HE Drink Trade ND TATE Purchase. By the Rt. Hon. Sir T. P. WHITTAKER, M.P. [pnuted by permission from The Contemporary Review, June, 1915). lished for THE TEMPERANCE LEGISLATION LEAGUE, - - [iament Mansions.Victoria St., London, S. W.,£r405, Produce Exchange, Manchester, By IS. KING 8L SON, Ltd., ORCHARD HOUSE, WESTMINSTER. Price Id., or 6s. per 100 nett. % THE DRINK TRADE AND . . . . STATE PURCHASE. FROM the Parliamentary point of view what is known as the Drink Problem is notoriously one of the most difficult and dangerous questions that any Government -can touch. The truth of this has been exemplified during the last few weeks. In a period of political truce, when all parties in the House have patriotically supported the Government in passing any legislation which the Executive deemed necessary to enable them to prosecute the war successfully and guard -against the difficulties which followed in its train, this question of drink has alone proved to be an apple of discord, and with regard to it alone have the Government been obliged to abandon the proposals which they considered the welfare of the country required them to make. The spectacle was a pitiable and humiliating one. The Problem. What is the lesson to be learnt from it ? Surely it is that the problem of dealing with the great evil which is our national discredit, would be enormously simplified if we were to eliminate from it the widespread influence — political and social, national and local — which personal financial interest in the trade creates and exercises against every effort to secure substantial reform. The difficulty of interfering effectively with the daily personal habits and social customs of a large number of people will always be sufficiently great without adding to it the organised and organising opposition of hundreds of thousands of persons who, as publicans or other jetailers of intoxicants, or as brewers or distillers, or as "allied 336533 trades," or as employees of any of these, or as shareholders in any of their undertakings, have a direct personal interest in preventing anything being done that would reduce the sale of those intoxicants upon w^hich their livelihood and income more or less depend. That they should find themselves in this unenviable position is inevitable. It is asking too much of human nature to expect that people who are engaged in a business, or are deriving an income from it, will support or even acquiesce in measures which are designed seriously to curtail its profits. That there is a great evil is unquestionable. Fifteen years ago the Majority Report of the Peel Commission, which was signed by the eight members of that Commission who, as brewers, distillers, wine merchants, or publicans were personally engaged in the liquor trade, declared that "a gigantic evil remained to be remedied," and everyone who has any practical acquaintance with our social and industrial conditions knows that the evil which still remains is very real and extremely serious. Local Veto. Prohibition of the retail sale of all intoxicating drinks is the policy advocated by practically all active temperance organisations in all parts of the world. Undoubtedly it is the simplest and most effective remedy where it can be enacted and enforced. Experience has taught that, as it can only be effectively enforced when local opinion and the local authorities are in its favour, the most prudent and practicable policy is to- press for the enactment of the power of Local Veto, and to rely upon that until it has been very widely exercised. That is the policy of the Temperance party in this country, and in my judgment it is sound and wise. But prohibition, even by local vote, can only be a remedy for intemperance when Parliament has been induced to give the people the power to veto the sale of drink and when the people, in their respective localities, use the power thus conferred upon them. At present neither of these conditions obtains except in Scotland, where Parliament has taken the first step. When Parliament has conferred the power on the people of England and Wales, as it undoubtedly will one of these days, there will be, under present conditions, a lengthy time notice, and when that has expired it will be a long time before the veto power will be used in the greater part of the most populous and important areas. Meanwhile ? In the meantime, as the trade in drink exists and is likely to continue, what is to be done ? Surely the practical problem is how to render it as little injurious as possible. Not only is the direct financial interest which so many thousands of persons have in the trade the great barrier to legislative reform, but it is the great obstacle in the way of the effective administration of the law when it has been enacted. The retailer chafes at the restrictions which are put upon him, and continually exercises his ingenuity to avoid and evade them. It is his business to sell drink, and he resents anything that interferes with him in so doing. The brewer and distiller, the shareholder and the allied trader, are in the same boat. They are actuated by similar motives, and they cherish similar feelings. The whole weight of their ingenuity and influence is thrown against the effective administration of the licensing laws. At Parliamentary elections they are the warmest and most energetic supporters of the candidates who are most opposed or least favourable to licensing reform. When the question of appointing magistrates arises, every imaginable effort is made and every conceivable wire is pulled in order to secure the selection of men favourable to their trade, and the exclusion of others who would be likely to support a strict enforcement of the law. In municipal boroughs where the Watch Committees control the police, they are particularly active at local elections, and they spare no effort to secure the appointment of their friends on the Watch Committees, in order that they may thereby influence and largely paralyse the action of the police in all matters affecting licensed premises. The publican follows this up with gentle attentions to the police and discreet contributions to testimonial funds and the like. The brewers frequently complete the defensive wire entanglements by employing as their solicitors the firm of which the Clerk to the Justices is a member. Then all kinds of devices are resorted to to push the sale of drink — goose clubs, games, competitions, hawking, giving credit, snugs, partitions and screens in public-houses : clubs are financed, shows and gatherings for sports are promoted, and advertise- ments of drink abound. The trade exists to sell as much drink as possible, and the whole of its organisation and arrangements have that object in view. Its aim is not to restrict drinking, but to extend it. A Striking Proposal. Clearly it would be an enormous gain if the direct personal financial interest of the liquor trader were eliminated, and all pushing of the sale of drink and all inducements to the seller to evade the law were abolished. That can only be done by taking the trade out of the hands of those who now conduct it and placing it under the control of persons whose only object would be to promote the public well-being, and who would have no interest in pushing the sale or conniving at breaches of the law : that is to say, by placing it under disinterested management. There are more ways than one of doing this. One proposal has quite recently attracted attention, because it is known that it had the support of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and was submitted by him to the Cabinet, not only as the best way of dealing with the immediate and pressing difficulty in which the country found itself with regard to the drinking habits of the people and the prosecution of the war, but also as a means of taking a great step forward towards the solution of one of the most, if not indeed the most, difficult of our social and political problems. The suggestion was that the Government should buy up the liquor trade in Great Britain, and carry it on under public control. The proposal was a startling one, and it required a Minister of the exceptional courage and imagination of Mr. Lloyd George to entertain it and endeavour to put it into practical shape. From the Point of View of the Trade. It is understood that the suggestion was made to the Chancellor by representative brewers when he interviewed them with a view to obtaining their co-operation in connection with' the proposals he desired to make in response to the complaints which had been made concerning the output and transport of munitions of war. That such a proposal should be made was not unnatural. For some time past the position of brewers and others who are largely interested in, and closely identified with, the liquor trade has been anything but an easy and pleasant one. It is far from being a comfortable and agreeable one now, and it is likely to become less and less enviable as time goes by. The tide of public opinion is steadily rising against the trade. It is a business into which it is almost impossible to induce anyone to go if he is not already connected with it, and the great majority of those who are in it would gladly get out of it if they could conveniently do so. They are continually being harassed by legislation, and proposals for legislation, of a more and more restrictive character, while of recent years the increases in the taxation levied upon them have been large. Nor is the outlook for the future any brighter. Hitherto the House of Lords has saved them from some of the legislation which they have feared most. Now the power of that assembly to protect them has been very materially curtailed by the Parliament Act. Further, it was not pleasant for them to hear the nation told by the Government that their trade is a serious hindrance to the success of their country in the life- and-death struggle in which it is engaged : and the prospect that the action that would be taken in relation thereto would still further disturb their business and reduce their profits was not a comforting one. There were substantial reasons on their side, therefore, why they should be willing to enter upon a deal and accept reasonable terms. From the Public Point of View. On the other hand, were there not weighty reasons why the representatives of the nation should consider the suggestion ? In the first place, the circumstances were unique and unlikely to recur. Parliament is working under a political truce. If, under that truce, the thorniest and most difficult and, I think I may add, the most unpleasant of all subjects of party 8- controversy could be dealt with by something like general agreement, the gain to the nation as a whole, and to all the political parties in it, would be great. The difBculty of attempting to deal with the drink problem under the ordinary conditions of party controversy, when so much party capital can be made out of it, and the supporters and opponents of other proposals on other questions are only too ready to enlist its partisans under their banner, has been experienced too often not to be well known. Consequently, if an opportunity presented itself for dealing with the problem under favourable conditions, it was clearly a pity to miss it, even in the midst of such disconcerting preoccupations and surroundings as we are now immersed in. The Terms Suggested. Of course, everything would turn upon the terms on which the transaction could be carried through. It would be useless to put before Parliament and the country anything that appeared to be extortionate or unreasonable. Anything that savoured of the scandal of ordinary arbitration proceedings with the extravagant farce of expert witnesses and an arbitrator and counsel whose fees pile up in proportion to the length of time over which they spin out the proceedings, which usually end in something like a splitting of the difference between the two most extreme valuations, would, very properly, be rejected with scorn. So would any talk of an addition of lo per cent, for compulsory purchase. The days for that sort of thing in circumstances like these have gone, and gone for ever. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer had ascertained that the leaders of the Unionist Party were prepared to consider the proposal he appointed two committees to consider the basis on which the terms of purchase should be arrived at, and the financial arrangements that would have to be made, should it be decided that the State should acquire the breweries in Great Britain, together with the interests in licensed premises and the control of other branches of the retail liquor trade. The Committee to which the problem of England and Wales was referred was a very representative one, and it made a unanimous report, the outstanding points of which have been made known and were : — I. — That the average prices for the three years ending June 30th, 1914, should be taken as the value of those securities which were quoted on London or provincial stock exchanges ; that where the securities were not quoted, or the undertakings were privately owned, the number of years' purchase of the average annual net profits at which the value should be fixed should be based upon the number of years' purchase of the annual net profits which the prices of quoted securities represent; that the values thus arrived at would be subject to adjustment if the quoted prices had been unduly affected during the three years by special circumstances, or if, in cases where there were no quotations, there were assets which were not reasonably represented in the profits. 2. — That the purchase price should be paid in 4 per cent. Government stock at par, redeemable at par at the option of the Government any time after seven years. Some Financial Considerations. When considering the financial aspects of such a transaction as this there are many important matters to be borne in mind. Not the least of them is the revenue now derived from licence duties and the taxes on beer, spirits, wine, etc. A payment corresponding to what these would have amounted to, according to the quantity of drink sold, if the trade had remained in private hands w^ould, of course, have to be made to the revenue out of the receipts from sales. The price to be paid for the whole of the liquor trade to be acquired in England and Wales on the basis suggested would probably have been something between £250,000,000 and ;f300, 000,000. The average annual net profits ma.de by the trade in these companies which have a Stock Exchange quotation for their securities are about 7 per cent, on the capital value represented by these quotations. It may, there- fore, be assumed that the purchase of the whole of the trade, on the average, would have been on a 7 per cent, basis. As the payment would have been made in 4 per cent. Government Stock, there would have been a margin of 3 per cent, to work , lO upon. This would have amounted to something like ^7,500,000 to ;fg, 000,000 a year, according to the capital value as ascertained. Buy a Declining Trade? It may at once be said: "Yes, but you would be buying a declining trade, and your object in acquiring it would be to destroy or very materially diminish it." The reply is, that while it is true that the consumption of drink per head of the population tends downward, the consumption per brewery or per licensed house, taken over terms of years, does not seriously diminish. Of course, there are peaks of boom and depths of depression in the drink trade as in all others, and if a period of low consumption be compared with one of a high demand a great falling off per head will be shown ; but in total, and especially per house, the reduction in sales has not been so great as many people imagine. Nor is it likely to be, unless and until we have much more stringent legislation effectively in force than we now possess. It is also true that it is the desire of the community generally to reduce very largely the consumption of drink, and that many of us desire to prohibit its sale altogether wherever public opinion will support so doing. But at best these results will only be obtained gradually and after the lapse of a very considerable period of time. Meanwhile, other consequences of national control would be making themselves felt in the financial position. A very large proportion of the breweries, probably something like three- fourths of them, would be closed, and a very large saving thereby made in standing charges and management expenses. An enormous number of licensed premises would at once be regarded as redundant and would be closed, and a corresponding saving in rents, rates, and working expenses would result from this concentration of the trade. If the licensed houses were reduced to one-half their present number, as they soon would be, the consumption of drink would not, as the result of that closing, be reduced to one-half. It might be reduced by one- fourth. That would mean that, on the average, each remaining house would do 50 per cent, more trade than it did before. As the working expenses would be increased very little and in many cases not at all, the net profit per house would be II considerably larger. The sale of the brewery premises and licensed houses which were not required would realise a large sum, which would at once be devoted to reducing the capital account and consequently the amount of interest annually payable on it. All the very large outlay now incurred in pushing the trade by means of advertisements in newspapers and magazines, posters on hoardings, circulars by post, enamelled plates on railways, and the like would cease and be saved. Nor would it be necessary to retain the most costly sites at the corners of streets. Equally commodious but far less expensive premises in the vicinity would answer every purpose. No compensation levies would be payable, no commercial travellers would be required ; and the sale of lighter beers would show a larger margin of profit. A very substantial reduction in consumption could be effected before these large savings and gains wer^ counter-balanced by it. Meanwhile, a considerable annual sinking fund payment would be at work steadily reducing the capital account. It will be said that Government management will never be so efficient and profitable as private enterprise. That is true ; and if the object were to do as much business as possible the objection would be a sound one, but as that is not the case the objection loses much of its force, although it does represent a set-off which must not be overlooked. When all allowance has been made, and the transaction is looked at from the purely financial point of view, there is no reason to think that it would have involved any serious risk and responsibility. What would be Gained ? What advantages would be gained ? Some of them may be summarised thus : — I. — The direct personal financial interest of individuals deriving an income from the trade would be enormously reduced and largely changed. 2. — The local and national, political and social influence, which is now so great a barrier to effective legislation and to the efficient administration of the laws which have been enacted, would practically disappear. 12 3- — The number of licensed premises would be enormously reduced. 4. — Grocers' licences would probably speedily disappear. 5- — Shortening of the hours of sale, closing on Sundays, earlier closing on Saturday nights, the abolition of snugs and screens, back doors and side entrances, the stopping of credit and of hawking drink in casks and bottles, and many other minor but important reforms would at once be rendered practicable and easy, and could be carried out by the simple process of an administrative order. 6. — Inducements to attempt unduly to influence and corrupt the police and pack our benches of magis- trates and Watch Committees would cease to exist. 7. — There would be an end of such contentious questions as compensation and a time limit. 8. — The wa}^ would not only be clear for giving the people in their respective localities a wide power of local option, including local veto, but the ability to use the power would be largely increased because the opposition to it would be much reduced and be far less active and vigorous. There would not be any wealthy and organised liquor trade to fight. An Objection on "Principle." I am aware that there are many well-meaning people who object, on what they consider to be ''principle," to the Government engaging in this trade and thereby making them as citizens participators in it. Their position is an inconsistent one. They are participators in the trade now. The com- munity receives from it some 50 or 60 million pounds a year as a contribution to its rates and taxes, and I have never met a single person who has declined to have his contribution to the national and local exchequers reduced by his share of the payment made by the liquor trade. In so far as they would be responsible as members of the community for the action of 13 the Government in carrying on the liquor trade, they are now similarly responsible for empowering justices to authorise publicans and other licensed persons to carry on the same trade. The difference between the community carrying on a trade itself and year by year definitely authorising a number of other people to carry it on, and taking from them an exceed- ingly large proportion of the profits which result therefrom, is far too fine and thin to be regarded as a principle. To plain- minded people it is difficult to distinguish the so-called principle from a hair-splitting quibble. If the trade now makes a profit of some 70 or 80 millions a year before licence duties and liquor taxes are paid, and we take 50 or 60 millions of that profit for national purposes, no fundamental and entirely new departure in principle would be involved if the State decided to acquire the remaining 20 millions a year. The only point really raised would be one of expediency. A Difficulty which is not New. If it be said that in the event of the State purchasing the liquor trade the direct interest of the authorities and the community in so running it as to produce the largest profit would be so great that restriction and reduction would be rendered extremely difficult, and prohibition would be impos- sible, the reply is, first, that we have the recent example of Russia to the contrary ; and second, that we are directly interested now in so promoting the trade in drink as to derive the largest possible revenue from it. The truth is that so far as difficulty arises from the fact that the community derives a large revenue from the sale of drink and may, therefore, be said to be directly interested in the maintenance and growth of the trade, that difficulty will remain with us so long as the trade continues, whatever system of controlling and restricting it may be adopted. The difficulty arises from the fact that intoxicating liquors and the sale of them are taxed. No responsible person has yet been foolish enough to suggest that they should not be taxed, and any attempt to repeal those taxes and thus make drink vastly cheaper would be resisted by no one more vigorously than by those who oppose the proposal we are now considering. Experience Elsewhere. The experiment of disinterested management has been tried in Norway and Sweden for many years under very Hmited and more or less unsatisfactory conditions. The results, even under those conditions, have been remarkable. The temptations to drink have been enormously reduced, and many temperance reforms, for which we have long vainly striven here, have been obtained there with the greatest ease. The adoption of the system in the towns of those countries has nowhere proved to be a rival of or an obstacle to the adoption of more stringent measures. On the contrary, it has again and again prepared the way for, and proved to be a stepping-stone to, more drastic action. No friend of temperance in either of those countries ever dreams of advocating the abandonment of disinterested management in order to return to any system of licence and private ownership. I am aware that these facts are contested by a band of active and earnest but, for the most part, often impracticable temperance people in this country. Considerations of space forbid that I should here and now enter upon a detailed discussion of the points at issue. I must content myself with saying that many of the statements made by these critics of the company-management systems of Norway and Sweden are not only grossly inaccurate and misleading, but are such ingenious perversions of facts and quotations as to render it charitable to adopt the conclusion that the authors of them are either astoundingly incompetent or completely blinded by prejudice. The War and the Financial Problem. When the suggestion was made that the Government should ask Parliament to grapple with the difficulty with which the country was confronted in regard to the output of ships and munitions of war and the transport of men and supplies, and at the same time lift an extremely difficult and important political and social problem out of the ruts of party controversy by purchase of the trade, one objection that was raised was that the issue of a large amount of Government stock at the present time would have an unfavourable effect on Government credit and the raising of the necessary funds for 15 the war. It is true that any considerable further issue of Government stock at any time affects the market value of all existing Government securities. But when the issue does not take money off the market, but is issued in exchange for other securities and investments and for the purchase of a revenue- producing undertaking, the effect of that issue is likely to be reduced to a minimum. A large amount of the particular issue that was contemplated would undoubtedly have been permanently held by those to whom it was issued, and the effect of any widespread attempt to sell by those who wished to realise could have been almost entirely counteracted by providing that for, say, one or two or three years after the war quotations for this particular issue should not be allowed on any Stock Exchange. That would not have prevented holders from selling privately or from obtaining advances from their bankers in cases of necessity. On the whole, I regret that it was not found possible to carry the proposal further. I agree with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in thinking that a great opportunity was missed, and I hope that the seed which his courage has sown will so develop as to render possible in the near future the taking of a step which appears to me to be likely to take us far in the direction of the solution of one of the most difficult of our national problems. It would probably simplify the trans- action and ease some Parliamentary difficulties that might arise if it were confined to England and Wales. Scotland has got its Temperance Act, and might desire to work out its own salvation on its own lines. Ireland might be left to deal with its problem in its own way in its own Parliament. Thos. p. Whittaker. Cole & Co., Wkstminster Printing Works, 92-96, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, S.W. HV6'(J 6 2 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY