise in the 
 above form, because the moral standard is com- 
 monly taken for granted, and the various impulses, 
 affections, and dispositions are made to derive their 
 ethical rank from their relation to that standard. 
 But this method is obviously inappropriate when 
 the standard is still to be ascertained. And it may 
 be thought that the constitution of man contains 
 in itself a means of distinguishing the moral value 
 of its various elements, or of the actions to which 
 so as to de- they lead, and thus furnishing a moral standard 
 
 termine a „ 
 
 standard Or cnd tor couduct. This purpose seems to have 
 been to some extent, though not quite clearly, kept 
 in view by the writers who, in the eighteenth 
 century, contended against the selfish theory of 
 action which had been set forth by Hobbes. They 
 attempted to show that selfishness was not the 
 only, nor even the most prominent, principle of 
 action ; and, from the system of diverse principles 
 which they found implanted in human nature, they 
 endeavoured to work out a theory of conduct.
 
 MOKAL SENTIMENT. 91 
 
 The leader of this school of thought was Shaftes- Tins at- 
 bury, the pupil and friend of Locke. Ten years shaLtbuo' 
 after the first printing of his most important ethical '^"^g^s! ^*^^ 
 treatise, the * Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit,' 
 we find him telling a correspondent that he is 
 making him " the greatest confidence in the world, 
 which is that of my philosophy, even against my 
 old tutor and governor, whose name is so estab- 
 lished in the world, but with whom I ever con- 
 cealed my differences as much as possible. For as 
 ill a builder as he is, and as little able to treat the 
 home-points of philosophy, he is of admirable use 
 against the rubbish of the schools in which most of 
 us have been bred up." ^ In the ' Inquiry,' Shaftes- 
 bury worked out an ethical doctrine radically dis- 
 tinct from that of Locke ; but (as the above passage 
 suggests) the full extent of the diff'erence of his 
 speculative point of view is not brought out in that 
 work. It is most clearly shown in the reflexions 
 set down for his own use, which have been re- 
 cently published under the title of ' Philosophical 
 Kegimen.' Virtue, he holds, is natural, and con- shaftes- 
 sists in living according to nature ; but ' nature ' tiolfar \ie'w 
 is not for him what it is for the ' naturalists ': °^ "''^"''• 
 it is the " order and appointment of supreme 
 reason;"- and according to this supreme reason 
 
 ^ Life, Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Shaftesbury, ed. 
 Eand (1900), p. 416. 
 2 Ibid., pp. 6, 50.
 
 92 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOKY. 
 
 everything happens ; " nothing is supernumerary 
 or unnecessary " : " the whole is harmony, the 
 numbers entire, the music perfect." ^ 
 Natural " Natural affection," according to Shaftesbury, " is 
 
 to affect according to nature or the design and will 
 of nature." In every creature, therefore, it tends 
 to the good of the species or kind. The mind of 
 man has a still further reach ; and " a creature 
 who is in that higher degree rational, and can 
 consider the good of the whole, must withal con- 
 sider himself as under an obligation to the interest 
 and good of the whole, preferably to the interest of 
 his private species : and this is the ground of a new 
 and superior affection. ... I must in a certain 
 manner be reconciled to all things, love all things, 
 and absolutely hate or abhor nothing whatsoever 
 that has being in the world. . . . This is the 
 natural affection of a rational creature, capable of 
 knowing nature and of considering the good and 
 interest of the whole." ^ 
 
 This high acquiescence in the universal reason of 
 things inspires Shaftesbury's ethical doctrine ; but 
 it has not full scope given to it in the ' Inquiry.' 
 There he has the special object in view of marking 
 off from one another the spheres of religion and 
 virtue ; and, while he holds that " the perfection 
 and height of virtue must be owing to the belief of 
 
 ^ Philosophical Regimen, pp. 31, 35. 
 2 Ibid., pp. 3, 6.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 93 
 
 a God," 1 he is concerned to show the independence 
 of morality : " there is no speculative opinion, per- 
 suasion, or belief, which is capable immediately or 
 directly to exclude or destroy it"; for "sense of 
 right and wrong " is " as natural to us as natural 
 afifection itself," and is " a first principle in our 
 constitution and make."^ 
 
 There are thus two principles inherent in the 
 nature of man upon which ethics must be based. 
 One of these is what Shaftesbury calls " natural 
 affection " ; the other is the " sense of right and 
 wrong " to which he gave the name of " moral 
 sense." ^ And, as the basis of ethics is to be in- 
 dependent of religion and of any "speculative 
 opinion/' his own speculative conviction of the 
 purpose and perfection of the universe would 
 seem to be excluded at the outset; so that appeal 
 cannot be made to that higher degree of natural 
 affection which brings a man " under an obligation 
 to the interest and good of the whole " as well 
 as and "preferably to the interest of his private 
 species." Natural affections are, therefore, in the 
 ' Inquiry,' defined simply as those " which lead to 
 the good of the public," as distinguished from the 
 Self-affections "whicli lead only to the good of the 
 
 ^ Inquiry, I. iii. 3 (Characteristics, 5th ed., vol. ii. p. 76). 
 2 Ibid., I. iii. 2 (vol. ii. p. 44). 
 
 '* The term is used several times in the marginal analysis, but 
 not in the text, of the 'Inquiry.'
 
 94 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 private/' and from the Unnatural affections which 
 lead to no good whatever.^ 
 
 With his speculative conception of the whole 
 left out of sight, it is difficult for Shaftesbury to 
 carry out consistently his teleological point of view. 
 Man and his afiections are, after all, but a part of 
 a larger whole ; and, as Butler says, " we cannot 
 have a thorough knowledge of any part without 
 knowing the whole." ^ How, then, is it possible to 
 show that man, with these different affections, yet 
 constitutes a harmonious system ? The field has 
 been restricted to human nature, and the admis- 
 sion of 'unnatural' affections therein seems of 
 itself an insuperable difficulty in the proof of 
 internal harmony; while the possible divergence 
 of the private and public systems calls for some 
 method of reconciliation. 
 The social Without an appeal to the universal design of 
 syslemsT^ thiugs, it is ucccssary to study the two systems 
 attempts at themsclvcs and show that they are really harmoni- 
 
 harijionismg •' "^ 
 
 them. ous. There is thus a constant tendency in Shaftes- 
 
 bury, and still more in his successors, Hutcheson 
 and Butler, to revert to empirical arguments in 
 order to demonstrate the harmony of virtue and 
 interest, and to prove to the individual that his 
 own happiness consists in the exercise of the social 
 affections. Thus Shaftesbury tries to show, by an 
 
 ^ Inquiry, 11. i. 3, p. 86. 
 
 - Sermons xv. ; AVorks, ed. of 1850, ii. 193.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 95 
 
 elaborate review of the facts, that to have the 
 " natural " (or social) affections too weak, or the 
 private affections too strong, is a source of misery,^ 
 as well as the chief source of vice;^ and that, 
 largely owing to the pleasure of virtuous action, 
 it is " to the private interest and good of every one 
 to work to the general good." ^ Hutcheson, again, 
 devotes a large portion of his most mature work to 
 allay the suspicion " that in following the impulse 
 of our kind affections and the moral faculty, we are 
 counteracting our interests and abandoning what 
 may be of more consequence to our happiness than 
 either this self -approbation or the applause of 
 others."^ And Butler, referring to virtuous con- 
 duct, says in a well-known passage, that " when 
 we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify 
 to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are 
 convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at 
 least not contrary to it," ^ Opposed as he was to 
 the selfish theory of human action, he was unable 
 to think of any sacrifice of private happiness as a 
 thing to be looked for, or in any way taken into 
 account, in conduct which is the result of calm 
 deliberation. It is therefore not difficult to under- 
 stand the judgment of Schleiermacher that "the 
 
 1 Inquii-y, II. ii. 1, 2 ; cf. pp. 99, 126, 139. 
 
 "- Ibid., II. i. 3, p. 97. » Ibid., II. ii. coucl., p. 175. 
 
 ■* System of Moral Philosophy, i. 99. 
 
 ^ Sermons, xi. ; Works, ii. 145.
 
 96 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 English school of Shaftesbury, with all their talk 
 about virtue, are really given up to pleasure." ^ 
 
 But the criticism is one-sided ; for it neglects 
 the teleological conception with which Shaftes- 
 bury started, and which he strove to carry through. 
 His difficulty was to systematise the various im- 
 pulses which make up the nature of man. The 
 conflict of impulses was too obvious a fact not to 
 be acknowledged even in his optimistic philosophy. 
 He recognised, as we have seen, not only private or 
 self - affections, promoting the good of the indi- 
 vidual, and ' natural ' or social affections which led 
 to the public good, but also ' unnatural ' affections, 
 which tended to no good whatever. The impulses 
 are systematised, but into different systems. The 
 last class of affections is condemned outright, be- 
 cause its results are contrary both to public and 
 Tiie empiri- to private Welfare ; while an attempt is made to 
 ment." prove from experience the coincidence in conduct of 
 the two other systems public and private. What 
 Shaftesbury had in view was a real organic union 
 between the individual and society ; but, when he 
 came to establish its nature, he made it consist 
 in an asserted harmony of interests. In order to 
 show the " obligation there is to virtue," he " cast 
 up all these particulars, from whence (as by way of 
 addition and subtraction) the main sum or general 
 account of happiness is either augmented or dimin- 
 
 ^ Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), p. 54.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 97 
 
 ished," and arrived at the conclusion that " to be 
 wicked or vicious is to be miserable or unhappy." ^ 
 He often spoke of virtue as identical with the 
 harmony or ' balance ' of the affections of the in- 
 dividual man ; but he expressly defined it as con- 
 sisting in the individual "having all his inclina- 
 tions and affections . . . agreeing with the good 
 of his kind or of that system in which he is 
 included, and of which he constitutes a part."^ 
 And the two views require to be connected by a 
 proof that the harmonious development of an 
 individual's affections will lead to the good of 
 the species: while this proof depends on a sum- 
 mation of consequences which is not free from 
 one-sidedness. 
 
 Shaftesbury does indeed contend that both the 
 self-affections and the " natural " or social affections 
 become self-destructive when carried to excess, or 
 so as to interfere with one another.^ But he is 
 unable to establish this position ; he cannot show 
 that the contradiction in the conception of a com- 
 pletely solitary being belongs also to the concep- 
 tion of a judiciously selfish being, whose affection 
 for other men, and whose devotion to causes or 
 institutions, are regulated by a due regard to the 
 relation in which they stand to his own interests. 
 This possibility is not altogether overlooked by 
 
 1 Inquiry, II. ii. pp. 77, 172, 173. 
 
 2 Ibid., II. i. 1, p. 77. 3 Cf. Ibid., II. i. 3, p. 87. 
 
 G
 
 98 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 Shaftesbury himself. For he institutes a somewhat 
 elaborate comparison between what he calls Entire 
 and Partial affection. The former takes in all man- 
 kind, and indeed the whole system of things ; in it 
 the ' life according to nature ' is fully realised. On 
 the other hand, it is argued " that partial affection, 
 or social love in part, without regard to a complete 
 society or whole, is in itself an inconsistency, and 
 implies an absolute contradiction." Such affection 
 is capricious, and, having " no foundation or estab- 
 lishment in reason, so it must be easily removable, 
 and subject to alteration, without reason " ; as it 
 gives but " a short and slender enjoyment " of the 
 pleasures of sympathy, " so neither is it able to 
 derive any considerable enjoyment from that other 
 principal branch of human happiness — namely, 
 consciousness of the actual or merited esteem of 
 others " ; it is even " impossible that they who 
 esteem or love by any other rule than that of 
 virtue should place their affection on such subjects 
 as they can long esteem or love " ; finally, the easy 
 temper and quiet mind on which pleasure largely 
 depends " must of necessity be owing to the natural 
 and good affections." ^ 
 
 The controversy, be it noted, is not whether 
 selfishness, untempered by the social affections, can 
 be a guide to happiness. The question is whether 
 it is possible for a man so to direct his social 
 
 1 Inquiry, 11. ii. 1, p. 110 ff.
 
 MOIIAL SENTIMENT. 99 
 
 affections tliat he may enjoy the pleasures of 
 human intercourse, with the love and esteem of 
 others, while avoiding the sacrifices which may 
 be entailed by complete devotion to the common 
 good. Perhaps the question hardly admits of a 
 quite conclusive answer; for the temper of mind 
 which is most susceptible to social pleasures is apt 
 to be most affected by social pains ; and yet this 
 risk may perhaps be largely diminished by follow- 
 ing the worldly advice to choose one's friends 
 prudently, and to interest oneself in causes which 
 give good promise of success. The mental attitude 
 of estimating eacl) experience as it comes by its 
 bearing on selfish interests is indeed fatal to the 
 pure sympathetic enjoyments ; but prudence in the 
 selection of friends and pursuits does not neces- 
 sarily entail the same attitude of mind or the same 
 results. And the contention cannot be established 
 that there is anything peculiarly capricious or un- 
 stable in affection to some rather than to others. 
 It is a paradox to say with Shaftesbury that this 
 cannot be real without affection to mankind as a 
 system. When the latter exists at all, it has com- 
 monly grown out of the former ; and, when it has 
 not arisen in this way, it is apt to be a thin intel- 
 lectual conceit. If evidence were wanted of the 
 reality of the ' partial ' affections, independently of 
 this cosmopolitan or cosmic sentiment, reference 
 might be made to a philosopher of a succeeding
 
 100 THE IXDIYIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 generation, whose temper (in the judgment of the 
 friend who knew him best) "seemed to be more 
 happily balanced than that perhaps of any other man 
 I have ever known," and who approached " as nearly 
 to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man 
 as perhaps the nature of human frailty will admit." 
 If this estimate is true — and it does not stand alone 
 — David Hume was certainly not devoid of ' natural ' 
 affection ; and yet, so far from feeling or express- 
 ing any ' entire ' affection towards the species as a 
 whole, he " affirmed that there is no such passion 
 in human minds as the love of mankind, merely as 
 such, independent of personal qualities, of services, 
 or of relation to ourself." ^ And a similar view 
 was expressed by a writer nearer our own day, 
 whose sympathies, like his antipathies, were never 
 imperfect : " Humanity," he said, " is only I writ 
 large, and love for Humanity generally means zeal 
 for MY notions as to what men should be and how 
 they should live. It frequently means distaste for 
 the present. He that loveth not his brother whom 
 he hath seen is peculiarly apt to suppose that he 
 loves his distant cousin whom he hath not seen, 
 and never will see." ' 
 
 Incomplete Shaftcsbury's analysis of human nature thus 
 harmony of f^-j^ ^^ estaWish his vlcw of its final purpose. 
 
 ^ Human Nature, III. ii. 1, ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 481. 
 
 2 J. F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 2nd ed., p. 300.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 101 
 
 He cannot show that social affection to be real social and 
 must take in humanity as a whole ; the social airections. 
 affections are not fully reconciled with the private ; 
 and the admission of ' unnatural ' affections remains 
 to the end a blot in the harmony of the whole. 
 The 'scheme of moral arithmetic' to which he 
 appealed 1 has a dubious result, and, by its very 
 nature as a summation of particulars, could never 
 establish the organic unity at which he aims. 
 
 In the doctrine of the Moral Sense Shaftesbury has 3. The 
 another means for exhibiting the purpose and unity the Moral 
 of man's nature. This ' sense of right and wrong ' ^'"'*®- 
 is asserted to be a " first principle in our constitu- 
 tion," 2 and to it appeal is made for our knowledge 
 of " the eternal measures and immutable inde- 
 pendent nature of worth and virtue " ; ^ by it also 
 the virtue or merit, which " is allowed to man 
 only," is distinguished from the mere goodness 
 which "lies within the reach of all sensible 
 creatures." Shaftesbury did not enter into any 
 thorough analysis of this sense ; but he brought 
 out with sufficient clearness its reflex nature. " In 
 a creature," he says, " capable of forming general 
 notions of things, not only the outward beings 
 which offer themselves to the sense are the objects 
 of the aff'ections, but the very actions themselves, 
 and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and 
 
 1 Inquiry, II. ii. coucl., p. 173. 
 
 - Ibid., I. iii. 1, p. 44. 5 Ibid, I. ii. 3, p. 36.
 
 sense. 
 
 102 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY, 
 
 their contraries, being brought into the mind by 
 reflexion, become objects. So that, by means of 
 this reflected sense, there arises another kind of 
 affection towards those very affections themselves, 
 which have been already felt, and are now become 
 the subject of a new liking or dislike." ^ 
 
 This doctrine of the moral sense was carried 
 out to important but divergent results by Shaftes- 
 bury's intellectual successors, Hutcheson and Butler. 
 (a)Hutche- Hutchesou elaborated the doctrine systematically 
 
 son's view ,.,.,. . , i-i-i 
 
 of the moral ^UQ in detail HI various works; and in his last 
 book, the 'System of Moral Philosophy,' the pro- 
 test against the egoism of Hobbes, carried on by the 
 whole school, finds expression in a complete theory 
 of human nature, in which the ' moral sense ' is 
 supreme, and the ends of conduct are independent 
 of self-interest. Hutcheson, too, approaches more 
 closely than either Shaftesbury or Butler did to the 
 way of looking at human nature which is spoken 
 of in this volume as ' naturalistic' For he denies 
 that reason has any independent function in deter- 
 mining the constitution and direction of the moral 
 sense.2 The questions thus arise — (a) What is the 
 
 ^ Inquiry, I. ii. 3, p. 28. 
 
 ^ " ^^^lat is Reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting 
 any end ? The ultimate end proposed by the common moralists 
 is the happiness of the agent himself, and this certainly he is 
 determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another 
 instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper 
 a principle of virtue as the instinct toward private happiness ? " 
 — Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 115.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 103 
 
 moral sense when not regarded as a rational deter- two ques- 
 mination of the ends of conduct ? and {b) To what ingTtr^^"^ 
 determination of ends or other distinction between 
 right and wrong in action does it lead ? On both 
 these points there is some difierence — of emphasis, 
 at least, if not of definite doctrine — between his 
 early ' Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of 
 Beauty and Virtue ' (1725), and the more mature 
 ' System,' published in 1755, eight years after his 
 death. 
 
 Hutcheson is in earnest with the rejection of (a) Nature of 
 reason as a creative force. The moral sense is not, not'reason^ 
 he says, a source of new ideas. Its objects are 
 received in the ordinary ways by which, through 
 " sensation and reflexion," we come by our know- 
 ledge.^ But just as we have a sense of beauty in 
 the forms of sensible objects, so there is a moral 
 sense given us from which, in the contemplation of 
 our actions, we derive " still nobler pleasures " than 
 those of physical sensation. This moral sense is at first de- 
 
 , . . „ . , . •11 fined as feel- 
 
 a determination or our minds to receive amiable ing of picas- 
 or disagreeable ideas of actions." ^ So far, there- '^''^ ^"^ p'""- 
 fore, it seems to be simply a pleasure in the con- 
 templation of certain actions which, we say, have 
 " an immediate goodness." " By a superior sense," 
 says Hutcheson, " which I call a moral one, we 
 perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such 
 actions in others, and are determined to love the 
 
 ^ Cf. System, i. 97 ; Inquiry, p. 124. - Inquiry, p. 124.
 
 104 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in 
 being conscious of having done such actions our- 
 selves) without any view of further natural advan- 
 tage from them." ^ The significance of this position 
 is easily seen. It is not only meant to give a 
 criterion of moral action; it is also a short cut 
 to the conclusion that virtue is for our private 
 interest. The disquieting suspicion that morality 
 may involve a sacrifice of individual happiness 
 " must be entirely removed, if we have a moral 
 sense and public affections, whose gratifications are 
 constituted by nature our most intense and durable 
 pleasures." ^ The elaborate analysis of conduct and 
 enumeration of the pleasures which various affec- 
 tions and actions bring in their train, which 
 Hutcheson gave in his latest work, were thus 
 unnecessary as long as the position was maintained 
 that the moral sense is emphatically a pleasure or 
 pain, and that the pleasures it gives are the most 
 intense and durable we have. 
 
 There was only an apparent contradiction in 
 this theory which placed the test of morality in 
 a pleasure consequent upon moral action, and yet 
 
 ^ Inquiry, p. 106. 
 
 2 Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affec- 
 tions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), p. xix. Cf. 
 Inquirj', pref., p. viii. : "I doubt we have made philosophy, as 
 well as religion, by our foolish management of it, so austere and 
 ungainly a form, that a gentleman cannot easily bring himself to 
 like it."
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 105 
 
 held that such actions were not performed from 
 interested motives. In the spirit of Butler's psy- 
 chology, Hutcheson contends ^ that virtue is pleas- 
 ant only because we have a natural and immediate 
 tendency towards virtuous action ; our true motive 
 is " some determination of our nature to study the 
 good of others " ; and this, although not always 
 immediately pleasant in itself, is yet succeeded by 
 the calm satisfaction of the moral sense. The real 
 weakness of Hutcheson's position is the fatal one 
 that he cannot show that it corresponds with facts, 
 that the pleasures incidental to the moral sense 
 outweigh all others. Indeed, he defends his opinion 
 in their favour only, in a way which reminds one 
 of Mill's method in the ' Utilitarianism,' by making 
 every juror stand aside unless he has pledged him- 
 self to morality.- It is open to any one, however, 
 to hold that the pleasures of benevolent action and 
 the ' relish ' of the moral sense are not of sufficient 
 hedonistic value to make up for the restraints they 
 put upon conduct and the enjoyments they oblige 
 one to forgo. Even if this position be not correct, 
 it is merely a mistake in estimating doubtful quan- 
 tities. The man who chooses the smaller pleasure 
 will be the loser by his mistake; but we cannot 
 
 J Cf. Inquiry, p. 140 ff. 
 
 ^ Introduction to Moral Philosophy, translated from the Latin, 
 2d ed., 1753, p. 43 ; cf. Essay on the Passions and Affections, &c., 
 p. 128.
 
 106 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 say that the selfish man is to blame for not being 
 benevolent, because the pleasures of benevolence 
 and the moral sense are greatest, any more than 
 we could blame the benevolent man for not being 
 selfish, if selfishness should turn out on the whole 
 to leave a greater hedonistic balance at the indi- 
 vidual's credit, 
 afterwards A morc objective determination of the moral 
 approbatLtf seuse is somctimes given by Hutcheson, especially 
 ordisappro- jj^ jjjg j^ter work. Without professedly changing 
 ground, he ceases to speak of it as a mere feeling 
 of pleasure, and calls it approbation or disapproba- 
 tion ; and, although the approbation is still spoken 
 of as pleasant, and the disapprobation as painful, 
 ' approbation ' and ' pleasure ' are no longer used as 
 synonymous.^ " It is," he says,^ " a natural and 
 immediate determination to approve certain affec- 
 tions and actions consequent upon them ; or a 
 natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not 
 referred to any other quality perceivable by our 
 other senses or by reasoning." Nor is this appro- 
 bation consequent upon the feeling of pleasure 
 which the affection or action produces in us. The 
 action is not "judged good because it gains to the 
 agent the pleasure of self-approbation, but it gains 
 to him this pleasure because it was antecedently 
 good, or had that quality which, by the constitu- 
 
 ^ As in the Inquiry, cf. pref., p. ix. - System, i. 58.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 107 
 
 tion of this sense, we must approve." ^ In further 
 defining this ' approbation ' of the good, how- 
 ever, he does not exhibit Butler's tendency to 
 explain it as a rational principle, but refers it 
 to a "taste or relish"- for certain affections and 
 actions, and this he takes no pains to distinguish 
 from pleasure. 
 
 The analogy he seeks to draw between the moral 
 sense and our other powers does not really favour 
 a distinction of it from pleasure. " To each of our 
 powers," he says, " we seem to have a corresponding 
 taste or sense, recommending the proper use of it 
 to the agent, and making him relish or value the 
 like exercise of it by another. This we see as to 
 the powers of voice, of imitation, designing, or 
 machinery, motion, reasoning; there is a sense 
 discerning or recommending the proper exercise 
 of them." 3 That is to say, besides the sense of 
 hearing, which has to do with sounds, there must 
 needs be another sense which has to do with our 
 way of hearing sounds ; besides the sense of sight, 
 which has to do with form and colour, there must 
 needs be another sense which has to do with our 
 way of perceiving form and colour; and so with 
 every other activity, especially those which proceed 
 from our ' highest powers.' A doctrine such as this 
 sets no limits to the manufacture of additional 
 
 1 System, i. 53. ^ ibi^., i. 59. ' Ibid., i. 59.
 
 108 THE INDR'IDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 senses. The whole view of human nature upon 
 which it proceeds is one of meaningless complexity, 
 which serves the one good purpose only of show- 
 ing how much ethics has suffered from a defective 
 psychology. 
 
 The mental objects or presentations which are 
 distinguished from one another by the difference 
 of their characteristic qualities, and which we 
 therefore call colours, or sounds, or movements, 
 are accompanied by varying degrees of pleasurable 
 or painful feeling ; and it is possible to hold that 
 the moral sense is a name for such feelings following 
 in the train of those complexes of presentations to 
 which we give the name of actions, or of those 
 other more permanent complexes we call affec- 
 tions. This, practically, was the position with 
 which Hutcheson started in the 'Inquiry.' Be- 
 nevolence pleased us and selfishness pained us ; 
 just as the taste of sugar was pleasant, and that 
 of wormwood unpleasant. Perhaps Hutcheson de- 
 parted from this theory, because he saw that if 
 conduct was made a matter of taste, there would 
 be no sufficient reason for condemning selfishness 
 any more than an unusual liking in food or drink. 
 He therefore relinquished, or seems to have re- 
 linquished, the view of the moral sense as a feeling 
 of pleasure or pain ; and under the influence, prob- 
 ably, of Butler, spoke of it as approbation or dis- 
 approbation. But he fell back on his original
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 109 
 
 theory by making this approbation depend on ' a 
 taste or relish,' which only lends itself to inter- 
 pretation as a peculiar feeling of pleasure. 
 
 The reflex nature of the moral sense is brought 0) The ob- 
 
 ,..,., (^ , , • 1 jectsoftlie 
 
 out more distinctly in the ' bystem than in the moral sense: 
 'Inquiry.' In his earlier work, Hutcheson had {1^^^^^^^*^^ 
 spoken of it as directly related to actions. But 
 it was more consistent with its reflective character 
 to regard it as having to do with mental powers 
 or ' affections ' in the first instance, and with actions afterwards 
 only indirectly or mediately. "The object of this tions; 
 sense," he says,^ " is not any external motion or 
 action, but the inward affections or dispositions " ; 
 and this is made by him to account for the dis- 
 crepancy which the deliverances of the moral sense 
 show in regard to actions. It "seems ever to 
 approve and condemn uniformly the same imme- 
 diate objects, the same affections and dispositions ; 
 though we reason very differently about the actions 
 which evidence certain dispositions or their con- 
 traries." This distinction is applied with unlimited 
 confidence in its efficacy. By means of it he would 
 explain the most fundamental differences in the 
 moral codes of men and nations. Thus people un- 
 acquainted with the industrial improvements which 
 give the character of permanence to property, may 
 " see no harm in depriving men of their artificial 
 
 ^ Sj'stem, i. 97. The same view is implied in his Essaj' (1728), 
 p. 276.
 
 110 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 acquisitions and stores beyond their present use," 
 — that is to say, " no evil may appear in theft." ^ 
 
 But it is more important in another respect; for 
 it enables the author to avoid the difficulty of find- 
 ing a principle according to which the moral sense 
 may be related to the empirical content of action. 
 As long as the moral sense was simply spoken of 
 as a feeling of pleasure, it could be conveniently 
 regarded as the consequent of external actions. 
 But if it is an internal sense distinct from pleasure, 
 it is easier to relate it to what he calls our internal 
 powers or affections than to action. The moral 
 sense, then, is to be the regulator of all our powers: 
 " its dignity and commanding nature we are imme- 
 diately conscious of, as we are conscious of the 
 power itself ";2 and by means of it Hutcheson 
 attempts to reduce human nature to a scale of 
 morality. 
 but its It is to be noted that, in the classification he 
 
 preference offers,^ what are commonly called the virtues of 
 candour, veracity, &c., are accounted not as virtues 
 themselves, but only as immediately connected with 
 virtuous affections : these are identified with the 
 'kind' or benevolent affections, directed to the 
 happiness of sentient beings. Within the latter 
 
 1 System, i. 93. = Ibid., i. 61. 
 
 ^ Ibid., i. 68 ff. With this may be compared the elaborate 
 classification of motives, according to their moral quality, in Dr 
 Martineau's 'Types of Ethical Theory,' ii. 176 ff.
 
 MOKAL SENTIMENT. Ill 
 
 there are two grounds of preference : the deliberate 
 affections are preferred to the passionate ; those 
 which are more extensive in the range of their 
 objects to the less extensive. With regard to the 
 former ground of preference, the "moral sense" of 
 the community has perhaps undergone some modi- 
 fication since Hutcheson's time, and looks upon 
 enthusiasm with less suspicion than it formerly 
 did. The other ground of preference ascribed to 
 the moral sense refers not so much to the affection 
 itself — which is the direct or immediate object of 
 the moral sense — as to the way in which the affec- 
 tion is applied, that is, the number of the objects mainly de- 
 to which it is directed. The affection of benevol- the nature 
 ence is the same in nature whether its object be tLn'\u?on 
 wide or restricted; though difference in this respect its objects, 
 profoundly influences the actions to which it leads. 
 The object approved or most approved by the moral 
 sense is therefore, according to Hutcheson, utili- 
 tarian conduct, or rather, as he would say, the calm 
 disposition leading thereto.^ In this way he obtains 
 a principle for determining the morality of actions: 
 but only through the arbitrary assertion that this 
 principle is immediately approved by the moral 
 seuse. The connexion of the moral sense with an 
 object such as universal benevolence, could only be 
 made out by showing a rational, or at any rate 
 an organic, union between individual sentiment and 
 
 ^ System, i. 50.
 
 112 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEOEY. 
 
 social wellbeing ; and Hutcheson's only way of 
 showing this is to exhibit the personal advantages 
 of benevolent conduct, and the disadvantages that 
 accompany selfishness. 
 
 (5) Butler's Both Shaftcsbury and Hutcheson were often led 
 morai°Iense. astray by a tendency to interpret facts as they 
 wished them to be, rather than as they were. 
 Their view of the consequences of action was 
 coloured by their optimism. Butler, too, in spite 
 of the difference in his general attitude to the 
 value of human life, was not altogether free from 
 a similar error. He thinks that Shaftesbury " has 
 shown beyond all contradiction that virtue is natur- 
 ally the interest or happiness, and vice the misery 
 of such a creature as man." ^ But, in view of par- 
 ticular exceptions, or of any one not being con- 
 vinced of "this happy tendency of virtue," he 
 Conscience thinks it ncccssary to emphasise the "natural 
 authority of the principle of reflexion." Con- 
 science is, he holds, a part of our inward nature ; 
 but it differs from the other parts of our nature 
 inasmuch as it is not related immediately to an 
 external object, but to the actions dealing with 
 such objects, and to the dispositions leading to 
 those actions. It is a principle of " reflex appro- 
 bation or disapprobation," which is said to have 
 equal respect to public and to private good. 
 
 ^ Sermons, Pref. 
 
 an authori- 
 tative law,
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 113 
 
 This tendency, however, would seem to be ascer- 
 tained empirically. The deliverances of conscience 
 are immediate judgments as to the morality of 
 actions and affections (for Butler speaks of it as 
 referring to both equally); and its reference to 
 the ends to which those actions or affections may 
 ultimately tend would, therefore, seem to be in- 
 direct.^ Butler was careful, moreover, not to speak 
 of it as an aesthetic or sensitive faculty, but as a 
 judgment. It is not a feeling of pleasure, but the 
 revelation of law. 
 
 The approval of conscience is thus made the and the 
 
 '^ ^ . criterion 
 
 criterion of morality. But a difficulty arises as of morality. 
 to the way in which we are to regard the author- 
 ity which conscience is said to carry along with it. 
 It "bears its own authority," ^ says Butler. His 
 utterances on this point commonly imply a teleo- 
 logical reference to an end implanted in human 
 nature, and to be discovered by observing that 
 nature — the realisation of the end being obliga- 
 tory, because it is shown to be the purpose which 
 the author of nature had in view in making man 
 what he is.^ The authority of conscience thus seems 
 to be derived from the divine purpose which it 
 displays. It carries within itself a claim to obedi- 
 
 1 Although it is not "at all doubtful in the general, what 
 course of action this faculty or practical discerning power within 
 us, approves. . . . It is . . . justice, veracity, and regard to the 
 common good." — Dissertation on Virtue, 
 
 2 Sermons, ii. ^ Sermons, ii. iii. 
 
 H
 
 114 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 Teleological 
 and jural 
 \'iews not 
 reconciled, 
 nor fully 
 developed. 
 
 ence: but the justification of this claim depends 
 on a theological basis. And hence the question 
 of the nature and origin of conscience is at once 
 raised, in order to determine the legitimacy of its 
 claim to be, rather than any other part of our 
 constitution, a divinely-implanted guide. 
 
 But more than one current of thought runs 
 through Butler's ethical treatise. The theological 
 reference is sometimes so used as to make the 
 obligation to morality, and even the nature of 
 morality, depend on the will of God : though 
 hardly according to Paley's crude method of seek- 
 ing in the external revelation of the divine com- 
 mand, a means of uniting the divergent interests 
 of the individual and of society. In general, 
 Butler's ruling idea is the idea of the system or 
 unity of human nature, for which he was largely 
 indebted to Shaftesbury's revival of the Platonic 
 conception. Conscience is regarded by him as the 
 expression of this unity. But its nature is never 
 more deeply probed. Its deliverances are justified 
 now by its supernatural mission, and now by the 
 more prosaic fact that it leads to our individual 
 interest 1 — at any rate, "if we take in the future" 
 — while it could not be recommended as a guide 
 if it did not.- On one side, therefore, Butler tends 
 to a form of theological utilitarianism, such as was 
 common in his own day, and was afterwards formu- 
 1 Sermons, iii. v. - Ibid., ix.
 
 MORAL SENTIMENT. 115 
 
 lated by Paley.^ On the other hand, his ethics 
 more naturally allies itself with a different theory, 
 in which the moral law is conceived as having its 
 source in practical reason, and the naturalistic basis 
 of ethics is definitely abandoned. 
 
 On the whole, it would appear that the psycho- 4. The ethics 
 logical ethics worked out by Shaftesbury and his timenta 
 followers occupies an insecure position between "^eolyT^ 
 the view discussed in the two preceding chapters 
 and that which sees in the spiritual nature of 
 man something more than a reaction to sense- 
 presentation, and assigns to reason a function in 
 the formation of objects of desire. The school of 
 Shaftesbury tried to strike out a middle course 
 between the theory that ends of action may be 
 determined by reason, and that which looks upon 
 all desires as being desires for objects as pleasur- 
 able. They made the attempt to found a system 
 of ethics on human nature, and they held that 
 that nature could not be accounted for by the 
 simple psychological analysis of the Epicurean 
 school as then represented by Hobbes. On the 
 other hand, they did not see their way to adopt 
 the ' rational ' ethics only known to them in the 
 abstract form it had received at the hands of 
 Clarke and Wollaston. But their own theory of 
 human nature requires a principle of harmony and 
 
 1 Cf. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik, i. 192.
 
 116 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 explanation co-ordination among the various impulses of which 
 
 of its T H P f" s 
 
 attempted they wcic unable to give a satisfactory account. It 
 evoiutkin. °^ ^^7 scem, however, that the idea of the develop- 
 ment of man, with which we are now familiar, may 
 enable us to overcome the difficulties which formerly 
 appeared insurmountable — showing the unity of 
 human nature, and the tendency of its activity. 
 The general course of evolution, to which all life 
 has been subject, is thought to have brought about 
 a harmony between individual and social feelings, 
 as well as between individual and social interests, 
 and thus to have removed the obstacles in the way 
 of founding morality on the basis of Naturalism. 
 It is, therefore, of importance to examine with care 
 the ethical bearings of the theory of evolution. 
 But, before proceeding to discuss this theory, it may 
 be well to give some account of the way in which, 
 independently of the doctrine of evolution, the 
 course of nature has been appealed to as the 
 standard of morality.
 
 117 
 
 CHAPTEH V. 
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 
 
 The preceding chapters have been concerned with subjective 
 Subjective Naturalism. The ' nature ' referred to I've Naturai- 
 has been that of the individual man ; and the *^'"" 
 restriction implied by the 'naturalistic' view has 
 been an interpretation of man's nature as consist- 
 ing of reactions to sense -presentation which, in 
 their occurrence and for their guidance, do not 
 stand in need of any non-empirical factor. In the 
 writers dealt with in last chapter, however, — at 
 any rate, in Shaftesbury and in Butler, — we have 
 found the recognition of a spiritual factor in human 
 nature which prevented iis from classing their 
 doctrines as naturalistic. "We have also found in 
 Shaftesbury, and there may be found in Butler, 
 a reference to the moral significance of the larger 
 system of things in which human nature is in- 
 cluded. And, in so far as this is present, their 
 doctrine is not individualistic, nor even merely
 
 118 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 tionist views 
 of the 
 moral sig- 
 nificance of 
 nature. 
 
 social, but depends on their view of reality as a 
 whole. The view of nature as a connected whole, 
 and of its development in time, has been defined 
 by modern science, and has given rise to what is 
 i.pre-evoiu. somctimes called the 'ethics of evolution.' But, 
 before going on to examine this theory in detail, it 
 may be well to pass shortly in review earlier concep- 
 tions of the moral significance of nature, as these 
 may shed some light on the later doctrine. 
 
 The appeal to the moral authority of nature is 
 most frequently met with in the literature which 
 heralded the revolutions of the eighteenth century. 
 The social, economic, and political order seemed to 
 exaggerate the distinction between nature and con- 
 vention; and the struggle against the latter thus 
 came to involve an appeal to the former. But the 
 idea was no product of the period; and it had a 
 long and eventful history behind it. That morality 
 was due to convention only and not to nature 
 seems to have been a favourite thesis of more than 
 one of the ancient Sophists ;i and their criticism 
 called forth a defence of the naturalness of morality. 
 The assertion of this position became of greater im- 
 portance for practical life when the old political 
 and religious authority was weakened with the 
 decline of the Greek state. And it was at this 
 period that the Stoics, with full consciousness, put 
 
 1 E.g., Hippias in Plato's Protagoras, 337, and ThrasjTnachus 
 in the Republic, i. 339. 
 
 ' Nature ' 
 contrasted 
 with 'con- 
 vention,'
 
 NATUKE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 119 
 
 forward the maxim ' live according to nature,' and 
 based morality upon the laws of the world as a 
 whole. At the same time the world was inter- 
 preted as a rational or divine order. For them and inter. 
 Nature, Eeason, and God had the same meaning ; ratioMiT 
 and the moral law could be described with equal 
 accuracy as the law of nature, or the law of reason, 
 or the law of God. In this scheme of thought the 
 individual was not divided from the whole : human 
 reason was held to be a part of the divine reason. 
 This doctrine was elaborated and defined in con- 
 troversy with the Epicureans, who adopted the 
 Sophistic view that morality is the result of a 
 convention, and who held that the state, which 
 enforces the moral law, is itself the result of an 
 'original compact.' 
 
 The Stoic conception inspired the appeal to 
 nature which characterises much of eighteenth- 
 century ethics, after it had itself been modified 
 in various ways in the course of ages. It had 
 been defined by the Koman jurists, who found in 
 it a philosophical basis for law. The Stoic 'law 
 of nature ' seems also to have been confused with 
 the /ws gentium — the rules for the decision of 
 causes in which one of the parties was not a 
 Eoman citizen, and therefore not a participant 
 in the privileges of the Eoman or civil law. This 
 system was characterised by simplicity of cere- 
 monial and by disregard for differences of race or
 
 120 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 social position. And on this account it seems to 
 have come to be identified with the Stoic concep- 
 tion, and to have been looked upon not simply as 
 a means of settling the disputes of persons outside 
 the pale of citizenship, but as the law of nature 
 of which all positive codes were corruptions, or to 
 which they were approximations. The 'law of 
 nature' thus gained content through being iden- 
 tified with an actual code. A further gain resulted 
 from a further confusion, when the jus gentium 
 was identified with the laws or customs which 
 regulate the relations of nations to one another : 
 so that what is now called international law gained 
 the dignity of the law of nature, and the phrase 
 'law of nature and of nations' arose. 
 
 New scope was given for the application of this 
 law of nature to morals and politics by the weaken- 
 ing of political and ecclesiastical authority which 
 marked the close of the middle ages. The dogmas 
 of the freedom and equality of men, under the 
 ' law of nature,' had already become part of the 
 stock-in-trade of philosophical jurists ; they stood 
 ready to be utilised by the critic of political and 
 economic institutions ; and the ' nature ' from which 
 they were supposed to be derived might serve as a 
 guide for conduct. 
 of twsTon-^ -^^^ influence of this conception upon the English 
 ception on moralists is obvious. Hobbes's theory is throuerh- 
 
 the English *' » 
 
 morausts. out E satirc upou the doctrine of the morality or
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 121 
 
 excellence of nature. His ' laws of nature ' imply 
 the abrogation of the 'state of nature' and the 
 restraint of man's natural impulses. The nature 
 of man, according to him, is not simply non- 
 moral : it is contra-social, and therefore opposed 
 to that which is the origin of morality. On the 
 other hand Locke, writing in the interests of the 
 English Revolution Settlement, maintained the Stoic 
 view of a law of nature, the authority of which 
 cannot be superseded even by the contract which 
 sets the sovereign on the throne. The philosophical 
 conception which underlies this view is alien to the 
 general theory of Locke ; but it is, as we have seen, 
 of the essence of Shaftesbury's doctrine. The same 
 point of view is to be found in Butler. His first 
 work is mainly occupied with human nature ; his 
 later work, the ' Analogy,' adds to this a view of 
 nature in the wider sense — or what might be called 
 Greater Nature — as also a moral force. Both con- Butler's 
 ceptions are governed by the doctrine that Nature, „atlre as a 
 whether in the larger or in the narrower sense, is ™°'^i°''<^«'"' 
 a constitution or system. It is neglect of this 
 consideration that makes some men say that in 
 following impulse they are obeying nature/ or that 
 particular instances of successful vice or suffering 
 virtue are inconsistent with " the wisdom, justice, 
 and goodness of the constitution of Nature." ^ The 
 
 ^ Sermons, ii. ; Works, ii. 20 ff. 
 
 ^ Analogy, part ii. chap. iv. ; Works, i. 187.
 
