MILITARY MISCELLANIES,
BY
JAMES B. FRY,
RETIRED ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, RANK OF COLONEL,
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
11 It fiufficcth not to the strength o/ the armes to have flesh, blood
and bonex, tin-less then have also siti.cwes, to stretch out and pull in
for the defence of the hody; so it sufflceth not in an army to have
VICTUALS, for the maintenance of it; ARMOUR and WEAPONS for the
defence of it; unless it have MONEY also, the SINEWES OP WARRE."
" Wherefore, seeing that money is such a real advantage in the
warres, we may conclude, that whosoever prepareth forwarre must
first be provided of MONEY, the Sinewes thereof."" (Ward's "An-
imadversions of Warre." London, 1639.)
BREISTTANO'S.
1889.
'- 'opyright liy
JAMES B/FRY.
PRESS OP
A. G. SHERWOOD <fe CO.
NEW YORK.
' /
PEEFACE.
THERE is nothing new in this compilation. My
purpose is to put some facts, opinions and comments
into book-form for the convenience of such military
students as may find occasion to refer to them.
MI81666
< < 73 U T the fact is that here as elsewhere, poetry has reached
the truth while science and common sense have missed it.
It has distinguished, as in spite of all mercenary and feeble
sophistry, men ever will distinguish, war from mere bloodshed.
It has discerned the higher feelings which lie beneath its re-
volting features. Carnage is terrible. The conversion of pro-
ducers into destroyers is a calamity. Death, and insults to
women worse than death, and human features obliterated beneath
the hoof of the war-horse, and reeking hospitals, and ruined
commerce, and violated homes, and broken hearts they are all
awful. But there is something worse than death. Cowardice
is worse. And the decay of enthusiasm and manliness is icorse.
And it is worse than death, aye, worse than a hundred thou-
sand deaths, when a people has gravitated down into the creed
that the ' wealth of nations ' consists not in generous hearts
\fire in each breast and freedom on each broiv' in national
virtues and primitive simplicity, and heroic endurance, and
preference of duty to life not in men, but in silk and cotton,
and something that they call ' Capital. ' Peace is blessed. Peace
arising out of charity But peace springing out of the calcu-
lations of selfishness is not blessed. If the price to be paid
for peace is this, that wealth accumulate and men decay, better
far that every street in every town of our once noble country
should run blood." Lecture of Rev. F. W. Robertson, Febru-
ary, 1852, before Mechanics' Institution, Brighton, England.
CONTENTS.
PAET I.
PAGE.
I. NOTES ON THEOEETICAL AND PRACTICAL MILITARY
MATTERS: 9
1. CONGRESS. 2. THE PRESIDENT. 3. OFFICE. 4.
COMMISSION. 5. GRADE. 6. RANK. 7. TITLE. 8. PRO-
MOTION. 9. TRANSFER. 10. AUTHORITY. 11. BREVET.
12. RETIREMENT. 13. REDUCING PAY. 14. RENTING QUAR-
TERS. 15. CHANGING STATION. 16. FORAGE FOR OFFI-
CERS' HORSES. 17. A SURVIVORSHIP ANNUITY SOCIETY.
18. DUTIES OF AN ADJUTANT-GENERAL. 19. ARMY REGU-
LATIONS.
II. THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY, 64
III. JUSTICE IN THE ARMY, 147
IV. LAW IN THE ARMY, 152
V. OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY, 161
VI. JUSTICE FOR THE ARMY, 177
VII. THE HONOR OF THE ARMY, 180
VIII. A MILITARY COURT OF APPEALS, 182
IX. AN ELASTIC REGULAR ARMY, 196
X. ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY, . . 204
XL THE MILITIA, '257
CONTENTS,
PART II.
PAGE.
I. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 277
II. AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT, .... 292
III. GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD, 311
IV. HALLECK AND GRANT. MISUNDERSTANDINGS, . 326
V. NICOLA Y'S "OUTBREAK OF REBELLION," . . . 349
VI. THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN, . . . . ' 357
VII. SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS" (BATTLE
OF SEVEN PINES), 401
VIII. DODGE'S "CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORS VILLE," . 427
IX. DOUBLED AY'S " CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYS-
BURG," 434
X. DE TROBRIAND'S "FOUR YEARS WITH THE ARMY
OF THE POTOMAC," 443
XI. PITTINGER'S " CAPTURING A LOCOMOTIVE," . . 455
XII. KEYES'S "FIFTY YEARS' OBSERVATION OF MEN AND
EVENTS," ... 462
XIII. KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER (NELSON AND
DAVIS), .486
XIV. CUSTER'S DEFEAT BY SITTING BULL, ... 506
XV. FARRAR'S " MILITARY MANNERS AND CUSTOMS," . 512
APPENDIX. 521
AETICLE I.
Notes on Theoretical and Practical
Military Matters.
I. CONGRESS.
THE Constitution gives Congress power to provide
for the common defence and general " welfare of the
United States," " to declare war," " to raise and sup-
port armies," " and to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces."
The responsibility for the common defence resting
on Congress, all the power essential to meet it is vested
in Congress, which possesses supreme control of the
land and naval forces. " There can be no limitation
of that authority, which is to provide for the defence
and protection of the community in any matter essen-
tial to its efficacy ; that is, in any matter essential to
the formation, direction and support of the national
forces." *
Congress, by virtue of its constitutional powers,
may make laws governing appointments and promo-
tions in the Army ; and without trenching on the rights
of the appointing power, may prescribe how original
or other vacancies shall be filled. These appointments
are " otherwise provided for " in the clauses of the
Constitution which empower Congress to raise armies
* Federalist, No. XXIII. Hamilton.
10
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
and make rules for their government and regulation.*
[See appendix A.]
II. THE PRESIDENT.
The Constitution provides that " the President shall
be Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States and of the militia of the several States
when called into the actual service of the United
States."
" No Act of Congress, no act even of the President
himself, can by constitutional possibility authorize or
create any military officer not subordinate to the
President." (7 " Opinions," 465.)
The President is the first General and the first
Admiral of the United States, but he exercises his
command in conformity to such rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces as
Congress, the supreme authority, may prescribe.
As Chief Magistrate " he shall nominate and, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate,f shall
* For exercise of power over appointments by early Congresses see
note t, page 7.
t Commissioned officers have not in all cases been confirmed by the
Senate under the present Constitution. The President was empowered
"alone to appoint" those of the "levies," March 3, 1791, and he
' ' alone ' ' was authorized to officer the Cavalry provided for by the Act of
1792. In other instances he has been required only to submit the names
of field and higher officers to the Senate. By the Act of July 6, 1812,
the President was authorized alone to confer brevet rank on officers,
while the Act of April 16, 1818, requires that " no brevet commission
shall hereafter be conferred but by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate." Thus, as early as 1791, Congress appears to have acted
on the understanding that it could except army appointments from the
operation of the general constitutional provision concerning appoint-
ments ; in other words, that army appointments belonged among those
" otherwise provided for " by the Constitution itself.
THEORETIC A.L AND PRACTICAL NOTES.
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers
of the United States whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which * shall be estab-
lished by law. But the Congress may by law vest
the appointment of such inferior officers f as they think
proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads of departments."
in. OFFICE.
Office is a public station or employment established
by law.J In its broadest sense it implies public du-
ties and powers and personal rights and privileges.
An officer is one who is invested with an office.
* The meaning of this evidently is whose offices " shall be established
toy law."
t A decision was rendered by the United States Supreme Court
in the case of the United States against Douglas Smith. Douglas
Smith was a clerk in the office of the Collector of Customs at New York,
and in 1886 he was indicted under section 5,490 of the Revised Statutes
for embezzlement of public moneys. The Court below was divided in
opinion as to the sufficiency of the indictment, and certified to this
court the following questions :
" First Is a clerk in the office of the Collector of Customs for the
city of New York, appointed by the Collector with the approbation of
the Secretary of the Treasury by virtue of section 2,634 of the Revised
Statutes, a person charged by any act of Congress with the safe
keeping of public moneys ?
" Second Was the defendant appointed by the head of a depart-
ment within the meaning of the constitutional provisions ' upon the
subject of the appointing power? "
This Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Field, answers both of
these questions in the negative and holds that section 3,639 of the
Revised Statutes concerning the safe keeping of public moneys does not
apply to Collectors' clerks, and that such clerks are not appointed by
the head of any department within the meaning of any constitutional
provision.
See Bouvier's Law Diet., p. 255; Wharton's Law Lexicon, p.
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
The Constitution requires that the President " shall
commission all the officers of the United States."
Offices in the Army are grouped in grades.*
Names are given to the grades and offices in the
different corps of the Army. For example, the name
of a grade in one corps is Assistant Surgeon-General.
That is also the name of the office constituting that
grade. The law provides that the incumbent of that
office shall have the rank of Colonel.
The names of grades in some other corps are Colonel,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, f etc., and the names of offices
in those grades are Colonel of Cavalry, Lieutenant-
Colonel of Artillery, Major of Infantry, etc. In these
cases rank is expressed in the term used by the law
for defining the office. The result would be the same,
if the law in the one case had called the grades by
other names Chief of Cavalry, Assistant Chief of
537; Blackstone's Commentaries: U. S. Supreme Court, 6 Wallace,
393 (42 New York Superior Court, 481) ; Webster and other lexicog-
raphers ; Tlie Nation of Aug. 10, 1882.
In a decision rendered March, 1884, concerning the case of an
officer of the Army on the retired list, Judge Lawrence, First Comp-
troller of the Treasury, says : " An office cannot exist unless it be es-
tablished or recognized by the Constitution or by Act of Congress. " " A
retired Army officer is an officer in the public service."
* See Grades.
t The following definitions are in Bailey's English Dictionary
(1747) :
Colonel. The Chief Commander of a regiment of horse or foot.
Lieutenant-Colonel (of Horse or Foot). An officer who is next in
post to the Colonel, and commands in his absence.
Major of a Regiment is the next in office to a Lieut. -Colonel, etc.
Captain. A head officer of a Troop of Horse, or a Company of
Foot, or of a Ship of War.
Lieutenant (of Horse or Foot) is next to the Captain, and com-
mands in his absence.
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 13
Artillery, etc., for example and then had provided
that the incumbent of the office of Chief of Cavalry
and of the office of Assistant Chief of Artillery should
have, respectively, the rank of Colonel and Lieutenant-
Colonel. In other words, the mere fact that rank in
some cases is expressed in the designation of office does
not make it differ from rank specifically provided for
an incumbent of office. The same principle governs.
Office in both cases is the source of authority in the
corps ; rank is a legal incident of office, a degree of dig-
nity, which fixes an order of precedence to be observed
in the exercise of authority beyond the corps.
iv. COMMISSION.
" The commission," said General Macomb, "is the in-
strument of authority." It is an official document of
two distinct parts. The first part is evidence or patent
of office with rights and privileges. It fixes both the
grade and rank of the officer. The language of the
President is : " By and with the advice and consent of
the Senate I do appoint him (naming office, grade
and corps) in the service of the United States to rank
as such from the day of ."
The second part confers the authority of the office
and imposes its duties and obligations. It -charges
the appointee " carefully and diligently to discharge
the duties of by doing and performing all man-
ner of things thereunto belonging." It directs " all
officers and soldiers under his command to be obedient
to his orders," and requires him to " observe and fol-
low such orders and directions as he may receive from
the superior officers set over him." Commissions do
14 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
not entitle their holders to authority beyond the body
to which the holders belong.
v. GRADES.
Grades are subdivisions in the military hierarchy,,
as the grade of General, the grade of Colonel, the
grade of Surgeon, the grade of Paymaster, etc., etc.
Though " grade " and " rank " are often used as sy-
nonymous terms, the former is more properly appli-
cable to positions than to persons. The question, for
example, What grade does he occupy ? and the an-
swer, the grade of Colonel, or Paymaster, etc., as the
case may be, illustrate the proper use of the term.
Its correct meaning appears in the 124th Article of
War, which says "officers of the militia . .
shall take rank next after all officers of the like grade
in said regular," etc.
The precedence of grades in a corps has long been
established by the " custom of war," and is usually ex-
pressed in the order of their arrangement in the law
creating the corps. General Scott said in an official
letter in 1846 : " There is not a syllable in any Act of
Parliament or of Congress ; not a syllable in the
British Articles of War and General Regulations, or
in our Articles of War (Act April 10, 1806), which
says in terms that an officer of any grade whatever
may command an officer of any other grade whatever.
Every question between grades and dates of the same
grade is settled both in Great Britain and the United
States by the ' custom of war in like cases.' ' When
a new grade is created in an established corps, the Act
creating it, to prevent confusion, should fix its position.
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 15
If that be not done, its position must be determined
by the best evidence available, the rank attached for
the incumbent being entitled to weight in deciding
the question.
The grade which an officer is to occupy is desig-
nated in his commission.
Every grade may many do contain a number of
offices. A corps may contain many offices and but
few grades.
VI. RANK.
Rank is a degree of dignity. In our Government
it is created by law, and is based upon office. Con-
gress may at any time change or abolish it, under the
constitutional power to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces.
The term rank applies to persons, and implies a
range of precedence or subordination among officers.
An officer's rank (as well as the grade he is to oc-
cupy and the office he is to hold) is designated in his
commission.
As authority proceeds from office, and as rank in
our country is conferred only on officers, it follows, as
Washington said, that " Military rank and eligibility
to command are ideas which cannot be separated."
Nevertheless, if all rank were' abolished, the authority
of office would remain.
When a law in terms confers rank on an incumbent
of office, as in case of the Act of June 16, 1880, which
conferred on the " Chief Signal Officer " " the rank
and pay of Brigadier-General," a new appointment
is not necessary to entitle the officer who may hold the
16
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
office, when the Act is passed, to the rank conferred by
the law.
VII. TITLE.
Title is an appellation of dignity. The term is
applicable to persons rather than to positions, dignity
being a quality which attaches not to office itself, but
to the incumbent by virtue of his occupation of office.
If the word name were used instead of title, when
speaking of office, grade and rank, it might prevent
some of the confusion which is created by such ex-
pressions as the title of his grade, the title of his office,
the title of his rank.
vni. PROMOTION.
Promotion in the Army is advancement to an office
in a higher grade.
Every promotion is an appointment to office and is
made subject to rules established by Congress for the
government and regulation of the Army.
The rank provided by law for incumbents of offices
in the Army, as a rule corresponds in importance with
the order of precedence of the offices. Hence promo-
tion usually produces higher rank. But this is not al-
ways the case, as the same rank may be provided by
law for the incumbents of different grades in a corps,
one grade having precedence of the other. That was
the case with the grades and offices of Paymaster-Gen-
eral and Assistant Paymasters-General from 1872 to
1876, all the incumbents having the rank of Colonel.
Although the incumbents had the same rank their
offices were not the same, and advancement from the
grade of Assistant Paymaster-General, with the rank
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 1 7
of Colonel, to the grade of Pay master- General, with
the rank of Colonel, was promotion.
When the law creates a military corps and names
the grades composing it in the order of their prece-
dence, as established by the custom of war, and gives
a relative position to such new grades as it may cre-
ate, the arrangement in the law is the order of prece-
dence of the grades for the exercise of authority with-
in the corps, and for guidance in making promotions,
let the rank provided for incumbents be what it may.
Promotion is governed by law. The present code
of Army Regulations of 1881 says:
"All vacancies in established regiments and corps,
to the rank of Colonel, shall be filled by promotion
according to seniority, except in case of disability or
other incompetency."
A regiment or corps is not " established " in the
meaning of the laws governing promotion until every
office in it has been filled once, no matter whether the
offices are all created at the same time or some at one
and some at another time. Until filled once every of-
fice affords what is called an original vacancy, to which
the rule of promotion by seniority does not apply, and
which, unless otherwise provided by law, may be filled
by selection.
IX. TRANSFERS.
After a man has been duly appointed to an office in
a regiment or corps of the Army, his transfer to another
regiment or corps involves vacation of one office and
installation in another. That is to say, it involves ap-
pointment to office. This, like any other appointment,
the appointee has the right to accept or decline. It is
18
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
in deference to these facts that Army Regulations
made or adopted by Congress forbid " the transfer of
officers from one regiment or corps to another," except
" on the mutual application of the parties desiring ike
change" This exceptional process, by which officers
are enabled practically to couple withdrawal from one
office with appointment to another, called transfer, is
provided by the Regulations to accommodate the of-
ficers, as shown by the fact that it is dependent on
"the mutual application of the parties desiring the
change " ; and their mutual application is evidently
regarded as a precedent acceptance of the new office.
No right exists to transfer an officer against his will
from the regiment or corps in which he has been duly
appointed to another, not even on the ground that it
may promote the welfare of the Service. In fact an
officer could not be considered as holding an office to
o
which he might be transferred if he declined the office
that is, if he declined the transfer nor could he
be considered as vacating the office to which he had
been duly appointed, for arbitrary transfer is not a
legal process for ejecting an incumbent from office.*
X. AUTHOEITY.
Authority in the military service is derived from
office. A commission to office, however, does not en-
title the holder to authority beyond the corps to which
he belongs. The authority of officers oft he Army is
extended beyond their corps by law and by custom of
war. The rule established by law for precedence in
the exercise of such extended authority is found in the
* This, however, is not intended to imply a limitation to the power
of Congress in disbanding, reducing or reorganizing the Army.
THEOEETIOAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 19
122d Article of War, which says: "If upon marches,
guards, or in quarters, different corps of the Army hap-
pen to join or do duty together, the officer highest in
rank of the line of the Army, marine corps or militia
by commission there on duty or in quarters, shall com-
mand the whole and give orders for what is needful
to the Service, unless otherwise specially directed by
the President, according to the nature of the case."
This law does not set up rank in lieu of office or in
addition to office as a source of authority. It merely
extends the authority of office and prescribes the order
among office holders, in which, under certain circum-
stances, the authority of office shall be exercised ; to
wit, in the order of rank. To exercise authority in
such cases, office holders must be in " the line of the
army, marine corps, or militia by commission there
on duty." The Articles of War (25 and 26) prior to
1806, out of which the 62d of that year and the 122d
of the present day grew, did not mention rank. They
required the " eldest officer," which meant senior or su-
perior officer, to command. The object of the old ar-
ticles on this point was, however, the same as of the
new. It was to prescribe how the authority of office,
which by the commission operates only within the
corps, should be extended over different corps of the
Army in certain contingencies not otherwise provided
for; to wit, when they "happen to join or do duty to-
gether " " upon marches, guards, or in quarters."
XI. BKEVET.
Is the brevet the instrument of office in the Army at
large, or is it merely the instrument of abstract rank
conferred upon civilian or soldier ?
.20
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
" The word brevet in French signifies, when applied
to offices in the army or navy, Commission. Brevet
was taken by the English from the French with this
meaning. As used in the United States Army, brevet
was borrowed with our Articles of War from England,
and in the British service it means a commission in
the army at large." (EL L. Scott's Mil'y Diet.)
Brevets were introduced into the British service
(1692) not to confer rank upon officers then in the
army, but for the purpose of appointing civilians to
offices in the army at large.
They appeared in our first Articles of War, which
went into operation June 20, 1775, and, as in the case
of the mother country, the first use made of them was
to appoint civilians to office in the army at large.
There can be no dispute that in the British army
the brevet is conclusive evidence of office. It is the
only commission to general offices held in that army
by officers above the corps grade of Colonel. If it did
not commission them to office they would not be officers
of the army. They not only hold offices by brevet, but,
as Clode tells us, in his " Forces of the Crown," and
as Regulations show, they have " promotion by brevet
. . . conferred strictly according to seniority." We
have no rank among civilians. Our Government does
not confer rank independent of office.
With no other commission than the brevet, persons
in our Service have in many cases exercised command,
received and disbursed public funds, administered law
as members of general courts-martial, and performed
all other duties belonging to officers of the Army, and
drawn the pay and allowances of the grades which
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 21
they held by brevet alone. If their brevets were not
commissions to office, these persons were not officers of
the Army. If brevets were evidence of office formerly,
they are so at the present time, for the legal restric-
tions which have been imposed from time to time on
brevets have not changed their nature. But the terms
of the Statutes, and the many questions which have
arisen affecting public and private interests, leave it
still in dispute, whether the brevet is evidence of office
in the Army at large or merely evidence of abstract
rank independent of office, or attached by law to some
office in a particular corps. The law now permits
brevets to be given only to officers oft he Army, and
the terms of the Act of 1812 support the view that
brevets are evidence of rank, not office. But rank and
office have been so often confounded in the Statutes
and elsewhere, that the mere use of the former term
is not conclusive.
A brevet is indisputably " a commission in the Army
at large." What does " commission " mean here ? Is
the person commissioned to rank or to office ? Hardly
to rank, for " rank is a degree of dignity." Like a vote
of thanks or a medal, rank can be conferred by an act of
Congress without the aid of the appointing power. In
our service it is not a "station or employment," nor is
it in itself a source of authority. It is dependent on
office, and may be attached to or withdrawn from the
incumbent of office or modified at pleasure by Con-
gress. It does not appear to be rank that men are
commissioned to by the brevet. On the contrary, the
brevet is evidence of station and employment, and is
a source of authority. It is not conferred or changed
22
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
by Congress. It is bestowed through the full exercise
of the appointing power. During the Revolution Con-
gress, while it possessed appointing power, used the
brevet as a means of increasing without limit the num-
ber of commissioned officers in the military Service.
There were but two brevets between the adoption
of the Constitution and 1812. They were bestowed
upon Harmar and de Poiery, and were conferred
through the operation of the regular appointing power
Washington, the President, nominated and the
Senate confirmed.
An Act was approved June 6, 1812, authorizing the
President to confer brevet rank, but, probably to pre-
vent him from increasing the number of officers, as had
been done during the Revolution, the law permitted
him to confer brevets only upon " officers of the Army."
On the 16th April, 1818, an Act was approved saying :
"No brevet commission shall hereafter be conferred
but by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."
This Act, which is still in force, was preceded by
a protracted discussion in Congress and full confer-
ence between committees of the Senate and House.
It requires that brevets shall be conferred by the exer-
cise of the full appointing power. The Constitution
requires the President to " commission all the officers
of the United States," and it does not require him to
commission any one else. He commissions all persons
on whom brevets are conferred; and furthermore,
he requires them to subscribe and file with accep-
tance of the commission the oath of office, in addi-
tion to the oath the officer may have filed with the
acceptance of his office in a particular corps. This
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 23
throughout is the process of appointment to office in
the Army.
An " office is a public station or employment estab-
lished by law" The brevet clearly is evidence of
public station or employment, but is that public sta-
tion or employment established by law ? The answer
is, yes; the Acts of July 6, 1812, and April 16, 1818,
authorizing and providing for conferring brevets, cre-
ated the public stations or offices necessary for the ful-
filment of the law. In opinion dated Dec. 11, 1822,
Attorney-General Wirt said : " Laws on military sub-
jects seldom fall within the sphere of a lawyer's prac-
tice or consideration, and he is consequently without
that key of experience in the subject-matter which is
so essential to their just construction. The origin and
nature of brevet rank, for example, the cases in which
it is conferred and the effects which it produces, are
purely questions of military experience, with regard to
which we have no written laws, and all suggestions in
regard to that rank must be of necessity beyond the
province of the mere jurist."
The character of the brevet was established in Great
Britain, by the custom of war, long before we separated
from the mother country. It was an instrument of
office in the army at large. Without reservation, ex-
planation or qualification, we adopted and used it 'as
an instrument of office during the Revolution. In 1812
we re-established the brevet, by law, the sole legal
condition imposed being that it should be given only
to officers of the Army, and thus while the number
of offices in the Army at large was increased indefi-
nitely, the number of officers was not increased.
24 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
In support of the opinion that brevets are commis-
sions to office and not merely certificates of rank, the
following may be noted :
In 1855 it was proposed to reward General Scott
with the brevet of Lieutenant-General for distinguished
services in the Mexican War. If the brevet meant
nothing but abstract rank it could have been conferred
by Act of Congress. But it was not conferred in that
way. On the contrary, the Act of February 15, 1855,
first "revived" the grade* of Lieutenant-General in the
Army, and General Scott was then duly appointed to
it by brevet.
The U. S. Supreme Court (14 Wallace, 550), in de-
ciding a claim for pay by a brevet officer, recognized
the brevet as evidence of office, saying : " There is a
difference of military position between an officer by
brevet and an officer by regular commission."
Generals Macomb and Scott regarded the brevet as
a commission in the Army at large.
Reverdy Johnson, discussing General Scott's brevet
of Lieutenant-General, said, " It was not only as an
honor, but as a compensation that the office was con-
ferred upon him."
The Assistant Attorney-General, acting for the
Government in the case of General H. J. Hunt, before
the Court of Claims, says, speaking of brevets : " The
military offices here mentioned, like all other offices of
the Army of the United States, are creatures of the
laws of Congress" "To discover the nature and attri-
butes of these offices" etc.
* Attorney-General Wirt in 1812 gave the opinion that the brevet
of Major in the Marine corps could not be conferred because there was
no such grade as Major in that corps.
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 25
The Army and Navy Journal published, " as a con-
tribution to the mooted question of brevet rank," a
letter dated November 11, 1880, from Colonel John P.
Nicholson, recorder-in-chief of the Military Order
of the Loyal Legion of the United States, to the Secre-
tary of War, and the Secretary's response transmitting
answers by the Adjutant-General to six questions
submitted by Col. Nicholson.
Colonel Nicholson's first two inquiries were
whether brevets conferred during the Rebellion
by Governors of States on commissioned officers
and enlisted men "are recognized as conferring
brevet rank in the United States Volunteers, and
whether such appointees are recognized by the War
Department as entitled to be designated as officers
by brevet in the United States Volunteers." To
these questions the Adjutant-General answered in the
negative. The United States recognized only the
commissions it conferred and those it adopted by
" muster-in." No one was mustered into United
States Service during the Rebellion under a brevet
from a State.
But the United States conferred brevets on volun-
teers in its service during the Rebellion ; and Colonel
Nicholson's third inquiry is : " Are these appointees
considered as still in the Volunteer Service of the Uni-
ted States and liable to active duty when called upon
by the President, the duties and privileges of their
respective offices being suspended in the meantime ? "
(See "Fry on Brevets," p. 10.) To this inquiry the
Adjutant-General replied : "The Volunteer officers bre-
vetted by the President during and after the war are
26 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
not considered as still in the Volunteer Service of
the United States." The Adjutant-General added,
"these brevets were based on the actual rank the
officers held in the U. S. Volunteer Service. The rec-
ognized rule is that a brevet appointment falls and
ceases to be effective with the commission on which
it is based." While it is true that in order to be
brevetted it is necessary to be a commissioned officer
in the military service, there is nothing in law, reg-
ulations, or competent decisions requiring that a bre-
vet be " based on .the actual rank " held, nor that
it shall fall and cease to be effective on account of
vacation of the particular grade held when it is con-
ferred. The Act of July 12, 1812, though not the
origin of brevets is practically the foundation of the
system in our Service. When it was passed there was
not a brevet officer in our Army. The second War of
Independence had begun, and as Attorney-General
Wirt said, " The Act was passed flagrante bello, and
was manifestly intended as a stimulus to enterprise in
a struggle which it was foreseen would require all our
strength." The terms of so much of that Act as is
involved in this issue are, "the President is hereby
authorized to confer brevet rank on such officers of the
Army as shall distinguish themselves by gallant actions
or meritorious conduct," etc. There is nothing in this
Act nor has there ever been anything in law or regula-
tions requiring brevets to be "based on the actual
rank" held, and to fall and "cease to be effective" when
that rank is vacated. All that the law requires on this
point is that the person on whom a brevet is conferred
shall be a commissioned officer of the military service
THEOKETICAL AND PKACTICAL NOTES. 27
and shall have distinguished himself by gallant actions
or meritorious conduct. No sequence is necessary be-
tween the " actual " or corps grade and the brevet, nor
between the brevets themselves. When the circum-
stances permit the bestowal of brevets the appointing
power has the same constitutional and legal rights to
bestow one brevet as another.
The foregoing remarks apply to brevets conferred
upon officers of Volunteers under the Act of March 3,
1863, which, embodying the principles of the act of
1812, authorized the President, with the advice of the
Senate, " to confer brevet rank on such commissioned
officers of Volunteers and other forces in the Service
of the United States, as have been or may hereafter be
distinguished by gallant actions or meritorious con-
duct." The theory that brevets under the Act of 1812,
and the acts which grew out of it, are based on " actual
rank," and fall with change of grade, is one of the most
extraordinary delusions that ever had a firm grip on a
government bureau. It first appeared in unsound ar-
guments put forth long ago by Adjutant-General Roger
Jones for the purpose of bolstering a claim he made to
hold two offices, one in the Adjutant-General's Depart-
ment and one in the Artillery, at the same time. More
than once destroyed when fairly brought to the test,
this theory nevertheless rises phoenix-like from its ashes,
and is re-embraced by the Adjutant-General's Depart-
ment, on the ground apparently that its own rulings
form precedents, and that the adverse decisions by
higher authority are merely exceptional cases. This
remarkable fatuity is probably due to bureaucratic
pride, and to misconception concerning Attorney-Gen-
28
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
eral Wirt's opinions. Adjutant-General Cooper, speak-
ing of the rulings of his department on this subject,
said " the principle of these decisions will be found
in the opinion of the Attorney-General, Mr. Wirt,
August, 1821." That opinion does not contain the prin-
ciple attributed to it. The question before Mr. Wirt
arose in the Marine Corps, in which there was at that
time no grade of Major. A Captain of marines became
entitled to a brevet. The question was whether he
should be given the brevet of Major, whether he
should have no brevet at all, or whether he should be
brevetted Lieutenant-Colonel. The Attorney-General
held that the brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel could be
conferred, but that the brevet of Major, the grade of
Major having no existence in the corps, could not be
conferred. In endeavoring to emphasize his views on
this point, the Attorney-General used language which
has been employed, conscientiously no doubt, by the
Adjutant-General's Department in antagonism to the
purpose and meaning of the opinion. Mr. Wirt said,
after this marine case had been forced upon him
ad nauseam, " It seems to me a palpable solecism in
military language to talk of the existence of a brevet
rank after the lineal rank by commission (of which the
brevet is merely the shadow) has been destroyed."
The figure of speech in the Attorney-General's brackets
has been taken literally, and with the rest of the sen-
tence forms the foundation of the theory that brevets
must be consecutive, each based on the grade next be-
low, and that as soon as the particular lineal grade on
which the first brevet is based, is vacated, the brevets
must all fall, though the grade be not destroyed, but on
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 29
the contrary, both the grade and the officer remain part
of the legal military establishment. There is no law,
nor is there an opinion from an Attorney-General to
sustain this theory. What Mr. Wirt decided was that
an officer cannot be bre vetted to a grade which " has
been destroyed," which has no legal existence. This
cannot be contested. Congress recognized the point
when it was proposed to reward General Scott for
services in the Mexican war. At that time no higher
grade than the one held by Major-General Scott existed
in our military establishment. Congress first " revived
the grade of Lieutenant-General in the Army of the
United States," and then the President and Senate con-
ferred on Major-General Scott the brevet of Lieu-
tenant-General.
Col. Nicholson's fourth inquiry was : " In cases
where brevet commissions were granted by the Presi-
dent in the usual manner to enlisted men in the Volun-
teer Service (see " Fry on Brevets," p, 236), are such
appointees recognized by the War Department as
officers ? " To this the Adjutant-General replied :
" Brevet commissions were issued to enlisted men in
the Volunteers through error only. There were but
very few cases like that referred to in the case of Pri-
vate Stowe. The person so brevetted, however, would
probably be entitled to all the privileges which the
law attaches to brevet rank thus conferred." The
Adjutant-General says there were " but very few cases "
like Private Stowe's. No case like it has ever ap-
peared. It was a plain violation of law. Colonel
Nicholson asked no doubt to remove uncertainty
in the Loyal Legion whether such appointees " are
30 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
recognized by the War Department as officers." He
is told that persons " so bre vetted " that is, privates
brevetted in the usual manner, but in violation
of the law which in conferring brevets restricts the
President and Senate to commissioned officers
"would probably be entitled to all the privileges
which the law attaches to brevet rank thus conferred."
That is to say, persons brevetted in violation of law
would probably be entitled to all the privileges which
the law attaches to brevets conferred in violation
of law. Col. Nicholson evidently tried to find out
what in the opinion of the War Department those
privileges are, but he failed.
The proposed appropriation of a hundred millions in
a single year, for the disabled of the last war, and the
favor shown in all spheres and pursuits, to those who
were conspicuous in that contest, prove that our people
appreciate important military services. Yet we have
not been able to devise any satisfactory system of re-
wards in the Regular Army as a lt stimulus to enter-
prise." Promotion by merit would not do. Influence is
the curse of the service. It blocks the way to military
punishments and is a standing menace to any system
of rewards we could adopt. It is well for the Army
that the law requires promotions to, and includ-
ing, the grade of Colonel to be made by seniority.
Whether it would not be best in time of peace to
carry the law of seniority still higher, especially now
that we have compulsory retirement for age, is a ques-
tion worthy of careful consideration.
After more than a hundred years' experience we have
found no substitute for the brevet, but have deprived
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 3 I
that reward of nearly all the value it once possessed.
If we are to have any stimulus to enterprise, the ques-
tion to consider is whether we ought to venture on
something new, or whether we should try to perfect or
improve the brevet system and rely upon it. The diffi-
culties in devising a system that will not do more harm
than good, and the risks in administering any system
are so great as to render experiments in a new field
dangerous. The brevet has the merit of being con-
ferred by the President and Senate of the United
States, and in its complimentary character it is akin to
the " thanks of Congress." The truth is, though it be
not openly confessed, that, abused, abridged, emascu-
lated as the brevet has been, the Army loves it still.
It has its faults, but the worst of them might be
removed. The indiscriminate distribution of brevets
after the War of the Rebellion no doubt contributed to
producing legislation which not only restrains the
appointing power in conferring this reward, but de-
prives the reward of advantages it formerly possessed.
If the brevet is to be retained as a stimulus to enter-
prise we have no other the proper course would be
to increase its value and at the same time restrict its
bestowal to cases of clearly defined and well estab-
lished gallant actions.
One step towards increasing the value of the brevet
would be to let it carry a specified pay independent of
all contingencies of command. That of itself ought to
impose caution in its bestowal. With that provision,
with the right to command as at present, when assigned
by the President, and with suitable insignia on the
regular uniform, the brevet would probably be the
^ MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
best form of reward and stimulus to enterprise that
can be devised for our Service.*
XII. RETIREMENT.
Ordinary or partial retirement is not vacation of
office. It is only withdrawal from "active service and
command, and from the line of promotion? This
point, after able discussion, was decided by the Court
of Claims in the case of General T. J. Wood, retired,
vs. the United States. The Court said, " Congress can-
not appoint him to a new and different office," " but
Congress may transfer him to the retired list, and may
change his rank and pay at any time without coming
in conflict with the Constitution. " " He still retains,
on the retired list, the office of Colonel of Cavalry.' 1 '' The
Supreme Court in the case of the United States vs.
Tyler (105 U. S., 244) decided that a retired Army
officer is an officer in the military Service.
The law does not design to deprive the retired
officer of office. On the contrary, it says, " He shall
continue to be borne on the Army Register " as a
retired officer of the grade which he may occupy at the
time of retirement; and the Revised Statutes say : "The
Army of the United States shall consist of one Gen-
eral . . . the officers of the Army on the retired
list . . . and the Professors and Corps of Cadets
of the United States Military Academy." While the
law provides for the retired officer's withdrawal from
active service and command, and from the line of
*The acts of July 12, 1862, and March 3, 1863, authorize the
President to bestow " medals of honor on such officers, non-commis-
sioned officers and privates as have most distinguished or may hereafter
most distinguish themselves in action."
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES.
proinotion, it leaves him in possession of his office,
his grade, rank and uniform and part of the pay of
his active grade, and it specifies duties which, under
the authority of his office, he may legally perform if
assigned.
The law not only says that the officer when retired
shall be withdrawn from the line of promotion, but it
requires that the next officer shall be promoted. It is
the purpose and effect of the law that the offices nec-
essary in the various grades to accomplish the retire-
ments required by the law shall exist (with the re-
strictions governing in retirement) as long as occupied
in addition to the legal complement of offices for active
service in the different corps. Although the law re-
stricts the functions and incidents of his office, the
partially retired officer belongs no less to his corps
and no more to the Army at large after retirement
than he did before.
XIII. REDUCING PAY.
The Army officer's contract is for life. He gives up
all other occupations and places his talents and time
at the disposal of his employer. The Government
exacts at will the fruits of his industry in peace, and
the exposure of his life in war and pestilence ; and
totally independent of the officer's comfort or wishes,
claims of him, at its discretion, services, involving not
only great personal but heavy pecuniary sacrifices.
The pay of the officer should rest upon the require-
ments of his life-long contract, and not upon the ser-
vices always designated by the Government which
he may be rendering at any particular moment. The
Captain in his quarters in garrison, or on leave of ab-
34 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
sence among his friends, is overpaid, no more, not a
thousandth part so much, in fact, as he is underpaid
when he is leading his company in the forefront of
battle, or nursing his men in pestilential hospitals.
His compensation is but an average and a low one
on his permanent contract. While he must hold
himself ever in readiness for exposure, and sacrifice
even of life itself, he receives no increase for his more
dangerous and valuable services. Should he not be
spared a reduction for his less conspicuous though
arduous labors ?
The officer of the Army knows that the Government
has a right to reduce his pay, but he asks, in consider-
ation of the nature of his contract, and the character
and magnitude of the services and sacrifices required
of him, that this right be not enforced unless general
economy makes it necessary to reduce all salaries.
Then the Army officer, without making any special
plea, will, as Generals Sherman, Hancock and others
have said, bear cheerfully the same percentage of reduc-
tion that the nation may find it necessary to apply to
all paid from its treasury.
In an article on the Army of the United States,
published in the North American Review, May- June,
1878, the Honorable James A. Garfield, M. C., says :
" During the last Congress, the House refused to
reduce the pay of its own officers, and thus expressed
its judgment of the proper relation between service
and compensation. Remembering how light are the
duties of most of the officers of the House during the
recess of Congress, and comparing the qualities and
training required for their work (mostly clerical) with
THEOKETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 35
the training and service required of regimental and
field officers, the following table will be found instruc-
tive :
PRESENT PAY OF CERTAIN OFFICERS OF THE HOUSE.
Clerk of the House, $4,500
Sergeant-at-Arms, 4,000
Doorkeeper, 2,500
Nine Assistant Clerks, each, 2,500
Clerk of Document Room, 2,000
Distributing Clerk, 1,800
Messenger, . . 1,440
Upholsterer and Locksmith, each, .... 1,400
PROPOSED PAY OF ARMY OFFICERS.
Colonel, . $3,500
Lieutenant-Colonel, .3,000
Major, 2,600
Captain (mounted), 1,800
Captain (not mounted), 1,600
First Lieutenant (mounted), 1,500
First Lieutenant (not mounted), . . . 1,400
Second Lieutenant (not mounted), .... 1,300
" Should this bill become a law it would be better,
so far as pay is concerned, to be a doorkeeper in the
House of Representatives than a senior Captain of
Infantry ; better to be the locksmith of the House,
than a Second Lieutenant of the line."
The pay of the Army officer is barely sufficient for
his proper support. To reduce it would tend -to
destroy the democratic character of the Service, by
driving the poor officers to other pursuits, and leaving
our military profession for the aristocracy of wealth
alone. Whatever the size or formation of the Army
may be, it should be efficient. In the interest of effi-
ciency as well as of the integrity and honor of the
Service, the officer should unless overruling public
36 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
necessity intervenes have security of place and pay
so long as he is worthy.
The subject of pay is forcibly and quaintly presented
in Ward's " Animadversions of Warre," 1639. The
author says :
" It is likewise money and pay that keeps the army
in good order, and makes it strictly to observe disci-
pline, the preserver of all : Pay is the poore souldiers
aqua-vita, which makes him comfortably undergoe the
hardest command; but want of it is such an aqua-
fortis, as eats through the iron doores of discipline, and
causeth whole armies to rush into disorders."
XIV. RENTING QUARTERS.
The inquiry concerning Army pay, which culminated
in the Act of July 15, 1870, was the most exhaustive
one on that subject that has ever figured in the history
of our service. The purpose of the resulting legisla-
tion was, first, to dispense, as far as possible, with
allowances, and have a fixed and definite sum of money
as the officer's compensation ; and, second, to provide
that, with a few unimportant exceptions, officers of the
same grade should receive exactly the same compensa-
tion, no matter what branch of the Service they might
belong to, where they might be stationed, or what
duty they might perform. Line and Staff, Artillery,
Cavalry, and Infantry, were, in this respect, all placed
on identically the same footing. Probably there are no
Army officers in any service who have fewer allowances
than ours receive under the present system ; and there
are no officials under our Government whose compensa-
tion is set forth more fully and plainly than that of our
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 37
Army officers. Under the Act of 1870, and the general
Regulations of the Army, then and still in force, the
Government, when not requiring its officers to be in the
field, provides for them when on duty quarters appro-
priate to their respective grades. A large majority of
the officers are posted habitually at points where the
Government owns quarters suitable for them ; and the
equality contemplated by the law is thus preserved
among all of these. But there is a small minority who
must, without any choice or discretion on their parts,
be posted from time to time at places where the Govern-
ment neither owns quarters, nor is disposed to purchase
or erect them. To preserve the equality heretofore
adverted to, the act of 1870 permits quarters to be
hired for these officers, according to their grades.
That is to say, the number of rooms authorized for an
officer's grade may be hired for him, when the Govern-
ment requires him to live where it has no rooms of its
own to give him ; and in like manner, it supplies him,
by purchase, with the fuel authorized and necessary for
these rooms. It is not possible, under existing circum-
stances, by any other plan or process, to secure,
throughout the Service, the equality of compensation
which is fair and just, and which the Act of July 15,
1870, sought to, and in principle does, establish. In
illustration it may be mentioned that the post of Fort
Columbus, Governor's Island, is within the City of
New York. The officers on duty there are supplied
by the Government with ample and excellent quarters.
There are, however, a number of other officers on duty
in New York City for whom the Government has no
quarters. Equality between these two classes can be
38
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
maintained only by the Government hiring for the latter
the equivalent of what it actually lends to the former.
Neither the renting of quarters nor providing
them in kind is restricted to any particular grade or
class of officers. Every officer is liable at any time to
find himself quartered under either branch of this just
principle.
XV. CHANGE OF STATION.
Changes of position in the military Service are fre-
quent and sudden. To enlisted men they are not a
great hardship. The Government supplies them with
quarters, furniture, camp and garrison equipage, cloth-
ing, rations, and transportation for their effects. It
is very different with the officer. All he gets for
change of position is mileage, by the shortest mail
route, and allowance for a few hundred pounds of
baggage in case of regular change of station. All the
expenses over mileage that an officer incurs, whether
on his own account or that of moving his wife, children)
servants and furniture, come out of his own pocket.
Furthermore, it frequently happens that the change of
an officer living in rented quarters, makes him a loser
to the extent of the unexpired term of his lease. A
case or two of actual experience may be mentioned in
illustration of the magnitude of this hardship. A care-
ful officer says: "I had ten thousand dollars in U. S.
bonds, the amount of two bequests. My station has
been so often changed, and at such expense, that, of
the ten thousand, I have precisely four hundred left,
which I have invested for my children." Since he
wrote the foregoing, his station has been changed two
or three times.
THEOKETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 39
Another officer who was ordered from the Atlantic
to the Pacific coast, shipped, around Cape Horn, as
much of his furniture as was necessary for the comfort
of his family. This, though the most economical
course, was expensive. He was soon ordered back
to the Atlantic coast. Before starting, being com-
pelled to close up promptly, he disposed of all his
furniture at a forced sale for the sum of $65, and
had to re-furnish when he reached his new station.
These changes, frequent, necessary and sudden, are
not confined to a limited period, but go on during
the whole of the officer's life. To provide for them
requires while the officer is stationary, economy that
none can appreciate except those who are compelled
to practise it. Change of station is a heavy and in-
evitable assessment on the officer's pay.
But there are other requirements. This is a free
country in which the social status of most men is
regulated by themselves. But by the law of the
land, officers of the Army are required to live
as gentlemen, and must, by the Articles of War,
be dismissed from the Service for conduct unbecom-
ing a gentleman. That they may in all respects
be worthy of the nation, heavy expenses resulting
from rules of life, public and private, which they
cannot disregard, if they would, are forced upon them.
In the matter of dress even, they are controlled.
Their uniform and equipment, prescribed by the Gov-
ernment, is enormously expensive in the first instance,
and must be frequently renewed, as poverty is not ac-
cepted as an excuse for shabbiness on duty. With the
bare sufficiency of their pay and allowances to meet
40 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the demands upon them, failure to pay a debt, large
or small, is treated as an offence against the honor of
the Service.
These are considerations which should be fully
weighed in estimating the compensation of Army officers
as an independent question, as well as in comparing
it with the pay of officers in the civil service.
XVI. FORAGE FOR OFFICERS' HORSES.
Experience in the- organization of armies has resulted
in a few general rules about which there is at this day
no dispute. One principle, growing out of the fact
that the horse is essential in the Service, is to make a
general division of the forces into mounted and not
mounted. The division is a necessary one, and our
laws contemplate that the distinct purposes of the
two parts shall be held in view notwithstanding
occasional interruptions. Thus the excess of pay
provided for a mounted officer over one not mounted,
attaches permanently to the office, and is not dis-
turbed by the fact that the mounted officer may
be called upon to do, for a time, duty not mounted.
Nothing which is calculated to promote the mounted
officer's main object mounted duty can properly be
neglected or withheld.
Experience has also shown that efficiency and econ-
omy are promoted by requiring the commissioned of-
ficer in the mounted service to provide his horse and
equipments, while the Government supplies horses and
equipments for the use of enlisted men.
The line between what the Government should fur-
nish and what the officer himself should furnish to
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 41
ensure the efficiency which depends on fitness between
the officer and his horse and equipments, has long been
clearly and distinctly drawn in our Service. The latter
produces the horse caparisoned, as he presents himself
in uniform, and the former feeds and shoes the horse.
The Government and the officer are under an equally
binding obligation the latter to keep and ride the
horse, and the former to feed and shoe him. It is a
serious defect in our Army that there are cases where
officers on sedentary service, remaining for a long time
undisturbed, omit the horsemanship which is an im-
portant element in their fitness and readiness for all of
their duties. But these are exceptions, and even in
them the officers do not necessarily and invariably
remain stationary. As a rule in the matter of sta-
tions, duties and expenses in our Army, the only
certainty is uncertainty.
The term " field service " has been proposed as in-
dicating the period during which an officer should have
his horse and forage. No rule basing the allowance
of forage on the contingency of field service could be
made to work advantageously. Doubts and disputes
damaging to the Service, with immense expense to the
officer, and no saving to the Government, would cer-
tainly arise under it. Field and garrison duty in
our Army are not confined to particular periods or
places. Either may occur in the East or the West,
and may continue for a longer or shorter time. Field
service might be construed as beginning to-day, when
the officer, under the proposed plan, would have to
buy his horse, and, ending to-morrow, when, for the
lack of feed, etc., he would have to sell him.
42 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
The present law on the subject seems to be ample
and appropriate. It is that "forage may be furnished
in kind to officers by the Quartermaster's Department,
according to law and regulations." (Act of July 15,
1870.)
The forage authorized by this Act is not an emolu-
ment for officers, directly or constructively. It is for
the purpose of keeping them at all times, ready to
mount, well qualified for the Government Service. That
purpose should not be abandoned. Horsemanship is
deemed so important in the German Army that staff
officers must be confirmed in it before promotion, and
it might well form part of the examination which
our officers should undergo before passing to higher
grades. If, in our Service, it is in some cases neg-
lected, correction may be applied by orders or regu-
lations under the law as it now stands.
XVII. AN ARMY MUTUAL SURVIVORSHIP ANNUITY SOCIETY.
It is plain that the Government cannot provide ade-
quately for the support of all the widows and orphans
of its public servants. The existing pension laws as
liberal doubtless as the Nation can afford come far
short of the actual necessities of the case. Hence we
witness the humiliating spectacle of the widows of
the higher and more distinguished, as well as the lower
and more obscure officers, begging Congress to give
them pensions so increased, by special enactment, as to
reach the sum of perhaps fifty or seventy-five dollars
a month. They act from necessity in asking, and
Congress acts from necessity in refusing or restricting.
Every day's experience furnishes new proof that the
THEOBETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 43
safest if not the only way to provide adequately for
the protection of the widows and orphans of officers of
the Army, is by an organization for that purpose among
the officers themselves. How to effect it is the ques-
tion. Life Insurance is attended with the objection
that at best it produces not a certain income, but only
a specific sum of money, and this comes to the widow
and orphan at the death of the protector and adviser,
and consequently it is very likely to be lost or reduced
by injudicious investment, or to be so trenched upon
for current expenses that it becomes too small to pro-
duce an income for support. Furthermore, with all
private corporations, whether for Life insurance or
annuity purposes, the officer must pay a percentage
large enough to cover his share of the heavy expenses,
and perhaps contribute to profits, and still he feels
that there is some risk of his not getting what he is
paying for. When we consider the number of these
companies open to him and the peculiar difficulties the
officer is under in deciding which is good and which is
not, it is plain to see that his fears on this score are
well founded. Then, too, whatever company he selects,
he is in the hands of strangers and knows that his
widow will be so likewise in making her claims or col-
lections after he is dead.
It is not the purpose of an annuity society to provide
life insurance, nor to supersede or interfere with any
Army life insurance scheme. Its sole object is to enable
an officer, by small deductions from his pay, to secure,
from the date of his death, an income for his wife,
child, or other designated person, in case that person
outlives him. The aggregate of the deductions from
44
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the pay of the officer is the price agreed upon for a
specified guarantee y that is, for a guarantee to the ef-
fect that in case the officer dies before his nominee,
the latter shall receive a stipulated income for life. As
long as the guarantee is held, the price of it, as agreed
upon, must be paid, and that price must belong, solely
and without reversionary claim of any sort, to the fund
from which the annuities are to be paid. This renders
it practicable to reduce the price of the guarantee to
the minimum, and at the same time keep the fund
adequate to the demands upon it.
Concerning the benefits to be received by the Gov-
ernment from this scheme, it may be said that the de-
ductions made monthly from the pay of officers will
continually go to increase the cash on hand in the
Treasury, and in the great majority of cases long be-
fore any annuity matures ; only so much being drawn
out from time to time as may be found necessary to
pay the annuities falling due. The Government will
have the use of and interest on all the remaining
balances, and its benefits therefrom will increase rap-
idly as time goes on. While this scheme does not pro-
pose any interference with the pension laws, it will
tend to prevent the increase of the regular pension list,
and remove the necessity for appropriations for special
pensions. The extent of this advantage to the Govern-
ment will of course depend on the success of the pro-
posed plan. The advantages offered to those who may
purchase annuities are :
1st. Absolute certainty that the conditions under
which they purchase annuities will be fully and ex-
actly complied with.
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 45
2(1. That each member, without regard to rank,
can secure for his nominee just as much monthly in-
come, to commence at his death, as he chooses to pay
for during his life.
3d. That the proportional price he pays for this
income is exactly fair as determined by the considera-
tion of all the elements, which the science of insurance
has shown to pertain to the subject, mathematically
considered ; and that the actual price is lower than is
charged for the same thing by private annuity com-
panies.
4th. That this income is independent of risk and
expense in collection, and will be paid monthly by the
pay department of the Army ; a method of payment
which is not only safe and convenient but is the one most
likely to be agreeable to the officer's widow or orphan.
5th. That this Society will be open to officers on
the same terms under all contingencies of service,
whereas in time of war or other special danger, the
increased charge for increased risk makes it next to
impossible for officers of the Army to procure life in-
surance or survivorship annuities in private corpora-
tions.
XVIII. DUTIES OF AN ADJUTANT-GENERAL.
Office in our Army renders the incumbent eligible
to command, but as a rule command is assumed by vir-
tue of assignment to duty.
The order making an original assignment should
specify clearly what is embraced in the command ; and
commanders succeeding the first one, exercise authority
to the same extent their predecessors did, unless other-
wise ordered.
46
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Although violations may be tolerated in practice, it
is, nevertheless, the theory of our military system that
the commanding officer is solely responsible for his en-
tire command staff as well as line and his authority
is as full and complete over the one as over the other.
In obedience to the full measure of responsibility
placed directly upon him, a Commanding General in
our Service performs the various duties of his office in
person, as far as possible.
In time of peace, when the operations, although
multifarious, are not of great magnitude, and when
economy in public expenditures is dwelt upon as of
special importance, commanding generals give their
personal attention to many matters of detail which, in
time of war, with large armies and grand operations,
they must entrust mainly, if not entirely, to adjutants-
general or chiefs of staff.
Our military laws provide no such office as Chief of
Staff. It has appeared but twice in our legal organiza-
tion, namely, in the Act of March 3, 1865, which was
repealed and the office abolished by the Act of April
3, 1869, and in the Act of March 3, 1813, which has
never been repealed in express terms, but which was
virtually repealed by the Acts of 1815, and 1821, fixing
the peace establishment. The necessities of the Ser-
vice, however, produce the office in fact, although it
does not exist in form, and legislative sanction is not
required for the assignment of an officer to duty as
Chief of Staff.
As a general rule the duties of this office fall upon
the Adjutant-General of the command.
That officer, whether in peace or war, is de facto
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 47
Chief of Staff, unless some other officer is specially as-
signed to that duty. But the office is essentially dif-
ferent in our Service from what it is in foreign services.
In the latter, the Chief of Staff, as such, has control
over, and is accountable for the staff of the command,
which creates a divided responsibility at the head of
the Army, while with us an Adjutant-General (or Chief
of Staff) is not a power in himself. He is, in fact, the
organ, and acts only in the name of the General with
whom he is serving, the latter alone being accountable
for the staff as well as line. The office of Adjutant-
General is absolutely indispensable in all large com-
mands. Its duties, speaking broadly, are all of those
duties of the Commanding General himself, which, un-
der a judicious division of labor, he does not perform
in person.
This division of labor is not made by the law, and
is but vaguely indicated by regulations. In fact it
cannot be governed by inflexible rules, but must vary
from time to time ; custom, the directions and wishes
of the commander, and the necessities of the Service as
they arise from day to day, alone can regulate it.
No General Order, and no important Special Order,
should be promulgated by an Adjutant-General until
it has been read and approved by the commander in
whose name it is made.
Any order, written or verbal, not palpably illegal,
that an Adjutant- General promulgates in the name of
the General Commanding is binding on all within the
sphere of the General's command.
Practically speaking, so far as the command is con-
cerned, whatever the Commanding General may do
48
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
himself, the Adjutant-General of the command may do
in his name, being responsible only to his commander.
The latter in turn is responsible to his superiors for
the Adjutant-General as well as for the rest of the
command. It is, therefore, a matter of the greatest
moment that Adjutants-General, who are the only of-
ficers in the Army invested with such large discretion,
should be persons of good character and good habits,
as well as men of judgment, learning, and experience.
The following extracts from the U. S. Army Regu-
lations of 1821, compiled by General Scott, and ap-
proved by Congress, though not reproduced in the ex-
isting code, are nevertheless of interest :
" 4. The duties of a Chief of Staff, including always
his assistants, whatever may be the corps to which he
is attached, fall under the heads sedentary and active."
" 5. Sedentary duties, or the business of the bureau,
as publishing orders in writing, making up written in-
structions and the transmission of them ; reception of
reports and returns ; disposing of them ; forming ta-
bles, showing the state and position of the corps, or
its several parts ; regulating details of service ; corre-
sponding with the corps, detachments, or individual
officers serving under the orders of the same com-
mander; corresponding with the administrative or dis-
bursing departments relative to the wants of the
troops, and, finally, the methodical arrangement and
care of the records and papers of his office. 7 '
" 8. Active duties. These consist principally in
establishing camps ; visiting guards and posts ; muster-
ing and inspecting troops ; inspecting guards and de-
tachments ; forming parades and lines of battle ; the
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 49
conduct or control of deserters and prisoners (from the
enemy); making reconnoisances, and, in general, dis-
charging such other exterior duties (exterior to the
bureau) as may be specially assigned."
" 7. This article regards more particularly the staff
of an army in the field, but will equally apply, in
many particulars, to the staff of a geographical mili-
tary department, or to that of a post in time of peace
or war."
The foregoing extracts, however, as well as the spe-
cification of duties for a Chief of Staff given by Jomini
and other foreign military writers, are to us merely
suggestions of the kind of service an Adjutant-General
may have to perform, and are not to be regarded as
setting forth the duties of his office.
An Adjutant-General should so arrange the public
business as to enable the commander to give timely
attention to official subjects in the order of their im-
portance. With a view to this, it is proper that cor-
respondence concerning a command, between its com-
mander and any one not superior to him in the mili-
tary service, as well as all official correspondence be-
tween a commander and those under his command,
should be conducted by, and all official communications
in the ascending line of this correspondence should -be
addressed to, the Adjutant-General of the command.
This secures prompt dispatch of public business, and
enables the Adjutant-General to obtain and submit
with those communications which require the special
direction of the commander, all the information neces-
sary to a full understanding of the subjects presented.
The Adjutant-General should also, if practicable, pro-
50 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
cure for transmittal with those communications which
his Commanding General has not the power to decide
upon, such information as will enable higher authority
to dispose of the subjects presented without further
reference ; but no subject which a commander is com-
petent to dispose of should be forwarded for the action
of higher power, except by way of appeal. In com-
municating information based upon reports in detail
from inferiors, the commander's own report should
embody all that may be of interest to higher authority.
Orders and instructions must be perfectly under-
stood in order to be promptly and fully executed.
They should, therefore, be so plainly expressed as to
be readily comprehended by the subordinate, who may
know nothing of the matter in hand but what he learns
from the orders or instructions received.
All orders, and all important decisions and opinions,
which are general in their bearing, should, when pro-
mulgated from an Adjutant-General's office, appear in
the form of "General" or "Special Orders," in regu-
larly numbered series, and not as "Circulars." The
latter form, if adopted at all, should be used only for
conveying information which is unimportant, and fugi-
tive in its nature.
Orders should be couched in brief and positive
terms.
Instructions, if not given verbally, usually take the
form of letters, and should be as elaborate and explana-
tory as the subject and occasion may require.
It is especially the duty of an Adjutant-General,
before promulgating orders, carefully to consider what
their effect will be upon or under existing orders and
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 51
regulations, and to ascertain that their execution is
practicable, and that they are such as will accomplish
the object with the greatest advantage to the Service,
and with the least fatigue and inconvenience to the troops.
An Adjutant-General should have his arrangements
made in advance for the distribution of orders with
the least possible delay and with the greatest pos-
sible certainty. The interval between the time an
order is given by a commander and received by a
subordinate, is not always fully appreciated. The
Adjutant-General should see that this interval is made
as short as possible. To that end he should keep him-
self informed of the position of the different parts of the
command, and the routes by which to reach them, and
should see that orders and instructions are punctu-
ally delivered and executed, as well as promptly sent.
During campaigns, important orders and instructions
should, if possible, be conveyed by, and delivered to,
commissioned officers.
There is no office in which subordination and true
military character are more essential than in that of an
Adjutant-General.
While he is not, like an Aid-de-camp, dependent on
the commander for his office, he is fully in the com-
mander's confidence. Entrusted with great power and
discretion under no other bonds than his personal and
official integrity and loyalty, he is under peculiar obli-
gations to his commander and to the Service for faith-
ful and efficient performance of duty. He should fur-
nish his Commanding General with information which
will contribute to the formation of just and correct
conclusions and opinions on all military matters con-
52 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
cerning the command. He is bound by honor as well
as by duty to lay official business before the Com-
manding General in a full, fair and impartial light,
and studiously to avoid those devices, in the so-called
" art of putting things," which are calculated to pro-
duce wrong impressions and imperfect or partial rul-
ings. While he should never assume the character of
an advocate, he should as the independence of his
position enables him to do on all proper occasions
give his own views and advice, frankly and fearlessly?
but not persistently, remembering that the business in
hand, and the responsibility therefor, belong not to
him but to the Commanding General.
XIX. ARMY REGULATIONS.
In 1779 (March 29) the Continental Congress
adopted certain " Regulations," to " be observed by all
the troops of the United States." These had been
prepared by Baron Steuben, and were published in the
same year as " Regulations for the order and discipline
of the troops of the United States." They were, for
the greater part, a system of tactics and rules for the
camp and on the march, but contained "Instructions,"
for the different regimental officers and enlisted men.
Other editions of these " Regulations," were published
in 1802, 1807, and 1809.
Many of the regulations in force at the beginning of
the year 1810, which had been issued at different
times since 1797, in the form of General and Executive
Orders, are given in Duane's Military Dictionary.
On the increase of the Army in 1798, in contempla-
tion of war with a foreign power, President Adams
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 53
issued manuscript regulations, supplementary to Baron
Steuben's, containing many rules prescribing duties of
the different grades of officers and enlisted men in ser-
vice, and particularly as to the administration in a
garrisoned post or barracks.
A number of regulations, in the form of General
Orders, were also issued by the War Department on
the increase of the Army in 1812. Some of these are
to be found in the appendix to "Maltby on Courts-
Martial."
In 1808 the Articles of War, the principal Existing
Regulations and Laws of the United States relating to
the Military Establishment in force on the 12th day
of April, 1808, were published apparently by author-
ity by Dinmore and Cooper, Washington, the " Reg-
ulations " covering but sixteen pages. In 1812 a vol-
ume, similar to that of 1808, was published by R. C.
Weightman, Washington, also apparently by author-
ity. That part of it which is devoted to the " Rules
and Regulations of the War Department " is contained
in twenty-seven pages.
In 1813 the General Regulations affecting the
Army of the United States, were for the first time col-
lected and issued by the War Department in book
form as a complete system.
By the Act of March 3 of that year, it was made
the duty of the Secretary of War to prepare General
Regulations "which Regulations, when approved by
the President of the United States, shall be respected
and obeyed, until altered and revoked by the same
authority."
The Regulations thus issued were laid before Con-
MILITABY MISCELLANIES.
gress at its next session, as required by the Act, and
are reprinted in the " American State Papers on Mili-
tary Affairs," Vol. I.
Editions of the Regulations were issued in Novem-
ber, 1814, and in 1815. The latter was published at
Albany, by " Webster and Skinners," and was not an
authorized edition.
By Act of April 24, 1816, the Regulations in force
before the reduction of the Army,* were recognized as
far as found applicable to the Service, and subject to
alterations by the Secretary of War, with the approba-
tion of the President.
This Act did not refer to any particular edition of
General Regulations, but to all the general rules, etc.,
existing at the time of the reduction.
An edition of the Regulations was authoritatively
issued in September of that year.
There was an edition published in January, 1820
by order of the Secretary of War, from the Adjutant
and Inspector-General's Office which was a reprint
of that of 1816, with the War Department orders
which had been issued in the meantime.
These Regulations of January, 1820, were wholly
distinct from those issued the following year in the
manner to be stated.
On the 22d December, 1819, the House of Repre-
sentatives had resolved that " the Secretary of War be
instructed to cause to be prepared and laid before this
House, at the next session of Congress, a system of
martial law, and a system of field service and police,
*The Act fixing the military peace establishment was approved
March 3, 1815 the actual reduction took place in June.
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 55
for the government of the Army of the United States."
On the 22d December, 1820, the Secretary of War
(Calhoun) accordingly submitted a system of "martial
law," prepared by Judge- Advocate Major Storrow
(which was never adopted), and a system of field ser-
vice and police, which had been prepared by General
Scott, and submitted to the War Department in Sep-
tember, 1818.
December 26, 1820, the speaker laid them before
the House. The document was in manuscript and was
ordered to be printed, and a copy laid upon the desk
of each member. (It is reprinted in the 3d vol. of the
State Papers on Military Affairs.) When the book
was printed several copies were sent to General Scott,
who made certain corrections, and on the 20th Febru-
ary, 1821, returned a corrected copy (of which he re-
tained a duplicate) to the War Department for the
committee of the House. It was received by the
chairman of the Committee on the %Sd February, 1821.
February 27, 1821, the chairman of the Military
Committee of the House, reported the Senate Bill, " to
reduce and fix the military peace establishment," with
certain amendments, among which was the addition of
a section approving and adopting " the system of Gen-
eral Regulations for the Army, compiled by Major-
General Scott." The bill, including this (the 14th)
section became law March 2, 1821. Early in that
month General Scott received directions to put the
book to press for the use of the Army, and (having
received a letter from the chairman of the Military
Committee of the House, informing him that the cor-
rected copy had been received, and section 14 added
56 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
to the Army Bill by way of amendment) he caused
the book to be reprinted from his retained duplicate
corrected copy.
The Regulations were then, July, 1821, issued by the
War Department, witli the corrections as " formally
approved by Congress."
This gave rise to the question, was the corrected
copy the one approved by Congress? In 1822 a com-
mittee of the House was appointed to investigate the
circumstances attending its publication. General Alex-
ander Smyth, the chairman of the Military Committee,
stated that when he proposed section 14, of the Act of
1821, to the committee as an amendment, he had refer-
ence to the corrected Regulations which he had then
received, that he did not recollect exhibiting them to
the committee, but thought he had, and believed that
when he reported the amendments to the House, he
had the corrected copy and deposited it with the clerk
with the intent that from that copy the system should
be published. These recollections were not, however,
sustained by the other members of the committee nor
by the clerk of the House. None of them apparently
had ever seen the corrected copy before the passage of
the law, but the clerk of the House thought he had
seen it subsequently, when General Smyth, made a
return to him of various papers which had been
before the committee, and he refused to receive it,
not considering himself the proper repository. Search
had been made in his office, but it could not be
found.
The select Committee reported that it was an act
of omission, and not of design, on the part of the chair-
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 57
man of the Military Committee in not submitting the
corrected copy to the Committee.
The Committee reported, May 6, 1822, and Con-
gress immediately passed an Act which was approved
May 7 repealing the 14th section of the Act of 1821.
Gaines was accused by Scott of being instrumental
in raising the opposition to these regulations.
The Regulations which were published to the Army
in July, 1821, by President Monroe, as approved by
Congress, never, therefore, in that form, had such ap-
proval, whereas the Regulations which were laid be-
fore Congress in 1820, but were never published to the
Army, had.
The next issue of Regulations was that of March 1,
1825, revised by General Scott.
In 1835, new Regulations, revised by Major-General
Macomb, were published. Some amendments were
made to these in an order from the War Department,
dated December 31, 1836, in which it was declared
that the General Order prefixed to the Regulations of
1835, had never been promulgated or in force, and
directing the page containing it to be cancelled, and
the Order of December 31, 1836, to be inserted in its
place.
Another edition of the Regulations was issued Jan-
uary 25, 1841, and u Re vised Regulations," May 1, 1847.
The next editions published to the Army were
those of January 1, 1857, August 10, 1861, and of
1863 (the latter being simply a republication of the
Regulations of 1861, with an appendix " containing
the changes and laws affecting Army Regulations and
Articles of War, to June 25, 1863 ").
58 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
By an Act, approved July 28, 1866, Congress di-
rected the Secretary of War " to have prepared, and
to report to Congress at its next session, a code of
Regulations for the government of the Army, and of
the Militia in actual service, which shall embrace all
necessary orders and forms of a general character, for
the performance of all duties incumbent on officers and
men in the military service, including rules for the
government of Courts-Martial. The existing Regula-
tions to remain in force until Congress shall have acted
on said report."
No code of Regulations having been submitted, Con-
gress, by Act of July 15, 1870, enacted as follows :
" The Secretary of War shall prepare a system of
General Regulations for the administration of the af-
fairs of the Army, which, when approved by Congress,
shall be in force and obeyed until altered or revoked
by the same authority, and said Regulations shall be
reported to Congress at its next session ; Provided.
That said Regulations shall not be inconsistent with
the laws of the United States."
A board, with Inspector-General Marcy at its head,
was accordingly, in 1871, appointed to prepare such a
system, and the Regulations proposed by it were sub-
mitted to the House, February 17, 1873, referred to
the committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be
printed. There was not time for the 42d Congress to
act on them.
The Military Committee of the 43d Congress having
had them under consideration, came to the conclusion
that regulations should be flexible, which would not
be the case if adopted by Congress. The Committee,
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 59
therefore, recommended a bill which was passed, and
approved, March 1, 1875, repealing the above quoted
section of the Act of July 15, 1870, and authorizing
the President " to make and publish Kegulations for
the government of the Army in accordance with exist-
ing laws," but the authority thus re-committed to the
President, was not acted on.
In 1876, however, by a Joint Resolution of August
15, Congress " requested" the President "to postpone
all action in connection with the publication of said
Regulations until after the report " of the Commission
on the reform and reorganization of the Army, created
by Act of July 24, 1876, was " received and acted
upon by Congress at its next session." Upon the
" report " here indicated no final action was ever taken,
and the said Commission was, after March 4, 1879,
discontinued. Thereupon an Act was approved June
23 of that year, section 2 of which provided as follows:
"That the Secretary of War is authorized and directed
to cause all the Regulations of the Army and general
orders now in force to be codified and published to
the Army, and to defray the expenses thereof out of
the contingent fund of the Army."
The work of codification was confided to the Adju-
tant-General of the Army, and the Secretary of War,
upon an opinion of the Judge- Advocate General, di-
rected that it should include all orders published since
the date of the Act authorizing the codification. It
includes, therefore, General Orders, No. 20, of Febru-
ary 15, 1881. The codification, thus prepared, was
approved by the Secretary of War (Alex. Ramsey)
and published for the instruction and government of
60 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the Army on February 17, 1881. It is known as the
United States Army Regulations, 1881.
A Board of Officers, of which Brigadier-General
Stephen V. Benet, Chief of Ordnance, was president,
was (by par. 1, Special Orders, No. 298, Headquarters
of the Army, A. Gr. O., December 28, 1886) appointed
to meet at the War Department on the 3d day of Jan-
uary, 1887, "for the purpose of revising and condens-
ing the Regulations of the Army and preparing a new
edition of the same." This edition was officially ap-
proved and promulgated as follows :
WAR DEPARTMENT,
February 9, 1889.
The President of the United States directs that the
following Regulations for the Army be published for
the government of all concerned, and that they be
strictly observed. Nothing contrary to the tenor of
these Regulations will be enjoined in any part of the
forces of the United States by any commander what-
soever.
WM. C. ENDICOTT,
Secretary of War.
It will be seen from the foregoing :
1. That the Regulations of 1813, although required
to be laid before Congress, were alterable and revok-
able by the President.
2. That the Regulations existing at the time of the
reduction of the Army in 1815, were recognized by
the Act of April 24, 1816, subject to alterations by the
Secretary of War, with the approbation of the Presi-
dent.
3. That only so much of the Regulations of 1821,
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NOTES. 1
as was contained in the original manuscript submitted
to the House in 1820, and ordered to be printed, was
approved and adopted by Congress.
4. And that, therefore, with this exception, the
Regulations of 1863, have been the only system of reg-
ulations adopted by Congress in such way as to make
it appear unalterable by the President.
ARTICLE II.
The Command of the Army.*
George Washington was appointed General and
Comniander-in-Chief by Congress June 15, 1775, but
(with the exception of the six months, commencing
December 27, 1776, during which it endowed Wash-
ington with dictatorial powers) Congress commanded
the Army directly a part of the time, and through
the Board of, and Secretary at War, the remainder.
General Washington resigned his commission as
General and Commander-in-Chief on the 23d of De-
cember, 1783; Major-General Henry Knox, then on
duty at West Point, became the senior officer of the
small force remaining in service, but he was not placed
in command. On the 2d of June, 1784, Congress
directed all the troops in service to be mustered out,
except 25 privates to guard the stores at Fort Pitt
and 55 to guard the stores at West Point, with a
proportionate number of officers no officer, however,
above the rank of Captain. Under this resolution
Major-General Knox was disbanded, and the Captain
(John Doughty) in command of the small artillery
force at West Point retained in service became the
senior officer of the Army, and Congress allowed him
the pay and emoluments of a Major of Artillery by
Resolution of November 11, 1784. The peace estab-
lishment, fixed by Resolution of June 3, 1784, pro-
* Field Glass, for May, 1879.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 63
vided for 700 men, to be formed into one regiment of
eight companies of infantry and two of artillery, " for
securing and protecting the northwestern frontiers of
the United States," etc. Josiah Harmar, of Penn-
sylvania, was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Command-
ant of these troops, and thus became the senior officer
in service. But that he did not command the Army is
evident from the fact that the resolution which pro-
vided the troops, authorized the Secretary at War to
direct "their destination and operations, subject to
the order of Congress." On the 27th of January, 1785,
Congress passed an ordinance for " ascertaining the
powers and duties of the Secretary at War." This
ordinance, amongst other things, declared it to be the
duty of the Secretary at War " to direct the arrange-
ment, destination and operation of such troops as are,
or may be, in service, subject to the orders of. Con-
gress." This was reiterated in Resolution of April
12, 1785, further defining the peace establishment.
On the 31st of July, 1787, Congress conferred upon
Lieut. -Col. Josiah Harmar a brevet commission of
Brigadier-General, and allowed him the emoluments,
but not the pay, of said commission, to continue, how-
ever, only during his command on the frontier. Matters
remained thus until the adoption of the Constitution
in 1789. Section II., Article 2, of that instrument
says " the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States when called into the
actual Service of the United States." The Conti-
nental Congress had exercised control of the Ar-
my. Several members of that Congress assisted in
64 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
framing the Constitution. They created the Supreme
Civil Magistrate, who was to be " Commander-in-
chief," and transferred to him, the President, and
not to the senior officer within the Army, the power
to command the Army which Congress had exercised.
But they provided in the Constitution for a division
of power, by giving to the President the command,
and by reserving to Congress the right to make ap-
propriations for the support of the Army and rules
for its government and regulation. On the 7th of Au-
gust, 1789, Congress created the Department of War,
and on the 29th of September, 1789, it passed an Act to
recognize and adapt to the Constitution the military
establishment previously created. President Wash-
ington on the 29th of September, 1789, nominated,
among others, Lieut.-Col. Josiah Harmar, Brigadier-
General by brevet, and he was confirmed and com-
missioned, and was retained under the Constitution in
the position he had held prior to its adoption. He
continued as the senior officer of the Army, but exer-
cised no command except of the troops on active
service with him on the northwestern frontier. On
the 4th of March, 1791, Governor Arthur St. Clair of
the Northwestern Territory was, under the Act of
March 3, 1791, appointed Major- General, superseding
Harmar as senior officer and as commander on the
frontier, but with no larger powers as Command er-in
Chief than Harmar had possessed. On the 5th of
March, 1792, St. Clair resigned and Anthony Wayne
(formerly Brigadier- General, Continental Army) was
on the same day appointed Major-General and placed
as " General-in-Chief " over the army on the frontier.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 65
He died December 15, 1796, and was succeeded same
day by one of his Brigadier-Generals James Wilkin-
son who continued until July 3, 1798. At this time
war with France was anticipated. Washington had
served two terms as President, and had retired to
private life, being succeeded in the Presidency by
John Adams.
The Act of May 28, 1798, authorizing a " provis-
ional " Army, empowered the President, whenever he
should deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, a " Commander of
the Army who being commissioned as Lieutenant-
General, might be authorized to command the armies
of the United States." The Act provided that the
" Commander of the Army," as well as others appointed
under it, might be discharged whenever the President
thought the public safety would justify it. Wash-
ington was nominated by the President on the 2d and
confirmed by the Senate on the 3d July, 1798, " to be
Lieutenant-General and Commander -in- Chief <A all the
armies raised or to be raised in the United States."
Our Republic was at that time in its infancy and was
threatened with a war of invasion by a powerful and
aggressive enemy. The independence which had been
won by the sword, but which was hardly yet fully in
possession of the civil powers, was in such danger that
the sword seemed indispensable to preserve it. Under
these circumstances, the " Father of his Country " was
called from his retirement to see that the freedom he
had fought for was not toppled over before it had
become really enthroned. It is not strange that under
these circumstances Washington was endowed with th e
66
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
large powers as Commander-in- Chief (though of ques-
tionable constitutionality) which he had exercised
during the Revolution. But even under the pressure
of these trying times, and in the presence of the
" Father of his Country," the President (Mr. Adams)
was watchful of the constitutional duties and prerog-
atives of his high office.
On the 3d March, 1799, an Act was passed "That
a Commander of the Army of the United States shall
be appointed and commissioned by the style of ' Gen-
eral of the Armies of the United States,' and the
present office and title of Lieutenant-General shall
thereafter be abolished." The purpose was to confer
the new office and title on Washington. But in the
view of Mr. Adams, while the title of Lieutenant-
General had relation to the higher office of the Presi-
dent as the General in fact, and did not fully ignore
the Chief Magistrate as the constitutional and actual
head of the Army, the title and office of General of
the " Armies of the United States " " touched," if it
did not " encroach upon, the constitutional functions
of the President." The office of " General," created by
the Act of March 3, 1798, was not filled, and Wash-
ington died in office as Lieutenant-Genera}. Then
Hamilton became the senior officer of the Army, and
as Inspector-General had some general supervision,
but there is nothing to show that he was put in com-
mand of the Army. Indeed, there is evidence to show
that he was never endowed with the command, but
that the Secretary of War directly exercised it ; for
on the 18th of December, 1799, Secretary of War
McHenry wrote to Hamilton, saying: " I intend that
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 67
the recruiting service shall be wholly confided to
you," and on the 5th of January, 1800, Hamilton wrote
to Mr. King, saying : "Who is to be Cominander-in-
Chief \ not the next in command. It will probably
be deferred." Hamilton and the other officers ap-
pointed for the " Provisional Army," raised during the
trouble between the United States and France, were
disbanded on the 15th of June, 1800. James Wil-
kinson, Brigadier-General of the regular Army, thus
again became the senior officer, and continued as such
until January 27, 1812. On the 27th of January, 1812,
war with Great Britain having broken out, Henry
Dearborn, who had been a Colonel in the Revolution-
ary Army, and Secretary of War from 1801 to 1809,
was appointed Major-General. Dearborn, as rep-
resenting the President, exercised command while he
was Secretary of W 7 ar, but did not assume it now that
he became the senior General. In 1808 he reported,
in relation to a proposed increase of the Army, "In the
event of war it will, I presume, be considered neces-
sary to arrange our military force into separate de-
partments, and to have a commander to each depart-
ment, and of course to have no such officer as Corn-
mander-in-Chief . "
In 1809, he, as Secretary of War, reported that "the
business of the Department had increased beyond the
capacity of what any one man could perform," and the
increase of the Army in 1812 made it necessary to pro-
vide relief. Delegation of the duties of command
was not resorted to probable not thought of. The
first remedy suggested was the creation of two Assist-
ant-Secretaries of War ; but for this plan, that of estab-
68
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
lisliing additional regular military bureaux was sub-
stituted and, accordingly, the Quartermaster-General's
Department, the Purchasing Department and the Ord-
nance Department were authorized by law. The
Adjutant-General's, Inspector-General's, Medical and
Pay Departments had already been established. The
Secretary of War himself, in the autumn of 1813, by
direction of President Madison, took the field and in
person directed the operations of the Army on the
Northern frontier. Dearborn was disbanded June 15,
1815, under the Act of March 3 of that year fixing the
military peace establishment. That Act provided for
two Major-Generals, and under it Jacob Brown and
Andrew Jackson were retained. Brown thus became
the senior General Officer of the Army on the 15th of
June, 1815; but the President assigned him to the com-
mand of the Division of the North, and Jackson to the
Division of the South, and exercised direct command
himself through his Secretary of War. This condition
of affairs continued until the reorganization under the
Act of March 2, 1821. That Act provided for one
Major-General only. The President divided the United
States into two departments, Eastern and Western,
assigned Brigadier-General Scott to the former, and
Brigadier-General Gaines to the latter, and directed
Major- General Brown to establish his Head-quarters in
the District of Columbia. This left Brown virtually
without a command, and simply as adviser of the Sec-
retary of War and President. His duties as senior
General seem to have been specifically defined to him
by the War Department though there is no record of
them for in his General Order of June 1, 1821, he
THE COMMAND OF THE AKMY. 69
said : " On assuming the new duties prescribed to him
by the Department of War, the Major- General con-
siders," etc. That it was not intended he should com-
mand the Army is evident from the fact that no orders
or instructions to that effect were made known to the
Army, nor did he make any such claim. Brown died
on the 24th of February, 1828, and was succeeded by
Alexander Macornb, who was appointed " Major-Gen-
eral." The following order was issued from the Ad-
jutant-General's office, by direction of the President,
on the 28th of May, 1828: "He [Maconib] is directed
to assume the command of the Army, and to take the
station which was occupied by Major-General Brown
at the time of his decease, at the seat of Government."
Macomb assumed command on the 29th of May,
1828, in the following terms: "Major-General Alex-
ander Macomb, by virtue of his appointment and the
orders of the President of the United States, assumes
command of the Army." At the time of Macomb's
appointment Scott was a Brigadier- General, and a
Major-General by brevet dating July 25, 1814. He
had expected to succeed Brown, and had for a long
time urged upon the Government that he was entitled
to rank as Major-General from the date of his brevet as
such. If this had been so he would have been senior
to Macomb, even after the latter had been appointed
vice Brown to the only Major-Gen eralcy in the Army.
The President's order assigning Macomb to the com-
mand of the Army was probable designed to override
Scott's pretensions, and not to make a change in the
principle and practice under which the President him-
self actually commanded through the Secretary of
70 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
War. Scott, however, as is well known, contested
Macomb's right to command him.
Macomb died June 25, 1841, and was succeeded by
Scott. The President on the 5th of July, 1841, issued
a similar order to that issued when Macomb was ap-
pointed Major-General, and Scott issued his order July
5, 1841, assuming command. Thus this form of an-
nouncing the senior General came into practice. Scott
(as shown by many facts, especially his failure to pro-
vide any authority or command for a General-in-Chief
in the Regulations of 1821 and 1825, prepared by him,
and by his correspondence with Secretaries of War
Marcy and Davis) was fully aware of the President's
constitutional obligation to command the Army. He
said, " The Acts of Congress in force do not create the
office of Commander-in-Chief," or " Commander of the
Army. The existing laws do not even require that
the senior General be called to Washington to act as
Commander of the Army under the President." On
the 15th of February, 1855, a joint resolution was
passed reviving the grade of Lieutenant- General, in
order that it might be conferred upon Scott, by brevet,
as an acknowledgment of his services in the Mexican
War. There was nothing in the resolution entitling the
incumbent to the command of the Army as there was
in the case of General Washington. General Scott, in
his new grade of Brevet Lieutenant-General, continued
in office until November 1, 1861, when, the Rebellion
being fully under way, he retired, and was succeeded
by Major-General George B. McClellan, then the senior
officer in the Army. On the 1st of June, 1862, McClel-
lan, still the senior, and after having for seven
THE COMMAND OF THE AKMY. 71
months exercised all the authority over the entire
army that a General-in-Chief can possess, was re-
duced to the command of the Department of Virginia,
and took the field at the head of the Army of the
Potomac; Major-General Henry W. Halleck, junior
to McClellan, as well as to Fremont, Dix, Banks,
Butler, and Hunter, being called to Washington by
the President and assigned to duty as General-in-
Chief of the Army of the United States. General
Halleck's own opinions and views as to his powers
under this assignment are referred to hereafter.
On the 29th of February, 1864, an Act was passed
directing " that the grade of Lieutenant-General be,
and the same is hereby revived in the Army of the
United States ; and the President is hereby authorized,
whenever he shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a
Lieutenant- General, to be selected from among those of-
ficers in the military service of the United States, not
below tlie grade of Major -General, most distinguished
for courage, skill and ability, who, being commissioned
as a Lieutenant- General, may be authorized under the
direction and during the pleasure of the President, to
command the Armies of the United States. Under this
Act, Major-General U. S. Grant was commissioned
Lieutenant-General March 2, 1864. But it was not
until the 12th of March, 1864, when Halleck at his
own request was relieved from duty as General-in-
Chief, that Grant was assigned to command the Armies
of the United States. On the same day Halleck was
assigned to duty in Washington as Chief of Staff of
the Army ; and he continued until the close of the
72
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
war to perform, under that title, the same duties that
he had theretofore performed under the designation of
"General-in-Chief."
On the 25th of July, 1866, an Act was passed re-
viving the grade of " General." Under it Lieutenant-
General Grant was appointed " General " July 25,
1866. The grade was revived in special recognition of
Grant's eminent services ; but that it gave him no ad-
ditional powers is evident from the terms of the Act,
which are identical in that particular with those of the
Act reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General. On the
2d of March, 1867, an Act was passed that a the Gen-
eral of the Army shall not be removed, suspended, or
relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere
than at said head-quarters (Washington), except at his
own request, without the previous approval of the
Senate." This Act further required that " all orders
and instructions relating to military operations issued
by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued
through the General of the Army, and in case of his
inability, through the next in rank ; and any orders or
instructions relating to military operations issued con-
trary to the requirements of this section shall be null
and void." Penalties were prescribed for any viola-
tion of these requirements.
It is historical that the President at this time was in
great disfavor, and was not long afterwards tried by a
High Court of Impeachment; and, although the im-
peachment failed, he was practically deposed as Coni-
mander-in-Chief by the Act just referred to, which he
had signed only under compulsion and protest. In
messages to Congress he called attention to, and pro-
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 73
tested against, this Act as depriving the President of
his constitutional rights. As it is not probable that
any one will ever cite this legislation in support of the
right of the President to delegate his powers as Com-
rnander-in-Chief, or the right of Congress constitution-
ally to deprive him of them, it need not be discussed
in this connection. It was repealed by the Act of July
15, 1870, which abolished the offices of General and
Lieutenant-General as soon as vacated by the officers
then holding them.
On the 4th of March, 1869, Grant became President
of the United States, and Lieutenant-General W. T.
Sherman was, on that date, appointed General. On
the 5th of March, 1869, the President directed General
Sherman to assume command of the Army, which he
did by an order dated March 8, 1869; but by an order
dated March 26, 1869, the President practically re-
sumed command himself, and has exercised it ever since.
On the 15th of July, 1870, an Act was passed di-
recting that " the offices of General and Lieutenant-
General of the Army shall continue until a vacancy
shall occur in the same, and no longer ; and when such
vacancy shall occur in either of said offices, immedi-
ately thereupon all laws and parts of laws creating
said office shall become inoperative, and shall, by vir-
tue of this Act, from thenceforward be held to be re-
pealed." The revival of the grades of Brevet Lieutenant-
General in 1865, and of Lieutenant-General and General
in 1864 and 1866, was not intended to make a change
in the regular military system of the United States, but
was designed to afford rewards for the distinguished
services of particular individuals. The intention is
74
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
the same in all, but is most clearly set forth in the case
of General Scott, the Joint Resolution reading :
" That the grade of Lieutenant-General be, and the
same is hereby, revived in the Army of the United
States, in order that when, in the opinion of the Presi-
dent and Senate, it shall be deemed proper to acknowl-
edge eminent services of a Major-General of the Army
in the late war with Mexico, in the mode already pro-
vided for in subordinate grades the grade of Lieu-
tenant-General may be specially conferred by brevet,
and by brevet only, to take rank from the date of such
service or services. Provided, however, that, when the
said grade of Lieutenant-General by brevet shall have
once been filled, and have become vacant, this Joint
Resolution shall thereafter expire and be of no effect."
It cannot be disputed that, if it is the meaning and
intention of the Constitution that the President shall
actually command the Army, the intention must be
carried out. To ascertain the intention, "the safest
rule of interpretation will be found to be to look into
the nature and object of the particular powers, duties,
and rights, with all the lights and aids of contempo-
rary history, and to give to the words of each just
such operation and force consistent with their legiti-
mate meaning as may fairly secure and attain the ends
proposed." (XVI. Pet. 610-616. Wheat. 418 )
u The intention of the instrument must prevail; this
intention must be collected from its words ; and its
words are to be understood in that sense in which
they are generally used by those for whom the instru-
ment is made." (XII. Wheaton, 832. Ch. J. Marshall.)
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 75
" The first and fundamental rule in relation to the
interpretation of all instruments applies to the Consti-
tution ; that is, to construe them according to the sense
of the terms and the intention of the parties. . . ,
This, for the reason that the Constitution, which was
founded by the people for themselves and their pos-
terity, and for objects of the most momentous nature ;
for the perpetual Union; for the establishment of jus-
tice ; for the general welfare, and for the perpetuation
of the blessings of liberty, requires that every inter-
pretation of its powers should have a constant refer-
ence to these objects. . . . Where technical words
are used, the technical meaning is to be applied to
them, unless it is repelled by the context." (Potter's
" Dwarris on Statutes," chap, xix., pp. 655, 662, 676,
677, quoting Story).
Admitting that the foregoing authorities establish
the fact that the intention when ascertained must be
carried out, it is necessary to look into the question as
to what was intended by that part of the Constitution
which says the President "SHALL BE Cornmander-in-
Chief of the Army," etc. This intention "must be
collected from its words ; and its words are to be
understood in that sense in which they are generally
used by those for whom the instrument is made."
When the Constitution was prepared we had just
emerged from an eight years' war for freedom. The
people were familiar with military operations, duties
and titles. Washington was the leader in the long
struggle by virtue of the commission of General and
Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United Col-
onies conferred upon him by the delegates all of
76
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
them being named. These delegates undoubtedly
meant by the term " Commander-in-Chief," that the
person holding that office should actually command,
and so Washington understood their wishes. There
is no reasonable doubt that the words "Commander-
in-Chief," as introduced into the Constitution, under
which Washington became the first President, were
meant in the same sense as that in which they had
been understood in his commission as " General." By
the term Commander-in-Chief, the " Fathers " meant
that the President must be the General of the Army
and the Admiral of the Navy, and no navy officer
makes any claim to the command of the Navy. The
design was to confer upon the President the power,
and impose upon him the obligation, to command ; and
it was not intended, in making him Commander-in-
Chief, to endow him with nominal functions or with
power which he might, in his discretion, delegate
to some one else. He, however, became Commander,
as the civil chief magistrate, instead of as the senior
General, and his title was changed. Instead of being
" General and Commander-in-Chief," he became " Presi-
dent and Commander-in-Chief," and though not triable
by court-martial, as a soldier, he was made amenable
to a special tribunal of a similar nature, namely the
High Court of Impeachment. That there should be
no semblance even of military domination, not only
was the actual command lodged irrevocably and un-
alterably with the elective civil chief magistrate, but
the Constitution provided that u no appropriation
of money " for the support of armies " shall be
for a longer term than two years." Never in the
THE COMMAND OF THE AEMY. 77
formation of a free government were there wiser
provisions. They could not have been set forth in
plainer or more positive terms. The President cannot
divest himself of the duties of Commander-in-Chief
(O'Brien's "Military Law," p. 30), nor can Congress take
them from him ; but, on the other hand, Congress only
can raise and support the forces over which this com-
mand is to be exercised. The military is thus raised,
commanded, and supported under the immediate con-
trol of two of the civil powers, and is helpless in the
the hands of either against the other. Kent, in his
" Commentaries," says : " It was difficult to constitute
the office [of President] in such a manner as to render
it equally safe and useful, by combining in the struc-
ture of its powers a due proportion of energy and
responsibility. The first is necessary to maintain a
firm administration of the law ; the second is equally
requisite to preserve inviolate the liberties of the
people. The authors of the Constitution appear
to have surveyed the two objects with profound
discernment, and to have organized the executive
department with consummate skill." That the in-
tention was that the President should actually com-
mand seems to be clear from the foregoing point of
view. But it may be inferred also from the facts
concerning the State Constitutions adopted prior to
and soon after the formation of the Union. It is fair
to assume that the principles in military affairs by
which the various State Executives were governed,
were of the same nature as those introduced into the
National Constitution, and that where the term " Com-
mander-in-Chief " was used by the delegates who
78
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
framed the Constitution of the Union, it was intended
to convey substantially the same meaning that it did
when used in the State constitutions. In this con-
nection we find the following :
New Hampshire. Constitution formed in 1784,
amended in 1792. . . . "The President of this
State for the time being shall be Commander-m-Chief
of the Army and Navy, and all the military forces of
this State by sea and by land . . . and lead and
conduct them . . . and, in fine, the Governor is
hereby entrusted with all other powers incident to the
office of Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief and
Admiral."
Massachusetts. Constitution agreed upon 1779-
1780. "The Governor of the Commonwealth for
the time being shall be Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy, and of all the military forces of the
State by sea and land . . . and lead and conduct
them, and with them to encounter, repel, resist, expel r
and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by
land, within or without the limits of this Common-
wealth ; . . . and that the Governor be entrusted
with all these and other powers, incident to the offices
of Captain-General and Coininander-in-Chief and
Admiral."
Connecticut. Under the Royal Charter of 1662, as
adopted by the people in 1776 and modified from
time to time till 1818, when the present Constitution
was adopted, "the Governor was Captain-General of
the Militia and the Deputy-Governor was Lieuten-
ant-General. Under the present Constitution, the Gov-
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 79
ernor is Captain-General of the Militia of the State,
except when called into the Service of the United
States."
NeiuYorJc. Constitution established by the Con-
vention, 1777. "That the Governor shall continue in
office three years, and shall, by virtue of his office, be
General and Commander-in-Chief of all the Militia, and
Admiral of the Navy of this State."
New Jersey. Constitution, 1776. . . . "That
the Governor, or, in his absence, the Vice-President of
the Council, shall have the Supreme Executive Power,
be Chancellor of the Colony, and act as Captain-Gen-
eral and Commander-in-Chief of all the Militia and
other military force in this Colony."
Pennsylvania. Constitution of 1776. "The Presi-
dent shall be Commander in- Chief of the forces of the
State, but shall not command in person, except advised
thereto by the Council, and then only so long as they
shall approve thereof." Constitution 1790. . . .
" He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of this Commonwealth, and of the Militia, ex-
cept when they shall be called into actual Service of
the United States." . . .
Delaware. Constitution of 1 776. " The President,
with the advice and consent of the Privy Council, may
embody the Militia and act as Captain-General and
Commander-in-Chief of them and [of] the other mili-
tary forces of this State, under the laws of the same."
Maryland. Constitution of 1776. . . . "That
the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Council, may embody the Militia, and, when embodied,
shall alone have the direction of all the regular land
and sea forces under the laws of this State ; but he
shall not command in person unless advised thereto
by the Council, and then only so long as they shall
approve thereof." . . .
Virginia. Constitution of 1776. "The Governor
may embody the Militia with the advice of the Privy
Council, and when embodied, shall alone have the di-
rection of the Militia, under the laws of the country."
North Carolina. Constitution of 1776. . . .
" The Governor, for the time being, shall be Captain-
General and Commander-in-Chief of the Militia ; and
in the recess of the General Assembly shall have
power, by and with the advice of the Council of State,
to embody the Militia for the public safety." . . .
South Carolina. Constitution of 1790. . . .
"The Governor shall be Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of this State, and of the Militia, ex-
cept when they shall be called into the actual Service
of the United States." In the Constitution of 1778
the Governor is uniformly styled " Governor and Com-
mander-in-Chief. "
Vermont. Constitution of 1786. "The Governor
shall be Captain-General and Command er-in Chief of
the forces of this State ; but shall not command in
person except advised thereto by the Council, and then
only so long as they shall approve thereof ; and the
Lieutenant-Governor shall, by virtue of his office, be
Lieutenant-General of all the forces of the State."
In relation to the reservation in the constitutions of
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 81
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Vermont, that the Gov-
ernor shall not command personally in the field with-
out the concurrence of the legislature, it may be stated
that in Hamilton's first draft of the Constitution of the
United States it was expressly set forth that the Presi-
dent shall not take the actual command, in the field,
of our Army without the consent of the Senate and
Assembly, but this was not agreed to. The presump-
tion seems to have been that, unless restrained by ex-
press limitation, the Commander-in-Chief might feel
bound to take the field to the prejudice of his other
duties. But, as stated, this, in the President's case,
was finally left to his discretion. So far were the
framers of the Constitution from intending that the
President should be able to delegate his powers as
Commander, that some of them doubted whether they
had succeeded in exempting him from the necessity of
exercising immediate personal command.
In the light of the foregoing circumstances it is not
strange that Hamilton in the Federalist spoke of the
President as "the first General and Admiral," and
in his later writings of the Governors as the first Gen-
erals in their several States. It, therefore, seems plain
that using the words " Commander-in-Chief " in the
sense in which they were understood by the framers
of the Constitution, as well as by those to whom the
instrument applied, that it was the intention that the
President should be the actual Commander. That in-
tention would not be carried out if the President di-
vested himself of his power and responsibility as Com-
mander by delegating them to a " chosen General."
One of Grotius' maxims of interpretation is that per-
82
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
mission includes "a liberty, but a command carries
along with it necessity of acting"
Attorney-General Wirt said : " It could never have
been the intention of the Constitution in assigning this
general power to the President to take care that the
laws be executed, that he should in person execute
them himself;" but, he adds, if the law^s "require a
particular officer by name to perform a duty, not only
is that OFFICER bound to perform it, but NO OTHEK officer
can perform it without a violation of tlie laiv"
Under these authorities, and others which might be
cited, a public officer to whom a duty is specifically
and distinctly assigned by the Constitution, or by the
law, cannot be said to perform that duty if he delegates
the performance of it to some one else. Nor could
such delegation of military command be admissible un-
der a construction giving a technical meaning to the
term " Commander-in-Chief." No officer of the Army
from the highest General down to the lowest subaltern
can delegate his authority. Orders have force only
because of the authority whence they emanate. The
channel through which they flow serves as proof of
their source.
A commanding officer may usually must exercise
authority through subordinate commanders, and may
give his orders and express his will through chosen offi-
cers but that is not delegating}^ command, which means
endowing another with the general power, and entrust-
ing its execution to his discretion. The term " Corn-
man der-in- Chief " is never used in the military service
to express any right to delegate command on the one
hand, or to acquire it by delegation on the other. On
THE COMMAND OF THE AKMY. 83
the contrary, its meaning indicates the exercise, not
the abandonment, of command. Again, there is an-
other light in which the subject may be viewed. The
man who is elected President by the people is, by the
Constitution, appointed to the office of " Commander-
in- Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States when called
into the Service of the United States," and in terms
no more specific the Vice-President is by the same in-
strument appointed President of the Senate. These
are the only two appointments made by the Constitu-
tion. The obligation actually to perform the duties
of his office seems to rest alike on each of the incum-
bents ; one has no more right to delegate the powers
of his specific office than the other. Recognizing the
fact that the Vice-President might be absent from his
place as President of the Senate, the Constitution, in-
stead of permitting him to delegate his powers, provides
in distinct terms how his duties shall be performed ;
but it does not admit that the President can by any
possibility do otherwise than continue in the actual
performance of the duties of his specific office as Com-
mander-in- Chief. There is significance in still another
view of the terms used. While there are several
things which the Constitution says the President
" shall do" Commander-in-Chief is the only thing which
it says he " shall be" To divest himself, by general
delegation, of the actual duties of this office would
seem to be a graver departure from the purpose of the
Constitution than it would be to delegate one of his
specific constitutional duties, the appointing power for
example. In fact, the construction which would give
MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
him the right to delegate the duties of his office as
Commander-in-Chief, would carry with it the right to
-delegate any or all of his constitutional duties, thus
violating the intention as stated by Jefferson, where
he says, " the theory of our Government is, that what
belongs to the executive power is to be exercised by
the uncontrolled will of the President." (Jefferson's
Works, vol. v., p. 569.)
In the way of illustration, it may be said that if
the Constitution had provided for a second Vice- Pres-
ident, and had made it his only duty to be Com-
mander-in-Chief, using the identical terms which now
confer that office on the President, there is hardly a
doubt that he would have been in fact, as well as in
name, the actual Commander. The obligation of act-
ual command resting on the President is quite as
strong as it would have been on a Vice-President in
the case assumed, and it is not in the least impaired by
the fact that the Constitution assigns other duties to
the President besides those of Commander-in-Chief.
It cannot be denied, however, that the right of the
President to delegate his powers, to some extent at
least, as Commander-in-Chief, has been affirmed by
some good authorities. Attorney-General Butler said
(April 6, 1835): "The President need not assume per-
sonal command of the militia. He may place them
under the command of any officer to whom, in his ab-
sence, lie may delegate his constitutional powers. It
may be indispensable that officers of the Army be re-
quired to serve in the militia ; as, for example, when
vacant offices are not immediately filled by the State,
or when the militia officers are absent or disabled. It
THE COMMAND OF THE AEMY. 85
must be remembered, however, that this power must
be exercised in accordance with the reserved rights-
of the States to officer their quotas." (II. " Opinions,"
711.)
But in relation to this opinion, it must be borne in
mind that when militia troops were called for by the
President in 1812, some of the States refusing to fur-
nish them took the ground that the President must
command the militia in person, or through militia of-
ficers. The point was submitted by the Governor of
Massachusetts to the Supreme Court of that State.
Justices Parsons, Sewall, and Parker of the Court de-
cided that " Congress may provide laws for the gov-
ernment of the militia when in actual service; but to
extend this power to the placing them under the com-
mand of an officer not of the militia " (Gen'l Dearborn
was referred to), " except the President, would render
nugatory the provision that the militia are to have of-
ficers appointed by the States ; " and the Court went
on to say that it could not determine who should com-
mand " in the absence of the President" No overruling
decision has been rendered on this point. And the
fact may be recalled that President Washington, in
1794, took the field in actual command of the militia
of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Virginia, and when
he relinquished immediate command he turned it over
to the Governor of the last named State.
In his "War Powers of the President," Whiting
says : " It is necessary to the proper conduct of war
that many, if not most, of the powers of the President
as Commander should be delegated to his Secretaries,
and Generals, and that many of their powers should
86 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
be exercised by officers under them ; and although it
not seldom happens that subalterns abuse the power
of arrest and detention, yet the inconvenience resulting
from this fact is one of the inevitable misfortunes of
war."
It will be observed that no right of general delega-
tion of power is here asserted. It is claimed that
" many if not most " of the powers of the President as
Commander may be delegated ; and this is urged in
the face of admitted abuses of the delegation ; nor was
this alleged to be a constitutional power of the Presi-
dent. It was claimed only as one of his war powers
under the Constitution and the delegation of authority
under discussion by Mr. Whiting was, more especially,
that to make arrests during a time when it was feared
treason was lurking in all quarters. Furthermore, his
work was prepared with a view to giving to the Presi-
dent the largest latitude that construction would ad-
mit of, so as to enable the Executive to deal in the
most summary manner with the difficult questions then
new, arising out of a great civil war.
The delegation of specific duties to subordinate of-
ficers from time to time, as contemplated by Butler
and Whiting, while the general duties of Commander-
in-Chief are reserved, is one thing. The assignment
of a subordinate as the " Commanding General " or
" General-in-Chief " being equivalent to an assign-
ment as the Commander -in- Chief is another and
a very different thing. The first is a special delega-
tion of power within the Army, manifesting instead of
derogating the supreme command over it. While the
latter, the general delegation of the full measure of
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 87
the President's powers, involves an abdication of these
powers.
The claim in favor of delegation of the President's
powers as Commander is very clearly stated by Major-
General Schofield. He says : " The Secretary of War is
the immediate head of the military establishment the
impersonation of the authority of the constitutional
Commander-in-Chief. The President is not only above,
but beyond the Army, rarely in contact with it, and
never heard from except through the Secretary of
War. The latter is regarded by all as the real head
the Chief:'' But he goes on to say: "The President"
(meaning, of course, the Secretary of War also) "does
not command in person ; he delegates his military com-
mand to a General Officer who has been educated, ap-
pointed, commissioned, and assigned by him for that
purpose. The President's military staff thus becomes
the staff of his representative the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Army ; " and he adds, " the orders of his
chosen General-in-Chief are as mucli his own orders as
if lie gave them in person" (Army and Navy Journal
of January 4, 1879 letter to Gen'l W. T. Sherman,
December 25, 1878.) If this complete delegation of
military power could be made, it might give rise to
the very danger which it was evidently the purpose of
the Constitution to guard against, viz.: the domination
of the civil by the military power. A military chief-
tain, endowed either by law or delegation with the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief, with the
President's military staff converted into his staff, and
with his orders acknowledged to be " as much the
President's orders as if he gave them himself," would
88
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
seem to be the functionary whose existence the Con-
stitution most pointedly intended to prevent.
But, besides the peril to the nation, there would be
danger to the Army, if the President could delegate
his powers as Commander-in-Chief. The right to del-
egate these powers over the Army, and the right to
assign an officer to duty within the Army according to
his own commission, have no connection. They are
entirely distinct from each other. If the President
had the right to delegate his powers as Commander-in
Chief, he could not, in the exercise of it, be limited to
a " chosen General " any more than to a chosen Cap-
tain, civilian, or any one else. It will appear without
argument, that in this view of the subject the power
to delegate might be very injurious to the Army itself.
The aspect of the question of putting a chosen Gen-
eral in actual command of the Army depends very
much on the direction from which it is viewed. Look-
ing from the strictly military point of view, it seems
clear that a chosen General, educated, and appointed
and assigned to the duty, should command ; and the
same conclusion would follow by reasoning from anal-
ogy, as we see that subordinate officers throughout the
Service actually command according to their respective
grades and assignments Colonels commanding regi-
ments ; Brigadier-Generals, brigades and departments ;
and Major-Generals, divisions ; the analogy being that
the senior General in the Army should command the
whole. There is, as already intimated, an essential
distinction between command within the Army, and
command over it. The analogy holds only for the
former. The latter is the failing point in the system.
THE COMMAND OP THE ARMY. 89
Having reached it, the subject must be looked at from
the constitutional point of view, which, involving as it
does the question of civil liberty, is by far the most
important one. George Ticknor Curtis says, in his
work on the " Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the
Constitution," " The reason on which it was rested by
the grand committee, and on which the plan of a Coun-
cil of State was rejected, was that the President of the
United States, unlike the executive in mixed govern-
ments of the monarchical form, was to be personally
responsible for his official conduct, and that the Con-
stitution should do nothing to dimmish that responsi-
bility, even in appearance. If it had not been intended
to make the President liable to impeachment, a Cab-
inet might have been useful, and would certainly have
been necessary if there was to be any responsibility
anywhere for executive acts. But a large majority of
the States preferred to interpose no shield between the
President and a public accusation. He might derive
any assistance from the great officers of the executive
departments which Congress might see fit to establish,
that he could obtain from their opinions or advice ;
but the powers which the Constitution was to confer on
him must be exercised by himself, and every official act
must be performed as his own."
Our political policy requires that the control of the
Army shall be actually and without qualification or
limitation subject to the civil power legislative and
executive. Anything short of this would violate the
fundamental ideas of Anglican civil liberty, wrought
out by centuries of English history, and finally adapted
to our system, and which were intended to be perpet-
90 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
uated by our Constitution. All the sacrifice of mili-
tary unity and efficiency, if there be any, which these
principles require, was no doubt duly estimated by the
framers of the Constitution, and is fully compensated
by the greater security to our Eepublican institutions
and to the freedom of the people. But it is a self-
evident fact that it would be difficult, if not impracti-
cable, for the President to attend in person to all the
duties of the Army, and the question arises, Has a
proper and sufficient remedy been provided to meet
this difficulty ? That question is settled by the Acts
of Congress creating the great Departments and their
Bureaux, and by several decisions and opinions con-
cerning them. It is enough to quote one decision of
the U. 8. Supreme Court, perhaps the most compre-
hensive of all the rulings on the subject. It is as fol-
lows :
The Secretary of War " is the regular constitutional
organ of the President for the administration of the
military establishment of the nation ; and rules and
orders publicly promulgated through him must be re-
ceived as the acts of the Executive, and as such be
binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and
constitutional authority."
This decision embraces more than is disclosed by a
mere cursory examination. It in fact settles the whole
question as to the command of the Army. The Pres-
ident is the Constitutional Commander-in-Chief. The
decision shows :
First. That he must administer the military estab-
lishment ; that is to say, he must direct the execution
and application of the laws on the subject.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 91
Second. For this purpose the Secretary of War, and
no one else, is his regular constitutional organ.
Third. That administering the military establish-
ment involves not only the execution and application
of laws, but the promulgation of "rules and orders."
Fourth. That all such " rules and orders " that is
to say, the acts of the President as expressed by rules
and orders for the military establishment, when pub-
licly promulgated through the Secretary of War must
be received as the act of the Executive and must be
binding. The effect of an attempt to promulgate them
through some one else the Secretary of the Treasury
for example may at present be left for conjecture.
The President must actually administer the military
establishment, and the decision shows that there is one,
and it shows but one, constitutional way in which he
may be relieved of the labor of continuous personal
command ; that is, by having that command exercised
by the Secretary of War ; not by virtue of delegated
power, nor in fact by any power of his own, but be-
cause his rules and orders, and his only, mast be re-
ceived as the acU of the President.
Remembering that the rules and orders in question
are all which are required for the execution and ap-
plication of the laws to the military Service (that is
for administering the military establishment), the con-
clusion is unavoidable that the person who must make
them, must command the Army ; and thus the decision
of the Supreme Court confirms the practice which,
though once or twice a little disturbed, has been in
actual operation since the foundation of the Govern-
ment, or, to quote Secretary of War Davis, " the ex-
92 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
elusive control of the military establishment has never
been surrendered to the senior General of the Army,
as the unvarying practice of the War Department ex-
hibits.' 7 The reason for this is well stated by Attor-
ney-General Bates, in language as follows :
" The President is a department of the Government,
and, although the only department which consists of a
single man, he is charged with a greater range and
variety of powers and duties than any other depart-
ment. He is a civil magistrate and a military cliief j
and in this regard we see a striking proof of the gen-
erality of the sentiment prevailing in this country at
the time of the formation of our Government, to the
effect that the military ought to be held in strict sub-
ordination to the civil power. For the Constitution,
while it grants to Congress the unrestricted power to
declare war, to raise and support armies, and to pro-
vide and maintain a navy, at the same time guards
carefully against the abuse of that power by with-
holding from Congress, and from the Army itself, the
authority to appoint the Chief Commander of a force so
potent for good or for evil to the State. The Consti-
tution provides that the President shall be Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States when called
into the actual Service of the United States. And
why is this? Surely not because the President is sup-
posed to be, or commorily is, in fact, a military man, a
man skilled in the art of war, and qualified to marshal
a host in the field of battle. No ! it is quite a different
reason : it is that whatever skilful soldier may lead
our armies to victory against a foreign foe, or may
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 93
quell a domestic insurrection ; however high he may
raise his professional renown, and whatever martial
glory he may win, still he is subject to the orders of
the civil magistrate, and he and his army are always
subordinate to the civil power."
And Attorney- General Gushing says : " No Act of
Congress, no act even of the President himself, can, by
constitutional possibility, authorize or create any mili-
tary officer not subordinate to the President."
The President is the Commander of the Army. The
Secretary of War is his constitutional organ ; and to
assert that two persons command the same force at
the same time involves a contradiction amounting to
absurdity. There can be but one Commander. All
others must be commanded. Saying that a chosen
General commands the whole Army under the Secre-
tary of War is admitting what is the fact that he
does not command it. The late Major- General Hal-
leek, who was an educated soldier, an accomplished
scholar, and a profound lawyer, fully comprehended
this. While " General-in-Chief " he wrote as follows :
"The great difficulty in the office of ' General-in-
Chief ' is that it is not understood by the country.
The responsibility and odium thrown upon it do not
belong to it. I am simply a 'military adviser of the
Secretary of War and the President, and must obey
and carry out wliat they decide upon, whether I concur
in their decisions or not. . . . It is my duty to
strengthen the hands of the President as Gommander-in-
Ghief, not to weaken them by factious opposition. I
have, therefore, cordially co-operated with him in any
plan decided upon, although I have never hesitated to
94 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
differ in opinion. I must leave it to history to vindi-
cate or condemn my own opinions or plans. They
will be found at some future time on record." (Let-
ter from H. W. Halleck, Headquarters Army, Wash-
ington, February 16, 1864, to Major-General "W. T.
Sherman.)
But the wishes of the Secretary of War, as well as
his rights, must be taken into account. Under the
Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court,,
he possesses the power, and whoever he may be, he
prefers exercising it in fact, to assigning it to some one
else. He is necessarily a man of distinction and
ability, usually a public leader of prominence, able and
active, with more or less ambition, member of a con-
stitutional cabinet in which every one of his colleagues,,
including the Secretary of the Navy, actually and
directly commands and conducts the business of hi&
department. How can it be expected that this one
cabinet officer would, if he could, abdicate his office,
and assign his duties to one of his subordinates and
become a mere figure-head in the Government !
The conclusions are :
1st. The President is required by the Constitution
actually to command the Army, and Congress has no
right to divest him of that duty, in whole or part.
2d. He cannot delegate the command if he would,,
and he probably would not if he could.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. CONTINUED.*
For many years the subject of the Command of the
Army has been a theme of discussion in the Army, and
* From Field Glass for July, 1879. By Brevet-Colonel William M.
Wherry, Captain 6th Infantry.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 95
by " would-be reformers " out of the Army. Of late
the discussion has been brought into special promi-
nence by the advocates of the pernicious doctrine that
the Army can be maintained as an effective and reli-
able executive instrument without a military head, to
which all its parts shall be subordinate, but must be
governed and controlled by a hydra headed body,
composed of the chiefs of bureaus of the War Depart-
ment, each one of whom is striving to secure predom-
inance and power in his department at the expense of
all other branches of the Service a system which,
while claiming the independence of the staff depart-
ments from all military control, threatens not to stop
until the line, including Generals of Command, is
subordinate to the staff bureaus. Hence, the subject
is at this time one of unusual interest to the Army and
to all those who desire to see our military establish-
ment, necessarily a small one, maintained on correct
principles and kept up to the highest state of effi-
ciency.
By the Constitution, Article II, Section 2, "The
President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States when called into the actual Service
of the United States." The vast majority of the func-
tions of the President, as Chief Executive, whether
civil or military, must be performed by his subordi-
nates, acting under his general directions and according
to regulations approved by him. It is utterly impos-
sible for him to perform them in person. To whom
may he delegate such authority ? To such officers as
Congress has authorized for that purpose.
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
The Constitution leaves this matter entirely to
Congress. It does not even provide in terms for the
heads of the great Executive departments of the Gov-
ernment. It simply recognizes the fact that such high
functionaries must be provided by Congress, in the
clause of the section above cited, which only author-
izes the President to call for their opinions in writing.
In accordance therewith, Congress created the Depart-
ment of War, and "a principal officer therein, to be
called the Secretary for the Department of War."
The Act of Congress creating the Department of War
and a Secretary thereof, in express terms, confines his
authority to the performance of such " duties as shall
from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him
by the President of the United States, agreeable to the
Constitution," and the same is to be said of every
officer in the military establishment, from the General
to the lowest lance-corporal. Each and every one of
them acts upon those below him in grade or rank by
authority of the President. No law prescribes, except
in a few particulars, the functions of any officer, but
each is to do " as shall from time to time be enjoined
on, or intrusted to him by the President of the United
States, agreeable to the Constitution," and the laws.
The Constitution does not make the Secretary of
War, for example, " the regular constitutional organ of
the President for the administration of the military
establishment of the nation." The Constitution says
nothing of the kind, nor anything on that subject. It
does not even name the Secretary of War, nor refer to
him in any way, except in the general terms referred
to above, viz.: " he (the President) may require the
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 97
opinion in writing of the principal officer in each, of
the Executive departments, upon any subject relating
to the duties of their respective offices." Hence, the
Secretary of War is " the regular constitutional organ
of the President," etc., simply because Congress has
authorized his appointment to discharge such duties
respecting military affairs and in such manner as the
President may direct. He is, as the Supreme Court
has decided, a a civil officer, and all his duties are civil
duties." He is not a military officer, and cannot take
the field in command of troops, as the President may
do. Hence, he cannot possibly perform in person all
the functions of the Commander-in-Chief, nor can all
those functions be performed by the President through
him. The Secretary is only the Chief of the civil
administration of the War Department, and the me-
dium of communication of the President with the
Army. It is for this last reason only that the acts of
the Secretary must be assumed, as said by the Supreme
Court, to be the acts of the President.
The military functions of the President must be
performed either in person or through military officers.
It is beyond dispute, he cannot perform them in
person. He may delegate those military functions to
such officers as the laws may designate for that pur-
pose, and to no others.
And all such officers must perform their duties as
the President may direct, within the limits of the law.
They all represent the Commander-in-Chief, to do
within their respective spheres such things and in such
manner as he has ordered in his regulations, in his
tactics, or in his " orders," published from time to time.
98 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
The President cannot in person perform all bis civil
functions, he must delegate them to subordinate offi-
cers. For the same reasons he cannot personally
perform all his military functions, nor can he delegate
them to the Secretary of War. And in addition to
the cogent and insuperable reasons why, from the
limitation of human power, the President cannot him-
self perform all his civil functions, comes in the
weighty one in reference to military functions, of their
peculiar character. The President is a civil officer and
so, too, the Secretary of War. All military duties
are in the highest sense technical. They require for
their efficient performance men specially educated for
them. The President needs the services of a Chief-
General as much as he does of a Chief-Engineer, or a
Chief-Quartermaster, or a Chief -Surgeon.
The entire Army needs a military commander quite
as much as, and more than, does a division, brigade, or
regiment. The case of the Navy is by no means a
parallel one. The different squadrons of the Navy
act in different parts of the world, and have no con-
nection with each other. Each Admiral is the Corn-
mander-in-Chief of an entirely separate squadron or
fleet. But the operations of all the armies of the
United States must, in general, be in military harmony
with each other. Hence, they must be under one
military head.
The recognition of this simple military principle has
been so strongly forced upon the country through the
disasters resulting from ignoring it, that it seems
amazing that any military men can have failed to learn
the lesson.
THE COMMAND OF THE AEMY. 99
Both this necessity and the exact constitutional
principle governing action under it have been recog-
nized by Congress in sundry acts, and were empha-
sized in the Act to revive the grade of Lieutenant-
General, who " may be authorized, under the direction
and during the pleasure of the President, to command
the Armies of the United States," when General Grant
was assigned to that command. It is well known
that General Grant declined to accept the commission
unless his command should include the staff of the
Army as well as the line, and that he did command
both, that is, the entire Army.
In the words " under the direction of the President,"
the constitutional prerogative of the " Command er-in-
Chief" is fully preserved. The constitutionality of
that law cannot for a moment be questioned. The
President's right to assign the Lieutenant-General, or
not to assign him, or to limit his command in his
discretion, was fully reserved. And so long as
the President continued to exercise the " direction "
contemplated by the law, it cannot be said that
he " abdicated " his functions as Commander-in-
Chief.
It is a great mistake to suppose the functions of a
General-in-Chief, even with the highest authority ever
given to that officer in this country, are identical with
those of the " Commander-in-Chief." So long as the
General acts u under the direction " and " during the
pleasure " of another, he falls very far short of the chief
command. He can do nothing, except as he may be
directed or permitted by his superior. Even the man-
ner in which he is to do the things directed or per-
100
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
mitted is largely controlled by the "regulations" es-
tablished by the Commander-in-Chief.
The military theory is perfectly simple and plain.
A " General-in-Chief " is a military expert, versed in
all branches of the science of war, appointed by the
President, under authority of the law, to do, in accord-
ance with the rules taught by the science of war, with
which he is familiar, those things which the " Com-
mander-in-Chief " may direct or authorize to be done,
but which he himself does not know how to do, or
which his other duties do not leave him the time to do
in person.
It is a mere abuse of terms to call a General-in-
Chief, so assigned, " Commander-in-Chief " in the sense
of the Constitution. This is doubtless one of the
cases where confusion arises from the use of the same
word in different senses, owing to the poverty of lan-
guage. But certainly no thoughtful person ought to
make the mistake of supposing a General assigned to
command the Army, under the direction of the Presi-
dent, to be thereby substituted for the President as
41 Commander-in-Chief in derogation of his constitu-
tional prerogative." Such an error could only result
from the most thoughtless construction of words, the
mere misinterpretation of a name.
The General-in-Chief no more displaces the Presi-
dent than does the Secretary of War. They both act
under the President's direction and control, and in
strict subordination to his supreme authority as Chief -
Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Yet we hear it asserted that the President cannot
delegate his powers as Commander-in-Chief to any-
THE COMMAND OF THE AKMY., 101
body. He must, under the Constitution, exercise those
powers in person. But this being a physical and moral
impossibility, the Supreme Court has come to the re-
lief of the overburdened President by deciding that
the orders of the Secretary of War must be received
as those of the President. Thus we are to be satisfied
with the fiction that the President actually commands
in person, when we all know he does not, and generally
cannot for want of military knowledge, and that be-
cause his orders come through another civilian who does
not and actually cannot command! But if the Presi-
dent attempts to make known his will to the Army
through a General who knows how to express that
will in military form and direct all the details of its
execution, we are told : " No ; that will not do ; that
would be a violation of the Constitution ; that would
be to abdicate his authority as Commander-in-Chief ! n
He may give his military orders to one who cannot
execute them, and that is all right ; but if he give his
orders to one who can execute them, that is all wrong !
He must, of course, have a General of some education
and experience in command of each division and brig-
ade, but the command of " all the armies " is such a
simple non-military business, it is so easy to direct the
operations of a million of men formed into half-a-dozen
or more armies, with all their staff included, any able-
bodied civilian can do that ! That does not require
any military education. The Constitution can not
possibly have intended to give the President power to
make a soldier do that business for him. He can do
that himself. Or, if he prefers, he can select some
other civilian, make him Secretary of War, and let
102 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
him do it ! For we are told " there is one, and but
one, constitutional way in which he may be relieved
of the labor of continuous personal command ; that is
by having that command exercised by the Secretary of
War ; not by virtue of delegated power, nor in fact
by any power of his own j but because his rules and
orders, and liis only, must be received as the acts of the
President" Not because the Secretary has any con-
stitutional authority; nor because the President can
give him any ; but because the Supreme Court has
decided that the Secretary's acts must be received as
those of the President !
The law is precisely the reverse of this. The Presi-
dent cannot delegate his military command to the Sec-
retary of War. There is not a word in the Constitu-
tion, nor in any Act of Congress to give him any such
authority. The President must exercise his powers in
person, or else through such officers as may be ap-
pointed for that purpose, and under authority of law.
Congress has authorized the appointment of certain
general officers, for the exercise, under the President's
direction, of appropriate military commands. He may
assign them, or not, as he pleases he may do in that
regard what the law has authorized, and no more ; but
the law cannot compel him to do what would be in
derogation of his constitutional power, viz.: to make
such assignments contrary to his judgment. He must
retain the substance of supreme command by retaining
control of all his subordinates and requiring them to
act according to his directions. So long as he does
this there is no limit in the Constitution to the organ-
ization of the Army and the distribution of commands
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 103
which Congress may authorize and the President
adopt.
It is simply absurd to say that Congress can not
authorize the President to assign a General to com-
mand " all the armies," or the entire Army, under his
direction. That would be to deny to the President
and Congress the power to do the very thing which
all military authors agree is the first great essential to
success in war ; that is, to select a competent General
to direct all the military forces to be employed.
Is it possible the Constitution requires the President
to actually do himself in person, although he may
know he is not competent to do it, this most moment-
ous of all executive duties ?
While Congress may expend millions to educate
subordinate officers, they are positively prohibited by
the Constitution from employing an educated soldier
as General-in-Chief, unless the people elect him Presi-
dent! In other words, the people are driven to the
necessity of either electing a military chieftain to the
Presidency, or else of trusting the command of the
Army to a civilian ! Can any thing be more mon-
strous ? What a set of imbeciles the " Fathers " must
have been !
But they never dreamed of such a thing Nor did
they practise it. In the struggle for independence
they saw the folly of such a theory, and subsequently
they provided against it, and even conferred the re-
sponsibility upon Washington in 1798.
Every military writer in all time has seen the ne-
cessity for and urged the importance of due subordina-
tion in all branches of an army to a supreme head,
104 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
and all officers of experience in our Service can recall
disasters and confusion resulting from the clashing and
distracting exercise of independent authority by the
chiefs of staff bureaus in Washington.
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the subject, and
its bearing upon the present, is contained in Major-
General Schofield's letter of October 13, 1876, to the
Secretary of War, on the subject of " Army Reorgan-
ization," from which the following extracts are taken:
" The President of the United States, the constitu-
tional Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, is
generally a civilian. As compared with the chief ex-
ecutive officers of most other nations, he is pre-emi-
nently a civil magistrate. It is as such civil head of
the nation, and not as a military chieftain, that he is
given the supreme command of the Army. His Sec-
retary of War is also a civilian, Congress having even
gone so far as to prohibit the appointment of an army
officer to that station. Thus the perfect subordination
of the military to the civil power is secured, military
command and administration are made to conform
strictly to the civil interpretation of the laws and to
the civil policy of the Government.
" But the President is not practically, and in gen-
eral can not possibly be, because his other duties pre-
vent, the actual '(military)' Commander-in-Chief of the
Army."
He must delegate his military functions to some
subordinate, acting under his general directions. Now
the simple questions is, shall this subordinate be a
General or a civilian ? In a country where the mon-
arch is an educated soldier and his War Minister one
THE COMMAND OF THE AKMY. 105
of his trusted lieutenants, such a question does not exist.
In ours it can not be ignored, but must be fairly met.
In such other country the War Minister may well be,
under the sovereign, the actual commander of the
army. In ours the plainest military principles forbid.
The President's military representative must be a
" General-in-Chief," not a civilian Secretary of War.
" The Secretary of War is the President's represen-
tative, as civil executive, for one department of the
Government, to direct and control military affairs and
conduct army administration in the President's stead ;
but not to command the Army, except in the general
sense in which the President himself commands it.
The Secretary for his department, stands in the Presi-
dent's place, and does in detail what the President
does in gross : directs and controls, not commands.
" It is true, as has been said, that no officer has any
right to command by virtue of his commission alone.
He can only command such forces as the President
may assign to him. The President's power in this re-
gard can not properly be limited by law.
" He may do or leave undone a thousand things
which he ought not. The question is not what he has
the power to do, but what he ought to do. His plain
duty as dictated by the simplest military principles,
is to assign some General to the command as l General-
in-Chief.' If he has not the necessary confidence in
the senior officer, he may relieve him from duty and
assign the next in rank, and so on until he finds one
whom he thinks qualified for the command. He has
no right to leave the Army to the command of a
civilian, a person to whose appointment for any suck
106 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
command the Senate has not consented, nor the law
provided. The other alternative of leaving the Army
practically without any Cornrnander-in-Chief, as has
been done, is no better. The several division or
department commanders and the chiefs of the several
staff corps, departments, and bureaux, then conduct
their affairs in their own several ways, with just
enough interference from the Secretary of War to
destroy what little adhesion to common military prin-
ciples might otherwise have existed.
" Unity in the command of an army is the one con-
dition indispensable. Other things imperfect may be
tolerated, but divided authority is inevitably disas-
trous. Of this truth our own recent history gives but
too abundant proof, and the history of other countries
may be searched in vain for contradictory evidence.
It is capable of demonstration to the satisfaction of
any average military mind, that our late war might
have been brought to a successful conclusion in two
years instead of four, and at half the cost in men and
money, if any one soldier of fair ability had been given
the absolute control of military operations and of the
necessary military resources of the country.
" It was only after three years of imperfect suc-
cesses, failures, and disasters, that a practical recog-
nition of this essential principle of unity was forced
upon the Government. Another time we may not be
given three years in which to learn the fundamental
principles of the Art of War and another year to
profit by the lesson.
" A vicious system, long followed in Peace, cannot
be suddenly changed upon the commencement of War.
THE COMMAND OF THE AEMY. 107
Habit, prejudice, and ignorance will either sustain
the old or make the new system inefficient, until
disaster, irretrievable, as in the case of France, or
enormously expensive, as in our own, awakens the
government to its delusion.
" No military system is worthy the name unless it
conforms in Peace in all its essential features to the
requirements of War. The Army must have, in Peace
as well as in War, a military head, or l General-in-
Chief,' who shall have, not only in name, but in fact,
the actual command of the Army, and not of a part
only, but of the entire Army.
" Whatever, may be true on other points, unity of
command under one military head is the first great and
indispensable necessity."
" Any portion of the Army may be detached from
purely military duties, in the discretion of the Presi-
dent or of Congress, and employed on civil works,
under the immediate direction of the heads of the ex-
ecutive departments to which they belong. Or army
officers may, in addition to their ordinary military du-
ties, be entrusted with others of a civil nature, in respect
to which they will be free from military control. In
like manner, strict subordination to their military
commander in all matters which appertain to the com-
mand, is entirely compatible with direct responsibility
to their administrative chiefs and the Secretary of
War, in matters of administration and accountability."
5f -J5- # # #
" The military theory is that of dual responsibility
of the staff ; similar to that of ministerial responsibil-
ity."
108 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
" As the minister is responsible to the Chief Exe-
cutive for faithful execution of his orders, and at the
same time to the people or to the legislature for strict
obedience to the laws, and wise and honest counsel
to his chief, so the staff officer is responsible to his
commander for the faithful execution of his orders, and
to the War Department for strict conformity to the
laws and regulations.
" No man is so learned, wise, and dispassionate as
not to need information, counsel, and restraint under
some circumstances. Military commanders are not
less liable than other men to such imperfection. No
commander can be familiar with all the details of the
laws and regulations for his government, or with the
state of the appropriations for each of the numerous
details embraced in the several branches of the Service.
No one can know the necessities of the numerous de-
tails of a large command, except as reported to him
by his subordinates. No one whose sole absorbing
aim is, and must be, the accomplishment of his mili-
tary ends, should be left the sole responsible judge of
the lawfulness of the means he may think most appro-
priate to those ends. The necessities of war make the
Army commander the sole judge in the last resort.
But wise governments surround him with a body of
intelligent, reliable, and responsible staff officers,
whose duty it is to assist him, to advise him, and to
guard him against any unwitting disregard of the
law."
# & * * *
" If this principle be correct, it necessarily follows
that the staff officers must have direct communication
THE COMMAND OP THE AEMY. 109
with their administrative chiefs, and through them
with the War Department, in respect to all matters in-
volving such responsibility and their accountability to
the Treasury. They must not be required nor per-
mitted to depend in such matters solely upon their
commanders. "
It may be said, in conclusion, that the real issue in
this country is not whether the Army shall be com-
manded by the President in person, or through a
General-in-Chief, but whether or not it shall be com-
manded by the Chiefs of Bureaus. Practically, the
functions of the General-in-Chief, as advocated by
those who argue in favor of such an assignment, are
coincident with those of the Chief of Staff, or Chef
$Etat- Major of European armies, He is the senior
in control to furnish the plans and elaborate the de-
tails of campaigns and the military administration
incident thereto and to do so effectually, he must have
control of all the parts that is, of the entire Army,
staff, as well as line.
Owing to the poverty of language, as mentioned
heretofore, confusion arises in the employment of
terms, and we are inclined to regard the chief of
staff, as spoken of in the Prussian army, for instance,
as the head of the staff corps only when in reality
he is the principal officer in command under their
sovereign the military head of the organized force,
and, as such, ranks as chief of the generals or mar-
shals who command.
HO MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. CONTINUED.*
An article by Colonel Wherry, Aid-de-Camp to Gen-
eral Scliofield, appeared in your last issue on "The
Command of the Army," the subject which I treated
in the Field Glass of May last. The author of that
article looks only from the military standpoint, and
argues the question as to what ought to be. I took a
general view and tried to ascertain what is, and why
it is. Hence, though writing under the same title, we
are not discussing the same subject. But as it is quite
evident that Colonel Wherry designs his article to
pass as a refutation of some of the views in mine, I
beg, in consideration of the importance of the topic,
the favor of your columns for a brief rejoinder.
Colonel Wherry contends for a distinction between
the terms " General-in-Chief " and " Commander -in-
Chief," and says that this is " one of the cases where
confusion arises from the use of the same word in dif-
ferent senses, owing to the poverty of language." The
military designation of the President is evidence of the
marvellous perspicuity which characterizes the Consti-
tution. He is called " Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Mili-
tia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States," which means, and which
is equivalent to saying, that he is practically the Chief
General of the Army, and the Chief Admiral of the
Navy. But the subject rises above a mere discussion
of terms. While admitting that the President is Com-
mander-in-Chief, Colonel Wherry, in the first part of
his article, insists that he may " delegate " his " mill-
* To the Editor of the Field Glass. By General James B. Fry.
THE COMMAND OF THE AKMY. Ill
tary functions." There need be no refinement of terms
or misunderstanding here. The usual meaning of the
word " delegate " is to endow another with general
power and entrust its execution to his discretion. Gen-
eral Schofield forestalls all doubt as to the words hav-
ing any other meaning in connection with this subject,
when, in speaking of the President, he says, "he del-
egates Jiis military command to a general officer, who
has been educated, appointed, commissioned, and as-
signed by him for that purpose. The President's mili-
tary staff thus becomes the staff of his military repre-
sentative " " the orders of his chosen General-in-Chief
are as much his own orders as if he gave them in per-
son." This is delegation of authority pure and simple.
It does not in the least resemble the assignment to duty
of a subordinate by his military superior. It clearly
means that the military duties and responsibilities im-
posed on the President by the Constitution, and the
military staff created by law to aid him in the per-
formance of them, shall be transferred to a chosen
General. His orders orders conceived, not by the
President, but by the General, resolved upon in his
discretion, promulgated as his will are as much the
President's orders as if he gave them himself. With
this issue plainly joined, we should not suffer from the
" poverty of language." But in the latter part of his
article, Colonel Wherry treats " delegation of author-
ity" and "assignment to duty" as synonymous ex-
pressions. He says " it is the President's plain duty,
as dictated by the simplest military principles, to as-
sign some General to the command as General-in-Chief."
" No officer," he says, " has any right to command by
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
virtue of his commission alone." " He can only com-
mand such forces as the President may assign to him.
The President's power in this regard cannot properly
be limited by law. The question is not what he has
the pouter to do, but what lie ought to do" It will
strike " the average military mind," to which Colonel
Wherry appeals, that, for practical purposes, it would
be well to settle what the President has the power to
do, before deciding what he ought to do. But the real
question is not, what ought he to do ? nor is it simply,
what has he the power to do ? It is, what, by the Con-
stitution, is lie obliged to do ? Must he actually com-
mand the Army, or may he delegate the command to a
" chosen General " ? using the word " delegate " as
General Schofield and Colonel Wherry use it. There
is no question as to the President's power to assign
all of his subordinates in the Army to duty according
to their respective commissions. What disposition
must he make of himself ? The language of the Con-
stitution is, the President "shall be Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,"
etc. I claim to have shown in my article in the Field
Glass of May, 1879, that the Constitution means that
the President must be the actual commander, that he
cannot " delegate " the command to any one, that the
framers of the Constitution meant to do just what
they did, and, in adopting the clause referred to, they
understood its bearing upon the military Service in
particular as well as upon the Government in general,
and that, as shown by experience, it is practicable for
the President to exercise the command in a way, pro-
vided by law> which the Supreme Court has pro-
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 113
nouuced constitutional. These points are not really
contested in Colonel Wherry's article, but he tells us
that the President ought to delegate his military func-
tions to some General. His reasons for this are, briefly,
as gleaned from his article, that the staff departments
are ambitious of predominance and power, that unity
in military command is essential, that military educa-
tion is of great value, that the President may be ig-
norant of the military duty which the Constitution
imposes on him, and he adds, in the way of illustra-
tration, that the War of Rebellion might have been
ended in two years instead of four, "if any one soldier
of fair military ability had been given the absolute
control of military operations, and the necessary mili-
tary resources of the country" (Let us ask, in paren-
thesis, how it could be possible, under our system, to
give any soldier the absolute power here mentioned ?
What would "the Fathers" have thought of such a
suggestion ?) The inapplicability of these arguments
to the question of the President's power to delegate
his military functions need not be pointed out in
detail. In using them, Colonel Wherry no doubt had
in mind their bearing on what he calls " the military
theory." He says : " the military theory is perfectly
simple and plain. A General-in-Chief is a military
expert, versed in all branches of the science of war,
appointed by the President, under authority of the
law, to do, in accordance with the rules taught by
the science of war with which he is familiar, those
things which the Commander-in-Chief may direct or
authorize to be done, but which he himself does not
know how to do, or which his other duties do not
114
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
leave him time to do in person.' 7 Any one may ad-
vance and advocate a theory. Tn relation to this one
it is only necessary to say, at present, that it does not
embrace the question at issue, to wit, the "delegation"
of the President's "military functions," nor does it ap-
pear to be sound in the light of a definition of the
term " General-in-Chief." The presumption that the
President is ignorant of his duties as Commander-in-
Chief is put forth in this "theory" as also in another
part of Colonel Wherry's article, where, quoting from
General Schofield, he says of one* "President," as
compared with the chief " executive officers of most
other nations he is pre-eminently a civil magistrate."
What chief executive can show better title to being
pre-eminently a military magistrate ? If direct ap-
pointment by the Constitution of his country to the
supreme command of all of its land and naval forces
can make a head magistrate a "military chief," cer-
tainly ours is one, and he has been so defined by an
Attorney-General. Without depreciating the advan-
tages of military education and talents, it may be said
that no presumption that the President is ignorant of
his duties can invalidate the force of his high com-
mission, nor can his chieftainship be impaired by the
opinion his subordinates may have of his military
ability or attainments. It is gratifying to find that,
notwithstanding Colonel Wherry argues that the
President should "delegate " his "military functions "
to some General who should "command," he arrives
at the conclusion that the chosen General can, after
all, be nothing more than the President's Chief -of -
* Misprint. Should be our. See p. 133.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 115
Staff, which is admitting that the President must
command. He says, "practically the functions of the
General-in-Chief, as advocated by those who argue in
favor of such an assignment, are coincident with those
of the Chief-ofStaff, or? Chef cTMat- Major ' of Euro-
pean armies." That is the conclusion at which Hal-
leek arrived when he was so-called General-in-Chief.
In my article of May last I said: "To assert that two
persons command the same force at the same time, in-
volves a contradiction amounting to absurdity. There
can be but one commander : all others must be com-
manded. Saying that a chosen General commands
the whole Army under the Secretary of War is admit-
ting, what is the fact, that he does not command it.
The late Major-General Halleck, who was an educated
soldier, an accomplished scholar, and a profound law-
yer, fully comprehended this. While General-in-Chief
he wrote as follows : 'The great difficulty in the office
of General-in-Chief is, that it is not understood by the
country. The responsibility and odium thrown upon
it do not belong to it. I am simply a military adviser
of the Secretary of War and the President, and must
obey and carry out what they decide upon, whether I
concur in their decisions or not. . . . It is my
duty to strengthen the hands of the President -as
Commander-in-Chief, not to weaken them by factious
opposition. I have, therefore, cordially co-operated
with him in any plan decided upon, although I have
never hesitated to differ in opinion. I must leave it
to history to vindicate my opinions or plans. They
will be found at some future time on record.' (Letter
from H. W. Halleck, Headquarters of the Army,
116
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Washington, Feb. 16, 1864, to Major-General W. T.
Sherman.) "
In conclusion, if, as the Constitution says, the Presi-
dent is Commander-in- Chief ; if, as I claim to have
shown, he cannot, as such, delegate his authority and
responsibility ; if he has a legal staff through whom
to exercise the command of the Army, as is admitted
by General Schofield's statement, that " the President's
staff" thus becomes the staff of his chosen General,
and if, as experience has shown it to be, it is practi-
cable for him to exercise the command in the only
way that the Supreme Court has pronounced constitu-
tional, how can he be expected to delegate the actual
command of the Army to a chosen General ? and who
are the " would-be " reformers of whom Colonel Wher-
ry speaks ? Are they the men who advocate an en-
forcement of the existing system, or those who urge a
departure from it ? *
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. CONTINUED. f
When I wrote my article on " The Command of the
Army," which appeared in your number for July, I
purposely omitted General Fry's or any other person's
name, to avoid personal controversy and the asperity
which usually belongs to such personal mention.
In your number for August appears a letter from
General Fry, Assistant Adjutant- General, which de-
mands an answer from me, and I desire to reply on
the broad ground upon which only such an important
subject should be discussed.
* This letter was dated Saratoga, July 7, 1879.
t From Field Glass for September, 1879. By Brevet-Colonel Will-
iam M. Wherry, Captain 6th Infantry.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 117
General Fry's answer has the great merit of reduc-
ing the subject of contention within very narrow
limits, and of clearly stating the only question upon
which there can be any difference of opinion so far as
it is a constitutional or legal question.
The position assumed by General Fry, in his article
in your May number, is restated by him in the August
number, in the following emphatic language: "To as-
sert that two persons command the same force at the
same time involves a contradiction amounting to ab-
surdity. There can be but one commander : all others
must be commanded. Saying that a chosen General
commands the whole Army under the Secretary of
War is admitting what is the fact, that he does not
command it." Is it meant that to command and be
commanded at the same time is an impossibility, " a
contradiction amounting to an absurdity " ? Of course
not. That is the condition in which all comman-
ders, save the President, from highest to lowest, find
themselves at all times. Each commands a certain
force, which force, with its immediate commander, is
also commanded by a superior, and so on up to the
Commander-in-Chief, the President. The relations
between superior and subordinate are essentially the
same throughout.
The law and regulations and the custom of Service
define to some extent the proper scope of functions to
be performed by each of the several grades of com-
manders. But there yet remains a wide range within
which any commander may, in his discretion, exercise
control of the details of military operations or leave
those details to his subordinates. The range within
118
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
which such discretion may be exercised is, of course,
greatest with the Comrnander-in-Chief. Who will
undertake to say exactly what functions of the chief
command he must exercise and what he may trust to
his subordinates ? It hardly need be stated that the
President may, in his discretion, control all the details
of military affairs so far as it is physically possible for
him to do so. But must he do this ? Must he in fact
exercise any of the functions of generalship ? May he
not, on the contrary, limit himself to simply determin-
ing the use that shall be made of the Army, under the
law, that is, the object for which it shall be employed,
and leave to his General-in-Chief the entire conduct of
the campaign ?
Again, because it has been decided by the Supreme
Court that rules and orders publicly promulgated
through him (the Secretary of War), must be received
as the acts of the Executive, does it follow that the
President cannot send his orders to the Army through
any other channel ? Are all laws held to be uncon-
stitutional until the Supreme Court approves them ?
Is the law authorizing the assignment of the General
of the Army to command all the armies unconstitu-
tional ? And did not General Grant so command ?
And was not the President at the same time, in fact
as well as in name, Commander-in-Chief ? Could not
General Grant command the Army, and the President,
by commanding him, also command the Army at the
same time ? What is meant by the proposition, " There
can be but one commander : all others must be com-
manded " ? It must mean that there cannot be at the
same time two independent commanders, for which it is
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 119
believed no one has ever contended. But certainly
there may be, at the same time, any number of com-
manders, each dependent upon and subordinate to the
next superior, and each acting under such orders and
instructions as he may receive from higher authority,
but exercising supreme command within the sphere of
duties left to his discretion.
Thus, to take an extreme case for illustration, there
may be a post garrisoned by a single company, but
with a post commander, superior to the Captain of the
company. In that case, the post commander would
exercise command over that one company as much or
as little as he sees fit, within the limits of the law and
regulations. Just so the Commander-in-Chief may as-
sign the General to command the entire Army, and yet
himself exercise the command so far as he sees fit
under his constitutional and legal obligation.
So also, if Congress sees fit, all the staff departments
may be united under one head, or Chief-of-Staff. Cer-
tainly no one will contend that there may not be one
instead of several Chief s-of -Staff, and that the Presi-
dent or Secretary of War may not command the staff
through that one, instead of as now, through the sev-
eral heads of bureaus. And why, so far as any consti-
tutional question is involved, may not this Chief-of-
Staff and the General-in-Chief be one and the same
person ?
Is there anything in the letter or spirit of the Con-
stitution which makes it necessary for the President
and Secretary of War to give their orders directly to
ten or twelve heads of departments, and to three, four,
or any other number of military commanders ? May
120
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
this not all be done through one chief instead of
through several, if Congress so desires? Would the
President be any the less Commander-in-Chief because
he exercised his functions, as such, through one subor-
dinate than through many ? The error into which
General Fry has fallen seems to proceed entirely from
the fallacy that a man cannot command and be com-
manded at the same time, a fallacy which is exposed
by the universal fact to the contrary.
It is believed that the constitutional question in-
volved in this subject is purely imaginary, and that
there is nothing in the letter or spirit of the Constitu-
tion to prevent the organization, command, and admin-
istration of the United States Army in accordance
with the strict military principles which have been
deduced from the experience of the military nations of
Europe. Army officers are at liberty to discuss this
subject upon the broad basis of principle, that is,
of "the military theory," and to consider how this
military principle or theory may be best applied to
our country and Government, and this not for the
present, but for all time, not under some one Presi-
dent,* as General Fry supposes, but under the Presi-
dent at any time, who, as everybody knows, is chosen
as a statesman, and not as a military chieftain. When
General Schofield wrote on this subject the then Presi-
*The text of General Fry's letter of July 7, as published in the
Field Glass for August, contains the following: "In another part of
Colonel Wherry's article, where quoting from General Schofield, he
says of one ' President ' as compared with the chief ' executive officers
of most other nations, he is pre-eminently a civil magistrate. ' ' But in
the copy in a number of the Field Glass sent to me by General Fry
since the above was written, he has corrected in ink the " one " to read
" our," hence the above remarks and this note. W.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 121
dent was our most eminent soldier, yet General Fry
quotes as if he understood General Schofield to refer
to that " one President."
So far as General Fry's claim that the President of
the United States " is pre-eminently a military magis-
trate " is concerned, it may not be inapplicable to quote
the following from a speech made by the Hon. Mr.
Edmunds, of Vermont, in the United States Senate,
May 9, L879 : "The President of the United States,
by the Constitution, commands it (the Army), not
because he is a military tyrant, or has any military or
divine right to command it, but because he, the chief
civil magistrate of the Union, and not the military
magistrate of the Union, is selected by the Constitu-
tion to command it.
" The Army is not intrusted to the command of a
military officer. It is intrusted to him (the President)
by your Constitution, and beyond your rightful power
to take away ; I say ' rightful power,' I do not know
what will happen. It is intrusted, beyond your right-
ful power to take away, to him as a civil officer to
command it. It is not, therefore, when it is exerted
under his authority the power of the sword per se, but
it is the power of the civil law."
This indicates what is the President's constitutional
duty in reference to the Army, namely, to control and
direct the uses to which it may be put, and not to
command it in a military sense. It is for that reason,
the subordination of the military to the civil, that the
command (that is, the use and direction of it, not the
military control or generalship of its various parts) is.
given to the civil magistrate.
122
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
It must be admitted Senator Edmunds is a constitu-
tional lawyer, and acquainted with what " the framers
of the Constitution meant to do." And his language
is very nearly identical with that of General Schofield,
in his letter quoted in my article, which General Fry
regards as presumptuous.
General Fry begs the whole question when he ad-
mits the President's command of the Army is or has
been exercised by the Secretary of War. If by a Sec-
retary of War, why not by a General ? If he cannot
delegate his authority to a General appointed in accord-
ance with law, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, how can he permit the Secretary, who is
" a civil officer, and whose duties are civil duties," and
" who cannot take the field," who " is not a part of the
Army," to exercise his military functions as Comman-
der-in-Chief ? General Fry claimed, in his first paper,
that " there is one constitutional way in which he (the
President) may be relieved of the labor of continuous
personal command, that is, by having that command ex-
ercised ~by the Secretary of War; not by virtue of dele-
gated power, nor, in fact by any power of his own, but
because his rules and orders, and his only, must be
received as the acts of the President," because the Su-
preme Court had decided that the President's " rules
and orders, publicly promulged through him (the
Secretary of War) must be received as the acts of the
Executive."
And in his letter, in your August number, he so refers
again to that decision, and claims that experience shows
"it is practicable for the President to exercise the
command in a way (namely, by the Secretary of War)
THE COMMAND OF THE AEMY. 123
that the Supreme Court has pronounced constitu-
tional." Now, that decision was not based upon a
question of command at all, and was not intended to
apply to military functions.
The decision of the Supreme Court (15 Peters, 291),
in which the Secretary of War is pronounced "the
regular constitutional organ of the President for the
administration, of the military establishment of the
nation," and which is so often quoted and relied upon
as manifesting the right of the Secretary of War to
execute the military functions of command of the
President, because of the subsequent language of the
decision, " and rules and orders publicly promulged
through him, must be received as the acts of the Ex-
ecutive, and as such be binding upon all within the
sphere of his legal and constitutional authority," was
given upon a case purely administrative and minis-
terial, a case of settlement of money accountability
and claim for compensation for disbursements. And
the decision was upon the right or power of the Presi-
dent, either in his own name or acting "through," his
secretary, to " modify, or repeal, or create anew " an
existing regulation, and denied the right of a subordi-
nate officer to insist upon a prior regulation as govern-
ing when the order for its repeal or modification " was
adopted by the proper authority " that is, the Presi-
dent and by the same authority promulged to every
officer through the regular official organ."
Now, beside the fact that the decision relates to
administrative duties, and not military command, it is
noticeable that the language used by the Supreme
Court throughout treats of the acts as being those of
124 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the President, and only promulgated " through " his
constitutional organ, not the acts of a delegate, deputy,
or alter ego.
In a preceding decision (13 Peters, 513) the same
court had, in reference to another purely administra-
tive act of the Secretary's, used the following lan-
guage: "Now, although the immediate agent in requir-
ing this reservation was the Secretary of War, yet we
feel justified in presuming that it was done by the ap-
probation and direction of the President. The Presi-
dent speaks and acts through the heads of the several
departments in relation to subjects which appertain to
their respective duties. Both military posts and In-
dian affairs, including agencies, belong to the War De-
partment. Hence we consider the act of the War De-
partment in requiring the reservation to be made, as
being in legal contemplation the act of the President,
and, consequently, that the reservation thus made w r as,
in legal effect, a reservation made by order of the
President, within the terms of the Act of Congress."
Now, the Supreme Court having decided that " he (the
Secretary of War) is a civil officer, and all his duties
are civil duties," how would it have been had the
act of the Secretary been a military instead of a
civil administrative act ? The whole decision hinges
upon the fact that the act was one appertaining to the
duties of the department, among which is not the mili-
tary command of the armies of the United States.
It is believed far safer for the President to " dele-
gate " his military command to a General-in-Chief than
to have it exercised by the Secretary of War not by any
constitutional authority, " nor by delegated power, nor in
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 125
fact by any power of his own" but relying upon a de-
cision of the Supreme Court which does not relate to
such functions. And it certainly would be more in ac-
cordance with the teachings of the best military author-
ities.
That the President has the power to delegate such
authority, and to assign the General-in-Chief cannot be
denied, for it is clearly and distinctly set forth in sun-
dry acts of Congress, and most recently in the act re-
viving the grade of General of the Army of the United
States, which reads as follows :
" That the grade of ' General of the Army of the
United States ' be and the same is hereby revived ;
and that the President is hereby authorized, whenever
he shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, a General of the
Army of the United States, to be selected from among
those officers in the military Service of the United
States most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability,
who being commissioned as General, may be author-
ized, under the direction and during the pleasure of
the President, to command the armies of the United
States." (Sec. 1, July 25, 1868, Chap. 232.)
So there is no question as to the power of the Presi-
dent in the case, but there seems to be one as to what
he ought to do. And since the constitutionality of
that Act of Congress has never been questioned, offi-
cers of the Army have a right to accept it in the dis-
cussion of this subject rather than a decision of the
Supreme Court, which does not apply to the question.
General Fry takes issue with me upon the use of the
word " delegate " or delegation, and claims that " it
126
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
does not in the least resemble the assignment to duty
of a subordinate by his military superior." The issue
as made by him is accepted, and his difficulty in this
will be found to be as fictitious and fallacious as the
trouble he has in reference to commanding and being
commanded at the same time.
The powers conferred upon the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army embrace every possible
detail of command respecting the duties of every indi-
vidual in the Army. He may exercise direct authority
in any and every one of this vast number of details, or
he may, as he does in his discretion, confide the vast
majority of these to his subordinates, both commanders
and staff officers. He does this habitually in his as-
signments of officers to command, and in his regula-
tions and orders prescribing what such commanders
may and what they shall do. It is not worth the
while to contend over the meaning of a word, but if
this is not a delegation of the authority of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, then what is it ?
The President reserves to himself the right at any
time to alter his regulations, change his commanders,
or in terf ere directly in any detail of command ; in
other words, to resume at any moment the power dele-
gated to his subordinates, or to control the manner of
their exercise. It is thus, in addition to what uses
authorized by law shall be niade of the Army, that the
President continually discharges the duty imposed
upon him as Commander-in-Chief. The vast majority
of these duties are actually performed by his subordi-
nates, whether they may be called " delegates " or not.
And if the President may confer these powers upon
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 127
twenty different officers, may he not confer them, or a
certain portion of them, npon one, the power so con-
ferred upon one to be exercised over the entire Army,
instead of over only a part of it ? If not, how large or
how small are the parts of the Army over which the
President may assign commanders ?
Again : where do the several commanders derive
the authority which they habitually exercise ? None
of that authority is conferred by the Constitution, and
very little (such as that relating to courts-martial, etc.)
by act of Congress. It is a portion of the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief which he confers
upon his subordinates, but which he may still resume
and exercise in person at any moment if he sees fit to
do so. Is not this a delegation of authority ? Wherein
consists the supposed difference between an assign-
ment to command under certain regulations and in-
structions and a delegation of military authority?
Unquestionably, then, the President may assign one
officer to command all the armies and all parts of the
armies of the United States under his direction and
during his pleasure, but he must assign an officer of
the Army appointed and commissioned according to
law, or he may assign any number of such officers so
appointed and commissioned to command parts of the
Army ; but he cannot assign such duties to the Secre-
tary of War, and in such assignments he delegates to
the officers so assigned his functions, or so much of
them as may be necessary to carry out his will.
The duties of officers, such as relate to courts-mar-
tial and certain duties of some of the staff departments,
defined by special acts of Congress, are to be per-
128 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
formed by authority of law ; all other duties are per-
formed by authority delegated by the President. And
there is nothing in the law preventing the President
from requiring those specific duties confided by law to
special officers from being performed under the super-
vision of a General-in-Chief, whom the law has author-
ized him to assign, so long as he does not take the
performance of such duties from the officers designated
in the laws.*
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. CONTINUED. f
Colonel Wherry desires more information than your
columns or my circumstances will justify me in giving
him in this letter. In his last communication on " The
Command of the Army," he asks some twenty-five
questions ! I find no new arguments to answer. I
thank him for his quotation from Senator Edmunds,
which clearly sustains my conclusion that the President
must command the Army. In my first article, I said
the " actual command " was " lodged irrevocably and
unalterably with the elective civil magistrate." and that
is substantially the ground taken by Senator Edmunds,
as Colonel Wherry quotes him. But the fact that the
highest civil functions and also the highest military
functions are lodged in the President does not impair
his supremacy in both. To deny the President hi* real
military power with a view to leaving that power to
be exercised, .through delegation or otherwise, by " a
chosen General," would destroy the force of Senator
Edmunds' argument as well as defeat the purpose of
* Dated, West Point, N. Y., August 4, 1879.
f General Fry in Field Glass ; dated, Governor's Island, September
9, 1879.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 1 29
the Constitution. The fact that the President is en-
dowed with supreme military power for the very
reason that he is chief civil magistrate does not weaken
the point here made.
Colonel Wherry is catching at straws. Because I
asserted the broad proposition that two persons cannot
command the same force at the same time, saying,
" there can be but one commander : all others must be
commanded," he attributes to me the " fallacy "
foolery, it might be called of holding that " a man
cannot command and be commanded at the same
time " ; and then he demolishes that "fallacy " ; telling
us that " there may be a post garrisoned by a single
company, but with a post commander superior to the
Captain of the company," who " would exercise com-
mand over that one company as much or as little as he
saw fit," etc. I despair of enabling Colonel Wherry
to grasp my meaning ; and it would not be allowing
fair play to the discernment of your readers if I com-
mented for their benefit on such points as the one I
have just quoted, or upon the Colonel's view that the
general principle plainly enunciated by the Supreme
Court that rules and orders publicly promulgated
through the Secretary of War must be received as the
acts of the President, and as such be binding upon- all
within the sphere of his legal and constitutional au-
thority must be restricted to so-called administrative
and ministerial matters, because the decision embrac-
ing the principle was given upon a case of money
accountability. That nothing more on the main ques-
tion is necessary from me is very clear. There is an
old story to the effect that during the Flood a certain
130 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
man made many fruitless attempts to get into the Ark,
and, when finally repulsed, he waded away with the
water up to his chin, remarking, " It makes no differ-
ence, there ain't going to be much of a shower, no
how." Fortunately he was so constituted that he
could take a cheerful view of a difficult situation.
Colonel Wherry seems able to take a like comforting
view of the weighty subject under discussion. After
having for several months wrestled unsuccessfully with
a trouble which, like the waters in the Deluge, grew
deeper and deeper, he at last turns away, remarking,
u it is believed that the constitutional question involved
in this subject is purely imaginary." Under this as-
sumption he abandons it, and proceeds to discuss
numerous other points, leaving the important matter
to the fate of Ginx' baby. I repeat that the points I
maintain are the broad ones distinctly stated in my
first article, namely, that the President is required by
the Constitution to command the Army (not nominally,
nor yet with "fuss and feathers," but actually)', that
Congress has no right to divest him of that duty, and that
he cannot delegate the command to " a chosen General,"
or any one else, but that the Secretary of War is his
" regular constitutional organ for the administration of
the MILITARY establishment of the nation," and may be
used in that capacity to any extent the President deems
best. The points which I especially contest are em-
braced in General Schofield's assertion that "The
President does not command in person ; he delegates
his military command to a General officer who has
been educated, appointed, commissioned and assigned
by him for that purpose. The President's military
THE COMMAND OF THE AEMY. 131
staff thus becomes the staff of his representative the
Commanding General of the Army; . . . the
orders of his chosen General-in-Chief are as much his
own orders as if he gave them in person." I will not
be a party to smothering these points in details and
side issues, nor to clouding them with sophistries ; nor
will I be drawn away from them through the allure-
ments of European systems, or native modern military
theories. As matters now stand, I am quite willing
to submit the case without further argument.
Colonel Wherry again presents the proposition of
having the "General-in-Chief" made " Chief -of-Staff "
of the Army. I have not discussed that proposition
directly. But so far as my argument on the President's
constitutional obligation to command the Army bears
upon the question of the appointment or assignment
of a Chief -of-Staff, it supports the view that the " Gen-
eral-in-Chief " can be nothing more than Chief-of-Staff.
Certainly a Chief-of-Staff can be authorized by law.
Possibly the President can make one by assignment
without further legislation. I know of nothing im-
pairing his power to do so, unless it be the fact that
the office of Chief-of-Staff to the Lieutenant-General,
created by the Act of March 3, 1 865, transferred to the
General by the Act of July 25, 1866, and filled until
March 12, 1869, was formally abolished by the Act of
April 3, 1869. But to convert the " General-in-Chief r
into Chief-of-Staff would not be much more than a
change of name. Whether it would grease the wheels
or not is a question ; it would not materially alter the
machine. The feature in our military system, which
Colonel Wherry and many other good officers are
132
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
trying in fact to remove, is not due to the organization
or behavior of the Army, line or staff, nor to military
grades or titles. It arises from the existence of the
Secretary of War. Their scheme involves the neces-
sity of " wiping out " the Secretary. His office au-
thorized in general terms by the Constitution has
been formally created by law. Various acts of Con-
gress have imposed upon him specific duties in the
military Service. Decisions of the Supreme Court,
and the inherent and imperative demands resulting
from the relations between the Secretary of War and
the President, have, for all purposes affecting the
Army, fastened these two functionaries so closely and
firmly together, that no officer of the Army can, with
any practical advantage to himself or the Service, be
wedged in between them. It was not accomplished
when Grant, as General, was backed by all the law on
the point now in force, and was covered with military
glory. No one acquainted with the war times need
be reminded of the actual command of the Army exer-
cised by President Lincoln through his Secretary of
War, Mr. Stanton, during the Rebellion. Nor, when
Grant had stepped from the head of the army-list into
the White House did he permit his successor as Gen-
eral, to come between him and his Secretary of War.
To abolish the Secretary of War would unquestionably
be very difficult, but the task of establishing between
him and the President a General with independent and
conclusive powers for any military purpose, either ad-
ministrative or executive, is more than difficult it is
hopeless.
Colonel Wherry's letter contains a few things which
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 133
it is proper for me to notice in the way of correction
and u cleaning up," although they are immaterial to
the question under consideration. He says, if I under-
stand him, that a letter from General Schofield, which
he quoted, is regarded by me as " presumptuous." So
far as I know, the assertion is wholly groundless. I
regard and have treated General Schofield as one of
the highest military authorities.
Again, in my letter which appeared in the Field
Glass of August, I am, through a misprint, made to
say " one " President making the expression special,
instead of " our " President making it general. I had
no opportunity to correct the proof, and did not see the
letter in print until the paper, regularly issued, reached
nie in Montreal about the 4th of August. Then I
detected and corrected the error.* To the reader who
examines carefully enough to become a reviewer, the
context, it seems to me, ought to have disclosed the
fact that the printer was at fault. But I did not leave
Colonel Wherry to make the discovery. I sent to him
by letter-mail a corrected copy as early as the 5th of
August. Notwithstanding all of this, he, in the Sep-
tember number of your paper, makes the erroneous
reading the basis of sharp comment as if it had been
correct, and then adds a foot-note confessing that-he
received from me a correction of the misprint. His
excuse for retaining his comments seems to be that his
article was written before he received notice of the
error. He revised the printer's proof of his article, and
that, too, after he received the correction. There was
* The error here mentioned was a misprint, and there is conclusive
evidence that General Fry corrected it as stated. [Ed. Field Glass.
134 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
unnecessary labor, due perhaps to an author's excus-
able love of offspring, in retaining and trying to
explain sharp comments founded upon error, instead
of preventing their appearance by simply striking
them out.
Finally, Colonel Wherry says that when he wrote
his article on " The Command of the Army," which
appeared in your number for July, he purposely
omitted " General Fry's or any oilier person's name, to
avoid personal controversy, and the asperity which
usually belongs to such personal mention." I do not
perceive the necessity for this statement, but finding it,
I may remind the Colonel that, in the article to which
he refers, he quoted from two officers General Scho-
field and myself and that he cited General Schofield
by name. I hope no " personal controversy " will arise
between them on this account. Colonel Wherry's
omission applied to me. I appreciate his motives as
he explains them, but it is a new notion that, in mak-
ing quotations, a writer may, to avoid personal contro-
versy, neglect to credit the author from whom he
quotes especially if, as in this instance, he quotes
from the published writings of two persons, one of
whose names is given. Colonel Wherry overestimates
my sensitiveness. In quoting me he can mention my
name with entire safety. As he has introduced the
subject, I may suggest that, as a rule, in making quo-
tations, personal controversy is more likely to be
avoided by giving authorities than by omitting
them.
With respect and kind feelings for those who differ
from me especially for General Schofield and Colonel
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 135
Wherry I quit this subject, leaving the Colonel a
lady's privilege the last word.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. CONTINUED.*
General Fry, in his last article (of September 9, in
your October number), graciously gives me the last
word. I am not disposed to comment on the tone of
his article, much less to retort in kind.
It is sufficient that he now states the case so as to
leave no ground for discussion. Certainly, it cannot
be contended that the President may lawfully be de-
prived of the actual command of the Army ; or that
the office of the Secretary of War may be, or ought to
be, abolished (" wiped out ") ; or a General-in-Chief
interposed between the President and the Secretary of
War. If this is the proposition with which General
Fry started, it is difficult to imagine why he thought
it necessary to prove it.
A very different proposition, viz.: that a Command-
ing General, General-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff under
both the President and the Secretary of War, and sub-
ject to their direction, might be placed over the entire
Army, line and staff, has been maintained on the one
hand and denied on the other. But, it now seems,
General Fry takes no part in this contention. Hence,
I cheerfully end the discussion, with assurances ' of
respect and kind feelings for General Fry, and regrets
that I failed to see at the start that his labored argu-
ment was designed only to prove the simple and self-
evident propositions with which he closes the discus-
sion.
* Colonel Wherry (West Point, N. Y., October 2), in Field Glass for
November, 1879.
136 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. CONTINUED.*
Your letter of the 2d inst. reached me some days
ago. You adhere positively, yet kindly I am sure, to
your assertion that the " fact of history is diametrically
the reverse " of a certain statement in my pamphlet
on the command of the Army. But you tell me to
"strike out the word diametrically" if I wish. In
my understanding of language, the reverse of a fact is
the same as diametrically the reverse of it. I do not
avail myself of your concession for the reason that it
does not change the meaning of your remark nor re-
duce the force of your contradiction. The statement
in my pamphlet is, " the fact may be recalled that
President Washington in 1794 took the field in actual
command of the militia of Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and Virginia ; and when he relinquished immediate
command, he turned it over to the Governor of the
last-named State." In your letter of October 26,
you say of this, 1st, "It is pivotal to the question "
discussed in my pamphlet, and, 2d, that it is "a serious
error of history that it is diametrically the reverse "
of the "fact of history." I do not regard the incident
as "pivotal" or very important to the question. It
was mentioned, as shown by the terms used, merely
as an example which had arisen by chance under a
rule which, I thought, firmly established by the argu-
ment of the pamphlet. As I look at it, the force of
the argument would not be impaired much, if at all,
by striking out the occurrence. But unimportant as
the statement appears to me in its connection in the
* Letter from General Fry (New York, November 23, 1882), to Gen-
eral H. C. Wayne, published in Journal Military Service Institution.
THE COMMAND OF THE ARM Y. 137
pamphlet, your flat and elaborate contradiction, de-
mands my reasons for making it. You say, " now the
fact of history is diametrically the reverse of this state-
ment. President Washington did not command in
person the militia above mentioned on the occasion
referred to, nor any other militia, nor any other troops
at any time during the two terms of his presidency ;"
and you add in relation to the militia force called into
the Service of the United States to suppress the
whiskey insurrection, " Governor Lee of Virginia was
appointed to the command of this force." In both of
your letters (October 26 and November 2) you
insist that the reader shall " interpret technical lan-
guage according to its meaning and application as de-
termined by our Constitution, military law and Army
Kegulations "; and add that "to inspect troops in no
manner implies command of them in person or ac-
tively." You speak as if the Constitution, military
laws and Army Regulations laid down or "deter-
mined " an exact method for interpreting technical
language. If that were so we should not be engaged
in discussion. But there is no accepted glossary to
the instrument you name. In the case we have in hand
you say Washington did not command " in person."
To be exact in technical terms, I may remind you that
my pamphlet does not say he commanded in person.
It says he took the field in " actual command," and
speaks of his " immediate command," We may be
differing a little about the technical meaning of
" actual," " immediate " and personal command, but I
think by explanation we may understand each other.
As to the facts of history in the case in point, I ob-
138 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
serve that you cite no authority but Sparks. You
admit that President Washington went in person to
the army but you hold that his only purpose was u to
inspect." In relation to his exercise of command you
say, " Sparks settles that question by telling us that
Washington had the intention at one time of taking
personal command of the militia if necessary, but that
he did not do so, but after inspecting them returned to
Philadelphia to be present at the meeting of Con-
gress." Here, on November 2, you accept Sparks
as settling the question, but in your letter of October
26, being at that time unwilling to admit that Wash-
ington ever had even the intention of taking command,
you discredit this same authority by saying, " but Mr.
Sparks gives no authority in confirmation of his inten-
tion, and as it is well known, a mere statement of
intention unsupported by corroborative testimony has
no positive weight." I may remark here that for the
purpose of the argument in my pamphlet, Washing-
ton's intention to take command is quite sufficient
even if he did not carry out the intention. Mr. Sparks
could have been discredited to more advantage on some
of his other statements concerning the whiskey insur-
rection, than upon what he says of Washington's in
tention to take command. For example, he says that
the " Secretary of War " accompanied the President to
the place of rendezvous and that the " Secretary of
War went on with the army to Pittsburgh These are
mistakes. The Secretary of War, Knox, did not ac-
company the President, did not go to the places of
rendezvous at all, nor did he go on with the army to
Pittsburg. Sparks 1 failure to state in the text of his
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 139
Life of Washington that the Secretary of the Treasury,
Hamilton, accompanied the President to the rendezvous
and went on with the army is a grave omission, especial-
ly in view of the active part taken by Hamilton in ike
military 'as well as in the civil business of the expedition.
To return to the main point. You, adopting Sparks,
say, as I understand you, Washington went merely
" to inspect " troops which were already organized and
under the command of Governor Lee of Virginia. I
think you are wrong. Washington himself says in
his message to Congress, November 20 : "I ordered
the militia to march, after once more admonishing the
insurgents." " If the state of things had afforded
reasons for the continuance of my presence with the
army it would not have been withheld." " But every
appearance assuring such an issue as will redound to
the reputation and strength of the United States, I
have judged it most proper to resume my duties at the
seat of Government, leaving the chief command with
the Governor of Virginia."
On the 8th of October (1794), Washington wrote
from Carlisle to General Daniel Morgan saying, " im-
perious circumstances alone can justify my absence
from the seat of Government while Congress is in ses-
sion, but if these, from the disposition of the people in
the refractory counties, and the state of the informa-
tion I expect to receive at the advanced posts, should
appear to exist, the less must yield to the greater duties
of my office, and I shall cross the mountains with the
troops ; if not, I shall place the combined force under
the orders of Governor Lee of Virginia and repair to
the seat of Government."
