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ARGUMENTATION AND 
 DEBATE 
 
 BY 
 JAMES MILTON O'NEILL 
 
 PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AND ORATORY IN THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 
 
 CRAVEN LAYCOCK 
 
 DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 
 AND 
 
 ROBERT LEIGHTON SCALES 
 
 SOMETIME INSTRUCTOR IN ENGLISH IN DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 
 
 
 Nm fork 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 1923 
 
 AU rights r«serpe4 
 
* * * * 
 • • • • 
 
 COPYKIQHT, 1917 
 
 By the MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 Set up and electrotyped. Published July, 1917. 
 
 J7^Ji-/ 
 
TO 
 
 CHARLES FRANCIS RICHARDSON 
 
 TEACHER, COLLEAGUE 
 
 AND 
 
 FSIEND. 
 
 572144 
 
WISDOM 
 
 Viscount Morley, Chancellor of Victoria University, at the recent opening 
 of the John Morley Chemical Laboratory given to that institution by 
 Mr. Carnegie, said that he sometimes thought he would like to set an ex- 
 amination on the subject, "What is an Educated Person?" For himself, he 
 said, he would "put at the very top the qualification that any educated 
 man or woman should know what is evidence, should know when a thing is 
 proved and when it is not proved." Moreover, added the eminent English 
 literary and political critic, "The educated person should know how many 
 interpretations the same verbal proposition would fairly bear, what weight 
 was to be attached to rival authorities." This is an extremely interesting 
 dictum, one that will especially interest the scientist with his loyalty to the 
 scientific and inductive method, and the lawyer with his traditions of care- 
 ful weighing of evidence. 
 
 — Editorial, The Boston Herald. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This volume is the result of a complete re-writing of 
 Argumentation and Debate as published by Laycock and 
 Scales in 1904. It has seemed to me that the original text 
 contained the clearest and most orderly explanation of the 
 subject ever published. It was felt, however, that this text, 
 in common with all other texts in argumentation, was not 
 sufficiently thorough for college and university classes. A 
 text which would go more deeply into the methods and pre- 
 cepts which argumentation has borrowed from logic, law, 
 rhetoric, and oratory, has been greatly needed for some time. 
 This volume is the result of an attempt to meet that need. 
 How well this purpose has been accomplished you who read 
 and use this book must judge. 
 
 This book has been prepared in the hope that it will serve 
 as a text to be carefully studied, considered, and discussed 
 by college and university classes in academic courses in 
 argumentation and debate. Within this field the aim has 
 been the broadest possible one. The purpose of the particu- 
 lar classes for which it has been written should be thorough- 
 going intelligence in regard to argumentation and debate, not 
 merely platform efficiency in this field. Platform efficiency 
 is not to be decried, but it should come after and be based 
 upon thoroughgoing intelligence, and should not, in academic 
 class rooms, be made an independent end to the exclusion 
 of this broader and more fundamental educational aim. 
 Such being its purpose, this volume, is, of course, submitted 
 as equally useful in classes working either in oral or in written 
 argumentation or in both. The fundamental principles of 
 argumentation are identical in both forms. Certain special 
 adaptations for oral presentation are particularly considered 
 in Part III, Debate. 
 
 ix 
 
X PREFACE 
 
 In regard to the content and method of certain chapters, 
 a word of explanation may be due. In the first place it was 
 decided that considerable material showing the relation of 
 argumentation to other fields, particularly to those of law 
 and logic, should be included in this volume. I have long 
 desired that my classes should have more complete and more 
 authoritative explanations of our relations with these fields 
 than I have been able to find in previous text-books on argu- 
 mentation, and I know that I am not alone in this. Most 
 teachers of argumentation and debate probably desire that 
 their students shall have backgrounds and foundations in 
 the subjects comparable to those furnished students in other 
 departments of the curriculum. Such backgrounds and 
 foundations will make it possible for the student of argu- 
 mentation to relate this work intelligently to his work in 
 logic, law, English composition, etc. And particularly thej'' 
 will enable him to take the results of this work with him to 
 his work in all other courses and into his thinking and acting 
 in everyday life. Having decided to include material of this 
 sort (such as is particularly found in the chapters dealing 
 with Evidence, Kinds of Arguments, and Fallacies), the 
 question arose as to the manner in which such material should 
 be introduced. It was decided that the use of many direct 
 quotations from recognized authorities in these several fields 
 would be the most frank, most accurate, most authoritative, 
 and on the whole most satisfactory method. It is for this 
 reason that the readers will find an unusual, though under 
 the circumstances I trust not an undue, amount of direct 
 quotation from other writers, in this text. 
 
 Throughout the text an effort has been made to systematize 
 and organize the material to be presented in such a manner 
 that from the table of contents to the individual paragraphs 
 of each and every chapter, the relation of one part to every 
 other part would be made clear. It is recognized that the 
 difference in conditions under which instruction in argumen- 
 tation is given in different institutions, will probably make 
 
PREFACE xi 
 
 it necessary for some teachers to omit some portions of this 
 text. If particular classes wish to skip certain sections (such 
 as a part or the whole of the chapters on the Kinds of Argu- 
 ments, or Fallacies) this may very easily be done. A brief 
 summary of the section omitted, and a statement of its rela- 
 tion to the other parts of the book may very easily be made 
 by the teacher. It has been felt desirable that as far as the 
 limits of a single volume permitted, a complete statement of 
 the doctrines and principles that may be included within 
 the field of argumentation should be given, but given in such 
 a manner that individual teachers may make such adapta- 
 tions as the time allowed or the previous preparation of the 
 students may seem to make advisable. 
 
 A glance at the pages of this book will make it evident 
 that I am indebted to a great many writers in the various 
 fields with which argumentation is concerned. I have tried 
 to give accurate credit and documentation in every instance 
 in which I have consciously drawn from the work of those 
 who have gone before me. A complete bibliography of the 
 publications to which reference is made in this text is pub- 
 lished in the appendix, and here I wish to express my thanks 
 and obligations to all the writers whose works are listed in 
 that place. 
 
 In addition I wish to express my appreciation of the help- 
 ful suggestions and criticism which I have received while 
 preparing this manuscript from Professors J. A. Winans of 
 Cornell University, J. S. Gaylord of Winona Normal School, 
 W. C. Shaw of Dartmouth College, C. H. Woolbert, formerly 
 of the University of Illinois, Dean H. W. Ballantine of the 
 University of Illinois Law School, and Dr. H. M. Kallen of 
 the Department of Philosophy of the University of Wis- 
 consin. 
 
 J. M. ON. 
 The University of Wisconsin, 
 
 May, 1917. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 {To the original hook by Lay cock and Scales) 
 
 The growing recognition of the importance of Argumenta- 
 tion as a separate subject of study in American colleges, and 
 the increasing emphasis which is put upon the necessity for 
 a proper method of presenting it, are probably due to the 
 appreciation of two facts. In the first place, it is coming 
 to be acknowledged that Argumentation is a peculiar art, 
 distinct from all others. Many of its principles are derived 
 from the fundamental elements of other arts and sciences. 
 Formal logic, rhetoric, oratory, and the rules of court pro- 
 cedure all contribute to it of their precepts; but though it is 
 thus composite in nature, it is essentially a unified art, de- 
 manding investigation for its own sake. Furthermore, it is 
 realized that argumentative skill does not belong exclusively 
 to any one profession or class of men. To know how to argue 
 is necessary not alone for the lawyer or the publicist, but 
 equally for the preacher, the scientist, the business man, or, 
 indeed, for any one who may wish to influence the opinions 
 or actions of his fellows; it is a power which every educated 
 man should have an opportunity to acquire. With these 
 requisites in mind, the authors have made it their purpose, 
 taking these component elements from their various sources, 
 to develop from them a body of principles, by the study and 
 practice of which the student may gain, so far as possible, the 
 ability to create or control the beliefs of others. 
 
 Any one seeking by argumentation to influence the 
 thoughts or acts of another must employ either the written 
 symbol or the spoken word. In this day of the newspaper, 
 the magazine, and the essay much of the most potent argu- 
 mentation comes from the pen or the public press, so that 
 
 xiii 
 
xiv PREFACE 
 
 the needs of the hour call for training in the written form. 
 On the other hand, there is a large class of students, who are 
 in search of training for the court room, the deliberative 
 assembly, or the platform. Consequently, the requisites of 
 both these kinds of presentation must be recognized in any 
 treatment of the art as a whole. Accordingly, with a view 
 to these requirements, the following plan has been adopted 
 in presenting the subject. The work is divided into two parts : 
 the first contains a discussion of the general principles of 
 argumentation, applicable alike to written and to spoken 
 discourse; the second part is devoted to the setting forth 
 of certain additional precepts peculiar to oral debate. Finally, 
 realizing that a thorough mastery of the subject can come 
 only from continued practice, the authors have given, in the 
 Appendix, a brief outline of the methods of instruction which 
 they have found to be most serviceable, and have ventured a 
 few suggestions which may prove helpful in supplementing 
 the study of the text. 
 
 C. L. 
 
 R. L. S. 
 Hanover, N. H., 
 May 30, 1904. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART I. INTRODUCTORY 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1. Definitions and Relations 1 
 
 PART 11. ARGUMENTATION 
 
 A. INVENTION 
 
 2. The Proposition IS 
 
 3. The Burden of Proof 33 
 
 4. The Issues 42 
 
 B. SELECTION 
 
 5. Gathering Material 68 
 
 6. Evidence 80 
 
 7. Kinds of Arguments 114 
 
 8. Fallacies 170 
 
 C. ARRANGEMENT 
 
 9. General Principles of Arrangement 197 
 
 10. Brief Drawing and Outlining 208 
 
 D. PRESENTATION 
 
 11. Persuasion 249 
 
 12. The Introduction 298 
 
 13. The Discussion 322 
 
 14. The Conclusion 334 
 
 15. Refutation 344 
 
 PART III. DEBATE 
 
 16. The Nature of Debate 367 
 
 17. The Main Speeches 392 
 
 18. Rebuttal Speeches 420 
 
 19. Delivery 430 
 
 XV 
 
xvi CONTENTS 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A. Bibliography 445 
 
 B. Pleading 449 
 
 C. Judges' Ballot with Instructions 452 
 
 D. Rules for Legal Brief Drawing 454 
 
 E. 1. Material for a Short Brief 457 
 
 2. Material for a Long Brief 459 
 
ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 PART I. INTRODUCTORY 
 CHAPTER 1 
 
 DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. Argumentation defined. 
 
 B. Fundamental importance. 
 
 C. Universal and indispensable. 
 
 D. Twofold nature. 
 
 E. Conviction alone. 
 
 F. Persuasion alone. 
 
 G. Four processes: 
 
 1. Invention. 
 
 2. Selection. 
 
 3. Arrangement. 
 
 4. Presentation. 
 
 H. No distinct dividing line. 
 
 I. Debate defined. 
 
 J. Argumentation and logic. 
 
 K. Argumentation and the forms of composition. 
 
 L. Sources of argumentation: 
 
 1. Law. 
 
 2. Logic. 
 
 3. Rhetoric. 
 
 4. Oratory. 
 
 A. Argumentation defined. Argumentation is the art of 
 influencing others, through the medium of reasoned dis- 
 course, to believe or act as we wish them to believe or act. 
 
 B. Fundamental importance. Belief is an element which 
 is most truly fundamental in the ability of man to grow 
 
 1 
 
2 ARbbME^'TA'nON AND DEBATE 
 
 and in his power to create. It is the beliefs of the individual 
 about religion, about politics, and about society, which de- 
 termine his attitude toward men and events, and which 
 govern his Actions in the affairs of life. Moreover, a man's 
 belief is rarely, if ever, entirely original. His creed is wrought 
 out of the ideas of priests and prophets; his political prin- 
 ciples are made up of materials taken from economists and 
 statesmen; his social tendencies are influenced by the theories 
 of philosophers and reformers; and in all his conceptions, 
 far more than he can realize, he is influenced by the opinions 
 of his daily companions. So that the revelation of truth 
 and the establishment of justice in human affairs, must de- 
 pend largely upon the power of those who stand at any time 
 for what is true and just, to control the convictions of their 
 fellows and so to make them see the best and seek after it. 
 What, then, of the art whose work it is to influence others to 
 believe or to act? Must it not be respected and cultivated 
 as the embodiment of much that is worthiest in human 
 thought and action? 
 
 C. Universal and indispensable. But argumentation is 
 worthy of respect and study, not simply because of its funda- 
 mental importance, but also because it is so nearly universal 
 and indispensable. We find its uses made manifest in almost 
 every branch of affairs. In the legislative assembly the strug- 
 gles of parties are settled and policies of government are 
 worked out by argument; in the courtroom it is argument 
 which advances the conflicting claims of individuals, pro- 
 tects their rights and privileges, and guides the regulation 
 of the duties of the citizen to the State; in faculty meetings, 
 fraternity meetings, mass meetings, men must argue in order 
 to weigh one course of action against another; in the meeting 
 room of the directors of a corporation, it is by argument that 
 its members come to decisions as to what is honorable and 
 what is expedient; and, wherever in the home or on the 
 street men differ about their private concerns, they argue 
 to adjust their differences and to find the truth. Indeed, 
 
DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 3 
 
 wherever active-minded men with opinions meet, there is 
 sure to be argumentation. 
 
 D. Twofold nature. It has long been the custom of 
 writers on argumentation to speak of its twofold nature — 
 its relation to reason on the one hand and to emotion on the 
 other. The subject has been divided into considerations of 
 principles that have to do with reason — ^principles of convic- 
 tion, and those that have to do with emotion — ^principles of 
 persuasion. Conviction has been defined as an appeal to 
 the intellect and persuasion as an appeal to the will. 
 
 Now modern psychologists are telling us that this old divi- 
 sion is not an essential or fundamental one, that in ultimate 
 psychological analysis conviction and persuasion are the 
 same, that these terms represent properly only a difference 
 of emphasis in methods of approach to the whole personality, 
 that the real appeal is to the person as a whole, and that 
 psychologically there is no difference between winning assent 
 to a thesis dealing with an unemotional matter of fact, and 
 winning assent to a proposition dealing with contentious 
 policies and deep prejudices. 
 
 These developments of modern psychology give rise to the 
 question, "Shall students of argumentation now drop this old 
 division and pay no further attention to long recognized 
 principles of conviction and persuasion?'* The answer is, 
 "No"; and in this answer the psychologists concur. 
 
 For practical purposes it is well to use this old distinction 
 to differentiate the types of cases or types of approach in cases 
 which have to do, first, mainly with gaining the assent of the 
 whole personality to such a proposition as, "A straight line is 
 the shortest distance between two points," and, second, 
 mainly with such propositions as, "Resolved: that National 
 Prohibition by Federal Amendment is desirable." We have 
 to deal in argumentation with all sorts of propositions rang- 
 ing from those to be carried, if at all, by clear and sound 
 reason based on facts — ^mere questions of fact in which human 
 likes and dislikes are not enlisted, to propositions of policy 
 
4 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 which touch the prejudices and passions very deeply. Be* 
 tween these two extremes we find all grades of mixture. 
 
 It is thought worth while for practical purposes to continue 
 to call work oh the former a work of conviction, and work on 
 the latter a work of persuasion, to label an appeal to the 
 "whole personality" which calls principally for a considera- 
 tion of the weight of evidence and the strength of inference as 
 an appeal to the intellect or "conviction," and to label an ap- 
 peal to the "whole personality" which calls for a considera- 
 tion of personal likes and dislikes, desires and prejudices — of 
 the duties, virtues, or happiness of oneself or others — to label 
 this sort of approach an appeal to emotions or "persua- 
 sion." And when we speak of argumentation which is aimed 
 at belief we mean mere acceptance — intellectual agreement. 
 When we speak of argumentation which aims at action we 
 mean gross action, behavior, conduct — not simply mental 
 action which is, of course, present in the acceptance of behef 
 or intellectual assent. 
 
 Successful argumentation practically always deals with 
 both aspects. Almost all important propositions on which 
 men differ are such that both intellectual and emotional con- 
 siderations have to be met. Beliefs are used as a basis for 
 action. 
 
 Winans' discusses the distinction between conviction and 
 persuasion in the following excellent paragraphs : 
 
 " It is convenient to use the word persuasion when we come 
 to treat, of influencing conduct. The word is not without 
 difficulties, since usage varies; yet there seems to be no good 
 substitute. A review of the authorities justifies us in accept- 
 ing tentatively Whateley's ^ definition of the word: 'Persua- 
 sion, properly so called, i. e., the art of influencing the will.* 
 To influence the will is identical with influencing the conduct, 
 and includes inducing or checking single acts or affecting a 
 prolonged course of conduct; but, as we shall use the term 
 persuasion, it is not limited to inducing physical acts, but 
 I Winans, pp. 249-250. 2 p^ge 128. 
 
DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 5 
 
 includes changing the mental attitude by removing preju- 
 dice, bringing about a fair-minded attitude toward a person, 
 a willingness to consider a proposition, or a desire to accept 
 it. The term is broad enough to include conviction, but we 
 shall for convenience use the latter term to designate the 
 process of * Bringing any one to recognize the truth of what 
 he has not before accepted. . . . ' ^ 
 
 "Those to whom the term persuasion means inducing to 
 believe usually distinguish it from conviction by saying that 
 to persuade is to secure belief by rather emotional methods, 
 while to convince is to use logic and reasoning. So The Stand- 
 ard Dictionary says persuade means *to induce to believe 
 willingly.* Here we have, probably, a hint of why the words 
 convince and persuade have been confused. To induce a man 
 to believe it is often necessary to make him willing to consider 
 the proposition at all, to remove prejudice and induce a will- 
 ingness to believe. Now this is a matter of emotional atti- 
 tude, and changing emotional attitude is included in the 
 proper work of persuasion. In this position I have the sup- 
 port of Baker's Principles of Argumentation, in which it is 
 said (p. 7) : * Conviction aims only to produce agreement be- 
 tween writer and reader; persuasion aims to prepare the way 
 for the process of conviction and to produce action as the 
 result of conviction.'" 
 
 E. Conviction alone. By the force of reasoning, by the 
 use of simple fact and logic, a man may make others see that 
 this or that statement is justified, that this or that argument 
 is logical, or even that the whole idea he is contending for is 
 true; but it does not follow that he has made them accept as 
 guides of conduct the propositions he advances. In order 
 to make them fully accept his views of the matter or agree 
 to act as he wishes, the arguer must also make them desire 
 to carry out his thesis by affecting their emotions. 
 
 "Nothing would seem to be a plainer lesson of experience 
 than that we mortals often leave undone those things we 
 ^ New English Dictionary. 
 
6 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 know we ought to do, and do those things we know we ought 
 not to do; yet this truth is constantly ignored by speakers, 
 and with bad results. This truth is proverbial: *The spirit is 
 willing, but the flesh is weak;' Video meliora proboque; deter- 
 iora sequor. Certain knowledge that lack of exercise is ruining 
 one's health does not necessarily drive one out of doors; yet 
 one does not for a moment believe that one's work or pleasure 
 is worth the cost. There must be, then, more than intel- 
 lectual acceptance of truth to secure action. 
 
 "It may seem absurd to insist upon such a truism as that 
 men do not always act in accordance with judgment; but I 
 write out of memory of class-room struggles. When regard- 
 ing a cold, barren, tactless speech I have asked, *What ele- 
 ments of persuasion does this contain?' I have received the 
 answer, *Does it not prove my claim? What more is 
 needed?' Apparently I have appeared a shocking cynic 
 when I have suggested that men are not always governed 
 by pure reason."^ 
 
 The weakness of any argumentative effort which consists 
 only of conviction, i. e., an appeal to the reason, is this: that, 
 though the person addressed may understand^ he may not 
 really be in any way affected because the impulses which give 
 force to his inmost convictions, and which stimulate him to 
 action, may not have been reached. Of course, in those cases 
 in which there is no persuasion, which are in nature cases for 
 pure conviction, as demonstrations in geometry, we must 
 not look for anything else. What has been said refers to 
 the weakness of relying on pure conviction in cases that have 
 persuasive possibilities — that seek to affect human conduct. 
 
 F. Persuasion alone. The results of an almost wholly 
 emotional appeal are usually no more satisfactory than those 
 of a simple intellectual demonstration. It is seldom an ad- 
 vantage for a speaker to stimulate the moving impulses of his 
 audience unless he can hold them in control; for he may find 
 he has set free a force that is as likely to act to his detriment 
 ^ Winans, p. 251. 
 
DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 7 
 
 as to his benefit. Then, too, he will probably find that the 
 effect of his appeal is but fleeting and unreliable; he will find 
 his hearers are stirred only to shallow and passing excitement, 
 and that calm deliberation will reveal the unsubstantial 
 nature of the argument and so leave their permanent beliefs 
 unaffected. The proportion of emphasis on conviction and 
 persuasion as these terms are here used, will, in any par- 
 ticular case, depend, of course, upon the circumstances; 
 in a college debate very often little persuasion is sufficient; 
 the campaign orator uses a great deal. Both, however, are 
 necessary in all effective argumentation which aims at in- 
 fluencing human behavior. 
 
 G. Four processes. Whatever the relative importance 
 of conviction and persuasion, there are, in every piece of 
 argumentative work four indispensable processes: (1) to 
 find out just what you want to establish; (2) to gather 
 the materials needed for the proofs; (3) to arrange these 
 materials; (4) to present them in good rhetorical or oratori- 
 cal form. For convenience we may name these four proc- 
 esses (covered in Part II of this book) respectively (1) In- 
 vention, (2) Selection, (3) Arrangement, and (4) Presentation. 
 
 1. Invention consists in determining upon those ideas 
 in the truth of which the speaker or writer wishes to make 
 his hearers or readers believe. No man can hope to influence 
 the beliefs of others, unless he first has in his own mind (a) 
 an exact idea of the beliefs he wishes to inculcate, (b) a clear 
 conception of the points of fact he must establish to convmce 
 his readers or hearers. Under this head we study proposi- 
 tions, burden of proof, and issues. 
 
 2. Selection consists in choosing from all the sources of 
 human knowledge those facts and inferences that will serve 
 to establish the ideas determined upon. Of all the evidence 
 and arguments that may be found on any question, the ar- 
 guer can use and wishes to use a comparatively small amount. 
 He must sort this small amount out of the mass of available 
 material with the utmost care. His success must depend in 
 
8 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 great degree upon his tact and good judgment in choosing 
 those materials that will appeal strongly to the minds and 
 hearts of those he seeks to influence. Here we take up 
 gathering material^ evidence, kinds of arguments^ and fallacies. 
 
 3. Arrangement consists in organizing these selected 
 materials in such a way as to secure the maximum effect upon 
 the beliefs or actions of the persons addressed. However 
 valuable the facts or appeals chosen for use may be, their 
 efficiency will depend largely upon the plan in accordance 
 with which they are utilized. They cannot be presented 
 clearly or forcibly unless they are brought into proper rela- 
 tions with each other and with the whole proof. Under ar- 
 rangement we consider general principles of arrangement and 
 briefing and outlining. 
 
 4. Presentation consists in putting the materials into 
 good rhetorical or oratorical form, in effectively communi- 
 cating their force to others by means of a good use of thought 
 and language. To convey to another the ideas invented, 
 selected, and arranged, demands a many-sided skill. In 
 written argument it calls for the application of the principles 
 of rhetoric; in spoken argument it calls for speaking ability 
 and skill in persuasion; in debate it calls for the peculiar pow- 
 ers of resource and adaptability which the circumstances of 
 this form of controversy demand. Here we study persuasion, 
 the introduction, the discussion, the conclusion, and refuta- 
 tion. 
 
 H. No distinct dividing line. Of course there are no dis- 
 tinct lines of demarcation between these various processes: 
 in any piece of argumentation the progress is continuous, 
 from the first conception of the ideas to be considered to the 
 final presentation. Any separation of it into parts must be 
 more or less arbitrary. It is attempted in this book only 
 because it may help in presenting some of the fundamental 
 principles with greater clearness. 
 
 I. Debate defined. Debate is a direct oral argumenta- 
 tive contest between two opposing sides, on a definite ques- 
 
DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 9 
 
 tion, at a definite time. It is a specialized form of argumen- 
 tation and requires special knowledge and skill not required 
 in other forms of argument. A good argumentative essayist 
 is not necessarily a good debater. A man who can write and 
 memorize and deliver a good argumentative address is not 
 necessarily a good debater. The latter must have all the skill 
 of the former, and in addition he must know how to conduct 
 his case on the platform. He must know the rules of the 
 game, and must be able to meet the many situations in offense 
 and defense as they arise in the contest. In Part III of this 
 volume, which is devoted to debate, we consider the nature 
 of debate, the main speeches, the rebuttal speeches, and delivery. 
 
 Before undertaking a detailed study of Argumentation it 
 will be well to have clearly in mind the relation of argumenta- 
 tion, not only to debate, but also to other subjects, especially 
 logic, and the forms of composition. 
 
 J. Argumentation and logic. Argumentation has been 
 defined as the art of influencing others, through the medium 
 of reasoned discourse, to believe or to act as we wish them to 
 believe or act. "Logic may be defined as the science of 
 thought, or as the science which investigates the process of 
 thinking." ^ "Logic is suflSciently defined for our purposes 
 if we say that it is the science of proof or evidence.'* ^ "Logic 
 may be most briefly defined as the Science of Reasoning. It 
 is more commonly defined, however, as the Science of the 
 Laws of Thought, and some logicians think it is the Science 
 of the Formal, or of the Necessary Laws of Thought." ^ 
 " Much discussion of a somewhat trifling character has arisen 
 upon the question whether Logic should be considered a 
 science only, an art only, or both at the same time . . . but 
 it seems substantially correct and suflScient to say, that logic 
 is a science in so far as it merely investigates the necessary 
 principles and forms of thought, and thus teaches us to un- 
 derstand in what correct thinking consists; but that it be- 
 comes an art when it is occupied in framing rules to assist 
 * Creighton, p. 1. 2 Bode, p. 4. ^ Jevons, p. 1. 
 
10 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 persons in detecting false reasoning. A science teaches us 
 to know and an art to do, and all the more perfect sciences 
 lead to the creation of corresponding useful arts." ^ There 
 is then a distinct difference between argumentation and logic 
 as the latter is usually defined. It is near the truth to say 
 that logic is the science of which argumentation is the corre- 
 sponding art. Logic teaches us to know, argumentation to do. 
 Logic helps us to understand the laws of thought, argumenta- 
 tion helps us to make other people agree with what we think. 
 K. Argumentation and the forms of composition. Argu- 
 mentation is usually classified as one of the four forms of 
 composition — narration, description, exposition, argumen- 
 tation. It is probably useful from the standpoint of the 
 teaching of English composition to have this label for a 
 composition that seeks to prove a definite proposition, but 
 it is not accurate to conceive of argumentation as simply one 
 of the four forms of composition. The art of argumentation, 
 of influencing the beliefs and actions of others by reasoned 
 discourse, rests upon much beside the principles of composi- 
 tion.^ Of the four processes treated in this book two only are 
 concerned with these principles, and these two are con- 
 cerned with much else. The man who would do satisfactory 
 work in argumentation must be skilled in description, narra- 
 tion, and exposition; and he must have in addition a knowl- 
 edge of logic, skill in gathering and testing evidence, and in 
 brief drawing, a knowledge of various methods of procedure 
 (for the most part borrowed from the law), along with skill 
 in using them, and, in most cases, ability in public speaking. 
 It is probably true, moreover, that most descriptive, narra- 
 tive, and expository writing is designed for the eye and is to 
 be read, and not heard by the ear. The opposite is true in 
 regard to argumentation. Practically all great arguments 
 are speeches, and even when argumentation is designed for 
 print rather than oral delivery, as in controversial articles, 
 editorials, etc., the best effect is gained by writing as if for 
 ^ Jevons, p. 5. 
 
DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 
 
 11 
 
 an audience with the hearer and the opponent always in mind. 
 What might be called a "speech style" or "oral style" is al- 
 ways preferable in argumentation and is practically always 
 used in good argumentation. So the worker in argumenta- 
 tion, whether oral or written, should be well versed in all that 
 goes to make effective speaking. In the words of Professor 
 Alien, "These, then, are the problems we have to consider: — 
 the use of the universal laws of reasoning, the development of 
 the habit of analysis and of unprejudiced methods of investi- 
 gation, the secret of cloar and rapid expression of intellectual 
 processes, and the art of adapting one's material to his hearers 
 so as to win their favor and affect their conduct. Clearly 
 the art that involves all this is of no mean order." ^ Clearly, 
 also, an art that involves all this is more than a subdivision 
 of the art of composition. 
 
 L. Sources of argumentation. The following table 
 shows approximately the sources of the rules, principles, 
 doctrines, methods, devices, etc., which taken together make 
 up the subject-matter of a thorough course in argumenta- 
 tion. Notice that some of the topics may be traced back to 
 more than one of the four great ancestors of argumentation: 
 Law, Logic, Rhetoric or English Composition, and Oratory 
 or Public Speaking. 
 
 1. Law 
 
 2. Logic 
 
 3. Rhetoric 
 
 4. Oratory 
 
 Burden of Proof 
 
 Propositions 
 
 Kinds of Arguments 
 
 Voice 
 
 Presumptions 
 
 Presumptions 
 
 General Principles 
 
 Platform 
 
 Issues 
 
 Issues 
 
 of Composition: 
 
 skill 
 
 Evidence 
 
 Evidence 
 
 Unity, 
 
 Technique of 
 
 Briefing 
 
 Kinds of Arguments 
 
 Coherence, 
 
 Debate 
 
 Refutation 
 
 Fallacies 
 
 Emphasis, 
 
 Oral Style 
 
 Procedure 
 
 Refutation 
 
 Outlining 
 
 Sentence Structure 
 Refutation 
 
 Persuasion 
 
 
 
 Persuasion 
 
 ^Art of Debate, p. 9. 
 
PART II. ARGUMENTATION 
 
 SECTION A. INVENTION 
 CHAPTER 2 
 
 THE PROPOSITION 
 
 OUTLINE 
 I. The Theory of Propositions 
 
 A. Subjects must be propositions. 
 
 B. Definition. 
 
 C. Necessity of having a proposition in all sorts of situationSc 
 
 1. Club. 
 
 2. Court of law. 
 
 3. Assembly. 
 
 4. Public discussions. 
 
 D. Advantage to hearer and speaker. 
 
 E. Not always expressed. 
 
 F. Classification. 
 
 1. Fact. 
 
 2. Policy. 
 
 n. Formulating the Proposition 
 
 A. The problem of formulating the proposition. 
 
 B. The process of formulating the proposition. 
 
 1. Finding the real question. 
 
 a. Study origin. 
 
 b. Analyze ideas. 
 
 2. Formulating the tentative proposition. 
 
 3. Testing this proposition. 
 
 a. Definitions. 
 
 b. Summary of definition. 
 
 4. Comparing and adjusting. 
 
 C. These steps not to be taken mechanically. 
 
 13 
 
14 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 III. Characteristics of Good Propositions for Debate 
 
 A. A list of desirable characteristics : 
 
 1. Assertion. 
 
 2. Single. 
 
 3. Unambiguous. 
 
 4. Unprejudiced. 
 
 5. As concrete and specific as possible. 
 
 6. Burden of proof on affirmative. 
 
 7. As brief and simple as possible. 
 
 8. Debatable. 
 
 9. Interesting. 
 
 I. The Theory of Propositions 
 
 A. Subjects for argumentation must be propositions. 
 In this important particular, argumentation differs, in addi- 
 tion to the things mentioned in the last chapter, from any of 
 the other kinds of rhetorical composition. In any of the three 
 other forms, we may have for our subject a simple word or 
 phrase, denoting merely some general concept existing in 
 the mind, which we wish to portray for our reader. If we 
 wish to write a narrative, we may choose some such subject 
 as "The Battle of Manila," or "An Ascent of the Jungfrau." 
 For an exposition we might well select such a topic as "The 
 New York Clearing House," or "Forest Fires; Their Cause 
 and Their Prevention," — these phrases would make excellent 
 titles for compositions of this nature; but in argumentation 
 such terms would be wholly valueless. 
 
 To take an example : suppose a student desiring to write 
 an expository discourse should determine on the title, "The 
 Tariff Bill of 1913." This would be a worthy subject; he 
 could in his composition, treat briefly of the history of tariff 
 legislation, explain the economic principles involved, give 
 the particulars in which this bill differs from earlier bills, 
 especially its immediate predecessor, tell what its advocates 
 and opponents claimed as to its probable effect, and perhaps 
 discuss the method of its administration, thus making of 
 
THE PROPOSITION 15 
 
 the whole an exposition of the nature and workings of this 
 bill. But as the subject of an argumentative effort this term 
 would be useless, for it does not suggest anything definite to 
 be proved or disproved ; it does not state any belief which the 
 writer wishes his reader to accept. In an argument on this 
 subject the author might discuss any one of a dozen ideas or 
 beliefs; he might argue for or against this particular bill; 
 that a high protective tariff would be a benefit to the people 
 of the United States; that tariff for revenue only is unwise. 
 If his argument is to be effective, he must determine in ad- 
 vance what idea or belief he is to uphold or attack. The sub- 
 ject of his argument will be a statement of the particular 
 idea or belief with which he is concerned. But a belief or an 
 opinion cannot be accurately expressed in a word or a phrase. 
 It demands a complete statement, a full sentence. To use 
 more technical language, we cannot argue a term; we must 
 have a proposition. 
 
 B. Definitions. "A term is so called because it forms 
 one end (Latin terminus) of a proposition, and strictly speak- 
 ing it is a term only so long as it stands in the proposition. 
 But we commonly speak of a term or a name meaning any 
 noun, substantive or adjective, or any combination of words 
 denoting an object of thought, whether that be .... an in- 
 dividual thing, a group of things, a quality of things, or a 
 group of qualities." ^ "Any word or group of words which 
 serves to point out any imaginable subject of discourse is 
 looked upon as a name or term." ^ "A complete assertion or 
 statement consists of two terms and a copula, and when then 
 expressed it forms a proposition." ^ "A proposition is the 
 expression in words of an act of judgment." * "A judgment 
 is a mental assertion of some thing as true or untrue, while 
 a proposition is the expression of a judgment in words. A 
 proposition therefore is a sentence." ^ 
 
 ^ Jevons, p. 17. ' Jevons, p, 16. 
 
 2 Bode, p. 7. 4 Creighton, p. 78. 
 
 ^ Bode, p. 52. 
 
16 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 To illustrate: "The Single Tax," "Co-education," "Mt. 
 Washington," "The Relation of Church and State," are all 
 terms. These expressions might well serve as the subjects of 
 narrations, descriptions, or expositions. No one of them could 
 serve as the basis of an argument.^ Before we can argue we 
 must have a judgment, an opinon, a belief, expressed in words 
 — that is a proposition. " Co-education should be abolished at 
 X (or adopted at Y)," "The Single Tax is preferable to the 
 general property tax," are propositions. 
 N C. The necessity of having a proposition in all sorts of 
 situations in which people argue should be kept carefully 
 in mind. 
 
 ^" 1. In a club there was once assigned as the topic of an 
 evening's debate, "William Pitt's Place in Enghsh History." 
 A few of the disputants spoke of his parliamentary abilities, 
 of his power as an orator and political leader; others gave 
 their attention to a consideration of his statesmanship, com- 
 mending his foreign policy or criticising his selfishness and 
 unscrupulousness; others commented on his personality and 
 his private life; and so, each speaker looked at the subject 
 from his own point of view, and no one endeavored to prove 
 or disprove any particular proposition. The discussion was 
 in many ways interesting, but as a debate the evening's work 
 was a failure; no one had been induced to accept any definite 
 belief about the subject, and no conclusion had been estab- 
 lished. In order to turn the discussion into a debate, the sub- 
 ject should have taken some such form as: Resolved, that 
 William Pitt was the greatest parliamentary leader of the 
 eighteenth century; or, William Pitt's conduct of Irish 
 affairs was detrimental to the interests of the Irish people. 
 The disputants made the mistake of trying to argue a 
 Jterm. 
 
 2. In a court of law we find a system in sharp contrast to 
 
 ^ Of course we can argue about the meaning of a term. We can express our 
 belief as to what the term "The Single Tax" means, and argue that prop- 
 osition. 
 
THE PROPOSITION 17 
 
 the method of this historical club. Here it is necessary that 
 the deliberations accomplish definite results. There must 
 be no waste of time or energy, and the end of it all must be 
 a settlement of the question presented for consideration. 
 With these purposes in mind, the court of law demands that 
 whenever a question is brought before it, "pleadings'* be 
 made and that these pleadings "shall set forth with certainty 
 and with truth the matters of fact or of law, the truth or 
 falsity of which must be decided to decide the case." In 
 other words, the court demands that any man who would 
 argue before it must, before he begins his demonstration, 
 make a clear and unmistakable proposition, stating the things 
 that he intends to prove true or false. 
 
 3. In a deliberative assembly, such as the house of repre- 
 sentatives, the proposition would be found expressed in the 
 form of some bill or resolution. In board meetings, faculty 
 meetings, society meetings, mass meetings, etc., the proposi- 
 tion usually exists in the form of a motion from the floor. 
 The presiding oflScer should see to it that a complete motion 
 covering the question in hand be phrased and presented to 
 the assembly, and that all discussion be confined to the 
 particular proposition before the house. y 
 
 4. In general public discussions a speaker should always V 
 have a definite proposition for each and every speech that he 
 makes. This is well brought out by Professor Foster in the 
 following paragraph: 
 
 "Every political campaign shows the need of definite 
 propositions for debate. In Maine, in the fall of 1906, some 
 of the speakers had no definite proposition, but launched 
 with vehemence upon the topic of the Prohibitory Law. 
 Stripped of all the confusing verbiage, invective, and humor, 
 some of the speeches of the Democrats could be reduced to 
 the contention, 'Prohibition does not prohibit'; and some of 
 the speeches of the Republicans could be reduced to the 
 contention, * Temperance is a great virtue.' As these 
 speeches were not concerned with debatable issues, there 
 
18 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 was no debate. Argumentation demands a complete prop- 
 osition." ^ 
 
 D. Advantage to hearer and speaker. The making of a 
 proposition is of great advantage to the reader or hearer in 
 enabHng him to understand the discussion and get some real 
 fruit from it. But it is no less an advantage to the writer or 
 speaker. In the first place, if he does not know the exact 
 proposition at issue, he is almost sure to waste time and effort, 
 and to confuse his audience, in arguing about matters that 
 are wholly outside the real question, and in proving things 
 that are "beside the point." Then again, he must know the 
 proposition in order to understand the position taken by his 
 opponent, and so be able to refute him. The proposition is 
 simply a statement of the position which the writer or 
 speaker must establish or overthrow, and he cannot expect 
 to be successful, either in positive proof or in refutation, 
 unless he understands just what is the work necessary for 
 him to do. 
 
 E. Propositions are not always expressed. While the 
 proposition should always be phrased by the writer or speaker 
 before he prepares his argument, it may be expressed or not 
 as the circumstances seem to require. Sometimes it may be 
 advisable not to state the proposition at the outset. This is 
 often true when one is preparing to address a "hostile" au- 
 dience or to write for a circle of readers whose present preju- 
 dices and beliefs are known to be opposed to the writer's po- 
 sition. In such a case it is well to use as a title sl term (State 
 wide prohibition) or the question form ("Is state wide prohi- 
 bition advisable.'^") and disclose your position only after you 
 have carefully prepared the way. For an oral debate the 
 proposition should always be expressed, and in the form of a 
 resolution: "Resolved: that state wide prohibition should be 
 adopted in Wisconsin." 
 
 F. Classifications of propositions may be drawn up in 
 many ways. Hyslop ^ gives six main divisions and nineteen 
 
 1 Foster, p. 3. 2 p^ge 121. 
 
THE PROPOSITION 19 
 
 subdivisions. But a consideration of the classifications made 
 in the science of logic would not have great practical value to 
 a student of the art of argumentation. Some writers ^ in the 
 latter field have, however, classified propositions as (1) prop- 
 ositions of fact and (2) propositions of policy. A proposi- 
 tion of policy deals with the question, "Ought this to be 
 done?" A proposition of fact deals with the question, 
 "Is this true? " A proposition of fact aims at belief, a propo- 
 sition of policy aims at action. Therefore unmixed ques- 
 tions of fact, as propositions in geometry, are settled largely 
 by impersonal convictions; questions of policy tend more and 
 more to be matters for persuasion mainly as we get further 
 from fact towards matter of mere personal likes and dislikes. 
 In argumentation we may try to influence others to belief 
 or act. Usually we try to do both. Most actions are based 
 on beliefs and most beliefs influence actions. By establishing 
 a certain fact or certain facts to the satisfaction of a given 
 audience (that is by both convincing and persuading) we 
 influence them to act as we desire. But since most argu- 
 ments of policy rest upon questions of fact, since many ques- 
 tions can be so phrased as to fit either type without altering 
 materially the nature of the case, and since the work to be 
 done in finding, phrasing, supporting, or attacking, is prac- 
 tically the same for both kinds of propositions, it is hardly 
 worth while to try to make much of this classification. It is 
 wise, however, to decide, among other things, whether we 
 are arguing facts (as such) or policies, before planning our 
 argument. A student should, moreover, consider this in 
 connection with choosing propositions for contest debating;^ 
 and in the affairs of real life we should avoid trying to settle 
 by discussion questions of fact that should be investigated 
 rather than argued. 
 
 1 See Pattee, pp. 20-22, and Gardiner, pp. 12-26. 
 
 2 See post, characteristics of good propositions (debatable), p. 30. 
 
20 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 II. Formulating the Proposition 
 
 So far we have been considering the nature of propositions 
 in general and the necessity of having a proposition in order 
 to have an argument. We now turn to the practical consider- 
 ation of how to formulate the particular proposition we need 
 from the mass of ideas to be found in any general field. 
 
 A. The problem of formulating the proposition when one 
 is not definitely formulated for us, is an exceedingly important 
 and often very difficult task. Stephen on Pleading ^ opens 
 with this significant sentence: "In the course of administer- 
 ing justice between litigating parties, there are two succes- 
 sive objects, — to ascertain the subject for decision, and to 
 decide." In practicing general argumentation under any and 
 all circumstances we should keep in mind these '*two succes- 
 sive objects." We should agree on what is to be decided 
 before we proceed to decide it. We should follow the instruc- 
 tive example of the courts in fixing on the proposition to be 
 decided, before we get confused by, and confuse, the evidence 
 and argument available in the general field of the discussion. 
 This is as true in arguments on politics, literature, and re- 
 ligion around the fire or at the dinner table, as of other dis- 
 cussions in legislature or courtroom. Let us first analyze 
 our differences as a distinct step, before advancing to attack 
 or defend. If this is done much argument will be saved. 
 Agreements will come with understanding. It is not always 
 easy to determine just what is the question really in issue, 
 but it is easier before the argument starts than after. It 
 may be obscured by the words of the discussion; it may be- 
 come confused with other kindred but different questions; it 
 may be separated with difficulty from the general problem 
 that embraces it. Then again it is often difficult to put the 
 question into words after it is found. Looseness in expres- 
 sion, ambiguity, the failure to know the true acceptations of 
 the words in the proposition, are mistakes fruitful in possibil- 
 ^ Williston's edition, p. 1. 
 
THE PROPOSITION 21 
 
 ities of serious error. The writer must know how to find out 
 what it is he wants to prove and how to express himself in 
 such a way that there can be no question as to his exact 
 meaning. 
 
 B. The process of formulating the proposition naturally 
 divides itself into four steps: (1) Finding out what is the 
 real quesiion, i. e., the facts and ideas, the truth or falsity of 
 which must be decided to decide the question. (2) Formulat- 
 ing the question in words. After the facts in issue have been 
 determined, they must be tentatively expressed in the form 
 of a complete statement. (3) Testing this statement by a 
 definition of its terms to find out just what it means as it 
 stands. (4) Comparing the meaning of the statement so 
 expressed with the meaning of the real question. If the state- 
 ment thus formulated does not express just what is intended, 
 it must be modified until it does. Whatever the circum- 
 stances, these four steps, though they are usually so inter- 
 mingled as not to seem like separate operations, will always be 
 helpful in finding or testing the true proposition. 
 
 1. Finding the real question. The student starting out 
 in his search after the proposition will usually find that it 
 exists originally in his mind in the shape of some problem 
 of a general nature. This problem, probably, is of too vague 
 and indefinite a character to be a fit topic for an argumenta- 
 tive effort. In order to develop from it a suitable proposition, 
 it must be narrowed down and restricted within the bounds 
 of some concrete and particular proposition. The work, 
 then, of determining on the exact question to be discussed is 
 largely the work of selecting out of a broad and general field 
 some single, concrete, and limited phase of the whole prob- 
 lem. In performing the work of this first step there is no 
 exact rule or method for all cases. Sometimes it may be neces- 
 sary for the disputant-to-be to examine the contents of his 
 own mind. More often it becomes desirable to do a consider- 
 able amount of preliminary reading and investigation in 
 connection with the search. But, whatever the circum- 
 
22 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 stances, the "narrowing down" process is essentially the 
 same, and there are certain steps that are always serviceable. 
 In the first place, it is generally helpful (a) to consider the 
 conditions under which the question arose. If the WTiter will 
 understand just how he came to be interested in the problem 
 he has in his mind, he will be able to see more clearly just 
 what is the phase of it with which he is most concerned and 
 which he desires to discuss; or, if he is investigating the prob- 
 lem by the reading of books or current magazines, the mat- 
 ters really in issue will take more definite form in proportion 
 as he understands the circumstances that generated them and 
 brought them into discussion. In the second place, after gain- 
 ing a comprehension of the origin of the question, it remains 
 for him (b) to analyze the ideas embraced within the general 
 problem as it exists in his own mind or in the minds of others. 
 Then he is ready to select the parts he wishes to consider and 
 classify them in such a manner that the result shall be a 
 single, distinct, and definite proposition. 
 
 To take an example: Let us suppose that a student in 
 want of a debatable proposition finds himself interested in 
 "The labor problem." He cannot argue "the labor prob- 
 lem " ; it is merely a term, and is too vague and indefinite an 
 idea. He must "narrow it down." To do this, he first con- 
 siders the origin of the question (or the origin of his interest 
 in the question). He finds perhaps, that his interest has 
 been aroused by some magazine article discussing compulsory 
 arbitration as a cure for strikes, or by some comment among 
 his friends on the incorporation of labor unions. Having 
 gone thus far, it remains for him to analyze his ideas and so 
 reduce the question still farther. Is it in the United States 
 that he thinks labor unions should be incorporated.'^ Further, 
 does he believe they ought to be incorporated under State 
 laws or under Federal laws.'* Does he want to consider only 
 the incorporation of the unions, or does he wish to discuss 
 the kindred question of the desirability of a compulsory arbi- 
 tration law.^ And so he goes on, interrogating his own mind, 
 
THE PROPOSITION 23 
 
 until he hits upon the exact phase of the labor problem that 
 he wishes to discuss. He has discovered the "real question." 
 
 2. Formulating the tentative proposition. Having found 
 the real question he formulates a proposition, perhaps as 
 follows, "Resolved: that in the United States labor unions 
 should be compelled to incorporate under Federal laws." But 
 this is only a part of the task; the question still remains: 
 Is this the proposition? Does it contain the ideas the student 
 has in mind.'' The statement thus made must be tested to see 
 if it expresses just what the writer intends. 
 
 3. Testing this proposition as first formulated is very- 
 important. A carelessly constructed sentence may result 
 in the making of a proposition which is very far from the 
 embodiment of the writer's ideas. And this carelessness 
 may have very serious results. A false grammatical con- 
 struction or the choice of a wrong word may mean the differ- 
 ence between victory and defeat, between having one's 
 ideas accepted and having them rejected. To avoid these 
 dangers, care must be taken that each word of the statement, 
 and the statement as a whole, shall represent one's ideas as 
 accurately as possible. Failure to understand the exact 
 meaning of a given proposition is often shown in the class 
 room. 
 
 For example, take a discussion of the question: " Re- 
 solved : that labor unions in the United States are detrimental 
 to the industrial interests of the country." In a debate on 
 this proposition, the affirmative admitted that the principle of 
 the organization of labor was right, and that labor unions 
 ought to exist in some form; "but," they said, "labor unions 
 to-day are detrimental because they inflict certain injuries 
 on the consumer and the employer, by such means as strikes, 
 the limitation of output, the uniform wage scale," etc. The 
 negative said, in substance, "We admit that labor unions 
 declare strikes, and that strikes are bad; we admit that the 
 unions sometimes limit output; but we contend that on the 
 whole the unions are not detrimental, because the industrial 
 
24 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 conditions would become worse if they did not exist at all." 
 Clearly the two sides did not meet at all in the discussion. 
 They were arguing two different questions. The affirmative 
 was arguing whether or not the policies and principles of the 
 unions at that time were such as to do greater injury than 
 good to industry; the negative was arguing the question 
 whether or not labor ought to be organized at all. The confu- 
 sion arose from a failure to find out what the proposition really 
 meant. It meant either the one thing or the other, but, in the 
 same debate, it should not mean both. The discussion could 
 not bring about any result till it had been settled what was 
 the true interpretation of the question. The disputants had 
 found a proposition, but not the proposition. Each word that 
 may be at all ambiguous must be examined and its true 
 meaning discovered. The grammatical structure of the sen- 
 tence and the relation of the words to each other must be 
 investigated, in order to be sure of the rightful interpretation 
 to be put upon the statement as a whole. 
 
 a. Definition. This work of testing the meaning of the 
 proposition may be called definition. The word "definition" 
 suggests a simple and easy task. "Look in Webster or the 
 Standard Dictionary , and work is done.'* But this is a mis- 
 take. Sometimes the statement is so simple that very little 
 effort is necessary to be sure of its meaning. But often the 
 proper testing of a proposition is a long and complicated 
 process. To take an example: Suppose a student is trying 
 to prepare for an intercollegiate debate a question having 
 to do with the preservation of the "independence" of some 
 nation. He starts out to define the word "independence." 
 He first consults W^ehster's Dictionary, and he finds there 
 this definition: "Exemption from reliance on others or con- 
 trol by them." This definition seems to fit his idea; but if 
 he is wise he will not accept it. The definition is valueless. 
 The dictionary merely gives the acceptation of the word in 
 its general usage. This question of the independence of a 
 nation is a question of international relations, and the term 
 
THE PROPOSITION 25 
 
 "independence** is a technical term in the code of the law of 
 nations. " Independence," then, must have the special mean- 
 ing given it in international law. 
 
 The student must seek this special meaning. He may 
 look in some larger dictionary, which will explain the term 
 in its technical interpretation. Probably he will directly 
 consult the international law authorities themselves. In 
 Lawrence's Principles of International Law, p. Ill, he 
 would find the following: "Independence may be defined as 
 the right of a state to manage all its affairs, whether external 
 or internal, without interference from other states, as long 
 as it respects the corresponding right possessed by each fully 
 sovereign member of the family of nations." 
 
 This would surely seem to be a final definition. But if the 
 student should go into a debate with that as his understand- 
 ing of the word, he would probably meet with an unpleasant 
 surprise. If he should carry his investigation further, he 
 would find that there are exceptions to the rule laid down in 
 the definition, exceptions that are really a part of the rule of 
 law. He will find that one nation or a group of nations may 
 directly interfere in the external or internal affairs of another 
 nation without violating that nation's rights of independence, 
 provided the intervening nations are interfering in order to 
 protect their own rights of sovereignty. He would find fur- 
 ther that the theory of independence permits a nation, even 
 when its own sovereign rights are not endangered, to interfere 
 in the affairs of another nation and restrict the exercise of 
 some of its natural rights of sovereignty, provided the re- 
 strictions imposed are of a certain limited nature as to their 
 extent and duration. These exceptions are as important 
 as the so-called "definition" itself. In fact, the debate, if 
 well argued, would probably turn on the truth of these ex- 
 ceptions and their application to the question. 
 
 An understanding of the true meaning of this word "in- 
 dependence" could only be found by this painstaking in- 
 vestigation. No less careful or less thorough definition could 
 
26 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 have disclosed the import of the word; and this accurate 
 knowledge was indispensable in order to make the proposi- 
 tion of any real value. 
 
 b. Summary of steps in definition. In the case of nearly 
 every such definition, the same method has to be pursued. 
 First, find its ordinary acceptation. Second, determine 
 whether it may have any meaning that is technical or in any 
 way peculiar. If it does have such a peculiar meaning, the 
 definition must be sought in the exposition of some writer 
 who will explain this special interpretation. If it is a term 
 in science, go to the speciahst in that science; if a political 
 phrase, go to the statesman or historian; if a legal term, go to 
 the jurist. Third, even after the definition is obtained from a 
 good authority, consider the questions : Are the terms of this 
 definition that I have found exact? Are there any exceptions 
 to the general statement .^^ The exceptions sometimes de- 
 stroy the rule. 
 
 4. Comparing and adjusting results of other steps. For 
 the fourth and last step it remains simply to compare and 
 adjust the results of the first three steps. If the work of 
 definition shows the statement as originally formulated to be 
 inaccurate or ambiguous, if it is found that the tentative prop- 
 osition does not express the ideas that the author intended 
 it to express, then the statement must be changed till it finally 
 does put the real question into words, clearly and accurately. 
 
 C. These steps are not to be taken mechanically. It 
 must not be supposed that they are mutually exclusive, set 
 off by hard and fast lines, and always to be followed rigidly 
 one after the other in the order given. They represent rather 
 an analysis of the process one should follow in framing a 
 proposition under the most diflScult circumstances. They 
 show the maximum of work to be done. In ordinary practice 
 they run together, and we phrase propositions usually per- 
 haps without taking all of these steps. This process is of- 
 fered here as a guide for the most difficult cases, and as a 
 testing and checking device in all cases. As much of this 
 
THE PROPOSITION 27 
 
 process should be followed in each instance as is needed to 
 insure the correct statement of the proposition. 
 
 III. Characteristics of Good Propositions for Debate 
 
 A. A list of desirable characteristics ^ or qualities of good 
 propositions for debate will help us to test ready made 
 resolutions for debate. We do not formulate from a general 
 field all of the propositions on which we have to work either 
 in courses in argumentation or in our business and political 
 activities. Many of them are given to us by others. More- 
 over, many of the subjects on which we do formulate proposi- 
 tions are of such a nature that the processes we have been 
 discussing do not have to be worked out in detail. It is 
 therefore worth while to have such a list in order that we may 
 have a simple series of tests by which to judge all proposi- 
 tions, our own and those of other people. Such tests are 
 particularly needed for propositions for formal debate. 
 
 1. Assertion. A proposition for debate should be phrased 
 in the form of an assertion, not a question. This is necessary 
 in order to get a clean-cut statement of the position of the 
 affirmative. It prevents ambiguity and makes possible an 
 accurate placing of the burden of proof. "Resolved: that 
 the city of X should install a water system using the water 
 of Lake A." Not, *' Should the city of X use the water of 
 Lake A?" 
 
 2. Single. A proposition should be single, not double. 
 The error must be avoided of combining two separate ideas in 
 one proposition; two questions, closely akin to one another 
 but really distinct from each other, may easily become con- 
 fused and be carelessly joined together in a single statement. 
 For example, students sometimes devise such propositions 
 as, "Resolved: that a high protective tariff is hostile to the 
 economic interests of the United States, and reciprocal trade 
 relations should be established with the Dominion of Can- 
 
 ^ For similar lists see Foster, p. 12, Keteham, pp. 13 and 20. 
 
\-r 
 
 28 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 ada;" or, "Resolved: that labor unions are detrimental to 
 industry, and they should be compelled to incorporate." 
 Now in each of these propositions there are two problems 
 presented; these problems are similar in the nature of the 
 ideas contained in them, but the issues to be determined are 
 very different. The proofs necessary to establish the fact 
 that labor unions are detrimental to industry are not at all 
 the same proofs required to show that they should be com- 
 pelled to incorporate; so that the attempt to combine in one 
 demonstration what are really two distinct proofs must 
 result in confusion. We may handle each of these questions 
 separately, but we cannot hope to treat both successfully 
 in one debate. Consequently, in formulating our statements 
 for debate, we must be sure not only to have a proposition, 
 but to have a single proposition. 
 
 3. Unambiguous. A proposition should be unambiguous. 
 Avoid ambiguous, general terms capable of a number of 
 different meanings — Civilization, church, progress, conser- 
 vatism. Use the most specific, most definite, most limited 
 term possible in each case. For example, in the proposition : 
 "Resolved: that the judiciary should be (or should not be) 
 independent of the will of the people," what is meant by 
 "judiciary," "independent," "the will of the people".^ 
 Until definite meanings have been agreed upon for all of 
 these terms (and preferably substituted for the original am- 
 biguous terms in the proposition) there can be no discussion 
 worth while. 
 
 4. Unprejudiced. A proposition should be unprejudiced. 
 
 he question must not be begged by a phraseology that as- 
 sumes the point to be proved. " Resolved : that the undesir- 
 able Japanese should be excluded." "Resolved: that the in- 
 efficient lecture system should be abolished." "Resolved: 
 that the barbarous conduct of the Bulgarian troops should be 
 condemned." The italicised words are all question begging 
 epithets which practically cover the point at issue. Avoid all 
 descriptive expressions of praise or blame. Colorless ex- 
 
THE PROPOSITION 29 
 
 pressions which serve simply to identify or define should be 
 used exclusively in phrasing propositions. 
 
 5. Concrete and specific. The proposition for debate 
 should be as concrete and specific as possible. This rule is 
 qualified somewhat because one cannot accurately say that 
 all propositions for debate should be concrete and specific. 
 If the case presents for discussion an abstract or general 
 proposition, there is no reason why such discussion should 
 not be had, but every proposition for debate should be as 
 concrete and specific as the circumstances of the discussion 
 permit. 
 
 6. Burden of proof on aflBlrmative. The burden of proof 
 should be on the affirmative. This general principle which is 
 universally true, should replace the rules of thumb contain- 
 ing half truths in regard to the negative statements and the 
 word "not." It makes no difference whether the proposition 
 is worded negatively or contains the forbidden word "not," 
 so long as the affirmative of the proposition as worded has 
 the burden of proof. ^ The burden of proof actually rests 
 upon the side advocating a change, or opposing the existing 
 order. The presumption is with "things as they are" where- 
 ever there is well-ordered discussion. Wherever there is 
 debating which pays proper attention to logical sequence and 
 economy of time and attention, the attack of the one op- 
 posing the present and advocating the new, is always ad- 
 vanced before the defense of the established order (or a 
 counter proposition or remedy) is brought forward. So that 
 in phrasing a proposition for debate, in order not to go astray 
 on this point, the only thing that is necessary is to inquire 
 which side is advocating the new, and opposing the existing 
 situation; then so word our proposition that that side will 
 have the affirmative. Often changing situations require dif- 
 ferent wordings of propositions due to the fact that the ac- 
 tual presumption may change from side to side with changing 
 conditions. For instance, a few years ago the proposition 
 
 ^ See oh. 3 on "Burden of Proof." 
 
30 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 "Resolved: that United States Senators should be elected by 
 popular vote," was well worded. Now this proposition is 
 badly worded because the burden of proof actually lies upon 
 the negative, and the presumption is with the aflSrmative. 
 Therefore, to-day the proposition should read, "Resolved: 
 that United States Senators should be elected by the Legis- 
 latures of the several states," or some other wording which 
 places the burden of proof upon the affirmative, and requires 
 the affirmative to advocate a change from the existing order. 
 
 7. Brief and simple. A proposition for debate should be 
 as brief and simple as possible. This rule is also qualified be- 
 cause brevity and simplicity should always be sacrificed to 
 accuracy. It sometimes happens that we are debating a 
 proposition which deals with a situation so complex that a 
 long and complex proposition is needed to set forth with 
 accuracy our opinion in regard to this situation. All we can 
 do is to strike out every superfluous word, and to have as 
 brief and simple a statement as will allow us to say accurately 
 what we wish to say. 
 
 8. Debatable. A proposition for debate should be de- 
 batable; By that we mean that it should be two-sided. 
 To speak more accurately, a proposition is debatable when 
 it is such that it permits an intelligent difference of opinion, 
 after the important facts which underlie it have been set 
 forth. We must avoid propositions which should be settled 
 by definite tests, or measurements, or investigation, rather 
 than by discussion. For instance, do not debate the ques- 
 tion of a horse's weight; weigh the horse. Do not debate 
 whether or not the price of a certain commodity has risen 
 25% in the last decade; refer to trustworthy reports and find 
 out whether or not this is true. This means practically. Do 
 not debate pure questions of fact when it is possible by investi- 
 gation to determine the truth so accurately that intelligent men 
 cannot differ after the results of the investigation become known. 
 Important questions of policy are practically always good 
 questions for debate. Certain questions which are questions 
 
THE PROPOSITION 31 
 
 of fact, but which cannot be settled accurately by simple 
 investigation, such as questions concerning the origin of the 
 earth, the origin of life, the descent of man, etc., may also 
 be excellent questions for debate. Useless, of course, for 
 the purpose of debate are all propositions stating mere per- 
 sonal taste or opinion which is based upon elements that are 
 hard to weigh and measure, or which involve comparisons 
 that must rest either upon such elements or upon simple 
 definition. For instance : " Resolved : that Lake Y is the most 
 beautiful lake in America." '* Resolved: that law is a nobler 
 profession than medicine." "Resolved: that James Whit- 
 comb Riley was a great poet." 
 
 9. Interesting. Propositions for debate should be inter- 
 esting. This applies of course more particularly to public 
 contest debates. The affairs of actual life require us often to 
 debate whatever propositions come up for discussion regard- 
 less of whether or not we are interested in them; and we do 
 not propose to say that committees, courts, and legislatures 
 should refrain from taking up any but interesting questions. 
 But for contest debating and practice debating, particularly if 
 the debaters want the advantage of a live audience, we should 
 give some attention to choosing propositions that will be 
 generally interesting to the debaters and to the audience 
 that we wish to attract. 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 2 
 
 THE PROPOSITION 
 
 1. Properly phrase as good propositions for debate six propo- 
 
 sitions of fact and six of policy. 
 
 2. Phrase good propositions on some phase of each of the 
 
 following subjects (these terms need not necessarily be 
 used in the proposition): Woodrow Wilson; Theodore 
 Roosevelt; Co-education; College Entrance Require- 
 ments; Minimum Wage; Mexico; Foreign Trade; Liquor 
 
32 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Regulation; English Composition; Inter-collegiate Ath- 
 letics. 
 
 3. Bring to class three argumentative newspaper editorials, 
 
 clipped from the recent press, preferably from the col- 
 lege paper, with a properly phrased proposition of your 
 own for each, which embodies as accurately as possible 
 the thesis of each editorial. 
 
 4. Hand in a list of ten poorly worded propositions for debate, 
 
 taken from lists of propositions in text-books, pamphlets, 
 bibliographies, etc., indicating the defects in each, and 
 giving the proper re-wording. 
 
 5. Hand in a well- worded proposition on some important 
 
 subject of interest to you, on which you will work during 
 the whole semester, and which will be referred to here- 
 after as the subject for your "original forensic." 
 
 Note: Lists of propositions ready worded for debate are omitted from this 
 book because it is felt that each class can better work out its own proposi- 
 tions according to the suggestions of this chapter. Subjects for propositions 
 can easily be obtained by reading the editorials of the daily press, or looking 
 through recent or current numbers of such periodicals as: Current Opinion, 
 The Review of Reviews, North American Review, The Forum, The Literary 
 Digest, The New Republic, Colliers, The Nation, etc. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. The problem of the burden of proof. 
 
 B. In legal procedure. 
 
 C. The shifting of the burden of proof. 
 
 D. Counter propositions. 
 
 E. Two propositions at once. 
 
 F. The burden of rebuttal. 
 
 G. Summary. 
 
 1. Burden of proof always on the actual aflBrmative, never 
 
 shifts. 
 
 2. Actual affirmative is the one who wants a change. 
 
 3. Actual affirmative and nominal affirmative must coincide. 
 
 4. Affirmative prima facie case creates for negative a burden 
 
 of rebuttal. 
 
 5. Burden of rebuttal may shift from side to side during the 
 
 debate. 
 H. Presumptions. 
 
 1. Of law. 
 
 a. Conclusive. 
 
 b. Disputable. 
 
 2. Of fact. 
 
 A. The problem of the burden of proof/ in common with 
 many other specific problems of general argumentation, can 
 best be studied by investigating its treatment in legal proce- 
 dure; for it is in the law that practical reasoning has received 
 most attention and reached its highest development. It 
 
 ^ For an exhaustive and authoritative discussion of this whole subject, 
 see Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, Chap- 
 ter IX. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1898. 
 
 33 ) 
 
34 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 seems to us wise to give a separate chapter to this problem, 
 and to try to present a clear and complete statement of the 
 burden of proof in law and in general argumentation. If 
 close attention were paid in argumentation outside the court- 
 room as well as in legal trials to such matters as burden of 
 proof, burden of rebuttal, prima fade case, types of negative 
 cases, etc., much confusion, disorganized bickering, and fu- 
 tile disputing would be avoided. These doctrines are sim- 
 ple to understand, easy to apply, and should be adhered 
 to in all argumentation which has any serious purpose 
 whatever. 
 
 B. In legal procedure. The expression "burden of 
 proof" in law is used in two different and distinct meanings, 
 and is also used by some people in a confused way to repre- 
 sent both meanings without discrimination. First. It is 
 used to represent the "risk of the proposition," the burden 
 upon that party to the controversy who will lose if nothing is 
 done. It is the burden of making good his claim which rests 
 upon the one who starts an action, who demands a change 
 from the existing situation. This is the true meaning of 
 "burden of proof," and is the only proper meaning of that 
 term outside of law courts. Second. In law, however, a 
 different meaning is also recognized. The term "burden of 
 proof" is sometimes used to mean the duty of "going forward 
 with evidence or argument" at any given time. Thus, if the 
 plaintiff who has the burden of proof in the first instance, 
 makes out a prima facie case, the defendant must bestir 
 himself in opposition to the aflfirmative, or accept defeat. 
 In these circumstances, he is said to have a duty to go for- 
 ward with either evidence or argument. If he accomplishes 
 this successfully, then the duty of going forward is once again 
 upon the affirmative or plaintiff. This duty or burden is 
 clearly quite distinct from the original risk of the proposition, 
 of making good his claim, which is upon every man who goes 
 into a court with a claim of any kind. Third. There is, as 
 we have said, a confused and undiscriminating use of the 
 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF 35 
 
 expression "burden of proof" to cover either or both of these 
 concepts. 
 
 C. The shifting of the burden of proof has long bepn a 
 vexed question in argumentation. It is clear from what we 
 have said above that the burden of proof in its first and most 
 legitimate meaning, that of the "risk of the proposition" 
 which is carried by the party to the controversy who demands 
 a change, can never shift. Since this is the only meaning that 
 the expression "burden of proof" should have in general 
 argumentation, it is proper to say that the burden of proof 
 never shifts. The duty of going forward with evidence or 
 argument at any given time, of course, may shift from time 
 to time in the course of the trial or discussion. But the 
 proper term to apply to this shifting burden is neither "bur- 
 den of proof" nor "duty of going forward," but ''burden of 
 rebuttal.** This "burden of rebuttal " may shift. For example, 
 the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the affirmative 
 who comes into court (or into a legislature, before a mass 
 meeting, a board of directors, or other assembly, or con- 
 ference) demanding or recommending a change in the exist- 
 ing situation. He necessarily takes the responsibility of 
 showing that such a change ought to be made. Before any- 
 one can be required to show why such a change should not 
 be made, the plaintiff or the affirmative must make out a 
 prima facie case. A prima facie case is one of sufficient 
 strength to win if it is not refuted. Suppose the affirmative 
 makes out such a case. Then the negative has a "burden 
 of rebuttal." He has not a burden of proof. His essential 
 responsibility is only to ^counteract the influence of the 
 prima facie case of the affirmative. If he does this the burden 
 of rebuttal may be said to shift to the affirmative, and if the 
 affirmative successfully answers the negative, the burden of 
 rebuttal is once again upon the negative and the prima facie 
 case stands still unanswered. If we will keep in mind these 
 two expressions, " burden of proof " and " burden of rebuttal " 
 and use them always as here defined, there will be no more 
 
36 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 confusion in regard to burden of proof. These terms will 
 be used in this way throughout this book. 
 
 D. Counter propositions. Whenever the answer of the 
 negative takes the form of a counter proposition^ (in law an 
 "affirmative defense") the negative, of course, becomes es- 
 sentially an affirmative, and has the burden of proof on the 
 new proposition. For example, if in a first degree murder 
 case the answer of the defense is not that the accused did not 
 kill the deceased, but that the accused was insane at the time, 
 this constitutes a counter proposition. For the time being the 
 question at issue is not, "Resolved: that A is guilty of mur- 
 der in the first degree," but, "Resolved: that A is (or was at 
 the time in question) insane." On this proposition the origi- 
 nal defense becomes the affirmative. The accused is pre- 
 sumed to be sane until the contrary is established. The 
 original prosecution becomes the negative, and seeks to 
 prevent the establishment of the fact of insanity. Here, 
 clearly, there is no shifting of the burden of proof. There is 
 a new proposition with a burden of proof of its own, and this 
 burden is on the new affirmative, and never shifts. 
 
 E. Two propositions at once. There is one type of dis- 
 cussion in which there are really two affirmatives, two nega- 
 tives, and two burdens of proof; really two propositions to be 
 decided in the same case. Such is the situation when we have 
 a case of direct comparison between two claims neither of 
 which has any presumption in its favor. This is the case when 
 it has been decided that a certain thing shall be done but the 
 choice between two plans has not yet been made. Suppose 
 it is decided that a canal shall be built between A and B. The 
 only question is whether the canal will be built on the X 
 route or the Y route. A commission is appointed to decide, 
 and the advocates of the two routes appear before the com- 
 mission to debate. Here there is really no affirmative, no 
 negative, no burden of proof as regards the big issue. It is 
 a question, and cannot be stated as a resolution placing a bur- 
 
 ^ See Types of Negative Cases, eh. 16. 
 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF 37 
 
 den on one unless we frame a counter proposition placing the 
 burden on the other. But if the X route has been adopted, 
 then the presumption is in its favor and the advocates of the 
 Y route have the burden of proof to show that the Y route 
 is better than the X route. 
 
 F. The burden of rebuttal. This term was invented by 
 Dean H. W. Ballantine. It is to be hoped that its use will 
 become universal. Its general acceptance will lend accuracy 
 and clearness to what has heretofore been a confused and 
 troublesome situation both in law and general argumenta- 
 tion and debate. Says Dean Ballantine, 
 
 ''Professor James Bradley Thayer was the first to demon- 
 strate clearly the inaccuracy of the common expression that 
 the burden of proof * shifts,' and to elaborate the distinction 
 between the burden of proof in the sense of *duty to estab- 
 lish,' which never shifts, and what is awkwardly termed 
 *the duty of going forward with the evidence,' which does 
 have the characteristic referred to as 'shifting.' It is sug- 
 gested that what is referred to as the burden of proof in this 
 second sense, or the so-called 'duty of going forward with 
 the evidence,' which is in fact not a duty at all, ought to be 
 christened by the new but exact name of 'burden of rebuttaV 
 When the plaintiff makes out a complete 'prima facie case, 
 whether with the aid of a presumption or by reasonable and 
 credible evidence, the burden of proof is said to shift to the 
 defendant. This use of the phrase is very inaccurate and 
 confusing. What is meant is that the plaintiff, having es- 
 tablished a preponderance in favor of his contentions, has 
 created a burden of rebuttal, or the necessity for this opponent 
 to meet and repel his prima facie case by evidence of equal 
 weight. This may be accomplished either by counter proof 
 and refutation of one or more of the essential propositions of 
 the plaintiff's case, or by the defendant assuming the laboring 
 oar and making affirmative proof of new propositions of his 
 own in confession and avoidance.^ The burden of proof is 
 ^ See Pleading, Appendix B. 
 
38 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 thus sometimes assumed by the defendant, but the need for 
 this arises only after the plaintiff has made out by evidence, 
 presumptions, or admissions, his case in chief. The defendant 
 may have the choice either to bear the burden of rebuttal which 
 has been created by the plaintiff, or to assume the burden of 
 proof of an affirmative defense, as where the defendant, in- 
 stead of denying the due execution, shows a material altera- 
 tion in the note sued on, and then the plaintiff in turn has 
 either to deny or rebut such showing, or confess and avoid 
 it by proof of circumstances rendering the alteration lawful 
 or excusable. The plaintiff must always at his peril maintain 
 the proof of his own contentions at the required height and 
 keep them good. As to these the burden never shifts from 
 him although he may satisfy it from time to time. But the 
 burden of rebuttal may be created for the plaintiff to reply to the 
 affirmative propositions of the defendant, in addition to the 
 necessity of restoring his own contentions. Thus the center 
 of gravity, or the preponderance of the evidence, may shift 
 from the plaintiff to the defendant or back again, but the 
 burden of establishing the proposition of claim or defense is 
 always with the same party. The negative is safe with an 
 even balance or equilibrium and he need merely rebut or 
 neutralize his adversary's proof; he need not establish a 
 rebuttal by a preponderance of evidence." ^ 
 
 G. Summary: 1. The burden of proof, then, always 
 rests upon the actual affirmative. 2. The affirmative is the 
 party who will lose if no evidence or argument is offered — 
 if nothing is done. The affirmative is the dissatisfied party, 
 the one who wants a change, the attacking party. 3. Care 
 must be taken that propositions be so phrased that the actual 
 affirmative and nominal affirmative coincide, that the af- 
 firmative of the proposition is actually taken by the one up- 
 holding the burden of the controversy. "The obligation of 
 proving any fact lies upon the party who substantially as- 
 
 ^ H. W. Ballantine, The Apportionment of Proof and the Burden of Rebuttal. 
 Law Notes, Dec, 1912, p. 168. 
 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF 39 
 
 serts the affirmative of the issue." ^ For example in the 
 question: "Resolved: that in the United States private own- 
 ership of railroads is preferable to national ownership," the 
 negative advocates a radical change. The negative "sub- 
 stantially asserts the affirmative of the issue." So the neg- 
 ative has the burden of proof, and is under obligation to 
 present evidence or argument before the affirmative can 
 properly be called on. If nothing is done the affirmative 
 wins. This of course is all wrong. The error is in the word- 
 ing of the proposition. It must be changed so that the real 
 burden of proof will rest on the affirmative side. This can 
 be done by transposing the words "private" and "national." 
 Then the affirmative is the attacking party, the dissatisfied 
 party, the one who loses if nothing is done. 4. When the af- 
 firmative has carried its burden of proof sufficiently to establish 
 a prima facie case, it has created for the negative a burden of 
 rebuttal. 5. The burden of rebuttal (a more accurate term 
 than *the duty of going forward with argument or evidence') 
 may shift from side to side during the conduct of the debate. 
 
 H. Presumptions of one kind or another are so often 
 mentioned in connection with the burden of proof that it is 
 well to state briefly the common usage of this term in law; 
 in order that we may know accurately what we are doing 
 when, in general argumentation, we attempt to use this term 
 in a way analogous to its legal usage. In order to set forth 
 with accuracy and authority the statement of the theory 
 of presumptions in English law, we quote the following 
 from an article in the English Law Magazine, volume 6, p. 348, 
 October, 1831. This article Professor Thayer quotes ^ and 
 characterizes ^ as "The best consideration of the subject of 
 presumption known to me." 
 
 "Presumptions are commonly divided by writers on Eng- 
 lish law, into two classes, namely, presumptions of law, and 
 presumptions of fact. 
 
 ^ Greenleaf, p. 93. ^ p^d Treatise, pp. 539ff. Appendix. 
 
 ' Thayer, pp. 313, footnote. 
 
40 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 "1. Presumptions of law are of two kinds, a. FirsU 
 conc/MSi>e or imperative presumptions, that is, legal rules not 
 to be overcome by any evidence that the fact is otherwise. 
 Thus by the statute of limitations, a simple contract debt, 
 not kept up in certain specified manners, is extinguished after 
 a lapse of six years, nor can it be recovered by proving that 
 the sum due has never been paid. . . . Again, a sane man 
 is presumed to contemplate the probable consequences of his 
 own acts; and this presumption is conclusive, nor may he 
 rebut it by showing that in fact he did not foresee them. . . . 
 b. Second, * disputable or rebuttable presumptions are def- 
 initions of the quantity of evidence, or the state of facts, 
 sufficient to make out a prima facie case; in other words, of 
 the circumstances under which the burden of proof [burden of 
 rebuttal] lies on the opposite party. Of this very extensive 
 class of presumptions a few examples will suffice. Thus, a 
 man is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty; that is, if 
 a man is charged with a crime, he is not bound to prove that 
 he did not, but his accuser is bound to prove that he did com- 
 mit it. (In cases of homicide, however, if it merely appears 
 that one man has killed another, he is presumed to be guilty 
 of murder, unless such evidence is produced as will either re- 
 duce the offense to manslaughter, or entirely remove its crim- 
 inality, by justifying or excusing it.) ^ 
 
 "2. Presumption of fact has a totally different meaning 
 from presumption of law; and refers not to propositions, but 
 to arguments — not to assuming, but inferring. When evi- 
 dence is offered which can only be brought to bear on the 
 matter at issue by a process of reasoning, the inference is 
 termed a presumption of fact. The statement on which this 
 inference is founded is termed presumptive evidence} . . . 
 If the witness or documents attest, not the fact to be proved, 
 but something from which that fact may be inferred, the evi- 
 dence is said to be presumptive or indirect. [The distinction 
 
 1 Footnote by Thayer, p. 541. 
 
 2 See Circumstantial Evidence, ch. 6. 
 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF 41 
 
 between positive and presumptive evidence is most correctly 
 stated by Mr. Bentham. * Evidence (says he) is direct, 
 positive, immediate, when it is of such a nature, that (ad- 
 mitting its accuracy) it brings with it a beHef of the thing to 
 be proved. Evidence is indirect, or circumstantial, when it 
 is of such a nature that (admitting its accuracy) it leads 
 to a belief of the thing to be proved only by way of induc- 
 tion (i. e., (deduction), reasoning, inference.' — Treatise on 
 Evidence by Dumont, 186n.] ^ A pr esumptio n ,_therefQre« 
 injthis sense, or a presumption of fact, can only mean an. 
 argument or inference; and presumptive evidence is not 
 evidence taken by itself, but only because, joined to some 
 other general proposition, it tends to prove a certain con- 
 clusion. Thus, when it is said that, where a person was found 
 standing over a wounded man with a bloody sword in his 
 hand, there is a presumption (or it may be probably inferred) 
 that the one stabbed the other; the fact that the man was 
 found with a bloody sword has, in itself, apart from its 
 consequence, no weight; but it tends to determine the ques- 
 tion at issue, who stabbed the wounded man. So, if the date 
 of a man's birth be at issue, and it is proved that he died 
 in a certain year at a certain age, his age and the time of his 
 death are in themselves indifferent; but they are data to 
 determine the year of his birth. . . . 
 
 "Natural presumptions, or presumptions of fact, are not 
 properly opposed to legal or artificial presumptions; but are 
 arguments founded on presumptive or circumstantial evi- 
 dence, which is opposed to direct or positive evidence. Pre- 
 sumptive evidence being that which tends to prove the fact 
 at issue, or from which the fact at issue may be inferred; 
 while direct evidence establishes the fact at issue itself 
 without any process of reasoning." 
 
 ^ Footnote by Thayer, p. 547. 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 THE ISSUES 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 I. Theory of Issues 
 
 A. Issues defined. 
 
 B. Examples. 
 
 1. In law. 
 
 2. In general discussion. 
 
 C. Terminology. 
 
 1. In law. 
 
 2. In general argumentation. 
 
 a. Potential. 
 
 b. Admitted. 
 
 D. Necessity of knowing. 
 
 E. Issues and proposition. 
 
 F. Issues and burden of proof. 
 
 1. Affirmative and negative. 
 
 2. Counter proposition. 
 
 3. Winning or losing. 
 
 G. Issues and conviction and persuasion. 
 H. Number and form of issues. 
 
 I. Issues and partition. 
 J. "Stock issues." 
 
 II, Finding the Issm^ 
 
 A. Think. 
 
 B. Study. 
 
 1. History. 
 
 a. Origin. 
 
 b. Present status. 
 
 2. All phases. 
 
 3. Both sides. 
 
 42 
 
THE ISSUES 43 
 
 C. Exclude. 
 
 1. Mutually admitted matter. 
 
 2. Irrelevant matter. 
 
 3. Unimportant matter. 
 
 4. Indirect matter. 
 
 D. Select. 
 
 1. Points which meet tests of C. 
 
 2. Vital points. 
 
 I. The Theory of the Issues 
 
 A. Issues defined. The issues are the inherently vital 
 points, elements, or sub-propositions, aflSrmed by the affirma- 
 tive and denied by the negative, upon the establishment of 
 which depends the establishment of the main proposition. 
 They are the ultimate, irreducible, essential matters of fact 
 or of principle (law) upon which the conclusion of the ques- 
 tion hinges. They are not simply "important main points" 
 or "points on which there is a clash of opinion." They are 
 the smallest possible divisions of crucial points, each one of 
 which the affirmative must establish in order to establish the 
 proposition. 
 
 B. Examples. Before explaining further let us illustrate 
 this by concrete examples from law and general argument. 
 
 1. In law. First let us say for example that A is accused 
 of the crime of burglary at common law. Now this crime 
 has five essential elements, (1) breaking, and (2) entering 
 (3) a dwelling (4) at night, (5) with felonious intent. There 
 are in the firstj^ace five issues here. The State (affirmative) 
 must prove /alU five. They are all vital. If the defense 
 (negative) prevents the affirmative from establishing any 
 single point beyond any reasonable doubt, the case of the 
 affirmative fails. Then the defendant is not guilty of bur- 
 glary. He may be guilty of a number of other things, but 
 that is another story. The defendant may admit that he 
 broke and entered a dwelling at night, but deny that it was 
 done with felonious intent — say he did it to put out a fire. 
 
44 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 The affirmative has established (or gained an admission of) 
 four of the five necessary points, but the whole case falls. 
 No affirmative case can stand after the loss of a single issue. 
 Any point which the affirmative can fail on, and still estab- 
 lish the case cannot he an issue, though it may be very impor- 
 tant. Importance is not enough — an issue is vital in the 
 strictest sense of that word. 
 
 2. In general discussion. Let us take an example in a 
 general field of discussion in which the issues are not deter- 
 mined for us by technical legal definition. Suppose a propo- 
 sition advocating the adoption of a "single tax" system in 
 some city, state, or nation. The issues are the specific prop- 
 ositions that the affirmative would have to prove to Ihe 
 satisfaction of a competent board of judges in order to show 
 that the particular single tax system they advocate ought 
 to be adopted. Suppose there are three such sub-questions 
 that the affirmative must answer satisfactorily, in order to 
 establish the proposition, for instance, (1) Is the present 
 system unsatisfactory? (2) Will the new system raise suffi- 
 cient revenue.'^ (3) Will it do this with substantial justice 
 (i. e., without evils — those complained of, or others as bad)? 
 If careful investigation should show that these are the issues 
 of the particular proposition under discussion, the affirmative 
 must prove all of them in order to establish its case. If the 
 negative shows that the claims of the affirmative on any one 
 of the three points are unfounded, the case fails, the negative 
 wins. If the present system is satisfactory — no abuses — no 
 shortcomings — no evils — is it possible to win a case for a 
 new system? If a tax system (old or new) will not raise suffi- 
 cient revenue, it is no good. What will be sufficient will, of 
 course, vary in different circumstances — but this question, 
 of the results to be obtained is always vital in such a question, 
 always an issue — if jth.e- negative fights on it. And if the new 
 system will not remove present evils — or will introduce others 
 just as bad or worse — then it is no good. So if the negative 
 blocks the affirmative on a single issue the affirmative loses. 
 
THE ISSUES 45 
 
 C. Terminology. Since there is considerable confusion 
 in regard to issues in argumentation, and since various kinds 
 of issues are sometimes mentioned in either law or general 
 argument, it may be well to consider the uses of the word 
 with its appropriate modifiers in each field. 
 
 1. In law. Our theory of issues in general discussion is 
 borrowed from legal procedure.^ We shall, therefore, start 
 with a lawyer's statement of the theory of issues in law. 
 Professor W. C. Robinson gives the following statement in 
 his Forensic Oratory:"^ 
 
 "Every cause, civil or criminal, consists of one or more 
 propositions, either of fact or law, aflSrmed by one side and 
 denied upon the other. If but a single proposition is affirmed, 
 the issue is a simple one, and the denial is as comprehensive 
 as the affirmation. Where two or more propositions are 
 affirmed, the denial may extend to all, resulting in a complex 
 issue, or it may be confined to one, and constitute a simple 
 issue. In trespass quare clausum, for example, the plaintiff 
 must affirm possession in himself, and an unlawful entry by 
 the defendant. The defendant may deny the entry or the 
 possession, thus tendering a single issue, or by a general de- 
 nial he may raise a complex issue, and put the plaintiff upon 
 proof of both. Again, in burglary the commonwealth affirms 
 that the defendant broke and entered, in the night season, 
 with felonious intent, into the dwelling of another. A gen- 
 eral denial creates a complex issue, ... on each of which 
 the commonwealth must establish its position beyond a 
 reasonable doubt. Or the defendant may in fact, if not in 
 form, rest his defense upon a single issue . . . and success- 
 fully maintaining this, attain the same result as if . . . 
 [all] had been decided in his favor. 
 
 "Each of these primary issues may in its turn contain 
 
 other [subordinate] issues, either simple or complex, whose 
 
 determination is essential to the decision of the issue which 
 
 includes them; and under these still lesser issues may be 
 
 1 See Pleading, Appendix B. 2 p^ges 62, 63. 
 
46 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 found, until the whole cause may be made to rest upon 
 some single indivisible fact, or on some simple dictum of the 
 law. This single fact or dictum then becomes the actual 
 issue in the cause, the only matter in dispute, the final test 
 of legal obligation. Thus, in the charge of burglary, the 
 defendant may deny the breaking, on the ground that the 
 door by which he entered was ajar, and on this fact alone the 
 question of his guilt or innocence depends. Or in a trespass, 
 if the defendant justifies his entry for that he was an officer 
 duly serving civil process, and this be met with an allegation 
 that his entry was upon the Sabbath before the setting of the 
 sun, the entire cause may be reduced to the question as to 
 the moment when defendant entered on the plaintiff's land. 
 
 "Whenever the issue can be thus simplified and con- 
 centrated in one single proposition, the labor both of the 
 advocate and of his auditors is rendered short and easy. 
 Confusion and obscurity, as far as is ever possible, are thereby 
 excluded. The relevancy of the proof is clearly seen and the 
 idea of legal obligation is easily developed and applied. Jus- 
 tice as well as the true interest of both parties, therefore, re- 
 quires that the cause should be presented to its arbiters with 
 issues as few and as well defined as the nature of the contro- 
 versy will permit. The discovery of this last, decisive issue 
 is the first duty of the advocate. This constitutes the cause. 
 This is the only proper subject-matter of the oration. The 
 ideas which lead his hearers to decide it in his favor are all 
 with which he need concern himself. If he can induce them 
 to agree with him on this, his cause is won; if not, his cause 
 is lost." 
 
 2. In general argumentation. These primary and sec- 
 ondary issues are found in all argumentation. The use of 
 them in the law courts differs slightly from their use in 
 argumentation elsewhere in this: in a court the primary 
 issues are declared and set forth in the pleadings, before the 
 real argument begins; whereas in ordinary argumentation the 
 finding and explaining of these primary issues may be part 
 
THE ISSUES 47 
 
 of the debate itself. But under all circumstances these issues 
 and the method of finding them are essentially the same. 
 The primary issues in both cases must be sought first. The 
 primary issue in law is close to the potential issue in general 
 argumentation, but in the latter whenever we can break up a 
 primary issue into say three points, each of which is still 
 vital, then we have three potential issues and will have to 
 establish all of them as actual issues if the negative fights on 
 them. The outcome of the argument may depend almost 
 entirely on the establishment of some one or more of the sub- 
 ordinate issues; as, for instance, the question of whether a 
 dooB was slightly ajar, or the time of day at which a thing 
 was done, or the trustworthiness of a witness. But the signif- 
 icance of any such subordinate issue is derived from the fact 
 that it affirms or denies one of the primary issues, so that its 
 bearing and importance cannot be understood until one 
 knows the primary issue which it serves to establish. The 
 primary issues, then, must be found first. If in general ar- 
 gumentation we keep a clear distinction between "issues of 
 fact" and "issues of principle" paralleling the law's distinc- 
 tions between issues of fact and of law, we will save consider- 
 able time and avoid much confusion. In general argument 
 the term "issues" is usually employed instead of "complex 
 issue." 
 
 For the purposes of general argumentation it seems better 
 not to use the term "subordinate issue." In this freer field 
 in which we are not bound by the legal systems of procedure 
 and rules of evidence, the problem is to find the (primary) 
 issues or issue, and then proceed to attack and defend with 
 whatever witnesses, evidence, and arguments are available 
 under the circumstances of the particular case. The broader 
 term "partition" better suited to general argumentation 
 renders the use of the term "subordinate issues" unnecessary 
 and undesirable. In this book, then, the term "the issues" 
 will be used to designate the actual issues — the smallest divi- 
 sion of points that, from the very nature of the problem, the 
 
48 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 affirmative must establish to establish the proposition, and 
 which the negative refuse to admit. 
 
 a. " Potential issues.** The potential issues are always 
 the same in the same question; they exist independently of 
 the wills of the disputants; they are to be discovered, not 
 invented or chosen. They are the points that are so vital 
 that they must be established or admitted in order to estab- 
 lish the proposition. The "potential" issues — the points 
 that will have to be proved by the affirmative unless admitted 
 by the negative — exist in the very nature of the proposition, 
 — and are always the same in the same proposition. They 
 are always the same for affirmative and negative, always the 
 same for every affirmative and every negative, on a given 
 proposition. Their discovery results from a thorough analy- 
 sis of the proposition. 
 
 Of course, if propositions vary in any way, the potential 
 issues may vary. "Resolved: that the commission form of 
 government should be adopted in Chicago," is not necessarily 
 the same proposition as, "Resolved: that the commission 
 form of government should be adopted in Dayton, Ohio." In 
 these cases the potential issues may or may not be the same. 
 But if on a certain evening twenty debates are held in the city 
 of Chicago on the first resolution, the potential issues will be 
 the same for all debates and for both teams in each debate. 
 
 b. " Admitted issues." Any "potential issues" which 
 the negative will admit may for convenience be called "ad- 
 mitted issues." These, of course, drop out of the contro- 
 versy. Admitted matter obviously cannot be an actual 
 issue. The issues are the inherently vital points that are 
 controverted by the negative. In general argumentation 
 what might be an issue if it were denied, falls back into the 
 class of "admitted matter" when it is admitted, and ceases 
 to be of importance in the discussion. 
 
 For instance : If in a given action possession in A and entry 
 by B are the points on which the proposition must rest, and 
 one is admitted, then the other constitutes the sole issue in 
 
THE ISSUES 49 
 
 that contest. So if the basic vital points in a proposal for the 
 adoption of a certain scheme of taxation are (a) the elimina- 
 tion of present evils, (b) the raising of sufficient revenue, and 
 (c) the working of justice to all classes, (that is, not bringing 
 in new evils) — if these are the foundations and the negative 
 admits (a), then the issues are (b) and (c). If the negative 
 admits (a) and (b) then the issue is (c). 
 
 D. The necessity of knowing the issues cannot be over- 
 estimated. Without an understanding of them the proposi- 
 tion is nothing more than a name. Argument on any ques- 
 tion implies some difference of opinion; it means that there 
 are certain ideas affirmed by one side and denied by the 
 other. The proposition is merely an expression of this clash 
 of opinion, and an understanding of its meaning depends 
 entirely upon a comprehension of the points of conflict. 
 If the writer would prove his proposition, he must prove these 
 critical points. Moreover, the value of his materials depends 
 upon their relation to these points; any evidence that gives 
 a direct and substantial support to these vital facts is valua- 
 ble; whatever does not bear directly on these facts is, at 
 best, of secondary importance. If a disputant makes a mis- 
 take in finding these critical points on which the discussion 
 must be based, he may well waste his time in proving some 
 fact that will not help him after it is proved, or he may be 
 surprised in debate by attack on some vital point which he 
 is not ready to defend. This danger is realized and guarded 
 against in the courts of law. They demand that the issues 
 shall be clearly stated in the beginning, and that every 
 piece of evidence, whether of fact or of law, shall have a di- 
 rect and evident bearing on some one of these issues, anything 
 that cannot conform to this test being declared irrelevant 
 and being excluded from consideration. Then again, a 
 speaker or writer who does not know the issues will probably 
 confuse his readers or hearers by giving them a false, distorted 
 view of his case. If a disputant does not comprehend just 
 what are the few vital points of his case, around which all the 
 
50 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 lesser facts must be grouped, his proof will almost certainly 
 lack the unity and coherence that are indispensable for 
 clearness and force in presentation. 
 
 E. Proposition and issues. We have seen in the pre- 
 ceding chapter that in order to have intelligent argumenta- 
 tion, we must first have a proposition. The proper formulat- 
 ing of the proposition insures that we have one single question 
 that can be argued directly and so brought to a definite 
 conclusion. This proposition thus makes clear the general 
 position which the disputant must argue for or against. But 
 he is not yet ready to select the evidence or the arguments 
 with which to support his contention. He has merely found 
 the field of battle. Before he can open the fight, or even ar- 
 range his forces, he must examine the ground he has chosen, 
 and find out its points of vantage and of weakness. The 
 proposition discloses the task that must in the end be ac- 
 complished, but it does not show what are the steps neces- 
 sary in the accomplishment, or just what method may be 
 most effective. The proposition gives a single question for 
 discussion; but even in any such single question there are in- 
 numerable arguments, points, masses of evidence, that may 
 be brought forward. All these arguments and all this evi- 
 dence cannot be used; it is not all of equal value; some of it 
 will have such a direct and obvious bearing on the question 
 that it must have great weight; but much of it will have such 
 an indefinite and remote bearing that to use it at all would 
 be a waste of time. Clearly, then, the next thing for the dis- 
 putant to do is to get some standards by reference to which he 
 can determine the value of these materials. There are always 
 certain points or propositions that are critical, that are so 
 vital that the whole question must hinge on them. A cen- 
 tury and a half ago, John Ward, in his Systems of Oratory, 
 said: "But in all disputes it is of the greatest consequence to 
 observe where the stress of the controversy lies. For, without 
 attending to this, persons may cavil about different matters, 
 without understanding each other or deciding anything." 
 
THE ISSUES 61 
 
 In any discussion the "stress of the controversy" inevitably 
 falls upon the proving or disproving of a few points, which 
 are the center and soul of the question : only as those who have 
 the burden of proof win in the struggle over these points 
 can they win the whole contest. In order, therefore, to know 
 what proofs to use, the disputant on either side, must first 
 find out just what are the points that the afiirmative must 
 establish by the proofs in order to establish the proposition. 
 These points are the issues. 
 
 F. Issues and burden of proof. It is well to consider 
 the relation of the theory of issues to various aspects of the 
 theory of burden of proof, in order that their complete har- 
 mony may be clear and all misunderstanding avoided. 
 
 1. The issues, and the affirmative and negative. The af- 
 firmative has no choice in regard to issues* — every "potential 
 issue" which the negative chooses to fight on, must be estab- 
 lished. The negative, on the other hand, may choose among 
 the potential issues what ones to admit and what to fight on. 
 In law this choice must be made known to the affirmative in 
 the course of the pleading, so that a suit never starts without 
 all parties knowing the issues and agreeing as to what the 
 issues are. In general discussion this situation should be 
 approximated as closely as possible. Before a debate starts, 
 or early in the debate, a direct clash should be brought about 
 on vital points that are left after all admissions have been 
 made. The affirmative, of course, has the burden of proof on 
 each issue. Establishing usually means "beyond a reason- 
 able doubt" or by "preponderating evidence," so the nega- 
 tive in trying to block a case seeks to raise reasonable doubts 
 on as many issues as possible, and usually does not risk every- 
 thing on fewer issues than are absolutely necessary. One 
 man may doubt on one issue and one on another, so it is well 
 to fight on as many as offer a good chance, unless one can be 
 absolutely sure of winning on fewer. 
 
 2. Issues and counter proposition. Sometimes the 
 negative sets up a substitute or counter plan or proposition. 
 
52 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 When this is the case the negative of course has the burden 
 of proof as to its plan. The issues of the case are not changed 
 by this plan of defense. If the substitute does not offer an 
 obstacle to the establishing of the affirmative side of the is- 
 sues it is a waste of time to talk about it. If the substitute 
 can be so presented as to block one or more of the vital points 
 of the affirmative, the case fails — the negative wins. But 
 the substitute may not have won. 
 
 For example, suppose in the burglary case already referred 
 to instead of confining its case to proving unfounded one or 
 more of the five accusations, the defense simply denies them 
 all and offers evidence that proves conclusively that B com- 
 mitted the crime in question. When they accuse B they nec- 
 essarily take the burden of proving B did these things. But 
 their only purpose is to show thereby that A is innocent. 
 And note that B is not declared guilty as the result of this 
 trial. The proposition is that A is guilty. The affirmative 
 have failed to establish their case either by having been 
 blocked on one or more of the issues, or by the negative offer- 
 ing a substitute. But the substitute did not vnn — not in thi? 
 trial. It is advanced only enough to show that the claims of 
 the affirmative are unfounded. 
 
 Again in the single tax illustration already given, suppose 
 that the negative after discovering the issues, finding out 
 what their opponents must do to win, decide on offering a 
 counter proposition instead of simply attacking these issues. 
 The negative claims that the single tax system should not be 
 adopted because the "classified property tax" would better 
 meet the present situation. Now, this counter proposition 
 is legitimate, worth while, and effective only if it meets the 
 issues of the case being discussed. Otherwise it is simply 
 arguing beside the point, evading the issue rather than meet- 
 ing it. If the negative can show by comparison with the 
 classified property tax system wherein the single tax system 
 is not the proper method by which to eliminate the evils, 
 yield sufficient revenue, or work substantial justice, then the 
 
THE ISSUES 53 
 
 negative use of this substitute is allowable and wise. But if 
 it does not meet the issues in the original proposition, its 
 use is neither justifiable nor expedient. 
 
 3. The issues and winning or losing. In what we have 
 just said concerning issues, burden or proof, and winning and 
 losing, we have had in mind actual cases in real life, not con- 
 test debates before judges who are to say who won the debate. 
 All that has been said, however, applies in these contest 
 debates exactly as it does in a law court or political campaign, 
 except the remarks on winning or losing. In a law court, in 
 a pohtical campaign, in business, in science, it is the case 
 that is being passed on. The decision is on the " merits of the 
 question," not on the way in which certain advocates handle 
 the case. But in an intercollegiate debate, for instance, the 
 decision should go always on the skill of the debaters,^ never 
 on the strength of the case (except in so far as this is indica- 
 tive of the skill of the debaters). The decision to mean any- 
 thing at all must be based on the skill shown in debating — 
 not on the strength of the evidence or the merits of the case. 
 A debate should, of course, be worked out and presented as 
 though the decision were to be made by the audience or jury 
 or judge on the merits of the case. For only in this way can 
 the contestants show their real ability as debaters, but the 
 judges should know enough about debating to render a de- 
 cision on ability alone. 
 
 G. The issues and conviction and persuasion. The 
 issues are the points that will have to be established by 
 the affirmative in order to convince competent judges that 
 their plan should be adopted. The issues have to do pri- 
 marily with conviction rather than persuasion. They are 
 the basis of the appeal to the intellect. The work of persua- 
 sion may be done in connection with proving the issues. 
 In selecting evidence, illustration, phraseology, the emotional 
 side of each audience (sentiments, taste, prejudices) should 
 always be kept in mind as one of the guides in all that we do. 
 1 See "Types of Decisions," eh. 16. "The Nature of Debate." 
 
54 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 But in discovering the issues in any case, we must consider 
 only the intellectual side of our case — the facts and the jus- 
 tifiable inferences from the facts. The analysis of the prop- 
 osition to find the issues should be impersonal — not done 
 with particular audiences or judges in mind. After the im- 
 personal case is discovered then the adjusting of it to any 
 particular tribunal should be carefully undertaken. This, 
 of course, means paying a good deal of attention to persua- 
 sion. 
 
 H. Number and form of issues. The number of issues 
 varies necessarily in different propositions. There are not 
 usually more than three or four, unless in some technical 
 or legal proposition in which there may be a large number. 
 In a great many propositions there is but one issue. The is- 
 sues are to be discovered. Careful analysis will reveal them. 
 We cannot decide in advance to "pick out" three or four 
 issues. We may find three or four and we may find but one. 
 When we have found the number of points that may be is- 
 sues from the nature of the case, our next step is to find out 
 if any of them are admitted. If so we place them in the in- 
 troduction as admitted matter. The others are our issues 
 for this controversy. 
 
 When found the issues should be expressed in such question 
 form that the affirmative will answer "Yes," and the nega- 
 tive "No." They should be always so stated in a brief, and 
 usually so stated in a speech or written argument. Do not 
 say "The issue is, that this plan will be financially advan- 
 tageous." Do not say "The issue is, * What will be the finan- 
 cial effect.?'" The proper form is: "The issue is, *Will this 
 plan be financially advantageous?'" This represents the 
 clean-cut question that must be answered — the exact point 
 which the affirmative affirms and the negative denies. 
 
 I. Issues and partition. The partition consists of a state- 
 ment of the main points to be taken up in the discussion. It 
 is an enumeration of the steps to be taken in presenting the 
 case. It is a plan of campaign determined on (and usually 
 
THE ISSUES 65 
 
 announced) in advance. The partition must not be confused 
 with the issues. They may, it is true, be substantially identi- 
 cal, but they may differ widely. There may be one issue and 
 four points in partition — or three points which cover the 
 three issues. The issues must all be vital points. The points 
 in partition must all be important but not necessarily vital. 
 If a single issue is lost the case fails. One or more points in 
 partition may be lost without losing the case. 
 
 Suppose a table is hanging suspended from the ceiling by a 
 chain of three links. If one link is destroyed the table falls. 
 The table represents "the case," the contention of the affirm- 
 ative; the links of chain represent the issues. Suppose the 
 table is standing on five legs. One, two, or three legs may 
 be removed and still the table be left standing. It might be 
 that four legs could be removed, and if the fifth were big 
 enough, and placed directly in the center of the table, it might 
 hold up the table, especially if the attack on it were very 
 weak. Here the table again represents "the case," and the 
 legs represent the points in partition. Or suppose two armies 
 are contending for the possession of a given territory, the 
 control of which both understand must depend upon the oc- 
 cupation of two particular points (the issues), a pass and a 
 certain height of ground. Now there are various positions 
 which the two opposing forces may seize and hold, and vari- 
 ous lines of attack which they may adopt, depending upon the 
 peculiar habits and methods of the respective generals; but 
 these positions and this strategy (the partition) are valuable 
 only as they serve to give the command of these two critical 
 points. In a like manner, let us suppose two disputants are 
 arguing the questions : " Resolved : that the army canteen 
 should be reestablished." Now the settlement of this ques- 
 tion may well depend upon the decision of two issues; namely, 
 (1) whether the canteen is beneficial to the individual soldier, 
 and (2) whether it is beneficial to the army as a whole. A 
 speaker on the affirmative might in his argument state his 
 intention of proving three points as follows: (1) that the 
 
56 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 opinions of reliable army officers are favorable to the canteen; 
 (2) that the number of arrests for drunkenness increased 
 when the canteen was abolished; (3) that the canteen is 
 beneficial in other countries. 
 
 These three points may be well chosen, but their impor- 
 tance must be derived from their efficiency in establishing the 
 affirmative side of the two issues mentioned above. A par- 
 tition, then, is a statement of the points the arguer intends 
 to prove; the issues are the points the affirmative must prove 
 in order to prove his case. If the points of the partition are 
 well chosen, they will usually correspond closely to the 
 issues; but they may be entirely different, and they are not 
 in any case necessarily identical. 
 
 J. " Stock issues." There has been some discussion 
 recently^ in regard to formulas for issues or "stock issues'* 
 that can be applied to all questions. It seems obviously 
 impossible to get stock issues that will apply to all different 
 kinds of questions. This follows from the very nature of is- 
 sues. But in regard to a large class of propositions much 
 used in contest debate a certain formula may be used as a 
 start in analysis. We refer to propositions of policy having 
 to do with changes in necessarily continuing systems, as 
 taxation, education, railways, water, light and power utili- 
 ties, sanitation, etc. Here are problems that cannot be 
 dropped. Here are enterprises that are to be kept going on 
 some basis or other. In such questions we may well start 
 an analysis on the basis of two "stock issues." The phrase- 
 ology may differ — the points are essentially the same. Va- 
 rious wordings of each are given: 
 
 1. Is the present unsatisfactory? Are there evils in the 
 existing situation.^ Is there a cause for action.'* Is there a 
 disease? Do we need a change? etc. 
 
 2. Is the proposed action an improvement? Will it 
 
 1 See The Special Issues, by J. R. Pelsma, and Formulas for the Special 
 Issue, by H. B. Gough, The Public Speaking Review, Vol. Ill, No. 3 (Nov., 
 1913), pp. 1-8. 
 
THE ISSUES 57 
 
 cure the evils? Is this the action we should take? Is this 
 the proper remedy? Is the proposed change the right one? 
 
 New systems will not be adopted while the present is 
 satisfactory, nor unless the proposed scheme looks like a 
 satisfactory remedy or improvement. So the man with a 
 new scheme for doing something that is to continue to be 
 done on some scheme, must always show somehow or other 
 (or get it admitted) that there is something wrong and his 
 scheme will make it right. 
 
 Why then are these not really the exact issues in all such 
 cases? For two reasons it is unsafe to accept them as such. 
 First, because analysis may show a more specific and concrete 
 wording for these general questions, and this will aid in many 
 ways. Second, and principally, because on accurate analysis 
 it may be found that one of these questions, especially num- 
 ber two, will break up into say three questions, each of which 
 must be proved by the affirmative. So each is an issue, 
 and we have a case of four issues instead of two. For exam- 
 ple, suppose the proposition deals with a new city water sys- 
 tem. We take the first stock issue and find out how specifi- 
 cally we can express this. It results in one question, perhaps, 
 
 (1) Is the present water supply insufficient? Then analysis 
 of the situation may show three questions each of which must 
 be affirmatively answered or the whole scheme fails — These 
 three for instance, (1) Is the proposed supply sufficient? 
 
 (2) Is it pure? (3) Can we afford to get it? So in this case 
 we find four actual issues, instead of two. If the negative 
 block one of the four the affirmative loses. 
 
 Notice, however, that it is not sufficient to be able to break 
 up a big question into three or four small ones; each small 
 one must be absolutely vital, or it is no issue. For instance, 
 suppose a big question hit upon under some question, to be: 
 Is this proposed method financially advantageous? Later 
 it is found that this is to be settled by answering these: (a) 
 Will it increase the sales? (b) Will it permit cheaper raw 
 material? (c) Will it lower the cost of advertising? Are 
 
58 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 these the issues? Clearly not, because each is not necessarily 
 vital. The affirmative could lose one (any one) and win, if 
 the total left were enough. It is the total result of these 
 three factors taken together that is the issue. These might 
 well be main points, points in partition, and might all be bit- 
 terly fought, but they are not issues. The big question of 
 financial advantage which these go to prove is the issue. 
 
 II. Finding the^sues 
 
 So much for the nature of the issues. We now have to 
 consider the problem of finding them. (While we usually 
 refer to the issues rather than to the issue it must be re- 
 membered that often we have but one issue.) This prob- 
 lem varies in difficulty under different propositions. In 
 many propositions the issues are obvious. All we need to 
 know to discover them is the nature of issues. They are there 
 in sight; we have only to recognize them. In other prop- 
 ositions the problem of analysis is a long and difficult one. 
 For such cases it is well to have in mind specific methods or 
 plans of action. But it must be admitted, and always re- 
 membered, that there is no one method that should always he 
 applied in all its details to any case that is to be analyzed. 
 The steps suggested in the following pages should be taken 
 in any case as far as is necessary to discover the issues. And 
 tentative issues that we have discovered, or points claimed 
 by our opponents as issues may be tested by the processes 
 here enumerated. If one has to analyze a question about 
 which he knows practically nothing, following all of these 
 steps in the order presented, will discover the issues. But 
 such cases occur rarely. The right thing is to imderstand the 
 whole system and use whatever part of it seems useful in any 
 particular case. 
 
 A. Think. The first thing to do in any case is to think. 
 This must always be done. Careful thinking will disclose 
 the issues in many cases. Think the proposition over from 
 
THE ISSUES 59 
 
 all angles. Ask yourself all sorts of questions about it. Who 
 wants thiis.^ Why.^ Whose business is it.'^ Who will pay for 
 it.? Who will suffer by it? Who will profit by it? What 
 kind of question is it? What interests are at stake? Eco- 
 nomic? Moral? vEsthetic? Social? Political? Commercial? 
 Industrial? Spiritual? Educational? Religious? Literary? 
 Artistic? Which one of these terms, some of which are over- 
 lapping or practically synonymous, best characterizes this 
 question? What standards within this field must we be 
 guided by? What do the terms used mean? How many 
 interpretations could possibly be put on this proposition? 
 Which one best fits the particular circumstances? 
 
 B. Study. 1. History. The next step, and one that 
 your thinking will naturally lead you to, is study. If we do 
 not already know we must study the meanings that may be 
 attributed to the terms and to the proposition as a whole. 
 As issues may differ with different propositions, in order to 
 find our particular issues we must learn what interpretation 
 to take and what its vital points are by studying (1) the his- 
 tory of the question with special attention to (a) its origin 
 and (b) the occasion for the present discussion. The nature 
 of any controversy must depend largely upon the circum- 
 stances of its birth or the causes of its present importance. 
 