 122 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 essence of human nature is to be found in certain 
 reflective or rational principles which have obvious 
 authority over the particular affections or impulses ; 
 and the essence of Greater Nature consists in this 
 that it is " a scheme in which means are made use 
 of to accomplish ends, and which is carried on by 
 general laws." 
 
 As this scheme is only imperfectly known to us, 
 it is impossible for Butler to put forward Greater 
 Nature as the moral standard for conduct. At the 
 same time, this imperfection in our knowledge is 
 used as an answer to all objections to the morality 
 of nature, and allows Butler to maintain that " the 
 natural and moral constitution and government of 
 the world are so connected as to make up together 
 but one scheme," and that " it is highly probable 
 that the first is formed and carried on merely in 
 subserviency to the latter, as the vegetable world 
 is for the animal and organised bodies for minds." ^ 
 The scheme of human nature is, however, more 
 clearly revealed : though, in Butler's first exposi- 
 tion of it, he seems unable to decide between 
 the relative claims of the two systems, private 
 and public, to which man by his nature belongs. 
 On the whole, however, and in spite of this hesita- 
 tion, he looks upon Conscience as the ultimately 
 authoritative guide. The standard of morality is 
 thus found in human nature, and in human nature 
 
 ^ Analogy, part i. chap. vii. ; Works, i. 126.
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 123 
 
 in so far as it is charged with a power of reviewing 
 and judging impulses and their ends : as we might 
 say, in so far as it is the " vehicle of a spiritual 
 principle." 
 
 In all this, although moral authority is ascribed 
 to nature, there is no trace of what is now tech- 
 nically called ' naturalism.' Conscience is supreme 
 in man, and represents the divine purpose; and 
 the divine scheme — could we comprehend it — 
 would explain both man and the world. In both 
 the spiritual principle is the highest, and the 
 highest has the right to rule. It is when the The natural 
 
 1 • 1. • • contrasted 
 
 appeal is made to nature as contrasted with spirit, ^itu the 
 or to instinct as against reason, that the influence 
 of a different view, allied to ' naturalism,' may be 
 traced. The old contrast between 'nature' and 
 ' convention ' easily passes into an opposition be- 
 tween the natural and the reflective. This is to 
 be seen not only in the early work of Eousseau,^ Rousseau. 
 and in much of the literature of the period, but 
 also in a philosophical writer whose point of view 
 closely resembles Butler's. 
 
 In his treatise on the ' Moral Sentiments ' Adam Adam 
 Smith finds the ethical standard in human nature, 
 and he also defends the morality of Greater Nature 
 
 ^ Discours sur I'origine et les fondemeus de I'inegalite pariiii les 
 homines (1753). In the Contrat Social (1760) the superiority of 
 the natural state of man to the civil or political is no longer 
 asserted.
 
 124 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 in a manner similar to Butler's. It is only, he says, 
 when the " general rules by which prosperity and 
 adversity are commonly distributed " are con- 
 sidered in a " cool and philosophical light " that 
 they " appear to be perfectly suited to the situation 
 of mankind in this life." Though " established for 
 the wisest and best purposes, they sometimes pro- 
 duce effects which shock all his [man's] natural 
 sentiments." But man is himself a part of nature, 
 an instrument in the hands of providence. He " is 
 by nature directed to correct, in some measure, 
 that distribution of things which she herself would 
 otherwise have made." In this way, "like the 
 gods of the poets, he is perpetually interposing, by 
 extraordinary means, in favour of virtue and in 
 opposition to vice, and, like them, endeavours to 
 turn away the arrow that is aimed at the head 
 of the righteous, but to accelerate the sword of 
 destruction that is lifted up against the wicked." 
 Yet it is an unequal strife, even although nature 
 may herself have armed her opponent: "the 
 natural course of things cannot be entirely con- 
 trolled by the impotent endeavours of man: the 
 current is too rapid and too strong for him to 
 stop it." ^ It would seem, therefore, that Greater 
 Nature cannot be a moral guide for conduct, since 
 it is open to correction by man. It is only when 
 we understand the ' general rules ' by which it 
 ^ Moral Sentiments, part iii. chap. v.
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 125 
 
 works that we can vindicate its morality. Smith 
 is not far from Butler's position, that nature is 
 good because it comes from God, and that, if we 
 cannot always see its goodness, this is due to our 
 imperfect comprehension of the system of nature 
 as a whole. 
 
 The conception of the natural order as a divine 
 order underlies the whole fabric of the 'Wealth 
 of Nations,' though it is expressed only in one or 
 two remarkable sentences. And in this work the 
 author shows no favour towards that interference 
 with the natural disposition of things for which 
 he had left room in the ' Moral Sentiments.' His 
 survey of the different systems of state-regulated 
 industry had convinced him that the state in- 
 variably went wrong when it interfered with 
 the " natural progress " of opulence. This progress 
 moves, he thinks, in an orderly manner, beginning 
 with what is fundamental or necessary to human 
 subsistence, and gradually raising upon this the 
 superstructure of social refinement ; and the same 
 process is held to be in harmony with the natural 
 inclinations of the individual. But governments, 
 in trying to anticipate the end of the process, have 
 reversed the natural order, and thus hindered the 
 growth of national wealth.^ Nature is looked 
 upon by Adam Smith as working through the 
 impulse of the individual towards self-preservation 
 
 ^ Wealth of Nations, book iii. chap. i.
 
 126 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 — "the natural effort of every individual to better 
 his own condition " — towards a further end.^ He 
 distrusts any deliberate or conscious effort even of 
 the individual towards this further end, as inter- 
 fering with the means which are overruled by 
 providence for its attainment. And the action of 
 the state, in so far as it involves the deliberate 
 guidance of industry, is looked upon as outside of 
 and indeed opposed to nature. Individual effort di- 
 rected to individual welfare is natural, and, as such, 
 part of the providential scheme which produces 
 social welfare out of individual selfishness ; but, so 
 far as directed to other or altruistic objects, it also 
 is regarded with suspicion, — indeed with derision.- 
 Amidst the looseness of thought which character- 
 
 1 Wealth of Nations, book iv. chap. ii. : " He iuteuds only his 
 ovra gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
 invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his inten- 
 tion." Cf. Kaut, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte (1784) ; 
 Werke, ed. Hartenstein, iv. 143 : "Eiuzelue Menschen und selbst 
 ganze Volker denkeu wenig darau, dass, indem sie, ein jedes nach 
 seinem Sinne und einer oft wider den anderen ilire eigene Absicht 
 verfolgen, sie unbemerkt an der Naturabsicht, die ihneu selbst 
 unbekannt ist, als an eiuem Leitfaden fortgeheu, und an derselben 
 Beforderuug arbeiten, an welcher, selb.st wenu sie ihnen bekannt 
 wiirde, ihnen doch wenig gelegen sein wiirde. " 
 
 - Wealth of Nations, book iv. chap. ii. : " By pursuing his own 
 interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectu- 
 ally than when he really intends to promote it. I have never 
 known much good done by those who affected to trade for the 
 public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among 
 merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading 
 them from it."
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 127 
 
 ises Adam Smith's use of the term ' natural,' ^ the 
 pretty constant implication may be discovered of 
 an opposition to the deliberate or reflective. 
 Nature is not regarded, in the way Butler re- 
 garded it, as expressing its essence when it 
 becomes reflective and self-conscious. The 'nat- 
 ural' is the fundamental and immediate, the in- 
 stinctive rather than the reflective : though the 
 moral character of this ' natural order ' rests upon 
 the assumption of a divinity which shapes our ends 
 and subordinates them to purposes of its own. 
 The end which Nature (in the larger sense) may be 
 said to have in view is social as well as individual ; 
 but Smith holds that the ' invisible hand ' that 
 directs it makes use of individuals as its instru- 
 ments to the almost complete exclusion of states. 
 
 As we have seen the word ' natural,' as it is 3. Amtig- 
 used in ethical and political discourse, is not the term 
 merely ambiguous : it is a tangled skein in which "''^^^'"'^ • 
 no one thread of meaning can be drawn out long. 
 But two meanings predominate amidst the con- 
 fusion ; and these meanings are distinct and even 
 antagonistic. In the first place, the ' natural ' may 
 mean the primitive — something that belonged to 
 
 ^ Hasbach distinguishes the following meanings : rational ; in 
 the natural course of things ; according to human nature ; self- 
 evident ; usual. — Philosophi.sche Grundlagen der von Quesnay 
 und Adam Smith begrtindeten politischen Okonomie (1890), 
 p. 87.
 
 128 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 asequivai- the thing in question from the time that it first 
 
 ent to the , i t i • • (• • ^ ^ 
 
 primitive, began to be. In this sense, if we said that man is 
 ' naturally ' a moral being, we should mean that at 
 no period of his history was he without moral ideas 
 for the guidance of conduct ; and, if we were to say 
 that he should be guided by ' nature,' we should be 
 implying that moral authority belongs to the primi- 
 tive to the exclusion of the mature and developed : 
 that instinct, for example, is to be preferred to 
 reason, that the physiological nature of man is a 
 better guide than the spiritual. The other mean- 
 er as refer- ing of the term is very different. In it the ' natural ' 
 state which Condition of a thing may be said to be that coudi- 
 idea ofV^^ tion which it is fitted to attain, in which its possi- 
 thing. bilities have their fullest and appropriate exercise, 
 
 or which, in a word, realises the idea of the thing. 
 In this sense to say that man is ' naturally ' a moral 
 being has a different meaning from what it had 
 before. It means that morality is necessary for 
 the realisation of the ' end ' to which he is adapted. 
 And, if it be said that we should live ' according to 
 nature,' this phrase also acquires a new meaning : 
 for ' nature ' is now identified with the realisation 
 of an idea, for which instinct and physiological 
 process are alike subordinate to rational and spirit- 
 ual development. In this latter sense the term was 
 used by Aristotle when he asserted that man was 
 by nature a social or political being and that the 
 stateless man must be either less or more than
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 129 
 
 human. With the Stoics also, and the greater 
 writers who were inspired by the Stoics, the 
 emphasis was not laid on the primitiveness of 
 reason, when the natural was identified with the 
 rational. But it would seem that it is not easy 
 always to keep strictly to the distinction between 
 logical and temporal priority. When common con- 
 sent is made the test of truth, as it was by Cicero,^ 
 or when appeal is made to the ' quod semper, quod 
 ubique, quod ab omnibus ' of ecclesiastical tradi- 
 tion, the implication is that what is always found, 
 and was therefore present from the beginning, is 
 an authoritative guide for thought and action. 
 
 In this way the authoritativeness of reason or 
 conscience would depend on its priority in time. 
 But to assert that reason rather than instinct is 
 primitive in man would be a hard saying. Be- 
 sides, the appeal to nature seems always to have 
 been accompanied by a criticism of the conven- 
 tions and artifices of an existing social order. A 
 simpler order was desired, and it was easy to 
 confuse the simplicity of instinct with the sim- 
 plicity of reason. The confusion has been illus- 
 trated from the writings of Adam Smith ; but it 
 was shared by many other writers of his own and 
 other times. The confusion itself is very simple. 
 The authority claimed for ' nature ' depends upon 
 its goodness ; and, for Smith and others, this means 
 
 ^ "Omnium consensus natursc vox est." — Cicero, Tusc. i. 35. 
 
 I
 
 130 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 that it depends upon its divine origin. But, be- 
 cause a spiritual plan dominates the world, it does 
 not follow that what is primitive in each part is 
 to be preferred to that which is of later growth : 
 instinct is not more 'natural' than reason. 
 
 The theory of Natural Law and Natural Eights, 
 in which moral authority is in one way or another 
 ascribed to nature, can be reached only if nature 
 be looked at from a point of view which is neither 
 ' naturalistic ' nor empirical. This theory, to which 
 were due the ' ideas of the revolution,' flourished 
 best in the soil of an a 'priori philosophy. In 
 England the ' ideas of the revolution ' were almost 
 supplanted, early in the nineteenth century, by 
 a system of ' philosophical radicalism ' framed by 
 empirical thinkers. Bentham saw quite clearly 
 that the doctrine of a law of nature and of natural 
 rights introduced an a ■priori element into thought 
 which was inconsistent with the empirical phil- 
 osophy. And it was largely owing to his influence 
 that the appeal to nature ceased to find favour 
 with English moralists and jurists.^ 
 
 4. Miirs The disregard into which the conception had 
 
 the morality fallen Icuds frcshucss to the method of treatment 
 of nature ^^igh it rccelvcd in J. S. Mill's essay on Nature.^ 
 
 ^ Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy, p. 385. 
 ^ Written between 1850 and 1858 ; first published (posthum- 
 ously) in his Three Essays on Religion, 1874.
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 131 
 
 Mill was perhaps not fully alive to the important 
 historical antecedents of the conception. But he 
 was at least unaffected by its ambiguities, and, 
 when he spoke of ' nature,' meant the same thing 
 by the word as does the writer on natural science. 
 He looked upon the doctrine of the moral authority 
 of nature as no longer an element in the philos- 
 ophical literature of his day, but as simply the sur- 
 vival of an old fallacy, whose influence on popular 
 thought still required to be exposed. In its theo- 
 logical bearing Mill's view of nature is closely 
 related to that of Butler in the ' Analogy ' : though 
 he empliasised the imperfections which appear to 
 us in the working of natural forces in a manner 
 foreign to Butler's unimpassioned intelligence, and 
 drew from them a very different inference. Apart 
 altogether from its theological applications, the 
 doctrine of the essay is of peculiar interest, for it 
 occupies a middle position between older modes of 
 thought and those which are specially characteristic 
 of the present day. 
 
 The views of Mill cannot be better expressed 
 than in his own summary : — 
 
 "The word Nature has two principal meanings: 
 it either denotes the entire system of things, with 
 the aggregate of all their properties, or it de- 
 notes things as they would be, apart from human 
 intervention. 
 
 " In the first of these senses, the doctrine that
 
 132 
 
 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 shows the 
 impossibil- 
 ity of re- 
 garding 
 either the 
 external 
 order of 
 nature, 
 
 man ought to follow nature is unmeaning; since 
 man has no power to do anything else than follow 
 nature ; all his actions are done through, and in 
 obedience to, some one or many of nature's physical 
 or mental laws. 
 
 " In the other sense of the term, the doctrine 
 that man ought to follow nature, or in other words, 
 ought to make the spontaneous course of things 
 the model of his voluntary actions, is equally irra- 
 tional and immoral. 
 
 " Irrational, because all human action whatever 
 consists in altering, and all useful action in im- 
 proving, the spontaneous course of nature : 
 
 " Immoral, because the course of material pheno- 
 mena being replete with everything which when 
 committed by human beings is most worthy of 
 abhorrence, any one who endeavoured in his actions 
 to imitate the natural course of things would be 
 universally seen and acknowledged to be the 
 wickedest of men." ^ 
 
 " In sober truth," he says in another passage, 
 "nearly all the things which men are hanged or 
 imprisoned for doing to one another are nature's 
 everyday performances." ^ 
 
 In his passionate denunciation of natural forces 
 Mill treats them as forming a stationary system ; 
 he takes little or no account of the view that 
 nature may be progressively working out an end 
 
 ^ Three Essays on Religion, p. 68. ^ Ibid., p. 28.
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 133 
 
 in interaction with human beings. " If Nature and 
 Man are both the works of a Being of perfect good- 
 ness," he says, then " that Being intended Nature 
 as a scheme to be amended, not imitated, by man." ^ 
 He overlooks the hypothesis, which is surely com- 
 plementary to his own, that Nature may be in- 
 tended to draw out and develop human character. 
 The idea that man, the highest product of nature, 
 is both educated by nature and the instrument by 
 means of which natural law may be turned to 
 moral ends is suggested by many of his arguments, 
 and may have been prevented from receiving dis- 
 tinct expression only by his underlying assumption 
 that nature is radically bad. Had Mill written a 
 few years later, a wider view of man's relation to 
 natural forces might have been forced upon his 
 attention by the theory of evolution. 
 
 Even within the essay there are considerations 
 which might have led the author to bring into 
 prominence this other aspect of the relation be- 
 tween nature and man. Having shown the im- 
 possibility of adopting the external course of nature 
 as a rule of life, he asks what moral guidance can 
 be given by the nature of man himself. "There oi the 
 is," he says, " one particular element in the con- factoi-s of 
 struction of the world, which to minds on the look- ';'''"*" "'J' 
 out for special indications of the Creator's will, has ^'^^^ ^und- 
 
 aid ; 
 
 appeared, not without plausibility, peculiarly fitted 
 
 ^ Three Essaj-s on Religion, p. 41.
 
 134 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 to afford them — viz., the active impulses of human 
 and other animated beings." ^ This view, if un- 
 qualified in statement, would, as Mill points out, 
 obliterate the whole distinction between good and 
 evil in conduct. With it we are already familiar : 
 it results from the confusion of the prior in time 
 with the higher in importance, so that impulse 
 and instinct are thought to be superior in moral 
 authority to deliberation, perhaps as being more 
 immediate effects of the divine handiwork. Mill's 
 treatment of this doctrine gives an interesting in- 
 dication of his own views. He does not in so 
 many words maintain that man is radically bad ; 
 but " it remains true," he says, " that nearly every 
 respectable attribute of humanity is the result not 
 of instinct, but of a victory over instinct." " It is 
 only in a highly artificialised condition of human 
 nature," he adds, "that the notion grew up or, I 
 believe, ever could have grown up, that goodness 
 was natural : because only after a long course of 
 artificial education did good sentiments become so 
 habitual, and so predominant over bad, as to arise 
 unprompted when occasion called for them." ^ If 
 we judge instinct by the conduct of early and un- 
 civilised races, we find neither virtue nor the love 
 of virtue, only a capacity for acquiring it. Hobbes 
 had long before described the pre-social or savage 
 life as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"; 
 ^ Three Essays on Religion, \:>. 43. ^ Ibid., p. 46.
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 135 
 
 Mill adds a companion picture of the nature of 
 savages : selfish, passionate, cowardly, dirty, always 
 liars, and without any sense of justice. It is only 
 because mankind are guided by interest, that is, 
 in so far as a deliberate estimate of consequences 
 overrules instinctive action, that the tendencies to 
 evil do not overcome the tendencies to good in 
 human nature.^ The rational factor in progress is 
 exaggerated by Mill ; but its importance is rightly 
 empliasised as against instinct's claim to guide, and 
 its influence has been constantly on the increase. 
 It ought to be observed, however, that the bene- 
 ficial effects of rational guidance depend upon the 
 insight which reason gives into the natural and 
 social conditions of welfare. To understand the 
 laws of nature and of social wellbeing, is to have 
 taken the first step towards adapting conduct to 
 circumstances ; and the individual human being is 
 educated and moralised through this intelligent 
 adaptation. 
 
 For the appeal to nature Mill substitutes a 
 deliberate calculation of the felicific results of 
 conduct. But even this calculation depends upon 
 knowledge of the nature of man and of the world, butover- 
 Ifc does not prove nature to be the standard of influence of 
 right and wrong ; but it does show that the moral- ordeTonwle 
 isation of man has taken place by interaction with growth of 
 
 moral 
 
 a natural and social order, which may therefore character. 
 
 1 
 
 Tliree Essaj-s on Religion, p. 53.
 
 136 THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY. 
 
 claim to stand in intimate relation with human 
 morality. 
 
 The older doctrine of the moral significance of 
 nature depended, in the last resort, on an implied 
 reference to a divine order which it was man's 
 duty to understand and follow. Against this 
 doctrine Mill laid down the counter-position that, 
 if God is good He must intend the happiness of 
 His creatures, and that this result can only be 
 attained by correcting nature, not by following it : 
 seeing that the course of nature, if uninterfered 
 with, leads to misery. But this opposition of 
 nature to morality is more abrupt than his pre- 
 misses justify. It is something that nature lends 
 itself to improvement. It is besides an orderly 
 system ; and it promotes order amongst those who 
 live within it. It displays adaptations ; and it 
 encourages their foresight. To improve it needs 
 effort and co-operation : so that its very imper- 
 fections are fitted to cultivate the personal and 
 social virtues of man. 
 
 Had Mill written a few years later it is not 
 likely that he would have been content to regard 
 nature as a stationary system. Even before the 
 publication of his essay, Darwin's work had modi- 
 fied the scientific view of the relation of living 
 beings to their environment ; and the suggestion 
 had been already made that the new theory of 
 evolution might be able to explain morality and
 
 NATURE AS THE MORAL STANDARD. 137 
 
 furnish the guidance for conduct which had been 
 sought in vain from older doctrines about Nature. 
 Mill's criticisms did not prevent the elaboration 
 and wide acceptance of an ' ethics of evolution.' 
 But they seem to have penetrated within the inner 
 circle of the evolutionists, and, twenty years after MiU'scriti- 
 his death, his passionate impeachment of the peated by 
 methods of Nature was echoed in Huxley's equally ""^j^^^g 
 vigorous denunciation of the immorality of the evolutionist 
 
 ° -^ point of 
 
 Cosmic Process. " Nature," said Mill, is " a scheme view. 
 to be amended, not imitated, by man," And, for 
 similar reasons, Huxley contended " that the ethical 
 progress of society depends, not on imitating the 
 cosmic process, still less in running away from it, 
 but in combating it." ^ To determine the measure 
 of truth in this opinion requires an independent 
 examination of the theory of evolution in relation 
 to morality. 
 
 1 Evolution and Ethics (Collected Essays, vol. ix. ), p. 83.
 
 138 
 
 PART 11. 
 
 THE THEOEY OF EYOLUTION. 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 OF MORALITY. 
 
 1. General 
 characteris- 
 tics of the 
 theory of 
 evolution : 
 
 To relinquish the individualistic theory of ethics 
 does not necessarily imply a recourse to evolution. 
 It may still be possible to rest the foundation of 
 ethics on the state, without that view of the 
 growth of the community and of its connexion 
 with the individual which the theory of evolution 
 involves. This, as has already been pointed out, 
 was, in part, what Bentham did ; while an attempt 
 — in some respects more elaborate still — to deduce 
 morality from society was made by Hobbes. The 
 theory of Bentham, and of his successor Professor 
 Bain, is indeed partly individualistic, partly social.^ 
 ^ The social basis of ethics is emphasised by Bain in his Practi-
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 139 
 
 111 the former reference, ethics becomes a theory 
 of prudence ; in the latter, a part of legislation. 
 With Hobbes, on the other hand, the identification 
 of individual and social interests is supposed to 
 be brought about by the absolute necessity, for 
 personal security, of a supreme political power, 
 into the hands of which all men have agreed to 
 transfer their rights to all things. But both 
 Hobbes and Bain might have avoided obvious 
 difificulties had they had the theory of evolution 
 to assist them, and had they thought themselves 
 justified in making use of it.^ For want of it 
 the former had to explain morality and its binding 
 force by means of the fiction of an 'original con- 
 tract ' ; while the latter had to account by the as- 
 sociations of a few years for the harmony of feel- 
 ing between the individual and the whole, and 
 for the good of the community coming to be so 
 faithfully reflected in the consciences of its mem- 
 
 cal Essays (1884), p. 155 : " ' How is society to be held together ? ' 
 is the first consideration ; and the sociologist — as constitution- 
 builder, administrator, judge— is the person to gi-apple -with the 
 problem. It is with him that law, obligation, right, command, 
 obedience, sanction, have their origin and their explanation. 
 Ethics is an important supplement to social or political law. But 
 it is still a department of law. In any other view it is a maze, a 
 mystery, a hopeless embroilment." 
 
 ^ Without denying that it is possible to apply the theory of 
 evolution to mind, Bain holds that, as a fact, moral sentiment 
 has not become organic and hereditary — " that there are no 
 moral instincts properly so called." — The Emotions and the "Will, 
 p. 56.
 
 140 THE THEOPtY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 bers. The theory of evolution gives a scientific 
 basis for this existing solidarity between man and 
 society. 
 
 The consensus of opinion amongst those who are 
 best qualified to judge — amongst those who alone 
 are qualified to judge — may be regarded as having 
 established the claim of the theory of evolution to 
 give the most satisfactory account of all forms of 
 natural life. And it may seem only advancing the 
 theory a step further, or only developing one of its 
 applications, to make it yield a complete explana- 
 tion of human nature, mental as well as physical. 
 If ethics, then, is to be founded on a ' natural ' 
 basis, no theory would seem to be complete which 
 leaves evolution out of account. 
 an assertion In general, the theory of evolution is an assertion 
 ^^fiife; of the unity of life, or, in its widest form, of the 
 unity of existence. The facts of heredity and vari- 
 ation, coupled with the ' selection ' of those varieties 
 which are best adapted to the environment, are, it 
 is contended, sufficient to explain the different 
 forms and species which life now manifests. The 
 assumption is specially discarded that there are 
 fixed differences between kinds of living things 
 making it impossible for them all to have de- 
 veloped from simple germs, which have, in the 
 course of time, become more heterogeneous and 
 complex, and so give rise to the wealth of organic
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 141 
 
 life. The general doctrine of evolution — in itself 
 almost as old as the history of thought, and held 
 in modern times by Kant, Wolff, and Lamarck — 
 needed to be supplemented by a definite view of 
 the way in which progressive modifications have 
 taken place ; and this view required to be estab- 
 lished as a really operative cause, before evolution 
 could receive scientific proof. This more special 
 element of the theory was Darwin's contribution 
 to the subject. Evolution, he showed — and herein 
 consists his theoretical advance on Lamarck — has 
 taken place by the ' natural selection ' of those 
 varieties of living beings which happen to be best 
 fitted for survival in the struggle for existence. 
 Organisms which have developed advantageous 
 modifications tend to survive, and to transmit their 
 modified structure to descendants, while organisms 
 without such modifications are less able to preserve 
 their life and to hand it on to successors. Older 
 types, it is true, remain, but only in circumstances 
 in which their continued existence does not seri- 
 ously interfere with the organisms which, in the 
 struggle for life, have developed a structure better 
 suited to their environment : when more perfect 
 and less perfect forms cannot exist together, only 
 the better adapted survive. 
 
 The theory of evolution is thus primarily the intiienrst 
 history of an order of sequent facts and relations, historical
 
 which may 
 have ethical 
 conse- 
 quences. 
 
 142 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 It is an account of the origin or growth of things 
 which attempts to explain their nature and consti- 
 tution by showing how they have come to be what 
 they are. But, in so doing, it naturally reveals the 
 but implies method and tendency of this order. And it is by 
 
 a teleologi- c i • • i i • i 
 
 cai aspect, mcaus 01 this its tclcological aspect that we see how 
 it may seem to be able, not merely to trace the de- 
 velopment of historical facts, such as the feelings 
 and customs of men, but at the same time to make 
 a more real contribution to ethics by pointing out 
 the course of action to which human nature is 
 adapted. It does not, like the old teleology, at- 
 tempt to show that each thing has been formed 
 with the design of subserving some particular 
 purpose. On the contrary, it reverses this way of 
 looking at thiugs. The fitness of an organism to 
 fulfil any definite end comes to be regarded as the 
 result not of a conscious design, independent of the 
 environment, but of the modifications produced in 
 the organism through the necessity laid upon it by 
 its surroundings of adapting itself to them or else 
 disappearing. What the theory does show is, that 
 adaptation to environment is necessary for life, and 
 that organisms unable to adapt themselves pass 
 away. Adaptation to environment will thus be 
 implied in, or be an essential means towards, self- 
 preservation and race-preservation, self-development 
 and race-development. And, should this preser- 
 vation or development he looked upon as the end of
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 143 
 
 conduct^ the adaptation to environment it implies 
 may help to define and characterise the end. 
 
 Again : when an organism adapts itself to its 
 environment, it does so by some modification being 
 produced in its structure corresponding to the modi- 
 fied function required by the conditions of life. In 
 this way, one organism increases in complexity in a 
 certain direction, while another organism, in differ- 
 ent circumstances, also develops a more compli- 
 cated structure, tliough one of a different kind. 
 Thus organisms, alike to begin with, become heter- 
 ogeneous in nature through exposure to different 
 surroundings. At the same time, by constant 
 interaction with their environments, they become 
 more definite and coherent in structure. Incipient 
 modifications are developed and defined in different 
 ways by different circumstances, and the parts of 
 a living being are brought into closer reciprocal 
 relations, and thus welded into a coherent organic 
 whole. This is what Spencer meant by saying that 
 evolution implies a transition from " an indefinite 
 incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent 
 heterogeneity " : ^ the whole process being inter- 
 connected in such a way that these different 
 aspects of it — defiuiteness, coherence, heterogeneity 
 — increase together and imply one another. By 
 
 ^ An assumption which is often made without the justification 
 of which it stands in need. See below, pp. 283, 321 ff. 
 2 First Principles, 4th ed., p. 380.
 
 144 
 
 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Distinction 
 of its his- 
 torical and 
 ethical 
 aspects. 
 
 this the inference would appear to be suggested 
 that, if conduct is to harmonise with the conditions 
 of evohition, this characteristic feature of it must 
 be recognised in the ethical end. 
 
 In saying this, I am perhaps anticipating results. 
 But it is well to show at the outset how the essen- 
 tially historical enquiry carried out by the evolu- 
 tionists may be thought to imply conclusions which 
 are ethical in their nature. To some, indeed, it 
 will appear superfluous to have spent even a 
 sentence in suggesting a primd facie case for the 
 ethical importance of evolution. If there is one 
 subject more than another, it may be said, which 
 has secured a place for itself in the scientific con- 
 sciousness of the day, it is the evolution-theory of 
 ethics. Without question, the phrase has been 
 received into the scientific vocabulary ; but there 
 is a good deal, even in the official literature on 
 the question, to make one doubt whether it is 
 always used with a distinct conception of its mean- 
 ing. When reference is made to the ' ethics of 
 evolution,' no more is sometimes meant — though 
 a great deal more should be meant — than an his- 
 torical account of the growth of moral ideas and 
 customs, which may provide (as Sir L. Stephen 
 expressed it) "a new armoury wherewith to en- 
 counter certain plausible objections of the so-called 
 Intuitionists." This, however, would only affect 
 the ethical psychology of an opposed school. The
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 145 
 
 profounder question still remains, "What bearing 
 has the theory of evolution, or its historical psy- 
 chology and sociology, on the nature of the ethical 
 end, or on the standard for distinguishing right and 
 wrong in conduct ? The answer to this question 
 would be the ' reconstruction ' and ' deeper change ' 
 which Stephen held to be necessary .^ It is the 
 ambiguity of the subject — or rather its twofold 
 range — which has made the application of evolution 
 to ethics look so obvious, and made a discussion of 
 the easier question frequently do duty for a solution 
 of the more difficult. The ethical writings of the 
 evolutionists, indeed, often confuse the problems of 
 history and theory in a way which presents the 
 same difficulty to the critic as the works of the 
 corresponding school in jurisprudence. In both, 
 the writers seem disinclined fairly to put to them- 
 selves the question as to the kind of subjects to 
 which so fruitful a method as that which has 
 fallen into their hands is i ^propriate : what its 
 conditions are, and whether it has any limits at 
 all. Every one is now familiar with the evils of 
 hypothetical history, and with the iniquity of the 
 proverbial philosophic offence' of constructing facts 
 out of one's inner consciousness. The historical 
 jurists deserve no little credit for the thoroughness 
 with which this has been enforced by them; perhaps, 
 too, the same lesson may be learned from the facts 
 
 ^ Science of Ethics, p. 6. 
 K
 
 146 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 of the development of morality. But it may be 
 questioned whether we are not at the present time 
 more apt to confuse fact and theory in the opposite 
 way : whether the science of law is not sometimes 
 lost sight of in the history of legal institutions, and 
 ethics in danger of being identified with the develop- 
 ment of moral sentiments and customs.^ 
 
 We may naturally expect the theory of evolution 
 to throw light on such questions as the growth of 
 moral feelings and ideas, and of the customs and 
 institutions in which morality is expressed and 
 embodied. But to show the process morality has 
 passed through in the individual mind and in society 
 still leaves unanswered the questions as to the moral 
 ideal and the distinction between good and evil in 
 conduct. It is necessary, therefore, to keep clearly 
 before us the difference between the historical and 
 the ethical problem, if we would successfully attack 
 the subject of the bearing of the theory of evolution 
 
 ^ Since the above paragraph was first pubh'shed the same point 
 has been enforced in Huxley's Romanes Lecture: "The pro- 
 pounders of what are called the ' ethics of evolution, ' when the 
 ' evolution of ethics ' would usually better express the object of 
 their speculations, adduce a number of more or less interesting 
 facts and more or less sound arguments, in favour of the origin 
 of the moral sentiments, in the same way as other natural phe- 
 nomena, by a process of evolution. . . . Cosmic evolution may 
 teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have 
 come about ; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish anj- better 
 reason whj" what we call good is preferable to what we call evil 
 than we had before." — Evolution and Ethics (Collected Essays, 
 vol. ix.), pp. 79, 80.
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 147 
 
 on this fundamental question of ethics. To the 
 theory of evohition we are indebted for the opening 
 up of a new field of investigation — the historical 
 treatment of conduct. But it is one thing to de- 
 scribe the way in which men have acted in the 
 past : to determine the end for their action now is 
 quite a different problem ; and there is no reason 
 why the distinction should be overlooked. The 
 interest which belongs to the history of morality 
 is not solely nor mainly due to its bearing on 
 questions beyond the historical sphere. That its 
 results will not be without relation — and that of 
 an important kind — to some questions of ethical 
 theory may well be expected. But it can only tend 
 to confusion if we treat the development of moral- 
 ity, in the human mind and in society, from a pre- 
 conceived attitude — dogmatic or agnostic — towards 
 the central problem of ethics. 
 
 The way in which the theory of evolution is ap- 2. The de- 
 plied to ethical psychology is easy enough to under- of nwraHty : 
 stand in principle, though complex and obscure in JJychoS^^ 
 many of its details. We have only to postulate 
 that mental as well as bodily traits admit of modi- 
 fication and of inheritance,^ and it at once follows 
 that sentiments and ideas leading to actions which 
 
 1 If we regard it as established that every meutal change has a 
 structural modification corresponding to it, the possibility of 
 mental evolution and inheritance presents no new difficulty.
 
 14:8 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 promote life will be encouraged and developed by 
 natural selection. Thus parental and filial feelings, 
 once originated, may have been developed through 
 those families and tribes in which they were 
 strongest, presenting a more united, and there- 
 fore stronger, front against hostile influences. The 
 feelings of tribal sympathy and patriotism, too, 
 may have had a similar history. Those races in 
 which they were strongest would, other things 
 being equal, obtain the mastery over and extermin- 
 ate other races in which they were relatively weak. 
 The compactness of the community would even be 
 promoted by that fear of the political and of the 
 religious control in which (according to Spencer) 
 the feeling of obligation had its root. In general, 
 benevolence and sympathy amongst a people give 
 it a solidarity from which it derives a stronger 
 position, so that in turn the benevolent and sym- 
 pathetic feelings gain free scope to develop and 
 expand. 
 
 But the working out of this theory is not with- 
 out its own difficulties. The factor in evolution 
 which can be most clearly traced — the principle of 
 natural selection — is not itself a source of change 
 or of the production of new results. It is only the 
 means by which advantageous changes are pre- 
 served and disadvantageous changes passed by. 
 That it may have scope for operation two things 
 are necessary : in the first place, living beings must
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 149 
 
 multiply at such a rate as to outrun the means of 
 subsistence, and thus produce a ' struggle for exist- 
 ence'; and in the second place, there must be 
 (co-operating with, but limiting, the principle of 
 heredity) an independent principle of variation, 
 in accordance with which the offspring of the same 
 parents tend to differ from one another. In this 
 way it comes about that the unfit are exterminated 
 in the struggle, and that only the ' fittest ' survive 
 or — as the phrase has it — ' are selected.' In spite 
 of much patient investigation on the part of biolo- 
 gists, the causes of variation still remain obscure. 
 It is not even possible as yet to decide with con- 
 fidence between the Lamarckian view, adopted by 
 Spencer, that variations are due to the unequal 
 pressure of the environment which produces * ac- 
 quired modifications,' and that these are capable of 
 hereditary transmission, and the view of Weismann 
 that such modifications cannot be transmitted, and 
 that the variations which are perpetuated are ulti- 
 mately due to tendencies inherent in the repro- 
 ductive cells of primitive organisms. But, in either 
 case, the principle of variation is independent of 
 natural selection and necessary for its working. 
 
 Now, if we suppose certain moral relations and its difficva- 
 
 , » , . , . . . ties : the 
 
 the leelmgs corresponding to them to exist in a origin of 
 society, and to tend to greater certainty and ful- j^ngg^^^^^" 
 ness of life on the part of those who possess them, 
 such relations and feelings will be favoured by the
 
 150 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 operation of the selective process, and will gradu- 
 ally be assimilated into the ' tissue ' of the social 
 organism. But this does not account for the origin 
 of morality generally nor of any particular moral 
 relation ; it merely shows how, having been some- 
 how originated, it has come to persist. There 
 are thus really two points to be considered in 
 tracing the development of moral ideas — the ques- 
 tion of origin and the question of persistence. 
 Even if the latter can be accounted for by nat- 
 ural selection, the former must be referred to the 
 obscure laws of variation, laws so obscure that 
 variations in nature are frequently spoken of as if 
 they took place by chance. The two questions 
 are involved at each stage in the progress of 
 morality. But it is at the initial stage that the 
 and of the question of origin is of greatest importance : when 
 the attempt is made to show how, in the course 
 of time, and by the aid of purely physical and 
 biological laws, feelings and conduct, from being 
 merely natural and reflex, have acquired a moral 
 character — when, in a word, the moral is being 
 evolved out of the non-moral. A difficulty comes 
 to the front here which scarcely arises when we 
 are simply tracing the various phases through which 
 the moral consciousness has passed, and the various 
 forms in which moral conduct and feelings have 
 expressed and embodied themselves. 
 
 The latter subject is obviously within the scope 
 
 moral con- 
 sciousness
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 151 
 
 of the theory of evolution, if that theory applies to 
 the processes of the human niiud and society as 
 well as to those of external nature. It is, indeed, natural 
 
 sclcclioii 
 
 too often and too easily assumed that natural selec- and pur- 
 tion operates in the higher kinds of life in the fg^cti^onr 
 same way and to the same extent as it operates in 
 the lower. But the assumption is not justified. 
 Each step in development involves a modification 
 which has to be accounted for not by natural 
 selection, but by the laws of variation. And in 
 human life varieties of conduct and of social forms 
 are to a large extent the result of known causes : 
 they are due to intelligent purpose, in which the 
 end is foreseen and means are deliberately adapted 
 to it. The end which nature might blindly achieve 
 by exterminating unfit varieties is aimed at directly, 
 and brought about — when intelligent purpose is 
 most successful — without any help from the opera- 
 tion of natural selection. In the realm of intelli- 
 gence natural selection is replaced by purposive. 
 
 The transition is, of course, a gradual one ; but 
 it is none the less a transition to a new order of 
 facts in which new causes operate. And it is in 
 this transition to conscious action determined by 
 an idea of its end that morality first appears. In 
 importance it may be compared to the transition 
 from the sphere of inorganic changes to that of life. 
 It is not necessary to deny that it may be possible 
 to trace the steps by which morality may have
 
 152 
 
 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 emerged from impulses, customs, and institutions 
 whose origin can be traced to purely natural or 
 non-moral causes — any more than it is necessary 
 for the biologist to deny the possibility of tracing 
 the first beginnings of life from the inorganic. But 
 the difference of the facts and their different modes 
 of operation have to be recognised. Just as natural 
 selection can have no place in inorganic evolution, 
 because it requires, as a condition of its presence, 
 the competition of living beings for means of 
 nourishment, so, in the same way, its rule is 
 coming to an end wherever conscious beings antici- 
 pate its operation by intelligent purposive action. 
 the develop- A further difficulty has to be met by the theory 
 of the development of morality, which is in a sense 
 complementary to the initial difficulty encountered 
 in differentiating the moral from the non-moral. 
 This further difficulty awaits it at a subsequent 
 stage of development when the extension and re- 
 finement of moral feeling seem to have gone on in 
 circumstances where there is no room for natural 
 selection to work. Thus it has been admitted that 
 the feeling of sympathy, and the habitual exercise 
 of mutual good offices among members of a com- 
 munity, strengthen that society, and make it fit to 
 prevail in the struggle for existence over other sim- 
 ilar societies, the members of which are not so much 
 at one amongst themselves in feeling and in act. 
 But as benevolence and sympathy widen, and 
 
 ment of 
 feelings 
 apart from 
 natural 
 selection.
 
 THE DEVOLOPMENT OF MORALITY. 153 
 
 become less closely connected with a definite 
 association of individuals, such as the family or 
 tribe, and there ceases to be a particular body to 
 the welfare of which these social feelings contrib- 
 ute, the operation of the law of natural selection 
 becomes less certain. This law only tends to con- 
 serve and perfect the feelings in question, in virtue 
 of the fact that the associations to whose good they 
 lead are successful in the struggle for life over 
 other associations the members of which are not 
 animated by like feelings. The one association 
 lives and expands, while the others are unable to 
 maintain themselves against the encroachments of 
 their neighbours, and thus fall to pieces. The law 
 of natural selection, therefore, comes into play only 
 when there are competing organisms struggling 
 against one another for the means of subsistence 
 and development. Not only is it the case, therefore, 
 that the sympathy which aids the weak who are 
 unable to take care of themselves, does not seem to 
 be of the kind that would contribute to success in 
 the struggle for existence ; ^ but the more general 
 
 Cf. Darwiu, Descent of Man, new ed., pp. 205, 206: "With 
 savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated ; and 
 those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. 
 We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the 
 process of elimination. . . . The aid which we feel impelled to 
 give to the helpless is mainly an incidental result of the instinct 
 of sympathy, which was originally acquired as part of the social 
 instincts, but subsequently rendered, in the manner previously 
 indicated, more tender and more widely diffused. Nor could we
 
 154 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 and catholic our sympathies are, the less will the 
 law of evolution helj) to preserve and develop 
 them — because the less will they tend to promote 
 the welfare of one rival association rather than 
 that of another. Thus the growth of really un- 
 restricted sympathy with men as men cannot have 
 been promoted in this way. The 'enthusiasm of 
 humanity' which animated the early Christians, 
 the self-renouncing brotherhood of Buddha, the 
 ' philanthropy ' attributed to men like Xenocrates - 
 who had freed themselves from the aristocratic 
 prejudices of Athens, the ' caritas generis humani ' 
 of the Stoics, — such feelings as these could not have 
 been encouraged, any more than they could have 
 been produced, by the operation of natural selection. 
 For, however much they tend to elevate the human 
 character, and to promote human happiness, they 
 do not advance the welfare of one body of men to 
 the exclusion of some other competitor in the 
 struggle for existence.- 
 
 But, although the law of natural evolution can- 
 
 check our sympathy, even at the urging of hard reason, without 
 deterioration in the noblest part of our nature." This "process 
 of elimination," which we "do our utmost to check," is simply 
 the operation of natural selection ; and it is significant that 
 Darwin held that it is only by opposing natural selection that we 
 can save " the noblest part of our nature " from deterioration. 
 
