THE MONEY PROBLEM. By Arthur Kitson. (8vo. 3>.6J.) New Edition in Press " Here is a book which disturbs classifications, which is unorthodox, which gets aside some very widely-received opinions as of little worth, and which presents its own side of certain vital questions with a persistency and logical Force from which it is hard for an unprejudiced reader to escape. . . . The end and aim of Mr. Kitson's whole argument is to build up a theory of money upon the lines of a purely mathematical induction. He follows Prof. Jevons In the endeavour to show that all the terms with which Political Economy deals involve the consideration of QUANTITIFS. But he diverges from Jevons at the point where the latter becomes illogical ; for indeed it is illogical to define value as a ' ratio of exchange,' and then to talk about a ' standard unit of value.' It is manifest that we cannot have a ' standard unit ' of a ' ratio.' The notion that such a thing is possible is responsible for the theory that gold and silver can be at once a standard of value and a medium of ex- change. When economists get rid of that theory, the community will get rid of panics not before. ' Values are ideal creations, and can only be properly expressed in terms of the ideal numbers.' Such is Mr. Kitson's remarkable announcement, and it is one which entitles him to a front rank in Economic discussion. His volume will be pooh-poohed by the orthodox eilosophers, and all the fogies will hold up their hands in horror. But Mr. Itson has got hold of the truth, and his theory cannot be permanently sub- verted. ... He has only to wait until education shall bring men up to his own level of thought, and so make it possible to conform practice to theory." Extract from Review of American Edition by the Evening Bulletin, Phila- delphia. " I can say with much pleasure that the presentation of Political Economy in the first few chapters is masterly. It is the best Economic book, the fullest, deepest, and truest I have ever seen." ROBERT BLATCHFORD, Editor of Clarion. " Jevons and others have pointed out the theoretic advantage of founding credit-money on a basis of general commodities. But Mr. Kitson has cer- tainly given a very able exposition of what we may term the theoretic practica- bility of such a system. His principles are thus summarised (p. 181) : First, Bank-notes should be issued against wealth and not against debt ; Second, Banks should not undertake obligations which they cannot always perform ; Third, Banks should be established and operated for the convenience and assistance of commerce, not for enriching bankers and shareholders.' . . . The most interesting part of Mr. Kitson's argument is his insistence that money has by right no other function than that of exchange. You may insure your instruments of exchange in any way you like, but that insurance is not money. A currency based on commodities is, he urges, the only sound sufficient currency ; its free issue would break the power of money-brokers and bankers and would secure a community against injurious fluctuations of value due to excesses or shortages of gold or any other artificially selected basis. The dangers of our existing unregulated credit systems are, however, very real, and Mr. Kitson is correct in attributing panics in large measure to the narrowness of the gold basis." Extract from Review by Westminster Gazette, London. " I venture to assert that your book was far easier reading for me than most economists. The fact is, my own mind has been marching along your own line of thought regarding the economics of money for four years, and the service of your book lay mainly in enabling me to advance along a smooth highway instead of cutting my way through a jungle. I have come to the conclusion that money is a common denominator of value, expresses ratios instead of measuring utility, and needed no material base. I have not, however, been able to carry out that principle across the entire field of money doctrine and reshape the doctrine of all the special branches in accordance with it. This you have been able to do, and in thus making the science of money fairly complete and self-consistent from the outset you have, it seems to me, established a claim to recognition much greater than others (like myself) who" have caught a glimmer or detected the bottom principle, but who have not had the analytic power to reorganize their entire body of doc- trine and make it a self-consistent whole. Your illustrations, also, are new and extremely helpful. I confess your treatment of Gresham's law was an ' eye-opener ' to me." PROFESSOR E. A. ROSS, Leland, Stanford University, California. PROFESSOR JOHN KELLY, Ph.D. (of Pittsfleld, Mass., U.S.A.), write* concerning this book : " I congratulate you upon having written the bet work on Currency In the English if not in any language." An Open Letter to the Right Hon. David Lloyd-George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the Cause of Strikes. (By Arthur Kitson, President of the B. 6- C. Reform League.) The Daily Herald, of London, of July 23, 1912, says : BANK MONOPOLY AND THE GREAT UNREST. We have endeavoured more than once to present and to trace the inti- mate connexion between our present bank monopoly system and the great unrest. As a cardinal cause of existing evils and anomalies and of the well- founded industrial insurrection in our midst, it has been no easy matter to make this clear, in view of the complex and confusing side issues which party warfare so constantly conjures up. It is all the more pleasing to us, then, in face of the difficulties, to have lighted upon a document which serves to confirm, in a most remarkable degree and with no uncertain voice, all our strictures, even the most outspoken and apparently daring, upon this all- vital question to the workers. A MERCILESS INDICTMENT. The document we allude to, which has come into our hands since writing the foregoing articles, is an " Open Letter to the Right Hon. David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the causes of Strikes and Bank Failures." It is written by one who is manifestly a master of his subject, and by one, moreover, who possesses that rare quality nowadays of an un- flinching moral courage. His indictment of our entirely irrational system is as clear as it is uncompromising, and his remedy in the direction of reform is, save in one important point, the same as our own. A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE. He opens up his impeachment with the story of an illuminating experience, and one, since it embodies the impressions of a non-Briton, every citizen of this kingdom in reading it should take to heart. The incident very appro- priatelyfctook place on the terrace of the House of Commons. The author of the book referred to, Mr. Arthur Kitson, found himself among a group of public men discussing the causes of present upheavals throughout the labour world. The company, representing a variety of views, declared each his own remedy one after the other in reply to the question propounded as to what reform our nation was in most need. One said, " Tariff Reform," another " Franchise Reform," another " Female Suffrage," another " the Single Tax," another " Right to Work," while yet another declared In favour of " Home Rule " I The question was then put to the distinguished stranger, a well-known American writer, and his remarks were " so unusual, and created so much astonishment, that one of the group carefully noted his remarks In shorthand," and these we welcome and gladly reproduce as Mr. Kitson prints them. . . . THE PESTILENTIAL BLIGHT. Mr. Arthur Kitson's little book is remarkable in many ways. In his researches into the causes of industrial unrest he has evidently delved deeply Into masses of authorities. He recognizes fully, as we do, the vitiated system of bank monopoly which hangs over our commerce, our trade, our industry, like a pestilential blight. The difficulties and dangers created by the fatal characters, insecurity of our banks under that abiding and extending despotism, the consequent trade fluctuations, the Impossibility of our bankers to keep pace with the forward march of our industries, omnipotence of financiers and the ignorance of legis- latorsall these points, on which we ourselves have so carefully dwelt, come under the lash of his unsparing censure. He is obviously, like ourselves, bent on bringing about the great Bank Reform. He sees clearly how these mighty impediments, set up in the past by the famous Whig Syndicate and maintained to-day by the Bank of Eng- land, are not only spreading ruin among the small producers, traders and workers, but imperilling England's future among the nations," TRADE FALLACIES TRADE FALMqiES Qf/fc* /: A CRITICISM OF EXISTING SUGGESTIONS FOR A r <9 TOWARDS NATIONAL '$ PROSPERITY By ARTHUR KITSON Author oi " The Money Problem," etc., etc. WITH x PRKFACB BY FRANCIS STOPFORD Editor of "Land and Water" LONDON P. S. KING & SON, LTD. ORCHARD HOUSE, WESTMINSTER 1917 PREFACE As I write, the revolution in Russia is the topic on every one's tongue. By the great majority in this country, the end of the Romanoff despotism has been regarded as sudden and surprising ; it had endured for so many centuries that it appeared impossible it could be finished in the inside of a week. But the few who had studied attentively Russian political and social life are aware the abdication was only the final deed in a course of action which had extended over two generations and more, and for which much blood had been shed, many tears had flowed and sacri- fice of life and liberty had been willingly offered up. A revolution are the short birth-pangs of a new era ; but the heavy weariness and pain of gestation has lasted previously for a long period of time. Students of Kipling will remember that beautiful poem in his History of England entitled " The Dawn Wind." The last verse, so prophetic of these times, may be quoted here : So when the world is asleep, and there seems no hope of her waking Out of some long bad dream that makes her mutter and moan, Suddenly, all men arise to the noise of fetters breaking, And every one smiles at his neighbour, and tells him his soul is his own. But it may be asked, what has this to do with v vi PREFACE Mr. Arthur Kitson's essays on Trade Fallacies * Just this. There are other despotisms than auto- cracy ; trade and currency have their own forms of absolutism which fetter freedom and compel adherence to false ideals. Whether we like it or not, we have to recognize these are the days that precede revolution for all the peoples. Man- kind stretches out its hands in the blinding mists of blood and tears, and cries aloud to be led up to nobler heights through the roar and fog of battle. Not yet can we gauge the forces that have been freed in this world struggle. But we hear the word " reconstruction " on every lip, though seldom is it recognized that there can be no sound reconstruction without demolition. The site has to be cleared of the rubble that has accumu- lated during the years of peace ; new foundations have to be dug, and more deeply, if the future social fabric is to be fairer and stronger than the one whose place it is to take. Land and Water under the present proprietary recognized this essential truth, and without committing itself definitely to the acceptance of the actual opinions expressed, has willingly opened its columns to those who can put forth bold views lucidly and sincerely on subjects with which they are familiar. I have before me a letter from a most cultured essayist, a student of human nature. He writes : " One of the great lessons of the war, I think, is that it enables us for the time being to get away from our custom- ary prepossessions, and take a calm view of them. But this involves a good deal of what Sidney Smith called ' speaking disrespectfully PREFACE vii of the equator ' and that is a thing some people cannot stand. That Land and Water can stand it is a good augury, and I do not think it will be found a misfortune." Mr. Kitson never troubles himself about the susceptibilities of the Equator ; those who are satisfied that British currency and banking, and her trading and industrial conditions are all that they should be, will be well advised to forswear this volume, for their prepossessions will be shocked. But when as Editor of Land and Water it fell to my lot to decide whether these articles should be printed in its columns, two outstanding facts presented themselves : (1st) Mr. Kitson's views closely coincided with those I had heard expressed by every British trader of enterprise and originality ; (2nd) the opinions were set out in such clear and straightforward lan- guage, that a subject, usually regarded as too technical and dull for a journal that caters for general readers, became not only comprehensible but always interesting and often fascinating. Since the articles were published, events have moved rapidly. No one now disputes that British banking methods have to be materially altered in so far as external trade is concerned. Gold currency to-day is a farce, in regard to our internal trade ; the business of the country is conducted on a paper currency. Moreover, Government is aw r ake to the truth that it is possible by " peaceful penetration " for an enemy to gain such economic power over a nation, as given time and opportunity will enable it to throttle the life out of its rival with viii PREFACE the least display of military force. Were it possible to visualize the peril from which the British Empire so closely escaped in 1914, there is not a man or woman in the land who would not, sick with horror, wonder whether it were a Divine decree that compelled Germany to declare war when she did, and not to wait for another ten years. Even yet the peril is not wholly over ; the submarine menace threatens our food supplies. As Midas besought the gods that everything he touched should be turned into gold, so we prayed that everything we re- quired should be at the cheapest price possible. We are learning the costliness of cheapness-at- any-cost to-day, much in the same way as Midas discovered his folly. A bond of sympathy between Mr. Kitson and the writer of this Preface has been an equal ad- miration of Ruskin. Ruskin wrote foolishly on the subject of factories and machinery, especially machinery. But his point of view is intelligible. Taking his stand on the cold-blooded theories piled together by Mill and other writers, he en- visaged machinery as the Moloch to which humanity was to be sacrificed by the followers of the false laws of political economists. He did not recognize that the difference between a steam - tractor and a plough or an American reaper- and- binder and a sickle is only one of degree, that each is constructed for the service of man ; but he did see clearly when all around him were blind that the human element must ever be the decisive factor in all enterprise, and that it can never be eliminated. This eternal truth has been PREFACE ix drummed into our heads by the big guns of battle. Multiply the engines of destruction as we will, yet victory or defeat in the ultimate issue can only be decided by man. " It is the law of good economy to make the best of everything. How much more to make the best of every creature ! " So Ruskin spoke in a lecture on " The Future of England " delivered in 1869. And again : " All land that is waste and ugly, you must redeem into ordered fruitful- ness ; all ruin, desolateness, imperfectness of hut or habitation, you must do away with ; and throughout every village and city of your English dominion, there must not be a hand that cannot find a helper, nor a heart that cannot find a com- forter." Formerly these were regarded as mere beautiful words, but to-day who will deny that they embody not only a truth, but a vital economic truth ? In the course of a recent letter Mr. Kitson wrote to me in these terms : " From my earliest days since I began the study of economics I have been convinced that orthodox economics as taught in our schools and colleges is founded on a gross fallacy. I have always been a believer in the unity and harmony of science. I cannot imagine one branch of human knowledge in its development deliberately contradicting another branch. The whole science of political economy has been avowedly opposed to all moral considerations, and writers like Mill, Cairns and even the late Professor Smart have not hesitated to say so. In the little work I have done in this direction I have aimed particularly to expose the crudities and unscientific character of economic ' science ' and have striven to lay the basis of a science x PREFACE that will harmonize with other branches of know- ledge, and particularly with the science of ethics. I mention this because it is at this point that I differ with many other writers, and even with Pro- fessor Hobson, although he has been working in this direction for years. I consider that Ruskin was one of the greatest economic writers that this country has produced, and we shall have to follow his rules and teachings to a considerable extent in the future if we are to succeed in building up our trade and industries on a satisfactory basis." Remember these are the deeply considered opinions of a man in the prime of life, who has been engaged in industry over thirty years here and in the United States, is a manufacturer and an employer of labour, and is the son and the grandson of manufacturers and employers of labour. The last essay in this volume on the psychology of the workshop represents at the present time not only the opinion of the writer of it, but, I believe, of many hard-headed and level-minded employers of labour throughout the kingdom. "It is as though civilization were standing to-day in the twilight of dawn. As the mists lift and earth shows forth more plainly, the heavens seem to recede, and the stars fade from sight, so that there comes to the watcher a strong temptation to deny in that moment the reality of the heavens. But he need only wait for the light to grow stronger for them again to become visible." So I wrote six years ago and the words seem already to have come true. Never have the eternal principles of freedom, justice and humanity shone forth more clearly, and never PREFACE xi have men been more determined to make this earth a nearer resemblance to the heaven whose existence they have denied because of the needless misery around them. But this revolution will not be accomplished in a day, or without effort of mind and body. It is books like the present volume that help it forward, and stimulate and concentrate men's thoughts on the gigantic work of reconstruction that lies ahead of us. FRANCIS STOPFORD. " LAND AND WATER " OFFICE, 5 CHANCERY LANI, W.C.2. March 25, 1917. AUTHOR'S NOTE THE publication of the following articles in book form which appeared in Land and Water dur- ing the past two years is due to the numerous requests from the readers of that well-known periodical. I have to record my thanks to the proprietors of Land a-nd Water for permission to reproduce these articles. Since they were published in that journal they have been revised and in some cases added to. As they were written under the circumstances prevailing at the time, and as these circumstances have often changed con- siderably in the wild whirlpool of war in which we live, it has seemed advisable not to attempt to bring them up to date ; it would frequently weaken arguments and dull the edge of current analogy, so I have attached to each chapter the date of original publication. A. K. STAMFORD, March 22, 1917. CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE I THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR . . 1 II THE FINANCIAL FACTOR . . .15 III CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE . . 39 IV ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM . . 59 V THE LONDON GOLD MARKET . . 73 VI WAR AND THE BANKERS ... 87 VII THE GOLD FETISH . . . .103 VIII INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS . . 121 IX TOWARDS A BETTER BANKING SYSTEM 139 X TREASURY NOTES . . . .155 XI GERMAN TRADE METHODS . . .173 XII NEW STEPS IN ECONOMIC REFORM . 187 XIII LABOUR, CAPITAL AND THE STATE . 197 XIV PROPERTY AND THE STATE . . 215 XV THE COMING TRADE WAR . . .231 XVI STATE CONTROL OF INDUSTRIES . . 249 XVII PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WORKSHOP 265 T.F. XV THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR CHAPTER I (December 4th, 1915) THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR WHEN the complete history of the Great War comes to be written, the historian will be confronted with some rather puzzling problems. For example, why have the Allies made so little effort to counteract the enemy's influence in neutral countries ? Why have they so completely failed to employ the psychological factor against the enemy, whilst the enemy has employed it in neutral countries with such skill and success against the Allies ? Why have the Allies been so negligent of the strongest weapon they possessed ? When the war started, the Allies were as all the world now knows entirely un- prepared to cope with the gigantic on^ slaught of the German armies, which long years of work and preparation had made 4 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR irresistible. But what they lacked in men and munitions they gained in the moral strength and justice of their cause. Never since wars began has the righteousness of a cause been more conspicuous^ or more one-sided. The Allies held the trump cards. Their cause was that of the whole world apart from that of the aggressors. Ranged on the side of Great Britain, France, and Russia, stood Civilization, Liberty, Chivalry and everything that man- kind aspires to freedom from bondage and oppression, the right of all nations to live their own individual lives, to speak and read in their own native tongue, to worship according to their own particular faith. All the natural aspirations of the vast majority of the world's inhabitants appeared to be centred in the victory of the Allies. NEUTRAL INDIFFERENCE Had any one predicted sixteen months ago the course the war has since taken and the present attitude of the various nations, the most incredible part of the THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR 5 predictions would have been the apparent indifference and in certain cases even the open hostility of neutral countries to the Allied cause. One would have felt safe in asserting that any Power that dared insult humanity by disregarding every code of honour, by rejecting every rule hitherto recognized by civilized nations for mitigat- ing the horrors of warfare by brazenly tearing up treaties, invading neutral coun- tries and reverting to the methods of ancient savagery as Germany and Austria have done, would have aroused the ven- geance of the entire globe, and launched all the forces of civilization against them. And yet, see what has happened. A considerable proportion of neutrals believe to-day that Germany's cause is a righteous one. Germany's rulers have succeeded in convincing their own people at home and abroad, as well as many neutrals, that the Allies were the aggressors. Apart from Italy, who entered the war because of her ancient hostility to Austria, it must be admitted that Germany has managed to secure greater help from neu- 6 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR trals than have the Allies. Germany has secured the active co-operation of Turkey and Bulgaria, and has prevented Greece and delayed Rumania the avowed enemies of these two races from declaring war them- selves on the side of the Allies, and has forced King Const antine to follow her example in the matter of disregarding treaties. Sweden is in sentiment at least decidedly pro-German. Switzerland, in spite of her danger from Germany's suc- cess, is divided, with a considerable balance in favour of our enemies. Holland seems similarly divided, and as loath to oppose Germany as though she belonged to the Teutonic Empire. Spain leans towards the German cause. Pope Benedict XV is known to have similar leanings. Lastly, the United States whom every one would have counted as being strongly and even aggressively on the side of Freedom prides herself upon her rigid neutrality, and looks on this great struggle with com- parative indifference. I speak now of the Government and the general opinion of the American people as expressed by their THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR 7 leading journals. It can hardly be doubted that if Germany had secured control of the seas and defeated our Navy, the muni- tions that have been and are still being shipped to the Allies from across the Atlan- tic, would have been going direct to Ger- many. Whatever help the Allies have received and are receiving from neutral countries, is due to the strength of our Navy and to commercial and financial policies, and not to any moral considera- tions. ALLIES' MAIN STRENGTH What every one would have regarded as the main strength of the Allied cause its justice seems to have been of little material advantage. At first sight it would appear as though moral considerations were of little or no value in warfare, and would lead one to despair of the ultimate triumph of Right over Wrong. Let us see, however, how this apparent inversion of the moral order of things has been brought about. How is it, to use our metaphor once more, that with so poor a hand, Germany has 8 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR been able to score so many points, and with a handful of trumps why have the Allies failed to win ? The answer is that from the very beginning of hostilities, Germany seized the psychological factor and has ceaselessly employed it with daring skill and even brazen effrontery, whilst on the other hand the Allies have either through ignorance, indifference, or foolishness neglected or refused to use the strongest weapon they could possibly have found and which good fortune originally placed in their hands. Indeed, they have allowed the enemy to spike their most powerful guns ! When the German rulers first planned their treacherous attack upon their neigh- bours, they drew up a lying report, setting forth the causes and origins of the war, asserting that Germany was surrounded by a world of enemies hungering and thirst- ing to destroy her, which was to be pub- lished at home and abroad as soon as war was declared. Preparations for a universal propaganda were made months and even years prior to the war. In every neutral THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR 9 country, emissaries of the German Govern- ment bought up newspapers and paved the way for controlling public opinion. It is stated that upwards of 10,000,000 has been spent by the German Government in the United States alone on propaganda work. Newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets and lectures illustrated by the cinema, have been produced and delivered by the thousand in all lands and in all tongues ! AVALANCHE OF FALSEHOOD Against this avalanche of falsehood the Allies have apparently done nothing, be- yond offering a direct denial. It is safe to say that not a single newspaper has been purchased or started in a neutral country by any of the Allied Powers for the purpose of counteracting this deadly campaign of German slander. Our own Government appears to have been content with the publication of a selection of Foreign Office literature, and one or two speeches of Sir Edward (Viscount) Grey, which was sold to the public at the price of one shilling a copy. 10 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR These, together with a few cheap pamphlets containing a digest of the Blue Book, and a recital of the horrors perpetrated by the Huns in France and Belgium, appear to be our total contribution to the world's de- mand for enlightenment regarding the greatest conspiracy in the world's history. The French have done a little better. The Russians, less than ourselves. Moreover, the long .delay in the publication of these pamphlets gave our enemies the field to themselves during the first months of the war. It is true that private effort has in a measure helped to make up this deficiency. But in spite of all this, it can be truthfully asserted that the neglect of the psycho- logical factor by the Allied Powers on the one hand, and the enormous use which the enemy has so skilfully and unscrupulously made of it on the other, has greatly pro- longed the war and increased the strength and resistance of the enemy. The psychology of the German people is probably the simplest to understand of any people in the world. It is all writ large in the methods they employ against those THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR 11 they wish to conquer. When the Germans desire to achieve certain psychological re- sults, they first ask themselves what would produce those results among themselves. For example, they are anxious to make their enemy civilians tire of the war and beg their Governments to sue for peace. To the question " What means must we employ to accomplish this result ? " their answer is " Precisely those which would cause our people to beg for peace." Hence all the horrors and deeds of frightfulness at which the world has stood aghast ! Here it would be well to notice how un- wittingly our enemies have exposed the true inwardness of their own character by their interpretation of the psychology of other nations. Knowing that fear and greed are the two most potent influences by which they themselves are swayed, they calmly assume that by these same influences the whole world can be governed. This affords us a most interesting view of the kind of " Kultur " the Germans have ac- quired. It is a fact that the greatest surprise and disappointment the German 12 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR rulers have yet experienced during the war is the utter failure of their deeds of fright- fulness Zeppelin raids, etc. to create panic and terror among their adversaries. This has puzzled them beyond words. That their methods have succeeded in the Balkans need not astonish us, for it is among those races whose psychology and morals (or ^mmorals) are nearest akin to their own, that one would ^aturally have predicted the results that nave happened, one might almost say inevitably. The psychological factor is far too large a subject with which to deal in detail within the space of a single article. Some time ago I suggested the creation of a " Ministry of Psychology " to work in conjunction with the Ministry of War and Munitions. Perhaps a " Ministry of Publication " would be a better term, since it is chiefly by publication that psychological effects are produced. The object of such a Ministry would be to endeavour to influence through suitable channels public opinion, both at home and abroad, and enlist the sympathies of all neutral countries ; to THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR 13 supervise and censor all publications at ~~- * ~~ "^" - "^^^*"""^ home and to stimulate and encourage the martial feelings of our own soldiers and sailors, as well as those of our civilians, by giving ample information of the origin, meaning and object of the conflict ; the results to this country and to the world if the enemy succeeds, and also if he is de- feated. Graphic accounts of military and naval encounters and exploits against the enemy and publications of the names of those regiments, ships, officers and men who have distinguished themselves should be given as often as possible. The presen- tation of suitable scenes and incidents in the Great War by films, which should be shown, not only to the troops themselves and civi- lians, but particularly to those employed in munition and other works. Had a large number of such views, been prepared by us and arrangements made for their display by means of cinema shows accom- panied by lectures at all the great industrial centres once or twice every month, there would have been for instance in the past, far less delay in munition work. Such a 14 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR Ministry would necessarily require a pro- found and intimate knowledge of the psy- chology of all nations, including, of course, our own. No finer war material was ever possessed by a nation than the men who form our armies and navies in this great war. That they have maintained their cheerfulness and ardour with so little help and encourage- ment from those psychological aids which our enemies provide in abundance, shows the wonderful quality of the men. The war is not yet over. The psychological factor will assume a greater and greater importance as the end approaches. It is not yet too late for the Allies and parti- cularly Great Britain to create a depart- ment controlled by men of world-wide experience, who would know how to employ this factor in a manner that would prove of incalculable value to the Allied Cause. K o 4^te r\ p&ty\e^ fabcfNto end of THE FINANCIAL FACTOR Klectgx i OJ05 cure, CHAPTER II (January, 1916) THE FINANCIAL FACTOR NOTWITHSTANDING its enormous economic and social importance to every member of the community, finance is not a particularly popular subject for discussion. Moreover, any attempt to deal with it in the space of a comparatively short article which will be comprehensible to the ordinary reader presents many difficulties. The subject itself is somewhat abstruse and highly technical, and its discussion involves the use of terms which often convey different meanings to different minds. For we are dealing with a branch of a science which is not yet classified as exact. Further, the average man's ideas of money and credit are usually based on partial knowledge, prejudice, and superstition. One whose financial knowledge and experience is con- 17 18 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR fined to the bank-notes and coins he carries in his pockets is very apt to believe in the existence of some special virtue or mys- terious power lurking within the metal and paper of which they are composed. On the other hand, the man who has been behind the scenes, has learned the true nature of currency, has watched its pro- gress in effecting exchanges, and knows its history past and present in all lands, will agree with John Stuart Mill when he wrote : " There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing in the economy of society than money, except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and labour. It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it." In endeavouring to make the subject comprehensible to the least instructed, I shall be compelled to deal with certain parts in a manner which, to the more en- lightened, may seem very elementary. Next to the problem of furnishing men and munitions necessary to win the war, that of the money supply has loomed the largest in the public eye. In one respect the importance of the financial factor THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 19 been very much exaggerated. In another sense, its importance cannot be over-esti- mated. And partly from ignorance and partly from confusion of thought most writers on this subject have insisted on its indispensability where it was least essential, and have failed to point out certain dangers where they really exist. At the beginning of the war more than one journalist confi- dently predicted that the Central Powers would collapse within a year through the exhaustion of their gold supplies. Others are continually harping on the fact that the financial resources (meaning gold) pos- sessed by the Allies' ensure victory. These assertions are strengthened by the un- fortunate use of such catch phrases as " beating the enemy with gold and silver bullets." All this is sheer exaggeration and displays a lamentable ignorance of the real nature and functions of money. If through a stoppage of our paper mills we were to run short of railway tickets, theatre tickets and postage stamps, no one would consider this a valid reason why the authorities should suspend our railway 20 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR and postal services, and close our theatres. Substitutes for tickets and stamps would soon be furnished, and the traffic, per- formances, and services would proceed as usual. So it is with the money supply. Some of the greatest wars in history have been fought and won by nations who, from the financiers' standpoint, were hope- lessly bankrupt. Napoleon and the French Republic fought Europe with nothing more solid in the financial line than " paper bullets." Great Britain fought and con- quered Napoleon with the aid of similar financial weapons. The American War of Independence and their Civil War were both similarly financed. A century ago writers would not have laid nearly so much stress on the importance of gold as many do to-day, for the reason that there was far less superstition regard- ing the use of the precious metals for currency purposes. The old economists had far clearer ideas of the functions of money than many of our modern writers. For example, the theory that money must possess what is called " intrinsic value " THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 21 did not serve to confuse the minds of students of monetary science in the days when the only money circulating was so-called inconvertible paper notes and token coins. No one at that time would have had the impudence to announce that " a currency system is impossible unless based on and backed by gold," as I have heard from the lips of a professor of economics. The mistake made by writers on war finance whose knowledge is con- fined to our modern banking practice in the City of London is in failing to remember that money is, after all, merely an artificial device, an invention, a contrivance for accomplishing certain ends which, under the stress of changing conditions, may be obtained in various ways. Money was defined by the economists of a century or more ago as " a ticket," " an order," " a token," " a counter." But after mono- metallism was forced upon the world by Parliamentary Acts through the influence of international bankers, money and gold became synonymous terms, and the true functions of money were confused with 22 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR those of the precious metals, although they are absolutely distinct. Hence the average man is unable to understand how a nation like Germany can continue the war after her gold reserves are exhausted. Apart from the settlement of Foreign Exchange balances, and payments for fo- reign propaganda work, gold is of compara- tively little importance to Germany at the present time. If the Central Powers were to lose every ounce of gold and silver they have amassed, it would have little or no effect on the war so long as their foreign trade is cut off. The supreme economic factor is production, not finance. Finance is merely the artificial aid to production and exchange. So long as the enemy can furnish men enough, can raise enough food and raw material, can manufacture suffi- cient guns, munition and clothing, and maintain his transportation facilities to keep his armies going, so long will the war last. In a closed self-supporting Empire which the Teutonic Powers and their Allies may be said within certain limits to comprise, its entire business can be as THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 23 easily, as satisfactorily, and far more economically carried on by a State Bank paper currency system than with a gold and silver currency. So long as the paper money is made legal tender throughout the Empire for all debts public and private, so long as the Government itself honours it and keeps the amounts issued within certain bounds, there is no reason why such a system should not enable the enemy to develop his resources as the United States developed hers so successfully for the whole of the greenback period. The real need for gold or some such valuable commodity in connexion with Foreign Exchange arises because paper currency loses its legal tender qualities the moment it leaves its own country. In this respect money is like a monarch. Whilst it is all-powerful on its own soil, it loses its power and ceases to function the moment it crosses beyond its frontiers. Strictly speaking, money meaning legal tender never goes abroad. The commo- dity of which it is composed may travel, in which case it becomes a piece of metal 24 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR of certain weight and fineness. But this is no more money in the strict sense of the word than the gold button of the miner is so many sovereigns. If I take a sovereign and deface the inscription or melt it down, although the gold is still intact, I have destroyed the money. If the entire commercial world were under one supreme ruler, all the bullion and coin of the world might be scrapped and buried, and a universal paper currency established which would maintain and facilitate trade and production far more easily and with infinitely less cost and friction than at present. That anomaly under which ex- change value appears both as a quantitative relation and as a commodity at one and the same time a phenomenon to which we owe many of our apparently economic Chinese puzzles would disappear as soon as our legal tender laws which at present bind our money to a certain commodity were repealed. The desirability and de- mand for gold arises chiefly indeed one might almost say entirely on account of the fact that all nations have raised gold THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 25 to a supremacy above all other commodities by making it when coined legal tender for all debts and for any amount. The present value of gold is due more to this fact than any other circumstance. The Financial Factor presents itself from two distinct and entirely opposite and con- flicting standpoints. The one is the bank- ers and moneylenders, and the other is the producers. To the banker, money presents itself as a valuable commodity from which he must needs draw dividends in the shape of interest. Hence cheapness in money is as hateful to the moneylender as cheap clothing is to the sweater. For this reason the banking interests have waged unceasing warfare against State Banking and what they term " cheap money expedients." Moreover, the histories of cheap currency experiments have mostly been written by bankers, their employees, or hired pro- fessors, who have invariably presented the subject from this interested class's point of view. Ic is for this reason that so much importance has been attached to gold for currency purposes. Its scarcity, its dear- 26 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR ness, gives weight to the demand for high interest charges. On the other hand, the producer regards money more from the standpoint of its utility his interests require the cheapest form obtainable- consistent with its ability to perform its work. {" There are just three ways in which a nation can obtain its war supplies : first, by producing them ; secondly, by pur- chasing them from neutrals ; and thirdly, by plundering conquered provinces. Ger- many has obtained her supplies by all three methods. But owing to the Allies' com- mand of the seas, her opportunities for purchasing have been greatly hampered. Hence her need for gold is enormously reduced. This, however, gives our enemy one advantage. It compels him to fall back on his own productive resources, thus saving him and his descendants the future burdens of interest charges on foreign loans. How much he has secured in the shape of forced indemnities and plunder from Belgium, France, and Poland, we cannot tell. There are evidences that hun- THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 27 dreds of thousands of men and women have been enslaved and forced to contribute their labour towards providing the enemy with food, clothing, and munitions. What- ever he secures from these sources are obtained without the need of either gold or loans. On the other hand, the Allies' supplies are obtained by production and foreign purchase, and hence their need for gold and foreign loans is far greater than the enemy's. Now the particular method of raising funds has a most important bearing on production both present and future. And it is here that danger lies, which few, if any, writers have so far mentioned. At the beginning of the struggle Mr. Asquith stated that there were three methods of paying for our importations of munitions and other necessaries. One was by exports of our own products together with our maritime services, another by the sale of foreign investments, and the third, by the loan. And he advocated the last as the most convenient for the nation. Let us consider these. To pay by our exports 28 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR would mean that we should be compelled to produce continuously for export at least as much as in ordinary times of peace. But as a large proportion of our factories are now turned over to special work for war munitions which from the economic standpoint is absolutely waste our ex- ports are necessarily curtailed. Similarly, since our ships are mostly employed in transporting men and munitions for the war, our maritime services, hitherto pro- fitably employed on foreign trade, are also greatly reduced. One point arises here which demands notice. If at the very beginning of the war greater encouragement had been given our own manufacturers by the Government to increase and develop their own plants, had fewer orders for munitions and larger orders for machines for making munitions been placed abroad, the Chancellor would have had far less difficulty in financing foreign purchases. As to financing by means of loans, this is eventually the most ruinous of all methods, although the most popular, because THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 29 its evil effects are not immediately per- ceived and the burdens entailed are spread over a wide area and a long period of time. Financing a world-wide crisis like the present, by the method of the loan, means the inevitable enslavement of this and future generations. It inflicts a perpetual burden upon production ! It constitutes a wedge which separates society into the two eternally conflicting classes: the idle rich, who live on interest ; and the over- burdened poor, who must produce it. Its effects are disastrous both socially and economically. It is probable that at the end of the war our National Debt will aggregate at least 3,000,000,000 ! The annual interest on this sum will be 150,000,000. This is three times the total net earnings of all the railway and tramway companies in the United Kingdom ! It will be as though the enemy had invaded our country and seized all our transporta- tion facilities and commandeered the entire profits for ages until the loans are paid. And what advantage does the nation get in return for this annual tribute ? Merely 30 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR time ! Actually this and nothing more ! We shall be paying this colossal sum merely for the privilege of being allowed to pay the principal if ever at a more con- venient season. At the end of twenty years we shall have paid in interest charges a sum approaching the entire cost of the war without having reduced the original debt by a single shilling. Such is the merci- less nature of the loan ! Moreover, the rate offered by the Government viz., 5 per cent. is far in excess of the average net earning capacity of the factors of production themselves. A simple arith- metical calculation will show that produc- tion does not keep pace with the demands of interest charges at anything like 5 per cent. After providing for the proper nour- ishment and sustenance of the two prime factors themselves, land and labour so that production and reproduction may continue and develop after reserving the necessary amount for wear and tear of capital, after deducting for the expenses of Government, national and municipal, for education, for defence, for the protection THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 31 of the sick, the wounded, the aged, the infirm, the insane, etc., etc., the residue will not be sufficient to pay an average of anything like 5 per cent, on the nation's capital. Some twenty years ago I showed that even in a country as rich in natural re- sources as the United States, the claims of capital outran the capacity of production, and hence periodically wholesale bank- ruptcy and starvation of the factors them- selves was inevitable There remains for us to consider the other method of financing the war mentioned by the Prime Minister. This plan has recently been adopted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. American securities are now being ex- changed for British Government Bonds, so that payments for American munitions and other goods can be made in American currency. This is by far a better arrange- ment than that originally adopted by the Government. Briefly stated, the advan- tages are as follows 1. It will tend to confine the Government loan to our own people, and therefore the TJ, D 32 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR interest will be largely expended on British products. 2. It will tend to reduce the volume of tributary goods flowing into this country from abroad which have hitherto competed with our home products, and tended to reduce wages and foment labour troubles. 3. It will tend to cheapen future loans for productive enterprises a consumma- tion devoutly to be wished. It may be inquired, " What method of financing the war could have been adopted other than those already mentioned by the Premier ? >! I will attempt to answer this as fully as the small space remaining will allow. At the end of July, 1914, when war was seen to be inevitable, our banking system, which was supposed by the man in the street to be impregnable, suddenly col- lapsed. Although the public received the news with astonishment, those who, like myself, have known and have striven for years to open the eyes of the public to the imminent danger of the confidence- basis upon which the business of our Joint Stock THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 33 banks has been conducted, fully expected this catastrophe. In An Open Letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (published by Dent & Sons, November, 1911) I said: " Under the fatal ban of the legal tender and Bank Charter Acts, all banking enterprise of an original character has been suppressed, and our Joint Stock banks have had to erect their vast edifices (of credit) upon the narrow and unstable foundations provided by these laws. To one who has given the subject any careful thought, the marvel is that we have so long escaped the inevitable debdcle which sooner or later must overtake us." Again in the same letter I said: " Moreover, it is as certain as that the sun will rise to-morrow, that in a great crisis we shall be com- pelled to suspend our Bank Charter Act and accom- modate ourselves to paper money." Instead of doing what has been done on former occasions under similar crises viz., suspending the Bank Charter Act our Government in my judgment very unwisely declared a moratorium (an in- direct way of announcing bankruptcy), a humiliation which must have caused our former great Chancellors, Peel, Gladstone, and Goschen, to turn in their graves. The generosity of the Government saved the 34 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR banks, as usual, at the public expense. The entire credit of the nation was placed at the banks' disposal, which enabled them to open their doors, resume business, and avoid a receivership. The nation was com- pelled by a complacent Chancellor to take all the risks whilst the bankers took all the profits. If at that time the Government had seized the golden opportunity of nation- alizing our entire banking business, instead of catering to the private interests of bank shareholders, they could have effected one of the greatest and most valuable economic achievements of modern times, and gained for the nation incalculable advantages. Unfortunately for this nation, neither the Government nor the Chancellor seemed to realize the advantages to be gained for the nation, or the opportunity which the bank- ing collapse offered. The present banking business of this country, which is practically a monopoly, is an extremely lucrative one, and is due to the special privileges granted by law. In the hands of the Government, it would be made to produce an enormous revenue, THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 35 whilst by extending credit facilities to manufacturers, farmers and small pro- ducers generally, at moderate rates of interest, a very great impetus might be given to production, and untold benefits conferred upon some of our most deserving classes, who are at present cut off from such credit facilities by the autocratic methods of our London banking directors. Moreover, under a national banking system, there need have been no war loans so far as Government purchases in this country are concerned. Issues of paper money would have sufficed for all domestic re- quirements. Germany is very wisely doing this at the present time to a very consider- able extent. It is said that the German banks have issued and circulated since the war notes equivalent to 1,000,000,000. No doubt this has tended to depreciate the value of the mark as compared with its purchasing power prior to the war. Disadvantageous as this may be in many ways, it is infinitely preferable to the mur- derous effects of the loan. After all, the evil effects of a depreciated currency are 36 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR more apparent in foreign than in home trade. But these effects are both ill and beneficial. It injures creditors, it benefits producers and debtors. It injures im- porters, it benefits exporters. Unfortu- nately, we are so completely under the continual shadow of the great London octopus, we are unable to see things in their true proportion. It has been the persistent policy of every British Cabinet since Sir Robert Peel's administration to sacrifice all and every interest towards maintaining the supremacy of the London bankers. To such a degree has this policy been carried out that the average man be- lieves the British Empire would collapse if London ceased to be the money market of the world. And to maintain this, British trade and production have been both sacrificed and taxed to an incredible degree. The United States has grown to be, economically speaking, a far more pros- perous and richer country than ours. And outside of Wall Street, no American parti- cularly aspires to see New York or Chicago the world's monetary centre. The same THE FINANCIAL FACTOR 37 might almost have been said of Germany prior to the war. It is questionable whether the London money market confers any substantial benefit on our home trade, our manufactures, or commerce. But it certainly does expose us to the most harass- ing and most fluctuating bank rate of any commercial nation in the world. One further method of raising funds may be mentioned. The method is so simple one is almost ashamed to mention it as novel. If, instead of offering bribes in the form of interest, the Government had made an appeal to the patriotism of the people to contribute funds voluntarily, I believe money would have poured in sufficient to carry on the war. Certainly few would have refused to lend their wealth without interest to safeguard England and her Empire. It seems incredible that a people would freely offer their lives and those of their husbands, brothers and sons to preserve the safety of their country, whilst refusing to give a portion of their property for the same object. Had the Government trusted and confided in the 38 THE FINANCIAL FACTOR people instead of following the advice of our bankers, this war might have been fought and paid for without inflicting all these burdens on future generations. To deny this is to deny that the British people are patriotic, and to accuse them of holding property far more sacred than the lives of their sons and brethren. It may yet happen that such an appeal will be found neces- sary. When that time comes the people will be found ready to make any sacrifice required to crush the enemy. In conclusion it may be objected that these ideas and suggestions are revolu- tionary. The answer is, we are already in the midst of the greatest revolution the world has yet experienced. The old order passeth. A new one is dawning. What its character will be depends much upon the ideas and actions of those of us now living. W. K\ -Hoe. This CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE n/c? uAvft.ki* \. uAoit 4o M .<*jp CHAPTER III (January 20th 9 1916) CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE MUCH time, energy, and money are being expended in tjie laudable endeavour to get our merchants and manufacturers to rea- lize the unique opportunity presented by the war for capturing some of the trade hitherto enjoyed by our enemy. The Board of Trade has opened a department for furnishing useful information regarding foreign markets, our Consuls are beginning to send reports of foreign wants and condi- tions. The British manufacturer has been severely lectured and criticized for his lack of enterprise for his refusal to adopt new methods, his conservatism and general thick-headedness. No doubt much of this is well deserved. The foreign agent, anx- ious to supply British goods, has shed 41 42 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE many a bitter tear over the stupidity of the Briton who argues that because his manufactures are recognized as satisfactory in his own country, they should therefore be good enough for the foreigner. His refusal to understand or to try to under- stand the foreign want has cost this country dearly. But when all this is admitted there remains much that requires further elucidation. Great Britain in the past has been easily the first and leading industrial power. Her early inventors, the enterprise of her capitalists and merchants, the skill and perseverance of her artisans made this land the world's home of industry. For over a century we reigned supreme in the indus- trial world until we began to find ourselves challenged first by the United States and then by Germany. NEW COMPETITION The advent of American and German competition has, however, entirely changed the character and methods of trade. Since the days when Richard Cobden preached CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 43 his gospel of the civilizing and pacific influences of trade, trade methods have undergone a complete revolution. Far from being pacific, modern trade involves a merciless system of warfare. It is war to the knife, in which the financially weak must succumb to the financially strong. Nowadays business success requires some- thing more than brains and more than skill. Success is usually on the side of the big bank account. inance^Jias become more and more the dominating factor in the international trade warfare which has Tieen waged with such determination and ruthlessness during the past thirty-five or forty years. And it is this particular factor which is never referred to in all the literature which the authorities are distri- buting so generously. A comparison of the methods by which the Germans have captured so much of the world's trade, with our own will throw a flood of light on this subject. For the past fifteen or twenty years German trade with Russia and Turkey, for example, has in- creased at an enormous rate. Notwith- 44 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE standing the Germans are and have been personally disliked by the people of both countries owing to their insolence, coarse- ness and unscrupulousness the Turks and Russians have found that their wants have been better supplied on more reasonable terms than by those of any other nation. The Russian dealer likes long-time credit. The German firm gives him all he demands. I have seen German bills drawn against Russian firms for terms of three, four, and even five years. Again, the German merchant not only learns and speaks the language of the country he wishes to trade with, but prints all his catalogues and price lists in the same language, and adopts the same monetary, weight, and measure units. His prices usually include delivery to the customers' doors. He distributes samples of his goods freely. He measures the character of those he deals with, and acts accordingly. He has no scruples. No Oriental politician can rival the smart Teuton salesman in matters pertaining to bribery and corrup- tion. CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 45 But behind all this stands the German Government in the persons of the German Ambassadors and Consuls, whose duty it is to assist in every possible way the intro- duction and extension of German trade. No German prince, not even the Kaiser himself, has ever considered it beneath his dignity to solicit favours and privileges from foreign rulers on behalf of German merchants. Much of the loyalty and pat- riotism of the average German is directly attributable to the belief that his King and Government are interested in his particular welfare and make it one of their duties to support him in his efforts to secure success. But the chief factor in Germany's industrial success is undoubtedly its bank- ing system. GERMAN BANKERS The German banker understands that his chief and most important client is his own countryman, and he stands ready to assist him to the best of his ability. The German manufacturer, inventor, merchant, tradesman, agriculturist and producer gen- 46 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE erally, have little difficulty in securing whatever financial support they require, provided, of course, they can satisfy their banker of their ability to produce and sell goods at a reasonable profit. The German banker shares in the profits of the industry he supports, and hence the holders of his bank shares do not depend upon thejnjgre interest charges on loans. German banks are therefore part and parcel of German industries, aiding and supporting them, ready to assist in every emergency and in every industrial development which pro- mises success. Now contrast all this with our British methods. The average Briton knows no language but his own and that often imperfectly. He produces only the goods he has been accustomed to all his life, and makes little or no effort to improve his methods or understand the wants of for- eigners. He sends his English catalogues abroad and quotes in English currency, f.o.b. London, Liverpool, Hull, Glasgow, or some other British port. His terms are cash against documents, or so many CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 47 days after receipt of invoice. There are, of course, many exceptions, but I am re- ferring to the average British firm. And unlike the German, he meets with little or no support from his own Government. Neither his Ambassador nor his Consul will, as a rule, move a finger to help him secure a contract or develop his foreign business. He stands absolutely alone ! Not only so. Very frequently he will find his Consul addressing him in Teutonic accents. For some inscrutable reason, the British Foreign Office has, for the last half-century or more, considered that British interests in foreign ports were as safe or safer in the hands of Germans than in those of the British themselves. BBITISH CONSULAR SERVICE In an article entitled " Consular Service Reform," published in the Open Review (July, 1909), Mr. Percy F. Martin, F.R.G.S., says : " From a long and intimate acquaintance with the methods of modern Consular Service, gathered, I may add, in every part of the world, I am firmly convinced that a more clumsily conceived or a more T.F. B 48 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE indifferently conducted system of Consular representa- tion does not exist than that of Great Britain. . . . Many persons who occupy the position of British Consul are ' British ' neither by birth nor sentiment nor in method. ... It was proved that throughout the great Empire (Germany), which is opposed so much to British trade and commerce, and between whose commercial representatives and ourselves has so long existed and must ever exist the keenest rivalry, nine-tenths of the Vice-Consuls are of German birth and origin." This was written, bear in mind, just five years before the war. In addition to all these disadvantages, the British manufacturer and merchant reap no financial benefit at the hands of their banker by reason of their being British citizens. The English banking sys- tem has been extolled mostly by the money-lending classes and foreigners throughout the world. Viewed from the standpoint of the foreigner, there is no question that it is a wonderful institution. For it collects the savings and earnings of the British people and distributes them with the utmost impartiality to the highest bidder, whether British or foreign, all over the world. The London banker is essen- tially an internationalist. He regards all CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 49 nations with an entirely impartial eye. He is swayed by one motive only namely, the determination to win big dividends with the least possible risk. If the foreign competitor requires financial accommoda- tion and is willing to pay a higher rate of interest than the British producer (with the same security) the foreigner wins. There are dozens of German industries flourishing to-day, built up and supported by British capital. It has long been the cry of Eng- lish firms that their banks offer them little or no support in the development of their businesses. THE Two BANKING SYSTEMS The broad distinction between the British and German Banking System is that whilst the former depends for its rewards upon what the ancients termed usury (that is, payment for use), the latter depends upon production. And between these two sys- tems a great gulf is fixed. For the one is less concerned with the industrial success of its own country than the other. It is not of such serious moment to the London 60 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE banker whether British trade is dull as the decline of German trade is to the German banker, for the London banker regards the world as his oyster. If the British pro- ducer finds trade too dull to employ the bank funds profitably, there are others. The German, or American, the Brazilian or Argentine merchant will be glad to employ them. Hence the dividends of our bank- ing companies show comparatively little variation regardless of our trade condi- tions. But industrial depression of the Fatherland means financial depression for the German banks, and vice versa. Hence it is entirely to the advantage of the German banker to assist to the best of his ability in stimulating the industrial prosperity of his own people. Our banking system deserves a chapter to itself. As a safe system for earning steady dividends for bank share- holders it stands almost unrivalled. For, as was demonstrated in August, 1914, in times of crisis it has the credit of the nation behind it without having any well-defined responsibilities thrust upon it, so that whilst the banks are allowed to reap all the CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 51 profits, the nation is compelled to take the risks. There are no obligations on the part of any of our banks to render aid or facili- ties to any British industries whatsoever. Such help is purely optional. As a national institution, our banking system is one of the most expensive and harassing that could possibly be devised. It taxes the British producer for the benefit of the foreigner. It compels him to pro- vide at all times a free gold market and a fixed level for gold, chiefly for the benefit of foreign merchants. It subjects him to the most variable bank rate in the world ! It has been variously estimated that every advance of 1 per cent, in the bank rate costs this country from 50,000 to 100,000 per week ! In addition to all the advantages enu- merated and possessed by the German producer, there is the further one that he is protected to a large extent from foreign competition in his home market. Every Government department in the Fatherland is forbidden to order goods from foreign firms where ^r&Uar goods are purchasable 52 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE in Germany. On the other hand, it has long since been the settled policy of our own Governments, Railway Companies, Municipalities and Corporations generally, to buy in the cheapest market, regardless of consequences. What possible chance then is there for British firms to capture German trade ? The answer is that there is no chance unless the conditions are completely changed. BEFORE THE WAR Prior to the war, the man or firm who made such an attempt, soon discovered that he was fighting not merely a German competitor but the entire German nation. And just as many of the small shopkeepers have been driven out by the great depart- mental stores, just as the small producer has been wiped out by the Trust and Com- bine, so many of our manufacturers and merchants have found successful competi- tion with German houses backed as they are by all the strength of the German Government impossible ! Since the war started, many instances have come to our knowledge of enemy firms ^having been CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 53 guaranteed certain dividends by their Government, provided they used every effort to oust rival nations from foreign markets. These firms were even advised to offer goods below cost, until all com- petitors were driven out, such losses being made good by the State. Again, the interest of the German authorities in every branch of industry is illustrated by their policy of furnishing gratuitous help to German inventors and discoverers. Take, for example, the glass industry. Heat-resisting glass is a com- paratively modern discovery, and was practically a German monopoly when the war started. The story of the rise of this industry was told me by a German pro- fessor of Jena some years ago. Two pro- fessors of the University of that town stumbled upon a method of manufacturing glass which could withstand both high and low temperatures without breaking. Recognizing the value of their discovery, they applied to the Government for finan- cial assistance, and it is said the Government immediately responded with a gift of 54 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 300,000 marks for the purpose of completing their experiments and starting the in- dustry. This industry employed at the outbreak of the war many thousands of people, and represented some millions of pounds of revenue to the German nation. Again, compare the German Govern- ment's attitude towards their dye industry, which has become another vast monopoly, to the treatment accorded this industry by our own. Here was an original British invention made the basis for a German monopoly ! Is it not a fact that hundreds of British inventors have had to go abroad or sell their inventions to foreigners in order to get them taken up ? Have not many of our progressive manufacturers been compelled to import German chemists and scientists to assist them in the deve- lopment of their manufactures ? Can we possibly wonder at the enormously greater progress of German industries when we contrast the entirely different attitudes of the two races and their Govern- ments ? CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 55 BUSINESS PATRIOTISM What advantage economically speaking - has it been to an inventor or manu- facturer or business man generally to belong to the British nation ? What privi- lege or advantage has his British birth and citizenship conferred upon him which the foreigner is not equally entitled to ? Ex- cept for the purpose of taxing him or soliciting his vote, what evidence is there that our Governments have been actively interested in the success of the average Briton ? German trade can be captured only by the nation that can emulate Germany in her enterprise, her knowledge, her organiza- tion (where the Government lends its wholehearted support to its producing classes), and finally, in her banking methods, where the banks recognize their chief functions to be the support and development of their nation's trade and industries. The lesson of business patriotism has yet to be learned both by our Government and people. No German could have writ- 56 CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE ten such a letter as that recently published by a well-known Earl, who asked if it was conceivable that the British public would stand being compelled after the war to pay more for certain goods instead of buying them from Germany ? If we are to win in our future trade warfare, we must present a solid front to the enemy. We must mobilize all our forces of production. We must consolidate our credit. The Gov- ernment and people must unite to support and help each other. Our Ambassadors and Consuls must all be British to the core. They should be conversant with trade and commerce in all its branches, and constitute the advance guards for opening up new fields for conquest by our merchants and manufacturers. The Government should nationalize our banking system and place banking facilities on easy terms within the reach of all classes. Inventors, discoverers and scientists should obtain social recogni- tion proportional to their attainments, and the conferring of titles on men of wealth regardless of the means by which their wealth has been acquired should cease. CAPTURING GERMAN TRADE 87 In spite of our many shortcomings, this nation possesses all the material and re- sources for leading the world industrially and intellectually to greater heights than have ever yet been foreshadowed. For the accomplishment of this, all we need are leaders who have the knowledge, the will, and the ability to organize and develop these resources. \i e \5 U -^O jcfefcs <#&\WA0& "* ti all fci -Wt^vi -Wt^-r o-P ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM /oar s. CHAPTER IV (January 27th, 1916) ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM IN his remarkable book Germany and the next War, Bernhardi mentions the following as one of the many advantages gained by war : " All the sham reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters, are unmasked." The present war has undoubtedly " unmasked " the " sham re- putations " of several of our most venerable and hitherto admired institutions both political and economic. Among these may be mentioned the doctrine of laissez faire which has long been the accredited gos- pel of our governing class. Free trade appears also to have fallen from its lofty pedestal during the past few months, judging from the recent parliamentary debates and editorials in certain Liberal journals. But our one idol that is at 61 62 ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM present in the greatest disrepute is Britain's banking system. SCATHING CRITICISMS Nowadays, it is almost impossible to peruse either a trade journal or newspaper without noticing some scathing criticism of the system which has hitherto been held up as a shining example of financial strength and efficiency. The Daily News, which prior to the war never expressed anything but blind and absolute faith in this national idol, publishes an article (January 15) by the Editor, entitled " Money for all," in which he says : " When the war came, the false bottom fell out of our banking system and we made a startling dis- covery. We found that the banks were an im- posing fair weather structure which tottered like a house of cards when the storm came and only sur- vived because in one swift hour Mr. Lloyd George gave them the security of the nation. It was dis- covered that behind all the appearances of strength, the banks were a fiction and the reality on which they traded was the credit of the State, yours and mine and everybody's. Gold disappeared from cir- culation, and there flowed forth a torrent of notes issued by the Treasury and represented nothing but the credit of the nation. " Walter Besant once said that ' the art of banking was to get other people's money and use it for your ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM 63 own advantage.' There has been no more illuminat- ing revelation during the war, and the question for us to ask is whether this private monopoly of the national credit can be permitted to continue ? Can we start the future with a ' corner ' in money ? Or must we not see that money like political power must be democratized ? If money is only a symbol representing the whole credit of the community, why should that symbol not be at the command of the whole community whose credit it represents ? " Now the remarkable thing about this article is not that it should be written at this time when " sham reputations " are falling in all directions, but that the writer did not make these discoveries and dis- closures sooner. During the past forty years quite a library of publications have appeared, exposing the rotten foundation of Britain's financial system and predicting a collapse sooner or later. This danger has been the subject of many discussions and resolutions at various meetings of our Trade bodies and Chambers of Commerce all over the United Kingdom for the last thirty-five years. Some of the most vigor- ous criticisms have been written by mem- bers of the banking profession themselves, such as Sir Edward Holden, and by financial writers like Walter Bagehot, and on one or 64 ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM two occasions no less an authority than the late Lord Goschen (when Chancellor of the Exchequer) uttered words of warning about the volcano upon which we were living. But like the warnings of the late Lord Salisbury, Frederick Harrison, Lord Roberts, and a host of others to prepare for the war in which we are now engaged, these utterances fell on deaf ears. For it has been the policy of the Press, with a few exceptions, to refuse a hearing to prophets who foretell danger or evil. Now that the murder is out, it will be instructive and interesting to examine the wonderful financial edifice the sham Gib- raltar which collapsed days before even hostilities had begun or a single shot had been fired. In his well-known work, Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot wrote : " The peculiar essence of our banking system is an unprecedented trust between man and man, and when that trust is much weakened by hidden causes, a small accident may greatly hurt it, and a great accident for a moment may almost destroy it." INHERENTLY WEAK To an outsider who for the first time ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM 65 learns the true nature of banking, it will appear amazing that intelligent men should devise a system so inherently weak and seriously regard it as a basis for a great nation's trade and industry ! That it has lasted so long speaks volumes for the honesty and faith of the British people the most trusting people in the world. That the system should have been face- tiously termed " The Great Confidence Game " is not surprising, for it is apparent that the basis of our banking business is public confidence. It is, however, only fair to say that the present system was neither designed nor foreseen by its founders as we now know it. It is a development, a sort of monstrosity an abnormal growth like a man's body attached to an infant's feet and legs. In 1844 Sir Robert Peel, a well-meaning but narrow-minded statesman, placed Bri- tish banking in a pair of iron boots. The foundation of the system was rigid and narrow. Little or no provision was made for the future development of commerce. The only question that appears to have 66 ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM been considered by Sir Robert Peel was how to conserve the value of the sovereign. The development of industry and its needs was quite a side issue, indeed it seems hardly to have received any consideration. Consequently as the banking needs of the nation increased, accommodation had to be provided by enlarging the superstruc- ture without any attempt to enlarge the foundation to a corresponding extent. The system, therefore, came to be likened to an inverted pyramid. The system is briefly as follows : The Bank of England (which by the way is a private Joint Stock bank, and is not in any way a national institution so far as its control and management are concerned) is the financial rock upon which all other British banks and financial firms and in- stitutions repose. It is known as the Bank of the Bankers. " All our credit system depends upon the Bank of England for its security," says Walter Bagehot ; " on the wisdom of the Directors of that one Joint Stock Company, it depends whether England shall be solvent or insolvent. This may seem too strong, but it is not. All banks depend on the Bank of Eng- land, all merchants depend upon some banker." X ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM 67 BANKING LAWS Our financial system is the result of certain Acts of Parliament such as our Legal Tender laws, and the Bank Charter Act. The former defines specifically the manner and form in which debts must be paid. The latter defines restrictions under which the banks are permitted to supply the public demand for the debt-paying commodity. And although the one created the necessity for an ever increasing supply of legal tender, the Bank Act not only made no provision for such a supply, it even made such provision both difficult and expensive. So that it became more profitable for the banks to find a substitute for legal tender thereby increasing the public risks. Hence the invention of the cheque system. Debts beyond forty shillings, both public and private, were made specifically payable in gold on demand. The mints were opened to the coinage of gold in unlimited amounts at the fixed rate of 3 17s. IQ^d. per ounce. The Bank of England was allowed the privilege of issuing notes to 68 ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM the extent of whatever gold it possessed, at the above rate. An additional issue of what has been termed " inconvertible " notes was allowed against securities and the National Debt to the bank (11, 000,000) at present amounting altogether to about 18,500,000. Subsidiary coinage was also provided for. But the main fact in the Bank Charter Act, which constitutes the inherent weakness of the whole system, was that the amount of legal tender available for carrying on the nation's trade and commerce depended not on our domestic needs but upon the conditions of the money markets abroad ! If, for example, a trade boom in Germany or America created an urgent demand for gold, the only method the Bank of England possessed for retaining its reserves was to raise the bank rate. Whilst this tended to cut off some of the foreign demand it also penalized our own people by taxing their banking facilities. It became a double- edged sword that cut both ways, and although it has proved a wonderful instru- ment for booming the value of bank shares, it has proved a dead-weight upon the backs ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM 69 of our producing classes and a serious brake upon the wheels of industry. Our economic system has been ingeni- ously illustrated by an inverted pyramid. It is supported upon its gold apex, which carries all the credit of the country. Upon this we have reared all our trade, manu- factures and business generally. The amount of gold has been a very varying quantity -but in any case it has repre- sented an extremely insignificant sum in proportion to the load it has had to carry. Just prior to the war the total amount of gold available throughout the country was estimated at less than 60,000,000. The volume of credit resting upon this ran into hundreds of millions. The bank de- posits alone subject to withdrawal at sight was at least ten times all the gold available. It is safe to say that altogether the volume of credit redeemable in gold on demand on August 1, 1914, was more than twenty-five times all the gold that the bankers could possibly scrape together ! The truth is, that ever since the passing of the Bank Charter Act, every bank in this 70 ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM country has been doing business on a margin of bankruptcy ! The engineer who constructs a bridge or machine, estimates the sizes and chooses his material on the basis of a margin of safety. He first calculates the maximum strains to which the bridge or machine will be subjected. He then multiplies this by two or three and builds accordingly. The Bank Charter Act compelled our bankers to adopt a margin of risk. No provision was made for any extraordinary event, such as war or panic. The one door of safety was suspending the Act. This was actu- ally done on three different occasions during the life of its famous author, with the result that the nation was saved from bankruptcy on each occasion. Imagine a Government passing an Act ostensibly for the protection of the public, which has to be suspended periodically to save the nation from its disastrous effects ! But the danger to which this Act exposed the country was not merely apparent in times of war crises. It was liable to arise at any moment through foreign events ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM 71 which otherwise would have been of little or no consequence to us. The removal of the cotton crops in Egypt or in the United States, the speculations of financial " plun- gers " in New York, Chicago, or San Fran- cisco, the decision of a Board of Railroad Directors in Argentina to extend their system, a presidential election in the United States, and hundreds of similar events which have little or no direct relation to our home trade any one of these was sufficient to affect our bank rate by causing withdrawals of gold from the Bank of England and to influence our commerce disastrously. So sensitive is our money market, in consequence of this stupid Bank Act, that we actually experience greater and more acute financial disturb- ances on account of foreign events than is experienced in the countries themselves in which these events are happening. When the Germans were besieging Paris in 1870, our bank rate stood at 10 per cent., whilst the rate of the Bank of France was only 7 per cent. The German Minister of Finance has boasted that no such panic 72 ENGLAND'S BANKING SYSTEM occurred in Berlin when war was declared in August, 1914, as that which was ex- perienced in London at the same time. The wonder is not so much that our banks collapsed at the mere rumour of war, but that they have been enabled to continue so successfully for so long on so unstable a foundation. Can we wonder that for- eigners have christened the British banking system the " Great Confidence Game " ? THE LONDON GOLD MARKET CHAPTER V (February 3rd, 1918) THE LONDON GOLD MARKET FINANCE, as taught in our standard finan- cial books and by our orthodox professors, reminds one of English history as it was taught in British schools fifty and more years ago. At that time the average scholar could recite from memory the names of all the Kings and Queens of England from the Saxon invasion to the accession of Queen Victoria in chronological order. He could tell you the dates of all the great English battles and which side won ; but of the intellectual, economic and social development of the English people in fact of the real history of England he knew nothing, for the simple reason that the history books told him nothing. It was assumed that the lives of monarchs and their Court favourites, their virtues, 75 76 THE LONDON GOLD MARKET vices, intrigues and wars were the only things that mattered, and chronicles of these events, interlarded with Court gossip, passed for English history. Similarly, Bri- tish books on Finance such as one finds recommended by our Schools of Political Economy and by the Press generally, are usually confined to a history of the rise of the Bank of England, a description of the money market, the rules and practices of our banking companies and a eulogy of the whole system as well as the usual tribute to the honesty of our bankers. In short, the writers of these books tell their readers only one part and the least im- portant part of their subject. They show how efficient, safe and profitable (to the banker) is the British banking system, how advantageous (to the banker and bullion dealer) is London's free gold mar- ket, what a wonderfully elastic and eco- nomic currency the cheque system pro- vides. But the most important and essential part, viz., the relation of this system to industry, its effect upon British enterprise whether stimulating or deaden- THE LONDON GOLD MARKET 77 ing its cost to the nation, etc., in short, the public side of the question, is ignored. Banking, in the eyes of the banker and his shareholders, may possibly be nothing more than a dividend-making business, first and last, but from the public stand- point, it is a necessary part of the great national economic machinery for the pro- duction, exchange and distribution of wealth. And the raison d'etre of the banker and his institution upon whom special privileges have been conferred by British Governments, is to be justified by showing that he is " doing his bit " in supporting and developing British trade and production. Like all inventions, banking systems are merely means to certain ends, and they should be judged solely by their efficiency in accomplishing those ends. And just as an Eastern traveller, who having confined his visits and observations to some Sultan's palace with all its riches and glories, without noticing the degrada- tion, the poverty and misery of the in- habitants, might write of the wealth and 78 THE LONDON GOLD MARKET prosperity of that country, so the average financial authority is apt to write of the marvellous success of our financial system, because he has seen only the prosperous side, the big dividends and the wealth which thanks to our special laws our bankers are able to amass, whilst the bank- ruptcies and failures, the burdens and anxieties which this system imposes on labour and capital are unknown to him. An example will make this clear. The most popular and recent book on this subject is The Meaning of Money, by Hartley Withers, a well-known financial writer for the Press and at present the holder of a recently created office in the Treasury. In a chapter extolling London's banking methods, Mr. Withers instances the great money crisis of 1907 which struck the United States and created such havoc in industrial, commercial and financial circles. This crisis, which it is now known was deliberately engineered by a clique of Wall Street gamblers, reacted on all the money markets of the world, particularly that of London. " The business of managing the THE LONDON GOLD MARKET 79 exchanges of the world during commercial crises," says Mr. Withers, " is obviously thrown on London, as things are at present, by its position as the only monetary city which is prepared to produce gold on demand." Gold was shipped from Europe to New York in large quantities esti- mated at some 25,000,000 sterling, ac- cording to Mr. Withers most of which went from London. As this amount would have depleted the reserves of the Bank of England, the bulk of it had to be drawn from abroad by the usual method of raising the bank rate. " It was," says Mr. Withers, " a very remarkable demonstra- tion of London's complete control over the world's exchanges " since " four-fifths of the amount shipped to the United States were supplied by foreign contributions." He adds : " It was thus shown by the events of this memor- able crisis, that London's tremendous responsibility of providing gold when it is required anywhere by a pressing emergency, is one that can be bravely and cheerfully borne as long as England is in a position, by applying sufficient twists of the monetary screw, to force other nations to contribute their share to the common necessity." TJT. o 80 THE LONDON GOLD MARKET Now this is very comforting and re- assuring to the reader who knows little or nothing of the practical side of the ques- tion. But the most interesting part of the story has been conveniently omitted. It is true that our banks " weathered the financial storm with ease," as the late Lord Avebury expressed it, but at whose expense ? The bank rate was raised to 7 per cent., and kept there for nearly three months, and although this enabled the banks to " weather the storm " by acquiring gold from abroad, incidentally it ruined hundreds of British merchants and producers and played havoc with our trade generally. If there is any truth in the statements made so frequently, that every advance in the bank rate of 1 per cent, costs British borrowers somewhere between 50,000 to 100,000 per week, then this " twisting of the monetary screw to force other nations to contribute their share to the common necessity " served also to squeeze from the British producers some- where between 2,500,000 and 5,000,000 THE LONDON GOLD MAKKET 81 in the shape of increased interest charges, to enable our bankers to save the American banks from the result of the machinations of a gang of unscrupulous Wall Street gamblers ! But this is only a part of the story. When the bank rate runs up, as it did in 1907, all our banks begin reducing overdrafts, and refuse accommodation to thousands of British merchants and manu- facturers who are often in sore need of such help. In consequence, enterprise is checked, production decreases, workmen are thrown out of employment or put on half-time, the public reduces its demand for goods, and business generally is de- pressed ! Moreover, it takes months, and sometimes years, for the nation to recover from the effects of such a crisis. If the total losses caused to this nation by the 1907 panic could have been carefully esti- mated, it would have been found to far exceed in amount all the gold sent by our philanthropic bankers to save the American bankers from the just punishment their recklessness and unscrupulousness deserved. The necessity which our bankers find 82 THE LONDON GOLD MARKET imposed upon them of rendering aid to foreign banks during financial crises, is one of the penalties this country is compelled to pay for the questionable advantage of maintaining a free gold market the only one in the world. Perhaps it will be convenient at this point to deal, once and for all, with this question of a free gold market. The bank- ers' bogy, which is invariably raised when- ever a drastic change is proposed in our banking or currency laws, is the fear that London may cease to be the world's mone- tary centre. Any interference with the system which compels us to provide a free gold market (chiefly for the convenience of foreigners) is represented as fraught with the gravest commercial and financial dangers to this country. What advantage is it then to our industries, our trade and commerce that London should maintain its financial position as the world's banking centre ? Soon after the United States currency crisis, the present writer put this question to the late Mr. Arthur Lee, a well known financial and commercial authority THE LONDON GOLD MARKET 83 Who had given years of study to this parti- cular subject. The reader need hardly be reminded of the vast importance of this particular question especially at this time when we are threatened with a stupen- dous trade war at the conclusion of hostili- ties. As our industrial and commercial classes will not be able to afford to carry any unnecessary burdens, it is wise now to consider closely whether this luxury of a free gold market is worth to the nation what it is costing. Mr. Arthur Lee was a member of the London Chamber of Commerce and at one time President of the Bristol Chamber of Commerce, and in reply to an inquiry as to what advantages, if any, our free market for gold conferred upon British trade and industries, he wrote : " It would be true to say that a free gold market in London is of assistance in securing to us such advan- tages as may accrue from London being the clearing house of the world. So long as London is the market of the world where gold may be most freely bought and sold, and so long as a monopoly is conferred upon gold in respect to its debt-redeeming power, so long will the exchange bankers and bullion dealers retain the enormously profitable financial business in which they have been engaged ever since modern laws con- 84 THE LONDON GOLD MARKET ferred a monopoly value upon gold. This would be an exact and truthful statement of the case. When- ever the pronoun ' we ' is used, I am always tempted to ask the question, who are ' we ' ? I have heard from the lips of a working man words somewhat similar to those you say you found in a recent article on the subject of ' London's Free Gold Market.' I asked him if he had thought whether ' we ' included him- self, and if not, would it not be well for purposes of argument if he used the correct noun instead of an incorrect pronoun ? The advantages of a free gold market to certain classes are obvious enough, but the advantages to the country as a whole are counter- balanced by such serious disadvantages that it seems probable that the latter outweigh the former. The 1 . The expenditure in this country of the profits made by a very small class of financiers (mostly cosmopolitan) . "2. The deposit in this country of balances due to foreigners, payable on demand, or at very short notice. "3. The ready negotiability in a foreign country of a bill of exchange payable in London. This may possibly enable a British x buyer to buy foreign goods at a lower price than a buyer in another country. " The disadvantages are : "1. The constant disturbance to business caused by rapid fluctuations in the rate of discount. "2. The opportunity given to foreign speculators to make profit at the expense of traders in this coun- try by manipulating the open gold market. 1 London bankers have never discriminated against foreigners in favour of British merchants. A foreign buyer can as readily arrange to have his bills drawn on London as the British buyer, and so obtain the same advantages. No one can rightly accuse London bankers of any excess of patriotism ! A. K. THE LONDON GOLD MARKET 85 "3. The draining of the savings of the people con- fided to country bankers in the direction of Lombard Street and thence to the financing of foreign specu- lators. "4. The discouraging of what is termed ' the fixing of capital ' in this country, which is another term for money sunk in sowing the seed which will spring up for the future benefit of our home industries. "5. The financial danger to the country of hold- ing upon loan large floating balances payable on demand, or at short notice, to foreigners. " The advantages and disadvantages of a free gold market may be shortly summed up thus : It gives us facilities for getting into debt, and it places debtors peculiarly at the mercy of creditors." This letter appears to me to give a fair and complete summary of the whole ques- tion. As to the enormous value our bank- ing methods and free gold market have been to foreigners particularly to the Germans, in creating German industries which have successfully competed with our own, the following extract from Mr. Hartley Withers' Meaning of Money will show: " Foreign financiers were quick to detect the ad- vantages of the English credit system and to turn them to their own profit and to the furtherance of the trade of the countries that they represent. It is often contended that the rapid expansion of German trade, which pushed itself largely by its elasticity and adaptability to the wishes of its customers, could never 86 THE LONDON GOLD MARKET have been achieved if it had not been assisted by cheap credit furnished in London, by means of which German merchants ousted English manufacturers with offers of long credit facilities to their foreign customers." Could any indictment of our banking system be stronger than the words I have here italicized ? WAR AND THE BANKERS CHAPTER VI (February 11th, 1916) WAR AND THE BANKERS THE present safety and strength of British Banks is due neither to the so-called " gold basis," nor to the ability or honesty of the men who manage them, but to the public belief that underneath the ridiculously small quantity of gold which is nothing more than a very thin veneer, in compari- son with the credit resting on it rests the national credit comprising the entire wealth of Great Britain. Our legal tender paper money is "as good as gold," not because the Bank of England holds sufficient gold for its redemption which, of course, it never does, nor anything like sufficient but because this money is backed by over 18,000,000,000 of wealth of every de- scription ! If Great Britain had been blessed at any 89 90 WAE AND THE BANKERS time during the past half-century with a statesman who really understood this sub- ject, and who had had sufficient indepen- dence and moral courage, the present system would have been scrapped, and a sound, rational banking system would have replaced it which nothing could shake. What basis for bank credit can be safer or stronger than the national wealth ? Which would a foreign Power prefer, the guarantee of a London bank or that of the British Government ? How determined British bankers were that the obvious lesson of the 1914 crisis should be construed to their advantage may be seen from the writings of one of their most able apolo- gists, Mr. Hartley Withers. Mr. Withers' book War and Lombard Street was published at the end of 1914, and here is his diagnosis of the trouble and the lesson he wishes us to learn. In his preface he says : " I only produce this brief outline, because there is one good reason for trying to make the meaning of these events clear at once. This is, that they gave a wonderful proof of the enormous strength of Eng- land's monetary power, and a full recognition of their strength may be useful now." WAR AND THE BANKERS 91 In his first chapter (page 3) he says : " It (the financial crisis of July and August, 1914) was an unpleasant string of surprises, but it was not brought about by any internal weakness in the Eng- lish banking system. The fury of the tempest was .such that no credit system could possibly have stood up against it. In fact, as will be shown, the chief reason for the suddenness and fullness of the blow that fell on London was nothing else but her own overwhelming strength. She was so strong, and so lonely in her strength that her strength overcame her. She held the rest of the world in fee with so mighty a grip that when she said to the rest of the world ' Please pay what you owe me,' the world could only gasp out ! But how can I pay you if you don't lend me the wherewithal ? " CURIOUS REASONING It is a little difficult to know how to answer such reasoning. Let us examine the author's version of these important events. Financial authorities have been educating the public to believe that the safety of bank credit is due entirely to the fact that it is all redeemable in gold on demand. They have also fostered the belief that credit, unsupported by gold, is dan- gerous. They talk of Germany's " paper money pyramid " as worthless. Naturally, therefore, as soon as the Balkan trouble arose in the summer of 1914, the holders 92 WAR AND THE BANKERS of cheques, bills, promissory notes and other forms of credit took the bankers at their word and rushed to have these credit instruments redeemed in gold. And the bankers couldn't produce 5 per cent, of the gold needed ! The hollow pretence of gold- redemption was at once exposed. Any commercial firm unable to meet its bills of acceptance when due is considered unsound, and is forced into liquidation, and the fact that various sums are due to the firm but unavailable is insufficient to save it. Why does not the same rule apply to the banks ? Every one knows that the moratorium was a confession of insolvency for the time being and ruin was only avoided through Mr. Lloyd George's prompt assistance in offering the national credit as security, and in issuing an abundance of one pound and ten shilling notes as legal tender a measure suggested years ago by the late Lord Goschen and vigorously opposed by Lombard Street and Threadneedle Street. Our banking system is surely reduced to hard straits when excuses, like those made by Mr. Hartley Withers, are offered WAR AND THE BANKERS 93 as an explanation of the crisis of 1914 ! Expressed in plain terms, the gist of Mr. Withers' argument is as follows : Whilst the payment of obligations in gold on demand may be an evidence of financial strength, the inability to do so is an evidence of " over- whelming strength / " Mr. Withers even intimates that the crisis was due to the " madness or wickedness " of the public in demanding fulfilment of the bankers' ob- ligations ! AN ANALOGY' Supposing the captain of a passenger ship should advise his passengers that in time of danger their only safety lay in each one possessing a ship's life belt, why should he consider it an evidence of their madness or wickedness if during a heavy storm or collision there should be a general rush for life belts ? And what would one say, if, when the ship was sinking and the passengers had discovered that there were not enough life belts for even 5 per cent, of those on board, the captain should say to those doomed to be drowned : " My friends, your fate is not due to any c in- 94 WAR AND THE BANKERS herent weakness ' in our method of safe- guarding the lives of those committed to our charge. The truth is, your predica- ment is a ' wonderful proof ' of its c over- whelming strength. 5 We have a monopoly of life belts, but we don't happen to have more than a few here. We lend them to other shipowners, and our position is so ' overwhelmingly strong ' that we are al- ways lending and consequently we can never keep more than a small percentage for ourselves ! " Can we wonder that the so-called " Gre- sham Law," which is a complete denial of the law of efficiency, is accepted as a mathe- matical axiom among men who can reason in the fashion of this financial expert ? If our " overwhelming strength " is due to the uncollected amount of gold owing to us, what becomes of the much-vaunted " payable on demand " claims ? The Gre- sham Law which is another of the many economic fallacies found in orthodox finan- cial treatises, and which has done duty for the bankers for several centuries ought to be given its quietus. Put into plain WAR AND THE BANKERS 95 English, it means that the only good money is that which the bankers provide or promise to provide. This " law " says, " bad money drives out good money, but good money cannot drive out bad money." The acceptance of this " law " depends entirely upon one's interpretation of the terms " good " and " bad." It was ob- served centuries ago that where a cheap money (that is, clipped coins, paper money) was circulating freely, any attempt to cause the circulation of gold coins of full weight, failed, because there were always enough smart and tricky people about to melt or clip such " good " coins and make a profit by selling the gold clippings. And natur- ally if paper was acceptable as currency it was extravagant to use an expensive metal like gold. THE GBESHAM LAW. Now the curious thing about this law is, that it is contradictory to all the laws of efficiency, evolution, and common sense. To take one out of thousands of every-day examples : Roofing material formerly con- T.F. 96 WAR AND THE BANKERS sisted of expensive metals, such as lead and copper. This gave place to tiles and slat- ing which were much cheaper and far more sanitary. According to " Gresham's Law," " bad " roofing has driven out " good " roofing. Similarly cheap Bessemer steel has driven out expensive wood, brass, and stone, for thousands of purposes, thereby increasing the safety and comforts of society. In the language of the " Gre- shamites," this means that " bad " material has driven out the " good." Cheap paper printing and bookbinding have driven out expensive parchment, engrossing and en- graving. Hence the " bad " printing press and machinery have driven out the " good " handicraft ! In all the ordinary affairs of life we judge of the comparative merits of two things by actual trial, and the one that survives is pronounced the better, that is better for the conditions under which the trial was made. Why should money be any exception to this general rule ? If paper money can perform all the functions of a gold currency, why use the expensive metal ? As a matter of fact. WAR AND THE BANKERS 97 to-day, 98 per cent, of our currency is paper, and the alleged necessity for gold is a pretence, but it enables the bankers to draw the same interest for the use of paper that they charge for the use of gold. This I believe is the real secret of their insistence on maintaining the so-called " gold basis." Had Sir Thomas Gresham been born two centuries later, his observations on currency would doubtless have led him to a totally different conclusion from that ex- pressed in the so-called " law " which goes by his name. He would most probably have formulated his conclusions as follows : " Our greatest philosopher, Sir Isaac Newton, has shown us that the direction of motion is always along the line of least resistance. Applying this truth to the industrial world, to the activities of man- kind, we find that men always seek to gratify their wants with the least expendi- ture of energy. Expressed in economic terms, the tendency of industry and trade is constantly towards cheapness towards the abolition of value. Under free condi- tions, therefore, cheap money must neces- 98 WAR AND THE BANKERS sarily drive out dear money. This follows from the teachings of philosophy and is confirmed by experience and observation." " Cheap " money does not necessarily mean money that is inefficient. Steel is enor- mously cheaper than gold, but a steel bridge is infinitely safer and better than one of gold. Financial writers like Withers who extol our bank cheque currency, are unconsciously denying the validity of the Gresham Law which they profess to uphold. Cheque currency is the cheapest form of money ever known, and has driven out gold currency to an extraordinary extent. And but for our legal tender laws, gold currency would disappear en- tirely. As long as it performs the function of money, cheap money is the best money, and must of necessity drive out dear money. Much satisfaction has been enjoyed by our Press over Sir Edward Holden's reply to the bombastic speeches of Herr Hel- ferich, the German Minister of Finance. Sir Edward's reply is said to be " crush- ing." No doubt our enemy is getting into serious financial difficulties. The mark is WAR AND THE BANKERS 99 falling rapidly in comparison with the monetary units of neutrals. He may al- ready have had to sell all his investments abroad. He may have to part with all his gold. But, I repeat what I have said in a previous article, so long as our enemy's industrial and productive activities re- main unimpaired, so long as he is permitted to exchange his products in sufficient quantities for such material and goods which he cannot produce and which are necessary for his food and manufactures, he cannot be economically destroyed, even if the mark should lose 90 per cent, of its former value ! A nation can exist without gold a metal which, except for use in certain arts such as jewellery and dentistry, is probably the most useless and most readily dispensable we have. Let us give the Devil his due. Let us reverse the conditions. Supposing Ger- many had destroyed our Navy and block- aded our coasts, where would our precious banking system be to-day ? Where would our pound sterling be ? Does any one imagine that our banking system would 100 WAR AND THE BANKERS have stood the strain that Germany's has without crumpling up ? We have seen that before a single shot was fired our system collapsed ! Indeed, the London banks depend absolutely upon foreign com- merce backed by the credit of a wealthy nation possessing the freedom of the seas, without which our gold supplies could never be renewed. Were our coasts block- aded they would collapse in a week ! A REAL COMPARISON The real comparison of Germany's bank- ing system with that of Great Britain's is to be found in their relation to the industries of each country respectively. The Ger- mans themselves admit that they owe their unprecedented commercial and industrial development largely to the policy of their bankers. Judged by the highest standard namely, the development and growth of a nation's industries it must be admitted that the German system has proved itself to be immeasurably superior to ours. Do our bankers intend to assist British manu- facturers to capture German trade in the WAR AND THE BANKERS 101 future ? If they do, they must alter their policy. Which is better for a nation, the possession of great and varied manufac- tures, of numerous engineering works, ship- building yards, electrical undertakings and general industries, or a monopoly of the world's banking business ? How much employment does the latter give in comparison to the former ? Would either the United States or Germany be willing to exchange its iron, steel and electrical industries for the whole of our banking business ? Is it not better for a nation morally, pecuniarily, physically and socially to be able to employ its people as scientists, agriculturists, mechanics, engi- neers, chemists, electricians than as bank clerks, chauffeurs, footmen and butlers ? I repeat that the thing that matters to us is, whether our industrial and productive activities are to be developed ? Are we producing commodities, food, minerals and other necessities as well as manufactured goods in sufficient quantities to meet the public needs, and to meet the national expenses ? 102 WAR AND THE BANKERS The loss of our banking monopoly may injure a few hundred or at most a few thousand people. But our loss of the world's markets in trade and commerce will mean the beginning of the downfall of the British Empire. THE GOLD FETISH CHAPTER VII (March 2nd, 1916) THE GOLD FETISH THE annual meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce will mark an im- portant step in our foreign trade policy. The members of our commercial bodies are fully aroused to the necessity of pre- paring for the coming trade war which will be waged relentlessly at the conclusion of present hostilities. The most urgent ques- tion, however, which will doubtless occupy the attention of these bodies will be the establishment of industrial banks for as- sisting British merchants in extending their trade and commerce throughout the world. Tariff measures will prove of little avail against the enemy, unless accompanied by a radical change in our banking and finan- cial methods. 105 106 THE GOLD FETISH Many members of our Chambers of Com- merce have written expressing their interest in and in many cases their agreement with the articles on the Banking Question in LAND AND WATER. Some correspon- dents, however, "have expressed surprise that they have been devoted principally to a criticism of our existing financial system, whilst little has been said to indicate what system should replace the present one. To such critics it is sufficient to say, that before one can erect a new building on the site of an old one, it is necessary first to clear away all the rubbish and obstructions. Our banking system, as I have hitherto pointed out, is founded on several glaring fallacies. It is the product of greed, ignor- ance and superstition. I have already exposed one or two of these fallacies, such as the gold basis fiction, and the so-called Gresham Law, but other errors equally glaring remain to be exposed and eradicated before we can attempt to replace the pre- sent institution with a better one. THE GOLD FETISH 107 FALLACIOUS PRINCIPLES Already many proposals have been offered to the Government regarding what their authors believe would prove salutary changes in our credit and monetary arrange- ments, but these proposals are not likely to receive serious consideration by the authori- ties until the current theories and principles of finance are shown to be fallacious. The chief object of the writer of these articles is to endeavour to convince the British public not only that the existing financial system is inadequate, dangerous and costly, but that owing to the false teachings of financial writers, the public has been defrauded of the free use of its own credit for industrial and commercial purposes. Since the war started, events have shown that the credit of Great Britain is worth several thousands of millions of pounds sterling. On the other hand, the credit of all the British banking companies combined is only a fraction of that of the British nation. How is it then that the British Government compels the nation to sell its superior credit for bank credit and 108 THE GOLD FETISH pay interest charges for the exchange ? That " the whole is greater than a part " is an elementary mathematical axiom. Why does not the axiom hold good in financial matters ? The credit of Great Britain comprises that of all the British people and its institu- tions. Why then does the Government enter into such an apparently foolish bar- gain as the exchange of the more valuable credit for the less valuable and pay a premium ? The answer is that the gold superstition still dominates the minds, not only of the Government, but of the vast majority of the citizens of this country. The average man still believes that there is some special virtue in gold when used for currency purposes which does not exist in paper. It is the prevalence of this superstition that has cost this country untold millions in interest charges which might have been saved. And just as the poor benighted heathen are victimized by their priests and sorcerers and induced to pay to have their homes freed from imagin- ary devils and evil spirits, so the average THE GOLD FETISH 109 Britisher has been willing to pay for the use of gold where paper would have answered equally well and would have facilitated his business to precisely the same degree. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer is reported to have boasted in a recent speech in the House of Commons that every 1 note issued by the Government is redeem- able in gold on demand. It is to be hoped the public will not take Mr. McKenna at his word, otherwise we shall have a repeti- tion of the midsummer crisis of 1914. The inference the Chancellor wishes us to draw from his statement is, that our legal tender notes are valuable because they can be redeemed in gold. So long as this super- stition prevails, so long will our producing classes be taxed for the use of credit and currency, which, under more enlightened conditions, they might have at practically little or nothing save the cost of service plus a small tax for insurance. ACTUAL FACTS Let us at once face the actual facts. // 110 THE GOLD FETISH in the future our currency and credit are to be based on gold, and if they are to be made redeemable in gold on demand, then our industries, our trade and commerce must be restricted. In other words, the limit of enter- prise and industry must be the amount of gold that our banks are able to control and are willing to make available, and as for capturing German trade, we may as well abandon all our efforts. On the other hand, if the people of this country hope greatly to increase their trade and commerce, if they have any serious intentions of capturing German trade, the gold basis will have to be abandoned as being insecure and insufficient, and the much safer and broader basis of the national credit will have to replace it. The statement made by Mr. McKenna regarding the ability of the banks to re- deem their obligations in gold has already proved to be incorrect. The real test was made at the end of July and the beginning of August, 1914, and nothing has happened since then to invalidate or alter the result of that test. Of course, what Mr. McKenna means and what the bankers undoubtedly THE GOLD FETISH 111 mean when they speak of " gold redemp- tion " is, that so long as the public is con- tent to take gold in small quantities, the banks are able to perform their obligations. If the question of time be eliminated, any bank might undertake to issue a million pounds of credit on a gold reserve of one hundred pounds. But in financial matters, time is always the essence of the contract. If the public demand gold redemption, they want redemption immediately on demand and not some months later at the banker's convenience. It would undoubtedly be possible in the course of six months for London Bridge to carry all the traffic that now passes across the Thames in a single month. Supposing during a Zeppelin raid all the Thames bridges were destroyed except one. Naturally the traffic would be seriously disorganized. At the same time, this one remaining bridge would no doubt enable the traffic to continue, although greatly reduced, and at very serious cost and delay to the London merchants and manufactur- ers. The same is true in regard to the T.F. i 112 THE GOLD FETISH redemption of credit in gold. In short, the gold standard and the gold basis mean that trade and commerce must be cut down solely in the interests of the money-lending classes, in order that they may be allowed to continue their control of credit. A SERIOUS INDICTMENT One of the most serious indictments brought gainst the gold basis will be found in a paper x read by Sir Edward Holden of the London City and Midland Banking Co. before the Liverpool Bankers' Institute in December, 1907, immediately after the United States currency panic. I cannot do better than reproduce Sir Edward's explanation of the depreciation of securities in gold at that time. His illustrations form one of the most complete exposures of the blighting and depressing effects upon trade and industry exercised by this gold super- stition, ever published. Sir Edward illus- trated the condition of the banks by a triangle which showed that credit is neces- sarily restricted by gold regardless of the enormous wealth possessed by the nation 1 The Depreciation of Securities in Relation to Gold. THE GOLD FETISH 113 in other forms. He first states what is often forgotten that loans create bank credits, and if we regard all the banks in London as one, the business of banking becomes little more than a matter of book- keeping the transfer of credit from one person to another. He then proceeds as follows : " The right side of the triangle represents the loans of the whole of the banks, and the left side represents the cash balance or reserve. If, then, you draw a line from the left of the base and equal to the base, you get the cash credits in existence. If the loans and credits as represented by the two sides of the triangle were the only two elements which bankers had to take into consideration, then there would be no necessity for them to restrict their loans at all, and traders could increase their business and obtain loans ad libitum. But there is another ele- ment, and a most important one, to be taken into consideration, and it is the fact that all the credits as represented by the left side of the triangle and the line drawn from the base, are practically payable on demand and in gold, assuming of course, that Bank of England notes represent gold. " Every banker must, therefore, make up his mind by what amounts his credits are liable to be diminished, both in ordinary and extraordinary times, and when he has thus made up his mind, he ought to keep that amount of available resources in gold, or as a means of obtaining gold. Let us consider, then, that the base of the triangle consists of gold, and it is the ratio of the base of the triangle to the total credits (both created and cash credits) which restrict bankers 114 THE GOLD FETISH from increasing unduly their loans. If business increases unduly, and if bankers continue to increase the loan side of the triangle, of course concurrently increasing their credits, and not being able to increase the gold base of the triangle, then evidently they are getting into danger, and the only judicious course which they can pursue is to curtail their loans, cur- tailing an undue increase of business, which curtails the credits, and thus re-establish the ratio. " You here see the direct connexion between trade on the one hand and gold on the other, and that it is not so much the production of gold as the amount of gold which can be obtained for the purpose of in- creasing the bankers' reserves. I venture to think that the above explanation will enable you to come to the conclusion that, if the gold base of the triangle cannot be increased, then the danger spot is the LOAN. " I want you to remember that the banking system of every country has its triangles, and that the prin- ciples enunciated above exist in every triangle of every banking system based on gold in the world ; that being so, it is clear, generally speaking, that the business of the world is carried on by means of loans, that loans create credits, that the stand-by for the protection of credits is gold, and that therefore gold controls trade. " It may happen that the trade of one country grows by leaps and bounds, the loans and credits, of course, following, while the trade of other coun- tries remains normal. What, then, takes place ? The gold base of the triangle of the former becomes too small, and it is necessary to enlarge it. How is the increase effected ? It is effected by the repre- sentative bank of the more prosperous country attacking the gold basis of the triangle of other coun- tries, and the instrument by which the attack is made is the rate of discount. By this means gold will be attracted from the bases of the triangles of other countries, and unless those bases are too great foff THE GOLD FETISH 115 the adequate protection of the credits, the represen- tative banks of those countries will meet the attack by also putting up their rates. But it may happen that the trade of every country has increased by leaps and bounds, and that all loans and credits have also increased. Then the fight begins by every country putting up its rate, first to prevent its base being diminished, and, secondly, to increase it if possible." Let us clearly understand the meaning of this very lucid and truthful illustration. Our producing classes are being urged to do their best to capture German trade. Now, no extension of trade is possible under present conditions except through the increase of bank loans. Supposing that these loans are granted and the enter- prise, skill, and industry of our people are rewarded by a great increase in trade. What certainty have they that they will be permitted to keep this trade ? And what is to limit this trade increase ? The answers are (1) that since trade depends upon the credit allowed by the banks, which in turn depends upon the amount of the gold reserves, there is abso- lutely no certainty. (2) That the limit is gauged neither by the enterprise of our people nor the extent of the markets open 116 THE GOLD FETISH for British goods, but by the same acci- dents, events and conditions which make all our industrial operations so uncertain, viz., the imports and exports of gold. Now London is the only free gold market in the world. Supposing therefore that after the war, Germany or the United States, or both, determine to wage a relent- less commercial war for the world's mar- kets. Not only will they attack by en- deavouring to undersell us, but they will try to cripple us in our most vulnerable spot : viz., our gold market. By with- drawing gold from London they can compel our banks to reduce their loans to British merchants, and our efforts at capturing German trade will be fruitless. And the only weapon of self-defence our bankers control is the bank rate ! If we apply Sir Edward Holden's con- clusions to the figure of an inverted pyramid, we shall see at a glance how the movements of gold affect our trade and commerce. We have as before a compara- tively small amount of gold supporting an enormous volume of credit, bank loans, THE GOLD FETISH H7 etc., on which rests the vast business interests of the nation. Now this volume of credit is supposed to bear a certain relation to the gold reserves held by the banks. Exactly what this is, the public can never tell, for the reason that only two banks in London publish their gold holdings, viz., the Bank of England and the London City and Midland Bank, of which Sir Edward Holden is its very able chairman and managing director. Of course, this relation necessarily varies from time to time, but no banker would go on indefinitely increasing his loans without increasing his gold reserves. And, vice versa, if his gold reserves are shrink- ing the prudent banker will necessarily be compelled to call in that proportion of his loans corresponding to the reduction in his reserves. Now the ratio of gold to bank credit in practice is supposed to vary from 10 to 20 per cent. Supposing our foreign competitors succeeded in with- drawing 5,000,000 in gold from the Bank of England. The bank loans must be reduced to the extent of 25,000,000 to 118 THE GOLD FETISH 50,000,000 to preserve the previously existing ratio. And by withdrawing this credit, of course the trade and commerce dependent on such loans are destroyed. Sir Edward Holden's Liverpool address was a very frank admission that the gold basis together with our free gold market places British trade and industry at the mercy, not only of our trade competitors, but of the bullion dealers and speculators of the world ! His illus- trations show that any long- continued period of industrial prosperity is made impossible by the restrictions imposed by the gold-redemption system. He further shows (no doubt unconsciously) that the gold basis is a brake upon the wheels of industry, continually interfering with the rate of production. Here also is the ex- planation of the phenomenon that periods of prosperity are inevitably followed by periods of depression. Increased trade demands increased banking facilities increased loans but the moment credit is increased to meet this demand, the gold reserves are strained, THE GOLD FETISH 110 the bank rate is raised, loans are called in, the brake is applied to the wheels of industry, production is checked, employees are discharged, enterprise is discouraged, and the extra demand for money and credit, which prosperous times require, is choked off! In short, our financial system destroys prosperity, and reduces trade to the amount of gold available. So that the mechanism of exchange, instead of facilitating trade at all times, actually checks it. It first stimulates industry, and then destroys it. The gold basis has become both the life and death of trade. INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS CHAPTER VTII (March 16th, 1916) INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS FOR many years past British manufacturers and merchants have complained of the difficulty of obtaining adequate banking facilities and of the unreasonable objections made by their bankers to affording them the accommodation their businesses re- quired. These complaints have become much more frequent and general since the London Joint Stock banks invaded the provinces in such force, and began their policy of absorbing the private country banks a policy which has proceeded at an accelerating speed of late, until to-day very few of the old private banks remain. Without doubt, this policy has been pro- ductive of great injury to the nation and great hardship to hundreds of small pro- ducers throughout Great Britain. 123 124 INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS These country banks were the mainstay of thousands of industries, and they were conducted on a far more liberal and patriotic scale than the London Joint Stock banks. The country banker knew all his clients personally, and was usually familiar with their family history. He knew whom to trust. He could easily distinguish between the thrifty, industrious, enterprising man and the extravagant, lazy and unprogressive in- dividual. The country banker was usually a leader in social affairs in his own town or district, and took a personal pride and interest in assisting in the development of its industries. Whilst he was, perhaps, as keen to make large profits as the London bankers, his desire was tempered by a sort of civic pride. It was very gratifying to him to feel he was helping his neighbours and fellow- townsmen, which ensured him their esteem and gratitude. The demands of borrowers in London or abroad were not likely to induce him to forget those of his own townspeople. In short, he usually had a large amount of local as well as national patriotism, ^ INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS 125 SYMPATHY AND MUTUAL HELP Those who have read Prince Kropotkin's great work, Mutual Aid, will remember what an immense factor sympathy, leading to mutual help, has been in the develop- ment of animal life. Sympathy has been a similarly valuable factor in the develop- ment of industrial and commercial affairs. This factor was present, influencing the conduct of the private banker. With the advent of the soulless Joint Stock Com- pany principle, this factor was utterly destroyed. The country banker frequently became a shareholder in his town's local enter- prises. All this greatly contributed to the upbuilding and development of Britain's industries. I have been told by many of the farmers and country tradesmen how comparatively easy it was for them to get financial help from their private bankers thirty or forty years ago. With the es- tablishment of the London Companies' country branches, all this is now changed. In place of the local banker with his wealth, power, local pride, knowledge and sym- 126 INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS pathy, we have a manager who is usually a stranger, and who knows little or nothing of the townspeople themselves, who is usually without any social or political standing, and is powerless to grant any considerable banking facilities without the consent of his London board of directors. His instructions are to secure all the deposit accounts possible and send as much cur- rency as he can to London. If it were possible for a country manager to acquire country deposits without having to grant loans, the London banks would regard this as an ideal condition. Just as in the United States the great bankers of New York and Chicago have always endeavoured to denude the States of cash in order to amass and control it in their own cities, so the London banks have tried to keep the stream of currency always flowing in their direction. When it is considered that this policy of denuding the country districts of money is often for the purpose of enabling the London banks to grant loans to foreigners who are interested in building up industries abroad which INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS 127 successfully compete with our own, the irony of the situation becomes apparent ! From the national and patriotic standpoint what can be more amazing than the know- ledge that the savings of the British public are being employed directly to cripple them in their own trade and industries ? In a former article I quoted from a well-known financial writer a statement showing the valuable assistance the London banks have given to the Germans in building up their vast businesses. This policy has been for this country ruinous in the extreme. Al- though it has probably helped to increase the banks' dividends, it has blasted scores of British industries. RISK OF A MONOPOLY The continual absorption of the smaller banking companies by the large ones, indicates that within a comparatively short space of time the entire banking business of Great Britain will be under the complete control of one board of directors. This is a national danger which should be pre- vented at all hazards. It would constitute T.F, K 128 INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS a monopoly as far reaching and as inimical to the public interests as that which was exposed in the United States by a Congressional Committee a few years ago. The monopoly of money is the greatest of all monopolies, for it controls all others ! It gives its controllers supreme power over production, trade and commerce nay, over life itself! Under modern conditions money has been made indispensable to every one. Such a monopoly ought to be permitted to no one company or aggrega- tion of companies. In the United States, its effects have been shown in the corrup- tion of political life, and in the omnipotence it gives to men like the late Pierpont Morgan, who was able to possess himself of almost any branch of industry he desired. The career of almost every one in America was at his mercy. He could make and un- make whom he chose, and woe to the man who opposed him ! His power far exceeded that of the President of the United States himself. If such a monopoly must exist, let it be INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS 129 owned by the nation. Here is a legitimate field for democratic control. For, even in the hands of the State, a hanking monopoly may be a source of infinite harm to the public, unless it is properly and impartially con- ducted for the interests of all classes dike. Honestly and efficiently conducted, it would prove one of the greatest institutions for the development of trade, for effecting a more equitable condition between capital and labour, for improving social conditions and providing an inexhaustible revenue for the State. The policy hitherto pursued by our Joint Stock banks has been to give facilities to the strong and deny it to the weak. Evidently they believe in the saying : " Unto him that hath shall be given, but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." The object of this policy is to lend to those only who are able to repay immediately on demand. Hence the speculator, the Stock Exchange gambler, can get accom- modation where the producer would be denied, 130 INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS THE POLICY HITHERTO I have known a manufacturer who, having sunk his capital in plant, machinery, and tools for producing necessary and useful articles, was unable to proceed for lack of banking accommodation which was refused him on the ground that machinery and tools are not considered banking security. Had this man bought shares and tried his luck as a gambler, he might have secured banking facilities to his heart's content. A system which discrimi- nates against the production of wealth in favour of gambling pure and simple, is neither morally nor economically beneficial to any country. Let it be admitted at once that this feature is not altogether the fault of the bankers themselves. It is the natural and combined results of the Legal Tender Acts and the deposit system under which the banks are compelled to agree to pay depositors their claims on demand in legal tender. Consequently it would be court- ing bankruptcy for the bankers to lock up all the money belonging to their de- INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS 131 positors in investments they are unable to quickly realize. Hence, preference is given to short-time loans on gilt-edged security. And this class of loan al- though suitable to speculators and dealers is unsuitable to the producing classes. The farmer who needs money to buy his seeds and fertilizers and agricultural ma- chinery, cannot undertake to repay the loan until he has sold his crops. A period of months and even years must sometimes intervene. What use is it to offer him a sum of money if there is the remotest pros- pect of the loan being called in, a few weeks or months later ? This would simply mean ruin to him. The banker would have to sell the farm in order to realize the amount of the loan. A WELL-KNOWN FINANCIAL GAME This practice is, however, a well-known financial game which is frequently played by unscrupulous moneylenders, and even by many who pose as capitalists. How many inventors, manufacturers and mer- chants have been swindled out of their 132 INADEQUACY OP OUR BANKS life's earnings by financial vampires who have advanced money on debentures, mortgages or promissory notes, and then swooped down on their luckless victims at a time when they knew that these were unable to repay the money ! Legal Tender Acts may possibly have been intended by their framers to facilitate trade and to ensure equitable dealings between man and man. But they have often been used as instruments of the grossest frauds and the cruellest oppression, enabling the financially strong to rob and terrorize over the finan- cially weak. The history of finance is strewn with the wreckage of myriads who have been broken by these merciless laws, which prescribe the particular instruments with which debts must be settled, without having made an adequate provision for a sufficient supply of these instruments. The Governments responsible for these Legal Tender Acts do not appear to have given much consideration to this phase of the subject. Our currency legislators seem to have been haunted with the fear of making INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS 133 money cheap. So they made the condi- tions for its creation as difficult as possible, and chose as the money-metal one of the rarest and most expensive, leaving the public to the tender mercies of the few privileged persons who happened to control its supply. For the development of a nation's in- dustries, deposit banking is insufficient. Long-time loans, so essential to those engaged in starting and building up their enterprises, are unsuited to those entrusted with money returnable on call. Further, the rigidity of the system under which legal tender could be created prior to the war, made long-time loans a somewhat dangerous enterprise for the banker. Any increase in the volume of legal tender notes beyond the normal amount, had to be accompanied by a corresponding in- crease in the gold reserves often a difficult and always an expensive proceeding. GERMANY'S MORE ELASTIC SYSTEM It is in this particular respect that the German system has proved itself far more 134 INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS elastic and suitable for industrial growth than the English system. Notes issued by the German Reichsbank required only one-third of their nominal value in gold and two-thirds in bills, the result being that, as the necessities of trade expanded, the means for supplying those necessities grew with them, since the security for the notes was furnished by the industries in the form of bills of exchange. The in- crease of the volume of uncovered notes is also permitted on payment to the Im- perial Government of 5 per cent, on all such excess amounts. The result is, the German bankers have had at their com- mand sufficient credit to back German trade and commerce to the fullest extent without running into very great danger. An industry that could earn more than 5 per cent, on any additional capital required could, other things being satisfactory, readily secure financial support. With a million marks of gold reserves, the German Reichsbank could issue three million of legal tender notes, and on this the bank could issue twelve million marks INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS 135 of bank credit, whereas under our system only one million of legal tender notes could be issued against one million of gold re- serves. And with an issue of four million of bank credit the position of our banks would be no safer than the German bank with its issue of twelve millions ! For the real basis of credit, in times of crises parti- cularly, is legal tender based on the national credit, and the public is satisfied with paper money provided they know it is legal tender for all debts, public and pri- vate. Consider the present position of the small producer who is anxious to develop his business. He has no gilt-edged security to offer his banker, and therefore cannot get the accommodation he requires. His only alternative is the private moneylender or promoter, to whom as security he must deliver up practically his soul. The money- lender points out the great risk he is run- ning and makes his interest charges cor- respondingly high. After a few months, or perhaps years, of struggle, during which the producer has been handicapped by the 136 INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS burdensome interest charges, the lender falls on him and cleans him out of all he possesses. If it be the promoter who helps him, it generally ends the same way i.e., in the promoter possessing himself of the business. Now it is this class of producer, one of the most useful in the country, for whom no financial provision has yet been made. Our laws have placed him between the devil and the deep sea ! The German Government, quicker and more intelligent in industrial and commercial matters than the British Government (and although autocratic, far more in touch with the wants of the producing classes than ours), has made provision for theirs, and Ger- many has been reaping a rich harvest almost entirely through such financial pro- vision. As I said previously, the main cause of the inadequacy of our banking system for commercial and industrial needs, is our stupid Bank Charter Act, which should be repealed. It has placed our banking system in a strait- jacket, and it can only INADEQUACY OF OUR BANKS 137 expand in one direction namely, by in- creasing the volume of bank credit, without necessarily increasing the base upon which it rests. TOWARDS A BETTER BANKING SYSTEM CHAPTER IX (March 30th, 1916) TOWARDS A BETTER BANKING SYSTEM IN the course of these articles on Finance, I have endeavoured to point out the evils of our present banking system and their causes. These evils may be briefly sum- marized as follows : (1) There is an insufficiency and an uncertainty of credit facilities, both as to time and amount, for the proper and con- tinuous development of our industries. (2) Owing to its unnecessary exposure to foreign influences, our credit market is extremely sensitive and unreliable, which results in our being afflicted with the most variable bank rate in the world. (3) Our bank credit is in constant danger of a collapse due to the export of gold which has been made the legal basis of credit. And the collapse of credit involves the annihilation of trade. 141 142 A BETTER BANKING SYSTEM (4) British bank credit has become prac- tically a monopoly of the London Joint Stock banks due to their control of the Clearing House. This monopoly gives bank directors a power and influence over British industries which they ought not to possess. With the constant amalgamation of our banks, this power is falling into the grasp of fewer and fewer hands. (5) The rate charged for loans is un- necessarily high. ANTIQUATED BANKING LAWS I have shown that these evils are the natural result of our antiquated currency and banking laws which have imposed unreasonable restrictions, compelling the banks to base all their transactions on gold. Where the bankers have been to blame is, first, in resisting every proposal for altering and improving the present system, and secondly, in supporting foreign loans, often in disregard of the needs of British traders, whose interests have been frequently sacri- ficed on behalf of the foreign trade com- petitor. No doubt they have had good A BETTER BANKING SYSTEM 143 reasons for pursuing such a policy. Con- sequently when the foreigner offers 7 per cent, or 8 per cent, for money where the British trader can only offer 4 per cent, or 5 per cent., they are apt to close with the foreigner. But think of the stupidity and shortsightedness of British statesmanship that enacts laws making the nation's trade and industries subject to the cupidity or caprice of the professional credit dealers ! And when at the end of each year the directors of our banks are able to pay their fortunate shareholders from 12 per cent, to 22 per cent, dividends, they are compelled to agree with Pippa that " God's in his heaven, and all's right with the world." Now although we have still several ob- structions to remove before the ground is cleared for a better system one remaining obstruction being the & , r eswd e prcxzuae \ PSYCHOLOGY OF THE WORKSHOP C^IA 4-W CI^GX ill fcefe? i\A INDEX Agencies German trade methods, 180 American securities, sale of, 31 Avebury, Lord, 80 Bagehot, Walter, 63, 64, 66 Balfour of Burleigh, Lord, 236 Bank Charter Act, 33, 67, 70, 136, 145, 159, 16T Bank of England, 66, 67 Gold holding of, 117 Bank of France, rate in 1870, 71 Banking : Amalgamation of banks, 151 Bank Rate fluctuations, 37, 68, 71, 80, 81 British and German systems compared, 49, 100* British system, criticism of, 61, 141 et seq. Clearing Houses, nationalization of, 153 Currency, banking interests in, 25 Free competitive banking, 149, 152 German banking system, 35, 45, 133, 176 London Gold Market, 36, 75 et seq., 82, 83, 116* Monopoly of, 127 Mutual banking, 149 Nationalization of, 34, 56, 148 et seq. Provincial banks, absorption of, 123 Bernhardi, 61 Besant, Walter, 62 Bismarck, Otto von, 229 Bleichroeder, 229 Bulgaria's alliance with Germany, 6 281 282 INDEX Business patriotism, 55 Capital v. Labour, 207 et seq. Chancellor of Exchequer, open letter to, 33 Cinema films to influence public opinion, 13, 276 Clearing Houses, nationalization of, 153 Cobden, Richard, 42, 228, 241 Coinage, metric system advocated, 191 et seq. Combines and Trusts, 242 Consular Service, reform of, 47 Controlled firms, conditions imposed upon, 253 et seq. Country banks and bankers, 125 et seq. Credit of Great Britain, value of, 107 Daily News article on Banking, 62 Daylight Saving Act, 190 Defence of the Realm Act, 252 Dyeing Industry, German monopoly, 54 Economic Conference, Paris, 1916, 235, 241, 248 Economics failure to solve industrial problems, 199 et seq. Education Acts, 221 Employers' Liability Act, 221 Factory Acts, 221 Financial factor in war, 17 et seq. Foreign loans and investments, 27 Free gold market, effect of, 76, 82, 83 Free Trade and Protection, coming economic war, 233 et seq. German Trade : Capture of, 41, 110, 115, 192 Dyeing, monopoly of, 54 Methods, 44, 175 et seq., 238 Organization of, 226 Trusts and Combines, 243 INDEX 285 Germany : Banking operations of, 35, 45, 133, 176 Bulgarian support, 6 Government Departments, purchases by, 51 Neutral countries' belief in German cause, 5 Psychological factor, employment in war, 8 Turkey's alliance with, 6 Gladstone, W. E., 33, 36 Glass industry, discovery of heat-resisting glass, 53 Gold as legal tender, value of, 24 Gold Reserves : Amount available before war, 69 Fallacy of, 21, 69, 89, 91, 110, 111, 118, 143, 149 Finance, effect of gold standard upon, 19 et seq, German and British systems compared, 134 London Free Gold Market, 75, 82, 83, 116 Treasury notes, gold reserves for issue of, 166 Goschen, Lord, 33, 64, 92, 190 " Gresham Law," 94, 95 Gresham, Sir Thomas, 97 Grey, Viscount, 9 Harrison, Frederick, 64 Hobhouse, Emily, 239 Hobson, John A., 206, 238 Holden, Sir Edward, 63, 98, 112, 116, 118, 145 Holland's neutrality, 6 " Inconvertible " notes, 68 Inventions and discoveries, German subsidies for, 55 Industrial banking system, 144 Jevons, Stanley, 200, 202 Kropotkin, Prince, 125 Labour : Capital v. Labour, 207 et seq. 284 INDEX Labour continued : Change of occupation, value of, 274 Controlled firms, conditions in, 255, 259, 260 Distinctions in industry, 273 Wages under Protection, 262 Welfare Department, 260 Women's labour, increase of, 269 Workshop psychology, 267 Labour Party, rise of, 217 Laissez-faire policy, 221, 222 Language schools, German secret subsidies to, 179 Lectures to influence public opinion, 13, 276 Lee, Arthur, 82 Legal Tender Acts, 67, 130, 132 Legal tender, value of gold as, 24 Loans : Charges for, 144 Industrial, 144 Interest rates, 145 Lloyd George, David, 92, 253 London City and Midland Bank, 112, 117 London Free Gold Market, 36, 75 et seq., 82,83, 116 McDonald, Ramsay, 206 McKenna, Rt. Hon. Reginald, 109, 110 Martin, Percy F., 47 Metric system, adoption of, 191 et seq. Mill, John Stuart, 18, 151, 217, 222 Monometallism, effect on finance, 21 Monopoly of banking, 127 Moratorium declared in 1914, 33, 160 Munitions, Ministry of, 28, 251, 253, 256, 260, 273 Napoleon, 20 National credit, use of, 146 et seq., 166 National debt, 29, 168, 170 Nationalization of banking, 34, 56, 148 et seq. Neutral countries' indifference to Allied Cause, 5 INDEX 285 Newspapers : Germany's propaganda in neutral countries, 9 Publication, Ministry of, 12 Newton, Sir Isaac, 97 Nigeria, sale of enemy lands in, 236 " Norman Angellism," 205 Paper money, issue of, 20, 146, 147, 160 Paris Economic Conference, 1916, 235, 241, 248 Patents, infringement by German firms, 185 Peel, Sir Robert, 33, 36, 65, 66, 146 Pensions Acts, 221 Pope Benedict XV, 6 Private provincial banks, absorption of, 123 Production and Exchange, supreme factors in war, 22 Property, State ownership of, 225, 226 Protection : Free Trade and Protection, coming economic war, 233 et seq. Wages under, 262 Proudhon, P. J., 204, 223 Psychology : British, 157 Ministry of, suggested, 12 War, psychological factor in, 1 et seq Workshop psychology, 267 Roberts, Lord, 65 Roumania, delay in declaring war against German/, 6 Rowntree, Seebohm, 260 Ruskin, John, 204 Salisbury, Marquis of, 64 Smith, Adam, 200, 204 Spain's neutrality, 6 Spencer, Herbert, 217, 222 Spies used in German trade, 177 286 INDEX State ownership and control : Increase of, 218 Industrial, 211, 251 et seq. Property, 225, 226 Trade organization under, 227 State Socialism, 219 Sweden, Pro-German feeling in, 6 Switzerland as a neutral, 6 Taxpayers, effect of " cheap pound " on, 171 Taylor, Frederick, 267 Trade : Banking control of, 150 British methods, 46 Business patriotism, 55 Free Trade and Protection, coming economic war, 233 et seq. German, see that title. Industrial banks, 144 et seq. International competition, 229 Mutual aid in, 256 Organization of, 226 Paris Conference, 1916, 235, 241, 248 Patents, infringement of, 185 State ownership, see that title. Trades Union Acts, 221 Treasury notes, issue of, 160 et seq. Trusts and Combines, 242 Turkey's alliance with Central Powers, 6 Union of Democratic Control, 206 United States of America, position as a neutral, 7 Wages under Protection, 262 War Loan, 1917, 168 Welfare Department of Ministry of Munitions, 260 Whitehead Aircraft' Works, 272 Withers, Hartley, 78, 85, 90, 92, 98 Women's labour in factories, increase of, 269 P. S KING & SON, Ltd., Orchard House. Wetinter. RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT TO ^ 202 Main Library LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE 2 3 4 5 6 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. Books may be Renewed by calling 642-3405. 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