THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A RESEARCH INTO THE SUBCONSCIOUS NATURE OF MAN AND SOCIETY BY BORIS SIDIS, M. A., PH.D. ASSOCIATE IN PSYCHOLOGY AT THE PATHOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF THE NEW YORK STATE HOSPITALS WITH AN INTRODUCTION V PROF. WILLIAM JAMES, OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY NEW YORK AND LONDON D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 1919 F COPTRIOHT, 1898, BT D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. Printed in the United States of America fltebicateb to DAVID GORDON LYON, PH.D. HOLLIS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY. INTKODUCTIOK I AM glad to contribute to this book of Dr. Boris Sidis a few words of introduction, which may possibly gain for it a prompter recognition by the world of readers who are interested in the things of which it treats. Much of the experimental part of the work, although planned entirely by Dr. Sidis, was done in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory, and I have been more or less in his confidence while his theoretic conclu- sions, based on his later work in the Pathological Institute of the New York State Hospitals, were taking shape. The meaning of personality, with its limits and its laws, forms a problem which until quite recently had to be discussed almost exclusively by logical and meta- physical methods. Within the past dozen years, how- ever, an immense amount of new empirical material had been injected into the question by the observations which the "recognition" by science of the hypnotic state set in motion. Many of these observations are pathological : fixed ideas, hysteric attacks, insane delu- sions, mediumistic phenomena, etc. And altogether, although they are far from having solved the problem of personality, they must be admitted to have trans- formed its outward shape. What are the limits of the consciousness of a human being ? Is " self " conscious- vi THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. ness only a part of the whole consciousness ? Are there many " selves " dissociated from one another ? What is the medium of synthesis in a group of associated ideas? How can certain systems of ideas be cut off and forgotten ? Is personality a product, and not a principle ? Such are the questions now being forced to the front questions now asked for the first time with some sense of their concrete import, and questions which it will require a great amount of further work, both of observation and of analysis, to answer ade- quately. Meanwhile many writers are seeking to fill the gap, and several books have been published seeking to popu- larize the new observations and ideas and present them in connected form. Dr. Sidis' work distinguishes itself from some of these by its originality, and from others by the width of its scope. It is divided into three parts : Suggestibility ; the Self ; Man as One of a Crowd. Under all these heads the author is original. He tries by ingenious experi- ments to show that the suggestibility of waking persons follows an opposite law to that of hypnotic subjects. Suggestions must be veiled, in the former case, to be effective ; in the latter case, the more direct and open they are the better. By other ingenious experiments Dr. Sidis tries to show that the " subliminal" or "ultra- marginal " portions of the mind may in normal persons distinguish objects which the attentive senses find it impossible to name. These latter experiments are in- complete, but they open the way to a highly important psychological investigation. In Part II, on " The Self," a very full account is given of " double personality," subliminal conscious- ness, etc. The author is led to adopt as an explanation INTRODUCTION. vii of the dissociations which lie at the root of all these conditions the physiological theory of retraction of the processes of the brain cells, which in other quarters also seems coming to the front. He makes an elaborate classification of the different degrees of dissociation or amnesia, and, on the basis of a highly interesting and important pathological case, suggests definite methods of diagnosis and cure. This portion of the book well deserves the attention of neurologists. In Part III the very important matter of " crowd psychology" is discussed, almost for the first time in English. There is probably no more practically impor- tant topic to the student of public affairs. Dr. Sidis illustrates it by fresh examples, and his treatment is highly suggestive. I am not convinced of all of Dr. Sidis' positions, but I can cordially recommend the volume to all classes of readers as a treatise both interesting and instructive, and original in a high degree, on a branch of research whose importance is daily growing greater. WILLIAM JAMES. HARVARD UNIVERSITY, November 1, 1897. CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTION BY PROF. WILLIAM JAMES . . . . v INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR 1 PART I. S UG GES TIBILITY. CHAPTER I. SUGGESTIONS AND SUGGESTIBILITY .... 5 II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF SUGGESTIONS AND SUGGESTI- BILITY 16 III. THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY ... 24 IV. THE CONDITIONS OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY . . 45 V. THE LAW OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY .... 50 VI. THE CONDITIONS OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY . . 56 VII. THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY . . 62 VIII. THE LAW OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY ... 78 IX. SUGGESTIBILITY AND THE WAKING CONSCIOUSNESS . 8? PART II. THE SELF. X. THE SECONDARY SELF 91 XI. THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF AND UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRA- TION -.109 XII. THE DOUBLE SELF 129 XIII. THE INTERRELATION OF THE TWO SELVES . . . 141 XIV. SUBCONSCIOUS SENSE PERCEPTION IN THE WAKING STATE 148 iz x THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION". CHAPTER PACK XV. THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF AND HALLUCINATIONS . . 154 XVI. THE SUBWAKING SELF AND THE NORMAL INDIVIDUAL 158 XVII. THE INTERCOMMUNICATION OF THE TWO SELVES . 162 XVIII. THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF IN THE WAKING STATE . 180 XIX. TlIE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY 188 XX. THE ELEMENTS AND STAGES OF SUBCONSCIOUSNESS . 201 XXI. THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF SUBCONSCIOUS- NESS 208 XXII. THE CASE OF THE REV. THOMAS CARSON HANNA . 216 XXIII. FORMS OF SUBCONSCIOUS STATES AND TYPES OF AMNESIA 228 XXIV. THE CHARACTER OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF . . 245 XXV. SUBCONSCIOUSNESS AND INSANITY .... 269 XXVI. THE TRAITS OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF . . . 293 PART III. SOCIETY. XXVII. SOCIAL SUGGESTIBILITY ...... 297 XXVIII. SOCIETY AND EPIDEMICS 309 XXIX. STAMPEDES 314 XXX. MEDIAEVAL SIENTAL EPIDEMICS . . . . .319 XXXI. DEMONOPHOBIA 331 XXXII. FINANCIAL CRAZES 343 XXXIII. AMERICAN MENTAL EPIDEMICS 350 APPENDIX 365 INDEX . . 381 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. INTRODUCTION. THE study of the subconscious is becoming of more and more absorbing interest. The phenomena of hys- teria and of hypnosis are now studied by the French psychologists with remarkable acumen and with an un- rivalled fertility of ingenious devices, and the results obtained thus far form almost an epoch in the history of psychology. Although the French psychologists work independently of one another and disagree among themselves on many important points, still their method and general line of investigation are pretty nearly the same. They all care for clinical cases more than for minute, detailed laboratory experiments the present hobby of the Germans and their chief work falls within the domain of the subconscious. The French psychologists seem to be on the track of a rich gold vein. Without closely formulating their method, they have all, as if by a mutual tacit understanding, chosen the right way that leads to a better and deeper in- sight into the nature of mind. For the mechanism of consciousness is hidden deep down in the depths of the subconscious, and it is thither we have to. descend in order to get a clear understanding of the 1 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. phenomena that appear in the broad daylight of con- sciousness. The German school, with "Wundt at its head, at first started out on similar lines, but they could not make any use of the subconscious, and their speculations ran wild in the fancies of Hartmann. The reason of this failure is due to the fact that the concept of the sub- conscious as conceived by the German school was extremely vague, and had rather the character of a mechanical than that of a psychical process. An un- conscious consciousness that was their concept of the subconscious. In such a form as this the subconscious was certainly meaningless mere nonsense and had to be given up. The German psychological investiga- tions are now confined to the content of consciousness in so far as the individual is immediately conscious of it. But as this form of consciousness is extremely nar- row and circumscribed, the results arrived at, though remarkable for their thoroughness, are after all of a rather trivial nature. It is what Prof. James aptly characterizes "the elaboration of the obvious." We may therefore, with full right, assert that it was the French psychologists who made proper use of the sub- conscious and arrived at results that are of the utmost importance to psychology, although it were well if the French were to conduct their investigations with Ger- man thoroughness. It is not, however, the French alone who work along the lines of the subconscious, but the English and Americans, too, have a large share in the work. Gourney, James, Myers, and others, have done much toward the elucidation of the obscure phenomena of the subconscious. Psychology is especially indebted to the genius of Myers for his wide and comprehensive study INTRODUCTION. 3 of the phenomena of the subconscious, or of what he calls the manifestations of the subliminal self. The only drawback in Myers's concept of the subliminal self is that he conceives it as a metaphysical entity, as a kind of a cosmic self. Now, while Myers may be right in his belief, the phenomena under investigation do not warrant the hypothesis of metaphysical entities. I have therefore avoided the use of the term " subliminal self," however excellent it might be in itself, in order not to entangle the reader in the metaphysical con- siderations that cluster round that concept, and also because my point of view of the subconscious widely differs from that of Myers. The study of subconscious phenomena is of great interest from a purely practical standpoint, because of the use that can be made of it in the state of health and disease. A knowledge of the laws of the subconscious is of momentous import in education, in the reformation of juvenile criminals and offenders, and one can hardly realize the great benefit that suffer- ing humanity will derive from a proper methodical use of the subconscious within the province of thera- peutics. The study of the subconscious is especially of great value to sociology, because nowhere else does the sub- conscious work on such a grand, stupendous scale as it does in the popular mind ; and the sociologist who ignores the subconscious lacks a deep insight into the nature of social forces. For the practical man who takes part in social affairs, in so far as they concern his own interests, the knowledge of the subconscious can hardly be overestimated ; and this knowledge becomes an imperative necessity to him who lives in a democ- racy. The object of this book is the study of the sujb- 4 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. conscious, normal or abnormal, individual or social, in its relation to suggestion and suggestibility ; and let me hope that the thoughtful reader will find my work not only interesting, but stimulating to thought and useful in practical life. T> o PATHOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, OF THE NEW YORK STATE HOSPITALS, NEW YORK, 1897. PART I. SUGGESTIBILITY. CHAPTEE I. SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY. PSYCHOLOGICAL investigators employ the term " sug- gestion " in such a careless and loose fashion that the reader is often puzzled as to its actual meaning. Sug- gestion is sometimes used for an idea bringing in its train another idea, and is thus identified with associa- tion. Some extend the province of suggestion, and make it so broad as to coincide with any influence man exerts on his fellow-beings. Others narrow down sug- gestion and suggestibility to mere symptoms of hyster- ical neurosis. This is done by the adherents of the Salpetriere school. Suggestion, again, is used by the Nancy school to indicate the cause which produces that peculiar state of mind in which the phenomena of sug- gestibility become especially prominent. This vague and hazy condition of the subject of sug- gestion causes much confusion in psychological discus- sions. To free the subject from this confusion of tongues, we must endeavour in some way or other to give a strict definition of suggestion, and rigorously study the phenomena contained within the limited field 5 C THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. of our investigation. "We must not follow in the way of those writers who employ the terms suggestion and suggestibility in all possible meanings. Such careless- ness can not but lead into a tangle of words. In order to give a full description of suggestion and make its boundary lines clear, distinct, and definite, let us take a few concrete cases and inspect them closely. I hold a newspaper in my hands and begin to roll it up ; soon I find that my friend sitting opposite me rolled up his in a similar way. This, we say, is a case of suggestion. My friend Mr. A. is absent-minded; he sits near the table, thinking of some abstruse mathematical prob- lem that baffles all his efforts to solve it. Absorbed in the solution of that intractable problem, he is blind and deaf to what is going on around him. His eyes are directed on the table, but he appears not to see any of the objects there. I put two glasses of water on the table, and at short intervals make passes in the direction of the glasses passes which he seems not to perceive ; then I resolutely stretch out my hand, take one of the glasses, and begin to drink. My friend fol- lows suit dreamily he raises his hand, takes the glass, and begins to sip, awakening fully to consciousness when a good part of the tumbler is emptied. To take an interesting and amusing case given by Ochorowitz in his book Mental Suggestion : " My friend P., a man no less absent-minded than he is keen of intellect, was playing chess in a neigh- bouring room. Others of us were talking near the door. I had made the remark that it was my friend's habit when he paid the closest attention to the game to whistle an air from Madame Angot. I was about to accompany him by beating time on the table. But SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY. 7 this time he whistled something else- a march from Le Prophete. " ' Listen,' said I to my associates ; ' we are going to play a trick upon P. We will (mentally) order him to pass from Le Prophete to La Fille de Madame Angot.' " First I began to drum the march ; then, profiting by some notes common to both, I passed quickly to the quicker and more staccato measure of my friend's fa- vourite air. P. on his part suddenly changed the air and began to whistle Madame Angot. Every one burst out laughing. My friend was too much absorbed in a check to the queen to notice anything. " ' Let us begin again,' said I, ' and go back to Le Prophete.' And straightway we had Meyerbeer once more with a special fugue. My friend knew that he had whistled something, but that was all he knew." A huckster stations himself in the middle of the street, on some public square, or on a sidewalk, and be- gins to pour forth volumes of gibberish intended both as a compliment to the people and a praise of his ware. The curiosity of the passers-by is awakened. They stop. Soon our hero forms the centre of a crowd that stupidly gazes at the " wonderful " objects held out to its view for admiration. A few moments more, and the crowd begins to buy the things the huckster sug- gests as " grand, beautiful, and cheap." A stump orator mounts a log or a car and begins to harangue the crowd. In the grossest way he praises the great intelligence, the brave spirit of the people, the virtue of the citizens, glibly telling his audience that with such genius as they possess they must clearly see that the prosperity of the country depends on the poli- tics he favours, on the party whose valiant champion he 2 S THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. now is. His argumentation is absurd, his motive is con- temptible, and still, as a rule, he carries the body of the crowd, unless another stump orator interferes and turns the stream of sentiment in another direction. The speech of Antony in Julius Caesar is an excellent ex- ample of suggestion. All these examples undoubtedly belong to the prov- ince of suggestion. Now what are their characteris- tic traits ? What are the elements common to all these cases of suggestion ? We find in all these instances a stream of consciousness that goes on flowing in its peculiar, individual, idiosyncratic way ; suddenly from the depths of the stream a wave rises to the surface, swamps the rest of the waves, overflows the banks, de- flects for a while the course of the current, and then suddenly subsides, disappears, and the stream resumes its natural course, flowing once more in its former bed. On tracing the cause of this disturbance, we invariably find that it is due to some external source, to some other stream running alongside the one disturbed. Stating the same in the language of Baldwin, we may say that " by suggestion is meant a great class of phenomena typified by the abrupt entrance from without into con- sciousness of an idea or image which becomes a part of the stream of thought, and tends to produce the mus- cular and volitional efforts which ordinarily follow upon its presence." * Is this our last say of suggestion ? Far from being the case. On closer inspection of our examples we find some more traits which are of the utmost importance. The subject accepts uncritically the idea suggested to him, and carries it out almost automatically. This can * Psychology, vol. ii. SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY. 9 be easily detected in nearly every instance of suggestion, but it stands out especially clear and sharp in its out- line in cases of hypnosis. I hypnotized Mr. F., * and commanded that, after awakening, when he would hear me cough, he should take three oranges on the table and give them to my friends who were present at the seance. I woke him up. A few minutes later I coughed ; he snatched from the table the oranges, which were, in fact, nothing but ordinary potatoes, and distributed them among my friends. While carrying out this post-hypnotic sugges- tion he appeared to be in a peculiar automatic condi- tion. His movements were hurried, as if some spring was loosened in his ideo-motor mechanism; his eyes were dull and glassy ; it was plain he was in a semicon- scious state. On my asking him afterward how the oranges appeared to him he replied : " They seemed to me rather queer ; they were too small and heavy for oranges. I thought they were lemons, but I did not attempt to examine them; something impelled me to carry out the order and be done with it." To take a still better example from the store of my hypnotic experiments : I hypnotized Mr. F., and sug- gested to him that after awakening, on hearing me cough, he should take the umbrella, open it, and prome- nade in the room three times. I woke him up. A few minutes later I coughed ; up went his legs, but he * Let me say at the outset that all the subjects on whom I made hypnotic experiments were never hypnotized by any one else before. Whatever, therefore, occurred during hypnosis was not due to pre- vious suggestive training unknown to me. Each subject was fully under my observation. I took the precaution of isolating my sub- jects from extraneous suggestion. During trance I suggested to them that no one should be able to hypnotize them. I ask the reader to bear this in mind. 10 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. remained sitting in the chair. I coughed again ; once more up went his legs, but he did not carry out my commands. I rehypnotized him, and this time I strongly and authoritatively commanded him he should carry out my post-hypnotic suggestion, taking care to suggest to him he should forget everything that passed during the hypnotic trance. He was awakened, felt well, conversed with his friends. While he was en- gaged in conversation I went behind his chair and coughed. Up he jumped, opened the umbrella, and walked in the room three times. When he was through with the suggested promenade the umbrella dropped from his hands on the floor, and, without picking it up, he sat down on a chair and smiled. He remembered very clearly the umbrella affair, and it seemed to him queer and comical. I asked him whether he knew what he was going to do when he heard me cough. " Yes, I knew I must do something in a general way, though. When I took the umbrella, I do not know how it happened, but I opened it and began to walk." I asked him whether he knew how many times he had to walk, to which he answered : " No, I did not know, but I kept on walking ; and when it came to the end of the third turn, the umbrella dropped from my hands." I could easily bring many more instances of the same type, but I think that those given will suffice for our purpose. What we find in all these caces is the uncritical ac- ceptance of the ideas or actions suggested, and also the motor automatism with which these ideas or actions are realized. In short, mental and motor automatism con- stitute the prominent elements of suggestion. There is, however, one more element in suggestion SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY. H an element which must be taken into account, and without which our definition of suggestion will be in- complete. This factor, or element, is the overcoming or circumventing of the subject's opposition. The suggested idea is forced on the stream of consciousness ; it is a stranger, an unwelcome guest, a parasite, which the subject's consciousness seeks to get rid of. The stream of the individual's consciousness combats sug- gested ideas as the organism does bacteria and baciHi that tend to disturb the stability of its equilibrium. It is this opposition element that Dr. J. Grossmann has in mind when he defines suggestion as " der Vorgang, bei dem eine Yorstellung sich einem Gehirn aufzuzwin- gen versucht." * My friend would not have rolled up his paper, nor would Mr. A. have taken the glass and sipped the wa- ter, nor would Mr. P. have whistled his airs, nor would the crowd have bought the articles of the huck- ster or voted for certain political candidates had they been openly commanded to do so. They would have opposed strenuously the suggestion given to them. It was required to devise means in order to circumvent this opposition. The same necessity for circumven- tion of opposition we find in post-hypnotic sugges- tion. At first the subject F. opposed the idea of walking with the umbrella. When I rehypnotized him I asked him, "Why did not you carry out my command ? " The reply was, " I wanted to see whether I could resist." That this was actually the case we can see from the fact that, while his legs started at the sig- nal and went up to fulfil the order, Mr. F. exclaimed, " I know what you want me to do, but I will not do * Zeitschrif t ftir Hypnoviismus, August, 1893. 