 1 ^lian, V. H., xiii. 30. 
 
 2 If conscience has no other function than that assigned to it 
 by Clifford, Lectures and Essay, ii. 169, "the preservation of 
 society in the struggle for existence," then it can never reach 
 universal benevolence or prescribe "duties towards all mankind."
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 155 
 
 not account, by survival of the fittest, for any 
 progress made by universal benevolence, yet it 
 might explain the value ascribed to the feeling of 
 benevolence, when its object is the family or the 
 community. Besides — as has already been pointed 
 out — natural selection always implies an initiative 
 got from elsewhere : it does not itself produce 
 modifications ; it only exterminates the unfit, thus 
 allowing favourable variations to flourish and com- 
 bine. It always implies an independent modifica- 
 tion of the organism ; its part is to select the 
 modifications best fitted to promote life. Hence 
 the mere fact of benevolence being universalised 
 is not in itself an anomaly on the theory of natural 
 selection, any more than is the fact of its being 
 extended from the family to the tribe. Only, the 
 latter extension is one which it perpetuates, the 
 former is not. No aspect of the theory of evolu- 
 tion seems able to account for an extension of the 
 feeling of universal benevolence among different 
 people or throughout different societies. This feel- 
 ing has neither tended to promote the welfare 
 of the race animated by it to the exclusion of 
 other competing races — for there are no competing 
 races whom it could affect — nor can it be shown 
 that it makes the individuals possessing it fitter 
 to wage successful war against opposing forces 
 than other individuals.^ 
 
 ^ A difficulty of another kind is suggested by Bain, who holds 
 that the "pleasure of malevolence" is not only a real element in
 
 156 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Its result: Apart from such special difficulties, however, 
 sSnature Comparative psychology has shed a new light on 
 oftheindi- i^j^g mental structure of the individual. The facts 
 
 vidual. 
 
 it brings forward show that the nature of the 
 individual man cannot be explained without taking 
 into account the relations in which he stands to 
 society by birth, education, and business. He is, 
 from the first, surrounded by, and dependent upon, 
 other individuals, and by a set of established usages 
 and institutions which modify his life ; and he is 
 connected with these in such a way that it is im- 
 possible to consider him as merely acted upon by 
 them and influencing them in turn. He has been 
 produced by, and has become a part of them. His 
 physical and mental structure bears the marks of 
 the same influences as those by which his so-called 
 environment has been formed. He is cell in the 
 'tissue' of which the body social is composed. 
 This was partly recognised, it is true, before the 
 theory of evolution had been elaborated. But the 
 
 the human constitution, but greater than would be naturally 
 called forth by the conditions and course of development. " It 
 is remarked by Mr Spencer," he says, ' ' that is was necessary for 
 the progress of the race that destructive activity should not be 
 painful, but on the whole pleasurable. In point of fact, however, 
 the pleasure of destruction has gone much beyond what these 
 words express, and much beyond what is advantageous to the 
 collective interest of animals and of human beings alike. The 
 positive delight in suffering has been at all stages too great." — The 
 Emotions and the Will, p. 66. So far from adopting this argu- 
 ment, however, I must confess myself still amongst the uncon- 
 vinced regarding the "pleasure of malevolence."
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 157 
 
 ' organic ' nature of the social union is confirmed 
 
 by that theory, and determines the whole view of 
 
 human life. 
 
 Now the various sentiments which bring one man (6) Develop- 
 ment of 
 into mental union with others act with greatest society. 
 
 facility when men are connected with one another 
 by some definite mutual bond such as that which 
 forms the family, the clan, or the nation. The 
 individual's feeling of sympathy with his neighbours 
 both promotes this social union and depends upon 
 it. But it is characteristic of the theory of evolu- 
 tion to put the external aspect first — the social 
 customs and institutions — and to trace from them 
 the growth of the corresponding sentiments and 
 ideas. Not word or thought or power, it holds, is 
 to be regarded as the origin of morality : " Im 
 Anfang war die That." The whole composed of 
 these units bound together by reciprocity of feeling 
 and function is termed the " social organism " ; and 
 what has been called moral sociology shows the 
 way in which the outward forms which express 
 and embody morality have grown up and become 
 part of it. 
 
 In this connexion, the theory of natural evolution 
 traces the process by which, from the rudimentary 
 beginnings of society, the members composing it 
 have gradually become more coherent amongst one 
 another, related in definite ways instead of merely 
 by chance, and more differentiated in function.
 
 158 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Certain rudimentary forms — such as tlie family 
 (in its rudest structure) — and the corresponding 
 instincts are presupposed. And from this basis 
 the origin of institutions and customs, political, 
 religious, and industrial, is traced. In giving form 
 to these various customs and institutions, along 
 with the corresponding sentiments, the course of 
 social evolution has had the effect of gradually 
 bringing out and cultivating those feelings and 
 tendencies in the individual which promote the 
 welfare of the community, while other individual 
 tendencies, hostile to social welfare, have been re- 
 pressed. Not sympathy and benevolence only, but 
 honesty, temperance, justice, and all the ordinary 
 social and personal virtues, may have their natural 
 history traced in this way — by showing how they 
 have contributed to the life of the individual, or of 
 the society, or of both.'^ Through the operation of 
 the laws of human development, the wicked are 
 "cut off from the earth," while the "perfect remain 
 in it " and leave their possessions to their children. 
 For those communities are always fittest to survive 
 in which each member, in feeling and in act, is 
 most at one with the whole. The tendency of 
 evolution would seem to be to produce not merely 
 an ideal but an actual identification of individual 
 
 ^ This subject is carefully discussed in Stephen's Science of 
 Ethics. Cf. also Alexander's Moral Order and Progress, 
 Wundt's Ethik, and Jhering's Zweck im Recht.
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 159 
 
 and social interests, in which each man finds his 
 own good in that of the state. We may, there- 
 fore, pause to enquire what are the factors in the 
 process which points to this result. 
 
 When we speak of 'development' or 'evolution' 3. Thefac- 
 
 dn • 1 i_ tors of 
 
 01 many meanmgs ; and when asser- moral de- 
 
 tions are made about the development of morality ^'^'op'^ei^t 
 it is well to know the exact meaning in which the 
 term is used before we assent to them or deny 
 them. We must know what factors are to be 
 understood as included in the process if the asser- 
 tion or the denial of the development of morality 
 is to be of any significance. It was the discovery 
 of natural selection as the dominant factor in 
 evolution that formed Darwin's greatest achieve- 
 ment in biology ; and in his works the term is 
 used with a precise meaning. It is not always 
 the same with the philosophical writings of his 
 successors. They do not imitate their master's 
 caution or rival his clearness of thought. And 
 the notion of development is applied to man and 
 society without any adequate consideration of the 
 question whether, in this case as in the former, 
 natural selection is the sole or leading factor in 
 the process. If it is meant to be implied that 
 natural selection plays the same part in man's life, 
 and, in particular, in his moral life, as it plays in 
 the development of plants and animals, then, no
 
 160 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 doubt, the notion of development is used with a 
 consistent meaning throughout ; but the doctrine 
 put forward is in conflict with the plain facts of 
 human experience. On the other hand, if further 
 factors are involved, these should be pointed out, 
 and the difference between the two notions of 
 development made clear. 
 
 The consideration of this difference may be 
 approached by quoting a passage from Professor 
 Ward's Gifford Lectures. " Take," he says, " the 
 passengers on a coach going through a glen here 
 in Scotland : in one sense the glen is the same for 
 them all, their common environment for the time 
 being. But one, an artist, will single out subjects 
 to sketch ; another, an angler, will see likely pools 
 for fish ; the third, a geologist, will detect raised 
 beaches, glacial striation, or perched blocks. Turn 
 a miscellaneous lot of birds into a garden : a fly- 
 catcher will at once be intent on the gnats, a bull- 
 finch on the peas, a thrush on the worms and 
 snails. Scatter a mixture of seeds evenly over a 
 diversified piece of country : heath and cistus will 
 spring up in the dry, flags and rushes in the 
 marshy, ground; violets and ferns in the shady 
 (a) Mode of hollows ; gorse and broom on the hilltops." ^ 
 ifaTurar° What happens in these different cases ? The seeds 
 Selection. ^^,g Scattered equally over the ground. But, in the 
 dry ground, the flags and rushes, the violets and 
 
 ^ Naturalism and Agnosticism, i. 295.
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 161 
 
 ferns die out. The same fate happens to heath in 
 the marshes, and to rushes in the shady hollows. 
 The seeds themselves can do nothing towards 
 choosing the environment that will suit them. 
 It is the environment only that selects them for 
 death or life : here Natural Selection rules alone. 
 But it is not quite the same with the birds turned 
 into a garden. We do not find bullfinches starv- 
 ing on a diet of gnats, or fly -catchers choking 
 on the worms, as we might find the shrivelled 
 violet-seed that had fallen on the dry and exposed 
 hilltop. A sure instinct leads each species of bird 
 to select for itself its appropriate food. That the 
 accuracy of this instinct is largely due to the 
 effects of natural selection upon previous genera- 
 tions need not be disputed. But two things hold : 
 in the first place, natural selection could not be its 
 sole cause ; no mere weeding - out process could 
 produce this positive principle ; and, in the second 
 place, whatever its antecedents may be, subjective 
 selection appears in the individual organism as a 
 definite mode of reaction upon the environment, 
 choosing that which is of interest, or pleases, or is 
 suitable. The operation of this principle of positive 
 selection cannot, it seems to me, be attributed with 
 any confidence to plant life : but its presence is un- 
 mistakable throughout the greater portion of the 
 animal kingdom ; and its gradual emergence is no 
 reason for overlooking its reality or its importance. 
 
 L
 
 162 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 (6) Subject. Subjective Selection is the name which has been 
 lion. ' given to this principle.^ The selection is among 
 alternatives offered by the environment, but it is 
 due to conditions which are within the organism. 
 On the plane of animal life the environment of 
 experience consists almost entirely of the objects 
 of immediate perception, and the subjective condi- 
 tions which determine the selection are of the 
 nature of impulse or of instinct. In human life 
 the possibility of ideal combination and rational 
 foresight widen the view of the environment till it 
 is transformed into the world of the statesman, the 
 scientist, or the mystic ; and the Subjective Selec- 
 tion takes the form of Eational Choice. An ex- 
 ample of [subjective selection in animals is the 
 principle of sexual selection on which Darwin 
 laid stress as a factor in development. But it is 
 when subjective selection is guided by intelligent 
 foresight, as it is in man, that its importance is 
 fully shown ; for then it becomes able to anticipate 
 the selective process which would otherwise be 
 worked out by nature, and to avoid the method of 
 destruction which the latter entails. 
 
 Besides these principles of Natural and Subject- 
 ive Selection there is another, which for our pur- 
 poses deserves separate recognition. Following out 
 the idea in the illustration already quoted from 
 
 1 Ward, article "Psychology," Ency. Brit., 9th ed., vol. xx. p. 
 42 b.
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 163 
 
 Professor Ward, one might go on to say : Land a 
 miscellaneous shipload of emigrants on the wharf 
 at New York : the farmer will set out for the 
 pastures or wheat lands of the West ; the artisan 
 will seek work in a factory ; the clerk will apply 
 at the offices or stores ; the wastrel will loaf 
 towards the nearest saloon, and hang round for a 
 job or a drink. They have all entered a social 
 environment full of specialised activities, and each 
 chooses the line which he thinks best suited to his 
 own case. Tiiis is Subjective Selection. But upon 
 it there at once begins to operate a new principle 
 which sifts the results of this subjective selection 
 from the point of view not of the individual, but 
 of the system which he has entered. This may be (<■) social 
 called Social Selection. By it the individuals who 
 can adapt themselves are adopted and rewarded, 
 while the others are passed by or suppressed. On 
 the individual this force is apt to operate with 
 something of the externality and relentlessness of 
 natural selection. And yet the nature of its opera- 
 tion is different ; it does not merely exterminate the 
 unfit, it actively selects and promotes the welfare 
 of the fit ; for, however imperfect it may be, the 
 methods of the social system reflect the intelligence, 
 and the organised intelligence, of the community. 
 
 It is necessary to emphasise the reality not only 
 of subjective selection but also of social selection 
 on account of the important part they play in the
 
 164 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 development of morality. There is an attractive 
 sound about the phrase ' natural selection in 
 morals.' Once used it was sure to gain currency ; 
 for it seemed to bring all forms of growth into line 
 under the same notion of development. But facts 
 are of more consequence than simplicity of phrase ; 
 and an unprejudiced view of the facts shows that 
 moral evolution implies factors which the student 
 Co-operation of biological cvolution may disregard. As already 
 factors in poiutcd out, natural selection is a faetor in the 
 veiopment. development of morality. The enfeebled body and 
 mind which follow intemperance give a superior 
 chance to the temperate man in the struggle for 
 life ; the bold and alert are more likely to survive 
 than the coward and the fool ; the qualities of 
 sympathy and orderliness which unite men into a 
 society contribute to their security in danger, and 
 to their success in conflict. But it may be con- 
 fidently asserted that, had natural selection been 
 the only force in operation, mankind would have 
 accomplished but a small part of the path of moral 
 progress which it has actually traversed. Along 
 the whole line, subjective selection is implied in 
 the performance of the actions which go to form 
 character; and, as civilisation advances, reflexion 
 and rational choice gradually assume a larger share 
 in their guidance. And it is not by natural selec- 
 tion alone that the results are approved and per- 
 petuated. Mind acts upon mind ; and, within the
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 165 
 
 social order, the institutions and customs of the 
 society contribute far more towards fashioning the 
 morality of each individual than natural selection 
 does. The ordinary member of society is often 
 hardly touched by the latter; but from the con- 
 stant influence of the social selection which guides 
 his conduct even when it seems — and is — most his 
 own, and which distributes to him all that he 
 thinks he has earned himself — from this influence 
 he can never escape. In this process social selec- 
 tion is operative — as truly, although not so patently, 
 as in electing a member of parliament, or in hanging 
 a murderer. 
 
 Social Selection manifests itself in diverse ways, Modeisof 
 
 T n • • ■ ■ ■, 1 Social Se- 
 
 and two modes oi its operation, in particular, need lection, 
 to be distinguished. It may influence the in- 
 dividual from within or from without. In the 
 former mode of operation it moulds the character internal, 
 of the man, affecting his desires, and becoming an 
 inseparable element in his will. So far it is simply 
 one of the determining factors of his Subjective 
 Selection. But it also acts in another way in 
 which it is analogous to, and apt to be confused 
 with, Natural Selection.^ The individual man is 
 not only fashioned and framed by social influences, 
 speaking the language, thinking the thoughts, fol- 
 
 ^ For the assertion of Professor Alexander that " the origin and 
 growth of morality " is not merely analogous to, but " identical 
 with the origin and growth of, natural species " (Moral Order and 
 Progress, p. 262), I can find no evidence.
 
 166 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 lowing the aims, which have come to him — he 
 knows not how — as part of his social inheritance. 
 He also stands face to face with society as part of 
 his environment, upon which he acts, and which 
 reacts upon him in turn. This degree of separa- 
 tion is implied in calling man an individual : he 
 can look upon society as something outside of and 
 opposed to himself; and it may act upon him after 
 and exter- the manner of an external force. In this way its 
 mode of operation is analogous to that of natural 
 selection. But there is no identity and little 
 resemblance between the two forces, though they 
 may be sometimes directed to the same end. For 
 example, both natural selection and social selection 
 favour temperance at the expense of intemperance ; 
 but they do so in different ways. The method of 
 natural selection is simple : intemperate habits 
 lead to diminished vigour and to failure in the 
 struggle for the means of life. Social selection, on 
 the other hand, acts more directly ; it dismisses 
 the drunkard from positions of trust, or locks him 
 up as ' drunk and disorderly,' or sends him to an 
 inebriates' home ; and it acts positively as well 
 as negatively : the sober man is sought out by 
 employers and placed in positions of profit and 
 responsibility, and in numerous ways he is made 
 to feel that society approves of him. In these 
 cases it is clear that society acts deliberately and 
 with foresight of the end. Social Selection is the
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. 167 
 
 expression of conscious purpose ; and the instru- 
 ments which it uses to carry out its purposes are 
 minds, and the institutions in which many minds 
 express their collective will. If we insist on the 
 attempt to comprehend within a single formula 
 the whole selective process which directs moral 
 development, then we should have to liold that 
 this process is purposive; for it is certain that 
 Social Selection implies purpose, and we cannot be 
 certain that Natural Selection does not. 
 
 No account of human and social development 
 can be accepted which overlooks the presence and 
 influence of intelligent purposive selection. In sub- 
 human development purpose may not be apparent: 
 natural selection may be the only discriminating 
 force, and variation may be assigned to the un- 
 known. But in human life purpose is a fact of 
 immediate experience. Deliberate volition is one 
 of the causes which lead to varieties of life and 
 conduct ; and the social order which selects the 
 varieties suited to it is directed by minds. It is 
 true that the purposive factor emerges only gradu- 
 ally into clearness. It is also true that within any 
 brief period the change in the mode of operation 
 is so slight that the curve of development may 
 have the appearance of a straight line ; and this 
 gives colour to the representation of moral pro- 
 gress as determined by merely 'natural' forces. 
 We are apt not to detect a new factor when it is
 
 168 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 introduced by insensible degrees ; but this is a 
 mere error of observation. Or we insist upon 
 following the maxim that we should "interpret 
 the more developed by the less developed." ^ 
 although this can only be accepted as a rule for 
 tracing historical sequences, and not for explaining 
 the nature of the forces at work. The gradual 
 emergence of the purposive factor in development 
 is no ground whatever for the assumption that it 
 can be either reduced to, or accounted for by, non- 
 purposive forces.^ 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 7. 
 
 ^ The instructive account of moral progress in Professor Alex- 
 ander's Moral Order and Progress (1889) brings out the historical 
 continuity of the process of development, but with a tendency to 
 interpret the higher by the lower, for which I can find no justi- 
 fication in the facts : while his method tends to obscure the 
 distinctions laid stress on above.
 
 1G9 
 
 CHAPTER VIL 
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEOllIES. 
 
 Before going on to enquire into the positive con- Bearing of 
 
 , . ■■ . , , .1 n 1 i.- the theory 
 
 tributions to ethics which the theory or evolution ofevouuion 
 has to offer, it is necessary to consider the relation eliS"^'''' 
 it bears to the preceding individualistic systems of theories. 
 morals. It was by way of investigations in psy- 
 chology and in the theory of society, that it first 
 began to influence ethical thought. And, at first 
 sight, it appeared to come as a natural ally of one 
 of the opposed schools, dreaded by the side it 
 opposed,^ welcomed with open arms by that 
 favoured with its friendship. But since the first 
 shock of pained and pleased surprise, there have 
 been rumours of dissension in the allies' camp;- 
 and the distribution of parties has now become a 
 matter of difficulty. The doctrine of evolution, 
 first seized upon for rebutting the arguments of the 
 
 1 Cf. Miss Cobbe, in Darwinism in Morals, and other Essays 
 (1872), p. 5. 
 
 2 And perhaps Huxley's Romanes Lecture (1893) may be re- 
 garded as a declaration of war.
 
 170 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTIOX. 
 
 intuitional moralists, has been found to transform 
 rather than to destroy their system ; and the utili- 
 tarianism in whose interests the new controversial 
 weapon was employed, seems to have been subjected 
 to a parallel process of transformation. The bearing 
 of evolution on egoism may appear to be even more 
 fundamental. For the inheritance by an individual 
 of the qualities acquired by his ancestors may be 
 thought to establish scientifically the theory of the 
 unity of the race, and, in doing so, to make the 
 selfish system of conduct an anachronism. 
 1. outheo- It is not necessary to examine at any length the 
 ing^ on moral application of cvolution to the theories which con- 
 sentiment gtruct cthical principles on the basis of moral senti- 
 
 or intuition. '^ ^ 
 
 ment : because these theories have been found either 
 to resolve themselves into a subtle form of egoistic 
 hedonism, or else to rest their ethical system on 
 a teleological or on a jural conception, which trans- 
 cends the ' naturalistic ' view of man. Evolution 
 has its own explanation to give of the seemingly 
 intuitive character of moral ideas — showing how 
 their immediate necessity for the individual of the 
 present day may be reconciled with their empirical 
 origin in the mental history of the race. It 
 attempts thus to supplant both egoism and in- 
 tuitionism by the same doctrine of the organic 
 union between individuals. 
 
 The phenomena of conscience and the moral 
 sentiments had been brought forward to show
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 171 
 
 tliat the origin of morality was independent of the 
 experience of the pleasurable or painful results of 
 action : that certain actions and traits of character 
 were immediately approved and pronounced to be 
 right by the individual conscience, and certain 
 others as inexplicably but infalHbly disapproved 
 and pronounced to be wrong. This phenomenon of 
 moral approbation or disapprobation had indeed 
 been thought by some — as has been already seen— 
 to be only a special feeling of pleasure or pain. 
 Even as such, however, it pointed to a peculiar 
 harmony or sympathy between the feelings of the 
 individual and the fortunes of society. For the 
 pleasure or pain of the individual was seen to be 
 excited by actions and dispositions which might be 
 shown to involve the common interests, but were 
 without special relation to his own. 
 
 Even on the 'empirical' interpretation of them, onginand 
 such facts of the mdividual mind were m need ot ^lorai seuti- 
 explanation ; and the theory of evolution has under- "XJl^io,',^ 
 taken to show how the pre-established harmony ^f^^^^^l^ 
 grew up. The results of this explanation are, of 
 course, not put forward as explaining the facts 
 away, or depriving them of reality, but as en- 
 abling us to see their true place and bearing in 
 the economy of hunuin nature. In tracing the 
 origin and history of the ' altruistic ' and ' moral ' 
 sentiments of the individual, the theory of evolution 
 has this end in view. It offers — so it is often said
 
 172 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 — terms of compromise between the 'intuitional' 
 and the ' empirical ' psychology of morals. It will 
 admit the immediate and intuitive character in the 
 individual of the sentiments which older empiricism 
 had tried to make out to be composite, growing up 
 in each person out of the materials afforded by his 
 environment, and the experiences to which he was 
 subjected. The theory of evolution contends for 
 an empiricism on a larger scale, which will more 
 closely connect the individual with the race, and 
 both with their environment. 
 Bearing of The qucstiou thus arises. What bearing has this 
 validity/^" psychological or ' psychogonical ' theory on the 
 ethical validity of moral intuitions and sentiments ? 
 It certainly does not follow that they are of no 
 moral value, merely because their origin can be 
 traced to simpler elements of experience. They 
 would lose ethical importance only if it were first 
 of all shown that their validity depended on their 
 not being derived from, or compounded out of, 
 other elements. As Professor Sidgwick says, " Those 
 who dispute the authority of moral or other in- 
 tuitions on the ground of their derivation must be 
 required to show, not merely that they are the 
 effects of certain causes, but that these causes are 
 of a kind that tend to produce invalid beliefs." ^ 
 
 But what the theory of evolution is able to 
 determine with regard to moral intuitions or sen- 
 
 1 Methods of Ethics, III. i. 4, 6th ed., p. 213.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 173 
 
 sibilities would seem to be not so much their 
 ethical validity or invalidity, as the range and 
 manner of their ethical application. It attempts 
 to show that particular moral beliefs or feel- 
 ings have been originated and formed by certain 
 external customs belonging to the conditions of 
 social or family life. These customs have im- 
 pressed themselves upon the mental structure, and 
 reappear in the individual in the shape of organic 
 tendencies to certain actions, or classes of actions, 
 and of aversion to other actions, accompanied by a 
 corresponding mental sentiment — or judgment — 
 of approbation or disapprobation. Thus the indivi- 
 dual comes instinctively to feel — or to judge, — "A 
 oucrht to be done," " B ought not to be done." Now 
 the evolutionist, as I conceive, does not proceed to 
 infer that such judgments are invalid because he 
 has shown how they originated — does not conclude 
 (to use Sidgwick's words) that " all propositions of 
 the form 'X is right' or 'good,' are untrustworthy;" 
 but he does ask in what way the history of these 
 judgments affects their application.^ 
 
 (a) He recognises, in the first place, that all such («) different 
 
 . social condi- 
 
 judgments are the natural result or a certam social tions from 
 condition, and that there is, therefore, some prob- may uaVe^ 
 
 resulted, 
 1 Cf. Sir F. Pollock, "Evolution and Ethics "—Mind, O.S., i. 
 
 pp. 335 fF. Apart from the bearing of a utilitarian test on in- 
 herited instincts, to which Sir F. Pollock refers, I have tried to 
 show what meaning they will have for the evolutionist who judges 
 them solely from the point of view of his theory.
 
 174 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 ability that the same kind of social state could 
 not continue to exist were these moral judgments 
 habitually disregarded in conduct. They have re- 
 sulted from a certain state of society, and have 
 been assumed — after insufficient experience, per- 
 haps — to be required for the stability of that state, 
 so that every action opposed to these moral judg- 
 ments will probably tend to weaken social bonds. 
 But the evolutionist's conclusions are not restricted 
 to such generalities. He may show that certain 
 moral judgments or sentiments have had their 
 origin from the habits of union between individuals, 
 and of respect for the rights of property, which 
 have obtained in every relatively permanent society, 
 and which may therefore be inferred to be prob- 
 ably necessary for the continued existence of any 
 community ; that certain other sentiments or in- 
 tuitions have descended to present individuals from 
 customs which have not been so universal in the 
 history of societies, although the communities pos- 
 sessing them have shown greater vitality than those 
 in which they were absent ; while others, again, 
 may be traced to institutions which, from their 
 occasional and unprogressive character, may be 
 shown to be neither necessary nor beneficial. 
 audconse- The evolutiouist will therefore contend that 
 encein theh' different degrees of value for the regulation of 
 value for couduct belong to different moral intuitions or 
 
 conduct ; '^ 
 
 classes of them. If one class is habitually dis-
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL TIIEOiaES. 175 
 
 regarded, he may assert that historical evidence 
 goes to show that society will fall to pieces, and 
 the life of man become, in the expressive words of 
 Hobbes, " solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 
 The disregard of another class will probably lead to 
 a more precarious existence, or one less rich in the 
 experiences which make up life ; while opposition 
 to a third class, so far from being hurtful or 
 dangerous, may remove unnecessary restrictions, 
 and aid the development both of the individual 
 and of society. He may accordingly look upon 
 these 'intuitions' as having the force of hypo- 
 thetical imperatives in relation to ends which 
 themselves possess different degrees of social 
 utility. 
 
 (h) There is a second point which will also be (6) their 
 recognised by the evolutionist. Although these character. 
 intuitions have been derived, they are now orgauic, 
 and their disappearance from the human mind as 
 instinctive tendencies towards or against action can 
 only be slow and painful. The process must involve 
 a certain amount of loss, and the loss as well as the 
 gain must be entered in the account. At the same 
 time, it is not a process that can be easily avoided. 
 As soon as the reason of the instinctive tendency 
 is enquired into, its force as instinct is weakened. 
 We pass from the action itself to the end it is fitted 
 to subserve ; and, if the instinctive action is not the 
 most appropriate, or has hurtful results, we have
 
 176 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 already reached the stage in which the instinct is 
 checked, and begins to yield to action directed by 
 a principle. Yet it dies out only gradually and 
 after a struggle. Nor does it seem possible to 
 assert with confidence, as mitigating this struggle, 
 that the strongest impulses will always be those 
 which are necessary or advantageous to the exist- 
 ence of society. For it is a common experience 
 that the moral intuitions which lead to conduct 
 that has ceased to serve a purpose, and the internal 
 sanctions which follow disregard of them, are often 
 even more powerful than those which protect such 
 virtues as justice or veracity. 
 Resultant From the preceding argument it follows that it 
 evolution- cannot be held that moral intuitions are invalid 
 because evolved. The evolutionist will certainly 
 go very far wrong, as Sidgwick points out, if he 
 maintains that a " general demonstration of the 
 derivedness or developedness of our moral faculty 
 can supply an adequate reason for distrusting it." 
 Instead of holding that, if we succeed in tracing 
 the origin of an intuition, it is thereby discredited, 
 he will admit that the mere fact of our possessing 
 any moral intuition shows that the habits of action 
 from which it was derived have been permanent 
 enough to leave their traces on the mental struc- 
 ture, and that the conduct to which it leads, like 
 the custom from which it came, will not destroy 
 society, but, on the contrary, will probably tend to 
 
 ism to intui- 
 tionism.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 177 
 
 its permanence. The general attitude of the evolu- 
 tion-theory to moral intuitions is therefore, after 
 all, very similar to that which Sidgwick has reached 
 as a result of his elaborate examination of the 
 maxims of common-sense. It is an attitude of 
 trust tempered by criticism. In both an appeal 
 is made from the axioms themselves : in the one 
 case, to their historical genesis and the institutions 
 in which they originated ; in the other, to the 
 searching test of logical consistency, and their 
 capability of being applied to conduct. But the 
 theory of evolution, if it succeeds in tracing the 
 origin of our moral intuitions, does seem to involve 
 the abandonment of the old intuitional method 
 which accepted them as rules of conduct from 
 which no appeal could be taken. 
 
 The theory of evolution transforms intuitionism 2. Bering 
 by the way in which it connects the individual ofevoiutk)"J 
 with the race. Its first effect upon egoism is o"«g°'s™- 
 similar. The nature of the individual man as now 
 exhibited is widely different from that which the 
 older individualistic theory used to deal with. The 
 latter is typified by the marble statue to which 
 Condillac ^ compares the percipient subject, as yet 
 unaffected by sense-impressions. The variety of 
 mental life which is actually met with is accounted 
 for by the different kinds of experiences different 
 
 * Traits des sensations, OEuvres (1798), vol. iii. 
 M
 
 178 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 men pass through ; and the consequent difference 
 in the sources of pleasure and pain accounts for 
 the diverse lines of activity which human beings 
 follow out. But the theory of evolution shows 
 that human nature is infinitely varied, not only 
 through the variety of circumstances, but through 
 the variety of inherited dispositions. One indi- 
 vidual is not merely connected with others through 
 considerable similarity of experience built upon an 
 equally characterless basis; but he is organically 
 related to all the members of the race, not only 
 bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh, but 
 mind of their mind. He is connected with others 
 by a thousand subtly interwoven threads of emotion 
 which enter into his life, and unite his desires and 
 activities with the functions of the larger organism 
 of which he is a member. 
 
 The theory of evolution has thus an important 
 contribution to make to the question of the relation 
 between egoism and altruism. It has remained for 
 it to show historically how the individual is so 
 
 nature of the 
 
 individual, conncctcd with the community that the good, or 
 the pleasure, of the one cannot be considered apart 
 from that of the other. From the non-evolutionist 
 point of view it was always open to show how the 
 individual depended on society, how his wants 
 could only be supplied by it, and how the security 
 and happiness of every one were bound up with 
 those of his fellows. The individualistic theory 
 
 Relation of 
 egoism to 
 altraism 
 as affected 
 by it: 
 (a) social
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 179 
 
 was thus able to give all sorts of egoistic reasons 
 why people should indulge in what is now called 
 altruistic conduct. Self was seen to be ' a poor 
 centre for a man's actions/ and only chosen by the 
 short-sighted person, who thereby missed both the 
 good to himself that followed from his neighbours' 
 wellbeing, and the peculiar pleasure of sympathy 
 and benevolent action. But the theory of evolution 
 has shown how the two things have developed 
 together in the race : first, the actual solidarity be- 
 tween the individual and the whole ; and secondly? 
 the subjective reflexion of the same fact, sympathy 
 with the feelings of others. When we ask, there- 
 fore, whether it is our own pleasure (or good) or 
 that of others that we ought to aim at, our atten- 
 tion is directed to the gradual obliteration of the 
 distinction between the interest and feelings of the 
 individual and those of the whole. Were this com- 
 pletely accomplished, there need be no more ques- 
 tion about the matter. If conduct with an egoistic 
 motive or aim always resulted in altruistic equally 
 with egoistic effects, and if altruistic conduct had 
 always egoistic equally with altruistic consequences, 
 it would even then be little more than vain subtlety 
 to ask whether egoism or altruism was to be the 
 real end of conduct. But if, in addition to the 
 identity of interests, there were also an identity of 
 motive or feeling, the question would be no longer 
 in place at all. For there would cease to be either
 
 180 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 a subjective distinction in motive between egoism 
 and altruism, or an objective distinction in the 
 but not courses of conduct to which they led. And it is 
 social. just because this identification is manifestly incom- 
 plete — because neither the interests nor the desires 
 of the individual harmonise v^'ith any degree of 
 exactness vs^ith those of his fellows — that we must 
 examine how far the conception of the social organ- 
 ism put forward in the theory of evolution is a true 
 expression for the connexion of individuals. 
 Difference At most, the theory of organic evolution can 
 individual make out that there is a tendency towards the 
 andsociai identification of the interests of the individual 
 
 organisms 
 
 with those of society. It cannot demonstrate a 
 complete identification. The community has in- 
 deed been called an organism, and the individual 
 spoken of as a cell in the tissue of which it is 
 composed ; but we must avoid pressing this analogy 
 to the point of breaking. Among so many points 
 of similarity between society and an individual 
 organism, there is one essential distinction, — the 
 social organism has no feelings and thoughts but 
 those of its individual members — the conscious 
 centre is in the unit, not in the whole ; whereas, 
 when we regard the individual organism and its 
 constituent members, consciousness is seen to exist 
 only in the whole, not in each several unit. The 
 absence of a " social sensorium " ^ should, therefore, 
 
 ^ Cf. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, i. 479.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 181 
 
 make us hesitate to identify the ends of individual 
 with those of collective action ; for, to a certain 
 extent, the individual can distinguish his own 
 interests from those of the society, and prefer the 
 former : so that the organic unity is incomplete. 
 Every cell in the individual body has a life-history 
 of its own, besides partaking of the life of the 
 organism ; and, did it possess the reason which 
 ' looks before and after,' it also might conceivably 
 adopt an egoistic attitude, and object to the sub- 
 ordination of its private interests to the good of 
 the whole. In the same way, the many individual 
 lives which make up the social organism — since 
 each of them possesses a separate consciousness — 
 are apt to disregard the life of the larger whole 
 whose members they are. Now what the theory 
 of utilitarianism requires is, that the happiness or 
 pleasurable consciousness of men in general, and 
 not of the individual agent, be made the end ; and 
 those who make egoism the moral standard, com- 
 monly maintain that the general happiness is the 
 end of politics.^ The individual is not indeed 
 required to be entirely unselfish or ' altruistic ' in 
 action. He is not altogether forbidden to seek his 
 own things, nor enjoined to seek only the things 
 of others; and evolutionist utilitarianism, indeed, 
 would tell him to seek his own happiness in the 
 happiness of the community. But the obvious 
 1 Cf. Barratt, "Ethics and Politics"— Mind, O.S., ii. 453 ff.
 
 of feeling. 
 
 182 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 remark must be borne in mind, that society, the 
 social organism, cannot experience happiness. 
 However it may resemble the individual organism 
 in the manner of its growth, the modes of its 
 activity, and even its relation to its component 
 members, yet it cannot feel pleasure or pain as 
 an individual does. The 'happiness of the com- 
 munity ' does not mean the happiness of the 
 social organism, but is only a concise formula for 
 the aggregate happinesses of the individuals com- 
 posing it. 
 
 in respect When it is Said, therefore — either as a political 
 or an ethical theory — that the happiness of society 
 is the end for conduct, the end prescribed is altru- 
 istic rather than social. Its object is not an organ- 
 ism, but an aggregate of individuals. A certain 
 organisation of society may lead to an increase in 
 this aggregate happiness, and so be necessary for 
 the attainment of the end ; but if the end is hap- 
 piness, the social organism and its wellbeing are 
 no longer the thing cared for, but the greatest 
 aggregate of pleasures on the part of its members. 
 So long, therefore, as the end is pleasure, it must 
 have reference to individuals. The utilitarian may 
 try to persuade the agent to seek the pleasures 
 of others as if they were his own — requiring him 
 thus to seek his end out of himself and the circle 
 of his own pleasures. And, while we continue to 
 hold pleasure to be the end, the evolution-theory
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 183 
 
 can go no further than tliis. It seemed to have 
 made out an organic unity between different in- 
 dividuals, through which it might be possible to 
 effect a reconciliation between the rival ethical 
 principles of egoism and altruism. But the feeling 
 of pleasure is just the point where individualism is 
 strongest, and in regard to which mankind, instead 
 of being an organism in which each part only sub- 
 serves the purposes of the whole, must rather be 
 regarded as a collection of competing and co- 
 operating units. 
 
 It is true that the social factor in the individual 
 life is brought into scientific cognisance by the 
 theory of evolution. This theory shows the way 
 in which a man's interests and feelings depend upon 
 others. And if, through the influence of a political 
 standpoint, or of some intuition of reason, a uni- 
 versalistic ethics has been already arrived at, it 
 can bring forward the organic union of individual 
 and society as a means of enforcing the social end 
 upon the individual agent. In this way the theory Tiieory of 
 of evolution makes a contribution to ethics at a simplified, 
 critical point where the individualistic theory l^uc'^ercT*^ 
 failed. For ethics must not rest content with amvedat. 
 pointing out an end for conduct or standard of 
 morality without giving a reason to the individual 
 why he should make this end his own — that is, 
 developing a doctrine of obligation. In many 
 current theories, notably in the common forms of
 
 184 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 utilitarianism, the two things are not necessarily 
 connected, since the standard is fixed from the 
 point of view of the whole, and obligation has 
 reference to the individual. The development of 
 morality may appear to show how the two stand- 
 points can be connected. If it could be made out 
 that the happiness of the community and of the 
 individual are identical, a standard of morality 
 which made the aggregate happiness the end 
 might be regarded as carrying its own obligation 
 within itself: politics and ethics would (on the 
 hedonistic theory) be harmonised. And, in so far 
 as evolution has brought the individual and society 
 into closer reciprocal dependence, it has lessened 
 the practical difficulty of bringing about this con- 
 ciliation, or — to speak with the utilitarians — of 
 making the standard of morality supply a doctrine 
 of obligation. At present, howev^er, the course of 
 human development is far from having reached the 
 point at which actual harmony between the race 
 and each member of it is established ; and it would 
 therefore still be a subject for enquiry whether the 
 theory of evolution could provide a basis for moral 
 obligation, even were the moral standard or the 
 end for conduct satisfactorily established. But, in 
 determining this latter question, we find that the 
 above psychological and sociological investigations 
 have no longer the same degree of value as before. 
 In the theory of obligation every fact brought for-
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 185 
 
 ward by evolution to show the harmony of indi- 
 vidual and social welfare makes the way easier for 
 establishing the reasonableness of the pursuit of 
 social ends by the individual. But from these 
 facts of past development we have also to deter- 
 mine a standard for present and future action. 
 And this question cannot be solved merely by 
 showing how morality has developed, though that 
 development may form an important part of the 
 evidence from which our conclusions are to be 
 drawn. 
 
 The harmony of interests and the harmony of (6) Limits to 
 
 »,. -IP • • ^ •!• complete 
 
 feelings required for the empirical reconciliation of conciliation 
 egoism and altruism are of such a kind that they antiTum- 
 need only to be stated to show how far they are ''*"^- 
 from being realised in present circumstances. The 
 constant struggle involved in the course of evolu- 
 tion throws doubt even on its ultimate attainment. 
 The rule has always been that the better-equipped 
 organism asserts and maintains its supremacy only 
 by vanquishing the organisms which are not so 
 well equipped. Conflict and competition have been (») con- 
 
 e • 1 1 i mi • tinned exist- 
 
 constant ractors in development, ihe present cir- enceof com- 
 cumstances of the individual have been determined ^we'enTn-^ 
 for him by the war of hostile interests between '''v'duais; 
 different communities, and between different mem- 
 bers of the same community ; and his mental in- 
 heritance has been largely formed by the emotions 
 corresponding to this rivalry. Perhaps the neces-
 
 186 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 sity for conflict has diminished with the advance 
 of evolution ; but it is probable that it would be 
 more correct to say that its forms have changed, 
 At any rate, it is still sufficiently great to make 
 competition one of the chief formative influences in 
 industrial and political life. And the causes from 
 which the struggle of interests arises are so con- 
 stant — the multiplication of desires and of desiring 
 individuals keeps so well in advance of the means 
 of satisfying desires — that it is doubtful whether 
 the course of evolution is fitted to bring about 
 complete harmony between different individuals. 
 It would almost seem that the ' moving equili- 
 brium' in human conduct, in which there is no 
 clash of diverse interests, cannot be expected to 
 be brought about much before the time when the 
 physical factors of the universe shall have reached 
 the stage in which life ends. 
 iP) different Bcsidcs, it docs uot do to spcak as if the only 
 
 and conflict- ^ , • , ■ -i • i , 
 
 ing degrees alternative to egoism were a comprehensive altru- 
 ism. Man is a member of a family, a tribe, a 
 nation, the race. His altruism, therefore, may 
 take the narrow form of family feeling, or it may 
 extend to tribal feeling, or to patriotism, or even 
 rise to devotion to humanity. And these do not 
 merely supplement one another; they are often 
 conflicting principles of conduct. Action for the 
 sake of the family may frequently be most unsocial ; 
 the keen patriot ignores the rights of other peoples ; 
 
 of altruism ;
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 187 
 
 the ' citizen of the world ' is too often a stranger 
 to the national spirit. Further, when civilisation 
 grows complex, the same man is a member of 
 many intersecting societies — a church, a trade, a 
 party organisation^ — and has to balance the claims 
 which each of these has upon him. The suppres- 
 sion of egoism would still leave undetermined the 
 different shares which these various social wholes 
 are to have in a man's sympathies, and their 
 different claims upon his conduct. 
 
 Any theory of society will show how the good (y)theaitru- 
 of the individual is not merely a part of the good esTandthe 
 of the whole, but reacts in various ways upon the f,'o^"e'^°'^ 
 organism of which he is a member. But, in the 
 case of any one individual, the results of acts done 
 for his own good (or pleasure), and the results 
 of those done for the good (or pleasure) of the 
 whole, do not correspond with any exactness, and 
 often widely diverge. If, then, the individual is 
 consciously aiming at his own good (or pleasure), 
 it is — if we look from the point of view of indi- 
 vidualistic ethics — only an incidental and fortui- 
 tous result of the action when it promotes the 
 common good. When we recognise the social factor 
 in the individual, this judgment must be modified. 
 The evolution-theory shows how he has become 
 so constituted that much that pleases him indi- 
 vidually, must of necessity benefit society at large. 
 
 ' Cf. Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 113.
 
 188 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 But there are obvious limits to the harmony. The 
 pleasure or interest of the individual is often the 
 reverse of advantageous to society. Tt may be the 
 case that in seeking his own private ends, he is yet, 
 to use the words of Adam Smith, " led by an in- 
 visible hand to promote an end which was no part 
 of his intention." ^ But, if so, the end is invisible 
 as well as the hand that points to it. And the 
 good of society can be said to be the natural and 
 uniform consequence of the individual's action, only 
 when he consciously makes it his end. In a word, 
 the true altruism — or, as we might call it, using a 
 word appropriated to another purpose — the true 
 socialism is when the good of others or of society 
 is pursued for its own sake ; and this is to be 
 distinguished from the false or imperfect altruism, 
 in which the same outward result is aimed at, 
 because it is seen to be the most prudent way of 
 promoting one's own good. Thus Spencer's elabor- 
 ate argument^ to show that conduct of purely 
 egoistic tendency, equally with conduct of purely 
 altruistic tendency, is insufficient and self-destruc- 
 tive, does not reach beyond the external results of 
 action, and leaves it possible for both end and 
 motive to be still egoistic. If " morality is in- 
 ternal,"^ the discussion proves no ethical proposi- 
 
 ^ Wealth of Nations, book iv. ch. ii. 
 2 Principles of Ethics, part i. chap. xiii. 
 
 ^ Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 155 ; cf. Spencer, Principles of 
 Ethics, i. 120.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 189 
 
 tion at all. The simplest form of selfishness may 
 indeed be transcended by recognising that the 
 pleasures and pains of others are sources of sym- 
 pathetic feeling in ourselves. But a subjective 
 or emotional egoism remains. And if the fact 
 that we "receive pleasure from the pleasure of 
 another man " ^ is our reason for seeking his 
 pleasure, we shall cease to seek it when a means 
 of greater pleasure offers. In human life as at 
 present constituted, no secure principle of conduct 
 can be based on the agreement of individual with 
 social good; for, if they diverge, as they often do, 
 there is no standard left for determining their 
 competing claims. 
 
 It will not do to divide all men, as Stephen («) altruistic 
 
 . T o ■ , i 1 , • r- 1 1 1 feelings in- 
 
 seems to do,- into two classes, typified by the completely 
 reasonable and therefore sympathetic man who ®**^^'''*''®'^' 
 has struck a bargain with society to take ' common 
 stock of pains and pleasures,' and the systematic- 
 ally selfish man who ' must be an idiot.' For most 
 men belong to neither of those two classses : their 
 bargain with society has not been fully completed, 
 and can be withdrawn from temporarily when cir- 
 cumstances make withdrawal convenient, though 
 this process cannot be carried on indefinitely with- 
 out greatly weakening the sympathetic feelings. 
 The majority of men are neither entirely sympa- 
 
 ' Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 226. - Ibid., p. 263.
 
 190 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 thetic nor yet ' systematically selfish ' : they are 
 unsystematically sympathetic and uusystematically 
 selfish. Such men have the sensibilities that give 
 'leveracre' to the moralist.^ But it is futile to 
 tell them to be more sympathetic, or entirely 
 sympathetic. Tor sympathetic feelings cannot be 
 produced at will: they can only come with that 
 slow modification of the character brought about 
 by conduct. Shall we then say that a man should 
 in all cases of conduct prefer the pleasure of the 
 whole or of others to his own pleasure ? If a man 
 were to do so, then, perhaps, by consistent self- 
 abnegation, altruism might become pleasant, and 
 both the man himself and his descendants become 
 more sympathetically constituted. This perfection 
 of altruistic sympathies is looked forward to by 
 Spencer as characteristic of a subsequent — the 
 final — stage of evolution. When that period 
 comes, men will compete with one another for the 
 few remaining opportunities of self-sacrifice.^ At 
 present, Spencer argues, pure altruism is suicidal. 
 The individual whose sympathetic nature is un- 
 developed may, however, go further, and ask what 
 right we have to say that "the moral law" is 
 " conformity to the conditions of social welfare," ^ 
 rather than to those of individual welfare. Evo- 
 lution, it would seem, does not suffice to prove 
 
 1 Cf. Science of Ethics, p. 442. 
 
 - Principles of Ethics, i. 253. ^ Science of Ethics, p. 349.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 191 
 
 this proposition, which appears, on the contrary, 
 to be a survival of the social or political way of 
 looking at things inherited from the utilitarian 
 theory. The point to be proved is why I ought 
 to adopt this standpoint when considering what 
 the end of my action is to be. And this point 
 stands in need of proof here as much as in utili- 
 tarianism, and seems almost equally destitute of it. 
 
 Feelings leading to altruistic conduct are un- and may be 
 
 1 • restrained 
 
 doubtedly possessed by the average man at his by reflexion. 
 present stage of development. Yet the being who 
 is able to reflect on the feelings possessed by him, 
 and compare the characteristics of different emo- 
 tional states, and the activities following from 
 them, has ah^eady before him the possibility of 
 transcending them. He is able to estimate their 
 value in terms of simpler — or of other — feelings ; 
 and the man who rigorously judges them by the 
 test of personal pleasure and pain manifests the 
 spirit of the egoistic hedonist — a spirit which the 
 theory of empirical evolution does not seem able to 
 exercise. 
 
 At the same time the tendency of the evolution- oo Tendency 
 
 .of evolution 
 
 theory is not to support but to supplant egoism, to supplant 
 Neither the basis of psychological hedonism on Evouition 
 which egoism is usually made to rest, nor the »ot the basis 
 
 o <! 'of psycliolo- 
 
 independent arguments which have been urged gicaihedon- 
 
 ism, 
 
 for its ethical theory, are drawn from the facts of 
 development. The theory of evolution may, in-
 
 192 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 deed, be made to suggest that non-hedonistic action 
 has arisen out of hedonistic : " That all affections 
 are generated by association with experienced 
 pleasure — only that the association is mainly an- 
 cestral in the case of ' affections ' proper. The 
 dim remembrance of ancestral pleasures, the force 
 of ancestral habit, produces that propension of 
 which Butler speaks, disproportionate to (distinct) 
 expectation and (personal) experience of pleasure." ^ 
 But this view will be rejected by the pure egoist,^ 
 who must maintain that the pain of acting 
 against ancestral habit would in every case be 
 greater than the expected pleasure forgone by 
 following it. According to the view suggested, 
 all deliberate volition would still be regarded as 
 hedonistically determined, though other motives 
 than pleasure might affect action through having 
 been inherited from cases of ancestral conduct in 
 which they tended to personal pleasure. Even 
 were it shown, however, that altruistic conduct has 
 been developed out of egoistic, the fact of its de- 
 velopment would not alter its present character. 
 If action now is not always moved by pleasure 
 and pain alone, it becomes a question of merely 
 historical interest to trace its genesis to conduct 
 to which our ancestors were hedonistically im- 
 
 1 F. Y. Edgeworth, Old and New Methods of Ethics (1877), 
 p. 11. 
 
 2 Cf. A. Barratt, Mind, O.S., iii. 280.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEOKIES. 193 
 
 pelled. The fact remains that the original sim- 
 plicity of motive has been broken into, and some- 
 thing else than personal pleasure admitted to have 
 sway. 
 
 But it does not seem to have been made out 
 that action in the early stages of human life was 
 completely egoistic, any more than that it is so 
 now. "From first to last," as Spencer put it,^ 
 self - sacrifice seems to have been involved in 
 the preservation of each successive generation of 
 individuals. We inherit propensities to action 
 which have been evolved from an initial stage in 
 which there was no conscious distinction between 
 egoism and altruism, though both tendencies were 
 present and were necessary for the continued exist- 
 ence of the species. The feelings inherited by the 
 egoistic hedonist are assessed by him at their pleas- 
 ure-value. But such feelings would never have been 
 acquired by his ancestors, had they tested each ger- 
 minal emotion in the same way, and so restrained 
 self-sacrifice for offspring and fellow-men. Perhaps 
 they did not clearly see or realise what their pleas- 
 ure consisted in, or accurately distinguish it from 
 family or tribal welfare; but, through this defi- 
 ciency of imagination, the feelings were able to 
 grow and perpetuate themselves, which have tended 
 to the preservation and consolidation of society. 
 
 Nor can we gather from evolution any ethical 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, part i. chap. xii.
 
 194 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 nor of argument leading to egoism as the standard of 
 
 hedonism, worth in conduct. The proof of egoism attempted 
 by the late Mr Barratt, for instance, is unaffected 
 by his recognition of the theory of evolution as 
 applied to mind, and depends on definitions and 
 axioms which hold (if at all) for the individual 
 man. Pleasure is defined by him as " that state 
 of consciousness which follows upon the unimpeded 
 performance (as such) of its function by one or 
 more of the parts of our organism";^ and the 
 good is forthwith identified with pleasure, by its 
 being shown that it is a " state of consciousness," 
 and that it "results from the due performance of 
 function (as such)."- But the 'due^ performance 
 of function ' is itself a state or states of conscious- 
 ness ; and in it, not in any sequent or concomitant 
 circumstances, the good may consist. The good, it 
 may be said, is not pleasure, but the activity of 
 which pleasure is only the consequent and comple- 
 tion. This is not a mere question of words. For 
 ' due performance of function ' cannot be measured 
 by the resultant or accompanying feeling of pleas- 
 ure : the most perfect functioning, just because it 
 has become habitual, has often the slightest accom- 
 paniment of pleasant feeling. The way in which 
 
 1 Physical Ethics, p. 12. 2 jbi^.^ p. 17. 
 
 ^ lu the word ' due ' an idea of worth is involved. Probably 
 Barratt meant by ' due performance ' one which made the faculty 
 correspond with its medium (cf. Physical Ethics, p. 9) ; but this 
 introduces a new standard of value.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 195 
 
 the argumeut is put in ' Physical Ethics ' is thus 
 well fitted to bring out the fundamental antithesis 
 between ethical systems according as they place 
 the good in the active element of function, or in 
 the passive element of pleasurable feeling which 
 accompanies functioning. The theory of evolution 
 seems to have led many of the writers who have 
 applied it to ethics to the other side of the anti- 
 thesis than that adhered to by Barratt. They rec- 
 ognise ethical value as belonging to * due perform- 
 ance of function,' rather than to the pleased states 
 of consciousness which follow ; and in this way 
 their theory leads them beyond hedonistic ethics.^ 
 
 ^ The transition involved in passing from ' pleasure ' to ' per- 
 formance of function' or 'life' as the end of conduct, may be 
 illustrated by the following passage from Mr Pater's ' Marius 
 the Epicurean' (1885, i. 163): "Really, to the phase of reflec- 
 tion through which Marius was then passing, the charge of 
 • hedonism,' whatever its real weight might be, was not properly 
 applicable to all. Not pleasure, but fulness of life, and ' insight ' 
 as conducting to that fulness— energy, choice and variety of 
 experience — including noble pain and sorrow even — loves such as 
 those in the exquisite old story of Apuleius ; such sincere and 
 strenuous forms of the moral life, as Seneca and Epictetus — 
 whatever form of human life, in short, was impassioned and 
 ideal : it was from this that the ' new Cyrenaicism ' of Marius 
 took its criterion of values. It was a theory, indeed, which 
 might rightly be regarded as in a great degree coincident with 
 the main principle of the Stoics themselves, and a version of the 
 precept ' Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy 
 might ' — a doctrine so widely applicable among the nobler spirits 
 of that time ; and as with that its mistaken tendency would lie 
 in the direction of a kind of idolatry of mere life, or natural gift 
 or strength— Vidoldtric dcs talents."
 
 amsm 
 
 196 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTIOX, 
 
 3. Bearing It has been argued that the theory of evolution 
 
 of the theory . . i -i 
 
 ofevokuion IS, in tendency, hostile to the egoistic principle. 
 Had egoism been consistently recognised and acted 
 upon during the course of human development, the 
 features of social life which most promote co-opera- 
 tion and progress would never have become per- 
 sistent. But the same objection cannot be urged 
 against universalistic hedonism. It is true that 
 this has not been the end consistently aimed at in 
 the past. Those from whom our social instincts 
 are inherited cannot be credited with having had 
 either the general happiness or social evolution in 
 view. Society and institutions furthering the 
 common good were not the work of primitive 
 utilitarians plotting for the greatest happiness of 
 the greatest number. They have come down to 
 us from times when social organisation was forced 
 upon men by the rude logic of facts which exter- 
 minated tribes in which the bond of union was 
 weak; and they have been gradually modified by 
 the pressure of external circumstances and the 
 growing influence of mental conceptions of what 
 is best. But the adoption of general happiness as 
 the end of action would not have had the same 
 effect on social evolution as the adoption of per- 
 sonal happiness as the end would have had. It 
 would have aided and would not have hindered 
 the growth of the feeling of unity among the 
 members of a tribe or state, as well as have led
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 197 
 
 to the recognition of the individual as subordinate 
 to the social organism. It may thus seem quite 
 natural to look to utilitarianism as giving the end 
 for reflective action, and yet to hold along with it 
 what is loosely called the ' ethics of evolution.' 
 
 But this first attitude of evolution to utilitarian- has led to 
 
 1 1 iii<i.i.>i its moditi- 
 
 ism was not fitted to be permanent ; and the 'start ^ cation 
 Spencer got on being classed with anti-utilitarians 
 must have been repeated in the experience of other 
 moralists as they found how far they had drifted 
 from their ancient moorings. Spencer's difference 
 from the utilitarian was not such as to lead him to 
 reject or modify their principle. He maintained, 
 as strongly as they did that " the ultimately 
 supreme end " is " happiness special and general." - 
 But lie disagreed with them in method : holding in method, 
 that, owing to the incommensurability of a man's 
 different pleasures and pains, and to the incommen- 
 surability of the pleasures and pains of one man 
 with those of others, coupled with the indetermin- 
 ateness of the means required to reach so indeter- 
 minate an end, happiness is not fitted to be the 
 immediate aim of conduct.^ But another method 
 
 ^ "The note in question greatly startled me by implicitly class- 
 ing me with anti-utilitarians. I have never regarded myself as an 
 anti-utilitarian." — Spencer's letter to J. S. Mill, quoted in Bain's 
 Mental and Moral Science, p. 721, and printed in full in Spencer's 
 Autobiography, ii. 88 f. 
 
 ■- Principles of Ethics, i. 173 ; cf. p. 30. 
 
 3 Ibid., i. 154, 155.
 
 198 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 (he thought) is open to us. For " since evolution 
 has been, and is still, working towards the highest 
 life, it follows that conforming to those principles 
 by which the highest life is achieved, is furthering 
 that end." ^ It is possible " to deduce, from the 
 laws of life and the conditions of existence, what 
 kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happi- 
 ness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness." ^ 
 Greatest pleasure, that is to say, is the end. But 
 it is so impossible to compare different kinds of 
 pleasure, different people's pleasure, and different 
 means for obtaining a maximum of it, that it is 
 not a practical end for aiming at. No doubt is 
 expressed that greatest happiness is the ulti- 
 mate end ; although no good reason is given for 
 holding that it is. But it is an indeterminate 
 end, and needs to be interpreted by the course of 
 evolution which is held to tend to it. It is not too 
 much to say, therefore, that Spencer was only 
 nominally a utilitarian. His ethical principles 
 were not arrived at by an estimate of the con- 
 sequences of action, but by deduction from the 
 laws of that ' highest life ' which is now in process 
 of evolution. This alliance between evolutionism 
 and hedonism will be examined in the following 
 chapter. At present it is necessary to consider 
 the reasons which have led other evolutionists to 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, i. 171. 
 
 2 Letter to J. S. Mill, in Principles of Ethics, i. 57.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 199 
 
 look upon the new morality as superseding the 
 utilitarian end. 
 
 Spencer's "dissent from the doctrine of utility, 
 as commonly understood, concerns," he tells us,^ 
 " not the object to be reached by men, but the 
 method of reaching it." With other writers, how- 
 ever, the theory of evolution has not only sup- 
 planted the method of utilitarianism, but also led 
 to a modification of its principle. The objections and in 
 they have taken to it may perhaps be summed up ^'"'"'^'p^* 
 by saying that they consider utilitarianism to have 
 looked upon conduct from a mechanical, instead of 
 from an organic point of view. It prescribed con- 
 duct to a man as if he were a machine with a 
 certain kind and quantity of work to turn out. 
 His nature was looked upon by it as fixed, and his 
 social conditions as unvarying ; and the ideal set <«) ideal ot 
 
 , „ , . ji e • ii • utilitarian- 
 
 before him was therefore unprogressive — somethmg i^m objected 
 that he was to do or to get, not something that he ^°^IZ^^°' 
 
 D ' o gressive. 
 
 was to become. According to Stephen, it " con- 
 siders society to be formed of an aggregate of 
 similar human beings. The character of each 
 molecule is regarded as constant." It can, there- 
 fore, give a test which is ' approximately accurate ' 
 only, which does not allow for the variation of 
 character and of social relations." ^ To the same 
 
 ^ Letter to J. S. Mill, in Bain's Mental and Moral Science, p. 
 721, Spencer's Autobiography, ii. 83. 
 ■■* Science of Ethics, p. 363.
 
 200 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 effect Miss Simcox maintained that it " might pass 
 muster in a theory of social statics, but it breaks 
 down altogether if we seek its help to construct a 
 theory of social dynamics." ^ These writers do not 
 seem to have made it quite clear, however, in what 
 way utilitarianism assumes a stationary condition 
 of human nature, and so formulates conduct in a 
 way unsuited to a progressive state. To say simply 
 that the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
 is the end, is not in itself inconsistent with a pro- 
 gressive state of human nature. It is true that, in 
 all the enthusiasm for and belief in progress to be 
 seen in a writer such as J. S. Mill, there is a con- 
 stant goal always set to it in the possible maximum 
 of pleasant feeling. It would not have been in- 
 consistent for him, however, to look upon human 
 nature as capable of developing new susceptibilities 
 for pleasure. Progress is made by increasing the 
 amount of pleasure actually got. And so far the 
 ideal itself is certainly fixed, while progress con- 
 sists in its gradual realisation. But there is no 
 special virtue in having an ideal which is itself 
 progressive. A progressive ideal simply means an 
 ideal which is incompletely comprehended, and the 
 comprehension of which proceeds gradually with 
 its realisation. At any time the definition of such 
 an ideal can only be tentative: with the actual 
 assimilation of character to it, the intellect comes 
 
 ^ Natural Law : An Essay in Ethics (1877), p. lOL
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 201 
 
 to grasp its nature with increasing clearness. I 
 do not myself think that we can expect to have 
 more than such a tentative and progressive com- 
 prehension of the moral ideal of humanity. But 
 we must not take objection to a theory because it 
 gives at once a clear and definite view of the final 
 end of conduct : though we must not refrain from 
 enquiring how the end is known. 
 
 But the bearing of the objection to utilitarianism Force of the 
 becomes apparent when we try to give some definite when 
 meaning to the end ' greatest happiness.' If we are ^^ll 
 content to receive it as simply a very general — or j"terpret 
 rather abstract — expression for our ideal, nothing happiness, 
 need be said, except to put the question, which has 
 been already asked, how we came by such an ideal. 
 The difficulty arises when we attempt to apply the 
 ideal to practice. With men of fixed character in by showing 
 an unchanging society, our way might be compara- whicifmen 
 tively clear. But, when both character and social ^^^!.°^^^"^ 
 relations vary, and their variation extends to sus- 
 ceptibility to pleasure and pain, and depends on 
 the actions adopted to obtain the end, utihtarianism 
 may well appear to be without a principle by which 
 to determine between different kinds of conduct. 
 To an objection similar to this, but taken from the 
 old point of view, that we have no time before 
 acting to sum up the pleasurable and painful con- 
 sequences of our actions. Mill replied that there 
 had been "ample time — namely, the whole past
 
 202 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 duration of the human species " ^ — in which to 
 estimate the felicific results of conduct. The 
 variability of faculty and function makes this 
 answer lack convincing power. Yet, perhaps, we 
 are apt at present to disregard the real value of 
 this collective experience of the race. True, 
 human nature is not a constant; but certain of 
 its qualities are persistent and constant enough not 
 to leave us in doubt as to whether, say, murder 
 and theft are beneficial or injurious to happiness. 
 There are at least certain actions, and, still more, 
 certain abstinences, upon which human security — 
 the basis of happiness — depends : though it would 
 seem that those 'secondary laws' may be more 
 properly regarded as conditions of life than means 
 to pleasure, 
 andamaxi- The difficulty, howcver, comes most clearly to 
 the front when we attempt to define the maximum 
 of happiness, and that not for an individual or 
 generation only, but for the race. It is not happi- 
 ness merely, but greatest happiness, that is the 
 utilitarian end. Is there any way, then, of deter- 
 mining how the maximum of happiness is to be 
 obtained for generations whose characters, though 
 inherited from present individuals, may be modified 
 almost indefinitely ? The very existence and num- 
 bers of these future generations are problematic; 
 and Mill, as is well known, spent much of his 
 
 ^ Utilitarianism, p. 34.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 203 
 
 energy in trying to induce the present generation 
 to restrict the numbers of the next. But he never 
 seems to have asked the question whether the true 
 end was greatest average happiness or greatest 
 aggregate happiness ; and either alternative would 
 have led to paradox. Even on the fundamental 
 question as to whether happiness is to be obtained 
 by the restriction of desires or by the satisfaction 
 which leads to their recurrence and increase, no 
 principle can be extracted from utilitarian ethics. 
 The theory of evolution has shown how desires may 
 be uprooted in the character of the race, though 
 they remain to the end in existing individuals ; 
 but in each case utilitarianism would require us 
 to sum up and estimate the relative advantages of 
 renunciation and satisfaction — a task which the 
 modifiability of human character seems to make 
 impossible. Thus, even if certain rules of living 
 may be ascertained, and justified by the utilitarian 
 principle, it would seem that the end of greatest 
 happiness for the race of man, or the sentient 
 creation generally, must remain ' abstract.' There 
 seems no principle through which it may be ap- 
 plied to conduct — no hope of an accurate esti- 
 mate of results — when the variability of the 
 individual and of social relations is taken into 
 
 account. 
 Count 
 ity must have an inward, not an external standard, anismasa 
 
 Connected with this is the assertion that moral- ('0 objection 
 
 to utilitari-
 
 204 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION, 
 
 theoiT of The evolutionists are inclined to condemn utilitari- 
 quences; anism as a theory of consequences, dealing solely 
 with work produced. According to Mill, "utili- 
 tarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others 
 in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with 
 the morality of the action, though much with the 
 worth of the agent." ^ And this seems to be just 
 what evolutionism objects to. Even the worth of 
 the agent is, according to utilitarianism, only a 
 tendency to perform the actions called moral : " a 
 good or a bad disposition" is said to be "a bent 
 of character from which useful or from which hurt- 
 ful actions are likely to arise." ^ Against this view 
 Stephen maintained that "the attempt to secure 
 an absolute and immutable moral law in its exter- 
 nal shape must be illusory. The moral law can be 
 stated unconditionally when it is stated in the form 
 ' Be this,' but not when it is stated in the form ' Do 
 this,' " 3 This, however, appears to express the matter 
 in a way not free from difficulty. The organic view 
 of conduct will object not only to considering action 
 apart from character, but also to considering char- 
 acter apart from action. We must treat conduct as 
 a whole : and, in order to do so, we must treat it as 
 both arising out of and forming character ; and we 
 must treat character not as mere potentiality, but 
 as it realises itself in conduct. The weakness of 
 
 ^ Utilitarianism, p. 26. 2 ibj^i,^ p_ 27 n. 
 
 ^ Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 385,
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL TIIEOKIES. 205 
 
 the utilitarian theory is its method of regarding 
 actions merely for the sake of their results : the 
 evolutionist must show how results are connected 
 with motives, — how character and conduct are dif- 
 ferent aspects of a whole. 
 
 The difference of the evolutionist view from utili- W and as re- 
 
 ... 1 • mi 1 L-ited solely 
 
 tarianism comes out at another point. 1 he latter to. sensiba- 
 places the standard and test of conduct in its effects ' ^' 
 on the sensibility. The best|is that which brings 
 most pleasure. Utilitarians are now, for the most 
 part, ready to admit that, to be in earnest with their 
 theory, they must reject Mill's attempt to distin- 
 guish qualities among pleasures. " If morality is to 
 be defined by happiness, we must, of course, allow 
 all kinds of happiness to count, and to count equally 
 so far as they are actually equal. We must reckon 
 the pleasures of malevolence as well as those of 
 benevolence." ^ Of his own pleasures — of the rela- 
 tive amounts of pleasure he gets from various sources 
 — each man is the final judge. One man prefers 
 ' push - pin ' to poetry, another poetry to ' push- 
 pin ' ; and neither has a right to call the other mis- 
 taken. If we are to aim at the greatest maximum 
 pleasure, therefore, we must not strive for what 
 are commonly called ' high ' pleasures rather than 
 * low ' pleasures, except as greater in intensity. If 
 we must have a standard, the judgment of the^men 
 of experience for which Mill contended must be 
 
 ^ Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 361.
 
 common 
 measure. 
 
 206 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 superseded by the judgment of the average man. 
 If pleasvire is the only end, and satisfaction is 
 simply another name for it, then it is plainly in- 
 correct to say that "it is better to be a human 
 being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better to be 
 of which Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." ^ As has 
 been urged from the evolutionist point of view, 
 " there is no common measure of happiness to en- 
 able us to say that the more perfect being enjoys 
 more of it than the less."^ There seems one way 
 only in which utilitarianism can bring its moral 
 ideal into harmony with the upward tendency 
 claimed for itself by evolutionist ethics — and that 
 is, by maintaining that the pleasures incident to 
 what are regarded as the higher functions are the 
 pleasures which excel others in respect of ' fecund- 
 ity ' : they are the source of future pleasures, and 
 are frequently inexclusive even in their present en- 
 joyment. The difficulty in making this assertion is 
 just that these ' higher ' pleasures are but slightly 
 appreciated by the majority of men, and can hardly 
 be said to be pleasures for them at all. But here 
 the theory of evolution, whose adherents have been 
 acting the part of the candid friend to utilitari- 
 anism, must come to its aid, and admit that human 
 nature may be so modified in the future as to allow 
 of the ' highest ' becoming also the ' greatest ' of 
 pleasures. The argument in the mouth of the utili- 
 
 ^ Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 14. "^ Simcox, Natural Law, p. 101.
 
 EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. 207 
 
 tarian is perhaps a somewhat arbitrary one, since 
 it could be applied equally well to any class of 
 pleasures. The notion of 'higher,' as applied 
 either to conduct or to pleasure, has been accepted 
 from current moral opinion. But the theory of 
 evolution has set itself to explain this notion, and 
 to develop a theory of morality in harmony with its 
 own scientific positions, and free from the defects 
 which it has found in other systems. How far it 
 contributes to the determination of the ethical end 
 or standard of worth in conduct will form the 
 subject of investigation in the following chapters.
 
 208 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 
 
 1. Alliance The alliance between Evolutionism and Hedonism 
 tfonlsmand ^^^y be arrived at from either of the two points of 
 hedonism ^iew which are beino; broug-ht into connexion : 
 
 eflected m ° " 
 
 two ways : jj^ay be either an attempt to bring the hedonistic 
 
 standard into the definite region of law revealed 
 
 by the evolution of life; or may result from the 
 
 endeavour to give clearness and persuasiveness to 
 
 an ethical standard which evolution itself seems to 
 
 point to. 
 
 (a) greatest The former point of view is represented by 
 
 be^o^btainecr Speucer's rejection of empirical utilitarianism, and 
 
 by confomi- substitution f or it of a practical end which is not 
 
 mg to laws ■•■ 
 
 of life or of enunciated in terms of pleasure. Happiness is still 
 
 evolution ; i i i i • 
 
 regarded by hmi as the supreme end ; but the 
 tendency to it is not to be adopted as the end in 
 practical morality. There are certain conditions 
 of social equilibrium which " must be fulfilled 
 before complete life — that is, greatest happiness — 
 can be obtained in any society." ^ Thus the form 
 
 ^ Data of Ethics, p. 171.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONIS>r. 209 
 
 of ' rational utilitarianism ' which lie endeavours to 
 establish " does not take welfare for its immediate 
 object of pursuit," but " conformity to certain prin- 
 ciples which, in the nature of things, causally 
 determine welfare."^ Having deduced "from the 
 laws of life and the conditions of existence what 
 kinds of action necessarily tend to produce hap- 
 piness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness," 
 we are to recognise these deductions "as laws of 
 conduct . . . irrespective of a direct estimation of 
 happiness or misery." ^ The assumption is thus 
 distinctly made that life tends to happiness, and 
 that the laws of its evolution yield practical prin- 
 ciples by following out which the greatest hap- 
 piness may be obtained, v^ithout attempting the 
 impossible task of estimating directly the felicific 
 and infelicific results of conduct. 
 
 Starting from the evolutionist point of view, but (^) ethical 
 with an opposite estimate of the relative value for evolution 
 practice of the ends supplied by evolutionism and by^j^elfure. 
 by hedonism, a like identification of them might 
 seem advisable. The 'increase of life' to which 
 evolution tends may be regarded as not merely an 
 account of the actual process of existence, but as a 
 principle of action for a conscious being. In this 
 way some such ethical imperative as " Be a self- 
 conscious agent in the evolution of the universe"^ 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, i. 162. - Ibid., i. 57. 
 
 3 Cf. A. Barratt, iu Miud, O.S., ii. 172 n. 
 
 O
 
 210 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTIOX. 
 
 may be formulated. Yet as the ' evolution of the 
 universe ' is a somewhat large conception, and its 
 laws are not clear to every one, it may seem neces- 
 sary that the end should be explained by transla- 
 tion into better-known terms. And this may be 
 done if the conduct which promotes life most is, 
 at the same time, the conduct which increases 
 pleasure most. In this way, although the ultimate 
 end is life, or, in vaster phrase, ' the evolution of 
 , the universe,' the practical end is pleasure. The 
 moral value of conduct will depend on its tend- 
 ency to increase the balance of pleasure over 
 pain. The ethics of evolution will be reduced to 
 hedonism. 
 
 This way of determining the evolutionist end is 
 put forward as a logical possibility rather than as 
 representing the views of any party. Yet it would 
 seem that the above point of view is not altogether 
 foreign to evolutionist morality. The preservation 
 or development of the individual — or of the race — 
 which is put forward as an expression both for the 
 actual course of evolution and the subjective im- 
 pulse corresponding to it, is often assumed to agree 
 at each step with the desire for pleasure, and, when 
 the stage of reflective consciousness is reached, to 
 be identical with the pursuit of a maximum of 
 pleasure.^ In this way it is assumed that the 
 
 ^ As illustrating this, I may refer to G. v. Gizycki, Philoso- 
 phische Consequenzen der Lamarck-Darwin'schen Entwicklungs-
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 211 
 
 preservation and development of life tend always 
 to pleasure, and that the end or tendency of evolu- 
 tion is being fulfilled when the greatest pleasure is 
 wisely sought. It is therefore necessary to enquire 
 how far the correspondence between life and 
 pleasure, or between development and pleasure, 
 actually holds, that we may see whether it is 
 possible for the one to take the place of the other 
 in determining the end for conduct. 
 
 Now it is argued, from the point of view of 2. Evolu- 
 tionist argu- 
 evolution, that, takmg for granted that pleasure meutfor 
 
 motives action, the organisms in which pleasurable tance of iife 
 
 acts coincided with life-preserving or health-pro- ^"'^ ^'^''^^' 
 
 moting acts must have survived in the struggle for 
 
 existence at the expense of those organisms whose 
 
 pleasurable activity tended to their destruction or 
 
 tlieorie (1876), p. 27: " Wir liaben obeu die Erhaltuug uiul 
 Forderuug des Lebeus des Individuums uud der Gattuug als das 
 eiue Ziel der Einrichtuug des geistigeu Organismus gekenn- 
 zeiclinet." V. 58 : " Auf das Streben uacli in sich befriedigteui 
 psychischen Lebeu [that is to say, pleasure] sind alle aniinaleu 
 Orgauismea angelegt." In his ' Gruudzvige der Moral' (1883) 
 and later works Dr Giiycki's principle and method are ultihtarian. 
 With the above may be compared Guyau, Esquisse d'uue morale 
 saus obligation ni sanction (1885), p. 15 : " L' action sort naturel- 
 leraent du fouctiounement de la vie, en grande partie incouscient ; 
 elle entre aussitot dans le domain de la conscience et de la jouis- 
 sance, mais elle n'en vient pas. La tendance de I'otre h, pers^verev 
 dans I'etre est le fond de tout desir sans constituer elle-meme uu 
 ddsir determine." For a criticism of Guyau's method and results 
 reference may be made to Mind, O.S., x. 276 fl".
 
 212 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 to the hindrance of their efficiency.^ The assump- 
 tion in this argument, in addition to the constant 
 postulate of natural selection, is simply that pleas- 
 ure is a chief motive of action ; the conclusion to 
 which it leads is that there is a broad correspond- 
 ence between life-preserving and pleasurable acts 
 — that the preservation and development of life are 
 pleasurable. It is necessary to examine with care 
 the validity of this important argument with refer- 
 ence to the attacks that may be made on it from 
 the pessimist point of view ; and, if its doctrine 
 of the correspondence of life and pleasure is not 
 entirely erroneous, to enquire further whether this 
 correspondence can be made to establish an end for 
 conduct, in accordance with the theory of evolution, 
 by measuring life in terms of pleasure. 
 3. objec- What then is to be said of the supposed "conflict 
 
 argument:^ between Eudffimonism [Hedonism] and Evolution- 
 ism " which V. Hartmann ^ opposes to the optimist 
 doctrine that evolution has tended to make life and 
 pleasure coincide ? 
 
 The problem of Pessimism resolves itself into 
 two questions which admit of being kept distinct: 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 82 f. ; Principles of Psy- 
 chology, § 125, 3d ed., i. 280 ; Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 83. 
 The simplicity of this argument will be appreciated if we consider 
 the difficulty Comte experienced in trying to reach a similar con- 
 clusion. See Positive Philosophy, Miss Martineau's translation, 
 ii. 87 ff. 
 
 ^ Cf. Phanomenologie des sittlicheu Bewusstseins, pp. 701, 
 708.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 213 
 
 (a) The first is, Does life on the whole give, or can 
 it give, a balance of pleasure ? This is the funda- 
 mental question of the value of life as put by those, 
 whether optimists or pessimists, who assume that 
 ' value ' means ' pleasure-value.' If it be answered 
 in the negative, the hedonistic ideal must be the re- 
 duction of the adverse balance to the zero-point of 
 feeling striven after by Eastern ascetics, but, to all 
 appearance, obtained only and most easily by death. 
 (h) The second question is, Does the evolution of life 
 lead to an increase of pleasure and diminution of 
 pain ? This is the question brought into promi- 
 nence in recent discussions, and of most importance 
 for the present enquiry ; and upon an affirmative 
 answer to it Evolutionist Hedonism is plainly de- 
 pendent. To both questions v. Hartmann gives an 
 answer in the negative. 
 
 (a) If the pessimist view of life is correct («) that life 
 
 d 11T11 1 T n i-ii cannot bring 
 
 fepencer held,^ then " the endmg or an undesirable more pieas- 
 existence being the thing to be wished, that which ^inT^° 
 causes the ending of it must be applauded." And 
 this is so far true, though not necessarily true in 
 the way Spencer thought. For this undesirable 
 existence cannot, perhaps, be brought to a final con- 
 clusion merely by ending the individual life : this 
 might only leave room for other individuals to fill 
 the vacant places. Annihilation (it may be said) is 
 the end not directly for the individual, but for the 
 
 Principles of Ethics, i. 26.
 
 214 THE THEOEY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 race. Not life itself, according to Schopenhauer, but 
 the will to live is to be killed in the individual man. 
 Even this code of morals, Hartmann thinks, is a rem- 
 nant of the false, pre-evolutionist individualism, and 
 would hinder the course of the universe, by leaving 
 the game to be played out by the remaining indi- 
 viduals whose wills were not strong enough to curb 
 or kill themselves. It is a mistake to think that 
 the will to live which pulses through all existence 
 can be annihilated by the phenomenal individual 
 The individual's duty is not to seek for himself the 
 painlessness of annihilation or passionless Nirwana, 
 but to join in the ceaseless painful striving of 
 nature, and, by contributing to the development of 
 life, to hasten its arrival once more at the goal of 
 unconsciousness. The self-destruction, not of the 
 individual will, but of the cosmic or universal will, 
 is the final end of action. 
 
 Apart from the metaphysical view of things with 
 which this estimate of the value of life is connected, 
 and which may be regarded perhaps as its conse- 
 quent rather than its cause,^ the pessimist doctrine 
 has a double foundation, in psychology and in the 
 facts of life, 
 (a) from the Psychologically, it seems to be best supported 
 natiirp of by Schopcnhauer's doctrine of will or desire as an 
 pleasure, inccssant paiuful striving, pleasure being merely 
 
 ^ Cf. Yaihiiiger : Hartmanu, Diiluing und Lange (1876), p. 
 124.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 215 
 
 the negative of this pain, and always coming short 
 of its complete satisfaction. But this position in- 
 volves a double error in psychological analysis, and 
 is relinquished even by Hartmann, though he still 
 regards pleasure as in all cases satisfaction of de- 
 sire. The painful element in desire is itself merely 
 a secondary or derived fact in human nature, con- 
 sequent on the inhibition of conative energy. The 
 pleasures we call passive are independent of desire; 
 and those which attend upon activity, but are not 
 themselves part of the end of action, are also en- 
 joyed without being striven after in order to satisfy 
 a want. Further, it is a mistake to look upon 
 the pleasure of attainment as a mere negation ^of 
 the pain of desire. The painful element of desire 
 comes from the inhibition of the attempted realisa- 
 tion of an ideal object. In unsatisfied desires, it is 
 true, the pain is in proportion to the strength of 
 the restrained longing. But, if the inhibition is 
 overcome, the pain is not measured by the strength 
 of the desire, but rather by the amount of opposi- 
 tion that has to be conquered in satisfying it. 
 Hence, not only are there other pleasures than 
 those of satisfied desire, but even the pleasure got 
 from such satisfaction may be something more 
 than a mere recompense for the pain accompanying 
 the desire. 
 
 The support got by pessimism from the facts of W from «»e 
 
 ■>•(•■ TM' 1 • • facts of hii- 
 
 human lite is more dimcult to estimate at its true mauiife;
 
 216 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 value. It is obvious that pleasure and pain are 
 intermingled in almost every experience ; and the 
 proportion in which they are mixed varies greatly 
 in different circumstances and according to the 
 susceptibilities of different persons. If we ask a 
 number of people whether life is on the whole 
 pleasant to them, not only do we receive a variety 
 of answers which it is hard to sum up and average, 
 but the answers we get are apt to reflect the feel- 
 ing of the moment rather than to represent an 
 impartial estimate of the pleasure and pain of a 
 lifetime. Thus experience seems unable to give 
 us a trustworthy answer to the average pleasure- 
 value of life ; but, if its verdict is correct, that 
 to some life is pleasant, though to many painful, 
 this shows that a surplus of pain does not follow 
 from the nature of life, and thus destroys the 
 position of thoroughgoing pessimism, which looks 
 upon this as the worst of all possible worlds. 
 (6) that the (b) It may still be maintained, however — and 
 ufedoernot ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ position which chiefly concerns us here 
 tend to — ^i^Q^^ ^j^Q course of evolution does not tend to in- 
 
 pleasnre. 
 
 crease the pleasure in life at the expense of the 
 pain in it, and that, therefore, even although 
 pleasure and evolution may both of them be 
 possible ends of conduct, they are ends which 
 point in different directions and lead to different 
 courses of action. 
 
 It is necessary for the evolutionist who holds
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 217 
 
 that the development of life does not tend to (a) incom- 
 
 , , , pletoness ol 
 
 increase pleasure, to meet argument already ad- the evoiu- 
 duced ^ to show their correspondence. Nor does J^'°"^ "^ ^^^' 
 that argument seem to be altogether beyond criti- 
 cism. To compare the progress shown in develop- 
 ment with pleasure, we ought to know exactly wliat 
 is meant by both terms. Yet it is impossible to 
 have a clear notion of progress witliout an idea 
 of the end to which it tends, and this has not 
 yet been obtained. It is largely on account of 
 the difficulty of obtaining such an idea that some 
 evolutionists seem to have been driven to measure 
 progress in terms of pleasure, just as, on the other 
 hand, owing to the difficulty of estimating and 
 summing up pleasures, some hedonists have been 
 induced to measure them by the progress of evo- 
 lution. What we have now to see is whether 
 the correspondence assumed between progress and 
 pleasure actually exists. And, to avoid the tau- 
 tology of saying that progress is increase of life, we 
 must judge of it simply by empirical observation 
 of the nature of human activity and of the course 
 of human affairs. 
 
 Now the attempted identification of pleasurable 
 and life-promoting activities rests on an incomplete 
 account of the motives and results of action. For, 
 in the first place, even if we were to admit that 
 pleasure and avoidance of pain are the only motives 
 
 ^ See above, p. 211 f.
 
 218 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 to action, it is clear that the influence of natural 
 selection has not prevented actions hurtful to life 
 from being sometimes accompanied by pleasant 
 sensations. Two causes may be suggested for this 
 result. In the first place, there are different kinds 
 of competition in nature. The struggle which de- 
 termines the onward movement of development is 
 not simply the conflict of individuals to maintain 
 themselves : that alone might have been expected 
 to lead to a greater measure of harmony be- 
 tween individual pleasure and individual survival 
 than is actually found. It is also a conflict 
 between groups: and this conflict favours modes 
 of action which are disconnected with individual 
 pleasure, and leads also to the individual being 
 protected by the group from some of the conse- 
 quences of his own desires. Again, in the second 
 place, man possesses the power of representing 
 ideal states in the imagination, and is thus able 
 to avoid actions hurtful to life, although these 
 actions are pleasant at the time. For the hurt- 
 ful consequences of the action may be so vividly 
 represented in idea as to outweigh the influence 
 of the present pleasure which could be got from 
 its enjoyment.! 
 
