GIFT OF 
 Mrs. L. J Richardson 
 
fHR 
 
IMPERIAL GERMANY 
 
 A LECTURE 
 
 BERNARD MOSES 
 
 BERKELEY, CAT,. 
 
 1386 
 

3 in per t a I C!3 ermdnn. 11 
 
 r T 1 HE events associated with the foundation and 
 development of the new German Empire 
 constitute the most important episode in the 
 history of Europe since the fall of Napoleon. 
 They stand as the culmination of a series of 
 events beginning with the Prussian reaction 
 against French domination in 1813. To be un- 
 derstood, they must be viewed in the light of 
 the failure of the arrangement effected by the 
 Congress of Vienna, and of the more or less aim- 
 less struggles embraced under the general desig- 
 nation of the Revolution of 1848. The new 
 German Empire arose out of the ruins of the 
 medieval empire which ceased to exist in 1806, 
 when Francis II. laid down the imperial crown. 
 At the time of its dissolution, the mediaeval em- 
 pire was one of the oldest political institutions of 
 
 * Delivered before the Political Science Club of the Univer- 
 sity of California, October 20, 188 j. 
 
Europe. Its existence stretched over the thou- 
 sand years from Charlemagne, in the beginning 
 of the ninth century, to Napoleon, in the begin- 
 ning 1 of the nineteenth century. It rested oa 
 the sublime idea that it was the sole instrument 
 for manifesting' and executing the will of God 
 with reference tj the political government of the 
 world. This idea constituted the basis of its. 
 pretension to universal dominion, but, like many 
 of the ideas suggested by the distorted Christi- 
 anity of the Middle Ages, it was utterly unre- 
 alizable. The mediaeval empire was formed un- 
 der the influence of religious visionaries, and 
 declined with the awakening practical intelli- 
 gence of modern times. The central power of 
 the Empire gradually vanished before the rising 
 power of the constituent States, till at last the 
 Emperor retained only an empty nam^ and a 
 powerless scepter. 
 
 The year which witnessed the final dissolution 
 of this ancient institution saw also the establish- 
 ment of the Confederation of the Rhine. This 
 Confederation had little significance, except 
 as a means for facilitating the exercise of French 
 influence in the affairs of Germany. It was under 
 the protection of Napoleon, who had "the power of 
 summoning the Federal Assembly, and of initia- 
 
ting ail discussions in it, through its prince-pres- 
 ident, the Duke of Dilberg." He had also "the 
 right of naming the prince-president, and the 
 right of commanding the confederation to make 
 war or peace." 
 
 With the overthrow of Napoleon, in 1814, the 
 Confederation disappeared, and the political 
 disintegration of Germany became complete. 
 Before 1814, the year marked by the Congress 
 of Vienna, the most persistent political tendency 
 in the history of Germany was the tendency 
 toward disunion and particularism. With this 
 year, however, begins an opposite course of pro- 
 gress, leading by successive steps to a more 
 complete governmental union of the German 
 people. The first step in this new direction w r as 
 the formation of the Germanic Confederation, 
 comprehending all the German states, under 
 the presidency of Austria. The second step 
 was the formation cf the North German Union 
 in which several of the most important South 
 German states, as Austria, Bavaria, Wiirtem- 
 berg, and Baden, were not included. The final 
 step was the organization of the Empire. This 
 event is noteworthy not merely because through 
 it was secured the present union of a large part 
 of the German people under one supreme gov- 
 
6 
 
 eminent, but also because in it there was 
 adopted a constitutional provision contributing to 
 secure the perpetual maintenance of this union. 
 The provision referred to is that by which the 
 power to veto any proposition for constitutional 
 change is placed in the hands of Prussia, whose 
 government is strongly blended with the gov- 
 ernment of the Empire, whose King is also 
 Emperor, and whose interests demand not only 
 that the bonds of union between the States be 
 maintained, but that the States be brought into 
 a closer union and more complete subordination 
 to the central government. If we bear in mind 
 these facts, that Prussia has seventeen members 
 in the Federal Council, appointed by the King, 
 that fourteen negative votes in this Council are 
 adequate to defeat any proposed constitutional 
 amendment, and that Prussia is vitally inter- 
 ested in defeating all constitutional changes that 
 do not tend to strengthen the central govern- 
 ment, we can readily see that, in the establish- 
 ment of the Empire, we have not merely the 
 fact of German unity achieved, but at the same 
 time the strongest possible check laid on the 
 spirit of decentralization. Nothing short of a 
 revolution or the overthrow of the imperial 
 
government by a foreign state can stop the slow 
 but sure drift of power towards the center. 
 