 The following is an excellent illustration of finding the 
 issues, taken from the argument by Daniel Webster before 
 the Supreme Court in the case of Luther vs. Borden. The 
 events that gave rise to this case occurred in Rhode Island 
 in 1841-42 and were what was popularly known as the 
 Dorr Rebellion. Mr. Webster began: — 
 
 "It is well known that in the years 1841 and 1842 political agita- 
 tion existed in Rhode Island. Some of the citizens of that State 
 undertook to form a new constitution of government, beginning 
 their proceedings toward that end by meetings of the people, held 
 without authority of law, and conducting those proceedings through 
 such forms as led them, in 1842, to say that they had established 
 a new constitution and form of government, and placed Mr. Thomas 
 
60 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 W. Dorr at its head. ... All will remember that the state of 
 things approached if not actual conflict between men in arms, at 
 least the 'perilous edge of battle.' In June, 1842, this agitation 
 subsided. The new government, as it called itself, disappeared 
 from the scene of action. The former government, the Charter 
 government, as it was sometimes styled, resumed undisputed control, 
 went on in its ordinary course, and the peace of the State was 
 restored. 
 
 "But the past had been too serious to be forgotten. The legis- 
 lature of the State had, at an early stage of the troubles, found it 
 necessary to enact special laws for the punishment of the persons 
 concerned in these proceedings. It defined the crime of treason, 
 as well as smaller offences, and authorized the declaration of martial 
 law. . . . This having been done, and the ephemeral government 
 of Mr. Dorr having disappeared, the grand juries of the State found 
 indictments against several persons for having disturbed the peace 
 of the State, and one against Dorr himself for treason. This in- 
 dictment came on in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in 1844, 
 before a tribunal admitted on all hands to be the legal judicature 
 of the State. He was tried by a jury of Rhode Island, above all 
 objection, and after all challenge. By that jury, under the instruc- 
 tions of the court, he was convicted of treason, and sentenced to 
 imprisonment for life. 
 
 "Now that an action is brought in the courts of the United States, 
 and before your honors, by appeal, ... it is alleged that Mr. Dorr, 
 instead of being a traitor or an insurrectionist, was the real gov- 
 ernor of the State at the time; that the force used by him was 
 exercised in defence of the constitution and laws, and not against 
 them; that he who opposed the constituted authorities was not 
 Mr. Dorr but Governor King; and that it was he who should 
 have been indicted, and tried, and sentenced." ^ 
 
 2. All phases. But a study of the origin and history of 
 the question may not reveal the issues. In many proposi- 
 tions and complicated problems we must go further and study 
 (2) all phases of the present situation. Very often issues 
 cannot be found without a complete understanding of the 
 proposition in all its phases. The phase that is, on hasty 
 1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, pp. 217-219. 
 
THE ISSUES 61 
 
 judgment, passed over as seemingly insignificant often de- 
 velops with careful scrutiny into some new line of thought 
 and discloses a new and vital issue. We must not consider 
 the economic phase of the question to the exclusion of the 
 ethical or aesthetic phases. If a question has a moral phase 
 and physical phase, an educational phase and a political 
 phase, we must study them all. Nothing that is relevant 
 can safely be ignored, however much it may seem a matter 
 of detail. The question must be thoroughly understood in 
 all its phases before any attempt is made to state the 
 issues. 
 
 3. Both sides. Akin to this study of all the phases and 
 points of view is the necessity of studying (3) both sides of 
 the question. With a knowledge of only his own side, a dis- 
 putant may invent some points that he decides he will prove; 
 but he cannot know the real issues. The issues are always 
 the points on which there is a conflict of opinion. To deter- 
 mine where this conflict is, he must obviously know what his 
 opponents maintain, what they are willing to admit, and what 
 they deny. Consequently there is nothing that will help 
 more to reveal the critical points in any discussion than to 
 compare the arguments advanced by the conflicting sides. 
 
 C. Exclude (1) Admitted matter. When we have gained 
 the proper knowledge of all the facts, the process is then a 
 process of exclusion and selection. The next step to take 
 then is to exclude (1) admitted matter. Clearly, if both 
 sides admit the truth of a certain idea, that idea cannot be a 
 critical point. The clash of opinion cannot arise from such 
 a point. By excluding such facts as these, we can narrow the 
 material down to the significant facts, which only are valua- 
 ble. 
 
 This is a method often used by great lawyers and delibera- 
 tive orators. Mr. William Wirt, in the case of Gibbons vs. 
 Ogden, finds the issues of the case by first excluding the 
 matters that may be admitted by either side. The legislature 
 of New York had granted to Robert Fulton and others cer- 
 
62 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tain exclusive rights of navigation on the waters of the State. 
 Mr. Wirt, in his speech, was endeavoring to prove the grant 
 to be unconstitutional. He began : — 
 
 "In discussing this question, the general principles assumed as 
 postulates on the other side may be, for the most part, admitted. 
 Thus it may be admitted, that by force of the Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence each State became sovereign; that they were, then, inde- 
 pendent of each other; that by virtue of their separate sovereignty 
 they had each full power to levy war, to make peace, to establish 
 and regulate commerce, to encourage the arts, and generally to 
 perform all other acts of sovereignty. I shall also concede that the 
 government of the United States is one of delegated powers, and 
 that it is one of enumerated powers, as contended for by the counsel 
 for the correspondent. . . . 
 
 "The peculiar rule of construction demanded for those powers 
 may also be conceded. But the express powers are to be strictly 
 construed; the implied powers are to be construed liberally. By 
 this it is understood to be meant, that Congress can do no more 
 than they are expressly authorized to do; though the means of doing 
 it are left to their discretion, under no other limit than that they 
 shall be necessary and proper to the end." ^ 
 
 It is often a help when we cannot know the minds of our 
 opponents to ask this very question: Can the other side 
 afford to admit this fact? It was in this way that Webster, 
 in the famous White murder trial, established one of his is- 
 sues in the face of the contradictions of the opposing counsel. 
 
 "The counsel say that they might safely admit that Richard 
 Crowninshield, Jr., was the perpetrator of this murder. But how 
 could they safely admit that.? If that were admitted, everything 
 else would follow. For why should Richard Crowninshield, Jr., 
 kill Mr. White.5^ He was not his heir, nor his devisee; nor was he 
 his enemy. What could be his motive? If Richard Crowninshield, 
 Jr., killed Mr. White, he did it at some one's procurement who 
 himself had a motive. And who, having a motive, is shown to have 
 had any intercourse with Richard Crowninshield, Jr., but Joseph 
 1 9 Wheaton, 160. 
 
THE ISSUES 63 
 
 Knapp, and this principally through the agency of the prisoner 
 at the bar? . . . He who believes, on this evidence, that Richard 
 Crowninshield, Jr., was the immediate murderer cannot doubt that 
 both the Knapps were conspirators in that murder. . . . The ad- 
 mission of so important and so connected a fact would render it 
 impossible to contend further against the proof of the entire con- 
 spiracy as we state it." 
 
 (2) Irrelevant and (3) unimportant matter. We must ex- 
 clude from the material in which we will find the issues (though 
 not necessarily from any use) not only admitted matter, but 
 also (2) irrelevant, and (3) unimportant matter. There are 
 many ideas and facts that are commonly associated with 
 the proposition which do not really have any logical bear- 
 ing on it. These should be carefully put aside at the out- 
 set. Then again, there are many other facts which are prop- 
 erly embraced within the meaning of the question which 
 may be very valuable as evidence to prove other facts, but 
 which manifestly are not important in themselves. For 
 instance, in a civil suit for damages in a court of law the 
 honesty or the intelligence of a witness might, under some 
 circumstances, become very significant, the establishment 
 of some vital point depending upon his reliability. Yet the 
 character of this witness would not be mentioned in the 
 pleadings as one of the issues, for his credibility is not im- 
 portant in itself, but only because of its effect upon some other 
 and larger point in the case. In seeking the issues, the first 
 step should be to exclude such facts as these, which are mani- 
 festly of only secondary importance. 
 
 The following, taken from Mr. Jeremiah S. Black's speech 
 "In Defence of the Right of Trial by Jury," illustrates the 
 effective use of this method. Here the speaker found his 
 issues by the exclusion of irrelevant matter. 
 
 "The case before you presents but a single point and that an 
 exceedingly plain one. It is not encumbered with any of those 
 vexed questions that might be expected to arise out of a great war. 
 
64 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 You are not called upon to decide what kind of rule a military 
 commander may impose upon the inhabitants of a hostile country 
 which he occupies as a conqueror, or what punishment he may in- 
 flict upon the soldiers of his own army or the followers of his camp; 
 or yet how he may deal with civilians in a beleaguered city or other 
 place in a state of actual siege which he is required to defend against 
 a public enemy. The contest covers no such ground as that. The 
 men whose acts we complain of erected themselves into a tribunal 
 for the trial and punishment of citizens who were connected in no 
 way whatever with the army or navy. And this they did in the 
 midst of a community whose social and legal organization had 
 never been disturbed by any war or insurrection, where the courts 
 were wide open, where judicial process was executed every day 
 without interruption, and where all the civil authorities, both 
 State and National, were in the full exercise of their func- 
 tions. . . . 
 
 "Keeping the character of the charges in mind, let us come at 
 once to the simple question upon which the court below divided in 
 opinion: Had the commissioners jurisdiction, were they invested 
 with legal authority to try the relators and put them to death for 
 the offence of which they were accused.^" ^ 
 
 4. Indirect. Furthermore we must exclude from our 
 issue material, regardless of its general relevancy or great 
 importance, all (4) indirect matter including important 
 subordinate issues. Every important and relevant fact that 
 is denied or that cannot safely be admitted is not necessarily 
 one of the issues. It may be a subordinate point, important 
 only indirectly because the proof of it establishes or helps to 
 establish some larger fact. In that case the larger fact, that 
 the subordinate fact serves to prove, is one of the issues. 
 Usually this discrimination between the issues and the sub- 
 ordinate points is not diflScult. The issues are the points the 
 proving of which directly proves the proposition itself; the 
 proving of the subordinate points, on the other hand, helps 
 to prove some larger fact, which larger fact in turn serves to 
 prove the proposition. The issues are related directly to the 
 1 Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, pp. 484, 485. 
 
THE ISSUES 65 
 
 proposition; the " subordinate issues," indirectly. For an ex- 
 ample, take the question: "Resolved: that labor unions 
 should be compelled to incorporate." In the consideration of 
 this question the fact would be emphasized that labor unions 
 had very rarely broken their contracts with their employers 
 in the past. This would clearly be only a subordinate point. 
 It would not serve to establish the proposition directly; it 
 would be significant only because it would help to establish 
 the larger fact, that there was no occasion (no cause for ac- 
 tion) for compelling the unions to incorporate. This last- 
 mentioned point, on the other hand, would be one of the 
 issues; it would be a vital fact not admitted by the opposing 
 side, on which there was a clash of opinion, and it would 
 stand in direct and immediate connection with the prop- 
 osition. 
 
 D. Select. While this exclusion has been going on we 
 have probably been selecting at the same time, saving out the 
 opposites of the classes of points we have excluded. Our 
 work, then, summed up positively, has been to select (1) 
 points which meet the test of C: (a) points on which there 
 is a direct clash of opinion (points that are not admitted — 
 that our opponents probably will not admit), (b) relevant 
 points, (c) important points, (d) direct (not indirect or sub- 
 ordinate) points. Our work is about done. These points are 
 necessarily few and may constitute the issues just as they 
 stand. There is one test which will determine this. Are all 
 of these points vital to the establishment of the aflSrmative 
 side of the proposition? We must select only vital points, 
 from this small group. Can the affirmative side be estab- 
 lished without establishing all of these points.'^ If so, they 
 are not all issues. If the affirmative can lose a point and still 
 prove its case, that point is not an issue. When we reach this 
 step in our analysis and find that the points we have selected 
 will not pass this final test the difficulty is usually that the 
 test for subordinate points and indirectness has not been 
 strictly applied, and that we have three or four points under 
 
66 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 a proposition in which there are only one or two issues. 
 What we need is a point or two that will group these 
 three or four and connect them to the proposition in a 
 vital way. 
 
 Suppose the resolution proposes a new method or process 
 in manufacture, in which there is no question of ethics, 
 politics, social justice, or any such phase to complicate the 
 issues, and suppose you have narrowed the points down to 
 three — the new process will lessen the cost of raw material, 
 will make unnecessary the paying of certain royalties now 
 being paid, and will produce a valuable by-product. These 
 points have passed your tests of importance, relevance, etc., 
 and are all emphatically denied by your opponents. Are 
 they issues? No; they are points in partition. There is 
 not an issue among them, because no one of them is really 
 vital. Suppose the negative shows that you will not lessen 
 the cost of raw material — that this will remain unchanged. 
 But you succeed in proving the saving on royalties and the 
 gaining of a new by-product. Of course you have estab- 
 lished your case — that the process should be adopted. Or 
 suppose the negative wins on two of them and shows no 
 change in regard to them, while you show a gain on one. 
 Your case is established. These cannot then be issues. Each 
 issue is so vital that if the affirmative fails to establish one of 
 them the case fails. The difficulty here is that you are trying 
 to get three issues where there is only one, viz., would this 
 process bring a financial advantage. This is the issue. To 
 establish the fact that this process should be adopted the 
 affirmative must show financial advantage, and this may be 
 shown in any possible way. There is only one issue. The 
 difficulty arose from not applying the test for directness 
 strictly enough. 
 
 Summary of method of finding the issues: 
 A. Think: On the proposition, its possible meaning, all its 
 elements, and aspects, to the limits of your present 
 knowledge. 
 
THE ISSUES 67 
 
 B. Study: 1. History of question, with especial attention to 
 
 a. Its origin, 
 
 b. Present occasion for discussion. 
 
 2. All phases of question. 
 
 3. Both sides . 
 
 C. Exclude: 
 
 1. Mutually admitted matter. 
 
 2. Irrelevant matter. 
 
 3. Unimportant matter. 
 
 4. Indirect matter. 
 
 D. Select: 
 
 1. Points which meet the test of C. 
 
 2. Vital points. 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 4 
 
 THE ISSUES 
 
 1. Give the potential issues on each of three propositions 
 
 on subjects used in Exercise 1, of Chapter 2. 
 
 2. Indicate under each of the propositions mentioned above 
 
 which "potential issues" you would admit if you were 
 in charge of the negative case. 
 
 3. Phrase propositions and under each give the most accurate 
 
 phraseology possible for the "stock issues" on each 
 of the following subjects: Military Preparedness; the 
 
 Commission Form of Government for city; 
 
 State Universities. 
 
 4. Give accurately all the steps in analysis leading to the 
 
 final statement of issues in the proposition for your 
 original forensic. 
 
SECTION B. SELECTION 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
 GATHERING MATERIAL 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. Invention and selection. 
 
 B. Importance of preliminary reading. 
 
 C. Necessity of method. 
 
 D. A note- taking system. 
 
 E. Note-book or card system. 
 
 F. The card form. 
 
 G. Accuracy in documentation. 
 H. What to look for. 
 
 1. Both sides. 
 
 2. Arguments and evidence. ^ 
 I. Where to look. 
 
 J. What plan to follow. 
 
 1. Newspaper reading. 
 . 2. The effective method. 
 
 a. General conditions. 
 
 b. Questions in dispute. 
 
 c. Details of evidence. 
 K. What to do : assimilate. 
 
 L. The way to assimilate material. 
 
 M. Personality. 
 
 N. Conscious practice. 
 
 A. Invention and selection. In the discussion of the 
 chapters under the head of Invention we have seen how a 
 question must be analyzed in order (1) to understand what is 
 the real proposition to be established, (2) and to understand 
 how to handle the burden of proof in regard to it, and (3) to 
 find out the issues, the vital ideas or matters of fact which 
 must be established to establish this proposition. We next 
 
 68 
 
GATHERING MATERIAL 69 
 
 come to a consideration of the means and methods to be 
 employed in the work of advancing or opposing the establish- 
 ment of these vital points, or issues, which have been dis- 
 covered. As we shall see later, much depends on the methods 
 by which we arrange our material and present it to the reader 
 or hearer. But before we can arrange our proofs or present 
 them, we must, obviously, take the various steps in the proc- 
 ess of Selection, and so get the exact material to be used. 
 This getting of material naturally divides itself into two 
 parts : first, the gathering of material by preliminary reading 
 or investigation; and second, the testing of the material we 
 find, and the selection of those parts that will best serve our 
 purpose in a given case. In the work of this second part we 
 will be aided by a knowledge of evidence^ forms of arguments, 
 and fallacies — ^the topics treated in the next three chapters. 
 Of course, in practice these steps in the process of selection 
 are not always mutually exclusive. Usually we test and se- 
 lect, using our knowledge of evidence, arguments, and fal- 
 lacies as we do our reading, and thus we choose or reject our 
 material as we find it while we are gathering our evidence 
 together. 
 
 B. Importance of preliminary reading. All argumen- 
 tation which involves preparation of any kind involves a 
 considerable amount of preliminary reading. The amount 
 varies; but in most serious argumentative work the time thus 
 spent is probably greater than that spent in all the other 
 work of preparation taken together. The lawyer spends by 
 far the greater part of his time in examining witnesses, docu- 
 ments, and authorities. The able senator or representative 
 preparing for debate works longest and hardest in the col- 
 lection of facts and figures. The intercollegiate debater 
 labors for weeks in libraries to gather the materials for a 
 twelve-minute speech. Surely a part of our work so funda- 
 mental and so arduous is worthy of the most careful consid- 
 eration. It is of sufficient importance to demand that we 
 adopt a clear and effective method of doing it. 
 
70 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 C. Necessity of method. In the case of the beginner in 
 argumentation, it must be admitted that a great deal of time 
 is wasted here. To a man who has had no practical experi- 
 ence, there does not seem to be any particular need of method 
 in reading. Newspapers, magazines, and encyclopaedias all 
 seem alike as long as he can find in them anything bearing 
 on the question. His method commonly is to start in any- 
 where and read as long as he can. Inevitably he wastes 
 many hours at the start on worthless material, and later, 
 to make up the time, he rushes along over the best authori- 
 ties with careless haste. Again, such a reader does not really 
 comprehend or assimilate what he reads. He reaps a harvest 
 of quotations from here and there, picks out a few points 
 from this writer and that, and he thinks his preparation is 
 complete. This inability to gather material intelligently 
 is a serious weakness. A rational method is necessary. There 
 must, of course, be individuality in all work of this kind; 
 personality should everywhere be cultivated rather than 
 repressed. But the principles given here have been engen- 
 dered by common experience and are so capable of universal 
 application that every man should follow them unless he is 
 in a position to set them aside deliberately in favor of other 
 specific principles that seem better fitted to his particular 
 needs. They must not be violated through ignorance or 
 carelessness. 
 
 D. A note-taking system must be used. It is a common 
 mistake for a student to trust to his memory the safe-keeping 
 of the ideas that he finds, with the almost inevitable result 
 that, when called for, the ideas are not available. They either 
 vanish and contribute nothing to the cause, or they must 
 be sought anew at some future time at the cost of redupli- 
 cated work. Often it becomes necessary to verify some idea 
 that has been suggested by some magazine article, or to reen- 
 force it with some good authority, and the chances are 
 strongly against the probability that the original article 
 can be found again. It is an extraordinary memory that 
 
GATHERING MATERIAL 71 
 
 can recall such a reference. Again, it is not always possible 
 to tell at the beginning just what evidence will finally be val- 
 uable. Facts that seem trivial at the moment when we 
 read them may turn out in the end to be important. But if 
 no note is taken of them, they are almost surely lost. Against 
 these and many other evils there is but one safeguard. A 
 system of note-taking must always be used. Facts, ideas, 
 arguments, illustrations, must be noted down in substance, 
 or copied as full quotations, when they are discovered. 
 
 E. A note-book or a card system may be used. A note- 
 book is perhaps easier to carry around, offers better facilities 
 for copying long extracts and preserving clippings, etc., and 
 binds all the material together in a single compact volume. 
 But the card system offers great advantages in sorting, 
 testing, organizing, using, and filing the material gathered. 
 Unless there are specific reasons arising from the circumstancs 
 of a given case for using a note-book, the card system should 
 be used. A few cards only need be available for each day's 
 reading. The accumulated material may be kept carefully 
 filed away in one place. When the time comes for drawing 
 the brief, or preparing the written argument, the speech, or 
 the debate, the cards can be easily sorted, and the best 
 material can be quickly selected and arranged in proper order 
 for use. All the material gathered on a given subject can be 
 properly indexed and filed away for use at any future time. 
 
 F. The card form shown here is recommended. It pro- 
 vides for accurate recording of material, authority (writer 
 or speaker), and source where this material was found. The 
 advantages of having all the documentation at the top of the 
 card, rather than at the bottom, are many. This makes it 
 easier to refer to the cards in a filing case or card index, with- 
 out loss of time and without disturbing the whole file. This 
 also makes it easier to sort and handle them at a desk, and 
 they are much more convenient for use on the platform in 
 actual speaking or debate. It is easy to preserve permanently 
 in immediately usable condition all the material one gathers 
 
72 
 
 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 on such cards — ^and the store may grow at any point without 
 disturbing the material on any other point. Cards may be 
 removed or added on any sub-topic, as the material available 
 changes from time to time. On the face of the card, of course, 
 should be written (or pasted, if clippings are used) either 
 exact quotations, paraphrases of the substance, or simply 
 a characterization of the book, article, or speech referred 
 to at the top of the card. A card four by six inches is very 
 convenient; but a larger or smaller card will do about as well. 
 
 TOPIC 
 
 AUTHORITY 
 
 SOURCE 
 
 Effect on 
 Workman s Health 
 
 Dr. John Smith, 
 
 Chairman Blank 
 
 Commission 
 
 Oidlook, Vol. 20, 
 p. 123 
 
 
 G. Accuracy in documentation ^ is essential. The exact 
 authority and source should always be recorded. References 
 to a "well known physician," a "physician writing in The 
 Outlook'\ or to " The Outlook", or " The Outlook, Vol. 20," are 
 all practically worthless. If you or others wish later to 
 verify the reference it will be difficult to do so unless the orig- 
 inal reference is exact. If you quote at all, quote accurately, 
 and use quotation marks, and dots to indicate any words 
 left out. Both in gathering and in using material give credit 
 for all quotations, expressions, and even ideas and illustra- 
 tions that are borrowed directly from a definite source. In 
 gathering material it is well to copy direct quotations very 
 * See Documentation and Argument from Authority, Ch. 6. 
 
GATHERING MATERIAL 73 
 
 freely. But in the process of making up your case you should 
 make the thought of most of the quotations a part of your 
 thought, and so use few direct quotations in the presentation 
 of your argument, except where you think added advantage 
 comes from giving the exact words of some recognized au- 
 thority, on the subject being treated — as for instance the 
 quotations in this text from well-known writers on logic, 
 law, etc. 
 
 Having realized the necessity of making an investigation, 
 and having adopted a method of note-taking, the student 
 who has an argument to prepare may then well ask four 
 questions : What shall I look for? Where shall I look? What 
 plan of search shall I follow? What shall I do with the 
 material 1 gather? 
 
 H. What to look for. 1. Understanding both sides. The 
 broad general answer to this first question is that the investi- 
 gator must look for material that will enable him to under- 
 stand both sides of his question. To know both sides of the 
 question thoroughly is of great value in all stages of argu- 
 mentation. In the first place, without such knowledge a 
 disputant cannot have that understanding of his case as a 
 whole which must precede the intelligent use of evidence and 
 arguments. We have already seen that the first step in prepa- 
 ration, and one of the most important steps, is always the 
 finding of the issues. But these issues cannot be found, nor 
 the partition arranged, except by knowing both sides. The 
 issues are always the points on which there is a direct clash of 
 opinion, and frequently these points can be found only by 
 comparing the assertions of the opposing parties and as- 
 certaining just where these assertions are contradictory. 
 The partition is a statement of the main points on which you 
 are to base your attack on your opponent's case, and your 
 defense of your own case against your opponent's attack. 
 A partition arranged without knowledge of your opponent's 
 case would obviously be quite useless. Again, a disputant 
 who knows only the arguments on his own side of the case 
 
74 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 may find himself helpless when confronted with some unex- 
 pected argument of his opponent. This inability to meet and 
 repel an opponent is fatal to success in argumentation, and it 
 must be guarded against in preparation. Such arguments 
 are rarely to be answered by inspiration. Inspiration is not 
 always reliable. The necessary knowledge must be^ gained 
 before the actual crisis comes; and it can be gained only by 
 studying the other side of the question and considering how 
 any attack may best be met. 
 
 2. Arguments and evidence. A more specific answer to 
 the first question mentioned above, is that the reader must 
 usually look for two classes of material, which might be 
 labeled arguments and evidence. First, the reader should 
 find the point of view, the opinion, which the writer of any 
 book or article takes of his subject as a whole, and also the 
 points which he seems to regard as the critical points in the 
 case, his reasons for his opinion, his arguments pro or con. 
 
 Second, the reader should look for evidence, facts stated, 
 incidents cited, statistics given, illustrations used, or any 
 quotable matter. These points and quotations should be 
 noted as they rise. It is a common experience of a beginner 
 that he passes over some idea or some apt quotation without 
 taking note of it, to find that later if he only had it at hand 
 it would be a valuable piece of evidence or a strong argument 
 from authority. New evidence is valuable wherever it is 
 found, and some note should always be taken of it. Opin- 
 ions, on the other hand, are usually valuable only as they 
 come from some writer who is a recognized authority on the 
 subject. And it should be borne in mind that as to who is 
 a recognized authority the audience is always the final judge. 
 No matter how great the knowledge of any writer, if he is 
 unknown to the audience or doubted by them, the quotation 
 ceases to have value as an ''argument from authority." 
 But while reading the words of a writer of acknowledged 
 standing, the note-book should be freely used. The quota- 
 tion may be taken down in full, or some reference may be 
 
GATHERING MATERIAL 75 
 
 noted to the place where it is found; but it must not be suf- 
 fered to escape entirely. 
 
 I. Where to look. The question "Where shall I look?" 
 will probably not bother many students in colleges and uni- 
 versities. Those who have a good library available will 
 turn at once to published bibliographies, card indexes, and 
 such monthly and annual indexes as The Readers Guide, 
 Poolers Index, and The Annual Library Index. Those who 
 cannot immediately command the facilities of a large library, 
 or who for any reason want more specific suggestions on 
 sources of material for argument, should write to University 
 Extension divisions, public libraries, etc. 
 
 J. What plan to follow. The question of a plan to be 
 followed in the use of various sources demands fuller consid- 
 eration. The correct principle to follow is undoubtedly to 
 read from the general to the specific. A lawyer preparing his 
 case for court begins his examination of witnesses with the 
 examination of his client. With his story as a foundation 
 he then goes on to seek the lesser details that he needs to 
 "fill in" his case. He knows that to begin with the testi- 
 mony of his lesser witnesses would result in a confusion and 
 waste of time. He might find that the testimony he had 
 spent hours in seeking was more easily found elsewhere, or 
 that, after all, it was of no service to the cause of his 
 client. 
 
 1. Newspaper reading. The principle applies with equal 
 force in the search for evidence by preliminary reading in 
 general argumentation. For example, the American news- 
 paper is a valuable source of material. Few are the discus- 
 sions where it cannot be used with effect, if it is used properly. 
 But in most cases it should be handled as the lawyer would 
 handle the witness who testified that the defendant, on a 
 certain day and hour, came to a certain livery stable and 
 hired a certain horse and carriage. Such evidence might 
 hang a man; the whole question of the guilt of a murderer 
 might depend on the identification of that particular horse 
 
76 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 and carriage. But that witness is not the first to be examined; 
 it might happen that his testimony had no bearing on the 
 case. The newspaper should be used in a similar way. It is 
 valuable as a means of corroboration; it may be valuable as 
 a source of facts for the support of some vital argument. 
 But it should rarely be read first. Various dangers arise 
 from such premature reading of the newspaper. In the first 
 place, it would often mean a waste of time. A writer of ac- 
 knowledged authority on a particular problem will put into 
 a few lines the substance of the whole of a pop^lar newspaper 
 editorial. Again, the student who seeks such a lesser source 
 first will find that he has spent time in gathering arguments 
 and facts that better writers easily refute. More serious still, 
 an investigator will often get from such a doubtful source 
 false impressions that later reading cannot entirely efface. 
 The work of preliminary reading, in this respect, is an exact 
 analogy to the work of the architect or the contractor. What 
 kind of judgment would it be on his part to plan his roof and 
 windows before he knew the size of the house or the general 
 style of its architecture.'' The writer who goes in search of 
 newspaper facts before he knows the fundamental conditions 
 of the problem in hand and the broad outlines of his case 
 shows no better judgment. 
 
 2. The effective method is to begin the investigation 
 with the reading of (a) books and magazine articles that give 
 an understanding of the general conditions on which the 
 question is founded. The understanding so gained is a 
 touchstone by which all else may be tested. Next, take up 
 (b) magazine articles or pamphlets bearing on the particular 
 question in dispute. By this time the main ideas on which 
 the proof must be founded gradually appear, and the case 
 as a whole begins to assume a definite form. Finally, make 
 a discriminating use of (c) such sources as the newspaper, to 
 get details of evidence still needed in addition to that alreadj' 
 gathered to support all points you wish to prove. It is only 
 by following such a plan of reading as this that there can be 
 
GATHERING MATERIAL 77 
 
 secured the three things most to be sought in the work of 
 reading prehminary to arrangement and final presentation, 
 viz.: (a) a grasp of the question as a whole; (b) an under- 
 standing of the vitally important points in the case; and (c) 
 the getting of evidence that is relevant and reliable. 
 
 K. What to do : assimilate. Lastly in regard to the step 
 we are now considering, the thing to do with the material 
 gathered is to assimilate it. "Assimilation is the process 
 by which plants and animals convert food into the various 
 tissues of their own proper substance.'* When a man eats, 
 if the food he takes is properly assimilated, it ceases to exist 
 as food and becomes part of the man himself. So in argu- 
 mentation, assimilation is the process by which the student 
 converts the materials gathered from all sources into the 
 fibers of his own finished arguments. We have stated in the 
 preceding section that the first thing to be sought in the read- 
 ing of any book or article is the point or points which the 
 writer regards as vital in the case. Merely to seize upon these 
 ideas, however, and force them bodily into the proof without 
 change of form, would inevitably produce the same disastrous 
 effects that would ensue if a man should eat without digestion. 
 The proof would be weak and ill formed. It would be a mere 
 jumble of facts and figures. The varied and inharmonious 
 ideas of different men would be mixed together in confusion. 
 The force of evidence that might be made convincing would 
 be spent with no effect. To have strength and vitality in 
 proof, the ideas and arguments of other writers and thinkers 
 must be so fused with one another and with the ideas of the 
 student himself, that the final product bears little if any re- 
 semblance to any one of the parts of which it is made; it is not 
 the idea of this book or that, nor the idea of the reader, but an 
 indivisible composite of all. Like the body, the proof is made 
 of many kinds of substances, but it must itself be new and a 
 distinctive unit. 
 
 L. The way to assimilate material. There is but one 
 way in which material can be so assimilated. It must be 
 
IS ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 done by the careful and constant thought of the reader as he 
 progresses, step by step. When one starts out to read on any 
 subject, he nearly always has in his own mind some original 
 conceptions of the question. In the first place, then, he 
 should understand just what these conceptions are. Then, 
 when in the course of his reading he finds some new idea, 
 some new argument, he should carefully compare it with the 
 contents of his own mind, and modify his own conceptions 
 accordingly. The ideas that result will not be those he has 
 read, nor will they be those he had originally: they will be 
 new. This process must be kept up unremittingly. The 
 material cannot be stored up for future assimilation any 
 more safely than a man could postpone the digestion of his 
 food. Each bit of material must be understood, compared, 
 and assimilated when it first is discovered. The evidence 
 gathered in this way ceases to exist in its various foreign 
 forms. The ideas no longer overlap or conflict with one an- 
 other. They fall into their proper places as parts of one 
 working body. 
 
 M. Personality. Such a method also gives to the proof 
 the invaluable quality of personality. Complete originality 
 in argumentation is very rare. The most effective speech or 
 essay often contains ideas and evidence that have become 
 time-honored by their frequent usage. But the ideas are so 
 altered by the personality of the author that they are made 
 new. The y take on fres h^fnrms atiH colors and gather an 
 origina l force] No quality is more valuable to charm or 
 interest an audience than this quality of personality; and the 
 personality that is forceful in argumentation is always at- 
 tributable largely to the power of assimilation. 
 
 N. Conscious practice. This power is gained only by 
 practice. It may well grow into an unconscious habit of mind ; 
 but the creation and development of it must always come 
 from conscious self-training. The ability to assimilate is, 
 of course, engendered and strengthened by other means than 
 preliminary reading in argumentation. But nowhere is the 
 
GATHERING MATERIAL 79 
 
 application of the power more practical or more important; 
 and a student who is enteriner upon the serious pursuit of 
 argumentation, however truiy he may possess this quality 
 of mind in general, will do well to watch himself for a time, 
 lest he fall into other habits. 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 5 
 
 GATHERING MATERIAL 
 
 1. Hand in at least twelve cards of notes gathered for use 
 in your original forensic, carrying out accurately the 
 suggestions and directions for note-taking on cards given 
 in this chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 EVIDENCE 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 I. The Nature of Evidence 
 
 A. Persuasion and conviction in evidence. 
 
 B. Proof. 
 
 C. Evidence. 
 
 D. Argument. 
 
 E. Evidence in law. 
 
 F. Evidence in general argumentation. 
 
 G. Sources of evidence. 
 H. Prejudiced witnesses. 
 
 II. The Kinds of Evidence 
 
 A. Direct or circumstantial. 
 
 B. Written or unwritten. 
 
 C. Real or personal. 
 
 D. Original or unoriginal (hearsay). 
 
 E. Pre-appointed or casual. 
 
 F. Positive or negative. 
 
 G. Ordinary or expert. 
 
 1. "Argument from authority." 
 
 2. Documentation of sources not argument from authority. 
 
 III. The Tests of Evidence 
 
 A. Tests of the quality of the evidence itself. 
 
 1. Consistent with human nature? 
 
 2. Consistent with known facts? 
 
 3. Consistent with itself? 
 
 4. Can it pass the hearsay test? 
 
 a. In law courts. 
 
 b. In general argumentation. 
 
 80 
 
EVIDENCE 81 
 
 (I) The nature of the evidence itself. 
 
 (II) The channel through which it comes. 
 5. Is it exceptionally valuable? 
 
 a. Admissions against interest. 
 
 b. Casual or undesigned. 
 
 c. Negative. 
 
 d. Real. 
 
 B. Tests of the sources of evidence. 
 
 1. Ordinary ("fact") witnesses. 
 
 a. Physically qualified? 
 
 b. Mentally qualified? 
 
 (I) Memory. 
 
 (II) Accuracy. 
 
 (A) Thoughtless exaggeration. 
 
 c. Morally qualified? 
 
 (I) Unduly interested in case. 
 
 (II) General moral character. 
 
 d. Opportunity for getting the truth? 
 
 2. Expert ("Opinion") witnesses. 
 
 a. Opinion evidence needed? 
 
 b. Authority qualified? 
 
 c. Authority recognized? 
 
 I. The Nature of Evidence 
 
 A. Persuasion and conviction in evidence. We now 
 come to the consideration of the second of the two parts in 
 the process of Selection, viz., the choosing from whatever 
 materials we have been able to gather, of those facts, argu- 
 ments, or appeals that will best serve our purpose in the case 
 in hand. Here, as everywhere, we must remember the dual 
 nature of all argumentation: o ur materials must be judged 
 a nd chosen in accordance with the standards both of con - 
 viction and of persuasion. _ Persuasio n, requires that we 
 c onsider th^ nharpntpr^ intplligATio^, and personal interest.^ 
 of our audience or readers, and the r»ireiir "gtQTi^Ac \n whif>li 
 we are a^ gni'^gr ^''^ t hat we may make use of the ideas and 
 m ethods that will strike most directly and forcibly upon . 
 
82 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the imflgi'nfltinn anH pppiiliar pmntinn^; nf tlin^sP we .address. 
 
 While e vi d e n c e must be chosen primarily on the basis of its 
 logical sufficiency, it is well always to consider also its per- 
 suasive-possibilities. When a choice is possible between evi- 
 dential facts, witnesses, groups of evidence, or methods of 
 proof, that which will have the more persuasive effect should 
 be chosen. But persuasion is a secondary consideration here. 
 Nothing can be good evidence that does not qualify as a 
 sound basis for conviction. Conviction requires that we un- 
 derstand what it is that constitutes the inherent strength of 
 the various kinds of proofs, so that we may employ evidence 
 and argument that will seem to the minds of others to be 
 logically strong and accurate. Leaving the standards of per- 
 suasion to be discussed at a later time, let us now turn to the 
 question: What are the inherent elements of strength and of 
 weakness in the various kinds of proof.'* 
 
 B. Proof is the name used to designate "^nything-whick 
 serveSj_eitherj mmedia telyjor m ediately to (; 'onv ince the min d 
 of t he truth or falsity of any fact or propositieft;^ . . 
 * Proof is also appHed to the conviction generated in the 
 mind by proof properly so called.""^^ "The word proof , 
 ... is applied by the most accurate logicians, to tll^ ^ffprf. _ 
 of evidence, and not to the medium by which truth is es- 
 tablished." ^ There is then substantial authority for using 
 the word to designate that which convinces the mind or the 
 conviction generated^the effect produced- The fact that 
 both of these meanings are in common use sbpuld be borne 
 in mind by all students of argumentation. It may save 
 misunderstanding in debate. Biit constructively it is of 
 little or no consequence which meaning we use. The "bur- 
 den of proof" means the same whichever definition is used; 
 and in our work under either we must consider the same sub- 
 divisions — (1) evidence, and (2) arguments. 
 
 C. Evidence. "The ^word evidence ... is applied to 
 
 t hat which tends tn rf>Tldfr ^^^IrlArit Cir *^ jrnnnnnfn j^w>m^ 
 
 1 Best, p. 5. 2 Greenleaf, p. 3. 
 
EVIDENCE 83 
 
 . . . Evidence, thus understood , lias he en well definecjj — 
 an y matter of fact, the effect, tendency, or design of which is. 
 \(y prnHiipp in the Tnind a. persiiflsion. affirmative or disaf- 
 firmative. of the exisf^npf^ nf gome other mfltter of fnct. The 
 f act sought to he proved is term ed ^^^ * principal fgf>t*^ 
 
 thef act whi chj Py^ds to es t ablish it , ^ \h ^ n yirlAnti'^r j r fi^ ^ fft ,* ^ 
 
 If A. is the * principal fact ' to be proved, and X the * evi- 
 dentiary fact,* the evidence offered, then the claim that X 
 proves A is an argument. This distinction should be kept clear. 
 "When one offers * evidence,' ... he offers, otherwise than 
 by reference to what is already known, to prove a matter 
 of fact which is to be used as a basis of inference to another 
 matter of fact. ... In giving evidence we are furnishing to 
 a tribunal a new basis for reasoning. . . . The new element 
 thus added is what we call evidence." ^ Evidence then con- 
 sists of all the matters of fact that may be used in the generat- 
 ing of proof. I t is the raw material from which the fj nisjied 
 pro duct^ proof, is to be mq nufqjetured. 
 
 D. Argument, in its restricted meaning, is the name 
 used to designate the prnopsci by whic h, from knowing the 
 e xistence of one fact, or a certain number of facts, we in fer 
 the e xistence of other facts. This meaning of the word "ar- 
 gument" must not be confused with other meanings. The 
 word may be used to refer to a finished discourse as a whole; 
 it may refer to an entire debate or discussion; or, as here, 
 it may mean simply a single process of reasoning. There is, 
 perhaps, no better definition of an argument, in this sense, 
 than Cardinal Newman's definition of reason, as "anyutroc- 
 
 eS S or act of the mind bv which , frr>m \rnr.xKT\n^ nn^ thin^ 
 
 it advances on to know another ! " To continue the analogy 
 of manufacturing, suggested in the last paragraph, argument 
 is the process by which the raw material, evidence, is turned 
 into the finished product, proof. 
 
 E. Evidence in law. Before discussing the classifica- 
 tion and tests of evidence in general argumentation, we should 
 
 1 Best, p. 6. 2 Thayer, pp. 263, 264. 
 
84 ' ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 have clearly in mind what legal evidence means as distinct 
 from evidence as used in ordinary discussion outside of court 
 trials. We should know the fundamental precepts and pur- 
 poses of the law of evidence in order to understand, and to 
 be able properly to apply, whatever borrowings we may 
 make from this division of legal practice. A clear under- 
 standing of the law of evidence will show us why evidence 
 in argumentation outside of law courts should not be rigidly 
 subjected to the legal tests. 
 
 The law of evidence concerns itself with furnishing to 
 courts matters of fact for their use in arriving at judicial 
 decisions in regard to questions before them. In discharging 
 their proper functions the courts of law are not engaged in 
 academic discussions nor in the work of discovering and en- 
 forcing abstract truth or abstract justice. Their purpose is 
 to settle disputes and award justice as fairly and accurately 
 as may be under the limits imposed upon them, such as time, 
 expense, etc., and by the use of such instrumentalities as are 
 available for their employment. The law of evidence has 
 developed to meet the requirements of this practical situa- 
 tion, and is not a set of rules to be followed outside of the 
 courtroom, by those working upon questions which are not 
 to be decided in courts of law. 
 
 The function of the law of evidence is set forth as follows 
 by Professor Thayer: ^ 
 
 " (1) It prescribes the manner of presenting evidence; a s 
 by requiring that it shall be given in open court by one who 
 personally knows the thing appearing in person, subject to 
 cross-examination, or by allowing it to be given by deposition, 
 taken in such and such a way; and the like. (2) It fixes the 
 q ualifications and the privilpgft of witnpsspsr and the mf^df ^^ 
 ex amining the m. (3) And chie fly, it determines, as amon g 
 pro bative matters, matters in their natu re evidential, — what 
 classes of things shall not be received. This excluding func- 
 tion is the characteristic one in our law of evidence." 
 1 Prel. Treat., p. 264. 
 
EVIDENCE 85 
 
 The relevancy of a piece of evidence cannot be settled by 
 law. Matters are relevant or not according to the tests of 
 logic and general experience. The law of evidence simply 
 says that under certain circumstances certain relevant evi- 
 dence shall not be admitted. It consists of a set of excluding 
 rules which exclude certain classes of relevant evidence, and 
 consists further of certain exceptions to these rules, which 
 admits subdivisions of classes of evidence excluded by the 
 general rules. Strictly legal tests of evidence are not tests of 
 logical relevancy, but tests of legal admissibility. The 
 grounds upon which legal admissibility has been denied to 
 certain classes of evidence are various. Some kinds of evi- 
 dence are thought to be of too little importance, in some the 
 connection is too farfetched. Some kinds of evidence are 
 excluded because it is feared their effects upon the juries 
 would not be salutary; others are excluded on grounds of 
 general public policy, etc., etc. It is well for the student of 
 general argumentation to be as familiar as possible with the 
 law of evidence in order to understand what use may prop- 
 erly be made outside of the courtrooms of suggestions to be 
 drawn from rules which are rigidly enforced in the courts 
 themselves. 
 
 F. Evidence in general argumentation. In brief then, 
 in general argumentation we may have good evidence that 
 would not be admitted in law courts. Relevancy, logical 
 sufficiencv, is what we demand of evidence outside of courts . 
 But in law evidence must meet this test and then also meet 
 the requirements of the law of evidence. There is no *' law of 
 evidence" as such outside of the courts. So the oft heard 
 statement that such and such evidence "would not be ad- 
 mitted in any court in the country" has really very little 
 force if the discussion is being carried on outside of a court. 
 The rules of l egal evidence have to do mainlv with admissi - 
 bility,, w hile in general argumentation, where we have no 
 
 r ules of admissi b il^^^y , ^^ ^^^ /^/->|^pp|.r.Q^Tnn;n1y TrritV. «n1nl !^ 
 
 vancy. However, while we do not exclude, it is probably well 
 
86 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 to scrutinize very carefully in general argumentation evidence 
 that courts have thought it best to exclude entirely from the 
 consideration of juries. In order to be able to do this, on 
 the one hand, and to be ready, on the other, to thwart who- 
 ever (either in ignorance or cunning) tries to apply in general 
 discussion the excluding rules of the law courts, it is well 
 to note carefully the references to the law of evidence, and 
 to legal procedure which are given in this book. 
 
 G. The sources of evidence. Evidence which seems 
 on its face to be credible, consistent, and convincing may be 
 rendered of no account by an expos ure of weakness in the 
 source from whence it come s. The sources of evidence are 
 three — persons , document^, and things ._ Persons are of 
 course the most important source. The testimony of persons 
 may of course be written as well as spoken. Not all written 
 evidence is documentary. Books, magazine articles, etc., 
 used in general argumentation should be used as the personal 
 testimony of their authors. When a writer states in a book 
 that a certain thing is true, this is personal testimony that 
 the thing is true and documentary evidence that he stated 
 that it was true. The person behind all personal testimony 
 should be tested alike in written and oral evidence. As the 
 term is used in this book "witness" covers both "speaker" 
 and "writer." It may be said, however, that written testi- 
 mony is less likely to contain such errors as are due to simple 
 thoughtlessness. But in all cases the sources of evidence 
 should be carefully examined. If it can be shown that the 
 statements, however plausible, are mere careless assertions 
 of unrehable persons, or that the testimony was given with 
 some dishonest motive, its value is gone. So it is alwavs. 
 necessary in selecting one*s own proof or i n attacking the 
 proof of an opponent to know what kinds^ , witnesses give 
 g ood evidence, and what kinds bad evidenc e. Looked at 
 from the viewpoint of the sources from whence the evidence 
 is derived, there a re two kinds of evidence : (a) Qidinary-esds. 
 deiice, and (b) expert evidence. There are certain tests 
 
EVIDENCE 87 
 
 that may be applied to all witnesses; these are the tests of 
 the sources of ordinary evidence. Then the examination of 
 the class of witnesses known as "experts" demands the 
 application of certain additional tests. 
 
 H. Prejudiced witnesses. Before passing on to a con- 
 sideration of the kinds of evidence and the tests of evidence, 
 it may be well to state what the function of the witness is, 
 to analyze his operations, and to give a warning concerning 
 a big question that is important in connection with the 
 testimony of all kinds of witnesses. A witness has to gather 
 impressions, facts, information, and then present these to 
 others. He must learn the truth and tell it. A good vyitness 
 must be capable and desirous of finding out or receiving the truth, 
 and capable and desirous of reporting the truth. The big 
 question that we must ask in regard to each witness is "with 
 what prei> Hipe. if any^ Hops Tip InnV upon thft m atter concern - 
 in g which he is testifying.?^". 
 
 Prejudice, bias, self-interest, personal liking for one thing 
 and dislike for another affects the truth finding as well as the 
 truth telling of many men who are desirous of finding and tell- 
 ing nothing but the truth. It is to a great extent true that 
 men (all men — and women — not simply the less intellectual) 
 believe what they want to believe. They are not capable 
 of finding the truth in regard to some things because they 
 look at these things through colored glasses, j^^hat many 
 honest men see, hear, and even taste, and smell, depends 
 t o a certain extent upon th ^ir prpj^jHiVps The solution of the 
 difficulty thus presented is not to yesnivp npf ^^r^ nc^ pmjia. 
 d iced witnesses, but to use the least prejudiced witnesses 
 p ossible., To decline to receive or accept the testimony of 
 prejudiced witnesses is to decline all testimony on most of the 
 important questions of the day. Of course there are many 
 mere questions of fact in which prejudices are of no account. 
 But in general argumentation, in politics, economics, sociol- 
 ogy, religion, literature, education, etc., most men who are 
 discussing questions, writing articles, and books, have def- 
 
88 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 inite opinions, beliefs, interests, and prejudices. This does 
 not mean that we must disregard what they testify to, but 
 that we must weigh their testimony with reference to their 
 pre-conceived notions, and al ways listen to the tejstirjioiiy^n 
 hatk-^es. Read what both the advocates and opponents of 
 a certain measure find in the facts of a given event, and then 
 draw your own conclusions as to the truth. Do not try to 
 get the truth concerning something from those who are 
 naturally prejudiced against it, and do not accept without 
 comparison with the statements of opponents the testimony 
 concerning something of those who are naturally prejudiced 
 in its favor. 
 
 II. The Kinds of Evidence 
 
 Evidence may be classified in a number of ways. Some of 
 the divisions made are more or less arbitrary and there is 
 slight disagreement among authorities, especially as to nomen- 
 clature. It is well worth while, however, to examine the com- 
 moner classifications and definitions at least to the extent 
 of learning what is meant by the terms used. 
 
 A. Direct or circumstantial. The most common classi- 
 fication of evidence is into (1) direct and (2) indirect or cir- 
 cumstantial. *' Evidence is either direct or indirect; accord- 
 ing as the principal fact follows from the evidentiary — ^the 
 factum prohandum from the factum probans — immediately 
 or by inference. In jurisprudence, however, direct evidence 
 is commonly used in a secondary sense; viz., as limited to 
 cases where the principal fact, or factum prohandum, is at- 
 tested direct by witnesses, things, or documents." ^ 
 
 In law, then, the term direct evidence is usually applied 
 to the testimony of persons who declare the existence of the 
 fact in issue, speaking from their own personal knowledge. 
 The important factor is that these persons testify directly 
 as to the existence of the fact in issue. The testimony is 
 required to be based on their own personal knowledge by 
 1 Best, pp. 15, 16. 
 
EVIDENCE 89 
 
 the hearsay rule. The evidence would still be direct as 
 distinct from circumstantial if the information were second- 
 hand or "hearsay," but since as such it would normally be 
 inadmissible in a law court, direct evidence in law is defined 
 in terms which cover direct original evidence. "A witness 
 testifies that he saw A inflict a mortal wound on B, of which 
 he instantly died; this is a case of direct evidence." ^ If the 
 witness testified that C told him that he (C) saw A kill B, 
 the evidence would still be direct (i. e., not circumstantial) 
 but it would be inadmissible as hearsay in law. Outside of 
 law courts, however, we act on this kind of direct evidence 
 every day. Indirect or circurastantial evidence ^ is " evidence 
 of some other fact, or facts, from which, taken singly or 
 collectively, the existence or nonexistence of the particular 
 fact, or facts, in question, may be inferred as a necessary 
 or probable consequence." ^ It is obviously impossible to 
 classify evidence as direct or circumstantial until we know the 
 "fact in issue" to determine which this evidence is advanced. 
 If it immediately affirms or denies some fact from which an 
 inference is made to the "fact in issue," it is circumstantial. 
 
 " If a witness testifies that a deceased person was shot with 
 a pistol, and the wadding (used in this pistol) is found to be 
 part of a letter addressed to the prisoner, the residue of which 
 is discovered in his pocket," ^ that is indirect or circumstan- 
 tial evidence. From the existence of these facts the jury may 
 infer the guilt of the prisoner. "* Circumstantial evidence is 
 either conclusive or presumptive: conclusive, where the con- 
 nection between the principal and evidentiary facts — the 
 factum probandum and factum prohans — is a necessary 
 consequence of the laws of Nature; presumptive, where it 
 only rests on a greater or less degree of probability. In 
 practice this latter is termed * presumptive evidence' — ob- 
 viously a secondary sense of the word; for direct evidence is 
 in truth only presumptive, seeing that it rests on a presump- 
 
 ^ Greenleaf, p. 17. ' Hughes, p. 1. 
 
 * See Presumptions of Fact, eh. 3. * Greenleaf, p. 17. 
 
90 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tion of the accuracy and veracity of witnesses, things, oi 
 documents.*' ^ 
 
 The most elective proof is gained by the use of these two 
 kinds of evidence in combination. Direct evidence may be 
 untrustworthy because of mistakes in the observation of the 
 witness or because of prejudice. Circumstantial evidence 
 may be inconclusive because of a possible ambiguity in the 
 inferences to be drawn from it. But when the two kinds are 
 used together, each confirming the other, the evidence be- 
 comes of the highest possible efficiency. 
 
 B. Written or unwritten. With respect to its form, we 
 may classify evidence as: (1) written, ^"^ (^) nn^-rittf^i^ 
 
 In the r»^iirt r>f Inw q pr^ngj^prpblp part nf thp eviHpncp is UJXl 
 
 written . It consists of the spoken testimony of witnesses, 
 present before the judge or jury. In fnrn^gl dp^^^^^ ojco^Vir^T'^^ 
 ho wever, the evidence is largely written .^ It is often akin 
 in its nature to the spoken testimony of the courts, in that 
 it expresses the beliefs of different persons as to the existence 
 of certain facts. But the persons themselves are rarely 
 present to express their beliefs orally. Their opinions are 
 gathered from books, magazines, newspapers, and docu- 
 ments. 
 
 C. Real or personal. "Again, evidence is either (1) 
 real or (2}_£ersmial.^ By real evidence is meant evidence of 
 
 1 Best, p. 16. 
 
 2 See p. 86. The Sources of Evidence, this chapter. 
 
 ^ "Stephen's limitation of the term 'evidence' to (1) the statements of 
 witnesses and (2) documents is too narrow. When, in a controversy be- 
 tween a tailor and his customer, involving the fit of a coat, the customer 
 puts on the coat and wears it during the trial, as in Brown vs. Foster, 113 
 Mass. at p. 137, a basis of inference is supplied otherwise than by reasoning 
 or statements, whether oral or written; ^nd it seems impossible to deny to 
 this the name of 'evidence.' 
 
 "It is what Bentham calls 'real evidence,' a phrase which imports a very 
 valuable discrimination, when limited to that which is presented directly to 
 the senses of the tribunal. It is not, practically, of much importance when 
 divided further into 'reported real evidence,' etc. Best in his treatise, has 
 confused the topic by following Bentham into this sort of refinement, over- 
 
EVIDENCE 91 
 
 which any object belonging to the class of things is the source, 
 persons also being included, in respect to such qualities as 
 belong to them in common with things." ^ Real evidence is 
 obtained when weapons or wounds are exhibited to the jury, 
 or fences or railroad crossings are examined by them, or a 
 person whose age or parentage is in issue appears before the 
 jury to be seen by them. Real evidence, of course, cannot 
 b e hearsay. It is evidence presented directly to the sens es 
 of those who are t o judge, without any interpretation by a 
 persog^ The evidence speaks for itself . There is no** thought 
 communication." It may of course be presented to any of 
 the senses, sight, hearing, taste, smell, etc. 
 
 Personal evidence is tha t which is afforded by a Jiuman 
 a gent, either in the way of discourse, or by voluntary sign s 
 (made for the purpo se of communicating tb^i^g^^«) Evi- 
 d ence gained by observation (of the person of the witness)_ or 
 th at afforded by involuntary changes of countenance and de - 
 port ment comes under the head o f rpal PvirJPT^pp^ When- 
 ever a witness communicates thought to a judge or jury either 
 by spoken language or by signs, he is giving personal evidence; 
 while if he shows the jury a wound, or that he can raise his 
 arm by raising it for them to see, he is giving real evidence. 
 
 D. Original and unoriginal. A division of evidence that 
 is important because under it we get one of the terms (hear- 
 say) that we hear most about in discussions of evidence, is 
 the division into (1) original and (2) unoriginal evidence. 
 Original evide nce is that ** which has an independent proba- 
 ti ve force of its own: unoriginah also called derivative, 
 transmitted, or secondhand evidence, is Jhat w hich derives 
 it s force from, through, or under some other." ^ Best 
 gives five forms of unoriginal evidence, but these minute 
 subdivisions are not of importance to the student of general 
 
 looking, probabljs for the moment, the fact that Bentham, unlike himself, 
 was engaged in a philosophical discussion and was not writing a law book." 
 Footnote, Thayer, pp. 263, 264. 
 
 1 Best, p. 16. 2 See Ibid. » Ibid., p. 17. 
 
92 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 argumentation. For us it is substantially correct to say that 
 iinofjgiy^fl,! fvifl^nrr mrnm hcarmy nrlHrnrni 
 
 Hearsay evidence is defined by Greenleaf ^ as "that kind 
 of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the 
 credit to be given to the witness himself, but rests also in 
 part on the veracity and competency of some other person. 
 ... Its extrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the 
 mind as to the existence of the fact, and the frauds that may 
 be practised under its cover, combine to support the rule, 
 that hearsay evidence is totally inadmissible." Hearsay 
 evidence, in brief, is the evidence of persons who testify to 
 the existence of some fact, on the ground that they have 
 been informed of its existence by some other person. Hearsay 
 evidence, of course, is always ** personal," never '*real." For 
 the exceptions to the hearsay rule in law see Best, ch. IV. ^ 
 
 In general argumentation. What the courts exclude, ar- 
 gumentation elsewhere should treat with suspicion, but 
 should not necessarily rule out. Courts must have rules 
 that will apply to all alike. But we are not so bound in gen- 
 eral argumentation. Of course, the hearsay evidence of the 
 ignorant, the careless, the vicious, is worthless. Buthearsay 
 e vidence coming through accurate, trained minds may be of 
 s uch a^aracter that it would be absurd to question it on 
 the ground that i t i« |ipar«ay Secondhand evidence, how- 
 ever, is usually less convincing than original evidence. The 
 testimony may be too many stages removed from the fact 
 itself. An audience will often suspect that the arguer cannot 
 or dare not produce the original authority. Again, it is too 
 easily overthrown. If a reliable witness who has a first-hand 
 knowledge can be brought to testify to any fact of a con- 
 tradictory nature, the hearsay evidence is immediately 
 brought to the ground. 
 
 Care must be taken not to confuse direct and original 
 evidence. If A testifies that B said that he saw X kill Y, 
 this is direct but hearsay. If A testifies that he saw X run- 
 1 Pages 121, 122. ^ pp, 434-444. 
 
EVIDENCE 93 
 
 ning away from the scene of the murder of Y at about the 
 time Y must have been killed, this is original but circum- 
 stantial evidence that X murdered Y. 
 
 E. Pre-aPDointed or casuaL Evidence may be divided 
 into (1) prp-nppointeH evidence and (2) casual .evidence^ 
 Wherever "the creation or preservation of an article of evi- 
 dence has been, either to public or private minds, an object 
 of solicitude, . . . (viz. in the view of its serving to give 
 effect to a right, or enforce an obligation, on some future 
 contingent occasion), the evidence so created and preserved 
 comes under the notion of pre-appointed evidence." ^ 
 Deeds, notes, written contracts, etc., are forms of written 
 pre-appointed evidence. W hen a man arranges to hav e 
 c ertain persons witness his words or actions in order -t hat 
 th ey maj Mystify to what he said or (\\(\, we have unwritten, 
 pre-appointed e^ridence. \Any evidence not coming under 
 the head of pre-appointed evidence is casual or undesigned 
 evidence. It is evidence that has been neither created nor 
 preserved for the purpose of using it as evidence of the fact 
 now being substantiated by it. This kind of evidence con- 
 sists of testimony given by persons who, when they gave it, 
 had no thought that it would ever be used as evidence in the 
 case in question. Speaking for another purpose a person 
 often lets fall a statement that is merely incidental. The 
 value of such evidence lies in its freedom from the suspicion 
 of any hidden motive. It is ingenuous and presumably hon- 
 est. But it has very serious weakness. The testimony may 
 well have been careless. The witness, thinking the assertion of 
 slight importance, may have been indifferent as to its accuracy. 
 
 Mr. Webster, in the following selection from his argument 
 in the White murder trial, enforced the value of some of his 
 evidence by showing that it was undesigned: — 
 
 *'Mr. Southwick swears all that a man can swear. He has the 
 best means of judging that could be had at the time. He tells you 
 
 * Best, p. 18, quoted from 2 Bentham Jud. Ev., 435. 
 
94 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 that he left his father's house at half-past ten o'clock, and as he 
 passed to his own house in Brown Street, he saw a man sitting on 
 the steps of the rope- walk; that he passed him three times, and 
 each time he held down his head, so that he did not see his face. 
 That the man had on a cloak, which was not wrapped around him, 
 and a glazed cap. That he took the man to be Frank Knapp at the 
 time; that, when he went into his house, he told his wife that he 
 thought it was Frank Knapp; that he knew him well, having known 
 him from a boy. And his wife swears that he did so tell her when 
 he came home. What could mislead this witness at the time? He 
 was not then suspecting Frank Knapp of anything. He could not 
 then be influenced by any prejudices. If you believe that the 
 witness saw Frank Knapp in this position at this time, it proves the 
 case." ^ 
 
 F. Positive or negative. This classification is important 
 because of the peculiar nature and significance of what has 
 long been called (especially by rhetoricians) "negative evi- 
 dence." The term (1) positive evidence is rarely used. It is 
 needed simply to balance the negative. P ositive evidence is 
 all actual evidenc e. (2 ) Negative evidence is the term applied 
 to a significant abs ence of evidence: as for instance, the ab- 
 sence of signs of campfires, as evidence that campers have not 
 preceded you along a certain trail; or the failure of a member 
 of a dinner party to mention, while discussing the dinner 
 later, that one of the guests died at the table of heart failure, 
 as evidence that this did not happen. 
 
 Such negative testimony, or the testimony of silence — 
 "the failure of the witness to mention a fact so striking that 
 he must have noticed it had it occurred" — has often been 
 mentioned by writers on argumentation as evidence of special 
 value. ^ The legal writers on evidence make statements 
 that seem at first quite contradictory. " Ordinarily a witness 
 who testifies to an affirmation is entitled to credit in prefer- 
 ence to one who testifies to a negative, because the latter 
 
 1 TheWarks of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 90. 
 
 2 See Baker and Huntington, p. 131, and Genung, Prac. Rket., p. 410, 
 
EVIDENCE 95 
 
 may have forgotten what actually occurred, while it is im- 
 possible to remember what never existed." ^ 
 
 "Our old lawyers lay down broadly, *It is a maxim in 
 law that witnesses cannot testify a negative, but an affirm- 
 ative.' From these and similar expressions it has been 
 rashly inferred, and is frequently asserted, that *a negative 
 is incapable of proof,' — a position wholly indefensible if un- 
 derstood in an unqualified sense. Nothing more was meant 
 than to express the undoubted truth that, in the ordinary 
 course of things, the burden of proof is not to be cast on the 
 party who merely denies an assertion. The ground on which 
 this rests has been already explained; and another grave ob- 
 jection to requiring proof of a simple negative is its indefi- 
 niteness. A person asserts that a certain event took place, 
 not saying when, where, or under what circumstances; how 
 am I to disprove that, ajid convince others that at no time, at 
 no place, and under no circumstances, has such a thing oc- 
 curred? The utmost that could possibly be done in most 
 instances w ould be to show the improbability of the sup posed. 
 event; and eventhiswould usually require an enormous 
 mass of presumptive evidence. Hence the well-known rule 
 that aj ^mative evidence is in genera l hetter_than negative evi- 
 dence. But when the negative ceases to be a simple one, — 
 l^Een it is qualified by time, place, or circumstance, — much 
 of this objection is removed; and proof of a negative may 
 very reasonably be required when the qualifying circum- 
 stances are the direct matter in issue, or the affirmative is 
 either probable in itself, or supported by a presumption, 
 or peculiar means of proof are in the hands of the party 
 asserting the negative." ^ These statements are not incon- 
 sistent. The legal writers make these remarks usually in 
 connection with a discussion of the burden of proof. All 
 sound thinkers agree that the affirmative (the affirmative 
 on the substance of the proposition, regardless of form) 
 has the burden of proof. So the courts insist on affirmative 
 1 Greenleaf, note 1. p. 93. « Best, pp. 262, 263. 
 
96 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 evidence, and do not require proof of a simple negative on 
 account of its indefiniteness. But when we have a simple, 
 definite, qualified denial, the case is quite different. And it 
 is only in regard to questions sufficiently qualified in time, 
 place, and circumstance that rhetoricians give special value 
 to negative evidence or the testimony of silence — the ab- 
 sence of evidence where it would naturally be found if the 
 statement made were true. 
 
 For instance, the absence of a man's name from the list of 
 students published in a college catalogue is negative evidence 
 that this man is not a student at this college. The failure 
 of the newspapers of a certain city for the month of May, 
 1888, to mention a sensational murder trial alleged to have 
 been held in that city during that month is negative evidence 
 that no such trial took place. If we fail to find in the stand- 
 ard biographies of a man any reference to his having been 
 elected to an important public office, it is safe to conclude 
 that he never was so elected. The strength of this evidence 
 is similar to that of casual evidence. It lies in the difficulty 
 of "manufacturing" or manipulating it. The absence of 
 evidence to support a claim where we have a right to expect 
 it to be found if the claim is true, is in many cases more con- 
 vincing than positive assertions. The common expression 
 "If that were true, we would have heard about it" expresses 
 the universal faith in negative evidence. 
 
 G. Ordinary or expert. Evidence may be classified as 
 (1) ordinary and (2) expert. Most evidence is ordinary. 
 This term covers all that is not expert. Expert testimony 
 strictly speaking is called in law "opinion evidence" and in 
 general argumentation "argument from authority." These 
 two terms cover practically parallel things, and we will gain 
 considerably in general argumentation if we understand the 
 legal doctrine of " opinion evidence " and follow it in dealing 
 with " argument from authority." In law the testimony of an 
 "ordinary" witness is not always limited strictly to matters 
 of fact. There are at times circumstances under which an 
 
EVIDENCE 97 
 
 ordinary witness is allowed to testify in regard to matters 
 of opinion, such for instance as his opinion regarding the 
 "character" or the "sanity" of some other person. Also, 
 there arise at times in law trials circumstances under which 
 an "expert'* witness testifies as to matters of fact rather than 
 to matters of opinion. For instance, an expert chemist 
 might very well testify as to matters of fact in the realm of 
 chemistry, under which circumstances he could not be called 
 strictly an " opinion " witness. However, the expert is usually 
 asked to interpret facts which he or other witnesses estab- 
 lish, and this interpretation which is the expert's principal 
 function usually is, of course, opinion evidence in law, or 
 argument from authority in general argumentation. 
 
 Professor Thayer ^ has the following to say concerning ex- 
 pert witnesses: 
 
 "What is their function? It is just this, of judging facts 
 and interpreting them. They are called in because ^ being men 
 of skill, they can interpret phenomena which other men cannot, 
 or cannot safely, interpret.^ They * judge' the phenomena, 
 the appearances or facts which are presented to them, and 
 testify to that which in truth these signify or really are; they 
 estimate qualities and values. We say that they testify to 
 opinion. In truth, they are * judging' something, and testi- 
 fying to their conclusion upon a matter of fact. It is perfectly 
 well settled, in our law, and, as it would seem, elsewhere, 
 that such opinions or judgments are merely those of a wit- 
 ness; they are simply to aid the final judges of fact, and not 
 to bind them." 
 
 The ordinary witness testifies that a certain alleged fact 
 is true because he actually observed it to be so; the expert 
 testifies that the same alleged fact is true because certain 
 other facts exist, and his peculiar and exceptional knowledge 
 justifies him in inferring the existence of the fact in question. 
 The ordinary witness in a law court is not allowed to express 
 an opinion or even to use a word which shows his opinion. 
 1 Page 196. 2 jtaijcs ours. 
 
98 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 He must state what he saw, heard, etc., without character- 
 izing it in any way. Under certain circumstances "experts" 
 are called who are allowed to express opinions — or give opin- 
 ion evidence. 
 
 To take a simple illustration, the question is whether a 
 certain man who was shot and killed wore a certain coat on 
 the day of the murder. The ordinary witness may testify 
 that he saw the deceased near the place of the murder a short 
 time before the deed, and that he was wearing the coat in 
 question. The expert finds certain stains on the coat and 
 with the aid of his exceptional knowledge of chemistry, he 
 infers that the stains are blood stains and freshly made. 
 This is his opinion. He is allowed to give this opinion to the 
 jury. An ordinary witness may tell the jury that he saw A 
 strike B in a certain manner. The expert can tell the jury 
 whether such a blow would be fatal to a man in B's condition. 
 Clearly in these cases th e value of the testimony of the expe rt 
 d epends upon his special technical skill. This is always the 
 primary test of expert evidence: Is the witness possessed of 
 such knowledge that he will draw the correct conclusions 
 from the facts presented to him.?^ It is as a rule only when the 
 expert is dealing with questions on which the layman cannot 
 be expected to draw his own conclusions, that he is allowed to 
 give opinion evidence; and until this point is reached he is 
 only an ordinary witness, regardless of his position or repu- 
 tation. 
 
 "As to the former (opinion evidence) it is traceable easily 
 to the same source as the hearsay rule. ... It was for the 
 jury to form opinions, and draw inferences and conclusions, 
 and not for the witness. He was merely to bring in to the 
 jury, or the judge, the raw material of fact, on which their 
 minds were to work. . . . The witness was not to say that 
 he * thought' or * believed' so and so: it was for the jury to 
 say what they thought and believed. The witness must say 
 what he had 'seen and heard;' ... In a sense all testi- 
 mony to matter of fact is opinion evidence, i. e., it is a con- 
 
EVIDENCE 99 
 
 elusion formed from phenomena and mental impressions. 
 Yet that is not the way we talk in courts or in common life. 
 Where shall the line be drawn .^ When does matter of fact 
 first become matter of opinion ? A difficult question ; but some 
 things are clear. There are questions which require special 
 training and knowledge to answer them. . . . On such 
 questions, then, the ordinary jury may be assisted by skilled 
 witnesses, who give their opinions. . . . There is ground for 
 saying that, in the main, any rule excluding opinion evidence 
 is limited to cases where, in the judgment of the court, it will 
 not be helpful to the jury. Whether accepted in terms or not, 
 this view largely governs the administration of the rule." ^ 
 Opinion evidence, then, is admissible in the courtroom 
 when (a) a question for decision is such that to answer it 
 requires special training, skill, ability, or experience — one 
 which the ordinary layman is unable to answer without the 
 help of someone who is specially prepared to understand such 
 a question, (b) an expert is available to assist the jury whom 
 (c) the court accepts as likely to be helpful to the jury in 
 arriving at the decision. 
 
 1. Argument from authority. In general argumentation 
 as we have said, this kind of evidence is what is known as 
 the "argument from authority." This is a false name, for it 
 is not properly an argument, — ^i. e., a process of reasoning, — 
 but evidence. It consists in establishing a fact b y quoting 
 th e opinion of some person whose knowledge is such as to 
 jnt^lify tV»^ aoppptanpo nf hi s inferences as truthful. N ow the 
 legal procedure in this matter should be followed closely in 
 all argumentation. This will, among other things, do away 
 with one of the most stupid and harmful of the bad practices 
 in contest debating — that of quoting alleged "authorities" 
 on all sorts of questions, (a) The people quoted are usually 
 not authorities — not experts — not people specially qualified 
 to express opinions on the questions discussed, and (b) the 
 questions on which the authorities are cited are not questions 
 1 Thayer, p. 196. 
 
100 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 which call for expert testimony. Very often they are plain, 
 ordinary, everyday propositions on which all citizens are sup- 
 posed to be qualified to pass judgment, (c) Moreover, author- 
 ities are rushed in without being so produced as to be accepted 
 by anyone as authorities whose opinions might be helpful. 
 
 It must be remembered that a distinguished man is not 
 necessarily an authority on any question on which he has 
 expressed an opinion.^ The fact that a man is a distinguished 
 scientist gives him no standing as a critic of literature. Suc- 
 cess in politics does not make a man an authority in educa- 
 tion. Dramatists are not per se entitled to the privileges 
 of opinion witnesses on questions of sociology; and the opin- 
 ions of famous clergymen in the field of economics should 
 usually be accorded the same good humored disregard that 
 ought to greet the pronouncements of learned economists 
 on questions of religion and theology. We are not saying that 
 a man should have no opinions except in his special field 
 of work — but simply that the fact that a man is an authority 
 ii ^one field does not make him an authority in other He lds. 
 
 2. Documentation of sources ^ not argument from au- 
 thority. Care should be taken to avoid the common error of 
 treating all documentation of sources and identification of 
 witnesses as arguments from authority. When a great jurist 
 is quoted as saying that a certain law was passed in a certain 
 state on a given date, he is an ordinary witness to be tested 
 precisely as the farmer who testifies in regard to an accident 
 on the highway. When the judge is quoted, and the place 
 where his statement was found is given, the witness is identi- 
 fied, and the source of information documented, as should 
 usually be done; but there is no expert testimony offered, no 
 opinion evidence given, no comment from authority used. We 
 have the latter situation when we quote the judge as saying 
 that such and such a law would be unconstitutional. 
 
 The following is an example of argument from authority 
 
 ^ See Argumentum ad verecundiam, p. 193. 
 2 See Documentation of Sources, eh. 5. 
 
EVIDENCE 101 
 
 from the speech by Patrick Henry on "The Right of a State 
 during the Revolution to Confiscate British Debts." In 
 seeking to prove that the confiscation of British debts is 
 warranted by necessity, he says: — 
 
 "The necessity being great and dreadful, you are warranted to 
 lay hold of every atom of money within your reach, especially if it 
 be the money of your enemies. It is prudent and necessary to 
 strengthen yourselves and weaken your enemies. Vattel, Book 3d, 
 ch. 8, sec. 138, says: 'The business of a just war being to suppress 
 violence and injustice, it gives a right to compel by force him who 
 is deaf to the voice of justice. It gives a right of doing against the 
 enemy whatever is necessary for weakening him, for disabling him 
 from making any further resistance in support of his injustice, and 
 the most effectual, the most proper methods may be chosen, pro- 
 vided they have nothing odious, be not unlawful in themselves, or 
 exploded by the law of nature.' Here let me pause for a moment and 
 ask whether it be odious in itself or exploded by the law of nature 
 to seize those debts?" ^ 
 
 III. The Tests of Evidence 
 
 Very important for our purposes are the tests to be applied 
 to determine 'the value of evidence. To know whothcr a 
 pi ece of evidence is strong or weak is essential to the in- 
 telligentc onduct of a c as£. We can use only a limited 
 amount of all that we gather. Wg m^st have the power to 
 d iscriminat e. Then, too, we must know what is strong 
 enough to be put in the forefront of the proof, and what is 
 so weak as to be valuable only for the purpose of "filling 
 in" and reenforcing the more important parts. For these 
 purposes we have two vital tests of evidence: (A), the t esljoi- 
 th e quality of the evidence its elf, and (B) , the t est of thf ^ni\^r.Rs. 
 from whence it emnes. For convenience in our discussion, 
 the sources of evidence will be referred to as "witnesses." 
 
 A. Tests of the quality of the evidence itself. 1. Is 
 the evidence consistent with human nature and human ex- 
 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 13. 
 
102 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 perience? An y man properly hesifca tes t o accept as a fa ct 
 anythia g that runs contrary to his own p ast ex pe r ie nce or the 
 expe rience of h is-iellow-men. To make him beheve in any 
 evidence that contradicts the behefs of his life and his habits 
 of thinking requires explanation, enfoccement, and substan- 
 tiation that soon become an argument in themselves, and 
 even then the unqualified acceptance of the proof may be 
 a matter of doubt. If the evidence is in this way contrary to 
 ordinary human experience, one must never neglect to main- 
 tain its truthfulness by explaining just why it is credible and 
 valuable. Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric ^ expresses 
 the situation, when he says: "From experience we learn to 
 confine our belief in human testimony within the proper 
 bounds. Hence we are taught to consider many attendant 
 circumstances which serve ... to corroborate ... its evi- 
 dence. The reputation of the attester, his manner of address, 
 the nature of the fact attested, the occasion of giving the testi- 
 mony, the possible or probable design in giving it and several 
 other circumstances have considerable influence in fixing the 
 degree of credibility." Evidence, then, should as far as pos- 
 si ble be consistent with ordinary human experie nce and the 
 natural course of affiairs . If it is of any extraordinary nature, 
 its credibility must be shown before it will be of value or effect. 
 The weakness of evidence that is of an extraordinary na- 
 ture and contrary to common experience, is exposed in the 
 following selection from the speech by John Henry North in 
 the case of Rex vs. Forbes and others. Mr. North's client 
 was charged with committing criminal assault upon the Lord- 
 lieutenant of Ireland. Testimony was given by a certain 
 Dr. M'Namara, who said that he actually saw the defendant 
 hurl a bottle at the Lord-lieutenant in a public theatre. 
 Mr. North attacks testimony as follows: — 
 
 "The Doctor in the middle gallery sees Handwich in the third 
 row of the upper one, though between them there were two benches 
 
 1 P. 77. 
 
EVIDENCE 103 
 
 covered with people, and the boarded parapet in front of the upper 
 gallery besides! Through all these obstacles he sees him in that 
 dark corner of the gallery where he represents him to be placed; 
 sees him fling the bottle, and is now able, at this distance of time, 
 to identify his person. The bottle itself he saw in what he learnedly 
 calls its transit. A word or two on that same transit. I hold it 
 physically impossible that a bottle could have taken the course 
 described by Farrell and M'Namara, from the upper gallery to 
 the stage, without being observed by four or five hundred spec- 
 tators. Just think what the theatre is: a wide, illuminated area, 
 whose bounding surfaces are studded with eyes as numerous as 
 those of Argus. Not a square inch in that field of view which 
 was not painted on the retina of some one eye or other in that vast 
 assembly. Consider, too, the time — the interval between the play 
 and farce — when the attention of the audience was not fixed upon 
 the stage, when people were all looking about them, recognizing 
 and greeting their friends and acquaintances. Was there no one 
 to mark this bottle but Farrell, M'Namara, and the young medical 
 student.' What, not one giggling girl In the boxes, glancing round 
 for admiration! not an operaglass pointed! no fortunate observer 
 of the transit but the astronomer from Ballinakill! Is all this 
 credible.^ But this is not all — voonders upon voonders, as the 
 Dutchman said when he got to London — the greatest miracle is 
 to come. Down comes the bottle, thundering from the upper 
 gallery to the stage, and falls unbroken!" ^ 
 
 2. Is the evidence consistent with known facts? The ne- 
 cessity is evident of avoidin^^ontradktion betwsei^^ 
 pi eces of evidence presented in \he. proof, or b^^tw^en pvide ncp 
 p resent e d and other well- ^^ow^ fQr>tg Its discovery by an 
 opponent or by the audience will ruin all confidence in the 
 guilty person. The mistake of adducing evidence that is 
 contradicted by the commonly known or easily proved facts 
 of the question is illustrated by the following examples. 
 
 A few years ago in a trial of a civil suit the defendant was 
 on the witness stand. He was seeking to establish an alibi. 
 In the course of his testimony he was asked to tell of all his 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Latoyers, p. 659. 
 
104 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 movements and doings on a particular day. He told of sev- 
 eral purchases he had made in the stores of the city, of his 
 visit to a barber's shop, and of various other incidents. When 
 this testimony was finished, the examining lawyer stated the 
 simple fact that the day in question had been the day of the 
 observance of President William McKinley's burial. E very- 
 shop and store had been closed. The testimony was not to 
 be reconciled with the facts well known to the judge and the 
 jury, and was discredited. 
 
 Webster used this test effectively in the White murder 
 trial to overthrow the testimony of one of the witnesses of 
 the defence: 
 
 "Balch says, that on the evening, whenever it was, he saw the 
 prisoner; the prisoner told him he was going out of town on horse- 
 back, for a distance of about twenty minutes' drive, and that he 
 was going to get a horse at Osborn's. This was about seven o'clock. 
 At about nine, Balch says he saw the prisoner again, and was then 
 told by him that he had had his ride, and had returned. Now it 
 appears by Osborn's books, that the prisoner had a saddle-horse 
 from his stable, not on Tuesday evening, the night of the murder, 
 but on the Saturday evening previous. This fixes the time about 
 which these young men testify, and is a complete answer and refuta- 
 tion of the attempted alibi on Tuesday evening." ^ 
 
 3. Is the evidence consistent with itself? Evidence that 
 contradicts itself is of course the worst possible kind. Some 
 answer may be made, some explanation given, to save the 
 situation when one's evidence is shown to be inconsistent 
 with human experience or known facts. Is human experience 
 correct and complete in regard to the matter in question? 
 Men are continually accepting beliefs that are inconsistent 
 with the experiences of their fathers. Are the known facts 
 really known or only supposed? Has there been a mistake? 
 Must we abandon some of the presumably established facts 
 in the light of new evidence? But when our evidence has an 
 
 » The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 83. 
 
EVIDENCE 105 
 
 inconsistency within itself we cannot escape without suffer- 
 ing some disadvantage. We cannot go outside and show the 
 error is on the other side. There is something wrong with our 
 own evidence, and when this is exposed by our opponent 
 our cause has suffered more than would have been the case 
 had we failed to meet any other test. Inconsistency in the 
 disputant himself is unpardonable. So, when Oppius was 
 charged with defrauding the soldiers of their pensions, 
 Cicero refuted the charge by proving that the same persons 
 charged Oppius with a design to corrupt the army with his 
 extravagant gifts and liberality. So a man who in explaining 
 irregularity in regard to advertising a certain function, based 
 part of his case on the fact that a large crowd was neither 
 expected nor desired because the patronage was a fixed and 
 assured one, and based a second part of his case on the as- 
 sertion that he had to do what was done in order to catch the 
 public and get as large an attendance as was desired, lost 
 greatly in the minds of the judges when this inconsistency 
 was pointed out. 
 
 4. Can the evidence pass the " hearsay " test? a. In the 
 law courts, of course, hearsay evidence is ruled out unless it 
 comes under one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay 
 rule. (See Best On Evidence.) ^ But it is well to note that evi- 
 dence may be hearsay and therefore inadmissible if offered to 
 prove one thing, and original evidence and admissible if offered 
 to prove another. Evidence is inadmissible as hearsay only 
 when offered as evidence of the thing stated — of the truth 
 of the remark made. For instance, W testifies, "I heard J 
 say to B 'the horse is sound.' " This is hearsay evidence if 
 offered to prove that the horse was sound. It is original evi- 
 dence if offered to prove that J warranted the horse. 
 
 b. In general argumentation, as a matter of fact, hearsay 
 evidence is often good. The question here is (1) whether the 
 evidence itself is of such a nature that it may be safely passed 
 from person to person with substantial accuracy, and (2) 
 
 1 Pp. 434-444. 
 
106 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 whether or not the channel through which the evidence 
 comes is satisfactory. The reasons for excluding hearsay at 
 all are: no chance for cross-examination of witness, witness 
 not under oath, the opportunity^ of someone in the chain not 
 saying what he meant, or someone not understanding cor- 
 rectly what was said. When by the mental and moral char- 
 acter of the persons forming the channel, and by the definite, 
 clean-cut nature of the evidence itself, these objections are 
 met, the fact that the evidence is hearsay amounts to very 
 little. For instance, we would give little credence to a village 
 story, vague "undocumented" rumor, or neighborhood 
 gossip, in regard to the behavior of newcomers to a neighbor- 
 ing estate — people who would naturally be misunderstood and 
 mistrusted by many of the villagers. But if the dean of X 
 College announced in faculty meeting that the dean of Y 
 College had said that the president of Y had telephoned that 
 the governor had just vetoed a certain bill, the hearsay 
 evidence would be accepted and acted upon without question. 
 
 5. Is the evidence of a kind that is exceptionally valuable? 
 Under this head it is well to mention four kinds of evidence 
 that have special value. We should keep these in mind 
 when testing evidence — either our own or our opponents'. 
 
 a. Admissions and declarations against interest. These are 
 the terms given in the courts to the testimony of persons 
 con trary to what their own concern in the cause wouk Leug- 
 ^gest-v This testimony is there regarded as of such importance 
 and so free from doubt that secondhand evidence of such 
 statements is made admissible,^ contrary to the general 
 rule excluding all hearsay evidence. When people make 
 deliberate statements to their own disadvantage the state- 
 ments are usually true, when people deliberately lie it is 
 because they think the lie is to their advantage. Sometimes 
 the admission or declaration is made when the person is aware 
 of its damaging nature; sometimes, when unaware. Such 
 testimony is ordinarily reliable; but there are exceptions. 
 1 See Best, p. 440. 
 
EVIDENCE 107 
 
 If the statement is made by a person unconscious of its 
 effect on his own interests, we must be sure that it was not 
 made carelessly, or under the influence of an intent to gain 
 some other end. If it is a deliberate admission or confession, 
 there may have been some hope of reward that led the wit- 
 ness to suffer a lesser evil for a greater gain; or the statement 
 may have been given under compulsion. In either case its 
 value is gone. But the presumption is always in favor of the 
 trustworthiness of this kind of evidence. To take an exam- 
 ple: a statement by any "protected" manufacturer that the 
 tariff duties were too high — if such a thing were possible — 
 would be a worthy bit of evidence. But if it could be proved 
 that he was about to embark in some new enterprise where 
 the tariff could not help him, that his purpose was the de- 
 struction of some greater rival, or that he was in the hire of a 
 political manager, its force would be destroyed. 
 
 b. Casual or undesigned evidence. This kind of evidence, 
 whose character has already been discussed, is specially val- 
 uable because of its freedom from suspicion. 
 
 c. Negative evidence. Negative evidence has also been fully 
 explained. It is a third type that is generally considered 
 especially valuable because it cannot be easily manufactured 
 or "doctored." It is difficult to tamper with an absence of 
 evidence. Though sometimes, of course, the significant ab- 
 sence may be artificially brought about. 
 
 d. Real evidence. If the nature of the controversy is such 
 as to permit the use of real evidence this sort (already dis- 
 cussed) is of course much better than personal evidence to 
 the same effect. When one can exhibit the condition of a 
 wound, the ill fit of a coat, the dangerous condition of a bridge 
 or railroad crossing, such exhibition will be better than oral 
 descriptions of these things. 
 
 B. Tests of the sources of evidence. 1. Tests of ordi- 
 nary — " fact " — witnesses. 
 
 a. Is the witness physically qualified? Most human 
 knowledge comes through the avenues of the five senses, and 
 
108 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 it is from the information so received that we get evidence. 
 Clearly, then, the physical powers of a witness may have 
 great influence upon his reliability. If a witness is color- 
 blind, his testimony that green signal lights were displayed 
 at the time and place of a railroad accident must be ignored. 
 However, this test is not very common outside of the court- 
 room. The writers that furnish the materials of student 
 debate and of ordinary disputation everywhere are usually 
 beyond the reach of such examination, and their testimony 
 is not commonly of such a nature that it makes much dif- 
 ference whether they are blind, or deaf, or otherwise un- 
 fortunate physically. But whenever phj^sical weakness may 
 have any possible effect on the testimony, the test should be 
 rigorously applied. It is one of the most effective of all 
 possible tests, for such a defect in a witness is conclusive 
 against his testimony. 
 
 b. Is the witness mentally qualified? More important 
 for the purposes of general argumentation than the test of 
 physical endowment is the test of mental powers. 
 
 (I) Memory. The test of the memory of a witness is ap- 
 plicable everywhere. In the courts, it is a part of the "stock 
 in trade" of a cross-examiner. In ordinary argument it is 
 less significant. A defective memory is damaging, because 
 it raises a strong presumption of error in the statement of 
 testimony. If the witness cannot remember things in general, 
 it is probable that he cannot clearly remember about the 
 particular fact in question. His impressions will probably 
 be vague and indistinct, and so his statements will be un- 
 reliable. 
 
 In the White murder trial, Webster used this test in 
 attacking a witness of the defence: — 
 
 "Mr. Burchmore says, to the best of his belief, it was the evening 
 of the murder. x\fterwards he attempts to speak positively, from 
 recollecting that he mentioned the circumstance to William Peirce 
 as he went to Mineral Spring on Fast-day. Last Monday morning 
 
EVIDENCE 109 
 
 he told Colonel Putnam he could not fix the time. This witness 
 stands in a much worse plight than either of the others. It is difii- 
 cult to reconcile all he has said with any belief in the accuracy of 
 his recollections." ^ 
 
 (II) Accuracy of statement. The accurate use of words 
 and phrases is not by any means universal. We shall treat 
 later of the different kinds of "liars"; but many mistakes of 
 verbal expression are wholly undesigned. Provincial phrases, 
 personal peculiarities in speech, a tendency toward exaggera- 
 tion, may often lead a witness to say what he does not really 
 mean. In getting written evidence, to avoid the mistake of 
 misunderstanding the witness, the real import of the tes- 
 timony should be gathered from the evidence as a whole 
 rather than from the exact words of any particular sentences. 
 Witnesses who are habitually inaccurate must, of course, be 
 treated with suspicion. There are many writers whose prac- 
 tice it is to deal in generalities and bold over-statements. 
 If a man has a reputation for that style of writing, his tes- 
 timony is of little or no value; and, in any case his credibility 
 is liable to question. 
 
 (A) Thoughtless exaggeration. Accidental or thoughtless 
 exaggeration is very common in oral testimony, and arises 
 from habits of mind in the witness. Some men have an 
 irresistible inipulse to *'make things big," like Falstaff, with 
 his "eleven men in buckram." Intentional exaggeration is 
 simply one kind of deliberate lying. A witness who exag- 
 gerates can best be exposed by investigating his accuracy in 
 other instances. Collins ^ uses this test in his argument to 
 prove that Swift was not married to Esther Johnson, when, 
 in speaking of one of the witnesses, a certain Dr. Madden, he 
 says: "Of Madden it is sufficient to say that in temper and 
 in blood he was half French, half Irish; and that as a writer 
 he is chiefly known as the author of a work wilder and more 
 
 » The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 83. 
 
 2 Jonathan Swift, by J. C. Collins, ch. VI, pp. 146-157. 
 
110 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 absurd than the wildest and most absurd of Whiston's 
 prophecies and Asgill's paradoxes." If a witness habitually 
 exaggerates, none of his statements can be accepted at their 
 face value. 
 
 c. Is the witness morally qualified? Deliberate perver- 
 sion of the truth implies some motive. With an expert the mo- 
 tive is most often that of pride. One expert is opposed to 
 another in some court trial or perhaps on some economic 
 question. Each feels that his reputation depends on the 
 overthrow of his rival. Consequently, though they may be- 
 gin with the most honest intentions, they yield to the de- 
 mands of the occasion, their testimony degenerates into a 
 spirited argument, and exaggeration and misrepresentation 
 are bred. With an ordinary witness the motive is some in- 
 terest in the question at issue. He feels some sympathy with 
 the parties most deeply involved in the outcome, or he him- 
 self has some interest in the question at issue. 
 
 A witness must be tested with these possible weaknesses in 
 view, in two respects: (I) Is he unduly interested in the out- 
 come? and (II) What is his general moral character? This 
 second test is significant, because it tells us to what extent 
 the witness would permit unworthy motives to influence his 
 words. A reputation for low moral character in a witness 
 makes his testimony of little or no value. 
 
 This test is one of the most conimon in the courts. Rufus 
 Choate gave a good illustration of its effectiveness in his 
 speech in the Dalton divorce case. While attacking one of 
 the leading witnesses of the pfaintiff, he said: — 
 
 "I begin, therefore, with the foundation witness in this case, 
 John H. Coburn, and I respectfully submit to you, that tried by 
 every test of credibility which the law recognizes, on your oaths 
 you are bound to disbelieve him. It is not that a laugh can be 
 raised against Coburn or his testimony — that is nothing; it is that, 
 according to those tests which are founded on the longest and 
 widest experience the law deems satisfactory to show whether a 
 jury can safely believe or not, he is not to be believed. I submit. 
 
EVIDENCE 111 
 
 then, that John H. Coburn is not an honest man, and is not, there- 
 fore, entitled to be heard in so dehcate a work as bringing every 
 word my cHent spoke on that evening to her husband; he is not an 
 honest man, and I put it on your solemn oath to you, that there 
 is not a mian on that jury who, on the exhibition of John H. Coburn, 
 would intrust him to carry a bundle worth five dollars from this 
 courthouse to the depot." ^ 
 
 d. Did the witness have an opportunity for getting the 
 truth? This is an obvious and important test. If the situa- 
 tion or experience of the witness has been such that he has not 
 had a chance to observe the existence of the facts to which 
 he testifies, and to observe them closely and carefully, his 
 statements are clearly untrustworthy. In the courts it is a 
 common method of impeaching testimony to show that a 
 witness was too far distant from the scene to see clearly, that 
 he did not have time to observe carefully, or that he did not 
 arrive in season. 
 
 This test is of first importance in all kinds of argumentation. 
 Innumerable are the writers who are ready to venture the 
 most positive statements on the foundation of a few weeks' 
 investigation, or who carelessly make bold assertions of some 
 general truth, when they have observed only a few phenom- 
 ena, and when those they have observed are as likely as not 
 to have been exceptional or sporadic in nature. It is not 
 uncommon that an author or a traveller visits such a conn- 
 try as Russia for a few months or a year, and, on his return, 
 writes articles or a book on Russian society, Russia's political 
 methods, and her economic prospects. Now, such a man is 
 not to be criticised for writing in the magazines or publishing 
 a book; his narrative may well be interesting. But, as ev- 
 idence^ his statements and prophecies generally amount to 
 nothing; Russian society and politics cannot be analyzed in 
 a month. Again, how often we find newspaper writers and 
 pamphleteers giving the most emphatic testimony to defects 
 
 * Great Speeches by Great Lawyers^ p. 307. 
 
112 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 in methods of colonial administration by their own govern- 
 ment, when they have never ventured beyond the borders of 
 their home states. Their earnestness may be good and their 
 patriotism commendable, but their testimony is worthless. 
 The opportunities for observation are insufficient to make 
 good evidence. 
 
 2. The tests of the sources of expert evidence. This in 
 general argumentation is testing the authorities in "argu- 
 ments from authority." The "authority" used for the pur- 
 pose of such argument or such evidence as this must bear 
 three special tests: 
 
 a. Is the case such as to ma ke the introduction o[ _pjnnion 
 ev idence^arg uments fnmL^aijIhnrify warrantnhlp. ? Do not 
 offend your audience by giving the opinions of alleged 
 authorities on questions on which the facts are available and 
 understandable to any intelligent man. Do not ask A to be- 
 lieve a thing because B believes it, when A's opinion is just 
 as good as B's. No authorities, no matter how good, should 
 be used in questions to settle which opinion evidence is not 
 needed. 
 
 h. Is the witness possss^sdj^-the knowledge-and experience 
 necessary to justify his a ccept ance as an expert in the matter 
 in question.? 
 
 c. Is his au thority recognized by the audience or reader? 
 However great the knowledge or skill of an expert, if his great- 
 ness is unknown to the hearer or reader, the effect of quoting 
 him will be a mere "flash in the pan." The audience or 
 reader will see in the pretended "authority" nothing more 
 than a meaningless name, and so will ignore his statement 
 The disputant must always be sure that the worth of his 
 expert is accepted; and if there may be any doubt, his first 
 duty is to establish for him a satisfactory reputation. 
 
EVIDENCE 113 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 6 
 
 EVIDENCE 
 
 1. Give an example of an item of evidence which shall be 
 
 personal, circumstantial, and original. 
 
 2. Give an example of an item of evidence which shall be 
 
 negative, real, circumstantial, and ordinary. 
 
 3. Give an example of an item of evidence which shall be 
 
 direct, unwritten, hearsay, personal, and casual. 
 
 4. Give an example of an item of evidence which shall be 
 
 negative, real, casual, and circumstantial. 
 
 5. Hand in a clipping or copy of an argument from current 
 
 newspapers, magazines, lectures, or text-books, contain- 
 ing an argument from authority. 
 
 6. On evidence drawn from the sources mentioned in number 
 
 five, containing ordinary evidence, apply all of the tests 
 applicable to it, stating the results, and your final opin- 
 ion as to the value of the evidence. 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 I. In Logic 
 
 A. Deduction. 
 
 B. Induction. 
 
 1. Real process of inference the same. 
 
 2. Object: necessary connection according to some general 
 principle. 
 
 3. Mutual dependence. 
 
 4. Kinds of induction: 
 
 a. Perfect. 
 
 b. Imperfect. 
 
 5. Methods of induction. 
 
 a. Agreement. 
 
 b. Difference. 
 
 c. Joint method. 
 
 d. Residues. 
 
 e. Concomitant variations. 
 
 C. The syllogism. 
 
 1. The special rules of the syllogism. 
 
 2. Definitions. 
 
 3. Sorites. 
 
 4. Inferences in quantitative relations. 
 
 5. Enthymemes. 
 
 6. The nature of syllogistic reasoning. 
 
 7. The weakness of the syllogism in general argumentation. 
 
 n. In Rhetoric 
 
 A. Antecedent probability. 
 
 1. Effect to cause not a part of a priori argument. 
 
 2. Methods of attack. 
 
 114 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 115 
 
 a. Connection complete? 
 
 b. Cause adequate? 
 
 c. Other causes present? 
 
 d. Substitute argument? 
 
 B. Sign. 
 
 1. Effect to cause. 
 
 a. Methods of attack. 
 
 (I) Some other cause? 
 
 (II) Cause capable? 
 
 (III) Connection complete? 
 
 2. Effect to effect. 
 
 a. Methods of attack. 
 
 (I) Those already given — used in combination, 
 
 3. Association of phenomena in past. 
 
 a. Association of phenomena and generalization. 
 
 b. Methods of attack. 
 
 (I) Cases too few? 
 
 (II) Contrary cases? 
 
 (III) Inconsistent? 
 
 C. Example. 
 
 1. Generalization. 
 
 a. Illustrative and argumentative examples. 
 
 b. Methods of attack. 
 
 (I) Fair specimens? 
 
 (II) Large enough part of field? 
 
 2. Analogy. 
 
 a. Figurative analogy. 
 
 b. Literal analogy. 
 
 (I) Generalization from a single instance. 
 
 c. Summary. 
 
 d. Methods of attack. 
 
 (I) Those of generalization for literal. 
 
 (II) False analogy for figurative. 
 
 3. Cause and effect in example. 
 
 I. In logic. Forms of arguments are classified and 
 studied mainly from two points of view — Logic and Rhetoric. 
 The difference already referred to between formal logic 
 and argumentation is strongly marked in the methods em- 
 
116 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 ployed by each in the treatment of the kinds of arguments, 
 or, as the term is in logic, of '* inferences." Logic explains 
 the different ways in which the mind may work in making 
 an inference or reasoning. Its purpose is to teach us to under- 
 stand our own thought processes. In rhetoric or argumenta- 
 tion the purpose in discussing the methods of inference, or 
 "the kinds of arguments," is to make clear the rules that 
 must be followed in order to make arguments that will be 
 valuable for the purpose of convincing and persuading 
 others. It is not the mind of the speaker or writer that must 
 be satisfied in argumentation, but the mind of the hearer or 
 reader. For this purpose the necessity of knowing the 
 various kinds of arguments that may be used is twofold; 
 it is necessary (1) in order to be able to select and use the 
 arguments that will be valuable in constructing one's own 
 proof, and (2) in order to be able to attack the proofs of an 
 opponent. In addition to these particular and practical ad- 
 vantages arising from a knowledge of the forms of argument, 
 logical and rhetorical, there seems to be a more general and 
 less definitely practical reason for studying all of the matters 
 discussed in this chapter. That is that anyone tvho is trained 
 in argumentation should be familiar with the vocabulary of 
 argument whether he ever makes practical use of it or not. One 
 who has had college or university training in argumentation 
 ought to be able to understand the logical terms and methods 
 here presented when they are used by others — even if he 
 does not care to use them himself. With these purposes in 
 mind, let us see what the logicians^ can do to help us. Before 
 
 ^ In presenting material drawn from Logic in this chapter and in the 
 chapter on Fallacies, it has been thought much better for many reasons to 
 let the logicians speak for themselves. The following discussion is therefore 
 taken almost entirely from the standard text-books of recognized authorities 
 on logic (Jevons, Creighton, Bode, Hibben, Hyslop, Sidgwick). Great care 
 has been exercised in choosing material that will best serve the purposes of 
 students of argumentation. In all cases of quotations of any length, permis- 
 sion to use them has been obtained from the publishers, and has been ac- 
 knowledged elsewhere. Here again I express my thanks. J. M. O'N. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 111 
 
 considering the kinds of arguments as usually given in rhet- 
 oric or argumentation we should understand what logic 
 has to say on the same subject under the heads of deduction, 
 induction, and the syllogism. 
 
 A. Deduction. "There are two directions in which 
 inference or reasoning may proceed. We may begin with 
 certain facts or principles which are already known, or are 
 assumed to be true, and proceed to show that some result 
 necessarily follows from them. Thus we might infer that if 
 the draughts of a stove are closed so that the supply of oxygen 
 is lessened, the fire will burn slowly; or from the relative 
 positions and revolutions of the planets, that an eclipse 
 of the sun will take place on a specified day and hour. This 
 method of reasoning is known as Deduction. It proceeds, 
 as we have seen, from premises to conclusion. ... In 
 deductive reasoning the particular case is always brought 
 under some general law or principle, which is already known 
 or assumed as true. Socrates is known to be mortal, because 
 as a man he falls under the general law that all men are mortal, 
 the closing of the draughts is a case of lessened supply of 
 oxygen, and, therefore, in accordance with the general law, 
 a case of slow burning. A deductive inference shows what 
 are the results of the application of a general law to particular 
 facts or instances. It proceeds downwards, as it were, from 
 the general law to its consequences. 
 
 B. Induction. "In Induction, on the contrary, the 
 procedure is just the opposite of this. We begin with par- 
 ticular phenomena, and try to discover from them the law 
 or principle which unites them. Certain facts are observed 
 to happen together, and the problem is to find the ground or 
 explanation of this connection. Inductive inference is thus 
 a process of reading the general law out of the particular 
 facts. It is an insight into the nature of the whole or system, 
 based upon a careful examination of the parts. * Yesterday 
 the smoke tended to fall to the ground, and it rained in the 
 afternoon.* These two facts may simply be observed a 
 
118 ' ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 number of times without any thought of their connectioa 
 But intelligence asks: Why should they happen in conjunc- 
 tion? And to answer this question, we must begin by ana- 
 lyzing the facts in our possession. When the smoke falls to 
 the ground, the atmosphere must be lighter than usual; this 
 is the case when it contains a great deal of moisture; but when 
 the atmosphere is in this condition, it usually tends to dis- 
 charge its moisture in the form of rain; therefore we have 
 the general law which enables us to show that the behavior 
 of the smoke and the rain yesterday were not only accident- 
 ally conjoinedy but essentially connected. 
 
 1. Real process of inference the same in deduction and 
 induction. "Deduction and Induction, then, are both 
 forms of inference, but the starting-point and mode of pro- 
 cedure of the one is different from that of the other. Conse- 
 quently, it is not unusual to speak of them as two kinds of 
 reasoning which are quite distinct and independent of each 
 other. It is, however, important to avoid this popular error, 
 and to remember that the real process of inference is in each 
 case the same. The essence of inference, as has been shown, 
 consists in the fact that it exhibits the manner in which par- 
 ticular facts are connected together into a system or whole} And 
 this end is achieved both by Deduction and Induction. In 
 the former case, the general law of connection — what we 
 may call the nature of the system within which the partic- 
 ulars fall — is known, and we argue from this as to the nature 
 and relations of the various parts which fall within it. We 
 have the common thread which unites the various facts in our 
 hand, and following it out are able to show its application 
 in determining the nature of events which have not yet 
 come within the range of our experience. Knowing the law 
 of gravity, for example, one could infer deductively what 
 momentum a ball weighing one pound must necessarily have 
 after falling one hundred feet. It would not be necessary 
 actually to measure the momentum of the falling body in 
 ^ Italics ours. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 119 
 
 this particular case, but it could be shown to be the neces- 
 sary result of the general law. What the deductive inference 
 shows to us, is the way in which a general principle or law 
 of connection runs through a group of facts, and constitutes 
 them a real or organic whole. The same insight is reached 
 by inductive inference, although the starting-point is en- 
 tirely different. As we have already seen, induction begins 
 by observing that certain phenomena are frequently con- 
 joined, and attempts to discover some law or principle which 
 will make the fact of their connection intelligible. 
 
 2. Object: necessary connection of facts according to 
 some general principle. "It is usual to say that in induc- 
 tion we go from the particular facts to the general law. The 
 following, however, would be a more correct form of state- 
 ment: Before the inference, we observe that a number of 
 phenomena occur together, but do not know whether this 
 conjunction is necessary or not; or, if we assume that it is 
 necessary, we do not understand why it should be so. As a 
 result of the inductive inference, we gain an insight into the 
 necessary connection of the observed phenomena, and also 
 understand the principle according to which the latter are 
 united. What we really obtain through an inductive infer- 
 ence is not only a general law, but also a perception of its 
 concrete application to particular phenomena. This being 
 so, it is clear that Induction and Deduction are not two differ- 
 ent kinds of inference. Inference always implies an effort on 
 the part of the mind to see how phenomena are necessarily con- 
 nected according to some general principle.^ And, in carrying 
 out this purpose, the mind must begin with the knowledge 
 which it already possesses. When the general law of con- 
 nection is known, and the object is to discover the nature of 
 some particular fact, the method of procedure is deductive. 
 But, when the problem by which we are confronted is to read 
 out of the facts of sense-perception the general law of their 
 connection, the method of inference which must be employed 
 
 * Italics ours. 
 
120 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 is that of induction. But from whatever point we set out, 
 and whatever may be the immediate object of the inference, 
 the result is always the same — an insight into the necessary 
 connection of facts according to some general principle." ^ 
 
 3. Mutual dependence. " While considering the distinc- 
 tions between induction and deduction, we must not over- 
 look their mutual dependence. We cannot proceed in deduc- 
 tion irrespective of induction, because the universal upon 
 which the deductive process is based arises in the majority 
 of cases from a previous induction. It is true that the uni- 
 versal term may be in a proposition that is known a prioriy 
 as the axioms of geometry and certain space and time postu- 
 lates; but a very small proportion of major premises can be 
 said to have such an origin, and their resulting conclusions 
 have very slight material significance. Deduction that 
 reaches other than purely abstract and formal conclusions 
 must rest upon induction for the material to form its prem- 
 ises. ... On the other hand, induction is dependent upon 
 deduction; for we cannot reason from particular instances to 
 a universal proposition, unless we assume as the basis of the 
 whole inductive process some postulate which has real uni- 
 versal significance. Otherwise, we reach only a high degree 
 of probability, but not necessity; a rude generalization, but 
 not universality. When we assert some such general state- 
 ment as this, that arsenic always acts as a poison, we have 
 based the universal character of the proposition upon an 
 underlying postulate that is understood even though it is not 
 expressed, such as the uniformity of nature, that under identi- 
 cal conditions we always look for identical effects. This is 
 referred to at this point merely to illustrate the deductive 
 basis of induction." ^ 
 
 4. Kinds of induction. "There are three different ap- 
 plications of the term * Induction,* which are generally as- 
 sumed to mean the same thing. To explain what they are 
 we have to produce the usual divisions of the subject, which 
 
 1 Creighton, pp. 329-333. 2 Hibben, pp. 173-173. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 121 
 
 are the so-called kinds of induction. They are (a) 'Perfed 
 Induction* and (b) 'Imperfect Induction.* The first meaning 
 of the term applies to the first kind, and the other two are 
 modifications of what is implied in imperfect induction. We 
 would not suspect a difference of meaning from this general 
 fact alone, but if we examine carefully the illustrations chosen 
 to describe the nature of the process as thus distinguished 
 into different kinds, we shall discern very clearly the great 
 differences of real meaning attaching to the term. Thus 
 * Perfect Induction' is simply an enumeration of the particulars 
 which form a class. It is the process which characterized 
 the method of Socrates in reaching his definitions, and which 
 Aristotle remarked was a new method compared with the ar- 
 gumentation of his predecessors. An example of perfect in- 
 duction is the following: * Mercury revolves on its axis; so 
 do Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and Neptune. 
 But these are all the planets, and therefore all the planets 
 revolve on their axes." Although this is stated in the form 
 of reasoning, it is not reasoning at all. This fact is apparent 
 in the nature of the conclusion, which is that " All the planets 
 revolve on their axis," not on the axis of Mercury, although 
 the same thing would be true if we had said " on the axis of 
 Mercury." But the special proof of its not being a case of 
 reasoning is in the fact that the so-called conclusion is merely 
 a universal statement of what had been enumerated in detail 
 in the premises. We are supposed to have observed the in- 
 dividual fact that *' Mercury revolves on its axis," and then 
 again that " Venus revolves on its axis," and so on through- 
 out the entire number of planets. Hence when we say, *' All 
 the planets revolve on their axes," we but universalize our 
 particular observations — ^we use the terms "all planets" as 
 an economical device to avoid repeating the proper name of 
 each planet. But we do not infer anything, or reason from 
 one proposition to another. We do not establish any new 
 connections of thought by the process, as we do in syllogistic 
 reasoning, . . . but we only generalize what we had observed 
 
122 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 in detail. It is precisely the same with all enumerations ol 
 individuals or particulars into a whole or class with a gen- 
 eral name denoting those enumerations only. They may be 
 called " Inductions " if we choose so to name them; but they 
 are not reasoning. They are only generalizations as opposed 
 to or distinct from reasoning, while the term " Induction,'* as 
 now used by logicians, denotes a process of inference or reason- 
 ing of some kind. It is quite generally agreed since the time 
 of Bacon that the so-called " Perfect Induction" is not properly 
 called " Induction," because it is not a mode of reasoning. 
 It has been the name for the Socratic process of obtaining 
 universal conceptions and definitions. But the contingencies 
 of the growth of knowledge and the demand of a method 
 which would take the place of the Aristotelian Logic sug- 
 gested the term " Inductive" as opposed to" Deductive," and 
 the rejection of " Perfect Induction" on the ground that it was 
 not ratiocinative in its nature, implied that Induction must 
 be a process of reasoning in order to compare it with Deduc- 
 tion. 
 