 Further, the analysis of volition involved in the 
 argument seems to be insufficient. For there are 
 other springs of action to be taken account of 
 
 1 Cf. Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Pliilosophy (1874), ii. 332 f.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 219 
 
 than pleasure and its opposite. Habit, imitation, 
 and interests of a more comprehensive kind than 
 desire of pleasant feeling, are all motives to action. 
 It is true that pleasure is always felt in the suc- 
 cessful performance of an action, and it is also true 
 that the inhibition of will is always painful ; but it 
 is none the less incorrect to look either upon the 
 pleasure that follows from the action, or the pain 
 that would be the result of its inhibition as, in 
 ordinary cases, the motive. It is motives of a 
 different kind than pleasure, such as imitation^ 
 and the influence of ideal ends, which most often 
 lead to progress. And the progress that is due to 
 such motives cannot be measured by its effects in 
 increasing pleasure, nor assumed to make pleasure 
 and life correspond. At the best, therefore, the 
 above argument only proves a general tendency 
 towards the coincidence of pleasurable actions with 
 actions which promote life ; it does not show that 
 the increase of life can be accurately measured by 
 pleasure. The process of natural selection might 
 kill off all organisms whose desires led them nor- 
 mally to action hurtful to life. But sufficient evi- 
 
 1 " Imitation," according to Kant (Grundlegung zur Met. d. 
 Sitten, Werke, iv. 257), "has no place at all for morals"; and 
 this is true if the naked law of duty— or respect for it— is the 
 Bole ethical motive. But if morality consists in the attainment 
 of an ideal which is being gradually realised in man, moral value 
 will not be denied to the motive which leads the individual to 
 fashion his own nature after that in which morality has attained 
 more complete realisation.
 
 220 
 
 THE THEOKY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 (/3) The pes- 
 simist doc- 
 trine that 
 life tends to 
 misery : 
 
 (««) the hy- 
 pothesis of 
 the uncon- 
 scious ; 
 
 deuce has not been brought forward to show that it 
 is fitted to produce an exact proportion between 
 progress and pleasure. 
 
 Hartmann, however, attempts to strike a more 
 fatal blow than this at the presupposition involved 
 in the argument for evolutionist hedonism. For 
 he contends that, throughout all life, the great 
 pulse of progress is neither, on the one hand, 
 desire for pleasure, nor, on the other, the more 
 complex and varied motives just referred to, but 
 that it is the incessant striving towards fulness of 
 life of an universal unconscious will, which is mani- 
 fested in all things, and which is for ever pressing 
 onwards towards conscious realisation, regardless 
 of the increase of pain which the course of evolu- 
 tion involves. But this hypothesis of unconscious 
 will is not a justifiable metaphysical principle got 
 at by the analysis of experience, and necessary for 
 its explanation, though lying beyond it. It is a 
 ' metempirical,' or rather mythical, cause inter- 
 polated into the processes of experience. Hence 
 the antagonism in which it stands to psychological 
 fact: its disregard of the effect of pleasure as a 
 powerful motive in volition ; and its neglect of the 
 obvious truth that function so reacts upon organ 
 that all actions have, by repetition merely, a 
 tendency to be performed with greater ease, and, 
 therefore, to yield in their performance increase 
 of pleasure. The smoothness and precision with
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISxM. 221 
 
 which it works may, indeed, lead to a function 
 being performed unconsciously, and thus without 
 either pain or pleasure. But the normal exercise 
 of conscious activity is uniformly pleasurable.^ 
 
 AVhile sivinji up Schopenhauer's doctrine of the (it)thena- 
 
 f3 o ir r tureofvoli- 
 
 merely negative character of pleasure, Hartmann tion; 
 yet contends that " eternal limits " are set by the 
 very nature of volition which make it impossible 
 to have a world with more pleasure in it than 
 pain. But his arguments ^ come very far short 
 of proving his case. For, in the first place, to say 
 that the stimulation and wearying of the nerves 
 imply the necessity of a cessation of pleasure as 
 well as of pain, is to confuse complete states of 
 consciousness with the subjective feeling which 
 accompanies each state. It is not true that one 
 ever becomes weary of pleasure. But any mental 
 state, however pleasurable to start with, tends to 
 become monotonous, wearisome, or painful. Pleas- 
 ure thus requires a change from one mental state 
 to another : to say that it requires a change from 
 pleasure to something else is a contradiction in 
 terms. It is the objects or activity that require to 
 be varied, not the feeling of pleasure. Again, in 
 the second place, it is true that pleasure is to be 
 regarded as indirect in so far as it is entirely due 
 to the cessation of a pain, and not to instantaneous 
 
 ^ See the concluding pages of this chapter. 
 
 2 Philosophic des Unbewussten, 6th ed., p. 660 ff.
 
 222 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 satisfaction of will. But it does not do to regard 
 the pleasure as altogether indirect when, although 
 the cessation of a pain is necessary for its produc- 
 tion, it is itself something more than this cessation. 
 The inhibition of will often prevents the realisa- 
 tion of an object which is very much more than a 
 recompense in pleasurable quality for the pain of 
 the restraint ; and, although the pleasure only arises 
 when this painful state of inhibition is removed, 
 it brings a direct and positive gain over and above 
 the gratification of the cessation of the pain. In 
 the third place, Hartmann argues that the satis- 
 faction of will is often unconscious, whereas pain 
 is eo ipso conscious. But, even admitting the 
 reality of unconscious will or desire, which this 
 argument involves, it does not follow that pleas- 
 ure and pain are differently affected in regard to 
 it. If pain is co ipso conscious, so also is pleasure ; 
 if the satisfaction of unconscious desire gives no 
 pleasure, neither does the absence of such satis- 
 faction give pain.^ It is true, as Hartmann adds 
 in the fourth place, that desire is often long and 
 the joy of satisfaction fleeting ; but this holds not 
 so much of mental pleasures as of those connected 
 with physical appetite. Of them it is true that 
 
 " These violent delights have violent ends, 
 And in their triumph die." 
 
 But in the higher pleasures with more permanent 
 
 ^ Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 226 u.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 223 
 
 objects of pursuit, although the desire may be long- 
 continued, the pleasure does not disappear in the 
 moment of gratification. 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that the pessimist psy- 
 chology, in treating pleasure in a different way from 
 pain, mistakes the true nature of both, and prevents 
 the argument from being faced which has been 
 brought forward to show the increasing corre- 
 spondence of pleasure and life. 
 
 The failure of the psychological argument makes (cc) the facts 
 the whole burden of the proof of pessimism rest progiess: 
 upon the argument from historical facts. And the 
 attempt has been definitely made to shovv^, from 
 observation of the course of human affairs, that the 
 progress of the world tends to misery. It is 
 necessary, therefore, to ask whether it can be 
 established that the facts included under the vague 
 term ' human progress ' have a normal tendency 
 either to increase pleasure or to act in the opposite 
 way. Now progress is a characteristic both of the 
 individual and of society ; but pleasure only be- 
 longs to the former, so that an answer to the 
 question whether individual progress tends to in- 
 crease the surplus of pleasure over pain, still leaves 
 unsettled the question as to the effect of social 
 progress. 
 
 It seems evident that both the physical and individual 
 mental development of the individual imply greater p"^^®""*'
 
 224 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 adaptability to and correspondence with, the exter- 
 nal world, and that, on account of this develop- 
 ment, there is less unpleasant friction between 
 outer and inner relations, and means are at hand 
 for obtaining objects of desire with less exertion 
 than formerly. But, at the same time, the increase 
 of knowledge and of skill always implies not merely 
 the means of satisfying old wants, but the creation 
 of new ones : we see more of the evil in the world 
 than our forefathers did, and there are more avenues 
 by which it can approach us, if we have also more 
 effective means for avoiding what we dislike. 
 Further, the widening of the sympathetic feelings 
 and their consequent activities, and the refinement 
 of the whole sensitive nature by which it responds 
 more quickly and accurately to emotional stimuli, 
 have made the present generation more susceptible 
 to both pain and pleasure than its predecessors. 
 But Hartmann's argument that the duller nervous 
 system of the savage races (Naturvolker) makes 
 them happier than the civilised (Culturvolker),^ 
 leaves out of sight the new sources of pleasure as 
 well as pain that are opened up to a refined sensi- 
 bility. According to Hartmann, the aesthetic sensi- 
 bilities may be a source of painless pleasure: yet 
 even their cultivation cannot be said to be matter 
 of pure gain to their possessors ; for the pain of 
 discord is to be set against — in his opinion, it out- 
 
 ^ Phil. d. Unbewussten, p. 747.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 225 
 
 weighs — the pleasure of harmony. On the whole, 
 then, it would appear that the evolution of the in- 
 dividual leads to greater possibilities both of pleasure 
 and of pain. The refinement of the intellectual 
 and the emotional nature opens up wider ranges of 
 both kinds of feeling; but it seems impossible to 
 arrive at a quite confident and objective judgment 
 as to its tendency ; and we are driven to look 
 mainly to the improvement of the social environ- 
 ment for the means of increasing pleasure and 
 diminishing pain. 
 
 But to estimate the hedonistic value of social social pro- 
 progress is a still more difficult task than the pre- 
 ceding. For the march of afl'airs often appears to 
 have little regard to its effect on the happiness of 
 the greater number of people concerned. Industri- imiustiiai, 
 ally, it may be thought that the increase in the 
 amount of wealth produced affords a vastly greater 
 means of comfort and luxury. Yet, it is doubtful 
 whether this increase has always been sufficient to 
 keep pace with the growth of population ; and it is 
 certain that every society whose territory is limited, 
 must, when its numbers have increased beyond a 
 certain point, begin to experience the diminishing 
 returns which nature yields for the labour expended 
 upon it. And, even although the average quantity 
 of wealth be greater now than it has been, it must 
 be remembered that wealth is measured by its 
 amount, whereas happiness depends on the equality 
 
 P
 
 226 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 with which that amount is distributed.^ Yet the 
 present industrial regime tends to the accumulation 
 of immense wealth in a few hands, rather than to 
 its proportionate increase throughout the com- 
 munity. The industrial progress which increases 
 the wealth of the rich, has little to recommend it 
 if it leaves the ' labouring poor ' at a starvation- 
 wage. 
 
 " And what if Trade sow cities 
 Like shells along the shore, 
 And thatch with towns the prairie broad 
 With railways ironed o'er ? " — 
 
 if the population can be divided into plutocrats 
 and proletariate. Moreover, the very nature of 
 economic production may seem to imply an opposi- 
 tion between social progress and individual well- 
 being. For the former, in demanding the greatest 
 possible amount of produce, requires an excessive 
 and increasing specialisation of labour. Each worker 
 
 1 Bentham, Theory of Legislation (by Dumont, 1876), p. 
 103 ff. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, 5fch ed., ii. 317, finds 
 iu this an instance of Weber's law. Thus, the man with £100 
 receives the same pleasure on receipt of £1, as the possessor of 
 £1000 does on receiving £10. As Wundt remarks, however, this 
 is only true within certain limits. Sixpence may give more 
 pleasure to a beggar who is never far from the starvation-point, 
 than the clearing of a million to Baron Rothschild. Further than 
 this, the law only states an ' abstract ' truth. For the suscepti- 
 bility to pleasure is not only very different in different individuals, 
 but this difference depends on many other circumstances than 
 the amount of wealth already in possession, — such as original 
 emotional susceptibility, &c.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 227 
 
 must perform that operation only to which he has 
 been specially trained, or which he can do best. 
 And in this way industrialism has a tendency to 
 occupy the greater part of the waking hours of an 
 increasing proportion of human lives in the repeti- 
 tion of a short series of mechanical movements 
 which call out a bare minimum of the faculties of 
 the worker, dwarf his nature, and reduce his life to 
 a mere succession of the same monotonous sensa- 
 tion.^ In spite, therefore, of immense improve- 
 ments in the general conditions of wellbeing, it is 
 still difficult to say that the happiness of the 
 average human life has been much increased by 
 the march of industrial progress. 
 
 A more hopeful view may, perhaps, be taken of and pouti 
 the effect of political progress. The increase of 
 popular government gratifies the desire for power, 
 and, in some cases, even tends to a more efficient 
 management of affairs. Still more important in its 
 effect on happiness is the greater security for life 
 and property which the gradual consolidation of 
 political control has brought about. It would 
 seem, too, that the harsher features of the stru""le 
 by which this advance takes place have been 
 modified ; and that the war of politics has abated 
 in fury more than the war of trade. On the whole, 
 therefore, the tendency of modern political rule 
 appears to be towards an almost unmixed gain in 
 
 1 Cf. Comte, Positive Philosophj-, ii. 144.
 
 228 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 respect of happiness, — by the security it affords 
 for life and property, by its wide distribution of 
 political power, and by the room it gives for indi- 
 vidual freedom. Yet the last of these results — in 
 the laissez-faire system of industrialism to which 
 it has led, and which, in spite of many modifica- 
 tions, is still in the ascendant — has effects of a 
 more doubtful character. 
 
 This mere reference to one or two of the leading 
 features of progress would not be sufficient to sup- 
 port a thesis either as to its beneficial or baneful 
 tendency. But evidence enough has been led to 
 show that the effects on pleasure of individual 
 and social development are of a mixed kind, — that 
 culture and civilisation have neither the tendency 
 to misery which Hartmanu follows Eousseau in 
 attributing to them,^ nor, on the other hand, that 
 steady correspondence with increasing pleasure 
 which would be required to establish the position 
 of evolutionist hedonism. 
 Necessity of It follows, therefore, that, without adopting a 
 between pcssimist vicw, we must still make our choice 
 ism^and^' between evolutionism and hedonism. The course 
 hedonism, ^j evolutiou — SO far as experience helps us to 
 understand it — cannot be measured by increase of 
 pleasure. Nothing is said here to show that it 
 is not perfectly consistent to hold that the moral 
 feelings and ideas, the customs to which they have 
 
 1 Phan. d. s. B., p. 640.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 229 
 
 given rise, and the institutions in whicli they are 
 embodied, have been produced by the ordinary laws 
 of evolution, and yet to maintain that the moral 
 end for reflective beings is the hedonistic or utili- 
 tarian end. It may be possible, that is to say, to 
 be an evolutionist in psychology and sociology at 
 the same time that one is a hedonist in ethics. 
 But it is not allowable to adopt pleasure as the 
 end, and yet speak of it as determined by evolution. 
 Evolution can determine no such end until it be 
 shown that the progress it connotes implies a pro- 
 portionate increase of pleasure. 
 
 The same conclusion may be supported by an (4) Pleasure 
 
 . , - . and pain as 
 
 enquiry into the nature oi pleasure and pain as modes of 
 modes of mental experience. For this will bring p™encer 
 out both the subjective nature of pleasure and its 
 dependence upon conditions which cannot be iden- 
 tified with that increase of life to which evolution 
 is said to tend. 
 
 In the first place, pleasure and pain are subjec- («) their 
 
 it". subjectivity, 
 
 tive. In action the subject seeks an end distinct 
 from his present state of consciousness, and recog- 
 nised as such; in knowledge — in sensation even — he 
 is aware of something which he does not identify 
 with himself ; but it is different with pleasure and 
 pain. The feeling is all his own : it is nothing 
 outside his conscious state at the time ; properly 
 speaking, it does not refer to anything else.
 
 230 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 although there are always, at the same time, per- 
 ceptional or ideal elements present which have an 
 objective reference. Like sensations, pleasure and 
 pain are elementary facts of mind; but they are 
 elementary facts of a different order. The difficulty 
 of defining pleasure or pain is not the same kind 
 of difficulty as that which meets us if we attempt 
 to define some elementary sensation. The latter 
 is connected in definite ways with other similar 
 sensations, can be compared and associated with 
 them, and combine with them into an object of 
 perception. Pleasures do not acquire this objective 
 character. Even to distinguish qualities amongst 
 them we must refer to the sensations or ideas 
 which they accompany. They seem to have no 
 distinguishable existence of their own, as sensa- 
 tions and concepts and actions have. They can be 
 spoken of only as affections of the percipient and 
 active subject, different in kind both from the 
 objects it knows and from the actions it performs. 
 As Hamilton has put it, pleasure and pain are 
 " subjectively subjective " : ^ they are affections of 
 the subject, not modes of the object - world. 
 " Pleasure is not a fact, nor is pain a fact, but 
 one fact is pleasant, another painful." ^ Pleasure, 
 
 ^ Lectures ou Metaphysics, ii. 432. 
 
 - L. Dumont, Th^orie scientific de la seusibilite, 2nd ed., p. 83 ; 
 cf. F. Bouillier, Du plaisir et de la douleur, 2nd ed., p. 29 ff. 
 The same view is held by Volkmann, Lehrbuch der Psychologic, 
 § 127, 3rd ed., ii. 300: "Das Gefiihl ist niimlich keiue eigeue
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 231 
 
 therefore, is a ruere feeling of the subject which butconnex- 
 accompanies its reuition to the object-world, with- jecu, 
 out being itself a part of the object-world. It is 
 not something by itself which we can choose rather 
 than something else, as we may select a peach 
 instead of an apple. 
 
 The relative and transient nature of pleasure 
 has been urged as an objection against any form 
 of hedonism by many philosophers since the time 
 of Plato. In our own day the arguments both 
 of T. H. Green and of Sidgwick have shown 
 that the calculus of pleasures and pains which 
 Bentham's ethics requires is much less certain 
 and easy than its author supposed. It is true 
 that Green sometimes overstated his case. The making 
 nature of pleasure does not prove hedonism to possible. 
 be an impossible end for conduct. Although we 
 cannot aim at pleasure 2^er se, we can aim at 
 objects which we have reason to believe will be 
 accompanied by pleasant feeling. And, although 
 pleasure and pain are not quantities that can be 
 added and subtracted,^ we may foresee that one 
 
 Vorstellung neben den anderen (es gibt keine eigenen Gefvihls- 
 vorstellungeu), ja iibeihaupt gar keine Vorstellung." See also 
 J. Ward, article "Psychology" in Ency. Bnt., xx. 401. Bain's 
 view is different ; but it does not altogether prevent him from 
 recognising the subjectivity of feeling : " Without intellectual 
 images clearly recollected we do not remember feelings ; the 
 reproduction of feeling is an intellectual fact, and the groundwork 
 is intellectual imagery." — Emotions, p. 63, 4th ed. 
 1 Cf. Green, Introduction to Hume's Treatise, ii. § 7.
 
 232 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Difficulty 
 for hedon- 
 ism arising 
 from the 
 facts of 
 evolution. 
 
 course of conduct will be accompanied by pleasant 
 feeling, another by painful feeling, and, on that 
 account, we may choose the former. In many 
 cases we can even make a quantitative estimate, 
 and say that the pleasant feeling accompanying 
 one course of action is more intense than that 
 accompanying another. And we choose one object 
 rather than another, not merely because one is 
 pleasant and the other painful, but (in case both 
 are pleasant) because we expect more intense or 
 more prolonged pleasure from one than from the 
 other. How inexact and tentative are these esti- 
 mates of pleasure has been abundantly shown by 
 Sidgwick.i As the guide of action they are weak 
 and faltering. But yet there is nothing in the 
 subjective nature of pleasure which makes it im- 
 possible for us to take it as our practical end in 
 conduct. 
 
 The difficulty arises when we connect hedonism 
 with the theory of evolution : when we use the 
 conception of pleasure for the purpose of giving 
 a precise meaning to that increase and develop- 
 ment of life to which the course of evolution is 
 said to tend, and which is sometimes put forward 
 as the end which the evolution-theory prescribes 
 for conduct ; or when, conversely, having adopted 
 the maximum of pleasures as our end, we seek 
 to explain that conception by means of the con- 
 ^ Methods of Ethics, Book ii. chaps, ii. -iii.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 233 
 
 ception of evolution. As long as we are content 
 to look upon human nature as consisting of un- 
 changing modes of activity, and as having constant 
 susceptibilities for pleasure and pain, we may 
 adopt the increase of pleasure and diminution 
 of pain as our aim even in conduct which has 
 a distant end in view. But tiie case is altered 
 when we take account of the fact that man's 
 actions and sensibilities are subject to indefinite 
 modification. Pleasure, as we have seen, is de- 
 pendent upon the state of conscious apprehension 
 and activity at any moment. By itself it is not 
 a possible object of pursuit. We always aim at 
 some end which can be expressed in objective 
 terms : although we may aim at certain objects 
 rather than others simply on account of their 
 pleasurable accompaniment. It may happen, how- 
 ever, that a kind of object or action which is 
 pleasurable at one time may become painful at 
 another time, and that what is now painful may 
 cease to be so and may become pleasant. In this 
 case our action, if it aims at pleasure, would have 
 to be entirely changed, our practical ethics would 
 need to be revised and reversed. And, although 
 no sudden alteration of this kind ever takes place, 
 the theory of evolution shows that a gradual modi- 
 fication of the sort does go on. „,^, 
 
 ° (b) The con- 
 
 The question concerning the conditions which ditionsof 
 
 pleasure and 
 
 determine the presence of pleasure and pain is pain.
 
 234 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 too intricate and too unsettled, on the physio- 
 logical side as well as on the psychological, to 
 admit of discussion in this place. Yet it may 
 be possible, while avoiding unnecessary contro- 
 versy, to bring out certain results which bear 
 upon the problem before us. 
 (a)pieasme There is one theory which might be regarded 
 Tbie as the ^s Settling the question out of hand, were it only 
 sense of in- ^-^^^ ^^ establish its own agreement with the facts ; 
 
 creased o ' 
 
 vitality. ^ud that is the famous doctrine that pleasure fol- 
 lows, or is the sense of, increased life — pain, on the 
 other hand, being the sense of diminished vitality.^ 
 But it has been already shown that neither the 
 actual facts of life, nor the tendencies to action, 
 can be so interpreted as to make their nature and 
 development correspond, with any degree of exact- 
 ness, with pleasure and its increase.- Nor is it 
 possible to make out that every pain corresponds 
 to a loss of vitality, while every pleasure heightens 
 it. To assert that pleasure-giving actions and life- 
 
 ^ Cf. Spinoza, Ethica, iii. 11, schol. ; Hobbes, Leviathan, i. 6, 
 p. 25 ; Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 4th ed., p. 303. 
 Bain's statement is carefully guarded : " A very considerable 
 number of the facts may be brought under the following principle 
 — namely, that states of pleasure are connected with an increase, 
 and states of pain with an abatement, of some, or all, of the vital 
 functions." 
 
 - See above, pp. 217 fF. ; and cf. Spencer, Psychology, § 126, i. 
 284 : " In the case of mankind, then, there has arisen, and must 
 long continue, a deep and involved derangement of the natural 
 connections between pleasure and beneficial actions, and between 
 pains and detrimental actions."
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 235 
 
 preserving actions coincide is simply to neglect 
 inconvenient facts. Pleasure is, no doubt, a usual 
 accompaniment of the normal processes of life ; and 
 pain reaches its climax in death. But, within the 
 range of experience, there are whole classes of facts 
 which the generalisation cannot cover. Painful 
 experiences are not always destructive of vitality, 
 nor are all pleasant experiences beneficial. As 
 Bain, who always keeps the facts in view, admits 
 with regard to the feeling-tone of sensation, " we 
 cannot contend that the degree of augmented vital 
 energy corresponds with the degree of the pleasure."^ 
 The same discrepancy may be traced in more complex 
 experiences. The effort after a fuller life, whether 
 physical or mental, even when its ultimate success 
 is not doubtful, may bring more pain than pleasure ; 
 while the life which never strains its powers to- 
 wards the limits of endurance, may find almost un- 
 interrupted pleasure : but such pleasure is the sure 
 herald of the process of degeneration. 
 
 Pleasure does not always show that the vitality O) Pleasure 
 of the organism as a whole, nor even that the vital orunhin- 
 power of some one of its functions, is on the in- successful 
 crease. But it is not dissociated from the activity f"ictioning. 
 of the subject. Conscious activity which attains 
 its end is pleasant ; thwarted or unsuccessful activ- 
 
 ^ The Senses and the Intellect, p. 306. The Law of Conserva- 
 tion is incomplete, Bain holds, and must be supplemented b}- the 
 Law of Stimulation (p. 315).
 
 236 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 ity is painful. With differences of detail, this view 
 is adopted by many psychologists as the most 
 adequate account of the conditions which deter- 
 mine the appearance of pleasant and painful feel- 
 ings. It is expressed in Hamilton's view of 
 pleasure as the reflex of unimpeded functioning,^ 
 and in Spencer's doctrine that pleasure is the con- 
 comitant of medium activities.^ It is more pre- 
 cisely formulated in Professor Ward's suggestion 
 " that there is pleasure in proportion as a maximum 
 of attention is effectively exercised, and pain in 
 proportion as such effective attention is frustrated 
 by distractions, shocks, or incomplete and faulty 
 adaptations, or fails of exercise, owing to the 
 narrowness of the field of consciousness and the 
 slowness and smallness of its changes," ^ Pro- 
 fessor Stout's view is similar: "The antithesis 
 between pleasure and pain is coincident with the 
 antithesis between free and impeded progress 
 towards an end. Unimpeded progress is pleasant 
 
 1 Hamilton, Lectures, ii. 440 : " Pleasure is the reflex of the 
 spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose ener- 
 gies we are conscious. Pain, a reflex of the overstrained or re- 
 pressed exertion of such a power." Cf. Aristotle, Eth. N., vii. 
 12, p. 1153 a 14, X. 4, p. 1174 b 20. 
 
 '^ Spencer, Psychology, § 123, i. 277 : " Generally speaking, 
 then, pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities, where 
 the activities are of kinds liable to be in excess or in defect ; and 
 where they are of kinds not liable to be excessive, pleasure in- 
 creases as the activity increases, except where the activity is 
 either constant or involuntary." 
 
 2 Art. "Psychology," Ency. Brit., xx. 71.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 237 
 
 Iq proportion to the intensity and complexity of 
 mental excitement. An activity which is thwarted 
 or retarded either by the presence of positive ob- 
 struction, or by the absence of co-operative condi- 
 tions, or in any other conceivable way, is painful 
 in proportion to its intensity and complexity, and 
 to the degree of hindrance." ^ 
 
 It is not necessary to discuss this theory in 
 detail. It has its own difficulties to meet, especi- 
 ally in connexion with the pleasures and pains 
 of the senses. But the most obvious objection 
 to it — that it leaves the so-called 'passive pleas- 
 ures ' unexplained — is without weight as long as it 
 cannot be shown that mental life is ever purely 
 passive, and without even the subjective reaction 
 involved in the direction of attention to an object. 
 For our present purposes it is sufficient to take 
 account of the relations in which pleasure stands 
 to conduct ; and, in this connexion, it is clear that 
 facile and successful activities are pleasant, and 
 that an action is painful in so far as it is thwarted 
 or ineffective. 
 
 If, then, pleasure is the result of effective func- change of 
 tioning, its conditions must be modified along with „*iodilLr 
 any change in the modes of activity which can be ^jonof func- 
 carried on without serious opposition and to a suc- 
 cessful issue. In the same way, could it be held 
 that pleasure follows increase of vital energy, it 
 
 ^ Analytic Psychology, ii. 270.
 
 238 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 would be subject to modification along with the 
 modification of the conditions under which life may 
 be preserved and developed. Now it is matter of 
 fact that the kinds of activity in which one takes 
 pleasure, or which give one pain, undergo constant, 
 though gradual, modification, A state of mind may 
 be at first pleasurable, but, if it be long-continued, 
 the pleasure will yield to an unpleasant feeling of 
 monotony. A similar change may take place in a 
 painful state of mind, its continuance does not pro- 
 long the same intensity of painful consciousness, 
 but the sensibility becomes dulled and the pain 
 diminishes, or factors in the mental state are so 
 modified as to alter the feeling-tone. The transi- 
 tion is most striking in the case of motor activities. 
 In learning to walk, or to ride, or to play any in- 
 strument, the first experiences are of painful effort. 
 Gradually, however, the required co-ordinations of 
 movement are found to entail less and less pain, 
 until the feeling passes over into its opposite, and 
 we have a pleasurable sense of successful effort 
 and well-adapted functioning. And, just as pain 
 may give way to pleasure, so pleasure too may 
 subside : the action may become automatic, and so 
 pass out of consciousness altogether, unless it be 
 so long continued as to produce fatigue, that is, 
 pain. Habit, which intensifies perceptions, weakens 
 pleasure and pain.i 
 
 ^ Cf. Dumont, Theorie scientific, p. 78.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 239 
 
 From the preceding discussion two things may Results. 
 be inferred. In the first place, pleasure and pain 
 are connected with the activities of the subject: 
 hindrances and defeat are felt as painful ; pleasure 
 results from overcoming obstacles, and from success 
 in attaining an end ; and the pleasure increases 
 with the intensity of the activity. In the second 
 place, the sources of pleasure and pain are modified 
 with the modification of these conditions : we learn 
 to solve difficulties, to accustom ourselves to new 
 circumstances, to guide to a successful issue events 
 with which we were formerly unable to cope ; in 
 these and many other ways, pleasure comes to be 
 experienced in modes of activity which were at one 
 time painful, and crowns the effort towards a fuller 
 and higher life. 
 
 What the doctrine of evolution adds to this is its (c)Appiica- 
 proof of the indefinite modifiability of human f unc- theoiy of 
 tion. " It is an essential principle of life," Spencer ^™i"t'°" = 
 wrote,^ before he had arrived at his general theory 
 of evolution, " that a faculty to which circumstances 
 do not allow full exercise diminishes ; and that a 
 faculty on which circumstances make excessive 
 demands increases " ; and to this we must now add, 
 " that, supposing it consistent with maintenance 
 of life, there is no kind of activity which will not 
 become a source of pleasure if continued ; and that 
 therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every 
 
 1 Social Statics, p. 79.
 
 24:0 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 mode of action demanded by social conditions." ^ It 
 is, he held, a " biological truth," that " everywhere 
 faculties adjust themselves to the conditions of 
 existence in such wise that the activities those 
 conditions require become pleasurable." ^ The vast 
 periods of time over which evolution stretches are 
 scarcely needed to show how pleasure may be made 
 to follow from almost any course of action consistent 
 with the continuance of life. The change of habits 
 which often takes place in the history of a nation, 
 and even in the life of an individual, makes this 
 sufficiently obvious. And, if we still think of 
 making attainment of pleasure the end of conduct, 
 the doctrine of evolution must give us pause. 
 
 It has been already argued that, given certain 
 
 sources of, and susceptibilities for, pleasure, the 
 
 course of evolution has not been such as to produce 
 
 an exact coincidence between them and the actions 
 
 any conduct which further life. But it would seem that, given 
 
 withcondi- habits of acting which are consistent with the 
 
 mav^comfto conditious of life, and which are systematically 
 
 be pieasur- carried out, these will not fail to grow pleasant as 
 
 the organism becomes adapted to them. At the 
 
 best, it is difficult enough to say, even for the 
 
 individual, whether one imagined object or course 
 
 of action will exceed another in pleasurable feeling 
 
 or not. But, when we remember that function and 
 
 feeling may be modified indefinitely, it is impossible 
 
 1 Principles of Ethics, i. 186. ^ ^^^^ q.S., vi. 85.
 
 HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 241 
 
 to say what course of conduct will produce the 
 greatest amount of pleasure for the race. Taking 
 in all its effects, we can hardly say that one way 
 of seeking pleasure is better — that is, will bring 
 more pleasure — than another. So profound are 
 the modifications which evolution produces, that 
 it seems impossible to guide the active tendencies 
 of mankind towards the goal of greatest pleasure, 
 unless, perhaps, by the quite general statement 
 that the greatest pleasure will be got from the 
 greatest amount of successful activity. 
 
 If, then, we have been seeking to define the evolu' maximum 
 
 , . ... e 1 pleasure not 
 
 tionist end by mterpretmg it in terms or pleasure, definable 
 it appears that we have only succeeded in making tennToT 
 the round of a circle : pleasure as the end is seen to ^'^''• 
 be only definable as life or activity, although it was 
 adopted as the end in order that by its help we might 
 discover what life or activity meant as the end for 
 conduct. We may, perhaps, still be able to hold to 
 a form of hedonism, if we turn our attention from 
 the race to a small portion of present mankind. In 
 spite of the modifiability of function and its at- 
 tendant feeling, we may still be able to say that such 
 and such a course of action is likely to bring most 
 pleasure to the individual. But we cannot extend 
 such a means of interpreting the ethics of evolution 
 to the race, where the possibility of modification is 
 indefinitely great, and the pain incurred in initiating 
 a change counts for little in comparison with its 
 
 Q
 
 242 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTIOX. 
 
 subsequent results. If we continue to look from 
 the evolutionist point of view, the question, What 
 conduct will on the whole bring most pleasure ? 
 only leads us back to the question, AVhat conduct 
 will most promote life ? And it was to give 
 meaning to this conception 'promotion of life' 
 that it was interpreted in terms of greatest 
 pleasure. The evolution-theory of ethics is thus 
 seen to oscillate between the theory which looks 
 upon the summum honurii as pleasure, and the 
 theory which finds it in activity. But it contains 
 elements which make it impossible for it to ad- 
 here to the former alternative. The comprehen- 
 siveness of its view of life makes it unable to 
 adopt pleasure as the end, since pleasure changes 
 with every modification of function. And it has 
 now to be seen whether the empirical method of 
 interpretation to which it adheres will allow of 
 its notion of life or activity affording a satisfac- 
 tory end for conduct, or any standard of moral 
 worth.
 
 243 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 In showing the important bearing which evolution wantofiiar. 
 
 « , , mony be- 
 
 has on the causes of pleasure, the argument or the tween evoiu- 
 preceding chapter has also made clear that the ends I'e^onism. 
 of evolutionism and of hedonism cannot be made to 
 explain one another. The theory which starts with 
 a maximum of pleasure as the ultimate end, but 
 points to the course of evolution as showing how 
 that end is to be realised, is confronted by the fact 
 that the development of life does not always tend 
 to increased pleasure, and that the laws of its 
 development cannot therefore be safely adopted as 
 maxims for the attainment of pleasure. The same 
 objection may be taken to the method of interpret- 
 ing the evolutionist standard by means of the pleas- 
 urable results of conduct. The two do not corre- 
 spond with that exactness which would admit of 
 one doing duty for the other as a practical guide. 
 And a further difficulty has been shown to stand
 
 244 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 in the way of this method. For, on coming to 
 analyse pleasure, we find that it may, by habitua- 
 tion, arise from any — or almost any — course of 
 conduct which is consistent with the conditions of 
 existence. The evolutionist, therefore, can have 
 no surer idea of greatest pleasure — even although 
 this may not be a very sure one — than that it 
 will follow in the train of the greatest or most 
 varied activity which harmonises with the laws of 
 life. 
 Necessity of Wc must therefore forsake the method of eclec- 
 ing incfepen- ticism, and cnquirc whether the theory of evolution 
 butiorof" ^^^ make any independent contribution towards 
 
 evolution determining either an ideal for conduct or a stand- 
 to ethics. .... 
 
 ard for distinguishing between right and wrong. 
 We are frequently told that it prescribes as the 
 end ' preservation,' or ' development,' or ' the health 
 of the society.' But to obtain a clear meaning for 
 such notions, we must see what definite content 
 the theory of evolution can give them, — without 
 considering, at present, the grounds for transform- 
 ing them into ethical precepts.^ Now, it may be 
 thought — and the suggestion deserves careful ex- 
 amination — that we may find in the characteristics 
 of evolution itself 2 an indication of the end which 
 
 1 Cf. below, pp. 282, 320 ff, 
 
 " Taking evolution in its widest sense, since the theory of 
 evolution does not " imply some intrinsic proclivity in every 
 species towards a higher form." — Spencer, First Principles, App. 
 p. 574 ; Principles of Sociology, i. 106.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 245 
 
 organisms produced by and subject to evolution are 
 naturally fitted to attain. These characteristics 
 must therefore be passed under review, that their 
 ethical bearings may be seen. 
 
 1. The first condition of development, and even i. Adapta- 
 
 -, tion to en- 
 
 of life, is correspondence between an organism and vironment 
 its environment. The waste implied in the pro- "^^^^^7 
 cesses which constitute the life of an organised 
 body has to be supplied by nutriment got from 
 surrounding objects. It requires food, air, light, 
 and heat in due proportions in order that its various 
 organs may do their work. When these circum- 
 stances change, either it adapts itself to the new 
 conditions or death ensues. Thus "we find that 
 every animal is limited to a certain range of clim- 
 ate ; every plant to certain zones of latitude and 
 elevation,"! — though nothing differs more among 
 different species than the extent of an organism's 
 adaptability to varying conditions. A definite or- 
 ganism and a medium suitable to it are called by 
 Comte the two " fundamental correlative conditions 
 of life " ; according to Spencer they constitute life. 
 " Conformity " is absolutely necessary between " the 
 vital functions of any organism and the condi- 
 tions in which it is placed." In this conformity 
 there are varying degrees, and " the completeness 
 of the life will be proportionate to the completeness 
 
 1 Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. 73.
 
 246 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 of the correspondence."! Even when life is not 
 altogether extinguished, it is impeded by imperfect 
 adaptation. Where external circumstances make 
 the attainment of nourishment difficult and pre- 
 carious, life is shortened in extent, and, within its 
 limits, more occupied with simply maintaining its 
 necessary functions — less full, varied, and active. 
 The same holds good whether the external circum- 
 stances are natural or social, — applies equally to 
 those whose energies are exhausted in the produc- 
 tion of a bare livelihood from a niggard soil and 
 unpropitious climate, and to those who, under 
 changed conditions, feel the hardship of adapting 
 themselves to a new social medium, 
 spoken of as Shall We Say, then, that the end of human conduct 
 
 the ethical . , . . o mi • 
 
 end; IS adaptation to environment? I his seems to be 
 
 the position taken up by some evolutionists. In 
 the language of von Baer,^ " the end of ends is 
 always that the organic body be adapted to the 
 conditions of the earth, its elements and means of 
 nutriment"; and Spencer has said "that all evil 
 results from the non - adaptation of constitution 
 to condition." ^ The hedonism which Spencer 
 definitely accepted as his ethical principle prevented 
 him, indeed, from fully adopting the theory of 
 human action which von Baer seemed to put for- 
 ward as the result of the doctrine of evolution. 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. 82. 
 
 2 Reden (1876), ii. 332. ^ gocial Statics (1850), p. 77.
 
 'the ethics of evolution. 247 
 
 Yet complete adaptation of constitution to condi- 
 tion is held by him to be characteristic of that 
 perfect form of life to wliich evolution tends, and 
 the laws of which are to be our guides in our 
 present imperfect social condition. In working 
 out his theory of ethics, he described acts as " good 
 or bad according as they are well or ill adjusted 
 to ends," identifying the good with " the conduct 
 furthering self-preservation," and the bad with 
 " the conduct tending to self-destruction." ^ The 
 notion of self-preservation thus introduced is nat- 
 urally suggested as the end subserved by the activ- 
 ity of an organism being adjusted to surrounding 
 conditions. Self-preservation, therefore, rather than defines the 
 adaptation to environment, will be regarded as the sp°if'^"° 
 end, with which adaptation will be connected as 
 the essential means. 
 
 This notion of self - preservation has played a 
 remarkable part in ethical and psychological dis- 
 cussion since the time of the Stoics. It withdraws 
 attention from the relative and transient feeling of 
 pleasure to the permanence of the living being. 
 Thus, with the Stoics, the notion of self-preser- 
 vation was accompanied by an ethics hostile to in- 
 dulgence in pleasure ; while, on the other hand, by 
 Spinoza and by Hobbes, pleasure was held to be as 
 the natural consequence of self-preserving acts — 
 the former defining it as a transition from less to 
 
 preser- 
 vation. 
 
 ^ Principles of Etliics, i. 25.
 
 248 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Self-preser- 
 vation and 
 social-pre- 
 servation. 
 
 greater perfection, the latter as the sense of what 
 helps the vital functions. The theory of evolution 
 has, of course, not only its distinctive contribution 
 to make to the doctrine of the connexion between 
 self-preservation and pleasure — a subject already 
 referred to, — but may also show how an increasing 
 harmony has been produced between acts which 
 tend to self-preservation and those which tend to 
 social preservation. With Spencer these two points 
 are united. His doctrine that the " conduct which 
 furthers race-maintenance evolves hand -in -hand 
 with the conduct which furthers self-maintenance " ^ 
 is preliminary to the establishment of the proposi- 
 tion that the highest life is one in which egoistic 
 and altruistic acts harmonise with one another and 
 with external conditions : " the life called moral 
 is one in which this moving equilibrium reaches 
 completeness or approaches most nearly to com- 
 pleteness." ^ 
 
 As has been already pointed out,^ it is not the 
 case, in the present state of human life, that ego- 
 istic and altruistic tendencies, even when properly 
 understood, always lead to the same course of 
 conduct; so that the theory of evolution does 
 not do away with the necessity for a ' compromise ' 
 between them. But, even had the theory of evolu- 
 tion overcome the opposition between the individual 
 
 1 Principles of Ethics, i. 16. ^ i^i^^ ^yi^ 
 
 ^ See above, chap. vii. pp. 180 ff.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 249 
 
 and social standpoints, much would still remain to 
 be done in order to establish a moral standard or 
 determine the ethical end. It seems better, there- 
 fore, to pass over at present the conflict of com- 
 peting interests. According to Pascal, " the entire 
 succession of men, the whole course of ages, is to 
 be regarded as one man always living and always 
 learning." And this is a suggestion which the 
 theory of evolution only states more definitely, 
 though it cannot completely vindicate it. On this 
 supposition, self-preservation is social-preservation, 
 and the possibly divergent interests of the individual 
 and the whole are left out of account. The end 
 for the race, then, according to the theory most 
 explicitly stated by von Baer, is a state of ' moving 
 equilibrium ' ; and to this state of affairs we are 
 at least, Spencer held, indubitably tending. In the 
 final stage of human development, man will be 
 perfectly adapted to the conditions of his environ- 
 ment, so that, to each change without, there will 
 be an answering organic change. The ideal which 
 seems to be held up to us is that of a time in 
 which there will be no more irksome friction in 
 the machinery of life, and circumstances will never 
 be unpropitious because the organism will never be 
 wanting in correspondence with them. OOAsthe 
 
 If this adaptation be adopted as the practical end for 
 
 ••• '■ '^ present 
 
 end for conduct under present conditions, and not conduct : 
 
 opposed to 
 
 merely as describing a far-off ideal to which we progress;
 
 250 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 are supposed to be tending, man may continue to 
 manifest a law of progress, but its initiation will 
 be from external conditions. If ' adaptation to en- 
 vironment' is consistently made the end, activity 
 will have to be restricted to suiting one's powers 
 to an external order of nature, and desire will have 
 to be curbed when it does not bring the means of 
 satisfaction along with it. ' Bene latere ' will again 
 be an equivalent for ' bene vivere,' and happiness 
 will have to be sought in withdrawal from the 
 distractions of active life, and in the restriction 
 of desire. It is strange to see the theory which 
 is supposed to be based upon and to account for 
 progress, returning in this way to an ideal similar 
 to that in which the post-Aristotelian schools took 
 refuge amid the decline of political and intellectual 
 life in Greece. The end which Stoic and Epicurean 
 alike sought in complete emancipation from the 
 conditions of the external world,^ is now, in more 
 scientific phrase, made to consist in complete har- 
 mony with these conditions. But, in their practical 
 results, the two theories would seem scarcely to 
 differ. It is not astonishing, therefore, if this 
 gospel of renunciation finds little favour among 
 practical men in our day. It is seen that, if a 
 man has not wants, he will make no efforts, and 
 that, if he make no efforts, his condition can never 
 be bettered. Thus social reformers have often found 
 
 1 Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, 3d ed., III. i. 454, 470.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 251 
 
 that the classes they have tried to elevate did not 
 feel the evil of their lot as their benefactors saw it, 
 and they have had to create the consciousness of 
 vi^ants before attempting to satisfy them.^ And the 
 practical tendency finds its counterpart in specu- 
 lative opinion, so that, whereas Epicurus placed 
 happiness in freedom from wants, modern hedonism 
 usually considers a man the happier the more wants 
 he has and is able to supply.^ 
 
 This practical tendency brings out the truth does not 
 that it is not only by the subordination of self sent the 
 to circumstances, and the restriction of desire to evXtion 
 present means of satisfaction, that the required 
 harmony between outer and inner relations can 
 be brought about. The other alternative is open : 
 circumstances may be subordinated to self. For 
 this latter alternative the theory of evolution 
 seems really to leave room as much as for the 
 former. It is excluded only when a one-sided 
 emphasis is laid on the need for adaptation to 
 environment. For evolution implies a gradually 
 increasing heterogeneity of structure as the pre- 
 lude to perfect agreement with circumstances : 
 " the limit of heterogeneity towards which every 
 aggregate progresses is the formation of as many 
 specialisations and combinations of parts as there 
 
 ^ Lassalle's tirade against the " verdammte Bediirfnisslosigkeit " 
 of the German workman is a case in point. 
 
 - Cf. Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus, 3d ed., ii. 458.
 
 252 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 are specialised and combined forces to be met." ^ 
 The end of evolution is a correspondence between 
 inner and outer which is not produced by the 
 easy method of both being very simple, but 
 which is consistent with, and indeed requires, 
 the complexity and heterogeneity produced in 
 both by constant interaction.^ The greater this 
 complexity, the more filled with sensation, 
 emotion, and thought life is, the greater is what 
 Spencer calls its ' breadth.' But, if ' adaptation ' 
 is still regarded as expressing the end, then, 
 the more perfect this adaptation is, the less 
 room seems left for change and, consequently, for 
 progress, and the end of human conduct is placed 
 in a state of moving equilibrium in which action 
 takes place without a jar and without disturbing 
 the play of external conditions.^ 
 
 (6) As de- This characteristic of ' adaptation ' is looked 
 
 uuimafe '^ upon by Spcnccr not as representing the conduct 
 
 condition of prescribed by morality in present circumstances, 
 
 but as describing the ultimate condition of human 
 
 life. As such, it is the foundation of his Absolute 
 
 Ethics — that "final permanent code" which "alone 
 
 1 Spencer, First Principles, p. 490. 
 
 ^ An aspect of Spencer's ethical theory which will be con- 
 sidered in the sequel : pp. 275 fif. 
 
 ^ Cf. A. Barratt, Phj-sical Ethics, p. 294, where morality- 
 is placed in " reasonable obedience to the physical laws of 
 nature."
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 253 
 
 admits of being definitely formulated, and so con- 
 stituting ethics as a science in contrast with em- 
 pirical ethics." ^ The " philosophical moralist," he 
 tells us, "treats solely of the straight man. He 
 determines the properties of the straight man ; 
 describes how the straight man comports himself ; 
 shows in what relationship he stands to other 
 straight men ; shows how a community of straight 
 men is constituted. Any deviation from strict 
 rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It 
 cannot be admitted into his premisses without 
 vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in 
 which a crooked man forms one of the elements 
 is insoluble by him." ^ 
 
 How, then, are we to conceive the nature or con- complete 
 
 ., inmi • -ii-i^' correspond- 
 
 duct of the 'straight man'? To begin with, it is eucewuh 
 made clear that his dealings are only with straight \ir^°^' 
 men ; for there are no ' crooked men ' in the ideal 
 community. "The coexistence of a perfect man 
 and an imperfect society is impossible ; and could 
 the two coexist the resulting conduct would not 
 furnish the ethical standard sought." ^ "The ulti- 
 mate man is one in whom this process [of adapta- 
 tion to the social state] has gone so far as to produce 
 a correspondence between all the promptings of his 
 nature and all the requirements of his life as car- 
 
 1 Principles of Ethics, i, 148. 
 
 2 Social Statics, quoted in Principles of Ethics, i. 271. 
 ' Principles of Ethics, i. 279.
 
 254 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Eesultant 
 absolute 
 code of 
 ethics 
 
 (a) lays 
 down ab- 
 stract prin- 
 ciples for 
 relation of 
 individual 
 to society ; 
 
 ried on in society. If so, it is a necessary implica- 
 tion that there exists an ideal code of conduct for- 
 mulating the behaviour of the completely-adapted 
 man in the completely-evolved society." This is 
 the code of Absolute Ethics, whose injunctions alone 
 are " absolutely right," and which " as a system of 
 ideal conduct, is to serve as a standard for our guid- 
 ance in solving, as well as we can, the problems of 
 real conduct." ^ At the outset we were required to 
 "interpret the more developed by the less devel- 
 oped " ; 2 the conclusion sets forth that the less 
 developed is to be guided by the more developed, 
 the real by the ideal. Now, ethics " includes all 
 conduct which furthers or hinders, in either direct 
 or indirect ways, the welfare of self or others."^ 
 Thus Absolute Ethics, like Relative Ethics, has 
 two divisions, personal and social. As to the latter, 
 Spencer formulated certain principles of justice, 
 negative beneficence, and positive beneficence* 
 which were supposed to describe the harmonious 
 co-operation of ideal men in the ideal state. These 
 principles may perhaps be capable of a modified 
 application to the present state of society, in which 
 there is a conflict of interests : although Spencer's 
 representation of them suggests the belief that they 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, p. 275. ^ Ibid., i. 7. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 281. 
 
 ^ See the examination of these by Sidgwick, Ethics of Green, 
 Spencer, and Martineau (1902), pp. 252-312. Cf. Prof. F. W. 
 Maitland's articles in Mind, O.S., viii. 354 ff., 506 ff.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 255 
 
 are not so much guides which the ideal gives to 
 the real, as suggestions for the construction of a 
 Utopia gathered from the requirements of present 
 social life. But, supposing the "harmonious co- 
 operation" of individuals to be thus provided for, 
 what is the personal end ? and what, it might be 
 added, is the social end, if society has any further 
 function than regulating the relation of its units to 
 one another ? Absolute ethics does not seem to 
 be able to give much guidance here. " A code of 0) further 
 
 , , , only defines 
 
 perfect personal conduct, we are told, "can never end of con- 
 be made definite."^ There are various types of f^'^J^^^'^jQ^. 
 activities, all of which may belong to lives "com- 
 plete after their kinds." But yet "perfection of 
 individual life" does imply "certain modes of 
 action which are approximately alike in all cases, 
 and which, therefore, become part of the subject- 
 matter of ethics." We cannot lay down "precise 
 rules for private conduct," but only "general re- 
 quirements." And these are: to maintain the 
 balance between waste and nutrition, to observe a 
 relation between activity and rest, to marry and 
 have children.2 This is " how the straight man 
 comports himself " : his functions seem to be physio- 
 logical only. Apart, therefore, from the suggestion 
 thrown out that a man's function may be the 
 realisation of a type of activity complete after 
 its kind — a suggestion to be considered in the 
 
 1 Principles of Ethics, i. 282. = Ibid., p. 283.
 
 256 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 sequel — all that we can say of the "completely- 
 adapted man" would seem to be that he will be 
 adapted to his circumstances, 
 (v) cannot We havc a right to demur if the pleasures of the 
 leldto^' filial condition of equilibrium be held up to our 
 happiness, imagination as a reason for aiming at it. That it 
 is " the establishment of the greatest perfection and 
 most complete happiness," ^ seems an unwarrant- 
 able assumption. Yet it is through this assump- 
 tion that an apparent harmony between Spencer's 
 hedonistic ethics and his view of the tendency of 
 evolution is brought about. It is not at all certain 
 that the result of perfectly adapted function would 
 be a continuance of greatly increased pleasure. It 
 is true that all the pains of disharmony between 
 inner desire or feelincj and outer circumstances 
 would, in such a case, disappear; but with them 
 also there would be lost the varied pleasures of 
 pursuit and successful struggle. It cannot even 
 be assumed that other pleasures would continue 
 as intense as before. For, as acts are performed 
 more easily, and thus with less conscious volition, 
 they gradually pass into the background of con- 
 sciousness, or out of consciousness altogether ; and 
 the pleasure accompanying them fades gradually 
 away as they cease to occupy the attention. 
 " Where action is perfectly automatic, feeling does 
 
 ^ First Principles, p. 517.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 257 
 
 not exist.' ^ The so-called 'passive' pleasures 
 might still remain. But the fact of effort being 
 no longer necessary for the adjustment of inner to 
 outer relations might have the effect of making the 
 ' moving equilibrium ' still called ' life ' automatic 
 in every detail. Indeed, if the suggestions of the 
 'First Principles' are to be carried out, it would 
 seem that the moving equilibrium is " a transitional 
 state on the way to complete equilibrium," - which 
 is another name for death.^ So far, therefore, from 
 heightened pleasure being the result of completely 
 perfect adjustment of inner to outer relations, this 
 adjustment would seem to reach its natural goal in 
 unconsciousness — a conclusion which may commend 
 itself to those of Spencer's disciples who take a less 
 optimist view of life than their master. 
 
 It seems evident, therefore, that to take adapta- 
 tion to environment, or self-preservation as inter- 
 preted by adaptation, as either end or criterion of 
 conduct, is to adopt an end or criterion which can- 
 not be defended by the plea that it will yield a 
 maximum of happiness or pleasure. And it is 
 almost with a feeling of relief that one finds 
 Spencer's confidence in the tendency of evolution 
 
 1 Spencer, Psychology, § 212, i. 478. 
 
 2 First Principles, p. 489. 
 
 * " A complete equilibrium of the aggregate is without life, 
 and a moving equilibrium of the aggregate is living." — Principles 
 of Sociology, i. 109. 
 
 R
 
 258 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 SO far shaken as to admit of his saying that 
 " however near to completeness the adaptation of 
 human nature to the conditions of existence at 
 large, physical and social, may become, it can 
 never reach completeness." ^ " Adaptation to in- 
 vironment" must, at any rate, be kept quite dis- 
 tinct from any theory of ethics which takes pleasure 
 as the end of life ; and it cannot consistently de- 
 termine any result as of ethical value on account 
 of its pleasurable consequences. The goal which 
 it sets before us, and in which human progress 
 ends, is conformity with an external order. The 
 modification of these external conditions by human 
 effort is to be justified ethically by the opportunity 
 it gives for bringing about a fuller agreement 
 between the individual or race and its environment. 
 The result is a stationary state of human conduct, 
 corresponding with, or a part of, the general 
 ' equilibration ' to which, according to Spencer, 
 all evolution tends. But this theory, which places 
 the end of conduct in what seems to be the 
 actual tendency of evolution, gains no real support 
 from this apparent harmony of ethics with general 
 philosophy. It may be granted that the evidence 
 of physical laws goes to show that the evolution 
 of the solar, or even stellar, system is towards a 
 condition in which the 'moving equilibrium' will 
 at last pass into a form in which there is no 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, i. 254.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 259 
 
 further sensible motion, and tlie concentration of 
 matter is complete. But, to infer from this that 
 the theory which places the end of conduct in a 
 similar equilibrium shows the harmony of morality 
 with the tendency of existence in general, would 
 really involve a confusion of the two different 
 meanings of ' end.' The end or termination of 
 all things may be equilibrium, motionlessness, 
 and disappearance of life, but this is no reason 
 why the end or aim of conduct should be a similar 
 equilibrium. 
 
 Indeed, to say that we ought to promote the end 
 of evolution, and that this end is annihilation, is 
 inconsistent with the postulate always implied by 
 Spencer's ethics — the postulate that conduct should 
 promote evolution because life is desirable,^ and 
 increase of life comes with the progress of evolu- 
 tion. Nor is it of any assistance to reply to this 
 by saying that the dissolution in which evolution 
 ends may be only the prelude to another process 
 of evolution in which life will gradually progress 
 till it again reaches equilibrium. For, in the 
 first place, this is only a problematical suggestion 
 — is not, to speak in Spencerian language, " de- 
 monstrable a priori by deduction from the persist- 
 ence of force," as the tendency of present evolution 
 to equilibrium is held to be; and secondly, the 
 new process, if it were to come about, would 
 
 ^ Spencer, Priuciples of Ethics, i. 26.
 
 260 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 have to begin again the slow ascent from the 
 lowest rung of the ladder of existence : so that, 
 in aiding evolution towards the goal of equilibrium, 
 we should be only guiding it to the old starting- 
 point which has now, after many a painful struggle, 
 been left far behind. 
 
 Tiie concep. The theory that goodness consists in adaptation 
 
 tion of social , . , ^ . • i i 
 
 equiiib- to environment may be put m a more complex and 
 ^'^™ ■ subtle way, but without, as it seems to me, meeting 
 the objections already urged against it. Stress, for 
 instance, may be laid on the fact that the social 
 order is part, and indeed the most important part, 
 of the environment of the individual, and that it 
 is in his adaptation to the social order, rather 
 than in his adaptation to the material order, that 
 goodness consists : morality may be identified with 
 social equilibrium.^ But this view does not get 
 rid of the former difficulties. The social order is 
 not the whole of man's environment ; society itself 
 must be adapted to the wider environment in order 
 to maintain its own equilibrium : so that social 
 equilibrium depends upon this further condition. 
 Besides, society is constituted by psychical factors ; 
 it also is a life ; and social conduct, equally with 
 individual conduct, requires a standard or criterion 
 of goodness if one way of social activity is ever to 
 be regarded as better than another. And if we 
 
 ^ Cf. Alexander, Moral Order and Progi-ess, p. 295.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 261 
 
 refuse to apply moral predicates to social action, 
 we refute ourselves whenever we mix in public life 
 and support a cause or an institution, while we 
 should find it hard to explain how the good or evil 
 which characterises individual activities ceases to 
 apply when men act in groups. 
 
 The conception of social equilibrium thus throws its inability 
 no more light on the ethical problem than the con- ,„ora^ st^nd- 
 ception of adaptation to environment did. The ^'^'^' 
 social order or environment must be assumed as 
 good before we can say that the goodness of con- 
 duct consists in adaptation to, or equilibrium with, 
 it. And the fact that all conduct produces changes 
 in the environment would itself be a difficulty 
 or this view, were it otherwise tenable. Spencer's 
 dream of a perfect state necessarily takes the 
 form of a stationary state ; and the one great and 
 unproved assumption that this final state is good 
 or best is thus sufficient for his purposes. But, 
 apart from this idea of an ultimate state of com- 
 plete adaptation, it is necessary to recognise that 
 both conduct and environment are in ceaseless 
 change, and that the equilibrium established at 
 any moment, even were it perfect at that moment, 
 would be overturned at the next. Morality has 
 been said to be " the equilibrium of social forces in 
 an order of conduct," ^ and, at the same time, it 
 is held that " goodness is in perpetual movement : 
 
 1 Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, p. 295.
 
 262 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 SO soon as it is attained it becomes evil, and a fresh 
 standard of goodness arises." ^ The equilibrium is 
 after all but an imaginary state, the result of an 
 imperfect and momentary view of the process: if 
 we look a moment longer we see that the forces 
 are moving forward towards a new distribution, 
 itself to be displaced almost as soon as it appears. 
 What significance is there then in continuing to 
 say that goodness consists in such an equilibrium ? 
 We may take an instantaneous photograph of a 
 horse as it stands motionless on the turf, or as it 
 leaps the hurdle : in the former case the forces 
 seem to us in equilibrium ; in the latter they do 
 not. It is the same in the progress of social life : 
 there are periods of rest and periods of fresh 
 endeavour; and in the former we may seem to find 
 the equilibrium which is absent in the latter. But 
 no reason has been given for taking the presence of 
 equilibrium as either the same thing as, or as a 
 test of, goodness. Besides, it is admitted that, if 
 there is equilibrium at all, it is but for a moment : 
 movement is the rule of life ; and as we pass from 
 the state of one moment to face the future, is there 
 no other guide for conduct than this will-o'-the- 
 wisp called equilibrium ? " If we assume," says 
 Professor Alexander,^ — and this may be taken as 
 his answer to the question, — " that the change of 
 ideals is not merely a change but a progress, we 
 
 1 Moral Order and Progress, p. 290. - Ibid., p. 291.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 263 
 
 may describe morality as the creation of a ' better.' " 
 But in this assumption the whole ethical question 
 is begf];ed. If we call the change a progress, we 
 have thereby assumed that it is towards a ' better ' 
 state. And on what grounds can the assumption 
 be justified? Even Spencer admitted that "the 
 survival of the fittest is not always the survival of 
 the best . . . the ' fittest,' throughout a wide range 
 of cases — perhaps the widest range — are not the 
 ' best.' '"' 1 But if change is held to be a progress 
 and to point to a better, the assumption is made 
 that evolution is an ethical process — that the 
 'fittest' which it tends to preserve are also the 
 morally ' best.' If we do make this assumption, 
 then the ethical conception is presupposed in our 
 view of evolution and not derived from it. If, on 
 the other hand, we do not make the assumption, 
 our distinction between good and evil comes to be 
 only a distinction between successful persistence 
 and failure in a struggle : the good will be 
 simply " what has come to prevail," and the 
 evil " that which has been rejected and 
 defeated." 2 
 
 Further, it would seem that the theory of evolu- (0) insutn- 
 tion itself is not fairly represented by a view which '^'^"'^^ °^ 
 
 ^ Athenteum, August 5, 1893, p. 194a ; Various Fragments, p. 
 114. 
 2 Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, pp. 306, 307.
 
 264 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 adaptation emphasises the fact of adaptation to environment 
 istend: to the exclusion of the fact of variation. The 
 latter is as necessary to progressive development 
 as is the former. Adaptation to environment might 
 seem to be most nearly complete when organism 
 and environment were both so simple as to be 
 hardly separate. The polype, which is scarcely 
 different from the sea - water it inhabits, might 
 seem by correspondence with its medium, to be 
 near the maximum of adaptation, though at the 
 very beginning of life. It may be solely because 
 the environment is subject to numerous changes 
 that the organism of simple structure cannot main- 
 tain life. But it is only through an unexplained 
 tendency to variation that progress in organic life 
 is possible. Perfect correspondence with the en- 
 vironment was not reached by simple organisms, 
 not only on account of the want of uniformity in 
 tendency to their surrouudings, but also because, unless a race 
 all organ- of organisms strike out a variety of characters in its 
 isms, different individual members, there would be no 
 
 material for natural selection to work upon. Did 
 organisms not tend to vary in function and struc- 
 ture, no progressive modification would be possible. 
 Those fittest to live would be selected once for all, 
 and all but those adapted to the environment 
 weeded out. 
 
 It is not necessary for our present purpose to 
 have any definite theory of the obscure laws by
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 265 
 
 which this variability is governed. It is enough 
 that natural selection requires the striking out of 
 new modifications as well as the transmission of 
 those already produced.^ It may be the fact (how- 
 ever little the evidence in its support) that varia- 
 tion is, in the last resort, due to changes in sur- 
 rounding circumstances, to the unequal incidence 
 of external forces upon a finite aggregate.^ But, 
 with living bodies as now constituted, it has, at 
 any rate as proximate cause, a twofold source. It 
 may be due to the direct effect of external forces, 
 or it may be caused by the energy stored up iu the 
 organism in growth.^ 
 
 In man the outgo of this force is conscious ; and, consciously 
 
 „ , . . . ,, . 1 1 • directed in 
 
 by means of his conscious or intelligent selection, man. 
 governed by interests of various kinds, he can 
 anticipate and modify the action of natural selec- 
 tion. The law that the fittest organism survives 
 may perhaps work in man as in the lower animals, 
 if only we give a wide enough meaning to ' fittest,' 
 so as to admit even of the weak being made fit 
 through the sympathy and help of the strong. 
 Selection becomes dependent upon variations of a 
 kind different from those in the merely animal 
 world, so that its practical effect may be in some 
 cases apparently reversed. "We thus see how it is 
 that even Darwin holds that in moralised societies 
 
 ^ Spencer, Biolugy, i. 257. - First Principles, p. 404 f. 
 
 ' Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 101.
 
 266 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 " natural selection apparently effects but little." ^ 
 It is indeed contended by Schaffle^ that, although 
 circumstances differ, the law of action remains the 
 same. Schaffle points out how, as we rise in the 
 scale of life, especially as it is manifested in human 
 society, the organisation becomes more delicate, and 
 other than merely natural facts have to be taken 
 account of, so that the fittest to live in the new 
 social and intellectual environment is no longer 
 the man of greatest physical strength and skill. 
 But this view requiries to be supplemented by the 
 facts brought forward, in a previous chapter, which 
 show that the principle of selection is no longer 
 purely natural, but is a mode of social activity 
 which is guided by intelligence and purpose. 
 
 The theory of natural selection as applied to the 
 ordinary spheres of plant and animal life, may per- 
 haps, for some purposes, neglect consideration of 
 the fact that it presupposes a tendency to variation 
 in the organisms whose growth it describes. But, 
 when the variation in the behaviour of the organism 
 becomes conscious and designed, there is thereby 
 produced a preliminary indication or determina- 
 tion of the lines on which selection has to work ; 
 and the new force should be definitely recognised. 
 
 1 Descent of Man, new ed. (1901), p. 212, cf. pp. 307, 945; cf. 
 A. R. Wallace, Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection 
 (1870), p. 330. 
 
 '•^ Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., i. (1877), 543 ff.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 2G7 
 
 Before the theory of evolution can give a full 
 account of the ethical in man, it must distinguish 
 consciously-determined from merely natural action, 
 and give an analysis of what is implied in the 
 former. We must bear in mind that it may be the 
 case that the ground and possibility of progress 
 and of the efficiency of ideal ends in human con- 
 duct — which ' adaptation to environment ' has been 
 unable logically to explain or leave room for — are 
 to be found in this differentiating fact of conscious 
 activity. But we must first of all see whether, 
 from the general characteristics implied in the facts 
 of variation, we can extract an ethical end or any 
 means for distinguishing between good and evil in 
 conduct. 
 
 2. " The lower animals," says a writer on biology, 2. End sug- 
 " are just as well organised for the purposes of their thL tend- 
 life as the higher are for theirs. The tape-worm is ^"^f^^J,^ . 
 relatively quite as perfect as the man, and dis- 
 tinguished from him by many superior capabili- 
 ties."^ It is incorrect to look upon the evolution 
 of animal life as working along one line only, so 
 that the difierent kinds of living beings can be 
 arranged, as it were, in an order of merit, in which 
 the organisation of the higher animals plainly 
 excels that of the lower. The conditions of life 
 are manifold and various enough to permit of 
 
 1 Rolph, Biol. Probl., p. 33.
 
 268 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 the existence of many species equally perfect 
 in relation to their different environments. The 
 fact that we are still able to speak of one 
 species or one animal as higher than another, 
 is not owing to the one being better adapted to 
 its environment than the other, but is identified 
 with " the amount of differentiation and special- 
 isation of the several organs in each being." ^ 
 Even Spencer, for whom equilibrium is the goal 
 of life, implicitly admits that ' adaptation ' alone is 
 not the end for human action, by his doctrine that 
 the degree of evolution may be measured by the 
 complexity of the adjustments it effects between 
 (a) pre- orgauism and environment. The end, therefore, it 
 
 scribes self- . , ^n 
 
 development iiiay be Said, IS uo longer the mere ' selr-preserva- 
 seif-pret'er^ tiou ' fouud in adaptation to environment, but the 
 vation, ' sclf-developmeut ' which implies temporary dis- 
 harmony between organism and surroundings. 
 
 For ' self-preservation ' and ' self-development,' 
 though frequently spoken of as identical, are really 
 distinct and often opposed notions — the former 
 denoting a tendency to persist in one's present 
 state of being, while the latter implies constant 
 change. It may be held, however, that, for an 
 organism such as man to persist in his state of 
 being, implies modification of his faculties, and 
 that this modification involves development. For 
 any organism to exist apart from change is, of 
 
 1 Darwin, Origin of Species, new ed. (1901), p. 152.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 269 
 
 course, impossible. Life is only known to us as 
 a series of changes. But that change does not 
 necessarily mean development or ' change to a 
 higher condition.' Degradation is as well known 
 a fact as development ; and, between the two, 
 there is room for a state of existence of which 
 it is difficult to say whether it improves or de- 
 teriorates. And, whatever may be intended by 
 the phrase, ' self-preservation ' points to a state 
 of this kind rather than to an improving condi- 
 tion. The notion of ' self-development ' has there- 
 fore a richer content than that of ' self-preser- 
 vation'; but just on this account it cannot be 
 explained by a reference to the nature of things 
 as they are. 
 
 It is true that self-development can only go on thus taking 
 by means of a continuous process of adjustment ; variability 
 but it is also necessary for it that this tendency 
 to adaptation should be continually hindered from 
 becoming complete or lapsing into equilibrium. 
 It is here that the function of variation comes in. 
 On the one side there is this tendency to vary 
 after a fashion often without any apparent regard 
 to external conditions ; on the other side, there is 
 the action of the external conditions selecting and 
 favouring those variations which bring the organ- 
 ism into closer correspondence with them. The 
 wide range over which the theory of natural selec- 
 tion applies is due to the fact that the environment
 
 270 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 is never uniform and never constant, so that modifi- 
 cations on the part of the organism have a chance 
 of suiting its varied and changing character. Its 
 changes, moreover, are often the result not so 
 much of any absolute alteration in external cir- 
 cumstances, as of a new relation between them 
 and living beings having been brought about. 
 For the enormous reproductive faculty of most 
 organisms makes them multiply so rapidly as to 
 press ever more and more closely against the limit 
 of subsistence, and thus to produce competition 
 for the means of living. Hence the fresh lines 
 of development originated by each organism have 
 to be tested by their correspondence with a con- 
 stantly changing medium. The altered circum- 
 stances give the modifications which organisms 
 are for ever striking out an opportunity of per- 
 petuating themselves, 
 which com- By cach new variation the existing relation 
 
 plicates the . , . j_ • t j_ i i 
 
 tendency to bctwcen orgauism and environment is disturbed. 
 encT^th*^" "T^^^ variation may, however, prove its utility at 
 environ- ouce bv a morc exact correspondence than before 
 
 ment, ■' ^ 
 
 with the requirements of external conditions. 
 But, in what are called the higher grades of life, 
 variations from tne type are sometimes not im- 
 mediately useful, although they may ultimately 
 become most advantageous.^ Were it not for 
 
 ^ Thus Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 76, speaking of the 'advan- 
 tage to man ' it must have been ' to become a biped,' says : " The
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 271 
 
 the remarkable power of persistence possessed 
 by the higher animals, the modified organism 
 would be unable to hold its own. The great 
 majority of such variations do, as a matter of 
 fact, soon disappear, because unable to prove their 
 utility. But others of them, either by the power 
 they give the organism to mould circumstances 
 to itself, or by their appropriateness to the greater 
 complexity which comes with the increased num- 
 ber of living organisms, and the more delicate 
 readjustment thus required, prove of greater ad- 
 vantage to the organism than the faculties simply 
 adapted to the preceding state of relative equilib- 
 rium. The higher adjustment of life to its sur- 
 roundings, which marks each state of advancing 
 evolution, had its beginning in the rupture of the 
 original simpler harmony that previously existed. 
 
 If we compare human conduct with that of especially 
 animals lower in the organic scale, it becomes conduct. 
 
 hands and arms could hardly have hecome perfect enough to have 
 manufactured weapons, or to have hurled stones and spears with 
 a true aim, as long as they were habitually used for locomotion 
 and for supporting the whole weight of the body ; or, as before 
 remarked, as long as they were especially fitted for climbing trees." 
 The hands had to lose their dexterity for the latter purposes 
 before they could acquire the more delicate adjustments neces- 
 sary for skill in the former. The transition was of course a 
 gi'adual one ; but the initial variations required would seem to 
 have been at first unfavourable to man's chances in the struggle 
 for existence, though it was through them that he rose to his 
 place at the summit of the organic scale.
 
 272 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 evident that there is a broad difference between 
 the two in this, that actions in the former are 
 purposed, performed with a definite end in view ; 
 whereas, in the latter, they seem to be the result 
 of blind impulse, and there are slight, if any, 
 traces of purpose. In activity of the latter kind, 
 natural selection works in the ordinary way by 
 exterminating the animals whose behaviour is not 
 suited to their environment. But actions done 
 with a view to an end may anticipate the verdict 
 of this natural law. The agent may see that 
 conduct of a particular kind would conduce to 
 the promotion of life, while conduct of a different 
 kind would render him less fit to live ; and, as a 
 consequence, actions of the former kind may be 
 chosen. In this way development may be anti- 
 cipated, and the present order of affairs may be 
 disturbed, more or less forcibly, in order to bring 
 about a foreseen better state of things. 
 
 We are thus able to see more clearly how it 
 is that the theory of evolution when applied to 
 ethics, may be thought to have different and 
 conflicting results. The first result is the view 
 already criticised, 'adaptation to environment,' 
 which corresponds to the notion of self-preser- 
 vation. But this end, as we have seen, only 
 takes one factor of evolution into consideration 
 — neglects the tendency to variation which all 
 evolution postulates, and which, in the higher
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 273 
 
 organisms, becomes purposive. The other end 
 which seems to be suggested by the tlieory of 
 evolution takes account of this tendency to 
 variation, and may be said to correspond to the 
 notion of self - development ; but this end it is 
 harder to define. Adaptation may, perhaps, be 
 understood by a reference to the environment to 
 which life is to be adapted. This involves a 
 knowledge of the conditions of the environment, 
 but nothing more. Development can be measured 
 by no such standard. On the one hand it implies 
 an independent, or relatively independent, tend- 
 ency to variation. On the other hand, however, 
 it is necessary that the disharmony with environ- 
 ment, in which this tendency to variation may 
 begin, should not be excessive and should not 
 be permanent ; for without a certain amount of 
 adaptation to environment no organism can live. 
 The extent of initial disharmony which is possible, 
 or is useful, varies according to the versatility of 
 the faculties of each individual organism, and to 
 its place in the scale of being ; but throughout 
 all existence it is true that want of adaptation 
 beyond a certain varying degree is fatal : " a 
 mode of action entirely alien to the prevailing 
 modes of action, cannot be successfully persisted 
 in — must eventuate in death of self, or posterity, 
 or both." ^ There are certain conditions in the 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 280. 
 S
 
 274 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 environment which correspond Vfith. the essential 
 requirements of organic life ; and without adapta- 
 tion to them life cannot be maintained. 
 
 (6) standard By what Standard, then, can we measure de- 
 fer measur- , ___ ■, ■, ^ n ^ 
 
 ing develop- vclopmcnt ? We have already seen, from the 
 ment i fQ^j^jiiia,' as it is called, or definition, of evolu- 
 
 tion, that it implies an advance to a state of 
 increased coherence, definiteness, and hetero- 
 geneity, by the double process of differentiation 
 of parts, and integration of these parts into a 
 whole by the formation of definite relations 
 among them to one another. The notions of 
 coherence amongst parts and of increased def- 
 initeness of function and structure are easily 
 understood. But the heterogeneity postulated 
 is a more complex notion, — has, in the first 
 place, a double reference, "is at the same time 
 a differentiation of the parts from each other and 
 a differentiation of the consolidated whole from 
 the environment " ; ^ and secondly, is manifested 
 in living beings in increased complexity of every 
 kind — of structure, form, chemical composition, 
 specific gravity, temperature, and self - mobility.^ 
 Can we then apply this at once to ethics, and 
 say that the most developed — which the evolu- 
 tionist assumes to be the most moral — conduct 
 is that which is most definite, coherent, and 
 heterogeneous ? This doctrine has at least the 
 
 ^ Spencer, Biology, i. 149. ^ Ibid., i. 144.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 275 
 
 merit of not leaving out of sight so fundamental 
 a characteristic of evolution as tiie tendeucy to 
 variation ; and, without being consistently held 
 to, it is the burden of much of Spencer's Ethics, 
 where it is illustrated and defended with great 
 ingenuity. 
 
 That moral conduct is distinguished by definite- f'jund m 
 ness and coherence — that it works towards a corapiexity 
 determinate end, and that its various actions are jito'tive!"'^ 
 in agreement with one another and parts of a 
 whole — may be admitted. But this is at most 
 a merely formal description of what is meant 
 by morality in conduct. To say that conduct 
 must be a coherent whole, and must seek a 
 determinate end by appropriate means, leaves 
 unsettled the question as to what this end 
 should be, or what means are best fitted to 
 attain it. But, when we go on to say that as 
 conduct is more varied in act,^ more hetero- 
 geneous in motive,'^ it is higher in the moral 
 scale, we seem to have got hold of something 
 which may be a guide for determining the ethical 
 end. The mark of what is higher in evolution, 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 71 : "Briefly, then, if the 
 conduct is the best possible on every occasion, it follows that as 
 the occasions are endlesslj' varied the acts will be endlessly varied 
 to suit — the heterogeneity in the combination of motions will be 
 extreme." 
 
 ■'' Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 106: "The acts character- 
 ised by the more complex motives and the more involved 
 thoughts, have all along been of higher authority for guidance."
 
 276 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 and consequently in morality, will be greater 
 heterogeneity or complexity.^ 
 
 This conclusion follows from an attempt not 
 merely to treat " moral phenomena as phenomena 
 of evolution," but also to find the "ultimate in- 
 terpretations " of ethics " only in those fundamen- 
 tal truths which are common to all" the sciences, 
 physical, biological, psychological, sociological.^ 
 Now the fundamental truths which these sciences 
 have in common are those only which are most 
 Difficulties abstract. But as we pass from mere relations be- 
 theory: twcen matter and motion to life, and from life 
 to self - consciousness, we do not merely add to 
 these fundamental truths certain others which are 
 not fundamental : we find that things are not 
 merely more complex, but are changed in aspect 
 and nature. Even though it be true that the new 
 phenomena may still admit of analysis into the old 
 simpler terms, and that life, mind, and society may 
 be interpreted as redistributions of matter and 
 motion,^ it must yet at least be admitted that the 
 change passed through is one similar to those which 
 Mill compared to chemical composition : the new 
 compound differs fundamentally in mode of action 
 from the elements out of which it was formed. 
 
 ^ Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 94 f., where a similar 
 definition is given in answer to the question, "What is the mean- 
 ing of better ? " 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 63. 
 
 ^ Cf. Spencer, First Principles, p. 566.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 277 
 
 Now, in saying that the most complex adjustments 
 of acts to ends are the highest kinds of conduct, 
 and that we should be guided by the more complex 
 in preference to simpler motives, this obvious diffi- 
 culty is passed over. It is true that Spencer, in 
 chapters rich in suggestion, and filled with skil- 
 fully chosen illustrations, has passed in review the 
 various aspects of conduct according as we look at 
 it from the point of view of the physical environ- 
 ment, of life, of mind, and of society. But, when 
 these different aspects are brought together and 
 compared, it becomes clear that the attempt to 
 judge conduct by reference to the 'fundamental 
 truth' that evolution implies an advance towards 
 greater complexity, must necessarily end in failure.^ 
 
 In the first place, there is a notable discrepancy (o):intinomy 
 
 - , . , . , produced by 
 
 between the biological and the sociological aspect, it between 
 For the complete development of the individual a^^i^lX 
 life implies that every function should be fulfilled, viauaiends; 
 and that its fulfilment should interfere with the 
 performance of no other function. " The perform- 
 ance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obli- 
 gation." "The ideally moral man ... is one in 
 
 1 So far as the followiug criticism may appear to apply to 
 Spencer, and not merely to a possible way of defining moral 
 conduct, it is necessary to bear in mind the words of his preface 
 to the Principles of Ethics : ' ' With a view to clearness, I have 
 treated separately some correlative aspects of conduct, drawing 
 conclusions either of which becomes untrue if divorced from the 
 other."
 
 278 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled," 
 — that is to say, " discharged in degrees duly ad- 
 justed to the conditions of existence."^ A fully 
 evolved life is marked by multiplicity and com- 
 plexity of function. And, if from the individual 
 we pass to the social organism, we find that the 
 same truth holds. The state, or organised body of 
 individuals, has many functions to perform; but it 
 can only perform them in the most efficient way 
 through the functions of its individual members 
 being specialised. From the social point of view, 
 therefore, the greatest possible division of labour is 
 a mark of the most evolved and perfect community. 
 And this division of labour implies that each in- 
 dividual, instead of performing every function of 
 which he is capable, should be made to restrict 
 himself to that at which he is best, so that the 
 community may be the gainer from the time and 
 exertion that are saved, and the skill that is pro- 
 duced, by the most economic expenditure of indi- 
 vidual talent. Thus social perfection appears to 
 imply a condition of things inconsistent with that 
 development of one's whole nature which, from the 
 biological point of view, has just been defined as a 
 characteristic of the ideally moral man. It seems, 
 indeed, inevitable that any such abstract prelimin- 
 ary notion of development as that which would test 
 it by increase of complexity must fail in such a 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 75 f.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 279 
 
 case as this where there is no question between the 
 competing claims of two phenomena on the same 
 level, but where harmony is wanted between the 
 different aspects the same phenomena present when 
 looked at from the point of view of the individual 
 and from the point of view of the whole. 
 
 There is still greater difficulty in applying this w its psy- 
 criterion, when we come to the psychological aspect aspect"^" 
 of morality. According to Spencer, " the acts char- 
 acterised by the more complex motives and the 
 more involved thoughts, have all along been of 
 higher authority for guidance." ^ lUit the later or 
 more advanced in mental evolutiou is not always 
 more complex in structure ; for it is a character- 
 istic of mental development that the processes by 
 which a result has been arrived at gradually dis- 
 appear on account of the diminished attention they 
 receive, so that there remains what is, so far as 
 psychical structure is concerned, a simple mental 
 state. Complexity of structure and indirectness of confounds 
 origin are thus really two different characteristics ofTtTOctnre 
 of states of mind, which frequently go together, but re'"|,g°fof 
 frequently part company.- When Spencer, accord- °"gi", 
 ingly, goes on to say ^ that " for the better preser- 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, i. 106. 
 
 '^ Althougli Spencer holds that representativeness varies as 
 definiteness, and measures complexitj', including the complexity 
 implied by increasing heterogeneity. — Principles of Psycholog)-, 
 ii. 516 f. 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, i, 113.
 
 280 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 neither of 
 which can 
 serve as an 
 ethical 
 standard. 
 
 vation of life the primitive simple presentative 
 feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved 
 compound and representative feelings," he is really 
 passing to a different standard without giving up 
 the former. The sympathy with injured Zulus or 
 Afghans so lavishly expressed by Spencer ^ may be 
 a more indirect, representative, or re-representative 
 feeling, than the sentiments which led to British 
 expeditions, and, as such, may be more to be com- 
 mended. But it would be rash to say that sym- 
 pathy with the ' British interests ' supposed to be 
 at stake — interests of commerce, and of the balance 
 of political power, as well as those arising from the 
 subtle effect of national prestige — is less complex 
 than the feeling of sympathy with a people dis- 
 possessed of its territory. The latter feeling may 
 be more indirect or representative, as implying an 
 imaginative appropriation of the circumstances of 
 another community ; but, so far as structure is 
 concerned, it is composed of far fewer and simpler 
 component elements than the feeling for British 
 interests. 
 
 Nor, on the other hand, can we allow ourselves 
 to take refuge in the conclusion that, if the more 
 complex emotion cannot be held to be better 
 morally, then that which is later in evolution may 
 at least be regarded as of higher authority than the 
 earlier evolved feeling. According to Spencer the 
 
 ^ Cf. Principles of Sociology, ii. 725.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 281 
 
 man who obtains by fraud the money to support 
 his family is to be condemned, because, although 
 we admit the claim his family have upon him, " we 
 regard as of superior authority the feelings which 
 respond to men's proprietary claims — feelings which 
 are re-representative in a higher degree and refer 
 to more remote difTused consequences." ^ But, were 
 this the ground of distinction, we ought also to 
 regard the feeling prompting a man to distribute 
 his fortune in any foolish enterprise ' as of superior 
 authority ' to those which prompt him to support 
 his family, if only the former are ' re-representative 
 in a higher degree,' and their consequences more 
 ' remote ' and ' diffused.' Many of the greatest 
 evils which infect social life and warp the moral 
 feelings of men are evils which are only possible 
 as the result of a highly advanced civilisation and 
 a refined and delicate organisation of the mind. 
 The factitious sentiments raised by a subtle casu- 
 istry with the effect of confusing the ordinary dis- 
 tinctions of right and wrong are, in almost all 
 cases, more indirect and re-representative than the 
 feelings in harmony with the moral conscious- 
 ness of the community which they set aside in 
 the individual conscience. So obvious, indeed, are 
 objections of this kind — objections, that is to say, 
 taken from the impossibility of so applying the 
 criterion as to construct a workable system of 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, i. 123.
 