 But within the central government itself, the 
 distribution of power is not such as to insure 
 prem inency of the present political order among 
 the several departments. It is true, generally, 
 that it is impossible to apportion the power of a 
 government among the several departments so 
 nicely that they will continue, as it were, in a 
 condition of stable equilibrium. One or another 
 will inevitably have an advantage of position, 
 and thus gradually draw to itself the balance of 
 power. In the early English government, the 
 possession of the right of initiating financial 
 legislation constituted the Commons' advantage 
 of position. Through this it has been possible 
 for that body to arrogate to itself all that power 
 which was formerly held by other departments. 
 In the course of political change there is mani- 
 fest a strong tendency to unite the initiating, 
 adapting, and executing powers in the same 
 person or body; and when popular representation 
 is admitted and maintaiiel, that body which 
 .stands in closest sympathy with the electors will 
 ultimately acquire the balance of power in the 
 government, and hold the position of superior 
 eiuleiK'e, In the imperial government of 
 
8 
 
 Germany popular representation is admitted, 
 but the representative body has only the power to 
 accept or reject propositions submitted to it. It 
 has no power to initiate m enures, and conse- 
 quently no power to m ike its originating will 
 felt directly in the affiirs of government. 
 Whenever the initiating function is withheld 
 from the representative branch of the legislature 
 a conflict is inaugurated which will result in the 
 representative body becoming either more or 
 iess. In England, where this condition of affairs 
 formerly existed, the representive body has 
 gained not only the right of initiating measures, 
 but also an acknowledged supremacy over the 
 other departments of government. The Reichs- 
 tag, or representative body in the imperial 
 legislature, in its control over taxation, has 
 essentially the position of advantage through 
 which the English Commons achieved independ- 
 ence. If the Reichstag fails to mike use of its 
 advantage, the Emperor, ministry, and federal 
 council will extend their authority at itsexpense. 
 Any organ of the sovereign, in the unrestrained 
 exercise of its delegated power, will always tend 
 to enlarge the field of its jurisdiction. As long 
 as the majority of the Reichstag is in esseatial 
 accord with the ministry and federal council, 
 
this b'Kly 111 ly ba content simply to register its 
 affirm itive or negltive decision on propositions 
 .submitted to it; but when the majority of the 
 members find themselves committed to pro- 
 positions vvhii'h the initiating' bodies are re- 
 luctant to formal. ite into 1 iws, the representatives 
 will imperatively dem md the right of ini- 
 tiating bills through which they may give 
 direct expression to their views. That the 
 views of a large number of the representatives, in 
 the near future, will stand in sharp contrast to 
 those of the ministry may be clearly seen from 
 the fact that every election brings into the 
 Reichstag an increased number of members 
 whose fundamental political principles are in 
 direct Conflict with those of the Emperor and 
 his ministers. If the balance of power in the 
 imperial government drifts into the Reichstag, 
 it will fill into the hands of men for the most 
 p irt untrained in self-government. For gener- 
 ations under military tutelage and class domina- 
 tion, the Germans of the Empire have lost much 
 ofth.it power of self-determination and self-re- 
 str.iint whijh are necessary to the conduct of a 
 government by representatives of the people. If, 
 on the other hand, power drifts more completely 
 into the hands of the Emperor and his ministers, 
 
10 
 
 the imperial government will assume that form 
 of absolutism which marked the governments of 
 nearly all important European states in the 
 seventeenth century, and whose disastrous out- 
 come in most cases is a "familiar tale of history. 
 One or the other of these alternatives will 
 inevitably be realized, and in neither direction 
 is the outlook specially hopeful. 
 