12 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. it." This opposition was overcome only after repeated and insistent injunctions that he must obey my com- mand. The first stages of hypnosis are especially character- ized by this spirit of opposition, which, however, grad- ually slackens as the subject falls into a deeper state of hypnosis, and completely disappears with the advent of somnambulism. To watch the struggle of the mind in its opposition to the engrafted suggested idea is of intense interest to the psychologist, and of great value to a clearer comprehension of suggestion itself. I hypnotized Mr. J. F. With one resolute command I made him cataleptic. " Rise ! " I commanded him. He rose. " Walk ! " He walked. " You can not walk forward ! " He tried to walk, but he could not. " You can only walk backward ! " He began to move back- ward. At the very first sitting he seemed to have fallen completely under my control and to carry out with- out any opposition all the motor suggestions given to him. This, however, was not really the case. Oppo- sition was there, only it was ineffective. As we con- tinued our sittings (and we had many of them) Mr. J. F. became more and more intractable, my control over him grew less and less, and now it is only after great exertion and repeated imperative commands that I am enabled to bring him into any cataleptic condition at all. The opposition or inhibition kept in abeyance during the first seance asserted itself as the subject became more familiar with the hypnotic condition. The following experiments are still more interest- ing, as revealing to us in the clearest way possible the internal struggle the great opposition which the con- sciousness of the subject shows to the parasitic sug- gested idea : SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY. 13 Mr. L. falls into a slight hypnotic condition into the first degree of hypnosis ; he can open his eyes if I challenge him that he is unable to do it. Although his hypnosis is but slight, I still tried on him post-hypnotic suggestions. While he was in the hypnotic condition I suggested to him that after awakening, when he will hear a knock, he will go to the table, take a cigarette, and light it. I suggested to him he should forget everything that passed during the hypnosis. On awakening he remembered everything. I gave a few knocks in quick succession. He rose from his chair, but immediately sat down again, and laughingly exclaimed, " No, I shall not do it ! " " Do what ? " I asked. " Light the cigarette nonsense ! " " Had you a strong desire to do it?" I asked him, putting the desire in the past, although it was plain he was still struggling with it. He did not answer. "Did you wish very much to do it ? " I asked again. " Not very much," he answered curtly and evasively. On another occasion I hypnotized Mr. L. by the method of fascination.* He seemed to have fallen into a slightly deeper hypnotic condition than usual. The post-hypnotic suggestion was to light the gas, and also complete amnesia. On awakening he remembered everything that passed during hypnosis. He ridiculed the post-hypnotic suggestions I gave him. After a few minutes' conversation, without my giving the sug- gestion signal, which was to be a knock, I left the room for a few moments for five or ten seconds. When I returned I found him lighting the gas. " What are you doing that for, Mr. L. ? " I asked. 'Ordinarily I use the method of Nancy; it is the most con- venient and pleasant way of hypnotization, as it requires no strain on the side of the subject. 14 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. " To feel easier," he answered ; " I felt somewhat un- easy." Evidently the post-hypnotic suggestion took deep root in his mind. He struggled hard against it, to put it down, to suppress it ; and it was due to this fact that he attempted to counteract the suggested idea by ridiculing it. As long as I was in the room he wanted to show the energy of his will, and he struggled hard against the insistent idea, keeping it at bay ; but when I left the room one of the motives of resisting the sug- gestion was removed, and the struggle became an un- equal one. The insistent parasitic idea asserted itself with greater force than before, and this time, not meet- ing with such a strenuous opposition, it gained the upper hand and realized itself completely. To take one more instance of the many sittings I had with Mr. L. I hypnotized him once in the pres- ence of two acquaintances of mine, and gave him a post-hypnotic suggestion to take from the table a box of matches and light the gas. This he had to do when hearing me cough. I woke him up, and as soon as he heard me cough he started up from his chair, looked hard at the box of matches, but did not take it. He went up to the window, put his head against the window pane, and seemed to be engaged in a severe struggle against the insistent suggested idea. Now and then one could perceive a slight shudder passing over his entire body, thus making almost palpably evident the inner, restless, contentious state of his consciousness. Again and again the suggested idea cropped up in his mind, and again and again it was suppressed ; now the sugges- tion gained ground, and now once more it was beaten and driven back into the obscure regions from which it came. I then rehypnotized him, strongly emphasized my suggestion, and then awakened him. I slightly SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY. 15 coughed. This time the suggested idea got a stronger hold of his mind. Mr. L. rose from his chair, took the box of matches, kept it in his hand for a second or two, and threw it resolutely on the table. "No," he ex- claimed, " I will not do it ! " Such cases might be multiplied by the hundreds, but I think that the hypnotic experiments made on my subjects L. and J. F. will suffice for our purpose. They show most clearly that the trait of opposition is an in- gredient of suggestion. This opposition element varies with the state of mind of the individual. What the nature of this variation is we shall see later on ; mean- while the present stage of our discussion fully enables us to formulate a definition of suggestion and suggestibility. By suggestion is meant the intrusion into the mind of an idea ; met with more or less opposition by the person ; accepted uncritically at last ; and realized un- reflectively, almost automatically. By suggestibility is meant that peculiar state of mind which is favourable to suggestion.* * The psycho-physiological state of suggestion I term suggesti- bility. By "suggestibility of a factor" is meant the power of the factor to induce the psycho-physiological state of suggestion of a certain degree of intensity, the suggestiveness of the factor being measured by the degree of suggestibility induced. CHAPTER II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY. ONCE the subject-matter under investigation is de- fined, we must proceed to a further subdivision of it ; we must define and classify the different species of sug- gestion and suggestibility. Already in our last chap- ter, in adducing different cases of suggestion, suggesti- bility in the normal state was tacitly implied. We have now reached a stage in our discussion in which we must state this fact more explicitly. The soil favourable for the seeds of suggestion exists also in what we call the normal individual. Suggestibility is present in what we call the normal state, and in order to reveal it we must only know how to tap it. The suggestible ele- ment is a constituent of our nature ; it never leaves us ; it is always present in us. Before Janet, Binet, and many other investigators undertook the study of hys- terical subjects, no one suspected the existence of those remarkable phenomena of double consciousness that opened for us new regions in the psychical life of man. These phenomena were merely not noticed, although present all the while ; and when at times they rose from their obscurity, came to light, and obtruded themselves on the attention of people, they were either put down as sorcery, witchcraft, or classed contemptuously with lying, cheating, and deception. The same is true with regard 16 CLASSIFICATION OF SUGGESTION. if to normal suggestibility. It rarely attracts our attention, as it manifests itself in but trifling things. When, how- ever, it rises to the surface and with the savage fury of a hurricane cripples and maims on its way everything it can not destroy, menaces life, and throws social order into the wildest confusion possible, we put it down as mobs. We do not in the least suspect that the awful, destructive, automatic spirit of the mob moves in the bosom of the peaceful crowd, reposes in the heart of the quiet assembly, and slumbers in the breast of the law-abiding citizen. "We do not suspect that the spirit of suggestibility lies hidden even in the best of men ; like the evil jinnee of the Arabian tales is corked up in the innocent-looking bottle. Deep down in the nature of man we find hidden the spirit of suggestibility. Every one of us is more or less suggestible. Man is often defined as a social animal. This definition is no doubt true, but it conveys little information as to the psychical state of each individual within society. There exists another definition which claims to give an insight into the nature of man, and that is the well-known an- cient view that man is a rational animal ; but this defi- nition breaks down as soon as we come- to test it by facts of life, for it scarcely holds true of the vast multitudes of mankind. Not sociality, not rationality, but sug- gestibility is what characterizes the average- specimen of humanity, for man is a suggestible animal. The fact of suggestibility existing in the normal in- dividual is of the highest importance in the theoretical field of knowledge, in psychology, sociology, ethics, history, as well as in practical life, in education, politics, and economics ; and since this fact of suggestibility may be subject to doubt on account of its seeming paradoxi- calness, it must therefore be established on a firm basis 18 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. by a rigorous experimentation, and I have taken great pains to prove this fact satisfactorily. The evidence for the existence of normal suggestibility I shall adduce later on in our discussion ; meanwhile I ask the reader to take it on trust, sincerely hoping that he will at the end be perfectly satisfied with the demonstration of its truth. The presence of suggestibility in such states as the hysterical and the hypnotic is a fact well proved and attested, and I think there is no need to say a word in * V its defence. Since the hysterical, the hypnotic, the somnambulic states do not belong to the routine of our experience; since they are but rare and occur under special peculiar conditions ; since they unfit one for so- cial life, disable in the struggle for existence, I think the reader will hot quarrel with me for naming such states abnormal. Thus it becomes quite clear that suggestibility must be classed under two heads : (1) Suggestibility in the normal state, or normal suggestibility, and (2) suggesti- bility in the abnormal state, or abnormal suggestibility. Turning now to suggestion, we find that it can be easily subdivided and classified according to the mode it is effected in consciousness. Concrete examples will best illustrate my meaning. The hypnotizer commands his subject to walk ; the latter walks. He raises the hand of the patient, and it remains uplifted in a con- tracted cataleptic condition. The hypnotizer tells the subject that after awakening, when he will hear a knock, he will take off his coat and dance a polka, and the sub- ject, on awakening and perceiving the signal, fulfils the order most faithfully. In cases like these the experi- menter gives his orders or suggestions directly, without beating round the bush, without any circumlocution, without any evasions. In a plain and brusque manner CLASSIFICATION OF SUGGESTION. 19 does the hypnotizer give his suggestion, so much so that it partakes of the nature of an imperative command issued by the order of the highest authority from which there is no appeal. The essential feature here, how- ever, is not so much the authoritativeness, for in many cases it may be totally absent, and a courteous, bland way of expression may be used ; not so much the au- thoritativeness, I say, as the plainness, the directness V * with which the suggestion is given. Such a suggestion we may designate as direct suggestion. Suggestions may also be given in quite a different way. Instead of openly telling the subject what he should do, the experimenter produces some object, or makes a movement, a gesture, which in their own silent fashion tell the subject what to do. To illustrate it by a few examples, so as to make my meaning clearer : I stretch out the hand of the hypnotic subject and make it rigid, and while doing this I press his arm with an iron rod. In the next seance as soon as the iron, rod touches the arm the hand becomes rigid. I tell the sub- ject to spell the word " Napoleon," and when he comes to " p " I stretch out my hand and make it stiff ; the sub- ject begins to stammer ; the muscles .of his lips spas- modically contract and stiffen. Dr. Tuckey brings a case of suggestion given by him unintentionally in such an indirect way. He hypnotized a physician and or- dered him to wake up in a quarter of an hour. He then left the room for about half an hour, being sure that in the meantime the subject would come back to himself . "When he returned he was surprised to find the patient still sitting in the chair, and in the most distressed condition possible. The patient could not recover his speech ; his jaws were firmly shut. Dr. Tuckey thinks that while hypnotizing he inadvertently passed his hands 20 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. over the mouth of the subject, and this was taken as a suggestion to keep the mouth firmly shut. My friend who drank the glass of water on account of my sug- gestive movements; Mr. P., whom Prof. Ochorowitz suggested to whistle certain airs ; the crowd that was induced by the politician by means of flattery and talk of business prosperity to vote for the party whose cause he advocated all these are good cases of this type of suggestion. This mode of influencing the mind plays a great part in the history of humanity, and is therefore of great importance in sociology. Such a kind of sugges- tion may be properly designated as indirect suggestion. Suggestion partakes of the nature of reflex action. This truth was implied in our discussion of the last chapter, and in the definition of suggestion we finally arrived at. And authorities are not lacking who go to support the same view. " Eine sorgfaltige Beobach- tung," writes Prof. Forel, " der Bedingungen der Sug- gestibilitat bringt uns immer wieder auf die relativ Ruhe des Gehirns zuriick, auf einen plastischen Zustand des- selben oder wenigstens eines Theiles desselben, worin die Vorstellungen eine schwachere Kraft oder Tendenz haben sich zu associiren und deshalb leichter dem von aussen commenden Impuls folgen." " Der Mechanis- mus (der Suggestion)," writes Dr. Bernheim, " ist ein physiologischer Mechanismus dessen Realisation sich mit den Eigenschaften unseres Hirn ganz gut vereinbarn lasst.* What Dr. Bernheim means to say here is that suggestion partakes of the nature of the reflex and automatic activity that characterizes the physiological mechanism in general. He makes himself more ex- plicit in another place. " The mechanism of sugges- * Zeitschrift fur Hypnotisraus, Januar, 1893. CLASSIFICATION OF SUGGESTION. 21 tion," lie writes in his book Suggestive Therapeutics, " may be summed up in the following formula : In- crease of the reflex ideo-motor, ideo-sensitive, and ideo- sensorial excitability." Goumey tells us in his simple straightforward way that the mechanism of " suggestion is conscious reflex action." * As reflex action of consciousness, suggestion has a double aspect : afferent, centripetal, or sensory, and efferent, centrifugal, or motor. This is perfectly obvi- ous, for in suggestion we deal, on the one hand, with the impression of the suggested idea on the mind and its acceptance by consciousness ; this is the afferent, sensory side of suggestion ; and, on the other hand, with the realization of the accepted idea; this is the efferent, motor side of suggestion. The process of suggestion may therefore be represented in the form of an arc, which may be called the suggestion arc. It is quite clear that in classifying suggestion as direct and indirect, we had solely in view the afferent, the sensory aspect of suggestion. If now we regard suggestion from the other aspect, from the efferent or motor aspect, we find that suggestion is subject to another subdivision. Concrete instances will bring out this subdivision most clearly. The experimenter suggests to the subject to turn over the chair and sit down near it on the floor. This is faithfully and immediately carried out by the sub- ject. The experimenter raises the patient's arm and bends it ; immediately the arm becomes stiff, rigid, cata- leptic. The suggested idea impressed on the brain is immediately discharged into the motor tracts. The same holds true of post-hypnotic or deferred sugges- tion. The idea suggested or the order given is present * Mind, Oct., 1884. 22 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. in the mind, only there is present a suggested obstacle to its motor discharge ; but as soon as some kind of suggested signal is perceived, the obstacle is removed and the idea immediately discharges itself along the motor tracts. I hypnotized one of my subjects, Mr. F., and ordered him that on awakening, when he hears me cough, he shall put out the gas. I woke him up. He remained quietly sitting in his chair, waiting, as it seemed, for my signal. He himself, however, was not in the least conscious of it ; f of when his brother asked him whether he would like to go home, as it was rather late, he answered in the negative. I then coughed, and Mr. F. immediately rushed for the light and put it out. What we find here is the literal carry- ing out of the suggested idea. This kind of suggestion the realization of which bears a direct and immediate relation to the suggested object or act is, of course, also present in normal suggestibility, as in the case of the buyer who chooses the goods suggested to him by the salesman or huckster, as in the case of the citizen who votes for the unknown candidate suggested to him by the politician. In short, when there is full and com- plete realization of the idea or order suggested, direct- ly or indirectly, we have that kind of suggestion which I designate as immediate. Instead, however, of immediately taking the hint and fully carrying it into execution, the subject may realize something else, either what is closely allied with the idea suggested or what is connected with it by association of contiguity. A suggestion is given to the subject that when he wakes up he will see a tiger. He is awakened, and sees a big cat. The subject is suggested that on awakening he will steal the pocketbook lying on the table. When aroused from the hypnotic state CLASSIFICATION OF SUGGESTION. 23 he goes up to the table, does not take the pocketbook, but the pencil that lies close to it. The buyer does not always choose the precise thing which the sales- man suggests, but some other thing closely allied to it. In case the suggestion is not successful, it is still, as a rule, realized in some indirect and mediate way. Man is not always doing what has been suggested to him ; he sometimes obeys not the suggested idea itself, but some other idea associated with the former by contiguity, simi- larity, or contrast. Suggestion by contrast is especially Interesting, as it often gives rise to counter-suggestion. Now such kind of suggestion, where not the suggested idea itself but the one associated with it is realized, I designate as mediate. Thus we have four kinds of suggestion : (a) Direct. (<$) Immediate. (b) Indirect. (e) Mediate. The classification of suggestion and suggestibility may be represented in terms of the suggestion arc in the following diagrammatic form : SUGGESTIBILITY NORMAL ABNORMAL 3O.;* * SUGG. CHAPTER in. THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. IN our last chapter we ventured to generalize that every man in his full normal waking state is more or less suggestible. I should not wonder if such a seem- ingly sweeping generalization should startle many a cautious reader, and should call forth strenuous opposi- tion. We must therefore rigorously demonstrate the fact of the universality of normal suggestibility. Such a proof is of the more importance, as the generalization which it establishes supplies a new principle to sociol- ogy, furnishes a key to the comprehension of many a great historical event, gives a deeper insight into the phenomena of political and economical life, and might possibly be of use in education. Is there such a thing as suggestibility in the normal waking condition ? The Nancy school, with Bernheim and Liebault at its head, gives an affirmative answer. " Jemanden hypnotisiren," says Bernheim, "heisstnur: seine Suggestibilitat kiinst- lich erhohen." In fact, the hypnotic state itself is in- duced by suggestion. " Es giebt keinen Hypnotismus : es giebt nur Phanomene der Suggestion," exclaims the Nancy professor. " Als etwas pathologisches, als eine kiinstliche Neurose betrachtet existirt ein Hypnotismus nicht. Wir schaffen im eigentlichen Sinne mit ilim keinen besonderen Zustand des Gehirns oder des Ner- .. 24 THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 25 vensystems ; wir machen uns ganz einfach nur eine phy- siologische Eigenthumlichkeit des Gehirns die Sugges- tibilitat zu Nutze und schaffen die zur Entfaltung dieser Suggestibility giinstigen Vorbedingungen." On closer inspection, however, we find that the great au- thority of the Nancy school stretches too wide and far the conception of suggestion, for, according to him, " Jede Yorstellung ist eine Suggestion." This, I say, is too far-fetched ; for it is to identify the whole field of mental activity with but a part of it, namely, suggesti- bility. This is, in fact, the obliteration of all traces of the problem itself. If now we turn and ask for facts that go to support his view, we find that Bernheim does not sustain his cause. He limits his instances to but a small class of persons who are easily suggestible in their waking state, but he offers no proof that suggestibility is present in all men. " Es giebt Menschen bei denen . . . die einfache Affirmation, ohne Schlaf und ohne vorhergehende ihn begunstigende Manipulationen bei ihnen alle sogenannten hypnotischen Phenomena her- vorruft. Durch das einfache Wort schafft man bei ihnen Anasthesia, Contractur, Hallucinationen, Im- puls, die verschiedensten Handlungen."-* Although the instances Prof. Bernheim adduces do not certainly establish the fact of the universality of normal suggestibility, they are still interesting for us as they show the presence of normal suggestibility in some particular cases at least. " Many subjects," writes Bernheim in his Suggestive Therapeutics, "who have previously been hypnotized may manifest susceptibility to the same suggestive phenomena in the waking state, without being again hypnotized, however slightly might * Zeitschrift, Januar, 1894. 26 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. have been the influence of a small number of previous seances. Here, for example, is the case of K., one of my patients who is accustomed to being hypnotized, and is subject to light somnambulism. Without put- ting him to sleep, I say directly : ' Close your hand. You can not open it again.' He keeps his hand closed and contracted, and makes fruitless efforts to open it. I make him hold out his other arm, with his hand open, and say, ' You can not shut it.' He tries in vain to do BO ; brings the phalanges into semiflexion, but can do no more in spite of every effort. There is in my serv- ice a young hysterical girl afflicted with sensitivo-sen- sorial hemiansesthesia of the left side, and capable of being hypnotized into deep sleep. In the waking condi- tion she is susceptible to catalepsy or suggestive contrac- tion. I can effect transfer of the hemianaesthesia from the left to the right side without hypnotizing and without touching her. In one of my somnambulistic cases I can obtain all possible modifications of sensibility in the wak- ing condition. It suffices to say, ' Your left side is insen- sible ' ; then if I prick his left arm with a pin, stick the pin into his nostril, touch the mucous membrane of his eye, or tickle his throat, he does not move. The other side of his body reacts. I transfer the anaesthesia from the left to the right side. I produce total anaesthesia, which was on one occasion so profound that my chef de cli- nique pulled out the roots of five teeth which were deeply embedded in the gums, twisting them round in their sockets for more than ten minutes. I simply said to the patient, ' You will have no feeling whatever.' He laughed as he spat out the blood, and did not show the least symptom of pain." Here, as we see, the experiments were carried on with somnambulic and hysterical subjects; the result, THE EVIDENCE OP NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 27 therefore, can not prove the facts of suggestibility in normal and perfectly healthy people. Some of my own experiments might possibly prove more conclusive. Mr. W., an acquaintance of mine, who was never hypno- tized by anyone, readily took suggestions in his waking state. I told him he could not write his name. He tried, and he did write it. I stretched out my arm, opened my hand and stiffened the fingers, and said, " Try now." He could not write his hand became cataleptic. I made a whole series of experiments of this kind, 'but as they interested me from quite a differ- ent point of view I shall give a detailed account of them later on. Meanwhile this one instance will suffice for our present purpose to show the power of sugges- tion in the waking state. The fact, however, of its rarity 'and singularity makes it unfit to prove the uni- versality of normal suggestibility. In the Zeitschrift f iir Hypnotismus * Prof. J. Del- boeuf brings cases of suggestibility in normal condition. Thus he made a patient anaesthetic who was not and could not be hypnotized. He told the patient : " Rei- chen Sie mir Ihren Arm, sehen Sie mich fest an und zeigen Sie mir durch Ihren Blick, dass Sie entschlossen sind, nichts zu f uhlen, und Sie werden thatsachlich nichts f iihlen." The patient did it. Prof. Delboeuf severely pricked the subject's arm, and the latter felt no pain. To take another case. An old man of seventy suf- ered great pain from facial neuralgia for more than fif- teen years. " Ich komme zu ihm," says Prof. Delboeuf ; " ziehe ihn heftig am Bart und erklare ihm, dass er keine Schmerzen mehr hat, dass er auch ferner keine Schmer- zen haben wird, und meine Prophezeihung erfiillt sich." * November and December, 1892. 28 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. These cases, like the preceding one, are subject to the same objections ; they do not prove the universality of normal suggestibility on account of their rarity and singularity. Not every one can so easily be made cata- leptic or anaesthetic in his waking condition. With most people such suggestions are failures even in hyp- nosis. The only way, then, to test the verity of normal suggestibility is to lay aside all experimentation on hys- terical, somnambulic, hypnotic, and extraordinarily sug- gestible subjects, and start a series of experiments on perfectly healthy and normal individuals. Thanks to Prof. H. Miinsterberg and to the admirable facilities afforded by the Psychological Laboratory of Harvard University and the Pathological Institute of the New York State Hospitals, I was enabled to carry out more than eight thousand experiments relating to the subject of suggestion. The order of experiments taken up first was sugges- tion of letters and figures. The mechanism of this class of experiments was as follows : A successive series of letters or of figures was introduced through a slit on a white screen, each letter or figure being pasted on a separate slip of cardboard which in colour and position coincided with the back- ground of the screen. Each experiment consisted of a series of nine slips. Each slip was kept on the back- ground for two or three seconds. The interval between the slip and its successor was also two or three seconds. Time was measured by a metronome inclosed within a felt box, with a rubber tube passing close to the ear of the experimenter, so that the subjects should not be dis- turbed by the ticking of the metronome. For the same reason the experimenter and his movements of inserting the slips into the white screen were all carefully hidden THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 29 by screens. The ring of a bell indicated that the series came to an end, and it also served as a signal for the subjects to write down immediately on paper which they kept ready in their hands anything that came into their mind at that particular moment letters, numerals, words, phrases, etc. While looking for evidence for normal suggesti- bility, an opportunity was also taken to arrange the ex- periments according to different factors, so that should it be proved that suggestion in the normal state is an indubitable fact, we should be enabled to know what kind of factors are the more impressive and sug- gestive. The seizes of letters and figures were arranged ac- cording to the following factors and their combi- nations : 1. Repetition. 2. Frequency. 3. Coexistence. 4. Last impression. Great care, of course, was taken not to repeat the same series of letters or figures. As I had many slips at my disposal the series could be easily changed both by permutation and insertion of new slips. The sub- jects did not and could not possibly suspect the sug- gested letter or figure, first, because there were so many of them in each series; second, because the factors studied were constantly varied ; and, third, because sham series, such as inverted or coloured letters, etc., were introduced so as to baffle the subjects. I had twelve subjects at my disposal, and experi- mented with three or four at a time. Recently I made experiments of this kind with thirteen subjects more, so that the total number of subjects is twenty -five. 30 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. The results are as follows : 1. KEPETITION. In the middle of the series a letter or numeral was shown three times in succession e. g. : B 3 E 6 K 8 M 5 M or 5 M 5 K 7 O 2 P 9 Of 300 experiments made, 53 succeeded that is, the subject wrote the letter or numeral suggested by the factor of repetition. The factor of repetition gives a suggestibility of IT' 6 per cent. 2. FREQUENCY. A letter or numeral was shown three times in the series, and each time with an inter- ruption e. g. : B 5 K 3 E 7 K 3 M or 9 K 3 C 4 E 8 D 6 Of 300 experiments made, 128 succeeded. The factor of frequency gives a suggestibility of 42 '6 per cent. 3. COEXISTENCE. A letter or numeral was shown repeatedly ; not, however, in succession, as it was in the THE EVIDENCE OP NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 31 case of the factor of repetition, also not with interrup- tions as it was in the case of frequency, but at the same time e. g. : B 4 E 1 C 2 L> 6 E E E, or 7 7 T M 5 L 3 A 9 F 8 Of 300 experiments made, only 20 succeeded. The factor of coexistence gives as its power of sug- gestion 6* 6 per cent. 4. LAST IMPRESSION. Here was studied the suggesti- bility effected by the last impression, by the last letter or figure. In all our experiments unnecessary repeti- tion was carefully avoided. It is plain that the nature of these experiments of last impression required that not one letter or figure should be repeated twice in the series e. g. : A 7 K 9 F 5 L 8 D or' 6 E 2 B 4 E 1 M 3 Of 300 experiments made, 190 succeeded. The factor of last impression gives a suggestibility of 63'3 per cent. 32 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. 5. COEXISTENCE AND LAST IMPRESSION. In these experiments a slip with three identical characters pasted on it appeared at the end of the series, thus combining in one the factor of coexistence with that of last im- pression e. g. : E 2 N 5 C 7 K 1 B or 9 M 8 Q 4 Z 6 A A A 333 Of 300 experiments made, 55 succeeded. The combined effect of coexistence and last impres- sion gives a suggestibility of 18*3 per cent. 6. FREQUENCY AND LAST IMPRESSION. The letter or numeral repeated with interruptions was also shown at the end of the series e. g. : M 5 C 2 B 8 C 2 K or 4 C 2 P 9 N 6 C 2 Of 150 experiments made, 113 succeeded. The combined effect of the two factors gives a sug- gestibility of 75 '2 per cent. Arranging now the factors in the order of their rate of effected suggestibility, we have the following table : THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 33 Per cent. Frequency and last impression 7"5'2 Last impression 63'3 Frequency 42*6 Coexistence and last impression . . . 18'3 Repetition . . . . , 17'6 Coexistence 6-6 Comparing now the suggestibility effected by dif- ferent factors,* that of the last impression stands out most prominently. The " last impression " is the most impressive. Our daily life teems with facts that illus- trate this rule : The child is influenced by the last impression it receives. In a debate he, as a rule, gains the victory in the eyes of the public who has the last word. In a crowd he moves and stirs the citizens to action who makes the last inciting speech. In a mob he who last sets an example becomes the hero and the leader. Frequency comes next to last impression and pre- cedes repetition. This may be explained by the fact that in repetition the suggestion is too grossly obvious, lying almost on the surface ; the mind, therefore, is aroused to opposition, and a counter-suggestion is formed ; while in frequency the suggestion, on account of the interruption, is not so tangibly obvious, the opposition therefore is considerably less, and the sug- gestion is left to run its course. Coexistence is a still poorer mode of suggestion than repetition; it only arouses opposition. Coexist- ence is in reality of the nature of repetition, for it is repetition in space ; it is a poor form of repetition. * Let me add here that the figures bring out rather the relative than the absolute suggestiveness of the factors studied. 34 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. On the whole, we may say that in the normal state temporal or spatial repetition is the most unfortunate mode of suggestion, while the best, the most successful of all the particular factors, is that of the last impres- sion that is, the mode of bringing the idea intended for suggestion at the very end. This rule is observed by influential orators and widely read popular writers ; it is known in rhetoric as bringing the composition to a climax. Of all the modes of suggestion, however, the most powerful, t/te most effective, and the most suc- cessful is a skilful combination of frequency and last impression. This rule is observed by Shakespeare in the speech of Antony. Be these rules of the particular factors what they may, one thing is clear and sure: these experiments unquestionably prove the reality of normal suggestibility ; they prove the presence of sug- gestibility in the average normal individual. From suggestion of ideas I turned to suggestion of movements, of acts. The first set of experiments was rather crude in form, but not without its peculiar inter- est and value. The experiments were carried on in the following way: On a little table I put a few objects, screened from the subject by a sheet of white cardboard. The subject was asked to concentrate his attention on a cer- tain spot of the screen for about twenty seconds. On the sudden removal of the screen the subject had im- mediately to do something anything he liked. It was, of course, also understood that the subject should keep his mind a blank as much as it was in his power, and, at any rate, that he should not beforehand make up his mind what to do. The subjects, I must add, were perfectly trustworthy people coworkers in the Psychological Laboratory. THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 35 Now, while the screen was removed I at the same time loudly suggested some action such as " Read ! " " Write ! " " Cut ! " " Strike ! " " Ring ! " etc. On the table were objects appropriate to such actions a book, a pen, a knife, a hammer, a bell. The subjects very frequently carried out the commands, the suggestions given to them. Of five hundred experiments made, about one half succeeded ; that is, the subject carried out the sugges- tion given to him during the removal of the screen. Allowing ten per cent for chance, there remains about forty per cent in favour of suggestibility. On interrogating the subjects of their state of mind at the moment of action, many of them told me that they felt no desire nor any particular impulse to carry out the act suggested, but that they complied with my order out of sheer politeness. (I should say, though, that the fact of the order being realized so many times, be it even from mere politeness, indicates the presence of suggestibility.) Some of the subjects became totally unfitted to do anything at all. It seemed as if all activity was for the time being under some powerful inhibition. In the case of one subject Mr. S., one of the ablest men in the Psychological Laboratory I found that my order was carried out in a reflex way ; so much so that a few times, when I called out " Strike ! " " Ham- mer ! " the hand went down on the table instantane- ously and with such violence that the table was nearly shattered. Mr. S. felt pain in his hand for some min- utes. On one occasion I called out, "Look there!" Quick as lightning Mr. S. turned round and looked hard. On another occasion I commanded, " Rise ! " Back moved the chair and up went Mr. S. 36 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. Now this set of experiments, if regarded alone, cer- tainly does not carry conviction as to the presence of suggestibility in all perfectly normal and healthy per- sons; but along with other experiments with those that relate to suggestion of ideas, and with those in re- lation to choice suggestion, of which I shall soon give a detailed account this last set of movements' and acts' suggestion certainly contributes its mite of evidence. It is not, however, on account of their positive side that I value these movement experiments, but on ac- count of their negative side. I shall resume this sub- ject further on in its proper place. Interesting as that last line of investigation was, I still had to aban- don it, because the experiments could not possibly be expressed in precise quantitative terms. Except in the case of Mr. S., I could not precisely know how far the experiment succeeded and how far it failed. The different factors remained unanalyzed, and the whole mechanism was extremely crude and primitive. Thanks to the advice of Prof. H. Miinsterberg, I was enabled to continue my research further and pene- trate deeper into one of the most obscure, most mys- terious, but also most promising regions of human nature. The experiments which I am about to de- scribe were carried out with great care and minute- ness of detail. The new factors studied were carefully analyzed and separated. I must confess that at first I did not fully realize the import and value of these ex- periments ; I saw in them nothing else than a further test and affirmation of the fact of normal suggestibility, especially on its efferent or motor side. The highest I thought of their value was that along with the preced- ing experiments they would carry to the mind convic- tion perfect certitude as to the universality of normal THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 3? suggestibility. But later on, when I summed up the results and thought the matter over, I was glad to dis- cover that the results had a profounder meaning than the one I put on them ; that they pointed to something beyond, to something deeper and wider than the prob- lem they were intended to solve. To pass now to the experiments themselves. The experiments were carried on in the following way : Six small squares (30x30 mm.) of different colours were placed on a white background. The white background with the six squares on it was again covered by a black cardboard. The subject was told to fix his attention on the black cardboard for five seconds (time being meas- ured by the metronome). At the end of five seconds the black cover was removed, and the subject had im- mediately to take one of the coloured squares, which- ever he liked. The subjects were nineteen in number. No subject was allowed to take part in these experiments more than one hour a week. Precautions were also taken that the same series of colours should not be repeated in the experiments with the same subject. For this pur- pose Bradley's colours were used, which give an end- less combination of different colours. At the beginning of each week the colours were rearranged in new series of six squares each; no series containing the same colour, the squares were all of different colours. Pre- caution was also taken to hide the arrangement of the experiments from the subjects.* * As the squares were rather small in size they could with equal facility be reached with either hand, and there was, therefore, no tendency to prefer the squares of one side more than those of the other side. Besides, control-experiments with black squares were made by me; and these experiments still further confirmed the THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. In these experiments on suggestion of choice the following six factors were studied : 1. Abnormal position. 2. Colored cover. 3. Strange shape. 4. Colour verbally suggested. 5. Place verbally suggested. 6. Environment. 1. ABNORMAL POSITION. One of the coloured squares was placed in some abnormal way, thus : OR 2. COLOURED COVER. Instead of the usual black cover a coloured cover was used in these experiments. A square of the same colour as that of the cover was placed in the series of squares. 3. STRANGE SHAPE. One of the coloured squares was here of some peculiar shape, of the form of a tri- angle, oblong rectangle, rhomboid, pentagon, star, etc., thus : A view that this factor of preference by convenience was totally absent. THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 39 4. COLOUR VEEBALLY SUGGESTED. One of the col- oured squares was shown to the subject, who had to de- termine its colour. This was not an easy task, as the subject had to tell the constituents of the colour, and give the precise name of it. The subject usually kept the coloured square in his hand, and spoke about it for more than a minute. In case he did not succeed, I told him the name of the colour. Then the square was replaced in the series, and the experiment proper began. 5. PLACE VERBALLY SUGGESTED. The place of one of the coloured squares was suggested by calling out a number during the removal of the cover and the set of choice, as, for instance, " Three ! " meaning the third in the row beginning from the left hand. In order that the subject should understand the number suggested and get used to this mode of counting, I asked of him in other suggestion experiments that, after having chosen a coloured square, he should also tell its place, counting from left to right. C. ENVIRONMENT. One of the six coloured squares was put on a larger square of differently coloured paper. A fringe environing the square was thus formed. Special care was taken not to leave in the same place the square suggested, but to shift it with each subsequent experiment. The differently coloured squares suggested were each time put in different places, so that the subject should not form a habit of choosing from one place more than from another. To counteract all expectation as to what the nature of the experiment was, the experiments were constantly 4 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. changed as to the nature of the factor, and, to be the more sure of completely eliminating expectation, sham experiments were introduced. Instead of the usual col- oured squares, the subject frequently found a row of black squares, looking like a funeral march. These black squares were often screened by a cover of gay colour. Before I proceed to give a detailed account of the experiments, I think it would be well to give the pre- cise meaning in which I here employ the terms of mediate and immediate suggestion and suggestibility. By immediate suggestion I mean to indicate the full realization of the suggestion given to the subject the fact of his taking the square suggested to him in a direct or indirect way. By mediate suggestion I mean to indicate the fact of incomplete realization of the suggestion the fact of taking a square next to the one suggested by the experi- ment e. g. : a a s <> s a d, Immediate suggestion. c or 6, Mediate suggestion. The results are as follows : * 1. ABNORMAL POSITION. Per cent. Immediate suggestion 47' 85 Mediate suggestion 5*37 Total suggestion 53-22 * See Appendix A. THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 41 2. . COLOUEED COVER. Per cent. Immediate suggestion 38-16 Mediate suggestion 5-83 Total suggestion 43-99 3. STRANGE SHAPE. i Immediate suggestion 43 Mediate suggestion 13 Total suggestion 56 4. COLOUR VERBALLY SUGGESTED. Immediate suggestion 28*89 Mediate suggestion 4*44 Total suggestion 33-33 5. PLACE VERBALLY SUGGESTED. Immediate suggestion 19-41 Mediate suggestion 0-58 Total suggestion 19*99 6. ENVIRONMENT. Immediate suggestion 30-44 Mediate suggestion 22-22 Total suggestion 52-66 Making now a table of the factors and arranging them in the order suggestibility effected, we have the following : 42 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. TABLE OF IMMEDIATE SUGGESTIBILITY. Per cent. Abnormal position 47' 8 Strange shape 43'0 Coloured Cover 38*1 Environment 3O4 Colour verbally suggested 28' 8 Place verbally suggested 19*4 Mediate suggestibility necessitates a rearrangement of the factors : TABLE OF MEDIATE SUGGESTIBILITY. Per cent. Environment 22'2 Strange shape 13'0 Coloured cover 5*8 Abnormal position 5*3 Colour verbally suggested 4'4 Place verbally suggested 0'5 A scrutiny of the table of immediate suggestibility shows that the factors of abnormal position and of abnormal or strange shape give the strongest sugges- tion. A familiar thing in a strange abnormal position or shape produces the most effective suggestion. Noth- ing speaks so much to the childish or popular mind as a caricature, monstrosity, a grotesque figure. A dis- torted picture of a familiar scene or person will at once attract the attention of the child, and power- fully affect its conduct in case the picture is intended to show the fate of bad children. The angelical hap- piness of saints, the pure, holy bliss of martyrs, the intolerable torments suffered by the wicked in hell, THE EVIDENCE OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 43 speak volumes to the vulgar religious mind. When Vladimir, the Russian Kniase (king), intended to aban- don paganism and accept a monotheistic religion, mis- sionaries came to him from the Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians. No argument could affect the bar- barian. The cunning Greeks then showed him a pic- ture representing the day of judgment. The righteous enjoy eternal bliss in the company of beautiful maiden- like angels, while the wicked, with distorted faces, writhe and wriggle in agonies of pain. The infidels are cooked in enormous kettles containing a hellish soup of hot, seething oil and bubbling sulphur and pitch. The sinners, the blasphemers, are mercilessly fried and roasted by horned, tailed, cloven -hoofed, grin- ning, hideous-looking devils. Vladimir was deeply af- fected by the picture of the Christian hell, and at once accepted the Greek faith. This Russian tradition may serve as a good illustration of the great power of sug- gestion possessed by the two factors of abnormal posi- tion and strange shape. Turning now to the table of mediate suggestibility, we find that the factor of environment gives us as high a rate as 22'2 per cent, almost twice .the rate of the mediate suggestibility possessed by the factor of strange shape, and more than five times the rate of the mediate suggestibility possessed by the factor colour verbally suggested. This can possibly be explained by the fact that one of the conditions of the environment factor was to put one of the squares on a differently coloured background. The fringed square looked somewhat prettier than its fellows, and it was this prettiness that enhanced the mediate suggestibility. An adorned, beautiful object sheds glory on its homely neighbours and makes them more eligible. 44 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. But however the case may he with the relative sug- gestihility of the particular factors studied, these last experiments on choice suggestion, together with the other suggestion experiments, establish the fact of nor- mal suggestibility on a firm and unshakable basis. MAN 18 A SUGGESTIBLE ANIMAL, pCLT excellence. CHAPTER IV. THE CONDITIONS OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 1. THE first and general condition of normal sug- gestibility is fixation of the attention. In all my experiments the one indispensable condi- tion was to fix the attention on some spot and thus to prepare the subject for the acceptance of the sugges- tion. I asked the subject to look on some particular point chosen by me, the time of fixation usually vary- ing from two to five seconds. In my experiments with letters and figures the attention of the subject was fixed on the white surface of the screen for about two sec- onds before the first character of the series appeared ; then, again, between each figure or letter and the next following there was an interval of two or three seconds during which the subject had to look fixedly at the uniformly white screen. In my experiments with coloured squares, or on choice suggestion, the condition of fixation of attention was scrupulously observed ; the subject had to fix his attention on a particular point for five seconds. The same condition was observed in my experiments on suggestion of movements and of acts. The fixation of attention, as I said, was usually not continued longer than five seconds. Thus, out of 4,487 experiments made on suggestion, only 500 experiments (those dealing with suggestion of movements) had a fixation time higher than five seconds. 45 46 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. Fixation of attention is one of the most important conditions of normal suggestibility so much so that when this condition was absent the experiments were unsuccessful, the suggestion given invariably failed. The subject declared he was disturbed, mixed up, that he was not in the mood, that he could not make up his mind to write anything, to execute movements, or to choose squares. 2. The next condition of normal suggestibility is distraction of the attention. The subject had to fix his attention on some irrelevant point, spot, thing that had no connection with the material of the experiments, no resemblance to the objects employed for suggestion. Usually I asked my subjects to fix their attention on some minute dot, because a large spot or a big object might have interfered with the suggestion, on account of form, size, etc. The attention had to be diverted from the objects of the experiments. I found that when this condition of distraction of attention was ab- sent the experiments, as a rule, failed. A. Binet, in his valuable article on Double Consciousness,* the results of which we will discuss later on, tells us that the sug- gestion of movements brought about in healthy, nor- mal persons when in their waking condition required one " necessary condition : that attention should not be fixed on the hand and what is taking place there." Now Binet made his suggestion experiments on the hand movements of the subject ; the condition, then, he re- quires is that of distraction of the attention from the objects of the experiments. 3. In all the experiments I had to guard against variety of impressions. Slight noises coming from the * See also his book, Les alternations de la personnalite. THE CONDITIONS OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 47 adjoining rooms in the laboratory, a new man coming into the room where the experiments were being car- ried on, a book dropping, an Italian playing on the street organ, and many other kindred impressions, were dis- tinctly unfavourable to the experiments, and had to be avoided as much as possible. The subjects had to ac- custom themselves to the conditions and objects in the room, and any new impressions strongly interfered with the success of the suggestion. A fresh, new impression, however slight, proved always a disturbance. When the impression was a strong one, or when many impressions came together, the experiments were interrupted and the whole work came to a standstill. The experiments could be carried on only in a monotonous environment, otherwise they failed. Thus we find that 'monotony is an indispensable condition of normal suggestibility. 4. While fixing their attention the subjects had to keep as quiet as possible ; for otherwise the subject became disturbed, his attention began to wander, and the suggestion failed. Before the experiments began the subjects were asked to make themselves as com- fortable as possible, so that they should not have to change their position during the experiments. We find, then, that normal suggestibility requires as one of its conditions a limitation of voluntary movements. 5. limitation of the field of consciousness may be also considered as one of the principal conditions of normal suggestibility. This condition, however, is in fact a result of the former ones namely, fixation of attention, monotony, and limitation of voluntary move- ments ; for when these last conditions are present the field of consciousness is contracted, closed to any new incoming impressions, limited only to a certain set of sensations, fixed, riveted to only a certain point. Con 48 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. traction of the field of consciousness may, however, be effected where the other conditions are absent. A sud- den, violent impression may instantly effect an enor- mous shrinkage of the field of consciousness, and then the other conditions will naturally follow, or rather co- exist ; for consciousness will reverberate with this one violent sense impression and will thus attend to only the latter. There will also be monotony, since this one sudden and violent sense impression tolerates few neighbours and drives out fresh incomers. Volun- tary movements will then certainly be limited, since the stream of consciousness is narrowed, and along with it its ideomotor side. The fact that limitation or con- traction of the field of consciousness may occur by itself without having been preceded by the conditions mentioned above led me to consider it a separate con- dition of normal suggestibility. 6. The experiments, again, could not be carried on without the condition of inhibition. I asked the sub- ject that, when he concentrated his attention and fixed a particular dot pointed out to him, he should try as much as it was in his power to banish all ideas images that had no connection with the experiments in hand ; that he should not even think of the experiments them- selves ; in short, that he should make his mind a, perfect blank, and voluntarily inhibit ideas, associations that might arise before his mind's eye and claim attention. Of course, this condition was rather a hard task for the subject to comply with, still it was observed as far as it was possible. When this condition was neglected by the subject the experiments invariably failed. Inhibi- tion, then, is a necessary condition of normal suggesti- bility. 7. The very last condition, but at the same time the THE CONDITIONS OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 49 principal one, the most fundamental condition sine qua non experiments in normal suggestion, was immediate execution. The subject was told that as soon as he per- ceived the signal he should immediately write, act, or choose. To make a synopsis of the conditions of normal sug- gestibility : 1. Fixation of attention. 2. Distraction of attention. 3. Monotony. 4. Limitation of voluntary movements. 5. Limitation of the field of consciousness. 6. Inhibition. 7. Immediate execution. CHAPTEK V. THE LAW OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. WE must turn again to our experiments and give a close study to the results obtained. We take choice suggestion first. N"ow, out of the six factors studied, four belong to direct suggestion and two to indirect suggestion. The factors of abnormal position, strange shape, coloured cover, environment, are of one type, while the factors of colour verbally suggested and place verbally suggested are of the other opposite type of suggestion. Is there any difference in the rate of sug- gestibility of the two types of suggestion ? Yes, and a very good one, too. For even a superficial glance at the two tables of immediate and mediate suggestibility,* if the latter are only inspected from the standpoint of the two types of suggestion, will at once disclose this radical difference. The average immediate suggesti- bility of the four factors belonging to the first type to indirect suggestion amounts to 39*8 per cent, whereas the average rate of immediate suggestibility of the two last factors belonging to the second type to direct sug- gestion amounts only to 2-i^l per cent. And if we inspect the table of mediate suggestibility, we find again a similar difference ; for the average medi- ate suggestibility of the first four factors belonging to the type of indirect suggestion gives a rate of 11 '5 per cent. * See Chapter III, page 42. 50 THE LAW OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 51 Whereas the average rate of mediate suggestibility of the last two factors belonging to the type of direct suggestion amounts- to only 2*4 per cent. The difference between the two types of suggestion becomes very striking indeed if we make a table of total suggestibility that is, if we add together the mediate and immediate suggestibility of each factor. Making thus the table and arranging the factors in the order of their respective rates of total suggestibility, we have the following results : * TABLE OF TOTAL SUGGESTIBILITY. Per cent. Strange shape 56 Abnormal position 53'2 Environment 52'6 Coloured cover 43*9 Colour verbally suggested 33'3 Place verbally suggested 19*9 A mere glance at this table shows the great differ- ence of the two types of suggestion ; and tins differ- ence becomes yet more evident, still more striking, if we take the rate of the average total suggestibility of the first type of factors and compare it with that of the second. For the average total suggestibility of the first four factors amounts to as much as 51 '4 per cent, while that of the last two amounts only to 26*6 per cent. The one rate is about twice the otheri The conclusion is obvious, as it lies now before us clear and distinct in its outlines. In the case of normal sugges- * See Chapter III, page 41. 52 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. tibility indirect suggestion is far more effective than direct suggestion. If we examine closer the nature of the last two fac- tors, colour verbally suggested and place verbally sug- gested, factors which we classed in the type of direct suggestion, we find that they are only relatively direct ; for, after all, the subject was not explicitly and directly told to take that colour. What we really must say of them is, that they far more approach the type of direct suggestion than the other four factors do. If now we inquire as to the rate of suggestibility when the factor is of the actual explicit type of direct suggestion, the answer is, naught. The experiments on suggestion of movements bring out clearly this answer. The suggestion employed there was that of the most direct and explicit kind, and, with the exception of Mr. S., the experiments proved a total failure. The sub- jects ironically complied with my command. The re- sults were negative zero. Direct suggestion is at the freezing point of normal suggestibility. It is only in proportion as a given factor becomes more indirect that it rises in the scale of suggestibility. In other words, the more indirect a factor is the higher is the rate of its suggestibility. Should we like to have still further proofs we can easily get them ; for a close scrutiny of the tables of immediate, mediate, and total suggestibility most clearly shows the truth of my position, namely, that in the nor- mal state a suggestion is more effective the more indirect it is, and in proportion as it becomes direct it loses its efficacy. Abnormal position, strange shape, and envi- ronment are the most indirect, and they give the highest suggestibility (environment in mediate suggestibility gives a slightly higher rate because of the additional THE LAW OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 53 factor of attractiveness). Abnormal position and abnor- mal shape have about the same rate ; for, on the whole, it makes no difference for man whether a familiar thing is put into an abnormal position or whether it appears in a strange garb : he is equally impressed and moved. As we come to the factor of coloured cover we find a slight de- crease in the rate of suggestibility. For if we take the average immediate suggestibility of abnormal position and strange shape * we have 45 '4 per cent, while that of coloured cover is 38'1 per cent ; the difference is 7*3 per cent ; and we find a difference between the same factors in the case of total suggestibility, the difference being 1O6 per cent. Now the suggestion of coloured cover is somewhat more direct than that of abnormal position, or strange shape; for in spreading a coloured cover over the squares, the subject, on seeing and fixing his attention on it, could not help suspecting that it was a square of the same colour that I wanted him to choose : opposition was aroused and the suggestion failed. Al- though I repeatedly baffled and disappointed the expec- tation of the subject by putting black squares under the coloured cover, or spreading one over a row of squares totally different in colour from that of the cover, still I could not completely dislodge the suspicion from the subject's mind ; it was always lurking in the background of his consciousness. Of the two factors, colour verbally suggested and place verbally suggested, the former is more indirect than the latter. In the one I merely showed a square to the subject and asked him to determine the colour, without hinting my intention (the subject very fre- quently being absorbingly interested in guessing the * See Chapter III, page 42. 54 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. name) ; while in the other the number of the place of the suggested square was called out during the removal of the cover the hint, therefore, was more direct. If now we look at the tables of immediate, mediate, and total suggestibility of the two factors we find a great difference in their rates of efficiency. The immediate suggestibility of the factor colour verbally suggested is 28'8 per cent, while that of place verbally suggested is 19*4 " the difference amounting to 9'4 " The mediate suggestibility of the factor colour verbally suggested is 4'4 " while that of place verbally suggested is but 0-5 " the difference amounting to 3'9 " The total suggestibility of colour, etc., is 33-3 " while that of place, etc., is 19'9 " the difference being 13*4 " If again we turn to our very first study with letters and figures, we find the results pointing to the same truth. The factors of frequency and last impression are far more indirect than those of coexistence and repe- tition, and we correspondingly find a great difference in their rates of suggestibility. Thus the average rate of frequency and of last impression is (63*3 -f 42'6) -f- 2 52'9 per cent ; while the average rate of suggesti- bility of repetition and of coexistence is (1T'6 + 6'6) -r- 2 12'1 per cent, the difference being 40*8 per cent. The factor of last impression, again, is relatively more indirect than that of frequency, and correspond- ingly we find a difference in their rates of suggesti- bility. THE LAW OF NORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 55 The factor of last impression gives. . 63 '3 per cent, while that of frequency gives 42*6 " the difference being 20*7 " The factor of repetition is relatively more indirect than that of coexistence, in the latter the suggestion be- ing almost grossly obvious, and once more we find a corresponding difference in their rates of suggestibility. Kepetition gives 1 Y'6 per cent, while the factor of coexistence gives. ... 6'6 " the difference being 11 Furthermore, the factor of last impression came with as high a rate as 63*3 per cent, but when the same fac- tor of last impression enters into combination with that of coexistence, forming one factor of coexistence and last impression, the rate falls as low as 18'3 per cent, thus strongly contrasting the efficacy of direct with that of indirect suggestion. What is the outcome of this whole discussion ? Nothing less than the law of normal suggestibility a law which we shall find later on of the utmost impor- tance. Normal suggestibility varies as indirect suggestion, and inversely as direct suggestion. CHAPTEK VI. THE CONDITIONS OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. THE great type of abnormal suggestibility is the hypnotic state ; so much so that the Nancy school de- fines hypnosis as a state of heightened suggestibility. The conditions of abnormal suggestibility are, in fact, those of hypnosis. What are they ? 1. The first and foremost is that of fixation of the attention. Thus Braid used to hypnotize his subjects by fixing their attention on some brilliant object or point. He considered a steady attention indispensable if hypnosis were to be attained ; the subject must look steadily at the object, he must only think of the thing he was fixing, and must not allow his attention to be diverted from it. Of such permanent importance is fixation of attention that, according to Braid, if only this condition is observed one can hypnotize even in the dark. The ability to direct one's thoughts in any par- ticular direction is very favourable to hypnosis. Those who can by no possibility fix their attention, who suf- fer from continual absence of mind, or those who are helplessly stupid and lacking the power of concentra- tion, are not hypnotizable. I find in my notes the case of an extremely stupid young boy of sixteen who, on account of lack of concentration of mind, is unable to solve the most elementary arithmetical problem. I 56 CONDITIONS OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 57 foretold that he would be unhypnotizable (of course I did not tell that to him). Although I hypnotized in his presence three good subjects, he remained refractory. I tried all kinds of methods I could think of ; the last one was that of Braid. For more than twenty minutes he fixed an object, his eyes being converged in the most orthodox fashion, inward and upward ; tears were trickling down his cheeks, but he remained unaffected, and for the simple reason that his attention was not kept steady it was roving and wandering all the while. All methods of hypnotization require fixation of atten- tion as their indispensable condition. The adherents of the Salpetriere school frequently hypnotize by fixing the subject's attention on the expectation of some sud- den brilliant ray of light meant to induce the hypnotic state. The followers of the Nancy school fix the at- tention of the subject on the two fingers held before his eyes and on the sounds of suggestion given by the operator. " I hold two fingers," says Bernheim,* " be- fore the patient's eyes and ask him to concentrate his attention on the idea of sleep." The efficacy of mes- meric passes is also due to the fixation of attention, for by those means the whole attention of the subject is directed to the particular place where the passes are made. " Let any one," says Dr. Moll,f " allow his arm or his leg to be mesmerized by passes, and he will find that his whole attention is directed to this part of his body, and much more strongly than if his attention was concentrated on the limb in another manner." " Die Hauptsache ist," Lehmann \ tells us, " dass in der Hypnose die Aufmerksamkeit in einer bestimmten Bichtung gebunden ist." This is not exactly true of * Suggestive Therapeutics. f Hypnotism. \ Die Hvpnose. 58 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. ihe hypnotic state itself, but it holds true with re- gard to the induction of hypnosis. " Children under three and four and insane persons, especially idiots, are unusually hard to hypnotize," says Prof. James.* " This seems due to the impossibility of getting them to fix their attention continually on the idea of the com- ing trance." Prof. James seems to me to have hit the mark when he tells us that the concentration of attention on the coming trance induces hypnosis. In short, fixation of attention is an indispensable condition of hypnosis. 2. Monotony of impressions is another condition of the hypnotic state. If you want to hypnotize a subject, especially if it is for the first time, you must put him into a monotonous environment. You must prevent fresh, new impressions from reaching the sensorium of the subject. Whatever your mode of hypnotization may be, it must always be of the same kind. This might be effected by a strong stimulus acting for a moment or two, or, what is far more often the case, by a prolonged monotonous series of slight stimuli. Thus Binet f tells us that " slight and prolonged stimuli of the same nature " constitute one of the modes of pro- ducing the hypnotic state. Bernheim \ expresses him- self on this point more clearly : " Let us add," he says, " that in the majority of the passes the monotonous, wearying, and continuous impression of one of the senses produce a certain intellectual drowsiness, the prelude of sleep. The mind, entirely absorbed by a quiet, uniform, and incessant perception, becomes for- eign to all other impressions ; it is too feebly stimulated, and allows itself to become dull." This condition of * Psychology, vol. ii. f Animal Magnetism. \ Suggestive Therapeutics. CONDITIONS OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 59 monotony is very clearly seen in the case of the Nancy method of hypnotization. The operator suggests in so many words the same idea of going to sleep : " Your eyelids are heavy ; your eyes are tired ; they begin to wink ; you feel a sort of drowsiness ; your arms and legs are motionless ; sleep is coming ; sleep ." My mode of hypnotization consists in forming a monot- onous environment ; the light is lowered, and a pro- found silence reigns in the room ; then gently and monotonously stroking the skin of the subject's fore- head, and in a low, muffled, monotonous voice, as if rocking a baby to sleep, I go on repeating, " Sleep, sleep, sleep," etc., until the subject falls into the hyp- notic state. 3. Limitation of voluntary movements is also one of the conditions of inducing hypnosis. The subject sits down on a chair in a comfortable position, and is asked to relax his muscles and make as few movements as possible to keep as quiet as a mouse. This condi- tion is, in fact, supplementary to that of fixation of at- tention, for many different movements strongly inter- fere with the steadiness of the attention. The attention changes, oscillates in different directions, and the induc- tion of hypnosis is rendered impossible. Dr. Moll * says that " fascination is induced by limitation of volun- tary movements." This is no doubt perfectly true, only Dr. Moll ought not to limit it to " fascination " alone, for limitation of voluntary movements is one of the principal conditions of inducing hypnosis in general. 4. Limitation of the field of consciousness must cer- tainly be included among the conditions of inducing hypnosis. The consciousness of the subject must be * Hypnotism. 60 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. narrowed to one idea of sleep. " I endeavour," says Braid in his Neurypnology, " to rid the mind at once of all ideas but one" Wundt defines the very nature of hypnosis as limitation of the field of consciousness, and to a certain extent he is justified in his assertion, seeing that all the methods of hypnotization turn on it as on a pivot. Thus the method of Braid narrows the field of consciousness to a brilliant point, that of mes- merism to the passes, that of the Nancy school to the tips of the fingers held out before the subject, or to the one idea of expectation of sleep. To induce hypnosis we must in some way or other effect such a limitation. We know that a strange emotion narrows down the field of consciousness. We often find that people under the emotion of intense excitement lose, so to say, their senses ; their mind seems to be paralyzed, or rather, so to say, the one idea that produces the excite- ment banishes all other ideas, and a state of monoideism, or concentration of the consciousness, is thus effected. People are frequently run over by carriages, cars, or trains on account of the sudden great fright caused. The one idea of danger reverberates in the mind like a sudden powerful clap of thunder, confusing and stun- ning all other ideas ; the mind is brought into a con- tracted cataleptic condition, and the field of conscious- ness is narrowed down to that one idea, to a single point. IsTow, we find that the hypnotic trance can also be induced by a strong and sudden stimulus acting on the sense organ. " Hypnotization," says Binet,* " can be produced by strong and sudden excitement of the senses." This mode of hypnotization may be suc- cessful with people of an intensely emotional nature or * Animal Magnetism. CONDITIONS OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 61 with hysterical subjects. A strong, sudden stimulus acts on them like a thunderclap, contracts their field of consciousness, and throws them into a hypnotic state. On the whole, we may say that limitation of the field of consciousness is one of the most important condi- tions of hypnotic trance. 5. The hypnotic trance, again, can not be induced without the condition of inhibition. The subject must inhibit all ideas, all images that come up before his mind. He must only think of the brilliant point, of the tips of the hypnotizer's fingers, of the passes, of the idea of going to sleep. " Look at me and think of nothing but sleep," tells Bernheim to his patients. " Make your mind a blank," is one of the conditions required by the hypnotizer of his subjects. Concentration of attention and limitation of the field of consciousness are, in fact, impossible without the presence of this condition of inhibition. The case of the boy mentioned above, who could not be hypnotized because his attention was roaming, because he was unable to concentrate his mind, was in reality due to the fact of lacking the power of inhibition. Inhibition, voluntary or involun- tary, is an indispensable condition of hypnosis. To make a synopsis of the conditions of hypnosis, or, what is the same, of abnormal suggestibility : 1. Fixation of attention. 2. Monotony. 3. Limitation of voluntary movements. 4. Limitation of the field of consciousness. 5. Inhibition. CHAPTER VII. THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. FROM the condition of hypnosis we turn now to an inquiry into its nature. To do this I think it would be best to examine from a purely empirical standpoint the general states into which the hypnotic subject may fall. Bernheim finds that there are not less than nine states or stages : 1. Drowsiness. 2. Drowsiness, with inability to open the eys. 3. Suggestive catalepsy slightly present. 4. Suggestive catalepsy more pronounced. 5. Suggestive contractures fully induced. 6. Automatic obedience. 7. Loss of memory on waking. Hallucinations not possible. 