 282 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 morals — that Spencer virtually relinquishes his 
 own theory, talking of it as true only " on the 
 average," ^ and even allowing that it is in some 
 cases suicidal.^ 
 
 As it cannot be held that the more complex in 
 evolution is of greater authority than the less 
 complex, nor that the later in evolution has such 
 authority over the earlier, we must admit that the 
 so-called ' fundamental characteristics ' of evolution, 
 which find a place in its definition or formula, are 
 unable to determine its value in an ethical regard. 
 The richness of life, physical, intellectual, and 
 social, has indeed been produced only by a long 
 course of development, and by the assimilation of 
 many various elements into a complex organisation ; 
 but its value cannot be measured either by the test 
 of mechanical complexity or by the length of time 
 it has taken to evolve. We must therefore seek 
 some other method of giving a meaning to evolu- 
 tion in the region of moral worth ; and we find 
 Spencer himself really falling back in his discussion 
 on the more general answer to our question, that 
 the end of evolution is life : " evolution becomes the 
 highest possible when the conduct simultaneously 
 achieves the greatest totality of life in self, offspring, 
 and fellow-men." ^ Since it appears, then, that the 
 
 1 Principles of Ethics, i. 107, 129. - Ibid., i. 110. 
 
 ^ Principles of Ethics, i. 25 ; cf. Lauge, Ges. d. Mat., ii. 247. 
 
 Lange's statement is noteworthj- : " Die menschliche Vernunft
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 283 
 
 characteristic of complexity or variety is as un- 
 satisfactory a criterion of morality as the notion 
 of ' adaptation to environment ' was found to be, 
 we must ask for some further interpretation of 
 the notion of 'development' or 'increase of life' 
 when regarded as the end of conduct. 
 
 3. The ethics of evolution — in whatever form 3. Further 
 we have as yet found it — has always proceeded on detoe'devei- 
 the assumption that life is desirable, and that it op^^ito"" 
 
 •t ' increase of 
 
 has a value which makes its pursuit and promotion ufeasthe 
 
 moral stand - 
 
 a reasonable moral end. How this fundamental ard. 
 ethical assumption^ is to be justified, I do not at 
 present enquire. But the question must now be 
 faced — What is meant by ' life ' when we say that 
 its 'increase' or 'development' is the moral end, 
 and speak of its 'greatest totality' in a way that 
 implies that it admits of quantitative measure- 
 ment ? The biological definition of life is itself Biological 
 
 I' T -r, , 1 T (• • definition of 
 
 matter or dispute. But, even were such a defini- lifeinsuffl- 
 tion as that proposed by Spencer agreed to, it "®"*' 
 would be impossible to take it as a standard for 
 human conduct. The very generality which may 
 
 kenut kein ancleres Ideal, als die moglichste Erhaltung und Ver- 
 vollkommnuiig des Lebens, welches einmal liegonuen hat, verbun- 
 den niit dor Einschriinkung von Geburt und Tod." 
 
 * The " endeavour to further evolution, especially that of the 
 human race," is put forward as a "new duty" by F. Gallon, 
 Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (1883), p. 
 337. See below, pp. 320 ff.
 
 284 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 make it fit to stand as a definition, or at least 
 abstract description, of life, renders it at the same 
 time incapable of serving as a criterion by which 
 the various modes of the manifestation of life may 
 be judged. One point, however, generally empha- 
 sised by the theory of evolution, may — to simplify 
 the argument — be admitted. Tlie life which human 
 conduct ' ought ' to increase is not merely that of 
 one individual man, but the whole life of the com- 
 munity — 'self, offspring, and fellow-men' — with 
 which the individual life is bound up. The theory 
 of evolution has shown how the growth of the 
 individual has been so dependent upon that of the 
 whole body of society that it is impossible to 
 separate their interests. At the same time, no 
 complete identity has been brought about, and it 
 remains one of the greatest difficulties of any em- 
 pirical theory to harmonise their competing claims. 
 For argument's sake, however, and to admit of the 
 quality of the end being investigated apart from 
 considerations as to the method of distribution, the 
 question may be discussed as if natural selection 
 had produced complete solidarity between the life 
 of the individual and that of the race. 
 
 What criterion have we, then, of the development 
 of human nature or life ? The answer at once sug- 
 gests itself that the higher evolution of life can be 
 accurately measured by the amount of pleasure got 
 by living beings. But this view has been examined
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 285 
 
 in the preceding chapter, and found to be unsup- 
 ported by sufficient evidence ; so that we are 
 driven to seek for some non-hedonistic criterion 
 that will give meaning to the phrase 'development' 
 or ' increase of life,' when prescribed as the ethical 
 end. 
 
 Nor is the matter made any clearer by saying Health as 
 that the 'health' of society is the end we ought to either used 
 promote.^ This has been put forward as an inter- p°ea"g^'e^'^^*' 
 pretation of the hedonistic principle, which brings 
 that principle into agreement with the theory of 
 evolution. As such, however, it seems open to fatal 
 objections. Given as an explanation of ' pleasure,' 
 it falls back upon the notion of ' life ' ; for health 
 can only be defined as tiiat which conduces to 
 continued and energetic life. Further than this, 
 there is a special difficulty in adopting health as 
 the proximate end where pleasure is the ultimate 
 end. Even if we could assert that health always 
 leads to pleasure, it is not evident that it is 
 better known, or more easily made the end, than 
 pleasure. For of present pleasure we have a 
 
 ' Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 185; Stephen, Science of Ethics, 
 p. 366. Dr Hutchison Stirling also has suggested Health as a 
 practical principle to be set against the anarchy of individualism. 
 But with him it is not an empirical generalisation of the tendency 
 of evolution. It is as " the outward sign of freedom, the realisa- 
 tion of the universal will," that "health may be set at once as 
 sign and as goal of tl\e harmonious operation of the whole system 
 — as sign and as goal of a realisation of life." — Secret of Hegel, 
 ii. 654.
 
 286 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Standard in our own consciousness from which 
 there is no appeal. And, although the value of 
 a series of pleasures is much harder to estimate, 
 there is also no slight difficulty in saying what 
 will promote the efficiency or health of an organism. 
 Besides, the question arises whether health really 
 corresponds with pleasure; and this is, in another 
 form, the question which has been already answered 
 in the negative, — whether life can be measured by 
 pleasure. 
 or falls back Oil the Other hand, if ' health ' is to be taken 
 
 on the 1 • f. 
 
 notion of uot as an explanation of or means to pleasure, 
 but as a substitute for the notion of ' life,' then we 
 hardly get beyond our original terms. ' Health ' 
 must be interpreted simply as that which leads to 
 strong and continued life : so that the only informa- 
 tion to be got from the new term is that the life we 
 are to promote must be vigorous and long ; and this 
 was already implied in saying that it is the increase 
 or development of life that is the end. It will not 
 do to identify the notion with the mere balance of 
 physiological functions which, in common language, 
 appropriates to itself the term ' health.' We must 
 include the health of the soul as well as the health 
 of the body, and the health of society as well as 
 the health of the soul. The balance of mental and 
 social, as well as of physiological, functions, is im- 
 plied in the complex life of whose evolution we 
 form a part. To say that we are to promote this
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 287 
 
 balance of various functions is to say nothing more 
 than that we are to promote the life into which 
 physical and mental and social factors enter. The 
 attempt to arrive at an end for conduct, by consid- 
 eration of the characteristics of evolution, has been 
 made without success. It has been found, too, that 
 'development' or 'increase of life' does not admit 
 of translation into the language of hedonism : and 
 the question thus arises. How we are to define this 
 end, which we are unable to interpret in terms of 
 pleasure ? 
 
 What meaning can be given to the notion 'in- ways of 
 crease of life' as the end of conduct, without increase of 
 interpreting life in terms of pleasure ? Can we, Ij^i^good*' 
 the question may be put, reach a ' natural ' good 
 as distinct from ' sensible good ' or pleasure ? We 
 must discard at the outset any such ' rational ' view 
 of nature as gave colour to the Stoic doctrine by 
 identifying nature with the universal reason. And 
 we must equally avoid the doctrine that reason 
 regulative of conduct is manifested in the consti- 
 tution of man either in a distinct faculty, such 
 as ' conscience,' or in the due regulation of the 
 various impulses. Trendelenburg's teleological con- 
 ception of human nature, for instance, implies a 
 rational element which could not be got from 
 the causal sequence traced by evolution.^ For he 
 determines the essence of man by reference to 
 ^ Naturrecht auf dem Qrunde der Ethik, 2d ed., 1868.
 
 288 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 the inner end of his constitution, and postulates an 
 organic unity of impulses which, in the form of con- 
 science, protests against self-seeking action on the 
 part of any single impulse. But no other hierarchy 
 of motives can be admitted here than that produced 
 by the natural law of evolution ; and this law can 
 only show how one impulse, or class of impulses, 
 has become more authoritative, by showing how it 
 has become stronger or more persistent : the other 
 methods of evolving this authority on the basis of 
 naturalism, do so by means of the pleasurable or 
 painful consequences of motives and actions. 
 either sub- There are two ways in which, on most or all 
 objective, cthical thcorics, the attempt may be made to dis- 
 tinguish 'good' from 'bad' conduct. We may 
 either look to a subjective principle as giving 
 the means of distinction, or we may test conduct 
 by its conformity with an objective standard. If 
 we like to make use of the terms self-preservation 
 and self-development, then these may refer either 
 to the subjective impulse which urges man to 
 preserve or develop his life, or to some objective 
 standard for estimating actions according as they 
 actually tend to prolong life or enrich it. Both 
 these possibilities are open to the theory of evolu- 
 tion. Although the subjective impulse is, of course, 
 a property of the individual, it may be the result 
 of the whole course of social development, and thus 
 take in others as well as self in the range of its
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 289 
 
 application. It is tlierefore necessary to examine 
 both methods of determination with some care, 
 especially as we are in no little danger of reaching 
 an illusory appearance of conclusiveness by allow- 
 ing the subjective standard to rest on the objective, 
 and the objective, in turn, on the subjective. 
 
 To begin with the subjective side. It may be («)8ubjpc- 
 
 . tive stand- 
 
 thought that we can point to some impulse, tend- arci : most 
 
 ency, motive, or class of motives in the individual hupuue"* 
 mind by following which the evolution of life will 
 be promoted, and that we are thus able to solve the 
 question of practical ethics, though our conception 
 of what the evolution of life connotes may still be 
 in want of exact definition. As already pointed 
 out. such an impulse (unless it depends on an 
 objective standard) must carry its own authority 
 with it by its strength or persistency. The case 
 would, of course, be perfectly simple, if we could 
 assert that the carrying out of all impulses in one's 
 nature was to be approved as tending to the de- 
 velopment of life. Could this assertion be made, 
 there might be no difficulty in ethics, or rather, 
 there might be no ethics at all, because there 
 would be no difficulty in conduct. It is obvious, 
 however, that the development of one natural 
 tendency often conflicts with that of another in 
 the same individual, as well as with the tendencies 
 of other individuals. The course of evolution has 
 no doubt tended to modify, though it has not rooted 
 
 T
 
 290 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 out, the impulses which are most prejudicial to 
 individual and social welfare. But the increase 
 of wants as well as satisfactions which it has 
 brought about in human nature makes it doubtful 
 whether it has on the whole tended to diminish 
 the conflict of motives. 
 implies dis- Again, when it is said that a man should "be 
 
 tinction be- , . , . , ,..,., , ,, , 
 
 tween per- himselt, Or that this IS his strongest tendency, '■ 
 transient"'^ tlicrc is an implicit reference to a distinction between 
 *®^^' a permanent and a transient, or a better and a 
 
 worse, self ; and it seems to be imagined that this 
 distinction can be reduced to difference in degrees 
 of strength. But evolution has not enabled us to 
 obviate Butler's objection to taking the ' strongest 
 tendency ' — meaning by this the tendency which 
 is any time strongest — as representing ' nature.' 
 For it is an undeniable fact that the tendency 
 which for a time is the strongest — it may even be 
 that which is strongest throughout an individual life 
 — frequently leads to a diminution of vital power 
 on the part of the agent, as well as to interference 
 with the free exercise of the vital powers of others. 
 Some advantage is gained, perhaps, by substituting 
 for ' strongest ' the nearly equivalent phrase ' most 
 persistent' tendency. All those impulses which 
 have in the past served to promote life have been 
 chosen out and stored up as a sort of permanent basis 
 for the human fabric ; whereas other impulses, not so 
 
 ^ Cf. E. Simcox, Natural Law, p. 97.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 291 
 
 advantageous in their eliects, have a less permanent 
 influence, though they are not less real. The more 
 regular or persistent class of impulses may, there- 
 fore (the idea is), be taken as representing the 
 course of the evolution by which they have been 
 produced. 
 
 To a large extent this distinction of two classes but includes 
 
 . ,. , rni J ^ non-moral 
 
 of impulses is justined. Ihere seems no doubt impulses in 
 that the social, and what are usually termed moral, ^^'^ '^°""®^' 
 feelings have a tendency to return into consciousness 
 after any temporary depression or exclusion, which 
 is not shared by some of the feelings with which 
 they most commonly conflict. Other impulses, how- 
 ever, not usually classed as moral, share this char- 
 acteristic of persistency or recurrence. " The wish 
 for another man's property," says Darwin, " is as 
 persistent a desire as any that can be named." The 
 selfish feelings have obviously this persistent char- 
 acter. But an evolutionist may perhaps maintain 
 that it is one of the defects of ordinary moral opinion 
 that it depreciates the necessity and value for life 
 of the selfish feelings, just because they are so strong 
 as to stand in need of no encouragement. And it is 
 not necessary that the evolutionist morality should 
 agree at all points with ordinary moral opinion or 
 moral intuition. It recognises, or ought to recog- 
 nise, the agency of immoral as well as moral forces, 
 admitting that it is by the action of both of these 
 that man as he is at present has been produced,
 
 292 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 although the principle of the survival of the fittest 
 has tended, though by no means uniformly, towards 
 the elimination of the immoral factor. We may 
 admit, therefore, that there is a pressure on the will 
 of the average individual towards certain kinds of 
 conduct rather than others, or, put more precisely, 
 that while all acts are performed in consequence of 
 pressure on the will, the pressure towards certain 
 kinds of acts is a permanent force which, although 
 overcome for the time, always tends to reassert 
 itself, while the tendency towards other acts incon- 
 sistent with these is more intermittent and variable, 
 and does not reassert itself in the same way. But 
 this subjective experience is so limited in accuracy 
 and extent as to be an unfit test of morality. 
 
 In the first place, selfish conduct is as necessary 
 for the preservation and development of man as 
 altruistic conduct, and must therefore have given 
 rise to an equally great and persistent pressure on 
 the will : so that the subjective criterion of persist- 
 ency leaves untouched what is often regarded as 
 the most difficult question of morals, the balance of 
 is restricted social and individual claims. In the second place, 
 habitr'or^ this subjective tendency is only a recurrence of 
 ^*'*™°' antecedent advantageous characteristics, and does 
 not lead us beyond the stahis quo, so that, if any 
 progress is to be made in the future, it will be 
 possible only through the pressure of new external 
 conditions : no function is left for any ethical idea
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 293 
 
 which points beyond past and present habits of 
 action. In the third phace, subjective tendency and caunot 
 only enables us to say generally that some acts or nature^of^ 
 tendencies are more persistent than others, without "'o™''ty- 
 giving any further description of what sort of acts 
 these are. Were these tendencies or impulses a 
 perfect guide to conduct, this defect would be of 
 little practical consequence. It would prevent our 
 having a definite ethical theory only in circum- 
 stances in which no ethical theory would be likely 
 to be asked for. But the line between the more 
 and less persistent motives is a vague and shifting 
 one. The impulses which are the residua of advan- 
 tageous ancestral actions are counteracted by other 
 impulses, residua of actions which would not be 
 counted as moral, though we inherit tendencies to 
 them because they formed a real part of our an- 
 cestral activity. If we are to get to any sort of 
 moral criterion, therefore, we stand in need of some 
 characteristic by which to distinguish the one class 
 of tendencies from the other. And as the only 
 subjective characteristic is that of strength or per- 
 sistency, and this has been found insufiicient, an 
 objective standard is shown to be necessary. 
 
 The impossibility of the subjective test doing Tims sub- 
 duty alone without support from some objective sto„dard 
 criterion, is practically acknowledged by the writer ^^!j^,"°j"^ 
 who has discussed this part of the subject with '^'^pe'^don 
 greater penetration than any other investigator on
 
 294 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 the same lines. "The average man," it is said, 
 "feels the pressure upon his own individual will 
 of all the unknown natural sequence of motive 
 which caused his ancestors to do on the whole 
 more often the right thing than the wrong "^ — 
 or, as we must read it without objective assump- 
 tion, " to do on the whole more often one class of 
 acts than another." The right must be held to 
 be simply that to which this "special feeling in 
 the subject is directed," and it therefore becomes 
 necessary " to discover what description of acts 
 inspire this feeling."^ Thus, with greater facility 
 than would be permitted to a critic, we are made 
 to pass from the subjective to the objective method 
 of determination. 
 (6) Objective The question. What is right ? is thus relin- 
 quished for the question, What is good ? Good 
 is said to be of three kinds — natural, sensible, 
 and moral. But as by sensible good is meant 
 pleasure,^ and pleasure is not the end, and as by 
 moral good is meant " the pursuit of natural good 
 under difficulties,"'* it follows that natural good 
 is the end we seek. We have thus to determine, 
 as exactly as may be, this objective standard called 
 natural good. It is interpreted in two ways, 
 which, however, may be " not necessarily inconsist- 
 ent " : (a) " the perfection of the type as it is," and 
 
 ^ Simcox, Natural Law, p. 86. ^ Ibid., p. 87. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 90. Mbid.,p. 99.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 295 
 
 (yS) " the absolute abundance and variety of vital 
 power." ^ 
 
 This phrase, ' the perfection of the type as it («) confor- 
 
 • J • 1 IT -iTTi 1 p itiity to the 
 
 IS, is somewhat misleading. When 'the perfec- typ^. 
 tion of the type ' is said to be the end, we natur- 
 ally regard the type as something that needs to 
 be brought to perfection, and ex hyi^othcsi is not 
 perfect at present, or ' as it is.' But if ' the per- 
 fection of the type as it is' is the standard, this 
 implies, unless the standard itself is faulty, that 
 the type is already perfect, and, therefore, that the 
 perfection spoken of is the characteristic of a thing 
 which conforms to the type, and not something to 
 which the type has to conform. This interpreta- 
 tion is confirmed by the fact that imperfection is 
 defined as "only departed from the class type."^ 
 Plainly, then, the objective standard meant is 
 conformity to the type. What, then, is the type ? 
 Concerning things made by art the answer is easy. 
 The type, as Stephen puts it, represents the The type 
 "maximum oi einciency, ^ or, as we may say, is what best 
 that which most fully realises the purpose for pu^^osl,* 
 which the thing was formed. The best bow is 
 that which shoots truest and farthest with a 
 relatively small expenditure of strength by the 
 archer; that which best realises the purpose of a 
 bow is the typical bow. A similar explanation 
 
 ' Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104. '^ Ibid., p. 87. 
 
 ^ Science of Ethics, p. 76.
 
 296 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 of types may be given regarding animals modified 
 by artificial selection. The typical pointer or 
 hunter can be defined from this teleological point 
 of view ; and, as long as people lived in the belief 
 that all things were made for man, it was natural 
 to fix the type of each class by reference to the 
 human purpose it could best subserve. So also, 
 as long as people think that, whether all things 
 were made for man or not, all things may be 
 made use of by him, there will be a tendency 
 towards the same anthropomorphic interpretation 
 of types. If, then, the typical products of art, 
 and, to a large extent, the typical products of na- 
 ture, are those which best serve human purposes, 
 or best correspond with human ideals, how shall 
 we define the typical man himself — the type 
 which it is our perfection to conform to? "Every 
 reasoning agent," it may perhaps be allowed,^ " rep- 
 resents a certain type " ; but the type can no longer 
 be defined merely as "maximum of efficiency," 
 for it is the end or purpose of this efficiency 
 which now requires determination. In defining 
 the typical man, we must have no idea of final 
 cause or purpose which is not rooted in the 
 nature of his organism. 
 
 How, then, shall we now determine the type in 
 conformity to which perfection consists ? ^ 
 
 ^ Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 74. 
 
 - Even were we to succeed in getting a satisfactory view of the
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 297 
 
 The first answer to this seems to be, that the was the 
 type is what is normal, — "what we have learned 
 to regard as the normal development of objects 
 belonging to " the class.- But the normal may 
 have either of two meanings. It may, in the first 
 place, mean the usual or customary. This, how- 
 ever, would make the typical man mean the ordi- 
 nary or average man ; and the ideal of conformity 
 to the type would be reduced to doing the cus- 
 tomary thing, and not trying to be better than 
 one's neighbours. But it is evident that this sta- 
 tionary morality does not represent properly what 
 is fundamental in the theory of evolution : " what- 
 ever other duties men may acknowledge, they do 
 not look upon it as a duty to preserve the species 
 in statu qiio."^ If natural science teaches one 
 thing more clearly than another, it is that the type, 
 like the individual, is not permanent, but the sub- 
 ject of gradual modifications. If the type is what 
 is normal, we must mean by ' normal ' something 
 else than customary. But the only other meaning or as what 
 of the word seems to imply a reference to a rule est vitality 
 — either a rule imposed from without, or an inner veiopment, 
 constitution or order. If the former alternative is ^^^^ '^' 
 adopted, then we may use another definition given 
 
 type, we should still have to leave room for the individuality of 
 each persou, which is such that his function must differ in a 
 manner corresponding to his peculiar nature and surroundings 
 (cf. Lotze, Grundziige der praktischen Phil., p. 13 f.) 
 2 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 88. ^ jbid., p. 100.
 
 298 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 by Stephen, and say that "the typical organism 
 is . . . that organism which is best fitted for all 
 the conditions of life, or, in other words, which 
 has the strongest vitality." ^ In this way we have 
 to fall back either on the notion of ' adaptation to 
 environment,' or on that of ' strongest vitality ' — 
 the notion we are seeking to interpret. If we adopt 
 the other meaning which the reference to a rule 
 may convey, then we are met by the fact that the 
 inner order or constitution which is to be our guide, 
 can (from our present empirical point of \'iew) mean 
 nothing different from the line of development. 
 And as we have already seen that it is unsatis- 
 factory to interpret this as equivalent to adapta- 
 tion to environment, or to increase of definiteness, 
 coherence, and heterogeneity, this principle of con- 
 formity to the type is reduced to the general 
 principle which we have been attempting to define 
 more exactly — increase of life.^ 
 
 1 Science of Ethics, p. 120. 
 
 2 A view similar to the above has been put forward again in the 
 article " Ethics " contributed to the tenth edition of the Encyclo- 
 pfodia Britannica (vol. xxviii.) by Professor J. A. Stewart. 
 According to his statement the Type is " the end m relation to 
 which all objects of human endeavour have ' reality ' and 'value,' 
 and are, and ought to be, desu-ed " (p. 300). The Type is thus 
 said to be the measure both of the 'reality' of all objects of 
 human endeavour, that is, of the degree in which they are 
 desired, and of their ' value,' or the degi-ee m which they ought 
 to be desired. But as long as these two things are not dis- 
 tinguished, the ethical problem is only obscured. It is only 
 because the things that are desired are not always things that
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 299 
 
 Thus the first determination of natural good (^)Abund- 
 
 n • p , ,, . 1 anceand 
 
 as "perfection or the type is seen to reduce varuty of 
 itself to the second, "absolute abundance and ^' ** ^*^'^' 
 
 ought to be desired — because all that is ' real ' does not also 
 possess ' value ' — that the ethical question arises at all. And yet 
 it is difficult to grasp this distinction in Professor Stewart's ex- 
 position either of what he calls the Particular Theory of Conduct 
 or of his General Theoiy of Conduct. The former (he says) has 
 to do with the conduct which "seems to be practical in an 
 eminent sense — moial conduct, which may be defined as conduct 
 willed by members of the social system for the sake of that 
 system." Strictly interpreted this distinguishes the conduct in 
 question not merely from non-moral conduct, or conduct un- 
 related to the social system, but also from immoral, in the sense 
 of contra-social, conduct. But it is doubtful whether this is the 
 meaning intended by the author. If it is not, nothing is said 
 lelevaut to the distinction sought. If it is, the theory is intellig- 
 ible enough, the social system being taken as the standard of 
 moral value. But this standard does not allow for the progressive 
 improvement of the social system itself ; and perhaps the theoiy 
 also overlooks the fact that societj' is simply an organisation of in- 
 dividuals, and that social activities, or individual activities com- 
 bined, are as much in need of a standard as individual activities 
 in isolation. The General Theory of Conduct has a wider outlook : 
 " from ' man in the state ' our range of view must be extended 
 till we can survey ' man in the cosmos ' " (p. 301 a). This may be 
 dealt with in either of two ways. The positive method will give 
 a history and description of man ; the other method " will call 
 attention to the significance of his being what he now is." The 
 latter method is non-evolutionist and need not concern us liere, 
 especially as Professor Stewart regards it as merely imaginative. 
 The positive way is restricted to ' some particular civilisation ' ; 
 further (although this is not said), it should describe that civilisa- 
 tion as it was or is. And the contribution of the theory of 
 evolution is to remind the moralist that "the type is not final, 
 and, at the same time, that the relations involved are so com- 
 plicated that calculation of what it will become even in the 
 comparatively near future is not to be attempted " (p. 301 b).
 
 300 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 variety of vital power." For the additional state- 
 ment, which makes the highest excellence consist 
 in "conformity to the type as it is going to be, 
 but as, except in a few chosen specimens, it is 
 not yet discernible to be," ^ is unsatisfactory. For 
 to those ' few chosen specimens ' the end would 
 seem to be simply to remain as they are — a con- 
 clusion which is hardly consistent for a writer 
 who regards morality as a continual progress to- 
 wards a higher life, a process of ' climbing.' ^ 
 And, for the generality of men, there must be 
 some standard for determining what is 'going to 
 
 Consequent!}-, ' ends ' or ' ideals ' are to be avoided: "the com- 
 plexity and mobility of the relations between organism and en- 
 vironment, as understood by Darwinism, are such as to preclude 
 entirely the idea of 'final correspondence'" (p. 305 b). The 
 ethical question remains, What is the standard for conduct now ? 
 How are we to define the Type which gives ' value,' as well as 
 'reality,' to all objects of human endeavour? The "achieved 
 result," as "developed 'up to date,'" is spoken of as this Type 
 (p. 306 a). But this "achieved result," with its mixture of good 
 and evil in impulse, character, and attainment, is just the moralist's 
 problem, not its solution. Professor Stewart seems to feel the 
 difficulty; for he says that the Type "expresses itself in the 
 successive ideals of slight betterment by which the moral life is 
 maintained and transformed." But an ideal is always an ideal, 
 even though it maybe a very little one; and "man's Type, as 
 developed ' up to date,'" so far as we have material for describing 
 it, contains the "achieved results" of evil as well as good in 
 ancestral conduct, and the tendencies which these have left 
 behind them. What is wanted, and what is not given, is a 
 criterion for distinguishing amongst these between the good and 
 the evil. This is the criticism which I have urged against the 
 "Darwinian moralists." 
 1 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104. ^ Ibid., p. 103.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 301 
 
 be,' and for certifying that the ' few chosen speci- 
 mens ' have realised this state in its perfect form. 
 Thus "conformity to the type as it is going to be," 
 equally with " perfection of [conformity to] the 
 type as it is," seems to be but another way of 
 saying " abundance and variety of vital power," or, 
 more fully stated, "the possession of abundant 
 faculties, active and passive, fully developed, and 
 in regular and equal exercise."^ The question 
 thus comes to be how we are to determine this 
 'abundance of faculties.' We cannot do so by 
 reference to such characteristics as increase in the 
 number and complexity of these faculties; for a 
 criterion of this kind, as we have seen, is of no 
 assistance in deciding the most fundamental ethical 
 questions. To say that these faculties must be 
 * regular and equal ' in their exercise, is to give 
 a merely formal canon. For how the equality 
 and regularity are to be brought about, — which 
 faculties are to be supreme and which subordin- 
 ate — what meaning equality can have in view of 
 the admitted diversity in a man's nature, — are 
 questions left altogether undetermined. And to 
 describe the ideal or perfect universe as one in 
 which there is no conflict or collision,^ is to give 
 a description which is negative as well as merely 
 
 ^ Simcox, Natural Law, p. 89. 
 
 - " Of real tendencies " — Natural Law, p. 98. But what 
 tendencies are not real ?
 
 302 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 which falls 
 back on the 
 subjective 
 standard. 
 
 Strongest 
 tendencies 
 the result 
 of past 
 activities, 
 
 formal, and which is void of application to actual 
 conditions. We are thus obliged to fall back on 
 a subjective criterion, and say that the abundant 
 life which it is the end of conduct to promote 
 is a man's strongest tendencies, or the greatest 
 number of these. Natural good is determined by 
 " preferring out of all the rudimentary possibilities 
 existing in nature, the combination that harmon- 
 ises the greatest number of the strongest tenden- 
 cies." ^ We set out, be it remembered, to obtain a 
 characterisation of those acts to which the most 
 persistent tendencies of human nature lead us ; 
 and the conclusion we have arrived at is, that they 
 are the acts which harmonise the greatest number 
 of the strongest tendencies. The objective stand- 
 ard is thus reduced to the subjective standard, 
 which it was brought in to explain and support. 
 
 Now these strongest tendencies, in the harmoni- 
 ous play of which natural good or perfection is said 
 to consist, are themselves the result of the courses 
 of conduct which have been most vigorous and suc- 
 cessful in ancestral organisms, and they may there- 
 fore, perhaps, be taken as a survival and index of 
 the antecedent state of human nature. So far as 
 the theory of evolution is able to reach any ideal 
 for conduct, that ideal would seem to be simply 
 the realisation — or, rather, continuation — of human 
 nature as it has been and is, — with this formal 
 
 ^ Natural Law, p. 98.
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 303 
 
 modification, that, while the various impulses are, 
 .80 far as possible, to have free play given them, 
 they should be developed in a harmonious manner. 
 It seems doubtful, however, how far this tendency 
 towards harmony is properly suggested by, or con- 
 sistent with, evolution, which has implied a cease- 
 less struggle of opposing forces. At any rate, 
 evolution does not seem competent to give any 
 sufficient principle of relative subordination be- 
 tween the various impulses, such as might add 
 reality to the formal principle of harmony. But 
 what it is essential to lay stress on here is, that 
 the only ideal which empirical evolution tends to 
 set up is conformity to human nature as it is, or to 
 the tendencies in it which are strongest and most 
 persistent. 
 
 We thus see that the attempt to explain on 
 empirical grounds what is meant by positing ' life,' 
 or ' increase and variety of life,' as the ideal or the 
 standard for action, is practically reduced to mak- 
 ing the most persistent impulses of human nature 
 the guide of conduct. But these impulses, it has 
 been shown, are only the survival or remnant of 
 past stages in the course of development, not 
 anticipations of future stages : so that evolution and thus 
 is in this way incapable of providing an ideal of forprogress. 
 progress as the end for conduct, and the last word 
 it seems able to give us as a guide for action is 
 that we should tread in the places where the foot-
 
 304 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 prints of ancestral conduct have left the deepest 
 impress. The ideal of such a system is summed 
 up in a new Beatitude, " Blessed is he that con- 
 tinueth where he is." It is probably just because 
 the empirical aspect of evolution seems so little 
 able to yield an end for human conduct corre- 
 sponding to the actual course of evolution — which 
 has been progress — that the attempts made to 
 develop a system of morals from the principle 
 just reached are so unsatisfactory. It is true that 
 systems have been worked out by moralists who 
 have taken human nature as their standard, and 
 that Trendelenburg, at any rate, expressly in- 
 cludes historical development in his conception of 
 man. But both Trendelenburg and a moralist 
 like Butler (who has as yet no conception of the 
 gradual modifications of human character and ten- 
 dencies produced by evolution) have a view of 
 human nature essentially distinct from that which 
 has been called the ' naturalistic ' view.'- For both 
 assume a definite rational organisation of impulses 
 similar to that taught in Plato's analogy between 
 the individual man and a political constitution, 
 so that the whole nature, or human nature as 
 
 ^ Cf. Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, p. 45 : " Von der philoso- 
 phischeu Seite kann es kein anderes Princip der Ethik geben als 
 das menschliche Wesen an sich, d. h., das menschliche Wesen in 
 der Tiefe seiner Idee und im Keichthum seiner historischen 
 Entwickelung. Beides gehort zusammen. Deun das nui- His- 
 torische wiirde blind und das nur Ideale leer."
 
 and social 
 ends 
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 305 
 
 a whole, cannot be identified with the impulses 
 which strength at any time makes most persistent, 
 but depends upon the rational allotment of function 
 and measure to each. 
 
 In summing up the argument of the preceding summary, 
 chapters, it is necessary to refer again to the dis- 
 cussion carried on in chapter vii. on the relation 
 between egoism and altruism as affected by the 
 theory of evolution. This discussion was not in- Difficulty of 
 serted in order to throw an additional obstacle in individual 
 the way of obtaining an ethical standard from the 
 empirical theory of evolution. It is an integral 
 part of an attempt to estimate the ethical value 
 of the evolution-theory. The theory of evolution 
 certainly seems to go a long way towards establish- 
 ing the unity of the individual with the race, and 
 towards substituting an organic relation between 
 them, in place of the almost contingent reciprocal 
 relations spoken of in earlier empirical theories. 
 But, when we come to enquire into the nature of 
 this organic unity, attempting still to keep to the 
 purely empirical point of view, we find that the old 
 difficulties return, that it must be recognised that 
 the connexion is empirically incomplete, and that it 
 breaks down at the very places where a firm basis 
 for the theory of morals is required. It was in this 
 way that, quite apart from this opposition between 
 the individual and the whole, the empirical char- 
 
 u
 
 306 
 
 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Hedonistic 
 interpreta- 
 tion of evol- 
 ution not 
 possible. 
 
 acter of the theory prevented our getting from it 
 any clear and consistent notion of the ethical end 
 to which it leads. 
 
 It appeared at first that the ethics of evolution, 
 when interpreted empirically, might be easily recon- 
 ciled with the older theory of hedonism, by identi- 
 fying life with pleasure — holding that the highest 
 or most evolved life is that which contains most 
 pleasure, and that increase of pleasure may there- 
 fore be taken as the end of conduct. In this way 
 the end of evolutionism would be reduced to the 
 end of utilitarianism. Some utilitarians, on the 
 other hand, sought to get rid of the difficulties of 
 their calculus, by the assumption that the greatest 
 pleasure would be found by following the direction 
 of evolution. But, around both points of view, and 
 the correspondence they assumed to exist between 
 pleasure and evolution, special difficulties were seen 
 to gather. Any hedonistic theory might be met by 
 the assertion that life is essentially a painful expe- 
 rience, and pleasure unattainable ; and, although the 
 grounds on which this assertion was made seemed 
 to be distinctly erroneous, and hedonism did not 
 appear to be an impossible theory of conduct, yet 
 a similar objection told with greater force against 
 the combination of evolutionism and hedonism. 
 For it holds the double position that the end is to 
 promote life, and that life is to be promoted by 
 adding to pleasure ; or else, that the end is pleasure,
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 307 
 
 but that pleasure is to be got by following evolu- 
 tion. It postulates, therefore, that the progress of 
 life tends, and tends even in a proportionate degree, 
 to the increase of pleasure. Yet we could obtain 
 no proof that this progress does, as a matter of fact, 
 increase pleasure in any regular way. On the con- 
 trary, the facts of experience seemed to show that 
 life and pleasure do not advance proportionately, 
 nor even always concomitantly. But a still more 
 important and fundamental objection to the hedon- 
 istic form of evolutionism was inferred from the 
 nature of pleasure itself; for it can be modified 
 indefinitely, and always follows in the wake of 
 function. Thus the sole intelligible account we 
 can give of what conduct will bring the greatest 
 pleasure is, that it is the conduct which calls forth 
 the greatest amount of successful energising, that 
 which employs the greatest number and the strong- 
 est of the human faculties. Hence, instead of being 
 able to measure life by pleasure, we were driven to 
 interpret pleasure in terms of life. 
 
 At first sight it seemed as if the theory of evolu- xoinde- 
 tion might lead us beyond the pleasure-basis of etwcai i.ieai 
 older Naturalism. But, when the matter was ^^^ttieory 
 examined more closely, it was found that the of evolution, 
 notions put forward were unsatisfactory, that they 
 did not represent the progressive nature of the 
 course of evolution, and that their apparent force 
 fell away before logical analysis. It became evi-
 
 308 THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 dent, in the first place, that no appropriate standard 
 for human conduct could be derived from the 
 nature of evolution in general. It is true that 
 adaptation to environment is necessary for life ; 
 but to put forward such adaptation as the moral 
 standard, is to set up a practical goal which corre- 
 sponds but ill with the facts from which it professes 
 to be taken, making the theory which is supposed 
 to account for progress establish no end by pursuit 
 of which progress becomes possible for human 
 action. Further than this, it neglects a factor in 
 evolution as necessary to it as is adaptation to 
 environment — the element, namely, of variation. 
 A theory which took the latter as well as the former 
 of these factors into account seemed, in the next 
 place, to be given by those general characteristics 
 which are said to mark all progress — increase of 
 definiteness, coherence, and heterogeneity. But 
 from these, again, it was found impossible to elicit 
 a coherent and consistent rule for determining right 
 and wrong in conduct, or a definite end for action : 
 they were too abstract and mechanical to suit the 
 living organism of human conduct ; and we were 
 thus driven back on the more general statement 
 that ' life ' or the ' increase of life ' is the end after 
 which we should strive. In enquiring into the 
 meaning which could be given to this end, without 
 interpreting it as pleasure, it was found, after 
 tracing it through various forms of expression, that
 
 THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. 309 
 
 it reduced itself to making a man's strongest and 
 most persistent impulses both standard and end. 
 And this proved to be not only an uncertain and 
 shifting guide for conduct, but an imperfect repre- 
 sentation of what was to be expected from a pro- 
 gressive,' because evolutionist, theory. For these 
 persistent impulses could only be regarded as the 
 survival of past activities, and consequently, con- 
 tained no ideal beyond that of continuing in the 
 old paths, and re-treading an already well-beaten 
 course. Just as from the external end of adaptation 
 to environment, so from this internal or sulijective 
 principle, no ideal for progress, nor any definite 
 standard for action, could be obtained. 
 
 It would appear, therefore, that the theory of 
 evolution — however great its achievements in the 
 realm of^ natural science — is almost resultless in 
 ethics. It has started with a fundamental ethical 
 assumption, the grounds of which have not been 
 examined, and which has, indeed, been seldom 
 recognised; and as a consequence, in spite of the 
 light which it throws on many practical questions, 
 it has been found unable either to set up a compre- 
 hensive ideal for life, or to yield any principle for 
 distinguishing between good and evil in conduct.
 
 310 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 1, Summary The preceding chapters have passed in review 
 
 tion^or"^' the various ways in which ethical results may 
 
 etwcr"'° seem to follow from the theory of evolution. 
 
 The enquiry has been complicated — to a large 
 
 extent, it has been caused — by a double ambiguity. 
 
 There are two quite different sets of questions to 
 
 which the name ' ethical ' is commonly applied : 
 
 and ' evolution ' differs in nature according to the 
 
 factors which it involves. A reference once more 
 
 to these points may serve the purpose of gathering 
 
 together the main lines of argument and enforcing 
 
 the conclusion arrived at. 
 
 Two dis- The enquiries commonly described as ' ethical ' 
 
 of'etwc'ai'^ comprise two kinds of question, which differ funda- 
 
 enquiry: mentally from one another in scope, and require 
 
 the employment of distinct methods for their 
 
 solution. On the one hand there are the facts 
 
 of human conduct, the customs and institutions 
 
 to which it gives rise, and the sentiments and 
 
 ideas by which it is accompanied. All these are
 
 CONCLUSION. 311 
 
 facts in time whose genesis and history may 
 be investigated by appropriate historical methods. 
 On the other hand, there is a question of different 
 scope which no amount of history can solve. This 
 is the question of the value or worth of conduct 
 and the truth of the judgments which men pass 
 upon it. The question is no longer how the action 
 came to be performed or the judgments passed 
 upon it arose, but whether the action was right, and 
 whether our moral judgments are true judgments. 
 
 The former class of questions, it is clear, are con- (") The evoi- 
 cerned with matters of fact and history. Their moral ideas 
 investigation, it has also been allowed, must be tiots!'"^'*"' 
 guided by the conception of evolution. But, 
 even here, an important distinction is often over- 
 looked. Evolution is a somewhat vague conception. 
 It may mean nothing more than an assertion of Evolution 
 historical continuity ; and, in this sense, it is true pre'^sion for 
 that moral conduct institutions and ideas have ^"■'t°"<^t'^ 
 
 contmuitj'. 
 
 been evolved. But the term may also have the 
 more defined meaning which owes its prominence 
 in contemporary thought to Darwin's researches 
 into organic development. In this meaning of Evolution 
 the terra evolution is defined by its method : it selection! 
 works by natural selection, that is, by the death of 
 those organisms which are unable to maintain them- 
 selves in the struggle for life. It postulates individ- 
 ual variety such that one organism is more efficient 
 than another in the struggle, and an environment
 
 312 CONCLUSION. 
 
 SO constituted as to be incapable of supporting all 
 
 the individual organisms which are produced. 
 
 Limits to In this definite meaning of the term, evolution 
 
 bi'uty^of"^^' ^0®^ ^o^ ^^^ cannot apply to more than a portion 
 
 natural gf ^]^q wliolc realm of fact and history. The con- 
 
 selection. "^ 
 
 ditions which it implies are clearly absent in the 
 region of the inorganic. The whole course of cosmic 
 evolution is outside the influence of ' evolution ' 
 in the Darwinian sense of the term, until we reach 
 the comparatively recent and comparatively re- 
 stricted domain of life. Natural selection is not 
 the only method of evolution : it could not operate 
 until late in the world's history ; it can never effect 
 more than a small portion of the facts in the 
 ceaseless process of existence. 
 
 The question thus suggests itself, Whether the 
 special method of evolution, which operates and 
 can operate only at a certain stage of evolution, 
 may not have a further as well as an earlier limit. 
 When once this question is fairly put, the answer 
 to it hardly seems doubtful. It is difficult to trace 
 the first emergence of natural selection in the cosmic 
 process ; but natural selection is nevertheless a force 
 qualitatively distinct from anything that can in- 
 fluence merely inorganic development. It is almost 
 equally difficult to identify the first appearances of 
 intelligent volition ; and yet it is a new factor in 
 development qualitatively distinct from natural 
 selection. Foresight is an essential characteristic
 
 CONCLUSION. 3 1 3 
 
 of intelligent volition ; and foresight is absent 
 from natural selection. Human activity involves 
 an ideal factor of which there are only anticipa- 
 tions in animal activity. 
 
 The prominence of biological study in contem- 
 porary thought, and the far-reaching importance of 
 its results, especially the discovery and formulation 
 of the principle of natural selection, have tended 
 to the exafr^eration of the effects of that force and 
 to the neglect of other factors in human develop- 
 ment. Yet these other factors may claim to be of 
 greater importance than natural selection in deter- 
 mining the conduct and social institutions of man. 
 
 The ' struggle for existence,' which was suiigested Different 
 to Darwin by Malthus's work, and which he had ^"apetmon 
 mainly — although not entirely — in view, was a *^° Jg3° 
 struggle between individuals for food and mates, me'^t: 
 
 '&o' 
 
 But, especially in the higher stages of life, the com- 
 petitions carried on are not merely between individ- 
 uals and not merely for means of livelihood. There 
 is, as Darwin saw, a conflict between groups as well 
 as a conflict between individuals ; and there is also 
 what has been called a conflict between ideas as 
 well as a conflict between groups. 
 
 A brief consideration of this last form of com- (a) the con- 
 petition may serve to illustrate the argument.^ ^eas; 
 
 ^ The following passages marked as quotatious are taken (with 
 slight modifications) from the author's 'Recent Tendencies in 
 Ethics ' (1904), pp. 54 fE,
 
 314 CONCLUSION. 
 
 " The various institutions in our national life may 
 be said to be forms which have to maintain 
 themselves, often in competition with other 
 and antagonistic forms of institution. The same 
 holds of our various ideas or general conceptions, 
 whether about morality or about matters more 
 purely intellectual. For instance, forty or fifty 
 years ago, there was a jBerce controversy amongst 
 biologists between the group of ideas represented 
 by Darwin's theory and the group of ideas rep- 
 resented by the traditional view of the fixity of 
 species ; and from this conflict the Darwinian 
 group of ideas has emerged victorious. Now, 
 when the phrase ' natural selection in morals ' is 
 used, the reference is commonly to a conflict of 
 this kind. The suggestion is that different ideas 
 and also different standards of action are mani- 
 fested at the same time in the same community, 
 that they compete with one another for existence, 
 and that those which are better adapted to the life 
 of the community survive, while the others grow 
 weaker and in the end disappear. In this way 
 the law of natural selection is supposed to apply 
 to moral ideas and moral standards, and also to 
 intellectual standards, and to the institutions and 
 customs in which our ideas are expressed." 
 
 But in this supposition an analogy is confused 
 with an identity.^ The mode of operation involves 
 
 ^ See above, p. 165.
 
 CONCLUSION. 315 
 
 foresight and purpose in the one case and not in 
 the other. In the great majority of instances the 
 holding of false or inadequate conceptions does 
 not tend to weaken vitality in the way that 
 would be necessary to give natural selection a 
 chance of operating by cutting off the organisms 
 which are unfit to maintain themselves. " Intel- 
 ligent selection is not restricted to the negative 
 method by which alone natural selection works ; 
 and its operation, positive as well as negative, was 
 certainly well known long before Darwin's day. 
 Starting with the familiar facts of artificial or 
 purposive selection, Darwin showed how results 
 similar to those aimed at and reached in this way 
 might be brought about by the operation of certain 
 natural laws, working without purpose or design. 
 Purposive selection pursues its ends more directly 
 and in general attains them far more quickly than 
 does natural selection. A still more striking char- 
 acteristic is the fact that it does not entail the 
 waste and pain which mark the course of natural 
 selection. Witness the records of natural selec- 
 tion in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, where 
 thousands are called into fruitless being that a 
 few may survive and prosper. Wastefulness is 
 the most striking feature of its method, and its 
 path is strewn with wreckage. In all these re- 
 spects the confiict of ideas belongs to the level of 
 purposive and not to that of natural selection.
 
 316 CONCLUSION. 
 
 It involves consciousness of the end, which natural 
 selection never does ; it is comparatively rapid in 
 reaching its goal and comparatively direct in the 
 route it takes ; and the victory of an idea does not 
 take effect through any general extermination of 
 the individuals who cherish ideas ' unfit ' for sur- 
 vival. It is true that human development has 
 not ceased to be affected by natural selection ; but 
 that process is always clumsy and slow and waste- 
 ful ; and the purposive intelligent selection which 
 gradually supersedes it is one of the greatest 
 possible gains to living beings: its presence dis- 
 tinguishes men from animals ; its predominance 
 distinguishes civilised men from savages ; the 
 higher the stage of civilisation, the more marked 
 is the development of selective intelligence. And 
 in the conflict of ideas, whether moral or intellec- 
 tual, the issue is determined by a selection which 
 is predominately purposive, and only in the slight- 
 est degree natural." 
 (^) the con- To a large extent it is the same with the conflict 
 gi'oups; of groups. The social qualities of sympathy, order, 
 obedience, and the like, have not arisen by mere 
 haphazard, and have not been favoured by natural 
 selection alone. "All through civilised life, and 
 probably throughout a great part of savage life, 
 there is the keenest enquiry into and perception of 
 the qualities which will make for success. These 
 qualities are carefully selected and positively fos-
 
 CONCLUSION. 317 
 
 tered. Armies are drilled — the power of endurance 
 and the habit of discipline are cultivated — in order 
 that victory may be gained. Intelligent foresight, 
 not natural selection, is the agent at work. The 
 issue may resemble the result of natural selection, 
 for it leads to conflict and defeat of the unfit ; but 
 the conqueror is he who has foreseen the conditions 
 of the struggle, has deliberately equipped his forces 
 for the fight, and been the intelligent organiser of 
 victory. 
 
 "And in the case of competition between in- (v) the con- 
 dividuals, it IS clear that natural selection is very dhidnais. 
 far from being the only factor. A man is trained 
 or trains himself for a profession. It does not just 
 somehow happen that a number of people develop 
 certain varieties of occupation, and that natural 
 selection makes play with the result, cutting off 
 the unfit and leaving only those who are fairly 
 well adapted to their positions. One adapts one- 
 self carefully and of set purpose to the conditions 
 of one's life, instead of simply waiting for natural 
 selection to cut one off should one happen to be 
 unfit. 
 
 " Even among animals there are certain processes Beginnings 
 which cannot be brought under natural selection, ive selection 
 There are the first efiibrts, slight as they may be, Uf^^.'^'"''^ 
 towards learning by experience. There are also 
 all those facts which Darwin classes under sexual 
 selection, where there is a positive choosing, due no
 
 3 1 8 CONCLUSION. 
 
 doubt not to intelligent purpose but nevertheless 
 to subjective impulse. This marks the beginning 
 of the end of the reign of natural selection, because 
 in it to the purely objective or external factor there 
 is added an internal or subjective factor; along 
 with the process of cutting off unsuitable indi- 
 viduals among chance varieties there appears the 
 process of selecting that variety which pleases or 
 attracts." 
 
 It must be borne in mind that, in strictness, 
 ' natural selection ' is not selection at all : it is 
 only a negative, not a positive, process. The posi- 
 tive tendency comes from another source altogether, 
 from a tendency within the organism. On the 
 lower levels of life its chief manifestation is the 
 unexplained tendency to variation. In man the 
 force is reflective and rational : ends are anticipated 
 in idea and deliberately pursued ; and, in so far as 
 the activity is wisely directed, the negative process 
 of selection called ' natural ' is displaced by a 
 positive selection which is intelligent. The course 
 of human development is altogether misinterpreted 
 if we overlook either the operation of subjective 
 selection on the part of the individual who strives 
 to accomplish his end, or the organised operation of 
 the same force as it is exhibited in social selection. 
 To the latter natural selection bears some analogy 
 in the results it produces ; but they are fundament- 
 ally distinct in their nature and mode of working.
 
 CONCLUSION. 319 
 
 Evolution works in many ways, and natural influence of 
 
 1 . . . 1 . „ ideas on 
 
 selection is neither its first nor its final method, moral devei- 
 So far, therefore, as we are concerned with the "p™^"** 
 questions of fact and history commonly classed as 
 ethical — that is to say, with the nature and growth 
 of moral institutions and moral ideas — the assertion 
 of moral development does not imply that the pro- 
 cess of evolution has been determined by the same 
 method as that which rules in biology, any more 
 than it implies that it has been determined by the 
 same method as that which rules astronomical or 
 cosmical changes. The course of moral develop- 
 ment may begin at a period when natural selection 
 is in the ascendant, but it rises out of it to a higher 
 stage in which the influence of natural selection 
 wanes and reason dominates the process. The facts 
 of the moral life — whether they are of the nature 
 of social institution or whether they belong to the 
 inner world of ideas — cannot be explained by 
 natural selection alone. To understand them we 
 must recognise the obvious facts of foresight and 
 purpose. Their evolution is not entirely nor even 
 mainly naturalistic: it involves a spiritual factor 
 which is manifested clearly in the history of man, 
 and which is as distinct from natural selection as 
 natural selection is distinct from tlie mechanical 
 causes to which inorganic changes are referred. 
 The method of evolution begins with mechanism, 
 is changed when life appears, and changed again
 
 320 CONCLUSION. 
 
 when life becomes self-conscious and can look 
 before and after. At each of these stages the 
 appearance of a new factor can be observed, and 
 this new factor affects the result and modifies the 
 method of the process. It is characteristic of 
 naturalism to attempt an interpretation of the 
 whole process in terms of those factors only which 
 appear at the earlier stages. The theory has the 
 advantage of simplicity; but the simplicity is gained 
 at the expense of the facts. 
 
 (&)The So far the argument has been concerned only 
 
 strictly • i i i i c i • • • 
 
 ethical qiips- With the development of moral institutions and 
 
 ofThemean- iclcas as facts whicli enter into human life. The 
 
 question has been purely one of history and fact. 
 
 standard of ^ r j j 
 
 ing and 
 standard 
 
 joodness : But another question remains of deeper ethical im- 
 port. Even if natural selection could do everything 
 ever claimed for it in the former regard, it would 
 still only exhibit an historical process, showing how 
 moral feelings, ideas, and customs have assumed 
 their present form. But that is not the question 
 before us when we ask how good is distinguished 
 from evil, or what the worth of things or conduct 
 is, or how the ideal of life or ethical end is to be 
 conceived. The question thus expressed in different 
 the facts of forms implies a new point of view, and no amount 
 irrelevant of history Can answcr it. It is an irrelevant answer 
 Sthir'"^'" to the question 'What is good?' when we are 
 question, given a mere record of men's ideas about what is
 
 fu.sed in 
 evolutionist 
 ethics : 
 
 CONCLUSION. 321 
 
 good and of the way in which these opinions arose. 
 We ask about the validity of moral judgments, and 
 are put off by speculations concerning their history. 
 The strictly ethical question is thus ignored. 
 
 Yet it is not too much to say that evolutionist xheprob. 
 
 , . ..... , . . leriis of his- 
 
 ethics owes its simplicity and attractiveness to its toiy and 
 evasion of the fundamental problem or to its con- ^"' '^^'^°^' 
 fusion of that problem with a question of history. 
 It constantly tends to make an account of the way 
 in which things have come to pass do duty for an 
 answer to the question, What is good ? Were its 
 history as sound as we have seen it to be doubtful 
 and arbitrary, it would not really touch the ques- 
 tion at issue. Attention has already been drawn 
 to this distinction, the neglect of which has made 
 possible the implied assumption of evolutionist 
 ethics.^ But it may be well to refer to it once 
 more, lest it should be obscured by the details of 
 the criticism worked out in the preceding chapters. 
 
 A description of the facts and laws of develop- 
 ment, however complete, could never of itself yield 
 any ethical precept. However fully he understood 
 the course of things, a man might be without the 
 knowledge of good and evil required to direct his 
 action, and the evolutionist would be unable to 
 give him a reason why he should adopt as maxims 
 of conduct the laws seen to operate in nature. 
 
 The idea which ascribes moral guidance to the 
 
 1 See above, pp. 142 f., Ui> f., 185, 244, 283. 
 X
 
 322 CONCLUSION. 
 
 laws of nature may result from a view of nature 
 as having a fundamental ethical or spiritual import, 
 perhaps in virtue of its divine origin. But this 
 way of looking at things cannot be reconciled with 
 Naturalism. And, in the minds of the naturalists, 
 the idea is more likely to be the result of a con- 
 fusion due to the different meanings of the concept 
 twodifferent ' end.' It would scem to be thought that, in point- 
 < end • ; ° ing out the drift or tendency of things, we are, at 
 the same time, prescribing the end towards which 
 human endeavour ought to be directed. Now, it 
 is very difficult to say how far tendencies of this 
 kind can be anticipated. The circumstances which 
 condition historical events are so complicated that 
 it is by no means easy to predict the result of 
 their combination. It has been urged, indeed, by 
 Schaffie^ that we are at least able to see as far as 
 the next stage of historical progress ; and this is 
 thought to lead to the conclusion that we should 
 make this stage of development our end : further 
 than it we cannot see, and therefore need not pro- 
 vide. According to this view, if without an ulti- 
 mate end for conduct, we should yet have a proxi- 
 mate end. Instead of saying that we should take 
 no thought for the morrow, the contention would 
 seem to be that we should live for to-morrow but 
 take no thought for the day after. 
 
 But here the change in point of view is scarcely 
 
 ^ Bau unci Leben cT-iS socialen Korperc-, ii. 68.
 
 CONCLUSION. 323 
 
 concealed. From the discussion of efficient causes 
 we proceed directly to prescribe an end for con- 
 duct. We have shown (let it be granted) that the 
 forces now in operation will modify the present 
 state of affairs in a certain known manner. To-day 
 we are in state A ; to-morrow we shall be in, or 
 well on the way towards, state Ab ; therefore, runs 
 the conclusion, implied or expressed, we ought to 
 make Ab our end. Here we have, at its plainest, 
 the fallacy due to the confusion of two different 
 meanings of ' end.' The tendency or ' end ' of evolu- 
 tion, as it was gathered or inferred from the facts, 
 was not, in the first instance, credited with any 
 ethical import; and yet it is made to convey a 
 moral obligation. 
 
 Nor is this the only confusion in what seems to evolution 
 be the fundamental thought of evolutionist ethics, human voi- 
 Conclusion and premiss hang loosely together, if evouittonas 
 they are not altogether inconsistent. For, if Ab is "■ ^^■'^°'^- 
 really the next stage of development, our making 
 it our end can neither help nor hinder its realisa- 
 tion. If, on the other hand, there is really a mean- 
 ing in our making the world-end our own, then we 
 cannot say with confidence that it is the next stage 
 in the course of events, since its realisation is not 
 merely in the future, but is also dependent upon 
 our volition. Two things are constantly confused 
 in discussions of this kind : the course of evolution 
 as it would be apart from my volition and that of
 
 324 CONCLUSION. 
 
 other men ; and the course of evolution as a whole, 
 inclusive of the effects of human volition. If the 
 latter is referred to when it is said that we should 
 make the tendency of evolution our conscious end, 
 the statement is without importance ; for how could 
 we act otherwise than in the way in which it has 
 been foreseen that we will act? If the former 
 meaning of the course of evolution is intended, 
 the assertion is unreasonable, for why should we 
 simply do that which would happen without our 
 action ? 
 
 In intelligent action (and all moral action in- 
 volves intelligence) the idea does not work itself 
 out in the same way as an efficient cause works in 
 the processes of nature. The idea as a mental fact 
 is a force which tends both to persist in conscious- 
 ness and to realise itself through the motor energies. 
 The idea or consciousness of an end is thus a motive 
 to action. The final cause becomes also an efficient 
 cause. But the two notions are not convertible. 
 The idea of an end, being conceived by reason, 
 cannot be described simply as a tendency become 
 conscious. It has passed into the region in which 
 various conceptions are, or may be, competing with 
 one another ; and the result depends upon volun- 
 tary decision. However the laws of this voluntary 
 decision may be expressed, they cannot be identi- 
 fied with the natural sequence of events as it may 
 be conceived to exist independently of the indi-
 
 CONCLUSION. 325 
 
 vidual consciousness. What seems the tendency 
 of things may be altered or modified upon some 
 ground of preference by the conscious subject. 
 
 The difficulties involved in its preliminary as- Tendency of 
 
 , , , . 1 • 1 evolutionist 
 
 sumption may perhaps have somethmg to do with ethics to 
 the constant tendency of evolutionist ethics to heYonis^. 
 revert to hedonism. Enough has already been 
 said of the impossibility of showing that evolution 
 constantly tends to increased pleasure. It may 
 be thought, however, that, if neither optimism 
 nor pessimism can be established, the modified 
 doctrine of what is called Meliorism may be ac- 
 cepted. And this theory — according to which the 
 world is improving, and the balance of pleasure 
 over pain is on the increase — might seem to form 
 a convenient refuge. For it may appear to follow 
 from it that, if the next stage in the world-pro- 
 cess — that towards which evolution is tending — is 
 known, then we should make it our end to ac- 
 celerate this stage, as it will bring with it a better 
 state of affairs than the present. But not even 
 the most enthusiastic meliorist has ever tried to 
 show anything more than that his doctrine holds 
 true in general, and that, although there are many 
 receding waves, the tide of human happiness is 
 rising. Unfortunately we cannot tell how great 
 these receding waves may be ; we cannot always 
 be sure when they surround us : we may be swim- 
 ming with them when it would be better for human
 
 326 CONCLUSION. 
 
 happiness if we battled against them. In judging 
 of any special and temporary movement of events 
 (and it is not pretended that our foresight can 
 extend far into the future) we cannot assume that 
 the second stage will be better than the first, or 
 that voluntary modification of it — should that be 
 possible — might not improve both the immediate 
 result and its later consequences. Much the 
 same must be said if we attempt to interpret 
 evolution by falling back on the conception of 
 ' efficiency ' or ' strength,' instead of on that of 
 pleasure. We cannot be sure that the forces 
 strongest at any given period and place are the 
 forces destined ultimately to prevail ; and we may 
 find ourselves co-operating with tendencies which 
 a larger view would have taught us to resist. 
 The strictly The further we go in examining any naturalistic 
 
 ethical c i • i i 
 
 question thcory of cthics, the clearer does it become that it 
 by eTo^i^- ^^^ make no nearer approach to a solution of the 
 *^°"- ethical question than to point out what courses of 
 
 action are likely to be the pleasantest, or what 
 tendencies to action the strongest ; and this it can 
 only do within very narrow limits both of time and 
 accuracy. As to what things are good it can say 
 nothing without a previous assumption identifying 
 good with some such notion as pleasant or power- 
 ful. The doctrine of evolution itself, which has 
 given new vogue to Naturalism both in morality 
 and in philosophy generally, only widens our view
 
 CONCLUSION. 327 
 
 of the old landscape. By its aid we cannot pass 
 from ' is ' to ' ouirht,' or from efficient to final 
 cause, any more than we can get beyond the 
 realm of space by means of the microscope or the 
 telescope. 
 
 Thus we return to the criticism. The theory of 
 evolution becomes ethical only by changing its 
 point of view from that of history to that of 
 validity, and by ignoring the fact that a change 
 has been made. To further evolution has been 
 called a 'new duty';^ but no ground is given for 
 the assertion that it is a duty. Or the ethical 
 imperative is laid down " be a self-conscious agent 
 in the evolution of the universe";- but again no 
 attempt is made to show how a statement about 
 the course of nature can be formulated as a rule 
 for conduct. The naturalists seem to be in the 
 same difficulty as Dr Johnson was when Boswell 
 plagued him to give a reason for action ; " ' Sir,' 
 said he, in an animated tone, ' it is driving on the 
 system of life.'"^ In their case too, the strength 
 of the answer lies in its ' animated tone.' 
 
 The facile doctrine that it is a duty to further 2. Tiiein. 
 evolution received a severe shock from Huxley's of evolution, 
 vigorous assertion of " the apparent paradox that 
 
 ^ F. Galton, Inquiriis into Human Faculty, p. 337. 
 ' A. Barratt, ]\Iind, O.S., ii. 172 u. 
 * Boswell's Life of Johnson, chap. liv.
 
 328 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Huxley's 
 opposition 
 of the 
 ethical and 
 cosniic pro- 
 cesses : 
 
 ethical nature, while born of cosmic nature, is 
 necessarily at enmity with its parent."^ He 
 drew a picture of the cosmic process not as en- 
 forcing, nor even as illustrating, morality, but as 
 exhibiting the action and the triumph of forces 
 which it is the business of morality to counteract. 
 " The practice of that which is ethically best," he 
 said, " what we call goodness or virtue — involves 
 a course of conduct which, in all respects, is op- 
 posed to that which leads to success in the cosmic 
 struggle for existence. . . . The ethical progress 
 of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic 
 process, still less in running away from it, but 
 in combating it."^ 
 
 This inversion of evolutionist ethics is more 
 salutary as well as more reasonable than the 
 doctrine against which it was directed, though its 
 contrasts are, perhaps, too sharply drawn. Huxley 
 was compelled by his general theory to look upon 
 morality as having arisen out of the very process 
 which it sets itself to oppose. To use his own 
 metaphor, it kicks down the ladder by which it 
 climbed. The two orders are thus strangely related 
 to one another. " The cosmic order has nothing to 
 say to the moral order, except that, somehow or 
 other, it has given it birth; the moral order has 
 nothing to say to the cosmic order, except that it is 
 
 ^ Evolution and Ethics, preface, p. viiL - Ibid., pp. SI, 83.
 
 CONCLUSION. 329 
 
 certainly bad.''^ But the contrast which Huxley 
 draws is not between the course of evolution as a 
 whole and the ethical process. Man, or at least 
 civilised man, is excluded from his survey of 
 nature when he characterises the methods of its 
 development. The opposition is between natural 
 selection and the conduct which is moral and 
 intelligent. But if the latter, as he also holds, is 
 a product of the former, its characteristics too 
 must be taken into account in order to understand 
 the cosmic process as a whole. 
 
 The true inference to be drawn from his argument tiie opposi- 
 
 - . , 1 ■ > 1 t'*^" really 
 
 is not that there is a conflict between ' ethics and between two 
 ' evolution.' The conflict is rather between one gJXtion. 
 stage of evolution and another : between the natural 
 selection which determines animal development and 
 the rational principles and ethical sentiments and 
 ideas which in some degree — and, it may be hoped, 
 in an increasing degree — determine human conduct. 
 These ethical motives have to win their way by 
 conflict — by struggle with other and non - ethical 
 forces which were appropriate to a lower stage of 
 development, and which yield only gradually to 
 ethical influence. The power of the new motives is 
 strengthened by the conflict ; and, as he carries out 
 his ideas to a successful issue, by methods which 
 mere * nature ' did not prescribe, man comes to con- 
 
 1 Recent Tendencies in Ethics, p. 47.
 
 330 CONCLUSION. 
 
 template himself as having a calling and destiny 
 
 beyond the physical process from which he has 
 
 emerged, and as the servant of ideals which that 
 
 process did not bestow. 
 
 Inadequacy The significance of evolution is not adequately 
 
 naturalistic undcrstood whcH we arbitrarily restrict attention to 
 
 interpreta- ^^iq mcthod of natural selection. This, indeed, is 
 
 tion of ' ' 
 
 evolution. Qjjg ^yay of interpreting evolution — the way which 
 has been more or less consistently maintained by 
 Naturalism. The ethical consequences of this 
 method have been discussed in the preceding 
 chapters, and it has been shown that,- in strict- 
 ness, they come to nothing. Its more general 
 philosophical consequence may be said to have 
 been the tendency to regard the physical or ex- 
 ternal process as the only efficient reality, and to 
 treat consciousness as simply an ' epiphenomenon ' 
 — the result, in some unexplained way, of a certain 
 stage of nervous organisation, and yet itself without 
 influence upon the course of events. A discussion 
 of this theory does not come within the scope of the 
 present work. But it may be said that it is hardly 
 possible to state it without contradiction : for, in 
 regarding mind as an efiect but not a cause, the 
 theory conflicts with its own postulate of the con- 
 servation of energy. 
 
 The naturalistic interpretation is not the only 
 possible interpretation of evolution. Its claim to 
 " interpret the more developed by the less de-
 
 CONCLUSION. 331 
 
 veloped " ^ is too often made to serve as an excuse 
 for overlooking or depreciating the characteristics 
 of the more developed stages. And, so far as 
 these have features which distinguish them from 
 the less advanced, and cannot be resolved into 
 them, the process as a vs^hole is left unexplained. 
 For an adequate view it is often necessary to in- 
 terpret the less advanced by the more advanced. 
 Consciousness cannot be explained by the uncon- 
 scious, nor can life be interpreted by describing its 
 physical equivalents. The psychologist would be 
 able to say nothing about the mental processes of 
 animals unless he could draw upon his knowledge 
 of his own mind ; and the whole literature of 
 biology, after Darwin as well as before him, 
 would require to be rewritten, were the conception 
 of purpose excluded. 
 
 The character of the course of evolution is seen possibility 
 in a different light when it is recognised that human pr.^'tati'on on 
 conduct and its methods must be taken into account ^''^ ^^^'^^ °f 
 
 idealism. 
 
 in interpreting the process. The scientific writers 
 who have been most forward in pressing the claim 
 that man must be held to be a part of the cosmic 
 process have also, unfortunately, been inclined to 
 interpret the whole process, not as it is, but as it 
 would be apart from human intervention and the 
 ideals which man brings to bear upon it. But the 
 claim that man must be interpreted as part of the 
 
 ^ Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 7.
 
 332 CONCLUSION. 
 
 universe involves the counterclaim that the nature 
 of the universe cannot be understood apart from 
 the distinctive features of man's activity. And, 
 when this is allowed, the naturalistic interpretation 
 of evolution becomes increasingly difficult. Evolu- 
 tion can no longer be regarded as entirely purpose- 
 less, for that part of it which we call human 
 conduct undoubtedly displays purpose. It cannot 
 be entirely indifferent or antagonistic to morality, 
 for the action of men, which enters into the process, 
 bears the impress of moral ideas. 
 
 These considerations are not put forward as 
 proving the truth of the view that the process of 
 evolution is the expression of a divine purpose. 
 They prove only that purpose and intelligence are 
 somewhere within the process, not that they are 
 present everywhere, or that the whole course of 
 nature is the expression of one increasing purpose. 
 But the facts leave room for this interpretation, if 
 they do not demonstrate it. 
 
 Its justification would require the establishment 
 of a view of the world which may be called idealist, 
 seeing that it would explain reality as depending 
 upon and expressing mind. No such justification 
 can be attempted here. But it may not be out of 
 place to remark that it enables us to avoid both 
 the fruitless efforts of the naturalists to derive an 
 ethical doctrine from the history of development, 
 and the antagonistic view urged by Huxley that
 
 CONCLUSION. 333 
 
 the cosmic and moral orders are iu hopeless con- 
 flict. It avoids the latter view, because it regards 
 the moral ideas and institutions of man as part of 
 the complete process, as factors in the movement 
 which leads in time from nature to spirit. And it 
 avoids the former view because it holds that the 
 ethical element which is manifested latest in the 
 temporal process, is presupposed from the first and 
 necessary to the understanding of the whole. The 
 ideal of goodness may contribute towards the inter- 
 pretation of evolution, but its own explanation 
 must be sought by another method.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Absolute ethics, 252. 
 Adamson, R., 18 n. 
 Adaptation, 142 f., 245 f., 308. 
 
 and pleasure, 256 f. 
 
 and progress, 249 f. 
 Alexander, S., 158 n., 165 u., 
 
 168 u., 260 f. 
 Aristotle, 7, 15 n,, 128, 236 n. 
 
 Baer, K. E, v., 246, 249. 
 Bain, A., referred to, 35, 36, 48 n., 
 58 n., 59, 63 n., 68 f., 138 f., 
 155 n., 231 n., 234 n. 
 Barratt, A., quoted, 27 n., 181 n., 
 192 n., 194 f., 209 n., 252 n., 
 327. 
 Beccaria, C, 80 n. 
 Benevolence, universal, 154 f. 
 Bentham, J., grounds of his utili- 
 tarian doctrine, 43 f., 47 f. 
 on pleasure and desire, 26. 
 on jjrivate ethics and legisla- 
 tion, 30 f., 43 f. 
 referred to or quoted, 41, 61, 
 65, 68, 74, 77, 80 n., 138, 
 226 n., 231. 
 Blackstone, Sir W., 52. 
 Bonar, J., 130 n. 
 Boswell, J., 327. 
 Bouillier, F., 230 n. 
 Butler, J., on conscience, 107, 
 112 f. 
 on pleasure and desire, 83 f. 
 on the harmony of virtue and 
 interest, 94 f., 112. 
 
 Butler, J., on the morality of 
 nature, 121 f. 
 referred to or quoted, 5, 78, 
 89 n., 94, 102, 117, 192. 
 304. 
 
 Cicero, 129. 
 
 Clarke, S., 78, 115. 
 
 Cliftbrd, W. K., 6 n., 154 n., 26.5, 
 
 276 n. 
 Coljbe, F. P., 169 n. 
 Competition between groups, 316 f. 
 ideas, 314 f. 
 individuals, 317. 
 Comte, A., 19 f., 212 n., 227 n., 245. 
 Condillac, E. B. de, 177 n. 
 Conduct, general and particular 
 
 theories of, 299 n. 
 Conservation, law of, 235 n. 
 Cosmic and moral orders, 137, 
 
 327 f. 
 
 Darwin, C, on the limits of nat- 
 
 iiral selection, 153 n., 265. 
 
 referred to or quoted, 19 f., 
 
 136, 159, 268 n., 270 n., 
 
 285 n., 291, 311, 313 f., 331. 
 
 Darwinian moralists, 300 n. 
 
 Degradation, 269. 
 
 Democritus, 18. 
 
 Desire and pleasure, theories of, 
 26 f., 61 f. 
 pessimist doctrine of, 214 f. 
 
 Development of morality, its psy- 
 chological aspect, 147 f.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 335 
 
 Development of morality, its social 
 aspect, 157 1'. 
 the factors in, 159 f. 
 Duniout, L., '^30n., 238u. 
 Duty, tlie utilitarian explanation 
 of, 48 f., 70. 
 
 Edgeworth, F. Y., 192. 
 Edwards, J., 27 n. 
 Eiliciency, maximum of, 295 f. 
 Egoism as an ethical theory, 33 f. 
 
 as atl'ected by evolution, 177 ff. 
 
 and altruism, 179 f., 248. 
 End, tlie ethical, 9. 
 
 and efficient cause, 324. 
 
 confusion of dilfereut meanings 
 of the term, 259, 322 f. 
 Epicurean end, nature of the, 250. 
 Epicureans, the, on nature and 
 
 convention, 119. 
 Epicurus, 19, 78, 251. 
 Epii)henonienou, 330. 
 Equality, the idea of, 73 f. 
 Equilibrium and pleasure, 256 f. 
 
 complete, 257 f. 
 
 moving, 252, 257. 
 
 social, as equivalent to good- 
 ness, 2(J0 f. 
 Ethical questions distinguished, 6 f. , 
 
 310 f. 
 
 of fact and history, 14 f., 
 
 311 f. 
 
 of worth, 7 f., 320 f. 
 Ethics and metaphysics, 1 f. 
 Evolution, bearing of, on egoism, 
 
 177 f. 
 intuitionism, 170 f. 
 utilitarianism, 196 f. 
 Evolution by natural selection, 
 
 148 f., 155, 311, 318. 
 its limits, 151 f., 159 f., 312 f., 
 
 319. 
 Evolution, general nature of the 
 
 theory, 141 f. 
 its difterent meanings, 159 f., 
 
 311. 
 as expressing historical con- 
 tinuity, 311. 
 its ettect on ethical psychology, 
 
 144. 
 its ethical significance, 142 f. 
 its historical and ethical aspects 
 
 contrasted, 145 f., 311 f., 
 
 320 f. 
 
 Evolution, interpretations of ideal- 
 istic, 331 f. 
 naturalistic, 330. 
 Evolutionism and hedonism, 196 f., 
 307 f. 
 connected in two ways, 208 f. 
 Evolutionist ethics, conception of 
 adaptation, 245 f., 272. 
 conception of specialisation and 
 
 complexity, 274 f. 
 conception of totality or in- 
 crease of life, 282 f. 
 its fundamental assumption, 
 142, 244, 283. 320 f. 
 
 Fiske, J,, 218 n. 
 
 Fittest, meaning of the term, 
 
 263 f. 
 Fixed ideas, 69, 87 f. 
 
 Galton, F., 283 n., 327. 
 
 Giz'ycki, G. v., 210 n. 
 
 Godwin, W., 76 n. 
 
 Good, the highest, 9. 
 
 Green, T. H., 33 n., 231. 
 
 Grote, G., his analysis of moral 
 
 sentiment, 60, 67, 71 f. 
 Grote, J., 42 n., 52 n. 
 Groups, competition of, 316 f. 
 Gurney, E., 46 n. 
 Guyan, 211 u. 
 
 Halevy, E.,49n., 59 n. 
 Hamilton, Sir W., 230, 236. 
 Happiness, 6 f. 
 
 aggregate and average, 203. 
 difficulty of determining a 
 maximum, 201 f. 
 Harmony of strongest tendencies, 
 
 302 f. 
 Hartmann, E. v., 212 f. 
 Ilasbach, W., 127 u. 
 Health, as an ethical conception, 
 
 285 f. 
 Hedonic calculus, inclusion of pro- 
 pinquity in the, 80 n. 
 Hedonism and evolutionism, 196 f., 
 307 f., 325 f. 
 connected in two ways, 208 f. 
 Hedonism, ethical, 33 f. 
 Hedonism, psychological, diflerent 
 forms of the theory, 24 f. 
 implies egoism in ethics, SO. 
 its ethical bearings, 28 f.
 
 !36 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Hedonism, psychological, logically 
 inconsistent with utilitarian- 
 ism, 77 f. 
 not based on evolution, 191 f. 
 Helvetius, C. A., 29 n., 30, 75 n. 
 Herbart, J. F., his doctrine of 
 
 desire, 85 f. 
 Historical method, 145 f. 
 Hobbes, T., 18, 19, 75 n., 90, 115, 
 
 120, 138 f., 175, 234 n., 247. 
 Holbach, P. H. D. d', 26 n., 31 n. 
 Hume, D., 18, 66 u., 100. 
 Hutcheson, F., on the harmony of 
 virtue and interest, 94 f., 
 104. 
 on the moral sense, 102 f. 
 referred to or quoted, 5, 94. 
 Huxley, T. H., his opposition be- 
 tween the cosmic process and 
 morality, 137, 327, 332. 
 referred to or quoted, 146 n., 
 169 n. 
 
 Ideal, the moral, 200 f. 
 Idealism, 17, 20 f., 3-31. 
 Ideals, presence of, in evolutionist 
 
 ethics, 300 n. 
 Ideas, competition of, 314 f. 
 Impulses, most i^ersistent, 289 f., 
 
 302 f. 
 Individual and social development, 
 
 277 f., 305. 
 Indi\aduals, competition of, 317. 
 Instinct and reason, 123 f., 134 f. 
 International law, 120. 
 
 Jhering, R. v., 158 n. 
 
 Johnson, S., 327. 
 
 Jus Gentium, 74 f., 119 f. 
 
 Kant, I., 5, 6, 15 n., 41, 126 n., 
 141, 219 n. 
 
 Lamarck. I. B. de, 141, 149. 
 
 Lange, F. A., 251 n., 282 n, 
 
 Lassalle, F., 251 n. 
 
 Lechler, G. V,, 18 n. 
 
 Life, increase or totality of, as 
 
 the end, 209 f., 242, 282 f., 
 
 301 f. 
 increase of, identified with 
 
 pleasure, 211 f., 217 f., 234 
 
 f. 
 Locke, J., 7, 27 n., 75 n., 91. 
 
 Lotze, H., 297 n. 
 
 Maine, Sir H., 74 f. 
 Maitland, F. W., 254 n. 
 Malevolence, pleasure of, 155 n. 
 Malthus, T. R., 313. 
 Martineau, J., 110 n. 
 Mazzini, J., 6. 
 Meliorism, 325 f. 
 Metaphysics and ethics, 1 f. 
 Methods of ethics, the enquiry into, 
 
 11. 
 Mill, James, on pleasure and desire, 
 
 26. 
 Mill, John Stuart, grounds of his 
 utilitarian doctrine, 44, 47, 
 65 f. 
 his defence of utilitarianism, 
 
 60 f. 
 his distinction of kind between 
 
 pleasures, 61 f. 
 his opposition between nature 
 
 and morality, 130 f. 
 his proof of utilitarianism, 47, 
 
 64. 
 on pleasure and desire, 26 n. 
 referred to or quoted, 67 f., 77, 
 82, 105, 200 f., 276. 
 Moral sense, the, 93, 101 f. 
 JMotive, complexity of, as implying 
 moral authority, 275, 279 f. 
 
 Natural and purposive selection 
 
 compared, 151 f., 160 f. 
 Natural, as opposed to reflective, 
 123 f., 134 f. 
 different meanings of, 127 f. 
 Natural good, 287 f. 
 
 objective standard for, 294 f. 
 subjective standard for, 289 f. 
 Natural law and natural rights, 
 
 130. 
 Natural selection, its nature and 
 conditions, 148 f., 155, 311, 
 318. 
 its limits, 151 f., 159 f., 312 f., 
 319. 
 Naturalism, history of the term, 
 18 n. 
 its meaning, 17 f. 
 objective, 117 ff. 
 subjective, 22 f. 
 Nature and human volition, 131 f., 
 323 f.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 337 
 
 Nature as a spiritual system, 119 f., 
 322. 
 as the whole system of things, 
 pre-evolutioiiist views of its 
 ethical significance, 117 If. 
 law of, 75, 119 f. 
 Normal, the, 297. 
 
 Obligation, 7 f., 46 n., 48 u., 53 n., 
 
 114, 183 f. 
 Origin and validity, 172 f,, 320 f. 
 
 Paley, W., 48 n., 56, 115. 
 
 Pascal, B., 249. 
 
 Pater, W., 195 n. 
 
 Pessimism, 212 f. 
 
 Plato, 83 n., 118 n. 
 
 Pleasure and adaptation, 256 f. 
 
 and desire, tlieories of, 26 f., 61 f. 
 
 and equilibrium, 256 f. 
 
 and pain, physical nature of, 
 229 f. 
 Pleasures, calculus of, 231. 
 
 distinction of kind in, 61 f. 
 Pollock, Sir F., 173 n. 
 Private ethics, Bentham's view of, 
 
 53 f. 
 Progress and evolutionist ethics, 
 303 f. 
 
 and increase of pleasure, 223 f. 
 Psychology of ethics, 14 f. 
 Purposive selection, 161 f., 315. 
 
 Quintillian, 75 n. 
 
 Reality and value, 298 n. 
 Renunciation, 250. 
 Rolph, W. H., 6, 267. 
 Rousseau, J. J., 123, 228. 
 
 Sanctions, the, 49 f., 59 n. 
 Schiiffle, A. E. F., 266, 322. 
 Schloiermacher, F., 95 f. 
 Schopenhauer, A., his doctrine of 
 
 desire, 84, 214, 221. 
 Self-development, 268. 
 Self-preservation, 125, 142, 247 f. 
 
 and self-development, 268. 
 Sentiment, moral or ethical, 67 f., 
 
 82 f. 
 Sexual selection, 162, 317. 
 Shaftesbury, third Earl of, his ra- 
 tional view of nature, 91 f., 
 117. 
 
 Shaftesbury, third Earl of, his use 
 of the term "naturalism," 
 19 n. 
 
 on natural affection, 92 f. 
 
 on partial and entire aflections, 
 
 98 f. 
 on religion and virtue, 92 f. 
 on the harmony of virtue and 
 
 interest, 94 f., 112. 
 on the moral sense, 93, 101 f. 
 Shaftesbury, the school of, 91, 94 f., 
 
 115. 
 Sidgwick, H., his rational utilitar- 
 ianism, 78. 
 referred to or quoted, 12, 28 n., 
 32 n., 46 u., 63 n., 84 n.,172 
 f., 231 f., 254 n. 
 Simcox, E., 200,206n.,290n.,294n. 
 Smith, Adam, on the morality of 
 nature, 123 f. 
 referred to or quoted, 76 n., 
 188. 
 Social and individual development, 
 277 f., 305. 
 organism, the, 157 f., ISO. 
 Social selection, 163 f. 
 
 its modes of operation, 165 f. 
 Sociology, ethical, 14 f. 
 Sophists, the, on nature and con- 
 vention, 118. 
 Specialisation of structure and 
 
 fiinction, 143, 251 f. 
 Spencer, H., 19 f., 143, 149, 180 n., 
 188 f., 193, 197 f., 208 f., 212 n., 
 234 n., 236 n., 239 f., 244 n., 
 273 u. 
 Spinoza, B. de, 234 n., 247. 
 Stationary state, 261. 
 Stephen, Sir J. F., 100. 
 Stephen, Sir L., 12 n., 27 n., 59 n., 
 144 f., 158 n., 187 n., 188 n., 189, 
 199, 204 n., 212 n., 285 n., 295 f. 
 Stewart, J. A., 298 n. 
 Stimulation, law of, 235 n. 
 Stirling, J. H., 285 n. 
 Stoics, the, on the law of nature, 
 119. 
 their view of nature, 119, 129, 
 
 287. 
 referred to, 154, 247, 250. 
 Stout, G. F., 236. 
 Struggle for existence, different 
 
 forms of, 313 f. 
 Subjective selection, 161 f., 315.
 
 338 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Sully, J., 222 n. 
 Sympathj', 65 f. 
 
 Teleological aspect of evolution, 
 142 f. 
 
 conception, the, 2, 94, 96, 114. 
 Tendencies, immediate, 322. 
 
 strongest, 290, 302 f. 
 Tissue, social, 156. 
 Totality of life, 282 f., 301 f. 
 Trendelenburg, A., 15 n., 287, 304. 
 Type, perfection of, or conformity 
 to, 294 f. 
 
 Unconscious will, the, 220. 
 Utilitarianism, as affected by evolu- 
 tion, 196 f. 
 incongruous elements in the 
 
 theory of, 77 f. 
 J. S. Mill's defence of, 60 f. 
 J. S. Mill's proof of, 64. 
 
 Utilitarianism, the formula of, 73. 
 transition from egoism to, 43 f. 
 
 Vaibiuger, H., 214 n. 
 Validity and history, 320 f. 
 
 and origin, 172 f. 
 Value and reality, 298 n. 
 Variation, its importance for the 
 
 ethics of evolution, 264 f. 
 Volkmanu, W., 230 n. 
 
 Wallace, A. R., 266 n. 
 
 Ward, J., 18 n., 88 n., 160, 163- 
 
 231 n., 236. 
 Weismann, A., 149. 
 Wollaston, W., 115. 
 Wundt, W., 158 n., 226 n. 
 
 Xenocrates, 154. 
 
 Zeller, E., 7 n., 250 n. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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