 "This second general meaning is the more important of 
 the two, and was called * Imperfect Induction' because the 
 conclusion contained more than the premises. Thus if I had 
 inferred that *A11 the planets revolve about their axes,' 
 from the mere fact that one of them did so, I should have 
 drawn an inductive inference. I should not in this case have 
 merely generalized the particulars of my observation or ex- 
 perience, but have conjectured or inferred that what was 
 true of one case would turn out to be true of all the objects 
 known upon other grounds to belong to the same class. 
 But this conclusion has no definite certainty such as the mind 
 desires, and hence to give this conjecture greater probability 
 I must vary my observation of facts in connection with the 
 several planets, and find whether they agree or disagree with 
 my supposition. If, for instance, I observed that certain of 
 them presented an absolutely invariable appearance, such 
 as a particular spot always in sight and in the same place, 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 123 
 
 the fact would be at least a presumption against the supposi- 
 tion of the planet's axial revolution. On the other hand, if 
 the spot presented certain regular changes of position and 
 periodical disappearance and reappearance, the fact would 
 be in favor of the hypothesis. This mode of repeating and 
 varying observations or experiments in the case of the ex- 
 perimental sciences, according to certain methods, which are 
 called the * Method of Agreement,' the * Method of Difference,' 
 the * Method of Concomitant Variations,' etc., has been called 
 the Inductive Method in general, as a mode of ascertaining 
 certain truths in a manner quite distinct from the ordinary 
 syllogistic and deductive reasoning. This is the third mean- 
 ing of the term, with which a theory of Induction has to 
 reckon.^" 
 
 5. Methods of induction. "We have now to consider 
 such methods as can be laid down for the purpose of guiding 
 us in the search for general truths or laws of nature among the 
 facts obtained by observation and experiment. Induction 
 consists in inferring from particulars to generals, or detecting 
 a general truth among its particular occurrences. But in 
 physical science the truths to be discovered generally relate 
 to the connection of cause and eflFect, and we usually call 
 them laws of causation or natural laws. 
 
 " By the Cause of an event we mean the circumstances which 
 must have preceded in order that the event should happen. 
 Nor is it generally possible to say that an event has one single 
 cause and no more. There are usually many different things, 
 conditions or circumstances necessary to the production of 
 an effect, and all of them must be considered causes or neces- 
 sary parts of the cause. ... 
 
 "By an antecedent we mean any thing, condition, or cir- 
 cumstance which exists before or, it may be, at the same time 
 with an event or phenomenon. By a consequent we mean any 
 thing, or circumstance, event, or phenomenon, which is dif- 
 ferent from any of the antecedents and follows after theii 
 1 Hyslop, pp. 295-298. 
 
124 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 conjunction or putting together. It does not follow that an 
 antecedent is a cause, because the effect might have hap- 
 pened without it. Thus the sun's light may be an antecedent 
 to the burning of a house, but not the cause, because the house 
 would burn equally well in the night. A necessary or indis- 
 pensable antecedent is however identical ivith a cause, being 
 that TNathout which the effect would not take place. 
 
 "The word phenomenon will also be often used. It means 
 simply anything which appears, and is therefore observed 
 by the senses; the derivation of the word from the Greek 
 word <t)at,v6iJL€vov, that which appears, exactly corresponds to 
 its logical use. 
 
 a. Method of agreement. "The first method of induc- 
 tion is that which Mr. Mill has aptly called the method of 
 agreement. It depends upon the rule that * Jf two or more 
 ingtanpfis nf th^ ph^H^^^^^^ ^ipdf^|-, inve5NtTgatinn have only 
 one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which . 
 alone all the instances agree, is the cause ^o r jeffect) of th &> 
 given j)henomenon.' The meaning of this First Canon of 
 inductive inquiry might, I think, be more briefly expressed 
 by saying that the sole invariable antecedent of a phenomenon 
 is probably its cause. 
 
 "To apply this method we must collect as many instances 
 of the phenomenon as possible, and compare together their 
 antecedents. Among these the causes will lie, but if we notice 
 that certain antecedents are present or absent without ap- 
 pearing to affect the result, we conclude that they cannot 
 be necessary antecedents. Hence it is the one antecedent 
 or group of antecedents always present, when the effect 
 follows, that we consider the cause. For example, bright 
 prismatic colours are seen on bubbles, on films of tar floating 
 upon water, on thin plates of mica, as also on cracks in glass, 
 or between two pieces of glass pressed together. On examin- 
 ing all such cases they seem to agree in nothing but the pres- 
 ence of a very thin layer or plate, and it appears to make no 
 appreciable difference of what kind of matter, solid, liquid 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 125 
 
 or gaseous, the plate is made. Hence we conclude that such 
 colours are caused merely by the thinness of the plates, and 
 this conclusion is proved true by the theory of the inter- 
 ference of light. Sir David Brewster beautifully proved in a 
 similar way that the colours seen upon Mother-of-pearl are 
 not caused by the nature of the substance, but by the form 
 of the surface. He took impressions of the Mother-of-pearl 
 in wax, and found that although the substance was entirely 
 different the colours were exactly the same. And it was 
 afterwards found that if a plate of metal had a surface marked 
 by very fine close grooves, it would have iridescent colours 
 like those of Mother-of-pearl. Hence it is evident that the 
 form of the surface, which is the only invariable antecedent 
 or condition requisite for the production of the colours must 
 be their cause. . . . 
 
 b. Method of difference. "The second method of 
 induction which we will now consider is known as the 
 Method of Difference. It is stated in Mr. Mill's Second 
 Canon as follows : — 
 
 " *If an instance in which the phenomenon under investiga- 
 tion occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have 
 every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring 
 only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two 
 instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable 
 part of the cause, of the phenomenon.* 
 
 ** In other words, we may say that the antecedent which is 
 invariably present when the phenomenon follows, and in- 
 variably absent when it is absent, other circumstances re- 
 maining the same, is the cause of the phenomenon in those 
 circumstances. 
 
 "Thus we can clearly prove that friction is one cause of 
 heat, because when two sticks are rubbed together they be- 
 come heated; when not rubbed they do not become heated. 
 Sir Humphry Davy showed that even two pieces of ice when 
 rubbed together in a vacuum produced heat as shown by their 
 melting, and thus completely demonstrated that friction 
 
126 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 is the source and cause of the heat. We prove that air is the 
 cause of sound being communicated to our ears by striking 
 a bell in the receiver of an air-pump, as Hawksbee first did in 
 1705, and then observing that when the receiver is full of 
 air we hear the bell; when it contains little or no air we do 
 not hear the bell. We learn that sodium or any of its com- 
 pounds produces a spectrum having a bright yellow double 
 line by noticing that there is no such line in the spectrum of 
 light when sodium is not present, but that if the smallest 
 quantity of sodium be thrown into the flame or other source 
 of light, the bright yellow line instantly appears. Oxygen 
 is the cause of respiration and life, because if an animal be 
 put into a jar full of atmospheric air, from which the oxygen 
 has been withdrawn, it soon becomes suffocated. 
 
 "This is essentially the great method of experiment and its 
 utility depends upon the precaution of only varying one 
 circumstance at a time, all other circumstances being maintained 
 just as they were. . . . 
 
 "Beautiful instances of experiment according to this 
 method are to be found, as Sir John Herschel has pointed 
 out, in the researches by which Dr. Wells discovered the cause 
 of the dew. If on a clear calm night a sheet or other covering 
 be stretched a foot or two above the earth, so as to screen the 
 ground below from the open sky, dew will be found on the 
 grass around the screen but not beneath it. As the tempera» 
 ture and moistness of the air, and other circumstances ar< 
 exactly the same, the open sky must be an indispensable an- 
 tecedent of dew. The same experiment is indeed tried for 
 us by nature, for if we make observations of dew during two 
 nights which differ in nothing but the absence of clouds in 
 one and their presence in the other, we shall find that the 
 clear open sky is requisite to the formation of dew. 
 
 c. Joint method. " It may often happen that we cannot 
 apply the method of difference perfectly by varying only one 
 circumstance at a time. Thus we cannot, generally speaking, 
 try the qualities of the same substance in the solid and liquid 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 127 
 
 condition without any other change of circumstances, be- 
 cause it is necessary to alter the temperature of the substance 
 in order to Hquefy or solidify it. The temperature might 
 thus be the cause of what we attribute to the liquid or solid 
 condition. Under such circumstances we have to resort to 
 what Mr. Mill calls the joint method of agreement and differ- 
 ence, which consists in a double application of the method of 
 agreement, first to a number of instances where an effect 
 is produced, and secondly, to a number of quite different 
 instances where the effect is not produced. It is clearly to 
 be understood, however, that the negative instances differ 
 in several circumstances from the positive ones; for if they 
 differed only in one circumstance we might apply the simple 
 method of difference. Iceland spar, for instance, has a curious 
 power of rendering things seen through it apparently double. 
 This phenomenon, called double refraction, also belongs to 
 many other crystals; and we might at once prove it to be due 
 to crystalline structure could we obtain any transparent 
 substance crystallized and uncrystallized, but subject to no 
 other alteration. We have, however, a pretty satisfactory 
 proof by observing that uniform transparent uncrystallized 
 substances agree in not possessing double refraction, and that 
 crystalline substances, on the other hand, with certain excep- 
 tions, which are easily explained, agree in possessing the power 
 in question. The principle of the joint method may be stated 
 in the following rule, which is Mr. Mill's Third Canon: — 
 
 " ' If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs 
 have only one circumstance in common, while two or more 
 instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common 
 save the absence of that circumstance; the circumstance in 
 which alone the two sets of instances (always or invariably) 
 differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part 
 of the cause, of the phenomenon.'" 
 
 " I have inserted the words in parenthesis, as without them 
 the canon seems to me to express exactly the opposite of 
 what Mr. Mill intends. . . . 
 
128 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 d. Method of residues. " We have now to consider a 
 method of Induction which must be employed when several 
 causes act at once and their effects are all blended together, 
 producing a joint effect of the same kind as the separate 
 effects. If in one Experiment friction, combustion, compres- 
 sion, and electric action are all going on at once, each of these 
 causes will produce quantities of heat which will be added 
 together, and it will be difficult or impossible to say how 
 much is due to each cause separately. We may call this a 
 case of the homogeneous intermixture of effects, the name 
 indicating that the joint effect is of the same kind as the 
 separate effects. It is distinguished by Mr. Mill from 
 cases of the heterogeneous intermixture of effects, where the 
 joint effect is totally different in kind from the separate 
 effects. Thus if we bend a bow too much it breaks instead 
 of bending further; if we warm ice it soon ceases to rise in 
 temperature and melts ; if we warm water it rises in tem- 
 perature homogeneously for a time but then suddenly ceases, 
 and an effect of a totally different kind, the production of 
 vapour, or possibly an explosion follows. 
 
 " Now when the joint effect is of a heterogeneous kind the 
 method of difference is sufficient to ascertain the cause of its 
 occurrence. Whether a bow or a spring will break with a 
 given weight may easily be tried, and whether water will 
 boil at a given temperature in any given state of the barom- 
 eter may also be easily ascertained. But in the homogeneous 
 intermixture of effects we have a more complicated task. 
 There are several causes each producing a part of the effect, 
 and we want to know how much is due to each. In this case we 
 must employ a further Inductive Method, called by Mr. Mill 
 the Method of Residues, thus stated in his Fourth Canon : — 
 
 " 'Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known 
 by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, 
 and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remain- 
 ing antecedents.' " 
 
 " If we know that the joint effect a, b, c, is due to the causes 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 129 
 
 A, B, and C, and can prove that a is due to A and b to B, 
 it follows that c must be due to C. There cannot be a simpler 
 case of this than ascertaining the exact weight of any commod- 
 ity in a cart by weighing the cart and load, and then sub- 
 tracting the tare or weight of the cart alone, which had been 
 previously ascertained. We can thus too ascertain how much 
 of the spring tides is due to the attraction of the sun, provided 
 we have previously determined the height of the tide due to 
 the moon, which will be about the average height of the tides 
 during the whole lunar month. Then subtracting the moon's 
 tide the remainder is the sun's tide. 
 
 "Newton employed this method in a beautiful experiment 
 to determine the elasticity of substances by allowing balls 
 made of the substances to swing against each other, and 
 then observing how far they rebounded compared with their 
 original fall. But the loss of motion is due partly to imper- 
 fect elasticity and partly to the resistance of the air. He 
 determined the amount of the latter effect in the simplest 
 manner by allowing the balls to swing without striking each 
 other, and observing how much each vibration was less than 
 the last. In this way he was enabled to calculate the quantity 
 that must be subtracted for the resistance of the air. . . . 
 
 e. Method of concomitant variations. "Every science 
 and every question in science, is first a matter of fact only, 
 then a matter of quantity, and by degrees becomes more and 
 more precisely quantitative. Thirty years ago most of the 
 phenomena of electricity and electro-magnetism were known 
 merely as facts; now they can be for the most part exactly 
 measured and calculated. 
 
 "As soon as phenomena can thus be measured we can ap- 
 ply a further Method of Induction of a very important char- 
 acter. It is the Method of Difference indeed applied under 
 far more favourable circumstances, where every degree and 
 quantity of a phenomenon gives us a new experiment and 
 proof of connection between cause and effect. It may be 
 called the Method of Concomitant Variations, and is thus 
 
130 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 stated by Mr. Mill, in what he entitled the Fiff h Can?n of 
 Induction. 
 
 "'Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever 
 another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is 
 either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is con- 
 nected with it through some fact of causation. . . . ' 
 
 "The illustrations of this method are infinitely numerous. 
 Thus Mr. Joule, of Manchester, conclusively proved that 
 friction is a cause of heat by expending exact quantities of 
 force in rubbing one substance against another, and showed 
 that the heat produced was exactly greater or less in propor- 
 tion as the force was greater or less. We can apply the 
 method to many cases which had previously been treated 
 by the simple method of difference; thus instead of striking 
 a bell in a complete vacuum we can strike it with a very 
 little air in the receiver of the air-pump, and we then hear 
 a very faint sound, which increases or decreases every time 
 we increase or decrease the density of the air. This experi- 
 ment conclusively satisfies any person that air is the cause 
 of the transmission of sound. . . 
 
 "The most extraordinary case of variations, however, 
 consists in the connection which has of late years been shoT\Ti 
 to exist between the Aurora Borealis, magnetic storms, and 
 the spots on the sun. It has only in the last thirty or forty 
 years become known that the magnetic compass needle is 
 subject at intervals to very slight but curious movements, 
 and that at the same time there are usually natural currents 
 of electricity produced in telegraph wires so as to interfere 
 with the transmission of messages. These disturbances are 
 known as magnetic storms, and are often observed to occur 
 when a fine display of the Northern or Southern Lights is 
 taking place in some part of the earth. Observations during 
 many years have shown that these storms come to their 
 worst at the end of every eleven years, the maximum taking 
 place about the present year 1870, and then diminish in 
 intensity until the next period of 'eleven years has passed. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS. 131 
 
 Close observations of the sun during thirty or forty years 
 have shown that the size and number of the dark spots, which 
 are gigantic storms going on upon the sun's surface, increase 
 and decrease exactly at the same periods of time as the mag- 
 netic storms upon the earth's surface. No one can doubt, 
 then, that these strange phenomena are connected together, 
 though the mode of the connection is quite unknown. It is 
 now believed that the planets Jupiter, Saturn, Venus, and 
 Mars, are the real causes of the disturbances; for Balfour 
 Stewart and Warren de la Rue have shown that an exact 
 correspondence exists between the motions of these planets 
 and the periods of the sunspots. This is a most remarkable 
 and extensive case of concomitant variations." ^ 
 
 C. The syUogism. "The name Syllogism means the 
 joining together in thought of two propositions, and is de- 
 rived from the Greek words ovv, with, and X0709, thought or 
 reason. It is thus exactly the equivalent of the word compu- 
 tation, which means thinking together (Latin con, together, 
 puto, to think), or reckoning. In a syllogism we so unite in 
 thought two premises, or propositions put forward, that 
 we are enabled to draw from them or infer, by means of the 
 middle term they contain, a third proposition called the con- 
 clusion. Syllogism may thus be defined as the act of thought 
 by which from two given propositions we proceed to a third 
 proposition, the truth of which necessarily follows from the 
 truth of these given propositions. When the argument is 
 fully expressed in language it is usual to call it concretely 
 ^a syllogism. 
 
 1. "The special rules of the syllogism . . . serve to in- 
 form us exactly under what circumstances one proposition 
 can be inferred from two other propositions, and are eight in 
 number, as follows: — 
 
 a. Every syllogism has three and only three terms. 
 
 These terms are called the major term, the minor term, 
 and the middle term. 
 
 ^ Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 239-253. 
 
132 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 b. Every syllogism contains three y and only three propositions. 
 These propositions are called the major premise, the minor 
 
 premise, and the conclusion. 
 
 c. The middle term must be distributed once at least, and must 
 not be ambiguous. 
 
 d. No term must be distributed in the conclusion which was 
 not distributed in one of the premises. 
 
 e. From negative premises nothing can be inferred. 
 
 f . // one premise be negative, the conclusion must be negative; 
 and vice versa, to prove a negative conclusion one of the premises 
 mu^t be negative. 
 
 From the above rules may be deduced two subordinate 
 rules, which it will nevertheless be convenient to state at 
 once. 
 
 g. From two particular premises no conclusion can be drawn. 
 h. // one premise be particular, the conclusion must be par- 
 ticular. 
 
 "All these rules are of such extreme importance that 
 it will be desirable for .the student not only to acquire a 
 perfect comprehension of their meaning and truth, but to 
 commit them to memory. ..." 
 
 2. Definitions. "The middle term may always be 
 known by the fact that it does not occur in the conclusion. 
 The major term is always the predicate of the conclusion, 
 and the minor term the subject. . . . 
 
 "Again, the syllogism necessarily consists of a premise 
 called the major premise, in which the major and middle 
 terms are compared together; of a minor premise which 
 similarly compares the minor and middle terms; and of a 
 conclusion, which contains the major and minor terms only. 
 In a strictly correct syllogism the major premise always 
 stands before the minor premise, but in ordinary writing and 
 speaking this rule is seldom observed; and that premise 
 which contains the major term still continues to be the major 
 premise, whatever may be its position. 
 
 "The third rule is a very important one, because many 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 133 
 
 fallacies arise from its neglect. By the middle term being 
 distributed once at least, we mean that the whole of it must be 
 referred to universally in one premise, if not both. The two 
 propositions — 
 
 All Frenchmen are Europeans, 
 All Russians are Europeans, 
 
 do not distribute the middle term at all, because they are 
 both affirmative propositions, which have undistributed 
 predicates." ^ 
 
 3. " Sorites or chain of reasoning. A Sorites is a chain of 
 reasoning in which the two terms of the conclusion are united 
 through the mediation of more than one intervening or con- 
 necting term. It may assume either of the two following 
 forms: 
 
 I 
 
 AisB; 
 
 All negroes are men; 
 
 BisC; 
 
 All men are vertebrates; 
 
 CisD; 
 
 All vertebrates are animals; 
 
 DisE; 
 
 All animals are mortal; 
 
 .AisE;. 
 
 ■ . All negroes are mortal. 
 
 
 n 
 
 CisE; 
 
 All animals are mortal; 
 
 C is D; 
 
 AH vertebrates are animals; 
 
 BisC; 
 
 All men are vertebrates; 
 
 AisB; 
 
 All negroes are men; 
 
 . ' . A is E; . ■ .All negroes are mortal. 
 
 "It is possible to treat a Sorites as an abbreviated form 
 of syllogistic inference, because the chain of reasoning may be 
 resolved into a series of syllogisms, each of which, except the 
 last, yields a conclusion that serves as a premise in the suc- 
 
 * Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 127-129. 
 
134 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 ceeding syllogism. From this point of view, the first of th« 
 above inferences is equivalent to three complete syllogisms, 
 as follows: 
 
 BisC; 
 
 CisD 
 
 D is E; 
 
 AisB; 
 
 AisG 
 
 AisD; 
 
 AisC;. 
 
 •.AisD. 
 
 .AisE; 
 
 4. "Inferences in quantitative relations. Certain infer- 
 ences that deal with quantitative relations give valid conclu- 
 sions, in spite of the fact that they seem to violate the rules 
 of the syllogism. The following are examples : 
 
 I 
 
 A is greater than B; 
 
 B is grea ter than C ; 
 
 ' . ' . A is greater than C* 
 
 n 
 
 A is north y B; 
 
 B is north ot C; 
 
 . ' . A is north of C. 
 
 ** In form these arguments are exactly the same as: 
 
 A is the landlord of B ; ^ 
 
 B is the landlord of 1^; 
 . ' .A is the landlord of C. 
 
 Yet this latter conclusion does not follow from the premises. 
 All of these syllogisms, it will be noticed, have four terms. 
 What requires explanation, therefore, is the fact that, In spite 
 of this apparent iiregularity, it is possible to draw valid 
 conclusions when the subject-matter concerns relations of 
 quantity. 
 
 " The explanation of this fact is, in brief, that the valid 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS • 135 
 
 conclusions are possible because they rest upon a true major 
 premise which does not appear in the argument. If A is 
 north of B, and B is north of C, we can infer the relation of 
 A and C, because we are familiar with the nature of space 
 relations. To state the law or the generalization which under- 
 lies the inference is a matter of some diflSculty. According 
 to some writers the inference, in correct syllogistic form, 
 would read about like this : 
 
 Whatever is north of that which is north of another is 
 
 north of that other; 
 A is something that is north of that which is north of C; 
 
 . * . A is north of C. 
 
 " It is true that we never formulate the major premise of this 
 inference, and that we usually do not even suspect its pres- 
 ence. But, as we shall see a little later, the suppression of one 
 of our premises is a frequent occurrence in everyday reason- 
 ing. This major premise is not formulated, just because the 
 relationship which it expresses is so simple and obvious. 
 This relationship is peculiar to the realm of quantity, and 
 so the recognition of this relationship enables us to make 
 inferences in this realm which have no precise parallel in 
 other fields." ^ 
 
 5. Enthymemes. "When one premise of an argument 
 is lacking, the name of enthymeme is applied to it. When an 
 argument is defective in this way, it must be remembered 
 that the missing proposition is to be regarded as in conscious- 
 ness, though not expressed. It is of great importance to 
 form the habit of making clear to oneself the premises by 
 which any conclusion claims to be supported. In this way 
 groundless assumptions are often brought to light, and the 
 weakness of an argument exposed."^ "Indeed, it is but 
 seldom in ordinary reasoning that we arrange our arguments 
 in the strict syllogistic form. We hurry on from one fact to 
 another in our thinking without stopping to make all the 
 steps definite and explicit. We feel it to be a waste of time, 
 1 Bode, pp. 78-80. 2 Creighton, p. 41. . 
 
136 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 and-a trial to the patience, to express what is clearly obvious, 
 and so we press on to the conclusion which is, for the time 
 being, the central point of interest. But the more rapid and 
 abbreviated the reasoning, the more necessary is it to keep 
 a clear head, and to understand what conclusion is aimed at, 
 and what premises are assumed in the argument. To bring 
 to light the hidden assumption upon which an argument is 
 based, is often the best means of refuting it. Enthymemes 
 are sometimes said to be of the first, second, or third order, 
 according as the major premise, the minor premise, or the 
 conclusion is wanting. As a matter of fact, an enthymeme 
 of the third order is a rhetorical device used to call special 
 attention to a conclusion which is perfectly obvious, although 
 suppressed. Thus, for example, *all boasters are cowards, 
 and we have had proofs that A is a boaster.' Here the con- 
 clusion is at once obvious, and is even more prominent than 
 if it were actually expressed." ^ 
 
 6. The nature of syllogistic reasoning. "The syllogism, 
 as we have already seen, presents a conclusion together with 
 the reasons by means of which it is supported. A single 
 proposition taken by itself is dogmatic: it merely asserts 
 without stating the grounds upon which it rests. The syl- 
 logism, on the other hand, justifies its conclusion by showing 
 the premises from which it has been derived. It thus appeals 
 to the reason of all men, and compels their assent. To do this, 
 it is of course necessary that the truth of the premises to 
 which appeal is made should be granted. If the premises are 
 disputed or doubtful, the argument is pushed a step further 
 back, and it is first necessary to show the grounds upon which 
 these premises rest. The assumption of syllogistic reason- 
 ing — and, indeed, of all reasoning whatsoever — is that it is 
 possible to reach propositions which every one will accept. 
 There are certain facts, we say, well known and established, 
 and these can always be appealed to in support of our con- 
 clusions. In syllogistic reasoning, then, we exhibit the inter- 
 1 Creighton, pp. 126, 127. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 137 
 
 dependence of propositions; i. e., we show how the truth of 
 some new proposition, or some proposition not regarded as 
 beyond question, follows necessarily from other propositions 
 whose truth every one will admit. " ^ 
 
 7. Weakness of the syllogism in general argumentation. 
 But the man who wishes to be successful in general argumen- 
 tation needs to be armed with more than a knowledge of the 
 syllogism. While it is true that putting an argument into 
 "syllogistic form" for the purpose of testing it is one of the 
 easiest and most accurate ways of determining the strength 
 or weakness of our argument (and of exactly locating any 
 weakness), the warning in the following paragraph against 
 depending upon the syllogism as a constructive device should 
 be carefully heeded. 
 
 "For it tells us only what the soundness of inferences 
 depends upon when we assume that the words in which they 
 are expressed are free from ambiguity. In actual inferences 
 this assumption is never strictly in accordance with the facts, 
 and is least in accordance with them when the soundness of 
 the inference is most debatable. That is the chief reason why 
 an appeal to Syllogistic Logic is generally so unconvincing. 
 Now that the direct inquiry into Nature is open to almost 
 every one, almost every one has begun to learn that sharp-cut 
 words are traps for the unwary. A syllogism can always be 
 blocked by refusing to admit the truth of a premise, and in 
 these times no special study of the forms of Syllogism is 
 needed to show us in practice at any rate that the easiest 
 and most effective way to do this is to criticise the words in 
 which it is expressed. Where the conclusion is disputable 
 there is seldom any difficulty in finding some want of def- 
 initeness in the premises, so that they can only combine 
 to form a conclusion when one of them is interpreted in a 
 sense which makes it untrue. To raise this objection — ^in 
 however untechnical language — is to tell the syllogistic 
 logician that his simple process is not yet available. The 
 1 Creighton, pp. 105, 106. 
 
138 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 real diflSculty of the question has first to be settled, and then 
 those who care to do so may put the reasoning into * syllo- 
 gistic form.'" ^ 
 
 II. In rhetoric. Nearly all writers on the subject of 
 rhetoric have divided the kinds of arguments into three 
 classes, and have given to these classes the names, (A) an- 
 tecedent probabiHty, (B) sign, and (C) example. The mean- 
 ings given to these titles and the divisions made under them 
 have been somewhat varied, so that there is no universally 
 accepted classification. Any division which shall be of 
 service in argumentation must have for its purpose the 
 establishment of standards by which we may determine 
 whether any particular arguments are good or bad, strong 
 or weak, as the materials of proof. Consequently, in order 
 to give a practical insight into the proper selection and use of 
 arguments in argumentation, and a practical power to detect 
 the most serious fallacies, the kinds of arguments should be 
 classified and explained in such a way as to make clear, as 
 far as possible, on what the strength of the various kinds of ar- 
 guments depends. The classification used here (the old tril- 
 ogy, systematized and clarified, we trust, in its subdivi- 
 sions) is retained as much more fundamental, accurate, 
 and serviceable than any of the modifications of it attempted 
 by recent writers. 
 
 The lines of division between the classes of arguments 
 cannot always be drawn with absolute distinctness. Many 
 arguments with slight changes in phrase pass from one class 
 to another. But this is not a serious matter. It is the under- 
 standing of the structure and substance of the arguments that 
 is essential. We have seen that an argument is a process by 
 which, from knowing the existence of a fact or a certain num- 
 ber of facts, we infer the existence of some other fact or facts. 
 In the first place, then, it should be stated that in nearly every 
 argument the validity of the inference depends upon a connec- 
 tion of cause and effect between the facts from which we infer and 
 ^ Sidgwick, pp. 75, 76. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 139 
 
 the facts to which we infer. This connection is not always 
 actuaRy understood by the person making the argument, 
 and is often not stated. But this connection is, nevertheless, 
 in most cases, the source of strength or weakness in the reason- 
 ing. It must be understood in order to know the real force 
 of the argument and detect the fallacies of the opponents. 
 "Whether the given inference be right or wrong, whether 
 it be express and deliberate, or rapid and free, whether it 
 take the form of a cut-and-dried syllogism, an argument from 
 analogy, or from circumstantial evidence, in all cases equally 
 it is our belief about the way things hang together in nature 
 that provides alike the sole motive power of inference and the 
 sole foundation on which we rest our proofs," ^ However, 
 there are many valid arguments in which this causal connec- 
 tion is not evident, and in these cases it must also be deter- 
 mined what is the element of their strength. 
 
 A. Antecedent probability. The argument from antece- 
 dent probability is an argument from cause to effect. 
 
 It is sometimes said that the argument from antecedent 
 probability requires a preliminary assumption; that the 
 argument consists in, assuming the existence of some fact and 
 then producing evidence to show that the assumption is 
 justified. This is not true. Very often it is convenient in 
 presenting or explaining the argument to make such an as- 
 sumption. As, for instance, in a criminal trial a lawyer, 
 when he is arguing before the jury, may practically assume 
 for the time that A murdered B, and then go on to show that 
 A had a motiye. Of course he must not assume that A com- 
 mitted the murder and then infer from this that he must have 
 had a motive. The assumption is purely a preliminary step. 
 The motive must be established independently. This having 
 been done, the lawyer argues from the known cause (the 
 motive) to the unknown effect (that A murdered B). This 
 is an argument from antecedent probability, and the assump- 
 tion made by the lawyer is not an essential part of the argu- 
 * Sidgwick, p. 46, 
 
140 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 ment. Note that the unknown effect is not that B was mur- 
 dered, or that B was killed, or that B is dead. The unknown 
 effect to which we argue is the fact in issue concerning A. 
 For the sake of clearness he may first show that A's pistol 
 was found beside the body, and present various other kinds 
 of evidence, to create a presumption of guilt against A, be- 
 fore he discusses his motives. Such a method is obviously 
 more sensible than examining the possible motives of all the 
 persons who might possibly have committed the crime, es- 
 pecially since the lawyer is hired to prosecute this particular 
 man, A. Moreover, the effect on the jury is helped by the 
 corroboration of other kinds of arguments, the arguments 
 from sign in this case. But this assumption is not essential. 
 The strength of the argument itself depends entirely upon the 
 connection of cause and effect, between the motive and the 
 deed. The argument is conclusive if it can be shown that 
 these motives of A were the cause that would produce the 
 effect in question, viz., the murder of B by A, and its validity 
 will vary with the strength of this causal connection. 
 
 The argument from antecedent probability, then, is an 
 inference from a known cause to an unknown effect; it consists 
 in showing that a certain known fact or combination of facts 
 is of such a nature as to bring to pass the existence of another 
 fact, whose existence is in dispute. An argument from cause 
 to effect is often called an a priori argument. 
 
 An example is found in the famous White murder trial. 
 There Daniel Webster showed that the Knapps believed they 
 could get Captain White's fortune by murdering him and 
 stealing his last will, and then argued that this motive was the 
 cause that produced the effect in question, viz., their murder 
 of Captain White. Again, if one of the larger universities 
 of the country is known and acknowledged to have a very 
 strong foot-ball team, it is an argument from antecedent 
 probability to infer that this team will defeat a team from 
 some small college of two or three hundred students. It 
 is inferred that the known cause — the strength of the univer- 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 141 
 
 sity team — will produce the effect of a victory over a weaker 
 rival. A good illustration of this kind of argument is found 
 in the following selection from a speech given at a National 
 Democratic Convention to account for hard times under a 
 Democratic administration: — 
 
 "When the Democracy came into power in 1893 it inherited from 
 its Republican predecessor a tax system and currency, a system of 
 which the McKinley and Sherman laws were the culminating 
 atrocities. It came into power amidst a panic which followed upon 
 their enactment with strikes, lockouts, riots, civil commotions, while 
 scenes of peaceful industry in Pennsylvania had become military 
 camps. Besides its manifest features, the McKinley law had thrown 
 away fifty millions of revenue derived from sugar under a special 
 plea of a free breakfast table, and substituted bounties to sugar 
 planters, thus increasing expenditure, thus burning the candle at 
 both ends and making the people pay at last for their alleged free 
 breakfast. 
 
 "From the joint operation of the McKinley law and the Sherman 
 law, an adverse balance of trade was forced against us in 1893, a 
 surplus of $100,000,000 in the treasury was converted into a deficit 
 of $70,000,000 in 1894; and engraved bonds prepared by a Repub- 
 lican secretary to borrow money to support the Government were 
 ill omens of preorganized ruin that awaited the coming Democracy 
 and depleted treasury." 
 
 The orator argues that these acts of Republican malad- 
 ministration were the causes that produced the effect of 
 Republican responsibility for hard times. 
 
 1. Effect to cause not part of a priori argument. It may 
 be noticed that in many such instances the argument from 
 cause to effect is preceded by a sort of preliminary argument 
 from effect to cause. Before we argue that the strength of 
 the foot-ball team will be the cause of victory, we may prove 
 that the team is strong by showing that it has won victories 
 over other teams in the past. This is an inference from 
 effect — the past victories — to cause — the strength of the 
 team. But this is not part of the a priori argument. 
 
142 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 The strength of the team is not really in question; it is in 
 this case generally admitted. If, however, the abilities of 
 the team are questioned and must first be proved by showing 
 past evidences of their achievements, the argument thus 
 becomes more truly an argument from certain known 
 effects of a given cause to other effects of the same cause, 
 i. e., an argument from sign. As has already been re- 
 marked, the lines of division between the classes are not 
 definite. 
 
 2. Methods of attack. An argument from antecedent 
 probability may be attacked in several ways, but they are 
 all the same in that they are all directed toward the destruc- 
 tion of the connection between cause and effect. In order to 
 be effective, the argument must show that the known or 
 proved fact would probably act as a cause to produce 
 the effect; and it is here that the argument is best at- 
 tacked. 
 
 a. Is the connection of cause and effect complete? Is 
 there a broken or missing link in the chain? 
 
 The two facts, one of which is called the cause and the 
 other the effect, are rarely in immediate connection with 
 each other. There are almost always several in- 
 C termediate steps between the two. " Intermediate 
 
 o links in a chain of causation are so many opportu- 
 
 o ' nities for counteraction, in the same way as the 
 
 2 length of a piece of railway provides opportu- 
 
 nities for any accident. They are intermediate 
 conditions. The pull on the trigger will fire the shot if, and 
 only if, the catch, the spring, the hammer, the cap, and so on, 
 all act in the expected manner. Therefore our forgetfulness 
 of intermediate links takes effect just in the same way as our 
 forgetfulness of conditions generally; it may give us a false 
 security." ^ It follows, then, that the closer the causal con- 
 nection, the surer is the argument, and that any argument 
 may be destroyed by showing that some of the necessary 
 ^ Sidgwick, p. 153. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 143 
 
 intennediate links are lacking. It might be proved that A 
 was inspired with a most malevolent hatred of B, that he 
 would welcome any favorable opportunity of attacking him, 
 even that he had actually sought to do him injury; but in 
 order to connect this motive with the murder of B, it must 
 be shown that none of the necessary intermediate steps were 
 lacking. It must be proved that A was present at the time, 
 that he had the necessary weapon, that he was physically 
 strong enough to do the deed. The destruction of one of 
 these links of the chain destroys the argument. 
 
 b. Is the cause adequate to produce the effect in question? 
 Could such a little cause have such a big effect? 
 
 It is not difficult to imagine any number of facts that might 
 possibly follow from the existence of some other fact. But 
 such connections are not always sufficient to make C— ~^ 
 a valid argument. It is not sufficient that a fact 
 might have a general tendency to produce a certain 
 effect. It must be shown that the cause in question 
 is in itself adequate to account for the existence of 
 the effect in question. Is it reasonable to argue that 
 such a little c could produce such a big E.^^ 
 
 Ex-Governor Black of New York, in the trial of Roland B. 
 Molineux for the murder of Mrs. Adams, used this test when, 
 in speaking of the motives assigned by the prosecution as the 
 cause of the murder, he said: "They have failed utterly to 
 supply a motive. It is absurd to suggest that out of a mere 
 quarrel such as Cornish and Molineux had, should grow a 
 hatred so profound as to inspire a man twelve months later 
 to commit murder." In 1893 the so-called "hard times" 
 from 1892 to 1896 were said by some people to have been 
 caused solely by the unexpected failure of a prominent Eng- 
 lish banking house. The failure in question might have been 
 a startling incident of the day, it might perhaps have precipi- 
 tated failures and misfortune elsewhere; but it was clearly 
 no adequate cause for such a widespread and prolonged mis- 
 fortune. 
 
144 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 c. Did the operation of other causes in the case in ques^ 
 tion prevent the action of the cause under discussion? 
 
 The normal progress between the cause and the effect is 
 often stopped or turned from its course by the intervention of 
 some other cause which destroys or turns aside the natural 
 result of the first cause. If a man takes a dose of deadly 
 poison, the chances are that it will cause his death; but it 
 may be shown that this effect will not actually follow in this 
 case, by showing that the man took an anti- 
 dote. The antidote prevents the occurrence of 
 the natural effect. One may argue that the, 
 Chinese race are very numerous, that as a 
 £ people they are physically formidable, that 
 
 they are peculiarly fortunate in climate and in 
 economic resources, and, consequently, that there is great 
 danger of a commercial "Yellow Peril." This is a clear 
 inference from cause to effect. But this reasoning may be 
 attacked, by arguing that certain racial peculiarities of the 
 Chinese prevent them from being aggressive competitors, 
 and make them thus incapable of the powers of initiative 
 and self-advancement necessary for independent commercial 
 progress as a race. The operation of this second cause will 
 destroy the connection of cause and effect on which the argu- 
 ment depends. 
 
 d. Is there an entirely different argument from cause to 
 effect that should be substituted for the one advanced? 
 
 Very often the argument from antecedent probability is 
 used to account for the existence of some particular phe- 
 nomenon. It is human nature to wish to know a sufficient 
 cause for any fact presented. If you say 
 something is true, somebody immediately 
 wants to know why it is natural that it should 
 be true. To recur to the example of the 
 criminal, if a lawyer tries to account for a 
 robbery, he must show that his explanation of it is natural 
 and reasonable. So he tries to show that the man he 
 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 145 
 
 is prosecuting had a motive for committing the crime. In 
 attempting to overthrow such an argument, it may not be 
 suflScient to show that the connection of cause and effect is 
 weak. A weak cause is better than no cause at all. Con- 
 sequently, it is necessary to substitute some other argument 
 from cause to effect for the argument that has been attacked. 
 The causal connection that seems the more reasonable will 
 be accepted to the exclusion of the other. 
 
 For instance, a man is murdered. This is a known fact. 
 We try to account for it by showing that A murdered him. 
 To prove this we show A's motive. In answer A shows that 
 B had a stronger motive. Here we substitute a complete new 
 argument that seems better to account for the big problem 
 we are trying to explain. Note that we are not substituting 
 a new c for the same E. We substitute B's motive for A's 
 motive and from this known cause argue to a new unknown 
 effect that B is the murderer. This being inconsistent with 
 the effect we inferred from A's motive, we make the substi- 
 tution complete and drop the first argument. 
 
 Of two such arguments of unequal force the stronger, of 
 course, ought to displace the weaker. If one argues that A 
 committed a murder in order to inherit $1,000, this argument 
 is met (though perhaps not the whole case against A) by show- 
 ing that B knew that by the death of the deceased he would 
 get $1,000,000. Other things being equal the million dollar 
 motive outweighs the thousand dollar motive. In case two 
 equal a priori arguments are presented, each person will 
 accept the one that he prefers to believe — the one that fits 
 his likes and dislikes best. This method was used in the 
 Molineux trial. The defence attacked the argument of the 
 prosecution to show that the defendant had a motive that 
 caused him to commit the murder in question, by producing 
 e\ndence to show that another man concerned in the case had 
 stronger motives and consequently that it was no more ra- 
 tional to accuse the defendant than it was to accuse this man. 
 
 In refuting arguments from antecedent probability the 
 
146 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 rhetorical treatment may take various forms, but the analysis 
 of the argument is always the same; the attack is always 
 directed toward one point, — the connection between cause 
 and effect. 
 
 B. Sign. The argument from sign is, in general, what the 
 name implies. It rests upon the assumption that the facts dealt 
 with will always or usually accompany each other, and that 
 consequently the presence of one will be a sign of the presence 
 of the other. As in the argument from antecedent probabil- 
 ity, most arguments from sign depend for their validity upon 
 a causal connection; but we shall also find that there is a class 
 of arguments from sign in which this causal connection is not 
 fully understood or expressed, or, at least, is hard to trace. 
 Arguments of this last-mentioned class depend for their 
 strength upon the fact of a more or less invariable association 
 in the past between the facts in question, and are therefore 
 closely akin to generalization. There are three kinds of 
 arguments from sign. 1. Arguments from effect to cause. 
 
 2. Arguments from one effect to another effect of the same cause. 
 
 3. Arguments from the association of phenomena in the past. 
 
 1. The argument from effect to cause is the reverse of 
 the argument from antecedent probability. As that was an 
 argument based on facts antecedent to the fact in dispute, 
 so this is an argument based on facts coming after the fact 
 in dispute. As the former is called an a priori argument, so 
 the latter is called an a posteriori argument. From a known, 
 admitted fact we argue back to an unknown, disputed fact. 
 We say the latter exists or existed because the former is an 
 effect of it. If it can be shown that any alleged fact whose 
 existence we wish to prove is or was the cause of any known 
 fact, the proof of this alleged fact is indisputable. When we 
 see ice, we safely conclude that the temperature has been 
 below a certain point; and the argument is beyond dispute, 
 because it is only a certain degree of coldness that will freeze 
 water. 
 
 William Seward argued from effect to cause in the follow- 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 147 
 
 ing part of his defence of William Freeman. Freeman was 
 on trial for murder, and Seward's defence was that of insanity 
 on the part of the prisoner: — 
 
 "There is proof, gentlemen, stronger than all this. It is silent, 
 yet speaking. It is that idiotic smile which plays continually on 
 the face of the maniac. It took its seat there while he was in the 
 State prison. In his solitary cell, under the pressure of his severe 
 tasks and trials in the workshop, and during the solemnities of 
 public worship in the chapel, it appealed, although in vain, to his 
 task-masters and his teachers. It is a smile, never rising into 
 laughter — without motive or cause — the smile of vacuity. . . . 
 
 "That chaotic smile is the external derangement which signifies 
 that the strings of the harp are disordered and broken, the superficial 
 mark which God has set upon the tabernacle to signify that its 
 immortal tenant is disturbed by a divine and mysterious com- 
 mandment. If you cannot see it, take heed that the obstruction of 
 your vision be not produced by the mote in your own eye, which 
 you are commanded to remove before you consider the beam in 
 your brother's eye. If you are bent on rejecting the testimony of 
 those who know, by experience and by science, the deep afflictions 
 of the prisoner, beware how you misinterpret the handwriting of 
 the Almighty." i 
 
 A number of years ago, in Yorkshire, England, a traveller, 
 having in his pocket certain marked coins, was attacked in 
 the early evening, murdered, and robbed. The following 
 day coins of this peculiar stamp were found on the person of a 
 certain manservant at an inn in the vicinity. This servant 
 was unable to account for his possession of the money, and 
 on this evidence he was tried, convicted, and hanged. This 
 was a clear argument from sign — from effect to cause. It 
 was argued that his possession of the coins was the effect 
 of his taking them from the body of the murdered man on the 
 evening before. But several years after it was found that the 
 conviction was a mistake. The keeper of the inn confessed 
 that he himself committed the murder and, in order to trans- 
 » Works of William H. Seward, Vol. I, p. 468. 
 
148 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 fer the guilt, got his servant intoxicated and put the coins into 
 his pocket. The argument from sign was fallacious, because 
 the effect in question was the result of another cause than 
 that inferred. 
 
 a. Methods of attack. There are two ways of attacking 
 the argument from effect to cause, one from the alleged cause 
 as the basis showing that it could not have been the cause of 
 the effect, the second from some other cause as a basis show- 
 ing that this other cause more probably produced the effect. 
 
 (I) May not the known effect be due to some other cause 
 than the one alleged? 
 
 A mariner at night seeing lights ahead infers 
 C ^^ C that a ship or a lighthouse is at hand. But 
 •"'""' ^^< \ his inference may be sadly false. The lights 
 / "**? may be set or manipulated on shore with the 
 ' purpose to mislead him and profit by the 
 
 ^£ wreck of his ship. Again it is argued that 
 
 Shakespeare must have written the works 
 attributed to him, because he was credited with their au- 
 thorship all through his life. It is said that this effect must 
 have been due to the cause, that he did actually write 
 the works. But those who oppose this view attack the ar- 
 gument by showing that the popular belief may be attributed 
 to other good causes,— to the comparative lack of interest 
 in the authorship at the time, or the desire of the real author 
 to conceal his identity, — and so, that the reputation is no 
 sure sign of authorship. 
 
 (II) Is the alleged cause capable of being the real cause 
 of the effect in question? 
 
 We may also attack the argument directly, in C ^_p 
 
 much the same way that we would attack the 
 argument from antecedent probability, by showing 
 that the cause which it is alleged produced the 
 known effect was really not capable of producing it. 
 This is commonly done by showing that the cause 
 was not powerful enough, or that in some way the effect would 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 149 
 
 not be a reasonable and normal result of this cause. But it 
 must be observed that this alone is not always suflBcient to de- 
 stroy the argument. Although this phenomenon might not 
 in itself have been a sufficient cause, other causes might have 
 cooperated with it in producing the effect, and so the known 
 effect may still be a sign of this alleged cause. To make the 
 refutation complete in such a case, it must be shown that 
 these other causes, whose cooperation was necessary, did not 
 exist. 
 
 (HI) Is the cause and effect connection complete? This, 
 the same test already suggested for antecedent probability, is, 
 of course, just as effective here. When a washout 
 ^ carries away a section of a railroad, trains cannot 
 
 B ^ go through in either direction. We can neither 
 
 ft " go up or down the chain of causal connection if a 
 
 g link is missing. 
 
 There are many other devices that may be in- 
 vented and employed in different cases, which are too numer- 
 ous or complicated to be explained here. The foregoing are 
 the most common and effective tests; and of the other tests 
 it may be remarked that they are all directed to destroy the 
 causal connection, and that they may be readily invented if 
 the nature of this inference from effect to cause is understood. 
 2. The argument from effect to effect. The second 
 class of the arguments from sign involves a process of in- 
 ference which is a combination of the argument from cause 
 to effect and the argument from effect to cause. The argu- 
 ment from effect to effect is simply an inference from a 
 known effect of some cause to the existence of an unknown 
 effect of the same cause. A certain fact or combination of 
 facts is known to exist. From the existence of this known fact 
 the existence is inferred of another fact which is alleged to 
 be its cause — the argument from effect to cause. Then a 
 second step is taken; it is inferred that this cause produces 
 another effect, this second unknown effect being the fact 
 which it is the aim of the argument to prove. Very often, 
 
150 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 of course, a short cut is taken from one effect to the othef 
 effect, paying little or no attention to the common cause. 
 To illustrate by a diagram : — 
 
 In full detail the process is as 
 follows: 
 
 The effect A is known, i e., 
 it is admitted or it has been 
 established by evidence. From 
 this known effect is inferred 
 FfF f ^y process number I (argument 
 from effect to cause) the ex- 
 istence of X, which is alleged to be its cause. Then by 
 process number II (argument from cause to effect) is inferred 
 the existence of Y, which is alleged to be another effect of 
 the cause X. The argument seeks to prove Y as an inference 
 from A, and in doing so it passes through the connecting 
 cause X. The short cut consists of inferring immediately 
 that where there is A there is Y. This is sound when it is 
 true that that which causes A invariably causes Y also. 
 
 In the evening we observe a redness of the sky, and we 
 argue that there will be fair weather the next day. It is 
 an argument from effect to effect. The redness is due to 
 certain atmospheric conditions, and these conditions are 
 such that they will produce fair weather. We argue that 
 a certain man will succeed as the president of a corpora- 
 tion. We first point to his success in other enterprises re- 
 quiring executive skill and creative power; from them we 
 infer their cause, his abilities, and then reason that these 
 abilities will produce their effect, viz., success in his new 
 undertaking. We notice that the thermometer is low and 
 at once infer good skating. 
 
 The following illustration is taken from the speech of David 
 Paul Brown in defence of Alexander William Holmes (before 
 the Circuit Court in Philadelphia, in 1832). A vessel was 
 wrecked, and, in order to save as many as possible of the 
 passengers, orders were given to throw overboard a part 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 151 
 
 of them. The defendant obeyed the order and threw certain 
 men over the side of the ship into the water. He was tried 
 for murder, and Mr. Brown is here arguing to show that the 
 defendant acted in good faith and with right motives. He 
 said: — 
 
 "I am strengthened in this position by the indisputable fact that 
 Holmes, the prisoner, during the whole voyage, was upon the kindest 
 and most harmonious terms with all the passengers; that he pre- 
 served the same friendly relation to them after the loss of the ship; 
 that he had perilled his life more than once to preserve them; that 
 he had literally stripped himself of his apparel for their comfort; in 
 short, his desire to save them seemed to absorb all consideration of ^ 
 mere personal or individual safety. In these circumstances, to 
 suppose anything cruel or wanton upon his part is to run counter 
 to everything that is possible or natural. I infer, therefore, that 
 he supposed the peril to be imminent and instantaneous, or he 
 never would have complied with the orders of the mate. ... I 
 maintain, therefore, that the most favorable construction is to be 
 placed upon his motives; and it is justly to be inferred that he 
 acted upon the impression that the danger was imminent, and that 
 death was inevitable to all, except by resorting to those means 
 which he actually adopted. . . But even taking all the statements 
 of the witnesses for the prosecution, highly colored — I will not say 
 discolored — as they are, and torture them as you may, it is impos- 
 sible for you to arrive at any other conclusion than that Holmes 
 was actuated by the kindest and most generous influences; and 
 certainly I need not say that kindness and generosity are opposed to 
 wantonness and barbarity." ^ 
 
 He argues that the former actions of Holmes were the 
 evidences of their cause, viz., his sincere interest for the wel- 
 fare of the passengers, and then argues that this cause pro- 
 duced the effect in question, his honesty of motive in this 
 particular instance. 
 
 In a great part of the arguments of this class it is notice- 
 able that more than one effect is usually adduced to prove 
 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, pp. 143, 144. 
 
152 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the existence of the cause, each eflFect giving added evidence 
 of the single cause alleged. 
 
 a. Methods of attack. The points of weakness in this 
 kind of argument are evident. It is a combination of the two 
 foregoing arguments, — from sign and from antecedent prob- 
 ability; and if either one of these component inferences is de- 
 fective or can be successfully attacked, the whole argument 
 is destroyed. Referring to the diagram given above, the 
 argument can be attacked in either leg of the triangle. (I) 
 The tests are, therefore, the tests already given for the arguments 
 from cause to effect and from effect to cause. 
 
 For example, the argument of Mr. Brown might be at- 
 tacked at two points. It might be shown that the effects 
 he mentioned — relations of Holmes with the passengers and 
 his apparent solicitude in their behalf, etc. — might not really 
 be due to the alleged cause, viz., his interest for their welfare, 
 but to another cause — perhaps his desire to win favor or 
 pecuniary gain. Again it might be attacked (test number 3, 
 of arguments from antecedent probability) by granting the 
 sincerity of his motives in general, but showing that certain 
 circumstances peculiar to his particular case prevented the 
 natural operation of the cause. Perhaps the defendant was 
 so fearful for his own life that his usual honesty was put aside 
 and he acted selfishly or maliciously. Or in the other example, 
 the thermometer may be out of order, so the cold that we in- 
 ferred may not have been. Our cause was wrong. Or the 
 cause may have been right, but a high wind prevented the 
 formation of ice, so our second effect is lacking. 
 
 3. Association of phenomena in the past. The third 
 class of arguments from sign is composed of arguments based 
 upon the past association of facts or phenomena. Two phe- 
 nomena have been observed to happen together so many 
 times in the past as to seem to justify the belief that they will 
 accompany one another in the future. So when one of the 
 facts or phenomena is observed to be present in any particular 
 case, it is inferred that the other also is present. In such 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 155 
 
 arguments the causal relation is not readily understood or 
 explained, although it undoubtedly exists. 
 
 a. Association of phenomena and generalization. This 
 kind of argument is very closely related to the argument by 
 generalization. In any given case a slight change in expres- 
 sion may shift the argument from one type to the other. 
 In so far as it is possible to draw a strict dividing line between 
 arguments from the association of phenomena in the past 
 and arguments by generalization, we classify according to 
 whether the underlying causal connections are expressed 
 or not. When the causal relations are not understood, or 
 are understood and taken for granted but not expressed, no 
 general rule formulated, the argument is strictly speaking 
 an argument from the association of phenomena in the past. 
 That is we accept one thing as the sign of something else 
 without expressing our mode of reasoning, without citing 
 a general rule with instances to prove it (generalization) and 
 without comparing two individual cases as to resemblances, 
 point by point, as a basis for inferring resemblance on a dis- 
 puted point (analogy). The argument from association 
 might be called simply an implied generalization. Its strength 
 depends upon the validity of the underlying unexpressed 
 generalization. 
 
 We may infer that any ruminating animal has cloven 
 hoofs; conversely, we may infer that any animal with cloven 
 hoofs is a ruminant. These inferences are reasonably safe 
 because in most cases the two characteristics have been 
 found to exist together, although scientists do not under- 
 stand the exact nature of the connection. The argument 
 about ruminant animals depends on the fact that the con- 
 currence of the two phenomena seldom fails. In some cases 
 the rule has been broken; the pig and the tapir, for illustra- 
 tion, have cloven hoofs, but are not ruminants : consequently, 
 the convincingness of the argument is weakened, and any 
 considerable number of exceptions would make it valueless. 
 
 The conclusion you draw that A is nearby when you see 
 
154 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 his dog or horse or hat somewhere; many every day state- 
 ments about the weather or crops, or the habits of animals; 
 the immediate and almost universal import of a half-masted 
 flag, or crepe on a door; all these are examples of this type of 
 argument. What has been said earlier about the impossi- 
 bility of hard and fast dividing lines, should be kept in mind 
 in connection with this type of argument. It is possible to 
 list here arguments that might fit under either of the other 
 types of sign, or under generalization, or even antecedent 
 probability. But it still seems well worth while to keep this 
 old label for that large class of "implied generalizations" in 
 which no general law is fonnulated or expressed, and many 
 times not understood. It should also be observed that ex- 
 amples of this type of argument are usually (not always) 
 found in fields where unchanging laws of nature are not in 
 control — or are not understood to be in control — but usually 
 are cases in which the human will plays an important part. 
 It is so possible that the two phenomena are not associated 
 this time — that someone else has A's horse, or dog, or hat — 
 that the flag has been half-masted by mistake, or the crepe 
 put up as a' joke. This argument is very weak in itself, but 
 is often important in corroborating other elements in a case, 
 b. Methods of attack. It is, then, clear where the argu- 
 ment may be open to attack. The habit of hasty, unreason- 
 ing (and often unrecognized) implied generalization is very 
 common. In many debates this very error is predominant. 
 A speaker or writer cites a few instances of the concurrence 
 of two facts in the past and argues that because they have 
 happened together in the past, they must happen together 
 in the present instance. Really, what he has established is, 
 that they may happen together; he has proved nothing, and 
 his attempt may be rendered null by (I) pointing out that 
 the cases are too few to establish a law of concurrence, which 
 is really necessary — i. e., exposing the weakness of the im- 
 plied generalization which fails to come up to the tests of a 
 real generalization which it must meet; or better, (II) by 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 155 
 
 producing contrary examples, definite eases where the one phe- 
 nomenon has occurred without the other; or (III) destroying 
 its corroborative function by showing it to be actually in- 
 consistent with facts in the case already known. Arguments 
 of this kind are from their nature of doubtful value. The co- 
 existence of the two facts in past instances is not shown to be 
 anything more than mere accident, and chance is at best a 
 weak foundation on which to base an interference. The 
 argument gathers its force wholly from the frequency of the 
 past concurrence of the phenomena. In order to approach 
 conclusiveness we must have: (I) a very large number of cases 
 of the observed concurrence of the facts or phenomena, and 
 (II) substantial uniformity in the operation of the rule that 
 when one occurs the other accompanies it, and (III) har- 
 mony with accepted facts in the case. 
 
 C. Example. The third and last division of the kinds 
 of arguments is composed of those which depend for their 
 strength upon the resemblance between the case in question 
 and some other case or cases, which are adduced either as 
 analogous in nature to this particular case, or as establishing 
 some general law that is applicable to it. There are, there- 
 fore, two classes of arguments from example, which may be 
 called, respectively, (1) the argument by generalization, and 
 (2) the argument from analogy. 
 
 1. Generalization. In arguments of this kind we "con- 
 sider one or more known individual objects or instances of a 
 certain class as fair specimens, in respect of some point or 
 other, of that class; and consequently draw an inference 
 from them respecting either the whole class or other less 
 known individuals of it." ^ Our purpose is to establish a 
 general law which will apply to a particular case under dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 The following from Burke*s Speech on Conciliation is 
 an illustration of an inference from individual instances to 
 a truth respecting the whole class to which they belong: — 
 1 Whately, p. 52. 
 
156 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 "In large bodies, the circulation of power must be less vigorous 
 at the extremities. Nature has said it. The Turk cannot govern 
 Egypt, and Arabia, and Curdistan, as he governs Thrace; nor has 
 he the same dominion in Crimea and Algiers, which he has at Brusa 
 and Smyrna. Despotism itself is obliged to truck and huckster. 
 The Sultan gets such obedience as he can. He governs with loose 
 rein, that he may govern at all; and the whole of the force and vigor 
 of his authority in his centre is derived from a prudent relaxation 
 in all his borders. Spain, in her provinces, is, perhaps, not so well 
 obeyed as you in yours. She complies too, she submits, she watches 
 times. This is the immutable condition, the eternal law, of ex- 
 tensive and detached empire." ^ 
 
 Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion delivered in the case 
 of McCulloch vs. Maryland,^ used the argument by generali- 
 zation as follows: — 
 
 "The power of creating a corporation, though appertaining to 
 sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war or levying taxes 
 or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent 
 power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or 
 used as a means of executing them. It is never the end for which 
 other powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects 
 are accomplished. No contributions are made to charity for the 
 sake of an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer 
 the charity; no seminary of learning is instituted in order to be 
 incorporated, but the corporate character is conferred to subserve 
 the purposes of education. No city was ever built with the sole 
 object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the 
 best means of being well governed. The power of creating a cor- 
 poration is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of 
 effecting something else." 
 
 In the following, Channing, arguing that the sufferings of 
 the slaves are evils and should be done away with, infers 
 from individual instances of a class to "another less known 
 individual of it:*' — 
 
 1 Cook's Edition, p. £6. 24 Wheat. 316. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 157 
 
 "Allow that the sufferings of the slave are less than those of the 
 free laborer. But the sufferings are Wrongs, and this changes their 
 nature. Pain as pain is notliing compared with pain when it is 
 wrong. A blow, given me by accident, may fell me to the earth; 
 but, after all, it is a trifle. A slight blow, inflicted in scorn or with 
 injurious intent, is an evil, which, without aid from my principles, 
 I could not bear. Let God's providence confine me to my room by 
 disease, and I more than submit, for in his dispensations I see 
 parental goodness seeking my purity and peace. But let man im- 
 prison me, without inflicting disease, and how intolerable my nar- 
 row bounds. So if the elements take away our property, we resign 
 it without a murmur; but if a man rob us of our fortune, poverty 
 weighs on us as a mountain. Anything can be borne but the will 
 and the power of the selfish, unrighteous man. . . . 
 
 '* My hostility to the system does not rest primarily on the physical 
 agonies it inflicts, but on a deeper foundation: on its flagrant injus- 
 tice, and on the misery necessarily involved in a system of wrong." ^ 
 
 He adduces examples to prove the general truth that, 
 regardless of the pain it inflicts, injustice or wrong always 
 creates an evil, and then applies this general truth to the 
 instance of slavery so proving that slavery is an evil. 
 
 Under this head Hill ^ offers some good suggestions and 
 provides some excellent examples which we quote. 
 
 a. Illustrative and argumentative examples. "In argu- 
 ments of the first class, it is important to distinguish between 
 examples which are merely illustrative and those which are 
 argumentative. A supposed case under a general principle 
 which is itself in dispute, though it may make the principle 
 more intelligible, does not tend to prove its truth. Cicero's 
 proposition that nothing is expedient which is dishonorable 
 is explained, but not established, by the example he gives, — 
 an example drawn from Themistocles's project of burning 
 the Spartan fleet. This plan Cicero, in opposition to Aris- 
 tides, maintains to be inexpedient because dishonorable; 
 but no one who had not already assented to the general 
 
 1 Channing's Works, Vol. V, pp. 37, 39. ^ HiU, pp. 361, 363. 
 
158 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 principle would be convinced of its soundness by this 
 example. 
 
 "An actual instance of the operation of a principle has, 
 on the other hand, the force of an argument. Such an ar- 
 gument is given in a criticism of Sir James Fitzjames Steph- 
 en's History of the Criminal Law of England. In answer 
 to Sir James's proposition 'that unanimity of jurors is es- 
 sential to trial by jury: that if that is to be given up, the 
 institution itself should be abolished,' his critic refers to the 
 fact that in Scotland, where a majority of jurors decide, 
 trial by jury succeeds as well as in England. Another ex- 
 ample is given in the following passage : — 
 
 "The outcry of a suffering beast may be no measure of its dis- 
 tress. That outcry, like all else in nature, is of a strictly utilitarian 
 character. But it was not developed in the first place as an appeal 
 to the sympathy of man, and therefore man's senses and intuitive 
 judgment cannot be trusted to interpret it aright. The pig squeals 
 aloiid when he is hurt, and advertises his woe over half the parish, 
 because, in the wild state, his comrades were sworn to rescue him 
 from a foe or die. Many a hunter who has been treed by a herd of 
 peccaries, after wounding one of them, has had convincing proof 
 of their magnificent esprit de corps. The sheep is dumb before 
 her persecutors because, when wild, there was no hope of salvation 
 from the scared flock, fast fleeing to inaccessible hills as soon as the 
 wolf began his raid. The Virginian opossum, when playing that 
 part in the world's drama which he has made peculiarly his own, 
 will allow his limp carcase to be mauled to an incredible extent 
 without moving an eyelid. He acts his lie with Cretan facility, and 
 sticks to it with more than Spartan fortitude. Yet he is silent for 
 exactly the same reason that the pig is so shrilly vociferous, viz., 
 because this has been proved the best way to preserve his precious 
 life." 1 
 
 "Still another example is the little essay by Charles Lamb^ 
 
 1 Louis Robinson, M. D., E very-day Cruelty. The Fortnightly Review, 
 July, 1894, p. 107. 
 
 2 Essays of Elia. Popular Fallacies, VII. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 159 
 
 on the popular proverb that ' of two disputants the warmest 
 is generally in the wrong' : — 
 
 "Our experience would lead us to quite an opposite conclusion. 
 Temper, indeed, is no test of truth; but warmth and earnestness 
 are a proof at least of a man's own conviction of the rectitude of 
 that which he maintains. Coolness is as often the result of an un- 
 principled indifference to truth or falsehood, as of a sober con- 
 fidence in a man's own side in a dispute. Nothing is more insulting 
 sometimes than the appearance of this philosophic temper. There 
 is little Titubus, the stammering law-stationer engaged in Lincoln's 
 Inn — we have seldom known this shrewd little fellow engaged in an 
 argument where we were not convinced he had the best of it, if his 
 tongue would but fairly have seconded him. When he has been 
 spluttering excellent broken sense for an hour together, writhing 
 and labouring to be delivered of the point of dispute — the very gist 
 of the controversy knocking at his teeth, which like some obstinate 
 iron-grating still obstructed its deliverance — his puny frame con- 
 vulsed, and face reddening all over at an unfairness in the logic 
 which he wanted articulation to expose, it has moved our gall to see 
 a smooth portly fellow of an adversary, that cared not a button for 
 the merits of the question, by merely laying his hand upon the 
 head of the stationer, and desiring him to be calm (your tall dis- 
 putants have always the advantage), with a provoking sneer carry 
 the argument clean from him in the opinion of all the by-standers, 
 who have gone away clearly convinced that Titubus must have 
 
 been in the wrong, because he was in a passion; and the Mr. , 
 
 meaning his opponent, is one of the fairest and at the same time 
 one of the most dispassionate arguers breathing!" 
 
 We have already mentioned a priori (antecedent probability 
 — cause to effect) and a posteriori (sign, first type, effect to 
 cause). A third label, afortioriy which is often used in con- 
 nection with these two, covers a certain use of the argument 
 from example. It may be used either in generalization, or 
 analogy. Genung ^ explains it briefly and gives some very 
 good illustrations. 
 
 1 Genung, Prac. Rhet^ pp. 421. 422. 
 
160 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 "A favorite use of the argument from example, especially 
 in oratory, is the argument technically called a fortiori, 
 which reasons that if a certain principle is true in a given case, 
 much more will it be true in a supposed case, wherein the 
 conditions are more favorable. 
 
 *' Many of the assertions of Scripture are put in the form of 
 an argument a fortiori; for example: * Wherefore, if God so 
 clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is 
 cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye 
 of little faith?' 
 
 "The following, from Burke, advocates sympathy with 
 the Irish Roman Catholics, as more natural and fitting, for 
 the English, than the sympathy which was actually given to 
 the Americans in the time of the Revolution : — 
 
 " 'I confess to you freely that the sufferings and distress of the 
 people of America in this cruel war have at times affected me more 
 deeply than I can express. I felt every gazette of triumph as a 
 blow upon my heart, which has an hundred times sunk and fainted 
 within me at all the mischiefs brought upon those who bear the 
 whole brunt of the war in the heart of their country. Yet the 
 Americans are utter strangers to me; a nation among whom I am 
 not sure that I have a single acquaintance. Was I to suffer my 
 mind to be so unaccountably warped, was I to keep such iniquitous 
 weights and measures of temper and of reason, as to sympathize 
 with those who are in open rebellion against an authority which I 
 respect, at war with a country which by every title ought to be, 
 and is, most dear to me, — and yet to have no feeling at all for the 
 hardships and indignities suffered by men who by their very vicinity 
 are bound up in a nearer relation to us, who contribute their share, 
 and more than their share, to the common prosperity, who perform 
 the common offices of social life, and who obey the laws, to the 
 full as well as I do?'" 
 
 b. Methods of attack. In this argument as we have said 
 we present '*one or more individual objects or instances, of 
 a certain class, as fair specimens, in respect of some point or 
 other, and draw an inference from them, respecting the whole 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 161 
 
 class or other less known objects of it." The itahcised parts 
 of this definition indicate the two points for attack on this 
 argument. To test an argument by generalization apply two 
 questions to it: 
 
 (I) "Are the specimens fair in respect of the point in is- 
 sue? " The failure to meet this test is very common in dis- 
 honest and partisan controversy. The statement that *' 100 
 students were asked if they wanted the system intro- 
 duced, and only three said * Yes," ' has no valid force whatever 
 if the 100 students were all unfair specimens of the general 
 student body of 5000 in regard to the particular point in issue. 
 Choosing unfair specimens and making out a plausible, but 
 dishonest and worthless generalization, is a favorite trick of 
 partisan investigators and advocates who have to make out 
 a preconceived case regardless of the truth. 
 
 (II) " Has a large enough part of the class been observed 
 to justify an inference regarding the whole class or unob- 
 served parts of it? " To apply this test, as the first one, it is 
 necessary to know the exact nature of the question at issue. 
 In questions which concern the working out of natural laws, 
 as in chemistry, physics, biology, etc., a very small number of 
 specimens are needed to determine the rule. If a certain 
 treatment of a dozen rabits results in each case in the same 
 way, it is reasonably safe to formulate a rule for all the mil- 
 lions of rabbits, or for other animals as well. In chemistry or 
 physics one very carefully performed experiment may well 
 settle some question for all time. A rule can be formulated 
 and followed with confidence in every case. This is gen- 
 eralization from a single instance. It is allowable when 
 dealing with the working of natural laws on inanimate 
 materials, and sometimes on plants and animals. Of course, 
 in regard to many questions, as questions in chemistry, or 
 physics, plants and animals, even human beings, are to be 
 tested in the same manner as inanimate materials. It is as 
 we get further and further from this type of question, and 
 nearer to questions involving personal taste, ability, prej- 
 
162 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 udice, opinion, belief, etc., that we must increasingly enlarge 
 the proportion of observed instances. The greater the possi- 
 ble variations in answer to our question, the wider must be 
 the field of observation, in order to justify a generalization. 
 And, of course, the very nature of many questions preclude 
 the possibility of getting a rule that will work without ex- 
 ceptions. In practically all questions affecting human con- 
 duct a high degree of probability is all we can hope to get for 
 any general rule. 
 
 2. Analogy. In taking up a consideration of the analogy 
 it is well to cite some well known and authoritative writers 
 in regard to different ideas as to what constitutes an analogy. 
 There are two quite different conceptions which we shall label 
 for convenience "figurative analogy" and "literal analogy." 
 
 a.. Figurative analogy. Says Whately: — ^ 
 
 "The word Analogy again is generally employed in the 
 case of Arguments in which the instance adduced is somewhat 
 more remote from that to which it is applied; e. g., a physi- 
 cian would be said to know by Experience the noxious effects 
 of a certain drug on the human constitution, if he had fre- 
 quently seen men poisoned by it; but if he thence conjectured 
 that it would be noxious to some other species of animal, he 
 would be said to reason from analogy; the only difference 
 being that the resemblance is less, between a man and a 
 brute, than between one man and another; and accordingly 
 it is found that many brutes are not acted upon by some 
 drugs which are pernicious to man. 
 
 "But more strictly speaking. Analogy ought to be distin- 
 guished from direct resemblance, with which it is often con- 
 founded, in the language, even of eminent writers (especially 
 on Chemistry and Natural History) in the present day. 
 Analogy being a * resemblance of ratios,* that should strictly 
 be called an Argument from Analogy, in which the two things 
 (viz. the one from which, and the one to which we argue) 
 are not, necessarily, themselves alike, but stand in similar 
 * ElemerUs of Rhetoric, pp. 72, 73. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 163 
 
 relations to some other things; or in other words, that the 
 common genus which they both fall under, consists in a 
 relation. Thus an egg and a seed are not in themselves alike, 
 but bear a like relation, to the parent bird and to her future 
 nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant 
 on the other, respectively; this relation being the genus which 
 both fall under; and many arguments might be drawn from' 
 this Analogy. Again, the fact that from birth different per- 
 sons have different bodily constitutions, in respect of com- 
 plexion, stature, strength, shape, liability to particular dis- 
 orders, &c., which constitutions, however, are capable of 
 being, to a certain extent, modified by regimen, medicine, 
 &c., affords an Analogy by which we may form a presumption, 
 that the like takes place in respect of mental qualities also; 
 though it is plain that there can be no direct resemblance 
 either between body and mind, or their respective attributes. 
 
 "In this kind of Argument, one error, which is very com- 
 mon, and which is to be sedulously avoided, is that of con- 
 cluding the things in question to be alike, because they are 
 Analogous; to resemble each other in themselves, because 
 there is a resemblance in the relation they bear to certain 
 other things; which is manifestly a groundless inference. 
 
 "Sometimes the mistake is made of supposing this direct 
 resemblance to exist when it does not; sometimes, of suppos- 
 ing, or sophistically representing, that such resemblance is 
 assertedy when no such thing was intended. One may often 
 hear a person reproached with having compared such and 
 such a person or thing to this or that, and with having in 
 so doing introduced a most unjust, absurd, and indecorous 
 comparison; when, in truth, the object in question had not 
 been, properly speaking, compared to any of these things; 
 an Analogy only having been asserted. And it is curious that 
 many persons are guilty of misrepresentation, who are, or 
 ought to be, familiar with the Scripture-Parables; in which 
 the words "compare" and "liken" are often introduced, 
 where it is evident that there could have been no thought of 
 
164 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 any direct resemblance. A child of ten years old would 
 hardly be guilty of such a blunder as to suppose that members 
 of the church are literally 'like' plants of corn, — sheep, — 
 fish caught in a net, — and fruit trees. 
 
 ''Another caution is applicable to the whole class of argu- 
 ments from Example; viz. not to consider the Resemblance 
 or Analogy to extend further (i. e., to more particulars than 
 it does) . The resemblance of a picture to the object it rep- 
 resents, is direct; but it extends no further than the one sense, 
 of Seeing, is concerned. . . . 
 
 "Thus, because a just Analogy has been discerned between 
 the metropolis of a country, and the heart of the animal body, 
 it has been sometimes contended that its increased size is a 
 disease — that it may impede some of its most important 
 functions, or even be the cause of its dissolution." 
 
 Here we have an excellent discussion of the strict old 
 analogy — a comparison of things which are not alike in them- 
 selves, — but are alike in the relations they bear to other 
 things. So we have analogies drawn between the circula- 
 tion of the blood and the circulation of money, the life of man 
 and the life of a nation, the spread of ideas and the spread of 
 disease. In all such analogies we are dealing simply with a 
 resemblance of relations. 
 
 b. Literal analogy. Another kind of analogy is explained 
 by Minto.^ "In a strict logical sense, however, as defined 
 by Mill, sanctioned by the previous usage of Butler and 
 Kant, analogy means more than a resemblance of relations. 
 It means a preponderating resemblance between two things 
 such as to warrant us in inferring that the resemblance ex- 
 tends further. This is a species of argument distinct from the 
 extension of an empirical law. In the extension of an empiri- 
 cal law (i. e., generalization), the ground of inference is a coin- 
 cidence frequently repeated vnthin our experience,'^ and the 
 inference is that it has occurred or will occur beyond that 
 experience; in the argument from analogy, the ground of in- 
 ^ Minto, book ii. ch. X. ^ Italics ours. 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 16^ 
 
 ference is the resemblance between two individual objects or 
 kinds of objects in a certain number of points, and tlie inference 
 is that they resemble one another in some other point, 
 known to belong to the one, but not known to belong to the 
 other. "Two things go together in many cases, therefore in 
 all, including this one," is the argument in extending a 
 generalization: *Two things agree in many respects, there- 
 fore in this other,' is the argument from analogy. 
 
 "The example given by Reid in his Intellectual Powers 
 has become the standard illustration of the peculiar argu- 
 ment from analogy. 
 
 "*We may observe a very great similitude between this earth 
 which we inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, 
 Venus, and Mercury. They all revolve around the sun, as the 
 earth does, although at different distances and in different periods. 
 They borrow all their light from the sun, as the earth does. Several 
 of them are known to revolve around their visible axis like the 
 earth, and by that means have like succession of day and night. 
 Some of them have moons, that serve to give them light in the ab- 
 sence of the sun, as our moon does to us. They are all, in their mo- 
 tions, subject to the same law of gravitation as the earth is. From 
 all this similitude it is not unreasonable to think that these planets 
 may, like our earth, be the habitations of various orders of living 
 creatures. There is some probability in this conclusion from 
 analogy.' " 
 
 The difference between these types of analogy may be 
 brought out by an illustration. Suppose you take an apple 
 and ascertain: (a) its shape, (b) its color, (c) its size, (d) its 
 weight, (e) scars and blemishes on it, (f ) its softness, and then 
 (g) its taste. The next day you find another apple which 
 agrees in all the points (a) to (f ) inclusive, and you infer that 
 this second apple will be like the first in taste also. They 
 agree in so many points that you reason that they will agree 
 in the point in question. Is this an analogy? It seems evi- 
 dent that Whately would say "No," and Minto would say 
 "Yes," 
 
166 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 (I) Generalization from a single instance. According to 
 Whately's definition of the analogy this would have to fall 
 into the "generalization" class of argument from example. 
 It would then be a generaHzation from a single instance. 
 And that is precisely what this argument is; literal analogy 
 is simply another name for it. You have in effect estab- 
 lished a general rule that apples which fit the condi- 
 tions (a) to (f), inclusive, taste so and so, and you apply 
 this general rule to the first apple considered. You would, 
 of course, apply it similarly to a whole barrel of apples. 
 This is a generalization based on a single specimen which 
 is considered a fair specimen, and is made in regard to things 
 that are so uniform in nature that such a generalization is 
 justified. The analogy quoted by Minto from Reid's In- 
 tellectual Powers is the same. Substantially a general law is 
 formed to the effect that all planets which are like the earth 
 in such and such respects are probably inhabited. 
 
 c. In summary, then, we have in arguments from ex- 
 ample two types: First, generalization, the establishment of 
 a general law, based upon specimens examined. This may 
 range from instances dealing with phenomena affected by 
 the human will (generalizations regarding people and human 
 institutions) to instances dealing with phenomena affected 
 only by unchanging laws of nature (generalizations in chem- 
 istry, physics, biology, etc.) At the first end of the scale we 
 must examine a great number of instances in order to have a 
 sound generalization. The number diminishes until at the 
 last end of the scale we can generalize from a single instance. 
 Such generalization from a single instance, especially when 
 only one case for its application is in mind, is often called 
 analogy. This use is so widespread that we must accept this 
 as permissible and recognize this as one of the types of analogy 
 {literal analogy) . Such an analogy is of course often a strong 
 argument. It has real logical force. Second, in addition to 
 the use of this term to cover a generalization from a single 
 instance, literal analogy, as discussed above, we have the old- 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 167 
 
 fashioned analogy (figurative), based purely on a resem- 
 blance of relations — not a direct comparison of members of 
 the same class point for point. This type of analogy is 
 usually only a figure of speech and has practically no logical 
 force. It is usually possible to answer it by saying that the 
 analogy is false, that the parallel is not close. Since the 
 things compared are not alike in themselves — not members 
 of the same class, it is always easy to show wherein the 
 parallel breaks down. 
 
 d. Methods of attack. So the methods of attack of the 
 (I) first type of analogy are really those to be applied to gen- 
 eralization: (A) Is it a fair specimen of the class? (B) Are 
 you taking a large enough part of the class — i. e., is this a 
 field in which one can generalize from a single instance? 
 
 (II) False analogy. The second type of analogy is met by 
 pointing out that the resemblances are not suflSciently par- 
 allel, by attacking it as a false analogy. Thus we often hear 
 it argued that men and nations are alike in certain particu- 
 lars, and that consequently nations must have youth, man- 
 hood, old age, and decay. The argument is not valid, be- 
 cause the resemblance is not a resemblance that has any 
 bearing on the argument. Men and nations are alike in 
 their moral responsibilities; for both, self-indulgence or mis- 
 judged action brings its punishment; for both, the same 
 intellectual qualities may bring success. But they are not 
 alike in the one essential point, viz., physical organization. 
 It is usually possible thus to waive aside any analogy of this 
 type. It has no probative force unless the parallel is admitted 
 to be sound — and then probative force is not needed. But 
 while this analogy is of little use as an "argument," it is 
 very effective as a "figure of speech" to make meaning clear. 
 To explain the unknown by drawing an analogy to the known 
 is one of the best ways of getting clearness — of showing 
 what you mean. It is very useful indeed in exposition. In 
 regard to resemblances, we must bear in mind that in order 
 to give grounds for any argument or illustration, it is impor- 
 
168 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tant not that the resemblances are many, but that they are 
 such as bear directly upon the argument. Horses and generals 
 are not alike in their relations, in many ways; but Lincoln's 
 argument derives its force from the fact that the two are 
 similar in the relation that is important to the argument. 
 " Csesar had his Brutus, Charles I his Cromwell, and George 
 III may profit by their example." Caesar was unlike Charles 
 I in most of his personal qualities; he ruled a different coun- 
 try, in a different age. George III was the very opposite of 
 the Roman in temper and character; his people, his advisers, 
 his century, were not similar to those of either of the men 
 cited as "examples." But the three cases were similar in the 
 essential element: Caisar, Charles I, and George III all repre- 
 sented the pressure of tyranny upon a spirited, liberty-loving 
 people. In each case oppression was the cause of the effect, 
 rebellion; and whatever other differences there may be in the 
 circumstances, the causes were similar in nature. Such an 
 argument only emphasizes the fact that the causal connec- 
 tion is essential in this class of arguments, and that the simili- 
 tude between the instances is a similitude of causes and effects. 
 3. Cause and effect in argument from example. In ar- 
 guments from example the connection of cause and effect, 
 as in the other two classes of arguments, is, of course, present. 
 The difference is that in the other classes the inference is 
 directly from cause to effect, or effect to cause, whereas in 
 this class the inference depends upon a comparison of causes 
 and effects. In the argument from antecedent probability 
 we argue that certain known facts are of such kind that they 
 must from their very nature produce a certain effect. In the 
 argument from example we argue that certain known facts 
 will be the cause of a certain effect because they are similar 
 to the certain other facts which have been the cause of a sim- 
 ilar effect in the past. If the facts that we produce as "ex- 
 amples" have happened to follow one another in the past 
 merely by accident, then no amount of comparison can prove 
 anything more than that similar facts may happen together in 
 
KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 169 
 
 the future by accident; the comparison cannot give valid 
 grounds for a belief that they certainly mil follow one 
 another. The causal connection must be present in order 
 to make the argument sound. It is, then, sometimes possible 
 to attack arguments from example from this point of view by 
 showing weakness in the connection in the "examples,'' as 
 well as by showing that the resemblance between the "ex- 
 amples" and the instance in dispute may not be a true 
 resemblance. The test of the causal connections, have been 
 given in the treatment of the other classes of arguments. 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 7 
 
 KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 
 
 1. Write out original examples of inductive and deductive 
 
 reasoning. 
 
 2. Hand in three examples each of perfect and imperfect 
 
 induction. 
 
 3. Give an original example of each of the five methods of 
 
 induction. 
 
 4. Hand in one good example of each of the following: Syl- 
 
 logism; Sorites; Inference in quantitative relation; En- 
 thymeme. 
 
 5. Give one sound argument from antecedent probability 
 
 and one unsound argument from antecedent probability, 
 indicating which method of attack exposes the weakness 
 of the latter. 
 
 6. Give one sound original example of each of the three kinds 
 
 of argument from mgp.; and one unsound argument of 
 each kind, indicating the weakness of each of the latter 
 and the proper methods of attack to use against each. 
 
 7. Give two sound and two unsound examples of argument 
 
 by generalization, explaining the strength and weakness 
 of each. 
 
 8. Give two examples each of figurative and literal analogy, 
 
 explaining the strength and weakness of each for argu- 
 mentative purposes. 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 FALLACIES 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 I. Definition and classification. 
 II. Rhetorical fallacies (Errors in interpretation)o 
 
 A. Incorrect obversion. 
 
 B. Incorrect conversion. 
 
 C. Amphibology. 
 
 D. Accent. 
 
 III. Logical fallacies (Errors in reasoning). 
 
 A. Formal (Violations of rules of syllogism). 
 
 1. In categorical arguments. 
 
 a. Four terms. 
 
 b. Undistributed Middle (Illicit Middle). 
 
 c. Illicit Major. 
 
 d. Illicit Minor. 
 
 e. Negative premise. 
 
 f. Particular premise. 
 
 2. In hypothetical arguments. 
 
 a. Denying the antecedent. 
 
 b. Affirming the consequent. 
 
 3. In disjunctive arguments. 
 
 a. Imperfect disjunction. 
 
 B. Material (not in the form but in the matter). 
 
 1. Equivocation (Ambiguity). 
 
 a. In quantity. 
 
 (I) Composition. 
 
 (II) Division, 
 s b. In quality. 
 
 (I) Ambiguous Middle (Specific accident). 
 
 (II) Simple accident. 
 
 (III) Converse accident. 
 
 2. Presumption. 
 
 a. Begging the question (Petitio Principii). 
 170 
 
FALLACIES 171 
 
 (I) Assumption of unproved premise (As- 
 sumptio non probata). 
 
 (II) Arguing in a circle (Circulus in pro- 
 bando). 
 
 b. Irrelevant conclusion (Ignoring the question) 
 
 (Ignorantio Elenchi). 
 
 (I) Argumentum ad hominem. 
 
 (II) Argumentum ad populum. 
 
 (III) Argumenlflta ud ignorantiam. 
 
 (IV) Argumentum ad verecundiam. 
 
 (V) Argumentum ad judicium. 
 
 c. Complex question. 
 
 d. Non sequitur (False consequent). 
 
 (I) Simple. 
 
 (II) False Cause (Post hoc ergo propter 
 hoc). 
 
 I. Definition and classification. A fallacy is an error in 
 reasoning. In a strictly logical sense the term fallacy can be 
 applied to no other kind of error. It is usual, however, in 
 discussing fallacies, to consider certain definite errors in in- 
 terpretation as well as errors in reasoning. Indeed logicians 
 usually preface their comments on these errors with the state- 
 ment that the proper place to deal with them is in a book on 
 rhetoric. They are variously classified as "errors in inter- 
 pretation," "hermeneutic fallacies," etc. We shall classify 
 them as rhetorical fallacies, to distinguish them from the 
 errors in reasoning, which we shall call logical fallacies. Con- 
 siderable search has failed to discover any two writers who 
 use classifications of fallacies which are the same in all re- 
 spects. Nor does the classification given here follow in detail 
 any given elsewhere. It is, however, in the main identical 
 with those given by Hyslop^ and Creighton.^ The amount 
 of time that can be profitably spent in studying a rather 
 complete list of fallacies, will vary with different classes. 
 But the avoidance of fallacies in our own reasoning, and the 
 1 Page 227. 2 Page 154. 
 
172 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 detection of them in the reasoning of o.thers are of such vital 
 importance that it seems well to give the student of argu- 
 mentation at least an opportunity to learn the nature of 
 the most common dangers. The twelve fallacies printed 
 in italics in the above table should be carefully studied. 
 This classification is not put forward as all-inclusive, nor are 
 its divisions deemed to be mutually exclusive. A given 
 fallacy may be classified under different heads, according 
 to the standpoint from which it is viewed. It is thought, 
 however, that this classification is better than others hitherto 
 published with respect to completeness, terminology, and 
 logical division. 
 
 II. Rhetorical fallacies, or errors of interpretation, are 
 faults of understanding, not of reasoning. They are mistakes 
 in interpreting propositions. They are not errors in "any 
 process or act of the mind by which, from knowing one thing, 
 it advances on to know another.'' ^ There is no advance to- 
 ward a new thing. The inference (if inference at all) involved 
 here is immediate inference. No new truth is developed. No 
 steps in reasoning are taken. For instance, in getting the 
 proposition "Some quadrupeds are horses" from the proposi- 
 tion "All horses are quadrupeds," we are doing no reasoning, 
 inferring no new truth. The first statement is the result 
 of the interpretation of the second, not of reasoning from the 
 second as a basis. 
 
 A. Incorrect obversion. Obversion of a proposition 
 means changing it from aflSrmative to negative or from 
 negative to affirmative without changing its meaning. For 
 instance, "All of the campers were asleep" — "Not one of the 
 campers was awake." "Not one of the specimens was 
 perfect" — "All of the specimens were imperfect." The 
 fallacy of illogical obversion arises when we fail to understand 
 the exact meaning of the first proposition or some of its 
 terms, and consequently get an obverse that does not mean 
 the same thing as the original. "All University men are 
 ^ Newman (italics not in original). 
 
FALLACIES 173 
 
 eligible" does not mean necessarily "No non-University men 
 are eligible," but **No University men are ineligible." To 
 avoid the fallacy of illogical obversion, we must change the 
 predicate only. The use of the negative of the original sub- 
 ject gives illogical obversion. To state the rule technically: 
 instead of affirming a predicate as true of a given subject, 
 we may deny its negative in regard to the same subject; in- 
 stead of denying a predicate of a given subject we may affirm 
 ^he negative of this predicate in regard to the same subject. 
 I'* All citizens will be admitted,'' logically ob verted gives us 
 "No citizens will be refused admission''; illogically ob verted 
 it results in "No aliens vnll be admitted." 
 
 B. Incorrect conversion. Conversion of a proposition 
 means transposing its subject and predicate without changing 
 its meaning. "No seniors are members of the club" — "No 
 members, of the club are seniors." The fallacy of illogical 
 conversion arises when we fail to grasp clearly the limitations 
 on the terms of the first proposition and give some term a 
 wider application in the second proposition than it had in 
 the first. Technically it is an error in distribution of terms. 
 If the second proposition distributes a term which was not 
 distributed in the first, the fallacy of illogical conversion is 
 committed. The statement that "All brave men are gener- 
 ous" does not mean that ".^ generous men are brave." 
 From "All horses are animals" it does not follow that "All 
 animals are horses" but that "Some animals are horses." 
 "In the heat of debate, or when using propositions without 
 proper attention, there is a natural tendency to assume that 
 a proposition which makes a universal statement regarding 
 the subject, does the same with regard to the predicate. And, 
 although such errors are very obvious when pointed out, — ^as, 
 indeed, in the case with nearly all logical fallacies, — they 
 may very easily impose on us when our minds are not fully 
 awake, that is, when attention is not active and consciously 
 on guard." ^ 
 
 1 Creighton, pp. 155, 156. 
 
174 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 C. " The fallacy of amphibology consists in an ambiguous 
 grammatical structure of a sentence, which produces miscon- 
 ception. A celebrated instance occurs in the prophecy of the 
 Spirit in Shakespeare's Henry VI.: *The Duke yet lives that 
 Henry shall depose,' which leaves it wholly doubtful whether 
 the Duke shall depose Henry, or Henry the Duke. This 
 prophecy is doubtless an imitation of those which the ancient 
 oracle of Delphi is reported to have uttered; and it seems that 
 this fallacy was a great resource to the oracles who were not 
 confident in their own powers of foresight. The Latin lan- 
 guage gives great scope to misconstructions, because it does 
 not require any fixed order for the words of a sentence, and 
 when there are two accusative cases with an infinitive verb, 
 it may be difficult to tell, except from the context, which 
 comes in regard to sense before the verb. The double mean- 
 ing which may be given to * twice two and three' arises from 
 amphibology; it may be 7 or 10, according as we add the 3 
 after or before multiplying. In the careless construction of 
 sentences it is often impossible to tell to what part any 
 adverb or qualifying clause refers. Thus, if a person says, 
 *I accomplished my business and returned the day after,' 
 it may be that the business was accomplished on the day 
 after as well as the return; but it may equally have been 
 finished on the previous day. Any ambiguity of this kind 
 may generally be avoided by a simple change in the order 
 of the words; as, for instance, *I accomplished my business, 
 and on the day after returned.' Amphibology may some- 
 times arise from confusing the subjects and predicates in a 
 compound sentence, as if in the sentence, * Platinum and iron 
 are very rare and useful metals,' I w^ere to apply the predicate 
 useful to platinum and rare to iron, which is not intended. 
 The word * respectively' is often used to show that the reader 
 is not at liberty to apply each predicate to each subject." ^ 
 
 D. " The fallacy of accent consists in any ambiguity 
 arising from a misplaced accent or emphasis thrown upon 
 
 1 Jevons, pp. 172, 173o 
 
FALLACIES 175 
 
 some word of a sentence. A ludicrous instance is liable to 
 occur in reading Chapter XIII. of the First Book of Kings, 
 verse 27, where it is said of the prophet, *And he spoke to 
 his sons, saying. Saddle me the ass, and they saddled him.* 
 The Italics indicate that the word him was supplied by the 
 translators of the authorized version, but it may suggest 
 a very different meaning. The Commandment, *Thou shalt 
 not bear false witness against thy neighbor,* may be made by 
 a slight emphasis of the voice on the last word to imply that 
 we are at liberty to bear false witness against other persons. 
 Mr. De Morgan, who remarks this, also points out that the 
 erroneous quoting of an author, by unfairly separating a 
 word from its context, or italicising words which were 
 not intended to be italicised, gives rise to cases of this 
 fallacy. 
 
 "It is curious to observe how many and various may 
 be the meanings attributable to the same sentence according 
 as emphasis is thrown upon one word or another. Thus the 
 sentence, *The study of Logic is not supposed to communicate 
 a knowledge of m^ny useful facts,' may be made to imply 
 that the study of Logic does communicate such a knowledge 
 although it is not supposed to do so; or that it communi- 
 cates a knowledge of a few useful facts; or that it communi- 
 cates a knowledge of many useless facts. This ambiguity 
 may be explained by considering that if you deny a thing to 
 have the group of qualities A, B, C, D, the truth of your 
 statement will be satisfied by any .one quality being absent, 
 and an accented pronunciation will often be used to indicate 
 that which the speaker believes to be absent. If you deny 
 that a particular fruit is ripe and sweet and well-flavored, 
 it may be unripe and sweet and well-flavored; or ripe and 
 sour and well-flavored; or ripe and sweet and ill-flavored; 
 or any two or even all three qualities may be absent. But 
 if you deny it to be ripe and sweet and well-flavored, the denial 
 would be understood to refer to the last quality. Jeremy 
 Bentham was so much afraid of being misled by this fallacy 
 
176 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 of accent that he employed a person to read to him, as I 
 have heard, who had a peculiarly monotonous manner of 
 reading." ^ 
 
 in. Logical fallacies are errors in reasoning or inference, 
 as distinct from errors in interpretation. There are two 
 classes of logical fallacies — formal and material. 
 
 A. Formal fallacies arise from a violation of the rules 
 of the syllogism. To detect them it is necessary only to be 
 familiar with the formal laws of reasoning. Knowledge 
 of the subject-matter dealt with in the argument is not 
 essential. Formal fallacies consist in violations of the 
 rules of the syllogism which have been given in an earlier 
 chapter. In enumerating and illustrating here the fallacies 
 that are associated with these rules, it is probably well to 
 follow the subdivisions indicated in our classification: cate- 
 gorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms.^ 
 
 1. In categorical syllogisms. A categorical syllogism is 
 one in which all the propositions are categorical propositions. 
 A categorical proposition is an absolute, declarative, positive 
 statement admitting no conditions or exceptions. "All men 
 are mortal. John is a man. John is mortal." These are 
 categorical statements. Six fallacies arise in categorical 
 syllogisms. 
 
 a. Four terms. ''Every syllogism has three and only 
 three terms.'' A fallacy arises when a fourth term is used. 
 It is so obvious when all four terms are quite distinct that 
 there is little danger of any one's being deceived by it. 
 As in: 
 
 Frenchmen are Europeans. 
 
 Germans are Caucasians. 
 
 Therefore Frenchmen are Caucasians. 
 But we commit the fallacy just the same when we have verb- 
 ally only three terms, if in reality we have four, by using one 
 term in two different senses. "The terms must be three, 
 
 ^ Jevons, pp. 174, 175. 
 
 2 See aisQ "dilemma" in Chapter on Refutation. 
 
FALLACIES 177 
 
 not only with regard to the letters and the words, but even 
 with regard to the meaning. For example: — 
 
 "Mouse is a monosyllable; 
 
 "A mouse eats cheese; 
 
 "Therefore a monosyllable eats cheese. 
 Here we have apparently only three terms, viz., * Mouse,' 
 * monosyllable,' and a 'creature that eats cheese'; but in 
 reality we have four terms, for the word * mouse' means two 
 different things. In one case it means an animal, in the other 
 case it means a word. It is not true to say that the animal 
 'mouse' is a monosyllable, nor that the word 'mouse' eats 
 cheese." ^ The overlapping of the divisions in our classifica- 
 tion of fallacies is shown by the fact that this fallacy may also 
 be classed as the material fallacy of equivocation called am- 
 biguous middle. 
 
 b. Undistributed middle. " The middle term must be 
 distributed once at least.** The fallacy arising from failure 
 to observe this rule is sometimes called illicit middle or illicit 
 process of the middle term. A term is distributed when the 
 whole of it is referred to universally. 
 
 Frenchmen are (some) Europeans; 
 
 (Some) Europeans are Teutonic; 
 
 Therefore Frenchmen are Teutonic. 
 The middle term, Europeans, is undistributed here. The 
 conclusion is therefore erroneous, in spite of the truth of the 
 premises. 
 
 Frenchmen are Europeans; 
 
 (All) Europeans are Occidentals. 
 
 Therefore Frenchmen are Occidentals. 
 Here the middle term is distributed in the major premise. 
 The conclusion is correct. 
 
 c. Illicit major. *'No term must be distributed in the 
 conclusion which was not distributed in one of the premises.** 
 Violations of this rule are called the fallacies of illicit major 
 when the major term is so treated. 
 
 1 Bodkin, p. 39. 
 
178 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Horses are animals; 
 
 Cows are not horses; 
 
 Therefore cows are not animals. 
 The major term, animals, is here used in the premise to de- 
 note some animals. Horses are a part of the animals of the 
 world. In the conclusion the term animals is used universally, 
 or covering all of the animals of the world. 
 
 d. Illicit minor. The fallacy of illicit minor consists 
 in distributing the minor term — giving it a wider apphcation 
 — in the conclusion when it was not distributed in the minor 
 premise — as in, 
 
 All Senators are at least thirty years old; 
 
 All Senators are voters; 
 
 Therefore all voters are at least thirty years old. 
 
 e. Negative premises. ''From negative premises noth- 
 ing can be inferred.'' This "rule is evidently founded on the 
 principle that inference can proceed only where there is 
 agreement, and that two differences or disagreements allow 
 of no reasoning." ^ A is not B, and C is not B, may both be 
 true statements and A and C may or may not agree with 
 each other. "Democratic Senators did not vote for this bill; 
 Senator A did not vote for this bill; therefore Senator A is a 
 Democratic Senator." The fallacy is here very evident. 
 The major premise simply tells us that Democratic Senators 
 and those who voted for the bill are in separate classes. The 
 minor premise tells us that Senator A is not in the latter 
 class. But he may or may not be in the former class. Je- 
 vons ^ gives a warning that must never be lost sight of in 
 dealing with negative premises. "It must not be supposed 
 that the mere occurrence of a negative particle (not or no) 
 in a proposition renders it negative in the manner contem- 
 plated by this rule. Thus the argument: 
 
 'What is not a compound is an element; 
 *Gold is not a compound; 
 'Therefore gold is an element,' 
 1 Jevoas, p. 133. 2 p. 134. 
 
FALLACIES 179 
 
 contains negatives in both premises, but is nevertheless valid, 
 because the negative in both cases affects the middle term 
 which is really the negative term not-compound.'* 
 
 f. Particular premises. ^*From two particular premises 
 no conclusions can be drawn." "If one premise is particular, 
 the conclusion must be particular." Particular propositions are 
 those in which the predicate is affirmed of a part only of the 
 subject, those in which the subject is qualified by "some" 
 '*a few," "the majority of," "most all of," etc. "The re- 
 maining rules of the syllogism, the 7th and the 8th, are by no 
 means of a self-evident character, and are, in fact, corrol- 
 laries of the first six rules; that is, consequences, which follow 
 from them. . . . We may call a breach of the 7th rule a 
 fallacy of particular premises, and that of the 8th rule the 
 fallacy of a universal conclusion from a. particular premise, 
 but these fallacies may really be resolved into those of Illicit 
 Process, or Undistributed Middle." ^ Since these fallacies, 
 when tested, always turn out to be due to illicit distribution 
 of terms, we shall not take space to treat them further under 
 this head. 
 
 2. In hypothetical syllogisms. A hypothetical syllogism 
 IS one in which the major premise is a hypothetical proposi- 
 tion, and the minor premise a categorical proposition. A 
 hypothetical proposition asserts something not directly and 
 positively, but subject to some condition or limitation. Ex- 
 ample: 
 
 If A paid the hotel bill, B owes A $1^00. 
 
 A paid the hotel bill. 
 
 Therefore B owes A $10.00. 
 The part of the major premise expressing the condition or 
 supposition is the antecedent; the part stating the result is the 
 consequent. Sound reasoning is obtained in this form of 
 argument only when the minor premise either affirms the ante- 
 cedent or denies the consequent. Two fallacies are therefore to 
 be specially guarded against here. 
 
 1 Jevons, p. 135. 
 
180 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 SL. Denying the antecedent. Whenever the minor prem- 
 ise of a hypothetical syllogism denies the antecedent the 
 reasoning is fallacious. For example: 
 
 If he has sold out, he will pay. 
 
 He has sold out. He has not sold out. 
 
 Therefore he will pay. Therefore he will not pay. 
 
 Notice that when we affirm the antecedent ("he has sold 
 out") it follows necessarily that "he will pay." But when we 
 deny the antecedent, "he has not sold out," it does not 
 follow necessarily that "he will not pay." The major premise 
 does not say that he will not pay unless he sells out. He may 
 pay any way. So in the following: 
 
 If he passed the examination, he is eligible. 
 
 He passed the examination. He did not pass the 
 
 examination. 
 
 .'. He is eligible. /. He is not eligible. 
 
 He may have had other ways of becoming eligible — daily aver- 
 age, outside reading, etc. Whenever the antecedent is denied 
 the conclusion does not necessarily follow — the reasoning is 
 fallacious. The conclusion may or may not be a true statement. 
 
 b. Aflirming the consequent. Whenever the minor 
 premise of a hypothetical syllogism affirms the consequent 
 the reasoning is fallacious. 
 
 If he were well, he would write. 
 
 He has not written. He has written. 
 
 .' . He is not well. .* . He is well. 
 
 Notice that when we deny the consequent, "he has not 
 written," it follows necessarily that "he is not well," but 
 when we affirm the consequent it does not follow that "he is 
 well." The major premise did not say that he would not 
 write unless he were well. He might write anyway. So in 
 the following: 
 
 If the winter has been severe, the birds will be dead. 
 
 The birds are not dead. The birds are dead. 
 
 ,*. The winter has not been severe. .*. The winter has been 
 
 severe. 
 
FALLACIES 181 
 
 If the major premise is true, finding the birds alive proves the 
 winter has not been severe; but finding them dead proves 
 nothing about the severity of the winter. They may have 
 died from other causes. But notice that you cannot say 
 " they might have been kept alive by special causes," for this 
 is denying the truth of your major premise. 
 
 3. In disjunctive syllogisms. A disjunctive syllogism 
 has a disjunctive proposition for a major prepaise, and a 
 categorical proposition for a minor premise. A disjunctive 
 proposition is one in which the predicate is made up of a 
 series of two or more words, phrases, or clauses expressing 
 opposition or separation, as in: A is either B or C or D. 
 "A disjunctive proposition is one which implies or«sserts 
 an alternative in the relation between the subject and predi- 
 cate; as, *A is either B or C,' or * Metals are either hard or 
 soft.' The symbols of the disjunctive proposition are either 
 and or.'' ^ 
 
 a. Imperfect disjunction. In disjunctive arguments 
 the fallacy of imperfect disjunction arises whenever the dis- 
 junction expressed is not both exhaustive and mutually 
 exclusive. 
 
 Since "the affirmation of one of the alternatives, as the 
 disjunctive syllogism informs us, involves the denial of the rest; 
 and conversely, the denial of all the other alternatives is 
 equivalent to the affirmation of the one that remains," ^ 
 we commit the fallacy whenever we fail to mention possible 
 alternatives, or when those mentioned overlap. 
 
 He is either slow-witted or lazy. 
 
 He is lazy. 
 
 .'. He is not slow witted. 
 This is fallacious — ^the alternatives are not mutually ex- 
 clusive — a person may be both slow-witted and lazy. 
 
 All voters are either democrats or republicans. 
 
 He is not a democrat. 
 
 .*. He is a republican. 
 1 Hyslop, p. 119. 2 Bode, p. 91. Italics ours. 
 
182 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Here the fallacy arises from the fact that the disjunction 
 does not exhaust the possibilities. He may be a socialist, a 
 prohibitionist, or a member of some other party, or of none. 
 
 The fallacy of imperfect disjunction, while usually listed 
 as a formal fallacy, might well be considered a material 
 fallacy of presumption. The fault lies in the matter — the 
 false assumption in the major premise. Grant the truth of 
 these premises and the conclusions follow. 
 
 B. Material fallacies arise outside of the form of the 
 argument, and are involved in the matter dealt with. "The 
 formal laws may be confoi'med to, but owing to some am- 
 biguity of meaning or assumption of facts which are not 
 true the conclusion may be materially vitiated in spite of 
 the correctness of the formal reasoning. The material Tal- 
 lacy can be detected only by those who are familiar with the 
 subject-matter of the discourse or argument." ^ Material 
 fallacies are divided into two groups — fallacies of equivoca- 
 tion and fallacies of presumption. 
 
 1. Fallacies of equivocation are caused by the equivocal 
 or ambiguous use of terms. "I have divided them into two 
 classes, those of quality, or accident, and those of quantity. 
 Those of quality or accident are so called because the fallacy 
 arises from some confusion due to differences of meaning in 
 regard to the attributes denoted by a term in a proposition. 
 Thus, if I say "Iron is a metal,'* I aflSrm "metal" of it in 
 its proper form, as an aggregate of certain qualities or at- 
 tributes. Now, if I also say "Rust is iron," I use the term 
 "iron" in a slightly different sense, affirming that the sub- 
 stance, or generic, not the specific, qualities of it are identical 
 with "rust"; that is to say "rust" is "iron" only in its sub- 
 stance, not in its form. This fact prevents me from drawing 
 the conclusion that "Rust is a metal." The fallacies of 
 quantity are so called because they are due to the different 
 senses in which a merely numerical aggregate of individuals 
 can be taken. Thus, "All the trees" may be taken coUec- 
 1 Hyslop, 223. 
 
FALLACIES 183 
 
 lively or distributively, and so give rise, as we shall see, to 
 an equivocation. We consider this form of fallacy first in 
 order, and it is perhaps the easier to detect. It is that of Com- 
 position and Division." ^ 
 
 a. In quantity. (I)" The fallacy of composition arises 
 when we affirm something to be true of a whole, which holds 
 true only of one or more of its parts when taken separately 
 or distributively." ^ The difficulty comes from using the 
 middle term distributively in the major premise and col- 
 lectively in the minor premise. The following illustrate this 
 fallacy : 
 
 All the angles of a triangle are less than two right angles. 
 
 A, B, and C are all the angles of a triangle. 
 
 . ' . A, B, and C are less than two right angles. 
 In the major premise we mean that each angle is less than two 
 right angles (the middle term is used distributively), in the 
 minor premise we mean all the angles taken together (the 
 middle term is used collectively). This fallacy is committed 
 when we argue that what is true of the various states in the 
 union is true of the United States as a nation, or that what is 
 true of members of a class or college, taken as individuals, 
 is true of the class as a class or of the college as an institution. 
 
 (n) Division is the opposite of composition. *' It consists 
 in assuming that what is true of the whole is also true of 
 the parts taken separately." ^ For instance: 
 
 All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. 
 
 A is an angle of a triangle. 
 
 . ' . A is equal to two right angles. 
 The difficulty comes from using the middle term collectively 
 in the major premise, and distributively in the minor premise. 
 
 Congress voted for X. 
 
 A is in Congress. i 
 
 . * . A voted for X. 
 
 b. In quality, or accident. "It is important to keep 
 these distinct from the fallacies of Composition and Division. 
 
 1 Hyslop, p. 228. 2 Creighton, p. 160. ^ Creighton, 162. 
 
184 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 The latter have to do with numerical or mathematical ag« 
 gregates and individuals, the former with logical or meta- 
 physical wholes which represent totals of attributes. Unless 
 we keep this in view we are liable to confuse them. But if 
 we remember that Composition and Division turn upon the 
 collective and distributive use of terms, and the fallacies of 
 Accident upon the confusion of essentia and accidentia, or 
 genus and species (conferentia and differentia), or of the ab- 
 stract and concrete, we shall have no difficulty in the judg- 
 ment of particular cases. We divide the fallacies of Accident 
 or Quality into three kinds." ^ 
 
 (I) Ambiguous middle (specific accident). In this fallacy 
 we use the middle term ambiguously — that is, give it a differ- 
 ent meaning in major premise and minor premise. Says 
 Jevons,^ "Equivocation consists in the same term being 
 used in two distinct senses; any of the three terms of the 
 syllogism may be subject to this fallacy, but it is usually the 
 middle term which is used in one sense in one premise and 
 in another sense in the other. In this case it is often called 
 the fallacy of ambiguous middle, and when we distinguish the 
 two meanings by using other suitable modes of expression 
 it becomes apparent that the supposed syllogism contains 
 four terms. The fallacy of equivocation may accordingly 
 be considered a disguised fallacy of four terms. Thus if a 
 person were to argue that *all criminal actions ought to be 
 punished by law; prosecutions for theft are criminal actions; 
 therefore prosecutions for theft ought to be punished by 
 law,' it is quite apparent that the term * criminal action' 
 means totally different things in the two premises, and that 
 there is no true middle term at all. Often, however, the am- 
 biguity is of a subtle and difficult character, so that dif- 
 ferent opinions may be held concerning it. Thus we might 
 argue : 
 
 "He who harms another should be punished. He who 
 communicates an infectious disease to another person harms 
 1 Hyslop, p. 231. 2 Pages 171, 172. 
 
FALLACIES • 185 
 
 him. Therefore he who communicates an infectious disease 
 to another person should be punished. 
 
 "This may or may not be held to be a correct argument 
 according to the kinds of actions we should consider to come 
 under the term harrriy according as we regard negligence or 
 malice requisite to constitute harm. Many diflficult legal 
 questions are of this nature, as for instance: 
 
 "Nuisances are punishable by law: 
 
 '*To keep a noisy dog is a nuisance; 
 
 "To keep a noisy dog is punishable by law. 
 
 "The question here would turn upon the degree of nuisance 
 w^hich the law would interfere to prevent. Or again: 
 
 "Interference with another man's business is illegal; 
 
 "Underselling interferes with another man's business; 
 
 "Therefore underselling is illegal. 
 
 "Here the question turns upon the kind of interference , and 
 it is obvious that underselling is not the kind of interference 
 referred to in the major premise." 
 
 Such fallacies may rise in many ways. (A) We may confuse 
 the etymological meaning and the common meaning of a 
 word : as, for instance, the sophistical argument often founded 
 on the word "representative." 
 
 "Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more 
 extensively and mischievously employed than in the case 
 of the word * representative.' Assuming that its right mean- 
 ing must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense 
 of the verb * represent,' the sophist persuades the multitude 
 that a member of the House of Commons is bound to be 
 guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents; and, 
 in short, to be merely spokesman: whereas law and custom, 
 which in this case may be considered as fixing the meaning 
 of the term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representa- 
 tive to act according to the best of his ovm responsibility." ^ 
 
 (B) We may confuse two or more common meanings of the 
 same word, where the word has different meanings in different 
 ^ Mill, System of Logic, p. 503. 
 
186 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 circumstances. The word "democratic" in one connection 
 is the name of a poHtical party; in another it designates a 
 body of political and social ideas and principles. So we 
 argue falsely: all Americans should be democratic; conse- 
 quently vote the Democratic ticket. The word "church" 
 may mean the whole body of believers, or it may mean the 
 officers of this body, viz., the clergy; and many false argu- 
 ments may result from confusing these meanings. 
 
 There are many other sources of confusion from ambiguity 
 in terms. Their variety and frequency only emphasize the 
 necessity of careful definition. Definition is the weapon 
 before which all ambiguity must fall. 
 
 "Nothing is more important than the subject of Definition, 
 and too much stress cannot be laid on it. It is the keystone 
 of all correct reasoning, and is most diflScult. . . . This 
 fault of not knowing the precise meanings of words is the most 
 fruitful source of Fallacies. Nearly all the flaws in argument 
 that are diflScult of detection take their rise from this. Too 
 much attention cannot be given to the matter of Definition. 
 It is the true panacea for all false reasoning." ^ 
 
 ,(II) Simple accident consists in arguing from genus to 
 species, from essence to accidenU from abstract to concrete. 
 To argue from genus to genus, from essence to essence is, 
 of course, always sound. "One of the oldest examples of 
 Simple Accident is the following: 
 
 " What you bought yesterday you eat to-day. 
 
 " You bought raw meat yesterday. 
 
 "Therefore you eat raw meat to-day. 
 De Morgan humorously remarks of this ancient illustration: 
 *This piece of meat has remained uncooked, as fresh as ever, a 
 prodigious time. It was raw when Reisch mentioned it in 
 the Margarita Philosophica in 1496; and Dr. Whately found 
 it in just the same state in 1826.* It is not so accurate an 
 illustration as is desirable according to the definition, because 
 the subject of the major premise is so indefinite, and is hardly 
 1 Bodkin, p. 145. 
 
FALLACIES 187 
 
 a genus. But in the conclusion the predicate is asserted of 
 the subject, with the accidental quality of rawness added, 
 while in the major premise that predicate is asserted only 
 of the substance or essence of what was bought, and hence 
 we mistakenly argue from meat in general, and without 
 qualification to meat in a particular form. Another and 
 perhaps better illustration is the following: 
 
 " Pine wood is good for lumber. 
 
 *' Matches are pine wood. 
 
 " Therefore matches are good for lumber. 
 Here the predicate of the major premise is asserted of the 
 substance or essence of *pine wood,' not of all forms of it, 
 while matches are pine wood not only in essence, but in a 
 particular form or accident. ... So also we cannot argue 
 from the fact that oxygen and hydrogen will burn, that 
 water will burn because it is oxygen and hydrogen. *It 
 w^ould be a case of the simple fallacy cf Accident to argue 
 that a magistrate is justified in using his power to forward 
 his own religious views, because every man has a right to 
 inculcate his own opinions. Evidently a magistrate as a man 
 has the rights of other men, but in his capacity of a magis- 
 trate he is distinguished from other men, and he must not 
 infer of his special powers in this respect what is true only 
 of his rights as a man.' All fallacies which attempt the sub- 
 stitution of a particular thing for the generic form belong 
 to this head." ^ 
 
 (III) Converse accident arises when we argue from species 
 to genus, from accident to essence, from concrete to abstract. 
 "An illustration of the fallacy of Converse Accident is the 
 following: 
 
 " Intoxicating liquors act as a poison. 
 
 " Wine is an intoxicating liquor. 
 
 " Therefore wine acts as a poison. 
 In this case we are arguing from the excessive use to all 
 uses of wine, an inference that is fallacious. The major 
 ^ Hyslop, 232-234. 
 
188 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 premise is true only of a particular mode of using liquors, 
 or of the excessive use of them, while the conclusion, unless 
 interpreted with a similar qualification, asserts the same 
 thing of a/Z forms of using them. *It is undoubtedly true 
 that to give to beggars promotes mendicancy and causes 
 evil; but if we interpret this to mean that assistance is never 
 to be given to those who solicit it, we fall into the converse 
 fallacy of Accident, inferring of all who solicit alms what is 
 true only of those who solicit alms as a profession.' Another 
 formulated instance appears in the following illustration: 
 
 " Loyalty to the government is the duty of all citizens. 
 
 "Loyalty to Charles I. was loyalty to the government. 
 
 "Therefore loyalty to Charles I. was the duty of all citizens. 
 We may look at this instance in more than one way. In the 
 first place, the major premise means that loyalty is a duty to 
 legitimate governments or to such as execute the law, while 
 the minor premise asserts the fact that loyalty to Charles I. 
 was loyalty to the government whatever its nature was, and 
 hence the conclusion asserts loyalty to Charles I. to be a duty 
 without qualification, and without distinguishing between 
 him as a magistrate and as a man. In the second place, loy- 
 alty to Charles I. may have been loyalty to him as a private 
 person, say by his servants, while all citizens could not be 
 loyal to him in this capacity, and so it is an error to argue 
 from this particular kind of loyalty to every form of it in- 
 cluding civil allegiance." ^ ^ 
 
 2. Presumption. Fallacies of presumption arise from 
 assuming or presuming something which needs to be proved, 
 taking for granted something we have no right to take for 
 granted. Examples follow of its main divisions and sub- 
 divisions. 
 
 a. Begging the question (petitio principii). This fal- 
 lacy consists in assuming the truth of some proposition which 
 is the same as, or equivalent to, the conclusion to be proved, 
 and thence inferring the truth of the conclusion. It may 
 ^ Hyslop, 234. 
 
FALLACIES 189 
 
 take any one of several forms. The most common are: 
 (I) assuming the truth of an unproved premise; (II) arguing 
 in a circle, 
 
 (I) Assumption of an unproved premise (assumptio non- 
 probata). It seems at first sight that no man would be so 
 foolish or so bold as to assume the truth of his conclusion as 
 one of the means of proving it. But names and phrases often 
 cloak the error, and in the course of the intervening discussion 
 the assumption may be forgotten before the conclusion is 
 reached; so it is not always an easy fallacy to run to earth. 
 Assuming the truth of some general proposition from which 
 the particular . conclusion in question must follow, is but 
 another form of the same mistake. To take an example 
 cited by John Ward: ^ 
 
 **So when the Clodian party contended that Mile ought to suffer 
 death for this reason, because he had confessed that he had killed 
 Clodius, that argument reduced to a syllogism would stand thus: 
 
 *'He who confesses he has killed another ought not to be allowed to 
 see the light. 
 
 " But Milo confesses this. 
 
 *' Therefore he ought not to live. 
 
 "Now the force of this argument lies in the major or first prop- 
 osition, which Cicero refutes by proving that the Roman people 
 had already determined contrary to what is there asserted: 'In 
 what Citpy^ says he, 'do these men dispute after this weak manner? 
 In that wherein the first capital trial was in the case of the brave Hora- 
 tiuSy who, before the city enjoyed perfect freedom, was saved by the 
 suffrages of the Roman people, tho' he confessed that he killed his 
 sister toith his own hand.' " 
 
 In this case the advocate who was prosecuting Milo as- 
 sumed the truth of a general proposition, which included the 
 particular proposition he sought to establish. He assumed 
 that every man who has killed another ought to die, when 
 it was admitted that Milo had killed Clodius. Cicero re- 
 1 Volume I, p. 159. 
 
190 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 futed the argument by pointing out the fallacy and showing 
 that the general assumption was false, because the Roman peo- 
 ple had in tlie past pardoned a man who had killed another. 
 
 (II) Arguing in a circle (circulus in probando). More 
 common than the foregoing is the fallacy called "arguing 
 in a circle." It is one of the frequent errors of careless ar- 
 guers and a common trick for confusing a sluggish thinker. 
 The fallacy consists in taking two propositions and using 
 them each in turn to prove the other — as in trying to prove 
 that a train is on time because it agrees with your watch, and 
 then proving that your watch is correct because it agrees 
 with the train. 
 
 The counsel for the plaintiff in the case of Ogden vs. Saund- 
 ers argued in a circle, and was exposed by Mr. Webster: 
 
 "The plaintiff in error argues in a complete circle. He supposes 
 the parties (in the making of a contract) to have had reference to it 
 (the statute law) because it was a binding law, and yet he proves it 
 to be a binding law only upon the ground that such reference was 
 made to it." 
 
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his Introduction to the 
 Indian Evidence Act, Ch. II, gives the following illustration: 
 
 "A ship is cast away under such circumstances that her loss 
 may be accounted for either by fraud or by accident. The captain 
 is tried for making away with her. A variety of circumstances 
 exist which would indicate preparation and expectation on his part 
 if the ship really was made away with, but which would justify no 
 suspicion at all if she was not. It is manifestly illogical, first, to 
 regard the antecedent circumstances as suspicious, because the 
 loss of the ship is assumed to be fraudulent, and, next, to infer 
 that the ship was fraudulently destroyed from the suspicious char- 
 acter of the antecedent circumstances." 
 
 b. Irrelevant conclusion, ignoring the question (ignor- 
 antio elenchi). This fallacy consists in mistaking the con- 
 clusion to be proved, or endeavoring to prove something 
 which has no important bearing on the point at issue. One 
 
FALLACIES 191 
 
 IS liable to fall into this fallacy either in positive proof in 
 proving the wrong point or in refutation in proving something 
 which is not the contradictory of the thing asserted by one's 
 opponent. In one's own proof one may waste effort in the 
 attempt to establish what is not worth establishing, or one 
 may attempt to deceive by proving something so near like 
 the real conclusion that it seems the same. In refutation, this 
 error lies in mistaking the point to be answered, or in delib- 
 erately misrepresenting an opponent's position in order to 
 make reply easier. 
 
 Mill cities the example of the refutation made against 
 Malthus's theory of population: 
 
 "The attempts, for instance, to disprove the population doctrines 
 of Mai thus have been mostly cases of ignoratio elenchi — ignoring 
 the point. Malthus has been supposed to be refuted if it could be 
 shown that in some countries or ages population has been nearly 
 stationary; as if he had asserted that population always increases 
 in a given ratio, or had not expressly declared that it increases 
 only in so far as it is not restrained by prudence, or kept down by 
 poverty and disease. Or, perhaps, a great collection of facts is 
 produced to prove that in some one country the people are better 
 off with a dense population than they are in another country with a 
 thin one; or that the people have become more numerous and better 
 off at the same time. As if the assertion were that a dense popula- 
 tion could not possibly be well off: as if it were not part of the very 
 doctrine, and essential to it, that where there is a more abundant 
 capital there may be a greater population without any increase of 
 poverty, or even with a diminution of it." ^ 
 
 Webster, arguing for the prosecution in the White murder 
 trial, exposed in an opponent the fallacy of ignoring the point, 
 as follows: 
 
 "The prisoner's counsel catch at supposed flaws of evidence, or 
 bad character of witnesses without meeting the case. Do they 
 mean to deny conspiracy? Do they mean to deny that the two 
 
 1 MUl, p. 517. 
 
192 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Crowninshields and the two Knapps were conspirators? Why do 
 they rail against Palmer, while they do not disprove, and hardly 
 dispute, the truth of any fact sworn to by him? Instead of this, 
 it is made a mere matter of sentimentality that Palmer had been 
 prevailed upon to betray his bosom companions and to violate the 
 sanctity of friendship. Again I ask. Why do they not meet the 
 case? If the fact is out, why not meet it? Do they mean to deny 
 that Captain White is dead? One would almost have supposed 
 even that, from some remarks that have been made. Do they 
 mean to deny the conspiracy? Or, admitting a conspiracy, do they 
 mean to deny only that Frank Knapp, the prisoner at the bar, was 
 abetting in the murder, being present, and so deny that he was a 
 principal? If a conspiracy is proved, it bears closely upon every 
 subsequent subject of inquiry. Why do they not come to the fact? 
 Here the defence is wholly indistinct. The counsel neither take 
 the ground nor abandon it. They neither fly nor light. They 
 hover. But they must come to a closer mode of contest. They 
 must meet the facts and either denj'^ or admit them." ^ 
 
 There are five common subdivisions of the fallacy of 
 irrelevant conclusion. The mistake in each is the same — 
 ignoring the real point in issue to argue about some other 
 point. These five types follow. 
 
 (I) Argumentum ad hominem is an appeal or attack 
 directed at the character, principles, beliefs, or statements 
 of some person, rather than at the subject-matter in con- 
 troversy. It is talking about a man when his character has 
 nothing to do with the case, attacking the past record of a 
 lawyer rather than the merits of his clients claim. Of course, 
 when a man*s character is a legitimate part of the case it 
 should be discussed. An attempt to show personal unfitness 
 of a candidate for the oflSce he is seeking is not an example of 
 this fallacy — or of any other. 
 
 (II) Argumentum ad populum is an appeal to the passion 
 or prejudice of a people and so obscuring and avoiding the 
 i*eal question — as when national prejudice is aroused rather 
 
 1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 59. 
 
FALLACIES 193 
 
 than facts discussed in regard to national defence or inter- 
 national relations of any kind. 
 
 (III) Argumentum ad ignorantiam is practically a falla- 
 cious attempt to shift the burden of proof. It is saying, 
 " What I say is true, because you cannot prove that it is not 
 true." It is essentially a confusion of positive proof and 
 refutation. To show that an opponent's case cannot be 
 estabhshed is a proper kind of attack in argumentation; but 
 it is only negative and destructive in nature. It proves 
 nothing positive, and the fallacy consists in maintaining that 
 the lack of proof thsit a proposition is not true, establishes that 
 it is true. "Thus," says Creighton, ^ "we cannot prove 
 affirmatively that spirits do not revisit the earth or send 
 messages to former friends through mediums." But this 
 does not prove that spirits do walk the earth. 
 
 (IV) ** Argumentum ad verecundiam is an appeal to the 
 reverence which most people feel for a great name. This 
 method of reasoning attempts to settle a question by referring 
 to the opinion of some alleged authority, without any 
 consideration of the arguments which are advanced for or 
 against the position. It is, of course, right to attach much 
 importance to the views of great men, but we must not 
 suppose that their opinion amounts to proof, or forbids us 
 to consider the matter for ourselves. 
 
 "There is, however, a more common, though still less jus- 
 tifiable, form of the argument from authority.^ A man who 
 is distinguished for his knowledge and attainments in some 
 particular field, is often quoted as an authority upon ques- 
 tions with which he has no special acquaintance. The pres- 
 tige of a great name is thus attached to it. Thus, for example, 
 a successful general is supposed to speak with authority upon 
 problems of state-craft, and the opinions of prominent clergy- 
 men are quoted regarding the latest scientific theories." ^ 
 
 (V) Argumentum ad judi6ium. This fallacy is com- 
 mitted when the real question is ignored and an attempt 
 
 1 P. 169. 8 See pp. 99-100. « Creighton, p. 170, 
 
194 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 made to prove that men generally believe so and so. It is 
 answering the proposition that the earth is round by proving 
 that all men believe the earth is flat. If you put forward a 
 proposition that admittedly is contrary to the general belief, 
 it is no answ^er to you to prove what the general belief is. 
 The fallacy consists in assuming that general belief cannot 
 be wrong. Prevailing opinion creates a strong presumption 
 in its favor, and places a heavy burden of proof on him who 
 opposes it, but it does not settle all questions. 
 
 c. Complex question. This is a question founded on 
 an assumption. It cannot be answered by "yes" or *'no'* 
 without granting the truth of the assumption. "Are you 
 again on speaking terms with your wife.'^" "Have you quit 
 drinking to excess .f^" 
 
 d. Non sequitur (false consequent). This consists sim- 
 ply in asserting a conclusion that does not follow from the 
 premises, because the conclusion has in it new matter that is 
 not covered by the premises. 
 
 (I) Simple non sequitur arises when the conclusion covers 
 new matter with no attempt made to show a cause and effect 
 connection. "Jones is a good husband and father, so he 
 ought to be elected mayor." "All men are rational. Socrates 
 is a man. Therefore Socrates is noble." 
 
 (II) False cause (post hoc, ergo propter hoc). This is 
 probably the most common and the most insidious form of 
 non sequitur. The fallacy consists in assuming that because 
 one occurrence precedes another in timey the one is the cause 
 of the other. Here time order is mistaken for cause and effect 
 connection. Many of the common superstitions of ancient 
 and of modern times illustrate this fallacy. For instance, 
 thirteen people sit at table together, and within a few months 
 one of the number is accidentally drowned; immediately 
 some one argues that the death is the effect of the thirteen 
 sitting at meat together. 
 
 Again, it has recently been argued that, because the num- 
 ber of crimes perpetrated by negroes in the Southern states 
 
FALLACIES 195 
 
 has increased since educational opportunities were first offered 
 to the negro, therefore the growth of crime is directly due to 
 the growth of education. It certainly is not sufficient for the 
 arguer to base his contention simply on the fact that the one 
 thing has followed the other y and few thoughtful men will be 
 inclined to accept the conclusion thus drawn. Until some- 
 thing more is done to show a definite causal connection, we 
 may safely call this a post hoc fallacy. 
 
 The most common form of this fallacy, perhaps, is that 
 used by the political arguer. It runs something like this: 
 "Such and such a political party came into power at such a 
 time, and for a number of years thereafter the country suffered 
 from financial depression; therefore the policies and admin- 
 istration of this political party are the cause of the unfortu- 
 nate state of affairs.** Now, the statement may or may not 
 be true, but the argument in the above form certainly con- 
 tains a fallacy. To show that this fallacy does exist, and 
 that the conclusion is not worthy of acceptance, it is neces- 
 sary only to point out the fact that any one of a half dozen 
 other causes might, at least as readily, have produced the 
 same result. 
 
 An illustration will make clear the commonness of this 
 kind of fallacy, and will also suggest the care that is neces- 
 sary to guard against it. In Harper's Weekly for March 5, 
 1904, the editors noted the fact that various college presi- 
 dents had estimated that "the college graduate has one 
 chance m iorty of * succeeding in life,* whereas the man who 
 hasn't been to college has only one chance in ten thousand.** 
 The inference naturally drawn from this statement is that 
 the mere fact that a man secures a college education multi- 
 plies many times his chances for success. To this inference 
 and to the possible fallacy that may lurk therein the editorial 
 in question addresses itself as follows: 
 
 "Not many persons doubt any longer that an American college 
 education is an advantage to most youths who can get it, but in 
 
196 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 these attempts to estimate statistically what college education does 
 for men there is a good deal of confusing of post hoc and propter hoc. 
 Define success as you will, a much larger proportion of American 
 college men win it than of men who don't go to college, but how 
 much college training does for those successful men is still debatable. 
 Remember they are a picked lot, the likeliest children of parents 
 whose ability or desire to send their children to college is evidence 
 of better fortune, or at least of higher aspirations than the average. 
 And because their parents are, as a rule, more or less prosperous 
 and well educated, they get and would get, whether they went to 
 college or not, a better than average start in life. In order to make 
 an estimate that would be really fair of what college does for boys, 
 it would be necessary to compare the fortunes of two groups of 
 boys from something like the same rank of life and of something 
 like equal ability, one a college- taught group and the other not. 
 But that cannot well be done. The colleges get the likeliest boys. 
 If one boy out of a family of four goes to college it is the clever 
 one. The boys who might go to college and don't are commonly 
 the lazy ones who won't study. The colleges get nowadays a large 
 proportion of the best boys of the strongest families. The best 
 boys of the strongest families would win far more than their pro- 
 portionate share of success even if there were no colleges." 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 8 
 
 FALLACIES 
 
 1. Hand in two specimens of copied matter from current 
 
 newspapers, lectures, text-books, etc., each containing a 
 fallacy, naming the fallacy, and writing an answer to 
 the reasoning given. 
 
 2. Hand in one original example each of undistributed mid- 
 
 dle, illicit major, and illicit minor. 
 
 3. Hand in two examples each of the fallacies denying the 
 
 antecedent and affirming the consequent. 
 
 4. Hand in one example each of ambiguous middle, begging 
 
 the question, irrelevant conclusion, and false cause. 
 
\ 
 
 SECTION C. ARRANGEMENT 
 CHAPTER 9 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. Function of arrangement. 
 
 B. Three great rhetorical principles. 
 
 1. Unity. 
 
 a. Introduction. 
 
 b. Conclusion. 
 
 c. Discussion. 
 
 2. Coherence. 
 
 a. Order. 
 
 (I) Subordination secondary materials. 
 
 (II) Elevation primary materials. 
 
 b. Conilection. 
 
 c. Summary. 
 
 3. Emphasis. 
 
 a. Emphasis and coherence. 
 
 b. Methods^of emphasis. 
 
 (I) Emphatic places. 
 
 C. Special importance of these principles in argumentation. 
 
 A. Function of arrangement. Through the study of 
 propositions, issues, and burden of proof, we have learned 
 what must he done. Guided by an understanding of evidence, 
 forms of arguments, and fallacies, we have chosen the materials 
 with which to accomplish our task. We now come to the 
 problem of organizing these materials into the most effective 
 arrangement for the performance of this particular task. 
 We have chosen our recruits and gathered them together; 
 but that is all. Our army is only half made; it is but a con- 
 fused and straggling mob. To tempt the fortunes of battle 
 
 197 
 
198 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 with such an array would mean defeat. The forces must be 
 organized into companies, regiments, divisions; they must be 
 officered with captains, colonels, and generals, and at their 
 head must be placed a commander, the master spirit of all; 
 they must be drilled and disciplined and taught to know their 
 rights and their duties. Organization is no more necessary 
 in an army than is arrangement in an argument: every master 
 of the art of war knows how to organize his forces; every 
 master of the art of debate knows how to arrange his proofs. 
 The results from lack of organization are the same in both, — 
 confusion, wasted strength, and weakness. It is only by 
 careful arrangement that ideas and evidence can be kept 
 from self-contradiction and confusion, that their strength 
 can be saved and directed to accomplish anything. 
 
 B. Three great rhetorical principles. To secure an 
 effective arrangement of materials in argumentation, the old 
 rhetorical principles of unity, coherence, and emphasis must 
 be scrupulously observed. We shall consider first their special 
 importance in argumentation, and then discuss (ch. 10) the 
 rules of brief drawing and outlining the following of which 
 will insure the observances of these principles. 
 
 1. Unity. It is essential to the success of any piece of 
 argumentation that the ultimate effect produced by it upon 
 the audience shall be a single impression, viz., the truth or 
 falsity, the wisdom or unwisdom of the proposition under 
 discussion. To achieve such a result our materials must be so 
 arranged as to be a single unit of force. Little facts and great 
 ideas must work together, each enforcing the other. Each 
 fact must corroborate its fellows, and inconsistency must 
 never appear. Everything must work for the single ulti- 
 mate purpose of proving, not this idea or that, but the propo- 
 sition. Proving a number of "main points" more or less 
 connected with the question in hand will not do. It is the 
 proposition that the affirmative must establish by proving 
 (or gaining admission of) all the issues contained in it. It is 
 the proposition that the negative must overthrow by prevent- 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT 199 
 
 ing the establishment of one or more of the issues on which 
 it rests. This is what is meant by unity in the whole compo- 
 sition. 
 
 a. Introduction. In any piece of argumentation the 
 most vital force is obviously the proof itself, — the evidence 
 and the arguments. It would, however, be a very defective 
 effort which contained nothing else besides the giving of 
 testimony and the manufacture of it into proof. These 
 materials must be introduced in such a manner as will clear 
 the way before them and place them in the field advantage- 
 ously for action. This is the work of the divisions of the 
 speech called the introduction. The purpose of introduction 
 is to make clear the real nature of the question in contro- 
 versy, why it is in dispute, how it is related to other prob- 
 lems, what the really significant facts are. Such an explana- 
 tion presents the question to the audience as a single complete 
 probleniy distinguished from other problems; it fixes the proofs 
 that are to follow in their true relations to the proposition 
 and to each other by explaining what facts are vital in the 
 case, how these facts may be proved, and how the disputant 
 intends to create the proof. The word introduction as used 
 here embraces all of the old division of the first part of a 
 speech into introduction (or exordium), narration, and par- 
 tition. By whatever name we call it, some preparation is 
 needed before the work of the discussion can be well done. 
 The audience must know what the dispute is about, what are 
 the issues to he decided, and what are the points of fact that de- 
 cide them, 
 
 b. Conclusion. In argumentation our work is seldom 
 complete until we have gathered together the evidence and 
 argument at the end of the discussion, to show how we have 
 made good the promises and claims of the beginning; no long 
 or elaborate work of argumentation is finished without a 
 conclusion, or peroration. From the viewpoint of unity the 
 conclusion is as indispensable as the introduction. It is 
 practically impossible to bind together evidence, arguments, 
 
200 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 and ideas of all kinds and degrees of importance, and make 
 them work in harmony, simply by means of logical internal 
 arrangement. There must be some other external force to 
 weld them together and establish them in their true relations 
 to one another and to the whole. The purpose of the con- 
 clusion is to do this final binding together of the many and 
 varied elements of the proof. However perfect the intro- 
 ductory precautions, as evidence and arguments are mar- 
 shalled in rapid succession, and as each fact and each idea 
 is emphasized in its importance, the reader or hearer may 
 lose his grasp on the case as a whole. He may believe this 
 testimony or accept that idea and still his beliefs may be 
 vague or hesitating about the conclusiveness of the proof as 
 a whole. He is not yet brought to that place where he can 
 be trusted to render a decision or to carry out his decision 
 into action. It still remains to show that the proof of this 
 point and that, though insufficient in themselves, when added 
 together prove the proposition. The cumulative force of the 
 whole proof must be displayed; evidence and arguments 
 must be gathered together and finally delivered as one blow. 
 This is the work of the conclusion, and if it is well done, the 
 end is but a restatement — though in very different manner — 
 of the beginning. The conclusion should usually be so re- 
 lated to the introduction that the proof seems in a way to 
 lead around in a circle, so that in the end we arrive again at 
 the point from which we started, the proposition. 
 
 c. Discussion. In addition to the work of the intro- 
 duction and the conclusion, in giving unity to the composi- 
 tion, care must be taken in the choice of the material for the 
 body of the discussion itself. But here the problem is very 
 simple. If all the material bears on the proposition unity 
 will be observed. The problem of making this bearing clear 
 is largely one of coherence. Unity and coherence are closely 
 related, and unity in the discussion might be said to be a 
 by-product of coherence. The proposition is the heart of the 
 whole composition; by relation to it all must be bound to- 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT 201 
 
 gether in one. Consequently the materials should be so 
 chosen and so arranged that every element is connected 
 either directly or indirectly with the proposition, and the 
 connection so clearly established that it will be understood 
 without effort. If a fact or an idea is set up as if for its own 
 sake or is left ambiguous in its bearing on the facts in issue, 
 it turns attention in the wrong direction, gives a mistaken 
 impression of the whole position taken by the arguer, and 
 destroys the cooperation between the parts, which is neces- 
 sary to unity. This whole problem of harmony within the 
 proof itself is, however, largely a matter of proper subordina- 
 tion of the parts, and may better be treated under the head- 
 ing of coherence. 
 
 2. Coherence. Closely akin to unity is the quality of 
 coherence. The purpose of all argumentation is to convey 
 ideas to others and make them believe or act as we want 
 them to; and, however well settled our own conceptions 
 may be, if we beget confusion in presenting them to others, 
 our efforts are in vain. However truly the principle of unity 
 is observed — however truly our facts and our inferences 
 have a bearing on the proposition we uphold, this bearing 
 must be clear to those we seek to influence or our argumenta- 
 tion is a failure. The principle of coherence, then, demands 
 that all the materials of the proof be so (a) ordered and so (6) 
 connected as to make clear their relation to each other and to the 
 proposition. 
 
 SL, Order. To have coherence we must first have order 
 among the elements used. First things must come first, 
 last things last. Big points must follow each other in proper 
 succession, each with its subordinate little points properly 
 grouped under it. The first thing to do to obtain order is to 
 attend to what may be called "subordination." 
 
 (I) Subordination of secondary elements. We have seen, 
 in the treatment of the finding of the issues, that in any 
 argumentative composition, the proof is made up of materials 
 of widely different values. There are some facts that are so 
 
202 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 vital that, if we can make sure of them, they will establish 
 our whole case; and there are others that, while truly valu- 
 able in the proper connection, have no meaning or impor- 
 tance in themselves. These secondary facts find the excuse 
 for their introduction in that they serve to prove the exist- 
 ence of some other more important fact. It follows that to 
 put them into the proof without making clear just what is 
 their bearing on these other larger facts, and just what is 
 the part they are intended to perform, is to lose their only 
 value. 
 
 (II) Elevation of primary elements. In contrast with 
 these materials of a secondary nature are those facts and 
 ideas in the proof that are themselves of primarj'^ importance. 
 The nature of the human mind is such that, in reasoning, 
 there are always a few points that stand out boldly, while all 
 else sinks into a background of support. Few readers or 
 hearers can carry in mind and thoroughly assimilate more 
 than a half dozen important ideas on any question in a single 
 debate; so that the greatest care must be taken to enforce 
 upon the attention and fix in the memory of auditors the 
 facts in the case that are really decisive. They may be per- 
 mitted to forget the details of evidence, but the existence of 
 these decisive facts they must be compelled to remember. If 
 a reader or hearer is really to comprehend the meaning of 
 any proofs, he must be made to understand what is large and 
 what is small, what is important and what trivial. There- 
 fore, in arranging our materials: (1) We must first find out 
 what are the critical points to be established. (2) Then these 
 points must be elevated — made to stand out above all the 
 rest of the proofs. (3) Finally, all the secondary materials 
 must be subordinated and grouped about these centers of 
 proof. 
 
 b. Connection. Order alone will not give coherence. 
 The materials used must be properly connected or confusion 
 is likely to result. This principle of connection is observed 
 when the different elements are woven together properly. 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT 203 
 
 Transitions must be arranged. Connections must be made. 
 Not only must the horse be before the cart, but he must be 
 hitched to the cart if the whole outfit is to be serviceable. 
 Rarely is any one fact suflScient to establish another larger 
 fact; more rarely is any one single fact or idea sufficient to 
 establish the proposition. Usually the process is: many 
 lesser bits of evidence are set forth to prove each larger fact; 
 then a number of these larger facts combine and cooperate 
 to prove the whole. Where the proofs are of such a nature, 
 the effectiveness of the coequal facts depends, in large de- 
 gree, upon the way in which they were made to work together. 
 Transitional phrases, sentences, and paragraphs must be 
 employed to ensure this cooperation. Much evidence, not 
 intelligible in itself, becomes full of meaning and force when 
 viewed in the light of other correlative evidence. In any part 
 ,of the proof, then, it is important that such facts be not set 
 forth till after those from which they get their importance, 
 and that the vital connection between such facts be clearly 
 evident. For a fact misunderstood or neglected when it is 
 first given, "falls back dead" and is rarely called to mind 
 again; it must in rnost cases be appreciated when it is given, 
 or it is lost. Especially is this true of the treatment of the 
 larger ideas in a composition. Often an audience listens 
 inattentively for many minutes to a speaker who is giving 
 his best energy to the establishment of some idea of the first 
 importance, because they are not possessed of those other 
 facts that they must know to realize the meaning of his proof. 
 c. Summary. For full coherence then it is necessary 
 to arrange all the ideas, primary and secondary, in the proper 
 order and to weave them all together with easy, natural 
 transitions. A reader or hearer should not feel that he is 
 being arbitrarily picked up, carried around, and dropped, 
 at the whim of the speaker or writer; he should rather haVe 
 the sensation of being led easily, yet firmly, along in the most 
 natural paths of reasoning. Readers or listeners are easily 
 confused by sudden breaks in the chain of reasoning, and 
 
204 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 readily become lost if their mental scenes are shifted too 
 suddenly. Listeners should know "where they are" in the 
 case at all times. As the speaker proceeds, an audience should 
 see the way opening gradually before them, and feel that 
 each step is natural; so that when they have come to the end 
 they will believe they have reached a proper destination. In 
 arranging for the proper observance of this principle, then, 
 we need to consider two requisites: (1) Proofs must be pre- 
 sented in such a logical order that every fact is clear in its 
 full import at the time when it is presented. (2) Each idea 
 must be verbally connected with the one preceding by such 
 a natural transition that a single chain of reasoning runs all 
 through the proof. 
 
 3. Emphasis. Well-directed emphasis is one of the 
 prime qualities of all successful composition, and nowhere 
 does it do a greater service than in argumentation. In the 
 first place, as we have already seen, there are some things 
 in our proof that are important and some that are trivia!; 
 emphasis distinguishes between them, magnifying the ad- 
 vantages of the former and minimizing the disadvantages 
 of the latter. A disputant always has some points in his case 
 that are strong and can be relied on, while he has others that 
 are weak and vulnerable; emphasis gives prominence to his 
 strong points and covers up his weak points. 
 
 a. Emphasis and coherence. Many qualities of arrange- 
 ment that make for coherence are as truly matters of em- 
 phasis. In fact all three principles we are considering are 
 very closely related. There are no sharp dividing lines be- 
 tween their provinces. Particularly do emphasis and co- 
 herence cooperate in bringing out the strength and in con- 
 cealing the weakness of any case. The grouping of lesser 
 facts around the greater, which is so essential to coherence, 
 is equally important in emphasizing the important points 
 in the proof. But, in addition to this discrimination between 
 the lesser and the greater facts, it is also necessary to dis- 
 criminate between the various more important points of 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT 205 
 
 the proof. Some are more warmly contested than others, and 
 the proof on these critical points must be made to stand out 
 over everything else. Again, on some issues, one contestant 
 or another has the weaker side for facts; available evidence 
 may be against him, and he must conceal his defects. So it 
 becomes necessary to know what are the ways of displaying 
 strength, and of hiding weakness. 
 
 b. Methods of emphasis. The common methods of em- 
 phasis, as far as the several principles of arrangement are 
 concerned, might be called the methods of place and space. 
 The former means placing more important points in certain 
 more emphatic positions. The latter means simply that we 
 give more space in a manuscript, more time in a speech, to 
 the important things and less space to the unimportant 
 things. A combination of both place and space methods is 
 of course better than either alone. 
 
 (I) Emphatic places. The emphatic parts of the proof 
 are the beginning and the end. At the beginning the audience 
 is expectant and critical, and the first impression is usually 
 enduring. The importance of the beginning depends some- 
 what on the circumstances; but it is rarely safe to make a 
 feeble beginning. The first impression must not be weak, for 
 it too often creates a prejudice that is an obstacle to later 
 progress. Sometimes the beginning is made exceptionally 
 important by the necessity for an immediate answer to some 
 argument advanced by an opponent. His arguments may 
 have been so strong and may have made such an efl'ect that 
 the answer to them becomes a turning-point of the proof; 
 the refutation of them must be made emphatic. This ref- 
 utation may, if the answer is very strong, and if it concerns 
 the most vital point of the whole question, be reserved till 
 the end. But sometimes the arguments need to be answered 
 at once, in order to remove hostility on the part of the au- 
 dience, and in order to influence them favorably for the recep- 
 tion of the other proofs that are to come. In such cases 
 both emphasis and tact require that the refutation be placed 
 
206 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 / . . 
 
 ^t the beginning. The most important point should usually 
 
 |e placed at the end, for that is the position of maximum 
 iphasis. At the end comes "the last word," the part 
 lich gives the final impulse to conviction and persuasion, 
 le parts between are most easily forgotten; so it is the mid- 
 dle of the proof that receives what is to be neglected or con- 
 cealed. 
 
 C. Special importance of these principles in argumenta- 
 tion. It may readily be seen from the preceding discussion 
 of the general principles of arrangement that unity, coherence, 
 and emphasis in argumentation imply more than in most 
 kinds of composition. The fusing of a multitude of thoughts 
 into one thought, the careful leading of a man's reason from 
 one point to another, the indispensable discrimination be- 
 tween great and small, the painstaking establishment of un- 
 mistakable relations between each small fact and the whole 
 question, the impressing of the few vital points on the atten- 
 tion and the memory, — all these tasks are exaggerated and 
 made more critical than in any other kind of writing or speak- 
 ing. It follows that much more care must be taken here 
 than in other kinds of composition, in the arrangement of our 
 materials, before we finally put them in rhetorical form for 
 presentation. In description or narration, all the work of pre- 
 liminary arrangement that may be desirable may be embodied 
 in a short outline of a few headings. All that is needed may 
 be a few rough jottings to state the main ideas and suggest 
 the general lines of their development; facts, rhetorical figures, 
 mental pictures may properly be left to the suggestion of the 
 moment. In argumentation the requisities are very different. 
 So much depends upon the exact relations of fact to fact and 
 point to point, in order to make our appeals to the reasoning 
 faculties clear and effective, that we must give much more 
 time and consideration to the arrangement of our materials. 
 We must not only arrange our main ideas and indicate the 
 general trend of the development of these ideas, but also the 
 details of fact and of explanation must be accurately estab- 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT 207 
 
 lished in their proper relations with each other. To meet 
 this special demand for attention to these principles in ar- 
 gumentation, we have special devices, the brief and the out- 
 line based on the brief. These are accurate, definite schemes 
 which if followed will make evident the proper arrangement 
 for practically perfect unity, coherence, and emphasis in each 
 particular case. 
 
CHAPTER 10 
 
 BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. What a brief is. 
 
 B. Purposes of a brief. 
 
 C. Brief is impersonal. 
 
 D. Legal brief drawing. 
 
 E. Brief and outline. 
 
 F. Rules for brief drawing. 
 
 G. Parallel column brief. 
 H. Complete sample brief. 
 
 A. What a brief is. A brief is a full and finished arrange- 
 ment in logical order of the evidence and argument on a given 
 side of a given case. It is not a preliminary outline on which 
 to build a speech or essay. Every detail of evidence in the 
 case is put into a properly drawn brief. The brief is a finished 
 article. It contains a full and complete statement of the 
 intellectual side of the case. Nothing need be added to it if 
 we want a decision simply on the weight of evidence and the 
 force of inference — and have a tribunal ready to give a de- 
 cision on these things alone. So we might present briefs on a 
 disputed question to a board of judges for decision without 
 presenting any other manuscripts or making any speeches. 
 All the materials of proof appear in a good brief. It is complete 
 in the elements of conviction, and almost wholly lacking in 
 the elements of persuasion as such. Except as some of the 
 evidence may have a persuasive force, there is no persuasion 
 in a brief. 
 
 B. Purposes of a brief. A brief may serve many pur- 
 poses. Its most important use is that of presenting it to 
 
 208 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 209 
 
 judges as the whole statement of the case without additional 
 comment of any kind. It may also be presented as the whole 
 statement of the intellectual side of a case preliminary to 
 arguing the question in full; or it may be presented as the 
 complete statement of fact in a case preliminary to arguing 
 general principles or points of law which should apply to such 
 a case. For all these purposes in which the brief passes from 
 the hands of the one who prepares it to a judge who is to de- 
 cide the case, the brief should be complete and perfectly 
 drawn. But this statement holds good also even when the 
 case is to be presented by a speech or an argumentative 
 article, pamphlet, or book. Putting the whole intellectual 
 side of the case into the form of a perfect brief gives one the 
 best opportunity really to know his case, all the details of it, 
 its strength and weakness. A perfect brief exhibits the 
 relation of every bit of evidence to the proposition and to 
 every other bit of evidence in the whole case. It also shows 
 the value and importance of each piece of evidence. It 
 brings out the strong points, the points that are covered by 
 more evidence than is necessary, and the weak points, the 
 points that must be bolstered up with more evidence or 
 very carefully handled in the presentation. So the prepara- 
 tion of a perfect brief is a most important part of the prepara- 
 tion of any case even if the case is to be presented orally. 
 
 C. The brief is impersonal. It belongs to and is deter- 
 mined by "the case." It is a true and unemotional arrange- 
 ment of all the facts and arguments in the case. It is not and 
 cannot be designed to fit a particular audience, without 
 losing its chief characteristics which distinguish it from an 
 outline. In fact we might say that a brief by its very nature 
 is not adapted to any audience. While perfect brief form is 
 probably the best method ever devised for presenting certain 
 types of cases on paper, it is usually a very poor method of 
 presenting any case orally. Getting ideas and impressions 
 through the eyes from a printed page is very different from 
 getting ideas and impressions through the ears from a living 
 
210 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 voice. But granting all this, it still remains true that the 
 preparation of a perfect brief should be part of the prepara- 
 tion of any important work in argumentation however it is 
 to be finally presented. 
 
 D. Legal brief drawing. Legal briefs are drawn to be 
 submitted to courts either to serve as the basis for oral ar- 
 gument or to be the complete presentation of the case, 
 when decision is rendered without argument, merely on the 
 briefs presented. "A brief is a document, prepared by coun- 
 sel for the use of the court as a basis for oral argument of a 
 cause; it contains a statement of the manner in which the 
 questions in controversy arose, of the facts of the case so far 
 as they relate to the questions; it is an outline of the argu- 
 ment, consisting of the propositions of law or fact to be main- 
 tained, the reasons upon which they are based, and citations of 
 authorities in their support." ^ The rules of legal brief draw- 
 ing are for the most part like the rules given in this chapter. 
 One important exception, however, is that solid paragraphs 
 containing many statements are usually used in legal briefs. 
 So our rule No. 4 is not a rule of legal briefing. Many details 
 of legal briefing are prescribed by law in various states, and 
 while conventions as to form, etc., differ slightly in different 
 states, it is true that the main principles of brief drawing in 
 general argumentation are identical with the main principles 
 of legal brief drawing as practiced by the best lawyers, 
 through the country. 
 
 "In the typical legal * brief on appeal' one looks for the 
 following well-defined stages, or subdivisions: — 
 
 1. The Title. 
 
 2. The Preliminary Statement. 
 
 3. The Statement of the Case (sometimes termed *The 
 
 Facts'). 
 
 4. The Specification of Errors. 
 
 5. The Brief of the Argument. 
 
 * Professor Henry S. Redfield in The Brief on Appeal. Quoted from Brief 
 Making (The West Publishing Co., p. 219) by Maxcy, The Brief, p. 3. 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 211 
 
 The general form of the argumentative brief, as it has been 
 developed in practice, follows closely after the legal model. 
 It contains — 
 
 1. The Title. 
 
 2. The PreHminary Introduction. 
 
 3. The Main Introduction. 
 
 4. The Statement of Issues. 
 
 5. The Brief of the Argument. 
 
 6. The Conclusion." ^ 
 
 Notice that the first four of these parts are covered by an 
 introduction y and that the fifth and sixth correspond to our 
 discussion and conclusion respectively. Some legal briefs 
 have "conclusions" in separate parts and some do not. 
 
 Dean Ballantine's twenty-one rules for legal briefing ^ 
 show clearly how closely the rules for briefing in general ar- 
 gumentation follow those for the legal brief. Of course, the 
 argumentative brief is an offspring of the legal brief. Here 
 as in many other phases of argumentation we have general- 
 ized what the legal profession has worked out for its specific 
 needs. 
 
 E. Brief and outline. After the impersonal brief is 
 finished an outline should be drawn up for any speech that is 
 to be presented. In drawing up the outline the speaker 
 should always keep his particular audience in mind, and adapt 
 his speech carefully to the audience which he must meet. 
 In preparing an argumentative speech one may differ from 
 the order of the brief as much as is desirable. It is a mistake 
 to suppose that a brief is always a good outline for a speech. 
 As a matter of fact it is rarely if ever so. An outline of al- 
 most any great argument will not coincide with a brief of 
 the material in the argument. This is as it should be. The 
 speech must fit the audience. It must be planned with great 
 attention to considerations of persuasion. Men differ in 
 their ways of presenting cases to audiences, and the same 
 case must be presented to different audiences differently. 
 1 Maxcy, pp. 6, 7. * Appendix E. 
 
212 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 In a speech we may wish to catch the attention and arouse 
 interest in the very beginning by presenting the most strik- 
 ing piece of evidence we have. In a brief we are not con- 
 fronted with the problem of getting the attention of the 
 judge. In a speech we may wish to reserve certain explana- 
 tory matter until we are ready to present certain arguments, 
 in a brief confusion would result if this were left out of the 
 introduction and put into the discussion. So the outline of 
 a speech should be made from a brief of the case, to meet the 
 requirements of a certain situation. Time, place, audience, 
 etc., should be carefully considered in the preparation of any 
 speech — and should not be considered at all in the prepara- 
 tion of a brief. And the speech may differ from the brief as 
 much as seems desirable in any given case. Of course in 
 some cases the brief may be followed rather closely, and in 
 many cases the main lines of the brief are followed. We 
 should never so desert the brief that we fail to meet the re- 
 quirements of unity, coherence, and emphasis in argumenta- 
 tion. In all cases the task of outlining the desired speech is 
 relatively simple after a good brief of the case is completed, 
 especially if the circumstances under which the speech is to 
 be given are fully understood. We should first go over the 
 brief and select those parts of the case which we wish to 
 present to the particular audience which we have to meet. 
 We may select almost wholly different portions for use in 
 presenting the same case to different audiences. (A case on 
 the honor system, for instance, to be presented first to stu- 
 dents and later to faculty. One audience might grant with- 
 out any argument the very points that would have to be 
 argued at great length before the other audience.) Second , 
 we should arrange these selected parts in whatever order 
 seems most persuasive for the particular audience we have 
 in mind, practically regardless of the arrangement of these 
 parts in the brief. A knowledge of persuasion and of the 
 principles of speech composition are of course of great value 
 here. But as far as brief drawing is concerned the principle 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 213 
 
 to remember is this : The brief is determined by the nature oj 
 the impersonal case which it is possible to build up on our side 
 of the proposition; the speech outline (or the speech) is determined 
 by the kind of presentation (both in substance and order) which it 
 is most desirable to make to a particular audience or set of judges. 
 F. Rules for brief drawing. The following seventeen 
 rules cover the work of brief drawing. Each rule here should 
 be strictly observed. Students should memorize these rules as 
 stated and should be able to explain the reasons for each rule. 
 
 GENERAL RULES 
 
 1. The brief should be divided into three parts, marked 
 respectively, introduction, discussion, and conclusion. 
 
 2. The ideas in the brief should be arranged in the form of 
 headings and subheadings. 
 
 3. Each heading and subheading should be in the form of 
 a complete statement. 
 
 4. Each heading and subheading should contain but a single 
 statement. (Rare exceptions may be made to this in the case 
 of literal quotations covering more than a single statement.) 
 
 5. Every coordinate series of statements should be ar- 
 ranged in order of climax^ unless this violates time order 
 in expository matter or logical order in argumentativ^e matter. 
 
 6. The relation between the headings and subheadings 
 should be indicated by means of margins, and letters, num- 
 bers, or other symbols. 
 
 7. No heading or subheading should be marked with more 
 than one symbol. 
 
 8. All references and sources of information should be ac- 
 curately stated in the brief, on the same page on which the 
 information is given. 
 
 RULES FOR INTRODUCTION 
 
 9. The first part of the introduction should contain all 
 the information necessary for an understanding of the dis- 
 cussion — history, definition, explanations, admissions, etc. 
 
214 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 10. The last part of the introduction should contain a 
 statement of the issues and of the partition. 
 
 11. The introduction should contain only statements 
 the truth of which is admitted by both sides. 
 
 RULES FOR DISCUSSION 
 
 12. The discussion should contain all evidence and argu- 
 ment to be used on the given side of the given proposition. 
 
 13. In the discussion, each main heading should read as a 
 reason for the truth or falsity of the proposition. 
 
 14. Each subheading, or series of coordinate subheadings, 
 should read as a reason for the truth of the heading above it. 
 
 15. Objections to be refuted should be dealt with as they 
 arise. 
 
 16. In phrasing refutation the heading should state clearly 
 the argument to be answered, and the character of the an- 
 swer to be made. 
 
 RULE FOR CONCLUSION 
 
 17. The conclusion should contain a summary of the 
 essential points of the proof. 
 
 Let us consider each of these rules in connection with work- 
 ing out a brief on the negative side of the proposition: Re- 
 solved that the contract system of employing convict labor 
 should be abolished. 
 
 Rule 1. The brief should he divided into three parts, 
 marked respectively^ introduction, discussion, and conclusion. 
 In the last chapter we saw that in any piece of argumenta- 
 tion the important part is the proof itself, and that in order 
 to secure unity it is necessary to subordinate the introduc- 
 tion and conclusion, making them simply a means to the more 
 effective presentation of the points in the proof. In outline 
 (A) it is evident that a part is introductory in nature, a part 
 is a discussion of the proof, and part is merely a word of con- 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 215 
 
 elusion. The first step, then, is to separate the parts and show 
 their relationship. 
 
 Negative (A) 
 
 The convict labor problem. 
 
 Necessity of employment. Experiments with different systems. 
 Effect of contract system on reformation. 
 
 Control by prison officers, habits of industry (regulations of the 
 contract), and learning trades. 
 
 Competition with free labor under the different systems. 
 
 Competition under piece-price system. 
 
 Competition under contract system. 
 
 Public-account system. 
 
 Methods of removing evils of competition under contract system. 
 
 Contract system is the most profitable. 
 
 Examples. 
 On the whole the contract system is preferable to any other. 
 
 Taking this outline and separating the parts according 
 to Rule 1 we have: 
 
 (B) 
 Introduction 
 
 The convict labor problem. 
 
 Necessity of employment. Experiments with different systems. 
 
 Discussion 
 
 Effect of contract system on reformation. 
 
 Control by prison officers, habits of industry (regulations of the 
 
 contract), and learning trades. 
 Competition with free labor under the different systems. 
 Competition under piece-price system. 
 Competition under contract system. 
 
 Methods of removing evils of competition under contract system. 
 Contract system is the most profitable. 
 , Examples. 
 
 Conclusion 
 On the whole the contract system is preferable to any other. 
 
216 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Rule 2. The ideas in the brief should be arranged in the 
 form of headings and subheadings. To secure unity and co- 
 herence in a brief we found not only that it was necessary to 
 consider the introduction and conclusion ancillary to the 
 discussion itself, but also that it was necessary to arrange 
 the material so that it will make clear what is important and 
 what is subordinate. The most natural methods of securing 
 this result is to arrange the material of the brief in headings 
 and subheadings. 
 
 Take, for instance, this from (A): 
 
 Competition with free labor under the different systems. 
 
 Competition under piece-price system. 
 
 Competition under contract system. 
 
 Public-account system. 
 
 Although these points are made here as of equal value, 
 it is obvious after a moment's observation that they are of 
 unequal value. Take the first two headings: the second is 
 certainly subordinate to the first, and should be so arranged. 
 Evidently there is some central idea in this group of headings, 
 and we must find this idea and state it in such a way that the 
 minor points can all be grouped under it. What, then, is the 
 central idea.f* It involves a comparison of the contract system 
 and the other systems as regards its competition with free 
 labor, and it may be stated as follows: 
 
 (C) 
 
 Competition with free labor is less harmful under the contract 
 system than under the other systems. 
 Effects of competition under the piece-price system. 
 Effects of competition under the public-account system. 
 Ways of removing any evil effects under the contract system. 
 
 Rule 3. Each heading and subheading should be in the form 
 of a complete statement. In (B) the most obvious fault is the 
 lack of clearness. For the purpose of conveying the ideas 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 217 
 
 to any other person than the mi?>ker of the brief, the outline 
 is useless. Take, for illustration, the introduction to this 
 outline : 
 
 The convict labor problem. 
 
 Necessity of employment. Experiments with different systems. 
 
 Here no one of the statements carries a clear idea of what 
 was in the mind of the writer. "Necessity of employment." 
 What about it? Does the writer mean there is no necessity 
 of employment, or that there is a general necessity.'^ Em- 
 ployment for what purpose? Under what conditions? These 
 questions and others may justly be asked, and the brief can- 
 not be said to be even tolerable, until the ideas are so stated 
 that they cannot be misunderstood. Evidently, the principal 
 difficulty lies in the fact that the writer has failed to make his 
 statements complete. A word, or even a number of words, 
 taken out of their connection may often have a number of 
 different meanings, and the way to guard against vagueness 
 and ambiguity is to make complete sentences. Let us then 
 expand these phrases into complete statements. 
 
 (D) 
 
 The problem of employment of the convict is one of the serious 
 problems of criminology. 
 It is admitted that the convict must be employed in some kind 
 of work. Several different systems of employment have been 
 tried in this country; the most important of which are: the 
 piece-price system, the public-account system, and the contract 
 system. 
 
 Rule 4. Each heading and subheading should contain 
 but a single statement^ except in occasional cases of literal 
 quotations. 
 
 Another common fault of brief drawing, and one closely 
 akin to the one just considered, is that of crowding too much 
 
218 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 into one heading. It is as important to have each heading 
 a single statement as it is to have each heading a complete 
 statement. Occasionally it may be allowable to quote 
 directly more than a single statement and have this stand as 
 one heading or subheading. But this must not be taken as 
 permission to insert whole blocks of undigested quotations. 
 Material taken from others should be boiled down to single 
 statements or to properly related series of single statements. 
 Clearness is greatly increased by living up to this rule very 
 carefully. Take, for instance, the first point from the dis- 
 cussion (B): 
 
 Effect of the contract system on reformation. 
 
 . Control by prison oflficers, habits of industry (regulations of the 
 contract), and the learning of trades. 
 
 Expanding this into complete statements in accordance 
 with Rule 3 we have: 
 
 The contract system is eflFective in the work of reforming the crim- 
 inal. Under this system criminals are under the direct and 
 responsible control of the prison officers, and are taught habits 
 of industry, for the regulations of the contracts prescribe these 
 things. The criminals have an opportunity to learn practical 
 trades. 
 
 The subordinate heading here is an incoherent jumble, 
 or, as it may be called, a crowded heading. The results of a 
 crowded heading are: a lack of evident connection between 
 the different subordinate headings, and a similar lack of con- 
 nection between the subordinate headings and the main 
 heading. For instance, the statement "for the regulations of 
 the contracts prescribe these things" evidently has no direct 
 connection with the main heading, "The contract system is 
 effective in the work of reforming the criminal," and to show 
 justification for its presence in the brief some change must 
 be made. This change must be made by a separation of the 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 219 
 
 different ideas of this heading into headings each containing a 
 single statement. It would then read as follows: 
 
 (E) 
 
 The contract system is effective in the work of reforming the 
 
 criminal. 
 Convicts are under the direct and responsible control of the prison 
 
 officers. 
 The contract provides that the contractor shall have no control 
 
 over the discipline of the prison. 
 The convicts are taught habits of industry. 
 The contract provides that they shall be continually employed. 
 Convicts have an opportunity to learn a practical trade. 
 
 Rule 5. Every coordinate series of statements should be 
 arranged in order of climax, unless this violates time order in 
 expository matter or logical order in argumentative matter. 
 Suppose we have six coordinate statements, say of the third 
 degree, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, under B. If this situation occurs in 
 the introduction, when we are explaining the history of the 
 question, and deals with incidents having a time order, we 
 should follow the time order regardless of the climax or other 
 considerations. If in the discussion our six coordinate points 
 have to do with matter linked in a logical sequence, — have 
 a cause and effect connection with each other — we must 
 follow the logical order. In all other cases we should arrange 
 them in climactic sequence, beginning with the weakest and 
 ending with the strongest. 
 
 Rule 6. The relation between the headings and subheadings 
 should be indicated by means of margins, and letters, numbers, 
 or other symbols. Thus far we have seen the importance of 
 so stating our headings that the main and the subordinate 
 parts shall stand clearly in their proper relations. It is nec- 
 essary to show the varying importance of the different 
 parts by the indentation of the margins and by the use of 
 symbols. In doing this some definite system ought to be 
 
220 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 followed. In this book the system of marking will be as 
 follows : 
 I. 
 A. 
 1. 
 a. 
 
 (I). 
 (A). 
 
 (1). 
 II. 
 
 A. etc. 
 
 Great care must be taken to see that marginal indentations 
 are always the same for symbols of equal order. So all roman 
 numerals on a page should be in line, and the same for 
 capital letters, arabic numerals, etc. The statements should 
 never run back to the left under the symbols. All margins 
 should be clear — the lower the order of importance of the 
 statements, the shorter the lines used, so that the eye can 
 quickly grasp the relation of all the statements on a page. 
 
 Outline (E), then, when these directions are carried out 
 will read: 
 
 (F) 
 
 I. The contract system is effective in the work of reforming the 
 criminal. 
 
 A. Convicts are under the direct and responsible control of the 
 
 prison officers. 
 1, The contract provides that the contractor shall have no 
 control over the discipline of the prison. 
 
 B. The convicts are taught habits of industry. 
 
 1. The contracts provides that they shall be continually 
 employed. 
 
 C. Convicts have an opportunity to learn a practical trade. 
 
 Rule 7. No heading or subheading should be marked 
 with more than one symbol. In applying any system of letter- 
 ing there is a common fault which leads to confusion, namely. 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 221 
 
 using more than one symbol for marking a single heading. 
 For instance, in outline (F), the marking is done correctly; 
 but a beginner in argumentation might easily fall into the 
 mistake of marking it something as follows: 
 
 (6) 
 
 A. 1. Convicts are under the direct and responsible control of the 
 prison officers. 
 
 2. The convicts are taught habits of industry. 
 
 3. Convicts have an opportunity to learn a practical trade. 
 
 In the first heading of (G) the reason in the mind of the 
 writer for marking it A. 1 probably is the more or less vague 
 idea that the three headings, numbered 1, 2, 3, are to be 
 grouped together. He feels that these headings are more or 
 less connected in meaning, so he puts in the letter A to indi- 
 cate the connection. He allows A to stand for a grouping 
 or summarizing statement which he has carelessly neglected 
 to put into words. This can be his only excuse for putting 
 in the extra letter, for otherwise it has no meaning whatever. 
 
 However, the use of the extra letter does not serve the 
 purpose he has in mind. It does not make clear just how 
 the subheads 1, 2, and 3 are connected, but confuses the 
 reader by making him stop and guess what is the connection 
 between them. If any such headings are really associated, 
 the association can be made clear only by definitely stating 
 the connecting idea, in a separate heading. By reference to 
 outline (F) we see how the relation of the ideas is rightly ex- 
 pressed. The subheadings are clearly established in their 
 proper relations to one another by stating in main heading I 
 the larger idea of which they are subordinate parts. So we 
 have the inviolable rule that no symbol should be put into 
 the brief unless it marks a separate and distinct heading of its 
 own. 
 
 Rule 8. All references and sources of information should 
 be accurately stated in the brief on the same page on which the 
 
222 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 information is given. Exact references (volume, number, 
 page, etc.) to all authorities and particular sources of informa- 
 tion should always be given on the page of the brief which has 
 the statement which they support. 
 
 The method of inserting references to authorities is a 
 matter of individual discretion rather than of rule or precept. 
 The method may be adopted which is used in the text of the 
 present volume, of putting numbers in the body of the text 
 (or brief) with the title and exact citation of the authority 
 appended at the foot of the page. Or, it is simpler, and just 
 as clear, merely to insert the reference in the margin of the 
 brief, opposite the heading in connection with which it is 
 quoted. Probably the best method, on the whole, and the 
 one to be recommended, is to add the reference at the end 
 of the quotation or statement which it supports. 
 
 Whatever the method, the exact citation for every author- 
 ity and particular source of information used should always 
 be given. 
 
 We have now a fairly distinct idea of the general rules for 
 arranging our ideas in the form of a brief. But there are 
 certain particular requisites that are peculiar to the three 
 divisions of the brief — the introduction, the discussion, and 
 the conclusion. These three parts differ from one another 
 in many ways, and must have certain rules of their own, in 
 accordance with which they can best perform their respective 
 functions. 
 
 Introduction 
 
 Rule 9. • The first part of the introduction should contain 
 all the information necessary for an understanding of the dis- 
 cussion — history y definition, explanations, admissions, etc. The 
 force of this rule is obvious from the very nature of the intro- 
 duction. The introduction exists solely for the purpose of 
 preparing the way for the effective operation of the 
 actual proof; and it has obviously failed in its purpose 
 if, when the evidence and arguments are presented to 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 223 
 
 the reader or hearer, by reason of his lack of information 
 about the question, he is incapable of understanding the 
 proof. 
 
 For an example take outline (B) . We find, in the discussion 
 proper, references to "the contract system," "the public- 
 account system," "the piece-price system," terms which 
 are meaningless to any man who has not given particular 
 study to the question. Again, we find the most important 
 points of the proof to be concerned with "reformation," 
 "competition with free labor," and "profitableness"; these 
 words have meaning in themselves, but we cannot see the 
 force of the arguments brought forward concerning them, 
 because we do not understand why these points are impor- 
 tant or how they tend to prove anything about the proposi- 
 tion. The introduction in this case, in the first place, should 
 have explained the import of these words whose meaning is 
 not clear in the discussion, i. e., it should have explained the 
 piece-price system, the public-account system, and the 
 contract system. 
 
 This is the work that is necessary to the introduction, viz. : 
 (1) a definition and explanation of the meaning of the words 
 of the proposition, and of all the important terms in the 
 question that need explanation in order to be perfectly clear 
 in the discussion; (2) a narration of the history of the problem 
 in dispute, if such a statement is necessary to make clear the 
 real nature of the question. 
 
 The explanation of the terms of the question we are using 
 might take form somewhat as follows : 
 
 (H) 
 
 Introduction 
 
 I. The problem of the employment of the convict is one of the 
 serious questions of criminology. 
 A. It is admitted that convicts must be employed in some 
 kind of work. 
 
224 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 B. Several different systems have been tried in this 
 country. 
 1. The principal systems are the piece-price system, 
 the public account-system, and the contract sys- 
 tem. 
 II. The three systems may be described as follows: 
 
 A. The characteristics of the piece-price system are three: 
 
 1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or corpora- 
 
 tions, under which the prison is furnished with 
 raw material. 
 
 2. These raw materials are manufactured by the 
 
 convicts at- agreed prices per piece. 
 
 3. The work is done wholly under the supervision of 
 
 prison officials. 
 
 B. The public-account system is as follows: 
 
 1. The prison buys its own raw materials. 
 
 2. The prison manufactures like a private firm, and 
 
 sells in the best available market. 
 
 C. The contract system involves the following charac- 
 
 teristics : 
 
 1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or corpora- 
 
 tions, under which convicts are employed at 
 certain agreed prices for their labor for fixed 
 periods of time. 
 
 2. The contractors are usually furnished by the prison 
 
 with power and machinery. 
 
 3. The convicts work under the immediate direction 
 
 of the contractor, but subject to the super- 
 vision of the prison officials. 
 Rule 10. The last part of the introduction should con- 
 tain a statement of the issues and of the partition. The work 
 of explaining the nature of the question, and stating the 
 points to be proved, is essentially the work that has been 
 treated in Chapter 4 on the Issues. By analyzing the ques- 
 tion, studying the history of its discussion, and picking out 
 the points that are vital to the establishment of the proposi- 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 225 
 
 tion we may find that the settlement of the question depends 
 on the decision of one vital issue, viz.: Is the continuance 
 of the contract system detrimental to the general welfare of 
 the State? And further that this question must be decided 
 by comparing the system with other possible systems (since 
 it is admitted that some system must be employed) on three 
 points, viz.: What system gives the best financial returns.'* 
 What system is most effective in reforming the criminal.^ 
 What system has the most beneficial effect on the free labor 
 of the State? 
 
 If the contract system can be shown on the whole to have 
 the preponderance of virtue in these respects, it is the most 
 desirable and should not be abolished. If, judged by these 
 standards, it is inferior on the whole to some one of the other 
 systems, it should be abolished. The explanation of the 
 nature of the question and the statement of the issue might, 
 then, take form as follows : 
 
 (I) 
 
 III. The issue is : Is the continuance of the contract sys- 
 tem detrimental to the general welfare of the 
 State ? 
 A. This question must be decided by comparing the sys- 
 tem with other possible systems (since it is ad- 
 mitted that some systems must be employed) on 
 three points, viz.: 
 
 1. Are the financial returns unsatisfactory? 
 
 2. Is the contract system unsatisfactory in regard to 
 
 the reformation of the criminal? 
 
 3. Does the contract system entail unnecessary in- 
 
 jurious effects to the free labor of the State? 
 The amount of explanation required in a brief depends 
 entirely upon the nature of the particular question. In out- 
 line (H) given above, the explanation of the nature of the ques- 
 tion is short and takes the form of exposition. In treating 
 any new or uncommon question, full and detailed explana- 
 
226 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tions would be required, in order to give the reader the in- 
 formation necessary to an understanding of the issue and 
 of the question as a whole. In such a generally known ques- 
 tion as that of the contract-labor system, little explanation 
 was necessary, and that simply of an expository nature. 
 But very often the explanation of the question takes the 
 form of a narration of facts or a history of the question. In 
 the court room it commonly consists of a narration of the 
 leading facts of the case to be presented. In a discussion of 
 the question, *^ Resolved, that United States senators should 
 be elected by a direct vote of the people," the explanation 
 would take a similar form. It would require a history of the 
 origin of the Senate and of the existing form of election, and a 
 narration of the events leading up to the agitation for popular 
 election. 
 
 Finally, it is desirable to state the points which the dis- 
 putant proposes to prove in order to establish his case. This 
 is the part of the introduction called the partition. Though 
 the points in the partition may well correspond quite closely 
 with the statement of the issues, thej^ are not always identical. 
 With the addition of this statement of the points of the proof, 
 the completed introduction might read as follows: 
 
 (J) 
 
 I. The problem of the employment of the convict is one of the 
 
 serious questions for criminology. 
 
 A. It is admitted that convicts must be employed in some 
 
 kind of work. 
 
 B. Several different systems have been tried in this coun- 
 
 try. 
 1. The principal systems are the piece-price system, 
 the public-account system, and the contract 
 system. 
 
 II. The three systems may be described as follows: 
 
 A. The characteristics of the piece-price system are three: 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 227 
 
 1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or cor- 
 
 porations, under which the prison is furnished 
 with raw material. 
 
 2. These raw materials are manufactured by the 
 
 convicts at agreed prices per piece. 
 
 3. The work is done wholly under the supervision of 
 
 prison officials. 
 
 B. The public-account system is as follows: 
 
 1. The prison buys its own raw materials. 
 
 2. The prison manufactures like a private firm and 
 
 sells in the best available market. 
 
 C. The contract system involves the following char- 
 
 acteristics : 
 
 1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or cor- 
 
 porations, under which convicts are employed 
 at certain agreed prices for their labor, for fixed 
 periods of time. 
 
 2. The contractors are usually furnished by the prison 
 
 with power and machinery. 
 
 3. The convicts work under the immediate direction 
 
 of the contractor, but subject to the supervision 
 of the prison officials. 
 
 III. The real question is, whether the continuance of the 
 
 contract system is detrimental to the general welfare 
 of the State. 
 A. The value of the system must be judged by three tests: 
 
 1. Are the financial returns unsatisfactory .^^ 
 
 2. Is the contract system unsatisfactory in regard to 
 
 the reformation of the criminal .f* 
 
 3. Does the contract system entail unnecessary in- 
 
 jurious effects to the free labor of the State .^^ 
 
 IV. The negative intends to prove its case by establishing 
 
 four facts : 
 
 A. The contract system brings the best financial returns. 
 
 B. The contract system is effective in the work of re- 
 
 forming the criminal. 
 
228 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 C. Any defects of the system can be remedied without 
 
 destroying the system. 
 
 D. The contract system is the most desirable for its 
 
 efiFect on the free labor of the State. 
 
 This introduction, of course, is susceptible to many changes 
 and improvements leading up to the issues, perhaps if desired 
 a fuller statement of the analysis, but it fulfils with reasonable 
 accuracy the functions of a good introduction for this particu- 
 lar question. In addition to Rule 9, which is explanatory of 
 the general nature of this part of the brief, it should be borne 
 in mind that there are generally three things necessary in 
 the introduction, in order to make it conform to this general 
 rule: (1) a definition and explanation of all the terms of the 
 proposition and of any other important terms in the discus- 
 sion that need explanation; (2) an explanation of the nature 
 and real meaning of the question as found by analyzing its 
 essential parts, in such a way as to lead up to (3) (Rule 10) 
 a statement of the issues and of the points to be proved by 
 the disputant in establishing his case. These three elements 
 of the introduction are, however, variable in importance, and 
 their necessity is not in all cases so imperative as to make 
 them all properly part of our Rules for Brief-drawing. But 
 the statement of the issues and of the points to be proved in 
 the discussion is so important as to justify the incorporation 
 of it among the principles of good brief drawing. We have 
 seen how indispensable it is for the disputant himself to find 
 and understand the issue; it is also generally desirable that 
 the reader or hearer understand them. For him, as for the 
 writer himself, it is knowlege of the issue that helps him to 
 get a clear view of the real question in its entirety; it is the 
 issue that enables him to follow readily the subsequent de- 
 velopment of the proof; it is by an understanding of the is- 
 sues that he may be made to feel the force of the evidence 
 and the arguments, and their full effect upon the proposition. 
 
 The work of explaining the issues is like the work of the 
 mill-race. The waters of the river go rushing by with im- 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 229 
 
 pressive sound and force; but they do not make paper or spin 
 cotton till the raceway gathers in their power and directs it 
 straight at the turbine wheel. So evidence, arguments, and 
 proof of all kinds may impress an audience with their volume 
 and loud sound, but they do not actually convince anybody 
 until they are controlled and effectively directed straight at 
 the proposition. This is the true work of the issues. They 
 are the agency by which the proofs given in the discussion 
 are brought into connection with the proposition, in such a 
 way that every blow in the proof strikes the question fairly 
 and helps the disputant to win his cause. In a speech it is 
 sometimes desirable, as a matter of tact, to conceal the points 
 to be proved in the discussion; but such cases are exceptional, 
 and are under all circumstances provided for in the out- 
 lining of the presentation rather than in the drawing of the 
 brief. 
 
 " Clash of opinion " in the brief. If the proposition is ac- 
 curately analyzed, each side will arrive at the "potential 
 issues," the claims the affirmative must advance unless they 
 are admitted by the negative. Wherever it is possible to get 
 the admissions of the negative these should be stated by the 
 affirmative to show the narrowing down to the actual fight- 
 ing issues. The negative brief, of course, should recite the 
 admissions after giving the potential issues, thus showing 
 clearly the issues on which the argument is to turn. But a 
 perfunctory statement of "the clash of opinion" for all briefs 
 (in most of which probably one side gives not only its opinions 
 but also those it supposes the opposition will hold) is super- 
 ficial and worthless. Stating what you are ready to prove and 
 what you expect the other side to admit, or what your oppo- 
 nent must prove and what you actually do admit, is quite a 
 different thing. This is what should be given to show the ac- 
 tual issues rather than a carefully balanced "clash of opinion" 
 which is in part mere guess-work. 
 
 Rule 11. The introduction should contain only statements 
 the truth of which is admitted by both sides. To recur again 
 
230 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 to the general principles of arrangement, the introduction 
 never exists for its own sake, and does not properly contain 
 the proof of the proposition. Particularly in brief drawing 
 is it the servant of the discussion and merely preparatory in 
 nature. If we put into it prejudiced statements, that an 
 opponent must deny and that we must consequently support 
 by proof, it is no longer an introduction, but merely one 
 part of the discussion. We have destroyed our real intro- 
 duction. This is a serious mistake, for with very few excep- 
 tions it is indispensable to success that the minds of judges 
 or readers of the brief be prepared for the reception of the 
 proofs before they are thrust upon them, and this work can- 
 not be well done if the writer is actually arguing, and fighting 
 an opponent all the way. There is nothing in the work of the 
 introduction to a brief to require any prejudice or controver- 
 sial attitude to make it effective. It is merely an explanation 
 of the matters that are to be reasoned about in the discussion, 
 and of the facts that must be known in order that the discus- 
 sion may be understood. The writings and speeches of the 
 masters of argumentative art all show their appreciation of 
 the true functions of the introduction and of the desirability 
 of keeping it free from signs of prejudice even in oral pres- 
 entation. Although it may sometimes be helpful to put 
 argument and evidence in at the beginning of a speech, it 
 usually turns out in the end that it is just as well for us to 
 withhold our proof till the discussion proper is reached, 
 and use the introduction for its primary purpose only. In a 
 brief this should always be done. It is no less important in 
 the case of briefs prepared not for the use of others in decid- 
 ing the case, but for the purpose of arranging, testing, and 
 relating all the evidence and argument that might be used, 
 as a step in preparation for oral or written presentation of 
 the whole case to one or several different audiences. Here 
 it is important that the writer keep his case clear by arrang- 
 ing an unprejudiced introduction. 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 231 
 
 The Discussion 
 
 Rule 12. The discussion should contain all evidence 
 and argument to be used on the given side of the given proposi- 
 tion. This rule is rather obvious when we understand the 
 proper functions of a brief, and that arguing should not be 
 done in the introduction of a brief. Of course, space does not 
 permit us to illustrate this rule. It should be remarked here 
 that the specimen brief given here is to illustrate correct 
 form — not full and accurate substance. It is undesirable to 
 insert into a text-book a full and complete brief on a big 
 question. 
 
 Rule 13. In the discussion, each main heading should 
 read as a reason for the truth or falsity of the proposition. The 
 main headings of the discussion are the points of the parti- 
 tion and should be taken up in the order given in the intro- 
 duction. They should be carefully phrased, so they may be 
 connected directly with the proposition by the word "be- 
 cause.'* For instance, we may say (the negative statement 
 of the proposition here, because we are working on a negative 
 brief): "The contract system of employing convict labor 
 should not be abolished, because 
 
 I. It brings the best financial returns. 
 II. It is effective in the work of reforming the criminal. 
 III. Any defects in it can be remedied without destroying 
 
 the system. 
 IV. It is most desirable for its effect on the free labor of the 
 State. 
 
 If there were an additional point of pure refutation it might 
 read as follows: 
 
 V. The contention of the affirmative that (such and such 
 a condition exists) is untenable. 
 
 Rule 14. Each subheading, or series of coordinate sub-' 
 headings, should read as a reason for the truth of the heading 
 above it. By a series of coordinate sub-headings is meant a 
 coordinate series which taken together constitute a reason for 
 
232 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the heading above, as B is true because 1 and 2 are true. 
 
 1 alone is not a reason for B. Neither is 2. But 1 and 2 
 taken together make a reason. The relation between 1 and 
 
 2 may not be best expressed by "and.'* This situation ob- 
 tains whenever we have subheadings that must be taken 
 together. " When coordinated statements in a brief stand in 
 contrast to one another, or in any suspended relation, the 
 several related propositions constitute, in reality, a single 
 compound argument, rather than a succession of equivalent 
 contentions." ^ 
 
 Such a series must read as a reason, rather than each part 
 of it so read, in order to comply with this rule. The symbols 
 used to represent such a series should be not 1 and 2, but 1^ 
 and 1^ or A^ A^ A^, etc. As, 
 
 A^ — and 
 
 A^ 
 
 because 
 
 The discussion contains the real proofs of the composition. 
 These proofs are always of the nature of flights of stairs as- 
 cending from different directions toward the proposition. 
 There are the smallest details of evidence, which serve to 
 establish certain facts; these facts go to prove some larger 
 facts; and so on, till all meet and are made one in the propo- 
 sition itself. 
 
 Now there are two ways in which these proofs may be 
 arranged to make clear this relation to one another. By 
 one method we proceed from lesser to greater; the smallest 
 details are stated first, then follow the facts these details 
 are meant to prove, and finally the result of it all is stated 
 in the proposition. C is true, hence B is true; B is true, 
 hence A is true, and so on. 
 
 The other method is just the inverse of this. The fact 
 that is directly connected with the proposition is put first; 
 
 1 Maxcy, p. 29. 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 233 
 
 jiiext come the facts that are the reasons for the truth of the 
 facts that were first alleged; then, following in series, are the 
 lesser and still lesser ideas, each statement reading as a reason 
 for the truth of the statement next above it. A is true be- 
 cause B is true; B is true because C is true, etc. 
 
 The first methods may be illustrated briefly as follows : 
 
 a. The convicts are generally employed within the walls 
 
 of the prison, and 
 
 b. The instructors employed by the contractors are under 
 
 the control of the prison ofiicers, and 
 
 c. The conditions of the employment of the convict are 
 
 specified in the contract or by legislation : hence: 
 1. The system gives opportunity for proper control of 
 the convicts, hence: 
 
 A. Deficiencies in reformatory methods and prison 
 discipline can be remedied by careful adminis- 
 tration, therefore: 
 III. Any defects in the contract system can be remedied 
 without destroying the system. 
 The second method would make this part of the brief read 
 as follows: 
 
 III. Any defects in the contract system can be remedied 
 without destroying the system because, 
 A. Deficiencies in reformatory methods and prison dis- 
 cipline can be remedied by careful adminis- 
 tration, for, 
 1. The system gives opportunity for proper 
 control of the convicts, for, 
 
 a. The convicts are generally employed 
 
 within the walls of the prison. 
 
 b. The instructors employed by the con- 
 
 tractors are under the control of the 
 prison officers. 
 
 c. The conditions of the employment of the 
 
 convict are specified in the contract or 
 by legislation. 
 
234 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 For the purposes of drawing a briefs the second method, 
 using the connectiv^es ''for' or ''because,'' is clearly far 
 better than the first, and should always be followed. In some 
 cases ^ it is wise in presenting proof to conceal till the end the 
 point that is being proved, but these cases are exceptional; 
 and even where such concealment is desirable, it should be 
 carried out in the final presentation, not in the making of the 
 brief. The defects of the first method, which may perhaps 
 be called the *' hence and therefore" method, are obvious. 
 When a brief or an argument founded upon such a brief is 
 presented, the reader or hearer does not understand what 
 the disputant is "driving at," till after long wanderings he 
 reaches the point to be proved; then the reader is forced to go 
 back over all the ground again, in order to estimate the real 
 force of what he has been reading, and an audience, who 
 cannot be given the privilege of hearing it explained 
 again, have irretrievably lost many of the good points of the 
 proof. 
 
 Again, the "hence and therefore" arrangement has the 
 disadvantage of presenting a deceptive appearance to the 
 eye. It puts the least important proof in the most prominent 
 places and makes it hard to appreciate," at a glance, the real 
 co-ordination of the points. Finally, it makes the work of 
 lettering and numbering difficult. 
 
 Rule 15. Objections to be refuted should be dealt with as they 
 arise. This means that in the brief we should weave in with 
 our constructive work specific refutation of statements of our 
 opponents whenever we know of them and are able to do so. 
 In any part of the brief it is possible to introduce a point 
 in refutation, by making one of the regular reasons read as 
 an answer to a specific charge of the other side. For in- 
 stance: 
 
 1 Sec a, p. 308. 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 235 
 
 I because 
 
 A 
 
 B because 
 
 1 
 
 2 because 
 
 a 
 
 b 
 
 c The charge that ( ) 
 
 is false, because 
 
 (I) 
 
 (11) _ ••• . 
 
 Such a piece of refutation as c in this diagram can obvi- 
 ously be inserted anywhere, in any series of reasons, in any 
 order of reasons, in any order of subordination. Of course, 
 if the refutation is of the first order, it will stand as a main 
 point in the discussion and so will be announced in the par- 
 tition as a regular main point. 
 
 Rule 16. In phrasing refutation the heading should state 
 clearly the argument to be ansivered, and the character of the 
 answer to be made. This precept is of great importance, 
 because it guards against a serious error. Refutation is the 
 name that is given to any attack directed against the proof 
 of an opponent. With the importance of refutation and the 
 methods of handling it, we are not now concerned; ^ but there 
 must always be more or less of it in any brief, and its effective- 
 ness depends very largely upon the way it is introduced. 
 The writer of a brief, knowing in his own mind what is the 
 position of his opponent which he desires to assail, very 
 naturally falls into the mistake of unconsciously attributing 
 a like knowledge to others, and so goes on to array his an- 
 swers, \^^thout making clear to his audience or readers just 
 what it is he is answering, and how he is answering it. This 
 carelessness often proves troublesome; for in order to make 
 refutation achieve its purposes, it is necessary that the at- 
 tention of an audience be first directed toward the exact point 
 1 See chapter 15. 
 
236 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 in controversy, in order that they may see the comparison of 
 the two sides and so feel the destructive force of the answer. 
 
 For example, it is urged by opponents of the contract 
 system, that the system enables the prison authorities and 
 the contractors to become rich at the expense of the prisoners. 
 In refuting this point, the student w^ould be guilty of am- 
 biguity if he should say, "The contract system does not 
 allow the prison authorities and the contractors to become 
 rich at the expense of the prisoners." It might very naturally 
 be supposed from the statement that this is a point of posi- 
 tive proof rather than a point in refutation, that the writer 
 is upholding this as one of the virtues of the system. This 
 makes his proof weak, for he is "damning the system with 
 faint praise." Again, this statement of the point might be 
 interpreted to mean, that the writer was comparing the con- 
 tract system with other systems, and declaring it to be pref- 
 erable in this respect. As a matter of fact, what he means 
 is, that the arguments made by his opponent to prove this 
 objection to the contract system are false. To make his 
 position clear and to bring his own arguments into proper 
 contrast with those of his opponent, he should have stated 
 his refutation somewhat as follows: "The objection that 
 this system allows the prison authorities and the contractors 
 to become rich at the expense of the prisoners is groundless, 
 for, etc." 
 
 This is, in general, the desirable way to introduce refuta- 
 tion: (1) state briefly and clearly the argument to be answered; 
 and (2) tell the nature of the answer. Then give the answer. 
 As for instance, "The contention that free silver causes pros- 
 perity is founded upon a false assumption, for," etc. "The 
 evidence of Madden that Swift was married to Stella John- 
 son is unreliable, for," etc. "The argument that the incor- 
 poration of labor unions will prevent strikes is weak, for," 
 etc. Whatever the form of the statement, it should so pro- 
 claim the argument to be answered that the attention of a 
 reader or hearer cannot be misdirected. 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 237 
 
 The Conclusion 
 
 Rule 17. The conclusion should contain a summary oj 
 the essential paints of the proof. The function of the conclu- 
 sion in the brief is obvious from the work itself. Its duty is 
 merely to sum up the essential points that have been estab- 
 hshed by the proof, and to make clear their bearing as a 
 whole on the proposition. This work is best done by a 
 summary in brief form, lettered and numbered. 
 
 The summary should generally contain a statement of 
 all the main headings of the discussion, and of as many of the 
 subheadings as are necessary finally to present the proof as 
 a whole. An illustration of the form of such summary is 
 given in the conclusion of the brief printed at the end of this 
 chapter. 
 
 G. Parallel column brief. Before closing this chapter 
 attention should be caUed to a new style of brief drawing 
 which arranges the discussion in three parallel columns of 
 inferences, facts, and sources. While this device seems to us 
 not well adapted for use as a final form for the finished brief, 
 it is an excellent scheme for enforcing and testing thorough- 
 going analysis. It brings out with great clearness the three 
 elements (arguments, evidence, and sources of information) 
 that must be found in any well-drawn brief, and might well 
 be used in preliminary exercises for training in accurate 
 analysis. As a means of demonstrating the difference between 
 bare assertions and substantial proof, it can be used to great 
 advantage. The following illustration and brief comment is 
 quoted from Professor F. B. Robinson's Elective Public 
 Speaking} The words "arguments" and "evidence" have 
 been substituted for "inferences" and "facts" as the head- 
 ings for the first two columns. In the first paragraph 
 quoted (p. 239) for "issues" the student should read 
 "points in partition." 
 
 1 Pages 280-284. 
 
238 
 
 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Arguments 
 
 Evidence 
 
 Sources 
 
 B. The permanent retention 
 
 
 
 of the Philippines is de- 
 
 
 
 sirable for economic rea- 
 
 
 
 sons, for 
 
 
 
 1. A valuable territory 
 
 (a) The area is more than 
 
 U. S. Survey. 
 
 is acquired. 
 
 115,000 square miles. 
 
 
 
 (b) Soil is very productive. 
 
 Miller: Eco- 
 
 
 (c) Can support a popula- 
 
 nomic Condi- 
 
 
 tion of 42,000,000— 
 
 tions in the 
 
 • 
 
 equal to that of 
 Japan. 
 
 Philippines. 
 
 2. Our foreign trade will 
 
 Increase since possession: 
 
 
 increase, for 
 
 In 1899, the Philippine 
 
 
 (a) Retention insures 
 
 Islands imported from 
 
 
 larger trade with 
 
 us one out of thirteen 
 
 
 the Philippines, 
 
 millions and sold us one 
 
 
 
 out of fifteen millions; in 
 
 Miller, p. 368. 
 
 
 1912, they imported 
 
 
 
 from us twenty-one out 
 
 
 
 of fifty-five millions, and 
 
 
 
 sent us twenty-two out 
 
 
 
 of fifty millions. 
 
 
 (b) Retention will in- 
 
 Philippines are located in 
 
 Worcester, 
 
 sure access to the 
 
 trade routes. 
 
 p. 888. 
 
 larger trade of 
 
 Philippine harbors are 
 
 Chamberlin, 
 
 the East, and 
 
 good. 
 
 Philippine 
 
 
 They are the best in the 
 
 Problem, 
 
 
 Pacific. 
 
 Ch. 7. 
 
 (c) The Eastern trade 
 
 
 
 is desirable. 
 
 
 
 I. There is a great 
 
 We alone exported to Asia 
 
 Worcester, 
 
 trade with 
 
 and Oceania two hun- 
 
 pp. 870-872. 
 
 Asia and es- 
 
 dred million dollars' 
 
 
 pecially China. 
 
 worth in 1913. 
 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 
 
 239 
 
 Arguments 
 
 Evidence 
 
 Sources 
 
 3. Home business and 
 
 Exports to China from 
 
 World Almanac, 
 
 capitat will be bene- 
 
 United States in 1914, 
 
 p. 219. 
 
 fited, for 
 
 thirty-five millions. 
 
 
 (a) Foreign exports 
 
 
 
 support additional 
 
 
 
 home production 
 
 
 
 and 
 
 
 
 I. Employ more 
 
 
 
 American labor. 
 
 
 
 II. Employ more 
 
 
 
 American cap- 
 
 
 
 ital. 
 
 
 
 (b) American capital 
 
 See figures for investment 
 
 Statesman's 
 
 will invest in the 
 
 of English capital in 
 
 Year Book. 
 
 Philippines, for 
 
 English colonies ; 
 
 
 I. Capital will 
 
 German capital in German 
 
 
 go where the 
 
 colonies, etc. 
 
 
 home country 
 
 
 
 guarantees 
 
 
 
 protection. 
 
 
 
 " The backbone of the inference column is made up of the 
 issues.^ Each one of them is an inference and all of the sub- 
 ordinate statements which are offered as supports are also 
 inferences. These issues ^ should be examined systemat- 
 ically. ... (a) Is each issue ^ distinct from every other one ? 
 (b) Are they all, taken together, adequate to lead you to 
 infer the main resolution from them ? (c) Are they properly 
 supported? . . . 
 
 " The facts in the second column should be abundant. 
 Furthermore, the source column must contain the names of 
 witnesses and sources so that the acceptability, credibility, 
 and conditions of observations may be passed upon. The 
 place where the evidence is to be found should be noted in 
 
 ^ For issues read points in partition. 
 
240 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 sufficient detail to enable others to get it readily ahd read 
 it in context. 
 
 "For faults in reasoning, carefully read the inference 
 column; to discover lack of facts, read the fact column; 
 and to check up authorities and sources, consult the last 
 column. This form of brief provides not only an or- 
 derly form-arrangement of material but also a basis of 
 criticism." 
 
 H. Complete sample brief. The following brief while 
 not complete as to details of evidence is correct in form, and 
 ought to be a satisfactory model. It is not presented as 
 complete or perfect or as approaching perfection, but it il- 
 lustrates the principles that govern the making of a brief, 
 effectively embodying the general laws of the arrangement 
 of materials. 
 
 Introduction ^ 
 
 I. The problem of the employment of the convict is one of 
 the serious questions of criminology. 
 
 A. It is admitted that convicts must be employed in 
 
 some kind of work. 
 
 B. Several different systems have been tried in this 
 
 country. 
 1 . The principal systems are the piece-price system, the 
 public-account system, and the contract system. 
 II. These three systems may be described as follows : 
 
 A. The characteristics of the piece-price systems are three: 
 
 1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or corpo- 
 
 rations under which the prison is furnished 
 with raw materials. 
 
 2. These raw materials are manufactured by the con- 
 
 victs at agreed prices per piece. 
 
 3. The work is done wholly under the supervision of 
 
 prison officials. 
 
 ^ The proposition is : " Resolved : that the contract system of employ- 
 ing convict labor should be abolished." 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 241 
 
 B. The public-account system is as follows: 
 
 1. The prison buys its own raw materials. 
 
 2. The prison manufactures like a private firm, and 
 
 sells in the best available market. 
 
 C. The contract system involves the following charac- 
 
 teristics : 
 
 1. Contracts are made with persons, firms, or corpo- 
 
 rations, under which convicts are employed at 
 certain agreed prices for their labor, for fixed 
 periods of time. 
 
 2. The contractors are usually furnished by the prison 
 
 with power and machinery. 
 
 3. The convicts work under the immediate direction 
 
 of the contractor, but subject tc the supervision 
 of the prison oflficials. 
 III. The issue is : Is the continuance of the contract 
 system detrimental to the general welfare of the 
 State.? 
 A. This question must be decided by comparing the sys- 
 tem with other possible systems (since it is ad- 
 mitted that some system must be employed) on 
 three points, viz.: 
 
 1. Are the financial returns unsatisfactory? 
 
 2. Does it fail to promote satisfactorily the reforma- 
 
 tion of the criminal.'^ 
 
 3. Does it entail unnecessary^ injurious effects on 
 
 the free labor of the State .'^ 
 IV. The negative intends to prove its case by establishing 
 four facts: 
 
 A. The contract system brings the best financial returns. 
 
 B. The contract system is effective in the work of re- 
 
 forming the criminal. 
 
 C. Any defects of the system can be remedied without 
 
 destroying it. 
 
 D. The contract system is the most desirable for its 
 
 effect on the free labor of the State. 
 
242 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Discussion 
 
 I. The contract system brings the best financial returns, 
 because, 
 
 A. The system avoids expenses necessary in the other 
 
 systems, for, 
 
 1. It avoids the expense of machinery. 
 
 2. It avoids the necessity of supplying working cap- 
 
 ital. 
 
 3. It avoids the employment of high-priced officials 
 
 and salesmen. 
 
 4. It avoids the risks and losses of trade. 
 
 5. It diminishes opportunities for peculation, because, 
 
 a. Extravagance and peculation are common 
 under the other systems, for, 
 (I) The Commissioner of Labor of New 
 York declares, "The large outlay 
 of funds under the public-account 
 system gave opportunity for whole- 
 sale extravagance and peculation." 
 
 B. The public-account system is seriously defective from 
 
 a financial standpoint, for, 
 
 1. In Illinois in four years and five months the loss 
 
 to the State was $314,212. 
 
 2. In New York it was found that the expenses of 
 
 the sales department were such as to make the 
 system financially impracticable. 
 
 C. According to the report of the United States Com- 
 
 mission of Labor, the income of this system is sixty- 
 five per cent of the running expenses of the prison. 
 
 D. The Commission, comparing this system with others, 
 
 declares these returns to be more satisfactory than 
 
 those from any other system, for, 
 1. This Commission says, "In a financial sense the 
 contract system is the most profitable of any to 
 the State, except the so-called lease system." 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 243 
 
 II. The contract system is effective in the work of reforming 
 
 the criminal, because, 
 
 A. The convicts are under the direct and responsible 
 
 control of the State, for, 
 
 1. In every contract there is a clause providing that 
 
 the contractor shall have no control over, and 
 shall in no way interfere with, prison discipline. 
 
 2. Punishment cannot be inflicted on the complaint 
 
 of instructors without full investigation by the 
 wardens. 
 
 3. The penalty for any violation of the rules by a 
 
 contractor or instructor is immediate dismissal. 
 
 B. The system teaches the prisoner a practical trade by 
 
 which he can earn an honest living after release, 
 because, 
 
 1. The Labor Commissioners of New York say that 
 
 the convicts learn exactly the same trades and 
 specialize in the same way as in factories and 
 other places of work outside. 
 
 2. It proved effective in Pennsylvania in teaching 
 
 trades for practice after leaving the prison. 
 
 C. It teaches habits of industry, because, 
 
 1. Under it the convict must be constantly employed, 
 for, 
 a. The contractor engages to keep a certain num- 
 ber of men continually employed. 
 
 D. The contract system promotes the health of the con- 
 
 victs, because, 
 1. Mr. Pillsbury of New York says that the system 
 is very beneficial to the health of the convicts, 
 and that they leave the prison in better physi- 
 cal condition than when they came. 
 
 III. Any defects in the contract system can be remedied 
 
 without destroying the system, because 
 A. Deficiencies in reformatory methods and prison disci- 
 pline can be remedied by careful administration, for, 
 
244 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 1. The system gives opportunity for proper control 
 
 of the convicts, for, 
 
 a. The convicts are generally employed within the 
 
 walls of the prison. 
 
 b. The instructors employed by the contractors 
 
 are under the control of the prison officers. 
 
 c. The conditions of the employment of the con- 
 
 vict are specified in the contract or by legis- 
 lation. 
 
 2. The work of reform depends largely upon the 
 
 character of the officers in charge. 
 
 3. The character of the officials can be improved by 
 
 legislation, for, 
 
 a. Making the offices non-partisan would remove 
 
 inefficiency due to politics. 
 
 b. Efficiency of the officers would be improved by 
 
 making the term of office permanent during 
 good behavior. 
 B. Any possible evils of competition can be remedied by 
 legislation, because, 
 
 1. Competition can be prevented by limiting the 
 
 production of any article by convicts to one- 
 tenth of the total product in that State. 
 
 2. Competition could be lessened by providing for a 
 
 greater diversity of products by the convicts, for, 
 a. The Labor Commissioner of Massachusetts rec- 
 ommends this as a remedy. 
 
 3. Competition could be lessened by a law requiring 
 
 the public advertisement for proposals for con- 
 tracts, because, 
 a. This would tend to prevent injuriously low 
 prices in competition, for, 
 (I) The advertisement of the proposals would 
 raise the cost of production to the con- 
 tractor by stimulating competition in 
 bids for the labor. 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 245 
 
 IV. The contract system is the most desirable for its effect on 
 the free labor of the State, because, 
 A. The argument that the competition of convict labor 
 with free labor under the contract system is det- 
 rimental to the welfare of the State is weak, for, 
 
 1. The competition must exist under any system of 
 
 employment, because, 
 a. The products of the convict must be sold in the 
 market. 
 
 2. The competition is more serious under the public- 
 
 account system, for, 
 
 a. Goods can be sold below the market price in 
 
 competition, because, 
 
 (I) The State cannot be forced into bank- 
 
 ruptcy. 
 
 (II) The whole cost of production is the cost 
 
 of the material. 
 
 b. The tendency is to centralize manufactures on 
 
 a few lines of production, for, 
 (I) It is impossible to manage many different 
 lines of manufacturing. 
 
 c. The United States Industrial Commission says, 
 
 "It has been shown by numerous investiga- 
 tions that under the public-account system 
 there is greater competition with the prod- 
 ucts of free labor than under any other." 
 
 3. The competition is at least no less harmful under 
 
 the piece-price system, because, 
 
 a. The Industrial Commission in their report of 
 
 1900 say that the piece-price system does 
 not affect the competition with free labor. 
 
 b. The first biennial report of the Bureau of Labor 
 
 of California declares that under the piece- 
 price system the effects of competition were 
 no different from the effects under the con- 
 tract system. 
 
246 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 c. The Prison Labor Reform Commission of New 
 
 York stated that, in practical operation, the 
 piece-price system was shown to be more 
 oppressive to competitive free labor than the 
 contract system. 
 
 d. In New Jersey this system was found to be 
 
 worse in its competitive effects than the con- 
 tract system. 
 B. It is conductive to the effective administration of the 
 prison, for, 
 
 1. The officers of the prison are chosen solely for 
 
 their efficiency as prison keepers, for, 
 a. They are not required to act as business man- 
 agers, because 
 (I) The manufacturing is done under the di- 
 rection of outside contractors. 
 
 2. The contract system restricts prisons to the use 
 
 for which they are intended, for, 
 a. It relieves the management of the prison from 
 the necessity of managing large manufactur- 
 ing establishments, as under the other sys- 
 tems. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 I. The negative has proved the following: 
 
 A. The contract system brings the best financial returns, 
 
 because, 
 
 1. It avoids expenses necessary in the other systems. 
 
 2. The public-account system is seriously defective 
 
 financially. 
 
 3. The income from the contract system is sixty-five 
 
 per cent of the running expenses. 
 
 4. Students of the subject declare that the returns are 
 
 largest from the contract system. 
 
 B. The contract system is effective in the work of reform- 
 
 ing the criminal, for 
 
BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 247 
 
 1. The convicts are under the direct control of the 
 
 State. 
 
 2. The system furnishes a trade to the convict, and 
 
 thus furnishes a means of honest Hvehhood on his 
 release. 
 
 3. The convict is taught habits of industry. 
 
 4. The contract system promotes the health of the 
 
 convicts. 
 
 C. Any defects in the contract system can be remedied 
 
 without destroying the system, for, 
 
 1. Disciplinary and reformatory deficiencies can be 
 
 remedied by careful administration. 
 
 2. Any possible evils of competition can be remedied 
 
 by legislation. 
 
 D. The contract system is the most desirable for its effect 
 
 on the general welfare of the State, for, 
 
 1. The argument that it introduces undesirable com- 
 
 petition with free labor is weak. 
 
 2. It gives effective prison administration. 
 
 II. We therefore maintain that the contract system of em- 
 ploying convict labor should not be abolished. 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 10 
 
 BRIEF DRAWING AND OUTLINING 
 
 1. Write the introduction to a brief on some "campus 
 
 topic.'* 
 
 2. Write the discussion of the brief mentioned in 1. 
 
 3. Hand in a complete brief of the material contained in 
 
 Appendix E, 1. 
 
 4. Write a complete brief of material contained in Appendix 
 
 E, 2. 
 
 5. Hand in, in the form of a parallel column brief, all of your 
 
 material on one main point in the discussion of the brief 
 of your original forensic. 
 
248 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 6. Hand in a complete brief of the subject chosen for your 
 
 original forensic. 
 
 7. Hand in three different outlines, showing the adaptation 
 
 of the material in the brief on the campus topic to three 
 different audiences — as for instance, the Freshman Class, 
 the Faculty, the Board of Regents, or Trustees. 
 
 8. Hand in a complete outline of your original forensic, 
 
 adapting the outline carefully to a particular audience 
 and occasion, the characteristics of each of which shall 
 be definitely set forth. 
 
SECTION D. PRESENTATION 
 CHAPTER 11 
 
 PERSUASION 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 I. Conviction and Persuasion in Presentation 
 
 A. The brief and presentation. 
 
 B. Conviction and persuasion. 
 
 C. Selecting parts of case for particular audience. 
 
 II. The Nature of Persuasion 
 
 A. Persuasion defined. 
 
 B. Persuasion in almost all argumentation. 
 
 C. Prejudice against an "emotional appeal." 
 
 D. Emotion in argumentation. 
 
 1. Emotion the basis in practical issues affecting human 
 
 conduct. 
 
 2. Strong tendency of men to believe what they wish to be- 
 
 lieve. 
 
 3. Emotions not belonging to the argument itself affect 
 
 decisions. 
 
 E. Kinds of emotional appeals. 
 
 F. Classifications of emotions. 
 
 m. Practical Suggestions for Persuasion 
 
 A. The speaker. 
 
 1. Know human nature. 
 
 2. Personality. 
 
 3. Sincerity or earnestness. 
 
 4. Modesty. 
 
 5. Self-control and reserve force. 
 
 6. Fairness. 
 
 249 
 
250 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 B. The subject. 
 
 1 . Fit audience and speaker„ 
 
 2. Handling subject-matter. 
 
 a. Brevity. 
 
 b. Simplicity. 
 
 c. Vividness. 
 
 (I) Reference to experience. 
 
 (A) Vivid experiences. 
 
 (1) Originally intense. 
 
 (2) Frequent occurrence. 
 
 (3) Frequently recollected. 
 
 (4) Recent. 
 
 (II) Concrete and specific. 
 
 d. Variety. 
 
 (I) Comparison and climax. 
 
 C. The audience. 
 
 1. Adaptation to particular audience. 
 
 2. Tact. 
 
 3. Indirect appeal. 
 
 4. Responsibility; facing the truth. 
 
 5. The friendly audience. 
 
 6. The hostile audience. 
 
 7. Eight suggestions for persuasion illustrated. 
 
 I. Conviction and Persuasion in Presentation 
 
 A. The brief and presentation. Under invention, se- 
 lection, and arrangement, we have considered the methods 
 of finding materials, of estimating their value, and of arrang- 
 ing them so as best to utilize their strength. The product of 
 our work has been embodied in a brief. It sometimes happens 
 that our preparation ends here; the brief itself may be the 
 presentation of our argument. But as a rule other prepara- 
 tion is required. The brief may be b ut the foundation- 
 st^nes.^ilithfi-feemns which sustain anrj shape the buildh ig, 
 but which in the end ar/^ hidden from view by nut^ward forms 
 thafare more sightJ^^and^J nore u s efu l; or it miijr behut an 
 orderTystorehouse of material from which Id .draaLwJiat ever 
 
PERSUASION 251 
 
 is n eeded f or specific occasions. To achieve our purposes, 
 we generally neemo put the materials in more pleasing 
 and effective rhetorical form. The brief as we have consid- 
 ered it so far is an impersonal thing. Iti^a full statement 
 of "the case'* as a case - ada pted to no audience in particula r. 
 It has no persuasion in it — except what may be there inci- 
 dentally on account of the persuasive nature of some of the 
 evidence. Even when a brief is to be the final presentation 
 of the case, it is still usually lacking in persuasion, is largely 
 impersonal and simply introduces the argument without 
 
 bias, prf>gpntg pviHptipp \x\ r^ff^r\ fr>rmj and draws jngjc al in- 
 fp renres without fervor or e rnntinn nf any kind.^ For the 
 presentation of this kind of case we are now prepared. A 
 neat manuscript which follows the suggestions and rules of 
 the last chapter is all that is necessary. 
 
 B. Conviction and persuasion. When we have to argue 
 a case in public (either orally or in print) the situation is 
 different. Then there is more to be done than we have yet 
 considered. Up to this point the work is the same for all 
 kinds of presentation. In the preparation of any important 
 argument the first thing to be done is the drawing of a com- 
 plete brief — a full statement of the intellectual basis of the 
 case. In this we consider the inherent weight of evidence and 
 force of inference as such, as far as possible without regard 
 to any particular audience. Now a new element enters in. 
 We now have to consider persuasion. 
 
 In our earlier consideration of the general nature of the 
 art, we have seen that there are two aspects or methods of 
 approach in all argumentation: (1) conviction, or the appeal 
 to the reason, which is the act of inducing another to accept 
 the truth of an idea or proposition; and (2) persuasion, or 
 the appeal to the emotions, which is the act of influencing 
 another by affecting his feelings. We have further seen that 
 both are usually essential to effectiveness. Certain elements 
 of persuasion must be considered in preparing to present any 
 case either oral or written to any general audience. There is 
 
252 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 no such thing as an audience of human beings to whom it is 
 safe to present any case without giving thought to the Hkes 
 and dishkes, prejudices, experiences, and habits of the people 
 to be addressed. How much conviction and how much per- 
 suasion to use must be determined by circumstances. In 
 an intercollegiate debate, the element of persuasion is slight. 
 It is usually no more than tact and vigor in the work of con- 
 viction. The lawyer before the jury needs a judicious mix- 
 ture of both. Dan ton before the French convention made 
 his appeal almost wholly to the turbulent passions of a pas- 
 sionate mob. But though the relative amounts of the two 
 elements may vary, both are almost always necessary for 
 success. 
 
 C. Selecting parts of case for each particular audience: 
 conviction. If we have a complete brief of the case pre- 
 pared with no particular audience in mind there is one other 
 step to take before we prepare a persuasive presentation for a 
 given audience. That is: sort out those parts of the brief, 
 those phases of the case, which you wish to present to this 
 particular audience. Not only will you perhaps want to 
 present the same material differently to different audiences 
 but you will want to present different material to different 
 audiences. Do not waste time and tire an audience by prov- 
 ing elaborately a point which to this particular audience needs 
 no proof. Do not give a long detailed introduction (suitable 
 to an uninformed audience) to an audience already familiar 
 with the facts. In other words, do not make a brief and then 
 present it as drawn to all audiences. Take the appropriate 
 parts for each audience. For instance, suppose you wish to 
 have a new policy adopted in your university. After careful 
 investigation and gathering of evidence you prepare a com- 
 plete brief in support of the proposed policy. If the decision 
 rests with a single officer or small committee this brief may 
 be submitted in full either with or without comment. But 
 suppose you must gain the support of a number of different 
 bodies by presenting the merits of your plan orally to them. 
 
PERSUASION 253 
 
 Suppose a group of audiences taken from this list: senior 
 class, athletic council, whole student body, faculty, board of 
 trustees, state legislature. One of these groups may admit 
 points which will have to be substantiated (with varying 
 degrees of thoroughness) before other bodies. Introductory 
 material needed in a student meeting might be superfluous 
 before faculty or legislature — or vice versa. In this way 
 "the case" as briefed must be changed and adapted to fit 
 each separate audience approached. An audience before 
 which a complete and properly drawn brief may profitably 
 be used as the outline of an oral argument is rarely if ever 
 found. 
 
 The most important work of conviction is about done 
 when the brief is completed. When the materials have been 
 gathered and arranged, it only remains to put the proof in 
 words that will impress it clearly and forcibly on the under- 
 standing of those we would convince. To be able to do this, 
 obviously the first requisite is a knowledge of rhetoric. The 
 effect of well-arranged and well-chosen proofs is often neu- 
 tralized by confused and halting English. The man who 
 cannot express himself is always a weakling in argumentation. 
 
 Then, in addition to the general principles of rhetoric, 
 there are certain adaptations of these rhetorical principles 
 to the peculiar work of argumentation. 
 
 A general treatment of rhetorical forms lies beyond the 
 necessary limits of this book. The principles that are pecu- 
 liar to argumentative composition will be treated in the fol- 
 lowing chapters on the introduction, the discussion, and the 
 conclusion. 
 
 II. The Nature of Persuasion 
 
 A. Persuasion defined. Persuasion has been defined 
 as the art of influencing another by affecting his feelings or 
 emotions. In the past text-books on rhetoric and argumenta- 
 tion have for the most part made this statement, and left 
 the student with little further help. While it is impossible 
 
254 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 in this book to give a thorough treatment of this subject, 
 it is possible, we believe, to give considerable assistance by 
 presenting a new definition. Winans ^ ventures such a new 
 definition, as follows: "Persuasion is the process of inducing 
 others to give fair, favorable, or undivided attention to propo- 
 sitions." In discussing this definition Professor Winans ^ 
 quotes in substantiation and approval many of the leading 
 psychologists. We quote one such: 
 
 *' We now need a principle by means of which we can sys- 
 tematize the suggestions for persuasion drawn from common 
 experience. Why do we will to do or not to do? We turn 
 to Professor James : ^ 
 
 "'What holds attention determines action. ... It seems 
 as if we ought to look for the secret of an idea's impulsive- 
 ness ... in the urgency with which it is able to compel atten- 
 tion and dominate in consciousness. Let it once so dominate, 
 let no other ideas succeed in displacing it, and whatever motor 
 effects belong to it by nature will inevitably occur. . . . 
 In short, one does not see any case in which the steadfast 
 occupancy of consciousness does not appear to be the prime 
 condition of impulsive power. It is still more obviously 
 the prime condition of inhibitive power. What checks our 
 impulses is the mere thinking of reasons to the contrary — 
 it is their bare presence in the mind which gives the veto, 
 and makes acts, otherwise seductive, impossible to perform. 
 If we could only forget our scruples, our doubts, our fears, 
 what exultant energy we should for a while display! ' " ^ 
 
 B. Persuasion in almost all argumentation. The ulti- 
 mate aim of most argumentation is to make others act as we 
 desire, to influence the conduct of others, to make others 
 
 ^ Public Speaking, p. 256. The quotations from this book found in this 
 chapter are used with the kind permission of Professor Winans and the 
 Century Company. Every teacher of argumentation should read in full 
 Winans' chapters on "Influencing Conduct" and "Persuasion and Belief." 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 253-257. 3 Briefer Course, pp. 448-452. 
 
 * Winans, pp. 253-4. 
 
PERSUASION 255 
 
 forget their scruples, doubts, fears, etc., in so far as these 
 keep them from giving fair, favorable, and undivided atten- 
 tion to our proposition. We have seen already that persua- 
 sion in some degree is practically always necessary in influenc- 
 ing the actions of others. He who goes before any audience 
 of human beings and attempts to get favorable action on a 
 proposition ignoring all considerations of persuasion is fore- 
 doomed to defeat. The only situation that offers an opportu- 
 nity for exceptions to this statement is that in which the 
 majority of the people present are at the start favorable to 
 the action sought — a situation in which no discussion is re- 
 quired at all. In fact even in such a case if a speech is made 
 and no attention paid to the persuasive elements in the situa- 
 tion, the case may well be lost. Men are often turned away 
 from their original intention by a speaker who talks tact- 
 lessly (i. e., not persuasively) in favor of "their side." There 
 is much erroneous talk nowadays about educated people, 
 trained intellects, intelligent citizens, etc., being superior 
 to persuasion, and basing their opinions, votes, decisions, 
 on "facts" and logic and pure reason. There is no such thing 
 as an audience that will come to decisions on "propositions of 
 policy" on purely logical grounds. A simple question of fact 
 unassociated with human conduct may be decided that way. 
 If anyone wishes to test this statement let him go before an 
 educated group, an audience of trained intellects, with a case 
 based on sound evidence and reasoning and present his case 
 in a way calculated to be displeasing to his audience. Go 
 before a college or university faculty, for instance, and " rub 
 them the wrong way," stand with thumbs in the arm-holes 
 of your vest, chew gum, use slang, make ill-bred personal 
 references to members present or absent — and see how many 
 votes you will get — even though these things have nothing 
 whatever to do with the real strength of your case. None 
 of these things could possibly be said to have any "proba- 
 tive value." The case is lost because its persuasive side was 
 neglected. 
 
256 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 C. Prejudice against an " emotional appeal.*' The case 
 of the ''intellectual" who resolutely refuses to be moved by 
 any emotional appeal is interesting. Have you ever heard 
 such a one declare that he will never vote (in faculty meeting 
 for instance) for any measure that is presented with an ap- 
 peal to emotions? Consider what this means. If he is to be 
 taken at his word, it means that in such a case his decision 
 will always be an emotional one — based on his prejudice 
 against what he thinks is an "appeal to the emotions" — 
 when he recognizes it. He has decided in advance to exclude 
 from consideration the intellectual value of the case and 
 render a purely emotional decision! But of course he is not 
 to be taken seriously, because if the persuasion (emotional 
 appeal) is well handled, he will be pleased. The presenta- 
 tion will fit his prejudices, his tastes will be comphed with, 
 agreeable ideas will be held up, and he will vote joyfully 
 (emotionally) and on the way home will pronounce vigor- 
 ously (emotionally) that that is the way he likes (emotion 
 again) to see a matter presented! Such a man is one of the 
 many people who have a wrong idea of the meaning of per- 
 suasion, persuasive case, emotional appeal, etc. It is thought 
 that there is something unworthy and cheap about persua- 
 sion and emotion — that a persuasive case is always an appeal 
 to base emotions and passions. Of course this is quite con- 
 trary to fact. Says Winans on this point :^ "Let us get 
 clearly in mind that we are not dealing with an artificial 
 or unusual problem. When you induce a man to join your 
 party, or buy an automobile, or improve his habits, or go 
 fishing with you, or pay his bills, or open his mind to the 
 possibility that the Germans, or the English, are well-mean- 
 ing men, you are persuading him. Persuasion is as familiar 
 as living, and you will recognize at once its means, such as 
 arguments, motives, suggestions, personal influence, tact." 
 "Persuasion is sometimes spoken of as altogether a matter 
 of * appealing to emotion.' The phrase proves misleading, 
 1 Public Speaking, pp. 251-252. 
 
PERSUASION 257 
 
 It is taken by some to refer to pathos only, or to an arousal 
 of the more violent feelings; or at best as an appeal to some 
 large emotion, such as patriotism. Again, the word appeal 
 is misunderstood as meaning direct, fervid exhortation only. 
 It is true that persuasion is quite largely concerned with 
 emotion. In persuasion we wish to allay such emotions as 
 will keep hostility to the proposed action in mind, such as 
 dislike for the means or the end, or desire for other ends; 
 and we wish to awaken such emotions as will win for the pro- 
 posed action favorable attention.*' ^ 
 
 D. Emotion in argumentation. The place of emotion in 
 argumentation has been best stated by Professor Winans in 
 the following paragraphs.^ 
 
 1. "Let us notice, ^7-5/, that in dealing vnth those practical 
 issues that directly ajfect human conduct, the very basis of argu- 
 ment is emotion; or as we noted in the preceding chapter, the 
 major premise of such an argument is the expression of an 
 emotion. If we argue that the square of the hypotenuse of a 
 right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other 
 two sides, we have pure reasoning, free from emotion; but 
 when we take up the proposition that Congress should pass 
 the immigration bill, involving an illiteracy test, over the 
 President's veto, we are constantly dealing with emotions. 
 We must assume first the emotion of patriotism, or that all de- 
 sire the good of the country. As we proceed we find ourselves 
 meeting with emotions involved in the interests of labor and 
 of corporations, with self-interest and the love of justice, 
 with race prejudices and loyalties, with the sentiment that 
 America should remain the home of the oppressed, with pity 
 for those who have had no opportunity for education, and 
 with a reluctance on the part of many to pass a measure over 
 President Wilson's veto. If we looked beneath the surface 
 of newspaper discussion, we might find certain religious 
 feelings playing an active part in the settlement of this issue. 
 The fact that some of these feelings ought not to influence 
 1 Public Speaking, p. 257. 2 jbij.^ pp. 304-310. 
 
258 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 our judgment of the question, and the fact that none of them 
 should be permitted to put us in such a state that we cannot 
 reason justly, do not change the facts that an argument on 
 the issue impinges upon emotion at every point, that some of 
 these emotions are necessary to a proper solution, and that 
 any one or several of them, good and bad, may be domi- 
 nating the minds of your hearers as you address them. The 
 question selected is far from an extreme instance, as you will 
 see if you think for a moment of such questions as intercol- 
 legiate athletics, modern dancing, woman's suffrage, and 
 blame for the European war. 
 
 2. *' In the second place, we notice with regard to the in- 
 fluence of emotion on argument, the strong tendency of men to 
 believe what they wish to believe} * Will and belief are undoubt- 
 edly common products of the same deeper lying forces. 
 Whatever appeals to us strongly enough to tempt us to de- 
 sire to believe, by the very same appeal compels belief.* 
 Experience declares, *A man convinced against his will is 
 of the same opinion still.* Almost as famous is the saying 
 attributed to a Scotchman, *I am quite open to convic- 
 tion, Sandy, but I should like to see the man who can con- 
 vince me.* This tendency to believe what we wish to believe 
 is encouraged by the fact that, with reference to questions 
 at all debatable, there are reasons, usually good reasons, 
 in support of either alternative. One can arrive at a decision 
 only by weighing the opposing arguments. Now, if he wishes 
 to arrive at a certain conclusion, the arguments for it seem 
 weighty and those in opposition very light. He is likely to 
 refuse credence to witnesses and authorities against the de- 
 sired conclusion. He may even refuse to listen to opposing 
 arguments; or he may listen in an attempt to be fair, but 
 with a subconscious determination to discredit what he hears, 
 saying all the while. That is not true; That is not important, 
 or That is insufficient. In other words, he refuses fair at- 
 tention. . . . 
 
 1 Pillsbury, Psychology of Reasoning, p. 54. 
 
PERSUASION 259 
 
 "But frequently I am told by my students, *Men ought 
 not to be influenced in their thinking by their emotions and 
 prejudices.' No one is stricter with other people's thinking 
 than your sophomore. He himself is open-minded in regard 
 to those subjects in which he has a purely intellectual inter- 
 est; but hear him argue on * activities,' women's suffrage, 
 or religion! At any rate, the question is not how men should 
 think, but how they do think. These are the words of a 
 practical idealist, Woodrow Wilson:^ 
 
 "As I look back upon the past of the South, it seems to me to 
 contain that best of dynamic forces, the force of emotion. We talk 
 a great deal about being governed by mind, by intellect, by intelli- 
 gence, in this boastful day of ours; but as a matter of fact, I don't 
 believe that one man out of a thousand is governed by his mind. 
 
 '"Men, no matter what their training, are governed by their 
 passions, and the most we can hope to accomplish is to keep the 
 handsome passions in the majority.' 
 
 " After all, are we not much too scornful of emotions? It is 
 true that men are often governed by unjustified emotions; 
 but it is also true that they are often led astray by false logic. 
 There are more men who feel truly than there are who reason 
 justly. Even Huxley, who held up the ideal of a mind which 
 is a *cold logic engine,' wished men to have strong emotions, 
 though well controlled. So eminent a scientist as Baldwin 
 has written: ^ 
 
 '"Neither will logic satisfy our moral or aesthetic demands, for 
 the logically true is often immoral and hideous. It is well, therefore, 
 to write large the truth that logical consistency is not the whole of 
 reality, and that the revolt of the heart against fact is often as 
 legitimate a measure of the true in this shifting universe as is the 
 cold denial given by rational conviction to the vagaries of casual 
 feeling.'" 
 
 ^ From a speech to the New York Southern Society in 1910, found in 
 Wood's After-Dinner Speeches, p. 46. 
 2 Elements of Psychology, p. 262. 
 
260 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 3. "In the third place, we may notice that emotions not 
 belonging to the argument itself, affect decisions. These may 
 arise from the occasion. The audience may be enthusiastic 
 or bored, good-natured or angry. Again, emotions may arise 
 from the relation of speaker and audience. They may feel great 
 respect for him, or be pleased by his manner, his friendliness 
 and good humor; or they may dishke him and feel resentment 
 or suspicion. We must consider what manner of men we ad- 
 dress, what feelings move them, and how opposition may be 
 abated and a mood of friendliness and candor established." 
 
 Perhaps the terms negative persuasion and positive per- 
 suasion will be helpful, the former indicating consideration 
 of the things one must refrain from doing in order not to de- 
 tract from the value of his intellectual or logical case, and 
 the latter indicating consideration of the things one must do 
 affirmatively in order to overcome prejudices, to get a fair 
 hearing for his case, or to enforce his logic and add to the 
 influence of his intellectual case. From this point of view 
 negative persuasion is always necessary, positive persuasion 
 very often necessary and, if well done, always helpful.^ 
 
 E. Kinds of emotional appeal. All those who wish to 
 practice argumentation successfully before any class of 
 audience must practice persuasion of some kind to a greater 
 or less extent. The question then naturally arises. If we must 
 practice persuasion and "appeal to emotion," what are our 
 opportunities .f* 
 
 What emotion or emotions shall we appeal to? What 
 emotion shall we arouse "in regard to our action" in order 
 "to win attention to it" ? Many writers have offered more 
 or less complete classifications of emotions from which the 
 student is presumablj^ supposed to select the emotion which 
 fits his case. A few such lists are offered here as suggestive 
 and perhaps even serviceable in a practical way in some situa- 
 tions. Aristotle^ mentions: anger and mildness; friendship 
 
 1 See ante, B., p. 254 and C, p. 256 
 
 2 The Rhetoric of Artistotle, Jebb translation, p. xxv. 
 
PERSUASION 261 
 
 and enmity; fear and boldness; shame and shamelessness; 
 gratitude (or favor) and ingratitude; pity and indignation; 
 envy and emulation. Whately ^ discusses the different kinds 
 of appeals as follows : 
 
 "For in order that the Will may be influenced, two things 
 are requisite; viz.: 1, that the proposed Object should appear 
 desirable; and 2, that the Means suggested should be proved 
 to be conducive to the attainment of that object; and this 
 last, evidently must depend on a process of Reasoning. . . . 
 
 "Persuasion, therefore, depends on, first. Argument (to 
 prove the expediency of the Means proposed), and secondly, 
 what is usually called Exhortation, i. e., the excitement of 
 men to adopt those Means, by representing the end as suffi- 
 ciently desirable. It will happen, indeed, not infrequently, 
 that the one or the other of these objects will have been al- 
 ready, either wholly or in part, accomplished; so that the 
 other shall be the only one that it is requisite to insist on; 
 viz.: sometimes the hearers will be sufficiently intent on the 
 pursuit of the End, and will be in doubt only as to the means 
 of attaining it; and sometimes, again, they will have no doubt 
 on that point, but will be indifferent, or not sufficiently 
 ardent, with respect to the proposed End, and will need to 
 be stimulated by Exhortations. Not sufficiently ardent, I 
 have said, because it will not so often happen that the object 
 in question will be one to which they are totally indifferent, 
 as that they will practically at least, not reckon it, or not 
 feel it, to be worth the requisite pains. . . . 
 
 "Aristotle, and many other writers, have spoken of ap- 
 peals to the passions as an unfair mode of influencing the 
 hearers. . . . But Aristotle by no means overlooked the 
 necessity with a view to Persuasion, properly sQj:;grmed, of 
 calling into action some motive that may influence the Will; 
 it is plain that whenever he speaks with reprobation of an 
 appeal to the Passions, his meaning is, the excitement of such 
 feelings as ought not to influence the decision of the question 
 1 Pages 128-131. 
 
262 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 in hand. A desire to do justice, may be called, in Dr. Camp- 
 bell's wide acceptation of the term, a * Passion* or * Affec- 
 tion'; this is what ought to influence a Judge; and no one 
 would ever censure a Pleader for striving to excite and 
 heighten this desire; but if the decision be influenced by an 
 appeal to Anger, Pity, etc., the feelings thus excited being 
 such as ought not to have operated, the Judge must be 
 allowed to have been unduly biassed. And that this is 
 Aristotle's meaning is evident from his characterizing the 
 introduction of such topics as * foreign to the matter in hand.' 
 It is evident, also, that as the motives which ought to operate 
 will be different in different cases, the same may be objection- 
 able and not fairly admissible, in one case, which in another 
 would be perfectly allowable. 
 
 " An instance occurs in Thucydides, in which this is very 
 judiciously and neatly pointed out; in the debate respecting 
 the Mityleneans, who had been subdued after a revolt, Cleon 
 is introduced contending for the justice of inflicting on them 
 capital punishment; to which Diodorus is made to reply, that 
 the Athenians are not sitting in judgment on the offenders, 
 but in deliberation as to their own interest; and ought there- 
 fore to consider, not the right they may have to put the re- 
 volters to death, but the expediency or inexpediency of such 
 a procedure. 
 
 '* In judicial cases, on the contrary, any appeal to the per- 
 sonal interests of the Judge, or even to public expediency, 
 would be irrelevant. In framing laws indeed, and (which 
 comes to the same thing) giving those decisions which are to 
 operate as Precedents, the public good is the object to be 
 pursued; but in the mere administering of the estabUshed 
 laws, it is inadmissible. 
 
 " There are many feelings, again, which it is evident should 
 in no case be allowed to operate; as Envy, thirst for Revenge, 
 etc., the excitement of which by the orator is to be reprobated 
 as an unfair artifice; but it is not the less necessary to be well 
 acquainted with their nature, in order to allay them when 
 
PERSUASION 263 
 
 previously existing in the hearers, or to counteract the efforts 
 of an adversary in producing or directing them. It is evident, 
 indeed, that all the weaknesses, as well as the powers, of the 
 human mind, and all the arts by which the Sophist takes 
 advantage of these weaknesses, must be familiarly known by a 
 perfect Orator; who, though he may be of such a character as 
 to disdain employing such arts, must not want the ability 
 to do so, or he would not be prepared to counteract them. 
 An acquaintance with the nature of poisons is necessary to 
 him who would administer antidotes." 
 
 F. Classification of the emotions. Professor W. C. Robin- 
 son ^ has given a classification of the emotions that it is some- 
 times helpful to have in mind. "That fundamental principle 
 out of which all noble impulses arise is the tendency of hu- 
 man nature toward perfection. . . . Perfection is predicable 
 of human nature as to its action, as to its character, and as 
 to its attainment. A man is perfect as to action when he 
 fulfils his duty; as to character, when his predominant ideas 
 and impulses are pure and virtuous; as to attainment, when 
 he possesses the highest happiness which human nature is 
 able to enjoy. And thus in actual life the fundamental tend- 
 ency toward perfection manifests itself in three subordinate 
 tendencies; the tendency toward duty, the tendency toward 
 virtue, and the tendency toward happiness. . . .^ 
 
 "These natural dispositions render the heart susceptible 
 to certain impulses, each of which corresponds to some one 
 of the many forms in which the ideas of duty, virtue, and 
 happiness are presented to the mind. The idea of duty yet 
 to be fulfilled awakens zeal; of duty heretofore performed, 
 complacency; of duty which another had omitted, anger; of 
 duty as discharged by another, approbation. The idea of 
 virtue as an attribute of character engenders admiration; 
 as exemplified in individuals, good will, esteem, friendship, 
 or even love for them and emulation of their excellence; as 
 contrasted with vice, abhorrence of the vice itself and aver- 
 ^ Forensic Oratory, pp. 14, 15. * italics ours. 
 
 / 
 
\ 
 
 264 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 sion or contempt toward those in whose character depravity 
 is manifested. The idea of happiness as possible, begets 
 courage, desire, and hope; as unattainable, despair; as al- 
 ready possessed, joy; as derived from others, gratitude; as 
 endangered, fear; as denied to others, pity; as prevented or 
 destroyed by others, indignation. These are the universal 
 impulses to which all men are subject. These are the weapons 
 of the orator to which no human heart can ever be invul- 
 nerable." 
 
 Winans^ mentions particularly fairness, the appeal for fair 
 play; desire for approval and admiration; rivalry, the desire 
 to emulate, to equal, or to surpass others; and fear, dread of 
 unpleasant consequences, public disapproval, dangers of the 
 wrong course. 
 
 III. Practical Suggestions for Persuasion 
 
 The purpose of this chapter so far has been to present, 
 as well as space would allow, what may be called the 
 theory of persuasion — to get the student to understand 
 broadly the nature and function of persuasion, and to 
 eradicate, if possible, erroneous beliefs in regard to this 
 subject. The remainder of the chapter purposes to present 
 some brief practical suggestions. These will be arranged 
 under three heads: those primarily applicable to the speaker 
 himself, those that have to do with the audience^ and 
 those that apply to the subject. While of course all of the 
 suggestions are for the use of the speaker, it is convenient 
 to group them according as they have to do with him per- 
 sonally, his relation to the audience (which usually includes 
 his relation to the occasion)^ and his relation to the subject. 
 This division is not strictly new. Baker and Huntington ^ 
 use one much like it. "Broadly speaking, the means by 
 which a speaker aims to produce action is by winning sym- 
 pathy for himself or his subject — usually both. Need to 
 » Pages 261-263. « (Revised Edition), p. 294. 
 
PERSUASION 265 
 
 establish and maintain such a sympathetic relationship 
 between speaker and audience may come from any one or all 
 of three sources: the nature of the subject: the relation of the au- 
 dience to it; and the relation of the speaker to subject or audi- 
 ence.'* Foster ^ gives the sources of persuasion as the man, 
 the subject, and the occasion, and refers to Daniel Webster's 
 famous discussion of eloquence. 
 
 "True eloquence, indeed, does not consist in speech. It cannot 
 be brought from far. Labor and learning may toil for it; but they 
 will toil in vain. Words and phrases may be marshalled in every 
 way; but they cannot compass it. It must exist in the mariy in the 
 subject, and in the occasion. Affected passion, intense expression, 
 the pomp of declamation, all may aspire after it — they cannot 
 reach it. It comes, if it come at all, like the outbreaking of a foun- 
 tain from the earth, or the bursting forth of volcanic fires, with 
 spontaneous, original, native force." ^ 
 
 While it is true that there can be no true eloquence with- 
 out persuasion, there can, of course, be persuasion without 
 real eloquence, and all speakers who wish to achieve results 
 must pay attention to problems in persuasion even though 
 they disclaim any desire for eloquence. 
 
 A. The speaker. 1. Know human nature. The first 
 requisite for a speaker who would persuade men is a knowl- 
 edge of human nature. One of the prime qualities of effec- 
 tiveness is adaptation to the audience. To get such adapta- 
 tion a speaker or writer must know the peculiarities of the 
 men he addresses. However, such knowledge alone will not 
 enable him to persuade. If he does not understand human 
 nature in general, he is powerless to reach the emotions which 
 he knows are before him. He must know how men in general 
 think and act; when a man is best persuaded by silence and 
 when he needs to be reassured; when to wait and when to 
 
 1 Page 265ff . 
 
 2 Webster's speech on John Adams, delivered at Boston, August 2, 1826. 
 Quoted, Clark and Blanchard, p. 10. 
 
 / 
 
\ 
 
 266 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 strike. Such knowledge is not gained from books; it comes 
 only from contact with men and close study of their habits 
 of mind. The master of persuasion is never a recluse. 
 
 2. Personality»r? Closely akin to the persuasive powers 
 arising from the knowledge of human nature, are the influences 
 that come from the personality of the speaker or writer. The 
 influence of personality is felt most strongly in oratory; but 
 personal character shows itself in print as well, and wherever 
 it goes it persuades, favorably or unfavorably. Every qual- 
 ity of mind or heart that may make enemies or make friends 
 is a proper part of persuasive power. Says Foster ^ on this 
 topic: "The power of a speaker to draw a whole audience 
 into the circle of his influence, and to hold them as if en- 
 tranced until his last word, is more easily felt than defined. 
 This power may be called personal m'agnetism. It is the 
 sum total of all the speaker's attributes, — his physical, men- 
 tal, and moral characteristics, raised to their highest power, 
 and working together for a definite object. In this respect, 
 more than in any other, an orator is born, not made. Yet all 
 that a man does to keep his body well formed and strong and 
 healthy, all that he does to make his thought keen and deep 
 and sound, and all that he does to make his conduct right as 
 God gives him to see the right, contribute to personal mag- 
 netism. A great and good speaker must first be a great 
 and good man." 
 
 3. Sincerity or earnestness. Among the definite qualities 
 that may be mentioned as particularly desirable in argumen- 
 tative persuasion, the first is sincerity or earnestness. No 
 man will be persuaded by any one who he thinks is trying to 
 deceive him or play with his convictions for personal ends. 
 A suspicious audience is the hardest kind to handle, and 
 undoubtedly an audience does not require much to make it 
 suspicious. Sometimes the hearers have occasion to suspect 
 that a speaker is positively dishonest and designing; but 
 more often they believe simply that the speaker is arguing 
 
 1 Foster, pp. 273, 274. 
 
PERSUASION 267 
 
 for argument's sake or **to be worthy of his hire," and that 
 he really has no interest or confidence in his cause. Such 
 suspicion is seriously damaging to persuasive power. Lyman 
 Abbott gives some excellent advice in an open letter ^ as fol- 
 lows: "When he rises to speak he must forget himself, pray 
 to be delivered from the ambition to be eloquent by an am- 
 bition to win a result; be careless of admiration and covetous 
 of practical fruits in his auditors' lives. Without this moral 
 preparation he will be a mere declaimer: with it he rnay be 
 an effective speaker. And whether he is what men call an 
 orator or not is a matter of no consequence." Enthusiasm 
 in an audience can be roused only by enthusiasm in the 
 speaker, and earnest conviction is begotten only by a belief 
 in the earnestness of him who persuades. "One has only to 
 examine the great speeches from Demosthenes to Webster 
 to see how earnestly the orators have in all parts of their 
 work impressed their sincerity on their audiences: one has 
 but to study the wrecked careers among orators to realize 
 that sincerity is the chief essential in persuasion. Without 
 it all else, in the long run, goes for naught." ^ Consequently 
 no great orator, no effective writer, neglects to be sure at 
 every step that those in his audience have confidence in 
 the honesty and earnestness of his endeavors. Hence it is, 
 that the following exordium is an example of one of the most 
 common methods of introduction. It is taken from the 
 speech of Sir James Mcintosh in behalf of Jean Peltier before 
 the Court of the King's Bench, February, 1803, and shows 
 how necessary a man, of even so great eloquence, thought it 
 to be that his audience believe in his sincerity. 
 
 "I must begin with observing that, though I know myself too 
 well to ascribe to anything but to the kindness and good nature of 
 my learned friend, the attorney-general, the unmerited praises 
 which he has been pleased to bestow on me, yet, I will venture to 
 
 ^ Quoted in Brander Matthews' Notes on Speech Making, p. 91. 
 2 Baker and Huntington, p. 302. 
 
268 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 say, he has done me no more than justice in supposing that in this 
 place and on this occasion, where I exercise the functions of an 
 inferior minister of justice, an inferior minister, indeed, but a 
 minister of justice still, I am incapable of lending myself to the pas- 
 sions of any client, and that I will not make the proceedings of this 
 court subservient to any political purpose." ^ 
 
 4. Modesty. Another element of persuasion is a quality 
 in the speaker or writer that may be termed modesty. Mod- 
 esty, in this connection, does not mean an attitude of subser- 
 vience or self-suspicion. Indeed, a speaker should feel and 
 (with modesty) exhibit the feeling that he is competent, 
 prepared, knows what he is talking about. Self-respect, 
 self-confidence, authority, and leadership are perfectly con- 
 sistent with true modesty. Proper modesty does not require 
 that a speaker apologize for his poor abilities, his "inadequacy 
 to the task before him," etc. A good rule to follow in public 
 speaking of any kind is "never apologize, never offer ex- 
 cuses." If it is true that you are "totally unprepared," know 
 nothing about the subject, do not attempt to make a speech — 
 if it is not true, do not lie about it. "Excuses and apologies 
 are sometimes prompted by conceit, often they are dishonest, 
 usually of no interest to the audience, and altogether bad. 
 There is but one speech in a hundred which may well begin 
 with excuses; and there are few that begin in any other way."^ 
 
 There is such a thing — even in public discussion — as false 
 modesty, and it is a detriment to him who plays with 
 it. Self-confidence and manly courage are perfectly con- 
 sistent with every attribute of real modesty. True modesty 
 requires simplyy that the man should he made secondary to 
 the subject. If it be an arguer's purpose to display his own 
 abilities and dazzle his audience, conceit is no hindrance; 
 but if it be his aim to win his case, it is different. If he makes 
 it evident that he thinks he is himself more important than 
 what he has to say, the men whom he is addressing will read- 
 
 1 Howell's Stale Trials, Vol. 28, p. 566. ^ Foster, p. 268. 
 
PERSUASION 269 
 
 ily share his disrespect for the cause he represents, and, how- 
 ever much they may envy his brilHancy, they will be likely 
 to give their allegiance elsewhere. Furthermore, an audience 
 has a natural tendency to doubt the modesty of a speaker. 
 For the moment he is on a plane a little above his auditors; 
 he stands as their leader in thought and action. Now men 
 in an audience are willing to be led, but they object to being 
 driven. They will accept leadership, but they will rebel 
 against dictation, and they are quick to notice any assump- 
 tion of superiority or command. The line between leader- 
 ship and dictation, between equality and assumed superi- 
 ority, is the dead-line of friendship with the audience, and a 
 speaker who crosses the line has lost much of the power of 
 persuasion. This is the essence of the art of persuasion; 
 the relation of the speaker to his audience and of the writer to 
 his reader must always be an attitude of leadership. 
 
 5. Self-control and reserve force. Closely akin to mod- 
 esty is self-control and reserve. The speaker who loses self- 
 control before an audience is sure to distract attention from his 
 case to himself and so lose the very heart of persuasion — 
 and he is likely to offend in a positive way as well. "A lack 
 of self-control is the besetting sin of very vigorous and en- 
 thusiastic speakers. These men often work themselves up 
 to a state of such excitement that they (a) exaggerate, (b) 
 say things they had not planned or wanted to say, (c) for- 
 get to say what they wanted to say, and (d) display feelings 
 which they should have restrained. Any newspaper reporter 
 will tell you how general is the fault of poor self-control. 
 Public men, because of it, make speeches for which they are 
 sorry and sometimes, we regret to state, they brand a true 
 report of such an address as a lie. Newspapers are blamed 
 for * misstatements' which in reality are the true records of 
 utterances made without self-control." ^ This must be not 
 taken to mean that vigor and enthusiasm are in essence 
 undesirable. Enough of these to give the impression that 
 ^ Robinson, F. B., p. 144. 
 
270 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the speaker really and vitally means what he says, is decidedly 
 worth while. But enthusiasm must not be allowed to "run 
 away" with the speaker; it must be controlled. We instinct- 
 ively like the man who can control himself and seems always 
 to have much power held in reserve. When a speaker gives 
 the impression that he has expended his last thought and 
 ultimate emotion he has lost his power to lead — to persuade. 
 The audience feel they have all he has and are as competent 
 to lead as he. A sense that there is much more that might 
 be said; deeper emotions that are controlled in order that 
 calm thought may prevail, has a very persuasive effect. 
 "Reserved force, which tells for much in all kinds of com- 
 position, cannot be overestimated as an instrument of per- 
 suasion. Webster's words, *It is, sir, as I have said, a 
 small college, and yet there are those who love it,' together 
 with his manifest effort to repress his emotion, did more for 
 Dartmouth College than could have been effected by hours 
 of direct appeal." ^ This truth which seems to be ignored 
 by so many poor and mediocre speakers, who always try 
 deliberately to work themselves and their hearers into a pas- 
 sion, is emphasized by all recognized writers on persuasion. 
 Says Foster,^ "Behind his most impassioned speech he must 
 have reserve force. He must have such command of self that 
 his hearers will believe his convictions to be the result of 
 calm, vigorous thinking, and his strongest emotions to be 
 under the control of his intellect. A speaker who is overcome 
 by his feelings may stimulate his audience to a brief response, 
 but the more enduring persuasion results from a masterful 
 expression of firm conviction, which is felt to be deliberate 
 and just in spite of a speaker's strong feelings." There is no 
 worse fault in public speaking than that of talking always in 
 a ringing, emotion laden voice. The speaker who falls into 
 this habit has little chance of being listened to and no chance 
 of influencing intelligent people. When you underline every 
 word on a page you emphasize none of them. A comment 
 1 Hill, p. 395. 2 Foster, p. 271. 
 
PERSUASION 271 
 
 which explains very well this danger of lack of reserve force 
 is that of Baker and Huntington. "Because exhibition 
 of emotion is often an easy way of moving other people to 
 act as we wish, it has been abused as a means of persuasion. 
 Expression of strong emotion is really dangerous unless one's 
 hearers are in full sympathy with it; they will feel in it, es- 
 pecially if highly refined, something a little repellent because 
 too uncontrolled. Moreover, frequent dependence on this 
 method of persuasion weakens its effect. An audience, 
 seeing that the speaker seems to feel readily any emotion, 
 begins to doubt the genuineness of this feeling, wondering 
 whether it is at best more than perhaps unconscious acting 
 of a high order. If it decides that the display of emotion is 
 really but acting, it may admire the man as an actor; it will 
 not long do his bidding. . . . 
 
 ** For a speaker to say to himself during the preparation of 
 his address : * This idea gives me a chance for a stirring burst 
 of emotion, therefore here I will let my audience see ho\\ 
 moved I am' has the theatric about it, and may lead to fail- 
 ure. It is safer in planning persuasion to trust to relating 
 one's ideas to motives operant in the audience and to de- 
 picting conditions which should arouse emotion. If it kindles 
 in the very words of a speaker, if in spite of his efforts to the 
 contrary it overmasters him, he will be very persuasive, but 
 if it does not arise in these ways, a note of insincerity will 
 probably spoil its effect. A student should remark here the 
 difference between the art of the orator and the art of the 
 actor. The success of the actor is complete if his audience 
 feels: *This is the perfect simulation of anger, grief, mirth, 
 misery.' For the orator that judgment is the doom of his 
 persuasive work. His audience must be swept out of its 
 critical self-control into participation in the anger, grief, 
 mirth, or misery, so complete as to take action in consequence 
 of it. The orator has a special act in mind as the end of his 
 persuasion; the actor has not." ^ 
 
 ^ Baker and Huntington, pp. 333-335. 
 
272 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 6. Fairness is happily a quality that most audiences delight 
 to find in a speaker. Do not try to take unsportsmanlike 
 advantages of your opponent. Be fair and honest with him 
 as well as with your audience. Quote him correctly, answer 
 what he really said. Be honest and fair in all representations 
 of his case or his statements in detail. "Fairness is itself 
 persuasive. Do not attempt to conceal important facts 
 which make against your position. Give your opponent all 
 possible credit; concede all that you can honestly concede. 
 Grant him everything but the one point which you must 
 establish. Present his case with manifest fairness. Present 
 it better than he can present it; and, if you can honestly do so, 
 make it even more forcible against your own contentions. 
 If you cannot state your opponent's case, you do not know it; 
 if you do not know it, you cannot hope to refute it; and if you 
 dare not state it, you acknowledge that you deserve defeat at 
 the start. Give your opponent credit for good faith, and thus 
 escape personalities. Save your time and your energy for re- 
 futing his arguments rather than himself." ^ 
 
 B. The subject. 1. Must fit speaker and audience. Not 
 much detailed discussion of persuasion is required under 
 this head. The subjects for most serious arguments are pre- 
 scribed, and naturally fit the occasion and the speaker. Thus 
 the greatest consideration is taken care of. To make persua- 
 sion easy the subject should fit the audience and the speaker. 
 Because in actual life we usually argue on a given subject 
 with those who are interested and responsible, and because 
 we usually argue* about something that interests us or con- 
 cerning which we are responsible, this special point is taken 
 care of. Of course you have an almost impossible situation 
 from the standpoint of persuasion when you are talking about 
 a subject that does not fit either yourself or your audience. 
 Do not attempt to argue any subject that will seem to your 
 audience ill suited to your age, experience, station in life, 
 etc. And do not argue with any audience on a subject con- 
 1 Foster, pp. 269-270. 
 
PERSUASION 273 
 
 cerning which you cannot find (or readily create) in them a 
 vital feeling of interest or responsibility. 
 
 2. Handling subject-matter. Assuming now that you have 
 a subject that is persuasively appropriate to yourself and your 
 audience, what practical suggestions can be made for your 
 guidance in handling the subject-matter? Four qualities 
 to be aimed at in order to get maximum persuasion out of 
 the handling of the subject-matter are: brevity, simplicity, 
 vividness, and variety. 
 
 a. Brevity. Appropriate brevity is attained, not by 
 leaving out material that should be used, but by omitting 
 all unnecessary remarks. It is a relative rather than an abso- 
 lute quality. The proper length for any given speech will 
 depend upon many circumstances. Brevity is violated when 
 one talks simply to fill up time, or because he does not know 
 how to quit, or because he cannot drop one point when he has 
 said enough on it. The use of unnecessary words or sentences 
 constitutes a breach of the law of brevity. The shortest 
 explanation that will explain, the shortest allusion that 
 will awaken the desired memories or associations, is the most 
 persuasive. Wasting time with unnecessary talking irritates 
 an audience and greatly hinders persuasion. Hill ^ gives a 
 pointed warning when he says, "It is in exordiums and pero- 
 rations that a young writer often fails : he does not know how 
 to get at his subject or how to get away from it. He should 
 beware of putting in a word of introduction that is not nec- 
 essary to prepare the way for his argument, and of adding a 
 word at the end that is not necessary to enforce his conclu- 
 sion. *Is he never going to begin?* *Will he never have 
 done?' are questions equally fatal." We have shown al- 
 ready how closely related are persuasion and attention. In- 
 deed Winans says,^ "Persuasion is the process of inducing 
 others to give fair, favorable, or undivided attention to prop- 
 ositions." Herbert Spencer ^ after commenting on numerous 
 
 1 HiU, A. S., p. 388. 2 page 256. 
 
 ' Philosophy of Style, pp. 6-8. 
 
274 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 maxims of rhetoric goes on as follows (italics not in the orig- 
 inal): "On seeking for some clue to the law underlying these 
 current maxims, we may see shadowed forth in many of 
 them, the importance of economizing the reader's or hearer's 
 attention. To so present ideas that they may be apprehended 
 vnth the least possible mental effort^ is the desideratum towards 
 which most of the rules above quoted point. When we 
 condemn writing that is wordy, or confused, or intricate — 
 when we praise this style as easy, and blame that as fatiguing, 
 we consciously or unconsciously assume this desideratum 
 as our standard of judgment. Regarding language as an 
 apparatus of symbols for the conveyance of thought, we may 
 say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and 
 the better arranged in its parts, the greater will be the effect 
 produced. In either case, whatever force is absorbed by 
 the machine is deducted from the result. A reader or listener 
 has at each moment but a limited amount of mental power 
 available. To recognize and interpret the symbols presented 
 to him, requires part of this power; to arrange and combine 
 the images suggested, requires a further part; and only that 
 part which remains can be used for realizing the thought con- 
 veyed. Hence, the more time and attention it takes to re- 
 ceive and understand each sentence, the less time and at- 
 tention can be given to the contained idea, and the less vividly 
 will that idea be conceived. 
 
 "How truly language must be regarded as a hindrance to 
 thought, though the necessary instrument of it, we shall 
 clearly perceive on remembering the comparative force with 
 which simple ideas are communicated by signs. To say 
 * Leave the room' is less expressive than to point to the door. 
 Placing a finger on the lips is more forcible than whispering 
 *Do not speak,' A beck of the hand is better than *Come 
 here.' No phrase can convey the idea of surprise so vividly 
 as opening the eyes and raising the eyebrows. A shrug of the 
 shoulders would lose much by translation into words. Again, 
 it may be remarked that when oral language is employed, 
 
PERSUASION 275 
 
 the strongest effects are produced by interjections, which con- 
 dense entire sentences into syllables. And in other cases, where 
 custom allows us to express thoughts by single words, as in 
 Beware, Heigho, Fudge, much force would be lost by expand- 
 ing them into specific propositions. Hence, carrying out the 
 metaphor that language is the vehicle of thought, there seems 
 reason to think that in all cases the friction and inertia of 
 the vehicle deduct from its efficiencj^; and that in compo- 
 sition, the chief, if not the sole thing to be done, is to re- 
 duce this friction and inartia to the smallest possible amount. 
 Let us then inquire whether economy of the recipient's at- 
 tention is not the secret of effect, alike in the right choice and 
 collocation of words, in the best arrangement of clauses in a 
 sentence, in the proper order of its principal and subordinate 
 propositions, in the judicious use of simile, metaphor and 
 other figures of speech and even in the rhythmical sequence 
 of syllables." 
 
 b. Simplicity. The first five definitions of simplicity 
 given in Webster's dictionary show how in practically every 
 shade of meaning of the word, simplicity as a rhetorical 
 quality must aid persuasion by economizing attention. The 
 definitions are: " 1. The quality or state of being simple, un- 
 mixed, or uncompounded. 2. The quality or state of being 
 not complex or of consisting of few parts. 3. Artlessness 
 of mind; freedom from cunning or duplicity. 4. Freedom 
 from artificial ornament, pretentious style or luxury; plain- 
 ness. 5. Freedom from subtlety or abstruseness; clearness." 
 Simplicity in rhetoric means all these things: unmixed, not 
 complex, free from cunning, duplicity, artificial ornament, 
 pretentiousness, subtlety, and abstruseness. The absence 
 of such simplicity both in composition and delivery lies at 
 the bottom of the greatest fault known in public speaking, 
 that is artificial, ornate, bombastic style which results in a 
 speech which is an exhibition and not a communication. This 
 indirectness which is a sort of parading of voice and vocabu- 
 lary — ringing, long drawn, emotionally false cadences in 
 
276 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 voice, and high flowing, ponderous periods in language, 
 is absolutely inconsistent with thought. A mentality that is 
 alive and active at the moment of utterance cannot use this 
 sort of medium. So this fault is most common in declama- 
 tion or in the speaking of those who have learned to speak 
 largely by declamatory practice. The common custom of 
 choosing only the perorations of great speeches (the parts in 
 which emotion was at its height with the audience prepared 
 for it — a tense emotional setting ready) for declamatory 
 practice, in a flat, uninteresting, absolutely non-emotional 
 atmosphere, by a boy who often cannot grasp the mighty 
 thoughts of the orator, is a fruitful source of this kind of 
 hollow, declamatory, meaningless speaking. The result 
 is a show rather than a conversation. Such speakers display 
 their powerful voices and teeming vocabularies before an 
 audience. They do not present live thoughts to an audience. 
 They do not reason with an audience. There is no contact. 
 It is all detached, impersonal, indirect; literally "sound and 
 fury signifying nothing." After such an experience the lis- 
 teners may say (if their taste is low) *' What a fine speech!" 
 They will not say *'Let us march against Phillip!" 
 
 Simplicity is akin to sincerity. The speaker or writer who 
 is really sincere usually treats his subject with simplicity. 
 In fact, having any one good quality aids us in getting the 
 others. False ornament, the ringing alliterative adjectives, 
 and trite figures of speech, which always hinder communi- 
 cation of thought, are usually the concrete offenses against 
 simplicity. Such hollow rhetoric should be eliminated what- 
 ever the cost. There can be no speech or manuscript that 
 will not be improved by such cutting — regardless of the 
 nature of what is left. Hardress O'Grady, of the University 
 of London, in a little volume ^ whose keynote is sincerity 
 gives much good advice and suggestion on this topic. To 
 quote: "Although the form and style be excellent, there can 
 be no good writing if the subject-matter is unreal to the 
 ^ Matter, Form, arid Style. 
 
PERSUASION 277 
 
 writer. No man can write honestly about subjects of which 
 he has no experience. His comments will strike the reader\ 
 as unreal, affected, or priggish, or they will be mere imita- 
 tions of some author read shortly before the work was 
 done. . . . Form and style are essential for the proper pres- 
 entation of the subject, to interest the reader, to please him, 
 and to keep his attention to the end. But form and style are 
 of no avail if there is no reality in the subject-matter. There- 
 fore the subject must be alive to the writer, it must be im- 
 portant to him, for otherwise it will not live and become im- 
 portant to the reader." ^ "Is it alive? is it interesting.^ is 
 it plain and honest truth .^^ has it a root in you.'^ Do not be 
 afraid to give yourself away. People will respect you all the 
 more for writing plainly and very sincerely. If the subject 
 interests you, with careful handling and sincere writing it 
 will interest others. An engineer, a motorist, an architect, 
 a schoolmaster, a scientist, will interest his audience very 
 much in a highly technical description if he is enthusiastic 
 about it, and uses plain, clear, *full-of -blood' language. 
 Great politicians have often held — or shall I say gripped .f* — 
 audiences that were really hostile to their opinions because 
 their speeches came from their very hearts. They had a root 
 in themselves."^ "Since I feel that style is sincerity, all 
 this book has been about style. . . . Go through your 
 writing with a blue pencil, and see what you can cross out as 
 unnecessary. . . . Beware of set phrases which have been 
 used so often that they have become stale or commonplace, 
 and have lost their original meaning. Beware of catchwords. 
 Beware of the sentence which sounds pretty or clever. Is 
 it true? Finally, ask yourself of every part and of the whole. 
 Is this honest thinking .f* honest description.'^ am I sincere? 
 is it true? Is it true?" ^ "Precision," says Phelps in discuss- 
 ing this topic,'* "is the most effective test of affected style 
 
 1 Matter, Form, and Style, p. 11. 2 jbid., p. 27. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 121. 
 
 * English Style in Public Discourse, pages 115, 116. 
 
278 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 as distinct from genuine style. In affected style, expression 
 is estranged from thought. Apply the test of precision, and 
 the mask drops. . . . Apply to any form of affectation in 
 style the query, *What precisely does the writer mean.''' and 
 the glamour of affected excellence disappears." 
 
 c. Vividness. "Deductions," says Cardinal Newman,^ 
 "have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly 
 reached, not through reason, but through the imagination, 
 by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts 
 and events, by history, by description." If we would per- 
 suade by means of direct impressions, facts, events, descrip- 
 tions, we must present such material vividly. Vividness is 
 an essential quality of all good persuasive work, either oral 
 or written. Vivid means strong, bright, animated, lifelike. 
 To get vividness we must have material capable of vivid 
 presentation; so we must keep this quality in mind when 
 choosing facts, evidence, anecdotes, etc. " The chief source of 
 brevity and \dvidness dramatically is selection. That is, a 
 dramatist does not give all the details of the lives of his char- 
 acters or of their conversations, but selects those parts which 
 are most significant for his purpose. Similarly a speaker, 
 in making any direct appeal to the emotions, should give only 
 the essential or striking features of that which moves him or 
 is intended to move his hearers." ^ Of course only that can 
 be vivid which is understood. A reference to anything with 
 which your audience is unfamiliar, instead of enforcing your 
 case by calling up a vivid image only hinders your case by 
 distracting the hearer's attention. While the man in the au- 
 dience is wondering whom you meant, or trying to recall the 
 historical fact to which you refer, he is paying no attention 
 to what you are saying. The reference must be instantly 
 intelligible or nothing is gained and much may be lost by 
 distracting attention. 
 
 (I) Reference to experience. Phillips, in his excellent 
 
 ^ Dismissions and Arguments, quoted by A. S. Hill, p. 394. 
 2 Baker and Huntington, p. 338. 
 
PERSUASION 279 
 
 chapter on The Principle of Reference to Experience ^ sums 
 this all up as follows: "If, then, the coming into the life of 
 the listener is a means to successful speaking, it logically fol- 
 lows that the more closely the reference touches the life, the 
 greater the effectiveness, or, to state it formally as a working 
 principle: 
 
 '* The more the speaker brings his idea within the vivid experi- 
 ence of the listener y the more likely will he attain his end, and, 
 obversely: 
 
 " The less the speaker brings his idea within the vivid experi- 
 ence of the listener, the less likely will he attain his end.** 
 
 (A) Vivid experiences. "This being so, the problem 
 of the speaker is the determination of the relative value of ex- 
 periences — their comparative vividness, and the principles 
 that govern this may now be stated: 
 
 " (1) An experience will be vivid to the listener in the degree 
 that it is originally intense, that is, in the degree the initial 
 experience engraved itself upon his memory. . . . 
 
 " (2) An experience will be vivid in the degree that it is 
 experienced frequently. You could describe the house that 
 you had lived in daily, for years, better than the house of an 
 acquaintance that you had visited but once. . . . 
 
 " (3) An experience will be vivid in the degree that it is 
 frequently recollected. A war veteran served through the cam- 
 paign but once. Yet his battles, sieges, fortunes, have all 
 their original intensity, through the frequency of recollec- 
 tion. Week after week, year after year, he retells them, and 
 thereby keeps his mental pictures fresh. . . . 
 
 " (4) An experience will be vivid in the degree that it is 
 recent. Other things equal, an experience has power accord- 
 ing to its nearness in time. We can recall this morning's 
 breakfast with greater distinctness than that of a year ago. 
 The raging headache of yesterday arouses deeper feeling than 
 that of last month. 
 
 " Including the foregoing in one statement, we have: An ex 
 1 Effective Speaking, p. 33ff. 
 
280 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 perience will he vivid in the degree that it is originally intense^ 
 recent, frequent in recurrence, and frequently recollected,'* 
 
 (II) The concrete and specific is always more vivid than 
 the abstract and general. Note the increasing vividness in 
 the following series : vegetation, vegetable, radish, white rad- 
 ish, long white radish, big long white radish, a white radish 
 four inches long, a withered white radish four inches long; 
 flower, rose, yellow rose. Consumption is more specific than 
 disease; disease than indisposition, drunkenness than dissipa- 
 tion. Says Lamont, ^ . . . "the right word is that which pre- 
 sents the idea most precisely. The sentence, *The horse is 
 coming down the street,* is not so precise, not so vivid as 
 *The horse is galloping down the street.' The reason is that 
 
 * coming' is a general word, covering all kinds of locomotion; 
 the horse may be walking, trotting, or pacing — all included 
 under * coming,' which conveys the notion rather hazily. 
 
 * Galloping,' however, describes but one gait and thus forms 
 in the mind a more sharply defined picture. * Galloping' 
 we call a specific word because it specifies the idea exactly. 
 From this example it is evident that one secret of a vivid and 
 interesting, as opposed to a colorless and dull, style, is to 
 employ, whenever possible, a specific rather than a general 
 word. The difference in effect is shown in the following pas- 
 sages : 
 
 General. All at once I saw two figures; one a man who was com- 
 ing east, and the other a girl who was coming down a cross street. 
 Well, sir, the two came together naturally enough at the corner; 
 and then came the unpleasant part of the thing, for the man 
 walked over the child and left her making a noise on the ground. 
 It does not sound very bad, but it was disagreeable to see. 
 
 Specific. All at once I saw two figures : one a little man who was 
 stumping along eastward at a good walk, and the other a girl of 
 maybe eight or ten who was running as hard as she was able down 
 a cross street. Well, sir, the two ran into one another naturally 
 
 * Lamont, English Composition, pp. 340- 341. 
 
PERSUASION 281 
 
 enough at the corner; and then came the horrible part of the thing; 
 for the man trampled calmly over the child's body and left her 
 screaming on the ground. It sounds nothing to hear, but it was 
 hellish to see." 
 
 "Do not write 'quite a distance* when you can just as well 
 write * twelve miles,' nor *rude habitations' when you mean 
 * adobe huts,' nor * intoxicating liquor' when you mean 
 'Kentucky bourbon.' Let your trees be maples or syca- 
 mores or live-oaks, and your birds towhees or blue- jays or 
 vireos. Give your characters a name, your incidents a date, 
 and even your sunsets a geographical location. Macaulay 
 understood well the value of this device. The Spectator is 
 'served up every morning with the bohea and rolls.' When 
 young men of rank went into the navy, ' Mulgrave, Dorset, 
 Rochester, and many others, left the playhouses and the Mall 
 for hammocks and salt pork.' Another man might have 
 written : * Whenever the Mahrattas threatened an incursion, 
 the inhabitants fled for their lives.' But Macaulay v/rites: 
 'Wherever their kettledrums were heard, the peasant threw 
 his bag of rice on his shoulder, hid his small savings in his 
 girdle, and fled with his wife and children to the mountains 
 or the jungles — to the milder neighborhood of the hyena 
 and the tiger.'" ^ 
 
 d. Variety is the life of speech. "Deadly monotony" 
 is a familiar term that is full of meaning. Monotony always 
 tends to put an audience to sleep; it dulls interest and kills 
 attention. Monotony of voice, of rhythm, of sentence struc- 
 ture, of paragraph organization, in words, in the use of evi- 
 dence and illustration — in fact monotony of any kind tires 
 and alienates the audience and makes persuasion diflficult or 
 impossible. Avoid monotony by securing, first, variety of 
 material; second, variety of phrase, sentence, paragraph, etc. 
 Such material spoken with the mind alert, with a "lively 
 sense of communication" will necessarily insure a varied de- 
 
 * Newcomer, Elements of Rhetoric, p. 238. 
 
282 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 livery. "Seek ye first a variety of thought, and variety of 
 delivery will be added unto you." The different qualities 
 of persuasion, as has been said, are of course intermingled. 
 Having some of them helps one to get the others. It is a 
 universal law. "To him that hath shall be given." He 
 who has simplicity and vividness will usually have variety 
 also without taking special thought to obtain it. 
 
 (I) Comparison and climax. Two closely associated rhe- 
 torical methods that aid in securing the quality of variety (as 
 well as the quality of vividness) are comparison and climax. 
 The student is doubtless familiar with these as explained in 
 all modern books on rhetoric and composition. The thor- 
 oughness of Whately's paragraphs written in 1846 may give 
 a deeper understanding. "Comparison is one powerful 
 means of exciting or heightening any emotion: viz.: by pre- 
 senting a parallel between the case in hand and some other 
 that is calculated to call forth such emotions; taking care of 
 course to represent the present case as stronger than the one 
 it is compared with, and such as ought to affect us more 
 powerfully. 
 
 "When several successive steps of this kind are employed 
 to raise the feelings gradually to the highest pitch (which is 
 the principal employment of what Rhetoricians call the Cli- 
 max), a far stronger effect is produced than by the mere 
 presentation of the most striking object at once. It is ob- 
 served by all travellers who have visited the Alps, or other 
 stupendous mountains, that they form a very inadequate 
 notion of the vastness of the greater ones, till they ascend 
 some of the less elevated (which yet are huge mountains), 
 and thence view the others still towering above them. And 
 the mind, no less than the eye, cannot so well take in and do 
 justice to any vast object at a single glance, as by several 
 successive approaches and repeated comparisons. Thus in 
 the well-known Climax of Cicero in the Oration against 
 Verres, shocked as the Romans were likely to be at the bare 
 mention of the crucifixion of one of their citizens, the sue- 
 
PERSUASION 283 
 
 cessive steps by which he brings them to the contemplation 
 of such an event, were calculated to work up their feelings to 
 a much higher pitch: 'It is an outrage to bind a Roman 
 citizen; to scourge him is an atrocious crime; to put him to 
 death is almost parricide; but to crucify him — what shall I 
 call it?* 
 
 "It is observed, accordingly, by Aristotle, in speaking of 
 Panegyric, that the person whom we would hold up to ad- 
 miration, should always be compared, and advantageously 
 compared, if possible, with those that are already illustrious, 
 but if not, at least with some person whom he excels : to excel, 
 being in itself, he says, a ground of admiration. The same 
 rule will apply, as has been said, to all other feelings as well 
 as to Admiration : Anger, or Pity, for instance, are more effec- 
 tually excited if we produce cases such as would call forth 
 those passions, and which, though similar to those before us, 
 are not so strong; and so with respect to the rest." ^ 
 
 C. The audience. 1. Adaptation to a particular audi- 
 ence. Know your audience and adapt your speech to your 
 audience. This, in summary, is the whole theory of handling 
 an audience, but it may be well to be somewhat more detailed 
 and specific. By knowing your audience is meant that you 
 should know as accurately as possible the interests and prej- 
 udices of each audience in regard to the subject you are to 
 present to them, and to the occasion on which you speak. 
 Do not deliver the same speech to six different types of au- 
 diences to whom you have to present the same subject. Dis- 
 cover how these audiences differ one from the other and adapt 
 your speech to each particular audience. In order to do this, 
 consider carefully what ideas in your speech toill most forcibly 
 offed the emotions of your particular hearers or readers. There 
 are in every question certain phases of it that have a particu- 
 lar interest for any particular audience. The workingmen of 
 Liverpool in 1863 were most interested in the industrial side 
 of the slavery question, and Beecher showed his consummate 
 1 Whately, R., p. 142. 
 
284 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tact in choosing this as the one phase to be treated above all 
 others at the mass-meeting in Philharmonic Hall. It would 
 have been folly to have discussed the question from the 
 standpoint of American patriotism. On the other hand, 
 before a council of clergymen in the United States, it would 
 have been the immorality of "man owning man" that would 
 have been the theme of persuasion. It often happens that 
 speakers and writers treat their subjects from too many points 
 of view. They turn the question over and examine it on 
 every side, when the men whom they address are moved in 
 mind or heart by only one aspect of it all. Intellect may be 
 the same in Gwery audience, varying only in the degree of its 
 keenness; but the emotional interests of audiences differ 
 widely in their very nature. In any subject there are only 
 certain phases that can touch these varying emotions, and it is 
 a fundamental duty of one who would persuade, to consider 
 well what these interesting phases are. Then his appeals 
 will be well directed toward the vulnerable points, and his 
 blows will be of some effect on the will of his audience. 
 
 2. Tact. The quality that lies at the basis of adaptation 
 is tact. The tactful person easily adapts his remarks to his 
 audience. Do not misunderstand what is meant by tact. It 
 does not mean hypocrisy, flattery, servility, obsequiousness. 
 There is nothing underhanded or deceitful about it. It is 
 nearer to politeness, consideration for the feelings of others, 
 good manners. Your despiser of tact uses a sledge hammer 
 for all purposes whether the task at hand properly requires 
 a tack hammer or a pile driver. He is usually as incapable of 
 great force as he is of delicate touch. He is an unskilled 
 workman — ^a bungler who tries to make up for his lack of 
 inteUigence and politeness by ill-bred boasting of his honesty 
 and good intentions. Of course tact is no proper substitute for 
 careful preparation and honest convictions, but it is the most 
 powerful ally of preparation and purpose. To decry tact 
 because some clever people rely on it to the exclusion of other 
 means is silly. It is like decrying education because educated 
 
PERSUASION 285 
 
 criminals are more dangerous than others. Intelligence is, 
 of course, a more dangerous adversary than stupidity — it is 
 also a more effective champion. 
 
 Early in this book we said that persuasion might be likened 
 to the engine of an automobile, conviction to the steering 
 gear. In the following extract, talent means practically that 
 which is covered in argumentation by the word conviction — 
 evidence, logic, fact, — the general worth and truth of your 
 case; tact means persuasion, the power of making your case 
 effective, of finding a way to get your truth accepted by 
 those to whom you present it. "Talent is something, but 
 tact is everything. Talent is serious, sober, grave, and 
 respectable; tact is all that, and more too. It is not a sixth 
 sense, but it is the life of all the five. It is the open eye, the 
 quick ear, the judging taste, the keen smell, and the lively 
 touch; it is the interpreter of all riddles, the surmounter of 
 all difficulties, the remover of all obstacles. It is useful in 
 all places, and at all times; it is useful in solitude, for it shows 
 a man his way into the world; it is useful in society, for it 
 shows him his way through the world. 
 
 "Talent is power, tact is skill; talent is weight, tact is 
 momentum; talent knows what to do, tact knows how to do it: 
 talent makes a man respectable, tact will make him respected; 
 talent is wealth, tact is ready money. . . . 
 
 "Take them to the bar, and let them shake their learned 
 curls at each other in legal rivalry. Talent sees its way 
 clearly, but tact is first at its journey's end. Talent has many 
 a compliment from the bench, but tact touches fees from 
 attorneys and clients. Talent speaks learnedly and logically, 
 tact triumphantly. Talent makes the world wonder that it 
 gets on no faster, tact excites astonishment that it gets on so 
 fast. And the secret is, that tact has no weight to carry; it 
 makes no false steps; it hits the right nail on the head; it loses 
 no time; it takes all hints; and, by keeping its eye on the 
 weathercock, is ready to take advantage of every wind that 
 blows. 
 
286 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 " Take them into the church. Talent has always something 
 worth hearing, tact is sure of abundance of hearers; . . . 
 talent convinces^ tact converts. . . . 
 
 " Talent has the ear of the house, but tact wins its heart and 
 has its votes: talent is fit for employment, but tact is fitted 
 for it. . . . It has served an invisible and extemporary 
 apprenticeship: it wants no drilling; it never ranks in the 
 awkward squad; it has no left hand, no deaf ear, no blind 
 side. It puts on no looks of wondrous wisdom, it has no air 
 of profundity, but plays with the details of place as dexter- 
 ously as a well-taught hand flourishes over the keys of the 
 pianoforte. It has all the air of commonplace, and all the 
 force and power of genius." ^ 
 
 3. Indirect appeal. The value of what is called the "in- 
 direct appeal" has often been discussed. It is probably one 
 of the best and safest "thumb rules" ever applied to the 
 problem of persuasion. Stated succinctly, it is : Never avow 
 in so many words your purpose to arouse any particular 
 emotion. The reasons for this rule have been set forth by 
 many writers, but none have surpassed the discussion of 
 Whately, which follows in full: 
 
 "The first and most important point to be observed in 
 every address to any Passion, Sentiment, Feeling, etc., is 
 (as has been already hinted), that it should not be introduced 
 as such, and plainly avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in 
 great measure, if not entirely, lost. This circumstance forms 
 a remarkable distinction between the head now under con- 
 sideration, and that of Argumentation (conviction). When 
 engaged in Reasoning, properly so called, our purpose not 
 only need not be concealed, but may (as I have said), without 
 prejudice to the effect, be distinctly declared: on the other 
 hand, even when the Feelings we wish to excite are such as 
 ought to operate, so that there is no reason to be ashamed of 
 the endeavours thus to influence the hearer, still our purpose 
 
 1 "Tact and Talent," The London Adas. Quoted by Clark and Blanchard, 
 pp. 110, 111. 
 
PERSUASION 287 
 
 and drift should be, if not absolutely concealed, yet not 
 openly declared, and made prominent. Whether the motives 
 which the orator is endeavouring to call into action be suit- 
 able or unsuitable to the occasion, — such as it is right, or 
 wrong, for the bearer to act upon, — the same rule will hold 
 good. In the latter case it is plain, that the speaker who is 
 seeking to bias unfairly the minds of the audience, will be 
 the more likely to succeed by going to work clandestinely, 
 in order that his hearers may not be on their guard and pre- 
 pare and fortify their minds against the impression he wishes 
 to produce. In the other case, — where the motives dwelt on 
 are such as ought to be present, and strongly to operate, — 
 men are not likely to be pleased with the idea that they need 
 to have these motives urged upon them, and that they are 
 not already sufficiently under the influence of such sentiments 
 as the occasion calls for. A man may indeed be convinced 
 that he is in such a predicament; and may ultimately feel 
 obliged to the Orator for exciting or strengthening such 
 sentiments; but while he confesses this, he cannot but feel 
 a degree of mortification in making the confession, and a 
 kind of jealousy of the apparent assumption of superiority, 
 in a speaker, who seems to say, *Now I will exhort you to feel 
 as you ought on this occasion;' *I will endeavour to inspire 
 you with such noble, and generous, and amiable sentiments 
 as you ought to entertain;' which is, in effect, the tone of 
 him who avows the purpose of Exhortation. The mind is 
 sure to revolt from the humiliation of being thus moulded 
 and fashioned in respect to its feelings, at the pleasure of 
 another; and is apt, perversely, to resist the influence of such 
 a discipline. 
 
 "On the other hand, there is no such implied superiority 
 in avowing the intention of convincing the understanding. 
 Men know, and (what is more to the purpose) feel, that he 
 who presents to their minds a new and cogent train of Ar- 
 gument, does not necessarily possess or assume any offensive 
 superiority; but may, by merely having devoted a particular 
 
288 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 attention to the point in question, succeed in setting before 
 them Arguments and Explanations which have not occurred 
 to themselves. And even if the arguments adduced, and the 
 conclusions drawn, should be opposite to those with which 
 they had formerly been satisfied, still there is nothing in this 
 so humiliating, as in that which seems to amount to the 
 imputation of a moral deficiency. 
 
 "It is true that Sermons not unfrequently prove popular, 
 which consist avowedly and almost exclusively of Exhorta- 
 tion, strictly so called, — in which the design of influencing 
 the sentiments and feelings is not only apparent, but prom- 
 inent throughout; but it is to be feared, that those who are 
 the most pleased with such discourses, are more apt to apply 
 these Exhortations to their neighbours than to themselves; 
 and that each bestows his commendation rather from the 
 consideration that such admonitions are much needed, and 
 must be generally useful, than from finding them thus useful 
 to himself. 
 
 "When indeed the speaker has made some progress in 
 exciting the feelings required, and has in great measure 
 gained possession of his audience, a direct and distinct 
 Exhortation to adopt the conduct recommended will often 
 prove very effectual; but never can it be needful or advisable 
 to tell them (as some do) that you are going to exhort them. 
 
 "It will, indeed, sometimes happen that the excitement of 
 a certain feeling will depend, in some measure, on a process of 
 Reasoning; e. g., it may be requisite to prove, where there is a 
 doubt on the subject, that the person so recommended to the 
 Pity, Gratitude, etc., of the hearers, is really an object de- 
 serving of these sentiments; but even then, it will almost 
 always be the case, that the chief point to be accomplished 
 shall be to raise those feelings to the requisite height, after 
 the understanding is convinced that the occasion calls for 
 them. And this is to be effected not by Argument, properly 
 so called, but by presenting the circumstances in such a point 
 of view, and so fixing and detaining the attention upon them, 
 
PERSUASION 289 
 
 that corresponding sentiments and emotions shall gradually, 
 and as it were spontaneously, arise. 
 
 "Sermons would probably have more effect, if, instead of 
 being, as they frequently are, directly hortatory^ they were 
 more in a didactic form; occupied chiefly in explaining some 
 transaction related, or doctrine laid down, in Scripture. 
 The generality of hearers are too much familiarized to direct 
 exhortation to feel it adequately : if they are led to the same 
 point obliquely, as it were, and induced to dwell with interest 
 for a considerable time on some point, closely, though in- 
 cidentally, connected with the most awful and important 
 truths, a very slight application to themselves might make 
 a greater impression than the most vehement appeal in the 
 outset. Often indeed they would themselves make this 
 application unconsciously; and if on any this procedure made 
 no impression, it can hardly be expected that anything else 
 would. To use a homely illustration, a moderate charge of 
 powder will have more effect in splitting a rock, if we begin 
 by deep boring, and introducing the charge into the very heart 
 of it, than ten times the quantity, exploded on the surface." ^ 
 
 4. Responsibility: Facing the truth. The thing that can 
 and should be done, directly, openly, bluntly, is to tell the audi- 
 ence of their own responsibility. There is no need here for indi- 
 rectness. You are not talking about what feeling should stir 
 them. You do not say '* I propose to arouse a feeling of guilt, 
 or sympathy, or love or hate," but "you are responsible for 
 this situation and I propose to prove it to you." "This is 
 the truth and you must face it." "There are the facts. 
 It's up to you. What are you going to do?" Says Winans ^ 
 on this point: "It is often very diflScult to bring home to an 
 audience the feeling that they are personally responsible for 
 the matter in hand. The preacher who levels a sermon at 
 the head of an erring deacon is congratulated by that very 
 deacon, who chuckles *to think how Brother Smith got 
 scored this morning.' The preacher is continually finding 
 1 Whately, pp. 136-138. 2 Winans, pp. 265-268. 
 
290 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 it necessary to say, * If the coat fits you, put it on.' The citi- 
 zen who attacks a municipal abuse finds dozens to * sympa- 
 thize' and say, * Yes, yes, why doesn't somebody attend to 
 that? ' for one to step forward and say,' I have come to help.' 
 Very likely the priest and the Levite who passed the injured 
 man by, said, *Too bad! Somebody should care for him, 
 and clean out those bandits too; but my business in Jericho 
 won't wait.' We can readily see that the speaker's task is 
 to get people to face their obligation squarely, to give it at- 
 tention when other matters of business and pleasure are 
 taking their minds. He must make them see that the public 
 nuisance, the grafting city administration, the violation of 
 tenement-house laws, the endangered honor of the university, 
 are the personal responsibility, not only of all of his hearers, 
 but of each of them; not something that *they' should at- 
 tend to, but something that unofficial John Smith should 
 attend to. 
 
 "The most obvious thing to do is to declare bluntly the 
 individual responsibility of each one present. But audiences 
 are rather hardened to this; we are all told of innumerable 
 imperative duties as men and citizens, as members of this 
 body and that. At least a new and interesting way of bring- 
 ing home the responsibility is needed, especially when one's 
 hearers are not yet aroused over the situation. . . . 
 
 "An important way of awakening the sense of responsibility, 
 which also enlists pride, is to give one's hearers something 
 definite to do, whether that something be really important 
 work in a position of trust, or merely signing a petition, or 
 standing up to be counted. Get them at least to commit 
 themselves publicly to your cause so that the public will 
 expect action from them. Get as many as feasible serving 
 on committees to do specific tasks and report upon them. 
 Men of real efficiency may be interested in a cause just by the 
 chance to do work well; they like to make things go. Other 
 men may be enlisted by being made to feel that they are 
 needed. . . . 
 
PERSUASION 29) 
 
 "It is important to prevent people from deceiving them- 
 selves with excuses. Professor James, in discussing attention 
 and will, puts stress upon the difficulty we often have in keep- 
 ing attention upon the right action, seeing clearly that a 
 duty is a duty and that an evil action is an evil action. . . . 
 It is sometimes the speaker's business to compel his audience 
 to face unpleasant facts as real, and in particular to prevent 
 their putting them away by calling them by other names. . . 
 
 " The part of the persuader in helping or compelling others 
 to accept and stick to the right conception, labeled with the 
 right name, is plain enough. He should not permit his 
 hearers to call rudeness or destructiveness fun, penuriousness 
 caring for one's own household, indolence weariness or illness, 
 snobbishness refinement, lies excuses, bigotry religion, or to 
 suffer from the two delusions from which an Oxford don says 
 his little world suffers, — having no opinions and calling it 
 balanced mind, and expressing no opinions and calling it 
 moderation. 
 
 "Dr. Wiley tells a story of a member of a certain Middle 
 West legislature who sought an appropriation of $100,000 
 for the protection of public health; but could secure only 
 $5,000. One morning he put upon the desk of each legislator 
 before the opening of the session, a fable which ran something 
 like this: *A sick mother with a baby is told by a physician 
 that she has tuberculosis and that she should seek a higher 
 altitude. Lack of means prevents her going. She appHes 
 to the state government and is told that not a dollar is avail- 
 able to save the mother and her child from death. At the 
 same time a farmer observes that one of his hogs has cholera 
 symptoms. He sends a telegram, collect, to the government. 
 The inspector comes next day, treats the hog with serum 
 and cures it. Moral : Be a hog ! ' The $ 1 00,000 appropriation 
 was promptly granted. The legislators saw from this vivid 
 presentation of the case that what they had variously called 
 economy, common-sense, business is business, etc., was really 
 putting the hog above the child." 
 
292 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 5. The friendly audience. Audiences may be, of course, 
 friendly, neutral, or hostile to the speaker or his cause. The 
 problem of persuasion is obviously comparatively easy with 
 friendly hearers, fairly diflBcult with the neutral group, and 
 hardest with the hostile audience. Read the following and 
 note the contrast due to the different circumstances under 
 which these two speeches were delivered. This is the elo- 
 quent conclusion of one of Henry Ward Beecher's sermons 
 in the pulpit of the Plymouth Church, Brooklyn: — 
 
 "We are children of God in proportion as we are in sympathy 
 with those who are around about us, and in proportion as we bear 
 with each other. How sacred is man, for whom Christ died! And 
 how ruthlessly do we treat him! Oh, my brother, oh, my sister, oh, 
 father and mother, you are of me, and I am of you ! We have the 
 same temptations. We are walking to the same sounds. We are 
 upon the same journey, out of darkness toward light; out of bondage 
 toward liberty; out of sin toward holiness; out of earth toward 
 heaven; out of self toward God. Let us clasp hands. Let us cover 
 each other's faults. Let us pray more and criticise less. Let us 
 love more and hate less. Let us bear more and smite less. And 
 by and by, when we stand in the unthralled land, in pure hght, 
 made as the angels of God, we will pity ourselves for every stone 
 that we threw, but we shall not be sorry for any tear that we shed, 
 or any hour of patient endurance that we experienced for another. 
 Not the songs that you sang, not the verses that you wrote, not 
 the monuments that you built, not the money that you amassed, 
 but what you did for one of Christ's little ones, in that hour will be 
 your joy and your glory above everything else. 
 
 " 'Brethren, this is a sermon that ought to have an application 
 to-day, on your way home, in your houses, and in your business to- 
 morrow. From this time forth, see that you are better men your- 
 selves, and see that your betterment is turned to the account of 
 somebody else. And consider yourselves as growing in grace in 
 proportion as you grow in patience and helpfulness. Consider 
 yourselves as growing in piety and as growing toward God in pro- 
 portion as you grow in sympathy for men.'" ^ 
 
 1 Plymouth Pulpit, Eighth Series, March-September, 1872, p. 245. 
 
PERSUASION 293 
 
 6. The hostile audience. With this, contrast the follow- 
 ing appeal by the same speaker to a hostile public meeting 
 in Liverpool, England. Mr. Beecher had already made sev- 
 eral speeches in the cities in England in behalf of the North- 
 ern interests in the Civil War, and this was his greatest effort. 
 Liverpool was the recognized headquarters of the Southern 
 sympathizers in England; so that the audience that confronted 
 him was largely hostile, and he was compelled to fight for a 
 hearing in the face of hisses, catcalls, and every form of in- 
 decent interruption. Mr. Beecher began: — 
 
 "For more than twenty-five years I have been made perfectly 
 familiar with popular assemblies in all parts of my country except 
 the extreme South. There has not for the whole of that time been 
 a single day of my life when it would have been safe for me to go 
 south of Mason and Dixon's line in my own country, and all for 
 one reason: my solemn, earnest, persistent testimony against that 
 which I consider to be the most atrocious thing under the sun — the 
 system of American slavery in a great free republic. (Cheers.) I 
 have passed through that early period when right of free speech was 
 denied to me. Again and again I have attempted to address au- 
 diences that, for no other crime than that of free speech, visited 
 me with all manner of contumelious epithets; and now since I have 
 been in England, although I have met with greater kindness and 
 courtesy on the part of most than I deserved, yet, on the other 
 hand, I perceive that the Southern influence prevails to some 
 extent in England. (Applause and uproar.) It is my old acquaint- 
 ance; I understand it perfectly — (laughter) — and I have always 
 held it to be an unfailing truth that where a man had a cause that 
 would bear examination he was perfectly willing to have it spoken 
 about. (Applause.) And when in Manchester I saw those huge 
 placards, 'Who is Henry Ward Beecher.?' (laughter, cries of 'Quite 
 right,' and applause), and when in Liverpool I was told that there 
 were those blood-red placards, purporting to say what Henry Ward 
 Beecher has said, and calling upon Englishmen to suppress free 
 speech, I tell you what I thought. I thought simply this, 'I am 
 glad of it.' (Laughter.) Why? Because if they had felt perfectly 
 secure, that you are the minions of the South and the slaves of 
 
294 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 slavery, they would have been perfectly still. (Applause and up- 
 roar.) And, therefore, when I saw so much nervous apprehension 
 that, if I were permitted to speak — (hisses and applause) — when 
 I found they were afraid to have me speak — (hisses, laughter, and 
 "No, no!") — when I found that they considered my speaking dam- 
 aging to their cause — (applause) — when I found that they appealed 
 from facts and reasonings to mob law — (applause and uproar) — I 
 said, no man need tell me what the heart and secret counsel of these 
 men are. They tremble and are afraid. (Applause, laughter, hisses, 
 "No, no!" and a voice, "New York mob.") Now, personally, it is 
 a matter of very little consequence to me whether I speak here to- 
 night or not. (Laughter and cheers.) But one thing is very cer- 
 tain, if you do permit me to speak here to-night, you will hear very 
 plain talking. (Applause and hisses.) You will not find a man 
 that dared to speak about Great Britain three thousand miles oflF, 
 and then is afraid to speak to Great Britain when he stands on her 
 shores. (Immense applause and hisses.) And if I do not mistake the 
 tone and temper of Englishmen, they had rather have a man who 
 opposes them in a manly way — (applause from all parts of the 
 hall) — than a sneak that agrees with them in an unmanly way. 
 (Applause and "Bravo!") Now, if I can carry you with me by 
 sound convictions, I shall be immensely glad (applause); but if 
 I cannot carry you with me by facts and sound arguments, I do 
 not wish you to go with me at all; and all that I ask is simply 
 FAIR PLAY. (Applause, and a voice. "You shall have it, too.") 
 
 "Those of you who are kind enough to wish to favor my speak- 
 ing, — and you will observe that my voice is slightly husky from 
 having spoken almost every night in succession for some time 
 past, — those who wish to hear me will do me the kindness simply 
 to sit still; and I and my friends the Secessionists will make all the 
 noise. (Laughter.)" ^ 
 
 It is striking indeed that these two speeches were from the 
 same lips. They are both strong emotional appeals, and the 
 power of each depends, in no small degree, upon the fitness 
 for the time and place. In the case of the sermon, Mr. 
 Beecher spoke to an audience gathered on a quiet Sabbath 
 
 ^ Patriotic Addresses, Beecher, p. 516. 
 
PERSUASION 295 
 
 day, in a consecrated edifice, in whose "dim religious light" 
 were felt all the sacred influences of architecture and of. music. 
 The minds of his hearers were open to high thoughts and 
 ready to meet in close communion of sympathy and feeling 
 with the orator. So he might well touch the chords of mutual 
 love and of aspiration. In Liverpool, before a strange au- 
 dience in a strange hall, his coming heralded by scurilous 
 placards and threats against his life, the orator was com- 
 pelled to fight for even the privilege of speech itself. To have 
 addressed such a crowd in terms of "holiness" and "tempta- 
 tion" would have been to raise a riot. On the other hand, if 
 the pastor of the Plymouth pulpit had appealed to his con- 
 gregation for "fair play," he would have been charged with 
 insanity. 
 
 Beecher's speech in Liverpool also affords a good illustra- 
 tion of the need of knowing the character and previous opinions 
 of an audience. His audience was largely made up of laboring 
 men. They were struggling from day to day to make an hon- 
 est living, and their standard of value was wages; they com- 
 monly estimated ideas in terms of pounds, shillings, and 
 pence. The master of persuasion knew their thoughts and 
 directed his appeal accordingly. He founded his reasoning 
 on the basis of the benefits to English industry and wages, 
 from the freeing of the Southern slaves. English industry, 
 he said, needs not cotton, but consumers; slaves are not con- 
 sumers, but make them free, and they become the patrons 
 of British cotton and linen, machines and books. Further- 
 more, he spoke in terms that would reach and stir a work- 
 ing man. 
 
 "It is a necessity of every manufacturing and commercial people 
 that their customers should be very wealthy and intelligent. Let 
 us put the subject before you in the familiar light of your own 
 local experience. To whom do the tradesmen of Liverpool sell the 
 most goods at the highest profit? To the ignorant and poor, or to 
 the educated and prosperous? (A voice, 'To the Southerners.* 
 Laughter.) The poor man buys simply for his body; he buys food, 
 
296 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 he buys clothing, he buys fuel, he buys lodging. His rule is to buy 
 the least and the cheapest that he can; he brings away as little as 
 he can; and he buys for the least he can. . . . 
 
 "A savage is a man of one story, and that one story a cellar. 
 When a man begins to be civilized, he raises another story. When 
 you christianize and civilize the man, you put story upon story, for 
 you develop faculty after faculty, and you have to supply every 
 story with your productions. The savage is a man one story deep, 
 the civilized man is thirty stories deep. (Applause.) Now, if you 
 go to a lodging-house where there are three or four men, your sales 
 to them may, no doubt, be worth something; but if you go to a 
 lodging-house like some of those which I saw in Edinburgh, which 
 seem to contain about twenty stories ('Oh, oh!' and interruption), 
 every story of which is full, and all who occupy buy of you — which 
 is the better customer, the man who is drawn out or the man who 
 is pinched up?"> 
 
 7. Eight suggestions for persuasion illustrated. This 
 Liverpool speech is generally used as the basis of discussion 
 of the problem of handling a hostile audience — or of per- 
 suasion in general. Baker and Huntington discuss eight sug- 
 gestions for persuasion, which are summarized as follows : ^ 
 
 " 1. Ascertain the habits of mind of your proposed audience. 
 
 " 2. Determine the special interests and the idiosyncrasies 
 of your audience. 
 
 "3. Connect lower with higher motives. 
 
 "4. Remember that the larger the audience the higher the 
 motives to which appeal may be made. 
 
 "5. Startling an audience may rout indifference or effec- 
 tively emphasize. 
 
 "6. Let the nature of your task determine the order of 
 your persuasion. 
 
 " 7. Unify the persuasion for some definite purpose. 
 
 "8. Be flexible; adapt the work to unexpected exigencies.'* 
 
 After this discussion they show how Beecher in this speech 
 exemplified all of these suggestions (symbols not in the origi- 
 
 ^ Patriotic Addresses, Beecher, p. 519. 
 2 The Principles of Argumentation, p. 331. 
 
PERSUASION • 297 
 
 nal). "Of course, masterly persuasion uses one or more of 
 these suggestions as experience and intuition prompt. 
 Beecher's Speech at Liverpool shows skillful recognition of all 
 of them. (1) Beecher planned it on the idea that an English 
 audience habitually likes fair play, courage, independence, 
 and good nature. He asked for the first because he could 
 offer the other three in exchange. (2) He constantly sought 
 to show the audience the connection between his subject 
 and their personal interests. (3) He knew that it is safest 
 to appeal to high motives, and that when lower motives are 
 used they must lead into higher. (4) His experience told 
 him that in so large an audience as his he might well connect 
 his special appeal with the highest motives. (5) He startled 
 his audience more than once by his frankness, his courage, 
 or his swift turning of the tables. (6-7) The persuasion of 
 each division worked toward a purpose which is stated first 
 in the last paragraphs of the address. (8) Nearly every page 
 illustrates his skill in grappling with conditions which could 
 not have been foreseen. Indeed, as an illustration of success- 
 ful coping with problems of persuasion raised by the nature 
 of the subject, the relation of the speaker to it and to the 
 audience, and the relation of the audience to the subject, 
 the Speech at Liverpool should be studied from end to end." ^ 
 
 * The Principles of Argumentation, p. 330. 
 
CHAPTER 12 
 
 THE INTRODUCTION 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 I. The function of the introduction. 
 A. Conviction. 
 
 1. Definition. 
 
 a. By authority. 
 
 b. Etymology. 
 
 c. Context. 
 
 d. Analogy. 
 
 e. Illustration. 
 
 f. Exclusion. 
 
 g. Analysis. 
 
 2. Explanation, issues, and partition. 
 
 a. Direct or inverted order. 
 
 b. Illustration of the three parts. 
 
 c. Two or more issues : parallel partition. 
 
 d. Issues emphasized. 
 
 e. Excluding irrelevant matter. 
 B. Persuasion. 
 
 1. Calm, courteous, conversational. 
 
 2. Do not detract from your theme. 
 
 3. Strange or hostile audiences. 
 
 4. Never lose temper. 
 
 5. Inattentive audience. 
 
 I. The function of the introduction is to prepare the way 
 for the work of the discussion proper. This duty of the in- 
 troduction is twofold. Both an intellectual and an emotional 
 approach to the problem must usually be made in the intro- 
 duction. The intellect must be prepared, so that all the proofs 
 may have their fullest effect; the emotions, in order that the 
 speaker or writer may from the first be brought into har- 
 
 298 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 299 
 
 monious and sympathetic relations with his audience. So 
 the introduction must contain the proper approach to both 
 conviction and persuasion. Cicero said the purpose of the 
 introduction is to render the audience ^*benevolos, attentos, 
 dociles'' — well disposed, attentive, ready to be influenced. 
 But it should be remembered, in connection with this much 
 quoted remark that Cicero divided speeches into six parts 
 (introduction, narration, proposition, proof, refutation, con- 
 clusion). By introduction he meant only the opening re- 
 marks whose function is almost purely persuasive. The work 
 in conviction to be accomplished in the introduction as we 
 understand it, Cicero took up under " narration and proposi- 
 tion." Some modern writers have given a threefold division 
 of the function of the introduction. Professor F. B. Robinson ^ 
 gives as the purpose of the introduction, " (A) to put the au- 
 dience in a state of favorable feeling; (B) to arouse interest 
 and secure attention; and (C) to prepare the audience to 
 understand the message." It will be noticed that the first of 
 these aims at persuasion, the second at persuasion and con- 
 viction, and the third at conviction. Pattee ^ says " the work 
 of the introduction is threefold: (1) to conciliate the audience; 
 (2) to explain the subject; and (3) to outline the discussion." 
 The first of these is a work in persuasion, the second and third 
 have to do with conviction. We shall discuss the function of 
 the introduction under the familiar division of conviction 
 and persuasion, as explained earlier in this book,^ using ap- 
 propriate subdivisions under each. 
 
 A. Conviction. We have seen that, with respect to 
 conviction, it is the duty of the introduction to give all the in- 
 formation necessary for an understanding of the discussion; 
 also that the parts usually necessary for the accomplishment 
 of this purpose are, briefly: (1) a definition of terms; (2) an 
 explanation of the question in such a way as to lead up to (3) 
 the issues, and (4) the partition or statement of the points 
 to be proved in the discussion. 
 
 1 Page 31. 2 Page 28. « See eh. 1. 
 
300 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 1. Definition ^ in argumentation serves two purposes. 
 It serves, firsU to enable the writer, in the beginning of his 
 work in preparation, to find out the real meaning of the ques- 
 tion. Secondly i it serves to make the meaning clear to the 
 reader or hearer. In the execution of the former of these two 
 purposes the definitions do not need to be expressed at all; 
 it is suflBcient that the investigator find and understand them 
 himself. But in presenting his proofs to others, the arguer 
 must consider the methods he will need to use, in order to 
 make his definitions effective with the persons he is seeking 
 to convince. To present a definition forcibly is not always 
 easy. A mere dictionary definition, which we have seen to 
 be of little or no value in finding out the meaning of the ques- 
 tion, is of even less value in the w^ork of presentation. If a 
 person does not understand the meaning of a word or phrase, 
 as used in a proposition, his confusion will not usually be 
 cleared by the quotation of a mere sentence from a diction- 
 ary. In the first place, such a definition is nearly always 
 too short and too compact to be grasped in its full meaning, 
 in the short time given for the statement of it. Moreover, 
 it will probably not be convincing. If the person who is being 
 argued with is to be made to accept fully the definition, he 
 must be persuaded of its reasonableness; he must be made to 
 see why the term means what the disputant says, and so be 
 brought to accept it without doubt or qualification. It is 
 for these reasons that we find all the best argumentative 
 writers and speakers taxing the resources of their ingenuity 
 for interesting, clear, and forcible methods of presenting their 
 definitions. The following are some of the most common 
 and eflPective methods used. 
 
 a. By authority. The arguments from authority, which 
 have already considered elsewhere,^ may be used with good 
 effect in the explanation of definitions. We have seen that 
 a dictionarj^ statement is of little value; but there are few 
 
 ^ See ante, p. 186, quotation from Bodkin. 
 ^ See chapter 6, Evidence, p. 99. 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 301 
 
 ways of defining more persuasive with an audience, than 
 to quote to them an explanation of the term, as given by 
 some recognized speciaHst in that branch of affairs with 
 which the word or phrase is concerned. The quotation, 
 however, should not usually be short or dogmatic in form. 
 It should be an explanation rather than a mere sentence 
 statement. Also, care should be taken, as in any argument 
 from authority, that the reliability of the person quoted is 
 fully recognized, so that the definition may have the full 
 force of expert evidence. In using this method, also, it is 
 usually desirable to explain the quotation, either before or 
 after reading it, in order to be sure that it is understood and 
 accepted by the persons addressed. It will be noticed in 
 the selection that follows, that the speaker, after citing his 
 definition, goes on at considerable length to comment on the 
 reasonableness of the statements of his authority, and to 
 show the bearing of the definition on the question before the 
 court. The illustration is from the speech by Mr. William 
 A. Beach before a military commission in Washington, D. C, 
 1865. He is here defining the term '* military law," quoting 
 from O'Brien's American Military Law (pp. 26-27) : — 
 
 *" Military law may be defined to be a body of rules and ordinances 
 prescribed by competent authority for the government of the 
 military state considered as a distinct community. . . . The gen- 
 eral law claims supreme and undisputed jurisdiction over all. The 
 military law puts forth no such pretensions. It aims solely to 
 enforce on the soldier the additional duties he has assumed. It 
 constitutes tribunals for the trial of breaches of military duty only. 
 It attempts not to regulate or adjust the civil rights of those who 
 fall under its cognizance, nor does it affect to redress civil injuries 
 or private wrongs, unless they be, in some degree, connected with 
 the safety and good order of the military state as having a tendency 
 to disturb its peace and quiet. Civil injuries or private wrongs, not 
 immediately related to the rights of a soldier as such, are left, like 
 his civil rights, to the redress of the general or common law.' . . . 
 
 "Your Honors perceive how completely the extract justifies my 
 
802 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 reasoning. It will impress Your Honors with its obvious propriety. 
 It assigns to Courts like yourselves their true position. It enables 
 them to accomplish their full oflSce, without interference with the 
 ordinary tribunals of the country. It disturbs none of the relations 
 of civil life. It assigns to you exclusively the field of military disci- 
 pline and efficiency. It maintains a wise harmony between the 
 necessity which called you into existence and the functions you 
 should exercise." ^ 
 
 b. By etymological derivation. The meaning of a term 
 may often be made clear, by tracing the etymological deriva- 
 tion of the word or the history of the development of its mean- 
 ing. This method is, perhaps, not so common as many others, 
 for ambiguity in a word does not, in argumentation, usually 
 arise from any confusion of its common meanings such as 
 might be removed by a study of its life history. But wher- 
 ever this method may be used it is always effective, because 
 such an explanation is logical and clear. John Quincy Adams, 
 in his Sixteenth Lecture on Rhetoric and Oratory at Har- 
 vard University in 1807, thus defined the word "passion": — 
 
 "There is, however, a more restricted sense in which the term 
 * passion' is used, and of which the precisest idea will be formed by 
 tracing its etymology. In this sense it is equivalent to sufferance, 
 distress, anguish. In this sense it has emphatically been applied to 
 the last sufferings of the Saviour; and to this sense it must be con- 
 fined when we are inquiring into those pathetic powers of oratory 
 which awaken the sympathies of the audience. These very words 
 themselves, 'pathetic' and 'sympathy,' are both derived from the 
 Greek irdSo^, of which the Latin passio is merely a translation. 
 And the meaning, universally annexed to them, has kept closer to 
 their original derivation than the Latin term." ^ 
 
 Blackstone, in Chapter XXVII of his Commentaries, de- 
 fines "heirlooms" by this method: — 
 
 - "Heirlooms are such goods and personal chattels as, contrary to 
 the nature of chattels, shall go by special custom to the heir along 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 459. 
 2 J. Q. Adam's Lectures, Vol. I, pp. 380, 381. 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 303 
 
 with the inheritance, and not the executor of the last proprietor. 
 The termination, loom, is of Saxon origin, in which language it 
 signifies a limb or member; so that an heirloom is nothing else but 
 a limb or member of the inheritance." ^ 
 
 c. From context. The meaning of a term often depends 
 upon the way in which it is used in connection with certain 
 other terms, in the same sentence or paragraph. Under such 
 conditions, the best way to define the terms is to explain 
 fully how they are connected with one another. Such an 
 explanation is sure to be forcible, if the reasoning is sound, 
 for it shows the person addressed just why the term means 
 what is alleged. An excellent illustration of this method was 
 given by Daniel Webster in his speech before the Supreme" 
 Court in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, 1807. Mr. Webster 
 is here defining the word "contracts": — 
 
 "The most conclusive argument, perhaps, arises from the con- 
 nection in which the clause stands. The words of the prohibition, 
 so far as it applies to civil rights, or right of property, are, that * no 
 State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but 
 gold and silver coin a tender in the payment of debts, or pass any 
 law impairing the obligation of contracts.' . . . The parts of the 
 prohibition are connected by the subject-matter, and ought, there- 
 fore, to be construed together. Taking the words thus together, 
 according to their natural connection, how is it possible to give a 
 more limited construction to the term 'contracts,' in the last branch 
 of the sentence, than to the word 'debts,' in that immediately 
 preceding? Can a State make anything but gold and silver a tender 
 in payment of future debts.'* This nobody pretends. But what 
 ground is there for a distinction? No State shall make anything 
 but gold and silver a tender in the payment of debts, either existing 
 or future, but that contracts spoken of are subsisting contracts only. 
 Such a distinction seems to us wholly arbitrary." ^ 
 
 d. By analogy. It is sometimes effective to show an 
 analogy between the terms to be defined and some other term 
 
 ^ Chase's Blackstone, p. 536. 
 
 2 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 38. 
 
304 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 whose meaning is better known. By comparing the ambigu- 
 ous phrase with some standards with which the audience are 
 well acquainted from their everyday experience, the ambi- 
 guity is removed. Mr. Seward, in his defence of William 
 Freeman before the Cayuga Oyer and Terminer, Auburn, 
 N. Y., 1846, defined "insanity" by the method of analogy 
 as follows: — 
 
 "Although my definition would not perhaps be strictly accurate, 
 I should pronounce insanity to be a derangement of the mind, 
 character, and conduct resulting from bodily disease. I take this 
 word 'derangement,' because it is one in common everyday use. 
 We all understand what is meant when it is said that anything is 
 ranged or arranged. The houses on a street are ranged, if built 
 upon a straight line. The fences on your farms are ranged. A 
 tower, if justly built, is ranged; that is, it is ranged by the plummet. 
 It rises in a perpendicular range from the earth. A file of men 
 marching in a straight line are in range. 'Range yourselves, men,' 
 though not exactly artistical, is not an uncommon word of com- 
 mand. Now what do we mean when we use the word 'c^ranged '? 
 Manifestly that a thing is not ranged, is not arranged, is out of 
 range. If the houses on the street be built irregularly, they are 
 deranged. If the fences be inclined to the right or left, they are 
 deranged. If there be an unequal pressure on either side, the tower 
 will lean, that is, it will be deranged. So if a man be insane. There 
 was a regular line which he was pursuing, not the same line which 
 you or I follow, for all men pursue different lines, and every sane 
 man has his own peculiar path. All these paths are straight, and 
 all are ranged, though all divergent. ... If the fond mother be- 
 comes the murderer of her offspring, it is easy to see that she is de- 
 ranged. If the pious man, whose steps were firm and whose path- 
 way led straight to Heaven, sinks without temptation into criminal 
 debasement, it is easy to see that he is deranged. But in cases 
 where no natural instinct or elevated principle throws its light 
 upon our research, it is often the most difficult and delicate of all 
 human investigations to determine when a person is deranged. 
 
 "We have two tests. First, to compare the individual after the 
 supposed derangement with himself as he was before. Second, to 
 compare his course with those ordinary lines of human life which 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 305 
 
 we expect sane persons of equal intelligence and similarly situated 
 to pursue." ^ 
 
 e. By illustration. One of the most common ways of ex- 
 plaining a term is to give illustrations of the interpretation 
 put upon it. The greatest virtue of such a method lies in its 
 vividness. A person will commonly remember a concrete 
 example long after he has forgotten the statement of a prin- 
 ciple. William Pinckney, in his defense of John Hodges 
 before the Circuit Court of Maryland, at the opening of his 
 speech gave an extended definition of "treason." The fol- 
 lowing is an excerpt from the first part of his explanation: — 
 
 "It may be aflfirmed as an universal proposition that criminal 
 intention is the essence of every species of crime. . . . 
 
 "Take the case of a man who, in time of war, is charged with the 
 defense of an important fortress or castle, which he surrenders to 
 an incompetent force. What more effectual means could he have 
 adopted to aid the enemy than the delivery of this fortress? The 
 books will tell you that if he was bribed to this desertion of his duty, 
 if he did it with a view to benefit the enemy, he is guilty of treason. 
 But if pusillanimity was the cause, or if it arose from a false calcu- 
 lation of his own means, or the force of the enemy, he is not a 
 traitor. You may banish him with ignominy from the ranks which 
 he has disgraced, or try him by martial law as a coward or a fool; 
 but he has committed no treason. 
 
 "Suppose a powerful force to invade the country, to which re- 
 sistance is hopeless. They levy contributions, they do not proclaim 
 that they will hang me if I neglect to comply with this order, but 
 they threaten plunder and desolation. I know they have the power 
 to execute that threat, and I comply accordingly. Now the paying 
 of money or the furnishing of provisions is an assistance; it is 
 * giving aid and comfort' much more effectually than the delivery 
 of a few prisoners or a deserter. Yet no man will call this treason, 
 because there is no evidence of hostility to the interests of the 
 country. The authorities say it is not treason." ^ 
 
 1 Works of William E. Seward, Vol. I, p. 425. 
 
 2 Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 38. 
 
306 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 f. By exclusion. The meaning of a term is often ambig- 
 uous because it is commonly understood to include more than 
 it really ought to include. Various attributes, closely con- 
 nected with the attributes properly implied in the term, 
 may easily become confused with the term itself. The con- 
 fusion may arise from the misrepresentation of an opponent, 
 or — the common difficulty — ^from a careless confusion of 
 ideas. In either case, the term is most satisfactorily defined 
 by drawing the line of distinction between the essential and 
 the unessential attributes, and by excluding the ideas that 
 are extraneous, thus leaving the term to include only its 
 natural ai^ proper intent. An excellent example is found in 
 the speech by James T. Brady in defence of the Savannah 
 privateers, before the Circuit Court of the United States. 
 Mr. Brady is here defining the term "piracy": — 
 
 "What are the circumstances, what are the acts, that, in view 
 of the law, amount to piracy? You will understand me that, 
 for the present, I entirely exclude from your consideration any of 
 the particular circumstances which are supposed to give to the 
 actual crime perpetrated a public character, lifting it out of the 
 penal law that you administer, and out of the regions of private 
 crime, into a field of quite different considerations. They are, 
 undoubtedly, that the act done shall be with intent of depriving 
 the person who is in possession of property, as its owner, or as the 
 representative of that owner, of that property. . . . There must 
 be actual violence, or the presence or exhibition of power and in- 
 tent to use violence, which produces the surrender and delivery 
 of the property. Such are the ingredients of robbery and piracy. 
 And, gentlemen, these two ingredients are all; and you must rob 
 one or the other of them of this, their poison, or the crime is com- 
 pletely proved, when the fact of the spoliation, with these ingredients, 
 shall have been proved. The use that the robber or the pirate in- 
 tends to make of retaliation, by way of injury, by way of provoca- 
 tion, by way of any other occasion or motive that seems justifiable 
 to his own conscience to any form whatever of the higher law, has 
 nothing to do with the completeness of the crime." ^ 
 1 Great Speeches by Great Lavryers, p. 381. 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 307 
 
 g. By analysis. Any definition, by whatever method, be- 
 fore it can be presented, requires that the term be analyzed 
 and the attributes essential to its meaning determined upon. 
 The name "analysis," as denoting one of the modes of pre- 
 senting a definition, does not mean that any more careful 
 preliminary analysis of the terms by the writer or speaker is 
 required than is necessary in any other case. It means only 
 that a definition is often best presented by directly explaining 
 to the audience what these essential attributes are, as they 
 have been found by analysis. The method here called by the 
 name "analysis'* consists, then, in explaining the attributes 
 that are properly impHed in the term. For example, Mr. 
 Beach, in defense of Samuel North, defined "crime" as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 "It will be conceded that all crime, punishable by human au- 
 thority, consists in the violation of some rule of conduct declared 
 and published by some competent source. The principle is funda- 
 mental. It underlies the administration of criminal justice by all 
 tribunals, whether military or civil. To constitute offense there 
 must be law existing and law violated; and the law which declares 
 it must be proclaimed and public. If it exist in the form of positive 
 enactment, it must be published. If it be customary law, it must 
 be general, uniform, acknowledged. The citizen cannot be en- 
 trapped into crime. He must be notified of the demands of society 
 in all the departments of its action, whether of peace or war, before 
 obedience can be exacted, and disobedience punished. In a govern- 
 ment of laws those acts only are criminal which the law condemns; 
 and publicity is one of its material requisites. The idea of secret 
 statutes, withheld from the subject whose conduct they are to 
 regulate, is hostile to every principle of just government, and 
 excites the sternest indignation." ^ 
 
 There are, of course, other ways in which a definition may 
 
 be presented; the foregoing are simply examples of some of 
 
 the most desirable methods. The choice of method depends 
 
 entirely upon the circumstances, — on the intelligence of the 
 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Lawyer Sy p. 453. 
 
308 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 audience, the nature of the question, and the nature of the 
 term itself. 
 
 2. Explanation, issues, and partition. In considering 
 the presentation of the remaining parts of the introduction, 
 viz., the explanation of the question, the issues, and the par- 
 tition, the three parts are best treated together. In this part 
 of the presentation one should give practically without 
 change whatever parts are needed of the brief already pre- 
 pared. If the student does not have the discussion of brief 
 drawing clearly in mind, he should refer, at this point, to the 
 directions given for the introduction to a brief. In any in- 
 troduction the explanation, the issues, and the partition must 
 be very closely related : the explanation of the question must 
 make the problem clear in such a way as to lead up to the 
 issues, and make them seem the only natural outgrowth from 
 the very nature of the case. It must cover a narration of 
 whatever facts (in the history of the case) are necessary for 
 an understanding of the discussion. It must show the kind 
 of question being dealt with — what standards must be used 
 in deciding it. This will lead clearly to a statement of the 
 issues, which will be the questions which must be decided 
 in order to decide this question in the right way. The par- 
 tition, in like manner, must be made to seem the natural 
 outgrowth from the issues. The purpose of the partition is, 
 to make the persons to be convinced understand just how the 
 proofs of the disputant meet the issues of the case, and es- 
 tablish his side of them. Consequently, the value of the par- 
 tition depends largely upon its close and evident relation to 
 the statement of the issues; sometimes the points of the is- 
 sues are identical with the points of the partition. 
 
 a. Direct or inverted order. The more clearly your 
 audience understands in advance what you believe the issues 
 to be, what you think the question really involves, what you 
 propose to prove, what your plan of campaign is, the more 
 easily they can follow you. Let them see the road ahead 
 and know where you propose to take them — unless you know 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 30* 
 
 they will not like the road. If they are sure to be unwilling 
 travellers, if they are afraid to follow this path, disinclined to 
 reach the destination you have in mind, lead them to it 
 gradually, logically, persuasively without frightening them 
 or antagonizing them in advance.^ Where ignorance is bliss, 
 'tis folly to state a partition. Professor Raymond M. Alden 
 discusses this point under the heading "Two Methods of 
 Approach." ^ "In a sense, of course, the debater has choice 
 of more than one method in constructing his Introduction. 
 He may state definitely not only the side of the case which 
 he wishes to support, but the sort of proof which he intends to 
 offer in supporting it. He may take the audience into his 
 confidence, and tell them just what the plan of his speech is 
 to be, in order that they may follow it as he proceeds and see 
 that he does just what he proposed to do. Under ordinary 
 circumstances, this method has great advantages. . . . Yet 
 there may be cases where a different plan is advisable. When 
 the cause to be defended is an extremely unpopular one, 
 when the audience must be won — if at all — ^by slow and care- 
 ful degrees, or when the proof to be presented is of such a 
 nature as not to be appreciated until all the evidence is in, 
 then the debater may adopt a more wary course. He may 
 not explain the nature of his argument at the outset, per- 
 haps not even admit which side he intends to establish; but 
 may open up the question as though he had little interest 
 in deciding it in either one way or the other, and then lead 
 his hearers on by paths that they have not foreseen, until 
 he brings them, unexpectedly perhaps, to the point which he 
 wished them to reach. Such a plan requires skill, but is 
 occasionally of no little value. The Introduction, then, either 
 may or may not conclude with a clear statement of the plan 
 of the speaker's argument." 
 
 b. An illustration of the presentation of the three parts 
 of the introduction here under consideration is found in the 
 
 1 See pp. 232, 234, on "inverted order." 
 
 2 Alden, R. M., The Art of Debate, pp. 139, 140. 
 
310 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 speech of David Dudley Field in the ease of the United States 
 vs. Cruikshank, 2 Otto. In this case Mr. Field's clients were 
 indicted for acts declared to be criminal by the so-called 
 Enforcement Act, passed by Congress in 1870. He is here 
 trying to prove that this Enforcement Act is unconstitutional. 
 He said: — 
 
 "Let us reduce and formulate the question, if we can, so as to 
 separate the incidental from the essential, in order that our atten- 
 tion may be withdrawn from all other considerations than that of 
 the one fundamental and permanent theory, upon which this legis- 
 lation must stand, if it stands at all." 
 
 He then quoted and briefly explained the thirteenth, four- 
 teenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution. 
 Continuing, he said: — 
 
 "Professing to act under the authority of these amendments. 
 Congress has passed five acts, four only of which were in existence 
 at the time of the indictment now under consideration: one called 
 the Civil Rights Act, passed April 9, 1866; the second called the 
 Enforcement Act, passed May 31, 1870; the third, amending this, 
 passed February 28, 1871; and a fourth act, passed April 20, 1871." 
 
 He then quoted the terms of these acts and explained their 
 provisions. Continuing: — 
 
 "By authority of this legislation ninety-seven persons were in- 
 dicted together in the Circuit Court of the United States for the 
 District of Louisiana, and three of them, the present defendants, 
 were found guilty upon the first sixteen counts. The indictment 
 was found under the 6th and 7th sections of the Enforcement Act, 
 sixteen counts being for simple conspiracy under the 6th section, 
 and the other sixteen being for conspiracy, with overt acts resulting 
 in murder." 
 
 He then explained the sixteen counts on which his clients had 
 been indicted. Continuing: — 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 311 
 
 "This indictment, or that portion of it upon which these defend- 
 ants have been convicted, is supposed to be justified by the 6th 
 section of the Enforcement Act, and that section is said to rest upon 
 the late amendments. In considering the question, whether it is 
 or is not supported by them, I assume, what cannot be disputed, 
 that before the late amendments this section, and the same may 
 be said of the other sections, would have been beyond the com- 
 petency of Congress. The point of contention, therefore, is whether 
 the amendments have conferred the power." 
 
 This last contains the statement of the issue of the case. 
 It is to be observed how carefully, step by step, Mr. Field 
 leads up to this statement, so that its accuracy is clearly and 
 fully understood by the court. It only remains for him to 
 complete his introduction by the statement of the partition. 
 After a word of explanation, connecting the issue with the 
 points of the partition, he finished as follows: — 
 
 "My argument, therefore, will consist of an endeavor to establish 
 the following two propositions : 
 
 "I. The natural interpretation of the language of the new 
 amendments does not justify the present legislation. 
 
 "II. If the natural interpretation did justify it, yet, as the lan- 
 guage is susceptible of a different one, the latter must be preferred 
 as that alone in which it was understood by the people." 
 
 c. Two or more issues — parallel partition. In the intro- 
 duction given above, the circumstances of the case made it 
 necessary to have the explanation of the question long and 
 detailed, and — as is common in cases at law — the explanation 
 took the form of a narration of events. Also the nature of 
 the case made it possible to reduce the question to a single 
 issue. This is not always possible. More often — as in most 
 cases dealing with public policies — the issues are two or 
 three in number. 
 
 It is to be noticed, in such cases, that the points of the par- 
 tition may correspond exactly with the points of the issues. 
 This is frequently desirable. It is a particularly clear method 
 
312 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 because it makes the relation between the issues and the 
 partition so evident. But it must be remembered that the 
 two parts are not identical. The issues are merely a state- 
 ment of the points on which the controvery must turn, and so 
 are unprejudiced in nature; the partition, on the other hand, 
 is the statement of the points the disputant means to estab- 
 lish in proving his side of the case. They are closely related, 
 but not the same. 
 
 d. The issues emphasized. In the example given above, 
 the issues are presented in the form of a bare statement. 
 But often this is not sufficient. Usually, the critical point or 
 points need to be emphasized, and so presented rhetorically, 
 that they will be impressed on the attention and the memory 
 of the audience. For example, Mr. Jeremiah Black, in his 
 argument in the case of Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, presented 
 the issue of the case briefly and forcibly as follows : — 
 
 "The case before you presents but a single point, and that an 
 exceedingly plain one. . . . Keeping the character of the charges 
 in mind, let us come at once to the simple question upon which 
 the court below divided in opinion: Had the commissioners juris- 
 diction — were they invested with legal authority to try the relaters 
 and put them to death for the offence of which they were accused.'* 
 We answer, no; and, therefore, the whole proceeding from beginning 
 to end was utterly null and void. On the other hand, it is absolutely 
 necessary for those who oppose us to assert, as they do assert, that 
 the commissioners had complete legal jurisdiction both of the 
 subject-matter and of the parties, so that their judgment upon the 
 law and the facts is absolutely conclusive and binding, not subject 
 to correction nor open to inquiry in any court whatever. Of these 
 two opposite views, you must adopt one or the other; for there is 
 no middle ground on which you can possibly stand." 
 
 6. Excluding extraneous matter. One very common 
 method of presenting the issues (as well as an important step 
 toward finding them) consists in excluding extraneous, 
 irrelevant, or mutually admitted matter. It is the error of 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 313 
 
 confusing other kindred questions with the question really 
 in hand that most often makes necessary a careful definition 
 of the issues; and this confusion may very effectively be 
 cleared away by explaining in the introduction what these 
 kindred questions are, and just why they ought to be excluded 
 from consideration. Burke, in his speech in the House of 
 Commons on the Marriage Act, 1781, made clear the issue 
 of the debate by excluding irrelevant matter. The bill in 
 question provided that the power of marrying, without 
 consent of parents, should not exist for persons under twenty- 
 one years of age. Mr. Burke, in his introduction, said: — 
 
 "The question is not now, whether the law ought to acknowledge 
 and protect such a state of life as minority, nor whether the con- 
 tinuance, which is fixed for that state, be not improperly prolonged 
 in the law of England. Neither of these in general is questioned. 
 The only question is, whether matrimony is to be taken out of the 
 general rule, and whether the minors of both sexes, without the 
 consent of their parents, ought to have a capacity of contracting 
 the matrimonial, whilst they have not the capacity of contracting 
 any other engagement." ^ 
 
 B. Persuasion. The function of conviction in the 
 introduction is to prepare the minds of the audience for an 
 understanding of the proof to be offered later in the argument. 
 The function of persuasion is to prepare the way for "favor- 
 able attention," or more strongly, to create a "will to believe." 
 The emotions of an audience need to be prepared no less 
 than their intellect. A man's emotions cannot be wildly and 
 roughly attacked any more than his reason; if the audience is 
 antagonistic to the speaker or out of harmony with him, 
 his emotional appeals will be unavailing. Consequently, 
 before a speaker can control these moving impulses of his 
 audience, he must establish with them close relations of 
 sympathetic attention. He must bring them into close 
 sympathy with himself so that whatever moves him may be 
 ^ Burke s Speeches^ p. 402. 
 
314 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 transmitted easily to them. Here, in the introduction, the 
 speaker often first touches on that emotion which he wishes 
 most to affect in his later efforts, and so prepares it for 
 stronger appeals that are to come. Persuasion in the intro- 
 duction is also a very valuable help in preparing for the work 
 of conviction in the discussion. If an audience is inattentive 
 or hostile to a speaker, much of his proof may pass by with- 
 out effect; so, in order to make his audience listen and do 
 justice to his demonstrations in the discussion, he must 
 interest them in his cause, and create in them a icillingness 
 to he convinced. In general, then, persuasion in the intro- 
 duction must bring the thought and feeling of the audience 
 into working harmony with the speaker or writer. 
 
 The discussion of persuasion given in the last chapter will 
 not be repeated here. Practically everything said there is 
 especially applicable to persuasion in the introduction. Our 
 purpose here is to make a few fundamental suggestions by 
 way of emphasis and practical guidance, and give a few ex- 
 amples of introductory remarks. The persuasive work of the 
 introduction is of utmost importance. A bad impression may 
 prevent a fair hearing — may prevent any hearing at all. 
 Every suggestion made in the last chapter should be taken 
 particularly to heart when planning introductions. 
 
 1. Calm, courteous, conversational. In the first place, 
 whenever possible, start with a reasonably calm, courteous, 
 conversational mode, in both "composition and delivery." 
 Even though the occasion will demand a great show of force 
 before you are through, always repress it in the beginning, 
 except in those rare instances (usually cases in which others 
 have just spoken before you) in which such an emotional 
 tension is reached that the audience as well as the speaker 
 feels the demand for indignant protest, denunciation, or 
 some form of recognition of the emotional demands of the 
 moment. At such a time nothing is more disgusting than 
 a cold, spineless, deliberate "don't get excited" attitude, 
 which springs from either hypocrisy or inability to grasp the 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 315 
 
 significance of the things that have been said. " The pretence of 
 indifference is no less insincere than the pretence of feeling." ^ 
 Probably, however, more speakers make a poor first impres- 
 sion on account of a loud, insistent, false, hollow, emotional, 
 "speechifying,*' opening than for any other one reason. A 
 very good plan for a speaker who is to deliver a prepared 
 speech, is to begin always with a few impromptu sentences, 
 spoken directly to the audience before him, concerning some- 
 thing that fits the particular occasion, — such as a reference 
 to remarks made by the chairman in introducing the speaker. 
 It ought to be easy for anyone to utter such sentences di- 
 rectly in conversational mode, and once started, thus to con- 
 tinue without falling into indirectness. Being calm, courte- 
 ous, and conversational does not mean necessarily being too 
 quiet — or even being quiet at all. It is possible to speak very 
 loudly, in a calm, courteous, conversational manner. Direct- 
 ness is the best of the conversational manner, and it is possi- 
 ble to be perfectly direct and as loud as need be. 
 
 2. Do not detract from your theme. For preparing intro- 
 ductions to different types of audiences, consider the fun- 
 damental principles of persuasion as given in the last chapter. 
 The interest, attention, friendly support, of audiences may 
 be won in various ways. The most important definite 
 warning to be given is : Do nothing to take interest and attention 
 away from your theme. Do not kill present interest by as- 
 suming that it does not exist and trying to create it in an 
 artificial way. Do not think you have to be funny in order 
 to get the attention of an intelligent audience. Many 
 speakers who ought to know better permanently alienate 
 audiences by acting on this offensive assumption. 
 
 Bradbury ^ gives some excellent advice. "The first few 
 sentences which a speaker utters before an audience, receive 
 more universal and closer attention than anything which he 
 may thereafter say on that particular occasion, no matter 
 
 1 Winans, p. 109. 
 
 2 The Structure of an Effective Public Speech, Harry B. Bradbury, pp. 16-19. 
 
316 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 how successful his oration may be. This is a psychological 
 fact which is easy to explain. Curiosity is one of the pre- 
 dominant characteristics of practically everybody. . . . 
 So when a new speaker is introduced and begins to talk, the 
 dullest and least attentive person in the audience listens, out 
 of sheer curiosity, to hear what this new speaker has to offer. 
 This, then, is the very best opportunity the man on the plat- 
 form will have to chain the attention of his audience to the 
 subject which he has in mind. How foolish to waste such a 
 golden opportunity. What unadulterated folly to throw 
 away this wonderful chance by actually directing the atten- 
 tion of the audience to some topic away from the main one 
 which the speaker wishes to press home and as to which he 
 desires to have the audience accept and act upon his rec- 
 ommendation. How unwise, then, to start a serious subject 
 with a funny story. Just to the extent that the story has 
 succeeded, exactly to that extent has the attention of the 
 audience been distracted from the serious matter in hand, 
 and it has been made that much harder again to focus their 
 attention on this matter. They will wait for further funny 
 stories and unless they are forthcoming there is a mental 
 resentment, which requires Herculean efforts and marked 
 ability to overcome, to the extent of again directing intel- 
 ligent attention to the serious questions under discussion. 
 It is barely possible that the point of a funny story may con- 
 tain the very essence of the serious argument and thus form 
 a good introduction. But this rarely happens and the prac- 
 tice is dangerous. 
 
 " Then if the funny introductory effort fails ! This is a calam- 
 ity greater than the inexperienced can possibly understand. 
 The golden opportunity of taking advantage of that fresh 
 bloom of keen attention is withered and dead. More than 
 that, the speaker must not overcome a feeling of resentment 
 and disgust, before he can secure attention for the serious 
 portions of his subject. 
 
 ** Wit and humor have their places on the public platform, 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 317 
 
 even in serious speeches, but they must be used sparingly, 
 and never in the form of a digressive funny story as part of 
 the introductory sentences. The sole use of such anecdotes 
 is to illustrate and make more forceful a serious argument." 
 3. Strange or hostile audiences. It sometimes happens 
 that the speaker or writer is a stranger to those whom he 
 addresses. Under such circumstances his first duty is to 
 create some bond of fellow-feeling with his audience. Here 
 modesty is clearly one indispensable quality. To this should 
 be added, when possible, the bonds of some common interest 
 or common emotion; again, an appeal may well be made for 
 a charitable hearing and for fair play. Sometimes the au- 
 dience is worse than a stranger; it may be an enemy. To 
 handle an audience that is hostile at the outset, is the most 
 diflBcult task with which an arguer is ever confronted. It 
 calls for a rare combination of courage and patience, of 
 modesty and self-confidence, of tact and determination. 
 The emotions best appealed to under such conditions are 
 commonly those of honesty, courtesy, or a desire for fair 
 play. The skill needed on such an occasion is well illustrated 
 in Beecher's Liverpool speech already discussed.^ A similar 
 plea, full of dignity, courage, and firm modesty, is found in 
 the opening words of William Pinckney's speech in the Mary- 
 land Assembly, in 1788, in behalf of a petition for the relief 
 of oppressed slaves : — 
 
 "Before I proceed to deliver my sentiments on the subject-matter 
 of the report under consideration, I must entreat the members of 
 this House to hear me with patience, and not to condemn what I 
 may happen to advance in support of the opinion I have formed, 
 until they shall have heard me out. I am conscious, sir, that upon 
 this occasion, I have long-established principles to combat and 
 deep-rooted prejudices to defeat; that I have fears and apprehen- 
 sions to silence, which the acts of former legislatures have sanc- 
 tioned, and that (what is equivalent to a host of difficulties) the 
 popular impressions are against me. But if I am honored with 
 
 1 See Ch. 11. 
 
318 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the same indulgent attention which the House has been pleased to 
 afford me, on past subjects of deliberation, I do not despair of sur- 
 mounting all these obstacles, in the common cause of justice, 
 humanity, and policy." ^ 
 
 4. Never lose temper. If prejudice has been created by 
 the appeals of a preceding speaker, these prejudices must, 
 as far as possible, be mitigated in the introduction, for such 
 an unfavorable attitude may nullify the effect of all proof or 
 persuasion, as long as the vision of the audience is thus dis- 
 torted. At such a time, the "retort courteous," ridicule, 
 sarcasm, or even invective are good weapons of defense. 
 Whatever weapon of reply is chosen, there is one precaution 
 that must always be remembered: the disputant must never 
 permit himself to lose his temper in the smallest degree. This 
 temptation is sure to arise in the heat of any earnest dis- 
 cussion where persuasion plays any great part, and it is a 
 temptation that must be always repressed, for ill temper in 
 discussion hurts only him who uses it. There are few better 
 models of personal retort in the history of oratory than can 
 be found in Webster's famous Reply to Hayne, in the debate 
 on the Foote Resolution.^ Another illustration of the great 
 senator's power in personal debate is found in his reply to 
 Calhoun on the 22d of March, 1838. Humor, sarcasm, and 
 defiance are wielded with power, yet all is courteous and 
 firmly dignified. 
 
 "Mr. President: I came rather late to the Senate this morning, 
 and, happening to meet a friend on the Avenue, I was admonished 
 to hasten my steps, as *the war was to be carried into Africa,' and 
 I was expected to be annihilated. I lost no time in following the 
 advice. Sir, since it would be awkward for one to be annihilated 
 without knowing anything about it. 
 
 "Well, Sir, the war has been carried into Africa. The honorable 
 member has made an expedition into regions as remote from the 
 subject of this debate as the orb of Jupiter from that of our earth. 
 
 1 Eloquence of the United States, Vol. V, p. 92. E. and H. Clark. 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 319 
 
 He has spoken of the tariff, of slavery, and of the late war. Of all 
 this I do not complain. On the contrary, if it be his pleasure to 
 allude to all or any of these topics, for any purpose whatever, I 
 am ready at all times to hear him. 
 
 "Sir, this carrying the war into Africa, which has become so 
 common a phrase among us, is, indeed, imitating a great example; 
 but it is an example which is not always followed with success. In 
 the first place, every man, though he be a man of talent and genius, 
 is not a Scipio; and in the next place, as I recollect this part of Ro- 
 man and Carthaginian history, — the gentleman may be more 
 accurate, but as I recollect it, when Scipio resolved upon carrying 
 the war into Africa, Hannibal was not at home. Now, Sir, I am 
 very little like Hannibal, but I am at home; and when Scipio 
 Africanus South Caroliniensis brings the war into my territories, 
 I shall not leave their defence to Asdrubal, nor Syphax, nor anybody 
 else. I meet him on the shore, at his landing, and propose but one 
 contest. 
 
 "Concurritur; horse 
 Momento cita mors venit, aut victoria Iseta." * 
 
 5. Inattentive audience. A hostile audience is less com- 
 mon than an inattentive one. It is well-nigh impossible to 
 convince an audience whose minds are wandering away from 
 the subject or who are carelessly half-listening. At the very 
 beginning, if any such danger is present, — and it is unfor- 
 tunately a common danger, — the attention of the audience 
 must be roused and centred on the topic of the hour. For 
 this reason, probably the most common of all forms of per- 
 suasive introduction is that which emphasizes the importance 
 of the question in discussion. There are many ways of arousing 
 interest in an audience. It may be shown that the question 
 is (a) of great inherent importance; that it is of a peculiar sig- 
 nificance because of its (b) relation to current events and con- 
 ditions; that it is (c) one of the growing problems of the future; 
 or, perhaps, (d) that it has some especially close bearing on 
 the interests of the particular audience. A good example is 
 
 1 The Works ofDanid Webster, Vol. IV. p. 500. 
 
320 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 found in the introduction of Charles James Fox to one of his 
 speeches on the East India Bill : — 
 
 "I did not intend. Sir, to have said anything in addition to that 
 which has been already urged so ably in favor of the resolution 
 now agitated. In my own opinion, its propriety and necessity 
 are completely and substantially established. A few particulars, 
 suggested in the course of the debate by gentlemen on the other 
 side of the House, may be thought, however, to merit some animad- 
 version. And, once for all, let no man complain of strong language. 
 Things are now arrived at such a crisis as renders it impossible to 
 speak without warmth. Delicacy and reserve are criminal where 
 the interests of Englishmen are at hazard. . . . 
 
 "This, at least, has made such an impression on my mind that 
 I never felt so much anxiety; I never addressed this House under 
 such a pressure of impending mischief; I never trembled so much 
 for public liberty as I now do. The question before the House 
 involves the rights of Parliament in all their consequences and 
 extent. These rights are the basis of our Constitution, and form 
 the spirit of whatever discriminates the government of a free 
 country. And have not these been threatened and assaulted?" ^ 
 
 In Burke's masterful introduction to his speech on '* Con- 
 ciliation with America," all of the four ways just mentioned 
 (for emphasizing the importance of a question) are skillfully 
 used. Consider the following, his last paragraph before 
 stating his proposition: — 
 
 "To restore order and repose to an empire so great and so dis- 
 tracted as ours, is, merely in the attempt, an undertaking that 
 would ennoble the flights of the highest genius, and obtain pardon 
 for the efforts of the meanest understanding. Struggling a good 
 while with these thoughts, by degrees I felt myself more firm. I 
 derived, at length, some confidence from what in other circum- 
 stances usually produces timidity. I grew less anxious, even from 
 the idea of my own insignificance. For, judging of what you are by 
 what you ought to be, I persuaded myself that you would not 
 reject a reasonable proposition because it had nothing but its reason 
 
 1 The World's Orators (England), pp. 317, 318. 
 
THE INTRODUCTION 321 
 
 to recommend it. On the other hand, being totally destitute of all 
 shadow of influence, natural or adventitious, I was very sure that, 
 if my proposition were futile or dangerous, if it were weakly con-^ 
 ceived or improperly timed, there was nothing exterior to it, of 
 power to awe, dazzle, or delude you. You will see it just as it 
 is, and you will treat it just as it deserves." ^ 
 
 EXERCISE . CHAPTER 12 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 1. Write a complete introduction, following the suggestions 
 
 of this chapter for each of the three speeches on the 
 campus topic, mentioned in the chapter on Briefing and 
 Outlining. 
 
 2. Chose a proposition on which men divide with very strong 
 
 prejudice, and write an introduction on the same side 
 of your proposition for each of two different audiences, 
 one of which shall be strongly prejudiced in your favor, 
 and the other strongly prejudiced against you. 
 
 3. Hand in a complete introduction to your original forensic. 
 
 ^ Burke's Speech on Conciliation uith America, edited by Albert S. Cook, 
 pp. 6, 7. 
 
CHAPTER 13 
 
 THE DISCUSSION 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. The principles of composition in the discussioB. 
 
 B. Relation of discussion to brief. 
 
 C. Variety in the discussion. 
 
 1. The forms of support. 
 
 a. Restatement. 
 
 b. General illustrations. 
 
 c. Specific instance. 
 
 d. Testimony. 
 
 e. Reasoning. 
 
 D. Showing relations in the discussion. 
 
 E. Methods of emphasis in the discussion. 
 
 1. Digression. 
 
 2. Iteration. 
 
 3. Rhetorical question. 
 
 F. Unity and coherence in the discussion, 
 
 1. Three aids. 
 
 a. Transitions. 
 
 b. Summaries. 
 
 c. Partitions. 
 
 2. Combined summary and partition. 
 
 A. Principles of composition in the discussion. The 
 
 work of presenting the proof in the discussion, is largely a 
 matter of applying the principles of composition to the mate- 
 rials already in hand. If the proofs have been well selected 
 and arranged, to make them accomplish their purpose re- 
 quires only the use of words that will effectively convey them 
 to the minds of others. So that the next requisite for forceful 
 presentation is a working knowledge of rhetoric in general. 
 
 322 
 
THE DISCUSSION 323 
 
 B. Relation of the discussion to the brief. Perhaps the 
 most important question to be dealt with in planning the dis- 
 cussion is the question of the proper relation of the finished 
 composition to the brief. How closely shall the brief be 
 followed in the final presentation? Shall the exact words of 
 the brief be repeated? In answering this question there are 
 two extremes that are generally to be avoided. On the one 
 hand, rhetorical embellishment may destroy all the advantage 
 gained by a good arrangement. On the other hand, the bare 
 bones of the brief may be exposed so rudely as to be offen- 
 sive. Of these two faults the beginner undoubtedly tends 
 toward the latter; he does not take pains enough to make his 
 dish enticing or even palatable. The speech or the finished 
 composition is too often a mere repetition of heads and sub- 
 heads, with the addition of a few conjunctions and a trite 
 phrase here and there. This defect, while far more pardon- 
 able than that of the speaker who talks at random and buries 
 what little he has to say in the confusion of vague and form- 
 less rhetoric, should be very carefully guarded against, be- 
 cause it is much more likely to occur. There is little danger 
 that after a student has prepared a good brief he will fall back 
 on formless rhetoric in the discussion. In presenting an 
 argument to an audience, the great thing for the author of a 
 good brief to guard against is slavery to the brief. Adapt 
 the discussion to the audience. Feel free to change the order 
 of points,^ to leave out part of the proof that is not required 
 for a particular audience, and in every way possible suit 
 the proof to the audience according to all the principles dis- 
 cussed in chapter 11. (See also discussion of persuasion 
 and audience in chapter 6.) If the brief has been really well 
 done, the discussion cannot be very bad unless the speaker 
 fail miserably in persuasion, either positive or negative. 
 
 C. Variety in the discussion. One of the rhetorical 
 elements most commonly lacking, and most needed in the 
 
 ^ See Rule 5 for brief drawing, chapter 10, and discussion of direct or in- 
 verted order, chapter 12. 
 
324 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 discussion, is variety. It is sometimes assumed that less 
 variety in presentation is desirable in argumentation than 
 in most of the other forms of composition or oratory. It is 
 said that in a story or in a demonstrative oration/ since the 
 purpose of the writer or speaker is to please, variety is indis- 
 pensable; but that in argumentation, since the appeal is 
 only to the reason, variety is superfluous. This is funda- 
 mentally wrong. The appeal in argumentation is not simply 
 to the reason. Argumentation that amounts to anything 
 (except in very rare cases, such as we find in mathematics) 
 is concerned with both conviction and persuasion. All the 
 relief, refreshment, pleasure, interest, and attention that 
 will result from variety in presentation cannot but help your 
 case with any audience. The point to be remembered here 
 is that in argument we must strive deliberately to get variety. 
 In other forms of address there may be sufficient variety in 
 the very subject-matter to give it interest; but in most 
 elaborate arguments, the natural coldness of logic needs to be 
 dressed more attractively to hold attention. It is easy, in 
 presenting proof after proof, to fall into some formula of 
 statement or some "stereotyped" method of arrangement. 
 This habit should be carefully avoided, and variety in word, 
 phrase, and manner should be sought from the beginning. 
 
 1. The forms of support. Some excellent suggestions that 
 will be helpful in gaining variety and avoiding stereotyped 
 methods of presenting argument will be found in Phillips* 
 Effective Speaking, particularly his discussion of the four 
 forms of support. Chapters VIII to XVI, inclusive. We 
 quote two of his keynote paragraphs : 
 
 ''Assertions May Demand Support. We make assertions 
 desiring some result. We wish the listener to see our idea 
 clearly, or to feel it, or to believe it, to act upon it, or to find 
 pleasure in it. Or we may seek some combination of these 
 Ends. If the utterance of the assertion alone attains our 
 
 ^"The purpose of demonstrative oratory is 'to charm the senses with 
 words that are fit and adequate.' " Ringwalt, p. 24. 
 
THE DISCUSSION 325 
 
 desired End further remark is a waste of time and energy. 
 If, however, the assertion does not achieve its purpose then, 
 as shown in preceding chapters, it must have support — 
 Cumulation. As experience attests that few assertions, iso- 
 lated, are effective, the main business of the speaker is the 
 supporting of assertions, and his great concern is how to sup- 
 port them so as to achieve the desired End with the least 
 expenditure of time and effort. 
 
 ''The Four Forms of Support. If now, we examine the 
 characteristics of the matter used to support assertions (Cu- 
 mulation) we find that it consists of four kinds. These may be 
 named (a) Restatement, (b) General Illustration, (c) Specific 
 Instance, (d) Testimony. Thus, we may say (Assertion), 
 * Greece had great men,' and continue, *She had master 
 minds.* This is Restatement. We have said the same thing 
 over again in different words. We go on, *She had orators, 
 philosophers, poets.' This is a General Illustration. We 
 have supported the assertion by presenting some of its 
 general features. We proceed, *She had Demosthenes, 
 iEschines, Aristotle, Plato, Homer, Sophocles.' This is 
 Specific Instance. We have strengthened our original as- 
 sertion by actual cases. Finally, we say, *Macaulay says: 
 "Her intellectual empire is imperishable.'" This is Testi- 
 mony. We have supported our assertion by corroboration." ^ 
 (e) Reasoning may well be added to Phillips' classification 
 of the forms of support. If a speaker points out certain 
 evidence from which it must be inferred that Greece had 
 great men he is supporting his assertion in a way not covered 
 by any of the four forms mentioned. This fifth form is, 
 of course, very commonly used in argumentation. 
 
 D. Showing relations in the discussion. In order to 
 convince, it is not sufficient that the materials of the proof 
 be well arranged in the mind of the speaker; the arrangement 
 must be made clear to the audience. Variety and smoothness 
 do not require that the relative importance of the points of 
 1 Phillips, pp. 88, 89. 
 
326 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the brief, or their connection with one another, be obscured 
 In fact, in spoken discourse, even more care needs to be 
 taken in the final presentation than in the brief itself, to 
 make clear the importance and the mutual relation of the 
 points. In the brief, the indenting of the headings and sub- 
 headings and the use of the symbolsy show to the eye how the 
 evidence and arguments are related to one another and to 
 the whole question, and distinguish between the important 
 and the incidental parts. But in spoken and in full manu- 
 script presentation, where there are not headings or subhead- 
 ings, these relations must he made evident by words; the large 
 and vital facts must be enforced by repetition, by illustration, 
 by direct explanation of their significance, or by some other 
 of the many possible methods of emphasis; the relation of one 
 piece of evidence to another must be fully explained, and the 
 purpose and effect of various arguments must be made evi- 
 dent to the reader or hearer. 
 
 E. Methods of emphasis in the discussion. 1. Digres- 
 sion. Three methods of bringing out the importance of cer- 
 tain material which are particularly useful in presenting ar- 
 guments, may well be mentioned and illustrated. The first 
 such method of gaining emphasis is by digressing in the middle 
 of an argument to explain the significance of a piece of evidence. 
 The following selection is taken from the speech by William 
 C. Plunkett in the case of Rex vs. Forbes and others. The 
 defendants were on trial for participation in a riot. They 
 were charged with hurling bottles and other missiles at the 
 Lord-lieutenant of Ireland in a public theater. 
 
 "When I state that a bottle was thrown at the king's representa- 
 tive, and that implements of violence were flung at his person, such 
 is the state of the public mind that it is listened to as if it were a 
 mere bagatelle, a jeu d'esprit, a trifle of which the Lord Lieutenant 
 need not take any notice, and which is below the attention of the 
 government and the law oflicers. Why, gentlemen of the jury, 
 are we awake? Can we be insensible to the effect of such occur- 
 rences upon the honor and safety of the country? Can we reflect, 
 
THE DISCUSSION 327 
 
 without indignation, that such an outrage should be committed 
 in a civilized country against the person of his majesty's repre- 
 sentative, because he had the presumption, in opposition to a 
 desperate gang, to execute the parting injunctions of the king in a 
 manner not calculated to give offence or excite animosity? '* * 
 
 2. Iteration. The persistent repetition of a word or phrase, 
 may also be forcibly used to impress an idea on a reader's 
 memory. This device is well illustrated in the following 
 passage from Matthew Arnold: — 
 
 "The practical genius of our people could not but urge irresistibly 
 to the production of a real prose style, because for the purposes 
 of modern life the old English prose, the prose of Milton and Taylor, 
 is cumbersome, unavailable, impossible. A style of regularity, 
 uniformity, precision, balance, was wanted. These are the quali- 
 ties of a serviceable prose style. Poetry was a different logicy as 
 Coleridge said, from prose. But there is no doubt that a style of 
 regularity, uniformity, precision, balance, will acquire a yet stronger 
 hold upon the mind of a nation if it is adopted in poetry as well as 
 in prose, and so comes to govern both. This is what happened in 
 France. To the practical, modern, and social genius of the French 
 a true prose was indispensable. They produced one of conspicuous 
 excellence, supremely powerful and influential in the last century, 
 the first to come and standing at first alone, a modern prose. French 
 prose is marked in the highest degree by the qualities of regularity, 
 uniformity, precision, balance. With little opposition from any 
 deep-seated and imperious poetic instincts, the French made their 
 poetry also conform to the law which was moulding their prose. 
 French poetry became marked with the qualities of regularity, 
 uniformity, precision, balance. . . . Our literature required a 
 prose which conformed to the true law of prose; and that it might 
 acquire this the more surely, it compelled poetry, as in France, to 
 conform itself to the law of prose likewise. . . . Poetry, or rather 
 the use of verse, entered in a remarkable degree, during the (eight- 
 eenth) century, into the whole of the daily life of the civilized 
 classes; and the poetry of the century was a perpetual school of the 
 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Latoyers, p. 638. 
 
328 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 qualities requisite for a good prose, qualities of regularity, uni« 
 formity, precision, balance." ^ 
 
 3. Rhetorical question. There are few methods of making 
 a vivid impression on the attention and memory of an au- 
 dience, more forcible than the use of the so-called rhetorical 
 question. The rhetorical question is one in which the answer 
 is implied in the form and dehvery of the question; as, for 
 example, "Is the United States a republic or a despotism?'* 
 The value of this device lies largely in the effect of variety 
 and incisiveness which it imparts and the dire tness it assists 
 in attaining. For what is probably the most perfect and 
 elaborate use of the rhetorical question to be found in Ameri- 
 can oratory see Carl Schurz's great speech on "General 
 Amnesty," ^ delivered in the United States Senate, Janu- 
 ary 30, 1872. The following illustration is from Webster's 
 speech in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders : — 
 
 **We come before the court alleging the law to be void and un- 
 constitutional; they stop the inquiry by opposing to us the law 
 itself. Is this logical? ... Is it not obvious, that, supposing the 
 act of New York to be a part of the contract, the question still 
 remains as undecided as ever. What is that act? Is it a law, or 
 is it a nullity? a thing of force, or a thing of no force? Suppose the 
 parties to have contemplated this act, what did they contemplate? 
 its words only, or its legal effect? its words, or the force which the 
 Constitution of the United States allows to it? If the parties con- 
 templated any law, they contemplated all the law that bore on their 
 contract, the aggregate of all the statute and constitutional provi- 
 sions." ' 
 
 F. Unity and coherence in the discussion. In addition 
 to the suggestions for gaining variety and emphasis, in the 
 discussion it is well to say a word about the special necessity 
 
 ^ Genimg, The Working Principles of Rheforic, p. 304. 
 
 2 To be found in many collections. See Ringwalt's Modem American 
 Oratory, pp. 93-130. Or Baker's Forms of Public Address, p. 353. 
 
 3 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 30. 
 
THE DISCUSSION 329 
 
 for coherence and unity in this part of our argument. Em- 
 phasis puts stress upon the significant points of the proof. 
 However, as we have already seen, to be convincing, a speaker 
 or writer must make his audience or readers accept, not this 
 point or that, but his whole case. In order thus to estabhsh 
 the proposition as a whole, in presenting the proof the differ- 
 ent elements nmst be firmly bound together in one. Someone 
 has said that there is "more force in a stone than in a hand- 
 ful of sand." See to it that your case is a stone — a " pudding- 
 stone" perhaps, but still a single stone capable of being 
 thrown at an enemy with some accuracy and force, or of 
 being used to block his advance with some effect. The in- 
 troduction and the conclusion are of great service in gaining 
 this unity; but it is dangerous to leave this work entirely to 
 these external aids. There must be coherence and unity 
 within the proof, as well as ropes and bands without. To 
 depend for unity entirely upon the partition at the beginning 
 and the summary at the end, is likely to make it seem arti- 
 ficial and forced; to gain an effect that is natural and con- 
 vincing, the unity must be made evident in the proof itself. 
 
 1. Three valuable aids in getting unity and coherence in 
 the proof itself, are : (a) transitions, (b) summaries, (c) parti- 
 tions. It is not true that these devices are desirable in every 
 piece of argumentation. Often the proofs are of such a nature, 
 their connection with one another is so obvious, that sum- 
 maries and partitions within the proof are unnecessary; 
 sometimes these devices are positively undesirable, because 
 they give an air of exactness and formality that is inappro- 
 priate. The practice of such methods may easily be carried 
 to an extreme; but the common danger is that of deficiency 
 'ather than of excess. 
 
 a. Transition. A speaker leading an audience along new 
 paths, needs to keep in close touch with them, lest they lose 
 the way and become confused. By the use of transitional 
 phrases, sentences, and paragraphs he holds them always 
 under a firm control, and is enabled to guide them carefully, 
 
330 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 so that the way is constantly opening ahead at each step. 
 John Ward, in his System of Oratory, explains a transition 
 as follows: — 
 
 "A transitioHy therefore, is a form of speech by which the 
 speaker in a few words tells his hearers both what he has said 
 already and what he next designs to say. Where a discourse con- 
 sists of several parts this is often very proper in passing from 
 one to another, especially when the parts are of a considerable 
 length; for it assists the hearers to carry the series of the 
 discourse in their mind, which is a great advantage to the 
 memory. It is likewise a great relief to the attention to be 
 told when an argument is finished and what is to be expected 
 next." 1 
 
 Mr. Ward also gives an excellent illustration of the use of 
 the simple transition: — 
 
 "Cicero, as I have had occasion to observe formerly, di- 
 vides his oration for the Manilian law into three parts, and 
 proposes to speak, first of the nature of the war against King 
 MithridateSy then of its greatness, and lastly of the choice of a 
 general. And when he has gone thro' the first head, which is 
 pretty long, he connects it with the second, by this short 
 transition: Having shown the nature of the war, I shall now 
 speak a few things of its greatness. And again, at the conclu- 
 sion of his second head, he reminds his hearers of his method 
 in the following manner: / think I have sufficiently shewn the 
 necessity of this war from the nature of it, and the danger of it 
 from its greatness. What remains is to speak concerning the 
 choice of a general, proper to be intrusted with it." ^ 
 
 b. Summary. The use of the summaries within the dis- 
 cussion contributes to unity and coherence, by gathering 
 together proofs that are closely associated, and relating them 
 clearly to the whole proposition. They bring the materials 
 thus summarized into one single strong point, instead of 
 a number of scattered and incomplete points. Also the sum- 
 
 1 John Ward, A System of Oratory, Vol. I, p. 290. 
 
 2 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 291. 
 
THE DISCUSSION 331 
 
 mary contributes to clearness, by closing up the division of 
 the proof that is completed, and making it evident that a 
 new line of argument is to be undertaken. Finally, these 
 occasional summaries help greatly in making intelligible the 
 final summary in the conclusion. 
 
 In the report of the Civil Service Commission of 1871, is 
 an excellent example of the short, simple, and direct style of 
 summary that is most effective for use within the proof it- 
 self:— 
 
 ''These are some of the serious and threatening evils of the 
 present practice of treating the inferior posts of administration as 
 party prizes. It exasperates party spirit and perverts the election. 
 It tends to fill the public service with incapacity and corruption, 
 destroying its reputation and repelling good men. It entices Con- 
 gress to desert the duties to which it is especially designated by 
 the Constitution, and tempts the Executive to perilous intrigue." * 
 
 The writer then takes up a new line of argument (refuta- 
 tion) with the following introductory sentence: — 
 
 "The arguments by which the present pernicious practice is 
 justified seem to us wholly unsound." ^ 
 
 c. Partition. Internal partitions perform much the same 
 office as the external partition of the introduction. They 
 turn the attention in the desired direction and explain what will 
 be done next, so that the audience can follow the line of 
 thought that is to come. Webster showed his mastery of the 
 art of being clear by his frequent use of this kind of partition. 
 No better model can be found than the following, taken from 
 his speech before the Supreme Court in the case of Luther 
 vs. Borden et al.:— 
 
 "Having thus, may it please your honors, attempted to state 
 the questions as they arise, and having referred to what has taken. 
 
 1 George William Curtis, Orations and Addresses, Vol. II, p. 43. 
 
332 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 place in Rhode Island, I shall present what further I have to say 
 in three propositions : — 
 
 **1. I say, first, that the matters offered to be proved by the 
 plaintiff in the court below are not of judicial cognizance; and proof 
 of them, therefore, was properly rejected by the court. 
 
 **2. If all these matters could be, and had been, legally proved, 
 they would have constituted no defence, because they show nothing 
 but an illegal attempt to overthrow the government of Rhode 
 Island. 
 
 **3. No proof was offered by the plaintiff to show that, in fact, 
 another government had gone into operation, by which the Charter 
 government had become displaced." ^ 
 
 2. The summary and partition are very effective in combi- 
 nation ; the summary showing what has been done, and the 
 partition what remains to be done, establish beyond a doubt 
 the unity of the demonstration, and give to the readers a clear 
 understanding of what is being accomplished. This combi- 
 nation should, however, be used with judgment, for it is the 
 most formal of all the methods of transition. It is most 
 properly used where the proof is very long, and where the 
 quality most to be sought for is that of logical perfection. 
 For example, it is most appropriate in such an effort as that 
 of Webster before the Supreme Court in the case of Gibbons 
 vs. Ogden: — 
 
 "I contend, therefore, in conclusion on this point, that the power 
 of Congress over these high branches of commercial regulation is 
 shown to be exclusive, by considering what was wished and in- 
 tended to be done, when the convention for forming the Constitu- 
 tion was called; by what was understood, in the State conventions, 
 to have been accomplished by the instrument; by the prohibitions 
 on the States, and the express exception relative to inspection laws; 
 by the nature of the power itself; by the terms used, as connected 
 with the nature of the power; by the subsequent understanding 
 and practice, both of Congress and the States; by the grant of ex- 
 clusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government; by the 
 
 1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 236. 
 
THE DISCUSSION 333 
 
 manifest danger of the opposite doctrine, and the ruinous conse- 
 quences to which it directly leads. . . . But I contend, in the 
 second place, that whether the grant were to be regarded as wholly 
 void or not, it must, at least, be inoperative, when the rights claimed 
 under it come in collision with other rights, enjoyed and secured 
 under the laws of the United States; and such collision, I maintain, 
 clearly exists in this case." ^ 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 13 
 
 THE DISCUSSION 
 
 1. Hand in complete discussion of one of the speeches men- 
 
 tioned in Exercise 1 of the last chapter. 
 
 2. Write a complete discussion for the favorable audience 
 
 mentioned in Exercise 2 of the last chapter. 
 
 3. Write a complete discussion for the hostile audience 
 
 mentioned in Exercise 2 of the last chapter. 
 
 4. Hand in the complete discussion for your original forensic. 
 
 1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, pp. 18, 19. 
 
CHAPTER 14 
 
 THE CONCLUSION 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 I. The purpose of the conclusion. 
 
 A. Conviction. 
 
 1. Summarize. 
 
 a. Variety. 
 
 (I) Formal. 
 (II) Informal. 
 (Ill) Sometimes persuasive. 
 
 2. Amplify and diminish. 
 
 B. Persuasion. 
 
 1. Well disposed toward speaker or writer. 
 
 2. Final stirring of favorable emotions. 
 
 I. The purpose of the conclusion. Twenty-two cen- 
 turies ago Aristotle ^ said that the object of the epilogue or 
 conclusion was four-fold: (1) to conciliate the audience in 
 favor of the speaker and to excite them against his adversary; 
 (2) to amplify and diminish; (3) to rouse the emotions; and 
 (4) to recapitulate. Time has not changed the truth of his 
 statement; these are to-day the offices of the conclusion. 
 Clearly, two of these are primarily concerned with convic- 
 tion and two with persuasion. To recapitulate and to ''am- 
 plify and diminish" are desirable, in order to make complete 
 the intellectual approach; to gain sympathy and to rouse the 
 feelings are desirable, in order successfully to make the emo- 
 tional approach. 
 
 A. Conviction. 1. Summarize. In argumentation the 
 first object of the conclusion is to recapitulate or summarize. 
 The concluding summary is generally necessary in order to 
 
 ^ Rhetoric. Jebb Translation, p. 198. 
 334 
 
THE CONCLUSION 335 
 
 make the proof clear and forcible. In the first place the points 
 made in the discussion must finally be gathered together into 
 a single point in order to convince the audience of the strength 
 of the demonstration as a whole; again, the various points 
 must be repeated and emphasized, in order to impress them 
 on the memory of the audience. 
 
 a. The summary may take a variety of forms, with varying 
 degrees of length and formality. In nearly all student ar- 
 gumentation the summary needs to be careful and detailed; 
 the main heads of the proof must be repeated, and usually 
 many of the subordinate points of the evidence. Rhetori- 
 cally, the summary may take the form of a plain recapitu- 
 lation, or it may be amplified by explanation and enforce- 
 ment. 
 
 (I) Formal. Gardiner ^ has a suggestive paragraph favor- 
 ing shorty decisive conclusions — a type that might well be 
 used except when there is a definite reason for using another 
 kind. 
 
 One of the best examples of a simple recapitulation is 
 found in the conclusion of Webster's speech in the case of 
 Ogden vs. Saunders: — 
 
 "To recapitulate what has been said, we maintain, first, that 
 the Constitution, by its grants to Congress and its prohibitions 
 on the states, has sought to establish one uniform standard of 
 value, or medium of payment. Second, that, by like means, it 
 has endeavored to provide for one uniform mode of discharging 
 debts, when they are to be discharged without payment. Third, 
 that these objects are connected, and that the first loses much of 
 its importance, if the last, also, be not accomplished. Fourth, 
 that, reading the grant to Congress, and the prohibition on the 
 States together, the inference is istrong that the Constitution in- 
 tended to confer an exclusive power to pass bankrupt laws on Con- 
 gress. Fifth, that the prohibition in the tenth section reaches to 
 all contracts, existing or future, in the same way that the other 
 prohibition, in the same section, extends to all debts, existing or 
 
 * The Making of ArgumeiUs, p. 187. 
 
336 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 future. Sixth, that, upon any other construction, one great politi- 
 cal object of the Constitution will fail of its accomplishment." ^ 
 
 (II) Informal. Usually, however, the summary is less 
 formal than the above in its phrasing, and less abrupt in its 
 ending. The more common style is such as that in Burke's 
 speech, on a bill for shortening the duration of ParHaments : — 
 
 "Thus, in my opinion, the shortness of a triennial sitting would 
 have the following ill effects: it would make the member more 
 shamelessly and shockingly corrupt, it would increase his depend- 
 ence on those who could best support him at his election, it would 
 wrack and tear to pieces the fortunes of those who stood upon their 
 own fortunes and their private interest; it would make the electors 
 infinitely more venal, and it would make the whole body of the 
 people who are, whether they have votes or not, concerned in elec- 
 tions, more lawless, more idle, more debauched; it would utterly 
 destroy the sobriety, the industry, the integrity, the simplicity of 
 all the people, and undermine, I am much afraid, the deepest and 
 best laid foundations of the commonwealth." ^ 
 
 (III) Sometimes largely persuasive. While discussing 
 summaries, it may be well to observe that under certain cir- 
 cumstances formal recapitulations may be largely persuasive. 
 It is of course rarely, if ever, true that a great argument 
 closes with a recapitulation that is mainly persuasive. The 
 conclusion of Wendell Phillips' speech on Daniel O'Connell 
 is a persuasive summary: 
 
 "For thirty restless and turbulent years he stood in front of 
 them, and said, 'Remember, he that commits a crime helps the 
 enemy.' And during that long and fearful struggle, I do not re- 
 member one of his followers ever being convicted of a political 
 offense, and during this period crimes of violence were very rare. 
 There is no such record in our history. Neither in classic nor in 
 modern times can the man be produced who held a million of people 
 
 ^The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 40. 
 2 The Speeches of Edmund Burke, p. 400. 
 
TEE CONCLUSION 337 
 
 In his right hand so passive. It was due to the consistency and 
 unity of a character that had hardly a flaw. I do not forget your 
 soldiers, orators, or poets — any of your leaders. But when I con- 
 sider O'Connell's personal disinterestedness, — his rare, brave 
 fidelity to every cause his principles covered, no matter how un- 
 popular, or how embarrassing to his main purpose, — that clear far- 
 reaching vision, and true heart which, on most moral and political 
 questions, set him so much ahead of his times; his eloquence, almost 
 equally effective in the courts, in the senate, and before the masses; 
 that sagacity which set at naught the malignant vigilance of the 
 whole imperial bar, watching thirty years for a misstep; when I 
 remember that he invented his vast success, bearing in mind its 
 nature; when I see the sobriety and moderation with which he used 
 his measureless power, and the lofty, generous purpose of his whole 
 life, — I am ready to affirm that he was, all things considered, the 
 greatest man the Irish race ever produced." ^ 
 
 2. " Amplify and diminish " is the name given to the prac- 
 tice of magnifying the importance of certain points in the 
 discussion, and belittling the importance of others. In doing 
 this, a disputant may diminish certain of his own proofs and 
 amplify certain others, his purpose being to bring out the 
 force of the greater points, by contrast with the lesser. But 
 usually, the practice consists in diminishing, not one's own 
 proof, but the proof of an opponent. In such a case, its 
 effectiveness consists in the direct contrasting of the argu- 
 ments on the opposite sides. The decision of any question 
 is determined by a comparison, in the minds of those ad- 
 dressed, of the relative weight of the proofs of the two arguers, 
 so that a disputant may help his cause just as truly, by di- 
 minishing the weight of the proof against him, as by adding 
 to that of his own. In almost any question, there are usually 
 some phases of it that are favorable to one side, and others 
 that are favorable to the other side; on certain points, the 
 facts support the affirmative, on others, they support the 
 negative. So, the beliefs of the audience or readers about the 
 
 * Ringwalt, Modern American Oratory, pp. 218, 219. 
 
338 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 proposition, as a whole, will be determined largely by their 
 opinions as to which phase, or what points, are really impor- 
 tant. Clearly, then, it would be the policy of the aflSrmative 
 to persuade the audience that the points established in favor 
 of the proposition were of more importance than the points 
 established against it. In this way the affirmative could 
 weaken its opponents, by belittling the significance of the 
 points they had proved and magnifying the significance of 
 its own points, just as surely as it could by a direct attack 
 upon their arguments or evidence. This is one of the most 
 common kinds of amplifying and diminishing. It may, 
 however, take various forms; it may consist in a contrasting 
 of the results of two opposite policies, a contrasting of the 
 evidence of the two sides, or a contrasting of the motives of the 
 two parties; but in all these the purpose is the same, viz.; 
 to compare the two proofs as a whole, and show the prepond- 
 erance of the one over the other. In student debates, where 
 both the materials of the discussion and the time are narrov/ly 
 limited, so that the conflict of the opposing proofs is peculiarly 
 direct, to amplify and diminish is especially effective. 
 
 IVTr. Evarts, in his argument in the case of the Savannah 
 Privateers, uses this artifice, diminishing the case of the de- 
 fense and amplifying his own case in prosecution: — 
 
 "And now, here is your duty, here your post of fidelity, not 
 against law, not against the least right under the law, but to sus- 
 tain, by whatever sacrifice there may be of sentiment or of feeling, 
 the law and the Constitution. I need not say to you, gentlemen, 
 that if, on a state of facts which admits no diversity of opinion, 
 with these opposite forces arrayed, as they now are, before you — 
 the Constitution of the United States, the laws of the United States, 
 the commission of this learned court, derived from the government 
 of the United States, the venire and impanelling of this jury, made 
 under the laws and by the authority of the United States, on our 
 side; met, on their side, by nothing on behalf of the prisoners, but 
 the commission, the power, the right, the authority of the rebel 
 government, proceeding from Jefferson Davis — you are asked by 
 
TEE CONCLUSION 339 
 
 the law, or under the law, or against the law, in some form, to 
 recognize this power, and thus to say that the vigor, the judgment, 
 the sense, and the duty of a jury, to confine themselves to their 
 responsibility on the facts of the case, are worthless and yielding 
 before impressions of a discursive and loose and general nature. 
 Be sure of it, gentlemen, that, on what I suppose to be the facts 
 concerning this particular transaction, a verdict of acquittal is 
 nothing but a determination that our government and its authority, 
 in the premises of this trial, for the purposes of your verdict, are 
 met and overthrown by the protection thrown around the prisoners 
 by the government of the Confederate States of America, actual 
 or incipient." ^ 
 
 B. Persuasion. 1. Well disposed toward speaker or 
 writer. The necessity of an appeal for sympathy,^ in the 
 conclusion, is too obvious to need explanation. When the 
 speech is over, or the essay is finished, the time has come for 
 the hearer or reader to act or deliberate on action; he must, 
 then, be favorably disposed in his feelings toward the speaker 
 or writer, in order to give his side a fair and favorable considera- 
 tion. All the labors of persuasion, in the introduction and in 
 the discussion, may be lost, if the emotions aroused there are 
 allowed to lapse at the end. The sympathy for the speaker 
 and his subject, v^hich has already been stirred, must be left 
 active in the minds of the audience, when he at length sub- 
 mits his case to their hands for judgment. 
 
 The conclusion reaps the harvest of sympathy, sowed in the 
 earlier parts of the argument. Aristotle suggests that this 
 last effort of persuasion may be an appeal by the speaker for 
 favor for himself and his cause, or it may be an attack on the 
 character or cause of an opponent. A good use of these 
 methods, in combination, is found in the argument of Ser- 
 geant Prentiss in defense of Edward C. Wilkinson, who was 
 on trial for murder. In the beginning of the selection he di- 
 rectly attacks the instigator of the trial, and later, the chief 
 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, p. 420. 
 ^ See discussion of persuasion in chapter 11. 
 
340 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 witnesses for the prosecution, closing with a brief appeal for 
 sympathy for himself: — 
 
 "But there is a murderer; and, strange to say, his name appears 
 upon the indictment, not as a criminal, but as a prosecutor. His 
 garments are wet with the blood of those upon whose deaths you 
 hold this solemn inquest. Yonder he sits, allaying for a moment 
 the hunger of that fierce vulture, conscience, by casting before it 
 the food of pretended regret, and false but apparent eagerness for 
 justice. He hopes to appease the manes of his slaughtered vic- 
 tims — victims to his falsehood and treachery — by sacrificing upon 
 their graves a hecatomb of innocent men. By base misrepresenta- 
 tions of the conduct of the defendants, he induced his imprudent 
 friends to attempt a vindication of his pretended wrongs by violence 
 and bloodshed. . . . 
 
 "Upon his head rests not only all the blood shed in this un- 
 fortunate strife, but also the soul-killing crime of perjury; for, 
 surely as he lives, did the words of craft and falsehood fall from 
 his lips, ere they hardly loosened from the Holy Volume. But I 
 dismiss him, and do consign him to the furies — trusting, in all 
 charity, that the terrible punishment he must suffer from the scor- 
 pion lash of a guilty conscience will be considered in his last account. 
 
 "Johnson and Oldham, too, are murderers at heart. But I shall 
 make to them no appeal. There is no chord in their bosoms which 
 can render back music to the touch of feeling. They have both 
 perjured themselves. The former cut up the truth as coolly as if 
 he had been carving meat in his own stall. The latter, on the con- 
 trary, was no longer the bold and hot-blooded knight, but the 
 shrinking pale-faced witness. Cowering beneath your stern and 
 indignant gaze, marked you not how 'his coward lip did from its 
 colors fly'; and how his quailing eye sought from floor to rafter 
 protection from each honest glance. . . . 
 
 "Gentlemen of the jury: — I shall detain you no longer. . . . 
 I had hoped, when the evidence was closed, that the common- 
 wealth's attorney might have found it in accordance with his duty 
 and his feelings to have entered at once a nolle prosequi. Could the 
 genius of 'Old Kentucky' have spoken, such would have been her 
 mandate. Blushing with shame at the inhospitable conduct of a 
 portion of her sons, she would have hastened to make reparation. 
 
THE CONCLUSION 341 
 
 "Gentlemen: Let her sentiments be spoken by you. I^t your 
 verdict take character from the noble State which you in part 
 represent. Without leaving your box, announce to the world that 
 here the defence of one's own person is no crime, and that the 
 protection of a brother's life is the subject of approbation rather 
 than of punishment. 
 
 "Gentlemen of the Jury: I return you my most profound and 
 sincere thanks for the kindness with which you have listened to 
 me, a stranger, pleading the cause of strangers. Your generous 
 and indulgent treatment I shall ever remember with the most 
 grateful emotions. In full confidence that you, by your sense of 
 humanity and justice, will supply the many defects in my feeble 
 advocacy, I now resign into your hands the fate of my clients. As 
 you shall do unto them, so, under like circumstances, may it be 
 done unto you." ^ 
 
 2. Final stirring of favorable emotions. But gaining sym- 
 pathy for one's self is not the whole of persuasion. The emo- 
 tions, which, as we have seen, are the mainsprings of action, 
 must be given a final stimulus. It is, however, not safe to 
 leave all appeal to the emotions to be made in the conclusion; 
 the feelings must be stirred in the introduction, and kept 
 ■constantly active through all the discussion. But there the 
 work of persuasion is only begun; in order to bring the 
 emotions finally into play, they must be wrought to the high- 
 est pitch of all at the close, and directed to the desired end. 
 Consequently, in any great oration, it is in the peroration 
 that we find the most impassioned eloquence; it is here that 
 the orator spends his powers freely in the final appeal. The 
 conclusion must complete, and give carrying force to the work 
 of persuasion, as it does to the work of conviction. 
 
 The emotions are so many, and the possible ways of stir- 
 ring them so varied, that examples are not, perhaps, of great 
 value. To gain such power requires a study of the whole 
 field of the persuasive art — a study of human nature, a study 
 of audiences, a study of the world's oratory. Finally, to 
 
 ^ Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, pp. 121-123. 
 
342 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 develop the fruits of study into real power, demands, in the 
 words of Demosthenes, "Practice! practice! practice!" 
 
 To choose examples of persuasion in the conclusion, in- 
 volves discrimination among many of the most brilliant 
 passages in the world's oratory. The following, from the 
 speech by Grattan on the "Declaration of Irish Right," is 
 not given as, in any sense, the best; it is simply an excellent 
 illustration of one kind : — 
 
 "I might, as a constituent, come to your bar and demand my 
 liberty. I do call upon you by the laws of the land, and their viola- 
 tion; by the instruction of eighteen centuries; by the arms, inspira- 
 tion, and providence of the present movement — tell us the rule by 
 which we shall go; assert the law of Ireland; declare the liberty of 
 the land ! I will not be answered by a public lie, in the shape of an 
 amendment; nor, speaking for the subject's freedom, am I to hear 
 of faction. I wish for nothing but to breathe in this our island, in 
 common with my fellow-subjects, the air of liberty. I have no am- 
 bition, unless it be to break your chains and contemplate your 
 glory. I never shall be satisfied so long as the meanest cottager in 
 Ireland has a link of the British chain clanking to his rags. He 
 may be naked, he shall not be in irons. And I do see the time at 
 hand; the spirit has gone forth; the declaration of right is planted, 
 and though great men should fall oflF, the cause will live; and 
 though he who utters this should die, yet the immortal fire shall 
 outlast the organ that conveys it, and the breath of liberty, hke 
 the word of the holy man, will not die with the prophet, but survive 
 him." 1 
 
 An emotional conclusion of a very different sort was that 
 used by Phillips Brooks in his speech in behalf of the Chil- 
 dren's Aid Society. 
 
 "I sometimes think how it would be if multitude were taken 
 away and we saw in its simplicity that which often loses itself in 
 the large variety in which it is manifested to us. Suppose there 
 were but one needy child in all the world. Suppose every child 
 from China to Peru were wrapped in the soft care and tender luxury 
 * Hardwicke, History of Oratory and Orators^ p. 138. 
 
THE CONCLUSION 343 
 
 which belong to children in their parents' arms. Suppose every 
 babe were cooing itself to rest in its mother's embrace, and every 
 little boy were looking up into the face of a father's sympathy for 
 the first manifestation of a truth that was to make him strong. 
 Then suppose that somewhere, anywhere, upon our earth, there 
 came one cry of a poor, wronged, needy child. Can you not be 
 sure that all humanity would lift itself up and never be satisfied 
 until that child was aided? Is it less pathetic, is it less appealing, 
 because they are here by the million instead of one or two? If one 
 of those little creatures that the doctor read to us about had stood 
 alone in all the generations of humanity, how infinitely pathetic it 
 would have been! How you all would have stood up and said, 
 * Where is that child? Where is that child? Life shall not be life 
 to us until we have relieved it, until those poor limbs have been 
 straightened and those arms made strong, until those bleared eyes 
 have been taught to see, and that voice has sung some of the first 
 beginnings of the song of life.' Well, there are hundreds and 
 thousands and millions of them. They look up to you from the 
 gutter as you walk the street. They look into the face of the good, 
 kind judge as he sits upon his bench. They come stretching out 
 their poor sick arms to the doctors in the hospitals, and you can 
 help them. You can help them. Help them just as you would if 
 there were only one of them, by giving your sympathy, your bless- 
 ing, your loud praise, and your large contributions to the Children's 
 Aid Society." ^ 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 14 
 
 THE CONCLUSION 
 
 1. Write conclusions for each of the speeches on the campus 
 
 topic mentioned in earlier chapters. 
 
 2. Write the conclusion to the speech to the favorable au- 
 
 dience mentioned in the last two chapters. 
 
 3. Write the conclusion to the speech for the hostile audience 
 
 mentioned in the last two chapters. 
 
 4. Hand in the complete conclusion to your original forensic. 
 
 * Essays and Addresses, quoted by Denney, Duncan, and McKinney, 
 Argum^tation and Debate, pp. 114, 115. 
 
CHAPTER 15 
 
 REFUTATION 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. The nature of refutation. 
 
 B. What to refute. 
 
 1. Answering too much. 
 
 a. Three objections. 
 
 (I) Loss of time and energy. 
 
 (II) Confusion. 
 
 (III) Undue importance to parts of opponent's case^ 
 
 2. Answering too Httle. 
 
 3. Answering yourself: "straw men." 
 
 C. Three fundamental requirements. 
 
 1. Research. 
 
 2. Reasoning. 
 
 3. Rhetoric. 
 
 D. Position of refutation. 
 
 E. Basic rule for all refutation. 
 
 F. Methods of refutation. 
 
 1. Tests of evidence. 
 
 2. Attacks on forms of arguments. 
 
 3. Exposing fallacies. 
 
 4. Special rhetorical devices. 
 
 a. Reductio ad absurdum. 
 
 b. Dilemma. 
 
 (I) More than two horns. 
 
 (II) Faulty disjunction. 
 
 c. Residues. 
 
 (I) Disjunction must be exhaustive. 
 
 d. Turning the tables. 
 
 A. The nature of refutation. Refutation consists in 
 the destruction of opposing proofs. As suggested in this 
 
 344 
 
REFUTATION 345 
 
 definition, refutation is, in form, destructive rather than 
 constructive; but in its purposes and results it is no less 
 serviceable than positive proof. With respect to any given 
 proposition, there are always two contrary beliefs that a 
 person may hold: he may believe that the proposition is 
 true or that it is not true. Consequently, if we can induce 
 him to reject the opposite of what we uphold, we are thereby 
 preparing him to accept our own views. Negative argu- 
 ment pure and simple is rarely, if ever, suflScient; for belief 
 is always essentially positive in nature, so that to destroy 
 without building up will not serve our purpose. Refutation, 
 therefore, is properly auxiliary and supplementary to posi- 
 tive proof. In our attempt to convince or persuade any man, 
 we must realize that he will, almost surely, have in his own 
 mind many preconceived ideas and preestablished opinions 
 about the matter in discussion, and that many of those ideas 
 and opinions are liable to be antagonistic to what we are 
 trying to make him believe. In such circumstances, our 
 success must often depend upon our ability to destroy these 
 hostile conceptions, thus preparing the way for the accept- 
 ance of our own contentions. The necessity for such de- 
 structive effort is, of course, peculiarly pressing in any form 
 of disputation where the arguer is confronted by some def- 
 inite opponents, as in debate, or perhaps in a newspaper 
 controversy; for here, the audience or readers are con- 
 sciously balancing the two sides of the question, and they 
 must be made to see with perfect clearness, that one side 
 overthrows and destroys the other. But in any form of ar- 
 gumentative discussion there are always opponents of some 
 kind, either real or imaginary, and they must be mastered 
 before we can hope to make others fully accept our own be- 
 liefs. 
 
 B. What to refute. The partial or complete destruction 
 of such opposing opinions and arguments often calls for a 
 keener insight and a more adroit attack, than does any of 
 the positive work of construction. It therefore becomes of 
 
346 ARGUMEMTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the first importance to decide what, and how much, one 
 ought to refute. Concerning this question John Quincy 
 Adams, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory (Lecture 
 XXII), 1 says:— 
 
 "There are three very common errors in the management 
 of controversy against which I think it proper here to guard 
 you, and from which I hope you will hereafter very sedulously 
 guard yourselves. The first may be termed answering too 
 much; the second answering too little; and the third answering 
 yourself, and not your opponent." 
 
 1. Answering too much. Speaking of the first of these 
 mistakes, he says: — 
 
 "You answer too much when you make it an invariable 
 principle to reply to everything which has been or could 
 be said by your antagonist on the other side. ... If you 
 contend against a diffuse speaker, who has wasted hour after 
 hour in a lingering lapse of words, which had little or no 
 bearing upon the proper question between you, it is incum- 
 bent upon you to discriminate between that part of his dis- 
 course which was pertinent, and that which was superfluous. 
 Nor is it less necessary to detect the artifice of an adversary, 
 who purposely mingles a flood of extraneous matter with the 
 controversy, for the sake of disguising the weakness of his 
 cause. In the former of these two cases, if you undertake to 
 answer everything that has been said, you charge yourself 
 with all the tediousness of your adversary, and double the 
 measure by an equal burden of your own. In the latter you 
 promote the cause of your antagonist by making yourself 
 the dupe of his stratagem. If, then, you have an opponent 
 whose redundancies arise only from his weakness, whose 
 standard of oratory is time, and whose measure of eloquence 
 if in arithmetical proportion to the multitude of his words, 
 your general rule should be to pass over all his general, un- 
 appropriate declamation in silence; to take no more notice 
 of it than if it had never been spoken. But if you see that 
 1 Volume II, pp. 8ie, 83. 
 
REFUTATION 347 
 
 the external matter is obtruded upon the subject with design 
 to mislead your attention, and fix it upon objects different 
 from that which is really at issue, you should so far take 
 notice of it as to point out the artifice, and derive from it an 
 argument of the most powerful eflScacy to your own side." 
 
 a. Three objections to answering too much. Answering 
 too many of the lesser arguments of an opponent should be 
 avoided for the following three excellent and practical rea- 
 sons: (I) In the first place, it involves a loss of time and energy. 
 This is particularly true in the case of the arguments of an 
 opponent who wastes himself in "a lingering lapse of words," 
 which have little or no bearing upon the proper question. 
 But it is also true, even when the efforts of an opponent are 
 well directed at the points in issue. The greater part of the 
 materials in any proof are, as w^e have seen, only secondary 
 in nature; they are of force merely because they tend to 
 establish some larger, more vital fact. The important thing 
 is, to reach and overthrow these more significant and critical 
 parts of the proof: if they can be destroyed, the secondary 
 facts fall with them. To sink a battle-ship does not demand 
 that every foot of its armor be twisted and torn, that every 
 turret and smoke-stack be demolished; one or two well- 
 aimed shots are enough. It is only necessary that the yv\- 
 nerable spot be well chosen, and that the aim be sure. Con- 
 sequently it should be the purpose of the debater, in his 
 refutation, to let the lesser points of his opponent pass un- 
 heeded, and to give his attention only to vital elements. 
 
 (II) In the second place, answering too much results in con- 
 fusion. To attempt to refute too many petty arguments, 
 weakens the discrimination between the important and the 
 unimportant, which is always necessary in argumentation, if 
 we are to make a distinct and lasting impression. Emphasis, 
 as a means to clearness and force, is just as desirable in 
 refutation as elsewhere, and emphasis cannot be attained, if 
 attention is given alike to the great and the small points. 
 
 (III) In the third place, answering too much gives undue 
 
348 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 dignity and importance to many points of the other side. In- 
 significant proofs are better left insignificant. To bring 
 them anew to the attention of the audience, and give them 
 the compHment of a serious reply, helps, rather than hinders, 
 an opponent. One way to dispose of a foolish or trivial point 
 is illustrated by Cicero in his defense of Q. Ligarius: — 
 
 "When Tubero, in his accusation of Ligarius before Caesar, 
 ihad made it part of his charge, that Ligarius was in Africa 
 during some part of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey ; 
 Cicero in his answer, not thinking it deserved a serious reply, 
 contents himself with barely mentioning it ironically. For 
 thus he begins his defense of Ligarius, Ccesar, my kinsman 
 Tubero has laid before you a new crime, and till this day un- 
 heard of, that Q. Ligarius was in Africa.'^ ^ 
 
 2. Answering too little. Of the second fault, which con- 
 sists in answering too little, Mr. Adams says: — 
 
 "The second error in controversy, against which I am 
 anxious of warning you, is that of answering too little. It is 
 not unfrequently found united with that against which I 
 have last admonished you. When too much of our strength 
 is lavished upon the outworks, the citadel is left proportion- 
 ately defenceless. If we say too much upon points extrinsic 
 to the cause, we shall seldom say enough upon those on which 
 it hinges. To avoid this fault, therefore, it is as essential to 
 ascertain which are the strong parts of your adversary's 
 argument as it is to escape the opposite error of excess. To 
 this effect it is also a duty of the first impression to obtain a 
 control over your own prejudices and feelings. Nothing is 
 so sure to blind us to the real validity of the reasons alleged 
 against us, as our passions. It is so much easier to despise, 
 than to answer an opponent's argument, that wherever we 
 can indulge our contempt, we are apt to forget that it is not 
 refutation." ^ Sarcasm and scorn may be aids to refutation, 
 but they are not substitutes for it. In refutation, then, the 
 
 1 John Ward, A System of Oratory, Vol. II, p. 366. 
 
 2 Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. II, p. 88. 
 
REFUTATION 349 
 
 first essential is to understand what are the few vital points 
 of the other side; to analyze your adversary's case, pick out 
 his "strong parts/' and answer them. 
 
 3. Answering yourself: "Straw men": Concerning the 
 last and very common error, which consists in "answering 
 yourself, " the comment made by Mr. Adams cannot be over- 
 emphasized : — 
 
 *'But the most inexcusable of all the errors in confutation 
 is that of answering yourself, instead of your adversary, 
 which is done whenever you suppress, or mutilate, or obscure, 
 or misstate, his reasoning, and then reply not to his positions, 
 but to those which you have substituted in their stead. This 
 practice is often the result of misapprehension, when a dis- 
 putant mistakes the point of the argument urged by his 
 adversary; but it often arises also from design, in which case 
 it should be clearly detected and indignantly exposed. The 
 duty of a disputant is fairly to take and fully to repel the 
 idea of his opponent, and not his own. To misrepresent the 
 meaning of your antagonist evinces a want of candor which 
 the auditory seldom fail to perceive, and which engages their 
 feelings in his favor. When involved in controversy, then, 
 never start against yourself frivolous objections for the sake 
 of showing how easily you can answer them. Quinctilian 
 relates an anecdote of the poet Accius, which every contro- 
 versial writer or speaker will do well to remember. Accius 
 was a writer of tragedies, and being once asked why he, whose 
 dialogue was celebrated for its energy, did not engage in the 
 practice of the bar, answered, because in his tragedies he 
 could make his characters say what he pleased; but that at the 
 bar he should have to contend with persons who would say 
 anything but what he pleased. There can be no possible 
 advantage in supposing our antagonist a fool. The most 
 probable effect of such an imagination is to prove ourselves 
 so." 1 
 
 The words of Accius should be observed by every student 
 ^ Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. II, pp. 90, 91. 
 
350 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 of argumentation. It is easy to set up "straw men'* and 
 knock them down, but it is dangerous and contemptible. 
 To suggest possible arguments, unless you are sure, either 
 that they have already been advanced, or that they must be 
 advanced by the other side, is foolish. If the arguments are 
 worth while, do not help your adversary by suggesting them; 
 if they are not worth while, it is a waste of time to notice 
 them. Furthermore, it gives an opponent the opportunity 
 to ridicule the effort, by admitting or ignoring the points 
 thus suggested. 
 
 C. Three fundamental requirements. Refutation has the 
 same three fundamental requirements as positive argument. 
 It must not be presumed that refutation is a separate and 
 distinct kind of argumentation. To refute demands skill in 
 the three Rs of argumentation: research, reasoning, and 
 rhetoric. 
 
 1. Research. "The first principle of refutation is, then: 
 Know all the ramifications of the discussion in which you take 
 part. Preparedness on both sides of the case is the first 
 essential of strong refutation." ^ One needs adequate in- 
 formation to refute an opponent. The man who is informed 
 on a question in controversy can best correct the mistakes of 
 an adversary. Thorough knowledge of all phases of the 
 question is needed, and since, in Webster's phrase, "acquisi- 
 tion is never extemporaneous," a wise debater will not rely 
 on readiness of tongue alone in this department of argumenta- 
 tion. Being "quick with a gun" is of Httle use when one has 
 no gun at all — or an unloaded one. 
 
 2. Reasoning. Sound reasoning, straight thinking, is 
 needed in refutation. Any slip here when one is " correcting " 
 the reasoning of others is doubly disastrous. Clear thinking 
 (and common honesty) will keep you from "answering your- 
 self," will enable you to show your readers or hearers just 
 what you are refuting. Only straight thinking will keep your 
 shots true. Often most careful analysis of an opposing ar- 
 
 1 Baker and Huntington, Principles of Argumentation, p. 171. 
 
REFUTATION 351 
 
 gument is needed in order to pick out the exact point to be 
 refuted, or to show the exact clash of discussion. Sometimes 
 throwing the argument into the form of a syllogism will make 
 strikingly clear the basic structure of a confused argument. 
 Lincoln used this device against Douglas in the debate at 
 Galesburg: 
 
 "Now, remembering the provision of the Constitution which I 
 have read, affirming that that instrument is the supreme law of 
 the land; that the judges of every state shall be bound by it, any 
 law or constitution of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; 
 that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution, 
 is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from it without 
 breaking it; durable as the instrument, part of the instrument, — 
 what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from it? I 
 think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of men capable 
 of argumenting, whether as I state it, in syllogistic form the argu- 
 ment has any fault in it.'^ 
 
 "Nothing in the constitution or laws of any state can destroy a 
 right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the 
 United States. 
 
 "The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly 
 affirmed in the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 "Therefore, nothing in the constitution or laws of any state can 
 destroy the right of property in a slave. 
 
 "I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; 
 assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have 
 capacity at all to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a 
 fault in it, as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; the false- 
 hood, in fact, is a fault in the premises. I believe that the right 
 of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in 
 the Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is." ^ 
 
 3. Rhetoric. Lastly, all that goes to make effective ex- 
 pression, rhetoric — oral or written, is of unusual importance 
 in refutation. Careless, inaccurate, disorganized style, or a 
 weak and listless delivery, will counteract the good offices 
 ^ Quoted from Foster's Argumentation^ pp. 183, 184. 
 
352 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 of both thorough knowledge and sound reasoning. Fact is 
 the bullet, reasoning is the aim, and expression (we trust no 
 untoward application of our figure will be made) is the force 
 that drives the bullet to its mark. 
 
 D. Position of refutation. With respect to the method 
 of handling refutation, a common word of advice is, to fol- 
 low up refutation with positive proof. This suggestion, 
 however, is of a general nature and is open to exceptions. 
 But it must not be forgotten that refutation is destructive; 
 it demolishes, but does not build up. To make men act or 
 thoroughly believe, it is not enough to make them see there is 
 no reason why they should not be convinced; they must be 
 made to see that there is a positive reason why they should 
 be convinced. Consequently, pure refutation is weak and 
 lacks the strongest elements of conviction; it is a necessary 
 help, but is not sufficient in itself. It is, therefore, generally 
 an anti-climax to place refutation at the end of the discus- 
 sion, or at the end of any important division of the argument. 
 Positive proof rather than refutation should be given the 
 most emphatic place. 
 
 This leads to the matter of the arrangement of refutation. 
 With respect to the strength and the weakness of the points 
 of refutation, the same rules apply as in positive proof; the 
 emphatic places are the beginning and the end. If, then, the 
 answer to be made is strong, it may well be put first or to- 
 ward the last. Weaker answers are best hidden in the mid- 
 dle. However, it often happens that an opponent makes a 
 point or presents some idea, which must be overthrown before 
 the speaker or writer can proceed with his own proof. In such 
 circumstances, clearly the answer to the point must be made 
 at the very beginning. Doubt often arises as to whether it is 
 best to make the answer a distinct point in the discussion, 
 or to introduce it merely as an incident to some other point. 
 This depends upon the importance of the argument to be 
 answered, and so is a question of personal judgment in each 
 particular case. In general, however, such answers are best 
 
REFUTATION 353 
 
 given in connection with those parts of one's own proof with 
 which they are naturally associated. In fact, they should 
 always be considered wherever they happen to arise in the 
 course of one's own argument, except where there is a pecu- 
 liar, definite reason (such as extreme importance of the point 
 made or effective challenge of previous speaker) for setting 
 this rule aside. Then usually such refutation should be given 
 before constructive argument. It is therefore true in gen- 
 eral that, with the exceptio^ of the most vital of the proofs 
 of the opposition, refutation is best made as the occasion for 
 the answer arises in the course of one's own demonstration. 
 These individual points that may be taken up as they arise 
 are sometimes called ''special refutation.'^ But if the answer 
 to an opponent's argument is, under the circumstances, of 
 such importance as to make any large part of the question 
 depend upon it, there should be no hesitation in making it 
 one of the main points of the proof, and emphasizing it as such. 
 Such a main point may be taken up wherever it most logi- 
 cally fits into the case. These large fundamental points 
 that make an important part of the case are sometimes 
 called ''general refutation.'' 
 
 E. Basic rule for all refutation. Before taking up any 
 of the particular methods there is one principle of refutation 
 that should be emphasized. Always make perfectly clear to the 
 audience or reader , just what is the point that is to he attacked, 
 and the nature of the attack to he made. Show what you are 
 going to refute, and how you are going to refute it. Repeat 
 what your opponent has said and then say that you will 
 show this to be false, irrelevant, unimportant, untrustworthy, 
 etc., as the case may be. The statement to which objection 
 is made should always be distinctly stated at the start, and its 
 place in the case — its relation to main points, issues, or prop- 
 osition — should be clearly shown. This statement should be 
 supplemented, while the reply is being presented, by what- 
 ever explanations are necessary, in order to make evident 
 the purposes and results of the answer. It must be made 
 
354 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 clear that there are two opposing arguments which directly 
 meet, and that one overthrows the other. The force of ref- 
 utation is destructive, and it cannot achieve its full effect 
 unless the audience understands just what is to be destroyed, 
 and just how the refutation accomplished the destruction. 
 
 A study of forensic and deliberative oratory shows the 
 painstaking care to observe this rule used by the ablest speak- 
 ers and writers. The following is an example of Webster's 
 method in forensic refutation, a model of clearness in intro- 
 ducing refutation. The quotation is from his speech in the 
 case of Ogden vs. Sai^nders: — 
 
 "Here we meet the opposite arguments, stated on different occa- 
 sions in different terms, but usually summed up in this, that the 
 law itself is a part of the contract, and therefore cannot impair it. 
 What does it mean. '^ Let us seek for clear ideas. It does not mean 
 that the law gives any particular construction to the terms of the 
 contract, or that it makes the promise, or the consideration, or the 
 time of performance, other than is expressed in the instrument 
 itself. It can only mean that it is to be taken as a part of the con- 
 tract or understanding of the parties, that the contract itself shall 
 be enforced by such laws and regulations respecting remedy and 
 for the enforcement of contracts as are in being in the State where 
 it is made at the time of entering into it. This is meant, or nothing 
 very clearly intelligible is meant, by saying the law is part of the 
 contract. . . . 
 
 "Against this we contend: — 
 
 " 1st. That, if the proposition were true, the consequence would 
 not follow. 
 
 "2nd. That the proposition itself cannot be maintained." ^ 
 
 To take an illustration from a deliberative oration: Web- 
 ster, in replying to Calhoun in the Senate, on the question of 
 the protective tariff, divided his speech into five parts, cor- 
 responding to the five main points of his opponent. The 
 following are the sentences introductory to these parts re- 
 spectively: — 
 
 1 The Works of Daniel Webgter, Vol. VI, p. 29. 
 
REFUTATION 355 
 
 "I. In treating of protection, or protective duties, the first prop- 
 osition of the honorable member is, that all duties laid on imports 
 really fall on exports; that they are a toll paid for going to market. 
 
 " II. Another opinion of the honorable member is, that increased 
 production brings about expansion of the currency, and that such 
 increase makes a further increase necessary. His idea is, that, if 
 some goods are imported, the amount of exports still keeping up, 
 the whole export being thus paid for by the import, specie must be 
 brought to settle the balance; that this increase of specie gives new 
 powers to the banks to discount; that the banks thereupon make 
 large issues, till the mass of currency becomes redundant and 
 swollen; that this swollen currency augments the price of articles of 
 our own manufacture, and makes it necessary to raise prices still 
 higher, and this creates a demand for the imposition of new duties. 
 This, as I understand it, is the honorable member's train of thought. 
 
 "III. There is a third general idea of the honorable gentleman, 
 upon which I would make a few observations. It is, that the South 
 and West are the great consumers of the products of the manufac- 
 tures of the North and East; that the capacity of -the South to con- 
 sume depends on her great staples; and that the sale of these 
 depends mainly on a foreign market. 
 
 "IV. A fourth sentiment of the honorable member is, that the 
 removal of all duties increases the exportation of articles manu- 
 factured at home. 
 
 "V. Finally, the honorable member is of the opinion that the 
 whole system of protection was prostrated, and is prostrated, cut 
 up, root and branch, and exterminated forever, by the State inter- 
 position of South Carolina." ^ 
 
 F. Methods of refutation. Refutation is the destruc- 
 tion of opposing proofs. Any method by which the proof of 
 an opponent may be v^^eakened or destroyed is a "method of 
 refutation.** There are four different sets of such methods in 
 argumentation. It must be borne in mind, however, that 
 these are not mutually exclusive lists. In many points they 
 practically coincide, being simply different names for the 
 same things, because these things are looked at from differ- 
 
 1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. IV, pp. 528-538. 
 
356 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 ent standpoints. We have considered three of these sets 
 under evidence, forms of argument, and fallacies. The fourth 
 is "special rhetorical devices." It is needless to do more 
 than mention the first three here. 
 
 1. Tests of evidence. Showing that the evidence presented 
 by an opponent is unsound — in some way fails to meet the 
 proper tests of such evidence — is effective refutation. (See 
 Chapter 6.) 
 
 2. Attack on the forms of arguments. Demonstrating the 
 weakness of any argument by the use of the tests discussed 
 in Chapter 7 is also an excellent method of refuting an ad- 
 versary. 
 
 3. Fallacies. When we expose a fallacy in another's ar- 
 gument we are using a very common and very effective 
 method of refuting him. (See Chapter 8.) 
 
 4. Special rhetorical devices. The fourth list of special 
 rhetorical devijces, not found in any of these other listsi 
 is usually given separately as an enumeration of the methods 
 of refutation. These devices are (a) redudio ad absurdum, 
 (b) dilemma, (c) residues, and (d) turning the tables. 
 
 a. Reductio ad absurdum. One of the most commonly 
 used methods of refutation is that of reducing an argument 
 to an absurdity, or, as it is named, the reductio ad absurdum. 
 The refuter adopts for the moment the line of argument of 
 his opponent; then, by carrying it out to its logical conclu- 
 sion, shows that it results in an absurdity. For example, 
 "When a lawy^er asserted in court that a corporation can 
 make no oral contract because it has no tongue, the judge 
 exposed the fallacy by saying, simply, **Then, according 
 to your own argument, a corporation could not make a writ- 
 ten contract because it has no hand.'" ^ 
 
 Cicero uses this method in the following: — 
 
 "Nor, if Publius Crassus was both an orator and a lawyer, is 
 the knowledge of the civil law for that reason included in the 
 
 1 Foster, p. 177. 
 
REFUTATION 367 
 
 power of speaking. For if any man, who, while exceUing in any art 
 or science, has acquired another, shall hold that his additional 
 knowledge is a part of that in which he previously excelled, we may, 
 by such a mode of argument, pretend that to play well at tennis is 
 a part of the knowledge of civil law, because Publius Mucins was 
 skilled in both." i 
 
 Macaulay makes striking use of this device: — 
 
 *' Many politicians of our time are in the habit of laying it down 
 as a self-evident proposition, that no people ought to be free till 
 they are fit to use their freedom. The maxim is worthy of the 
 fool in the old story, who resolved not to go into the water until 
 he had learned to swim. If men are to wait for liberty until they 
 become wise and good in slavery, they may indeed wait forever.'* 2 
 
 This method is effective because of its simplicity and di- 
 rectness; it also has in it an element of ridicule that is per- 
 suasive against an opponent. William Ellery Channing, in 
 a reply to Henry Clay on the slavery question, used this 
 method as follows: — 
 
 "But this property, we are told, is not to be questioned on 
 account of its long duration. *Two hundred years of legislation 
 have sanctioned and sanctified negro slaves as property.' Nothing 
 but respect for the speaker could repress criticism on this unhappy 
 phraseology. We will trust it escaped him without thought. But 
 to confine ourselves to the argument from duration; how obvious 
 the reply! Is injustice changed into justice by the practice of ages.'* 
 Is my victim made a righteous prey because I have bowed him 
 to the earth till he cannot rise? For more than two hundred years 
 heretics were burned, and not by mobs, not by Lynch law, but by 
 the decrees of councils, at the instigation of theologians, and with 
 the sanction of the laws and religions of nations; and was this a 
 reason for keeping up the fires, that they had burned two hundred 
 years? In the Eastern world, successive despots, not for two hun- 
 dred years, but for twice two thousand, have claimed the right of 
 life and death over millions, and, with no law but their own will, 
 
 * Quoted by Foster, p. 177. ^ Quoted by Foster, p. 178. 
 
358 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 have beheaded, bowstrung* starved, tortured unhappy men without 
 number who have incurred their wrath; and does the lapse of so 
 many centuries sanctify murder and ferocious power? " 
 
 Again: — 
 
 "But the great argument remains. It is said that this property 
 must not be questioned, because it is estabhshed by law. 'That is 
 property which the law declares to he property.' ^ Thus human law 
 is made supreme, decisive, in a question of morals. Thus the idea 
 of an eternal, immutable justice is set at naught. Thus the great 
 rule of human life is made to be the ordinance of interested men. 
 But there is a higher tribunal, a throne of equal justice, immovable 
 by the conspiracy of all human legislatures. *That is property 
 which the law declares to be property.' Then the laws have only 
 to declare you, or me, or Mr. Clay, to be property, and we become 
 chattels and are bound to bear the yoke! Does not even man's 
 moral nature repel this doctrine too intuitively to leave time or 
 need for argument?" ^ 
 
 b. The dilemma is one of the oldest of all known rhetorical 
 forms. As a method of refutation, it consists in reducing an 
 issue to an alternative, and then showing that both members 
 of the alternative are untenable. These two members are 
 called the "horns of the dilemma.*' The refuter says in sub- 
 stance: "Now, with respect to this point at issue, there are 
 two and only two possibilities, viz., A and B. But A is not 
 true, and B is not true; consequently your contention fails." 
 In order to make the dilemma conclusive, obviously two 
 things are necessary : (I) The horns of the dilemma must in- 
 clude all the possibilities in the case, i. e., the alternative must 
 he exact. (II) Both memhers of the alternative must he destroyed. 
 
 James Wilson, speaking in the convention for the province 
 of Pennsylvania, in vindication of the colonies, January, 
 1775, used the dilemma as follows: — 
 
 "In the first place, then, I say that the persons who allege that 
 
 1 The italics are by Mr. Clay. 
 
 2 The Works of William E. Channing, D. D., Vol. V, pp. 48, 49. 
 
REFUTATION 359 
 
 those employed to alter the charter and constitution of Massachu- 
 setts Bay act by virtue of a commission from his majesty for that 
 purpose, speak improperly, and contrary to the truth of the case. 
 I say they do not act by virtue of such commission; I say it is im- 
 possible they can act by virtue of such a commission. What is 
 called a commission either contains particular directions for the 
 purpose mentioned, or it contains no such particular directions. In 
 either case can those, who act for that purpose, act by virtue of a 
 commission? In one case, what is called a commission is void; it 
 has no legal existence; it can communicate no authority. In the 
 other case, it extends not to the purpose mentioned. The latter 
 point is too plain to be insisted on: I (will) prove the former." ^ 
 
 Jeremiah S. Black, in defense of the right of trial by jury, 
 thus attacked the contention of his opponents, which was 
 that the law of nations was binding in the trial of the cause 
 in question: — 
 
 "Our friends on the other side are quite conscious that when 
 they deny the binding obligation of the Constitution they must put 
 some other system of law in its place. Their brief gives us notice 
 that, while the Constitution, and the acts of Congress, and Magna 
 Charta, and the common law, and all the rules of natural justice 
 shall remain under foot, they will try American citizens according 
 to the law of nations! But the law of nations takes no notice of the 
 subject. If that system did contain a special provision that a 
 government might hang one of its own citizens without a judge or 
 jury, it would still be competent for the American people to say, 
 as they have said, that no such thing should ever be done here. 
 That is my answer to the law of nations." ^ 
 
 (I) More than two horns. Sometimes the possibilities 
 with respect to the point in issue cannot be reduced to two. 
 There may be a choice offered of any one of three or more 
 possible conditions, or courses of action. In such a case, to 
 state the issue in the form of a dilemma, presenting a single 
 alternative, would not be an exact disjunction, and so would 
 
 1 Eloquence of the United States, Vol. V, p. 56. E. and H. Clark. 
 
 2 Great Speeches by Great LawyerSt p. 507. 
 
360 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 be fallacious; to be truthful it is always necessary to state 
 all the possibilities of choice, whatever their number. When 
 more than two possibilities are to be considered, the method 
 is, properly speaking, not a dilemma; but the modus operandi 
 is similar. Webster, in his argument in the case of the Prov- 
 idence Railroad Co. vs. City of Boston, made a division into 
 three possibilities. Mr. Webster is here contending against 
 the proposition that a certain street or piece of land is a pub- 
 lic highway: — 
 
 "If this street, or land, or whatever it may be, has become and 
 now is a public highway, it must have become so in one of three 
 ways, and to these points I particularly call your honors' attention. 
 
 "1st. It must either have become a highway by having been 
 regularly laid out according to usage and law; or 
 
 "2d. By dedication as such by those having the power to dedicate 
 it, and acceptance and adoption so far as they are required; or 
 
 "3d. As a highway by long user, without the existence of proof 
 of any original laying out, or dedication. 
 
 "It is not pretended by any one that the land in question is a 
 highway, upon the last of these grounds. I shall therefore confine 
 myself to the consideration of the other two questions; namely, 
 'Was there ever a formal and regular laying out of a street here.'^ 
 or was there ever a regular and sufficient dedication and accept- 
 
 (II) If the disjunction of the dilemma is faulty an opening 
 is left for an opponent which may result in great discomfiture 
 to the author of the defective dilemma. 
 
 "Thus Lincoln, in his speech on the Dred Scott Decision, 
 refused to accept either of the horns of the dilemma presented 
 by Douglas. Lincoln said of Douglas: — 
 
 "He finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of 
 Independence includes all men, black as well as white, and forthwith 
 he boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to 
 argue gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because 
 
 1 Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 186. 
 
REFUTATION 361 
 
 they want to vote, to eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes. He 
 will have it that they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest 
 against the counterfeit logic which concludes that because I do not 
 want a black woman for a slave, I must necessarily want her for a 
 wife. I need not have her for either. I can just leave her alone." ^ 
 
 c. The method of residues, like that of the dilemma, is 
 founded upon a division of the point in question into parts. 
 The difference is that in the dilemma all the parts are de- 
 stroyed, whereas, in the method of residues, one of the parts 
 is left standing. By the method of residues, the matter in 
 dispute is divided into two or more sections, which include 
 all the possibilities in the case; then all but one of these are 
 demolished, the one left standing being the aspect of the is- 
 sue which the refuter wishes to establish. "There are," 
 says the refuter, "three possibilities, A, B, and C. But A 
 and B are false, consequently the presumption is that C is 
 true.*' This method is not, strictly speaking, a method 
 of refuting. It is rather a method of using refutation: the 
 ultimate purpose of the speaker or writer is not destructive, 
 but constructive; he destroys some of the parts into which 
 he divides the question, in order that he may establish the 
 remaining part. He uses refutation to accomplish his end; 
 but the end itself is constructive proof. 
 
 (I) Division must be exhaustive. The first requisite in us- 
 ing the method of residues is, that the division of the whole into 
 parts shall be exhaustive. The strength of the method de- 
 pends entirely upon the assumption, that all the possibilities 
 in the case are destroyed save one. If, then, the disputant 
 omits, in his division, to mention one of the possibilities, he 
 has proved nothing, for it still remains uncertain which pos- 
 sibility is true, — the one he seeks to establish or the one he 
 failed to mention. Again, in order to make the work com- 
 plete, it is necessary that the residuary part be enforced by 
 positive demonstration. The refuting of all but one of the 
 
 1 Foster, pp. 182, 183. 
 
362 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 possibilities, leaves a presumption that the remaining pos- 
 sibility is true; but there may well be a suspicion that even 
 this last part too is false, or that there is some fallacy in the 
 division. Consequently, to be at all convincing the residuary 
 part must be enforced by positive proof. 
 
 An excellent example of the use of the method of resi- 
 dues, is that found in Thomas H. Huxley's Lectures 
 on Evolution, delivered in New York in 1876. Professor 
 Huxley was here endeavoring to establish the theory of evo- 
 lution, as the true theory respecting past history of the uni- 
 verse. In his first lecture he divided the question into three 
 possible hypotheses as follows: — 
 
 *'So far as I know, there are only three hypotheses which ever 
 have been entertained, or which well can be entertained, respecting 
 the past history of Nature. I will, in the first place, state the 
 hypotheses, and then I will consider what evidence bearing upon 
 them is in our possession, and by what light of criticism that evi- 
 dence is to be interpreted. 
 
 "Upon the first hypothesis, the assumption is, that phenomena 
 of Nature similar to those exliibited by the present world have 
 always existed; in other words, that the universe has existed from 
 all eternity in what may be broadly termed its present condition. 
 
 "The second hypothesis is, that the present state of things has 
 had only a limited duration; and that, at some period in the past, a 
 condition of the world, essentially similar to that which we now 
 know, came into existence, without any precedent condition from 
 which it could have naturally proceeded. The assumption that 
 successive states of Nature have arisen, each without any relation 
 of natural causation to an antecedent state, is a mere modification 
 of this second hypothesis. 
 
 "The third hypothesis also assumes that the present state of 
 things has had but a limited duration; but it supposes that this 
 state has been evolved by a natural process from an antecedent 
 state, and that from another, and so on; and, on this hypothesis, 
 the attempt to assign any limit to the series of past changes is, 
 usually, given up.'* ^ 
 
 * Popular Science Monthly, Vol. X, p. 44. 
 
REFUTATION 363 
 
 He then proceeded, in his series of lectures, to overthrow 
 the first two hypotheses, leaving the third — the theory of 
 evolution — standing as the residuary part, and finally he 
 supported this theory by positive proof of its probability. 
 
 Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with Americay used 
 the method of residues. He began: — 
 
 "Sir, if I were capable of engaging you to an equal attention, I 
 would state, that as far as I am capable of discerning, there are 
 but three ways of proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which 
 prevails in your Colonies, and disturbs your government. These 
 are: — to change that spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the 
 causes; to prosecute it as criminal; or, to comply with it as neces- 
 sary. I would not be guilty of an imperfect enumeration; I can 
 think of but these three. Another has indeed been started, that of 
 giving up the Colonies; but it met so slight a reception that I do 
 not think myself obliged to dwell a great while upon it. It is nothing 
 but a little sally of anger, like the frowardness of peevish children, 
 who, when they cannot get all they would have, are resolved to 
 take nothing." 
 
 He then considered the first two ways at length and proved 
 them impracticable, and concluded : — 
 
 "If then the removal of the causes of this spirit of American 
 liberty be, for the greater part, or rather entirely impracticable; 
 if the ideas of criminal process be inapplicable, or if applicable 
 are in the highest degree inexpedient, what way yet remains? No 
 way is open, but the third and last, to comply with the American 
 spirit as necessary; or, if you please, to submit to it as a necessary 
 evil." 2 
 
 d. " Turning the tables " is simply showing that some- 
 thing presented by your opponent really supports your case 
 and not his. It is "stealing his thunder." To turn the argu- 
 ment of an opponent against him is not often possible. But 
 circumstances sometimes give the opportunity. A piece of 
 1 Cook's edition, pp. 30. 31. « Ibid., pp. 38, 39. 
 
364 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 testimony may be used by a writer, when he has not fully 
 considered all the interpretations that may be put upon it. 
 It not infrequently happens that evidence, or an argument, is 
 introduced to give support to some particular point, and, 
 in its bearing on that phase of the question, the evidence may 
 be favorable to the speaker or writer who introduces it; but 
 as the discussion proceeds, it may turn out that, with respect 
 to some other phase of the question, the evidence or the ar- 
 gument may be interpreted in another way, adversely to its 
 inventor. The effect of such an unexpected turn of affairs 
 is obvious; the opponent is "hoist with his own petard." 
 The very manner of introducing the proof adds to its effect- 
 iveness. Webster, in the Girard Will Case, used this method 
 in attacking one of the proofs of the defendants : — 
 
 "The arguments of my learned friend, may it please your honors, 
 in relation to the Jewish laws as tolerated by the statutes, go to 
 maintain my very proposition; that is, that no school for the in- 
 struction of youth in any system which is in any way derogatory to 
 the Christian religion, or for the teaching of doctrines that are in 
 any way contrary to the Christian religion is, or ever was, regarded 
 as a charity by the courts. It is true that the statutes of Toleration 
 regarded a devise for the maintenance of poor Jewish children, to 
 give them food and raiment and lodging, as a charity. But a devise 
 for the teaching of the Jewish religion to poor children, that should 
 come into the Court of Chancery, would not be regarded as a 
 charity, or entitled to any peculiar privileges from the court." ^ 
 
 Lincoln "turned the tables" admirably in his speech at 
 Cooper Union in February, 1860. 
 
 "Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against 
 sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less 
 than eight years before Washington gave that warning he had, as 
 President of the United States, approved and signed an act of 
 Congress enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern 
 Territory, which act embodied the policy of the government, upon 
 
 1 The Works of Daniel Webster, Vol. VI, p. 166. 
 
HEFUTATION 365 
 
 that subject, up to and at the very moment he penned that warning; 
 and about one year after he penned it, he wrote Lafayette that he 
 considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same 
 connection his hope that we should at some time have a confederacy 
 of free states. 
 
 "Bearing this in mind and seeing that sectionalism has since 
 arisen upon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your 
 hands against us or in our hands against you? Could Washington 
 himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon 
 us who sustain his policy, or upon you who repudiate it? We re- 
 spect that warning of Washington and we commend it to you, 
 together with his example pointing to the right application of it." * 
 
 EXERCISE. CHAPTER 15 
 
 REFUTATION 
 
 Hand in if possible three examples of poor refutation which 
 answers too much, too little, or answers "straw men," 
 taken from current periodicals, lectures, text-books, etc. 
 
 Hand in two original examples of each of the four special 
 rhetorical devices for refutation. 
 
 Quoted by Foster, p. 189. 
 
PART III. DEBATE 
 CHAPTER 16 
 
 THE NATURl: OF DEBATE 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. 
 
 Definition. 
 
 B. 
 
 Relation to argumentation. 
 
 C. 
 
 The work of preparation. 
 
 D. 
 
 "Contest Debates" and debates in "Real Lifco'' 
 
 
 1. The immediate purpose of each type. 
 
 
 2. Getting nearer to the truth. 
 
 
 3. Three types of decisions. 
 
 
 a. The juryman's vote. 
 
 
 b. The legislator's vote. 
 
 
 c. The critic's vote. 
 
 
 4. Sport or game. 
 
 
 5. Convictions. 
 
 
 6. Preparation of contest debates. 
 
 E. 
 
 The aflfirmative case. 
 
 F. 
 
 The negative case. Four types. 
 
 
 1. Pure refutation. 
 
 
 2. Defense of present. 
 
 
 3. Adjustment. 
 
 
 4. Counter proposition. 
 
 
 a. State clearly. 
 
 
 b. Actually counter. 
 
 G. 
 
 Personal attitude and bearing. 
 
 
 1. Personal tone. 
 
 
 2. Self-control. 
 
 
 3. Sarcasm and ridicule. 
 
 
 4. Personal inconsistency. 
 
 A. Definition. In the preceding chapters the principles 
 that- have been set forth apply equally to written and to 
 
 367 
 
368 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 spoken argumentation. But in that form of discussion com- 
 monly known as debate, which consists in a direct oral ar- 
 gumentative contest between two opposing sides, on a definite 
 question, at a definite time, some of these principles must un- 
 dergo slight adaptations, and to them must be added other 
 new principles. 
 
 B. Relation to argumentation. A good argumentative 
 essayist is not necessarily a good debater, any more than a 
 good writer is necessarily a good speaker. To begin with, a 
 debater in addition to knowing the principles of argumenta- 
 tion must know something of the arts of public speech; he may 
 not be positively eloquent, but he must know how to express 
 himself before an audience with a reasonable degree of ease 
 and force. But public speaking is not all. A man who can 
 write and memorize and deliver a good argumentative address 
 is not necessarily a good debater. The latter must have all 
 the skill of the former, and in addition, he mu^t know how to 
 conduct his case on the platform. He must know the ** rules of 
 the game," and must be able to meet the many situations 
 in offense and defense as they arise in the contest. In other 
 words, the debater, in addition to being a good speaker, mus* 
 be something of a general. In polemic w^arfare there are am- 
 buscades, unexpected reenforcements for the enemy, and 
 critical situations of various kinds some of which cannot be 
 foreseen. To meet these contingencies and master them 
 demands a clear head, quick judgment, firm decision, and 
 a certain amount of bold self-confidence. There is, moreover, 
 a strategy of debate which must be learned by study and 
 experience. How to open the battle, when to use ligh: 
 cavalry and when to use artillery, when to attack, when to 
 give way, how to plan an ambuscade, how to retreat — a 
 knowledge of these things belongs no less to the debater 
 than to the military commander. 
 
 C. The work of preparation for debate is often very 
 different in many ways from that for written argument. In 
 preliminary reading, attention must be given to matters that 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 369 
 
 might under other conditions safely be neglected. In selecting 
 evidence, the choice must often be determined by the special 
 conditions; evidence that is good in an essay, is often in- 
 effective in spoken argument. In outlining the case, the 
 choice of the main headings and the arrangement of the points 
 must be planned, with regard to the exigencies and the 
 strategy of the contest. Then, also, 'preparation for the 
 refutation of an opponent's arguments must be much more 
 thorough. To attempt to make fixed and inexorable rules 
 for many of these processes would be a mistake; uniformity 
 of method in many phases of debating is undesirable, as well 
 as impossible. Consequently, the principles in the following 
 chapters are for the most part general rather than specific. 
 Further, it should be understood that debate is not a form 
 of argumentation entirely separate and distinct from other 
 forms. Every principle enunciated in the preceding chapters, 
 on argumentation in general, has full force in debate. The 
 suggestions to be given are merely additional. 
 
 D. " Contest debates " and debates in "real life." ^ Let 
 us understand perfectly what is meant by debating. Broadly 
 speaking, wherever in this book we refer to debating, we 
 mean real debating — the actual discussion of actual problems 
 in real life. It is as training for this sort of debating that a 
 course in debate should be conducted. (Indeed, the training 
 for the debates of real life is the ultimate purpose of the formal 
 contest debate.) But before proceeding to a careful consid- 
 eration of the general principles of debating, which are the same 
 in both "contest" and "real life" debates, let us consider 
 
 * For full discussion of this topic see as follows in the Quarterly Journal 
 of Public Speaking: Editorial "A disconcerted editor and others," by J. M. 
 O'Neill, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 79; "Debating as related to non-academic life," 
 by W. H. Davis, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 105; Editorial by J. M. O'Neill, "Able 
 non-debaters," Vol. I, No. 2, p. 201; Editorial by J. M. O'Neill, "Judges 
 again," Vol. I, No. 3, p. 305; "Is debating primarily a game?" by W. H. 
 Davis, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 171; Editorial by J. M. O'Neill, "Game or Counter- 
 feit Presentment," Vol. II, No. 2, p. 193; Some of the material used in this 
 chapter was first published in these editorials. J. M. O'N. 
 
370 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 some of the limitations of contest debating. There are cer- 
 tain differences in attending circumstances, between con- 
 tests and real life, which necessitate a different conception as 
 to the immediate purpose of the contests and proper manner 
 of judging them. 
 
 1. The immediate purpose of each type. The broad ob- 
 jects back of contest debating are properly the training and 
 valuable experience received by each one participating, the 
 reward of merit to students who excel in class work and 
 trials, the setting of good examples of debating before large 
 bodies of students, etc. But the immediate purpose of the 
 debaters in any given contest is, and should be, to demon- 
 strate their superior ability (in debate) over their opponents. 
 Keeping this truth in mind will help to clear up many dif- 
 ficulties and misconceptions in regard to contest debating. 
 
 The immediate purpose of any debate in real life, on the 
 other hand, is to bring about the right settlement of the ques- 
 tion. The judges should be concerned with nothing else. 
 
 The decision in "real life'* should be on "the case" not 
 on the abihty of the debaters concerned. In contest debating 
 such a purpose is obviously not aimed at, and therefore a 
 decision on "the case" is highly undesirable. Here the deci- 
 sion should always be on the comparative ability of the debaters 
 on the opposing teams. . This statement does not mean that 
 in regard to the principles of argumentation already discussed 
 (or the additional principles of debating presented in this 
 section), there is any fundamental difference in real life and 
 in contest debates. But in one situation debating is to be 
 judged, in the other the question is to be settled. The same 
 rules and principles apply to the debating in both situations. 
 As far as the debaters and audience are concerned the con- 
 test should he conducted exactly as though the audience were 
 to settle the question. But the judges should award the debate 
 to the team that has done the work better — to the better 
 debaters — not to the team they agree with as to the merits 
 of the case. 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 371 
 
 2. " Getting nearer to the truth "poor basis for contest 
 decision. A decision for an affirmative team should not 
 mean that the affirmative team "got nearer to the truth" as 
 it is sometimes put. It should mean that the affirmative team 
 is on the whole composed of better debaters than the negative 
 team. The trouble with the other basis for decisions is that 
 before the judges can determine which side is right — which 
 side gets nearer the truth — they must necessarily determine 
 what is right — what the truth is. Of course the truth to any 
 judge is the side of the question that he happens to believe 
 in. Surely, then, a team that argues directly away from the 
 truth has no chance against a team that argues for the truth, 
 no matter how feebly. So the result, in any case so judged, 
 must be that each judge will vote for the team that upholds 
 the side of the question that he happens to favor. Then the 
 decision records simply the private opinions of the judges on 
 the question discussed. Anyone interested in these opinions 
 could probably get them by mail at a great saving of time and 
 money. It is neither right nor complimentary to the judges 
 to expect them to have no opinions on the questions debated, 
 or to expect the debaters under the limitations of a contest 
 debate to change the opinions of the judges. The proper 
 question to be answered by the award is, "Which institution 
 has the better debating team?" Each judge should know 
 enough about debating (regardless of his knowledge or opin- 
 ions in economics, politics, theology, etc.) to give an expert 
 opinion on the comparative ability of the opposing teams, 
 entirely aside from his private opinion on the question de- 
 bated, either before or after the deabte. Of course, judges 
 should be chosen who know enough about real debating to 
 know that skill does not consist in glibness of tongue, trickery 
 of phraseology, nor superficiality of thought. 
 
 3. Three t3rpes of decisions. What are the possible 
 types of decisions? There are three. A judge may conceiv- 
 ably vote in any one of three different ways. He may give 
 a "juryman's vote," a "legislator's vote," or a "critic's vote." 
 
372 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 a. The juryman's vote. A juryman is supposed to exclude 
 from his consideration all except the evidence duly admitted 
 in a given trial, and to vote on that regardless of his preju- 
 dices, convictions, evidence privately gained, or real feeling 
 as to right or wrong. His question is not "Is this defendant 
 really guilty?'* but "Is this defendant guilty according to 
 the law and evidence advanced here in this trial?" Is this 
 the type of vote we want from a judge in an intercollegiate 
 debate? Decidedly not. First, the side having the burden 
 of proof would be almost sure to lose, simply because the time 
 allowed is too short to prove the cases undertaken by the af- 
 firmatives in intercollegiate debate. There is time enough 
 for a good discussion, time enough for some fine training and 
 experience, time enough for a keen game, but not to prove 
 the case to jurymen who exclude all but the evidence of- 
 fered on that occasion. Second, it is bad to aim at this type 
 of decision, because it is practically impossible to get this atti- 
 tude of mind on the part of the judges. Even if men do some- 
 times perform this feat in the courtroom (when aided by the 
 rigidity of procedure, the rulings of the judge, the oaths, and 
 the immediate, recognized, important results of their deci- 
 sions) it is absurd to expect it in intercollegiate debate. So 
 the decision will be simply the juryman's opinion of the 
 merits of the question, his old opinions, perhaps strengthened 
 or weakened but essentially unchanged by the debate. So 
 his decision means nothing as far as the given contest is 
 concerned. The result is usually the same actually as that 
 discussed next — the legislator's vote. 
 
 b. The legislator's vote is supposed to be strictly on the 
 merits of the question (as seen by himself or by a constituency 
 which has instructed him, usually the former). He is not 
 confined to the evidence offered in a given debate in the 
 house, but relies on all the information that he has. He 
 thinks (or is supposed to think) of what he has read, what 
 he has experienced, what he has heard elsewhere, and "all 
 things considered" he votes as he believes on the question. 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 373 
 
 It is neither the case made out by one side, nor the skill ol 
 the debaters in the discussion that determines his vote. 
 He believes so and so, and votes accordingly. It is self- 
 evident that such a registering of the judge's private behefs 
 on the question is of no use in intercollegiate debate. It 
 has nothing to do with the work of the teams, and is usually 
 unrelated to what was done in the debate, because of the 
 impossibility of actually reversing a judge's opinion on a big 
 question in the time allowed. 
 
 c. The critic's vote. The other possibility (as far as we 
 know the only other one) is a critic's vote, or expert's vote, 
 giving expert opinion as to the comparative excellence of the 
 debating done. Such a judge knowing well all the limita- 
 tions of formal contest debating says when the contest is 
 over which side has the better team. This type of decision 
 is the only correct one. It is the only one that can be won 
 or lost by the debaters. Political creeds, social philosophies, 
 have nothing to do with it. The team doing the best work 
 not the team lucky enough to fit in with the beliefs of the 
 judges, gets the prize. Such decisions encourage good 
 genuine discussions, and discourage jockeying for judges and 
 aiming cases at the known predilections of the members of 
 the board. Of course, such critics' decisions should when- 
 ever possible be given by experts in debating. No one should 
 be called on to judge a debate who is unfamiliar with the 
 nature of such contests. Judges should be chosen as care- 
 fully as referees and umpires, and on same general grounds. 
 Of course, decisions should always be rendered by ballot 
 without consultation. The debating should all be done by 
 the team. The judges should judge without discussions. 
 (See Appendix C for sample ballot with instructions to 
 judges.) 
 
 4. Sport or game. The custom has grown in recent 
 years of referring to contest debating as a sport or a game} 
 This seems to us a proper thing because essentially true. 
 ^ See footnote at beginning of this chapter. 
 
374 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 This conception helps us to keep the right attitude toward it, 
 helps judges to decide on proper grounds, and frees us from 
 much cant and hypocrisy. 
 
 5. Convictions of the debaters. Another point on which 
 there has been some confusion has been the question of the 
 convictions of debaters. There has been of late years much 
 careless talking on this point by people who have not under- 
 stood the conditions governing intercollegiate debates. They 
 fail to realize that the purpose of these contests is to afford 
 opportunity for keen competition and training for the discus- 
 sions of real life. The fear that a young man is morally in- 
 jured by debating on the side of the question which does not 
 coincide with his convictions has very little basis. 
 
 It is not the proper business of the colleges to turn out 
 "young men with ardent convictions on the side of the right," 
 so far as the particular kind of questions usually used in in- 
 tercollegiate debates is concerned. ^Vhich is the "side of the 
 right" in the armament question? the tariff question.'^ the 
 recall of judicial decisions? the ship-subsidy question? gov- 
 ernment ownership of railroads? Those who have college 
 debating in charge in the class room or as an extra-curricular 
 activity should not be, professionally, advocates of either 
 side. Sir Roger's judicial attitude is altogether better. It 
 is our business rather to see that that which "might be 
 said on both sides," be it little or much, is discovered, 
 analyzed, organized, and presented clearly, honestly, intel- 
 ligently. 
 
 It certainly is the duty of the colleges to turn out "young 
 men who can make a good argument" on either side of such 
 questions without regard to their convictions. T\Tiether a 
 man will argue against his convictions in actual life, where 
 the "merits of the question" are really to be decided, is a 
 very different thing. Surely he must be mentally capable of 
 doing it. To be able to argue well on one side of these eco- 
 nomic and political questions, a man must be capable of ar- 
 guing on the other side. Argument that is worth while has an 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 375 
 
 intellectual basis. It is built upon facts and intelligent 
 inferences rather than on ardent convictions. Skill in the 
 use of the facts and inferences available may be gained on 
 either side of a question without regard to convictions. In- 
 struction and practice in debate should give young men this 
 skill. And where these matters are properly handled, stress 
 is not laid on getting the speaker to think rightly in regard 
 to the merits of either side of these questions — but to think. 
 accurately on both sides. Stress is laid on getting the student 
 to investigate thoroughly (which includes impartially), to 
 choose evidence wisely, to organize his case logically, and to 
 discuss it intelligently., While students are studying and 
 practicing for the purpose of gaining facility in these things, 
 the less attention paid to ardent convictions the better. 
 Requiring a student to present the best possible case for the 
 side of a political or economic question in which he thinks he 
 doesn't believe is to be highly recommended as an educative 
 process. If only all our lawmakers could be compelled to 
 undergo severe training in just this exercise how much 
 easier it would be for them to distinguish facts from preju- 
 dices, and to learn to draw intelligent inferences from the 
 former and to disregard the latter. This is "vocational 
 training for conscienceless politics" in the same way that 
 studying pharmacy prepares students to become poisoners, 
 that athletics prepares for all sorts of physical violence, 
 and that medical colleges prepare for quackery and mal- 
 practice. 
 
 Of course we grant that the debater who can add to the 
 intellectual preparation mentioned above, real conviction 
 and emotional enthusiasm will have a better chance to show 
 his powers on the platform. We like him to have, whenever 
 possible (and appropriate), that true eloquence which Web- 
 ster says labor and learning toil for in vain. So in making 
 up contest teams in debate the convictions of the debaters, 
 when they have convictions, are probably always considered 
 — ^not, however, for the purpose of safe-guarding morals. 
 
376 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Since the triangular system (allowing each college to have a 
 team on each side) is almost universal now, it probably very 
 rarely happens that a student who has ardent convictions 
 talks against them in an intercollegiate contest. But it 
 would not undermine his moral character if he did. 
 
 6. The preparation of contest debates should be thorough. 
 Debaters who rely on ghb talking to the exclusion of thor- 
 ough knowledge will be defeated in well-judged contests. 
 Debaters should know and follow the principles of argumen- 
 tation. Intelligent and effective debating follows them every- 
 where. The only coaching allowed should be done by well- 
 trained teachers of argumentation and debate, and should 
 be confined to criticism and suggestion — never going to ac- 
 tual work in getting up the debate. Students who do not 
 know already how to prepare a debate — who are not ac- 
 quainted with principles and conventions of argumentation 
 and debate should not be on debating teams. Supervision 
 and criticism by regular teachers ought to be good. Special 
 coaching by men hired for that purpose is usually bad. It 
 is well to have debates arranged in triangular leagues so 
 that each institution will have one team on each side of the 
 question. Then practice debates — full debates — can be had 
 frequently. This is the best possible preparation for the plat- 
 form. Speeches should not be written at all under these cir- 
 cumstances. The debaters should use an outline only, which 
 will grow and change as the case develops. Debaters so pre- 
 pared will be at home on the platform in the debate and 
 audiences will be spared that almost universally stupid pro- 
 duction — a memorized speech in a debate. 
 
 E. The affirmative case. The work of the affirmative 
 in a debate differs somewhat from that of the negative. The 
 affirmative has the burden of proof in all properly worded 
 questions. The affirmative case then must establish the 
 affirmative of all issues — all potential issues not admitted 
 by the negative. The question should be analyzed to find the 
 issues (see chapter 4). Then a partition should be decided 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 377 
 
 upon that will back up the affirmative of all issues on which 
 there is a fight. 
 
 F. The negative case. Four types. The negative, on 
 other hand, has a somewhat different problem. Sometime, 
 somehow, the negative must block at least one issue. This is 
 essential for any negative case. But as it is difficult to tell 
 just how effectively (in the opinion of others) one has suc- 
 ceeded in blocking any given issue, the negative usually wants 
 to put up as strong a case as the circumstances will allow — not 
 as weak a case as will actually block the affirmative. The 
 negative usually fights on each possible issue that allows a 
 good chance of opposition. This gives an impression of 
 greater strength in the negative case as a whole. Viewed 
 from this standpoint there are four types of negative cases 
 possible. 
 
 1. Pure refutation. The first, and weakest, negative is 
 a case of pure refutation. The negative simply attacks what 
 the affirmative offers and seeks to destroy it without taking 
 any responsibility for " the situation." It in effect says to the 
 affirmative, "You are wrong, that's all. We are not saying 
 what is right, but your proposition is no good." It is simple 
 denial. It is simply resting on their presumption and trying 
 by pure refutation to prevent the affirmative from establish- 
 ing a prima facie case. Such case, is, of course, only permis- 
 sible when it can be made out beyond any question. Where 
 it is possible to show the affirmative is hopelessly wrong that 
 may be all that is necessary for the time being. This type 
 should never be used when there is any good or truth at all 
 in the affirmative contentions. It is practically never found 
 in contest debating. 
 
 2. Defense of the present. The second type of negative is 
 a positive "defense of the present" (in addition to refutation 
 of course). The affirmative is wrong because no change is 
 needed at all. There is nothing wrong in the present situa-* 
 tion. No crime has been committed. There is no graft, no 
 inefficiency. "Whatever is is right." This is Httle better 
 
378 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 than pure refutation of the affirmative, but does have the 
 added element of actually defending the negative presump- 
 tions. This might be called a "stand pat" case. 
 
 3. Adjustment. The third case is one of adjustment, 
 repairs, some changes, but not an adoption of the affirmative 
 case. It is a liberal view of the situation, ready to make what 
 changes are necessary. Admitting the present is not perfect, 
 but still denying that the affirmative is right, it substantially 
 defends the present. This is a very common type of nega- 
 tive in contest debating and everywhere else. This case is 
 also cumulative, adding "repairs" to "defense" and "ref- 
 utation." 
 
 4. Counter proposition. The most radical case possible 
 for a negative is that of a counter proposition. This is ad- 
 mitting that there is a situation which demands remedy, 
 admitting a cause for action, but advocating a different 
 remedy. The counter proposition is the most daring and 
 radical case. There are two principles that must always be 
 lived up to in this case: (a) The counter proposition must be 
 stated unth perfect clearness. The negative has to take the 
 burden of proof on this proposition, and for safety and clear- 
 ness the proposition must be carefully worded and stated. 
 (b) A counter proposition must be counter. It must be in- 
 consistent with the proposition of the affirmative. If the 
 affirmative can say, "We have no objection to the theory 
 proposed by the negative, but it does not answer our case," 
 then the counter proposition is useless. It must, in order to 
 be any good, be antagonistic to that which the affirmative 
 case is advocating. It is an "affirmative defense" in legal 
 phrase, and must effectively negative the affirmative, as the 
 "affirmative defense" of insanity is a complete negative in 
 a murder trial. Here the defense takes the burden of proof 
 and has to prove insanity, while the prosecution takes the 
 Viewpoint of the presumption of sanity, and becomes for the 
 time a negative. This situation must be paralleled in general 
 argumentation when we are using a counter proposition. 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 379 
 
 It is the duty of the negative to clash with the affirmative, 
 therefore if the counter proposition is such that the affirma- 
 tive can accept it the negative is responsible for the failure 
 to meet. It is not enough that the counter proposition be 
 different; it must be vitally inconsistent with the affirmative 
 plan. 
 
 G. Personal attitude and bearing. Personality counts 
 for a great deal in debate, and problems in personal bearing 
 and personal attitude suggest themselves generally through- 
 out the whole course of the debate. It is deemed well, there- 
 fore, to present here, before taking up the different parts of 
 the debate, certain considerations and illustrations of personal 
 attitude and bearing in debate. 
 
 1. The personal tone to be cultivated in debate is a serious 
 matter, and a matter concerning which many flagrant mis- 
 takes are made. The personal element in debate is large. 
 There the speaker usually stands as the immediate sponsor 
 for all that he says and does; he is an advocate, personally 
 responsible for every opinion he advances: the man and the 
 cause are inextricably bound together. This condition of 
 affairs has two results; the first is, that the audience will be 
 greatly influenced by the personality of the speaker; the 
 second, that there is a temptation to attack an opponent for 
 his personality as well as for the principles he advocates. 
 The two main purposes of a debater are to win sympathy for 
 himseff and his cause and to discountenance his opponent 
 and the opposing cause. But unfortunately these two pur- 
 poses may conflict with each other. Sarcasm, ridicule, and 
 even personalities are undoubtedly admissible and helpful, 
 under certain circumstances and when properly handled, in 
 discrediting an opponent; but inappropriately introduced or 
 improperly handled, they are as harmful in discrediting the 
 man who uses them. These are dangerous weapons, treach- 
 erously two-edged *. a blow well directed will cut and maim an 
 enemy, but a slip or a blunder will surely turn the blow against 
 its author. With respect to personalities, i. e., attacks on the 
 
380 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 character or actions of a man, Shakespeare offers a good 
 
 motto : — 
 
 ". . . . Beware 
 Of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, 
 Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee." 
 
 An audience always sympathizes with the man who sticks to 
 the question and treats his "friends of the other side" with' 
 courtesy and good humor; if a case cannot be won on its 
 merits, rarely can it be won by resort to personalities. On 
 the other hand, an audience invariably respects a man who 
 can defend himself, and who has in him the spirit of fight 
 that resents a foul blow. A debater must never give ground, 
 even if his opponent resorts to weapons that he himself scorns 
 to use. In repelling such a personal attack there is one tempt- 
 ation, — the temptation to answer abuse with abuse. The 
 man who has the quarrel forced on him has the sympathy of 
 the audience at the start, and, if he is wise, he will take care 
 to retain that sympathy by keeping his dignity and self- 
 control. If he descends to the level chosen by his assailant, 
 and combats poison with poison, he has thrown away his 
 advantage and must fight on even terms. A model of per- 
 sonal tone may be found in Lincoln's conduct of his debate 
 with Douglas. Fully to appreciate his good-humored self- 
 control and his simple, but resolute, dignity, requires the 
 reading of the speeches of Senator Douglas, filled as they are 
 with misrepresentation and personal abuse. In his speech at 
 Springfield, July 17, Mr. Lincoln said: — 
 
 "Having made that speech with the most kindly feeling toward 
 Judge Douglas, as manifested therein, I was gratified when I found 
 that he had carefully examined it and had detected no error of 
 fact, nor any inference against him, nor any misrepresentations, of 
 which he thought fit to complain. In neither of the two speeches 
 I have mentioned did he make any such complaint. I will thank 
 any one who will inform me that he, in his speech to-day, pointed 
 out anything I had stated, respecting him, as being erroneous. I 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 381 
 
 presume there is no such thing. I have reason to be gratified that 
 the care and caution used in that speech left it so that he, most of 
 all others interested in discovering error, has not been able to point 
 out one thing against him which he could say was wrong. He seizes 
 upon the doctrines he supposes to be included in that speech, and 
 declares that upon them will turn the issue of this campaign. He 
 then quotes, or attempts to quote, from my speech. I will not say 
 that he wilfully misquotes, but he does fail to quote accurately. His 
 attempt at quoting is from a passage which I believe I can quote 
 accurately from memory. I shall make the quotation now, with 
 some comments upon it, as I have already said, in order that the 
 judge shall be left entirely without excuse for misrepresenting me. 
 I do so now, as I hope, for the last time. I do this in great caution, 
 in order that if he repeats his misrepresentations, it shall be plain 
 to all that he does so wilfully. If, after all, he still persists, I shall 
 be compelled to reconstruct the course I have marked out for myself, 
 and draw upon such humble resources as I have for a new course, 
 better suited to the real exigencies of the case. I set out, in this 
 campaign, with the intention of conducting it strictly as a gentle- 
 man, in substance at least, if not in the outside polish. The latter 
 I shall never be, but that which constitutes the inside of a gentle- 
 man I hope I understand, and am not less inclined to practise than 
 others. It was my purpose and expectation that this canvass would 
 be conducted upon principle, and with fairness upon both sides, 
 and it shall not be my fault if this purpose and expectation shall 
 be given up. ^ 
 
 Later, in his opening speech in the sixth joint debate, at 
 Quincy, October 13, he said: — 
 
 "He reminds me of the fact that he entered upon this canvass 
 with the purpose to treat me courteously; that touched me some- 
 what. It sets me thinking. I was aware, when it was first agreed 
 that Judge Douglas and I were to have these seven joint discus- 
 sions, that they were the successive acts of a drama — perhaps I 
 should say, to be enacted not merely in the face of audiences like 
 this, but in the face of the nation, and to some extent by my relation 
 to him, and not from anything in myself, in the face of the world; 
 
 * Lincoln-Douglas Debates^ p. 58. 
 
382 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 and I am anxious that they should be conducted with dignity anA 
 in the good temper which should be befitting the vast audience 
 before which it was conducted. But when Judge Douglas got home 
 from Washington and made his first speech in Chicago, the evening 
 afterward I made some sort of reply to it. His second speech was 
 made at Bloomington, in which he commented upon my speech 
 at Chicago, and said that I had used language ingeniously contrived 
 to conceal my intentions, or words to that effect. Now, I under- 
 stand that this is an imputation upon my veracity and candor. 
 I do not know what the Judge understood by it; but in our first 
 discussion at Ottawa he led off by charging a bargain, somewhat 
 corrupt in character, upon Trumbull and myself — that we had en- 
 tered into a bargain, one of the terms of which was that Trumbull 
 was to abolitionize the old Democratic party, and I (Lincoln) was 
 to abolitionize the old Whig party — I pretending to be as good an 
 old-line Wliig as ever. Judge Douglas may not understand that 
 he implicated my truthfulness and my honor when he said I was 
 doing one thing and pretending another; and I misunderstood him 
 if he thought he was treating me in a dignified way, as a man of 
 honor and truth, as he now claims he was disposed to treat me. 
 Even after that time, at Galesburgh, when he brings forward an 
 extract from a speech made at Charleston, to prove that I was trying 
 to play a double part — that I was trying to cheat the public, and 
 get votes upon one set of principles at one place and upon another 
 set of principles at another place — I do not understand but that he 
 impeached my honor, my veracity, and my candor, and because he 
 does this, I do not understand that I am bound, if I see a truthful 
 ground for it, to keep my hands off him. As soon as I learned that 
 Judge Douglas was disposed to treat me in this way, I signified in 
 one of my speeches that I should be driven to draw upon whatever 
 of humble resources I might have to adopt a new course with him. 
 I was not entirely sure that I should be able to hold my own with 
 him, but I at least had the purpose made to do as well as I could 
 upon him; and now I say that I will not be the first to cry 'hold.' 
 I think it originated with the Judge, and when he quits, I probably 
 will. But I shall not ask any favors at all. He asks me, or rather 
 he asks the audience, if I wish to push this matter to the point of 
 personal difficulty. I tell him, no. He did not make a mistake in 
 one of his early speeches, when he called me an 'amiable' man, 
 
TEE NATURE OF DEBATE 383 
 
 though perhaps he did when lie called me an 'intelligent' man. It 
 really hurts me very much to suppose that I have wronged anybody 
 on earth. I again tell him, no! I very much prefer, when this can- 
 vass shall be over, however it may result, that we at least part with- 
 out any bitter recollections of personal difficulties. 
 
 "The Judge, in his concluding speech at Galesburg, says that 
 I was pushing this matter to a personal difficulty, to avoid the 
 responsibility for the enormity of my principles. I say to the Judge 
 and this audience now, that I will again state our principles as well 
 as I hastily can in all their enormity, and if the Judge hereafter 
 chooses to confine himself to a war upon these principles, he will 
 probably not find me departing from the same course." ^ 
 
 With these models of personal dignity contrast the follow- 
 ing extract from the speech by Senator Pettit in the debate in 
 the Senate on the Fugitive Slave Law, June 26, 1854 : — 
 
 "Now, sir, to give this clause of the Declaration of Independence 
 any other construction than that which I have given it, is an evi- 
 dent, a self-evident, a palpable lie. What is the language? That 
 *all men are created equal.' Are they created equally tall, equally 
 broad, equally long, equally short? Are they created politically 
 equal? Are they created physically equal? Are they created men- 
 tally equal? Are they created morally equal? ... I ask the chair, 
 then, whether the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Sumner), with 
 his odium on his lips, is the equal of his revolutionary sires? Is he 
 the equal of Adams, of Hancock, of Warren, who was the first 
 martyr in the great cause of liberty, of freedom, and of union? Is he 
 the equal of these men? I had rather ask you, Mr. President, for 
 I think you would answer 'no,' and he might answer 'yes.' . . . 
 I ask that Senator, then, or I ask you, sir, whether that Senator is 
 the equal of the late lamented Daniel Webster, who preceded him 
 here long years ago? ... I believe as a mere mental man — and 
 I speak of him in no other capacity — Webster had not his equal on 
 this continent, if he had in Europe or on any other continent. Is 
 that Senator his equal? He might as well say that the jackal is the 
 equal of the lion, or that the buzzard is the equal of the eagle. 
 
 "When you, sir (addressing Mr. Sumner) find no man beneath 
 * Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 196. 
 
384 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 you; when those who are near you — your own class of men — can 
 find no man beneath you; when you shall claim as your equal the 
 man who rolls in the gutter, whom God has deprived in his own 
 organization and creation of all mental power and capacity; when 
 you shall claim that he who wallows in the gutter with the vilest 
 and most worthless is your equal, then your interpretation of the 
 doctrine is true. Let me go farther. If the Almighty ever intended 
 to create the Senator the equal with the mighty and lamented 
 Webster, I must say that he made a gross blunder and a most 
 egregious mistake. . . . Sir, I am inclined to believe that, in a 
 moral point of view, that Senator cannot find one beneath himself, 
 taking his own declaration to-day. He who will swear here in this 
 body, appealing to God for the truth of what he says, to support 
 the Constitution of the Union, and then boldly proclaim that he 
 will not do it, has sunk, in my estimation, to a depth of humiliation 
 and degradation which it would not be enviable for the veriest serf 
 or the lowest of God's creatures to occupy. It may be in that point 
 of view the Senator regards all others as his equal; but there are 
 some who are not willing to regard that Senator as their equal, and 
 who will never be coerced into any such admission." i 
 
 2. Self-control. The difference between these two 
 speeches is the difference between gentlemanly self-control 
 and coarse vituperation. A debater must never allow himself, 
 no matter how great the provocation, to be carried over the 
 bounds that confine the gentleman; coarseness, even though 
 it appear but for a moment, is always harmful. Coarseness 
 in debate is most often a matter of loss of temper. A man of 
 low character may be expected to show forth his nature at 
 any time; but for any high-minded man, the thing that 
 usually brings him to grief is the loss of his temper. Good 
 humor is a great asset in any controversy. He who loses his 
 temper in a debate, loses his best defense. One can be in- 
 dignant, offended, disgusted, without loss of temper. Any 
 loss of control, any exhibition of anger and peevishness is 
 almost sure to detract. A debater should learn how to be 
 "severe and parliamentary at the same time." 
 
 * Congressional Debates, Vol. 28, Part II, p. 1518. 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 385 
 
 3. Sarcasm and ridicule. Good humor is even more nec- 
 essary if one is to use sarcasm or ridicule. The line must not 
 be drawn so strictly against these weapons as against per- 
 sonalities pure and simple. Sarcasm in a skilful hand is a 
 formidable weapon, and ridicule can often win a point where 
 nothing else would avail. But it must always be remembered 
 that these are light arms. They are fine- wrought, flexible 
 foils, and they must be wielded with a light hand. They 
 are not suited for the slashing and cutting of broad-sword 
 play. To fence with them a man must be quick, light of 
 hand, and, above all, cool and self-controlled. Some men 
 cannot use sarcasm and ridicule at all, and no man can afford 
 to use them carelessly. Ill temper in the use of these weapons 
 is both careless and clumsy. It always results in a wild aim 
 and looks like foul play. Sarcasm and ridicule are most 
 effective when directed against conceit and affectation. 
 A speaker who allows his conceit to rise to the surface, or 
 who assumes a tone of grandiloquence or bombast, has ex- 
 posed a weak spot in his armor. And there is no weapon 
 that will so readily find the spot and strike through it as one 
 of these light side-arms of forensic combat. The following 
 is one of the best illustrations of the use of ridicule that can 
 be found in American oratory. It is so interesting and so 
 worthy of study with respect to its general tone, its vivid 
 rhetoric, and its telling choice of figures of speech as to justify 
 the giving of the passage nearly in full. A certain General 
 Crary, on February 14, 1840, in the debate in the House on 
 the Cumberland Road Bill, attacked General William Henry 
 Harrison for alleged deficiencies as a military commander, 
 severely criticising his conduct of the battle of Tippecanoe 
 and of various other campaigns. Thomas Corwin of Ohio 
 replied in a speech of which the following is a part. Mr. 
 Crary was so overwhelmed that John Quincy Adams, a few 
 days after, referred to him as "the late Mr. Crary." 
 
 *'In all other countries, and in all former times, a gentleman who 
 would either speak or be listened to on the subject of war, involving 
 
386 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 subtle criticisms and strategy, and careful reviews of marches, sieges, 
 battles, regular and casual, and irregular onslaughts, would be 
 required to show, first, that he had studied much, investigated 
 fully, and digested the science and history of his subject. But here, 
 sir, no such painful preparation is required; witness the gentleman 
 from Michigan! He has announced to the House that he is a militia 
 general on the peace establishment! That he is a lawyer we know, 
 tolerably well read in Tidd's 'Practice' and Espinasse's *Nisi Prius.' 
 These studies, so happily adapted to the subject of war, with an 
 appointment in the militia in time of peace, furnish him at once 
 with all the knowledge necessary to discourse to us, as from high 
 authority, upon all the mysteries of the 'trade of death.' Again, 
 Mr. Speaker, it must occur to every one, that we, to whom these 
 questions are submitted and these military criticisms are addressed, 
 being all colonels at least, and most of us, like the gentleman him- 
 self, brigadiers, are, of all conceivable tribunals, best qualified to 
 decide any nice points connected with military science. I hope 
 the House will not be alarmed with the impression that I am about 
 to discuss one or the other of the military questions now before us 
 at length, but I wish to submit a remark or two, by way of preparing 
 us for a proper appreciation of the merits of the discourse w^e have 
 heard. I trust we are all brother-oflScers, that the gentleman from 
 Michigan, and the two hundred and forty colonels or generals of 
 this honorable House, will receive what I have to say as coming 
 from an old brother in arms, and addressed to them, in a spirit of 
 candor, 
 
 " ' Such as becometh comrades free. 
 Reposing after victory.' 
 
 "Sir, we all know the military studies of the military gentleman 
 from Michigan before he was promoted. I take it to be beyond a 
 reasonable doubt that he had perused with great care the title page 
 of 'Baron Steuben.' Nay, I go further; as the gentleman has in- 
 cidentally assured us that he is prone to look into musty and neg- 
 lected volumes, I venture to assert, without vouching in the least 
 from personal knowledge, that he has prosecuted his researches so 
 far as to be able to know that the rear rank stands right behind the 
 front. This, I think, is fairly inferable from what I understood him 
 to say of the two lines of encampment at Tippecanoe. Thus we see, 
 Mr. Speaker, that the gentleman from Michigan, being a militia 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 387 
 
 general, as he has told us, his brother oflScers, in that simple state- 
 ment has revealed the glorious history of toils, privations, sacrifices, 
 and bloody scenes, through which, we know from experience and 
 observation, a militia oflScer, in time of peace, is sure to pass. We 
 all in fancy now see the gentleman from Michigan in that most 
 dangerous and glorious event in the life of a militia general on the 
 peace establishment — a parade day! That day, for which all the 
 other days of his life seem to have been made. We can see the 
 troops in motion — umbrellas, hoes, and axe-handles, and other like 
 deadly implements of war, overshadowing all the fields, when lo! 
 the leader of the hosts approaches ! 
 
 "* Far off his coming shines!' 
 
 His plume, which, after the fashion of the great Bourbon, is of 
 awful length, reads its baleful history in the bereaved necks and 
 bosoms of forty neighboring henroosts. Like the great Suwaroff, 
 he seems somewhat careless in forms or points of dress; hence his 
 epaulettes may be on his shoulders, back, or sides, but still gleaming, 
 gloriously gleaming in the sun. Mounted he is, too, let it not be 
 forgotten. Need I describe to the colonels and generals of this 
 honorable House the steeds which heroes bestride on these occa- 
 sions? No! I see the memory of other days is with you. You see 
 before you the gentleman from Michigan, mounted on his crop- 
 eared, bushy-tailed mare, the singular obliquity of whose hinder 
 limbs is best described by that most expressive phrase, * sickle 
 hams' — for height just fourteen hands, *all told'; yes, sir, there 
 you see his * steed that laughs at the shaking of the spear'; that is 
 his war horse, * whose neck is clothed in thunder.' Mr. Speaker, 
 we have glowing descriptions in history of Alexander the Great 
 and his war horse Bucephalus, at the head of the invincible Mace- 
 donian phalanx; but sir, such are the improvements of modern times, 
 that every one must see that our militia general, with his crop-eared 
 mare with bushy tail and sickle hams, would totally frighten off a 
 battle field a hundred Alexanders. But, sir, to the history of the 
 parade day. The general, thus mounted and equipped, is in the 
 field and ready for action. On the eve of some desperate enterprise, 
 such as giving order to shoulder arms, it may be, there occurs a 
 crisis, one of those accidents of war, which no sagacity could foresee 
 nor prevent. A cloud rises and passes over the sun! Here is an 
 
388 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 occasion for the display of that greatest of all traits in the history 
 of a commander — the tact which enables him to seize upon and 
 turn to good account unlooked-for events as they arise. Now for 
 the caution wherewith the Roman Fabius foiled the skill and 
 courage of Hannibal! A retreat is ordered, and troops and general, 
 in a twinkling, are found safely bivouacked in a neighboring gro- 
 cery." ^ 
 
 With respect to all three of the methods mentioned above, 
 viz., personalities, sarcasm, and ridicule, it is to be remarked 
 that they are only occasional weapons. They are not sub- 
 stitutes for proof or for the substance of argument. They 
 are merely auxiliaries. It is often easier to malign or laugh 
 at an opponent than to answer him, but it does not accom- 
 plish the same end. 
 
 4. Personal inconsistency. The charge of personal in- 
 sistency belongs in debate more truly than elsewhere. As 
 we have already seen, in debate the speakers generally stand 
 as personally responsible advocates of the opinions they 
 espouse. Consequently, if it can be shown that a speaker 
 is inconsistent in his opinions, the shot often strikes home. 
 If it is proved that a speaker upholds views that he formerly 
 condemned, or that his actions belie his words, his motives 
 are clearly impeached and his sincerity or veracity is at least 
 open to suspicion. This charge may be used as a means of 
 ridicule, making light of the pretended earnestness of an 
 opponent, or it may be, used as the foundation of a serious 
 charge of fraud or hyprocrisy. Lincoln used it in his speech 
 at Chicago, July 10, to ridicule an excess of oratorical enthu- 
 siasm on the part of Senator Douglas. Speaking of the 
 Dred Scott Decision, he said : — 
 
 "The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision, 
 is a degree of sacredness that has never been before thrown around 
 any other decision. I have never heard of such a thing. . . . But 
 Judge Douglas will have it that all hands must take this extraor- 
 
 * Hardwicke, History of Oratory and Orators, pp. 368-371. 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 389 
 
 dinary decision, made under these extraordinary circumstances, 
 and give their vote in Congress in accordance with it, yield to it, 
 and obey it in every possible sense. Circumstances alter cases. Do 
 not gentlemen here remember the case of that same Supreme Court, 
 some twenty-five or thirty years ago, deciding that a National 
 Bank was constitutional.'* I ask if somebody does not remember 
 that a National Bank was declared to be constitutional .f* Such is 
 the truth, whether it be remembered or not. The Bank charter 
 ran out, and a recharter was granted by Congress. That recharter 
 was laid before General Jackson. It was urged upon him, when he 
 denied the constitutionality of the Bank, that the Supreme Court 
 had decided that it was constitutional; and that General Jackson 
 then said that the Supreme Court had no right to lay down a rule 
 to govern a coordinate branch of the Government, the members 
 of which had sworn to support the Constitution — that each member 
 had sworn to support that Constitution as he understood it. I 
 will venture here to say, that I have heard Judge Douglas say 
 that he approved of General Jackson's act. What has now become 
 of all his tirade about 'resistance to the Supreme Court'?" ^ 
 
 Senator Hayne, in his second speech on the Foote Reso- 
 lution, used this device differently, rather making it the 
 foundation of a serious charge of inconsistency and apos- 
 tasy: — 
 
 *'I am not at all surprised, however, at the aversion of the gentle- 
 man to the very name of tariff. I doubt not that it must always 
 bring up some very unpleasant recollections to his mind. If I am 
 not greatly mistaken, the Senator from Massachusetts was a leading 
 actor at a great meeting got up in Boston in 1820 against the tariff. 
 It has generally been supposed that he drew up the resolutions 
 adopted by that meeting, denouncing the tariff system as unequal, 
 oppressive, and unjust, and, if I am not much mistaken, denying 
 its constitutionality. Certain it is that the gentleman made a 
 speech on that occasion in support of those resolutions, denouncing 
 the system in no very measured terms; and, if ray memory serves me, 
 calling its constitutionality in question. I regret that I have not 
 
 ^ Lincoln-Douglas Debates^ pp. 20, 21. 
 
390 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 been able to lay my hands on those proceedings, but I have seen 
 them, and I cannot be mistaken in their character. At that time, 
 sir, the Senator from Massachusetts entertained the very sentiments 
 in relation to the tariff which the South now entertains. We next 
 find the Senator from Massachusetts expressing his opinion on the 
 tariff as a member of the House of Representatives from the city 
 of Boston in 1824. On that occasion, sir, the gentleman assumed a 
 position which commanded the respect and admiration of his coun- 
 try. He stood forth the powerful and fearless champion of free 
 trade. He met, in that conflict, the advocates of restriction and 
 monopoly, and they 'fled from before his face.' With a profound 
 sagacity, a fulness of knowledge, and a richness of illustration that 
 has never been surpassed, he maintained and established the prin- 
 ciples of commercial freedom on a foundation never to be 
 shaken. . . . Then it was that he erected to free trade a beautiful 
 and enduring monument, and 'inscribed the marble with his name.* 
 It is with pain and regret that I now go forward to the next great 
 era in the political life of that gentleman, when he was found upon 
 the floor supporting, advocating, and finally voting for the tariff of 
 1828 — that 'bill of abominations.' By that act, sir, the Senator 
 from Massachusetts has destroyed the labors of his whole life, and 
 given a wound to the cause of free trade, never to be healed. Sir, 
 when I recollect the position which that gentleman once occupied, 
 and that which he now holds in public estimation, in relation to 
 this subject, it is not at all surprising that the tariff should be 
 hateful to his ears. Sir, if I had erected to my own fame so proud a 
 monument as that which the gentleman built in 1824, and I could 
 have been tempted to destroy it with my own hands, I should hate 
 the voice that should ring 'the accursed tariff' in my ears. I doubt 
 not the gentleman feels very much in relation to the tariff as a 
 certain knight did to 'instinct,' and with him would be disposed to 
 exclaim — 
 
 "'Ah, no more of that Hal, and thou lov'st me.'" ^ 
 
 It is evident that in some kinds of debate this particular 
 form of attack finds no place. In intercollegiate debate, or 
 before a jury, it is rarely opportune, because the personal 
 
 1 Debates in Congress, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 49. Gales and Seaton, Washing- 
 ton. 1830. 
 
THE NATURE OF DEBATE 391 
 
 opinions of the speakers in these situations have little "to 
 do with the case." The speakers are merely instruments of 
 competition or of justice, in presenting whatever is to be said 
 on either side of the question, and so are not open to personal 
 attacks. 
 
CHAPTER 17 
 
 THE MAIN SPEECHES 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A.. Main speeches and brief. 
 
 B. Preparatory practice. 
 
 C. Divisions of debate. 
 
 1. The introduction. 
 
 a. First affirmative. 
 
 b. First negative. 
 
 (I) Adaj/t to circumstances. 
 
 c. Definitions. 
 
 d. Issues. 
 
 e. Partition. 
 
 2. The discussion. 
 
 a. Main heads. 
 
 b. Repetition. 
 
 c. Summaries and partitions. 
 
 d. Asking questions. 
 
 (I) To get definite answers. 
 
 (II) To waste time. 
 
 (III) To force into a dilemma. 
 
 3. The conclusion. 
 
 a. Strategy. 
 
 b. Summary. 
 
 c. Balanced summary. 
 
 A. Main speeches and brief. The main speeches in 
 any debate should not be planned until after a complete 
 brief of the case has been prepared. The brief should, of 
 course, be one, not three, even if there are three speakers. 
 This is true both of contest debates and actual debates in the 
 affairs of life. There should be one complete brief of the 
 case. Then this brief should be divided as seems best among 
 
 392 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 393 
 
 whatever number of speakers is to present the case. Each 
 speaker should take his section and prepare an outHne of it, 
 and talk from the outline. The brief should not be taken as the 
 necessary outline of the case. Speeches delivered from a good 
 brief as an outline are apt to be wooden and tiresome. 
 
 B. Preparatory practice. The practice in preparation 
 for contest debate should consist of numerous debates be- 
 tween opposing teams. The now almost universal plan of 
 triangular debates makes this feasible, as each institution 
 has a team on each side. Each team should try all possible 
 schemes of attack and defense — always covering in some way 
 or other the case as briefed, but using as many different kinds 
 of outlines as can be invented. A speaker who is at all fluent 
 and quick-witted should rarely even write a manuscript in 
 preparation for a debate. He should debate from an outline 
 as often as possible and learn to adapt his remarks to what- 
 ever form the discussion takes. Probably, if slow-minded and 
 halting speakers must go into contest debates, they will have 
 to write and memorize their arguments, but this is hardly 
 worth calling debating, and should always be given little 
 credit by judges of contest debates. In class work in de- 
 bates no student should ever write a manuscript.^ Briefs 
 and outlines should be the only " paper basis'* for class 
 debates. 
 
 C. Divisions of the debate. The debate should be one — 
 should have absolute unity. It should be fundamentally 
 the same if delivered by one or two or three speakers. We, 
 therefore, discuss the main speeches here from the stand- 
 point of introduction, discussion, and conclusion, not from 
 that of first, second, and third speaker. If there are three 
 speakers, the first usually gives the introduction and part 
 of the discussion, the second more of the discussion, and the 
 third the rest of the discussion and the conclusion. The situa- 
 
 * Please note that this is not saying that practice in written argumentation 
 is not valuable. It is; and should be indulged in before students take a 
 course in debating. It is not the best preparation for a debate. 
 
394 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tion will not be essentially different with one or two or even 
 four speakers on a side. 
 
 1. The Introduction 
 
 a. First affirmative. In a debate to have the first speech 
 is a privilege. This privilege, which arises from the influence 
 of the speech upon the remainder of the debate, is twofold. 
 First, the speaker has an opportunity to make the first im- 
 pression on the audience; and, secondly, he has an opportu- 
 nity to direct the course of the debate. This, then, is the duty 
 of a speaker opening a debate, whom, for convenience, we 
 will call the "first speaker on the aflSrmative," viz, to win a 
 fair hearing for himself and his side of the proposition. Posi- 
 tive persuasion to win sympathy is usually dangerous here, 
 but what we have called negative persuasion is of the 
 utmost importance. Avoid giving an unfavorable impres- 
 sion. Be clear, calm, reasonable, fair to opponents, accurate 
 and thorough in explanations. In this manner explain the 
 case, set forth the issues, accept the burden of proof, out- 
 line your case as far as seems advisable, and then start the 
 argument. It often happens in debate that there is one 
 method of analyzing and discussing the question that is ad- 
 vantageous to the affirmative, and another method that is 
 advantageous to the negative. Consequently, to force an 
 opponent to discuss the question according to your plan, 
 to compel him to fight you on your own grounds, is a point 
 won. To return to a military comparison, in war it is a great 
 advantage to be able to have the choice of position; and this 
 advantage generally goes to the army that is first on the field. 
 A well-prepared, aggressive first speaker can so explain the 
 origin and history of the question, and so present the issues, 
 as to compel his opponent to accept his analysis of the case, 
 provided of course that he presents a fair and legitimate 
 interpretation, but a weak or apologetic opening affirmative 
 may well miss this opportunity, and allow the negative 
 practically to control the discussion. By such an opening 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 395 
 
 th J affirmative can lose its chief advantage over the negative. 
 The affirmative should remember that the proposition, and 
 the burden of proving it, is theirs; it is their case. They have 
 a right (within the limits of legitimate interpretation), to 
 establish it as they see fit. To allow the negative to take this 
 opportunity awaj^ from them is an indication of great incom- 
 petence. Rhetorically, an opening speaker should use a grac- 
 ful and finished, but never ornate or "high-flown," diction. 
 His general tone should be conciliatory. Above all, his ex- 
 position should be lucid and interesting, avoiding fine dis- 
 tinctions and technicalities in explaining the question. 
 
 b. First negative. The duty of the speaker in opposition, 
 who may be called the "first speaker on the negative,'* is 
 clear. He may adopt the same tone and rhetorical style as 
 the opening speaker, — clear, smooth, and conciliatory; or he 
 may under some circumstances, take a different attitude, an 
 attitude of open belligerency from the start. But he must, 
 whatever the method, attempt to counteract the influence of 
 his opponent who has introduced the debate. This is a diffi- 
 cult task, calling for tact and aggressive force. Sometimes, 
 though not often in contest debating, his opponent will have 
 excited the audience against him, or will have won their 
 sympathy for himself; then the speaker must counteract 
 these effects by the use of sarcasm, wit, invective, or what- 
 ever resources he may command. If the opening speaker 
 has seemed to establish an interpretation of the question 
 unfavorable to the negative, he must offer battle at the very 
 start, and overthrow this interpretation by showing that, 
 "the preceding speaker has misread history and misunder- 
 stood the facts," that he has "failed to present the real 
 issues involved," or "unfortunately failed to grasp the real 
 question," etc. Whatever the situation he finds left by his 
 opponent, he must adapt himself to it and attempt to change 
 it to his own advantage. He must take matters as he finds 
 them. The one thing that he must not do is to ignore what 
 has been said. He must not take the platform and start 
 
396 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 his case as if nothing had been said. He is the second speaker 
 in the discussion, and unless he can adapt his speech to what 
 has been said, he is a very poor debater, whatever else he 
 may be. At such a time, a lecture or an essay is worse then 
 nothing. The whole value of the introduction of a first 
 speaker on the negative, depends on its adaptation to the 
 circumstances. Somehow he must recognize the interpreta- 
 tion of the first affirmative and either accept it as satisfac- 
 tory, or challenge it as unsound. If the latter, he must 
 proceed at once to show why unsound and to explain the in- 
 terpretation of the negative. 
 
 An illustration directly in point may be taken from the 
 famous Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858. The circum- 
 stances of this controversy are well known. It occurred 
 during the most intense period of the slavery struggle, 
 just before the opening of the War of the Rebellion. The 
 country was stirred to a passionate interest, by the fight 
 in Congress over the admission of Kansas into the Union, 
 by the conflict between slavery and anti-slavery factions in 
 that state, and by the Dred Scott decision, just declared by 
 the Supreme Court. Lincoln and Douglas were rival candi- 
 dates for an Illinois senatorship. They were recognized rep- 
 resentatives of the two great political factions of the North, 
 and the whole country soon became the spectators of the 
 contest. Douglas, in his opening speech at Chicago, July 9, 
 1858, had mentioned, "An unholy and unnatural alliance," 
 and had advocated popular sovereignty, "the right of the 
 people of each territory to decide for themselves whether 
 slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits." In Lin- 
 coln's reply he "turned the tables" on Judge Douglas in a 
 typical Lincoln introduction leading up to the main issue. 
 
 "My fellow-citizens: On yesterday evening, upon the occasion of 
 the reception given to Senator Douglas, I was furnished with a seat 
 very convenient for hearing him, and was otherwise very courteously 
 treated by him and his friends, and for which I thank him and 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 397 
 
 them. During the course of his remarks my name was mentioned 
 in such a way as, I suppose, renders it at least nor improper that 
 I should make some sort of reply to him. I shall not attempt to 
 follow him in the precise order in which he addressed the assembled 
 multitude upon that occasion, though I shall perhaps do so in the 
 main. 
 
 "There was one question to which he asked the attention of the 
 crowd, which I deem of somewhat less importance — at least of 
 propriety for me to dwell upon — than the others, which he brought 
 in near the close of his speech, and which I think it would not be en- 
 tirely proper for me to omit attending to, and yet if I were not to 
 give some attention to it now, I should probably forget it altogether. 
 While I am upon this subject, allow me to say that I do not intend 
 to indulge in that inconvenient mode sometimes adopted in public 
 speaking, of reading from documents; but I shall depart from that 
 rule so far as to read a little scrap from his speech which notices 
 this first topic of which I shall speak — that is, provided I can find 
 it in the paper. 
 
 " *I have made up my mind to appeal to the people against the 
 combination that has been made against me! the Republican leaders 
 have formed an alliance, an unholy and unnatural alliance, with a 
 portion of unscrupulous federal office-holders. I intend to fight 
 that allied army wherever I meet them. I know they deny the al- 
 liance, but yet these men who are trying to divide the Democratic 
 party for the purpose of electing a Republican Senator in my place, 
 are just as much the agents and tools of the supporters of Mr. 
 Lincoln. Hence I shall deal with this allied army just as the Rus- 
 sians dealt with the allied forces at Sebastopol — that is, the Rus- 
 sians did not stop to inquire, when they fired a broadside, whether 
 it hit an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Turk. Nor will I stop to 
 inquire, nor shall I hesitate, whether my blows shall hit these 
 Republican leaders or theu- allies, who are holding the federal oflSces 
 and yet acting in concert with them.* 
 
 "Well, now, gentlemen, is not that very alarming? Just to think 
 of it! right at the outset of his canvass, I, a poor, kind, amiable 
 gentleman, I am to be slain in this way. Why, my friend, the 
 Judge, is not only, as it turns out, not a dead lion, nor even a living 
 one — ^he is the rugged Russian Bear! 
 
 "But if they will have it — for he says that we deny it — that 
 
398 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 there is any such alliance, as he says there is — and I don't propose 
 hanging very much upon this question of veracity — but if he will 
 have it that there is such an alliance — that the Administration men 
 and we are allied and we stand in thfe attitude of English, French 
 and Turk, he occupying the position of the Russians, in that case, 
 I beg that he will indulge us while we barely suggest to him that 
 these allies took Sebastopol. . . . 
 
 "Popular sovereignty! everlasting popular sovereignty! Let us 
 for a moment inquire into this vast matter of popular sovereignty," 
 etc.i 
 
 (I) Adaptation to circumstances. We have said, that the 
 value of the introduction of a first speaker on the negative 
 depends upon the adaptation to circumstances. This is also 
 true of the introduction to any speech, after the opening 
 speech. The very essence of debate, as contrasted with 
 simple written argumentation, consists in seeing situations 
 and meeting them. A series of arguments on a proposition 
 does not necessarily constitute a debate. A debater who 
 demonstrates and argues regardless of what the opposition 
 is doing, is like a fencer who lunges right and left without 
 looking at his opponent. Very seldom is it safe to enter the 
 discussion without taking notice of what has been said and 
 done by preceding speakers, or without laying some founda- 
 tion of sympathy and understanding with the audience. 
 
 For example, contrast the two following introductions. 
 They are both from the same man, Senator Robert Y. Hayne 
 of South Carolina. They were both delivered in the same 
 debate, the debate in the Senate in 1830, on the famous 
 Foote Resolution. But there is this difference : the first is the 
 introduction to Mr. Hayne's opening speech; the second is 
 part of the introduction to a second speech, delivered at a 
 later stage of the discussion, after he had been attacked and 
 his position assailed by such senators as Benton and Webster. 
 The contrast shows the difference in tone and method adapted 
 to the different situations. 
 
 * Lincoln-Douglas Debates, pp. 14, 15. 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 399 
 
 Mr. Hayne*s opening speech began as follows: — 
 
 "It has been said, and correctly said, by more than one gentle- 
 man, that resolutions of inquiry were usually suffered to pass with- 
 out opposition. The parliamentary practice in this respect was 
 certainly founded in good sense and sound policy, which regarded 
 such resolutions as intended merely to elicit information, and there- 
 fore entitled to favor. But I cannot give my assent to the proposi- 
 tion so broadly laid down by some gentlemen, that because nobody 
 stands committed by a vote for inquiry, that, therefore, every 
 resolution proposing an inquiry, no matter on what subject, must 
 pass almost as a matter of course, and that, to discuss or oppose 
 such resolutions, is unparliamentary. The true distinction seems 
 to be this: where information is desired as the basis of legislation, 
 or where the policy of any measure, or the principles it involves, 
 are really questionable, it was always proper to send the subject 
 to a committee for investigation; but where all the material facts 
 are already known, and there is fixed and settled opinion in respect 
 to the policy to be pursued, inquiry was unnecessary, and ought 
 to be refused. No one, he thought, could doubt the correctness of 
 the position assumed by the gentleman from Missouri, that no 
 inquiry ought ever to be instituted as to the expediency of doing 
 *a great and acknowledged wrong.' I do not mean, however, to 
 intimate an opinion that such is the character of this resolution. 
 The application of these rules to the case before us will decide my 
 vote, and every Senator can apply them for himself to the decision 
 of the question, whether the inquiry now called for should be 
 granted or refused. With that decision, whatever it may be, I 
 shall be contented. 
 
 "I have not risen, however, Mr. President, for the purpose of 
 discussing the propriety of instituting the inquiry recommended by 
 the resolution, but to offer a few remarks on another and much 
 more important question, to which gentlemen have alluded in the 
 course of this debate — I mean the policy which ought to be pursued 
 in relation to the public lands. Every gentleman who has had a 
 seat in Congress for the last two or three years ^ or even for the last 
 two or three weeks, must be convinced of the great and growing 
 importance of this question. More than half of our time has been 
 taken up with the discussion of propositions connected with the 
 
400 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 public lands; more than half of our acts embrace provisions growing 
 out of this fruitful source. Day after day the changes are rung 
 on this topic, from the grave inquiry into the right of the new 
 States to the absolute sovereignty and property in the soil, down 
 to the grant of a preemption of a few quarter sections to actual 
 settlers. In the language of a great orator in relation to another 
 ' vexed question,' we may truly say, ' that year after year we have 
 been lashed round the miserable circle of occasional arguments and 
 temporary expedients!' No gentleman can fail to perceive that 
 this is a question no longer to be evaded; it must be met — fairly 
 and fearlessly met. A question that is pressed upon us in so many 
 ways; that intrudes in such a variety of shapes; involving so deeply 
 the feelings and interests of a large portion of the Union; insinuating 
 itself into almost every question of public policy, and tinging the 
 whole course of our legislation, cannot be put aside or laid asleep. 
 We cannot long avoid it; we must meet and overcome it, or it will 
 overcome us. Let us, then, be prepared to encounter it in a spirit 
 of wisdom and of justice, and endeavor to prepare our own minds 
 and the minds of the people for a just and enlightened decision. 
 The object of the remarks I am about to offer is merely to call public 
 attention to the question, to throw out a few crude and undigested 
 thoughts, as food for reflection, in order to prepare the public mind 
 for the adoption, at no distant day, of some fixed and settled policy 
 in relation to the public lands. I believe that, out of the western 
 country, there is no subject in the whole range of our legislation 
 less understood, and in relation to which there exists so many 
 errors, and such unhappy prejudices and misconception. 
 
 "There may be said to be two great parties in this country, who 
 entertain very opposite opinions in relation to the character of the 
 policy which the Government has heretofore pursued, in relation 
 to the public lands, as well as to that which ought, hereafter, to be 
 pursued." ^ 
 
 The introduction to his second speech, in part, was: — 
 
 "When I took occasion, two days ago, to throw out some ideas 
 with respect to the policy of the Government in relation to the 
 public lands, nothing certainly could have been farther from my 
 
 * Debates in Congress, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 21-32. 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 401 
 
 thoughts than that I should be compelled again to throw myself 
 upon the indulgence of the Senate. Little did I expect to be called 
 upon to meet such an argument as was yesterday urged by the 
 gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster). Sir, I questioned 
 no man's opinions; I impeached no man's motives; I charged no 
 party, or State, or section of country, with hostility to any other; 
 but ventured, I thought in a becoming spirit, to put forth my own 
 sentiments in relation to a great national question of public policy. 
 Such was my course. The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Benton), 
 it is true, had charged upon the Eastern States an early and con- 
 tinued hostility towards the West, and referred to a number of 
 historical facts and documents in support of that charge. Now, 
 sir, how have these different arguments been met.'' The honorable 
 gentleman from Massachusetts, after deliberating a whole night 
 upon his course, comes into this chamber to vindicate New England, 
 and, instead of making up his issue with the gentleman from Mis- 
 souri, on the charges which he had preferred, chooses to consider 
 me as the author of those charges, and, losing sight entirely of that 
 gentleman, selects me as his adversary, and pours out all the vials 
 of his mighty wrath upon my devoted head. Nor is he willing to 
 stop there. He goes on to assail the institutions and policy of the 
 South, and calls in question the principles and conduct of the State 
 which I have the honor to represent. When I find a gentleman of 
 mature age and experience, of acknowledged talents and profound 
 sagacity, pursuing a course like this, declining the contest offered 
 from the West, and making war upon the unoffending South, I 
 must believe, I am bound to believe, he has some object in view 
 that he has not ventured to disclose. Why is this? Has the gentle- 
 man discovered in former controversies with the gentleman from 
 Missouri that he is overmatched by that Senator.'* And does he 
 hope for a more easy victory over a more feeble adversary? Has 
 the gentleman's distempered fancy been disturbed by gloomy fore- 
 bodings of 'new alliances to be formed,' at which he hinted? Has 
 the ghost of the murdered Coalition come back, like the ghost of 
 Banquo, to *sear the eye-balls' of the gentleman, and will it not 
 Mown at his bidding'? Are dark visions of broken hopes, and 
 honors lost forever, still floating before his heated imagination? 
 Sir, if it be his object to thrust me between the gentleman from, 
 Missouri and himself, in order to rescue the East from the contest 
 
402 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 it has provoked with the West, he shall not be gratified. Sir, I will 
 not be dragged into the defence of my friend from Missouri. The 
 South shall not be forced into a conflict not its own. The gentleman 
 from Missouri is able to fight his own battles. The gallant West 
 needs no aid from the South to repel any attack which may be 
 made on them from any quarter. Let the gentleman from Massa- 
 chusetts controvert the facts and argument? of the gentleman from 
 Missouri — if he can; and if he win the victory, let him wear its 
 honors: I shall not deprive him of his laurels." ^ 
 
 c. Definition of terms in the introduction is especially 
 important in debate. We have seen that the purpose of 
 all preliminary definition is to enable the reader or hearer 
 readily to comprehend the terms used in the discussion. In 
 written argumentation, if the reader runs across a word or 
 phrase that he does not understand, he can pause and think 
 it over till he does understand, or he can even lay aside the 
 essay for a time until he can find out the meaning elsewhere. 
 But in spoken discourse it is different. The audience must 
 catch the meaning of every phrase and every idea as it falls 
 from the lips of the speaker, or they will not get it at all, 
 and the effect of the whole argument will be lost. Conse- 
 quently, the greatest care must be taken that no term is left 
 ambiguous. The methods of defining have already been 
 explained; it only needs to be emphasized that definition is 
 more important in debate than in any other form of discussion. 
 
 d. Issues in debate. For a similar reason the issues and 
 explanation of the question are important. And there is this 
 additional reason for giving attention to the issues : in debate 
 a great multiplicity of facts and arguments is thrown together 
 in a short time; and an audience may easily become perplexed 
 in the midst of such confusion, unless they are given some 
 standard of judgment. An audience cannot see the force or 
 bearing of arguments, unless they understand what are the vital 
 points in the question. If they know the issues, they can 
 appreciate the meaning of any important fact that is pre- 
 
 1 Debater in Congress, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 43. 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 403 
 
 sented, and they will be likely to remember it; but an au- 
 dience, left free to judge things according to their own pre- 
 vious knowledge and preconceived opinions, cannot be relied 
 on to judge rightly as to what is worth remembering. For 
 these reasons the issues should always be presented in the in- 
 troduction in someforrriy and further, it is wise to repeat them 
 in various forms in the discussion, keeping them always clearly 
 before the audience. 
 
 e. Partition in debate. The desirability of the partition 
 is always a matter of judgment, depending entirely on the 
 circumstances. It always contributes to clearness; but it is 
 sometimes unwise to reveal in detail to the enemy the line 
 of attack you intend to pursue. There is no ethical considera- 
 tion that demands a full statement of plan at the very outset. 
 When to divulge matter should be determined by the cir- 
 cumstances. The interests of the audience and of your own 
 side should determine — not the interests of your opponents. 
 The only thing demanded by ethics and good sportsmanship 
 is that you give your opponents time to ansiver each point, 
 provided they are prepared. You are under no obligation 
 to give them time to prepare an answer. This would only 
 encourage lazy and careless preparation. Each side should 
 be ready for anything the other side can say — and should 
 be given a fair chance to show they are ready. Sometimes 
 a distinct partition is impossible; for example, in the 
 Lincoln-Douglas debates a definite partition would have 
 been awkward and inappropriate, for no particular question 
 was under discussion, the debates being informal and ex- 
 temporaneous, and really but a running fight. In general a 
 partition of some kind is desirable, unless there is some objec- 
 tion to it, such as those suggested above. A partition need 
 not be formal in character; it does not necessarily imply a 
 division of the proof into three, four, or five parts, stating 
 exactly what is to be proved. The partition may be very 
 cursory and informal, merely suggesting for the sake of clear- 
 ness the general course to be followed in the discussion; for 
 
404 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 example, in the following, taken from the introduction to 
 Charles Sumner's speech in the Senate, May 19 and 20, 1866, 
 on the '*Bill for the Admission of Kansas into the Union," 
 Mr. Sumner makes a partition, which adds greatly to the 
 clearness and force of the speech, but which, at the sam^ 
 time, has no air of formality and reveals nothing of the char-, 
 acter of the arguments to follow: — 
 
 "Such is the Crime and such the criminal which it is my duty 
 to expose; and, by the blessings of God, this duty shall be done 
 completely to the end. But this will not be enough. The Apologies, 
 which, with strange hardihood are offered for the Crime, must be 
 torn away, so that it shall stand forth without a single rag or fig-leaf 
 to cover its vileness. And, finally, the True Remedy must be 
 shown. The subject is complex in relations, as it is transcendent 
 in importance; and yet, if I am honored by your attention, I hope 
 to present it clearly in all its parts, while I conduct you to the 
 inevitable conclusion that Kansas must be admitted at once, with 
 her present Constitution, as a State of this Union, and give a new 
 star to the blue field of our National Flag. And here I derive 
 satisfaction from the thought that the cause is so strong in itself 
 as to bear even the infirmities of its advocates; nor can it require 
 anything beyond that simplicity of treatment and moderation of 
 manner which I desire to cultivate. Its true character is such 
 that, like Hercules, it will conquer just so soon as it is recognized. 
 
 " My task will be divided under three different heads : first, THE 
 CRIME AGAINST KANSAS, in its origin and extent; secondly, 
 THE APOLOGIES FOR THE CRIME; and, thirdly, THE TRUE 
 REMEDY." 1 
 
 2. The Discussion 
 
 a. Main heads. In drawing a brief for use in debate, par- 
 ticular care should be taken in the selection of the main heads. 
 Not only should the question be divided accurately and 
 logically, but also attention should be given to the forms of 
 statement of the headings. These main headings are sure to 
 be the objective points of the attack of the other side, and 
 1 Works of Charles Sumner, Vol. IV, pp. 143, 144. 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 405 
 
 they must be made strong enough to stand the shock. If an 
 opponent can force you to take back a phrase, or to acknowl- 
 edge an exaggeration in any of your fundamental proposi- 
 tions, he has scored a point, and the audience will always 
 give him credit for it, often more credit than he really de- 
 serves. Carelessness or rhetorical flourish must never be 
 permitted to make a main heading say either more or less 
 than exactly what is meant. Intrenchments are not built 
 because they look well, but because they can be held against 
 attack; main headings are not made because they sound well, 
 but because they offer definite points of resistance to an 
 opponent. 
 
 Senator Douglas, in the debates mentioned above, with 
 his habitually bombastic style of oratory, made many wild 
 charges and assertions. Often the point he aimed to establish 
 was valid, but, through carelessness or over-excitement, he 
 exaggerated. He had an able opponent, and every blunder 
 and every exaggeration was laid bare, much to his discom- 
 fiture and humiliation. Lincoln, on the other hand, as he 
 himself admitted in the discussion, prepared with sedulous 
 care the statement of every important proposition he ad- 
 vanced. His propositions were attacked and his attitude was 
 repeatedly misrepresented by Senator Douglas, but reply was 
 difficult; he had only to read the exact words of his former 
 speeches and reiterate his statements, thus at the same time 
 reenforcing his own position and exposing the trickery of his 
 opponent. For example, in the following selection Lincoln 
 replies to such an attack on one of his fundamental proposi- 
 tions: — 
 
 "Out of this Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabrication — 
 of my purpose to introduce a perfect, social, and political equality 
 between the white and black races. His assertion that I made an 
 * especial objection' ... to the decision (the Dred Scott decision) 
 on this account is untrue in point of fact. 
 
 "Now, while I am upon this subject, and as Henry Clay has 
 been alluded to, I desire to place myself in connection with Mr. 
 
406 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Clay as nearly right before this people as may be. I am quite aware 
 what the Judge's object is here by all these allusions. He knows 
 that we are before an audience, having strong sympathies south- 
 ward by relationship, place of birth, and so on. He desires to place 
 me in an extremely abolition attitude. He read upon a former 
 occasion, and alludes without reading to-day, to a portion of a 
 speech which I delivered in Chicago. In his quotations from that 
 speech, as he has made them upon former occasions, the extracts 
 were taken in such a way as, I suppose, brings them within the 
 definition of what is called garbling — taking portions of a speech 
 which, when taken by themselves, do not present the entire sense 
 of the speaker as expressed at the time. I propose, therefore, out 
 of that same speech to show how one portion of it which he skipped 
 over (taking an extract before and an extract after) will give a 
 different idea, and the true idea I intended to convey. . . . 
 
 "Allow me . . . briefly to present one extract from a speech of 
 mine, more than a year ago, at Springfield, in discussing this very 
 same question, soon after Judge Douglas took his ground that ne- 
 groes were not included in the Declaration of Independence: — 
 
 " 'I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to 
 include all men, but they did not mean to declare all men equal 
 in all respects. They did not mean to say all men were equal in 
 color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They 
 defined with tolerable distinctness in what they did consider all 
 men created equal — equal in certain inalienable rights, among which 
 are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This they said, and 
 this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, 
 that all men were actually enjoying that equality, or yet, that 
 they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact, 
 they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to 
 declare the rigkty so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast 
 as circumstances should permit. 
 
 " 'They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which 
 should be familiar to all: constantly looked to, constantly labored 
 for, and even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approxi- 
 mated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its in- 
 fluence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all 
 people, of all colors, everywhere.' 
 
 *' There again are the sentiments I have expressed in regard to 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 407 
 
 the Declaration of Independence upon a former occasion — senti- 
 ments which have been put in print and read wherever anybody 
 cared to know what so humble an individual as myself chose to 
 say in regard to it." ^ 
 
 b. Repetition. Another evidence of the skill of these 
 two debaters is found in the constant repetition by both, of 
 sentences and phrases containing their main propositions. 
 In speech after speech, and many times over in each speech, 
 Senator Douglas repeated his cry of "popular sovereignty, 
 the right of the people of a State to settle the question of 
 slavery for themselves," and his demand for "obedience to 
 the decision of the highest tribunal in the land, the Supreme 
 Court.'* Lincoln we find reiterating with equal persistence 
 his statements that "a house divided against itself cannot 
 stand; this government cannot endure permanently half 
 slave and half free"; that "slavery is wrong"; that "slavery 
 must be put where it was put at the foundation of the govern- 
 ment, in the course of ultimate extinction." It is well to bear 
 in mind in preparing a case, the desirability of this repetition 
 in oral debate. An audience cannot turn back to compare 
 statements and refresh memory. The speaker must by 
 various devices " keep his case up " clearly before the audience 
 all the time. Repetition is one of the most serviceable of 
 such devices. Every main heading should, as far as possible, 
 be stated in such rhetorical form that it can be easily and 
 forcibly repeated; it should be stated briefly and in clear and 
 simple language. Sometimes it is effective to compress the 
 idea into a single word or phrase; as, for illustration, Charles 
 Sumner did in his speech in the Senate on the " Crime against 
 Kansas," a speech referred to above: — 
 
 "And with this exposure I take my leave of the Crime against 
 Kansas. Emerging from all the blackness of this Crime, where we 
 seem to have been lost, as in a savage wood, and turning our back 
 upon it, as upon desolation and death, from which, while others 
 
 ^ Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 224. 
 
d08 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 have suffered, we have escaped, I come now to THE APOLOGIES 
 which the Crime has found. . . . 
 
 "They are four in number, and fourfold in character. The first 
 is the Apology tyrannical; the second, the Apology imbecile; the 
 third, the Apology absurd; and the fourth, the Apology infamous; 
 that is all. Tyranny, imbecility, absurdity, and infamy all unite to 
 dance, like the weird sisters, about this Crime. 
 
 "The Apology tyrannical is founded on the mistaken act of Gov- 
 ernor Reeder, in authenticating the Usurping Legislature," etc. 
 
 Again, later in hLs speech, he said: — 
 
 "As the Apologias were fourfold, so are the proposed Remedies 
 fourfold; and they range themselves in natural order, under designa- 
 tions which so truly disclose their character as even to supersede 
 argument. First, we have the Remedy of Tyranny; next, the Remedy 
 of Folly; next, the Remedy of Injustice and Civil War; and fourthly, 
 the Remedy of Justice and Peace. There are four caskets; and you 
 are to deitermine which shall be opened by Senatorial votes. 
 
 "There is the Remedy of Tyranny, which, like its complement, 
 the Apology of Tyranny, — though espoused on this floor, especially 
 by the Senator from Illinois, — proceeds from the President, and is 
 embodied in a special message," etc.^ 
 
 This method has the virtue of vividness. Each of the 
 phrases chosen is striking and likely to stick in the memory; 
 it can be readily repeated and almost turned into a sort of 
 war-cry. But care must be taken in choosing the phrase, to 
 see that it is appropriate and that it expresses the full mean- 
 ing of the speaker. Furthermore, the audience must always 
 be made to understand just what the phrase implies; the 
 word "heading" always suggests a name rather than a 
 proposition, and is liable to be vague or ambiguous if left 
 unexplained. Mr. Summer, in the speech quoted above, was 
 careful, in every case, to state in fair and full language the 
 exact proposition he intended to attack or support; for ex- 
 ample, after stating, as quoted above, the four apologies made 
 
 1 WarJes of Charles Sumner, Vol. VI, pp. 184 and 185. 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 40'A 
 
 by his opponents, naming them, respectively, "the apology 
 tyrannical, the apology imbecile, the apology absurd, and 
 the apology infamous," he goes on to explain the meaning 
 of each name as follows: — 
 
 "Next comes the Apology imbecile, which is founded on the al- 
 leged want of power in the President to arrest this Crime. It is 
 openly asserted, that, under existing laws, the Chief Magistrate 
 has no authority to interfere in Kansas for this purpose. . . . 
 
 "Next comes the Apology absurd, which is, indeed, in the nature 
 of pretext. It is alleged that a small printed pamphlet, containing 
 the ' Constitution and Ritual of the Grand Encampment and Regi- 
 ments of the Kansas Legion,' was taken from the person of one 
 George F. Warren, who attempted to avoid detection by chewing 
 it. The oaths and grandiose titles of the pretended legion are also 
 set forth, and this poor mummery of a secret society, which existed 
 only on paper, is gravely introduced on this floor, in order to ex- 
 tenuate the Crime against Kansas. It has been paraded in more 
 than one speech, and even stuffed into the report of the Com- 
 mittee," etc.i 
 
 c. Summaries and partitions. The desirability and proper 
 use of summaries and partitions in the discussion, has been 
 already treated in the chapters on Presentation. But it 
 should be said here, in addition, that the best opportunity 
 and the greatest demand for using these artifices is found in 
 debate. Something of this kind is necessary to bring order 
 out of chaos. In the confusion of argument, answer, and 
 rejoinder, of evidence and counter evidence, of big things and 
 little things, crowded together and following one another in 
 rapid succession, the effect on the audience easily becomes 
 kaleidoscopic; they see the combinations of shapes and colors 
 tossing about before their eyes, but there is nothing in par- 
 ticular to be impressed by, or to remember. These defects 
 can be avoided in large measure by the use of internal sum- 
 maries, i. e., summaries at various points within the proof, 
 which serve to pick out the really important things in the 
 
 1 Works of Charles Sumner, Vol. IV, pp. 187 and 192. 
 
410 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 question and impress them clearly upon the attention and 
 memory. Furthermore, used in conjunction with partitions, 
 they keep the audience always informed just where they are 
 and where they are to be led next. At every turn in the course 
 of the debate there are many roads branching out in various 
 directions. A summary or a partition, or the two in combina- 
 tion, makes clear to the listener that he has reached the 
 end of one road and put it behind him, and that he is now 
 to turn in a certain new direction for a time. Particularly 
 when, in debate, some point has been discussed back and 
 forth foi* a time between the opposing sides, it is almost 
 necessary to summarize what has been said on each side, 
 to compare the opposing proofs, and make clear what you 
 would have the audience believe is the result of it all. It is 
 only in this way that matters can be brought to some con- 
 clusion, and the audience made ready to turn their attention 
 elsewhere. 
 
 d. Asking questions. A common stratagem of debate is 
 the asking of questions. By this is not meant the figure of 
 speech known as the "rhetorical question." The stratagem 
 consists rather in directly asking questions that really call for 
 an answer. This is usually engaged in during the give and 
 take of the discussion. The purposes of resorting to this 
 stratagem are three: (I) To compel an opponent to take a 
 definite position on some issue: (II) to tempt him to waste 
 time on trivial matters, or (III) to force him into a dilemma, 
 where he may be caught whichever way he answers. 
 
 (I) To get definite answers. To accomplish the first of 
 these aims, the value of a question is obvious. A debater often 
 encounters an opponent whose power lies less in his ability 
 to prove an issue than in his ability to evade it. Such an 
 opponent is facile in shifting ground and can readily becloud 
 the point in dispute. He is like a cuttlefish that squirts the 
 water full of a black excretion and escapes in the darkness. In 
 exposing and cornering such a man, there is hardly a better 
 way to "pin him down" than to compress the point in issue 
 
TEE MAIN SPEECHES 411 
 
 into a single, clear, direct question and demand an answer. 
 The question, of course, needs to be framed in such a way 
 that it cannot be readily evaded or distorted from its intended 
 meaning; also, in asking the question, it should be presented 
 in such a forcible and imperative manner that a failure to 
 answer will be unsafe. But, with these precautions, in the 
 face of a question clearly worded and strongly put, an oppo- 
 nent will find it difficult to evade the issue. 
 
 (II) To waste time. To propound questions for an oppo- 
 nent to waste time upon is good tactics under some circum- 
 stances, and the disposition of such a question is a good test 
 of a debater's ability. A question put with an air of taunt or 
 challenge is a great temptation; an inexperienced or impul- 
 sive debater may often be drawn into the trap of answering 
 at any cost. This trick is sometimes tried in intercollegiate 
 debate, where the time is limited and a waste of even a minute 
 is a serious matter. A debater should realize the nature of 
 this stratagem, not only in order to be able to try it himself, 
 but in order to be able to appreciate it when he is the intended 
 victim. There is one rule that is truly a golden rule for an 
 inexperienced debater, "Stick to the point." There are three 
 ways of evading such questions. One way is to ignore them, 
 a method which is sometimes not safe if the questions have 
 been well presented, and if the audience seems to be impressed 
 with them. Another is to avoid them by evasive ambiguous 
 answers, a method which calls for much tact and shrewdness. 
 The third, is to expose them by explaining the motives of the 
 propounder of the questions, to show that the questions are 
 not important, but merely intended as snares. 
 
 (ni) To force into a dilemma. The third purpose that 
 may be served by the asking of a question is that of forcing 
 an opponent into a dilemma, where he may be caught, how- 
 ever he answers. Lincoln, with great shrewdness, drove 
 Senator Douglas into such a situation in the joint debates 
 in 1858. Briefly, the circumstances were these: Lincoln 
 assumed at the start a position of hostility to the Dred Scott 
 
412 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 Decision, which declared, in substance, that Congress had no 
 power to exclude slavery from any of the territories. Senator 
 Douglas attacked Mr. Lincoln bitterly for his position in the 
 matter, declaring that any decision of the Supreme Court 
 was final and sacred, and that any man who rejected or de- 
 nounced such a decision was "unpatriotic, disloyal, revolu- 
 tionary," etc. It also happened that Mr. Lincoln had charged 
 Senator Douglas with being concerned with certain other 
 Democrats in a conspiracy to ** nationalize slavery." He gave 
 evidence tending to expose such a conspiracy, and showed that 
 but one thing was wanted to make it complete, viz., a decision 
 of the Supreme Court, declaring that a state of the Union 
 could not exclude slavery from its limits; and he further- 
 more charged Senator Douglas with planning and working 
 to procure such a decision. Under the circumstances, Mr. 
 Lincoln propounded the following question: *'If the Supreme 
 Court of the United States shall decide that States cannot 
 exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquies- 
 ing in it, adopting it, and following it as a rule of political 
 action?" Senator Douglas was caught. If he answered in 
 the affirmative, he seemed to substantiate the charge of con- 
 spiracy to get such a decision, and gave Mr. Lincoln an 
 opportunity to drive home his attack; on the other hand, if 
 he answered in the negative, he was committing the very act 
 which he had denounced in Mr. Lincoln as unpatriotic, revo- 
 lutionary and heretical, viz., opposing a decision of the 
 Supreme Court. But one course was open, and the wily 
 debater adopted it; he evaded the question. In his speech 
 at Freeport, August 27, he said: — 
 
 "The third question which Mr. Lincoln presented is, if the 
 Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that a State of 
 this Union cannot exclude slavery from its own limits, will I submit 
 to it? I am amazed that Lincoln should ask such a question. ('A 
 schoolboy knows better.') Yes, a schoolboy does know better. 
 Mr. Lincoln's object is to cast an imputation upon the Supreme 
 Court. He knows that there never was but one man in America, 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 413 
 
 claiming any degree of intelligence or decency, who ever fot a mo- 
 ment pretended such a thing. It is true that the Washington 
 Union, in an article published on the 17th of last December, did 
 put forth that doctrine, and I denounced the article on the floor 
 of the Senate in a speech which Mr. Lincoln now pretends was 
 against the President. The Union had claimed that slavery had a 
 right to go into the free states, and that any provision in the con- 
 stitution or laws of the free. States to the contrary were null and 
 void. I denounced it in the Senate, as I said before, and I was the 
 first man who did. Lincoln's friends, Trumbull, and Seward, and 
 Hale, and Wilson, and the whole black Republican side of the 
 Senate, were silent. They left it to me to denounce it. And what 
 was the reply made to me on that occasion .^^ Mr. Toombs of 
 Georgia got up and undertook to lecture me on the ground that 
 I ought not to have deemed the article worthy of notice, and ought 
 not to have replied to it; that there was not one man, woman, or 
 child south of the Potomac, in any slave State, who did not repu- 
 diate any such pretension. Mr. Lincoln knows that that reply was 
 made on the spot, and yet he now asks this question. He might as 
 well ask me, suppose Mr. Lincoln should steal a horse, would I 
 sanction it; and it would be as genteel in me to ask him, in the 
 event he stole a horse, what ought to be done with him. He casts 
 an imputation upon the Supreme Court of the United States by 
 supposing that they would violate the Constitution of the United 
 States. I tell him that such a thing is not possible. It would be 
 an act of moral treason that no man on the bench could ever de- 
 scend to. Mr. Lincoln himself would never in his partisan feelings 
 so far forget what was right as to be guilty of such an act." ^ 
 
 3. The Conclusion 
 
 With respect to the conclusion, little needs to be said more 
 than has already been said in the book on Presentation. 
 The importance of the conclusion in debate is obvious. It 
 is undoubtedly an advantage to be so placed as to be able 
 to direct the course of things to come; but it is a greater ad- 
 vantage to be so placed ai§ to be able to review and sum up the 
 things that are past. To the .last speaker is given the oppor- 
 ^ Lincoln-Douglas Debates, p. 96. 
 
414 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tunity of leaving his interpretation of the facts, and his sum- 
 mary of the important points, fresh in the minds of his au- 
 dience. So that a closing speaker is even better situated than 
 an opening speaker, to obtain the acceptance of his method 
 of dividing the question and his statement of the issues; that 
 is, he is in such a position that he can finally persuade the 
 audience to look at the question through his eyes. Moreover, 
 on any contested point he has the privilege of the last word. 
 
 a. Strategy in conclusion. Oftentimes a speaker, if he 
 knows beforehand that he is to have the privileges of the final 
 reply, can with good effect hold some of his fire till the end 
 and surprise the enemy with new evidence when reenforce- 
 ment is badly needed. This is a bit of strategy that can be 
 practiced in many situations. For example, in intercollegiate 
 debate, or any similar prearranged contest where the jiumber 
 and order of speakers is fixed, it is not unusual that one side 
 keeps back its best refutation of some point in the discussion 
 till its last speech. By this means the opposing side may 
 perhaps be led to think that the point has been conceded and 
 so be tempted to keep silence themselves. x\gain, it is a wise 
 stratagem when a speaker feels that he has the weaker end 
 of the proof on a point : if he reveals his answer too early, his 
 opponents may make a rejoinder and lay bare the weakness; 
 but by waiting till later he shelters the weakest parts of his 
 case. When it is necessary to fight with crippled soldiers in 
 the ranks, they should be given the most protected positions. 
 It will, however, be kept clearly in mind that what is said in 
 this paragraph, when applied to rebuttal speeches, refers 
 only to answers that are to be made to opponents* arguments; 
 for it is generally conceded that a debater ought not to introduce 
 new positive arguments in his rebuttal. But one has a perfect 
 right to answer arguments when he pleases. 
 
 b. Summarizing. From the viewpoint of conviction, the 
 first duty of a speaker who closes the argument for his side 
 of the case, is to summarize the whole proof. We have al- 
 ready spoken several times of the confusion natural to de- 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 415 
 
 bate, a confusion arising from the rapid succession of argu- 
 ments and evidence, and from the conflicts, crossings, and 
 interminglings of the proofs and ideas of both sides. We 
 refer to it again only to emphasize the value of concluding 
 summaries. After people have listened for any consid- 
 erable time, to the presentation of a mass of heterogeneous 
 facts and ideas, they need to have their conceptions of the 
 case as a whole straightened out again, and to have their 
 memories refreshed with a new understanding of the points 
 that are important. The auditors cannot be relied on to carry 
 in mind to the end the things that are vital; their vision is 
 sure to become clouded by details, and they turn with relief 
 to a man who will clear up matters and set them right. For 
 this reason the hearers can be counted on to give careful 
 attention to a concluding summary, and so they are more 
 likely to remember it than almost anything else in the debate. 
 The desirability of the summary is made greater by the fact 
 that, in the debate, the proof of either side is scattered along 
 through the discussion; it consequently becomes necessary, 
 if the proof is to be properly unified, that these broken threads 
 be woven together at the end by a summary. In some cir- 
 cumstances a mere recapitulation by the last speaker is not 
 enough. In debates where there is "team-work,'* it is often 
 desirable that each speaker in his conclusion should summa- 
 rize what has preceded. This keeps the hearers always in 
 close touch with the proof, and gives them an understanding 
 of just what is being accomplished at each forward step; then 
 when the end is finally reached, the case, as a whole, is em- 
 bedded in their minds, and the final summary is much more 
 intelligible and effective. The mistake may easily be made of 
 making a summary too long or too detailed. To be effective 
 it needs always to be direct , incisive , and as brief as is consistent 
 with clearness. To be diffuse or tediously technical destroys 
 the aggressive force that is indispensable. Any kind ot 
 recapitulation must be as sharp, as firm, and as bold as the 
 blows of the hammer. Such a conclusion is exemplified in 
 
416 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the following peroration of a speech by Sir Robert Peel, in the 
 debate in the House of Commons on the bill relieving the dis- 
 abilities of the Jews. It is especially to be noticed for its skil- 
 ful repetition and emphasis of the central idea of the whole 
 speech, viz., forgiveness and reparation for past wrongs: 
 
 "It is for these reasons — because I believe it to be in conformity 
 with the enlarged and comprehensive spirit of the British Con- 
 stitution — that these disqualifications should no longer exist; be- 
 cause I rejoice in the opportunity of making reparation for" the 
 injuries and persecutions of former times; because I think the Jew 
 has fairly earned the privileges which it is proposed to extend to 
 him, by patience and forbearance, by tried fidelity and loyalty; 
 but above all, because I am a member of a Christian people, because 
 I am a member of a Christian legislature, I will perform an act 
 which I believe to be in strict conformity with the spirit and pre- 
 cepts of the Christian religion. We are commanded by that re- 
 ligion, as the condition of our own forgiveness to forgive those who 
 have trespassed against us. That duty is not in this case imposed 
 upon us; but there is another duty as sacred in point of moral 
 obligation, and more trying to human pride, namely, that we should 
 forgive those against whom we have trespassed. Sir, I shall give 
 my cordial support to the bill before the House." ^ 
 
 c. Balanced summary. Of all the forms of summaries 
 that may be used, the most effective in debate is "the bal- 
 anced summary," that which in an earlier part we have 
 called '* amplifying and diminishing." The distinguishing 
 characteristic of debate is the directness of conflict between 
 the opposing sides. The audience is kept constantly balanc- 
 ing one argument against another and swaying back and 
 forth with the struggle of the contending factions. Conse- 
 quently in the end their judgment is always relative. It is 
 not that one side is strong or weak, but that it is on the whole 
 stronger or weaker than the other. So it is clearly wiser to 
 assist the audience in this comparison and try to make them 
 see the relative strength of the two sides as you wish them 
 1 World's Orators (England), Part III, p. 211. 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 417 
 
 to make the comparison by themselves, according to what- 
 ever standards may happen to be uppermost in their minds. 
 Sometimes, if a speaker feels that he has the weaker side of the 
 proof, it is more politic for him to leave his hearers in uncer- 
 tainty, and to cover up the logical conclusion that would 
 result from such a comparison. This is good tactics, for ex- 
 ample, when a man adopts a policy of obstruction, i. e., when 
 he finds that he has not a strong positive case, and so resorts 
 to the trick of lying in wait and throwing up objections 
 against his opponent. If all his objections were carefully 
 analyzed and logically summed up, they would not really 
 amount to much; so his only hope lies in the general discredit 
 he may throw upon the proof against him. In such a situa- 
 tion he would suffer by a contrast of point with point, and 
 he would gain by leaving matters in confusion. This is, of 
 course, a great confession of weakness and is very danger- 
 ous wdth opponents good enough to recognize and expose it. 
 But, assuming that a speaker has a fair side of the argument, 
 to amplify and diminish is advisable. It makes the proof com- 
 plete and presents definitely a statement of the conclusion 
 that must be drawn. It is a final charge, where all the forces 
 of your own side are gathered together and thrown directly 
 against the enemy. A good illustration of its effectiveness 
 is found in the conclusion of Senator Douglas's speech at 
 Chicago, July 9, 1858:— 
 
 "Thus you see, my fellow-citizens, that the issues between Mr. 
 Lincoln and myself, as respective candidates for the U. S. Senate, 
 as made up, are direct, unequivocal, and irreconcilable. He goes 
 for uniformity in our domestic institutions, for a war of sections, 
 until one or the other shall be subdued. I go for the great principle 
 of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the right of the people to decide for 
 themselves. 
 
 "On the other point, Mr. Lincoln goes for a warfare on the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, because of their judicial 
 decision in the Dred Scott case. I yield obedience to the decision 
 of that court — to the final determination of the highest judicial 
 
418 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 tribunal known to our constitution. He objects to the Dred Scott 
 decision because it does not put the negro in the possession of the 
 rights of citizenship on an equality with the white man. I am op- 
 posed to negro equality. I repeat that this nation is a white people — 
 a people composed of European descendants — a people that have 
 established this government for themselves and their posterity, and 
 I am in favor of preserving not only the purity of the blood, but the 
 purity of the government from any mixture or amalgamation with 
 inferior races. I have seen the effects of this mixture of superior 
 and inferior races — this amalgamation of white men and Indians 
 and negroes; we have seen it in Mexico, in Central America, in 
 South America, and in all the Spanish-American States, and its 
 result has been degeneration, demoralization, and degradation below 
 the capacity for self-government. 
 
 "I am opposed to taking any step that recognizes the negro 
 man or the Indian as the equal of the white man. I am opposed to 
 giving him a voice in the administration of the government. I 
 would extend to the negro, and the Indian, and to all dependent 
 races every right, every privilege, and every immunity consistent 
 with the safety and welfare of the white races; but equality they 
 never should have, either political or social, or in any other respect 
 whatever. 
 
 "My friends, you see that the issues are distinctly drawn. I 
 stand by the same platform that I have so often proclaimed to 
 you and to the people of Illinois heretofore. I stand by the Demo- 
 cratic organization, yield obedience to its usages, and support its 
 regular nominations. I indorse and approve the Cincinnati plat- 
 form, and I adhere to and intend to carry out, as part of that plat- 
 form, the great principle of self-government, which recognizes the 
 right of the people in each State and Territory to decide for them- 
 selves their domestic institutions. In other words, if the Lecompton 
 issue shall arise again, you have only to turn back and see where 
 you have found me during the last six months, and then rest as- 
 sured that you will find me in the same position, batthng for the 
 same principle, and vindicating it from assault, from whatever 
 quarter it may come, so long as I have the power to do it." ^ 
 
 In this summary the speaker has stated with fair accuracy 
 1 Lincdn-Douglas Debates, pp. 12, 13. 
 
THE MAIN SPEECHES 419 
 
 the points of difference between him and his opponent, but 
 he has so stated them as to present his own side always in 
 the better Hght. He places the arguments side by side, but 
 he states the points in a manner favorable to himself; and at 
 the close he drives home the fact and the idea that lies at the 
 foundation of his own case, thus leaving in the minds of his 
 hearers an impression that, on the whole, their votes and 
 their support should be given to his cause. 
 
CHAPTER 18 
 
 REBUTTAL SPEECHES 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. Rebuttal explained. 
 
 B. No new constructive points. 
 
 C. The preparation of rebuttal. 
 
 1. Must be prepared in advance. 
 
 2. Memorized preparation. 
 
 3. Know the other side. 
 
 4. Be ready for surprises. 
 
 D. Effect of time limit. 
 
 E. Answer whole case. 
 
 1. Find fundamental points. 
 
 2. Show audience. 
 
 F. Have a clear and careful method. 
 
 G. Be fair to opponents. 
 
 A. Rebuttal explained. General refutation has already 
 been defined as the destruction of opposing proofs. It is 
 either evidence or argument presented, not for the purpose 
 of directly advancing your own case, but of blocking or 
 destroying the case of your opponent. It is now the almost 
 universal practice in contest debating (and is very common 
 in actual debates in assemblies of various sorts) to provide for 
 special second speeches to be made after the main cases have 
 been presented, for the purpose of presenting such material. 
 Such speeches are called rebuttal speeches. In law rebuttal 
 is "the giving of evidence on the part of a plaintiff (affirma- 
 tive) to destroy the effect of evidence introduced by the 
 defendant (negative) in the same suit." (Webster's Diet.) 
 In some debates, both contest and real, this legal precedent 
 is more closely followed, and the affirmative only has rebuttal 
 speeches. Of course, all speakers on both sides may have 
 
 420 
 
REBUTTAL SPEECHES 421 
 
 more or less refutation in the main speeches. Since the order 
 of speaking and the nature of negative cases gives the nega- 
 tive speakers superior opportunities for refutation in the main 
 speeches, it is well to give the affirmative some compensating 
 advantages in rebuttal. So even where both sides have equal 
 rebuttal speeches, the negative leads in rebuttal, giving the 
 affirmative the last rebuttal speech. Refutation is the broader 
 term (as we use them) and rebuttal is the refutation that is 
 given in a special speech which has properly no (or very 
 little) constructive material in it. 
 
 B. No new constructive points of importance should be 
 allowed in the rebuttal speeches. Only such material as can 
 be used against the opponents' case should be permitted. It 
 has already been suggested that it is well in a debate where 
 a man may speak more than once to hold material in reserve 
 for rebuttal. It is, of course, possible to repeat or refer to 
 arguments and evidence already given, but such repetition 
 or reference must be subordinate to rebuttal and used de- 
 structively, not constructively. But the repetition of old 
 materials is never quite so strong as the production of new. 
 So that it is sometimes good strategy, even at the cost of 
 taking something away from the strength of a first speech, 
 to hold back some good evidence as a reserve. But the judges 
 of contest debates should always penalize debaters who sim- 
 ply repeat or continue their main speeches during the time 
 allowed for rebuttal. All that has been said concerning 
 refutation in argumentation (in chapter 15) applies to re- 
 buttal speechs in debate. It is not repeated here, not because 
 it is less important, but because it has been sufficiently dis- 
 cussed in that chapter. Refutation is the very essence of 
 debate, and the power to refute well is one to be sought by a 
 debater as earnestly as he would seek any single power that 
 a public speaker may hope to possess. 
 
 C. The preparation of rebuttal should be very carefully 
 done. This does not mean, however, that rebuttal speeches 
 should be memorized, or even written out. 
 
422 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 1. The rebuttal must be prepared in advance. The mate- 
 rial out of which to fashion rebuttal speeches should be care- 
 fully gathered and arranged for rapid use. Many contest de- 
 baters fail in this phase of their work. In debate, rebuttal is no 
 less important than positive proof; in intercollegiate debates it 
 is most often the rebuttal that is decisive; in any discussion it 
 is the "last speech*' that is coveted; Webster's famous Reply 
 to Hayne was almost pure refutation. And it is very sel- 
 dom that successful refutation is impromptu. Good rebuttal 
 speeches are practically always extempore, not impromptu, 
 nor memorized. An anecdote in point is told concerning 
 one of the most brilliant advocates of the English bar. This 
 lawyer was one day arguing an important case before one of 
 the highest tribunals of the country. In the course of the 
 trial he was made the object of an attack, personal and politi- 
 cal in nature, from his opponent, the attorney for the prose- 
 cution. The attack was bitter, but forcible and persuasive. 
 It seemed to be unexpected by any one; the court was sur- 
 prised, but manifestly affected. The advocate arose to make 
 reply, and in his introduction, with perfect calmness and 
 great eloquence, he answered every charge, retrieved the 
 lost favor of the court, and overpowered his assailant with an 
 irresistible invective. After this trial was finished, one of the 
 judges — a personal friend — expressed his surprise and ad- 
 miration at the extraordinary eloquence of the reply, declar- 
 ing the retort to be one of the most brilliant passages ever 
 heard in an English court of law, and added, that he had 
 never believed such impromptu oratory to be within the lim- 
 its of human powers. In answer to these congratulations, the 
 advocate invited the justice to accompany him to his law 
 chambers. Entering his library, he walked to a desk, opened 
 a drawer, and took from it a manuscript; it was his speech of 
 the morning written out in full, nearly word for word as he 
 had delivered it. He had foreseen a contingency that nobody 
 else had expected or deemed possible, and had made ready to 
 meet the situation. He won because he had prepared in 
 
REBUTTAL SPEECHES 423 
 
 advance. And the circumstances of his situation made 
 practically memorized preparation proper. 
 
 2. Memorized preparation, however, should rarely be at- 
 tempted by beginners, especially in contest debating. There 
 is, in the first place, too great danger that the opposition will 
 not say just what you are prepared to answer — and there is 
 in debate no greater exhibition of stupidity, no greater indica- 
 tion of weakness, than is afforded by a memorized rebuttal 
 that does not fit. Preparation of material to meet extem- 
 poraneously any stand taken by the opposition is good 
 preparation. Anything else is weak and dangerous. Daniel 
 Webster declared that all the material of his Reply to Hayne 
 tad been gathered, and waiting in his desk for months before 
 the debate. Speaking of Senator Hayne, he said to a friend : 
 "If he had tried to make a speech to fit my notes, he could 
 not have hit it better. No man is ever inspired with the 
 occasion; I never was." Mere words and gestures do not 
 make refutation any more than they make positive proof. 
 There must be just as much evidence in the one as in the 
 other. Rebuttal demands as careful a choice of weapons 
 and as accurate a method of handling them as any other 
 kind of proof. Invention, selection, and arrangement de- 
 mand as much preliminary planning here, as elsewhere. 
 
 3. Know the other side. Clearly, the primary necessity 
 in preparing refutation is to know just what points we may 
 be called upon to answer; we must have a clear and accurate 
 understanding of the points our opponents need to establish, 
 and of the methods they may adopt in the attempt. Would 
 any capable general ever lay the plans for a battle without 
 first considering the position of his enemy, his location, his 
 points of strength and weakness? As we have discovered 
 earlier, the selecting of the main heads of brief in debate, 
 depends very largely upon what the opposition may be able 
 to "do about it." Those points must be chosen for em- 
 phasis, points that hit hardest and straightest at the necessary 
 proofs of the other side (when we are able to tell in advance 
 
424 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 what such necessary proof will be) ; and at the same time we 
 must remember that these main heads will surely be attacked, 
 and we must take up a position that is defensible against 
 assault. All this means a study and comparison of the two 
 sides of the question, so as to find out what arguments need 
 to be attacked, and, on the other hand, how one's own ar- 
 guments may be best defended against the particular attack 
 the other side will have to make. 
 
 4. Be ready for surprises. But it is rarely possible to 
 foresee every argument that an opponent may advance. No 
 two persons reason just alike: an opponent may well look 
 at the question from some peculiar standpoint, or, as more 
 often happens, he may plan a surprise. Then, too, there are 
 many minor questions that are raised in such a discussion, 
 which it is hardly worth while trying to anticipate, or which 
 escape notice in preparation. Commonly, these minor points 
 are best left unanswered; but sometimes circumstances make 
 them worth notice. Whatever the reason, it is certain that 
 all the incidents of a debate cannot be foreseen; we must 
 always expect the unexpected. A successful debater must 
 always be ready to meet strange situations, and to manufac- 
 ture more or less of refutation and of proof on the scene of 
 action. Now, a disputant who has read only on those phases 
 of the question that are of interest to him, or who undertakes 
 only those parts of the discussion that he treats in his own 
 proof, is helpless in such circumstances. He has no resources 
 to draw upon. If the discussion were in writing, he might 
 think it over, consult new authorities, and plan his answer; 
 but in debate there is no such opportunity. He must act 
 at once. He is in the predicament of a military expedition 
 that sets out on a long campaign, with a day's rations and 
 no base of supplies. When a debater is thus surprised, his 
 only hope must lie in having a thorough knowledge of the 
 question as a whole, and in all its details, a knowledge so 
 thorough as to be ready at the call of any exigency. Further- 
 more, a broad understanding of the foundations and general 
 
REBUTTAL SPEECHES 425 
 
 conditions of the question is necessary, in order to be able 
 to estimate rightly the force and bearing of arguments 
 that are made by opponents. A superficial preparation 
 always distorts the mental vision of a speaker, and confuses 
 in his mind the real issues in the discussion. But debate de- 
 mands an especially clear perception and quick judgment of 
 what is vital; the debater must think as quickly and act as 
 decisively as the broker on the exchange; superficial in- 
 formation or a confused understanding mean as sure disaster 
 in the one case as in the other. A debater in action must be 
 able, when any argument or any evidence is brought against 
 him, to estimate in a few seconds just what the matter 
 amounts to, how it is related to his own case, how much to 
 say about it, and where — in what part of his speech — to an- 
 swer it. Here a stock of ready-made arguments becomes useless. 
 Only a deep understanding of the subject to the very bottom can 
 give the clear, ready insight, and the steady judgment that alone 
 avails. 
 
 D. Effect of time limit. These foregoing suggestions are 
 especially applicable in preparation for school or college de- 
 bates. There the limitations of time are very stringent: not 
 the smallest fraction of a minute can be lost in confusion or 
 unnecessary deliberation; the answer must be in the debater's 
 head as soon as the argument has left his opponent's lips. 
 This necessity for such preparation, important everywhere, 
 here intensified by the circumstances, constitutes one of the 
 most valuable phases of contest debating. 
 
 E. Answer whole case. Too much emphasis cannot be 
 given to the remarks in chapter 15 concerning what to answer 
 in refutation. It is probably worth while here to discuss this 
 question with particular reference to the rebuttal speeches in 
 formal debate. The great fundamental principle which 
 should guide the preparation of all rebuttal speeches is : An- 
 swer the whole case of the other side. One of the fatal weak- 
 nesses in the power of any debater, and a weakness that is 
 almost invariably displayed by a beginner, is the weakness 
 
426 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 of attacking only a part of an opponent's proof. It is easiest, 
 in refutation to pick out the weak points of the opposition 
 and attack them, leaving the more formidable points stand- 
 ing: it demands less careful preparation, and a less accurate 
 analysis of the case of the other side; and it often seems to 
 make the greatest impression on the audience. Consequently 
 there is a temptation to pick up the more obvious errors of an 
 opponent and dramatically expose them, or to seize upon 
 some foolish word or phrase and ridicule it; it brings a laugh 
 or a burst of applause, whereas, in an attempt to refute any 
 of the stronger proofs, success is not so easy, for the audience, 
 feeling that there are two sides to the issue, are not so readily 
 convinced. But in the end, the audience will probably adhere 
 to the man who has made them believe that his case, as a 
 whole, is the stronger. Consequently, to achieve final success, 
 the debater must endeavor to make them see, not that he has 
 destroyed an argument here and there, but that he has over- 
 whelmed the proof against him, in its entirety. 
 
 1. Find the fundamental points. In order to make an 
 attack upon the whole case of the other side, two things are nec- 
 essary. In the^r^^ place, the speaker must analyze the entire 
 'proof of his opponents and pick out the few basic points in it. 
 It is necessary to determine upon the few fundamental 
 points of an opponent's proof, for the same reason that it is 
 necessary to determine upon those of one's own. It is nec- 
 essary for the sake of clearness; to give the same attention to 
 the large and the small points of the other side perplexes a 
 hearer in his undertsanding of the question as a whole. It 
 is necessary for the sake of emphasis; it is only by neglecting 
 or slighting trivial facts and dwelling upon the important 
 ones, that the vital points of the question can be brought out 
 into a clear light. It is necessary for the sake of saving time; 
 rebuttal speeches are usually short, and definitely limited. 
 To give attention to the facts of secondary importance is to 
 waste part of these precious minutes. If the vital points 
 of an opponent's contentions are destroyed, his subordinate 
 
REBUTTAL SPEECHES 427 
 
 points fall with them and so do not need special rebuttal. 
 These main contentions must be answered if an opponent 
 is to be defeated at all, and, if they are answered, to do more is 
 superfluous. 
 
 2. Show audience that these points cover the case. But 
 it is not enough for a debater merely to pick out in his own 
 mind the important points of the other side, and proceed to 
 refute them, he must, in the second place, make it clear to the 
 audience that in answering these points he is meeting the whole 
 case against him — that these are the foundations of the oppos- 
 ing case. To give the rebuttal its full effect requires that the 
 audience be made to see that the speaker is attacking the 
 entire proof in opposition, and that, if he succeeds, he has 
 won his case. To do this requires that the arguments to be 
 answered shall be stated clearly beforehand, and that they 
 shall be explained in such a way as to make it evident that in 
 them is contained the whole case of the other side. It is very 
 often desirable, as a means of making it evident that the 
 whole case of the other side is being attacked, to analyze 
 openly before the audience the proof of an opponent, and 
 explain just what his argument as a whole amounts to. For 
 instance, a speaker in rebuttal might well begin in some such 
 manner as this: ''Everything of any importance that my 
 opponent has had to say on this question may be reduced to 
 these three propositions, viz., first, etc., second, etc., third;" 
 "my opponent's case, as far as it has been presented to us 
 can be stated in his own words, as follows," etc. In some 
 such way the audience may be made to have faith in the 
 speaker's sincerity, and in the importance of his efforts in 
 rebuttal, and so be made ready to acknowledge the full force 
 of his refutation. 
 
 For example, Webster, in his Reply to Hayne in the debate 
 on the Foote Resolution, devoted the body of his speech to 
 the refutation of Senator Hayne's theory of states' rights 
 under the Constitution. Before entering on this task, he 
 set forth in full the case presented by Senator Hayne, stating 
 
428 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 all the essential propositions of his doctrine, and making it 
 evident that taken together they embraced everything that 
 demanded refutation: — 
 
 "There yet remains to be performed by far the most grave and 
 important duty, which I feel to be devolved on me by this occasion. 
 It is to state, and to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles 
 of the constitution under which we are here assembled. I might 
 well have desired that so weighty a task should have fallen into 
 other and abler hands. I could have wished that it should have 
 been executed by those whose character and experience give weight 
 and influence to their opinions, such as cannot possibly belong to 
 mine. But, sir, I have met the occasion, not sought it; and I shall 
 proceed to state my own sentiments, without challenging for them 
 any particular regard, with studied plainness, and as much precision 
 as possible. 
 
 *'I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina to 
 maintain, that it is a right of the State Legislatures to interfere, 
 whenever, in their judgment, this Government transcends its con- 
 stitutional limits, and to arrest the operation of its laws. 
 
 "I understand him to maintain this right, as a right existing under 
 the constitution; not as a right to overthrow it, on the ground of 
 extreme necessity, such as would justify violent revolution. 
 
 "I understand him to maintain an authority, on the part of the 
 states, thus to interfere, for the purpose of correcting the exercise 
 of power by the General Government, of checking it, and of com- 
 pelling it to conform to their opinion of the extent of its powers. 
 
 "I understand him to maint:ain that the ultimate power of judg- 
 ing of the constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged 
 exclusively in the General Government, or any branch of it; but 
 that, on the contrary, the States may lawfully decide for them- 
 selves, and each state for itself, whether in a given case, the act 
 of the General Government transcends its power. 
 
 *'I understand him to insist that, if the exigency of the case, in 
 the opinion of any State Government, require it, such State Gov- 
 ernment may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the 
 General Government, which it deems plainly and palpably un- 
 constitutional." 1 
 
 1 Congressional Debates, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 72, 73. 
 
REBUTTAL SPEECHES 429 
 
 F. Have a clear and careful method. The natural tend- 
 ency of young debaters in rebuttal is toward carelessness of 
 method. It is true, even of more experienced men, that 
 speakers who are very careful in arranging and presenting 
 their original proofs, when they come to the work of refuta- 
 tion, forget themselves and degenerate into a weak informal- 
 ity, wandering from the point and mixing up their materials 
 without regard for clearness of statement, the proper arrange- 
 ment of evidence, or the natural sequence of the proofs. 
 Rebuttal is no more informal than any other kind of demon- 
 stration, and requires just as much care in presentation. 
 The materials for it must be selected as judiciously, arranged 
 as logically, and stated as clearly. A young debater does well 
 to watch himself consciously till he has formed firm habits 
 of the right kind. 
 
 G. Be fair to opponents. The final word in regard to 
 rebuttal speeches is: Be fair, courteous, good humored^ and 
 honest in dealing with the opposing case. State the opposing 
 arguments fairly. Do not color them to suit yourself by 
 rephrasing, or substituting, or inserting words not used by 
 your antagonist. In the use of charts and maps, in asking to 
 examine evidence, in giving them an opportunity to examine 
 your evidence, be courteous. You will hurt your own case, 
 and make your audience uncomfortable by being churlish 
 and ill-tempered. It is probably not necessary to advocate 
 and advise common honesty. An honest man will be an 
 honest debater. Manufacturing evidence, garbling quota- 
 tions, falsifying references, misstating facts — these things 
 are not " strategy," and " part of the game." They are simply 
 cheap dishonesty — plain lies. No self-respecting debater 
 will indulge in such practices. In contest debating when the 
 stupid or dishonest are detected in such practices, permanent 
 disbarment from platform activities should be the minimum 
 penalty. 
 
CHAPTER 19 
 
 DELIVERY 
 
 OUTLINE 
 
 A. Oral presentation in debate. 
 
 B. Four methods. 
 
 1. Reading. 
 
 2. Memorizing. 
 
 a. Place for memorized speeches. 
 
 b. Writing as a preparation. 
 
 3. Impromptu. 
 
 4. Extemporaneous. 
 
 a. Advantages. 
 
 (I) Flexibility of speech. 
 
 (II) Fit mood of audience. 
 
 (III) Physical advantage. 
 
 (IV) Use of inspiration from audience. 
 
 b. Dangers. 
 
 (I) Exaggeration. 
 
 (II) Repetition of substance. 
 
 (III) Monotony of form. 
 
 c. Dangers may be overcome. 
 
 d. Combining memoriter and extempore: "Block Sys- 
 
 tem." 
 
 e. Specific suggestions for extemporaneous debating. 
 
 (I) Notes. 
 
 (II) Outlines. 
 
 (III) Charts. 
 
 (IV) Platform hints. 
 
 (V) Practice. 
 
 A. Oral presentation in debate. All that has to do with 
 oral delivery is of great importance in debate. To know how 
 to investigate a problem, gather and arrange argument and 
 
 430 
 
DELIVERY 431 
 
 evidence, and write a convincing and persuasive speech does 
 not make one a debater. A good debater must be able to do 
 all this, and in addition must be able to speak well in public 
 — must be able to present his case orally to an audience. 
 In getting ready for this final and crucial part of his work, 
 the fundamental question the debater has to meet is: "How 
 much shall I write — How far shall I put my preparation into 
 written form?" This is an important question: habits ill- 
 formed in this particular have been responsible for the fail- 
 ures of many preachers, lecturers, and advocates. On the 
 other hand, correct habits are equally potent for success. 
 Moreover, every beginner should realize that strength or 
 weakness in this respect is truly a matter of habit, for practices 
 adopted early grow fast and soon become difficult to aban- 
 don. Even at the cost of hard work and discouraging fail- 
 ures, a young debater should begin right. 
 
 B. Four methods. When we come to consider this ques- 
 tion, we find there are four possible methods: (1) reading 
 manuscript, (2) delivering a written manuscript from memory , 
 (3) impromptu speaking without any previous preparation 
 whatever, (4) extempore speaking from notes or outline. 
 
 1. Reading. The first method, that of writing out a com- 
 plete speech, and reading it verbatim, should never be followed 
 by a debater in contest debating or in actual controversy 
 in court or assembly. It is contrary to the purpose and spirit 
 of debate. A debate is two-sided; it consists of the clash and 
 interplay of the opponents. Without mutual adaptation and 
 adjustment there can be no real debate. Two written ar- 
 guments on opposite sides of a question do not constitute a 
 debate. But not only this, not only does this method pre- 
 clude meeting an opponent, but it also shuts one away from 
 the audience. There can be little, if any, contact with the 
 audience. The inter-communication between speaker and 
 hearer that gives vitality to the speech is absolutely pre- 
 cluded. There may be occasions on which a man is justified 
 in reading a manuscript to an audience, but such an occasion 
 
432 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 is never found in debate. Any one who has ever heard a 
 preacher read his sermons, sentence by sentence, from a 
 manuscript, need not be told that in the scrimmage of a de- 
 bate such a practice would be fatal. This method lacks all 
 the spontaneity, all the power of adaptation to circumstances, 
 all the aggressiveness that is essential. 
 
 2. Memorizing. The second method, that of delivering a 
 written speech from memory has, of course, most of the 
 disadvantages of the reading method. Considered as a 
 method to be adopted permanently and for regular use, 
 memorizing must undoubtedly be condemned. The most 
 obvious defect of such a practice is the lack of adaptability 
 to circumstances. We have already seen that a large element 
 of debating power lies in the ability to appreciate and grapple 
 with situations; but a speaker who has learned the sentences 
 he is to deliver is powerless if anything unexpected arises, or 
 if his written speech does not happen to fit the occasion. 
 Again, the memoriter method involves a great and largely 
 useless physical strain. It demands the most severe mental 
 and nervous exertion in committing the speech, in worrying 
 over the chances of forgetting, and in delivery. One's energy 
 should be more intelligently expended in debate. So serious 
 a strain does it require, that a continuance of such practices 
 tends to diminish spontaneity and quickness of thought, 
 which gradually impairs the fineness and clearness of the 
 whole mind. Memorizing also prevents, in a great degree, the 
 necessary closeness of contact between speaker and audience. 
 It demands a remarkable degree of elocutionary skill to in- 
 fuse into committed passages the variety and the spontaneity 
 of extempore speaking. The memoriter speaker all too easily 
 becomes an actor, posing and soHloquizing — an attitude fatal 
 to power in debate, for it destroys the leadership which we 
 have seen is indispensable in the work of persuasion. Then, 
 too, all the inspiration that should come from the reflex 
 action of the audience is lost. The declaimer, instead of 
 being stirred and directed by any manifestations of thought 
 
DELIVERY 433 
 
 or emotion on the part of his hearers, is liable to be confused 
 by such influences, and is constantly fearful of their appear- 
 ance. Memorized debating is too likely to be an exhihitiony 
 not a communication. There is probably little danger to-day 
 that debaters will read manuscripts, but the evil of memo- 
 rized speeches still continues. Teachers and coaches should 
 insist that debaters refrain from memorizing — even perhaps 
 from writing speeches. Many college debaters are handi- 
 capped by being allowed to get the habit of memorizing. 
 This means that they never reach their full power. They are 
 like healthy men who wear always appliances meant for 
 cripples, for fear that they may sometime need them. The 
 result is a chronic weakness that makes the artificial support 
 necessary. Any person who has intelligence enough to have 
 a right to hope to be a debater, has intelligence enough to 
 learn how to debate extemporaneously. Would-be debaters 
 should compel themselves to learn the best method — and 
 teachers should tolerate no other method in practice. 
 
 a. Place for memorized speeches. It must be clearly un- 
 stood that we are not saying here that there are no proper 
 occasions whatever for memorized speeches. Indeed, there, 
 are many that call for such — or at least on which such 
 speeches are perfectly appropriate. But these are never 
 debates. They are rather great formal demonstrative oc- 
 casions of some sort, at which experienced speakers are called 
 on for the "oration of the day." Experienced speakers are 
 more safe in memorized speaking. It is very difficult for a 
 young speaker who has not had extensive platform experi- 
 ence, to deliver a memorized speech with that directness — 
 that sense of communication — which is the very soul of ef- 
 fective speaking. An experienced judge can usually tell the 
 exact point at which a young speaker turns from extempore 
 to memoriter speaking — and this is almost without exception 
 a change from better to worse. Experienced speakers when 
 not debating may use memorized speeches. Debaters and 
 beginners should avoid this method. 
 
434 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 b. Writing speeches as part of the preparation of a debate 
 is sometimes an excellent thing. Often it is dangerous. It 
 is good for the debater who has the courage to throw the 
 manuscript into the waste basket (or file it away), as soon as 
 he has it as he wants it in form, length, etc. When this stage 
 is reached an outline of the manuscript should be made 
 and the manuscript put out of sight and kept there. Then 
 the speaking in practice should be from the outline without 
 any attempt to recall the words of the manuscript. Of course, 
 it is true here as elsewhere, that the practice of writing is a 
 great benefit to any speaker who is strong enough to be 
 master of what he has written. Of course, a complete and 
 accurate brief should always be written as the basis of any 
 debate. Especially to a debater in the early stages of his ca- 
 reer, the writing of briefs, and, sometimes, finished speeches, 
 is of the greatest value. Enough has already been said in the 
 preceding parts of this book to make it evident that argumen- 
 tation is a distinct art with rules and methods peculiar to 
 itself. Upon the understanding of these methods and the ob- 
 servation of these rules success depends, and in bringing one's 
 self to comprehend these various principles, and to develop 
 habits in conformity with them, the practice of writing is 
 very valuable. In preparing a careful and detailed brief, 
 which shall present all of his proof in its full strength to a 
 reader, a student must at every step, from the statement of 
 the proposition to the final summary, be conscious of the prin- 
 ciples he is following and of his reasons for doing so; he has 
 time and opportunity to realize just why he introduces his 
 proof in a certain way, why he selects certain evidence, why 
 he arranges his material in accordance with a certain plan. 
 Furthermore, what is written can be subsequently examined 
 for defects and virtues. In this way a student can detect his 
 weaknesses and set himself to remedy them. Finally, a per- 
 son who is writing thinks more closely and concisely, and 
 uses more exact language than one who is speaking, and so 
 develops the qualities of straightforward, logical reasoning, 
 
DELIVERY 435 
 
 and of clear, accurate use of words. It does not follow that 
 a debater should write all he says, or that he should always 
 keep up the practice of writing as a means of self-training. 
 Study and experience gradually turn these qualities men- 
 tioned above into habits of mind, and the habits once formed 
 are a permanent asset. But, for the debater in the formative 
 period of his career, the regular writing of briefs and manu- 
 scripts is invaluable. 
 
 3. Impromptu. Little need be said about the third meth- 
 od, impromptu speaking — without any previous preparation 
 whatever. This is not likely in a debate unless it happens 
 to be unavoidable as is sometimes the case in real life — never, 
 of course, in contest debating. The power of impromptu 
 speech is not to be disparaged, and it is undoubtedly true 
 that many veteran speakers can debate a proposition with 
 very brief preparation and from a very few notes; but such 
 powers are begotten of long practice and self-cultivation; for 
 a beginner to make such men the models for his own early 
 efforts is foolhardy, and always has unfortunate results. To 
 make such a venture at the start, would be like attempting 
 to learn to swim by jumping into mid-ocean at the first 
 lesson; the well-nigh certain result is to be lost in a flood of 
 bad habits. From such beginnings are produced the ram- 
 bling, incoherent, inconclusive speakers that are always in- 
 ferior or mediocre in debate. The weakness of such arguers 
 is that they are wholly lacking in the element of f onn : they 
 never learn how to conserve their strength to spend it to some 
 purpose; they waste their forces because they have never 
 learned how to marshal and direct them. 
 
 4. Extemporaneous speaking should undoubtedly be the 
 ideal of the debater. A distinction should always be made 
 between extemporaneous speaking and impromptu speaking. 
 An impromtu speech is wholly unpremeditated; the speaker 
 rises on the moment and talks off-hand, not having delib- 
 erated on the subject at all. But "extemporaneous," as the 
 term is now used, is a name applied to any speech for which 
 
436 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the language and details of rhetorical form have not been 
 previously prepared. But the more fundamental preparation 
 must have been exhaustive. Extemporaneous speaking is 
 the highest type, the most difficult, most effective, and de- 
 mands the most thorough preparation. The speaker is al- 
 ways assumed to be prepared on the question, and he may or 
 may not use notes or outline. 
 
 a. The advantages of this extempore method are many 
 and great: (I) The first advantage — and first in order of im- 
 portance — is the power of adaptation — the flexibility — which 
 it gives to the speaker. The debater who depends for his lan- 
 guage upon nothing but his ever present power of making up 
 his words as he goes, can at any time omit any of his ideas or 
 arguments that the circumstances make unnecessary; he 
 can put into his proof anything that an unexpected turn of 
 affairs requires; he can, if expedient, adopt a wholly new line 
 of demonstration. (II) Furthermore, the extemporizer can 
 fit himself to the mood of his audience: if he sees they do not 
 understand a point, he can stop to explain and enforce it 
 upon them; if they seem personally hostile or inattentive, he 
 can resort to persuasion to remedy the situation. At all 
 times, he can hold his position as leader of the assembly both 
 in thought and in feeling. He can reason with his audience. 
 (Ill) Then, too, extemporizing carries with it great physical 
 advantages. "The voice of the speaker is deeper, stronger, 
 dnd more flexible, and the effort required to produce it much 
 less. The head being held erect, there is no constriction of 
 the throat, the lungs are fully expanded, and the respiratory 
 muscles are free to perform their functions." ^ (IV) Again, 
 the inspiration of sympathy from the audience comes loith itsfidl 
 poiver only to the extemporizer. William Pitt truly said that 
 "eloquence is not in the man; it is in the assembly." The re- 
 sponse of hearer to speaker may disturb a declaimer but it gives 
 added strength to the extemporizer, helping him to mount 
 to eloquence with a greater boldness and self-confidence. 
 ^ Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratory, p. 13. 
 
DELIVERY 43') 
 
 b. The dangers of extemporaneous speaking should be 
 borne in mind as well as the great benefits that flow from it. 
 There, are three that a young speaker needs particularly to 
 guard against. (I) The first is exaggeration. The youthful ora- 
 tor, to whom word and idea usually come with tantalizing dif- 
 ficulty, when at length he begins to feel the flow of words com- 
 ing full and free to his lips, is too liable to be caught up in the 
 onward rush and carried much further than he intends ; swollen 
 by the rising enthusiasm, the tide of eloquence mounts higher 
 and higher till it sweeps over the bounds of accuracy, even of 
 truthfulness, and turns into a flood of hyperbole. Then it is 
 that a speaker makes statements that he is afterward forced 
 to take back, calls his opponent bad names, and in general 
 forgets his self-control. Lord Chatham, with all his long 
 experience and constant practice, said that he did not dare 
 to speak extemporaneously with a state secret lurking in his 
 mind, "for in the Sibylline frenzy of his oratory he knew not 
 what he said." ^ A common form of misrepresentation con- 
 sists in stating evidence carelessly. If a speaker has in his 
 mind the general nature and effect of certain facts, but has 
 not decided just how to put them into words, he finds him- 
 self sorely tempted to color the facts with a little rhetorical 
 flourish, to make a "few" into a "great many," to augment 
 "a score" into "hundreds," or to transform "often" into 
 "always." Such exaggeration may, with constant practice, 
 become something of a habit, so that the tendency should be 
 repressed at the start. 
 
 (II) A second danger is that of awkward repetition of sub- 
 stance. The danger of repeating ideas, of rambling around 
 and covering the same point a number of times, ought to be 
 obviated by careful planning and outlining. This kind of 
 repetition should not be a common fault in extemporaneous 
 speaking. If a speaker permits himself to become indolent 
 in his choice of phrases, however, he will surely find that 
 certain combinations of words will be constantly coming to 
 * Matthews, Orators and Oratory^ p. 109. 
 
438 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 his lips till they become tiresome. This often results in a 
 confusion of thoughts : one stock phrase is made to represent 
 several different ideas; two ideas that are similar but not 
 exactly alike are both expressed in these same hackneyed 
 terms, simply because the speaker is too careless to know the 
 distinction, or has the habit of stating things with only 
 approximate truth. This danger, of course, threatens partic- 
 ularly a speaker whose range of words is small; and for such 
 a man the fault may be overcome by resorting to the dic- 
 tionary, to the reading of good literature and good orations, 
 or to any expedient for the increase of the vocabulary. The 
 same fault appears in the awkward repetition of introductory 
 and transitional phrases, such as: *'Let us next consider," 
 "My next point is," "In the next place," "Along this same 
 line," "Thus we see," etc. A speaker composing as he goes, 
 does not realize how often these phrases are reiterated; but 
 it is noticeable to the audience. 
 
 (Ill) A third danger is that of monotony of form — the fault 
 of explaining or reasoning out everything in the same way. 
 It is very easy to adopt a sort of logical formula in accordance 
 with which argument after argument is unfolded. A certain 
 mode of reasoning in his own mind is peculiar to the speaker, 
 and when before an audience it is natural to explain the 
 matter to others just as he explained it to himself. The effect 
 of such repetition is much the same as that which a reader 
 gets from page after page of syllogisms in a treatise on formal 
 logic. The reasoning is clear and accurate, but uninteresting 
 and tiresome. 
 
 c. Dangers may be overcome. Such dangers as these, 
 though they must surely be met, should not be a source of dis- 
 couragement. The dangers attendant upon other methods of 
 public speaking are equally numerous and usually far more 
 formidable. The young extemporizer to whom the beginning 
 seems hard, may well bear in mind an example cited by Dr. 
 Buckley from Mr. Gilchrist's Life of Richard Cobden: — 
 
 "I saw Richard Cobden sitting beside John Bright in the 
 
DELIVERY 439 
 
 House of Commons. Perhaps no more persuasive speaker, 
 whose power depended largely upon a clear and earnest 
 statement of facts, has ever sat in the British Parliament. 
 Speaking of the Treaty of Commerce with France in 1860, 
 Mr. Gladstone six years later said, *I don't believe that the 
 man breathed upon earth at that epoch, or now breathes 
 upon earth, that could have effected that great measure with 
 the single exception of Mr. Cobden.* 
 
 "His was the triumph of the pure extemporizer. In 1864 
 he wrote to Mr. Delane, editor of the London Times: — 
 
 " *It is known that I am not in the habit of writing a word 
 beforehand of what I speak in public. Like other speakers, 
 practice has given me as perfect self-possession in the pres- 
 ence of an audience as if I were writing in my closet. Now 
 my ever constant and overruling thought while addressing a 
 public meeting — the only necessity which long experience of 
 the arts of the controversialist has impressed upon my mind 
 — is to avoid the possibility of being misrepresented, and 
 prevent my opponents from raising a false issue, a trick as old 
 as Aristotle.' 
 
 "Yet this master persuader of hard-headed business men 
 was nervous and confused in his first speech; in fact, he 
 practically broke down, and the chairman had to apologize 
 for him. For some time afterward he was so discouraged by 
 his maiden effort that if he had been allowed to follow the 
 bent of his inclination, he would never again have appeared 
 as a public speaker?" ^ 
 
 d. Combining memoriter and extempore: "Block sys- 
 tem." It is possible to combine some memorizing with 
 extemporaneous speaking; and under some conditions the 
 combination may be effective. The peroration of an otherwise 
 extempore speech may sometimes be memorized with good 
 results. A beginner may find this a helpful means of weaning 
 himself from declamation, and taking on the strength of ex- 
 temporaneous speech. And even an experienced speaker may 
 ^ Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratory, pp. 369, 370. 
 
440 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 memorize certain passages which require delicate treatment 
 of any kind, the preparation of which he does not wish to 
 leave to the moment of utterance. Such passages may be in- 
 terspersed through an extemporaneous speech without losing 
 the advantages of this method. Some people advocate mem- 
 orizing most of the introduction and conclusion and extempo- 
 rizing the discussion. This is close to what has been called 
 "the block system" — that is, practically the whole debate is 
 memorized in sections. The different sections may be shifted 
 to suit the demands of the occasion, or some of them may be 
 dropped out. This method gives a certain kind of flexibility, 
 but the speaker is after all declaiming memorized material 
 most of the time. This is bad from the standpoint of debat- 
 ing. Some memorized passages may be used if there is need, 
 provided they are not the greater part of the speech, and 
 provided the speaker can keep from leaning too much on 
 such helps. But as a permanent practice, by which the at- 
 tempt is made to mix the two and deceive an audience into 
 thinking the whole to be extempore, this method is likely to 
 be a failure. An excellent criticism is given by Dr. James 
 M. Buckley, in his book on Extemporaneous Oratory for Pro- 
 fessional and Amateur Speakers: — 
 
 "A joint use of the extemporaneous and the recitative has 
 marked advantages, and is to be commended to those who 
 cannot trust themselves wholly to the former. But it is 
 extremely difficult to adjust it gracefully and forcefully. 
 Transitions of style are usually obvious, extemporized por- 
 tions being spoken more swiftly or more slowly than the re- 
 cited. Emphasis and accent are different, and gesticulation 
 undergoes a noticeable change. The reciter is prone to pro- 
 ceed more rapidly than when he extemporizes; at other times, 
 according to the strength of his memory or his excitability 
 when uttering words not previously prepared, he may speak 
 more slowly. A lawyer delivered a Fourth of July oration, 
 in preparation for which he had composed perhaps ten epi- 
 grams and half as many paragraphs, some consisting of at 
 
DELIVERY 441 
 
 least three times that number of sentences, and had com- 
 mitted these to memory, expecting to extemporize the con- 
 nective tissue. What he had learned he recited perfectly; 
 what he extemporized he delivered Under slight embarrass- 
 ment, and his course resembled that of a man crossing a 
 bridge, some of the planks of which were weak and others 
 strong. He fairly leaped when he came to one of his com- 
 mitted paragraphs, and it was obvious that he rejoiced in 
 spirit, but more than once his hesitation and awkwardness 
 were pitiable." ^ 
 
 e. Specific suggestions to be followed in all debating, par- 
 ticularly in extemporaneous debating, and which have not 
 already been made, are contained in the following paragraphs: 
 
 (I) Notes. We have said that in extemporaneous speak- 
 ing a speaker may or may not use notes. For a beginner in 
 any kind of oratory it is desirable that some notes be used, if 
 the speech is to be one of any length or intricacy. The prej- 
 udice that still exists in some places against the use of notes 
 by a speaker should be disregarded. It is founded on false 
 standards and a misconception of a speaker's purpose. The 
 speaker should be trying to convey thought effectively to 
 the audience — not trying to exhibit his power of memory or 
 other personal qualities. When a speaker has an important 
 case to present to an audience it is very foolish to use much 
 of his energy in remembering matters that can better be 
 carried on a card or two. Especially young speakers should 
 always relieve themselves of the worry and strain of memo- 
 rized delivery and carry an outline and notes to the platform. 
 They should not even attempt to carry a memorized outline 
 of any length. It takes a mature mind and much experience, 
 to enable a man to carry the complete outline of a speech, in 
 such a way as to guard against the forgetting of points, on 
 the one hand, and wandering from the subject, on the other. 
 And particularly in debate, where the situation is ever chang- 
 ing and where so much depends upon the circumstances of 
 1 Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratori/y pp. 25, 26. 
 
442 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 the moment, it is doubtful if even a veteran can work effect- 
 ively without notes. Outlines and notes should be used in 
 intercollegiate and other contest and practice debates for the 
 purpose of bringing the experience as close as possible to 
 actual debates in real life, and of giving the best training for 
 these. Long and detailed arguments are not presented in 
 courts, legislatures, hearings, etc., without notes. Our de- 
 bates should be as close as possible to the best of these dis- 
 cussions. 
 
 (II) Outlines. A complete brief should never be used 
 as an outline of a speech. After the brief is completed a 
 short outline should be made up for any speech, using such 
 parts of the brief as are needed. The outline should be pre- 
 pared with a particular audience, occasion, time limit, etc., 
 in view. The brief ignores all these. The outline should take 
 up points, present material, in whatever order seems best 
 for a particular situation, absolutely regardless of the order 
 followed in the brief or of the rules of brief drawing. And 
 finally, the outline should be capable of alteration and should 
 be adjusted to the occasion just before the speaker takes 
 the platform. For instance, in an intercollegiate debate a 
 speaker should follow carefully all that is said before his 
 turn comes and should make whatever changes in his out- 
 lines are demanded by the changing situation. Points may 
 be dropped out, put in, or re-arranged. The outline should 
 be short, typewritten, with wide spacing (to allow for 
 changes), on 4 x 6 cards. With the outline, but preferably 
 on other cards, should be all quotations and statistics to be 
 used. A debater should never present memorized quotations 
 (except very short ones) or memorized statistics, to an au- 
 dience. It is foolish to burden the memory this way. It is 
 careless, for one is likely to forget. It is artificial and can 
 have no excuse other than that of being an attempt to meet 
 a prejudice against notes, or of showing ofiF one's memory. 
 Judges are likely to be suspicious of memorized quotations 
 and statistics. We have heard debaters reel off identical 
 
DELIVERY 443 
 
 figures or quotations at two different places in the same 
 speeches. All were memorized and the wrong set came out, 
 and the debaters went on with their declamation, with no 
 thought of what they were saying. Use a short and flexible 
 outline y and use notes for all quotations and statistics. 
 
 (III) Charts. Use charts and diagrams to hang up before 
 the audience on these conditions: (A) that there is no under- 
 standing to the contrary with your opponents; (B) that you 
 are willing to leave the chart up after you use it in order that 
 your opponents may use it as they wish; (never put up a 
 chart and then take it down before your opponent has a 
 chance to use it) ; (C) that you can make certain important 
 things clearer in less time w^ith a chart than without it. When 
 these conditions are present there is no reason why charts 
 and diagrams should not be used. A slight warning may well 
 be given, however, for contest debates. Charts are much 
 more dangerous for a negative team than for an affirmative, 
 because the latter has the last opportunity to discuss the 
 chart before the audience. If a negative hangs up a chart, 
 and the affirmative puts off refutation of it till the last speech 
 (as they have a perfect right to do) the negative has no 
 chance to answer. Unless the negative feels sure of the chart, 
 it is better not to use one. 
 
 (IV) Platform hints. It is impossible in this book to 
 discuss platform speaking at any length. Various suggestions 
 have been given by the way. All would-be debaters should 
 learn how to be effective speakers. Regular courses of in- 
 struction in speaking are the best means of getting the right 
 start. Actual practice with real audiences is the only means 
 of getting real proficiency in the art. 
 
 (V) Practice. A regular course in practical debating — 
 actual speaking in regular debates, with personal criticism 
 by a competent instructor — is the proper meatis to use in 
 getting started right as a debater. Continued practice after 
 one knows what to try to do, is the only way to become 
 skilful. Extended practice before one knows what to do is 
 
444 ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE 
 
 likely to produce more harm than good. It develops the 
 habit of loose, rambling, superficial, assertive talking, which 
 is the antithesis of intelligent debating. So-called debates on 
 big questions, for which only a few hours are spent in prep- 
 aration are wholly evil as far as learning to debate is concerned. 
 With this warning in mind, we may well follow the advice 
 given by a friend to Edward Everett Hale at the opening of 
 his career. "If you want to be a good public speaker, when- 
 ever anyone is fool enough to ask you to speak, you be fool 
 enough to do it." 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 A. Bibliography. 
 
 B. Pleading. 
 
 C. Instructions to Judges with Sample Ballot. 
 
 D. Rules for Legal Brief Drawing. 
 
 E. 1. Material for a Short Brief. 
 2. Material for a Long Brief. 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 References to the following Publications are made in footnotes in 
 
 the text 
 
 Adams, J. Q., Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Cambridge, Mass., 
 Hilliard & Metcalf, 1810. 
 
 Alden, R. M., The Art of Debate, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 
 1900. 
 
 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Jebb's Translation, Cambridge, England, 
 University Press, 1909. 
 
 Baker, G. P., The Forms of Public Address, New York, Henry 
 Holt & Co., 1904. 
 
 Baker, G. P., and Huntington, H. B., The Principles of Argumenta- 
 tion (Revised Edition), New York, Ginn & Co., 1905. 
 
 Baldwin, J. M., Elements of Psychology, New York, Holt, 1891. 
 
 Ballantine, H. W., The Apportionment of Proof, and the Burden 
 of Rebuttal, Law Notes, December, 1912. 
 
 Beecher, H. W., Plymouth Pulpit, 8th Series, New York, March- 
 Sept., 1872. 
 
 Beecher, H. W., Patriotic Addresses, New York, 1891. 
 
 Best, On Evidence, Chamberlayne's Ed., Boston, Boston Book 
 Co., 1908. 
 
 Bodkin, R. C, How to Reason, Dublin, Browne & Nolan, 1907. 
 
 445 
 
446 APPENDIX A 
 
 Bode, B. H., An Outline of Logic, New York, Henry Holt & Co^ 
 1910. 
 
 Bradbury, H. B., The Structure of an Effective Public Speech, 
 Greenfield, Mass., T Morey & Sons, 1915. 
 
 Brooks, Phillips, Essays and Addresses, New York, 1894. 
 
 Buckley, Extemporaneous Oratory, Eaton & Main, 1898. 
 
 Burke, Edmund, Speech on Conciliation with America, Cook's 
 Edition, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1896. 
 
 Channing, W. E., Works, Boston, G. G. Channing, 1849. 
 
 Chase's Blackstone. 
 
 Clark, E. and H., Eloquence of the United States, Middletown, 
 Conn., 1827. 
 
 Clark, S. H., and Blanchard, F. M., Practical Public Speaking, New 
 York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. 
 
 Collins, J. C, Jonathan Swift, London, 1893. 
 
 Congressional Debates. 
 
 Creighton, J. E., Introductory Logic, New York, Macmillan Co., 
 1907. 
 
 Curtis, G. W., Orations and Addresses, New York, Harper, 1893. 
 
 Debates in Congress, Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1830. 
 
 Denney, J. V., Duncan, C. S., and McKinney, F. C, Argumenta- 
 tion and Debate, New York, American Book Company, 
 1910. 
 
 Foster, W. T., Argumentation and Debating, New York, Houghton- 
 Mifflin Co., 1908. 
 
 Gardiner, J. H., The Making of Arguments, New York, Ginn & Co., 
 1912. 
 
 Genung, J. F., Practical Rhetoric, Boston, Ginn & Co., 1896. 
 
 Genung, J. F., The Working Principles of Rhetoric, Boston, Ginn, 
 1901. 
 
 Gough, H. B., Formulas for the Special Issue, The Public Speaking 
 Review, Vol. 3, No. 3. 
 
 Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, W. L. Snyder, New York, 
 Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1904. 
 
 Greenleaf, On Evidence, Thirteenth Edition. 
 
 Hardwicke, History of Oratory and Orators, New York, G. P. Put- 
 nam Sons, 1896. 
 
 Hibben, Logic, Deductive and Inductive, New York, Charles Scrib- 
 ner's Sons, 1905. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 447 
 
 Hill, A. S., Principles of Rhetoric (Revised Edition), New Yorl^ 
 
 American Book Co., 1895. 
 Howell's Stale Trials. 
 Hughes, On Evidence. 
 Hyslop, J. H., Elements of Logic, New York, Charles Scribner's 
 
 Sons, 1901. 
 James, William, Psychology, Briefer Course, New York, Henry Holt 
 
 & Co., 1913. 
 Jevons, W. S., Lessons in Logic, New York, Macmillan Co., 1913. 
 Ketcham, V. A., Argumentation and Debate, New York, Macmillan 
 
 Co., 1914. 
 Lamb, Charles, Essays of Elia, London, J. M. Dent & Co., 1897. 
 Lamont, Hammond, English Composition, New York, Charles 
 
 Scribner's Sons, 1907. 
 Lincoln-Douglas Debates, Columbus, Ohio, FoUett, Foster & Co., 
 
 1860. 
 Matthews, W., Oratory and Orators, S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago, 
 
 1879. 
 Matthews, Brander, Notes on Speech Making, New York, Long- 
 mans, Green & Co., 1901. 
 Maxcy, C. L., The Brief, New York, Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1916. 
 Mill, System of Logic, New York, Harper, 1874. 
 Minto, Logic, Inductive and Deductive, London, 1893. 
 Newcomer, A. G., Elements of Rhetoric, New York, Henry Holt 
 
 & Co., 1906. 
 O'Grady, Hardress, Matter, Form, and Style, New York, Dutton, 
 
 1913. 
 Pattee, G. K., Practical Argumentation, New York, The Century 
 
 Co. (Revised Edition), 1916. 
 Pelsma, J. R., The Special Issues, Public Speaking Review, Vol. 3, 
 
 No. 3. 
 Phelps, Austin, English Style in Public Discourse, New York, 
 
 Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912. 
 Phillips, A. E., Effective Speaking, Chicago, The Newton Co., 
 
 1910. 
 Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, Chicago, University of 
 
 Chicago Press, 1915- 
 Ringwalt, R. C, Modern American Oratory, New York, Henry 
 
 Holt & Co., 1898. 
 
^48 APPENDIX A 
 
 Robinson, F. B., Effective Public Speaking, Chicago, LaSalle 
 Extension University, 1915. 
 
 Robinson, Lewis, M. D., Everyday Cruelty, Fortnightly Review, 
 July, 1894. 
 
 Robinson, W. C, Forensic Oratory, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 
 1893. 
 
 Seward, William H., Works, Boston, 1887. 
 
 Sidgwick, A., The Process of Argument, London, 1893. 
 
 Stephen, H. J., On Pleading, Edited by Samuel Williston, Cam- 
 bridge, Mass., The Harvard Law Review Publishing Associa- 
 tion, 1895. 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, Philosophy of Style. 
 
 Sumner, Charles, Works, Boston, Lee and Sheppard, 1872. 
 
 Thayer, J. B., Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, Boston, Little, 
 Brown & Co., 1898. 
 
 Ward, John, System of Oratory, London, 1759. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, Works, Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1851. 
 
 Whateley, Richard, Elements of Rhetoric (Reprint), Louisville, 
 Ky., John T. Morton & Company. 
 
 Wilson, Woodrow, Speech to the New York Southern Society, 1910, 
 in Wood's After-Dinner Speeches. 
 
 Winans, J. A., Public Speaking, New York, The Century Co., 1915. 
 
 World's Orators, New York, G. P. Putnam Sons, 1900. 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 PLEADING 
 
 This brief statement presents *' in a general view, the nature 
 of the process of pleading, and the manner of coming to 
 issue," in common law. This is adapted from the first part 
 of Chapter I of Stephen on Pleading^ edited by Samuel 
 WiUiston, Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard Law Review 
 PubHshing Association, 1895. It is given here in the belief 
 that it will aid students in gaining an understanding of the 
 doctrine of issues, and it will make clear certain references in 
 the text in the chapters on "Issues" and "Burden of Proof." 
 
 1. Plaintiff (Affirmative) makes declaration of his cause of 
 
 action — states the nature and quality of his case. 
 
 2. Defendant (Negative) answers either: 
 
 a. Demurrer. Even supposing facts to be true, denies 
 
 plaintiff in point of law has rights he claims. 
 Tender of issue in law, necessarily accepted by 
 plaintiff. 
 
 or 
 
 b. Plea. 
 
 (1) Dilatory. 
 
 (a) To the jurisdiction of the court — denies 
 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 (b) In suspension of action — shows some 
 
 ground for not proceeding with suit 
 now. 
 
 (c) In abatement — shows declaration im- 
 
 properly drawn — does not deny right 
 of action itself. 
 
 (2) Peremptory — in bar of the action — denies 
 
 right of action altogether. 
 449 
 
450 APPENDIX B 
 
 (a) Traverse — denies all or some essential 
 
 part of the averments of fact in the 
 declaration. Tender of issue of fact 
 (which plaintiff must accept or demur 
 to the traverse as insufficient in law) , 
 which raises an issue in law which is 
 necessarily accepted. 
 
 (b) Confession and avoidance — admits facts 
 
 of declaration but alleges new facts 
 which obviate or repel their legal 
 effect. 
 At this point if the defendant has demurred or pleaded by 
 way of traverse the parties are now at issue either on the law 
 or on the facts involved. If the defendant take either of the 
 other possibilities — a dilatory plea or a plea of way of con- 
 fession and avoidance^ then the 
 3. Plaintiff answers: 
 
 a. Demurrer — tender issue in law as above, 
 
 b. Replication, 
 
 (1) Traverse — tender issue of fact as above, 
 
 (2) Confession and avoidance. 
 
 "If the replication be by way of traverse, it is necessary 
 (as in the case of the plea) that it should tender issue. So, 
 if the plaintiff demur, an issue in law is necessarily tendered; 
 and, in either case, the ultimate result is a joinder in issue; 
 upon the same principles as above explained with respect 
 to the plea. But if the replication be in confession and 
 avoidance, the defendant may then, in his turn, either demur, 
 — or, by a pleading, traverse, or confess and avoid, its allega- 
 tions. If such pleading take place, it is called the rejoinder. 
 
 " In the same manner, and subject to the same law of pro- 
 ceeding, viz., that of demurring, or traversing, or pleading in 
 confession and avoidance, is conducted all the subsequent 
 altercation, to which the nature of the case may lead; and the 
 order and denominations of the alternate allegations of fact 
 
PLEADING 451 
 
 (or pleadings) throughout the whole series, are as follows: — 
 declaration^ plea^ replication^ re joinder ^ surrejoinder y rebutter 
 and surrebutter. After the surrebutter, the pleadings have 
 no distinctive names; for beyond that stage they are very 
 seldom found to extend. 
 
 "To whatever length of series the pleadings may happen 
 to lead, it is obvious that by adherence to the plan here de- 
 scribed, one of the parties must at some period of the proc- 
 ess, more or less remote, be brought either to demur or to 
 traverse; for, as no case can involve an inexhaustible store of 
 new relevant matter, there must somewhere be a limit to 
 pleading in the way of confession and avoidance. . . . 
 
 "As the parties will at length arrive at demurrer or trav- 
 erse, so, whenever a traverse is at length produced, it comprises 
 a tender of issue (as in the above examples) ; and a demurrer 
 also necessarily involves a tender of issue; the consequence of 
 which is, in either case, a joinder in issue, exactly upon the 
 same principle as above explained with respect to the plea; 
 so that the parties arrive at issue, after a longer series of plead- 
 ings, precisely in the same manner as when the process termi- 
 nates at the earliest possible state. Such is, in a general 
 view, the nature of the process of pleading, and the manner 
 of coming to issue." ^ 
 
 ^ Stephen on Pleading, Williston's edition, pp. 5(^5^, 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
 judges' ballot with instructions 
 
 The following instructions to judges should be printed or 
 typewritten on the ballot given to each judge at the opening 
 of the debate, and a copy of this should be sent to each one 
 with the invitation to act as judge. 
 
 The annual inter-collegiate debate. Uni- 
 
 versity OF , affirmative. University of , 
 
 negative. 
 
 Friday, March , 19 . 
 
 Resolved: etc. 
 
 Instructions 
 To the Judge: 
 
 You are called here as one who understands debating, to 
 give an opinion as to the comparative ability in debate shown 
 by the teams taking part in this contest. Your question is 
 which team shows a higher average skill in debating — not sim- 
 ply which presents the stronger evidence, nor which side you 
 agree with either before or after the debate. Ability in de- 
 bate, or skill in debate, covers knowledge of available ma- 
 terial, analysis, reasoning, rhetoric, proper debate tactics, 
 and ability to talk to an audience. You are the sole judge 
 as to what weight shall be given to these various elements. 
 Copies of these ballots are to be preserved for the guidance 
 and instruction of the contestants and others who are to 
 
 452 
 
JUDGES' BALLOT WITH INSTRUCTIONS 453 
 
 follow them. Therefore in giving your reasons for your 
 decision please be as specific as possible. 
 
 Ballot 
 
 It is my decision that the debate should be awarded to the 
 team for the following reasons: 
 
 (ample space should be left here on ballot.) 
 
 (Signed) Judge. 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
 RULES FOR LEGAL BRIEF DRAWING 
 
 This very complete set of rules for legal brief drawing 
 appears as an appendix to Problems in ContractSy ^ by Dean 
 H. W. Ballantine of the University of Illinois Law School, 
 formerly Professor of Law in the University of Wisconsin. 
 A comparison of these rules with those given in chapter 10 
 will show the difference between legal brief drawing and brief 
 drawing on general argumentation. 
 
 Directions for Briefmaking 
 
 "The following twenty-one rules cover the work of drawing 
 outline or skeleton briefs. Each rule here should be strictly 
 observed. Students should memorize these rules as stated 
 and should understand the reasons for them. 
 
 General Rules 
 
 1. Divide the brief into three parts, marked respectively — 
 introduction, argument, and conclusion. 
 
 2. Arrange the arguments in the brief in logical order in 
 the form of headings and subheadings. 
 
 3. State each heading and subheading or argument in the 
 form of assertions or propositions of fact or law, not of mere 
 vague topics. 
 
 4. Let each heading and subheading or argument contain 
 but a single assertion or proposition, in order to insure con- 
 densation and careful analysis. 
 
 5. Arrange every coordinate series of statements in order 
 
 ^ (Rochester, N. Y.: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., 1916.) 
 
 454 
 
RULES FOR LEGAL BRIEF DRAWING 455 
 
 of climaXy unless this violates time order in expository matter 
 or logical order in argumentative matter. 
 
 6. Indicate the relation between the headings and subhead- 
 ings by means of margins, and letters, numbers, or other 
 symbols. 
 
 7. Let no heading or subheading be marked with more 
 than one symbol. 
 
 8. Indicate accurately all references, citations, and sources 
 of information relied upon in the brief under the proper 
 heading or subheading. 
 
 Rules for Introduction 
 
 9. In the first part of the introduction give all the facts 
 and information necessary for an understanding of the case. 
 Distinguish the main issues by briefly stating admitted mat- 
 ter, excluding irrelevant matter, and contrasting the principal 
 contentions of the one side with those of the other; thus 
 showing the essential points to be established or overthrown. 
 
 10. At the end of the introduction make a terse statement 
 of the precise issues presented by the case which the court 
 must decide, and of the divisions and order in which they 
 will be taken up. 
 
 11. Let the introduction contain only statements, the 
 truth of which must be acknowledged by both sides for the 
 purposes of the argument. 
 
 Rules for Argument 
 
 12. Let the argument proper state the gist of all the reasons 
 and authorities relied upon in the case. 
 
 13. In the argument let each main heading read as an af- 
 firmation of or as a reason for one of the issues to be estab- 
 lished. 
 
 14. Let each subheading, or series of subheadings, read as 
 a reason for the truth of the heading above it. 
 
 15. Support the main propositions or arguments by enough 
 subordinate propositions to give the various reasons for the 
 
.456 APPENDIX D 
 
 main contentions, and in like manner support the subordinate 
 propositions, if there are further points to be made. 
 
 16. Cite cases and authorities under the specific subordi- 
 nate propositions which they sustain. 
 
 17. Use great care to make the propositions of the argu- 
 ment as concise, cogent, and pointed as possible. Avoid 
 gHttering generalities, platitudes, repetitions, and trite or 
 sweeping assertions, which carry no thought or conviction. 
 
 18. A careful analysis and a logical argument of a case on 
 principle, supported by two or three strong cases on the 
 essential points is the way to win. Beware of too many cases 
 or of any case which does not hit the nail on the head. The 
 court has only limited time and patience. 
 
 19. Objections to be refuted should be dealt with as they 
 arise. Hold your opponent strictly to the proof of his case. 
 
 20. In phrasing refutation the heading should state clearly 
 the argument to be answered. 
 
 Rule for Conclusion 
 
 21. The conclusion should contain a summary of the 
 essential points of the argument. 
 
 "Note: The skeleton brief here suggested is intended as the 
 mere iron framework or outline guide of a complete written 
 or oral argument. The training in the observance of these 
 rules will compel searching analysis, conciseness, thorough- 
 ness and a clear order and method of treatment which should 
 appeal at once to any court. The complete argument may 
 be readily built up upon this framework, with such attri- 
 butes of style, emphasis, elaboration, illustration, and per- 
 suasion as may be appropriate. 
 
 '*I am indebted for the substance of several of these rules 
 to a forthcoming work on Argumentation by my colleague. 
 Professor J. M. O'Neill. For illustrations of outline briefs 
 see also W. T. Foster, Argumentation and Debatingy Chap. 9, 
 and App. IV and V, pp. 359, 371." 
 
APPENDIX E. 1 
 
 MATERIAL FOR A SHORT BRIEF 
 
 A Neglected Industry 
 
 (From the Boston Transcript) 
 
 The value of the goat as a domestic animal and a beneficial 
 factor in the agricultural industry has at various times been 
 discussed in these columns. Our belief in that value has been 
 based on the habits of the animal and its natural adaptation 
 to the conditions to be found in our farming sections, espe- 
 cially in New England. According to our Washington 
 despatches, already published, a similar condition has been 
 borne in upon the minds of some of our federal authorities. 
 The bureau of statistics of the department of commerce and 
 labor shows that we have been importing goat skins from va- 
 rious countries during the past decade at the rate of fifty 
 millions a year. This shows the extent of the market for one 
 of the items in the goat's potential value. 
 
 But the department has also been impressed by consular 
 testimony with respect to the worth of the flesh as an addi- 
 tion to the meat supply of the country and suggests that for 
 such a purpose alone goat raising would be a profitable in- 
 dustry. We are somewhat inclined to doubt that, but the 
 main question does not depend upon proof of it. The meat 
 is certainly wholesome. We have scriptural authority and 
 precedent for that and doubtless it would be popular were its 
 use more common. But why not, suggests the bureau, keep 
 within our own country the twenty-five millions that we pay 
 for the skins alone .^^ Then there are the fleeces, for which 
 there is a steady and growing demand. To grow these at their 
 best no doubt requires care, as it does to produce almost 
 anything of good quality, but there is warrant for exercising 
 it in the fact that it pays. 
 
 467 
 
458 APPENDIX E 
 
 Thus in a direct inventory we find meat for the eater, 
 fleeces for raiment, and skins for shoes and other goods, with 
 possibly a side fine of very digestible milk for infants and 
 invalids. But that is only a part and perhaps not the most 
 important part of the case that can be made out in favor of 
 the more general use of these too much neglected animals. 
 The goat has been represented as having a fondness for tin 
 cans and old junk of various kinds as articles of diet. This 
 is giving him more credit or more criticism than he deserves. 
 While his appetite is healthy and his digestion excellent, he 
 is purely a vegetarian, though within that limitation he is 
 very thorough. There is hardly a New England farm of 
 average size on which a flock of goats could not be kept for 
 nothing during seven or eight months in the year. From the 
 time that the leaves appear on the trees and undergrowth 
 in the spring until they depart in the fall, the goat will take 
 care of himself if let alone. 
 
 It is for this reason that he is able to render a great service. 
 Not only does he live off the country but in doing so he en- 
 riches instead of impoverishes it He is a browser rather than 
 a grazer, preferring leaves to grass, and supports abounding 
 life on what the farmer not only does not need but does not 
 want. He forces back the constantly invading army of brush 
 and if the flock is large enough it will clean out growths about 
 the trees of the forest and improve conditions generally. 
 They are natural foresters, a fact that has been recognized 
 by those in charge of some of the western reserves, where 
 they have been kept to eat fire lanes for long distances. If 
 goats were stationed in suflScient numbers in the woodlands 
 of Massachusetts we should not suffer from forest fires to the 
 extent that has been our portion for some years past, because 
 they would leave little for the fire to feed upon. What other 
 servants can the farmer find that will work diligently through 
 the productive season to improve his land, protect his forests, 
 and keep themselves? 
 
APPENDIX E. 2 
 
 material for a long brief 
 
 Samuel W. McCall on Reciprocity with Canada 
 House of Representatives, Friday, April 21, 1911 
 
 (From the Congressional Record) 
 
 Mr. Chairman: In arising to close the debate in behalf of 
 those members upon this side of the House who believe in the 
 policy of the present bill, I desire to say that I think the 
 House is to be congratulated upon the illuminating discussion 
 to which it has had an opportunity to listen. The speeches 
 delivered upon both sides of the question and upon both sides 
 of the aisle have been worthy of the subject — a subject which, 
 as was said by the gentleman from Illinois yesterday, is one 
 of the most important ever before the American Congress. 
 The bill has important international aspects and features of 
 an economic character that call for the careful consideration 
 of every member. It does not make an appeal for the use of 
 the heroics of the hustings, but for the best thought each one 
 of us is capable of giving it. 
 
 I listened with great interest to the speech of the gentleman 
 from Maine [Mr. Hinds] — the first speech that he has had an 
 opportunity to deliver in this House, of which he has been 
 almost the directing agency for neariy twenty years. It was 
 a speech beautiful in structure, such a speech as is made out 
 of a full mind, and it was entirely worthy of the subject 
 which he discussed. I say that, although I profoundly dis- 
 believe in the conclusions which he maintained. I regretted 
 to notice, however, the pessimistic tone that the gentleman 
 adopted with reference to the American farmer. But it is not 
 strange that, having been in a position where for twer*-'' 
 
 469 
 
460 APPENDIX E 
 
 years he could not escape from listening to the debates, he 
 should have caught the minor key in which the praises of the 
 farmer are usually sung upon this floor. 
 
 According to his eulogists here, the American farmer is a 
 very serious minded individual, with his wife and numerous 
 progeny gathered about him — and I observe that these eulo- 
 gists usually bless him with a bountiful offspring — desperately 
 and with great solemnity endeavoring to cling to a precarious 
 existence. These orators lament over his rugged qualities, 
 they almost brood over his virtues, and as for his faults, he 
 has none, for he is a being to whom it is impossible to sin. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I have had some experience with the Amer- 
 ican farmer. I have seen him in his native lair. It was my 
 great good fortune to live for a number of years in my boy- 
 hood upon one of those glorious farms in northwestern Illinois 
 — a $200-an-acre farm, as the gentleman from Indiana called 
 it — one of those prairie farms, not the flat farms that you have 
 farther to the west, but where you have the billows of the 
 prairie tumbling about you. One of those farms which, when 
 they are under cultivation, present a scene of pastoral beauty 
 and of fertility such as can scarcely be found anywhere in the 
 world. I have seen farmers actually burn corn for fuel, as 
 has been so dramatically stated in this debate. Why, it has 
 been presented here, as if it showed the destitution of the 
 American farmer and his straitened circumstances that he 
 actually burned corn for fuel. I have seen him burn corn. 
 Sometimes he would overcrop with one grain and could not 
 sell it profitably, but he was pretty sure to get even on some 
 other grain; and instead of brooding over the burning of corn, 
 more probably the farmer would sit cheerily smoking his pipe 
 in the light of its blazing fire and his sons would rejoice that 
 they did not have to chop wood. 
 
 The American farmer is not the sad-eyed monstrosity, 
 always staring destiny in the face, that we have had painted 
 here. The farmers, as I knew them, were a prosperous, 
 independent, and happy race of men. I have known many 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 461 
 
 farmers, and I have known some men even on Wall Street, 
 and I have made up my mind that they both belong to the 
 same race, and that there is about as much human nature in 
 the one class as in the other. I have sometimes thought 
 that if the numbers were reversed and that if we had 5,000,000 
 voters on Wall Street and only a few hundred farmers, our 
 statesmen would sing the homely virtues of J. P. Morgan and 
 his crew and would bestow upon them some of these lugu- 
 brious eulogiums of which the American farmer has been so 
 long the patient victim. And their worst enemy could hardly 
 wish them a harder fate. 
 
 Now, it is argued against this bill — and I do not propose 
 to weary the House with a repetition of the statistics we 
 have heard — that just as the opening up of the Western 
 States depressed agriculture in New England so the open- 
 ing up of our markets to Canadian produce will have the 
 same effect upon the agriculture of the country, and es- 
 pecially upon the agriculture of the West. There is no sim- 
 ilarity whatever between the two cases. From 1870 to 
 1890, you will remember, we built railroads simply for the 
 sake of building railroads. We threw, sometimes in a single 
 year, many thousands of miles of railroad across the most fer- 
 tile land on the face of the globe, land that was uninhabited. 
 Railroads went in advance of civilization, and in order to get 
 business they sent their agents all over Europe stimulating 
 immigration; and it so happened that the financial and com- 
 mercial depression from 1873 to 1878 threw hundreds of 
 thousands of men out of employment in the East, and they 
 found places upon the western farms. We had brought under 
 cultivation, and their produce thrown upon our markets 
 almost, as it were, in a day, great and fertile states of this 
 Union, and in order to permit the farmers to live, the rail- 
 roads gave them unnaturally low rates to the markets of the 
 country and to those abroad. 
 
 It was said by Prof. Meyer that a bushel of wheat could 
 be carried more cheaply from Chicago to Liverpool than from 
 
462 APPENDIX E 
 
 Budapest to Prague, a distance in a straight line of only 175 
 miles. A man in Illinois could get into the markets of Boston 
 more cheaply than a man who lived in Worcester County in 
 Massachusetts. The result of this abnormally low rate was 
 practically to transport the prairies of the West into the sub- 
 urbs of New York and Boston. And, of course, agriculture 
 was depressed in New England, not merely from that cir- 
 cumstance, but because of the conditions there which were 
 adverse to agriculture as it was then conducted. 
 
 I saw agriculture not only in the West, but when I was a 
 young boy my father sent me to New England to school, and 
 I had an opportunity there to see how they farmed in New 
 England. In the West a farmer could turn a furrow for a 
 mile, if his farm went that far, without taking his hand from 
 the plow: but in New England the farmer would urge his 
 horses, and more often his oxen, for a few feet and then would 
 have to turn out for a stump or stone. He would try to select 
 smooth little patches upon the hillside. While a New Eng- 
 land hillside, with its alternation of little rye fields and corn- 
 fields and pasture and meadow and woodland, presents a very 
 beautiful mosaic to the eye, it certainly is not favorable to 
 agriculture. And it was inevitable that under the adverse 
 natural conditions and with the antiquated methods which 
 the New England farmers employed they could not compete 
 with the rich and fertile prairie lands of the West. 
 
 Now, how is it with Canada.^ Why, there is, as I have said, 
 no parallel between the two cases. Champlain laid the foun- 
 dations of Port Royal and Quebec before the Pilgrims landed 
 upon Plymouth Rock. That country is as old as this 
 country. 
 
 For one hundred and fifty years it has been a part of the 
 wealthiest empire in the world, and yet to-day it has less than 
 8,000,000 people, and instead of capitalists putting in their 
 money, thrusting railroads across the cold fields of Canada, 
 Canada has been compelled largely to build her railroads out 
 of her own treasury, and although she has given enormous 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 463 
 
 land grants and vast sums of money she to-day has only 
 about 25,000 miles of railroads in the whole Dominion. 
 
 Canada has not the slightest advantage over the West in 
 fertility or in aptitude for agriculture. The advantage is 
 all the other way. The part of Canada gentlemen fear is a 
 country of a single crop. A single crop will sack the soil. 
 The farms in the Canadian northwest are scarcely habitable 
 for a good many months in the year. Agriculture in our West 
 can be carried on under far better conditions than there. 
 
 The lands there are not so cheap as they were in the West 
 when it was settled. Rich prairie land sold in the United 
 States for $5 and less an acre. I happen to know a case where 
 a very intelligent business man of New England desired to 
 buy a half section of unbroken land for each of his two sons. 
 He bought it nearly two years ago, selecting it with great 
 judgment and care, and he was compelled to pay the Can- 
 adian Pacific Railroad Co. $25 an acre, and another young 
 man bought some land two weeks afterwards and it had 
 risen to $30 an acre; and that prairie land has since been going 
 up in price. These young gentlemen who started out to 
 build their fortunes found that they had to pay a very high 
 price for their horses, had to hire a man to look after their 
 farms in the winter, began with a drought and a poor crop, 
 and at the present time they still have their fortunes to 
 acquire. 
 
 But suppose our young men do go to Canada, and many 
 of them have already gone there. Why, the state of Iowa, 
 that wonderful agricultural state, during the last decade lost 
 in population. Does that mean that it declined in prosperity? 
 Not at all. It is one of the greatest, and is destined to con- 
 tinue to be one of the greatest, and richest agricultural regions 
 in the world. But young men have gone from Iowa because 
 they could get more land in Canada than at home. The land 
 of their own state was all taken up. Suppose they shall found 
 upon the eastern slopes of the Canadian Rockies a newer and 
 a fairer Iowa? Who is there who will not wish them God- 
 
464 APPENDIX E 
 
 speed? They go there to win their fortunes, just as theii 
 fathers made their fortunes, by seUing in the open markets of 
 the world; and if they deserve to prosper and if the country 
 is so favorable to agriculture, they will repeat the prosperity 
 of their fathers. 
 
 The gentleman from Maine [Mr. Hinds], in the course of 
 his speech, alluded to the agricultural conditions in Germany, 
 and to the fact that Bismarck established agricultural duties 
 there. I fancy that Bismarck did not establish agricultural 
 duties so much for the sake of agriculture as to placate the 
 powerful agrarian element and establish generally in Germany 
 the policy of protection. But they have had, ever since the 
 time of Bismarck, high protection upon agricultural products 
 in Germany. 
 
 Let us see what the effect has been. There is this singular 
 law, pointed out by Prof. Fawcett, of Cambridge University, 
 England, that while in a great many articles of common use 
 the demand does not increase the price, yet in the case of 
 agricultural products the demand does increase the price, 
 and he reached that conclusion upon a line of argument 
 something like this: 
 
 A man may be producing manufactures of cotton or flax 
 or some other article in which labor is the chief element of 
 production, and if there is a demand for twice as many goods 
 of the kind he makes, he doubles the size of his factory and 
 can manufacture even more cheaply than he could before. 
 But in a country like Germany, which normally supports its 
 population, when you come to increase that population under 
 the stimulus of protection, by building up great manufac- 
 turing cities and making a strain upon the resources of the 
 soil, there is a greater demand for agricultural produce than 
 the farmer normally has raised. Now, there are in every 
 country some lands that ordinarily are not cultivated be- 
 causes prices do not make it profitable to cultivate them. 
 They are called valueless, but when you raise the price of farm 
 products it pays to till the best of these lands, and the higher 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 466 
 
 the price the poorer the land it will pay to cultivate. There 
 is an "oscillating margin,** upon which you may or may not 
 be able profitably to raise farm produce, according as farm 
 produce is high or low. The man who cultivates must get 
 prices that will warrant him in doing so. These prices enable 
 the man who has fertile land to make still more money, and 
 the increased demand for agricultural produce drives people 
 into the cultivation of lands previously unprofitable, and in 
 order to induce them to do it they must of necessity be paid 
 a higher price for their produce. 
 
 Now, let us see what has happened in Germany, which 
 relatively to us has a very large population per square mile 
 and which, with a growing population, has had high protec- 
 tion in agriculture for a great many years. The growing 
 demand for foodstuffs has greatly increased prices. I no- 
 ticed the. other day an address made by the chancellor of 
 the German Empire, who is a rigid and uncompromising 
 protectionist. At a meeting of the National Society of Ag- 
 riculture he said: 
 
 I am especially grateful to the president — 
 
 That is, the president of that society — 
 
 for his frank admission that the prices of many farm products 
 have in the past year reached an unhealthy height, burdening 
 in a deplorable manner a great number of people. 
 
 That comes from the chancellor of the German Empire 
 with reference to this artificial increase in the price of food. 
 He declares that it burdens in a deplorable manner a great 
 number of people. 
 
 Let us look further at the situation in Germany. The 
 agrarian element there, who own the land, are a very power- 
 ful element. They not only enjoy high and unnatural prices 
 for the common articles of food, but they have great power 
 in directing the German Empire. As you all know the state 
 owns the railroads. At a certain time of the year the sugar- 
 
466 APPENDIX E 
 
 bearing lands along the Elbe make special demands for ag- 
 ricultural labor, and so it used to be the custom at that time 
 of the year for laborers living along the Oder to go and help 
 in the harvest of these sugar-bearing lands, where they would 
 get better wages, and then when the harvesting was over to 
 come back again. The German railroads gave them excursion 
 rates. Those agrarians who lived along the Oder made a 
 complaint to the German Government in effect that they 
 had a natural right to employ the labor of their locality, and 
 that for the Government to give these laborers excursion 
 rates made it necessary for the agrarians to pay higher wages 
 to their men; and although the minister of finance admitted 
 that it was a good thing for the German laborer, although it 
 gave him more money temporarily, although it enabled an 
 untraveled class to get away from home and to see another 
 part of the Empire and have their outlook broadened, yet the 
 Government yielded to the demand of the agrarian element 
 and refused longer to sell the excursion tickets. 
 
 The gentleman from Maine [Mr. Hinds] alluded to the 
 law called the Gregory King law, by which he showed that 
 as the supply of an article of common use increased at an 
 arithmetical ratio, the price decreased at practically a ge- 
 ometrical ratio. 
 
 That is, you increase the surplus of a necessary article and 
 you depress the price out of all proportion to the amount by 
 which you increase the surplus. It readily occurred to me 
 that there is a reverse to that law, and the other side is illus- 
 trated in the case of Germany. If you decrease below the 
 natural demand the supply of an article of common use in 
 an arithmetical ratio, you increase the price of that article 
 in practically a geometrical ratio. I think there is no escape 
 from that conclusion. 
 
 Then about the static equilibrium of which he spoke, in 
 nations between agriculture and manufactures. It is a very 
 good thing if you can secure the equilibrium naturally, but it 
 is a very bad thing to pay too much for it. Suppose there is a 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 467 
 
 nation that has coal mines, iron mines, water powers, great 
 facilities for manufacturing, and a poor soil. Is it wise for 
 her to take her people from the operation of the great natural 
 resources and facilities for manufacturing with which she 
 has been blessed and put them to the cultivation of an infertile 
 soil? Is it not better for them to work the mines, to build up 
 manufactures, and exchange their products with some other 
 nation that does not have these resources but has a fertile 
 soil? 
 
 Carry it out to extremes on this theory and every household 
 should maintain an equilibrium, and each should have its 
 own blacksmith, its own shoemaker, and its own spinner. 
 The law of modern trade is for men and nations to do the 
 things they are best fitted to do and to exchange products 
 with each other. 
 
 I paid close attention to the argument of the gentleman 
 from Maine, because I have a high respect for him and be- 
 cause I was greatly attracted by his speech. There is one 
 other thing to which I wish to call attention. He referred to 
 the British Tariff Commission, and quoted them as in favor, 
 practically, of reenacting the corn laws. That would strike 
 an ordinary man as an admission almost from the Cobden 
 Club itself in favor of the policy which the gentleman from 
 Maine was advocating. I thought from its name, as very 
 likely the gentleman from Maine thought, that it must be a 
 royal commission, or if not a royal commission it must be a 
 sort of government commission. I have looked it up, and in 
 HazelVs Annual, which tells you briefly everything about 
 the Empire, you will find the British Tariff Commission 
 tabulated with other similar organizations. On the one side 
 it frankly states the organizations against Mr. Chamberlain's 
 proposal, which was to tax food coming into England, and 
 there we have the Free Trade League and the Cobden Club 
 and others. In the other column they have catalogued the 
 organizations for Mr. Chamberlain's proposal, and among 
 them is the tariff commission, established by Joseph Cham- 
 
468 APPENDIX E 
 
 berlain in the beginning of 1904 in order to push along his 
 particular ideas. That is practically the protective-tariff 
 league of the British Empire, and if you read the names you 
 will find there a collection of gentlemen, some of them very 
 comfortable manufacturers, who are deeply concerned, as 
 are the manufacturers in this country, for the poor farmer. 
 
 I could construct a tariff commission like that here, and 
 it would be a commission of more eminent ability. I would 
 put the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cannon], my distin- 
 guished, and I may say my illustrious, friend at the head; 
 I would put the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Dalzell] 
 upon it; I would give a place upon it to the gentleman from 
 Michigan [Mr. Fordney] ; and then I would add to it the sec- 
 retary of the American Protective Tariff League and of the 
 Home Market Club of Massachusetts. And we should have 
 a fine collection of gentlemen, of great ability and great 
 knowledge; but if I wanted to hold forth anything they said 
 in favor of protection as an admission of an ancient enemy 
 to protection I think some of our narrow-minded partisans 
 on the other side would reserve the right to object. 
 
 This whole discussion has revolved about the price of 
 wheat. But first I wish to say a word about the price of 
 land. I do not think the effect of this legislation is going to 
 be to decrease the price of land, but to keep it from going 
 up too rapidly in value. So far as competition with Canada 
 is concerned, if North Dakota, which has a longer summer 
 and a shorter winter than Canada, can be a part of the same 
 agricultural domain and can compete with Kansas and 
 Iowa and Oklahoma and those wonderfully rich lands to- 
 ward the South, lands as fertile as those in Campania, where, 
 as Virgil said — 
 
 Summer borrows months beyond her own; 
 Twice the teeming flocks are fruitful, 
 Twice the laden orchards groan — 
 
 if North Dakota can compete with lands like those, what 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 469 
 
 has she to fear from the more frosty Alberta? What has 
 Mimiesota to fear from Manitoba when she can prosper 
 side by side with Iowa and Nebraska? 
 
 The debate has been chiefly about the farmer, and I 
 have wondered whether he was really so much agitated 
 over this bill as we have been led to believe. I have won- 
 dered, since in 1865 patriotism was the pretext which certain 
 great interests employed to terminate the Elgin treaty, 
 whether after all there was not something masked behind 
 the farmer here. People have been industriously sending 
 telegrams to members. Evidently there has been a great 
 campaign of education, and the suspicion that the farmer 
 was being put where he did not deserve to be has reminded 
 me of that old fort near Panama which was captured from the 
 Spaniards by Morgan and his buccaneers, and it is said the 
 way they captured it was to drive in advance of their charg- 
 ing columns the nuns and the sisters of charity. The 
 Spaniards did not wish to fire upon these good women and so 
 the buccaneers captured the fortress. I do not wish to say 
 that there have been any other gentlemen behind the Ameri- 
 can farmer, but I have had just a suspicion that there were 
 some interests behind him pushing him to the front to take 
 the brunt of the fire or to silence it. 
 
 But this whole question revolves about wheat, and it 
 seems to me that we can decide it upon wheat alone. I think 
 there is no doubt that in any country which exports a consid- 
 erable surplus of wheat the price is fixed in the market that 
 takes the surplus. We have been for many years one of the 
 great granaries of the world, selling in the open market, and 
 our wheat has sold on a parity and is selling to-day on a par- 
 ity, freights being adjusted, with the wheat of Argentina, 
 of Australia, of Canada, of India, and Russia. Although it 
 would seem hardly necessary to quote an authority upon so 
 clear a proposition, I have here Prof. Dondlinger's interesting 
 book on wheat. He has evidently written with great sym- 
 pathy for the farmer, and he lays down this proposition: 
 
470 APPENDIX E 
 
 As soon as a country has a surplus for export and receives 
 more for exported wheat than the home price, plus the ex- 
 porting, the export will increase, the home price will rise, 
 production will increase, and the price is no longer fixed 
 within the count^>^ The country which buys the export 
 may thus fix the price of wheat for the country which pro- 
 duces it. . . . It is as a consumer of the world surplus that 
 England has held a position of such commanding importance 
 in fixing the price of wheat. 
 
 Gentlemen present here some discrepancies in the price 
 of wheat upon one side of the line and the other. I can find 
 similar discrepancies between neighboring towns in South 
 Dakota. It depends upon elevator facilities, it depends upon 
 competition in buying, and you can find those differences in 
 towns in the same state. They are simply little backward 
 whirls and eddies, that you will find in the most rapid onrushing 
 stream. They are simply the exceptions that prove the rule. 
 
 The man in North Dakota does not compete with the 
 man across the line in Manitoba directly, but he competes 
 with him 4,000 miles away in the Liverpool market. We 
 have an exportable surplus of something like 100,000,000 
 bushels a year, and Canada has an exportable surplus of, 
 perhaps, half that amount, and those surpluses are both 
 taken by the Liverpool market. It makes no difference 
 whether the wheat is swept from Canadian or American 
 threshing floors, when it goes to Liverpool, according to its 
 quality, one kind brings the same price as the other. And 
 so we witness this spectacle on account of the high tariff 
 wall; we see these two broad, golden rivers of wheat flowing 
 in parallel lines upon either side of the boundary and seeking 
 the level of a common market. It seems to me quite beyond 
 our capacity to understand that any other law can operate 
 where we export such an enormous volume of this necessary 
 article, not controlled by a trust, than that the price is fixed 
 in the country which takes the surplus. 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 471 
 
 Let us take the reverse of that, and we have an illustra- 
 tion to prove the truth of this rule. Take sugar. We do not 
 produce as much sugar as we consume. We consume some 
 3,500,000 tons every year, and we need to import a great deal 
 from the outside world. Some years ago we had before this 
 House a proposition to give a preferential duty of 20 per cent 
 to Cuban sugar over other sugars. It was alleged here that 
 the Cubans, for whom we designed this arrangement, would 
 get no benefit at all, but that it would go to the Sugar Trust, 
 and what do we see? We see precisely the result that the 
 advocates of that reciprocity bill pointed out at that time. 
 
 The sugar market of the world is Hamburg. The price 
 of sugar in New York is the Hamburg price plus the freight 
 across the ocean plus the full duty into New York. And the 
 Cuban planters, providing they show reasonable intelligence 
 and do not glut the market at a given time, can reckon on 
 the Hamburg price with the freight and full duty added. 
 Since we have to make up our deficiency in the production 
 of sugar by large importations, our home price is the world's 
 — or Hamburg — price with the duty added, and there is a 
 parity in price between Hamburg and Cuba and Sumatra 
 when the differences in duties and freights are con- 
 sidered. 
 
 I read this morning in the New York Sun an article upon 
 sugar written, I believe, by Mr. Robinson, one of the most 
 accomplished economic writers upon the American press. 
 He took importations from Sumatra and from some other 
 countries and he carried out the prices into thousandths, and 
 then an importation from Cuba, which had a preferential 
 duty. When they were finally landed in New York they all 
 appeared at precisely the same price, each paying its freight 
 and particular duty. The price is adjusted, although I am 
 not quoting him as an authority upon that, with reference 
 to the Hamburg price. 
 
 What is going to happen to wheat if this bill passes? 
 Gentlemen say, if the effect is not to decrease the price of 
 
472 APPENDIX E 
 
 bread, why do we want to pass the bill, and if it is going 
 to decrease the price of bread, it will injure the American 
 farmer, and they repeat this very ancient tariff riddle. I 
 will tell you what I think will happen. We are going to 
 reach just the same condition in regard to wheat as we are 
 in to-day in regard to sugar. When we cease to raise as 
 much as we consume, and when we shall have to bring 
 wheat in from other nations for our own consumption, then 
 we shall see the law I have been talking about illustrated 
 from the reverse side. 
 
 Instead of our exporting at the world's price to Liver- 
 pool, paying our freight, we shall buy at the world's price 
 at Liverpool and pay in addition the freight and the cost of 
 overcoming any other obstacles in order to get into our own 
 market; and when you reach that point the tariff for the 
 first time— this tariff that has looked so magnificent upon 
 the statute books to the American farmer — will become 
 operative to increase the price of wheat above the world's 
 price. Now, is there any American farmer who would 
 desire to add to the price he is getting in Liverpool 25 cents 
 a bushel of tariff plus the freight rate from Liverpool .f* He 
 has prospered on wheat growing on the basis of prices in 
 the markets of the world. Do you imagine that when the 
 time of our scarcity comes and when we are not raising 
 as much as we consume that the American farmer will de- 
 sire to have this price artificially raised in order that he 
 may make more money? He certainly will make as much 
 then if the tariff is not on as he does now. 
 
 A great deal has been said about the Elgin treaty. It has 
 been argued that it was unfavorable to the United States. 
 Let me call your attention to this circumstance, that in 1850 
 the trade going both ways between Canada and the United 
 States only amounted to about $5,000,000 a year. This 
 treaty was put in force in 1855 and remained in force for 
 eleven years, and yet in that time it covered nearly a half 
 billion of trade between the two countries. Why, it practi- 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 473 
 
 cally created trade between Canada and the United States, 
 and Canada for a generation after we abrogated that treaty 
 stood in our antechambers asking that we make another 
 reciprocity arrangement with her. She continued to do so 
 for thirty years, until at last Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, "No 
 more pilgrimages to Washington." 
 
 Sir John Macdonald made it the fundamental policy of 
 his party to have reciprocity with the United States and, 
 at the same time, incidental protection. And when he came 
 into power, about 1880, for, I think, the second or third time, 
 he estabhshed the policy of protection for Canada and at- 
 tempted to secure a reciprocity treaty. That policy of pro- 
 tection had the effect of stimulating Canadian manufacture, 
 and in 1893 Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the present prime minister, 
 said that "If you give us Liberals power we will destroy 
 protection, which is a sham and a delusion and a robbery," 
 showing that there was complete reciprocity in political 
 rhetoric and that he had gotten that "free of all duty" from 
 the Democratic Party in the United States. 
 
 Sir Wilfrid Laurier three years afterwards was intrusted 
 with power. He is a sound and sagacious statesman, and I 
 wish to call the attention of my enthusiastic friends upon the 
 other side of the aisle to the fact that he has done nothing 
 whatever to reduce protective duties in Canada except sim- 
 ply to create the British preferential. And I trust that his 
 sound sense and moderation will be imitated by gentlemen 
 upon the other side if they ever have the responsibility of 
 dealing with the tremendous industries of the United States. 
 
 I think it is not necessary to say anything upon the most- 
 favored-nation aspect of this treaty. We heard a great deal 
 about it when the question was discussed in the last Congress, 
 and the fact that that objection has not been urged by gentle- 
 men in the present debate is pretty conclusive evidence that 
 there was no foundation whatever for their former conten- 
 tion. I think, also, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Rowland] 
 has finally disposed of the argument, or, rather, the objec- 
 
474 APPENDIX E 
 
 tion, that we should not have reciprocity in competitive 
 articles. ^ 
 
 I am rather surprised to find gentlemen representing 
 border states of the Union opposed to this treaty. A high- 
 tariff wall, however beneficial it may be to a country as a 
 whole, throws a very deep shadow. People can only trade 
 upon one side of the wall. They are shut out from their 
 neighbors upon the other side. If the men in North Da- 
 kota would look at this a little more broadly, they would 
 see that it would be far better for their state, for the farmers 
 there, to trade across the line and acquire farms across the 
 line and not be upon the outer rim of the country where the 
 circulation of the trade current is feeble, as is that of the blood 
 in the extremities of the body. I would suggest that they 
 should not want to continue to be the extremities of the body 
 politic, but that they might more profitably wish to annex 
 Canada industrially, so that they might trade and extend 
 their farms to the north as well as- to the south. 
 
 Now, it has been denied that the policy of reciprocity, 
 such as this bill presents, is a Republican policy. We have 
 had it shown in this debate that the administration of Pres- 
 ident Grant, who was a pretty good Republican and did 
 not come from New England, negotiated a reciprocity treaty 
 upon the lines of the Elgin treaty. We have seen that Gar- 
 field, afterwards President, was in favor of the Elgin treaty. 
 We had it asserted upon the authority of Mr. Curtis that Mr. 
 McKinley was in favor of the policy. Certainly the amend- 
 ment proposed by Mr. Blaine tended strongly to show that he 
 was in favor of the policy. 
 
 And now I want to quote from a veiy distinguished man, 
 a man who was governor of a leading state and who has 
 since succeeded a great statesman as the political leader 
 of his state. I refer to Albert B. Cummins, who was at the 
 time governor of Iowa. I am going to quote from a speech 
 of Gov. Cummins, made to the Boston Merchants' Associa- 
 tion on December 10, 1903. I will not read all of the extract. 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 475 
 
 because it is somewhat long, but I will read what he says in 
 conclusion: 
 
 Suppose we could to-night add Canada, from ocean to 
 ocean and from her southern line to the North Pole, to the 
 territory of the United States, so that when some cour- 
 ageous American explorer plants the banner of the Republic 
 upon the axis of the world and its beautiful folds fill with 
 the air of the North it will proclaim the eternal sovereignty 
 of the United States. . . . How many are there here or else- 
 where who would look upon this accession of power and popu- 
 lation upon land and lake and sea as a misfortune to our 
 country or a blow inflicted upon her prosperity? 
 
 I go further and eliminate national pride. How many 
 banks would fail on that account? How many factories 
 would close because the Stars and Stripes were flying over 
 this vast domain? What acre would be worth less? What 
 man would be without work or receive less compensa- 
 tion? . . . 
 
 Mark you, I am not dreaming of annexation, nor am I 
 advocating free trade with Canada, for the former is more 
 remote than ever before, and the latter is wholly imprac- 
 ticable. I have used the figure only to show that we can 
 safely draw nearer to our neighbor and safely enter upon 
 the negotiation of a reciprocal treaty." 
 
 I commend that to the attention of some of our agricultural 
 friends from the West. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, it appears frona some of the arguments 
 made in this House, and from some of the arguments that 
 are advanced in Canada, that this bill is to be mutually de- 
 structive to the agriculture of both countries, and that the 
 deplorable condition of the American farmer under it is only 
 to be equaled by the wretched squalor which the Canadian 
 farmer will have to face. As the gentleman from Minnesota 
 [Mr. Nye] so eloquently said yesterday, this bill presents a 
 great ethical question. It presents an enlightened policy. 
 
476 APPENDIX E 
 
 The President of the United States is simply asking this 
 country to obey the laws of nature, which no great nation 
 can violate with impunity. 
 
 Here these two countries lie side by side for over 3,700 
 miles. The lines of trade naturally run north and south, 
 and we are attempting to force them to run east and 
 west. 
 
 And it is the policy of justice. Remember that during 
 the last dozen years our balance of trade against Canada 
 has been nearly $1,000,000,000. She is buying of us this 
 very year more than $250,000,000 in value, and 70 per cent 
 of that trade goes there absolutely free of duty. Her av- 
 erage duty against the goods that we send her is only half as 
 much as the average duty that we impose against her; and 
 of this you may be certain, that after this bill shall pass the 
 average duty of the United States against Canada will still 
 be higher than the average of the duties levied by Canada 
 against the United States. 
 
 The President is recognizing the laws of nature. The 
 fact that that country buys from us nearly twice as much as 
 she does from all the other nations of the world shows most 
 powerfully how the ties of nature are drawing us commer- 
 cially together. It is not wise to try to float upstream. We 
 should permit the laws of nature to work without obstruc- 
 tion, and they will work, for the benefit of both countries. 
 The size of our planet is dwindling every year. The dis- 
 covery of all of the lands of the world, the wonderful inven- 
 tions of the last century, the railroad and the telephone 
 and the telegraph make this world to-day as small, compared 
 with the world of the time of Columbus, as one of Jupiter's 
 satellites is as compared with Jupiter. We are rapidly grow- 
 ing smaller, and here is this great neighbor of ours that is 
 industrially a part of the United States. I say it is wise for 
 us to recognize that fact and to pass this bill. It does not go 
 far enough, but it takes a long step in the right direction. 
 
 I regret that I have only three minutes more. It is argued 
 
MATERIAL FOR A LONG BRIEF 477 
 
 in effect by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Lenroot] 
 in his very able speech: 
 
 Add this farmer's free list to this bill. Load it to the gun- 
 wales with amendments and sink it if you can. 
 
 Consider for a moment the sort of a measure this bill 
 would become. Here is a proposition to carry out an in- 
 ternational agreement. The first section of the act saj^s 
 that flour shall be admitted at a certain rate of duty from 
 Canada when Canada shall admit flour at the same rate 
 coming from this country, and the same thing with regard 
 to meat and other articles. 
 
 The trade is carefully carried out in the first article. Then, 
 in the fourth article, with contemptuous levity we say that 
 all these things, coming from all the rest of the world, for 
 which Canadian statesmen have paid a consideration to get 
 a reduction of duty upon them, shall come into our markets 
 free of duty. Webster said, "Politics should cease at the 
 water's edge"; but this would be playing politics upon an 
 international scale. It would treat with levity the negotia- 
 tions between the Canadian commissioners and the President 
 of the United States. It would attest, at the same time, their 
 inability to make a bargain and the ability of the President 
 of the United States to drive a hard bargain, because, with- 
 out any consideration whatever, in a subsequent section, we 
 freely give better terms to the rest of the world. 
 
 Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may have just two or three 
 minutes more, the boundary line between these two countries 
 stretches, as I have said, for 3,700 miles. There is no modern 
 fort along that line. After the war of 1812, by the Rush- 
 Bagehot treaty, we agreed to have no further armaments 
 upon the Great Lakes, although two of the chief battles of 
 that war had been fought upon them. Great cities, with 
 billions of dollars of property, with fabulous wealth, have 
 grown up along that boundary. They are not defended by a 
 single gun, but there are no cities in all the world that are 
 more safe, because they are fortified and guarded by the good 
 
478 APPENDIX E 
 
 sense, the common interests, and the friendly sentiments of 
 two great nations. We have forts, it is true, and guns along 
 that line, but they are antiquated and the survivals of a time 
 long past. And we have made the dreams of the poets come 
 true for the boys wage mimic wars in the crumbling embra- 
 sures of the forts, the birds build their nests in the lips of the 
 cannon, and little children play upon them and clasp their 
 silent throats. We can just as safely dismantle the tariff 
 forts between the two countries. Canada is one with us in 
 sentiment. She is one with us in all the strongest ties that 
 can draw nations together; and I trust that this side of the 
 House will vie with that side of the House and support the 
 President of the United States in the enlightened and civil- 
 ized policy proposed by this bill. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abbott, L., 267 
 
 Accent, fallacy of, 174 
 
 Accident, fallacies of, 183 
 
 — , fallacy of converse, 187 
 
 — , fallacy of, simple, 186 
 
 — , fallacy of, specific, 184 
 
 Accuracy of statement of witness, 
 
 109 
 Actual issues, 46, 47 
 Adams, J. J., 302, 346, 348, 349 
 Adaptation to audience, 212, 252, 
 
 283 
 
 — to audience, in introduction, 314 
 
 — to circumstances, first negative, 
 398 
 
 Adjustment, negative case, 378 
 Admissibility of evidence, 85 
 Admissions, 106 
 Admitted issues, 48 
 
 — matter in brief, 229 
 Advantages of extempore method, 
 
 436 
 AflSrmative case and the issues, 376 
 
 — case in debate, 376 
 
 — defense, 35, 378 
 
 — , first, in debate, 394 
 
 Affirming the consequent, fallacy, 
 180 
 
 A fortiori argument, 159, 160 
 
 Agreement, method of, 124 
 
 Aids to unity and coherence in dis- 
 cussion, 329 
 
 Alden, R. M., 11, 309 
 
 Ambiguity in propositions, 28 
 
 Ambiguous middle, 177, 184 
 
 — use of termi, 182 
 
 Amphibology, fallacy of, 174 
 Amplify and diminish in conclusion. 
 
 337 
 Amplifying and diminishing, 416 
 Analogy, 162 
 
 — definition by, 303 
 
 — false, 167 
 
 — , figurative, 162 
 
 — , kinds of, 162 
 
 — , literal, 164 
 
 Analysis and exposition in rebuttal, 
 
 427 
 — , definition by, 307 
 Ancestors of argumentation, 11 
 Answering too little, 348 
 
 — too much, 346 
 
 — too much, three objections, 347 
 
 — yourself, 349 
 
 Answer whole case in rebuttal, 425 
 
 Antecedent, defined, 123 
 
 — , denying the, fallacy of, 180 
 
 — probability, 139 
 
 — probability, methods of attack 
 on, 142 
 
 A posteriori argument, 146 
 Appeal, emotional, kind of, 260 
 A priori argument, 140, 141 
 Arguing in a circle, fallacy, 190 
 Argumentation and logic, 9, 115 
 
 — and the forms of composition, 10 
 — , conviction and persuasion in, 3-7 
 
 — defined, 1 
 
 — , emotion in, 257 
 — , four processes in, 7 
 -^, relation to debate, 368 
 — f science or art, 10 
 — , sources of, 11 
 
 479 
 
INDEX 
 
 Argument by generalization, 155 
 — , defined, 83 
 
 — from analogy, 162 
 
 — from authority, 74, 99, 100 
 
 — from cause to effect, 139 
 
 — from effect to cause, 146 
 
 — from effect to effect, 149 
 
 — from example, 155 
 
 — from example, cause and effect 
 in, 168 
 
 — , from sign, 146 
 
 — in brief, 231 
 Arguments and evidence, 74 
 — , forms of, outline, 114-115 
 
 — from analogy, methods of at- 
 tack, 167 
 
 — , in logic, 115 
 
 — , kinds of, outline, 114-115 
 
 Argumentum ad hominem, 190 
 
 — ad ignorantiam, 193 
 
 — ad judicium, 193 
 
 — adpopulum, 190 
 
 — ad verecundiam, 193 
 Aristotle, 260, 334 
 Arnold, M., 327 
 Arrangement, 8 
 
 — , function of, 197 
 Asking questions in debate, 410 
 Assertion, form of proposition, 27 
 Assertions and support, 324 
 Assimilation, 77 
 
 Association of phenomena and gen- 
 eralization, 153 
 
 — of phenomena in the past, 152 
 
 — of phenomena, methods of at- 
 tack, 154 
 
 Assumption of unproved premise, 
 fallacy, 189 
 
 Assumptio non probata, 189 
 
 Attack on forms of arguments, ref- 
 utation, 356 
 
 Audience, adaptation to, 212, 252, 
 283 
 
 Audience, friendly, 292 
 
 — , hostile, 293 
 
 — , inattentive, introduction, 319 
 
 — , suggestions for persuasion, 283 
 
 — , well disposed, 339 
 
 Authority, argument from, 74, 99, 
 
 100 
 — , definition by, 300 
 — , test of, 112 
 
 B 
 
 Baker, G. P., 5, 94, 328 
 
 Baker and Huntington, 94, 264, 267, 
 
 271, 278, 296, 297, 350 
 Balance summary, 416 
 Baldwin, J. M., 259 
 Ballantine, H. W., 37, 211 
 Basic rule for all refutation, 353 
 Beach, W. A., in North case, 307 
 — , on military law, 301 
 Beecher, H. W., 283, 292, 293-296 
 Begging the question fallacy, 188 
 Belief and will, 258 
 Beliefs of debates, 374 
 Best, W. M., 82, 83, 88, 90, 91, 92, 
 
 93, 95, 105, 106 
 Black, F. S., in Molineux case, 143 
 
 — in ex parte Milligan, 312 
 
 — , on right to trial by jury, 63, 359 
 Blackstone's commentaries, 302 
 Block system of presentation, 439 
 Bode, B. H., 9, 15, 116, 135, 181 
 Bodkin, R. C, 177, 186, 300 
 Bradbury, H. B., 315 
 Brady, J. T., in case of Savannah 
 
 privateers, 306 
 Brevity, 273 
 Brief, admitted matter, 229 
 
 — and main speeches, 392 
 
 — and outline, 211 
 
 — and presentation, 250 
 
 — and simple propositions. 30 
 
INDEX 
 
 481 
 
 Brief, clash of opinion in, 229 
 
 — , climax in, 219 
 
 — , conclusion, 237 
 
 — , complete sample, 240 
 
 — , complete statements, 216 
 
 — t coordinate subheadings, 231 
 
 — , defined, 208 
 
 — , discussion, 231 
 
 — , divisions of, 214 
 
 — , documentation in, 221 
 
 — drawing and outlining, 208 
 
 — drawing, legal, 210 
 
 — drawing, rules, 213 
 
 — , headings and subheadings, 216 
 — , introduction, 222 
 
 — is impersonal, 209 
 
 — , issues and partition in, 224 
 
 — , main headings, 231 
 
 — , order in, 219 
 
 — , parallel column, 237 
 
 — , purposes of, 208 
 
 — , references in, 221 
 
 — , refutation in, 234, 235 
 
 — , relation of discussion to, 323 
 
 — , relations in, 219 
 
 — , single statements, 217 
 
 — , subheadings, 231 
 
 — , symbols in, 220 
 
 Brooks, P., 342 
 
 Brown, D. P., in Holmes case, 150 
 
 Buckley, J. M., 436, 438, 439, 440 
 
 Burden of proof, 33 
 
 — of proof and negative evidence, 
 95 
 
 — and issues, 51 
 
 — in law, 34 
 
 — in propositions, 29 
 — , summary, 38 
 
 — of rebuttal, 35 
 
 — of rebuttal, defined, 37 
 Burke, E., on conciliation with 
 
 America, 155, 320, 363 
 — , on duration of Parliaments, 336 
 
 Burke, on Irish Catholics, 160 
 — , on the Marriage act, 313 
 
 Calmness in introduction, 314 
 Campbell, G., 102 
 Card form for note, 72 
 
 — system, gathering material, 71 
 Case, aflSrmative in debate, 376 
 — , negative, four types, 377 
 Casual evidence, 93, 107 
 Categorical proposition, 176 
 
 — syllogism, 176 
 
 Cause adequate to produce effect, 
 143 
 
 — and effect connection complete, 
 149 
 
 — in argument from example, 168 
 
 — capable of being real cause, 148 
 — , defined, 123 
 
 — to effect, 139 
 
 Channing, W. E., in reply to Clay, 
 
 357-358 
 — , on slavery, 156 
 Characteristics of good propositions, 
 
 27 
 Charts in presentation, 443 
 Chatham, Lord, 437 
 Choate, R., in Dal ton case, 110 
 Cicero, 299, 348, 356 
 Circulus in probando, 90 
 Circumstantial evidence, 40, 88, 
 
 89 
 Clark and Blanchard, 286 
 Clash of opinion in issues, 43 
 • — of opinion in brief, 229 
 Classification of emotions, 263 
 
 — of fallacies, 171 
 Clearness in refutation, 353 
 Climax and comparison, 282 
 
 — in brief, 219 
 Coarseness in debate, 384 
 
482 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Coherence, 201 
 
 — and emphasis, 204 
 
 — in discussion, 328 
 — , summary of, 203 
 CoUins, J. C, 109 
 
 Combined memorizing and extempo- 
 raneous, 439, 440 
 Comparison and climax, 282 
 Complete sample brief, 240 
 — , statements in brief, 216 
 Complex issues, 45 
 
 — question fallacy, 194 
 Composition, fallacy, 183 
 
 — , principles of, in discussion, 322 
 Conclusion, 199, 334 
 — , amplify and diminish, 337 
 — , conviction in, 334 
 
 — in brief, 237 
 
 — in debate, 413 
 
 — , irrelevant fallacy, 190 
 
 — , persuasion in, 339 
 
 — r purpose of, 334 
 
 — , stirring emotions in, 341 
 
 — , summaries in, 334 
 
 — :, presumptions, 40 
 
 Concomitant variations, method of, 
 
 129 
 Concrete and specific, 280 
 
 — and specific propositions, 29 
 Confusion in refutation, 347 
 Connection, in coherence, 202 
 
 — , of cause and effect complete, 142 
 Conscious practice, 78 
 Consequent, affirming the, fallacy, 
 
 180 
 — , defined, 123 
 — , false, fallacy, 194 
 Contest debates, 369 
 
 — debates, decision, 53 
 
 — debates, preparation of, 376 
 Context, definition from, 303 
 Conversational mode in introduc- 
 tion, 314 
 
 Converse accident fallacy, 187 
 Conversion, fallacy of illogical, 173 
 Conviction and persuasion, 251 
 
 — and persuasion and the issues, 53 
 
 — and persuasion in argumenta- 
 tion, 3-7 
 
 — and persuasion in evidence, 81 
 
 — and persuasion in presentation, 
 250 
 
 Conviction in conclusion, 334 
 
 — , in introduction, 299 
 
 Convictions of debates, 374 
 
 Coordinate subheadings in brief, 231 
 
 Corwin, T., on General Crary, 385 
 
 Counter proposition, 36 
 
 — , proposition and issues, 51 
 
 — , proposition; negative case, 378 
 
 Courtesy in introduction, 314 
 
 Creighton, J. E., 9, 15, 116, 120, 135, 
 
 136, 137, 171, 173, 183, 193 
 Critic's note in contest debate, 372. 
 
 373 
 Curtis, G. W., 331 
 
 D 
 
 Dangers of extempore speaking, 437 
 Davis, W. H , 369 
 Debatable propositions, 30 
 Debate, affirmative case in, 376 
 
 — defined, 8, 367 
 — , discussion, 404 
 — , divisions, 393 
 — , ethics in, 403 
 
 — , first negative in, 395 
 
 — , introduction, 394 
 
 — J issues in, 402 
 
 — t main heads in, 404 
 
 — , memorized, 432 
 
 — , methods of presentation, 431 
 
 — , nature of, outline, 367 
 
 — , partition in, 403 
 
 — , personality in, 379 
 
 — f preparation for, 368 
 
INDEX 
 
 483 
 
 Debate, preparatory practice for, 393 
 
 — , presentation in, 430 
 
 — , questions in, 410 
 
 — , reading manuscript in, 431 
 
 — , relation to argumentation, 368 
 
 Debaters' beliefs, 374 
 
 — convictions, 374 
 
 — opinions, 374 
 
 Debate, sarcasm and ridicule, 385 
 
 Debates, contest, 369 
 
 — , decision in, 370 
 
 — , judging, 370, 371 
 
 — , preparation of contest, 376 
 
 — , purpose of, 370 
 
 — , self-control in, 384 
 
 — , sport or game, 373 
 
 — , types of decisions, 371 
 
 Decision in contest debate, 53 
 
 — in debates, 370 
 Declarations against interest, 106 
 Deduction, 117 
 
 Defense of present, negative case, 377 
 Definition by analogy, 303 
 
 — by analysis, 307 
 
 — by authority, 300 
 
 — by etymological derivation, 302 
 
 — by exclusion, 306 
 
 — by illustration, 305 
 
 — from context, 303 
 
 — in introduction, 300, 402 
 
 — of fallacies, 171 
 
 — of terms, 24 
 
 — , purposes q(, 300 
 
 — , summary of steps in, 26 
 
 Deliberate perversion of the truth, 
 
 110 
 Delivery impromptu, 435 
 — , manuscript, 431 
 — , memorized, 432 
 — , notes in, 441 
 — , outlines, 430 
 — , outline in, 442 
 Demosthenes, 342 
 
 Denney, Duncan, and McKinney, 
 343 
 
 Denying the antecedent, fallacy of, 
 180 
 
 Detract interest from theme m intro- 
 duction, 315 
 
 Difference, method of, 125 
 
 Digression, for emphasis, 326 
 
 Dilemma, 356, 357 
 
 — , more than two hours, 359 
 
 Direct evidence, 88 
 
 — or inverted order, 308 
 Discussion, the, outline, 322 
 — , unity in the, 200 
 
 — , coherence in, 328 
 — t emphasis in, 326 
 
 — in brief, 231 
 
 — in debate, 404 
 
 — , partitions in, 329, 331, 332 
 
 — , principle of composition in, 322 
 
 — , relations in, 325 
 
 — , relation to brief, 323 
 
 — , summaries and partition in, 409 
 
 — , summaries in, 329, 330, 332 
 
 — , transitions in, 329, 332 
 
 — , unity in, 328 
 
 — , variety in, 323 
 
 Disjunction, faulty, of dilemma, 360 
 
 — , imperfect fallacy, 181 
 
 Disjunction syllogism, 181 
 
 Disputable presumptions, 40 
 
 Distribution of terms, 183 
 
 — of term, defined, 133 
 Division exhaustive, in method of 
 
 residues, 361 
 — , fallacy of, 183 
 Divisions of brief, 214 
 
 — of the debate, 393 
 Documentation in notes, 72 
 — , in brief, 221 
 
 — of sources, 100 
 Double propositions, 27 
 Duty of going forward, 34, 35 
 
484 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Earnestness in persuasion, 266 
 Effect to cause, 146 
 
 — to cause, methods of attack on 
 arguments from, 148 
 
 — to cause not part of a 'priori ar- 
 gument, 141 
 
 — to effect, 149 
 
 — to effect diagram, 150 
 
 — to effect, methods of attack, 152 
 Eight suggestions for persuasion, 296 
 Elevation of primary elements, 202 
 Emotion appeal, kinds of, 260 
 
 — appeal, prejudice against, 256 
 
 — in argumentation, 257 
 Emotions, classification of, 263 
 
 — in conclusion, 341 
 Emphasis, 204 
 
 — and coherence, 204 
 — , digression, 326 
 
 — , iteration, 327 
 
 — , methods of, 205 
 
 — , methods of, in discussion, 326 
 
 Emphatic places, 205 
 
 English composition, 10 
 
 Enthymemes, 135 
 
 Equivocation, defined, 184 
 
 — , fallacies of, 182 
 
 Ethics in debate, 403 
 
 — , in rebuttal, 429 
 
 Etymological derivation, definition 
 
 by, 302 
 Evarts, W. M., in case of Savannah 
 
 Privateers, 338 
 Evidence, admissibility of, 85 
 
 — and arguments, 74 
 — , casual, 93, 107 
 
 — , circumstantial, 41, 88, 89 
 — , consistent with human nature 
 and experience, 101 
 
 — consistent with itself, 104 
 
 — consistent with known facts, 103 
 — , defined, 82 
 
 Evidence, direct, 88 
 
 — , exceptionally valuable kinds of, 
 
 106 
 — , expert, 96, 97 
 — , hearsay, 89, 91, 92 
 — , hearsay test, 105 
 
 — in brief, 231 
 — , indirect, 88, 89 
 
 — in general argumentation, 85 
 
 — in law, 83-85 
 
 — , kinds of, 88-101 
 
 — , nature of, 81 
 
 — , negative, 94, 95, 96, 107 
 
 — , opinion, 96, 97, 98 
 
 — f opinion test of, 112 
 
 — , ordinary, 96, 97 
 
 — f original, 89, 91 
 
 — , outline, 80-81 
 
 — , personal, 90, 92 
 
 — , persuasion and conviction in, 81 
 
 — , positive, 94 
 
 — J pre-appointed, 93 
 
 — f presumptive, 40, 41, 89 
 
 — , real, 90, 92, 107 
 
 — , relevancy of, 85 
 
 — , second hand, 91, 92 
 
 — , sources of, 86 
 
 — , tests of, 101-112 
 
 — , test of expert, 112 
 
 — , tests of sources of, 107 
 
 — , undesigned, 107 
 
 — , unoriginal, 91 
 
 — , unwritten, 90 
 
 — , written, 90 
 
 Exaggeration, thoughtless, 109 
 
 Example, argument from, 155 
 
 Excluding extraneous matter, 312 
 
 Exclusion, definition by, 306 
 
 Exhortation, 261 
 
 Experience, reference to, 278 
 
 Experiences, vivid, 279 
 
 Expert evidence, 96, 97 
 
 — testimony, 96, 97 
 
INDEX 
 
 485 
 
 Expert vote in debate, 373 
 — , witnesses, test of, 112 
 Explanation in introduction, 308 
 Exposition and analysis in rebuttal, 
 
 427 
 Extemporaneous presentation, 435 
 Extempore method, advantages of, 
 
 436 
 
 — rebuttal, 422 
 
 — speaking, dangers of, 437 
 Extraneous matter, 312 
 
 Facing the truth, persuasion, 289 
 "Fact" witnesses, tests of, 107 
 Fairness in persuasion, 272 
 
 — in rebuttal, 429 
 Fair specimens, 161 
 Fallacies, classification of, 171 
 — , definition, 171 
 
 — , formal, 176 
 — , hermeneutic, 171 
 — , logical, 171, 176 
 — , material, 182 
 
 — of equivocation, 182 
 
 — of presumption, 188 
 
 — , outline, 170-171 j 
 
 — , refutation, 356 \ 
 
 — , rhetorical, 171, 172 
 Fallacy, accent, 174 , 
 
 — , aflSrming the consequent, 180 
 — , amphibology, 174 
 — , arguing in a circle, 190 
 — , assumption of unproved prem- 
 ise, 189 
 — , begging the question, 188 
 — , complex question, 194 
 — , converse accident, 187 
 — , conversion, 173 
 — , denying the antecedent, 180 
 — , false cause, 194 
 — , false consequent, 194 
 — t four terms, 176 
 
 Fallacy, ignoring the question, 190 
 
 — , illicit major, 177 
 
 — , illicit minor, 178 
 
 — , imperfect disjunction, 181 
 
 — , irrelevant conclusion, 190, 
 
 — , negative premises, 178 
 
 — , obversion, 172 
 
 — of composition, 183 
 
 — division, 183 
 
 — , particular premises, 179 
 — , simple accident, 186 
 — , simple non sequitur, 194 
 — , undistributed middle, 177 
 False analogy, 167 
 
 — cause fallacy, 194 
 
 — consequent fallacy, 194 
 
 Field, D. D., in U. S. vs. Cniik- 
 
 shank, 310 
 Figurative analogy, 162 
 Finding the issues, 58-67 
 First aflSrmative in debate, 394 
 First negative, adaptation to circum- 
 stances, 398 
 
 — negative in debate, 395 
 Formal fallacies, 176 
 
 — ■ summaries, 335 
 Form of issues, 54 
 Forms of support, 324 
 Formulating the proposition, 20-21 
 Foster, W. T., 17, 18, 27, 265, 266, 
 
 268, 270, 272, 351, 356, 357, 361, 
 
 365 
 Four processes in argumentation, 7 
 
 — terms, fallacy, 176 
 
 — types of negative case, 377 
 Fox, C. J., on East India Bill, 320 
 Friendly audience, 292 
 Function of law of evidence, 84 
 
 — of the introduction, 298 
 
 — of witnesses, 87 
 Fundamental points in rebuttal, 426 
 Funny stories in introduction, 315- 
 
 316 
 
486 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Game or sport, debate, 373 
 Gardiner, J. H., 19, 335 
 Gathering material, 68-79 
 General illustration, form of support, 
 
 325 
 Generalization, 155 
 
 — and association of phenomena, 
 153 
 
 — from a single instance, 161, 166 
 — , illustrative and argumentative, 
 
 157 
 
 — implied, 153 
 
 — , methods of attack, 160 
 General refutation, 353 
 
 — to specific in reading, 75 
 Genung, J. F., 94, 159, 328 
 "Getting nearer to the truth," in 
 
 contest debates, 371 
 Gough, H. B., 56 
 G rattan, on Declaration of Irish 
 
 Right, 342 
 Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, 
 
 101, 103, 111, 151, 302, 305, 306, 
 
 307, 327, 339, 341, 359 
 Greenleaf, on evidence, 39, 82, 89, 
 
 92, 94, 95 
 
 H 
 
 Hale, E. E., 444 
 
 Hardwicke, H., 342 
 
 Hayne, R. Y., on Foote Resolution, 
 
 389, 398-402 
 Headings and subheadings, in brief, 
 
 216 
 Hearsay evidence, 89, 91, 92 
 — , evidence test of, 105 
 Henry, P., confiscation of British 
 
 Debts, 101 
 Hermeneutic fallacies, 171 
 Hibben, J. G., 120 
 Hill, A. S., 157, 270, 273, 278 
 Honesty in rebuttal, 429 
 
 Hostile audience, 293 
 — , introduction, 317 
 Hughes, on evidence, 89 
 Human nature and experience, evi. 
 dence consistent with, 101 
 
 — known for persuasion, 265 
 Huxley, T. H., on evolution, 362 
 Hypothetical propositions, 179 
 
 — syllogism, 179 
 
 Hyslop, J. H., 18, 116, 123, 171, 181, 
 182, 183, 184, 187, 188 
 
 I 
 
 Ignorantio elenchi, 190 
 
 Ignoring the question fallacy, 190 
 
 Illicit major fallacy, 177 
 
 — minor fallacy, 178 
 Illustration and argumentative ex- 
 amples of generalization, 157 
 
 Illustration, definition by, 305 
 Imperfect disjunction fallacy, 181 
 
 — induction, 121 
 Impersonal, brief, 209 
 Implied generalization, 153 
 Impromptu debating, 435 
 Inattentive audience, introduction, 
 
 319 
 Inconsistency in debate, 388 
 — , personal, in contest debate, 390 
 Indirect appeal, 286 
 
 — evidence, 88, 89 
 Induction, 117 
 
 — imperfect, 121 
 
 — kinds of, 120 
 
 — methods of, 123 
 
 — perfect, 121 
 Inference, essence of, 118 
 
 — object of in induction and deduc- 
 tion, 119 
 
 — process of in induction and de- 
 duction, 118 
 
 Inferences in quantitative relations, 
 134 
 
INDEX 
 
 487 
 
 Informal summaries, 336 
 Interesting propositions, 31 
 Interest, undue in case, 110 
 Internal summaries, 409 
 Interpretation, errors in, 171 
 Introducing refutation, 353 
 Introduction and unity, 199 
 
 — conversational mode, 314 
 
 — conviction in, 299 
 
 — debate, 394 
 
 — definition in, 300, 402 
 
 — detract from theme, 315 
 
 — explanation in, 308 
 
 — function of, 298 
 
 — hostile audiences, 317 
 
 — inattentive audience, 319 
 
 — issues and partition, 308 
 
 — stories in, 316 
 
 — strange audience, 317 
 
 — temper in, 318 
 
 — the, outline, 298 
 
 — to brief, 222 
 Invention, 7 
 
 — and selection, 68 
 
 — summarized, 66 
 Inverted or direct order, 308 
 Irrelevant conclusion fallacy, 190 
 Issue, complex, 45 
 
 — actual, 46, 47 
 
 — potential, 47, 48, 51 
 
 — single, 45 
 
 — stock, 56 
 
 — and winning and losing, 53 
 Issues defined, 43 
 
 — emphasized, 312 
 — , finding the, 58 
 — , form of, 54 
 
 — in debate, 402 
 
 — in general discussion, 44 
 
 — in introduction, 308 
 
 — in law, 43 
 
 — , necessity of knowing, 49 
 — , number of, 54 
 
 Issues, primary, 45, 46, 47 
 — , subordinate, 45, 46, 47 
 — , summary of method of finding, 
 
 66 
 — , terminology, 45 
 — , theory of, 43 
 — , two or more, parallel partition, 
 
 311 
 
 — the, outline, 42 
 
 — admitted, 48 
 
 — , and aflSrmative and negative, 51 
 
 — and burden of proof, 51 
 
 — and conviction and persuasion, 53 
 
 — and counter proposition, 51 
 
 — and partition in brief, 224 
 
 — and proposition, 50 
 Iteration, emphasis, 327 
 
 James, W., 254, 291 
 
 Jevons, W. S., 9, 10, 15, 116, 131, 
 
 133, 174, 176, 178, 179, 184 
 Joint method, 126 
 Judging debate, 53, 370, 371 
 
 — expert judge, 373 
 
 — the critic's vote, 373 
 
 — the juryman's vote, 372 
 
 — the legislator's vote, 372 
 
 — three types of decisions, 371 
 Judgment, defined, 15 
 Juryman's vote, 371, 372 
 
 K 
 
 Ketcham, V. A., 27 
 Kinds of arguments, outline, 114- 
 115 
 
 — in rhetoric, 138 
 
 — emotional appeal, 260 
 
 — evidence, 88-101 
 
 — induction, 120 
 
 — summaries, 335 
 
488 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Know other side in rebuttal, 423 
 Known effect due to other cause, 148 
 — facts, evidence consistent with, 
 103 
 
 Lamb, C, Popular Fallacies, 158 
 
 Lamont, H., 280 
 
 Law, brief drawing in, 210 
 
 — of evidence, 83-85 
 
 — function of, 84 
 
 — source of argumentation, 11 
 Legal brief drawing, 210 
 Legislator's vote, 371, 372 
 Lincoln, A., at Cooper Union, 364 
 Lincoln-Douglas debates, 351, 360, 
 
 380, 381, 389, 396, 403, 405, 407, 
 
 411, 417 
 Lists of propositions, 32 
 Literal analogy, 164 
 Logic and argumentation, 9, 115 
 
 — defined, 9 
 
 — science or art, 9-10 
 
 — source of argumentation, 11 
 Logical fallacies, 171, 176 
 
 of time in refutation, 347 
 
 M 
 
 Mcintosh, Sir J., in Peltier case, 267 
 Macaulay, T. B., 357 
 Main headings in brief, 231 
 
 — heads in debate, 404 
 
 — points, 43 
 
 — speeches and brief, 392 
 
 — speeches, outline, 392 
 Major premise, defined, 132 
 
 — term, defined, 132 
 Marshall, J., in McCuUoch vs. Mary- 
 land, 156 
 
 Material fallacies, 182 
 
 — gathering, 68-79 
 Matthews, B., 267 
 
 Maxcy, C. L., 210, 211, 232 
 Memorized delivery, 432 
 
 — rebuttal, 423 
 
 — speeches, place for, 433 
 
 — in debate, 376 
 Memorizing in debate, 432 
 Memory of witness, 108 
 Merits of the question, 53 
 Method, joint, 126 
 
 — in gathering material, 70 
 
 — in rebuttal, 429 
 
 — of agreement, 124 
 
 — of concomitant variations, 128 
 
 — of difference, 125 
 
 — of residues, 128, 361 
 
 Methods of attack on antecedent 
 probability, 142 
 
 — of attack arguments from anal- 
 ogy, 167 
 
 — association of phenomena, 154 
 
 — of attack on arguments from 
 effect to cause, 148 
 
 — of attack on effect to effect ar- 
 gument, 152 
 
 — of attack on generalization, 160 
 
 — of emphasis, 205 
 
 — of emphasis in discussion, 326 
 
 — of induction, 123 
 
 — of presentation in debate, 431 
 
 — of presenting definitions, 300 
 
 — of refutation, 355 
 Middle, ambiguous, 177, 184 
 — , undistributed, 177 
 
 — term, defined, 132 
 Mill, J. S., 185, 191 
 Minor premise defined, 132 
 
 — term, defined, 132 
 Minto, on analogy, 164 
 Modesty in persuasion, 268 
 Monotony, 281 
 
 — of form in extempore speaking, 
 438 
 
 Morally qualified witness, 110 
 
INDEX 
 
 489 
 
 Mutual dependence of induction and 
 deduction, 120 
 
 N 
 
 Natural presumptions, 41 
 Nature of evidence, 81 
 
 — of persuasion, 253 
 
 — of refutation, 344 
 Negative case, adjustment, 378 
 
 — case, counter proposition, 378 
 
 — case, defense of present, 377 
 
 — case, four types, 377 
 
 — case, pure refutation, 377 
 
 — evidence, 94, 95, 96, 107 
 
 — persuasion, 260 
 
 — premises fallacy, 178 
 
 — propositions, 29 
 
 — testimony, 94 
 
 New arguments in rebuttal, 414 
 Newcomer, A. G., 281 
 New constructive points in rebuttal, 
 421 
 
 — English dictionary, 5 
 Newman, J. H., 83, 172, 278 
 Newspaper reading, 75 
 
 Non sequitur, 194 
 
 North, J. H., in Rex vs. Forbes, 102 
 Note book system gathering mate- 
 rial, 71 
 
 — taking system, gathering ma- 
 terial, 70 
 
 Notes, use of in presentation, 441 
 Number of issues, 54 
 
 Object of inference in induction and 
 
 deduction, 119 
 Obversion, fallacy of illogical, 172 
 O'Grady, H., 276, 277 
 Opening speech in debate, 394 
 — speech, negative, 395 
 Operation of other causes, 144 
 
 Opinion, clash of in brief, 229 
 
 — evidence, 96, 97, 98 
 
 — evidence, test of, 112 
 Opinions, as evidence, 74 
 
 — of debaters, 374 
 Opportunity for getting the truth, 
 
 111 
 Oral presentation in debate, 430 
 
 — style, 11 
 
 Oratory, source of argumentation, 11 
 Order, direct or inverted, 308 
 
 — in coherence, 201 
 
 — of headings in brief, 219 
 Ordinary evidence, 96, 97 
 Original evidence, 89, 91 
 Outline from brief, 211-212 
 
 — use of presentation, 441, 442 
 
 Parallel column brief, 237 
 Particular premises, fallacy, 179 
 Partition and issues, 54 
 
 — and issues in brief, 224 
 
 — and subordinate issues, 47 
 
 — in debate, 403 
 
 — in introduction, 308 
 — , parallel to issues, 311 
 
 — and summaries in discussion, 409 
 
 — in discussions, 329, 331, 322 
 Patee, G. K., 19, 299 
 
 Peel, Sir R., on disabilities of the 
 
 Jews, 416 
 Pelsma, J. R., 56 
 Perfect induction, 121 
 Personal attitude in debate, 379 
 
 — evidence, 90, 92 
 
 — inconsistency, 388 
 
 — tone in debate, 379 
 Personality, 78, 266 
 
 — in debate, 379 
 Persuasion and conviction, 251 
 
 — and conviction, and the issues, 53 
 
490 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Persuasion and conviction in argu- 
 mentation, 3-7 
 
 — and conviction in evidence, 81 
 
 — and conviction in presentation, 
 250 
 
 — , defined, 253 
 
 — , eight suggestions for, 296 
 
 — in argumentation, 254 
 
 — in conclusion, 339 
 
 — in the introduction, 313 
 — , nature of, 253 
 
 — , negative and positive, 260 
 — , outline, 249-250 
 — , practical suggestions for, 264 
 — , suggestions in regard to the 
 
 speaker, 265 
 — , the subject, 272 
 Persuasive summaries, 336 
 Petitio principii, 188 
 Petti t. Senator, on Fugitive Slave 
 
 Law, 383 
 Phelps, A., 277 
 Phenomenon, defined, 124 
 Phillips, A. E., 278, 324 
 Phillips, W., on Daniel O'Connell, 
 
 336 
 Pillsbury, W. B., 258 
 Pinckney, W., in Hodges case, 305 
 — , in Maryland Assembly, 317 
 Pitt, W., 436 
 Plan to follow in gathering material, 
 
 75 
 Platform hints, 443 
 Plunkett, W. C, in Rex vs. Forbes, 
 
 326 
 Position of refutation, 352 
 Positive evidence, 40, 94 
 
 — persuasion, 260 
 
 Post hoc, ergo propter hoc, 194 
 
 Potential issue, 47, 48, 51 
 
 Practical suggestions for persuasion, 
 
 264 
 Practice and assimilation, 78 
 
 Practice, debates, 376, 393 
 
 — in debate, 443 
 Pre-appointed evidence, 93 
 Prejudice against emotional appeal, 
 
 256 
 Prejudiced propositions, 28 
 
 — witnesses, 87 
 Preliminary reading, 63 
 Preparation, advance of rebuttal, 
 
 422 
 
 — of contest debates, 376 
 
 — of rebuttal, 421 
 
 — for debate, 368 
 
 — for debate, writing as, 434 
 Preparatory practice in debate, 393 
 Presentation, 8 
 
 — and the brief, 250 
 — , charts in, 443 
 
 — , conviction and jjersuasion in, 
 
 250 
 — , extemporaneous, 435 
 — , impromptu, 435 
 
 — in debate, 430 
 — , notes in, 441 
 
 — , specific suggestions for, 441 
 — , use of outline in, 441, 442 
 Presumption, fallacies of, 188 
 
 — in propositions, 29 
 Presumptions, artificial, 41 
 — , conclusive, 40 
 
 — , disputable, 40 
 — , legal, 41 
 — , natural, 41 
 
 — of fact, 40 
 
 — of law, 39, 40 
 Presumptive evidence, 40, 41, 89 
 Prima facie case, 34, 35, 37, 39 
 
 — facie case, defined, 35 
 Primary elements, elevation of, 202 
 
 — issues, 45, 46, 47 
 
 Principles of composition in the 
 
 discussion, 322 
 Probability, antecedent, 139 
 
INDEX 
 
 491 
 
 Process of inference in induction and 
 
 deduction, 118 
 Proof, defined, 82 
 — , positive and refutation, 352 
 Proposition and issues, 50 
 — , assertion, 27 
 — , categorical, 176 
 — , counter, and issues, 51 
 — , defined, 15 
 — , disjunctive, 181 
 —.double, 27 
 — , formulating the, 20-21 
 — , in a club, 16 
 — , in court of law, 16 
 — , in deliberative assembly, 17 
 — , in public discussions, 17 
 Propositions, advantage of, to 
 
 bearer and speaker, 18 
 — , ambiguity in, 28 
 — , as subjects of argumentation, 14 
 
 — brief and simple, 30 
 — , burden of proof, 29 
 
 — , characteristics of good, 27 
 
 — , classifications of, 18 
 
 — , concrete and specific, 29 
 
 — , debatable, 30 
 
 — , hypothetical, 179 
 
 — , interesting, 31 
 
 — , list of, 32 
 
 — , necessity, 16 
 
 — , negative, 29 
 
 — not always expressed, 18 
 
 — of fact, 19 
 
 — of policy, 19 
 — , prejudiced, 28 
 
 — , presumptions in, 29 
 
 — , single, 27 
 
 — , simple and brief, 30 
 
 — , simple and concrete, 29 
 
 — , testing the, 23 
 
 — , two at once, 36 
 
 — , two-sided, 30 
 
 — , unambiguous, 28 
 
 Propositions, unprejudiced, 28 
 Pure refutation, negative case, 377 
 Purposes of brief, 208 
 
 — of conclusion, 334 
 
 — of debating, 370 
 
 Q 
 
 Quality, fallacies of equivocation, 
 183 
 
 — , of evidence, test of, 101 
 
 Quantitative relations, inferences in, 
 134 
 
 Quantity, fallacies in equivocation, 
 183 
 
 Quarterly Journal of Public Speak- 
 ing, 369 
 
 Question, begging the, fallacy, 188 
 
 — , complex, fallacy, 194 
 
 — , ignoring the, fallacy, 190 
 
 — , real, 21-22 
 
 — , rhetorical, 328 
 
 Questions in debate, 410 
 
 — , for definite answers, 410 
 
 — , to force dilemma, 411 
 
 — , to waste time, 411 
 
 Quinctilian, 349 
 
 Quotations and statistics in de- 
 livery, 442, 443 
 
 Reading manuscript, in debate, 431 
 
 — , newspaper, 75 
 
 — , preliminary, 69 
 
 Real evidence, 90, 92, 107 
 
 " Real life " debates, 369 
 
 — , question, 21-22 
 
 Reason and emotion, in argumentar 
 
 tion, 3 
 — , Newman's definition of ,82 
 Reasoning, form of support, 325 
 — , refutation, 350 
 — , science of, 9 
 — , syllogistic, 136 
 
492 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Rebuttal and refutation, 420-421 
 
 — , answer whole case, 425 
 
 — , eflfect of time limit, 425 
 
 — , ethics in, 429 
 
 — , explained, 420 
 
 — , exposition and analysis in, 427 
 
 — , extempore, 422 
 
 — , fairness in, 429 
 
 — , fundamental points in, 426 
 
 — in law, 420 
 
 — , know other side, 423 
 
 — , memorized, 423 
 
 — , method in, 429 
 
 — , new arguments in, 414 
 
 — , new points in, 421 
 
 — , outline, 420 
 
 — , preparation of, 421 
 
 — , prepared in advance, 422 
 
 — , strategy in, 421 
 
 — , surprises in, 424 
 
 — , vital points in, 426 
 
 Redfield, H. S., 210 
 
 Reductio ad absurdum, 356 
 
 Reference to experience, 278 
 
 References in brief, 221 
 
 — in material used, 72 
 Refutation and positive proof, 352 
 
 — and rebuttal, 420-421 
 — , answering too little, 348 
 — , answering too much, 346 
 — , answering yourself, 349 
 
 — , attack on forms of arguments, 
 
 356 
 — , basic rule for all, 353 
 — , clearness in, 353 
 — , confusion in, 347 
 — , fallacies, 356 
 — , general, 353 
 
 — in brief, 234, 235 
 — , introducing, 353 
 — , loss of time, 347 
 — , methods of, 355 
 — , nature of, 344 
 
 References, outline of, 344 
 
 — , position of, 352 
 
 — , pure, negative case, 377 
 
 — , reasoning, 350 
 
 — , research, 350 
 
 — , rhetoric, 351 
 
 — , rhetorical devices, 356 
 
 — , special, 353 
 
 — , statement of, 353 
 
 — , strategy in, 414 
 
 — , straw men, 349 
 
 — , tests of evidence, 356 
 
 — , three requirements of, 350 
 
 — , turning the tables, 363 
 
 Refute, what to, 345 
 
 Reid, on analogy, 165 
 
 Relation of discussion to brief, 323 
 
 Relations in brief, 219 
 
 • — in discussion, 325 
 
 Relevancy of evidence, 85 
 
 *' Repairs" case, negative, 378 
 
 Repetition, in discussion, 407 
 
 — , in extempore speaking, 437 
 
 Requirements, three, of refutation, 
 
 350 
 Research, refutation, 350 
 Reserve force, 269 
 Residues, method of refutation, 
 
 356, 361 
 — , division exhaustive, 361 
 — , method of, induction, 128 
 Responsibility, persuasion, 289 
 Restatement, form of support, 325 
 Rhetorical devices, refutation, 356 
 
 — fallacies, 171, 172 
 
 — principles, special importance, 
 in argument, 206 
 
 — principles, three great, 198 
 
 — question, 328 
 
 Rhetoric, kinds of arguments in, 138 
 
 — reasoning, 351 
 
 — source of argumentation, 11 
 Ridicule in debate, 385 
 
INDEX 
 
 493 
 
 Ringwalt, R. C, 328, 337 
 
 Risk of the proposition, 34 
 
 Robinson, F. B., 237, 269, 299 
 
 — , L., 158 
 
 — , W. C, 45, 263 
 
 Rule, basic for all refutation, 353 
 
 Rules for brief drawing, 213 
 
 — of the syllogism, 131 
 
 Sample brief, complete, 240 
 Sarcasm in debate, 385 
 
 — in refutation, 348 
 Schurz, C, 328 
 
 Science or art, argumentation, 10 
 Secondary elements, subordination 
 
 of, 201 
 Second-hand evidence, 91, 92 
 Selection, 7, 69 
 Self-control in debate, 384 
 
 — in persuasion, 269 
 
 Seward, W., in Freeman case, 147, 
 
 304 
 Shifting on the burden of proof, 35, 37 
 Sidgwick, A., 116, 138, 139, 142 
 Sign, argument from, 146 
 
 — kinds of argument from, 146 
 Simple non sequitur fallacy, 194 
 
 — and brief propositions, 30 
 
 — accident, fallacies, 186 
 Simplicity, in persuasion, 275 
 Sincerity, in persuasion, 266 
 Single, characteristic of good propo- 
 sition, 27 
 
 Single issues, 45 
 
 — issue, 45 
 
 — statements in brief, 217 
 Skill of debaters, 53 
 Sorites, 133 
 
 Sources, documentation of, 100 
 
 — of argumentation, 11 
 
 — of evidence, 86 
 
 — of material, 75 
 
 Special refutation, 353 
 Specific accident, fallacy of, 184 
 
 — and concrete propositions, 29 
 
 — and concrete terms, 280 
 
 — instance, form of support, 325 
 Specimens, enough observed, 161 
 
 — fair in respect of point in issue, 
 161 
 
 Speech style, 11 
 Spencer, H., 273 
 Sport or game, debate, 373 
 Standard dictionary, 5 
 "Stand pat" case, 378 
 Statement, defined, 15 
 
 — of refutation, 353 
 
 Statistics and quotations, in de- 
 livery, 442-443 
 Stephen on Pleading, 20 
 Stephens. Sir J. F., 158, 190 
 Stirring emotions, in conclusion, 341 
 Stock issues, 56 
 
 Stories in the introduction, 315-316 
 Strange audience, introduction, 317 
 Strategy in conclusion, 414 
 
 — in rebuttal, 421 
 Straw men, 349 
 Style, oral, 11 
 Subheadings, in brief, 231 
 Subject-matter, handling, for per- 
 suasion, 273 
 
 Subject, persuasion suggestions, 272 
 Subjects, for argumentation, 14 
 Subordinate issues, 45, 46, 47 
 Subordination of secondary ele- 
 ments, 201 
 Substitute argument, from cause to 
 
 effect, 144 
 Suggestions, eight, for persuasion, 
 296 
 
 — for persuasion, in regard to au- 
 dience, 283 
 
 — for persuasion, in regard to sub- 
 ject, 272 
 
494 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Suggestions for presentation, 441 
 — , practical, for persuasion, 264 
 Summaries and partitions, in dis- 
 cussion, 409 
 — , formal, 335 
 
 — in conclusion, 334, 415 
 
 — in discussion, 329, 330, 332 
 — , informal, 336 
 
 — , internal, 409 
 — , kinds of, 335 
 — , persuasive, 336 
 Summary, balanced, 416 
 
 — of arguments, from example, 166 
 
 — of coherence, 203 
 
 Sumner, C, on Crime against 
 
 Kansas, 404, 407 
 Support, forms of, 324 
 Surprises, in rebuttal, 424 
 Syllogism, categorical, 176 
 
 — defined, 131 
 
 — disjunctive, 181 
 
 — hypothetical, 179 
 
 — rules of, 131 
 
 — weakness of in general argumen- 
 tation, 137 
 
 Syllogistic reasoning, 136 
 Symbols, in brief, 220 
 
 Tests of ordinary witnesses, 107 
 
 — of quality of evidence, 101 
 
 — of sources of evidence, 107 
 Thayer, J. B., 33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 83, 
 
 84, 90, 91, 97, 99 
 Theory of issues, 43 
 Thoughtless exaggeration, 109 
 Three fundamental requirements of 
 
 refutation, 350 
 
 — objections to answering too 
 much, 347 
 
 Time limit, effect of, in rebuttal, 425 
 Transitions in discussion, 329, 332 
 Turning the tables, 356, 363 
 Two propositions at once, 36 
 Two-sided propositions, 30 
 Types of negative c^se, 377 
 
 Unambiguous propositions, 28 
 Undesigned evidence, 107 
 Undistributed middle, fallacy, 177 
 Undue interest in case, 110 
 Unity in composition, 198 
 — in discussion, 328 
 Unoriginal evidence, 91 
 Unprejudiced propositions, 28 
 Unwritten evidence, 90 
 
 Tact, 284 
 
 — and talent, 285 
 Temper, in debate, 384 
 
 — in introduction, 318 
 Term, defined, 15 
 Terminology, in issues, 45 
 Testimony, expert, 96, 97 
 
 — form of support, 325 
 
 — negative, 94 
 
 — of silence, 94 
 Testing the proposition, 23 
 Tests of evidence, 101-112 
 
 — of evidence, refutation, 356 
 
 — of expert witnesses, 112 
 
 Variations, method of concomitant, 
 
 129 
 Variety, in persuasion, 281 
 — , in discussion, 323 
 Vital points, in rebuttal, 426 
 Vividness, in persuasion, 278 
 Vivid experiences, 279 
 
 W 
 
 Ward, J.> 50, 189, 330, 348 
 Weakness of syllogism, in general 
 " argumentation, 137 
 
INDEX 
 
 495 
 
 Webster, D., 350 
 
 — , in Dartmouth College case, 270 
 
 — , in Gibbons vs. Ogden, 332 
 
 — , in Girard Will case, 364 
 
 — , in Luther vs. Borden, 59, 331 
 
 — , in Ogden vs. Saunders, 190, 303, 
 
 328, 335, 354 
 — , in Prov. R. R. vs. Boston, 360 
 — , in Reply to Calhoun, 318, 354 
 — ^,in Reply to Hayne, 318, 422, 
 
 423, 427 
 
 — in White Murder case, 62, 93, 
 104, 108, 140, 191 
 
 — on eloquence, 265 
 
 Well disposed, audience toward 
 
 speaker, 339 
 Whately, R., 4, 155, 162, 186, 261, 
 ■ 282, 283, 286, 289 
 What plan to follow in gathering 
 
 material, 75 
 
 — to look for in gathering material, 
 73 
 
 — to refute, 345 
 
 Where to look in gathering material, 
 
 75 
 Wilkinson, E. C, in Prentiss case, 
 
 339 
 Will and belief, 258 
 Williston, S.. 20 
 
 Wilson, J., in Pennsylvania conven- 
 tion, 358 
 Wilson, W., 259 
 Winans, J., 9, 46, 254, 256, 257, 264, 
 
 273, 289, 315 
 Winning and losing, and the issues, 
 
 53 
 Wirt, William, in Gibbons vs. Ogden, 
 
 61 
 Witness, accuracy of statement of, 
 
 109 
 — , expert, 96, 97 
 — , expert, test of, 112 
 Witness, memory of, 108 
 — , mentally qualified, 108 
 — , morally qualified, 110 
 — , opportunity for getting the truth, 
 
 111 
 — , ordinary, 96 
 
 Witnesses, "fact," tests of, 107 
 — , function, 87 
 — , ordinary, tests of, 107 
 — , physically qualified, 107 
 — , prejudiced, 87 
 Writing as preparation for debate, 
 
 434 
 — speeches for debate, 393 
 Written evidence, 90 
 
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