8. Loss of memory. Slight possibility of producing hallucinations, but not post-hypnotically. 9. Loss of memory. Hypnotic and post-hypnotic hallucinations possible. Dr. Liebault finds that there are only six of them : 1. Drowsiness. 2. Drowsiness. Suggestive catalepsy indncible. 3. Light sleep. Automatic movements possible. 4. Deep sleep. Phenomena rapport manifested. 5. Light somnambulism. Memory hazy on waking. 62 THE NATURE OP ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 63 6. Deep somnambulism. Total amnesia. Phe- nomena of post-hypnotic suggestion possible. Prof. August Forel reduces them to three : 1. Drowsiness. 2. Inability to open the eyes. Obedience to sug- gestion. 3. Somnambulism. Amnesia. Dr. Lloyd-Tukey gives the following states : 1. Light sleep. 2. Profound sleep. 3. Somnambulism. Max Dessoir reduces them to two : 1. Voluntary movements show changes. 2. Abnormalities in the functions of the sense or- gans are added. Edmund Gurney, the most philosophical of all the writers and investigators on the subject of hypnotism, gives the following two states : 1. The alert state. 2. The deep state. As a matter of fact, however, the subjects little respect all those quasi-scientific classifications of hyp- notic states. Dr. Kingsbury is no doubt right in his remark that " patients vary as much in hypnosis as they do in their features." No doubt there are as many hypnotic states as there are persons ; no doubt that it is utterly impossible to give cut-and-dried definitions for the infinite variety of hypnotic stages. Although all this is perfectly true, we still assert that there is a line of subdivision a boundary line that separates one region of hypnotic phenomena from that of another. This boundary line is, in fact, implied in nearly all the classifications of hypnosis. To find this boundary line, let us examine the state 64 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. of mind of the subject when he is in a light hyp- notic trance. The subject is in a passive condition. If during hypnotization he was sitting in a chair, there he will remain until roused, his limbs relaxed, his fea- tures placid, making as few movements as possible, occasionally changing his position if it becomes very uncomfortable. If his eyes are closed, he will continue to keep them in that condition. Try now to make a direct suggestion that might in the least interfere with what he considers as his voluntary life, with his free- dom of action ; challenge him, for instance, by raising his hand and teDing him that he can not lower it, that he can not open his eyes ; down goes the hand and up goes the eyelid, thus showing us that, passive as he ap- pears to be, he does have control over his limbs. The controlling consciousness is there, only it is in- active, passive, and it requires a special external stimu- lus to set it going, to put it into activity. My friend Mr. L. told me once he wondered greatly at the passiv- ity in which he was when in a state of hypnosis. He told me he firmly made up his mind that when hypno- tized again he would start a conversation on different topics. A few minutes later I hypnotized him, but he remained as passive as usual. To start him into activ- ity an impulse from without was first required. Mark now the peculiarity. The activity set going does not continue longer than the challenged act. I raise the subject's arm and challenge him to lower it ; he does lower the arm, but keeps it down there in a passive condition. I tell the subject he is unable to walk ; the challenge is accepted ; he makes a step, very rarely two, showing me that he can walk, that he possesses full control over his legs, but remains passively in one place. He makes another step if you challenge him THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 65 again. The controlling consciousness is in a passive state, and reasserts itself at every single challenge to act. The act done, and the controlling consciousness falls back into its former state the subject relapses into his passive condition. Hypnotization produces a deep cleft in the mind of the subject, a cleft by which the waking, controlling consciousness is separated from the great stream of conscious life. Now when the cleft is not deep enough we have the different slight hypnotic states, but as the cleft becomes deeper and deeper the hypnosis grows more profound, and when the controlling consciousness is fully cut off from the rest of conscious life we have a state of full hyp- nosis which is commonly called somnambulism, and in which there is complete amnesia on awakening. That is why we have the strange accounts of hypnotic subjects, especially of those who are on the verge of somnambu- lism, that during hypnosis they were indifferent to the actions of their body the latter acted by itself ; that they were mere spectators of all the experiments per- formed on them, of all the strange actions, dramas, that transpired during the trance ; that it seemed to them as if they themselves, their personality, retreated far, far away. We have not to wonder that on the question " Where are you ? " the subject sometimes gives the seemingly absurd reply of Krafft-Ebing's patient " In your eye." There are pathological cases on record which are analogous to this state. The conscious controlling " I " seems to retreat far, far away from the worM. Dr. Krishaber brings the case of a patient who gives tl?e following account of himself : " I myself was immeas- urably far away. I looked about me with terror aD3 astonishment ; the world was escaping from me. I r& marked at the same time that my voice was extremely 66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. far away from me, that it sounded no longer as if mine. Constantly it seemed to me as if my legs did not belong to me. It was almost as bad with my arms. I appeared to myself to act automatically, by an impulsion foreign to myself. It was certainly another who had taken my form and assumed my functions. I hated, I despised this other ; he was perfectly odious to me." To return, however, to hypnosis. In the superficial stages, when the subject is not in a very deep trance, we frequently meet with curious phenomena of the following kind : I raise the hand of the subject and put it in some uncomfortable position and let it remain there ; there it stays all the while. I challenge him to lower his hand. He does not answer. I repeat again the challenge. No reply. " Answer me : Why do not you lower the hand ? " "I do not care to," comes the slow answer. I keep on challenging him for some seconds. At last the stimuli get summated, the con- trolling consciousness is stimulated, makes strenuous efforts, and the hand, shaking and in jerks, slowly de- scends. I tell the subject that he forgot his name, that he can by no means remember it. He keeps silent. " You forgot your name, you do not remember it," I assert firmly and positively. " Yes, I do," comes in a low voice the slow and tardy reply. " But you do not know your name." " Yes, I do." " No, you don't." " Yes, I do." And so he wrangles with me for about three or five minutes, until at last he seems to brace himself up and tells me his name. " But why did you not tell it to me before ? " "I really do not care to tell my name." The cleft in the mind is here of some depth, and it requires a strong challenge, an intense stimulus, to set the controlling consciousness into ac- tivity. THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 67 When the patient sinks into a deeper and deeper hypnotic condition, when the hypnosis is so profound as to verge on somnambulism, the waking, controlling consciousness hangs, so to say, on a thread to the rest of organic life ; and when that thread, too, is cut off by suggestion, or by some other means, the waking, guiding consciousness loses all contact with the stream of life. We can easily state our theory in terms of physi- ological psychology. The nervous centres of man's nervous system, if classified as to function, may be divided into inferior and superior. Tli3 inferior cen- tres are characterized by reflex and automatic activity. A stimulus excites the peripheral nerve endings of some sense organ ; at once a nervous current is set up in the afferent nerves. This current in its turn stimulates a plexus of central ganglia, the nervous energy of which is set free and is propagated along the efferent nerves toward glands or muscles ; secretions^ excretions, muscular contractions, or relaxations are the final result. Ingoing and outgoing nervous cur- rents may be modified by the nervous centres ; nervous currents may be intensified, decreased in energy, or even entirely inhibited by mutual interaction, according to the law derived by Prof. Ziehen from the general physiology of the nerves namely : " If an excitation of definite intensity (m) take place in one cortical cle- ment (i), and another excitation of a different intensity (n) take place at the same time in another cortical ele- ment (c), which is connected by a path of conduction with 5, the two intensities of excitation may recip- rocally modify each other." Although such a modifi- cation may frequently occur, still it remains true that the inferior centres are of a reflex nature. No sooner is the nervous energy of a lower centre set free than at 68 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. once it tends to discharge itself into some kind of ac- tion, of movement. The physiological process of set- ting free the nervous energy in a central ganglion, or in a system of central ganglia, is accompanied in the simpler but more integrated, more organized centres by sentience, sensitiveness, sensibility,* and in the more complex but less integrated, less organized centres by consciousness, sensations, perceptions, images, and ideas. Turning now to the superior or the highest nervous centres, we find that they possess the function of choice and will. A number of impressions, of sensations, of ideas reach those will-centres, and a sifting, a selecting, an inhibitory process at once begins. Some of the im- pressions are rejected, inhibited ; others are permitted to work themselves out within certain limits, and others again are given full, free play. Psychologically, this process expresses itself in the fiat or the neget, in the " I will " or the " I will not." Every one is well ac- quainted with the will-effort, especially when having to make some momentous resolution. These superior choice and will-centres, localized by Ferrier, Bianchi, and others in the frontal lobes, and by other writers in the upper layers of the cortex these centres, on ac- count of their selective and inhibitory function, may be characterized as inhibitory centres par excellence. Now, parallel to the double system of nervous cen- tres, the inferior and the superior, we also have a double consciousness, the inferior, the organic, the reflex con- sciousness, and the superior, the controlling, the choice, and will consciousness. The controlling consciousness may be characterized as the guardian consciousness of * See G. H. Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind, second series. THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 69 the species. And from an evolutionary teleological standpoint we can well see of what use this guardian consciousness is to the life of the species. The external world bombards, so to say, the living organism with innumerable stimuli ; from all sides thousands of im- pressions come on, crowding upon the senses of the individual. Each impression has a motor tendency which, if not counteracted by other impressions, must fatally result in some action. It is not, however, of advantage to the organism always to act, and to act immediately on all stimuli reaching it ; hence that organism will succeed in the struggle for life that pos- sesses some inhibitory choice and will-centres. The choice and will-centres permit only a certain number of impressions to take effect ; the rest are inhibited. Only those impressions that are advantageous to the life ex- istence of the organism are allowed to take their course ; the others are nipped in their bud. The guardian con- sciousness wards off as far as it is able all the harm- ful blows with which the environment incessantly as- sails the organic life of the individual. Having all this in mind, we can now understand the nature of hypnosis. In the normal condition of man the superior and the inferior centres work in perfect harmony; the upper and the lower consciousness are for all practical purposes blended into a unity forming one conscious personality. In hypnosis the two systems of nervous centres are dissociated, the superior centres and the upper consciousness are inhibited, or, better, cut off, split off from the rest of the nervous system with its organic consciousness, which is thus laid bare, open to the influence of external stimuli or suggestions. Physiologically, hypnosis is an inhibition of the in- hibitory centres, or, in other words, hypnosis is a dis- 70 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. aggregation of tfo superior from tlie inferior centres^ necessarily followed, as is the removal of inhibition in general, by an increase of the idea-motor and ideo-sen- sory reflex excitability. Psychologically, hypnosis is the split-off^ disaggregated^ organic^ reflex consciousness pure and simple. This theory of hypnosis is, in fact, a generalization in which the views of the two schools, the Salpetriere and the Nancy, are included. With the Nancy school, we agree that suggestion is all-powerful in hypnotic trance ; the hypnotic trance is, in fact, a state of height- ened suggestibility, or, rather of pure reflex con- sciousness ; but with the Paris school we agree, that a changed physiological state is a prerequisite to hyp- nosis, and this modification consists in the disaggrega- tion of the superior from the inferior centres, in the segregation of the controlling consciousness from the reflex consciousness. In hypnotic trance the upper in- hibiting, resisting consciousness being absent, we have direct access to man's organic consciousness, and through it to organic life itself. Strong, persistent impressions or suggestions made on the reflex organic consciousness of the inferior centres may modify their functional dis- position, induce trophic changes, and even change or- ganic structures. But whatever the case may be with regard to psycho -therapeutics, this, it seems, may be fairly granted, that the process of hypnotization consists in the separation of the higher inhibitory cortical gan- glion cells from the rest of the cerebro-spinal and sym- pathetic nervous systems. Hypnosis, we may say, is the more or less effected disaggregation of the controlling inhibitory centres from the rest of the nervous system ; along with this disaggregation there goes a dissociation of the controlling guardian consciousness from the reflex THE NATURE OP ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 71 organic consciousness. Dissociation is the secret of hypnosis, and amnesia is the ripe fruit. The magnitude of this disaggregation greatly varies. If it is at its minimum, the hypnosis is light ; if at its maximum, the hypnosis is deep, and is known as som- nambulism. From our standpoint of hypnosis we may say that there are only two great distinct classes of hypnotic states : 1. Incomplete dissociation of the waking, controlling consciousness. 2. Complete dissociation of the waking conscious- ness. Stating the same somewhat differently, we may say that there are two states : 1. Incomplete hypnosis accompanied by a greater or lesser degree of memory. 2. Complete hypnosis with no memory. In other words, hypnosis has two states : 1. The mnesic state. 2. The amnesic state. Amnesia is the boundary line that separates two different hypnotic regions. This view of the matter is, in fact, taken by Ed- mund Gourney ; for he tells us that " we might with- out incorrectness describe the higher hypnotic phenom- ena as reflex action, in respect of the certainty with which particular movements follow on particular stim- uli ; but they are, and their peculiarity consists in their being, conscious reflex action"* "The heart of the problem [of hypnotism] " he says in another place, " lies not in CONSCIOUSNESS, but in WILL." In his paper on The Stages of Hypnotising E. Gourney distinguishes * Mind, October, 1884. P. S. P. R., December, 1884. f Ibid., January, 1884. P. S. P. R., January, 1884. 6 Y2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. two states of hypnosis the alert and the deep state. " The question then presents itself," he writes, " Is there any distinction of kind between the two states f I be- lieve that there is such a distinction, and that the phe- nomena needed to establish it are to be found in the domain of memory" Gnrney, however, thinks that not only is the deep, but the hypnotic state as a whole, that is, the alert one, too, is separated from the normal state by amnesia a proposition which is not borne out by facts. On the whole, however, I may say that Gur- ney was on the right track ; he cast a searching glance deep into the nature of hypnosis. If we turn now to the classifications reviewed by us we find that they have a change of memory, am- nesia, as their fundamentum divisionis. Max Des- soir's forms the only exception, but his classification sins against the truth of facts. For there are cases of subjects who fall into deep hypnosis and still there can be induced no abnormal changes in the sense or- gans. I myself have a somnambule, Mr. F., who can be led through a series of imaginary scenes and changes of personalities, but whose sense organs remain almost normal, perfectly free from suggestion ; by no means can I make him see a picture on a blank paper, or feel the taste of sugar on eating salt, or take a glass of water for a glass of wine phenomena which I easily induce in another somnambule, Mr. W. There are again other cases on record where the sense organs are deeply affected, but no abnormalities can be induced in the voluntary movements. Bernheim brings a few cases of this kind. Amnesia is the only boundary line in hypnosis, and degeneration of consciousness is its source. Suggestion is at present the shibboleth of many a THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 7-3 "scientific" psychologist. Suggestion is the magic key that opens all secrets and discloses all mysteries. Sug- gestion explains everything. To any question as to hypnosis asked of the suggestionist, he, like a parrot, has but one answer : " Suggestion " ! "Well may Binet say : * "It is insufficient to explain everything that takes place in hypnotized subjects by invoking the hackneyed term 'Suggestion!' And that suffices for all purposes ; that explains everything, and, like the panacea of the ancients, it cures everything. As a matter of fact, theories of suggestion thus invoked amount to nothing less than makeshifts to save people the trouble of serious and delicate investigation." Sug- gestionists make of suggestion a kind of metaphysical absolute, a Spinozistic causa sui, for, according to this trance-philosophy, hypnosis is nothing but suggestion ; and by what is it induced ? Why, by suggestion ! Sug- gestion is thus its own cause. Absurd as this trance- philosophy of suggestionism is, it is none the less the current view of many a "scientific" psychologist. Still the authorities on the subject do not always talk the suggestion jargon ; in their more lucid states they use quite a different language. The pity only is that they do not grasp the full import and meaning of their own propositions ; they do not see the far-reaching conse- quences of their own statements. Dr. Moll, in his remarkable book on Hypnotism, sums up his theory of hypnosis thus : " "We may, then, consider every hypnosis as a state in which the normal course of the ideas is inhibited. It matters not whether the ideas have to do with movements or with sense im- pressions. Their normal course is always inhibited. * On Double Consciousness. 74 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. The idea of a movement called up in a subject in or out of hypnosis has a tendency to induce the movement. But in waking life this idea is made ineffectual by the voluntary idea of the subject that he will prevent the suggested movement ; the hypnotized subject can not do this* The same is the case with suggested paralysis. Sense delusions can be explained in a similar way. We tell the hypnotic subject, ' Here is a dog,' and he realizes it, and sees the dog. The limitation of the normal course of the ideas allows the idea of the dog to be- come a perception. The subject is unable to control the external ideas, or to put forward his own ; the ex- ternal ones dominate his consciousness. Psychologically speaking, what we mean by attention is the power of fixing certain ideas in the mind and of working with them. Consequently we may say that there is an alter- ation of attention in hypnosis. But attention may be either spontaneous or reflex. When by any act of will we choose one of several ideas and fix our attention upon it, this is spontaneous attention ; but when one idea among several gets the upper hand through its in- tensity or for some other reason, and thus represses other ideas and draws exclusive attention upon itself, this is reflex attention. Now it is only spontaneous at- tention which is altered in hypnosis i. e., the subject's ability voluntarily to prefer one idea to another is inter- fered with, while reflex attention is undisturbed, and it is through this last that a suggested idea, the choice of which has not, however, been left to the subject, comes into prominence. "Many investigators," continues Dr. Moll, "con- ceive hypnotism in this way. The works of Durand * The italics are mine. THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. f5 de Gros, Liebault, and more lately of Beard, Kichet, Schneider, Wundt, and Bentivegni, are in the main di- rect to this point." It is truly amusing to see how people concede the main substance to their opponents and still cling to the empty shell of their old creeds. Accepting inhibition of spontaneous attention as the source, as the nature of hypnosis, the psychologist of the suggestion school fully abandons his medical charm, his all-powerful magic suggestion. Inhibition of spontaneous attention, of voluntary control, leaving a residue of reflex attention, what is it, if not the full admission that the hypnotic state is a mental disaggregation, a dissociation of the controlling from the reflex consciousness ? Turning now to one of the leaders of the Nancy school, to the greatest popularizer of suggestionism Prof. Bernheim we find him to be still more explicit on this point. I humbly ask the reader's pardon for the lengthy quotation I am going to offer him. I find it will give additional confirmation to my view of the nature of hypnosis. In his book, " Suggestive Thera- peutics," Bernheim gives us the following account of hypnosis, an account that practically amounts to a com- plete abandonment of his omnipotent deity suggestion : "The one thing certain is that a peculiar aptitude for transforming the idea received into an act exists in hyp- notized subjects who are susceptible to suggestion. In the normal consciousness every formulated idea is ques- tioned by the mind. After being perceived by the cortical centres, the impression extends to the cells of the adjacent convolutions ; their peculiar activity is excited ; the diverse faculties generated by the gray substance of the brain come into play ; the impression is elaborated, registered, and analyzed by means of a 76 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. complex mental process which ends in its acceptation or neutralization ; if there is cause, the mind vetoes it. In the hypnotized subject, on the contrary, the trans- formation of thought into action, sensation, movement, or vision is so quickly and so actively accomplished that the intellectual inhibition has not time to act. When the mind interposes, it is already an accomplished fact, which is often registered with surprise, and which is confirmed by the fact that it proves to be real, and no intervention can hamper it further. If I say to the hypnotized subject, ' Tour hand remained closed,' the brain carries out the idea as soon as it is formulated ; reflex is immediately transmitted from the cortical centre, where the idea induced by the auditory nerve is perceived, to the motor centre, corresponding to the central origin of the nerves subserving flexion of the hand ; contracture occurs hi flexion. There is then exaltation of the ideo-motor reflex excitability, which effects the unconscious (subconscious?) transformation of the thought into movement unknown to the will. The same thing occurs when I say to the hypnotized subject, 'You have a tickling sensation in your nose.' The thought induced through hearing is reflected upon the centre of olfactory sensibility, where it awakens the sensitive memory image of the nasal itching as former impressions have created it and left it imprinted and latent. This memory sensation thus resuscitated may be intense enough to cause the reflex action of sneezing. There is also, then, exaltation of the ideo-sensorial reflex excitability, which effects the unconscious transformation of the thought into sensation, or into a sensory image. In the same way the visual, acoustic, and gustatory images succeed the suggested idea. " Negative suggestions are more difficult to explain. THE NATURE OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. f? If I say to the hypnotized subject, ' Your body is in- sensible, your eye is blind,' the impression transmitted by the auditory nerve to the centre of tactile or visual anaesthesia is that retinal vision exists, but the cerebral perception no longer exists. It seems as if it might be a reflex paralysis of a cortical centre, which the suggested idea has produced in this case. The mechanism of sug- gestion in general may then be summed up in the fol- lowing formula : Increase of the reflex ideo-motor, ideo- sensorial excitability. In the same way through the effect of some influence strychnine, for example the sensitive-motor excitability is increased in the spinal cord, so that the least impression at the periphery of a nerve is immediately transformed into contracture without the moderating influence of the brain being able to prevent this transformation. In the sama way in hypnotization the ideo-reflex excitability is increased in the brain, so that any idea received is immediately transformed into an act, without the controlling portion of the brain, the higher centres, being able to prevent the transfor- mation." Thus we clearly see that when the suggestionist comes to discuss the nature of hypnosis, he abandons his posi- tion and admits that a split in the brain cutting off the higher controlling centres from the lower ones is at the basis of hypnosis. The very conditions of hypnosis pro- claim this fact, for they are but keen psychical scalpels and have the power to effect a deep incision in the semi- fluid stream of consciousness. Fixation of attention, monotony, limitation of the field of consciousness, limita- tion of voluntary movements, inhibition all of them are calculated to pare, to split off the controlling from the reflex consciousness. The nature of hypnosis, of abnor- mal suggestibility, is a disaggregation of consciousness. CHAPTER VIII. THE LAW OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. A CLOSE examination of the facts of hypnotic sug- gestion will readily yield us the law of abnormal sug- gestibility. I hypnotize Mr. N., and tell him that on awakening, when he will hear me cough, he will go to the table, take the Bible, open it on the first page, and read aloud the first verse of the first chapter. He is then awak- ened. I cough. He rises, walks up to the table, but stops there and does not budge. I rehypnotize him. He tells me he did not want to carry out the sugges- tion. " But you must do it ! " I insist. " You must go to the table, open the Bible on the first page, and read the first verse of the first chapter. You must do it ! you can not help doing it ! " He is then awak- ened, and this time the post-hypnotic suggestion is fully carried out. I hypnotize Mr. L. "Rise!" I command. He rises. " Walk ! " He walks." " You are unable to walk ! " He makes a step or two, showing me that he can easily do it. "But it is impossible for you to walk ; you can not walk ; you are utterly unable to walk ; you must not, and you can not walk ; you lost all power of moving ; no matter how you try, you find it impossible to take a step ; you can not move your 78 THE LAW OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 79 legs ; you have lost all control over them ; they are stiff, rigid, and firmly fixed to the ground. Oh, no, you can not walk ; it is a physical impossibility for you to walk." I go on in this way, pouring forth a torrent of suggestions ; and this time my suggestion takes full . effect. The subject tries hard to move ; he can not do it, his legs are rigid, cataleptic. I hypnotize Mr. J. F., a strong, powerful, healthy, burly fellow. "Rise!" I command. He rises. "Walk!" He walks. " You can not move ! " I command again in a somewhat louder voice. The subject makes a step forward. "But you can not move!" I insist in a still louder voice than before, laying more stress on "can not." He makes a step hesitatingly and with great difficulty, like one dragging a heavy burden on his legs. " You can not move ! " I call out in a louder and more commanding tone, putting still more empha- sis on the suggestion "can not." The subject comes to a complete standstill. He is fully paralyzed ; by no effort of will can he take a step forward. We may put it down as a rule, that when the sug- gestion is not taken there is a far higher probability of bringing it into effect by repeating the suggestion over and over again in a louder key and in a more com- manding voice. The rule of hypnotic suggestion is, The more direct we make our suggestion the greater the chance of its success. If we examine the facts of suggestion in the deeper states of hypnosis we find that the same rule holds true. The hypnotizer must make himself perfectly under- stood by the subject, by the reflex consciousness of the patient. I hypnotize Mr. L., make passes over his hand, and suggest that it is rigid, stiff . It becomes cataleptic. On 80 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. a second occasion, when I make the passes, his hand be- comes rigid ; he knows from previous experiments what it is I want of him.* The experiments of Braid, Heidenhein, etc., and the controversy between the Nancy and Salpetriere school beautifully bring out this general rule of hypnosis. Thus Braid, in his Neurypnology, tells us of some phreno-hypnotic experiments he made with a subject. "This patient," he writes, "being pressed over the phrenologist's organ of time, always expressed a desire * to write ' a letter to her mother or her brother ; over the organ of tune, ' to sing ' ; between this and wit, * to be judicious ' ; the boundary between wit and causality, ' to be clever ' ; causality, ' to have knowledge,' and so on." f Heidenhein found that in pressing certain regions of the subject's body certain abnormal phenomena ap- peared ; that in pressing the neck echolalia resulted the patient repeated everything that was said before him with the exactness of a phonograph ; that the stimula- tion of the neck produced vocal sounds, as in Goltz's experiments. Silva, Binet, Fere, and Heidenhein be- lieve that they can move single limbs of the somnambule by stimulating the parts of the head which correspond to the motor centres of the limbs concerned. Chalan- der even proposed to study the physiology of the brain in this way. Charcot, Dumontpallier, Berillon, Lepine, Strahl, Griitzner, and Heidenhein regard hemihypnosis that is, hypnosis of one side of the body as a physi- ological condition induced by the closing of one eye or * Sphygmographic or pulse tracings Illustrate well this state of catalepsy (see diagram, Plate I). f I must add here that Braid, in his later investigations in hyp- nosis, became fully aware of the real source of the phenomena. THE LAW OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 81 by friction of one half of the crown of the head. Binet and Fere claim that a magnet can effect a transfer of anaesthesia, etc., to the opposite side of the body. Now such experiments invariably fail when made by other observers and on other subjects. Braid him- self tells us : * "I also very soon ascertained that the same points of the cranium when thus excited did not excite the same ideas or emotions in the minds of differ- ent patients, which I considered ought to have been the case." He hastens, however, to add : " I have since dis- covered the cause of this namely, not having operated at the proper stage of the hypnotic condition" The Italics are his own, although Braid meant in quite a different sense from that implied by me. You may press a. bump on the head of a fresh subject, and press it as much and as long as you like, and nothing particu- lar will result, or anything might follow. And the rea- son is, the subject does not know what to expect ; he has no suspicion of what the experimenter wants him to do. Charcot and his school maintain that there are three states of what they name " le grand e hypnotisme." These states are induced physiologically. 1. The lethargic state is induced by fixation upon an object, or by passing lightly upon the eyeball through the closed eyelids. In this stage suggestion is impos- sible, but we find in it anaesthesia, a certain muscular hyperexcitability ; any muscle excited by pressure or light friction contracts ; pressure upon the ulnar nerve provokes the ulnar attitude ; and pressure upon the facial nerve is followed by distortion of the features of the corresponding side of the face. 2. A subject in the lethargic condition can be made * Neurypnology. 82 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. to pass into the second or cataleptic state by raising his eyelids. If one eye only is opened the corresponding side of the body alone passes into the cataleptic condi- tion, the other side remaining lethargic. Suggestions can be induced through the muscular sense. If the subject's hand is put into a condition as if to give a kiss, his face assumes a smiling expression ; if his hands are joined as in prayer, the face becomes grave and the subject kneels down. This condition of catalepsy can also be induced at. once without having the subject pass through lethargy, and that is caused by some nervous shock produced by a brilliant point or a violent noise. 3. Lethargy and catalepsy can be transformed into somnambulism by light or repeated friction of the top of the subject's head. Anaesthesia, hyperacute sensi- bility, and susceptibility to all kinds of suggestion char- acterize this state. Now when other observers came to verify these three states they invariably failed to reproduce them without the agency of suggestion. Wetterstrand never found them at all among 3,589 different persons. " I have been as little able," writes Dr. Moll, "as have many others, to observe the stages of Charcot in my experiments. I have, besides, often experimented on several hystero-epileptics, but have failed to observe the stages, in spite of Bichet's opinion that every one who experiments on such persons will obtain the same results as the school of Charcot did." Bernheim finds that these three stages can not be induced without sug- gestion. Continued suggestion alone has been able to produce them. Liebault, who hypnotized more than six thousand persons, never observed anything that should go to confirm the hypnotic stages as described by Charcot. " I have never been able," writes Bern- THE LAW OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 83 heim,* " to determine without suggestion any phe- nomena by pressure exercised upon certain points of the cranium. For example, here is one of my som- nambulistic cases. I press upon the different points of the cranium ; no result. I say, ' Now I am going to touch that part of the cranium which corresponds to the movement of the left arm, and this arm will go into convulsions.' Having said this, I touch an arbi- trary part of the head ; immediately the left arm is convulsed. I state that I am going to induce aphasia by touching the region corresponding to speech. I touch any part of the head, and the subject no longer replies to my questions. Then I state that I shall touch the head in such a way that irritation of the cen- tres of speech will result. The person then answers my questions in the following manner : ' What is your name ? ' ' Marie, Marie, Marie.' ' How are you ? ' ' Well, well, well.' ' You have no pain ? ' * None at all, none at all, none at all.' " I myself made similar experiments on my subjects and with similar results. I pressed different regions of the Jiead of my subject and nothing resulted. I then said, " I am going to press your shoulder and you will be unable to speak." I pressed it, and he could not speak. In my following seances, whenever I pressed that subject's shoulder he lost the power of speech. I pressed the head of Mr. W. in different places and no result followed. I then said, " I will press the centre of speech and you will be unable to speak." I firmly pressed an arbitrary part of the head, and the subject was unable to speak. Without suggestion, by mere physiological means, we are unable to induce any * Suggestive Therapeutics. 84 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. particular changes in the hypnotic subject. The sub- ject must know what we require of him. It is not necessary to make suggestions to each sub- ject separately. If a hypnotizable person is present at a seance, he takes the hint at once, and when he is hyp- notized he manifests phenomena similar to the one he has witnessed. He knows exactly what the hypnotizer wants of him. " Here is an experiment," writes Bernheim,* " which I made with M. Beaunis. We hypnotized a nurse in our service who was susceptible to somnambulism. She had never been present either as witness or as sub- ject of the kind of experiment which I wanted to try on her. I put the upper left limb into the cataleptic condition in the horizontal position, the thumb and in- dex fingers stretched out, the other fingers bent ; the right arm remained relaxed. I applied the magnet to it for eight minutes. Nothing occurred. Then turn- ing to M. Beaunis, I said : ' Now I am going to try an experiment. I shall apply the magnet to the right hand (on the unaffected hand), and in a minute you will see this arm lifted and take the exact attitude of the left one, while the latter relaxes and falls.' I placed the magnet just where it was at first, and in a minute the suggested transfer was realized with perfect precision. If, then, without saying anything more, I put the magnet back against the left hand at the end of a minute the transfer occurred in inverse order, and so on consecutively. Afterward I said, ' I shall change the direction of the magnet, and the transfer will take place from the arm to the leg.' At the end of a minute the arm fell and the leg was raised. I put the * Suggestive Therapeutics. THE LAW OF ABNORMAL SUGGESTIBILITY. 85 magnet against the leg without saying anything, and the transfer took place from the leg to the arm. If, with- out saying anything to the subject, I replace the mag- net by a knife, a pencil, a bottle, a piece of paper, or use anything in its place, the same phenomenon occurs. The next day I repeated these experiments on another somnambulist who had been present the day before, and without saying anything to her, or to any of the persons present, they succeeded marvellously / the idea of the transfer had been suggested to her mind by the circumstances of which she had been a witness" In deep hypnosis, on account of the hypersesthesia of the subject's senses, the slightest hint suffices. But here, too, the subject must be trained by previous ex- periments as to the interpretation of the hint. In short, we may fully assert that in hypnosis the subject must know what the hypnotizer wants of him, so that the more precise, exact, and frank the suggestion is, the surer will be its success. We may put it down as a rule for practitioners who intend to use hypnotism for therapeutic purposes, In giving the suggestion to the patient, make your language plain, precise, and direct to the point. The following cases will show the necessity of ob- serving this last rule : Prof. "W. James gave to one of his patients a post- hypnotic suggestion to smoke only one pipe of tobacco a day. When the patient came again Prof. James asked him how many pipes he smoked a day ? The answer was, " One only." On being hypnotized the patient confessed that he bought a pipe with a bowl of large dimensions, and that it was this one pipe he was smok- ing the whole day. Mr. F. suffered from attacks of acute headache. 86 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. On account of the violent pain he had to discontinue his work. He came to me to be cured by hypnotism. I have hypnotized him several times and greatly re- lieved his headache. He could continue his occupation without any inconvenience. At the eighth sitting he told me he had no more violent attacks, but was only suffering from occasional slight headaches. I suggested that he will have no more slight headaches. Next day he came to me complaining of a severe attack. All the facts discussed in this chapter prove in the clearest way the truth that in hypnosis, in the state of abnormal suggestibility, the more direct a suggestion is the greater is the chance of its being realized, the stronger is its efficacy ; and vice versa, the more indi- rect a suggestion is the less is the chance of having it realized, the less is its efficacy. The law of abnormal suggestibility may be stated as follows : Abnormal suggestibility varies as direct suggestion. and inversely as indirect suggestion. PLATE I shows the influence of suggestion in the production of catalepsy. The subject was put into a state of hypnosis and a sphygmographic record was taken of him. In the middle of the record the subject was thrown into a cataleptic state. At once the record changed ; the characteristic pulse- wave disappeared and was replaced either by a curve full of fine minute vibrations (A and D), or by a series of broken lines (B and E) traces of the pulse-waves r.nd sometimes by one rapidly de- scending straight line passing over into a series of fine minute vibrations as the suggestion of rigidity was more and more enforced (C). Now, at the height of the cataleptic state the subject was sug- gested that he was " well " again, and immediately the characteristic pulse-wave appeared once more, and very often in a better condition, the ascending limb on the upward stroke was higher, and the secondary or dicrotic wave on the descending limb became more emphasized (A, C and'J). The arrow -> indicates the direction in which the record runs. IT a wo juiri '.--*} ; ' ' ni ff; . ; ; iumd *- WV..TU CHAPTEK IX. SUGGESTIBILITY AND THE WAKING CONSCIOUSNESS. IT is now high time to gather up the threads of our discussion and weave them into one organic, living whole ; to bring the stray rays of light that reached us in the course of our research together into one focus, and illuminate the dark, mysterious regions we under- took to explore. To do this we must retrace our steps and inspect closer the conditions that admit one into that strange land of puzzles, wonders, and prodigies. A comparison of the conditions of normal and ab- normal suggestibility will, I think, prove interesting and valuable, as it might give us a glimpse deep into the nature of suggestibility in general. To facilitate this comparison, it would be best to make a table in which the conditions of normal and ab- normal suggestibility should run parallel to each other. TABLE OF CONDITIONS OF NORMAL AND ABNORMAJ_ SUGGESTIBILITY. Normal Suggestibility. Abnormal Suggestibility. 1. Fixation of attention. 1. Fixation of attention. 2. Distraction. 2. 3. Monotony. 3. Monotony. 4. Limitation of voluntary 4. Limitation of voluntary movements. movements. 5. Limitation of the field of 5. Limitation of the field of consciousness. consciousness. 6. Inhibition. 6. Inhibition. 7. Immediate execution. 7. 7 87 88 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. A glance at our last table will show at once that the conditions in both cases are essentially the same, with the only difference that in abnormal suggestibility two conditions are wanting namely, distraction and imme- diate execution. This sameness of conditions clearly indicates that both normal and abnormal suggestibility flow from some one common source, that they are of like nature, and that they are due to similar causes. Now a previous study led us to the conclusion that the nature of abnormal suggestibility is a disaggregation of consciousness, a slit, a scar produced in the mind, a crack that may extend wider and deeper, ending at last in a total disjunction of the waking, guiding, control- ling consciousness from the reflex consciousness, from the rest of the stream of life. Normal suggestibility is of like nature it is a cleft in the mind ; only here the cleft is not so deep, not so lasting as it is in hypnosis, or in the state of abnormal suggestibility ; the split is here but momentary, evanescent, fleeting, disappearing at the very moment of its appearance. This fleeting, evanescent character of the split gives the reason why suggestion in the normal state, why normal suggestibility requires immediate execution as one of its most indispensable conditions. We must take the opportunity of the momentary ebb of the con- trolling consciousness and hastily plant our suggestion in the soil of reflex consciousness. "We must watch for this favourable moment ; not let it slip by, otherwise the suggestion is a failure. Furthermore, we must be careful to keep in abeyance, for the moment, though, the ever-active, ever-restless waves of the controlling consciousness ; we must find for them work in some other direction ; we must divert, we must distract them. That is why normal suggestibility requires the addi- THE WAKING CONSCIOUSNESS. 89 tional conditions of distraction and of immediate execu- tion. For in the normal state the waking, controlling consciousness is always on its guard, and when enticed, leaves its ground only a single step, and that only for but a moment. In normal suggestibility the psychical scar is faint; the lesion effected in the body of con- sciousness is superficial, transitory, fleeting. In abnor- mal suggestibility, on the contrary, the slit is deep and lasting it is a severe gash. In both cases, however, we have a removal, a dissociation of the waking from the subwaking, reflex consciousness, and suggestion be- ing effected only through the latter. It is the subwak- ing, the reflex, not the waking, the controlling, conscious- ness that is suggestible. Suggestibility is the attribute, the very essence of the subwaking, reflex consciousness. That our suggestions should take root and bring forth fruit, that they should become fully realized, we must address them to the subwaking consciousness directly, and in order to do that a disaggregation of conscious- ness must be effected. If we turn to the laws of normal and abnormal sug- gestibility, we find still further evidence in support of our view as to the nature of suggestibility and its rela- tion to the subwaking, reflex consciousness. A mere comparison of the two laws reveals the truth of our position : The Law of Abnormal The Law of Normal Suggestibility. Suggestibility. Abnormal suggestibility varies Normal suggestibility varies as as direct suggestion, and in- indirect suggestion, and in- versely as indirect sugges- versely as direct suggestion, tion. The two laws are the reverse of each other, thus clearly indicating the presence of a controlling, inhib- 90 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. itorj conscious element in the one case, and its absence in the other. In the normal state we must guard against the inhibitory waking consciousness, and we must therefore make our suggestion as indirect as pos- sible. In the abnormal state, on the contrary, no cir- cumspection is needed ; the controlling, inhibitory wak- ing consciousness is more or less absent, the subwaking reflex consciousness is exposed to external stimuli, and our suggestions, therefore, are the more effective the more direct we make them. With full right may we now assert that suggestibility is a disagg negation of consciousness a disaggregation in which the subwak- ing, reflex consciousness enters into direct communica- tion with the external world. The general law of suggestibility is now plainly obvious : SUGGESTIBILITY VARIES AS THE AMOUNT OF DISAG- GREGATION, AND INVERSELY AS THE UNIFICATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.* * See Appendix B. PART n. THE SELF. CHAPTEE X. THE SECONDARY SELF. THE law of suggestibility in general, and those of normal and abnormal suggestibility in particular, indi- cate a coexistence of two streams of consciousness, of two selves within the frame of the individual ; the one, the waking consciousness, the waking self ; the other, the subwaking consciousness, the subwaking self. But although the conditions and laws of suggestibility clearly point to a double self as constituting human individu- ality, still the proof, strong as it appears to me to be, is rather of an indirect nature. We must therefore look for facts that should directly and explicitly prove the same truth. We do not lack such facts. We turn first to those of hysteria. If we put a pencil or scissors into the anaesthetic hand of the hysterical person without his seeing it, the insensible hand makes adaptive movements. The fin- gers seize the pencil and place it in a position as if the hand were going to write. Quite differently does the hand possess itself of the scissors : the hand gets hold of the instrument in the proper way, and seems ready for work, for cutting. Now all the while the subject 91 92 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. is totally unconscious of what is happening there to his hand, since it is insensible, and he can not possibly see it, as his face is concealed by a screen. It is obvious that in order for such movements of adaptation to occur that there must be recognition of the object kept by the anaesthetic hand. But recognition requires a complex mental operation : it requires that the object should be perceived, should be remembered, and should be classed with objects of a certain kind and order. The very fact of the adaptation movements indicate the presence of some kind of embryonic will. Simple as these experi- ments are, they none the less strongly indicate the pres- ence of a hidden agency that works through the an- aesthetic hand; an agency that possesses perception, memory, judgment, and even will. Since these last operations are essentially characteristics of conscious- ness, of a self, we must necessarily conclude that it is a conscious agency that acts through the insensible hand of the hysterical person. Since the activity of this in- telligence, simple and elementary as it is, is unknown to the subject, it is quite clear that there is present within him a secondary consciousness standing in no connec- tion with the primary stream of personal consciousness, and somehow coming in possession of the person's hand. As we advance in our research and make the condi- tions more and more complicated, all doubt as to the presence of a conscious being, behind the veil of the subject's primary consciousness, completely disappears. "We put a pen," says Bluet,* "into the anaesthetic hand and we make it write a word ; left to itself, the * Binet, On Double Consciousness. Vide Binet, Sur les alterna- tions de la Conscience, Revue Philosophique, v, 27, 1884. THE SECONDARY SELF. 93 hand preserves its attitude, and at the expiration of a short space of time repeats the words often five or ten times. Having arrived at this fact, we again seize the anaesthetic hand and cause it to write some familiar word for example, the patient's own name but in so doing we intentionally commit an error in spelling. In its turn the anaesthetic hand repeats the word, but, oddly enough, the hand betrays a momentary hesitation when it reaches the letter at which the error in orthog- raphy was committed. If a superfluous letter happens to have been added, sometimes the hand will hesitat- ingly rewrite the name along with the supplementary letter ; again, it will retrace only a part of the letter in question ; and again, finally, entirely suppress it." It is quite evident that we have here to deal with a con- scious agent hesitating about mistakes and able to cor- rect them ; we can not possibly ascribe such activity to mere unconscious cerebration. If again we take the anaesthetic hand and trace on the dorsal side of it a letter or a figure, the hand traces this figure or letter. Evidently the secondary con- sciousness is in full possession of these perceptions, although the primary consciousness of the subject is totally ignorant of them. Furthermore, insensible as the anaesthetic hand is, since no pinching, pricking, burning, or faradization of it are perceived by the subject, still we can show that there exists a hidden sensibility in the hand ; this can easily be proved by the aesthesiometer. If we prick the insensible hand with one of the points of a pair of compasses, the hand automatically traces a single point. Apply both points, and the automatic writing will trace two points, thus informing us of its degree of insensi- bility. 94r THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. The amaurotic or hysterical eye gives us still stronger evidence of the existence of a secondary being perceiving things which lie outside the visual distance of the subject's waking consciousness. Hys- terical subjects often complain of the loss of sight. As a matter of fact, when we come to test it we find that the subject does see what he claims not to see. This is detected by the so-called " box of Flees." This box is so skilfully arranged that the patient sees with his right eye the picture or the figure situated to the left, and with his left eye what is situated to the right. The hysterical person blind in the right eye, when put to such a test, declares that he sees the picture to the left side but not that to the right. He sees with the blind eye. Amaurosis may also be tested in a somewhat differ- ent way. A pair of spectacles in which one glass is red and the other green is put on the patient's eye, and he is made to read six letters on a blank frame, alternately covered with red and green glass. When one eye is closed only three letters can be seen through the spectacles namely, the ones corresponding in color to the spectacle glass through which the eye is looking ; the other three can not be seen on account of the two complementary colors forming black. The patient, then, blind in one eye (say the right), ought to see only three letters when he has the spectacles on. When, however, put to this test the patient promptly reads the six letters. The right eye undoubtedly sees, only the image is retained by the secondary self, and a spe- cial arrangement of conditions is required to force that hidden self to surrender the image it stole. To reveal the presence of this secondary self that perceives and knows facts hidden from the upper con- THE SECONDARY SELF. 95 Bciousness or primary self, I frequently employ the fol- lowing simple but sure method, which may be charac- terized as the method of " guessing " : Impressions are made on the anaesthetic limb, and the subject who does not perceive any of the applied stimuli is asked just to make a " wild guess " as to the nature and number of the stimuli, if there were any. Now the interest is that nearly all the guesses are found to be correct. Dr. William A. White, of Binghamton State Hospital, finds that this method works well in his cases. "In the case of D. F./' Dr. White writes to me, " whose field of vision I sent you, I find by experi- ment, taking a hint from you, that, by introducing fingers between the limit of her field of vision (which is very contracted) and the limit of the normal field, she could guess each time and tell which finger was held up." To bring out still more clearly and decisively the presence of a secondary consciousness that perceives the image which the hysterical person does not see, A. Binet performed the following experiment : " We place," he says,* " the hysterical subject before a scale of printed letters, and tentatively seek the maximum distance from the board at which the subject is able to read the largest letters. After having experimentally determined the maximum distance at which the subject can read the largest letters of the series, we invite him to read certain small letters that are placed below the former. Naturally enough, the subject is unable to do so ; but if at this instant we slip a pencil into the anaes- thetic hand, we are able by the agency of the hand to induce automatic writing, and this writing will repro- * Binet, On Double Consciousness ; also, Rerue Philosophique, v, 27. 96 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. duce precisely the letters which the subject is in vain trying to read. It is highly interesting to observe that during the very time the subject is repeatedly declaring that he does not see the letters, the anaesthetic hand, unknown to him, writes out the letters one after an- other. If, interrupting the experiments, we ask the subject to write of his own free will the letters of the printed series, he will not be able to do so ; and when asked simply to draw what he sees, he will only pro- duce a few zigzag marks that have no meaning." These experiments plainly prove that the secondary consciousness sees the letters or words, and directs the anaesthetic hand it possesses to write what it perceives. Furthermore, if we remove the subject at too great a distance, so that the letters are altogether out of the range of vision of the secondary consciousness, the automatic writing begins to make errors writing, for instance, " Lucien " instead of " Louise " ; it tries to guess. Now if anything plainly shows the presence of a hidden intelligence, it is surely this guessing of which the subject himself is totally unconscious, for guess- ing is essentially a characteristic of consciousness. " An automaton," truly remarks Binet, " does not mistake ; the secondary consciousness, on the contrary, is subject to errors because it is a consciousness, because it is a thing that reasons and combines thoughts." This last conclusion is still further proved by the following experiments: "There are patients," writes Binet* " (St. Am., for example), whose hand spontaneously finishes the word they are made to trace. Thus I cause the letter ' d ' to be written ; the hand continues and writes 'don.' I write 'pa,' and the hand continues and * Binet, On Double Consciousness ; also, Revue Philosophique, v, 27. THE SECONDARY SELF. 97 writes 'pavilion.' I write 'Sal,' and the hand writes ' Salpetriere.' Here it is still more obvious that we are in the presence of a hidden agency that can take hints and develop them intelligently. We saw above that distraction of attention is one of the indispensable conditions of suggestibility in the normal waking state. Now, M. Janet, in his experi- ments on hysterical persons, used chiefly this condition, or (as it may be called) "method of distraction," as a means for coming into direct oral communication with the secondary suggestible self. In hysterical persons it is easier to bring about the conditions of suggesti- bility, because, as a rule, they possess a contracted field of consciousness, and when engaged in one thing they are oblivious to all else. "When Lucie [the subject] talked directly with any one," says M. Janet,* " she ceased to be able to hear any other person. You may stand behind her, call her by name, shout abuse in her ear, without making her turn round ; or place yourself before her, show her objects, touch her, etc., without attracting her notice. When finally she becomes aware of you she thinks you have just come into the room again, and greets you accordingly." M. Janet availed himself of these already existent conditions of suggestibility, and began to give her suggestions while she was in the waking state. When the subject's at- tention was fully fixed on a conversation with a third party M. Janet came up behind her, whispered in her ear some simple commands, which she instantly obeyed. He made her reply by signs to his questions, and even made her answer in writing if a pencil were placed in her hands. The subject's primary consciousness was * Pierre Janet, L'Automatisme Psychologique. 98 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. entirely ignorant of what was going on. In some cases the patient was made to pass through a series of awkward bodily positions without the least spark of knowledge on his side. The following is a very inter- esting and striking case : P., a man of forty, was received at the hospital at Havre for delirium tremens. He improved and became quite rational during the daytime. The hos- pital doctor observed that the patient was highly sug- gestible, and invited M. Janet to experiment on him. " While the doctor was talking to the patient on some interesting subject," writes M. Janet,' 55 ' " I placed my- self behind P., and told him to raise his arm. On the first trial I had to touch his arm in order to pro- voke the desired act ; afterward his unconscious obedi- ence followed my order without difficulty. I made him walk, sit down, kneel all without his knowing it. I even told him to lie down on his stomach, and he fell down at once, but his head still raised itself to answer at once the doctor's questions. The doctor asked him, 'In what position are you while I am talking to you ? ' ' Why, I am standing by my bed ; I am not moving." 1 The secondary self accepted motor suggestions of which the primary self was totally unaware. As the orders thus whispered to the secondary, subwaking self become more complicated the latter rises to the surface, pushes the waking self into the background and carries out the suggested commands. " M. Binet had been kind enough," writes M. Janet," f " to show me one of the subjects on whom he was in the habit of studying acts rendered unconscious by * Pierre Janet, L'Automatisme Psychologique. f Ibid. THE SECONDARY SELF. 99 anaesthesia, and I had asked his permission to pro- duce on this subject the phenomenon of suggestion by distraction. Everything took place just as I expected. The subject (Hab.), fully awake, talked to M. Binet. Placing myself behind her, I caused her to move her hand unconsciously, to write a few words, to answer my questions by signs, etc. Suddenly Hab. ceased to speak to M. Binet, and, turning toward me, continued correctly by the voice the conversation she had begun with me by unconscious signs. On the other hand, she no longer spoke to M. Binet, and could no longer hear him speak ; in a word, she had fallen into elective som- nambulism (rapport). It was necessary to wake her up, and when awakened she had naturally forgotten everything. Now Hab. had no previous knowledge of me at all ; it was not, therefore, my presence which had sent her to sleep. The sleep was in this case manifestly the result of the development of unconscious actions, which had invaded and finally effaced the nor- mal consciousness. This explanation, indeed, is easily verified. My subject, Madame. B , remains wide awake in my neighbourhood so long as I do not pro- voke unconscious phenomena, but when the unconscious phenomena become too numerous and too complicated she goes to sleep." We have here clear and direct proof as to the presence of a conscious agency lying buried below the upper stratum of personal life, and also as to the identity of this hidden, mysterious self with the hypnotic self. The self of normal and that of abnormal suggestibility are one and the same.. Turning now to hypnosis, we find that the classical experiments of P. Janet and Gourney on deferred or post-hypnotic suggestion furnish clear, valid, and direct evidence of the reality of a secondary consciousness, of 100 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. an intelligent, subwaking, hypnotic self concealed be- hind the curtain of personal consciousness. " When Lucie was in a state of genuine somnam- bulism," writes P. Janet, " I said to her, in the tone used for giving suggestions, 'When I clap my hand twelve times you will go to sleep again.' Then I talked to her of other things, and five or six minutes later I woke her completely. The forgetfulness of all that had happened during the hypnotic state, and of my suggestion in particular, was complete. I was assured of this forgetfulness, which was an important thing here, first, by the preceding state of sleep, which was genuine somnambulism with all its characteristic symptoms; by the agreement of all those who have been engaged upon these questions, and who have all proved the forgetfulness of similar suggestions after waking ; and, finally, by the results of all the preced- ing experiments made upon this subject, in which I have always found this unconsciousness. Other people / surrounded Lucie and talked to her about different things ; and then, drawing back a few steps, I struck my hand five blows at rather long intervals and rather faintly, noticing at the same time that the subject paid no attention to me, but still talked on briskly. I came nearer and said to her, 'Did you hear what I just did ? ' ' What did you do ? ' said she, ' I was not pay- ing attention.' ' This ' (I clapped my hands). ' You just clapped your hands.' ' How many times ? ' ' Once.' I drew back and continued to clap more faintly every now and then. Lucie, whose attention was distracted, no longer listened to me, and seemed to have completely forgotten my existence. When I had clapped six times more in this way, which with the preceding ones made twelve, Lucie stopped talk- THE SECONDARY SELF. 101 ing immediately, closed her eyes, and fell back asleep. ' Why do you go to sleep ? ' I said to her. ' I do not know anything about it ; it came upon me all at once,' she said. " The somnambulist must have counted, for I en- deavoured to make the blows just alike, and the twelfth could not be distinguished from the preceding ones. She must have heard them and counted them, but without knowing it; therefore, unconsciously (sub- consciously). The experiment was easy to repeat, and I repeated it in many ways. In this way Lucie counted unconsciously (subconsciously) up to forty- three, the blows being sometimes regular and some- times irregular, with never a mistake in the result. The most striking of these experiments was this: I gave the order, ' At the third blow you will raise your hands, at the fifth you will lower them, at the sixth you will look foolish, at the ninth you will walk about the room, and at the sixteenth you will go to sleep in an easy-chair.' She remembered nothing at all of this on waking, but all these actions were performed in the order desired, although during the whole time Lucie replied to questions that were put to her, and was not aware that she counted the noises, that she looked foolish, or that she walked about. "After repeating the experiment I cast about for some means of varying it, in order to obtain very sim- ple unconscious judgments. The experiment was al- ways arranged in the same way. Suggestions were made during a well-established hypnotic sleep, then the subject was thoroughly wakened, and the signals and the actions took place in the waking state. 'When I repeat the same letter in succession you will become rigid.' After she awoke I whispered the 102 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. letters, 'a,' 'c,' 'd,' 'e,' 'a,' 'a.' Lucie became mo- tionless and perfectly rigid. That shows an uncon- scious judgment of resemblance. I may also cite some examples of judgments of difference : ' You will go to sleep when I pronounce an uneven number,' or ' Your hands will revolve around each other when I pronounce a woman's name.' The result is the same ; as long as I whisper even numbers or names of men nothing hap- pens, but the suggestion is carried out when I give the proper signal. Lucie has therefore listened uncon- sciously (subconsciously), compared, and appreciated the differences. " I next tried to complicate the experiment in order to see to what lengths this faculty of an unconscious (subconscious) judgment would go. 'When the sum of the number which I shall pronounce amounts to ten you will throw kisses.' The same precautions were taken. She was awakened, forgetfulness established, and while she was chatting witli other people who dis- turbed her as much as possible, I whispered, at quite a distance from her, 'Two, three, one, four,' and she made the movement. Then I tried more complicated numbers and other operations. 'When the numbers that I shall pronounce two by two, subtracted from one another, leave six, you will make a certain gesture ' or multiplication, and even very simple divisions. The whole thing was carried out with almost no errors, ex- cept when the calculation became too complicated and could not be done in her head. There was no new faculty there, only the usual processes were operating unconsciously (subconsciously). " It seems to me that these experiments are quite directly connected with the problem of the intelligent performance of suggestion that appears to be forgotten. THE SECONDARY SELF. 103 The facts mentioned are perfectly accurate. Som- nambulists are able to count the days and hours that intervene between the present time and the perform- ance of a suggestion, although they have no memory whatever of the suggestion itself. Outside of their consciousness there is a memory that persists, an atten- tion always on the alert, and a judgment perfectly capable of counting the days, as is shown by its being able to make these multiplications and divisions." The experiments of E. Gourney confirm the same truth that behind the primary upper consciousness a secondary lower consciousness is present. " P 11," writes E. Gourney, " was told on March 26th that on the one hundred and twenty-third day from then he was to put a blank sheet of paper in an envelope and send it to a friend of mine whose name and residence he knew, but whom he had never seen. The subject was not referred to again till April 18th, when he was hypnotized and asked if he remembered anything in connection with this gentleman. He at once repeated the order, and said, ' This is the twenty- third day a hundred more.' " / (hypnotizer). How do you know ? Have you noted each day ? " P U. No ; it seemed natural. " S. Have you thought of it often ? "P II. It generally strikes me early in the morning. Something tells me, 'You have got to count.' " S. Does that happen every day ? " P U. No, not every day perhaps more likely every other day. It goes from my mind. I never think of it during the day. I only know it has to be done. 8 104 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. " He was questioned again on April 20th, and at once said, ' That is going on all right twenty-five days ' ; and on April 22d, when in the trance, he spontane- ously recalled the subject and added ' Twenty-seven days.' After he was awakened (April 18th), I asked him if he knew the gentleman in question or had been thinking about him. He was clearly surprised at the question." The hypnotic self knew he had to do some- thing, knew the particular act and the precise day when he had to perform it ; watched the flow of time, counted the days and all that was going on, without the least in- timation to the consciousness of the waking personal self. E. Gourney then conceived the happy idea of further tapping the intelligence and knowledge of this subwaking hypnotic self by means of automatic writ- ing. "I showed P 11," says E. Gourney,* "a plan- chette he had never seen or touched one before and got him to write his name with it. He was then hyp- notized, and told that it had been as dark as night in London on the previous day, and that he would be able to write what he had heard. He was awakened, and as usual was offered a sovereign to say what it was he had been told, and as usual without impunity to my purse. He was then placed with his hand on the plan- chette, a large screen being held in the front of his face, so that it was impossible for him to see the paper or instrument. In less than a minute the writing began. The words were, ' It was a dark day in London." " When asked what he had written, he did not know. He was given a post-hypnotic suggestion to poke the fire in six minutes, and that he should inform us how * E. Gourney. Poet-hypnotic States, Pr. S. P. R., April, 1887. THE SECONDARY SELF. 105 the time was going, without any direction as to writing. He wrote soon after waking, f P 11, will you poke the fire in six minutes ? ' " To prove decisively the intelligence of the second- ary, subwaking, hypnotic self, Gourney gave the en- tranced subject arithmetical problems to solve, and immediately had him awakened. When put to the planchette the subject gave the solution of the problem, without being conscious as to what he was doing. It was the hypnotic self who made the calculation, who solved the arithmetical problem. W s was told to add together 5, 6, 8, 9, and had just time to say " 5," when he was awakened in the fraction of a second with the words on his lips. The planchette immediately produced " 28." P 11 was told during trance to add all the digits from 1 to 9 ; the first result was 39, the second 45 (right). Rehypnotized, and asked by S. what he had been writing, he said, " You told me to add the figures from 1 to 9 = 45." " Did you write it ? " " Yes, I wrote it down." W s was hypnotized and told that in six minutes he was to blow a candle out, and that he would be re- quired at the same time before this to write the num- ber of minutes that had passed and the number that had still to elapse. He was awakened, laughed and talked as usual, and, of course, knew nothing of the order. In about three and a half minutes (he was taken by surprise, so to say) he was set down to the planchette, which wrote, " Four and a half one more." About a minute passed, and W s was rehypnotized, but just as his eyes were beginning to close, he raised himself and blew out the candle, saying, " It is beginning to smell." Hypnotized and questioned, he remembered 106 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. all that lie had done ; and when it was pointed out to him that four and a half and one do not make six, he explained the discrepancy by saying, " It took half a minute for you to tell me ; I reckoned from the end of your telling me." S 1 was told in the trance that he was to look out of the window seven minutes after waking, and that he was to write how the time was going. He was then awakened. This was 7.34^ p. M. I set him to the planchette, and the writing began at 7.36. I did not watch the process, but when I stood holding the screen in front of his eyes I was so close to his hand that I could not help becoming aware that the writing was being produced at distinct intervals. I remarked that he was going by fits and starts, and seemed to have to pause to get up steam. Immediately on the conclu- sion of the writing at 7.40 he got up and drew aside the blind, and looked out. Examining the paper, I found " 25, 34, 43, 52, 61, 7." Clearly he had aimed at recording at each moment when he began the number that had passed and the number that remained. The subwaking, suggestible, hypnotic being seems to be not a physiological automa- ton, but a self, possessing consciousness, memory, and even a rudimentary intelligence. Sphygmographic or tracings of the radial artery seem to point to the same conclusion. Thus in the normal state, on the application of agreeable stimuli, such as perfumes, the curves become broader, the pulse slower, indicating a muscular relaxation of the heart ; while on the other hand, if disagreeable or painful stimuli are applied, such as pricking, faradic or gal- vanic currents, ammonia, acetic acid, formaline, etc., the pulse becomes rapid, the " Riickstoss elevation," or the PLATE II. A, B, C and D are sphygmographic or pulse tracings in the fully waking normal state. The first part of each tracing in A, C and D shows the normal pulse of the subject; the rest ia under the influence of pain stimuli, such as ammonia or acetic acid. B, in the first part of the record, ia normal, with no stimulus ; the second part of the record shows the influence of the pleasant stimulus of vanilla ; the third part of B shows the effect of acetic acid. Tracings B and C are of the same subject whose characteristic normal (rather abnormal) pulse was that of C normal. Under the influence of pleasant stimuli (B, " vanilla ") the abnormal (normal to this subject) characteristics of this pulse became more manifest. Under the influence of painful stimuli (acetic acid, ammonia, etc.) the abnormal charac- teristic (normal pulse of this subject) disappeared, and the pulse became a typical normal pulse. Tracing E, in the first part of the record, shows the pulse in hypnosis, but with no application of any stimuli ; the second part of the record shows the influence of pain stimuli in hypnosis with sug- gestive analgesis. The arrow -> indicates the direction in which the record .. ...I.''! ' ' ,: lyf'/iu - ' d; 'to Iraq f>a, i* inssjislq uri- i'j !i -- io THE SECONDARY SELF. 107 dicrotic wave, becomes accentuated, and even rises in height (in cases where the dicrotic wave is absent it re- appears under pain), the heart beats increase, indicating a more frequent muscular contraction. If now the subject is hypnotized and made an- aesthetic and analgesic, and agreeable and disagreeable stimuli are applied, although the subject feels no pain whatever, still the characteristics of the pain and pleas- ure curves are strangely marked, indicating the pres- ence of a diffused subconscious feeling. Kecords of respiration and of the radial artery, or what is called pneumographic and sphygmographic tracings, bring out clearly the real nature of the subcon- scious. This is done in the following way : A simultaneous pneumographic and sphygmographic record is first taken of the subject while he is in his normal waking state. A second record is then taken, with the only difference that disagreeable and painful stimuli, such as faradic current or odours of ammonia or acetic acid, are introduced. The tracings will at once show the painful sensations of the subject. The curves will suddenly rise, revealing the violent reactions to the' unwelcome stimuli. If now the subject is thrown into a hypnotic trance and a third record is taken, we shall then have the following curious results : If disagreeable and pain- ful stimuli are applied, and if analgesia is suggested, the subject claims that he feels no pain whatever. In his normal waking state the subject will strongly react, he will scream from pain, but now he keeps quiet. Is there no reaction ? Does the subject actually feel no pain ? Far from being the case. If we look at the pneumographic tracings we find the waves uniformly deep and broad, the respiration is hard and laboured ; a 108 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. similar change we find in the tracings of the radial artery. The pain feeling is there, only it is not concen- trated ; it is diffused. The upper consciousness does not feel the pain, but the subconsciousness does. The painful or uneasy feeling is diffused all over the organic consciousness of the secondary self. PLATE III. A A are sphygmographic and pneu- mographic tracings of the subject in the normal state. B B are tracings of normal state with pain stimuli, and the reaction of the subject is shown in the abruptly ascending waves. C are tracings of the subject in a state of hypnosis, with suggested analgesia or loss of pain sensibility, and under the uninterrupted application of pain stimuli (acetic acid, ammonia, electricity, pricking, etc.). (The upper tracing of each couplet is sphygmo- graphic ; the lower is pneumographic.) -i/9flq 5oB airiqargoragydqe OT* K k .III (i) ui loo^dtig tdj }<. rfliw 9Jj Iimon lo nnioinj SIB v\ >n > -,: vDijmdu :yu8 rfiiw ,eieonqvri lo 90tei> B ,ii j->-j[(Mf> sdj To odJ ittfuiu im ,rliIiliHa' nie<{ lc - lyfaas ni4| li- iini{ .vii->iil <*!' .iiiuoHUiui * i'il'jni.' i li-uio to ; 'T) <- PLATE IV. A A are sphygmographic and pneu- mographic records in normal state under the influ- ence of pain stimuli (acetic acid, ammonia, elec- tricity, etc.). B B and C C are tracings under the continuous application of pain stimuli in the state of hypnosis with suggestive analgesia. In C C the suggestion of analgesia was in one place annulled, the reaction became very powerful, and the curve rose ; with the renewed suggestion of analgesia the reaction disappeared and the curve immediately fell. (The upper tracing of each couplet is sphygmo- graphic ; the lower is pneumographic.) k k .VI m BHO-> Huraily ntq 1 bnu ft ft .(.oto ,/Jiyii} sriJ ni Hoiiih*! ateq to m>jJBorIqq uoi/niino > j 9iiJ '^ "3 al .ei89^(Bnfi sviJji^goa ritiw eusonqvrf ^o 9t)Jlq 9ao 0r >.i.tf Jii^gliuJi In noil- biui f ltrli9woq yssv 9fa*-ja<: jufTl-u oil} jsigs^lisiiij 'to noil- - diiv i -r/iuo odi IMJ j -oarg^rfqe ei telquoo ifaes lo yui-^nJ i^t, . CHAPTER XL THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF AND UNCONSCIOUS CEEEBKATION. THE facts of post-hypnotic negative hallucinations or of systematized anaesthesia still further reveal the presence of a subconscious self below the upper waking consciousness. The following interesting experiments made by Bernheim and M. Liegeois, and quoted by Binet in his remarkable book, The Alternations of Per- sonality, may serve as good illustrations : "Elise B., eighteen years old, a servant, suffering from sciatica. She was a respectable young girl, steady, of average intelligence, and, with the exception of her sciatica, presenting no neuropathic manifestations, symp- toms, nor hereditary tendencies. " It was very easy, after her first sitting, to bring on somnambulism coupled with a. state in which she was sensitive to hallucinations both hypnotic and post-hyp- notic, and to amnesia on awaking. I easily developed negative hallucinations with her. During her sleep I said to her, 'When you wake you will no longer see me : I shall have gone.' "When she awoke she looked about for me, and did not seem to see me. I talked to her in vain, shouted in her ear, stuck a pin in her skin, her nostrils, under the nails, and thrust the point of the pin in the mucous membrane of the eye. She did not move a muscle. As far as she was concerned, I had 109 HO THE PSYCHOLOGY OP SUGGESTION. ceased to exist, and all the acoustic, visual, tactile, and other impressions emanating from myself did not make the slightest impression upon her ; she ignored them all. As soon, however, as another person, unknown to her, touched her with the pin, she perceived it quickly, and drew back the member that had been pricked. " I may add, in passing, that this experiment is not equally successful with all somnambuli sts. Many patients do not realize negative sensorial suggestions, and others only partially. Some, for example, when I declare that they shall not see me on awaking, do not see me, indeed, but they do hear my voice and feel my touch. Some are astonished to hear me and feel the pricks without seeing me, others do not attempt to understand it, and, finally, others believe that the voice and the sensation come from another person who is present. Sometimes the negative hallucination is made complete for all their sensations when the suggestion is given in this way : ' When you wake, if I touch you and prick you you will not feel it ; if I speak to you you will not hear me. Moreover, you will not see me: I shall have gone.' Some subjects' sensations are quite neutralized after this detailed suggestion; with others, only the visual sensation is neutralized, all the other negative sensorial suggestions remaining ineffectual. " The somnambulist of whom I speak realized every- thing to perfection. Logical in her delusive conception, she apparently did not perceive me with any of her senses. It was useless to tell her that I was there and that I was talking to her. She was convinced that they were simply making fun at her expense. I gazed at her obstinately, and said : ' You see me well enough, but you act as if you did not see me. You are a hum- bug; you are playing a part.' She did not stir, and THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF. HI continued to talk to other people. I added with a con- fident manner : ' However, I know all about it. You can not deceive me. It is only two years since you had a child, and you made away with it. Is that true ? I have been told so.' She did not move ; her face re- mained peaceful. Wishing to see, on account of its medico-legal bearing, whether a serious offence might be committed under cover of a negative hallucination, I roughly raised her dress and skirt. Although natu- rally very modest, she allowed this without a blush. I pinched the calf of her leg and thigh. She made absolutely no sign whatever. I am convinced that she might have been assaulted in this state without the slightest resistance. " That established, I asked the head of the clinic to put her to sleep again and suggest to her that I should again be there when she awoke. This she realized. She saw me again, and remembered nothing that had happened in the interval. I said to her: 'You have just seen me. I talked with you.' She was astonished, and said, ' Why, no, you were not there.' ' I was there, and I did talk with you. Ask these gentlemen if I didn't.' 'I saw these gentlemen very well. M. P. tried to persuade me that you were there. But that was only a joke. You were not there.' ' Yery well,' I said, 'but you remember everything that happened while I was not there all that I said and did to you.' ' But how could you say and do anything to me when you were not there ? ' I insisted. Speaking seriously,- and looking her in the face, I laid stress on every word : ' It is true, I was not there, but you remember just the same.' 1 put my hand on her forehead and declared, ' You remember everything, absolutely every- thing. There speak out: what did I say to you?' 112 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. After a moment's concentrated thought, she blushed, and said, ' Oh, no, it is imposible ; I must have dreamed it.' ' Yery well ; what did I say to you in this dream ? ' She was ashamed, and did not want to say. I insisted. At last she said, ' You said that I had had a child.' ' And what did I do to you ? ' ' You pricked me with a pin.' ' And then ? ' After a few minutes she said, ' Oh, no, I would not have allowed you to do it ; it is a dream.' ' What did you dream ? ' ' That you exposed me,' etc. " In this way I was able to call up the memory of all that had been said and done by me while she sup- posed that she did not see me. Therefore, in reality she both saw and heard me, notwithstanding her ap- parent obtuseness she neither saw nor heard me. She saw me with her bodily (subconscious) eyes, but she did not see me with the eyes of the mind (upper conscious- ness). She was smitten with blindness, deafness, and psychical anaesthesia as far as I was concerned. All sensorial impressions emanating from me were dis- tinctly perceived, but remained unconscious for her (upper consciousness). " Similar experiments were performed by M. Lie- geois. ' I no longer existed,' writes M. Liegeois, ' as far as Madame M. was concerned, to whom M. Liebault had, at my request, suggested that when she woke she would no longer see or hear me. I spoke to her : she did not reply. I stood before her : she did not see me. I pricked her with a pin : she felt no pain. She was asked where I was : she said she did not know that I had undoubtedly gone, etc. " I then conceived the idea of making some sugges- tions in loud tones to this person, for whom I had seemed to become an entire stranger; and, what was very singular, she obeyed these suggestions. THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF. " I told her to rise : she rose. To sit down : she seated herself. To make her hands revolve round one another : she did so. I suggested a toothache to her, and she had a toothache ; sneezing, and she sneezed. I said that she was cold, and she shivered ; that she ought to go to the stove in which there was no fire and there she went ; until I told her that she was warm, and then she was all right. During all this time she was, as far as all the assistants were concerned, as fully awake as they were. When questioned by them, she replied that I was absent, she did not know why ; perhaps I would soon come back, etc. Questioned by me with the use of the first personal pronoun, all my questions remained unanswered. She only realized the ideas I expressed impersonally, if I may use such an expression, and as if she drew from her own thought. It is her unconscious (subconscious) ego that causes her to act, and the con- scious ego has not the slightest idea of the impulse that she receives from without. " The experiment seemed to me sufficiently inter- esting to bear repeating on another subject, Camille S., and here is a concise resume of the proofs and verifica- tions secured some days later from this girl : " Camille S. is eighteen years old, and a very good somnambulist. M. Liebault and I have known her for nearly four years. We have often put her to sleep. We always found her to be perfectly sincere, and we came to have entire confidence in her. This statement is necessary, as we shall see, to give weight to the singular results obtained which confirmed absolutely the first observation made on Madame M. " M. Liebault put Camille to sleep, and at my re- quest suggested to her that she would no longer see or hear me ; then he left me to experiment in my own 114 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. way. When she awoke the subject was in communica- tion with everybody, except that I no longer existed for her. Yet, as I am about to show, that is not quite accurate. It was as if there were two personalities within her one that saw me when the other did not see me, and that heard me when the other paid no attention to what I was saying. " In the first place, I assured myself of the state of her sensibility. And it was very curious that this ex- isted for all the assistants, but did not exist for any- thing emanating from me. If any one else pricked her she quickly drew her arm back. If I pricked her she did not feel it. I stuck pins in her that remained hang- ing from her arms and cheek. She complained of no sensation, not feeling them at all. This fact of anaes- thesia, not real, but in a measure personal, is certainly very singular. It is quite new, if I am not mistaken. In the same way, if I held a bottle of ammonia under her nose she did not push it away, but she turned away from it when it was presented to her by a strange hand. " While she was in this condition, neither seeing nor hearing me apparently, at least almost all the sug- gestions are carried out that may be made in the wak- ing state. I sum them up in the order in which they follow, from my notes taken at the time, June 14th, 1888. " I need not repeat that if I speak directly to Camille S. if I ask her, for example, how she is, how long it is since she stopped growing, etc. her coun- tenance remains impassive. She neither sees nor hears me at least she is not conscious of so doing. " I then proceed, as I said above, impersonally, talking not in my own name, but as if an internal voice of her own was speaking, and expressing such ideas as THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF. the subject would be likely to get from her own private thought. Then somnambulistic automatism shows itself in this new and unexpected guise as complete as any of the other forms already known. " I said aloud, ' Camille is thirsty ; she is going to the kitchen for a glass of water, that she will bring back and set on this table.' She did not seem to have heard me, and yet in a few minutes she acted as I had said, and carried out the suggestion with that brisk and impetuous manner which has already been frequently noticed in somnambulists. She was asked why she brought the glass that she put on the table. She did not know what was meant. She had not moved. There was no glass there. "I said, 'Camille sees the glass, but there is no water in it, as they are trying to make her believe ; it is wine, and very good wine, too ; she is going to drink it, and it will do her good.' She promptly performed the order thus given to her, then immediately forgot all about it. " I made her say some words in succession that were scarcely proper. * Devil take it ! ' ' Confound it ! ' ' Con -' and she repeated all that I suggested to her, but instantly losing the memory of what she had just said. " A certain M. F., astonished at this, upbraided her for using these unseemly expressions. She said : ' I did not say those vulgar words. What do you take me for ? You are dreaming ; you must have gone mad.' " She saw me without seeing me, as this shows. I said, ' Camille is going to sit on M. L.'s knee.' She im- mediately jumped violently on my knee, and, on being questioned, declared that she had not moved from the bench where she was seated a moment before. 116 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION. " M. Liebault spoke to me. As she neither saw nor heard me consciously, she was astonished, and then be- gan a conversation with him in which I played the part of a prompter who dwelt in her own brain. I suggest- ed all the following words to her, and she uttered them, thinking that she was expressing her own thought : " ' M. Liebault, aren't you talking to the wall ? I must put you to sleep to cure you. We will change roles,' etc. " ' M. F., how is your bronchitis ? ' "M. F. asked her how and why she said all this. She replied, after I had whispered to her : ' How do you think it comes to me ? Just as it comes to every one. How do your own thoughts come ? ' and she con- tinued to enlarge upon the theme given her by me. " She seemed to be in a perfectly normal state, and held her own with all the assistants with great presence of mind. Only in the midst of her conversation she inserted the phrases that I created in her mind, uncon- sciously making them her own. " Thus, while she was arguing with M. F., whom she told that she would take to Mareville,* her interlocutor having objected, ' I am not insane,' she replied : ' All insane people say that they are not insane. You say that you are not insane, therefore you must be insane.' She was very proud of her syllogism, and never sus- pected that she had just got it from me. " Wishing to make sure, once more, that she saw me without being conscious of it, I said : ' Camille is going to take a bottle of cologne out of M. L.'s vest pocket ; she will uncork it and enjoy its delightful odour.' She rose, came directly to me, looked first in the left, then * Lunatic asylum near Nancy. THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF. in the right pocket, took out a bottle of ammonia, un- corked it, and inhaled it with pleasure. I was obliged to take it away from her. Then, still under the influ- ence of suggestion, she took off my right shoe. M. F. said to her : ' What are you doing there ? You are tak- ing off one of M. L.'s shoes!' She was offended. * What are you talking about ? M. L. is not here, so it is not possible for me to take off his shoe. You are still more insane than you were just now ! ' And when M. F. raised both arms while he was talking to me, Camille cried : ' Absolutely, I must take you to Mare- ville. It is too bad ! Poor M. F. ! ' He did not seem to be cast down by her remark. ' But what shoe is that that you are holding ? what is it ? ' I came to my sub- ject's assistance, and said: 'It is a shoe that Camille must try on ; she was not able to do it this morning at home, because the shoemaker did not keep his appoint- ment. He was drunk, and he has only just brought it. She is going to try it on right here.' "All that was accepted, repeated exactly, and promptly performed as if by spontaneous inspiration. For propriety's sake she turned toward the wall to try on my shoe. She found it a little large, and returned it to me, because I said she ought to return it to me. " Finally, at my suggestion, she took the glass back lo the kitchen. When she returned, questioned by M. F., she declared that she had not left the room, that she had not drunk anything, and that she had not had a glass in her hands. It was of no use to show her the wet ring that the bottom of the glass had left on the table. She did not see any ring ; there was none ; they were trying to fool her. And then, in order to prove what she said, she passed her hand over the table several times, making the leaves fly on which I 118 THK PSYCHOLOGY OK SUGGESTION, took my notes, and which shared in my privilege of being invisible, witliout seeing them. If there \\\\<\ been an inkstand there, it too would undoubtedly have been thrown to the floor. "In order to bring this scries of tests to :m end, I said aloud: ' Camille, you arc going to see ;md hear me, I will open your eyes. You are now all right.' I was three metres from her, but the suggestion openiled. Camille passed without any ;ipp;ircnt. tnmsiiion stage from the state of negative ballucinatioD into which M. Li6bault had thrown her into the, normal st;i.lc, which in her case wan, as usual, accompanied by complete, am- nesia. She had no idea of all that bad just buppencd the numerous experiments, varied in every conceivable way, the hallucinations, the words, the actions in which she played the principal part all this was forgotten; it was all, as far as she was concerned, as if it had not been. 11 I can not do better than to bring M. Liegeois's own interpretation of his experiments, an inlerpret;i.tiori with which I fully agree: "During the negative hallucinations," says M. Lie geois, "the subject sees what IK; does not seem to and hears what he docs not seem to hear. Two penOfl alities (selves) exist within him an unconscious (sub- conscious) ego that sees and hears, and a eonsciou that does not fee nor hear." And I may add that not only do the two egos exist within the state of negative hallucination, but also within the normal state. The facts of hypnotic, memory alone -.trongly indi- cate the intelligent nature of the subconscious, ('an the theory of uncon.-.cious cerebration x explain, for in * On nnr:<rii\:\i,\\, :<<. < 'ur|>cMt< r' Mi-ntal I'l. olo#y ; Irc.lfind, Tin: I'lot. upon ttic I'.rniri ; Ijiyork, t'nconwiouH /ration, Journal ol Mental .Junnury un'l Ajril, 1870; THE SUBCONSCIOUS SELF. stance, the fact of suggested amnesia during hypnosis ? I hypnotise Mr. V. F., and make him pass through many lively scenes and actions, I give him hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestions. The subject is wakened and hypnotized time and again. At last he is put into a hypnotic state, and is suggested that on awaking he shall not remember anything of what had happened in the state of hypnosis. The subject, on emerging from his trance, remembers nothing of what he has passed through. I then put my hand on his forehead and tell him in a commanding voice, u You remember now \ thing!" As if touched by the wand of a ma- gician, the suppressed memories become endowed with life and movement and invade the consciousness of the subject Everything is now clearly remembered, and the subject is able to relate the tale of his ad- ventures without the omission of the least incident, So detailed is the account that one can not help won- dering at the extraordinary memory displayed by the subject. How is the theory of unconscious cerebra- tion to account for this strange fact f Prof. Ziehen, in his Physiological Psychology, tells us that "it is still a matter of doubt whether, despite their eom- plieateness, all the facts of the hypnotized individual are not motions accomplished without any concomitant psychical processes," and that " even the recollection of the hypnotic psychical processes do not necessarily argue t*i/