140 MILITABY MISCELLANIES.
On the 9th of October, being still at Carlisle, he
wrote to Knox, Secretary of War, at Philadelphia,
" it would have given rne pleasure to have you with
with nie," but " it is now too late as we shall be in the
act of crossing the mountains, or I shall be on my
return to Philadelphia, according to circumstances and
the information T shall receive at the head of the line,
before you could arrive." " To-morrow, if I can get
the troops in motion at this place, I shall set out for
Williamsport, thence to Bedford, where about the
18th or 20th, my ultimate measures will be determined
on."
On the 16th of October, he wrote from Cumber-
land, to Randolph, Secretary of State, "I do not ex-
pect to be here more than two days, thence to Bedford,
whence, as soon as matters are arranged and a plan
settled, I shall shape my course for Philadelphia, but
not because the impertinence of Mr. Bache or his cor-
respondent has undertaken to pronounce that I cannot
constitutionally command the Army 'while Congress is
in session"
On the 20th of October, Washington having arrived
at Bedford, decided on the u ultimate measures " men-
tioned in his letter of the 8th to Morgan. He directed
Hamilton to address a formal and lengthy letter of
instructions to Governor Lee which opens by saying :
" I have it in special instruction from the President of
the United States now at this place, to convey to you
on his behalf the following instructions for the general
direction of your conduct in the command of the
militia army with which you are charged." It is
in this letter that the rank of the Governors is an-
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 141
nounced ; Hamilton saying, " it has been settled that
the Governor of Pennsylvania will be second, the
Governor of New Jersey third in command." On the
same day, October 26, Washington addressed a let-
ter to Governor Lee in which he says, " could my fur-
ther presence with them " (the troops) " have been
necessary or compatible with my civil duties, at a
period when an approaching session of Congress par-
ticularly calls me to return to the seat of Government,
it would not have been withheld. In leaving them,
I have less to regret as I know I commit them to able
and faithful direction."
The foregoing extracts afford conclusive proof, as it
seems to me, that wheu President Washington, in
September, 1794, left the seat of Government for Car-
lisle, Williamsport and Bedford, it was not merely " to
inspect " a militia force which was, as you claim, at that
time organized and commanded by Governor Lee of
Virginia. If a doubt could remain on this point it
probably would be removed by what Washington
himself says of his purpose. In the message sent to
Congress after his return he says he " visited the places
of general rendezvous to obtain more exact informa-
tion, and to direct a plan for ulterior movements."
What was embraced in directing a plan ? What in
fact did he do ? I have said in substance that he went
in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the militia
he had called into the Service of the United States, and
that he exercised the actual command of that militia
until he turned it over to Governor Lee of Virginia.
In support of this I cite the foregoing extracts and
will add a few comments. If he was not exercising
142
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
command there would be no meaning in the indigna-
tion with which he spurns Mr. Bache's assertion that he
could not constitutionally command the Army while
Congress was in session, and in his giving reasons for
his return to the seat of Government, which were
not that he was not commanding but, that matters
were arranged and a plan directed so that it was un-
necessary for him to remain with the army. In fact,
Mr. Bache's question about Washington's right to
command could hardly have arisen if the right had not
been exercised.
In his message to Congress, Nov. 20, Washington
says, " f ordered the militia to march," "./put in mo-
tion 15,000 men;" and he distinctly states that it was
" as Commander-in- Chief of the militia when called
into the Service of the United States," that he pro-
ceeded to join the troops. The Constitution appoints
the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States and of the militia when
called into the Service of the United States. He is-
always on duty in that capacity. No assignment or
formal announcement is necessary to the exercise by
him of any command he may deem proper.
As soon as he arrived at Carlisle, he went directly
and actively to work to improve the discipline of the
troops there. They were disorderly, and it was feared
they would burn the town. " To what heights these
heats might have gone if the President had not arrived
so seasonably it is impossible to tell." " Though there
were officers possessed of virtue and experience before
he arrived, yet their authority was not sufficient to
preserve order," etc. " After a short conversation he
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 143
informed us he was just going out about some business
relating to the army, and that after breakfast he was
going to see a division of the army march, but would
converse with us at 10 o'clock that morning." Thus he
was attending in person to army business both before
and after breakfast. " He assured us that he would
provide by dispersing the disorderly corps among bet-
ter troops, or otherwise, that they should be kept in
strict subordination." "Having rode out a few miles
to see some relations, the President was gone out to
the army before we returned." "General Smith, who
commanded the Maryland brigade, complied strictly
with the President's orders in discharging such of the
men as were disorderly." " The President was hap-
pily successful in reducing the licentious part of the
army to subordination," * etc., etc. This certainly in-
dicates the exercise of " actual " and " immediate "
command. The President confirms it by his letter of
October 9, already cited, in which he says, " If /can
get the troops in motion at this place, I shall set out
for Williamsport, thence to Bedford." That he was at
this time actually executing the duties of his military
office is further shown by his letter of October 8 to
Morgan, his letter of October 20 to Lee, and his
message of November 20 to Congress. In the" first
he says, "if imperious circumstances require it, the
less must yield to the greater duties of my office, and
I shall march across the mountains with the troops."
In the second he distinctly contrasts the military du-
ties he was then performing with the " civil duties "
he proposed to resume by returning to the seat of Gov-
* Findley's History of the Whiskey Insurrection.
144 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
ernment. In the third, after giving reasons for his
return from the army, he says : " I have judged it
most proper to resume my duties at the seat of Govern-
ment, leaving the chief command with the Governor of
Virginia." Clearly from this, he had for a time laid
aside his civil duties at the seat of Government, for the
purpose of attending in person to military duties at the
seat of war. And furthermore it appears plain enough
from this that the Governor of Virginia did not have
the chief command of the militia army until the Presi-
dent left it to him by quitting the field. It is true that
Washington is reported to have said at Carlisle that he
did not "command the army in person, but had ap-
pointed Governor Lee Commander-in-Chief." The date
on which he appointed Lee to command in person, or
left him in chief command, is not material in this dis-
cussion. It would seem however that he had not ap-
pointed Lee as late as October 8, for he said in his
letter of that date to Morgan, if not required to cross
the mountains, " I shall " (that is at some future time)
" place the combined force under the orders of Gov-
ernor Lee of Virginia." It seems clear that up to that
date the President was exercising the command him-
self.
The Governors bore the same relation to their respec-
tive forces that the President bore to the whole force.
He and they exercised command on exactly the same
principles. For the purpose of actual military com-
mand he fixed their relative military rank as already
shown. In our discussion, the historical fact of the
President's part in the whiskey insurrection is impor-
tant only as bearing on the principle of command
THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 145
which controls alike the President and the Governors.
Admitting, that at some date not known, the Presi-
dent appointed Lee to command in person, it would
still be true that up to the date of his departure, the
President actually exercised the chief command him-
self. In his letter of October 20 to Lee he says of
the troops : " In leaving them I have less to regret as
I know I commit them to able and faithful direction."
You will observe the force of the present tense of the
verb commit. It seems to me that it was then and
there that the immediate command was relinquished
by the President and turned over to the Governor of
Virginia, just as stated in my pamphlet, and that you
are in error in characterizing my statement as " dia-
metrically the reverse of the fact of history."
Allow me also to say, in all kindness, that the
" brief history " of the whiskey insurrection, given in
your letter of October 26, is defective in making no
allusion to the documents I have cited ; for without
considering them, Washington's part, especially in the
military operations, cannot be fully understood.
A few words as to a general proposition in your
letter and I shall close.
You say "it is not to be supposed that the Chief
Magistrate of the nation shall be qualified to command
in person, an army in the field, or direct the ma-
noeuvres of a naval squadron. Nor is it to be sup-
posed that he could abstract himself from his other
duties, civil and military, to command in person on
land or sea, were he competent to do so. Either sup-
position is an impossibility, and therefore both are in-
admissible."
146 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
On the basis of these assumptions, after we have
had more than a hundred years of experience, you
would transplant from the British military system to
ours, certain features and titles which the founders of
our Government understood and rejected. That Wash-
ington did not entertain the views you express con-
cerning the military functions of the President, is
proved by the foregoing extracts.
It seems to me there is no more unstable founda-
tion for a military system than the assumption that
the actual head of it is incompetent, and if com-
petent would necessarily be unable to perform
his duties ; and so I judge the framers of our Con-
stitution thought, for it is recorded, that " objec-
tions were made to that part of this article by which
the President is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
militia of the several States ; and it was wished to be
so far restrained that he should not command in per-
son, but this could not be obtained"'
Looking from my point of view, the only supposi-
tion admissible is, that the President is qualified for
all the duties imposed upon him by the Constitution.
The/act is the Constitution and laws afford him ample
facilities for the efficient performance of them.
* Luther Martin's Letter to Maryland House of Representatives. El-
liott's Debate on Federal Constitution.
ARTICLE III.
Justice in the Army.*
Justice is absolutely essential to discipline in our
Army. Inasmuch as the military is a more arbitrary
and despotic system than the civil, so is even-handed
justice the more necessary in it. Mercy (which is one
form of favoritism) should not be confounded with
kindness. It implies wrong known both to the offender
and the judge. Justice and mercy are totally incom-
patible. There can be no such compound as justice
seasoned with mercy. The least particle of the latter
destroys the former. In the Army, if not elsewhere,
it is justice, not mercy, that " is twice blessed " ; it
" blesses him that gives, and him that receives " ; and
as justice conveys double blessings, so does mercy
bring double evils. The records of our Army sustain
the assertion that remissions and mitigations of de-
served penalties smooth the way to repetitions of
offences and lead offenders deeper and deeper into
trouble.
But the more common form of favoritism in Army
management does not come under the head of mercy.
Many Army scandals if not attributable to, have been
promoted by, the purer form of this evil. It is a
truism that some men cannot stand prosperity. In
the Army where regularity and strict routine are the
rule, sudden elevation is dangerous, especially when
* Army and Navy Journal, September 22, 1883.
147
148 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
it does not come from established merit. Take for
example the case of .A cadet, he was pro-
moted in 1871 to the grade of 2d Lieutenant. After
less than two years' service in that grade he resigned ;
and without distinction in the Army or out of it he
was in 1876 appointed paymaster with the rank, pay,
and emoluments of Jfcyor, while his classmates who
had served faithfully during the time he was out of
the Army, were still Lieutenants. He could not stand
the sudden and unearned elevation. To him the pay
and emoluments of Major seemed so large compared
with those of his former and proper grade, 2d Lieu-
tenant, that he probably thought they would sustain
any indulgence, even a big game of draw-poker. When
his pay failed he resorted to the public purse to meet
the demands of habits he never would have formed if
he had remained a Lieutenant until he grew gradually
to higher grades. This is no apology for his crimes.
It is merely one of the causes of them.
Colonel -'s case is also in point. He, a young
Major of cavalry, received by a mere stroke of the
pen the rank, pay and emoluments of Colonel, was
transferred from the active service and wholesome in-
fluence of his regiment to Washington City, where he
had little or nothing to do. He, too, became dizzy
and was not able to resist the temptations of his new
and exalted sphere.
Colonel furnishes another example of influ-
ence, or favoritism. He had shown ability and gal-
lantry as a soldier, and had military recommendations
for promotion to the grade of Major in the Adjutant-
Department. But the contest between him
JUSTICE IN THE AEMY. 149
and other officers for that position was decided in his
favor by political influence. The lesson he learned
from concentrating and applying that influence to
secure his promotion, he subsequently turned to such
account that the military powers of the War Depart-
ment were not able even to change his station. He
would not leave Washington, the source of favors.
There, as he is said to have expressed it in a gambler's
figure of speech, he had a seat near the dealer, and
that was an advantage in the game which he was not
going to surrender. Nor did he surrender it. He
held Washington as his station from the time he en-
tered the Adjutant-General's Department by promo-
tion until he left it by voluntary retirement ; and that
was still his residence when he appeared in the scan-
dals which bear his name.
The cure for these ills is not in the hands of the
Army. But united action on the part of officers may
promote remedial measures. There is nothing in
which the Army is more deeply concerned than in the
laws and regulations governing appointments and
promotions and their enforcement. While appoint-
ments to so-called original vacancies are by unre-
strained selection, the law provides that selections for
appointment to the lowest grades in several of the
staff departments shall be made from the Army. The
rule of promotion is that seniority shall govern, but
there are exceptions to the rule, and under these selec-
tion has precedence. There is a growing tendency to
restrict the operation of the rule and increase the ex-
ceptions. This works badly for the Army. Certainly
it is objectionable in a military system to have medi-
150 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
ocrity, especially as it grows old, sit witli all the
weight of the law ou active and aspiring energy and
ability. Promotion based on merit might be of ad-
vantage to the Army, provided relative merit could
be accurately determined and promotion made to con-
form rigidly and impartially to it. But that is impos-
sible in our Service, though in times of great and im-
mediate danger appointments and promotions may to
a limited extent be made safely by selection. With
us, speaking broadly, there is no such thing as promo-
tion by merit. All promotion that is not by seniority
is now, and will continue to be, by favoritism. The
Army's views upon these systems, if clearly expressed,
would no doubt have some weight. It is not easy to
secure the attention to this subject which it deserves.
Comparatively few of our people are willing to con-
cern themselves during the long years of peace with
preparations for war. Only part of those who admit
the necessity for activity in that direction are able to
live up to their convictions. The belief that if war
should come, we shall be able through the intelligence,
patriotism and pluck of the people to provide for it
after it gets in sight, is widespread and sincere.
While the Army is respected for its character and the
services it has rendered, people impressed by the fact
that it is not necessary to our present welfare, do not
realize that its preservation in the highest state of pro-
ficiency and efficiency is necessary as an assurance of
safety in the future.
On the easy and agreeable assumption that we shall
have no more wars, Army offices come to be regarded
as well paid positions, in which there is nothing of
JUSTICE IN THE ARMY. 151
importance to do, and which one man can fill as well
as another. Viewed in this way it is quite natural
that Army offices in time of peace should be used to
the fullest extent of the law, to reward services, po-
litical or personal, rendered by a candidate or his
backers.
The only protection against this eril seems to be in
positive laws requiring promotion (in time of peace at
least), to be by seniority, even to the very top. Some
points concerning corps and arms of service would
have to be considered, but they would give rise to no
practical difficulty. Our liberal and comprehensive
system of retirement would prevent serious injury to
the Service from the occupation of high places by
worn-out or broken-down men. It would be better
for the Army to have majorities in the Pay Depart-
ment filled by promoting the senior Captains in the
line, and vacancies in the captaincies of the Quarter-
master's Department and Subsistence Department
filled by promoting the senior first Lieutenants of the
line, than to have them filled as at present by so-called
selection.
AKTICLE IV.
Law in the Army/
Division and Department commanders have fre-
quently in fact generally, of late retained authority
when beyond the limits of their commands. This has
occurred when absence was, and also when it was not,
on duty, and somewhat regardless of the distance the
commander might go or the length of time he might
stay. There is no doubt that such proceedings have
led, and may continue to lead, to serious embarrass-
ment, and it is clearly in the interest of the public
service that General Gibbon files a temperate and re-
spectful objection to them. But he appears to go too
far in charging that they are a direct violation of the
122d Article of War. That Article says :
"AnT. 122. If, upon marches, guards, or in quarters,
different corps of the Army happen to join or do duty
together, the officer highest in rank of the line of the
Army, marine corps, or militia, by commission, there
on duty or in quarters, shall command the whole, and
give orders for what is needful to the Service, unless
otherwise specially directed by the President, accord-
ing to the nature of the case."
General Gibbon maintains that this Article pre-
scribes the rule of succession in command, not only in
all the organizations of the Army as created by law,
but also in the sub-divisions of the country made by
* See article in the 4th number of the Journal.
152
LAW IN THE AEMY.
153
the President for the welfare of the Service, and for
his convenience as Commander-in-Chief ; and he takes
the extreme ground that absence instantaneously dis-
qualifies the regularly assigned commander, and that,
" the moment he absents himself, the law steps in, and
says " (Art. 122) "that the next in rank 'is the com-
mander? r This broad claim does not appear to be
sustained by the Article quoted. It cannot fairly be
said that the troops posted and habitually encom-
passed within the limits of a geographical department
" happen to join or do duty together " in the meaning
of this Article ; nor can the temporary absence of the
designated Department commander give rise to the
contingency or happening which it is clearly the pur-
pose of the Article to provide for. In fact there is no
statute law requiring the transfer or relinquishment of
command on account of the temporary absence of a
Division or Department commander. The attempt to
correct what threatened to be an abuse is weakened by
presenting the dangerous practice as a violation of any
particular Article of War. The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral has reached substantially the same conclusion that
General Gibbon arrives at on the main question, but
he does so by a process of reasoning, not by alleging a
direct violation of law. He says "the place it is
submitted of the action taken is material to the ques-
tion of a proper exercise of an attribute of command."
But the views of the Judge Advocate General on this
subject have been examined by the Attorney-General
of the United States and overruled. The opinion-
with which General Gibbon was probably not ac-
quainted when he wrote is as follows :
154 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, August 28, 1880.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
SIR : Yours of the 24th instant, asking whether a
Department commander, assigned by the President to
command^ can exercise the functions of his office to
appoint general courts-martial, and act upon the
record of proceedings of the same when he is outside
the territorial limits of his command, has been duly
considered, in connection with Orders No. 26, Wash-
ington, May 18, 1878, in the case of General Kautz,
and Orders No. 9, Vancouver Barracks, Washington
Territory, May 14, 1880, transmitted by you in the
same connection ; and herewith I submit a reply.
The division and subdivision of the territory of the
United States into military divisions and departments
is a matter of discretion for the President, and scarcely
anything, and that indirect and for the present purpose
uninstructive, is to be found upon the subject in the
statutes. Orders making such geographical divisions,
and assigning officers to their commands, are also very
brief, and throw no special light upon the present
question.
In the absence of special orders or legislation to that
effect, I am of opinion that personal presence within
the territorial limits of his Department is not essential
to the validity of commands given by a Department
commander to be executed within such limits such,
for instance, as the appointment of a court-martial.
The question which you put, is general, as regards
the absence in question, so that my answer is neces-
sarily general also. Whether there may be exceptions
IAW IN THE ARMY. 155
to it growing out of special circumstances attending ab-
sence, can be best determined when those circumstances
arise. But I see no reason why mere absence should
have the effect of invalidating such commands.
The distribution of military command into geograph-
ical departments, is, as I suppose, mainly for the pur-
pose of preventing collision and confusion, and so of
securing individual responsibility in the execution of
commands by officers otherwise of like authority.
Practically, such collision is to be apprehended rather
in execution than in exercise. It seems, therefore, that
the place of the action taken is material to the question
of the proper execution of command rather than to that
of its proper exercise. In the analogous cases of civil
authority, the incident of geographical limits for its
execution has not, in the absence of special features,
been considered to require, ex. gr., judicial orders to be
issued by a judge only whilst within such limits. In
order to render this necessary, something else must
concur to indicate the will of the constituting au-
thority. The ground of this opinion is that there is
present here nothing else to indicate the will of the
President or other proper superior authority, that the
functions of commanding officers should be so limited.
In the meantime, the arguments in its favor are such
as are for consideration only by the power having leg-
islative or quasi legislative control of the question (i. <?.,
by statute or by order).
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILIPS, Solicitor- General.
Approved. CHAS. DEVENS, Attorney -General
156 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
This leaves nothing more to be said at present on
the law of the subject. As the legal authority of a
Department commander is not necessarily impaired
by his temporary absence, of course he may exercise
that authority through his Adjutant-General as usual ;
and General Gibbon's argument that by doing so the
law is violated and a junior (the Adjutant-General)
is put in command of a senior, falls. But this does
not fully dispose of the practical questions involved.
The Attorney- General admits that there may be ex-
ceptions "growing out of special circumstances attend-
ing absence." It is in relation to these that lines
should be drawn. It would not do to have an officer
in a department or division assume that he was next
in rank, and then assume command every time he
heard the regularly assigned commander was across
the boundary. That would be replacing one bad
practice by another involving more mischievous con-
sequences. Nor can it be admitted that the responsi-
bility devolves on the next in rank merely because
the commander on whom the President has placed
that responsibility steps over the line. Such a shift-
ing of authority and responsibility would be a wrong
not only to the Service but to the officer next in rank.
That officer could not fairly be held accountable for
military operations far beyond his observation and
about which he might have no information, and for
administrative affairs which he would, in most cases,
be without the facilities for managing. This becomes
the more apparent when we consider the vast areas
covered by our geographical departments, and recall
the fact that the troops in some of them frequently
LAW IN THE ARMY. 157
occupy regions and operate on lines which have no
regular communication with one another. It is no
doubt partly to meet this condition of things that the
President assigns commanders of Departments, puts
their headquarters at suitable points, and gives them
the necessary staff for the performance of their duties.
On the other hand when it is known from absence
or any other cause that orders purporting to be those
of the commander do not, and cannot, emanate from
him, his troops should not be expected to obey them.
This brings us to the auxiliary argument in General
Gibbon's article. It is in relation to the validity of
orders promulgated by a staff officer in the name of
his commander. He discusses at length a case grow-
ing out of contested orders in the Department of the
Columbia, the commander being absent with the sanc-
tion of the General of the Army, who said to him :
"Let the Assistant Adjutant-General run affairs as
usual, referring to General McDowell's action such
matters as are requisite." The question here is as
stated above, the one of long standing, as to the force
of orders promulgated by an Adjutant- General in the
name of his commander. This question may arise
when the commander is within, as well as when he is
beyond, the limit of his Department. There never has
been, and probably never will be, an act of Congress
settling it.
General Gibbon maintains, when a Department
commander who is beyond the limits of his command,
issues orders through his Adjutant-General, that the
Adjutant-General is thereby, and in violation of law,
put in command of his seniors in rank.
158
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
That way of putting the point appears to cloud the
main issue. No one in the Army advocates or at-
tempts putting a junior in command of his senior. If
the orders were, or purported to be those of the
junior, there would be no difficulty. They would be
disregarded, and the junior, if not treated more se-
riously, would be laughed at. The trouble in the
matter under consideration arises from the very fact
that the orders purport to be, and with rare excep-
tions, are in fact, those of a common superior the
regularly assigned commander. The Duke of Wel-
lington said : " Every staff officer must be considered
as acting under the direct orders and superintendence
of the superior officer for whose assistance he is em-
ployed, and who must be considered responsible for
his acts. To consider the relative situation of general
officer and staff in any other light would tend to
alter the nature of the service, and in fact to give the
command of the troops to the subaltern staff officer
instead of to the general officer. If Lieutenant -
has conducted himself improperly, Major-General
is responsible, and Colonel - - has no more right to
notice the deficiencies of Lieutenant in the per-
formance of his duty toward Major-General - - than
the Major-General has to interfere in a matter of
detail between the respective officers and the barrack-
master. . . ."
The principle thus announced by the Iron Duke in
1827 has, by the custom of Service acquired among
us the force of law ; and the rule is that any order,
written or verbal, not palpably illegal, that the Adju-
tant-General of a command promulgates in the name-
LAW IN THE ARMY. 159
of the General commanding is binding on all within
the sphere of the General's authority, the Adjutant-
General being responsible only to his commander, and
the commander being in turn responsible to his
superior for the Adjutant-General as well as for the
rest of the command,
It is the evil of orders issued by Deparment com-
manders when they are absent that doubts arise as to
whether they are in fact the orders of the commander.
He who disobeys them does so at his peril. He may
turn out to be right, but he incurs a heavy burthen of
proof, especially in these times when railroads and
telegraphs enable such rapid and full communication
between the absent commander and his staff at head-
quarters. To prevent all doubt and embarrassment
whenever the absence of a Division or Department
commander is to be such as to disqualify him for
command, he should be formally relieved and a suc-
cessor assigned. Recent orders making temporary
assignments in the absence of regular Department
commanders indicate a return to this course. It
must, as a rule, rest with superior authority to decide
when the occasion has arisen for such changes in
command of divisions and departments. Too much
latitude in either direction indicates not violation of
law but faults of administration. While the man-
agement of Army affairs must be strictly legal, it
should at the same time be practical. Much of our
military legislation is loosely drawn and every year
brings more skill in the art of construction. Army
statutes have become martyrs to it. They are now
liable to almost as many interpretations as they con-
160
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
tain words. The unwritten law alone escapes. The
practices of a well governed military establishment,
when hardened into "customs of Service "make the
soundest and plainest laws for the internal affairs of
an army. They are the experience of years speaking
to the soldier in the vernacular. We have such cus-
toms and we cannot be construed out of them. The
more they are respected and cherished the better.
ARTICLE V.
Obedience in the Army and Navy.
A communication in one of the Washington papers
says that " very intelligent gentlemen " advance the
doctrine that the duty of a soldier is " blind obedience
to every order of his superior officer, lawful or unlaw-
ful." " If," says the writer, " such opinions as these
are held by gentlemen of intelligence not in the Army
or Naval Service, what can be expected from the
officer or the private soldier, the best part of whose
life has been passed in strict obedience to rigorous
military discipline ? " We protest against the assump-
tion that less knowledge on this point is to be expected
from officers and men in the Army and Navy, than from
very intelligent gentlemen not in them. Prompted by
duty as well as by interest, those in the public service
have made themselves quite well acquainted with this
important subject.
The Article of War which enjoins obedience by sub-
ordinates to all lawful commands of superiors is
familiar to the Army. The difficulty is in the appli-
cation of it. An illustration of this is given in the
columns of the very issue which contains the com-
munication we are considering. A commanding officer
ordered a Lieutenant of his command not to visit the
sutler's store. The Lieutenant, after careful considera-
tion of the subject, positively declined to regard the
order as legal, and on that ground disobeyed it. He
161
162
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
was tried, found guilty, sentenced to forfeit fifty dol-
lars of his pay 'per month for four months, and to be
severely reprimanded in General Orders. The finding
and sentence were approved by the reviewing author-
ity. The Lieutenant was acquainted with the Article
of War ; but failed in the application of it to his own
case. It is in disposing of the questions which arise
under the law, that the man in the Service encounters
difficulty.
What is meant by lawful commands ?
Is the person commanded to judge in all cases of
the lawfulness of the commands ?
If not, in what cases, or class of cases, is the com-
mander the judge of the lawfulness ?
In these last-mentioned cases, if there be such,
would the law military protect the subordinate in dis-
obeying an unlawful command ?
When is it right to obey unlawful commands ?
Whether to him who gives an unlawful command,
to him who executes it, to the two jointly, or in what
degree to each, responsibility should attach, are ques-
tions of deep concern to the public service and to the
community.
These are some of the questions with which the
military service has to deal, not theoretically alone,
but practically. The soldier is not enabled to solve
them by being told simply, that he, like the private
citizen, is bound to obey the laws of the land. With-
out undertaking to discuss these questions seriatim^
we present some remarks and authorities bearing upon
them.
Responsibility must attach to somebody for viola-
OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY. 163
tion of law. There is a formidable array of authori-
ties in support of the view that the illegal command
of a superior is not in the eye of the common law a
justification for the unlawful act of a subordinate.
But the rulings are generally coupled with explana-
tions and reservations which greatly restrict their
operation in practice. Then, again, there are argu-
ments and authorities directly in support of the oppo-
site view. Whether a command is lawful often de-
pends on circumstances with which the superior is
acquainted but of which the subordinate is ignorant.
The limits of authority are not determined by written
law. Whatever is necessary for the maintenance of
military discipline falls within the scope of military
authority. " The soldier forfeits that portion of his
civil rights which would interfere with the discipline
of the army/' says Burke. u He is bound," says
Clode, " to obey and to give his personal service to the
Crown under the punishments imposed upon him for
disobedience by the Mutiny Act and Articles of War.
No other obligation must be put in competition with
this ; neither parental authority, nor religious scruples,
nor personal safety, nor pecuniary advantages from
other service. All the duties of his life are, according
to the theory of military obedience, absorbed in that
one duty of obeying the commands of the officers set
over him." By a principle inherent in the system,
the subordinate position held by the person to whom
a command is addressed, forbids the presumption that
lie may decide whether or not the thing commanded is
necessary for the maintenance of discipline. The
person who gives the command is recognized as the
164
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
one who has the means of deciding as to its necessity,
and to him attaches the responsibility of deciding
correctly. Whatever the right to give an order may
be, the right to disobey cannot be founded on the fact
that the thing commanded is not a usual or recognized
subject of a military order ; for circumstances in the
knowledge of him who gives the command may bring
within the sphere of military authority that to which
it would not ordinarily extend. While members of
the military and naval service are bound by a solemn
oath to obey all lawful orders of their superiors, they
are not sworn to disobey unlawful ones. Disobedience
of unlawful orders is left entirely to the discretion of
the actor in each particular case, subject to approval
or punishment as may be subsequently adjudged. In
all cases where there is the least doubt as to the law-
fulness of orders, the moral obligation of the oath
calls for obedience. Obedience to unlawful orders is
often not only justifiable, but highly meritorious.
This is shown by the readiness and unanimity with
which indemnity laws are passed for the protection of
those concerned, and by the public approval and favor
sometimes shown to the most conspicuous actors in
disobedience. The Act of March 7, 1867, and the
fame acquired by General Dix for his order to shoot
on the spot any man who attempted to haul down the
American flag, are cases in point.
It is in consideration of the moral obligations of his
oath, and of the requirements of that discipline with-
out which the military service would not only fail in
the purpose for which it is maintained, but would be-
come a vexation to the community, a danger to the
OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY. 165
Government, and a menace to freedom, that the best
authorities have expressed themselves so pointedly in
support of rigid obedience. As for example :
" So general is the rule, that the orders of a superior
shall be imperative on the military inferior, that it
will admit not of exception, unless in the instance
when the orders, or more accurately speaking, the
things commanded to be done, are directly repugnant
or contrary to law. In the case, only, when the orders
would afford no legal excuse in a court of law for the
act committed under them, can the inferior question or
hesitate to obey the commands he receives from his
superior ; such as if he were directed, in a moment of
delirium by his officer, to fire on a peaceful and
unoffending bystander, or, if such a thing could be sup-
posable, to plunder the property, or to commit, or as-
sist in committing some personal injury on a fellow
subject. It is only then in orders, which, if executed,
would effect some palpable outrage against moral or
religious obligations, which all laws profess to regard,
and which cannot be superseded by the partial regula-
tions of a particular society, that soldiers can hope for
indemnity, in resistance of the commands of a superior.
And, even then, when the alternative is between
two offences, and the choice must be determined by
the adoption of the less, instead of the greater ; of the
disobedience of command, or of the commission of some
outrageous civil or military crime ; the responsibility
will always be upon the inferior, and in this case a
dreadful responsibility, to show, that the commands,
which he would otherwise be bounden to obey, are
manifestly and palpably illegal ; else he may involve
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
himself in the guilt, and certainly in the penalty of a
positive crime, under the supposition or pretence of
avoiding an imaginary one.
". . . Prompt, ready, unhesitating obedience, in
soldiers, to those who are set over them, is so neces-
sary to the safety of the military state, and to the suc-
cess of every military achievement, that it would be
pernicious to have it understood, that military diso-
bedience, in any instance, may go unquestioned. . . .
"Except in the solitary instance, when the illegality of
an order is glaringly apparent on the face of it, a mili-
tary subordinate is compelled to a complete and un-
deviating obedience to the very letter of the command
received.
". . . Hence it is scarcely possible to imagine a
case, where a subordinate officer would be at liberty to
depart from the positive command of his superior."
(Samuel's " Law Military.")
". . . And the true and practical intent and
meaning of this appears to be that so long as the or-
ders of a superior are not obviously and decidedly in
opposition to the well-known and established customs
of the Army, or to the laws of the land ; or, if in op-
position to such laws, do not tend to an irreparable re-
sult; so long must the orders of a superior meet prompt,
immediate, and unhesitating obedience. It surely can-
not accord with justice to render a soldier responsible,
even in courts of civil judicature, for an illegal act re-
sulting from the execution of an order, not in itself so
glaringly opposed to all law, as for its illegality to be
apparent without reflection or consideration : hesitation
in a soldier is, in certain circumstances, a crime ; and
OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY. 167
hesitation is inseparable from reflection and considera-
tion ; reflection and consideration, therefore, ivlicn tend-
ing to question the order of a superior, must, in some
sense, be considered as a military offence" (" Simmons
on Courts-martial.")
" Obedience to command is the chief military virtue,
in relation to which all others are secondary and sub-
ordinate ; and disobedience is reckoned among the
principal military crimes, and is justly liable to the
most exemplary punishment. So general is the rule,
that the orders of a superior shall be imperative on the
military inferior, that it will not admit of exception,
unless when the orders, or the thing commanded to be
done, are directly contrary to law. An inferior officer
may at times be reluctant to execute an order which
he may think to be illegal, afraid alike of the responsi-
bility of refusing and the risk he may run by obeying,
should any damage be done to property, etc. But, in
such a case, the officer giving the order will be an-
swerable for the legal penalties." (Hough's "Prece-
dents on Military Law.")
" ' It would,' said the late Sir Robert Peel, < be ut-
terly impossible to maintain discipline if soldiers were
allowed to be political partisans, correspondents to
newspapers, or members of political clubs. Then in-
deed a standing army would be in truth a curse then
they (the House of Commons) might bid farewell to
liberty.' He denied the truth of the doctrine that ' a
soldier continued to enjoy all the rights of a citizen.'
It was clear that l he must forfeit that portion of his
civil rights which would interfere with the discipline
of the army.'
168 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
" One thing, however, is clear, and the language in
which the rule has been laid down by the Supreme
Court of the realm, when applied to the combatant
branches 4 of the army, is terribly emphatic. ' A sub-
ordinate officer must not/ even to save the lives of
others or his own life (how much less the public treas-
ure), 'judge of the danger, propriety, expediency, or
consequences of the order lie receives he must obey
nothing can excuse him but a physical impossibility?
And the same learned judges (Mansfield and Lough-
borough) went on to declare, l that the first, second
and third part of a soldier is obedience.' The doctrine
of this case has never been disputed in the common
law 7 courts, and it is the essence of the military sys-
tem.
"The distinctive feature of our military allegiance
is that of implicit obedience. ' We have not,' to quote
the words of Mr. Burke, already used, i distracted our
army by dividing principles of obedience ; we have
put them under one single authority.' In acting,
therefore, against the civil community under military
orders, what intervening sanction between the Sover-
eign and the military officer does the law require, to
make the order as between the officer and the civil
community a lawful order, and one to be implicitly
obeyed by him ? The answer to this question is sug-
gested by the words of a great soldier. ' Soldiers/
wrote the late General Sir Charles Napier, t must obey
the King, and the King acts by the advice of his min-
isters. If in his name they order the soldiers to do
wrong, let the minister's head pay the forfeit ; with
that, the soldiers have nothing to do beyond taking
OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY. 169
care, when guarding the scaffold, that no man impedes
the executioner in the functions of his calling.' Un-
questionably, therefore, the authority of a responsible
minister is needed to give constitutional validity to
orders for the action of the military in matters affect-
ing the civil community. When the command of the
Sovereign is communicated to the military officer
through the channel of his responsible minister, the
remedy, when sought by legal proceedings, civil or
criminal, must (it is submitted), be rather against the
minister giving than against the officer honestly obey-
ing the command." (Clode's " Forces of the Crown.")
" Military obedience is the result of reflection, not of
blindness; and is invariably found to be most perfect
among the most civilized nations. . . . It is wrong
to give trifling orders, but right to obey all orders."
(Sir Charles Napier.)
"If an individual ratifies an act done on his behalf,
the nature of the act remains unchanged ; it is still
a mere trespass, and the party injured has his op-
tion to sue either. If the Crown ratifies an act, the
character of the act becomes altered, for the ratifica-
tion does not give the party injured the double option
of bringing his action against the agent who com-
mitted the trespass, or the principal who ratified it ;
but a remedy against the Crown only (such as it is),
and actually exempts from all liability the person who
commits the trespass." (Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch.
R, 166, Parke, B.)
The Lord Chancellor, in 1853, said in the House of
Lords :
" It was the duty, in case of a riot, for every one of
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
her Majesty's subjects to exert himself singly, or in
combination, to stop that riot especially with the least
possible violence. That applied equally to soldiers as
to all other persons placed in a position that enabled
them to stop a riot. What effect had that upon the
position of soldiers? It imposed it upon them, or
rather upon those who commanded them, as an impera-
tive duty, that they should interfere on such an occa-
sion. ... It was impossible to define the limit
when the orders of a commanding officer were or were
not fit to be obeyed. It was the duty of the soldier to
obey Ms officer and to do that with the least possible
cost of life or limb."
The Earl of Darlington said that " every man who
was a military man was bound to obey the orders
given him, let those orders be what they might.
(' No ! No ! ') He begged pardon ; he spoke as a
military man, and he would still say it was his duty
to obey the orders of his superior officer. It was
perfectly true a man might receive an order which his
superior officer was not justified in giving, but it was
the man's duty to obey that order in the first instance,
and afterwards to obtain redress"
The Earl of Stratford said :
" A standing army and military law has, my Lords,
been always inconsistent with the liberties of the peo-
ple. The officers and soldiers under such a regulation,
are always obliged to give the most implicit obedience
to the commands of their superior officers; they must
observe and execute the orders they receive without any
reserve or hesitation ; they must not inquire whether
their orders be according to the law ; if they do they
OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY.
are guilty of mutiny, and may be immediately shot for
any such disobedience."
Mr. Napier, Attorney- General of Ireland, at the time
of riot, said (in the Six-mile Bridge case) : " Though
the soldiers, in point of military discipline, were bound
to obey the order of their officer, that mere order of it-
self would not furnish a justification of the act of the
soldiers in a court of law. " Sir John Elley said in the
same debate : " Did the House wish the army to be-
come a deliberative body ? If they did, where was
their boasted discipline ? The duty of the British
soldier was to obey the order of his commanding offi-
cer, and not to argue the propriety of his command."
" While subordinate officers and soldiers are pausing
to consider whether they ought to obey, or are scru-
pulously weighing the evidences of the facts upon
which the Commander-in-Chief exercises the right to
demand their services, the hostile enterprise may be
accomplished without the means of resistance. If a
superior officer has a right to contest the orders of the
President upon his own doubts as to the exigency
having arisen, it must be equally the right of every
inferior officer and soldier ; and any act done by any
person in furtherance of such order would subject
him to responsibility in a civil suit in which his de-
fence must finally rest upon his ability to re-establish
the facts by competent proofs. Such a course would
be subversive of all discipline, and expose the best
disposed officers to the chances of ruinous litigation."
(Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton, 19. U. S. Supreme
Court.)
" ' It is a general and sound principle,' said Spencer,
172
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
J. (in Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johnson R., 150),
i that whenever the law vests any person with the
power to do an act, and constitutes him a judge of
the evidence on which the act may be done, and, at
the same time, contemplates that the act is to be car-
ried into effect, through the instrumentality of agents,
the person thus clothed with power is invested with
discretion, and is, quoad hoc, a judge. His mandates
to his legal agents, on his declaring the event to have
happened, will be a protection to those agents ; and it
is not their duty or business to investigate the facts
thus referred to their superior, and to re judge his de-
termination. In a military point of view, the contrary
doctrine would be subversive of all discipline, and as
it regards the safety and security of the United States,
and its citizens, the consequences would be deplorable
and fatal '
" Except in a plain case of excess of authority, when
at first blush it is apparent and palpable to the com-
monest understanding that the order is illegal, I can-
not but think that the law should excuse the military
subordinate, when acting in obedience to the orders of
his commander. Otherwise he is placed in the danger-
ous dilemma of being liable in damages to third par-
ties for obedience to an order, or to the loss of his
commission and disgrace, for disobedience thereto.
. . . 4 The first duty of a soldier is obedience,'
and without this there can be neither discipline nor
efficiency in the Army. If every subordinate officer
and soldier were at liberty to question the legality of
the orders of the commander, and obey them or not
as they may consider them valid or invalid, the camp
OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY. 173
would be turned into a debating school, where the
precious moment for action would be wasted in wordy
conflicts between the advocates of conflicting opin-
ions. . . . Nor is it necessary to the ends of jus-
tice that the subordinate or soldier should be respon-
sible for obedience to the illegal order of a superior.
In any case, the party injured can have but one satis-
faction, and that may and should be obtained from
the really responsible party the officer who gave the
illegal order. I am aware that in civil life the rule is
well settled otherwise, and that a person committing an
illegal act cannot justify his conduct upon the ground
of a command from another. But the circumstances of
the two cases are entirely different. In the latter case
the party giving the command and the one obeying it
are equal in the eye of the law. The latter does not
act upon compulsion; he is a free agent, and at liberty
to exercise his judgment in the premises. Personal
responsibility should be commensurate with freedom
of action to do or refrain from doing. For acts done
under what is deemed compulsion or duress, the law
holds no one liable. In contemplation of law, the
wife is under the power and authority of the husband.
Therefore, for even criminal acts, when done in the
presence of the latter, she is not held responsible.
The law presumes that she acted under coercion of
her husband, and excuses her. If the law excuses the
wife on the presumption of coercion, for what reason
should it refuse a like protection to the subordinate
and soldier when acting in obedience to the command
of his lawful superior?" (McCall v. McDowell, 1
Abbott, 212. Deady, J.)
174
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
The Constitution of the United States vests the
President with certain executive functions, in the
exercise of which he has absolute and unlimited discre-
tion. Amongst the most important of these functions
are those of Commander-in-Chief. They must neces-
sarily be exercised through the medium of subordinates
to whom the same discretion extends, but their aces are,
in such cases, his acts; their discretion, his discretion.
(Pomeroy's "Constitutional Law," p. 422.) When the
President acts within the sphere of his constitutional
powers as Commander-in-Chief, in the exercise of that
absolute discretion which belongs to him, he acts in a.
quasi judicial capacity, and the subordinate cannot
assume the power of disobeying his mandates on the
ground of their illegality. The responsibility rests-
with him, and may be tested by impeachment.
As to this question of responsibility, it may, in
brief, be said that the vindication of public justice
and private rights does not make it necessary that
both the person giving the order and the one obeying
it should be held responsible. They would, except
in the case of a flagrant violation of law, be satisfied
if the responsibility be fixed with either the one or the
other. Now, although as a general rule, a command
cannot be pleaded as a defence for an illegal act, it i&
believed that a military command does not ordinarily
come within the rule, because it is not reconcilable
with the law of the land, which as a protection to
the people as much as for any other reason makes
implicit and unhesitating obedience the duty of the
soldier. But it is reconcilable with this law, as well
as a sufficient safeguard to the community and reason-
OBEDIENCE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY.
able in itself, that the one who commands rather than
the involuntary agent, should be responsible.
" If one person makes use of another, who is a mere
instrument, to do any act, the thing done is the act,
not of him who is merely the instrument, but of the
person who uses him as such instrument." (Ilott v.
Wikes, 3 Barn, and Aid., 315.) " The justification of
the soldier in obeying it (the order) would be, first,
under the rule of the common law, that an inferior,
in an ordinary criminal case, must be held justified in
obeying the directions not obviously improper or
contrary to law of a superior officer, that is, if the
inferior acted honestly upon what he might not unrea-
sonably deem to be the effect of the orders of his super-
ior ; and, secondly, under the Mutiny Act and Articles
of War." (Clode's "Military Forces," Vol. II, p. 151.
See also cases there cited.)
The writer, whose communication furnishes the text
of this article, closes his argument in favor of dis-
obedience of unlawful commands by referring to u the
New Orleans usurpation, and the Charleston enor-
mity," and then warns " gentlemen of the Army and
Navy " to keep their " hands off the national legis-
lature." It is generally conceded that the Army has
behaved in the South with remarkable prudence and
wisdom. Orders have in no case been disobeyed.
The responsibility rests with those who gave orders,
not those who executed them. If these orders have
violated specific laws, or public justice, there are
direct, available modes of proceeding against the
responsible parties; and we do not doubt that these
parties are quite willing and ready to accept and
176
MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
answer the responsibility. Except in its more im-
portant bearing upon the discipline of the Service,
the question of obedience or disobedience is a personal
one affecting the individual citizen or soldier, and not
the nation at large. If ever the liberties of this
people are so far jeopardized as to rest upon dis-
obedience of unlawful commands issued by superiors
to their subordinates in our little Army, they will be
already lost, whether the commands be obeyed or
disobeyed.
ARTICLE VI.
Justice for the Army.*
The Array, persevering in the trial and conviction
of its guilty members, is at last receiving that support
which is necessary to its purification. The Secretary
of War is earnestly co-operating in the detection and
prosecution of offenders, and the President is approv-
ing the findings of courts-martial and executing their
sentences without partiality, favor, or affection. The
Military Committee of the Senate is said to be opposed
to legislative reinstatement of dismissed officers, and
the public press of the country is aroused. It cannot
be denied that recent exposures make us appear badly,
but it will be remembered that more is heard of de-
linquents in the military than in other professions, for
the reason that they are publicly tried by the profes-
sion itself, and are chargeable with many offences
common to all walks of life but punishable only among
soldiers. In other words, while soldiers live under
the general code, they are in addition under an exact-
ing special code. All their wrong-doings are exposed.
All the sins of the people's military service are open
to the people's scrutiny. In judging the Army the
public is not likely to forget that many unworthy men
were put into the regular service through political
influence at the close of the war, and many such have
been appointed since through the same influence. The
*Army and Navy Journal, August 25, 1883.
177
178 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
Army is not responsible for the appointment of bad
men, but it is accountable if it does not proceed
against them as soon after appointment as their con-
duct calls for it. That has been done at all times con-
sistently and conscientiously.
The Army would be culpable if it showed any dis-
position to keep unworthy officers in its ranks or to
protect them from exposure and punishment. But not
being responsible for their appointment, and doing all
in its power to expose and expel them, it ought to be
credited with its open and vigorous efforts to purify
itself. It is not chargeable with demoralization for
containing bad material which it did not select and
which it is doing all in its power to get rid of. The
Army's efforts for its own purification have been seri-
ously interfered with. The interposition of higher
authority in favor of offenders has been so frequent
since the war, especially from 1876 to 1880, as to be
a great injury to the Service. Many of the evils which
have been exposed recently are fairly chargeable to
executive and legislative reversal of Army action.
The New York Herald, of Jan. 21, 1881, contained
important facts on this point. It gave a list of cases
in which sentences of courts-martial were mitigated
or set aside and gross offences condoned by President
Hayes. It said that "Mr. Hayes might justly be
called the promoter of intemperance in the Army and
the friend and defender of wrong-doers." " Up to the
present time," said the Herald, " out of sixty convic-
tions for gross offences, most of them involving ex-
treme cases of drunkenness on duty, only nineteen
have been confirmed by him, while forty-one have by
JUSTICE FOR THE AEMY. 179
his personal order been so mitigated as to retain the
offending officers in the Army." The Herald then re-
cited the sixty cases, giving the names of the officers,
their offences and sentences.
The offences condoned included drunkenness on
duty ; misuse, and misapplication of public property ;
selling pay accounts on several occasions for the same
month to different individuals; violation of a solemn
pledge ; conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle-
man, with specifications too gross, vulgar and profane
for republication ; extreme cruelty to enlisted men
and gross and most indecent blackguardism and pro-
fanity towards them and fellow-officers ; assaulting a
fellow-officer who had but one arm, striking him a
severe blow in the face and calling him a liar ; gross
cruelty to sick enlisted men, causing the death of one
and imperilling the lives of several ; riding in uniform
in a carriage with a private soldier and two notorious
prostitutes, and drinking with them, and carousing
until handcuffed and taken to jail. Of the last case,
the Herald says the offender " had been appointed
from civil life the year before and his restoration was
due solely to political influence." How could the
Army purify itself when the Executive pronounced
such men fit to be kept in it ! When the strong - cur-
rent of military justice is dammed by the authorities
set over tlie Army, stagnant pools are formed which
breed scandal, fraud, disobedience, dissipation and
disgrace, sometimes even among those educated for
the Service. The Army itself damns its culprits, but
never dams the steady stream of military law.
ARTICLE VII.
The Honor of the Army.
The New York Sun in its issue of April 24, 1881,
gives a list of " Army officers charged, tried, convicted
and dismissed by court-martial since 1867." The Sun
parades this list as " a very bad record for the boasted
honor of Army officers," and adds, " There is no other
profession or branch of business in which such a large
proportion of its followers have been found unfaith-
ful and unworthy." This assertion is unjust to the
military profession. There would be some founda-
tion for it if the unworthy officers composing the list
had been kept in the Army. But that is not the case.
It is a list of men who have been ejected. To settle
the account fairly the President and Senate may be
charged with putting these men into office and the
Army credited with thrusting them out of it. The
list shows the vigor and persistence of the military
service in purifying itself since the close of the re-
bellion. Accepting the Sun's list as correct, the fol-
lowing table gives actual numbers and percentages
for each year :
No. of Commissioned No. Dismissed by p .
Officers in Service. Court-Martial.
In 1868 2,988 26 .87
In 1869 2,988 28 .93
In 1870 2,277 22 .87
In 1871 2,287 12 .52
In 1872 2,264 12 .52
In 1873 2,263 12 .52
180
THE HONOR OF THE ARMY. 181
No. of Commissioned No. Dismissed by p ow . , n t nn
Officers in Service. Court-Martial.
In 1874 2,253 10 .44
In 1875 2,204 15 .68
In 1876 2,168 6 .27
In 1877 2,151 14 .65
In 1878 2,157 6 .27
In 1879 2,153 5 .23
In 1880 2,155 7 .32
In 1881. . r 2,155 3 .13
When the legal, medical and other professions shall
have proceeded as vigorously and openly in purging
themselves as the Army has, and when merchants,
bankers, brokers and even newspapers have done the
same, we shall be better able to judge whether it is
true of the Army "that there is no profession or
branch of business in which such a large proportion
of its members and followers " are in fact unfaithful
and unworthy. The military service is governed by
stringent Jaws and rules not applicable to other pro-
fessions and branches of business. It is a merit pecul-
iar to that service that the "unfaithful and unworthy "
are not only u found," but are legally and publicly
tried and condemned by the profession itself and are
promptly and adequately punished in all cases, except
those in which the Executive clemency is interposed.
A list of dismissals affords a bad record for the honor
of the officers included in the list, but as proof that
the Army finds and casts out the unworthy members
the record is certainly a good one for the " boasted
honor" of the Army itself. World, May 16, 1881.
ARTICLE VIII.
A Military Court of Appeals.
Colonel Lieber, Judge Advocate, is one of the best
authorities on military law. He holds that military
obedience " can only be enforced by prompt punish-
ment ; that the recognition of this has led to a depar-
ture from the ordinary forms of trial, and to the build-
ing up of a new system for the very purpose of having
one sufficiently summary in its nature; that in carrying
out this object, a common law, military, has grown up
of necessity, to a large extent, at variance with the
common law, civil," etc. ; that u military law is founded
upon the idea of a departure from the civil law and
should not become a sacrifice to principles of civil
jurisprudence at variance with its object"; that "the
fundamental principle of a code of military punish-
ments is the enforcement of prompt obedience by prompt
punishment" and he adds: " Because we have made
progress in the amelioration of punishment, we must
not, however, jump to the conclusion that this includes
delay in its execution." . . . " The admission of
new features favoring delay is inconsistent with the
object," etc.
These propositions admit of some explanation or
qualification. They do not justify the conclusion that
the efficacy of military punishment depends on its
promptness alone. The claim in favor of promptness
is, of course, based on the assumption that the finding
182
A MILITARY COURT OF APPEALS. 183
is correct. The proceedings of courts-martial should
be sound as well as summary. Inasmuch as the mili-
tary is a more arbitrary and despotic system than the
civil, so is uniform and even-handed justice the more
necessary in it.
The claim in favor of prompt punishment is a claim
for prompt proceedings and true findings. The amel-
ioration of punishment is due to progress in enlighten-
ment. Promptness in military punishment is a feature
designed to increase the exemplary effect by adding to
the terror of the infliction. But in the Army as well
as out of it, government through terror is gradually
yielding to the control of a higher sense of justice.
Promptness must now submit to all the delay which
legally constituted authority finds necessary to the
ascertainment of truth according to the highest lights
of the time. It is not so important that the punish-
ment be prompt as that it be inevitable. That, nowa-
days cannot be, until guilt is clearly established. The
practical question, therefore, is : What shall be the
procedure to attain this end ? Colonel Lieber says :
" Military law, like other sciences, is progressive. It
is not a stagnant pool. But it has, by virtue of its na-
ture, been to a large extent progressive within its own
sphere independently of others."
The science of Military Law is progressive, and so is
the science of Civil Law in a greater degree and in a
larger field. If progress in the science of civil law has
brought to light principles or modes of procedure
which are essential to the ascertainment of truth, they
could not be " at variance with the objects of the Mili-
tary Code,*' and they ought to be applied to it. Any
184 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
lack of promptness in punishment which might result,
would be outweighed by the increased chance of cer-
tainty of just punishment.
It is probably in deference to a deeply-seated con-
viction that all available means of ascertaining truth
are not invariably resorted to by courts-martial that
their findings and sentences are so often interfered
with by the legislative and executive branches of our
Government. The President and Congress are the
only sources of appeal in such cases. They often re-
ceive evidence which satisfies them that the findings of
courts-martial are not just. The fact that the proceed-
ings were summary and the punishment prompt, is
usually a point in favor of the complainant, and thus,
promptness on the presumption that it has interfered
with justice tends to defeat the good effect which it
is designed to secure. The certainty of punishment is
overthrown by doubts which might be forestalled by
less promptness. Cases are reopened which were sup-
posed to be closed, and are retried by tribunals with-
out legal power and without judicial modes of pro-
cedure. This is probably more injurious to the Ser-
vice than less promptness and unquestionable judicial
proceedings would be.
During the past eighteen months, bills or resolu-
tions have been introduced in the U. S. Senate or
House for the restoration of about thirty-six officers
of the Army who have been dismissed by sentences
of courts-martial. There are now on the rolls of the
Army eight officers who were dismissed by sentences
of courts-martial, and after remaining out of service
for some time, were re-instated by special Acts of
A MILITARY COURT OF APPEALS. 185
Congress, and eight similarly dismissed who were
reinstated or reappointed by the President. These
facts suggest the inquiries: Is not the progress of
military law kept rather too closely " within its
own sphere " for our Republic, by continuing to re-
gard our ordinary courts-martial as courts of final
jurisdiction in cases of sentences to death, or dismissal
of officers ? Could we introduce to advantage a Su-
preme Court-martial with final jurisdiction in such
cases, by appeal from lower tribunals of military
justice ?
Congress can " raise and support armies," and
"make rules for the government of the land and
naval forces."
Courts-martial are what Congress chooses to make
them under this provision of the Constitution. At
present they are regarded as courts of final jurisdic-
tion, but they are not so in fact. Appeals from them
are entertained, as already stated, both by the execu-
tive and legislative branches and by both are their
findings set aside. Not only this, but after courts-
martial have been dissolved, new tribunals (as in the
Hammond and Fitz-John Porter cases) have been con-
stituted, for the purpose of rehearing questions long
before settled by defunct courts. In the light of these
facts the question is repeated, would it be wise and prac-
ticable for the law-making power to create a Military
Court of Appeal and final jurisdiction in the cases
which the Articles of War now require shall go before
the President for confirmation ?
One of the earliest codes of war, if not the first
formal code, was that published to his army by Gus-
186
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
tavus Adolphus in 1620, and printed in English in
1639 in Ward's " Animadversions of Warre." Among
its articles creating courts-martial, is one establishing
a military court of appeal. It is in the following
terms :
"151. All questions in like manner happening
betwixt officers and their souldiers, if they suspect
our lower court to be partiall any way, then may they
appeale unto our highest court who shall decide the
matter."
As this article was abandoned long before our day,
it of course could not be offered as a strong argument
in support of introducing now a similar practice to the
one it prescribed. But it is the purpose of this paper
merely to present a subject for consideration not to
advocate it. The old article is therefore quoted for
what it is worth, with the remark that the abandon-
ment of a liberal measure in the armies of Europe is
not sufficient proof that it would not suit our Service
if given a fair trial.
To render the change under consideration effect-
ive, it would be necessary to transfer by law to the
Supreme Court-martial the power to confirm sentences
which the Articles of War now confer on the Presi-
dent.
" For the general safety," Macaulay says : " A
summary jurisdiction of terrible extent must in camp
be entrusted to rude tribunals, composed of men of
the sword." In view of this, the Articles of War con-
tain severe and specific penalties for the grave offences
of soldiers. For some, death, and for others, dismissal
is the penalty fixed by tlie laiv. The discretion of
A MILITARY COURT OF APPEALS. 187
courts-martial in those cases is limited to the question
" Guilty or not guilty ? " Dealing with the one matter
of dismissal (which it is the aim of this article to treat),
we find that it is required by the law, in case of any
officer who takes a bribe, who knowingly makes a
false muster or a false return, who is found drunk on
guard, party, or other duty, who is guilty of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and so on with
several other offences. Stringent provisions in the
Articles of War, and rigid enforcement of them are
necessary to prevent insubordination which would not
only destroy the usefulness of the Army, but might in
critical times, endanger the public freedom.
The purpose of the law to preserve the discipline
and purity of the Service is shown not only by the pro-
visions which require that unworthy officers be thrust
out, but is clearly exhibited in the 3d Article, which
makes it a dismissable offence for any officer to bring
unworthy men into the ranks by enlisting intoxicated
persons, deserters from the military or naval service,
or any person who has been " convicted of any infam-
ous criminal offence." It is doing quite as much vio-
lence to the policy of the law to retain or reappoint
an officer guilty of being drunk on duty, as it is to en-
list an intoxicated man as a private soldier.
A good deal of complaint is made of the power exer-
cised by the President in remitting or mitigating sen-
tences of dismissal which go before him for confirma-
tion as required by the 106th Article of War, which
says : " In time of peace, no sentence of a court-martial,
directing the dismissal of an officer, shall be carried
into execution until it shall have been confirmed by
188
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the President." All the power to mitigate which the
Commander-in-Chief has, as such, is conferred and reg-
ulated by Congress. It is more restricted in the Ar-
ticles governing the Army, than in those governing the
Navy, and is distinct from the constitutional pardon-
ing power of the President. In illustration of this, a
case of dismissal from the Navy may be mentioned in
which the Attorney-General of the United States said ::
" It is not necessary to go into consideration of the na-
ture or extent of the pardoning power conferred upon
the President by the Constitution, because the whole
question in this case may be regarded as fully disposed
of by the Act of Congress approved on the 23d day of
April, 1800, entitled ' An Act for the better govern-
ment of the Navy of the United States.' By the 42d
Article it is provided that ' the President of the United
States, or when the trial takes place out of the United
States, the commander of the fleet or squadron, shall
possess full power to pardon any offence committed
against these Articles after conviction, or mitigate the
punishment decreed by a court-martial.' The sen-
tence in the present case, of dismissal f ro7n the service,
was punishment decreed by the court-martial ; and
the power of the President to mitigate this punishment
was as full and ample as Congress, by any act of leg-
islation in the most unrestricted terms, can confer"
(op: V.,p. 43.)
The court-martial record, in case of dismissal in the
Army, goes before the President in his capacity of Com-
mander-in- Chief, and, under the 106th Article of War,
he acts on it in that capacity, though the act is a judi-
cial one; "The powers and duties of the President as.
A MILITARY COURT OF APPEALS. 189
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy [says Tif-
fany in his work on " Government and Constitutional
Law "] are separate and distinct from his powers and
duties as the simple executive head of the nation.
Neither of those functions of the presidential office
derives any strength from the other."
In all ordinary cases military commanders who have
power to approve and execute sentences, have power
to remit or mitigate them, but dismissal forms an ex-
ception. Here the 112th Article of War steps in and
says : " Every officer who is authorized to order a gen-
eral court-martial, shall have power to pardon or miti-
gate any punishment adjudged by it, except the punish-
ment of death or dismissal of an officer"
This gives rise to a question whether strict construc-
tion of the 106th Article, in connection with the 112th
just quoted, does not require the Commander-in-Chief,
as such, merely to confirm or not confirm in those cases
where the law limiting the power of the court to say
guilty, or not guilty has specifically fixed dismissal
as the penalty, and where the purpose of the penalty
is so important and so clearly set forth. If he con-
firms the sentence it would seem that his power
over the case as Cornmander-in-Chief ends, and the
offender stands dismissed by the law. But just -here,
in practice, another authority comes in. It is the par-
doning power of the Chief Executive ; and notwith-
standing the fact that the powers and duties of the
President as Commander-in-Chief and as Chief Execu-
tive are separate and distinct, they become mixed in
the cases under consideration, and we find such records
as the following in relation to an officer sentenced to
190 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
dismissal for drunkenness on duty and conduct unbe-
coming an officer and a gentleman : " The President 17
(as Comniander-m-Chief) " approves the proceedings,
findings and sentence, but is pleased " (no doubt as
Chief Executive with the pardoning power) " to com-
mute the sentence to suspension for one year from
rank and command and from pay, except $50 per
month." It will be remembered that if a sentence of
dismissal from the Army is confirmed by the Corn-
mander-in-Chief, the law intends to dismiss the ac-
cused, and it denies to the Commander-in-Chief, as
such (112th Article), the power to mitigate. The
President is required by the Constitution to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed." The law
says that in such a case as the one just quoted the
offender shall be dismissed. But the Constitution
gives the Chief Executive the power to pardon, which
includes partial pardon, or mitigation.
Tiffany says : " The propriety of pardoning a crim-
inal after he has been convicted of a crime against the
public has been seriously questioned by learned and
able men." (" Tiffany on Government and Constitu-
tional Law," page 332.) " The legislative authority
which creates an offence or crime and announces its
penalty can repeal or modify the law at pleasure ; can
excuse the delinquent upon such conditions as it sees
fit to impose. But this authority has its foundation
in prerogative, not in executive power. It can be exer-
cised by the Sovereign, not by the mere Executive"
(Ibid.) " If the operation of the law is to be sus-
pended, it is the province of the law-making authority
to suspend it, not of him who is entrusted with the
A MILITARY COUET OF APPEALS. 191
exercise of mere executive powers, with the authority
attendant to reprieve or pardon those who are con-
demned and put into his hands to receive the pen-
alty." (Ibid.)
But, on the other hand, the U. S. Supreme Court
has decided in relation to the pardoning power, that,
" This power of the President is not subject to legis-
lative control. Congress can neither limit the effect
of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class
of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy re-
posed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative
restrictions." (Ex-parte Garland v. Wallace, K. 333,
380.)
And Pomeroy says : " Is any legislative action
needed to aid the President, or can any legislative
action restrain him in the exercise of his function ?
Plainly not. Pardoning is clearly a kind of executing,
not of making laws. As far as authority is conferred
upon the Chief Magistrate, it can neither be extended
nor limited by Congress. A statute passed to give
construction to the Constitution, and to confine its
operation to particular classes of pardons, would be a
palpable usurpation of the judicial functions. Thus
an Act of Congress which should take away the Pres-
ident's power to grant constitutional pardons, or to
grant pardons before trial, would be absolutely void."
("Pomeroy on Constitutional Law," page 465.)
It is manifest that the President finds it impracti-
cable in the cases we are considering to exercise both
constitutional functions take care that the law re-
quiring dismissal is faithfully executed, and after-
wards, if he is so inclined, apply pardon to so much
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
of the punishment as pardon may be able to reach.
In this view of the position in which the President is
placed, we are brought back to the question ; Would
it be well for the law to transfer the confirming power
to a Supreme Court-martial, and leave the President
to exercise, in these cases, merely the constitutional
pardoning power ? In the present system in which
power to confirm is given to the President by law,
and power to pardon by the Constitution, his duty as
Comniander-in-Chief, and his duty as Chief Executive
are not only commingled, but too much prominence
and facility seem to accrue to the pardoning branch.
Every case of dismissal going before the President as
Commander-in-Chief for confirmation is by that very
fact as part of the trial under the law thrust upon
his attention as a question of pardon under the Con-
stitution. In this respect the offender against the
military law has a better chance to escape punishment
than the offender against the civil law, notwithstand-
ing it is admitted that the just punishment of the for-
mer should be more prompt, severe and certain than
of the latter.
It is true that the power of Congress and the Presi-
dent's pardoning power would exist with a Military
Court of Appeal, just as they do without it, but the
temptation and the opportunity to exercise these
powers would be materially reduced. Moreover, the
rights of the accused must be fully weighed. The
sentences of dismissal awarded by courts-martial are
sometimes wrong. While the President's pardoning
power, or an Act of Congress, may prevent some of
the consequences of the wrong, neither the President
A MILITARY COURT OF APPEALS. 193
nor Congress can proceed judicially in ascertaining
the truth, nor can they rectify the wrong. That could
-only be done fully, on ascertainment of truth through
a judicial tribunal, created and empowered for such
cases. Do we need one ?
The sentence of dismissal (with which we are deal-
ing, as the matter of practical importance) is blasting
in its consequences. It involves loss of profession,
loss of pay, and loss of reputation. The same " rude
tribunal" which has had final jurisdiction of it for
centuries, has it still. Yet, as we are told, and admit,
" Military law is not a stagnant pool. Within its
own sphere it is progressive." Will that progress
justify the establishment of a Military Court of Ap-
peal as a remedy for the evils which have been indi-
cated ? Would the remedy be worse than the disease?
Military punishment should be prompt, but it must be
just. Taking things as they are in our Service would
delay in final action in cases of dismissal be increased
or reduced, by having a Court of Appeal, with all the
finality of jurisdiction that law could confer upon it?
Neither the legislative nor the executive branch of the
G-overnment is disposed to violate its trust in the ac-
tion of which we hear so much complaint concerning
dismissals. They merely grope for justice, which -such
a tribunal as that under consideration might make so
clear as to prevent their interference, or at least so
probable as to give them good grounds for declining
to interfere.*
* Now as to the court-martial question alluded to by Senator Harri-
son in referring to the appeals to him. It must be remembered that a
court-martial must consist of thirteen members and its findings be ap-
proved by the President. I am quite willing to see a court of appeals
194 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
on courts-martial established. It would settle a great many vexed
questions and give a legitimate channel for subsequent operations in-
stead of those who make the laws being told the findings are all wrong
by some fellow working up his own case on ex-parte statements. Gen.
Sherman's remarks to graduating class at West Point, June 12, 1882
(Neiv York Herald).
The Times of to-day, in an editorial headed "Gen. Swaim's Case,"
points out with clearness and force the ' ' juggling of words ' ' by the
court-martial when it substituted "wrong" for u fraud." "This,"
you say, ' ' is quibbling unworthy of a judicial body, most of all a court-
martial." That is quite true, but it should be borne in mind that
courts-martial do not belong to the judicial system, and are not in fact
judicial bodies. They are founded on the constitutional power of Con-
gress to " raise and support armies," and " make rules for their govern-
ment and regulation," and are created as provided by the Articles of
War, not by laws concerning the judiciary. They are not designed to
violate the principles of justice, but to secure the most rigid and sum-
mary enforcement of them. They are, however, merely instruments
which the law authorizes military commanders to use as their auxilia-
ries in establishing and maintaining discipline, good order, etc. , in the
land and naval forces. From the nature of these tribunals and the fact
that they are composed of officers taken in turn or by chance, without
regard to their qualifications for such service, it is not strange that the
judicial mind of the country is sometimes amazed and horrified at their
judgments in important cases. Extraordinary as their judgments are
in some instances, it has been held by high authorities that the findings
of courts-martial are final. The sounder view, it seems to me, is that
they are final only in the sense that there is no appointed tribunal to
which it is expressly provided an appeal can be taken. Neither Con-
gress nor either branch of it can properly assume to be a court of ap-
peal and revise to acquit or revise to convict a man tried by court-mar-
tial ; but there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in the decisions of
the courts, nor in the terms or policy of the laws which forbids the
Government to correct a manifest and flagrant wrong involved in the
sentence of a court-martial. If, for example, the court-martial should,
through a mistake of identity, sentence the wrong man to be shot, his
execution would not be imperative because the judgments of courts
martial are technically final. Permit me, further, to file an exception
to a statenlent by the President in his remarks upon the Swaim case.
Regarding the vacancy in the Army which Swaim's displacement from
his present office would create, the President says : ' ' The constitutional
power of the Executive in filling vacancies cannot be restricted to indi-
A MILITARY COURT OP APPEALS. 195
viduals." No one has ever contested the right of Congress to regulate
promotions in the Army by virtue of its constitutional power to ' ' make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. ' *
It is a fact settled by the courts, by the executive and legislative de-
partments, and by custom that a promotion in the Army is an " ap-
pointment." Regulating promotion by law is nothing less than re-
stricting the President to individuals in filling vacancies in the Army.
It is a right Congress always has exercised and always ought to exer-
cise.
JAMES B. FRY, United States Army.
NEW YORK, Feb. 25, 1885.
N. Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1885.
ARTICLE IX.
An Elastic Regular Army.*
The subject of reorganizing the Army has been un-
der consideration for years and is yet pending in Con-
gress. The discussion has brought forth a variety of
opinions on minor points, but it is admitted on all
hands that our companies now contain so few enlisted
men as to make it impossible for them to perform
efficiently their current duties, and keep pace with the
progress of the military profession. This defect is
aggravated by the fact that the companies are scat-
tered among many stations ; but even if the number of
posts should be reduced it would not be removed.
The companies are too small to work upon effectively
for purposes of military instruction. The only remedy
is to increase the number of enlisted men in each com-
pany. But instead of being willing to increase the
strength of the Army, Congress has evinced a dispo-
sition to reduce it, and has emphatically refused to
oarry the aggregate beyond the twenty-five thousand
men at present authorized.
The problem, therefore, of augmenting the strength
of the companies admits of but little manipulation.
As the number of men for the entire Army cannot
be increased, the number of companies must be re-
duced. When this reduction in the number of com-
panies is made, and the strength of each is increased
* Tfie Field Glass, September, 1879.
196
AN ELASTIC EEGULAB ARMY. 197
in a corresponding ratio, it makes no material differ-
ence in the instruction of the troops, or the perform-
ance of their duties, either in peace or war, whether
the companies are thrown into regiments of ten com-
panies or into battalions of four companies.
When the War of the Rebellion broke out in 1861,
the infantry in our regular army consisted of ten regi-
ments of ten companies each. The exigency of public
affairs necessitated an increase of this force, and, at
the instance, mainly, of Major-General McDowell, the
increase was made by creating nine new regiments of
infantry, each regiment consisting of not less than two
nor more than three battalions, each battalion consist-
ing of eight companies, thus introducing the form of
organization proposed at present by the advocates of
an elastic system.
These nine regiments remained in service with the
above-described organization until 1866. That is to
say, we had during the entire civil war ten regi-
ments of infantry, of ten companies each, under the
present regimental plan of organization, and nine
under the battalion organization now proposed for re-
adoption.
As these battalions continued from the beginning
to the close of the war, there is good reason to" sup-
pose that their particular form of organization was
fairly tested. It probably received no special favors,
but was simply tried upon its merits. The result was
that when the Army was reorganized in 1866, the bat-
talion plan was abandoned without a protest or mur-
mur, and the entire infantry force was remodelled on
the former, and present, regimental non-elastic basis.
198 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
The subject, however, of battalion organization has
recently been brought again into notice.
There has certainly been nothing in our own expe-
rience since its abandonment in 1866 to afford proofs
of the wisdom of returning to it now. The fact that
it is in use in foreign services has been brought into
prominence by officers who have recently travelled
abroad, but that was well known to us when we
adopted the battalion organization in 1861, and as-
suredly was not forgotten when we discontinued it in
1866. The present effort to return to it is not made
upon the ground that it will affect in any important
way the present duties of the troops, but results from
the assumption that it will make the regular army so
elastic as to fit it for expansion to meet the demands of
war, and for contraction to accommodate itself to the
requirements of peace.
It is, therefore, proper to consider the subject in the
light of that anticipation. First, let us see what is
proposed by the so-called " Burnside Bill," which is
the product of a Joint Commission of the two Houses,
and which may be regarded as the plan of those
officers who advocate an elastic regular army.
We now have twenty -five regiments of infantry,
each regiment having ten companies ; ten regiments
of cavalry, each with twelve companies ; and five
regiments of artillery, each with twelve companies ;
making in all two hundred and fifty companies of
infantry, one hundred and twenty of cavalry, and
sixty of artillery.
The " reorganization " proposes that there shall be
eighteen regiments of infantry, each regiment to have
AN ELASTIC REGULAR AKMY. 199
four battalions of four companies each ; eight regi-
ments of cavalry, each to have four battalions of four
troops each ; and five regiments of artillery, each to
have four battalions of four companies each. The
third battalion of each regiment to have its officers,
but no enlisted men, and the fourth battalion to have
neither officers nor men. In other words, the " reor-
ganization " provides for one hundred and forty-four
companies of infantry, sixty-four of cavalry, and forty
of artillery, fully officered and manned ; seventy-two
of infantry, thirty-two of cavalry, and twenty of artil-
lery, with officers, but no men, and a like number of
companies as these last, with neither officers nor men.
While the third battalion is a legal skeleton, the
fourth is merely the shadow of a skeleton. It cannot
have any substance without a law permitting it. In
other words, Congress is asked to pass a bill author-
izing some future Congress to make a law for increas-
ing the Army, and prescribing how the increase shall
be made. Such legislation would seem rather unnec-
essary, and would probably be fruitless. The proposed
bill would, in the infantry, entail an increase in the
present establishment, of officers for two companies to
each regiment, and in the cavalry and artillery it
would retain at the public cost a surplus of officers
for four companies to each regiment ; thiis making
surplus one hundred and eight officers of infantry,
ninety-six of cavalry, and eighty of artillery, to be
maintained at large cost to await emergencies. Judg.
ing from experience, the probabilities are that a law
creating a surplus which might not be needed for the
regular duties of their offices, would speedily be fol-
200 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
lowed by another abolishing it entirely, even though
the supernumeraries might be performing special du-
ties by detail.
What are the ultimate purposes for which it may
be assumed that these additional battalions in the
elastic army are to be called out and applied ?
First. There are the ever-present hostilities with the
Indian tribes on the frontiers. The elastic system can
scarcely be necessary in this connection, as the best
authorities agree that danger from Indians is rapidly
decreasing from year to year. The frontiersmen, un-
der the protection of the Army, are spreading over the
whole Indian country, east and west of the Rocky
Mountains, and as they become firmly settled and
united, the necessity for affording them military pro-
tection will continue to diminish. There would seem
to be no use therefore in creating an expansive army
system for this purpose.
Second. Is it for the suppression of internal disor-
ders and riots ? It is generally admitted to be the
duty of the States, not the General Government, to
suppress internal disturbances ; but, granting for the
moment that the regular army should be organized so
as to admit of expansion for this purpose, it needs no
argument to show that elasticity would be of no use
here. Riots and disorders usually arise suddenly, and
as suddenly collapse. A little reflection, even if we
had not had experience, would demonstrate the im-
practicability, almost impossibility, of expanding the
Army by enlisting, organizing, arming and equipping
companies after a riot is started, or even foreseen, in
time to be of any use in quelling it. The memorable
AN ELASTIC KEGULAR ARMY. 201
labor riots of the summer of 1877 burst forth unex-
pectedly, and rose in a few days to a terrible mag-
nitude, but were on the decrease long before new troops
for the regular army could by any possibility have
been raised to suppress them.
Third. The only other purpose is a foreign war.
This, presumably, is the main object of the proposed
elastic system. But will the expansion to the utmost
limit allowed by the proposed plan be of any practi-
cal service in this connection ? To fill the third bat-
talion of each regiment (which is to be ready with its
officers, but no men) would only make an addition of
25 per cent, to the present force of 25,000 men, and a
further increase, if a law should be enacted author-
izing it, by filling the fourth, or paper battalion, -would
simply double the present force, and give us an army
of fifty thousand men.
At the close of the AVar of the Rebellion we had a
million of men in arms, and even with the large forces
in the field at all times, it was found impossible to
end the war speedily. We have no reason to suppose
that a war entered into by us with a foreign power
would not be of the same magnitude as other contests
of modern times.
The principle in war that in order. to achieve speedy
and satisfactory results, large bodies of troops must
be massed, and placed quickly in the field of action,
was never of more practical value than at present.
The elastic scheme proposed, giving us only fifty
thousand men of all arms, would fall far short of meet-
ing this requirement.
Its insufficiency is only too apparent when consid-
202
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ered in connection with the chances of a foreign
war.
But, after all, and here is the essential point, there
is no way of securing enlisted men for the proposed
elastic army when a necessity for expansion arises.
Without attempting to convince by argument, a little
reflection will show that in order to insure certainty
in filling the ranks of a large regular army, it would
be necessary to resort to compulsory service, or in
other words, the draft. But that measure, obnoxious
as a final resort, would be actually impossible as a pri-
mary or preliminary one. The first effort to enforce
upon the citizen military service in the regular army
would arouse a public sentiment that would compel a
call for the national forces, as contemplated in our plan
of government, and as has heretofore been done. In
fact, there is no other way by which we could carry on
a great war, and our experience from 1861 to 1865
sufficiently developed the fact that the plan of calling
out the national forces, and using the regular army,
mainly for organizing, supplying and instructing them,
and generally for leavening the whole lump, is the
best for our purpose.
The system of an elastic regular army is applicable
to a nation in which every male is born into the mili-
tary service, and can only absent himself from the du-
ties pertaining thereto, even to attend to the ordinary
pursuits of life, when, and for as long a time as the
sovereign pleases. Such a system is wholly unsuited
to our Government, and to our people in their present
condition.
So far as the United States are concerned, the ad-
AN ELASTIC REGULAR ARMY. 203
vantages of an elastic regular army, such as lias been
proposed for ours, are purely theoretical. The diffi-
culty of expanding, so as to grapple with sudden
emergencies, would, as suggested in the foregoing re-
marks, be very great ; but the difficulty in that direc-
tion would be no greater than in the opposite one of
reduction, after an increase had once been made. Con-
gress has, especially since the close of the Rebellion,
had much experience on this point, and should be fully
able to estimate the magnitude of the effort necessary
to effect a reduction of the Army. Justice to those
who render great services' in time of war, coupled with
the various personal questions which arise, makes this
a grave matter. There is no more difficult and painful
task than to dispose of the crop of ^heroes left by war.
The Government has the power to reduce the Army
at pleasure without any regard to the wishes, feelings,
or positions of those vitally interested, but it will be
conceded that sudden and frequent expansions, fol-
lowed by similar reductions, of a regular army, would
be very injurious to, if not entirely destructive of, its
military spirit. Slow promotion in a standing army,
though discouraging, is bearable, but occasional set-
backs with uncertainty of tenure are fatal.
ARTICLE X.
Admission to the Military Academy.*
In Peace prepare for War is a maxim as old as war
itself. It is expressed in the Fable of the Boar
quietly whetting his tusks, with no enemy in sight.
Ward, in his "Animadversions of Warre," as early
as 1639 heads a chapter, " It is good in time of peace
to provide for warre " ; and*, having established that
proposition, he follows with a chapter entitled "Of
the things necessarily to be provided ; and first, of
1 victuals.'' ' Evidently he believed, as has since been
said, an army moves upon its belly.
We attach peculiar importance to the maxim, be-
cause the Father of his Country transmitted it to us.
But to provide " victuals " beforehand was not the
preparation Washington had in mind. He deemed
military education a duty of peace ; and in 1793 rec-
ommended the creation of means " for the study of
those branches of the art " (of war) " which can
scarcely ever be attained by practice alone." The
Military Academy grew out of the necessity which he
experienced during the long struggle for freedom ; and
for many years past that Institution has been supply-
ing with remarkable success the demands for high
military education which from time to time have been
made upon it. There is no national institution of any
description that has fulfilled its purpose better, or is-
* Journal of Military Service Institution, 1883.
204
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 205
more creditable to its various managers than the U. S.
Military Academy.
It is with due deference to this fact that it is pro-
posed to discuss the examination for admission to it as
now conducted by the authorities. There are but two
statutes on the subject of the qualifications of candi-
dates. Section 3, Act of April 29, 1812, says: "Each
cadet previously to his appointment by the President
of the United. States shall be well versed in reading,
writing and arithmetic." This was the whole law
upon the subject until 1866. The Academy itself,
long prior to 1866, had been finding fault with the
quality of the material admitted under the statute of
1812. It desired that the standard for admission
should be raised, without, however, raising the stand-
ard of graduation. In other words, it was desired
that the candidate should have more education to get
in, but that the graduate might go out with about the
same amount as formerly. It was not the purpose of
the Academy, however, to escape its duty of giving a
thorough education, or even to lessen its own labor.
The aim, no doubt, was to secure pupils who, on ac-
count of their advanced preparation, would be more
likely to master the military course and turn out the
most accomplished graduates.
In 1866 it was enacted (by joint resolution of June
16, Section 2) that " in addition to the requirements
necessary for admission, as provided by Section 3 of
the Act making further provision for the Corps of
Engineers, approved April 29, 1812, candidates shall
be required to have a knowledge of the elements of
English grammar, of descriptive geography, particu-
206
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
larly of our own country, and of the history of the
United States."
This Act admits of great latitude in construction.
It requires " a knowledge of the elements of English
grammar," etc., etc. What is " a knowledge," and
what are "the elements," are questions left for decis-
ion of the Academy. This law certainly raised the
standard of admission. It did so, however, only by
exacting a knowledge of the elements of English
grammar, geography, and history of the United States,
in addition to previous requirements. The Act of
1812, which requires merely that the candidate shall
be " well versed in reading, writing, and arithmetic,"
has not been changed. No higher standard in those
subjects is authorized. But the standard in them has
been raised. The law simply requires that the can-
didate shall be well versed in reading, writing, and
arithmetic. The Academic Regulations construing
and enlarging the law say he "must be able to
perform with facility and accuracy the various oper-
ations of the four ground rules of arithmetic, of reduc-
tion, of simple and compound proportion, and of vul-
gar and decimal fractions," etc. The Regulations in-
crease the severity of the law. The Academic Board
increases the severity of the Regulations. " Well
versed in arithmetic" as used in the law, and as con-
strued by the Academy in early times, means skill in
the handling of known quantities knowledge of the
rules of arithmetic, doing sums in figures not profi-
ciency in solving problems, involving unknown quan-
tities, and perhaps calling for the use of letters and
signs. In short, the candidate, by the law, must be
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 207
well versed in arithmetic, not algebra. The following
ten (10) questions in arithmetic (?) put to candidates
in June, 1882, are submitted as evidence of the
severity of the Academic Board :
Time allowed three and a half hours.
1. How many times will 641 14s. \\\d. contain <2
15s. 6jrf. ?
2. Find the smallest number greater than 3 which,
divided by 54, 69 and 132, will give in each case
a remainder of 2^.
3. On October 12, 1881, A was 33 years, 6 months, 16
days old, and B was 42 years, 3 months, 2 days.
On what day of the month and year was B ex-
actly five times as old as A, and why did he not
remain so ?
4. A does jo of a piece of work in 14 days; he then
calls in B and they finish the work in 2 days. In
how many days would B have done the work alone?
5. Multiply 4.32 by .00012.
6. Explain the reason for placing the decimal point in
example 5. (The rule for doing so is not the
reason.)
7. If 35 men do a piece of work in 24 days, in how
many days will 2} of that number do a piece of
work 7 times as great, providing the second set
of men work twice as fast as the first, but only
w r ork one-third as long in a day ?
8. Separate 772f into three numbers, which shall be in
the same proportion as 2J, 7 and 5 ?
9. How many fifteenths are there in 1.03 ?
10. At a game of ball A wins 9 games out of 15 when
playing with B, and 16 out of 25 when playing
208 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
against C. How many games out of 118 could
C win playing against B ?
The questions submitted to candidates in Septem-
ber, 1882, were of the same kind. Three of them
are as follows :
" A cistern can be filled by a pipe in 18 minutes, and
by another in one -third of an hour, and can be
emptied by a tap in two-thirds of an hour ; how
much of , the tank will be filled in 10 minutes, all
being open ? "
******
" A wheel, five feet in diameter, makes 2,500 turns and
goes 6 miles. The circumference is 3.1416 times
the diameter, how much did the wheel lose by
turning around ? "
******
"The stage leaves Rousley at 12.30 P.M., and travels
1 5 miles in two hours. How far can a boy travel
in a stage so that travelling 3J miles an hour he
may reach Rousley at 2.45 P.M.? "
So much for arithmetic.
The law says the candidate shall be " well versed
in reading and writing." The Regulations say he
"must be able to read and write the English language
correctly " (which is more than all college graduates
can do), and shall have a knowledge of English gram-
mar. To enforce this regulation the Academic Board
divides grammar into three parts named and valued as
follows :
1st, Definition, value 15
2d, Parsing, - "45
3d, Correcting errors in English, - "40
Total, - 100
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 209
The candidate who fails to get 60 of the total is
generally rejected.
" A knowledge of the elements " is an elastic term,
as already stated, and it rests primarily with the Aca-
demic Board to determine its scope, but statistics
hereinafter given, taken with the foregoing facts, indi-
cate that the time has come for higher authority to
interpret the law and revise the Regulations on the
subject of admission.*
No classification of candidates by their knowledge
when entering is authorized or necessary. They are
arranged alphabetically for beginning their academic
course, and their subsequent classification is wholly
according to merit as ascertained by examination in
the courses taught at the Academy. The conclusion
from the foregoing premises is that the present system
of examination does not conform to the law, or at
least to a proper interpretation of it.
It is maintained, in addition to this, that the system
is not calculated to secure the best results. It is not
now and never has been the purpose of the Military
Academy merely to produce the Second Lieutenants
required by the regular army. As Mr. McHenry,
Secretary of War, said, in 1 800 : u It is not enough
that the troops it may be deemed proper to maintain
be rendered as perfect as possible in form, organiza-
tion and discipline ; the dignity, the character to be
supported, and the safety of the country further re-
quire that it should have military instruction capable
* Woolwich only requires of candidates ' ' a competent knowledge of
the first four rules of arithmetic, the rule of three, the declination of
the nouns, and conjugation of verbs by the Latin grammar." (Clode's
" Forces of the Crown," pp. 459, 460.)
210 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
of perpetuating the art of war. Military science ought
to be cultivated with peculiar care, so that a sufficient
stock may always exist ready to be imparted and dif-
fused to any extent, and a competent number of per-
sons be prepared and qualified to act as engineers,"
etc.
Washington, in 1796, urging that there should be a
school to keep the nation " supplied with an adequate
stock of military knowledge," said, -'The art of
war is extensive and complicated ; it demands much
previous study ; the possession of it in its most iwi-
proved and perfect state is always of great moment to
the security of a nation."
President Monroe said, in 1822, "The Military
Academy forms the basis in regard to science on which
the military establishment rests."
The various laws concerning the creation, organiza-
tion and re-organizations of the Military Academy
sustain the assertion that the main purpose of the In-
stitution is the one set forth in the foregoing extracts.
The Academy, besides furnishing Lieutenants for the
current duties of the regular army, should keep the
nation supplied with persons thoroughly educated and
acquainted with the "art of war" "in its most ap-
proved and perfect state" among whom men may always
be found qualified for high command, and for the
duties of the artillery, the engineers and the staff.
With a view to securing better material for this
purpose, the standard of admission has been raised,
and the Academic Board about 1870 established a
new method of examining candidates. Formerly the-
candidate was examined orally and at the black-board,
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 211
in the presence of the whole faculty. Sometimes he
was under the disadvantage of embarrassment, but
the experience, patience and skill of the professors
overcame that, and disclosed not only how much of
the subject upon which he was examined the candi-
date understood, but led to a pretty close estimate of
the character and calibre of his mind. An examina-
tion conducted in this way was thorough, considerate,
liberal, and resulted in well-founded convictions and
comparatively correct conclusions. The objection to
it was that it exposed the Board to the charge of
being influenced by feeling one way or the other, and
of not having an exact record of the examinations with
which to defend its action. It was largely, if not
wholly, a defensive measure, not in the interest of the
candidate, that the Academic Board abandoned that
system. Under the present system the candidates are
(for examination) known to the Board only by num-
bers. Questions in the various subjects, written out
beforehand, are submitted to the candidates, who,
under the eye of an assistant-professor, but without
aid or consultation, work for a limited time to pro-
duce the answers in writing. The merit in these
answers is indicated by numbers fixed arbitrarily by
the Board.
If the number received in a subject does not come
up to the level prescribed, the Board rejects without
learning any more about the person concerned than
these written questions and answers convey without,
in fact, knowing who the person is. This has the
effect of putting " cramming " at a premium, instead
of a discount, for entry to the Institution in which
212
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
cramming is most roundly condemned and most posi-
tively interdicted. This examination is free from
partiality and prejudice, and affords a record made by
the candidate himself with which the Board can de-
fend its action, and, in case of complaint, confuse and
confound the candidate and his friends. Nevertheless
it is harsh and unwise, and is at variance with the
mode of proceeding at all subsequent examinations.
While (if the questions be proper) it might be made
to fulfil the requirements of the law, it is not the way
to secure that material to which the course of instruc-
tion at the Military Academy can be applied with the
best results. It gives no consideration to lack of years
or lack of opportunities for schooling. It calls for as
much book knowledge from the Western farmer boy
of 17 as from the man of 22 from Boston, the seat of
learning. No account is taken of the fact that the
training of the former may have been such as to give
high development to traits essential in the genuine
soldier industry, energy, fidelity, obedience, courage,
perseverance, and self-reliance. The tendency of the
high standard of admission and the present mode of
examination is to discriminate against the poorer Con-
gressional Districts and Territories, in the enjoyment
equally with the rich, of the right of representation at
the national Military Academy. From 1838 to 1876
the only period for which statistics on this point
are at hand the Academic Board rejected one-third
of the candidates from Arkansas, nearly one-half of
those from Colorado, nearly one-third from Kansas,
nearly two-thirds from Nevada, one-half from West
Virginia, and five-sixths from Idaho ; while for the
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 213
same period it rejected but little more than one-twelfth
from the District of Columbia, about one-seventh from
Connecticut, one-tenth from Maine, less than one-four-
teenth from Massachusetts, one-thirteenth from Rhode
Island, less than one-twentieth from Vermont, and less
than one-twenty-third from New Jersey. The Military
Academy, in a way and degree peculiar to itself,
develops the reasoning powers and gives scope and
grasp to the mind in dealing with the various prob-
lems of life as they are encountered from day to day.
This is the merit of the West Point system. Hence
the more of the aggregate knowledge required for
graduation which a pupil acquires through that system
the better mental training he will have.
The youth of true manliness, with mind enough to
master the studies, is a better subject for receiving the
West Point course in its full force, if he has just
enough education to enter, than he would be with a
greater amount of modern cramming.* In other words,
early cramming is opposed to the distinctive purpose
of the West Point system, which is high development
of reasoning power and thorough understanding of
principles.
Of the class which entered in 1839 (Grant's) the
Academic Board rejected but 2 out of 78. From
1840 to 1849 the rejections by the Academic Board
ranged from zero to 15 per cent., the annual average
* In a recent lecture for candidates for admission to the India Civil
Service, published since this article was prepared, Prof. Max Muller
says : " That process of cramming and crowding which has of late been
brought to the highest pitch of perfection, instead of exciting an appe-
tite for work, is apt to produce an indifference, if not a kind of intellec-
tual nausea, that may last for life."
214 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
being 7 per cent. The class which entered in 1849
had no rejections. It graduated McPherson No. 1,
Sill No. 3, Schofield No. 7, Tyler No. 22, Sheridan
No. 34, and Hood No. 44.
During the next decade beginning with 1850 the
rejections averaged 12 per cent., the lowest, 3 per
cent., being in the class which entered in 1850. The
class that entered in 1850 graduated G. W. C. Lee
No. 1, Abbot No. 2, Ruger No. 3, Howard No. 4,
Pegram No. 10, J. E. B. Stuart No. 13, Stephen D.
Lee No. 17, Greble No. 21, S. H. Weed No. 27, and
B. F. Davis No. 32. The greatest number of rejec-
tions in the decade was in the class which entered in
1859. That class graduated Meigs No. 1, Michie No.
2, and Twining No. 3.
The average percentage of rejections in the next
decade beginning with 1860 was 18, the smallest 8,
in 1863, and the largest 30, in 1868.
In the next seven years, from 1870 to 1876, the
average percentage rose to 37, reaching the enormous
figure 52 in the year 1870.
Prior to 1866 the law did not permit the examina-
tion of candidates in grammar, geography or history.
From 1840 to 1849, 52 persons were rejected ; of these
21 failed in reading, 24 in writing, 21 in spelling, and
52 in arithmetic. Many of these, as indicated by the
figures, failed in more than one subject. From 1850
to 1859, 118 persons were rejected; 30 failures in
reading, 80 in writing, 85 in spelling, and 58 in arith-
metic.
In the following decade grammar, geography and
history became subjects for examination, and 170 re-
ADMISSION TO THE MILITAKY ACADEMY. 215
jections occurred ; 46 in reading, 98 in writing, 91 in
spelling, and 94 in arithmetic ; and although only
three classes were examined under the law adding the
new subjects above mentioned, there were 50 failures
in grammar, 35 in geography, and 41 in history.
During the seven years from 1870 to 1876 there
were 401 rejections ; 35 in reading, 165 in writing,
165 in spelling, 161 in arithmetic, 257 in grammar,
204 in geography, and 171 in history.
There is something startling, if not alarming, in the
rapid increase in rejections, and in the magnitude of
the final figures. The average yearly percentage of
rejections has gone up from 7 in 1840 to 52 in 1870;
and the actual number of persons turned away has
risen from 70 for the ten years from 1840 to 1849, to
401 for the seven years from 1870 to 1876.
Two causes only could operate to produce this re-
markable result first, the higher standard of admis-
sion, including the introduction of new subjects and
the manner of conducting the examination ; and, sec-
ond, inferiority in the candidates as compared with
their predecessors. As the means of so-called educa-
tion have increased greatly during the period under
consideration, it would seem that the later candidates
should be better prepared than the earlier ones were.
If that were so the enormous increase in rejections
would be due wholly to the operation of the law and
the action of the Academy. But there is good reason
to think that in later years candidates have not been
as well qualified as formerly. This may be attributed
to the fact that instruction in the ordinary branches is
not as thorough under the popular school system of
216
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the present day as it was under the private school
system of earlier times. It is a law of nature that
cost is the measure of value. The public school sys-
tem, it is true, costs enough over eighty millions of
dollars a year but that system is based on the as-
sumption that people are entitled to schooling whether
they pay or not. Some get it without cost, direct or
indirect. This tends to depreciate the quality of the
article as well as the estimate placed upon the gratuity
by its beneficiaries. When parents were directly re-
sponsible and settled at so much a quarter for having
their boys taught the three R's, they took more pains
to see they were getting what they paid for than they
do now, when the State determines what education is,
assumes the responsibility, decides as to the quid pro-
quo ', and pays the bills. The compulsory feature of
the public school system bears directly on the view
here presented. When schooling was a commodity
which could not be obtained except by direct payment
of hard-earned cash, it was mainly sought for in cases
of minds inclined and fitted to receive it. Hence in
those days intellect and schooling were more frequent-
ly found together than they are now, when all intel-
lects are bound by law to take schooling. The pro-
portion of intellectual among the educated boys was
greater, and the boy who had average information was
then more apt than now to possess the necessary intel-
lect for West Point.
General Schofield said in 1880, while Superintendent
of the Military Academy, " I have understood it as the
general opinion of the older officers here that the can-
didates exhibit less thoroughness of elementary in-
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 217
struction than they did in earlier times." The late
Professor Church reported as follows to the Board of
Visitors in 1876 : "From my experience in the exam-
ination of candidates for admission to the Military
Academy, I am satisfied that there is somewhere a
serious defect in the system of instruction or in its
application, in the schools of our country, for educa-
tion in the elementary branches ; particularly in arith-
metic, reading, and spelling. I think our candidates
are not as thoroughly prepared as they were twenty
years ago."
In 1880 Professor Kendrick said, "I frequently
conversed with Mr. Church upon the subject; we
were in full agreement thereon. Judging from what
we see here, the common branches reading, spelling,
grammar, arithmetic, geography are not so thoroughly
taught in the schools of the country as they were
twenty-five years ago. The young men who come to
us are not taught to observe and to reason so well as
they were forty years ago. The schools of a large
part of New England form no exception to this re-
mark."
In support of the foregoing views, it should be borne
in mind that in former times the candidates were a year
younger than now, the limits then being 16 and 21,
whereas they are now 17 and 22, thus giving a year
longer for preparation.
But, after allowing full weight to the falling off in
preparation, the fact remains that the Academy exacts
a higher degree of mere acquirements than formerly,
and that doing so tends to the admission of " crammed"
candidates and the rejection of good raw material, and
218 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
is not likely to further the purpose of the Institu-
tion.
During the decade from 1840 to 1850, 869 cadets
were admitted, and 427 graduated, 49.1 per cent.
From 1850 to 1860, 807 were admitted, and 383 grad-
uated, 47.4 per cent. From 1860 to 1870, 778 were
admitted, and 494 graduated. This period embraced
the Civil War, and the percentage of graduates arose
to 63.4, but in the next decade, 1870 to 1880, the per-
centage fell to 53.4, there being 948 admissions and
507 graduations.
Adopting 1866 as the date of the high standard of
admission, the records disclose the facts that for ten
years just preceding that time that is, from 1857 to
1866 the Academic Board rejected only 17.3 per
cent, of the candidates for admission, whereas for the
ten years following the introduction of the high stand-
ard, 1867 to 1876, the average of rejections was 34.4.
That is to say, the percentage under the new standard
for the period named is double what it is under the
old. If this enormous increase is based on sound
principles it ought to show a corresponding increase
in the percentage of graduates. But we find that for
the period from 1867 to 1876 the rejections increased
a hundred per cent, over the preceding decade, while
of those admitted there has been an increase of less
than 6 per cent, in the graduations. To this it may
be added that the percentage of graduates in the
class of 1882 is less than in any class for 25 years pre-
ceding the time the standard was raised. It appears
from this that raising the standard of admission has
not materially increased the quantity of graduates. It
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 219
cannot, as yet at least, be claimed that it lias improved
the quality of them.
All who graduated prior to 1866 were admitted un-
der the old, or low standard. They have been tried
by time in peace and war. The civil as well as the
military walks of life attest their excellence. It re-
mains to be seen how the graduates who entered or
may enter under the higher standard of admission will
compare with them.
It is noteworthy that the average number of cadets
at the Academy is not materially greater than it was
years ago, notwithstanding the fact that in consequence
of increase of population, the number authorized by
law has gone up from 250 in 1850 to 253 in 1860, to
263 in 1870, and to 312 in 1880. There were only
about 185 cadets at the Academy from January to
June, 1882, and twelve per cent, of these had been
found deficient and turned back for a year to go over
the course a second time. Of the original 102 persons
who entered in 1878 only 26 graduated June, 1882.
The Academy is a popular Institution designed to
confer its advantages with as near approach to equal-
ity as practicable throughout the country. The law
says that " each Congressional and Territorial District
and the District of Columbia shall be entitled to -have
one cadet at said Academy," and that " the individual
selected shall be an actual resident of the Congres-
sional District of the State, or Territory, or District of
Columbia," from which the appointment purports to be
made. In executing this law, the President deems it
his duty to appoint the candidate recommended to
him by the Congressional Representative of the Dis-
220 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
trict. This system was established in full light of the
fact that inequality existed and would continue in the
educational opportunities of the residents of the
various Congressional Districts and Territories. It
calls for a construction of the law which will favor a
low rather than a high standard of admission in order
to give the fairest chance possible for representation
to districts in which the opportunities for preparatory
education are comparatively limited. It is a well
known fact that, once in, boys with but little educa-
tion prior to admission sometimes make the best prog-
ress in the four years' course at the Academy, and
become distinguished men. The law foresaw inequal-
ity among cadets, not only when admitted, but when
graduated, and provided that, " after going through all
the classes," the cadet " shall be considered as among
the candidates for a commission in any corps according
to the duties lie may be competent to perform.' 1 ''
The foregoing remarks are designed to show that
the examination required by law for admission is not
conducted as it ought to be. But beyond this, con-
sidering all the facts on the subject, especially the
way appointments to the Academy are made (one
from each Congressional District on the recommenda-
tion of the Member of Congress), it is quite possible
that it would be better to dispense by law with a
mental examination for admission, and let every phys-
ically qualified appointee enter upon the course and
remain until found deficient in a subject taught by the
Academy. This would require the Institution to
bestow six months or so of its labor on a much larger
number than it does now. But none of the instruction
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 221
would be lost. Much or little, it would in cases of
discharge be taken back to be "imparted and dif-
fused " in the Congressional District entitled to it.
It would simplify matters at the Academy if every
appointee were capable of graduating. But that is
hardly possible. A preparatory year as a part of the
course of the Institution, in addition to the four years'
term, as at present established, might increase the per-
centage of graduates, and would afford appointees a
fair chance of admission to the regular course.
In providing a military education for a limited
number of its sons, the Government certainly ought
to see that its bounty is wisely bestowed. Could not
that be done sufficiently well by care in appointment,
rather than by rejecting the appointee before he has had
a trial in the course taugJit by the Academy ? In any
event, the Academy will not fail to do its part in pro-
viding a good education, in the broadest acceptance of
the term, for all appointees confided to it.
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. CONTINUED.
Remarks at a General Meeting of the Military Ser-
vice Institution of the United States :
GENERAL JAMES B. FRY Mr. Chairman and Gen-
tlemen : I wish to express my gratification at the able
and interesting paper just read by Professor Andrews.
I have no doubt he will in due time receive from this
meeting a hearty vote of thanks. I am personally in-
debted to him for the kind terms in which he has
alluded to me. I wish to say that I disclaim any in-
tention in this discussion of criticising the general
methods of the Academy. My comments here have
222 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
been in respect to the manner of getting material, not
as to the use made by the Academy of the material
confided to it. On this point my opinions do not re-
sult from any action of the Academy in particular
cases, nor have they been hastily formed. A paper
read by Professor Michie before this Institution De-
cember 10, 1879, and the discussion following it, are
printed in our Journal (Vol. I., No. 2). My remarks
on that occasion are given in the Journal as follows :
" There is one point frequently discussed touched upon
in the professor's paper to-night, to which I will ask
a moment's attention. It is the question of raising the
standard of admission to the Military Academy. It
seems to me that raising the standard wxmld not be
quite consistent with the large claims we make in favor
of the West Point system of education. We insist, and
I think with good reason, that the great merit of the
Military Academy in its intellectual relations is the
mental Gaining it affords ; that in a way and in a de-
gree peculiar to itself it develops the reasoning powers,
gives the scope and grasp to the mind which enables
it to deal promptly and vigorously with the various
problems of life as they may be encountered from day
to day ; and we attach a very subordinate importance
to the mere acquisition from the text-books or lectures
of ascertained facts or accepted theories. We claim,
further, that the extended and rigid course of mathe-
matics prescribed for the Academy, and the peculiar
manner in which that course is taught, are the princi-
pal means through which the desired mental training
is secured. These things being so, it seems to me that
the best material the Academy can have to work upon
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 223
is that which can be admitted under a standard about
like the present one,* which, though low, gives as a
general thing reasonable assurance of sufficient mental
capacity on the part of the candidate to receive the
West Point system and assimilate it in the easiest and
most effective way. Of course the more the cadet can
receive of this system the better. I assume it is ad-
mitted that, speaking generally, the candidates who
present themselves have acquired what knowledge
they possess under a system entirely different from
that of the Military Academy ; that they have learned
by rule and rote, or, in other words, that their educa-
tion is to a great extent a course of cramming, which
I am inclined to think the common school system of
the day is encouraging. If this is true, as I assume it
to be, raising the standard of admission at West Point
would be calling for more cramming. The candidates
would have to increase the amount of their acquire-
ments, but of course could not be expected to change
the system under which education such as theirs is
given throughout the country. The additional cram-
ming would not, it seems to me, facilitate the mental
development aimed at by the West Point system, and
might possibly have the effect of retarding it."
In the paper which I read on November 18,- 1882,
to which the professor has just replied, I elaborated
the foregoing views, and gave some statistics and other
evidence in support of them.
In connection with the subject of getting material
* When this remark was made I had the old standard in mind, and
did not know how much the standard had been raised in the last few
years.
224 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
for the Academy, I alluded in general terms to the
purpose of the Institution. The professor has treated
that point pretty thoroughly, and I think, in relation
to it, there is a fair and square issue between us. I
understand him to hold that the intention of the law
is that the Military Academy shall have the lest
material in the land. I do not look upon that as the
Intention of the laws creating and providing for the
institution, nor as desirable. Other professions and
occupations should be considered. The church, the
law, medicine, etc., etc., have a claim equal at least to
that of the Army for the best. It is difficult to agree
upon the original or present purpose of the Military
Academy. I understand it to be the intention of the
law, however, to distribute the appointments to it
over the whole country. In that I see there is a
direct difference of opinion between the professor and
myself. As he stated in his introductory remarks
that he had the co-operation of his associate professors
in the preparation of his paper, I suppose we may re-
gard what he has said as the West Point view. I ac-
cept it as such, and admit that the side is well put. I
understand the professor to mean that it would be a
wise proceeding for the Government if it found the
best material each year from New England, say, to
accept the whole batch of cadets from that section. I
dissent from this. I regard the Academy as national,
and think it should work on material from every dis-
trict in the United States ; and I am sure there is no
district that cannot furnish somebody who can com-
ply with the requirements of the laws if they are
properly administered. The professor has dwelt up-
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 225
on the fact that Boards of Visitors have favored a
high standard of admission. In fact, I may say that
these reports are the authorities he relies upon. This
is an argument of apparent importance ; but I must
say that it seems to me the reports of Boards of Visi-
tors on this point are not entitled to the consideration
which we might suppose from the composition of the
Boards. If, instead of Boards of Visitors as at present
constituted, there was a Board of Supervision, a Super-
visory Board of Education, composed of the same
members from year to year, made responsible jointly
with the Academic Board for the rules of admission
and the course of instruction, I should have great
respect for its report. But quite the reverse of that is
the case. From an experience of five years as an in-
structor and as adjutant and secretary of the Academic
Board at West Point, and from pretty close observa-
tion since, I am led to think that Boards of Visitors
adopt many of the opinions of the Academy, and on
many points their reports are in reality West Point
speaking by another voice. I do not mean to assert
that Boards of Visitors give themselves away, but
they are, perhaps unavoidably, influenced, if not large-
ly governed, in many things by the West Point opin-
ion, which is not only a very plausible, but a- very
persistent one upon all matters affecting the Academy.
The result is that the Board of Visitors a temporary
'body instead of advising the Academy in educational
matters for which the Academy is responsible, is in
reality advised by the Academy. I cannot recall all
the points in my paper upon which Professor Andrews
has commented. I shall notice all I remember. He
226 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
criticised my statement that the regulations increase
the severity of the law, and the Academic Board in-
creases the severity of the regulations in the matter of
the requirements for admission.
I do not think he has proved me in error on that
point. The law says the appointee shall be " well
versed " in arithmetic, etc. The regulations say he
shall perform with " facility and accuracy," etc. I
make a distinction between the meaning of these
terms, and regard the latter as exacting more than the
former. In my opinion, it is in the power of the
Board to proceed more rigidly under this regulation
requiring " facility and accuracy " than is contemplated
by the law, which merely requires the appointee to be
"well versed,'" etc. As to the other point, that the
Board exceeds the regulations, I submit the questions
asked last June. If they are so simple, as the profes-
sor says, that inability to solve them will produce
smiles on some faces and blushes on others, then my
assertion that the Board has enlarged upon the regula-
tions is not sustained. That I leave to others for de-
cision, remarking only that in a letter which I shall
soon read, Colonel Lazelle, late Commandant of Cadets,
says : " I think that the tendency and the actual
present practice is to exact everything possible within
the Board's construction of the statute. I remember
on one occasion calling attention to the fact that one
of the printed problems was a subject in alligation
which I regarded as beyond elementary proportion,
and therefore beyond even the requirements of the
Military Academy regulations for admission of candi-
dates." Before he began his address the professor dis-
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 227
tributed in this assembly printed copies of the questions-
asked in June last, with the solution in each case given
with the problem. If the problems are so simple that
men ought to blush at being unable to solve them,
why was it necessary for the Academy to prepare and
print solutions of them for such a meeting as this ?
I say with frankness and sincerity that the solutions
confirm me in the opinion that these problems, taken
as a whole, are not a proper test in arithmetic for ad-
mission to the Military Academy. If, says the pro-
fessor, these problems are so difficult, how is it that so-
many of the candidates of 1882 were admitted upon
them ? That question, I confess, puzzles me almost as
much as the problems did before they were made
easier by being shown how to do them. The only
answer which occurs to me is that the candidates of
that year may have been unusually well coached. Pos-
sibly a larger proportion had been prepared at the
special schools of Colonels Symonds and Huse. Col-
onels Symonds and Huse are both graduates, and for-
mer instructors at the Academy. I have nothing to
say against their institutions. On the contrary, I be-
lieve they are good schools, and the higher the West
Point standard of admission the better for them ; and
with the present high standard, the sooner an ap-
pointee to the Military Academy gets into one of
them the better for him, provided he can stand the
expense. But I invite attention to the probability
that their special character, if not their existence, is
due to the modern standard of admission at West
Point, and if special preparation is necessary for ad-
mission, as indicated by these schools, I suggest the
228
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
question whether or not the Government should es-
tablish and regulate the schools for it. Upon the
subject of the present requirements and the necessity
for special preparation to meet them, Colonel Huse
has issued a circular* which is quite significant. It is
as follows :
To YOUNG MEN INTENDING TO ENTER WEST POINT.
In the ten years, 1847-1856, the number of candi-
dates appointed to West Point was 962. Of this
number 132 (13J per cent.) failed to enter.
In the next ten years 1,082 were appointed, and
288 (26 per cent.) failed to enter.
In the next ten years, 1867-1876, the latest date
for which I have the official report of appointments
and failures, 1,560 were appointed, and 697 (44^ per
cent.) failed to enter.
It thus appears that while thirty years ago nearly
seven-eighths of the appointees to West Point became
cadets, of late years nearly one-half have failed to enter.
The failures are not, as might be supposed, confined
to young men who have had no advantages. High
School graduates, bearing diplomas that might be ex-
pected to carry them in without examination, and un-
dergraduates of even the most prominent colleges have
been rejected.
It is plain, then, that candidates should not take it
for granted that they have nothing to do after secur-
ing their appointment ; nearly all require more or less
preparation, and some cannot do with less than a year
of persistent study.
* I have italicized some sentences in this circular to call attention to
their bearing on points I have alluded to.
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 229
The figures given above show how muck more difficult
it is to enter now than it was thirty years ago, and old
graduates should be careful in giving information to
their young friends as to the character of the examina-
tion. It is probable that candidates have failed from
judging themselves by the standard of friends who
entered West Point when the requirements were lower
than they are now.
Success cannot be secured by any system of cram-
ming, or by the use of " influence " at Washington.
The examination papers are recast from year to year
with great care, so that coaching on examples and
questions similar to what appear in old examination
papers is quite useless, and favoritism is securely
guarded against by the anonymous system, candidates
being known only by number. Nothing but a good
knowledge of first principles avails a candidate at a
West Point examination.
At my school, the Highland Falls Academy, special
attention is paid to preparing West Point candidates.
i am a graduate of West Point, and served as an
instructor there seven years. It may be thought,
therefore, that a weak candidate can come to me a
few weeks before examination and by some special
process of mine be got into West Point. This -is an
error. I have been of service to candidates that have
come to me only a short time before their examina-
tion, and some of these young men have owed their
success to my efforts ; but I am not willing to do
mere cramming work, and in fact it is difficult to cram
a deficient candidate so as to deceive the examiners.
Most young men can spend at least a year profit-
230 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ably in preparing for West Point, and in order that
the failures may be as few as possible the War De-
partment recommends members of Congress to nomi-
nate candidates one year in advance of the vacancies
they are to fill.
Many young men fail in Spelling. Few persons
have any idea of the labor and patience required on
the part of both instructor and pupil to make a cor-
rect speller of a young man of seventeen who cannot
spell.
I have never had a candidate fail in this respect
that has spent a year with me, though I have had
some whose case seemed hopeless when they came.
In Arithmetic mere figuring is of little value. The
candidate must show an acquaintance with fundamen-
tal principles and an ability to think, to satisfy the
Board.
The following questions have been asked within a
year or two :
" If the same number be added to both terms of an
improper fraction will the value of the fraction be
increased or diminished, and why ? "
" What is the reason for placing the decimal point
in example 5 multiply 4.32 by .00012? The rule
for doing so is not the reason."
No candidate can answer such questions from mere
coaching. Questions like them may not be asked
again for years, but equally searching ones will be,
and problems requiring careful thought are given
every year.
In Grammar no mere routine parsing is received.
At the examination this year some candidates hardly
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 231
knew what to write when they read the direction on
the Grammar Paper not to give gender, number or
person. The grammatical construction of certain
underlined words was all that was required, and this
was just what many could not give.
For most young men that come to me, a year is not too
long to spend in preparatory work, and some require
more time. Those that do not require much prepara-
tion for the examination are put at French, Geometry
and Algebra, subjects which a candidate may, if he has
a good instructor, study to advantage before entering.
To some careful previous training in these subjects is
very important, for the fourth class examinations
prove fatal to many that enter without any previous
knowledge of them.
I employ, as far as practicable, West Point methods
of instruction, and keep myself informed as to all
changes, however slight, in the system of examination ;
and my pupils, being so near West Point, have oppor-
tunities of learning for themselves from cadet acquain-
tances what will be required of them after entering.
I may claim, therefore, to offer all the advantages
likely to be found in any preparatory school.
My pupils have been remarkably successful during
the four years I have been preparing candidates, not
only a larger number, but a larger per cent, of my
candidates having entered West Point than from any
other school during that time.
My charge for tuition, board, fuel and lights, and
washing, except of starched clothing, which is done
at reasonable rates by laundresses in the neighbor-
hood, is $500 for [the school year, and at the same
232 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
rate for longer periods than four months. For shorter
periods $65 per month, and anything more than half
a month will be charged as a mouth.
Pupils will furnish their own books, napkins, towels,
blankets and sheets (single beds).
Candidates are, of course, subject to the ordinary
rules of the school, circular of which is herewith en-
closed.
CALEB HUSE, Principal,
Highland Falls Academy.
HIGHLAND FALLS, N. Y., September, 1882.
The professor alluded with but little respect, I think,
to the earlier examinations for admission. He said
they were oral, brief, and that the wonder is that any-
body failed to pass ; that the Board could not, or did
not, get at the knowledge of a candidate, etc. But he
has not disputed, and I think cannot dispute, that the
graduates under that system of admission have proved
good officers and able men as good and able as the
higher standard of admission has produced. The pro-
fessor's remark was rather disparaging to the Academic
Boards of earlier times. My conviction as to the
earlier examinations is very strong. It is that the
Board, say from 1840 to 1860, was competent and
thorough. It was composed most of the time of Ma-
han, Bartlett, Church, Bailey or Kendrick, Weir, Agnel
and others I need not name, with Robert E. Lee and
Richard Delafield as Superintendents. I think it was
fully competent to weigh the information it obtained,
and that it took time enough to obtain the necessary
amount of information to judge of the candidate's fit-
ADMISSION TO THE MILITAEY ACADEMY. 233
ness. I say this after nearly five years' experience as
Secretary of that Board. I therefore reiterate my
opinion for what it is worth, that the Board did by
that test get a good knowledge of what the candidate
knew, and formed a pretty correct opinion as to what
he was likely to accomplish if admitted.
Now, as to the mode of admission. The professor
has set forth the arguments in favor of the anonymous
written examination at present in vogue for candidates.
If this system has great merit for admitting candi-
dates, I do not see why it is not used for subsequent
examinations of progress in studies. The system for
admission has been changed by introducing the anony-
mous paper examination without applying that system
to subsequent examinations. I will only add on this
point what was written to me by a United States Sen-
ator. I do not give his language. He said that to
expect to find what the candidate knows by these
slips of paper is as unreasonable as to expect a jury to
get at the truth of a subject by having written state-
ments from witnesses. I will here explain that the
old system of admission for which I contend was not
literally oral ; much of it was written. The candidate,
however, was not withdrawn from and unknown to
the faculty, as at present. On the contrary, he was
before it, wrote upon the blackboard in its presence,
and in addition was questioned by the professors as
thoroughly as they thought best. By that system the
fate of a candidate rests on what he knows. By the
present anonymous paper system his fate may be settled
by what he does not know. The former, properly
enough, was called examination for admission. A
234
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
more appropriate name for the latter would be exam-
ination for rejection.
The professor also referred to my remarks respecting
cramming. I said : " The youth of true manliness,
with mind enough to master the studies, is a better
subject for receiving the West Point course in its full
force, if he has just enough education to enter, than he
would be with a greater amount of modern cramming.
In other words early cramming is opposed to the dis-
tinctive purpose of the West Point system, which is
high development of the reasoning powers and thor-
ough understanding of principles." The professor
draws from this the conclusion that I regard learning
as a disadvantage ; that I argue in favor of ignorance.
I did not intend to be so understood. I, however,
make a distinction, which he does not seem to regard,
between mere learning and real education. If my
meaning is not plain enough in the terms of the fore-
going quotation, a foot-note, which was read and printed
as part of my article, shows it unmistakably. The
foot-note is : " In a recent lecture for candidates for
admission to the India Civil Service published since
this article was prepared, Professor Max Muller says :
1 That process of cramming and crowding which has of
late been brought to the highest pitch of perfection,
instead of exciting an appetite for work, is apt to pro-
duce an indifference, if not a kind of intellectual nausea
that may last for life. 7 ' After having written with
that very thought in mind I was pleased to come across
the foregoing statement by Professor Muller, which
sustains my view that an overdose of modern cram-
ming may be an injury to an appointee to West Point.
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 235
That was my meaning. I think it is clearly enough
expressed, and I adhere to the statement.
The professor advocates, as I understand him, the
system of competitive examination. Without going
into a general discussion of this subject, I must ex-
press my unfriendliness to it as a system. But if, as
a principle, it ought to be applied to candidates for
admission, then, as a principle, I think it should be
applied also in the selection of the professors who
teach them. But I do not believe in the system at all.
Such statistics as Professor Andrews presents cover
only short periods. On the other hand, I took the whole
range back to 1840. I do not understand that he has
answered or impaired the force of the statistical facts
in my paper. He does not dispute my statement that
" the average yearly percentage of rejections has gone
up from 7 in 1840 to 52 in 1870 ; and the actual num-
ber of persons turned away has risen from 70 for the
ten years from 1840 to 1849, to 401 for the seven years
from 1870 to 1876." Nor does he controvert my con-
clusion drawn from the enormous increase in rejections
under the high standard of admission : to wit, that if
the high standard theory is sound, it ought to show a
corresponding increase in the percentage of graduates.
But, as I showed, instead of that, we find -for the
period from 1867, when the high standard began, to
1876, the rejections increased a hundred per cent, over
the preceding decade (old, or low standard of admis-
sion), while of those admitted there was an increase
of less than six per cent, in the graduations. The pro-
fessor makes no explanation of this.
In relation to my statistics showing the large pro-
236
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
portion of rejections from Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas,
Nevada, West Virginia and Idaho, he names some
Western Territories which he says I forgot to men-
tion. But he does not show that the omission im-
paired the soundness of my conclusion. The statistics
I gave were to support my assertion that " the ten-
dency of the high standard of admission and the
present mode of examination is to discriminate against
the poorer Congressional Districts and Territories in
the enjoyment equally with the rich of the right of
representation at the national Military Academy."
The professor denies the correctness of this statement,
and adds that some of the poorest candidates come
from the richest districts, and some of the best from
the poorer ones. These may be facts, but they do not
disprove the tendency I asserted to discrimination in
a high standard of admission and the present mode of
examination.
The professor's remark that the poor man's son has
no more right than the son of the rich man to a place
for which he is not qualified is quite true, but it seems
irrelevant. No question has been raised as to rich
men's sons and poor men's sons, nor as to the occupa-
tion by either of places for which they are not quali-
fied. The questions are, What qualifications should
be required ? and how should they be ascertained ?
The professor concedes that in getting rid of what
he calls " ignoramuses " young men of ability and
character may be rejected. But he destroys the value
of this concession by asking, if the young man has
ability and character, how is it he has not obtained
a common school education ? All that is required, he
ADMISSION TO THE MILITAEY ACADEMY.
237
says, may be learned in a common school, and there is
no part of the country where a common school educa-
tion cannot be obtained. I do not undertake to answer
his question, nor do I admit the correctness of his as-
sertions, but the logic of what he says is that ability
and character imply preparation ; hence all young men
of ability and character are prepared to enter the Mili-
tary Academy under the present standard ; and if the
Academic Board finds candidates not prepared, it fol-
lows conversely they have not ability and character.
Preparation, therefore, according to Professor Andrews'
argument, is the test of and measure for ability and
character. This is a strong claim for "culture." The
professor asks, If a man is a dunce why should he be
sent to the Academy ? If he is a dunce, he should not
be sent there, but I do not admit that lack of prep-
paration to pass the examination, at present required,
proves a man a dunce. The professor appears to think
it does. If that is so, it disposes of an important part
of our subject.
I understood the professor to say that the examina-
tion in grammar is very slight. I was under the im-
pression that it is rather severe. From 1870 to 1876
there were 401 rejections 35 in reading, 165 in
writing, 165 in spelling, 161 in arithmetic, .204 in
geography, 171 in history, and 257 in grammar. That
must mean something. Colonel Huse, in his circular
of September, 1882, already cited, warns candidates
that "in grammar no mere routine parsing is re-
ceived."
In my paper I said, " In former times the candidates
were a year younger than now, the limits then being
238 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
16 and 21, whereas now they are 17 and 22, thus giv-
ing a year longer for preparation."
I now suggest that these limits are too broad.
Under them boys and men, to the disadvantage of the
former, become candidates for the same class. This
after admission proves a disadvantage to the Institu-
tion in discipline and general administration, as the
same rules and regulations are applied to all, boys and
men alike. I am inclined to think that the ages for
admission ought to be from 17 to 18, or at most from
17 to 19.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I desire to present another
point. In my article of November 18th, I stated that
the present system of examination for admission does
not conform, strictly to the law, and I suggested that
it might be well if Congress would pass a law dispens-
ing entirely with a mental examination for admission,
letting every physically qualified appointee enter upon
the course and remain until graduated or found defi-
cient in a subject taught by the Academy. The profes-
sor, I believe, looks upon that as a premium on igno-
rance. I do not see it in that light. In fact I now go
a little farther than I did at first. I am inclined to
think that the existing law is sufficient to dispense
with an examination for admission by the Academic
Board. I doubt whether the law, if strictly construed,
would justify the present so-called examination for ad-
mission. It is the Act of 1812 ; the subsequent Acts do
not bear upon this point. Its terms are : " Each cadet
previously to his appointment by the President of the
United States shall be well versed in reading, writing,
and arithmetic." The meaning, it seems to me, is that
ADMISSION TO THE MILITAKY ACADEMY. 239
it shall be ascertained that the boy is well versed in
reading, writing and arithmetic before the President
appoints him not before he is admitted but before he
is appointed. If this is so, he should not be examined
for admission, but for appointment. As the President
deems it his duty in executing this law to accept the
recommendation of the Congressional Representative
of the District, it seems to me to rest with the Con-
gressman, who recommends, and the President, who
appoints, to ascertain before appointment whether the
boy has the qualifications required by the law.
GENERAL VOGDES A cadet, as I understand, does
not receive his warrant until the January examination.
GENERAL FRY It is true that after passing exami-
nation in January the cadet receives a warrant, about
which the law says nothing, but he receives in the
first instance what is called a conditional appointment.
That is the very appointment which, in my opinion,
this law refers to. That is the appointment upon
which he reports at the Academy, and upon which he
is mustered, paid, court-martialed, etc., and it is to
that appointment, as it seems to me, that the law re-
fers when it says previously to his appointment by the
President the boy must be well versed in arithmetic,
etc. When that appointment is made, it appears to
me all questions of qualifications in reading, writing
and arithmetic are closed. The examination in Jan-
uary is not to ascertain whether the law prescribing
qualifications for appointment has been observed. On
the contrary, it is conducted exclusively upon those
things taught by the Academy between July and Jan-
uary.
240 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Mr. Chairman, of course opinions as well as statistics
are of value in the consideration of the matter we have
in hand. I desire, therefore, to present extracts from
a few of the many letters I have received from
graduates of the Military Academy. Here is one from
an officer of prominence formerly connected with the
Academy, and still feeling a deep interest in it.
" SAN FRANCISCO, December 4, 1882.
" MY DEAR GENERAL :
" I write to say that I am very much pleased to see
that you have brought the system of examination
practised on beginners at the Military Academy under
discussion. I trust that you will bring out clearly the
features of this system and its bearings upon the
Service before you dismiss it from attention. It is an
innovation which I have watched with some surprise
as practised in examinations of teachers. In this
application it ignores the real qualifications which it
ought to be the object of the examination to bring
out. It breeds a frequent scandal by the early ac-
quaintance which some get with the proposed questions
in advance of others. This is, however, a minor ob-
jection.
" I think you have attributed a distinction to the
system by admitting that its standard is high, which
is not deserved. I am not able to see that there is
any standard in the system by which to measure what
you desire to ascertain in regard to the mental quality
or educational acquirements.
" Some of the questions cited by you as given to the
last class may properly be called puzzles, or enigmas,
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 241
when given to boys not trained in this kind of thing.
They belong to the same place in mathematics that
sleight of hand bears in the mechanical world. They
seem to me to bear only a remote relation to the
qualities and acquirements we have a right to look for
in the boys who aspire to a military career.
" It would not surprise me to learn that those who
give the best promise in the mathematical tournament
fail of substantial progress in the subsequent course of
study. An analogy may be found in the physical
failure in after life of the prodigies of muscular devel-
opment in the gymnasium or boat-pulling contests.
" The argument for the system appears to be that
it permits no partiality to be shown by the Academic
Boards, I am loth to think that the charge against
the Board thus implied can be well founded. If, un-
fortunately, it is well founded, the case would seem to
require a remedy of a different character. The sys-
tem appears to me to introduce a discrimination in*
favor of those trained by a special, if not a bad
method, to the injury of individuals, and, what is
worse, to the injury of the Service. While open to
this objection it applies no test of real value. I can
well understand that the very best minds in the class,
with fair preparation, too, are quite likely to appear
among the worst in such a contest, and that the or-
dinary person may appear to the best advantage. A
three hours' contest to a boy not trained to attack
quirks and puzzles may show him in a light of ap-
parent ignorance which he does not deserve, and, con-
versely, trained mediocrity may appear too well. This
makes little difference unless the good boy is found
242 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
deficient, otherwise, if the subsequent instruction is
what it was, he will soon establish his position. It
would seem necessary, to make the system fair, that a
boy failing on enigmas should, before being pro-
nounced deficient, be subjected to such a discreet
examination as Professor Church was wont to give us,
and have the opportunity to show that his failure was
due not to want of reasonable knowledge, but to other
circumstances. This personal element of the candi-
date his personal appearance, the intelligence exhib-
ited, his embarrassment or confidence ought not, it
appears to me, to be eliminated in an examination.
They are essential quite as much as a little knowl-
edge, more or less, which at best is small.
" I am inclined to think favorably of your proposi-
tion to admit every one not grossly and obviously
incompetent, and try all by the test of the course.
Some instances of development, after the boys had
*taken in the air of the place, struck me with force
during my connection with the Academy. One case
was that of a boy, who did not begin to open until he
entered the course of mechanics. He started near
foot in a class of six sections, and before the year was
out he was in the first section, and was graduated
about twelfth. It was a wonderful development. He
was killed in the war. I think he would have con-
tinued to expand. This case proves little beyond the
fact, and cannot be taken as a guide, yet it goes to
illustrate the necessity of some elasticity or power of
adjustment in the system which is applied on entrance.
A rigid set of questions that not one-half the officers
of the Army to-day could solve in three hours is plain-
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 243
ly not the one to govern in the admission of a lot of
comparatively untrained men, whom you are going to
train in some other way, I hope, than in the system
indicated by the questions.
" The obvious tendency is to cramming, the one thing
which the traditions of the Academy have hitherto
consigned to ignominy.
" It has been the pride of the Academy to range
men, at least in the most important studies, by what
they really knew, while appearance of knowledge,
which was not really present, has always provoked
scorn and derision. This system is a revolution. It
establishes premiums for knowledge of curiosities, and
appears to me to lack conspicuously the only merit that
I knew to be claimed for it namely, impartiality.
" I hope you will take this letter as an indication of
my sympathy in this business, which appears to me to
have considerable importance.
" Yours truly,
" G. H. MENDELL.
" P. S. In examination for places as teachers in
public schools it may well be that it is necessary to
have a system of competition by which the examiners
shall be guided in assigning a position to one of ten
applicants. There is no reason at West Point- for
competition at the first examination, which does not
pretend to arrange in order of merit, the object of this
examination being merely to determine a fair proba-
bility that the candidate will make good progress in
the course to follow, and not to determine whether
one is a better scholar than another. This considera-
tion, together with the past history of the Academy,
244
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
seems to me to show that the innovation is not necessary,
and that it is not an improvement on old methods."
I may mention that Colonel Mendell is interested in
public school education. He was Assistant Professor
of Philosophy at West Point from January 3, 1859, to
June 18, 1863.
On Colonel Mendell's letter is written, " I concur in
the above. Charles S. Stewart "-Colonel Stewart,
of the Engineers. I have also a great many others
here, but will only take time to refer to a few of
them. Colonel Henry M. Lazelle, lately Commandant
of Cadets, says :
" COMMONWEALTH HOTEL,
"BOSTON, MASS., October 14, 1882.
" DEAR GENERAL FRY :
******
" I am glad that at last this subject and its cor-
relative have attracted attention in the Army outside
of West Point; and I am equally glad that they are to
have a hearing within Army circles, and I hope, their
remedy there.
******
" I think that the tendency and the actual present
practice is to exact everything possible within the
Board's construction of the statute.
" I remember on one occasion calling attention to
the fact that one of the printed problems was a sub-
ject in alligation, which I regarded as beyond elemen-
tary proportion, and therefore beyond even the re-
quirements of the Military Academy regulations for
admission of candidates.
ADMISSION TO THE MILITAEY ACADEMY. 245
" It is true that there can be no partiality, that the
examination is wholly impersonal ; but it is unques-
tionably exacting to the smallest details ; while the
previous opportunities or disadvantages, the peculiari-
ties or the future possibilities of the student applicant,
are never known, under the present system, to the
Academic Board, and in no way interest its members.
In my judgment the questions in some subjects, espe-
cially in history and geography, are so numerous, and
of so wide a scope, that only a rapid writer, perfectly
familiar with the answers required, could present a
perfect paper within the allotted time ; and it is need-
less to say that such a being does not often present
himself.
" I think that the Academic Board attaches great
weight to the idea that it spares to the candidate the
mortification of a future failure ; and to the Academy
much expense by the summary rejection (without in-
quiry) of those unable to secure the percentage re-
quired. While this may be true to a certain extent,
there is at the same time, on the other hand, afforded
the applicant a full opportunity to avail himself of
his cramming (as you have stated), without cross-ques-
tioning, or the sifting out of the reasons of things
the whys and wherefores in the present silent written
examinations ; and there is further completely ignored
the fact that the minds of youth of equal aptitude and
ultimate possibilities have developed unequally, be-
cause of unequal training in a given direction, some
having had, perhaps, only very meagre preparatory
advantages. And yet every graduate knows that
many of these raw specimens, barely able to enter,
246 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
climb during the four years to very near the top of
their class. Such an institution of the people, and for
the people, should be fairly within their reach with-
out an expensive preparatory course. Such, evidently,
was the intention of the founders of the Military
Academy. And it is plain that antagonisms will be
generated sooner or later, in the public mind towards
an institution whose benefits are not to be obtained
except by a costly preliminary process; and which
even then rejects on an average more than one-third of
all applicants at their first trial.
* & * -H- * *
" It is within the knowledge of all, that during the
past twelve or fifteen years the steady tendency at
West Point has been toward increasing the course of
studies in extent and difficulty. And it is no reflec-
tion upon any one that this is so, since it is an inevi-
table result of the rapid multiplication of the methods
and of the truths of science. Each professor there
has been ambitious to keep pace with progress else-
where ; has been jealous of the time given to subjects
in departments other than his own ; and anxious per-
haps to swell the dimensions of his own depart-
ment of instruction. It is easy to see that the
natural result of this would be to declare deficient,
without much toleration or charity. An additional
language Spanish is now taught, and I think
that I am safe in saying that in every other de-
partment of study there the course has been in-
creased, while the period four years is the same
as formerly.
" The consequences of all the united causes are, few
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 247
successful candidates for admission, and very small
graduating classes.
* * * * * #
" The mental strain of the present course and its
exactions are, it seems to me, from beginning to end,
too much. It leaves the cadet exhausted, and on
graduating, he throws his professional studies aside to
be resumed only when compelled to do so. But a rel-
atively small proportion of the large number present-
ing themselves each June at West Point can stand it
for four years. Hence the Corps of Cadets will con-
tinue to be small, and the number of graduates in the
Service disproportionate to the number of non-gradu-
ates so long as existing conditions continue.
" The Military Academy was certainly created for
the Army, and not the reverse ; and the public sooner
or later, out of patience and sympathy with it, as now
producing, will demand that it supply the needs of the
Army. When it is considered that no purely military
instruction is given, except in tactics, until the last
year, and that cadets are very seldom found deficient
in that year, that the deficiencies are chiefly in pure or
applied mathematics and the languages, it does seem
that less pressure might and should be exerted in these
last named studies. As cadets doing fairly -well
therein would easily master the fourth year's course,
the Army would have many more graduates, who, per-
haps, if not fitted for the higher duties of their pro-
fession, would be eminently qualified for those of the
line; and it certainly would be a great gainer in intel-
ligence and in professional qualifications. And cer-
tainly, as you have said, the law establishing the course
248 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
of studies at the Academy and providing for its grad-
uates contemplated this gradation in Academic pro-
ficiency with the view of increasing the number of
graduates.
" I beg, General, that you will pardon any indiscre-
tions of language or hasty thoughts that may appear
herein.
* * # # vf *
" With the highest esteem, I remain most sincerely,
" Your obedient servant,
"H. M. LAZELLE."
Colonel C. S. Stewart, Engineer Corps, writes as
follows :
a SAN FRANCISCO, GAL., December 2, 1882.
" MY DEAR FRIEND :
" Let me thank you for your good words as given in
the Army and Navy Journal of last week, which call
attention to the illegal tests required of candidates for
admission by the Academic Board at the Military
Academy. The arithmetical jugglery and legerde-
main may, however, be theoretically ordered by the
Secretary of War, but, if so, he, it seems to me, goes
far beyond the intent and meaning of the statutes. I
trust he may be induced to make the Board go back
to a simple examination, which would give some chance
to many a fellow now turned off to hold on, and, with
the training at the Academy, make as good an officer
as any now obtained.
"It is only within a very few years that I have
had any knowledge of this, as it seems to me, out-
rageous system of examination for admission at West
Point. . . .
" C. SEAFORTH STEWART."
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 249
Colonel Stewart graduated head of the class in
which McClellan was second, and has a son who passed
the examination for admission and is now a cadet at
the Academy.
General W. W. Burns, of the Subsistence Depart-
ment, authorizes me to use the following letter ad-
dressed by him to the Army and Navy Register:
" SIR : Your correspondent (unknown quantity)
seems to be anxious to popularize West Point so that
the people will look upon the Sieves with more favor.
He would lengthen the term a year, grant leaves to
visit and keep up current relations with the times and
people, raise the standard of admission, and would
remodel the course so as to take in knowledge of mod-
ern warfare, etc. In a word, would place it more on
a footing with other colleges. He says he is a young
man, and therefore. ad vises the doing away with old
methods to square with young and vigorous ideas suit-
able to steam, electricity, breech-loaders, armor de-
fences, etc. These are taking suggestions, and strike
the popular heart. i Progress ' is the tocsin of the
times. Festina lente. Principles are not young ; dis-
coveries may be. The Medes and the Persians
Homer's Greeks based military education upon order
and discipline. Order, heaven's first law ; discipline,
the rule of wisdom. Discipline of the mind and body.
Mathematics discipline the mind, calisthenics the body;
both require order and healthful restraint. Military
education forms a matrix for knowledge which comes
after, as the sprout from the rich soil. Whatever seed
250 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
be planted finds quick root and flourishes. A democ-
racy fosters military education as a necessary evil, for
its method is autocratic. It can never be popularized.
It ought not to be in our body politic, but should be
treated as gunpowder, kept secluded and safe, re-
spected for its use, guarded against abuse. The cadet
should be taken as a young colt from the field, with-
out false training or loose handling, vigorous from his
native stock (the people), ambitious to improve his
condition, eager to win the goal, his eye upon his
country's eagle and flag waving above him. Reading,
writing, arithmetic, his country's history and geogra-
phy imbibed from his common school, mathematics
and drill will soon test his natural abilities. Then let
the chaff be blown away and the sound seed ground
in the mill of discipline, both of mind and body,
healthily, as was done at West Point. Then he should
be reserved for his country's use, not his own or that of
popular friends. Knowledge of current war, history,
morals and manners should follow at such schools as
Fort Monroe and Leavenworth, in corps or regiments.
He is dedicated, set apart for the people, who are sov-
ereign, as a servant of the public. His life a school,
theoretical, practical, progressive, for emergencies.
High schools are destroying the youth of our times,
turning out loose professionals, or degenerating indus-
trial classes into an overstock of clerks, poorly paid,
would-be gentlemen. Loose habits and smattering
science to be unlearned would take half of the West
Point term ; the character could never be reformed.
It is brain, nerve and muscle that West Point requires,
not knowledge in a diversified curriculum. Bacon
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 251
recommends few books, well digested, not for knowl-
edge, but for the mind discipline. Doubtless the
young professors now at West Point understand this.
" REPUBLIC. "
General L. C. Hunt writes me as follows :
U A^N ARBOR, MICHIGAN, March 15, 1883.
" DEAR FRY :
******
" West Point always has been, as it is now, intensely
conservative. There is so much that is really admir-
able at the Institution, under any regime, and so much
that is fascinating in its surroundings and belongings,
that each generation of men stationed there will regard
as heretical any change or criticism or any reversion
to the methods of the past which we know to have
worked better.
" For my part I am satisfied that the methods since
the war have not been up to the old mark too much
crowding, exaction, cramming specially not enough
of broad general outlook.
"L. C. HUNT."
General Webb, President of the College of the City
of New York, writes :
" MY DEAR GENERAL :
" In answer to your request that I should furnish
you with a copy of the remarks that I was induced to
make after hearing you read your most interesting
paper upon the admission of new cadets to the U. 8.
Military Academy, I regret to state that I have been
unable until this late day to put them in writing. I
hope you will accept this letter, therefore, as simply
the result of an effort to recall sentiments forced from
252
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
me by hearing your arguments in favor of a change in
the examination of candidates for our Alma Mater.
" If one who has had six years' experience as an in-
structor at West Point and fourteen years' experience
as president of a college, extending over a period
during which he has conducted the examination of
over 12,000 candidates for admission from the New
York public schools, can be of any service in securing
a settled conviction in the mind of our average Con-
gressman as to his duties in regard to this matter of
selecting candidates for West Point, and securing a
proper representation of his State and district in the
Military Academy, I will gladly do my part in this
letter.
" We all know the working of the law, and we know
that each candidate represents a Congressional Dis-
trict, but there are two points to which I would call
special attention, and one is already covered by your
paper.
"The first is as you stated. The duty devolved
upon those appointed to conduct the affairs of the
Academy is to secure, as far as may lie in their power,
under suitable regulations, adopted to protect the
Academy from suffering any diminution in a proper
standard in a knowledge of belle lettres, arts and mili-
tary science on the part of its graduates, while at the
same time they shall secure, as far as possible, a rep-
resentation from, all parts of our country.
" We therefore feel at once that this question of ex-
aminations for admission, and the question of the du-
ties of members of Congress in regard to making ap-
pointments, will both give rise to as many discussions
ADMISSION TO TEE MILITARY ACADEMY. 253
and as many methods of discussing them as you may
find men willing to write. You will therefore find
from me in this paper only what I recall as having
said in the presence of the Military Service Institution
on these two subjects.
" The Military Academy, as a national school, has
always stood on about the same footing in regard to
the ordinary boys' school as most of our leading col-
leges have been supposed to stand. The gravest error
that has been committed has been that which fostered
the idea that the Military Academy should seek her
recruits from among college graduates. To print a
number of questions, said to be of about sunicient
testing qualities in the various subjects, and to hold
them up as models for those who are preparing them-
selves to enter West Point, is proper, and conducive
to produce among the boys' schools of our country a
fine appreciation of what a good common school edu-
cation ought to be in this country. This is all that
the law contemplated ; indeed, all that the law allows.
And so much for entrance examinations. The com-
mon sense of the Academic Board at West Point must
govern this whole matter until it may be made neces-
sary for Congressmen to encroach upon the privileges
and rights of that body, when the privileges and rights
of their constituents are interfered with by them.
And now as to the duties of these Congressmen.
" If the district a citizen is called upon to represent
in Congress be in a condition such as to prevent the
member from selecting a suitable candidate for West
Point, it is the duty of the Congressman to refrain
from making such selection until through his influence
254
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
he may raise the standard of education in that district.
If the district be one capable of furnishing a suitable
candidate, fully equal to pass the moderate examina-
tion which should be required for entrance to West
Point, he must under the law select one fitted by nature,
and by habits, and by associations to become the com-
rade of officers of the Army, and all the certificates of
boards and committees and politicians are worthless
in. the eyes of the law when the question of the re-
sponsibility of the Congressman is brought up.
" The brightest brain in any district never has been
and never will be the best fitted for the duties of an
Army officer. No member of Congress has the right
to send to West Point a coarse, bright fellow, simply
because he passes a Board of Examiners, called to-
gether possibly to free him from the responsibility
which the law put upon him. If he wants to do his
duty through a board let him announce that the
board is to pick out the man best fitted physically,
morally, intellectually, and in habits and disposition
to receive so important an appointment from the Gov-
ernment ; if the Congressman himself knows nothing
about his candidate's habits and calling, the people in
the vicinity will. Some Congressmen have pursued
this course conscientiously, but I fear many have not.
Therefore it should be understood that there is noth-
ing whatsoever which under the law can free a Con-
gressman from these responsibilities. And when a
common fellow is dismissed from West Point the
name of the man who selected one notoriously unfit
should be published. If these rules were adopted
you would not find many self-mutilators or liars.
ADMISSION TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 255
" If these be the duties of Congressmen, how care-
ful must the Academic Board be not to place the
standard for admission beyond the reach of the young
man who would be deemed in his district best fitted
for college.
"And now, agreeing with you in the spirit of your
paper and expressing as I have, possibly in too strong
a manner, the feelings that have arisen when I have
heard West Point discussed during the past eight
years, I turn to another question which will, I hope,
call for earnest consideration from the Academic
Board.
" Nothing can be more important to the young candi-
date than the old-fashioned oral examination made in
a public way by kind-hearted, intelligent professors,
who seek solely the good of the Academy, and are
above dwelling in a pedantic manner upon technicali-
ties which do not affect the general capacity and
knowledge of the young man. You may answer that
we conduct our examinations in this college through
written matter. Yes, but I have a thousand young
men to examine in seven subjects, and it is not in my
power to require the oral examination, whose loss I
deplore. The best of heart and the best of headwork
is lost to me. The examination of the eight hundred
students for advancement is required by law to be
oral whenever possible.
" I think I have been sufficiently explicit, but I sin-
cerely regret that, writing at the last moment and
under pressure, I am prevented from sending you a
better digested document. I have expressed, however,
the results of a long experience. If cadets could be
256 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
chosen by such able men as Mr. Hewitt, West Point
would not suffer. But if some of the other members
do not profit by his example in spirit and in deed, the
Academic Board at West Point will continue to be
antagonistic to the best interests of maoy members of
Congress.
" Therefore I say, finally, let us all know that you do
not require a young man to know too much to enter
West Point. Then let the members of Congress read
the law in a proper spirit and correspond to its pro-
visions.
" I remain truly yours,
" ALEX. S. WEBB.
"NEW YORK, June 1, 1883."
I now repeat that I am under obligations to Pro-
fessor Andrews for the kind terms in which he has
mentioned me, and, as an officer of this Institution, I
thank him for reading his paper. I have no doubt
that the Army will receive it with interest, and that
the proper authorities will in due time pass impartially
and wisely on the subject under discussion.
Mr. Chairman, I move a vote of thanks to Professor
Andrews.
JUDGE ADVOCATE GARDNER I move, Mr. President,
as an amendment to the resolution, the addition of
these words, viz. : " and that a copy be requested for
the archives of this Institution."
The amendment was accepted by General Fry.
ARTICLE XI.
The Militia.*
There are many indications of a deep-seated pur-
pose to have the country derive permanent advantage
from the military lessons of the War of the Rebellion
while the principal actors- in the great struggle are
spared to us as teachers. The able paper to which
we have just listened adds to the proofs that there is
a widespread feeling in favor of doing something more
than has yet been done to promote the military in-
terests of the country. It is in response to that feel-
ing that this Institution exists. The question is, upon
what should the friends of progress concentrate their
efforts ? I feel that I shall be in a small minority
when, dissenting from the paper of the illustrious Gen-
eral of the Army, I answer, not upon the Militia.
General Sherman (as I understand him) says all
parties agree that it is the settled policy of our
Government to maintain the smallest kind of a Regular
Army as a school of instruction ; that in case of war
the armies which Congress is empowered to raise and
support must be supplemented by the militia; that
the militia is the physical force on which the Chief
Magistrate of the nation must mainly depend ; that it
is our duty as soldiers and citizens to aid as far as we
may to mould the militia into a form in which it may
* Remarks by General Fry upon a paper on ' ' The Militia, ' ' read by
General Sherman before the Military Service Institution.
257
258
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
be made valuable when called into active service ;
and lie advocates a bill, now before Congress, for re-
organizing and making an appropriation for the militia.
With due deference to the high source from which
these views emanate, I venture to express dissent from
some of them. I do not underestimate the value of
military organization and instruction among the peo-
ple, for it is to the people the Government must go in
one way or another for its defence and support. But
the trouble, as I see it, is that the General Government
can accomplish no appreciable good under its power
to provide for organizing and disciplining the militia.
Militiamen are not " troops," or " soldiers " ; they are
armed civilians, the arms-bearing citizens of the vari-
ous States. They constitute a State force of which
the Governor is Commander-in-chief. The character
of this force is not changed by the fact that it may
for a limited time, and for specified purposes, be placed
on detached service under the President of the United
States. The Constitution clearly separates and distin-
guishes the militia from the " armies " of the United
States. It says : Congress shall have power, 1st, to
provide and maintain a navy ; 2d, to raise and support
armies ; and 3d, to provide for calling forth the militia.
If General Sherman is correctly reported, he said in a
letter to Governor Long of Massachusetts, in 1880, he
was " more than willing that the organized militia and
volunteers of the country shall be considered as a part
of the Army of the United States." I am unable to
perceive how the militia can be considered a part of
the Army, or how any one of the three species of force
which the General Government is authorized by the
THE MILITIA. 259
Constitution to use, can be considered part of either
of the other two.
The power given to Congress by the Constitution
to provide for organizing and disciplining the militia,
is in fact a nullity, because the militia is composed of
the arms-bearing citizens of the States, and the Con-
stitution reserves to the States the right to appoint
the officers and train the militia, and the Governor of
the State is the militia's commander-in-chief. It is not
practicable for the General Government to control the
militia, even so far as to establish uniformity through-
out the different States. If uniformity were attempt-
ed in earnest, the General Government would be com-
pelled to set up a standard and then seek conformity
to it by force of law. It will no doubt be admitted
without argument that forcible process is not practi-
cable if it were constitutional ; so that the question is
narrowed to the simple inquiry, should the General
Government set up a standard of proficiency for the
militia of all the States and make itself responsible for
securing conformity to that standard by persuasion
by offering inducements or rewards ? Such a course
suggests several grave questions. Congress has the
right to appropriate money for arming the militia, but
its right to appropriate prize-money to induce militia-
men to improve in the profession of arms may well be
questioned. If the General Government fixed a stand-
ard, and sought conformity to it in any way, even
through temptation to share in appropriations, it
would necessarily incur responsibility which might
lead to annoyances and even serious complications.
It may fairly be held that the military purposes for
260 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
which Congress should appropriate money (except as
specifically provided for in the matter of arming the
militia) must be found under its constitutional power
to raise and support armies, which is wholly separate
and distinct from its power to call forth the militia
and from its nominal power to provide for organizing
and disciplining the militia.
The only purposes for which the General Govern-
ment can call forth the militia are, first, " to execute
the laws of the Union " ; second, " to suppress insur-
rections, etc." ; and third, " to repel invasion" Al-
though offensive warfare as a necessary part of repel-
ing invasion might be carried on to a limited extent
by militia, the General Government has no constitu-
tional power to call forth the militia for the purpose
of invasion, or for any other purpose than one of the
three named.
In view of the foregoing facts, and others which I
have not time to mention, I see no reason to believe
that the military interests of the country can be im-
proved materially by any effort of the General Govern-
ment to do more under its power to provide for or-
ganizing and disciplining the militia than it has here-
tofore done. All of importance that can be done
toward organizing, disciplining, and instructing the
militia, must, it seems to me, be done by the States.
It is well to bear in mind that although the militia
has been severely let alone by the General Govern-
ment, the subject of its improvement has been under
discussion ever since the Government was founded.
On the 21st of January, 1790, President Washington
submitted to Congress an elaborate report from his
THE MILITIA.
261
Secretary of War, General Knox, upon a well-organ-
ized militia, and a plan for securing it. General Knox
said : " An energetic militia is to be regarded as the
capital security of a free republic, and not a standing
army forming a distinct class of the community ; " but
he admitted the impracticability of " disciplining at
once the mass of the people," and added : " All dis-
cussions on the subject of a powerful militia will re-
sult in one or the other of the following principles :
First, either efficient institutions must be established
for the military education of the youth, and that the
knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused through-
out the community by the means of rotation ; or, sec-
ondly, that the militia must be formed of substitutes,
after the manner of the militia of Great Britain." In
1792 the existing militia law was passed.
In 1803 a committee reported to the House that
" after full investigation " they were of opinion that
the law of May 8, 1792, "embraceth all the objects of
a militia institution delegated to Congress " ; and they
added: "the principles of that law lay the founda-
tions of a militia system on the broad basis prescribed
by the Constitution, and are well calculated to insure
a complete national defence if carried into effect by the
State governments agreeably to the power reserved to
the States respectively by the Constitution ; and
therefore ought not to be altered " ; and the commit-
tee recommended that the President " be requested to
write to the Executive of each State," urging the im-
portance of vigorous exertions by the State govern-
ments.
In 1806, a committee reported at length to the
262 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
House, and closed by saying, " that it is inexpedient
to adopt measures for the classification or new organi-
zation of the militia."
In 1809 another committee reported to the House,
" that having carefully examined the subject referred
to them, they are of opinion that it would not be
proper, at this time, to make any alteration in the
militia system of the United States."
In 1810 a committee reported to the Senate: "If
the States are anxious for an effective militia, to them
belongs the power, and to them belong the means of
rendering the militia our bulwark in war and our
safeguard in peace ; and as the committee are willing
to hope that the States will not be unmindful of the
great duty of providing for the national safety by a
well-ordered and effective militia, and as the committee
are unwilling to declare any powers to Congress not
expressly given by the Constitution, nor necessarily
incident to the powers delegated, they submit the fol-
lowing resolution, viz. : Resolved, That the committee
be discharged from further consideration of this sub-
ject."
The House also considered the subject in 1810, so
far as to collect information upon it. It was in re-
sponse to an inquiry from Mr. Tallmadge, of the
House, at that session, that General Huntington, of
Connecticut, who was an officer in the Revolution, a
Brigadier- General in the Provisional Army of 1798-99,
and twice a member of Congress, said : " I have never
seen any system proposed in which I have confidence ;
nor do I believe any system commensurate to the object
will ever be adopted by the Government, or, if adopted,
THE MILITIA.
263
be submitted to by the sovereign people. . . . Let
the Government proceed to regulate the militia to the
utmost length their masters, the sovereign people, will
bear ; it will be just so far as to make them food for
powder in the day of battle ; and death, or what is
worse, loss of honor, must be expected by every officer
of spirit connected with them."
In 1816 the Secretary of War communicated to the
House a plan for organizing and disciplining the
militia.
In 1817 Mr. Harrison reported to the House upon
the two points : " First, Is it desirable that the whole
male population of the United States, of the proper
age, should be trained to the use of arms, so as to
supersede under any circumstances the necessity of a
standing army ? " " Second, Is it practicable ? " Upon
these inquiries an able and elaborate report was made.
The conclusions were that " the liberties of America
must be preserved as they were won, by the arms, the
discipline, and the valor of her f reeborn sons " ; that
"nothing can be more dangerous in such a govern-
ment than to have a knowledge of the military art
confined to a part of the people, for sooner or later
that part will govern " ; that " there can scarcely be a
restraint more vexatious and disgusting to a grown
man than the initiatory lessons of the military art " ;
that " to this cause is to be attributed the little prog-
ress that has been made in training the militia of the
United States " ; and that there is " no prospect that
any change of system could, with regard to the pres-
ent militia, produce the result at which we aim."
Hence the committee concluded that to establish a
264 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
sound military system we must begin on the youth of
the country; and that we ought " to devise a system of
military instruction which shall be engrafted on and
form part of the ordinary education of our youth,
extended without exception to every individual of the
proper age not in distant schools established for the
purpose, but that it should form a branch of education
in every school within the United States."
In 1819 Mr. Harrison made to the House another
full report upon the subject.
In 1822 the Committee on Ways and Means re-
ported to the House: "It is not expedient at this
time to increase the annual appropriation for arming
the militia."
In 1826 the Secretary of War, James Barbour, made
an earnest effort in relation to the militia. He ad-
dressed a circular-letter to Governors of States and
other prominent persons for their views. He adopted
it as an unquestionable political maxim, that " a well-
organized and well-disciplined militia is the natural
defence of a free people " ; and added : " I am anxious
to see a system adopted by the National Legislature
which will realize the hopes of us all in reference to
this great arm of national defence." The many and
elaborate replies he received presented various phases
of the subject. No better authority responded than
Timothy Pickering, who served with the Massachu-
setts militia in 1775, was a member of the Continental
Board of War, Quartermaster-General in 1780, Post-
master-General in 1791, Secretary of War, January,
1795; Secretary of State, December, 1795; United
States Senator in 1803, and member of the United
THE MILITIA. 265
States House of Representatives in 1813. He said:
" The opinion that a well-organized and well-disci-
plined militia is the natural defence of a free people
is entitled to the character given to it by the Secre-
tary, that of a maxim, but surely the experience of
the people of the United States will not authorize the
conclusion ; because a well-disciplined militia compre-
hending the active mass of able-bodied men never had,
and, I do not hesitate to say, never will have, an ex-
istence in our country." " If," added Pickering, " the
worse than useless project of training the whole body
of the militia be abandoned, some encouragement
would be requisite to induce men to join select volun-
teers"
General E. P. Gaines also took hold of the subject
in 1826, and made a ]ong report upon it; and in 1829
it was again fully reported upon in the House. A
bill was offered, and some new points made in its sup-
port. It was boldly asserted that " the object of an
organization of the militia of the United States should
be to make every individual thereof liable to enrol-
ment, a citizen-soldier, and to give to the whole the
character and efficiency of an army" " To accomplish
this great object," it was asserted, " liberal disburse-
ments must be made from the Treasury of the United
States " ; and the Government was openly charged
with " a disastrous and withering parsimony " toward
the militia; and then, somewhat as now, the surplus
in the United States Treasury was urged as a reason
for a government appropriation for the militia. The
committee said : "Already have propositions, novel and
experimental in their character, to dispose of an antici-
266 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
pitted burdensome surplus in the Treasury of the
United States, been presented to Congress for consid-
eration. If such anticipations are well founded, the
claim of the militia of the United States to a liberal
share of such surplus is irresistible," and the committee
offered a bill. But notwithstanding all these efforts,
o
including the last one mentioned, to deplete a plethoric
treasury, the General Government could not be led into
legislating for the militia of the States further than
making the usual appropriation for arms.
States also, and their militia officers, petitioned Con-
gress from time to time without effect. It is not nec-
essary to refer specially to the efforts of later times.
It seems to be a crystallized conviction, and I think a
sound one, that it is neither constitutional nor practi-
cable for the General Government to make a reliable
military force of the militia; and that the General
Government ought not to make appropriations directly
for militia purposes, otherwise than providing arms.
The second article of Amendments to the Constitu-
tion says : "A well-regulated militia being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." The
right secured to our people by this article is a precious
one ; and eminent jurists, statesmen, and soldiers have
reaffirmed the assumption or maxim upon which it is
predicated, to wit: that a well-regulated militia is
necessary to the security of a free State ; but, as Pick-
ering said in 1810, there is nothing in our experience
to confirm it. No one will maintain that we have
ever had a well-regulated militia, or any thing ap-
proaching it, and we are farther from it to-day than
THE MILITIA. 267
we ever were. Yet we have had both foreign and
domestic wars and we are still free.
In a letter to Congress Washington said : "If called
upon to declare upon oath whether the militia have
been most serviceable or hurtful on the whole, I should
subscribe to the latter"; and Pickering said it had
" never done any good to the country except in the
single affair of Banker Hill."
The bad behavior of the militia in the War of 1812
including its refusal to cross the Canada frontier
o
is a matter of history.
The conclusion is, that instead of depending upon a
well-regulated militia, our liberties depend, primarily,
upon the character, spirit, and intelligence of our peo-
ple, and secondarily, upon a wise exercise of the con-
stitutional power of Congress to raise and support
armies.
In the letter from Washington already cited he
says : " The jealousy of a standing army and the evils
to be apprehended from one are remote, and, in my
judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not
at all to be dreaded."
But, Mr. President, the real proposition before us is
not to improve and enforce the so-called " well-regu-
lated militia " system of the Constitution, but to
abandon it.
As I have shown, I do not expect the General Gov-
ernment to derive much benefit from that system, but
I dissent from the grounds upon which it is proposed
to abandon it. The proposition is that the General
Government shall appropriate money directly for the
aid or encouragement of certain volunteer military
268
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
organizations, of which the so-called National Guard
of the State of New York is a good, if not the best,
example. This force is in fact a State army, though
as it marches under the militia ilao^ I do not assert
o
that it is in violation of the Constitution, which says :
" No State shall, without the consent of Congress
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace."
Certainly the National Guard of New York is an ex-
cellent military force. I look with respect and admi-
ration upon the devotion of its members to the unsel-
fish and noble task of preparing themselves for afford-
ing military protection to the very fellow-citizens who
are their competitors in civil life, and who profit by
the time these National Guardsmen take from their
regular pursuits, and for the general welfare devote
to improvement in the profession of arms. I repeat,
I respect and admire the purposes and zeal of these
citizen-soldiers. But we are considering the public
question, whether upon the facts in the case, the Gen-
eral Government ought to appropriate money for their
assistance, under its constitutional power to provide
for organizing and disciplining the militia. I think
not. Certainly not, if a well-regulated militia such as
our forefathers meant, and our Constitution and laws
contemplate, is necessary to our security ; for this Na-
tional Guard is a substitute for the militia an eva-
sion of the militia laws, or rather the State's apology
for not enforcing the militia laws upon all able-bodied
male citizens between eighteen and forty-five years of
age. If the General Government should recognize and
aid this special State force it would to the extent of
that recognition and aid oppose the enforcement of
THE MILITIA. 269
the militia system, and substitute for it a system of
standing armies, for the States ; and it would be build-
ing up these State standing armies under cover of the
very militia system which their existence would de-
stroy. The militia is in service by law; it is a com-
pulsory force. These National Guardsmen enlist vol-
untarily, but they receive all there is in the militia
laws of the United States, and of the State, to further
their military purposes. They are enlisted, organized,
uniformed, equipped, drilled, instructed, and disci-
plined as soldiers. " Nothing," said Mr. Harrison, in
his report to the U. S. House of Representatives in
1816, "can be more dangerous in such a government
than to have a knowledge of the military art confined
to a part of the people ; for sooner or later that part
will govern." I do not share Mr. Harrison's appre-
hensions, but this National Guard is the "part of the
people " to which all or nearly all knowledge of the
military art under control of the various States is con-
fined ; and to this restriction of military knowledge it
is proposed the General Government shall give direct
aid and encouragement by an appropriation of money.
It is not to be supposed that the liberties of the people
of this country will ever be in jeopardy from either
the Army of the United States, or from these armies
of the respective States ; but it may be asserted with
safety that the danger is no more remote from one of
these forces than from the other ; and of the two, the
General Government had better devote its money to
the development and support of the former. With-
out dwelling longer upon this point, I may say it seems
to me there are weighty objections to the General Gov-
270
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ernment appropriating money directly for these spe-
cial State forces, as well as to appropriations for the
militia of the laws. It is beyond dispute that such
State armies as the National Guard of New York are
valuable military bodies, whose services may be need-
ed at any moment. Promoting their military effi-
ciency, however, is a matter that rests with the States
who create and control these substitutes for the militia,
not with the General Government. As U. S. Senator
Smith reported in 1810: "If the States are anxious
for an effective militia, to them belongs the power,
and to them belong the means of rendering the militia
truly our bulwark in war and our safeguard in peace."
But notwithstanding the duty of the States, it can-
not be denied that our military defence rests largely and
directly upon the General Government ; and if that
Government is not to create, maintain, or encourage
" the militia," or its substitute the National Guard, by
direct appropriations, through what channels shall it
proceed to meet the responsibility it is under ? The
answer seems to be, through its constitutional powers
to provide and maintain a navy, and to raise and sup-
port armies, and make rules for their government and
regulation. This includes the power to enlist and to
draft the men, appoint the officers, and to organize,
discipline, educate, feed, clothe, equip, transport, and
pay the forces. The right of the General Government
to promote military education through the exercise of
its power to raise and support armies, is limited only
by the will of the people as expressed through Con-
gress. That, no doubt, was the view taken by the
committee which reported to the U. S. House of Kep-
THE MILITIA. 271
resentatives in 1817, that we ought " to devise a system
of military instruction which shall be engrafted on
and form part of the ordinary education of our youth,"
and under which officers of the Army are now detailed
for service at a number of the schools and colleges of
the country. I have no doubt that more can be done
in that way for the military interests of the country,
than can be accomplished by any effort of the General
Government to force or coax grown men to submit to
militia training.
In addition to these schools for youth, much can be
accomplished through the military schools established
and maintained under the power to raise and support
armies. The Military Academy at West Point, the
Engineer School at Willet's Point, the Artillery
School at Fort Monroe, the Infantry School at Fort
Leavenworth, the Cavalry School which the Lieuten-
ant-General Commanding the Army proposes for Fort
Riley, and this Military Service Institution (composed
of twelve hundred officers and ex-officers of the
Regular Army) laboring to preserve the true military
spirit and to disseminate military information, can all
be developed and enlarged to any extent that Con-
gress may deem necessary in providing military in-
struction for the security of the country. Further-
more, military geographical departments, and military
stations, especially the permanent posts occupied by
the artillery near our seaboard cities, can under the
power to raise and support armies be made practical
fields and schools for all the volunteer forces that care
to gather together in and around them for military ex-
ercise and instruction. In all these cases the General
272 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Government would have full control and responsi-
bility. And finally, as the essential basis of its mili-
tary system, the General Government should as it has
always shown itself willing to do support a standing
army large enough to give full development to the
various arms of Service, to keep pace with the prog-
ress of the military profession throughout the world,
especially in matters pertaining to the staff, and the
manufacture of and improvements in weapons and
projectiles of war.
I venture the assertion that no thinking citizen of
the republic, when he recalls the behavior of our Reg-
ular Army since the formation of the Government, and
particularly at the close of the Rebellion and during
the period of reconstruction, really feels afraid that
the liberties of the people will ever be endangered by
it. If we ever lose our freedom it will be from the
corruption of the people, from loss of manliness, from
adopting the creed that u the wealth of nations con-
sists, not in national virtues and primitive simplicity,
but in silk and cotton and something they call capi-
tal " ; and not from the Regular Army. The truth is,
the opposition to our Regular Army is in reality based
on economy, or parsimony if you please. No one who
studies the subject can fail to see, that just in the pro-
portion that a body politic becomes devoted to peace-
able pursuits, is the necessity developed for setting
apart a portion of the community for special military
training and service.
In case of war, I regard it as inevitable that, instead
of depend ing upon the militia, the General Government,
under its power to raise and support armies, will call
THE MILITIA.
273
volunteers into its own service, and if necessary, enroll
and draft the " national forces " as it did by the so-
called Enrolment Act of March 3, 1863. In New
York that Act was held to be unconstitutional upon
the ground that it attempted to create a national
militia; but, on the other hand, in Pennsylvania it
was held to be constitutional ; and it is now recognized
as a constitutional exercise of the power to raise and
support armies. If the national forces are called for
directly by the General Government they are quite sure
to come ; whereas, calls for State militia may be re-
fused as they were in 1812 and in 1861. Upon the
latter occasion some Governors not only refused but
defied the National Executive; upon the former, the
Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island refused to furnish the militia called for by the
President under the Act of April 10, 1812, and the
Governor of the first named State took the broad
ground that " the commanders-in-chief of the militia
of the several States have a right to determine whether
any of the exigencies contemplated by the Constitu-
tion of the United States exist, so as to require them
to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of
the United States, at the request of the President, to
be commanded by him, pursuant to acts of Congress."
In this view, the Governor was sustained by his coun-
cil, and by Justices Parsons, Sewell, and Parker of the
Supreme Court of the State. These Justices said :
"As this power is not delegated to the United States
by the Federal Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, it is reserved to the States respectively ;
and from the nature of the power, it must be exercised
274 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
by those with whom respectively is entrusted the
chief command of the militia." This doctrine was
disputed by Secretary of War James Monroe, in 1815;
and in the case of Martin v. Mott, the U. S. Supreme
Court squarely overruled it saying : " We are all of
opinion that the authority to decide whether the exi-
gency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President ;
and that his decision is conclusive upon all other per-
sons." But notwithstanding the clearness and sound-
ness of the Supreme Court's decision upon the princi-
ple, the power to decide whether the militia as such
shall be called out and put under the President, rests
practically with the Governors. If they, dissenting
from the President's views as to the exigency, refuse
his call, there is no process provided by which he can
secure the services of the militia with any certainty,
even though he appeal directly to militia officers sub-
ordinate to the Governor. Hence the necessity under
the power to raise and support armies for accepting
United States volunteers, and for enrolling and draft-
ing the " national forces."
I am not unmindful of the fact that the elements
which make up the " national forces " are essentially
the same as those which constitute the militia of the
States ; and that whether these elements are to respond
to our necessities as national forces, or State militia, it
is equally to the interest of the country that they re-
ceive beforehand all the military instruction practi-
cable. The point I desire to make here is that, taking
all things into consideration, the least dispute as to
constitutional power and public expediency will arise,
and the best results will be attained, if the General
THE MILITIA.
275
Government directs its efforts to secure that instruction
through its ample power to raise and support armies,
and not through its nominal power to provide for
organizing and disciplining the militia of the States,
leaving the States to work upon their citizens as militia.
PART II.
ARTICLE I.
Abraham Lincoln.*
Although I do not remember to have seen Lincoln
until the day of his first inauguration as President, I
knew him through my father. Pioneers from Ken
tucky to Illinois, they were friends from an early
period. Lincoln was a private in the volunteer forces
commanded by my father in the Black Hawk War of
1831-32. He was always a man of note among his
associates, in the Indian campaign as well as in sub-
sequent political campaigns, especially in the contest
with Douglas for the United States Senate. Mv
o /
father was an ardent personal and political friend of
Douglas, and in his circle it was looked upon as pre-
sumptuous and ridiculous for Abe Lincoln to compete
with the " Little Giant " for the Senate of the United
States.
The contest proved that the so called rail-splitter
was the real giant, and led to his selection for the
head of the new party at Chicago in the summer of
1860, and to his election to the Presidency in the fol-
lowing autumn. Lincoln and his Illinois competitor,
* " Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln," Edited by Allan Thorndike
Rice.
277
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Stephen A. Douglas, formed a striking contrast.
Douglas was low in stature, rotund in figure, with a
short neck, a big bullet-head, and a chubby face.
His lips were forced into the fixed smile character-
istic of the popular and well-satisfied public man of a
period when political success depended largely upon
what a man said, how he said it, and how he appeared
in personal intercourse with the people ; and not, as
now, much upon what newspapers say of him and for
him.
Lincoln was tall and thin ; his long bones were
united by large joints, and he had a long neck and an
angular face and head. Many likenesses represent his
face well enough, but none that I have ever seen do
justice to the awkwardness and ungainliness of his
figure. His feet, hanging loosely to his ankles, were
prominent objects ; but his hands were more con-
spicuous even than his feet due perhaps to the fact
that ceremony at times compelled him to clothe them
in white kid gloves, which always fitted loosely.
Both in the height of conversation and in the depth
of reflection his hand now and then ran over or sup-
ported his head, giving his hair habitually a disor-
dered aspect. I never saw him when he appeared to
me otherwise than a great man, and a very ugly one.
His expression in repose was sad and dull ; but his
ever-recurring humor, at short intervals, flashed forth
with the brilliancy of an electric light. I observed
but two well-defined expressions in his countenance ;
one, that of a pure, thoughtful, honest man, absorbed
by a sense of duty and responsibility: the other, that
of a humorist so full of fun that he could not keep it
ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 279
all in. His power of analysis was wonderful. He
strengthened every case he stated, and no anecdote or
joke ever lost force or effect from his telling. He in-
variably carried the listener with him to the very
climax, and when that was reached in relating a
humorous story, he laughed all over. His large
mouth assumed an unexpected and comical shape,
the skin on his nose gathered into wrinkles, and his
small eyes, though partly closed, emitted infectious
rays of fun. It was not only the aptness of his stories,
but his way of telling them, and his own unfeigned
enjoyment, that gave them zest, even among the
gravest men and upon the most serious occasions.
Nevertheless, Lincoln a good listener was not a
good conversationalist. When he talked, he told a
story or argued a case. But it should be remembered
that during the entire four years of his Presidency,
from the spring of 1861 until his death in April, 1865,
civil war prevailed. It bore heaviest upon him, and
his mind was bent daily, hourly even, upon the
weighty matters of his high office ; so that, as he
might have expressed it, he was either lifting with all
his might at the butt-end of the log, or sitting upon it
whittling, for rest and recreation.
Lincoln was as nearly master of himself as it is pos-
sible for a man clothed with great authority and en-
gaged in the affairs of public life to become. He had
no bad habits, and if he was not wholly free from the
passions of human nature, it is quite certain that pas-
sion but rarely, if ever, governed his action. If he
deviated from the straight course of justice, it was
usually from indulgence for the minor faults or weak-
280
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
nesses of his fellow-men. I observed but one craving
that he could not overcome : that was for a second
term of the Presidency. He was fully conscious of
the grip this desire had upon him, and once said in the
way of apology for it :
" No man knows what that gnawing is till he has
had it."
During the spring of 1861 I was in charge of the
appointment branch of the Adjutant-General's De-
partment. Upon one occasion, when I was at the
White House in the course of duty, the President,
after disposing of the matter in hand, said :
" You are in charge of the Appointment Office. I
have here a bushel-basketful of applications for offices
in the Army. I have tried to examine them all, but
they have increased so rapidly that I have got behind
and may have neglected some. I will send them all
to your office. Overhaul them, lay those that require
further action before the Secretary of War, and file
the others."
The bushel-basketful came, and the papers were
overhauled. They were dotted with notes, comments,
and queries by the President. One slip of paper
which I handed back to the President with the remark
that I supposed he would not care to have it placed
upon the official files bore a memorandum in his own
handwriting as follows :
" On this day Mrs. called upon me. She is the
wife of Major of the Regular Army. She wants
her husband made a Brigadier-General. She is a saucy
little woman, and I think she will torment me till I
have to do it. A. L."
ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 2<Sl
It was not long before that little woman's husband
was appointed a Brigadier-General.
At a later date I heard a conversation between Lin-
coln and Stanton in relation to the selection of Briga-
dier- Generals. The many applications and recommen-
dations were examined and discussed. Lincoln finally
said :
u Well, Mr. Secretary, I concur in pretty much all
you say. The only point I make is, that there has
got to be something done that will be unquestionably
in the interest of the Dutch, and to that end I want
Schimmelfennig appointed."
The Secretary replied :
" Mr. President, perhaps this Schimmel-what's-his-
name is not as highly recommended as some other
German officer."
" No matter about that," said Lincoln, " his name
will make up for any difference there may be, and I'll
take the risk of his coming out all right."
Then, with a laugh, he repeated, dwelling upon each
syllable of the name, and accenting the last one,
" Schim-mel-fen-/?/<7 must be appointed."
There is no purpose here to question General
Schimmelfennig's merits. The only object is to show
that Lincoln had reasons, in addition to Schimmelfen-
nig's recommendations, for appointing him Brigadier.
General.
After I became Provost-Marshal-General of the
United States March, 1863 the duty of enrolling
and drafting the national forces required me to see a
great deal of the President.
Once when I went into his office at the White
282
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
House, I found a private soldier making a complaint
to him. It was a summer afternoon. Lincoln looked
tired and careworn ; but he was listening as patiently
as he could to the grievances of the obscure member
of the military force known as "Scott's nine hundred,"
then stationed in Washington. When I approached
Lincoln's desk I heard him say :
" Well, my man, that may all be so, but you must
go to your officers about it."
The man, however, presuming upon Lincoln's good-
nature, and determined to make the most of his op-
portunity, persisted in re-telling his troubles and plead-
ing for the President's interference. After listening
to the same story two or three times as he gazed
wearily through the south window of his office upon
the broad Potomac in the distance, Lincoln turned
upon the man, and said in a peremptory tone that
ended the interview.
" Now, my man, go away, go away ! I cannot med-
dle in your case. I could as easily bail out the Poto-
mac River with a teaspoon as attend to all the details
of the Army."
The following is a good example of Lincoln's clear-
ness and force in stating a case. It relates to the
vexed question that prevailed in 1864-65 concerning
the quota of troops to be furnished by the States. The
Legislature of Rhode Island sent a committee to
Washington to confer with the President upon the
subject of the number of men required from that State.
The committee said in its report :
a The President at this point interrupted the com-
mittee to say that complaints from several States had
ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 283
already been made to the same effect, and in one in-
stance the subject had been earnestly pressed to his
attention, and that he had personally taken the pains
to examine for himself the formula which the Provost-
Marshal-General had adopted for the calculation and
distribution of the quotas for the different States, and
had arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible
for any candid mind to doubt or question its entire
fairness. In order that your committee might be fully
possessed of his opinion upon this subject, the Presi-
dent read the following paper, the original of which
had been forwarded to his Excellency the Governor of
the State of Vermont :
" ' EXECUTIVE MANSION, )
WASHINGTON, February, 8, 1865. j"
" ' Complaint is made to me by Vermont that the
assignment of her quota for the draft on the impend-
ing call is intrinsically unjust, and also in bad faith of
the Government's promise to fairly allow credits for
men previously furnished.
" ' To illustrate, a supposed case is stated as follows :
Vermont and New Hampshire must between them fur-
nish six thousand (6,000) men on the pending call ; and
being equals, one must furnish as many as the other
in the long-run. But the Government finds that on
former calls Vermont furnished a surplus of five hun-
dred (500), and New Hampshire a surplus of fifteen
hundred (1,500). These two surpluses make 2,000,
and added to the six thousand (6,000) make eight
thousand (8,000) to be furnished by the two States ;
or four thousand each, less fair credits. Then sub-
tracting Vermont's surplus of five hundred (500) from
284
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
her four thousand (4,000), leaves three thousand five
hundred (3,500) as her quota on the pending call ;
and likewise subtracting New Hampshire's surplus of
fifteen hundred (1,500) from her four thousand (4,000),
leaves two thousand five hundred (2,500) as her
quota on the pending call. These three thousand five
hundred (3,500) and two thousand five hundred
(2,500) make precisely the six thousand (6,000) which
the supposed case requires from the two States ; and
it is just equal for Vermont to furnish one thousand
(1,000) more now than New Hampshire, because New
Hampshire has heretofore furnished (1,000) more than
Vermont, which equalizes the burden of the two in the
long run ; and this proceeding, so far from being bad
faith to Vermont, is indispensable to keeping good faith
with New Hampshire. By no other process can the six
thousand (6,000) men be obtained from the two States,
and at the same time deal justly and keep faith with
both ; and we do but confuse ourselves in questioning
the operation by which the right result is reached.
" i The supposed case is perfect as an illustration.
" 'The pending call is not for three hundred thou-
sand (300,000) men, subject to fair credits, but is for
three hundred thousand (300,000) remaining after all
fair credits have been deducted; and it is impossible
to concede what Vermont asks without coming out
short of the three hundred thousand (300,000) men,
or making other localities pay for the partiality shown
her. This upon the case stated. If there be different
reasons for making an allowance to Vermont, let them
be presented and considered.
(Signed) " 'A. LINCOLN.' '
ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 285
This statement of the case by Lincoln was a conclu-
sive answer to both Vermont and Rhode Island.
A story has long been current that Lincoln sent an
applicant for office with a note to the Secretary of
War, directing that a letter of appointment be pre-
pared for the man to the office he sought ; that the
applicant returned to the President and announced
that Stanton refused to obey the order; that the Presi-
dent looked disappointed, but merely expressed his
regret at the result, and remarked that he had not
much influence with the administration. The anecdote
has generally been interpreted as meaning that Lincoln
could not control Stanton. The inference is erroneous.
Lincoln, so far as I could discover, was in every re-
spect the actual head of the administration, and when-
ever he chose to do so he controlled Stanton as well as
all the other Cabinet ministers.
I will cite one instance in relation to Stanton.
After compulsory military service was resorted to,
States and districts tried to fill their quotas, and save
their own citizens from being drafted into the Army,
by voting bounties to buy men wherever they could
be found. The agent appointed by a county in one
of the Middle States, and supplied with bounty money,
learned that some Confederate prisoners of war at
Chicago were about to be released and enlisted in our
army for service against the Indians in the Northwest.
The thrifty thought occurred to the agent to pay these
prisoners a bounty for what they were going to do
without any pay at all, and in return for this payment
have them credited as soldiers furnished by his county.
Being an acquaintance of Lincoln, the agent obtained
286 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
from him an order to have the men credited as desired.
But the Secretary of War refused to have the credits
allowed. 'Indignant and disappointed, the agent re-
turned to the President, who reiterated the order, but
without effect. Then Lincoln went in person to Stan-
ton's 'office, and I was called there by the latter to
state the facts in the case.
I reported to the two high officials, as I had pre-
viously done to the Secretary alone, that these men
already belonged to the United States, being prisoners
of war; that they could not be used against the Con-
federates; that they had no relation whatever to the
county to which it was proposed they should be cred-
ited; that all that was necessary toward enlisting them
in our army for Indian service was the Government's
release of them as prisoners of war; that to give them
bounty and credit them to a county which owed some
of its own men for service against the Confederates
would waste money and deprive the army operating
against a powerful enemy of that number of men,
etc.
Stanton said :
" Now, Mr. President, those are the facts, and you
must see that your order cannot be executed."
Lincoln sat upon a sofa with his legs crossed, and
did not say a word until the Secretary's last remark.
Then he said in a somewhat positive tone : " Mr.
Secretary, I reckon you'll have to execute the order."
Stanton replied with asperity:
"Mr. President, I cannot do it. The order is an
improper one, and I cannot execute it."
Lincoln fixed hi8 eye upon Stanton, and in a firm
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
287
voice, and with an accent that clearly showed his de-
termination, he said :
11 Mr. Secretary, it will have to be done"
Stan ton then realized that he was overmatched.
He had made a square issue with the President and
been defeated, notwithstanding the fact that he was
in the right. Upon an intimation from him I with-
drew and did not witness his surrender. A few min-
utes after I reached my office I received instructions
from the Secretary to carry out the President's order.
Stanton never mentioned the subject to me afterward,
nor did I ever ascertain the special, and no doubt suf-
ficient, reasons which the President had for his action
in the case.
The vexatious duties of the General Government
concerning the draft made demands upon Lincoln's
ability not only in deciding important questions, but
in avoiding decisions when it was not best to risk a
rupture with State officials by rendering them. Upon
one occasion the Governor of a State came to rny
office bristling with complaints in relation to the
number of troops required from his State, the details
for drafting the men, and the plan of compulsory ser-
vice in general. I found it impossible to satisfy his
demands, and accompanied him to the Secretary of
War's office, whence, after a stormy interview with
Stanton, he went alone to press his ultimatum upon
the highest authority. After I had waited anxiously
for some hours, expecting important orders or de-
cisions from the President, or at least a summons to
the White House for explanation, the Governor re-
turned, and said with a pleasant smile that he was
288 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
going home by the next train, and merely dropped in
en route to say good-by. Neither the business he
came upon nor his interview with the President was
alluded to.
As soon as I could see Lincoln, I said :
" Mr. President, I am very anxious to learn how
you disposed of Governor . He went to your
office from the War Department in a towering rage. I
suppose you found it necessary to make large conces-
sions to him, as he returned from you entirely satisfied."
" Oh, no," he replied, " I did not concede anything.
You know how that Illinois farmer managed the big
log that lay in the middle of his field ! To the in-
quiries of his neighbors one Sunday, he announced
that he had got rid of the big log. i Got rid of it ! '
said they ; ' how did you do it ? It was too big to
haul out, too knotty to split, and too wet and soggy
to burn ; what did you do ? ' ' Well, now, boys,' re-
plied the farmer, ' if you won't divulge the secret, I'll
tell you how I got rid of it I ploughed around it."
Now," said Lincoln, " don't tell anybody, but that's the
way I got rid of Governor - . I ploughed around
him, but it took me three mortal hours to do it, and I
was afraid every minute he'd see what I was at."
Lincoln w^as a good judge of men, and quickly
learned the peculiar traits of character in those he
had to deal with.
I recall an anecdote by which he pointed out a
marked trait in one of our Northern Governors. This
Governor was earnest, able and untiring in keeping
up the war spirit in his State, and in raising and
equipping troops ; but he always wanted his own
ABE AH AM LINCOLN. 289
way, and illy brooked the restraints imposed by the
necessity of conforming to a general system. Though
devoted to the cause, he was at times overbearing and
exacting in his intercourse with the General Govern-
ment. Upon one occasion he complained and pro-
tested more bitterly than usual, and warned those in
authority that the execution of their orders in hie
State would be beset by difficulties and dangers. The
tone of his dispatches gave rise to an apprehension
that he might not co-operate fully in the enterprise in
hand. The Secretary of War, therefore, laid the dis-
patches before the President for advice or instructions.
They did not disturb Lincoln in the least. In fact,
they rather amused him. After reading all the papers,
he said in a cheerful and reassuring tone :
" Never mind, never mind ; those dispatches don't
mean anything. Just go right ahead. The Governor
is like a boy I saw once at a launching. When every-
thing was ready they picked out a boy and sent him
under the ship to knock away the trigger and let her
go. At the critical moment everything depended on
the boy. He had to do the job well by a direct,
vigorous blow, and then lie flat and keep still while
the ship slid over him. The boy did everything
right, but he yelled as if he was being murdered from
the time he got under the keel until he got out. I
thought the hide was all scraped off his back ; but he
wasn't hurt at all. The master of the yard told me
that this boy was always chosen for that job, that he
did his work well, that he never had been hurt, but
that he always squealed in that way. That's just the
way with Governor - . Make up your minds that
290
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
he is not hurt, and that he is doing the work right,
and pay no attention to his squealing. He only wants
to make you understand how hard his task is, and
that he is on hand performing it."
Time proved that the President's estimate of the
Governor was correct.
Lincoln watched the operations of the armies in the
field with the deepest interest, the keenest insight,
and the widest comprehension. The congratulatory
order which General Meade published to his troops
after the battle of Gettysburg was telegraphed to the
War Department. During those days and nights of
anxiety, Lincoln clung to the War Office, and de-
voured every scrap of news as it came over the tele*
graph wires. He hoped for and expected substantial
fruits from our dearly bought victory at Gettysburg.
I saw him read General Meade's congratulatory order.
When he came to the sentence about " driving the in-
vaders from our soil," an expression of disappointment
settled upon his face, his hands dropped upon his
knees, and in tones of anguish he exclaimed, "Drive
the invaders from our soil ! My God ! Is that all ? "
I was designated by the Secretary of War as a sort
of special escort to accompany the President from
Washington to Gettysburg upon the occasion of the
first anniversary of the battle at that place. At the
appointed time I went to the White House, where 1
found the President's carriage at the door to take him
to the station ; but he was not ready. When he ap-
peared it was rather late, and I remarked that he had
no time to lose in going to the train. " Well," said he,
"I feel about that as the convict in one of our Illinois
ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 291
towns felt when he was going to the gallows. As he
passed along the road in custody of the sheriff, the
people, eager to see the execution, kept crowding and
pushing past him. At last he called out : l Boys, you
needn't be in such a hurry to get ahead, there won't be
any fun till I yet there.'' '
It has been said, I believe, that Lincoln wrote in
the car en route to Gettysburg the celebrated speech
which he delivered upon that historic battle-ground.
I am quite sure that is an error. I have no recollec-
tion of seeing him writing or even reading his speech
during the journey. In fact, there was hardly any op-
portunity for him to read or write.
In April, 1865, I was sent with the government ex-
cursion from AVashington to Charleston to take part
in the ceremony of raising over Fort Sumter the flag
that had been lowered there in April, 1861. When I
reported to Stan ton upon my return, he gave me a de-
tailed account of the awful tragedy which had been
enacted in the national capital during our absence.
He said that he had never felt so sensible of his deep
affection for Lincoln as he did during their final inter-
view. At last they could see the end of bloody,
fratricidal war. Peace was dawning upon their be-
loved country. " Well done, good and faithful ser-
vants ! " was upon the lips of the nation. As they
exchanged congratulations, Lincoln, from his greater
height, dropped his long arm upon Stanton's shoul-
ders, and a hearty embrace terminated their rejoicings
over the close of the mighty struggle. Stanton went
home happy. That night Lincoln was assassinated,
and a black pall covered the land.
ARTICLE II.
Ail Acquaintance with Grant.*
One afternoon in June, 1843, while I was at West
Point, a candidate for admission to the Military Acad-
emy, I wandered into the riding hall, where the mem-
bers of the graduating class were going through their
final mounted exercises before Major Richard Dela-
field, the distinguished engineer, then superintendent,
the Academic Board, and a large assemblage of spec-
tators. When the regular services were completed,
the class, still mounted, was formed in line through
the centre of the hall, the riding-master placed the
leaping-bar higher than a man's head, and called out
" Cadet Grant ! " A clean-faced, slender, blue-eyed
young fellow, weighing about 120 pounds, dashed
from the ranks on a powerfully built chestnut-sorrel
horse, and galloped down the opposite side of the hall.
As he turned at the farther end and came into the
straight stretch across which the bar was placed, the
horse increased his pace, and, measuring his strides
for the great leap before him, bounded into the air
and cleared the bar, carrying his rider as if man and
beast had been welded together. The spectators were
breathless ! " Very well done, sir ! " growled " old
Hershberger," the riding-master, and the class was
dismissed and disappeared ; but " Cadet Grant " re-
mained a living image in my memory.
* North American Review. December, 1885.
292
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT. 293-
A few months before graduation, one of Grant's
classmates, James A. Hardie, said to his friend and in-
structor, " Well, sir, if a great emergency arises in this
country during our lifetime, Sam. Grant will be the
man to meet it." 1 If I had heard Hardie's prediction
I doubt not I should have believed in it, for I thought
the young man who could perform the feat of horse-
manship I had witnessed, and wore a sword, could da
anything.
I was in General Grant's room in New York City
on the 25th of May, 1885. Forty years had elapsed
since Hardie's prediction was made, and it had been
amply fulfilled. But, alas ! the hand of death was
upon the hero of it. Though brave and cheerful, he
was almost voiceless. Before him were sheets of his
forthcoming book, and a few artist's proofs of a steel
engraving of himself made from a daguerreotype taken
soon after his graduation. He wrote my name and
his own upon one of the engravings and handed it to-
me. I said, " General, this looks as you did the first
time I ever saw you. It was when you made the
great jump in the riding exercises of your graduation."
" Yes," he whispered, " I remember that very well.
York was a wonderful horse. I could feel him. gather-
ing under me for the effort as he approached the bar.
Have you heard anything lately of Hershberger ? " I
replied, "No, I never heard of him after he left West
Point years ago." " Oh," said the General, " I have
* In the summer of 1845, only two years after Grant's graduation,
his class-mate and room-mate, George Deshon, now a Catholic priest in
New York City, said at West Point, in presence of Professor Kendrick
and Mr. Stebbins of Springfield, Mass., that Grant would some day
prove to the Academic Board that he was the strongest man in his class.
294 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
heard of him since the war. He was in Carlisle, old
and poor, and I sent him a check for fifty dollars."
This early friendship had lived for forty years, and
the old master was enabled to say near the close of
his pupil's career, as he had said at the beginning- of
it, " Very well done, sir ! "
During the period of Grant's official authority, I
saw but little of him. I was not one of the so-called
" Grant men " of the Army. It was not until we were
near neighbors in New York City, in 1881-85, that I
became well acquainted with him. At that time he
was out of office, and the third term movement to re-
store him to the Presidency had failed. My acquaint-
ance began with the cadet. It matured with the
General, and was not disturbed by partiality or in-
terest. Grant was always free from arrogance of office,
but in the little I had seen of him, prior to 1881, I
had not been able to get through the crust of his nat-
ural reserve or diffidence, and I was behind those who
knew him well, in my estimate of his character and
ability. By constant and free personal relations with
him for the last three or four years of his life, and a
fuller study of his career, I caught up and perceived
the soundness of the exalted public judgment of this
remarkable man.
It may be said, without detracting from his merits,
that perhaps a knowledge of his many good and great
deeds has tended to make it somewhat the fashion,
since Grant's death, to try and lift him above all the
imperfections of men. The sounder view is that he
was not free from human frailties, but was great in
spite of them. He was what military men call " nn-
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT. 295
soldierly " in feeling, bearing, and appearance ; yet he
was a great General, and the most essential trait of
soldiership, obedience, was next to a religion with him.
He knew the value of discipline in an army, but he
had neither taste nor aptitude for establishing or en-
forcing it, and instinctively relied more upon the man
than upon the soldier. He loved and cherished his
army associations above all others, but did not like
the profession of arms. In an interview with him last
winter, I alluded to his lack of fondness for purely
military affairs, whereupon he selected a sheet from
the proofs which lay before him, and as evidence of
his taste, pointed to a statement therein, to the eifect
that soon after he entered the Army, 1843, he reviewed
his West Point studies, in order to prepare himself for
a professorship in some institution of learning and
leave the military service.
In disposition, Grant was patient, kind, and consid-
erate. In manner, he was natural, quiet, and unas-
suming, somewhat diffident, but not bashful or awk-
ward. He had no readiness in showing off his acquire-
ments ; on the contrary, his acquirements did not
appear until forced to the front, and then they showed
him off without his knowing it. He was well edu-
cated, but it is probably true that the first impression
he made upon strangers was that he was a plain man
without elements of greatness. A closer acquaintance
however, hardly ever failed to create firm belief in his
extraordinary reserve power. While truth, courage,
tenacity, and self-reliance were his ruling traits, he had
but little pride of opinion. He did not hesitate in
choosing the best course, no matter who proposed it ;
296
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
and in military affairs he would execute a plan pre-
scribed by higher authority with as much vigor and
fidelity as if it had been his own. He did not trouble
himself about the past or the future, but concentrated
all his faculties upon the matter he was at the moment
called upon by his duty to deal with.
Neither responsibility, nor turmoil, nor danger, nor
pleasure, nor pain, impaired the force of his resolution,
or interrupted the steady flow of his intellect. The
war is full of illustrations of his bravery and deter-
mination of character, and of his self-reliance and self-
possession under trying circumstances. History does
not record a more heroic personal effort than the one
he made in writing a book, when he was in agony 'and
on the verge of the grave, to rescue his family from
the misfortunes that had befallen them.
Grant possessed some humor, and occasionally told
a story, but rarely indulged in figures of speech, and did
not exaggerate or emphasize even for the purpose of il-
lustration. If he had any imagination it was kept under
by his habit of literal truth. He made no use of ex-
pletives and but little of adjectives. He would not
have indulged in profane language even if he had pos-
sessed no religious scruples on the subject. Though
he was not without temper and resentment, he was so-
patient and matter-of-fact, that he never felt inclined
to damn things, as men, when sorelv tried, sometimes
do.
In congenial company he conversed with pleasure-
and fluency, but he felt no obligation to talk for the
mere purpose of entertaining the persons in his pres-
ence. He spoke only because he had something to-
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT.
297
tell. Having no regard for forms of expression, he
never, in writing or speaking, turned sentences for
effect, nor could he dissemble or use words to mislead.
If he did not wish to express his thoughts he was
silent, and left people to draw their own inferences.
He had unlimited faith in those whom he once took
to his heart. His friendship was accompanied by the
fullest confidence, and, when his choice was not wisely
made, it served to facilitate and to shield evil prac-
tices, which it is the duty of that high sentiment to
restrain ; and thus Grant's friendship sometimes injured
him who gave and him who received it. It was a
principle with him never to abandon a comrade u under
fire " ; and a friend in disgrace, as well as a friend in
trouble, could depend upon him until Grant himself
found him guilty. I called upon Grant on Sunday
evening, May 4, 1883, the day that he borrowed the
hundred and fifty thousand dollars from Vanderbilt.
He was very cheerful, and said to me, "I expect to
have a game of cards on Tuesday night, and would be
glad to have you come." As I was taking my leave he
repeated the invitation, but thinking the meeting might
depend upon further arrangements, as sometimes hap-
pened, I thanked him, and said I would hold myself
subject to his call. " No," he replied, " don't wait for
further notice. Ward is certainly coming, and the
party is made." On Tuesday morning about 11 o'clock
I met Grant by chance in a car going down-town. He
was upon crutches on account of the accident he had
met with some time before. He talked about persons
and events of the war, without restraint, and was so
much interested in conversation that he failed to get
298 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
out at the right station. As he left the car he said,
" I shall expect you to-night." By a singular coinci-
dence we fell into the same car going up-town about
3 P.M., and I again seated myself by his side. After a
few minutes of gloomy silence on his part, he said,
" We will not have the meeting I fixed for to-night;
I have bad news." I replied, " Why, General, I hope
it is nothing serious." " Yes," he continued, " the
Marine Bank has failed or is about to fail. It owes
our firm a large amount, and I suppose we are ruined.
When I went down-town this morning I thought I was
worth a great deal of money, now I don't know that I
have a dollar ; and probably my sons, too, have lost
everything." I had heard nothing of the financial
crash which had occurred during the day. I said,
" General, do you suspect Ward ? " He replied, " You
know I expected him at my house to-night. If he had
come to the office any time to-day and assured me all
was right, I should have believed him and gone home
contented. But I waited until nearly 3 o'clock, and
he did not appear. I do not know what to think."
He was not willing even then to accuse the knave in
whom he had confided, and prior to that time, notwith-
standing warnings which would have aroused a dis-
honest man, had no suspicion that villainy had been
practised. After he became aware of the truth, three
or four days passed before the enormity of the dis-
aster made its full impression upon him, but he never
recovered from the shock of the deception and wrong
practised upon him by one of the basest creatures of
the age.
Grant's self-reliance and integrity were so deeply
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT. 299
seated and highly developed that it was difficult for
him to make the wishes and opinions of others the
basis of his own action in public affairs. Hence,
though long a controlling factor in politics, he never
was a politician. Destitute of the simplest arts of de-
ception, silence was his recourse when urged to action
he did not approve. Hence he was called silent, and
sometimes even stolid.
Prior to 1867 Grant was nothing but a soldier. He
regarded his election to the chief magistracy of the
nation as a promotion, and did not at first realize that
while the scope of his authority had been enlarged its
nature had been changed, and that he could not govern
the country as he had governed the Army. He soon
discovered that his forces, now political instead of
military, could not be concentrated upon the line of
operations he had laid down ; and he promptly
changed base to the party that elected him, and
then advanced upon the new line with as much con-
fidence and fidelity as if it had been his first choice.
That movement consolidated his military prestige, his
personal power, and the political strength of the
Republican Party into a public force, of which
contrary to the fated powerlessness of ex-Presidents
generally he was the real head to the day of his
death, and w r hich has never been surpassed, if it has
been equalled, in this country. When the change of
base just mentioned became known, many of Grant's
old friends thought he had surrendered to the politi-
cians, but he had not ; nor was his new course incon-
sistent with his self-reliance and stern sense of duty.
He had become sensible of the fact that to enforce
300
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
" no policy against the will of the people/' a part of
public affairs had to be conducted according to the
principles and dogmas of the dominant party ; and as
far as he could clearly identify that part he let those
whom he regarded as party leaders have it to them-
selves. But in all other matters in fact, upon special
occasions in these he relied upon himself and acted
up to his own sense of duty, and demanded " uncon-
ditional surrender " from all who opposed him. He
not only crushed Charles Sumner, who ventured into
revolt, but probably would have succeeded in prevent-
ing his return to the United States Senate, if that
distinguished leader had not died before the time
came for his re-election.
Grant wrote with remarkable facility. His war
papers are not only his ow r n composition, but many of
them are in his own handwriting. His article in the
North American Review of November, 1882, is an ex-
ample of the rapidity with which he could write what
he had to say, as well as of the clearness and force
with which he expressed his meaning. It was com-
menced on the 24th of October, and was in the editor's
hands on the 25th. He said of it at the time:
" It does not appear to me worthy of a place in a
magazine of the standing of the North American Re-
view. It was dictated from notes prepared hastily.
The subject, however, has become so familiar to me,
that I think I have committed no error in the state-
ment of facts."
Grant showed but little interest in abstruse subjects,
and rarely took part in the discussion of them. His
conversation was always marked by simplicity, and
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT. 301
freedom, from vanity, vainglory and mock-modesty.
His excellent memory was a store-house upon which he
drew for the interesting reminiscences which formed
the staple of his conversation.
He was wise, but having no gifts as a debater, he
could not shine in council. It was his nature or his
habit, as heretofore stated, to concentrate his mind
upon subjects which required his own action, or for
which he was responsible.
The prominence of these affairs, the precedence of
the practical and personal over the theoretical and
general, sometimes misled the public judgment as to
his real power and ability. Like many great men,
he required the pressure of necessity to bring out his
strength. He could not dwell upon theories, or appear
to advantage in hypothetical cases, and even in practi-
cal matters his mental processes were carried on beneath
the surface. Until he was ready to act he gave no
sign by word or expression of his own train of thought
or the impression made upon him by others, though
they might make him change his mind and induce action
different from what he had intended. He generally
adhered to his first convictions, but never halted long
between two opinions. When he changed, he went
over without qualification or regard for consequences,
and was not disturbed by lingering doubts or regrets.
The Fitz-John Porter case served to exhibit one of
Grant's best traits devotion to his own deliberate
sense of duty, despite the temptations of interest, ease,
and expediency. " Consistency is a jewel," but so is
truth, and to Grant the latter was more precious than
the former. Porter's claim that he had been wronged
302
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
by the court-martial which convicted him in 1863, and
that new evidence to prove it would be presented if a
hearing could be granted, was laid before Grant as
early as 1867, but the appeal was refused or neglected.
As long as Grant was General-in-Chief of the Army
and President of the United States, with power to act
effectively in redressing the alleged wrong, he accepted
the verdict of the court-martial without understanding
the record of that tribunal and the new evidence
which Porter offered to produce. But in September,
1881, when he had become a private citizen and a
resident of New York City, Porter asked an interview.
To this Grant replied in writing, September 27, 1881 :
" I will hear what you have to say, and will en-
deavor to listen without prejudice ; and if convinced
that I was wrong in former opinions, entertained and
possibly expressed, T would be willing to correct them."
The result was that Grant agreed to study the
whole case, including the record of the court-martial,
and state his conclusions. The investigation, which
was prolonged till December 19, convinced him that a
great wrong had been done, and he became deeply
distressed that he had not mastered the subject while
he was in power. Then, regardless of the inconsistent
attitude in which his change of mind placed him, and
the antagonisms it created, he devoted all of his ability
and influence to procure for Porter the justice he
thought due him. In a letter dated November 3,
1883, which was given to the public, he said to Porter:
" I did believe that General Pope was so odious to
some of the officers in the East, that a cordial support
was not given him by them. ... I supposed you
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH QKANT. 303
had shared in this feeling. . . . Until 1881, when
I re-examined for myself, my belief was that on the
29th of August, 1862, a great battle was fought be-
tween General Pope commanding the Union forces,
and General Jackson commanding the Confederate
forces ; and that you with a corps of twelve or more
thousand men stood in a position across the right flank
of Jackson, and where you could ea'sily get into his
rear ; that you received an order to do so about 5 or
5.30 o'clock, which you refused to obey because of
clouds of dust in your front, which you contended in-
dicated an enemy in superior force to you ; that you
allowed Pope to get beaten while you stood idly look-
ing on without raising an am to help him. With this
understanding, and without a doubt as to the correct-
ness of it, I condemned you."
Then he proceeded to give the results of his own
examination of the case, expressed his regret that he
had not made the investigation while he was in office,
and added :
" As long as I have a voice it shall be raised in your
support, without any reference to its effect upon me or
others."
On the 30th of December, 1881, he replied as fol-
lows to a letter from Senator Logan :
" MY DEAR GENERAL :
" I have your letter of yesterday. It is true that I
have re-examined the proceedings of the court-martial
and court of inquiry in Fitz-John Porter's case, and
believe sincerely that I have done him an injustice,
and have so written to the President. When I gave
General Porter the letter, I requested him to send you
304
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
a copy. If he has not done so he will, or I will.
That letter will explain all I would otherwise write
you on this subject. I reluctantly came to the con-
clusion I did, but was convinced beyond all precon-
ceived notions, and felt it due to an accused man to
say so. Very truly yours,
" U. S. GRANT."
In a letter to Porter, dated February 4, 1882, he
said :
"My whole object now is to benefit you; and to
this end I am willing to do anything that is truthful."
Grant was slow to take offence, was not malicious,
and did not hastily resent wrongs; but animosity
sometimes found its way to his heart, and when rooted
there it was as hardy as his friendship, though it did
not assert itself in action unless specially invited by
circumstances. His course towards his old associates
of the Regular Army, while he was in power, affords
many illustrations of his friendship, and possibly a
few of the other kind. One of the bulletins which he
issued during his last sickness announced that he de-
sired the good-will of all ; and he closed a letter from
Mt. McGregor, dated June 22, 1885, with the words:
" I am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if
convinced that I have done one, I am always willing
to make the fullest admission."
That was not only the truth, but was no doubt the
whole truth ; and was quite as far as he was disposed
to go. He had to be " convinced " that he had done
injustice before he was willing to advance towards
reconciliations. Some of his opinions of men were
founded in error or misunderstanding, and some of his
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT.
305
feelings possibly in prejudice ; but as he believed they
were right, it was not in the power of approaching
death to make him surrender them. Mr. G. W. Childs
has said :
" General Grant always felt that he was badly
treated by Halleck. . . . During my long friend-
ship with him, I never heard him more than two or
three times speak unkindly of Halleck."
Grant was unjustly accused after the capture of
Donelson, and was dissatisfied with the treatment he
received ; but his animosity towards Halleck, born at
Donelson, got its growth afterwards. The lapse of
time and the whirl of events probably disqualified him
for fixing the exact course of it, and confused him as
to the time when it took substantial form.
During a conversation with Grant about his Shiloh
article, after it had appeared in print, one of the per-
sons present asked me whether it was true, as reported,
that Buell was going to answer General Grant. I re-
plied :
"I do not understand that he is going to answer
General Grant, but he will write an article giving an
account of the battle."
I then said to Grant :
" General, you and Buell will never agree about the
battle of Shiloh, but in a recent letter to me, Buell
spoke most kindly of you, saying, among other things,
that when you and he were young together in the
Army you had, as he expressed it, ' attractive, even
endearing qualities.' '
I waited for response, but in vain. Grant remained
silent. I construed his action upon this and a sub-
306
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
sequent occasion to mean that the remarks commen-
datory of Buell's character and ability, made in the
Shiloh article, conveyed all he chose to express upon
that subject as it then stood.
The bulk of Grant's admiration and friendship was
no doflbt bestowed upon Sherman, McPherson, and
Sheridan. The day before he started from Nashville
to Washington, in March, 1864, to receive his commis-
sion as Lieutenant-General, Grant wrote a letter to
Sherman expressing a full sense of his obligations to
subordinates, and saying :
" I want to express my thanks to you and McPher-
son as the men to whom, above all others, I feel in-
debted for whatever I have had of success. . . .
I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giv-
ing it the most flattering construction. The word you
I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also."
Grant had antipathies as well as attachments. His
relations to his generals would form a striking chapter
of history ; and an interesting part of it would be the
story of the estrangement between him and Hancock.
In his account of the battle of Shiloh, published in
the Century Magazine, Grant said :
" The enemy had hardly started in retreat from his
last position, when, looking back toward the river, I
saw a division of troops coming up in beautiful order
as if going on parade or review. The commander was
at the head of the column, and the staff seemed to be
bestowed about as they would have been had they
been going on parade. When the head of the column
came near where I was standing, it was halted, and
the commanding officer, General A. McD. McCook,
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT. 307
rode up to where I was, and appealed to me not to
send his division any farther, saying that they were
worn out with marching and fighting. ... It was
not, however, the rank and file or the junior officers
who asked to be excused, but the division com-
mander."
This was a remarkable error, and did great injustice
to McCook. Grant, soon after the publication of the
foregoing statement, and subsequently in the Century
Magazine, admitted the injustice of it, but said noth-
ing as to how he happened to make the mistake. Not
long after the article appeared, I mentioned the error,
and told the General I thought he had fallen into it
by merging two occasions into one through a lapse of
memory that McCook's division did march in column
and in dress parade order, from the river to the line
of battle, and it made a fine spectacle, but it was quite
early in the morning of the second day's fight. That,
no doubt, was the spectacle which impressed itself
iipon the General's memory. But at that time the
enemy had not " started in retreat from his last posi-
tion." Indeed, the only question, then, was whether
we could beat him, not whether we would pursue
him. McCook's division, after marching up in column
in dress parade order, formed line, attacked, and was
actively engaged the rest of the day, and it was not
until evening, when the enemy had been defeated,
that the question of pursuit arose. " Then," I said to
Grant, " you probably saw McCook a second time,
and the conversation which you mention in the article
took place." He admitted the probability that the
explanation was correct.
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
When the second session of the last Congress began,
a bill for the retirement of Grant as General of the
Army had passed the Senate, and was before the
House ; the Fitz-John Porter bill had been vetoed, and
Grant, though a wreck financially and physically, had
written to Porter, July 4 :
" You can scarcely conceive the pain it caused me
to read the veto of your bill by the President yester-
day. I was not prepared for it. This message is the
merest sophistry. It is, no doubt, a great disappoint-
ment to you and your family, but I believe it will
result ultimately in doing you full justice. You were
dismissed unjustly, and you are entitled to restoration.
Be of good cheer, and pray that justice may yet be
-done you and yours."
This letter, of course, was not known to the Presi-
dent, but in the condition of affairs just set forth,
President Arthur, in his last annual message, said :
" I recommend that in recognition of the eminent
services of Ulysses S. Grant, late General of the armies
of the United States, and twice President of this na-
tion, the Congress confer upon him a suitable pension."
This formal recommendation of a pension implied
that the President did not favor a bill to place Grant
on the retired list of the Army. Grant, in a letter to
Senator Mitchell, dated December 5, 1884, requested
that the pension bill be withdrawn, and said he would
not accept a pension if the bill should pass and be ap-
proved. This ended the pension movement.
The well-deserved boon of retirement came at last,
and with a unanimity and public approval that made
it welcome, and the dying hero received it gratefully.
AN ACQUAINTANCE WITH GRANT.
509?
The time has not come for final judgment of Grant-
He had great abilities and great opportunities. Chance-
is undoubtedly an important factor in the race of glory r
and perhaps it favored Grant in the War of Rebellion-
General Sherman goes so far as to have said since
Grant's death, that, "had C. F. Smith lived, Grant
would have disappeared to history after Donelson " ;
but that is conjecture. Grant was one of the " singular
few " who possessed qualities which probably would
have gained for him a high place in history, no matter
who had lived to compete with him in our great War-
No man was known by reputation, and personally,
to so many men of his time as Grant. The nations of
the earth read of him, saw him, and judged him.
After the fame of his great deeds had spread over the
world, he travelled through both hemispheres, and re-
ceived the willing and unstinted homage of men high
and low in various climes and countries. The record
of what he has said and what he has done must place
him high in the roll of the world's great men. Pos-
terity will see to that. We who knew him face to
face may bear witness to what he was in himself. We
need not inquire to what extent he imbibed and as-
similated the wisdom, the knowledge, or the morality
of worthy parents, of early teachers, of friends and
staff officers, such as McPherson, and Rawlins, and
Wilson, and Bowers. Undoubtedly with him, as with
other men, the surrounding influences of his life had
much to do with making him what he was. He en-
dured disappointment, humiliation, and poverty ; he
was tempted by military success and glory, and en-
countered the rivalries, the jealousies, the intrigues of
310 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ambitious and aspiring generals ; lie floated for years
upon the high tide of popular favor and good fortune,
and then fell through the evil of others, and was
wrongfully and cruelly dashed against the rocks of
financial discredit and ruin ; and finally, while tried
by prolonged and excruciating physical torture, he
made an effort, unsurpassed in its heroism, to restore
the fortunes of his family by the work of his own
brain and hand. What did the duties, the obligations,
the temptations, the sorrows, the struggles of life,
make of this man ? One of the truest, strongest,
bravest human entities that the world has ever pro-
duced.
ARTICLE III.
Grant and Matthew Arnold.
"An Estimate."*
Mr. Arnold introduced General Grant to the people
of England in the January and February issues of
Murray's Magazine, and his articles have since been
published in book form by Cupples, Upham & Co., of
Boston, and entitled " An Estimate."
As Grant had visited England and received the
most cordial welcome from all classes, there is no con-
ceivable reason for Mr. Arnold's post-mortem introduc-
tion of him, unless it be that Grant never lectured in
Great Britain.
It is not necessary to introduce Mr. Arnold to the
people of the United States. We know him by his
distinction in the fields of learning, and besides that
he has lectured to us. Indeed, if we may judge by
his " Estimate " of Grant, he is not likely to lose any
opportunity to lecture us. Perhaps we need it cer-
tainly we can bear it. But we must be permitted a
little hero-worship, though our idol be a man of the
sword, not of the pen.
Having been General-in-Chief during a great war,
and twice President of the United States, Grant's
career is open to the closest scrutiny and the most
rigid public judgment ; and having published a book,
* North American Review, April. 1887.
311
312 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
he is amenable to the strictest rules of fair criticism,
We should have no right to be sensitive concerning.
Mr. Arnold's " Estimate," if it did not do injustice^
Mr. Arnold has presented a weak and incorrect ab-
stract of our hero's literary, as well as of his military
work. It is not the purpose of this article, however r
to assume the task of setting that right. The world
will judge for itself of General Grant's " Memoirs " and
of his public services. Beyond commenting upon a
few general points, the only purpose of this article is
to make some comparison between the literary work
of the distinguished but matter-of-fact American sol-
dier and the learned British critic.
Mr. Arnold says that " in the rage for comparison-
making the Americans beat the world." That shall
not deter us from comparing the English of the Amer-
ican soldier and the British scholar.
It must be remembered that General Grant never
posed as a scholar, and that he wrote his "Memoirs " in
the throes of death, with no time to choose words. '
Mr. Arnold says of Grant's " Memoirs :" " I found a
language all astray in its use of will and shall, should
and would an English without charm and without
high-breeding." This expression implies the assump-
tion on Mr. Arnold's part that he is master of pure
English. Does his article sustain that pretension ?
High lights in literature express their meaning accu-
rately. When Mr. Arnold says that Grant's English
is without " high- breeding," he does not mean that
Grant himself is without " high-breeding." He uses
the term high-breeding in relation to language, not
on the sly in relation to the man. We understand
GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD. 313
high-breeding in men, in cattle, in dogs, etc., but Mr.
Arnold will have to tell us what high-breeding in
language is.
Grant says of his tiresome life at the Military Acad-
emy : " The last two years wore away more rapidly
than the first two." Mr. Arnold, putting this into
high-bred English, says : " His last two years went
quicker than his first two." Grant says, " I had grown
six inches in stature " ; Arnold says, " with a stature
that had run up too fast for his strength." Speaking
of a large public meeting, Grant says, " In the evening
the court-house was packed." Arnold says, " In the
evening the court-house was crammed" Grant says,
" My opinion was, and still is, that immediately after
the fall of Fort Donelson the way was opened to the
National forces all over the Southwest without much
resistance. If one General who would have taken the
responsibility had been in command of all the troops
west of the Alleghanies, he could have inarched to
Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg with
the troops we then had, and, as volunteering was
going on rapidly over the North, there would soon
have been force enough at all these centres to operate
offensively against any body of the enemy that might
be found near them." This clear statement, when put
into Mr. Arnold's high-bred English for the British
public, comes out as follows: "He thought both then
and ever after, that by the fall of Fort Donelson the
way was opened to the forces of the North all over
the Southwest without much resistance, that a vigor-
ous commander, disposing of all the troops west of the
Alleghanies, might have at once marched to Chatta-
314 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
nooga, Corinth, Memphis, and Vicksburg, and broken
down every resistance."
Grant says: "On the 22d of August, 1848, I was
married to Miss Julia Dent, the ]ady of whom I have
spoken. In April following I was ordered to Detroit,
Michigan, where two years were spent with but few
important incidents. ... In the spring of 1851
the garrison at Detroit was transferred to Sackett's
Harbor, and in the following spring the entire Fourth
Infantry was ordered to the Pacific Coast. It was de-
cided that Mrs. Grant should visit my parents at first
for a few months, and then remain with her own
family at their St. Louis home until an opportunity
offered of sending for her." Mr. Arnold converts this
plain, smooth narrative into the following high-bred
or liy~brid English : " When the evacuation of Mexico
was completed, Grant married, in August, 1848, Miss
Julia Dent, to whom he had been engaged more than
four years. For two years the young couple lived at
Detroit, Michigan, where Grant was now stationed ;
he was then ordered to the Pacific Coast. It was set-
tled that Mrs. Grant should, during his absence, live
with her own family at St. Louis." If there is any
" charm " in the construction of the foregoing state-
ment by Mr. Arnold, or in his use of the words now,
then, and settled, it is well concealed.
Grant says : " The enemy occupied Grand Gulf,
Haines' Bluff, and Jackson with a force of nearly sixty
thousand men. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicks-
burg, and is connected with it by a railroad. My first
problem was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base."
Mr. Arnold's version of this is as follows : " The
GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD. 315
enemy had at Grand Gulf, at Haines' Bluff, north of
Vicksburg, and at Jackson, the capital of the State of
Mississippi, in which all these places are, about sixty
thousand men."
Of his efforts to earn a living after he resigned from
the Army in 1854 Grant says: " My wife had a farm
near St. Louis, to which we went, but I had no means
to stock it. A house had to be built also. I worked
very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather,
and accomplished the object in a moderate way. If
nothing else could be done, I would load a cord of
wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. I
managed to keep along very well until 1858, when I
was attacked by fever and ague. In 1858 I sold out
my stock, crops, and farming utensils at auction, and
gave up farming."
The English wdth " charm," into which Mr. Arnold
throws this frank and pathetic part of General Grant's
story, is as follows: "First he tried farming on a farm
belonging to his wife near St. Louis ; but he could not
make it answer, though he worked hard. He had in-
sufficient capital and more than sufficient fever and
ague." Aside from the flippancy with which Mr.
Arnold treats Grant's poverty and sickness, the last
sentence just quoted entitles him to the credit for a
fair share of the " smartness " which he attributes to
Yankees.
The foregoing are examples of the English of the
man of the sword and the man of the pen. In no in-
stance does Mr. Arnold's change in General Grant's
English improve it.
But Mr. Arnold's failure to improve General Grant's
316 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
English, in translating it for the British public, is not
the only particular in which his article is defective.
In some instances he fails to express the General's
meaning. For example, speaking of the preliminary
operations of the Mexican War, Grant says the occu-
pation of certain territory was apparently, u to force
Mexico to initiate war." " We were sent to provoke
a fight, but it was essential that Mexico should com-
mence it." Surely that is plain enough. But Mr.
Arnold renders it as follows ; " Ostensibly the Ameri-
can troops were sent to prevent filibustering into
Texas; really they were sent as a menace to Mexico,
in case she appeared to contemplate war." Again,
Grant says of his appointment to the Military Acade-
my, Mr. Harmer, the member of the House of Repre-
sentatives, " cheerfully appointed me." Mr. Arnold,
observing, perhaps by a careless reading, that a Sena-
tor from Ohio w r as addressed upon the subject of the
appointment, says : " The United States Senator for
Ohio procured for young Grant, when he was seven-
teen years old, a nomination to West Point." The
error in this instance is not serious, but as Mr. Arnold
must know that every State of our Union has two
Senators, his use of the definite article the in the sen-
tence, " the United States Senator for Ohio," suggests
that misuse of the definite article is not set down in
his linguistic category as an offence. In fact, with
some Englishmen the importance of scrupulous care in
the use of ivill and shall, would and should, seems to
overshadow many other things in letters. Nor is Mr.
Arnold more particular with his pronouns than with
his articles. In speaking of Meade and Grant, he says :
GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD. 317
" Both Meade and Grant behaved very well. Meade
suggested to Grant that he might wish to have imme-
diately under him Sherman, who had been serving
with Grant in the West. He begged him not to hesi-
tate if he thought it good for the Service. Grant as-
<_> o
sured him that he had no thought of moving him, and
in his " Memoirs/' after relating what had passed, he
adds," etc.
It is not worth while to multiply illustrations, but
it may be noted that Mr. Arnold's vocabulary is large.
He has more words than he needs, and he appears to
throw in the surplus to get rid of it. Possibly, how-
ever, the mystery of English with " charm " and " high-
breeding" may lie hidden in the distribution of this
surplus. Here are some examples : " The afternoon
of that same day ; " " he says with perfect truth ; "
"high genius ; " " the United States Senator for Ohio
procured for young Grant when he was 17 years old ; "
"from this time he was always the same strong man,"
etc. ; " almost exactly the same strength as at the be-
ginning of the campaign ; " " if the South could suc-
ceed in prolonging an indecisive struggle year after
year still, the North might probably grow tired of the
contest ; " " in the field there was some sharp fighting
for a day or tivo still ; " " but the Mexican war came
on and kept him in the Army;" "Grant declined be-
cause he was to go off that evening to visit his chil-
dren." Perhaps on and off, as they stand in the last
two sentences, are not so bad as they would be if they
changed places, but they are unnecessary, unless it be
that they give "charm" and " high-breeding " to the
English.
318 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Without making more comparisons between the
English of General Grant and Mr. Arnold, the follow-
ing may be taken from Mr. Arnold's article as fair ex-
amples of his English with charm and high-breeding.
Comparing Grant before he went to West Point with
English school-boys, Mr. Arnold calls the latter " our
young gentlemen " / and speaking of the way Grant
was reared, he says : " The bringing up of Abraham
Lincoln was also, I suppose, in this wise" Two more
examples must suffice. Mr. Arnold says : " After
Grant had, after a hard and bloody struggle of two
days, won the battle of Shiloh, in which a ball cut in
two the scabbard of his sword, and more than 10,000
men were killed and wounded on the side of the
North, General Halleck, who did not love Grant, ar-
rived on the scene of action and assumed the com-
mand." " And, therefore, crossing the James River he
invested, after failing to carry it by assault, Peters-
burg, the enemy's stronghold south of Richmond.
. . . Finally, Grant, resuming operations in March,
1865, possessed himself of the outer works of Peters-
burg. . . . Then Grant proceeded to possess him-
self of the railroad by which Lee's army and Rich-
mond itself, now drew their supplies."
Under cover of a statement made by Grant, Mr.
Arnold assumes the defence of the sympathy for the
South shown by England during the Rebellion. Grant
says : " It was evident to my mind that the election
of a Republican President in 1856 meant the secession
of all the slave States and rebellion. Under these
circumstances I preferred the success of a candidate
whose election would prevent or postpone secession,
GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD. 319
to seeing the country plunged into a war, the end of
which no man could foretell."
Upon this Mr. Arnold remarks : " I am not con-
cerned to discuss Grant's reasons for his vote, but I
wish to remark how completely his reflections dispose
of the reproaches addressed so often by Americans to
England for not sympathizing with the North attack-
ing slavery in a war with the South upholding it.
From what he says, it is evident how very far the
North was, when the war began, from attacking
slavery."
Did Mr. Arnold have to learn from Grant's book
" from what he says "- that the North was very far
from attacking slavery when the War began ? His-
tory abounds in proof of that. Our Congress, after
war broke out, passed a resolution saying that " the
War was not waged for the purpose of overthrowing
or interfering with the rights or established institu-
tions of the States, but to defend and maintain the
permanency of the Constitution and to preserve the
Union with all the dignity and equal rights of the
several States unimpaired " ; and about the same time
the Confederate Commissioners, Yancey, Mann, and
Rust, said, in a letter to Earl Russell : " It was from
no fear that the slaves would be liberated that seces-
sion took place. The very party in power has pro-
posed to guarantee slavery forever in the States, if the
South would but remain in the Union." That Mr.
Arnold should discover these historical facts by draw-
ing an inference from General Grant's book is as sur-
prising as his discovery of General Grant in 1880 ;
but his conclusion from the discovery is more surpris-
320 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
ing still. From the fact that Grant in 1856 held the
opinion that the election of a Democratic President
would prevent or postpone a civil war in his country,
and voted accordingly, Mr. Arnold draws the con-
clusion that Americans were unjust, or at least incon-
sistent, in reproaching " England for not sympathizing
with the North attacking slavery, in a war with the
South upholding it." The meaning is that as the
North was not attacking slavery at the beginning it
had no claim to English sympathy. This is a weak
defence. According to the morals of England, slavery
was a monstrous evil ; and in this judgment a large
part of our Northern people heartily concurred. But
slavery, having been found by us as it was left here
by England, was imbedded in our Constitution ; and
our Government from the beginning had been part
slave and part free, with the free part located in the
North, growing in moral strength as well as in pro-
portional numbers. The necessity for subjection of
the slave-owners' will to the will of the Union after
political control had passed to the North in I860, the
unwillingness of the North to have slavery extended,
and a violent resentment by Southerners of abolition-
ism in the abstract, caused the Southern States to
secede from the Union, and proceed to set up a gov-
ernment of which Mr. A. H. Stephens, its Vice-Presi-
dent, said in a public speech, March 21, 1861 : "Its
foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the
great truth that the negro is not equal to the white
man ; that slavery subordination to the superior race
is his natural and normal condition. This, our new
government, is the first in the history of the world
GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD. 321
based upon this great physiological and moral truth."
Mr. Arnold tells us that " admiration and favor are
not compellable ; we admire and favor only an object
which delights us, helps us, elevates us, does us good."
The government described by Mr. Stephens, based
upon slavery, is the one which Mr. Arnold admits
many Englishmen, for whom he now offers a poor
excuse, admired and favored, as against the Govern-
ment of the Union, founded upon the principle of
human freedom, and composed largely of men devoted
to the general enforcement of that principle. It is
true that the Union, choosing between evils and trust-
ing to the appearance of some peaceful process for
eliminating slavery, was willing, at first, to let the evil
alone where it existed, rather than enter upon a bloody
civil war, the end of which, as Grant says, no man
could foretell. But this dilemma of the North affords
no excuse to Englishmen, who were not in the dilem-
ma, for taking sides with the South ; nor does Grant's
action in 1856 " dispose of the reproaches addressed
so often by Americans to England for not sympathiz-
ing with the North " in the civil war of 1861-65. If
English lack of sympathy for the North had been, as
Mr. Arnold intimates, because the North did -not at-
tack slavery at the beginning, then surely, as soon as
the Government did attack it, early in 1863, they
would have been with the North heartily. But the
abolition of slavery did not divert English sympathies
from the South to the North.
Mr. Arnold himself probably has some love for
Americans in general, for he uses the lash freely, and
we are told that whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth.
322
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Grant, Mr. Arnold tells us, a is boastful, as Americans
are apt to be, for his nation " ; " The Americans are
too self -laudatory ; " " Grant was boastful only in cir-
cumstances where nothing but high genius or high
training, I suppose, can save an American from being
boastful ; " " The United States would be more attrac-
tive to us if they were more backward in proclaiming
themselves the greatest nation on earth ; " " The
Americans in the rage for comparison-making beat the
world ; whatever excellence is mentioned America
must, if possible, be brought in to balance or surpass
it. That fine and delicate naturalist, Mr. Burroughs,
mentions trout, and instantly he adds, British trout,
by the way, are not so beautiful as our own."
Mr. Arnold shows a keen perception of the fitness
of things by 'closing these extravaganzas with a fish
story.
It is to the chance by which " some documents pub-
lished by General Badeau in the American newspapers
first attracted his (my) attention to Grant " that the
British people are indebted for Mr. Arnold's discovery
of the American soldier, and it must be admitted that
the treatment of General Grant in Mr. Arnold's
so-called Estimate, though patronizing, is quite com-
mendatory. Indeed, having caught from America
" the rage for comparison-making," he compares Grant
to the Iron Duke, saying : " But he certainly had a
good deal of the character and qualities which we so
justly respect in the Duke of Wellington." . . .
" Surely, in all this he resembles the Duke of Welling-
ton." Englishmen are not boastful. They merely set
up one of their own heroes as the standard of human
GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD.
823
greatness, and measure other men by that standard.
So, too, Mr. Arnold does honor to Grant's "Memoirs."
Notwithstanding they are in language " all astray in
its use of will and shall, ... an English without
charm and without high-breeding," Mr. Arnold com-
forts us by saying, "surely the Duke of Wellington
would have read these i Memoirs ' with pleasure."
But having lifted us above the American level by
admitting that Grant " had a good deal of the qualities"
of the Duke of Wellington, and that the Duke " would
have read these 'Memoirs' with pleasure," Mr. Arnold
drops us back by saying, " Cardinal Mazarin used to
ask concerning a man, before employing him, est-il
Jieureux? Grant was Jieureux; " and there he leaves
us. How deeply are we indebted to him ?
MARK TWAIN DEFENDS GEN. GRANT'S ENGLISH ATTACKING MAT-
THEW ARNOLD. The Army and Navy Club of Connecticut held their
annual reunion to-night to commemorate the anniversary of Gen.
Grant's birthday. The chief address on the memory of Gen. Grant was
delivered by the Rev. Dr. M. B. Riddle, formerly a chaplain in the Ser-
vice. Toastmaster V. B. Chamberlain introduced Mr. S. L. Clemens
(Mark Twain), who spoke as follows :
MARK TWAIN'S SPEECH.
I will detain you with only just a few words just a few thousand
words ; and then give place to a better man if he has been created.
Lately a great and honored author, Matthew Arnold has been' finding-
fault with Gen. Grant's English. That would be fair enough, may be,
if the examples of imperfect English averaged more instances to the
page in Gen. Grant's book than they do in Mr. Arnold's criticism upon
the book but they don't. (Laughter and applause.) It would be fair
enough, may be, if such instances were commoner in Gen. Grant's book
than they are in the works of the average standard author but they
aren't. In truth, Gen. Grant's derelictions in the matter of grammar
and construction are not more frequent than are such derelictions in
the works of a majority of the professional authors of our time and all
previous times authors as exclusively and painstakingly trained to the
literary trade as was Gen. Grant to the trade of war. (Applause.)
MILITARY MISCELLANIES
MR. ARNOLD'S GRAMMAR.
This is not a random statement ; it is a fact, and easily demonstrable.
I have at home a book called u Modern English Literature, its Blemishes
and Defects," by Henry H. Breen, F.S.A., a countryman of Mr. Arnold.
In it I find examples of bad grammar and slovenly English from the
pens cf Sydney Smith, Sheridan. Hallam, Whateley, Caiiyle, both Dis-
raelis, Allison, Junius, Blair, Macaulay, Shakespeare, Milton, Gibbon,
Southey, Bulwer. Cobbett, Dr. Samuel Johnson, Trench, Lamb, Landor,
Smollett, Wai pole, Walker (of the dictionary), Christopher North.
Kirke White, Mrs. Sigourney, Benjamin Franklin, Walter Scott and
Mr. Lindley Murray, who made the grammar.
In Mr. Arnold's paper on Gen. Grant's book we find a couple of
grammatical crimes and more than several examples of very crude and
slovenly English enough of them to easily entitle him to a lofty place
in that illustrious list of delinquents just named. The following pas-
sage, all by itself, ought to elect him : ' ' Meade suggested to Grant
that he might wish to have immediately under him Sherman, who had
been serving with Grant in the West. He begged him not to hesitate
if he thought it for the good of the Service. Grant assured him that he
had no thought of moving him, and in his 'Memoirs,' after relating what
had passed, he adds," &c. To read that passage a couple of times
would make a man dizzy, to read it four times would make him drunk.
(Great laughter.) Gen. Grant's grammar is as good as anybody's; but
if this were not so, Mr. Breen would brush that inconsequential fact
aside and hunt his great book for far higher game. Mr. Breen makes
this discriminating remark : "To suppose that because a man is a poet or
a historian, he must be correct in his grammar, is to suppose that an
architect must be a joiner, or a physician a compounder of medicines."
Mr. Breen 's point is well taken. If you should climb the mighty Mat-
terhorn to look out over the kingdoms of the earth, it might be a pleas-
ant incident to find strawberries up there; but, Great Scott, you don't
climb the Matterhorn for strawberries ! (Continued applause.)
GRANT'S IMMORTAL SENTENCES.
There is that about the sun which makes us forget his spots ; and
when we think of Gen. Grant our pulses quicken and his grammar
vanishes. We only remember that this is the simple soldier who, all
untaught of the silken phrase-makers, linked words together with an
art surpassing the art of the schools, and put into them a something
which will still bring to American ears, as long as America shall last,
the roll of his vanished drums and the tread of his marching hosts.
(Applause.) What do we care for grammar when we think of the man
that put together that thunderous phrase, " Unconditional and imme-
GRANT AND MATTHEW ARNOLD. 325
diate surrender ! ' ' And those others : "I propose to move immediately
upon your works ! " "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes
all summer!" (Applause.) Mr. Arnold would doubtless claim that
that last sentence is not strictly grammatical, and yet nevertheless it
did certainly wake up this nation as a hundred million tons of Al,
fourth proof, hard-boiled, hide-bound grammar from another mouth
couldn't have done. And finally we have that gentler phrase, that one
which shows you another true side of the man ; shows that in his sol-
dier heart there was room for other than gory war mottoes, and in his
tongue the gift to fitly phrase them : " Let us have peace." (Prolonged
applause and cheers.) Hartford, Conn., April 27.
ARTICLE IV.
Halleck and Grant Misunder-
standings.*
Grant opened his Shiloh article in the Century
Magazine (February, 1885) with the statement that he
had been unjustly treated by Halleck after the capture
of Fort Donelson; and his "Personal Memoirs " con-
tain the same charge, and, in addition, are laden with
adverse criticism of Halleck. The leading article in
the North American Review for December, 1885, by
Colonel F. D. Grant, is entitled " Halleck's Injustice to
Grant "; and for weeks after its appearance large post-
ers were displayed from the news-stands in New York
City, bearing, in conspicuous type, the words " Grant
Vindicated from Halleck's Slanders ; by Colonel F. D.
Grant."
It is proper to state that Colonel Grant disclaims
responsibility for the heading of his article, and while
he presents official documents which suggest, but do
not prove injustice, he merely disseminates, without
comment, his father's sentiments concerning Halleck ;
and though he speaks of having taken the documents
from his father's files, they are to be found in their
proper places in the "Records of the Rebellion."
Grant and Halleck are dead. Though not equally
successful, they were equally earnest and patriotic, and
both deserved well of their country. Halleck's lot
* Magazine of American History, Dec., 1886, p. 561.
326
H ALLEGE AND GRANT. 327
-was disappointment and premature death.* Fair-play
demands that all questions of justice between him and
Grant be treated according to their merits, apart from
the comparative military ability, eminence, and popu-
larity of the two great men.
Without going into tedious details, it may be as-
sumed that the charge of injustice has one main and
four subordinate specifications. The first is, that after
the capture of Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862, Hal-
leek sought to promote C. F. Smith to a major-gen-
eralcy over Grant, and thus give Smith the honors of
the victory.
This is the one specification of real substance to
prove Halleck's injustice to Grant. Halleck is not
guilty of it. All three of the authorities just cited,f
General and Colonel Grant and General Badeau, have
failed to present one essential telegram upon the sub-
ject. They set forth the fact that on the 19th of Feb-
ruary, 1862, Halleck telegraphed McClellan : " Briga-
dier-General Charles F. Smith, by his coolness and
bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle was against
us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's works.
Make him a Major-General. You can't get a better
one. Honor him for this victory and the whole coun-
try will applaud ; " and leave it to be understood that
by this telegram Smith was recommended instead of
Grant, and to the neglect and prejudice of Grant.
The truth is that Halleck by telegraph recommended
* Halleck died January 9, 1872, aged 57.
t " Personal Memoirs," vol. i., p. 328; North American Review, De-
cember, 1885, p. 522 ; Badeau's Military History of General Grant,
vol. i., p. 54.
328
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Grant for a major-generalcy on the 17th of February,
two days before he recommended Smith. This dis-
patch (vol. vii., p. 628, " Records of the Rebellion,") is
plainly of record. It reads : " Make Btiell, Grant
and Pope Major-Generals of volunteers, and give me
command in the West. I ask this in return for Forts
Henry and Donelson." Grant's name was promptly
sent to the Senate, and the fact was announced in the
newspapers of the 18th. It is not necessary to quote
more than one. The New York daily Tribune of Feb-
ruary 18, 1862, announced Grant's nomination with
the heading, " Honor to the brave ! " and its Washing-
ton correspondent on the same day wrote : "The Sen-
ate in executive session to-day unanimously confirmed
Grant as Major-General." Halleck recommended Grant
by telegraph on the 17th; the President's nomination
of Grant was announced in the morning papers of the
18th. Halleck would naturally be watching for the
announcement, and it is safe and fair to say he knew
of the nomination on the 18th certainly by the morn-
ing of the 19th, the day on which he recommended
Smith. But be that as it may, he recommended
Grant, and Grant was nominated and confirmed be-
fore Smith was recommended ; which is conclusive as
to what Halleck sought to do.
Badeau, ignoring Halleck's prior recommendation
of Grant, and assuming that Halleck designed to honor
Smith at Grant's expense, says, vol. i., p. 54 : " Neither
did the Government agree with Halleck that Smith
should receive the honors of this victory. The Secre-
tary of War at once recommended Grant for a Major-
General of volunteers, and the President nominated
H ALLEGE AND GKANT. 329
him the same day." This version of the transaction
given in Badeau's book, published in 1867, is mislead-
ing, and is unjust to Halleck. Though the foregoing
statement is not specified by Grant as one of the
" facts " relating to Donelson which Grant says in his
"Memoirs," p. 328, "General Badeau unearthed," it is
probable that he accepted it as a fact, and died in the
belief that Halleck tried to give Smith the honor and
reward for Donelson. As the minor or incidental
matters of this supposed grievance have been pre-
sented formally, they must be considered.
The first of them is that, failing to get Smith pro-
moted to rank Grant, Halleck, nevertheless, gave
Smith command of an expedition up the Tennessee
early in March, 1862, and left Grant at Fort Henry,
as Grant states it, " virtually in arrest and without a
command." *
On the 15th of February, 1862, Halleck gave Grant
command of the " District of West Tennessee," " limits
undefined." He sent a telegram on the 1st of March,
directing Grant to move his column up the Tennessee
River to destroy railroad bridges. Halleck did not
designate the commanders for the sub-columns into
which the expedition was to be divided for the work
to be done. He merely said : " General C. F. Smith,
or some very discreet officer, should be selected for
such commands ; " and " that competent officers should
be left to command the garrisons of Fort Henry and
Donelson in your absence." He intended Grant to
go with the expedition. But soon after Halleck made
* " Personal Memoirs," vol. i., pp. 327-8 ; Century Magazine, Febru-
ary, 1885, p. 594.
330
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the order for the movement, he heard as he reported
to McClellan on the 3d of March that Grant had left
his command and gone to Nashville without authority,
that great disorders in the army had occurred during
Grant's absence ; and coupling these accounts with his
failure to get reports and returns from Grant, and with
a rumor that reached him on the 4th published as
one of the telegrams in Colonel Grant's article that
Grant had " resumed his former bad habits," Halleck
on the 4th telegraphed Grant, " You will place Major-
General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and
remain yourself at Fort Henry." In speaking of this
affair in the winter of 1885, Grant said that Halleck
left him at Fort Henry " in arrest." I remarked that
I thought he was in error about the arrest, but he
adhered to his assertion. His Shiloh article for the
Century Magazine had then been written, but not
published. When it appeared, it contained the state-
ment that he was " virtually in arrest." That state-
ment is repeated in the " Personal Memoirs," and is
strengthened by the addition that he was " without a
command."
The facts upon this point are, that McClellan, in a
dispatch of March 3d, authorized Halleck to arrest
Grant, but Halleck answered on the 4th that lie did
not " deem it advisable." There was no order of ar-
rest, no report or return indicating arrest; and no re-
striction of Grant's authority. The telegram directing
him to remain at Fort Henry was the only order in
the case. Grant's authority over the entire District of
West Tennessee, including the expeditionary force un-
der C. F. Smith, was uninterrupted and unlimited. No
H ALLEGE AND GRANT. 331
one lias ever pretended to show any order or instruc-
tion to the contrary. The " Records" abound in proofs
that Grant was continuously on duty and in full com-
mand of his district and troops. On the 5th of March
he issued formal orders for Smith to take command of
the expedition, and gave him instructions for conduct-
ing it, saying, " I will remain at Fort Henry and throw
forward all the troops that can be provided with
transportation." On the 6th he reported to Halleck,
" All transports here will be loaded and off to-day, if
the gunboats arrive to convoy them. One gunboat has
gone to Savannah. The transports here will not take
all the troops in readiness to move. Your instructions
contemplated my commanding expedition in person.
Dispatch yesterday changed it." On the same day he re-
ported to Halleck : " Union City is said to be garrisoned
by rebels. I will keep a lookout to prevent a surprise
from that direction while the garrison is weak here."
On the 7th he wrote to General S. A. Hurlburt, com-
manding fourth division : u Embark your forces on the
transports now awaiting you as rapidly as possible."
. . . Signed "U. S. Grant, Major- General, Com-
manding" On the same day and over the same signa-
ture he issued an equally peremptory order to " Colonel
K. I. Oglesby, commanding U. S. forces, Fort Donel-
"son, Tenn" On the 9th, he telegraphed Halleck, "I
will do all in my power to advance the expedition
now started . . .1 renew my application to he re-
lieved from further duty" showing that he was on
duty. On the 9th he made to Halleck a statement of
the forces in the district: those composing the expedi-
tion, 25,206; those at Fort Henry awaiting transport a-
'332
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
tiou, 5,740; those at Clarksville, 1,173; those at Fort
Donelson, 2,328. On the 10th he telegraphed Halleck,
" Third Iowa Infantry just arrived. Effective strength,
676 ; ordered : to join General Smith. Advance of ex-
pedition started last evening;" and also on the 10th
to Halleck, " To-morrow is the day when all persons
of proper age are to be enrolled in this State in the
rebel army. Troops are now in Paris to enforce the
orders of Governor Harris. I am concentrating the
small force under my command on the west bank of
the river, to defeat their object as far as lays in my
power." On the llth, he wrote as follows: " General
C. F. Smith, commanding expedition to Upper Ten-
nessee. Send back steamers as rapidly as possible to
enable us to forward troops . . . U. S. Grant,
Major- General, Commanding;" and on the same day,
llth, he telegraphed Halleck, "I shall run down to
Paducah to-night." These dispatches and others of
like import, showing Grant to have been constantly on
duty, are in " Records of Rebellion," vol. x., part ii., pp.
3 to 29. They prove that he was not in arrest of any
sort, that he was not without a command, and that he
was exercising command loyally and efficiently over
his entire district, including the forces under imme-
diate control of C. F, Smith.
It is true that Grant's detention on duty at Fort
Henry grew out of Halleck's disapprobation. The de-
tention itself, however, would not have been a griev-
ance if it had not been based upon special causes.
Halleck had required Sherman, who was Grant's supe-
rior officer, to remain a few miles in the rear and push
forward men and munitions to enable Grant to capture
H ALLEGE AND GRANT. 333
Forts Henry and Donelson, but Sherman did not com-
plain that he was virtually in arrest or without a com-
mand. The order for Grant to remain at Fort Henry
was, in fact, of no practical disadvantage to him. It
was made on the 4th of March. On the 9th, only five
days afterward, and before anything of importance had
been done up the Tennessee, Halleck terminated the
effect of the order by telegraphing to Grant to be
ready to take the advance (vol. x., part ii., p. 27,
" Eecords of Rebellion.")
This notification was given on the very day that the
advance of the expedition, as reported by Grant, started
from Fort Henry ; so that, practically, Grant was not
left behind at all. The notification was repeated on
the llth, and again on the 13th, Halleck saying upon
the latter date, " I wish you, as soon as your new army
is in the field, to assume the immediate command and
lead it on to new victories." By directing Grant to
assume immediate command, Halleck recognized that
Grant had been continuously exercising general com-
mand. Under this authority, and fixing his own time
for starting to the front, Grant proceeded up the Ten-
nessee and reached Savannah on the 17th of March.
Not having been relieved from command by arrest or
otherwise, he issued no order assuming command on
reaching Savannah, but continued in the exercise of
the authority conferred by his assignment of February
15th, to command of the District of West Tennessee.
As already stated, Grant's detention at Fort Henry,
while his new army was getting ready for the field,
was not in itself a grievance. But the next specifica-
tion of Halleck' s injustice to Grant rests upon the
334 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
causes which led to the detention. Grant specifies as
follows : " Halleck reported to Washington that he had
repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my force,
but could get nothing out of me ; that I had gone to
Nashville beyond the limits of my command without
his authority, and that my army was more demoralized
by victory than the army at Bull Run had been by
defeat." (" Personal Memoirs," vol. i., p. 327.)
Halleck did not say that Grant's army was more de-
moralized in fact, he did not say that it was demoral-
ized at all. He said, " it seems to be as muck demoral-
ized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of
the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run." It is true
that Halleck called upon Grant for reports and returns;
and that he reported the failure to get them to McClel-
lan, who, as well as Halleck, wanted the information.
Some of Halleck's calls did not reach Grant, and some
of Grant's reports did not reach Halleck. In a tele-
gram to Halleck of March 24, Grant says : " I have
just learned to-day that your dispatches to me after the
taking of Fort Donelson, reached Fort Henry some
of them at least but were never sent to me. What
has become of the operator then at Fort Henry ? I
don't know." There was no explanation that covered
the case of " Returns," for Grant did not make them.
In telegram, March 9, he said to Halleck : " You had
a better chance of knowing my strength whilst sur-
rounding Fort Donelson than I had. Troops were re-
porting daily by your orders," etc.
As the General-in-Chief was calling upon Halleck for
information concerning Grant's force, there is no
ground for serious complaint because Halleck reported
H ALLEGE AND GRANT.
335
his inability to get it from Grant. No one disputes
that Grant went to Nashville without Halleck's au-
thority. On the 25th of Februar}^ he notified Cullum,
Halleck's Chief -of -Staff, then at Cairo, that he would
" go to Nashville immediately after the arrival of the
next mail, should there be no orders to prevent it."
It is not known when the next mail arrived ; but Grant
went to Nashville by boat, arriving there on the 27th
of February. Hearing that he was in the city, Buell
went to Grant's steamer to see him, and had an in-
formal conversation with him. During the day Grant
wrote a note of no special importance to Buell, and
left in the evening. He claimed, and Halleck after
investigation admitted, that the trip was made from a
" desire to subserve the public interests " ; and there
is no purpose here to question the propriety of it, but
it cannot be said, fairly, that it was unjust for Halleck
to mention this trip to McClellan in explanation of
failure to get reports and returns from Grant. In his
"Memoirs" (vol. i., p. 326), Grant contradicts Hal-
leck's assertion that Nashville was beyond the limit of
Grant's command, saying, " that place was not beyond
the limits of my command, which it had been expressly
declared in orders were not defined." The. limits of
Grant's district were not defined, but Nashville was
beyond the limits which Halleck had a right to go,
and beyond the limits he could empower Grant to go.
Furthermore, Nashville was in Buell's command and
in his possession, and Buell, by the President's order,
was independent of both Halleck and Grant. The
exigencies of the occasion as Grant saw them no doubt,
required him to go to Nashville just as he did ; but
336
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
there was nothing in the fact of the limits of his dis-
trict being undefined which brought Nashville, then
belonging to the territory of, and actually occupied by
an independent army, within the limits of Grant's dis-
trict.
. If Halleck did Grant any injustice in the causes
which led to the latter's detention at Fort Henry, it
was in saying that " Grant's army seems to be as
much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson, as
was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run."
That, evidently, w r as not intended as a specific allega-
tion. It was an ejaculatory expression of Halleck's
displeasure at the irregularities of which he com-
plained. The ground for it was that he could get " no
reports, no returns," that Grant had " gone to Nash-
ville without authority," and that serious disorders in
his army had occurred during his absence. Halleck
received, and on the 6th of March transmitted to
Grant, a copy of a letter addressed to Judge David
Davis, then President of the Western Investigation
Commission. The writer's name was not given, but
Judge Davis vouched for him as " a man of integrity
and perfectly reliable." The letter (vol. x., part ii.,
p. 13, "Rec. of Reb."), charged various frauds and
irregularities among officers and men after the capture
of Fort Donelson. Grant had tried to correct the irreg-
ularities and did not deny them ; in fact, his orders
go to prove them ("Rec. Reb." vol. vii., pp. 599, 633,
650), and his letter to Halleck of March 18th, with
characteristic frankness, distinctly admits some of
them. He says : " I have found that there was much
truth in the report that captured stores were carried
HALLECK AND GKANT. 337
off from Fort Henry, improperly ; " and on the same
day he issued a general order, saying : " A better state
of discipline than has heretofore been maintained
with much of this command is demanded, and will be
enforced." ("Rec. Reb.," vol. x., part ii., p. 47.) On
the 25th of March he said in a telegram to Halleck,
upon this subject : " I most fully appreciate your just-
ness, General, in the part you have taken " (p. 63) ;
and on the 24th of March he said, referring to another
species of disorder in his army, to which Halleck had
called his attention : " I acknowledge the justness of
your rebuke in this respect, although I thought all
proper measures had been taken to prevent such
abuses, and will see that no such violation occurs in
future ; " adding, in the same dispatch, " the conduct
of the Twenty-first Missouri, on the way up here,
has been reported to me as infamous." These evi-
dences of a bad condition of affairs in Grant's forces
after Donelson are reproduced, not as a reflection
upon Grant, but in justice to Halleck, as the explana-
tion of his displeasure. There had not been time and
opportunity for Grant to organize and discipline the
raw levies hurriedly sent to him for that early cam-
paign. But in the interest of the discipline which
Halleck knew must be established as soon as possible,
for the sake of what remained to be done, it was none
the less his duty to rebuke disorders even in Grant's
victorious forces. The War Department, in a letter
of March 10, to Halleck, directed him to make a for-
mal report of what he had mentioned by telegraph,
concerning Grant's absence at Nashville, and his fail-
ure to make returns, etc, Halleck investigated the
338 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
subject, and as early as March 15, made a full report
to Washington, saying, among other things : ''General
Grant has made the proper explanations. As he
acted from a praiseworthy, although mistaken zeal for
the public service in going to Nashville and leaving
his command, I respectfully recommend that no fur-
ther notice be taken of it. There never has been any
want of military subordination on the part of General
Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces
has been explained as resulting partly from the fail-
ure of Colonels of regiments to report to him on their
arrival, and partly from an interruption of telegraphic
communication. All of these irregularities have been
remedied." ("Eec. Eeb.", vol. v., p. 683.) Before
this report was made, Halleck had ordered Grant up
the Tennessee. He promptly sent Grant a copy of
the communication from which the foregoing extract
is taken, and also a copy of the communication to
which it is an answer. In a letter dated March 24 r
acknowledging these copies, Grant said : " I most fully
appreciate your justness, General, in the part you have
taken." Halleck, no doubt, felt that he had been
generous. In that way the affair was closed. But
after the war the case was re-opened by Badeau, in
his " Military History of General Grant," and more
recently by both General and Colonel Grant.
Re-opening this case has given rise to what is
treated in this article as Grant's third subordinate
specification of Halleck's injustice. The complaint, as
stated by Grant in his " Personal Memoirs," is, that
Halleck forwarded "a copy of a detailed dispatch
from himself to Washington, entirely exonerating me ;
H ALLEGE AND GRANT. 339
but lie did not inform me that it ivas his oivn reports
that had created all the trouble. I never knew the truth
until General Badeam unearthed the facts in his re-
searches for his history of my campaigns^
The complaint here is not based upon the contents
of the dispatch, which Grant assumes "created all
the trouble," but upon Halleck's omission to send
Grant a copy of that dispatch ; or, " its concealment
from me when pretending to explain the action of his
superiors," as Grant puts it. ("Personal Memoirs," vol.
i., p. 328.) It is by no means certain that Halleck's
dispatch " created all the trouble " ; but aside from
that, the trouble having been ended, neither duty nor
expediency required Halleck to re-open it. The
wound was healed by the report of March 15, and
Halleck knew that Grant's usefulness would probably
be increased by keeping it healed. He is not charge-
able with " concealment," because he did not tell
Grant in 1862 all that passed then between Halleck
and McClellan. That was not required either by
army regulations or custom of Service. If that charge
were just it would lie against Grant as well as Hal-
leck. After Grant gained confidence and power, he
sent dispatches to Washington, speaking unfavorably
of other Generals ; but he is not chargeable with
wrongful concealment because he did not tell the sub-
ordinate what he had said to the superior. He did
simply what he thought duty required. A brief ex-
planation of the dispatch which Grant says was con-
cealed from him and unearthed by Badeau, is, how-
ever, necessary. It was from Halleck to McClellan,
March 3, and reads as follows : " I have had no com-
340
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
munication with General Grant for more than a week.
He left his command without my authority and went
to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demor-
alized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of
the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to
censure a successful General immediately after a vic-
tory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no
returns, no reports, no information of any kind from
him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and en-
joys it, without any regard to the future. I am worn
out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F.
Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emer-
gency." Badeau says in his u History " (vol. i., p. 65)?
this telegram " was not left on file in the War Depart-
ment, but was obtained by me after long research and
repeated efforts."
But in an official report to the Secretary of "War,
from the War .Records office, it is stated that " Hal-
leek's telegram of March 3, 1862, to McClellan, was
found in package No. 96, United States Military Tele-
graph Records, filed in War Department. The reply
of McClellan bearing the approval of the Secretary
of War was found in volume of 'Telegrams sent
by Major-General McClellan and staff, March 1 to 10,
and September 1 to 16, 1862, ib., vol. 3.' That
' volume was in War Department files. A copy of
McClellan 's reply was also found in package Xo. 96,
referred to above.' " From this it seems that Halleck's
telegram was on file in the War Department. The
statement in Badeau's " History," published in 1867,
that this telegram was not left on file in the War De-
partment, but was obtained by Badeau after long re-
HALLECK AND GRANT. 341
search and repeated efforts was, in fact, " unearthed,"
as Grant expresses it in his " Memoirs," implied that
somebody had concealed it, and probably made upon
Grant's mind and fastened there an impression unjust
to Halleck. The injustice to Grant involved in this
telegram of March 3, had been corrected by Halleck's
full report of March 15, a copy of which had been
sent to Grant. The foregoing quotation from the
report of the War Records office, shows that no wrong
was done to Grant through the concealment of the
dispatch ; shows, in fact, that there was no conceal-
ment. Here the details in refutation of Halleck's so-
called injustice to Grant after the battle of Fort
Donelson may be closed. But there are some general
considerations which bear upon the subject. The
campaign of Fort Uonelson was made in February,
1862. Halleck was high in authority, being one of the
three Major- Generals of the Regular Army. Grant,
one of Halleck's many subordinates, was but a Briga-
dier-General of volunteers. The operations on the
Tennessee and Cumberland, the operations on the
Mississippi and the campaign in Missouri and Ar-
kansas, under Curtis, were all directed by Halleck.
Grant was merely the lieutenant in command of one
of Halleck's columns. Halleck's reputation as well as
Grant's was at stake, and he was necessarily anxious
and exacting. As shown further on, Grant under-
stood this, and as late as 1879 announced that he bore
Halleck no ill-will on account of the action then taken.
In February, 1862, the War was young, and high
officers had to be taken on trust. Grant did not pos-
sess, nor had he then earned the confidence of the
342 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Government. If Grant's ability and trustworthiness
had had then the foundation of his later career, Hal-
leek's anxiety and fault-finding would have been inde-
fensible. But as matters stood at the time, his watch-
fulness of Grant, even his doubts and misgivings, were
the natural outgrowth of attending facts and circum-
stances. Indeed, it is remarkable that Halleck should
have been so little influenced by personal preference.
Sherman and Halleck at that time were devoted
friends, and Sherman as well as Grant was one of
Halleck's subordinates. Yet Halleck gave Grant, the
junior, command of the column on the Tennessee and
Cumberland, because he was first identified with the
service in that quarter, and held Sherman, the senior, a
few miles down the river, while Grant reaped the glory
and reward of capturing Forts Henry and Donelsou.
Sherman made no complaint of injustice. On the con-
trary, as Badeau says, he wrote Grant February 13 :
" I will do everything in my power to' hurry forward
your re-enforcements and supplies ; and if I could be
of service myself, would gladly come without making
any question of rank with you or General Smith."
The last subordinate specification of injustice is, as
Grant states it, that a few days after the battle of
Shiloh, " General Halleck moved his headquarters to
Pittsburg Landing, and assumed command of the troops
in the field. Although next to him in rank, and nomi-
nally in command of my old district and army, I was
ignored as much as if I had been at the most distant
point of territory within my jurisdiction." (" Personal
Memoirs," vol. i., p. 370; Century Magazine, February,
1885, p. 594.)
HALLECK AND GRANT. 343
This may show bad judgment on Halleck's part, but
the facts do not prove injustice. After the battle of
Shiloh, Halleck formed his army into the left wing
under Pope ; the center, under Buell ; the right wing
under George H. Thomas, and the reserve under
McClernand. Grant, still in command of the Army of
the Tennessee and the district of West Tennessee, was
in addition assigned as second in command, a position
without defined duties or specific authority. Nomi-
nally, the new arrangement was an honor to Grant
practically, it restricted his powers. The Donelson
shadow that had been partly cleared away, had reap-
peared after Shiloh and hung heavily over Grant. It did
not vanish until he captured Vicksburg in July, 1863.
The opinion which Halleck held of Grant's army a
week after the battle of Shiloh is shown by the follow-
ing, dated,
"PiTTSBURG LANDING, April 14, 1862.
"To Major-General U. S. Grant, commanding District
and Army in the field. Immediate and active measures
must be taken to put your command in condition to
resist another attack. Fractions of batteries will be
united temporarily under competent officers, supplied
with ammunition, and placed in position for service.
Divisions and brigades should, where necessary, be re-
organized and put in position, and all stragglers re-
stored to their companies and regiments. Your army
is not now in condition to resist an attack. It must
be made so without delay. Staff officers must be sent
to obtain returns from division commanders, and assist
in supplying all deficiencies.
"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General."
344
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
At that time there was a deep and widespread sen-
timent adverse to Grant. On the 23d of April the
Secretary of War telegraphed Halleck : " The President
desires to know . . . whether any neglect or mis-
conduct of General Grant or any other officer contribu-
ted to the sad casualties that befell our forces on
Sunday." This telegram was not due to anything
Halleck had reported about Shiloh. He replied : " The
sad casualties of Sunday 6th were due in part to the
bad conduct of officers who were utterly unfit for their
places, and in part to the numbers and bravery of the
enemy. I prefer to express no opinion in regard to
the misconduct of individuals till I receive the reports
of commanders of divisions."
That there was more complaint of Grant than ap-
pears in detail in the "Kecords," is indicated by Hal-
leek's letter of May 12, 1862, in which he says to Grant :
u You certainly will not suspect me of any intention
to injure your feelings or reputation, or to do you in-
justice. . . . For the last three months I have done
everything in my power to ward off the attacks which
were made upon you."
Fortunately for the country and for Grant, he had
the inherent strength to bear his burden, and to re-
move adverse feeling by his great deeds. Much of the
dissatisfaction with Grant after Shiloh arose from the
reported surprise of his army on the 6th. Halleck, in
that matter, took his lieutenant's part, and boldly de-
nied the surprise, saying in a telegram of May 2, to
Stanton : " The newspaper accounts that our divisions
were surprised are utterly false ; " adding in his formal
report of June 15, 1862, "the impression which at one
HA.LLECK AND GKANT. 345
time seemed to have been received by the Department
that our forces were surprised on the morning of the
6th, is entirely erroneous." Time seems to have
proved the futility of all denials of surprise, but Hal-
leek's denial was none the less a friendly and a timely
service to Grant.
The official records, informal evidence, and Grant's
"Personal Memoirs," vol. i., show that bad feeling did
not exist between Grant and Halleck at the close of
the war. Grant probably felt during the contest that
Halleck, though he had sometimes found fault, had
been friendly and just to him. On the llth of
August, 1863, more than a year after what he presents
in his " Memoirs" as the Shiloh injustice, Grant said
to Halleck in a letter written with his own hand, " I
feel under many obligations to you, General, for the
interest you have ever taken in my welfare, and that
of the army I have the honor to command. I will
do the best I can to satisfy you that your confidence
has not been misplaced."
In a letter to a distinguished General written on
the 16th of February, 1864, Halleck said : "You have
probably seen the attempt in the newspapers to create
difficulties and jealousies between me and Grant.
This is all for political eifect. There is not the slight-
est ground for any such assertions. There cannot, and
will not, be any differences between us. If he is made
Lieutenant-General, as I presume he will be, I shall
most cordially welcome him to the command, glad to be
relieved from so thankless and disagreeable a position.
I took it against my will, and shall be most happy to
leave it as soon as another is designated to fill it."
346 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
In a letter dated July 16, 1864, to the same officer,
Halleck said, speaking of Grant, who had then been
put over Halleck's head : " While the General himself
is free from petty jealousies, he has men about him
who would gladly make difficulties between us. I
know that they have tried it several times, but I do
not think they will succeed."
Immediately after Lee's surrender Grant went to
Washington, and Halleck from Washington to Rich-
mond for duty. On the 17th of May, 1865, Secretary
Stanton telegraphed to Halleck : " General Grant is
here with his wife. It is not safe for him to be at the
hotel, and he is reluctant to go into a private family.
He would go into your house for a while if agreeable
to you. Will you write him to do so while your
family are absent ? " Halleck at once telegraphed
Grant, " There are two servants and most of the fur-
niture and bedding in the house I occupied in George-
town. I suggest that while your wife is with you,
you move right in and make yourself comfortable.
My family will not again occupy it, and I do not re-
quire the furniture here, at least for the present.
During the hot weather you can make yourself much
more comfortable there than in Washington." Grant
promptly accepted this friendly offer, telegraphing
Halleck, " Your very kind dispatch, placing your
house at Mrs. Grant's disposal during her stay, is
received. I have not seen Mrs. Grant, but I know
that she will be delighted to get out of the hotel for
the few weeks she remains here." Halleck's house
was occupied by General and Mrs. Grant. This offer
and acceptance of hospitality was supplemented by
HALLECK AND GRANT.
347
the following expressions of friendliness and courtesy.
Telegram from Grant to Halleck, May 26: "I under-
stand that Mrs. Halleck is expected in Washington.
If you will let me know when to expect her, I will be
glad to meet her at the wharf with a carriage, and
have Mrs. Grant entertain her during her stay in this
city." Halleck to Grant, May 27: "Mrs. Halleck
will not visit Washington till she goes north for the
summer. The house will therefore remain entirely
at your disposal."
The foregoing communications show that Grant en-
tertained feelings of friendship and respect for Hal-
leck at the close of the War. And there are favorable
expressions from him of a much later date. John
Russell Young, in his book "Around the World with
General Grant" (1879), quotes Grant thus: "In the
early part of the War Halleck did very good service
for which he has never received sufficient credit I
mean in his civic administration. Some of his orders
were in anticipation, I think, of those of Butler, which
gave him so much fame in New Orleans " (p. 465,
vol. ii.), . . . " he was in addition a very able
military man. Halleck had intellect and great ac-
quirements outside of his military education. He
was at the head of the California bar when the War
broke out, and his appointment to the Major-Generalcy
was a gratification to all who knew the old Army.
When I was made Lieutenant-General, General Hal-
leck became Chief-of-Staff of the Army. He was very
useful, and was loyal and industrious ; sincerely
anxious for the success of the country, and without
any feeling of soreness at being superseded. In this
348 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
respect Halleck was a contrast to other officers of
equal ability, who felt that unless they had the com-
mand they craved they were not needed. Halleck's
immense knowledge of military science was of great
use in the War Office to those of us in the field " (p.
216, vol. ii.). . . . "After Donelson I was in dis-
grace, and practically without a command, because of
some misunderstanding on the part of Halleck. It all
came right in time. I never bore Halleck ill-will for
it. He was in command, and it was his duty to com-
mand as he pleased" (p. 452, vol. ii.). Grant's unkind
feeling toward Halleck appears to have been engen-
dered quite recently, and was due probably to misun-
derstanding of the facts arising from Grant's inability
to search the " Records " thoroughly for himself.
NEW YOEK CITY, December 15, 1885.
ARTICLE V.
Nicolay's " Outbreak of Rebellion." *
Colonel Nicolay has made an important contribu-
tion to history and has done the readers of the present
day a service of incalculable value. Adhering close-
ly to the facts established by official records, and un-
der the restraint of presenting occurrences in chrono-
logical order, he invests his account of the outbreak of
rebellion with the charm of a romance. His style is
excellent, though at times he drops below the sublime,
as, for example, in stating that Ellsworth's Zouaves
were received at the Academy of Music, in New York
City, by " as fashionable an audience as ever packed
the walls or split their Icid gloves to encore the most
famous prima-donna." Occasionally, too, an adjective
appears which may improve the turn of a sentence
but impairs its accuracy, as when speaking of the
affair at Blackburn's Ford, June 18, 1861, the author
says that " Tyler withdrew his reluctant officers and
men from the fight." There was no reluctance to
speak of in that engagement. Officers and men were
anxious to get into it, and more anxious to get out of
it. Many of them did not wait to be withdrawn.
Colonel Nicolay generally views his subject from the
extreme standpoint of the Republican Party. He
places the responsibility not on the Southern people,
* " The Outbreak of Rebellion," by Colonel John G. Nicolay. Chas.
Scribner's Sons. N. Y.
349
350
MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
but on their leaders, and regards the Rebellion as the
fruit of a deliberate cunning conspiracy of cliques and
cabals. He does not admit that the South had any
cause of complaint, or that there was anything in the
terms of the Constitution or the history of its adop-
tion on which to found the so-called " State rights " ;
and to support his condemnation of this doctrine he
pronounces State rights and State supremacy synony-
mous terms and uses the latter term. The merit of
Colonel Nicolay's work lies chiefly in the chapters
which deal with the political events and commotions
that preceded the outbreak of actual hostilities. There
is nothing in American biography surpassing his pen-
pictures of Buchanan and Lincoln. They are mere
outline sketches, but the likenesses are nearly perfect.
His personal devotion to the Martyr President per-
haps carries him a little too far when he claims that
Lincoln's " countenance " when " illuminated " in the
utterance of a strong or " stirring thought " was " posi-
tively handsome," but that is merely a matter of opin-
ion or taste, and if he errs at all it is on the right
side, the side of love.
He takes the 5th day of October, 1860, as the
initial point of the " American Rebellion " because on
that day Governor Gist of South Carolina commenced
a correspondence with the Governors of the Cotton
States concerning secession. That, however, does not
fix an initial point. Governor Gist's action was but a
continuation of treasonable proceedings which had
been going on in South Carolina for many years. The
first overt act was the adoption of an Ordinance of
Secession by the South Carolina Convention, Decem-
NICOLAY'3 " OUTBREAK OP REBELLION." 351
ber 20, 1860. That is the true initial point of the
Rebellion, and it is the one adopted by the compiler
of the "Records of the Rebellion," Colonel R. N. Scott,
U. S. A. It is well merely for convenience of reference
to note that after the War the Federal courts decided
that " the proclamation of the 19th of April, 1861,
was the first formal recognition of the existence of
civil war by the National authority," and that ' the
suppression of the Rebellion is to be deemed to have
taken place on the 20th of August, 1866."
Colonel Nicolay brings his narrative down to Mc-
Clellan's appointment as General-in-Chief in 1861, giv-
ing a history of the early operations in West Virginia,
Patterson's Harper's Ferry Campaign, and McDoAvell's
Campaign of Manassas or Bull Run. His account of
these operations is interesting and in the main accu-
rate, but is not marked by the skill and vigor that
characterize the treatment of the earlier events of the
outbreak. He recites too many elementary principles-
It might have been of use to the raw levies brought
forward at the time lie writes about, to announce that
" war combines art with science " ; that " the superior
work of the veteran comes through long years of prac-
tice " ; that " the value of a veteran consists as much
of his habitual expertness in the routine of camp and
march, as of coolness and confidence tinder fire " ; and
that an army develops " the greatest usefulness from
action and thoroughness of organization," but it is
hardly worth while for Colonel Nicolay at this date
to give such precepts so much prominence in a narra-
tive of this sort. His meaning in some of these pre-
cepts is not clear ; as, for example, when he says, " of
352 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
all machines an army develops perhaps, the greatest
inefficiency from mere friction," and he is rather too
hard on the public in saying, " occasionally an idea
finds a tenacious and almost ineradicable lodgment in
the public mind, without a shadow of reason or truth
to justify it. Because the fanatic John Brown selected
Harper's Ferry as the scene of his wild exploit, the
public mind jumped to the conclusion that the spot
was a natural stronghold, a Gibraltar, a Thermopylae.
Now the single mountain line called the Blue Ridge
crossing the Potomac River at Harper's Ferry, is as
far from being a mountain stronghold as a straight
line of picket-fence across a brook is from being a
block house. John Brown was as unsound in war as
in politics. But it would seem that even in highly
civilized nations there lingers a remnant of the savage
superstition that insanity is inspiration ; for strong
minds caught at the suggestion that he had recognized
in Harper's Ferry a negro Thermopylae."
Colonel Nicolay discusses Patterson's Campaign
about Harper's Ferry at considerable length. He
shows that Patterson was, in due time, informed by
General Scott that McDowell would make an ad vance
from Washington " against Beauregard at Manassas,
and that Johnston must be defeated or detained in
the Shenandoah Valley in order that their two armies
might not unite and defeat McDowell," and that Pat-
terson " found nothing but reasons for fear and justi-
fication for inaction and retreat," and that with ample
means and full instruction he utterly failed either to
defeat Johnston or detain him. Patterson, the author
adds, " had neither the skill nor courage to direct the
NICOLA.Y'8 " OUTBREAK OF REBELLION." 353
blow." What then ? Having fixed this lamentable
failure upon Patterson, Colonel Nicolay undertakes to
transfer the blame from him to his Assistant Adjutant-
General ! He sa} r s : " In justice to him (Patterson),
however, it should always be remembered that his
personal instinct was right, and that he was led into
his fatal error mainly by the influence of his Chief-of-
Staff, Fitz John Porter." What weight suppressed
" personal instinct " is entitled to in extenuating mili-
tary failures, it is hard to say, but certainly nothing
much worse can be said of a commanding general
than that he was led into a fatal error through the
" influence " of his staff officer. It is no apology for
failure that the commander adopts bad advice. He
has the power and the glory. It is not fair play to
try to shift the responsibility from him to his power-
less adviser. That merely hurts the one without
helping the other. It is remarkable that the most
extended citation of proof in the whole volume is
made in support of the unimportant point that Patter-
son was led into error by the influence of Fitz John
Porter ; and it is still more remarkable that the testi-
mony quoted instead of proving the statement clearly
refutes it. The author says Patterson's "Senior Aide-
de-Camp, in his testimony before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War relates the circumstances un-
der which he took his final decision : i At one time '
(says this Aide-de-Camp) ' General Patterson had given
an order to move from Bunker Hill to Winchester.
He was very unwilling to leave Johnston even at
Winchester without attacking him, and on the after-
noon before we left Bunker Hill he decided to attack
him notwithstanding his force.'
354
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
" i Question. Behind his intrenchments ? '
" i Answer. Yes, sir ; it went so far that his order
was written by his Assistant Adjutant-General, Colo-
nel Porter. It was very much against the wishes of
Colonel Porter, and he asked General Patterson if he
would send for Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel
Thomas, and consult them on the movements. General
Patterson replied: u No, sir ; for I know they will at-
tempt to dissuade me from it, and I have made up my
mind to fight Johnston under all circumstances." That
was the day before we left Bunker Hill. Then Colo-
nel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie and
Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted as to the best
manner to carry out his wishes. He consented and
they came, and after half an hour they dissuaded him
from it.' "
This is one of the many ex-parte statements made
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War; but
as Colonel Nicolay adopts it, it is not proposed here to
discredit it. It shows as clearly as language can, that,
so far from being led into error by Porter, Patterson
squarely repelled that officer's influence, and in spite
of it made up his mind " to fight Jolmston under all
circumstances.' 1 '' He, however, accepted Porter's sug-
gestion to consult Colonels Abercrombie and Thomas,
as to the best manner of conducting the fight he had
resolved upon and in that consultation " they " Aber-
crombie and Thomas led him into the fatal error of
not fighting at all. Who, it may be asked, were Aber-
crombie and Thomas that Patterson should have been
so fatally led by them after having resisted Porter's
" influence " ? The former was an old and esteemed
NICOLAY'S "OUTBREAK OF REBELLION." 355
officer of the Regular Army of high rank, and was Pat-
terson's life-long friend and son-in-law. The Thomas
mentioned was George H. Thomas, whose life was
spent in the Regular Army. He too was an officer of
high rank and known ability at that time. His career
as a Major-General in the Rebellion was brilliant and
successful. It is not strange that Patterson, with the
character that Colonel Nicolay gives him, failed to fight
if these two men advised against it ; but it is amazing
that Colonel Nicolay should go so far out of his way
in a fruitless and unnecessary attempt to fasten on
Porter the responsibility for the effects of advice,
which by the testimony adduced belongs to Abercrom-
bie and Thomas. But strange to say Colonel Nicolay
does not produce all the testimony. The report of the
Committee on the Conduct of the War from which he
quotes to prove that it was Porter's influence which
prevented Patterson from fighting, contains the testi-
mony of Colonel Craig Biddle, one of Patterson's aides,
showing that a council of general officers unanimously
opposed the advance. It is as follows : a The discus-
sion at Martinsburg was as to whether or not General
Patterson should go on to Winchester. General Pat-
terson was very full of that himself. He was' deter-
mined to go to Winchester, but the opinions of all the
regular officers who were with him were against it.
. . Ihe opinions of all the men in whom I had any
confidence were against it. . . . He (Patterson)
decided upon going ahead against the remonstrances of
General Porter who advised against it. He (Porter)
told me he considered he had done his duty, and said
no more. The movement was delayed in consequence
356
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
of General Stone 's command not being able to move right
away. It was then evident that there was so much
opposition to it that the General was induced to call
a council of the general officers in his command at
which I was present. They were unanimously opposed
to the advance"
Why in the face of all these facts Colonel Nicolay
should assert that Patterson " was led into his fatal
error mainly by the influence of his Chief -of -Staff, Fitz
John Porter," must be left to conjecture.
If we look up instead of down for the cause of the
failure of the campaign of 1861 we shall probably find
that General Scott is not entirely free from responsi-
bility. As General-in-Chief of the Army, it was in
his power, if not restrained by the President, to unite
the armies of McDowell and Patterson or keep them
apart. He chose the latter course, giving McDowell
no better assurance than that if Johnston joined Beau-
regard he should have "Patterson on his heels" It
would perhaps have been better to put Patterson on
Johnston's toes by sending him in due time to the
Manassas field of operations via Leesburg.
When weighing military services a historian should
hold the scales with a firm grasp. In Patterson's cam-
paign there appears to be a little unsteadiness in our
author's hand, but that, in its relations to the general
subject, is a mere blemish on a meritorious work; and
the Scribners have a right to feel proud of the intro-
ductory volume of their commendable enterprise.
ARTICLE VI.
The First Battle of Bull Run.*
Speaking broadly, the South had political control
of the Government until 1860. The election of Lin-
coln to the Presidency in that year showed that South-
ern domination within the Union had probably come
to an end and that the anti-slavery spirit of the North
was growing. But it was from no fear that the slaves
would be liberated that secession took place. Presi-
dent Lincoln, to avoid war, was at the beginning
willing that slavery should be continued in the States
where it existed. Congress, even after the Battle of
Bull Run, almost unanimously resolved with the most
conciliatory feeling, that the War was " not waged in
any spirit of oppresssion, nor from any purpose of
conquest or subjugation, nor for the purpose of over-
throwing or interfering with the rights or established
institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain
the permanency of the Constitution and to preserve
the Union with all the dignity and equal rights .of the
several States unimpaired."
The necessity for subjection of the slave-masters 7
will to the will of the Union after political control had
passed to the North ; the unwillingness of the North
to have slavery extended and a violent resentment in
the South of abolitionism in the abstract, was the
* Published in part in the " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War."
Century Company, N. Y.
357
358 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
cause of the attempt of Southern States to withdraw
from the Union. The Confederate Commissioners,
Yancey, Munn and Rust, in their letter to Earl Rus-
sell said : " It was from no fear that the slaves would
be liberated that secession took place. The very party
in power has proposed to guarantee slavery forever in
the States if the South would but remain in the Union."
Secession, which had long been ripening in South
Carolina, was actually inaugurated there in October
prior to the election, and was formally declared De-
cember 20, 1860. Through the activito of political
leaders, but much against the will of many of the
people, it spread rapidly among other States and the
South was soon in rebellion.
As President Buchanan's administration was draw-
ing to a close he was forced by the action of the South
to decide whether the power of the General Govern-
ment should be used to coerce, into submission, States
that had attempted to secede from the Union. His
opinion was that the contingency was not provided
for, that while a State had no right to secede, the
Constitution gave no authority to coerce, and that he
had no right to do anything except hold the property
and enforce the laws of the United States.
Before President Buchanan went out of uffice, a
spirit not only of secession but of war and aggression
was rampant in the South, and the capital of the na-
tion seemed to be in danger of seizure by the reckless
and daring spirits of the fostering rebellion. For its
protection and in order to consult about holding
Southern forts and arsenals, General Scott was in
December called to Washington, from which he had
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 359
been absent since the inauguration of Pierce, who had
defeated him for the Presidency. Jefferson Davis,
Pierce's Secretary of War, and General Scott had
quarrelled and the genius of acrimony controlled the
correspondence which took place between them.""
Notwithstanding the fact that on account of his age
and infirmities he was soon overwhelmed by the rush
of events, General Scott's laurels had not withered at
the outbreak of the War, and he brought to the emer-
gency, ability, experience and prestige. A high light
in the whole military world, he towered above the rest
of our Army, at that time, professionally as he did
physically. As the effect of his immense stature was
increased by contrast with a short Aide-de-Camp, pur-
posely chosen as it was suspected, so was his exalted
character marked by one or two conspicuous but not
very harmful foibles. With much learning, great
* The last letter of that correspondence is as follows :
"WAR DEPARTMENT,
"WASHINGTON, May 27, 1856.
u SIR: I have received your letter of the 21st instant. The delay
for which you make a hypocritical apology has strengthened you to re-
sume the labor of vituperation ; but having early in this correspondence
stamped you with falsehood, and whenever you presented a tangible
point convicted you by conclusive proof, I have ceased to regard your
abuse ; and as you present nothing in this letter which requires remark,
I am gratified to be relieved from the necessity of further exposing your
malignity and depravity. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" JEFFERSON DAVIS, Secretary of War.
" Brevet Lieut. -General Winfield Scott, U.S. Army, New York City."
To mark the difference between precept and example, it may be
noted that upon the heels of the foregoing abusive letter to Genera
Scott, Davis, as Secretary of War, issued in 1857, a new code of Army
Regulations, the first Article of which says : " Superiors of every grade
are forbid to injure those under them, by tyrannical or capricious con-
duct or by abusive language."
360 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
military ability, a strict sense of justice, and a kind
heart, lie was vain and somewhat petulant. He loved
the Union and hated Jefferson Davis.
By authority of the President, General Scott assem-
bled a small force of regulars in the capital and for
the first time in the history of the country, the elec-
toral count was made and a President was inaugurated
under the protection of soldiery. But before the in-
auguration of Lincoln, March 4, the secession move-
ment had spread through the " cotton-belt " and dele-
gates from the secession States had met as a congress
at Montgomery, Alabama, February 4. On the 8th,
they had organized the " Provisional Government of
the Confederate States of America," and on the 9th
had elected Jefferson Davis President and Alexander
H. Stephens Vice-President. On the llth of March
the Confederate Congress adopted a constitution con-
taining a clause saying, "The institution of Negro
slavery as it now exists in the Confederate States shall
be recognized and protected."
In his Inaugural Address, February 18, Jefferson
Davis expressed it as the judgment and will of the
Southern people that a reunion with the North was
" neither practicable nor desirable." Stephens in his
speech, March 21, 1861, said of the new Southern
government, " Its foundations are laid, its corner-stone
rests upon the great truth that the Negro is not equal
to the white man, that slavery subordination to the
superior race is his natural and normal condition. This
our new government is the first in the history of the
world based upon this great physiological and moral
truth."
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL KUN. 361
In his Inaugural Address, Lincoln avowed that he
had no purpose to interfere, directly or indirectly, with
slavery in the States where it existed, but he pro-
nounced ordinances of secession legally void ; asserted
that the Union was perpetual ; that it would defend
itself and hold its property and offices and collect its
duties and imports.
That is the issue that was joined at the time. The
South, believing in the doctrine of State rights, main-
tained that a State had the right to withdraw from the
Union, and the Southern States proceeded to withdraw
from the Government of the United States and set up
a government of their own, based upon slavery. The
Government of the United States, without then passing
upon the principle of slavery and without any purpose
of interfering with it where it existed, denied the right
of secession and asserted the perpetuity of the Union
and the right and duty of the General Government to
enforce the laws of the United States over the whole
country.
Actual hostilities were not long delayed. Major
Anderson, commanding a small Union force in Fort
Moultrie, a weak post in Charleston harbor, finding
himself threatened by the gathering and angry, troops
of South Carolina, while commissioners of that State
were in Washington to treat for the surrender of the
forts, escaped the danger of capture by transferring
his command to Fort Sumter on the night of December
26, 1860.
Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, promptly
seized Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the Arsenal,
Custom House and Post Office in Charleston, raised
362 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
the Palmetto flag over them and began the construc-
tion of batteries to bombard Fort Sumter. On the
9th of January he fired upon and drove away the
steamship " Star of the West," sent by the Government
with recruits and supplies for Major Anderson. The
siege of Fort Sumter was assumed by the Confederate
government on the 1st of March, with General Beaure-
gard in command. Learning on the 8th of April that
a naval expedition was about to approach with succor
for the garrison, Beauregard on the 12th opened fire
upon the fort, which surrendered on the 13th, and its
Union flag was lowered to be raised only on the fourth
anniversary thereafter. For many months the Govern-
ment had borne insults and wrongs with amazing
patience. Diplomacy and forbearance were at an
end.
The morning that the news of the firing upon Sum-
ter reached Washington, President Lincoln issued a
proclamation dated April 15, convening Congress and
calling forth 75,000 three months' militia to suppress
combinations against the Government, to cause the laws
to be executed and to maintain the honor, the integrity
and existence of the Union and the perpetuity of pop-
ular government.
The war spirit was aroused to the highest pitch in
the North as well as in the South. The people in
arms prepared to flock to their respective standards,
those of the South to establish a new government based
upon slavery; those of the North to preserve the Union
as it was. Upon the issue of abolishing slavery as it
then existed, indeed upon any other issue than the one
plainly and forcibly announced by President Lincoln,
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 363
the General Government would have failed to raise an
a,rnry for the suppression of the rebellion.
The Federal situation was alarming. Sumter fell
on the 13th of April; Virginia seceded on the 17th.
She seized Harper's Ferry on the 18th and the Norfolk
Navy Yard on the 20th. On the 19th a mob in Balti-
more assaulted the 6th Massachusetts Volunteers as it
passed through to Washington, and soon the bridges
were burned and railroad communication was cut off
between Washington and the North. The national
capital, a slave-holding city, lying between the slave-
holding States of Virginia and Maryland, was in peril.
But General Scott was there with two light batteries,
the Marine Corps and a few foot companies of the Reg-
ular Army. On the 9th of April, President Lincoln
called upon the District of Columbia for militia, but
the response increased for the moment the alarm of
the situation. Some of the men refused to be mustered
into service, being disloyal, and others exacted the
-condition that they should not be required to serve
beyond the limits of the District. Thirty-eight com-
panies were, however, finally obtained, thirty-five of
them with the condition just mentioned, and being
placed under the command of their Inspector-General,
that able and indefatigable soldier, General Charles P.
Stone, contributed to avert the shame that threatened
the nation in the loss of its capital before the Northern
people could reach it. After April 12, both sides
began to prepare in earnest for the gigantic struggle,
which lasted until four years of bloody war had worn
out the South.
The North had a regular army composed on January
384
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
1st, 1862, of 1,098 officers, and 15,304 enlisted men.
Of this force, some four or five hundred men were in
Washington. The remainder were scattered from the
British boundary to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the
Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. After January 1st, the
Army in addition to ordinary casualties, was reduced
by the surrender of a considerable part of its own
oificers to the Confederates, and by the resignation
and desertion of 313 commissioned officers, who joined
the South. No addition was made to the government
forces prior to April, 1861. The Southerners,, daring,
fiery, full of confidence in their own prowess and of
contempt for the courage and manhood of the North,
having through their leaders resolved upon secession
as soon as they were voted down by the election of
Lincoln, before that even in South Carolina, had
taken up arms and spent the winter of their favoring
clime in military exercises. The Northerners, on the
other hand, deprecating war and hoping that patience
and forbearance would prevent it, made no preparation
for the hostilities that were forced upon them.
Lincoln, who was at the head of the Union, had had
no experience as a party leader or executive officer
and was without knowledge of military affairs or
acquaintance with military men. Davis, at the head
of the Confederacy, was an experienced and acknowl-
edged Southern leader; was a graduate of the Military
Academy ; had commanded a regiment in the Mexican
War; had been Secretary of War under President
Pierce, and was chairman of the military committee in
the United States Senate at the time he left Congress
to take part with the South. He was not only well
THE FIKST BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 365
versed in everything relating to war, but was thor-
oughly informed concerning the character and capacity
of prominent and promising officers of the Army.
There was nothing experimental in his choice of his
high military commanders. Those appointed at the
beginning retained command with but few exceptions,
until they lost their lives or the War closed.
The Southern States, all claiming to be independent
republics after secession, with all their governmental
machinery including militia and volunteer organiza-
tions in complete working order, transferred them-
selves as States from the Union to the Confederacy in
cheerful obedience to the command of State rights and
slavery. The organization of a general government
from such elements, with war as its immediate pur-
pose, was a simple matter. Davis had only to accept
and arrange according to his ample information and
well-matured judgment, the abundant and ambitious
material at hand in the way that he thought would
best secure the purposes of the Rebellion. Lincoln had
to adapt the machinery of a conservative old govern-
ment, some of it unsuitable, some unsound, to sudden
demands for which it was not designed.
Officers from all departments of the Federal civil
service and from all the corps of the Regular Army,
most of them full of vigor, with the same education
and experience as those who remained, went South
and awaited assignment to the duties for which Davis
might regard them as best qualified. All Confederate
offices were vacant and the Confederate President had
large if not absolute power in filling them. On the
other hand, the civil offices under Lincoln were occu-
366
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
pied or controlled by party and in the small Regular
Army of the Union the law required that vacancies as
they occurred should as a rule be filled by seniority.
There was no retired list for the disabled, and the
Army was weighed down by longevity ; by venerated
traditions ; by prerogatives of service rendered in for-
mer wars; by the firmly tied red tape of military
bureauism and by the deep-seated and well-founded
fear of the auditors and comptrollers of the Treasury.
Nothing but time and experience possibly nothing
but disaster could remove from the path of the Union
President difficulties from which the Confederate
President was, by the situation, quite free. So, too,
Davis was free from the disloyalty which surrounded
Lincoln at that period and which was injurious not
only through its reality but through the apprehension
and suspicion that lingered after it had ceased in fact.
The talents of Simon Cameron, his first Secretary of
War, were political, not military. He was a kind,
gentle, placid man, gifted with powers to persuade,
not to command. Shrewd and skilled in the manage-
ment of business and personal matters, he had no
knowledge of military affairs, and could not give the
President much assistance in assembling and organ-
izing for war the earnest and impatient, but unmilitary
people of the North.
In the beginning of the War, therefore, the military
advantage was on the side of the Confederates, not-
withstanding the greater resources of the North, which
produced their effect only as the contest was prolonged.
After the firing of the first gun upon Sumter, the
two sides were equally active in marshalling their
THE FIRST BA.T1LE OF BULL RUN. 367
forces on a line along the border States from the At-
lantic coast of Virginia in the east to Kansas in the
o
west. Many of the earlier collisions along this line
were due rather to special causes or local feeling than
to general military considerations. The prompt ad-
vance of the Union forces under McClellan to West
Virginia was to protect that new-born free State.
Patterson's movement to Hagerstown and thence to
Harper's Ferry was to prevent Maryland from joining
or aiding the Rebellion, to re-open the Baltimore and
Ohio railroad, and prevent invasion from the Shenan-
cloah Valley. The Southerners having left the Union
and set up the Confederacy upon the principle of
State rights, in violation of that principle invaded the
State of Kentucky in opposition to her apparent pur-
pose of armed neutrality. That made Kentucky a
field of early hostilities and helped to anchor her to
the Union. Missouri was rescued from secession
through the energy of General F. P. Blair and her
other Union men, and by the indomitable will of Cap-
tain Lyon of the Regular Army, whose great work
was accomplished under many disadvantages. In
illustration of the difficulty with which the new con-
dition of affairs penetrated the case-hardened bureauism
of long peace, it may be mentioned that the venerable
Adjutant-General of the Army, when a crisis was at
hand in Missouri, came from a consultation with the
President and Secretary Cameron, and with a sorry
expression of countenance and an ominous shake of
the head exclaimed, " It's bad, very bad ; we're giving
that young man Lyon a great deal too much power in
Missouri."
368
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Early in the contest another young Union officer
came to the front. Major Irvin McDowell was ap-
pointed Brigadier-General May 14. He was forty-
three years of age, of unexceptionable habits and
great physical powers. His education, begun in
France, was continued at the United States Military
Academy, from which he was graduated in 1838.
Always a close student, he was well informed outside
as well as inside his profession. Distinguished in the
Mexican war, intensely Union in his sentiments, full
of energy and patriotism, outspoken in his opinions,
highly esteemed by General Scott, on whose staff he
had served, he at once secured the confidence of the
President and the Secretary of War, under whose ob-
servation lie was serving in Washington. Without
political antecedents or acquaintances, he was chosen
for advancement on account of his record, his ability,
and his vigor.
Northern forces had hastened to Washington upon
the call of President Lincoln,* but prior to May 24
they had been held rigidly on the north side of the
Potomac. On the night of May 23-24, the Confederate
pickets being then in sight of the Capitol, three col-
umns were thrown across the river by General J. K.
F. Mansfield, then commanding the Department of
Washington, and a line from Alexandria below to
* The aspect of affairs was so threatening after President Lincoln's
call of April 15 for 75,000 three-months' militia, and General Scott was
so averse to undertaking any active operations with such short-term
troops, that, as early as May 3, and without waiting for the meeting of
Congress, the President entered upon the creation of an additional vol-
unteer army to be composed of 42,034 three-years' men, together with
an increase of 22,714 regulars and 18,000 seamen.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 369
chain-bridge above Washington was intrenched under
guidance of able engineers. On the 27th Brigadier-
General Irvin McDowell was placed in command south
of the Potomac.
By the 1st of June the Southern government had
been transferred from Montgomery to Richmond, and
the capitals of the Union and of the Confederacy
stood defiantly confronting each other. General Scott
was in chief command of the Union forces, with Mc-
Dowell south of the Potomac, confronted by his old
classmate, Beauregard, hot from the capture of Fort
Sumter.
General Patterson, of Pennsylvania, a veteran of
the War of 1812 and the War with Mexico, was in
command near Harper's Ferry, opposed by General
Joseph E. Johnston. The Confederate President,
Davis, then in Richmond, with General R. E. Lee as
military adviser, exercised in person general military
control of the Southern forces. The enemy to be en-
gaged by McDowell occupied what was called the
" Alexandria line," with headquarters at Manassas,
the junction of the Orange and Alexandria with the
Mannassas Gap railroad. The stream known as Bull
Run, some three miles in front of Manassas, was the
line of defense. On Beauregard's right, thirty miles
away, at the mouth of Aquia Creek, there was a Con-
federate brigade of 3,000 men and 6 guns under Gen-
eral Holmes. The approach to Richmond from the
Lower Chesapeake, threatened by General. B. F. But-
ler, was guarded by Confederates under Generals
Huger and Magruder. On Beauregard's left, sixty
miles distant, in the Lower Shenandoah Valley and
370
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
separated from him by the Blue Ridge Mountains,
was the Confederate army of the Shenandoah under
command of General Johnston. Beauregard's author-
ity did not extend over the forces of Johnston, Huger,
Magruder, or Holmes, but Holmes was with him be-
fore the battle of Bull Run, and so was Johnston,
who, as will appear more fully hereafter, joined at a
decisive moment.
Early in June Patterson was pushing his column
against Harper's Ferry, and on the 3d of that month
McDowell was called upon by General Scott to submit
" an estimate of the number and composition of a
column to be pushed toward Manassas Junction and
perhaps the Gap, say in 4 or 5 days, to favor Patter-
son's attack upon Harper's Ferry." McDowell had
then been in command at Arlington less than a week,
his raw regiments south of the Potomac were not yet
brigaded, and this was the first intimation he had of
offensive operations. He reported, June 4th, that
] 2,000 infantry, 2 batteries, 6 or 8 companies of cav-
alry, and a reserve of 5,000 ready to move from Alex-
andria would be required. Johnston, however, gave
up Harper's Ferry to Patterson, and the diversion by
McDowell was not ordered. But the public demand
for an advance became imperative stimulated perhaps
by the successful dash of fifty men of the 2d United
States Cavalry, under Lieutenant C. H. Tompkins,
through the enemy's outposts at Fairfax Court House
on the night of June 1st, and by the unfortunate re-
sult of the movement of a regiment under General
Schenck toward Vienna, June 9, as well as by a dis-
aster to some of General Butler's troops on the 10th
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 371
at Big Bethel, near Fort Monroe. On the 24th of
June, in compliance with verbal instructions from
General Scott, McDowell submitted a " plan of opera-
tions and the composition of the force required to
carry it into effect." He estimated the Confederate
force at Manassas Junction and its dependencies at
25,000 men, assumed that his movements could not be
kept secret and that the enemy would call up addi-
tional forces from all quarters, and added : " If Gen-
eral J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by Major-
General Patterson, and Major-General Butler occupies
the force now in his vicinity, I think they will not be
able to bring up more than 10,000 men, so we may
calculate upon having to do with about 35,000 men."
And as it turned out, that was about the number he
" had to do with." For the advance, McDowell asked
" a force of 30,000 of all arms, with a reserve of 10,-
000." He knew that Beauregard had batteries in
position at several places in front of Bull Run and
defensive works behind the Run and at Manassas
Junction. The stream being fordable at many places,
McDowell proposed in his plan of operations to turn
the enemy's position and force him out of it by seizing
or threatening his communications. Nevertheless, he
said in his report :
" Believing the chances are greatly in favor of the
enemy's accepting battle between this and the Junction
and that the consequences of that battle will be of the
greatest importance to the country, as establishing the
prestige in this contest, on the one side or the other,
the more so as the two sections will be fairly repre-
sented by regiments from almost every State, I
372
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
think it of great consequence that, as for the most part
our regiments are exceedingly raw and the best of
them, with few exceptions, not over steady in line,
they be organized into as many small fixed brigades as
the number of regular Colonels may admit, . .
so that the men may have as fair a chance as the na-
ture of things and the comparative inexperience of most
will allow."
This remarkably sound report was approved, and
McDowell was directed to carry his plan into effect
July 8. But the government machinery worked
slowly and there was jealousy in the way, so that the
troops to bring his army up to the strength agreed upon
did not reach him until the 16th.
Beau regard's Army of the Potomac at Manassas
consisted of the brigades of Holmes, Bonham, Ewell,
D. R. Jones, Longstreet, Cocke and Early, and of 3
regiments of infantry, 1 regiment and 3 battalions of
cavalry, and 6 batteries of artillery, containing in all
27 guns, making an aggregate available force on the
field of Bull Run of about 23,000 men.* Johnston's
army from the Shenandoah consisted of the brigades
* Beauregard himself has said that on the 18th of July he had "along
the line of Bull Run about 17,000 men ; that on the 19th General
Holmes joined him with about 3,000 men " ; and that he " received
from Richmond between the 18th and 21st about 2,000 more " ; and
that Johnston brought about 8,000 more, the advance arriving "on the
morning of the 20th and the remainder about noon of the 21st, ' ' mak-
ing his whole force, as he states it, " nearly 30,000 men of all arms."
The figures are probably under the mark, as Hampton's Legion, Mc-
Rea's Regiment, a North Carolina "regiment and two battalions of
Mississippi and Alabama" joined between the 17th and 21st. Beaure-
gard's force may fairly be placed at 32,000 ; and the opposing armies,
both in the aggregate and in the parts engaged, were nearer equal in
that than in any other battle in Virginia.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL KUN. 373
of Jackson, Bee, Bartow, and Kirby Smith, 2 regi-
ments of infantry not brigaded, 1 regiment of cavalry
(12 companies), and 5 batteries (20 guns), making an
aggregate at Bull Run of 8,340.
McDowell's army consisted of 5 divisions, Tyler's
First Division, containing 4 brigades (Keyes's,
Schenck's, W. T. Sherman's, and Richardson's); Hun-
ter's Second Division, containing 2 brigades (Andrew
Porter's and Burnside's); Heintzelman's Third Divi-
sion, containing 3 Brigades (Franklin's, Willcox's, and
Howard's) ; Runyon's Fourth Division (9 regiments
not brigaded) ; and Miles's Fifth Division, containing
2 brigades (Blenker's and Davies's), 10 batteries of
artillery, besides two guns attached to infantry regi-
ments, 49 guns in all, and 7 companies of regular cav-
alry. Of the foregoing forces, 9 of the batteries and
8 companies of infantry were regulars, and 1 small
battalion was marines. The aggregate force was about
35,000 men. Runyon's Fourth Division was 6 or 7
miles in the rear guarding the road to Alexandria, and,
though counted in the aggregate, was not embraced in
McDowell's order for battle.*
There was an ill-suppressed feeling of sympathy
with the Confederacy in the Southern element of
Washington society; but the halls of Congress re-
sounded with the eloquence of Union speakers. Mar-
tial music filled the air, and war was the topic wher-
ever men met. By day and night the tramp of sol-
diers was heard, and staff-officers and orderlies galloped
* The average leDgth of service of McDowell's men prior to the bat-
tle was about sixty days.~*The longest in service were the three-months'
men, and of these he had fourteen regiments.
374
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
through the streets between the headquarters of Gen-
erals Scott and McDowell. Northern enthusiasm was
unbounded. "On to Richmond" was the war-cry.
Public sentiment was irresistible, and in response to it
the army advanced. It was a glorious spectacle. The
various regiments were brilliantly uniformed according
to the aesthetic taste of peace, and the silken banners
they flung to the breeze were unsoiled and untorn.
The bitter realities of war were nearer than we knew.
McDowell marched on the afternoon of July 16,
the men carrying three days' rations in their haver-
sacks ; provision wagons were to follow from Alexan-
dria the next day. On the morning of the 18th his
forces were concentrated at Centreville, a point about
20 miles west of the Potomac and 6 or 7 miles east of
Manassas Junction. Beauregard's outposts fell back
without resistance. Bull Run, flowing south-easterly,
is about half-way between Centreville and Manassas
Junction, and, owing to its abrupt banks, the timber
with which it was fringed, and some artificial de-
fenses at the fords, was a formidable obstacle.
The stream was fordable, but all the crossings for
eight miles, from Union Mills on the south to the
Stone Bridge on the north, were defended by Beau-
regard's forces. The Warrenton Turnpike, passing
through Centreville, leads nearly due west, crossing
Bull Run at the Stone Bridge. The direct road from
Centreville to Manassas crosses Bull Run at Mitchell's
Ford, half a mile or so above another crossing known
as Blackburn's Ford. Union Mills was covered by
Swell's brigade, supported after the 18th by Holmes's
brigade ; McLean's Ford, next to the north, was cov-
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL EUN. 375
ered by D. R. Jones's brigade ; Blackburn's Ford was
defended by Longstreet's brigade, supported by Early's
brigade; Mitchell's Ford was held by Bonham's bri-
gade, with an outpost of two guns and an infantry
support east of Bull Run ; the stream between Mitch-
ell's Ford and the Stone Bridge was covered by
Cocke's brigade ; the Stone Bridge on the Confederate
left was held by Evans with 1 regiment and Wheat's
special battalion of infantry, 1 battery of 4 guns, and
2 companies of cavalry.*
McDowell was compelled to wait at Centreville un-
til his provision wagons arrived and he could issue
rations. His orders having carried his leading divi-
sion under Tyler no farther than Centreville, he wrote
that officer at 8.15 A.M. on the 18th, " Observe well
the roads to Bull Run and to Warrenton. Do not
bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression
that we are moving on Manassas." McDowell then
o
went to the extreme left of his line to examine the
country with reference to a sudden movement of the
army to turn the enemy's right flank. The recon-
* The state of General Beauregard's mind at the time is indicated
by the following telegram on the 17th of July from him to Jefferson
Davis : ' ' The enemy has assaulted my outposts in heavy force. . I have
fallen back on the line of Bull Run and will make a stand at Mitchell's
Ford. If his force is overwhelming, I shall retire to Rappahannock
railroad bridge, saving my command for defence there and future oper-
ations. Please inform Johnston of this via Staunton, and also Holmes.
Send forward any re-enforcements at the earliest possible instant and by
every possible means." The alarm in this dispatch and the apprehen-
sion it shows of McDowell's " overwhelming " strength are not in har-
mony with the more recent assurance of the Confederate commander,
that through sources in Washington treasonable to the Union, and in
other ways, he " was almost as well informed of the strength of the hos-
tile army in my [his] front as its commander."
376
MILITARY MISCELLANIES
noissance showed him that the country was unfavor-
able to the movement, and he abandoned it. While
he was gone to the left, Tyler, presumably to " keep
up the impression that we were moving on Manassas,"
went forward from Centreville with a squadron of
cavalry and two companies of infantry for the purpose
of making a reconnoissance of Mitchell's and Black-
burn's fords along the direct road to Manassas. The
force of the enemy at these fords has just been given.
Eeaching the crest of the ridge overlooking the valley
of Bull Run and a mile or so from the stream, the
enemy was seen on the opposite bank, and Tyler
brought up Benjamin's artillery, 2 20-pounder rifled
guns, Ayres's field battery of 6 guns, and Richardson's
brigade of infantry. The 20-pounders opened from
the ridge and a few shots were exchanged with the
enemy's batteries. Desiring more information than,
the long-range cannonade afforded, Tyler ordered
Richardson's brigade and a section of Ayres's battery,
supported by a squadron of cavalry, to move from the
ridge across the open bottom of Bull Run and take
position near the stream and have skirmishers " scour
the thick woods " which skirted it. Two regiments
of infantry, 2 pieces of artillery, and a squadron of
cavalry moved down the slope into the woods and
opened fire, driving Bonham's outpost to the cover of
in trench ments across the stream. The brigades of
Bonham and Longstreet, the latter being re-enforced
for the occasion by Early's brigade, responded at short
range to the fire of the Federal reconnoitering force
and drove it back in disorder. Tyler reported that
having satisfied himself " that the enemy was in force,"
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL EUN.
377
and ascertained " the position of his batteries," he
withdrew. This unauthorized reconnoissance, called
by the Federals the affair at Blackburn's Ford, was
regarded at the time by the Confederates as a serious
attack, and was dignified by the name of the " battle
of Bull Run," the engagement of the 21st being called
by them the battle of Manassas. The Confederates,
feeling that they had repulsed a heavy and real attack,
were encouraged by the result. The Federal troops,
on the other hand, were greatly depressed. The regi-
ment which suffered most was completely demoralized,
and McDowell thought that the depression of the re.
pulse was felt throughout his army and produced its
effect upon the Pennsylvania regiment and the New
York battery which insisted (their terms having ex-
pired) upon their discharge, and on the 21st, as he ex-
pressed it, " marched to the rear to the sound of the
enemy's cannon." Even Tyler himself felt the de-
pressing effect of his repulse, if we may judge by his
cautious and feeble action on the 21st when dash was
required.
The operations of the 18th confirmed McDowell in
his opinion that with his raw troops the Confederate
position should be turned instead of attacked in front.
Careful examination had satisfied him that the country
did not favor a movement to turn the enemy's right.
On the night of the 18th the haversacks of his men
were empty, and had to be replenished from the pro-
vision wagons, which were late in getting up. Nor
had he yet determined upon his point or plan of attack.
While resting and provisioning his men, he devoted
the 19th and 20th to a careful examination by his en-
378 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
gineers of the enemy's position and the intervening
country. His men, not soldiers, but civilians in uni-
form, unused to marching, hot, weary, and footsore,
dropped down as they had halted and bivouacked on
the roads about Centreville. Notwithstanding Beau-
regard's elation over the affair at Blackburn's Ford on
the 18th, he permitted the 19th and 20th to pass
without a movement to follow up the advantage he
had gained. During these two days, McDowell care-
fully examined the Confederate position, and made
his plan to manoeuvre the enemy out of it. Beaure-
gard ordered no aggressive movement until the 21st,
and then, as appears from his own statement, through
miscarriage of orders and lack of apprehension on the
part of subordinates, the effort was a complete fiasco,
with the comical result of frightening his own troops,
who, late in the afternoon, mistook the return of one
of their brigades for an attack by McDowell's left,
and the serious result of interfering with the pursuit
after he had gained the battle of the 21st.
But Beauregard, though not aggressive on the 19th
and 20th, was riot idle within his own lines. The
Confederate President had authorized Johnston, Beau-
regard's senior, to use his discretion in moving to the
support of Manassas, and Beauregard, urging John-
ston to do so, sent railway transportation for the
Shenandoah forces. But, as he states, " he at the
same time submitted the alternative proposition to
Johnston that, having passed the Blue Eidge, he
should assemble his forces, press forward by way of
Aldie, north- west of Manassas, and fall upon Mc-
Dowell's right rear," while he, Beauregard, "prepared
THE FIKST BATTLE OF BULL KUN. 379
for the operation at the first sound of the conflict,
should strenuously assume the offensive in front."
" The situation and circumstances specially favored
the signal success of such an operation," says Beaure-
gard. An attack by two armies moving from opposite
points upon an enemy, with the time of attack for one
depending upon the sound of the other's cannon, is
hazardous even with well-disciplined and well-seasoned
troops, and is next to fatal with raw levies. Johnston
chose the wiser course of moving by rail to Manassas,
thus preserving the benefit of " interior lines," which,
Beauregard says, was the " sole military advantage at
the moment that the Confederates possessed."
The campaign which General Scott required Mc-
Dowell to make was undertaken with the understand-
ing that Johnston should be prevented from joining
Beauresrard. With no lack of confidence in himself.
O 7
McDowell was dominated by the feeling of subordi-
nation and deference to General Scott which at that
time pervaded the whole Army, and General Scott,
who controlled both McDowell and Patterson, assured
McDowell that Johnston should not join Beauregard
without having " Patterson on his heels." Yet John-
ston's army, nearly nine thousand strong, joined Beau-
regard; Bee's brigade and Johnston in person arriving
on the morning of the 20th, the remainder about noon
on the 21st. Although the enforced delay at Centre-
ville enabled McDowell to provision his troops and
gain information upon which to base an excellent plan
of attack, it proved fatal by affording time for a junc-
tion of the opposing forces. On the 21st of July
General Scott addressed a dispatch to McDowell, say-
380 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ing : " It is known that a strong re-enforcement left
Winchester on the afternoon of the 18th, which you
w r ill also have to beat. Four new regiments will leave
to-day to be at Fairfax Station to-night. Others shall
follow to-morrow twice the number if necessary."
When this dispatch was penned, McDowell was fight-
ing the " strong re-enforcement" which left Winchester
on the 18th. General Scott's report that Beauregard
had been re-enforced, the information that four regi-
ments had been sent to McDowell, and the promise
that twice the number would be sent if necessary, all
came too late and Patterson came not at all.*
* On the 17th of July Patterson, with some 16,000 three-months' men,
whose terms began to expire on the 24th, was at Charlestown, and John-
ston, with about the same number, was at Winchester. On that day
General Scott telegraphed Patterson, " McDowell's first day's work has
driven the enemy behind Fairfax Court House. Do not let the enemy
amuse and delay you with a small force in front while he re-enforces
the Junction with his main body." To this Patterson replied at half-
past one o'clock in the morning of the 18th, stating his difficulties and
asking, ' ' Shall I attack ? ' ' General Scott answered on the same day :
" I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy, or that you
at least had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have
been at least his equal and I suppose superior in numbers. Has he not
stolen a march and sent re-enforcements toward Manassas Junction? "
Patterson replied on the same day (18th), " The enemy has stolen no
march upon me. I have caused him to be re-enforced ; ' ' and at one
o'clock P.M. on that day he added: " I have succeeded, in accordance
with the wishes of the General-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston's
force at Winchester. " At the very hour that Patterson was writing
this dispatch Johnston's advance was leaving Winchester. On the 18th
Johnston telegraphed to Richmond that Patterson was at Charlestown,
and said : ' ' Unless he prevents it, we shall move toward General Beau-
regard to-day." He moved accordingly, and the Confederate armies
were united for battle. It rested, however, with higher authority than
Patterson to establish between his army and McDowell's the relations
that the occasion called for. In considering the requirements for Mc-
Dowell's movement against Manassas, General Scott gave great weight
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 381
During the 19th and 20th the bivouacs of McDow-
ell's army at Centreville, almost within cannon range
of the enemy, were thronged by visitors, official and
unofficial, who came in carriages from Washington,
bringing their own supplies. They were under no
military restraint, and passed to and fro among the
troops as they pleased, giving the scene the appear-
ance of a monster military picnic.* Among others,
to the general and irresistible fear then prevailing in Washington that
the capital might be seized by a dash. Its direct defence was the first
purpose of the three-months' militia. The Potomac at Washington was
itself a strong barrier, and with the field-works on its south bank af-
forded security in that quarter. The danger was thought to be from
the Shenandoah, and that induced the Government to keep Patterson
in the valley. Indeed, on the 30th of June Colonel C. P. Stone's com-
mand was ordered from Point of Rocks to Patterson at Martinsburg,
where it arrived on the 8th of July ; whereas the offensive campaign
against Manassas, ordered soon after, required Patterson to go to Stone,
as he proposed to do June 21, instead of Stone to Patterson. The cam-
paign of McDowell was forced upon General Scott by public opinion,
but did not relieve the authorities from the fear that Johnston might
rush down and seize Washington. General Scott, under the pressure of
the offensive in one quarter and the defensive in another, imposed up-
on Patterson the double task, difficult, if not impossible, of preventing
Johnston from moving on the capital and from joining Beauregard.
If that task was possible, it could have been accomplished only by per-
sistent fighting, and that General Scott was unwilling to order : though
in his dispatch of the 18th in 'reply to Patterson's question, " Shall I
attack? " he said, u I have certainly been expecting you to beat the
enemy." Prior to that, his instructions to Patterson had enjoined cau-
tion. As soon as McDowell advanced, Patterson was upon an exterior
line and in a false military position. Admitting that he might have
done more to detain Johnston, bad strategy was probably more to blame
for the result than any action or lack of action on Patterson's part.
* The presence of senators, congressmen, and other civilians upon the
field on the 21st gave rise to extravagant and absurd stories, in which
alleged forethought and valor among them are contrasted with a lack
of these qualities in the troops. The plain truth is that the non-com-
batants and their vehicles merely increased the confusion and demorali-
zation of the retreat.
382
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the venerable Secretary of War, Cameron, called upon
McDowell. Whether due to a naturally serious ex-
pression, to a sense of responsibility, to a premonition
of the fate of his brother who fell upon the field on
the 21st, or to other cause, his countenance showed
apprehension of evil; but men generally were confi-
dent and jovial.
McDowell's plan of battle promulgated on the 20th,
was to turn the enemy's left, force him from his de-
fensive position, and, "if possible, destroy the railroad
leading from Manassas to the Valley of Virginia,
where the enemy has a large force." He did not
know when he issued this order that Johnston had
joined Beauregard, though he suspected it, Miles's
Fifth Division, with Richardson's brigade of Tyler's
division, and a strong force of artillery was to remain
in reserve at Centreville, prepare defensive works
there and threaten Blackburn's Ford. Tyler's First
Division which was on the turnpike in advance, was
to move at 2.30 A.M., threaten the Stone Bridge and
open fire upon it at daybreak. This demonstration
was to be vigorous, its first purpose being to divert
attention from the movements of the turning column.
As soon as Tyler's troops cleared the way, Hunter's
Second Division, followed by Heintzelman's Third
Division, was to move to a point on the Warren ton
Turnpike about one or two miles east of Centreville
and there take a country road to the right, cross the
Run at Sudley Springs, come down upon the flank
and rear of the enemy at the Stone Bridge, and foice
him to open the way for Tyler's division to cross there
and attack, fresh and in full force.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL KUN.
383
Tyler's start was so late and his advance was so
slow as to hold Hunter and Heintzelman two or three
hours on the mile or two of the turnpike between
their camps and the point at which they were to turn
off for the flank inarch. This delay, and the fact that
the flank march proved difficult and some twelve
miles instead of about six as was expected, were of
serious moment. The flanking column did not cross
at Sudley Springs until 9.30 instead of 7, the long
march, with its many interruptions, tired out the men,
and the delay gave the enemy time to discover the
turning movement. Tyler's operations against the
Stone Bridge were feeble and ineffective. By 8 o'clock
Evans was satisfied that he was in no danger in front,
and perceived the movement to turn his position.
He was on the left of the Confederate line, guarding
the point where the Warrenton Turnpike, the great
highway to the field, crossed Bull Run, the Confeder-
ate line of defence. He had no instructions to guide
him in the emergency that had arisen. But he did
not hesitate. Reporting his information and purpose
to the adjoining commander, Cocke, and leaving four
companies of infantry to deceive and hold Tyler at
the bridge, Evans before 9 o'clock turned his back
upon the point he was set to guard, marched a mile
away, and, seizing the high ground to the north of
Young's Branch of Bull Run, formed line of battle at
right angles to his former line, his left resting near
the Sudley Springs road, by which Burnside with the
head of the turning column was approaching, thus
covering the Warrenton Turnpike and opposing a
determined front to the Federal advance upon the
384 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
Confederate left and rear.* In his rear to the south
lay the valley of Young's Branch, and rising from
that was the higher ridge or plateau on which the
Robinson house and the Henry house were situated,
and on which the main action took place in the
afternoon. Burnside, finding Evans across his path,
promptly formed line of battle and attacked about
9.45 A.M. Hunter, the division commander, who was
at the head of Burnside's brigade directing the forma-
tion of the first skirmish line, was severely wounded
and taken to the rear at the opening of the action.
Evans not only repulsed but pursued the troops that
made the attack upon him. Andrew Porter's brigade
of Hunter's division followed Burnside closely and
came to his support. In the meantime Bee had
formed a Confederate line of battle with his and Bar-
tow's brigades of Johnston's army on the Henry house
plateau, a stronger position than the one held by
Evans, and desired Evans to fall back to that line ;
but Evans, probably feeling bound to cover the War-
rantor! Turnpike and hold it against Tyler as well
as against the flanking column, insisted that Bee
should move across the valley to his support, which
was done.
After Bee joined Evans, the preliminary battle con-
tinued to rage upon the ground chosen by the latter.
The opposing forces were Burnside's and Porter's bri-
gades, with one regiment of Heintzelman's division on
the Federal side, and Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's
* Evans's action was probably one of the best pieces of soldiership on
either side during the campaign, but it seems to have received no spe-
cial commendation from his superiors.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 385
brigades on the Confederate side. The Confederates
were dislodged and driven back to the Henry house
plateau, where Bee had previously formed line and
where what Beauregard called " the mingled remnants
of Bee's, Bartow's, and Evans's commands r were re-
formed under cover of Stonewall Jackson's brigade of
Johnston's army.
The time of this repulse, as proved by so accurate
an authority as Stonewall Jackson, was before 11.30
A.M., and this is substantially confirmed by Beaure-
gard 's official report made at the time. Sherman and
Keyes had nothing to do with it. They did not begin
to cross Bull Run until noon. Thus, after nearly two
hours' stubborn fighting with the forces of Johnston,
which General Scott had promised should be kept
away, McDowell won the first advantage ; but Johns
ton had cost him dearly.
During all this time Johnston and Beauregard had
been waiting near Mitchell's Ford for the development
of the attack they had ordered by their right upon
McDowell at Centreville. The gravity of the situa-
tion upon their left had not yet dawned upon them.
What might the result have been if the Union column
had not been detained by Tyler's delay in moving out
in the early morning, or if Johnston's army, to which
Bee, Bartow, and Jackson belonged, had not arrived ?
But the heavy firing on the left soon diverted
Johnston and Beauregard from all thought of an
offensive movement with their right, and decided
them, as Beauregard has said, " to hurry up all avail-
able re-enforcements, including the reserves that were
to have moved upon Centreville, to our left, and fight
386 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the battle out in that quarter." Thereupon Beaure-
gard ordered " Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet to make
a strong demonstration all along their front on the
other side of Bull Run, and ordered the reserves,
Holmes's brigade with six guns, and Early's brigade
to move swiftly to the left," and he and Johnston set
out at full speed for the point of conflict, which they
reached while Bee was attempting to rally his men
about Jackson's brigade on the Henry house plateau.
McDowell had waited in the morning at the point on
the Warren ton Turnpike where his flanking column
turned to the right, until the troops, except Howard's
brigade, which he halted at that point, had passed.
He gazed silently and with evident pride upon the
gay regiments as they filed briskly but quietly past in
the freshness of the early morning, and then, remark-
ing to his staff, u Gentlemen, that is a big force," he
mounted arid moved forward to the field by way of
Sudley Springs. He reached the scene of actual con-
flict somewhat earlier than Johnston and Beauregard
did, and, seeing the enemy driven across the valley of
Young's Branch and behind the Warrenton Turnpike,
at once sent a swift aide-de-camp to Tyler with orders
to " press the attack " at the Stone Bridge. Tyler
acknowledged that he received this order by 11
o'clock. It was Tyler's division upon which Mc-
Dowell relied for the decisive fighting of the day. He
knew that the march of the turning column would be
fatiguing, and when by a sturdy fight it had cleared
the Warrenton Turnpike for the advance of Tyler's
division, it had, in fact, done more than its fair pro-
portion of the work. But Tyler did not attempt to
THE FIEST BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 387
force the passage of the Stone Bridge, which, after
about 8 o'clock, was defended by only four companies
of infantry, though he admitted that by the plan of
battle, when Hunter and Heintzelman had attacked
the enemy in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, " he was
to force the passage of Bull Run at that point and
attack the enemy in flank." Soon after McDowell's
arrival at the front, Burnside rode up to him and said
that his brigade had borne the brunt of the battle,
that it was out of ammunition, and that he wanted per-
mission to withdraw, refit and fill cartridge-boxes. Mc-
Dowell in the excitement of the occasion gave reluct-
ant consent, and the brigade, which certainly had done
nobly, marched to the rear, stacked arms, and took no
further part in the fight. Having sent the order to
Tyler to press his attack and orders to the rear of the
turning column to hurry forward, McDowell, like
Beauregard, rushed in person into the conflict, and by
the force of circumstances became for the time the
commander of the turning column and the force actu-
ally engaged, rather than the commander of his whole
army. With the exception of sending his Adjutant-
General to find and hurry Tyler forward, his subse-
quent orders were mainly or wholly to the troops un-
der his own observation. Unlike Beauregard, he had
no Johnston in rear with full authority and knowl-
* After the affair at Blackburn's Ford on the 18th and Tyler's action
in the battle of the 21st, a bitterness between Tyler and McDowell grew
up which lasted till they died. As late as 1884, McDowell, writing to
me of Tyler's criticism of him after the war, said, " How I have been
punished for my leniency to that man ! If there is anything clearer to
me than anything else with reference to our operations in that cam-
paign, it is that if we had had another commander for our right we
should have had a complete and brilliant success."
388
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
edge of the situation to throw forward reserves and
re-enforcements. It was not until 12 o'clock that
Sherman received orders from Tyler to cross the
stream, which he did at a ford above the Stone Bridge,
going to the assistance of Hunter. Sherman reported
to McDowell on the field and joined in the pursuit of
Bee's forces across the valley of Young's Branch.
Reyes's brigade, accompanied by Tyler in person, fol-
lowed across the stream where Sherman forded, but
without uniting with the other forces on the field,
made a feeble advance upon the slope of the plateau
toward the Robinson house, and then about 2 o'clock
filed off by flank to its left and, sheltered by the east
front of the bluff that forms the plateau, marched
down Young's Branch out of sight of the enemy and
took no further part in the engagement. McDowell
did not know where it was, nor did he then know
that Sclienck's brigade of Tyler's division did not cross
the Run at all.
The line taken up by Stonewall Jackson upon
which Bee, Bartow, and Evans rallied on the southern
part of the plateau was a very strong one. The
ground was high and afforded the cover of a curvi-
linear wood with the concave side toward the Federal
line of attack. According to Beauregard's official re-
port made at the time, he had upon this part of the
field, at the beginning, 6,500 infantry, 13 pieces of
artillery, and 2 companies of cavalry, and this line
was continuously re-enforced from Beauregard's own
reserves and by the arrival of the troops from the She-
nandoah Valley.
To carry this formidable position, McDowell had at
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL KUN. 389
hand the brigades of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and
Porter, Palmer's battalion of regular cavalry, and
Ricketts's and Griffin's regular batteries. Porter's
brigade had been reduced and shaken by the morning
fight. Howard's brigade was in reserve and only
came into action late in the afternoon. The men, un-
used to field service, and not yet over the hot and
dusty march from the Potomac, had been under arms
since midnight. The plateau, however, was promptly
assaulted, the northern part of it was carried, the bat-
teries of Ricketts and Griffin were planted near the
Henry house, and McDowell clambered to the upper
story of that structure to get a glance at the whole
field. Upon the Henry house plateau, of which the
Confederates held the southern and the Federals the
northern part, the tide of battle ebbed and flowed as
McDowell pushed in Franklin's, Willcox's, Sherman's,
Porter's, and at last Howard's brigades, and as Beau-
regard put into action reserves which Johnston sent
from the right and re-enforcements which he hurried
forward from the Shenandoah Valley as they arrived
by cars. On the plateau, Beauregard says, the disad-
vantage of his " smooth-bore guns was reduced by the
shortness of range." The short range was due to the
Federal advance, and the several struggles for the
plateau were at close quarters and gallant on both
sides. The batteries of Ricketts and Griffin, by their
fine discipline, wonderful daring, and matchless skill,
were the prime features in the fight. The battle was
not lost till they were lost. When in their advanced
and perilous position, and just after their infantry
supports had been driven over the slopes, a fatal mis-
390 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
take occurred. A regiment of infantry came out of
the woods on Griffin's right, and as he was in the act
of opening upon it with canister, he was deterred by
the assurance of Major Barry, the chief of artillery,
that it u was a regiment sent by Colonel Heintzelman
to support the battery."* A moment more and the
doubtful regiment proved its identity by a deadly vol-
ley, and, as Griffin states in his official report, a every
cannoneer was cut down and a large number of horses
killed, leaving the battery (which was without sup-
port excepting in name) perfectly helpless." The
effect upon Ricketts was equally fatal. He, desper-
ately wounded, and Ramsay, his lieutenant, killed, lay
in the wreck of the battery. Beauregard speaks of
his last advance on the plateau as "leaving in our
final possession the Robinson and Henry houses, with
most of Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries, the men of
which were mostly shot down where they bravely
stood by their guns." Having become separated from
McDowell, I fell in with Barnard, his chief engineer,
and while together we observed the New York Fire
Zouaves, who had been supporting Griffin's battery,
fleeing to the rear in their gaudy uniforms, in utter
confusion. Thereupon I rode back to where I knew
Burnside's brigade was at rest, and stated to Burnside
the condition of affairs, with the suggestion that he
form and move his brigade to the front. Returning,
I again met Barnard, and as the battle seemed to him
and me to be going against us, and not knowing where
McDowell was, with the concurrence of Barnard, as
* Griffin himself told me so as we rode together after leaving Cen-
treville. He and I were classmates and warm friends.
THE FIRST BA.TTLE OF BULL KUN. 391
stated in his official report, I immediately sent a note
to Miles, telling him to move two brigades of his re-
serves tip to the Stone Bridgeand telegraphed to
Washington to send forward all the troops that could
be spared.
After the arrival of Howard's brigade, McDowell
for the last time pressed up the slope to the plateau,
forced back the Confederate line, and regained posses-
sion of the Henry and Robinson houses and of the
lost batteries. But there were no longer cannoneers
to man or horses to move these guns that had done so
much. By the arrival upon this part of the field of
his own reserves and Kirby Smith's brigade of John-
ston's army about half -past three, Beauregard extend-
ed his left to outflank McDowell's shattered, shortened
and disconnected line, and the Federals left the field
about half-past four. Until then they had fought
wonderfully well for raw troops. There were no
fresh forces on the field to support or encourage them,
and the men seemed to be seized simultaneously by
the conviction that it was no use to do anything more
and they might as well start home. Cohesion was
lost, the organizations with some exceptions being
disintegrated, and the men quietly walked off. There
was no special excitement except that arising from
the frantic efforts of officers to stop men who paid
little or no attention to anything that was said. On
the high ground by the Matthews house, about where
Evans had taken position in the morning to check Burn-
side, McDowell and his staff, aided by other officers,
made a desperate but futile effort to arrest the masses
and form them into line. There, I went to Arnold's
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
battery as it came by, and advised that he unlimber
and make a stand as a rally ing-point, which he did,
saying he was in fair condition and ready to fight as
long as there was any fighting to be done. But all
efforts failed. The stragglers moved past the guns,
in spite of all that could be done, and as stated in his
report, Arnold at my direction joined Sykes's battalion
of infantry of Porter's brigade and Palmer's battalion
of cavalry, all of the Regular Army, to cover the rear,
as the men trooped back in great disorder across Bull
Run. There were some hours of daylight for the
Confederates to gather the fruits of victory, but a few
rounds of shell and canister checked all the pursuit
that was attempted, and the occasion called for no
sacrifices or valorous deeds by the stanch regulars of
the rear-guard. There was no panic, in the ordinary
meaning of the word, until the retiring soldiers, guns,
wagons, congressmen and carriages were fired upon,
on the road east of Bull Run. Then the panic began,
and the bridge over Cub Run being rendered impass-
able for vehicles by a wagon that was upset upon it,
utter confusion set in : pleasure-carriages, gun-carriages
and ammunition wagons which could not be put
across the Run were abandoned and blocked the
way, and stragglers broke and threw aside their mus-
kets and cut horses from their harness and rode off
upon them. In leaving the field the men took the
same routes, in a general way, by which they had
reached it. Hence when the men of Hunter's and
Heintzelman's divisions got back to Centreville, they
had covered about twenty-five miles. That night they
walked back to the Potomac, an additional distance
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL BUN. 393
of twenty miles ; so that these undisciplined and un-
seasoned men within thirty-six hours walked fully
forty -five miles, besides fighting from about 10 A.M.
until 4 P.M. on a hot and dusty day in July. Mc-
Dowell in person reached Centreville before sunset,*
and found there Miles's division with Richardson's
brigade and three regiments of Runyon's division, and
Hunt's, Tidball's, Ayres's, and Greene's batteries and
one or two fragments of batteries, making about twenty
guns. It was a formidable force, but there was a lack
of food and the mass of the army was completely de-
moralized. Beauregard had about an equal force which
had not been in the fight, consisting of Ewell's, Jones's?
and Longstreet's brigades and some troops of other
brigades. McDowell consulted the division and brigade
commanders who were at hand upon the question of
making a stand or retreating. The verdict was in favor
of the latter, but a decision of officers one way or the
other was of no moment ; the men had already decided
for themselves and were streaming away to the rear, in
spite of all that could be done. They had no interest
or treasure in Centreville, and their hearts were not
there. Their tents, provisions, baggage, and letters
from home were upon the banks of the Potomac, and
no power could have stopped them short of the camps
they had left less than a week before. As before
stated, most of them were sovereigns in uniform, not
* I left the field with General Franklin. His brigade had dissolved.
We moved first northerly, crossed Bull Run below the Sudley Spring
Ford, and then bore south and east. Learning by inquiries of the men
I passed that McDowell was ahead of me, I left Franklin and hurried
on to Centreville, where I found McDowell, just after sunset, rearrang-
ng the positions of his reserves.
394 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
soldiers. McDowell accepted the situation, detailed
Richardson's and Blenker's brigades to cover the re-
treat, and the army, a disorganized mass, with some
creditable exceptions, drifted as the men pleased away
from the scene of action. There was no pursuit, and
the march from Centreville was as barren of oppor-
tunities for the rear-guard as the withdrawal from the
field of battle had been.* When McDowell reached
Fairfax Court-House in the night, he was in communi-
cation with Washington and exchanged telegrams
with General Scott, in one of which the old hero said,
" We are not discouraged " ; but that dispatch did not
lighten the gloom in which it was received. McDow-
ell was so tired that while sitting on the ground writ-
ing a dispatch he fell asleep, pencil in hand, in the
middle of a sentence. His Adjutant-General aroused
him ; the dispatch was finished, and the weary ride
to the Potomac resumed. When the unfortunate com-
mander dismounted at Arlington next forenoon in a
soaking rain, after thirty-two hours in the saddle, his
disastrous campaign of six days was closed.
The first martial effervescence of the country was
over. The three-months' men went home, and the
three-months' chapter of the War ended with the
South triumphant and confident ; the North disap-
pointed but determined.
* The revised losses are as follows: Federal, 16 officers and 444 en-
listed men killed ; 78 officers and 1,046 enlisted men wounded ; 50 of-
ficers and 1,262 enlisted men missing ; 25 pieces of artillery and a large
quantity of small arms. Confederate, 25 officers and 362 enlisted men
killed; 63 officers and 1,519 enlisted men wounded ; 1 officer and 12
enlisted men missing.
THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE FIRST
BULL RUN AS GIVEN BY "CENTURY
MAGAZINE."
[The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the
gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for
killed ; w for wounded ; m for captured or missing ; c for captured.]
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION ARMY.
Brig. -Gen. Irvin McDowell. Staff loss: w, 1. (Capt. O. H. Tilling-
hast, mortally wounded.)
FIRST DIVISION, Brig. -Gen. Daniel Tyler. Staff loss, w, 2. First
Brigade, Col. Erasmus D. Keyes : 3d Me., Col. C. D. Jameson, 1st Conn.,
Col. G. S. Burnham; 3d Conn., Col. A. H. Terry; 3d Conn., Col.
John L. Chatfield. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 50; m, 154=223. Second
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert C. Schenck : 2d N. Y. (militia), Col. G. W.
B. Tompkins; 1st Ohio, Col. A. McD. McCook ; 2d Ohio, Lieut. -Col.
Rodney Mason ; E, 2d U. S. Arty., Capt. J. H. Carlisle. Brigade loss:
k, 21; w, 25; m, 52=98. Third Brigade, Col. W. T. Sherman: 13th
N. Y., Col. I. F. Quinby; 69th N. Y., Col. M. Corcoran (w and c),
Capt. James Kelly; 79th N. Y., Col. James Cameron (k) ; 2d Wis.,
Lieut. -Col. H. W. Peck ; E, 3d U. S. Arty., Capt. R. B. Ayres. Brigade
loss : k, 107 ; w, 205 ; m, 293=605. Fourth Brigade, Col. Israel B.
Richardson: 1st Mass., Col. Robert Cowdin; 12th N. Y., Col. Ezra L.
Walrath; 2d Mich., Major A. W. Williams; 3d Mich., Col. Daniel Mc-
Connell; G, 1st U. S. Arty., Lieut. John Edwards; M, 2d U. S. Arty.,
Capt. Henry J. Hunt. This brigade was only slightly engaged in front
of Blackburn's Ford, with the loss of one officerjdlled.
SECOND DIVISION, Col. D. Hunter (w), Col. Andrew Porter. Staff
loss: w, 1 ; m, 1=2. First Brigade, Col. Andrew^Porter : 8th N. Y.
(militia), Col. Geo. Lyons; 14th N. Y. (militia), Col. A. M. Wood (w
and c), Lieut.-Col. E. B. Fowler; 27th N. Y., Col. H. W. Slocum (w),
Major J. J. Bartlett; Battalion U. S. Infantry,*Major George Sykes;
Battalion U. S. Marines, Major J. G. Reynolds ; JBattalion U. S. Cavalry,
Major I. N. Palmer ; D, 5th U. S. Arty., Capt. Charles Griffin. Brigade
loss: k, 86; w, 177; m, 201=464. Second ^Brigade, Col. Ambrose E.
Burnside: 2d N. H., Col. Gilman Marston (w), Lieut.-Col. F. S. Fiske ;
1st R. L, Major J. P. Balch ; 2d R. I. (with battery), Col. John S. Slo-
395
-
396 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
cum (k), Lieut. -Col. Frank Wheaton ; 71st N. Y. (with two howitzers).
Col. H. P. Martin. Brigade loss: k, 58; w, 171 ; m, 134=363.
THIRD DIVISION, Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman. First Brigade, CoL
W. B. Franklin: 5th Mass., Col. S. C. Lawrence; llth Mass., Col.
George Clark, Jr. ; 1st Minn., Col. W. A. Gorman; I, 1st U. S. Arty.,
Capt. J. B. Ricketts (w and c), Lieut. Edmund Kirby. Brigade loss :
k, 70; w, 197; m, 92=359. Second Brigade, Col. Orlando B. Willcox
(w and c), Col. J. H. H. Ward ; llth N. Y., Lieut.-Col. N. L. Farnham ;
38th N. Y., Col. J. H. H. Ward, Lieut,-Col. A. Farnsworth ; 1st Mich.,
Major A. F. Bidwell ; 4th Mich., Col. D. A. Woodbury ; D, 2d U.S.
Arty., Capt. Richard Arnold. Brigade loss: k, 65; w, 177; m, 190=
432. Third Brigade, Col. Oliver O. Howard: 3d Me., Major H. G.
Staples; 4th Me., Col. H. G. Berry; 5th Me., Col. M. H. Dunnell ; 2d
Vt., Col. Henry Whiting. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 100; m, 98=225.
FOURTH (RESERVE) DIVISION. [Not on the field of battle.] Brig.-
Gen." Theodore Runyon. Militia: 1st N. J., Col. A. J. Johnson; 2d N.
J., Col. H. M. Baker; 3d N. J., Col. Wm. Napton ; 4th N. J., CoL
Matthew Miller, Jr. Volunteers: 1st N. J., CoL W. R. Montgomery;
2d N. J., Col. Geo. W. McLean; 3d N. J., Col. George W. Taylor; 41st
N. Y., Col. Leopold von Gilsa.
FIFTH DIVISION. [In reserve at Centreville and not engaged in the
battle proper. It had some skirmishing during the day and while cov-
ering the retreat of the army.] Col. Dixon S. Miles. First Brigade,
Col. Louis Blenker; 8th N. Y. (Vols.), Lieut.-Col. Julius Stahel; 29th
N. Y., Col. Adolph von Steinwehr ; 39th N. Y. (Garibaldi Guards), Col.
F. G. D'Utassy; 27thJPenna., Col. Max Einstein; A, 2d U. S. Arty.,
Capt. John C. Tidball ; Bookwood's N. Y. battery, Capt. Charles Book-
wood. Brigade loss: k, 6 ; w, 16 ; m, 96=118. Second Brigade, Col.
Thomas A. Davies: 16th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Samuel Marsh; 18th N. Y.,
Col. W. A. Jackson; 31st N. Y., Col. C. E. Pratt; 32d N. Y., Col. R.
Matheson; G, 2d U. S. Arty., Lieut. O. D. Greene. Brigade loss: w,
2; m, 1=3.
Total loss of the Union Army: killed, 460; wounded, 1,124; cap-
tured or missing, 1,312, grand total, 2,896. /
STRENGTH OF THE UNION ARMY.
General James B. Fry, who was General McDowell's Adjutant-Gen-
eral, prepared, in October, 1884, a statement of the strength of the
army, in brief as follows :
u It was not practicable at the time to ascertain the strength of the
army with accuracy ; and it is impossible now to make a return which
can be pronounced absolutely correct.
u The abstract which appears on page 309, vol. ii., ' Official Rec-
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
397
ords,' is not a return of McDowell's army at the Battle of Bull Run,
and was not prepared by me, but, as I understand, has been compiled
since the war. It purports to give the strength of the ' Department of
Northeastern Virginia,' July 16 and 17, not of McDowell's army, July
21. It does not show the losses resulting from the discharge of the
4th Pennsylvania Infantry and Varian's New York battery, which
marched to the rear on the morning of the 21st, nor the heavy losses
incident to the march of the army from the Potomac ; it embraces two
regiments the 21st and 25th New York Infantry which were not
with the army in the field ; and it contains the strength of Company
E, Second United States Cavalry, as a special item, whereas that com-
pany is embraced in the strength of the Second (Hunter's) Division, to
which it, with the rest of the cavalry belonged.
4k ln his report of the battle (p. 324, vol. ii., 'Official Records')
General McDowell says he crossed Bull Run ' with about eighteen thou-
sand men.' I collected information to that effect for him at the time.
His statement is substantially correct. The following is an exhibit in
detail of the forces actually engaged :
COMMANDS.
Officers.
Enlisted
men.
General staff . . ....
19
First Division, two brigades . . ....
284
5,068
Second Division, two brigades
252
5,717
Third Division, three brigades
341
6,891
Total seven brigades . .
896
17,676
" Only Reyes's and Sherman's brigades of the four brigades of the
First Division crossed Bull Run.
" The Fifth Division, with Richardson's brigade of the First Division
attached, was in reserve at and in front of Centreville. Some of it was
lightly engaged on our side of Bull Run in repelling a feeble advance of
the enemy. The Fourth (Reserve) Division was left to guard our com-
munications with the Potomac, its advance being seven miles in rear of
Centre ville.
" That is to say, McDowell crossed Bull Run with 896 officers, 17,676
rank and file, and 24 pieces of artillery.
" The artillerymen who crossed Bull Run are embraced in the figures
of the foregoing table. The guns were as follows : Ricketts's Battery,
6 10-pounder rifle guns ; Griffin's Battery, 4 10-pounder rifle guns, 2
12-pounder howitzers; Arnold's Battery, 2 13-pounder rifle guns, 2
6-pounder smooth-bores ; R. I. Battery, 6 13-pounder rifles ; 71st N. Y.
Reg't's Battery, 2 Dahlgren howitzers.
398
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
" The artillery in addition to that which crossed Bull Run, was as
follows: Hunt's Battery, 4 12-pounder rifle guns; Carlisle's Battery, 2
13-pounder rifle guns, 2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns ; TidbalPs Battery,
2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers; Greene's Bat-
tery, 4 10-pounder rifle guns; Ayres's Battery, 2 10-pounder rifle guns,
2 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, 2 12-pounder howitzers ; Ed wards 's Bat-
tery, 2 20-pounder rifle guns, 1 30-pounder rifle gun."
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
General Joseph E. Johnston.
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Brig. -Gen. G. T. Beauregard. First Bri-
gade, Brig. -Gen. M. L. Bonham: llth N. C., Col. W. W. Kirkland ;
2d S. C., Col. J. B. Kershaw; 3d S. C., Col. J. H. Williams; 7th S. C.,
Col. Thomas G. Bacon; 8th S. C., Col. E. B. C. Cash. Loss, k, 10 ; w,
66=76. Second Brigade [not actively engaged], Brig. -Gen. R. S. Ewell :
5th Ala., Col. R. E. Rodes; 6th Ala., Col. J. J. Seibels; 6th La., Col.
J. G. Seymour. Third Brigade, Brig. -Gen. D. R. Jones: 17th Miss.,
Col. W. S. Featherston; 18th Miss., Col. E. R. Burt ; 5th S. C., Col. M.
Jenkins. Loss; k, 13; w, 62=75. Fourth Brigade [not actively en-
gaged], Brig. -Gen. James Longstreet : 5th N. C., Lieut. -Col. Jones; 1st
Va., Major F. G. Skinner; llth Va.. Col. S. Garland, Jr. ; 17th Va.,
Col. M. D. Corse. Loss: k, 2 ; w, 12=14. Fifth Brigade, Col. P. St.
Geo. Cocke : 8th Va., Col. Eppa Hunton ; 18th Va., Col. R. E. Withers ;
19th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. C. Strange; 28th Va.. Col. R. T. Preston; 49th
Va. (3 cos.), Col. Wm. Smith. Loss : k, 23 ; w 79 ; m, 2=104. Sixth
Brigade, Col. Jubal A Early: 7th La., Col. Harry T. Hays; 13th Miss.,
Col. Wm. Barksdale; 7th Va., Col. J. L. Kemper ; 24th Va., Lieut.-
Col. P. Hairston, Jr. Loss : k, 13 ; w, 67=79. Evans's command
(temporarily organized), Col. N. G. Evans : 1st La. Battalion, Major C.
R. Wheat (w) ; 4th S. C., Col. J. B. E. Sloan; Cavalry, Capt. W. R.
Terry; Artillery, Lieut. G. S. Davidson. Loss: k, 20; w, 118; m, 8=
146. Reserve Brigade [not actively engaged], Brig.-Gen. T. H. Holmes r
1st Arkansas and 2d Tennessee. Unattached Infantry, 8th La. ; Col.
H. B. Kelly ; Hampton's (S. C.) Legion, Col. Wade Hampton. Loss :
k, 19 ; w, 100 ; m, 2=121. Cavalry: 30th Virginia, Col. R. C. W.
Radford ; Harrison's Battalion ; Ten independent companies. Loss : k,
5; w, 8=13. Artillery: Battalion Washington Artillery (La.), Major
J. B. Walton; Alexandria (Va.) Battery, Capt. Del Kemper: Latham's
(Va.) Battery, Capt. H. G. Latham ; Loudoun (Va.) Artillery, Capt.
Arthur D. Rogers ; Shields's (Va.) Battery, Capt. J. C. Shields. Loss :
k, 2 ; w, 8=10. Total loss Army of the Potomac : k, 105 ; w, 519 ; m,
12=636.
THE FIRST BATTLE OP BULL KUN. 399
ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH, General Joseph E. Johnston. First
Brigade, Brig. -Gen. T. J. Jackson: 2d Va., Col. J. W. Allen; 4th Va.,
Col. J. F. Preston; 5th Va., Col. Kenton Harper; 27th Va., Lieut. -Col.
John Echols; 33d Va., Col. A. C. Cummings. Loss: k, 119; w, 442
=561. Second Brigade, Col. F. S. Bartow (k) : 7th Ga., Col. Lucius J.
Gartrell; 8th Ga., Lieut. -Col. W. M. Gardner. Loss: k, 60; w, 293
=353. Third Brigade, Brig. -Gen. B. E. Bee (k) : 4th Ala., Col. Jones
(k), Col. S. R. Gist: 2d Miss., Col. W. C. Falkner; llth Miss. (2 cos.),
Lieut.-Col. P. F. Liddell; 6th N. C., Col. C. F. Fisher (k). Loss: k,
95 ; w, 309; m, 1=405. Fourth Brigade, Brig. -Gen. E. K. Smith (w).
Col. Arnold Elzey: 1st Md. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. George H. Steuart ;
3d Tennessee, Col. John C. Vaughn; 10th Va., Col. S. B. Gibbons;
13th Va., Col. A. P. Hill. Loss: k, 8 : w, 19=27. Artillery: Imbo-
den's, Stanard's, Pendleton's, Alburtis's, and Beckham's batteries.
Cavalry: 1st Va., Col. J. E. B. Stuart. (Loss not specifically reported.)
Total loss Army of the Shenandoah : k, 282 ; w, 1,063 ; m, 1=1,346.
Total loss of the Confederate Army : killed, 387; wounded, 1,582;
captured or missing, 13, grand total, 1,982.
STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.
In October, 1884, General Thomas Jordan, who was General Beaure-
gard's Adjutant-General, prepared a statement of the strength of the
Confederate Army at Bull Run or Manassas, of which the following is
a condensation :
" So far as the troops of Beauregard's immediate Army of the Po-
tomac are concerned, this statement is condensed from two that I pre-
pared with the sub-returns of all the commands before me as the Adju-
tant-General of that army, September 25, 1861, and I will vouch for
its exactness. In respect to the Army of the Shenandoah, I have been
obliged to present an estimate of 8,340 as the total of the rank and file
of Johnston's army, my authority for which is a statement written by
me in the official report of the battle, and based, as I distinctly recol-
lect, upon official documents and returns in my hands at the time, of
the accuracy of which I was and am satisfied. The totals of General
Beauregard's Army of the Potomac are :
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AVAILABLE ON THE FIELD.
Generals and Staff 37
Infantry, Rank and File 19,569
Cavalry. " 1,468
Artillery " " '. 826
21,900
Field Guns.. 27
400 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ACTIVELY ENGAGED.
Generals and Staff 10
Infantry, Rank and File 8,415
Cavalry, " " 1,000
Artillery, " " 288
9,713
Field Guns ,. 17
RECAPITULATION.
Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery. Staff. Total.
Army of the Potomac Rank and
File engaged 8,415 1,000 288 10 9,713
Army of the Shenandoah, Rank
and File engaged (estimated) .. 7,684 300 350 6 8,340
Total Rank and File, both Confed-
erate armies, engaged 16,099 1,300 638 16 18,053"
ARTICLE VII.
Smith's " Confederate War Papers."
This is a book in four parts by General G. W.
Smith, late Major-General Confederate Army. It is
a contribution to the controversies going on among
ex-officers of the Confederacy ; but its real value is
in the new light it throws upon the battle of Seven
Pines, or Fair Oaks.
The book adds one more to the proofs that the
President of the ex-Confederacy had to contend with
formidable opposition inside of his own lines. Never-
theless, he stood from beginning to end at the head
of the able and ambitious generals and politicians
turbulently thrown together by secession. That fact
is evidence of his ability, earnestness of purpose, and
force of character. That he should have bitter op-
ponents was inevitable. The author of this book ap-
pears as one of them ; but he says something on both
sides of the subject and comments with moderation.
When General Smith reported for duty at Fairfax
Court-House in September, 1861, General J. E. John-
ston, commanding the army, and General Beauregard,
second in command, were on bad terms with Mr.
* ' ' Confederate War Papers : Fairfax Court-House, New Orleans,
Seven Pines, Richmond and North Carolina." By Gustavus W. Smith,
late Major-General, Confederate States Army. New York: Atlantic
Publishing and Engraving Co.
Journal Military Service Institute.
401
402
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Davis, the Confederate President. General Smith,
the third in rank, was on friendly terms with all of
them. The three Generals were in favor of having
the army under them strengthened and authorized to
invade the North that fall, by turning Washington.
With a view to convincing Mr. Davis of the wisdom
of this course, and securing the necessary re-enforce-
ments, he was invited to visit headquarters, at Fair-
fax Court-House, for a conference, and accepted, think-
ing the conference was for general purposes. The
meeting took place early in October the exact date
is not stated. General Smith was the common friend.
The Generals wanted "to concentrate in that vicinity,
as rapidly as possible, all the available forces of the
Confederacy, cross the Potomac with the army thus
re-enforced, and by pressing the fighting in the enemy's
country, make a determined effort in the autumn of
1861 to compel the Northern States to recognize our
(the Southern) independence."
Mr. Davis, on the other hand, said that " the whole
country was demanding protection at his hands, and
praying for arms and troops for defence " ; that he
hoped for arms from abroad before spring ; and he
advocated minor military operations some of which
he specified to occupy, instruct, and encourage the
troops during the winter. The Generals, finding
themselves disappointed in the one grand operation
which they advocated, failed to undertake the minor
operations pointed out by their President. Bad feel-
ing between the two parties continued to grow ;
questions arose among the people as to the war policy
of Mr. Davis ; and it seemed that the President might
SMITH'S " CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS " 403
be credited with the views the Generals had advocated
and he had opposed. The conference held in October
was informal, and was not recorded. But in January
following (1862) General Smith wrote out his recol-
lection of it, signed the paper, obtained the signatures
of Johnston and Beauregard, and filed the document
away. He says in his book that the statement was
" mildly drawn, care being taken to make it as re-
spectful as possible, consistent with the facts." He
could have given this statement a better character by
simply asserting that it was a true record of what oc-
curred. He adds : " It was not intended to publish
it unless it became necessary to use it in vindication
of the truth." That is to say, it was a secret docu-
ment, prepared by the Confederate President's subor-
dinates, held by one of them to be drawn against his
superior officer if the holder thought best. By the
time General Smith drew up the paper in January,
1862, he had, no doubt, joined Johnston and Beaure-
gard in opposition to their President. Mr. Davis says
in his book : " Twenty years after the event I learned
of this secret report by one party without notice
having been given to the other of a conversation
said to have lasted two hours. I have noticed the
improbabilities and inconsistencies of the paper, and,
without remark, I submit to honorable men, the con-
cealment from me in which it was prepared, where-
by they may judge of the chances for such co-intel-
ligence as needs must exist between the Executive
and the commanders of armies to insure attainable
success."
There is not likely to be much difference of opinion
404 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
upon this issue. The verdict will be in favor of the
ex-President of the " lost cause."
A word as to the merits of the war policy, for which
the Generals were anxious to secure credit at the ex-
pense of their President. The author says, " I believed
that by the course proposed we could, before winter
set in, convince the people of the Northern States,
that it was unwise for them to persist in trying to
hold the Southern people in the Union at the point
of the bayonet. By pressing the fighting in the
enemy's country we expected to compel the Northern
States to recognize our independence." As the author
anticipated such remarkable results, it is not strange
that he deems it important to fix on Mr. Davis the
responsibility for " the failure of the Confederate
army in Virginia to make an active campaign of inva-
sion, fighting on Northern soil, in the autumn of 1861."
But General Smith was mistaken in his premises.
Bayonets were necessary to settle the questions which
were open at the time, but they are not required to
"hold the Southern people in the Union." Further-
more, his great expectations from an invasion in the
fall of 1861 would not have been realized. It would
not have compelled the Northern States to recognize
the independence of the Southern Confederacy. Gen-
eral Smith's belief, affected no doubt by his hope, may
have been due somewhat to the fact that Northern
valor and soldiership were at that time underestimated
in the South ; Union troops were looked upon, not as
earnest men contending for a principle, but as " Lin-
coln hirelings." One Southern man, some people
thought, was equal in war to five or six Yankees.
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 405
The truth is, that in addition to the desire for human
freedom, as an independent principle, there was in the
North a determination to preserve the Government,
and a deep-seated, old-fashioned patriotism which many
prominent Southerners did not reckon upon. The
war, from the nature of the case, could not be decided
by a dash. It had to be a trial of courage, endurance,
and resources combined. But there were more direct
considerations which also tended to induce Mr. Davis
to reject the war policy presented by his Generals at
Fairfax Court House. He saw, no doubt, that while
the proposed policy was tempting from a purely mili-
tary point of view, it took small account of political
conditions which he could not disregard. " The whole
country," as he told the Generals, " was demanding
protection at his hands, and praying for arms and
troops for defence" He could not have consolidated
his people for the long struggle which had to come, if
he had denied defence to all, for the sole purpose of
an invasion from Virginia. General Smith admits that
there " was the hope and expectation that, before the
end of winter, arms would be introduced into the
country ; and all were confident that we could then not
only protect our own country, but successfully invade
that of the enemy" This admission alone is a suffi-
cient answer for Mr. Davis to the war policy of his
Generals.
SEVEN PINES.
Part III. is entitled " Notes on the Battle of Seven
Pines, or Fair Oaks." This is much the most impor-
tant part of the work.
During that action Smith was next in rank to John-
406 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ston, the General-in-Chief, and commanded the left wing
of the Confederate army during the first day, and the
whole army from 7 P.M. on the first day, when John-
ston was wounded, till 1 P.M. on the second day. His-
torians have failed to commend his part in the action.
In his book, Smith, with drawn sabre, boldly charges
upon them all ; attacking especially the accounts given
by Jefferson Davis in his " Rise and Fall of the Con-
federacy," Joseph E. Johnston in his " Narrative, 7 '
Richard Taylor in his " Destruction and Reconstruc-
tion," writers on the Confederate side ; and Swinton
and Webb, Union authors.
To weigh the points General Smith makes, it is nec-
essary to recall the main features of the situation at
the time the battle of Seven Pines was fought.
As McClellan followed the retiring Confederates up
the Peninsula from Williamsburg, in May, 1861, his
main line of advance, nearly due west, was the Rich-
mond and Williamsburg, or Old Stage, road. About
ten miles east of Richmond this road crosses the Chick-
ahominy River by Bottom's Bridge. The part of the
Chickahorniny with which we are concerned runs almost
in a right line from northwest to southeast. At the
point on the Williamsburg road where it is spanned
by Bottom's Bridge, the stream is about forty feet
wide, and for fifteen or twenty miles above it varies
in width from forty to seventy-five or eighty feet. It
is skirted by heavy timber, and its valley, or bottom-
land, varying from half a mile to a mile in width, is
low and marshy, and is subject to overflow. A mile
above Bottom's Bridge the stream is crossed by the
bridge of the Richmond and York River Railroad.
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS. 1
407
This railroad runs from Richmond to West Point at
the head of York River. It crosses the Pamunky
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into the York. This crossing, called White House,
408 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
only about twelve miles by the railroad from the
Chicahominy, was the Union depot York and Pa-
munky rivers being open to our shipping.
As they withdrew from Williamsburg, the Confed-
erates crossed to the Richmond side of the Chicka-
hominy, and destroyed the bridges as far as they could,
but did not undertake to defend the crossings. They
did not appear disposed to make a stand until they
were under cover of the entrenchments around Rich-
mond.
McClellan's advance (Keyes's 4th Corps) reached
the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge on the 20th of
May, forded the stream, and occupied the high ground
on the west side. Although the season was unusually
wet, the Chickahominy was then fordable at all cross-
ings above Bottom's Bridge. Neither the river nor
the enemy, therefore prevented the Union army from
continuing the advance. But McClellan threw his
army forward into line upon his leading corps as his
left, and established the centre and right of it in rear
of the Chickahominy, the left being in front of that
stream. He deemed this disposition of his centre and
right necessary to guard hie line of communication
(twelve miles long) with his depot at the White
House, and to protect his right and rear ; although he
assumed that, as a final result, the opposing army
would take shelter behind its defences near Richmond,
and that a siege would ensue.
As the Chickahominy was liable to rise suddenly,
become impassable, and sweep away temporary bridges,
and thus cut him off from his base on the Pamunky,
McClellan was not willing to throw all of his army
SMITH'S " CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 409
across the stream until he had built bridges which
would enable him to pass troops and supplies with
certainty and celerity. While constructing these
bridges he held a strong position. On the left a
stream called White Oak branch rises near Richmond,
flows easterly just south of the Williarnsburg road,
and empties in the Chickahominy two or three miles
below Bottom's Bridge. The valley of this creek,
from its mouth for several miles toward Richmond, is
a difficult and in most places an impassable morass,
called White-Oak swamp. The left wing of the
army, Keyes's 4th Corps, with Heintzelman's 3d Corps
as reserve, was thus well covered. A stream called
Beaver-Dam creek runs nearly due south, and empties
into the Chickahominy at a point north of Richmond.
Upon the high bank of this creek, at right angles to
his main line along the Chickahominy, the Union com-
mander posted his right flank. His line thus estab-
lished, covered, speaking broadly, the northeastern
quarter of a circle drawn around Richmond with a
radius of about twelve miles, and extended from Bot-
tom's Bridge, east of Richmond, along the Chickahom-
iny to Meadow Bridge north of that city, a distance
of about fifteen miles. The weakness of the position
was in the fact that the army was astride a stream
which might, and did, rise so as to prevent one wing
from supporting the other.
The Confederate army was posted between the
Chickahominy and Richmond, and was necessarily well
concentrated ; but the entrenchments around the city
were weak.
In addition to the danger he was in from McClel-
410
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Ian, the Confederate commander was menaced by
McDowell, who, with over forty thousand men and a
hundred guns (if not deterred by counter movements
against Washington), threatened to advance on McClel-
lan's right, from Fredericksburg, some sixty miles
north of Richmond.
Johnston, with his entire army well in hand, had
resolved to pursue an offensive-defensive policy.
While he was deliberating upon striking a blow at
McClellan's left near Bottom's Bridge or waiting an
opportunity to do so he heard (May 27) that Mc-
Dowell was advancing from Fredericksburg. There-
upon he resolved to cross the upper Chickahominy and
(on 29th May) destroy or "double-up" McClellan's
right before McDowell could get within supporting
distance ; and for this purpose he strengthened his
left and placed General G. W. Smith in command of
his left wing. Bat learning on the 28th that McDow-
ell had abandoned the advance had in fact turned
north Johnston countermanded his orders for attack-
ing the Union right.*
In the meantime McClellan had been pushing his
left wing forward. On the 24th Casey's division (of
Keyes's 4th Corps) occupied and entrenched a point
called Seven Pines, only seven miles from Richmond
by the main Williamsburg road. Couch's division
(the other part of Keyes's corps) was not far in rear ;
* General Smith repeats with a little sly sarcasm how the Confeder-
ate President, Davis, hurried through his office work on the morning
of the 29th, and rode about the field trying to find the performance,
which he finally learned from subordinates that Johnston with whom
he was not on cordial terms had countermanded, without notifying
him.
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 411
and Heintzelman's 3d Corps had crossed the Chicka-
hominy at Bottom's Bridge, and was guarding the
road to the left through White-Oak swamp, and ready
to support the troops in front.
On the 29th Casey's division was pushed forward a
half or three quarters of a mile to the front of Seven
Pines, and began to entrench; and Couch occupied
the position vacated by Casey at Seven Pines.
By the 30th the time had come when the Confed-
erate commander felt that some positive move must
be made in support of his offensive-defensive policy.
The season, being unusually wet, increased actually
and relatively the difficulties of the Union army.
The Chickahominy had overflowed the bottom-lands,
destroyed some of the new bridges, and delayed the
completion of others. The elements were decidedly
in favor of the Confederates.
On the 30th Johnston, encouraged by a reconnois-
sance in force, decided to attack McClellan's left next
day, the 31st, and the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair
Oaks, was the result.
To use almost literally General Smith's description
which agrees generally with that of Union writers
the point known as Seven Pines is merely the junc-
tion of two roads ; it is seven miles east of Richmond,
on the Williamsburg (or Old Stage) road, which starts
out from the southern part of the city. From the
northern suburb of the city another road starts out,
and runs in an easterly direction, keeping about two
miles to the north of the Williamsburg road for a dis-
tance of seven miles from Richmond, where it forks at
a point called Old Tavern. The fork to the left leads
412
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
northerly to New Bridge on the Chickahominy, oppo-
site McClellan's centre. The fork to the right runs
southeasterly two miles, where it intersects the Will-
iamsburg road at Seven Pines. This fork of two miles
from Old Tavern to Seven Pines, with the main road
(seven miles) from Old Tavern to Richmond, is the
" Nine-Mile Road." The Richmond and York River
Railroad lies between the Will iamsburg and Nine-
Mile roads, until it crosses the latter at a point called
Fair Oaks, a mile northwest from Seven Pines.
The Charles City road branches off from the Will-
iamsburg road at a point three miles east of Richmond,
and leads to the southwest, below White-Oak swamp ;
but before reaching the swamp, going by that road
from Richmond, lateral country roads lead from the
Charles City to the Williamsburg road
The country about Seven Pines is generally flat and
swampy, with farms and heavy timber interspersed.
Although there are many country roads through the
neighborhood, it is a bad region for army movements
in rainy weather, even on the roads.
The natural features of the battle-field afforded no-
special favor either to attack or defence ; but the Con-
federates had some advantage in the fact that the two-
best highways the Williamsburg and Nine-Mile road&
lying at a safe and convenient distance apart, led
from their camps and intersected at the point occupied
by the Union forces ; thus enabling a ready concen-
tration upon the field of battle.
The official morning report made at the time
(" Records of Rebellion," vol. xi., part iii., p. 204)
shows that on the 31st of May, McClellan's Army of
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAK PAPERS." 413
the Potomac in the Peninsula, had 98,008 present for
duty, not including McDowell's arrny, 41,000 near
Fredericksburg, nor Wool's command of 11,514 for
duty, at Fort Monroe.
No return of the Confederate forces for May 31 ap-
pears ; but a return for May 21 (vol. xi., part iii., p.
530) gives the strength of Johnston's army (Smith's
1st Division, Longstreet's 2d Division, Magruder's 3d
Division, D. H. Hill's 4th Division, Cavalry Brigade,
and Artillery Reserve) as 53,688. But before the
battle of Seven Pines the force was increased by
Huger's division, 5,000, and by other re-enforcements,
which ran it up, no doubt, to the figures given by
General Smith, 62,000 present on May 31.
On the 30th when Johnston ordered the attack
although the Chickahominy was high, McClellan had
several bridges by which, at that time, he could cross
to support his left wing. But during the night of the
30th-31st the rain fell in torrents, and raised the
already swollen stream, so as almost to prove the ruin
of the Union left. Surnner got to its relief by antici-
pating orders. Receiving instructions at 1 P.M. to " be
in readiness to move at a moment's warning," he did
not simply prepare his command, but, hearing the
sound of battle on the opposite side of the river, he
formed his two divisions, and marched each to the
bridge it had built across the Chickahominy, and
waited with " the heads of columns on the bridges,"
holding the flooring down against the rising waters,
for word to advance. The orders came at two o'clock.
Just before that, one of the bridges was swept from
under the feet of the men, but both divisions rushed
414
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
across the other bridge before it became impassable y
and reached the field in time to avert the impending
disaster. This is one of the few instances in which a
great result in war can be traced directly to a single
exhibition of good soldiership by a subordinate. In
auditing the public services of its soldiers this Gov-
ernment cannot overestimate its debt to General E. V.
Sumner for his conduct on the 31st of May, 1862.
Johnston's purpose of attacking Keyes at Seven
Pines was adopted before the heavy rain of the night
of the 30th 31st, and was not suggested by the advan-
tage which that storm gave him by destroying bridges.
His orders were based upon the assumption that the
Chickahominy , as he said, would " be high passable
only at the bridges." In fact, the battle was due
rather to the course of events than to his conception.
Speaking of Casey's advance beyond Seven Pines, and
Longstreet's desire to attack him, Johnston said in a
letter to Generals Whiting and G. W. Smith on the
29th : " Who knows but in the course of the morning
Longstreet's scheme may accomplish itself. If we get
into a fight here, you must hurry to help us." Up to
that time certainly Johnston had not decided to attack.
This is further shown by his instructions of the 30th
to Huger, hereafter quoted. But during the day
the 30th Longstreet was with him in person, and re-
ceived verbal instructions for next day's operations,
Johnston's orders for this battle constitute one of
the principal topics discussed in General Smith's book.
They do not show a well defined purpose in the com-
mander's mind.
The general control of the attack was entrusted to
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 415
Longstreet, who had his own division 14,000, D. H.
Hill's division 11,000, and Huger's division 5,000, a
force of 30,000 men present. In addition to this,
Hood's brigade of Smith's division joined Longstreet
during the afternoon of the battle. Longstreet's
orders from Johnston were verbal. D. H. Hill re-
ceived orders from Longstreet to conduct the attack.
Huger, who had arrived only the day before the bat-
tle, though the senior, was required to act under Long-
street ; but, nevertheless, Johnston gave him written
orders as if he were independent. Huger was blamed
for not taking an earlier and more active part than he
did, but he appears to have defended himself success-
fully against the accusations. His orders from Johns-
ton were as follows :
"May 30, 1862, 8.40 P.M.
" MAJOR- GENERAL HUGER: General: The reports
of Major-General D. H. Hill give me the impression
that the enemy is in considerable strength in his front.
It seems to me necessary that we should increase our
force also. For that object I wish to concentrate the
troops of your division on the Charles City road, and
concentrate the troops of Major- General Hill on that to
Williamsourg. To do this, it will be necessary for
you to move as early in the morning as possible, to re-
lieve the brigade of General Hill's division now on the
Charles City road. The road is the second large one
diverging to the right from the Williamsburg road ;
the first turns off near the toll-gate. On reaching your
position on the Charles City road, learn at once the
routes to the main roads to Richmond on your right
and left, especially those to the left, and try and find
416
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
guides. Be ready, if an action should be begun on
your left, to fall upon the enemy's flank.
" Most respectfully your obedient servant,
"J. E. JOHNSTON, General.
" P. S. It is important to move early."
Certainly under such orders, clearly expressing a
defensive purpose, and telling him to be ready if an
action should be begun on his left, an officer could not
be expected to begin an action himself. But appar-
ently, lest he might do something, the Confederate
commander sent Huger a second order as follows :
"MAY 31.
" MAJOR-GENERAL HUGER: General: I fear that
in my note of last evening, of which there is no copy,
I was too positive on the subject of YOUR ATTACKING the
enemy's left flank* It will, of course, be necessary for
you to know what force is before you first. I hope to
be able to have that ascertained for you by cavalry.
As our main force will be on your left, it will be neces-
sary for your progress to the front to conform at
first to that of General Hill. If you find no strong
body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill ;
but then, a strong reserve should be retained to cover
our right. Yours truly,
" J. E. JOHNSTON, General"
These orders are in " Records of Rebellion," vol. xi.,
part i., page 938. They show conclusively that John-
ston did not expect Huger to begin an attack, which
beginning Longstreet reported that he lost several
hours waiting for. In fact, the most that these orders
* Italics by the reviewer in all instances in this review.
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 417
required of Huger was to co- operate in a battle which
was to be begun by others. If he found no strong
body in his front, it would " be well to aid General
Hill " ; but even in that case he was to retain " a
strong reserve " to cover the right.
Huger claimed, and it does not appear to have been
controverted, that though he was the senior, he was
ready to take Longstreet's orders, and so expressed
himself to Longstreet at the time, but that he received
no orders from that officer.
Yet, in the face of these facts, Longstreet said in a
note to Johnston dated June 7 (" Records of Rebel-
lion," vol. xi., part iii., p. 580) : " The failure of com-
plete success on Saturday, May 31, I attribute to the
slow movements of General Huger's command. This
threw perhaps the hardest part of the battle upon my
own poor division. ... I can't help but think a
display of his forces on the left flank of the enemy by
General Huger would have completed the affair, and
given Whiting as easy and pretty a game as was ever
had upon a battle-field. Slow men are a little out of
place upon the field." The Records do not show that
Johnston repelled the imputation put upon Huger.
Although the attack was entrusted to the right
wing, some 30,000 men under Longstreet, the Con-
federate commander gave orders for co-operation by
his left wing. At 9.15 P.M. on the 30th he wrote
General G. W. Smith, commanding the left wing
(" Records of Rebellion," vol. xi., part iii., p. 563) :
" If nothing prevents we will fall upon the enemy in
front of Major- General Hill ... as early as pos-
sible. The Chickahominy will be high, and passable
418
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
only at the bridges, a great advantage to us. Please
be ready to move by the Nine-Mile road, corning as
early as possible to the point at which the road to
New Bridge turns off. Should there be cause of
haste,* General McLaws on your approach will be
ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may re-
inforce General Longstreet."
The part assigned to the left by this order was but
little, if any, more aggressive than that allotted to
Huger oh the right. Evidently all the fighting orders
were given to Longstreet verbally. Yet both Smith
and Huger were blamed as if they had received orders
to attack ; and the former has been forced to defend
himself in a book against the charge of having failed
to do what there is nothing to show he was ordered
to do, or ought to have done. General Smith shows
quite clearly that historians of the battle of Seven
Pines have wronged him. While other writers may
have been ignorant, Johnston, according to General
Smith, knew the truth, but did not divulge it in
fact, suppressed it. Smith, the second in command,
was on intimate terms with Johnston, the chief. He
shows in his book that he was fully informed as to
Johnston's plans and intentions. When the move-
ment was ordered on the 30th, Longstreet's division
was on the Nine-Mile road,f and Johnston directed
that it should proceed to the attack by that road ;
while D. H. Hill's division advanced by the Williams-
burg road on which it was lying ; and Huger's by the
* That is to say, should Longstreet need assistance before you reach
McLaw's position.
t See map.
SMITH'S " CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 419
Charles City road, further to the right south. That
would have brought Long-street's division upon Keyes's
right flank, the weakness of which is shown by the
following remark from Keyes's recent book (" Fifty
Years' Observations," etc., p. 452) : " The left of my
lines was all protected by the White-Oak swamp, but
the right was on ground so favorable to the approach
of the enemy, and so far from the Chickahominy, that
if Johnston had attacked there an hour or two earlier
than he did, I could have made but a feeble- defence
comparatively, and every man of us would have been
killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or river
before assistance could have reached us." The loss of
this grand opportunity, the existence of which is ad-
mitted on all sides, has been charged by most, if not
all, writers on the subject to General G. W. Smith.
By his book he succeeds in transferring the responsi-
bility to Johnston and Longstreet. He proves, using
Johnston as principal witness, that Johnston's orders
required Long street's division to proceed to the Nine-
Mile road against the weak point of Keyes's line de-
scribed above ; but that on the morning of the 31st
Smith ascertained and informed Johnston that Long-
street's division had left that road and gone down to
the Williamsburg road and fallen in behind Hill.
Johnston sent orders for Longstreet, if not too late,
to send at least part of his division back to proceed as
ordered by the Nine-Mile road. But it was too late,
or was thought to be. Having entrusted the manage-
ment of the attack to Longstreet, Johnston left him
to conduct it by the Williamsburg road, and went
himself along the Nine-Mile road with G. W. Smith's
420 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
division, and held that division until late in the after-
noon, watching the north side of the Chickahominy.
Smith stated these particulars in his official report,
dated June 23, 1862, but they were stricken out by
request of Johnston, because he did not want " to
make generally known the misunderstanding between
Longstreet and himself in regard to the direction in
which Longstreet's division was to move into action."
Certainly it is due to General Smith, as well as to
history, -that these important points should become
generally known now.
But after giving due weight to the fact that Long-
street, not Smith, was ordered to attack Keyes's ex-
posed right flank by the Nine-Mile road, it remains
true that Smith's division and Smith in person early
in the day reached the position on that road from
which the fatal attack could and should have been
made. The question is, Who was to blame for the
failure of Smith's division to make it at the right
time ? The answer is, Johnston, as proved by Smith's
book. The same conclusion must be drawn from
Johnston's official report, dated June 24, 1862 (vol.
xi., part i., pp. 933, 934, " Records of Rebellion").
He says : " General Smith was to march to the junc-
tion of the New Bridge road and the Nine-Mile road,
to be in readiness either to fall on Keyes^s flank or to
cover Longstreet s left. . . . In the meantime I
had placed myself on the left of the force employed in
his (Longstreet's) attack, withthe division of General
Smith, that I might be on a part of the field where I
could observe and be ready to meet any counter-move-
ments which the enemtfs General might make against
SMITH'S " CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 421
our centre or left. Owing to the peculiar condition of
the atmosphere, the sound of the musketry did not
reach us.* I consequently deferred giving the signal
for General Smith's advance until about four <f clock,
at which time Major Jasper S. Whiting, of General
Smith's staff, whom I had sent to learn the state of
affairs with General Longstreet's column, returned,
reporting that it was pressing on with vigor. Smith's
troops were at once moved forward"
This proves beyond all cavil that Smith's attack
was made at the very time and place that Johnston
himself designated ; and there does not appear to be
any charge that the attack was not well conducted.
But, as has been shown, Johnston, who was with the
division, did not order the attack until four o'clock,
and by the time it was under way one of the "counter-
movements of the enemy's General," which Johnston
had placed himself on his left to watch, had actually
been made. Sumner, with Sedgwick's division, reached
the field from the north side of the Chickahominy, at
4.30, and was joined later by Richardson's division ;
so that no sooner had Smith commenced his attack
upon Couch, of Keyes's corps, than he was compelled
to turn and defend himself against Sumner, who. was
on his flank and threatening his rear.
* This is precisely what occurred at the battle of Perryville, except
that Johnston had ordered and was expecting the sound of the mus-
ketry fire he anxiously listened for, but failed to hear ; whereas, Bnell
simply failed to hear musketry fire which he had not ordered, and
which he had no particular reason to expect. It is a coincidence, also,
that in both cases notice of the heavy firing, which began about two
o'clock, reached the commanders by staff-officers about four o'clock,
and thereupon the wing not engaged was immediately ordered into
action.
422
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
To summarize: Keyes's 4th Corps, about 9,000
strong, consisting of Casey's and Couch's divisions, the
former composed mainly of raw troops, constituted the
advance of the Union left wing, and was the force
upon which the Confederate assault was made. Mc-
Clellan's orders to Keyes were to hold Seven Pines
strongly. Keyes made a line of entrenchments a mile
in rear (east) of Seven Pines, then moved forward and
occupied the forks of the road at Seven Pines, and
made a line of rifle pits a mile long from Seven Pines
to Fair Oaks. On the 29th, Keyes moved Casey's di-
vision forward a half a mile or more on the Williams-
burg road, covering a point where a country road
started north to Old Tavern, on the Nine-Mile road.
Couch's division, at the same time, was posted in
Casey's old position at Seven Pines, and both divisions
set to work to strengthen their lines by rifle pits and by
slashing the timber for abatis. Casey made a redoubt
for artillery on the left, his line extending on both
sides of the Williamsburg road. From the nature of
the country, Casey's pickets were only a thousand
yards in advance of his line.
Heintzelman's 3d Corps had taken position between
Seven Pines and Bottom's Bridge ; Hooker's division
on the left, watching the road through White-Oak
swamp, and Kearney's division on the right and front,
near Savage Station. On the 25th, Heintzelman was
placed in general command of the two corps his own
and Keyes's.
On the 31st, Keyes's forces occupied two weakly-
entrenched lines to wit : the line of Casey's division,
about half a mile in front of Seven Pines, and the line
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 423
of Couch's division at Seven Pines. Besides these,
there was the third line of rifle pits a mile in rear of
Seven Pines. The left flank of the Union forces was
well covered by White-Oak swamp, watched by
Hooker ; but the right flank of Casey and Couch rest-
ing on or near the Nine-Mile road, by which the enemy
could advance, was entirely exposed. Fortunately for
the Union cause, the attack came by the Williamsburg
road upon the strongest point. Nevertheless, it was
successful, due, mainly, to its inherent strength partly
to the fact, that Casey's division was composed largely
of raw troops, and partly also to the fact that the ene-
my, with the advantage of the initiative, had quietly
concentrated for the attack ; whereas Keyes, though
not surprised, had to call his troops from their labors
and resist, with fragments at a time, the heavy on-
slaught made upon him by a solid column. He was
beaten in detail.
When convinced that the attack was real, Casey
sent one regiment forward to support his pickets
that, of course, was quickly driven back. In the
meantime, he formed a line of one battery and four
regiments of infantry, a quarter of a mile in front of
his rifle pits. This too was soon swept out of the
fight, and his main line in the rifle pits was that much
the weaker. Soon the rifle pits, but thinly manned,
were attacked, outflanked, and carried, and the last of
Casey's division was driven to the rear. The full
weight of the Confederate assault then fell upon
Couch, who had already been weakened by efforts to
sustain Casey, and cut his line in two between Seven
Pines and Fair Oaks, driving him in person, with
424 MILITARY MISCELLANIES
Abercrombie's brigade, to the northeast, where, at
4.30 P.M., Sumner succored him in the desperate resist-
ance he was making against G. W. Smith's attack by
the Nine-Mile road.
In due time Heintzelman's troops aided in checking
the Confederate advance on the left and centre, as
Sumner did on the right ; but night closed in with the
Confederates in possession of the battle-field; John-
ston, the Confederate commander, was taken to the
rear, wounded, about 7 P.M., and the command de-
volved upon Major-General G. W. Smith, the author
of the book under review. Smith held command until
1 P.M. the next day, June 1st, when, by Jefferson
Davis' order, he was superseded on the field by Gen-
eral R. E. Lee, and, naturally enough, his feelings have
been on edge ever since. During the night both
sides re-formed their shattered ranks, rectified their
lines, and prepared to attack next morning.
There were three Union corps in the field, but they
were beyond support ; the rise in the Chickahominy
having swept away the bridges. Their situation was
perilous, but they were equal to the emergency. Seiz-
ing the initiative, they attacked with vigor at day-
light, recovered their lost ground, and, after a severe
contest, re-occupied the position from which they had
been driven, and the status before the battle was
resumed.
The result, as so often happened during the war r
was not satisfactory to either side less satisfactory,,
no doubt, to the Confederate than the Union side,
because they started with several advantages, among
them the initiative and an overpowering force at the
SMITH'S "CONFEDERATE WAR PAPERS." 425
point of attack, and because also the victory which
they ought to have gained promised great fruits.
They lost one of the best opportunities they had in
the war.
In judging the principal actors in this battle, it
should be borne in mind that the war was young at
that time. These opposing armies had done a good
deal of digging, and some fighting about Yorktown
and Williamsburg, and had floundered through the
mud from the lower Peninsula up to the Chickahominy,
but, except the few officers and men who may have
been in the battle of Bull Eun, they had not had a
serious engagement. Both sides were astounded, pos-
sibly a little dazed, by the realities of battle, which
they experienced for the first time at Seven Pines.
Casey says in his report, it was " the most terrible fire
of musketry I have ever witnessed " ; and when Long-
street had fought only five or six of his thirteen brig-
ades he called for help on the 31st, and actually beg-
ged for it during next day's fight.
The Confederate commander's reason for not con-
centrating his force on the three isolated Union corps
about Seven Pines, east of Richmond on June 1, prob-
ably was that, not knowing the exact state of the
Chickahominy, he feared he might expose Richmond
and the rear of his army to the Union corps, which
threatened him from their positions only six or seven
miles north of the city.
In relation to his failure to advance upon Rich-
mond after the success of June 1, the Union com-
mander says in his official report : " The only availa-
ble means for uniting our forces at Fair Oaks, for an
426 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
advance upon Richmond after the battle, was to march
the troops from Mechanicsville and other points on
the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's
Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to
Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles.
In the condition of the roads at that time, this march
could not have been made with artillery in less than
two days ; within which time the enemy would have
been secure within his entrenchments around Rich-
mond. . . . Therefore I held the positions already
gained, and completed our crossings as rapidly as pos-
sible."
On the 26th of June, nearly a month after the bat-
tle of Seven Pines, the Confederates assumed the offen-
sive, attacked the Union right flank north of the
Chickahominy, and the "seven days'" battle, and
Union withdrawal to James River, began, and the
campaign of the Peninsula ended.
ARTICLE VIII.
Dodge's " Campaign of Chancel-
lorsville."
Colonel Theodore A. Dodge, U. S. Army (retired),
has made a rich contribution to military literature by
his work entitled "The Campaign of Chancellorsville,"
published recently by Osgood & Co., of Boston. Col-
onel Dodge has evidently consulted authorities with
great care and good judgment, but he appears to have
leaned rather too heavily upon the Committee on the
Conduct of the War.
The proceedings of that anomalous tribunal were
ex-parte and irregular. It did not observe sufficiently
either the rules of evidence or the principles of fair
dealing. Officers before it were induced, or permitted,
to boast and growl under oath ; to criticise their absent
companions in arms, and to express opinions concerning
the qualifications and services of others, including
even their military superiors. Its record has value as
secondary or corroborative testimony. Standing alone,
it is not sound evidence, especially when the witnesses
are speaking of others ; and when they testify con-
cerning themselves, of course their statements must be
tested by the rules especially applicable to such cases.
* * # * # #
Notwithstanding conflicting claims and statements,
* Journal of Military Service Institution.
427
428 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
there is not much room left for difference of opinion
about the main features of the campaign of Chancel-
lorsville. Hooker with about 113,000 men, not in-
cluding a cavalry corps of 1 1 ,000 which was detailed
to cut the enemy's line of communications occupied
the north side of the Rappahannock, confronted by
Lee with about 55,000, strongly entrenched on the
heights behind Fredericksburg, on the south side.
Hooker was fully justifiable by his superiority in
numbers and other attending circumstances, in divid-
ing his force for an offensive campaign. The real ob-
ject of the left wing under Sedgwick was to make
such a demonstration in front, as would enable the
right wing under Hooker to cross the river, turn Lee's
left flank, and place itself unopposed at Chancellors-
ville, to the west and south of Fredericksburg and
only ten miles from it. Both wings performed their
parts of this bold plan faultlessly, and on the evening
of Thursday, April 30, Hooker in person with four
corps was at Chancellorsville and was joined during
the night by Sickles's corps withdrawn from the left
wing. Hooker gave instructions for an advance on
the following (Friday) morning, and issued general
orders No. 47, saying " that the operations of the last
three days have determined that the enemy must in-
gloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences and
give us battle on our own ground where certain des-
truction awaits him." It was not until Thursday
night that Lee understood what was going on. Then,
instead of ingloriously flying, he " seized the masses of
his force, and with the grasp of a Titan swung them
into position as a giant might fling a mighty stone
DODGE'S " CAMPAIGN OF OH ANCELLORSVILLE." 429
from a sling." (Swinton). The hostile forces advan-
cing, the one from Chancellorsville, and the other from
Fredericksburg, met about a mile from the former
place, where the Federal troops seized a strong line of
battle, and needed nothing but Hooker's permission
to realize the predictions of his boastful order of the
preceding day. But that permission was denied them.
They were required to give up the good position they
had gained in front, and fall back to a bad one in rear,
and were kept in retreat from day to day until they
had recrossed the Rappahannock on the night of May
5 and 6. From the moment of discovering (Friday,
May 1) Lee's determination to fight, Hooker's manage-
ment of the campaign was beneath criticism.
He abandoned the offensive before Jackson's flank
movement of Saturday morning was begun or resolved
upon, so that he had not even the poor excuse of that
move of the enemy for retreating. When on Saturday
he found that Lee would not fall back, he sent to
Sedgwick for Reynold's corps, which reached him late
that night, making him stronger than he was before
Howard's defeat of Saturday evening. Yet he stuck
to a losing defensive. On Friday night, May 1, Lee,
with but little more than half the force which- Hooker
had under his immediate command on the field of
Chancellorsville, divided his army into two parts,
sending one under Jackson on a march of fifteen miles
along Hooker's front and to his extreme right and rear.
After that, nothing could have saved Lee from de-
struction if Hooker had taken advantage of the oppor-
tunity. But lying, as he did, between the two wings
of Lee's army, and being far stronger than both of
430 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
them combined, instead of beating them in detail, he
devoted four days and all of his energy to slipping
out from between them and moving back to his own
side of the river, doing the enemy only such harm as
was unavoidable in getting away. Saturday night-
having withdrawn Reynold's corps from the left wing
and knowing that the Rebel force (commanded by
Lee in person), which for two days had been attacking
his five corps from the east, lay directly between him
and Sedgwick, and that Sedgwick could not advance
without first carrying by assault the defences of Fred-
ericksburg which the Army of the Potomac had failed
to carry in December, and that, besides the fighting, a
march of twelve or fourteen miles would have to be
made he, at eleven o'clock at night, ordered Sedgwick
with his single corps of 22,000 men to carry the
heights behind Fred ericksburg and be in the vicinity
of the Commanding General at daylight next morning,
destroying en route any force lie might meet with.
Swinton says " for the successful execution of this plan
not only was Sedgwick bound to the most energetic
action, but Hooker also was engaged by every consid-
eration of honor and duty to so act as to make the
dangerous task he had assigned to Sedgwick possible."
It is surprising that so able and consistent a writer as
Swinton should dignify this wild venture by calling
it a " plan " and discussing it. He admits that u this
move would under the circumstances have been an
impossibility even had no enemy interposed."
It is only necessary here to recall the fact that Sedg-
wick carried the works at Fredericksburg on Sunday
forenoon, advanced five or six miles to Salem Heights,
DODGE'S ' CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE." 43 1
where, single-handed, at 4 or 5 P.M., he fought a battle
with Lee, and not a thing was done by Hooker to
rescue or relieve him. On the contrary, while he
was fighting Lee with the remnant of his corps of
22,000, Hooker with "the Union right wing, 80,000,
retreated to a place where it could not be hurt, leav-
ing Sedgwick and his companions to take care of
themselves."* By stubborn fighting, Sedgwick held
out until the night of May 4 and 5, when, through
skill, bravery and good-fortune, he was able to recross
the Rappahannock at Bank's ford, having lost 5,000
men about a quarter of his force, and nearly a third
of the loss of the whole army. Couch thinks that the
din around Hooker's ears at the Chancellor House
prevented his hearing the sound of Sedgwick's guns
at Salem Heights, but that is immaterial. He knew
what his orders required Sedgwick to do, and about
where he ought to be. Furthermore, high officers in
Couch's own corps heard Sedgwick's guns. Yet
Hooker blamed this able and gallant officer for the
loss of the campaign. Sedgwick did wonders. It
was almost impossible for him to do more. But if
he had " destroyed " Lee and pursued Hooker he could
not have stopped him. The commander of the Army
of the Potomac was in such a state that he probably
would have continued his retreat. His movements
were dictated by personal demoralization, not by mili-
tary conditions. Stonewall Jackson's corps, though
badly shattered, would have remained in the field,
and in Hooker's frame of mind that would have been
enough for him to retreat from. Hooker opened the
* Couch.
432
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
campaign imbued with the belief that Lee would
necessarily retreat as soon as he found the Army of
the Potomac on his left flank and rear. Another idea
which perhaps unconsciously found a lodgment in his
mind was defending himself in the remote contingency
that Lee did not retire. This view is sustained by
the second part of his order of April 30, wherein he
says Lee must " ingloriously fly or come out from be-
hind his defences, and give us battle on our own
ground" that is, behind our defences ; defence being
instinctively his purpose, provided Lee came out.
He went to Chancellorsville not for a fight, but for
a foot race. He fully expected Lee to withdraw.
But, like the braggart in the duel, when he found at
the last moment the enemy ivould not run, he deter-
mined that he would. His subsequent management
was quite in harmony with this theory, which is sub-
stantially the one entertained by Swinton and Couch.
The thump on the head at the Chancellor House
counts for nothing, because he did not receive that
until Sunday, which was after his gravest blunders
had been made. Couch says, " As to the charge that
the battle was lost because the General was intoxi-
cated, I have always stated that he probably abstained
from the use of ardent spirits when it would have
been far better for him to have continued in Ms usual
habit in that respect." This conveys the impression
that a lack of whiskey was the trouble. Bad as it is,
that is as good an explanation of Hooker's extra-
ordinary conduct as any that has been offered. If
his habits were as indicated, Couch's opinion may be
correct, for a sober drunkard is not unlikely to be
DODGE'S " CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLOKSVILLE." 433
both stupid and timid in action. But however that
may be, when the campaign was over, instead of being
permitted to attack his subordinates before the Com-
mittee on the Conduct of the War, he ought to have
been required to defend himself before a Court of
Inquiry. As heretofore stated, his own responsibili-
ties were heavy enough without having any of How-
ard's transferred to him.
It can be said of Howard, concerning the behavior
of the llth Corps at Chancellors ville, that he had
been in command of it only thirty days, that subse-
quently he improved its discipline and instruction, and
it won the special commendation of Thomas at the
battle of Lookout Mountain.
AETICLE IX.
Doubleday's " Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg."
In his preface General Doubleday says that he has
had " better opportunities to judge of men and meas-
ures than usually falls to the lot of others who have
written on the subject ; " that he has " always felt it
to be the duty of every one who held a prominent
position in the great war to give to posterity the bene-
fit of his personal recollections " at the risk of " severe
criticism and much personal feeling," announces that
he cannot " consent to fulfil his (my) allotted task by
a colorless history praising everybody and attributing
all disasters to dispensations of Providence for which
no one is to blame," and adds, that " where great dis-
asters have occurred it is due both to the living and
the dead that the causes and circumstances be justly
and properly stated." A belligerent beginning ! It is
the opening of the controversialist rather than of the
historian, and suggests a purpose which perusal of the
work confirms to enhance the value of " personal
recollections " as compared with " dry official state-
ments,"' and thus settle some old scores with both the
" living and the dead." This is dangerous ground for
history, especially as affecting the dead.
* ' ' Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, ' ' by Abner Doubleday, Bvt.
Maj.-Genl. U. S. A. Vol. VI. " Campaigns of the Civil War." New
York : C. Scribner's Sons. 1882.
Journal of Military Service Institution.
434
" CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG." 435
General Doubleday discusses the questions of Gen-
eral Meade's intention and behavior at the battle of
Gettysburg, but there is nothing in his personal recol-
lections which will be likely to fasten on General
Meade the accusations of which he was long ago ac-
quitted by the " dry official " records and his own ex-
planations. Nevertheless, for more reasons than those
given by General Doubleday, it will probably be the
verdict of history that General Meade failed to gather
the legitimate fruits of his victory. In fact he did not
seem to appreciate that he had gained a victory. Pre-
sident Lincoln was bitterly disappointed. When (in
Meade's congratulatory order which was telegraphed
to him) he read the sentence about driving the in-
vaders from our soil, he dropped his hands, and in sad
and measured tones repeated, "Drive the invaders
from our soil! My God! is that all?" Disheartened
and apprehensive, he, on the 6th of July, telegraphed
from the Soldiers' Home to General Halleck : " I left
the telegraph office a good deal disappointed. You
know I did not like the phrase in Order No. 68, I be-
lieve, ' drive the invaders from our soil.' Since that
I see a dispatch from General French saying the ene-
my is crossing his wounded over the river in . flats,
without saying why he does not stop it, or even inti-
mating a thought it ought to be stopped. Still later,
another dispatch from General Pleasanton, by direc-
tion of General Meade, to General French stating that
the main army is halted because it is believed the
rebels are concentrating 'on the road to wards Hagers-
town beyond Fairfield,' and is not to move until it is
ascertained that the rebels intend to evacuate Cum-
436
MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
berland Valley. These things all appear to me to be
connected with a purpose to cover Baltimore and
Washington, and to get the enemy across the river
again without a further collision ; and they do not ap-
pear connected with a purpose to prevent his crossing
and to destroy him. I do fear the former purpose is
acted upon and the latter is rejected. If you are satis-
fied the latter purpose is entertained and is judiciously
pursued, I am content. If you are not so satisfied,
please look to it.
" A. LINCOLN."
On July 15th, the day after the enemy crossed the
Potomac, President Lincoln used the following re-
markable language in a telegram to Mr. Cameron : " I
would give much to be relieved of the impression that
Meade, Couch, Smith and all, since the battle of Get-
tysburg, have striven only to get Lee over the river
without another fight." Probably President Lincoln's
famous letter of October 16th for General Meade, pro-
posing to take all the responsibility in case of defeat,
and none of the credit in case of success, was inspired
by the President's disappointment at the result of the
operations following the battle of Gettysburg. A
military admirer says of Mr. Lincoln " He was the
best General we had, and it is a wonder the other
Generals did not break his heart."
It is a pity General Doubleday, going beyond the
question of Meade's generalship, makes statements
which may be understood as flings at that high offi-
cer's personal bearing in action. On page 177, for-
getting that the position of the Commanding General
on the field of battle is not a proper subject for impu-
" CHANCELLOBSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG." 437
tation or criticism by his subordinates, he says that an
officer who rode to Meade's Headquarters during the
battle of Gettysburg with the intelligence that Sickles'
line was driven in, "found the General walking up
and down the room apparently quite unconscious of
the movements which might have been discerned by
riding to the top of the hill" etc. ; and again, " General
Meade's Headquarters was in the centre of this cannon-
ade, and as the balls were flying very thickly there,
and killing the horses of his staff, he found it neces-
sary, temporarily, to abandon the place." "He rode
over to Power's Hill, made his Headquarters with
General Slocum, and when the firing ceased rode hack
again.' 1 '' It is true General Doubleday adds, in the
way of apology for General Meade, that " where noth-
ing is to be gained by exposure, it is sound sense to
shelter men and officers as much as possible." The
explanation merely tends to confirm the impression
which the reader may fairly entertain of the author'a
unfriendly purpose in introducing the incident.
There is rather an unkind imputation upon two
dead officers Halleck and Meade where the au-
thor says, page 116, "as the new commander of
the Union Army " (Meade) " was a favorite of Gen-
eral Halleck, no notice was taken of his disregard
of instructions in detaching the garrison of Harper's
Ferry." In fact, General Doubleday appears to have
a poor opinion of many of his brother officers, especi-
ally of Howard, who lives to speak for himself. He
says of a number of them en masse (page 32, speaking
of Chancellors ville), " the subsequent investigation of
this sad business by the Congressional Committee on
438
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the Conduct of the War was very much of a farce and
necessarily unreliable, for so long as both Hooker and
Howard were left in high command, it was absurd to
suppose their subordinates would testify against
them." What kind of officers must we have had if it
is " absurd to suppose" that they failed to tell the
truth because Hooker and Howard were left in high
command ? General Doubleday himself was a witness
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and
he testified not only in plain but in bitter language
against his superior officer, General Meade, while he,
Meade, was still in high command. There is nothing
to show that other officers did not speak with equal
conscientiousness if not with equal severity.
The main features in the campaigns of Chancellors-
ville and Gettysburg have been pretty well agreed upon
by military students and writers. It is not worth while,
therefore, to go into a detailed review of General Double-
day's account of those operations. He attaches more
importance than most other writers have done fco the
part taken by General Sickles, in both campaigns, and
to the operations of the cavalry force under General
Pleasanton at Chancellorsville. The author makes an
argument and presents a diagram to demonstrate
mathematically that " it is impossible for any troops
to hold their ground when attacked at once on both
fronts," if posted on the two sides of a right angle as
General Sickles posted his corps at Gettysburg. The
attack from " both sides," which the author here
assumes, would be a marked case of " converging col-
umns " (as he uses that term) which he tells us always
fail. But passing that over, General Doubleday is
" CHANCELLOBSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG." 439
correct in pronouncing the disposition a faulty one in
theory. Whether or not it is so in practice depends
on circumstances. The line occupied by General
Sickles' corps was substantially the same in figure as
as that occupied by the whole Army at Gettysburg,
and that position was so good that a dispute is yet
going on about the credit for having selected it, and
our Army held its ground there though attacked on
both fronts at once.
There is certainly exaggeration in the results at-
tributed by the author to some of the minor affairs of
the cavalry. For example (page 37) he says that a
charge, at the cost of his life, by Major Keenan with
four hundred of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry,
against Stonewall Jackson's front of ten thousand men
at Chancellorsville, " saved the army from capture"
and " the country from the unutterable degradation of
the establishment of slavery in the Northern States."
Without disparaging Major Keenan's gallantry and
sacrifice, it is not too much to say that slavery would
not have been established in the Northern States, if
he had never charged or never been born. The author
seems to concern himself more than necessary in such
a book as his, with the objects the rebels aimed- to ac-
complish by the war. Page 48, that object was "Ven-
geance," page 188 it was " Conquest of the North,''
and same page it was to determine " whether freedom
or slavery was to rule the Northern States"; page 195
it was " to extend the area of slavery over the free
States"; but after all by page 197, it was "the ac-
knowledgment of the independence of the Southern
Confederacy."
440
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
It was worth while for the military profession to
weigh carefully General Doubleday's sweeping and
unsparing condemnation of "converging columns," on
the field of battle as well as in strategy. Page 52 he
says, " in the history of lost empires we almost inva-
riably find that the cause of their final overthrow on
the battlefield may be traced to the violation of one
military principle, which is that the attempt to over-
power a central force by converging columns is almost
ahvays fatal to the assailants" " Yet this is the first
mistake made by every tyro in generalship." Strength-
ening the broad assertion he adds, the columns " never
arrive at the same time," " the outer army is always
beaten in detail," "one portion is sure to be defeated
before the other arrives." Page 67 he says of Chan-
cellorsville, "Sedgwick's movement, in my opinion,
added another example to the evil effect of converg-
ing columns against a central force " ; page 157, " uni-
versal experience demonstrates that columns converg-
ing on a central force almost invariably fail in their
object and are beaten in detail. Gettysburg seems to
be a striking exemplification of this." Page 159, "Lee
boldly directed that each flank of the Union Army
should be assailed at the same time, while constant
demonstrations against our centre were to be kept up
to prevent either wing from being re-enforced." It
was " another attempt to converge columns," etc. This
is repeated, page 176. Page 179, "There is always
some reason why columns never converge in time."
The military principle for which General Doubleday
contends so stoutly has long been accepted as a sound
one in strategy, but his claims in its favor are prob-
" CHA.NOELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG." 441
ably more absolute and comprehensive than any
which have ever before been made. These claims
suggest the question whether the principle admits
of more rigid application now than in former times.
The facilities for concentrating columns on a given
point at a designated time have increased with the
improvements in the means of transportation, and
especially with the means of communication by tele-
graph and signal. That being so, the objection to
converging columns would seem to be less than in
earlier times. Certainly the author goes too far in
saying the columns " never " arrive in time, that the
outer army is " always " beaten, that one portion is
"sure" to be defeated before the other arrives, etc.,
etc. A few cases may be cited. The Prussians in
1866 marched converging columns through different
passes in the mountains, formed a timely junction on
the field of Sadowa and gained a decisive victory.
The Germans were victorious at Worth, yet their staff
account says of the final attack of Froschwiller,
"troops from the southeast and north reached and
stormed the common goal almost simultaneously."
There was a striking case of the success of " con-
verging columns" at Aladja-Dagh, near Kars (1877).
The Russian plan was to attack the position in front
with about 30,000 men, and in rear with about half
that number. The latter force, keeping in communi-
cation with the main body by field telegraph, marched
some forty miles around the enemy's flank. The col-
umns attacked simultaneously and gained a decisive
victory.
McDowell's converging columns at our first Bull
442
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Run were successful, and he lost the battle only be-
cause the enemy, resorting to a similar manoeuvre,
brought Johnston's converging columns on our central
force in the nick of time. Hooker's converging of
columns at Chancellorsville was successful, but he
lost the benefit of it through his sudden and unac-
countable temporary imbecility, and was finally over-
thrown by Lee's resort to a similar operation in send-
ing Jackson to converge and attack the central force
after a circuitous and difficult march of fifteen miles.
Furthermore, the author furnishes evidence against
himself on this point. He says (page 181), speaking
of the second day at Gettysburg, "A night attack on
the rear of our army in conjunction with an advance
from the opposite side on Hancock's front would have
thrown us into great confusion and must have suc-
ceeded." Such an attack which the author says "must
have succeeded, 7 ' would have been a marked example
of converging columns, which he tells us always fail.
There is much that is interesting in General Double-
day's work, but he indulges too freely in surmises, and
men's intentions, and there is now and then a lack of
precision as to events. For example, he tells us posi-
tively, page 29, of " Stonewall " Jackson's death, that
"his own troops fired into him with fatal effect,"
whereas, on the following page he says, " whether the
rebels killed him or whether some of his wounds came
from our own troops is a matter of doubt"
ARTICLE X.
De Trobriand's " Four Years with the
Army of the Potomac."
General de Trobriand is a charming writer. With-
out any disparagement to his soldiership, which is of
a high order, it might be said that his pen is mightier
than his sword.
The book under consideration was prepared im-
mediately after the close of our Civil War, and was
written in the French language and for the French
people.
In his preface to the French edition, dated May,
1867, the author says: "Everything which I have
here related which I have not myself seen, I have from
the evidence of the actors themselves, and by a minute
comparison with the official documents and depositions
in extenso, taken before the Congressional Committee
on the Conduct of the War." The tripod of authority
upon which the work stands is, therefore, 1st.. What
the author saw (and he kept a diary). 2d. What he
calls " the evidence of the actors themselves " ; but
how that was obtained does not appear. 3d. The
* " Four Years with the Army of the Potomac," by Regis de Trobri-
and, Brevet Major-General U. S. Vols. Translated by George K.
Dauchy, late Lieutenant Commanding 12th New York Battery Light
Artillery U. S. Vols. With portrait and maps. Boston : Ticknor &
Co. 1889.
Journal Military Service Institution, March 1, 1889.
443
444 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
official documents and depositions before the " Com-
mittee on the Conduct of the War." By far the most
interesting and valuable part of the work is that
which rests upon the first leg of the tripod. Neither
the evidence, as he must have received it, from " the
actors themselves," nor the report of the Committee
on the Conduct of the War, affords a substantial foun-
dation for the accounts given of campaigns and battles
which the author did not witness. The Committee on
the Conduct of the War was an anomalous tribunal,
which sprang from the loyalty and zeal of a free and
earnest people. It was composed of Congressmen, not
of soldiers. It had its uses. Its report furnishes
some bright side-lights, but to rely upon that report
as a basis for history and criticism must lead to error
and injustice. When General de Trobriand wrote his
book, the compilation of the War Records had not
been commenced. Indeed, these indispensable vouch-
ers for historical accounts of the Civil War had not
been assorted. But few of those from the Confed-
erate side had been received by our Government, and
all Union and Confederate were, for practicable
purposes, inaccessible.
For more than twenty years since General de Tro-
briand's book first appeared, the Government has
been preparing and publishing the official records
which are essential to correct and fair accounts of the
campaigns and battles of the Civil War. It is not
.possible within the compass of a book review to point
out the important discrepancies between the Records
and the accounts given in " Four Years with the
Army of the Potomac," Discrepancies were un-
DE TROBRIAND'S "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC." 445
avoidable in a book written at the close of the War,
when, if the memory was fresh the feelings were
strong. It would not be necessary to make note of
them if it were not that, in the broad light of the
present day the work is translated into English and
published in this country without revision. Indeed,
the author, without making or authorizing any revi-
sion of the historical matter, says to the translator :
"Leave intact, without modification or extenuation,
my judgments upon men and things, for, whatever
may be otherwise their value, they have at least the
recommendation in their favor that they are the hon-
est expression of seasoned convictions based upon
factSj and which I did not find cause to modify since
the above was published." The "facts" in some
instances turn out to be like the fact stated by the
man who said the horse was sixteen feet high, and
then stuck to it because he had said sixteen feet
instead of sixteen hands. General de Trobriand ad-
heres to his conclusions regardless of manifest changes
in his premises, which is in effect saying to the world :
u If the established facts of the present day do not
agree with what I said twenty years ago, so much the
worse for the facts." It is a pity the author takes this
bourbonistic view of the subject. It is not meant
that the historical and critical parts of his work are
wholly wrong ; far from it. It is because the book is
good that the American edition of it deserved revision
that would bring it up to the enlightened standard of
the present time. In so far as it conforms to the
assurances in the preface, the book is of the highest
interest. " This book," the author says, " is a narra-
446
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
tive. I have limited myself to those things which I
have seen. I tell of events as they have passed under
my eyes, and as I wrote them down, day by day, in a
journal " ; and he adds : " the reader can follow me in
perfect security." The parts of the book which con-
form to these assurances are admirable and delightful.
So, too, in genera], are the accounts of political mat-
ters, though the effect of political interference in
military affairs during the War is overdrawn. The
first chapter of the book, treating of the causes of the
War is particularly good. The personal sketches,
though not free from the appearance of bias, are
spirited and graphic. The criticisms of high com-
manders are usually severe, in some cases harsh.
The grave defects of the book are in the accounts
of events of which the author knew nothing of his
own knowledge, and in the judgments he bases upon
these accounts, and still adheres to. As heretofore
mentioned, the book was written while the war feel-
ing remained hot. It shows some strong prejudices,
but that was to be expected. Prejudice is a natural
outgrowth from those human organisms in which
both the intellect and the feelings are highly devel-
oped. Yet it is an unwholesome fungus that ought
not to be swallowed even when highly seasoned and
daintily served.
A brief reference may be made to some question-
able parts of the work. Undoubtedly, President
Buchanan's part in public affairs between the election
and inauguration of his successor (November, 1860, to
March, 1861) was far from creditable, but there were
extenuating circumstances which do not appear in the
DE TKOBRIAND'S ''ARMY OF THE POTOMAC." 447
book. After the new President was elected, the old
President was practically powerless. Congress (which
assembled in December, 1860) did not heed Buchan-
an's recommendations. He submitted several meas-
ures looking to coercion of the South, but they were
not acted upon. Everything which appeared to be of
national importance was held by Congress to await
the incoming administration. In fact, Congress was
almost as uncertain as the President about what ought
to be done. At that time, upon the question of the
constitutional powers of the Government, a large ma-
jority of the Northern people shared Mr. Buchanan's
views. The coercive power of the General Govern-
ment was admitted to be ample within certain limits.
That is to say, it could enforce its authority, acting
directly upon individual citizens within a State, but it
could not make war upon a State or upon the whole
people of a State, guilty and innocent alike. This
belief which merely embarrassed citizens in general,
completely confused and confounded the citizen who
happened to occupy the Presidential chair. President
Buchanan knew that he had no legal power to raise
armies of his own volition, and if he had attempted
to call out the Militia and increase the Regular Army
and Navy by his own order as President Lincoln did,
after Fort Sumter was tfred upon, it is quite possible he
would have been impeached.
In speaking of Pope's campaign the author says :
" Finally the ill-will and disobedience of at least one
of his corps commanders contributed sensibly to defeat
his plans and paralyze his efforts." The corps com-
mander he refers to is Fitz John Porter ; and the
448 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
author adds, " in regard to Porter's conduct, military
justice has pronounced. He was cashiered, dismissed
from the Army, and declared incapable of occupying
any position of confidence, honor or profit, under the
Government of the United States."
When the author (December 14, 1886) authorized
the American edition of his book, Porter had been
restored to the Army by the nomination of the Presi-
dent and the confirmation of the Senate, the restora-
tion being specially authorized by Act of Congress.
The restoration was the result of an impartial, and
searching investigation by a just and learned tribunal,
of which Major-General Schofield, now General-in-
Chief, was President. This tribunal, with essential in-
formation before it which the court-martial did not
and could not have, said, "The judgment of the court-
martial upon General Porter's conduct was evidently
based upon greatly erroneous impressions," and after
pointing out these impressions, the tribunal adds :
"The reports of the 29th and those of the 30th of
August, have somehow been strangely confounded
with each other. Even the Confederate reports have,
since the termination of the War, been similarly mis-
construed. Those of the 30th have been misquoted
as referring to the 29th, thus to prove that a furious
battle was going on while Porter was comparatively
inactive on the 29th. The fierce and gallant struggle
of his own troops on the 30th has thus been used to
sustain the original error under which he was con-
demned. General Porter w T as, in effect, condemned
for not having taken any part in his own battle. Such
was the error upon which General Porter was pro-
DE TROBKIAND'S "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC." 449
nounced guilty of the most shameful crime known
among soldiers. We believe not one among all the
gallant soldiers on that bloody field was less deserving
of such condemnation than he.
" Having thus given the reasons for our conclusions,
we have the honor to report, in accordance with the
President's order, that, in our opinion, justice requires
at his hands such action as may be necessary to annul
and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-
martial in the case of Major-General Fitz John Porter,
and to restore him to the positions of which that sen-
tence deprived him. Such restoration to take effect
from the date of his dismissal from service."
In the face of these facts the American edition of
General de Trobriand's book appears without revision
and with the injunction to the translator " to leave in-
tact" the author's "judgments upon men and things."
Of the defenders of Fort Sumter, the author says :
" They had done their duty nothing more. Left to
themselves, in a hopeless position, they had undergone
a bombardment of two days, which injured only the
walls, though they wished it to be well-understood
that they yielded to force only ; after which they had
packed their baggage and surrendered the- place.
With the best will in tlae world, it seemed impossible
to find anything heroic in it. And yet, to see the
ovations given to them, to read the dithyrambs com-
posed in their honor, it would appear that Anderson
and his eighty men had rendered for America, at Fort
Sumter, what in ancient times Leonidas and his three
hundred had done for Greece at Thermopylae." This
is rather a narrow view of Anderson's part. The
450
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
strictly military defence of Fort Sumter was but a
small part of his difficult service. Never in the history
of this country has a public officer been placed and
held by his Government in such a responsible and dif-
ficult position. With the end of an old administra-
tion and the beginning of a new one, with revolution
and civil war fomenting, and neither administration
knowing whether to rely upon conciliation or coercion,
whether to pocket insults or resent them, whether to
apologize or fight, Anderson, besieged by armed
enemies for nearly five months, was furnished with no
other instructions than equivocal ones, which at best
fixed upon him the responsibility of submitting to
humiliation and starvation in the cause of peace and
good citizenship, or of precipitating civil war by re-
sponding to the dictates of military duty and true
soldiership.
It was not the military defence of Sumter, but his
bearing under the trying circumstances that made
Anderson's conduct heroic.
Speaking of General Scott, the author says (p. 49),
" Enfeebled morally and physically by years, the old
candidate for the Presidency saw but one issue to the
strife already entered on, the division of the Union
into four confederations."
This is entirely wrong. General Scott was never
enfeebled " morally," and never thought the one issue
of the strife would be the division of the Union into
four confederations.
McClellan's part in the War invites adverse criti-
cism, but the author seems too severe upon him. Cer-
tainly he is entitled to all that the developments of the
DE TKOBRIAND'S "AKMY OF THE POTOMAC." 451
last twenty years have produced in his favor, as well
as to the softening influence of time. In their eulogis-
tic " Life of Lincoln," Nicolay and Hay describe M c-
Clellan at great length and with no partiality for him.
They have before them not only the official records,
and the military publications to date, but all the
papers of Mr. Lincoln. In conclusion they say in the
last number of the Century Magazine (Feb., 1889) :
" Thus ended the military career of George Brinton
McClellan. Now, that the fierce passions of the War,
its suspicions and its animosities, have passed away,
we are able to judge him more accurately and more
justly than was possible amid that moral and material
tumult and confusion. He was as far from being the
traitor and craven that many thought him as from
being the martyr and hero that others would like to
have him appear. It would be unfair to deny that he
rendered, to the full measure of his capacity, sincere
and honest service to the Republic. His technical
knowledge was extensive, his industry untiring; his
private character was pure and upright, his integrity
without stain. In the private life to which he retired
he carried with him the general respect and esteem
and the affection of a troop of friends ; and when by
their partiality he was afterwards called to the exer-
cise of important official functions, every office he
held he adorned with the highest civic virtues and ac-
complishments. No one now can doubt his patriotism
or his honor, and the fact that he was once doubted
illustrates merely the part which the blackest suspi-
cions play in a great civil war, and the stress to which
the public mind was driven in the effort to account
452 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
for the lack of results he gave the country in return
for the vast resources which were so lavishly placed
in his hands."
There are, of course, errors and omissions in the
book, some of which may be noted. In his able
chapter upon the causes of the War, the author, de-
scribing the growth of the anti-slavery feeling in the
North, says: "In 1848 ex-President Van Buren was
the anti-slavery candidate. This fact alone is enough
to show the great progress in public opinion during
the administration of President Polk. General Taylor
was elected, it is true, but the large number of votes
cast for Mr. Van Buren gave the party he represented
an importance, which, increasing from day to day,
already presaged the part it would play in the near
future."
This way of presenting a historical matter is mis-
leading. The reader, especially a foreign reader,
might well infer from the foregoing account tljat the
Presidential contest in 1848 was between Taylor and
Van Buren. The fact is, however, that the contest
was between Taylor, the candidate of the Whig party,
and Cass, the candidate of the Democratic party. The
entire electoral vote was divided between them. Van
Buren, the candidate of the so-called free-soil party,
did not receive one electoral vote and polled only
about two hundred and ninety thousand of the popular
vote.
Speaking of the assumption of the Presidential
functions by Mr. Lincoln, the author says (p. 51) :
"Mr. Lincoln surrounded himself immediately with
men devoted to the Union cause, and resolved to give
DE TROBRIAND'S u ARMY OF THE POTOMAC." 453
force to the will of the people. They were : Mr.
Seward, of New York, . . . for Secretary of
State; Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, Secretary of the
Treasury ; Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, Secretary
of War ; Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, Secretary of
the Navy ; Caleb D. Smith, Secretary of the Interior."
Two very active and important functionaries are
omitted, namely : Bates, the Attorney-General, and
Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster-General. Blair was
a graduate of the Military Academy in the same class
as Meade, and busied himself with military affairs in
Lincoln's cabinet.
It would seem that there ought not to be any reason
for mistakes about the date of the first Bull Run, yet
one occurs in this book, due no doubt to misprint.
We are told (p. 72), " The officers (of the author's regi-
ment), were called together to choose a Colonel on the
21st of July, the evening before the battle of Bull Run.
I was elected. On the 23d, the morning of the battle,.
a telegraphic dispatch announced to me that my regi-
ment was accepted, etc."
The translator appears to have given accurately the
meaning of the author, and to have preserved faithfully
the force of the French idioms. Some parts .of the
translation are perhaps too literal. Page 48 affords
an example : " Anderson and his little faithful troop
were left, abandoned to their fate, and, under the
effect of such an insult to the national flag, Mr. Bu-
chanan humiliated himself to promise to send no more-
men nor munitions of war nor provisions to that hand-
ful of brave men who had displayed and defended the
flag of the United States in face of the rebels of South
454 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Carolina." If one happened to turn from contempla-
tion of the excellent portrait of the author, which
forms the frontispiece, to page 48 of the text, he could
hardly read that page without a French accent.
ARTICLE XL
Pittenger's a Capturing a Locomotive."
On the 7th of April, 1862, General O. M. Mitchel,
U. S. Volunteers, commanding in Middle Tennessee,
organized a party of twenty- four men to steal into the
enemy's lines, assemble at Marietta, Gra., capture a
locomotive and run north, destroying en route the
bridges and telegraph between the place of capture
and Chattanooga. The expedition was suggested and
conducted by J. J. Andrews, a spy. The soldiers
volunteered for the service, and were told the nature
and purpose of it. They were armed only with revol-
vers, exchanged their uniforms for citizen's dress, and
deceived the enemy's troops and people. Twenty-
two of the party assembled at Marietta on Friday
evening, April 11, took passage on the north-bound
train about daylight next morning, and when the
train stopped for breakfast at a station called Big
Shanty, they quietly uncoupled the locomotive and
three box cars and started at full speed up the track.
Pursuit was made as soon as possible. The adven-
turers met with unexpected difficulties and delays, and
after running about a hundred miles were compelled
to abandon the train and scatter in the woods. The
surrounding country was aroused. The fugitives
were hunted down and all were captured and thrown
into loathsome prisons. After some months Andrews
* Journal of Military Service Institution.
455
456 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
the leader and seven others were tried by court-mar-
tial and hanged, and eight made their escape. The
remaining six were exchanged in the following March.
The absorbing story of this unparalleled enterprise
is told in detail by the Reverend William Pittenger,
one of the survivors, in a volume entitled " Capturing
a Locomotive," recently published by J. B. Lippincott
&Co.
No romance contains more of danger, pluck, resolu-
tion, endurance, suffering, gloom and hope than this
truthful account of an actual occurrence in our War
of Rebellion. It does not detract from the interest of
the story that the author is not fully informed as to
the origin of the enterprise, and is not strictly correct
as to its purposes and their importance. The adven-
ture he describes w T as the second that was planned,
both of which he erroneously assumes were inaugu-
rated under the authority of General Mitchel for the
purpose of enabling or facilitating the capture of
Chattanooga by that officer. The facts are about as
follows : The rebel line, extending in the winter of
1861-62 from Columbus, on the Mississippi River, to
Bowling Green, Kentucky, was broken in the centre
by the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the
enemy was forced to fall back. The main body from
Bowling Green retired via Nashville through Middle
Tennessee to the south of the Tennessee River. Gen-
eral Halleck, adhering to his interior line, moved his
troops up the Tennessee River in March, with a view
to breaking the new line the enemy had established,
or was about to establish, along the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad. Buell 7 who with the army of
PITTENGEK'S " CAPTURING A LOCOMOTIVE.'
457
the Ohio had seized Nashville in the latter part of
February, 1862, and was about marching westward to
join Grant at Savanna on the Tennessee, was not un-
mindful of the advantage of breaking west of Chatta-
nooga the railroad which led the rebel forces from the
east and south to his flank, and also directly connected
them with Corinth against which Halleck was moving.
The spy Andrews, who was in Buell's service, repre-
sented early in March, 1862, that, with a party of six
trusty men, he could destroy the railroad bridges be-
tween Chattanooga and Bridgeport, and also the im-
portant bridge over the Tennessee at the latter place,
and thus effectually prevent the enemy from using
that route either to re-enforce Corinth or retnrn to
Middle Tennessee. Buell had received but little bene-
fit from Andrews's services, and did not encourage the
proposition, but, in consequence mainly of the confi-
dence and urgency of the spy, he finally directed his
Chief-of-Staff, Colonel James B. Fry, to confer fully
with Andrews and use his discretion as to authorizing
and organizing the enterprise. The Chief-of-Staff, on
the strength of Andrews's assurance that an engineer
running a regular train over the road was in our in-
terest, and would use his locomotive for the purpose,
sanctioned and arranged the undertaking. General
Mitchel was directed to furnish six men if volunteers
for the service could be found. That is all General
Mitchel had to do with the original enterprise.* It
* SARATOGA, August 5, 1863.
To GENERAL L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington City, D. C.
SIR : In the " Official Gazette " of the 21st ultimo, I see a report
of Judge Advocate-General Holt, dated the 27th of March, relative to
458 MILITAEY MISCELLANIES.
appears from Mr. Pittenger's book that the party as-
sembled at Atlanta, but failing to find the engineer
on whose co-operation the enterprise was based gave
it up, and all the men made their way safely back
to our lines. This terminated the effort to destroy
bridges west of Chattanooga by capturing a locomo-
tive. In relation to the merits of this scheme, it may
be said that, at the time, perhaps the object was of
sufficient importance to cover the probabilities of fail-
ure and the risk to the men engaged, but at best the
undertaking was hardly commendable. Buell, basing
no plans on the success of it, marched with the main
body of his army for the field of Shiloh without
knowing the result. When Andrews returned early
in April, he found General Mitchel in command near
" an expedition set on foot in April, 1862, under the authority and
direction," as the report says, "of General O. M. Mitchel, the object
of which was to destroy the communication on the Georgia State Rail-
road between Atlanta and Chattanooga." The expedition was " set on
foot" under my authority; the plan was arranged between Mr. An-
drews, whom I had had in employment from shortly after assuming
command in Kentucky, and my Chief-of -Staff, Colonel James B. Fry ;
and General Mitchel had nothing to do either with its conception or
execution, except to furnish from his command the soldiers who took
part in it. He was directed to furnish six ; instead of that he sent
twenty -two. Had he conformed to the instructions given him it would
have been better ; the chances of success would have been greater, and
in any event several lives would have been saved. The report speaks
of the plan as an emanation of genius ; and of the results which it
promised as "absolutely sublime." It may be proper therefore to
say, that this statement is made for the sake of truth, and not to call
attention to the extravagant colors in which it has been presented.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
[Signed.] D. C. BUELL, Major-General.
[NOTE. General Buell knew only of the first expedition the one
he authorized. The second, sent by Mitchel, without Buell's authority,
was never reported.]
PITTENGER'S < ; CAPTURING A LOCOMOTIVE." 459
Nashville, and reported to him in Buell's absence.
Mitchel, with no enemy to oppose him, was advanc-
ing through Middle Tennessee, and occupied Hunts-
ville on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad on
Friday, April 11. The author says Mitchel's purpose
was to capture Chattanooga. Appropriating the idea of
bridge- burn ing, Mitchel on the 7th of April the last
day of the battle of Shiloh started a party of twenty-
four men under Andrews to capture a locomotive and
destroy bridges south of Chattanooga, between that
place and Marietta. No exception can fairly be taken
to the author's graphic account of the failure of that
effort, but he and the Judge Advocate-General of the
Army and the Southern newspapers appear to have
attached undue importance to the object of it. The
destruction of* bridges between Marietta and Chatta-
nooga would not have enabled General Mitchel to
take the latter place. If his instructions or the mili-
tary conditions had justified him in an attempt to
capture Chattanooga which they did not the pres-
ervation of the bridge over the Tennessee would have
been important to his success. The enemy had only to
burn that structure, as they did when Mitchel's troops
approached it April 29, in order to check an advance
on Chattanooga. Furthermore, if Mitchel's party had
succeeded in burning bridges between Marietta and
Chattanooga, that would not have prevented the re-
enforcement of the latter place, as the regular railroad
route through East 'Tennessee was open and in the
enemy's possession, and it was from the east, and not
from the south, where there were but fe\v if any
available troops until Corinth was evacuated, that the
460 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
place was most likely to be re-enforced. Mitchel's
bridge-burners, therefore, took desperate chances to
accomplish objects of no substantial advantage. Judge
Advocate-General Holt probably had not examined
carefully into the military aspects of the subject when
he reported of this enterprise in 1863, " in the gigantic
and overwhelming results it sought and was likely to
accomplish, it was absolutely sublime." General
Mitchel made no such claim. In fact, seeing as he
no doubt finally did, the. insufficiency of the object,
and the completeness of the failure and its deplorable
consequences, he never made any report whatever of
the operation.
It is not strange that when the men engaged in this
affair were captured, they endeavored to have the ene-
my treat them as prisoners of war, but it is rather
remarkable that the author at this late day claims that
their only offence " was that of accepting a dangerous
service proposed by their own officers," and complains
that the rebels treated them as spies. They were
soldiers who stripped off their uniforms and went into
the enemy's lines to war against Mm in disguise. The
author maintains that, as they did not " lurk " about
the enemy's camps for the purpose of getting informa-
tion they were not spies. That plea is technical and
feeble ; nor is the argument that the rebel partisans
and guerillas came in citizen's dress within our lines
of any material weight in this connection. We are
convicted on these points out of our own mouths.
Our authorities say " a spy is punishable with death."
" A person proved to be a regular soldier of the ene-
my's army, found in citizen's dress within the lines of
PITTENGER'S "CAPTURING A LOCOMOTIVE." 461
the captor, is universally dealt with as a spy."
"Armed prowlers by whatever names they may be
called, who steal within the lines of the hostile army
for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying
bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying
the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not en-
titled to the privileges of the prisoner of war." Mr.
Pittenger has given us the most thrilling story of the
Rebellion, but his heroes, brilliant and daring, were, by
the rules of war, marauders and spies, who knowingly
and voluntarily bet their lives on a desperate game
and lost. Only eight of the twenty -four were exe-
cuted. Instead of blaming the winner for taking one-
third of the stakes, the author should have thanked
him for not enforcing his right to the other two-thirds.
AKTICLE XII.
Keyes's " Fifty Years' Observation of
Men and Events."*
This is one of the most entertaining books of the
period. The author's characteristics, so well known
to the old Army, speak f 1*0111 every page. He never
fail's to be earnest and forcible. If his opinions are
not always sound, they are openly and honestly enter-
tained. His observations of men and events of his
time are perhaps the more entertaining from the fact
that while his convictions are strong and sincere, his
work is notional rather than logical spicy, not prosy.
The apothegms in his book will please the cynic more
than his military criticisms will instruct the soldier.
The flavor of the former may be found in the follow-
ing quotations : " The antics of military and political
jealousy, like the follies of love, are beyond the scope
of prose." "Religion, surgery, chemistry, and engi-
neering are prosperous ; and if a man is more to be
pitied when he falls into the clutches of the law, and
his property is converted by sharpers, he is safer when
* " Fifty Years' Observation of Men and Events, Civil and Military."
By E. D. Keyes, Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. Army ; Late Major-
General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding the Fourth Corps. Charles
Scribner's Sons. New York, 1884.
Journal of Military Service Institution.
462
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 463
he trusts himself with a doctor." "The directors and
stockholders of railroads (in early times) constituted
the meekest and most sorrowful class of our citizens.
They were palid, meagre, and supplicating men ; but
now they are a distinct class, to which all the world
makes obeisance, and they have become ruddy, surfeit-
swelled, and dictatorial." "The most surprising of
all legal contests originate in the vagaries of true or
simulated love." "The practice of law hardens most
men, and renders them insensible to the torments
of litigation." " The abuses of no human organiza-
tion can ever be corrected by those who profit by
them."
As an example of General Keyes's military criticism,
the following is cited (p. 216): "The operations of
the Army of the Tennessee under its new leader were
full of vigor, and in the month of May, 1863, General
Grant crossed the Mississippi below Vicksburg, placed
himself between Pemberton, who commanded in that
city, and Joseph E. Johnston, who was at the head of
an army in the interior. From the moment I became
acquainted with the nature of that movement, I have
considered Grant as one of the great captains of
history. The story of nearly every one of them em-
braces a similar history. Alexander of Macedon
crossed the Indus to capture old Porus. Scipio went
over the Mediterranean to fight and vanquish Han-
nibal. Caesar, already as great as any man in the
world, crossed the Rubicon, and became the greatest.
Tamerlane passed the sea on the ice to die of fatigue.
Turenne crossed the Rhine to drive back Monticuculi,
and to be killed. Napoleon fought his way over the
464 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Adige to enter the temple of fame, and at a later
date, when success had turned his head, he ventured
to the northern side of the Boristhenese to see the
lustre of his star pale in the smoke of burning Mos-
cow."
From this commingling of rivers, seas, mountains,
generals, victories, defeats, and death, Grant's greatness
is deduced, without counting the campaign of kisses
Leaiider won by swimming the Hellespont. The mili-
tary merit of Grant's Vicksburg campaign, when he
decided to run the batteries, and pass the city, is
beyond dispute. He crossed the dividing waters to
get at the enemy, and so did the other great leaders
mentioned by General Keyes, but the use of that
coincidence as proof in itself of Grant's generalship
is something quite new.
With all its amiability and frankness, this book
shows some aversions, and Halleck appears to be one
of them. The author says, speaking of the firm of
Halleck, Peachy & Billings, in early times in San
Francisco (p. 301) : " Halleck was thrifty and perse-
vering, but his distinctive characteristics were obduracy
and laboriousness. I was less intimate with him than
with the other two, for he was more inclined to be rny
enemy than my friend." This perhaps accounts for a
disposition which appears in the book to misjudge
Halleck. Speaking of Thomas (p. 168) the author
says : " Not long before the battle of Nashville,
which gave permanence to his renown, he was accused
of dilatoriness and inefficiency. The disadvantageous
reports were credited, arid General-in-Chief of the
Army Halleck issued an order and had it printed, re-
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 465
lieving Thomas, and directing General Schofield to
assume command of his army. For some reason un-
known to me, the order was not sent," etc. The
proposition above mentioned, to supersede Thomas,
has been under public and private discussion ever
since the close of the War. General Keyes's errors
concerning it are unaccountable. When the battle
of Nashville was fought, December 15-16, 1864,
Lieutenant-General Grant was General-in-Chief, hav-
ing (under the act of March, 1864), superseded Hal-
leek in that duty nine months previously. Major-
General Ilalleck held then, and for the preceding
nine months had held, only the nominal position of
Chief- of Staff.
The further facts in the case are as follows :
On the 2d of December Stan toil telegraphed to
Grant : " The President feels solicitous about the
disposition of General Thomas to lay in fortifications
for an indefinite period, until Wilson gets equipments.
This looks like the McClellan and Kosecrans strategy,
to do nothing and let the rebels ride the country. The
President wishes you to consider the matter." This
telegram was followed on the 7th of December by
another from Stanton to Grant, saying : " General
Thomas seems unwilling to attack because it is
hazardous, as if all war was anything but hazardous.
If he waits for Wilson to get ready Gabriel will be
blowing his last horn." To this Grant replied on the
same day : " You probably saw my order to Thomas
to attack. If he does not do it promptly, I would
recommend superseding him by Schofield, leaving
Thomas subordinate." The next day (the 8th) Grant
466
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
telegraphed Halleck : " If Thomas has not struck yet,
he ought to be ordered to hand over his command.
There is no better man to repel an attack than Thomas,
but I fear he is too cautious to ever take the initiative,"
to which Halleck, at nine that evening, replied : " If
you wish General Thomas relieved from command,
give the order. No one here will, I think, interfere.
The responsibility, however, will be yours, as no one
here, so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas's
removal." To this Grant replied immediately (10 P.M.
December 8) : " Your dispatch of 9 P.M. just received.
I want General Thomas reminded of the importance
of immediate action. I sent him a dispatch this
evening which will probably urge him on. I would
not say relieve him till I hear further from him." On
the morning of the 9th of December Halleck tele-
graphed Thomas: "General Grant expresses much
dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy.
If you wait until General Wilson mounts all his cavalry
you will wait until Doomsday, for the waste equals
the supply. Moreover, you will soon be in the same
condition that Rosecrans was last year, with so many
animals that you cannot feed them. Reports already-
come in of a scarcity of forage." On the morning of
December 9, Grant telegraphed Halleck : " Dispatch
of 8 P.M. last night from Nashville shows the enemy
scattered for more than seventy miles down the river,
and no attack yet made by Thomas. Please telegraph
order relieving him at once and placing Schofield in
command. Thomas should be directed to turn over
all orders and dispatches received since the battle of
Franklin to Schofield."
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 467
In pursuance of these instructions, Ilalleck bad an
order drawn up in terms as follows :
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
GENERAL ORDERS | WASHINGTON, D. C.,Dec. 9, 1864.
No. j
In accordance with the following dispatch from
Lieutenant-General Grant, viz. : u Please telegraph
order relieving him (General Thomas) at once and
placing Schofield in command. Thomas should be
directed to turn over all dispatches received since the
battle of Franklin to Schofield.
" U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant- General"
THE PRESIDENT ORDERS,
I. That Major-General Schofield assume command
of all troops in the Department of the Cumberland,
the Ohio, and the Tennessee.
II. That Major-General George H. Thomas report
to General Schofield for duty, and turn over to him
all orders and dispatches received by him as specified
above.
By order of the SECRETARY OF WAR.
OFFICIAL: J. C. KELTON, A. A.-G.
Halleck, however, did not promulgate the order.
While he was holding it upon his sole responsibility,
he, at 3.20 P.M., December 9, received the following
telegram from Thomas, sent at 2.15 P.M. same day:
"Your telegram of 10.30 A.M., to-day received. I re-
gret General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my
delay in attacking the enemy. I feel conscious that I
have done everything in my power t0 prepare, and
468
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
that troops could not have been got ready before this,
and if he should order me to be relieved I will sub-
mit without a murmur. A terrible storm, freezing
rain, has come on since daylight, which will render an
attack impossible until it breaks."
Halleck instantly at 4.10 P.M. same day tele-
graphed Grant as follows : " Orders relieving General
Thomas had been made out when his telegram of this
P.M. was received. If you still wish these orders tele-
graphed to Nashville they will be forwarded." To
which Grant replied at 5.30 P.M. on the same day :
"General Thomas has been urged in every way possible
to attack the enemy, even to giving the precise order.
He did say he thought he would be able to attack on
the 7th, but did not do so, nor has he given a reason
for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice
to an officer who has done so much good service as
Thomas has, however. You will therefore suspend
the order relieving him until it is seen whether he
will do any thing."
It thus appears that Stan ton's impatience with
Thomas was brought to bear upon Grant as early as
December 2, and that Grant shared it very soon after,
if not at the time ; that the President's order supersed-
ing Thomas by Schofield was made in pursuance of
Grant's advice, and that it was drawn up by Halleck
as Chief-of-Staff ; that instead of promulgating it
instantly and relieving Thomas by telegraph, as
Grant directed on the morning of the 9th, Halleck
held the order on his own responsibility, and at 4.10
in the afternoon asked Grant by telegraph whether he
still wished the order concerning Thomas and Scho-
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 469
field telegraphed to Nashville. It was in response to
this that Grant suspended the order. Clearly Hal-
leek's action was in Thomas's interest, and comment
upon the injustice done Halleck by General Keyes is
unnecessary.
But notwithstanding the foregoing order was sus-
pended on the 9th, Thomas had not attacked by the
13th, and on that day Grant took the matter of super-
seding him into his own hands and made the follow-
ing order from the field :
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
SPECIAL ORDERS | CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 13, 1864.
No. 149. j
I. Major-General John A. Logan, U. S. Volunteers,
will proceed immediately to Nashville, Tenn., report-
ing by telegraph, to the Lieutenant-General Command-
ing, his arrival at Louisville, Ky., and also his arrival
at Nashville. . . .
By command of LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT,
T. L. BOWERS, A. A.-G.
Though not expressed in the foregoing order
Grant's intention was to supersede Thomas by Logan
and go to Nashville himself to supervise operations.
But before Logan arrived at Nashville on the 17th,
Thomas had fought the battle of Nashville, December
1516, and gained his crowning victory. Logan tele-
graphed Grant from Louisville at 10 A.M., December
17: "I've just arrived, weather bad, raining since
yesterday morning. People here jubilant over Thom-
as's success ; confidence seems to be restored. I will
remain here to hear from you. All things going light
470 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
It would seem best that I return soon to join my com-
mand with Sherman." On the 19th of December
Grant telegraphed Logan, who was still at Louisville :
" The news from Thomas so far is in the highest de-
gree gratifying. You need not go farther. Before
starting to join Sherman report in Washington."
That was the end of the two moves to supersede
Thomas.
On the 14th of February, 1884, Grant addressed to
Logan a letter in explanation of the purpose and
scope of the orders given to Logan, making it clear
that Grant was dissatisfied with the slowness of Gen-
eral Thomas's " moving, " and on that account sent
Logan " out with orders to relieve him " ; though he
did not intend Logan's orders to settle any question
which might arise between Logan and Schofield as to
the general command of the combined armies of the
Cumberland and Ohio.
The author (p. 214), in speaking of Fort Donelson,
1862, says: "General H. W. Halleck was a man of
talent and a patriot, but often a slave to prejudice.
He knew nothing about Grant's character, and he
wished to know nothing good. . . . General Hal-
leck accused him of neglect, superseded him in his
command by General C. F. Smith, and finally, upon
some pretence, placed Grant in arrest." This is unjust
to Halleck. The records show that early in March,
1862, Halleck subjected Grant to some unmerited cen-
sure, for occurrences subsequent to the capture of Fort
Donelson (February 16, 1862), and that in reports to
Washington he alleged that Grant left his command
and went to Nashville without authority ; that he failed
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 47 1
to make reports and returns, and that his army was
badly demoralized. In response to Halleck's report
concerning Grant, McClellan, then at the head of the
Army, telegraphed Halleck (March 3): u Do not hesi-
tate to arrest him at once if the good of the service
requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command. You
are at liberty to regard this as a positive order,
if it will smooth your way." On the next day
(March 4) Halleck replied to McClellan : " I do not
deem it advisable to arrest him at present, but have
placed General Smith in command of the expedition
up the Tennessee." On the 10th of March the Presi-
dent, through the Adjutant-General, called upon Hal-
leck for an official statement concerning the reports
against Grant ; and Halleck stated in response (March
15) : " General Grant and several officers of high rank
in his command immediately after the battle of Fort
Donelson went to Nashville without my authority or
knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investiga-
tion that General Grant did this from good intentions
and from a desire to subserve the public interests.
During the absence of General Grant and part of his
general officers numerous irregularities are said to have
occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation
of the orders issued by General Grant before his de-
parture, and probably under the circumstances were
unavoidable. General Grant has made proper explan-
ations, and has been directed to resume command in
the field. As he acted from a praiseworthy, although
mistaken zeal for the public service in going to Nash-
ville and leaving his command, I respectfully recom-
mend that no further notice be taken of it. There
472 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
never has been any want of military subordination on
the part of General Grant, and his failure to make re-
turns of his force has been explained as resulting
partly from the failure of Colonels of regiments to re-
port to him on their arrival, and partly from an inter-
ruption of telegraphic communication. All these
irregularities have now been remedied." The fore-
going documents give all the essential facts in the
case afforded by the official records. They fail to
show that Halleck " placed Grant in arrest." They
show, on the contrary, that under specific authority
from the General-in-Chief to place Grant in arrest Hal-
leck declined to do so ; that he put General C. F. Smith
in immediate command of an expedition up the Ten-
nessee River, leaving Grant on duty at Fort Henry. As
soon, however, as Halleck received explanations of
what he had supposed to be irregularities, he sent
Grant forward to his command, and in a formal letter
to the Adjutant-General of the Army explained away
what had been reported against him.
Another criticism is in relation to Halleck's opera-
tions against Corinth. The author says : " Halleck
continued to fortify against a retreating enemy, gained
nothing, so far as I have discovered, but disadvantages,
until the month of July, and being convinced that to
command an army in the field was not his vocation,
he recommended Colonel Robert Allen as his successor,
and departed for Washington to assume command of
the whole Army, vice General George B. McClel-
lan. Allen declined the command and Grant was re-
stored to it."
This novel bit of military history and criticism is
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 473
full of errors. Halleck's operations as commander in
the field, from April to July, 1862, were not brilliant,
but it cannot correctly be said that he gained nothing
but disadvantages, and it is far from correct to say he
became convinced that command in the field was not
his vocation. He is the best witness as to what he
became convinced of concerning his fitness to command
in the field ; and on that point he said in a telegram
to Buell, July 15: "I am ordered to Washington and
shall leave day after to-morrow. Very sorry J for I
can be of more use here thaji there." He left the field
for Washington with reluctance, in compliance with
the President's positive order of July 11, and a tele-
gram of the 14th, saying " I am very anxious, almost
impatient, to have you here." General Keyes says
Halleck recommended " Colonel Robert Allen as his
successor and departed for Washington," and that
"Allen declined the command." The meaning of this
must be not simply that Halleck recommended Allen,
but that the command was offered, otherwise it could
not have been " declined."
In Badeau's " Life of Grant " (vol. i., p. 108, note)
there is a letter from Allen written July 9, 1866, more
than four years after the event, in which Allen -says :
" I had joined General Halleck a short time subsequent
to the fall of Corinth, and was attached to his imme-
diate command when he received his appointment of
General-in-Chief, with orders to repair at once to
Washington. Shortly after he came to my tent.
After a somewhat protracted conversation he turned
to me and said, i Now what can I do for you ? ' I re-
plied that I did not know that he could do anything.
474
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
1 Yes,' he rejoined, ' I can give you command of this
army.' I replied * I have not rank.' ' That,' said he,
1 can easily be obtained.' I do not remember exactly
what my reply was to this, but it was to the effect
that I doubted the expediency of such a measure.
. . . He did not press the subject." The word of
General Robert Allen is not to be questioned, but
even if his recollection is correct, it is probable that
undue weight has been attached to what occurred.
He and Halleck were warm friends. Whatever Hal-
leek said on the occasion, probably, was "gush," aris-
ing from good-fellowship and the exuberance of spirits
so common around the camp-fires of successful armies.
Allen, it will be observed, did not say that he " de-
clined " the command, but only that he " doubted the
expediency of such a measure," and Halleck "did not
press the subject."
There is nothing in the official records to prove or
indicate that the command was offered to Allen, or
that Allen was recommended for it, or that Halleck
had any other purpose than to turn the command over
to Grant, the next in rank. Halleck had no power to
make Allen his successor, nor was there any custom
of war or statute by which the President even could
have given the command to Allen, who was only a
Major in the Quartermaster's Department, and an ad-
ditional Aide-de-Camp with the rank of Colonel. Grant,
who was on duty in that field, was a Major-General.
The resolution of April 4, 1862, then in force, said:
"Whenever military operations may require the pres-
ence of two or more officers of the same grade in the
same field or department, the President may assign
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 475
the command of the forces in such field or department
without regard to seniority of rank " ; but that did
not, and was never construed to, permit the President
to disregard grades, and assign a Colonel to the com-
mand of Major- Generals.
The official records show that on the llth of July,
1862, the President "ordered that Major-General
Henry W. Halleck be assigned to the command of the
whole land-forces of the United States, as General-in-
Chief, and that he repair to this capital as soon as he
can with safety to the position and operations within
the department under his charge." This order was
telegraphed to Halleck on the day it was issued, and
the Secretary of War added to it : " State when you
may be expected here. Your presence is required
by many circumstances." Immediately after receiving
the foregoing order, Halleck telegraphed to Grant,
who was at Memphis : " You will immediately repair
to this place, and report to these headquarters," and
July 11 he telegraphed the President: "Your orders
of this date are this moment received. General Grant,
next in command, is at Memphis. I have telegraphed
to him to immediately repair to this place. I will
start for Washington the moment I can have a per-
sonal interview with General Grant." On the 15th of
July, Halleck telegraphed the Secretaiy of War : " In
leaving this department, shall I relinquish the com-
mand to the next in rank, or will the President desig.
nate who will be the commander ? " and receiving no
reply he, on the 15th, answered as follows President
Lincoln's telegram urging him to hasten to Washing-
ton : " General Grant has just arrived from Memphis.
476
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Hope to finally arrange distribution of troops, and to
leave here Thursday morning, 17th." There is noth-
ing in the official records to indicate any other plan or
wish on Halleck's part than to turn over the command
to Grant, the next in rank. In fact, in the absence of
other evidence, the foregoing telegrams disprove Gen-
eral Keyes's assertion that Halleck recommended
" Colonel Allen as his successor," and that "Allen de-
clined the command."
Allen wrote August 6, 1862, from St. Louis to Gen-
eral Halleck in Washington : " A delegation goes from
this city to Washington to-day to solicit the appoint-
ment of a Military Governor for this State. This is
an office I think I could fill, and since I am one of the
supernumerary brigadiers (now no brigadier at all), I
would accept this office, and give my whole ability to
it. I am willing, however, to abide your judgment,
and serve you where I may be most useful. Two of
the four delegates are, I know, in favor of me." But
Halleck declined to recommend Allen for the compar-
atively unimportant position of Military Governor of
Missouri, though invited to do so by the foregoing
letter, written but a few days after Halleck is said by
the author to have recommended Allen as his successor
in command of all the West, of which Missouri was a
part.
Notwithstanding his admiration for Grant, the
author, in some instances, does not do that great cap-
tain justice. He says (p. 214), in relation to a dispute
between Halleck and Grant concerning reports and
returns after the capture of Fort Donelson : " It is
possible that Grant's stupendous success may have
REYES'S ' ' OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 477
over-excited him, and caused him to omit making cus-
tomary reports to headquarters." It has already been
shown that this was all explained. Grant did make,
as far as practicable, the reports and returns he was at
the moment censured for not making, but through the
confusion of war Halleck did not receive them. Grant
was well poised, and even his wonderful success never
disturbed his equilibrium. Again the author says of
Grant: "Lest his adversary should infer he was in-
fluenced by fear, he assailed the almost impregnable
position of CoM Harbor, at a cost of 7,000 men at
least, while he inflicted but trifling loss on the Con-
federates." Grant gave the enemy no chance to think
he was afraid to fight, and certainly never made an
attack to remove an opinion which the enemy could
not entertain.
General Keyes, like some other distinguished sol-
diers of the Rebellion, makes a fling at the officers of
our Engineer Corps. He says : " At the beginning
of the War the engineers were everywhere in the
direction. The engineers are worthy of all respect
for their talents, integrity, and devotion to duty, but
they appeared always to overlook and disregard the
necessity of service with troops of the line, as a prep-
aration for command in the field. At West Point I
had McClellan under instruction. I knew how proud
he was of being in the Engineer Corps." McClellan
served with troops in the principal battles of the
Mexican War, and proud as he may have been of
being in the Engineer Corps, he promptly gave up his
first lieutenancy in that corps for a captaincy of
cavalry in 1855. In choosing officers of the Regular
478
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Army for command during the Rebellion, the Govern-
ment gave no preference to corps, and General Keyes's
assertion that at the beginning of the War the engi-
neers were everywhere in the direction, will not bear
examination. Anderson, of the artillery, commanded
during the attack upon Fort Sumter, April 12-13 ;
Lyon, of the infantry, was in command at Camp Jack-
sou, Mo., May 10; Benjamin F. Butler, of the volun-
teers, was in the direction at Fort Monroe, Virginia,
when the battle of Great Bethel was fought on June
10 ; Patterson, of the volunteers, was in the direction
on the Upper Potomac, June and July ; and McDowell
was in the direction in front of Washington during
the same time. The army which made the first Bull
Run campaign, July, 1861, was commanded by
McDowell. His division commanders were Tyler,
Hunter, Heintzelnian, Runyon, and Miles not one of
them was ever in the Engineer Corps. McClellan's
Army of the Potomac, as organized for its first cam-
paign, 1862, contained five corps. McDowell com-
manded the 1st, Sumner the 2d, Heintzelnian the 3d,
Keyes the 4th, Banks the 5th, and Marcy was Chief-
of-Staff. There was not an engineer officer among
them, unless McClellan, who had ceased to be a Lieu-
tenant of engineers to become a Captain of cavalry,
can be called one.
The truth is, General Keyes himself, an artillery
officer, was the earliest in direction, and possessed the
most ample authority. He and Meigs of the engineers,
without the knowledge of General Scott, and behind
" the ambush of original power," as hereafter explained,
prepared plans for the defence of Fort Pickens ;
KEYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 479
whereupon the President issued the following compre-
hensive and extraordinary document :
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 3, 161.
" LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E. D. KEYES, United States
Army, Military Secretary :
u You will proceed forthwith to the city of New
York, to carry out the instructions which you have
received here. All requisitions made upon officers of
the staff by your authority, and all orders given by
you to any officer of the Army in my name, will be
instantly obeyed.
[Signed] "ABRAHAM LINCOLN."
Although engineer officers were not in the direction
at the beginning, it must be admitted that by the
time the War closed, the Engineer Corps, in propor-
tion to other arms of Service, had furnished at least
its full quota of high commanders ; among them may
be mentioned Meade, Pope, Humphreys, Tower,
Wright, Newton, Whipple, Franklin, W. F. Smith,
Foster, Parke, McPherson, Gillmore, Warren, and
Weitzel.
To estimate at its true value what General Keyes
says of General Scott, the reader should begin at the
end of the book. He will there find the feeling under
which the author has recalled and presented the inci-
dents of an association and friendship of nearly thirty
years with his old chief. In 1833, only sixteen
months after Keyes had graduated, General Scott took
this young Lieutenant on his staff, kept him till 1838,
when he was appointed Assistant Adjutant-General,
with rank of Captain, and went to duty elsewhere. But
480
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
he remained away only a few months. By December 1
he was back again. How glad he was to return he
shows by saying : " I sacrificed actual rank to gratify
iny desire to enjoy New York and Washington, and
to be for a limited time longer with my old com-
mander." He then remained on Scott's staff two
years, till promoted to a captaincy in his regiment.
By January 1, 1860, he for the third time joined
General Scott's staff, and continued upon it till the
General discharged him April 19, 1861. General
Keyes says that the " irritation " against his chief
caused by this discharge " continued for several years,
but it gradually subsided and was finally extin-
guished." His book does not sustain his conclusion.
In depicting General Scott the author has, unconsci-
ously perhaps, woven through his work from begin-
ning to end a notion, which is finally used instead of
the real cause, to account for his dismissal from the
staff. The error referred to is that while General
Scott was a sound Union man, his sentiments were so
intensely Southern that he could not deal justly with
Northern officers; that his treatment of them was
tyrannical, and General Keyes would have us believe
that he, the trusted friend and confidential staff-officer,
fell a victim to the prejudices of his chief. Is he not
mistaken as to the cause of his removal ? Amidst the
turmoil of the outbreak of the Rebellion, the General
in-Chief found that his confidential military secretary
had prepared and submitted to the Secretary of State
and President a plan for re-enforcing and holding Fort
Pickens, matters which belonged to General Scott's
province as General-in-Chief, and which he was attend-
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 481
ing to. The plan was accepted. Keyes was sent to
New York with authority, heretofore quoted, to use
the President's name in carrying it out. The fact that
General Scott was the ambitious, jealous, rigid, punc-
tilious soldier which General Keyes proves him to
have been, is enough in itself to account for his dis-
pleasure at the course pursued by his staff-officer. That
Keyes realized the character of his own course is
shown (pp. 381-2) where he says, in an interview with
the President and Secretary of State : " 1 1 am ready/
said I, i but I have not had time to see General Scott,
who is entirely ignorant of what I am doing ; as I am
his military secretary, he will be angry if I don't let
him know.' Notwithstanding I had been long subject
to obey military commands implicitly, a rebellious
thought arose in my mind when I received from Sec-
retary Seward such clean-cut orders. Nevertheless I
reflected that he could speak from the ambush of
original power, and concluded to obey him with alac-
rity." The book shows that while in New York under
the Secretary of State, General Keyes issued orders
not only in the name of the President, for which he
had authority, but in the name of General Scott, for
which lie had no authority. General Keyes's breach of
propriety, as he claims, was not so great as some offi-
cers of the time supposed it to be. But the fact is
well established that Keyes was dismissed from the
staff for the reason that General Scott believed his
confidential secretary had committed a grave military
impropriety, and there is no reason to think that in
reaching that conclusion General Scott was influenced
by hostility toward Northern officers. In fact, there
482
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
is no evidence that General Scott was ever unjust or
unfair to Northern officers. Cullum, who was ap-
pointed to Scott's staff just before Keyes left it, was
born in the North, had as strong Northern proclivities
as Keyes, and so had General Townsend, Scott's Ad-
jutant-General, and Colonel Schuyler Hamilton,
Keyes's successor, and Colonels Van Rensselear and
Wright, all Northern men, who remained on Scott's
staff until he retired. If General Scott had treated
Northern officers as represented, these honorable men
would not have remained upon his staff, nor would
General Keyes have voluntarily returned to it twice,
once at the sacrifice of rank, and spent a large part of
his military life upon it. But if General Scott had
entertained any prejudice at all against Northern men,
Keyes should have escaped the effects of it. Accord-
ing to his own account, he was a member of the South
Carolina slaveocracy in good standing. He says (p.
183): " Under the old regime, to such as enjoyed their
confidence, the hospitality of the South Carolinian
was supremely attractive. My initiation to it was due
to an event, the relation of which recalls a condition
of things now forever past. One day, when my wife
found it difficult to hire a cook, I went up to Charles-
ton and bought a female slave. As she stood upon a
block I bid her off. Then I went to a desk, and re-
ceived a bill of sale for one wench, aged twenty-three
years, price $350. I had already experienced the
pride of ownership in its various gradations, as the
proprietor of a dog, a horse, a bit of land ; but it was
only when I could call a human being my property,
that I enjoyed the self-importance of a capitalist. No
REYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 483
sooner was iny purchase known than I was admitted
to the society of Charleston, with a stamp of merit
above my value. I visited the plantations in winter,"
etc. With an intense, inborn Northernisrn, and a
hatred of the curse of slavery, so uncontrollable as to
arouse General Scott's hostility and tyranny, General
Keyes quite joyously bought and held the right to the
fetters and the lash. It is hardly credible that he sold
the right when the use of it ceased to be to his ad-
vantage, but on this point he says nothing. He
accepted and enjoyed the pecuniary and social benefits
of slavery. If General Scott entertained the overrul-
ing Southern sentiments attributed to him by General
Keyes, surely the Southern fellowship into which
Keyes was admitted by becoming a slave-holder would
have protected him from their direful effects. " War,"
the author says (p. 210), " was the only means to get
rid of the curse of slavery." Did his woman-slave re-
main in bondage till released by the Rebellion? Her
history is of more interest than that of General Scott's
negro Tom ; because Tom was free.
A word now for the white woman. The author
says (p. 20) : " General Scott was then so popular
that ... he was frequently beset by women' who
clustered around him like summer flies." If the ladies
had to be likened unto flies, so gallant a soldier as
General Keyes might have used butterflies instead of
summer flies for the comparison.
One of General Keyes's jokes is that old Colonel
Burke having signed the record as president of a
council of administration, returned after a brown
study and added an I to the word council. If the
484 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Colonel were alive be might have revenge by pointing
out that after having spelled correctly the name of his
Adjutant, Colonel (then Lieutenant) Lawrence Kip,
General Keyes returns to p. 271 of his book, and puts
the debasing extra p to that illustrious name. In fact
General Keyes or the printer's devil has played havoc
with names. Even the veteran General Harney in
this book loses his middle name in one instance, and
is simply William Harney. The distinguished Gen-
eral Birney, having lost his life, now loses an i, and is
metamorphosed into Barney. General D. McM. Gregg
becomes D. McGregg. Colonel Robert N. Scott, who
is known far and wide as engaged in the herculean
labor of compiling the records of the Rebellion, and
correcting and pre venting errors in war literature,
finds (p. 465) that his work is being done by Colonel
Thomas Scott. That is all bad enough, but not the
worst. Of the services rendered to the Military Acad-
emy by his friend, General G. W. Cullum (whop. 401,
is called Callam, as aid to Scott), the author speaks
in the highest terms, and justly so, for of all gradu-
ates not one has made more direct and valuable return
to his Alma Mater for her fostering care than General
Cullum ; and greater love for her than his hath no
man known. Imagine his feelings when he finds Gen-
eral Keyes saying of the Military Academy (p. 194):
" That institution accomplishes all that finite means
can perform in equal space of time to increase a
man's value in war and his integrity in peace, and
among those whose faithful and efficient devotion to
it entitles them to honor, I place the name of Gen-
eral George W. J/cCullum, second only to that of
KEYES'S " OBSERVATION OF MEN AND EVENTS." 485
Sylvanus Thayer." McCullum ! To that favor comes
the man who has performed the enormous task of
making a correct record of the name and services of
every graduate of the Military Academy.
But one more event can be noticed in this review.
Speaking of the successful and festive winding up of
Indian operations in Oregon in 1858, the author says:
" The feast being over, I went away, but an hour later
returned by the tent, and saw old Moses stretched flat
on the floor, his feet in the shade, his face in the sun,
dead drunk and asleep."
" I doubt if in the history of our country there has
ever been an Indian campaign in which so much was
accomplished at an equal cost. The good result was
due to three causes : the proper instruction of the
soldiers at the commencement, the excellence of the
Quartermaster's Department, and the admirable fitness
of our Commander, Colonel George Wright." Surely
in his commendation the author should have men-
tioned the Commissary Department which furnished
the whiskey that laid old Moses out.
General Keyes's book, written mainly from memory,
contains errors, some of which have been pointed out ;
but is replete with information, anecdotes and striking
pen pictures. The Army will enjoy it.
Whether the author has drawn the veil from more
of the inner life of his dead chief, General Scott, than
a confidential staff-officer and trusted friend should
expose, and whether the light he has thrown upon
that life is white or colored, are open questions.
ARTICLE XIII.
Killed by a Brother Soldier.*
" General Davis has just sJiot General Nelson ! "
said John J. Crittenden, as he walked rapidly up to
his son, General T. L. Crittenden, at the Gait House
breakfast- table, on the 29th of September, 1862. This
announcement, in the clear and impressive voice pe-
culiar to the great Kentucky orator and statesman,
sent a thrill of horror through all who heard it. Men
hurried to witness or hear of the death-scene in the
tragedy. Nelson, shot through the heart, laid at full
length upon the floor. General Crittenden kneeled,
took his hand, and said : a Nelson, are you seriously
hurt? 7 ' "Tom, I am murdered," was the reply.
When the Army of the Ohio, under Buell, was mov-
ing on Chattanooga, in the summer of 1862, the line
of railroad some three hundred miles long from
Louisville, Ky., upon which the troops were depen-
dent for supplies, was so frequently broken by the
enemy that Buell detached Nelson, in whom he had
great confidence, and sent him to Kentucky with
orders to take command there and re-establish and
protect the line of supply. Upon reaching his desti-
nation Nelson found himself second to General H. G.
Wright, whom the President, without Buell's knowl-
Journal Military Service Institution.
486
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER.
487
edge, had placed in command of a military depart-
ment, embracing the State of Kentucky. Wright's
troops under the immediate command of Nelson, and
the Confederate forces, under Kirby Smith, fought a
battle at Richmond, Ky., on the 30th of August, in
which the former were defeated, and Nelson was
wounded. The Confederates took possession of Lex-
ington and Frankfort, held the " Blue-grass " region,
and threatened Cincinnati and Louisville. Wright
looked to Cincinnati, his headquarters being there,
and entrusted the defence of Louisville to Nelson.
Louisville, threatened by both Bragg and Kirby
Smith, was in great peril. Nelson, able, energetic,
arbitrary, was straining every nerve for the defence of
the city. Davis, who was then on sick-leave in In-
diana, appreciating the condition of affairs in Ken-
tucky, and hearing that general officers were needed
there, volunteered his services, reported to Nelson, by
order of Wright and was charged with the duty of or-
ganizing and arming the citizens of Louisville. Nelson's
quarters and offices were in the Gait House, at
the north end of the west corridor, on the first or
main floor. His Adjutant-General's office was in room
No. 12, and his Medical Director's office in room No.
10. After Davis had been for a day or two on the
duty to which he had been assigned, he called in the
afternoon at headquarters, and Nelson said: "Well,
Davis, how are you getting along with your com.
mand ? " Davis replied : " I don't know." Nelson
asked : " How many regiments have you organized ? "
Davis again replied : " I don't know." Then Nelson
said : " How many companies have you ? " To which
488
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Davis responded in a seemingly careless tone : " I
don't know." Nelson then said, testily : " But you
should know," adding, as he arose from his seat, "I am
disappointed in you, General Davis. I selected you
for this duty because you are an officer of the Regular
Army, but I find I made a mistake." Davis arose and
remarked, in a cool, deliberate manner: " General
Nelson, I am a regular soldier, and I demand the
treatment due to me as a general officer." Davis then
stepped across to the door of the Medical Director's
room both doors being open, as the weather was very
warm and said : "Dr. Irwin I wish you to be a wit-
ness to this conversation." Nelson said : " Yes,
Doctor, I want you to remember this." Davis
then said to Nelson : " I demand from you the
courtesy due to my rank." Nelson replied : " I will
treat you as you deserve. You have disappointed
me ; you have been unfaithful to the trust which I re-
posed in you, and I shall relieve you at once," adding,
" you are relieved from duty here, and you will pro-
ceed to Cincinnati and report to General Wright."
Davis said: "You have no authority to order me."
Nelson turned toward the Adjutant-General and
said : " Captain, if General Davis does not leave the
city by nine o'clock to-night, give instructions to the
Provost-Marshal to see that he shall be put across the
Ohio." Upon such occasions Nelson was overbear-
ing and his manner Avas peculiarly offensive. Highly
incensed by the treatment he had received, Davis
withdrew ; and that night went to Cincinnati and re-
*As given by Dr. Irwin, now Surgeon, with rank of Major and
Brevet-Colonel U. S. A.
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIEK 489
ported to Wright, who assigned him to command in
front of Covington and Newport, Ky. A few days
thereafter (Sept. 25) Buell reached Louisville and
superseded Nelson in command, and Wright ordered
Davis to return to Louisville and report to Buell. In
pursuance of Wright's order, Davis, on the morning
of September 29, 1862, appeared at the Gait House,
Louisville, the headquarters at that time of both Buell
and Nelson. When Nelson entered the grand hall, or
office, of the hotel, just after breakfast, there were
many men there, among them Davis and Governor O.
P. Morton, of Indiana. Nelson went to the clerk's
office, asked if General Buell had breakfasted, and
then turned, leaned his back against the counter, faced
the assembled people, and glanced over the hall with
his clear black eye. In the prime of life, in perfect
health, six feet two inches in height, weighing three
hundred pounds, his great body covered by a capacious
white vest, his coat open and thrown back, he was the
feature of the grand hall. Davis, a small, sallow,
blue-eyed, dyspeptic-looking man, less than five feet
nine inches high, and weighing only about one hun-
dred and twenty-five pounds, approached, charged
Nelson with having insulted him at their last meeting,
and said he must have satisfaction. Nelson told him
abruptly to go away. Davis, however, who was ac-
companied by Morton, pressed his demand till Nelson
said : " Go away, you d d puppy, I don't want
anything to do with you ! " Davis had taken from
the box on the counter one of the visiting cards kept
there for common use, and, in the excitement of the
interview, had squeezed it into a small ball, which,
490 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
upon hearing the insulting words just quoted, he
nipped into Nelson's face with his forefinger and
thumb, as boys shoot marbles. Thereupon, Nelson,
with the back of his hand, slapped Davis in the face.
He then turned to Morton and said : "Did you come
here, sir, to see me insulted ? " " No, sir," replied
Morton, and Nelson walked away toward his room,
which, it will be remembered, was on the office floor,
and at the north end of the hall or corridor which ex-
tends along the west side of the building. A doorway
connects this corridor with the grand or office hall, and
near that doorway starts a staircase which leads from
the hall to the floor above. After the slap, Davis
turned to Captain - , an old Mexican- War friend
from Indiana, and asked for a pistol. Captain -
did not have a pistol, but he immediately obtained one
from Thomas W. Gibson and gave it to Davis. Gib-
son was a friend of Davis, and was from Indiana, but
at the time of this occurrence he was a practising law-
yer in Louisville. In the meantime Nelson had passed
from the office hall into the corridor which led to his
room, had walked toward his room, then turned back
and was near the foot of the staircase and in front of
the doorway leading to the office hall when Davis
reached the threshold from the office. They were face
to face and about a yard apart, the one with pistol in
hand, the other entirely unarmed. Davis fired and
Nelson walked on up stairs. Buell, at the time, was
in his room, which was near the head of the stairs on
the second floor. It is believed that Nelson was on
his way to report to Buell what had occurred, when
he was confronted and shot by Davis. Be that as it
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER. 491
may, he walked up stairs after he was shot, and fell
in the hall between the head of the stairs and Buell's
apartment. Those who had gathered around carried
him into the room nearest the spot where he fell and
laid him on the floor. He said to Silas F. Miller, pro-
prietor of the hotel, who had rushed to the scene when
he heard the pistol : " Send for a clergyman ; I wish
to be baptized. I have been basely murdered." The
Rev. J. Talbot, an Episcopal minister, was called. All
the medical aid available was summoned. Surgeon
Robert Murray, Buell's medical director at the time
(afterward Surgeon-General of the Army), says : " I
was summoned from the Louisville Hotel to the Gait
House when he was shot. I found him on the floor
of his room insensible, with stertorous breathing, and
evidently dying from hemorrhage. The ball, a small
one, entered just above the heart, had passed through
that organ or the large vessels connected with it. I
am quite sure that he did not utter an intelligible
word after I saw him." Before Surgeon Murray
arrived, however, a number of persons went into the
room, among them General Crittenden, mentioned in
the opening of this narrative, the Rev. J. Talbot, and
myself. At half-past eight A.M., within less than an
liour from the time Nelson was shot, he was dead.
I was in the grand hall of the Gait House when the
encounter took place, but I did not know Davis was
there ; nor had I heard of the difficulty that had
occurred some days before between him and Nelson.
They were both my warm friends. Davis had been
2d Lieutenant in the company of which I was
1st Lieutenant, and part of the time commander.
192 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
We had. been companions and messmates. Upon
hearing the sound of the pistol, I ascertained what
had happened, and made my way through the crowd
that had gathered around Davis, put my hand upon
his shoulder, and told him that I placed him in arrest
by order of General Buell. I was at that time Buell's
Chief-of-Staff. Davis, though greatly agitated, showed
no signs of rage. He was glad to be taken from his
surroundings, and placed in formal military custody
by a friend and proper military official. I took his
arm, and we immediately went together to his room
on an upper floor of the Gait House. No policeman
had any thing to do with his arrest ; nor did one ap-
pear so far as I know. When we entered the room,
and closed the door, Davis said he wanted to tell me
the facts in the case while they were fresh. He then
gave me details of the affair, including the decisive
incident of flipping the paper wad into Nelson's face.
I remained with Davis but a few minutes. I am
satisfied that he had not anticipated the fatal ending
to the encounter he had just closed with Nelson. He
sought the interview unarmed, and so far as known
none of his friends were armed except Gibson, and it
is not probable that he had provided himself for this
occasion with the small pistol which was passed from
him to Davis. It seemed to be Davis's purpose to
confront Nelson in a public place, demand satisfaction
for the wrong done him a few days before, and if he
received no apology, to insult Nelson openly, and then
leave him to seek satisfaction in any way, personally
or officially, that he saw fit. It was to fasten upon
Nelson the insult of a blow that the paper wad was.
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER. 493
flipped into his face. Nelson, no doubt, had that
offensive act in mind when he said to .Morton just
after it was committed : " Did you come here, sir, to
see me insulted ? " But, instead of waiting to send a
challenge, or take official action, if he had been in-
clined to do either, for the insult he had received
through the paper wad, Nelson avenged himself on
the spot by returning the blow. Davis then carried
on the fight, and it reached an end he had not de-
signed. Nelson (as well as Davis) had many devoted
friends about the Gait House at the time, and there
were mutterings of vengeance among them. But wiser
counsels prevailed. Generals Jackson and Terrill were
the most difficult to appease. They both found sol-
diers' graves a few days later upon the battlefield of
Perryville.
Buell regarded Davis's action not only as a high
crime, but as a gross violation of military discipline.
He felt that the case called for prompt and vigorous
treatment ; but he could not administer it. The cam-
paign was beginning. A new commander was found
for Nelson's corps, and the army marched the second
day after his death. Buell could neither spare from
his forces the high officers necessary to constitute a
proper court-martial, nor could he give the necessary
attention to preparing the case for trial in Louisville,
where it was best, if not necessary to try it. He
therefore reported by telegraph as follows :
" FLOYD'S FORK, KT.
" Via Louisville, Oct. 3, 1862. (Received 6.20 P.M.)
" GENERAL H. W. HALLECK :
" Brigadier-General Davis is under arrest at Louis-
494
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
ville for the killing of General Nelson. His trial by a
court-martial or military commission should take place
immediately, but I can't spare officers from the army
now in motion to compose a court. It can perhaps
better be done from Washington.
"The circumstances are, that on a previous occasion
Nelson censured Davis for what he considered neglect
of duty, ordered him to report to General Wright at
Cincinnati, Ohio. Davis said with reference to that
matter that if he could not get satisfaction or justice
lie would take the law in his own hands. On the oc-
casion of the killing he approached Nelson in a large
company and introduced the subject. Harsh or violent
words ensued, and Nelson slapped Davis in the face
and walked oif. Davis followed him, having procured
a pistol from some person in the party, and met Nelson
in the hall of the hotel. Davis fired. The ball en-
tered the right breast, inflicting a mortal wound, and
causing death in a few minutes.
"D. C. BUELL, Major- General"
The military authorities did not institute the pro-
ceedings suggested in the foregoing report from
Buell to Halleck ; nor was Davis taken from military
custody by the civil authorities ; but in a few days he
was at large. Wright, the General commanding the
Military Department in which the offence was com-
mitted, explains Davis's release as follows : " The
period during which an officer could be continued in
arrest without charges (none had been preferred) hav-
ing expired, and General Buell being then in the field,
Davis appealed to me, and I notified him that he
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER. 495
should no longer consider himself in arrest." Wright
adds : " I was satisfied that Davis acted purely on
the defensive in the unfortunate affair, and I presumed
that Buell held very similar views, as he took no
action in the matter after placing him in arrest." I
do not know upon what Wright based his opinion
that Davis acted purely on the defensive, but he is in
error as to Buell's views in the matter.* Da vis's
course in taking the law into his own hands, and the
failure to bring him to trial, both met with Buell's
unqualified disapprobation.
The case is without a parallel. A Brigadier-General
in the highly disciplined army of a law-abiding people,
reaching the headquarters just as the forces were
ready to march to the battlefield, instead of report-
ing for duty against the common enemy, as he was
under orders to do, sought out a Major-General com-
manding a corps of the army to which both belonged,
killed him on the spot, and then went to duty with-
out punishment, trial, or rebuke. Though officially re-
ported, as already shown, no military trial was insti-
tuted.
It appears from the records of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, Louisville, Ky., that on the 27th of October
(1862), Davis was indicted by the Grand Jury for
"manslaughter," and admitted to bail in the sum of
$5,000. T. W. Gibson, who furnished the pistol with
which Davis killed Nelson, and W. P. Thomasson
were sureties on his bond. The case was continued
from time to time until the 24th of May, 1864, when
it " was stricken from the docket, with leave to rein-
* See Buell' s article on Shiloh in Century Magazine.
496 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
state " ; and nothing more was heard of it in the halls
of justice.*
It has been said that Davis was pardoned by the
Governor of Kentucky, but the Secretary of State, of
the Commonwealth, contradicts this in a letter dated
April 8, 1885, saying: "There is nothing on the Ex-
ecutive Journal, to indicate that Governor Robinson
or Governor Bramlette issued a pardon to General
Jeff. C. Davis for the killing of General Nelson."
There is good reason for the belief that Morton's
influence was exerted to prevent proceedings against
Davis. An able and influential lawyer, James Speed,
Esq., of Louisville, who was afterwards appointed
Attorney-General in President Lincoln's Cabinet, was
retained as Davis's counsel, and succeeded in saving
his client from both civil and military prosecution.
Davis was born in Clarke County, Indiana, March
2, 1828. He began his military career, June, 1846,
by volunteering for the Mexican War, as private in
the 3d Indiana Infantry. He took part in the battle
of Buena Vista, was appointed 2d Lieutenant 1st U.
S. Artillery, June 17, 1848 ; 1st Lieutenant, February
29, 1852; and Captain, May 14, 1861. He was en-
gaged in Anderson's defence of Fort Sumter, at the
outbreak of the Civil War, April, 1861 ; and in
August of that year became Colonel of the 22d
Regiment of Indiana Volunteers. Before the close of
the War he had reached the grade of Major-General
of volunteers, and the command of the 14th Army
Corps ; to which General Sherman says he had " fairly
* Collin' s History of Kentucky is in error in stating that ' ' General
Davis was never indicted, nor tried by the civil authorities. ' ' Page
581, Vol. II.
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIEE. 497
risen by merit and hard service." u He threw his
whole soul into the contest/' adds General Sherman,
" and wherever fighting was hardest for four years, we
find him at the front. .To recount his deeds would
require a volume." When the War was over, he was
appointed Colonel of the 23d U. S. Infantry, and held
that office until his death from pneumonia, November
30,1879.
Davis was brave, quiet, obliging, humorous in dis-
position, and full of ambition, daring, endurance, and
self-confidence. He felt that he was a born military
chieftain. As early as 1852, w^hen he was but twenty-
four years of age, and only a 2d Lieutenant, I heard
him express entire confidence in his ability to com-
mand an expedition for the invasion and capture of
the Island of Cuba. The last years of his life were
passed in broken health, and were somewhat embit-
tered by disappointment at not receiving the Brigadier-
Oeneralcy, for which he felt qualified, and which he,
as well as others, thought he had earned by his ser-
vices in the Civil War ; but I never heard that he ex-
pressed, and I do not believe that he felt, any regret
for having killed Nelson.
o
Nelson was born at Maysville, Ky., September 27,
1824 ; was appointed Acting Midshipman in the Navy,
January 28, 1840; Passed Midshipman, July 11, 1846;
Lieutenant, September 18, 1855; and Lieutenant-
Commander, August 5, 1862.
In the Navy he acquired the principles and rules of
rigid obedience and discipline, which he applied with
marked effect to the volunteer land forces that came
under his control early in the Civil War. He was
498 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
distinguished for gallant and meritorious services as a
Navy officer in the War with Mexico. When the Ke-
bellion broke out in 1861, Nelson was on duty at the
Washington Navy-Yard. His pronounced Unionism,
and his clearness and vigor in discussing existing
affairs and forecasting the course of events, at once at-
tracted the favorable notice of the Government. In
the summer of 1861, his native State, Kentucky, was
torn by contending parties, one trying to drag her into
rebellion, another seeking her distinct action in favor
of the Union cause, and a third advocating the middle
course of armed neutrality. At that critical time, Nel-
son, an officer of the Navy, was directed to report for
special duty to the Secretary of War ; and under date
of July 1, 1861, was "ordered by the Adjutant-General
of the Army to organize and muster into the United
States Service, volunteer troops from East Tennessee,.
West Tennessee, and South-East Kentucky." Under
these instructions, but left to rely mainly upon his own
resources, judgment, and discretion, Nelson went to
Kentucky and established "Camp Dick Kobinson," a
spot that is now historic as the scene of the early
labors by which he began an active defence against
the invaders and the internal foes of his native State,
and anchored her to the cause of the Union.
On the 16th of September, 1861, he was appointed
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, and his authority
was extended to the command of troops operating in
Eastern Kentucky. Buell assumed command of the
Department of the Ohio (including Kentucky) Novem-
ber 15, 1861, and Nelson then fell under his control.
When Buell organized the army which was first called
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER. 499
the Army of the Ohio, and later the Army of the
Cumberland, he assigned Nelson to the command of
the 4th Division. From that time until his death (Sep-
tember 29, 1862) Nelson's career grew more and more
brilliant and meritorious ; and on account of his gal-
lantry and good conduct in the campaign at Shiloh
(April, 1862), he was promoted to the grade of Major-
General. The summary of services and character,
made in Buell's order issued upon the occasion of Nel-
son's death, is enough for the purpose of this article.
The order says :
" The General commanding announces with inex-
pressible regret, the death of Major-General William
Nelson, which occurred in this city at half-past eight
o'clock this morning. The deceased was bred a sailor,
and was an officer of the Navy while holding a com-
mission in the military service. History will honor
him as one of the first to organize by his individual
exertion, a military force in Kentucky, his native
State, to rescue her from the vortex of rebellion to-
ward which she was drifting.
" He was a man of extensive information, compre-
hensive views, and great energy and force of character.
By his nature he was intolerant of disobedience, or
neglect of public duty ; but no man was more prompt
to recognize and foster merit in his inferiors ; and in
his own conduct he set an example of vigilance, indus-
try, and prompt attention to duty which he exacted
from others. In battle his example was equally
marked. On more than one field, at Shiloh, Rich-
mond, and Ivy Mountain, he was conspicuous for his
gallant bearing."
500 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
Nelson's remains were buried at Cave-Hill Cemetery,
Louisville, October 2, 1862. On the 21st of August,
1863, they were transferred to Camp Dick Robinson,
and interred there with appropriate honors ; but were
subsequently removed by his relatives to his native
place, Maysville, Ky., where they now rest.
Erroneous versions of the encounter between Nelson
and Davis, unfavorable to the former, were scattered
broadcast at the time. Nelson's habitual violence of
character was exaggerated, the idea of retribution sup-
planted the demands of justice ; and public attention
became fixed upon Nelson's alleged violent conduct
toward men generally, and not upon Davis's specific act
of violence in shooting Nelson. Though Davis was
aggrieved, it is difficult to see now, even if it was not
then, how he can be justified in provoking the final
quarrel and committing the foul deed of death. The
facts will not sustain the theory of self-defence ; and
the military law, as he well knew, offered prompt and
ample redress for all the wrong Nelson had done him
at their first meeting. But he made no appeal to law.
On the contrary he deliberately took all law into his
own hands. Whether he proceeded solely upon his
own judgment, or was advised and incited by others,
is not positively known ; but I do not doubt that
Morton, and perhaps others, without designing or fore-
seeing the fatal consequences, encouraged Davis to
insult Nelson publicly for wrong done in an official
interview. One step led to another in the attempt to
place and fix the insult, until the end was Nelson's
violent death.
It was a cruel fate that brought about a collision
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER. 501
between these two rash men. General officers whose
country needed them, great soldiers, brother soldiers,
the one bearing an unhealed wound received in
battle for the cause to which both had pledged their
lives was slain by the other, the Union arms, at a
critical juncture, lost services of incalculable value, and
the result of a great campaign was very different from
what it would have been if these men had not pre-
vented each other from performing their proper parts
in it.
NOTE.
Many erroneous accounts of this tragic encounter
have been published. One of the latest is that of a
correspondent of the Philadelphia Press, who wrote
to that paper from Cleveland, Ohio, February 23, 1885,
as follows :
" General James B. Steedman was an eye-witness to
the killing of General Nelson, the bully, by General
Jeff. C. Davis, a quiet, little man whom he had grossly
insulted.
" There was a lot of us standing at the Gait House
bar," said he, " among them being General John T.
Croxton, of the Kentucky Infantry. I heard voices
down the long hall and looked that way, and saw a
group in which were General Nelson, Governor Mor-
ton, and General Davis. They were quite excited
and talking in a vehement manner. Almost imme-
diately Nelson drew back his right hand and slapped
Davis in the face. Davis was a small man, while Nel-
son was over six feet tall, weighed well on to three
hundred pounds, and was as strong as a giant. I
502 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
turned to Croxton and said : ' There is going to be
trouble. Nelson has struck Davis.' We moved toward
the group, and as we did so Nelson moved back a few
steps and leaned against the office rail. Morton and
Davis moved back a short distance. The former took
a pistol from his hip-pocket and handed it to Davis,
who stepped forward, levelled it and fired. Nelson
threw his hand up to his breast and said : i Jim, I'm a
dead man; send for an Episcopal minister.' We all
took hold of him and carried him into a little side
room. His clothes were thrown open, and near the
heart was found a small blue mark, about the size of
a tehot. No blood was seen, and the wound had closed.
A clergyman came running in, and as he entered we
withdrew and closed the door. In ten minutes Nel-
son was dead.
" Davis remained quietly near where the encounter
had taken place. .Among those who first appeared in
answer to the shot was a policeman, who placed Davis
under arrest. He went along quietly, but was soon
released on the demand of General Buell or the
Mayor. He was never called to account in any way
for the deed. There was nothing else the man could
have done under the circumstances. He would have
had no show in a physical contest. To have received
a blow in that manner and in that public place, and
then to have walked away with his hands in his
pockets, would have driven him from the Army in
disgrace. There have been questions raised as to
whether Morton furnished the weapon or not. I was
not near enough to see that it was a pistol he gave
Davis, but I do know he took something from his
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER. 503
pocket, handed it over, and that Davis raised his
hand and immediately fired. The homicide did not
seem to change Davis in the least he was always a
morose, quiet man."
A more formal and more erroneous account, as well
as a more unjust one to Nelson, is found in Shaler's
" History of Kentucky " (p. 319) : "Always a man of
passionate nature, the defeat of his forces by Kirby
Smith made him furious, though he was responsible
for the condition that brought it about, for to him
more than to any one else must be attributed the
leaving of Morgan's forces at Cumberland Gap. When
organizing the forces in Louisville under Buell, his
rage broke forth against General J. C. Davis. Dur-
ing a trifling dispute concerning some unimportant
matter, he insulted his opponent, and on his dignified
remonstrance struck him with his hand. Davis in-
stantly killed him. Davis's act was generally ap-
proved by his brother soldiers." In a foot-note to
this the author says in justification of Davis : " In
war the personal dignity of officers and men must be
preserved. It cannot be kept without such cruel
customs."
The foregoing statement that "he insulted his op-
ponent, and on his dignified remonstrance struck him
with his hand," leaves a doubt as to who made the
dignified remonstrance, who was struck, who did the
striking, and whose hand was used for the blow ; but
there can be no doubt about the general inaccuracy of
Professor Shaler's account of the affair.
The assertion that Nelson, " more than any one
else," was responsible for leaving Morgan's forces at
504 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Cumberland Gap, or that he was in any degree re-
sponsible for it, is erroneous. He had no authority
or responsibility in the matter. He was subordinate
to Gen. H. G.Wright, who, as Department Commander
assigned by the President, controlled Morgan. But
Wright even, superior as he was to Nelson, was not
responsible for Morgan's remaining at Cumberland
Gap after the position had been turned by Kirby
Smith's advance into Kentucky. On the 22d of
August, eight days before the defeat which according
to the author settled Nelson into a month's " rage,"
Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the Army pursuing
a precedent determination - - telegraphed Morgan :
" Hold on firmly. I will see that you are very soon
supported by other troops " ; and on the 30th of
August he telegraphed Wright : " The relief of Mor-
gan and the holding of Cumberland Gap are deemed
of the first importance" Halleck, therefore, held Mor-
gan at Cumberland Gap. Nelson had nothing to do
with it.
The difficulty between Nelson and Davis occurred,
not when Nelson " was organizing the forces in Louis-
ville under Buell" but when he was organizing them
under himself, and in the excitement of a threatened
attack upon the city.
In the author's account, the two interviews between
Nelson and Davis, which were about a week apart,
are merged into one ; and Nelson is represented as
first insulting Davis, and then striking him when
Davis submitted a " dignified remonstrance." This is
incorrect and unjust.
In his attempt to justify Davis the author says :
KILLED BY A BROTHER SOLDIER. 505
" In war the personal dignity of officers and men must
be preserved. It cannot be kept without maintaining
such cruel practices." The duty of maintaining per-
sonal dignity is not confined to war, nor to soldiers,
nor does it depend upon " cruel practices " either in
peace or war. No men have so little excuse for re-
sorting to the pistol and the bowie-knife, in their
dealings with one another, as the very men whom the
author encourages in the use of them. Soldiers are
not only protected by the civil code, but by the more
stringent military code, to which they are pledged by
oath of office, and by duty to their country.
NEW YORK, September 1, 1885.
AETICLE XIV.
Ouster's Defeat by Sitting Bull/
Speaking broadly, battles, as public events, are
always sharp and conspicuous. Their results are im-
mediate and important. These are reasons why we
are both hasty and extravagant in criticising the parts
played in them by the principal actors. Before we
have sufficient information to deal modestly with
praise or blame, we commence an arbitrary and lavish
distribution of glory and shame. The erection of
monuments to the dead, and the sinking of bottomless
pits for some of the living, are begun before the smoke
has sufficiently cleared away to permit a fair view of
the battlefield ; and it often happens that information
which should have been patiently waited for, conies in
time to stop both the monument and the pit, before
the one has risen above, or the other sunk below, the
surface of the earth.
As will be seen further on, it is not our purpose to
discourage the noble sentiment that is manifesting
itself in subscriptions for a monument to Ouster. We
aim only to enjoin moderation in judgment and action
towards all concerned in the recent disaster on the
Little Big Horn. There are two sides to every case,
but in this instance one side is silenced by death.
General Terry has been placed in a somewhat false
position by the relative order in which his two reports
* Army and Navy Journal, July 22, 1876.
506
OUSTER'S DEFEAT BY SITTING BULL. 507
reached the public. The second one, marked " Confi-
dential/' and evidently intended only as an explana-
tion to his military superior, Sheridan, was, accident-
ally, the first received, and was evidently published in
response to the public anxiety ; whereas the official
report of the occurrence was not received at Army
Headquarters, and could not be given out, nntil an
erroneous, impression, to the effect that Terry had been
eager to seize the public ear in his own defence had
been created by the confidential explanation. These
two reports taken in connection with such other reliable
information as has come to hand, justify certain gene-
ral inferences :
1st. The enemy was underrated by Sherman, Sheri-
dan, Terry, Crook, and Custer. It should be borne in
mind that when Custer left Terry, June 22, both were
ignorant of the fact that the enemy they were seeking
had defeated Crook on the 17th of that month.
2d. Ignorant of the enemy's real strength and
prowess, Terry, as w r ell as Custer, thought that the
7th Cavalry (12 companies) under the latter officer,
was fully able to defeat the Indians, the only trouble
apprehended being to catch them. This is shown by
the fact that Custer did not want, nor did. Terry
require him to take, the Gatling battery, which would
have retarded his movements, but strengthened his
command, and the fact is admitted in Terry's confiden-
tial explanation, where he says, a he expressed the
utmost confidence that he had all the force he could
need, and I shared his confidence." Under this impres-
sion Terry, the commander, being fully and solely
responsible for the strength, equipment, and orders of
508 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
Ouster's force, started that officer on the expedition.
That Ouster thought he was strong enough does not
relieve Terry of his responsibility on that point.
3d. As to the instructions from Terry under which
Ouster moved. They are dated June 22. Reno had
just returned from a scout in which he had discovered
the Indian trail, but had turned back without pursu-
ing it to contact with the Indians. Terry says to
Ouster having furnished him with fifteen days'
rations " You will proceed up the Rosebud in pur-
suit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by
Major Reno a few days since. It is impossible to give
any definite instructions in regard to this movement^
and were it not impossible to do so, the Department
Commander places too much confidence in your zeal r
energy and ability to wish to impose upon you precise
orders which might hamper your action when nearly
in contact with the enemy" The Department Com-
mander, however, in general terms indicated his
" views," but did not require compliance with, if Ous-
ter saw a sufficient reason for a departure from, them.
There was evidently no material difference of under-
standing between the two officers. In Terry's confi-
dential explanation of July 2 to Sheridan, as well as
in his letter of instructions of June 22 to Custer, the
point of prime importance was to get Custer to the
south of the enemy, and this because Terry feared the
Indians would escape if they had the least opportunity
^to do so. It was not in Terry's instructions, and it
clearly was not in his mind that Custer, if he came
"in contact with the enemy," should defer fighting
him until the infantry came up.
OUSTER'S DEFEAT BY SITTING BULL. 509
We knew but little of the country except that it
was wild, very broken, and without roads. It was
surmised that the enemy was on the Little Big Horn
River, but his position was, in point of fact, unknown.
He was known, however, to be vigilant, to move with
celerity, and to possess a thorough knowledge of the
country. There could be no justification for any plan
of operations which made an attack dependent upon a
junction between Ouster and Gibbon, after three or four
days' march from different points, in the wilderness.
The views which Terry expressed as to Ouster's
best line of march would probably have carried the
latter farther to his left the south than he went.
But these were views to be acted upon or disregarded
at Ouster's discretion, and they were evidently ex-
pressed with no eye to Ouster's danger, but solely to
prevent the dreaded escape of the enemy.
Admitting for the moment that Ouster had gone
quite to the south of the enemy, and that Gibbon was
known to be approaching from the north, there were,
still, wide doors open for escape. This was not an
enemy to be leisurely bagged, and if Ouster had simply
watched him, as soon as the Indian vigilance showed
Gibbon to be in dangerous proximity, he would have
escaped, and Ouster would have suffered disgrace for
not attacking with a force the sufficiency of which
had been admitted by all concerned. Without further
argument the inference is fair that, finding himself in
the presence of the enemy whose flight was to be ex-
pected, with its well known serious consequences to
our side, and having no knowledge of Gibbon's posi-
tion, Ouster was right in attacking.
510
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
4th. For the inarches to the fatal field, the prelim-
inaries to the attack, and for the plan of battle, Cus-
ter was clearly responsible. Terry says that Custer
told him he would march at the rate of about thirty
miles a day, but adds that " on the 22d he marched
twelve miles, on the 23d, twenty-five miles, from 5
A.M. until 8 P.M. of the 24th, forty-five miles, and then,
after night, ten miles further, resting but without un-
saddling, and then twenty-three miles to the battle-
field/' the implication being that some blame attached
to Custer for not conforming more nearly to the thirty
miles average. It is easy to understand that through
a very difficult and unknown country, no great regu-
larity could be expected in the marches of a large
military force. Water and grass must be reached at
due times, unforeseen obstacles have to be overcome.
It has been asserted that, smarting under the wounds
which preceding events had inflicted upon his pride,
Custer dashed recklessly into this affair for the pur-
pose of eclipsing his superior officers in the same field,
regardless of cost or consequences. This is going too
far. Custer was doubtless glad of the opportunity to
fight the battle alone, and was stimulated by the
anticipation of a victory which, illuminating his
already brilliant career, would make him outshine
those put on duty over him in that campaign. But
his management of the affair was probably about
what it would have been under the same circum-
stances, if he had had no grievance. His mistake was
in acting in mingled ignorance of, and contempt for,
his enemy. He regarded attack and victory in this
instance as synonymous terms, the only point being to
CUSTEK'S DEFEAT BY SITTING BULL. 511
prevent the escape of the foe. Under this fatal delu-
sion he opened the engagement, with his command
divided into four parts, with no certainty of co-
operation or support between any two of them. Three
companies, under Benteen, were far away on the left,
ordered in, it is true, and by chance they arrived in time
to aid Keno. One company, under MacDougal, was in
rear with the pack train. Reno was sent to the left
bank of the river to attack the enemy with three
companies, while Ouster with the other five companies
not only remained on the opposite bank from Reno,
but moved back of the bluff, and three miles lower
down the stream, thus placing mutual support, in
case of necessity, out of the question, and fell into a
complete or partial ambuscade.
Neither ambition, nor wounded vanity, prompted
these fatal dispositions, nor were they due to lack of
knowledge of the principles of his profession. They
proceeded, as heretofore stated, from a misconception,
which Ouster shared with others, in relation to the
numbers, prowess, and sagacity of the enemy.
AKTICLE XV.
Farrer's " Military Manners and
Customs."
Under the misleading title of " Military Manners
and Customs," James Anson Farrer makes an earnest
appeal to mankind to construct a temple of universal
and everlasting peace. But in place of beginning by
laying a solid foundation in the hearts of men, and
then building the edifice up stone by stone, the plan
is to commence at the steeple and build downward by
magic. Soldiers, whose business it is to conduct war,
are called upon to prevent it. The process is easy.
All soldiers must at once resolve that they will not
fight except in a cause that is just, and then only in
defence of their country. Everybody being thus
thrown upon a permanent defensive, there can be no
offensive ; and soldiers, weapons and war will soon
vanish into thin air. To have announced this end in
so many words would have been breaking bad news
for soldiers too suddenly ; but it follows from what is
disclosed. With soldiers refusing to fight except on
the defensive, nations will be confined within their
own boundaries, will cease to want what they do not
have, and will be quiet and contented for evermore.
* ' ' Military Manners and Customs, ' ' by James Anson Farrer. author
of * ' Primitive Manners and Customs, "etc. New York : Henry Holt
&Co., 1885.
Journal of Military Service Institution.
512
FARRER'S "MILITARY MANNERS.'
513
A single turn of one wank thus throws all the military
machines of earth out of gear, and blocks the game of
war forever. The features of the process can only be
described here in general terms. Those who want the
details should read the book, which abounds in learn-
ing and information.
Men cannot fight without courage of some sort, and
" the soldier's courage," we are told (p. 7), " is a mi-
racle of which discipline is the simple explanation."
The soldier has only b}^ a moral effort to undo the
miracle which has destroyed his moral powers, and
fighting must cease. The plan is beautiful, and its
execution rests with the man of war. "The soldier
claims to be a non-moral agent. That is the corner-
stone of the whole military system " (p. 279). Knock
that out, " and the custom of war will shake to its
foundation, and in time go the way that other evil
customs have gone before it" (p. 280).
The soldier's part in the demolition, though all-im-
portant, is quite simple. It may be learned in two or
three easy lessons : First, he must evolve from his in-
ner consciousness the resolution that he will not fight
until he is " fully satisfied in his own mind of the jus-
tice of the cause he fights for" (p. 277), and the ob-
ject must be (p. 264) " to defend his country in case
of invasion." Before obeying orders to fight he must,
therefore, ascertain from all governments concerned
the causes of quarrel, and render judgment upon them.
Secondly, if he decides that the war is to be offensive
on the part of his government, he must discard disci-
pline and refuse to fight. But if he finds that the war
is to be defensive and just, he must preserve discipline
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
the miracle that makes him fight and proceed to
repel the enemy. Thirdly, he should be vigilant dur-
ing the progress of hostilities, and stop fighting when-
ever the war in his judgment assumes an offensive
form.
We find (p. 227) that " fighting is only possible be-
tween civilized countries, because discipline first fits
men for war and for nothing else, and then war again
necessitates discipline." Thus, an evil perpetual-mo-
tion machine is running, with the " miracle of disci-
pline " as its main-spring. The soldier who, accord-
ing to this book, has always been the worst of man-
kind, and gives no promise of improvement, is called
upon to undo the miracle, break the main-spring, and
wreck the machine which his own existence depends
upon preserving in good order.
The author very naturally says of his plan (p. 277) :
" The objection to it, that its adoption would mean
the ruin of military discipline, will appear the great-
est argument of all in its favor, when we reflect that
its universal adoption would make war itself, which
is the only reason for discipline, altogether impos-
sible."
The importance of destroying discipline and war is-
shown (p. 215) where it is said that war is an "evil
custom, which lies at the root of almost every other r
and is the main cause and sustenance of crime and
pauperism and disease. " War, therefore, not " money,"'
is the root of all evil.
If the principle that soldiers should pass upon the
justness of the decisions and orders they receive from
their country before executing them is sound, it must
FARRER'S ''MILITARY MANNERS."
apply to other officers and agents of government as
well as to soldiers, because individual responsibility is
no more incumbent upon military than upon non-
military men. If the soldier must refuse to obey duly
constituted authority until he is " fully satisfied in his
own mind " that the cause in which he is ordered to
act is just, so must the marshal or the sheriff refuse to
obey the mandates of the court to seize person or
property until he is " fully satisfied in his own mind "
that the cause in which he is to make the arrest or
seizure is just. In short, upon the principle mentioned,
every man would have to disregard constituted author-
ity whenever he differed in judgment from those em-
powered to decide ; then society would disintegrate,
and mankind would be in a bad way, unless by a
miracle all the individual elements should be made
perfect at the same time, and in that event this world
would be of no further use. But the truth is that sol-
diers, marshals, sheriffs, and men generally are trying
to live up to their highest lights. As Abraham Lin-
coln expressed it, they are trying to do right as God
gives them to see the right. Public servants, military
as well as civil, are sustained by judgment and con-
science in executing the legal orders of the duly con-
stituted authorities of their country, and are not to
blame if those orders are not abreast with the morality
preached by the most advanced thinkers of the age.
Those who would prevent war should base their efforts
upon the fact that war results from the character and
conduct of men, not from the existence or discipline of
the few called soldiers. If every soldier and weapon
on earth should be destroyed to-day, and men left as
516 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
they are, they might be fighting to-morrow or next day.
Our own experience supports this assertion. We, a
peaceably disposed people, have several times resorted
to war ; yet, practically speaking, we have never had a
standing army none, certainly, which gave the mili-
tary sentiment any power among us. In 1861, with a
population of some thirty millions, we had only about
thirteen thousand soldiers. The great war that broke
out that year was caused by men not in the military ser-
vice, and was in direct opposition to such military senti-
ment as so small a force could express. Undisciplined
and unarmed civilians caused the war, and millions of
them took what weapons they could get and fought
one another, until one side, after four years of bloody
strife, established what it thought to be right. They
fought, because in the course of events a great ques-
tion arose upon which civilized, intelligent, educated,
honest men could not agree ; nor could they agree to
disagree, because to do nothing was, as they saw it, to
do wrong. They thought that as long as the same
God that gave them their convictions of right allowed
them strength to defend, that right, the cowardly
abandonment of it was worse than war and devasta-
tion and death. Soldiers and discipline have nothing
to do with causing such contests, though there is some
variety in the soldier's manner of conducting them.
In our Civil War the policy of some commanders
prompted by a public sentiment among civilians in the
North was to impose the actual horrors of war not
only upon the men in arms but on the whole people of
the South. On the other hand, of all the prisoners
taken by the great captain, " Unconditional Surren-
FAKKER'S "MILITARY MANNERS." 517
cler " Grant, not one was ever, with his consent, treated
with the least cruelty; and the kind terms which this
grini soldier granted his foes, when Lee and his army
surrendered at Appomattox, created wide-spread and
outspoken indignation in the so-called moral circles of
our most enlightened civil centres.
The disposition of the author to attribute war to
the action of particular individuals, rather than to the
character and passions of men generally, is shown in
his statement (p. 21) that " writers on the laws of
nations have, in fact, led us into a fools' paradise about
war which has done more than anything else to keep
the custom in existence -by representing it as some-
thing quite mild and almost refined in modern times."
It is hardly fair to charge great and learned jurists
with deliberately deceiving men into the sufferings of
war by misrepresenting the horrors of it ; nor does
the assertion that men have been misled in that way
accord with our e very-day experience, which is that
the horrors of war are known by all men.
Probably to remove the erroneous impression which
he says writers on the laws of nations have created,
the author has gleaned history from the dawn of time
to noon of the present for examples of cruelty and
bad faith by military men ; but he does not compare
them with the cruelty and perfidy of non-military men
of the same countries and periods. He omits nothing
that could tend to bring the profession of arms into
disrepute, and is unsparing in his denunciation of
military men and measures. " The soldier, the thief,
the murderer," he says (p. 119), "are seen in scarcely
distinguishable colors " ; " destruction is practised for
518 MILITAKY MISCELLANIES.
its own sake " ; " the burning of grain and villages for
the mere pleasure of the flames, forms almost inva-
riably the most prominent features " (p. 163) ; and
humane "arguments hardly ever prevail over that
passion for wanton destruction, and for often quite
unnecessary slaughter, which finds a ready and com-
prehensive shelter under the wing of military expe-
diency."
The stratagems of war, as well as its cruelties,
receive the author's severe condemnation. "What,"
he asks (p. 148), " is the moral difference between
entering a town as a spy and the military service of
winning it by surprise ? " " The military code regard-
ing the fair and legitimate use of fraud and deception
has nothing whatever in common with the ordinary
moral code of civil life, the principle openly professed
in it being so totally foreign to our simplest rule of
upright and worthy conduct, that in any other than
the fighting classes of our civilized societies they
would not be advocated for very shame, nor listened
to for a moment without resentment."
After looking upon these highly colored pictures we
are prepared for the statement (p. 153) that, u the
realism of war threatens to become more repellent
than its romance was once attractive, and to deter men
more and more from the choice of a profession of
which similar disgusting scenes are the common and
the probable episodes." The author's wish is probably
father to his prediction, and is no doubt due to his
peace principles, which are so strong that he says
(p. 139) : " If we are justified in contending for our
rights by force, it is hard to say we may not do so by
FARRER'S "MILITARY MANNERS." 519
fraud." When, in contending for our rights, there is
no difference between force and fraud, when men be-
come too good to practise stratagems or take advantage
of one another in war, they will be too good to go to
war, and there will be no soldiers. But as long as
the individuals constituting nations use force among
themselves in contending for their rights ; as long as
societies organized for the common good of their con-
stituent elements have governors, marshals, sheriffs,
constables, policemen, jailors, executioners ; as long,
in fact, as men need government, that long may nations
be expected to contend by force for their rights as
they understand them, and to keep armies for that
purpose. In the meantime men will not be deterred
from entering the military profession by the horrors
of war, the defects in the laws of nations, orthe pre-
sumption that force is as bad as fraud in contending
for what is right. Soldiers who continue to obey the
laws of their country and the laws of war, need not
fear being mistaken for thieves or murderers, even
though moralists and advanced thinkers see grave
defects in those laws. And when the men of all other
professions and employments conform, as closely as
soldiers of the United States do, to established law
and accepted principles of morality, justice, and honor,
there will be fewer wars and fairer dealing among men
in both peace and war.
APPENDIX A.
The Court of Claims in the case of Major John B. Collins v.
the United States (Reports, Vol. XIV.) held that Congress
may " authorize the President or the head of the War Depart-
ment to appoint an army officer, because the officer to be
appointed is inferior to the one thus vested with the appointing
power. The word inferior is not here used in a sense of petty
or unimportant ; but means subordinate or inferior to those
officers in whom respectively the power of appointment may be
vested the President, the courts of law, and the heads of
departments/' . . . " Whenever, therefore, Congress thinks
proper to vest in the President alone, in a court of law, or in
the head of a department, the appointment of any of their
respective subordinate officers, other than those named in the
clause under consideration, or whose appointment is otherwise
provided for by the Constitution, it must be held that such
officers are inferior officers in the meaning of the Constitution,
whose appointment in that manner, Congress has the power' to
authorize/'
The Supreme Court of the United States (in the case of the
United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S., 503) has rendered a deci-
sion in accord with the foregoing views of the Court of Claims.
Whether officers of the Army are "inferior officers/' whose
appointments may be vested ly law in the President alone, or
in the Secretary of War, is one question, while the right of
Congress under the provisions of the Constitution which say
that Congress shall have power to "raise and support armies,"
and make rules for their government and regulation, is another
question.
On the 25th of April, 1822, the Senate of the United States
adopted the following Report from its military committee: "In
the 8th Section of the 1st Article of the Constitution of the
United States it is provided that Congress shall have power ' to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
521
522 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
naval forces/ In virtue of this power Congress have directed,
both with land and naval service, that promotion shall be
according to seniority. This principle has heretofore been held
sacred. . . . The Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that ' Congress shall have power to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval- forces.
Under this article of the Constitution, it is competent for
Congress to make suoh rules and regulations for the govern-
ment of the Army and Navy as they may think will pro-
mote the Service. This power has been exercised from the
foundation of our Government in relation to the Army and
Navy. Congress have fixed the rule in promotions and appoint-
ments. Every promotion is a new appointment." (See Am.
State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. II., pp. 406-7.) .
Attorney- General Brewster said in an opinion in the Fitz-
John Porter case: " I am aware that the power of Congress over
military and naval appointments has been put upon grounds
not applicable to civil appointments." These " grounds" must
be the constitutional power of Congress to raise and support
armies and make rules for their government and regulation.
There can be no other grounds for the difference.
The Attorney-General of the United States (14 Opin. 164)
says: " It may be regarded as definitely settled by the practice
of the Government, that the regulation and government of the
Army include, as being properly within their scope, the regula^
tion of the appointment and promotion of officers therein.
And as the Constitution expressly confers upon Congress
authority to make rules for the government and regulation of
the Army, it follows that that body may, by virtue of this
authority, impose such restrictions and limitations upon the
appointing power as it may deem proper in regard to making
promotions or appointments to fill any and all vacancies of
whatever kind occurring in the Army, provided, of course, that
the restrictions and limitations be not inconsistent or incom-
patible with the exercise of the appointing power by the depart-
ment of the Government to which that power constitutionally
belongs."
AS it is conceded that, ~by virtue of the authority to make
APPENDIX. 523
rules for the government and regulation of the Army, Congress
may, in the matter of Army appointments, impose upon the
appointing power all the restrictions and limitations that Con-
gress deem proper, and as the power to make Army appoint-
ments "constitutionally belongs " to the appointing power only
so far as Congress does not restrict and limit it, there can be no'
force so far as Army appointments are concerned in the At-
torney-GeneraFs proviso that the rights of the appointing power
shall not be interfered with. ;
In the opinion already cited, Attorney-General Brewster said
concerning the foregoing extract from his predecessor : " Con-
ceding all that is here claimed for Congress under the provision
of the Constitution adverted to, it does not follow that the
right to regulate appointments to offices in the Army can be
carried, to the designation of particular individuals to fill such
offices, without imposing an unconstitutional restriction upon
the appointing power/' In this as in the preceding extract, the
concession and the denial are inconsistent. As the right is
conceded to impose in Army appointments all the restrictions
and. limitations Congress deem proper, there cannot be a proviso
that the unrestricted and unlimited right be restricted and
limited so that particular individuals are not designated for
office. In both opinions the concession concedes the whole
case. The right of Congress to regulate promotions has been
exercised without protest from the foundation of the Gov-
ernment. Yet every promotion is an appointment, and
regulating promotion is, at best, limiting the President to
the designation of one of a class, and is often, in fact,
the designation of a particular individual. This iinporttan
and conceded right of Congress is founded in their consti-
tutional power to raise and support armies, and make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
and is entirely independent of the question, whether officers of
the Army are " inferior officers " in the meaning of the term as
used in that clause of the Constitution which says that " Con-
gress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as
they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads, of departments." The statutes contain many exam-
MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
pies of the exercise of the right by Congress to regulate appoint-
ments and some even to designate individuals. A law, approved
June 17, 1874, required "that an additional Major be added to
the Second Regiment of artillery, to be filled by the nomination
and appointment of Captain James M. Robertson of said regi-
ment." The President approved the act, and executed the law,
which designated a particular individual for the office. Acts of
like bearing upon the question under consideration, though not
all so pointed, were passed as follows:
March 1, 1873, in case of Ashton, of the Navy; March 2, 1874,
in case of Kilburn, of the Navy; June 16, 1874, in case of the
Inspector-General of the Army; June 18, 1874, in case of Book,
of the Navy; June 22, 1874, in case of Plunkett, of the Navy;
June 23, 1874, in case of Preble, of the Navy; June 23, 1874,
in case of Payne, of the Army; January 30, 1875, in case of
Wykoff, of the Navy; March 3, 1875, in case of Beaumont, of
the Navy; March 3, 1875, in case of McLean, of the Army;
March 3, 1875, in case of Chamberlin, of the Army; June 21,
1876, in case of Sinclair, of the Army; June 24, 1876, in case
of Olmstead, of the Army; June 26, 1876, in case of Emory, of
the Army; July 25, 1876, in case of Preston, of the Army;
March 3, 1877, in case of a Signal Sergeant to be a Lieutenant
in the Army: March 3, 1877, in case of Spencer, Freudenberg
and Maley, of the Army; March 15, 1878, in case of Hammond,
of the Army; April 8, 1878, in case of Darling, of the Army;
April 23, 1878, in case of Armes, of the Army; June 19, 1878,
in cases of Walker and Mullen, of the Army; March 3, 1879,
in cases of Hunt and Collins, of the Army; February 19, 1879,
in case of Wyse, of the Army; and March 3, 1879, in case of
Stanhope, of the Army, in which case the authorization to
appoint the individual was accompanied " with directions to
the Secretary of War to place him upon the retired list." An
act noteworthy in its relation to the power of Congress to
designate particular individuals for office, was that in case of
Major Granville O. Haller, 7th U. S. Infantry, who was dis-
missed in July, 1863. An act, approved March 3, 1879, required
"the Secretary of War to order a military court-martial or court
of inquiry, to inquire into the matter" of Haller's dismissal;
APPENDIX. 525
"said court to be fully empowered to confirm or annul the
action of the War Department by which said Haller was sum-
marily dismissed; and the finding to have the effect of restoring
said Haller to his rank, with the promotion to which he would be
entitled, if it be found that he was wrongfully dismissed."
Under this act, Haller, who left the Army a Major in 18G3,
came back to it a Colonel in 1879.
APPENDIX B.
SEC. 1. That when any number of officers of the United
States Army, not less than two hundred and fifty, shall signify
to the Secretary of War their desire to unite for mutual sur-
vivorship annuity protection, and shall be deemed eligible
thereto by the Secretary of War, it shall be the duty of the
Secretary of War to make, through the Pay Department of the
Army, equitable deductions, determined as provided in section
2 of this act, from the monthly pay of said officers, and to de-
posit the same to the credit of the Treasurer of the United
States, to be passed into the general balances of the United
States Treasury, and be known as the Army Mutual Survivor-
ship Annuity Fund.
SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to
adopt, as soon after the passage of this act as practicable, a set
of Survivorship Annuity Tables, based upon suitable Life
Tables, and six per cent, interest to regulate the deductions to
be made from the monthly pay of such officers of the Army as
may be accepted by the Secretary of War under this act, to
secure to each one of said officers the survivorship annuity
which he may elect to purchase for a nominee to be designated
by him.
SEC. 3. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to have
526
MILITARY MISCELLANIEB.
such examinations made of officers applying for purchase of
annuities under this act, as he may deem necessary ; to issue
such certificates of purchase, and to prescribe such rules and
forms, not inconsistent with this act, as may be needful to
govern the applications of officers for said annuities, and to
secure prompt and proper responses to said applications.
SEC. 4. The purchase of a survivorship annuity under this
act shall take effect from the date that the application therefor
shall receive the approval of the Secretary of War, and the
annuity shall be due to the nominee from the date of the death
of the purchaser.
SEC. 5. Nothing in this act shall be construed as limiting
the number of annuities which may be purchased by the same
person ; and in case any purchaser of an annuity under this act
shall elect to terminate the monthly deductions from his pay,
required by this 'act on account of such purchase, he shall be
entitled to receive, in lieu of a certificate for a full annuity, a'
paid up certificate for an annuity in equitable proportion to the
amount of deductions which shall have been made from his
pay on account of said purchase, the payment of which annuity
to his nominee shall commence at the death of said purchaser.
SEC, 6. Estimates for so much of the Army Mutual Sur-
vivorship- Annuity Fund as may from time to time be required
to pay annuities falling due under the provisions of this act,
shall be made and transmitted to Congress in the same manner
as estimates for pay of the Army.
SEC. 7. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of War -to have
the annuities falling due under this act, paid by the Pay De-
partment of the Army in the same manner that officers of the
Army are paid; and all laws and regulations fixing the accoun-
tability for public fund^ shall apply to the moneys of the Army
Mutual Survivorship Annuity Fund.
SEC. 8. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of War, to sub-
mit to Congress, annually a full statement of the Army Mutual
Survivorship Annuity Fund, and he is hereby authorized to
adopt such rules and forms as may from time to time be found
APPENDIX. 527
necessary to carry out the purposes of this act; Provided, that
no compensation, pay or fee shall be allowed to any officer for
services rendered under this act.
Lieut. Col. J. B. Fry, Asst. Adjt.-GenL, U. 8. A.
DEAR SIR: I have carefully examined the project of a law for
the creation of an Army Survivorship Annuity Company, sent
to me with your note of the 1st instant. I can only judge,
without hesitation, of the object of the law, which I deem of
the highest importance to the Army. Whether the terms as
you have stated them, be the best to secure the object, I cannot
say, though they commend themselves very strongly to my
judgment. Such a society has long been needed, and the won-
der is that, in view of all the circumstances, it has never been
created. It is, in my judgment, the only means of affording
adequate protection to the dependent widows and orphans of
deceased Army officers, free from all charge against the Govern-
ment.
The necessary funds will be easily provided by the officers
themselves, by a voluntary reduction of their receipts from the
Army Paymaster. The amount of this reduction will be re-
tained by the Treasury, and be available for the current expen-
ses of the Government, and Congress will not, I am sure, in
view of the humane object, refuse to allow an interest upon this
money equal to that paid upon the most favored bonds of the
United States. Should your project become law, it will give
me great pleasure to aid the company forward by having pre-
pared a suitable set of Annuity Tables for its use. Not only this,
but it will afford me great pleasure to aid in any other way in
my power.
Very truly yours,
WM. H. C. BARTLETT.
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE Co., March 3, 1874.
528 MILITARY MISCELLANIES.
General J. B. Fry, N. Y.
MY DEAR GENERAL: I have read with great care and inter-
est the proposed bill for the formation of an Army Mutual
Survivorship Annuity Society, with remarks accompanying it.
It seems to me that the plan proposed will meet, in the best
possible manner, the wants of the officers of the Army. It is
simple and practicable. The expense of management will be
so small, that the annuities purchased will be obtained for
the smallest possible premiums a great benefit to the offi-
cer while at the same time, the premiums may be so arranged
as to give to the Government all the profits which, with the
same expenses, could be made by a well-managed private com-
pany.
The arrangement in section 5, of the revised copy sent me
yesterday, of giving to a purchaser desiring to cease making
payments, a paid up policy for an equitable annuity, removes
the only objection that had occurred to me on the first draft of
the bill.
I am very truly yours,
A. E. CHURCH.
WEST POINT, N. Y., March 13, 1874.
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36817
wM ill
NOV 6 1967
LD 21A-
IOAH AHC
General Library
University of California
Berkeley
(A/9
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY