\ ^^ f.-,^

'M r^ , -, , ,._ , ,

€^16

THE LIBRARY

THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

A N

O N

GENIUS.

BY
ALEXANDER GERARD, D. D.

fROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN KING'S COLLEGE,

ABERDEEN^

Quid ilia vis, quae tandem eft, quae inveftigat occulta, qus
inventio, atque excogitatio dicitur ?

Cic. Quaeft. Tufc. lib. i.

LONDON:

Printed for W. Strahan; T. Cadell in the Strand^
and W. Creech at Edinburgh.

MDCCLXXIV.

niv. ' f rM.Lotfag.a w y. ' ^j w j g gMUAmj w ai

BF
G-3k

ADVERTISEMENT.

TH E Author of the following EJfaj
had occafion, in writing on Tajlcy
to confider its connexion with Genius.
The attention which he beftowed on this
latter faculty, in that one point of view,
convinced him, that its Nature and its
Principles admitted and required a fuller
inveftigation than had ever been at-
tempted, and determined him to enter
on that inveftigation immediately after
•finifhing his former work. Accord ingly
his plan was formed, the firft part com-
pofed, and fome progrefs made in the
fecond part, fo long ago as the year
1758. He was then in an office which
favoured enquiries of this nature; his
continuance in it would have afforded
him the opportunity of compleating the

A 2 defign

JL /^ o /^ O O O

iv ADVERTISEMENT.

defign in a fhort time ; and the indul-
gent reception given by the Public to his
EJfay on Tajie would have encouraged
him to it: but being foon after removed
to an office which necefTarily diredled
his chief attention to fubjecfts of a dif-
ferent kind, and fully occupied his time,
he has been able to profecute his de-
fign, with long and frequent interrup-
tions, only as the immediate duties of
his profeffion allowed him leifure. In-
tervals of fuch leifure have put it in his
power to reduce his thoughts to the form
in which they now appear. Tht fubje^
is curious ; of the execution the PubHc
are the proper judges.

CON-

CONTENTS.

Introduction. -* — i*agc i

PART I.

Of the Nature of Genius. ;-;- c

§£CT. I. Of the Province and Criierion of Genius,

ibid.
Sect. II. To what Faculty of the Mindy Genius pro-
perly belongs, — 2 j

Sect. III. How Genius arifes from the Imagination*

39
Sect. IV. Of the Influence of Judgment upon Genius,

Sect. V. Of the Dependence of Genius on other Intel*
le^ual Powers. — — S^r

PART II.

Of the general Sources of the Varieties of
Genius. — '^-^ J07

Sect. I. Of the Sources of the Varieties ofCiitius in
the Imagination 't particularly of the ^alities of
Ideas which produce Affociation. — ibS

Sect. II. Of the Influence of Habit on Affociation,

125
Sect,

vi CONTENTS.

Sect. III. Of the hfuence of the Pajftons on Ajfocia'
tion. — — — 147

Sect. IV. Reflexions on the Principles of Affociation.
Ideas ftiggefled^ either by Senfations^ or by other
Ideas. 184

Sect. V. Of the Combination of the affociating Prin-
ciples. 192

Sect. VI. Of the Modifications of the affociating
Principles. • 197

Sect. VII. Of the Predominance of the affociatmg
Principles. • — 215

Sect. VIII. Of Flexibility of Imagination. 232

Sect. IX. Of the Varieties of Memory, and their In-
fluence on Genius. — — _ 243

Sect. X. Of the Varieties of Judgment, and their
Influence on Genius. — — 2 79

PART III.
Of the Kinds of Genius. — — 317

Sect. !• Genius twofold; for Science, or for the
Arts. 318

Sect. II. Of the StruHure of Imagination which dif-
tinguifhes the two Kinds of Genius. — 323

Sect. III. How the two Kinds of Genius differ in

refpe5i of the Affiftance which they derive from

Memory* — — — ^s^

'Sect. IV. How the two Kinds of Genius differ in

refpeX of the Affijiance which they derive from

Judgment* t"^^ — 3^9

Sect.

CONTENTS. vii

Sect. V. ^he two Kinds of Genius farther compared
and dijiinguifhed. — — 378

Sect. VI. Tajle efftntial to Genius for the Arts, 391

Sect. VII. The Power of Execution necejfary to Ge-
nius for the Arts. — — 416

Sect. V ill. Of the Union of different Kinds of Ge-
nius. — — — 42^

Puhlijhed by the fame Author^

An ESSAY on TASTE,

WITH

Three Dissertations on the fame Subjed,
by Mr. De Voltaire, Mr. D'Alem-
BERT, F.R. S. and Mr. De Montesquieu.

THE SECOND EDITION.
Printed for T. Cad ell in the Strand.

A N

ESSAY

O N

GENIUS

IT is remarked by thofe "who have confi-
dered the ftate of human knowlege with
greateft attention, that the fubje£ts of
men's enquiries have been, in moll: cafes, de-
termined by accident, and not purfued with
regular application, according to their dignity
or their natural connexion. On this account,
fome fubjed:s of the greatefl importance have
been totally negleded, and many more have
been imperfectly examined, and profecuted
no farther than fuperficial obfervations fpon-
taneoufly occurred, and cafual inclination dif-
pofed men to attend to them. This has hap-
pened in all the fciences, but efpecially in the

B fcienc^

2 ^n EJfay on Genms„

fcience of human nature. It has feldon^
been explored with that care which is requir
fite in a fubjed fo fubtile and abftrufe. Far
from taking a complete furvey of this curious
region, men have fatisfied themfelves with
fome random incurfions, vifiting only a few
trads which happened to engage the^r curio-
fity, and penetrating even into thefe, only fo
far as fome prefent view required.

All the fame caufcs which produce fuch a
fuperficial and fortuitous method of inveftiga-
tion with regard to other fubjeds, produce it
likewife with regard to the human mind;
and fome circumftances render our enquiries
on this fubjed, flight and accidental, which
do not extend their influence to the others.
The phenomena of the mind have not fo great
fleddinefs of exiftence, as the qualities of bo-
dies. It is impoffible to make experiments fo
purpofely on the underftandlng or the paf-
fions, to purfue them fo deliberately, or to
repeat them fo eafily, as on material things.
It is necefl^ary to catch appearances as they
happen to difcover themfelves, either imme-
diately to a man's own confcioufnefs, or by
^heir efFeds in the condud or converfation of

other.

An EJfay on Genius, 3

other men. For this reafon it requires long
time, favourable opportunities, and inceflant
attention, to colled fuch a number of fads
concerning any of the mental powers, as will
be fufficient for deducing conclufions concern-
ing them, by a juft and regular indudion.

This difficulty which attends the inveftiga-
tion of the principles of human nature, has
contributed much to check the progrefs of
men's enquiries concerning them, and to pre-
vent fome of the moft important of them from
being at all profefledly analyfed. Genius
itfelf, the leading faculty of the mind, the
grand inftrument of all inveftigation, has
fcarce ever been examined with care. In the
writings of thofe who treat with greateft ac-
curacy of the intelledual powers, we find
only a few incidental obfervations concerning
Genius. It is confelTed to be a fubjcd of ca-
pital importance, without the knowlege of
which a regular method of invention cannot
be eftablifhed, and ufeful difcoveries muft
continue to be made, as they have generally
been made hitherto, merely by chance. But
it is reckoned a fubjed which can be reduced
to no fixt or general principles; its phenome-

B 2 na

A . An Effay on Genius.

na are almoft univerfally regarded as j^noma-f
lous and inexplicable. It is however worth
■while to enquire, whether this be really the
cafe, and to make an attempt at leaft, to ex«
plain the nature and varieties of Genius froiii
the fimplc qualuij§ p/jhe bjijfQai;i mind.

PART

[ s 1

PART L

0/ the Nature of Genius.

IT will be proper to begin our enquiries,
by afcertaining, what it is that properly
conftitutes Genius as diftinguifhed from our
other intelledual powers. This wnll both
render our conception of it precife, and lead
us to difcover, what other operations of the
iinderftanding, attend it in its exertions, or
affift it, and in what manner.

SECT. I.

Of the Province and Criterion of Genius,

^X^ H E powers of the human mind, how-
ever diftinca in themfelves, are gene-
rally complicated in their energies. Scarce
any of them can be exerted in perfedion,
without the affiftance of many others. On
this account, it is very difficult to colledt the
phenomena whrch belong to each, to diftin-
guifli precifely one faculty from the reft, and
to afcertain its peculiar nature and province.

B 3 The

6 The Province and Criterion Part I.

The habit of confounding our mental powers
with one another, is fo ftrong as to render the
clofeft attention neceflary for making a fepa-
ration ; and the natural fubtlety of the fub-
je<n: makes it hard to refledlupon it with clofe
attention. But without determining, in this
manner, the proper nature of each faculty^
and marking its real difference from thofe
which moft refemble it and are often combin-
ed with it, our conception of it will be im-
perfect and indeterminate.

Th e exertions of Genius can never be com-
plete or regular, when any of the intellectual
powers is remarkably defective. It receives
afTiftance from them all. But Genius is not-
withftanding one of the intelledual powers,
and diftinguifhable from the reft. There are
many productions which are far from fatisfy-
ing reafon, or altogether approving themfelves
to tafte, in which we yet acknowlege confpi-
cuous marks of real genius. Their faults
difcover a dcfeCt, not of this, but of feme
other power. Few competent judges will
now-a-days aflert that the dialectics of Arif-
totle, are of any confiderable utility for the
end which he propofed to anfwer by them,
the difcovery of truth : but that work, per-
haps

Sect. I. of Genius, 7

haps mdre than any other of his works, dif-
plays the compafs of his genius. It will be
generally aHovved that the writings of Shake-
fpear have almoft as great faults as beauties ;
hut it will be as generally afferted, that his
genius is fo original and immenfe as to place
him at the head of modern poets. What then
is the precife criterion of genius ? If we can
determine what it isj we fhall the more eafily
form a diftind: conception of the nature of
this faculty.

The difficulty in determining the province
of genius, which ariles from the natural in-
tricacy and mutual connexion of the intellec-
tual powers, is increafed by the confufed ap-
plication of names, to which that has given
occafion. Genius is confounded, not only by
the vulgar, but even fometimes by judicious
writers, with mere capacity. Nothing how-
ever is more evident, than that they are to-
tally diftind:. A capacity of learning, is very
general among mankind. As birds are by
nature made fit for flying, a horfe for the
courfe, or a wild beaft for fiercenefs, fo doci-
lity is congenial to man. A human creature
in every refped: unteachable, were one of the
greateft and rareft of monfters. Moft chil-

B 4 dren

8 The Province and Criterion Part 1.

dren promife fome abilities, though the want
of cuhure and other caufes often blaft them,
and fruftrate the kind intentions of Nature [a].
Mere capacity, in moft fubjeds, implies no-
thing beyond a little judgment, a tolerable
memory, and confiderable induflry. But true
genius is very different, and much lefs fre-
quent.

Genius is properly the faculty of inven-
tion ; by means of which a man is qualified
for making new difcoveries in fcience, or for
producing original works of art. We may
afcribe tafte, judgment, or knowlege, to a
man who is incapable of invention ; but we
cannot reckon him a man of genius. In order
to determine, how far he merits this charac-
ter, we mufl enquire, whether he has difco-
vered any new principle in fcience, or invent-
ed any new art, or carried thofe arts which
are already pradifed, to a higher degree of
perfedion, than former mafters ? Or, whe-

{a) Sicut aves ad volatum, equi ad curfum, ad fsvitiam
ferae gignuntur : ita nobis propria eft mentis agiratio, atque
folertia. — Hebetes vero et indociles non magis fecundum na-
turam hominis eduntur, quam prodigiofa corpora, ct monftris
infignia: fed hi pauci admodum. Fuerit argumentum, quod
in pueris elucet fpes plurimorum : quae cum emoritur sstate,
manifeftum eft non naturam defecifTe, fed curam, Quintil.
Injiitut, Orat, lib. i, cap. i.

ther,

Sect. I. of Genius. g

ther, at leaft, he has, in matters of fclence,
improved on the difcoveries of his predecef-
fors, and reduced principles formerly known,
to a greater degree of fimplicity and confift-
ence, or traced them through a train of con-
fequences hitherto unknown ? Or, in the
arts, defigned fome new work, different from
thofe of his predeceflbrs, though not perhaps
excelling them ? Whatever falls fliort of
this, is fervile imitation, or a dull effort of
plodding induftry, which, as not implying in-
vention, can be deemed no proof of genius,
whatever capacity, fiiill, or diligence it may
evidence. But if a man fhows invention, no
intellectual defeds which his performance
may betray, can forfeit his claim to genius.
His invention may be irregular, wild, undif-
ciplined ; but ftill it is regarded as an infalli-
ble mark of real natural genius : and the de^
gree of this faculty, that we afcribe to him,
is always in proportion to our eftimate of the
novelty, the difficulty, or the dignity of his
inventions.

These obfervations, when barely mention-
ed, are fo agreeable to our natural fentiments,
that a long illuftration of them would be fu-

perfluous. They would be amply confirmed

6 by

to The Province and Criterion Part I.

by an examination of the chafaders of thofc
whom the voice of all ages has pronounced
moft eminent for genius, and of the particu-
lar grounds on which this eminence has been
affigned them. But a few examples fhall
fuffice in fo clear a cafe.

All the ancients who are moft celebrated
for genius in the greater kinds of poetry, ei-
ther invented fome new fpecies, or brought a
fpecies already invented, to higher perfedion ;
or at leaft produced compofitions diftinguifhed
from thofe of others, by a diverfity of fub-
jed, or by a peculiar and original manner.
jEfchylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, not only
compofed feveral tragedies, by which they
difplayed Invention, in the contrivance of the
fable, in imagining incidents, in forming cha-
racters, in conceiving fentiments adapted to
them ; but each of them made fome confider-
able improvements in the conftrudion of th«
drama [b). The genius of Homer has been

^0? riyacyu Kut rcc rov XP(o\) -liXarTuai, xul Tov hoyoy ir^urayunfyiv
vet,fBcr)iivcc<rt, Tps^ ^£ xai cr^iviH/y^onpiac Sc»^oxMt. APIZTOT< tte^
wojr,T. XEtp. ^. K«» Et'p7r'i<5'>;?» It xcii ret aM^cc yii) h ciXovofAu, aK-
/« rfayiKu7ciro<; yi 7uv voty.Tu* ^^JrissTai. X£(p. »7. Aii ob7 XavSavsiv
wotouwa?, xu) /x» Soxuv Xiyit^ inTr'hxa^vjuc, ct.>^>.a. 'jrcipvkcTuc* Tckto
yei.p TtKXvov' Ixii ^£ TovvavTiof. ' D.a'TriB ydc wpo? ETTipofAffcvTa oiapak-
Xoyratf KuSotTtep Vfoi; toi)? o"vovc tcv? fiEfAiyfjuivovc, Ka» cicv r, QioSafov
<fuyy\ 7ri7ro»Si Wf sj T>j\ 7w» aMwv twcxpTwf. 'H p.i» yap tov 7\iyo)iTo(;

always

Sect. I. of Genius, ii

always held in veneration. His Iliad, his
Odyfley, and even his more trivial produc-
tions, difplay fo much of rich and original
invention in almoft every poffible way, as
would have fecured to the author an acknow-
legement of very uncommon genius, though
he had lived in the moft enlightened age, and
pofTefled all advantages for improving his
natufial talents. But our idea of his inven-
tion is immenfely raifed, when we confider,
that he lived in times of ignorance, when
poetry remained almofl in its firft rudenefs;
that he had no model, by which he could di-
rect his conceptions, or from which he could
receive fo much as a hint of his grand de-
figns; and that he notwithftanding, merely
by the force of his own abilities, brought the
nobleft fpecies of poetry all at once to its jufl
perfedtlon, and comprehended alfo in his works,
the rudiments of every other fpecies of com-

?\iKrov IxXiyuv crvmBri' 07,'So 'EfpjTrioi;? vonT Koct vTrtozt^i irfwro^t
'Pr,ro(. /3iC. 7. xip. /2. Tragedias primus in lucem i^fchylus

protulit. Sed lon^eclarius illuftraverunt hoc opus Sophocles

atque Euripides. Quintil. Inji. Orat^ lib. x. cap. i.

perfonse pallsque repertor honellac

.^fchylus et modicis indravit pulpita tignis,
Et docuit ffiagnamque loqui, nitique cothurno,

HoR. An Poet. ver. 27S,

pofition,

1 2 The Province and Criterion Pa r t I.

pofition, the feeds from which, in Ariftotle's
judgment (^), fucceeding writers reared both
tragedy and comedy, and from which, in the
opinion of Quintilian [d\ even orators might
produce all the virtues of their art. On ac-
count of original and extenfive invention,
thus amazingly difplayed, his title to the firft
rank of genius, has been acknowleged by all
capable and impartial judges. The Erieid is
perhaps more correal and faultlefs than the
Iliad ; but few have pretended that Virgil is
the greater poet. He does not fhow fuch co-
pious and boundlefs invention, as his matter.
Befides, Virgil derives from imitation, many
things for which Homer is indebted folely to
his own penetration. Were we to compare
the Eneid with Paradife Loft, merely in re-
fped of the genius which they manifeft, we
might juftly prefer Milton to Virgil. For
though we know that Milton was perfectly

(f) "ricnrif ot Kcc) ra. <ntov^oiix /xaAira 7roi>;T»s Oj^twpo? ^» (/xowj yxa
uv/^ OT* Eu, aA^ oTi Kdi f*»fA>}(7£i; Sfct^xrnta,<i nioir,a-iv) ovru KactToc rrf
Xuu.uoi(x,<; av'/'u-cirai 'Trpu.TOi vTziatt^iv, ov -^oyoVf aXXoi to y-7\o7ov $ex~
ftaTo7ro»>ia"«?. O yap JVIapyeiT>!j wjaMyov t^n ucnrtf lA^a; xat \jdvcr-

CHX "TTfai; TXq TSXyuSlx^, cvru flXi omo( TTpOi; T«r XWf*&)d»«J. Hspi
W0I5;T. X£^. ^.

{^) Hie (quemadmodum ex oceano dicit ipfe amnium vim,
fontiumque curfus initium capere) omnibus eloquentias parti-
bus exemplum et orium dedit. Injhtt Orat, lib. x. cap. i .

well

Sect. I, of Genius, 13

well acquainted both with the Mantuan and
with Homer, had the works of both in his
eye, and fcrupled not to imitate them; yet
the nature of his plan, and the peculiarity of
many of the incidents and characters in his
poem, require greater and more original in-
vention, than there was room for difplaying
in a fubjed: fo fimilar to Homer*s, as that of
the Eneid is. It will be generally allov/ed,
that Shakefpear is, in point of genius, fuper
rior to Milton. The preference arifes from
the fuperiority of his invention. In the lower
accomplifhments of a poet, he is often defec-
tive : but the richnefs of his defcrlptlons, the
multiplicity and juflnefs of his charaders ; the
variety, the compafs, and the propriety of
his fentiments, bear the deepeft marks of their
being original : and at the fame time that the
internal excellences of his works difplay a lux-
uriance of invention, we know that his edu-
cation gave him but flender opportunities of
being acquainted with thofe ancient mailers,
from whom he could have borrowed any of
his beauties, or by whofe example he could
have even improved his natural powers.
There were many Englifh rhymers before the
time of Chaucer I but he is juftly reckoned

the

14 The Province and Criterion Part I.

the father of Engliih poetry, becaufe he firfl
difplayed invention in any confiderable de-
gree. If it were neceflary to multiply ex-
amples on this head, we might fhow that in
all the arts, invention has always been re-
garded as the only criterion^of Genius. Even
wildnefs and extravagance of invention, fome-
times procures higher praife, than the utrnoft
nicety and corredtnefs. We afcribe fo great
merit to invention, that on account of it, we
allow the artift who excels in it, the privilege
of tranfgreffing eftablifhed rules, and would
fcarce wi{h even the redundancies of his nar
tural force and fpirit to be lopt off by culture:
this, we are afraid, might check the vigour
of his invention, which we reckon fo capital
an excellence, that nothing could make
amends for the want of it,

In fcience too, as well as in the arts, inven-
tion is the proper province of Genius, and its
only certain meafure. Socrates owes his re-
putation for genius, to his being the inventor
qf moral philofophy, and of a peculiar and
proper manner of commnnicating it [e). Ari-

(f) ZwxfaTJi?, Tiyi iiSixijv ht7Ciyo(,yav. AIOF. AAEPT. 'Jifooij*..
^cwu>t xui fJiifi^t *^» vaBicri, Kcti •rrfo.yjjiaan, otTrXui «7ra«rj ^iKoac-r

f^aihxpi^inu nAOYTAPX. It jrptr^. 9j-o?v*T£tT. Socrates mihi vi-

ftotk

Sect. L of Genius, 15

ilotle is efteemed one of the greateft geniufes
of antiquity : it is becaufe he made the moft
extenfive difcoyeries in philofophy. In phy-
fics, in morals, in logic, in criticifm, in po-
litics, he has difplayed a penetrating and
inventive mind, capable of remarking circum-
ftances and inveftigating general laws, which
lay concealed from others (/). T^e greatnefs

detur, id quod cqnftat inter omneis, primus a rebus occultis,
et ab ipfa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante euro philo-»
fophi occupati fuerunt, avocavifTe philofophiam, et ad vitani
communem adduxiffe. Cxc. Acad.^ceft. lib, i. A quohaec
omnis, qu:e eft de vita et moribus, philofopbia manavit.
7a/?. ^<ejl. lib. iii. Socrates autem primus philofophiam de-
vocavit e ccelo, et in urbibus coUocavit, et in domos etiam in-
troduxit, et coegit de vita, et moribus, rebufque bonis ee
inalis quaererc. Cuj us multiplex ratio difputandi, rerumque
varietas, et ingenii magnltudo—'-^X^xii genera eff^cit diffentien-
tium philofophorum. Ibid, lib. v.

(/) Diogenes Laertius introduces an account of his nu-
merous writings, amounting to near four hundred treatifes,
by remarking that it is proper to enumerate them, ^»a rtic itiiji
itunroi.% Xoyotj Tcev^jfo; dfiTv^, and concludes his catalogue with ob-
ferving the extenfive invention which they evidence, to^ yap

e.>kOK (pt>io7roiWTaTo; iymro xa.) "EYPETIKnTATOS. /?»?. t. Abun-
dantia quadam ingenii praeftabat, ut mihi videtur, Ariftoteles,
—Quo profefto nihil eft acutius, nihil politius. Cic. Acad,
^ajl, lib. i, Ariftoteles, vir fummo ingenio, fcientia, co-
pia. — Ariftoteles longe omnibus (Platonem femper excipio)
prajftans et ingenio et diligentia. Tufc. ^^Ji . lib- i. — Peri-
patetici veteres, quorum princeps Ariftoteles, quern, ex-.
cepto Platone, haud fcio an redle dixerim principem philofo-
phorum. — Natura fic ab iis inveftigata eft, ut nulla pars ccelo,
mari, terra prastermifla fit. Quinetiam cum de rerum initiis,
omnique mundo locuti effent, ut multa, non modo probabili
argumentatione, fed etiam neceflaria mathematicorum ratione
concluderent ; maximam materiam ex rebus per fe inveftigatis,
ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attuleruiU. Perfecutus eft:

5 . pf

1 6 The Province and Criterion Part I.

of Bacon's genius will ever be admired. It
is the immenfity of his difcoveries, that leads
us to form fo exalted an idea of it. In con-
tradiction to the fpirit of the philofophy in
which he had been educated, without affift-
ance from thofe who had gone before him,
he was able to difcover, what fciences had
been hitherto neglected, and what they fhould
contain ; to add them to the fciences already
cultivated ; to convert philofophy from an
art of difputation, into an inftrument of fub-
jeding the works of nature to the dominion
of man, and of producing ufeful arts ; to
eftablilli rules, formerly unknown, by which
genuine and indu6:ive philofophy might be
cultivated, and raifed to perfection; and to
make confiderable progrefs in applying thefe
rules to the adual production of that ftupen-

Arlftoteles animantium omnium ortus, vlftus, figuras.
Differendique ab iifdem, non dialedice folum, fed etiam ora-
torie praecepta funt tradita ; ab Ariftoteleque principede fingu-
lis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio eft inftituta.
— Omnium fere civi'tatum non Graeciag folum, fed etiam bar-
bariae, ab Ariftotele, mores, inftituta, difciplinas — cognovi-
jnus. De Fin. lib. v. Sed quis omnium do^ior, quis acu-
tior, quis in rebus vel inveniendis, vel judicandis acrior Ari-
ftotele fuit ? Orat. Quae tandem ars digna Uteris Platoni
defuit ? Quot fa;culis Ariftoteles didicit, ut non folum quae
ad philofophos atque oratores pertinent, fcientia compleftere-
tur, fed animalium fatorumque naturas omnes perquireret?
Illis enim haec invenienda fuerunt, nobis cognofcenda funt.
Quint. /«/?. Orat. lib, xii. cap. 1 1,

dous

Sect. I. of Gmius. i'y

dous edifice of knowlege, of which his com-
prehenfive mind had formed the plan;

In every art and fcienccj then, the praife
of genius is beftowed on invention, and is
proportioned to the degree of iti In general,
the firft rank is affigned to thofe who have
invented, v\'hen there was no example or mo-
del, of which they could avail themfelves,
when their predeceflbrs had made no prepara-
tion for their difcoveries, nor given any hint
which could fuggeft them ; and who have,
iiotwithftanding thefe difadvantages, brought
their defigns to a confiderable degree of per-
fedion. It is on this account, that Homefr
ftands without a rival in the poetic world.

Tpie Y who profecute the hints, or improve
the difcoveries of thofc w^ho have gone before
them, are ordinarily entitled only to the fe?-
cond rank. It fometimes happens, hovv'ever,
that an improvement or addition is fo confi-
derable, as to evidence invention equal to what
was difplayed in the firft efiay. In that cafe,
We find the genius of the improver rated aS
high as the perfon's who gave tliC hint. J^X-
chines, Hyperides, and above all Demoft-
henes, who brou;2;ht elnnuencc to ncrfedion,
are celebrated for genius, at Icafi: as much as

G Lyfiai,

1 8 The Province and Criterion Part T.

Lyfias, Ifocratcs, and IfDsus, who arc confi-
dered as the inventors of (o many peculiar
fliles (/). Before the time of Archhnedes,
geometry had heen carried to a very confider-
able degree of perfedtion ; but he made fo
many and fo great improvements in it, that
he is placed at the head of the ancient geome-
tricians [g ). All the difcoveries of Newton,
except thofe which belong to pure mathema-
tics, are but a few members of that body of
philofophy, the outlines of which Bacon had
conceived entire. Newton has exhibited
them perfed; and accurately finiflied ; but he
had the diredions and example of Bacon,
who, without any affiftance, fketched out the
whole defign. It would neverthelefs be a
queflion of very difficult folution, which of
the two pofleffed the greatefl genius ? New-

(y) IIjp* Acivapxou rciv ^nrofoc; wTiv ufv.xui If Tor? irsfl ruv u^x.'^mr
y^cc<puavj, oM ro f^r.Ts 'EYPEIH'N l^'^ov yiyovhaii ;i(;;ap«T-,3f o? tm avj
ofa, usvrip rlv AoJ-tav, ttcc) tI-i Jc-oXfCirr.v, xa) Tov JauTcv' [/.y.re tu7
kvfr.iAi-juy iTc'pK TEAEmTHN, JcrTTEf rh ^r.^ot^^ivrt^ Ku) rlv 'Ahj-
y^vivh x«« 'TTTspnoijv ^J/AEK Xfwf^iv. AI0NY2. AAIKAP. Ativxfx°';'

(g) II y fit un fi grand nombre de deeouvertes, que Panti-
quite lui a decerne d'un commun accord la premiere place
parmi Ics geometres. Les methodcs imaginees par Archimede
font aufii reconnucs pour les premiers germes, et des germes
afiez dc-veloppes de celles qui ont porte fi haut la Geometric
dans ces derniers terns. Vv'allis, bon juge en fes matieres,
temoignefon admiration pour ce grand homme, par ces mots^
^jir Jiupenda fagacUaiis, qui prima fuvdamenta po/uit in-ventio^
itum fere omnium, de niiibus promo'vendis atas nojlra gloriatur,
Hift. des Math, par Montucla. • Part I. liv. iv. \ 5.

ton's

SECf. t. <)J Cenliis. Jt.^

ton's enquiries concerning bodies the moft
fubtle or the moft remote, feem to demand an
acutenefs and compafs of invention, which
we might pronounce adequate to all the invef-
ligations of Bacon, though his difcoveries in
mathematics, perfed:]y original, were not ex-
tant, to give a fandtion to the judgment.

Nay, it is obfervable that, if the firft trial
was left very imperfeft, it may diicover lefs
invention, than is exerted afterwards in per-
feding the art ; and that, in this cafe, he who
perfcds the art is acknowleged to poflefs ad-
mirable genius, while the hrft attempts are
difregarded, and the very names of thofe who
made them, totally forgotten. They who
made the firft eftays in painting, only circum**
fcribed their figures with a fmgle line: their
works and themfelves were foon buried in
oblivion. Their immediate fucceilors in the
art, added but a few other lines by vvay of
fliading ; Cleophantus firft daubed the figures
"Vvith a fmgle colour, laid on every where
alike : but neither have thefe acquired fame (/.?).

[h^ Alii apud Sicyonem, alii apud Corinthios repertam
{afHrmant piclarani] umbra honiii)is lineis ci re u nod u eta ; ita-
que talem primam fuifTe: fecundam fingulis coloribus, et
monochromaton di<^iam, poflquam opc-rolicr inventa erat:
duratque talis etiam nunc. Inventam hnearem dicunt a Phi-

C % By

'zo The Province and Criterion Part I.

By fuch trifling inventions, though original,
they did not manifeft a degree of genius,
which any advantages could have rendered
fufficient for the difcoveries that were after-
w^ards made. Cimon is fald to have invented
the varying of the attitudes, and to have
greatly improved the art of giving relief to
the figures ; and Paneus to have been the firfl
who painted hiftory (2). Polygnotus intro-
duced expreflion into the countenances of his
figures, and made confiderable improvements
in the drapery [h). Thefe were important

lode ^gyptio, tel Cleanthe Corinthio. Primi exercuere Ar-
dices Corinthius et Telephantes Sicyonius, line ullo etiam-
num colore, jam tamen fpargentes lineas intus. Ideo et quos
pingerent afcribere inftitutum. Primus invenit eas colorare,
tefta (ut ferunt) trita, Cleophantus Corinthius. Plin. Nat.
Hijl. lib. XXXV. cap. 3. Other authors give the fame account of
the rudenefs of the firll attempts in painting. "Otc vtv^c^ito n

Tw? oicot. ari^vaq Bixoc^ov ra fua, wr= i'7Tr/fa<pnv civro'i'<; rot;; ypa^saf,
Tovro l3ouc^ iKtho 'iTfiToc, Totno oii/ofov, AIAIAN. Trotx. h"o^» /3»b» ».

(/■) Eumarum Athenienfem figuras omnes imitari aufum :
quique inventa ejus excoluerit, Cimonem Cleoneum. Hie
cataglypha invenit; hoc eft obliquas imagines, et varix for-
mare vultus, refpicientes, fufpicientes, ec defpicientes : arti-
culis etiam memb.a diilinxit, venas protulit, prasterque in
vefte rugas et finus invenit. Paneus quidem frater Phiduc
etiam proelium Athenienfium adverfus Perfas, apud Maratho-
nem faftum pinxit. Pl:k. ib, cap. 8.

(/(•) Polygnotus Thafius, qui primus mulieres lacida vefle
pinxit, capita earum miris verlicoloribusoperuit, plurimumquc
piHura; primus contulit : fiquidem inltituit os adaperire, den-
ies oltendere, vultum ab aniiquo rigore variare. Plin. ib.
cap. 9.

inventions,

Sect. I. of Genius, 2i

inventions, and are acknowlegecl to be proofs
of genius in the authors of them; yet, be-
caufe they carried not thefe improvements to
a great degree of perfcdlion, their genius has
fcarce been fo highly celebrated by moft
judges as that of feveral who fucceeded
them (/), and pradifed the art in fo maflerly
a way as to fatisfy tafte, and excite admira-
tion [ill]. Such were Zeuxis, who difcovered
the proper difpofition of light and fhade, and
rofe above his contemporaries in all the excel-
lencies of painting which had been till then
attempted («); Parrhafius, v,'ho firft intro-
duced exacSlnefs of proportion, livelinefs of
expreffion, and elegance in the outlines (oj;

(/) Omnes hi jam illuftres : non tamen in quibus harrere
expofitio debeat, feilinans ad lumina artis : in quibus primus
refulfit ApoUodorus Athenienfis. Hie primus fpecies expri-
Diere inllituit, primufque gloriam penicillo jure contulit.
Neque ante eum tabula uliius oftenditur, qua; teneat oculos.
lb.

{m) Zeuxis, Aglaaphon, Apclles; neque eorum quifquam
eft, cui quidquam in arte fua dcefle videatur. Cic. de Or at.
lib. iii.

(k) Zeuxim, qui turn longe ceteris excellere pi6iorib>is
exiftimabatur. Cic. de In'vent. lib. ii. Audentem jam ali-
quid penicillum ad magnam gloriam perduxit. — Aptem ipfis
ablatam Zeuxin ferre Tecura. Plin. ib.

(o) Primi, quorum quidem opera non vetuftatis modo gra-
tia vifenda funt, clari piclores fuiire dicuntur Polygnotus
atque Aglaophon, quorum fimplcx color tarn fui lludiofos
adhuc habet, ut ilia prope rudia, ac velut futurse mox artis

C 3 Timanthcs,

22 The Province and C?^iierion Part T.

Timanthcs. who was diflinguillied by the art
of making; his pictures to luggeft more than
the pencil could exprefs (^). Such w^ere flill
mere eminently the next race of painters,
who perfeded the art f^) ; Apelles, who
ftands unrivalled in the gracefulnefs and
iinifhed beauty of his w^orks (r) ; Protogenesi

pnmordia, maxlmis qui pofr eos cxtiterunt authoribus praefe-
rantur, proprio qucdam intelligendi (ut mea fert opinio) ambit u.
Port Zeuxis atque Parrhafius non multum zetate dillantes— —
plurimum arti addiderunt. Quorum prior luminum umbra-
rumque inveni/Te rationem, fecundus examinafle fubtilius
lineas traditur. — Ita circunifcripiit omnia, ut eum legumlato-
rem vocent. Q;;int. /«/?. Orat. lib. xii. cap. lo. Parrha-
fius — et ipfe muka confiiruit. Primus et f, mmetriam pifturaj
dedir, primus argutias vultu?, et elegantiam capilli, et venu-
flatem oris, conieflione artificum in lineis extremis palmam
adeptus. Flik. ib, cap. lo.

(/) Timanthi vel plurimi afTuit ingenii. Ejus enim efl:
Iphigenia oratorum laudibus celebrata, &c. Et in omnibus
ejus operibus intelligitur plus Temper quam pingitur, et cum
ars fumma fit, ingenium tanien ultra artem ell. Flik. ib.
Operienda funt quxdam, five ofiendi non debent, five expri-
mi prodignitate non poffunt, ut fecit Timanthes, &c. Quint,
Inji. Orat. lib, ii. cap. 14.

{q) Similis in pidura ratio efl:, in qua Zeuxim, et Polyg-
notum, et Timanthe.m, et eorum qui non funt ufi plus quam
quatuor coloribus, formas et lineamenta laudamus. At in
Actione, Nicomacho, Proiogene, Apelle, jam perfeda funt
omnia. Cic. Brut.

(r) Veru.n et omnes prius genitos futurofque poftea fupe-
ravit Apelles. — Prascipua ejus in arte venuftas fuit, &c.
Pi.iN. ib. Jngenio et gratia, quam ipfe in fe maxime jaftat,
Apelles efl: priflantilTimus. Qi'ikt. InJi. Orat, lib. xii.
cap. 10. Nemo pidlor — inventus qui Veneris earn partem,
quam Apelles inchoatam reliquiffet abfolveret, oris enin^
pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi fpem auferebat. Cic,
^i Off. lib. iii. Plin, jb*

whofe

Sect. I. of Genius, 23

whofe only blemlfli was too much labour ( j ) ;
Amphion and Afcleplodorus, the former of
whom Apelles preferred to himfelf, for regu-
lar diftribution, and the latter for correctnefs
of proportion (^); Ariftides, who was perfed
in exprefling the paffions and affedlons of
the foul {u) ; Nicias, who is celebrated for
his fkilful didribution of light and fhade, and
the reUef of his pictures [nj], Quintilian feems
indeed to give the preference, in point of ge-
nius, to the painters who immediately pre*
ceeded Zeuxis ; but it is becaufcj in his judg-
ment, they difplayed moil: invention (.x). The
fame obfervation which is thus exemplified

( J ) TlcuroyivYiq o ^uyfx.foi; tow IxTwcrc!/ (pjcs'iv, Itttx 'met o^xTiKuti
yM^puv tlsTsAiO-jv, ^Ov 'AiriXKriq l^uv. To f^iv ■TTfuiTov 'im a^uiwi^y
iX9t'\a,TTi7<; iirl t7i Trapa^o'^w S;«. 'Eitb Aiiiouv 'i<pny xctl o.'srJyo? [A,syxqt

Ty'voi, ttJmj wjt'jV tov Ivacivav ■^xiktu- AIAIAN. ttodc. irop, pit.

4?. xi(p. [AX. Et aliajTi gloriam ufurpavit [Apelle?,] cum Pro-
tagenls opus iminenfi laboiis ac cura^ fupra iTio4um anxice mi-
raretur. Dixit enim omnia fibi cum illo paria efTe, aut illi
nieliora ; fed uno i"e prssftare, quod manum ille de tabula
nefciret tolJere. Puik. ib. Cura, Frotogenes — pra^ftantiffi-
mus. Quint, ib.

(/) Nee debebat Amphioni de difpnfitione, ncc Afclepio-
doro de menfuils. Plin. ib. Eadcm ajtate Afclepiodorus fuit,
cjnein in fymmetria mirabatur Apelles. Ib,

(u) Squalls ejus fuJt Aiillides Thebanus. Is omnium
primus aniraumpinxit, et fcnAis cmnes cxprefiit. Plin. ib.

(tj) Biligentiffime mulieres pinxit. Lumen et umbras cu-
ifiodivit, atque ut eminerent e tabulis pidura;, maximc cura-
vir, &c. Plin. ib. cap. ii.

ix) See Note (o), above.

C 4 in

24 The Province and Criterion Part I.

jn the beginnings of painting, might be con-
firmed from the fate of the firft pra(!^itioner3
in every art. Both the works and the genius
of the nrfl fculptors, were defpifed in after-
a^es, while Polycletus, Phidias, Euphranor,
and others, who, improving on their eflays,
rofe to excellence, were held in veneration [y).
Scarce one of the poets who preceded Homer,
is mentioned by ancient authors (z). No
work of any tragedian older than iEfchylus,
has been thought worth preferving ; and
though the name of Thefpis is not forgotten,
he is m.entioned rather with contempt for the

O) Q^^s enim eorum, qui ha'c minora a nim advert unt,
non intelligit, Canachi ligna rigidiora efle, quam ut imitentur
veritatem ? Calamidis dura ilia quidem, fed tamen moUiora
quam Canachi. Nondiim Myronis fatis ad veritatem adducla,
jam tamen quje non dubites pnlchra dicere, Pulchriora etiam
Polycleti, et jam plane perfeda, ut mitii quidem^ videre folent.
Cic. Erut.—?W\d\?i fimulacris, quibus nihil in illogenere
pcrfeftius videmus. Orat. Nam duriora et Tufcanicis prox-
jma Calon atque Egefias, jam minus rigida Calamis, molliora
adhuc fupra didis Myron fecit. Diligentia et decor in Poly-
tleto fuper citteros.— At quce Polycleto defuerunt, Phidis
atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus
ctftcicndis melior artifex traditur : in ebore vero longe citra
xmulum. Q^.iNT. In/l. Orat lib. xii. cap. lo. Euphrano-
rem admirandum facit, quod et caeteris optimus ftudiis inter
prxcipuos, et pingendi fingendique idem mirus artifex fuit.
Ibid. See alfo Plin. Nat. Uifc. lib. xxxiv. cap. 8. lib, xxxv.
pap. II.

(z) Nee dubitari debet, quin fuerint ante Homerum poetas,
quod ex eis carminibus intelligi potett, qu:s apud ilium, ct
jn Phxacum, et in procorum epulis canuntur. Cic. Brut.

rudenefi

Sect. T. r)f Genius] '25

rudenefs of his eflays, than with edeem, as
the inventor of the drama (^).

It is acknowleged that the Greeks receiv-
ed the beginnings cf their knowlege in philo-
fophy and mathematics, from the Egyptians ;
but there is reafon to fufped, that among the
Egyptians, thefe fciences were in a very im-
perfed: Hate : it is certain that the earheft
Greek philofophers learned, in Egypt, only
the firft elements of mathematics. In Greece,
the fciences made rapid progrefs, and reached
a very high degree of improvement. If the
Egyptians were the inventors, this proves
them to be ingenious ; but the Greeks fhewed
themfelves to pofl'efs fuperiour genius, and
are acknovv'legcd to have poflefFed it, for
greater invention was necelTary for the perfec-
tion to which they rofe. Arts and fciences
have been known to the Chinefe for many
ages, held in the higheft veneration, and flu-
died with great ardor; yet they have not
gone beyond the elements of moft of them.
This is an evidence that real genius is not
frequent among them. They are defedlive in

{a) Ignotum tragic;^ genus invenifTe Camenas
Dicitur, et plauftris vexifTe poemata Thefpls,
Qui canerent agerentijue, perundi facibus ora.

HoR. iirs Poet, ver. zy^,

invention 5

0.6 The Province and Crltermi Part I,

invention ; they have fomc lucky ideas, but
thev are incapable of purfuing thcni.

It is worth while to remark, that fome-
times we are necelTarily liable to error in
comparing the genius of different authors,
- from the impolTibility of our afcertaining, in
many cafes, the degree of invention which
truly belongs to them. At one time we may
reckon that original, which is only imitation,
or even a fervile copy; at another, what we
brand with thefe epithets of reproach, may
be really invention. This circumftance is
often of peculiar difadvantage to modern au-
thors ; and it leads us, perhaps, to afcribe
greater genius to the ancients, than they are
entitled to. The former are accufed of bor-
rowing from their predeceflbrs, many prin-
ciples, fcntiments, or images, for which they
are indebted folely to their own genius. In
the latter, every thing is reckoned oinginal,
becaufe we know not, who had occupied it
before. We can form no objedion againft
the oldeft authors extant, for the works of
thofe who wrote before them, are long fnice
loft. Ariftotle had not, even in his time, the
means of difcovering, in every particular,
how far Homer owed the perfections of his
i worksj

Sect. II. of Genius, 27

works, to the leffons of others, and how far
to the excellence of his own genius [b],

SECT. 11.

To ijuhat Faculty of the Miiid, Genius froperly

belongs,

SINCE invention is the infallible crite-
rion of Genius, we cannot hetter invefti-
gate the nature of Genius, than by enquiring,
what power of the mind it is, that qualifies
a man for invention ? Invention is the capa-
city of producing nevv^ beauties in works of
art, and new truths in matters of fcience;
tvhich can be accomplifiied only by affembling
ideas in various pofitions and arrangements,
that we may obtain uncommon views of
them. Our intelledual powers, fo far as it
is neceflary to confider them at prefent, may
be reduced to four ; Senfe, Memory, Imagi-
nation, and Judgment. By recollecting the
proper offices of thefe, we fhall be abk to de-
termine, from which of them Genius derives
its origin.

{h) Speaking of the entire unity of Homer's fables, he
leaves it undetermined, wlietlier he was 'dife*Eted in this by
inftrudion, or by his own natural parts : nroi ^(« tiX^r.v, n ^'»

3ense

28 To "juhat Faculty J Part L

Sense only perceives thofe objedls which
are really exiftent, and adually exhibited to
the mind. It can, therefore, lead us to no
difcovery beyond the objects that happen, in
the courfe of nature, to occur to it. It can-
not carry us a ftep farther than the real things
which prefent themfelves to its notice at any
one individual moment. Its fphere is' thus
by much too narrow, to render it the parent
of invention [c].

Memory is confined to a review of thofe
objects which have once been prefent to fenfe.
It gives a fort of duration to the perceptions
which fenfe has conveyed, but it can create
no new perceptions. Like a mirrour, it re-
flects faithful images of the obje<3:s formerly
perceived by us, but can exhibit no form with
which it is not in this manner fupplied. It
is in its nature a mere copier ; it preferves
fcrupuloufly the very pofition and arrange-
ment of the original fenfations, and gives us
along with this, a perception of their hav-
ing been at fome paft time prefent to the

(<:) It is obvious that we here ufe the \vori./c>ife in an exten-
five meaning, fo as to include not only the external lenfes,
but alfo that internal fenfe or confcioufncff, by which we
attend to the operations of our own minds.

mind.

Sect. II. Genhis belongs. 29

mind [d). It is thus precifely the reverfe of
invention.

Imagination is much lefs confined in its
operations. Even when it exerts ittelf in the
fimpleft manner, when it feems only to pre-
fent ideas unattended with remembrance, it
in fome degree difplays its creative power.
It does not, like memory, profefTedly copy
its ideas from preceding perceptions of fenfe,
nor refer them to any prior archetypes. It
exhibits them as independent exiftences pro-
duced by itfelf. It may be queftioned, whe-
ther, in fome very pecuUar cafes, its power
extends not even to the formation of a fimple
idea [e]. But it is certain that, when it only
exhibits fimple ideas which have been deriv-
ed from the fenfes, it confers fomething ori-
ginal upon them, by the manner in which it
exhibits them. Light and heat are ideas

(«) 'OiiT£ yd-f TO iA.i7<Kov h^s^nxt fA.vnit,onvnv, a>.\ t'rt ^o^ocrlv kx\
E/vOTr"' — ovTi TGu TrapMToj, a.>X «VaSv5rK' TatT>) yua ovn to /LtsA-
A&y, Q-JTi TO yiiioiA.2vov yvufl^oj^vj, aAAx to vaclv (aovov. 'H ^l uy,;u,r.,
lov ysvifAVjov. To ci -ttsl^Iv c't£ Trajrsns'j otcv roTt to T'.ivkov on Ifrt,
ovQuq u-j (pciir, [,u:;ij,0'jcvtv, ovh to S££i.-fov|y<,£;o>, Bswcuv xui vouv, oc\>A to
^Ev «icrSavr3-S;ci <p-i)ai, to o-TiriTucrBxi yi^ovyj. "Otci-j Ti cinv tuv hio-
ynuva-)(r) Ttir i7riry;y.r,v r.a.) Tr,v a'i^5r,a-iv, o^Vi) /xEftvv^Tat Ta; TotJ TpyJ-
vouj oTi duo ofcaTj iaati' to f^h^ ot» £fA.i)i.Bif *> i^iucricri, to ^e, oTt
viKovaiv, Yi en niiv, r> T4 Totovroi'' on yup urcn iJi^yn Kxra to u-jr/^ti-

ivoriS-Bv. API2T0T. Tnpt fArofji,.

(f) Treatife on Hum. Nat,

which

30 To ivhat Faculty, Part I,

which memory retains exadlly at all times,
and whenever we pleafe, we can recoUedt oyr
having formerly perceived them by our fenfes.
But imagination can prelent thefe ideas, not
as copies, but as originals. We often form
them in a cold day, or in a dark night, with-
out refledting on our having perceived them
before; and confider them only as objeO:s
which would be agreeable at prefent, or
which we may hereafter experience.

Imagination isftill more inventive in all
its other operations. It can lead us from a
perception that is prefent, to the view of
many more, and carry us through extenfive,
diftant, and untrodden fields of thought. It
can dart in an inftant, from earth to heaven,
and from heaven to earth ; it can run with
the greateft eafe and celerity, through the
whole compafs of nature, and even beyond its
utmoft limits. It can tranfpofe, vary, and
compound our perceptions into an endlefs
variety of forms, fo as to produce numberlefs
combinations that are wholly new (f). Even

(/) Quas eft enihi forma tarn inufitata, tam nulla, quam
Tion fibi ipfe animus pofiit effingere ? ut, qua; numquam vidi-
mus, ea tamen formata habearnus, oppidorum litus, hominum
figuras. — Nihil eft cnini, de quo cogiure nequcamus. Cic.
tie di'vinat. lib. ii.

Sect. II. Genius belongs, 31

in Ileep, when the fenfes are locked up, and
when the exercife of memory is totally fuf-
pended, imagination eminently difplays its
inventive force ; which is then fo great, that
" the flow of fpeech make unpremeditated
harangues, or converfe readily in languages
that they are but little acquainted with ; the
grave abound in pleafantries, the dull in re-
partees and points of wit. There is not a
more painful adion of the mind, than inven-
tion ; yet in dreams it works wdth that eafe
and adivity that we are not fenfible when
the faculty is employed, and we read without
flop or hefitation, letters, books, or papers,
which are merely the inflantaneous fuggef-
tions of our own imaginations (^).'*

To the imagination, invention is accord-
ingly referred, even by the generality of
mankind. If a poet or an orator only repeat
the fentiments of others, or be unable to
illuflrate his fubjed with proper images, in-

{g) See Spectator, No. 487. Anlmorum eft ea vis, at-
que natura, ut vigeant vigilantes, nullo adventitio pulfu,
fed fuo motu, inciedibili quadam celeritate. Hi cum fufli-
nentur snembris, et corpore, et lenfibus, omnia cerciora
cernunt, cogitant, fentiuiit. Cum autem hsc fubtrafia funt,
defertufque animus languore corporis, turn agicatur ipfe per
ieie. Jtaqac in co et forma; verfantur, et adiones ; et multa
ar.diri, mukadici videntur, Qic. de divinat, lib, ii.

cldents,

32 To ijuh at Faculty^ PartL

cidents, characters, or obfervations, every
perfon imputes this defed: of invention, to
the barrennefs of his fancy. All genuine
productions in the arts, are marked with
flrong fignatures of a bright and lively imagi^
nation : and every original work in fcience,
will be found, on examination, to proclaim a
force and vigour of the fame power, though
the traces of it may not be fo obvious at firfl
view. Imagination is, therefore, a fource of
invention. Whether it be the only fource,
will appear immediately.

Judgment, in which we comprehend rea*
fin, from the comparifon of ideas and fenfa-
tions, difcovers relations which are not the
objeds of fenfe. But many fubjeCts admit of
the moft copious invention, where the things
invented are^not relations. Whatever influ-
ence, therefore, judgment may have in fome
kinds of invention, and however neceffary for
perfecting the operations of Genius in every
kind, its affiftance may be, it cannot be reck-
oned properly the inventive pov/er, as there
are many objects of invention, to which it
has not an immediate refpeCt. Befides, even
in fcience, where relations arc what we want
to difcover, judgment cannot fearch out or

bring

Sect. ir. Genhis belongs. 35

bring into view, the perceptions that are to
be compared. They muft be fuggefted by
fome other power, as we have occalion for
them ; and till they are fuggefted, judgment
has nothing about which it may employ itfelf ;
it muft remain inadive, and can make no
comparifon or deduction. Its fole bufmefs is,
to obferve the relations of thofe perceptions
with which it is fupplicd by fenfe, memory,
or imagination, and to produce convidion by
its exertion.

Of all the kinds of judgment, rcafon has
moft the appearance of an inventive power,
as it not only perceives the connexion of the
feveral parts of a proof, but alfo infers the
conclufion from all the parts together. Mr.
Locke analyfes realon into two powers. Saga-
city, and Illation; and afcribes to it four
different exeixifes. " The firft and higheffc
*' degree of reafon, fays he, is the difcover-
*' ing and finding out of proofs ; the fecond,
*' the regular and methodical difpofition of
" them, and laying them in a clear and fit
" order, to make their connexion and force
*' be plainly and eafily perceived \ the third
" is, the perceiving their connexion ; and
*' the fourth, a making a right concUi-

D ^ " fion."

34 To ivh at Faculty <i Part I,

" fion {h)y He might have juftly given
this as an enumeration of all the fteps which
the mind takes in the difcovery of new con-
clufions : But they are not all to be afcribed
to reafon. The firft of them, the finding out
of ideas or experiments which may ferve for
proofs, is the province, not of reafon, but of
imagination. It is imagination likewife, that
Can be moft properly faid to order and difpofe
the proofs. It arranges them in a certain
difpofition ; then reafon furveys them, and
examines, whether this difpofition is fuch as
can enable it to perceive their connexion. If
it does not, reafon rejeds that difpofition ;
and imagination is again fet a working, ar-
ranges them in a different manner, and con-
tinues to vary the difpofition, till it either
fuggefts one which reafon finds fufficient for
its purpofe, or till, after having wandered
through all the arrangements of its materials
that occur to it, it is wearied with the repeti-
tion of unfuccefsful attempts, and gives over
the work as defperate and imprad:icable. The
difpofition, therefore, of the proofs muft be
afcribed to imagination, though reafon always

{h) EfTay concerning Human Underflanding. B. iv. c. 17,

follows

Sect. II. Genius belongs, 35

follows in its foot-fleps, keeps pace with it,
and recalls it when it has made an ufelefs ex-
cuiTion. It follows, that the two lafl opera-
tions which Locke afTigns to reafon, are the
only ones which properly and ftridly belong
to it. Its bufinefs is, to perceive the connex-
ion or force of the proofs, after they are dif-
covercd and arranged ; and from the whole
train of them to infer a jufl conclufion. This
is performed by every man who learns a
fcience from the writings or Infcrudiions of
others. It muft be performed before a per-
fon can comprehend a demonflration in Eu-
clid, or the proof of any conclufion in philo-
fophy. It implies, not genius, but mere
capacity ; and is daily accomplifhed by mul-
titudes who are not able to make any original
difcovery in the fciences. Indeed, without
this, no invention in fcience can be compkat-
ed ; but without an imagination capable of
finding out and ordering the proofs, no inven-
tion could be even begun. The chief difR-
culty in inventing new truths, regards that
part which is the work of imagination, the
difcovering of fit intermediate ideas, or appo-
fite experiments, and the difpofing of them
in fuch a manner that they may lead to juft

D 2 and

36 To ivhat Faculty^ Part I'.

and important conclufions. It is this that
requires genius, and is regarded as its proper
province. The reft demands, not invention,
but the fame abilities which are necefTary for
apprehending the difcoveries of other men.
A perfon may be able to perceive, with the
greatest eafe and certainty, the connexion
and force of proofs which are prefented to
him in due order, who could not have con-
trived or arranged thefe proofs. He may
poflefs reafon in perfection, and yet be totally
deftilute of invention, originality, and ge-
nius [i).

From thefe obfervations, it would appear,
that genius of every kind derives its imme-
diate origin from the imagination. Mere
imagination, it is true, will not conftitute
genius. If fancy were left entirely to itfelf,
it would run into wild caprice and extrava-
gance, unworthy to be called invention. A

(/) In this enumeration, we have not mentioned tap, a
f.culty which confelTedly has great influence on genius. The
reafons will readily occur. It influences only ibme kinds of
genius, not all the kiiids but we have here confined ourfelves
to the confideration of genius in general. Taile is not a fini-
ple, but a derived faculty. In refpeft of its principles, it is
a compound of judgment and internal fenfe ; (EJay on Tajie^
part Jl. fed. 2.) and its efFeds on genius refemble, fome-
tinies thofc of the one of thefe powers,, and fomeumes thofe
of the other,

raaa

5ect. II. Genms belongs. 37

man who throws out indlgefted notions,
contradidory pofitlons, trite and vulgar kn^
timents, or foolifh whimlies, is not faid to
have invented them, but is rather blamed for
not having avoided them. As fancy has an
indirect dependence both on fenfe and me-
mory, from which It receives the firft ele-
ments of all its conceptions, fo when it exerts
itfelf in the way of genius, it has an imme-
diate connexion with judgment, which muft
conftantly attend it, and corredt and regulate
its fuggefllons. This connexion Is fo inti-
mate, that a man can fcaixe be faid to have
invented till he has exercifed his judgment {k).
But ftlll it is true that imagination invents,
and judgment only fcrutinizes and determines
concerning what it has invented. It is ima-
gination that produces genius ; the other in-
telledual faculties lend their afliftance to rear
the offspring of imagination to maturity. It
is alfo true, that in matters of fpeculation,
imagination refigns its difcoveries into the
hands of reafon, fooner than in the arts, and
leaves it more to finifli. Yet it always fup-

{k) Ego porro ne invenifle quidem credo eum, qui non ju-
dicavit : nee enim contraria, communia, ilulta invenifTe
dicitur quifquam, fed non vitafle. Quint. ////?. Orat. lib. iii,
cap. 3.

D 3 plie&

38 To zvhat Faculty, Part I.

plies the fubjedt on which reafon is to work.
Without judgment, imagination would be
extravagant; but without imagination, judg-
ment could do nothing. A bright and vigo-
rous imagination joined with a very moderate
judgment, will produce genius, incorred:, it
may be, but fertile and extenfive : but the
niceft judgment unattended with a good ima-
gination, cannot bcftow a fingle fpark of
genius. It will form good fenfe, it will en-
able a man to perceive every defeat and error
in the difcoveries of others ; but it cannot
qualify him for fupplying thefe defeats, or
for being himfelf the author of any new in^
yention. A man of mere judgment, is effen-
tially different from a man of genius. The
former can employ his reafon only on fubjeds
that are provided by others ; but the latter
can provide fubjeds for himfelf. This abi-
lity is owing folely to his poffefling a com-
prehenfive imagination, which the former
wants.

It is the imagination, therefore, with its
operations and laws, that we muft efpecially
examine, in order to explain the nature of
Genius. The other faculties which affift it,
particularly judgment, which is more inti-
mately

Sect. II. Genius belongs. 3q

mately connedled with it than any of the reft,
will need to be confidered, but are to be re-
garded only in a fecondary view.

SECT. III.
Hoiv Genius arifes from the Imagination,

WHEN memory prefents ideas, it an-
nexes to them a convidion that the
ideas themfelves, or the objeds from v^'hich
they are copied, were formerly perceived ;
and it exhibits the ideas in the fame form and
order in which the things themfelves appear-
ed. In time remembrance fails, ideas are
perceived without being referred to any prior
fenfations of their originals, the order of the
parts is forgotten. But even then, ideas do
not lie in the mind without any connexion or
dependence. Imagination can conne6t them
by new relations. It knits them together by
other ties than what connected the real things
from which they are derived ; and often be-
llows an union upon ideas whofe archetypes
had no relation. In this operation, it is far
from being capricious or irtegular, but for
the moft part obferves general and eflablifhcd

D 4 rules.

^o Hoiv Genius arifes Part I.

rules. There are certain qualities which ei-
ther really belong, or at lead are fuppoied to
belong to all the ideas that are ailbciated by
the imagination. Thefe qualities muft be
confidered as, by the conftitution of our na-
ture, rendering ideas fit to be aiTooiated. It
is impoffible to give a reafon, why thefe qua-
lities unite ideas : it is not neceflary at pre-
fent to explain particularly what they are.
Experience informs us, that the influence of
aflbciation is very great. By means of it,
multitudes of ideas originally diftindt and un-
conneded, rife always in company, fo that
one of them cannot make its appearance,
without introducing all the reft. On this
account, human thought is perfectly reftlefs.
It requires no labour to run from one idea to
Others. We have fo great a propenfity to do
it, that no refolution has force enough to re-
ftrain us from it, nor will the ftrongeft efforts
be able to confine us long to the contempla-
tion of a fmgle idea. We are inceffantly
looking round to every fide, without intend-
ing it ; we employ ourfelves about many ob-
jects, almoft at the fame inftant (/). Nay,

(/) Niiiira bumani inger.ii it's eft cgllis et velox, fic in
cmncm partem, ut ita dixeriirj, fpe(!-tat, uc ne poflit quidem
^liquid agvYCj tantum unum, in plura vero, non eodem die

aflbciatioa

Sect. III. frorn the Imagination. 41

aflbciation is often fo ftrong, that it beftows a
fort of cohefion on feveral feparate ideas, and
makes them flart up in niimberlefs combina-
tions, many of them different from every
form which the fenfes have perceived ; and
thus produces a new creation. In this ope-
ration of the imagination, its affociating
power, we fliall, on a careful examination,
difcover the origin of genius.

Association being an operation of fancy,
common to all men, fome of its effeds are
univerfal. In every individual, it difplays
itfelf in many inftances. Not to mention
fuch cafes as are totally unconneded with our
prefent fubje^t, fcarce any perlbn is fo ftupid,
as not to have fometime in his life, produced
a bright tiafh of imagination, though fur-
rounded, it may be, with a wide extent of
darknefs. But fuch tranfient blazes do not
neceffarily imply real genius. It is fomething
more permanent and uniform. It requires a
peculiar vigour of affociation. In order to
produce it, the imagination muft be compre*
henfive, regular, and adive.

jnodo, fed eodem temporis -momento vim fuam impendat.
Quint, hijl. Oral. lib. i. cap. zo,

'J Genius

42 How Genius arijes Part I.

Genius implies fuch comprehejifi'venefs of
imagination as enables a man, on every occa-
fion, to call in the conceptions that are necef-
fary for executing the defigns or compleating
the works in which he engages. This takes
place, when the affociating principles are
ftrong, and fit for ading in an extenfive
fphere. If they be weak, they will call in
memory to their aid. Unable to guide our
fteps in an unknown country, they keep in
the roads to which we have been accuftomed ;
and are directed in fuggefting ideas, by the
connexions which we remember. Every pro-
dudtion of a man who labours under this de-
bility of niind, bears evident marks of barren-
nefs, a quality more oppofite to true genius
than any other. Nothing appears in it un-
common or new; every thing is trite and
unoriginal. Or, if he attempts to quit the
beaten path, and ftart new game, he can
find out but a few ideas, he is exhaufted by a
Ihort excurfion, and mufl either make a flop,
or return to the tracks of memory. Induftry
endeavouring, in this manner, to fupply the
want of a copious imagination, by accurate
remembrance or diligent obfervation, will
produce, inftead of a philofopher, a devoted

follower.

Sect. III. from the Imagination, 43

follower, or a dull laborious commentator;
inftead of a poet, a fervile imitator, or a
painful tranflator. But when the aflbciating
principles are vigorous, imagination, confci-
ous as it were of its own ftrength, failles
forth, without needing fupport or afking
afiiftance, into regions hitherto unexplored,
and penetrates into their remotefl: corners,
unfatigued with the length of the way. la
a man of genius, the power of afTociation is
fo great, that when any idea is prefent to his
mind, it immediately leads him to the con-
ception of thofe that are connected with it.
No fooner almoft is a defign formed, or the
hint of a fubjedl ftarted, than all the ideas
which are requifite for compleating it, ruih
into his view as if they were conjured up by
the force of magic. His daring imagination
traverfes all nature, and colleds materials fit
for his purpofe, from all the moft diftant
corners of the unlverfe; and prefents them
at the very inftant when they become ufeful
or neceflary. In confequence of this, he
takes in a comprehenfive view of every fub-
je£t to which his genius is adapted.

Thus, when the aflbciating principles arc
ftrong and have an extenfive influence, they

naturally

44 Honv Genius arifes Part T,

naturally form, in proportion to the degree
of their ftrength, that boundlefs fertility, that
inexhauftible copioufnefs of invention, which
is not only one necefiary ingredient in true
genius, but the firft and moft effential con-
ftituent of it. The fmalleft production will
in fome meafure difcover, in what extent this
power is poffefTed. A work of real genius
always proclaims, in the cleareft manner,
that immenfe quantities of materials have
been collected by fancy, and fubjedted to the
author's choice. There is no particular, per-
haps, in the works of Homer, that has been
more univerfally remarked and admired,
than the prodigious compafs of imagination,
which thev fhow. His penetration has gain-
ed him accefs to all the magazines of ideas,
and enabled him to draw materials from every
part of nature, and from the. whole circle of
human arts. Knowlege of them was pre-
requiiite, but could have been of no fervice
after it was obtained, without the livelieft
fancy, fuggefting them readily, and applying
them on fuitable occafions. A comprehenfive
imagination gave Newton fo great command
over the natural and the intelledual world,
that, in his philofophical enquiries, he miffes

Sect. III. from the ImaginaUon, 4.^

no experiment which is neceflary for pro-
moting his inveftigation, and, in his mathe-
matical refearches, difcovers every idea which
can be a proper medium for inferring his
conclufion, and includes in his problems
almoft every cafe that can occur.

This extenfive compafs of thought enables
a man to derive from his own treafure, what
they who want it, are indebted for to the
works of others. He who poflefleth a fertile
imagination, is under no necefTity of arrogat-
ing to himfelf the difcoveries of others, or of
adorning his own produdtions with the beau-
ties which he has pilfered from them. He
will not decline to ufe, on proper occafions,
the inventions of his predeceflbrs, either in
fcience or in the arts ; but in ufmg them, he
will difplay his own genius. He will at leaft
preferve the full fpirit of the original, not
contented with merely tranfmitting its form :
the propriety with which the imitation or the
theory is introduced, and the force, with
w^hich it is applied, will fhow that it was not
merely copied from memory, but appofitely
fuggefted by a vigorous imagination : and
frequently he will give farther proof of ge-
nius, by improving on the borrowed hint,

^6 Jlonv Genius arifes Part I.

by adding new beauties, or delivering a known
truth with greater elegance and juftnefs.

Genius implies regularity -, as well as
comprehenfiyenefs of imagination. Regula-
rity arifes in a great meafure from fuch a turn
of imagination as enables the affociating prin-
ciples, not only to introduce proper ideas,
but alfo to connect the defign of the whole
with every idea that is introduced. When
the defign is fteddily kept in view, and the
mind fo formed as to be ftrongly affected by
that aiTociating quality by which the defign
is related to the means of executing it, the
imagination can fcarce fail of being regular
and corred. Any conception that is prefent,
will introduce moft readily thofe ideas which
are related to the main defign, as well as to
itfelf, though there fhould be a thoufand
others bearing the fame relation to itfelf, but
unconneded with the general fubjed. Thefe
latter have only one tie, but the former have
a double relation, and will therefore rufh into
the thoughts with double violence. They
will occur and be obfervcd, while the reft ne-
ver come into view, or, if they make their
appearance, are rejeded fo quickly that we
inftantly forget our ever having thought of

them.

Sect, III. from the Imagination. 47

them. No fooner does the imagination, in
a moment of wandering, fuggeft any idea not
conducive to the delign, than the conception
of this defign breaks in of its own accord,
and, hke an antagonifi mufcle, counteracfling
the other affociation, draws us off to the
view of a more proper idea.

In this manner an attachment to the de-
fign naturally produces that regularity of
imagination, that capacity of avoiding fo-
reign, ufelefs, and fuperfluous conceptions,
at the fame time that none neceflary or pro-
per are pafled by, which is always mofl: per-
fect in the greateft geniufes, and conftitutes
no inconfiderable part of their excellence*
As acutenefs of fmell carries a dog along the
path of the game for which he fearches, and
fecures him againft the danger of quitting it,
upon another fcent: fo this happy ftrudure
of imagination leads the man of genius into
thofe tracks where the proper ideas lurk, and
not only enables him to difcover them, but,
by a kiod of inftindtive infallibility, prevents
him from turning afide to wander in impro-
per roads, or to fpend his time in the con-
templation of unappofite ideas. As the bee
extrads from fuch flowers as can fupply
6 them,

^8 Hoiv Genius arlfes Part I.

them, the juices which are proper to he con-
verted into honey, without lofing its labour
in fipping thofe juices which would be perni-
cious, or in examining thofe vegetables which
are ufelefs ; fo true genius difcovers at once
the ideas which are conducive to its purpofe,
without at all thinking of fuch as are unne-
cefTary or would obflru£t it. The extent of
Homer's imagination is not more remarkable
than its regularity. Poets of inferiour genius
would have comprehended a hiftory of the
Trojan war in one of his poems, and all the
events of the life of Ulyfles in the other :
but his corred: Imagination admits no detail
inconfiftent with the unity of the fable (»z),
no fhining epifode that can be deemed uncon-
nected with the fubjedl, nor a fmgle image
unfuitable to the nature of his work. In the
writings of Newton, we fcarce find any ob-
fervation that is fuperfluous, any experiment
whofe force is fully implied in any other,

(ot) This is rcmirked particularly by Ariflotle, as one of
Homer's chief and diitinguilhing virtues. "O o"' "0//(.v;po? uaire^ x.xi
TdOL'KKx ^ixyifih, !t:x,l To'.r huci Kd'Aco^ ioiTv. Oivtranuv/xp TTcmvf ovK
tTroiTiCTiv UTra.VTae, oV« aurio a-VK^y'' • u* oioiv BuTioov yivoj^hov,

w/xynctHov "fiiy ri \iKoc, BxTcpov yit/caBui' otM. a. wsp (jCuxv TTfu^vv, olxr
J\iyoyiiv rvv Oovj-atixv, ervvi<-r,aav' hy^o.a^ ii text rr,v l?\ixdx, IJipl
•JToinT. Xi<p. y). Ato ut^TTio t'i'JToyuvj iiS'v) X-xl txvtyi Biciri'io; uv (^xn'ift
"Oi/LT.poc TTxpx Tcvi a.^>\ov;, Tw f/i>iof Tov Tirohi^ov xxi Trip i^o-jtx OLBymt
xat Ti^o;, l7r»p(,£(f/3C-at wour* oAoi'. K, T. A. Xif . Ky%.

any

Sect. III. from the tmaghiatioii, 49

any quefllon or problem which has not fome*
thing peculiar.

Neither fertility nor regularity of ima-
gination will form a good genius, if the one
be disjoined from the other. If fertility be
wanting, the corredeft imagination will bd
confined within narrow bounds, and will be
very flow in its operations ; there can be no
penetratiori or copious invention. If regula-
rity be abfent, an exuberant invention will
lofe itfelf in a wildernefs of its own creation.
There is a falfe fertility, which arifes from a
difordered and irregular fancy. As the fame
idea bears fome relation to an infinite num-
ber of other ideas, the aflbciating principles
may lead us, after a very few fteps, to fiich
ideas as are conne6ted with the laft that was
prefent, yet have no connexion either with the
former ones, or with the main defign. A
man, therefore, who follows any aflbciationj
however trivial or devious, that hits his fancy^
may fhow a great deal of imagination without
difplaying any real genius. The Imagination
produces abundance of glaring, brilliant
thoughts ; but not being conducive to any fixt
defign, nor organized into one whole, they
can be regarded only as an abortion of fancy,

E not

50 How Genius arifes Part L

not as the legitimate progeny of genius. A
multitude of ideas, collected by fuch an ima-
gination, form a confufed chaos, in which in-
confiftent conceptions are often mixt, concep-
tions fo unfuitable and difproportioned, that
they can no more be combined intd one regu-
lar work, than a number of wheels taken
from different w^atches, can be united into
one machine. Were it neceffary to produce
inftances of a fruitful imagination unproduc-
tive of true genius, we might find enough
among thofe pretenders to poetry, who can,
through many lines, run from one fhining
image to another, and finifh many harmo-
nious periods, without any fentiment or de-
fign ; or among thofe pretenders to fcience,
who can devife a hundred experiments, coin-
ciding in all their material circumftances,
without a view to any conclufion, and with-
out advancing ufeful knowledge afingle ftep.
Such imagination is like a tree fo overcharged
with fruit, that no part of it can come to full
maturity.

But even when a falfe luxuriance of fancy
does not extinguilli true genius, it very much
diminifhes its force and beauty. Sometimes
it overloads every fubjed: with a fuperfiuity of

illuftration

SfccT. III. front the Imagination. §i

illuftration or of ornament, which either
wearies by introducing prolixity, or dazzles
too much to give entire fatisfadion. A painter
who indulges this exuberance of fanc^j will
multiply figures which increafe the compo-
lition of his work without adding to its ex-
preffion, which embarrafs the fpedator with-
out having any fhare in the adion, and which
feem to be introduced only that they may
aukwardly fill lip an empty fpace upon the
canvas. Marini, fays a French critic {«), if
he mentions a nightingale or a rofe, fays
every thing on the fubjed: that he can ima-
gine; far from rejeding any idea that oc-
curs to him, he goes in fearch of fuch as can-
not naturally occur ; he always lavifhes orl
his fubjed, every thing that can be thought
or faid. Sometimes luxuriance of imagina-
tion produces an irregular condud in works
of genius, carrying the author every now
and then out of fight of his defign, into di-
.greffions which have a very fleader connexion

(k) Cavalier M-^r'n ne s'eft jamais veu une imagination plus
fertile ne moir s re; 1 e que la iknne. S'il parlc d'lin roffigr.ol
ou dun rofe, il en dit tout ce qu'on Ci) peut iinaginer ; bieo
Ijin de rejetter ce qiii fe preferite, il va chercher ce qui ne fc
prefcnte pas, il cpuifc toujours fon'fujet. \ Bntret.d'AriU
et d' Eugene,

E 2 with

5 2 How Genius arlfes Part I,

with it. This is remarkably exemplified in
Ariofto. He poflefles great readinefs and
quicknefs of genius; his inventions are fur-
prifingly various ; but that vivacity and agi-
lity of fancy from which he derives thefe
virtues, has betrayed him into continual dif-
order and incoherence, and unnatural inter-
ruptions of his ftory. The Fairy ^een dif-
covers inexhauftible richnefs of invention,
but is chargeable with the like irregularity.
It would be poffible to bring inftances of
both thefe kinds of vicious redundance from
the writings of a very great philofopher ; we
might point out many paflages in The EJfay
tn Human Under/landing, in which Mr. Locke
has indulged both a tedious diffufenefs in the
illuftration of his fubjed, and unfeafonable
digrefTions from it,

A MAN is fometimes fo entirely under the
power of accidental aflbciations, that he feems
fcarce to have propofed any end, but to have
defigned to begin with one idea, to go from
that to any other which it happened by any
means to fuggeft, and fo from this to othersj
yielding up the mind to follow paffively what-
ever aflbciations chance to afFed it. This is
in an eminent degree the cafe of Montaigne

Sect. III. from the Imagination, 53

in many of his efTays. He fays juftly of
himfelf, " What are thefe eflays of mine but
*' grotefques and monftrous pieces of patch-
" work, put together without any certain
" figure, or any order, connexion, or pro-
** portion, but what is accidental [p) ?" This
flyle of compofition, carried to the utmofl: de-
gree of incoherence, has been lately intro-
duced : novelty, along with a great degree
of wit, humour, and fine feelings, procured
the firft attempt confiderable fuccefs ; and this
fuccefs has raifed a multitude of infipld imi-
tators. It is only uncommon merit in the
parts, that can gain indulgence to fuch writ-
ings : the total want of defign is an eflential
defed, and fiiows a capital imperfedion in
the genius of the writer, an irregularity of
imagination.

There is in the human mind a ftrong
propenfity to make excurfions ; which may
naturally be expeded to exert itfelf moft ia
thofe who have the greateft quicknefs and
compafs of imagination. If it be indulged
without referve, it will produce incoherent
medleys, fantaftical rhapfodies, or unmeaning

(e) Liv, i. ch. 27.

«k -

E 3 reveries^

^4 Roiv Genius arifcs Part I.

reveries. Often, however, the bye-roads of
afTociation, as we may term them, lead to
rich and unexpedled regions, give occafion to
noble fallies of imagination, and proclaim an
uncommon force of genius, able to penetrate
through unfrequented v^ays to lofty or beau-
tiful conceptions. This is the character of
Pindar's genius, the boldnefs of which more
than compenfates for its irregularity. The
trueft eenius is in hazard of fometimes run-

ning into fuperfluitles, and will find occafion
to prune the luxuriance, and redify the dif-
order of its firft conceptions. But this fa-
culty can never be reckoned perfedt, till it
has acquired a capacity of avoiding them in
mofl cafes. It mud fupply a large flock, and
at the fame time manage it with economy.
While it produces all that is neceflary, it muft
evite ail that is fuperfluous (p).

Thus to render genius complete, fcrtiHty
and regularity of imagination muftbe united.
Their union forms that boundlefs penetration^
which charadterifes true genius. By theip

{p) This is well exprelTed by Quifltilian : fpeaking of rhe-,
torical common- places, he obferves, that t^*ey will be hurt-
ful, rather than beneficial ; " Nifi et animi qusdam ingenita.
natura, et ftudio exercitata velocitas, refla nos ad ea quse,
conveniunt caufb, ferant.'' ////?/>. Orat. lib. v. cap. lo. "'

union

Sect. III. from the Imagination, 55

union they will be both improved : the one
will give us an ample choice ; the other wiU
prevent our choice from being perplexed with
needlefs multiplicity. An extenfive imagi-
nation, imprefled with a ftrong ailociation of
the defign, and regulated by it, will draw out
from the whole compafs of nature, the fuit-
stble ideas, without attending to any other.
In ftudying the works of a great genius, w^e
can fcarce avoid fuppofnig, that all pofTible
conceptions have been explicitly expofed to
liis view, and fubjeded to his choice. The
appofite materials are coileded in as great
abundance, and prefented with as great pro-
priety, as if this had been the cafe : and yet
perhaps, no other ideas have occurred to him,
but thofe which he has ufed. They, and
they alone, have been prefented with entire
propriety, by the regularity of a compre-
henfive imagination retaining fight of the de-
fign through all the fteps^ of its progrefs.
This effed:, which refults from the union of
thefe two virtues, is confpicuous in the great
poet and in the great philofopher whom we
have already mentioned, as eminently pof-
feffing both. It may be obferved by contraft-
ing a fmgle defcription of Shakefpeare or

E 4 Thomfon,

1 6 Hozv Genius arlfes Part I.

Thomfon, with the laboured deliqeations of •
^ poetafter, who would fupply the want of
genuine fancy by the induftry of obfervation ?
in the former, all the ftriking features of the
objed:, and none elfe, are ftrongly marked ;
in the latter, every circumftance feems to be
taken notice of with the minutenefs of a na-
tural hiftorian ; but after all, thofe features
are omitted, which are fitted for making an
impreffion on the fancy. Compare Euclid
with his commentators ; the oppofition that
may be remarked between them, will fet the
charader of real genius in a ftrong light : the
train of Euclid's propofitions is fimple, yet
complete ; his laborious expofitors appear to,
have intended to amafs all poflible propo-
fitions, however trifling of unneceiTary. One
can fcarce read a paragraph in Butler's Ana-^
logy-, or a chapter in Montefquieu's Spirit of
Laivs^ without being ftruck with the notion,
that the whole courfe of Providence was di-
ie£lly in the view of the one, and the whole
Jiiftory of mankind in the view of the other i
with fo great appearance of readinefs do they
obferve even the repioteft and leaft obvious
drcumftances which can any wife affect their
argument. In ftudying a work of true ge-

xiiuS|

Sect. III. from the Imagination: 5)

nius, when we attend to the multitude and
variety of the materials, we wonder how the
author could have found them all ; and when
we reflect how proper and appofite every part
is, we are apt to think that it muft have oc-
curred to almoft any perfon. Such is the
effed: of copioufnefs and regularity of ima*
gination, united and harmonioufly exerted.

Genius implies likewlfe aSli'vity of ima-
gination. Whenever a fine imagination poC-
fefles healthful vigour, it will be continually
llarting hints, and pouring in conceptions
upon the mind. As foon as any of them ap«
pears, fancy, with the. utmoftalertnefs, places
them in every light, and enables us to purfue
them through all their confequences, that we
may be able to determine, whether they will
promote the defign which we have in eye.
This adlivity of imagination, by which it
darts with the quicknefs of lightning, through
all pofTible views of the ideas which are pre-
fented, arifes from the fame perfedion of the
^ITocIating principles, which produces the
other qualities of genius. Thefe principles
?re fo vigorous, that they will not allow the
piind to be unemployed for a moment, and

58 How Genius arifis Part I,

at the fame time conftantly fuggeft the defign
of the work, as the point to which all this
employment tends. A falfe agility of ima-.
gination produces mere ufelefs mufmg, or
endlefs reveries, and hurries a, man over large
field?, without any fettled aim : but true ge-
jiius purfues a fixt diredlion, and employs its
adlivity in continually ftarting fuch concep-
tions as not only arife from the prefent idea^
but alfo terminate in the general fubje<ft : and
though a thoufand arrangements of the con-
ceptions which it ftarts, fhould fail of anfwer-
ing the intention, it is indefatigable in trying
new arrangements, till it can happily accom-
plifh one that anfwers it. Whenever an image
or a fentiment occurs to the poet or the ora-i
tor, imagination fets it in every poffible light,
enables him to conceive its genuine efFedt,
and thus puts it in his power to judge, whe-
ther it ought to be rejected or retained. A
philofopher no fooner thinks of an experi-
ment or an argument, than imagination, by
reprefenting it in every attitude, enables him
to determine, what will be its force, and
whether it will be to his purpofe. In this
manner the reftlefs adivity of imagination

quickly

gECT.tll. 'from the Imagination. 59

quickly conftructs a fort of model by which
we may form fome idea of the work, before
we proceed to execute it.

This adivity of imagination is of great
importance to genius. Genius may indeed,
in fome degree, exift without it; ima^
gination may be comprehenfive when it is
exerted, and correct, and yet not adive. But
without adivity, genius will never exert it-?
felf, except when excited and puflied for-
ward by fome external caufe; adivity of
fancy is like an internal ftimulus, which will
not allow genius to lie idle or dormant, but
makes it operate fpontaneoufly and with con-
ftancy. Without it, invention would at befl
be very flow. Even after materials were fug-
gefted, their propriety could not be judged of^
till adual trial were made of their pofitions
and effeds, at a great expence of time and
labour : and as fuch trial would be extremely
tedious and diflicult, we would either take up
with the firil view or pofition that occurred,
or relinquilh all attempts, difcouraged by the
profped of that fatigue which mufi: attend
the improvement of our plan. But when
fancy is expeditious in exhibiting every pof-
fible arrangement of our conceptions, it
I * quickly

66 How Genius arifes Part I,

quickly puts it in our power to perceive all
their confequences and relations to our fub-
je£t, and enables us eafily to make a choice,
and foon to finifh our invention.

Thus the force of the imagination, or the
vigour of the aflbciating principles, produces
genius, fo far as it regards the colledion,
and even the choice of fit materials for the
difcovery that is propofed.

But. invention is not completed by merely
depofiting a fufEcient quantity of proper ma-
terials, in any order, as in a magazine or
llore-houfe. In every cafe, fome degree of
regular difpofition is implied in the very no-
tion of invention, and comes within the pro-
vince of genius [q). It is not fufficient for a
Luilder to collect ftones, timber, and what-
ever elfe is neceflary for the edifice, except
they be alfo properly difpofed and united in
the fabric ; fo in the arts and fciences, a huge
eolledlion of conceptions which bear fome
relation to one another and to the main fub-
je£t, will form only a confufed heap, if they
be not, by a proper dirpofuion> united into

{o) Collocare autem, etfi eft commune, tamea ad invents
Cndum refer tur. Cic. par tit. Or at*

I one

Sect. III. from the Imagination, 6i

one regular work (r). A piece of painting
cannot be faid to be defigned, though all the
figures were conceived in their due propor-
tions, till the artift has alfo formed a diftind
idea of the economy of the whole. If the
order of the notes in a mufical compofition
were altered, it would deftroy the harmony,
which was the fole objed of invention. As
an animal body will become monftrous, though
it has all its eflential members, if one of
them be transferred to the place of another ;
fo a poem will become perfedly difagreeable
and fantaflical, by the tranfpofition of its
parts. A diflocation deftroys the vigour of
any member of the body, and unfits it for
its proper function ; and an oration will lofe
its whole efFed, if arguments, inftead of be-

(r) Sed ut opera extruentibus fatis non eft, faxa atque ma-
teriam, et caetera a:dificanti utilia congerere, nifi difponendis
lis collocandifque artificum manus adhibeatur : fic in dicendo
quamlibet abundans rerum copia, cumulum tantum habeat
atque congeflum, nift illas eadem difpofitio in ordinem di-
geftas, atque inter fe commiflas devinxerit. Nee immerito
fecunda quinque partium pofita eft, cum fine ea prior nihil
valeat. Neque enim, quanquam fufis omnibus membris fta-
tua fit, nifi collocetur. Et fiquam in corporibus noftris alio-
rumve animalium partem permutes et transferas, licet habeat
eadem omnia, prodigium fit tamen. Et artus etiam leviter
loco moti, perdunt quo viguerunt ufum : et turbati exercitas
fibiipfi funt impedimento. Nee mihi videntur errare, qui
ipfam rerum naturam ftare ordine putant; quo confufo, peri-
tura funt omnia. Qitint. /«/?. Orat. lib. vii. cap. i.

ing

6l Hoiv Genius arifes Part L

ing diftindly urged, are blended together
without articulation. In fcience too^ a mul-
titude of ideas, if they be not arranged in
fuch a manner that their connexion may be
perceived, inliead of leading us to difcover a
Gonclufion, will only involve us in perplexity,
as an army thrown into diforder, can make
no advantage of its numbers, but, on the
contrary, obftruds its own motions. In every
cafe, difpofition is fo intimately connected
with invention, and even interwoven with
it, that it is impoflible to feparate them evea
in idea. If therefore imagination contribute
nothing to the difpofition of the materials, it
will follow, that genius muft, in a confider-
ablc degree, derive its origin from fome
other power of the mand. But it will ap-
pear upon enquiry, that imagination contri-
butes very much to the difpofition of every"
w^ork.

When a perfon flarts the iirft hint of s
new invention, and begins to meditate a
work either in art or fcience, his notion of
the whole is generally but imperfed: and con-
fufed. When a number of appofite concep-
tions are collected, various views of their
connexions open to him, and perplex his

choice.^

^ECT. III. from the Imagination. 6^

thoice. But by degrees the profped clears*
As related ideas are apt to be aflbciated, fo,
by the very fame conflitution of our nature^
thofe that are moft nearly related will be
moft ftrongly and intimately aflbciated toge-^
thet. The operations of genius in forming
its defigns, are of a more perfect kind than
the operations of art or induftry in executing
them. A ftatuary conceives all the parts of
his v^ork at once, though when he comes to
execute it, he can form only one mem.ber at
a time, and muft during this interval leave
all the reft a fliapelefs block. An archite(f^
contrives a whole palace in an inftant; but
when he comes to build it, he muft firft pro-
vide materials, and then rear the different
parts of the edifice only in fucceffion. But
to collect the materials, and to order and ap-
ply them, are not to genius diftindl and fuc-
ceflive works. This faculty bears a greater
refemblance to nature in its operations, than
to the lefs perfect energies of art. When a
vegetable draws in moifture from the earth,
nature, by the fame action by which it draws
it in, and at the fame time, converts it to
the nouriftiment of the plant : it at once cir-
culates through its veflels, and is affimilated

iJj. How Genius arijes Part I.

to its feveral parts. In like manner, genius
arranges its ideas by the fame operation, and
almoft at the fame time, that it colledts them.
The fame force of alTociation which makes
us perceive the connexion of all the ideas
with the fubjed, leads us foon to perceive
alfo the various degrees of that connexion.
By means of it, thefe ideas, like'a well-dif-
ciplined army, fall, of their own accord, into
rank and order, and divide themfelves into
different clafles, according to their different
relations. The moft ftrongly related unite of
courfe in the fame member, and all the mem-
bers are fet in that pofition which affociation
leads us to affign to them, as the moft na-
tural. If the principles of affociation fhould
not at flrft lead readily to any difpofition, or
fhould lead to one which is difapproved on
examination, they continue to exert them-
felves, labour in fearching for fome other
method, proje^l new ones, throw out the
unappofite ideas which perplex the mind and
impede its operations, and thus by their con-
tinued efforts and unremitted adtivity, con-^
dudt us at length to a regular form, in which
reafon can find fcarce any idea that is mif*
placed*

Thtji

Sect. III. from the tmagination, 65

Thus imagination is no unfkilful architeO: ;
it coiledls and chiifes the materials ; and
though they may at firft lie in a rude and
undigefted chaos, it in a great meafure, by
its own force, by means of its aflbciating
power, after repeated attempts and tranfpo-
fitions, defigns a regular and w^ell-propor-
tioned edifice. ,

A WEAKNESS of this mcthodlfing power
may arlfe either from a want of adivity in
the 'imagination, or from our having a flight
aflbciation of the dcfign. The former pre-,
vents our turning our conceptions readily into
different forms, and thereby leads us to take
up with the firft that offers, however incor-
rect. The latter prevents our being affeded
by the different connexions of the parts,
which arife from their having different re-
fpedls and fubordinations to the general de-
^\%Ti. From whatever caufe this weaknefs
proceeds, it is a great impcrfedion in genius.
It renders it flow in forming its produ<ftion5,
as the confufion of the materials occafions
difficulty in applying them to ufe: it alfo
renders them lefs valuable when they are
formed, as they retain, in fome meafure, the
appearance of diforder, intricacy, and dif-
agreeable perplexity. Ariftotle confiders the

irrcgu-

66 How Genius arifis Part L

irregularity of cUrpofition in Euripides as a
capital imperfedion, for which nothing al-
moft but his fingular power of interefting
and affeding could have made atonement (j).
In every art, the difpofition of the fubje£t
into a confiftent plan, is indeed one of the
mofl important offices of invention; nor is
it a lefs momentous article, in difcoveries
which refpe*^: the fciences. It is not more
abfolutely neceflary in an algebraical invefti-
gation, to afcertain the feveral quantities by
diftind fymbols, than to difpofe thefe fym-
bo!s, and the equations which are compofed of
them, in a regular and convenient order.

Enthusiasm has been generally confi-
dered -as a very common, if not an infepa-
rable attendant of genius. Poets have been
looked upon as infpired, both by themfelves
and others. No man can be an accompliflied
orator, who is not poffeffed of fuch fenfibility
of heart, as to be actuated, at pleafure, by
the paffions which he would excite in others.
Even the fpeculative philofopher and the cool
mathematician have often difplayed a very
high degree of ardor in the exertion of their
genius. The explication which has been
given of the nature of genius, will not only

{s) Hip wonjT. xi^. ty. quoted above, Seft. i. Note {h).

6 enable

Sect. III. from the Imagination, (y]

enable us to account for this, but incline us
alfo to reckon it impoffible that ever an high
degree of genius fhould be unaccompanied
with fomething of that elevation and warmth
of imagination, v^hich we term enthufiafm (/).
Genius turns our thoughts habitually to fuch
fubjeds as are adapted to it ; habitual applica-
tion to any fubjed, enables us to form ftrong
and lively conceptions of every thing relating
to it ; a ftrong conception naturally invigo-
rates and elevates the imagination in contem-
plating it ; and while this frame continues,
'all the adions of the mind will be ftrong and
vehement. Such is the difpofitlon with which
a man of genius turns his view to any fub-
jed; as foon as he begins to think how it
may be compleated, he eyes it as a rich trea-
fure, with delight and confcious pride ; he
triumphs in the profped of forming

" he knows not what excelling things,"

and purfues all the aflbciations which it pre-
fents, with incredible eagernefs and fpirit.
When an ingenious track of thinking pre-
fents itfelf, though but cafually, to true ge-

{s) Ariftotle, who will not be fufpcfied to be too great a
favourer of enthufiafm, fecms to affert, That it alone can dif-
pofe men to fearch for new inventions in philofophy ; Aia ya.^
TO 0AYMAZEIN oi aiSpa-TTCixai «.'>> KaX to 7rjaJT>.» i^r^avTo ^» dO'opiTt.
MtTO, T« <P'j<7i>i.a., a. Kiip. /?.

F 2 nius,

6B Hew Genius Ar'ifes Part L

nius, occupied it may be with fomething elfe,
imagination darts alongft it with great rapi-
dity; and by this rapidity its ardor is more
inflamed. The velocity of its motion fets it
on fire, Uke a chariot wheel which is kindled
by the quicknefs of its revolution. As a
{brightly courfer continually mends his pace,
fo genius, in proportion as it proceeds in its
fubjedt, acquires new force and fpirit, which
urges it on fo vehemently, that it cannot be
reftrained from profecuting it. Difficulties in
the execution only excite its vigour, roufe its
keennefs, and draw out its utmoft efforts to
furmount them. Its motions become ftill
more impetuous, till the mind is enraptured
with the fubjedt, and exalted into an extafy.
In this manner the fire of genius, like a di-
vine impulfe, raifes the mind above itfelf,
and by the natural influence of imagination
actuates it as if it were fupernaturally infpired.
The ardor which thus fprings from the ex-
ertion of genius, has fometimes rifen to a
degree of fervour perfedly aftonifhing. Ar-
chimedes (>*), Protogenes (?/), and Parmegi-

(0 Quern ardcrem fludii cenfetis fnilTe in Archimede, qui,
dum in puhere cjurrdam dekribit attentius, ne patriam qui-
dcin captain effe leni'erit ? Cic. ^e Fin. lib. v.

(h) Erat Trotogenes in fuburbano hortulo fuo, hoc eft De-
tietrii caftris. Neque interpellatus prsliis, inchoata opera
iruerniifit omnino»

J ano,

Sect. III. from the Imagination. t<)

ano (^), are faid to have been fo totally ea-
tranced, the two latter in painting, and the
former in the lefs enthufiaftic inveftigation of
mathematical truth, as not to be diverted from
their works by all the terrors of hoftile ar-
mies taking by fiorm the places where they
were employed. It is reported of Marini,
that he was fo intent on revlfmg fome ftan-
zas of his Adonis, that he fiifFered one of his
legs to be burnt for a confiderable time, be-
fore he was fenfible of it [^y\ We may

remark farther. That as a kind of enthufi-
aftic ardour naturally arifes from the exertion
of genius, fo this ardour greatly alfifts and
improves the operations of genius. By ele-
vating and enlivening the fancy, it gives
vigour and adivity to its affociating power,
enables it to proceed with alacrity in fearch-
ing out the neceffary ideas ; and at the fame
time, by engroffing us wholly in the prefent
fubjedt, preferves us from attending to fo-
reign ideas, which would confound our
thought, and retard our progrefs (z).

(jf) Graham's account of painters.

(ji) Eloges des S9avans, torn. 2.

(2) Les Peintres et les Poetes ne pouvent inventer de fang
froid. On fait bien qu'ils entient en un efpcce d'enthoufi-
afme, lorfqu'ils prodiiifent leurs idees, &c. Reflex. Crit.
Jmt lapoef. et/ur laj>eint. 2 Part, z St3.

F 3 Wfi

7© Hoiv Genius arifesy &c. Part I.

We have now explained, how genius arifes
from the perfection and vigour of the imagi-
nation. However capricious and unaccount-
able this faculty may be often reckoned, yet
it is fubjed to eftablifhed laws ; and is ca-
pable, not only of fuch extent as qualifies it
for colleding ideas from all the parts of na-
ture, but alfo of fuch regularity and correcSt-
nefs as is in a great meafure fufficient for
avoiding all improper ideas, for feledling fuch
as are fubordinate to the defign, and for dif-
pofifig them into a confiftent plan, or a dif-
tindt method. It is the firft author of all
inventions, and has greater influence in car-
rying them to perfection, than we are ready
to fufpeCt. It forms what we properly cali
genius in every art, and in every fcience.
It is always neceifary indeed, thsit judgment:
attend it in its operations, and aflift it in dif-
covering truth or beauty. In what ways it
does fo, we fhall next enquire.

SECT,

[ 71 ]

SECT. IV.

Of the injliience of Judgment upon Genius,

THOUGH genius be properly a com-
prehenfive, regular, and adive imagi-
nation, yet it can never attain perfedion, or
exert itfelf fuccefsfully on any fubjed, except
it be united with a found and piercing judg-
ment. The vigour of imagination carries
it forward to invention ; but underftanding
muft always condud it and regulate its mo-
tions. A horfe of high mettle ranging at
liberty, will run with great fwiftnefs and
fpirit, but in an irregular track and without
any fixt diredion : a fkilful rider makes him
move ftraight in the road, with equal fpirit
and fwiftnefs. In like manner, a fine ima-
gination left to itfelf, will break out into
bold fallies and wild extravagance, and over-
leap the bounds of truth or probability : but
when it is put under the management of
found judgment, it leads to folid and ufeful
invention, without having its natural fpright-
linefs in the leaft impaired.

It is the union of an extenfive imagina-
tion with an accurate judgment, that has ac-

F 4 compliihed

72 Of the irtfuence of Judgment Part I.

complifhed the great geniufes of all ages.
In matters of fcience, the neceffity of judg-
ment is obvious : all the colledions and ar-
rangements of ideas which imagination makes,
are immediately fubjected to reafon, that it
may infer truth. Jf we be not careful to
diflinguiih thofe operations of the mind which
are performed in conjundion, we ihall be
apt to refer philofophical genius wholly to
reafon, overlooking the influence of imagina-
tion. The afnftance of reafon is as truly ne-
ceflary in the fine arts as in fcience, though
in thefe it has not the appearance of being fo
conflantly applied. It is very remarkable
that all the fine arts have been cultivated, and
even brought to perfedion, before the rules
of art were inveftigated or formed into a fyf-
tem : there is not a fmgle inflance of any art
that has begun to be pradifed in confequence
of rules being prefcribed for it. The firft
performers could not have explained the
feveral rules which the nature of their work
made neceffary; but their judgment was not-
withftanding fo exad and vigorous as to pre-
vent their tranfgr effing them. Their corred-
nefs is fo wonderfully perfed, that critics,
difcovered the rules which they prefcribe,
pnly by remarking thofe laws by which true

genius.

Sect. IV, upon Genius. 73

genius, though uninllruded, had adually
governed itfelf. Ariftotle does not invent
new rules of compofition, but only points
out thofe which Homer had formerly obferv-
ed in the Epos, Sophocles in the Drama, and
niany of the Grecian orators in Eloquence.
The fame obfervation may be extended to
painting, mufic, and every other art. The
great geniufes who invented and Improved
them, have poflfeiTed the acuteft judgment,
which has faithfully attended them, and care-
fully guarded their fteps in thofe diftant and .
unfrequented regions which the boldnefs of
their fancy led them to explore : and judg-
ment has fometimes exerted itfelf with fa
great fuccefs, that the perfon who attempte4
the firft production in an art, has exhibited a
perfe<S): model, in which pofterity could find
no fault, and the excellence of which none of
their attempts could equal. The Iliad is at
once the firft, and the beft of Epic poems,
the admiration and the ftandard of all fuc-
peeding ages. Had Elomer, along with his
rich imagination, pofleired inferior judgment,
his poem muft, like the works of Shakefpear,
have had great defeds, excufable indeed,
but confpicuous and undeniable. A perfect
judgment is feldom beftowed by Nature,

even

74 Of the influence of Jiidgfncnt Part I,

even on her mofl favoured fons ; but a very
confiderable degree of it always belongs to
real genius. It may be remarked in the mofl
incorredt and irregular artifts ; even when it
has not force enough to difcern every fault,
or when the violence of imagination is too
great to fuffer it to be exerted with fuificient
feverity, yet Hill it prevents perfed abfur-
dity, and reflrains imagination from frantic
excurfions. Pindar is judicious even in his
irregularities. The boldnefs of his fancy, if
it had been under no control from reafon,
would have produced, not wild fublimity,
but madnefs and frenzy. Shakefpear's judg-
ment was not enough improved to enable him
always to avoid improper fubje(fls, unnatural
and improbable incidents, forced and quib-
bling expreflions, or to perceive the regula-
rity and fimplicity which beft fuits the nature
of the drama ; but in fupporting the propriety
of character, in marking the fit expreflions
and the natural effects of the feveral paflions,
and in many other particulars, he difplays
fuch an uncommon accuracy of judgment, as
leads us to impute his blemifhes, rather to
the bad tafte of thofe for whom he wrote,
than to any defeat in his own underftanding.
Judgment is of fo great importance, that,

though

Sect. IV. upon Genius'. 75

though we muft often acknowlege genius in
works in which judgment has not been fcru-
puloufly exercifed, yet this circumftance never
fails to render them far lefs valuable than
they would have been, if they had been
finifhed with corrednefs. The irregularity
of Rubens's defigns, and his injudicious
mixture of incongruous perfonages in many
of his pictures, throw a fhade over thofe ex-
cellencies which he pofTefled in perfection.
Nothing lefs than the higheft degree of genius
can obtain lafting and thorough approbation,
when judgment has not been accurately exer-
cifed. Shakefpear's unequalled genius has fecur-
edhim admiration. But very great genius was
not able to preferve Dryden from the ridicule
of thofe who were far his inferiors, on ac-
count of incorredlnefles into which his unfor-
tunate circumftances betrayed him ; nor has
it obtained from impartial poflerity, fo great
attention and applaufe as much lefs abilities,
more judicioully exerted, would have certainly
commanded.

In a man of genius, imagination can fcarce
take a fingle ftep, but judgment fliould attend
it. The moft luxuriant fancy ftands moft in
need of being checked by judgment. As ^
|ich foil produces not only the largefl quan-
tity

t6 Of the injiiience of Judgment P a r t |,

tity of grain, but alfo the greateft profufioa
of fuch weeds as tend to choak it; foa fertile
imagination, along with juft and ufeful ideas,
produces many trifling, falfe, and improper
thoughts, which, if they be not immediately
examined by reafon, and fpeedily reje(^ed,
will over-run and obftrud the truth or the
beauty which the others might have pro-^
duced («). Judgment cannot colled: ideas,
but it revifes thofe which fancy has colleded,
and either adopts or rejeds them, as it finds
caufe. Though a bright and comprehenfive
fancy be the principal ingredient in genius,
yet nothing is fo dangerous as to affed to
difplay it conftantly, or to indulge it without
any control from refledion ; nothing is pro^
dudive of greater faults. This leads phiiofo-j
phers to conftrud whimfical hypothefes, inr
ftead of conftruding juft theories. This leads
poets to defcribe improbable events and unna-
tural charaders, and to fearch for unfeafon-
able wit and ill-timed fplcndour, when judg^
ment would have direded them to imitate
nature with exadnefs, and to ftudy fimplicity

{a) Nihil eft feracius ingeniis, iis pra;rertim, qus difcipU-
uis exculta funt. Sed ut fegetes fecund;e et uberes, non folum
fruges, verum herbas etiam efFundunt inimiciffimas frugibus;
fie interdum ex illis locis, aut Jevia qusdam, aut caiifis aliena,
aut non utilia gignuntur, quorum ab oratoris judicio deledus
magnus adhibebitur. Cic Orator.

Sect. IV. %ipon Genius, *?;^

of expreffion. This leads painters caprici-
oufly to create imaginary decorations, inftead
of inventing natural and confiftent embellifh-
ments. Imagination muft fet all the ideas
and all the analogies of things, which it col-
led:s, before the difcerning eye of reafon, and
fubmit them abfolutely to its fovereign deci-
fion. It is juftly obferved by Quintilian,
that every fidion of the human fancy is ap-
proved in the moment of its produdion [b).
The exertion of the mind which is requifit-e
in forming it, is agreeable ; and the face of
novelty which infant conceptions wear, fails
not to recommend them promifcuoufly, till
reafon has had time to furvey and examine
them. Were reafon never to fcrutinize them,
all our ideas would be retained indifcrimi-
nately, and the productions of fancy would
be perfectly monllrous. While a man is en^.
gaged in compofition or inveftigation, he
often feems to himfelf to be fired with his
fubjedl, and to teem with ideas ; but on re-
vifmg the work, finds that his judgment is
offended, and his time loil. An idea that
fparkled in the eye of fancy, is often con-
demned by judgment as falfe and unfubftan-
tial. A more rigid exercife of this latter

{b) Omnia noftra, dum nafcuntur, placent. Jnfi. Oraf.
lib. X. cap. 3.

faculty,

78 Of the 'influence of] iidgment Part L

faculty, would have prefervcd Taflb from
introducing fentlments which have fhow
without juftnefs, and figures which furprife
and dazzle, but are unfuitable to the purpofe
to which they ought to have been fubfervient ;
and would have enabled him to efcape the
cenfure of having overfpread his work with
tinfel, and thus fullied the luftre of the pure
gold which it contains (c).

A FERTILE imagination is apt to overload
a work with a fuperfluity of ideas : an accu-
rate judgment rejedts all that are unnecefTary,
Shakefpear was not always able to keep the
richnefs of his fancy from difplaying itlelf in
cafes where judgment would have directed
him to control it. That very exuberance of
imagination which commands our admiration,
is fometimes indulged fo far as neceflarily to
incur our cenfure. We need not be at a lofs
for an example. In the Midfummer Night's
Dream (^), Helena upbraiding Hermia, de-

(f) An ingenious critic, fpeaking of the rich poetic vein of
Ariofto, fays, Elle remporte veritablement fur la pcelie de la
Jerufalem delivree, dont ies figures ne font pas fouvent conve-
nables a I'endroit ou le Poete ies met en ceuvre. 11 y a fouvent
encore plus de brillant et d'eclat dans ces figures que de ve-
rite. Je veux dire qu'ellcs furprennent et qu'elles eblouiflent
I'imagination, mais qu'elles n'y peignent pas dilHnftment des
images propres a nous interefler. Voila ce que M. Defpreaux
a defini, le clinquant du Taffe. Reflex. Crit. fur la poejie et
Jur la peinture, tome i. fe6\, 34.

[d) Aft 3. fcene 8.

fcribes

Sect. IV". upon Genius » 79

fcribes the clofenefs of their early friendship
in the moft natural manner, by expreffive
circumftances fuited to the ftate of childhood ;

Is all the counfel that we two have fhar'd,
The filters vows, the hours that we have fpent.
When we have chid the hafty-footed time
For parting us 5 O ! and is all forgot ?
All fchool-days friendfhip, childhood innocence?
We, Hermia, like two artificial gods,
Created with our needles both one flower.
Both on one fampler, fitting on one cufhion ;
Both warbling of one fong, both in one key ;
As if our hands, our fides, voices and minds
Had been incorporate.

But here the Poet*s own imagination takes
fire, and he goes on :

So we grew togjether
Like to a double cherry, feeming parted.
But yet an union in partition.
Two lovely berries moulded on one Item ;
Or with two feeming bodies, but one heart,
Two of the firft, like coats in heraldry.
Due but to one, and crowned with one crell.

And his imagination has crouded together
more images than would have been proper
though he had been defcribing infant friend-
fhip in his own perfon, not to mention that
feme of them are frigid and far-fetched.

But

So Of the influence of Judgment Part I.

But the redundance Is the more faulty, as the
defcription is put into the mouth of Helena,
who was too little at eafe, too much diftrad-
ed with vexation, to be at leifure to fearch for
a multitude of fimilitudes.

Imagination will be often led by flight
and incidental affociations, to fuggeft ideas
•which, when canvafled by judgment, are
difcovered to be foreign and improper.
When a man is no longer affedted by the
aflbciation which conducted him to them, he
wonders how he ever could have thought that
pertinent, which he once admired. Painters
of confiderable rank have reprefented friars
in the habit of their order, as prefent at fome
of our Saviour's miracles. Judgment muft
perceive this to be totally abfurd ; bat their
religion prevented their exercifing judgment
in the cafe. No lefs an artift than Michael
Angelo introduces Charon and his boat into
the folemnitics of the future judgment paint-
ed according to the Chrijftian revelation.
The flighteft exertion of judgment, would
have made him fenfible of fo great an incon-
gruity. An idea may often like wife, in one
point of view, be adapted to a work, which,
if fet in another light, would be unfuitable,
or lefs appofite. While fancy conceives the

various

Sect. IV. tip on Genius. 8i

various attitudes in which the idea may be
placed, judgment is wakeful and obfervant,
that it may chufe the propereft.

Regularity of imagination, which is of
the greateft importance in genius, could ne-
ver be acquired without the aid of judgment.
It is only judgment conftantly exerting itfelf
along with fancy, and often checking it and
examining its ideas, that produces by degrees
a habit of correcftnefs in thinking, and enures
the mind to move ftraight forward to the encj
propofcd, without declining into the bye-
paths which run off on both fides. Imagina-
tion is a faculty fo wild in its own nature,
that it muft be accuftomed to the difcipline of
reafon before it can become tame and manaee-
able enough for a correal produdion. Nor
will it be capable of this even after it has ac-
quired the greateft pofFible regularity, except
judgment attend it and perpetually curb its
motions. The moft regular imagination will
fometimes make an unnatural excurfion, and
prefcnt improper ideas ; judgment muft there-
fore be ready to review its work, and to re-
ject fuch ideas. Many of Bacon's conjediures
concerning fubjedts which he had not oppor-
tunity to examine perfe<3:ly, are falfe though
they be ingenious, and would have been dif-

G avowed

2 Of the vifluence of Judgment P A R t I.

avowed by judgment, when it had canvafled
them. Newton^s imagination was more cor-
red than his, and more conftantly under the
control of judgment; yet reafon would have
perhaps, on examination, rejected fome of
the fuppofitions which he makes in his que-
ries. The firft fketch of every work of ge-
nius, is always very different from the finifh-
ed piece. Not only are many things added
by the pofterior effays of imagination, affect-
ed by new affociations in repeated views of
the fubje£l:, and thus penetrating deeper into
its nature ; but alfo many things are re-r
trenched or altered by judgment on a revifal,
•which it had not force enough .to prevent
fancy from exhibiting in the courfe of the
invention. AfTociation could not recal the
idea of the defign, in order to bring back
fancy when it has wandered from it, if judg-
ment did not inform us that it had wandered,
by perceiving the tendency of the ideas which
it has fuggcfled. The fineft imagination,
totally deftitute of afTiflance from judgment,
would in fome meafure refemble a blind man,
who may be very dexterous in groping the
right road, but cannot know certainly, whe-
ther he continues in it, and has no means of
recovering it, if he once flray.

S^CT. IV". upon Genius, 83

No degree of corrednefs can hinder imagi-
nation from introducing different ideas that
are ail conducive to the propofed defign. But
fome of them may promote it more than
others. In this cafe, judgment alone can de-
termine which is fitteft, and enable us to make
a choice. If it did not exert itfelf, fancy
muft continue for ever at a ftand, diftraded
with the variety, and undetermined where to
fix. Sometimes again it happens, that tho'
each of the ideas is fubfervient to the end in
view, yet they are fo incongruous that they
cannot be all adopted with propriety. Shake-
fpear {e) defcribes the terrors of death, by a
variety of very ftriking and poetical images ;

Ay, but to die, and go we know not where>
To live in cold obftruilion, and to rot,
This fenfible warm motion to become
A kneaded clod ; and the dilated fph'it
To hath in fery floods, or to reftde
In thrilling regions of thick-ribbed ice.
To be imprijon^d in the 'uieivlefs ivinds^
And blonvn ivith rejllefs violence round about
The pendant ivorld. -

All the ideas here introduced are conducive
to the poet's defign, and might have been

(e) Meafure foj Meafurc,

G 3 fuggefted

84- Of the injluenc€ of Judgment PartL

fiiggefted by the corredeft fancy. It is only
judgment that can difapprove the uniting of
them in the fame defcrlption, as being hete-
rogeneous, derived partly from Chriftian
manners, and partly from pagan notions.
This faculty would have direded the poet to
retain only the former, as being moft con-
gruous to Claudio the fpeaker, or, if h6
thought not thefe fufficlent, to fet fancy again
■ to work, to finifh the defcrlption with con-
fiftent images.

Every work of genius is a whole, made
up by the regular combination of different
parts, fo organized as to become altogether
fubfervieJit to a common end. The different
degrees of relation which the parts bear to
one another and to the end, affeding imagi-
nation in proportion to their clofenefs, lead it
to ailign to each its proper place, and thus
lay the foundation of a natural difpofition.
But however perfedly the afTocIating princi-
ples perform this part of their office, a perfon
will fcarce reckon himfelf certain of the pro-
priety of that difpofition, till it has been au-
thorifed by judgment. Fancy forms the plan
in a fort of mechanical or inftindive manner :
judgment, on reviewing it, perceives its rec-
titude or its errors, as it were fcientifically ;

Sect. IV. upon Genius, 85

its decilions are founded on refledlon, and
produce a convi£tion of their juftnefs. The
fame qualities which form natural relations
among the parts of a work, afFeding the
imagination, produce correfpondent philofor
phical relations among thefe parts, which
judgment can contemplate, inrefped: of which
it can compare the feveral parts, and difcover
their influence on one another, and on the
whole, and can by this means perceive, with-
out danger of error, the fituations that ought
to be afligned them. For inftance, in a fable
6t for tragedy, there are fome incidents
which are properly caufes, and others which
are their effeds or confequences : caufation
operating on the fancy as an aflbciating qua-
lity, will lead imagination, in the moft rapid
career of invention, even though it fliould
outrun judgment, to place thefe incidents for
the moft part in their natural fituation, accord-
ing to the relation which fubfifts between
them: and caufation is at the fame time a
philofophical relation, by contemplating which
judgment can determine, w^hat incidents are
fit to form the beginning, what to form the
middle, and what the end. Thus even when
fancy is moft fuccefsful in contriving a na-
tural difpofttion, it is from the review of rea-

G 3 fon

86 Of the hifluence of JvJgment Part I.

fon we derive afliirance of its being natural
andjuft. But it often happens that fancy
throws its materials into diforder. In this
cafe it is only judgment that can perceive the
error. An accidental or trifling affociation
may miflead fancy ; but judgment is not fub-
jedt to the impulfe, it furveys deliberately
the connexions of the parts, it remarks their
mutual influence, it convinces us of the im-
propriety of their pofition, and puts fancy
upon making eff'orts to imagine others, which
it attends to as they rife, and either rejed:s>
or approves them.

To form a proper plan in any extenfive
work of genius, is a matter of fuch difficulty
as to require the union of imagination and
reafon in their greateft ftrength. Imagination
muft exhibit all the various pofitions of the
parts, and conceive the effed^t of every part in
each of thefe pofitions. Judgment muft at
the fame time furvey them with a piercing-
eye, compare readily the eff^e£t of each part
in one pofition, with its effedl in another,
and from the refult of its comparifons, quickly
pronounce, which is the beft arrangement.
Fancy could not have formed the regular
plan of an epic poem, though Homer had had
the ftrongeft and moft conflant perception of

the

Sect. IV. upoii Genius. 87

the end at which it aimed, if judgment had
not, from the confideration of this end, and
the repeated comparifon of it with the means
which imagination propofed for accomplifhing
it, difcovered, in what fituation every inci-.
dent would produce the very greatefl efFed:.
One needs only read over the curious feries
of experiments by which Newton has invefti-
gated the laws of light and colours, to be con--
vinced that it required the nicefl judgment,
as well as the moft comprehenfive imagina-
tion, to conduct them in fuch ^ manner that
every fucceeding one fhould confirm and ex-
tend the conclufions to which the preceding-
ones had given rife.

It deferves alfo to be remarked, that every
difference in the nature of an invention, re-
quires a correfpondent variety in the difpofi-
tion. A fine imagination will in fome mea-
fure, by its own power, diverfify the arrange-
ment agreeably to the nature of the inven-
tion ; but it may reap great advantage from
the aid of judgment. When this faculty has
confidered all the circumftances of the fub-
jedt, it can determine with certainty, which
of the plans fuggefled by fancy, will mofl
promote the perfection of the work. De-
moflhenes and iEfchin-cs have adopted difpo-

G 4 fitions

88 Of the influence of Judgment Part J..

fitions perfectly oppofue, in their orations aC
the trial of Ctefiphon. The oppofite ends at
which they aimed, fuggefted this contrariety
of the means; but it was judgment perceiv-
ing the one difpofition fitteft for imprefling
the judges with a fenfe of Ctefiphon's guilt,
and the other fitteft for convincing them of
his innocence, that determined the rival ora-
tors to chufe the oppofite roads which they
feave taken.

Thi.'S, while imagination is adive in con-
ceiving all the various combinations and ar-
rangements of the ideas which it has eolledt-
ed, judgment muft be as indefatigable in fur-
veying them, and determining concerning
their real force and cqnfequences. |t muft
remark in an inftant thofe pofitions of theni
which are unfit for anfvvering the purpofe?,
and be able, without lofmg much time in
fcrutinizing them, to pitch upon thofe that
are fit. Fancy throws out both the worthlefa
earth and the rich ore ; judgment, like a fkil-
ful refiner, diftinguifhcs the one from the
other, and purifies the gold contained in the
latter, from the drofs with which it is inter-
mingled. The reftlefs efforts of the moft
healthful imagination would be both ufelefs
and endlefs, if they were not fubjeded to the

cognizaote

Sect. IV. upon Genius. 89

cognizance of reafon. To imagine all the
poflible arrangements of a fet of ideas, were
an unmeaning play of thought, if they merely
pafled through the mind, like the images that
are faid to fucceed one another in the brown
ftudy, without reafon being able to arreft
fuch of them as it approves. Were reafon
only flow in her determinations, in compari^
fon with the quicknefs with which fancy
conceives, like Una's dwarf, lagging behind
her far aivay, even this would greatly impede
the work of genius, retard its progrefs, or
ftop it altogether by conftantly curbing the
impetuofity of fancy (/). Or if its fpirit were
too hardy to be wholly broken, it would out"
run its companion ; it would difpofe a man to
take up with the firft conception that occur-
red, rather than weary himfelf in attempts to
procure better, when judgment were fo dull
as not to diftinguifh readily which deferves
the preference.

In this manner judgment affifts, moderates,
and guides the exertions of imagination thro*
the whole courfe of the invention. But after

(/) Atque plerofque videas hsrentes circa fingula, et dum
inveniunt, et dum inventa ponderanc. Quod etiam fi idcirco
iieret, ut femper optimis uterentur, abominanda tamen hjcc
infelicitas erat, qua; et curfum dicendi refrenat, et calorem
f:ogitationis extinguit mora el diffidentia. Quint. InJI. Orat,
|ib. viii, proem.

imagination

90 Of the infiucnce of "Judgment Part L
imagination has defifted from its work, judg-
ment reviews, corre^fts, and finifhes it. In
fcience, the work cannot receive even its rude
form till reafon has com Dared the feveral
ideas and obfervations which fancy had fug-
gefted, and perceived their connexions, and
inferred their confequences. And in the arts,
where fancy is able to accomplifh a Iketch of
the whole, the review of reafon is abfolutely
necelTary, to polifli and improve the work.
Whenever fancy happens to ftray, judgment
alone can perceive that it has ftrayed ; and
though it has attended fancy during the whole
feries of its inveftigations, obferving its errors
and drawing it off from them, it is alfo re-
quilite that it renew its examination when
the work is finifhed. It can then take a
more deliberate furvey of the whole, and will
be able to reject or alter many things which
it formerly allowed to remain untouched,
either becaufe it did not perceive them on a
tranfient view, or becaufe it was unwilling to
chill the ardor of fancy by fo long a delay as
would have been neceffary for amending
them (^). The end leads a perfon to the dif-

T» icycc wciy »j avv7(\i7v iTrtcxoTrcyvTi?, on ttiV o-^'iv uvtuv «(^»r«'TEfj
tjj wcXXaxi; Xftan Trctovat xui vvt xcit fcaMcv am(,yi.nr,v tij? Tcocpoc f*»«
Xflv ^ja^o^aj %v aTrox^VTnu rl ffvn^U **' tc crtiiy.Si^. HAOYTAPX.

covery

Sect. IV. tipon Genius, 91

covery of the means which are adapted to it ;
and the mutual relations of thefe means de-
termine the form and the fituation into which
each of them fhould be thrown as it occurs ;
judgment will pronounce concerning thefe
with confiderable juftnefs, during the forma-
tion of the work : but after the work is finifh-
ed, when it has the whole in its view at once,
it has an opportunity of pronouncing many
decifions on points concerning which it had
not formerly the means of determining. A
view of the whole directs it to retrench one
part as fuperfluous in refped of the general
defign, to enlarge another as defedive, to
foften fome features, to heighten others, to
brighten this part, and to cafl that into a
fhade*

In the exertion of genius, judgment not
only regulates imagination, in the ways which
have been hitherto pointed out, but often
likewife fupplies it with new materials.
Judgment cannot by its own power fuggefl: a
train of ideas, but its determinations often put
fancy into a new track, and enable it to ex-
tend its views. Imagination can introduce
ideas only by pieans of their connexion with
fome prefent perception from which it fets out
in fearch of them ; and this perception is in

many

92 Of the infiuence of Judgment Part I.

many cafes no other than a decifion of judg-
ment. Every review that judgment takes of
the productions of genius, difcovers fome re-
lation of the parts. This relation is a new
perception which may tranfport fancy to
others that are connected with it, and thus
conduct it into regions which it did not for-
merly think of exploring, and from which it
may bring home many conceptions fit for
perfeding its work. A few experiments will
enable a philofopher to exercife his judgment
fo far as to guefs at the conclufions to which
they lead, or to determine the different ways
in which the phenomena that they exhi-
bit, may be accounted for. And this exer-»
tion of reafon will lead him to imagine the
farther experiments that are neceifary for
bringing the queflion to a decifion, experi-*
ments of which he never would have thought
if this judgment had not intervened. It is
only a judgment that can be the occafi®n of
fuggefting what is called an experimmtum
cnicis, in philofophical enquiries. Had not
judgment been properly exercifed, M. Azout
could never have contrived an experiment of
this kind, for determining the caufe of the
afcent of fluids in exhaufted tubes, nor Sir
Ifaac Newton fer evincing indifputably that

the

Sect. IV. upon Ge^iius, 93

the inequality of refradion in the prlfmatic
image, arifes from an original difference ia
the rays of which the light of the fun is com-
pofed. When a poet has, by the exercife of
judgment, determined the general nature and
qualities of the incidents which will be pro-
per for promoting the end of his poem, this
determination will affift him in finding out
fuch incidents. Homer having discovered by
judgment, that the defign of an epic poem
would be beft accomplifhed by a feries of inci-
dents rifmg naturally from one another, and
by means of their mutual dependence confti-
tuting one adion, doubtlefs found many inci-
dents fuggefted to him by this view of the
economy of the whole, which might have
otherwife efcaped his notice. Spencer having
negleded to form fuch a previous judgment
of the nature of his work, needed all the
force of his amazing fancy, along with the
numerous fidions of romance, to furnifh him
with fuch a variety of unconnected adventures
as might continually engage the foul and fill
it with furprife by their extravagance and
holdnefs. All the afliftances in invention,
which orators have contrived, by means of
topics and common places, are founded on
6 this

94 Of the infdience of 'judgment Part I.

this principle ; That judgment, by furveying
the work diredts imagination to many quar-
ters where it may find conceptions adapted to
its purpofe : and Quintilian juftiy obferves,
that thefe artificial helps are no farther ufeful
than as they enable imagination to take the
hint from the decifion of judgment, and by
its own force run diredly forward to thofe
topics which fuit the prefent cafe {h)* Judg-
ment will likewife give a new impulfe to
fancy, and prompt us in invention, by per-
ceiving an error, either in the matter or in the
difpofition. The very fame viev/ of thefe
which ferves to deted the fault, will often
fuggeft the means by which, not only it may
be redified, but new truth or beauty alfo may
be produced. It is in this way that an exa-
mination of the imperfed or faulty produc-
tions of others, often enables a man of genius
to make advances in art or fcience, and leads
him on to new difcoveries. In fuch ways a3

{h) Illud quoque ftudlofi eloquentise cogitent, neque om»
nibus in caufis ea qua; demonitravimus, cunda pofTe reperiri :
neque cum propofua fuerit materia dicendi, rcrutandafingula,
et velat olliatim pulfanda, ut fciant an ad probandum id quod
intendimus, forte refpondeant, nifi cum difcunt, et adhuc
ufu carent. Infinitam enim faciet ipfares dicendi tarditatein,
ii Temper necefle fit, ut tentantes unumquodque eorum quod
fit aptum atque conveniens, experieudo nofcamus. Inji, Orat.
lib. V. cap. 10.

thefe,

Sect. IV. upon Genius. gjp

thefe, judgment affifts the imagination, by-
putting it in the track of invention, as well
as by controling and regulating its opera-
tions.

SECT. V.

Of the Dependence of Genius on other intel-
leflual Powers,

IT was formerly obferved, that all our in-
tellectual powers may be reduced to four
clafles, fenfe, memory, imagination, and judg-
ment. We have found that Genius is the im-
mediate offspring of the imagination, and
that it is attended by judgment in all its exer-
tions. Its relation to fenfe and memory, is
more diftant, and its dependence on them
more indired. What is the preclfe nature of
this relation and dependence, will appear
from the following obfervations.

The aiTociating principles of the mind
would never exert themfelves if they were not
excited into adion by the impulfe of fome
objed: already perceived. It is only when
thus excited, that imagination runs out in
fearch of thofe ideas which are related to that
obje<3:. On this account, in analyfmg the

operations

«ff6 Of the Dependence of Genius Part I.

operations of genius, we muft at laft have re-
courfe to fome perception giving rife to them,
•which was not itfelf fuggefted by imagination,
but exhibited either by fenfe or by memory [a),
Thefe faculties give therefore in a manner
the firft hint of every invention ; a hint per-
haps inconfiderable in itfelf, but which may
in fome fenfe be confidered as the fource of
the whole difcovery that genius makes by
means of it. The largeft river takes its rife
from fome fmall fountain ; iifuing from this,
it rolls its llreams over a long extent of coun-
try, and is enlarged during its courfe by the
influx of many rivulets derived from fprings
no more confiderable than its own, till at laft
it becomes an impaflable torrent, liker to the
ocean than to the pitiful rill which purled
near its fource. In like manner, even thofe
works of genius which appear moft ftupen-
dous when they are compleated, fpring at firfl
from fome fingle perception of fenfe or me-
mory, obvious, it may be, and trifling, and
become ftupendous only by the gradual accef-
fion of ideas fuggefted by perceptions equally
trivial and common. We admire with rea-

(«) Quicquld porro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a fen-

iibus. ClC. dejin. lib. i. Kaj o'la t&uto /xvjTf'pa Twv i^ova-uv ifAv
BoXiyn^v iUxi t^'j MNHMOST'NHN. nAOYTAFX, vi{) w«i^.

tcyuy*

Ion,

Segt.V, en other hitdkSlual Poivers. 97

fon, the genius difplayed by Newton in the
xlifcovery of the laws of gravitation which the
^eleftial bodies obferve in their revolutions.
It was perhaps his perceiving by fenfe a ftone
or an apple fall to the ground, without any
vifible force impelling it, or the remembrance
of this common appearance, that excited his
genius, and direded it 10 that train of thought
which conduced him at lafl: to the inveftiga-
tion of thefe laws. It is affirmed by an anci-
ent author (/>), that the accidental hearing of
the noife of a fmith's hammers of different
weights, gave Pythagoras the firft hint of the
caufe of the variety of mufical lounds, and
led him by degrees into a complete theory of
iiiufic(c). No philofopher would ever go in

(b) Macros, lib. ii.

[c) An elegant modern writer relates this remarkable flor)')
to the following purpoi'e. " Who would have thought that
the clangorous noiie of a fmith's hammers Ihould have givca
the tirll rife to mufic ? Yet Macrobius, in his fccond book^
relates that Pythagoras, in palling by a fmith's Ihop, found
that the founds proceeding from the hammers were either
iiiore grave, or acute, according to the difierent weights of
the hammers. The philofopher, to improve this hint, fuA
peuds different weights by ilrings of the faire bignefs, and
found in like manner that the founds anfvvercd to the weights.
This being difcovered, he finds out thofe numbers which pro-
duced founds that were confonains : as that two firings of the
fame fubltance and tsnfion, the One being double the length
of the other, gave that interval which is called diapaj'on or an
tighth ; the lame v^as alfo effected from two llnngs of the
fame length and fize, the one having four times the ten lion
et the other, by theli; Heps, from fo meati a beginning, did

H fearch

98 Of the Dependence of Genius PartL

fearch of a theory, if fome phenomenon fub-
jedled to his immediate obfervation, did not
difpofe him to confider in what manner it
may be accounted for. It is the fubjed in
which a poet is engaged, and which he has
already conceived, that leads him, by refem-
blance, to find out an image proper for illuf-
trating it. In every cafe, fenfe or memory
fets imagination at firft in that road, by pur-
fuing which it arrives at important inven-
tions.

The brighteft imagination can fuggeft no
idea which is not originally derived from
fenfe and memory. In map.y cafes, even in
fuch as very much difplay its power, it does
no more but call in feafonably the very con-
ceptions which fenfe has conveyed, and which
memory retains. A philofopher is often led
to an important conclufion, by recolleding in
its proper place a phenomenon which he re-
members to have very commonly obferved.
A great part of poetry confifts in defcripticns
properly introduced, of thofe external objeds
which the poet has actually obferved, or in
the expreffion on fuitable occafions, of the

this man reduce, what was only before nolfe, to one of the
mod delightful fclences, by marrying it to the mathematics ;
and by that means caufed it to be one of the moft abftrad and
demonUrative of fciences." Sp£Ctator, No. 334'

I fentiments

Sect. V. on other inteUe^uatPo%vet^s. 99

fentiments and paflions which he has himfelf
been confcious of, or which he has d^ifcbvdred
in other men on fimilar occafions. It is no
reproach to genius to receive its materials
thus wholly prepared, from fenfe and me-
mory. Its force appears fufliciently in its
laying hold on them at the proper time, and
arranging them in regular order. Homer's
comparifons have ever been and will always
be admired as indications of furprifmg genius:
the immenfe variety of them, the facility with
which they appear to occur, the perfed cor-
refpondence of the images with the fubjed:
for the illuftration of which they are pro-
duced, and the majeilic fimplicity with which
they are exprefTed, leave no room to doubt of
the poet's genius. But the images themfelves
are generally drawn from fuch objeds as he
well remembered to have feen. The frag-
ments of true hiftory which the fame poeC
has related, are to be referred wholly to me-
mory ; imagination Vv'-as employed only in the
introdudion and application of them. In this
manner, as a mafter-builder has his materials
prepared by inferiour v/orkmen, or as a hiA
tory painter is provided with his colours by
the labour of others, fo the faculty of iiu'cn-
tion often receives the entire ideas which it

H 2 exhibits,

100 Of the Dependence of Genius Part L

exhibits, from the inferiour faculties, and
employs itfelf only in applying and arrange-
ing them. Hence it proceeds that poets of
original genius always exprefs the manners
of their own age, and the natural appear-
ances which have occurred to themfelves. It
was Homer's extenfive obfervation of men
and things that fupplied him with fo immenfe
a field of thought. The cuftoms of the age
diredled Spenfer, at leaft in part, to form his
plan on allegorical adventures of chivalry (d)^
and induced TafTo to found his poem on a
holy war. OfTian's imagery is fo different
from what would be fuggefted by the prefent
flate of things, that a modern wTiter could
fcarce bring himfelf to run into it, much lefs
to preferve it uniformly, by the utmoft efforts
of ftudy, or even by defigned imitation ; but
it is perfedly agreeable to all that we can con-
ceive of the face of nature and the ftate of
f »':iety in the times when that author is fup-
pofed to have lived.

But even w^hen imagination does not fug-
geft conceptions which have been received
entire from fcnfe and memory, but creates
fuch as are properly its own, it muft ftill not-
withflanding derive from thefe fources, the.

(</) Warton's Oh/er'vations on spenfer, p. 218.

ingredients

Sect. V. on other intellectual Foivsrs, loi

ingredients of which it compounds them.
The parts and members of its ideas have
been conveyed feparately by the fenfes, and
depofited in the memory, though fancy has
united them in a manner in which they were
never obferved to be combined. The power
of fancy is fubje6ted to the fame limitation as
our power over the natural world. Give it a
flock of fimple ideas, and it will produce an
cndlefs variety of complex notions : but as
we can create no new fubftance, fo neither
can we, except perhaps in a few very pecu-
liar inftances, imagine the idea of a fimple
quality which we have never had accefs to
obferve. When a philofopher attempts a new
experiment, he only places bodies already
known, in a fituation in which thefe bodies
never w^ere obferved, but of which he has an
idea by having feen other bodies placed in
that or a like relation ; and if he be able,
previous to adual trial, to guefs what appear-
ances the experiment will difclofe, the ability
arifes only from his remembering the refult of
another experiment in fome meaiure fimilar
to the prefent. The boldeft fidions of the
poets, which leaft refemble any thing in na-
ture, are yet compofed of parts which really
€xift in nature. When Homer formed the

H 3 idea

1 02 Of the Dependence of Genius Part I.

idea of Chimera-, he only joined into one ani-.
nial, parts which belonged to different ani-
mals ; the head of a lion, the body of a goat,
and the tail of a ferpent (f). Phidias is fald
to have formed his celebrated ftatue of Jupiter,
merely by the for^-e of his imagination, from
Homer's defcrlption of that deity [f). Yet
Hill he only varied a little the ordinary fea-
tures of a man. Even thofe painters who
have been mod: celebrated ibr invention, have
generally fatisfied themfHves with inventing
the adlion, and have derived the particular
figures and their attitudes from obfervation
of feveral individuals, and fometimes even
frorn the imitation of one individual.

Indeed though it were poffible for fancy
to create ideas wholly unlike* to thofe things
which men have acccfs to obferve, the attempt
w^ould prove entirely ufelefs. The artlfl
might amufe himfelf ^vlth the forms of his
own creation, but they would produce no
effc(ft either on the tafte or on the paflions of

IX. ^. V. i8i.

(y) A7ro/xj5if«.oy£ii!)i'5-« c£ Toy <i>tiolov oT» •Ti'foi; Tov Tlacyoecivoii eJwe mv

Trp, Tv,^ O/AWfOf o» i'ssuv iKn^itcav tovtuv'

H xai Kvcii'ifia-iv I'ss o^ftcri vn.ai Kpou'wi',
^jU-bfiViai o Ufa. pQxircii i'Xwuja-avTo ataKro^

others.

Sec T. V. on other intelleclual Poivers. 103

others. Men can be touched only by ideas
which they are able readily to conceive ; and
they can conceive only thofe ideas, the mem-
bers of v^hich fenfe has already depolited in
the memory. On this account we find it dif-
ficult to enter into manners very different
from our own. The refinement to which
we are accuftomed in modern times, renders
the fmiplicity of manners which Homer attri-
butes to his heroes, an cbjedl of furprlfe.
That fimpllcity of manners prevailed In his
time, and prevented his contemporaries from
affixing an idea of meannefs to many adions
and appearances in common life, from which
he derives comparifons to illuftrate the fu-
blimefl objeds. But modern luxury has raifed
the polite into a fphere fo diPdnd: from what
is termed low life, that we muft put a fort of
force upon our minds, in order to feparate
ideas of meannefs from fuch things as can
now occur only in a fhepherd*s cottage or a
country village. Critics more delicate than
judicious, are fo entirely under the influence
of this prejudice, that they ftigmatife the paf-
fages of ancient authors which refer to cuf-
toms very different from thofe of the prefent
age.

H 4 Memory

104 Of the Dependence of Genius Part L

Memory affifls genius in another rcfped:-
To recollect inftead of inventing, fhows a de-
feat of genius ; but it were faulty to be fo
intent upon invention, as fludioufly to avoid
recoUedlion on all occalions. If we lofe fight
altogether of the beaten road of memory, we
fhall be in danger of miffing our way in the
winding paths of imagination. So bold an
adventurer will come at laft to regions inha-
bited only by monfters. It is not fufficient
for rendering a producflion natural, that its
feparate parts be copied from real things ;
the order and connexions of the real things
mufl likewife be in fome meafure imitated.
If the parts of a work be put in a fituation
totally unlike to that which correfponding
objects in nature pofTefs, if will give the fame
kind of difguft as if the parts themfelves had
been perfedly fantaftical. If a philofopher
fhould deduce any phenomenon from a known
caufe, by a procefs oppofite to what we have
obferved in fimilar cafes, we would fufpedt
for this very reafon, that his explication were
rather a whimfical hypothefis, than a leglti-.
jpaate inveftigation, and we would readily
pronounce that his imagination might have
been correded by his memory, and led into \

much

Sect. V. on other IntelkSlual Powers, 105

much jufter train of thinking. If a number
of events natural in themfelves, were com-
bined in the adlon of a poem fo as to fucceed
one another in an order and by relations per-
fedly diffimilar to every ferics which hiftory
or our own obfervation had exhibited, we
pould not but be difgufied with this deviation
from what memory informs us is the reality
of things. The courfe of nature is fo fteddy
and regular, that a certain analogy runs thro^
all the parts of it. Whenever any feries of
events is exhibited to the mind, memory re-
colleQs fome other part of the courfe of na-
ture ; and if the ordinary analogy be want-?
ing, that feries is pronounced unnatural and
improbable. On this account, even in cafes
where the greateft latitude is allowed to in-
vention, care mull be taken that the offspring
of genius bear fome refemblance to the por-
trait of nature, which memory retains : and
this refemblance cannot be produced unlels
memory is confulted while genius exerts
itfelf, and this latter faculty in this manner
vouchfafes to take its model from the former.
This is the foundation of Horace's rule :

Fi6ta voluptatis caufa fint proxima veris :

fJe, quodcunque volet, pofcat fibi fabula credi (g-).

(^) Ars Poet. V. 338.

io6 Of the Bepefidencei &c. Part I.

In a word, Genius is often led to its inven-
tions by a train of ideas fuggefted to it by a
fimilar train which memory retains, and it
is only the remembrance of the latter that
enables judgment to determine concerning the
juftnefs o£ the former.

PART

[ 107 ]

PART IL

Of the general Sources of the Varieties

of Genius^

E N I U S always arifes from thofe prin-
ciples of the human mind which we
have pointed cut ; but it derives confiderable
diverfities of form from the different modifi-
cations of thefe principles. Imagination be-
ing that faculty which is the immediate fource
of genius, we muft fearch for the origin of
the varieties of genius, chiefly in the feveral
modifications of which imagination is fufcep-
tible. But becaufe imagination is attended
and affifted in all the exertions of genius, by
other faculties, without the co-operation of
which its eff^eds would be extremely imper-
fed, fome of the varieties of genius are no
doubt partly owing to the peculiar force or
modification of thefe other faculties. On this
account, an examination of the, different
forms which all the powers combined in per-
fect genius afTume, and of the different laws
by which they are guided, will be neceflary,
in order to prepare us for an inveftigation of

the different kinds of genius.

SECT.

I o8 Of the ^alities of Ideas Part II,

SECT. I.

Of the Sources of the Varieties of Genius in the
Imagination 'j particularly of the ^alities
of Ideas it' hie h produce AJfociation,

IT has been remarked already, that imagi-
nation produces genius chiefly by the
tendency which it has to aflbciate different
perceptions, fo that one of them being pre-
fent, it may introduce others to our view
without our being confcious of any defign or
our needing any effort to call them up. This
tendency of imagination has been often taken
notice of. Some late philofophers have ob-
ferved that imagination does not ad at ran-
dom in affociating ideas, and have, with con-
fiderable fuccefs, traced out the laws by which
it is governed, or afcertained thofe qualities
of ideas, and thofe relations fubfifling between
ideas, which fit them for being affociated or
for introducing each other into the mind [a).
In examining this fubjedl, fo far as is neceffary
for unfolding the principles of genius, 1 fhall
not fcrupuloufly avoid repeating what has

{a) See Treati/e on Human Nature y vol. i. part I. fe(5l, 4.
flemgKtf efCrifki/m, chap. i.

beett

Sect. I. ivhich produce Affociation, 109

been obferved by others ; but fhall endeavour
to throw all that occurs, into that form which
will be moft fubfervient to the particular pur-
pofe which I have in view.

In fearching for the laws of aflbciation, it
is natural to enquire, firft, what are the qua-
lities or relations of ideas themfelves, which
fit them for being aflbciated ; and next, whe-
ther there be any principles in the human
Gonftitution, which afFe(St the aflbciation of
ideas, fo as to make fome to unite more rea-
dily than others which yet ate equally poflefl'-
ed of the aflbciating qualities or relations.

Among thofe qualities or relations of
ideas, which fit them for being aflbciated,
there is an obvious diftindtion : fome of
them 2XtJimple^ others are compounded. The
fimple principles of aflbciation may be re-
duced to three, refembla7ice, contrariety^ and
'vicinity.

Perceptions may refemble one another
in diff^erent manners, and in very difl^erent
degrees ; but whenever they at all refemble,
one of them being prefent to the mind, will
naturally tranfport it to the conception of the
other. When we look at a picture, we are
naturally led by refemblance, to think of the
perfon whom the pidure reprefents. Per-
ceiving

110 Of the ^alifics of Ideas Part IL

ceiving any individual, we naturally think of
any other individual of the fame fpecies, with
which we happen to be acquainted. The
mention of any phenomenon or event, rea-
dily brings into our view another phenome-
non or event fimilar in its caufe, its nature,
its circumftances, or its confequences. " It
**- hath been obferved, fays Lord Verulam {h\
*' by the ancients, that fait water will dilTolve
" fait put into it, in lefs time than frefli wa-
*^ ter will diflblve it. — -Try it with fugar put
*' into water formerly fugared, and into other
" water unfugared." Here one fact fuggefts
an analogous or fimilar trial. Shakefpear
reprefents Northumberland as guided by this
aflbciating quality, when he faw Morton
come in hafte from, the battle where his fon
had been engaged, pale, trembling, agitated,
at a lofs what to fay ; and reprefents him very
naturally as led by this occafion to think of a
like event :

Thou trembled:, and the whitenefs in thy cheek
Is aptcr than thy tongue to tell thy errand.
Ev'n fuch a man, fo faint, fo fpiritlefs,
So dull, fo dead in look, fo woe-be-gone,
Drew Priam's curtain in the dead of nig-hr.
And would have told him half his Troy was burn'd j

(b) Sylva Sylvarum, Cent. 9, Exp. 83,

Buc

Sect. I. which produce AJfociation. iw

But Priam found the fire, ere he his rongue j
And I my Piercy's death, ere thou report'ft it [c].

Any one quality or circumftance common to
two perceptions, forms a refemblance between
them, fufficient to connect them in the ima-
gination : it is generally fuch an imperfect
refemblance as this, that fuggefls fimilitudes
and images (J).

Contrariety is a word commonly ufed
with confiderable latitude. There are fome
perceptions which do not readily introduce
their contraries : but in very many inftances
a perception does fuggeft another which is in
fome fenfe contrary to it ; and therefore con-
trariety may juftly be confidered as a princi-
ple of affociation. " The fun-beams, fays
" Verulam (^), do turn wine into vinegar.
" but ^i. Whether they would not fweeteri
" verjuice ?" In this cafe, one efFedt of the
fun-beams leads him to conceive a contrary
effect in a contrary fubjed:. When light is
perceived, it does not cafily fuggeif-che idea
of darknefs ; but the perception of (larknefs
very quickly fuggefls the idea of light. In

(0 Second part o^ Henry IV. aft i. fcene 3.

{d") Non enim res tota toti rei neceffe eft fimilis fit, fed
ad ipfum, ad quod conferetur, fimilitudinem habeat oportec.
Ad Htreii, lib. iv.

(J) Inqiiifuio de Calore et Frigore,

health

112 Of the ^lalities of Ideas Part if.

health we are not ready to think of ficknefs ;
but ficknefs forcibly introduceth the idea of
heahh. When we feel cold, we very natu-
rally think of heati and of the pleafure of thofe
who enjoy it. When we are warm and com-
fortably lodged in a ftormy night, it is not
uncommon to refled: with pity on the oppo-
lite condition of thofe who are abroad : here
however the aflbciation is affifted by, and is
perhaps chiefly owing to the perception of the
ftorm, fuggefting ideas of its effeds. Re-
markable dangers or diftreffes in which a per-
fon has feme time been involved, dwell on
his imagination, and are brought into his
view by every thing of an oppofite nature, in
his after fitiiation. A perfon raifed fuddenly
to profperity, riches, or power, will fome-
times find his forrtier poverty, meannefs, or
obfcurity forcing itfelf into his thoughts; and
they v/ill much oftner be fuggefted to fpeda-
tors, by the view of his prefent elevation. A
pe;"fon fallen into adverfity of any kind, will
find himfelf ftill more ftrongly difpofed to
recoiled: the profperity which preceded it;
the imagination of a fpedator alfo is naturally
led to the thought of this. Old men opprefled
with infirmities, and become incapable of
enjoym^ent, naturally dwell on the ftrength,

5 tli«

Sect. I. ivhich produce AJJhciation. 113

the adivity, and the picafurcs of their youth.
A monarch groaning under the cares of go-
vernment, and kept awake by his difquietudc,
will readily think on the eafe of the peafant,
and refled:,

How many thoufands of my poorefl fubjedts
Are at this hour afleep ! [f)

The refledion is luggefled by a twofold con-
trariety, that between the meannefs of the
fubjed and the elevation of the king, and
that between the eafe of the former and the
reftleffnefs of the latter. A perfon*s difpoii-
tion or condud at one time, will put us in
mind of a contrary difpoiition which he has
poiTefled, or of a contrary condud which he
has purfued, at another time. Friendfhip be-
tween pcrfons Vv'ho have been reconciled, na-
turally puts us in mind of their former en-
mity. Enmity aiifing between old friends,
fuggefls the idea of their intimacy in times
paft. Shakefpcar introduces King Henry as
faying, when he heard of Northumberland's
rebellion,

'Tis not ten years fince Richard and Northum-
berland
Did feaft together ; and in two years after

(/) Second Part of Hexrj IV. ac^ 3. fcene r,

I Were

ii4 Of the ^uiMes of Ideas Part 11.
Were they at wars : it is but eight years fince
This Piercy was the man neareft my foul.
Who like a brother toil'd in my affairs.
And laid his love and life under my foot ;
Yea, for my fake, ev'n to the eyes of Richard,
Gave him defiance. [g)

In like manner any fpecies of behaviour in one
perfon, will fometimes fuggeft contrary or
very different conduct in another. Thus
King Henry, on hearing the exploits of
young Piercy, naturally fays,

Yea there thou mak'fl me fad, and mak'ft me fin
In envy that my Lord Northumberland
Should be the father of fo blefl a fon,
A fon who is the theme of honour's tongue,
Amongft a grove the very ftraighteft plant.
Who is fweet fortune's minion and her pride j
Whilfl I by looking on the praife of him.
See riot and difhonour ftain the brow
Of my young Harry. {h)

The fame poet furnifhes us with a compli-
cated example of the influence of contrariety
in fuggefting ideas, in a palTage of Clifford*&
fpeech to Henry VT. York's ambitious care
of his fon, fuggefls the King's faulty indif-
ference about his fon ; and this again fug-
gefts the care of brute creatures about their

{g) Second part of ^if«r;' IV. acl 3. fcene 2,
{h) Yiiii T^&n oi Henry \Y , ad 1. icene i.

offspring.

Sect. I. ivhich produce /^Jfociation. ii^

offspring, their irrational nature forming at
the fame time another contraft between them
and a human being :

He but a Duke, would have his fon a King,

And r.iife his iffue like a loving fire -,

Thou being a King, bled with a goodly fon,

Did'ft yiekl confenc to difinherit him ;

Which argued thee a moil unloving father.

Unreaibnuble creatures feed their young.

And though man's face be fearful to their eyes,

Yet in prote6lion of their tender ones

Who hath not feen them (even with thofe wings

Which fometimes they have us'd with tearful

flight)
Make war with him who climb'd into their neft,
Off'ring their own hvcs m their young's de-
fence ? (z)

Here two birds ufmg their wings for repelling
danger, fuggefts to the poet the oppo fuc pur-
pofe of flying from danger, for which they
commonly employ them. Thus many per-
ceptions naturally introduce fuch others as
are in fome fenfe contrary to them. Indeed
fo much does contrariety influence the train
of our ideas, that a great part of common
converlation, efpecially that of old men, con-
fifts in remarking the changes, vicilTitades,

(J) Third part oi Henry VI. adt 2. fccne 3.

I 2 and

1 1 6 Of the ^uilitus of Ideas P A R t II.

and reverfes which ihcy have had occafion to
obferve in perfons and in things.

Vicinity is Hkewife a principle of aflb-
ciation among ideas. The conception of any
cbje£t naturally carries the thought to the idea
of another objedl which was connected with it
cither in place or in time. Mention one
houfe in a city, or one feat in a country with
which w^e are acquainted, we naturally think
and talk of others adjacent ; and frequently
when we are not acquainted with them, we
even make an eifort to imagine them. Bring
us to a place where w^e have formerly been,
or only fpeak of it, immediately ideas of per-
fons whom we have feen, of eonverfations ia
which we have been engaged, of adlions
which we have done, or of fcenes which we
have witnefTed, in that place or near it, croud
into our mind.

Nemo libenter recollt, qui lasfit locum {k]»

If any event be mentioned, the mind very
naturally fets out from it, and goes on recol-
leding a whole feries of fuccefiive events.
Nothing is more common than for an hifto-
rian to introduce the relation of an event no-
wife related to his fubje6t, with this obfcrva-

i^k) PhjEdr. lib.i. fab, iS.

tion.

Sect. I. ^vhich produce AJfoclation, 117

tion, that it happened in the place or about
the time of which he is writing. The pro-
lixity of circumftantial and involved ftory-
tellers often aiifes wholly from this, that
they croud into their narration, a multitude
of circumftances which have no connexion
with the thread of it, but have happened to
be contiguous in place or in time to fome
particular incidents, and are continually fug-
gefted to the fpeaker, by means of this rela-
tion. " A gentleman," fays one of the
authors of the Spedator, ** whom I had the
** honour to be in company with the other
" day, upon fome occafion that he was pleaf- ■
" ed to take, faid, he remembered a very
** pretty repartee made by a very witty man
" in King Charles's time upon the like occa-
" lion. I remember, faid he, much about
" the time of Oates's plot, that a coufin-
'' german and I were at the Bear in riolburn,
** — Jack Thomfcn was there, — I am fure it
** was fpoken fomewhcre thereabouts, for we
'* drank a bottle in that neighbourliood every
" evening (/)." The occaficn of the flcry is
fuggefled by means of refemblance; all the
circumftances of the ftory which we have
tranfcribed, are fuggefled only by vicinity.

(/) Spectator, No. )3«.

I 3 There

Ii8 Of the ^alities of Ideas Part II,

There are other qualities or relations of a
compound nature, which fit ideas for being
afTcciated and for introducing one another.
They are produced by the union of the fimple
relations already mentioned, with one another
or with other circumftanccs. Such are fo-
ex'i/lence, the relation of caife and effcB^ and
order.

When qualities are co-exiftent in any ob-
jed:, they are conceived by the mind as con-
neded both in time and in place, and this
connexion is regarded as conftant and per-
manent. Thefe relations of the parts have fo
great influence on the mind, and conned; the
ideas of the parts fo ftrongly in the imagina-
tion, that we conceive them all with almoft
as great facility as we could conceive any one
of them. On this account we beftow unity
on the w^iole colledion, and confider them all
as making but one perception. We have fo,
ilrong a propeniity to this, that it cofts us,
fome trouble to analyfe a complex perception
into its parts ; and indeed this is feldom at-
tempted by the generality of mankind. A
number of diftind perceptions being thus
united, by co-exiftence, in the imagination,
any one of them occurring to the mind, fug-
gefts the reft. If we fmell any fruit at a dif-

tance^

Sect. I. ijuh'ich produce Ajfociation, 119

tance, we immediately conceive its colour,
fhape, and tafte. If we ftiould find one wheel
of a watch, or one part of a machine in a
defert, it would call up the idea of the ma-
chine to which it belongs.

The relation of caufe and efted, which
likewife fits ideas for being aflbciated, is a
compound relation : it includes conjundtion in
place, for the caufe is always conceived as
contiguous to its efFe<5t ; it includes conjunc-
tion in time, for the caufe is always prior to
the effe6l ; and the caufe is always fuppofed
to exert power or energy in producing the
efFed, or at leaft to have fomehow a fitnefs to
produce it, fo that the effect has a depend-
ence upon that caufe (;;/). The conception of
a caufe naturally leads us to think of the
effed; ; and the conception of an effedt as na-
turally conveys our thought to the idea of
the caufe. The fight of a wound leads us
immediately to conceive both the pain which
it occafions, and the weapon by which it was
produced. Thinking of any perfon, we na-
turally recolle^fl fome aQion of which he vv^as
the author. Thinking of any tranfadion, we

(»;) Caufa autem ea eft, qus id efficit, cujus eft caufa, ut
vulnus, mortis ; cruditas, morbi ; ignis, ardoris. Itaque non
fie caufa intelligi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedat, id ei
caufa fit, fed quod cuique eflicienter antecedat. Cic deFato,

I 4 naturally

I20 Of the ^lizl'itUs of Ideas Part H.

natur^illy recoiled the perfons who were con-
cerned in it, and even reflect on other parts ^
of their behaviour. The prefence or the men-
tion of the fon of a friend, naturally intro-
duces the idea of the father.

It was remarked formerly that in every
work of genius, all the parts are connedted
with the defign, and that the ftrength of that
affociating principle by which they are con-
neded with it, produces regularity of imagi-
nation. We may now obferve that this con-
nexion wiiich fubfiils between the parts and
the defign, and in general the connexion be-
tween all means and their end, is a fpecies of
the relation of caufe and effedt. Every part
of a regular work, both in fcience and in the
arts, either immediately promotes the defign,
or is fubfervient to fome other part which
promotes it. When a perfon has a diftintf];
view", and a flrong and ileddy perception of
the defign, it will lead him to conceive all the
fubordinate ends which muft be attained in
order to accompllfli the main defign, and
which, in rcfpedt of it, are means or imme-
diate caufes. Each of thefe fubordinate ends
will fiiggeft the m.eans by which it may be
effected, keeping the ultimate defign at the
fame time conftantly in view. Thus, by the

affociating

Sect. I. ivhich produce yjljfociation. 121

^fTociating force of caufe and effect, the whole
out-lines of the work will be at once prefented
to the mind ; and partly by means of this
relation, and partly by means of other rela-
tions, they will introduce all the conceptions
which are requifite for finifliing it. What-
ever conception is introduced, firft the fubor-
dinate ends, and next, by their influence,
the ultimate end will recur to the thought,
and difpofe us either to adopt the conception
as fuitable, or to rejedl it as unferviceable.
When a perfon has a lively and conftant view
of the end of a work, it will produce an ha-
bitual fenfe that he is in fearch of means fit
to promote that end, though perhaps he does
not often explicitly refledt upon it. The
fenfe of this will keep his imagination in a
preparation and difpofition for being peculi-
arly affe£ted with the relation between the
ineans and the end. In confequence of this,
not only does the end fugged the natural
means of promoting it, but moreover what-
ever idea almoft occurs to the mind, the per-
fon has a tendency to view it on all fides, on
purpofe to fee whether it can in any way con-
tribute to that end, the perception of which
dwells continually on his imagination. The
eifeds of a ftrong aflbciation of the defign,

were

122 Of the ^lallties of Ideas Part H.

were formerly pointed out ; the obfervations
nov/ made, explain what this aflbciation of
th,e defign is, and how it is fitted for produ-
cing thefe effeds.

Order evidently produces a ftrong con-
nexion between ideas, and gives one great
power to introduce others. It is a com-
pounded relation which may take place either
between the parts of the fame thing or be-?
tween different things. Order arifes fronx
things being united or placed together, ac-
cording as they are more clofely related.
When the parts of a machine are properly
combined, they have order ; if they be either
laid in a heap, or any of them mifplaced, the
order is deflroyed. In a regular treatife on
any fubje6l, order is preferved through the
whole ; in a fet of aphorifms there is no order.
In the former cafe, one part very readily
fuggefts the reH: ; in the latter, it is not fo.
It is this principle of order that gives the parts
of any regular fyftern a peculiar povvcr to
fuggeft ideas both of the other parts and of
the whole. By means of it, the parts of an
edifice have a ftrider union in the imagina-
tion, than the parts of a heap of flones ; the
parts of a plant or of an animal body in their
united fxate, are more clofely aflbciated than

they

Sect. I. ivhich produce AJfociation. 123

they would be if they were difunited and yet
huddled into a narrower compafs. By means
of the fame principle, an event will fuggeft
another on which it had an influence, much
more eafily than one with which it had no
connexion, though contemporary or immedi-
ately fucceffive. We run with great facility
over a train of perceptions in order ; but if
we negled: their order, the mind finds great
difficulty in paffing from one of them to the
others.

All the relations of ideas, which fit them
for being aflbciated, are reducible to thofe
that have been mentioned. We often ima-
gine that fome of thefe relations belong to
ideas to which they do not belong : but in
this cafe, as we are not fenfible of our mif-
take, they produce, though they be merely
imaginary, as ftrong afibciationas if they had
been real.

Before we finifh this part of the fubje^t,
it will not be improper to obferve, That thefe
feveral relations or qualities of ideas operate
upon the imagination in an inftin^live or me-
chanical way, that is, without our refled-ing
that they belong to the ideas. When one
idea has fuggcfled another, we difcover on
comparing them, that they do, for inrtance,

5 refemble

124 Of the ^lalities of Ideas Part IL

refemble each other : but it was not a pre-
vious perception of their refemblance that
made the one to fuggeft the other ; it fug-
gefled it inflindlively without our perceiving
at the time, how or wherefore it fuggefted it.
Hence, though aflbciation of all the kinds
that have been mentioned, is natural to all
men, yet every man is fo far from knowing
diftindlly the qualities and relations of ideas
which produce aflbciation, that the enumera-
tion of them is but a recent difcovery among
philofophers themfelves. Before two percep-^
tions can be compared, they muft be both
prefent to the mind ; but except it happen
tliat both are exhibited together by fenfe or
memory, one of them becomes prefent to the
mind only by its being fuggefted by the
other, by means of fome of the relations
which fubfifl between them, operating mecha-
nically on the imagination. In moil: cafes
indeed, the relations of the ideas have been
often perceived ; and the oftcncr they have
been attended to, and the more diftinclly they
are apprehended, the mere ftrongly vnW the
ideas be aifociated and the more readily will
one of them fuggeft the other. Imaginary,
eroundlefs, and unnatural affociations of ideas,
always prefuppofe an opinion, though a falfe
6 opinion,

Sect. I. ivhich produce AJfoclation. i2j

opinion, fomehow imbibed of their being re-
lated; but after this opinion is formed, the
fuppofed connexion operates on the imagina-
tion, mechanically, and without our refleding
on its original foundation. In the fame me-
chanical manner the real relations of ideas,
even fuch as have been moil frequently re-
fle<fled upon, ad: on the imagination in fug-
gefting one another; the previous compari-
fons of the ideas, and perceptions of their
relations, are only caufes which contribute to
their acting with the greater force,

SECT. II.

Of the Influence of Hah'it on Ajjbciation.

WE fhall next enquire, What othec
principles there are in the human
conftltution, which affed: the aflbciation of
ideas fo as to make fome to unite more readily
than others, equally poiTefled of the aflbciating
qualities or relations juft now enumerated.
There are two principles of this kind, whofe
influence is very evident; habity and the paf
ftons. Any prefent perception introduces
fuch ideas related to it, as we have been ac-
cuftomed to, and fuch as are congruous to

the

1 26 Of the Influence of Habit P A rt IL

the pafTion which influences us at the time,
much more readily than others which are
equally related to that perception. Both thefe
principles not only afteO: in this manner the
introducSlion of Ideas which are aflbclated by
means of relations fiibfiftlng between them,
but are likewife themfelves diftin6b and fepa-
rate caufes of aflbciatlon : habit, or a prefent
paflion, often fuggefts trains of ideas which
derive their connexion, not from their rela-
tion to one another, but chiefly from their
congruity to the habit or the paflion.

"When we confider habit as determining
fome related ideas to be more readily aflbciat-
ed than others equally related, its effeds are
chiefly the three following.

First, An idea which cuftom has render-
ed familiar to us, will be more eafily intro-
duced by any prefent perception, than an-
other idea which is equally related to that
perception, but which we are little accuftomed
to think upon. This effect of habit is very
confpicuous, not only in common life, but
likev;ife in all works of genius. It was re-
marked before, that perfons in the habits of
the modern religious orders are introduced *
into many pi(flures reprefentifig parts of the
gcfpel hiftory, and that a very little exercife

Sect. II. on Ajfociatlon. iiy

of judgment would have direded the painter
to reject this abfurdity as foon as it came into
his thoughts : but glaring as the abfurdity is,
it is by no means furprifmg that it fhould
come into the thoughts of a popifh painter.
He is fo much accuftomed to fee the religious
of his church, and they are fo invariably
bearing a part in every adion of a facred na-
ture, of which he can be a fpedator, that ha-
bit can fcarce fail to bring them into his
view, whenever the fubjed: of his work has
any the ilighteft relation to them. There are
fome objeds and appearances of objeds in
nature, open and obvious to the obfervation
of all, and therefore rendered by cu (lorn fa-
miliar to all. Thefe objeds and appearances
fupply the fimllitudes and images which have
been molt early appropriated, and moft fre-
quently ufed by poets and orators. The rea-
fon is plain; becaufe 'referablance and habit
united their force in fuggefting them, they
occurred more readily than images which
were fuggefted by refemblance alone. When
a writer abounds in images of this kind, and
in them only, we are apt to pronounce with-
out hefitation, that he is a mere imitator.
But this judgment is too hafty : the fame
caufe which has rendered thefe images trite

and

128 Of the Infuence of Habit Part II.

and common, will always make a perfon of
indrfFcixnt genius to run into them, even
without imitation. Images from objects and
appearances which are not very common, can-
not be iuggefted to a perfon, except his ima-
gination be lively, fo that the afTociating
principle of refemblance be vigorous enough
to introduce them without any affiftance from
habit ; and therefore a perfon who has a weak
imagination, is almofl necefiarily confined to
images taken from things whofe familiarity
has made them already occur to many. Thus
the moft common defeat of genius in poets
and orators, is a ftriking inftance of the power
which habit has to afTift the operation of the
affociating qualities of ideas. Its power is
likewife evident in authors and artifts of the
greateft genius. A painter of real genius will
always reprefent, and a poet of real genius
will always draw his images from th^t Hate
and face of nature which occurs in the places
he is acquainted with, and thofe objedts and
appearances which he himfelf has had occafion
to obferve ; and by this means he often dif-
tinguifhes himfelf from imitators, who not
having genius fufficient for obferving the
great original. Nature, the real appearances
of things exhibited to themfelves, defcribe

them

Sect. 11. en Affociation. 129

them as they have been already defcribed by
others in lituations totally different. But in
thefe imitators too, the force of cuftom in
facilitating the introduction of ideas, is ob-
fervable : they have often attended to the de-
fcriptions of others, they have feldom been
ilruck with the originals in Nature ; by this
means the reprefentations of others are more
familiar to them than any images of their
own ; and that is the reafon why they more
readily occur to them.

When a perfon is intent on a particular
fludy, or meditating any work of genius,
when in confequence of this his thoughts
cuftomarily dwell upon it, every thing that
occurs to him in reading, in converfation or
in life, immediately brings his prefenc work
or fludy into his view, and fets him on think-
ing, whether, and in what manner, it may
be accommodated to that work or ftudy, and
rendered ufeful in them. Had the fame thing
occurred to a perfon engaged in a different
purfuit, it would have led him, by the fame
principle, to apply it to a quite ditFerent pur-
pofe. The example that was iaft produced^
fuggefts an illuftration of this remark. An
ingenious modern critic being employed in
afcertaining the marks of imitation, took no-

K tice

130 Of the Injluence of Hahit P a r t II.

tice that fome of the lingllfli poets defcribe
the Spring, not as they have obferved it in
their own climate, but as they have been ac-
cuftomed to fee it defcribed by the poets of
warmer regions, who painted what they really
experienced : this, in conformity to the dcfign
which occupied his thoughts, fuggeiled to
him one mark of imitation, " That where the
*' local peculiarities of Nature are to be de-
" fcribed, there an exad conformity of the
*' matter will evince an imitation (rt).'* The
writer of this eflay finding this obfervation in
that ingenious critic, it occurred to him, that
it might be applied in both its parts, for ex-
emplifying the force of cuftom in promoting
the introdu6lion of ideas connected by fome of
the aflfociating qualities. To a third perfon it
might have fuggefled fomething totally dif-
ferent, but fui table to the particular purpofe
which happened to be moft familiar to him at
the time.

Every profefTion or way of life renders a
correfpondcnt fet of ideas familiar to a per-
fon ; and in confequence of this, the fame
objed; frequently leads different perfons into
totally different tracks of thinking. A plant
which fuggcffs an image or defcription to a

(rf) Hurd's Letter to Mr, Mafcn, en the Marks of Intitatien.

poet.

S ft c T . IL on AJJociation. 131

poet, will engage the botanift in determining
to what clafs it belongs, the chemift in think-
ing of the procefs by which it may be ana-
lyfed, and the phyfician in conlidering its
virtues as a medicine. The view of the hea-
vens in a fine evening will lead the thoughts
of the aftronomer to the fyftem of the uni-
verfe, will make the painter conceive a land-
fcape, will fupply the poet with noble image-
ry, and engage the divine in a train of
religious meditation. Mention an event or
tell a ftory in a mixt Company, it will fugged
to, perhaps, every individual of the com-
pany, different thoughts or reflections ; but
what it fuggefts to each, will generally be
fomething which his own habitual courfe of
life or a prefent accident renders familiar to
him. Tell the news of a battle, or fpeak of
a perfon who has fallen in it j the ladies ex-
f refs their fympathy with the wives or mo-
thers of the flain ; the merchant takes notice
in what manner trade is affedred bv the war ;
the foldier fpeaks of the glory of dying in the
field, or relates his own campaigns, exploits^
and wounds ; the politician inftruds the com-
pany concerning the origin of the war, the
motives to it, and the advantages or the loifes
to be derived from it ; the fcholar recollects

K 2 fome

13^ Of the Influence of Bahit Part If *

fome battle rendered famous by claflical de-
Icriptlon, or traces the revolutions in the art
©f war ; and if there be a poet in the circle,
ke wiir perhaps, inattentive to all that pafTes,
be employed in forming filently a lively con-
ception of the fcene.

. Jn ail thefe inftances it is plain that cuflom^
gives great affiftance to any of the affociatin^:^
qualities with which it happens to eo-operate,
and makes them introduce an idea that is fa-
miliar to us rather than another lefs familiar,
though to this latter thefe qualities equally
belong. Conceptions to which we are not
accuftomed, are fhy to enter into the mind %
it requires a fort of force to bring them into
view ; they muft have a very flrong relation to
the prefent perception before it be able to in-
troduce them. But cuftom gives the ideas
which it has rendered familiar, a tendency ta
occur ; they ftand ready, as it were, to enter
on the flighteft occafion ; we have a ftrong
propenfity to think of them ; any relation ta
the prefent objed of thought, however weak,
w^ill be fufficient to introduce them ; and a
flrong relation to it, will fuggeft them with
the greateft eafe and quicknefs. The difpofi-
tion of our mind towards familiar ideas, is
thus analogous to our inclination towards our

acquaintance j

Sect.il on Ajfociation. 133

acquaintance ; it is with a fort of reludance,
or not without fome ceremony, that we go
into the company of Grangers ; but we need
fmall inducement to feek the company of aa
old friend ; we enter into it with perfed: eafe*
nay cannot without difficulty be reftrained
from entering into it.

Secondly, cuftom renders us more apt to
be afFeded with one of the aflbciating qualities
than with others. We fhall have occafion to
obferve afterwards, that by the original con-
llitution of nature, the imagination is often
more apt to be affeded with one of the aflb-
ciating qualities than with the reft. This
natural propenfity may give occafion to a ha-
bit of following chiefly one of them. But
though the mind were by nature equally open
to the influence of all the aflbciating qualities,
yet various accidents may lead a perfon to be
influenced for a confiderable time together,
by one aflbciating quality only, or by one
much oftener than by others. Whenever
this happens, a habit will be acquired of paf-
fing from one perception to another, by
means chiefly of that aflbciating quality ; and
that habit once formed, will produce a pro-
penfity to continue ftill to trace perceptions
principally by that particular quality, or will

K 3 add

134 Of the Influence of Hahit Part II.

add ftrength to the propenGty v/hich was de^
rived from nature. This obfervation might
be confirmed by a multitude of inftances.
Let a perfon who has been much accuftomed
to mathematical ftudies, write on the moft
diffimilar fubjeds, he not only throws his
treatife as much as poffible into the mathe-
matical form, but is difpofed to feek for and
conceive relations between his ideas, refern-r
bling the mathematical relations. It was per-
haps the habit of attending to the mathe-
matical fciences, that difpofed Dr. Clark to
explain the foundation of morals, in the
manner in which he has explained it, to
place it in fitnefs or congruity, and to deduce
that congruity from abftrad: relations, inftead
of referring it to the conftitution of man, or
to the moral nature of God. If a perfon has
confined his reading for a confiderable time to
the works of poets, he will find a difpofition,
efpecially if his own flilc be not yet perfedly
formed, to write on every fubjed: in a figura-
tive and poetical manner. In general, a per-
fon's manner of writing is formed in a great
degree, by the manner of thofe authors v/honi
he has been moft accuflomed to ftudy : he
purfues his thoughts in the fame pa^hs, dif-
pofes them by means of fimilar relations, and

even

Sect. II. on ^J[ociation. 135-

even arranges his expreiTions, without reflec-
tion, upon the fame principles. This obfer-
vation is equally applicable to painters, and
artifts of every kind.

But we need not nmultiply examples of the
power of cuftom in difpofnig us to rollow one
aflbciating quality in preference 10 others ;
for many of thofe which we have produced
under the former head, are appofite to our
prefent purpofe. It is not only the familiarity
oi the ideas which are fuitable to our fituation
and manner of life, that renders them lit to
be aflbciated with any prefent perception, but
alfo their being connected with that percep-
tion by a relation which our fituation or man-
ner of life has made familiar, and given us a
habit of being affeded by. When the fame
objcift fuggefls different ideas to different per-
fons, thefe ideas are fometimes connected with
that objedl by the fame relation ; but gene-
rally they are conne£ted with it by different
relations, and the idea fuggefted to a particu-
lar perfon, is fuch as bears that relation to
the prefent objed:, which he is by habit or
otherwife mofl prone to follow. By beffow-
ing a very fmall degree of attention, this may
be obferved in almoft all the examples already
given of the force of cuftom in facilitating the

K. 4 intro-

136 Of the Lijluence of Habit Part II.

introdudion of familiar ideas : I fhall point
it out only in one of them. The fame plant,
it was remarked, may fugged different ideas
to pcrfons of different profeffions: it is by
refemblance that it fuggefts an image to the
poet, and refemblance is the relation by which
he is moft accuftomed to be affected ; it is by
the relation of caufe and effect that it fuggefls
the confideration of its elements to the che-
iiiift, and of its virtues to the phyfician, and
that is the relation which their ftudies render
moft familiar to them.

Thus, if nature has given a perfon a pecu-
liar pronenefs to follow fome one of the affo-
c.iating relations, the impulfe of nature will
gradually produce an habit of following that
relation moft frequently ; and as foon as that
liabit is produced, it will ftrengthen the natu-
ral pronenefs : or if fuch a habit be produced
by accidental caufes, it will of itfelf, without
any afliftance from the natural conftitutlon of
the mind, beget a ful table propenfity. Rela-
tions which we are accuftomed to follow in the
train of our thoughts, are like roads with
which we are acquainted, and in which we
therefore purfue a journey without any con-
cern, hefitation, or deviation.

Sect.il on Jpciation, 137

It will not perhaps be fuperfluous to re-
mark farther, that it is not only long cuftom
•which produces this efFed : the fhorteft cuf-
tom, fuch as cannot with propriety be faid to
amount to a habit, is fuiBTicient. When a per-
fon has been occafionally, for ever fo fhort a
time, affeded by one affociating quality, he
acquires a propenfity to continue to be affect-
ed by that quality. When one has been any*
how led to ufe feveral images or fimilitudes in
a compofition, he is prone for fome time to
run into the fame figures. A metaphor once
employed, gives a perfon a difpofition to pur-
fue it, by means of which it is fometimes fo
long continued as to produce an allegory. A
few contrails or antithefes naturally and of
courfe lead an author into more. An exam-
ple formerly produced of affociation by means
of contrariety (^), affords a plain proof of the
influence of a very tranfient cuftom.

Thirdly, Cuflom not only renders one
allbciating quality more ready to affed: us,
than other qualities ; it likewife renders the
fame quality readier to operate on the imagi-
nation after one particular manner than after
another manner. We fhall hereafter have

{h) The fxample from Clifford's Tpeech to Henry VI.
p. 115,

occafiou

13S Of the hiflueiice of Habit Part If.

occafion to examine the different forms which
the fame affociating quahty aifumes, or the
different ways in which it operates in intro-
ducing ideas. In general, it is evident that
there are very different forms or fpecies of
each of the affociating qualities ; for inftance,
things refemhle one another in many different
ways. Now one fort of refemblance may be
a powerful principle of affociation, to a par-
ticular pcrfon on whom other forts of refem-
blance have very little influence; and the
propenfity of that pcifon to be affeded chiefly
by this one fort, often proceeds, at Icafl in
part, from his having acquired a habit of
being affedled by it. An example formerly
made ufe of, may be applied for the illuftra-
tion of this. A plant fuggeffs an image to a
poet, and leads a botanifl to think of the clafs
to v^^hich it belongs ; it operates on the ima-
ginations of both, by refemblance ; on the
poet, by the refemblance of its general ap-
pearance, or of fome of its particular quali-
ties, to a diftant fubje<5l ; on the botanift, by
the exad refemblance of its parts to indivi-
duals of the fame kind. But thefe two forts
of refemblance are almoft as different from
one another as refemblance is from vicinity :
jio two turns of imagination are more unlike

than

Sj:ct.'IL on JJ/ociation. 139

than that of the poet and that of the natural
hiftorian. Both are in this inftance affe(3:ed
by the refemblance which the idea fuggefted
bears to the prefent objed ; but the one of
them is in no degree affected by the particu-
lar fpecies of relemblance which afFe(3:s the
other. Every one almoft of the aflbciating
quahties is capable of as great variety as re-
femblance. Now as a perfon may derive
from nature, a propenfity to be influenced by
any of the affociating qualities in one particur
lar way rather than in another way, fo by
his being accullomed to be thus influenced,
that propenfity will be increafed. After the
obfervations which have been already made,
little needs to be faid for confirmation of this.
It is as eafy to conceive how a perfon may
acquire a habit of being affeded by an aflb-
ciating quality in one particular manner, as
to conceive how he may acquire a habit of
being afl-eded by one quality more than by
others : and when it has been proved that in
the latter cafe the habit begets a facility in
tracing ideas by that one quality to which a
perfon has been accuftomed, it will eafily be
allowed that the habit muft have equal force
in difpofing us to a particular mode of aflbci-
^tion by any quality. To recur to a former in-
ftance,
3

140 Of the Influence of Habit Part II,

ftance, there can be no doubt that it is partly
by their cuftomary ftudies, as well as by the
natural turn of their imaginations, that the
poet and the botanift are led by the plant pre-
fented to them, to ideas connedted with it by
very different forts of refemblance ; and that
the chemift and the phyfician, though both
influenced by the relation of caufe and effed:,
are yet influenced by very diff^erent fpecies of
that relation, and led, one to think of the ele-
anents of which the plant is compofed, and
the other to trace its eff"eds on animal bodies.
Both In fimilitude and in metaphor, the
image is connected with the fubject by refem-
blance ; but a perfon may be rendered by
cuftom readier to exprefs himfelf in one of
thefe figures than iji the other.

It is a neceflary confequence of thefe effedls
of habit, that it frequently oppofes and over-
balances the influence of the aflx)ciating qua-
lities. A perception is prefent to the mind ;
one idea is very ftrongly connedcd with it by
refemblance, or by fome other relation ; an-
other idea is weakly related to it, but is ei-
ther familiar to us, or Is related by a tie or a
modification of a tie which we have been
much accuftomed to follow : the relations of
ideas would introduce the former, but cuftom

often

S E c T . II. on AJfo elation, 141

often overpowers them, and gains the pre-
ference to the latter. Cuftom fometiraes co-
operates with relations ; and in that cafe it
augments their force : but fometimes it coun-
teracts them ; and whenever it does fo, it
weakens or totally deftroys their influence.
By this means the mind is often prevented
from purfuing a train of thought through
the ftrongeft connexions, as it naturally would
if it were not influenced by habit. This is
the caufe of many tranfitions in authors and
in Gonverfation, which appear unnatural, and
are unaccountable to thofe who have not the
fame habits.

Hitherto we have fuppofed the percep-
tions which introduce one another, to be really
related by fome of the aflbciating qualities
formerly enumerated, and have fhewn how-
habit affifts or obftrudts the operation of thefe
qualities, or in what ways it afFeds the fuc-
ceffion of perceptions. But cuftom will like-
wife produce an union between perceptions
which are not otherwife related. Though
two perceptions have no natural bond of
union, yet if they have happened to be pre-
fented often together, one of them can fcarce
ever appear afterwards without introducing
the other. In this cafe, as the connexion arifes

wholly

142 Of the hijiuence of Habit PartIL

wholly from the force of habit, fo the degree
of that connexion is in proportion to the
llrength of the habit, or to the number of in-
ftances in which the perceptions have occurred
together. Many examples of the power of
cuftom to beget an affociation of ideas, have
been often taken notice of : but though there
were no other, language alone would be a fuf-
ficient proof of this. The words of any lan-
guage have no natural connexion with the
perceptions which they exprefs. They owe
their fignification wholly to compad : yet by
cuftom they acquire fo firm a connexion with
fentiments, that no fooner is a word in a
known language pronounced, than it excites
the idea which it has been ufed for exprefling,
and no fooner does a thought ftart up in the
mind, than it fuggefts a word correfpondent
to it. Cuftom has beftowed upon them an
indiflbluble connexio-n ; and the moft igno-
rant fcarce imagine that they have any con-
nexion except that which cuftom has be-
ftowed. In language we perceive likevvife,
that the ftrength of the aflbciation is in pro-
portion to the ftrength of the habit. If a
perfon be but imperfedly accuftomed to a
language, or have been long without the habit
of ufmg it, the words of that langua*ge, though

Sect. II. on AJfociation, 143

*he be acquainted with them, do not, by being
pronounced, fuggeft fo quickly the ideas frg^
nified by them, nor are themfelves fo readily
fuggefted, when he wants to exprefs his own
fentiments, as the words of a language to
which he has been much and conitantly ac-
cuftomed. A perfon for fome time fpeaka
with hefitation, and underftands with diffi-
culty a foreign language, though he knows
the words that are employed ; but he fpeaks
his mother-tongue readily, and underftands it
with eafe [c). There is fcarce any perfon but
has fome favourite words and phrafes, which
continually occur both in his converfation and

(<•) The connexion eftablifhed by cuftom, between ideas and
the \yords of a language, being mutual, it may perhaps be
thought, that the ideas ihould fuggeft the words, and the words
the ideas, with equal quicknefs and eafe. But this is not the
cafe. The tranfition from the words to the ideas, is generally
much cafier than that from the ideas to the words. A perfon
who is learning a ftrange language, will be able to underlland
a book or a converfation in that language long before he can
write or fpeak it. Even in one's native tongue, one can rea-
dily underlland what is written or fpoken in the bell and pro-
pereft terms, though he could not have ufed thefe terms for ex-
prefling the fame ideas ; and many write or fpeak with difticulty
and hefitation, who underftand what they read or hear, with
perfcft eafe. This proceeds from the firft principle which we
have eftabliflied concerning the influence of cuftom upon afTo-
ciation, and is a new inftance for confirming and illuftrating
that principle. The ideas are txioxq familiar to us than the
words ; they are often raifed by their proper objedls, or fug-
gefted by other words ; they often make their appearance in
the mind, and are applied to various purpofcs, when the
names of them are not thought upon ; and x\it\x faviiliariij
makes them to be fuggefted readily. That this is the true
taufe, is confirmed by obferring that where it does not take

144 0/ ^^^^ Influence of Hahit P A R t IL
in his writings, though there be many others
in the language, equally fit for expreffing the
lame thought. The former having by fome
means or other been frequently ufed by him,
and on that account become familiar to him,
rufh into his mind of their own accord, when-
ever the idea to which they correfpond, is
prefent. But if at any time, difgufted with
the frequency of thefe terms, he be defirous
of diverfifying his ftile, it requires fome time
and ftudied efforts to recoiled the fynonymous
terms that are lefs familiar to him, though he
knows them perfed:ly well. They are but
weakly connected by cuftom with his ideas,
and therefore they come not quickly into his
mind. Thus habit not only affifts the aflbci-
ating qualities in introducing ideas, but like-
wife itfelf unites Ideas to which none of the
aiTociating qualities belong.

We may farther remark an effed of habit
on the imagination, different from both thefe.
If a perfon has accufloined himfelf to any
particular objed: or adion while he was em-
ployed in purfuing a train of ideas, that ob-

place, Ideas are not fuggefied more readily than words are in
ordinary cafes. V/hen the ideas exprcued are fuch as we have
been Httlc accuflomed to attend to, a difcourfe or compolition
is underfiood by us with difiiculty, as well as when ideas are
exprefled by unyfual words : they arc not familiar to us, and
therefore are not readily fuggeikd.

jedl

Sect. IL en AJfociation. 14 j

jed: or adion becomes abfolutely neceflary for
his purfuing any train. Without it, ideas,
though connected by relations as ftrong as
poflible, cannot introduce one another ; by
means of it, they are readily fuggefted : yet
the accuftomed objedl or adion has no more
connexion with any one train than with any
other, nor feems capable of either affifting
the relations which already unite the ideas,
or beftowing any new relation upon them. A
perfon may by cuftom become unable to think
or difcourfe of a fubje^:, without keeping his
eye fixt in a particular direction, or indulging
himfelf in fome ufual pofture or motion. De-
prive fome perfons of a fnufF-box, imme-
diately fancy is extinguifhed, and a regular
or fluent fucceflion of ideas can no longer
take place. " I fat by an eminent flory-teller
•* and politician," fays an ingenious writer ;
•* I obferved this gentleman t'other day in
" the midft of a ftory diverted from it by
" looking at fomething at a diftance, and I
'* foftly hid his box. But he returns to his
" tale, and looking for his box, he cries, dnd
** fo. Sir — Then when he fhould have taken
** a pinch, as I *w as faying., fays he,— ii/jj 11a
** body fe en my box ? His friend befeeches him
•' to finifh his narration : then he proceeds,

L " arid

14^ Of the Influence of Habit Part II.
*' and fo^ Sir, — Where can my. box be? Then
" turning to me ; Fray, Sir, did you fee my
*' box ? Yes, Sir, faid I, I took it to fee how
*' long you could live without it. He refumes
" his tale, and I took notice that his dulnefs
" was much more regular and fluent than
" before (i).'* " I remember,'' fays Mr.
Addifon, *' when I was a young man, and
" ufed to frequent Weftminfter-hall, there
" was a counfellor who never pleaded with^
*' out a piece of pack-thread in his hand,
" which he ufed to twift about a thumb or a
" finger, all the while he was fpeaking : the
*' wags of thofe days ufed to call it the thread
*' of his difcourfe, for he was not able to utter
" a word without it. One of his clients, who
*' was more merry than wife, ftole it from
*' him one day in the midft of his pleading 5
" but he had better have let it alone, for he
« loft his caufe by his jeft [e]:' The effed
of habit in thefe inftances is very ftrange and
unaccountable. The cuftom has no greater
fitnefs for introducing any one fet of ideas
than any other ; the particular ideas which are
introduced, have no fort of connexion with the
circumftance which cuftom has rendered ne-

(//) Tatler, No. 35. •
{e) Spectator, No, 407.

cefl*ary

Sect. III. on AJfociahon. i^j

cefTary for their introdu61ion, and perhaps
have never formerly been conjoined with it ;
it feems to contribute to their introdudion
only by preventing an uneafmefs which would
indifpofe the mind for exerting its faculties.

SECT. III.

Of the InJIucnce of the Paffions on AJJociation,

f I ''HE other principle in human nature,
Jt which has an Influence on the afToci-
ation of ideas, which either promotes the in-
trodudion of fuch as are linked together by
fome of the affociating qualities, or introduces
ideas unconned:ed with each other, merely by
means of their relation to itfelf, is a prefent
paffion.

A PASSION in flrid propriety means only
fuch an emotion as is produced by fome one
particular caufe, and diredcd to fome one de-
terminate objed. There are feveral emotions,
as remorfe, felf-approbation, and the like,
which may perhaps be reckoned fenfations
rather than paffions : but our prefent defign
does not render it neceflary to attend to that
diftlndtion. A paffion is fomething different
from an habitual temper or turn of mind : the

L 2 latter

1.48 Of the InJInence of the Pajtons Part II.

latter may in Ibme inftances have derived its
origin from the frequent returns or the long
continuance of a particular pafTion ; but once
formed, it fubfifts without the operation of
any particular caufe, and without being fixt
on any precife object, and produces a perma-
nent propenfity to any fentiments or paffions
"which are congruous to it. But a paflion and
an habitual temper have fo many things in
common, that we may without any incon-
venience include both in the caufe of affoci-
ation which we are now examining : it will
be fufficient to diftinguifh them in particular
inftances, when fuch fhall happen to occur^
in which their influence on the introduction
of ideas is different, or in which they run
counter to one another.

In general, that the train of ideas fuggefted
to the mind, has a very great dependence on
the paffions, is obvious. Mention fome actions
of a pcrfon whom we love ; our love will fug-
geft fuch circumftances as tend to make us ap-
prove thefe adions. Mention the very fame
actions to another who entertains refentment
agalnft the perfon who did them ; and his
imagination will immediately clothe them
■with fuch circumftances as deftroy their merit,
or render them blameable. Let us barely

think

Sect. III. on Affociation, 149

think of any perfon : if we love him, we rea-
dily recoiled: and dwell upon the fair and
worthy parts of his character ; if we hate
him, his wrong or fufpicious actions croud
into our thoughts. The joyful heart runs
eafily into a gay and pleafant train of think-
ing, but does not naturally recolle(fl any thing
that is gloomy, and inftantly rejects it if it be
iuggefted by peculiar caufes. The obferva-
tion holds of every emotion, paflion, and dif-
pofition.

It will be proper, however, to attempt a
fuller explication of the manner in which the
paffions influence the aflbciation of ideas. To
underftand this, is of great importance in a
theory of the varieties of genius ; for to give
a juft reprefentation of the paffions, is one of
the greatefl: efforts of genius ; and it can be
accompliflied only by following thofe paths
into which the paflions naturally diredl the
thoughts. But the influence of the paffions
on the fucceffion of our ideas, though thus
important, relates only to one fpecies of ge-
nius, genius for the arts. It would therefore
be improper to enter on a full difcufhon of it
at prefent, when we are tracing out the gene^
ral fources of the varieties of genius. In the
obfervations which we are now to make on

L 3 this

150 Of the Influence of the Pajfons Part II.

this fubjed:, fome examples will be neceflary
both for illuftrating and for confirming our
principles. It may perhaps be thought mofl
proper to draw thefe from our own experi-
ence in real life. But to be able to feled: ex-
amples from real life, and to fet them in a
Ilriking light, would require no fmall degree
of one of tlie higheft and rareft kinds of poeti-
cal genius. It will therefore be both the fafeft
and the beft way, to take our examples from
fuch reprefentations of the pafTions in poetry,
as are confeiTedly natural, and will approve
themfelves natural to the tafte of the reader.
Such examples have as great authority as in-
fiances which a perfon himfelf obferves in or-
dinary life. Shakefpear alone will almoft fup^
ply us with as many as are necefTary.

In taking a general view of the influence
of the palTions on affociation, it will be necef-^
fary, firft, to point out the manner in which
they afFedt the nature of the ideas felcded and
introduced.

There are fome ideas intimately connected
with a paffion, as the objed: of the paffion, its
' caufe, Vv^hat is fit for fupporting it, or what
gratifies it. Every paffion has a ftrong ten-
dency to fuggefl fuch ideas, to force them
into our view, to make us prone to conceive

them.

Sect. III. on Ajfoclation, 151

them. We naturally continue fixt In atten-
tion to fuch ideas, or recur often to the con-
templation of them. A paffion leads us to
them, folely by its own force, without any
afliftance from a prefent perception conneded
with them. When a perfon is under the in-
fluence of any paffion, the difficulty is not to
recoiled the objeds clofely conneded with it>
but to prevent their haunting him continually.
An angry man, for example, can fcarce avoid
thinking of the perfon who has offended him,
and of the injury which he has done him, re-
coUeding every thing he can diffionourable
to that perfon, remembering with pleafure the
misfortunes which have happened to him,
even imagining dlftreffes into which he may
fall, and in a word dwelling on the concep-
tion of every thing immediately relating to
his anger. Angelo*s defcription of his own
dlfpofition when he was under the power of
love. Is perfedly natural ;

When I would pray and think, I think and pray
To feveral fubjcds : heav'n hath my empty words,
Whilft my intention hearing not my tongue,
Anchors on Ifabel : heav'n's in my mouth.
As if I did but only chew its name,
And in my heart the ftrong and fwelling evil

Of my conception. {a)

[a) Mea/ure for Meafurey aft 2. fcene 10.

L 4 Different

152 Of the Influence of the FaJJions PartIL

Different ideas are in different ways
clofely conne<3:ed with the fame paflion ; the
paflion tends to introduce all thefe. On this
■account it often happens that the mind does
not reft on any one of them, but conceives
them all by turns. Every paflion often occa-
fions an abruptnefs of thought ; this is one
caufe of that abruptnefs ; different ideas being
connected with the pafTion, in different re-
fpeds, but with almoft equal clofenefs, the
pafTion introduces them all, or feveral of them
at leaft, in alternate fuccelTion. Sebaftian over-
whelmed with fear and grief by the profpedt
of immediate Ihipwreck, exclaims,

Mercy on us !

We fplit, we fplit ! farewel my wife and children^
Brother farewel ! we fplit, we fplit, we fplit ! (^)

His paflion leads him' to think of himfelf, its
moft immediate objedt ; but without fuffering
him to refl a moment on this, it hurries him on
to a conception of the caufe of his pafTion, the
Iplitting of the ihip ; it allows him to make
but a very fhort ftop here ; it caufes his family
and friends, objeds which were likewife nearly
related to his grief, to croud into his view ;
and from thefe, it forces him back to the
thought of the immediate caufe. of his palTion,

{h) Tem^efii aft I. fcenc U

Sect. III. on Jfo elation, 155

and makes his mind to dwell upon it. It
fuffers him not to think of any thing that has
not an intimate relation to itfelf, and it makes
his imagination to vibrate between thofe
which have luch relation. Ifabel being in-
formed that her brother had been put to death
by Angelo's command, her refentment imme-
diately fuggefts fome means of revenging
his death ; but without fufFering her to reft
on thefe means, or to take any notice of the
impoffibility of her employing them, even
though it is mentioned to her, refentment
brings into her thoughts in an inftant, her
brother, herfelf, the wickednefs of mankind,
and the bafenefs of Angelo, all objeds natu-
turally conneded with her paflion :

Jfab. Oh, I will to him and pluck out his eyes.
Duke. You fhall not be admitted to his fight.
Jfal>. Unhappy Claudio ! wretched Ifabel !
Injurious world ! moft damned Angelo ! {c)

If a paflion can thus introduce ideas fultable
to it, merely by its own force, it will much
more introduce them when there happens to
be a perception prefent to the mind, to which
they bear any of the affociating relations.
Either the paflion alone, or that relation alone
would have been fufficient for the effed:

(0 Meafurt for Miafurey aft 4, fcene 10.

when

154 Of the Tnjluence of the Pajfions Part II.

when both therefore operate together, they
are like mechanical forces ading in the fame
diredion, which produce a double efFeO:, or
produce the fame ^^cCt with half the diffi-
culty. When any paffion prevails in the
foul, ideas flridly connected with that paf-
fion are in a continual readinefs to rulh into
the thoughts on every the flighteft occafion.
Hence it is commonly obferved that the moft
diftant hint is fufficient to dired. the imagina-
tion to an objedl which is congruous to the
prefent difpofition of the mind. We have a
very natural and ftrong reprefentation of this
in Lear's grief and indignation on account of
the unklndnefs of his daughters. When he
fees Edgar's dlfmal fituation, he fays,

" DId'Il thou give all to thy daughters ? and art
thou come to this ?" '

On hearing his raving, the fame thought
again ruihes into Lear's mind,

*' What ! have his daughters brought him to this
pafs ? Couldft thou fave nothing ? Did'il thou
give 'em all ?"

The fool's interruption could not divert the
thought ; he goes on.

Now all the plagues that in the pendulous air

Hang fated o'er men's faults, .light on thy

dauo-hters !

« He

Sect, III. on JJfociatmi. 155

** He hath no daughters, Sir,"
fays Kent: but flill the objed before him,
keeps the fame idea rivetted in his imagina-
tion ;

Death, traitor, nothing could have fubdu'd nature
To fuch a lownefs, but his unkind daughters.
Is it the fafhion, that difcarded fathers
Should have thus little mercy on their flefh ?
Judicious punifhment ! 'Twas this flefh begot
Thofe pelican daughters.- {d)

There are ordinarily many occafions which
have a powerful tendency to fuggeft to a per-
fon poifeiTed by a paffion, objeds altogether
unrelated to that paffion : the mind is always
difpofed to f ejed thefe, and in confequence of
this, it purfues one of two courfes. Some-
times it takes a handle from the objecfls that
occur, whatever they be, to recoiled: fome-
thing jkitablc to the prefent paffion, it ima-
gines thofe objeds related to this paffiion,
though their analogy to it be very remote,
as in the example juft now given, nay tho'
they have not even a fliadov/ of connexion
with it. Harpagon going out of his garden
in queft of the officers of juftice, after he had
milfed his cafket of money, and feeing the

{d) King Lear, acl 3. fcene 6,

people

156 of the Influence of the Pajfions Part II.

people in the flreet, is naturally made to
fay;

" What a croud's here got together ! I can
caft; my eyes on no body who gives me not
fufpicion, everything feems my thief. Heh!
what are they talking of there ? Of him that
robbed me ? What noife is that above ? Is it
my thief that's there ? For heaven's fake, if
you know tidings of my thief, I befeech you
tell me. Is he not hid there amongfl you ?
They all flare at me, and fall a laughing.
You'll fee that they are certainly concerned
in this robbery committed upon me. Here,
quick, commiffaries, archers, provofts, judges,
racks, gibbets, and executioners [e)^

This happens when the paffion is violent,
and when the tendency of the prefent objeds
to fuggeft ideas unfuitable to it, is not very
flrong. But when the paffion is not fo vio-

(f) Que de gens aflembles ! Je ne jette mes regards fur
perfonne qui ne me donne des foup9ons, et tout me femble
mon voleur. Eh! de quoi eft ce qu'on parle la ? de celui
qui m'aderobe? Quel bruit fait-on lahaut? Eft-ce mon vo-
leur qui eft ? De grace, fi I'on fait des nouvelles de mon vo-
leur, je fupplie que Ton m'en dife. N'eft-il point cache la
parmi vous? lis me regardent tous, et fe mettent a rire,
Vous verrez qu'ils ont part fans doute au vol que Ton ma fait.
Allons vitc, des commiflaires, des archers, des prevots, des
juges, des genes, des potences, et des bourreaux. VAvart
De Moliere, ad 4. fcene 7.

lent,

Sect. III. on JJfo elation. 157

lent, or when it is an habitual difpofition that
prevails in the foul, and when at the fame
time the prefent objects have a ftrong ten-
dency to lead the thoughts to ideas unrelated
to that paffion or difpofition, the mind takes
a different courfe : it goes backward and for-
ward between the ideas fuggefted by the paf-
fion, and the ideas fuggefted by the prefent
objects ; there is a conftant ftruggle between
thefe, and a quick and frequent variation of
thought. This is another caufe of abruptnefs
and unconnedednefs in the fentiments of a
perfon under the power of any pafTion ; his
mind vibrates between conceptions fultable to
his paffion and diflimilar conceptions arifing
from different circumftances in his fituation.
Moliere has reprefented this ftrongly in Har-
pagon ; however he is engaged, his avarice
makes the thought of the money which he
had hid in his garden, to intermix itfelf with
his prefent employment.

Those objects which are clofely conneded
with any paffion, are likewife conneded by
fome of the affociating qualities v/ith other
objects, which therefore they have a natural
tendency to fuggeft. Now as it appears from
what has been faid, that every paffion exerts
itfelf in confining our thoughts to the objects

imme-

i,5B Of the Infuence of the Paffions Part IfJ

immediately connedted with it, it would feem
to follow, that a paffion muft hinder thefe
from fuggefting any other objeds, however
nearly related to themfelves, and thus to put
a flop to all fucceffion of ideas. It has plainly
a tendency to this ; and the tendency takes
effe(3: in fome degree. A paffion never fails
to confine our attention very much to the ideas
which are moft immrediately related to itfelf.
But fuch is the confcitution of the human
mind, that it cannot confine its attention
altogether to one unvaried object for any con-
fiderable time. The paffions being oppofed
by this law of our conftitution, cannot keep
the mind long fixt on one view of the objed:
which it has firft ffiggefted. Yet it endea-
vours to do fo ; and the firfl: effed: of the en-
deavour is, that the mind averfe from quitting
that object, turns it to every fide, and views
it in various lights. In the following exam-
ple, this effed appears very ftrikingly with
refped to the paffion of love :

Ros. Orlando !

Cel. Orlando.

Ros. Alas the day, what fhall I do with

my doublet and hofe ? wha't did he when

thou faweft him ? what faid he ? how looked

he ? wherein went he .»* what makes him

3 here ?

Sect. III. on AJfociat'mu 159

here ? did he afk for me ? where remains he ?
how parted he with thee? and when fhalt
thou fee him again? Anfwer me in one

word.

CeL You muft borrow me Garagantua's
mouth firft ; 'tis a word too great for any
mouth of this age's fize : to fay ay and no to
thefe particulars, is more than to anfwer in a
catechifm.

Ros, But doth he know that I am in the
foreft, and in man's apparel ? looks he as
frefhly as he did the day he wreftled ?

Cel, It is as eafy to count atoms as to re-
-folve the proportions of a lover (/).

We have already difcovered two fources of the
abruptnefs of thought occafioned by paffion ;
and we may now perceive another fource of
it. Different views of the fame object are
very unlike ; a paffion brings thefe different
views before the mind, in a rapid fucceffion
and in an irregular groupe.

In this way the paffion prevents a change
of objedl for fome time. But the different
views of the fame objed: are not inexhauftible.
The paffion therefore yielding to the impulfe
of our conflitution, allows the prefent objed:

{/) As you like it, ad 3. icene 6.

1 6o Of the Injluence of the Pqffions Part II.

to fuggeft ideas related to it. Hence it arlfes
that, under the influence of any paffion, we
conceive not only the objects which are inti-
mately related to it, but alfo fuch others as
are flrongly connected with thefe by any of
the aflbciating qualities. The former objeds
would fuggeft thefe latter, if we were not
under the influence of any paflion, thefe
therefore will occur more readily than any
others, when, notwithftanding the influence of
the paflion, we muft have fome ideas on
which to employ our thoughts. Befides, an
idea conneded with objects clofely related to a
paflion, may by its prefence gratify the paf-
fion, or fupport it, or fall in with it in other
ways ; and in this cafe fuch an idea is often
fuggefted even when the mind is under no
neceflity of being relieved from a conception
which has long occupied it. The Countefs of
Rouflllon parting with her fon Bertram, who
is going to the army, the grief which this
produces, fuggefts to them both, an event
related by refemblance, and in fome meafure
alfo by caufation, to the occafion of that grief;
the lofs of her hufljand and his father :

Countefs, In delivering up my fon from me,
I bury a fecond hufl^and.

z Bertn

Sect. III. on AJfociation. i6i

Bertr. And in going, Madam^ I weep o'er
toy father's death anew {g).

The niother does not fay, the delivering up
of my fon reminds me of my burying my
hulband ; (he expreffes it muxh more ftrong-
ly; the fon fpeaks in a manner equally for-
tible, the imagination of both converts the
jprefeht event into the fimilar event fuggefted
by it. This figure is felt by every perfon to
be perfedly natural and proper ; and its be-
ing fo, fhows thatj when an object i}:ri(!?l:ly
conrieded with a paffion introduces another
bbjed aflbciated with itfelf, the paffion im-
pel! s the mind to conceive this other objed
very ftrongly, and to beftow upon it as inti-
mate a relation to the paffion, as poffible.

But though a paffion does not hinder an
objedt from fuggefting others, it has a great
influence on the nature of the ideas fuggefted.
An objedt which has been brought into view
immediately by a paffion, may be related, by
one or other of the affi^ciatlng qualities, to a
great multitude of ideas of very different
kinds : but it will not in this cafe introduce
any of thefe indifcriminately ; the paffion
which brought itfelf into view, will dired it
to introduce fuch of thefe only as are fuitable

{£) AW sixxll that ends nvell, zd. i, fcene I.

M to

1 62 Of the Lift lie nee of the Paffons Part II.

to that paffion. The perception prefent to
the mind, confidcred limply in itfelf, has an
equal fitnefs to bring into view any one of a
hundred ideas; but itfelf was introduced by
a paffion which flill continues to exert its
power, and indifpofes the mind for thinking
on any thing unfuitable to it, and which thus
diverts the aflbciating force of the prefent
perception from the direction it might have
otherwife taken, and leads the imagination to
feled: and take notice of only fuch ideas as
are fui table to the paffion, as well as to the
prefent perception, overlooking many others
which are equally conneded with the latter.
The affi^ciating forces of thefc two, have
fome fimilitude to compound powers in me-
chanics, vs^hich by their joint adiion produce
motion in a diredion different from that in
which either ads, and lying between the fe-
parate directions of the two. Or, to fet the
matter in a different light, thofe ideas which
are not only affociated v/ith the prefent per-
ception, but alfo fuitable to the paffion that
introduced it, are dragged into the mind by
a double force ; whereas the prefent percep-
tion alone tends to drav/ in other ideas affo-
£iated with it, and the paffion oppofes their
entraace, often with fuperior Hrength. The

latter

Sect. III. en AJfociatlon. 163

latter cannot therefore fail to be negle^ficd ; the
former mull be introduced in preference to them.
Thus, though a paffion allows an object imme-
diately conneded with it, to introduce ideas, yet
it always moulds thofe which are introduced,
into its ow^n likenefs, or into a form agreeable
to itfelf, and it fufFers none to enter which
are not fufceptible of this form. "When Alon-
zo's companions are endeavouring to alleviate
his grief for the fuppofed lofs of his fon, by
diverting his thoughts to his daughter's mar-
riage with the King of Tunis, in their return
from which they now fufrered fhipwreck, he
anfwers them.

You cram thefe words into mine ears againfb
The itomach of my fenie. Would I had never
Married my daughter there ! for coming thence
My fon is loft, and, in my rate, fhe too,
Who is fo far from Italy remov'd,
I ne'er again fhall fee her : O thou mine heir
Of Naples and of Milan, what ftrange fifli
Hath made his meal on thee ? {h)

This example illuftrates and confirms almoft
every obfervation w^e have had occalion to
make concerning the influence of the paflions
upon aflbciation. His grief keeps his atten-
tion fixt on the lofs of his fon, an objed: im-

{h) Tempefi, afl 2. fcene i.

M 2 mediately

164 Of the Influence ofthePaJj'wns Part II.

mediately connected with it as being its caufe,
and that in fpight of every thought by which
his companions endeavoured to divert it.
This object fuggefts an idea related to it by
caufation, his daughter's marriage at Tunis,
the event which occafioned that lofs. This
event carries his thoughts back again to the
death of his fon ; which, when thus again
prefented to his imagination, fuggefts a fe-
cond time his daughter's marriage, by means
of its rcfemblance to it in one particular, that
her diftance deprived him of all intercourfe
•with her, as much as if fhe too had been
dead. But forrow for his fon allows him not
to reft long upon this thought, fuitable as it
is to his paflion, or to purfue any others
which this might have introduced ; it makes
his imagination inftantly to recur to the lofs
of his fon, to view it in every light, to con-
ceive many circumftances relating to him,
his being his heir, his being entitled to large
dominions, his being devoured by filhes.
This example is thus a new illuftratlon of the
principles formerly explained, That a pafTion
tends to fix the view on objects intimately
conneded with it, or to make it often recur
to them, not only on the flighteft hint, but
even without any occafion, and that thefe

objects

Sect. III. on JJfociatlon, 165

Gbjed:s fuggeft ideas related to them. It is
likewife a dired illuftration of the principle
now under confideration, and for the fake of
which we have cited it. It is a flriking in-
ftance of the power of a pafTion to enable a
perception connected with it, to introduce not
indifcriminately any ideas related to itfelf,
but only fuch as are at the fame time fuitable
to the nature of the paffion. No ideas are
conceived, but fuch as are perfedlly fuitable
to Alonzo*s forrow. Claribel's marriage was
in itfelf fully as lit for fuggefting ideas of the
mirth or pomp which attended it, or of the
circumftances which rendered it defirable,
and moved Alonzo to urge it, as for fuggefting
ideas of its difagreeable circumftances and
eonfequences. It had ad:ually fuggefted ideas
of the former kind to the reft of the compa-
ny; but Alonzo's forrow hinders them from
occurring to him, and forces into his view
fuch thoughts as are unpleafant, and excite
regret.

Further, a paftion has an influence on
the number^ as well as on the nature of the
ideas introduced. It tends fo ftrongly to keep
the attention fixt on the objects ftridly con-
nected with it, that it fuff"ers not thefe to fug-
geft a long train of ideas, fucceftively related

M 3 to

1 66 Of the Injluencc of the Paffions . Par t II,

lo each other. It generally allows us to gq
only one ftep or two beyond them ; after we
have been led by means of them to conceive
one idea, we go not forward to the view of
others aiTocIated with that; ftill the pafhoa
makes the obje6i: nearly allied to it, to dwell
upon the thought ; we recur to the contem-
plation of this object, and it fuggefts a new
idea, related to itfelf but not to that idea
which it had introduced formerly. In othec
cafes, after the imagination has once receive4
an irapulfe, it readily goes on from one per-
ception through a number of others, till it
arrive at a great diftance from that with which
it began : and it would be difficult to flop its
career, to bring it back to the objedl from
which it fet out, or to make it enter into a
different track. But when the mind is occu-
pied by a paffion, the difficulty lies wholly
on the other fide : the paffion directs the view
to things clofely connedled with it, fo power-
fully and fo conftantly, that the imagination
is drawn backward to repeated conceptions of
them ; when our natural propenfity to vary
the objcd of our thought, indifpofes us for
dwelling longer on them alone, they yet re-
tain their hold of us fo far that we enter ea-
fily into another track pointed out by them :

Se c t. hi. on A(fodat'ion, 167

we cannot without a painful effort, often
we cannot at all, proceed fo long in one path
as to leave them far behind us; all the ideas
introduced after a few removes, are but
flightly conneded with the objedt which the
paffion difpofes us to red upon^ and that paffion
checks all propenfity to go through or attend
to many ideas but flightly conneded. The
imagination referables a perfon attached to
home, who cannot without reludance under-
take a long journey, but can with pleafure
make fhort excurfions, returning home from
each, and thence fetting out anew. Oppofite
forces in mechanics tend to deftroy one ano-
ther. This is analogous to the cafe before us.
The objeds ftri£lly connected with a painon
are naturally fit for introducing ideas related
to themfelves ; the paflion ads in a contrary
diredion, and endeavours to keep the mind
from running off to thefe : there is a perpe-
tual ftruggle between the two. The paffion
having kept the attention fixt for fome time
on an objed intimately conneded v/ith it, its
force begins to flag : that objed is conceived
in a lively and vigorous manner, by reafon of
its relation to the paffion, and therefore very
powerfully draws in ideas affociated with it.
But the conception of all the fucceeding ob-

M 4 jeds

i68 * Of the hifaience of the Pqffions Part II.

jeds drawn in by it, is ftill weaker and
weaker ; on this account their power of intro-
ducing ideas becomes continually lefs and
lefs ; fo that after a few fteps they give us a
very inconfiderable propenfity to go forward.
The paffion exerts a force fuperior to their's ;
it therefore prevails, it prevents farther afTo-
ciation, it brings back the attention to fome
objed clofely conneded with it, it invigorates
the conception of that objed fo as to enable it
to fuggeft a new idea ; but it hinders us from
going to a greater diftance than before. Here
we difcover a new caufe of that abruptnefs of
thought which a paffion occafions. It arifes
partly, we have feen, from the mind's divid-
ing its attention between feveral objeds all
clofely and almoft equally conneded with the
paffion ; partly from the rapidity with which
the mind takes in diffiimilar views of any one
of thefe objeds ; and partly from the ftruggle
between objeds fuggeftcd by the paffion, and
pbjeds fuggefted by other means : but it alfo
arifes partly from the conftant vibration of the
thought between the objeds immediately con-
tiedcd with the paffion, and the ideas w^hich
they tend to introduce. The mind leaves
any of thefe ideas as foon as it has conceived
it, it lays hold of an objed more clofely con-
neded

Sect. III. QJi AJJociat'ion. 169

neded with the pa^Tion, it runs from it to an
idea fuggefted by it, but wholly unrelated to
the former. This alone muft produce a great
want of connexion, and many breaks, in the
expreffion of fentiments refulting from a paf-
fion. Thefe principles now laid down, are
fufficiently illuftrated by the laft example
which we cited, Alonzo's grief made the lofs
of his fon to fuggefl the difbnce of his daugh-
ter, and the confequence of that diftance, the
improbability of his ever feeing her ; but
without allowing him to purfue that thought,
hurries him back to the lofs of his fon, and fets
him a thinking on new circumftances con-
neded with it. The marriage of his daugh-
ter, the lofs of his fon, the lofs of his daughter,
her diftance, the little chance for his feeing
her again, the lofs of his fon, his being heir
to extenfive territories, his being devoured by
fifhes, all fucceed one another in his thoughts,
with great abruptnefs and rapidity.

There is a fault very common in drama-
tic poetry : perfons are made to exprefs their
pafTions, not as if they were really adluated
by them, but as if they were fpedators of
them in others ; the poet gives not a natural
reprefentation of the pafTion, but a laboured
^efcription of it. The obfervations juft now
5 made^

I/O Of the Injliience of the Paffions Part 11.

made, lead us to a difcovery of the fource of
this fault. An obje<51: which is in a particular
inftance ftridly conneded with a pafTion, and
forced into the mind by it, may be confidered
not only in this particular point of view, but
alfo limply in itfelf, as a prefent perception.
Its influence on aflbciation is very different,
according as it Hands in one of thefe fituations
or the other. When it is in the mind fimply
as a prefent perception, it tends to fuggeft
any ideas w^hatever that are conneded with it
by any of the aflbciating qualities, and to
caufe the mind run from one of thefe through
a long train of ideas fucceflively introducing
one another. But when it is brought into the
mind by a palTion to which it is intimately
related, it receives a tindlure from that paf-
fion, it is wholly under the diredion of that
paflion, it exerts its power of afTociation only
in fuch ways and fo far as the paflion permits,
it introduces fuch ideas alone as are fuitable
to the pafTion, and it introduces no long
trains of ideas, but fuffers the mind to return
quickly to the conception of itfelf, or of fome
other objed as intimately related to the paffion.
For example, a perfon may think of the dif-
trefs of another without feeling pity : in this
cafe, the thought of that diftrefs may lead

him

Sect. III. on ^Jfoc'mtwt, ijt

him to conceive any of the actions of the per-
fon who fuffers it, any other perfons who have
had a concern in thefe adions or a connexion
with the ador, any particulars of the condud:
or fortunes of thefe perfons ; and may thus
open a boundlefs field of thought. But when
the diftrefs excites pity, this paflion extin-
guifhes all propenfity to fuch excurfions, it
fixes our view on the diftrefs by which it is
produced. This diftrefs may fuggeft, by
means of refemblance, other inftances of dif-
trefs in other perfons ; it may fuggeft, by
means of contrariety, fuch circumftances of
former profperity, as aggravate the prefent
diftrefs ; it may lead us to think of the caufe
of it, or to trace out its confequences ; in a
word, it may introduce any ideas ftridlly con-
neded with it, and congruous to the paftion
of pity : but it has no tendency to fuggeft any
others, or to lead the imagination into a re-
mote or extenfive wandering. Did it attempt
this, and did the mind follow it w^ithout re-
ferve, it muft quickly come to feme ideas re-
pugnant to the paflion, and fit for producing
an oppofite difpofition : but this cannot na-
turally or eafily happen to a perfon under the
power of any paflion. A paflion leaves no
inclination for going through a long train of

ideas,

172 Of the Infiience of the Pajfons Part II,

ideas, ^nd if the mind fhould run off to any
diftance or to unfuitable ideas, the paffion
would immediately check it, and recall the
attention to ideas congruous to itfelf, as well
as related to the objedt immediately fuggefled
by it. Now an indifferent poet having con-
ceived fome of the objcdls ftridtly conned:ed
with a paffion, confiders that objedl: only in
general, and abllradly as a prefent percep-
tion ; he therefore allows himfelf to run into
fuch z. train of thought, as that objed prefent
to the mind would dictate, if it were uncon-
nected with any paffion ; he goes on coolly
imagining fuch ideas as it fuggefts by means
of any of the principles of affi^ciation ; and he
makes the perfon poffeiled by the paffion, to
exprefs all thefe ideas. He feels not the paf-
fion, he has not force of genius or fenfibility
of heart fufficient for conceiving how it would
affedt a perfon who felt it, or for entering
into the fentiments which it would produce
in him. The fentiments which he makes hini
utter, might all be very proper in a defcrip-
tion, a difcourfe, or a meditation, occafioned
by the view of fuch an object ; but they are
not natural to a perfon in whom that objedt
produces a fuitable paffion. In order to con-
ceive fentiments natural to him, the poet ought

Sect. III. 072 AJfociation. 17^

to have confined himfelf to the confideraticn
of the object in this one point of view, as
ftridly conneded with a paffion and fuggefted
by it; he ought to indulge only fuch a train
of thought, as it would lead to in thefe cir-
cumftances, or fuch a train as the paffion with
which it is prefently conned:ed, would intro-
duce into the mind of a perfon under the
power of that paffion.

This is indeed fo difficult, that the beft poets
cannot always perfectly attain it. Shakefpear
makes the dutchefs of Gloucefter, in parting
with John of Gaunt, to exprefs her grief in
this manner :

Tet one i^ord more ; grief houndeth where it falls.
Not with the empty hollownefs^ but weight :
I take my leave before I have begun ;
For for row ends not when it feemeth done.
Commend me to my brother, Edmund York ;

Lo, this is all nay yet depart not fo ;

Though this be all, do not fo quickly go :
I fhall remember more. Bid him — oh what ?
With all good fpeed at Plalhie vifit me.
Alack, and what /hall good old York fee there.
But empty lodgings, and unfurnifli'd walls.
Unpeopled offices, untrodden flones ?
And what hear there for welcome, but my groans ?
Therefore commend me, — let him not come there
To feek out forrow that dwells every where ;

All

174 Of the Injliience of the PaJ/ions Part IL

All defolate will I from hence, and die ;

The laft leave of thee takes my weeping eye. {i)

The latter part of the fpeecli Is a natural ex-
preffion of grief, and of violent grief; the
firft four lines are a defcription, not an ex-
prefTion of it, and therefore unfuitable to the
dutchefs's ftate of mind ; the reflection which
they contain is juft, but too cool for the tem-
per of the fpeaken

^ It follows from the obfervations which have
been made, that a palTion tends to hinder the
mind from running into the conception of
fuch ideas as have no connexion with that
paffion. Since a paflion fixes the view on ob-
jects immediately connetSted with it, fince it
continually draws the mind back to the con-
ception of thefe objedts even from ideas fug-
gefted by themfelves, fince it prevents their
introducing many ideas naturally connected
with them, the neceflary confequence is, that
it will much more exclude ideas which have
no relation either to thefe objects or to the
paflion, and will render a very flrong efl'ort
requifite for bringing them into view. A di-
red proof of this arifes from the difficulty
which we experience in diverting any paflion
which has taken firm pofleflion of the foul, by

(/} Richard U; aft I. fcene 3.

application

Sect. III. on JJfociation. 17^

application to fiich fubjed:s as have a tendency
td'banifh it : the ftrongeft refolution and the in-
tenfeft endeavours are often infufficient for
bringing the mind to fix on thefe fubjedts.
Nay, fo great is the force of the paflion, that
when other fubje^ls are moft poveerfully urged
upon us, when we have the ftrongeft calls to
give application to them, yet we cannot enter
into them with fpirit ; the paftion mixes with
all our thoughts, and continually difturbs the
courfe of them.

It often happens that two different pafHons,
or that a prefent paffion and an habitual dif-
pofition, occupy the mind together. Each of
thefe having a tendency to fix the mind on
objeds ftridly connected with itfelf, or to di-
red it to fuch ideas as thefe objeds fuggeft,
the mind turns quickly from thoughts intro-
duced by the one paffion, to thofe which are
introduced by the other, and runs conftantly
backward and forward between them, with-
out refting a moment on either. In this cafe,
the thoughts muft have an uncommon degree
of abruptnefs : each of the paflions fingly
would have occafioned abruptnefs in the ways
already taken notice of; but to this is fuper-
added the unconnedlednefs which arifes from
the view being fuccellively directed to objeds

afTociated

176 Of the I7iflue7ice of the P Colons Part IL

aflbclated with different paffions. Shakefpear
affords us a ftriking inftance of this, when he
reprefents Shylock agitated by avarice, by
grief for the lofs of his daughter, and by Yage
at her having married a Chriftian and ftolen
his money, and in confequence of that agita-
tion exclaiming,

My daughter, O my ducats, O my daughter I
Fled with a Chriftian ? O my chriftian ducats !
Jufticc, the law, my ducats, and my daughter !
A fealed bag, two fealed bags of ducats,
Of double ducats, ftol'n from me by my daughter !
And jewels, two ftones, rich and precious ftones,
Stol'n by my daughter ! juftice ! find the girl ;
She hath the ftones upon her, and the ducats ! {k)

If was evinced, that babit not only pro-
motes the introdudion of fuch ideas as it has
rendered familiar, but alfo gives the mind, in
fome cafes, a propenfity to afibciate ideas by
one relation rather than by others. It does
not appear that the paffions give an abfolute
preference to any one relation. An objedt
immediately connected with a pafTion, fuggefts
indifcriminately ideas coiineded with itfelf by
any of the aflbciating qualities. Some of
thefe qualities may, however, be confidered as
in fome fenfe more fuitable to the paffions than

{k) Merchant of Venice, aft 2, fcene 9,

Others :

Sect. III. 07i Affociatlon. 177

others ; and that in two refpe<5ls : a pafTion
introduces ideas connedled with its immediate
objeds by fome of the aflbciating qualities,
more commonly and frequently than fuch as
are connected with them by other aiFocIating
qualities : and fome of the aflbciating quali-
ties lead the mind to a greater diflance from
the objeds ftridly connedted with the paflion,
than others of them. Ideas introduced by
fome aflbciating qualities, have a Lefs perfe£l
relation to the paflion, than ideas introduced
by others : the former ideas are rarely fug-
gefted by a paflion, the latter often : the qua-
lities which give ideas introduced by them but
an imperfed relation, fcarce ever lead the
mind more than one ftep beyond the objeds
ftridly connected with the paflion ; the others
may lead it feveral fteps, introducing a feries
of ideas fucceflively aflbciated wdth one ano-
ther.

Resemblance is a quality of the former
kind : there are many ways in which ideas
may refemble an objed intimately conneded
with a paflion, that will not lead that object
to fuggeft thefe ideas. The refemblance mufl:
be of a peculiar kind, mufl be fuch as fits an
idea to aff"ed: the paflion in the fame way
with the objed which fuggefts it, elfe the paf-

N fion

170 Of the Influence of the Pajfions Part II.

lioii will check its. operation. When the re-
femblance is thus peculiar, the affociation is
indeed very ilrong ; there are few ideas wdiich
occur more readily either to aperfon fufFering
any diftrefs, or to a fpedlator moved with pity
for his fii-ffering, than the idea of a fimilar
diftrels. But otl^er forts of refemblance have
no fuch cfFc£t : hence it is iiniverfally allowed,
that fnnilitudes are in general unfuitable to
the language of pafiion, and that even me-
tauhors ouput to be admitted into it with
great referve. In this refped:, what Shakef-
pear puts into the mouth of the queen,, when
Ihe fees her hufoand king Richard a prifoner>
is faulty and unnatural;

But foft, but fee, or rather do not fee.
My fair rofe wither ; yet look up ; behold,
Th;it you in pity may difiblve to dew,
And wafli him frefli again with true-love tears.
O thou the model where old Troy did (land,
I'hou map of honour, thou king Richard's tomb.
And not king Richard ; thou moft "beauteous inn,
Why fnould hard favour'd grief be lodg'd in thee.
When triumph is become an ale-houfe gueft ? (/)

Befides, refemblance leads the mind only one
flep ; an idea fuggeiled by means of its re-
femblance to any of the objedls flridly con-

(/) RichaidW. a6l 5! fcene i.

ne6led

Sect. III. on Affbciation. 179

neded with a palTion, feldom fuggefts another
idea refembling itfelf. A paffion occupies the
mind too much, to leave it leifure or inclina-
tion for hunting after fimilitudes. One re-
fembling idea is often fuitable to the paffion,
and fit to influence it; but by conceiving ano-
ther idea refembling that, much more by go-
ing through feveral ideas, each of which is
fuggefled by its refemblance to the preceding,
we mull come to fuch as are no ways related
to the paffion, as are wholly unfit for influ-
encing it, and as bear no likenefs to any of
the objecSls clofely conneded with it. But the
nature of paffion permits us not to indulge
ourfelves in the conception of fuch ideas,
Richard giving vent to his grief in prifon,
might naturally fay, on hearing time broke
in mufic.

And here have I the daintinefs of ear.
To check time broke in a diforder'd firing;
But for the concord of my (late and time.
Had not an ear to hear my true time broke :
I wafled time, and now doth time walle me.

But he could fcarce naturally add,

For now hath time made me his numb' ring; clock r
My thoughts are minutes •, and with fighs they jar
Their watches to mine eyes the outward watch;

N 2 Whereto

1 8o Of the Injluence of the Pafftons Part IT,

Whereto my finger, like a dial's point.

Is pointing fiill, in cleanfing them from tears. (»?)■

Objects ftridly ccnneded with a paffion^
often fugged CQUti^ary objeds ; but they fug-
;;eft only fuch as are contrary in fome particu-
lar ways, which render them fit for influen-
cing the prefent pafTion : objects in all other
ways contrary, the paffion leads the mind ta-
reject.

Lady. Madam, we'll tell tales.

^een. Of for row, or of joy ?

Lddy. Of either, Madam*

^feen. Of neither, girl.
For if of joy, being altogether wanting.
It doth remember me the more of forrow :
Or if of grief, &:c. (;/)

Contrariety feldom leads the mind more than
one ftep from the objedl immediately fug-
gefted by the paflion : a fliort contrail: may
very much enliven our conception of that ob~
jcG: ; it thus naturally falls in with the paflion:
but a feries of eontrafls would produce a very
difl'erent efi^ed ; a multitude of antithefes in
writing of any fort, fliow an imagination dif-
pofcd to feek amufcment, not a mind intenfely
engaged by its fubjcil:.

(m) Richard W. a£l 5. fcene io.
(«) Hid, art j. fcene 7..

Objects

Sect. III. on Jjjociaiwu i8i

Objects ftridly connected with a paffion,
often fuggeft likewife the ideas of other ob-
jects afTociated with them by 'vicinity. In-
deed contiguous objeds are frequently con-
iieded together by other relations, and in that
<:afe a pafTion leads us firongly to conceive
them. But vicinity alone is fufficient for
producing this effedt : a view of the contigu-
ous objeds renders our conception of a thing
determinate and lively, and thus when that
thing is intimately related to a pafTion, tends
to invigorate and fupport the paffion. A paf-
fion makes us prone to this, and naturally
affifts vicinity in introducing fuch ideas as
can promote it. But vicinity never intro-
duces a long train of ideas : it would be un-
natural for a perfon aduated by any paffion,
to run along a multitude of obje6ls contigu-
ous to one another cither in place or in time,
for this would tend to divert the paffion by
variety.

Co -EXISTENCE and the relation of caujh
and effe5l^ are the principles of alTociation
which the paffions employ moft frequently,
and which fuggeft the longeft trains of ideas.
Thefe give ideas the moft perfed relation to
a paffion; and almoft every idea introduced
by means of thefe principles, really influences

N 3 the

1 82 Of the hifiiieiice of the Pajfwns Part II.

the paffion. Co-exiftence fuggcfls the quali-
ties, the circumftanccs, the accefforles, and
the concomitants of thofe objeds which are
clofely connected with the paffion ; and the
more of thefe we have in our view, the ftronger
and liveUer is our conception of thofe objedls.
All the objeds almoft which the relation of
caufe and effect can fuggeft, contribute either
more immediately or m.ore remotely to the
produdion of the paffion itfelf ; and therefore
are ftrongly conneded with it. Accordingly,
in moll of the examples which have been
produced, the ideas fuggefted by objeds ftrldly
conneded with the paffions, are fuch as are
fuggefted by means of thefe two principles of
aflbciation.

It is a natural Inference from the obfer-
vations which have been already made, that
the paffions, far from difpofmg us to follow
order in the train of our ideas, render us in-
capable of preferving order. The inference
is fo obvious, that it is not neceflary to fpend
time in confirming it. Abruptnefs, incohe-
rence, fluduation of thought, are the confe-
quences of paffion ; and thefe are the re-
verfe of order. But it is worth while to ob-
ferve, that a paffion even inverts the natural
order of our ideas. As the imagination paffes

fron:^

Sect. III. on Affociatlon, 185

from one idea to another conne^led with it,
fo a paffion once excited does not confine
itfelf to its lirll: objed, but readily extends it-
felf to other objects connected with that ; love
or hatred to any perfon, feldom fails to pro-
duce fome degree of love or hatred to fuch as
are conne(5ted with him. It has been fhowa
by philofophers, that the imagination palTes
moft readily from a lefs confiderable to a more
confiderabie objed: ; but that a pafTion, on the
contrary, pafles with greateft eafe from the
more to the lefs confiderable objed (0) : and
what we would now obferve is, that a paffion
prevailing in the mind, caufes the imagina-
tion to proceed in this latter diredion. In-
deed if it did not, the paffion itfelf could not
be extended to the inferior and fubordinate
objeds ; for it cannot be direded to them till
we have formed ideas of them. When the
mind is cool, and not under the influence of
any paffion, the idea of a fon or of a fervant
fuggefls the idea of the father or the mafter,
more naturally and more certainly than the
idea of the father or the mafter would fug-
gefl: that of the fon or the fervant. On the
contrary, love, hatred, refentment, towards a
father or a mafter, very readily extend them-

(0) Treatife of Human Nature, Vcl. II. Partii. Icdi.z.

N 4 felves

184 Ideas fuggefied hy sulfations ^ Part IL

felves to the fon or the fervant, though we
might feel the fame paffions towards thefe
latter, without conceiving any degree of them
towards the former. At the fame time the
pafhon towards the fuperior, gives the imagi-
nation an irrefiftible propenfity to run into
the conception of the inferior or dependent ;
eager to extend itfelf, it forces upon us the
idea without which it could not be extended,

S E C T. IV.

JieflecIio7is on the Principles of /Iffociation^
Ideas fugg^ftcd eithsr by Senfations^ or by
other Ideas,

FROM the account which has been al-
ready given of the principles of aifoci-?
ation, it is eafy to colieift, That there is a
broad foundation laid in the nature of the
human imagination, for great extent and va^
riety of genius. There are many relations of
ideas, which fit them for being afTociated ;
almoft every perception bears fome of thefe
relations to many different ideas; habit and
the paffions multiply and vary the inflru^
ments of affociation : by thefe means there
are inni»merable handles by which the imagi-
nation

Sect. IV. or by other Ideas. 185

nation may feize fuch ideas as it has occafion
for. Genius has, in feme men, great force
and compafs : but a vigorous conftrudion of
the aflbciating principles is fufEcient to account
for it, however great it be ; for if they be vi-
gorous, any one perception may introduce a
great multitude of others, and that by means
of many different relations. The principles
of affociation likewife being fo various, can-
not but admit many diftindl combinations and
modifications, by vv^hich genius will be mould-
ed into a great diverfity of forms. In order *
therefore to prepare the way for a difcovery
of the varieties of genius, it will be proper to
make fome reflections on the principles of
affociation, which have been feparately illuf-
trated.

The prefent perception which introduces
others, by means of the relations that they
bear to it, may be either a fenfation of an
objedt, or only an idea of it. In whichever
of thefe ways the objedl be perceived, it has
the very fame relations to others ; and there-
fore in both cafes it has a tendency to fuggcfl:
the very fame ideas. But it will not always
fuggeft them with the fame force or certainty
in thefe two cafes.

That

iZ6 Ideas fuggefied by Senfationsy Part II.

That a perception may introduce others.
It is neceffary that itfelf take feme hold of the
mind, and be attended to ; and the ftronger a
perception is, it takes the firmer hold of the
mind, and excites the clofer attention. The
adual fenfation of an object is always much
ftronger than any conception of it, which
memory or imagination can exhibit. On this
account, a fenfation of an objed: will often
introduce ideas which the mere conception of
that obje(fl would not have force to fuggefl: ;
it gives a ftronger impulfe to the mind, and
renders lefs intimate relations to the prefent
objedl, fufficient for bringing thefe ideas into
view. Merely to think of darknefs, does not
lead us fo readily or fo neceflarily to the con-
ception of its oppofite, light, as our being
actually involved in darknefs. The fight of
a fliip periftiing in a ftorra, not only raifes
ftronger emotions, but likewife introduces a
much greater variety of ideas into the mind,
than barely reading or hearing of a ftiip-
wreck : in the latter cafe, it fometimes makes
fo little impreflion upon us, as not to give
rife to any train of ideas. . The mention or
the accidental recolledion of a place where we
have fpent a confiderable part of oqr lives,

will

Sect, IV. or by other Ideas : 187

■will bring to mind occurrences which hap-
pened there ; but every perfon has felt, that
vifiting that place reminds him of many-
more, and makes them rufli into his thoughts
with much greater rapidity. The mention
of a perfon often makes us recoiled: that there
is fome purpofe for which we want to fee
him ; but fometimes, Vvhen we cannot call to
mind what it particularly is, the fight of
that perfon brings it quickly into our thoughts.
In confequence of the ftiperior force of fenfa-
tions, which enables them to fuggeft concep-
tions by means of much weaker relations
than ideas can, it often happens, that an ob-
jed: occurring to the fenfes, gives a vei*y quick,
and feemingly unaccountable turn to the courfe
of the thoughts. It makes a man ceafe to
purfue a train of fcntiments connected with
his former ideas by the ftrongeft relations,
and run into fuch as are much more weakly
related to the objed which he perceives by
fenfe.

But, on the other hand, there are cafes in
which the idea of an objedl will fuggeft fuch
thoughts as the fcnfation of that objed: could
not have fuggefted. This happens chiefly
when objects are of fuch a nature, that the
fenfation of them is exceeding ftrong and in-

tcrefls

i88 Ideas fuggejled by Sen/at lons^ Part IL

terefts us very deeply, when, for inftance, it
is in a high degree pleafant or painful, or
when it produces any ftrong or violent paf-
fion. In thefe cafes, it engroffes our whole
attention, and by doing fo, prevents ideas
from occurring, which would have been na-
turally fuggefted by a mere idea of that object,
becaufe the idea would not have occupied the
mind fo much. Many of the obfervations
which we have already made concerning the
paffions, may be eafily applied to the illuflra-
tion of this polition. To confirm it by a
feparate example, relations of tortures fome-
times fuggeft a variety of conceptions of dif-
ferent kinds; but it is remarked, that the
fight of tortures chills the whole foul, and
produces almofl: a total flagnation of thought.
A PERSON has always fenfations of thofe
objedls which belong to his own ftate and
condition ; others, who obferve his fituation,
conceive the fame objects only in idea. Hence
there arifes often a great difference between
the train of thoughts which are raifed in a
perfon by the fenfe of his own fituation, and
that train which obfervation of his fituation
introduces into the minds of others. The
thoughts, refledlions, and fentiments of a
perfon who adually feels pain or ficknefs, are

generally

Sect. IV. or by other Id^as, i8g

generally different in feveral refpeds, from
thofe of the perfons who vifit him ; thefe often
engage in converfation, even relating to his
diftrefs, into which he can by no means enter.
Suppofe a perfon raifed from meannefs to
great profperity or dignity ; his own fenti-
ments are very unlike to the reflections of
fpeCtators. The vivacity with which he per-
ceives it, the force with which it lays hold of
him by means of the fenfes, leads him into
many thoughts which the idea of it has not
power enough to fuggeft to others. But at
the fame time it fcarce at all leads him to
think of fome things which moil readily occur
to the reft of the world. The contraft be-
tween his prefent and his former fituation, is
one of the firft and moft natural reflexions
that the world makes : but there are many
refledlions into which the man himfelf runs
more eafily and more frequently. His pre-
fent fituation makes fo ftrong an impreflion
on him, that he attends chiefly to fuch ideas
as are fuitable to it ; it excites many agree-
able paflions, thefe increafe his propenfity to
attend only to agreeable perceptions : his for-
mer meannefs is in the main mortifying, and
therefore the whole of his temper oppofes his
running into the contemplation of it. Many

regard

1 gb Ideas fuggejied hy Sen/at ions, Pa R T It.

regard both the prefent and the paft ft ate of
another with great indifference; neither af-
feds them much, . neither raifes any paffion ;
they confider both without any emotion,
merely as objeds expofed to their view : thefe
objeds can fuggeft ideas to them, only by
their natural relations to other objeds ; and
therefore they run freely into whatever
thoughts thefe relations fuggeft : contrariety
is one of thefe relations ; its force is the
greater in this cafe, becaufe the oppofite con-
ditions belong to the fame perfon j and by
means of it, the man's former condition is
readily brought into view. Some again ob-
ferve fuch a change of fortune happening to
another, not without fome emotion. When-
ever, for in (lance, the idea of it occurs to one
perfon, it is attended with envy, and this
paffion augments its power to fuggeft his for-
mer meannefs, and turns it when it is fug-
gefted, into fuch a form as makes it feem to
fully or obfcure his prefent elevation.^ On
the contrary, in the mind of the benevolent,
fuch good fortune produces joy ; the perfon's
former obfcurity, by rendering the good for-
tune the greater, tends to fupport and ralfe
that joy, and therefore finds ready accefs to

the mind.

Sect. IV. or hy other Ideas, tgi

In a word, the train of fentiments intro-
duced by an object, varies confiderably accord-
ing as a perfon has himfelf a fenfation of that
obje(£l, or only obferves one who has ; and
that both becaufe the immediate efFedts of
fenfations on aflbciation, are different in many
refpeds from thofe of ideas, and becaufe they
give rife to different paffions and emotions.
Every one who would give a natural repre-
fentation of thoughts and fentiments, muft
attend to this principle : it has therefore a
near relation to every fpecies of genius which
is converfant about characters. It has likewife
a more extenfive influence upon genius : fen-
timents fuggefled by a man's own fituation,
mix with all the exertions of his genius, on
whatever fubjeds it be employed ; and his
fituation thus gives it fome peculiarity, and
diflinguifhcs his produdions from thofe of
another man poffeffed of the mcfl fimilar ge-
nius, but placed in diflimilar circumftances.

Thus aifociation is fufceptible of great va,-?'
rieties according as it is produced by a fenfa-
tion, or by an idea : it is likevsrife fufceptible
of varieties arifing from other caufes, which
we fliall next proceed to confider.

SECT.

iqz Of the Comhinahon of Part IL

SECT. V.

Of the Combination of the offociating Prht-

ci^les^

TH E feveral principles of affoclation
wkich have been enumerated, are dif-
ferent, and fome of them are very imlike to
others of them : every perception w^hatever is
conneded with fome ideas by fome of thefe
principles, and with fome ideas by other prin*
ciples ; but often alfo a perception is conned:-
ed with another by two or more of thefe
principles at once.

It was impofTible to confider the afTociat-
ing principles fo much feparately, as to pre-
vent many inftances of this combination from
occurring in what has been already faid, or
to avoid mentioning fome of the confequences
of it. We have found examples of habit and
of paffion concurring with fome of the rela-
tions of ideas, in fuggefting the fame thought.
Different relations of ideas may be combined
in like manner. A thing which refembles
another, may at the fame time be contiguous
to it, or be its caufe, or its effdd:. Morton,

relating

S E C T . V. the ajjociating Principles^ 193

relating in what manner Piercy's fall deprived
his troops of courage, fays.

For from his metal was his party fleel'd %
Which once in him abated, all the reft
Turn'd on themfelves, like dull and heavy lead*
And as the thing that's heavy in itfelf,
Upon enforcement flies with greateft fpeed :
So did our men, heavy in Hotfpur's lofs.
Lend to this weight fuch lightnefs with their fear^
That arrows fled not fwifter toward their aim.
Than did our foldiers, aiming at their fafety.
Fly from the field. [a)

The feveral images here employed ; Jieel
lojing its temper; heavy things moving fajlet
than light things^ ivhen they are projected
ivith fufficient force j arroivsjlying to a mark ;
have fuch a degree of refemblance to the de-
je6tion and flight of brave foldiers, as is fuffi-
cient to render them proper fimilitudes : but
in this cafe, they are not fuggefted to the
poet by refemblance alone ; being things em«
ployed in war, they have all a kind of vici*-
nity to what happened in the field of battle ;
the ufe that is made of them in war, conneda
them with it by a fpecies of caufation ; and
therefore they have a ftronger relation to the
fubjed defa'ibed, than images which only re-

(a) Second ^z^n o^ Henry W . a^ I. Icene 3.

O fembk

ig4 Of the Combination of Part II.

femble it, though in the moft perfect man-
ner. The power of thefe complicated rela-
tions has hurried on the poet to purfue and io
accumulate the images, more than is confid-
ent with perfeO; fmiplicity and corrcdtnefs.
Juflin was led by the fame co-operation of
principles, to the choice of the funilitude by
which he illuilrates the effedt of the death of
Epaminondas, on the fpirit of the Thebans,
a fnnilitude too remote to have otherwife
come into his mind : " For as, if you break
*' off the point of a weapon, you take from
** the reft of the iron the power of hurting,
** fo that General of the Thebans, being taken
" away, like the point of the weapon, the
" power alfo of the ftate was deadened (^)."

It is not neceifary to multiply examples of
the combination of different aflbciating quali-'
ties ; to conceive this, is not a matter of any
difficulty. But it will be proper to make an,
obfervation which ferves to render fome of our
former conclufions more preclfe and determi-
nate. We could fcarce avoid mentioning
contrariety as an affociaiing quality, becaufe
it fometimes conneds ideas by itfelf, and be-

{h) Nam ficati tcio fi primam aciem pr^fregeris, relicjuo
ferro vim nocendi fuftuleris ; fic illo, velut mucrone teli, ab-
late duce rhebanorum, rei quot^ue publics; vires hebetata:
funt. Hijl, lib. vi. cap, 8,

caufe

Sect.V. the ajfociatlng Prmciples, 19 j

caufe often when it is affifted by other rela-
tions, it is notwithftanding the chief and
prevalent relation. But from a review of the
examples which were given, it will appear,
that for the mofi: part, when contrariety
unites ideas, it is combined with fome other
relation. One thing, for inftance, fuggefts
its contrary when both belong to the fame
fubjed:, in many cafes where it would not
fuggefi: it, if they belonged to different fub7
jedis. It is when oppofite fortunes happen
by a remarkable reverfe, to the fame pcrfon,
that they irrefiftibly fuggeft each other*^

One efFedl of the combination of different
aflbciating principles, has been often hinted at
already. That combination produces a clofer
and ftronger relation between perceptions, than
either of the principles alone : one of the
perceptions introduces the other with a double
force, and therefore in preference to thofe
which are conneded with it only by a fingle
tie.

This combination likewife contributes
greatly to the force and extent of genius.
Jt fupplies the imagination with many means
of apprehending the conceptions for which it
has occafion. If a perfon be not affected by
one of the relations which fubfift between a

O z prefent

ig6 Of the Combination^ Sec, Part IL

prefent perception and an idea which fuits his
purpofe, he may be affeded by another of
them. If neither of the relations fmgly have
rforce enough to operate upon his imagina-
tion, they may derive fuSicient force from
their union, and be able together to lead him
readily to the difcovery of fuch appofite ma-
terials as otherwife he muft have miffed.

This combination contributes not only to
increafe the force of genius, but alfo to diver-
fify Its form. The feparate principles of affo-
ciation being fo numerous as they are, muft
be fufceptible of an almoft infinite number c^
combinations; and every * poffible combina-
tion of them conftitutes a new ground of
union among perceptions, which will be fub-
fervient to genius. Any prefent perception
will fuggeft a thoufand different ideas to as
many different perfons, according to the dif-
ferent affociating principles or combinations
of principles by which they are affeded ;.
and this will produce a correfpondent diver-
fity both in the fubftance and in the ftrudure
of their works*

SECT.

I 197 ]

SECT. VI.

Of the Modifications of the affociating Prin-
ciples,

AS the principles of aflbciatlon may lye
combined v/ith endlefs variety, fo each
principle is fufceptlble of different forms or
modifications. This was hinted before ; it
will now be proper to explain it.

Vicinity admits degrees ; for obje£l;s do
not fuggefl thofe only which are properly
contiguous ; but it admits not any dlverfity
in kind, except what was already taken no-
tice of, that it may be referred either to place
or to time. But all the other principles of
afTociatlon are fufceptible of much greater

varieties.

Resemblance not only takes place in

•different degrees^ but alio is of different
kinds. The difference Is only in degree, when
the fame quality of an objed: is the ground o^
its refemblance to feveral different things:
one thing may refemble feveral others, in co-
lour, fuppofe ; but refembles them more or
lefs, according to the different fhades of that
colour, which belong to them. Again, the

O 3 difference

1 98 of the Modifications of Part II.

difference is only in degree, when it arifes
from things poffeffing the fame qualities in
common, but poffeffing more or fewer of
them. One quality common to two objeds,
forms a real refemblance between them ; but
the refem.blance is much more perfed when
they have feveral common qualities : all ani-
mals, or all vegetables, have fome degree of
refemblance; animals or vegetables of the
fame clafs, have a greater refemblance ; thole
of the fame genus, ftill a greater ; the indi-
viduals of the fame fpecies, yet a greater;
and fome of the individuals have a much more
perfect refemblance than others.

But farther, one thing may refemble feveral
others, by means of its different qualities ; it
may refemble fome by its colour, others by its
fmeil, others by its figure, others by its lize :
each of thcfe forms a different kind of refem-
blance; for neither the qualities themfelves,
nor the fimilitudes ariling from them, can
admit comparifon in refpe«a of degree. Hence
any one thing is capable of as many forts of
refemblance to other things, as it poffeffes
diftind qualities. It is capable of many
more.

It not only refembles fome things by its
particular, definite, conftituent qualities, as

Sect. VI. the ajfociatlng Principles. 199

in the inftances already given: it may re-
femble other things by fome general charac-
ter belonging to fome of its qualities. Sweet-
nefs originally and properly belongs to taftes ;
but in a figurative fenfe we fpeak of fweet
colours, fv/eet founds, fweet difpofitions; wo,
intend to exprefs fome charadter common to
thefe diftind: qualities, which produces a re-
femblance among them, (o obvious that it has
rendered the figure ordinary in all languages,
if not flridly univerfal.

A THING may likewife refemble others, by
a fort of general appearance refuhing from
all its qualities, or from feveral of them. Of
this kind are the general likeneffes w^hich are
often obferved between the faces and the airs
of different perfons.

It may refemble other things, by bearing
the fame relation to fome objedt, which they
bear to the fame obje(3:, or even to kindred
objeds, nay to objects in no way connected .
by proceeding from the fame caufe, or by
proceeding from a fimilar caufe, or by pro-
ceeding from a totally different caufe in a
fomewhat fimilar manner; or by producing
fimilar effeds, or by producing its peculiar
effects in a fimilar manner. Refemblances of
this fort, however flight or remote they may

O 4 be

200 Of the Modifications of Part II.

be thought at firft fight, are fo clofe and juft,
that they are fufficient for producing a tran«
fition from one objed to another, which can-
not be reckoned unnatural, even when a per-
fon is under the influence of a paffion : Baffanio
overjoyed at Portia's having accepted his love,
fays,

Madam, you have bereft me of all words.
Only my blood fpeaks to you in my veins \
And there is fuch confufion in my powVs,
As, after fome oration fairly fpoke
By a beloved Prince, there doth appear
Among the buzzing, pleafed multitude,
"Where every fomething being blent together.
Turns to a wild of nothing, fave of joy
Expreft, and not expreft. {a)

The caufe of his joy is compared to what
refembles it in no refpe6t except in pro-
ducing i fimilar effect upon the mind, a like
confufed fenfation of joy. If that comparifon
Ihould by any be thought not entirely natural
in a perfon's exprefTion of his own paflion,
yet it will be acknowledged by all, that in a
defcription of that paflion, the comparifon
would be unexceptionable ; and this is a fuffi-.
cient proof, that the refemblance is a proper
ground of aflfociation. The juftnefs of thefe

{a) Merchant of Venice, aft 3, fcenc 2.

forts

Sect. VI. the ajjociatiiig Principles. 201
forts of refemblance appears farther from this,
that they have given rife to comparifons and
metaphors which fhow themfelves to be natu-
tral by being adopted in all ages and nations :
it is in fome of the indired ways now men-
tioned, that light refembles knowlege, joy,
goodnefs, and perfection ; yet light is one of
the moft beautiful and natural emblems of all
thefe. The refemblance which takes place
between fimple perceptions of the fame clafs,
between different fmells^ for inftance, feems
to belong to fome of the kinds now under
confideration. Simple perceptions being void
of compofition, can fcarce have fome qualities
in common, and other qualities which diftin-
guifh them ; our notion of their refemblance
muft proceed from their affeding the mind in
ways, the fimilarity of which we perceive,
though we cannot perhaps explain it, or from
our prefuming that they proceed from caufes
fomehow clofely related.

In a word, there is no quality, no relation,
no adlion of an objed:, no point of view in
which we can confider it, but may be the foun-
dation of a refemblance between it and fome
other. The refemblance is often of a very
delicate nature, and yet very obvious and
ilrong ; we readily feel it, but fometimes we

can

202 Of the Modif cations of Part II.

can fcarce at all define whence it arifes, or of
what kind it is.

Contrariety, in the extent in which it is
generally underftood, and in which it pro-
motes aflbciation, is reducible to feveral dif-
ferent fpecies. By contrariety is fometimes
meant only great diverfity. diffimilitude or
diftance ; as when bitter is faid to be contrary
to fweet ; and in this fenfe it admits many
degrees. In another fenfe, objedls are called
contrary, when one is only the negation or
abfence of the other ; thus darknefs and light,
health and ficknefs, are contraries [b). Other
objeds are contraries in a flill more proper
fenfe, as pleafure and pain, hope and fear, love
and hatred. Very often the two former of
thefe kinds of contrariety, and fometimes all
the three, run into one another by an eafy
gradation : rich and poor are terms of contra-
riety, but they exprefs, at different times, all
the three fpecies of contrariety ; poverty fome-
times figniiies only a very inferior degree of
riches, and then the contrariety is of the firll

{h) Cicero takes notice of thefe two kinds, though under
diiFerent names ; Contrarium crt, quod pofitum in genere di-
verfo, ab eodem cui contrarium eile dicicur, plurimum diftat,
ut frigus calori, vitas mors. Difparatum autem eft id, quod
ab aliqua re per oppofiiionem negationis fepjrarur, hoc modo,
fapere et non fapere. De Invefit. Lib, I. But the examples
which he gives are not appofitc, except in the mere expreflion.

kind;

Sect. VI. the ajfoclatlng Principles, 203

kind ; fometimes it denotes total indigence,
in which cafe the contrariety is of the fecond
kind ; but if the perfon to whofe condition
the word is applied be in debt, the contrariety
is of the third kind.

Objects which, confidered fimply in them-
felves, could not be reckoned contraries, yet
come to be regarded as fuch, when either
their caufes or their efFed:s are contrary in any
of the fenfes that have been mentioned. Heat
and cold are perhaps termed contraries, ra-
ther on account of the contrariety of their
caufes and of their effects, than of any oppo-
fition between the two fenfations themfelves.
Acids and alkalis, aftringents and laxatives,
feptics and antifeptics, are denominated con-
traries, merely on account of the contrariety
of fome of their efFeds.

Of co-exijicnce alfo there are many different
modifications, Thofe qualities which are
united in any natural whole or individual, are
in the propercft fenfe co-exiflent ; yet they
are not all co-exiftent in precifely the fame
degree or manner. The qualities which are
common to one individual with feveral others,
which together form the charader of the fpe-
cies, and would be enumerated in a juft defi-
nition of it, feem to have a co-c,xi{tence fome-

what

204 Of the Modifications of Part II.

what different from thofe which are peculiar
to one or a few individuals. Thefe two forts
of qualities influence affociation differently ;
a quality of the former fort moft readily fug-
gefts the idea of the fpecies ; one of the latter
fort, the idea of the individual. Some qua-
lities of the latter fort are permanent in the
individual ; others are temporary : thefe are,
at a particular time, really as infeparable from
it, as thofe are; yet they can fcarce be con-
fidered as belonging to it by a co-exiflence
equally clofe, though it Is fo flrong as very
readily to produce affociation.

Not only the effential qualities of a thing,
but circumfiances alfo which are not con-
fidered as entering into its fubflance, may
acquire a fort of co-exiflence with it, which
fhall ad; very powerfully on the imagination.
Thus whatever belongs to the condition of a
perfon, his poffefTions, his profpeds, all by
which he is diflinguifhed from others, all that
can render the conception of him more deter-
minate or more ftriking, acquire a connexion
with him, which produces affociation. Nay,
things which have belonged to the flate of the
fame perfon at different times, as poverty and
riches, meannefs and elevation, acquire, by
means of their relation to him, a connexion

with

Sect. VI. the ajfoclatlng Principles, 205

with one another, which there would be an
apparent impropriety in terming co-exiitence,
but which afFeds the imagination in a man-
ner perfcdly analogous. Whatever is clofely
or long connedcd with a thing, as an adjund,
or a concomitant, or belongs to it in any way,
comes naturally to be confidered as in fome
fenfe co-exiftent with it, and they will fuggeft
one another. If we have feen a perfon at
any one time in a remarkable attitude, or
fituation, or drefs, we can fcarce ever think
of him without conceiving it alfo. On the
other hand, a garment, a ring, the moft tri-
fling piece of drefs, will produce a lively con-
ception of the perfon to whom it belonged.
Ovid gives us a natural pidure of this in
Pyramus :

Ut vero veftem quoque fanguine tinflain

Repperit ; una duos nox, inquit, perdet amantes ;
E quibus ilia fuit longa digniflima vita, (b)

Several diftind fubflances are often com-
bined into a fyftem; and in that cafe they are
confidered as parts of one whole, and are
united in the imagination by the principle of
co-exiftence. An army, a nation, a church,
is a whole, including feveral individuals, in a

{}) Mitamorph, lib. iv.

manner

2o6 Of the Modifications of ParT IT.

manner fntiilar to that in which an individual
includes many different qualities.

What we have faid, does not perhaps
amount to a complete enumeration of all the
forms which co-exiftence aflumes ; but it fuf-
ficiently evinces that this relation does affume
a very great variety of forms.

It would not be eafy to purfue the relation
of caufe and effeB, through all the forms in
which it operates on the imagination ; but
many of the principal ones are very obvious.
What gives exiftence to any thing, what makes
any change in it, what influences any of its
powers or virtues, what contributes to its pre-
fervation, or to its deflrudion, a mean for
anfwering any end, an argument for proving >
any conclufion, a propofition from which a
corollary may be deduced, a motive to any fort
of condud; ail thefe are called caufes, but
plainly in very different fenfes ; and they all
are, in the imagination, affociated with their
feveral effeds or confequences. In the ex-
amples which we have had occafion to pro-
duce, mofl of thefe modifications of caufation
have occurred. This relation makes a per-
ception of the caufe, or of the effed, to in-
troduce the idea of its correlative, whether

the

Sect. VI. the a]} o dating Principles, 207

the effed be a fubftance or a mode, whether
the caufe give exiftence to the efFed, or only
alter it, or in any way affe6t it, or have a
power of affeding it. But the relation has
greateft force when it is mod; perfed : a fer-
vant will not fo readily fuggeft the idea of
his m after, as a fon that of his father.

Objects may be conneded as caufe and
efFed, when one of them does not immedi-
ately produce or influence the other. What
is, in any of the fenfes now mentioned, a
caufe, is conneded not only with its imme-
diate effeds, but alfo with the remoteft effeds
of any thing produced or affeded by it. In
a feries of things where each is the imme-
diate caufe of what fucceeds it, the laft efied
really depends upon the firft caufe. Some-
times we are ignorant of many of the inter-
mediate fteps, and regard that as the neareft,
which is only a remote caufe : an ordinary
man reckons the motion of his hand the im-
mediate cffed of his volition, becaufe he knows
nothing of the mufcles by which his hand is
moved. But even vv^hen we arc acquainted
with the whole chain of cauf-^s and effeds,
the effed will fometimes fuggeft a remote
caufe, Vs^ithout our ever thinking of the inter-
vening links ; or the remote caufe will di-
re dly

2of? Of the Modifications of Part IL

redly introduce the idea of the efFeQ; which
fprings from it by the mediation of many fub-
ordinate caufes, while to thefe we do not at
all attend. Thus when there has been one
among a perfon's anceftors very eminent,
though at a great diflance of time, it is natu-
ral both for the perfon himfelf and for others
to dired their thoughts to that one. Horace
in addrefhng his patron, mentions not his fa-
ther, but much remoter anceftors ;

Maecenas, atavis edite regibus. [c)
Tyrrhena regum progenies, [d)

This principle is fometimes fo powerful, that
a perfon finds himfelf difpofed to give a fa-
mily, or even a nation, a name formed from
that of their founder, many ages after his.
death. Such is the epithet which Virgil gives
his countrymen long after the time of Romulus;

' Subitoque novum confurgere helium

Romulidis. [e]

As the fame caufe fometimes produces many
different effeds, all thefe effeds, however dif-
fimilar, are conneded with one another by
means of their relation to the common caufe?

(f) Lib. I. Od. I.
\d) Lib. III. Od. 29.
{e) JSmd. Lib. VIU;

2 and

S-ECT. VI. the jajfoc'iating Principles. sog

and by virtue of this connexion one of the
efFedts will lead us to think of the other. Heat
and light are both effects of fire ; and one
of them being perceived, naturally fuggefts
the other. Sometimes one effedt fuggefts the
idea of the caufe, and this introduces the idea
of the other efFed:. The fight of a fon Vv^ill
lead us to think of the father, and the thought
of him will introduce a difcourfe or enquiry
concerning his other children. Sometimes
again one effed: will introduce the idea of
another effe(5t, without firft fuggefting the
idea of their common caufe. The fight of a
perfon may difpofe us to think of a brother,
without our once thinking of the parents, by "
means of vv^hom they are related to each other.
In this cafe, it feems to be a fpecies of rcfem-
blance that produces the aflbciation ; the two
effects are like in this particular, that they
are derived from the fame caufe. In like
manner, when two or more objedls are joint
caufes of the fame effedis, they are related to
one another, and the perception of the one
readily carries the thoughts to the other.

Order, as well as the other relations which
promote aflbciation, may be diftinguifhed into
different fpecies.

P There;

219 Of the Modifications of PartK,

There Is an order in place. The or-
der of things in place may feem fometimes
•to promote alTociation almoft only by the in-
fluence of vicinity. Thus the thinking of
one of a company, will firfl: lead us to think
of the perfon who fat contiguous to him, then
of another who was next to this fecond, and
fo on, till we have gone through the whole
company in the order in which they happened
to be placed. Here the order of the perfons,
by which the imagination is affected, appears
to be little different from vicinity. But it
really is fomewhat different : we may fup-
pofe the fame number of perfons of which
the company confifled, {landing together in
a confufed crowd : in this fituation, they may
be more clofely contiguous than before ; but
tbey have not order, and therefore one of
them will not fo readily fuggeH the refl, nor
will it be fo eafy to recoiled: them all. What
then Is the difference between thefe two fitu-
aticns ? Formerly thefe perfons did compofe
a regular figure, now they do not. Order^
therefore, even of the fimpleft kind. Includes
regularity of figure, as well as vicinity ; and
by means of that regularity, order alTocIates.-
ideas more flrongly than vicinity alone. But

order

Sect. VI. the ajfociating Prhiclples. 21 i

order in place often Implies more ; it arifes
from thofe things or parts of things being
placed contiguous, which are connected by
other relations. Thus a number of perfons
may be placed, not only in fome regular
figure, but in a farther order, according to
their fex, age, or dignity. In this cafe, the
affociating force of order, is made up of the
united forces of contiguity, and of the rela-
tions which the things or parts bear to one
another, independent of their contiguity.
The parts of a watch are placed in order^
when each part Is contiguous to thofe from
which it receives, and to which it communi-
cates motion. In confequence of this, the
idea of any one part will lead us to conceive
the part next to it, or to conceive all the parts,
or will fuggeft an idea of the whole, much
more eafily and quickly than it could, if we
only confidered that part as laid in a heap
along with the reft : yet in a heap, the parts
might have had clofer contiguity, than in the
machine.

There is likewife an order in time. It

arifes from placing thofe things in immediate

fucceffion, which are related by refemblance,

caufation, or any other relation. SuccefTion

^ alone would aflbciate the ideas, though their*

P ;? objedts

212 Of the Modifications ef Part 1L

objedls were not otherwlfe related ; thefe re-
lations would affociate them, though the things
had not been fucceflive ; both being combined
in order, it muft have great power to produce
aflbciation. In a regular proceffion, perfons
'iiot only follow one another, btit are difpofed
ticcording to their rank and dignity : in con-
fequence of this, either the view, or a defcrip-
tion of a fmall part of a proceffion, is enough
to enable the imagination to pafs along all the
other parts, and to take in a conception of the
-whole. Succeffive events are generally con-
necftcd as caufes and efFeds : when they are>
they will readily occur to evei-y perfon in the
order in which they happened, and influenced
one another ; every narration may fuggeft
examples of this. But when fucceflive obje(!ls
happen not to be thus conne6:ed, they are
flightly aflbciated by mere fucceflion. In a
chronological table, events are conne^dled by
fucceflion alone; in a regular hiftory, by or-
der; in this lafl: cafe, there is a much greater
union of the parts, than in the former. The
other relations which, in order, are joined
with fucceflion, have fo confiderable force,
that an hiftorian often gives the moft perfect
order to his narration, by bringing together
events in it, which have a natural connexion,

though

Sect. VI. the ajjbciatlng Principles. 213

though they did not happen in immediate fuc-
ceflion, and is, without reflection or defign,
ied to adopt this order.

There is likewife what may be called an
order of nature. This has often a great ana-
logy to order in place and in time. It is no
wonder that it fliould, fince we conceive all
things as conne<3:ed both with place and with
time. Order in both feems to be, in fom.e in-
ftances, eftabliflied by nature ; our thoughts
move eafily in tracing defcent, or in following
the courfe of time, but with difnculty in tra-
cing afcent, or in going backward in time. But
ilill the fpecies of order now under confidera-
tion, is different from the other two. In
many cafes, there is a natural order in things
themfelves : hence one manner of confiderins:
them, is according to order, and another con-
trary to it ; our thoughts muft proceed in that
natural order, elfe their progrefs is obftru£ted.
In conceiving a man, our thoughts pafs rea-
dily from the head downwards ; it is in many
refpe<9:s the principal part of the body, and
by it that nourifhment is conveyed, which
fuftains the whole. In conceiving a tree we
proceed upwards from the root to the ftem
and the branches : it is from the firft that
thefe latter parts derive their nourifhment,

P 3 and

a 1 4 Of the Modifications of Part II.

and by it they are fupported ; there is alfo a
fucceflion in their firft produdion, they grow
up gradually from the root : both thefe caufes
have an influence on the courfe of our
thoughts. In conceiving a houfe, the mind,
in like manner, naturally afcends from the
bottom to the top, and for the fame reafons ;
the inferiour parts fupport the fuperiour ; the
building proceeds from the foundation up-
wards : befides, if we would go into the houfe,
we mufl: afcend from the ground towards the
yoof ; the mind takes the lame courfe.

There are perhaps fome cafes in which
cuflom alone fixes a certain order ; but after
cuilom has fixt it, it operates as ftrongly on
the mind, as if it had been eftablifhed by na-
ture. Writing from right to left, or from
left to right, is determined merely by cuftom ;
but in confequence of that cuftom, an Euro-
pean finds difficulty in tracing the combina-
tion of letters in the former diredion, and an
Oriental finds equal difficulty in tracing that
eombination in the latter diredtlon.

Thus every one of the afTociating princi^
pies affijmes many diff^erent forms ; and every
diftind; form which any of them can alfume,
ynay be confidered as a feparate relation, and
neceflarily produces a correfpoi\dent peculia-
rity

Sect. VII. the ajfoclathig Prlnclpks, 215

rity In the exertion of genius, which is di-
redted by it. The feveral modifications of
thefe principles muft contribute both to in-
creafe the force, and to diverfify the form of
genius, in the very fame ways, as it has been
already fhown that the variety of their com-
binations does.

SECT. VII.

Of the Predominance of the affociathig

Principles,

THE obfervations which we have hitherto
made, fliow that there muft be great
differences and diffimilitudes in the effeds of
genius ; for they lead us to perceive that it may
proceed from one conception to another in an
infinite variety of ways. But in order to ex-
plain, in what manner the multitude of the
affociating qualities lays a foundation for per-
manent diverfities of genius, fome farther ob-
fervations will be neceffary.

All the affociating principles have fome
degree of force in every man. There is per-
haps no perfon on whom any one of them has
no influence at all. But in almoft every man,
fome one of them is predominant : on every
fubjeit, a man is apt to follow one relation

P 4 rather

2i6 Of the Predominance of Part U.

rather than any other, and to conceive chiefly
fuch ideas as are, by that relation, connected
with the prefent perception. Whence this
proceeds, is perhaps inexpUcable ; it muft,
in a great meafure, be refolved into original
differences in the conftitution of the mind :
but the thing itfelf is evident in the mofl; fim-
ple and common inftances. If different per-
fons fet themfelves to recollect a company, one
naturally recolledls it by running over the
places occupied by thofe who compofed it ;
another enumerates them according to their;
feveral profeflions, conditions, ages, or fexes ;
another according to their refpetftive families
and connexions : in the firft perfon, vicinity
or order ; in the fecond, refemblance ; in the
third, the relation of caufe and efFccfl, is the
predominant principle of affociation. ,

When any "objed: is conceived by a perfon,
all its qualities are in fome meafure prefent to
his view: but in confequence of original dif-
ferences in the turn of men's imaginations,
one man's attention is fixt chiefly on one of
thefe qualities, and another man's attention
on a different quality. This is, in many
cafes, the immediate caufe of the predomi-
nance of one affociating principle. The dif-
ferent qualities of an objed: not only lay a

founda-

Sect. VII. the affoc'iating Principles. 2iy

foundation for a connexion between ^it and
different objects, but alfo connect it with thofe
different objects by means of different rela-
tions ; and each perfon is affedted by that re-
lation which belongs to the quality on which
he mofl readily fixes his attention. A few
perfons can fcarce engage in a converfation
on any fubjed, without affording an example
of this. Whatever it be that is firft intro-
duced, almofl every perfon confiders it in a
different point of view, and in confequence
of this runs into a different train of thinking
and a different fet of reflexions. When dia-
logue is conduced naturally, the feveral affo-
ciating qualities by which the fpeakers are af-
fected, may be eafily traced out : each of
them goes on in a train fuited to his own turn
of imagination, and one of them fometimes
in a train even oppofite to that which is pur-
fued by another. By care to preferve this va-
riety, dialogue-writing is rendered natural ;
and it is on account of the difficulty of pre-
ferving this variety, that fo few fucceed in that
manner of writing.

An original conflitution of mind is not the

only caufe of a perfon's being influenced by

one affociating principle more than by others :

it was formerly obferved, that this may pro-

6 ceed

a 1 8 Of the IP re dominance of Part II.

ceed from habit. But the habit generally
takes its rife from an original propenfity to
follow chiefly one relation ; it always takes
its rife from this, when its effeds are perma-
nent. A diverfity in the predominant prin-
ciple of affociation, is often obfervable very
early in children, previous to the poflibility
of their having contrad:ed habits of thinking,
and muft therefore be natural. If the origi-r
nal propenfity be weak, it may be over-
powered by other caufes : but if it be flrong,
it will frequently exert itfelf ; by frequent
exertion it will beget a habit of being influ-
enced by it ; and by the formation of the
habit it will be confirmed. Still, therefore,
the predominance of one aflbciating principle
or another, is, in mofl: cafes at leaft, ultimately
refolvable into an original confl:itution of the
mind.

Here is a dire£l foundation for a perma-
nent variety of genius. In fome man of ge-
nius of another, each of the aflbciating prin-
ciples is predominant ; and whichever of them
is, it forms a turn of genius fuitable to it, and
different from what the prevalence of any
other would have produced. Invention in
difi^erent arts and fciences, is dependent on
very difl^erent relations of perceptions : genius
z for

Sect.VIT. the ajfo dating Principles* gig

for a particular art or fcieece, will therefore
be formed by the prevalence of that principle
of aflbciation which chiefly leads to invention
in it. Jn comparing the works of men of ge-
nius, we may find number] efs illuftrations of
this : we may often find the fame fad; or the
fame objed prefent to the minds of the philo-
fopher, the hiilorian, the poet, the orator,
the painter ; we may obferve that it leads each
of them a different road, or that they pafs
from it to other ideas by different relations ;
and by attending to thefe, we may be able to
afcertain and defcribe the peculiarity of genius
in each of them.

What has been now faid of the different
principles of affociation, is equally applicable
to all the different forms or modifications of
which it has been fliown that every one of
thefe principles is capable. There are various
kinds of refemblance, for inftance, of contra-^
riety, of caufation ; one man is naturally in-
fluenced chiefly by one kind, another by ano-
ther kind ; the turn of genius in each is fuit^-
able to that kind by which he is mofl affected.
Hence mufl arife many diverfities of genius.
Whether a perfon pafs from caufes to effects,
or from effedts to caufes, his imagination is
influenced by the fame relation : yet all men

are

S20 Of the Predominance of Part II,

are not equally fitted for both. In mathema-
tics, one man is moft turned for algebra,
another for geometry. One excells in the
analytical part of philofophy, in refolving
phenomena into their caufes, and reducing
them to general laws ; and another excells in
explaining the phenomena, in applying ge-
neral principles to a number of cafes, and in
accounting for them elegantly and fuccefT-
fuUy. Many of the falfe fyftems of philofo-
phy which have made a figure in the world,
certainly difplay very confiderable genius, hut
genius of different kinds. Des Cartes de-
duced his whole philofophy from a few ge-
neral principles : he fhowed a propenfity to
pafs from caufes to their efFeds. Gilbert en-
deavoured, in a manner not at all deftitute of
ingenuity, to refolve all the phenomena of
nature into magnetifm : the prevailing turn
of his imagination was to proceed from effects
to caufes.

Most commonly, the great divifions of ge-
nius arife from the prevalence of one principle
of afibciation or another ; and the more mi-
nute varieties from the prevalence of different
modifications of the fame principle. Yet thefe
"modifications are fometimes fodiffimilar, that
the predominance of one or another of them

produces

Sect. VII. the ajfociating Principles, 221

produces a difference of genius as great as
could be produced by the predominance of
principles totally diftindl. In a mere recital
of fads, there is fcarce any room for genius :
but the true hiftorian does not confine himfelf
to fuch recital ; he places fads in connexioa,
}>e rifes to the fources of adions, and he pur-
fues them through their confequences : it is
in this that hiftorical genius appears ; and in
this the hiftorian is plainly aduated by the
relation of caufe and effed. The fame adions
which the hiftorian relates, may be alfo con-
fidered by the philofopher, their motives at-
tended to, and conclufions deduced from them,
concerning the conftitution of human nature :
in this he is influenced by the fame relation
of caufe and eff'ed, but by a different fpecies
of it ; and accordingly he fliows a kind of ge-
nius totally diftind from that of the hiftorian.
I Ihall give an example which is ftill more
ftriking. In reducing bodies to regular divi-
fions and fubdivifions, the natural hiftorian is
conduded altogether by the principle of re-
femblance ; in adorning a fubjed with fimiles
and metaphors, the poet is likewife under the
influence of the principle of refemblance :
yet no two forts of genius are perhaps more
different than that for natural hiftory, and

that

222 Of the Predominance of PartIL

that for poetry. In accounting for the phe-
nomena of bodies, the phllofopher follows a
quite different relation, that of cauie and ef-
fect ; but the genius of a natural hiftorian,
is much more akin to philofophical, than to
poetical genius.

But farther; Not only the prevalence of
different forms of the fame affociating prin-
ciple, is fufficient for producing very diffniii-
lar turns of genius ; but alfo one of thefe
forms only operating in fomewhat different
manners, has force enough to mark genius
with a perceptible peculiarity. An image is
always connected with a fubjed: by refem-
blance : but the image may be applied either
in a comparifon or in a metaphor ; and one
perfon is led by the turn of his imagination
chiefly to the ufe of the one, and another per-
fon chiefly to the ufe of the other of thefe
figures. Here a diverfity of genius, fo confi-
derable that it may become in fome degree
charad:erifl:ical, arifes from a very fmall dif-
ference in the manner in which two perfons
pafs from one perception to another by means
of the very fame relation, from their only
paffing with different degrees of rapidity, and
confidering the refembling objed wath diffe-
rent degrees of deliberation. Nay, though two

poets

Sect. VII. the ajfoclating Principles. i^i

poets illuftrate their fubje£ts by the fame com-
parifon, they may difplay a variety of genius
by their different manners of purfuing it ;
one is happy at fetting the main image full in
view by one bold ftroke ; the other traces the
iikenefs minutely, and thus introduces ele-
gance into his work. When differences {o
minute in the form of the fame affociating
principle, and even in the manner of our
yielding to the fame form of any of the aflb-
ciating principles, can give a peculiar turn to
the imagination, there mufl evidently be room
for a prodigious variety in genius.

We would be apt to take it for granted,
that the affociating force of any relation mufl
be in proportion to the degree of that relation.
The more perfedt the relation is between two
perceptions, the more clofely, we would ex-
pert, they fliall be united in the imagination,
and the more readily Ihall one of them fuggeR
the other. If refemblance, for inflance, be
what gives one perception a tendency to in-
troduce another, it is natural to think that this
tendency will be ftrongefl when the refem-
blance is greateft. Doubtlefs this is generally
the cafe : but it is far from holding univer-
fally ; there are feveral limitations and excep-
tions.

For

524 Of the P redoinhid3ice of Part It^

For example, Though the relation which
one objed bears to another be very ftrongj
yet if 'it be common, if it be fuch as that ob-
jeiSt 'bears likewife to many other objeds, it
•will not operate fo ftrongly on the imagina-
tion, as a weaker relation which is fpecial and
diftine:mihino:. Number diftradts the atten-
tion, and hinders any one of the objeds from
making a ftriking impreffion. A nobleman
attrads lefs notice in a crowd of perfons of his
own rank, than a man of much lower note,
would command in a company where he has
no equal. Singularity is always ftriking.

Again ; If it be aflertedthat the ftronger ,
relation will prove the moft powerful princi-
ple of afTociation, the aflertion muft be con-
fined to one form or modification of that
relation. Of the various forms or modifica-
tions which, it has been fhown, every rela-
tion admits, fome may be confidered as
greater in degree than others : but different
men are chiefly aff'eded by different modifi-
cations of a relation ; and therefore fome will
be moft affeded by a weaker relation, becaufe
it is of that form from w^hich they are moft
fufceptible of an impreffion. Indeed, fome of
the peculiarities of genius neceffarily imply a
propenfity to be influenced moft by fome of

the

Sect. VIL the ajfociatlng Principles, 225
the weaker modifications of the aflbciatinfr

principles. Poetical genius, for example, fo
far as it depends on the force of the principle
of refemblance, confifts in a propenfity to be
affedled, not by the completeft relemblances,
but by fuch as are more imperfeft. In poeti-
cal imagery, the refemblance ought to be
always juft, but it is an excellence that it be
not altogether obvious, and it is neceflary
that it be mixt with fomething of diverfity.
Any individual is likened, not fo often to
another individual of the fame fpecies, as to
one of a different fpecies, or even to fome-
thing totally different in kind : a hero is com-
pared, not fo frequently nor fo beautifully to
another hero, as to a lion or to the fun. The
exafl: fimllitudes to which the naturalift con-
fines his attention, have no influence upon
the poet, and would be a very improper
foundation for metaphors or comparifons.

But it is further obfervable, That fome are
apt to be influenced even by a weak degree of
any modification of an affociating quality^
rather than by a fl:ronger degree of the very
fame modification. Thus fome men, on
whatever fubje<Sl they reafon, deduce all their
reafonings from remote principles, and never
prove any point by the fhortefl and mofl di-

226 Of the Predominance of Part 11,

red arguments. There are writers, moft of
whofe images and antithefes are far-fetched
and forced. This turn of imagination pro-
duces a peculiarity of genius, but generally
fuch an one as is faulty. A late ingenious
writer [a] has remarked tMs peculiarity, that
fome are apt to attend chiefly to remote and
trifling relations of ideas; and he gives a
very appofite example of it from Shakefpear ;

" Hofefs. Thou didft fwear to me on a
parcel-gilt goblet, fitting in my Dolphin-
chamber, at the round table, by a fea-coal
fire, on Wednefday in Whitfun-week, when
the Prince broke thy head for likening him to
a finging man of Windfor ; thou didft fwear
to me then, as I was w^fhing thy wound, to
marry me, and make me my lady thy wife.
Canft thou deny it ? did not good-wife Keach
the butcher's wife come in then, and call me
gollip Quickly ? coming in to borrow a mefs
of vinegar ; telling us fhe had a good difh of
prawns, whereby thou didft defire to eat fome ;
whereby I told thee they were ill for a green
wound ; and didft not thou, when fhe was
gone down ftairs, defire me to be no more fo
familiarity with fuch poor people, faying that
ere long they fhould call me Madam ? and

[a] Elements ofCritici/m, chap. I ,

I didft

Sect. VII. the ajfbciatlng Principles. 227

didft thou not klfs me, and bid me fetch thee
thirty Ihillings ?" [h)

That author accounts for this peculiarity, by
refolving it into a want of difcernment ; but
this account is not altogether fatisfying. Sup-
pofe remote or (lightly connected ideas to have
occurred to a perfon, difcernment may lead
him to reje^ them, and the want of it may
prevent his rejecting them. But the queflioii
remains. Whence comes it that fuch ideas
occur to fome, and not to others ? Their oc-^
curring may in fome meafure proceed indi-
rectly from a want of difcernment : the judg-
ment of fome men is fo ftrong that it attends
imagination in all its exertions, and gives it
an habitual tendency to fuggeft only fuch
ideas as have a proper connexion with the
prefent perception; a defed: of judgment or
difcernment prevents imagination from ac-
quiring this correclnefs, th.e want of which
leaves it at liberty to run into flight and re-
mote aflbciatlons. But this is not the princi-
pal or immediate, far lefs the only caufe of
it : its origin mufl be fought chiefly in the na-
tural turn of the imagination. If we attend
to the example jufl: now quoted, we fhall
find that all the triding aifociations contained
{h) Second part oi Hcnrj W. aol 2. fcene 2,

0^2 in

2 2S Of the Predominance of Part IT.

in it, confift in the introdudlion of a number
of circumftances which have no other con-
nexion with the fubjedt of difcourfe, but this,
that they happened in the place and at the
time to which it refers. The turn of imagi-
nation which it fliows, feems therefore to
arife merely from vicinity being the prevail-
ing principle of afTociation. Mere vicinity
either in time or in place, is one of the flighteft
and leaft important relations, and confequently
whenever it is the prevailing relation, it will
produce a propenfity to trifling affociations (r),

(f) That the prevalence of this relation, is by far the mod
common caafe of trifling afTociations, may, I believe, be
affirmed with confidence. If we examine feveral inllances of
fuch trifling aifociations, we fhall find that they are generally
formed by mere vicinity. One other inilance I Ihall give from
the fame author.

Cloxvn. Sir, {he came in great with child ; and longing
(fave your honour's reverence) for fiew'd prunes ; we had but
two in the houfe, which at that very inltant time flood, as it
were, in a fruit-difh, a difh of lome three pence ^ (your ho-
nours have feen fuch dilhes, they are not China dilhes, but
very good difhes.)

Efcalus. Go to, go to ; no matter for the difh. Sir.

Cloiun. No indeed. Sir, not of a pin ; you are therein in
the right : but to the point ; as I fay, this Mrs. Elboa.Uy being,
as 1 fay, with child, and being great belly'd, and longing, as
I faid, for prunes ; and having no more in the difh, as I faid ;
Mailer Frolh here, this very man, having eaten the reft, as I
faid, and, as I fay, paying for them very honeflly ; for, as you
know. Mafter Froth, I could not give you three pence again.

Froth. No indeed.

Clo^n. Very well ; you being then, if you be remembred,
cracking the flones of the forefaid prunes.

Froth. Ay, fo I did indeed.

Cloivn. V hy, very well ; I telling you then, if you be re-
membred, that fuch a one, and fuch a one, were paft cure of

The

Sect. VII. the ajjoclathig Principles. 229

The predominance of the principle of refem-
blance, when indulged without referve, often
produces a fimilar propenfity, as in the neiu
fong ofncwjinnlies. Some of the qualities of
every thing are lefs important than others ;
they give rife to none but trivial relations ; a
propenfity therefore to attend chiefly to fuch
qualities, muft produce trifling affociations,
whatever be the principle to which they be-
long. It deferves to be remarked, however,
that a tendency to conceive ideas which are
but remotely conneded with the prefent per-
ception, fometimes conflitutes an excellence
of genius. Some men fee at one glance, the
moftdiftant caufes and confequences of things.

the thing you wot of, unlefs they kept good diet, as I told
you.

Froth. All this is true.

■ Clonxjn. Why, very well then.

Ej'cal. Come, you are a tedious foo! ; to the purpofe : what
was done to Elbc-w's wife, that he hath caufe to complain of?
come to what was done to her

Clo^n. bir, your honour cannot come to that yet.

Efcal. No, Sir, I mean it not.

CUvjn. Sir, bat you fhall come to it, by your honour's leave :
and I befeech you, look into Mailer Fioth here, Sir, a man of
fourfcore pound a year : u hofe father died at Hallovjmas,
Was't not at Hc.llo'wmas^ Mailer Fnih /*

Froth. All holland eve.

Clo^n. Why, very well ; I hope here be truths. He, Sir,
fitting, as I fay, in a lower chair. Sir: 'twas in the Bunch
of Grapes, where indeed you have a delight to fit, have you
not ?

Froth, I have fo, becaufe it is an open room, and good for
winter.

CU-i'jn, Why, very well then : I hope here be truths.

Meafure far Meajure, acl 2, fcene 2.

0.3 This

2 30 Of the P redominmice of P a r t II,

This proceeds from an uncommon adllvity of
imagination, which enables it to pafs in an
inftant through a long feries of ideas, fo that
all the middle fteps are fcarce attended to, and
very quickly forgotten.

The peculiar form which genius affumcs,
depends not on the predominant principle of
afibciation alone, but alfo on the degree of
force which all the other principles of affoci-
ation have. There is not any fubjecfl in which
invention depends upon, or can be accom-
plifhed by only one of thefe principles. In
every fubjcdi, there is one leading principle of
invention ; but many other principles, by be-
ing exerted m fubordination to that, contribute
to the invention. Though one aflbciating
principle be predominant in every man of
genius, yet all the other principles operate
along wath it. Thefe may be combined in
very different proportions ; and every differ-
ence in the manner of their combination, or
in their comparative flrength, will produce as
real, though not fo remarkable a peculiarity
pf genius, as a diiTerencc in the predominant
principle. In fuch genius, for inftance, as
enables a man to account for the phenomena
pf things, the relation of caufe and effe(5b is
|he predominant principle of aiTociation : but

refemblancG

Sect. VII. the affociating Principles, 231

refemblance alfo muft have fome force, other-
wife the fimilar phenomena, and tlie analo-
gous experiments from which general conclu-
fions are deducible, cannot be fuggefted ; order
muft have fome Influence, for if the obferva-
tions be not properly difpofed, they will lead
to no conclufion : contrariety muft have fome
influence, elfe thofe contradictory inftances
will not occur, which are necefl^ary for limit-
ing the conclufions and giving them preci-
fion. Every diff^erent proportion which thefe
principles bear to one another, will ftamp phi-
lofophical genius with a peculiar character,
will adapt it to one particular fort of fubjeds,
or will give it a determinate degree of excel-
lence. In genius of every kind, there is the
like complication and adjuftmentof aflbciating
principles. In every individual, genius is like
an organized body, the form of which arifes
from the manner in which the feveral mem-
bers are combined, and is altered by every the
the fmalleft change in the flze or pofition of
any one of them. This being the cafe, the
polfible arrangements andfubordinations of all
the aflTociating principles and their modifica-
tions, are fo many that they lay a foundation
for an endlefs variety of genius.

CL4 SECT.

232 Of Flexibility Part II.

SECT. VIII.

Of Flexibility of Imagination,

7E have now pointed out fome fixt and
V V permanent qualities of the imagina-
tion, which are fufficient for the production
of a great variety of genius : but before we
leave this part of the fubjecl, it will be pro-
per to obferve, that imagination has a certain
pliablcnefs or flexibility, by means of which
ftill greater variety is introduced.

Any particular turn of imagination does
not lie in a mere point ; it admits fome lati-
tude without lofing its charadleriflical pecu-
liarity. The predominant principle of aflcci-
ation may continue the fame in the main, and
yet lead into tracks of thought confiderably
different : the proportions which the feveral
principles of aiTociation bear to one another,
may be altered without being wholly deftroy-
ed ; juft as the configuration of the features
may be altered in a face by different pafTions
or different ftates of health, and yet that face
be acknowleged the fame, and remain clearly
diflinguifhable from every other. In confe-
quence of this flexibility, the difcoveries of
the fame perfon, on the fame fubjedt, will be

very

Sect. VIII. of Imagination. 233

very different at different times. If a perlbn
write his thoughts on a fubjed: at different
periods, the fentiments, the imagery, the com-
portion, the order, will be far from being the
very fame. In fome cafes the difference is fo
great, a's to fhow that different affociating
principles, at leaft very different modifications
of the fame principle, have been predominant
at thefe different periods.

A TEMPORARY variation in the turn of a
man's imagination, or in the form of his ge-
nius, fometimes arifes fi'om caufes as far be-
yond the reach of our invefcigation, as many
of thofe which produce an alteration in the
conftitution of the body, or of thofe which
make one fummer to differ from another.
But fuch variation may often be accounted
for from the influence which habit has upon
the operations of fancy.

Habit difpofes men to be eafily affected
by a relation which they have for fome time
been accuftomed to follow ; and it often dif-
pofes them fo ftrongly to this, as to make fome
other affociating principle to prevail for a
while, above that which is naturally predomi-
nant. To this effect of habit it is owing,
that a man, by applying for fome time to a
fubjed which he could fcarce force himfelf to

fludy

234 Of Flexibility Part II.

ftudy at firfl:, comes to enter into it with eafe.
From the fame efFedl of habit, will arife a very
great degree of that diverfity which has been
mentioned, in the produdions of one man on
the fame fubjed.

Habit may contribute to this diverfity in
another way, and that even without making
any alteration in the predominant principle
of aflbciation. Habit makes fuch ideas as are
at the time moft familiar to us, ' rufh more
readily into the mind, than fuch as are lefs
familiar, though thefe latter be equally or
even more ftrongly related to the prefent per-
ception. Many caufes render different ideas
moft familiar to a perfon at different times :
and as a perception may be conneded, by
means of any one affociating quality, with a
thoufand others, that perception will naturally
fuggeff any of thefe which is at prefent moft
familiar, provided it be conneded with it by
the relation which has greateft influence on
that particular perfon. Other ideas may be
more ftrongly conneded with it by the fame
relation, and would be more readily fuggcfted
to a perfon who was not under the power of
that habit 5 but with this perfon, the famili-
arity of the former idea gains it the prefer-
ence to all others. When on the firft concep-
tion

Sect. VIII. of Imagination, 235

tion of a riibje6l, certain ideas belonging to it
occur in this manner, by reafon of their fami-^
liarity to us, they lead us to fuch other ideas
as have the ftrongeft relation to them. But
if the ideas which were firft fuggefted, had
been different, they would have led us, by the
fame principles, into a very different train of
thinking, and the whole work would have
born a very dilTimilar afpedt. Thus when a
perfon fets out from a place where feveral
roads terminate, a very few fleps decide which
of them he takes ; and by going on in it, he
arrives at a place very diftant from that to
which he fhould have been brought by ano^
ther of the roads iffuing from the fame point.
This flexibility of imagination takes place
in all men, in fome degree ; but it takes place
in fome men, in a much greater degree than
in others. No man has an imagination fo
dull, or an imagination fo invariably fixt in
one form, as to be nowife alfeded by habit or
other occafional caufes : but there are two forts
of perfons, who are difpofed to be mofl affedted
by thefe. Firft, they whofe genius is not very
great, nor ftrongly marked with any pecu-
liarity. It is on this account eafily turned
■out of its direction by accidental caufes, and
eagerly lays hold of the afiiftance which may

-' 3 ^ ^ Flexibility P a R t 11.

be derived from their operation. Secondly,
they whofe genius is uncommonly ftrong and
lively. In thefe the fame effe*^ is produced
by a very different caufe ; the vigour and ac-
tivity of their alfociating powers, bellows
great delicacy and fenfibility upon their ima-
ginations, and renders them fufceptible of
ftrong impreffions from any temporary caufes ;
they feel the force of every fuch caufe, and
receive a tranfient form or tindure from it.
The produdlions of thefe tvvro different forts
of perfons, bear marks of the different caufes
from which the flexibility of their fancies
fprings. The works of the former have no
common charader, but are almoft as unlike
to one another as to the works of a different
perfon ; but through all the works of the lat-
ter, notwithftanding their varieties, there runs
a certain peculiarity, which fhows that they
had the fame author.

It has been often obferved, that the dif-
ferent works of men of genius fometimes dif-
fer very much in the degree of their perfec-
tion. This may fometimes arife from the
fubjeds not being equally adapted to their abi-
lities. But in many cafes It happens, that a
perfon will at one time very fuccefsfully pro-
fecute a fubjed which he has often attempted

Sect. VIII. of Imagination, 237

in vain before, or accomplifh a difcovery by-
accident, which has eluded many profefTed in-
veftigations. This may frequently be ac-
counted for from the principles juft now efta-
blifhed. Habit, or fome other incidental caufe,
gives the fancy at one time a turn, which we
do not reflect upon, but which prepares it for
attaining a certain difcovery ; and that either
by rendering an idea familiar, which is fub-
fervient to that difcovery, or by difpofmg it
to follow the relation which leads moll natu-
rally to the difcovery. At another time, the
fame caufe gives the mind fo ftrong a propen-
fity to attend to an idea, or to follow a rela-
tion which draws us off from the proper track,
and obftruds the invention, that no efforts
can conquer it. When the appearance arifes
not from this caufe, it may often be afcribed
to the inequalities which are incident to the
vigour of genius in the fame man at different
times, and which may be in fome meafure
accounted for from the obfervations that have
been formerly made. Though the principles
of affociation be never perhaps entirely dor-
mant or impotent, yet they are not, m any
any man, alike prone to exert themfelves, or
fit for adling with the fame force, at all feafcns.
Sometimes they are active, and ready to run

from

238 Of Flexibility Part 1L

from any idea that occurs, through a long
train of other ideas related to it, without a
poffibility of our refifting their influence, or
cooling the ardour which their activity in-
fpires. When the imagination is in this ftate,
and is at the fame time imprefled with a flrong
"view of a particular end, genius is extenfive
and vigorous, and can with eafe perfed in-
ventions, as by a lucky and unaccountable hit,
in purfuing which it has formerly toiled in
vain. To produce this vigour and alertnefs
of invention, it is neceflary that there be fome
prefent perception conneded with many
others, from which it may fet out ; that the
aflbciating principle to which that connexion
correfponds, be flrong ; that the mind be not
deeply engaged in any other train of thinking
which would lead off from this track ; and
that we have a ftrong aflbciation of the de-
fign. If any of thefe conditions be wanting,
that alertnefs will be obftruded. It fome-
times is obftruded to a very great degree ;
fancy is deprefled, the power of afTociation
feems to be fufpended, or if it at all exert it-
felf, it is only in trifling, unmeaning excur-
fions ; it is too feeble to keep the defign ia
view, and is continually allowing us to quit
the road which would lead us forward to a

valuables

Sect. VIII. of ImaginaYion. 2 39

valuable invention. While this debility of
imagination continues, it throws genius into
a ftate of languor. It enters on its work with-
out fufficient ardour ; it is fluggifh, and can
make no progrefs in it ; it fuggefts no ideas,
or but few that are conducive to its intention ;
and all our efforts to exert it are unfuccefsful.
We cannot call up ideas, as it were, by name,
we can only caft ourfelves into the roads in
which they are likelieft to occur ; and if fancy
be not powerful enough to bring them into
view, we muft remain without them. This
accounts, in a great meafure, for the common
obfervation, that moft ufeful inventions have
been made by accident, often when men were
in fearch of fomething elfe. This fhows us
likewife, why the greateft geniufes fometimes
fmk below themfelves, and fail in undertak-
ings in which at another time they would
have eafily fucceeded. It is as impoffible,
during thefe unfavourable turns of genius, to
fupply its defeds by application, as it is for
application to produce genius in thofe who
naturally want it. The force and fplendour
of imagination throw a luftre on the pro-
dudions of real genius, which renders them
eafily diftingulfhable from the lifelefs and
infipid produdions of unanimated induftry.

Diligence

240 Of Flexibility P a R t II.

Diligence and acquired abilities may affift or
improve genius, but it is only a vigorous ima-
gination that can produce it. Whenever mere
labour is fubftituted in the place of this, it
can but mimic genius : the w^ork will always
bear evident traces of unnatural force and auk-
ward ftraining.

The flexibility of the human imagination
appears not only in a perfon's attempts on
the fame fubjedt : in fome men*s efforts on
different fubjed;s, it appears very remarkably.
There are men in whom one affociating prin-
ciple feems to be predominant v/hen they are
engaged in fome fubjed:s, and a totally differ-
ent principle when they apply to fubjecSts of
another kind. Whatever be their prefent fub-
jedl, their minds adapt themfelves in an in-
ftant to it, and are prepared to yield them-
felves wholly up to thofe relations which be-
long to that fubjed, and by means of which
difcoveries may be made in it. It is not eafy
to explain all the caufes from which this fort
of flexibility arifes ; perhaps it is in fome
meafure unaccountable : but there is one caufe
to which it is often owing. Every work in
which genius can be employed, has a parti-
cular defign or end. True genius always fits
a man for forming a lively and permanent
j> concep-

Sect, VIII. of Imagination, 241

conception of the defign, fuch a conception
of it as may make all his thoughts to move
' in fubfervience to it. An uncommon vigour
and delicacy of the affociating principles will
enable a man to conceive many diffimilar de-
figns, with all the vivacity which is requifite
for making any one of them dwell on the
imagination. Its nature gives a temporary
bent to the mind. It infufes great adivity
into thofe aflbciating principles, by our fol-
lowing of which it may be promoted. Thefe
principles are not, perhaps, naturally predo-
minant in the perfon ; the perception of a
different defign would have rendered a quite
different principle predominant : but thefe
have naturally fo great a degree of ftrength,
that, with the afnfcance which they receive from
the defign, they can be made to prevail, and
to regulate, for fome time, all the exertions
of the imagination. In fome men, a capacity
of being ftrongly affedted with the view of
any particular defign, and a pliancy of fancy
confequent on this, are fo great, that their ge-
nius feems to be almofl equally adapted to the
moft oppofite fubjects. There have been per-
fons who were at once inventors in matters of
fcience, and originals in the arts. In mimics
this pliancy of fancy appears in a very great

R degree.

242- Of Ykxihility Part II,

degree, though it be employed In an inferioiir
province. Wherever it is poflefled, a per-
fon's thoughts are w^holly moulded by the pre-
fent defign ; he lofes fight of himfelf, and is
perfectly transformed into the charadier which
he wants to aflume. Thus as a fitnefs for
being ftrongly imprefled by a defign, beftows
regularity on genius, fo a capacity of being
equally hnpreiTed by dilhmilar defigns, gives
a great variety and compafs to the genius of a
particular perfon.

We have now endeavoured to difcover the
fources of the varieties of genius, fo far as
they lie in the peculiarities of the imagina-
tion. If none of the affoclating principles be
Itrong, there can be no genius. If one be re-
markably vigorous in comparifon with the
reft, genius will be fixt to one fort of fubjeds
fuited to that principle. If all of thqm be
very vigorous, the perception of a particular
defign will have force enough to give any one
of them a temporary prevalence ; and by this
means genius will have great compafs, its ex-
ertions will be fufceptible of great variety. la
proportion to the degree of variety of which
genius is thus fufceptible, it will approach the
nearer to unlverfality,

Bu7

Sect. Villi bf imagination. 243

But thougli the varieties which belong to
imagination, evidently produce many diver-
fities of genius, we fliall never be able to ac-
count for all its diverfities by attending only
to the imagination; for imagination alone is
not fufficient for compleating any work of ge-
nius. In all its perfect exertions, it derives
aid from other faculties, the varieties of which
muft contribute fomewhat to the feveral forms
which it afTumes. The faculties from which
imagination receives affiftanGe, are fenfe, nie-
mory, and judgment. An enquiry into the
varieties of which the firft of thefe is capable,
v.'oul4 give us little light : the varieties inci*
dent to the two iaft, it v/ill be of importance
to examine. The varieties of memory bear
the neareft analogy to thofe of imagination.,
and for that reafon it will be natural firii to
explain them.

SECT. li.

Of the Varieties of Memory^ and their hifiuence

on Genius^,

£MORY is employed either in t-etain-
ing fingle perceptions, or in preferv-
ing tlie order and connexiotl of different
perceptions. It is fufceptlble of confiderablc?
varieties in refpecl of both thefc exertions.

R z Every

244 Of the Varieties Part 11.

Every perception retained by memory, de-
cays by length of time. As diftant objeds
look fainter and fmaller to the eye, and as
diftant founds ft:rike the ear more feebly, than
fuch as are near ; fo the remembrance of things
paft grows weaker in proportion to the time
which has elapfed fmce they were prefent ;
and at laft every trace of them is obliterated.
But fome perceptions decay much more flowly
than others. While one perception is for-
gotten as foon as it is received, the remem-
brance of another is firm and permanent for
many years. The general principles on which
the permanence of remembrance depends, are
very fimple.

It may be eftablilhed as a principle, that
thofe perceptions are moft firmly and perma-
nently remembered, which were ftrongeft at
firfl:. A ft:rong perception, like a deep fhade
of colouring, feems to decay more flowly than
one that is faint and delicate ; and though it
fhould decay as faft:, it would be longer be-
fore it were effaced. The particular cafes
reducible to this general principle, are very
numerous ; and they are all experiments
ferving to confirm it. They are chiefly the
following.

The

Sect. IX. of Memory. 245

The perceptions offenfe are always llronger
than any ideas which we can form ; and ac-
cordingly what we have perceived by our
fenfes, is better remembered than what we
have only heard or read of. The percep-
tions of fome of the fenfes, are ftronger and
more ftriking than thofe of other fenfes ; and
in confequence of that they fix themfelves
more durably in the memory. Of all our
perceptions, pleafure and pain are thofe which
afFed us moft deeply ; and the objeds which
produce them, lay fafteft hold of the memory :
we often hear men give it as a reafon for their
never being able to forget one thing, that it
affected them much ; and give it as a reafon
for their having no remembrance of another
thing, that it did not at all intereft them, [a)

Some degree of attention is neceiTary for
our perceiving objects at all ; founds often
ftrike the ear without being heard, things are
often full in our view without being feen ;
the whole attention of the foul is otherwife
engaged. By bellowing attention, the mind
as it were embraces the objects exhibited to it,

[a) Siquas res in vita videmus parvas, ufitatas, quctidianar,
eas meminifle non folemus : piopcerea quod nulla niii nova,
aut admirabili re commovetur animus. At fi quid videmus aut
audimus egregie turpe, aut honeftum, inufitatum, magnum,
incredibile, ridicukm. Id diu nieminifle confucvimus. Ai
tier en, lib. iii.

R 3 and

24<3 Of the Varieties Part IT,

and lays Itfelf open to a flrong impreffion
from them, which makes them both afFed it
much while they are prefent, and keep firm
poffefficu of the memory afterwards. The
length of time for which attention is beflowed,
as well as the clofenefs of the attention, ren-
ders our perception of an objedl the ilronger ;
and it renders the remembrance of it propof-
tionably the more lading [b). In like man-
ner, by returning often to the contemplation
of an obie<^, we learn to conceive it vigoroufly,
and the remembrance of it becomes clear and
permanent : a perception which has feldom
affeded the fenfes, is quickly obliterated from
the memory ; light and colours are totally
forgotten by thofe who have early loft their
fight : but fuch perceptions as are repeated
every day, never quit their hold of the me-
mory ; by the attention beflowed upon them
as often as they recur, they are preferved in
their original firength, without finding time
even to begin to decay.

It is obferved, that every thing is well
remembered, which is impreffed on the min4

{b) Nee dubiurr; eil, quin plurimi^m in hac parte valeat
mentis ihten.io, et velut acies luminum a profpeiHu rerum
quas intuetur, non averfa. Unde accidit, ut qu£ per plures
dies fcribimLs edifcendi caufa, cogitatione ipfa contineat.
Quint. Ltfi. Orst. lib. xi. cap. 2.

"wher^

S E c T . I X . tif Memory, 247

when free and difengaged {c). This is one
of the circumflances which render the morn-
ing favourable to ftudy [d]. On this account
we retain through life, what we learn in child-
hood and early youth [e). When the mind is
already occupied by one object, an effort is
neceifary to draw it off from that objed ; this
effort weakens the application with which we
attend to the fucceeding objed : the former
objed: ftill attracts fome part of our attention,
and thus farther weakens our conception of
the other. But a difengaged mind beflows
its whole attention on the objed: that is pre-
fented to it, and conceives it with great viva-
city. Thus alfo, a thing is well remembered,
when the mind is, for fome time after having
perceived it, occupied by no new objed: (f) :
in this cafe there is room for continued, as
well as clofe, attention, which strengthens
the impreflion oii the fenfes, and, in confe-

(f) Plurimum conferre anlmum cogitationibus aliis

liberum. Quint. Injl. Qrat. lib. xi. cap. 2,

{d) K-uBcc'iftB Kcii fjivnfiwivo^iv ftaMsv, sn<; ctv ewcsv Ttturov Ivrvy^ct-
vwjxev iitiiTx <jtc(iKjV a%i; tsj; rifx.sfu<;, ovx cTi o/aoiw; «*« to voAMi^ uTi"

{e^ Qu2j acciderunt in pueritia, meminlmus optime (atpe.
Ad Her en. Jib iij.

{/) Aliae inllantiai dabunt banc alteram fpeciem ; ut qu-e
maxime imprimuntur a mente pura, et minus prxoccupata
ante vel poll ; veluti qu;e difcuntur in pueritia, aut quae com-
mentamur ante fomnum, etiam prima; qua;que rerum vices i
jnagis hxreanc in memoria, ViiRULAM. Nov, Org, lib. II.
apti. 26.

R 4 quence

248 Of the Varieties Part II.

quence of that, upon the memory. Pre-ex-
pedation likewife renders the remembrance
of an obje<ft durable : it roufes the attention,
it puts the mind in a proper difpofition for
bellowing attention, it invigorates our con-
ception of the object [g). It is from experi-
ence of thefe effedts of pre-expedation, that
perfons who wifh us to be much affeded with
■what they communicate, raife our curiofity,
delay fatisfying it, and render us as impatient
as they can.

Once more, we remember that heft, which
we underftand moft perfedly. What we un-
derftand, ftrikes us with its whole force : of
what we underftand imperfectly, it is only
the pare underftood, that makes any impref-
fion on us ; of the reft we have no perception :
even that part makes but a faint imprefTion ;
it would acquire additional force from its
connexion with the other parts, if the whole
were underftood.

In all thefe inftances it appears, that per-
ceptions originally flrong, are moft firmly
remembered.

(g) Aliae denique inftantiae dabunt hanc alteram fpeciem ;
ut qu^ expedantUi", et attentionem excitant, melius hjereant,
quam quae pra;tcrvolant. Itaque fi fciiptum aliquod vicies
perlegeris, non tarn facile illud memoriter difces, quam fi
illud legas decies, tentando interim illud recitare, et ubi de-
ficit memoria, iivfpiciendo librum. VzKVhhU. Ibid.

Memory

Sect. IX. of Memory, 249

Memory preferves the order and con-
nexion of perceptions, as well as the percep-
tions themfelves. If it did not, we could re-
tain only fimple perceptions. Every complex
objed confifts of feveral parts united together
in a certain manner ; memory retains not
only all the parts, but alfo the manner in
which they are united. It retains the latter
fo firmly, that we do not naturally attend to
the diftindion of the parts which compofe a
whole. It is almoft only the philofopher that
thinks of enumerating them ; and in order to
enumerate them, he muft fet himfelf pur-
pofely to analyfe and decompound his idea of
the whole. Different wholes are connected
in nature by various relations ; thefe relations
are obferved when the things are exhibited to
our fenfes ; and the real obferved relations of
things are retained by the memory. As it is
by co-exiftence, that the parts of the fame
whole are united, fo it is by vicinity, caufa-
tion, and order, that different wholes are con-
nected in nature, and, in confequence of the
obfervation of this, afterwards tied together
in the memory.

In every cafe of flrong and exa(^ remem-
brance, we have a clear perception of the
connexions of things, as well as of the things

them-

-5^ ^f ^^-'^ Varieties P A R T 11.

tliemfelves. Things which are in the memory
together, do not lie in confufion, but form
diftinft images, and are beheld in their jull
proportions. It is this property of memory,
that enables imagination to introduce into its
works, entire fcenes of real hiftory, or large
parts of nature, which we have adtually ob-
ferved. The introduction of thefe not only
affifts the operation of imagination, and lei-
fens its labour, but likewife contributes to the
excellence of its productions. Shakefpeare's
defcriptioh of Dover cliff, may ferve as an
example of the advantage to which genius
can turn this exercife of memory ;

Come on, Sir, here's the place — ftand ftill. How

fearful
And dizzy 'tis, to caft one's eyes fo low !
The crows and choiighs, that wing the mid-way air.
Show fcarce {q grofs as beetles. Half-way dowtt
Hangs one that gathers famphire ; dreadful trade"?
Methinks he feems no bigger than his head.
The fill:!ermen that walk upon the beach
Appear like mice ; and yond tall anchoring bark,
Diminifhed to her cock ; her cock a buoy
Almofl too fmall for fight. The murmuring furge
That on th' unnumbred idle pebbles chafes.
Cannot be heard fo high [h).

{h) King Lear, aifl ^ . fcene 6,

Many

Sect. IX. cf Memory, 251

Many defcrlptions and relations which are
introduced into poetry, as if they were the
creation of fancy, are really copied from me-
mory. To have recourfe, in this manner, to
memory, contributes greatly to beftow rich-
nefs and variety on the works of genius : for
no imagination has force enough to diverfify
fcenes feigned by itfelf, in fo great a degree
as objeds and events are diverfified in nature.
Some painters, inftead of imitating nature,
draw almofi: all their figures from a general
idea which they have formed to themfelves*
The confequence is, that a famenefs runs
through all their works ; they reprefent not
that endlefs variety which attention to nature
would have fuggefled to them. Anthony
Tempefta and Peter Tcda are taken notice of
as faulty in this way. On the other hand, it
is obferved that attention to the real varieties
of nature, has introduced great variety into
the works of Salvator Rofa, except in one
particular, the legs of his figures, which are
copied not from nature, but from an idea of
his own, and which for this reafon, though
well drawn, are too fimilar.

Thus memory, by retaining the real con-?
pexlons of things, gives us a diftind: and en-
\\\t perception of thcfe things, when they are

^11

252 Of the Varieties Part II.

all adiially prefent to our view. But it mull
be remarked further, That when one of the
things only is in view, the reft may be brought
to our remembrance, by means of their con-
nexion with it, preferved by memory. When
we think of one part of a machine, it fuggefts
the other parts, and the form of the whole.
When we think of one objedt in a complex
fcene, it bring the reft into our view. When
memory prefents one event, this leads us to
think of the other events which were con-
ne(5ted with it, and to conceive them in their
proper order. The remembrance of many
periods of a difcourfe or of a great number of
verfes, is often revived by the fmgle word
with which they begin (i). Thus ideas are in-
troduced by others with which they are con-
nected in the memory, in the very fame man^
ner as it has been already fliown that they are
introduced by thofe with which they are afTo-
ciated in the imagination. It is obfervable
too that the connexions retained by memory,
are the fame with feme of the relations by
which ideas are aflbciated in the Imagination,
On thefe accounts, the exertions of thefe two
faculties are often very analogous, and fome-

(/■) Nam etiam excidentes, unius admonitione verbl in me-
moriam reponuntur. Quint. Injl, Orat, lib. xi. cap. 2.

times

Sect. IX. of Memory, 253

times not dlftinguifhable except by the perfon
himfelf. When things are conneded in the
mind by vicinity, co-exiftence, caufation, or
order, in the manner in which we have ad:u-
ally obferved them, and when at the fame
time we have a convidtion of our having ob-
ferved them thus connedted, the exhibition
not only of the things themfelves, but alfo of
their connexions, is properly afcribed to me-
mory. When thefe relations are beftowed
upon things to which they may belong, but
which we have never actually obferved united
by them ; when at leaft we have forgotten
that we had obferved the things placed in thefe
relations ; or when we join things together,
not by thefe relations, but on account of their
refemblance or their contrariety ; in all thefe
cafes, things are properly faid to be affociated
in the imagination, not conjoined in the me-
mory. For example, when a perfon gives a
minute defcription of a country which he has
lately feen, or relates a feries of events which
he has witneffed or learned from hiftory, the
whole is owing to the exercife of memory ;
imagination has no fhare in it. If he illuf-
trate any part of his recital by a comparifon
with refembling objects, or enliven it by con-
trafts ; or if he have forgotten part of the ob-
jects,

i^54 Of the Varieties Part IL

jeds, and fupply the defe<51: which this would
occafion in his ftory, by putting in fuch cir-
cumftances as are confiflent with the other
parts ; then he exercifes imagination as really,
though not in fo great a degree, as he who
contrives any of the imaginary trains of events
or fcenes of adion, which are common with
poets and writers of romance.

As the exertions of memory retaining the
connexions of things, and the exertions *of
imagination, are thus analogous, fo It is far-
ther oblervable, that they are almofl: always
neceflarily intermingled. Sometimes imagi-
nation takes the lead, and memory a£ts in
fubordination to it : how far, and in what
ways, was explained formerly [k). Let us
now take notice, in what manner imagination
is exercifed when it acts in fubordination to
memory. In exhibiting any one thing which
we have obferved, or a number of things in
their obferved order, memory alone is ex-
erted. But from thefe we often pafs to other
things, connected with them not by an order
really obferved, but by fome other ties : in
this cafe the tranfition is made by the imagi-
liation. The things to which this tranfirion
19 made, are diftinftly remembered ; and

(/^) Part J. feft. 5.

I t^-hile

Sect. IX. of Manory. 255

while we dwell on them, memory is the only,
faculty employed in conceiving theiru It is
when we leave thefe, and pafs to others riot
connected with them in our experience, that
imagination is again exerted. We never caa
have a long train of thoughts, or carry on a
long converfation, even relating to the mei^eft
matters of fatt, wholly by the fuggefticns of
memory, without any ^id from imagination.
If this faculty did not interpofe, and give us
a new impulfe, our thoughts would quickly
ftagnate, our converiktion would fail, v;e
Ihould be ftridly confined to one fubjei^, at
leaft to fuch groupes of objedls and fuch fuc-
ceffive events, as we have obferved really con-
joined in nature. Thus, as it was formerly
fhown on the one hand, that memory aflifts
imagination in all works of genius, fo on the
otlier hand memory receives great affiilance
from imagination, in moft of its operations-
What has been faid on this point, will enable
us in fome meafure to conceive, how imagir
nation,- and confequently genius, cnter/S into
a fpecies of compofition from which many
have totally excluded it, the writing o^ hii-
tory. By what has been faidi we are led
jikewife to make a remark which regards ge-
jilus of every kind, That oUr remembrance

-5^ Of the Varieties Part II.

of the real connexions of things, multiplies
the ties by which ideas are united in our
minds ; and confequently multiplies both the
roads by which we may be led to the concep-
tion of fuch ideas as we have occafion for,
and the combinations into which the relations
of ideas may be formed : and how much thefe
circumftances contribute both to the compafs
and to the variety of genius, has been fuffici-
ently explained already.

The fitnefs which both the connexions of
things retained by memory and their relations
in the imagination, have fox caufmg one bring
others into our view, contributes much to the
flrength and perfection of remembrance.
Without this, the exercife of memory would
be much more difficult than it is : for our re-
membering any feries of thoughts, it would
be neceffary to imprefs them all vigoroufly on
the mind ; if any of them were faint, it would
neccflarily be forgotten. But becaufe one
idea introduces others connecSted with it, we
may fometimes remember many, by gaining
a flrong perception of a few : the relation of
the many to the few, will be fufficient for
calling them to mind, though they themfelves
be but weakly remembered.

6 Nay

Segt.IX. of Memory, 2j;7

Nay farther ; one perception may become
ftrong by being conned:ed with another. This
obfervation is neceiTary for giving the jufb
extent to a principle formerly laid down
That the firmnefs with which feparate objeifls
are remembered, is in proportion to the
ftrength of our original perceptions of thefe
objeds. This principle will appear liable to
many exceptions, if it be not remarked^ that
though a perception was not itfelf ftrong at
hril, yet if it was conneded with a flrong
perception, it is well remembered by means
of that connexion. A ftrong perception com-
municates ftrength to other perceptions cort-»
neded with it ; and in Confequence of this
communication, they imprint thernfelves as
deeply on the memory as if they had had in-
herent ftrength. Belldcs, the ftrong percep*
tion will frequently recur to our view ; and
as often as it occurs, it will readily fuggeft
fuch as are conneded with it ; it will commu-
nicate ftrength to them, and make them to
be conceived with force and vivacity. On
this account alfo, if the idea of an objed
comes, at any of its appearances in the me-
mory, to be connedcd with another that is
ftrong, it will derive ftrength from this latter,
and in confequence of this be vigoroully rc-

S membered,

258 Of the Far te ties P ar T IL

membered, though the objeds had no con-
nexion when they were originally perceived
by the fenfes. The truth of thefe obferva-
tions appears in many inftances. It was to
affifl the introduction of ideas by the force of
fenfible figns, that the ancient orators ufed
images in the artificial memory (/). We
often hear perfons affign as a reafon for their
retaining a thing ftrongly, fome affedling pe-
culiarity in their circumftances when they
firft became acquainted wdth it, which has
united itfelf infeparably to it, and rendered
it impoffible for them to forget it. We fome-
times want a perfon to recolledl a particular
occurrence ; we affirm again and again that
he was prefent at it ; but he can remember
nothing of it : we mention fomething which
happened at the fame time, or was otherwife
conneded with it ; he remembers this dif-

(/) Vidit autem hoc prudenter five Samonides, five alius
quis invenit, ea maxime animis cffingi noftrls, quas efTent a
fenfu tradita, atque imprelTa : acerrimura autem ex omnibus
noRris fenfibus cfle fenfum videndi : quare facillime animo
teneri pofle ea, quae perciperentur auribus, aut cogitatione,
fi etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur, ut res
csEcas, et ab adfpeilus judicio remotas, conformatio quxdam,
et imago, et figura ita notaret, ut ea qua; cogitando complefH
non poffemus, intuendo quafi tenercmus. Cic. de Oratorey
lib. ii. Alise autem inllantis dabunt banc alteram fpeciem ;
ut quicquid deducat intelledluale ad feriendum fenfum (qua;
raJio etiam prascipue viget in artificiali memoria) juvet me-
moriam. Verulam. Ncv. O^g. Ibid. See aifo, De Augm.
S^atntiarumf lib: v. cap, 5.

tindly;

Sect. IX. of Memory, 2^9

tlndly ; the remembrance of it revives his
remembrance of that occurrence, beftov/s vi-
vacity upon it, and renders it clearly percep-
tible. If v^e have a high fenfe of the impor-
tance of any fubjedl, that fenfe makes every
thing related to this fubject, to be ftrongly
remembered. The reafon and the efficacy of
punifliments depend very much on the prin-
ciple now under confideration ; the remem-
brance of the pain or ihame preferves the re-
membrance of the fault, and by conftantly
attending it, produces conftant averfion to
the repetition of the fault, and care to avoid
it. Wc do not eafily forget any thing related
to a perfon whom we love. What excites
defire, admiration, joy, fear, forrow, or in
general any flrong paffion, is firmly remem-
bered ; the paffion communicates force both
to the fenfation and to the idea of the object
by which it was excited (;;/).

We are not always wholly paffive in the
exercife of memory ; we can make efforts to
remember what does not caft up to us readily
and of its own accord. This voluntary exer-
tion of memory, is called recolleclion. As

fw) AHae inftantiae dabunt hanc alteram fpeciem ; ut qune
faciunt impreflionem in affeftu forti, incutientes fcilicct me-
tum, admirationem, pudorein, deledatioriem, juvent memo-
riain. Vi:rula.m. Nov, O^g. Ibid.

S 2 remem-

26 o Of the Varieties PartIL

remembrance is aflifted by the relations of
things, fo recoUcdion is altogether owing to
them. It would be abfolutely impoffible, if
there were not fuch a connexion among our
ideas, as enables one of them when excited,
to bring another into view. V/e cannot call
up an idea dire^Iy by an a6t of the will.
We cannot will to raife that particular idea
which we want ; for this would imply that
we conceived it already, and needed not to
raife it by a volition : and if we have not al-
ready conceived it, wc will to raife we know
n3t what idea. It is only indlrc^ly that we
raife an idea by a volition. The idea which
we want, has fome relations to certain others ;
thefe others, with the relations which they
bear to that, may be in our view ; we can
voluntarily fet out from thefe, and purfue the
feveral relations which belong to them, till
we fall upon tiiat relation which leads to the
idea wanted. The leaft refledion on what
palTes in our own minds, will convince u&
that this is the very way which we take in-
recoUedling. We are juft like perfons in
fearch of fomething which they have loft,
they know not precifely where ; but by their
knowing the place where they firft miffed it,
by their recollecting when they lad had it, by

thek

Sect. IX. of Memory, 261

their remembering all the places they have
been in fmce, and by their thinking what
might be the occafion of their lofing it, their
fearch is reduced within ibme bounds, and
they have fome direction in it, whereas other-
wife they had been obliged to feek for it at
perfect random. In the fam.e manner, in
confequence of the connexion which fubfifls
among different ideas, we may have a fort of
anticipation of one which is not yet prefent
to the mind, a notion of fome relation which
it bears to another that is prefent ; and by
that notion we are in the proper track for
finding it, and following this track are quick-
ly led to it. Hence verfes are not only more
eafily committed to memory, than profe, but
alfo more readily recolledled : when we are
at a lofs about a w^ord, we know before-hand
that it muft be fuch as will agree not only
with the fcnfe but alfo with the meafurc.
Hence order and a regular diftribution is a
great affifcance in recolletfling a difcourfe : if
a particular period occur not readily, we know
at lead that it mull be fuch as fuits a certain
part of the plan (71). It was on this principle

\n) Verum et in his quas fcripfimus, complei5lendis, mul-
tuni valent, et in iis que cogitamus, continendis, prope fo've
{excepta qua; potiflima elt, excrcitationc) divifio et compofitio.
JSain qui rede diviferet, nunquam poteric ia rerum ordine er-

S 3 that

262 of the Varieties Part 11.

that the ancients introduced places Into their
contrivance of an artificial memory : the ora-
tor had this advantage for recoiiedting any
part of his oration, that he knev^r it to be
what he had referred to a particular place [o].
As an idea is recollected only by our follow-
rare. Etiam qus! bene compofita erunj^ inemoriam

ferie fua ducent. Nam ficut facilius verfus edifSlmuf, quam
profam orationem, ita profam vindtam, quam diJToIutam.
Quint. Inji. Orat. lib. xi. cap. 2.

(<?) InvenilTe fertur (Simonides) ordinem efTe maxime, qui
rnemorise lumen afrerret. Itaque iis, qui hanc partem in-
genii exercerent, locos efle capiendos, et ea quae memoria
tenere vellent, eftingenda animo, atque in his locis collocanda :
iic fore, ut ordinem rerum, locorum ordo confervaret. Cic .
deOratcre, lib. ii. Ex hoc Simonidis fado noti;tum videtur,
juvari merr.oriam fignaris animo fedibus, idque credere fuo
quifque experimento. Nam cum in loca aliqua poll tenipns
reverli fumus, non ipfa agnofcimus tantum, fed etiam quaj in
hisfecerimus reminifcimur, perfona^quefubeunt, nonnunqua.-n
tacitas quoque cogitationes in mentem revertuntur. Quint.
Jnjl. Crat. lib. xi. cap. 2. !nrianti2;conftitutiv2: funt; ordo,
live diftributio, quse manifefto juvat memoriam. Item loci

in memoria artificiali : Hujufmodi autem loci memoriam

infigniter juvant, eamque longe fupra vires naturales exaltant.
Item earmina facilius hsrent, et difcuntur menioriter, quam
profa. Atque ex illo manipulo trium inllantiarum, videlicet
ordinis, locorum artificialis memorir, et verfuum, conllitui-
tar fpecies una auxilii ad memoriam. Species autem ilia,
^bfcijjio injiniti redte vocari pofTit. Cum enim quis aliquid
reminifci aut revocare in memoriam nititur; fi nullam pne-
notioncm habeat, aut perceptionem ejus quod qurerit, qu.rrit
certe et molitur, et hac iliac difcurrit, tanquam in inhnito.
.Quod fi certam aliquam prsnotionem habeat, Hatim abfcin-
ditur infinitum, et fit difcurfus memoria; magis in vicino. In
tribus autem illis inftantiis quae fuperius didx funt, prasno-
tio perfpicua eft et certa. In prima videlicet, debet elTe ali-
quid quod congruat cum ordine : in fecunda debet efie imago,
qui relationem aliquam habeat, five convenientiam ad ilia
loca certa : in tertia dcbent efie verba, qua; cadant in vcrftim :
atque ita abfcinditur infinitum, Verl lam. Ihtj. Org. Ibid.
De 4ifgm, Sciiiji, lib. v. cap. 5.

3 Jn£

Sect, IX. of Memory. 263

ing fome relation which we know that it
bears to another, it is evident that its bearing
feveral different relations to that other, will
facilitate our recolledion of it. Any one of
thefe relations may conduct us to it ; and we
may light upon one of them when we have
miffed another. We often remember a dif-
courfe, when we have forgotten the fpeaker ;
if we retain but a few circumftances of the
time and place, thefe may lead us equally to
feveral perfons, among whom we cannot dif-
tinguiiOhi the real fpeaker : but if w^e retain a
great number of circumftances, as the tone
of voice and the manner in which it was told,
the number, fituation, and other circumftan-
ces of the company, fome or other of thefe
will lead us to afcertain the very fpeaker.
All the circumftances together will lead us to
recoiled: the idea which we want, both more
quickly and more ftrongly than one or a few
of them could have done ; they will draw it
into the mind with a fort of impetuofity,
which at once accelerates its motion, and ena-
bles it to ftrike us with greater force : for in
the exercife of memory, as well as in the
exertions of imagination, feveral relations
operating together, ad: with a compound

% 4 force.

2,64 Of the Varieties Part 1L

force ip). At the fame time, the greater the
number of circumftances are, the ftronger is
the oonvidion attending our recolledion, and
the more abfolute the certainty of our being
-in the right. What has been faid concerning
recolledlion, is fully illuftrated by the follow-
ing example :

Sir Charles. Who was that other ?

LordMorelove. One of my Lord FoppingtciC?>
gang, the pert coxcomb that's juft come to
a fmall eftate, and a great periwig — he that
fmgs himfelf among the women — -What d ye
call him ? — he won't fpeak to a commoner
when a lord's in company. — You always fee
him with a cane dangling at his button, his
breaft open, no gloves, one eye tucked under
his hat, and a tooth-pick — Startups that's his
name(^).

Thus thofe connexions of ideas which caufe
them to fuccced one another of their own ac-
cord in a regular train, fubjed; this train, at
the fame time, to the power of the will in a
certain degree, and enable us to alter it, ia
inany inftances, at our pleafure.

(/) AiLc inflantlcc dabant banc alteram fpeciem ; ut mul-
tiiudo circumftantiaruni, five anfarum, juvet memoriam ; ve-
Juti Icriptio per partes nun conanuaus, Icftio live recitatio
voce aha. Ibid.

[a) Car clefs Hufiand, aft i.

The

Sect. IX. of Memory, 265

The voluntary exertion of the memory in
recollection, is very analogous to the exercife
of Imagination in producing a work of genius;
for in this exercife, as well as in that exer-
tion, the will has always fome concern : it de-
termines the fubjed:, and it is continually em-
ployed in choohng the proper trails of thought.
If it were not employed in this, genius mufl:
go on like a mere machine, and a perfoa
fliould have no power over it after it were
once fet in motion. In what manner the will
mixes itfelf with the operations of the ima-
gination, and influences them, may be under-
llood from the account of recolledion, which
we have now given. Recolled;ion, and the
voluntary exercife of imagination, differ chiefly
in two things. Firfl, in the end propofed.
We properly recollect, when all that we
deflre, is to recal to memory fomething
which we have obferved : and in recalling
it, we are often aflifted by fancy ; for we may
be led to it, not only by its obferved con-
nexions v.ith other things, but alfo by any
relations to them, which imagination has be-
flowed. We voluntarily exert imagination,
when our intention Is, merely to gather toge-
ther fuch ideas as fuit our nrefent work ; and
in gathering them together, real connexion?

preferved

^66 Of the Varieties Part K.

preferved by memory, are often of great fer-
Yice to us. Secondly, when we properly re-
colle<51: ideas, they are no looner brought into
our view, than we have a convidtion that ei-
ther they themfelves, or the objedlsfrom which
they are derived, have been formerly perceived
by us ; and that convidlion is attended to by
the mind : when the ideas are brought into
view by the imagination, either we have no
fuch convidion, or we take no notice of it.
Thefe two, recolled:ion and the exerclfe of
imagination, are conjoined in producing every
work of genius, but not equally in works of
all kinds, nor in the genius of all perfons.

The obfervations which we have hitherto
made, regard the different operations in which
memory is exerted ; and they fhow the influ-
ence which thefe feveral operations have upon
genius. But there are likewife differences of
another fort incident to memory, fuch as affed:
all its operations, and produce varieties in its
form and power. All thefe differences may
be explained from the principles already laid
down, either from thofe which regard feparate
thoughts, or from thofe which regard their
connexions, or from both together. By con-
fidering the moft remarkable of thefe differ-
ences, thofe principles will be farther con-
firmed

Sect. IX. of Memory, 267

firmed and illuftrated, and fome additional
obfervations concerning genius, will be fug-
gefted.

The memory of the fame perfon is not
equally perfect in all the periods of his life.
Memory is weak in very young children,
and in very old men ; but the weaknefs pro-
ceeds from diffimilar caufes. The former arc
not capable either of beftowing fo clofe atten-
tion upon things, or of comprehending them
fo perfedlly, as would be neceffary for their
making a ftrong or lafting impreflion on the
memory. In the latter, all the powers of per-
ception are become dull, nothing can flrike
them fo deeply as to infix itfelf in the me-
mory. That this is the real caufe of the de-
cay of memory by age, is evident from the
common remark, that old perfons forget what
happened yefterday, but remember difi:in6tly
what occurred many years ago : could re-
cent events afi^e^^ their deadened organs with
equal force, their remembrance of them would
be equally tenacious (r). In the former part
of youth, memory is very firm : many caufes
then concur to make all our perceptions ftrong,
and confequently durable ; the mind is not

[r) Ale, 01 T£ er^odfec v;oi x.acl oi yifcvricy ai-A,<iY,u,ov'; hcit peovtri ycift

pre-

aGS Of the Vay'ieties Part II.

pre-occupieJ ; the fpirits are lively ; curiofity
is high ; every thing being new, ftrikes with
its full force ; admirrttion is eafily raifed, and
all the paflions ftrong, and fit for communi-
cating vigour to the perceptions which occa-
fion them. In the age of maturity, many of
thefe caufes of flrong remembrance ceafe : but
their place is in a confiderable degree fupplied
by others ; things are more perfectly undcr-
ftood ; the connexions of perceptions are more
fully perceived ; and memory is improved by
habit. It is in youth and maturity, that ge-
nius exerts itfelf with greateft power : in
childhood it has fcarce begun to dawn ; in old
age it fmks into a glimmering twilight. Were
it only on account of the affiftance from me-
mory of which it ftands in need, it muft be in
fome meafure fubjecl to thefe changes. But
this Is not the only or the principal caufe of
its being fubjed to them ; the powers on
which it has a more immediate and effential
dependence, are fubjc6t to the fame changes.
It is a general law of our nature, that all our
faculties rife gradually to their perfedion, and
gradually decline.

Memory admits much greater varieties
in different perfons, varieties both in degree
and in kind,

There

S F. c T . IX. of Memory. 2 69

There arc chiefly four perfeftlons of Vv'hich
memory is capable. Thefe are rarely united
in the fame perfon ; and the prevalence of one
of them, or the manner and degree in which
they are united, produces very great diverfi-
tles in the memories of different perfons.
Some of the perfedions of memory arife from
the llrength with which feparate perceptions
are remembered, others from the ability of
remembering their connexions firmly. — It is
a perfedlion of memory to be fiifceptible, to
receive an impreffion quickly : it is likewife
a perfedion of memory to be tenacious [s).
Both thefe perfedions arife chiefly from a lit-
ncfs for remembering feparate perceptions :
but they do not always go together ; nay,
they who commit a thing quickly to memory,
generally forget it fooneft. This may fcem
to contradict the maxim, that perceptions ori-
ginally ftrong, are firmly remembered. But
it is perfedly coniiilent with it. Becaufe the
impreflion is made quickly, it does not follow-
that it is ftrong : a fufceptible memory, like a
foft body, receives fome impreflion at once,
and becaufe this impreffion is perceivable at
once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we al-

(^) Ejus duplex virtus, facile percipere, ei fideliter cor.ii-
TiCit, Qj_'iNT. Jnji, Ofcit, lib, i. cap, 4.

low

^70 Of the Varieties Part II.

low It to continue flight : when the memory
is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the im-
preflion is not made without continued labour,
it is deep before it can be at all taken notice
of, and therefore it is permanent (/). Some-
times thefe perfections are united : the me-
mory is of fuch a happy temperature as may
be compared to wax, which receives the feal
eafily and ftrongly when it is melted, and im-
mediately hardens and fufFers it not to be
effaced. Of thefe two perfections, the former
is in its nature and principles moft congenial
to genius ; but the latter is at leaft equally
fubfervient to its operations ; for no percep-
tion can be fuggefted by fancy or applied to
any purpofe, except it be remembered. — It is
a perfection of memory to be diflin5l^ to ex-
hibit things in their proper form and order :
it is alfo a perfection to be ready, to call to
mind eafily and quickly fuch ideas as we have
occafion for. DiftinCtnefs relates to fuch things
as are in our view together ; readinefs, to fuch
as make their appearance in fucceffion. They
are infeparable, and always take place almoft
in the fame degree. They arifc from the fame

(/) Etiam ilia prsvelox ierc cito effluit, et velut prsfenti
ofE^io fiinfla nihil in pofterum debeat, tanquam dimifla dif-
cedit. Nee eft mirum magis haerere animo, quae diudus affixa
fint. Quint, Inji, Orat, lib. xi. cap, 2,

principle.

Sect. IX. of Memory. 271

principle, from a natural aptitude to retain the
relations of things. The memory cannot in-
deed be diftind, except the feveral feparate
perceptions be well retained ; the omiflion of
one part or member would deftroy the har-
mony of the whole : but diftindnefs arifes
immediately from a lively remembrance of
their connexions ; if this were wanting, all
the particulars would lie jumbled in confufion.
It is, in like manner, when the connexions of
things are ftrongly perceived, that fome of
them introduce others readily. If in fome
cafes there be diflindtnefs of remembrance
without readinefs of recolledtion, the defe<fl in
this latter virtue is owing to the weaknefs and
inactivity of imagination, failing to exert it-
felf at the proper time. In proportion to the
degree in which thefe perfe6i:ions of memory
are poffeffed, they mufl render the energies of
genius the more perfe<d, and likewife afFe<3:
the form of its productions, fo far as it emr
ploys in them materials borrowed from me-
mory. Confufion in a work may proceed
from indiftinCtnefs of remembrance, as well
as from irregularity of imagination : not only
feeblenefs of imagination, but alfo flownefs of
recoUedion, may render a work both labori-
ous and meagre. Belides thefs defeats, coa-

fufioa

272 Of the Varieties Part IL

fufion and flownefs, which are diredly oppofed
to the excellences cf memory now under
coniideration, there is an imperfedlion which
bears a relation to both thefe excellences,
which feems to refemble them, but in truth
only mimics them ; I mean, the remembrance
of things merely by rote, when a perfon can
run over things exadly, in their obfervcd or-
der, and be certain of recollecting any part of
them by thus running over them, but can re-
member nothing, if he be put out of that
train. In this cafe, the feparate perceptions
are faintly impreffed upon the mind, their ex-
perienced connexions ftrongly ; and thefe are
the only connexions which influence it, the
relations conferred by imagination have none ;
the fubjed: likewife is not clearly underftood.
Thefe being the caufes of this peculiarity of
memory, it can feldom be found along with
genius, or indeed with a great degree of any
of the intelledual powers.

Memor Y admits likewife varieties in kind ;
and thefe varieties tend more diredly than
any hitherto mentioned, to divcrfify the form
of genius.

Many caufes were formerly pointed out,

•which may render perceptions ftrong and

ftrongly remembered. Any one of thefe caufes

I may

Se t T . IX, of Memory, ^ 7 J

may render any perception or clafs of percep-
tions ftrongefl: and moil afFedting to a par-
ticular perfon : by fome or other of thefe
caufes, different perceptions will unavoidably
be rendered ftrongefl: to different perfons ; and
thefe will, by confequence, dwell moft in the
memory, and take the fafteft hold of It. The
objects of ftrong remembrance will thus be
neceffarily different in different men : and the
difference of thefe will occafion a correfpon-
dent difference in the exertions of genius, and
that with refpedt both to the perceptions from
which it fets out, and to thofe which It after-
wards collects.

First, the peculiar turn of memory will
affed: genius, by determining, in many in-
ftances, the perception from which it fets out,
in its inveftigations or itscompofitions. Ever^^
invention, it was already (hown, takes its rife
from fome prefent perception, which fuggefts
the other ideas neceffary in the work. If
that prefent perception be not adually fab-
je<3:ed to the fenfes, it muft be a perception
exhibited by memory. Memory will moft
readily exhibit thofe perceptions which it re-
tains ftrongly ; for it is a never-failing effed:
of ftrong remembrance, to caufe a perception
occur often, and remain almoft conftantly in

T our

274 Of the Varieties , Part II.

our view, fo that it cannot be baniflied with-
out difficulty, fometimcs not at all. But the
prefent perception, which is thus often fixt by
the peculiar caft of memory, determines ge-
nius to attach itfelf to fuch ideas as are con-
nedled with it, and to follow the read which
they point out ; and confequently it influences
the whole feries of the thoughts, and contri-
butes not a little to the peculiar form which
the work affumes. Several different percep-
tions being, by means of different principles9
ftrongly remembered by the fame perfon, will
fit him for exercifmg his genius on different
fubjedls : they will alfo lead him to works of
different kinds ; for in fome forts of percep-
tions one relation is more confpicuous and
apteft to lay hold of the imagination, and in
other forts another relation ; and our follow-
ing one or the other, will produce a work of
one fpecies, or of a different fpecies. The
perceptions ftrongly remembered being much
more various in different perfons, than they
can be in the fame perfon, will produce a pro-
portionably greater variety, both in the fub-
je(fts which they choofe for the exercife of ge-
nius, and in the fpecies of works in which
they engage. .

Secondly,

Sect. IX. of Memory. 275

Secondly, the particular things which arc
ftrongly remembered by a perfon, will dirediy
influence the ideas introduced, as well as the
perception from which he fets out. Imagi-
nation can exhibit only fuch ideas as a perfon
has ; ideas which he has loft, whatever is for-
gotten, cannot poffibly be fuggefted, nor em-
ployed in any work of genius. By an inca-
pacity of retaining certain forts of ideas firmly,
a man may be neceflarily prevented from ufmg
materials which he once poirefled, however fit
they would have been for compleating or
adorning his work. The ideas to which his
memory is adapted, compofe the flock which
he can employ. Befules, of the ideas which
he retains, thofe which are retained moft
ftrongly, will recur ofteneft to his view^ and
Confequently will be moft familiar to him. On .
this account they will occur and be employed
by him, more readily than any others. Ideas
by being ftrongly remembered, force them-
felves frequently into our view, and engage
our attention, when there is no particular oc-.
cafion to introduce them : undoubtedly then,
when they are related to a fubjedt on which
we are exercifing our genius, they will be fug-
gefted more readily, than other ideas equally,
or even more nearly related to that fubjedt,

T 2 but

2 7 S ^f the Varieties P A R T IL

but not fo flrongly fixt in our memory. Thus
the whole complexion of a work is neceflarily
tinged by the kind of thoughts which the
memory of the author is fitted to retain with
greateft ftrength and clearnefs : and hence
muft arife very great diverfity in the produc-
tions of different perfons, even on the fame
fubje£l ; diverfities proportioned to the num-
ber of ways in which the perceptions of me-
mory may be ftrong, either in themfelves, or
by communication from thofe with which
they are^connedled.

All the obferved connexions of things lay
hold of the memory in fome degree ; but they
do not all equally lay hold of the memory of
every man. One perfon's memory retains fome
connexions moft ftrongly ; another perfon's
retains chiefly quite different connexions.
One confequence of this is, that if two per-
fons give an account of any objed: which they
remember, their defcriptions of it will be con-
fiderably different. Were they to introduce
reprefentations of that objed into works of
genius, there would be a correfpondent diffi-
militude between thefe reprefentations. There
would be a difference likewife in the ufes to
which they were applied ; for by being put
into different attitudes, the fame objed is

adapted

Sect. IX. of Memory, 277

adapted to different purpofes. Another con-
fequence is, that the memories of different
perfons are fuited to different fubjeds. Some
are efpecially ready in remembering reafon-
ings, and fuch phenomena and proceffes in
nature as are the proper fubjc£ts of reafoning ;
the connexions of things as caufes and effects,
make the flrongefl impreffion on their me-
mory. Some retain moft firmly the form and
ftru(3:ure of natural bodies, or defcriptions of
them ; their memory is chiefly affected by
the co-exiftence of the parts. Others retain
beft, trains of events, or relations of them in
hiftory ; vicinity, order, and that fpecies of
caufation by which events depend on one ano-
ther, are the connexions which fuit their me-
mory. Others are remarkable for eafily re-
membering poetry ; the relations of ideas
which prevail in it, lay faftefl hold on their
memory : many of thefe relations are origi-
nally beflowed upon the parts folely by ima-
gination ; but after they are beflowed, and the
work is read, they become obferved connex-
ions of the parts of that work, and are proper
objeds of memory. Thofe things which are
peculiarly fuitable to a perfon's memory, arc
generally thofe to which his underflanding and
his tafle are moft adapted. This fuggefts a

T 3 reafon

078 Of the Varieties of Memory. Part II.

reafon why they are pecuharly fuitable to his
memory : they are the fubjeds to which he
can attend mojft eafily and moft clofely, into
which he can enter moft deeply, and from
which he receives the greateft plcafure ; they
cannot therefore fail to make a ftrong and lad-
ing impreffion on him. Their making fucli
^n impreffion on him, will neceflarily have an
influence on the turn of his genius. Every
man will introduce into his works chiefly thofe
fubjeds which he remembers beft, if they can
at all fait his purpofe. Both the illuflrations
and the epifodes of one poet, relate almoft con-
ftantly to natural things ; thofe of another are
generally taken from hiilorv, or confift of nar-
ration ; a third abounds on every occafioii
with moral fentiments, or runs out into philo-
fophical fpeculations. The peculiar congruity
of different connexions to different memories,
contributes to produce variety of genius, in
the fame manner, though not in fo great a
degree, as the predominance of one affociat-
ing principle; for exertions of memory enter
into every work of genius, though only in
fubordination to the exertions of imagination.

SECT.

[ 179 ]

SECT. X.

Of the Varieties of Jjidgment^ and their
Influence on Genius.

IF we recoiled, how conftantly judgment
attends imagination, and in how many-
ways it aflifts and. regulates it, in all the exer-
tions of genius, we cannot doubt that the
diverfities of which judgment is fufceptible,
will contribute greatly to the variety of ge-
nius obfervable among men. To inveftigate
the feveral powers of judgment, and to afcer-
tain the foundation of our feveral convidions
and reafonings, is a principal fubjed in all
treatifes concerning human underftanding ;
but it is our bufinefs to confider judgment
only fo far as its varieties affed the operations
of genius.

When in the analyfis of genius we diftin-
guifh judgment from fenfe, memory, and
imagination, we ufe the term in its moft ex-
tenfive fignification. Taken in this extent,
it is of two kinds, judgment of truth, and
judgment of beauty. To the former, the
name is moft commonly appropriated : the
latter is called tafle.

T 4 Truth

^8o 0/ the Varieties Part II,

Truth regards either real exlflence, or
the relations of general ideas : judgment is
exercifed about both ; and about each it is
exercifed in different ways, fometimes intui-
tively, at other times by reafoning, fometimes
producing certainty, and at other times only
probability. It includes all the intelletoal
faculties by which we diftinguilh truth from
falfehood, embrace and aflent to the one, and
difbelieve and rejed the other {a). Men dif^
fer either in the degree in which they poffefs
the fame fpecies of judgment, or in the fpecies
of judgment which they are moft prone to
exercife, and exercife in greateft perfe(fJtion.

The faculties by which we perceive fuch
truths as regard the relations of general ideas,
are commonly known.

Self-evident truths are perceived by in-
iuitiouy which exerts itfelf in an infallible
convidllon that certain relations belong to the
ideas compared, and cannot but belong to

{a) The author was led, many years ago, by the office
which he then held, to enquire with fome care, into the
feveral modifications of judgment, the kinds of evidence
(porrefpondent to them, and the nature and degree of convic-
tion produced by them- New light lias been thrown on feveral
branches of this fubjeft, by Dr. Reid's ingenious Inquiry;
and the whole of it has been illuftrated with great perfpicuiiy
and elegance, in Dr. Beattie's EJay on Truth, Part I. The
prcfent defign admite the confideration of this fubje(^, only ia
poe very confined point of view? as connefted with the varir
fities of genius,

them;

Sect. X. Of Judgment, 28 r

them; and this convidion arifes on the mere
comparifon of the ideas themfelves, without
any reafoning. In all the proper fubjeds of
intuition, we perceive the relation to be im-
plied in the very nature of the ideas, fo that it
muft appear the fame to every being, capable
of comparing them.

Such relations of ideas as are not felf-evi-
dent, can be perceived only by reafon. None
but the necejfary relations of ideas can be de-
duced by reafon, merely by comparifon of the
ideas themfelves ; at leafl thefe are the only
relations which can be in this way deduced
with fuch certainty as to make it worth while
to attempt deducing them. The reafoning
by which fuch relations are deduced, is called
demonftration. In order to our perceiving the
force of a demonftration, we muft perceive
the truth of all the fteps of which it confifts.
But it is not properly by an exertion of rea-
fon, that we perceive the truth of each fepa-
rate ftep. Often the convidion is intuitive ;
as when in the courfe of a demonftration we
aflume the equality of two fides of a triangle,
which are radii of the fame circle. Even
fuch propofitions as have been formerly de-
jnonftratcd, when they arc applied in a fub-
fequent demonftration, cannot in that cafe be

ftridly

282 Of the Varieties Part IL

ftridly afcrlbed to reafon ; for though it was
reafoii that firft produced a convidlon of their
truth, it is memory that retains, and either
memory or imagination that prefents, the
convidion in the prefent cafe ; and generally
the convidion is prefented alone, without the
proofs to which it was originally bwing. In
order to our deducing a conclufion from a
feries of argumentation, it is necelTary that
■we retain all the fteps of that feries ; if any of
them be forgotten, we cannot perceive the
evidence of the conclufion ; and it is by me-
mory that they are retained. In confequence
of all this, a conclufion is inferred from the
whole argument: the inferring of this con-
clufion, and the produdlon of a convidion
of its truth, are the only exertions of reafon,
as diftinguifhed from our other intelledual
powers. Reafon, lo far as it is employed in
demonftration, is that faculty by which we
draw inferences from the comparifon of our
ideas, or obtain a convidion that a relation
fubfifls between two ideas, by our having
found that thefe bear certain relations to other
ideas. This is an original faculty of the hu-
man mind. It is the more perfed, the more
cafily, the more quickly, and in the more in-
fianceswe can infer conclufions by the compa-
rifon

Sect. X. of Judgment, 283

rifon of our ideas. It is pofTefled by different
men in very different degrees of perfedion.
Thefe doubtlefs are owing principally to an
original diverfity in the faculty of reafon it-
felf ; but as it is attended and aided in all its
exertions, by memory, and in fome of them
by imagination alfo, its varieties may arife in
part from the degree of thefe latter powers
which men poffefs, and from the particular
modification of them which prevails. If a
man's memory be remarkably turned for re-
taining the relations of ideas, and his imagi-
nation for fuggefting them, this will affift him
greatly in perceiving the connexion of the
feveral fleps of a demonf^ration, and in re^
taining them all, and will thus make his rea-
fon appear the more acute. But if his memory
and fancy had been ill adapted to fuch fub-
jeds, he muft, even with the fame fliare of
reafon, have run a rifk of being perplexed in
purfuing a long train of argumentation.

The exiftcnce and the connexions of real
things, are the fubjeds of very many of our
judgments. The exertions of underflanding
employed about them, are different from
thofe which are employed about the relations
of ideas, and likewife admit great variety.
The exiftcnce of real things, and their con-
nexions.

284 OJ the Varieties Part II.

nexions, areperceived intuitively; theyareinfer-
red by an immediate judgment of Nature; they
are deduced by a train of confequences j they
are believed on the teftimony of others : they
are known with certainty ; or they are aflented
to as probable in a greater or a lefs degree.

Every man is confcious of his own fenfa-
tions, ideas, thoughts, paflions, and the fe-
veral operations of his own mind ; and while
he is confcious of them, he is convinced of
their prefent exiftence. The judgment which
produces this convidion, is implied in the
very nature of confcioufnefs, and complicated
"with every ad of it. It is a judgment dif-
ferent in kind from our intuitive perception
of the agreement or difagreement of two ideas
which we compare ; but it is equally imme-
diate, equally unavoidable, and is even a pre-
requifite to that perception.

Every fenfation, every idea, which a mafi
has, every operation, every pafTion, of which
he is confcious, fuggefts the aotion of him-
felf, and enables him, without any exercife
of reafon, without any information from ex-
perience, by a natural and inexplicable prin-
ciple, to infer the exiftence of himfelf as the
percipient and agent. The inference is im-
mediate, and without any comparifon of

ideas \

Sect. X. ofjudgment, 285

ideas ; it is likewife indubitable, the original
conftitution of our nature will not allow us to
call it in queftion.

Whenever we have a fenfation by means
of our bodily organs, we infer from it fome
quality in bodies, which is the caufe or occa-
fion of it. There is an inference : but it is
made without any reafoning or comparifon of
ideas ; we can perceive no neceffary connexion
between the fenfation and the quality inferred
from it : the inference is made previous to
experience : it is made by a judgment of na-
ture ; our belief of it arifes from an original
and inexplicable principle of the mind, which
determines us to it immediately and irrefif-
tibly.

We remember our fenfations, the qualities
of bodies which they fuggefted, the paffions
and the operations of our minds. The re-
membrance of them implies a convidion of
their paft exigence, which is, like thofe al-
ready mentioned, a judgment of nature, im-
mediate, unavoidable, and indubitable, to
which every man is determined by his confti*
tution, and of which no other account can
be given.

We can compare the fevcral obje£ts about
which the mind employs itfelf, whether they

236 Of the Varieties Part IL

be its own operations, or the qualities of bo-
dies ; the comparilbn fuggefts a great variety
of connexions and relations belonging to
them; and about all thefe, judgment is exer-
cifed in many different ways. — It perceives
the rcfemhlaiice of fome things, and the diffi-
militude of others : it perceives both intui-
tively, and it perceives them on comparifon of
the things thcmfelvcs or of their ideas. Should
we mifs forming the judgment immediately,
we can never be brought to form it by argu-
ment; we can only be led to beftow greater
attention, that, by our becoming more per-
fectly acquainted with the objecfts, the intui-
tive faculty may exert itfelf to greater advan-
tage. When we compare fome things

together, we perceive their contrariety ; fome-
times we perceive it intuitively, and fome-
times experience of the things themfelves, or
of their caufes, or of their confequences, is

neceffary for our forming the judgment.

When things poffefs any quality in common,
judgment may be employed in deciding con-
cerning the degree of that quality : the judg-
ment is often intuitive; it may however be
aided by continued and repeated attention;
and it is fometimes produced by a mixture of
experiment and reafoning. When experi-

6 ments

Sect.X. of Judgment, 287

merits are made for enlightening the judg-
ment, they tend to exhibit the qualities more
perfectly to the mind ; the reafoning that is
introduced, regards the caufes or the efFeds
of the qualities compared, or ferves for efta-
blifhing their connexion with fome pheno-
mena which caft up in the courfe of the
experiment, and from which their degrees
may be inferred. A thermometer is employed
for afcertaining the degrees of heat ; it fhows
immediately the degrees of expanfion in the
fluid ; and experience teaches us the conftaut
connexion between thefe degrees and the de-
grees of heat. Real things bear to one

another, certain proportions in their quantity
or their number : judgment is exercifed about
thefe ; fometimes it perceives them intui-
tively, and at other times it deduces them by

various kinds of reafoning When we

confider objects which have a continued ex-
iftence, we perceive their Identity^ or we
judge them to be different from, however
fimilar to thofe which we had obferved for-
merly. In this cafe, our judgment is fome-
times intuitive, on our comparing the prefent
object with our idea of that which we had be-
fore perceived ; and fometimes it is the refult of
reafoning. When it is intuitive, it is, geneirally

^88 Of the Varieties Part IL

at leaft, rather a judgment refolvable into
our conftitution, than a perception of necef-
fary agreement or difagreement : when it is
the refult of reafoning, the reafoning is found-
ed on our experience of the ordinary dura-
tion of the feveral kinds of things, of the
changes which they are capable of undergo-
ing, and of other circumftances relating to

themfelves and their caufes. Things have

different relations in tijne and place: judg-
naent cannot difcover thefe by a mere compa-
rifon of the things, but by experience and

obfervation. It is in the fame way, that

•we judge concerning the co-exiftence of qua-
lities : we can perceive intuitively that fome
qualities are inconfiftent or incapable of be-
in^^ co-exiftent ; in fome few cafes alfo, one
quality implies another, fo that their co-ex-
iftence is felf-evident, as figure and extenfion
are infeparable : but in moft cafes, even after
experience has fhown that certain qualities
are actually co-cxiftent, we can find out no

necefTary bond of union among them.

Th« jre is a principle in our conftitution, which
detcjrmines us irrefiftibly, without reafoning
or \ )roof, to judge that there is fome caufe of
eveiry new exiflence, and of every change
whi ch things undergo. We have a natural

I propenfity

Sect. X* tfjiulgmenti 289

propenfity to conficler particular things as
caufes or efFeds, we pronounce them fuch,
not from any comparifon of their qualities, or
any perception of the fitnefs of the one to
produce the other, but from experience of
their conjundion. With refped: to objeds
which we have all our lives judged to Hand
in this relation, it is often the fubjed of intri-
cate and uncertain invefligation, what are the
qualities which fit them for bearing this rela-
tion to one another, and often we remain
altogether ignorant of this.

There is an original principle in our na-
ture, which determines us to judge. That the
future will refemble the paft, and inftances of
which we have had no experience, thofe of
which we have had experience* As God has
made the courfe of nature uniform and con-
ftant, fo he has formed us for placing implicic
confidence in its uniformity and conftancy,
for expeding the continuance of thofe con-
nexions of things, which we have hitherto
obferved. This principle is inexplicable ; the
judgment to v/hich it leads us, is immediate
and independent upon arguments. It is the
foundation of all our reafonings concerning
real things. Guided by it, we conclude,
what will be, from our experience of what

U has

290 Of the Varieties Part IL

has been ; the particular judgments which ex-
perience has didated, we extend beyond the
inftances of which we have had experience,
and render general : we believe that thofe
qualities which we have obferved to be co-
exiftent, will in all fimilar inftances be co-
exiftent, that caufes will conftantly produce
fuch efFeds, and efFeds require fuch caufes
as they formerly have. It is to this original
principle in human nature, that we owe our
convidion in all our reafonings from expe^
rience. But this principle, fimple and uni-
form in itfelf, admits great variety, and is
complicated with many exertions of the un-
derftanding, in its application to particular
fubjeds. It will therefore be proper to make
feme oblervations upon it.

Our experience of the paft and of what we
are acquainted with, is the ground on which
we form all our judgments concerning the
future, and what is unknown to us. Expe-
rience is the refult of a number of particular
obfervations. Attention to the feveral in-
ftances as they occurred, and diftind remem-
brance of them afterwards, are neceflary for
our acquiring experience ; and men's expe-
rience in the fame circumftances, will be
greater or lefs in proportion to their propen-

fity

Sect. X. of "judgment, 2gt

flty to attend to what pafles before them, and
their ability to remember it.—- — In every in-
ftance, the circumftances which are of im-.
portance for forming experience, are found
in conjundicn with others which are of no
importance : there is a natural fagacity fit for
diftinguifliing thefe, which different men pof-
fefs in very different degrees ; s^nd in propor-
tion to the degree of it which a man poffeffes,
his experience will be more or lefs exadt and
preclfe. Experience is not merely the re-
membrance of a number of unconneded ob-
fervations : it is a judgment formed with
fagacity from them all together [h). It is
formed by means of a fort of abflra€ting
power, which feparates the neceffary circum-
ftances from the accidental : and the kind and
degree of convidion that attends it, corre-
fponds to the particular relation or connexion
of the things, on which our obfervation is
fixt. In fome cafes, there is little difficulty
in forming fuch a judgment with precifion ;
there are few accidental and unimportant cir-
cumftances joined with the neceffary and im-

{b) TlpuTOi cs rrti dmyfa^r,/; rpowof, o ^i« Tun ccia'Br,tTii>>ii , cctar^a.-

c<)io5»tf£»? "SJoX^ut (AtnyLczi yetuvroci, t&te (pa(Tl^ lyiiv if/.iueiolix.t' e^wsi^jiat
ydf ifi To tun «/xo£io«/» OT^iJjSo;. nAQYTAPX. 'sij) tut ap<r«. Tei"?
^iAoo-e^. Sit, $. »t<p, i«.

U 2 portant

292 Of the Varieties Part II.

portant ones. In other cafes, the unimportant
circumftances are ib many, and fo mud],
blended with the important, that it requires
fuperior acutenefs to feparate them : though
the particular inftances be perfectly remem-
bered, yet often no experience is derived
from them, or experience very inaccurate,
and unfit for being applied to any ufe. This
difficulty is the primary caufe of all the un-
certainty and all the intricacies which attend
our reafonings from experience, and of all
the errors into which we are apt to fall in
fuch reafonings. For want of a degree of
acutenefs fufficient to furmount the difficulty,
we form falfe judgments of the connexions of
things, in the very inftances which we have
had accefs to obferve : and if we attempt to
reafon from thefe inftances, the falfehood
cannot fail to be communicated to all the con-
clufions which we infer.

After we have collected experience, in
order to our reafoning from it, it is neceflary
that it be recollected and brought into our
view when we have occafion for it. This is
the work of imagination. The inftance con-
cerning which we want to draw a conclufion,
is aftbciated with the fimilar inftances of which
we have had experience, and fuggefts them.

Their

Sect. X. of judgment, 293

Their being readily and perfedly fuggefted,
depends partly on the force of the memory
retaining them diftindly, and partly on the
vigour of the imagination, on the ftrength
and adivity of that aflbciating principle which
conneds them with the prefent inftance.
Often when we have had very extenfive ex-
perience, we are rendered incapable of draw-
ing a conclufion from it, by its not being
fuggefted at the time when it would be ufe-
ful. In all our experimental reafonings,
imagination mufl: be exerted ; and confe-
quently men's capacity for fuch reafonings,
muft in fome meafure depend on the degree
in which they poffefs that faculty (r).

When our paft experience is fuggefted, we
compare the thing of which we want to judge,
with that experience, that we may difcern
whether it correfponds to it or not. The
power of determining this juftly, is of the
lame kind with that fagacity which enables

{c) Perceptions of fight fuggelting ideas of tangible quali-
ties, have been confidered by feme philofophers as a judgment,
by others as an efFeft of afrociation. What has been juft now
faid, accounts for this difference, and fhows that both are
partly right. Both judgment and imagination are concerned.
There was a judgment originally formed of the connexion be-
r*veen the vifible and the tangible qualities ; but it is imagina-
tion that enables the perception of the former to fuggeft the
idea of the latter, and to fuggeft it fo quickly and eafily, that
icxh idea is confounded with that perception.

U 3 US

294 Of the Varieties Part 11.

us to collect accurate experience : it is the
fame principle exerted in a different manner,
and in fomewhat different circumftances : and
on our having this power in perfedion, found-
nefs of judgment in all our reafonings from
experience, very much depends. Thofe men
who are defective in it, draw their conclufions
from inftances nowife fimilar; and therefore
their conclufions are erroneous or inaccurate.

When experience is colled:ed, fuggefted,
and applied to the inflance in queflion, a coji-
clufion is drawn wholly by means of that ori*
ginal principle already mentioned, which leads
us to exped: the continuance of things and
their connexions, according to our pafl ex-
perience. When our paft experience has been
both extenfive and uniform, and the prefent
inftance exadly correfponds to it, we draw
the conclufion with certainty : if any of thefe
three circumflances be wanting, if we have
had experience only in a few inftances, or if
there has been a contrariety in our experi-
ence, or if the inftances of which we have
had experience, do not exadly refemble the
prefent inftance, the conclufion is attended
only with probability^ and embraced with
different degrees of opinion proportioned to
the degrees of probability. The laft of thefe

cafe»

Sect. X. of [judgment, 295

cafeS is difllnguiflied by the nanie oi analo-
gical reafoning. The varieties of aflent in all
of them, neceflarily refult from the nature of
that principle to which they are owing.

The feveral operations of the mind which
are thus united in reafoning from experience,
affift and promote one another. A propenfity
to obferve and attend to the feveral inftances
which occur to us, gives fagacity a great ad-
vantage for collecting general experience from
them; it fixes them alfo deeply in the me-
mory ; and renders it eafier for imagination
to {\xg<^t^ them when we have occafion for
them. A natural fagacity in gathering cor-
rect experience, promotes, in its turn, atten-
tion to the objects which fall under our obfer-
vation, and gives it fuch a diredion as makes
it rnoft ufeful, by rendering our ideas of the
experienced inftances determinate and diftind;
it likewife gives imagination the means of
introducing them. It was obferved already,
that a capacity of acquiring accurate experi-
ence, is abfolutely necefTary for our drawing
juft conclufions : it is proper to obferve on
the other hand, that the faculty employed in
drawing fuch conclufions, when improved by
exercife, gives great afliftance in acquiring
ferther experience. The conclufions them-

U 4 felvei

2C)6 Of the Varieties Part II.

felves alfo which we have deduced from ex-
perience, are ufeful for cnabhng us to collect
'experience with greater eafe, and with greater
corre<5lnefs. Every jufl; conclufion with which
we become acquainted, throws new light on
the face of nature, gives us a more extenfive
view of its courfe and its laws, and enables
us to corre<^ fome error, to afcertain fome
ambiguity, or to define fome indiftindlnefs,
in our former obfervations even concerning
objedl:s w^hich are moft familiar to us. Our
ptiinary experience is derived from particular
inftances which have fallen under our obfer-
vation : from it we deduce conclufions, which
"we adopt and reft in : and the maxims im--
plied in thefe conclufions, form a fort of
J'econdary experience, by which the primary
is extended, limited, or correded, and by
which fagacity is aided in forming nev;r expe-
riences with greater acutenefs, facility, and
afi^urance, This fecondary experience has
been in fome meafiire acquired, and the habit
formed of applying it to ufe, by every man,
Jong before he comes to the age of reflection,
or begins to attend to the operations of his
own mind. Even that principle which leads
vs to judge, that the future will refemble the
paft, and inftances of which we have not had

experience,

Sect. X. Of 'Judgment, ii.)'j

experience, thofe of which we have, is
ftrcngthened and exerts itfelf with greater
aflurance, in confequence of our being accuf-
tomed to draw concluhons from experience.
By means of this, we often allow certain be-
lief to conclufions founded on experience of a
very few inftances, fometimes even on a
fmgle trial ; we take it for granted that every
fimilar trial will turn out in the fame way ;
for we have experience of the ftability of the
courfe of Nature, and this general experience
in fome meafure fupplies the place of expe-
rience in that particular cafe.

As there are thus feveral powers jointly
exerted in all our reafonings from experience,
it is only when all thefe powers exift in full
vigour, that the faculty of reafoning from
experience can be perfedl. The different de-
grees of thefe powers in different men, will
produce correfpondent degrees of judgment
in matters of experience. The different pro-
portions in which thefe powers are united,
will occafion varieties in the form which this
kind of judgment affumes, and in the fubje6ts
to which it is adapted.

Finally, there is in our nature, an ori-
ginal determination to give credit to the tef-

timony

298 Of the Varieties P a R t TI.

timony of others [d]. Did this determination
exert itfelf without any reftraint, it would
lead us to bolieve whatever is faid by others.
It would exert itfelf without reftraint, if we
had never found ourfelves deceived by others.
But experience teaches us that others are of^
ten deceived, and that they fometimes intend
to deceive, and, in confequence of this difco-
very, leads us to examine their teilimony
before we aifent to it. We confider the cha-
racters and the number of the witneffes, the
ends which they may ferve by deceiving us,
the motives which may urge them to attempt
it, their opportunities of knowing the truth ;
and we eftimate by thefe circumftances, the
degree of credibility which belongs to their
reports. We compare the fubjedt of their
teftimony with our own experience, and give
greater or lefs credit to it according to it?
probability. In all this, there is ample fcope
for the exercife of judgment. It is chiefly
the kind of judgment employed in reafoning
from experience, that is exercifed in eftimat-
ing the degree of affent due to a particular
teftimony : and it is by the conclufions and

{d) See Campbell's Diferiation on Miracles, part i.
fea. I, 2. where this fpecies of belief is explained with great
ingenuity.

-^ 5 maxims

Sect. X. ef Judgment. 299

maxims which we have deduced from expe-
rience, that we reftrain and limit our afTent to
teftimony. On the other hand, the informa-
tion which we receive from the teftimony of
others, is added to our own obfervations, be-
comes a part of our experience, and extends
it, and is built upon as a foundation in our
experimental reafonings.

We judge of beauty, as well as of truth ;
the faculty by which we judge of it, is diftin-
guifhed by the name of tafte. It likewife is
fufceptible of great varieties, which contribute
to diverfify the forms and exertions of genius.
The influence of tafte does not, like that of
judgment, extend to all the kinds of genius ;
and therefore we have not hitherto been led
to a particular confideration of it : it is fufE-
cient to obferve in general, That it influences
genius in producing beauty, in the fame ways
in which judgment influences all the exertions
of genius. Indeed the effects formerly afcrib-
ed to judgment (^), proceed in a great mea-
fure from that fpecies of it which we call
tafte, in all fuch works of genius as are pro-
per objeds of tafte.

The varieties of tafte are either in degree
or in kind. In every inftance, it is a corn-
er) Part I. feft. 4.

pound

Soo Of the Varietiet Part II.

pound of judgment properly fo called, and of
the internal fenfes {f). Both thefe may be
pofTefl'ed in very different degrees of ftrength ;
and every difference in the degree of either,
will produce a correfpondent difference in the

degree of tafte. The tafle of one man holds

chiefly of judgment, the tafte of another man,
chiefly of the internal fenfes. This will ren-
der their taftes different in kind. One fet of
qualities are the proper objedls of judgment,
another fet immediately affed and exercife
the internal fenfes : the one fet or the other
will be principally attended to and perceived
by a perfon, according as judgment or inter-
nal fenfe is the prevailing principle in his

tafte. Each of thefe principles alfo is fuf-

ceptible of great varieties. The varieties of
judgment have been juft now enumerated :
feveral of them enter into thofe exertions
which regard the objeds of tafte, fit men for
taking different views of thefe objedts, and
give tafte diffunilar turns. One judges beft
of the proportion of the parts, another of
utility ; each is moft pleafed with and fets the
higheft value upon that quality of which he
is the moft capable judge. The internal
fenfes are many, and are adapted to different

fubjeds,

Sect. X. of Judgment, • .3-01

fubjeds, or to the different qualities of the
fame fubjed (g) : the predominance, there-
fore, of any one of thefe fenfes will give tafte
a correfpondent form. One man is fufcep-
tible of ftrong impreffions from grandeur and
fublimity ; another has a quick feeling of the
beautiful and elegant : one has a tafte for the
harmony of founds, another for the graceful-
uefs of forms.

The perfedion of tafte confifts xwfmjih'ility^
refinement y corrednefsy and the jiifi proportion
of its principles (/j). In all thefe refpeds, the
taftes of dift'erent men dift*er extremely : we
find in individuals, all the intermediate de-
grees between an almoft total want of any of
thefe qualities, and the utmoft perfedian of
it. — A perfon maylikewife poflbfs one of thefe
perfedions, while he is defective in the reft:
or, without being remarkably defcdive in any
of them, he may be eminent in one. Hence
will fpring diflimilar kinds of tafte.

Of the kinds of judgment which have been
enumerated, fome belong in a nearly equal
degree to all men. Such is that intuitive
faculty by which we perceive the felf-evident
relations of general ideas : fuch are our na-

Kg) Ejr^y OH TaJ}e, Part I.

(Jj) Itid, Part 11, fea. 4, 5, 6, 7.

I tural

30 J> Of the Varieties P A r t 11.

tural judgments concerning the exiftence of
our perceptions and of the qualities and be-
ings immediately fuggefted by them. Any
defeat in thefe fpecies of judgment, would
totally difqualify men for ordinary life.
Thefe admitting no variety, can produce no
diverfities of genius. Some philofophers
have not, indeed, allowed thefe their due
weight, and in confequence of that, have
attempted to eftablifh paradoxes, and intro-
duce fcepticifm inconfiftent with them. But
this has not proceeded from their being defti-
tute of thefe powers, or from their poflefTing
therri^ in a lefs degree than other men ; for
their behaviour in common life fliows that
they pay fufficient regard to them ; but it
has proceeded from their not refleding upon
them, and explaining them to themfelves, in
analyzing human nature. It is, therefore,
only an error in their theories, not a fign of
any imperfed:ion in their conftitution.

Other powers of judgment are pofTefTed
by different men in very different degrees ;
and fome who excel in one kind, are defec-
tive in another. They who have great
acutenefs in mathematical and demonftrative
reafoning, fometimes betray great weaknefs in
arguing from experience, and judging con-
cerning

Sect.X. ofjudgmsnt, 303

cerning matters of fadl. On the other hand,
there have been inftances of perfons, who
could fcarce perceive the evidence of the ea-
fieft demonftration in Euclid's Elements, and
were incapable of apprehending mathematical
reafonings of length and intricacy ; but could
judge very prudently in common life, drav/
cOnclufions from experience with great ex-
a^nefs, and underftand all the fciences which
confift of fuch conclufions. It is not furprif-
ing that it ihould be fo : for not only is that
feafon by which we perceive the relations of
general ideas, different from that judgment
to which we owe our conviction in matters of
experience; but alfo in theie two kinds of
reaibning, memory and imagination are ex-
erted about different fubjeds, to which dif-
ferent modifications of thefc powers are
adapted. Some have a talent in philofophical
reafonings, deducing the caufes and the ge-
neral laws of things from their phenomena,
or tracing the appearances which will refult
from any fuppofed caufes or laws, who never-
thelefs are ill qualified for unravelling hifto-
rical doubts, or tracing the motives and the
confequences of human actions. Others are
greAt mailers in reafoning concerning human
Ufa, who have no great abilities for reafon-

ings

304 Of i he Varieties Part IL

ings concerning human nature, the fubject of
philofophical inveftigation moft nearly allied
to that. Though conclufions of tliefe dif-
ferent kinds, be fometimes deduced from the
very fame fads, yet for the dedudion of
them, thefe fads muft be fet in different
lights, different circumftances of them muft
be attended to, and a different fort of abftrac-
tion exercifed, as well as a different kind of
inftances faggeftcd by fancy for fupporting
the conclufion. It happens much more fre-
quently, that a perfon, along with great
powers of reafon, poffeffes but imperfed
tafte, or that a perfon of line tafte, is not
remarkable for vigour or depth of underftand-
ing. Every man will be prone to exercife
that kind of judgment in which he excels,
and to fludy the fubjeds which give fcope to
it ; and he will fhun fuch fubjeds as require a
kind of judgment in which he is deficient:
the former kind will be improved by habit,
the latter will be impaired by negled. Hence
the original differences of judgment will be
increafed. The kinds of judgment which
thus admit variety in themfclves, are they
that divcrfify the form and the exertions of
genius. In what manner they diverfify them,
will appear from the following obfcrvations.

Imagination

Sect. X. of Judgment, ^0^

Imagination cannot in any cafe perfedt
its difcoveries without the ailiftance of judg-
ment. Imagination colleds materials ; a cer-
tain kind and degree of judgment is neceflary
for applying them to ufe. If they are not
applicable to any purpofe which fuits a per-
fon*s turn of underftanding or tafte, or if he
has not a degree of thefe powers fufficient for
difcerning that purpofe and adapting the ma-
terials to it, they will be thrown afide as iife-
lefs, or at mofi: preferved in their indigefted
form. Since the revival of natural philofo-
phy, many have tried multitudes of experi-
ments, who wanting the judgment neceffary
^for difcerning the refult of them, have not
been able to deduce any general conclufions
from them. There is a degree of imagina-
tion requifite for contriving experiments;
'there may be genius fhown in condudting and
varying them ; but it is genius only for na-
tural hiftory. Along with a turn of imagi-
nation fit for leading from one experiment to
another, there is a (Irong propenfity to atterrd
to the circumftances of particular fads : but
•there is a weaknefs in the abftrading power,
and a defed: in the other faculties employed
in reafonJng from fadts, which prevent the
mind's advancing to general dedu^ions of

X laws

3c6 Of the Varieties Part II.

laws and caufes. In order to produce philo-
fophical genius, there muft be fuperadded,
acutenefs in difcerning the refult of experi-
ments, and comparing them together, an ap-
titude for recolle£ling obfervations as they be-
come neceflary, a propenfity to fearch for
caufes and connexions. A perfon poflefled
of this caft of mind, will draw conclufions
from the appearances obferved by others,
■which they themfelves could never have
thought of : and yet this perfon has not per-
haps the turn of imagination, or the degree
of attention neceflary for making all the trials
which they made. Pofl^efled of genius for
natural y^zV?^^^, he may be rather defe<3:ive in
that kind of genius which ferves to promote
natural hi/lory. Boyle had an admirable turn
for making experiments, he made many w^ith
great accuracy on a variety of fubjetts ; he
made fome concerning the appearance of light
by the prifm, he obierved the oblong image
of rays refradted by means of it, he diftin-
guiflied that image into live diff'erent colours,
.and he made fome remarks upon this pheno-
menon (2) ; but he thought not of inferring
from it, the different degrees of refrangibility
in the rays of light. A different kind of

[i) Boyle Exper. et Confiderat, de Colerihus^ Par. III. Exp. 4.

judgment,

Sect.X. of Judgment, .307

judgment, orafuperiordegree of the fame kind
of judgment, enabled Newton, from the fame
phenomenon, to form many conclufions on
this fubjea {k]. Ever fmce eledricity began
to attradl the attention of the curious, many
perfons have employed themfelves in making
experiments relating to it, and have difplayed
confiderable ingenuity in making them ; but
moft of thefe have not difcovered philofophi-
cal or fcientific ingenuity. It is to a very
few in the large catalogue of eledricians, that
philofophical genius can be afcribed ; for to
a very few is confined all that has been done
in accounting for the phenomena of electrical
experiments, and deducing important prin-
ciples from them.

When a perfon wants the kind or degree
of judgment neceffary for applying the mate-
rials which imagination has collected, to that
purpofe of invention to which they might be
iubfervient, his genius is repreffed, the dif-
appointment tends to prevent his indulging
himfelf in again amafling materials of the
fame fort, and to make him turn his fancy to
fuch works as, being more fuitable to the turn
of his judgment, he can profecute with fuc-
cefs. By this means, his genius will be, flill
more than it originally was, confirmed in that

(-f) Optics, Book I.

X 2 diredion

3"eS Of the Varimes Pa r t II.

dlredion to which his powers of judgment
are beft adapted. There are not wanting in^
fiances of' perfons who, finding their turn of
judgment and tafte imperfedly adapted to
that fpecies of exertion to which their imagi-
nation ha^d firft prompted them, have quitted
it for another fpfecies to which they fount!
thefe powers more adequate, and in which
'they could therefore become more corredt.

The fame materials may be applied to dif-
ferent purpofes. They will be applied by
' every, perfon chiefly to that purpofe which his
judgment beft enables him to accomplifh. If
the imaginations of two men were fo fimilar
'as to colle<5l the very fame materials, or to
fuggeft the fame ideas ; yet if their turns of
judgment be diflimilar, they will apply thefe
to purpofes as diffimilar, and be unlike in the
' particular form and in all the exertions of
their genius.

Judgment not only receives the materials
fcledted by imagination, and forms them for
ufe, but alfo excites imagination, and fets it
a- working. The decifions of judgment, as
well as our fenfations and ideas, are percep-
tions which may give an impulfe to imagina-
tion, and direft it into a particular track of
thinking. Men's decifions upon the mate-
rials

Sect. X. ofJiLdgment. 309

rials before them, will be different, accordinij
to the fpecies of judgoient in which they ex-
cel ; and will give proportionably different
impulfes to the imagination, and make it to
move in proportionably different directions.
On this account, judgment muft have a flrong
tendency to diverfify the form of genius.
Genius takes very few fteps in any invefliga-
tion, in any train of fentiment and thinking,
or in forming any defign, without receiving
an impulfe from judgment : through its whole
progrefs, conclufions and determinations are
intermixed clofely and at very fhort intervals,
•with the fuggeftions of fancy ; and the con-
clufions and determinations thus intermixed,
will always be fuch chiefly as proceed from
that modification of judgment in which the-
perfon excells. A prevailing tafte for th^
ludicrous, determined the genius of Peter di
Cofimo, though fit for producing greater
works,, to fuch fubjeds of painting as ad-
mitted only fatyrs, harpies, and the like
whimfical and monftrous figures It was the.
corredeft tafte for beauty, continually regu-
lating and inftigating a fine imagination, that
produced the purity of defign, the fweetnefs
of difpofition, the propriety and grace, by
which Raphael is charaderifed. A defed: in

X 3 that

^10 Of the Varieties Part II.

that tafte rendered Correggio in fome refpeds
incorredt and ungraceful, while a ftrong relifli
for the fublime, prompting and directing an
imagination well formed for producing it,
beflowed upon him a peculiar greatnefs of
manner (/).

If a man be defedive in the fpecles of
judgment requifite for any particular deter-
minations or conclufions, fo as not to form
them at all, or to form them wrong, when
they become neceflary, his fancy will be at
a ftand, his genius will be unable to carry
the work farther forward, or to improve it to
a higher degree of excellence. Did the judg-
ment of an artift enable him to perceive the
particulars in which he is faulty, his genius
would often be fufficient to corred them j
their remaining therefore in his works, fliows
that his judgment was not able to fcrutinize
them properly : Titian relinquifhed the dry
manner of his mafter, w'hich appeared in his
firft paintings, as foon as his judgment was
improved enough to perceive and to difapprove
it ; though Ludovico Carracci for fome time
fhowed little genius for painting, yet after
his judgment was improved by the diligent
Jludy of the works of great painters, it gave

(/) Fkeskoy's Judgment of Painters.

his

Sect. X. of Judgment. 311

his fancy fo powerful an impulfe, that he be-
came excellent in defign, colouring, and
grace [m) : without that improvement of judg-
ment, the genius of thefe artifts mufl have
remained defective. In every part of natural
fcience, experiments have been made with
great accuracy, by fome who were not turned
for obferving all the circumftances of the ex-
periments ; thefe circumftances have been
minutely obferved by fome who, for want of
the power of abftracftion, could not determine
the refult of the experiments ; and fome who
were capable of determining this, have been
hindered from purfuing the conclufions to
which it might have led, not only for want
of imagination fufficient for carrying on the
inveftigation, but alfo for want of the fpecies
of judgment which muft have been employed
in it.

The fame materials may give occafion for
determinations and conclufions of different
forts : if a perfon poffefs only the kind of
judgment fit for forming one of thefe forts,
immediately on forming them, he will leave
the road purfued by another who, poflefllng
a different kind of judgment, had formed
diffimilar conclufions, he will go forward in

(w) Fresnoy, ibid. Graham's account of painter?.

X 4 apccu-

^12 Of the Varieties Part II,

a- peculiar track, and arrive at a very diftant
point. Nev/ton formed a judgment concern-
ing the unequal refradion of the rays of light,
6"om fome of the fimpleft prifmatical experi-
ments:: it vFas this judgment that fuggefted
to liim: the fubfequent experiments proper for
afcertaining that principle, and gradually
opened up the wonderful courfe of obferva-
tions and the noble train of difcoveries which
he made concerning light and colours ; and
in the profecution oFthefe, both the moft vi-
gorous power of abftradion, and the moll
piercing judgment of mathematical truth,
were continually exerted. Boyle was inferi-
iDur to Newton in the former of thefe powers,
and poflefTed no great degree of the latter ;
his turn of underftanding led him not to form
the fame conclufion from the moft obviou?
experiments ; by not having formed it, his
genius was at a ftand in deducing the laws of
refraction, he quitted the prifmatic experi-
ments without applying them to any ufe : but
he poflefTed judgment of another kind, and
by means of it, from a multitude of experi-
ments deduced conclufion s of a different na-
ture, concerning the immediate caufes of co-
lours in particular bodies^ and the methods of
producing them.

Se c T. X. of Judgment, 3 1 3

It was already fliown, That regularity of
imagination is an eflential conftituent of ge-
nius ; tliat this regularity confifts in a capa-
city of keeping the end of a work fteadily in
•view, and a propenfity to fubordinate the
parts to that end ; and that, though it be pri-
marily founded in a particular turn of the
imagination, it is promoted by the exercife
of judgment, and could not, without this,
attain tolerable perfedion. It is judgment
that perceives when imagination deviates from
the paths which lead to the end propofed ; it
is owing to this perception, that imagination
is recalled from its wanderings, and made to
fet out anew in the right road ; and it is the
frequent exercife of judgment in this employ-
ment, that gives imagination an habitual re-
gularity and corred;nefs. This excellence of
imagination muft therefore have a great de-
pendence both on the degree and on the kind
of judgment which a perfon poflefTes,

The acuter any fpecles of judgment is, the
more readily, the more certainly, and the
more conftantly, it will obferve and check
every improper excurfion of fancy. Genius
will therefore, in every man, acquire a degree
pf correftnefs in fome meafure proportioned
tt) the exa«5lnefs of his judgment.

fURTHEF,

314 Of the Varieties Part II.

Further, the means adapted to different
ends, are conneded with thefe ends by diffe-.
rent relations, and promote them in different
manners. According therefore to the variety
of the ends propofed, a different kind of judg-
ment is neceffary, for difcerning, whether
the materials colle(fied, have or have not a
tendency to promote them. On this account,
men's diverfity in point of judgment will give
their imaginations different forts of regula-
rity, and confequently mould their genius
into different forms. Hence a perfon who
thinks and compofes with great corredlnefs.
on one kind of fubjed:, often runs into great
wildnefs and irregularity on a different kind.
No tvv'o arts are more analogous than poetry
and eloquence ; but the poet aims chiefly at
pleafmg, and the orator at moving. The
poet may have a very nice difcernment of the
qualities which are fit to pleafe, and may
condudt a poem with the utmoft regularity ;
and yet may be incapable of producing a re-
gular oration : the qualities which tend to
move, are different in fome refpedls from thofe
which pleafe ; to move, objects mull be fet
in a different light, and defcribed in a diffe-
rent manner, from what pure poetry would
require ; to difcern their tendency to move,

a fort

Sect. X. ofjiidg^nent, 31^

a fort of judgment different from the poeti-
cal, is neceffary ; if the poet have not this
fort of judgment, he cannot fucceed in elo-
quence, the parts of his oration, though fe-"
parately beautiful, will be often improper and
mifplaced. Indeed a poet always runs a rifk
of becoming florid, defultory and incorrect,
in an oration ; he cannot efcape it, except he
poffefs judgment of another kind, as well as
that which pure poetry would demand.

In thefe feveral ways which have been
mentioned, in fitting men for applying their
ideas to different purpofes, in leading imagi-
nation into different tracks, and in beftowing
on it different kinds of regularity, judgment
is adtive in diverfifying the forms of genius.
But it may likewife be obferved. That, inde-
pendent of this influence of judgment upon
genius, there will always be a confiderable
analogy in the form of thefe two powers. In
all cafes, fome exertions of imagination are
intermixed with thofe of judgment. In ma-
thematical reafonings, truths felf-evident, or
already demonftrated, are feafonably fuggefted
by fancy ; in experimental reafonings, parti-
cular fad:s and conclulions from them, are in
like manner fuggefted ; in experimental rea-
fonings of different kinds, different forts of

facts

31 6 Of the Varieties of Judgment. Part II,

fa£l& and conclufions are brought into view ;
in the fine arts, fancy is continually employed
in exhibiting to tafte, thofe qualities- concern-
ing which it pronounces. In confequence of
this, every man has an advantage for excel-
ling in that fpecies of judgment, which i&
moft congruous to the turn of his imagina-
tion : and on the other hand, his imagination
will take that turn which is moft fuitable to
the peculiarity of his judgment. Thus, by^
the influence which thefe two powers mutu-
ally exert on one another, each of them is fa
moulded and altered, that their habitual form;
and charader becomes in a great meafure the
Came*

B A R 1^

[ 517 1

PART iir.

Of the Kinds of Genius,

IT HER TO we have endeavoured to
inveftigate feparately the fources from
which the diverfities of genius fpring. kt
this inveftigation, it was neceffary to fearch
out the varieties incident to thofe powers
which are any ways concerned in the opera-
tions of genius ; for thefe varieties are the
fimple principles, by the combination of feveral
of which every diftin<St kind or form of genius
'is conftituted. We muft now purfue a dif-
ferent method. Every kind of genius de-
rives its denomination moft properly from the
nature of the obje(ft about which it is em-
ployed, or of the end to which it is adapted.
The diftindion, therefore, of the kinds of ge-
nius, may be moft commodioufly deduced
from the difference of their objects and ends :
and diftinguifhing them according to thefe, we
muft explain each, by combining the prin-
ciples already eftabliftied, and purfuing tiie^m
through their natural confequences.

SECT.

3i8 Genius for Science, Part IIL

S E C T. I.

Genius tzuofold ; for Science^ or for the Arts,

THE ends to which Genius may be
adapted, are reducible to two ; the
difcovery of truths and the production of
beauty. The former belongs to the fciences^
the latter to the arts. Genius is, then, the
power of invention, either in fcience or in the
arts, either of truth or of beauty.

There are great differences between one
fcience and another, and between one art and
another. On account of thefe differences,
each fcience and each art requires fomething
peculiar in the genius which is fuited to it. I
intend not, at prefent, to defcend to the invefti-
gation of thefe minuter peculiarities : it would
. be curious ; but it would be likewife intricate :
at any rate it is naturally pofterior to th-e illuf-
tratlon of the more general difllnctions of
. genius.

There is likewife a general analogy among
all the fciences, and among all the arts ; and
therefore we may exped: to find fome charac
ters common to fcientific genius in all the
forms which it affumes, and other characters,
diffimilar to thefe, common to all the kinds of

genius

Sect. I. or for the Ar-ts, 319

genius which are exerted in the arts. Thefe
are the charad:ers which I (hall endeavour to
afcertain.

Some difference between genius for fcience,
and genius for the arts, arifes neceffarily from
the very diverfity of their ends. I begin with
this. Scientific genius addreffes its difcove-
ries to the underflanding ; their end is infor-
mation : genius for the arts addreffes its pro-
ductions to tafte, and aims at pleafmg by
them. It is a property of genius, that it keeps
the end of the work continually in view, and
by the view of it, modifies all the parts of the
work, and feleCIs the means which it employs
fo as they may be fubfervient to that end.
This contributes to diftinguifh thefe two kinds
of genius, and to render all their operations
and efforts very diffimilar : they confider all
their objeds in perfectly different lights.

Scientific genius leads a perfon to look
out only for fuch objecfts and ideas as imply
fome truth, or fuggeft fome new conclufion.
Affifted by the conftant perception of this end,
any relation is fufficient for introducing fuch
objedts and ideas; all the affociating princi-
ples are put upon the fearch for them; every
obje<St which thefe principles prefent, is ffed-
dily contemplated in that point of view in
5 which

320 Genius for Science, Par Till.

■which It contributes to this purpofe ; all the
circumftances of it which contribute to this
purpofe, are ftudioufly fought out and exa-
mined with care ; objeds and circumftances
of objciSts, which contribute nothing to it, ei-
ther are not at all fuggefted, or are inftantly
perceived to be ufelefs, and difmifled without
the fmalleft notice. Genius for the arts ren-
ders the perfon who poffeffeth it, equally in-
tent on pleafmg tafte by his work. In con-
fequence of its impulfe, objects and ideas fit
to gratify tafte, are very readily fuggefted to
him ; they are drawn into his view by their
relation to the defign, as well as by the rela-
tions which they bear to one another ; as foon
as they are fuggefted, they are moulded into
that form, and placed in that attitude, in
which they promote this defign, and they are
contemplated in that form and attitude alone :
fuch objects and fuch circumftances of objeds
as are unfit to pleafe, either do not at all occur
to the artift, or, being perceived at one glance
to be unfit, are immediately rejeded.

By this fixt aflbciation of fo difiimilar ends,
the two kinds of genius become very unlike
in all their exeriions. In every complex ob-
je(ft that can engage our attention, there are
two forts of qualities J there are fome which

give

Sect. L or for the Arts, 321

give us pleafure or pain, and there are others
which convey perceptions of an indifferent
nature. Genius for the arts directs the at-
tention chiefly to the former fort, and it leads
to confider them only fo far as they either im-
mediately produce, or remotely contribute to
pleafure or pain. Qualities which appear In-
different to fenfe, gratify tafte in fome fitu-
ations : whenever they do, they attracSt the
notice and employ the powers of genius for
the arts. The mere perception of extenfion
is indifferent ; but the largenefs of Its quan-
tity produces grandeur, its terminations form
figures either beautiful or fignificant ; a juff
reprefentation of It often difplays flvill : in all
thefe cafes It Is a fource of pleafure, and en-
gages the notice and employs the abilities of
the poet and the painter. Both thofe quali-
ties of things which give pleafure or pain,
and thofe which give neither, enter into the
fciences and affect the genius adapted to them.
But the former are generally confidered ab-
Itradedly from the pleafure or pain which
they give ; and even when thefe are taken Into
the account, the philofopher proceeds as if he
were infenfible to them, makes them the fub-
je(ft of cool enquiry, examines what truLh

Y they

32 2 Genius for Science, PartIIL

they indicate, analyzes the feelings, or traces
the caufes ?.^d cfFe^ls of them.

The philofopher defcribes minutely all the
appearances of his obje<ft : his defign requires
it J everyone of them involves fome truth;
inattention to any one of them may prevent
the dilcovery of truth, or occafion error ; thofe
of them which feem leall ftriking, often lead
moft diredly to truth, or lead to the moft im-
portant truths. A poet, on the contrary,
would overlook by far the greatefl part of
thefe appearances ; they are unfit to. pleafe,
and for that reafon attradt no fhare of his at-
tention : he fixes on a few that are mofl: firik-
ing, and labours to fet thefe in a ftriking light.
The obfervation of many minute circum-
ftances, and a variety of exadl menfurations,
were abfolutely neceifary for afcertaining the
laws of light and colours ; and Newton*s ge-
nius gave him a propenfity to attend to them :
thefe would make no figure in poetry ; and a
poet, though perfectly acquainted with them,
would never oncethinkof them while engaged
in compofition ; he would catch fome general
appearances, and be fatisfied with thele.

A GEM I us for fcience is iormtd hj pene-

tratiouy a genius for the arts, by brightnefs,

2 There

S E c T . I. or for the Arts. 323

There are, perhaps, no general characters by
which thefe two kinds of genius can be more
properly difcriminated. Each of thefe cha-
racters is produced by certain pecuHar quali-
ties of thofe powers on which genius has a
dependence. In the one of them are combined
modifications of imagination, memory, and
judgment, different from thofe modifications
of the fame powers, v^'hich are combined in
the other : thefe powers likewife are combined
in different proportions.

SECT. It.

OJ the StniSlure oj Imagination^ %vhich di/iin-^
giilfics the tvoQ kinds of Gen'nis,

OTH penetration and brightnefs imply
a great extent and compafs of imagi-
tiation, or great vigour of the aflbciating prin-
ciples; but they imply different forts of com-
pafs and vigour. Penetration implies fuch a
force of imagination as leads to the compre-*"
hcnfion and explication of a fubjeQ : bright-^
nefs of imagination fits a man for adorning
a fubje(!l. A penetrating mind emits' the rays
by which truth is difcovcrcd : a bright fancy
fupplies the colours by whicli beaiity is pro-
duced. There are many peouliatities of imct-

Y 2 ginatiouj

124 0/ the Stniclvre of Imagination Part IlL

2:lnation, which contribute to the formation
of thefe oppofite characters : by tracing out
thefe, our general defcription of the diftinc-
tion between genius for fcience and genius
for the arts, will be juftified, and a more par-
ticular view will be obtained of the difference
of thefe two kinds.

Acute NESS of judgment is eflential to pe-
netration, but cannot alone produce it. It
would produce corrednefs and readinefs in
' deciding upon materials which were in our
view : but penetration implies, over and above
this, a capacity of bringing quickly and com-
pletely into view, whatever materials are ne-
ceffary for our prefent purpofe. This capa-
city can arife only from itiiagination. In ge-
neral, penetration requires that conlirudion
of imagination, which fits a man for fixing
his view fteddily on one thing, or on thofe
connected with it by clofe and important re-
lations, for attending to all the circumflances
belonging to that thing, and, as it were, ex-
haufling its qualities. This conflrudion of
imagination Is evidently adapted to the end
of fcience, the inveftlgation of truth. For
the conclufions of fcience lie deep, and muft
efcape the tranfient glance of the fuperficial
obferver : they occur by our attending to fuch

qualities

Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius, 325*

qualities in things as are leafl: ftriking and
lead apt to force themfelves on our attention,
and by our pondering and contemplating in a
variety of lights, fuch qualities as cannot be '
perfedly comprehended by a perfon who dwells
not on the fame objed for any length of time.
— Brightnefs of imagination is of an oppofite
nature : it is fuch a ftrength of imagination
as makes every prefent objedt fuggeil a mul-
titude of ideas, and hurries the mind quickly
from one thing, to others not very ftridly
conneded with it. This charader is no lefs
evidently accommodated to the purpofe of the
arts, than penetration to that of the fciences.
A quick fucceffion, or a copious exhibition of
different objeds fit to pleafe, is a great mean
of producing the beauty fought after in all the
arts. In poetry, for inftance, the intricacy of
the fable, that is, the variety and difTimilarity
of the incidents, and the diverfity, the num-
ber, and a proper remotenefs of the images,
are reckoned among the furefl: teds of real
genius. ^

It would appear to be one confequence of
what has been faid, that penetration implies
an aptnefs to be affeded only by the clofefl: and
ftrongeft relations of things ; and that bright-

Y 3 nefs

326 Of the Struclure of hnaginat'ion Part III.

nefs implies a propenfity to be influenced by
fuch relations as are {lighter and more re-
mote : for the latter propenhty tends to draw
off the mind to a gre^t diftance from its ob-
je£t ; but the former allows it to continue
nearer to it, and makes it eafier to recur quickly
to iht contemplation of it. The confequence
is juft ; and the confideration of it will farther
determine our idea of the difference between
a genius for fcience and a genius for the arts.
When ideas are fuggefted to men of thefe dif-
ferent kinds of genius, by means of the fame
relation, it will be found that, generally, the
ideas connedted with the prefent objeO: by the
ffronger degree of that relation, are fuggefted
to the philofopher, and thofe connected by the
weaker degree of it, to the artift. The former
fort are thofe about which the dedudions of
fcience are commonly employed ; the latter
fupply the decorations neceffary in the fine
arts. Any comparifon by which a philofopher
would illuftrate or confirm a theory, muft be
fuch as is exadly parallel ; it is enough for a
poetical comparifon, and even heightens its
beauty, that it agree with the fubjed to which
it is applied, only in fome of its circumftances,
When ji philofopher explains the caufes of

any

Sect. II. in the Hvo Kinds of Genius. 3.27

any appearance, or traces out the effedls of
any principle, he proceeds regularly through
them all, according to the difrerent degrees of
their dependence : let a poet introduce the
fame fuhjed: ; he will defcribe, not all the
caufes or efTcds, but fome of them ; he will
often omit the neareft and moil dired:, and
take notice only of fuch as are more diftant
and indiredl ; he will not give a full delinea-
tion of any one caufe or effect, but mark each
by fome leading or Rriking circumftances.
Thefe differences in manner are natural con-
fequences of the difference in the principles
of aflbciation, now under confideration ; and
that they take place, miglit be Ihown by an
induQion of many particulars. The fubjedt
of Lucretius's poem is fcieatilical ; feveral of
the Epicurean theories which he deicribes poe-
tically, are philofophically deduced "in the
writings of the ancients : compare his account
of any part of the Epicurean fyftcm, with the
account of the fame part in Cicero's philofo-
phical works, for inftance, and the differences
juft now remarked will appear. If in any
inftances they do not appear, it will be found
either that the former is not there properly
poetical, or that the latter has dreffed up phi-
lofophy in a rhetorical garb approaching near

Y 4 to

328 of the Stnicliire of Imagination Part III.

to the poetical (^7). Thomfon introduces feve-
ral parts of the Newtonian philofophy ; com-
pare his account of thefe with the fame parts
as delivered by fyftematic writers, and you will
find the fame differences.

{a) All thefe cafes may be exemplified in different paflages
of thefe two writers. They both give an account, for in-
flance, of Epicurus'?, dodrine concerning the motion of atoms.
Lucretius's account of their moving downward, is given in a
manner confiderably poetical, and in which we may remark
many of the peculiarities juft now mentioned, as charafterif-
tical of genius for the arts :

Nunc locus ell: (ut opinor) in his illud quoque rebus

Coniirmare tibi, nullam rem poffe fua vi

Corpoream furfum ferri, furfumque meare.

Ncc tibi dent in eo flammarum corpora fraudem :

Surfus enim vorfus gignuntur, ct augmina fumunt.

Kt furfam nitidse fruges, arbuftaque crefcunt :

Pondera, quantum in fe eft, quom deorfum cunfla ferantur :

Nee quom fubfiliunt ignes ad tefta domorum,

Et celeri flamma degullant tigns, trabeifque.

Sponte fuafacere id fine vi fubigente putandum eft.

Quod genus, e noftro quom milTus corpore fanguis

Emicat exfultans alte, fpargitque cruorem.

Nonne vides etiam, quanta vi tigna trabeifque

R.efpuat humor aqua; ? nam quam magi' merfimus altam

Direda, et magna vi multi prefnmas isgre :

Tam cupide furfum revomit magis, atque remittit :

Plus ut parte foras emergant, exfiliantque.

Nee tan-ien hasc, quantu'll in fe, dubitamus, opinor,

Qnin vacuum per inane deorfum cunfta ferantur.

Sic igitur debent fiamms quoque pofle per auras

Aeris expreflls furfum fuccedere, quanquam

Pondera, quantum in fe eft, deorfum deducere pugnent.

NoQurnafque faceis coeli fubiime voianteis

Nonne vides longos flammarum ducere traclus.

In quafcunque dedit'parteis natura meatum ? &c.

liib, ii. ver. 154,

Cicero gives an account of the fame do£lrine, in a manner
very onlike, in the fimple cool manner fuitable to iciehce :

But

Sect. II. hi the Hvo Kinds of Genius. 329

But a propenfity to be afFe(5led with the
clofer or the {lighter degrees of relation, is not
alone fufficient to account for the difference
between brightnefs and penetration, or to ex-
plain how one genius is fit for fcience, and ano-
ther for the arts. It muft be obferved farther,
that the peculiar predominance of fome of the
aflbciating principles contributes to form pe-
netration, and the predominance of others of
them, to form brightnefs of imagination ; and
that in feveral ways.

There are fome of the relations of things
which lead the mind more quickly, and to a

*' Cenfet enlm, eadem ilia individua, et folida corpora ferre
fuo deorfum pondere ad lineam : hunc naturalem eiTe omnium
corporum motum." DeFin. lib. i. and in feveral other places.
*rhe poet's account of the declination of the atoms, has little
poetical in it ;

lUud in his quoque te rebus cognofcere avemus :
Corpora cum deorfum reftum per inane feruntur
Ponderibus propriis : incerto tempore firme,
Incertifque locis, fpatio fecedere paullum,
Tantum quod nomen mutatum dicere poffis.
Quod nifi declinare folerent, omnia deorfum,
imbris uti guttse, caderent per inane profundum :
Nee foret offcnfus natus, ncc plaga creata
Frincipiis. Ita nil unquam natura creaifet.

Jbid. ver. 216.

and in eonfequence of this, it differs very little from Cicero's
account of the fame tenet ; " Deinde ibidem homo acutus,
cum illud occurreret, fi omnia drorfum e regione ferrentur,
et, ut dixi, ad lineam, numquam fore, ut atomus altera alte-
ram poffet attingere : itaquc declinare dixit atomum

perpaullum : Ita effici complexiones, et copulationes, et;

adhsefiones atomorum inter fe : ex quo efficeretur mundus,
omnefque partes mundi, quasque in eo e/Dnt." Uid. Many
^ther ^^amples migh: be produced.

greater

33^ Of the Struclure of Imagination Part III,

greater diftance, from thefe things, than other
relations would lead it: the former will by
this very circumftance, according to what has
been already evinced, be mod favourable to
brightnefs, the latter to penetration. There
are fome qualities in every objeS:, which lay
a foundation for relations between it and
many other objecfts : thus the obvious fenfible
.qualities of bodies produce an infinity of re-
femblances or contrails to a multitude of other
things. A ftrong propenfity to attend to thefe
qualities, and to be affeded by the relations
correfpondent to them, will be highly condu-
cive to brightnefs of fancy ; it will produce
furprifing aflemblages, agreeable imagery, and
unexpeded ornaments. But it is unfavour-
able to penetration ; it produces afTociations
which mull lead the mind through many ob-
jects in a rapid fuccefTion, allowing it to take
but a fuperficial view of each. It will there-
fore contribute to penetration, at lead it will
remove one obflruction to the exercife of this
power, that the imagination be not readily or
ilrongly afFedcd by thofe (lighter relations
which the mofl obvious qualities form among
a great multitude of things unconneded in
other refpeds. Accordingly, I do not fay all,
but moll philofophers who were really in-
ventors,

Sect. II. in the tzvo Kinds of Genius. 331

ventors, have fhown no great turn for adorn-
ing their writings with fuch images and com-
parifons as form the graces of poetry. There
are in all objeds, qualities llkewife of an op-
pofite kind, which do not form obvious con-
nexions between them and a multitude of
other objeds. Such are the mutual influence
of the qualities of the fame thing, the various
phenomena of thefe qualities, their caufes and
their confequences. Thefe, inftead of impel-
ling the mind to wander through a wide ex-
tent of things, rather confine it to one thing,
or to fuch as are intimately conneded with it
in fome important refpedt. A prevailing pro-
penfity, therefore, to attend chiefly to fuch
qualities, will not hurry the mind with rapi-
dity from one thing to others ; and will there-
fore be unfavourable to brightnefs : but it \n\\\
leave it at leifure to dwell on its prefent ob-
jedt, and difpofe it, that it may find employ-
ment, to contemplate it in every light; and
will thus be conducive to penetration.

It is obfervable likevv^fe, that the qualities
laft mentioned form the moft important and
interefting relations among things ; thefe will,
therefore, influence the imagination and pro-
mote penetratipn, in much the fame manner
with the jftronger degrees of any one relation :

the

335 Of the StniSl lire of Imagination Part III.

the relations which are formed by the others,
are much more trivial, and will affect the
fancy and produce brightnefs, in the fame
manner with the (lighter degrees of any rela-
tion.

The more important relations of things,
will alfo be tliofe which lead mod naturally
to the difcovery of truths concerning them ;
the more trivial relations are, on the other
hand, naturally adapted to amufement and
pleafure, which is the objed: of the arts.
This difference fuggefls an obfervation of con-
fiderable confequence for explaining the dif^
tindion between the two kinds of genius now
under confideration. We fhall find on exa-
mination, that thofe relations which have
been already mentioned, as conducive to pe-
netration, by the predominance of their in-
fluence en the imagination, are the relations
chiefly concerned in the difcovery of truth.
Thefe relations are all reducible to the dif-
ferent modes of caufation and co-exiftence ;
and fome or other of the modes of thefe, are
the immediate fubje^ts of moft of the conclu-
fions in the feveral fciences. In the fcience
both of bodies and of the mind, the enquiry
i« principally about the caufes of phenomena,
their concomitants, the effeds proceeding

from

Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius. 333
from caufes, and the confequences of general
laws. Many propofitions in mathematics
regard the properties which are co-exiftent in
figures and numbers, or which neceflarily re-
fult from their nature. Even when other
relations are the immediate objedts of fcien-
tifical conclufions, yet it is chiefly by means
of caufation and co-exiftence that they are
inferred. In mathematics, the proportions of
quantities and numbers are deduced as necef-
fary confequences from principles formerly
known. In hydroftatics, the fpecific gravi-
ties of bodies, which are properly degrees of
a common quality, are deduced from certain
effei^s of the weight of bodies. This being
the cafe, the predominance of thefe relations,
caufation and co-exiftence, as principles of
affociation in the fancy, cannot fail to pro-
duce penetration, and to fit genius peculiarly
for the fubje(^s of fcience. It direds the
mind into the very track where truth lies ; it
furnifhes it with the very inftruments by
which truth may be difcovered. — It is no lefs
true, that thofe which have been mentioned
as the more trivial relations, and by their
prevalence conducive to brightnefs, or fome
of them at leaft, are moft adapted to the ob-
jed and the end of the arts. The fine arts

are

334 Of the Striicliire of Imagination Part IIL

are commonly called imitative : were they all
purely and totally fuch, there could be no
difficulty in pronouncing that rcfsmblance is
the relation which would lead fancy to con-
trive works of art. In painting, for inftance,
which is ftridlly imitative, the figures, the
attitudes, the expreffion, the colouring, are
but fo many means of rendering the pidture a
juft and ftriking reprefentationof theftandard,
whether actual or ideal, which the artift had
in view ; and the conception of this ftandard
fuggefts them all to the fancy by the afTociat-
ing principle of refemblance. But even in
cafes where the arts are leaft imitative, it will
appear on attention that this principle is pre-
dominant. A difcovery in fcience is fome-
times defcribed poetically : fuch a defcription!
will, perhaps more clearly and ftrikingly than
any other inftance, fliow how much poetry is
employed about refemblances, and confe-
quently how eifential it is to poetic genius,
that this be the predominant principle of alfo-
ciation. Thomfon thus defcribes Newton's
optical difcoveries ;

Even light itfelf, which every thing difplays.
Shone undifcover'd, till his brighter mind
Untwifted all the (hining robe of day ;
And, from the whitening undidinguifh'd blaze.

Col-

Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius, 33 j

Colledling every ray into his kind.
To the charm'd eye educ'd the gorgeous train
Of parent-colours. Firft the flaming Red
Sprung vivid forth ; the tawny Orange next -,
And next delicious Yellow ; by whofe fide
Fell the kind beams of all-refrefhing Green.
Then the pure Blue, that fwells autumnal fkies.
Ethereal play'd ; and then, of fadder hue,
Emerg'd the deepened Indico, as when
The heavy-fkirted evening droops with frofl,
While the laft gleamings of rcfrafted light
Dy'd in the fainting Violet away (b).

All that is poetical in the defcrlption, is pro-
duced by the metaphors and comparifons,
(evidently fuggefted by the principle of re-
femblance) which are here introduced, and
implied in fuch expreffions as thefe, untivi/Ied
all the Jfmiing robe of day — the gorgeous train
of parent-colours — the flaming red — the taivny
orange — kind beams of green — bine that fiv ells
autumnal jldes^ ethereal play d — indico of fad-
der huCi as ivhen the heavy-Jkirted evenmg
droops luith frofl — dy''d in the fainting 'uiolet
aivay [c).

Whatever relation is the predominant
principle of aflbciation in a particular perfon,

{h) Poem to the memory of Sir I. Newton, ver, 96— 1 1 1 .

(f) The fame obfervation is applicable to his defcrlption of
the Rain-bow, immediately fubjoined, ver. 112-^-115.

that

336 Of the Stniclure of Imagination PartIIL
that perfon is always dirpofed to fix his atten-
tion chiefly on thofe cjualitles in objeds which
lay a foundation for that relation ; and he is
difpofed to confider every quality in the light
in which it is fitteft for fuggcfting ideas by
means of that relation (<:/). This difpofition
is, perhaps, one caufe of the predominance
of a particular aflbciating principle : it cer-
tainly adds to the force of the predominant
principle, and affifls it in forming a correfpon-
dent turn of genius. The man, for inftance,
whofe imagination is under the influence of
caufation and co-exiftence, not only ftrongly
feels the force of thefe relations when they
are perceived, but is alfo prone to perceive
them, prone to confider every objed before
him, in that attitude in which it can mofi:
readily fuggefl its caufcs, its efredts, its con-
comitants, and the like. This will contri-
bute very much to render his genius pene-
trating ; both to dired it to the inveftigations
which belong to fcience, and to fit it to enter
deeply into them. He is continually bufy in
turning every object that comes in his way,
to fome ufe in the difcovery of truth. He
has the fame advantage for invention, that
the merchant who is intent on every oppor-
(</) See above, Part II. feft. 7.

tunlty

Sect. il. in the iivo Kinds of Genius, 337

tunlty of gain, has for enriching himfelf.
Juft fo, if refertiblance be the predominant
principle of aflbciation, the niind, continually
in fearch of refemblances, \vill eagerly fet
every obje<5t in fuch a point of view that it
may fuggeft them ; and confequently it will
be fuccefsful in finding them out, and exhi-
biting them, as well as ftrongly afFeded by
them when they are found. The colours of
light refradlcd by the prifm, have been ob-
ferved by the poet, as well as by the philofo*
pher, but they are confidered by thefe in dif-
ferent points of view, lead them into very
different trains of thinking, and are applied
to very different purpofes. Pope applies them
as an image for illuflrating a refembllng fub-
jed, and is led away quickly from the contem-
plation of them to that fubjcd: ;

Falfe eloquence, like the prifmatic glafs.
Its gaudy colours fpreads on ev'ry place ;
The face of Nature we no more furvey.
All glares alike, without diflindlion gay :
But true expreffion, like th' unchanging fun.
Clears and improves whatever it Ihines upon.
It gilds all objefls, but it alters none {e).

The obfervation of them gave Newton*s mind
a very different impulfe : his attention was

(f) EfTay on Criucifm, ver. jii — 318.

Z fixt

}

33^ Of the StruBurc of Imagination Part IIL

fixt upon thefe colours themfelves; he confi-
dered them as an efFecft which requires a fuit-
able caufe, and was led to contrive a curious
fet of experiments for afcertaining that caufe.
Some of thefe experiments exhibit phenome-
na which the poet might defcribe for their
own fakes, or the painter find an occafion to
rcprefent on canvafs : but Newton attended
only to thofe circumftances which indicated
fome of the laws of light and colours ; and
how flrongly he was impelled to attend to
thefe, any perfon may judge by recolleding
"what a prodigious number of appearances and
eircumftances, minute in themfelveSj and,
abftraded from the inveiligation in which he
was engaged, unimportant and uninterefting,
he took notice of, and delineated vdth fcru-
pulous exadlnefs, in his feveral experiments.
. I.^DEED, as we obferved formerly [f)., no
one principle of aiTociation is fufficient for
invention on any fubjed, alone, or without
the affiftance of other principles, ading m
fubordination to it. On this account, the
predominance of refemblance, or of caufation
and co-exiftcnce, appropriates genius ta the
arts or to the fciences, not merely by the ex-
ertion of thefe principles themfelves, but alfa

(/) Part II. fea. 7,

Sect. II. in the tivo Kinds cf Genius. 339

by determining other affociatlng principles to
ad: in fubfervience to them, i here are two
ways in which one afibciating principle may
make others ad in fubfervience to it.

First, It may determine them to fuggefl
chiefly fuch ideas as are fuitable to it, and ap-
plicable to its purpofes. Very various ideas
are connedcd with any prefent objed: by the
fame relation; all thefe are in themfelves
equally fit to be fuggefled by that objed : but
if fome of them correfpond to the predomi-
nant principle of aflbciation, or to the defigii
which it leads a perfon to propofe and to keep
in view, thefe will be introduced in prefer-
ence to others which have no fuch correfpon-
dence. A double relation belongs to them,
and draws them into view by a double power.
The fubordinate principles exert themfelves
by their own force ; but the predominant one
gives their exertions a particular diredion ;
it likewife makes them, in that diredion, ad
with greater vigour than they would in any
other ; it, as it were, infufes its own fpirit into
them. In genius for the arts, refemblance,
the predominant principle of afiociation,
continually operates along wixh. all the other
principles, and, by uniting its force to theirs,
caufes them fuggefl only, and fugged quickly,

Z 2 fuch

340 Oj the St run lire of Imagination Part Hf,

inch ideas as are conducive to the imitation or
reprefcntation which the artift has in view.
The attributes, quahties, and circumftances
of any fubjcd, are connected with it hy co-
cxiftencc, and arc naturally fuggeftcd to the
imagination by this relation : the predomi-
nance of rcfcmblancc as an aflbciating prin-
ciple in the poet or the painter, will make
thefe to be fuggefted, w^henever they are nc-
ccllary for marking diflin6l:ly the objedt which
he defciibcs or reprefents ; and it will make
thofc of them to occur moft readily W'hich are
propereft for this purpofe, even though they
be in ihemfelves remote. Nealces painting a
naval engagement between the Egyptians and
the Perfians, and wanting to intimate that it
had happened on the Nile, the waters of
which are of the fame colour with the fea,
contrived to accomplilli his aim, by drawing
an afs drinking on the banks, and a crocodile
endeavouring to furpriz.c him [g). In every
good pidlure, in every good poetical defcrip-
lion, we perceive the iniluence of co-exiftence
operating on the imagination, under the di-

(j) Slquidemcuni pralium navale ^ITgyptiiSrum et Perfarum
pinxilfet, quod in N'ilo, cujus aqua eil niari iimilis, factum
i.olcbaC intelligi ; argiimcnioqiie declaravir, quod arte non
poierat : aiellLini eniin in 11 tcic bil;eincn-i pinxit, et crocodi-
ium iur.uianiem ci. I^l.'n. Aa/, /////. lib. x.\xv. cap. lo.

redion

Sect. II. in the tzvo Kinds -of Genius. 341

redlon of refemblance : whenever it does net
operate, precifion is wanting, nothing is ap-
propriated, every thing is common and inde-
terminate; whenever it is not direded by
refemblance, there are fuperfluous, ufelefs, or
ill-adapted circumftances. A defeat in the
former refped:, produces poverty of genius ;
a defed: in the latter refped, irregularity, ^
Both defects are obfcrvable in fome works
even of the mofl ingenious artifts, and are
acknowledged to take fomething from their
merit, and to indicate a failure in the exer-
tion of genius. It has often been remarked
3,8 a blemifli in Pope's Windfor Forefl, and it
has fometimes been urged as a proof of his
not having much genius for dcfcriptive poe-
try, that he defcribes rural beauty in general,
rather than the peculiarities of that place ;
the apology made for him by his advocates,
that the place had at that time fcw^ peculiar
beauties, fuppofes the juftnefs of the prin-
ciple on which the remark proceeds, and, if
it be allowed, will imply that the fubjed: was
ill-chofen for a difplay of poetic genius ; and
will thus confirm the obfervation which we
have made. Cowley's poem On the ^cens
repairing Somcrfet-houfe^ is rather, a minute
ddincatiou of its fituation and the objects

Z 3 fur rounding

34- Of the StruHure of Imagination Part III.

furrounding it, than a poetical defcrlption by
a proper feledion of its beauties. Every epi-.
thet which is as applicable to almofl: any other
fiibjed: as to that to which it is applied, every
defcription w^hich is vague and not charac-*
teriftical of its original, every chara6:er that
is not diftindly marked, is an inftance of
the former defect in genius. Every circum-
ftance in a defcription which counterad:s the
effed of the whole, or even which contributes
nothing to it, every incident not fufficiently
conneded with the main fubjed, is an inftance
of the latter. Either of thefe defedts, if it
be great and permanent, is acknowledged to
be inconfiftent wuth any confiderable degree of
real genius. — What has been faid concerning
co-exiftence, may be eafily applied to all the
other relations. For inftance, no perform-
ance in any of the arts, can be carried on
without the introdudion of caufes and of
effeds ; it is often by means of thefe that the
fubjcds are marked, and a diftin<^ refemblance
or reprefentation of them, produced. The
principle of refemblance, keeping the artift:
intent on the produdion of this, will render
caufation a(fiive in fuggefting ideas conducive
to it; we ftiall perceive in his work many
jlluftrations of things by their caufes or their

confequences,

Sect. II. in the tivo Kinds of Genius. 343

confequences, which (how that the aflbciating
principle of caufation has been very active ;
and we fliall perceive the fitnefs of them all
for giving a precife and lively conception of
the object, which Ihows that its adivity was
influenced and direded by refemblance. In
confequence of both thefe circumftances, the
piece is both rich and corred. In the greatest
part of poetical dcfcriptions, one principal
means of conveying a ftriking defcription,
is the fuggeftion of caufes or effeds : in the
very firft defcription in Thomfon's Spring,
it is almofl the only means employed ;

And fee where furly Winter pafles off

Far to the north, and calls his ruffian blails :

His blafts obey, and quit the howling hill.

The fhattered foreft, and the ravag'd vale ;

While fofter gales fucceed, at whofe kind touch,

DifTolving fnows in livid torrents loft.

The mountains lift their green heads to the fky {h).

In like manner, the predominance of refem-
blance makes contrariety to fuggefl, not any
ideas which happen to bear that relation to
the prefent objed:, but fuch as form contrails
and oppofitions fit to render the conception
of it clearer and more ftriking. All the con-
trafts which are approved, in painting, in

, {b) Ver, II — 17.

Z 4 mufic.

544 Of the Struffure of Imagination Part III,

mulic, or in poetry, arc fuch as contribute tQ
this purpofc. As it is thus eflential to genius
for the arts, that all the ajTociating principles
a^t in fubordination to reremblance, fo their
acfling in this fubordination, with vigour and
quicknefs, muft contribute greatly to bright-
nefs and richnefs of imagination : they are
like a multitude of fervants, bufied In provid-
ing abundance of all things for their prince.
The degree of perfedlon in genius, will al-
ways bp proportioned to the vigour of all the
aflbciating principles, and the ftridnefs of
their fubjedtion to the leading one.

After what has been faid, it will be eafy
to explain, how caufatlon and co-exiftence,
the one or the other of which is always the
predominant principle of affoclation in fcienr.
tific genius, determine all the other principles
to introduce fuch ideas as lead to the difcovery
of truth, and, by imparting vigour to them
while they ad: in this direction, enable then;
to introduce fuch ideas readily and in abun-
dance. It will be fufficlent to illuftrate this,
with refpedt to one principle of aflbciation.
In every fort of fcientific genius, refemblance
muft have confiderable influence on the ima-
gination ; in mathematics, fimilitude of ratios
is often a means of invention ; in philofophy,

one

Sect, IL if^ the two Kinds of Genius. 345

one experiment fuggefts others which have a
Ijkenefs to it, and one conclulion leads to ano-
ther analogous conclufion. The prefent ob-
ject might fuggefl many others, by means of
their refemblance to it, which would contri-
bute nothing to a new difcovery : it is when
the predominant principle of aflbciation, ad-
ing powerfully on a perfon, fixes his atten-
tion on the reference of the prefent objed: to
the difcovery of a particular truth, and, ia
confequence of this, makes it fuggefl only
fuch, from among the fimilar objects, as have
the fame reference, that the principle of re-
femblance promotes penetration, and contri-
butes to the fertility of fcientific genius. Ex-
periments in electricity have gradually and
fucceffively fuggefted a great multitude of
other experiments on the fame fubjeCt ; all
thefe experiments have been frequently re-
peated by many perfons ; the feveral circum-
flances of them have been accurately obferved
and recorded ; and they have been furprif-
ingly varied : but very many of them ferve
only to diverfify the appearances, to aftonifh
or amufe, but lead not to any difcovery con-
cerning the nature, the caufe, or the Jaws of
eledrlcity. Some of thofe who have made
the moft experiments, deduced no general

conclufjons

34^ Of the ^triiEliire of Imagination Part III,

concliifions from them, or were inaccurate
and erroneous in thofe which they attempted
to deduce : they poiTelTed, in a confiderable
degree of ftrength, the aflbciating principle
of refemblance, and thofe other affociating
principles which were neceifary for leading
them from one experiment to another, and
for enablino- them to contrive and conducSt

experiments, but they were defective in thofe
principles of affociation which mud be predo-
minant in order to form a genius for fcienti-
fical dedudiions, and without acting in fub-
ordination to which, thefe former cannot pro-
mote this purpofe. Others have deduced
fome general conclufions from fome of their
experiments, but have likewife made many
experiments which tend to no fuch conclu-
fions : in them the principles of aifociation
which muft take the lead in forming fcien-
tific genius, have had fome degree of force,
yet not force enough to render them uni-
formly and habitually predominant ; and in
confequence of this the other affociating prin-
ciples have adled in fubordination to them,
^only in fome inflances, not conftantly or in
all their experiments. There is no eledrician
who has difplayed a greater fhare of real fci-
entific genius, than Franklin. His experi-
ments

Sect. IL in the two Kinds of Genius. 347

ments are not fo numerous as thofe of many
others : this proceeds not from an inferiority
to any, in the fpecies of ingenuity requifite
for contriving and condudling experiments ;
on the contrary in all his experiments there is
a peculiar neatnefs, beauty, and variety ; but
it proceeds from his poffeffing the aflbciating
principle of caufation in very great vigour,
fo that it conftantly exerts itfelf, and makes
all the other aflbciating principles ad in per-
fect fubfervience to it. Accordingly there is
fcarce one of his experiments fuperfluous,
unmeaning, or indefinite ; they all contribute
■ to eftablifh general conclufions, they are un-
dertaken with this view, and they are con-
ducted in the manner fitteft for accomplifhing
it. His experiments for inflance on the
Leyden phial, area regularly connected feries
fit for eftablifhing the difference between po-
fitive and negative eledricity, for afcertaining
the feveral circumftances of that difference,
for tracing out its feveral confequences, and
for fetting them in fuch lights as may render
them mod fubfervient both to the contrivance
of new experiments and to the deduction of
ntw conclufions. The effed of pointed
bodies in drawing off the eledrical fire, is
difcovered by a fet of experiments well con-
trived

34B Of the Struclure of Imagination Part III.

trived for the purpofe ; and Is immediately
applied to new experiments proper for invef-
tigating the exadt fimilarity of eleO:ricity to
thunder and lightning, experiments con-
ducted with a fteady view to the eftablifhment
of this dodirine, and with the corredeft fub-
fervience to it : and that fimilarity is applied
to important pra<5tical purpofes, with a readi-
nefs and addrefs which fhows a mind intent
on invefligating effects and confequences, ac-
tuated by that afTociating principle which in-
ftigates to the inveftigation of them, putting
in motion all the other principles which lead
to the means of profecuting that inveftigation,
and making them operate with vigour in the
life of thefe means (z).

Secondly, As each of the afTociating prln»
ciples is fufceptible of various modifications (^),
the predominant principle may make the reft
adt in fubordination to itfclf, by difpofmg us
to be afFeded by thofe modifications of them,
which are mofl coincident with it, and fittefl
for promoting its defigns. This feems to be
one of the chief ways in which the predomi-
nant principle determines any other principle

(/■) Fadls amply fufficient H^r fupporting all the obfervations
made in this illuftration, will be found in Prikstlv's ////^cr;^
of EkSiricity^ Parti.

(^) See Part II. fed. 6,

to
3

Sec r-. II. in the two Kinds of Genius, 349

to fuggeft fome ideas in preference toothers ;
and therefore the taking notice of it, ferves
to explain farther the obfervations made un-
der the Lift head. When we confider how-
many and how diflimilar modifications every
alTociating principle admits, we muft be fea-
fible that the power of the predominant prin-
ciple to modify the others fuitably to its own
defigns, w^ill introduce great variety into their
sfFeds, and give birth to very different kinds
of genius. Refemblance, forinftance, which
is the leading inftrument of invention in the
arts, is often a fubordinate inftrument of in-
vention in fcience. But refemblance is of
very different kinds. The refemblances which
influence the poet or the painter, are for the
moft part fuch as belong to the fenfible qua-
lities or the general appearances of things,
fuch as are ftriking, and fach as the artift can
make to be eafily and ftrongly conceived by
others. Such refemblances are of little con-
fequence in the inveftigations of fcience, and
have little influence on the imagination of
the philofopher. It is his aim to difcover
caufes, laws, or effeds : intent on this, he
obferves, and is affe<0:ed by, fuch fimilitudes
as regard the manner of conducing experi-
ments, fuch as are indications of things pro-
ceeding

350 Of the St ruSlure of Imagination Part III,

ceeding from the fame caufes with the prefect
objed:, or from fimilar caufes, of their being
produced in the fame manner, of their having
fimilar confequences, or of their bearing
fimilar relations to any object, and the like.
Such forts of refemblance are congruous to
the predominant principle of caufation ; they
are fubfervient to its operations ; they are the
forts which make one proportion, one expe-
riment, or one conclufion fuggeft others :
and that principle caufes thefe, rather than
other forts of refemblance, to a<fl vigoroufly
and pour in ideas upon the mind. One can
conceive m.any objc<3:s which the appearances
of light refradted by the prifm, would have
naturally fuggefted to a poet ; but they would
have all been fuch as bear fome refemblance
or analogy to thefe appearances themfeives.
The prifmatic experiments fuggefted to New-
ton other experiments or obfervations on
bubbles and plates of air, of glafs, and of
water, on fpeculums, on heated fteel, melted
metals, coloured powders, falts, vitriols, al-
lum, borax, nitre, camphire, diamonds, and
a great variety of other fubftances. None of
them would have come within the range of
poetical genius ; fome of them are too ex-
adly fimilar to ferve for images or compa-

rifons,

Sect. II, in the tni'o K'nids of Genius. 351

rifons, others are too remote to be applicable,
in their obvious appearance, to the purpofe
of illuftration, others have nothing fit to ftrike
the fancy, or to promote the poet's views :
but they v^ere the very trials applicable to
Newton's defign ; and his predominant prin-
ciple of affociation, keeping that defign fix-
edly in his view, excited and gave vigour to
the forts of refemblance which could fugged
objeds fubfervient to it. In like manner, the
relation of caufe and efFe£l, which is a lead-
ing principle of affociation to the philofopher,
is very often employed by the artifl: as a fub-
ordinate principle ; and, by being in him
fubordinate, it is modified in particular ways :
he is influenced, not by every fpecies of it,
but by thofe fpecies which can enliven or de-
fine the reprefentation of an objed:. The
philofopher is affeded, for inflance, by the
clofer and more proper kinds of caufation ;
thefe alone are of ufe in his defigns : the poet
is mofl frequently affeded by the lefs proper
kinds, and the remoter degrees of this rela-
tion ; thefe are generally the fitteft for enter-
ing into flriking defcriptions. This will alfo
hold true of co-exiftence ; it is of little ufe to
the philofopher, and is little employed by
him, except in its ftridefl: forms ; it is ufed

5 ' by

352 Of the StruSiure of Imagination Part lit.

by the artift in all its forms, chiefly in fuch
as are more loofe. Contrariety is employed
both in fclcnce and in the arts, as a fubordi-
nate principle of afTociation ; but different
kinds of it operate in thefe two fubje^fts, ac-
cording to their congruity to the predomi-
nant principle in each, and their fubfervience
to the refpeftive ends of each. The philofo-
pher is influenced chiefly by contrarieties in
the caufes and the effects of things ; a genius
for the arts, though not infenfible to thefe,
is alfo, and perhaps more, affected by oppo-
litions and contrails in the appearances of
things themfelves.

Thus in every kind of genius, the prin-
ciple of afTociation which is in that kind pre-
dominant, keeps the end in view, renders the
mind intent upon it, gives it a difpofition to
run into what can promote it, and to reje(£t
what is unferviceable for it : by means of all
this, that predominant principle gives all the
other principles a propenfity to fuggeft fucli
ideas, and to afTume fuch forms as are moft
coincident with it, and moft fubfervient to
the end of the work. In every kind of ge-
nius, all the affociating principles muft ope-
rate vigoroully : but the predominant prin-
ciple operates by its own inherent vigour,

Sect. II. in the tnvo Kinds of Genius, %^i

like the fun which fhines with his own light ;
and the fubordinate principles may be com-
pared to the moon, which fliines with bor-
rowed light, and refleds it only on that fide
which is turned to the fun ; they have their
vigour imparted to them by the predominant
principle, and they a£t in a diredion fuitable
to it. It will confirm the juftnefs of this
diftindion, and farther illuftrate our fubjed,
to obferve. That the conRant operation of
the predominant principle along with the
fubordinate ones, is always clearly perceiv-
able, not only in the fubfervience which it
gives thefe to its defigns, but alfo in the fe-
parate effeds which it produces. Let one
experiment, for inftance, fuggeft a fimilar
one to a philofopher, he not only applies it
to the inveftigation in which he was profelT-
edly engaged ; but, if it fuggefl: any other
conclufions by means of any of its circum-
ftances, he readily takes notice of them alfo,
and thus fliows how much and how uninter-
ruptedly the relation of caufe and cffed influ-
ences his imagination. Innumerable inftances
of the imagination being in this manner- in-
fluenced, might be colleded from the works
of philofophers. To hint but at a very fev/ ;
Newton refted not in applying his optical

A a experiments

554 Of the St ruclure of Imagination PartIIL

experiments to the difcovery of the proper*
ties of light and colours, which was his im-
mediate view in making them, but confidered
alfo how they might be applied to the expli-
cation of animal motion, attraction, and other
phenomena (/). Wheeler having found by
experiments, that bodies to which eledtricity
is communicated, repel one another, was led
by the circumftances of thefe experiments, to
obferve, that it fuggefts a reafon for a very
different phenomenon, for the diflblution of
bodies in menftrua, viz. that the particles of
the folvend, having imbibed particles of the
menftruum, fo as to be faturated with them,
the faturated particles become repulfive of
one another, feparate and fly to pieces [m).
Defaguliers was led in like manner to think
of transferring the refult of his eledrical ex-
periments, to account for the fixing of air by
llcams of fulphur, and for the afcent of va-
pours [n]. And later electricians have thought
of applying their experiments and conclu-
llcns to account, not only for thunder, light-
ning, and meteors, but alfo for water-fpouts,
hurricanes, and earthquakes (o). A poet

(/) optics, Qu. 24. 31, &c.

(w) V^xtsThY's HiJ}. of Eleciricitj, Part I. per. 4.-

(«) Ibid. per. 6.

(0) Ibid. per. 10. kCt. 12*

fometimes

Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius* ^^^

fometimes introduces a feries of caufes and
efFeds ; but he always defcrlbes them In a
manner different from the philofopher : how-
much his imagination is under the power of
refemblance, appears from his illuftrating
every part of the defcription by epithets,
huages, metaphors, and comparifons. The
paffage already quoted from Thomfon, con-
cerning the prifmatic image, may ferve as an
ilhiftration of this. Many other examples
might be produced (/>).

(p) Many paflages in Lucretius, of which the fubjedl is
purely fcientihcal, are in this manner rendered beautifully
poetical. Whenever Virgil introduces a fubje(!'l of fcience,
the prevalence of a poetic genius is confpicuous through the
whole of it. The two following paflages are inltances of this.

Iccirco certis dimenfum partibus orbem
Per duodena regit mundi fol aureus allra.
Quinque tenent cceIuhi zouje : quarum unum corufco
Semper fole rubens, et torrida femper ab igni :
Quam circum extremae dextra l^evaque trahuntur,
Ca;rulea glacie concretae, atque imbribus atris.
Has inter, mediamque, du.'e mortalibus a;gris
MunereconcefliE divum : et via feda per ambas,
Obliquus qua fe fignorum verterct ordo.
Mundus ut ad Schythiam Riphseafque arduus arceis
Confurgit ; premitur Libyan devexus in Auflros.
Hie vertex nobis femper fublimis : at ilium
Subpedibus Styx atra videt, Manefque profundi :
Maximus heic flexu fmuofo elabitur anguis
Circum, perque duas in morem fliiminis Arftos:
Arftos, oceani metuenreis xquore tingi,
lllic, ut perhibent, aut intempclla filet nox
Semper, et obtenta denfantur no£te tenebrs:
Aut redit a nobis Aurora, dicmque i,;dacit:

A a 2 One

35<^ Of the Stru5iurc of Imagination Part III.

One remarkable difference between the
two kinds of genius, remains yet to be men-
tioned. In fcientifical invefligations, the
imagination can receive no affiftance from the
paffions : few pafTions can mix with thefe in-
veftigations ; and if thefe few were allowed
to interfere, they would infed: our conclu-
fions, and obftrud: our difcoveries. Where
truth is the object, the paffions can produce
only prejudices fit to lead away from it. But
genius for the arts can never exift where the
paffions have not great power over the imagi-
nation, in affeding the train and aflbciation
of perceptions. An imagination eafily af-
feded by the paffions, is peculiar to genius
for the arts ; and it is eflential to it in all the
forms which it can affiime. There is fcarce
any of the fine arts which is not fufceptible
of the pathetic, and in which the pathetic is

Nofque ubi primus equis oriens afflavlt anhells,
lUic fera rubens accendit lumina Vefper.

Georgic. lib. i. v. 23 J,

Me vero primum dulces ante omnia Mufe
Quarum facra fero ingenti perculfus amore,
Accipiant ; ccelique vias, et fydera raonflrent :
Defeilus Solis varies, Lunaeque labores ;
Unde tremor terris : qua vi maria alta tumefcaDt
Obicibus ruptis ; rurfufque in fe ipfa refidant :
Quid tantum oceano properent fe tingere foles
Hyberni, vel quae tardis mora noftibus obllet.

Lib, ii. V. 475.

not

Sect. II. in the tivo Kinds of Genius* 357

not a capital excellence. In painting, in
mufic, in poetry, in eloquence, it is often
nccefTary to exprefs the paflions and afFedions
of the foul : they can be exprefled only by
the perfon whofe fenfibility of heart enables
him to conceive the pafFion with vivacity, to
catch it as by infedlion, and whofe imagina-
tion immediately receives an impulfe from it,
and pours in the ideas of the proper charac-
ters of the feveral paflions, of thofe efFedls,
imitable in the particular art, by which each
paflion naturally fhows itfelf. Every artift
muft often excite the paflions : they are ex-
cited chiefly by being well exprefled : they
are excited alfo by ftrong reprefentations of
their objects and their caufes ; but it is the
fancy, excited by the lively conception of the
paflion, running into the fame thoughts
which the paflion, if really working, would
fuggeft, and placing the artift in the fituation
in which he would then be, that puts it in
his power to imagine, and confcquently to
reprefent, its caufes and its objeds in a way
proper for infufing it into others [q).

{q) Summa enim (quantum ego quidem fentio) circa mo-

vendos affeAus in hoc pofita ell, ut moveamur ipfi. Nee

incenditnifi ignis, nee madcfcimus nifi humore: nee res ulla
dat alteri colorem, quem ipfa non habet. Primum eft igitur,
ut — afficiamur antcquam afficere conemur. At quomodo fiet

A a 3 In

35^ Hoiv the tnjoo Kinds ofGenms Part III.

In thefe feveral ways, brightnefs and pene-
tration, a genius for the arts and a genius for
the fciences, arife from a difference in the
turn and conftru6:ion of the imagination.

SECT. III.

Hoiv the tivo Kinds of Genius differ in refpecl'
of the AJJiJlance zvhicb they derive front
Memory,

JOTH in genius for the arts, and in ge-
nius for fcience, imagination is afTifted
by memory, operating in fubordination to it,
and operating continually along with it. But:
it is not, in thefe two kinds, affifted equally,
by memory, nor affifled by the fame fpecies
of memory.

utafficiamur? Neque enim fiint motus in noftra poteflate.
Tentabo etiam de hoc dicere, Quas <pacT«o-ta? Giasci vocant,
nos fane vifiones appellemus : per quas imagines rerum ab^>
fentium ita repr^cfentantur animo, ut eas cernere oculis, ac pra;-
fentes habere videamur: has quifquis bene conceperit, is erit;,
in affedlibus potentiffimus. Hunc quidcm dicunt i^^avrjic-iiroi,
qui fibi res, voces, actus, fecundum verum optime finget:'
quod quidem nobis volentibus facile continget. — Infequetur
Evap^ta, quae a Cicerone illuRratio et evidentia nominatur ;
qu</non tarn dicere videtur, quam oftendere : et afFeftus non
aliter quam fi rebus ipfis interfimus, fequentur. Qoint. Inji,
Orat. lib. vi. cap. 3. Sed cum fint alii veri afFeclus, alii fifti
et imitati, — hi carent natura, ideoque in his primum eft bene
affici, et concipere imagines reruni, et tanquam veris moveri.
Hid. lib. xi. cap. 3.

Sect. III. differ in refpecl of Metnory. 359

In fcientifical invention, memory is exerted
in a much greater degree, and its afliftance is
more indifpenfably necefiary than in the arts.
All the experiments, all the obfervations, all
the principles, employed In phllofophlcal in-
vefligationsj miift be fuch as have been actu-
ally obferved or afcertalned, and are exadly
remembered, elfe they can be of no ufe for
eflabllfhing a juft theory. Memory muft at-
teft the phenomena as really obferved, and the
principles as already verified, and produce a
full convidllon of their having been obferved
and verified, elfe the philofopher would never
think of applying them to the fupport of his
theory. Phenomena not experienced, but ima-
gined, could lead to none but chimerical con-
clufions. At one time electricians imagined
that they faw In their experiments the power
of electricity affedted by the colours of bodies,
and light bodies performing a regular motion
from weft to eaft round an elcCtrified ball [a] :
had thefe faCts been taken for granted, and
Gonclufions deduced from them, the conclu-
fions muft have been altoc-ether fanciful.

^fc>'

Often indeed men can in fome degree Imagine
beforehand what will be the rcfult of an ex-
periment, or what the appearances which It

{a) pRiEc;i.y's Hijlory of Ehdricity, Part I. per. v.

A a 4 will

360 How the two Kinds of Genius Part III.

will difclofe ; nay, cannot reflraln themfelvea
from conjectures concerning this. But it is
only intimate acquaintance with the fubjed!:,,
extenfive knowlcge of the laws of nature, ac-
curate remembrance of the appearances which
have attended analogous experiments, difcern-
ment of the variation of circumf^ances in the
experiment propofed, and judgment of the
probable confequences of that variation, that
can enable them to conjecture right. Some
of Bacon's anticipations, and many of New-
ton's conjedures in his queries, were juft, and
have been fmce eftablilhed by adual trial§.
But if, without thefe requifites, by the mere
force of imagination, a perfon venture to guefa
in this manner, he will almoft certainly guefs
wrong ; and, if he proceed to reafon from it,
will produce a fantaftical hypothefis. Scarce
any man can poITefs the requifites mentioned,
in fo great a degree, as to render it fafe for
him to build upon the fuppofed refult, with-
out firft bringing it to adtual trial, and making
himfelf certain of the fa.Ct. Even when ^
man may naturally think that he has the belt
foundation for his conjedure, the refult may,
on trial, turn out not only different, but di-
reClly oppofite. When all the experimenta
at that time made feemed to fhow, that the

electrical

S E G T . I II . differ in refpe5i of Memory, 361

eledlrical fire is contained In the glafs itfelf^^
and when it was known that the earth or a
floor draws off this fire from a globe or tube
in which it has been excited, it was natural
to conjedure that the electrical power would
be ftrengthened by preventing its being thus
drawn off, by fiipporting the machine and the
operator on fome fiibftance which is not a con-
ductor of electricity ; the conjecture was
formed by feveral electricians, and was in the
higheft degree plaufible : but when they made;
the trial, the very reverfe of their expectation
happened, the power w^as very much weak-
ened ; and this unlooked for cfFeCt led fome
of them to corrcCt the fpecious error which
had occafioned their conjecture, to conclude
that the eleCtric fire Is only collected, not pro-
duced, in the glafs by friCtion, and to difcover
the twofold electricity, the pofitive and the
negative [h), FaCts imagined, or rafhly taken
for granted, have produced numberlefs errors
in fcience. All the faCts on which true fci-
ence can be built, niull be exhibited by me-
mory; the operation by which they are im-
mediately applied, is recollection. This re-
CoUeCtion is indeed under the influence of a

{I) Prikstly's W_fi, of Ekaddty, Parti, per. vll. and
per. viii. fedt. 3.

• •

piercing

362 Hoiju the two Kinds of Genius Part III.

piercing imagination. Imagination excited by
a prefent perception, puts us upon fearching
for the proper experiments and obfervations ;
it is often by relations fit to afFed: itfelf alone,
that it gives us the firft hint of thefe, but me-
mory is the power which it fends, as it were,
in fear ch of them, and by means of which it
finds them. Imagination inlligates us to recol-
lection, and gives our recoiledion the proper
aim ; but it is by memory that this aim is ac-
complifhed. It is the only guide to truth, the
obje£i; and the end of fcience.

It is not fo in the arts. V/hen the painter
draws a figure or a landfcape, when the poet
conceives a defcription, a character, or an
event, it may be fuch as he has really ob-
ferved, and remembers, and may be only by
fancy drawn out of the repofitory of memory,
and applied in the proper place. But it is not
of importance whether it be or not ; its be-
ing attefted by memory, its being exactly like
to fomething obferved, are not the circum-
ftar.ces to which the artift principally attends :
though it has never httn obferved, it may be
produdiive of beauty, and' this is all that is re-
quired in the arts. Human invention is not
fo fertile, as to be able to diverfify its produc-
tions fufficiently, without ever employing

memory

Se c T . III. differ in refpe^l of Memory, 363

memory to copy from the reality of things ;
and therefore this latter faculty is a neceflary
and ufeful auxiliary to fancy [c]. Many
figures and fcenes in the works of the molt
original painters, are fuch as they remem-
bered to have feen : many defcriptions, cha-
raders, and details, in the works of the mofb
inventive poets, are fuch as memory retained.
Even Michael Angelo is faid to have transfer-
red into his Lajl 'Judgment^ feveral entire
figures from the paintings of Luca Signorelli.
Giacomo da Porte took the ideas of moll of his
figures in very numerous and highly efleemed
hillory-paintings, from his own family and
acquaintance. Francifco Albani defigned his
Venufes and his Cupida by his own wife and
children. Moft of the fables of Shakefpear
himfelf, are fuch as he found already con-
trived. But when fancy has force enough to
produce fcenes, figures, characters, fables, or
beauties of any kind, without that aid from
memory, we are fo far from being difpleafed
with the want of it, that, on the contrary, pro-

(0 It is a juft obfervation of the ingenious and elegant au-
thor of A Critical Dijj'ertaticn on the Poems of OJjian, ',' Truth
** makes an impreffion on the mind far beyond any fiiflion j
and no man, Jet his imagination be ever fo ftrong, relares
*' any events fo feelingly as^hofe in which he has been in-
*• terefted ; paints any fcene fo naturally as one which he has
•♦ feen ; or draws any charafters in fuch Itrong colours as thofe
■ *' which he has perfonaliy known."

vided

364 Hoiv the tzuo Kinds of Genius Part III.

vided memory and judgment have been con-
fulted fo far as to enable fancy to reprefent
things as they may have been, we regard genius
as the greater and the more original for not
Handing in need of farther aid. Deviations
from the reality of things, which would dif-
grace fcience, and be abfolutely inconfiftent
with its genuine end, contribute to perfedion
in the arts.

Oenius for fcience and genius for the arts,
are iikewife aiiifted, principally, by different
fpecies of memory. A capacity of ftrongly
remembering feparate objcds, is far from be-
ing unnecefTary in the inveftigations of fci-
ence : many of the phenomena v/hich Nature
exhibits, or which experiments difclofe, are
fimple objects ; and every phenomena muft
be attended to and retained, elfe the confe-
quence will be, either that no conclufion can
be formed, or that the conclufion muft be
wrong. But a turn for accurately remem-
bering the connexions of things is Iikewife
abfolutely neceiTary, and of capital import-
ance. To retain lively ideas of the feveral
feparate appearances, will contribute little
to promote fcience, except we alfo have ob-
ferved and remember the precife fituation in
which the appearances occurred, all the cir-

cumftances

Sect. HI. differ in refpeB of Memory. 365

cumflances which attended them, what ap-
pearances preceded, what were confequent,
and what contemporary, how they came on^
varied, and again went off. That fluids alcend
in exhaufted tubes, was always known ; but
no legitimate conclufion could be drawn from
this appearance, as long as it was taken for
granted that they would afcend to any height :
it was only when the exadl heights to which
they rife were obferved, that a difcovery was
made of the caufe of their afcent, the prefl'ure
of the air ; a difcovery which has led for-
ward to many others both curious and ufeful.
Phenomena imperfectly obferved, can produce
no juft conclufions ; and a confufed or im-
perfedl remembrance of phenomena, will ob-
ftru£t the juftnefs of the conclufions, as much,
and in the fame ways, as if fome of their ef-
fential circumftances had been wholly over-
looked.

In the arts, the memory of feparate objects
muft be very ftrong and lively : the artift muft
conceive them ftrikingly, that he may be able
to reprefent them ftrikingly. Memory of the
connexions of things is often of great utility :
but it is not always abfolutely ncceflary to re-
tain all their real connexions with precifion.
5 Even

^66 Hoiv the tijuo Kinds of Genius Part III.

Even in a profelTed imitation of a real object,
a full and minute exhibition of all its circum-
flances is not infifted upon ; a feledlion of
fuch as, according to the art by which the
imitation is made, will produce the greateft
beauty, is not only allowed, but approved. In
a portrait or a landfcape, likenefs to the ori-
ginal is indifpenfable ; yet in both it is ex-
pected that real genius will fet that original
in an advantageous light, heightening its ex-
cellences, and extenuating its defeds. What
has been obferved in one fituation, is often ac-
commodated by the artift to his own fubjedt ;
but he is at liberty to reprefent it independent
of the things in connexion with which it was
obferved, to transfef* it into a different fitua^
tion, and to alter many of its circumftances ;
nay, if he take not this liberty, he will be
blamed as too fervile and painful a copier of
Nature, and accufed of poverty of invention.
Though the artiil's remembrance of real
things be accurate, fancy muft not borrow the
whole, but fnatch what fuits its purpofe, and
make it its own. A fpecies of memory more
accurate than it is allowed to make ufe of in
the arts, cannot be reckoned neceflary to ge-
nius for the arts : on the contrary, it might

hurt

& E c T . III. differ in refpeB of Memory, 367

hurt this genius, by leading into minute de-
tails, and too circumftantial deferiptions or de-
lineations.

The natural appearances which are ufeful
in productions in the arts, muft always be
fuch as are in fome refped: ftriking. To ren-
der memory, therefore, fubfervient to genius
for the arts, it is fufficient that it be fit for re-
taining ideas of fuch appearances as have made
a ftrong impreflion on the fenfes, as have
forced attention, as have pleafed tafte, as have
excited fome paffion or emotion, as have
feemed peculiar and diftinguifhing. It is in
a perfon whofe perceptions are readily ren-
dered ftrong and durable by thefe circum-
ftances, that memory will be qualified for depo-
fiting materials fit for being employed in the
arts. But the appearances which are of im-
portance in fcientific invefligations are of a
different fort, generally noways ftriking in
themfelves, often apparently inconfiderable.
The perceptions of them being thus weaker
than thofe of the other fort, a greater natural
ftrength of memory is necefl^ary for retaining
them. The memory muft likewife be turned
for deriving ftrength from fuch circumftances
as fuit the nature of thefe appearances. The
mind muft be prone to clofe and continued

attentioiij,

3 68 Honv the two Kinds of Genius Part lit*

attention, that this may infix in the memory
perceptions too weak for laying hold of it by
their own power. It muft: be prone to fup-
pofe importance in appearances feemingly
trifling and unpromifing ; to look forward to
their tendency and confeqiiences with a high
curiofity and eager pre-expedation, that, if
they turn out in the manner that was looked
for, the gratification of that principle may im-
prefs them indelibly on the mind, or, if they
turn out otherwife, that principle may be
again excited, which will imprefs them no
lefs indelibly. It is when circumftances of
this kind have the principal influence on ren-
dering remembrance ftrong, that memory is
fit for giving afliflance in fcientifical difco-
veries. In the writings of every perfon who
has been remarkable for fuch difcoveries, we
perceive plain evidences how much power
thefe circumftances had over his mind.

The connexions of things which muft be
reprefented in the arts, are not the fame with
thofe connexions which muft be obferved in
the fciences. The artift is concerned chiefly
with the refemblances of things, and thefe of
the more fenfible and ftriking kinds ; and, ia
fubordination to thefe, with their obvious con-
trafts, their peculiar and difcriminating cir-
cumftances,

Sect. III. differ in refpeB of Memory . 3 ^9

cumftances, and their more fignal caufes and
effects : the philofopher is concerned with
their caufes^ effeds, and laws ; and, as con-
ducive to the difcovery of thefe, with their
precife qualities and adjunds, their more hid-
den fimilitudes and analogies, and their more
fecret differences and contrarieties. Memory
is adapted to genius for the one, or genius for
the other, according as it is turned mofl for
being aifedted with the former fort of con-
nexions, or with the latter.

SECT. IV.

Hoiv the tivo Kinds of Genius differ in refpeSl
of the AJJi/lance '^juhich they derive front
fiidgment.

sY imagination, with all the afTiftance
which it can receive from the heft
adapted memory, neither brightnefs nor pene-
tration is completed. But in this refpedl
there is a confidcrable difference betv/een them.
Some degree of brightnefs may arife merely
from the imagination ; but no degree of pene-^
tration can ; the lowell: degree of this cannot
poffibly exift without acutenefs of judgment*
Accordingly, though we may with great pro-
priety fpeak of brightnefs of fancy, it would

B b be

370 Hozu the Hvo Kinds of Genius Part 111.

be abfolutely improper to ufe any expreffions
which implied our afcribing penetration to
this faculty alone.

That judgment affifls genius of every
kind, in fuggefling fuch ideas as fuit the pur-
pofe, was formerly fhown. In the fciences,
in producing the materials lit for the invefti-
gation of truth, this affiftance is indifpenfably
neceflary. The decifions of judgment con-
cerning objedls or ideas already produced, con-
(idered, and compared, fuggefl to the imagi-
nation other ideas aflbciated with thefe deci-
fions, and fit for carrying forward the invefli-
galion. Judgment is employed in giving fuch
decifions, at every ftep that is taken ; and they
are the only means by which we can be car-
ried forward another ftep. In the arts too, the
decifions of judgment do often fuggeft new
ideas ; but the ideas abfolutely neceiTary may,
in many cafes, be fuggefted by other means.
A rapid imagination often, without giving
judgment time to interpofe, pours in, by its
own force, a great abundance of conceptions,
fo proper, that when they are afterwards re-
viewed, the acuteft underftanding, and the
niceft tafte, <ran fcarce find fault with them-
In the arts, this rapidity of imagination, which
waits not for the interpofition of judgment,

often

S E c T . I V. differ in refpeSi of Judgment. 3 7 1

often produces a noble boldnefs and freedom
of manner ; in fcience it could produce only
abfurdity and error.

In fcience, an acute and vigorous judgment
is neceffary for making any ufe of the concep-
tions which imagination has fuggefted. It is
the precife bufmefs of fcience to deduce con-
clufions from certain obfervations, experi-
ments, or ideas ; but the dedudion of thefe is
altogether the work of judgment, and will be
performed with greater or lefs advantage, in
proportion to the degree of its acutenefs.
We fometimcs meet with perfons v/ho are re-
markable for making uncommon reflections
on the triteft fubjed:s, or dravving new con-
clufions from the moil familiar facts : this is
acknowledged to imply real ingenuity; butic
Ihows chiefly acutenefs of judgment. The
commonnefs of the fads or the fubjedts, makes
no great force of imagination requifite for
bringing them into view; they had actually
been in the view of hundreds : but thefe had
not the quicknefs of underftanding which has
led to the new conclufions or reflexions,.
Many of the fads on which Nev^'ton founds
his theory of gravitation, and that of light
and colours, require no great degree of ima-

B b 2 gination

372 Hoiv the two Kinds of Genius Part III.

gination to bring them into view, and had
actually been obferved by many. That the
fame conclufions were not by thefe deduced
from them, may be afcribed partly to a defedt
of imagination, preventing their being fet in
that light in which they would have readily
fuggefted the conclufions, and partly to the
want of fuch depth of judgment as was fufE-
cient for deducing them. Depth of judgment
contributed perhaps more than vigour of ima-
gination, to enable that great phiiofopher to
perceive the tendency of common fadls with
furprifrng quicknefs, and to trace their confe-
quences with fmgular accuracy. It was in
the contrivance of new experiments, proper
and decifive, that the vigour of his imagina-
tion fhowed itfelf. Any one propofition in '
Euclid's Elements, follows neceifarily from
thofe which precede it ; and the work of ima-
gination neceflary for the demonftration of
it, is in a great meafure performed by the
laying down of thefe in a natural order and
feries. Suppofe then a perfon perfectly ma-
iler of the lirft forty-fix proportions ; he has
all the principles neceffary for demonftrating
that the fquare of the hypothenufe of a right-
angled triangle, is equal to the fquares of the
2 other

Sect. IV. differ hi refpecl of judgment, 373

other two fides. To conceive this propofitioii
of one's felf, would, however, fhow a great
degree of genius, a vigour of imagination as
well as of judgment. If the propofition were
mentioned to him, and he w^ere informed,
that it is deducible from the propofitions al-
ready demonftrated, it would ftill require a
confiderable vigour of both thefe faculties, to
conceive the figure neceflary for the demon-
ftration, and to make out the feveral lleps of
it, without affiftance. If even the figure were
defcribed, it would Indicate fome degree of
genius, immediately to perceive the whole
train of the proof: but in this cafe, a very
great part of the work of imagination is per-
formed by the teacher ; it is chiefly acutenefs
of judgment that is neceflary for accomplifli-
ing what remains. In the more intricate
parts of mathematics, it requires greater vi-~
gour of judgment, as well as of imagination,
to fee feveral fteps before us ; and to be ca-
pable of this, fliows a higher degree of ge-
nius. Thus, from the very nature and end
of fcientifical invention, judgment is ccn-
ftantly and intimately conned:ed with imagi-
nation in all the operations of genius ; and a
great acutenefs of judgment is neceflary for

B b 3 enabling

374 ^^'^ t^J^ i'^'o Kinds of Genius Part III.

enabling genius to fliow itfelf. But in the

arts, the ideas collcded r.re not applied to the
dedudion of conclufions, which is the proper
work of judgmentj and requires reafoning.
They are applied to a quite different purpofe,
to the produ6lion of beauty, which imagina-
tion can in fome meafure accomplifh by itfelf:
and therefore it is not abfolutely neceflary,
either that the operations of judgment be fo
intimately blended with thofe of fancy, or
that fo great a degree of judgment be pof-
fefled.

There is an efl'ential difference between
thofe relations which are predominant in ge-
nius for the arts, and thofe which are predo-
minant in fcientific genius. The former are
intuitively perceivable, the latter are not.
Both of them can affe^ the imagination and
fuggeft ideas, by them connected with the
prefent object, without our having prevloufly
perceived by an exercife of judgment, that
thefe relatipns belong to the ideas : but it is
natural for us, after ideas have been in this
manner fuggefted, to refled: on the relation
which fubfifts between them and the objeds
that fuggefted them, and to form judgments
concerning it. Now when refemblauce, the

predominant

Sect. IV. differ hire fpcB of Jiidgmejit. 375

predominant relation in genius for the arts,
has fuggefted an image, a fmgle glance of
thought is fufficient for perceiving the reality
of the refemblance; it is felf-evident , it re-
quires no fenfible exertion of mind. This is
not the cafe with the relations of caufe and
efi^dl, and co-exiftence, the prevalent rela-
tions in fcientific genius. They are not intui-
tive relations; they are perceived to belong
to objedis, only in confequence of experience;
they are afcertained by a careful examination
and indudion. This implies a fenfible and
continued exertion of judgment and reafon.
A confiderable degree, therefore, of the exer-
cife of thefe faculties is rendered eflential to
fcientific genius, by the nature of thofe rela-
tions about which it is ultimately converfant.
Were thefe the only relations with v^^hich
fcientifical deductions are concerned, and re-
femblance the only relation that afFedts the
imagination in invention in the arts, there
would be a very great difference with refpe£t
to the degree and kind of judgment neceffary
for affifting genius in thefe two provinces.
But both in fcience and in the arts, all the
relations w^hich perceptions can bear to one
another, are, in f«bordination to thefe predo-

B b ^ minant

376 Hoiv the tivo Kinds of Genius Part 111,

minant ones, employed for introducing pro-
per conceptions ; and confequently there- is
fcope in both, for the exerclfe of the kinds of
judgment adapted to all the claffes of rela-
tions. This makes the difference much lefs;
every fpecies of judgment may give fomc
affiftance, both in fcience and in the arts.
Yet ftill the difference is very confiderable ;
for even when the fame fpecies of judgment is
employed in thefe two, one modification of it
is ufefiil in the one, and a different modiiica-
tion in the other. A judgment, for inflance,
adapted to the perception of mathematical
truths, is in fome meafure neceflary to the
painter ; but it is a judgment rather of the
practical refult of the truths demonftratcd,
than of the precife connexion of thcfe truths
-^uth the principles on which they depend.
The painter and the poet, as well as the phi-
lofopher, muft pay a regard to experience ;
but fo exact an agreement to what we have
experienced, is not neceffary for our approv-
ing the works of the artif^, as for our admit-
ting the conclufions of the philofopher. In
general, the exadter forms of every fpecies of
judgment are requifite in fcience, the loofer
forms are fufEcient for the arts j the more

laborious

Sect. IV. differ in refpeci of 'Judgment. 377

laborious exertions fuit the former, the rea-
dier exertions, the latter ; the fciences de-
mand uncommon depth and force of reafon,
the arts need rather a certain quicknefs of
difcernment.

The moft remarkable difference between
genius for fcience, and genius for the arts,
in refpect of the affiftance which they receive
from judgment, is, that tafte, or the judg-
ment of beauty, is efTentially neceiTary to the
latter, but enters not at all into the former.
This is an article of fuch importance, that it
will require a particular confideration ; but
fome obfervations may be made for farther
illuflrating the diftinction between the two
kinds of genius, which are fo much connedled
with what has been now faid, that it will be
proper to make them, before we proceed to
that.

SECT.

3 7 S 37?^ tivo Kinds of Genius Pa r t IIT.

SECT. V.

The tivo Kinds of Genius farther compared
and di/iinguijtjed,

IT is a diftindtion between genius for the
arts, and genius for fcicnce, implied in
what we have faid of the affiftance which they
receive from judgment, or at leaft eafily de-
ducible from it, That in the arts, imagination
in fome meafure fketches the whole work ; in
fcience, it cannot. The plan of a poem or a
pidture may be conceived by the fole power of
fancy. The affbciating principles may fug-
geft abundance of materials fuited to the de-
fign. The fame principles will naturally
give thefe materials different degrees of attrac-
tion, proportioned to their feveral degrees of
lelation to one another, by means of which
the moft nearly related will fall regularly into
the fame member, and the whole will ac-
quire, in a good meafure, a proper order and
arrangement. The exertion of judgment will
no doubt contribute much to render the work
more complete; it will cut off redundancies,
redify diforders, and even fupply defeds :

but

S E c T . V. farther compared. 379

but fiill without it, a pidlure or a poem may
acquire fome degree of form. In fcience, on
the contrary, imagination alone cannot pro-
duce even the rudcft draught or the mofl im-
perfe(fl iketch of an invention : it can only
fuggeft the materials from which judgment
may colled: that invention ; it muft put them
into the hands of judgment, and fubjed: them
to its fcrutiny conftantly as it fuggefts them ;
and it is judgment alone that applies them to
life.

This leads us naturally to an obfervatlon
which will give us an opportunity of examin-
ing and afcertaining fome fentiments and
maxims concerning genius, which are fome-
times exprefl'ed without fufficient precifion :
the obfervation is, That genius for the arts
holds more of imagination, than fcientific
genius. This obfervation is fo obvious, that
it has been often afferted, That imagination
is neceflary only for productions in the arts,
not at all for difcoveries in fcience. In confe-
quence of this received opinion, productions
in the arts have been called exclufively, works
of imagination. The opinion is not juft ; but
it would not have been adopted fo generally
as it has been, if it had not, in appearance,

ii flrong

3B0 The tivo Kinds of Genius Part III.

a ftrong foundation. It was juft now ob-
iervcd, that in the arts imagination goes far-
ther towards perfeding its effedls, than it can
in fcience; this contributes to make its in-
fluence moft confpicuous in the arts. In one
view too, genius for the arts does require
greater flrength of imagination, than pene-
tration requires ; it implies a great delicacy
and adivity of the aflbciating principles, fit-
ting them for being affeded by very flender
relations : this alfo renders the operation of
fancy more obvious and more ftriking. Be-
fides, the afTociating principles which are
chiefly implied in brightnefs, are more com-
monly referred to the imagination, than thofe
which are predominant in penetration. The
caufe of this feems to be, that the former are
perceived without reafoning, are applied ge-
nerally to the purpofe of pleafing, and, even
when they give rile to judgments, occafion
not any procefs of argumentation, but only
intuitive decifions, which give little exercife
to the underftanding, and are fcarce taken
notice of; but the latter cannot be perceived
without the exercife of reafon, they are prin-
cipally ufed for deducing concluflons, and the
concluflons to which they lead, imply a con-
tinued.

Se c T . V. farther compared, 381

tinued, often a laborious exercife of judg-
ment, which cannot fail to be refle<f^ed on.
Hence it is natural to regard the former as
qualities which affedt the imagination, and
the latter as relations about which the judg-
ment is employed ; and confequently, if men
do not think with great precifion, to refer
only genius for the arts to imagination. It
may be added that genius for the arts makes
ufe of a greater variety of aflbciating princi-
ples than fcientific genius, and employs them
in a greater extent, and with lefs limitation ;
it avails itfelf of all the different forms and
modifications of each of them, while very few
forms of any of them can be rendered fubfer-
vient to the inveftigation of truth ; and it
alone is influenced by the aflbciating power
of the paffions. In all thefe refpedls, it may
be aflerted vsfith reafon, that genius for the
arts holds more of imagination, than fcientific
genius, and that its effeds may be termed
peculiarly works of imagination. But it is
not true, either that fuch genius is completed
by imagination alone, or that it is the only
kind that implies imagination.

Scientific genius has been defcribed
with a like inaccuracy ; it has been confidered

^82 The Hvo Kinds of Genius Part III.

as requiring only judgment, and not at all
implying imagination. We have feen that it
holds much more of judgment, than genius
for the arts does : this has given occafion for
afcribing it wholly to that faculty ; but it is a
miftake. A very ingenious and profound
philofopher has given his fandion to this
miftake ; fpeaking of a work which indicates
a very great degree of fcientific genius, not
only uncommon clear nefs and depth of judg-
ment, but alfo ftrength and even livelinefs of
imagination, he difclaims genius, and inti-
mates that the nature of his work required it
not ; " I claim no other merit, than that of
' having given great attention to the opera-
' tions of my own mind, and of having ex-
' prefled, with all the perfpiculty I was able,
' what, I conceive, every man who gives
' the fune attention, will feel and perceive.
' The produOiions of imagination require a
' genius which foars above the common
' rank; but the treafures of knowlege are
' commonly buried deep, and may be reach-

* ed by thofe drudges who can dig with

* labour and patience, though they have not
' wings to fly (rt).'* The author's modefty

(a) Rezd's Inquiry into the Human Mind^ Dedication.

under-

Se c T . V. farther compared, 383

under-rates his own abilities, and in this in-
ftance renders his decifion inaccurate. That
turn of imagination which fits a perfon for
produdions in the arts, may no doubt be
moft properly faid to foar, to fly, and to
have wings. To dig with labour and pa-
tience, is a metaphor which may with equal
propriety be applied to the inveftigation of
philofophical truth ; it is ftrongly expreffive
of the intenfe and continued exertion of judg-
ment, which is requlfite in obferving all the
circumftances of the feveral experiments, dif-
cerning which of them are effential, compar-
ing them together, and tracing out the refult
of the whole : but the metaphor mull not be
overftrained, it muft not be underftood io
ftridlly as to reprefent the philofopher as a
mere drudge, deftitute of fancy; without great
vigour and adivity of imagination, the expe-
riments and obfervations made ufe of in that
curious work, or in any philofophical enquiry
of a lij^e nature, could not be contrived,
Ifuggefted, and arranged, fo as to lay a foun-
dation for legitimate conclufions. The In-
quiry into the Human Mind^ on the Principles
of Common Senfe^ (hows not merely great acute-
nefs of judgment, but alio a very high degree

3^4 ^^^ ^"^^ Kinds of Genius Part IIL
of that penetration in which force of imagi-
nation is an indifpenfable ingredient. After
the author has unfolded his important difco-
veries, another man may feel and perceive
the feveral operations which he defcribes, by
giving even lefs attention than he beftowcd,
and without poffefTrng any {hare of geniiis ;
but genius was abfolutely neceflary to the
making of the difcoveries. The v/ork is not,
in the ordinary fenfe, a production of imagi-
nation ; but it difplays imagination and ge-
nius, though of a different kind from what
is difplayed in a pidure or a poem, yet foar-
ing as much above the common rank. In
fcience, the operation of judgment is more
obvious and flriking than in the arts ; it is
it, not imagination, that finilhes the work ;
and therefore even that part of the work,
which imagination alone can accomplifh, and
which indicates genius, has been afcribed to
judgment.

In commending a pcrfon, it is coiUmon to
beflow all excellence upon him, and to deny
others their real merit in order to exalt him,*
The fame caufe from which this appearance
proceeds in ordinary life, has produced the
inaccurate defcriptions of genius now men-
tioned*

S £ c T . V. farther compared. 385

tioned. Becaufe Imagination can do a great
deal in the arts, genius for them has been
placed in imagination alone. Becaufe it can
by itfelf do little in the fciences, it has been
excluded from fcientific genius ; and becaufe
judgment has a great ihare in the whole pro-
cefs of every difcovery which belongs to this
department, all has been afcribed to it. But
as a fenfible man allows thofe whom he com-
mends, their proper kind and precife degree
of merit, fo we ought, with a juft difcernment,
to give each of thefe faculties its real fhare
in forming every kind of genius.

Genius has been defined by fome to con-
fift in the union of a fine imagination and a
fine judgment. According to them, its origin
may be referred v/ith equal propriety to either
of thefe faculties, or rather a great perfedtion
of both is alike neceflary for its exiftence.
The extenfive influence of judgment in pro-
ducing works of genius has given occafion to
this definition. But genius ought notwith-
ftanding to be confidered as a modification of
the imagination. It is no reafon againft our
confidering it in this light, that judgment
attends it in all its exertions. It has been
obferved already, that intelledual powers,

C c eOentially

386 The two Kinds of Genius Part Ilf.

eflentlally diftind: in themfelves, are fre-
quently complicated together in their exer-
ciie. Ileafon, for inftance, cannot perceive
the evidence of a demonftration, except me-
mory be exerted in retaining the feveral
fleps : forgetfulnefs of thefe would as effec-
tually prevent our obtaining a conviction of
the truth of the conclufion, as an incapacity
of difcerning the evidence of any of the pro-
portions included in the proof: but it would
be improper, on this account, to confound
reafon with memory. In like manner, though
genius needs the afhflance of judgment, yet
it ought to be confidered as a faculty diftindt
from judgment. Genius confifls eifentially
in the vigour and in a particular economy or
conftru6tion of the imagination : it is in this
that a man muft excel, in order to be eminent
for genius : where Nature has beftowed this
in a confiderable degree, an uncommon accu-
racy of judgment is not requifite for found-
ing a claim to real genius ; a moderate fhare
of it will be fufEcienr.

Could the defcription be at all admitted,
it would be applicable only to fcientific ge-
nius. With refpe^l to this fpecies, the ex-
tenfive and continued exercife of judgmenS

S E c T. V. farther compared, 387

in profecuting difcoveries, gives the defcrip-
tion a confiderable appearance of proprietye
Yet even here it has not entire propriety,
A perfon may pofTefs ftrength of judgment
in a very high degree, and the kind of judg-
ment perfedly adapted to fcience, and yet
be deftitute of fcientific genius : he may be
an accurate critic on the inveftigations of
others, and yet hirafelf no inventer. Many
perfons who could never have made original
difcoveries, have explained the difcoveries of
others with great difl:ind:nefs, and decided
between contending theories with great acute-
nefs and folidity. On the ccntrary, a per-
fon who poffefl'es that particular form of ima-
gination which fits for fcientifical difcoveries,
is never wholly deilitute of fcientific genir.6 ;
no fuch perfon is ever found without a de-
gree of judgment fufficient for enabling him
to make fome difcoveries. If his judgment
be not fo deep and found as to prevent his
falling into miflakes, yet his inveftigations
will fliow ingenuity notwitliRanding his
miftakes. The theories of Des Cartes, Leib-
nitz, Malebranche, Berkeley, muft be acknow-
leged to be ingenious, though in many par-
ticulars they be not juft ; thefe philofophers

C c 2 " had

388 The tivo Kinds of Genius P A R T III.

had genius, they pofleffcd very confiderable
powers of imagination, but not judgment
proportionably piercing. Even in fcientific
genius, therefore, imagination is the leading
faculty : where it prevails and is fuitably
conftruded, fuch genius is never totally
wanting ; and without this, no degree of
fuch genius ever can exifl:.

But in genius for the arts, an uncommon
ftrength of judgment is fo far from being
neceflary, that a degree of imagination which
would have produced genius, if it had been
joined to an ordinary judgment, may be
rendered abortive, and unable to difplay itfelf,
by being united to a very nice judgment.
The great acutenefs of this faculty will dif-
cover every the fmalleft blemifh in what
fancy produces, and will, by fcrupuloufly
canvafling it and requiring greater excellence
than the imagination can attain, extinguifh
its ardor, and make it give over attempting to
invent, or elfe enervate its inventions, deprive
them of force and fpirit, and fubftitute an
infipid corrednefs in its place [b). It is al-

{b) Evenit plerumque ut hac diligentia deterior etiam fiat

oratio. Nam ilia qua; curam fatentur, et fifta atque

compofita videri etiam volunt, nee gratiam confequuntur, &c.
Quint, InJl.Qrai. lib. viii. procem. Nec promptum eft

moft

S E c T . V. farther compared, 3 89

moft better to give fancy an uncontrouled
range, than to break its -vigour by the con-
tinual reftraint of an overfcrupulous judg-
ment. Puntormo is faid to have poflefled a
degree of genius fufficient for producing pic-
tures which obtained the approbation of
Raphael and Michael Angelo ; but the excef-
five fcrupuloufnefs of his judgment rendered
his genius in a great meafure ufelefs ; he not
only was extremely tedious, but alfo could
never pleafe himfelf, or be fatisfied with any
of his own works. It was the fame caufe
that made Virgil enjoin his friends to burn
the ^neid ; it was not finlflied with all the
exad:nefs that the nicety of his judgment re-
quired : had the injundion been obeyed, it
would have been a fir iking inflance of the
effeds of very great genius blafted by an ex-
cefFive degree of judgment [c\ In the arts,

dicere, utros peccare validius putem, quibus omnia fua pla-
ccnt, an quibus nihil. Accidit enim etiam ingeniofis adolef-
centibus frequenter ut labore confumantur, ct in filentium
ufque defcendant nimia bene dicendi cuplditate. Id. lib. x.
cap. 3.

{/) Protogenes, whom Apelles blamed {or hurting his
works by correding them too much, and Leonardi da Vinci,
who left many of his pidures unfinifhed, becaufe he could not
finlfh them fuitably to his high idea of perfedlion, are appo-
fite examples here ; but having had occafion to quote them
dfevvhere, the former, EJfay on T'ajle, Part 11. fed. 6. the
latter, Ibid. fed. 5. Iwas unwilling to ufe a repetition.

C c 3 then.

39^ The tivo Kinds of Genius Part III.

then, an uncommon acutenefs of judgment
is fo far from conftituting genius, that it will
abfolutely deftroy genius, unlefs the imagi-
nation be as uncommonly comprehenfive.
The former faculty muft not have greater ac-
curacy than is proportioned to the extent and
vigour of the latter. Judgment muft pre-
ferve imagination from lofing itfelf in its ex-
curfions, without obftruding its vifiting freely
all the regions of nature. It muft prevent
imnatural afTociations, w^ithout checking fuch
as are bold. It muft regulate, but not deftroy
the impetuofity and ardor of the foul. It has
been obferved that, though fyftems of pre-
cepts in the arts, direct and improve the
judgment, they rather curb and reftrain ge-
nius. They render men fo ftudious to avoid
faults, that they fcarce aim at beauties. It
is remarked that, when works of imagination
have been brought to the utmoft degree of
corrednefs in any age or nation, there has
been afterwards very little difplay of original
or extenfive genius. This may have been
owing in part to natural caufes, which feem
never to fuff'er an age illuftrious for arts and
fciences, to be of long continuance : but it
has probably been owin^ in part likewife to

the

Sect. V. farther compared, 391

the caufe that is more commonly affigned 5
That a tafte for corrednefs being once gene-
rally eftabliilied, the neceflity which artifts
were under of producing this quality, in
order to gain approbation, cramped their
imaginations and difplrited their works.

SECT. VI.

Tajle ejfential to Genius for the Arts,

TH E obfervations which were formerly
made upon the difference between ge-
nius for the fciences, and genius for the artsj
in refpedt of the alTiftance which they receive
from judgment, regarded chiefly the degree
and manner in which judgment is exercifed
in their operations. But thefe two kinds of
genius imply likewife different kinds of judg-
ment.

Scientific genius requires only that kind
of judgment which has truth for its object ;
but it requires great flrength of judgment in
that kind. As that kind includes feveral
fpecies, the predominance of one or another
of thefe, will adapt genius to the correfpon-
dent fubje(St of invefligation : but any one of

G c 4 thefe

392 Tajle ejfential to Part III.

thefe fpecles prevailing along with a congru-
ous turn of imagination, will produce fome
form of fcientific genius.

Genius for the arts does not exclude that
kind of judgment which perceives truth :
it demands not, however, an eminent degree
of it. But another kind of judgment, that
which pronounces concerning beauty^ and is
ordinarily called tajie, is eflential to fuch ge-
nius. This is at once a diftindive character
of genius for the arts, and a common characr
ter of genius in all the arts.

Taste, as has been already obferved in
general, influences genius for the arts, in
all the fame ways in which the difcernment
of truth influences genius of every kind :
and the varieties of tafte, and thofe of judg-
ment, have fimilar eff'edls in diverfifying the
forms of genius. Tafte regulates fancy, in-
ftigates it, and contributes to give it habitual
regularity ; it performs thefe offices more or
lefs perfectly, and performs them in one
manner or one refpedt, or in another, accord-
ing to the degree in which it is poflefl'ed, and
the fpecies of it which predominates.

In the artift, tafte exerts itfelf continually,
yeftraiping, regulating, and directing fancy ;

furveying

Sect. VI. Cen'ms for the Arts, 393

furveying the conceptions which that facuhy
has fuggefted, approving them when they are
fuitable to it, perceiving what is faulty, re-
jedling what is redundant, marking what is
incomplete, correcting and perfeding the
whole. Without this exercife of tafte, the
firft rude conception of a defign could never
be improved, nor any finifhed work produced.
Tafte defers not its decifions till the concep-
tion be exprefled or the defign executed ; it
not only intermixes them with the execution,
but makes them to prevent and dired: the ex-^
ecution. Where there is true genius, fancy
exhibits its creations fo diftindly in the very
moment of their produdion, that an acute
tafte can perceive what they will be when
they are executed, and judge beforehand of
their eft'edt. Acutenefs of tafte fufficient for
this, is neceflary to the artift. If he had
only fuch a degree of tafte as could pronounce,
upon a leifurely examination, when the work
were actually executed, he muft have the
whole to begin anew, wherever tafte difap-
proved ; and fo many things would require
alteration, that the labour of finiftiing any
work would be infinite. An imagination
truly poetical conceives its ideas in a moment,

394 Tajle ejfential to Part IIL

fo clearly and forcibly, that a vigorous tafte
is able to approve or difapprove them before
they are put in words or fet off by the har-
mony of numbers. Were the painter inca-
pable of forming a judgment of his defigns
till he had actually put them upon canvas,
he could fcarce ever finifh a fmgle pidure.
Every inventer in the fine arts, muft poflefs '
that livelinefs of imagination, and that quick-
nefs of tafte, which, when united and jointly
exerted, can put it in his power to forefee the
effedl of his conceptions and defigns. If his
tafte be in any refpedl imperfed, the kinds
of faults which that imperfection unfits him
for perceiving, cannot be corrected, but will
remain blcmifhes in his works.

When tafte has condemned what the artift
had imagined, he will of courfe endeavour
to fet imagination again a working, and to
dire£t it into another track, that it may fug-
geft fomething which will be approved.
Often it is tafte itfelf that in this cafe infti-
gates imagination. Its decifions are percep-
tions which excite the fancy, give it an im-
pulfe, and fuggeft trains of ideas conneded
with them. When tafte condemns, the very
nature of the fault which it perceives, often

fuggefts

Sect.VL Geniusfor the Arts. 395

fuggefts fomethlng that will be approved.
When it approves, the view which it takes of
its objed, may lead to the conception of
fomething which it will ftill more highly ap-
prove. But it is not only by being thus ex-
ercifed about a perfon's own produdions,
that tafte gives an impulfe and diredion to
fancy. All the fine arts are, in fome fenfe,
imitative of Nature j invention in thefe art-s,
is only obferving and copying Nature in a
certain manner : natural objedls and appear-
ances are obferved by the artift, they are con-
ceived with diRindnefs and with force, their
charaderiftical circumftances are feleded, and
fo expreffed as to imprint the whole form on
the minds of others, with the like ckarnefs
and vivacity with Vv^hich he himfelf appre-
hended it. But, in mofi: inftances, it is tafte
alone, that direds and animiates his obferva-
tion of Nature, makes fancy retain a lively
conception of it, and run into the view of
every thing that can contribute to exprefs it.
Without an impulfe from tafte, imagination
could not begin to act. Natural appearances
and objects lie open to the obfervation of all ;
they are feen by ordinary perfons, as well as
by the poet and the painter. The former

take

396 Tajle effcntlal to Part III.

take no notice of them, they have no tafte to
perceive their beauties ; but by the latter,
thefe beauties are beheld with delight, and
make a ftrong impreffion, which roufes ima-
gination to fpirited exertions. The former
perceives what is expofed to his view, but
grofsly, faintly, and confufedly ; it can give
no determinate direction to fancy : the tafte
of the latter enables him to perceive every
feature, character, and circumftance of his
objed with precifion and with force ; and in
confequence of this, fancy produces a flrik-
ing likenefs, a delineation of it lively and
precifely marked. A perfon may have fine
tafte, and yet not be a painter or a poet ; he
may want that brightnefs of fancy, which
thefe arts require : but if a perfon be pofTefled
of this, nothing is necefTary to make it blaze
forth, but a high tafte of forne objcd: adapted
to it. Every peculiarity of tafte, by giving
a man peculiar feelings from the objects
which he obferves, leads him into peculiar
tracks of thinking, correfpondent to it.
Many artifts in every way, have propofed to
themfelves, fome of the moft illuftrious of
their predeceflbrs, as their ftandard and their
model : in the choice, they were directed by

the

Sect. VL Genius for the Arts, 397

the peculiarity of their own tafle, approving
moft the diftingulfhing excellences of that
mafter ; and that tafte has been generally
powerful enough to give their fancy a direc-
tion, and to ftamp their performances with a
charader, fimilar to his. In all imitations,
it is tafte that gives genius its particular form
and track. Whenever the degree of perfec-
tion to which any art has already arrived,
leads forward to new improvements, it does
fo chiefly by means of tafte ; its judgments
on the works already produced, point out
new roads of invention to the imagination.
In like manner, with refpeiSt to the great ar-
chetype, Nature, every difference of tafte
■will occafion a correfpondent difference in
the appearances which engage the attention,
and arreft the fancy, and in the point of view
in which they are confidered ; and the range
which fancy makes, and the cffeds which it
produces, will always be fuitable and analo-
gous to thofe peculiar perceptions of tafte,
by which it was put in motion.

Taste is likewife neceffary for forming
genius in the arts, to regularity and corre<Sl-
nefs. It is tafte principally that, in this de-
partment, perceives when any of the concep-
6 tions

39^ Tafte ejfential to Part III.

tions produced by fancy, are unfuitable to
the end of the work : without its interpofing
its judgment on that end being fuggefted,
fuch conceptions could not be rectified ; witii-
out its being in the ufe of interpofing its
judgments, imagination could never acquire
the habit of generally avoiding them. Irre-
gularity in works of art, is moft commonly
owing to fome defed in tafte; it proceeds
from fome wildnefs of imagination, which
a perfedly good tafte would have fubdued.
A luxuriant and undifciplined imagination
may introduce into a pidlure fome figure or
attitude, or into a poem fome fcene or de-
fcription or image, which counteracts the
general effect, or is inconfiflent with the pre-
vailing qualities of the piece ; it may blend
fomething mean with a great fubjed, or
fomething ludicrous with a folemn one : tafie
fufficiently acute would perceive the incon-
gruity with fo high difguft, as to prevent
imagination from dwelling upon it fo long as
fully to conceive it, as at leaft to rejed: it
whenever it faw it reprefented, and as to take
from imagination by degrees all propenfity
to run into what were fo abhorrent from its
views. The kind of irregularity into which

any

Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts. 39^

any artift runs, will always be that which his
particular tafte is moft unable to corred.

By ad:ing upon imagination in thefe feve-
ral ways, by checking, by inftigating it, by
giving it regularity, tafle has very great in-
fluence on genius, and the varieties of tafte
contribute much to diverfify the form of ge-
nius. A perfon's genius and his tafte are cor-
refpondent. What he approves, and what he
can produce, are of the fame kind, and marked
with the fame character. Every peculiarity
of tafte ftiows itfelf in a man's decifions con-
cerning the works of others ; it fhows itfelf
alfo in his own VvTorks, for by it his fancy is,
in a great degree, influenced in producing
them.

Both judgment and tafte intermix them-
felves with the operations of fancy ; but they
aff'edt theie operations in refpedrs fomevk^hat
difi^erent. While reafon reftrains imagina-
tion from conceptions which are contrary to
truth, or fuggefts fuch as are conformable ta
it, tafte condemns thofe which are defective In
fublimity or grace, and prompts to fuch as have
thefe qualities. The former rejed:s what
would render the work falfe or abfurd ; the
latter, what would render it in any degree
unpleafmg.

3 Though

400 Tajie cjfential to Part III.

Though judgment be a neceffary ingre-
dient in good tafte, it can never produce it
without acutenefs of the internal fenfes. If
judgment be ftrong, but thefe fenfes weak or
wanting, the exertions of genius may be re-
gular and vigorous, fo far as judgment could
affed them ; but they will be feeble and ir-
regular in thofe qualities which are the proper
objects of tafte. This is obfervable in almofl
all the produdions of rude ages and unpolifhed
nations, often to a very great degree. In every
age, fome perfon, even among thofe who are
in feveral refpedls approveable, betrays, in
fome one particular, a coarfenefs of genius in-
confiftent with good tafte. Images which are
low or coarfe, may illuftrate a fubjedt with
great exadnefs or force ; to mere reafon they
would therefore appear unexceptionable ; but
the leaft delicacy of tafte would be difgufted
with them, and prevent their admiiTion. To
authors who indulge themfelves in the ufe of
them, we may allow ftrength of judgment,
but muft refufe tafte : they may have force,
but want elegance of genius. In the moft ju-
dicious and eloquent compofitions of our fore-
fathers who lived fome centuries ago, fimili-
tudes, allufions, and incidents are introduced,
fo homely or fo indelicate, that a nice tafte

would

Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts, 401

would be difgufted with the very repetition of
them as examples. Every one has heard of
the low and dirty reprefentations introduced
into fome of the Dutch paintings. When
fuch appearances are very ftrong, we enter
readily into the diftindion between judgment
and tafte ; we pronounce the author deftitute
of the latter, and to this caufe afcribe the
grofsnefs of his genius ; though the appear-
ances be not {q palpable, we pronounce that
incorredinefs or indelicacy of tafle has infeded
his genius : in both cafes we can perceive the
difference between that influence which judg-
ment has upon works of genius, and that
which the internal fenfes have.

These fenfes may, on the contrary, be
ftrong where judgment is inaccurate. In this
cafe, the artift is qualified for fuch particulars
as contribute to the beauty and elegance of
his work, but not for thofe which render it
jufl: and folid. The materials which imagi-
nation prefents, will be applied fo as to pleafe
on a fuperficial view, rather than to fatisfy on
a careful examination. This effed is obferv-
able in poets who are brilliant without foli-
dity, and in orators who are florid but not
argumentative,

D d Consist-

Consistently with goodnefs of tafte, ei-
ther judgment or internal fenfe may predomi-
nate in its compofition i a work will always,
bear marks of the predominance of the one or
the other. Congreve pofleffed an elegant tafte,
as well as a fparkling imagination ; but a
nicer judgment would have repudiated many
of his flafhes of wit, as being unnatural. In
the performances of Pietro Tefta, fublime and
noble ideas, a profufion of figures ftrongly
marked, elegance and exadlnefs of drawing,
iliow exuberance of fancy and enthufiafm of
genius, united to tafte in many refpeds ex-
quilite ; but incoherence of defign, and a jum-
ble of unconnected figures, render it difticult to
difcover his aim, and turn many of his works
into groupes of monfters and chimeras : the
exertion of a more accurate and better in-
formed judgment, would have prevented this
wildnefs and extravagance [a). Correggio-
ftiows exquifite judgment in the condud: of
his pieces and the union of his painting ; un-
gracefulnefs in feme of his attitudes, an un-
pleafing difpofition of his groupes, and incor-
rednefs of drawing, betray a tafte not, in.
all refpeds, fully proportioned to it. Accu-

[a) E/faj on PritstSy chap. 3..

rate:

Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts, 403

fate judgment of the anatomy of the human
body, rendered his drawings perfed;Iy correct ;
a t^Jic as accurate, would have rendered them
equally elegant (Z>). The orations of Demof-
thenes and of Cicero bear plain marks of a
diverfity of tafte, as well as of imagination;
they fhow that the tafte of the former held
very much of judgment, and the tafte of the
latter, of fentiment or feeling. Demollhenes
js the more convincing, Cicero the more pleaf-
ing orator. The fermons of Barrow and of
Seed, are both eloquent ; but in very different
ways : the former fhows a copious imagina-
tion linited to the founded underftanding ; the
latter a bright and flowing fancy combined
with quick and elegant feelings.

There are different qualities in the works
of genius which fall under the immediate cog-
nizance of judgment, and which require dif-
ferent kinds of judgment. If an artift be
defedive in the kind of judgment adapted to
any one of the fe qualities, he cannot direct his
imagination in producing it, though in pro-
ducing other qualities, to which his under-
ftanding is adapted, he may be very judicious.
Both the difpofition, for inftance, of the whole

[F\ Fresnov's 'Judgment of Painters,

D d 2 perfor-

404 Tafe eifcntial to PartIIL

performance, and the juftnefs of particular
parts, arc objedls of judgment ; a work may
be perfedl in one of thefe refpeds, and infe-
riour or faulty in the other. Among the an-
cient painters, Amphion excelled in the for-
mer, Afclepiodorus in the latter {c).

In like manner, if a perfon poflefles any
one of the internal fenfes in great perfedlion,
his imagination will never want a prompter
and a guide in producing the qualities which
are the proper objeds of that fenfe ; while it
may fail much in producing the qualities
adapted to fuch other fenfes as he poflefles in
an inferiour degree. Zeuxis was efteemed the
firft of the ancient painters in refpedl of co-
louring ; Euphranor was admired for the ful>-
limity of his works ; both were cenfured for
negledling proportion in fome particulars (d) :
the former fhowed an exquihte fenfe of one
fpecies of beauty, that of colours ; the latter,
a tafte for the grand and noble ; . tafte for the

{c) Nee debebat Amphioni de difpofitione, nee Afcleplo-
doro demenfurls. Plin. AW. ////?. lib. xxxv. cap. 10. Eadem
astate Afclepiodorus fuit, quern in fymmetria mirabatur
Apelles. Ibid.

. {d) Deprehenditur tamen Zeuxis grandior in capitibus ar-
ticulifque. Plin. /Z/V. cap. 9. Euphranor — primus videtur et
exprefllffe dignitates, infignia heroum, et ufurpafie fymme-
triani : fed fuit in univerfitate corporum exilior, capitibus,
articulifque grandior. /^/V. cap. u,

beauty

Sect. VL Genius for the Arts, 405

beauty of proportion was not perfed in either.
Ariftides was defeGive in the particular in
which Zeuxis excelled, in tafte for beauty and
ibftnefs of colouring, as well as in the power
of producing it : but in expreffing the paflions
and afFedions, he excelled all his predecef-
fors [e) ; he poffeifed a quicknefs and acute-
nefs of feeling, which fitted him for con-
ceiving ftrongly, and confequently for expref-
fing forcibly, the traces with which the in-
ward emotions mark the features and the atti-
tude. It was the chara<3:er of Pyreicus, that he
painted only mean fubjedls, but painted them
with great beauty (/) : this Ihowed tafte, in
one refped: grovelling, and in another refpe^t
elegant. A fimilar conjunction is very re-
markable in Swift : his writings put it beyond
doubt that he was ingenious, in many refpeds
judicious, and pofleiled of a tafte for corred-
nefs and elegance of compofition ; but they
abound with low fubjeds, grofs ideas, and
dirty images, inconfiftent with delicacy of
fentiment,

{is Is omnium primus animum pinxit, et fenfus omnes ex-
preffit, quos vocant Grseci -^JS? ; item perturbationes : durior
paullo in coloribus. Plin. Ibid. cap. lo.

(/) Humilia quidem fecutus, humilitatis tamen fummam
adeptus ell gloriam. Plin. /^/V.

D d 3 Sensi-

4o6 Tafte ejfential to Part III,

Sensibility of tafte, is neceflary to its
perfection ; it makes a perfoii feel ftrongly
every beauty or blemifh which he perceived.
A lively imagination can never exift where
fenfibility of tafte is wanting ; or if it could,
all that it produced would be frigid and fpi-
ritlefs ; no objecfl could make an impreffion
fufEcient to give it a brifk and aftive motion.
A great degree of fenfibility, if the other per-
fections of tafte were wanting, joined with a
fancy proportionably lively, would carry an
artift into wildnefs and extravagance. But if
the fenfibility be not exceflive, and if it be ac-
companied by the other perfections of tafte, it
will only raife vivacity of imagination to a
proper pitch. It is enraptured by every ftrik-
ing form, it fills the foul with hi^h enthu-
fiafm, it fets the fancy on fire, it pufties it for-
ward with impetuofity, renders all its concep-
tions glowing, and beftows a freedom and be-
coming negligence on its productions. When
a tafte of this conftruCtion exercifes itfelf about
what fancy Is producing, it approves with fo
high a relifti, or difapproves with fo quick a
difguft, as communicates new vivacity and
force to the efforts of imagination. Great fen-
fibility of tafte contributed not a little to Gior-

gione*s

Sect. VL G aims for the Arts, 407

gione's freedom of drawing, flrength of co-
louring, and of relief; and to the boldnefs,
rapidity, and even extravagance, which are
remarked in Tiiitoret's manner.

Refinement and elegance of tafle has an
€iFed on fancy, in fome refpeds oppofiie to
thofe of fenfibillty. Where it prevails, it
hinders many forms and appearances ftriking
to others, from yielding it fuch gratification
as may make an imprefiion on the fancy.
There is no rifk of its running into extrava-
gance ; the danger is, left it deviate into
quaintnefs, affedation, and fubtilty. Vicious
refinement is pleafed with thefe, and fends
imagination in fearch of them ; they are
adopted, and ufurp the place of natural beau-
ties. But true refinement of tafte leads ima-
gination to rejed: whatever is coarfe, or even
of inferiour beauty, and, penetrating into fuch
beauties as are mod latent, feeling fuch as are
moft delicate, and comprehending fuch as arc
moft complex, it enables them to affed: and
give an impulfe to fancy, and direds it to pro-
duce not only what is beautiful, but what is
elegant, not only what pleafes, but aifo w^hat
fills the tafte, to produce according to the par-
ticular ftrudure of the imagination, the grace-

D d 4 ful.

4o8 Tajle ejfcnt'ial to Part III.

ful, the profound, or the extraordinary. The
artifts of limple ages, can fcarce attain fo great
a refinement of tafte, as to avoid, in every in-
ftancc, ideas which will appear grofs and be-
come unpleaiing in politer times. Even Ho-
mer admits images in fome degree coarfe and
indelicate; Virgil, bred in the elegance of the
Auguflan age, was diredled by an improved
tafte, when he imitated him mofl clofely, to
rejc61: fome of thefe images altogether, and to
avoid the offenfive part of others. It is the
want of perfe£l elegance of tafte formed by ac-
quaintance with the beft models, that has mixt
ftiffnefs and ungracefulnefs with the great
excellences of Albert Durer, Hans Holbein,
Rembrandt, and even Rubens.

Correctness of tafte fecures a perfoa
from approving any but real beauties, or dif-
approving any but real faults, and enables
him to perceive the precife kind and degree
of both. The juftnefs of its decifions often
gives occafion to a new exertion of imagi-
nation, where otherwife it would not have
^een attempted. But it influences imagination
principally, not by inftigating, but by reftrain-
ing and direding it, and forming it to regu-
larity. A great degree of corre(5tnefs will

perfectly

Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts, 409

perfedly chill a weak imagination, and pre-
vent its producing any thing. It is related
of Andrea Verrochio, that he was fo fenfible
of the inferiority of his own figures to one
which Leonardo da Vinci, then his fcholar,
had by his order painted in one of his
pieces, that he never afterwards attempted
painting ; had his tafte determined lefs juftly,
he might have continued to produce works
deferving approbation. If It does not totally
chill a moderate fancy, it will at leaft check it
fo much as to produce a mediocrity, where
nothing is faulty, but nothing pleafes highly.
It is the chara6:er of Andrea del Sarts, that he
is careful, diligent, and corred:, but defedlve
in life and fplrit. Even the line genius of
Protogenes fuffcred, in the opinion of Apelles,
by the too great corredlnefs of his tafte leading
him to difpirit his pictures by exceifive care.
Corredtnefs of tafte has difciplined Pope's ge-
nius fo much, that fome have refufed him all
pretenfions to imagination. It Is an imagi-
nation uncommonly bright and vigorous, that
can bear all the reftraints which a correal tafte
lays it under. It requires thefe reftraints ;
without them, great blemiflies will be inter-
niixed with great beauties in its works : by

fubmittlng

410 Tqfte ejjential to Part III.

fubmittlng to them, the immortal works of
Milton would have been cleared of the con-
ceits and quibbles which difgrace them.

Perfection of tafte requires the union,
the due proportion, and the regular adjuftment
of all its principles. If any principle of tafte
be wanting, or weak in comparifon with the
reft, imagination mifTes both the regulation
and the impulfe which that principle would
have given it ; and its productions bear marks
of its having mifled them. Every poet, every
painter, every artift, who leaves in his works
what is difgufting to one of the principles of
tafte, while he fatisfies the other principle,
fhows a defed: in their comparative vigour.
They were never perhaps united in any man
in a proportion perfectly exadt ; while none is
wanting or remarkably defecflive, fome degree
of imperfeOiion is always perceivable in fome
one of them, and fome other is fo exquifitely
perfect as to give tafte its predominating cha-
radter ; but ftill the vigour in which they all
cxift, is fufticient for giving tafte enlargement
and regularity. When a tafte fo perfedl is
united to a vigorous imagination, it produces
genius in fome fenfe univerfal, fit for render-
ing its work really, though not equally, ex-
cellent

Sect. VI. Genhis for the Arts, 411

cellent in all refpeds, marked with features
correfpondent to the charadteriftical form of
that tafte. It is a piercing imagination thus
directed by a fine tafte, that has entitled a few
artifts in every way to the firft rank. Nei-
ther Homer nor Virgil is abfolutely faultlefs ;
each has his principal and diftindive excel-
lence ; but both have fo much excellence in
every kind, as could not have been attained
without perfedlion of tafte, as well as of ima-
gination. Titian's tafte in drawing was not
exadly corre(£l: ; ftrength and beauty of co-
louring was his leading excellence, and fliowed
the prevailing turn of his tafte, which was,
at the fame time, in all other refpe<Sts fo good
as to guide his fancy and his pencil into great
delicacy of drawing, agreeable refemblance of
Nature, fpirited and charaderiftical touches,
diverfified and graceful attitudes, pleafing ne-
gligence of drapery, and in a word no ordi-
nary degree of every excellence. It was the
praife of Raphael, that, though he fell ftiort
of fome in colouring, yet while he furpafled
in grace, he likewife was mafter of more of
the excellent parts of painting than any other
artift. It was a like univerfality of tafte, along
with great power of imagination, that enabled

Hannibal

412 Tajle ejjentuil to PartIIL

Hannibal Carracci to unite in himfelf the per-
fedions of all former artiils, and to imitate
them at his pleafure.

In a word, every work of genius muft, in
its charadleriftical excellences and defeds, bear
plain marks of the degree in which its au-
thor poflefled any of the perfedions of tafte.
Every man's peculiar tafte, exerting itfelf
along with his imagination, puts him on
fearching for fuch conceptions as it moft re-
lifhes, on moulding them into that form which
fuits it beft, on adopting fuch as it approves, on
avoiding and rejeding whatever it difapproves.

I SHALL take occafion here to remark a
difference between genius for fcience, and ge-
nius for the arts, refulting from the diverfity
of all the powers employed in thefe two de-
partments, and of the manner in which they
are employed, a difference that, for this rea-
fon, falls not properly under any of the par-
ticular heads hitherto confidered. The exer-
tions of fcientific genius have in their nature
a certain fedatenefs, gravity, and aufterity :
genius for the arts operates with a kind of
fprightlinefs, gaiety, vivacity, or impetuofity.
This difference may be accounted for from the
obfervations which we have already made.

Sect.VI. Genius for the Arts, 413

It arifes in fome meafure from the different
degrees and manners in which judgment is
exercifed in thefe two kinds of genius. All
the exertions of judgment about truth, are in
their nature cool and compofed ; and in the
operation of fcientific genius, thefe exertions
are almoft uninterrupted. An idea is no fooner
fuggefted than it is examined, fcrutinized,
and reafoned upon, and deliberately purfued
through all its confequences : this exercife
calms, and as it were depreffes the foul, and
gives a caft of ferioufnefs to the operation of
genius in inveftigating truth. Invention in
the arts, requires not fo continual an exercife
of judgment, and therefore wants that cafl:.
The exertion of judgment has a greater de-
gree of fedatenefs, and more depreffes the foul,
when reafoning is neceffary, than when the
decifion is intuitive ; and the more intricate
and laborious the reafoning is, the greater is
the fedatenefs and ferioufnefs vv^ith which it is
purfued. In fcientific invention, judgment is
exercifed chiefly in reafoning. But in the
arts, an idea fuggefted, generally appears fit or
unfit at firft fight, and is adopted or rejeQed
in an inftant ; even when it needs to be
canvaffed, this is done without a laborious

fcrutiny,

414 Tajle ejfemlal to Part III.

fcrutiny, and therefore without introducing
Iblemnity of difpofition.

The perception of truth is an indifferent
feeUng ; the fentiments oi tajle dxo, not indif-
ferent : the conclufions which the philofopher
forms in the courfe of his inveftigation, are
apprehended without any fenfatioa of plea-
fure ; the work of the artift, in the feveral
ileps of his progrefs, is continually gratifying
his tafle, giving him fenfations of delight, and
by means of thefe elevating his mind and en-
livening his temper. The inventer in fcienjce
has often indeed high pleafure from the con-
fcioufnefs of fuccefs ; but the artift enjoys this
in common with him, and has all the plea-
fures of taRe fuperadded to it. If the philo-
fopher's pleafure in the gratification of his cu-
riofity is to be confidered as diftind from the
agreeable confcioufnefs of fuccefs., yet it is a
fatisfadion of a more fedate nature than moft
of the gratifications of tafte, and therefore lefs
fit for enlivening the foul.

The exertions of the imagination have in
themfelves fomething brifk and fprightly ;
but thofe exertions of it, which enter into fci-
entific genius, have lefs of this charatSter than
^he flights of fancy roaming tlu'jugh all the
3 remotefl

Si:cT. VI. Genius for the Arts, 415

remoteft relations, and often likewife animated
by the influence of the pafTions, which take
place in the arts : and confequently, fcientific
genius would be more fedate and compofed
than the other kind, though the continued
and laborious interpofition of judgment did
Bot check the natural gaiety and impetuofity
of imagination. The mind is perhaps occu-
pied with equal intenfenefs in both kinds of
invention ; and hence enthufiafm is common
to both kinds of genius : but the mind is oc-
cupied in different ways ; different faculties
of it are principally engaged. In fcience,
judgment is employed as much as imagina-
tion ; and in fcientific genius, that complexion
is predominant which marks the exertions of
the former : its operations are fedate and com-
pofed, and it is generally attended with foli-
dity of temper, and with a character whofe
very peculiarities have a certain gravity and
ftayednefs. In the arts, judgment is lefs fre-
quently interpofed, and it is interpofed with
lefs labour, imagination is left at liberty to
purfue its courfe without a continual check,,
and therefore purfues it with a fort of ala-
crity and chearfulnefs, heightened by the ever
returning approbations of tafle: genius for

the

41 6 Power of Execution necejjary Part III.

the arts, partakes generally in this tempera-
ment of imagination ; it Is Tprightly in all its
motions, and is often accompanied with a
turn of charaQier gay, unftaid, or defultory.
Sometimes indeed a melancholy call is found
along with great genius in the arts; when it
is, it proceeds either from a fimilar call of
imagination, or from quick fenfibility, the
common attendant of a lively fancy and a de-
licate talle, too llrongly affected by the gloo-
mier views of human life.

SECT. VII.

The Poiver of Execution neceffary to Genius

for the Arts,

CIENTIFIC genius compleats its
operations by invention ; at leaft, very
ordinary talents are fufficient for expreffing its
difcoveries, and it is not confidered as fufFer-
ing a very great diminution of its proper
merit, from the want of ability for elegant
expreflion: but genius for the arts implies,
in every cafe, not only the power of inven-
tion, but alfo the power of execution. In
different arts, the manners of expreflion, or
6 the

Sect. VII. to Genius for the Arts, 417

the iiiftruments of execution are fo different,
that, without entering into the peculiarities of
thefe, it is not poffible to explain fully this
' part of genius. But a capacity of employing
fome inftrument, fo as to exprefs the concep-
tions of the imagination, is common to ge-
nius for all the arts. Some obfervations will,
therefore, be proper, Goncerning that capa-
xity, ifi far as, it is thus common. This is all
that we fliall attempt at prefent.

A CAPAGITY for execution is fometimes
found in a perfon who has no power of inven-
tion; but when It Is, it implies not any de-
■gfee'of geniu^.^ There are ^mechanics who
can execute a machine from *»» model or pat-
^tem, with gr^at dexterity anrf* neatnefs, who
could not haA^e contrived that machine, who
'could not fo-'iHuch as have conceived it from
^'a defcripticn, and who could not make any
^improvement on the ftru(£ture of the fimpleft
-utenfily There ,^ic perfons who can paint
"^ very exadly after a copy, but could not de-
f'fign^an'hiftorlcalipfdure, or a land (cape, nor
*^ even' draw a: portrait from the life. Perfons
*^' incapable of mufical'iinVention, may yet be
"^admirable performers., 'Iti^^ poetry, a power
of execution feparated fi,;orn^, every degree of
' - E e the

■■f. f : >

4i8 Potvei' of Execution necejfary Part III.

the correfpondent invention, is perhaps more
rare than in any of the other artsj yet there
are tolerable verfifiers, who could not derive
from their ow^n fund, any part of the plan of
a poem. It would be an impropriety to attri-
bute genius to fuch perfons ; it is fcarce ever
attributed to them, by thofe who think with
the leaft precifion ; the capacity which they
fhow, is fometimes termed ingenuity, but it
is always diftinguifhed from that fort of inge-
nuity which belongs to invention :

Diftat ab ingenio longe manus,— (^:)

fays a writer on painting ; the obfervation is
applicable to all the arts.

On the other hand, there may be fome
degree of invention in a particular art, with-
out a capacity of correfpondent execution. A
perfon may compofe in mufic, who cannot
perform. Many have invented the fubjeit of
a pidure, and in idea deligned the whole of
it, fo that, from their defcription of their
conception, a mailer might execute it, though
they themfelves never ufed the pencil. Others
might proceed a ftep farther; they could
fketch out the piece, without being able to

{a) Fresnoy de arte graph, ver. 494.

colour

Se c T . VII. to Genius for the Arts, 4 1 9

colour it. It is remarked of Pietro Tefta,
that in drawings, his execution is both ma-
fterly and correct, but notwithftanding this,
and notwithftanding his having poflelTed in-
vention fublime and exuberant, he attempted
often, without fuccefs, to acquire the art of
colouring. In like manner, a perfon may con-
ceive the whole plan of a poem, and even
exprefs it agreeably in profe, who cannot
cloath it with numbers. The Telemachus
of Fenelon is a dired example of this. Such
perfons poflefs real genius, and perhaps a high
degree of it, fo far as it extends : but they
fhow not a genius complete in the art to which
it points. In order to compleat genius in any
of the arts, a man mull poflefs the power of
employing a proper vehicle, congruous to the
nature of that art, for conveying the concep-
tions of his imagination to the fenfes and the
fouls of other men. It is this that puts it in
the power of genius to fhow itfelf : without
this, its fineft conceptions would perifh, like
an infant in the womb ; without this, the
brighteft imagination would be like a vigo-
rous mind confined in a lame or paralytic
body. Want of fkill in execution was, per-
haps, the only thing that hindered fome of

E e 2 the

426 Power of Execution necejfary Part III.

the earlieft painters, and fome of the firft re-
ftbrers of the art, who* are now neglected and
almoft fbfg5tten, from obtaining a Very high

.H.ivj ^,,,

rank." "'"'^

In every art, expreflion contains fomething
ihechahidal. : In painting, the management of
the pebcil; in -niufic, the ufe of the inftru-
feentjmJbeVry/ the:. artifice of numbers, or
dexterity in verll'fying, are in a great meafure
mechanical. So far, expreffion rtiay be learn-
ed ; and' without exercife, no perfon can be-
come perfe(3;' iti it. The greatcfl geniufes
^^ve bden fehfibfe of this: Apelles made it
a rule to paint fomething every day (b), Ti-
. tian for' mahy years copied whatever he im-
(dertbolj:,' with great labour and care, that he
Itnlght thiis acquire an eafy manner (r). But
there are many whom no exercife or inftruc-
'tion will be fufEcient for rendering mafters of
it. ' A certain, turn of mind is neceffary for
'acquiring It V^ arid that turn of mind which
*fits a . perfon for learning eafily and welt- the
"mechanical' part of 'expreiflion" in any particu-

-^-*(.^). Apelli. ffiit .^lip^uin perpetua confuetudo, nunquain

"tant occufJatam diem agendi, ut non, lineam ducendo, exer-

xie'ret artenv; quod ab eo irtproverbiom venit. ' Flin. Nat.

-Jiiji. lib, x;^-xv. Qap. 10. 1. ■. ^ . . ' .

■^,A*'^-' -•■- ,--44. -,> 'vr, - -'i \UiK> Dilj {Ctjra
\c) Fkbsnoy z juifgmsfit c/ Fawterr, ^ *

~^4^^-3 -> -■ <.^ lop

S,EC r. VII. to Genius for ths Arts^ 45 1

lar art, is an ingredient in genius for that
art-

A GOOD deal of previous knpwlege is like-
wife neceflary for a perfon's executing in any^
of the arts. Knowlege, for itiffaiice, of the
words of a language, of its ftrudture,' of th^
meafures which fuit it, is prerequifite to the'
poet; knowlege of anatomy, of perfpc^tive,''
of the nature of colours, to the pointer. But
a turn of mind congruous to the particular
kind of knowlege, will affift him greatly m
acquiring it ; and an imagination fuited to
any of the fine arts, is atfolutely neceltary fot
enabjing him to perceive, nay for prompting
him to confider, how his knowlege may b^
applied to that art. In the moment of execu-
tion alfo, imagination is employed in fuggeft-
ing this knowlege, and rendering it fubfervieiit
to. the prefent purpofe. Such a turn of mindi^,
and fuch a ftru6ture of imagination, as fits
for this, is neceflary for compleating a geniu^
ipr the arts. ^, - '*
^'^HE power of expreflion, fo far as it dif-
fers both from mechanical dexterity, and from
Kovvlege acquired by uudy^, confifts jierhaps
entirely iT^ a ciap^^^^ of fe'tVirig abjeds in fuch
a light that they may kffe^ Others with the
^ E fe 3 ^ fame

422 Power of ExecutioniuceJJary Part III.

fame ideas, aflbciations, and feelings, with
which the artift is afFeded. This capacity
arifes chiefly from fuch force of imagination
as at once renders the conception of things
precife and definite, and leads a perfon to
forefee readily what effedl every touch in the
expreflion will produce, or to conceive quickly
the proper means of producing any defired
effed. This is obvioufly refolveable into aflb-
ciation, and therefore will, in every art, be
found to fpring from the fame principles of the
mind, which form the fource of invention in
that art. It is quicknefs and readinefs in thus
forefeeing and conceiving, that in a great mea-
fure renders the execution fpirited ; it alone
can prevent the neceflity of frequently alter-
ing and retouching, which never fails to pro-
duce deadnefs and languor.

It fometimes happens that particular cir-
cumftances render it impoffible to employ the
moft obvious and direct means of producing a
certain effect. It fhows great power of ex-
preflion to contrive readily, in fuch a cafe,
fome other means lefs obvious. The moft
natural means of marking the principal figure
in a piifture, is by the ftrength of the lights ;
a peculiarity in the difpofition.may fometimes

prevent

Sect. VII. to Genius for the Arts, 423

prevent the painter from ufing this means,
and he may notwithftanding render his prin-
cipal figure confpicuous, by a peculiarity in
the colouring. The contrivance of Timan-
thes, an ancient painter, is well knov^rn, and
has been often applauded : in the facrifice of
Iphigenia, being unable to give to the father
a greater degree of forrow than he had given
to the other fpedators, he produced the fame
efFe<Sl by concealing his face {d].

It always fhows real genius to execute
one's beautiful inventions by the inftruments
and in the manners which are well known,
and have been long in ufe. But a much
greater degree of genius was difplayed by
thofe artifts who firft brought thefe inftru-
ments into ufe, or who confiderably improved
the manner of ufing them. If it be true that

{^) Ejus enim eft Iphigenia, oratorum laudlbus celebrata :
qua ftante ad aras peritura, cum moeftos pinxiflet omnes, prre-
cipue patrem ; cum triftitiai omnem imaginem confumpfiflet,
patris ipfius vultum velavit, quem digne non poterat often-
dere. Plin. Nat. Hi'^. lib. xxxv. cap. lo. Ut fecit Ti-
mantes, ut opinor, Cithnius, in ea tabula qua Colotem
Teium vicit. Nam cum in Iphigeniae immolatione pinxilfet
triftem Calchantem, triftiorem Ulyffem, addidiflct Menelao
quem fummum poterat ars efficere moerorem, confumptis aiFec-
tibus, non reperiens quo digne modo patris vultum pofTct
exprimere, velavit ejus caput, et fuo cuique animo dedit ^fti-
mandum. Quint. Inji. Orat. lib. ii. cap. 15, See alfo
Valer.Max. lib. viii. cap. 11.

£04 Apol-

ji^^lf Poiuer of ExecutioHneceJfary PatitHL'

Apollodorus was the firft who had the art of
expreffing the lights arid fliades in painting,
he by this fhowed a higher genius in expref-
Aori, than they who have, even with the
greateil fuccefs, pfadiifed that art, fiace he
difcovered it. Correggio fhowed great origi-'
nality by introducing a new and pccuHar.
manner of diftribtiting hghts, fo as to give
uncommon force and roundnefs to his pic-
tures (<?). The poet who firft introduced a
meafure adapted to a pafticiilar Toft of fub-
jed-S, and ufed it properly, haS a claim to
genius in exprefTion, fuperidrio' thcir's who.
. have afterwards written poems in that fuit-
able meafure. Spenfer's' ftanza may be re-
garded as one indication of his genius, though
the irnitation of it by others has been fomejr.
times cenfured as injudicious.

It generally happens, that the expreflion
of an artift, bears the fame chara61:er with his'
invention. It is natural that it.fliould; the
imagination influences both, by many of the
fame principles. ' Pindar^s fancy was wild,
his verfmcation alfQ.isirregulaTk.. Pope's ima-
gination was correct,,; fb^, is .|?is^. -i^l^^ru^rB^
fometimes, the invention ahd the expreflionf

: .,.:...■■ ,:u. ., ; . 1-, ■ ■'■■

(*) F R E s N Y 's 'Judgment of Painters^

"^ are

SECTiVII. to CBnius for the Jrts. 425

are of different complexions. In invention
Pietro Tefta was enthufiaftic and incoherent,
but his drawing was elegantly corredt. Such
diflbnance between the. two Qperations of ge-
nius in the arts, may arife from a^diflimila-
rity in the turn of his imagination and his
tafte. It may arifc iikewife from a defedt, or
from an excellence, in the mechanical part of
expreffion. A defed: in this will render the
organs unable to do juftice to the' conceptions.
The. beft poet may exprefs his ideas , to great
difadvantage by writing in a dead or foreign
language. Freedom and eafinefs of invention
is afcribed to Simon Memmi, but the art of
painting was in his time fo much in its infan-
cy, that hia execution could not throv%^ off the
tpmrary character of liiffnefs. The earlieft
works even of Raphael and Titian, fhow fome
drinefs in the execution,, incongruous to their
other excellences, ovv^ing either to the v\'ant
of pradice, or >td^ the imperfed: manner of
their mafters [f). On the other hand, a
great dexterity in "the" mechanical -part, may
taife the executioA'tQ a degree or kind of ex-
cellence, far beyond the artift's power of in-
vention. Many painters have very liapplly

ij") Ibid,- iindiOh/er'OatU'ns on' htT jirt of Painting,

'^ 5 copied

4^6 Of the Union of Part III.

copied a manner of execution very unlike to
their own turn of genius.

SECT. VIII.

Of the Union of different Kinds of Genius,

TH E fum of what has been faid, is
this : fcientific genius arifes from fuch
"vigour of imagination as difpofes a perfon to
be affected chiefly by the ftrongeft and moft
important relations of things, particularly by
caufation and co-exiftence, operating power-
fully, giving a propenfity to fet every objedt
in that attitude in which it lays a foundation
for thefe relations ; and making all the other
principles of affociation to adt in fubordination
to thefe ; and it requires the afliftance both of
an exad: and folid judgment, and of an accu-
rate and diftind: memory. Genius for the
arts fprings from fuch livelinefs of imagina-
tion as difpofes a perfon to attend chiefly to
thofe qualities of things, which lay a founda-
tion for relations between them and many
others, to be aff'eded by the flighter degrees
of relation, or by the more trivial relations,
efpecially to be aduated by refemblance, as
his predominant and leading principle of aflb-

ciation ;

Sect. VIIL different Kinds of Genius. 427

elation; with a memory fimllarly turned;
and it requires for compleating it, a quicknefs
of difcernment, and great acutenefs and live-
linefs of tafte; together with the power of
imparting, by means of fome fenfible inftru-
ment, his own fentiments and conceptions to
other men.

All the principles combined in genius,
are very differently modified in thefe two
fpecies of it ; in fome principal refpedts, the
modifications are even oppofite. This abun-
dantly expofes a conceit, which has been very
crudely thrown out by fome (^), in oppofition
to the plaineft experience, That a man who
has genius in one way, wiH have equal ge-
nius in any other way to which he is pleafed
to turn himfelf with equal application ; nay,
that there is no original difference between
thofe who difplay the greateft genius, and
thofe who fhow none : but that all the differ-
ence between genius and no genius, between
genius of one kind and of another, arifes
from education, ftudy, adventitious caufes,
and acquired habits. The affertion is irrccon-
cileable to the commonefl appearances in hu-
man life ; and in the whole courfe of this

(<») See Rv FFHE ad's Z//?o/^ /*«/?.

enquiry,

428 Q/^^ ^/"^.^ '^.;,i .P^^T^fe

enquiry,; we have found that the^e are, In the
principles of human nature, originaj and per-,
manent varieties which «niuft produce jremark-
able differences in point of genius*, . •^ , ', .;:
.From thefe varieties it. would jrather leerti .
tou follow^ that genius, foj: fcierice, ^nd ^e-
nius for the arts, are incompatible. But this
would be the Qant;rary,, extreme : experience
fhows that they are not. Net to mention

thofe -:who lipf^b^en^jbpLth^^^^^^

orators ; even mor^ediifimilar forms pf genius
have been united. Among the ancients, Pam-
philus was. at once a j)airiter, and a mathema-
tician {b)i . Metrodorua was reckoned ohe of
the moft ■iearned philofophers,- and, Hkewife.
one of the, inoft fkilf ul paiiiters,^ that Athens

produced" 11?: "hi^ ^"'^M- V ^i"^i^^#3f
derns, Leonardi da Vinci was a painter, fcujp-

cif ue srithmetka .«r| gepmeArij*. PtiN. Nat. uyi, YtQ.'XfXf*
cap. 10. . . - ^ , ^

(f) Eodem tempore erat Metfodorus piftor, idemqaiirphilo.
ibphur, magnae in utr?que fcientia audoritatis, luque cum
Lucius Paulus, devidlo Perfeo, j>etiiiTet' ab Athenicnfibus," ut
quem probaaffimu»Ti philofoplium riiitferefit fibi/^ad ■efudktCh
dos liberos,,.iteinquepidGrem a,d tnuijiphum e5<;c9lendum,
Athenienfes MetrOdorum elegeru'rit ; profeffi eundtiti' iit iltrb-
que deflderio piTjftantilfiir.um. Plin. ib. cap. 11,

^^■''^-- ^-^s-^-^i^i tor.

»,■•-■ ^ At* ^

^E'd^i Vill. different Hinds of Genius. 429

tor, archited:, mufician, and at the fame time
a chemifl and mathematician. Aiiguftine
Carrachi was a very good painter, excelled in
^ilgi^aving, fucceeded in poetry^ and fhowed
a turn-alfo fortnufic, rhetoric, natural philo*
fcphy, and mathematics. It is remarkable
that both Titian's fon Horatio, and Parme^
giano, entered fo deep into chemical refearches.
Eft ''by-nthediii' to --empoverifh themfelves.
^iivg3Lrti^s j4nafyjis df Beauty fhows that he
^aid' g€ftius forr^philofophical inveftigation ;
sffidliiB genius in his own art, was very high^.
^Blkll^y, with a great degree of mathematical
^g'eniu'Si fhowed fome degree of the poetical.
B€i%tie^sEJfayGtt Truth fhows him to be it
philofopher; his genius in poetry is confefled.
Aft ianioh of different kinds of :genius cannot
take place except when all the affociating
p)rincipl€S have— -a* Confiderable degree of
ftrerigthi add the iniagination is, at the fame
tim:e capable of a Very lively and command'-
ing impreffion from the particular end that is
M view. 'It arifes diredly from x\\2it flexibi-
lity of ■ ithaginatiott^ which was fufficiently
explained already [d]^ Great flexibility join-
ed even to at moderate fancy, will produce a

-"'«='" ■t4-f«.ti?reii: si" »''2'-'^"rf' ,)

•'"-•'■-' ■ little

43 o Of the Union of Part III*

little genius in various departments ; joined
to a fine imagination, it will enable a man to
excel in various ways : the fined imagination,
with little flexibility, will be confined to one
way, or at moft be excellent but in one.

Indeed, even when a perfon unites in him*
felf different kinds of genius, it will be gene-
rally found, that he excels only in one de-
partment, and that in others his genius is of
an inferior order. In the fubje(St to which
his genius is moft adapted, it exerts itfelf
with vigour ; it follows the aflbciating prin-
ciple which is naturally prevalent. In the
fubjedt to which it is lefs adapted, it operates
more heavily ; it follows an affociating prin-
ciple which is hy foreign caufes forced into a
temporary predominance. The efFe(Sts of ge-
nius in the former cafe, are like fruits fuit-
able to the climate, which attain their perfed
flavour ; in the latter, they are like fruits
raifed by artificial heat, in a climate not pro-
per for them, which remain infipid, and ne-
ver reach their full maturity. Under the
guidance of the principle of aflbciation na-
turally predominant, the other principles
operate with fuch alacrity as fubjeds fhow in
ferving their rightful king ; under the gui-
dance

Sect. VIII. different Kinds of Genius. 43 1

dance of any other principle, their operation
refembles the fpiritlefs backwardnefs with
which a people obey an ufurper or a con-
queror.

When a perfon's genius is naturally turned
to one of thefe objedts, fcience or the arts, it
will require very powerful caufes to lead him
to exert it about the other. It will perhaps
be found, that almoft no perfon has done fo>
except when he was impelled to it by a pecu-
liar education, by very forcible example, by
being thrown into a way of life which required
it, or by circumllances of the like nature.

It may likewife be remarked, that, in fome
inftances, perhaps in fome of thofe formerly
produced, the union of thefe dijQTimilar forms
of genius, is only apparent, not real. Ge^
nius in one way, has been accompanied, not
by the power of invention, but merely by
capacity^ in the other way. It muft be own-
ed, that generally Nature is more frugal of
her gifts, than to lavifh on one man, very
, unlike modifications of genius. The greatelt
inventers in fcience, have fcarce ever fhowu
genius in the arts. Ariftotle was perhaps the
moft inventive among the ancient philofo-
phers ; and his ftile, though very precife,

exatf^,

432 vAirA^'(y//7<? Union of Part III.

exadi, and fuitable to. .tbefubtility of philo-
fophy, fhows a turn of imirid, little adapted
either to poetry or to eloquence; even his
critical works difplay more of cool judgment^
ipatient a<"tention, and deep refledlion, than of
that ardor of tafte, Vv-hich never fails to attend
geniiis for the fine arts. On the other^hahd^
the grea'tefli geniufes 'for the arts, have gene-
rally betrayed a want iof that precifion and
depth which are neceflary for fcientilic invefr
tigations. nl .ro'inonbr

Some have fuppofed a diftin<5felve peculi^
arity fo ilrongly impreiled by Nature, on every
man of genius, as to aflert, that the fame
perfon can fcarce excel in two different arts,
however analogous; that no writer* for ex-
ample, ever almoft fucceeded both in verfe
and profe ; nay, that the fam.e perfon cannot
excel in both the fpecies of dramatic poetry,
tragedy and comedy (J). In fupport of fuch
afi'ertions it is remarked, that none of the
ancients undertook both thefe fpecies pf .the
drama ; and with the fame view, the wretch-
ednefs of the Roman orator's poetry is often
mentioned. It would be unjuft, however,
to eftimate the compafs of human genius

{d) Rambler, No, 169. '" ''^

from

Sect. VIII. different Kinds of Genius, 433

from fuch inftanees. Homer, the father of
the epic poem, hath left a work wholly of the
ludicrous kind. It would perhaps be difficult
to determine whether Shakefpear poffefled
greater excellence in tragedy or in comedy ;
that he pofleffed very great excellence in both,
is unqueftionable. In both, feveral other mo-
derns have fhown real genius. Many have
likewife been both orators and poets. But
after all, it muft be owned that, in moft cafes,
a man's genius fits him not only for faience
alone, or for the arts alone, but alfo for one
fcience, or for one art. Many have fhown
genius either in mathematics, or in natural
philofophy, or in the philofophy of the mind,
who have difcovcred none in the refl: of thefe
branches. It appears from Pope's letters,
that he applied to painting with confiderable
eagernefs, it does not appear that he diico-
vered any great degree of genius for paint-
ing; for mufic, it is faid that he had not
even a confiderable capacity, though he fhows
the quickefl: fenfe of the harmony t.: verfe;
if it be true, it would appear that, among the
arts, his genius confmed him almcH: wholly
to poetry. In humorous painting, Hogarth
was unrivalled j he attempted portrait-paint-

F f ing,

434 Of the Union, &c. Part III*

ing, it is faid, with the moll wretched fuc-
cefs.

It feems then to be the common, though
not ftridly the univerfal, law of human na-»
ture, that genius fits the perfon who is endued
with it, for invention in fome one particular
art, or particular fcience. Still, therefore,
there is room for enquiring, by what minuter
varieties of the powers combined in genius,
thefe fubordinate differences of its form are
6xt. The enquiry would be laborious and
intricate, but it would be curious, and, per-*
haps, not without utility.

THE END.

» A

ERRATA:

In the Text.

Page 76. line 19. /orconftrufting, reinventing. P. 84.'
I. 14. /or altogether, read all together. P. 125. I S, 9.
read in making them to fuggeft one another. P. 2c^. L 9.
for bring, read brings. P. 409. 1. 14. /or Sarts, read Sitto.
P. 410. U 14. /or principle, r^«</ principles.

In the Notes*

Page 11. 1. ult. read magnumque. P. 20. 1. %. for (;),
place (,) after yxha^i. lb. 1 g. for ^Zxt read^ux. P. 24.
1. 6. /or videre, r^«</ videri. P. 29. 1. 2. /or aiaSflrK* r^a^
«»<79wK. 1. ^» for fMYifioHuttt read ^ivniMnvui* 1. 6» /or ^t?r»faw9aj»

University of California

SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

305 De Neve Drive - Parking Lot 17 • Box 951388

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90095-1388

Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed.

y[h\ u 1 2002

f?'

3 1158 00764 6010

BF
G31e

3>!

o I

O :

O I

O =
CO i

''^!/»?^*'^^
'^/^^^'

\4rtft''-''^flK<^A' i

"'^''

H^iSl

^^•^'mife