 Those who judge of the excellences or defect 
 of government from the somewhat exalted 
 standpoint of metaphysical speculation, are like- 
 ly to award that one the first place which pos- 
 sesses the most complete organization and is 
 most successful in preserving peace and order 
 among its subjects. There is no doubt 
 that the maintenance of an efficient police sup- 
 ervision over the conduct of its citizens-Ms an im- 
 portant function of the state. Judged merely 
 with reference to its success in this direction, 
 the present German government must be given 
 a very high rank. There is very much in this 
 phase of its activity to excite admiration. But 
 repression is not the only aim of wise political 
 administration. It is one of the highest aims of 
 government so to order public affairs lh.it the 
 individuals who make up the nation shall not 
 degenerate. When this end Ls overlooked in 
 
11 
 
 attempts to carry out thoroughly a system of 
 minute control, the government is not attaining 
 its highest purpose. As the organism which 
 thinks and speaks for the multitudes, who recog- 
 nize its- authority, it is the business of the 
 government to make possible such conditions 
 as will favor the growth of a strong, temperate, 
 self-reliint, and intelligent nation. The repres- 
 sive policy of the German Empire, curtailing on 
 every side the field uf independent individual 
 action, and hedging evch citizen about so 
 narrowly that he loses much of the feeling of 
 personal responsibility, tends to degrade the 
 great body of the nation to the position of an 
 unthinking rabble. Repression, therefore, breeds 
 a condition of society which makes repression 
 necessary. It carries with it no hope of a better 
 state. Once entered upon, it becomes a necessity, 
 and by it the nation is driven into successive 
 stages of social irresponsibility, till at last it is 
 torn asunder in the conflicts of classes, or ends 
 ingloriously in utter stagnation. 
 
 There is something worse in a nation than the 
 confusion and uproar of democracy, and that is- 
 orderly conduct which has been reached at the 
 cost of social independence and individual self- 
 respect. Venice and Florence, in their careers 
 
12 
 
 as independent states, illustrate the contrast. 
 The officers of the Venetian government, in the 
 execution of the repressive policy, were omni- 
 present and omniscient. The citizen who stepped 
 aside from his narrowly prescribed course of 
 conduct was speedily, and often without cere- 
 mony, overtaken by the penalty of the violated 
 law. As a result, throughout a long period of 
 its history, Venice remained remarkably free 
 from internal strife and noisy popular disturb- 
 ance. Yet, in spite of ail the advantages of 
 abundant wealth, of internal quiet, and exten- 
 sive intercourse with the most cultivated 
 nations of the world, Venice did not produce 
 men who have made themselves remembered. 
 Florence, on the other hand, which for centuries 
 was tilled with struggles of pirties and the up- 
 roar of political agitation, occupies a large place 
 in the history of European civilization, and 
 many of the most exalted spirits of modern 
 times received their first and abiding impulses 
 from the free life of the republic. It is not, how- 
 ever, pertinent to the subject in hand to affirm 
 or deny that literature, art, and learning will 
 thrive under a governmental policy which may 
 be designated as repressive or protective. 
 What I wish specially to emph isi/e is, that 
 
13 
 
 although such a policy prevails in Germany, it 
 can, under no interpretation, be set down as an 
 element in the cause of that nation's exalted 
 position in the intellectual world. The men 
 who have given Germany her scholarly repu- 
 tation are not the products of a stagnant society; 
 in fact communities or nations that are willing 
 or are forced to allow everything to be done for 
 them are not likely to produce original or 
 creative minds. In refutation of this view the 
 reign of Louis XIV. is often cited. A critical 
 examination of this portion of French history 
 shows, however, that the literary splendor of 
 the reign of Louis XIV. "was not the result of 
 his efforts, but was the work of that great gen- 
 eration which preceded him; and that the intel- 
 lect of France, so far from being benefited by 
 his munificence, was hampered by his protec- 
 tion." The national intellect was stunted by 
 the supervision of the court, and, "as a natural 
 consequence, the minds of man, driven from the 
 higher departments, took refuge in the lower, 
 and concentrated themselves upra those inferior 
 subjects where the discovery of truth is not the 
 main object, but where beauty of form and ex- 
 pression are the things chiefly pursued." The 
 influence of the reign of Louis XIV. on the Li- 
 
telleetual life of France was, in the first place, 
 "to sacrifice science to art," and, in the second 
 place, to cause the decay of art itself. 
 
 But no parallel between Germany and France 
 in this regard is possible, for Germany is only 
 now entering upon a phase of history through 
 which Franc^ passed long ago. England, France, 
 arid Spain pissed through brilliant periods of in- 
 tellectual activity and literary culture before 
 Germany had fully shaken off the slumber of 
 the Middle Ages. The Protestant Reformation, 
 Which turned all intellectual force to theological 
 study and discussion; the Thirty*Years' War, 
 which destroyed the nation's basis of physical 
 support; and the subsequent century of recu- 
 peration, filled with petty jealousies and internal 
 wars, furnish adequate reason for the late de- 
 velopment of the German people. Their great 
 intellectual achievements belong to the century 
 since the death of Frederick the Great, a cen- 
 tury in which the great body of the people have 
 continued a living and originating force. In the 
 struggle for independence, in 1813, they played 
 a leading }nrt. When Prussia entered the 
 war against Napoleon the same year, the 
 people lead and the king followed. The 
 political agitations which made the middle 
 
15 
 
 years of the century memorable, showed 
 the people still able of taking- a vigorous ini- 
 tiative. Pursuing 1 this line of thought, it 
 becomes clear that G^rminy his grown to her 
 present degree of intellectual eminence under 
 social conditions entirely unlike those which 
 have been imposed on the nation by the Empire. 
 The past century of German history which 
 records the rise of the nation to greatness, 
 records also the operations of a spirit of 
 popular unrest, and strong national aspirations 
 towards an exalted end more or less definitely 
 conceived. Whether the influence of the exist- 
 ing system, which tends to crowd the common 
 people into a uniformity of insignificance, will 
 be such as to continue the growth of the past 
 hundred years, can be definitely determined 
 only by the enquirers of the next century. The 
 teaching of the repressive policy, however, as 
 seen in history, suggests a probable negative. 
 There may be schools of perfect organization 
 and equipment, but unless there is independ- 
 ence of character in the bulk of the nation, and 
 a strong feeling of self-reliance and self-respect, 
 it is vain to look for the development or con- 
 tinuance of national greatness. There may 
 be the most efficient army in the world, but it 
 
16 
 
 will be no guarantee of continued prosperity, if 
 the expenditure for its maintenance absorbs an 
 undue portion of the national income. The 
 army of the Empire is no doubt necessary to 
 preserve the integrity of the imperial territory, 
 but at the same time the burden which it im- 
 poses on the nation must be set down among the 
 sources of economic weakness. 
 
 Germany at present is in the condition of the 
 athlete who has attained the object of his train- 
 ing and is at the height of his vigor. His won- 
 derful development, however, is no guarantee of 
 a long life and a hearty old age. On the con- 
 trary, the records of such lives show an aston- 
 ishingly large number of cases suffering early 
 death or premature decline. They have paid 
 out the reserve and therefore must suspend 
 operations. By nature poor in resources, Ger- 
 many has undertaken, by checking the influx of 
 the world's wealth, to provide for its vast ex- 
 penditures and thus put off the day of exhaus- 
 tion. It is attempting to become rich by shut- 
 ting its doors to the offered abundance of other 
 nations. 
 
 Considering the motives which move men to 
 wealth-production, it is a self-evident proposi- 
 tion that if men are left free to act, they will put 
 
17 
 
 forth their productive forced in the direction of 
 thei'- greatest productive ability; and no central 
 power, however f ar-seeing in its paternal super- 
 vision, can determine this direction in the mil- 
 lions of individual cases as well as the individuals 
 them. selves. It follows, therefore, that where 
 the individual members of a nation are left free 
 in their industrial and commercial activity, 
 there will be the maximum of wealth-produc- 
 tion for the nation as a whole. But the German 
 government has seen fit to tnrust its interfering 
 hand not only into that which the English peo- 
 ple are disposed to regard as the peculiar realm of 
 personal liberty, but also into the affairs of in- 
 dustry and trade. By its restrictions and im- 
 positions, it has lifted certain departments into 
 unnatural prominence, and crowded others into 
 enforced insignificance. This policy has had a 
 threefold result. In the first place, it has 
 brought to the government an increased rev- 
 enue, which has enabled it not only to meet its 
 current expenses, but also to build numerous 
 imposing structures, either for use in practical 
 affairs or for commemorating the heroic achieve- 
 ments of the army. This architectural display, 
 supported by the revenues of the government, 
 has betrayed superficial observers into the con- 
 
18 
 
 vie! ion that the nation itself is growing' rich. In 
 the second place, this policy of industrial and 
 commercial restriction has had the effect of 
 bringing about a more unequal distribution of 
 wealth, giving to certain manufacturers in- 
 creased gains, without at the same time adding 
 materially to the aggregate gains of the nation, 
 or increasing proportionately the rewards of la- 
 bor. The wealth that has been added to the 
 manufacturer's store has been taken from the 
 store of the consumer, for while prices have ad- 
 vanced, wages have remained comparatively 
 stationary. Thus, in the third place, this policy 
 has contributed to the difficulties which the bulk 
 of the population experience in maintaining a 
 decent existence. Prices have been raised by ex- 
 cluding other nations from free competition in 
 the markets, but the incomes of the masses have 
 not risen in a corresponding degree, if they have 
 risen at all. In fact Prussian statistics seem to 
 indicate that the class whose incomes are less 
 than one hundred and twenty-five dollars a year, 
 has increased much faster than other classes. 
 In 1882, this class constituted more than one 
 quarter of the Prussian population, and in the 
 preceding five years it had increased by a mil- 
 lion and a half. "The statistics of the other Ger- 
 
19 
 
 man States," writes Geffcken in 1884, "show a si m- 
 il.tr result; the poor-rates have increased every- 
 where in an alarming proportion, and the num- 
 ber of vagrants and tramps have become a gen- 
 eral plague. Our industrial production suffers 
 from chronic plethora, its net produce does not 
 correspond to its immense expansion, still less is a 
 real amelioration of the situation of the working 
 classes to be decerned. The supply of labor gen- 
 erally exceeds the demands; consequently wages 
 do not rise, and the lower strata of the popula- 
 tion can absorb comparatively little of the mass 
 of products which are daily thrown upon the 
 market, because the scantiness of their earnings 
 does not allow them to satisfy correspondingly 
 their wants. But in the higher classes also all 
 the callings are overcrowded; the increase of 
 academical students has been abnormal and far 
 exceeding the demand, and a considerable part 
 of this surplus of trained forces, finding no em- 
 ployment, perishes or launches into adventures. 
 In short, everywhere we find an enhanced strug- 
 gle for existence, which engenders dissatisfac- 
 tion and hopelessness, and furnishes social de- 
 mocracy with fresh recruits." 
 
 The influence of the German government, with 
 reference to this last suggestion by Dr. Geffcken, 
 
20 
 
 merits thoughtful consideration; I mean the ii> 
 fluence of the imperial policy on the socialistic 
 agitation of the present. Reduced to its lowest 
 terms, the doctrine of modern Socialism is an 
 affirmation on the much-debated question as to 
 t lie proper sphere of governmental action. "It 
 is not only a theory of the state's action, but a 
 theory of the state's action founded on a theory 
 of the laborer's right." It is the extreme oppo- 
 site to that theory which maintains the "abso- 
 lute abstention on the part of the state in all that 
 concerns material well-being." Such a theory of 
 state action as that embodied in Socialism is not 
 hi keeping with the democratic spirit; it is rather 
 to be considered as a logical outgrowth of a mon- 
 archy which extends its paternal protection and 
 control over many details which in a republic are 
 left to the discreet management of individuals. 
 It is natural, therefore, to expect the development 
 of the socialistic doctrine in Germany, where 
 power is exercised under a liberal conception of 
 the sphere of state authority, rather than in a 
 republic where the people are jealous of state 
 power, even when it is delegated by themselves. 
 The practice of the German government, in en- 
 tering extensively into the affairs of business, 
 has tended to deepen the conviction that it might, 
 
21 
 
 with advantage to the laborers, go to still greater 
 lengths in tl]e ownership of the agents of pro- 
 duction. In maintaining the army, moreover, 
 conditions are established favorable to the in- 
 crease of Socialism. Large numbers of men aiv 
 called from those occupations in which they 
 must rely on their individual efforts for support, 
 to spend a series of years under conditions where 
 the burden of support is shifted to the govern- 
 ment. Going back from the army to a society 
 in which the struggle for life is severe, they 
 carry with them the knowledge of what the state 
 may do to relieve them of the labor and anxieties 
 of this struggle. Having seen that the state can 
 successfully manage great productive enter- 
 prises, and also that it may support under its 
 immediate charge large bodies of its citizens, 
 they are, at this stage, ripe for the reception of 
 the socialistic gospel. The very process, through 
 which a large number of minds have been fitted 
 to receive a new social dispensation, has also pre- 
 pared some of the bolder spirits to become heralds 
 of the glad tidings. From these and other con- 
 siderations more or less dependent on the action 
 and organization of the society, we are able to 
 see how the German nation has become the 
 mother of the present discontent, and the Em- 
 
22 
 
 pire the breeding place of agitators whose fanati- 
 cism is only equalled by their social short-sight- 
 edness. They become a menace to social order, 
 not because their views prove false the accepted 
 basis of society, but because they appeal to those 
 elements of the community whose actions are 
 not a matter of reason but of sympathy. They 
 are the product of a rigid and repressive admin- 
 istration, yet the end of their agitation is a sys- 
 tem which, to be successful, must be a thous.md 
 times more rigid and far-reaching in its tyranny 
 than any government which they oppose. Their 
 opposition is thorough, but not necessarily en- 
 lightened or consistent. In their missionary 
 tours, they do not stop to understand either the 
 faults or the excellences of different govern- 
 ments, but are ready, without examining them, 
 to lay destructive hands on all. 
 
 When republican doctrines were being car- 
 ried out in France, in 1789, the adherents of 
 monarchy in Europe thought themselves justi- 
 fied in combining to prevent their spread to 
 other countries. Had the efforts of the several 
 monarchical states been confined to upholding 
 their own institutions against the assaults of im- 
 migrants from republican France, just men 
 everywhere would have been in sympathy with 
 
28 
 
 their undertaking. But in attempting to crush 
 republicanism in France, they went beyond their 
 proper sphere. The citizens of the republic of 
 the United States have no desire to seek to 
 modify the social and political institutions of the 
 German Empire, or to interfere with their pro- 
 duction of socialists or anarchists; they desire 
 only that the foul brood may be retained and fed 
 in the original nest. While the repressive and 
 protective governmental policy of Germany, 
 which limits in a large measure the personal 
 independence of the subject, is the fundamental 
 cause of this social revolt, it has a secondary 
 cause in the hard economic conditions to which 
 the masses are doomed. Yet these hard econ- 
 omic.oonditions &re the very foundation of ex- 
 cellence in certain departments. In the United 
 States it is difficult to persuade men of high 
 attainments to devote their lives to primary 
 teaching for the low sulary at which women, not 
 of high attainments, may be induced to undertake 
 the work. The opportunities for individual en- 
 terprise, with sure and abundant material re- 
 ward, call men to other pursuits. But in Ger- 
 many men of high attainments are willing for 
 an assured pittance to dev r ote their lives to in- 
 struction in the lower schools, recognizing the 
 
fact that if they abandon their positions they will 
 be thrown into a severe struggle for- existence 
 without certainty of satisfactory reward. Thus 
 the poverty of German resources keeps men in 
 these lower but vastly important positions. Tiie 
 superiority of German schools, therefore, over 
 those of the United States, is in large part due to 
 the inferiority of Germany's opportunities for ad- 
 vancing material well-being. It is not because 
 the German loves money less than the Ameri- 
 can, but simply because his opportunities for 
 getting it are worse. 
 
 Thus far I have spoken only of the internal 
 forces and tendencies of the Empire. What the 
 operation of these forces will be in the future 
 will depend somewhat upon the position which 
 the Empire maintains in the group of Western 
 nations. The external relations of the Germans 
 hive been vague and indefinite because the peo- 
 ple have lacked national unity. We are able to 
 p >int out, however, in the course of German 
 history various periods when the foreign rela- 
 tions of the nation have been of marked influence 
 in determining its internal development. In 
 the first stages of German imperialism, the con- 
 nection between Germany and Italy was most 
 important. It was the connection of a nation 
 
25 
 
 having traditions of cultivation, with a nation 
 whose traditions smacked of the forests and bar- 
 barism. The 'German soldiers followed the Em- 
 perors over the Alps, and many never returned, 
 but there came back from Italy germs of a higher 
 culture. Still the men who had acquired in Italy 
 somewhat of cultivation, and tasted the refine- 
 ments of an old civilization, remained always 
 under the fatal attraction which allured them to 
 the shores of the Mediterranean. When the 
 bond was severed which had bound Germany 
 arid Italy into one great Empire, the several 
 states of Germany were pretending to independ- 
 ence, and the relations between them were as- 
 suming the form of international relations. 
 When the people were finally divided by their 
 ecclesiastical quarrels, the way was prepared for 
 a great national humiliation. The utter mate- 
 rial desolation which appeared in the track of 
 the Thirty-Years' War was Hot a greater nation- 
 al calamity than that loss of independence which 
 is manifest when we behold the Protestant states 
 knocking at the doors of foreign princes, and 
 asking for aid and protection, and the emperor 
 submitting to conditions which practically de- 
 prived him of the imperial dignity, in order to 
 wee u re th3 services of such an adventurer as 
 
26 
 
 Wallenstein. But even a greater depth was 
 reached in the eighteenth century, when every 
 petty prince of Germany constructed the cere- 
 mony of his court and the administration of his 
 principality after the model of the court and 
 administration of Louis XIV. French influence 
 was so thoroughly dominant that it paralyzed 
 all manifestations of the German spirit, and ren- 
 dered futile all attempts to further the national 
 development. Even so conspicious a leader of 
 the Germans as Frederick the Great exerted 
 whatever influence he possessed in favor of ex- 
 tending in Germany the culture of France. 
 
 The complete national demoralization of Ger- 
 many at the close of the last century, the loss of 
 national conciousness, and the almost entire ab- 
 sence of lofty patriotism, made it compirativsly 
 easy for the conquered German States to submit 
 to the conditions of the Napoleonic rule. With 
 sonu other nations this would have meant a far 
 greater sacrifice. Had the English, for example, 
 heen obliged to submit to similar conditions, it 
 would have cost them the painful renunciation 
 of that \vhich had grown to be a vital part of 
 their moral being. But the moral being of the 
 German at that time was incomplete; it lacked 
 the essential elem9iit of love of country. It was 
 
27 
 
 only when the patriotic' trumpet blasts of Kor- 
 ner and of Arndt .swept over the land, and 
 roused a responsive echo in the hearts of the 
 people, that the lacking* element was supplied. 
 The history of Germany's relation to foreign 
 powers previous to this time is an unenviable 
 record. But at this point begins a period of 
 great national achievements in foreign affairs, 
 through the important crises of which the na- 
 tion has been carried by the well-directed force 
 of patriotic enthusiasm. While the struggle 
 was for independence, as in 1813, or for bringing 
 about a more perfect national union, as in 1866 
 and in 1870, it was comparatively easy to keep 
 alive the patriotic fire; and in so far as the reign 
 of William has created a tradition of heroic 
 achievements in which the members of all states 
 are proud to claim participation, there has been 
 added a stimulus to the maintenance of the 
 newly awakened consciousness. But the press* 
 ure of poverty, which is being felt by a larger 
 and larger part of the population, tends in time 
 of peace to crush out patriotic sentiment and 
 breed discontent. Yet no way appears open to 
 the Empire for an offensive war of conquest 
 through which to quiet discontent and arouse 
 once more popular enthusiasm; and the defen- 
 
28 
 
 sive war which must be undertaken against 
 Russia sooner or later cannot be said to offer a 
 flattering prospect either to the government or 
 to the people. Although, therefore, the Ger- 
 mans have known how to make use of external 
 pressure from various sides to weld the bonds of 
 national union, and to create a powerful senti- 
 ment in favor of the Empire, the way does not 
 appear open to an equ illy advantageous usa of 
 those relations in the future. There seems to be 
 no scope for the future activity of the Empire 
 in international affairs but to stand in a position 
 of resistance. It has extended its territory to a 
 point which reason and the traditions of the na- 
 tion suggest as a proper limit. It has closed a 
 successful movement towards union with a ser- 
 ies of brilliant victories, and it may now abstain 
 from pursuing an aggressive p;>!L*y with entire 
 self-respect; in fact, there is no direction in 
 which such a policy can be pursued with advan- 
 tage and a show of justice. But with the na- 
 tions which stand as rivals of the Empire, France 
 and Russia, the case is quite different. They 
 are predetermined to aggression: France, by rea- 
 son of her wounded pride, her great losses of 
 territory and wealth and her desire to regain the 
 position so long held as the leader of European 
 
29 
 
 civilization; Russia, through the force of a tenden- 
 cy as old as the monarchy, and which for a thou- 
 sand years has been making itself manifest in 
 pushing out the borders of the Empire in all di- 
 rections. Between these two powers, the Ger- 
 man Empire, in the immediate future, Lsdoomi J 
 to the ungrateful task of m.iiat lining a powerful 
 army of defense. In the case of a nation like 
 France, whose parts have had no independent 
 existence for centuries, external pressure tends 
 to unite all parties and factions in the vigorous 
 pursuit of a common end, in other words, to 
 bring about a more complete national consolida- 
 tion. But in the case of Germany, where the 
 several States retain a happy memory of inde- 
 pendence, external pressure will not necessarily 
 bring about a more complete union and consoli- 
 dation. If it is strong enough to threaten to 
 overwhelm the Empire, it will the rather have 
 a tendency to loosen the bonds of union between 
 the States and lead them to seek safety in for- 
 eign alliances, thereby destroying the integrity 
 of the imperial state. Thereforp, although the 
 constitution has provided the strongest political 
 barrier possible against the disintegration of the 
 Empire, such di integration may become one of 
 the unavoidable consequences of an aggressive 
 
30 
 
 policy on the part of Prance or Russia. That 
 such is to be the policy of these two nations does 
 not admit of doubt. France which all the world 
 is disposed to leave in peace within her borders, 
 does not wish peace. Her annual army expenses 
 are now even more than those of the German 
 Empire; and it is not to be supposed that the 
 French nation is building 1 up a great military es^ 
 tabiishment simply that it may later go to pieces 
 through idleness and corruption. By this vast 
 expenditure, France is preparing 1113 ins which, 
 in the impending European war, may enable 
 her to have revenge on her ancient enemy and 
 set up once more her former prestige. 
 
 The initiative, however, in Germany's embar- 
 rassments from without is not likely to be taken 
 by France, but by Russia. Two hundred an i fifty 
 years ago the western limit of this colossal 
 empire was a line running through a point east 
 of the site of St. Petersburg. The political 
 center of the Czar's dominions has thus been 
 transferred to a region which in the seventeenth 
 century was a part of the Swedish territory. 
 In this gradual and apparently irresistible move- 
 ment westward, many states and provinces have 
 been absorbed, till at last a halt has been made 
 on the borders of the German Empire. Whether* 
 
t\\ls halt will be permanent or merely temporary 
 will depend upon the ability of Germany to cet 
 up a wall of defense firm enough to resist the 
 glacier-like movement of the Russian power. 
 For an indisputable solution of this doubt history 
 affords only one method, that of actual conflict; 
 and in the conflict, or series of conflicts, which 
 is to' determine the relative position of two 
 nations, the ultimate supremacy will incline to 
 that nation which has the more abundant 
 resources, either realized or undeveloped, of 
 men and wealth. In this respect Russia and the 
 United States are the two leading nations of 
 the world. They are nations not yet in the 
 prime of life, whose period of maximum wealth 
 and po"wer relatively to other nations is in the 
 future; while some of the other Western states, 
 as Spain and, perhaps, England, have passed 
 their prime, and in the future of civilization 
 will grow relatively less. Russia, therefore, 
 appears to be destined to fill a larger place than 
 hitherto in the community of nations, and it is 
 not improbable that earlier or later some of its 
 territorial expansion will be gained at the ex- 
 pense of the German Empire. But for a deter- 
 mination of the extent to which the Napoleonic 
 prophecy will be fulfilled we look to the future. 
 
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 General Library 
 University of California 
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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY