THE CHRONICLES OF AMERICA SERIES ALLEN JOHNSON ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE LINION E 456 S832 NATHANIEL W, STEPHENSON iTY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ S831 TEXTBOOK EDITION THE CHRONICLES OF AMERICA SERIES ALLEN JOHNSON EDITOR- GERHARD R. LOMER CHARLES W. JEFFERYS ASSISTANT EDITORS ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE UNION A CHRONICLE OF THE EMBATTLED NORTH BY NATHANIEL W. STEPHENSON NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS TORONTO: GLASGOW, BROOK & CO. LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS PREFACE Av* IN spite of a lapse of sixty years, the historian who attempts to portray the era of Lincoln is still faced with almost impossible demands and still confronted with arbitrary points of view. It is out of the question, in a book so brief as this must necessarily be, to meet all these demands or to alter these points of view. Interests that are purely local, events that did not with certainty contribute to the final outcome, gossip, as well as the mere caprice of the scholar these must ob- viously be set aside. The task imposed upon the volume resolves itself, at bottom, into just two questions: Why was there a war? Why was the Lincoln Govern- ment successful? With these two questions al- ways in mind I have endeavored, on the one hand, to select and consolidate the pertinent facts; on the other, to make clear, even at the cost of is x PREFACE explanatory comment, their relations in the histori- cal sequence of cause and effect. This purpose has particularly governed the use of biographical matter, in which the main illustration, of course, is the career of Lincoln. Prominent as it is here made, the Lincoln matter all bears in the last analysis on one point his control of his support. On that the history of the North hinges. The personal and private Lincoln it is impossible to present within these pages. The public Lincoln, including the character of his mind, is here the essential matter. The bibliography at the close of the volume in- dicates the more important books which are at the reader's disposal and which it is unfortunate not to know. NATHANIEL W. STEPHENSON. CHARLESTON, S. C.. March, 1918. CONTENTS I. THE TWO NATIONS OF THE RE- PUBLIC Page 1 II. THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION " 19 HI. THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY " 40 IV. THE CRISIS " 59 V. SECESSION " 81 VI. WAR " 102 til. LINCOLN " 126 VIII. THE RULE OF LINCOLN " 142 IX. THE CRUCIAL MATTER " 168 X. THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY " 192 tl. NORTHERN LIFE DURING THE WAR " 204 XII. THE MEXICAN EPISODE " 224 XIII. THE PLEBISCITE OF 1864 " 233 XIV. LINCOLN'S FINAL INTENTIONS " 251 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE " 261 INDEX " 265 ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE UNION CHAPTER I THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC "THERE is really no Union now between the North and the South. . . . No two nations upon earth entertain feelings of more bitter rancor to- ward each other than these two nations of the Republic." This remark, which is attributed to Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, provides the key to Amer- ican politics in the decade following the Compro- mise of 1850. To trace this division of the people to its ultimate source, one would have to go far back into colonial times. There was a process of natural selection at work, in the intellectual and economic conditions of the eighteenth century, which inevitably drew together certain types and generated certain forces. This process manifested 2 LINCOLN AND THE UNION itself in one form in His Majesty's plantations of the North, and in another in those of the South. As early as the opening of the nineteenth century, the social tendencies of the two regions were al- ready so far alienated that they involved differ- ences which would scarcely admit of reconciliation. It is a truism to say that these differences grad- ually were concentrated around fundamentally different conceptions of labor of slave labor in the South, of free labor in the North. Nothing, however, could be more fallacious than the notion that this growing antagonism was controlled by any deliberate purpose in either part of the country. It was apparently necessary that this Republic in its evolution should proceed from confederation to nationality through an in- termediate and apparently reactionary period of sectionalism. In this stage of American history, slavery was without doubt one of the prime fac- tors involved, but sectional consciousness, with all its emotional and psychological implications, was the fundamental impulse of the stern events which occurred between 1850 and 1865. By the middle of the nineteenth century the more influential Southerners had come generally to regard their section of the country as a distinct THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 3 social unit. The next step was inevitable. The South began to regard itself as a separate political unit. It is the distinction of Calhoun that he showed himself toward the end sufficiently flexible to become the exponent of this new political im- pulse. With all his earlier fire he encouraged the Southerners to withdraw from the so-called na- tional parties, Whig and Democratic, to establish instead a single Southern party, and to formu- late, by means of popular conventions, a single concerted policy for the entire South. At that time such a policy was still regarded, from the Southern point of view, as a radical idea. In 1851, a battle was fought at the polls between the two Southern ideas the old one which up- held separate state independence, and the new one which virtually acknowledged Southern national- ity. The issue at stake was the acceptance or the rejection of a compromise which could bring no permanent settlement of fundamental differences. Nowhere was the battle more interesting than in South Carolina, for it brought into clear light that powerful Southern leader who ten years later was to be the master-spirit of secession Robert Barn well Rhett. In 1851 he fought hard to revive the older idea of state independence and to carry 4 LINCOLN AND THE UNION South Carolina as a separate state out of the Union. Accordingly it is significant of the progress that the consolidation of the South had made at this date that on this issue Rhett encountered general opposition. This difference of opinion as to policy was not inspired, as some historians have too hast- ily concluded, by national feeling. Scarcely any of the leaders of the opposition considered the Federal Government supreme over the State Government. They opposed Rhett because they felt secession to be at that moment bad policy. They saw that, if South Carolina went out of the Union in 1851, she would go alone and the solidarity of the South would be broken. They were not lacking in sec- tional patriotism, but their conception of the best solution of the complex problem differed from that advocated by Rhett. Their position was summed up by Langdon Cheves when he said, "To secede now is to secede from the South as well as from the Union. " On the basis of this belief they defeated Hhett and put off secession for ten years. There is no analogous single event in the history of the North, previous to the war, which reveals with similar clearness a sectional consciousness. On the surface the life of the people seemed, indeed, to belie the existence of any such feeling. The THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 5 Northern capitalist class aimed steadily at being non-sectional, and it made free use of the word national. We must not forget, however, that all sorts of people talked of national institutions, and that the term, until we look closely into the mind of the person using it, signifies nothing. Because the Northern capitalist repudiated the idea of sectionalism, it does not follow that he set up any other in its place. Instead of accomplishing any- thing so positive, he remained for the most part a negative quantity. Living usually somewhere between Maine and Ohio, he made it his chief purpose to regulate the outflow of manufactures from that industrial re- gion and the inflow of agricultural produce. The movement of the latter eastward and northward, and the former westward and southward, repre- sents roughly but graphically the movement of the business of that time. The Easterner lived in fear of losing the money which was owed him in the South. As the political and economic conditions of the day made unlikely any serious clash of interest between the East and the West, he had little solicitude about his accounts beyond the Alleghanies. But a gradually developing hostility between North and South was accompanied by a 6 LINCOLN AND THE UNION parallel anxiety on the part of Northern capital for its Southern investments and debts. When the war eventually became inevitable, $200,000,000 were owed by Southerners to Northerners. For those days this was an indebtedness of no incon- siderable magnitude. The Northern capitalists, preoccupied with their desire to secure this ac- count, were naturally eager to repudiate section- alism, and talked about national interests with a zeal that has sometimes been misinterpreted. Throughout the entire period from 1850 to 1865, capital in American politics played for the most part a negative role, and not until after the war did it become independent of its Southern interests. For the real North of that day we must turn to those Northerners who felt sufficient unto them- selves and whose political convictions were un- biased by personal interests which were involved in other parts of the country. We must listen to the distinct voices that gave utterance to their views, and we must observe the definite schemes of their political leaders. Directly we do this, the fact stares us in the face that the North had become a democracy. The rich man no longer played the role of grandee, for by this time there had arisen THE TWO NATIONS OF THE JttEPCJBLIC 7 those two groups which, between them, are the ruin of aristocracy the class of prosperous labor- ers and the group of well-to-do intellectuals. Of these, the latter gave utterance, first, to their faith in democracy, and then, with all the intensity of partisan zeal, to their sense of the North as the agent of democracy. The prosperous laborers ap- plauded this expression of an opinion in which they thoroughly believed and at the same time gave their willing support to a land policy that was typically Northern. American economic history in the middle third of the century is essentially the record of a struggle to gain possession of public land. The opposing forces were the South, which strove to perpetuate by this means a social system that was funda- mentally aristocratic, and the North, which sought by the same means to foster its ideal of democracy. Though the South, with the aid of its economic vassal, the Northern capitalist class, was for some time able to check the land-hunger of the Northern democrats, it was never able entirely to secure the control which it desired, but was always faced with the steady and continued opposition of the real North. On one occasion in Congress, the heart of the whole matter was clearly shown, for at the 8 LINCOLN AND THE UNION very moment when the Northerners of the demo- cratic class were pressing one of their frequent schemes for free land, Southerners and their sympathetic Northern henchmen were furthering a scheme that aimed at the purchase of Cuba. From the impatient sneer of a Southerner that the Northerners sought to give "land to the landless" and the retort that the Southerners seemed equally anxious to supply "niggers to the niggerless, " it can be seen that American history is sometimes better summed up by angry politicians than by historians. We must be on our guard, however, against ascribing to either side too precise a consciousness of its own motives. The old days when the Amer- ican Civil War was conceived as a clear-cut issue are as a watch in the night that has passed, and we now realize that historical movements are almost without exception the resultants of many motives. We have come to recognize that men have always misapprehended themselves, contradicted them- selves, obeyed primal impulses, and then deluded themselves with sophistications upon the springs of action. In a word, unaware of what they are doing, men allow their aesthetic and dramatic senses to shape their conceptions of their own lives. THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 9 That "great impersonal artist," of whom Matthew Arnold has so much to say, is at work in us all, subtly making us into illusions, first to ourselves and later to the historian. It is the business of history, as of analytic fiction, both to feel the power of these illusions and to work through them in imagination to the dim but potent motives on which they rest. We are prone to forget that we act from subconscious quite as often as from con- scious influences, from motives that arise out of the dim parts of our being, from the midst of shad- ows that psychology has only recently begun to lift, where senses subtler than the obvious make use of fear, intuition, prejudice, habit, and illusion, and too often play with us as the wind with blown leaves. True as this is of man individually, it is even more fundamentally true of man collectively, of parties, of peoples. It is a strikingly accurate description of the relation of the two American nations that now found themselves opposed with- in the Republic. Neither fully understood the other. Each had a social ideal that was deeper laid than any theory of government or than any commercial or humanitarian interest. Both knew vaguely but with sure instinct that their interests 10 LINCOLN AND THE UNION and ideals were irreconcilable. Each felt in its heart the deadly passion of self-preservation. It was because, in both North and South, men were subtly conscious that a whole social system was the issue at stake, and because on each side they believed in their own ideals with their whole souls, that, when the time came for their trial by fire, they went to their deaths singing. In the South there still obtained the ancient ideal of territorial aristocracy. Those long tradi- tions of the Western European peoples which had made of the great landholder a petty prince lay beneath the plantation life of the Southern States. The feudal spirit, revived in a softer world and under brighter skies, gave to those who partici- pated in it the same graces and somewhat the same capacities which it gave to the knightly class in the days of Roland courage, frankness, gen- erosity, ability in affairs, a sense of responsibility, the consciousness of caste. The mode of life which the planters enjoyed and which the inferior whites regarded as a social paradise was a life of complete deliverance from toil, of disinterested participation in local government, of absolute personal freedom a life in which the mechanical action of law was less important than the more human compulsion THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 11 of social opinion, and in which private differences were settled under the code of honor. This Southern life was carried on in the most ap- propriate environment. On a landed estate, often larger than many of Europe's baronies, stood the great house of the planter, usually a graceful ex- ample of colonial architecture, surrounded by stately gardens. This mansion was the center of a boundless hospitality; guests were always com- ing and going; the hostess and her daughters were the very symbols of kindliness and ease. To think of such houses was to think of innumerable joyous days; of gentlemen galloping across coun- try after the hounds; of coaches lumbering along avenues of noble oaks, bringing handsome women to visit the mansion; of great f eastings; of nights of music and dancing; above all, of the great festival of Christmas, celebrated much as had been the custom in "Merrie England" centuries before. Below the surface of this bright world lay the enslaved black race. In the minds of many South- erners it was always a secret burden from which they saw no means of freeing themselves. To eman- cipate the slaves, and thereby to create a popula- tion of free blacks, was generally considered, from the white point of view, an impossible solution of 12 LINCOLN AND THE UNION the problem. The Southerners usually believed that the African could be tamed only in small groups and when constantly surrounded by white influence, as in the case of house servants. Though a few great capitalists had taken up the idea that the deliberate exploitation of the blacks was the high prerogative of the whites, the general senti- ment of the Southern people was more truly expressed by Toombs when he said: "The question is not whether we could be more prosperous and happy with these three and a half million slaves in Africa, and their places filled with an equal num- ber of hardy, intelligent, and enterprising citizens of the superior race; but it is simply whether, while we have them among us, we would be most prosperous with them in freedom or in bondage." The Southern people, in the majority of in- stances, had no hatred of the blacks. In the main they led their free, spirited, and gracious life, con- vinced that the maintenance of slavery was but making the best of circumstances which were be- yond their control. It was these Southern people who were to hear from afar the horrible indictment of all their motives by the Abolitionists and who were to react in a growing bitterness and distrust toward everything Northern. THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 13 But of these Southern people the average North- erner knew nothing. He knew the South only on its least attractive side of professional politics. For there was a group of powerful magnates, rich planters or " slave barons," who easily made their way into Congress, and who played into the hands of the Northern capitalists, for a purpose similar to theirs. It was these men who forced the issue upon slavery; they warned the common people of the North to mind their own business ; and for do- ing so they were warmly applauded by the North- ern capitalist class. It was therefore in opposition to the whole American world of organized capital that the Northern masses demanded the use of "the Northern hammer" as Sumner put it, in one of his most furious speeches in their aim to destroy a section where, intuitively, they felt their democratic ideal could not be realized. And what was that ideal? Merely to answer democracy is to dodge the fundamental question. The North was too complex in its social structure and too multitudinous in its interests to confine itself to one type of life. It included all sorts and conditions of men from the most gracious of scholars who lived in romantic ease among his German and Spanish books, and whose lovely house 14 LINCOLN AND THE UNION in Cambridge is forever associated with the noble presence of Washington, to the hardy frontiersman, breaking the new soil of his Western claim, whose wife at sunset shaded her tired eyes, under a hand rough with labor, as she stood on the threshold of her log cabin, watching for the return of her man across the weedy fields which he had not yet fully subdued. Far apart as were Longfellow and this toiler of the West, they yet felt themselves to be one in purpose. They were democrats, but not after the simple, elementary manner of the demo- crats at the opening of the century. In the North, there had come to life a peculiar phase of idealism that had touched democracy with mysticism and had added to it a vague but genuine romance. This new vision of the destiny of the country had the practical effect of making the Northerner? identify themselves in their imaginations with all mankind and in creating in them an enthusiastic desire, not only to give to every American a home of his own, but also to throw open the gates of the nation and to share the wealth of America with the poor of all the world. In very truth, it was their dominating passion to give "land to the landless." Here was the clue to much of their attitude toward the South. Most of these Northern dreamers gave THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 15 little or no thought to slavery itself; but they felt that the section which maintained such a system was so committed to aristocracy that any real friendship with it was impossible. We are thus forced to conceive the American Republic in the years immediately following the Compromise of 1850 as, in effect, a dual nation, without a common loyalty between the two parts. Before long the most significant of the great North- erners of the time was to describe this impossible condition by the appropriate metaphor of a house divided against itself. It was not, however, until eight years after the division of the country had been acknowledged in 1850 that these words were uttered. In those eight years both sections awoke to the seriousness of the differences that they had admitted. Both perceived that, instead of solv- ing their problem in 1850, they had merely drawn sharply the lines of future conflict. In every thoughtful mind there arose the same alternative questions: Is there no solution but fighting it out until one side destroys the other, or we end as two nations confessedly independent? Or is there some conceivable new outlet for this opposition of energy on the part of the sections, some new mode of permanent adjustment? 16 LINCOLN AND THE UNION It was at the moment when thinking men were asking these questions that one of the nimblest of politicians took the center of the stage. Stephen A. Douglas was far-sighted enough to understand the land-hunger of the time. One is tempted to add that his ear was to the ground. The state- ment will not, however, go unchallenged, for able apologists have their good word to say for Douglas. Though in the main, the traditional view of him as the prince of political jugglers still holds its own, let us admit that his bold, rough spirit, filled as it was with political daring, was not without its strange vein of idealism. And then let us repeat that his ear was to the ground. Much careful research has indeed been expended in seeking to determine who originated the policy which, about 1853, Douglas decided to make his own. There has also been much dispute about his motives. Most of us, however, see in his course of action an instance of playing the game of politics with an audacity that was magnificent. His conduct may well have been the result of a combination of motives which included a desire to retain the favor of the Northwest, a wish to pave the way to his candidacy for the Presidency, the intention to enlist the aid of the South as well a, THE TWO NATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 17 that of his own locality, and perhaps the hope that he was performing a service of real value to his country. That is, he saw that the favor of his own Northwest would be lavished upon any man who opened up to settlement the rich lands be- yond Iowa and Missouri which were still held by the Indians, and for which the Westerners were clamoring. Furthermore, they wanted a railroad that would reach to the Pacific. There were, how- ever, local entanglements and political cross-pur- poses which involved the interests of the free State of Illinois and those of the slave State of Missouri. Douglas's great stroke was a programme for har- monizing all these conflicting interests and for drawing together the West and the South. Slave- holders were to be given what at that moment they wanted most an opportunity to expand in- to that territory to the north and west of Missouri which had been made free by the Compromise of 1820, while the free Northwest was to have its railroad to the coast and also its chance to expand into the Indian country. Douglas thus became the champion of a bill which would organize two new territories, Kansas and Nebraska, but which would leave the settlers in each to decide whether slavery or free labor should prevail within their 18 LINCOLN AND THE UNION boundaries. This territorial scheme was accepted by a Congress in which the Southerners and their Northern allies held control, and what is known as the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was signed by Presi- dent Pierce on May 30, 1854. ' 1 The origin of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill has been a much dis- cussed subject among historians in recent years. The older view that Douglas was simply playing into the hands of the "slave- power" by sacrificing Kansas, is no longer tenable. This point has been elaborated by Allen Johnson in his study of Douglas (Stephen A. Douglas: a Study in American Politics). In his Re- peal of the Missouri Compromise, P. O. Ray contends that the legislation of 1854 originated in a factional controversy in Mis- souri, and that Douglas merely served the interests of the pro- slavery group led by Senator David R. Atchinson of Missouri. Still another point of view is that presented in the Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, by F. H. Hodder, who would explain not only the division of the Nebraska Territory into Kansas and Nebraska, but the object of the entire bill by the insistent efforts of promoters of the Pacific railroad scheme to secure a right of way through Nebraska. This project involved the organization c f a territorial government and the repeal of the Missouri Com- promise. Douglas was deeply interested in the western railroad interests and carried through the necessary legislation. CHAPTER II THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION IN order to understand Douglas one must under- stand the Democratic party of 1854 in which Douglas was a conspicuous leader. The Demo- crats boasted that they were the only really na- tional party and contended that their rivals, the Whigs and the Know-Nothings, were merely the representatives of localities or classes. Sectional- ism was the favorite charge which the Democrats brought against their enemies; and yet it was upon these very Democrats that the slaveholders had hitherto relied, and it was upon certain members of this party that the label, "Northern men with Southern principles," had been bestowed. The label was not, however, altogether fair, for the motives of the Democrats were deeply rooted in their own peculiar temperament. In the last analysis, what had held their organization together, and what had enabled them to dominate politics TO 30 LINCOLN AND THE UNION for nearly the span of a generation, was their faith in a principle that then appealed powerfully, and that still appeals, to much in the American char- acter. This was the principle of negative action on the part of the government the old idea that the government should do as little as possible and should confine itself practically to the duties of the policeman. This principle has seemed always to express to the average mind that traditional in- dividualism which is an inheritance o? the Anglo- Saxon race. In America, in the middle of the nineteenth century, it reenforced that tradition of local independence which was strong throughout the West and doubly strong in the South. Then, too, the Democratic party still spoke the language of the theoretical Democracy inherited from Jeffer- son. And Americans have always been the slaves of phrases! Furthermore, the close alliance of the Northern party machine with the South made it, generally, an object of care for all those Northern interests that depended on the Southern market. As to the Southerners, their relation with this party has two distinct chapters. The first embraced the twenty years preceding the Compromise of 1850, and may be thought of as merging into the second THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 21 during three or four years following the great equivocation. In that period, while the anti- slavery crusade was taking form, the aim of South- ern politicians was mainly negative. "Let us alone," was their chief demand. Though aggres- sive in their policy, they were too far-sighted to demand of the North any positive course in favor of slavery. The rise of a new type of Southern politician, however, created a different situation and began a second chapter in the relation between the South and the Democratic party machine in the North. But of that hereafter. Until 1854, it was the obvious part of wisdom for Southerners to cooperate as far as possible with that party whose cardinal idea was that the government should come as near as conceivable to a system of non-interference; that it should not interfere with business, and therefore oppose a tariff; that it should not interfere with local government, and therefore applaud states rights; that it should not interfere with slavery, and therefore frown upon militant abolition. Its policy was, to adopt a familiar phrase, one of masterly inactivity. In- deed it may well be called the party of political evasion. It was a huge, loose confederacy of differing political groups, embracing paupers and 22 LINCOLN AND THE UNION millionaires, moderate anti-slavery men and slave barons, all of whom were held together by the unreliable bond of an agreement not to tread on each other's toes. Of this party Douglas was the typical represen- tative, both in strength and weakness. He had all its pliability, its good humor, its broad and easy way with things, its passion for playing pol- itics. Nevertheless, in calling upon the believers in political evasion to consent for this once to reverse their principle and to endorse a positive action, he had taken a great risk. Would their sporting sense of politics as a gigantic game carry him through successfully? He knew that there was a hard fight before him, but with the courage of a great political strategist, and proudly confi- dent in his hold upon the main body of his party, he prepared for both the attacks and the defec- tions that were inevitable. Defections, indeed, began at once. Even before the bill had been passed, the Appeal of the Inde- pendent Democrats was printed in a New York paper, with the signatures of members of Congress representing both the extreme anti-slavery wing of the Democrats and the organized Free-Soil party. The most famous of these names were those of THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 23 Chase and Sumner, both of whom had been sent to the Senate by a coalition of Free-Soilers and Democrats. With them was the veteran aboli- tionist, Giddings of Ohio. The Appeal denounced Douglas as an "unscrupulous politician" and sounded both the war-cries of the Northern masses by accusing him of being engaged in "an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoccupied region im- migrants from the Old World and free laborers from our own States." The events of the spring and summer of 1854 may all be grouped under two heads the forma- tion of an anti-Nebraska party, and the quick rush of sectional patriotism to seize the territory laid open by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The in- stantaneous refusal of the Northerners to confine their settlement to Nebraska, and their prompt invasion of Kansas; the similar invasion from the South ; the support of both movements by societies organized for that purpose; the war in Kansas all the details of this thrilling story have been told elsewhere. x The political story alone concerns us here. When the fight began there were four parties 1 See Jesse Macy, The Anti-Slavery Crusade. (In The Chronicle* ii* America.) 24 LINCOLN AND THE UNION in the field : the Democrats, the Whigs, the Free' Soilers, and the Know-No things. The Free-Soil party, hitherto a small organiza- tion, had sought to make slavery the main issue in politics. Its watchword was "Free soil, free speech, free labor, and free men." It is needless to add that it was instantaneous in its opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The Whigs at the moment enjoyed the greatest prestige, owing to the association with them of such distinguished leaders as Webster and Clay. In 1854, however, as a party they were dying, and the very condition that had made success possible for the Democrats made it impossible for the W T higs, because the latter stood for positive ideas, and aimed to be national in reality and not in the eva- sive Democratic sense of the term. For, as a mat- ter of fact, on analysis all the greater issues of the day proved to be sectional. The Whigs would not, like the Democrats, adopt a negative attitude toward these issues, nor would they consent to be- come merely sectional. Yet at the moment nega- tion and sectionalism were the only alternatives, and between these millstones the Whig organization was destined to be ground to bits and to disappear after the next Presidential election. THE PASTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 25 Even previous to 1S54, numbers of Whigs had sought a desperate outlet for tieir desire to be positive in politics and had created a new party which during a few years was to seem a reality and then vanish together with its parent. The one chance for a party which had positive ideas and which wished not to be sectional was the defi- nite abandonment of existing issues and the discov- ery of some new issue not connected with sectional feeling. Now, it happened that a variety of causes, social and religious, had brought about bad blood between native and foreigner, in some of the great cities, and upon the issue involved in this condi- tion the failing spirit of the Whigs fastened. A secret society which had been formed to oppose th'_ naturalization of foreigners quickly became a recognized political party. As the members of the Society answered all questions with "I do not know, " they came to be called "Know-Nothings, " though they called themselves "Americans." In those states where the Whigs had been strongest Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania this last attempt to apply their former temper, though not their principles, had for a moment some success; but it could not escape the fierce division which was forced on the country by Douglas. As 6 LINCOLN AND THE UNION a result, it rapidly split into factions, one of which merged with the enemies of Douglas, while the other was lost among his supporters. What would the great dying Whig party leave behind it? This was the really momentous ques- tion in 1854. Briefly, this party bequeathed the temper of political positivism and at the same time the dread of sectionalism. The inner clue to American politics during the next few years is, to many minds, to be found largely in the union of this old Whig temper with a new-born sectional patriotism, and, to other minds, in the gradual and reluctant passing of the Whig opposition to a sec- tional party. But though this transformation of the wrecks of W 7 higgism began immediately, and while the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was still being hotly debated in Congress, it was not until 1860 that it was completed. In the meantime various incidents had shown that the sectional patriotism of the North, the fury of the abolitionists, and the positive temper in politics, were all drawing closer together. Each of these tendencies can be briefly illustrated. For example, the rush to Kansas had begun, and the Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Society was prepar- ing to assist settlers who were oing west. In THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 27 May, there occurred at Boston one of the most con- spicuous attempts to rescue a fugitive slave, in which a mob led by Thomas Wentworth Higginson attacked the guards of Anthony Burns, a captured fugitive, killed one of them, but failed to get the slave, who was carried to a revenue cutter between lines of soldiers and returned to slavery. Among numerous details of the hour the burning of Douglas in effigy is perhaps worth passing notice. In July the anti-Nebraska men of Michigan held a convention, at which they organized as a politi- cal party and nominated a state ticket. Of their nominees, two had hitherto ranked themselves as Free-Soilers, three as anti-slavery Democrats, and five as Whigs. For the name of their party they chose " Republican," and as the foundation of their platform the resolution "That, postpon- ing and suspending all differences with regard to political economy or administrative policy," they would "act cordially and faithfully in unison," opposing the extension of slavery, and would "co- operate and be known as 'Republicans' until the contest be terminated. " The history of the next two years is, in its main outlines, the story of the war in Kansas and of the spread of this new party throughout the North. It 28 LINCOLN AND THE UNION was only by degrees, however, that the Republicans absorbed the various groups of anti-Nebraska men. What happened at this time in Illinois may be taken as typical, and it is particularly noteworthy as revealing the first real appearance of Abraham Lincoln in American history. Though in 1854 he was not yet a national figure, Lincoln was locally accredited with keen political insight, and was regarded in Illinois as a strong lawyer. The story is told of him that, while he was attending court on the circuit, he heard th^ news of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in a tavern and sat up most of the night talking about it. Next morning he used a phrase destined to become famous. "I tell you," said he to a fellow lawyer, "this nation cannot exist half slave and half free." Lincoln, however, was not one of the first to join the Republicans. In Illinois, in 1854, Lincoln resigned his seat in the legislature to become the Whig candidate for United States senator, to suc- ceed the Democratic colleague of Douglas. But there was little chance of his election, for the real contest was between the two wings of the Demo- crats, the Nebraska men and the anti-Nebraska men, and Lincoln withdrew in favor of the candi- date of the latter, who was elected. THE PART^ OF POLITICAL EVASION 29 During the following year, from the midst of his busy law practice, Lincoln watched the Whig party go to pieces. He saw a great part of its vote lodge temporarily among the Know-Nothings, but before the end of the year even they began to lose their prominence. In the autumn, from the obscurity of his provincial life, he saw, far off, Seward, the most astute politician of the day, join the new movement. In New York, the Republi- can state convention and the Whig state conven- tion merged into one, and Seward pronounced a baptismal oration upon the Republican party of New York. In the House of Representatives which met in December, 1855, the anti-Nebraska men were divided among themselves, and the Know- Nothings held the balance of power. No can- didate for the speakership, however, was able to command a majority, and finally, after it had been agreed that a plurality would be suf- ficient, the contest closed, on the one hundred and thirty-third ballot, with the election of a Republican, N. P. Banks. Meanwhile in the South, the Whigs were rapidly leaving the party, pausing a moment with the Know-Nothings, only to find that their inevitable resting-place, 30 LINCOLN AND THE UNION under stress of sectional feeling, was with the Democrats. On Washington's birthday, 1856, the Know- Nothing national convention met at Philadelphia. It promptly split upon the subject of slavery, and a portion of its membership sent word offering support to another convention which was sitting at Pittsburgh, and which had been called to form a national organization for the Republican party, A third assembly held on this same day was com- posed of the newspaper editors of Illinois, and may be looked upon as the organization of the Repub- lican party in that state. At the dinner following this informal convention, Lincoln, who was one of the speakers, was toasted as "the next United States Senator. " Some four months afterward, in Philadelphia, the Republicans held their first national convention. Only a few years previous its members had called themselves by various names Democrats, Free- Soilers, Know-Nothings, Whigs. The old hos- tilities of these different groups had not yet died out. Consequently, though Seward was far and away the most eminent member of the new party, he was not nominated for President. That danger- ous honor was bestowed upon a dashing soldier and THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 31 explorer of the Rocky Mountains and the Far West, John C. Fremont, 1 The key to the political situation in the North, during that momentous year, was to be found in the great number of able Whigs who, seeing that their own party was lost but refusing to be side- tracked by the make-believe issue of the Know- Nothings, were now hesitating what to do. Though the ordinary politicians among the Republicans doubtless wished to conciliate these unattached W T higs, the astuteness of the leaders was too great to allow them to succumb to that temptation. They seem to have feared the possible effect of immediately incorporating in their ranks, while their new organization was still so plastic, the bulk of those conservative classes which were, after all, the backbone of this irreducible Whig minimum. The Republican campaign was conducted with a degree of passion that had scarcely been equaled in America before that day. To the well-ordered spirit of the conservative classes the tone which the Republicans assumed appeared shocking. Boldly sectional in their language, sweeping in their denunciation of slavery, the leaders of the cam- 1 For an account of Fremont, see Stewart Edward White, The Forty-Niners (in The Chronicles of America}. Chapter II. 32 LINCOLN AND THE UNION paign made bitter and effective use of a number of recent events. Uncle Tom's Cabin, published in 1852, and already immensely popular, was used as a political tract to arouse, by its gruesome picture of slavery, a hatred of slaveholders. Returned settlers from Kansas went about the North telling horrible stories of guerrilla warfare, so colored as to throw the odium all on one side. The scandal of the moment was the attack made by Preston Brooks on Sumner, after the latter's furious dia^ tribe in the Senate, which was published as The Crime Against Kansas. With double skill the Republicans made equal capital out of the intel- lectual violence of the speech and the physical violence of the retort. In addition to this, there was ready to their hands the evidence of Southern and Democratic sympathy with a filibustering attempt to conquer the republic of Nicaragua, where William Walker, an American adventurer, had recently made himself dictator. Walker had succeeded in having his minister acknowledged by the Democratic Administration, and in obtaining the endorsement of a great Democratic meeting which was held in New York. It looked, therefore, as if the party of political evasion had an anchor to windward, and that, in the event of their losing THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 33 in Kansas, they intended to placate their Southern wing by the annexation of Nicaragua. Here, indeed, was a stronger political tempest than Douglas, weatherwise though he was, had foreseen. How was political evasion to brave it? With a courage quite equal to the boldness of the Republicans, the Democrats took another tack and steered for less troubled waters. Their con- vention at Cincinnati was temperate and discreet in all its expressions, and for President it nomi- nated a Northerner, James Buchanan of Penn- sylvania, a man who was wholly dissociated in the public mind from the struggle over Kansas. The Democratic party leaders knew that they already had two strong groups of supporters* Whatever they did, the South would have to go along with them, in its reaction against the furi- ous sectionalism of the Republicans. Besides the Southern support, the Democrats counted upon the aid of the professional politicians those men who considered politics rather as a fascinating game than as serious and difficult work based upon principle. Upon these the Democrats could con- fidently rely, for they already had, in Douglas in the North and Toombs in the South, two master politicians who knew this type and its impulses 34 LINCOLN AND THE UNION intimately, because they themselves belonged to it. But the Democrats needed the support of a third group. If they could only win over the Northern remnant of the Whigs that was still unattached, their position would be secure. In their efforts to obtain this additional and very necessary reinforcement, they decided to appear as temperate and restrained as possible a well bred party which all mild and conservative men could trust. This attitude they formulated in connection with Kansas, which at that time had two govern- ments: one, a territorial government, set up by emigrants from the South; the other, a state government, under the constitution drawn up at Topeka by emigrants from the North. One authorized slavery; the other prohibited slavery; and both had appealed to Washington for recogni- tion. It was with this quite definite issue that Congress was chiefly concerned in the spring of 1856. During the summer Toombs introduced a bill securing to the settlers of Kansas complete freedom of action and providing for an election of delegates to a convention to draw up a state con- stitution which would determine whether slav- ery or freedom was to prevail in other words, THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 35 whether Kansas was to be annexed to the South or to the North. This bill was merely the full expression of what Douglas had aimed at in 1854 and of what was nicknamed "popular sov- ereignty" the right of the locality to choose for itself between slave and free labor. Two years before, such a measure would have seemed radical. But in politics time is wonder- fully elastic. Those two years had been packed with turmoil. Kansas had been the scene of a bloody conflict. Regardless of which side had a majority on the ground, extremists on each side had demanded recognition for the government set up by their own party. By contrast, Toombs's offer to let the majority rule appeared temperate. The Republicans saw instantly that they must discredit the proposal or the ground would be cut from under them. Though the bill passed the Senate, they were able to set it aside in the House in favor of a bill admitting Kansas as a free state with the Topeka constitution. The Democrats thereupon accused the Republicans of not wanting peace and of wishing to keep up the war-cry "Bleeding Kansas" until election time. That, throughout the country, the two parties continued on the lines of policy they had chosen 36 LINCOLN AND THE UNION may be seen from an illustration. A House com* mittee which had gone to Kansas to investigate submitted two reports, one of which, submitted by a Democratic member, told the true story of the murders committed by John Brown at Potta- watomie. And yet, while the Republicans spread everywhere their shocking tales of murders of free- state settlers, the Democrats made practically no use of this equally shocking tale of the murder of slaveholders. Apparently they were resolved to appear temperate and conservative to the bittei end. And they had their reward. Or, perhaps the fury of the Republicans had its just deserts. From either point of view, the result was a choice of evils on the part of the reluctant Whigs, and that choice was expressed in the following words by as typical a New Englander a? Rufus Choate: "The first duty of Whigs," wrote Choate to the Maine State central committee, "is to unite with some organization of our countrymen to defeat and dissolve the new geographical party calling itself Republican. . . . The question for each and every one of us is . . . by what vote can I do most to prevent the madness of th^ times from working its maddest act the very THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 37 ecstasy of its madness the permanent formation and the actual triumph of a party which knows one half of America only to hate and dread it. If the Republican party," Choate continued, "ac- complishes its object and gives the government to the North, I turn my eyes from the consequences. To the fifteen states of the South that government will appear an alien government. It will appear worse. It will appear a hostile government. It will represent to their eye a vast region of states organized upon anti-slavery, flushed by triumph, cheered onward by the voice of the pulpit, tribune, and press; its mission, to inaugurate freedom and put down the oligarchy; its constitution, the glit- tering and sounding generalities of natural right which make up the Declaration of Independence. . . . Practically the contest, in my judgment, is between Mr. Buchanan and Colonel Fremont. In these circumstances, I vote for Mr. Buchanan. " The party of political evasion thus became the refuge of the old original Whigs who were forced to take advantage of any port in a storm. Bu- chanan was elected by an overwhelming majority. To the careless eye, Douglas had been justified by results; his party had triumphed as perhaps never before: and yet, no great political success was ever 38 LINCOLN AND THE UNION based upon less stable foundations. To maintain this position, those Northerners who reasoned as Choate did were a necessity; but to keep them in the party of political evasion would depend upon the ability of this party to play the game of politics without acknowledging sectional bias. Whether this difficult task could be accomplished would depend upon the South. Toombs, on his part, was anxious to continue making the party of evasion play the great American game of politics, and in his eagerness he perhaps overestimated his hold upon the South. This, however, remains to be seen. Already another faction had formed around William L. Yancey of Alabama a faction as intolerant of political evasion as the Republicans themselves, and one that was eager to match the sectional Northern party by a sectional Southern party. It had for the moment fallen into line with the Toombs faction because, like the Whigs, it had not the courage to do otherwise. The question now was whether it would continue fearful, and whether political evasion would continue to reign. The key to the history of the next four years is in the growth of this positive Southern party, which had the inevitable result of forcing the THE PARTY OF POLITICAL EVASION 39 Whig remainder to choose, not as in 1856 between a positive sectional policy and an evasive non- sectional policy, but in 1860 between two policies both of which were at once positive and sectional. CHAPTER III THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY THE South had thus far been kept in line with the cause of political evasion by a small group of able politicians, chief among whom were Robert Toombs, Howell Cobb, and Alexander H. Stephens. Curiously enough all three were Georgians, and this might indeed be called the day of Georgia in the history of the South. A different type of man, however, and one sig- nificant of a divergent point of view, had long en- deavored to shake the leadership of the Georgian group. Rhett in South Carolina, Jefferson Davis in Mississippi, and above all Yancey in Alabama, together with the interests and sentiment which they represented, were almost ready to contest the orthodoxy of the policy of "nothing doing." To consolidate the interests behind them, to arouse and fire the sentiment on which they relied, was now the confessed purpose of these determined 40 THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 41 men. So little attention has hitherto been given to motive in American politics that the modern student still lacks a clear-cut and intelligent perception of these various factions. In spite of this fact, however, these men may safely be re- garded as being distinctly more intellectual, and as having distinctly deeper natures, than the men who came together under the leadership of Toombs and Cobb, and who had the true pro- vincial enthusiasm for politics as the great Ameri- can sport. The factions of both Toombs and Yancey were intensely Southern and, whenever a crisis might come, neither meant to hesitate an instant over striking hard for the South. Toombs, however, wanted to prevent such a situation, while Yancey was anxious to force one. The former conceived felicity as the joy of playing politics on the biggest stage, and he therefore bent all his strength to preserving the so-called national parties; the latter, scornful of all such union, was for a sepa- rate Southern community. Furthermore, no man could become enthusi- astic about political evasion unless by nature he also took kindly to compromise. So, Toombs and his followers were for preserving the negative 42 LINCOLN AND THE UNION Democratic position of 1856. In a formal paper of great ability Stephens defended that position when he appeared for reelection to Congress in 1857. Cobb, who had entered Buchanan's Cabi- net as Secretary of the Treasury, and who spoke hopefully of making Kansas a slave state, insisted nevertheless that such a change must be "brought about by the recognized principles of carrying out the will of the majority which is the great doctrine of the Kansas Bill." To Yancey, as to the Re- publicans, Kansas was a disputed border-land for which the so-called two nations were fighting. The internal Southern conflict between these two factions began anew with the Congressional elections of 1857. It is worth observing that the make-up of these factions was almost a resurrec- tion of the two groups which, in 1850, had divided the South on the question of rejecting the Com- promise. In a letter to Stephens in reference to one of the Yancey men, Cobb prophesied: "Mc- Donald will utterly fail to get up a new Southern Rights party. Burnt children dread the fire, and he cannot get up as strong an organization as he did in 1850. Still it is necessary to guard every point, as McDonald is a hard hand to deal with. " For the moment, he foretold events correctly., THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 43 The Southern elections of 1857 did not break the hold of the moderates. Yancey turned to different machinery, quite as useful for his purpose. This he found in the South- ern commercial conventions, which were held an- nually. At this point there arises a vexed ques- tion which has, of late, aroused much discussion. Was there then what we should call today a slave " interest " ? Was organized capital deliberately exploiting slavery? And did Yancey play into its hands? 1 The truth seems to be that, between 1856 and 1860, both the idealist parties, the Repub- licans and the Secessionists, made peace with, shall we say, the Mammon of unrighteousness, or merely organized capital? The one joined hands with the iron interest of the North; the other, with the slave interest of the South. The Republicans preached the domination of the North and a protective tariff; the Yancey men preached the independence of the South and the reopening of the slave trade. These two issues Yancey, however, failed to unite, though the commercial convention of 1859 1 For those who would be persuaded that there was such a slave interest, perhaps the best presentation is to be found in Professor Dodd's Life of Jefferson Davis. 44 LINCOLN AND THE UNION at last gave its support to a resolution that all laws, state or federal, prohibiting the African slave trade ought to be repealed. That great body of North- ern capital which had dealings with the South was ready, as it always had been, to finance any scheme that Southern business desired. Slavers were fitted out in New York, and the city authorities did not prevent their sailing. Against this som- ber background stands forth that much admired action of Lewis Cass of Michigan, Buchanan's Secretary of State. Already the slave trade was in process of revival, and the British Navy, impelled by the powerful anti-slavery sentiment in England, was active in its suppression. American ships sus- pected of being slavers were visited and searched. Cass seized his opportunity, and declaring that such things "could not be submitted to by an independent nation without dishonor," sent out American warships to prevent this interference. Thereupon the British government consented to give up trying to police the ocean against slavers. It is indeed true, therefore, that neither North nor South has an historical monopoly of the support of slavery ! It is but fair to add that, so far as the movement to reopen the slave trade found favor outside the THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 45 slave barons and their New York allies, it was advocated as a means of political defense, of in- creasing Southern population as an offset to the movement of free emigration into the North, and of keeping the proportion of Southern representav- tion in Congress. Stephens, just after Cass had successfully twisted the lion's tail, took this posi- tion in a speech that caused a sensation. In a private letter he added, "Unless we get immigra- tion from abroad, we shall have few more slave states. This great truth seems to take the people by surprise. Some shrink from it as they would from death. Still, it is as true as death." The scheme, however, never received general accept- ance; and in the constitution of the Southern Confederacy there was a section prohibiting the African slave trade. On the other of these two issues the independence of the South Yancey steadily gained ground. With each year from 1856 to 1860, a larger proportion of Southerners drew out of political evasion and gave adherence to the idea of presenting an ultimatum to the North, with secession as an alternative. Meanwhile, Buchanan sent to Kansas, as Gover- nor, Robert J. Walker, one of the most astute of the Democrats of the opoosite faction and a 46 LINCOLN AND THE UNION Mississippian. The tangled situation which Walker found, the details of his attempt to straighten it out, belong in another volume. 1 It is enough in this connection merely to mention the episode of the Lecompton convention in the election of which the Northern settlers refused to participate, though Walker had promised that they should have full protection and a fair count as well as that the work of the convention should be submit- ted to a popular vote. This action of Walker's was one more cause of contention between the warring factions in the South. The fact that he had met the Northerners half-way was seized upon by the Yancey men as evidence of the betrayal of the South by the Democratic moderates. On the other hand, Cobb, writing of the situation in Kansas, said that "a large majority are against slavery and . . . our friends regard the fate of Kansas as a free state pretty well fixed . . . the pro-slavery men, finding that Kansas was likely to become a Black Republican State, determined to unite with the free-state Democrats." Here is the clue to Walker's course. As a strict party man, he preferred to accept Kansas free, with 1 See Jesse Macy, The Anti-Slavery Crusade. (In The Chron- icles of America.) THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 47 Democrats in control, rather than risk losing it altogether. The next step in the affair is one of the unsolved problems in American history. Buchanan sud- denly changed front, disgraced Walker, and threw himself into the arms of the Southern extremists. Though his reasons for doing so have been debated to this day, they have not yet been established beyond dispute. What seems to be the favorite explanation is that Buchanan was in a panic. What brought him to that condition may have been the following events. The free-state men, by refusing to take part in electing the convention, had given control to the slaveholders, who proved they were not slow to seize their opportunity. They drew up a con- stitution favoring slavery, but this constitution, Walker had promised, was to be submitted in referendum. If the convention decided, however, not to submit the constitution, would not Congress have the right to accept it and admit Kansas as a state? This question was immediately raised. It now became plain that, by refusing to take part in the election, the free-state Kansans had thrown away a great tactical advantage. Of this blunder in generalship the Yancey men took instant ad- 48 LINCOLN AND THE UNION vantage. It was known that the proportion of Free-Soilers in Kansas was very great perhaps a majority and the Southerners reasoned that they should not be obliged to give up the advan- tage they had won merely to let their enemies re- trieve their mistake. Jefferson Davis formulated this position in an address to the Mississippi Legis- lature in which he insisted that Congress, not the Kansas electorate, was entitled to create the Kansas constitution, that the Convention was a proper- ly chosen body, and that its work should stand. What Davis said in a stately way, others said in a furious way. Buchanan stated afterward that he changed front because certain Southern States had threatened that, if he did not abandon Walker, they would secede. Be that as it may, Buchanan did abandon Walker and threw all the influence of the Adminis- tration in favor of admitting Kansas with the Lecompton constitution. But would this be true to that principle of "popular sovereignty" which was the very essence of the Kansas-Nebraska Act? Would it be true to the principle that each locality should decide for itself between slavery and free- dom? On this issue the Southerners were fairly generally agreed and maintained that there was no THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 49 obligation to go behind the work of the convention. Not so, however, the great exponent of popular sovereignty, Douglas. Rising in his place in the Senate, he charged the President with conspiring to defeat the will of the majority in Kansas. " If Kansas wants a slave state constitution," said he, "she has a right to it; if she wants a free state constitution, she has a right to it. It is none of my business which way the slavery clause is de- cided. I care not whether it is voted up or down. " There followed one of those prolonged legisla- tive battles for which the Congress of the United States is justly celebrated. Furious oratory, prop- ositions, counter-propositions, projected com- promises, other compromises, and at the end nothing positive. But Douglas had defeated the attempt to bring in Kansas with the Lecompton constitution. As to the details of the story, they include such distinguished happenings as a brawl- ing, all-night session when "thirty men, at least, were engaged in the fisticuff, " and one Represen- tative knocked another down. Douglas was again at the center of the stage, but his term as Senator was nearing its end. He and the President had split their party. Pursued by the vengeful malice of the Administration, Douglas 50 LINCOLN AND THE UNION went home in 1858 to Illinois to fight for his ree'leo tion. His issue, of course, was popular sovereignty. His temper was still the temper of political evasion. How to hold fast to his own doctrine, and at the same time keep to his programme of "nothing doing"; how to satisfy the negative Democrats of the North without losing his last hold on the posi- tive men of the South such were his problems, and they were made still more difficult by a recent decision of the Supreme Court. The now famous case of Dred Scott had been decided in the previous year. Its bewildering legal technicalities may here be passed over; funda- mentally, the real question involved was the status of a negro, Dred Scott. A slave who had been owned in Missouri, and who had been taken by his master to the State of Illinois, to the free ter- ritory of Minnesota, and then back to Missouri, now claimed to be free. The Supreme Court un- dertook to decide whether his residence in Min- nesota rendered him free, and also whether any negro of slave descent could be a citizen of the United States. The official opinion of the Court, delivered by Chief Justice Taney, decided both questions against the suppliant. It was held that the "citizens" recognized by the Constitution THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 51 not include negroes. So, even if Scott were free, he could not be considered a citizen entitled to bring suit in the Federal Courts. Furthermore, he could not be considered free, in spite of his residence in Minnesota, because, as the Court now ruled, Congress, when it enacted the Missouri Compromise, had exceeded its authority; the en- actment had never really been in force; there was no binding prohibition of slavery in the North- western territories. If this decision was good law, all the discussion about popular sovereignty went for nothing, and neither an act of Congress nor the vote of the popu- lation of a territory, whether for or against slavery, was of any value whatsoever. Nothing mattered until the new-made state itself took action after its admission to the Union. Until that time, no power, national or local, could lawfully interfere with the introduction of slaves. In the case of Kansas, it was no longer of the least importance what be- came of the Lecompton constitution or of any other that the settlers might make. The territory was open to settlement by slaveholders and would continue to be so as long as it remained a territory. The same conditions existed in Nebraska and in all the Northwest. The Dred Scott decision was 52 LINCOLN AND THE UNION accepted as orthodox Democratic doctrine by the South, by the Administration, and by the "North- ern men with Southern principles." The astute masters of the game of politics on the Democratic side struck the note of legality. This was law, the expression of the highest tribunal of the Re- public; what more was to be said? Though in truth there was but one other thing to be said, and that revolutionary, the Republicans, never- theless, did not falter over it. Seward announced it in a speech in Congress on "Freedom in Kansas, " when he uttered this menace: "We shall reorgan- ize the Court and thus reform its political senti- ments and practices. " In the autumn of 1858 Douglas attempted to perform the acrobatic feat of reconciling the Dred Scott decision, which as a Democrat he had to accept, with that idea of popular sovereignty without which his immediate followers could not be content. In accepting the Republican nomi- nation as Douglas's opponent for the senatorship, Lincoln used these words which have taken rank among his most famous utterances: "A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 53 be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new North as well as South. " No one had ever so tellingly expressed the death- grapple of the sections : slavery the weapon of one, free labor the weapon of the other. Though Lin- coln was at that time forty-nine years old, his political experience, in contrast with that of Doug- las, was negligible. He afterward aptly described his early life in that expressive line from Gray, "The short and simple annals of the poor." He lacked regular schooling, and it was altogether from the practice of law that he had gained such formal education as he had. In law, however, he had become a master, and his position, to judge from the class of cases entrusted to him, was second to none in Illinois. To that severe yet wholesome cast of mind which the law establishes in men naturally lofty, Lincoln added the tonic influence of a sense of style not the verbal acrobatics of 54 LINCOLN AND THE UNION the rhetorician, but that power to make words and thought a unit which makes the artist of a man who has great ideas. How Lincoln came by this literary faculty is, indeed, as puzzling as how Burns came by it. But there it was, discip- lined by the court room, made pungent by famil- iarity with plain people, stimulated by constant reading of Shakespeare, and chastened by study of the Bible. It was arranged that Douglas and Lincoln should tour the State together in a series of joinu debates. As a consequence there followed a most interesting opposition of methods in the use of words, a contest between the method formed in Congress at a time when Congress was a perfect rhetorical academy, and that method of using words which was based on an arduous study of Blackstone, Shakespeare, and Isaiah. Lincoln is- sued from the debates one of the chief intellec- tual leaders of America, and with a place in English literature; Douglas came out a Senator from Illinois. But though Douglas kept his following together, and though Lincoln was voted down, to Lincoln belonged the real strategic victory. In order to save himself with his own people, Douglas had THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 55 been forced to make admissions that ruined him with the South. Because of these admissions the breach in the party of political evasion became irreparable. It was in the debate at Freeport that Douglas's fate overtook him, for Lincoln put this question: "Can the people of a United States territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a state constitution?" Douglas answered in his best style of political thunder. "It matters not," he said, "what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not go into a territory under the Constitu- tion; the people have the lawful means to intro- duce it or exclude it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour any- where unless it is supported by local police regu- lations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local legislatures; and if the people are opposed to slavery, they will elect rep- resentatives to that body who will by unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. 56 LINCOLN AND THE UNION Hence, no matter what the decision of the Su- preme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave terri- tory or a free territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska Bill." As to the moral aspect of his actions, Douglas must ultimately be judged by the significance which this position in which he placed himself assumed in his own mind. Friendly critics excuse him: an interpretation of the Dred Scott decision which explained it away as an irresponsible utter- ance on a subject outside the scope of the case, a mere obiter dictum, is the justification which is called in to save him from the charge of insincerity. His friends, today, admit that this interpretation was bad law, but maintain that it may have been good morals, and that Douglas honestly held it. But many of us have not yet advanced so far in critical generosity, and cannot help feeling that Douglas's position remains political legerdemain an attempt by a great officer of the government, professing to defend the Supreme Court, to show the people how to go through the motions of obedience to the Court while defeating its inten- tion. If not double-dealing in a strict sense, it must yet be considered as having in it the temper THE POLITICIANS AND THE NEW DAY 57 of double-dealing. 1 This was, indeed, the view of many men of his own day and, among them, of Lincoln. Yet the type of man on whom the masters of the game of politics relied saw noth- ing in Douglas's position at which to be disturb- ed. It was merely playing politics, and if that absorbing sport required one to carry water on both shoulders, why play the game! Douglas was the man for people like that. They cheered him to the echo and sent him back to the Senate. So well was this type understood by some of Lincoln's friends that they had begged him, at least according to tradition, not to put the ques- tion at Freeport, as by doing so he would enable Douglas to save himself with his constituency. Lincoln saw further, however. He understood better than they the forces then at work in America. The reply reported of him was: "If Douglas an- swers, he can never be President, and the battle of 1860 is worth a hundred of this. " Well might Yancey and his followers receive 1 There are three ways of regarding Douglas's position : (1) As merely a daring piece of evasion designed to hold all the Democrats together; (2) as an attempt, to secure his locality at all costs, taking his chances on the South; (3) as a sincere expression of the legal in- terpretation mentioned above. It is impossible in attempting to choose among these to escape wholly one's impression of the man's character. 58 LINCOLN AND THE UNION with a shout of joy the "Freeport Doctrine," as Douglas's supreme evasion was called. Should Southerners trust any longer the man who had evolved from the principle of let-' em-alone to the principle of double-dealing? However, the South- erners were far from controlling the situation. Though the events of 1858 had created discord in the Democratic party, they had not consolidated the South. Men like Toombs and Stephens were still hopeful of keeping the States together in the old bond of political evasion. The Democratic machine, damaged though it was, had not yet lost its hold on the moderate South, and while that continued to be the case, there was still power in it. CHAPTER IV THE CRISIS THE Southern moderates in 1859 form one of those political groups, numerous enough in history, who at a crisis arrest our imagination because of the irony of their situation. Unsuspecting, these men went their way, during the last summer of the old regime, busy with the ordinary affairs of state, absorbed in their opposition to the Southern radicals, never dreaming of the doom that was secretly moving toward them through the plans of John Brown. In the soft brilliancy of the Southern summer when the roses were in bloom, many grave gentlemen walked slowly up and down together under the oaks of their plantation ave- nues, in the grateful dusk, talking eagerly of how the scales trembled in Southern politics between Toombs and Yancey, and questioning whether the extremists could ride down the moderate South and reopen the slave trade. In all their wonder- 59 60 LINCOLN AND THE UNION ing whether Douglas would ever come back to them or would prove the blind Samson pulling down their temple about their ears, there was never a word about the approaching shadow which was so much more real than the shades of the falling night, and yet so entirely shut away from their observation. In this summer, Stephens withdrew as he thought from public life. With an intensely sensi- tive nature, he had at times flashes of strange feel- ing which an unsophisticated society would regard as prophetic inspirations. When he left Washing-- ton "on the beautiful morning of the 5th of March, 1859, he stood at the stern of the boat for some minutes gazing back at the capital." He had announced his intention of not standing again as a Representative, and one of his fellow-passengers asked jokingly whether he was thinking of his return as a Senator. Stephen's reply was full of emotion, "No, I never expect to see Washington again unless I am brought here as a prisoner of war. " During the summer he endeavored to cast off his intuition of approaching disaster. At his plantation, "Liberty Hall," he endeavored to be content with the innumerable objects associated with his youth; he tried to feel again the grace of THE CRISIS 61 the days that were gone, the mysterious loveliness of the Southern landscape with its immense fields, its forests, its great empty spaces filled with glow- ing sunshine. He tried to possess his troubled soul with the severe intellectual ardor of the law. But his gift of second sight would not rest. He could not overcome his intuition that, for all the peace and dreaminess of the outward world, destiny was upon him. Looking out from his spiritual seclu- sion, he beheld what seemed to him complete po- litical confusion, both local and national. His despairing mood found expression a little later in the words: "Indeed if we were now to have a Southern convention to determine upon the true policy of the South either in the Union or out of it, I should expect to see just as much profitless dis- cussion, disagreement, crimination, and recrimina- tion amongst the members of it from different states and from the same state, as we witness in the present House of Representatives between Democrats, Republicans, and Americans." Among the sources of confusion Stephens saw, close at home, the Southern battle over the reopen- ing of the slave trade. The reality of that issue had been made plain in May, 1859, when the Southern commercial congress at Vicksburg en- 62 LINCOLN AND THE UNION tertained at the same time two resolutions: one, that the convention should urge all Southern States to amend their constitutions by a clause prohibiting the increase of African slavery; the other, that the convention urge all the Legislatures of Southern States to present memorials to Con- gress asking the repeal of the law against African slave trade. Of these opposed resolutions, the latter was adopted on the last day of the conven- tion, 1 though the moderates fought hard against it. The split between Southern moderates and Southern radicals was further indicated by their differing attitudes toward the adventurers from the United States in Central America. The Vicks- burg Convention adopted resolutions which were thinly veiled endorsements of southward expan- sion. In the early autumn another Nicaraguan ex- pedition was nipped in the bud by the vigilance of American naval forces. Cobb, prime factor in the group of Southern moderates as well as Secretary of the Treasury, wrote to Buchanan expressing his satisfaction at the event, mentioning the work of his own department in bringing it about, and also 1 It is significant that the composition of these Southern com- mercial congresses and the Congress of the whole Southern people was strikingly different in personnel. Very few members of tbe commercial congresses reappear in the Confederate Congress. THE CRISIS 63 alluding to his arrangments to prevent slave trad- ing off the Florida coast. But the spirit of doubt was strong even among the moderates. Douglas was the target. Stephens gives a glimpse of it in a letter written during his last session in Congress. "Cobb called on me Saturday night," he writes. "He is exceedingly bitter against Douglas. I joked him a good deal, and told him he had better not fight, or he would certainly be whipped; that is, in driving Douglas out of the Democratic party. He said that if Douglas ever was restored to the confidence of the Democracy of Georgia, it would be over his dead body politically. This shows his excitement, that is all. I laughed at him, and told him he would run his feelings and his policy into the ground." The anger of Cobb, who was himself a confessed candidate for the Democratic nomination, was im- periling the Democratic national machine which Toombs was still struggling so resolutely to hold together. Indeed, as late as the autumn of 1859 the machine still held together. Then came the man of destiny, the bolt from the blue, the end of the chapter. A marvelous fanatic a sort of reincarnation of the grimmest of the Covenanters by one daring act shattered the 64 LINCOLN AND THE UNION machine and made impossible any further coali tion on the principle of "nothing doing." This man of destiny was John Brown, whose attack on Harper's Ferry took place October 16th, and whose execution by the authorities of Virginia on the charges of murder and treason occurred on the 2nd of December. The incident filled the South with consternation. The prompt condemnation of it by many Republi- can leaders did not offset, in the minds of South- erners, the fury of praise accorded by others. The South had a ghastly tradition derived chiefly from what is known as Nat Turner's Rebellion in Virginia, a tradition of the massacre of white women and children by negroes. As Brown had set out to rouse a slave rebellion, every Southerner familiar with his own traditions shuddered, identi- fying in imagination John Brown and Nat Turner. Horror became rage when the Southerners heard of enthusiastic applause in Boston and of Emer- son's description of Brown as "that new saint " who was to "make the gallows glorious like the cross." In the excitement produced by remarks such as this, justice was not done to Lincoln's censure. In his speech at Cooper Institute in New York, in February, 1860, Lincoln had said: THE CRISIS 65 " John Brown's effort . . . in its philosophy cor- responds with the many attempts related in history at the assassination of kings and emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people, until he fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures the attempt which ends in little else than in his own execution. " A few months afterwards, the Republican national convention condemned the act of Brown as " among the gravest of crimes. " An immediate effect of the John Brown episode was a passionate outburst from all the radical press of the South in defense of slavery. The fol- lowers of Yancey made the most of their opportu- nity. The men who voted at Vicksburg to reopen the slave trade could find no words to measure their hatred of every one who, at this moment of crisis, would not declare slavery a blessing. Many of the men who opposed the slave traders also felt that, in the face of possible slave insurrection, the peril of their families was the one paramount con- sideration. Nevertheless, it is easy for the special pleader to give a wrong impression of the sentiment of the time. A grim desire for self-preservation took possession of the South, as well as a deadly fear of any person or any thing that tended directly 66 LINCOLN AND THE UNION or indirectly to incite the blacks to insurrection Northerners of abolitionist sympathies were warned to leave the country, and in some cases they were tarred and feathered. Great anger was aroused by the detection of book-agents who were distribut- ing a furious polemic against slavery, The Impend- ing Crisis of the South: How to Meet It, by Hinton Rowan Helper, a Southerner of inferior social posi- tion belonging to the class known as poor whites. The book teemed with such sentences as this, addressing slaveholders: "Do you aspire to be- come victims of white non-slave-holding vengeance by day and of barbarous massacres by the negroes at night?" It is scarcely strange, therefore, that in 1859 no Southerner would hear a good word of anyone caught distributing the book. And yet, in the midst of all this vehement exaltation of slavery, the fight to prevent a reopening of the slave trade went bravely on. Stephens, writing to a friend who was correspondent for the Southern Con- federacy, in Atlanta, warned him in April, 1860, "neither to advocate disunion or the opening of the slave trade. The people here at present I believe are as much opposed to it as they are at the North; and I believe the Northern people could be in- duced to open it sooner than the Southern people. " THE CRISIS 67 The winter of 1859-1860 witnessed a famous con- gressional battle over the speakership. The new Congress which met in December contained 109 Republicans, 101 Democrats, and 27 Know-No th- ings. The Republican candidate for speaker was John Sherman of Ohio. As the first ballot showed that he could not command a majority, a Demo- crat from Missouri introduced this resolution: "Whereas certain members of this House, now in nomination for speaker, did endorse the book hereinafter mentioned, Resolved, That the doc- trines and sentiments of a certain book, called The Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It* are insurrectionary and hostile to the peace and ! tranquillity of the country, and that no member of this House, who has indorsed or recommended it, is fit to be speaker of the House. " During two months there were strange scenes in the House, while the clerk acted as temporary speaker and furious diatribes were thundered back and forth across the aisle that separated Repub- licans from Democrats, with a passage of fisticuffs or even a drawn pistol to add variety to the scene. The end of it all was a deal. Pennington, of the "People's Party" of New Jersey, who had sup- ported Sherman but had not endorsed Helper, (68 LINCOLN AND THE UNION was given the Republican support; a Know-Noth- ing was made sergeant-at-arms; and Know-No th- ing votes added to the Republican votes made Pennington speaker. In many Northern cities the news of his election was greeted with the great salute of a hundred guns, but at Richmond the papers came out in mourning type. Two great figures now advanced to the center of the Congressional stage Jefferson Davis, Senator from Mississippi, a lean eagle of a man with pierc- ing blue eyes, and Judah P. Benjamin, Senator from Louisiana, whose perpetual smile cloaked an intellect that was nimble, keen, and ruthless. Both men were destined to play leading roles in the lofty drama of revolution; each was to expe- rience a tragic ending of his political hope, one in exile, the other in a solitary proscription amid the ruins of the society for which he had sacrified his all. These men, though often spoken of as mere mouthpieces of Yancey, were in reality quite dif- ferent from him both in temper and in point of view. Davis, who was destined eventually to become the target of Yancey *s bitterest enmity, had re- fused ten years before to join in the secession movement which ignored Calhoun's doctrine that THE CRISIS 69 the South had become a social unit. Though a believer in slavery under the conditions of the moment, Davis had none of the passion of the slave baron for slavery at all costs. Furthermore, as events were destined to show in a startlingly dramatic way, he was careless of South Carolina's passion for state rights. He was a practical poli- tician, but not at all the old type of the party of political evasion, the type of Toombs. No other man of the moment was on the whole so well able to combine the elements of Southern politics against those more negative elements of which Toombs was the symbol. The history of the Con- federacy shows that the combination which Davis now effected was not as thorough as he supposed it was. But at the moment he appeared to succeed and seemed to give common purpose to the vast majority of the Southern people. With his ally Benjamin, he struck at the Toombs policy of a National Democratic party. On the day following the election of Pennington. Davis introduced in the Senate a series of reso- lutions which were to serve as the Southern ulti- matum, and which demanded of Congress the protection of slavery against territorial legislatures. This was but carrying to its logical conclusion that 70 LINCOLN AND THE UNION Dred Scott decision which Douglas and his follow- ers proposed to accept. If Congress could not restrict slavery in the territories, how could its creature, a territorial legislature do so? And yet the Douglas men attempted to take away the power from Congress and to retain it for the ter- ritorial legislatures. Senator Pugh of Ohio had already locked horns with Davis on this point, and had attempted to show that a territorial legis- lature was independent of Congress. "Then I would ask the Senator further, " retorted the logical Davis, "why it is he makes an appropriation to pay members of the territorial legislature; how it is that he invests the Governor with veto power over their acts; and how it is that he appoints judges to decide upon the validity of their acts. " In the Democratic convention which met at Charleston in April, 1860, the waning power of political evasion made its last real stand against the rising power of political positivism. To accept Douglas and the idea that somehow territorial leg- islatures were free to do what Congress could not do, or to reject Douglas and endorse Davis's ulti- matum that in substance was the issue. "In this convention where there should be confidence and harmony," said the Charleston Mercury, "it is THE CRISIS 71 plain that men feel as if they were going into a battle." In the committee on resolutions where the States were equally represented, the majority were anti-Douglas ; they submitted a report affirm- ing Davis's position that territorial legislatures had no right to prohibit slavery and that the Federal Government should protect slavery against them. The minority refused to go further than an ap- proval of the Dred Scott case and a pledge to abide by all future decisions of the Supreme Court. After both reports had been submitted, there fol- lowed the central event of the convention the now famous speech by Yancey which repudiated political evasion from top to bottom, frankly de- fended slavery, and demanded either complete guarantees for its continued existence or, as an alternative, Southern independence. Pugh in- stantly replied and summed up Yancey's speech as a demand upon Northern Democrats to say that slavery was right, and that it was their duty not only to let slavery alone but to aid in extend- ing it. "Gentlemen of the South," he exclaimed, "you mistake us you mistake us we will not doit." In the full convention, where the representation of the States was not equal, the Douglas men, after 72 LINCOLN AND THE UNION hot debate, forced the adoption of the minority report. Thereupon the Alabama delegation pro- tested and formally withdrew from the conven- tion, and other delegations followed. There was wild excitement in Charleston, where that even- ing in the streets Yancey addressed crowds that cheered for a Southern republic. The remaining history of the Democratic nominations is a matter of detail. The Charleston convention adjourned without making nominations. Each of its frag- ments reorganized as a separate convention, and ultimately two Democratic tickets were put into the field, with Breckinridge of Kentucky as the candidate on the Yancey ticket and Douglas on the other. While the Democrats were thus making history through their fateful break-up into separate parties, a considerable number of the so-called best people of the country determined that they had nowhere politically to lay their heads. A few of the old Whigs were still unable to consort either with Re- publicans or with Democrats, old or new. The Know-Nothings, likewise, though their number had been steadily melting away, had not entirely disappeared. To unite these political remnants in any definite political whole seemed beyond human THE CRISIS 73 ingenuity. A common sentiment, however, they did have a real love of the Union and a real un- happiness, because its existence appeared to be threatened. The outcome was that they organized the Constitutional Union Party, nominating for President John Bell of Tennessee, and for Vice- President Edward Everett of Massachusetts. Their platform was little more than a profession of love of the Union and a condemnation of sectional selfishness. This Bell and Everett ticket has a deeper sig- nificance than has generally been admitted. It reveals the fact that the sentiment of Union, in distinction from the belief in the Union, had be- come a real force in American life. There could be no clearer testimony to the strength of this feel- ing than this spectacle of a great congregation of moderate people, unable to agree upon anything except this sentiment, stepping between the sec- tional parties like a resolute wayfarer going for- ward into darkness along a perilous strand between two raging seas. That this feeling of Union was the same thing as the eager determination of the Republicans, in 1860, to control the Government is one of those historical fallacies that have had their day. The Republican party became, in time and 74 LINCOLN AND THE UNION under stress of war, the refuge of this sentiment and proved sufficiently far-sighted to merge its identity temporarily in the composite Union party of 1864. But in 1860 it was still a sectional party. Among its leaders Lincoln was perhaps the only Unionist in the same sense as Bell and Everett. Perhaps the truest Unionists of the North, out- side the Constitutional Union Party, in 1860, were those Democrats in the following of Douglas who, after fighting to the last ditch against both the sectional parties, were to accept, in 1861, the al- ternative of war rather than dissolution. The course of Douglas himself, as we shall see hereafter, showed that in his mind there was a fixed limit of concession beyond which he could not go. When circumstances forced him to that limit, the senti- ment of Union took control of him, swept aside his political jugglery, abolished his time-serving, and drove him into cooperation with his bitterest foes that the Union might be saved. Nor was the pure sentiment of Union confined to the North and West. Though undoubtedly the sentiment of locality was more powerful through the South, yet when the test came in the election of 1860, the leading candidate of the upper South, in Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, was John Bell, the Con- THE CRISIS 75 stitutional Unionist. In every Southern State this sentiment was able to command a considerable part of the vote. z Widely different in temper were those stern and resolute men whose organization, in perfect fight- ing trim, faced eagerly the divided Democrats. The Republicans had no division among themselves upon doctrine. Such division as existed was due to the ordinary rivalry of political leaders. In the opinion of all his enemies and of most Americans, Seward was the Republican man of the hour. During much of 1859 he had discreetly withdrawn from the country and had left to his partisans the conduct of his campaign, which seems to have been going well when he returned in the midst of the turmoil following the death of John Brown. Nevertheless he was disturbed over his prospects, for he found that in many minds, both North and South, he was looked upon as the ultimate cause of all the turmoil. His famous speech on the "ir- repressible conflict" was everywhere quoted as an exultant prophecy of these terrible latter days. It was long the custom to deny to Seward any 1 A possible exception was South Carolina. As the presidential electors were appointed by the legislature, there is no certain record of minority sentiment. 76 LINCOLN AND THE UNION good motive in a speech which he now delivered, just as it was to deny Webster any good motive for his famous 7th of March speech. But such criticism is now less frequent than it used to be. Both men were seeking the Presidency; both, we may fairly believe, were shocked by the turmoil of political currents ; each tried oiling the waters, and in the attempt each ruined his candidacy. Sew- ard's speech in condemnation of John Brown in February, 1860, was an appeal to the conservative North against the radical North, and to many of his followers it seemed a change of front. It certainly gained him no new friends and it lost him some old ones, so that his star as a presiden- tial candidate began its decline. The first ballot in the Republican convention surprised the country. Of the votes, 233 were necessary for a choice. Seward had only 173j^. Next to him, with 102 votes, stood none of the leading candidates, but the comparatively obscure Lincoln. A gap of more than 50 votes separated Lincoln from Cameron, Chase, and Bates. On the second ballot Seward gained 11 votes, while Lin- coln gained 79. The enemies of Seward, finding it impossible to combine on any of the conspicuous candidates, were moving toward Lincoln, the man THE CRISIS 77 with fewest enemies. The third ballot gave Lin- coln the nomination. We have seen that one of the basal questions of the time was which new political group should absorb the Whig remainder. The Constitutional Union party aimed to accomplish this. The Re- publicans sought to out-maneuver them. They made their platform as temperate as they could and yet consistent with the maintenance of their opposition to Douglas and popular sovereignty; and they went no further in their anti-slavery demands than that the territories should be pre- served for free labor. Another basal question had been considered in the Republican platform. Where would Northern capital stand in the reorganization of parties? Was capital, like men, to become frankly sectional or would it remain impersonal, careless how nations rose or fell, so long as dividends continued? To some extent capital had given an answer. When, in the excitement following the John Brown inci- dent, a Southern newspaper published a white list of New York merchants whose political views should commend them to Southerners, and a black list of those who were objectionable, many New Yorkers sought a place in the white list. Northern 78 LINCOLN AND THE UNION capital had done its part in financing the revived slave trade. August Belmont, the New York re- presentative of the Rothschilds, was one of the close allies of Davis, Yancey, and Benjamin in their war upon Douglas. In a word, a great por- tion of Northern capital had its heart where its investments were in the South. But there was other capital which obeyed the same law, and which had investments in the North; and with this capital the Republicans had been trafficking. They had succeeded in winning over the power- ful manufacturing interests of Pennsylvania, the pivotal State that had elected Buchanan in 1856. The steps by which the new party of enthusi- asm made its deal with the body of capital which was not at one with Belmont and the Democrats are not essential to the present narrative. Two facts suffice. In 1857 a great collapse in American business "the panic of fifty-seven" led the commercial world to turn to the party in power for some scheme of redress. But their very prin- ciples, among which was non-intervention in busi- ness, made the Democrats feeble doctors for such a need, and they evaded the situation. The Re- publicans, with their insistence on positivism in government, had therefore an opportunity to make THE CRISIS 79 a new application of the doctrine of governmental aid to business. In the spring of 1860, the Re- publican House of Representatives passed the Morrill tariff bill, consideration of which was post- poned by the Democratic Senate. But it served its purpose: it was a Republican manifesto. The Republicans felt that this bill, together with their party platform, gave the necessary guarantee to the Pennsylvania manufacturers, and they there- fore entered the campaign confident they would carry Pennsylvania nor was their confidence misplaced. The campaign was characterized by three things : by an ominous quiet coupled with great intensity of feeling; by the organization of huge party so- cieties in military form "Wide-awakes" for Lin- coln, numbering 400,000, and "Minute Men" for Breckinridge, with a membership chiefly South- ern; and by the perfect frankness, in all parts of the South, of threats of secession in case the Re- publicans won. In none of the States which eventually seceded were any votes cast for Lincoln, with the excep- tion of a small number in Virginia. In almost all the other Southern States and in the slave-hold- ing border States, all the other candidates made 80 LINCOLN AND THE UNION respectable showings. In Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, Bell led. But everywhere else in the other slave-holding States Breckinridge led, ex- cepting in Missouri where Douglas won by a few hundred. Every free State except New Jersey went for Lincoln. And yet he did not have a ma- jority of the popular vote, which stood: Lincoln, 1,866,452; Douglas, 1,376,957; Breckinridge, 849,- 781; Bell, 588,879. x The majority against Lincoln was nearly a million. The distribution of the votes was such that Lincoln had in the Electoral College, 180 electors; Breckinridge, 72; Bell, 39; Douglas, 12. In neither House of Congress did the Repub- licans have a majority. 1 The figures of the popular vote are variously given by different compilers. These are taken from Stanwood, A History of the Presi- dency. CHAPTER V SECESSION IN tracing American history from 1854 to 1860 we cannot fail to observe that it reduces itself chiefly to a problem in that science which poli- ticians understand so well applied psychology. Definite types of men moulded by the conditions of those days are the determining factors not the slavery question in itself; not, primarily, eco- nomic forces; not a theory of government, nor a clash of theories; not any one thing; but the fluid, changeful forces of human nature, battling with circumstances and expressing themselves in the fashion of men's minds. To say this is to ac- knowledge the fatefulness of sheer feeling. Davis described the situation exactly when he said, in 1860, "A sectional hostility has been substituted for a general fraternity." To his own question, "Where is the remedy?" he gave the answer, "In the hearts of the people. " There, after all, is the 6 81 82 LINCOLN AND THE UNION conclusion of the whole matter. The strife be- tween North and South had ceased to be a thing of the head; it had become a thing of the heart. Granted the emotions of 1860, the way in which our country staggered into war has all the terrible fascination of a tragedy on the theme of fate. That a secession movement would begin some- where in the South before the end of 1860 was a foregone conclusion. South Carolina was the logical place, and in South Carolina the inevitable occurred. The presidential election was quickly followed by an election of delegates, on the 6th of December, to consider in convention the rela- tions of the State with the Union. The arguments before the Convention were familiar and had been advocated since 1851. The leaders of the dis- unionists were the same who had led the unsuccess- ful movement of ten years before. The central figure was Rhett, who never for a moment had wavered. Consumed his life long by the one idea of the independence of South Carolina, that stern enthusiast pressed on to a triumphant conclusion. The powers which had defeated him in 1851 were now either silent or converted, so that there was practically no opposition. In a burst of pas- sionate zeal the independence of South Carolina SECESSION 83 was proclaimed on December 20, 1860, by an ordi- nance of secession. Simultaneously, by one of those dramatic coin- cidences which make history stranger than fiction, Lincoln took a step which supplemented this ac- tion and established its tragic significance. What that step was will appear in a moment. Even before the secession began, various types of men in politics had begun to do each after his kind. Those whom destiny drove first into a corner were the lovers of political evasion. The issue was forced upon them by the instantaneous demand of the people of South Carolina for pos- session of forts in Charleston Harbor whi'eh were controlled by the Federal Government. Antici- pating such a demand, Major Robert Anderson, the commandant at Charleston, had written to Buchanan on the 23d of November that "Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney must be garrisoned immediately, if the Government determines to keep command of this harbor. " In the mind of every American of the party of political evasion, there now began a sad, internal conflict. Every one of them had to choose among three courses: to shut his eyes and to continue to wail that the function of government is to do 84 LINCOLN AND THE UNION nothing; to make an end of political evasion and to come out frankly in approval of the Southern position; or to break with his own record, to emerge from his evasions on the opposite side, and to confess himself first and before all a supporter of the Union. One or another of these three courses, sooner or later, every man of the President's fol- lowing chose. We shall see presently the relative strength of the three groups into which that fol- lowing broke and what strange courses some- times tragic, sometimes comic two of the three pursued. For the moment our concern is how the division manifested itself among the heads of the oarty at Washington. ^he President took the first of the three courses. He held it with the nervous clutch of a weak nature until overmastered by two grim men who gradually hypnotized his will. The turning-point for Bu- chanan, and the last poor crisis in his inglorious career, came on Sunday, December 30th. Before that day arrived, his vacillation had moved his friends to pity and his enemies to scorn. One of his best friends wrote privately, "The President is pale with fear"; and the hostile point of view found expression in such comments as this, "Buch- anan, it is said, divides his time between praying SECESSION 85 and crying. Such a perfect imbecile never held office before. " With the question what to do about the forts hanging over his bewildered soul, Buchanan sent a message to Congress on December 4, 1860, in which he sought to defend the traditional evasive policy of his party. He denied the constitutional right of secession, but he was also denied his own right to oppose such a course. Seward was not unfair to the mental caliber of the message when he wrote to his wife that Buchanan showed "con- clusively that it is the duty of the President to execute the laws unless somebody opposes him; and that no State has a right to go out of the Union unless it wants to. " This message of Buchanan's hastened the in- evitable separation of the Democratic party into its elements. The ablest Southern member of the Cabinet, Cobb, resigned. He was too strong an intellect to continue the policy of "nothing doing" now that the crisis had come. He was too de- voted a Southerner to come out of political evas- ion except on one side. On the day Cobb resign- ed the South Carolina Representatives called on Buchanan and asked him not to make any change in the disposition of troops at Charleston, and par- 86 LINCOLN AND THE UNION ticularly not to strengthen Sumter, a fortress on au island in the midst of the harbor, without at least giving notice to the state authorities. What was said in this interview was not put in writing but was remembered afterward in different ways with unfortunate consequences. Every action of Buchanan in this fateful month continued the disintegration of his following. Just as Cobb had to choose between his reasonings as a Democratic party man and his feelings as a South- erner, so the aged Cass, his Secretary of State, and an old personal friend, now felt constrained to choose between his Democratic reasoning and his Northern sympathies, and resigned from the Cab- inet on the llth of December. Buchanan then turned instinctively to the strongest natures that remained among his close associates. It is a com- pliment to the innate force of Jeremiah S. Black^ the Attorney-General, that Buchanan advanced him to the post of Secretary of State and allowed him to name as his successor in the Attorney- Generalship Edwin M. Stanton. Both were tried Democrats of the old style, "let-'em-alone" sort; and both had supported the President in his Kan- sas policy. But each, like every other member of his party, was being forced by circumstances SECESSION 87 to make his choice among the three inevitable courses, and each chose the Northern side. At once the question of the moment was whether the new Secretary of State and his powerful hench- men would hypnotize the President. For a couple of weeks the issue hung in the bal- ance. Then there appeared at Washington com- missioners from South Carolina "empowered to treat . . . for the delivery of forts . . . and other real estate" held by the Federal Government within their State. On the day following their arrival, Buchanan was informed by telegraph that Anderson had dismantled Fort Moultrie on the north side of the harbor, had spiked its guns, and had removed its garrison to the island fortress, Sumter, which was supposed to be far more de- fensible. At Charleston his action was interpreted as preparation for war; and all South Carolinians saw in it a violation of a pledge which they believed the President had given their congressmen, three weeks previous, in that talk which had not been written down. Greatly excited and fearful of de- signs against them, the South Carolina commis- sioners held two conferences with the President on the 27th and 28th of December. They believed that he had broken his word, and they told him so. 88 LINCOLN AND THE UNION Deeply agitated and refusing to admit that he had committed himself at the earlier conference, he said that Anderson had acted on his own respon- sibility, but he refused to order him back to the now ruined Fort Moultrie. One remark which he let fall has been remembered as evidence ot his querulous state of mind: "You are pressing me too importunately, " exclaimed the unhappy Presi- dent; "you don't give me time to consider; you don't give me time to say my prayers; I always say my prayers when required to act upon any great state affair." One remembers Hampden "seeking the Lord" about ship money, and one realizes that the same act may have a vastly dif- ferent significance in different temperaments. Buchanan, however, was virtually ready to give way to the demand of the commissioners. He drew up a paper to that effect and showed it to the Cabinet. Then the turning-point came. In a painful interview, Black, long one of his most trusted friends, told him of his intention to resign, and that Stanton would go with him and probably also the Postmaster-General, Holt. The idea of losing the support of these strong personalities terrified Buchanan, who immediately fell into a panic. Handing Black the paper he had drawn SECESSION 89 up, Buchanan begged him to retain office and to alter the paper as he saw fit. To this Black agreed. The demand for the surrender of the forts was refused; Anderson was not ordered back to Moul- trie; and for the brief remainder of Buchanan's administration Black acted as prime minister. A very powerful section of the Northern democ- racy, well typified by their leaders at Washington, had thus emerged from political evasion on the Northern side. These men, known afterwards as War Democrats, combined with the Republicans to form the composite Union party which sup- ported Lincoln. It is significant that Stanton eventually reappeared in the Cabinet as Lincoln's Secretary of War, and that along with him ap- peared another War Democrat, Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy. With them, at last, Douglas, the greatest of all the old Demo- crats of the North, took his position. What be- came of the other factions of the old Democratic party remains to be told. While Buchanan, early in the month, was weep- ing over the pitilessness of fate, more practical Northerners were grappling with the question of what was to be done about the situation. In their thoughts they anticipated a later statesman and 00 LINCOLN AND THE UNION realized that they were confronted by 9 condi- tion and not by a theory. Secession was at last a reality. Which course should they take? What strikes us most forcibly, as we look back upon that day, is the widespread desire for peace. The abolitionists form a conspicuous example. Their watchword was "Let the erring sisters go in peace." Wendell Phillips, their most gifted orator, a master of spoken style at once simple and melodious, declaimed splendidly against war. Garrison, in The Liberator, followed his example. Whittier put the same feeling into his verse : They break the links of Union; shall we light The flames of hell to weld anew the chain On that red anvil where each blow is pain? Horace Greeley said in an editorial in the New York Tribune: "If the cotton states shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we shall insist on letting them go in peace. . . . Whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep them in. We hope never to live in a republic where one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets. " The Democrats naturally clung to their tradi- tions, and, even when they went over, as Black SECESSION 91 and Stanton did, to the Anti-Southern group, they still hoped that war would not be the result. Equally earnest against war were most of the Re- publicans, though a few, to be sure, were ready to swing the "Northern hammer." Sumner pro- phesied that slavery would "go down in blood." But the bulk of the Republicans were for a sec- tional compromise, and among them there was general approbation of a scheme which contem- plated reviving the line of the Missouri Compro- mise, and thus frankly admitting the existence of two distinct sections, and guaranteeing to each the security of its own institutions. The greatest Republican boss of that day, Thurlow Weed, came Out in defense of this plan. No power was arrayed more zealously on the side of peace of any kind than the power of money. It was estimated that two hundred millions of dollars were owed by Southerners to Northerners. War, it was reasoned, would cause the cancellation of these obligations. To save their Southern ac- counts, the moneyed interests of the North joined the extremists of Abolition in pleading to let the erring sisters go in peace, if necessary, rather than provoke them to war and the confiscation of debts. It was the dread of such an outcome 92 LINCOLN AND THE UNION which finally happened and ruined many North- ern firms that caused the stock-market in New York to go up and down with feverish uncer- tainty. Banks suspended payment in Washing- ton, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. The one im- portant and all-engrossing thing in the mind's eye of all the financial world at this moment was that specter of unpaid Southern accounts. At this juncture, Senator Crittenden of Ken- tucky submitted to the Senate a plan which has been known ever since as the Crittenden Com- promise. It was similar to Weed's plan, but it also provided that the division of the country on the Missouri Compromise line should be established by a constitutional amendment, which would thus forever solidify sectionalism. Those elements of the population generally called the conservative and the responsible were delighted. Edward Eve- rett wrote to Crittenden, "I saw with great sat- isfaction your patriotic movement, and I wish from the bottom of my heart it might succeed"; and August Belmont in a letter to Crittenden spoke for the moneyed interest: "I have yet to meet the first Union-loving man, in or out of politics, who does not approve your compromise proposition. ..." SECESSION 93 The Senate submitted the Compromise to a Committee of Thirteen. In this committee the Southern leaders, Toombs and Davis, were both willing to accept the Compromise, if a majority of the Republican members would agree. Indeed, if the Republicans would agree to it, there seemed no reason why a new understanding between the sections might not be reached, and no reason why sectionalism, if accepted as the basis of the govern- ment, might not solve the immediate problem and thus avert war. In this crisis all eyes were turned to Seward, that conspicuous Republican who was generally looked upon as the real head of his party. And Seward, at that very moment, was debating whether to accept Lincoln's offer of the Secretary- ship of State, for he considered it vital to have an understanding with Lincoln on the subject of the Compromise. He talked the matter over with Weed, and they decided that Weed should go to Springfield and come to terms with Lincoln. It was the interview between Weed and Lincoln held, it seems, on the very day on which the Ordi- nance of Secession was adopted which gave to that day its double significance. Lincoln refused point-blank to accept the com- promise and he put his refusal in writing. The 94 LINCOLN AND THE UNION historic meaning of his refusal, and the signifi- cance of his determination not to solve the problem of the hour by accepting a dual system of govern- ment based on frankly sectional assumptions, were probably, in a measure, lost on both Weed and Seward. They had, however, no misunderstand- ing of its practical effect. This crude Western lawyer had certain ideas from which he would not budge, and the party would have to go along with him. Weed and Seward therefore promptly fell into line, and Seward accepted the Secretaryship and came out in opposition to the Compromise. Other Republicans with whom Lincoln had com- municated by letter made known his views, and Greeley announced them in The Tribune. The outcome was the solid alignment of all the Repub- licans in Congress against the Compromise. As a result, this last attempt to reunite the sections came to nothing. Not more than once or twice, if ever, in American history, has there been such an anxious New Year's Day as that which ushered in 1861. A few days before, a Republican Congressman had written to one of his constituents: "The heavens are indeed black and an awful storm is gathering ... I see no way that either North or South can escape its SECESSION 95 fury." Events were indeed moving fast toward disaster. The garrison at Sumter was in need of supplies, and in the first week of the new year Buchanan attempted to relieve its wants. But a merchant vessel, the Star of the West, by which supplies were sent, was fired upon by the South Carolina authorities as it approached the harbor and was compelled to turn back. This incident caused the withdrawal from the Cabinet of the last opposition members Thompson, of Mississippi, the Secretary of the Interior, and Thomas, of Maryland, the Secretary of the Treasury. In the course of the month five Southern States followed South Carolina out of the Union, and their Sena- tors and Representatives resigned from the Con- gress of the United States. The resignation of Jefferson Davis was commu- nicated to the Senate in a speech of farewell which even now holds the imagination of the student, and which to the men of that day, with the Union crumbling around them, seemed one of the most mournful and dramatic of orations. Davis pos- sessed a beautiful, melodious voice; he had a noble presence, tall, erect, spare, even ascetic, with a flashing blue eye. He was deeply moved by the occasion; his address was a requiem. That he 36 LINCOLN AND THE UNION withdrew in sorrow but with fixed determination, no one who listened to him could doubt. Early in February, the Southern Confederacy was formed with Davis as its provisional President. With the prophetic vision of a logical mind, he saw that war was inevitable, and he boldly proclaimed his vision. In various speeches on his way South, he had as- sured the Southern people that y/ar was coming, and that it would be long and bloody. The withdrawal of these Southern members threw the control of the House into the hands of the Republicans. Their realization of their power was expressed in two measures which also passed the Senate; Kansas was admitted as a State with an anti-slavery constitution; and the Morrill tar- iff, which they had failed to pass the previous spring, now became law. Thus the Republicans began redeeming their pledges to the anti-slavery men on the one hand and to the commercial inter- est on the other. The time had now arrived for the Republican nominee to proceed from Spring- field to Washington. The journey was circuitous in order to enable Lincoln to speak at a number of places. Never before, probably, had the Northern people felt such tense strain as at that moment; never had they looked to an incoming President SECESSION 97 with such anxious doubt. Would he prevent war? Or, if he could not do that, would he be able to extricate the country Heaven alone knew how! without a terrible ordeal? Since his elec- tion, Lincoln had remained quietly at Springfield. Though he had influenced events through letters to Congressmen, his one conspicuous action during that winter was the defeat of the Crittenden Com- promise. The Southern President had called upon his people to put their house in order as preparation for war. What, now, had Lincoln to say to the people of the North? The biographers of Lincoln have not satisfac- torily revealed the state of his mind between elec- tion and inauguration. We may safely guess that his silence covered a great internal struggle. Ex- cept for his one action in defeating the Compromise, he had allowed events to drift; but by that one action he had taken upon himself the responsibil- ity for the drift. Though the country at that time did not fully appreciate this aspect of the situa- tion, who now can doubt that Lincoln did? His mind was always a lonely one. His very humor has in it, so often, the note of solitude, of one who is laughing to make the best of things, of one who is spiritually alone. During those months when 98 LINCOLN AND THE UNION the country drifted from its moorings, and when war was becoming steadily more probable, Lin- coln, after the manner of the prophets, wrestled alone with the problems which he saw before him. From the little we know of his inward state, it is hard for us to conclude that he was happy. A story which is told by his former partner, Mr. Herndon, seems significant. As Lincoln was leav- ing his unpretentious law-office for the last time, he turned to Mr. Herndon and asked him not to take down their old sign. "Let it hang there undisturbed," said he. "Give our clients to un- derstand that the election of a President makes no difference in the firm. ... If I live, I'm coming back some time, and then we'll go right on practising law as if nothing had happened. " How far removed from self-sufficiency was the man whose thoughts, on the eve of his elevation to the Presidency, lingered in a provincial law office, fondly insistent that only death should pre- vent his returning some time and resuming in those homely surroundings the life he had led pre- vious to his greatness. In a mood of wistfulness and of intense preoccupation, he began his journey to Washington. It was not the mood from which to strike fire and kindle hope. To the anxious, SECESSION 99 listening country his speeches on the journey to Washington were disappointing. Perhaps his strangely sensitive mind felt too powerfully the fatefulness of the moment and reacted with a sort of lightness that did not really represent the real man. Be that as it may, he was never less convincing than at that time. Nor were people impressed by his bearing. Often he appeared awkward, too much in appearance the country lawyer. He acted as a man who was ill at ease and he spoke as a man who had nothing to say. Gloom darkened the North as a consequence of these un- fortunate speeches, for they expressed an opti- mism which we cannot believe he really felt, and which hurt him in the estimation of the country. " There is no crisis but an artificial one, " was one of liis ill-timed assurances, and another, "There is nothing going wrong. . . . There is nothing that really hurts any one." Of his supporters some were discouraged ; others were exasperated ; and an able but angry partisan even went so far as to write in a private letter, "Lincoln is a Simple Susan. " The fourth of March arrived, and with it the end of Lincoln's blundering. One good omen for the success of the new Administration was the presence of Douglas on the inaugural platform. 100 LINCOLN AND THE UNION He had accepted fate, deeply as it wounded him, and had come out of the shattered party of eva- sion on the side of his section. For the purpose of showing his support of the administration at this critical time, he had taken a place on the stand where Lincoln was to speak. By one of those curious little dramatic touches with which chance loves to embroider history, the presence of Douglas became a gracious detail in the memory of the day. Lincoln, worn and awkward, con- tinued to hold his hat in his hand. Douglas, with the tact born of social experience, stepped forward and took it from him without exposing Lincoln's embarrassment. The inaugural address which Lincoln now pro- nounced had little similarity to those unfortunate utterances which he had made on the journey to Washington. The cloud that had been over him, whatever it was, had lifted. Lincoln was ready for his great labor. The inaugural con- tained three main propositions. Lincoln pledged himself not to interfere directly or indirectly with slavery in the States where it then existed; he promised to support the enforcement of the fugitive slave law; and he declared he would maintain the Union. "No State," said he, "upon SECESSION 101 its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union .... To the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly en- joins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. ... In doing this, there need be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to n