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 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 h
 
 A N 
 
 A 
 
 O N 
 
 GENIUS. 
 
 BY 
 ALEXANDER GERARD, D. D. 
 
 fROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN KING'S COLLEGE, 
 
 ABERDEEN^ 
 
 Quid ilia vis, quae tandem eft, quae inveftigat occulta, qus 
 inventio, atque excogitatio dicitur ? 
 
 Cic. Quaeft. Tufc. lib. i. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for W. Strahan; T. Cadell in the Strand^ 
 and W. Creech at Edinburgh. 
 
 MDCCLXXIV.
 
 niv. ' f rM.Lotfag.a w y. ' ^j w j g gMUAmj w ai 
 
 BF 
 G-3k 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 TH E Author of the following EJfaj 
 had occafion, in writing on Tajlcy 
 to confider its connexion with Genius. 
 The attention which he beftowed on this 
 latter faculty, in that one point of view, 
 convinced him, that its Nature and its 
 Principles admitted and required a fuller 
 inveftigation than had ever been at- 
 tempted, and determined him to enter 
 on that inveftigation immediately after 
 •finifhing his former work. Accord ingly 
 his plan was formed, the firft part com- 
 pofed, and fome progrefs made in the 
 fecond part, fo long ago as the year 
 1758. He was then in an office which 
 favoured enquiries of this nature; his 
 continuance in it would have afforded 
 him the opportunity of compleating the 
 
 A 2 defign 
 
 JL /^ o /^ O O O
 
 iv ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 defign in a fhort time ; and the indul- 
 gent reception given by the Public to his 
 EJfay on Tajie would have encouraged 
 him to it: but being foon after removed 
 to an office which necefTarily diredled 
 his chief attention to fubjecfts of a dif- 
 ferent kind, and fully occupied his time, 
 he has been able to profecute his de- 
 fign, with long and frequent interrup- 
 tions, only as the immediate duties of 
 his profeffion allowed him leifure. In- 
 tervals of fuch leifure have put it in his 
 power to reduce his thoughts to the form 
 in which they now appear. Tht fubje^ 
 is curious ; of the execution the PubHc 
 are the proper judges. 
 
 CON-
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction. -* — i*agc i 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Of the Nature of Genius. ;-;- c 
 
 §£CT. I. Of the Province and Criierion of Genius, 
 
 ibid. 
 Sect. II. To what Faculty of the Mindy Genius pro- 
 perly belongs, — 2 j 
 
 Sect. III. How Genius arifes from the Imagination* 
 
 39 
 Sect. IV. Of the Influence of Judgment upon Genius, 
 
 Sect. V. Of the Dependence of Genius on other Intel* 
 le^ual Powers. — — S^r 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Of the general Sources of the Varieties of 
 Genius. — '^-^ J07 
 
 Sect. I. Of the Sources of the Varieties ofCiitius in 
 the Imagination 't particularly of the ^alities of 
 Ideas which produce Affociation. — ibS 
 
 Sect. II. Of the Influence of Habit on Affociation, 
 
 125 
 Sect, 
 
 ^
 
 vi CONTENTS. 
 
 Sect. III. Of the hfuence of the Pajftons on Ajfocia' 
 tion. — — — 147 
 
 Sect. IV. Reflexions on the Principles of Affociation. 
 Ideas ftiggefled^ either by Senfations^ or by other 
 Ideas. 184 
 
 Sect. V. Of the Combination of the affociating Prin- 
 ciples. 192 
 
 Sect. VI. Of the Modifications of the affociating 
 Principles. • 197 
 
 Sect. VII. Of the Predominance of the affociatmg 
 Principles. • — 215 
 
 Sect. VIII. Of Flexibility of Imagination. 232 
 
 Sect. IX. Of the Varieties of Memory, and their In- 
 fluence on Genius. — — _ 243 
 
 Sect. X. Of the Varieties of Judgment, and their 
 Influence on Genius. — — 2 79 
 
 PART III. 
 Of the Kinds of Genius. — — 317 
 
 Sect. !• Genius twofold; for Science, or for the 
 Arts. 318 
 
 Sect. II. Of the StruHure of Imagination which dif- 
 tinguifhes the two Kinds of Genius. — 323 
 
 Sect. III. How the two Kinds of Genius differ in 
 
 refpe5i of the Affiftance which they derive from 
 
 Memory* — — — ^s^ 
 
 'Sect. IV. How the two Kinds of Genius differ in 
 
 refpeX of the Affijiance which they derive from 
 
 Judgment* t"^^ — 3^9 
 
 Sect.
 
 CONTENTS. vii 
 
 Sect. V. ^he two Kinds of Genius farther compared 
 and dijiinguifhed. — — 378 
 
 Sect. VI. Tajle efftntial to Genius for the Arts, 391 
 
 Sect. VII. The Power of Execution necejfary to Ge- 
 nius for the Arts. — — 416 
 
 Sect. V ill. Of the Union of different Kinds of Ge- 
 nius. — — — 42^
 
 Puhlijhed by the fame Author^ 
 
 An ESSAY on TASTE, 
 
 WITH 
 
 Three Dissertations on the fame Subjed, 
 by Mr. De Voltaire, Mr. D'Alem- 
 BERT, F.R. S. and Mr. De Montesquieu. 
 
 THE SECOND EDITION. 
 Printed for T. Cad ell in the Strand. 
 
 AN
 
 A N 
 
 ESSAY 
 
 O N 
 
 GENIUS 
 
 IT is remarked by thofe "who have confi- 
 dered the ftate of human knowlege with 
 greateft attention, that the fubje£ts of 
 men's enquiries have been, in moll: cafes, de- 
 termined by accident, and not purfued with 
 regular application, according to their dignity 
 or their natural connexion. On this account, 
 fome fubjed:s of the greatefl importance have 
 been totally negleded, and many more have 
 been imperfectly examined, and profecuted 
 no farther than fuperficial obfervations fpon- 
 taneoufly occurred, and cafual inclination dif- 
 pofed men to attend to them. This has hap- 
 pened in all the fciences, but efpecially in the 
 
 B fcienc^
 
 2 ^n EJfay on Genms„ 
 
 fcience of human nature. It has feldon^ 
 been explored with that care which is requir 
 fite in a fubjed fo fubtile and abftrufe. Far 
 from taking a complete furvey of this curious 
 region, men have fatisfied themfelves with 
 fome random incurfions, vifiting only a few 
 trads which happened to engage the^r curio- 
 fity, and penetrating even into thefe, only fo 
 far as fome prefent view required. 
 
 All the fame caufcs which produce fuch a 
 fuperficial and fortuitous method of inveftiga- 
 tion with regard to other fubjeds, produce it 
 likewife with regard to the human mind; 
 and fome circumftances render our enquiries 
 on this fubjed, flight and accidental, which 
 do not extend their influence to the others. 
 The phenomena of the mind have not fo great 
 fleddinefs of exiftence, as the qualities of bo- 
 dies. It is impoffible to make experiments fo 
 purpofely on the underftandlng or the paf- 
 fions, to purfue them fo deliberately, or to 
 repeat them fo eafily, as on material things. 
 It is necefl^ary to catch appearances as they 
 happen to difcover themfelves, either imme- 
 diately to a man's own confcioufnefs, or by 
 ^heir efFeds in the condud or converfation of 
 
 other.
 
 An EJfay on Genius, 3 
 
 other men. For this reafon it requires long 
 time, favourable opportunities, and inceflant 
 attention, to colled fuch a number of fads 
 concerning any of the mental powers, as will 
 be fufficient for deducing conclufions concern- 
 ing them, by a juft and regular indudion. 
 
 This difficulty which attends the inveftiga- 
 tion of the principles of human nature, has 
 contributed much to check the progrefs of 
 men's enquiries concerning them, and to pre- 
 vent fome of the moft important of them from 
 being at all profefledly analyfed. Genius 
 itfelf, the leading faculty of the mind, the 
 grand inftrument of all inveftigation, has 
 fcarce ever been examined with care. In the 
 writings of thofe who treat with greateft ac- 
 curacy of the intelledual powers, we find 
 only a few incidental obfervations concerning 
 Genius. It is confelTed to be a fubjcd of ca- 
 pital importance, without the knowlege of 
 which a regular method of invention cannot 
 be eftablifhed, and ufeful difcoveries muft 
 continue to be made, as they have generally 
 been made hitherto, merely by chance. But 
 it is reckoned a fubjed which can be reduced 
 to no fixt or general principles; its phenome- 
 
 B 2 na
 
 A . An Effay on Genius. 
 
 na are almoft univerfally regarded as j^noma-f 
 lous and inexplicable. It is however worth 
 ■while to enquire, whether this be really the 
 cafe, and to make an attempt at leaft, to ex« 
 plain the nature and varieties of Genius froiii 
 the fimplc qualuij§ p/jhe bjijfQai;i mind. 
 
 PART 
 
 f
 
 [ s 1 
 
 PART L 
 
 0/ the Nature of Genius. 
 
 IT will be proper to begin our enquiries, 
 by afcertaining, what it is that properly 
 conftitutes Genius as diftinguifhed from our 
 other intelledual powers. This wnll both 
 render our conception of it precife, and lead 
 us to difcover, what other operations of the 
 iinderftanding, attend it in its exertions, or 
 affift it, and in what manner. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of the Province and Criterion of Genius, 
 
 ^X^ H E powers of the human mind, how- 
 ever diftinca in themfelves, are gene- 
 rally complicated in their energies. Scarce 
 any of them can be exerted in perfedion, 
 without the affiftance of many others. On 
 this account, it is very difficult to colledt the 
 phenomena whrch belong to each, to diftin- 
 guifli precifely one faculty from the reft, and 
 to afcertain its peculiar nature and province. 
 
 B 3 The
 
 6 The Province and Criterion Part I. 
 
 The habit of confounding our mental powers 
 with one another, is fo ftrong as to render the 
 clofeft attention neceflary for making a fepa- 
 ration ; and the natural fubtlety of the fub- 
 je<n: makes it hard to refledlupon it with clofe 
 attention. But without determining, in this 
 manner, the proper nature of each faculty^ 
 and marking its real difference from thofe 
 which moft refemble it and are often combin- 
 ed with it, our conception of it will be im- 
 perfect and indeterminate. 
 
 Th e exertions of Genius can never be com- 
 plete or regular, when any of the intellectual 
 powers is remarkably defective. It receives 
 afTiftance from them all. But Genius is not- 
 withftanding one of the intelledual powers, 
 and diftinguifhable from the reft. There are 
 many productions which are far from fatisfy- 
 ing reafon, or altogether approving themfelves 
 to tafte, in which we yet acknowlege confpi- 
 cuous marks of real genius. Their faults 
 difcover a dcfeCt, not of this, but of feme 
 other power. Few competent judges will 
 now-a-days aflert that the dialectics of Arif- 
 totle, are of any confiderable utility for the 
 end which he propofed to anfwer by them, 
 the difcovery of truth : but that work, per- 
 haps
 
 Sect. I. of Genius, 7 
 
 haps mdre than any other of his works, dif- 
 plays the compafs of his genius. It will be 
 generally aHovved that the writings of Shake- 
 fpear have almoft as great faults as beauties ; 
 hut it will be as generally afferted, that his 
 genius is fo original and immenfe as to place 
 him at the head of modern poets. What then 
 is the precife criterion of genius ? If we can 
 determine what it isj we fhall the more eafily 
 form a diftind: conception of the nature of 
 this faculty. 
 
 The difficulty in determining the province 
 of genius, which ariles from the natural in- 
 tricacy and mutual connexion of the intellec- 
 tual powers, is increafed by the confufed ap- 
 plication of names, to which that has given 
 occafion. Genius is confounded, not only by 
 the vulgar, but even fometimes by judicious 
 writers, with mere capacity. Nothing how- 
 ever is more evident, than that they are to- 
 tally diftind:. A capacity of learning, is very 
 general among mankind. As birds are by 
 nature made fit for flying, a horfe for the 
 courfe, or a wild beaft for fiercenefs, fo doci- 
 lity is congenial to man. A human creature 
 in every refped: unteachable, were one of the 
 greateft and rareft of monfters. Moft chil- 
 
 B 4 dren
 
 8 The Province and Criterion Part 1. 
 
 dren promife fome abilities, though the want 
 of cuhure and other caufes often blaft them, 
 and fruftrate the kind intentions of Nature [a]. 
 Mere capacity, in moft fubjeds, implies no- 
 thing beyond a little judgment, a tolerable 
 memory, and confiderable induflry. But true 
 genius is very different, and much lefs fre- 
 quent. 
 
 Genius is properly the faculty of inven- 
 tion ; by means of which a man is qualified 
 for making new difcoveries in fcience, or for 
 producing original works of art. We may 
 afcribe tafte, judgment, or knowlege, to a 
 man who is incapable of invention ; but we 
 cannot reckon him a man of genius. In order 
 to determine, how far he merits this charac- 
 ter, we mufl enquire, whether he has difco- 
 vered any new principle in fcience, or invent- 
 ed any new art, or carried thofe arts which 
 are already pradifed, to a higher degree of 
 perfedion, than former mafters ? Or, whe- 
 
 {a) Sicut aves ad volatum, equi ad curfum, ad fsvitiam 
 ferae gignuntur : ita nobis propria eft mentis agiratio, atque 
 folertia. — Hebetes vero et indociles non magis fecundum na- 
 turam hominis eduntur, quam prodigiofa corpora, ct monftris 
 infignia: fed hi pauci admodum. Fuerit argumentum, quod 
 in pueris elucet fpes plurimorum : quae cum emoritur sstate, 
 manifeftum eft non naturam defecifTe, fed curam, Quintil. 
 Injiitut, Orat, lib. i, cap. i. 
 
 ther,
 
 Sect. I. of Genius. g 
 
 ther, at leaft, he has, in matters of fclence, 
 improved on the difcoveries of his predecef- 
 fors, and reduced principles formerly known, 
 to a greater degree of fimplicity and confift- 
 ence, or traced them through a train of con- 
 fequences hitherto unknown ? Or, in the 
 arts, defigned fome new work, different from 
 thofe of his predeceflbrs, though not perhaps 
 excelling them ? Whatever falls fliort of 
 this, is fervile imitation, or a dull effort of 
 plodding induftry, which, as not implying in- 
 vention, can be deemed no proof of genius, 
 whatever capacity, fiiill, or diligence it may 
 evidence. But if a man fhows invention, no 
 intellectual defeds which his performance 
 may betray, can forfeit his claim to genius. 
 His invention may be irregular, wild, undif- 
 ciplined ; but ftill it is regarded as an infalli- 
 ble mark of real natural genius : and the de^ 
 gree of this faculty, that we afcribe to him, 
 is always in proportion to our eftimate of the 
 novelty, the difficulty, or the dignity of his 
 inventions. 
 
 These obfervations, when barely mention- 
 ed, are fo agreeable to our natural fentiments, 
 that a long illuftration of them would be fu- 
 
 perfluous. They would be amply confirmed 
 
 6 by
 
 to The Province and Criterion Part I. 
 
 by an examination of the chafaders of thofc 
 whom the voice of all ages has pronounced 
 moft eminent for genius, and of the particu- 
 lar grounds on which this eminence has been 
 affigned them. But a few examples fhall 
 fuffice in fo clear a cafe. 
 
 All the ancients who are moft celebrated 
 for genius in the greater kinds of poetry, ei- 
 ther invented fome new fpecies, or brought a 
 fpecies already invented, to higher perfedion ; 
 or at leaft produced compofitions diftinguifhed 
 from thofe of others, by a diverfity of fub- 
 jed, or by a peculiar and original manner. 
 jEfchylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, not only 
 compofed feveral tragedies, by which they 
 difplayed Invention, in the contrivance of the 
 fable, in imagining incidents, in forming cha- 
 racters, in conceiving fentiments adapted to 
 them ; but each of them made fome confider- 
 able improvements in the conftrudion of th« 
 drama [b). The genius of Homer has been 
 
 ^0? riyacyu Kut rcc rov XP(o\) -liXarTuai, xul Tov hoyoy ir^urayunfyiv 
 vet,fBcr)iivcc<rt, Tps^ ^£ xai cr^iviH/y^onpiac Sc»^oxMt. APIZTOT< tte^ 
 wojr,T. XEtp. ^. K«» Et'p7r'i<5'>;?» It xcii ret aM^cc yii) h ciXovofAu, aK- 
 /« rfayiKu7ciro<; yi 7uv voty.Tu* ^^JrissTai. X£(p. »7. Aii ob7 XavSavsiv 
 wotouwa?, xu) /x» Soxuv Xiyit^ inTr'hxa^vjuc, ct.>^>.a. 'jrcipvkcTuc* Tckto 
 yei.p TtKXvov' Ixii ^£ TovvavTiof. ' D.a'TriB ydc wpo? ETTipofAffcvTa oiapak- 
 Xoyratf KuSotTtep Vfoi; toi)? o"vovc tcv? fiEfAiyfjuivovc, Ka» cicv r, QioSafov 
 <fuyy\ 7ri7ro»Si Wf sj T>j\ 7w» aMwv twcxpTwf. 'H p.i» yap tov 7\iyo)iTo(; 
 
 always
 
 Sect. I. of Genius, ii 
 
 always held in veneration. His Iliad, his 
 Odyfley, and even his more trivial produc- 
 tions, difplay fo much of rich and original 
 invention in almoft every poffible way, as 
 would have fecured to the author an acknow- 
 legement of very uncommon genius, though 
 he had lived in the moft enlightened age, and 
 pofTefled all advantages for improving his 
 natufial talents. But our idea of his inven- 
 tion is immenfely raifed, when we confider, 
 that he lived in times of ignorance, when 
 poetry remained almofl in its firft rudenefs; 
 that he had no model, by which he could di- 
 rect his conceptions, or from which he could 
 receive fo much as a hint of his grand de- 
 figns; and that he notwithftanding, merely 
 by the force of his own abilities, brought the 
 nobleft fpecies of poetry all at once to its jufl 
 perfedtlon, and comprehended alfo in his works, 
 the rudiments of every other fpecies of com- 
 
 ?\iKrov IxXiyuv crvmBri' 07,'So 'EfpjTrioi;? vonT Koct vTrtozt^i irfwro^t 
 'Pr,ro(. /3iC. 7. xip. /2. Tragedias primus in lucem i^fchylus 
 
 protulit. Sed lon^eclarius illuftraverunt hoc opus Sophocles 
 
 atque Euripides. Quintil. Inji. Orat^ lib. x. cap. i. 
 
 perfonse pallsque repertor honellac 
 
 .^fchylus et modicis indravit pulpita tignis, 
 Et docuit ffiagnamque loqui, nitique cothurno, 
 
 HoR. An Poet. ver. 27S, 
 
 pofition,
 
 1 2 The Province and Criterion Pa r t I. 
 
 pofition, the feeds from which, in Ariftotle's 
 judgment (^), fucceeding writers reared both 
 tragedy and comedy, and from which, in the 
 opinion of Quintilian [d\ even orators might 
 produce all the virtues of their art. On ac- 
 count of original and extenfive invention, 
 thus amazingly difplayed, his title to the firft 
 rank of genius, has been acknowleged by all 
 capable and impartial judges. The Erieid is 
 perhaps more correal and faultlefs than the 
 Iliad ; but few have pretended that Virgil is 
 the greater poet. He does not fhow fuch co- 
 pious and boundlefs invention, as his matter. 
 Befides, Virgil derives from imitation, many 
 things for which Homer is indebted folely to 
 his own penetration. Were we to compare 
 the Eneid with Paradife Loft, merely in re- 
 fped of the genius which they manifeft, we 
 might juftly prefer Milton to Virgil. For 
 though we know that Milton was perfectly 
 
 (f) "ricnrif ot Kcc) ra. <ntov^oiix /xaAira 7roi>;T»s Oj^twpo? ^» (/xowj yxa 
 uv/^ OT* Eu, aA^ oTi Kdi f*»fA>}(7£i; Sfct^xrnta,<i nioir,a-iv) ovru KactToc rrf 
 Xuu.uoi(x,<; av'/'u-cirai 'Trpu.TOi vTziatt^iv, ov -^oyoVf aXXoi to y-7\o7ov $ex~ 
 ftaTo7ro»>ia"«?. O yap JVIapyeiT>!j wjaMyov t^n ucnrtf lA^a; xat \jdvcr- 
 
 CHX "TTfai; TXq TSXyuSlx^, cvru flXi omo( TTpOi; T«r XWf*&)d»«J. Hspi 
 W0I5;T. X£^. ^. 
 
 {^) Hie (quemadmodum ex oceano dicit ipfe amnium vim, 
 fontiumque curfus initium capere) omnibus eloquentias parti- 
 bus exemplum et orium dedit. Injhtt Orat, lib. x. cap. i . 
 
 well
 
 Sect. I, of Genius, 13 
 
 well acquainted both with the Mantuan and 
 with Homer, had the works of both in his 
 eye, and fcrupled not to imitate them; yet 
 the nature of his plan, and the peculiarity of 
 many of the incidents and characters in his 
 poem, require greater and more original in- 
 vention, than there was room for difplaying 
 in a fubjed: fo fimilar to Homer*s, as that of 
 the Eneid is. It will be generally allov/ed, 
 that Shakefpear is, in point of genius, fuper 
 rior to Milton. The preference arifes from 
 the fuperiority of his invention. In the lower 
 accomplifhments of a poet, he is often defec- 
 tive : but the richnefs of his defcrlptlons, the 
 multiplicity and juflnefs of his charaders ; the 
 variety, the compafs, and the propriety of 
 his fentiments, bear the deepeft marks of their 
 being original : and at the fame time that the 
 internal excellences of his works difplay a lux- 
 uriance of invention, we know that his edu- 
 cation gave him but flender opportunities of 
 being acquainted with thofe ancient mailers, 
 from whom he could have borrowed any of 
 his beauties, or by whofe example he could 
 have even improved his natural powers. 
 There were many Englifh rhymers before the 
 time of Chaucer I but he is juftly reckoned 
 
 the
 
 14 The Province and Criterion Part I. 
 
 the father of Engliih poetry, becaufe he firfl 
 difplayed invention in any confiderable de- 
 gree. If it were neceflary to multiply ex- 
 amples on this head, we might fhow that in 
 all the arts, invention has always been re- 
 garded as the only criterion^of Genius. Even 
 wildnefs and extravagance of invention, fome- 
 times procures higher praife, than the utrnoft 
 nicety and corredtnefs. We afcribe fo great 
 merit to invention, that on account of it, we 
 allow the artift who excels in it, the privilege 
 of tranfgreffing eftablifhed rules, and would 
 fcarce wi{h even the redundancies of his nar 
 tural force and fpirit to be lopt off by culture: 
 this, we are afraid, might check the vigour 
 of his invention, which we reckon fo capital 
 an excellence, that nothing could make 
 amends for the want of it, 
 
 In fcience too, as well as in the arts, inven- 
 tion is the proper province of Genius, and its 
 only certain meafure. Socrates owes his re- 
 putation for genius, to his being the inventor 
 qf moral philofophy, and of a peculiar and 
 proper manner of commnnicating it [e). Ari- 
 
 (f) ZwxfaTJi?, Tiyi iiSixijv ht7Ciyo(,yav. AIOF. AAEPT. 'Jifooij*.. 
 ^cwu>t xui fJiifi^t *^» vaBicri, Kcti •rrfo.yjjiaan, otTrXui «7ra«rj ^iKoac-r 
 
 f^aihxpi^inu nAOYTAPX. It jrptr^. 9j-o?v*T£tT. Socrates mihi vi- 
 
 ftotk
 
 Sect. L of Genius, 15 
 
 ilotle is efteemed one of the greateft geniufes 
 of antiquity : it is becaufe he made the moft 
 extenfive difcoyeries in philofophy. In phy- 
 fics, in morals, in logic, in criticifm, in po- 
 litics, he has difplayed a penetrating and 
 inventive mind, capable of remarking circum- 
 ftances and inveftigating general laws, which 
 lay concealed from others (/). T^e greatnefs 
 
 detur, id quod cqnftat inter omneis, primus a rebus occultis, 
 et ab ipfa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante euro philo-» 
 fophi occupati fuerunt, avocavifTe philofophiam, et ad vitani 
 communem adduxiffe. Cxc. Acad.^ceft. lib, i. A quohaec 
 omnis, qu:e eft de vita et moribus, philofopbia manavit. 
 7a/?. ^<ejl. lib. iii. Socrates autem primus philofophiam de- 
 vocavit e ccelo, et in urbibus coUocavit, et in domos etiam in- 
 troduxit, et coegit de vita, et moribus, rebufque bonis ee 
 inalis quaererc. Cuj us multiplex ratio difputandi, rerumque 
 varietas, et ingenii magnltudo—'-^X^xii genera eff^cit diffentien- 
 tium philofophorum. Ibid, lib. v. 
 
 (/) Diogenes Laertius introduces an account of his nu- 
 merous writings, amounting to near four hundred treatifes, 
 by remarking that it is proper to enumerate them, ^»a rtic itiiji 
 itunroi.% Xoyotj Tcev^jfo; dfiTv^, and concludes his catalogue with ob- 
 ferving the extenfive invention which they evidence, to^ yap 
 
 e.>kOK (pt>io7roiWTaTo; iymro xa.) "EYPETIKnTATOS. /?»?. t. Abun- 
 dantia quadam ingenii praeftabat, ut mihi videtur, Ariftoteles, 
 —Quo profefto nihil eft acutius, nihil politius. Cic. Acad, 
 ^ajl, lib. i, Ariftoteles, vir fummo ingenio, fcientia, co- 
 pia. — Ariftoteles longe omnibus (Platonem femper excipio) 
 prajftans et ingenio et diligentia. Tufc. ^^Ji . lib- i. — Peri- 
 patetici veteres, quorum princeps Ariftoteles, quern, ex-. 
 cepto Platone, haud fcio an redle dixerim principem philofo- 
 phorum. — Natura fic ab iis inveftigata eft, ut nulla pars ccelo, 
 mari, terra prastermifla fit. Quinetiam cum de rerum initiis, 
 omnique mundo locuti effent, ut multa, non modo probabili 
 argumentatione, fed etiam neceflaria mathematicorum ratione 
 concluderent ; maximam materiam ex rebus per fe inveftigatis, 
 ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attuleruiU. Perfecutus eft: 
 
 5 . pf
 
 1 6 The Province and Criterion Part I. 
 
 of Bacon's genius will ever be admired. It 
 is the immenfity of his difcoveries, that leads 
 us to form fo exalted an idea of it. In con- 
 tradiction to the fpirit of the philofophy in 
 which he had been educated, without affift- 
 ance from thofe who had gone before him, 
 he was able to difcover, what fciences had 
 been hitherto neglected, and what they fhould 
 contain ; to add them to the fciences already 
 cultivated ; to convert philofophy from an 
 art of difputation, into an inftrument of fub- 
 jeding the works of nature to the dominion 
 of man, and of producing ufeful arts ; to 
 eftablilli rules, formerly unknown, by which 
 genuine and indu6:ive philofophy might be 
 cultivated, and raifed to perfection; and to 
 make confiderable progrefs in applying thefe 
 rules to the adual production of that ftupen- 
 
 Arlftoteles animantium omnium ortus, vlftus, figuras. 
 Differendique ab iifdem, non dialedice folum, fed etiam ora- 
 torie praecepta funt tradita ; ab Ariftoteleque principede fingu- 
 lis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio eft inftituta. 
 — Omnium fere civi'tatum non Graeciag folum, fed etiam bar- 
 bariae, ab Ariftotele, mores, inftituta, difciplinas — cognovi- 
 jnus. De Fin. lib. v. Sed quis omnium do^ior, quis acu- 
 tior, quis in rebus vel inveniendis, vel judicandis acrior Ari- 
 ftotele fuit ? Orat. Quae tandem ars digna Uteris Platoni 
 defuit ? Quot fa;culis Ariftoteles didicit, ut non folum quae 
 ad philofophos atque oratores pertinent, fcientia compleftere- 
 tur, fed animalium fatorumque naturas omnes perquireret? 
 Illis enim haec invenienda fuerunt, nobis cognofcenda funt. 
 Quint. /«/?. Orat. lib, xii. cap. 1 1, 
 
 dous
 
 Sect. I. of Gmius. i'y 
 
 dous edifice of knowlege, of which his com- 
 prehenfive mind had formed the plan; 
 
 In every art and fcienccj then, the praife 
 of genius is beftowed on invention, and is 
 proportioned to the degree of iti In general, 
 the firft rank is affigned to thofe who have 
 invented, v\'hen there was no example or mo- 
 del, of which they could avail themfelves, 
 when their predeceflbrs had made no prepara- 
 tion for their difcoveries, nor given any hint 
 which could fuggeft them ; and who have, 
 iiotwithftanding thefe difadvantages, brought 
 their defigns to a confiderable degree of per- 
 fedion. It is on this account, that Homefr 
 ftands without a rival in the poetic world. 
 
 Tpie Y who profecute the hints, or improve 
 the difcoveries of thofc w^ho have gone before 
 them, are ordinarily entitled only to the fe?- 
 cond rank. It fometimes happens, hovv'ever, 
 that an improvement or addition is fo confi- 
 derable, as to evidence invention equal to what 
 was difplayed in the firft efiay. In that cafe, 
 We find the genius of the improver rated aS 
 high as the perfon's who gave tliC hint. J^X- 
 chines, Hyperides, and above all Demoft- 
 henes, who brou;2;ht elnnuencc to ncrfedion, 
 are celebrated for genius, at Icafi: as much as 
 
 G Lyfiai,
 
 1 8 The Province and Criterion Part T. 
 
 Lyfias, Ifocratcs, and IfDsus, who arc confi- 
 dered as the inventors of (o many peculiar 
 fliles (/). Before the time of Archhnedes, 
 geometry had heen carried to a very confider- 
 able degree of perfedtion ; but he made fo 
 many and fo great improvements in it, that 
 he is placed at the head of the ancient geome- 
 tricians [g ). All the difcoveries of Newton, 
 except thofe which belong to pure mathema- 
 tics, are but a few members of that body of 
 philofophy, the outlines of which Bacon had 
 conceived entire. Newton has exhibited 
 them perfed; and accurately finiflied ; but he 
 had the diredions and example of Bacon, 
 who, without any affiftance, fketched out the 
 whole defign. It would neverthelefs be a 
 queflion of very difficult folution, which of 
 the two pofleffed the greatefl genius ? New- 
 
 (y) IIjp* Acivapxou rciv ^nrofoc; wTiv ufv.xui If Tor? irsfl ruv u^x.'^mr 
 y^cc<puavj, oM ro f^r.Ts 'EYPEIH'N l^'^ov yiyovhaii ;i(;;ap«T-,3f o? tm avj 
 ofa, usvrip rlv AoJ-tav, ttcc) tI-i Jc-oXfCirr.v, xa) Tov JauTcv' [/.y.re tu7 
 kvfr.iAi-juy iTc'pK TEAEmTHN, JcrTTEf rh ^r.^ot^^ivrt^ Ku) rlv 'Ahj- 
 y^vivh x«« 'TTTspnoijv ^J/AEK Xfwf^iv. AI0NY2. AAIKAP. Ativxfx°';' 
 
 (g) II y fit un fi grand nombre de deeouvertes, que Panti- 
 quite lui a decerne d'un commun accord la premiere place 
 parmi Ics geometres. Les methodcs imaginees par Archimede 
 font aufii reconnucs pour les premiers germes, et des germes 
 afiez dc-veloppes de celles qui ont porte fi haut la Geometric 
 dans ces derniers terns. Vv'allis, bon juge en fes matieres, 
 temoignefon admiration pour ce grand homme, par ces mots^ 
 ^jir Jiupenda fagacUaiis, qui prima fuvdamenta po/uit in-ventio^ 
 itum fere omnium, de niiibus promo'vendis atas nojlra gloriatur, 
 Hift. des Math, par Montucla. • Part I. liv. iv. \ 5. 
 
 ton's
 
 SECf. t. <)J Cenliis. Jt.^ 
 
 ton's enquiries concerning bodies the moft 
 fubtle or the moft remote, feem to demand an 
 acutenefs and compafs of invention, which 
 we might pronounce adequate to all the invef- 
 ligations of Bacon, though his difcoveries in 
 mathematics, perfed:]y original, were not ex- 
 tant, to give a fandtion to the judgment. 
 
 Nay, it is obfervable that, if the firft trial 
 was left very imperfeft, it may diicover lefs 
 invention, than is exerted afterwards in per- 
 feding the art ; and that, in this cafe, he who 
 perfcds the art is acknowleged to poflefs ad- 
 mirable genius, while the hrft attempts are 
 difregarded, and the very names of thofe who 
 made them, totally forgotten. They who 
 made the firft eftays in painting, only circum** 
 fcribed their figures with a fmgle line: their 
 works and themfelves were foon buried in 
 oblivion. Their immediate fucceilors in the 
 art, added but a few other lines by vvay of 
 fliading ; Cleophantus firft daubed the figures 
 "Vvith a fmgle colour, laid on every where 
 alike : but neither have thefe acquired fame (/.?). 
 
 [h^ Alii apud Sicyonem, alii apud Corinthios repertam 
 {afHrmant piclarani] umbra honiii)is lineis ci re u nod u eta ; ita- 
 que talem primam fuifTe: fecundam fingulis coloribus, et 
 monochromaton di<^iam, poflquam opc-rolicr inventa erat: 
 duratque talis etiam nunc. Inventam hnearem dicunt a Phi- 
 
 C % By
 
 'zo The Province and Criterion Part I. 
 
 By fuch trifling inventions, though original, 
 they did not manifeft a degree of genius, 
 which any advantages could have rendered 
 fufficient for the difcoveries that were after- 
 w^ards made. Cimon is fald to have invented 
 the varying of the attitudes, and to have 
 greatly improved the art of giving relief to 
 the figures ; and Paneus to have been the firfl 
 who painted hiftory (2). Polygnotus intro- 
 duced expreflion into the countenances of his 
 figures, and made confiderable improvements 
 in the drapery [h). Thefe were important 
 
 lode ^gyptio, tel Cleanthe Corinthio. Primi exercuere Ar- 
 dices Corinthius et Telephantes Sicyonius, line ullo etiam- 
 num colore, jam tamen fpargentes lineas intus. Ideo et quos 
 pingerent afcribere inftitutum. Primus invenit eas colorare, 
 tefta (ut ferunt) trita, Cleophantus Corinthius. Plin. Nat. 
 Hijl. lib. XXXV. cap. 3. Other authors give the fame account of 
 the rudenefs of the firll attempts in painting. "Otc vtv^c^ito n 
 
 Tw? oicot. ari^vaq Bixoc^ov ra fua, wr= i'7Tr/fa<pnv civro'i'<; rot;; ypa^saf, 
 Tovro l3ouc^ iKtho 'iTfiToc, Totno oii/ofov, AIAIAN. Trotx. h"o^» /3»b» ». 
 
 (/■) Eumarum Athenienfem figuras omnes imitari aufum : 
 quique inventa ejus excoluerit, Cimonem Cleoneum. Hie 
 cataglypha invenit; hoc eft obliquas imagines, et varix for- 
 mare vultus, refpicientes, fufpicientes, ec defpicientes : arti- 
 culis etiam memb.a diilinxit, venas protulit, prasterque in 
 vefte rugas et finus invenit. Paneus quidem frater Phiduc 
 etiam proelium Athenienfium adverfus Perfas, apud Maratho- 
 nem faftum pinxit. Pl:k. ib, cap. 8. 
 
 (/(•) Polygnotus Thafius, qui primus mulieres lacida vefle 
 pinxit, capita earum miris verlicoloribusoperuit, plurimumquc 
 piHura; primus contulit : fiquidem inltituit os adaperire, den- 
 ies oltendere, vultum ab aniiquo rigore variare. Plin. ib. 
 cap. 9. 
 
 inventions,
 
 Sect. I. of Genius, 2i 
 
 inventions, and are acknowlegecl to be proofs 
 of genius in the authors of them; yet, be- 
 caufe they carried not thefe improvements to 
 a great degree of perfcdlion, their genius has 
 fcarce been fo highly celebrated by moft 
 judges as that of feveral who fucceeded 
 them (/), and pradifed the art in fo maflerly 
 a way as to fatisfy tafte, and excite admira- 
 tion [ill]. Such were Zeuxis, who difcovered 
 the proper difpofition of light and fhade, and 
 rofe above his contemporaries in all the excel- 
 lencies of painting which had been till then 
 attempted («); Parrhafius, v,'ho firft intro- 
 duced exacSlnefs of proportion, livelinefs of 
 expreffion, and elegance in the outlines (oj; 
 
 (/) Omnes hi jam illuftres : non tamen in quibus harrere 
 expofitio debeat, feilinans ad lumina artis : in quibus primus 
 refulfit ApoUodorus Athenienfis. Hie primus fpecies expri- 
 Diere inllituit, primufque gloriam penicillo jure contulit. 
 Neque ante eum tabula uliius oftenditur, qua; teneat oculos. 
 lb. 
 
 {m) Zeuxis, Aglaaphon, Apclles; neque eorum quifquam 
 eft, cui quidquam in arte fua dcefle videatur. Cic. de Or at. 
 lib. iii. 
 
 (k) Zeuxim, qui turn longe ceteris excellere pi6iorib>is 
 exiftimabatur. Cic. de In'vent. lib. ii. Audentem jam ali- 
 quid penicillum ad magnam gloriam perduxit. — Aptem ipfis 
 ablatam Zeuxin ferre Tecura. Plin. ib. 
 
 (o) Primi, quorum quidem opera non vetuftatis modo gra- 
 tia vifenda funt, clari piclores fuiire dicuntur Polygnotus 
 atque Aglaophon, quorum fimplcx color tarn fui lludiofos 
 adhuc habet, ut ilia prope rudia, ac velut futurse mox artis 
 
 C 3 Timanthcs,
 
 22 The Province and C?^iierion Part T. 
 
 Timanthcs. who was diflinguillied by the art 
 of making; his pictures to luggeft more than 
 the pencil could exprefs (^). Such w^ere flill 
 mere eminently the next race of painters, 
 who perfeded the art f^) ; Apelles, who 
 ftands unrivalled in the gracefulnefs and 
 iinifhed beauty of his w^orks (r) ; Protogenesi 
 
 pnmordia, maxlmis qui pofr eos cxtiterunt authoribus praefe- 
 rantur, proprio qucdam intelligendi (ut mea fert opinio) ambit u. 
 Port Zeuxis atque Parrhafius non multum zetate dillantes— — 
 plurimum arti addiderunt. Quorum prior luminum umbra- 
 rumque inveni/Te rationem, fecundus examinafle fubtilius 
 lineas traditur. — Ita circunifcripiit omnia, ut eum legumlato- 
 rem vocent. Q;;int. /«/?. Orat. lib. xii. cap. lo. Parrha- 
 fius — et ipfe muka confiiruit. Primus et f, mmetriam pifturaj 
 dedir, primus argutias vultu?, et elegantiam capilli, et venu- 
 flatem oris, conieflione artificum in lineis extremis palmam 
 adeptus. Flik. ib, cap. lo. 
 
 (/) Timanthi vel plurimi afTuit ingenii. Ejus enim efl: 
 Iphigenia oratorum laudibus celebrata, &c. Et in omnibus 
 ejus operibus intelligitur plus Temper quam pingitur, et cum 
 ars fumma fit, ingenium tanien ultra artem ell. Flik. ib. 
 Operienda funt quxdam, five ofiendi non debent, five expri- 
 mi prodignitate non poffunt, ut fecit Timanthes, &c. Quint, 
 Inji. Orat. lib, ii. cap. 14. 
 
 {q) Similis in pidura ratio efl:, in qua Zeuxim, et Polyg- 
 notum, et Timanthe.m, et eorum qui non funt ufi plus quam 
 quatuor coloribus, formas et lineamenta laudamus. At in 
 Actione, Nicomacho, Proiogene, Apelle, jam perfeda funt 
 omnia. Cic. Brut. 
 
 (r) Veru.n et omnes prius genitos futurofque poftea fupe- 
 ravit Apelles. — Prascipua ejus in arte venuftas fuit, &c. 
 Pi.iN. ib. Jngenio et gratia, quam ipfe in fe maxime jaftat, 
 Apelles efl: priflantilTimus. Qi'ikt. InJi. Orat, lib. xii. 
 cap. 10. Nemo pidlor — inventus qui Veneris earn partem, 
 quam Apelles inchoatam reliquiffet abfolveret, oris enin^ 
 pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi fpem auferebat. Cic, 
 ^i Off. lib. iii. Plin, jb* 
 
 whofe
 
 Sect. I. of Genius, 23 
 
 whofe only blemlfli was too much labour ( j ) ; 
 Amphion and Afcleplodorus, the former of 
 whom Apelles preferred to himfelf, for regu- 
 lar diftribution, and the latter for correctnefs 
 of proportion (^); Ariftides, who was perfed 
 in exprefling the paffions and affedlons of 
 the foul {u) ; Nicias, who is celebrated for 
 his fkilful didribution of light and fhade, and 
 the reUef of his pictures [nj], Quintilian feems 
 indeed to give the preference, in point of ge- 
 nius, to the painters who immediately pre* 
 ceeded Zeuxis ; but it is becaufcj in his judg- 
 ment, they difplayed moil: invention (.x). The 
 fame obfervation which is thus exemplified 
 
 ( J ) TlcuroyivYiq o ^uyfx.foi; tow IxTwcrc!/ (pjcs'iv, Itttx 'met o^xTiKuti 
 yM^puv tlsTsAiO-jv, ^Ov 'AiriXKriq l^uv. To f^iv ■TTfuiTov 'im a^uiwi^y 
 iX9t'\a,TTi7<; iirl t7i Trapa^o'^w S;«. 'Eitb Aiiiouv 'i<pny xctl o.'srJyo? [A,syxqt 
 
 Ty'voi, ttJmj wjt'jV tov Ivacivav ■^xiktu- AIAIAN. ttodc. irop, pit. 
 
 4?. xi(p. [AX. Et aliajTi gloriam ufurpavit [Apelle?,] cum Pro- 
 tagenls opus iminenfi laboiis ac cura^ fupra iTio4um anxice mi- 
 raretur. Dixit enim omnia fibi cum illo paria efTe, aut illi 
 nieliora ; fed uno i"e prssftare, quod manum ille de tabula 
 nefciret tolJere. Puik. ib. Cura, Frotogenes — pra^ftantiffi- 
 mus. Quint, ib. 
 
 (/) Nee debebat Amphioni de difpnfitione, ncc Afclepio- 
 doro de menfuils. Plin. ib. Eadcm ajtate Afclepiodorus fuit, 
 cjnein in fymmetria mirabatur Apelles. Ib, 
 
 (u) Squalls ejus fuJt Aiillides Thebanus. Is omnium 
 primus aniraumpinxit, et fcnAis cmnes cxprefiit. Plin. ib. 
 
 (tj) Biligentiffime mulieres pinxit. Lumen et umbras cu- 
 ifiodivit, atque ut eminerent e tabulis pidura;, maximc cura- 
 vir, &c. Plin. ib. cap. ii. 
 
 ix) See Note (o), above. 
 
 C 4 in
 
 24 The Province and Criterion Part I. 
 
 jn the beginnings of painting, might be con- 
 firmed from the fate of the firft pra(!^itioner3 
 in every art. Both the works and the genius 
 of the nrfl fculptors, were defpifed in after- 
 a^es, while Polycletus, Phidias, Euphranor, 
 and others, who, improving on their eflays, 
 rofe to excellence, were held in veneration [y). 
 Scarce one of the poets who preceded Homer, 
 is mentioned by ancient authors (z). No 
 work of any tragedian older than iEfchylus, 
 has been thought worth preferving ; and 
 though the name of Thefpis is not forgotten, 
 he is m.entioned rather with contempt for the 
 
 O) Q^^s enim eorum, qui ha'c minora a nim advert unt, 
 non intelligit, Canachi ligna rigidiora efle, quam ut imitentur 
 veritatem ? Calamidis dura ilia quidem, fed tamen moUiora 
 quam Canachi. Nondiim Myronis fatis ad veritatem adducla, 
 jam tamen quje non dubites pnlchra dicere, Pulchriora etiam 
 Polycleti, et jam plane perfeda, ut mitii quidem^ videre folent. 
 Cic. Erut.—?W\d\?i fimulacris, quibus nihil in illogenere 
 pcrfeftius videmus. Orat. Nam duriora et Tufcanicis prox- 
 jma Calon atque Egefias, jam minus rigida Calamis, molliora 
 adhuc fupra didis Myron fecit. Diligentia et decor in Poly- 
 tleto fuper citteros.— At quce Polycleto defuerunt, Phidis 
 atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus 
 ctftcicndis melior artifex traditur : in ebore vero longe citra 
 xmulum. Q^.iNT. In/l. Orat lib. xii. cap. lo. Euphrano- 
 rem admirandum facit, quod et caeteris optimus ftudiis inter 
 prxcipuos, et pingendi fingendique idem mirus artifex fuit. 
 Ibid. See alfo Plin. Nat. Uifc. lib. xxxiv. cap. 8. lib, xxxv. 
 pap. II. 
 
 (z) Nee dubitari debet, quin fuerint ante Homerum poetas, 
 quod ex eis carminibus intelligi potett, qu:s apud ilium, ct 
 jn Phxacum, et in procorum epulis canuntur. Cic. Brut. 
 
 rudenefi
 
 Sect. T. r)f Genius] '25 
 
 rudenefs of his eflays, than with edeem, as 
 the inventor of the drama (^). 
 
 It is acknowleged that the Greeks receiv- 
 ed the beginnings cf their knowlege in philo- 
 fophy and mathematics, from the Egyptians ; 
 but there is reafon to fufped, that among the 
 Egyptians, thefe fciences were in a very im- 
 perfed: Hate : it is certain that the earheft 
 Greek philofophers learned, in Egypt, only 
 the firft elements of mathematics. In Greece, 
 the fciences made rapid progrefs, and reached 
 a very high degree of improvement. If the 
 Egyptians were the inventors, this proves 
 them to be ingenious ; but the Greeks fhewed 
 themfelves to pofl'efs fuperiour genius, and 
 are acknovv'legcd to have poflefFed it, for 
 greater invention was necelTary for the perfec- 
 tion to which they rofe. Arts and fciences 
 have been known to the Chinefe for many 
 ages, held in the higheft veneration, and flu- 
 died with great ardor; yet they have not 
 gone beyond the elements of moft of them. 
 This is an evidence that real genius is not 
 frequent among them. They are defedlive in 
 
 {a) Ignotum tragic;^ genus invenifTe Camenas 
 Dicitur, et plauftris vexifTe poemata Thefpls, 
 Qui canerent agerentijue, perundi facibus ora. 
 
 HoR. iirs Poet, ver. zy^, 
 
 invention 5
 
 0.6 The Province and Crltermi Part I, 
 
 invention ; they have fomc lucky ideas, but 
 thev are incapable of purfuing thcni. 
 
 It is worth while to remark, that fome- 
 times we are necelTarily liable to error in 
 comparing the genius of different authors, 
 - from the impolTibility of our afcertaining, in 
 many cafes, the degree of invention which 
 truly belongs to them. At one time we may 
 reckon that original, which is only imitation, 
 or even a fervile copy; at another, what we 
 brand with thefe epithets of reproach, may 
 be really invention. This circumftance is 
 often of peculiar difadvantage to modern au- 
 thors ; and it leads us, perhaps, to afcribe 
 greater genius to the ancients, than they are 
 entitled to. The former are accufed of bor- 
 rowing from their predeceflbrs, many prin- 
 ciples, fcntiments, or images, for which they 
 are indebted folely to their own genius. In 
 the latter, every thing is reckoned oinginal, 
 becaufe we know not, who had occupied it 
 before. We can form no objedion againft 
 the oldeft authors extant, for the works of 
 thofe who wrote before them, are long fnice 
 loft. Ariftotle had not, even in his time, the 
 means of difcovering, in every particular, 
 how far Homer owed the perfections of his 
 i worksj
 
 Sect. II. of Genius, 27 
 
 works, to the leffons of others, and how far 
 to the excellence of his own genius [b], 
 
 SECT. 11. 
 
 To ijuhat Faculty of the Miiid, Genius froperly 
 
 belongs, 
 
 SINCE invention is the infallible crite- 
 rion of Genius, we cannot hetter invefti- 
 gate the nature of Genius, than by enquiring, 
 what power of the mind it is, that qualifies 
 a man for invention ? Invention is the capa- 
 city of producing nevv^ beauties in works of 
 art, and new truths in matters of fcience; 
 tvhich can be accomplifiied only by affembling 
 ideas in various pofitions and arrangements, 
 that we may obtain uncommon views of 
 them. Our intelledual powers, fo far as it 
 is neceflary to confider them at prefent, may 
 be reduced to four ; Senfe, Memory, Imagi- 
 nation, and Judgment. By recollecting the 
 proper offices of thefe, we fhall be abk to de- 
 termine, from which of them Genius derives 
 its origin. 
 
 {h) Speaking of the entire unity of Homer's fables, he 
 leaves it undetermined, wlietlier he was 'dife*Eted in this by 
 inftrudion, or by his own natural parts : nroi ^(« tiX^r.v, n ^'» 
 
 3ense
 
 28 To "juhat Faculty J Part L 
 
 Sense only perceives thofe objedls which 
 are really exiftent, and adually exhibited to 
 the mind. It can, therefore, lead us to no 
 difcovery beyond the objects that happen, in 
 the courfe of nature, to occur to it. It can- 
 not carry us a ftep farther than the real things 
 which prefent themfelves to its notice at any 
 one individual moment. Its fphere is' thus 
 by much too narrow, to render it the parent 
 of invention [c]. 
 
 Memory is confined to a review of thofe 
 objects which have once been prefent to fenfe. 
 It gives a fort of duration to the perceptions 
 which fenfe has conveyed, but it can create 
 no new perceptions. Like a mirrour, it re- 
 flects faithful images of the obje<3:s formerly 
 perceived by us, but can exhibit no form with 
 which it is not in this manner fupplied. It 
 is in its nature a mere copier ; it preferves 
 fcrupuloufly the very pofition and arrange- 
 ment of the original fenfations, and gives us 
 along with this, a perception of their hav- 
 ing been at fome paft time prefent to the 
 
 (<:) It is obvious that we here ufe the \vori./c>ife in an exten- 
 five meaning, fo as to include not only the external lenfes, 
 but alfo that internal fenfe or confcioufncff, by which we 
 attend to the operations of our own minds. 
 
 mind.
 
 Sect. II. Genhis belongs. 29 
 
 mind [d). It is thus precifely the reverfe of 
 invention. 
 
 Imagination is much lefs confined in its 
 operations. Even when it exerts ittelf in the 
 fimpleft manner, when it feems only to pre- 
 fent ideas unattended with remembrance, it 
 in fome degree difplays its creative power. 
 It does not, like memory, profefTedly copy 
 its ideas from preceding perceptions of fenfe, 
 nor refer them to any prior archetypes. It 
 exhibits them as independent exiftences pro- 
 duced by itfelf. It may be queftioned, whe- 
 ther, in fome very pecuUar cafes, its power 
 extends not even to the formation of a fimple 
 idea [e]. But it is certain that, when it only 
 exhibits fimple ideas which have been deriv- 
 ed from the fenfes, it confers fomething ori- 
 ginal upon them, by the manner in which it 
 exhibits them. Light and heat are ideas 
 
 («) 'OiiT£ yd-f TO iA.i7<Kov h^s^nxt fA.vnit,onvnv, a>.\ t'rt ^o^ocrlv kx\ 
 E/vOTr"' — ovTi TGu TrapMToj, a.>X «VaSv5rK' TatT>) yua ovn to /LtsA- 
 A&y, Q-JTi TO yiiioiA.2vov yvufl^oj^vj, aAAx to vaclv (aovov. 'H ^l uy,;u,r., 
 lov ysvifAVjov. To ci -ttsl^Iv c't£ Trajrsns'j otcv roTt to T'.ivkov on Ifrt, 
 ovQuq u-j (pciir, [,u:;ij,0'jcvtv, ovh to S££i.-fov|y<,£;o>, Bswcuv xui vouv, oc\>A to 
 ^Ev «icrSavr3-S;ci <p-i)ai, to o-TiriTucrBxi yi^ovyj. "Otci-j Ti cinv tuv hio- 
 ynuva-)(r) Ttir i7riry;y.r,v r.a.) Tr,v a'i^5r,a-iv, o^Vi) /xEftvv^Tat Ta; TotJ TpyJ- 
 vouj oTi duo ofcaTj iaati' to f^h^ ot» £fA.i)i.Bif *> i^iucricri, to ^e, oTt 
 viKovaiv, Yi en niiv, r> T4 Totovroi'' on yup urcn iJi^yn Kxra to u-jr/^ti- 
 
 ivoriS-Bv. API2T0T. Tnpt fArofji,. 
 
 (f) Treatife on Hum. Nat, 
 
 which
 
 30 To ivhat Faculty, Part I, 
 
 which memory retains exadlly at all times, 
 and whenever we pleafe, we can recoUedt oyr 
 having formerly perceived them by our fenfes. 
 But imagination can prelent thefe ideas, not 
 as copies, but as originals. We often form 
 them in a cold day, or in a dark night, with- 
 out refledting on our having perceived them 
 before; and confider them only as objeO:s 
 which would be agreeable at prefent, or 
 which we may hereafter experience. 
 
 Imagination isftill more inventive in all 
 its other operations. It can lead us from a 
 perception that is prefent, to the view of 
 many more, and carry us through extenfive, 
 diftant, and untrodden fields of thought. It 
 can dart in an inftant, from earth to heaven, 
 and from heaven to earth ; it can run with 
 the greateft eafe and celerity, through the 
 whole compafs of nature, and even beyond its 
 utmoft limits. It can tranfpofe, vary, and 
 compound our perceptions into an endlefs 
 variety of forms, fo as to produce numberlefs 
 combinations that are wholly new (f). Even 
 
 (/) Quas eft enihi forma tarn inufitata, tam nulla, quam 
 Tion fibi ipfe animus pofiit effingere ? ut, qua; numquam vidi- 
 mus, ea tamen formata habearnus, oppidorum litus, hominum 
 figuras. — Nihil eft cnini, de quo cogiure nequcamus. Cic. 
 tie di'vinat. lib. ii.
 
 Sect. II. Genius belongs, 31 
 
 in Ileep, when the fenfes are locked up, and 
 when the exercife of memory is totally fuf- 
 pended, imagination eminently difplays its 
 inventive force ; which is then fo great, that 
 " the flow of fpeech make unpremeditated 
 harangues, or converfe readily in languages 
 that they are but little acquainted with ; the 
 grave abound in pleafantries, the dull in re- 
 partees and points of wit. There is not a 
 more painful adion of the mind, than inven- 
 tion ; yet in dreams it works wdth that eafe 
 and adivity that we are not fenfible when 
 the faculty is employed, and we read without 
 flop or hefitation, letters, books, or papers, 
 which are merely the inflantaneous fuggef- 
 tions of our own imaginations (^).'* 
 
 To the imagination, invention is accord- 
 ingly referred, even by the generality of 
 mankind. If a poet or an orator only repeat 
 the fentiments of others, or be unable to 
 illuflrate his fubjed with proper images, in- 
 
 {g) See Spectator, No. 487. Anlmorum eft ea vis, at- 
 que natura, ut vigeant vigilantes, nullo adventitio pulfu, 
 fed fuo motu, inciedibili quadam celeritate. Hi cum fufli- 
 nentur snembris, et corpore, et lenfibus, omnia cerciora 
 cernunt, cogitant, fentiuiit. Cum autem hsc fubtrafia funt, 
 defertufque animus languore corporis, turn agicatur ipfe per 
 ieie. Jtaqac in co et forma; verfantur, et adiones ; et multa 
 ar.diri, mukadici videntur, Qic. de divinat, lib, ii. 
 
 cldents,
 
 32 To ijuh at Faculty^ PartL 
 
 cidents, characters, or obfervations, every 
 perfon imputes this defed: of invention, to 
 the barrennefs of his fancy. All genuine 
 productions in the arts, are marked with 
 flrong fignatures of a bright and lively imagi^ 
 nation : and every original work in fcience, 
 will be found, on examination, to proclaim a 
 force and vigour of the fame power, though 
 the traces of it may not be fo obvious at firfl 
 view. Imagination is, therefore, a fource of 
 invention. Whether it be the only fource, 
 will appear immediately. 
 
 Judgment, in which we comprehend rea* 
 fin, from the comparifon of ideas and fenfa- 
 tions, difcovers relations which are not the 
 objeds of fenfe. But many fubjeCts admit of 
 the moft copious invention, where the things 
 invented are^not relations. Whatever influ- 
 ence, therefore, judgment may have in fome 
 kinds of invention, and however neceffary for 
 perfecting the operations of Genius in every 
 kind, its affiftance may be, it cannot be reck- 
 oned properly the inventive pov/er, as there 
 are many objects of invention, to which it 
 has not an immediate refpeCt. Befides, even 
 in fcience, where relations arc what we want 
 to difcover, judgment cannot fearch out or 
 
 bring
 
 Sect. ir. Genhis belongs. 35 
 
 bring into view, the perceptions that are to 
 be compared. They muft be fuggefted by 
 fome other power, as we have occalion for 
 them ; and till they are fuggefted, judgment 
 has nothing about which it may employ itfelf ; 
 it muft remain inadive, and can make no 
 comparifon or deduction. Its fole bufmefs is, 
 to obferve the relations of thofe perceptions 
 with which it is fupplicd by fenfe, memory, 
 or imagination, and to produce convidion by 
 its exertion. 
 
 Of all the kinds of judgment, rcafon has 
 moft the appearance of an inventive power, 
 as it not only perceives the connexion of the 
 feveral parts of a proof, but alfo infers the 
 conclufion from all the parts together. Mr. 
 Locke analyfes realon into two powers. Saga- 
 city, and Illation; and afcribes to it four 
 different exeixifes. " The firft and higheffc 
 *' degree of reafon, fays he, is the difcover- 
 *' ing and finding out of proofs ; the fecond, 
 *' the regular and methodical difpofition of 
 " them, and laying them in a clear and fit 
 " order, to make their connexion and force 
 *' be plainly and eafily perceived \ the third 
 " is, the perceiving their connexion ; and 
 *' the fourth, a making a right concUi- 
 
 D ^ " fion."
 
 34 To ivh at Faculty <i Part I, 
 
 " fion {h)y He might have juftly given 
 this as an enumeration of all the fteps which 
 the mind takes in the difcovery of new con- 
 clufions : But they are not all to be afcribed 
 to reafon. The firft of them, the finding out 
 of ideas or experiments which may ferve for 
 proofs, is the province, not of reafon, but of 
 imagination. It is imagination likewife, that 
 Can be moft properly faid to order and difpofe 
 the proofs. It arranges them in a certain 
 difpofition ; then reafon furveys them, and 
 examines, whether this difpofition is fuch as 
 can enable it to perceive their connexion. If 
 it does not, reafon rejeds that difpofition ; 
 and imagination is again fet a working, ar- 
 ranges them in a different manner, and con- 
 tinues to vary the difpofition, till it either 
 fuggefts one which reafon finds fufficient for 
 its purpofe, or till, after having wandered 
 through all the arrangements of its materials 
 that occur to it, it is wearied with the repeti- 
 tion of unfuccefsful attempts, and gives over 
 the work as defperate and imprad:icable. The 
 difpofition, therefore, of the proofs muft be 
 afcribed to imagination, though reafon always 
 
 {h) EfTay concerning Human Underflanding. B. iv. c. 17, 
 
 follows
 
 Sect. II. Genius belongs, 35 
 
 follows in its foot-fleps, keeps pace with it, 
 and recalls it when it has made an ufelefs ex- 
 cuiTion. It follows, that the two lafl opera- 
 tions which Locke afTigns to reafon, are the 
 only ones which properly and ftridly belong 
 to it. Its bufinefs is, to perceive the connex- 
 ion or force of the proofs, after they are dif- 
 covercd and arranged ; and from the whole 
 train of them to infer a jufl conclufion. This 
 is performed by every man who learns a 
 fcience from the writings or Infcrudiions of 
 others. It muft be performed before a per- 
 fon can comprehend a demonflration in Eu- 
 clid, or the proof of any conclufion in philo- 
 fophy. It implies, not genius, but mere 
 capacity ; and is daily accomplifhed by mul- 
 titudes who are not able to make any original 
 difcovery in the fciences. Indeed, without 
 this, no invention in fcience can be compkat- 
 ed ; but without an imagination capable of 
 finding out and ordering the proofs, no inven- 
 tion could be even begun. The chief difR- 
 culty in inventing new truths, regards that 
 part which is the work of imagination, the 
 difcovering of fit intermediate ideas, or appo- 
 fite experiments, and the difpofing of them 
 in fuch a manner that they may lead to juft 
 
 D 2 and
 
 36 To ivhat Faculty^ Part I'. 
 
 and important conclufions. It is this that 
 requires genius, and is regarded as its proper 
 province. The reft demands, not invention, 
 but the fame abilities which are necefTary for 
 apprehending the difcoveries of other men. 
 A perfon may be able to perceive, with the 
 greatest eafe and certainty, the connexion 
 and force of proofs which are prefented to 
 him in due order, who could not have con- 
 trived or arranged thefe proofs. He may 
 poflefs reafon in perfection, and yet be totally 
 deftilute of invention, originality, and ge- 
 nius [i). 
 
 From thefe obfervations, it would appear, 
 that genius of every kind derives its imme- 
 diate origin from the imagination. Mere 
 imagination, it is true, will not conftitute 
 genius. If fancy were left entirely to itfelf, 
 it would run into wild caprice and extrava- 
 gance, unworthy to be called invention. A 
 
 (/) In this enumeration, we have not mentioned tap, a 
 f.culty which confelTedly has great influence on genius. The 
 reafons will readily occur. It influences only ibme kinds of 
 genius, not all the kiiids but we have here confined ourfelves 
 to the confideration of genius in general. Taile is not a fini- 
 ple, but a derived faculty. In refpeft of its principles, it is 
 a compound of judgment and internal fenfe ; (EJay on Tajie^ 
 part Jl. fed. 2.) and its efFeds on genius refemble, fome- 
 tinies thofc of the one of thefe powers,, and fomeumes thofe 
 of the other, 
 
 raaa
 
 5ect. II. Genms belongs. 37 
 
 man who throws out indlgefted notions, 
 contradidory pofitlons, trite and vulgar kn^ 
 timents, or foolifh whimlies, is not faid to 
 have invented them, but is rather blamed for 
 not having avoided them. As fancy has an 
 indirect dependence both on fenfe and me- 
 mory, from which It receives the firft ele- 
 ments of all its conceptions, fo when it exerts 
 itfelf in the way of genius, it has an imme- 
 diate connexion with judgment, which muft 
 conftantly attend it, and corredt and regulate 
 its fuggefllons. This connexion Is fo inti- 
 mate, that a man can fcaixe be faid to have 
 invented till he has exercifed his judgment {k). 
 But ftlll it is true that imagination invents, 
 and judgment only fcrutinizes and determines 
 concerning what it has invented. It is ima- 
 gination that produces genius ; the other in- 
 telledual faculties lend their afliftance to rear 
 the offspring of imagination to maturity. It 
 is alfo true, that in matters of fpeculation, 
 imagination refigns its difcoveries into the 
 hands of reafon, fooner than in the arts, and 
 leaves it more to finifli. Yet it always fup- 
 
 {k) Ego porro ne invenifle quidem credo eum, qui non ju- 
 dicavit : nee enim contraria, communia, ilulta invenifTe 
 dicitur quifquam, fed non vitafle. Quint. ////?. Orat. lib. iii, 
 cap. 3. 
 
 D 3 plie&
 
 38 To zvhat Faculty, Part I. 
 
 plies the fubjedt on which reafon is to work. 
 Without judgment, imagination would be 
 extravagant; but without imagination, judg- 
 ment could do nothing. A bright and vigo- 
 rous imagination joined with a very moderate 
 judgment, will produce genius, incorred:, it 
 may be, but fertile and extenfive : but the 
 niceft judgment unattended with a good ima- 
 gination, cannot bcftow a fingle fpark of 
 genius. It will form good fenfe, it will en- 
 able a man to perceive every defeat and error 
 in the difcoveries of others ; but it cannot 
 qualify him for fupplying thefe defeats, or 
 for being himfelf the author of any new in^ 
 yention. A man of mere judgment, is effen- 
 tially different from a man of genius. The 
 former can employ his reafon only on fubjeds 
 that are provided by others ; but the latter 
 can provide fubjeds for himfelf. This abi- 
 lity is owing folely to his poffefling a com- 
 prehenfive imagination, which the former 
 wants. 
 
 It is the imagination, therefore, with its 
 operations and laws, that we muft efpecially 
 examine, in order to explain the nature of 
 Genius. The other faculties which affift it, 
 particularly judgment, which is more inti- 
 mately
 
 Sect. II. Genius belongs. 3q 
 
 mately connedled with it than any of the reft, 
 will need to be confidered, but are to be re- 
 garded only in a fecondary view. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 Hoiv Genius arifes from the Imagination, 
 
 WHEN memory prefents ideas, it an- 
 nexes to them a convidion that the 
 ideas themfelves, or the objeds from v^'hich 
 they are copied, were formerly perceived ; 
 and it exhibits the ideas in the fame form and 
 order in which the things themfelves appear- 
 ed. In time remembrance fails, ideas are 
 perceived without being referred to any prior 
 fenfations of their originals, the order of the 
 parts is forgotten. But even then, ideas do 
 not lie in the mind without any connexion or 
 dependence. Imagination can conne6t them 
 by new relations. It knits them together by 
 other ties than what connected the real things 
 from which they are derived ; and often be- 
 llows an union upon ideas whofe archetypes 
 had no relation. In this operation, it is far 
 from being capricious or irtegular, but for 
 the moft part obferves general and eflablifhcd 
 
 D 4 rules.
 
 ^o Hoiv Genius arifes Part I. 
 
 rules. There are certain qualities which ei- 
 ther really belong, or at lead are fuppoied to 
 belong to all the ideas that are ailbciated by 
 the imagination. Thefe qualities muft be 
 confidered as, by the conftitution of our na- 
 ture, rendering ideas fit to be aiTooiated. It 
 is impoffible to give a reafon, why thefe qua- 
 lities unite ideas : it is not neceflary at pre- 
 fent to explain particularly what they are. 
 Experience informs us, that the influence of 
 aflbciation is very great. By means of it, 
 multitudes of ideas originally diftindt and un- 
 conneded, rife always in company, fo that 
 one of them cannot make its appearance, 
 without introducing all the reft. On this 
 account, human thought is perfectly reftlefs. 
 It requires no labour to run from one idea to 
 Others. We have fo great a propenfity to do 
 it, that no refolution has force enough to re- 
 ftrain us from it, nor will the ftrongeft efforts 
 be able to confine us long to the contempla- 
 tion of a fmgle idea. We are inceffantly 
 looking round to every fide, without intend- 
 ing it ; we employ ourfelves about many ob- 
 jects, almoft at the fame inftant (/). Nay, 
 
 (/) Niiiira bumani inger.ii it's eft cgllis et velox, fic in 
 cmncm partem, ut ita dixeriirj, fpe(!-tat, uc ne poflit quidem 
 ^liquid agvYCj tantum unum, in plura vero, non eodem die 
 
 aflbciatioa
 
 Sect. III. frorn the Imagination. 41 
 
 aflbciation is often fo ftrong, that it beftows a 
 fort of cohefion on feveral feparate ideas, and 
 makes them flart up in niimberlefs combina- 
 tions, many of them different from every 
 form which the fenfes have perceived ; and 
 thus produces a new creation. In this ope- 
 ration of the imagination, its affociating 
 power, we fliall, on a careful examination, 
 difcover the origin of genius. 
 
 Association being an operation of fancy, 
 common to all men, fome of its effeds are 
 univerfal. In every individual, it difplays 
 itfelf in many inftances. Not to mention 
 fuch cafes as are totally unconneded with our 
 prefent fubje^t, fcarce any perlbn is fo ftupid, 
 as not to have fometime in his life, produced 
 a bright tiafh of imagination, though fur- 
 rounded, it may be, with a wide extent of 
 darknefs. But fuch tranfient blazes do not 
 neceffarily imply real genius. It is fomething 
 more permanent and uniform. It requires a 
 peculiar vigour of affociation. In order to 
 produce it, the imagination muft be compre* 
 henfive, regular, and adive. 
 
 jnodo, fed eodem temporis -momento vim fuam impendat. 
 Quint, hijl. Oral. lib. i. cap. zo, 
 
 'J Genius
 
 42 How Genius arijes Part I. 
 
 Genius implies fuch comprehejifi'venefs of 
 imagination as enables a man, on every occa- 
 fion, to call in the conceptions that are necef- 
 fary for executing the defigns or compleating 
 the works in which he engages. This takes 
 place, when the affociating principles are 
 ftrong, and fit for ading in an extenfive 
 fphere. If they be weak, they will call in 
 memory to their aid. Unable to guide our 
 fteps in an unknown country, they keep in 
 the roads to which we have been accuftomed ; 
 and are directed in fuggefting ideas, by the 
 connexions which we remember. Every pro- 
 dudtion of a man who labours under this de- 
 bility of niind, bears evident marks of barren- 
 nefs, a quality more oppofite to true genius 
 than any other. Nothing appears in it un- 
 common or new; every thing is trite and 
 unoriginal. Or, if he attempts to quit the 
 beaten path, and ftart new game, he can 
 find out but a few ideas, he is exhaufted by a 
 Ihort excurfion, and mufl either make a flop, 
 or return to the tracks of memory. Induftry 
 endeavouring, in this manner, to fupply the 
 want of a copious imagination, by accurate 
 remembrance or diligent obfervation, will 
 produce, inftead of a philofopher, a devoted 
 
 follower.
 
 Sect. III. from the Imagination, 43 
 
 follower, or a dull laborious commentator; 
 inftead of a poet, a fervile imitator, or a 
 painful tranflator. But when the aflbciating 
 principles are vigorous, imagination, confci- 
 ous as it were of its own ftrength, failles 
 forth, without needing fupport or afking 
 afiiftance, into regions hitherto unexplored, 
 and penetrates into their remotefl: corners, 
 unfatigued with the length of the way. la 
 a man of genius, the power of afTociation is 
 fo great, that when any idea is prefent to his 
 mind, it immediately leads him to the con- 
 ception of thofe that are connected with it. 
 No fooner almoft is a defign formed, or the 
 hint of a fubjedl ftarted, than all the ideas 
 which are requifite for compleating it, ruih 
 into his view as if they were conjured up by 
 the force of magic. His daring imagination 
 traverfes all nature, and colleds materials fit 
 for his purpofe, from all the moft diftant 
 corners of the unlverfe; and prefents them 
 at the very inftant when they become ufeful 
 or neceflary. In confequence of this, he 
 takes in a comprehenfive view of every fub- 
 je£t to which his genius is adapted. 
 
 Thus, when the aflbciating principles arc 
 ftrong and have an extenfive influence, they 
 
 naturally
 
 44 Honv Genius arifes Part T, 
 
 naturally form, in proportion to the degree 
 of their ftrength, that boundlefs fertility, that 
 inexhauftible copioufnefs of invention, which 
 is not only one necefiary ingredient in true 
 genius, but the firft and moft effential con- 
 ftituent of it. The fmalleft production will 
 in fome meafure difcover, in what extent this 
 power is poffefTed. A work of real genius 
 always proclaims, in the cleareft manner, 
 that immenfe quantities of materials have 
 been collected by fancy, and fubjedted to the 
 author's choice. There is no particular, per- 
 haps, in the works of Homer, that has been 
 more univerfally remarked and admired, 
 than the prodigious compafs of imagination, 
 which thev fhow. His penetration has gain- 
 ed him accefs to all the magazines of ideas, 
 and enabled him to draw materials from every 
 part of nature, and from the. whole circle of 
 human arts. Knowlege of them was pre- 
 requiiite, but could have been of no fervice 
 after it was obtained, without the livelieft 
 fancy, fuggefting them readily, and applying 
 them on fuitable occafions. A comprehenfive 
 imagination gave Newton fo great command 
 over the natural and the intelledual world, 
 that, in his philofophical enquiries, he miffes 
 
 no
 
 Sect. III. from the ImaginaUon, 4.^ 
 
 no experiment which is neceflary for pro- 
 moting his inveftigation, and, in his mathe- 
 matical refearches, difcovers every idea which 
 can be a proper medium for inferring his 
 conclufion, and includes in his problems 
 almoft every cafe that can occur. 
 
 This extenfive compafs of thought enables 
 a man to derive from his own treafure, what 
 they who want it, are indebted for to the 
 works of others. He who poflefleth a fertile 
 imagination, is under no necefTity of arrogat- 
 ing to himfelf the difcoveries of others, or of 
 adorning his own produdtions with the beau- 
 ties which he has pilfered from them. He 
 will not decline to ufe, on proper occafions, 
 the inventions of his predeceflbrs, either in 
 fcience or in the arts ; but in ufmg them, he 
 will difplay his own genius. He will at leaft 
 preferve the full fpirit of the original, not 
 contented with merely tranfmitting its form : 
 the propriety with which the imitation or the 
 theory is introduced, and the force, with 
 w^hich it is applied, will fhow that it was not 
 merely copied from memory, but appofitely 
 fuggefted by a vigorous imagination : and 
 frequently he will give farther proof of ge- 
 nius, by improving on the borrowed hint, 
 
 by
 
 ^6 Jlonv Genius arifes Part I. 
 
 by adding new beauties, or delivering a known 
 truth with greater elegance and juftnefs. 
 
 Genius implies regularity -, as well as 
 comprehenfiyenefs of imagination. Regula- 
 rity arifes in a great meafure from fuch a turn 
 of imagination as enables the affociating prin- 
 ciples, not only to introduce proper ideas, 
 but alfo to connect the defign of the whole 
 with every idea that is introduced. When 
 the defign is fteddily kept in view, and the 
 mind fo formed as to be ftrongly affected by 
 that aiTociating quality by which the defign 
 is related to the means of executing it, the 
 imagination can fcarce fail of being regular 
 and corred. Any conception that is prefent, 
 will introduce moft readily thofe ideas which 
 are related to the main defign, as well as to 
 itfelf, though there fhould be a thoufand 
 others bearing the fame relation to itfelf, but 
 unconneded with the general fubjed. Thefe 
 latter have only one tie, but the former have 
 a double relation, and will therefore rufh into 
 the thoughts with double violence. They 
 will occur and be obfervcd, while the reft ne- 
 ver come into view, or, if they make their 
 appearance, are rejeded fo quickly that we 
 inftantly forget our ever having thought of 
 
 them.
 
 Sect, III. from the Imagination. 47 
 
 them. No fooner does the imagination, in 
 a moment of wandering, fuggeft any idea not 
 conducive to the delign, than the conception 
 of this defign breaks in of its own accord, 
 and, hke an antagonifi mufcle, counteracfling 
 the other affociation, draws us off to the 
 view of a more proper idea. 
 
 In this manner an attachment to the de- 
 fign naturally produces that regularity of 
 imagination, that capacity of avoiding fo- 
 reign, ufelefs, and fuperfluous conceptions, 
 at the fame time that none neceflary or pro- 
 per are pafled by, which is always mofl: per- 
 fect in the greateft geniufes, and conftitutes 
 no inconfiderable part of their excellence* 
 As acutenefs of fmell carries a dog along the 
 path of the game for which he fearches, and 
 fecures him againft the danger of quitting it, 
 upon another fcent: fo this happy ftrudure 
 of imagination leads the man of genius into 
 thofe tracks where the proper ideas lurk, and 
 not only enables him to difcover them, but, 
 by a kiod of inftindtive infallibility, prevents 
 him from turning afide to wander in impro- 
 per roads, or to fpend his time in the con- 
 templation of unappofite ideas. As the bee 
 extrads from fuch flowers as can fupply 
 6 them,
 
 ^8 Hoiv Genius arlfes Part I. 
 
 them, the juices which are proper to he con- 
 verted into honey, without lofing its labour 
 in fipping thofe juices which would be perni- 
 cious, or in examining thofe vegetables which 
 are ufelefs ; fo true genius difcovers at once 
 the ideas which are conducive to its purpofe, 
 without at all thinking of fuch as are unne- 
 cefTary or would obflru£t it. The extent of 
 Homer's imagination is not more remarkable 
 than its regularity. Poets of inferiour genius 
 would have comprehended a hiftory of the 
 Trojan war in one of his poems, and all the 
 events of the life of Ulyfles in the other : 
 but his corred: Imagination admits no detail 
 inconfiftent with the unity of the fable (»z), 
 no fhining epifode that can be deemed uncon- 
 nected with the fubjedl, nor a fmgle image 
 unfuitable to the nature of his work. In the 
 writings of Newton, we fcarce find any ob- 
 fervation that is fuperfluous, any experiment 
 whofe force is fully implied in any other, 
 
 (ot) This is rcmirked particularly by Ariflotle, as one of 
 Homer's chief and diitinguilhing virtues. "O o"' "0//(.v;po? uaire^ x.xi 
 TdOL'KKx ^ixyifih, !t:x,l To'.r huci Kd'Aco^ ioiTv. Oivtranuv/xp TTcmvf ovK 
 tTroiTiCTiv UTra.VTae, oV« aurio a-VK^y'' • u* oioiv BuTioov yivoj^hov, 
 
 w/xynctHov "fiiy ri \iKoc, BxTcpov yit/caBui' otM. a. wsp (jCuxv TTfu^vv, olxr 
 J\iyoyiiv rvv Oovj-atixv, ervvi<-r,aav' hy^o.a^ ii text rr,v l?\ixdx, IJipl 
 •JToinT. Xi<p. y). Ato ut^TTio t'i'JToyuvj iiS'v) X-xl txvtyi Biciri'io; uv (^xn'ift 
 "Oi/LT.poc TTxpx Tcvi a.^>\ov;, Tw f/i>iof Tov Tirohi^ov xxi Trip i^o-jtx OLBymt 
 xat Ti^o;, l7r»p(,£(f/3C-at wour* oAoi'. K, T. A. Xif . Ky%. 
 
 any
 
 Sect. III. from the tmaghiatioii, 49 
 
 any quefllon or problem which has not fome* 
 thing peculiar. 
 
 Neither fertility nor regularity of ima- 
 gination will form a good genius, if the one 
 be disjoined from the other. If fertility be 
 wanting, the corredeft imagination will bd 
 confined within narrow bounds, and will be 
 very flow in its operations ; there can be no 
 penetratiori or copious invention. If regula- 
 rity be abfent, an exuberant invention will 
 lofe itfelf in a wildernefs of its own creation. 
 There is a falfe fertility, which arifes from a 
 difordered and irregular fancy. As the fame 
 idea bears fome relation to an infinite num- 
 ber of other ideas, the aflbciating principles 
 may lead us, after a very few fteps, to fiich 
 ideas as are conne6ted with the laft that was 
 prefent, yet have no connexion either with the 
 former ones, or with the main defign. A 
 man, therefore, who follows any aflbciationj 
 however trivial or devious, that hits his fancy^ 
 may fhow a great deal of imagination without 
 difplaying any real genius. The Imagination 
 produces abundance of glaring, brilliant 
 thoughts ; but not being conducive to any fixt 
 defign, nor organized into one whole, they 
 can be regarded only as an abortion of fancy, 
 
 E not
 
 50 How Genius arifes Part L 
 
 not as the legitimate progeny of genius. A 
 multitude of ideas, collected by fuch an ima- 
 gination, form a confufed chaos, in which in- 
 confiftent conceptions are often mixt, concep- 
 tions fo unfuitable and difproportioned, that 
 they can no more be combined intd one regu- 
 lar work, than a number of wheels taken 
 from different w^atches, can be united into 
 one machine. Were it neceffary to produce 
 inftances of a fruitful imagination unproduc- 
 tive of true genius, we might find enough 
 among thofe pretenders to poetry, who can, 
 through many lines, run from one fhining 
 image to another, and finifh many harmo- 
 nious periods, without any fentiment or de- 
 fign ; or among thofe pretenders to fcience, 
 who can devife a hundred experiments, coin- 
 ciding in all their material circumftances, 
 without a view to any conclufion, and with- 
 out advancing ufeful knowledge afingle ftep. 
 Such imagination is like a tree fo overcharged 
 with fruit, that no part of it can come to full 
 maturity. 
 
 But even when a falfe luxuriance of fancy 
 does not extinguilli true genius, it very much 
 diminifhes its force and beauty. Sometimes 
 it overloads every fubjed: with a fuperfiuity of 
 
 illuftration
 
 SfccT. III. front the Imagination. §i 
 
 illuftration or of ornament, which either 
 wearies by introducing prolixity, or dazzles 
 too much to give entire fatisfadion. A painter 
 who indulges this exuberance of fanc^j will 
 multiply figures which increafe the compo- 
 lition of his work without adding to its ex- 
 preffion, which embarrafs the fpedator with- 
 out having any fhare in the adion, and which 
 feem to be introduced only that they may 
 aukwardly fill lip an empty fpace upon the 
 canvas. Marini, fays a French critic {«), if 
 he mentions a nightingale or a rofe, fays 
 every thing on the fubjed: that he can ima- 
 gine; far from rejeding any idea that oc- 
 curs to him, he goes in fearch of fuch as can- 
 not naturally occur ; he always lavifhes orl 
 his fubjed, every thing that can be thought 
 or faid. Sometimes luxuriance of imagina- 
 tion produces an irregular condud in works 
 of genius, carrying the author every now 
 and then out of fight of his defign, into di- 
 .greffions which have a very fleader connexion 
 
 (k) Cavalier M-^r'n ne s'eft jamais veu une imagination plus 
 fertile ne moir s re; 1 e que la iknne. S'il parlc d'lin roffigr.ol 
 ou dun rofe, il en dit tout ce qu'on Ci) peut iinaginer ; bieo 
 Ijin de rejetter ce qiii fe preferite, il va chercher ce qui ne fc 
 prefcnte pas, il cpuifc toujours fon'fujet. \ Bntret.d'AriU 
 et d' Eugene, 
 
 E 2 with
 
 5 2 How Genius arlfes Part I, 
 
 with it. This is remarkably exemplified in 
 Ariofto. He poflefles great readinefs and 
 quicknefs of genius; his inventions are fur- 
 prifingly various ; but that vivacity and agi- 
 lity of fancy from which he derives thefe 
 virtues, has betrayed him into continual dif- 
 order and incoherence, and unnatural inter- 
 ruptions of his ftory. The Fairy ^een dif- 
 covers inexhauftible richnefs of invention, 
 but is chargeable with the like irregularity. 
 It would be poffible to bring inftances of 
 both thefe kinds of vicious redundance from 
 the writings of a very great philofopher ; we 
 might point out many paflages in The EJfay 
 tn Human Under/landing, in which Mr. Locke 
 has indulged both a tedious diffufenefs in the 
 illuftration of his fubjed, and unfeafonable 
 digrefTions from it, 
 
 A MAN is fometimes fo entirely under the 
 power of accidental aflbciations, that he feems 
 fcarce to have propofed any end, but to have 
 defigned to begin with one idea, to go from 
 that to any other which it happened by any 
 means to fuggeft, and fo from this to othersj 
 yielding up the mind to follow paffively what- 
 ever aflbciations chance to afFed it. This is 
 in an eminent degree the cafe of Montaigne
 
 Sect. III. from the Imagination, 53 
 
 in many of his efTays. He fays juftly of 
 himfelf, " What are thefe eflays of mine but 
 *' grotefques and monftrous pieces of patch- 
 " work, put together without any certain 
 " figure, or any order, connexion, or pro- 
 ** portion, but what is accidental [p) ?" This 
 flyle of compofition, carried to the utmofl: de- 
 gree of incoherence, has been lately intro- 
 duced : novelty, along with a great degree 
 of wit, humour, and fine feelings, procured 
 the firft attempt confiderable fuccefs ; and this 
 fuccefs has raifed a multitude of infipld imi- 
 tators. It is only uncommon merit in the 
 parts, that can gain indulgence to fuch writ- 
 ings : the total want of defign is an eflential 
 defed, and fiiows a capital imperfedion in 
 the genius of the writer, an irregularity of 
 imagination. 
 
 There is in the human mind a ftrong 
 propenfity to make excurfions ; which may 
 naturally be expeded to exert itfelf moft ia 
 thofe who have the greateft quicknefs and 
 compafs of imagination. If it be indulged 
 without referve, it will produce incoherent 
 medleys, fantaftical rhapfodies, or unmeaning 
 
 (e) Liv, i. ch. 27. 
 
 «k - 
 
 E 3 reveries^
 
 ^4 Roiv Genius arifcs Part I. 
 
 reveries. Often, however, the bye-roads of 
 afTociation, as we may term them, lead to 
 rich and unexpedled regions, give occafion to 
 noble fallies of imagination, and proclaim an 
 uncommon force of genius, able to penetrate 
 through unfrequented v^ays to lofty or beau- 
 tiful conceptions. This is the character of 
 Pindar's genius, the boldnefs of which more 
 than compenfates for its irregularity. The 
 trueft eenius is in hazard of fometimes run- 
 
 o 
 
 ning into fuperfluitles, and will find occafion 
 to prune the luxuriance, and redify the dif- 
 order of its firft conceptions. But this fa- 
 culty can never be reckoned perfedt, till it 
 has acquired a capacity of avoiding them in 
 mofl cafes. It mud fupply a large flock, and 
 at the fame time manage it with economy. 
 While it produces all that is neceflary, it muft 
 evite ail that is fuperfluous (p). 
 
 Thus to render genius complete, fcrtiHty 
 and regularity of imagination muftbe united. 
 Their union forms that boundlefs penetration^ 
 which charadterifes true genius. By theip 
 
 {p) This is well exprelTed by Quifltilian : fpeaking of rhe-, 
 torical common- places, he obferves, that t^*ey will be hurt- 
 ful, rather than beneficial ; " Nifi et animi qusdam ingenita. 
 natura, et ftudio exercitata velocitas, refla nos ad ea quse, 
 conveniunt caufb, ferant.'' ////?/>. Orat. lib. v. cap. lo. "' 
 
 union
 
 Sect. III. from the Imagination, 55 
 
 union they will be both improved : the one 
 will give us an ample choice ; the other wiU 
 prevent our choice from being perplexed with 
 needlefs multiplicity. An extenfive imagi- 
 nation, imprefled with a ftrong ailociation of 
 the defign, and regulated by it, will draw out 
 from the whole compafs of nature, the fuit- 
 stble ideas, without attending to any other. 
 In ftudying the works of a great genius, w^e 
 can fcarce avoid fuppofnig, that all pofTible 
 conceptions have been explicitly expofed to 
 liis view, and fubjeded to his choice. The 
 appofite materials are coileded in as great 
 abundance, and prefented with as great pro- 
 priety, as if this had been the cafe : and yet 
 perhaps, no other ideas have occurred to him, 
 but thofe which he has ufed. They, and 
 they alone, have been prefented with entire 
 propriety, by the regularity of a compre- 
 henfive imagination retaining fight of the de- 
 fign through all the fteps^ of its progrefs. 
 This effed:, which refults from the union of 
 thefe two virtues, is confpicuous in the great 
 poet and in the great philofopher whom we 
 have already mentioned, as eminently pof- 
 feffing both. It may be obferved by contraft- 
 ing a fmgle defcription of Shakefpeare or 
 
 E 4 Thomfon,
 
 1 6 Hozv Genius arlfes Part I. 
 
 Thomfon, with the laboured deliqeations of • 
 ^ poetafter, who would fupply the want of 
 genuine fancy by the induftry of obfervation ? 
 in the former, all the ftriking features of the 
 objed:, and none elfe, are ftrongly marked ; 
 in the latter, every circumftance feems to be 
 taken notice of with the minutenefs of a na- 
 tural hiftorian ; but after all, thofe features 
 are omitted, which are fitted for making an 
 impreffion on the fancy. Compare Euclid 
 with his commentators ; the oppofition that 
 may be remarked between them, will fet the 
 charader of real genius in a ftrong light : the 
 train of Euclid's propofitions is fimple, yet 
 complete ; his laborious expofitors appear to, 
 have intended to amafs all poflible propo- 
 fitions, however trifling of unneceiTary. One 
 can fcarce read a paragraph in Butler's Ana-^ 
 logy-, or a chapter in Montefquieu's Spirit of 
 Laivs^ without being ftruck with the notion, 
 that the whole courfe of Providence was di- 
 ie£lly in the view of the one, and the whole 
 Jiiftory of mankind in the view of the other i 
 with fo great appearance of readinefs do they 
 obferve even the repioteft and leaft obvious 
 drcumftances which can any wife affect their 
 argument. In ftudying a work of true ge- 
 
 xiiuS|
 
 Sect. III. from the Imagination: 5) 
 
 nius, when we attend to the multitude and 
 variety of the materials, we wonder how the 
 author could have found them all ; and when 
 we reflect how proper and appofite every part 
 is, we are apt to think that it muft have oc- 
 curred to almoft any perfon. Such is the 
 effed: of copioufnefs and regularity of ima* 
 gination, united and harmonioufly exerted. 
 
 Genius implies likewlfe aSli'vity of ima- 
 gination. Whenever a fine imagination poC- 
 fefles healthful vigour, it will be continually 
 llarting hints, and pouring in conceptions 
 upon the mind. As foon as any of them ap« 
 pears, fancy, with the. utmoftalertnefs, places 
 them in every light, and enables us to purfue 
 them through all their confequences, that we 
 may be able to determine, whether they will 
 promote the defign which we have in eye. 
 This adlivity of imagination, by which it 
 darts with the quicknefs of lightning, through 
 all pofTible views of the ideas which are pre- 
 fented, arifes from the fame perfedion of the 
 ^ITocIating principles, which produces the 
 other qualities of genius. Thefe principles 
 ?re fo vigorous, that they will not allow the 
 piind to be unemployed for a moment, and
 
 58 How Genius arifis Part I, 
 
 at the fame time conftantly fuggeft the defign 
 of the work, as the point to which all this 
 employment tends. A falfe agility of ima-. 
 gination produces mere ufelefs mufmg, or 
 endlefs reveries, and hurries a, man over large 
 field?, without any fettled aim : but true ge- 
 jiius purfues a fixt diredlion, and employs its 
 adlivity in continually ftarting fuch concep- 
 tions as not only arife from the prefent idea^ 
 but alfo terminate in the general fubje<ft : and 
 though a thoufand arrangements of the con- 
 ceptions which it ftarts, fhould fail of anfwer- 
 ing the intention, it is indefatigable in trying 
 new arrangements, till it can happily accom- 
 plifh one that anfwers it. Whenever an image 
 or a fentiment occurs to the poet or the ora-i 
 tor, imagination fets it in every poffible light, 
 enables him to conceive its genuine efFedt, 
 and thus puts it in his power to judge, whe- 
 ther it ought to be rejected or retained. A 
 philofopher no fooner thinks of an experi- 
 ment or an argument, than imagination, by 
 reprefenting it in every attitude, enables him 
 to determine, what will be its force, and 
 whether it will be to his purpofe. In this 
 manner the reftlefs adivity of imagination 
 
 quickly
 
 gECT.tll. 'from the Imagination. 59 
 
 quickly conftructs a fort of model by which 
 we may form fome idea of the work, before 
 we proceed to execute it. 
 
 This adivity of imagination is of great 
 importance to genius. Genius may indeed, 
 in fome degree, exift without it; ima^ 
 gination may be comprehenfive when it is 
 exerted, and correct, and yet not adive. But 
 without adivity, genius will never exert it-? 
 felf, except when excited and puflied for- 
 ward by fome external caufe; adivity of 
 fancy is like an internal ftimulus, which will 
 not allow genius to lie idle or dormant, but 
 makes it operate fpontaneoufly and with con- 
 ftancy. Without it, invention would at befl 
 be very flow. Even after materials were fug- 
 gefted, their propriety could not be judged of^ 
 till adual trial were made of their pofitions 
 and effeds, at a great expence of time and 
 labour : and as fuch trial would be extremely 
 tedious and diflicult, we would either take up 
 with the firil view or pofition that occurred, 
 or relinquilh all attempts, difcouraged by the 
 profped of that fatigue which mufi: attend 
 the improvement of our plan. But when 
 fancy is expeditious in exhibiting every pof- 
 fible arrangement of our conceptions, it 
 I * quickly
 
 66 How Genius arifes Part I, 
 
 quickly puts it in our power to perceive all 
 their confequences and relations to our fub- 
 je£t, and enables us eafily to make a choice, 
 and foon to finifh our invention. 
 
 Thus the force of the imagination, or the 
 vigour of the aflbciating principles, produces 
 genius, fo far as it regards the colledion, 
 and even the choice of fit materials for the 
 difcovery that is propofed. 
 
 But. invention is not completed by merely 
 depofiting a fufEcient quantity of proper ma- 
 terials, in any order, as in a magazine or 
 llore-houfe. In every cafe, fome degree of 
 regular difpofition is implied in the very no- 
 tion of invention, and comes within the pro- 
 vince of genius [q). It is not fufficient for a 
 Luilder to collect ftones, timber, and what- 
 ever elfe is neceflary for the edifice, except 
 they be alfo properly difpofed and united in 
 the fabric ; fo in the arts and fciences, a huge 
 eolledlion of conceptions which bear fome 
 relation to one another and to the main fub- 
 je£t, will form only a confufed heap, if they 
 be not, by a proper dirpofuion> united into 
 
 {o) Collocare autem, etfi eft commune, tamea ad invents 
 Cndum refer tur. Cic. par tit. Or at* 
 
 I one
 
 Sect. III. from the Imagination, 6i 
 
 one regular work (r). A piece of painting 
 cannot be faid to be defigned, though all the 
 figures were conceived in their due propor- 
 tions, till the artift has alfo formed a diftind 
 idea of the economy of the whole. If the 
 order of the notes in a mufical compofition 
 were altered, it would deftroy the harmony, 
 which was the fole objed of invention. As 
 an animal body will become monftrous, though 
 it has all its eflential members, if one of 
 them be transferred to the place of another ; 
 fo a poem will become perfedly difagreeable 
 and fantaflical, by the tranfpofition of its 
 parts. A diflocation deftroys the vigour of 
 any member of the body, and unfits it for 
 its proper function ; and an oration will lofe 
 its whole efFed, if arguments, inftead of be- 
 
 (r) Sed ut opera extruentibus fatis non eft, faxa atque ma- 
 teriam, et caetera a:dificanti utilia congerere, nifi difponendis 
 lis collocandifque artificum manus adhibeatur : fic in dicendo 
 quamlibet abundans rerum copia, cumulum tantum habeat 
 atque congeflum, nift illas eadem difpofitio in ordinem di- 
 geftas, atque inter fe commiflas devinxerit. Nee immerito 
 fecunda quinque partium pofita eft, cum fine ea prior nihil 
 valeat. Neque enim, quanquam fufis omnibus membris fta- 
 tua fit, nifi collocetur. Et fiquam in corporibus noftris alio- 
 rumve animalium partem permutes et transferas, licet habeat 
 eadem omnia, prodigium fit tamen. Et artus etiam leviter 
 loco moti, perdunt quo viguerunt ufum : et turbati exercitas 
 fibiipfi funt impedimento. Nee mihi videntur errare, qui 
 ipfam rerum naturam ftare ordine putant; quo confufo, peri- 
 tura funt omnia. Qitint. /«/?. Orat. lib. vii. cap. i. 
 
 ing
 
 6l Hoiv Genius arifes Part L 
 
 ing diftindly urged, are blended together 
 without articulation. In fcience too^ a mul- 
 titude of ideas, if they be not arranged in 
 fuch a manner that their connexion may be 
 perceived, inliead of leading us to difcover a 
 Gonclufion, will only involve us in perplexity, 
 as an army thrown into diforder, can make 
 no advantage of its numbers, but, on the 
 contrary, obftruds its own motions. In every 
 cafe, difpofition is fo intimately connected 
 with invention, and even interwoven with 
 it, that it is impoflible to feparate them evea 
 in idea. If therefore imagination contribute 
 nothing to the difpofition of the materials, it 
 will follow, that genius muft, in a confider- 
 ablc degree, derive its origin from fome 
 other power of the mand. But it will ap- 
 pear upon enquiry, that imagination contri- 
 butes very much to the difpofition of every" 
 w^ork. 
 
 When a perfon flarts the iirft hint of s 
 new invention, and begins to meditate a 
 work either in art or fcience, his notion of 
 the whole is generally but imperfed: and con- 
 fufed. When a number of appofite concep- 
 tions are collected, various views of their 
 connexions open to him, and perplex his 
 
 choice.^
 
 ^ECT. III. from the Imagination. 6^ 
 
 thoice. But by degrees the profped clears* 
 As related ideas are apt to be aflbciated, fo, 
 by the very fame conflitution of our nature^ 
 thofe that are moft nearly related will be 
 moft ftrongly and intimately aflbciated toge-^ 
 thet. The operations of genius in forming 
 its defigns, are of a more perfect kind than 
 the operations of art or induftry in executing 
 them. A ftatuary conceives all the parts of 
 his v^ork at once, though when he comes to 
 execute it, he can form only one mem.ber at 
 a time, and muft during this interval leave 
 all the reft a fliapelefs block. An archite(f^ 
 contrives a whole palace in an inftant; but 
 when he comes to build it, he muft firft pro- 
 vide materials, and then rear the different 
 parts of the edifice only in fucceffion. But 
 to collect the materials, and to order and ap- 
 ply them, are not to genius diftindl and fuc- 
 ceflive works. This faculty bears a greater 
 refemblance to nature in its operations, than 
 to the lefs perfect energies of art. When a 
 vegetable draws in moifture from the earth, 
 nature, by the fame action by which it draws 
 it in, and at the fame time, converts it to 
 the nouriftiment of the plant : it at once cir- 
 culates through its veflels, and is affimilated 
 
 to
 
 iJj. How Genius arijes Part I. 
 
 to its feveral parts. In like manner, genius 
 arranges its ideas by the fame operation, and 
 almoft at the fame time, that it colledts them. 
 The fame force of alTociation which makes 
 us perceive the connexion of all the ideas 
 with the fubjed, leads us foon to perceive 
 alfo the various degrees of that connexion. 
 By means of it, thefe ideas, like'a well-dif- 
 ciplined army, fall, of their own accord, into 
 rank and order, and divide themfelves into 
 different clafles, according to their different 
 relations. The moft ftrongly related unite of 
 courfe in the fame member, and all the mem- 
 bers are fet in that pofition which affociation 
 leads us to affign to them, as the moft na- 
 tural. If the principles of affociation fhould 
 not at flrft lead readily to any difpofition, or 
 fhould lead to one which is difapproved on 
 examination, they continue to exert them- 
 felves, labour in fearching for fome other 
 method, proje^l new ones, throw out the 
 unappofite ideas which perplex the mind and 
 impede its operations, and thus by their con- 
 tinued efforts and unremitted adtivity, con-^ 
 dudt us at length to a regular form, in which 
 reafon can find fcarce any idea that is mif* 
 placed* 
 
 Thtji
 
 Sect. III. from the tmagination, 65 
 
 Thus imagination is no unfkilful architeO: ; 
 it coiledls and chiifes the materials ; and 
 though they may at firft lie in a rude and 
 undigefted chaos, it in a great meafure, by 
 its own force, by means of its aflbciating 
 power, after repeated attempts and tranfpo- 
 fitions, defigns a regular and w^ell-propor- 
 tioned edifice. , 
 
 A WEAKNESS of this mcthodlfing power 
 may arlfe either from a want of adivity in 
 the 'imagination, or from our having a flight 
 aflbciation of the dcfign. The former pre-, 
 vents our turning our conceptions readily into 
 different forms, and thereby leads us to take 
 up with the firft that offers, however incor- 
 rect. The latter prevents our being affeded 
 by the different connexions of the parts, 
 which arife from their having different re- 
 fpedls and fubordinations to the general de- 
 ^\%Ti. From whatever caufe this weaknefs 
 proceeds, it is a great impcrfedion in genius. 
 It renders it flow in forming its produ<ftion5, 
 as the confufion of the materials occafions 
 difficulty in applying them to ufe: it alfo 
 renders them lefs valuable when they are 
 formed, as they retain, in fome meafure, the 
 appearance of diforder, intricacy, and dif- 
 agreeable perplexity. Ariftotle confiders the 
 
 irrcgu-
 
 66 How Genius arifis Part L 
 
 irregularity of cUrpofition in Euripides as a 
 capital imperfedion, for which nothing al- 
 moft but his fingular power of interefting 
 and affeding could have made atonement (j). 
 In every art, the difpofition of the fubje£t 
 into a confiftent plan, is indeed one of the 
 mofl important offices of invention; nor is 
 it a lefs momentous article, in difcoveries 
 which refpe*^: the fciences. It is not more 
 abfolutely neceflary in an algebraical invefti- 
 gation, to afcertain the feveral quantities by 
 diftind fymbols, than to difpofe thefe fym- 
 bo!s, and the equations which are compofed of 
 them, in a regular and convenient order. 
 
 Enthusiasm has been generally confi- 
 dered -as a very common, if not an infepa- 
 rable attendant of genius. Poets have been 
 looked upon as infpired, both by themfelves 
 and others. No man can be an accompliflied 
 orator, who is not poffeffed of fuch fenfibility 
 of heart, as to be actuated, at pleafure, by 
 the paffions which he would excite in others. 
 Even the fpeculative philofopher and the cool 
 mathematician have often difplayed a very 
 high degree of ardor in the exertion of their 
 genius. The explication which has been 
 given of the nature of genius, will not only 
 
 {s) Hip wonjT. xi^. ty. quoted above, Seft. i. Note {h). 
 
 6 enable
 
 Sect. III. from the Imagination, (y] 
 
 enable us to account for this, but incline us 
 alfo to reckon it impoffible that ever an high 
 degree of genius fhould be unaccompanied 
 with fomething of that elevation and warmth 
 of imagination, v^hich we term enthufiafm (/). 
 Genius turns our thoughts habitually to fuch 
 fubjeds as are adapted to it ; habitual applica- 
 tion to any fubjed, enables us to form ftrong 
 and lively conceptions of every thing relating 
 to it ; a ftrong conception naturally invigo- 
 rates and elevates the imagination in contem- 
 plating it ; and while this frame continues, 
 'all the adions of the mind will be ftrong and 
 vehement. Such is the difpofitlon with which 
 a man of genius turns his view to any fub- 
 jed; as foon as he begins to think how it 
 may be compleated, he eyes it as a rich trea- 
 fure, with delight and confcious pride ; he 
 triumphs in the profped of forming 
 
 " he knows not what excelling things," 
 
 and purfues all the aflbciations which it pre- 
 fents, with incredible eagernefs and fpirit. 
 When an ingenious track of thinking pre- 
 fents itfelf, though but cafually, to true ge- 
 
 {s) Ariftotle, who will not be fufpcfied to be too great a 
 favourer of enthufiafm, fecms to affert, That it alone can dif- 
 pofe men to fearch for new inventions in philofophy ; Aia ya.^ 
 TO 0AYMAZEIN oi aiSpa-TTCixai «.'>> KaX to 7rjaJT>.» i^r^avTo ^» dO'opiTt. 
 MtTO, T« <P'j<7i>i.a., a. Kiip. /?. 
 
 F 2 nius,
 
 6B Hew Genius Ar'ifes Part L 
 
 nius, occupied it may be with fomething elfe, 
 imagination darts alongft it with great rapi- 
 dity; and by this rapidity its ardor is more 
 inflamed. The velocity of its motion fets it 
 on fire, Uke a chariot wheel which is kindled 
 by the quicknefs of its revolution. As a 
 {brightly courfer continually mends his pace, 
 fo genius, in proportion as it proceeds in its 
 fubjedt, acquires new force and fpirit, which 
 urges it on fo vehemently, that it cannot be 
 reftrained from profecuting it. Difficulties in 
 the execution only excite its vigour, roufe its 
 keennefs, and draw out its utmoft efforts to 
 furmount them. Its motions become ftill 
 more impetuous, till the mind is enraptured 
 with the fubjedt, and exalted into an extafy. 
 In this manner the fire of genius, like a di- 
 vine impulfe, raifes the mind above itfelf, 
 and by the natural influence of imagination 
 actuates it as if it were fupernaturally infpired. 
 The ardor which thus fprings from the ex- 
 ertion of genius, has fometimes rifen to a 
 degree of fervour perfedly aftonifhing. Ar- 
 chimedes (>*), Protogenes (?/), and Parmegi- 
 
 (0 Quern ardcrem fludii cenfetis fnilTe in Archimede, qui, 
 dum in puhere cjurrdam dekribit attentius, ne patriam qui- 
 dcin captain effe leni'erit ? Cic. ^e Fin. lib. v. 
 
 (h) Erat Trotogenes in fuburbano hortulo fuo, hoc eft De- 
 tietrii caftris. Neque interpellatus prsliis, inchoata opera 
 iruerniifit omnino» 
 
 J ano,
 
 Sect. III. from the Imagination. t<) 
 
 ano (^), are faid to have been fo totally ea- 
 tranced, the two latter in painting, and the 
 former in the lefs enthufiaftic inveftigation of 
 mathematical truth, as not to be diverted from 
 their works by all the terrors of hoftile ar- 
 mies taking by fiorm the places where they 
 were employed. It is reported of Marini, 
 that he was fo intent on revlfmg fome ftan- 
 zas of his Adonis, that he fiifFered one of his 
 legs to be burnt for a confiderable time, be- 
 fore he was fenfible of it [^y\ We may 
 
 remark farther. That as a kind of enthufi- 
 aftic ardour naturally arifes from the exertion 
 of genius, fo this ardour greatly alfifts and 
 improves the operations of genius. By ele- 
 vating and enlivening the fancy, it gives 
 vigour and adivity to its affociating power, 
 enables it to proceed with alacrity in fearch- 
 ing out the neceffary ideas ; and at the fame 
 time, by engroffing us wholly in the prefent 
 fubjedt, preferves us from attending to fo- 
 reign ideas, which would confound our 
 thought, and retard our progrefs (z). 
 
 (jf) Graham's account of painters. 
 
 (ji) Eloges des S9avans, torn. 2. 
 
 (2) Les Peintres et les Poetes ne pouvent inventer de fang 
 froid. On fait bien qu'ils entient en un efpcce d'enthoufi- 
 afme, lorfqu'ils prodiiifent leurs idees, &c. Reflex. Crit. 
 Jmt lapoef. et/ur laj>eint. 2 Part, z St3. 
 
 F 3 Wfi
 
 7© Hoiv Genius arifesy &c. Part I. 
 
 We have now explained, how genius arifes 
 from the perfection and vigour of the imagi- 
 nation. However capricious and unaccount- 
 able this faculty may be often reckoned, yet 
 it is fubjed to eftablifhed laws ; and is ca- 
 pable, not only of fuch extent as qualifies it 
 for colleding ideas from all the parts of na- 
 ture, but alfo of fuch regularity and correcSt- 
 nefs as is in a great meafure fufficient for 
 avoiding all improper ideas, for feledling fuch 
 as are fubordinate to the defign, and for dif- 
 pofifig them into a confiftent plan, or a dif- 
 tindt method. It is the firft author of all 
 inventions, and has greater influence in car- 
 rying them to perfection, than we are ready 
 to fufpeCt. It forms what we properly cali 
 genius in every art, and in every fcience. 
 It is always neceifary indeed, thsit judgment: 
 attend it in its operations, and aflift it in dif- 
 covering truth or beauty. In what ways it 
 does fo, we fhall next enquire. 
 
 SECT,
 
 [ 71 ] 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of the injliience of Judgment upon Genius, 
 
 THOUGH genius be properly a com- 
 prehenfive, regular, and adive imagi- 
 nation, yet it can never attain perfedion, or 
 exert itfelf fuccefsfully on any fubjed, except 
 it be united with a found and piercing judg- 
 ment. The vigour of imagination carries 
 it forward to invention ; but underftanding 
 muft always condud it and regulate its mo- 
 tions. A horfe of high mettle ranging at 
 liberty, will run with great fwiftnefs and 
 fpirit, but in an irregular track and without 
 any fixt diredion : a fkilful rider makes him 
 move ftraight in the road, with equal fpirit 
 and fwiftnefs. In like manner, a fine ima- 
 gination left to itfelf, will break out into 
 bold fallies and wild extravagance, and over- 
 leap the bounds of truth or probability : but 
 when it is put under the management of 
 found judgment, it leads to folid and ufeful 
 invention, without having its natural fpright- 
 linefs in the leaft impaired. 
 
 It is the union of an extenfive imagina- 
 tion with an accurate judgment, that has ac- 
 
 F 4 compliihed
 
 72 Of the irtfuence of Judgment Part I. 
 
 complifhed the great geniufes of all ages. 
 In matters of fcience, the neceffity of judg- 
 ment is obvious : all the colledions and ar- 
 rangements of ideas which imagination makes, 
 are immediately fubjected to reafon, that it 
 may infer truth. Jf we be not careful to 
 diflinguiih thofe operations of the mind which 
 are performed in conjundion, we ihall be 
 apt to refer philofophical genius wholly to 
 reafon, overlooking the influence of imagina- 
 tion. The afnftance of reafon is as truly ne- 
 ceflary in the fine arts as in fcience, though 
 in thefe it has not the appearance of being fo 
 conflantly applied. It is very remarkable 
 that all the fine arts have been cultivated, and 
 even brought to perfedion, before the rules 
 of art were inveftigated or formed into a fyf- 
 tem : there is not a fmgle inflance of any art 
 that has begun to be pradifed in confequence 
 of rules being prefcribed for it. The firft 
 performers could not have explained the 
 feveral rules which the nature of their work 
 made neceffary; but their judgment was not- 
 withftanding fo exad and vigorous as to pre- 
 vent their tranfgr effing them. Their corred- 
 nefs is fo wonderfully perfed, that critics, 
 difcovered the rules which they prefcribe, 
 pnly by remarking thofe laws by which true 
 
 genius.
 
 Sect. IV, upon Genius. 73 
 
 genius, though uninllruded, had adually 
 governed itfelf. Ariftotle does not invent 
 new rules of compofition, but only points 
 out thofe which Homer had formerly obferv- 
 ed in the Epos, Sophocles in the Drama, and 
 niany of the Grecian orators in Eloquence. 
 The fame obfervation may be extended to 
 painting, mufic, and every other art. The 
 great geniufes who invented and Improved 
 them, have poflfeiTed the acuteft judgment, 
 which has faithfully attended them, and care- 
 fully guarded their fteps in thofe diftant and . 
 unfrequented regions which the boldnefs of 
 their fancy led them to explore : and judg- 
 ment has fometimes exerted itfelf with fa 
 great fuccefs, that the perfon who attempte4 
 the firft production in an art, has exhibited a 
 perfe<S): model, in which pofterity could find 
 no fault, and the excellence of which none of 
 their attempts could equal. The Iliad is at 
 once the firft, and the beft of Epic poems, 
 the admiration and the ftandard of all fuc- 
 peeding ages. Had Elomer, along with his 
 rich imagination, pofleired inferior judgment, 
 his poem muft, like the works of Shakefpear, 
 have had great defeds, excufable indeed, 
 but confpicuous and undeniable. A perfect 
 judgment is feldom beftowed by Nature, 
 
 even
 
 74 Of the influence of Jiidgfncnt Part I, 
 
 even on her mofl favoured fons ; but a very 
 confiderable degree of it always belongs to 
 real genius. It may be remarked in the mofl 
 incorredt and irregular artifts ; even when it 
 has not force enough to difcern every fault, 
 or when the violence of imagination is too 
 great to fuffer it to be exerted with fuificient 
 feverity, yet Hill it prevents perfed abfur- 
 dity, and reflrains imagination from frantic 
 excurfions. Pindar is judicious even in his 
 irregularities. The boldnefs of his fancy, if 
 it had been under no control from reafon, 
 would have produced, not wild fublimity, 
 but madnefs and frenzy. Shakefpear's judg- 
 ment was not enough improved to enable him 
 always to avoid improper fubje(fls, unnatural 
 and improbable incidents, forced and quib- 
 bling expreflions, or to perceive the regula- 
 rity and fimplicity which beft fuits the nature 
 of the drama ; but in fupporting the propriety 
 of character, in marking the fit expreflions 
 and the natural effects of the feveral paflions, 
 and in many other particulars, he difplays 
 fuch an uncommon accuracy of judgment, as 
 leads us to impute his blemifhes, rather to 
 the bad tafte of thofe for whom he wrote, 
 than to any defeat in his own underftanding. 
 Judgment is of fo great importance, that, 
 
 though
 
 Sect. IV. upon Genius'. 75 
 
 though we muft often acknowlege genius in 
 works in which judgment has not been fcru- 
 puloufly exercifed, yet this circumftance never 
 fails to render them far lefs valuable than 
 they would have been, if they had been 
 finifhed with corrednefs. The irregularity 
 of Rubens's defigns, and his injudicious 
 mixture of incongruous perfonages in many 
 of his pictures, throw a fhade over thofe ex- 
 cellencies which he pofTefled in perfection. 
 Nothing lefs than the higheft degree of genius 
 can obtain lafting and thorough approbation, 
 when judgment has not been accurately exer- 
 cifed. Shakefpear's unequalled genius has fecur- 
 edhim admiration. But very great genius was 
 not able to preferve Dryden from the ridicule 
 of thofe who were far his inferiors, on ac- 
 count of incorredlnefles into which his unfor- 
 tunate circumftances betrayed him ; nor has 
 it obtained from impartial poflerity, fo great 
 attention and applaufe as much lefs abilities, 
 more judicioully exerted, would have certainly 
 commanded. 
 
 In a man of genius, imagination can fcarce 
 take a fingle ftep, but judgment fliould attend 
 it. The moft luxuriant fancy ftands moft in 
 need of being checked by judgment. As ^ 
 |ich foil produces not only the largefl quan- 
 tity
 
 t6 Of the injiiience of Judgment P a r t |, 
 
 tity of grain, but alfo the greateft profufioa 
 of fuch weeds as tend to choak it; foa fertile 
 imagination, along with juft and ufeful ideas, 
 produces many trifling, falfe, and improper 
 thoughts, which, if they be not immediately 
 examined by reafon, and fpeedily reje(^ed, 
 will over-run and obftrud the truth or the 
 beauty which the others might have pro-^ 
 duced («). Judgment cannot colled: ideas, 
 but it revifes thofe which fancy has colleded, 
 and either adopts or rejeds them, as it finds 
 caufe. Though a bright and comprehenfive 
 fancy be the principal ingredient in genius, 
 yet nothing is fo dangerous as to affed to 
 difplay it conftantly, or to indulge it without 
 any control from refledion ; nothing is pro^ 
 dudive of greater faults. This leads phiiofo-j 
 phers to conftrud whimfical hypothefes, inr 
 ftead of conftruding juft theories. This leads 
 poets to defcribe improbable events and unna- 
 tural charaders, and to fearch for unfeafon- 
 able wit and ill-timed fplcndour, when judg^ 
 ment would have direded them to imitate 
 nature with exadnefs, and to ftudy fimplicity 
 
 {a) Nihil eft feracius ingeniis, iis pra;rertim, qus difcipU- 
 uis exculta funt. Sed ut fegetes fecund;e et uberes, non folum 
 fruges, verum herbas etiam efFundunt inimiciffimas frugibus; 
 fie interdum ex illis locis, aut Jevia qusdam, aut caiifis aliena, 
 aut non utilia gignuntur, quorum ab oratoris judicio deledus 
 magnus adhibebitur. Cic Orator. 
 
 of
 
 Sect. IV. %ipon Genius, *?;^ 
 
 of expreffion. This leads painters caprici- 
 oufly to create imaginary decorations, inftead 
 of inventing natural and confiftent embellifh- 
 ments. Imagination muft fet all the ideas 
 and all the analogies of things, which it col- 
 led:s, before the difcerning eye of reafon, and 
 fubmit them abfolutely to its fovereign deci- 
 fion. It is juftly obferved by Quintilian, 
 that every fidion of the human fancy is ap- 
 proved in the moment of its produdion [b). 
 The exertion of the mind which is requifit-e 
 in forming it, is agreeable ; and the face of 
 novelty which infant conceptions wear, fails 
 not to recommend them promifcuoufly, till 
 reafon has had time to furvey and examine 
 them. Were reafon never to fcrutinize them, 
 all our ideas would be retained indifcrimi- 
 nately, and the productions of fancy would 
 be perfectly monllrous. While a man is en^. 
 gaged in compofition or inveftigation, he 
 often feems to himfelf to be fired with his 
 fubjedl, and to teem with ideas ; but on re- 
 vifmg the work, finds that his judgment is 
 offended, and his time loil. An idea that 
 fparkled in the eye of fancy, is often con- 
 demned by judgment as falfe and unfubftan- 
 tial. A more rigid exercife of this latter 
 
 {b) Omnia noftra, dum nafcuntur, placent. Jnfi. Oraf. 
 lib. X. cap. 3. 
 
 faculty,
 
 78 Of the 'influence of] iidgment Part L 
 
 faculty, would have prefervcd Taflb from 
 introducing fentlments which have fhow 
 without juftnefs, and figures which furprife 
 and dazzle, but are unfuitable to the purpofe 
 to which they ought to have been fubfervient ; 
 and would have enabled him to efcape the 
 cenfure of having overfpread his work with 
 tinfel, and thus fullied the luftre of the pure 
 gold which it contains (c). 
 
 A FERTILE imagination is apt to overload 
 a work with a fuperfluity of ideas : an accu- 
 rate judgment rejedts all that are unnecefTary, 
 Shakefpear was not always able to keep the 
 richnefs of his fancy from difplaying itlelf in 
 cafes where judgment would have directed 
 him to control it. That very exuberance of 
 imagination which commands our admiration, 
 is fometimes indulged fo far as neceflarily to 
 incur our cenfure. We need not be at a lofs 
 for an example. In the Midfummer Night's 
 Dream (^), Helena upbraiding Hermia, de- 
 
 (f) An ingenious critic, fpeaking of the rich poetic vein of 
 Ariofto, fays, Elle remporte veritablement fur la pcelie de la 
 Jerufalem delivree, dont ies figures ne font pas fouvent conve- 
 nables a I'endroit ou le Poete ies met en ceuvre. 11 y a fouvent 
 encore plus de brillant et d'eclat dans ces figures que de ve- 
 rite. Je veux dire qu'ellcs furprennent et qu'elles eblouiflent 
 I'imagination, mais qu'elles n'y peignent pas dilHnftment des 
 images propres a nous interefler. Voila ce que M. Defpreaux 
 a defini, le clinquant du Taffe. Reflex. Crit. fur la poejie et 
 Jur la peinture, tome i. fe6\, 34. 
 
 [d) Aft 3. fcene 8. 
 
 fcribes
 
 Sect. IV". upon Genius » 79 
 
 fcribes the clofenefs of their early friendship 
 in the moft natural manner, by expreffive 
 circumftances fuited to the ftate of childhood ; 
 
 Is all the counfel that we two have fhar'd, 
 The filters vows, the hours that we have fpent. 
 When we have chid the hafty-footed time 
 For parting us 5 O ! and is all forgot ? 
 All fchool-days friendfhip, childhood innocence? 
 We, Hermia, like two artificial gods, 
 Created with our needles both one flower. 
 Both on one fampler, fitting on one cufhion ; 
 Both warbling of one fong, both in one key ; 
 As if our hands, our fides, voices and minds 
 Had been incorporate. 
 
 But here the Poet*s own imagination takes 
 fire, and he goes on : 
 
 So we grew togjether 
 Like to a double cherry, feeming parted. 
 But yet an union in partition. 
 Two lovely berries moulded on one Item ; 
 Or with two feeming bodies, but one heart, 
 Two of the firft, like coats in heraldry. 
 Due but to one, and crowned with one crell. 
 
 And his imagination has crouded together 
 more images than would have been proper 
 though he had been defcribing infant friend- 
 fhip in his own perfon, not to mention that 
 feme of them are frigid and far-fetched. 
 
 But
 
 So Of the influence of Judgment Part I. 
 
 But the redundance Is the more faulty, as the 
 defcription is put into the mouth of Helena, 
 who was too little at eafe, too much diftrad- 
 ed with vexation, to be at leifure to fearch for 
 a multitude of fimilitudes. 
 
 Imagination will be often led by flight 
 and incidental affociations, to fuggeft ideas 
 •which, when canvafled by judgment, are 
 difcovered to be foreign and improper. 
 When a man is no longer affedted by the 
 aflbciation which conducted him to them, he 
 wonders how he ever could have thought that 
 pertinent, which he once admired. Painters 
 of confiderable rank have reprefented friars 
 in the habit of their order, as prefent at fome 
 of our Saviour's miracles. Judgment muft 
 perceive this to be totally abfurd ; bat their 
 religion prevented their exercifing judgment 
 in the cafe. No lefs an artift than Michael 
 Angelo introduces Charon and his boat into 
 the folemnitics of the future judgment paint- 
 ed according to the Chrijftian revelation. 
 The flighteft exertion of judgment, would 
 have made him fenfible of fo great an incon- 
 gruity. An idea may often like wife, in one 
 point of view, be adapted to a work, which, 
 if fet in another light, would be unfuitable, 
 or lefs appofite. While fancy conceives the 
 
 various
 
 Sect. IV. tip on Genius. 8i 
 
 various attitudes in which the idea may be 
 placed, judgment is wakeful and obfervant, 
 that it may chufe the propereft. 
 
 Regularity of imagination, which is of 
 the greateft importance in genius, could ne- 
 ver be acquired without the aid of judgment. 
 It is only judgment conftantly exerting itfelf 
 along with fancy, and often checking it and 
 examining its ideas, that produces by degrees 
 a habit of correcftnefs in thinking, and enures 
 the mind to move ftraight forward to the encj 
 propofcd, without declining into the bye- 
 paths which run off on both fides. Imagina- 
 tion is a faculty fo wild in its own nature, 
 that it muft be accuftomed to the difcipline of 
 reafon before it can become tame and manaee- 
 able enough for a correal produdion. Nor 
 will it be capable of this even after it has ac- 
 quired the greateft pofFible regularity, except 
 judgment attend it and perpetually curb its 
 motions. The moft regular imagination will 
 fometimes make an unnatural excurfion, and 
 prefcnt improper ideas ; judgment muft there- 
 fore be ready to review its work, and to re- 
 ject fuch ideas. Many of Bacon's conjediures 
 concerning fubjedts which he had not oppor- 
 tunity to examine perfe<3:ly, are falfe though 
 they be ingenious, and would have been dif- 
 
 G avowed
 
 2 Of the vifluence of Judgment P A R t I. 
 
 avowed by judgment, when it had canvafled 
 them. Newton^s imagination was more cor- 
 red than his, and more conftantly under the 
 control of judgment; yet reafon would have 
 perhaps, on examination, rejected fome of 
 the fuppofitions which he makes in his que- 
 ries. The firft fketch of every work of ge- 
 nius, is always very different from the finifh- 
 ed piece. Not only are many things added 
 by the pofterior effays of imagination, affect- 
 ed by new affociations in repeated views of 
 the fubje£l:, and thus penetrating deeper into 
 its nature ; but alfo many things are re-r 
 trenched or altered by judgment on a revifal, 
 •which it had not force enough .to prevent 
 fancy from exhibiting in the courfe of the 
 invention. AfTociation could not recal the 
 idea of the defign, in order to bring back 
 fancy when it has wandered from it, if judg- 
 ment did not inform us that it had wandered, 
 by perceiving the tendency of the ideas which 
 it has fuggcfled. The fineft imagination, 
 totally deftitute of afTiflance from judgment, 
 would in fome meafure refemble a blind man, 
 who may be very dexterous in groping the 
 right road, but cannot know certainly, whe- 
 ther he continues in it, and has no means of 
 recovering it, if he once flray. 
 
 No
 
 S^CT. IV". upon Genius, 83 
 
 No degree of corrednefs can hinder imagi- 
 nation from introducing different ideas that 
 are ail conducive to the propofed defign. But 
 fome of them may promote it more than 
 others. In this cafe, judgment alone can de- 
 termine which is fitteft, and enable us to make 
 a choice. If it did not exert itfelf, fancy 
 muft continue for ever at a ftand, diftraded 
 with the variety, and undetermined where to 
 fix. Sometimes again it happens, that tho' 
 each of the ideas is fubfervient to the end in 
 view, yet they are fo incongruous that they 
 cannot be all adopted with propriety. Shake- 
 fpear {e) defcribes the terrors of death, by a 
 variety of very ftriking and poetical images ; 
 
 Ay, but to die, and go we know not where> 
 To live in cold obftruilion, and to rot, 
 This fenfible warm motion to become 
 A kneaded clod ; and the dilated fph'it 
 To hath in fery floods, or to reftde 
 In thrilling regions of thick-ribbed ice. 
 To be imprijon^d in the 'uieivlefs ivinds^ 
 And blonvn ivith rejllefs violence round about 
 The pendant ivorld. - 
 
 All the ideas here introduced are conducive 
 to the poet's defign, and might have been 
 
 (e) Meafure foj Meafurc, 
 
 G 3 fuggefted
 
 84- Of the injluenc€ of Judgment PartL 
 
 fiiggefted by the corredeft fancy. It is only 
 judgment that can difapprove the uniting of 
 them in the fame defcrlption, as being hete- 
 rogeneous, derived partly from Chriftian 
 manners, and partly from pagan notions. 
 This faculty would have direded the poet to 
 retain only the former, as being moft con- 
 gruous to Claudio the fpeaker, or, if h6 
 thought not thefe fufficlent, to fet fancy again 
 ■ to work, to finifh the defcrlption with con- 
 fiftent images. 
 
 Every work of genius is a whole, made 
 up by the regular combination of different 
 parts, fo organized as to become altogether 
 fubfervieJit to a common end. The different 
 degrees of relation which the parts bear to 
 one another and to the end, affeding imagi- 
 nation in proportion to their clofenefs, lead it 
 to ailign to each its proper place, and thus 
 lay the foundation of a natural difpofition. 
 But however perfedly the afTocIating princi- 
 ples perform this part of their office, a perfon 
 will fcarce reckon himfelf certain of the pro- 
 priety of that difpofition, till it has been au- 
 thorifed by judgment. Fancy forms the plan 
 in a fort of mechanical or inftindive manner : 
 judgment, on reviewing it, perceives its rec- 
 titude or its errors, as it were fcientifically ;
 
 Sect. IV. upon Genius, 85 
 
 its decilions are founded on refledlon, and 
 produce a convi£tion of their juftnefs. The 
 fame qualities which form natural relations 
 among the parts of a work, afFeding the 
 imagination, produce correfpondent philofor 
 phical relations among thefe parts, which 
 judgment can contemplate, inrefped: of which 
 it can compare the feveral parts, and difcover 
 their influence on one another, and on the 
 whole, and can by this means perceive, with- 
 out danger of error, the fituations that ought 
 to be afligned them. For inftance, in a fable 
 6t for tragedy, there are fome incidents 
 which are properly caufes, and others which 
 are their effeds or confequences : caufation 
 operating on the fancy as an aflbciating qua- 
 lity, will lead imagination, in the moft rapid 
 career of invention, even though it fliould 
 outrun judgment, to place thefe incidents for 
 the moft part in their natural fituation, accord- 
 ing to the relation which fubfifts between 
 them: and caufation is at the fame time a 
 philofophical relation, by contemplating which 
 judgment can determine, w^hat incidents are 
 fit to form the beginning, what to form the 
 middle, and what the end. Thus even when 
 fancy is moft fuccefsful in contriving a na- 
 tural difpofttion, it is from the review of rea- 
 
 G 3 fon
 
 86 Of the hifluence of JvJgment Part I. 
 
 fon we derive afliirance of its being natural 
 andjuft. But it often happens that fancy 
 throws its materials into diforder. In this 
 cafe it is only judgment that can perceive the 
 error. An accidental or trifling affociation 
 may miflead fancy ; but judgment is not fub- 
 jedt to the impulfe, it furveys deliberately 
 the connexions of the parts, it remarks their 
 mutual influence, it convinces us of the im- 
 propriety of their pofition, and puts fancy 
 upon making eff'orts to imagine others, which 
 it attends to as they rife, and either rejed:s> 
 or approves them. 
 
 To form a proper plan in any extenfive 
 work of genius, is a matter of fuch difficulty 
 as to require the union of imagination and 
 reafon in their greateft ftrength. Imagination 
 muft exhibit all the various pofitions of the 
 parts, and conceive the effed^t of every part in 
 each of thefe pofitions. Judgment muft at 
 the fame time furvey them with a piercing- 
 eye, compare readily the eff^e£t of each part 
 in one pofition, with its effedl in another, 
 and from the refult of its comparifons, quickly 
 pronounce, which is the beft arrangement. 
 Fancy could not have formed the regular 
 plan of an epic poem, though Homer had had 
 the ftrongeft and moft conflant perception of 
 
 the
 
 Sect. IV. upoii Genius. 87 
 
 the end at which it aimed, if judgment had 
 not, from the confideration of this end, and 
 the repeated comparifon of it with the means 
 which imagination propofed for accomplifhing 
 it, difcovered, in what fituation every inci-. 
 dent would produce the very greatefl efFed:. 
 One needs only read over the curious feries 
 of experiments by which Newton has invefti- 
 gated the laws of light and colours, to be con-- 
 vinced that it required the nicefl judgment, 
 as well as the moft comprehenfive imagina- 
 tion, to conduct them in fuch ^ manner that 
 every fucceeding one fhould confirm and ex- 
 tend the conclufions to which the preceding- 
 ones had given rife. 
 
 It deferves alfo to be remarked, that every 
 difference in the nature of an invention, re- 
 quires a correfpondent variety in the difpofi- 
 tion. A fine imagination will in fome mea- 
 fure, by its own power, diverfify the arrange- 
 ment agreeably to the nature of the inven- 
 tion ; but it may reap great advantage from 
 the aid of judgment. When this faculty has 
 confidered all the circumftances of the fub- 
 jedt, it can determine with certainty, which 
 of the plans fuggefled by fancy, will mofl 
 promote the perfection of the work. De- 
 moflhenes and iEfchin-cs have adopted difpo- 
 
 G 4 fitions
 
 88 Of the influence of Judgment Part J.. 
 
 fitions perfectly oppofue, in their orations aC 
 the trial of Ctefiphon. The oppofite ends at 
 which they aimed, fuggefted this contrariety 
 of the means; but it was judgment perceiv- 
 ing the one difpofition fitteft for imprefling 
 the judges with a fenfe of Ctefiphon's guilt, 
 and the other fitteft for convincing them of 
 his innocence, that determined the rival ora- 
 tors to chufe the oppofite roads which they 
 feave taken. 
 
 Thi.'S, while imagination is adive in con- 
 ceiving all the various combinations and ar- 
 rangements of the ideas which it has eolledt- 
 ed, judgment muft be as indefatigable in fur- 
 veying them, and determining concerning 
 their real force and cqnfequences. |t muft 
 remark in an inftant thofe pofitions of theni 
 which are unfit for anfvvering the purpofe?, 
 and be able, without lofmg much time in 
 fcrutinizing them, to pitch upon thofe that 
 are fit. Fancy throws out both the worthlefa 
 earth and the rich ore ; judgment, like a fkil- 
 ful refiner, diftinguifhcs the one from the 
 other, and purifies the gold contained in the 
 latter, from the drofs with which it is inter- 
 mingled. The reftlefs efforts of the moft 
 healthful imagination would be both ufelefs 
 and endlefs, if they were not fubjeded to the 
 
 cognizaote
 
 Sect. IV. upon Genius. 89 
 
 cognizance of reafon. To imagine all the 
 poflible arrangements of a fet of ideas, were 
 an unmeaning play of thought, if they merely 
 pafled through the mind, like the images that 
 are faid to fucceed one another in the brown 
 ftudy, without reafon being able to arreft 
 fuch of them as it approves. Were reafon 
 only flow in her determinations, in compari^ 
 fon with the quicknefs with which fancy 
 conceives, like Una's dwarf, lagging behind 
 her far aivay, even this would greatly impede 
 the work of genius, retard its progrefs, or 
 ftop it altogether by conftantly curbing the 
 impetuofity of fancy (/). Or if its fpirit were 
 too hardy to be wholly broken, it would out" 
 run its companion ; it would difpofe a man to 
 take up with the firft conception that occur- 
 red, rather than weary himfelf in attempts to 
 procure better, when judgment were fo dull 
 as not to diftinguifh readily which deferves 
 the preference. 
 
 In this manner judgment affifts, moderates, 
 and guides the exertions of imagination thro* 
 the whole courfe of the invention. But after 
 
 (/) Atque plerofque videas hsrentes circa fingula, et dum 
 inveniunt, et dum inventa ponderanc. Quod etiam fi idcirco 
 iieret, ut femper optimis uterentur, abominanda tamen hjcc 
 infelicitas erat, qua; et curfum dicendi refrenat, et calorem 
 f:ogitationis extinguit mora el diffidentia. Quint. InJI. Orat, 
 |ib. viii, proem. 
 
 imagination
 
 90 Of the infiucnce of "Judgment Part L 
 imagination has defifted from its work, judg- 
 ment reviews, corre^fts, and finifhes it. In 
 fcience, the work cannot receive even its rude 
 form till reafon has com Dared the feveral 
 ideas and obfervations which fancy had fug- 
 gefted, and perceived their connexions, and 
 inferred their confequences. And in the arts, 
 where fancy is able to accomplifh a Iketch of 
 the whole, the review of reafon is abfolutely 
 necelTary, to polifli and improve the work. 
 Whenever fancy happens to ftray, judgment 
 alone can perceive that it has ftrayed ; and 
 though it has attended fancy during the whole 
 feries of its inveftigations, obferving its errors 
 and drawing it off from them, it is alfo re- 
 quilite that it renew its examination when 
 the work is finifhed. It can then take a 
 more deliberate furvey of the whole, and will 
 be able to reject or alter many things which 
 it formerly allowed to remain untouched, 
 either becaufe it did not perceive them on a 
 tranfient view, or becaufe it was unwilling to 
 chill the ardor of fancy by fo long a delay as 
 would have been neceffary for amending 
 them (^). The end leads a perfon to the dif- 
 
 T» icycc wciy »j avv7(\i7v iTrtcxoTrcyvTi?, on ttiV o-^'iv uvtuv «(^»r«'TEfj 
 tjj wcXXaxi; Xftan Trctovat xui vvt xcit fcaMcv am(,yi.nr,v tij? Tcocpoc f*»« 
 Xflv ^ja^o^aj %v aTrox^VTnu rl ffvn^U **' tc crtiiy.Si^. HAOYTAPX. 
 
 covery
 
 Sect. IV. tipon Genius, 91 
 
 covery of the means which are adapted to it ; 
 and the mutual relations of thefe means de- 
 termine the form and the fituation into which 
 each of them fhould be thrown as it occurs ; 
 judgment will pronounce concerning thefe 
 with confiderable juftnefs, during the forma- 
 tion of the work : but after the work is finifh- 
 ed, when it has the whole in its view at once, 
 it has an opportunity of pronouncing many 
 decifions on points concerning which it had 
 not formerly the means of determining. A 
 view of the whole directs it to retrench one 
 part as fuperfluous in refped of the general 
 defign, to enlarge another as defedive, to 
 foften fome features, to heighten others, to 
 brighten this part, and to cafl that into a 
 fhade* 
 
 In the exertion of genius, judgment not 
 only regulates imagination, in the ways which 
 have been hitherto pointed out, but often 
 likewife fupplies it with new materials. 
 Judgment cannot by its own power fuggefl: a 
 train of ideas, but its determinations often put 
 fancy into a new track, and enable it to ex- 
 tend its views. Imagination can introduce 
 ideas only by pieans of their connexion with 
 fome prefent perception from which it fets out 
 in fearch of them ; and this perception is in 
 
 many
 
 92 Of the infiuence of Judgment Part I. 
 
 many cafes no other than a decifion of judg- 
 ment. Every review that judgment takes of 
 the productions of genius, difcovers fome re- 
 lation of the parts. This relation is a new 
 perception which may tranfport fancy to 
 others that are connected with it, and thus 
 conduct it into regions which it did not for- 
 merly think of exploring, and from which it 
 may bring home many conceptions fit for 
 perfeding its work. A few experiments will 
 enable a philofopher to exercife his judgment 
 fo far as to guefs at the conclufions to which 
 they lead, or to determine the different ways 
 in which the phenomena that they exhi- 
 bit, may be accounted for. And this exer-» 
 tion of reafon will lead him to imagine the 
 farther experiments that are neceifary for 
 bringing the queflion to a decifion, experi-* 
 ments of which he never would have thought 
 if this judgment had not intervened. It is 
 only a judgment that can be the occafi®n of 
 fuggefting what is called an experimmtum 
 cnicis, in philofophical enquiries. Had not 
 judgment been properly exercifed, M. Azout 
 could never have contrived an experiment of 
 this kind, for determining the caufe of the 
 afcent of fluids in exhaufted tubes, nor Sir 
 Ifaac Newton fer evincing indifputably that 
 
 the
 
 Sect. IV. upon Ge^iius, 93 
 
 the inequality of refradion in the prlfmatic 
 image, arifes from an original difference ia 
 the rays of which the light of the fun is com- 
 pofed. When a poet has, by the exercife of 
 judgment, determined the general nature and 
 qualities of the incidents which will be pro- 
 per for promoting the end of his poem, this 
 determination will affift him in finding out 
 fuch incidents. Homer having discovered by 
 judgment, that the defign of an epic poem 
 would be beft accomplifhed by a feries of inci- 
 dents rifmg naturally from one another, and 
 by means of their mutual dependence confti- 
 tuting one adion, doubtlefs found many inci- 
 dents fuggefted to him by this view of the 
 economy of the whole, which might have 
 otherwife efcaped his notice. Spencer having 
 negleded to form fuch a previous judgment 
 of the nature of his work, needed all the 
 force of his amazing fancy, along with the 
 numerous fidions of romance, to furnifh him 
 with fuch a variety of unconnected adventures 
 as might continually engage the foul and fill 
 it with furprife by their extravagance and 
 holdnefs. All the afliftances in invention, 
 which orators have contrived, by means of 
 topics and common places, are founded on 
 6 this
 
 94 Of the infdience of 'judgment Part I. 
 
 this principle ; That judgment, by furveying 
 the work diredts imagination to many quar- 
 ters where it may find conceptions adapted to 
 its purpofe : and Quintilian juftiy obferves, 
 that thefe artificial helps are no farther ufeful 
 than as they enable imagination to take the 
 hint from the decifion of judgment, and by 
 its own force run diredly forward to thofe 
 topics which fuit the prefent cafe {h)* Judg- 
 ment will likewife give a new impulfe to 
 fancy, and prompt us in invention, by per- 
 ceiving an error, either in the matter or in the 
 difpofition. The very fame viev/ of thefe 
 which ferves to deted the fault, will often 
 fuggeft the means by which, not only it may 
 be redified, but new truth or beauty alfo may 
 be produced. It is in this way that an exa- 
 mination of the imperfed or faulty produc- 
 tions of others, often enables a man of genius 
 to make advances in art or fcience, and leads 
 him on to new difcoveries. In fuch ways a3 
 
 {h) Illud quoque ftudlofi eloquentise cogitent, neque om» 
 nibus in caufis ea qua; demonitravimus, cunda pofTe reperiri : 
 neque cum propofua fuerit materia dicendi, rcrutandafingula, 
 et velat olliatim pulfanda, ut fciant an ad probandum id quod 
 intendimus, forte refpondeant, nifi cum difcunt, et adhuc 
 ufu carent. Infinitam enim faciet ipfares dicendi tarditatein, 
 ii Temper necefle fit, ut tentantes unumquodque eorum quod 
 fit aptum atque conveniens, experieudo nofcamus. Inji, Orat. 
 lib. V. cap. 10. 
 
 thefe,
 
 Sect. IV. upon Genius. gjp 
 
 thefe, judgment affifts the imagination, by- 
 putting it in the track of invention, as well 
 as by controling and regulating its opera- 
 tions. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of the Dependence of Genius on other intel- 
 leflual Powers, 
 
 IT was formerly obferved, that all our in- 
 tellectual powers may be reduced to four 
 clafles, fenfe, memory, imagination, and judg- 
 ment. We have found that Genius is the im- 
 mediate offspring of the imagination, and 
 that it is attended by judgment in all its exer- 
 tions. Its relation to fenfe and memory, is 
 more diftant, and its dependence on them 
 more indired. What is the preclfe nature of 
 this relation and dependence, will appear 
 from the following obfervations. 
 
 The aiTociating principles of the mind 
 would never exert themfelves if they were not 
 excited into adion by the impulfe of fome 
 objed: already perceived. It is only when 
 thus excited, that imagination runs out in 
 fearch of thofe ideas which are related to that 
 obje<3:. On this account, in analyfmg the 
 
 operations
 
 «ff6 Of the Dependence of Genius Part I. 
 
 operations of genius, we muft at laft have re- 
 courfe to fome perception giving rife to them, 
 •which was not itfelf fuggefted by imagination, 
 but exhibited either by fenfe or by memory [a), 
 Thefe faculties give therefore in a manner 
 the firft hint of every invention ; a hint per- 
 haps inconfiderable in itfelf, but which may 
 in fome fenfe be confidered as the fource of 
 the whole difcovery that genius makes by 
 means of it. The largeft river takes its rife 
 from fome fmall fountain ; iifuing from this, 
 it rolls its llreams over a long extent of coun- 
 try, and is enlarged during its courfe by the 
 influx of many rivulets derived from fprings 
 no more confiderable than its own, till at laft 
 it becomes an impaflable torrent, liker to the 
 ocean than to the pitiful rill which purled 
 near its fource. In like manner, even thofe 
 works of genius which appear moft ftupen- 
 dous when they are compleated, fpring at firfl 
 from fome fingle perception of fenfe or me- 
 mory, obvious, it may be, and trifling, and 
 become ftupendous only by the gradual accef- 
 fion of ideas fuggefted by perceptions equally 
 trivial and common. We admire with rea- 
 
 («) Quicquld porro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a fen- 
 
 iibus. ClC. dejin. lib. i. Kaj o'la t&uto /xvjTf'pa Twv i^ova-uv ifAv 
 BoXiyn^v iUxi t^'j MNHMOST'NHN. nAOYTAFX, vi{) w«i^. 
 
 tcyuy* 
 
 Ion,
 
 Segt.V, en other hitdkSlual Poivers. 97 
 
 fon, the genius difplayed by Newton in the 
 xlifcovery of the laws of gravitation which the 
 ^eleftial bodies obferve in their revolutions. 
 It was perhaps his perceiving by fenfe a ftone 
 or an apple fall to the ground, without any 
 vifible force impelling it, or the remembrance 
 of this common appearance, that excited his 
 genius, and direded it 10 that train of thought 
 which conduced him at lafl: to the inveftiga- 
 tion of thefe laws. It is affirmed by an anci- 
 ent author (/>), that the accidental hearing of 
 the noife of a fmith's hammers of different 
 weights, gave Pythagoras the firft hint of the 
 caufe of the variety of mufical lounds, and 
 led him by degrees into a complete theory of 
 iiiufic(c). No philofopher would ever go in 
 
 (b) Macros, lib. ii. 
 
 [c) An elegant modern writer relates this remarkable flor)') 
 to the following purpoi'e. " Who would have thought that 
 the clangorous noiie of a fmith's hammers Ihould have givca 
 the tirll rife to mufic ? Yet Macrobius, in his fccond book^ 
 relates that Pythagoras, in palling by a fmith's Ihop, found 
 that the founds proceeding from the hammers were either 
 iiiore grave, or acute, according to the difierent weights of 
 the hammers. The philofopher, to improve this hint, fuA 
 peuds different weights by ilrings of the faire bignefs, and 
 found in like manner that the founds anfvvercd to the weights. 
 This being difcovered, he finds out thofe numbers which pro- 
 duced founds that were confonains : as that two firings of the 
 fame fubltance and tsnfion, the One being double the length 
 of the other, gave that interval which is called diapaj'on or an 
 tighth ; the lame v^as alfo effected from two llnngs of the 
 fame length and fize, the one having four times the ten lion 
 et the other, by theli; Heps, from fo meati a beginning, did 
 
 H fearch
 
 98 Of the Dependence of Genius PartL 
 
 fearch of a theory, if fome phenomenon fub- 
 jedled to his immediate obfervation, did not 
 difpofe him to confider in what manner it 
 may be accounted for. It is the fubjed in 
 which a poet is engaged, and which he has 
 already conceived, that leads him, by refem- 
 blance, to find out an image proper for illuf- 
 trating it. In every cafe, fenfe or memory 
 fets imagination at firft in that road, by pur- 
 fuing which it arrives at important inven- 
 tions. 
 
 The brighteft imagination can fuggeft no 
 idea which is not originally derived from 
 fenfe and memory. In map.y cafes, even in 
 fuch as very much difplay its power, it does 
 no more but call in feafonably the very con- 
 ceptions which fenfe has conveyed, and which 
 memory retains. A philofopher is often led 
 to an important conclufion, by recolleding in 
 its proper place a phenomenon which he re- 
 members to have very commonly obferved. 
 A great part of poetry confifts in defcripticns 
 properly introduced, of thofe external objeds 
 which the poet has actually obferved, or in 
 the expreffion on fuitable occafions, of the 
 
 this man reduce, what was only before nolfe, to one of the 
 mod delightful fclences, by marrying it to the mathematics ; 
 and by that means caufed it to be one of the moft abftrad and 
 demonUrative of fciences." Sp£Ctator, No. 334' 
 
 I fentiments
 
 Sect. V. on other inteUe^uatPo%vet^s. 99 
 
 fentiments and paflions which he has himfelf 
 been confcious of, or which he has d^ifcbvdred 
 in other men on fimilar occafions. It is no 
 reproach to genius to receive its materials 
 thus wholly prepared, from fenfe and me- 
 mory. Its force appears fufliciently in its 
 laying hold on them at the proper time, and 
 arranging them in regular order. Homer's 
 comparifons have ever been and will always 
 be admired as indications of furprifmg genius: 
 the immenfe variety of them, the facility with 
 which they appear to occur, the perfed cor- 
 refpondence of the images with the fubjed: 
 for the illuftration of which they are pro- 
 duced, and the majeilic fimplicity with which 
 they are exprefTed, leave no room to doubt of 
 the poet's genius. But the images themfelves 
 are generally drawn from fuch objeds as he 
 well remembered to have feen. The frag- 
 ments of true hiftory which the fame poeC 
 has related, are to be referred wholly to me- 
 mory ; imagination Vv'-as employed only in the 
 introdudion and application of them. In this 
 manner, as a mafter-builder has his materials 
 prepared by inferiour v/orkmen, or as a hiA 
 tory painter is provided with his colours by 
 the labour of others, fo the faculty of iiu'cn- 
 tion often receives the entire ideas which it 
 
 H 2 exhibits,
 
 100 Of the Dependence of Genius Part L 
 
 exhibits, from the inferiour faculties, and 
 employs itfelf only in applying and arrange- 
 ing them. Hence it proceeds that poets of 
 original genius always exprefs the manners 
 of their own age, and the natural appear- 
 ances which have occurred to themfelves. It 
 was Homer's extenfive obfervation of men 
 and things that fupplied him with fo immenfe 
 a field of thought. The cuftoms of the age 
 diredled Spenfer, at leaft in part, to form his 
 plan on allegorical adventures of chivalry (d)^ 
 and induced TafTo to found his poem on a 
 holy war. OfTian's imagery is fo different 
 from what would be fuggefted by the prefent 
 flate of things, that a modern wTiter could 
 fcarce bring himfelf to run into it, much lefs 
 to preferve it uniformly, by the utmoft efforts 
 of ftudy, or even by defigned imitation ; but 
 it is perfedly agreeable to all that we can con- 
 ceive of the face of nature and the ftate of 
 f »':iety in the times when that author is fup- 
 pofed to have lived. 
 
 But even w^hen imagination does not fug- 
 geft conceptions which have been received 
 entire from fcnfe and memory, but creates 
 fuch as are properly its own, it muft ftill not- 
 withflanding derive from thefe fources, the. 
 
 (</) Warton's Oh/er'vations on spenfer, p. 218. 
 
 ingredients
 
 Sect. V. on other intellectual Foivsrs, loi 
 
 ingredients of which it compounds them. 
 The parts and members of its ideas have 
 been conveyed feparately by the fenfes, and 
 depofited in the memory, though fancy has 
 united them in a manner in which they were 
 never obferved to be combined. The power 
 of fancy is fubje6ted to the fame limitation as 
 our power over the natural world. Give it a 
 flock of fimple ideas, and it will produce an 
 cndlefs variety of complex notions : but as 
 we can create no new fubftance, fo neither 
 can we, except perhaps in a few very pecu- 
 liar inftances, imagine the idea of a fimple 
 quality which we have never had accefs to 
 obferve. When a philofopher attempts a new 
 experiment, he only places bodies already 
 known, in a fituation in which thefe bodies 
 never w^ere obferved, but of which he has an 
 idea by having feen other bodies placed in 
 that or a like relation ; and if he be able, 
 previous to adual trial, to guefs what appear- 
 ances the experiment will difclofe, the ability 
 arifes only from his remembering the refult of 
 another experiment in fome meaiure fimilar 
 to the prefent. The boldeft fidions of the 
 poets, which leaft refemble any thing in na- 
 ture, are yet compofed of parts which really 
 €xift in nature. When Homer formed the 
 
 H 3 idea
 
 1 02 Of the Dependence of Genius Part I. 
 
 idea of Chimera-, he only joined into one ani-. 
 nial, parts which belonged to different ani- 
 mals ; the head of a lion, the body of a goat, 
 and the tail of a ferpent (f). Phidias is fald 
 to have formed his celebrated ftatue of Jupiter, 
 merely by the for^-e of his imagination, from 
 Homer's defcrlption of that deity [f). Yet 
 Hill he only varied a little the ordinary fea- 
 tures of a man. Even thofe painters who 
 have been mod: celebrated ibr invention, have 
 generally fatisfied themfHves with inventing 
 the adlion, and have derived the particular 
 figures and their attitudes from obfervation 
 of feveral individuals, and fometimes even 
 frorn the imitation of one individual. 
 
 Indeed though it were poffible for fancy 
 to create ideas wholly unlike* to thofe things 
 which men have acccfs to obferve, the attempt 
 w^ould prove entirely ufelefs. The artlfl 
 might amufe himfelf ^vlth the forms of his 
 own creation, but they would produce no 
 effc(ft either on the tafte or on the paflions of 
 
 IX. ^. V. i8i. 
 
 (y) A7ro/xj5if«.oy£ii!)i'5-« c£ Toy <i>tiolov oT» •Ti'foi; Tov Tlacyoecivoii eJwe mv 
 
 Trp, Tv,^ O/AWfOf o» i'ssuv iKn^itcav tovtuv' 
 
 H xai Kvcii'ifia-iv I'ss o^ftcri vn.ai Kpou'wi', 
 ^jU-bfiViai o Ufa. pQxircii i'Xwuja-avTo ataKro^ 
 
 others.
 
 Sec T. V. on other intelleclual Poivers. 103 
 
 others. Men can be touched only by ideas 
 which they are able readily to conceive ; and 
 they can conceive only thofe ideas, the mem- 
 bers of v^hich fenfe has already depolited in 
 the memory. On this account we find it dif- 
 ficult to enter into manners very different 
 from our own. The refinement to which 
 we are accuftomed in modern times, renders 
 the fmiplicity of manners which Homer attri- 
 butes to his heroes, an cbjedl of furprlfe. 
 That fimpllcity of manners prevailed In his 
 time, and prevented his contemporaries from 
 affixing an idea of meannefs to many adions 
 and appearances in common life, from which 
 he derives comparifons to illuftrate the fu- 
 blimefl objeds. But modern luxury has raifed 
 the polite into a fphere fo diPdnd: from what 
 is termed low life, that we muft put a fort of 
 force upon our minds, in order to feparate 
 ideas of meannefs from fuch things as can 
 now occur only in a fhepherd*s cottage or a 
 country village. Critics more delicate than 
 judicious, are fo entirely under the influence 
 of this prejudice, that they ftigmatife the paf- 
 fages of ancient authors which refer to cuf- 
 toms very different from thofe of the prefent 
 age. 
 
 H 4 Memory
 
 104 Of the Dependence of Genius Part L 
 
 Memory affifls genius in another rcfped:- 
 To recollect inftead of inventing, fhows a de- 
 feat of genius ; but it were faulty to be fo 
 intent upon invention, as fludioufly to avoid 
 recoUedlion on all occalions. If we lofe fight 
 altogether of the beaten road of memory, we 
 fhall be in danger of miffing our way in the 
 winding paths of imagination. So bold an 
 adventurer will come at laft to regions inha- 
 bited only by monfters. It is not fufficient 
 for rendering a producflion natural, that its 
 feparate parts be copied from real things ; 
 the order and connexions of the real things 
 mufl likewife be in fome meafure imitated. 
 If the parts of a work be put in a fituation 
 totally unlike to that which correfponding 
 objects in nature pofTefs, if will give the fame 
 kind of difguft as if the parts themfelves had 
 been perfedly fantaftical. If a philofopher 
 fhould deduce any phenomenon from a known 
 caufe, by a procefs oppofite to what we have 
 obferved in fimilar cafes, we would fufpedt 
 for this very reafon, that his explication were 
 rather a whimfical hypothefis, than a leglti-. 
 jpaate inveftigation, and we would readily 
 pronounce that his imagination might have 
 been correded by his memory, and led into \ 
 
 much
 
 Sect. V. on other IntelkSlual Powers, 105 
 
 much jufter train of thinking. If a number 
 of events natural in themfelves, were com- 
 bined in the adlon of a poem fo as to fucceed 
 one another in an order and by relations per- 
 fedly diffimilar to every ferics which hiftory 
 or our own obfervation had exhibited, we 
 pould not but be difgufied with this deviation 
 from what memory informs us is the reality 
 of things. The courfe of nature is fo fteddy 
 and regular, that a certain analogy runs thro^ 
 all the parts of it. Whenever any feries of 
 events is exhibited to the mind, memory re- 
 colleQs fome other part of the courfe of na- 
 ture ; and if the ordinary analogy be want-? 
 ing, that feries is pronounced unnatural and 
 improbable. On this account, even in cafes 
 where the greateft latitude is allowed to in- 
 vention, care mull be taken that the offspring 
 of genius bear fome refemblance to the por- 
 trait of nature, which memory retains : and 
 this refemblance cannot be produced unlels 
 memory is confulted while genius exerts 
 itfelf, and this latter faculty in this manner 
 vouchfafes to take its model from the former. 
 This is the foundation of Horace's rule : 
 
 Fi6ta voluptatis caufa fint proxima veris : 
 
 fJe, quodcunque volet, pofcat fibi fabula credi (g-). 
 
 (^) Ars Poet. V. 338. 
 
 In
 
 io6 Of the Bepefidencei &c. Part I. 
 
 In a word, Genius is often led to its inven- 
 tions by a train of ideas fuggefted to it by a 
 fimilar train which memory retains, and it 
 is only the remembrance of the latter that 
 enables judgment to determine concerning the 
 juftnefs o£ the former. 
 
 PART
 
 / 
 
 [ 107 ] 
 
 PART IL 
 
 Of the general Sources of the Varieties 
 
 of Genius^ 
 
 E N I U S always arifes from thofe prin- 
 ciples of the human mind which we 
 have pointed cut ; but it derives confiderable 
 diverfities of form from the different modifi- 
 cations of thefe principles. Imagination be- 
 ing that faculty which is the immediate fource 
 of genius, we muft fearch for the origin of 
 the varieties of genius, chiefly in the feveral 
 modifications of which imagination is fufcep- 
 tible. But becaufe imagination is attended 
 and affifted in all the exertions of genius, by 
 other faculties, without the co-operation of 
 which its eff^eds would be extremely imper- 
 fed, fome of the varieties of genius are no 
 doubt partly owing to the peculiar force or 
 modification of thefe other faculties. On this 
 account, an examination of the, different 
 forms which all the powers combined in per- 
 fect genius afTume, and of the different laws 
 by which they are guided, will be neceflary, 
 in order to prepare us for an inveftigation of 
 
 the different kinds of genius. 
 
 SECT.
 
 I o8 Of the ^alities of Ideas Part II, 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of the Sources of the Varieties of Genius in the 
 Imagination 'j particularly of the ^alities 
 of Ideas it' hie h produce AJfociation, 
 
 IT has been remarked already, that imagi- 
 nation produces genius chiefly by the 
 tendency which it has to aflbciate different 
 perceptions, fo that one of them being pre- 
 fent, it may introduce others to our view 
 without our being confcious of any defign or 
 our needing any effort to call them up. This 
 tendency of imagination has been often taken 
 notice of. Some late philofophers have ob- 
 ferved that imagination does not ad at ran- 
 dom in affociating ideas, and have, with con- 
 fiderable fuccefs, traced out the laws by which 
 it is governed, or afcertained thofe qualities 
 of ideas, and thofe relations fubfifling between 
 ideas, which fit them for being affociated or 
 for introducing each other into the mind [a). 
 In examining this fubjedl, fo far as is neceffary 
 for unfolding the principles of genius, 1 fhall 
 not fcrupuloufly avoid repeating what has 
 
 {a) See Treati/e on Human Nature y vol. i. part I. fe(5l, 4. 
 flemgKtf efCrifki/m, chap. i. 
 
 beett
 
 Sect. I. ivhich produce Affociation, 109 
 
 been obferved by others ; but fhall endeavour 
 to throw all that occurs, into that form which 
 will be moft fubfervient to the particular pur- 
 pofe which I have in view. 
 
 In fearching for the laws of aflbciation, it 
 is natural to enquire, firft, what are the qua- 
 lities or relations of ideas themfelves, which 
 fit them for being aflbciated ; and next, whe- 
 ther there be any principles in the human 
 Gonftitution, which afFe(St the aflbciation of 
 ideas, fo as to make fome to unite more rea- 
 dily than others which yet ate equally poflefl'- 
 ed of the aflbciating qualities or relations. 
 
 Among thofe qualities or relations of 
 ideas, which fit them for being aflbciated, 
 there is an obvious diftindtion : fome of 
 them 2XtJimple^ others are compounded. The 
 fimple principles of aflbciation may be re- 
 duced to three, refembla7ice, contrariety^ and 
 'vicinity. 
 
 Perceptions may refemble one another 
 in diff^erent manners, and in very difl^erent 
 degrees ; but whenever they at all refemble, 
 one of them being prefent to the mind, will 
 naturally tranfport it to the conception of the 
 other. When we look at a picture, we are 
 naturally led by refemblance, to think of the 
 perfon whom the pidure reprefents. Per- 
 ceiving
 
 110 Of the ^alifics of Ideas Part IL 
 
 ceiving any individual, we naturally think of 
 any other individual of the fame fpecies, with 
 which we happen to be acquainted. The 
 mention of any phenomenon or event, rea- 
 dily brings into our view another phenome- 
 non or event fimilar in its caufe, its nature, 
 its circumftances, or its confequences. " It 
 **- hath been obferved, fays Lord Verulam {h\ 
 *' by the ancients, that fait water will dilTolve 
 " fait put into it, in lefs time than frefli wa- 
 *^ ter will diflblve it. — -Try it with fugar put 
 *' into water formerly fugared, and into other 
 " water unfugared." Here one fact fuggefts 
 an analogous or fimilar trial. Shakefpear 
 reprefents Northumberland as guided by this 
 aflbciating quality, when he faw Morton 
 come in hafte from, the battle where his fon 
 had been engaged, pale, trembling, agitated, 
 at a lofs what to fay ; and reprefents him very 
 naturally as led by this occafion to think of a 
 like event : 
 
 Thou trembled:, and the whitenefs in thy cheek 
 Is aptcr than thy tongue to tell thy errand. 
 Ev'n fuch a man, fo faint, fo fpiritlefs, 
 So dull, fo dead in look, fo woe-be-gone, 
 Drew Priam's curtain in the dead of nig-hr. 
 And would have told him half his Troy was burn'd j 
 
 (b) Sylva Sylvarum, Cent. 9, Exp. 83, 
 
 Buc
 
 Sect. I. which produce AJfociation. iw 
 
 But Priam found the fire, ere he his rongue j 
 And I my Piercy's death, ere thou report'ft it [c]. 
 
 Any one quality or circumftance common to 
 two perceptions, forms a refemblance between 
 them, fufficient to connect them in the ima- 
 gination : it is generally fuch an imperfect 
 refemblance as this, that fuggefls fimilitudes 
 and images (J). 
 
 Contrariety is a word commonly ufed 
 with confiderable latitude. There are fome 
 perceptions which do not readily introduce 
 their contraries : but in very many inftances 
 a perception does fuggeft another which is in 
 fome fenfe contrary to it ; and therefore con- 
 trariety may juftly be confidered as a princi- 
 ple of affociation. " The fun-beams, fays 
 " Verulam (^), do turn wine into vinegar. 
 " but ^i. Whether they would not fweeteri 
 " verjuice ?" In this cafe, one efFedt of the 
 fun-beams leads him to conceive a contrary 
 effect in a contrary fubjed:. When light is 
 perceived, it does not cafily fuggeif-che idea 
 of darknefs ; but the perception of (larknefs 
 very quickly fuggefls the idea of light. In 
 
 (0 Second part o^ Henry IV. aft i. fcene 3. 
 
 {d") Non enim res tota toti rei neceffe eft fimilis fit, fed 
 ad ipfum, ad quod conferetur, fimilitudinem habeat oportec. 
 Ad Htreii, lib. iv. 
 
 (J) Inqiiifuio de Calore et Frigore, 
 
 health
 
 112 Of the ^lalities of Ideas Part if. 
 
 health we are not ready to think of ficknefs ; 
 but ficknefs forcibly introduceth the idea of 
 heahh. When we feel cold, we very natu- 
 rally think of heati and of the pleafure of thofe 
 who enjoy it. When we are warm and com- 
 fortably lodged in a ftormy night, it is not 
 uncommon to refled: with pity on the oppo- 
 lite condition of thofe who are abroad : here 
 however the aflbciation is affifted by, and is 
 perhaps chiefly owing to the perception of the 
 ftorm, fuggefting ideas of its effeds. Re- 
 markable dangers or diftreffes in which a per- 
 fon has feme time been involved, dwell on 
 his imagination, and are brought into his 
 view by every thing of an oppofite nature, in 
 his after fitiiation. A perfon raifed fuddenly 
 to profperity, riches, or power, will fome- 
 times find his forrtier poverty, meannefs, or 
 obfcurity forcing itfelf into his thoughts; and 
 they v/ill much oftner be fuggefted to fpeda- 
 tors, by the view of his prefent elevation. A 
 pe;"fon fallen into adverfity of any kind, will 
 find himfelf ftill more ftrongly difpofed to 
 recoiled: the profperity which preceded it; 
 the imagination of a fpedator alfo is naturally 
 led to the thought of this. Old men opprefled 
 with infirmities, and become incapable of 
 enjoym^ent, naturally dwell on the ftrength, 
 
 5 tli«
 
 Sect. I. ivhich produce AJJhciation. 113 
 
 the adivity, and the picafurcs of their youth. 
 A monarch groaning under the cares of go- 
 vernment, and kept awake by his difquietudc, 
 will readily think on the eafe of the peafant, 
 and refled:, 
 
 How many thoufands of my poorefl fubjedts 
 Are at this hour afleep ! [f) 
 
 The refledion is luggefled by a twofold con- 
 trariety, that between the meannefs of the 
 fubjed and the elevation of the king, and 
 that between the eafe of the former and the 
 reftleffnefs of the latter. A perfon*s difpoii- 
 tion or condud at one time, will put us in 
 mind of a contrary difpoiition which he has 
 poiTefled, or of a contrary condud which he 
 has purfued, at another time. Friendfhip be- 
 tween pcrfons Vv'ho have been reconciled, na- 
 turally puts us in mind of their former en- 
 mity. Enmity aiifing between old friends, 
 fuggefls the idea of their intimacy in times 
 paft. Shakefpcar introduces King Henry as 
 faying, when he heard of Northumberland's 
 rebellion, 
 
 'Tis not ten years fince Richard and Northum- 
 berland 
 Did feaft together ; and in two years after 
 
 (/) Second Part of Hexrj IV. ac^ 3. fcene r, 
 
 I Were
 
 ii4 Of the ^uiMes of Ideas Part 11. 
 Were they at wars : it is but eight years fince 
 This Piercy was the man neareft my foul. 
 Who like a brother toil'd in my affairs. 
 And laid his love and life under my foot ; 
 Yea, for my fake, ev'n to the eyes of Richard, 
 Gave him defiance. [g) 
 
 In like manner any fpecies of behaviour in one 
 perfon, will fometimes fuggeft contrary or 
 very different conduct in another. Thus 
 King Henry, on hearing the exploits of 
 young Piercy, naturally fays, 
 
 Yea there thou mak'fl me fad, and mak'ft me fin 
 In envy that my Lord Northumberland 
 Should be the father of fo blefl a fon, 
 A fon who is the theme of honour's tongue, 
 Amongft a grove the very ftraighteft plant. 
 Who is fweet fortune's minion and her pride j 
 Whilfl I by looking on the praife of him. 
 See riot and difhonour ftain the brow 
 Of my young Harry. {h) 
 
 The fame poet furnifhes us with a compli- 
 cated example of the influence of contrariety 
 in fuggefting ideas, in a palTage of Clifford*& 
 fpeech to Henry VT. York's ambitious care 
 of his fon, fuggefls the King's faulty indif- 
 ference about his fon ; and this again fug- 
 gefts the care of brute creatures about their 
 
 {g) Second part of ^if«r;' IV. acl 3. fcene 2, 
 {h) Yiiii T^&n oi Henry \Y , ad 1. icene i. 
 
 offspring.
 
 Sect. I. ivhich produce /^Jfociation. ii^ 
 
 offspring, their irrational nature forming at 
 the fame time another contraft between them 
 and a human being : 
 
 He but a Duke, would have his fon a King, 
 
 And r.iife his iffue like a loving fire -, 
 
 Thou being a King, bled with a goodly fon, 
 
 Did'ft yiekl confenc to difinherit him ; 
 
 Which argued thee a moil unloving father. 
 
 Unreaibnuble creatures feed their young. 
 
 And though man's face be fearful to their eyes, 
 
 Yet in prote6lion of their tender ones 
 
 Who hath not feen them (even with thofe wings 
 
 Which fometimes they have us'd with tearful 
 
 flight) 
 Make war with him who climb'd into their neft, 
 Off'ring their own hvcs m their young's de- 
 fence ? (z) 
 
 Here two birds ufmg their wings for repelling 
 danger, fuggefts to the poet the oppo fuc pur- 
 pofe of flying from danger, for which they 
 commonly employ them. Thus many per- 
 ceptions naturally introduce fuch others as 
 are in fome fenfe contrary to them. Indeed 
 fo much does contrariety influence the train 
 of our ideas, that a great part of common 
 converlation, efpecially that of old men, con- 
 fifts in remarking the changes, vicilTitades, 
 
 (J) Third part oi Henry VI. adt 2. fccne 3. 
 
 I 2 and
 
 1 1 6 Of the ^uilitus of Ideas P A R t II. 
 
 and reverfes which ihcy have had occafion to 
 obferve in perfons and in things. 
 
 Vicinity is Hkewife a principle of aflb- 
 ciation among ideas. The conception of any 
 cbje£t naturally carries the thought to the idea 
 of another objedl which was connected with it 
 cither in place or in time. Mention one 
 houfe in a city, or one feat in a country with 
 which w^e are acquainted, we naturally think 
 and talk of others adjacent ; and frequently 
 when we are not acquainted with them, we 
 even make an eifort to imagine them. Bring 
 us to a place where w^e have formerly been, 
 or only fpeak of it, immediately ideas of per- 
 fons whom we have feen, of eonverfations ia 
 which we have been engaged, of adlions 
 which we have done, or of fcenes which we 
 have witnefTed, in that place or near it, croud 
 into our mind. 
 
 Nemo libenter recollt, qui lasfit locum {k]» 
 
 If any event be mentioned, the mind very 
 naturally fets out from it, and goes on recol- 
 leding a whole feries of fuccefiive events. 
 Nothing is more common than for an hifto- 
 rian to introduce the relation of an event no- 
 wife related to his fubje6t, with this obfcrva- 
 
 i^k) PhjEdr. lib.i. fab, iS. 
 
 tion.
 
 Sect. I. ^vhich produce AJfoclation, 117 
 
 tion, that it happened in the place or about 
 the time of which he is writing. The pro- 
 lixity of circumftantial and involved ftory- 
 tellers often aiifes wholly from this, that 
 they croud into their narration, a multitude 
 of circumftances which have no connexion 
 with the thread of it, but have happened to 
 be contiguous in place or in time to fome 
 particular incidents, and are continually fug- 
 gefted to the fpeaker, by means of this rela- 
 tion. " A gentleman," fays one of the 
 authors of the Spedator, ** whom I had the 
 ** honour to be in company with the other 
 " day, upon fome occafion that he was pleaf- ■ 
 " ed to take, faid, he remembered a very 
 ** pretty repartee made by a very witty man 
 " in King Charles's time upon the like occa- 
 " lion. I remember, faid he, much about 
 " the time of Oates's plot, that a coufin- 
 '' german and I were at the Bear in riolburn, 
 ** — Jack Thomfcn was there, — I am fure it 
 ** was fpoken fomewhcre thereabouts, for we 
 '* drank a bottle in that neighbourliood every 
 " evening (/)." The occaficn of the flcry is 
 fuggefled by means of refemblance; all the 
 circumftances of the ftory which we have 
 tranfcribed, are fuggefled only by vicinity. 
 
 (/) Spectator, No. )3«. 
 
 I 3 There
 
 Ii8 Of the ^alities of Ideas Part II, 
 
 There are other qualities or relations of a 
 compound nature, which fit ideas for being 
 afTcciated and for introducing one another. 
 They are produced by the union of the fimple 
 relations already mentioned, with one another 
 or with other circumftanccs. Such are fo- 
 ex'i/lence, the relation of caife and effcB^ and 
 order. 
 
 When qualities are co-exiftent in any ob- 
 jed:, they are conceived by the mind as con- 
 neded both in time and in place, and this 
 connexion is regarded as conftant and per- 
 manent. Thefe relations of the parts have fo 
 great influence on the mind, and conned; the 
 ideas of the parts fo ftrongly in the imagina- 
 tion, that we conceive them all with almoft 
 as great facility as we could conceive any one 
 of them. On this account we beftow unity 
 on the w^iole colledion, and confider them all 
 as making but one perception. We have fo, 
 ilrong a propeniity to this, that it cofts us, 
 fome trouble to analyfe a complex perception 
 into its parts ; and indeed this is feldom at- 
 tempted by the generality of mankind. A 
 number of diftind perceptions being thus 
 united, by co-exiftence, in the imagination, 
 any one of them occurring to the mind, fug- 
 gefts the reft. If we fmell any fruit at a dif- 
 
 tance^
 
 Sect. I. ijuh'ich produce Ajfociation, 119 
 
 tance, we immediately conceive its colour, 
 fhape, and tafte. If we ftiould find one wheel 
 of a watch, or one part of a machine in a 
 defert, it would call up the idea of the ma- 
 chine to which it belongs. 
 
 The relation of caufe and efted, which 
 likewife fits ideas for being aflbciated, is a 
 compound relation : it includes conjundtion in 
 place, for the caufe is always conceived as 
 contiguous to its efFe<5t ; it includes conjunc- 
 tion in time, for the caufe is always prior to 
 the effe6l ; and the caufe is always fuppofed 
 to exert power or energy in producing the 
 efFed, or at leaft to have fomehow a fitnefs to 
 produce it, fo that the effect has a depend- 
 ence upon that caufe (;;/). The conception of 
 a caufe naturally leads us to think of the 
 effed; ; and the conception of an effedt as na- 
 turally conveys our thought to the idea of 
 the caufe. The fight of a wound leads us 
 immediately to conceive both the pain which 
 it occafions, and the weapon by which it was 
 produced. Thinking of any perfon, we na- 
 turally recolle^fl fome aQion of which he vv^as 
 the author. Thinking of any tranfadion, we 
 
 (»;) Caufa autem ea eft, qus id efficit, cujus eft caufa, ut 
 vulnus, mortis ; cruditas, morbi ; ignis, ardoris. Itaque non 
 fie caufa intelligi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedat, id ei 
 caufa fit, fed quod cuique eflicienter antecedat. Cic deFato, 
 
 I 4 naturally
 
 I20 Of the ^lizl'itUs of Ideas Part H. 
 
 natur^illy recoiled the perfons who were con- 
 cerned in it, and even reflect on other parts ^ 
 of their behaviour. The prefence or the men- 
 tion of the fon of a friend, naturally intro- 
 duces the idea of the father. 
 
 It was remarked formerly that in every 
 work of genius, all the parts are connedted 
 with the defign, and that the ftrength of that 
 affociating principle by which they are con- 
 neded with it, produces regularity of imagi- 
 nation. We may now obferve that this con- 
 nexion wiiich fubfiils between the parts and 
 the defign, and in general the connexion be- 
 tween all means and their end, is a fpecies of 
 the relation of caufe and effedt. Every part 
 of a regular work, both in fcience and in the 
 arts, either immediately promotes the defign, 
 or is fubfervient to fome other part which 
 promotes it. When a perfon has a diftintf]; 
 view", and a flrong and ileddy perception of 
 the defign, it will lead him to conceive all the 
 fubordinate ends which muft be attained in 
 order to accompllfli the main defign, and 
 which, in rcfpedt of it, are means or imme- 
 diate caufes. Each of thefe fubordinate ends 
 will fiiggeft the m.eans by which it may be 
 effected, keeping the ultimate defign at the 
 fame time conftantly in view. Thus, by the 
 
 affociating
 
 Sect. I. ivhich produce yjljfociation. 121 
 
 ^fTociating force of caufe and effect, the whole 
 out-lines of the work will be at once prefented 
 to the mind ; and partly by means of this 
 relation, and partly by means of other rela- 
 tions, they will introduce all the conceptions 
 which are requifite for finifliing it. What- 
 ever conception is introduced, firft the fubor- 
 dinate ends, and next, by their influence, 
 the ultimate end will recur to the thought, 
 and difpofe us either to adopt the conception 
 as fuitable, or to rejedl it as unferviceable. 
 When a perfon has a lively and conftant view 
 of the end of a work, it will produce an ha- 
 bitual fenfe that he is in fearch of means fit 
 to promote that end, though perhaps he does 
 not often explicitly refledt upon it. The 
 fenfe of this will keep his imagination in a 
 preparation and difpofition for being peculi- 
 arly affe£ted with the relation between the 
 ineans and the end. In confequence of this, 
 not only does the end fugged the natural 
 means of promoting it, but moreover what- 
 ever idea almoft occurs to the mind, the per- 
 fon has a tendency to view it on all fides, on 
 purpofe to fee whether it can in any way con- 
 tribute to that end, the perception of which 
 dwells continually on his imagination. The 
 eifeds of a ftrong aflbciation of the defign, 
 
 were
 
 122 Of the ^lallties of Ideas Part H. 
 
 were formerly pointed out ; the obfervations 
 nov/ made, explain what this aflbciation of 
 th,e defign is, and how it is fitted for produ- 
 cing thefe effeds. 
 
 Order evidently produces a ftrong con- 
 nexion between ideas, and gives one great 
 power to introduce others. It is a com- 
 pounded relation which may take place either 
 between the parts of the fame thing or be-? 
 tween different things. Order arifes fronx 
 things being united or placed together, ac- 
 cording as they are more clofely related. 
 When the parts of a machine are properly 
 combined, they have order ; if they be either 
 laid in a heap, or any of them mifplaced, the 
 order is deflroyed. In a regular treatife on 
 any fubje6l, order is preferved through the 
 whole ; in a fet of aphorifms there is no order. 
 In the former cafe, one part very readily 
 fuggefts the reH: ; in the latter, it is not fo. 
 It is this principle of order that gives the parts 
 of any regular fyftern a peculiar povvcr to 
 fuggeft ideas both of the other parts and of 
 the whole. By means of it, the parts of an 
 edifice have a ftrider union in the imagina- 
 tion, than the parts of a heap of flones ; the 
 parts of a plant or of an animal body in their 
 united fxate, are more clofely aflbciated than 
 
 they
 
 Sect. I. ivhich produce AJfociation. 123 
 
 they would be if they were difunited and yet 
 huddled into a narrower compafs. By means 
 of the fame principle, an event will fuggeft 
 another on which it had an influence, much 
 more eafily than one with which it had no 
 connexion, though contemporary or immedi- 
 ately fucceffive. We run with great facility 
 over a train of perceptions in order ; but if 
 we negled: their order, the mind finds great 
 difficulty in paffing from one of them to the 
 others. 
 
 All the relations of ideas, which fit them 
 for being aflbciated, are reducible to thofe 
 that have been mentioned. We often ima- 
 gine that fome of thefe relations belong to 
 ideas to which they do not belong : but in 
 this cafe, as we are not fenfible of our mif- 
 take, they produce, though they be merely 
 imaginary, as ftrong afibciationas if they had 
 been real. 
 
 Before we finifh this part of the fubje^t, 
 it will not be improper to obferve, That thefe 
 feveral relations or qualities of ideas operate 
 upon the imagination in an inftin^live or me- 
 chanical way, that is, without our refled-ing 
 that they belong to the ideas. When one 
 idea has fuggcfled another, we difcover on 
 comparing them, that they do, for inrtance, 
 
 5 refemble
 
 124 Of the ^lalities of Ideas Part IL 
 
 refemble each other : but it was not a pre- 
 vious perception of their refemblance that 
 made the one to fuggeft the other ; it fug- 
 gefled it inflindlively without our perceiving 
 at the time, how or wherefore it fuggefted it. 
 Hence, though aflbciation of all the kinds 
 that have been mentioned, is natural to all 
 men, yet every man is fo far from knowing 
 diftindlly the qualities and relations of ideas 
 which produce aflbciation, that the enumera- 
 tion of them is but a recent difcovery among 
 philofophers themfelves. Before two percep-^ 
 tions can be compared, they muft be both 
 prefent to the mind ; but except it happen 
 tliat both are exhibited together by fenfe or 
 memory, one of them becomes prefent to the 
 mind only by its being fuggefted by the 
 other, by means of fome of the relations 
 which fubfifl between them, operating mecha- 
 nically on the imagination. In moil: cafes 
 indeed, the relations of the ideas have been 
 often perceived ; and the oftcncr they have 
 been attended to, and the more diftinclly they 
 are apprehended, the mere ftrongly vnW the 
 ideas be aifociated and the more readily will 
 one of them fuggeft the other. Imaginary, 
 eroundlefs, and unnatural affociations of ideas, 
 always prefuppofe an opinion, though a falfe 
 6 opinion,
 
 Sect. I. ivhich produce AJfoclation. i2j 
 
 opinion, fomehow imbibed of their being re- 
 lated; but after this opinion is formed, the 
 fuppofed connexion operates on the imagina- 
 tion, mechanically, and without our refleding 
 on its original foundation. In the fame me- 
 chanical manner the real relations of ideas, 
 even fuch as have been moil frequently re- 
 fle<fled upon, ad: on the imagination in fug- 
 gefting one another; the previous compari- 
 fons of the ideas, and perceptions of their 
 relations, are only caufes which contribute to 
 their acting with the greater force, 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of the Influence of Hah'it on Ajjbciation. 
 
 WE fhall next enquire, What othec 
 principles there are in the human 
 conftltution, which affed: the aflbciation of 
 ideas fo as to make fome to unite more readily 
 than others, equally poiTefled of the aflbciating 
 qualities or relations juft now enumerated. 
 There are two principles of this kind, whofe 
 influence is very evident; habity and the paf 
 ftons. Any prefent perception introduces 
 fuch ideas related to it, as we have been ac- 
 cuftomed to, and fuch as are congruous to 
 
 the 
 
 \
 
 1 26 Of the Influence of Habit P A rt IL 
 
 the pafTion which influences us at the time, 
 much more readily than others which are 
 equally related to that perception. Both thefe 
 principles not only afteO: in this manner the 
 introducSlion of Ideas which are aflbclated by 
 means of relations fiibfiftlng between them, 
 but are likewife themfelves diftin6b and fepa- 
 rate caufes of aflbciatlon : habit, or a prefent 
 paflion, often fuggefts trains of ideas which 
 derive their connexion, not from their rela- 
 tion to one another, but chiefly from their 
 congruity to the habit or the paflion. 
 
 "When we confider habit as determining 
 fome related ideas to be more readily aflbciat- 
 ed than others equally related, its effeds are 
 chiefly the three following. 
 
 First, An idea which cuftom has render- 
 ed familiar to us, will be more eafily intro- 
 duced by any prefent perception, than an- 
 other idea which is equally related to that 
 perception, but which we are little accuftomed 
 to think upon. This effect of habit is very 
 confpicuous, not only in common life, but 
 likev;ife in all works of genius. It was re- 
 marked before, that perfons in the habits of 
 the modern religious orders are introduced * 
 into many pi(flures reprefentifig parts of the 
 gcfpel hiftory, and that a very little exercife 
 
 of
 
 Sect. II. on Ajfociatlon. iiy 
 
 of judgment would have direded the painter 
 to reject this abfurdity as foon as it came into 
 his thoughts : but glaring as the abfurdity is, 
 it is by no means furprifmg that it fhould 
 come into the thoughts of a popifh painter. 
 He is fo much accuftomed to fee the religious 
 of his church, and they are fo invariably 
 bearing a part in every adion of a facred na- 
 ture, of which he can be a fpedator, that ha- 
 bit can fcarce fail to bring them into his 
 view, whenever the fubjed: of his work has 
 any the ilighteft relation to them. There are 
 fome objeds and appearances of objeds in 
 nature, open and obvious to the obfervation 
 of all, and therefore rendered by cu (lorn fa- 
 miliar to all. Thefe objeds and appearances 
 fupply the fimllitudes and images which have 
 been molt early appropriated, and moft fre- 
 quently ufed by poets and orators. The rea- 
 fon is plain; becaufe 'referablance and habit 
 united their force in fuggefting them, they 
 occurred more readily than images which 
 were fuggefted by refemblance alone. When 
 a writer abounds in images of this kind, and 
 in them only, we are apt to pronounce with- 
 out hefitation, that he is a mere imitator. 
 But this judgment is too hafty : the fame 
 caufe which has rendered thefe images trite 
 
 and
 
 128 Of the Infuence of Habit Part II. 
 
 and common, will always make a perfon of 
 indrfFcixnt genius to run into them, even 
 without imitation. Images from objects and 
 appearances which are not very common, can- 
 not be iuggefted to a perfon, except his ima- 
 gination be lively, fo that the afTociating 
 principle of refemblance be vigorous enough 
 to introduce them without any affiftance from 
 habit ; and therefore a perfon who has a weak 
 imagination, is almofl necefiarily confined to 
 images taken from things whofe familiarity 
 has made them already occur to many. Thus 
 the moft common defeat of genius in poets 
 and orators, is a ftriking inftance of the power 
 which habit has to afTift the operation of the 
 affociating qualities of ideas. Its power is 
 likewife evident in authors and artifts of the 
 greateft genius. A painter of real genius will 
 always reprefent, and a poet of real genius 
 will always draw his images from th^t Hate 
 and face of nature which occurs in the places 
 he is acquainted with, and thofe objedts and 
 appearances which he himfelf has had occafion 
 to obferve ; and by this means he often dif- 
 tinguifhes himfelf from imitators, who not 
 having genius fufficient for obferving the 
 great original. Nature, the real appearances 
 of things exhibited to themfelves, defcribe 
 
 them
 
 Sect. 11. en Affociation. 129 
 
 them as they have been already defcribed by 
 others in lituations totally different. But in 
 thefe imitators too, the force of cuftom in 
 facilitating the introduction of ideas, is ob- 
 fervable : they have often attended to the de- 
 fcriptions of others, they have feldom been 
 ilruck with the originals in Nature ; by this 
 means the reprefentations of others are more 
 familiar to them than any images of their 
 own ; and that is the reafon why they more 
 readily occur to them. 
 
 When a perfon is intent on a particular 
 fludy, or meditating any work of genius, 
 when in confequence of this his thoughts 
 cuftomarily dwell upon it, every thing that 
 occurs to him in reading, in converfation or 
 in life, immediately brings his prefenc work 
 or fludy into his view, and fets him on think- 
 ing, whether, and in what manner, it may 
 be accommodated to that work or ftudy, and 
 rendered ufeful in them. Had the fame thing 
 occurred to a perfon engaged in a different 
 purfuit, it would have led him, by the fame 
 principle, to apply it to a quite ditFerent pur- 
 pofe. The example that was iaft produced^ 
 fuggefts an illuftration of this remark. An 
 ingenious modern critic being employed in 
 afcertaining the marks of imitation, took no- 
 
 K tice
 
 130 Of the Injluence of Hahit P a r t II. 
 
 tice that fome of the lingllfli poets defcribe 
 the Spring, not as they have obferved it in 
 their own climate, but as they have been ac- 
 cuftomed to fee it defcribed by the poets of 
 warmer regions, who painted what they really 
 experienced : this, in conformity to the dcfign 
 which occupied his thoughts, fuggeiled to 
 him one mark of imitation, " That where the 
 *' local peculiarities of Nature are to be de- 
 " fcribed, there an exad conformity of the 
 *' matter will evince an imitation (rt).'* The 
 writer of this eflay finding this obfervation in 
 that ingenious critic, it occurred to him, that 
 it might be applied in both its parts, for ex- 
 emplifying the force of cuftom in promoting 
 the introdu6lion of ideas connected by fome of 
 the aflfociating qualities. To a third perfon it 
 might have fuggefled fomething totally dif- 
 ferent, but fui table to the particular purpofe 
 which happened to be moft familiar to him at 
 the time. 
 
 Every profefTion or way of life renders a 
 correfpondcnt fet of ideas familiar to a per- 
 fon ; and in confequence of this, the fame 
 objed; frequently leads different perfons into 
 totally different tracks of thinking. A plant 
 which fuggcffs an image or defcription to a 
 
 (rf) Hurd's Letter to Mr, Mafcn, en the Marks of Intitatien. 
 
 poet.
 
 S ft c T . IL on AJJociation. 131 
 
 poet, will engage the botanift in determining 
 to what clafs it belongs, the chemift in think- 
 ing of the procefs by which it may be ana- 
 lyfed, and the phyfician in conlidering its 
 virtues as a medicine. The view of the hea- 
 vens in a fine evening will lead the thoughts 
 of the aftronomer to the fyftem of the uni- 
 verfe, will make the painter conceive a land- 
 fcape, will fupply the poet with noble image- 
 ry, and engage the divine in a train of 
 religious meditation. Mention an event or 
 tell a ftory in a mixt Company, it will fugged 
 to, perhaps, every individual of the com- 
 pany, different thoughts or reflections ; but 
 what it fuggefts to each, will generally be 
 fomething which his own habitual courfe of 
 life or a prefent accident renders familiar to 
 him. Tell the news of a battle, or fpeak of 
 a perfon who has fallen in it j the ladies ex- 
 f refs their fympathy with the wives or mo- 
 thers of the flain ; the merchant takes notice 
 in what manner trade is affedred bv the war ; 
 the foldier fpeaks of the glory of dying in the 
 field, or relates his own campaigns, exploits^ 
 and wounds ; the politician inftruds the com- 
 pany concerning the origin of the war, the 
 motives to it, and the advantages or the loifes 
 to be derived from it ; the fcholar recollects 
 
 K 2 fome
 
 13^ Of the Influence of Bahit Part If * 
 
 fome battle rendered famous by claflical de- 
 Icriptlon, or traces the revolutions in the art 
 ©f war ; and if there be a poet in the circle, 
 ke wiir perhaps, inattentive to all that pafTes, 
 be employed in forming filently a lively con- 
 ception of the fcene. 
 
 . Jn ail thefe inftances it is plain that cuflom^ 
 gives great affiftance to any of the affociatin^:^ 
 qualities with which it happens to eo-operate, 
 and makes them introduce an idea that is fa- 
 miliar to us rather than another lefs familiar, 
 though to this latter thefe qualities equally 
 belong. Conceptions to which we are not 
 accuftomed, are fhy to enter into the mind % 
 it requires a fort of force to bring them into 
 view ; they muft have a very flrong relation to 
 the prefent perception before it be able to in- 
 troduce them. But cuftom gives the ideas 
 which it has rendered familiar, a tendency ta 
 occur ; they ftand ready, as it were, to enter 
 on the flighteft occafion ; we have a ftrong 
 propenfity to think of them ; any relation ta 
 the prefent objed of thought, however weak, 
 w^ill be fufficient to introduce them ; and a 
 flrong relation to it, will fuggeft them with 
 the greateft eafe and quicknefs. The difpofi- 
 tion of our mind towards familiar ideas, is 
 thus analogous to our inclination towards our 
 
 acquaintance j
 
 Sect.il on Ajfociation. 133 
 
 acquaintance ; it is with a fort of reludance, 
 or not without fome ceremony, that we go 
 into the company of Grangers ; but we need 
 fmall inducement to feek the company of aa 
 old friend ; we enter into it with perfed: eafe* 
 nay cannot without difficulty be reftrained 
 from entering into it. 
 
 Secondly, cuftom renders us more apt to 
 be afFeded with one of the aflbciating qualities 
 than with others. We fhall have occafion to 
 obferve afterwards, that by the original con- 
 llitution of nature, the imagination is often 
 more apt to be affeded with one of the aflb- 
 ciating qualities than with the reft. This 
 natural propenfity may give occafion to a ha- 
 bit of following chiefly one of them. But 
 though the mind were by nature equally open 
 to the influence of all the aflbciating qualities, 
 yet various accidents may lead a perfon to be 
 influenced for a confiderable time together, 
 by one aflbciating quality only, or by one 
 much oftener than by others. Whenever 
 this happens, a habit will be acquired of paf- 
 fing from one perception to another, by 
 means chiefly of that aflbciating quality ; and 
 that habit once formed, will produce a pro- 
 penfity to continue ftill to trace perceptions 
 principally by that particular quality, or will 
 
 K 3 add
 
 134 Of the Influence of Hahit Part II. 
 
 add ftrength to the propenGty v/hich was de^ 
 rived from nature. This obfervation might 
 be confirmed by a multitude of inftances. 
 Let a perfon who has been much accuftomed 
 to mathematical ftudies, write on the moft 
 diffimilar fubjeds, he not only throws his 
 treatife as much as poffible into the mathe- 
 matical form, but is difpofed to feek for and 
 conceive relations between his ideas, refern-r 
 bling the mathematical relations. It was per- 
 haps the habit of attending to the mathe- 
 matical fciences, that difpofed Dr. Clark to 
 explain the foundation of morals, in the 
 manner in which he has explained it, to 
 place it in fitnefs or congruity, and to deduce 
 that congruity from abftrad: relations, inftead 
 of referring it to the conftitution of man, or 
 to the moral nature of God. If a perfon has 
 confined his reading for a confiderable time to 
 the works of poets, he will find a difpofition, 
 efpecially if his own flilc be not yet perfedly 
 formed, to write on every fubjed: in a figura- 
 tive and poetical manner. In general, a per- 
 fon's manner of writing is formed in a great 
 degree, by the manner of thofe authors v/honi 
 he has been moft accuflomed to ftudy : he 
 purfues his thoughts in the fame pa^hs, dif- 
 pofes them by means of fimilar relations, and 
 
 even
 
 Sect. II. on ^J[ociation. 135- 
 
 even arranges his expreiTions, without reflec- 
 tion, upon the fame principles. This obfer- 
 vation is equally applicable to painters, and 
 artifts of every kind. 
 
 But we need not nmultiply examples of the 
 power of cuftom in difpofnig us to rollow one 
 aflbciating quality in preference 10 others ; 
 for many of thofe which we have produced 
 under the former head, are appofite to our 
 prefent purpofe. It is not only the familiarity 
 oi the ideas which are fuitable to our fituation 
 and manner of life, that renders them lit to 
 be aflbciated with any prefent perception, but 
 alfo their being connected with that percep- 
 tion by a relation which our fituation or man- 
 ner of life has made familiar, and given us a 
 habit of being affeded by. When the fame 
 objcift fuggefls different ideas to different per- 
 fons, thefe ideas are fometimes connected with 
 that objedl by the fame relation ; but gene- 
 rally they are conne£ted with it by different 
 relations, and the idea fuggefted to a particu- 
 lar perfon, is fuch as bears that relation to 
 the prefent objed:, which he is by habit or 
 otherwife mofl prone to follow. By beffow- 
 ing a very fmall degree of attention, this may 
 be obferved in almoft all the examples already 
 given of the force of cuftom in facilitating the 
 
 K. 4 intro-
 
 136 Of the Lijluence of Habit Part II. 
 
 introdudion of familiar ideas : I fhall point 
 it out only in one of them. The fame plant, 
 it was remarked, may fugged different ideas 
 to pcrfons of different profeffions: it is by 
 refemblance that it fuggefts an image to the 
 poet, and refemblance is the relation by which 
 he is moft accuftomed to be affected ; it is by 
 the relation of caufe and effect that it fuggefls 
 the confideration of its elements to the che- 
 iiiift, and of its virtues to the phyfician, and 
 that is the relation which their ftudies render 
 moft familiar to them. 
 
 Thus, if nature has given a perfon a pecu- 
 liar pronenefs to follow fome one of the affo- 
 c.iating relations, the impulfe of nature will 
 gradually produce an habit of following that 
 relation moft frequently ; and as foon as that 
 liabit is produced, it will ftrengthen the natu- 
 ral pronenefs : or if fuch a habit be produced 
 by accidental caufes, it will of itfelf, without 
 any afliftance from the natural conftitutlon of 
 the mind, beget a ful table propenfity. Rela- 
 tions which we are accuftomed to follow in the 
 train of our thoughts, are like roads with 
 which we are acquainted, and in which we 
 therefore purfue a journey without any con- 
 cern, hefitation, or deviation. 
 
 It
 
 Sect.il on Jpciation, 137 
 
 It will not perhaps be fuperfluous to re- 
 mark farther, that it is not only long cuftom 
 •which produces this efFed : the fhorteft cuf- 
 tom, fuch as cannot with propriety be faid to 
 amount to a habit, is fuiBTicient. When a per- 
 fon has been occafionally, for ever fo fhort a 
 time, affeded by one affociating quality, he 
 acquires a propenfity to continue to be affect- 
 ed by that quality. When one has been any* 
 how led to ufe feveral images or fimilitudes in 
 a compofition, he is prone for fome time to 
 run into the fame figures. A metaphor once 
 employed, gives a perfon a difpofition to pur- 
 fue it, by means of which it is fometimes fo 
 long continued as to produce an allegory. A 
 few contrails or antithefes naturally and of 
 courfe lead an author into more. An exam- 
 ple formerly produced of affociation by means 
 of contrariety (^), affords a plain proof of the 
 influence of a very tranfient cuftom. 
 
 Thirdly, Cuflom not only renders one 
 allbciating quality more ready to affed: us, 
 than other qualities ; it likewife renders the 
 fame quality readier to operate on the imagi- 
 nation after one particular manner than after 
 another manner. We fhall hereafter have 
 
 {h) The fxample from Clifford's Tpeech to Henry VI. 
 p. 115, 
 
 occafiou
 
 13S Of the hiflueiice of Habit Part If. 
 
 occafion to examine the different forms which 
 the fame affociating quahty aifumes, or the 
 different ways in which it operates in intro- 
 ducing ideas. In general, it is evident that 
 there are very different forms or fpecies of 
 each of the affociating qualities ; for inftance, 
 things refemhle one another in many different 
 ways. Now one fort of refemblance may be 
 a powerful principle of affociation, to a par- 
 ticular pcrfon on whom other forts of refem- 
 blance have very little influence; and the 
 propenfity of that pcifon to be affeded chiefly 
 by this one fort, often proceeds, at Icafl in 
 part, from his having acquired a habit of 
 being affedled by it. An example formerly 
 made ufe of, may be applied for the illuftra- 
 tion of this. A plant fuggeffs an image to a 
 poet, and leads a botanifl to think of the clafs 
 to v^^hich it belongs ; it operates on the ima- 
 ginations of both, by refemblance ; on the 
 poet, by the refemblance of its general ap- 
 pearance, or of fome of its particular quali- 
 ties, to a diftant fubje<5l ; on the botanift, by 
 the exad refemblance of its parts to indivi- 
 duals of the fame kind. But thefe two forts 
 of refemblance are almoft as different from 
 one another as refemblance is from vicinity : 
 jio two turns of imagination are more unlike 
 
 than
 
 Sj:ct.'IL on JJ/ociation. 139 
 
 than that of the poet and that of the natural 
 hiftorian. Both are in this inftance affe(3:ed 
 by the refemblance which the idea fuggefted 
 bears to the prefent objed ; but the one of 
 them is in no degree affected by the particu- 
 lar fpecies of relemblance which afFe(3:s the 
 other. Every one almoft of the aflbciating 
 quahties is capable of as great variety as re- 
 femblance. Now as a perfon may derive 
 from nature, a propenfity to be influenced by 
 any of the affociating qualities in one particur 
 lar way rather than in another way, fo by 
 his being accullomed to be thus influenced, 
 that propenfity will be increafed. After the 
 obfervations which have been already made, 
 little needs to be faid for confirmation of this. 
 It is as eafy to conceive how a perfon may 
 acquire a habit of being affeded by an aflb- 
 ciating quality in one particular manner, as 
 to conceive how he may acquire a habit of 
 being afl-eded by one quality more than by 
 others : and when it has been proved that in 
 the latter cafe the habit begets a facility in 
 tracing ideas by that one quality to which a 
 perfon has been accuftomed, it will eafily be 
 allowed that the habit muft have equal force 
 in difpofing us to a particular mode of aflbci- 
 ^tion by any quality. To recur to a former in- 
 ftance, 
 3
 
 140 Of the Influence of Habit Part II, 
 
 ftance, there can be no doubt that it is partly 
 by their cuftomary ftudies, as well as by the 
 natural turn of their imaginations, that the 
 poet and the botanift are led by the plant pre- 
 fented to them, to ideas connedted with it by 
 very different forts of refemblance ; and that 
 the chemift and the phyfician, though both 
 influenced by the relation of caufe and effed:, 
 are yet influenced by very diff^erent fpecies of 
 that relation, and led, one to think of the ele- 
 anents of which the plant is compofed, and 
 the other to trace its eff"eds on animal bodies. 
 Both In fimilitude and in metaphor, the 
 image is connected with the fubject by refem- 
 blance ; but a perfon may be rendered by 
 cuftom readier to exprefs himfelf in one of 
 thefe figures than iji the other. 
 
 It is a neceflary confequence of thefe effedls 
 of habit, that it frequently oppofes and over- 
 balances the influence of the aflx)ciating qua- 
 lities. A perception is prefent to the mind ; 
 one idea is very ftrongly connedcd with it by 
 refemblance, or by fome other relation ; an- 
 other idea is weakly related to it, but is ei- 
 ther familiar to us, or Is related by a tie or a 
 modification of a tie which we have been 
 much accuftomed to follow : the relations of 
 ideas would introduce the former, but cuftom 
 
 often
 
 S E c T . II. on AJfo elation, 141 
 
 often overpowers them, and gains the pre- 
 ference to the latter. Cuftom fometiraes co- 
 operates with relations ; and in that cafe it 
 augments their force : but fometimes it coun- 
 teracts them ; and whenever it does fo, it 
 weakens or totally deftroys their influence. 
 By this means the mind is often prevented 
 from purfuing a train of thought through 
 the ftrongeft connexions, as it naturally would 
 if it were not influenced by habit. This is 
 the caufe of many tranfitions in authors and 
 in Gonverfation, which appear unnatural, and 
 are unaccountable to thofe who have not the 
 fame habits. 
 
 Hitherto we have fuppofed the percep- 
 tions which introduce one another, to be really 
 related by fome of the aflbciating qualities 
 formerly enumerated, and have fhewn how- 
 habit affifts or obftrudts the operation of thefe 
 qualities, or in what ways it afFeds the fuc- 
 ceffion of perceptions. But cuftom will like- 
 wife produce an union between perceptions 
 which are not otherwife related. Though 
 two perceptions have no natural bond of 
 union, yet if they have happened to be pre- 
 fented often together, one of them can fcarce 
 ever appear afterwards without introducing 
 the other. In this cafe, as the connexion arifes 
 
 wholly
 
 142 Of the hijiuence of Habit PartIL 
 
 wholly from the force of habit, fo the degree 
 of that connexion is in proportion to the 
 llrength of the habit, or to the number of in- 
 ftances in which the perceptions have occurred 
 together. Many examples of the power of 
 cuftom to beget an affociation of ideas, have 
 been often taken notice of : but though there 
 were no other, language alone would be a fuf- 
 ficient proof of this. The words of any lan- 
 guage have no natural connexion with the 
 perceptions which they exprefs. They owe 
 their fignification wholly to compad : yet by 
 cuftom they acquire fo firm a connexion with 
 fentiments, that no fooner is a word in a 
 known language pronounced, than it excites 
 the idea which it has been ufed for exprefling, 
 and no fooner does a thought ftart up in the 
 mind, than it fuggefts a word correfpondent 
 to it. Cuftom has beftowed upon them an 
 indiflbluble connexio-n ; and the moft igno- 
 rant fcarce imagine that they have any con- 
 nexion except that which cuftom has be- 
 ftowed. In language we perceive likevvife, 
 that the ftrength of the aflbciation is in pro- 
 portion to the ftrength of the habit. If a 
 perfon be but imperfedly accuftomed to a 
 language, or have been long without the habit 
 of ufmg it, the words of that langua*ge, though 
 
 he
 
 Sect. II. on AJfociation, 143 
 
 *he be acquainted with them, do not, by being 
 pronounced, fuggeft fo quickly the ideas frg^ 
 nified by them, nor are themfelves fo readily 
 fuggefted, when he wants to exprefs his own 
 fentiments, as the words of a language to 
 which he has been much and conitantly ac- 
 cuftomed. A perfon for fome time fpeaka 
 with hefitation, and underftands with diffi- 
 culty a foreign language, though he knows 
 the words that are employed ; but he fpeaks 
 his mother-tongue readily, and underftands it 
 with eafe [c). There is fcarce any perfon but 
 has fome favourite words and phrafes, which 
 continually occur both in his converfation and 
 
 (<•) The connexion eftablifhed by cuftom, between ideas and 
 the \yords of a language, being mutual, it may perhaps be 
 thought, that the ideas ihould fuggeft the words, and the words 
 the ideas, with equal quicknefs and eafe. But this is not the 
 cafe. The tranfition from the words to the ideas, is generally 
 much cafier than that from the ideas to the words. A perfon 
 who is learning a ftrange language, will be able to underlland 
 a book or a converfation in that language long before he can 
 write or fpeak it. Even in one's native tongue, one can rea- 
 dily underlland what is written or fpoken in the bell and pro- 
 pereft terms, though he could not have ufed thefe terms for ex- 
 prefling the fame ideas ; and many write or fpeak with difticulty 
 and hefitation, who underftand what they read or hear, with 
 perfcft eafe. This proceeds from the firft principle which we 
 have eftabliflied concerning the influence of cuftom upon afTo- 
 ciation, and is a new inftance for confirming and illuftrating 
 that principle. The ideas are txioxq familiar to us than the 
 words ; they are often raifed by their proper objedls, or fug- 
 gefted by other words ; they often make their appearance in 
 the mind, and are applied to various purpofcs, when the 
 names of them are not thought upon ; and x\it\x faviiliariij 
 makes them to be fuggefted readily. That this is the true 
 taufe, is confirmed by obferring that where it does not take 
 
 ia
 
 144 0/ ^^^^ Influence of Hahit P A R t IL 
 in his writings, though there be many others 
 in the language, equally fit for expreffing the 
 lame thought. The former having by fome 
 means or other been frequently ufed by him, 
 and on that account become familiar to him, 
 rufh into his mind of their own accord, when- 
 ever the idea to which they correfpond, is 
 prefent. But if at any time, difgufted with 
 the frequency of thefe terms, he be defirous 
 of diverfifying his ftile, it requires fome time 
 and ftudied efforts to recoiled the fynonymous 
 terms that are lefs familiar to him, though he 
 knows them perfed:ly well. They are but 
 weakly connected by cuftom with his ideas, 
 and therefore they come not quickly into his 
 mind. Thus habit not only affifts the aflbci- 
 ating qualities in introducing ideas, but like- 
 wife itfelf unites Ideas to which none of the 
 aiTociating qualities belong. 
 
 We may farther remark an effed of habit 
 on the imagination, different from both thefe. 
 If a perfon has accufloined himfelf to any 
 particular objed: or adion while he was em- 
 ployed in purfuing a train of ideas, that ob- 
 
 place, Ideas are not fuggefied more readily than words are in 
 ordinary cafes. V/hen the ideas exprcued are fuch as we have 
 been Httlc accuflomed to attend to, a difcourfe or compolition 
 is underfiood by us with difiiculty, as well as when ideas are 
 exprefled by unyfual words : they arc not familiar to us, and 
 therefore are not readily fuggeikd. 
 
 jedl
 
 Sect. IL en AJfociation. 14 j 
 
 jed: or adion becomes abfolutely neceflary for 
 his purfuing any train. Without it, ideas, 
 though connected by relations as ftrong as 
 poflible, cannot introduce one another ; by 
 means of it, they are readily fuggefted : yet 
 the accuftomed objedl or adion has no more 
 connexion with any one train than with any 
 other, nor feems capable of either affifting 
 the relations which already unite the ideas, 
 or beftowing any new relation upon them. A 
 perfon may by cuftom become unable to think 
 or difcourfe of a fubje^:, without keeping his 
 eye fixt in a particular direction, or indulging 
 himfelf in fome ufual pofture or motion. De- 
 prive fome perfons of a fnufF-box, imme- 
 diately fancy is extinguifhed, and a regular 
 or fluent fucceflion of ideas can no longer 
 take place. " I fat by an eminent flory-teller 
 •* and politician," fays an ingenious writer ; 
 •* I obferved this gentleman t'other day in 
 " the midft of a ftory diverted from it by 
 " looking at fomething at a diftance, and I 
 '* foftly hid his box. But he returns to his 
 " tale, and looking for his box, he cries, dnd 
 ** fo. Sir — Then when he fhould have taken 
 ** a pinch, as I *w as faying., fays he,— ii/jj 11a 
 ** body fe en my box ? His friend befeeches him 
 •' to finifh his narration : then he proceeds, 
 
 L " arid
 
 14^ Of the Influence of Habit Part II. 
 *' and fo^ Sir, — Where can my. box be? Then 
 " turning to me ; Fray, Sir, did you fee my 
 *' box ? Yes, Sir, faid I, I took it to fee how 
 *' long you could live without it. He refumes 
 " his tale, and I took notice that his dulnefs 
 " was much more regular and fluent than 
 " before (i).'* " I remember,'' fays Mr. 
 Addifon, *' when I was a young man, and 
 " ufed to frequent Weftminfter-hall, there 
 " was a counfellor who never pleaded with^ 
 *' out a piece of pack-thread in his hand, 
 " which he ufed to twift about a thumb or a 
 " finger, all the while he was fpeaking : the 
 *' wags of thofe days ufed to call it the thread 
 *' of his difcourfe, for he was not able to utter 
 " a word without it. One of his clients, who 
 *' was more merry than wife, ftole it from 
 *' him one day in the midft of his pleading 5 
 " but he had better have let it alone, for he 
 « loft his caufe by his jeft [e]:' The effed 
 of habit in thefe inftances is very ftrange and 
 unaccountable. The cuftom has no greater 
 fitnefs for introducing any one fet of ideas 
 than any other ; the particular ideas which are 
 introduced, have no fort of connexion with the 
 circumftance which cuftom has rendered ne- 
 
 (//) Tatler, No. 35. • 
 {e) Spectator, No, 407. 
 
 cefl*ary
 
 Sect. III. on AJfociahon. i^j 
 
 cefTary for their introdu61ion, and perhaps 
 have never formerly been conjoined with it ; 
 it feems to contribute to their introdudion 
 only by preventing an uneafmefs which would 
 indifpofe the mind for exerting its faculties. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of the InJIucnce of the Paffions on AJJociation, 
 
 f I ''HE other principle in human nature, 
 Jt which has an Influence on the afToci- 
 ation of ideas, which either promotes the in- 
 trodudion of fuch as are linked together by 
 fome of the affociating qualities, or introduces 
 ideas unconned:ed with each other, merely by 
 means of their relation to itfelf, is a prefent 
 paffion. 
 
 A PASSION in flrid propriety means only 
 fuch an emotion as is produced by fome one 
 particular caufe, and diredcd to fome one de- 
 terminate objed. There are feveral emotions, 
 as remorfe, felf-approbation, and the like, 
 which may perhaps be reckoned fenfations 
 rather than paffions : but our prefent defign 
 does not render it neceflary to attend to that 
 diftlndtion. A paffion is fomething different 
 from an habitual temper or turn of mind : the 
 
 L 2 latter
 
 1.48 Of the InJInence of the Pajtons Part II. 
 
 latter may in Ibme inftances have derived its 
 origin from the frequent returns or the long 
 continuance of a particular pafTion ; but once 
 formed, it fubfifts without the operation of 
 any particular caufe, and without being fixt 
 on any precife object, and produces a perma- 
 nent propenfity to any fentiments or paffions 
 "which are congruous to it. But a paflion and 
 an habitual temper have fo many things in 
 common, that we may without any incon- 
 venience include both in the caufe of affoci- 
 ation which we are now examining : it will 
 be fufficient to diftinguifh them in particular 
 inftances, when fuch fhall happen to occur^ 
 in which their influence on the introduction 
 of ideas is different, or in which they run 
 counter to one another. 
 
 In general, that the train of ideas fuggefted 
 to the mind, has a very great dependence on 
 the paffions, is obvious. Mention fome actions 
 of a pcrfon whom we love ; our love will fug- 
 geft fuch circumftances as tend to make us ap- 
 prove thefe adions. Mention the very fame 
 actions to another who entertains refentment 
 agalnft the perfon who did them ; and his 
 imagination will immediately clothe them 
 ■with fuch circumftances as deftroy their merit, 
 or render them blameable. Let us barely 
 
 think
 
 Sect. III. on Affociation, 149 
 
 think of any perfon : if we love him, we rea- 
 dily recoiled: and dwell upon the fair and 
 worthy parts of his character ; if we hate 
 him, his wrong or fufpicious actions croud 
 into our thoughts. The joyful heart runs 
 eafily into a gay and pleafant train of think- 
 ing, but does not naturally recolle(fl any thing 
 that is gloomy, and inftantly rejects it if it be 
 iuggefted by peculiar caufes. The obferva- 
 tion holds of every emotion, paflion, and dif- 
 pofition. 
 
 It will be proper, however, to attempt a 
 fuller explication of the manner in which the 
 paffions influence the aflbciation of ideas. To 
 underftand this, is of great importance in a 
 theory of the varieties of genius ; for to give 
 a juft reprefentation of the paffions, is one of 
 the greatefl: efforts of genius ; and it can be 
 accompliflied only by following thofe paths 
 into which the paflions naturally diredl the 
 thoughts. But the influence of the paffions 
 on the fucceffion of our ideas, though thus 
 important, relates only to one fpecies of ge- 
 nius, genius for the arts. It would therefore 
 be improper to enter on a full difcufhon of it 
 at prefent, when we are tracing out the gene^ 
 ral fources of the varieties of genius. In the 
 obfervations which we are now to make on 
 
 L 3 this
 
 150 Of the Influence of the Pajfons Part II. 
 
 this fubjed:, fome examples will be neceflary 
 both for illuftrating and for confirming our 
 principles. It may perhaps be thought mofl 
 proper to draw thefe from our own experi- 
 ence in real life. But to be able to feled: ex- 
 amples from real life, and to fet them in a 
 Ilriking light, would require no fmall degree 
 of one of tlie higheft and rareft kinds of poeti- 
 cal genius. It will therefore be both the fafeft 
 and the beft way, to take our examples from 
 fuch reprefentations of the pafTions in poetry, 
 as are confeiTedly natural, and will approve 
 themfelves natural to the tafte of the reader. 
 Such examples have as great authority as in- 
 fiances which a perfon himfelf obferves in or- 
 dinary life. Shakefpear alone will almoft fup^ 
 ply us with as many as are necefTary. 
 
 In taking a general view of the influence 
 of the palTions on affociation, it will be necef-^ 
 fary, firft, to point out the manner in which 
 they afFedt the nature of the ideas felcded and 
 introduced. 
 
 There are fome ideas intimately connected 
 with a paffion, as the objed: of the paffion, its 
 ' caufe, Vv^hat is fit for fupporting it, or what 
 gratifies it. Every paffion has a ftrong ten- 
 dency to fuggefl fuch ideas, to force them 
 into our view, to make us prone to conceive 
 
 them.
 
 Sect. III. on Ajfoclation, 151 
 
 them. We naturally continue fixt In atten- 
 tion to fuch ideas, or recur often to the con- 
 templation of them. A paffion leads us to 
 them, folely by its own force, without any 
 afliftance from a prefent perception conneded 
 with them. When a perfon is under the in- 
 fluence of any paffion, the difficulty is not to 
 recoiled the objeds clofely conneded with it> 
 but to prevent their haunting him continually. 
 An angry man, for example, can fcarce avoid 
 thinking of the perfon who has offended him, 
 and of the injury which he has done him, re- 
 coUeding every thing he can diffionourable 
 to that perfon, remembering with pleafure the 
 misfortunes which have happened to him, 
 even imagining dlftreffes into which he may 
 fall, and in a word dwelling on the concep- 
 tion of every thing immediately relating to 
 his anger. Angelo*s defcription of his own 
 dlfpofition when he was under the power of 
 love. Is perfedly natural ; 
 
 When I would pray and think, I think and pray 
 To feveral fubjcds : heav'n hath my empty words, 
 Whilft my intention hearing not my tongue, 
 Anchors on Ifabel : heav'n's in my mouth. 
 As if I did but only chew its name, 
 And in my heart the ftrong and fwelling evil 
 
 Of my conception. {a) 
 
 [a) Mea/ure for Meafurey aft 2. fcene 10. 
 
 L 4 Different
 
 152 Of the Influence of the FaJJions PartIL 
 
 Different ideas are in different ways 
 clofely conne<3:ed with the fame paflion ; the 
 paflion tends to introduce all thefe. On this 
 ■account it often happens that the mind does 
 not reft on any one of them, but conceives 
 them all by turns. Every paflion often occa- 
 fions an abruptnefs of thought ; this is one 
 caufe of that abruptnefs ; different ideas being 
 connected with the pafTion, in different re- 
 fpeds, but with almoft equal clofenefs, the 
 pafTion introduces them all, or feveral of them 
 at leaft, in alternate fuccelTion. Sebaftian over- 
 whelmed with fear and grief by the profpedt 
 of immediate Ihipwreck, exclaims, 
 
 Mercy on us ! 
 
 We fplit, we fplit ! farewel my wife and children^ 
 Brother farewel ! we fplit, we fplit, we fplit ! (^) 
 
 His paflion leads him' to think of himfelf, its 
 moft immediate objedt ; but without fuffering 
 him to refl a moment on this, it hurries him on 
 to a conception of the caufe of his pafTion, the 
 Iplitting of the ihip ; it allows him to make 
 but a very fhort ftop here ; it caufes his family 
 and friends, objeds which were likewife nearly 
 related to his grief, to croud into his view ; 
 and from thefe, it forces him back to the 
 thought of the immediate caufe. of his palTion, 
 
 {h) Tem^efii aft I. fcenc U
 
 Sect. III. on Jfo elation, 155 
 
 and makes his mind to dwell upon it. It 
 fuffers him not to think of any thing that has 
 not an intimate relation to itfelf, and it makes 
 his imagination to vibrate between thofe 
 which have luch relation. Ifabel being in- 
 formed that her brother had been put to death 
 by Angelo's command, her refentment imme- 
 diately fuggefts fome means of revenging 
 his death ; but without fufFering her to reft 
 on thefe means, or to take any notice of the 
 impoffibility of her employing them, even 
 though it is mentioned to her, refentment 
 brings into her thoughts in an inftant, her 
 brother, herfelf, the wickednefs of mankind, 
 and the bafenefs of Angelo, all objeds natu- 
 turally conneded with her paflion : 
 
 Jfab. Oh, I will to him and pluck out his eyes. 
 Duke. You fhall not be admitted to his fight. 
 Jfal>. Unhappy Claudio ! wretched Ifabel ! 
 Injurious world ! moft damned Angelo ! {c) 
 
 If a paflion can thus introduce ideas fultable 
 to it, merely by its own force, it will much 
 more introduce them when there happens to 
 be a perception prefent to the mind, to which 
 they bear any of the affociating relations. 
 Either the paflion alone, or that relation alone 
 would have been fufficient for the effed: 
 
 (0 Meafurt for Miafurey aft 4, fcene 10. 
 
 when
 
 154 Of the Tnjluence of the Pajfions Part II. 
 
 when both therefore operate together, they 
 are like mechanical forces ading in the fame 
 diredion, which produce a double efFeO:, or 
 produce the fame ^^cCt with half the diffi- 
 culty. When any paffion prevails in the 
 foul, ideas flridly connected with that paf- 
 fion are in a continual readinefs to rulh into 
 the thoughts on every the flighteft occafion. 
 Hence it is commonly obferved that the moft 
 diftant hint is fufficient to dired. the imagina- 
 tion to an objedl which is congruous to the 
 prefent difpofition of the mind. We have a 
 very natural and ftrong reprefentation of this 
 in Lear's grief and indignation on account of 
 the unklndnefs of his daughters. When he 
 fees Edgar's dlfmal fituation, he fays, 
 
 " DId'Il thou give all to thy daughters ? and art 
 thou come to this ?" ' 
 
 On hearing his raving, the fame thought 
 again ruihes into Lear's mind, 
 
 *' What ! have his daughters brought him to this 
 pafs ? Couldft thou fave nothing ? Did'il thou 
 give 'em all ?" 
 
 The fool's interruption could not divert the 
 thought ; he goes on. 
 
 Now all the plagues that in the pendulous air 
 
 Hang fated o'er men's faults, .light on thy 
 
 dauo-hters ! 
 
 « He
 
 Sect, III. on JJfociatmi. 155 
 
 ** He hath no daughters, Sir," 
 fays Kent: but flill the objed before him, 
 keeps the fame idea rivetted in his imagina- 
 tion ; 
 
 Death, traitor, nothing could have fubdu'd nature 
 To fuch a lownefs, but his unkind daughters. 
 Is it the fafhion, that difcarded fathers 
 Should have thus little mercy on their flefh ? 
 Judicious punifhment ! 'Twas this flefh begot 
 Thofe pelican daughters.- {d) 
 
 There are ordinarily many occafions which 
 have a powerful tendency to fuggeft to a per- 
 fon poifeiTed by a paffion, objeds altogether 
 unrelated to that paffion : the mind is always 
 difpofed to f ejed thefe, and in confequence of 
 this, it purfues one of two courfes. Some- 
 times it takes a handle from the objecfls that 
 occur, whatever they be, to recoiled: fome- 
 thing jkitablc to the prefent paffion, it ima- 
 gines thofe objeds related to this paffiion, 
 though their analogy to it be very remote, 
 as in the example juft now given, nay tho' 
 they have not even a fliadov/ of connexion 
 with it. Harpagon going out of his garden 
 in queft of the officers of juftice, after he had 
 milfed his cafket of money, and feeing the 
 
 {d) King Lear, acl 3. fcene 6, 
 
 people
 
 156 of the Influence of the Pajfions Part II. 
 
 people in the flreet, is naturally made to 
 fay; 
 
 " What a croud's here got together ! I can 
 caft; my eyes on no body who gives me not 
 fufpicion, everything feems my thief. Heh! 
 what are they talking of there ? Of him that 
 robbed me ? What noife is that above ? Is it 
 my thief that's there ? For heaven's fake, if 
 you know tidings of my thief, I befeech you 
 tell me. Is he not hid there amongfl you ? 
 They all flare at me, and fall a laughing. 
 You'll fee that they are certainly concerned 
 in this robbery committed upon me. Here, 
 quick, commiffaries, archers, provofts, judges, 
 racks, gibbets, and executioners [e)^ 
 
 This happens when the paffion is violent, 
 and when the tendency of the prefent objeds 
 to fuggeft ideas unfuitable to it, is not very 
 flrong. But when the paffion is not fo vio- 
 
 (f) Que de gens aflembles ! Je ne jette mes regards fur 
 perfonne qui ne me donne des foup9ons, et tout me femble 
 mon voleur. Eh! de quoi eft ce qu'on parle la ? de celui 
 qui m'aderobe? Quel bruit fait-on lahaut? Eft-ce mon vo- 
 leur qui eft ? De grace, fi I'on fait des nouvelles de mon vo- 
 leur, je fupplie que Ton m'en dife. N'eft-il point cache la 
 parmi vous? lis me regardent tous, et fe mettent a rire, 
 Vous verrez qu'ils ont part fans doute au vol que Ton ma fait. 
 Allons vitc, des commiflaires, des archers, des prevots, des 
 juges, des genes, des potences, et des bourreaux. VAvart 
 De Moliere, ad 4. fcene 7. 
 
 lent,
 
 Sect. III. on JJfo elation. 157 
 
 lent, or when it is an habitual difpofition that 
 prevails in the foul, and when at the fame 
 time the prefent objects have a ftrong ten- 
 dency to lead the thoughts to ideas unrelated 
 to that paffion or difpofition, the mind takes 
 a different courfe : it goes backward and for- 
 ward between the ideas fuggefted by the paf- 
 fion, and the ideas fuggefted by the prefent 
 objects ; there is a conftant ftruggle between 
 thefe, and a quick and frequent variation of 
 thought. This is another caufe of abruptnefs 
 and unconnedednefs in the fentiments of a 
 perfon under the power of any pafTion ; his 
 mind vibrates between conceptions fultable to 
 his paffion and diflimilar conceptions arifing 
 from different circumftances in his fituation. 
 Moliere has reprefented this ftrongly in Har- 
 pagon ; however he is engaged, his avarice 
 makes the thought of the money which he 
 had hid in his garden, to intermix itfelf with 
 his prefent employment. 
 
 Those objects which are clofely conneded 
 with any paffion, are likewife conneded by 
 fome of the affociating qualities v/ith other 
 objects, which therefore they have a natural 
 tendency to fuggeft. Now as it appears from 
 what has been faid, that every paffion exerts 
 itfelf in confining our thoughts to the objects 
 
 imme-
 
 i,5B Of the Infuence of the Paffions Part IfJ 
 
 immediately connedted with it, it would feem 
 to follow, that a paffion muft hinder thefe 
 from fuggefting any other objeds, however 
 nearly related to themfelves, and thus to put 
 a flop to all fucceffion of ideas. It has plainly 
 a tendency to this ; and the tendency takes 
 effe(3: in fome degree. A paffion never fails 
 to confine our attention very much to the ideas 
 which are moft immrediately related to itfelf. 
 But fuch is the confcitution of the human 
 mind, that it cannot confine its attention 
 altogether to one unvaried object for any con- 
 fiderable time. The paffions being oppofed 
 by this law of our conftitution, cannot keep 
 the mind long fixt on one view of the objed: 
 which it has firft ffiggefted. Yet it endea- 
 vours to do fo ; and the firfl: effed: of the en- 
 deavour is, that the mind averfe from quitting 
 that object, turns it to every fide, and views 
 it in various lights. In the following exam- 
 ple, this effed appears very ftrikingly with 
 refped to the paffion of love : 
 
 Ros. Orlando ! 
 
 Cel. Orlando. 
 
 Ros. Alas the day, what fhall I do with 
 
 my doublet and hofe ? wha't did he when 
 
 thou faweft him ? what faid he ? how looked 
 
 he ? wherein went he .»* what makes him 
 
 3 here ?
 
 Sect. III. on AJfociat'mu 159 
 
 here ? did he afk for me ? where remains he ? 
 how parted he with thee? and when fhalt 
 thou fee him again? Anfwer me in one 
 
 word. 
 
 CeL You muft borrow me Garagantua's 
 mouth firft ; 'tis a word too great for any 
 mouth of this age's fize : to fay ay and no to 
 thefe particulars, is more than to anfwer in a 
 catechifm. 
 
 Ros, But doth he know that I am in the 
 foreft, and in man's apparel ? looks he as 
 frefhly as he did the day he wreftled ? 
 
 Cel, It is as eafy to count atoms as to re- 
 -folve the proportions of a lover (/). 
 
 We have already difcovered two fources of the 
 abruptnefs of thought occafioned by paffion ; 
 and we may now perceive another fource of 
 it. Different views of the fame object are 
 very unlike ; a paffion brings thefe different 
 views before the mind, in a rapid fucceffion 
 and in an irregular groupe. 
 
 In this way the paffion prevents a change 
 of objedl for fome time. But the different 
 views of the fame objed: are not inexhauftible. 
 The paffion therefore yielding to the impulfe 
 of our conflitution, allows the prefent objed: 
 
 {/) As you like it, ad 3. icene 6. 
 
 to
 
 1 6o Of the Injluence of the Pqffions Part II. 
 
 to fuggeft ideas related to it. Hence it arlfes 
 that, under the influence of any paffion, we 
 conceive not only the objects which are inti- 
 mately related to it, but alfo fuch others as 
 are flrongly connected with thefe by any of 
 the aflbciating qualities. The former objeds 
 would fuggeft thefe latter, if we were not 
 under the influence of any paflion, thefe 
 therefore will occur more readily than any 
 others, when, notwithftanding the influence of 
 the paflion, we muft have fome ideas on 
 which to employ our thoughts. Befides, an 
 idea conneded with objects clofely related to a 
 paflion, may by its prefence gratify the paf- 
 fion, or fupport it, or fall in with it in other 
 ways ; and in this cafe fuch an idea is often 
 fuggefted even when the mind is under no 
 neceflity of being relieved from a conception 
 which has long occupied it. The Countefs of 
 Rouflllon parting with her fon Bertram, who 
 is going to the army, the grief which this 
 produces, fuggefts to them both, an event 
 related by refemblance, and in fome meafure 
 alfo by caufation, to the occafion of that grief; 
 the lofs of her hufljand and his father : 
 
 Countefs, In delivering up my fon from me, 
 I bury a fecond hufl^and. 
 
 z Bertn
 
 Sect. III. on AJfociation. i6i 
 
 Bertr. And in going, Madam^ I weep o'er 
 toy father's death anew {g). 
 
 The niother does not fay, the delivering up 
 of my fon reminds me of my burying my 
 hulband ; (he expreffes it muxh more ftrong- 
 ly; the fon fpeaks in a manner equally for- 
 tible, the imagination of both converts the 
 jprefeht event into the fimilar event fuggefted 
 by it. This figure is felt by every perfon to 
 be perfedly natural and proper ; and its be- 
 ing fo, fhows thatj when an object i}:ri(!?l:ly 
 conrieded with a paffion introduces another 
 bbjed aflbciated with itfelf, the paffion im- 
 pel! s the mind to conceive this other objed 
 very ftrongly, and to beftow upon it as inti- 
 mate a relation to the paffion, as poffible. 
 
 But though a paffion does not hinder an 
 objedt from fuggefting others, it has a great 
 influence on the nature of the ideas fuggefted. 
 An objedt which has been brought into view 
 immediately by a paffion, may be related, by 
 one or other of the affi^ciatlng qualities, to a 
 great multitude of ideas of very different 
 kinds : but it will not in this cafe introduce 
 any of thefe indifcriminately ; the paffion 
 which brought itfelf into view, will dired it 
 to introduce fuch of thefe only as are fuitable 
 
 {£) AW sixxll that ends nvell, zd. i, fcene I. 
 
 M to
 
 1 62 Of the Lift lie nee of the Paffons Part II. 
 
 to that paffion. The perception prefent to 
 the mind, confidcred limply in itfelf, has an 
 equal fitnefs to bring into view any one of a 
 hundred ideas; but itfelf was introduced by 
 a paffion which flill continues to exert its 
 power, and indifpofes the mind for thinking 
 on any thing unfuitable to it, and which thus 
 diverts the aflbciating force of the prefent 
 perception from the direction it might have 
 otherwife taken, and leads the imagination to 
 feled: and take notice of only fuch ideas as 
 are fui table to the paffion, as well as to the 
 prefent perception, overlooking many others 
 which are equally conneded with the latter. 
 The affi^ciating forces of thefc two, have 
 fome fimilitude to compound powers in me- 
 chanics, vs^hich by their joint adiion produce 
 motion in a diredion different from that in 
 which either ads, and lying between the fe- 
 parate directions of the two. Or, to fet the 
 matter in a different light, thofe ideas which 
 are not only affociated v/ith the prefent per- 
 ception, but alfo fuitable to the paffion that 
 introduced it, are dragged into the mind by 
 a double force ; whereas the prefent percep- 
 tion alone tends to drav/ in other ideas affo- 
 £iated with it, and the paffion oppofes their 
 entraace, often with fuperior Hrength. The 
 
 latter
 
 Sect. III. en AJfociatlon. 163 
 
 latter cannot therefore fail to be negle^ficd ; the 
 former mull be introduced in preference to them. 
 Thus, though a paffion allows an object imme- 
 diately conneded with it, to introduce ideas, yet 
 it always moulds thofe which are introduced, 
 into its ow^n likenefs, or into a form agreeable 
 to itfelf, and it fufFers none to enter which 
 are not fufceptible of this form. "When Alon- 
 zo's companions are endeavouring to alleviate 
 his grief for the fuppofed lofs of his fon, by 
 diverting his thoughts to his daughter's mar- 
 riage with the King of Tunis, in their return 
 from which they now fufrered fhipwreck, he 
 anfwers them. 
 
 You cram thefe words into mine ears againfb 
 The itomach of my fenie. Would I had never 
 Married my daughter there ! for coming thence 
 My fon is loft, and, in my rate, fhe too, 
 Who is fo far from Italy remov'd, 
 I ne'er again fhall fee her : O thou mine heir 
 Of Naples and of Milan, what ftrange fifli 
 Hath made his meal on thee ? {h) 
 
 This example illuftrates and confirms almoft 
 every obfervation w^e have had occalion to 
 make concerning the influence of the paflions 
 upon aflbciation. His grief keeps his atten- 
 tion fixt on the lofs of his fon, an objed: im- 
 
 {h) Tempefi, afl 2. fcene i. 
 
 M 2 mediately
 
 164 Of the Influence ofthePaJj'wns Part II. 
 
 mediately connected with it as being its caufe, 
 and that in fpight of every thought by which 
 his companions endeavoured to divert it. 
 This object fuggefts an idea related to it by 
 caufation, his daughter's marriage at Tunis, 
 the event which occafioned that lofs. This 
 event carries his thoughts back again to the 
 death of his fon ; which, when thus again 
 prefented to his imagination, fuggefts a fe- 
 cond time his daughter's marriage, by means 
 of its rcfemblance to it in one particular, that 
 her diftance deprived him of all intercourfe 
 •with her, as much as if fhe too had been 
 dead. But forrow for his fon allows him not 
 to reft long upon this thought, fuitable as it 
 is to his paflion, or to purfue any others 
 which this might have introduced ; it makes 
 his imagination inftantly to recur to the lofs 
 of his fon, to view it in every light, to con- 
 ceive many circumftances relating to him, 
 his being his heir, his being entitled to large 
 dominions, his being devoured by filhes. 
 This example is thus a new illuftratlon of the 
 principles formerly explained, That a pafTion 
 tends to fix the view on objects intimately 
 conneded with it, or to make it often recur 
 to them, not only on the flighteft hint, but 
 even without any occafion, and that thefe 
 
 objects
 
 Sect. III. on JJfociatlon, 165 
 
 Gbjed:s fuggeft ideas related to them. It is 
 likewife a dired illuftration of the principle 
 now under confideration, and for the fake of 
 which we have cited it. It is a flriking in- 
 ftance of the power of a pafTion to enable a 
 perception connected with it, to introduce not 
 indifcriminately any ideas related to itfelf, 
 but only fuch as are at the fame time fuitable 
 to the nature of the paffion. No ideas are 
 conceived, but fuch as are perfedlly fuitable 
 to Alonzo*s forrow. Claribel's marriage was 
 in itfelf fully as lit for fuggefting ideas of the 
 mirth or pomp which attended it, or of the 
 circumftances which rendered it defirable, 
 and moved Alonzo to urge it, as for fuggefting 
 ideas of its difagreeable circumftances and 
 eonfequences. It had ad:ually fuggefted ideas 
 of the former kind to the reft of the compa- 
 ny; but Alonzo's forrow hinders them from 
 occurring to him, and forces into his view 
 fuch thoughts as are unpleafant, and excite 
 regret. 
 
 Further, a paftion has an influence on 
 the number^ as well as on the nature of the 
 ideas introduced. It tends fo ftrongly to keep 
 the attention fixt on the objects ftridly con- 
 nected with it, that it fuff"ers not thefe to fug- 
 geft a long train of ideas, fucceftively related 
 
 M 3 to
 
 1 66 Of the Injluencc of the Paffions . Par t II, 
 
 lo each other. It generally allows us to gq 
 only one ftep or two beyond them ; after we 
 have been led by means of them to conceive 
 one idea, we go not forward to the view of 
 others aiTocIated with that; ftill the pafhoa 
 makes the obje6i: nearly allied to it, to dwell 
 upon the thought ; we recur to the contem- 
 plation of this object, and it fuggefts a new 
 idea, related to itfelf but not to that idea 
 which it had introduced formerly. In othec 
 cafes, after the imagination has once receive4 
 an irapulfe, it readily goes on from one per- 
 ception through a number of others, till it 
 arrive at a great diftance from that with which 
 it began : and it would be difficult to flop its 
 career, to bring it back to the objedl from 
 which it fet out, or to make it enter into a 
 different track. But when the mind is occu- 
 pied by a paffion, the difficulty lies wholly 
 on the other fide : the paffion directs the view 
 to things clofely connedled with it, fo power- 
 fully and fo conftantly, that the imagination 
 is drawn backward to repeated conceptions of 
 them ; when our natural propenfity to vary 
 the objcd of our thought, indifpofes us for 
 dwelling longer on them alone, they yet re- 
 tain their hold of us fo far that we enter ea- 
 fily into another track pointed out by them :
 
 Se c t. hi. on A(fodat'ion, 167 
 
 we cannot without a painful effort, often 
 we cannot at all, proceed fo long in one path 
 as to leave them far behind us; all the ideas 
 introduced after a few removes, are but 
 flightly conneded with the objedt which the 
 paffion difpofes us to red upon^ and that paffion 
 checks all propenfity to go through or attend 
 to many ideas but flightly conneded. The 
 imagination referables a perfon attached to 
 home, who cannot without reludance under- 
 take a long journey, but can with pleafure 
 make fhort excurfions, returning home from 
 each, and thence fetting out anew. Oppofite 
 forces in mechanics tend to deftroy one ano- 
 ther. This is analogous to the cafe before us. 
 The objeds ftri£lly connected with a painon 
 are naturally fit for introducing ideas related 
 to themfelves ; the paflion ads in a contrary 
 diredion, and endeavours to keep the mind 
 from running off to thefe : there is a perpe- 
 tual ftruggle between the two. The paffion 
 having kept the attention fixt for fome time 
 on an objed intimately conneded v/ith it, its 
 force begins to flag : that objed is conceived 
 in a lively and vigorous manner, by reafon of 
 its relation to the paffion, and therefore very 
 powerfully draws in ideas affociated with it. 
 But the conception of all the fucceeding ob- 
 
 M 4 jeds
 
 i68 * Of the hifaience of the Pqffions Part II. 
 
 jeds drawn in by it, is ftill weaker and 
 weaker ; on this account their power of intro- 
 ducing ideas becomes continually lefs and 
 lefs ; fo that after a few fteps they give us a 
 very inconfiderable propenfity to go forward. 
 The paffion exerts a force fuperior to their's ; 
 it therefore prevails, it prevents farther afTo- 
 ciation, it brings back the attention to fome 
 objed clofely conneded with it, it invigorates 
 the conception of that objed fo as to enable it 
 to fuggeft a new idea ; but it hinders us from 
 going to a greater diftance than before. Here 
 we difcover a new caufe of that abruptnefs of 
 thought which a paffion occafions. It arifes 
 partly, we have feen, from the mind's divid- 
 ing its attention between feveral objeds all 
 clofely and almoft equally conneded with the 
 paffion ; partly from the rapidity with which 
 the mind takes in diffiimilar views of any one 
 of thefe objeds ; and partly from the ftruggle 
 between objeds fuggeftcd by the paffion, and 
 pbjeds fuggefted by other means : but it alfo 
 arifes partly from the conftant vibration of the 
 thought between the objeds immediately con- 
 tiedcd with the paffion, and the ideas w^hich 
 they tend to introduce. The mind leaves 
 any of thefe ideas as foon as it has conceived 
 it, it lays hold of an objed more clofely con- 
 neded
 
 Sect. III. QJi AJJociat'ion. 169 
 
 neded with the pa^Tion, it runs from it to an 
 idea fuggefted by it, but wholly unrelated to 
 the former. This alone muft produce a great 
 want of connexion, and many breaks, in the 
 expreffion of fentiments refulting from a paf- 
 fion. Thefe principles now laid down, are 
 fufficiently illuftrated by the laft example 
 which we cited, Alonzo's grief made the lofs 
 of his fon to fuggefl the difbnce of his daugh- 
 ter, and the confequence of that diftance, the 
 improbability of his ever feeing her ; but 
 without allowing him to purfue that thought, 
 hurries him back to the lofs of his fon, and fets 
 him a thinking on new circumftances con- 
 neded with it. The marriage of his daugh- 
 ter, the lofs of his fon, the lofs of his daughter, 
 her diftance, the little chance for his feeing 
 her again, the lofs of his fon, his being heir 
 to extenfive territories, his being devoured by 
 fifhes, all fucceed one another in his thoughts, 
 with great abruptnefs and rapidity. 
 
 There is a fault very common in drama- 
 tic poetry : perfons are made to exprefs their 
 pafTions, not as if they were really adluated 
 by them, but as if they were fpedators of 
 them in others ; the poet gives not a natural 
 reprefentation of the pafTion, but a laboured 
 ^efcription of it. The obfervations juft now 
 5 made^
 
 I/O Of the Injliience of the Paffions Part 11. 
 
 made, lead us to a difcovery of the fource of 
 this fault. An obje<51: which is in a particular 
 inftance ftridly conneded with a pafTion, and 
 forced into the mind by it, may be confidered 
 not only in this particular point of view, but 
 alfo limply in itfelf, as a prefent perception. 
 Its influence on aflbciation is very different, 
 according as it Hands in one of thefe fituations 
 or the other. When it is in the mind fimply 
 as a prefent perception, it tends to fuggeft 
 any ideas w^hatever that are conneded with it 
 by any of the aflbciating qualities, and to 
 caufe the mind run from one of thefe through 
 a long train of ideas fucceflively introducing 
 one another. But when it is brought into the 
 mind by a palTion to which it is intimately 
 related, it receives a tindlure from that paf- 
 fion, it is wholly under the diredion of that 
 paflion, it exerts its power of afTociation only 
 in fuch ways and fo far as the paflion permits, 
 it introduces fuch ideas alone as are fuitable 
 to the pafTion, and it introduces no long 
 trains of ideas, but fuffers the mind to return 
 quickly to the conception of itfelf, or of fome 
 other objed as intimately related to the paffion. 
 For example, a perfon may think of the dif- 
 trefs of another without feeling pity : in this 
 cafe, the thought of that diftrefs may lead 
 
 him
 
 Sect. III. on ^Jfoc'mtwt, ijt 
 
 him to conceive any of the actions of the per- 
 fon who fuffers it, any other perfons who have 
 had a concern in thefe adions or a connexion 
 with the ador, any particulars of the condud: 
 or fortunes of thefe perfons ; and may thus 
 open a boundlefs field of thought. But when 
 the diftrefs excites pity, this paflion extin- 
 guifhes all propenfity to fuch excurfions, it 
 fixes our view on the diftrefs by which it is 
 produced. This diftrefs may fuggeft, by 
 means of refemblance, other inftances of dif- 
 trefs in other perfons ; it may fuggeft, by 
 means of contrariety, fuch circumftances of 
 former profperity, as aggravate the prefent 
 diftrefs ; it may lead us to think of the caufe 
 of it, or to trace out its confequences ; in a 
 word, it may introduce any ideas ftridlly con- 
 neded with it, and congruous to the paftion 
 of pity : but it has no tendency to fuggeft any 
 others, or to lead the imagination into a re- 
 mote or extenfive wandering. Did it attempt 
 this, and did the mind follow it w^ithout re- 
 ferve, it muft quickly come to feme ideas re- 
 pugnant to the paflion, and fit for producing 
 an oppofite difpofition : but this cannot na- 
 turally or eafily happen to a perfon under the 
 power of any paflion. A paflion leaves no 
 inclination for going through a long train of 
 
 ideas,
 
 172 Of the Infiience of the Pajfons Part II, 
 
 ideas, ^nd if the mind fhould run off to any 
 diftance or to unfuitable ideas, the paffion 
 would immediately check it, and recall the 
 attention to ideas congruous to itfelf, as well 
 as related to the objedt immediately fuggefled 
 by it. Now an indifferent poet having con- 
 ceived fome of the objcdls ftridtly conned:ed 
 with a paffion, confiders that objedl: only in 
 general, and abllradly as a prefent percep- 
 tion ; he therefore allows himfelf to run into 
 fuch z. train of thought, as that objed prefent 
 to the mind would dictate, if it were uncon- 
 nected with any paffion ; he goes on coolly 
 imagining fuch ideas as it fuggefts by means 
 of any of the principles of affi^ciation ; and he 
 makes the perfon poffeiled by the paffion, to 
 exprefs all thefe ideas. He feels not the paf- 
 fion, he has not force of genius or fenfibility 
 of heart fufficient for conceiving how it would 
 affedt a perfon who felt it, or for entering 
 into the fentiments which it would produce 
 in him. The fentiments which he makes hini 
 utter, might all be very proper in a defcrip- 
 tion, a difcourfe, or a meditation, occafioned 
 by the view of fuch an object ; but they are 
 not natural to a perfon in whom that objedt 
 produces a fuitable paffion. In order to con- 
 ceive fentiments natural to him, the poet ought 
 
 to
 
 Sect. III. 072 AJfociation. 17^ 
 
 to have confined himfelf to the confideraticn 
 of the object in this one point of view, as 
 ftridly conneded with a paffion and fuggefted 
 by it; he ought to indulge only fuch a train 
 of thought, as it would lead to in thefe cir- 
 cumftances, or fuch a train as the paffion with 
 which it is prefently conned:ed, would intro- 
 duce into the mind of a perfon under the 
 power of that paffion. 
 
 This is indeed fo difficult, that the beft poets 
 cannot always perfectly attain it. Shakefpear 
 makes the dutchefs of Gloucefter, in parting 
 with John of Gaunt, to exprefs her grief in 
 this manner : 
 
 Tet one i^ord more ; grief houndeth where it falls. 
 Not with the empty hollownefs^ but weight : 
 I take my leave before I have begun ; 
 For for row ends not when it feemeth done. 
 Commend me to my brother, Edmund York ; 
 
 Lo, this is all nay yet depart not fo ; 
 
 Though this be all, do not fo quickly go : 
 I fhall remember more. Bid him — oh what ? 
 With all good fpeed at Plalhie vifit me. 
 Alack, and what /hall good old York fee there. 
 But empty lodgings, and unfurnifli'd walls. 
 Unpeopled offices, untrodden flones ? 
 And what hear there for welcome, but my groans ? 
 Therefore commend me, — let him not come there 
 To feek out forrow that dwells every where ; 
 
 All
 
 174 Of the Injliience of the PaJ/ions Part IL 
 
 All defolate will I from hence, and die ; 
 
 The laft leave of thee takes my weeping eye. {i) 
 
 The latter part of the fpeecli Is a natural ex- 
 preffion of grief, and of violent grief; the 
 firft four lines are a defcription, not an ex- 
 prefTion of it, and therefore unfuitable to the 
 dutchefs's ftate of mind ; the reflection which 
 they contain is juft, but too cool for the tem- 
 per of the fpeaken 
 
 ^ It follows from the obfervations which have 
 been made, that a palTion tends to hinder the 
 mind from running into the conception of 
 fuch ideas as have no connexion with that 
 paffion. Since a paflion fixes the view on ob- 
 jects immediately connetSted with it, fince it 
 continually draws the mind back to the con- 
 ception of thefe objedts even from ideas fug- 
 gefted by themfelves, fince it prevents their 
 introducing many ideas naturally connected 
 with them, the neceflary confequence is, that 
 it will much more exclude ideas which have 
 no relation either to thefe objects or to the 
 paflion, and will render a very flrong efl'ort 
 requifite for bringing them into view. A di- 
 red proof of this arifes from the difficulty 
 which we experience in diverting any paflion 
 which has taken firm pofleflion of the foul, by 
 
 (/} Richard U; aft I. fcene 3. 
 
 application
 
 Sect. III. on JJfociation. 17^ 
 
 application to fiich fubjed:s as have a tendency 
 td'banifh it : the ftrongeft refolution and the in- 
 tenfeft endeavours are often infufficient for 
 bringing the mind to fix on thefe fubjedts. 
 Nay, fo great is the force of the paflion, that 
 when other fubje^ls are moft poveerfully urged 
 upon us, when we have the ftrongeft calls to 
 give application to them, yet we cannot enter 
 into them with fpirit ; the paftion mixes with 
 all our thoughts, and continually difturbs the 
 courfe of them. 
 
 It often happens that two different pafHons, 
 or that a prefent paffion and an habitual dif- 
 pofition, occupy the mind together. Each of 
 thefe having a tendency to fix the mind on 
 objeds ftridly connected with itfelf, or to di- 
 red it to fuch ideas as thefe objeds fuggeft, 
 the mind turns quickly from thoughts intro- 
 duced by the one paffion, to thofe which are 
 introduced by the other, and runs conftantly 
 backward and forward between them, with- 
 out refting a moment on either. In this cafe, 
 the thoughts muft have an uncommon degree 
 of abruptnefs : each of the paflions fingly 
 would have occafioned abruptnefs in the ways 
 already taken notice of; but to this is fuper- 
 added the unconnedlednefs which arifes from 
 the view being fuccellively directed to objeds 
 
 afTociated
 
 176 Of the I7iflue7ice of the P Colons Part IL 
 
 aflbclated with different paffions. Shakefpear 
 affords us a ftriking inftance of this, when he 
 reprefents Shylock agitated by avarice, by 
 grief for the lofs of his daughter, and by Yage 
 at her having married a Chriftian and ftolen 
 his money, and in confequence of that agita- 
 tion exclaiming, 
 
 My daughter, O my ducats, O my daughter I 
 Fled with a Chriftian ? O my chriftian ducats ! 
 Jufticc, the law, my ducats, and my daughter ! 
 A fealed bag, two fealed bags of ducats, 
 Of double ducats, ftol'n from me by my daughter ! 
 And jewels, two ftones, rich and precious ftones, 
 Stol'n by my daughter ! juftice ! find the girl ; 
 She hath the ftones upon her, and the ducats ! {k) 
 
 If was evinced, that babit not only pro- 
 motes the introdudion of fuch ideas as it has 
 rendered familiar, but alfo gives the mind, in 
 fome cafes, a propenfity to afibciate ideas by 
 one relation rather than by others. It does 
 not appear that the paffions give an abfolute 
 preference to any one relation. An objedt 
 immediately connected with a pafTion, fuggefts 
 indifcriminately ideas coiineded with itfelf by 
 any of the aflbciating qualities. Some of 
 thefe qualities may, however, be confidered as 
 in fome fenfe more fuitable to the paffions than 
 
 {k) Merchant of Venice, aft 2, fcene 9, 
 
 Others :
 
 Sect. III. 07i Affociatlon. 177 
 
 others ; and that in two refpe<5ls : a pafTion 
 introduces ideas connedled with its immediate 
 objeds by fome of the aflbciating qualities, 
 more commonly and frequently than fuch as 
 are connected with them by other aiFocIating 
 qualities : and fome of the aflbciating quali- 
 ties lead the mind to a greater diflance from 
 the objeds ftridly connedted with the paflion, 
 than others of them. Ideas introduced by 
 fome aflbciating qualities, have a Lefs perfe£l 
 relation to the paflion, than ideas introduced 
 by others : the former ideas are rarely fug- 
 gefted by a paflion, the latter often : the qua- 
 lities which give ideas introduced by them but 
 an imperfed relation, fcarce ever lead the 
 mind more than one ftep beyond the objeds 
 ftridly connected with the paflion ; the others 
 may lead it feveral fteps, introducing a feries 
 of ideas fucceflively aflbciated wdth one ano- 
 ther. 
 
 Resemblance is a quality of the former 
 kind : there are many ways in which ideas 
 may refemble an objed intimately conneded 
 with a paflion, that will not lead that object 
 to fuggeft thefe ideas. The refemblance mufl: 
 be of a peculiar kind, mufl be fuch as fits an 
 idea to aff"ed: the paflion in the fame way 
 with the objed which fuggefts it, elfe the paf- 
 
 N fion
 
 170 Of the Influence of the Pajfions Part II. 
 
 lioii will check its. operation. When the re- 
 femblance is thus peculiar, the affociation is 
 indeed very ilrong ; there are few ideas wdiich 
 occur more readily either to aperfon fufFering 
 any diftrefs, or to a fpedlator moved with pity 
 for his fii-ffering, than the idea of a fimilar 
 diftrels. But otl^er forts of refemblance have 
 no fuch cfFc£t : hence it is iiniverfally allowed, 
 that fnnilitudes are in general unfuitable to 
 the language of pafiion, and that even me- 
 tauhors ouput to be admitted into it with 
 great referve. In this refped:, what Shakef- 
 pear puts into the mouth of the queen,, when 
 Ihe fees her hufoand king Richard a prifoner> 
 is faulty and unnatural; 
 
 But foft, but fee, or rather do not fee. 
 My fair rofe wither ; yet look up ; behold, 
 Th;it you in pity may difiblve to dew, 
 And wafli him frefli again with true-love tears. 
 O thou the model where old Troy did (land, 
 I'hou map of honour, thou king Richard's tomb. 
 And not king Richard ; thou moft "beauteous inn, 
 Why fnould hard favour'd grief be lodg'd in thee. 
 When triumph is become an ale-houfe gueft ? (/) 
 
 Befides, refemblance leads the mind only one 
 flep ; an idea fuggeiled by means of its re- 
 femblance to any of the objedls flridly con- 
 
 (/) RichaidW. a6l 5! fcene i. 
 
 ne6led
 
 Sect. III. on Affbciation. 179 
 
 neded with a palTion, feldom fuggefts another 
 idea refembling itfelf. A paffion occupies the 
 mind too much, to leave it leifure or inclina- 
 tion for hunting after fimilitudes. One re- 
 fembling idea is often fuitable to the paffion, 
 and fit to influence it; but by conceiving ano- 
 ther idea refembling that, much more by go- 
 ing through feveral ideas, each of which is 
 fuggefled by its refemblance to the preceding, 
 we mull come to fuch as are no ways related 
 to the paffion, as are wholly unfit for influ- 
 encing it, and as bear no likenefs to any of 
 the objecSls clofely conneded with it. But the 
 nature of paffion permits us not to indulge 
 ourfelves in the conception of fuch ideas, 
 Richard giving vent to his grief in prifon, 
 might naturally fay, on hearing time broke 
 in mufic. 
 
 And here have I the daintinefs of ear. 
 To check time broke in a diforder'd firing; 
 But for the concord of my (late and time. 
 Had not an ear to hear my true time broke : 
 I wafled time, and now doth time walle me. 
 
 But he could fcarce naturally add, 
 
 For now hath time made me his numb' ring; clock r 
 My thoughts are minutes •, and with fighs they jar 
 Their watches to mine eyes the outward watch; 
 
 N 2 Whereto
 
 1 8o Of the Injluence of the Pafftons Part IT, 
 
 Whereto my finger, like a dial's point. 
 
 Is pointing fiill, in cleanfing them from tears. (»?)■ 
 
 Objects ftridly ccnneded with a paffion^ 
 often fugged CQUti^ary objeds ; but they fug- 
 ;;eft only fuch as are contrary in fome particu- 
 lar ways, which render them fit for influen- 
 cing the prefent pafTion : objects in all other 
 ways contrary, the paffion leads the mind ta- 
 reject. 
 
 Lady. Madam, we'll tell tales. 
 
 ^een. Of for row, or of joy ? 
 
 Lddy. Of either, Madam* 
 
 ^feen. Of neither, girl. 
 For if of joy, being altogether wanting. 
 It doth remember me the more of forrow : 
 Or if of grief, &:c. (;/) 
 
 Contrariety feldom leads the mind more than 
 one ftep from the objedl immediately fug- 
 gefted by the paflion : a fliort contrail: may 
 very much enliven our conception of that ob~ 
 jcG: ; it thus naturally falls in with the paflion: 
 but a feries of eontrafls would produce a very 
 difl'erent efi^ed ; a multitude of antithefes in 
 writing of any fort, fliow an imagination dif- 
 pofcd to feek amufcment, not a mind intenfely 
 engaged by its fubjcil:. 
 
 (m) Richard W. a£l 5. fcene io. 
 («) Hid, art j. fcene 7.. 
 
 Objects
 
 Sect. III. on Jjjociaiwu i8i 
 
 Objects ftridly connected with a paffion, 
 often fuggeft likewife the ideas of other ob- 
 jects afTociated with them by 'vicinity. In- 
 deed contiguous objeds are frequently con- 
 iieded together by other relations, and in that 
 <:afe a pafTion leads us firongly to conceive 
 them. But vicinity alone is fufficient for 
 producing this effedt : a view of the contigu- 
 ous objeds renders our conception of a thing 
 determinate and lively, and thus when that 
 thing is intimately related to a pafTion, tends 
 to invigorate and fupport the paffion. A paf- 
 fion makes us prone to this, and naturally 
 affifts vicinity in introducing fuch ideas as 
 can promote it. But vicinity never intro- 
 duces a long train of ideas : it would be un- 
 natural for a perfon aduated by any paffion, 
 to run along a multitude of obje6ls contigu- 
 ous to one another cither in place or in time, 
 for this would tend to divert the paffion by 
 variety. 
 
 Co -EXISTENCE and the relation of caujh 
 and effe5l^ are the principles of alTociation 
 which the paffions employ moft frequently, 
 and which fuggeft the longeft trains of ideas. 
 Thefe give ideas the moft perfed relation to 
 a paffion; and almoft every idea introduced 
 by means of thefe principles, really influences 
 
 N 3 the
 
 1 82 Of the hifiiieiice of the Pajfwns Part II. 
 
 the paffion. Co-exiftence fuggcfls the quali- 
 ties, the circumftanccs, the accefforles, and 
 the concomitants of thofe objeds which are 
 clofely connected with the paffion ; and the 
 more of thefe we have in our view, the ftronger 
 and liveUer is our conception of thofe objedls. 
 All the objeds almoft which the relation of 
 caufe and effect can fuggeft, contribute either 
 more immediately or m.ore remotely to the 
 produdion of the paffion itfelf ; and therefore 
 are ftrongly conneded with it. Accordingly, 
 in moll of the examples which have been 
 produced, the ideas fuggefted by objeds ftrldly 
 conneded with the paffions, are fuch as are 
 fuggefted by means of thefe two principles of 
 aflbciation. 
 
 It is a natural Inference from the obfer- 
 vations which have been already made, that 
 the paffions, far from difpofmg us to follow 
 order in the train of our ideas, render us in- 
 capable of preferving order. The inference 
 is fo obvious, that it is not neceflary to fpend 
 time in confirming it. Abruptnefs, incohe- 
 rence, fluduation of thought, are the confe- 
 quences of paffion ; and thefe are the re- 
 verfe of order. But it is worth while to ob- 
 ferve, that a paffion even inverts the natural 
 order of our ideas. As the imagination paffes 
 
 fron:^
 
 Sect. III. on Affociatlon, 185 
 
 from one idea to another conne^led with it, 
 fo a paffion once excited does not confine 
 itfelf to its lirll: objed, but readily extends it- 
 felf to other objects connected with that ; love 
 or hatred to any perfon, feldom fails to pro- 
 duce fome degree of love or hatred to fuch as 
 are conne(5ted with him. It has been fhowa 
 by philofophers, that the imagination palTes 
 moft readily from a lefs confiderable to a more 
 confiderabie objed: ; but that a pafTion, on the 
 contrary, pafles with greateft eafe from the 
 more to the lefs confiderable objed (0) : and 
 what we would now obferve is, that a paffion 
 prevailing in the mind, caufes the imagina- 
 tion to proceed in this latter diredion. In- 
 deed if it did not, the paffion itfelf could not 
 be extended to the inferior and fubordinate 
 objeds ; for it cannot be direded to them till 
 we have formed ideas of them. When the 
 mind is cool, and not under the influence of 
 any paffion, the idea of a fon or of a fervant 
 fuggefls the idea of the father or the mafter, 
 more naturally and more certainly than the 
 idea of the father or the mafter would fug- 
 gefl: that of the fon or the fervant. On the 
 contrary, love, hatred, refentment, towards a 
 father or a mafter, very readily extend them- 
 
 (0) Treatife of Human Nature, Vcl. II. Partii. Icdi.z. 
 
 N 4 felves
 
 184 Ideas fuggefied hy sulfations ^ Part IL 
 
 felves to the fon or the fervant, though we 
 might feel the fame paffions towards thefe 
 latter, without conceiving any degree of them 
 towards the former. At the fame time the 
 pafhon towards the fuperior, gives the imagi- 
 nation an irrefiftible propenfity to run into 
 the conception of the inferior or dependent ; 
 eager to extend itfelf, it forces upon us the 
 idea without which it could not be extended, 
 
 S E C T. IV. 
 
 JieflecIio7is on the Principles of /Iffociation^ 
 Ideas fugg^ftcd eithsr by Senfations^ or by 
 other Ideas, 
 
 FROM the account which has been al- 
 ready given of the principles of aifoci-? 
 ation, it is eafy to colieift, That there is a 
 broad foundation laid in the nature of the 
 human imagination, for great extent and va^ 
 riety of genius. There are many relations of 
 ideas, which fit them for being afTociated ; 
 almoft every perception bears fome of thefe 
 relations to many different ideas; habit and 
 the paffions multiply and vary the inflru^ 
 ments of affociation : by thefe means there 
 are inni»merable handles by which the imagi- 
 nation
 
 Sect. IV. or by other Ideas. 185 
 
 nation may feize fuch ideas as it has occafion 
 for. Genius has, in feme men, great force 
 and compafs : but a vigorous conftrudion of 
 the aflbciating principles is fufEcient to account 
 for it, however great it be ; for if they be vi- 
 gorous, any one perception may introduce a 
 great multitude of others, and that by means 
 of many different relations. The principles 
 of affociation likewife being fo various, can- 
 not but admit many diftindl combinations and 
 modifications, by vv^hich genius will be mould- 
 ed into a great diverfity of forms. In order * 
 therefore to prepare the way for a difcovery 
 of the varieties of genius, it will be proper to 
 make fome reflections on the principles of 
 affociation, which have been feparately illuf- 
 trated. 
 
 The prefent perception which introduces 
 others, by means of the relations that they 
 bear to it, may be either a fenfation of an 
 objedt, or only an idea of it. In whichever 
 of thefe ways the objedl be perceived, it has 
 the very fame relations to others ; and there- 
 fore in both cafes it has a tendency to fuggcfl: 
 the very fame ideas. But it will not always 
 fuggeft them with the fame force or certainty 
 in thefe two cafes. 
 
 That
 
 iZ6 Ideas fuggefied by Senfationsy Part II. 
 
 That a perception may introduce others. 
 It is neceffary that itfelf take feme hold of the 
 mind, and be attended to ; and the ftronger a 
 perception is, it takes the firmer hold of the 
 mind, and excites the clofer attention. The 
 adual fenfation of an object is always much 
 ftronger than any conception of it, which 
 memory or imagination can exhibit. On this 
 account, a fenfation of an objed: will often 
 introduce ideas which the mere conception of 
 that obje(fl would not have force to fuggefl: ; 
 it gives a ftronger impulfe to the mind, and 
 renders lefs intimate relations to the prefent 
 objedl, fufficient for bringing thefe ideas into 
 view. Merely to think of darknefs, does not 
 lead us fo readily or fo neceflarily to the con- 
 ception of its oppofite, light, as our being 
 actually involved in darknefs. The fight of 
 a fliip periftiing in a ftorra, not only raifes 
 ftronger emotions, but likewife introduces a 
 much greater variety of ideas into the mind, 
 than barely reading or hearing of a ftiip- 
 wreck : in the latter cafe, it fometimes makes 
 fo little impreflion upon us, as not to give 
 rife to any train of ideas. . The mention or 
 the accidental recolledion of a place where we 
 have fpent a confiderable part of oqr lives, 
 
 will
 
 Sect, IV. or by other Ideas : 187 
 
 ■will bring to mind occurrences which hap- 
 pened there ; but every perfon has felt, that 
 vifiting that place reminds him of many- 
 more, and makes them rufli into his thoughts 
 with much greater rapidity. The mention 
 of a perfon often makes us recoiled: that there 
 is fome purpofe for which we want to fee 
 him ; but fometimes, Vvhen we cannot call to 
 mind what it particularly is, the fight of 
 that perfon brings it quickly into our thoughts. 
 In confequence of the ftiperior force of fenfa- 
 tions, which enables them to fuggeft concep- 
 tions by means of much weaker relations 
 than ideas can, it often happens, that an ob- 
 jed: occurring to the fenfes, gives a vei*y quick, 
 and feemingly unaccountable turn to the courfe 
 of the thoughts. It makes a man ceafe to 
 purfue a train of fcntiments connected with 
 his former ideas by the ftrongeft relations, 
 and run into fuch as are much more weakly 
 related to the objed which he perceives by 
 fenfe. 
 
 But, on the other hand, there are cafes in 
 which the idea of an objedl will fuggeft fuch 
 thoughts as the fcnfation of that objed: could 
 not have fuggefted. This happens chiefly 
 when objects are of fuch a nature, that the 
 fenfation of them is exceeding ftrong and in- 
 
 tcrefls
 
 i88 Ideas fuggejled by Sen/at lons^ Part IL 
 
 terefts us very deeply, when, for inftance, it 
 is in a high degree pleafant or painful, or 
 when it produces any ftrong or violent paf- 
 fion. In thefe cafes, it engroffes our whole 
 attention, and by doing fo, prevents ideas 
 from occurring, which would have been na- 
 turally fuggefted by a mere idea of that object, 
 becaufe the idea would not have occupied the 
 mind fo much. Many of the obfervations 
 which we have already made concerning the 
 paffions, may be eafily applied to the illuflra- 
 tion of this polition. To confirm it by a 
 feparate example, relations of tortures fome- 
 times fuggeft a variety of conceptions of dif- 
 ferent kinds; but it is remarked, that the 
 fight of tortures chills the whole foul, and 
 produces almofl: a total flagnation of thought. 
 A PERSON has always fenfations of thofe 
 objedls which belong to his own ftate and 
 condition ; others, who obferve his fituation, 
 conceive the fame objects only in idea. Hence 
 there arifes often a great difference between 
 the train of thoughts which are raifed in a 
 perfon by the fenfe of his own fituation, and 
 that train which obfervation of his fituation 
 introduces into the minds of others. The 
 thoughts, refledlions, and fentiments of a 
 perfon who adually feels pain or ficknefs, are 
 
 generally
 
 Sect. IV. or by other Id^as, i8g 
 
 generally different in feveral refpeds, from 
 thofe of the perfons who vifit him ; thefe often 
 engage in converfation, even relating to his 
 diftrefs, into which he can by no means enter. 
 Suppofe a perfon raifed from meannefs to 
 great profperity or dignity ; his own fenti- 
 ments are very unlike to the reflections of 
 fpeCtators. The vivacity with which he per- 
 ceives it, the force with which it lays hold of 
 him by means of the fenfes, leads him into 
 many thoughts which the idea of it has not 
 power enough to fuggeft to others. But at 
 the fame time it fcarce at all leads him to 
 think of fome things which moil readily occur 
 to the reft of the world. The contraft be- 
 tween his prefent and his former fituation, is 
 one of the firft and moft natural reflexions 
 that the world makes : but there are many 
 refledlions into which the man himfelf runs 
 more eafily and more frequently. His pre- 
 fent fituation makes fo ftrong an impreflion 
 on him, that he attends chiefly to fuch ideas 
 as are fuitable to it ; it excites many agree- 
 able paflions, thefe increafe his propenfity to 
 attend only to agreeable perceptions : his for- 
 mer meannefs is in the main mortifying, and 
 therefore the whole of his temper oppofes his 
 running into the contemplation of it. Many 
 
 regard
 
 1 gb Ideas fuggejied hy Sen/at ions, Pa R T It. 
 
 regard both the prefent and the paft ft ate of 
 another with great indifference; neither af- 
 feds them much, . neither raifes any paffion ; 
 they confider both without any emotion, 
 merely as objeds expofed to their view : thefe 
 objeds can fuggeft ideas to them, only by 
 their natural relations to other objeds ; and 
 therefore they run freely into whatever 
 thoughts thefe relations fuggeft : contrariety 
 is one of thefe relations ; its force is the 
 greater in this cafe, becaufe the oppofite con- 
 ditions belong to the fame perfon j and by 
 means of it, the man's former condition is 
 readily brought into view. Some again ob- 
 ferve fuch a change of fortune happening to 
 another, not without fome emotion. When- 
 ever, for in (lance, the idea of it occurs to one 
 perfon, it is attended with envy, and this 
 paffion augments its power to fuggeft his for- 
 mer meannefs, and turns it when it is fug- 
 gefted, into fuch a form as makes it feem to 
 fully or obfcure his prefent elevation.^ On 
 the contrary, in the mind of the benevolent, 
 fuch good fortune produces joy ; the perfon's 
 former obfcurity, by rendering the good for- 
 tune the greater, tends to fupport and ralfe 
 that joy, and therefore finds ready accefs to 
 
 the mind. 
 
 In
 
 Sect. IV. or hy other Ideas, tgi 
 
 In a word, the train of fentiments intro- 
 duced by an object, varies confiderably accord- 
 ing as a perfon has himfelf a fenfation of that 
 obje(£l, or only obferves one who has ; and 
 that both becaufe the immediate efFedts of 
 fenfations on aflbciation, are different in many 
 refpeds from thofe of ideas, and becaufe they 
 give rife to different paffions and emotions. 
 Every one who would give a natural repre- 
 fentation of thoughts and fentiments, muft 
 attend to this principle : it has therefore a 
 near relation to every fpecies of genius which 
 is converfant about characters. It has likewife 
 a more extenfive influence upon genius : fen- 
 timents fuggefled by a man's own fituation, 
 mix with all the exertions of his genius, on 
 whatever fubjeds it be employed ; and his 
 fituation thus gives it fome peculiarity, and 
 diflinguifhcs his produdions from thofe of 
 another man poffeffed of the mcfl fimilar ge- 
 nius, but placed in diflimilar circumftances. 
 
 Thus aifociation is fufceptible of great va,-?' 
 rieties according as it is produced by a fenfa- 
 tion, or by an idea : it is likevsrife fufceptible 
 of varieties arifing from other caufes, which 
 we fliall next proceed to confider. 
 
 SECT.
 
 iqz Of the Comhinahon of Part IL 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of the Combination of the offociating Prht- 
 
 ci^les^ 
 
 TH E feveral principles of affoclation 
 wkich have been enumerated, are dif- 
 ferent, and fome of them are very imlike to 
 others of them : every perception w^hatever is 
 conneded with fome ideas by fome of thefe 
 principles, and with fome ideas by other prin* 
 ciples ; but often alfo a perception is conned:- 
 ed with another by two or more of thefe 
 principles at once. 
 
 It was impofTible to confider the afTociat- 
 ing principles fo much feparately, as to pre- 
 vent many inftances of this combination from 
 occurring in what has been already faid, or 
 to avoid mentioning fome of the confequences 
 of it. We have found examples of habit and 
 of paffion concurring with fome of the rela- 
 tions of ideas, in fuggefting the fame thought. 
 Different relations of ideas may be combined 
 in like manner. A thing which refembles 
 another, may at the fame time be contiguous 
 to it, or be its caufe, or its effdd:. Morton, 
 
 relating
 
 S E C T . V. the ajjociating Principles^ 193 
 
 relating in what manner Piercy's fall deprived 
 his troops of courage, fays. 
 
 For from his metal was his party fleel'd % 
 Which once in him abated, all the reft 
 Turn'd on themfelves, like dull and heavy lead* 
 And as the thing that's heavy in itfelf, 
 Upon enforcement flies with greateft fpeed : 
 So did our men, heavy in Hotfpur's lofs. 
 Lend to this weight fuch lightnefs with their fear^ 
 That arrows fled not fwifter toward their aim. 
 Than did our foldiers, aiming at their fafety. 
 Fly from the field. [a) 
 
 The feveral images here employed ; Jieel 
 lojing its temper; heavy things moving fajlet 
 than light things^ ivhen they are projected 
 ivith fufficient force j arroivsjlying to a mark ; 
 have fuch a degree of refemblance to the de- 
 je6tion and flight of brave foldiers, as is fuffi- 
 cient to render them proper fimilitudes : but 
 in this cafe, they are not fuggefted to the 
 poet by refemblance alone ; being things em« 
 ployed in war, they have all a kind of vici*- 
 nity to what happened in the field of battle ; 
 the ufe that is made of them in war, conneda 
 them with it by a fpecies of caufation ; and 
 therefore they have a ftronger relation to the 
 fubjed defa'ibed, than images which only re- 
 
 (a) Second ^z^n o^ Henry W . a^ I. Icene 3. 
 
 O fembk
 
 ig4 Of the Combination of Part II. 
 
 femble it, though in the moft perfect man- 
 ner. The power of thefe complicated rela- 
 tions has hurried on the poet to purfue and io 
 accumulate the images, more than is confid- 
 ent with perfeO; fmiplicity and corrcdtnefs. 
 Juflin was led by the fame co-operation of 
 principles, to the choice of the funilitude by 
 which he illuilrates the effedt of the death of 
 Epaminondas, on the fpirit of the Thebans, 
 a fnnilitude too remote to have otherwife 
 come into his mind : " For as, if you break 
 *' off the point of a weapon, you take from 
 ** the reft of the iron the power of hurting, 
 ** fo that General of the Thebans, being taken 
 " away, like the point of the weapon, the 
 " power alfo of the ftate was deadened (^)." 
 
 It is not neceifary to multiply examples of 
 the combination of different aflbciating quali-' 
 ties ; to conceive this, is not a matter of any 
 difficulty. But it will be proper to make an, 
 obfervation which ferves to render fome of our 
 former conclufions more preclfe and determi- 
 nate. We could fcarce avoid mentioning 
 contrariety as an affociaiing quality, becaufe 
 it fometimes conneds ideas by itfelf, and be- 
 
 {h) Nam ficati tcio fi primam aciem pr^fregeris, relicjuo 
 ferro vim nocendi fuftuleris ; fic illo, velut mucrone teli, ab- 
 late duce rhebanorum, rei quot^ue publics; vires hebetata: 
 funt. Hijl, lib. vi. cap, 8, 
 
 caufe
 
 Sect.V. the ajfociatlng Prmciples, 19 j 
 
 caufe often when it is affifted by other rela- 
 tions, it is notwithftanding the chief and 
 prevalent relation. But from a review of the 
 examples which were given, it will appear, 
 that for the mofi: part, when contrariety 
 unites ideas, it is combined with fome other 
 relation. One thing, for inftance, fuggefts 
 its contrary when both belong to the fame 
 fubjed:, in many cafes where it would not 
 fuggefi: it, if they belonged to different fub7 
 jedis. It is when oppofite fortunes happen 
 by a remarkable reverfe, to the fame pcrfon, 
 that they irrefiftibly fuggeft each other*^ 
 
 One efFedl of the combination of different 
 aflbciating principles, has been often hinted at 
 already. That combination produces a clofer 
 and ftronger relation between perceptions, than 
 either of the principles alone : one of the 
 perceptions introduces the other with a double 
 force, and therefore in preference to thofe 
 which are conneded with it only by a fingle 
 tie. 
 
 This combination likewife contributes 
 greatly to the force and extent of genius. 
 Jt fupplies the imagination with many means 
 of apprehending the conceptions for which it 
 has occafion. If a perfon be not affected by 
 one of the relations which fubfift between a 
 
 O z prefent
 
 ig6 Of the Combination^ Sec, Part IL 
 
 prefent perception and an idea which fuits his 
 purpofe, he may be affeded by another of 
 them. If neither of the relations fmgly have 
 rforce enough to operate upon his imagina- 
 tion, they may derive fuSicient force from 
 their union, and be able together to lead him 
 readily to the difcovery of fuch appofite ma- 
 terials as otherwife he muft have miffed. 
 
 This combination contributes not only to 
 increafe the force of genius, but alfo to diver- 
 fify Its form. The feparate principles of affo- 
 ciation being fo numerous as they are, muft 
 be fufceptible of an almoft infinite number c^ 
 combinations; and every * poffible combina- 
 tion of them conftitutes a new ground of 
 union among perceptions, which will be fub- 
 fervient to genius. Any prefent perception 
 will fuggeft a thoufand different ideas to as 
 many different perfons, according to the dif- 
 ferent affociating principles or combinations 
 of principles by which they are affeded ;. 
 and this will produce a correfpondent diver- 
 fity both in the fubftance and in the ftrudure 
 of their works* 
 
 SECT.
 
 I 197 ] 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of the Modifications of the affociating Prin- 
 ciples, 
 
 AS the principles of aflbciatlon may lye 
 combined v/ith endlefs variety, fo each 
 principle is fufceptlble of different forms or 
 modifications. This was hinted before ; it 
 will now be proper to explain it. 
 
 Vicinity admits degrees ; for obje£l;s do 
 not fuggefl thofe only which are properly 
 contiguous ; but it admits not any dlverfity 
 in kind, except what was already taken no- 
 tice of, that it may be referred either to place 
 or to time. But all the other principles of 
 afTociatlon are fufceptible of much greater 
 
 varieties. 
 
 Resemblance not only takes place in 
 
 •different degrees^ but alio is of different 
 kinds. The difference Is only in degree, when 
 the fame quality of an objed: is the ground o^ 
 its refemblance to feveral different things: 
 one thing may refemble feveral others, in co- 
 lour, fuppofe ; but refembles them more or 
 lefs, according to the different fhades of that 
 colour, which belong to them. Again, the 
 
 O 3 difference
 
 1 98 of the Modifications of Part II. 
 
 difference is only in degree, when it arifes 
 from things poffeffing the fame qualities in 
 common, but poffeffing more or fewer of 
 them. One quality common to two objeds, 
 forms a real refemblance between them ; but 
 the refem.blance is much more perfed when 
 they have feveral common qualities : all ani- 
 mals, or all vegetables, have fome degree of 
 refemblance; animals or vegetables of the 
 fame clafs, have a greater refemblance ; thole 
 of the fame genus, ftill a greater ; the indi- 
 viduals of the fame fpecies, yet a greater; 
 and fome of the individuals have a much more 
 perfect refemblance than others. 
 
 But farther, one thing may refemble feveral 
 others, by means of its different qualities ; it 
 may refemble fome by its colour, others by its 
 fmeil, others by its figure, others by its lize : 
 each of thcfe forms a different kind of refem- 
 blance; for neither the qualities themfelves, 
 nor the fimilitudes ariling from them, can 
 admit comparifon in refpe«a of degree. Hence 
 any one thing is capable of as many forts of 
 refemblance to other things, as it poffeffes 
 diftind qualities. It is capable of many 
 more. 
 
 It not only refembles fome things by its 
 particular, definite, conftituent qualities, as 
 
 in
 
 Sect. VI. the ajfociatlng Principles. 199 
 
 in the inftances already given: it may re- 
 femble other things by fome general charac- 
 ter belonging to fome of its qualities. Sweet- 
 nefs originally and properly belongs to taftes ; 
 but in a figurative fenfe we fpeak of fweet 
 colours, fv/eet founds, fweet difpofitions; wo, 
 intend to exprefs fome charadter common to 
 thefe diftind: qualities, which produces a re- 
 femblance among them, (o obvious that it has 
 rendered the figure ordinary in all languages, 
 if not flridly univerfal. 
 
 A THING may likewife refemble others, by 
 a fort of general appearance refuhing from 
 all its qualities, or from feveral of them. Of 
 this kind are the general likeneffes w^hich are 
 often obferved between the faces and the airs 
 of different perfons. 
 
 It may refemble other things, by bearing 
 the fame relation to fome objedt, which they 
 bear to the fame obje(3:, or even to kindred 
 objeds, nay to objects in no way connected . 
 by proceeding from the fame caufe, or by 
 proceeding from a fimilar caufe, or by pro- 
 ceeding from a totally different caufe in a 
 fomewhat fimilar manner; or by producing 
 fimilar effeds, or by producing its peculiar 
 effects in a fimilar manner. Refemblances of 
 this fort, however flight or remote they may 
 
 O 4 be
 
 200 Of the Modifications of Part II. 
 
 be thought at firft fight, are fo clofe and juft, 
 that they are fufficient for producing a tran« 
 fition from one objed to another, which can- 
 not be reckoned unnatural, even when a per- 
 fon is under the influence of a paffion : Baffanio 
 overjoyed at Portia's having accepted his love, 
 fays, 
 
 Madam, you have bereft me of all words. 
 Only my blood fpeaks to you in my veins \ 
 And there is fuch confufion in my powVs, 
 As, after fome oration fairly fpoke 
 By a beloved Prince, there doth appear 
 Among the buzzing, pleafed multitude, 
 "Where every fomething being blent together. 
 Turns to a wild of nothing, fave of joy 
 Expreft, and not expreft. {a) 
 
 The caufe of his joy is compared to what 
 refembles it in no refpe6t except in pro- 
 ducing i fimilar effect upon the mind, a like 
 confufed fenfation of joy. If that comparifon 
 Ihould by any be thought not entirely natural 
 in a perfon's exprefTion of his own paflion, 
 yet it will be acknowledged by all, that in a 
 defcription of that paflion, the comparifon 
 would be unexceptionable ; and this is a fuffi-. 
 cient proof, that the refemblance is a proper 
 ground of aflfociation. The juftnefs of thefe 
 
 {a) Merchant of Venice, aft 3, fcenc 2. 
 
 forts
 
 Sect. VI. the ajjociatiiig Principles. 201 
 forts of refemblance appears farther from this, 
 that they have given rife to comparifons and 
 metaphors which fhow themfelves to be natu- 
 tral by being adopted in all ages and nations : 
 it is in fome of the indired ways now men- 
 tioned, that light refembles knowlege, joy, 
 goodnefs, and perfection ; yet light is one of 
 the moft beautiful and natural emblems of all 
 thefe. The refemblance which takes place 
 between fimple perceptions of the fame clafs, 
 between different fmells^ for inftance, feems 
 to belong to fome of the kinds now under 
 confideration. Simple perceptions being void 
 of compofition, can fcarce have fome qualities 
 in common, and other qualities which diftin- 
 guifh them ; our notion of their refemblance 
 muft proceed from their affeding the mind in 
 ways, the fimilarity of which we perceive, 
 though we cannot perhaps explain it, or from 
 our prefuming that they proceed from caufes 
 fomehow clofely related. 
 
 In a word, there is no quality, no relation, 
 no adlion of an objed:, no point of view in 
 which we can confider it, but may be the foun- 
 dation of a refemblance between it and fome 
 other. The refemblance is often of a very 
 delicate nature, and yet very obvious and 
 ilrong ; we readily feel it, but fometimes we 
 
 can
 
 202 Of the Modif cations of Part II. 
 
 can fcarce at all define whence it arifes, or of 
 what kind it is. 
 
 Contrariety, in the extent in which it is 
 generally underftood, and in which it pro- 
 motes aflbciation, is reducible to feveral dif- 
 ferent fpecies. By contrariety is fometimes 
 meant only great diverfity. diffimilitude or 
 diftance ; as when bitter is faid to be contrary 
 to fweet ; and in this fenfe it admits many 
 degrees. In another fenfe, objedls are called 
 contrary, when one is only the negation or 
 abfence of the other ; thus darknefs and light, 
 health and ficknefs, are contraries [b). Other 
 objeds are contraries in a flill more proper 
 fenfe, as pleafure and pain, hope and fear, love 
 and hatred. Very often the two former of 
 thefe kinds of contrariety, and fometimes all 
 the three, run into one another by an eafy 
 gradation : rich and poor are terms of contra- 
 riety, but they exprefs, at different times, all 
 the three fpecies of contrariety ; poverty fome- 
 times figniiies only a very inferior degree of 
 riches, and then the contrariety is of the firll 
 
 {h) Cicero takes notice of thefe two kinds, though under 
 diiFerent names ; Contrarium crt, quod pofitum in genere di- 
 verfo, ab eodem cui contrarium eile dicicur, plurimum diftat, 
 ut frigus calori, vitas mors. Difparatum autem eft id, quod 
 ab aliqua re per oppofiiionem negationis fepjrarur, hoc modo, 
 fapere et non fapere. De Invefit. Lib, I. But the examples 
 which he gives are not appofitc, except in the mere expreflion. 
 
 kind;
 
 Sect. VI. the ajfoclatlng Principles, 203 
 
 kind ; fometimes it denotes total indigence, 
 in which cafe the contrariety is of the fecond 
 kind ; but if the perfon to whofe condition 
 the word is applied be in debt, the contrariety 
 is of the third kind. 
 
 Objects which, confidered fimply in them- 
 felves, could not be reckoned contraries, yet 
 come to be regarded as fuch, when either 
 their caufes or their efFed:s are contrary in any 
 of the fenfes that have been mentioned. Heat 
 and cold are perhaps termed contraries, ra- 
 ther on account of the contrariety of their 
 caufes and of their effects, than of any oppo- 
 fition between the two fenfations themfelves. 
 Acids and alkalis, aftringents and laxatives, 
 feptics and antifeptics, are denominated con- 
 traries, merely on account of the contrariety 
 of fome of their efFeds. 
 
 Of co-exijicnce alfo there are many different 
 modifications, Thofe qualities which are 
 united in any natural whole or individual, are 
 in the propercft fenfe co-exiflent ; yet they 
 are not all co-exiftent in precifely the fame 
 degree or manner. The qualities which are 
 common to one individual with feveral others, 
 which together form the charader of the fpe- 
 cies, and would be enumerated in a juft defi- 
 nition of it, feem to have a co-c,xi{tence fome- 
 
 what
 
 204 Of the Modifications of Part II. 
 
 what different from thofe which are peculiar 
 to one or a few individuals. Thefe two forts 
 of qualities influence affociation differently ; 
 a quality of the former fort moft readily fug- 
 gefts the idea of the fpecies ; one of the latter 
 fort, the idea of the individual. Some qua- 
 lities of the latter fort are permanent in the 
 individual ; others are temporary : thefe are, 
 at a particular time, really as infeparable from 
 it, as thofe are; yet they can fcarce be con- 
 fidered as belonging to it by a co-exiflence 
 equally clofe, though it Is fo flrong as very 
 readily to produce affociation. 
 
 Not only the effential qualities of a thing, 
 but circumfiances alfo which are not con- 
 fidered as entering into its fubflance, may 
 acquire a fort of co-exiflence with it, which 
 fhall ad; very powerfully on the imagination. 
 Thus whatever belongs to the condition of a 
 perfon, his poffefTions, his profpeds, all by 
 which he is diflinguifhed from others, all that 
 can render the conception of him more deter- 
 minate or more ftriking, acquire a connexion 
 with him, which produces affociation. Nay, 
 things which have belonged to the flate of the 
 fame perfon at different times, as poverty and 
 riches, meannefs and elevation, acquire, by 
 means of their relation to him, a connexion 
 
 with
 
 Sect. VI. the ajfoclatlng Principles, 205 
 
 with one another, which there would be an 
 apparent impropriety in terming co-exiitence, 
 but which afFeds the imagination in a man- 
 ner perfcdly analogous. Whatever is clofely 
 or long connedcd with a thing, as an adjund, 
 or a concomitant, or belongs to it in any way, 
 comes naturally to be confidered as in fome 
 fenfe co-exiftent with it, and they will fuggeft 
 one another. If we have feen a perfon at 
 any one time in a remarkable attitude, or 
 fituation, or drefs, we can fcarce ever think 
 of him without conceiving it alfo. On the 
 other hand, a garment, a ring, the moft tri- 
 fling piece of drefs, will produce a lively con- 
 ception of the perfon to whom it belonged. 
 Ovid gives us a natural pidure of this in 
 Pyramus : 
 
 Ut vero veftem quoque fanguine tinflain 
 
 Repperit ; una duos nox, inquit, perdet amantes ; 
 E quibus ilia fuit longa digniflima vita, (b) 
 
 Several diftind fubflances are often com- 
 bined into a fyftem; and in that cafe they are 
 confidered as parts of one whole, and are 
 united in the imagination by the principle of 
 co-exiftence. An army, a nation, a church, 
 is a whole, including feveral individuals, in a 
 
 {}) Mitamorph, lib. iv. 
 
 manner
 
 2o6 Of the Modifications of ParT IT. 
 
 manner fntiilar to that in which an individual 
 includes many different qualities. 
 
 What we have faid, does not perhaps 
 amount to a complete enumeration of all the 
 forms which co-exiftence aflumes ; but it fuf- 
 ficiently evinces that this relation does affume 
 a very great variety of forms. 
 
 It would not be eafy to purfue the relation 
 of caufe and effeB, through all the forms in 
 which it operates on the imagination ; but 
 many of the principal ones are very obvious. 
 What gives exiftence to any thing, what makes 
 any change in it, what influences any of its 
 powers or virtues, what contributes to its pre- 
 fervation, or to its deflrudion, a mean for 
 anfwering any end, an argument for proving > 
 any conclufion, a propofition from which a 
 corollary may be deduced, a motive to any fort 
 of condud; ail thefe are called caufes, but 
 plainly in very different fenfes ; and they all 
 are, in the imagination, affociated with their 
 feveral effeds or confequences. In the ex- 
 amples which we have had occafion to pro- 
 duce, mofl of thefe modifications of caufation 
 have occurred. This relation makes a per- 
 ception of the caufe, or of the effed, to in- 
 troduce the idea of its correlative, whether 
 
 the
 
 Sect. VI. the a]} o dating Principles, 207 
 
 the effed be a fubftance or a mode, whether 
 the caufe give exiftence to the efFed, or only 
 alter it, or in any way affe6t it, or have a 
 power of affeding it. But the relation has 
 greateft force when it is mod; perfed : a fer- 
 vant will not fo readily fuggeft the idea of 
 his m after, as a fon that of his father. 
 
 Objects may be conneded as caufe and 
 efFed, when one of them does not immedi- 
 ately produce or influence the other. What 
 is, in any of the fenfes now mentioned, a 
 caufe, is conneded not only with its imme- 
 diate effeds, but alfo with the remoteft effeds 
 of any thing produced or affeded by it. In 
 a feries of things where each is the imme- 
 diate caufe of what fucceeds it, the laft efied 
 really depends upon the firft caufe. Some- 
 times we are ignorant of many of the inter- 
 mediate fteps, and regard that as the neareft, 
 which is only a remote caufe : an ordinary 
 man reckons the motion of his hand the im- 
 mediate cffed of his volition, becaufe he knows 
 nothing of the mufcles by which his hand is 
 moved. But even vv^hen we arc acquainted 
 with the whole chain of cauf-^s and effeds, 
 the effed will fometimes fuggeft a remote 
 caufe, Vs^ithout our ever thinking of the inter- 
 vening links ; or the remote caufe will di- 
 re dly 
 
 3
 
 2of? Of the Modifications of Part IL 
 
 redly introduce the idea of the efFeQ; which 
 fprings from it by the mediation of many fub- 
 ordinate caufes, while to thefe we do not at 
 all attend. Thus when there has been one 
 among a perfon's anceftors very eminent, 
 though at a great diflance of time, it is natu- 
 ral both for the perfon himfelf and for others 
 to dired their thoughts to that one. Horace 
 in addrefhng his patron, mentions not his fa- 
 ther, but much remoter anceftors ; 
 
 Maecenas, atavis edite regibus. [c) 
 Tyrrhena regum progenies, [d) 
 
 This principle is fometimes fo powerful, that 
 a perfon finds himfelf difpofed to give a fa- 
 mily, or even a nation, a name formed from 
 that of their founder, many ages after his. 
 death. Such is the epithet which Virgil gives 
 his countrymen long after the time of Romulus; 
 
 ' Subitoque novum confurgere helium 
 
 Romulidis. [e] 
 
 As the fame caufe fometimes produces many 
 different effeds, all thefe effeds, however dif- 
 fimilar, are conneded with one another by 
 means of their relation to the common caufe? 
 
 (f) Lib. I. Od. I. 
 \d) Lib. III. Od. 29. 
 {e) JSmd. Lib. VIU; 
 
 2 and
 
 S-ECT. VI. the jajfoc'iating Principles. sog 
 
 and by virtue of this connexion one of the 
 efFedts will lead us to think of the other. Heat 
 and light are both effects of fire ; and one 
 of them being perceived, naturally fuggefts 
 the other. Sometimes one effedt fuggefts the 
 idea of the caufe, and this introduces the idea 
 of the other efFed:. The fight of a fon Vv^ill 
 lead us to think of the father, and the thought 
 of him will introduce a difcourfe or enquiry 
 concerning his other children. Sometimes 
 again one effed: will introduce the idea of 
 another effe(5t, without firft fuggefting the 
 idea of their common caufe. The fight of a 
 perfon may difpofe us to think of a brother, 
 without our once thinking of the parents, by " 
 means of vv^hom they are related to each other. 
 In this cafe, it feems to be a fpecies of rcfem- 
 blance that produces the aflbciation ; the two 
 effects are like in this particular, that they 
 are derived from the fame caufe. In like 
 manner, when two or more objedls are joint 
 caufes of the fame effedis, they are related to 
 one another, and the perception of the one 
 readily carries the thoughts to the other. 
 
 Order, as well as the other relations which 
 promote aflbciation, may be diftinguifhed into 
 different fpecies. 
 
 P There;
 
 219 Of the Modifications of PartK, 
 
 There Is an order in place. The or- 
 der of things in place may feem fometimes 
 •to promote alTociation almoft only by the in- 
 fluence of vicinity. Thus the thinking of 
 one of a company, will firfl: lead us to think 
 of the perfon who fat contiguous to him, then 
 of another who was next to this fecond, and 
 fo on, till we have gone through the whole 
 company in the order in which they happened 
 to be placed. Here the order of the perfons, 
 by which the imagination is affected, appears 
 to be little different from vicinity. But it 
 really is fomewhat different : we may fup- 
 pofe the fame number of perfons of which 
 the company confifled, {landing together in 
 a confufed crowd : in this fituation, they may 
 be more clofely contiguous than before ; but 
 tbey have not order, and therefore one of 
 them will not fo readily fuggeH the refl, nor 
 will it be fo eafy to recoiled: them all. What 
 then Is the difference between thefe two fitu- 
 aticns ? Formerly thefe perfons did compofe 
 a regular figure, now they do not. Order^ 
 therefore, even of the fimpleft kind. Includes 
 regularity of figure, as well as vicinity ; and 
 by means of that regularity, order alTocIates.- 
 ideas more flrongly than vicinity alone. But 
 
 order
 
 Sect. VI. the ajfociating Prhiclples. 21 i 
 
 order in place often Implies more ; it arifes 
 from thofe things or parts of things being 
 placed contiguous, which are connected by 
 other relations. Thus a number of perfons 
 may be placed, not only in fome regular 
 figure, but in a farther order, according to 
 their fex, age, or dignity. In this cafe, the 
 affociating force of order, is made up of the 
 united forces of contiguity, and of the rela- 
 tions which the things or parts bear to one 
 another, independent of their contiguity. 
 The parts of a watch are placed in order^ 
 when each part Is contiguous to thofe from 
 which it receives, and to which it communi- 
 cates motion. In confequence of this, the 
 idea of any one part will lead us to conceive 
 the part next to it, or to conceive all the parts, 
 or will fuggeft an idea of the whole, much 
 more eafily and quickly than it could, if we 
 only confidered that part as laid in a heap 
 along with the reft : yet in a heap, the parts 
 might have had clofer contiguity, than in the 
 machine. 
 
 There is likewife an order in time. It 
 
 arifes from placing thofe things in immediate 
 
 fucceffion, which are related by refemblance, 
 
 caufation, or any other relation. SuccefTion 
 
 ^ alone would aflbciate the ideas, though their* 
 
 P ;? objedts
 
 212 Of the Modifications ef Part 1L 
 
 objedls were not otherwlfe related ; thefe re- 
 lations would affociate them, though the things 
 had not been fucceflive ; both being combined 
 in order, it muft have great power to produce 
 aflbciation. In a regular proceffion, perfons 
 'iiot only follow one another, btit are difpofed 
 ticcording to their rank and dignity : in con- 
 fequence of this, either the view, or a defcrip- 
 tion of a fmall part of a proceffion, is enough 
 to enable the imagination to pafs along all the 
 other parts, and to take in a conception of the 
 -whole. Succeffive events are generally con- 
 necftcd as caufes and efFeds : when they are> 
 they will readily occur to evei-y perfon in the 
 order in which they happened, and influenced 
 one another ; every narration may fuggeft 
 examples of this. But when fucceflive obje(!ls 
 happen not to be thus conne6:ed, they are 
 flightly aflbciated by mere fucceflion. In a 
 chronological table, events are conne^dled by 
 fucceflion alone; in a regular hiftory, by or- 
 der; in this lafl: cafe, there is a much greater 
 union of the parts, than in the former. The 
 other relations which, in order, are joined 
 with fucceflion, have fo confiderable force, 
 that an hiftorian often gives the moft perfect 
 order to his narration, by bringing together 
 events in it, which have a natural connexion, 
 
 though
 
 Sect. VI. the ajjbciatlng Principles. 213 
 
 though they did not happen in immediate fuc- 
 ceflion, and is, without reflection or defign, 
 ied to adopt this order. 
 
 There is likewife what may be called an 
 order of nature. This has often a great ana- 
 logy to order in place and in time. It is no 
 wonder that it fliould, fince we conceive all 
 things as conne<3:ed both with place and with 
 time. Order in both feems to be, in fom.e in- 
 ftances, eftabliflied by nature ; our thoughts 
 move eafily in tracing defcent, or in following 
 the courfe of time, but with difnculty in tra- 
 cing afcent, or in going backward in time. But 
 ilill the fpecies of order now under confidera- 
 tion, is different from the other two. In 
 many cafes, there is a natural order in things 
 themfelves : hence one manner of confiderins: 
 them, is according to order, and another con- 
 trary to it ; our thoughts muft proceed in that 
 natural order, elfe their progrefs is obftru£ted. 
 In conceiving a man, our thoughts pafs rea- 
 dily from the head downwards ; it is in many 
 refpe<9:s the principal part of the body, and 
 by it that nourifhment is conveyed, which 
 fuftains the whole. In conceiving a tree we 
 proceed upwards from the root to the ftem 
 and the branches : it is from the firft that 
 thefe latter parts derive their nourifhment, 
 
 P 3 and
 
 a 1 4 Of the Modifications of Part II. 
 
 and by it they are fupported ; there is alfo a 
 fucceflion in their firft produdion, they grow 
 up gradually from the root : both thefe caufes 
 have an influence on the courfe of our 
 thoughts. In conceiving a houfe, the mind, 
 in like manner, naturally afcends from the 
 bottom to the top, and for the fame reafons ; 
 the inferiour parts fupport the fuperiour ; the 
 building proceeds from the foundation up- 
 wards : befides, if we would go into the houfe, 
 we mufl: afcend from the ground towards the 
 yoof ; the mind takes the lame courfe. 
 
 There are perhaps fome cafes in which 
 cuflom alone fixes a certain order ; but after 
 cuilom has fixt it, it operates as ftrongly on 
 the mind, as if it had been eftablifhed by na- 
 ture. Writing from right to left, or from 
 left to right, is determined merely by cuftom ; 
 but in confequence of that cuftom, an Euro- 
 pean finds difficulty in tracing the combina- 
 tion of letters in the former diredion, and an 
 Oriental finds equal difficulty in tracing that 
 eombination in the latter diredtlon. 
 
 Thus every one of the afTociating princi^ 
 pies affijmes many diff^erent forms ; and every 
 diftind; form which any of them can alfume, 
 ynay be confidered as a feparate relation, and 
 neceflarily produces a correfpoi\dent peculia- 
 rity
 
 Sect. VII. the ajfoclathig Prlnclpks, 215 
 
 rity In the exertion of genius, which is di- 
 redted by it. The feveral modifications of 
 thefe principles muft contribute both to in- 
 creafe the force, and to diverfify the form of 
 genius, in the very fame ways, as it has been 
 already fhown that the variety of their com- 
 binations does. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Of the Predominance of the affociathig 
 
 Principles, 
 
 THE obfervations which we have hitherto 
 made, fliow that there muft be great 
 differences and diffimilitudes in the effeds of 
 genius ; for they lead us to perceive that it may 
 proceed from one conception to another in an 
 infinite variety of ways. But in order to ex- 
 plain, in what manner the multitude of the 
 affociating qualities lays a foundation for per- 
 manent diverfities of genius, fome farther ob- 
 fervations will be neceffary. 
 
 All the affociating principles have fome 
 degree of force in every man. There is per- 
 haps no perfon on whom any one of them has 
 no influence at all. But in almoft every man, 
 fome one of them is predominant : on every 
 fubjeit, a man is apt to follow one relation 
 
 P 4 rather
 
 2i6 Of the Predominance of Part U. 
 
 rather than any other, and to conceive chiefly 
 fuch ideas as are, by that relation, connected 
 with the prefent perception. Whence this 
 proceeds, is perhaps inexpUcable ; it muft, 
 in a great meafure, be refolved into original 
 differences in the conftitution of the mind : 
 but the thing itfelf is evident in the mofl; fim- 
 ple and common inftances. If different per- 
 fons fet themfelves to recollect a company, one 
 naturally recolledls it by running over the 
 places occupied by thofe who compofed it ; 
 another enumerates them according to their; 
 feveral profeflions, conditions, ages, or fexes ; 
 another according to their refpetftive families 
 and connexions : in the firft perfon, vicinity 
 or order ; in the fecond, refemblance ; in the 
 third, the relation of caufe and efFccfl, is the 
 predominant principle of affociation. , 
 
 When any "objed: is conceived by a perfon, 
 all its qualities are in fome meafure prefent to 
 his view: but in confequence of original dif- 
 ferences in the turn of men's imaginations, 
 one man's attention is fixt chiefly on one of 
 thefe qualities, and another man's attention 
 on a different quality. This is, in many 
 cafes, the immediate caufe of the predomi- 
 nance of one affociating principle. The dif- 
 ferent qualities of an objed: not only lay a 
 
 founda-
 
 Sect. VII. the affoc'iating Principles. 2iy 
 
 foundation for a connexion between ^it and 
 different objects, but alfo connect it with thofe 
 different objects by means of different rela- 
 tions ; and each perfon is affedted by that re- 
 lation which belongs to the quality on which 
 he mofl readily fixes his attention. A few 
 perfons can fcarce engage in a converfation 
 on any fubjed, without affording an example 
 of this. Whatever it be that is firft intro- 
 duced, almofl every perfon confiders it in a 
 different point of view, and in confequence 
 of this runs into a different train of thinking 
 and a different fet of reflexions. When dia- 
 logue is conduced naturally, the feveral affo- 
 ciating qualities by which the fpeakers are af- 
 fected, may be eafily traced out : each of 
 them goes on in a train fuited to his own turn 
 of imagination, and one of them fometimes 
 in a train even oppofite to that which is pur- 
 fued by another. By care to preferve this va- 
 riety, dialogue-writing is rendered natural ; 
 and it is on account of the difficulty of pre- 
 ferving this variety, that fo few fucceed in that 
 manner of writing. 
 
 An original conflitution of mind is not the 
 
 only caufe of a perfon's being influenced by 
 
 one affociating principle more than by others : 
 
 it was formerly obferved, that this may pro- 
 
 6 ceed
 
 a 1 8 Of the IP re dominance of Part II. 
 
 ceed from habit. But the habit generally 
 takes its rife from an original propenfity to 
 follow chiefly one relation ; it always takes 
 its rife from this, when its effeds are perma- 
 nent. A diverfity in the predominant prin- 
 ciple of affociation, is often obfervable very 
 early in children, previous to the poflibility 
 of their having contrad:ed habits of thinking, 
 and muft therefore be natural. If the origi-r 
 nal propenfity be weak, it may be over- 
 powered by other caufes : but if it be flrong, 
 it will frequently exert itfelf ; by frequent 
 exertion it will beget a habit of being influ- 
 enced by it ; and by the formation of the 
 habit it will be confirmed. Still, therefore, 
 the predominance of one aflbciating principle 
 or another, is, in mofl: cafes at leaft, ultimately 
 refolvable into an original confl:itution of the 
 mind. 
 
 Here is a dire£l foundation for a perma- 
 nent variety of genius. In fome man of ge- 
 nius of another, each of the aflbciating prin- 
 ciples is predominant ; and whichever of them 
 is, it forms a turn of genius fuitable to it, and 
 different from what the prevalence of any 
 other would have produced. Invention in 
 difi^erent arts and fciences, is dependent on 
 very difl^erent relations of perceptions : genius 
 z for
 
 Sect.VIT. the ajfo dating Principles* gig 
 
 for a particular art or fcieece, will therefore 
 be formed by the prevalence of that principle 
 of aflbciation which chiefly leads to invention 
 in it. Jn comparing the works of men of ge- 
 nius, we may find number] efs illuftrations of 
 this : we may often find the fame fad; or the 
 fame objed prefent to the minds of the philo- 
 fopher, the hiilorian, the poet, the orator, 
 the painter ; we may obferve that it leads each 
 of them a different road, or that they pafs 
 from it to other ideas by different relations ; 
 and by attending to thefe, we may be able to 
 afcertain and defcribe the peculiarity of genius 
 in each of them. 
 
 What has been now faid of the different 
 principles of affociation, is equally applicable 
 to all the different forms or modifications of 
 which it has been fliown that every one of 
 thefe principles is capable. There are various 
 kinds of refemblance, for inftance, of contra-^ 
 riety, of caufation ; one man is naturally in- 
 fluenced chiefly by one kind, another by ano- 
 ther kind ; the turn of genius in each is fuit^- 
 able to that kind by which he is mofl affected. 
 Hence mufl arife many diverfities of genius. 
 Whether a perfon pafs from caufes to effects, 
 or from effedts to caufes, his imagination is 
 influenced by the fame relation : yet all men 
 
 are
 
 S20 Of the Predominance of Part II, 
 
 are not equally fitted for both. In mathema- 
 tics, one man is moft turned for algebra, 
 another for geometry. One excells in the 
 analytical part of philofophy, in refolving 
 phenomena into their caufes, and reducing 
 them to general laws ; and another excells in 
 explaining the phenomena, in applying ge- 
 neral principles to a number of cafes, and in 
 accounting for them elegantly and fuccefT- 
 fuUy. Many of the falfe fyftems of philofo- 
 phy which have made a figure in the world, 
 certainly difplay very confiderable genius, hut 
 genius of different kinds. Des Cartes de- 
 duced his whole philofophy from a few ge- 
 neral principles : he fhowed a propenfity to 
 pafs from caufes to their efFeds. Gilbert en- 
 deavoured, in a manner not at all deftitute of 
 ingenuity, to refolve all the phenomena of 
 nature into magnetifm : the prevailing turn 
 of his imagination was to proceed from effects 
 to caufes. 
 
 Most commonly, the great divifions of ge- 
 nius arife from the prevalence of one principle 
 of afibciation or another ; and the more mi- 
 nute varieties from the prevalence of different 
 modifications of the fame principle. Yet thefe 
 "modifications are fometimes fodiffimilar, that 
 the predominance of one or another of them 
 
 produces
 
 Sect. VII. the ajfociating Principles, 221 
 
 produces a difference of genius as great as 
 could be produced by the predominance of 
 principles totally diftindl. In a mere recital 
 of fads, there is fcarce any room for genius : 
 but the true hiftorian does not confine himfelf 
 to fuch recital ; he places fads in connexioa, 
 }>e rifes to the fources of adions, and he pur- 
 fues them through their confequences : it is 
 in this that hiftorical genius appears ; and in 
 this the hiftorian is plainly aduated by the 
 relation of caufe and effed. The fame adions 
 which the hiftorian relates, may be alfo con- 
 fidered by the philofopher, their motives at- 
 tended to, and conclufions deduced from them, 
 concerning the conftitution of human nature : 
 in this he is influenced by the fame relation 
 of caufe and eff'ed, but by a different fpecies 
 of it ; and accordingly he fliows a kind of ge- 
 nius totally diftind from that of the hiftorian. 
 I Ihall give an example which is ftill more 
 ftriking. In reducing bodies to regular divi- 
 fions and fubdivifions, the natural hiftorian is 
 conduded altogether by the principle of re- 
 femblance ; in adorning a fubjed with fimiles 
 and metaphors, the poet is likewife under the 
 influence of the principle of refemblance : 
 yet no two forts of genius are perhaps more 
 different than that for natural hiftory, and 
 
 that
 
 222 Of the Predominance of PartIL 
 
 that for poetry. In accounting for the phe- 
 nomena of bodies, the phllofopher follows a 
 quite different relation, that of cauie and ef- 
 fect ; but the genius of a natural hiftorian, 
 is much more akin to philofophical, than to 
 poetical genius. 
 
 But farther; Not only the prevalence of 
 different forms of the fame affociating prin- 
 ciple, is fufficient for producing very diffniii- 
 lar turns of genius ; but alfo one of thefe 
 forms only operating in fomewhat different 
 manners, has force enough to mark genius 
 with a perceptible peculiarity. An image is 
 always connected with a fubjed: by refem- 
 blance : but the image may be applied either 
 in a comparifon or in a metaphor ; and one 
 perfon is led by the turn of his imagination 
 chiefly to the ufe of the one, and another per- 
 fon chiefly to the ufe of the other of thefe 
 figures. Here a diverfity of genius, fo confi- 
 derable that it may become in fome degree 
 charad:erifl:ical, arifes from a very fmall dif- 
 ference in the manner in which two perfons 
 pafs from one perception to another by means 
 of the very fame relation, from their only 
 paffing with different degrees of rapidity, and 
 confidering the refembling objed wath diffe- 
 rent degrees of deliberation. Nay, though two 
 
 poets
 
 Sect. VII. the ajfoclating Principles. i^i 
 
 poets illuftrate their fubje£ts by the fame com- 
 parifon, they may difplay a variety of genius 
 by their different manners of purfuing it ; 
 one is happy at fetting the main image full in 
 view by one bold ftroke ; the other traces the 
 iikenefs minutely, and thus introduces ele- 
 gance into his work. When differences {o 
 minute in the form of the fame affociating 
 principle, and even in the manner of our 
 yielding to the fame form of any of the aflb- 
 ciating principles, can give a peculiar turn to 
 the imagination, there mufl evidently be room 
 for a prodigious variety in genius. 
 
 We would be apt to take it for granted, 
 that the affociating force of any relation mufl 
 be in proportion to the degree of that relation. 
 The more perfedt the relation is between two 
 perceptions, the more clofely, we would ex- 
 pert, they fliall be united in the imagination, 
 and the more readily Ihall one of them fuggeR 
 the other. If refemblance, for inflance, be 
 what gives one perception a tendency to in- 
 troduce another, it is natural to think that this 
 tendency will be ftrongefl when the refem- 
 blance is greateft. Doubtlefs this is generally 
 the cafe : but it is far from holding univer- 
 fally ; there are feveral limitations and excep- 
 tions. 
 
 For
 
 524 Of the P redoinhid3ice of Part It^ 
 
 For example, Though the relation which 
 one objed bears to another be very ftrongj 
 yet if 'it be common, if it be fuch as that ob- 
 jeiSt 'bears likewife to many other objeds, it 
 •will not operate fo ftrongly on the imagina- 
 tion, as a weaker relation which is fpecial and 
 diftine:mihino:. Number diftradts the atten- 
 tion, and hinders any one of the objeds from 
 making a ftriking impreffion. A nobleman 
 attrads lefs notice in a crowd of perfons of his 
 own rank, than a man of much lower note, 
 would command in a company where he has 
 no equal. Singularity is always ftriking. 
 
 Again ; If it be aflertedthat the ftronger , 
 relation will prove the moft powerful princi- 
 ple of afTociation, the aflertion muft be con- 
 fined to one form or modification of that 
 relation. Of the various forms or modifica- 
 tions which, it has been fhown, every rela- 
 tion admits, fome may be confidered as 
 greater in degree than others : but different 
 men are chiefly aff'eded by different modifi- 
 cations of a relation ; and therefore fome will 
 be moft affeded by a weaker relation, becaufe 
 it is of that form from w^hich they are moft 
 fufceptible of an impreffion. Indeed, fome of 
 the peculiarities of genius neceffarily imply a 
 propenfity to be influenced moft by fome of 
 
 the
 
 Sect. VIL the ajfociatlng Principles, 225 
 the weaker modifications of the aflbciatinfr 
 
 o 
 
 principles. Poetical genius, for example, fo 
 far as it depends on the force of the principle 
 of refemblance, confifts in a propenfity to be 
 affedled, not by the completeft relemblances, 
 but by fuch as are more imperfeft. In poeti- 
 cal imagery, the refemblance ought to be 
 always juft, but it is an excellence that it be 
 not altogether obvious, and it is neceflary 
 that it be mixt with fomething of diverfity. 
 Any individual is likened, not fo often to 
 another individual of the fame fpecies, as to 
 one of a different fpecies, or even to fome- 
 thing totally different in kind : a hero is com- 
 pared, not fo frequently nor fo beautifully to 
 another hero, as to a lion or to the fun. The 
 exafl: fimllitudes to which the naturalift con- 
 fines his attention, have no influence upon 
 the poet, and would be a very improper 
 foundation for metaphors or comparifons. 
 
 But it is further obfervable, That fome are 
 apt to be influenced even by a weak degree of 
 any modification of an affociating quality^ 
 rather than by a fl:ronger degree of the very 
 fame modification. Thus fome men, on 
 whatever fubje<Sl they reafon, deduce all their 
 reafonings from remote principles, and never 
 prove any point by the fhortefl and mofl di-
 
 226 Of the Predominance of Part 11, 
 
 red arguments. There are writers, moft of 
 whofe images and antithefes are far-fetched 
 and forced. This turn of imagination pro- 
 duces a peculiarity of genius, but generally 
 fuch an one as is faulty. A late ingenious 
 writer [a] has remarked tMs peculiarity, that 
 fome are apt to attend chiefly to remote and 
 trifling relations of ideas; and he gives a 
 very appofite example of it from Shakefpear ; 
 
 " Hofefs. Thou didft fwear to me on a 
 parcel-gilt goblet, fitting in my Dolphin- 
 chamber, at the round table, by a fea-coal 
 fire, on Wednefday in Whitfun-week, when 
 the Prince broke thy head for likening him to 
 a finging man of Windfor ; thou didft fwear 
 to me then, as I was w^fhing thy wound, to 
 marry me, and make me my lady thy wife. 
 Canft thou deny it ? did not good-wife Keach 
 the butcher's wife come in then, and call me 
 gollip Quickly ? coming in to borrow a mefs 
 of vinegar ; telling us fhe had a good difh of 
 prawns, whereby thou didft defire to eat fome ; 
 whereby I told thee they were ill for a green 
 wound ; and didft not thou, when fhe was 
 gone down ftairs, defire me to be no more fo 
 familiarity with fuch poor people, faying that 
 ere long they fhould call me Madam ? and 
 
 [a] Elements ofCritici/m, chap. I , 
 
 I didft
 
 Sect. VII. the ajfbciatlng Principles. 227 
 
 didft thou not klfs me, and bid me fetch thee 
 thirty Ihillings ?" [h) 
 
 That author accounts for this peculiarity, by 
 refolving it into a want of difcernment ; but 
 this account is not altogether fatisfying. Sup- 
 pofe remote or (lightly connected ideas to have 
 occurred to a perfon, difcernment may lead 
 him to reje^ them, and the want of it may 
 prevent his rejecting them. But the queflioii 
 remains. Whence comes it that fuch ideas 
 occur to fome, and not to others ? Their oc-^ 
 curring may in fome meafure proceed indi- 
 rectly from a want of difcernment : the judg- 
 ment of fome men is fo ftrong that it attends 
 imagination in all its exertions, and gives it 
 an habitual tendency to fuggeft only fuch 
 ideas as have a proper connexion with the 
 prefent perception; a defed: of judgment or 
 difcernment prevents imagination from ac- 
 quiring this correclnefs, th.e want of which 
 leaves it at liberty to run into flight and re- 
 mote aflbciatlons. But this is not the princi- 
 pal or immediate, far lefs the only caufe of 
 it : its origin mufl be fought chiefly in the na- 
 tural turn of the imagination. If we attend 
 to the example jufl: now quoted, we fhall 
 find that all the triding aifociations contained 
 {h) Second part oi Hcnrj W. aol 2. fcene 2, 
 
 0^2 in
 
 2 2S Of the Predominance of Part IT. 
 
 in it, confift in the introdudlion of a number 
 of circumftances which have no other con- 
 nexion with the fubjedt of difcourfe, but this, 
 that they happened in the place and at the 
 time to which it refers. The turn of imagi- 
 nation which it fliows, feems therefore to 
 arife merely from vicinity being the prevail- 
 ing principle of afTociation. Mere vicinity 
 either in time or in place, is one of the flighteft 
 and leaft important relations, and confequently 
 whenever it is the prevailing relation, it will 
 produce a propenfity to trifling affociations (r), 
 
 (f) That the prevalence of this relation, is by far the mod 
 common caafe of trifling afTociations, may, I believe, be 
 affirmed with confidence. If we examine feveral inllances of 
 fuch trifling aifociations, we fhall find that they are generally 
 formed by mere vicinity. One other inilance I Ihall give from 
 the fame author. 
 
 Cloxvn. Sir, {he came in great with child ; and longing 
 (fave your honour's reverence) for fiew'd prunes ; we had but 
 two in the houfe, which at that very inltant time flood, as it 
 were, in a fruit-difh, a difh of lome three pence ^ (your ho- 
 nours have feen fuch dilhes, they are not China dilhes, but 
 very good difhes.) 
 
 Efcalus. Go to, go to ; no matter for the difh. Sir. 
 
 Cloiun. No indeed. Sir, not of a pin ; you are therein in 
 the right : but to the point ; as I fay, this Mrs. Elboa.Uy being, 
 as 1 fay, with child, and being great belly'd, and longing, as 
 I faid, for prunes ; and having no more in the difh, as I faid ; 
 Mailer Frolh here, this very man, having eaten the reft, as I 
 faid, and, as I fay, paying for them very honeflly ; for, as you 
 know. Mafter Froth, I could not give you three pence again. 
 
 Froth. No indeed. 
 
 Clo^n. Very well ; you being then, if you be remembred, 
 cracking the flones of the forefaid prunes. 
 
 Froth. Ay, fo I did indeed. 
 
 Cloivn. V hy, very well ; I telling you then, if you be re- 
 membred, that fuch a one, and fuch a one, were paft cure of 
 
 The
 
 Sect. VII. the ajjoclathig Principles. 229 
 
 The predominance of the principle of refem- 
 blance, when indulged without referve, often 
 produces a fimilar propenfity, as in the neiu 
 fong ofncwjinnlies. Some of the qualities of 
 every thing are lefs important than others ; 
 they give rife to none but trivial relations ; a 
 propenfity therefore to attend chiefly to fuch 
 qualities, muft produce trifling affociations, 
 whatever be the principle to which they be- 
 long. It deferves to be remarked, however, 
 that a tendency to conceive ideas which are 
 but remotely conneded with the prefent per- 
 ception, fometimes conflitutes an excellence 
 of genius. Some men fee at one glance, the 
 moftdiftant caufes and confequences of things. 
 
 the thing you wot of, unlefs they kept good diet, as I told 
 you. 
 
 Froth. All this is true. 
 
 ■ Clonxjn. Why, very well then. 
 
 Ej'cal. Come, you are a tedious foo! ; to the purpofe : what 
 was done to Elbc-w's wife, that he hath caufe to complain of? 
 come to what was done to her 
 
 Clo^n. bir, your honour cannot come to that yet. 
 
 Efcal. No, Sir, I mean it not. 
 
 CUvjn. Sir, bat you fhall come to it, by your honour's leave : 
 and I befeech you, look into Mailer Fioth here, Sir, a man of 
 fourfcore pound a year : u hofe father died at Hallovjmas, 
 Was't not at Hc.llo'wmas^ Mailer Fnih /* 
 
 Froth. All holland eve. 
 
 Clo^n. Why, very well ; I hope here be truths. He, Sir, 
 fitting, as I fay, in a lower chair. Sir: 'twas in the Bunch 
 of Grapes, where indeed you have a delight to fit, have you 
 not ? 
 
 Froth, I have fo, becaufe it is an open room, and good for 
 winter. 
 
 CU-i'jn, Why, very well then : I hope here be truths. 
 
 Meafure far Meajure, acl 2, fcene 2. 
 
 0.3 This
 
 2 30 Of the P redominmice of P a r t II, 
 
 This proceeds from an uncommon adllvity of 
 imagination, which enables it to pafs in an 
 inftant through a long feries of ideas, fo that 
 all the middle fteps are fcarce attended to, and 
 very quickly forgotten. 
 
 The peculiar form which genius affumcs, 
 depends not on the predominant principle of 
 afibciation alone, but alfo on the degree of 
 force which all the other principles of affoci- 
 ation have. There is not any fubjecfl in which 
 invention depends upon, or can be accom- 
 plifhed by only one of thefe principles. In 
 every fubjcdi, there is one leading principle of 
 invention ; but many other principles, by be- 
 ing exerted m fubordination to that, contribute 
 to the invention. Though one aflbciating 
 principle be predominant in every man of 
 genius, yet all the other principles operate 
 along wath it. Thefe may be combined in 
 very different proportions ; and every differ- 
 ence in the manner of their combination, or 
 in their comparative flrength, will produce as 
 real, though not fo remarkable a peculiarity 
 pf genius, as a diiTerencc in the predominant 
 principle. In fuch genius, for inftance, as 
 enables a man to account for the phenomena 
 pf things, the relation of caufe and effe(5b is 
 |he predominant principle of aiTociation : but 
 
 refemblancG
 
 Sect. VII. the affociating Principles, 231 
 
 refemblance alfo muft have fome force, other- 
 wife the fimilar phenomena, and tlie analo- 
 gous experiments from which general conclu- 
 fions are deducible, cannot be fuggefted ; order 
 muft have fome Influence, for if the obferva- 
 tions be not properly difpofed, they will lead 
 to no conclufion : contrariety muft have fome 
 influence, elfe thofe contradictory inftances 
 will not occur, which are necefl^ary for limit- 
 ing the conclufions and giving them preci- 
 fion. Every diff^erent proportion which thefe 
 principles bear to one another, will ftamp phi- 
 lofophical genius with a peculiar character, 
 will adapt it to one particular fort of fubjeds, 
 or will give it a determinate degree of excel- 
 lence. In genius of every kind, there is the 
 like complication and adjuftmentof aflbciating 
 principles. In every individual, genius is like 
 an organized body, the form of which arifes 
 from the manner in which the feveral mem- 
 bers are combined, and is altered by every the 
 the fmalleft change in the flze or pofition of 
 any one of them. This being the cafe, the 
 polfible arrangements andfubordinations of all 
 the aflTociating principles and their modifica- 
 tions, are fo many that they lay a foundation 
 for an endlefs variety of genius. 
 
 CL4 SECT.
 
 232 Of Flexibility Part II. 
 
 \^ 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of Flexibility of Imagination, 
 
 7E have now pointed out fome fixt and 
 V V permanent qualities of the imagina- 
 tion, which are fufficient for the production 
 of a great variety of genius : but before we 
 leave this part of the fubjecl, it will be pro- 
 per to obferve, that imagination has a certain 
 pliablcnefs or flexibility, by means of which 
 ftill greater variety is introduced. 
 
 Any particular turn of imagination does 
 not lie in a mere point ; it admits fome lati- 
 tude without lofing its charadleriflical pecu- 
 liarity. The predominant principle of aflcci- 
 ation may continue the fame in the main, and 
 yet lead into tracks of thought confiderably 
 different : the proportions which the feveral 
 principles of aiTociation bear to one another, 
 may be altered without being wholly deftroy- 
 ed ; juft as the configuration of the features 
 may be altered in a face by different pafTions 
 or different ftates of health, and yet that face 
 be acknowleged the fame, and remain clearly 
 diflinguifhable from every other. In confe- 
 quence of this flexibility, the difcoveries of 
 the fame perfon, on the fame fubjedt, will be 
 
 very
 
 Sect. VIII. of Imagination. 233 
 
 very different at different times. If a perlbn 
 write his thoughts on a fubjed: at different 
 periods, the fentiments, the imagery, the com- 
 portion, the order, will be far from being the 
 very fame. In fome cafes the difference is fo 
 great, a's to fhow that different affociating 
 principles, at leaft very different modifications 
 of the fame principle, have been predominant 
 at thefe different periods. 
 
 A TEMPORARY variation in the turn of a 
 man's imagination, or in the form of his ge- 
 nius, fometimes arifes fi'om caufes as far be- 
 yond the reach of our invefcigation, as many 
 of thofe which produce an alteration in the 
 conftitution of the body, or of thofe which 
 make one fummer to differ from another. 
 But fuch variation may often be accounted 
 for from the influence which habit has upon 
 the operations of fancy. 
 
 Habit difpofes men to be eafily affected 
 by a relation which they have for fome time 
 been accuftomed to follow ; and it often dif- 
 pofes them fo ftrongly to this, as to make fome 
 other affociating principle to prevail for a 
 while, above that which is naturally predomi- 
 nant. To this effect of habit it is owing, 
 that a man, by applying for fome time to a 
 fubjed which he could fcarce force himfelf to 
 
 fludy
 
 234 Of Flexibility Part II. 
 
 ftudy at firfl:, comes to enter into it with eafe. 
 From the fame efFedl of habit, will arife a very 
 great degree of that diverfity which has been 
 mentioned, in the produdions of one man on 
 the fame fubjed. 
 
 Habit may contribute to this diverfity in 
 another way, and that even without making 
 any alteration in the predominant principle 
 of aflbciation. Habit makes fuch ideas as are 
 at the time moft familiar to us, ' rufh more 
 readily into the mind, than fuch as are lefs 
 familiar, though thefe latter be equally or 
 even more ftrongly related to the prefent per- 
 ception. Many caufes render different ideas 
 moft familiar to a perfon at different times : 
 and as a perception may be conneded, by 
 means of any one affociating quality, with a 
 thoufand others, that perception will naturally 
 fuggeff any of thefe which is at prefent moft 
 familiar, provided it be conneded with it by 
 the relation which has greateft influence on 
 that particular perfon. Other ideas may be 
 more ftrongly conneded with it by the fame 
 relation, and would be more readily fuggcfted 
 to a perfon who was not under the power of 
 that habit 5 but with this perfon, the famili- 
 arity of the former idea gains it the prefer- 
 ence to all others. When on the firft concep- 
 tion
 
 Sect. VIII. of Imagination, 235 
 
 tion of a riibje6l, certain ideas belonging to it 
 occur in this manner, by reafon of their fami-^ 
 liarity to us, they lead us to fuch other ideas 
 as have the ftrongeft relation to them. But 
 if the ideas which were firft fuggefted, had 
 been different, they would have led us, by the 
 fame principles, into a very different train of 
 thinking, and the whole work would have 
 born a very dilTimilar afpedt. Thus when a 
 perfon fets out from a place where feveral 
 roads terminate, a very few fleps decide which 
 of them he takes ; and by going on in it, he 
 arrives at a place very diftant from that to 
 which he fhould have been brought by ano^ 
 ther of the roads iffuing from the fame point. 
 This flexibility of imagination takes place 
 in all men, in fome degree ; but it takes place 
 in fome men, in a much greater degree than 
 in others. No man has an imagination fo 
 dull, or an imagination fo invariably fixt in 
 one form, as to be nowife alfeded by habit or 
 other occafional caufes : but there are two forts 
 of perfons, who are difpofed to be mofl affedted 
 by thefe. Firft, they whofe genius is not very 
 great, nor ftrongly marked with any pecu- 
 liarity. It is on this account eafily turned 
 ■out of its direction by accidental caufes, and 
 eagerly lays hold of the afiiftance which may
 
 -' 3 ^ ^ Flexibility P a R t 11. 
 
 be derived from their operation. Secondly, 
 they whofe genius is uncommonly ftrong and 
 lively. In thefe the fame effe*^ is produced 
 by a very different caufe ; the vigour and ac- 
 tivity of their alfociating powers, bellows 
 great delicacy and fenfibility upon their ima- 
 ginations, and renders them fufceptible of 
 ftrong impreffions from any temporary caufes ; 
 they feel the force of every fuch caufe, and 
 receive a tranfient form or tindure from it. 
 The produdlions of thefe tvvro different forts 
 of perfons, bear marks of the different caufes 
 from which the flexibility of their fancies 
 fprings. The works of the former have no 
 common charader, but are almoft as unlike 
 to one another as to the works of a different 
 perfon ; but through all the works of the lat- 
 ter, notwithftanding their varieties, there runs 
 a certain peculiarity, which fhows that they 
 had the fame author. 
 
 It has been often obferved, that the dif- 
 ferent works of men of genius fometimes dif- 
 fer very much in the degree of their perfec- 
 tion. This may fometimes arife from the 
 fubjeds not being equally adapted to their abi- 
 lities. But in many cafes It happens, that a 
 perfon will at one time very fuccefsfully pro- 
 fecute a fubjed which he has often attempted 
 
 in
 
 Sect. VIII. of Imagination, 237 
 
 in vain before, or accomplifh a difcovery by- 
 accident, which has eluded many profefTed in- 
 veftigations. This may frequently be ac- 
 counted for from the principles juft now efta- 
 blifhed. Habit, or fome other incidental caufe, 
 gives the fancy at one time a turn, which we 
 do not reflect upon, but which prepares it for 
 attaining a certain difcovery ; and that either 
 by rendering an idea familiar, which is fub- 
 fervient to that difcovery, or by difpofmg it 
 to follow the relation which leads moll natu- 
 rally to the difcovery. At another time, the 
 fame caufe gives the mind fo ftrong a propen- 
 fity to attend to an idea, or to follow a rela- 
 tion which draws us off from the proper track, 
 and obftruds the invention, that no efforts 
 can conquer it. When the appearance arifes 
 not from this caufe, it may often be afcribed 
 to the inequalities which are incident to the 
 vigour of genius in the fame man at different 
 times, and which may be in fome meafure 
 accounted for from the obfervations that have 
 been formerly made. Though the principles 
 of affociation be never perhaps entirely dor- 
 mant or impotent, yet they are not, m any 
 any man, alike prone to exert themfelves, or 
 fit for adling with the fame force, at all feafcns. 
 Sometimes they are active, and ready to run 
 
 from
 
 238 Of Flexibility Part 1L 
 
 from any idea that occurs, through a long 
 train of other ideas related to it, without a 
 poffibility of our refifting their influence, or 
 cooling the ardour which their activity in- 
 fpires. When the imagination is in this ftate, 
 and is at the fame time imprefled with a flrong 
 "view of a particular end, genius is extenfive 
 and vigorous, and can with eafe perfed in- 
 ventions, as by a lucky and unaccountable hit, 
 in purfuing which it has formerly toiled in 
 vain. To produce this vigour and alertnefs 
 of invention, it is neceflary that there be fome 
 prefent perception conneded with many 
 others, from which it may fet out ; that the 
 aflbciating principle to which that connexion 
 correfponds, be flrong ; that the mind be not 
 deeply engaged in any other train of thinking 
 which would lead off from this track ; and 
 that we have a ftrong aflbciation of the de- 
 fign. If any of thefe conditions be wanting, 
 that alertnefs will be obftruded. It fome- 
 times is obftruded to a very great degree ; 
 fancy is deprefled, the power of afTociation 
 feems to be fufpended, or if it at all exert it- 
 felf, it is only in trifling, unmeaning excur- 
 fions ; it is too feeble to keep the defign ia 
 view, and is continually allowing us to quit 
 the road which would lead us forward to a 
 
 valuables
 
 Sect. VIII. of ImaginaYion. 2 39 
 
 valuable invention. While this debility of 
 imagination continues, it throws genius into 
 a ftate of languor. It enters on its work with- 
 out fufficient ardour ; it is fluggifh, and can 
 make no progrefs in it ; it fuggefts no ideas, 
 or but few that are conducive to its intention ; 
 and all our efforts to exert it are unfuccefsful. 
 We cannot call up ideas, as it were, by name, 
 we can only caft ourfelves into the roads in 
 which they are likelieft to occur ; and if fancy 
 be not powerful enough to bring them into 
 view, we muft remain without them. This 
 accounts, in a great meafure, for the common 
 obfervation, that moft ufeful inventions have 
 been made by accident, often when men were 
 in fearch of fomething elfe. This fhows us 
 likewife, why the greateft geniufes fometimes 
 fmk below themfelves, and fail in undertak- 
 ings in which at another time they would 
 have eafily fucceeded. It is as impoffible, 
 during thefe unfavourable turns of genius, to 
 fupply its defeds by application, as it is for 
 application to produce genius in thofe who 
 naturally want it. The force and fplendour 
 of imagination throw a luftre on the pro- 
 dudions of real genius, which renders them 
 eafily diftingulfhable from the lifelefs and 
 infipid produdions of unanimated induftry. 
 
 Diligence
 
 240 Of Flexibility P a R t II. 
 
 Diligence and acquired abilities may affift or 
 improve genius, but it is only a vigorous ima- 
 gination that can produce it. Whenever mere 
 labour is fubftituted in the place of this, it 
 can but mimic genius : the w^ork will always 
 bear evident traces of unnatural force and auk- 
 ward ftraining. 
 
 The flexibility of the human imagination 
 appears not only in a perfon's attempts on 
 the fame fubjedt : in fome men*s efforts on 
 different fubjed;s, it appears very remarkably. 
 There are men in whom one affociating prin- 
 ciple feems to be predominant v/hen they are 
 engaged in fome fubjed:s, and a totally differ- 
 ent principle when they apply to fubjecSts of 
 another kind. Whatever be their prefent fub- 
 jedl, their minds adapt themfelves in an in- 
 ftant to it, and are prepared to yield them- 
 felves wholly up to thofe relations which be- 
 long to that fubjed, and by means of which 
 difcoveries may be made in it. It is not eafy 
 to explain all the caufes from which this fort 
 of flexibility arifes ; perhaps it is in fome 
 meafure unaccountable : but there is one caufe 
 to which it is often owing. Every work in 
 which genius can be employed, has a parti- 
 cular defign or end. True genius always fits 
 a man for forming a lively and permanent 
 j> concep-
 
 Sect, VIII. of Imagination, 241 
 
 conception of the defign, fuch a conception 
 of it as may make all his thoughts to move 
 ' in fubfervience to it. An uncommon vigour 
 and delicacy of the affociating principles will 
 enable a man to conceive many diffimilar de- 
 figns, with all the vivacity which is requifite 
 for making any one of them dwell on the 
 imagination. Its nature gives a temporary 
 bent to the mind. It infufes great adivity 
 into thofe aflbciating principles, by our fol- 
 lowing of which it may be promoted. Thefe 
 principles are not, perhaps, naturally predo- 
 minant in the perfon ; the perception of a 
 different defign would have rendered a quite 
 different principle predominant : but thefe 
 have naturally fo great a degree of ftrength, 
 that, with the afnfcance which they receive from 
 the defign, they can be made to prevail, and 
 to regulate, for fome time, all the exertions 
 of the imagination. In fome men, a capacity 
 of being ftrongly affedted with the view of 
 any particular defign, and a pliancy of fancy 
 confequent on this, are fo great, that their ge- 
 nius feems to be almofl equally adapted to the 
 moft oppofite fubjects. There have been per- 
 fons who were at once inventors in matters of 
 fcience, and originals in the arts. In mimics 
 this pliancy of fancy appears in a very great 
 
 R degree.
 
 242- Of Ykxihility Part II, 
 
 degree, though it be employed In an inferioiir 
 province. Wherever it is poflefled, a per- 
 fon's thoughts are w^holly moulded by the pre- 
 fent defign ; he lofes fight of himfelf, and is 
 perfectly transformed into the charadier which 
 he wants to aflume. Thus as a fitnefs for 
 being ftrongly imprefled by a defign, beftows 
 regularity on genius, fo a capacity of being 
 equally hnpreiTed by dilhmilar defigns, gives 
 a great variety and compafs to the genius of a 
 particular perfon. 
 
 We have now endeavoured to difcover the 
 fources of the varieties of genius, fo far as 
 they lie in the peculiarities of the imagina- 
 tion. If none of the affoclating principles be 
 Itrong, there can be no genius. If one be re- 
 markably vigorous in comparifon with the 
 reft, genius will be fixt to one fort of fubjeds 
 fuited to that principle. If all of thqm be 
 very vigorous, the perception of a particular 
 defign will have force enough to give any one 
 of them a temporary prevalence ; and by this 
 means genius will have great compafs, its ex- 
 ertions will be fufceptible of great variety. la 
 proportion to the degree of variety of which 
 genius is thus fufceptible, it will approach the 
 nearer to unlverfality, 
 
 Bu7
 
 Sect. Villi bf imagination. 243 
 
 But thougli the varieties which belong to 
 imagination, evidently produce many diver- 
 fities of genius, we fliall never be able to ac- 
 count for all its diverfities by attending only 
 to the imagination; for imagination alone is 
 not fufficient for compleating any work of ge- 
 nius. In all its perfect exertions, it derives 
 aid from other faculties, the varieties of which 
 muft contribute fomewhat to the feveral forms 
 which it afTumes. The faculties from which 
 imagination receives affiftanGe, are fenfe, nie- 
 mory, and judgment. An enquiry into the 
 varieties of which the firft of thefe is capable, 
 v.'oul4 give us little light : the varieties inci* 
 dent to the two iaft, it v/ill be of importance 
 to examine. The varieties of memory bear 
 the neareft analogy to thofe of imagination., 
 and for that reafon it will be natural firii to 
 explain them. 
 
 SECT. li. 
 
 Of the Varieties of Memory^ and their hifiuence 
 
 on Genius^, 
 
 £MORY is employed either in t-etain- 
 ing fingle perceptions, or in preferv- 
 ing tlie order and connexiotl of different 
 perceptions. It is fufceptlble of confiderablc? 
 varieties in refpecl of both thefc exertions. 
 
 R z Every
 
 244 Of the Varieties Part 11. 
 
 Every perception retained by memory, de- 
 cays by length of time. As diftant objeds 
 look fainter and fmaller to the eye, and as 
 diftant founds ft:rike the ear more feebly, than 
 fuch as are near ; fo the remembrance of things 
 paft grows weaker in proportion to the time 
 which has elapfed fmce they were prefent ; 
 and at laft every trace of them is obliterated. 
 But fome perceptions decay much more flowly 
 than others. While one perception is for- 
 gotten as foon as it is received, the remem- 
 brance of another is firm and permanent for 
 many years. The general principles on which 
 the permanence of remembrance depends, are 
 very fimple. 
 
 It may be eftablilhed as a principle, that 
 thofe perceptions are moft firmly and perma- 
 nently remembered, which were ftrongeft at 
 firfl:. A ft:rong perception, like a deep fhade 
 of colouring, feems to decay more flowly than 
 one that is faint and delicate ; and though it 
 fhould decay as faft:, it would be longer be- 
 fore it were effaced. The particular cafes 
 reducible to this general principle, are very 
 numerous ; and they are all experiments 
 ferving to confirm it. They are chiefly the 
 following. 
 
 The
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory. 245 
 
 The perceptions offenfe are always llronger 
 than any ideas which we can form ; and ac- 
 cordingly what we have perceived by our 
 fenfes, is better remembered than what we 
 have only heard or read of. The percep- 
 tions of fome of the fenfes, are ftronger and 
 more ftriking than thofe of other fenfes ; and 
 in confequence of that they fix themfelves 
 more durably in the memory. Of all our 
 perceptions, pleafure and pain are thofe which 
 afFed us moft deeply ; and the objeds which 
 produce them, lay fafteft hold of the memory : 
 we often hear men give it as a reafon for their 
 never being able to forget one thing, that it 
 affected them much ; and give it as a reafon 
 for their having no remembrance of another 
 thing, that it did not at all intereft them, [a) 
 
 Some degree of attention is neceiTary for 
 our perceiving objects at all ; founds often 
 ftrike the ear without being heard, things are 
 often full in our view without being feen ; 
 the whole attention of the foul is otherwife 
 engaged. By bellowing attention, the mind 
 as it were embraces the objects exhibited to it, 
 
 [a) Siquas res in vita videmus parvas, ufitatas, quctidianar, 
 eas meminifle non folemus : piopcerea quod nulla niii nova, 
 aut admirabili re commovetur animus. At fi quid videmus aut 
 audimus egregie turpe, aut honeftum, inufitatum, magnum, 
 incredibile, ridicukm. Id diu nieminifle confucvimus. Ai 
 tier en, lib. iii. 
 
 R 3 and
 
 24<3 Of the Varieties Part IT, 
 
 and lays Itfelf open to a flrong impreffion 
 from them, which makes them both afFed it 
 much while they are prefent, and keep firm 
 poffefficu of the memory afterwards. The 
 length of time for which attention is beflowed, 
 as well as the clofenefs of the attention, ren- 
 ders our perception of an objedl the ilronger ; 
 and it renders the remembrance of it propof- 
 tionably the more lading [b). In like man- 
 ner, by returning often to the contemplation 
 of an obie<^, we learn to conceive it vigoroufly, 
 and the remembrance of it becomes clear and 
 permanent : a perception which has feldom 
 affeded the fenfes, is quickly obliterated from 
 the memory ; light and colours are totally 
 forgotten by thofe who have early loft their 
 fight : but fuch perceptions as are repeated 
 every day, never quit their hold of the me- 
 mory ; by the attention beflowed upon them 
 as often as they recur, they are preferved in 
 their original firength, without finding time 
 even to begin to decay. 
 
 It is obferved, that every thing is well 
 remembered, which is impreffed on the min4 
 
 {b) Nee dubiurr; eil, quin plurimi^m in hac parte valeat 
 mentis ihten.io, et velut acies luminum a profpeiHu rerum 
 quas intuetur, non averfa. Unde accidit, ut qu£ per plures 
 dies fcribimLs edifcendi caufa, cogitatione ipfa contineat. 
 Quint. Ltfi. Orst. lib. xi. cap. 2. 
 
 "wher^
 
 S E c T . I X . tif Memory, 247 
 
 when free and difengaged {c). This is one 
 of the circumflances which render the morn- 
 ing favourable to ftudy [d]. On this account 
 we retain through life, what we learn in child- 
 hood and early youth [e). When the mind is 
 already occupied by one object, an effort is 
 neceifary to draw it off from that objed ; this 
 effort weakens the application with which we 
 attend to the fucceeding objed : the former 
 objed: ftill attracts fome part of our attention, 
 and thus farther weakens our conception of 
 the other. But a difengaged mind beflows 
 its whole attention on the objed: that is pre- 
 fented to it, and conceives it with great viva- 
 city. Thus alfo, a thing is well remembered, 
 when the mind is, for fome time after having 
 perceived it, occupied by no new objed: (f) : 
 in this cafe there is room for continued, as 
 well as clofe, attention, which strengthens 
 the impreflion oii the fenfes, and, in confe- 
 
 (f) Plurimum conferre anlmum cogitationibus aliis 
 
 liberum. Quint. Injl. Qrat. lib. xi. cap. 2, 
 
 {d) K-uBcc'iftB Kcii fjivnfiwivo^iv ftaMsv, sn<; ctv ewcsv Ttturov Ivrvy^ct- 
 vwjxev iitiiTx <jtc(iKjV a%i; tsj; rifx.sfu<;, ovx cTi o/aoiw; «*« to voAMi^ uTi" 
 
 {e^ Qu2j acciderunt in pueritia, meminlmus optime (atpe. 
 Ad Her en. Jib iij. 
 
 {/) Aliae inllantiai dabunt banc alteram fpeciem ; ut qu-e 
 maxime imprimuntur a mente pura, et minus prxoccupata 
 ante vel poll ; veluti qu;e difcuntur in pueritia, aut quae com- 
 mentamur ante fomnum, etiam prima; qua;que rerum vices i 
 jnagis hxreanc in memoria, ViiRULAM. Nov, Org, lib. II. 
 apti. 26. 
 
 R 4 quence
 
 248 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 quence of that, upon the memory. Pre-ex- 
 pedation likewife renders the remembrance 
 of an obje<ft durable : it roufes the attention, 
 it puts the mind in a proper difpofition for 
 bellowing attention, it invigorates our con- 
 ception of the object [g). It is from experi- 
 ence of thefe effedts of pre-expedation, that 
 perfons who wifh us to be much affeded with 
 ■what they communicate, raife our curiofity, 
 delay fatisfying it, and render us as impatient 
 as they can. 
 
 Once more, we remember that heft, which 
 we underftand moft perfedly. What we un- 
 derftand, ftrikes us with its whole force : of 
 what we underftand imperfectly, it is only 
 the pare underftood, that makes any impref- 
 fion on us ; of the reft we have no perception : 
 even that part makes but a faint imprefTion ; 
 it would acquire additional force from its 
 connexion with the other parts, if the whole 
 were underftood. 
 
 In all thefe inftances it appears, that per- 
 ceptions originally flrong, are moft firmly 
 remembered. 
 
 (g) Aliae denique inftantiae dabunt hanc alteram fpeciem ; 
 ut qu^ expedantUi", et attentionem excitant, melius hjereant, 
 quam quae pra;tcrvolant. Itaque fi fciiptum aliquod vicies 
 perlegeris, non tarn facile illud memoriter difces, quam fi 
 illud legas decies, tentando interim illud recitare, et ubi de- 
 ficit memoria, iivfpiciendo librum. VzKVhhU. Ibid. 
 
 Memory
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory, 249 
 
 Memory preferves the order and con- 
 nexion of perceptions, as well as the percep- 
 tions themfelves. If it did not, we could re- 
 tain only fimple perceptions. Every complex 
 objed confifts of feveral parts united together 
 in a certain manner ; memory retains not 
 only all the parts, but alfo the manner in 
 which they are united. It retains the latter 
 fo firmly, that we do not naturally attend to 
 the diftindion of the parts which compofe a 
 whole. It is almoft only the philofopher that 
 thinks of enumerating them ; and in order to 
 enumerate them, he muft fet himfelf pur- 
 pofely to analyfe and decompound his idea of 
 the whole. Different wholes are connected 
 in nature by various relations ; thefe relations 
 are obferved when the things are exhibited to 
 our fenfes ; and the real obferved relations of 
 things are retained by the memory. As it is 
 by co-exiftence, that the parts of the fame 
 whole are united, fo it is by vicinity, caufa- 
 tion, and order, that different wholes are con- 
 nected in nature, and, in confequence of the 
 obfervation of this, afterwards tied together 
 in the memory. 
 
 In every cafe of flrong and exa(^ remem- 
 brance, we have a clear perception of the 
 connexions of things, as well as of the things 
 
 them-
 
 -5^ ^f ^^-'^ Varieties P A R T 11. 
 
 tliemfelves. Things which are in the memory 
 together, do not lie in confufion, but form 
 diftinft images, and are beheld in their jull 
 proportions. It is this property of memory, 
 that enables imagination to introduce into its 
 works, entire fcenes of real hiftory, or large 
 parts of nature, which we have adtually ob- 
 ferved. The introduction of thefe not only 
 affifts the operation of imagination, and lei- 
 fens its labour, but likewife contributes to the 
 excellence of its productions. Shakefpeare's 
 defcriptioh of Dover cliff, may ferve as an 
 example of the advantage to which genius 
 can turn this exercife of memory ; 
 
 Come on, Sir, here's the place — ftand ftill. How 
 
 fearful 
 And dizzy 'tis, to caft one's eyes fo low ! 
 The crows and choiighs, that wing the mid-way air. 
 Show fcarce {q grofs as beetles. Half-way dowtt 
 Hangs one that gathers famphire ; dreadful trade"? 
 Methinks he feems no bigger than his head. 
 The fill:!ermen that walk upon the beach 
 Appear like mice ; and yond tall anchoring bark, 
 Diminifhed to her cock ; her cock a buoy 
 Almofl too fmall for fight. The murmuring furge 
 That on th' unnumbred idle pebbles chafes. 
 Cannot be heard fo high [h). 
 
 {h) King Lear, aifl ^ . fcene 6, 
 
 Many
 
 Sect. IX. cf Memory, 251 
 
 Many defcrlptions and relations which are 
 introduced into poetry, as if they were the 
 creation of fancy, are really copied from me- 
 mory. To have recourfe, in this manner, to 
 memory, contributes greatly to beftow rich- 
 nefs and variety on the works of genius : for 
 no imagination has force enough to diverfify 
 fcenes feigned by itfelf, in fo great a degree 
 as objeds and events are diverfified in nature. 
 Some painters, inftead of imitating nature, 
 draw almofi: all their figures from a general 
 idea which they have formed to themfelves* 
 The confequence is, that a famenefs runs 
 through all their works ; they reprefent not 
 that endlefs variety which attention to nature 
 would have fuggefled to them. Anthony 
 Tempefta and Peter Tcda are taken notice of 
 as faulty in this way. On the other hand, it 
 is obferved that attention to the real varieties 
 of nature, has introduced great variety into 
 the works of Salvator Rofa, except in one 
 particular, the legs of his figures, which are 
 copied not from nature, but from an idea of 
 his own, and which for this reafon, though 
 well drawn, are too fimilar. 
 
 Thus memory, by retaining the real con-? 
 pexlons of things, gives us a diftind: and en- 
 \\\t perception of thcfe things, when they are 
 
 ^11
 
 252 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 all adiially prefent to our view. But it mull 
 be remarked further, That when one of the 
 things only is in view, the reft may be brought 
 to our remembrance, by means of their con- 
 nexion with it, preferved by memory. When 
 we think of one part of a machine, it fuggefts 
 the other parts, and the form of the whole. 
 When we think of one objedt in a complex 
 fcene, it bring the reft into our view. When 
 memory prefents one event, this leads us to 
 think of the other events which were con- 
 ne(5ted with it, and to conceive them in their 
 proper order. The remembrance of many 
 periods of a difcourfe or of a great number of 
 verfes, is often revived by the fmgle word 
 with which they begin (i). Thus ideas are in- 
 troduced by others with which they are con- 
 nected in the memory, in the very fame man^ 
 ner as it has been already fliown that they are 
 introduced by thofe with which they are afTo- 
 ciated in the imagination. It is obfervable 
 too that the connexions retained by memory, 
 are the fame with feme of the relations by 
 which ideas are aflbciated in the Imagination, 
 On thefe accounts, the exertions of thefe two 
 faculties are often very analogous, and fome- 
 
 (/■) Nam etiam excidentes, unius admonitione verbl in me- 
 moriam reponuntur. Quint. Injl, Orat, lib. xi. cap. 2. 
 
 times
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory, 253 
 
 times not dlftinguifhable except by the perfon 
 himfelf. When things are conneded in the 
 mind by vicinity, co-exiftence, caufation, or 
 order, in the manner in which we have ad:u- 
 ally obferved them, and when at the fame 
 time we have a convidtion of our having ob- 
 ferved them thus connedted, the exhibition 
 not only of the things themfelves, but alfo of 
 their connexions, is properly afcribed to me- 
 mory. When thefe relations are beftowed 
 upon things to which they may belong, but 
 which we have never actually obferved united 
 by them ; when at leaft we have forgotten 
 that we had obferved the things placed in thefe 
 relations ; or when we join things together, 
 not by thefe relations, but on account of their 
 refemblance or their contrariety ; in all thefe 
 cafes, things are properly faid to be affociated 
 in the imagination, not conjoined in the me- 
 mory. For example, when a perfon gives a 
 minute defcription of a country which he has 
 lately feen, or relates a feries of events which 
 he has witneffed or learned from hiftory, the 
 whole is owing to the exercife of memory ; 
 imagination has no fhare in it. If he illuf- 
 trate any part of his recital by a comparifon 
 with refembling objects, or enliven it by con- 
 trafts ; or if he have forgotten part of the ob- 
 jects,
 
 i^54 Of the Varieties Part IL 
 
 jeds, and fupply the defe<51: which this would 
 occafion in his ftory, by putting in fuch cir- 
 cumftances as are confiflent with the other 
 parts ; then he exercifes imagination as really, 
 though not in fo great a degree, as he who 
 contrives any of the imaginary trains of events 
 or fcenes of adion, which are common with 
 poets and writers of romance. 
 
 As the exertions of memory retaining the 
 connexions of things, and the exertions *of 
 imagination, are thus analogous, fo It is far- 
 ther oblervable, that they are almofl: always 
 neceflarily intermingled. Sometimes imagi- 
 nation takes the lead, and memory a£ts in 
 fubordination to it : how far, and in what 
 ways, was explained formerly [k). Let us 
 now take notice, in what manner imagination 
 is exercifed when it acts in fubordination to 
 memory. In exhibiting any one thing which 
 we have obferved, or a number of things in 
 their obferved order, memory alone is ex- 
 erted. But from thefe we often pafs to other 
 things, connected with them not by an order 
 really obferved, but by fome other ties : in 
 this cafe the tranfition is made by the imagi- 
 liation. The things to which this tranfirion 
 19 made, are diftinftly remembered ; and 
 
 (/^) Part J. feft. 5. 
 
 I t^-hile
 
 Sect. IX. of Manory. 255 
 
 while we dwell on them, memory is the only, 
 faculty employed in conceiving theiru It is 
 when we leave thefe, and pafs to others riot 
 connected with them in our experience, that 
 imagination is again exerted. We never caa 
 have a long train of thoughts, or carry on a 
 long converfation, even relating to the mei^eft 
 matters of fatt, wholly by the fuggefticns of 
 memory, without any ^id from imagination. 
 If this faculty did not interpofe, and give us 
 a new impulfe, our thoughts would quickly 
 ftagnate, our converiktion would fail, v;e 
 Ihould be ftridly confined to one fubjei^, at 
 leaft to fuch groupes of objedls and fuch fuc- 
 ceffive events, as we have obferved really con- 
 joined in nature. Thus, as it was formerly 
 fhown on the one hand, that memory aflifts 
 imagination in all works of genius, fo on the 
 otlier hand memory receives great affiilance 
 from imagination, in moft of its operations- 
 What has been faid on this point, will enable 
 us in fome meafure to conceive, how imagir 
 nation,- and confequently genius, cnter/S into 
 a fpecies of compofition from which many 
 have totally excluded it, the writing o^ hii- 
 tory. By what has been faidi we are led 
 jikewife to make a remark which regards ge- 
 jilus of every kind, That oUr remembrance 
 
 of
 
 -5^ Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 of the real connexions of things, multiplies 
 the ties by which ideas are united in our 
 minds ; and confequently multiplies both the 
 roads by which we may be led to the concep- 
 tion of fuch ideas as we have occafion for, 
 and the combinations into which the relations 
 of ideas may be formed : and how much thefe 
 circumftances contribute both to the compafs 
 and to the variety of genius, has been fuffici- 
 ently explained already. 
 
 The fitnefs which both the connexions of 
 things retained by memory and their relations 
 in the imagination, have fox caufmg one bring 
 others into our view, contributes much to the 
 flrength and perfection of remembrance. 
 Without this, the exercife of memory would 
 be much more difficult than it is : for our re- 
 membering any feries of thoughts, it would 
 be neceffary to imprefs them all vigoroufly on 
 the mind ; if any of them were faint, it would 
 neccflarily be forgotten. But becaufe one 
 idea introduces others connecSted with it, we 
 may fometimes remember many, by gaining 
 a flrong perception of a few : the relation of 
 the many to the few, will be fufficient for 
 calling them to mind, though they themfelves 
 be but weakly remembered. 
 
 6 Nay
 
 5 
 
 Segt.IX. of Memory, 2j;7 
 
 Nay farther ; one perception may become 
 ftrong by being conned:ed with another. This 
 obfervation is neceiTary for giving the jufb 
 extent to a principle formerly laid down 
 That the firmnefs with which feparate objeifls 
 are remembered, is in proportion to the 
 ftrength of our original perceptions of thefe 
 objeds. This principle will appear liable to 
 many exceptions, if it be not remarked^ that 
 though a perception was not itfelf ftrong at 
 hril, yet if it was conneded with a flrong 
 perception, it is well remembered by means 
 of that connexion. A ftrong perception com- 
 municates ftrength to other perceptions cort-» 
 neded with it ; and in Confequence of this 
 communication, they imprint thernfelves as 
 deeply on the memory as if they had had in- 
 herent ftrength. Belldcs, the ftrong percep* 
 tion will frequently recur to our view ; and 
 as often as it occurs, it will readily fuggeft 
 fuch as are conneded with it ; it will commu- 
 nicate ftrength to them, and make them to 
 be conceived with force and vivacity. On 
 this account alfo, if the idea of an objed 
 comes, at any of its appearances in the me- 
 mory, to be connedcd with another that is 
 ftrong, it will derive ftrength from this latter, 
 and in confequence of this be vigoroully rc- 
 
 S membered,
 
 258 Of the Far te ties P ar T IL 
 
 membered, though the objeds had no con- 
 nexion when they were originally perceived 
 by the fenfes. The truth of thefe obferva- 
 tions appears in many inftances. It was to 
 affifl the introduction of ideas by the force of 
 fenfible figns, that the ancient orators ufed 
 images in the artificial memory (/). We 
 often hear perfons affign as a reafon for their 
 retaining a thing ftrongly, fome affedling pe- 
 culiarity in their circumftances when they 
 firft became acquainted wdth it, which has 
 united itfelf infeparably to it, and rendered 
 it impoffible for them to forget it. We fome- 
 times want a perfon to recolledl a particular 
 occurrence ; we affirm again and again that 
 he was prefent at it ; but he can remember 
 nothing of it : we mention fomething which 
 happened at the fame time, or was otherwife 
 conneded with it ; he remembers this dif- 
 
 (/) Vidit autem hoc prudenter five Samonides, five alius 
 quis invenit, ea maxime animis cffingi noftrls, quas efTent a 
 fenfu tradita, atque imprelTa : acerrimura autem ex omnibus 
 noRris fenfibus cfle fenfum videndi : quare facillime animo 
 teneri pofle ea, quae perciperentur auribus, aut cogitatione, 
 fi etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur, ut res 
 csEcas, et ab adfpeilus judicio remotas, conformatio quxdam, 
 et imago, et figura ita notaret, ut ea qua; cogitando complefH 
 non poffemus, intuendo quafi tenercmus. Cic. de Oratorey 
 lib. ii. Alise autem inllantis dabunt banc alteram fpeciem ; 
 ut quicquid deducat intelledluale ad feriendum fenfum (qua; 
 raJio etiam prascipue viget in artificiali memoria) juvet me- 
 moriam. Verulam. Ncv. O^g. Ibid. See aifo, De Augm. 
 S^atntiarumf lib: v. cap, 5. 
 
 tindly;
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory, 2^9 
 
 tlndly ; the remembrance of it revives his 
 remembrance of that occurrence, beftov/s vi- 
 vacity upon it, and renders it clearly percep- 
 tible. If v^e have a high fenfe of the impor- 
 tance of any fubjedl, that fenfe makes every 
 thing related to this fubject, to be ftrongly 
 remembered. The reafon and the efficacy of 
 punifliments depend very much on the prin- 
 ciple now under confideration ; the remem- 
 brance of the pain or ihame preferves the re- 
 membrance of the fault, and by conftantly 
 attending it, produces conftant averfion to 
 the repetition of the fault, and care to avoid 
 it. Wc do not eafily forget any thing related 
 to a perfon whom we love. What excites 
 defire, admiration, joy, fear, forrow, or in 
 general any flrong paffion, is firmly remem- 
 bered ; the paffion communicates force both 
 to the fenfation and to the idea of the object 
 by which it was excited (;;/). 
 
 We are not always wholly paffive in the 
 exercife of memory ; we can make efforts to 
 remember what does not caft up to us readily 
 and of its own accord. This voluntary exer- 
 tion of memory, is called recolleclion. As 
 
 fw) AHae inftantiae dabunt hanc alteram fpeciem ; ut qune 
 faciunt impreflionem in affeftu forti, incutientes fcilicct me- 
 tum, admirationem, pudorein, deledatioriem, juvent memo- 
 riain. Vi:rula.m. Nov, O^g. Ibid. 
 
 S 2 remem-
 
 26 o Of the Varieties PartIL 
 
 remembrance is aflifted by the relations of 
 things, fo recoUcdion is altogether owing to 
 them. It would be abfolutely impoffible, if 
 there were not fuch a connexion among our 
 ideas, as enables one of them when excited, 
 to bring another into view. V/e cannot call 
 up an idea dire^Iy by an a6t of the will. 
 We cannot will to raife that particular idea 
 which we want ; for this would imply that 
 we conceived it already, and needed not to 
 raife it by a volition : and if we have not al- 
 ready conceived it, wc will to raife we know 
 n3t what idea. It is only indlrc^ly that we 
 raife an idea by a volition. The idea which 
 we want, has fome relations to certain others ; 
 thefe others, with the relations which they 
 bear to that, may be in our view ; we can 
 voluntarily fet out from thefe, and purfue the 
 feveral relations which belong to them, till 
 we fall upon tiiat relation which leads to the 
 idea wanted. The leaft refledion on what 
 palTes in our own minds, will convince u& 
 that this is the very way which we take in- 
 recoUedling. We are juft like perfons in 
 fearch of fomething which they have loft, 
 they know not precifely where ; but by their 
 knowing the place where they firft miffed it, 
 by their recollecting when they lad had it, by 
 
 thek
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory, 261 
 
 their remembering all the places they have 
 been in fmce, and by their thinking what 
 might be the occafion of their lofing it, their 
 fearch is reduced within ibme bounds, and 
 they have fome direction in it, whereas other- 
 wife they had been obliged to feek for it at 
 perfect random. In the fam.e manner, in 
 confequence of the connexion which fubfifls 
 among different ideas, we may have a fort of 
 anticipation of one which is not yet prefent 
 to the mind, a notion of fome relation which 
 it bears to another that is prefent ; and by 
 that notion we are in the proper track for 
 finding it, and following this track are quick- 
 ly led to it. Hence verfes are not only more 
 eafily committed to memory, than profe, but 
 alfo more readily recolledled : when we are 
 at a lofs about a w^ord, we know before-hand 
 that it muft be fuch as will agree not only 
 with the fcnfe but alfo with the meafurc. 
 Hence order and a regular diftribution is a 
 great affifcance in recolletfling a difcourfe : if 
 a particular period occur not readily, we know 
 at lead that it mull be fuch as fuits a certain 
 part of the plan (71). It was on this principle 
 
 \n) Verum et in his quas fcripfimus, complei5lendis, mul- 
 tuni valent, et in iis que cogitamus, continendis, prope fo've 
 {excepta qua; potiflima elt, excrcitationc) divifio et compofitio. 
 JSain qui rede diviferet, nunquam poteric ia rerum ordine er- 
 
 S 3 that
 
 262 of the Varieties Part 11. 
 
 that the ancients introduced places Into their 
 contrivance of an artificial memory : the ora- 
 tor had this advantage for recoiiedting any 
 part of his oration, that he knev^r it to be 
 what he had referred to a particular place [o]. 
 As an idea is recollected only by our follow- 
 rare. Etiam qus! bene compofita erunj^ inemoriam 
 
 ferie fua ducent. Nam ficut facilius verfus edifSlmuf, quam 
 profam orationem, ita profam vindtam, quam diJToIutam. 
 Quint. Inji. Orat. lib. xi. cap. 2. 
 
 (<?) InvenilTe fertur (Simonides) ordinem efTe maxime, qui 
 rnemorise lumen afrerret. Itaque iis, qui hanc partem in- 
 genii exercerent, locos efle capiendos, et ea quae memoria 
 tenere vellent, eftingenda animo, atque in his locis collocanda : 
 iic fore, ut ordinem rerum, locorum ordo confervaret. Cic . 
 deOratcre, lib. ii. Ex hoc Simonidis fado noti;tum videtur, 
 juvari merr.oriam fignaris animo fedibus, idque credere fuo 
 quifque experimento. Nam cum in loca aliqua poll tenipns 
 reverli fumus, non ipfa agnofcimus tantum, fed etiam quaj in 
 hisfecerimus reminifcimur, perfona^quefubeunt, nonnunqua.-n 
 tacitas quoque cogitationes in mentem revertuntur. Quint. 
 Jnjl. Crat. lib. xi. cap. 2. !nrianti2;conftitutiv2: funt; ordo, 
 live diftributio, quse manifefto juvat memoriam. Item loci 
 
 in memoria artificiali : Hujufmodi autem loci memoriam 
 
 infigniter juvant, eamque longe fupra vires naturales exaltant. 
 Item earmina facilius hsrent, et difcuntur menioriter, quam 
 profa. Atque ex illo manipulo trium inllantiarum, videlicet 
 ordinis, locorum artificialis memorir, et verfuum, conllitui- 
 tar fpecies una auxilii ad memoriam. Species autem ilia, 
 ^bfcijjio injiniti redte vocari pofTit. Cum enim quis aliquid 
 reminifci aut revocare in memoriam nititur; fi nullam pne- 
 notioncm habeat, aut perceptionem ejus quod qurerit, qu.rrit 
 certe et molitur, et hac iliac difcurrit, tanquam in inhnito. 
 .Quod fi certam aliquam prsnotionem habeat, Hatim abfcin- 
 ditur infinitum, et fit difcurfus memoria; magis in vicino. In 
 tribus autem illis inftantiis quae fuperius didx funt, prasno- 
 tio perfpicua eft et certa. In prima videlicet, debet elTe ali- 
 quid quod congruat cum ordine : in fecunda debet efie imago, 
 qui relationem aliquam habeat, five convenientiam ad ilia 
 loca certa : in tertia dcbent efie verba, qua; cadant in vcrftim : 
 atque ita abfcinditur infinitum, Verl lam. Ihtj. Org. Ibid. 
 De 4ifgm, Sciiiji, lib. v. cap. 5. 
 
 3 Jn£
 
 Sect, IX. of Memory. 263 
 
 ing fome relation which we know that it 
 bears to another, it is evident that its bearing 
 feveral different relations to that other, will 
 facilitate our recolledion of it. Any one of 
 thefe relations may conduct us to it ; and we 
 may light upon one of them when we have 
 miffed another. We often remember a dif- 
 courfe, when we have forgotten the fpeaker ; 
 if we retain but a few circumftances of the 
 time and place, thefe may lead us equally to 
 feveral perfons, among whom we cannot dif- 
 tinguiiOhi the real fpeaker : but if w^e retain a 
 great number of circumftances, as the tone 
 of voice and the manner in which it was told, 
 the number, fituation, and other circumftan- 
 ces of the company, fome or other of thefe 
 will lead us to afcertain the very fpeaker. 
 All the circumftances together will lead us to 
 recoiled: the idea which we want, both more 
 quickly and more ftrongly than one or a few 
 of them could have done ; they will draw it 
 into the mind with a fort of impetuofity, 
 which at once accelerates its motion, and ena- 
 bles it to ftrike us with greater force : for in 
 the exercife of memory, as well as in the 
 exertions of imagination, feveral relations 
 operating together, ad: with a compound 
 
 % 4 force.
 
 2,64 Of the Varieties Part 1L 
 
 force ip). At the fame time, the greater the 
 number of circumftances are, the ftronger is 
 the oonvidion attending our recolledion, and 
 the more abfolute the certainty of our being 
 -in the right. What has been faid concerning 
 recolledlion, is fully illuftrated by the follow- 
 ing example : 
 
 Sir Charles. Who was that other ? 
 
 LordMorelove. One of my Lord FoppingtciC?> 
 gang, the pert coxcomb that's juft come to 
 a fmall eftate, and a great periwig — he that 
 fmgs himfelf among the women — -What d ye 
 call him ? — he won't fpeak to a commoner 
 when a lord's in company. — You always fee 
 him with a cane dangling at his button, his 
 breaft open, no gloves, one eye tucked under 
 his hat, and a tooth-pick — Startups that's his 
 name(^). 
 
 Thus thofe connexions of ideas which caufe 
 them to fuccced one another of their own ac- 
 cord in a regular train, fubjed; this train, at 
 the fame time, to the power of the will in a 
 certain degree, and enable us to alter it, ia 
 inany inftances, at our pleafure. 
 
 (/) AiLc inflantlcc dabant banc alteram fpeciem ; ut mul- 
 tiiudo circumftantiaruni, five anfarum, juvet memoriam ; ve- 
 Juti Icriptio per partes nun conanuaus, Icftio live recitatio 
 voce aha. Ibid. 
 
 [a) Car clefs Hufiand, aft i. 
 
 The
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory, 265 
 
 The voluntary exertion of the memory in 
 recollection, is very analogous to the exercife 
 of Imagination in producing a work of genius; 
 for in this exercife, as well as in that exer- 
 tion, the will has always fome concern : it de- 
 termines the fubjed:, and it is continually em- 
 ployed in choohng the proper trails of thought. 
 If it were not employed in this, genius mufl: 
 go on like a mere machine, and a perfoa 
 fliould have no power over it after it were 
 once fet in motion. In what manner the will 
 mixes itfelf with the operations of the ima- 
 gination, and influences them, may be under- 
 llood from the account of recolledion, which 
 we have now given. Recolled;ion, and the 
 voluntary exercife of imagination, differ chiefly 
 in two things. Firfl, in the end propofed. 
 We properly recollect, when all that we 
 deflre, is to recal to memory fomething 
 which we have obferved : and in recalling 
 it, we are often aflifted by fancy ; for we may 
 be led to it, not only by its obferved con- 
 nexions v.ith other things, but alfo by any 
 relations to them, which imagination has be- 
 flowed. We voluntarily exert imagination, 
 when our intention Is, merely to gather toge- 
 ther fuch ideas as fuit our nrefent work ; and 
 in gathering them together, real connexion? 
 
 preferved
 
 ^66 Of the Varieties Part K. 
 
 preferved by memory, are often of great fer- 
 Yice to us. Secondly, when we properly re- 
 colle<51: ideas, they are no looner brought into 
 our view, than we have a convidtion that ei- 
 ther they themfelves, or the objedlsfrom which 
 they are derived, have been formerly perceived 
 by us ; and that convidlion is attended to by 
 the mind : when the ideas are brought into 
 view by the imagination, either we have no 
 fuch convidion, or we take no notice of it. 
 Thefe two, recolled:ion and the exerclfe of 
 imagination, are conjoined in producing every 
 work of genius, but not equally in works of 
 all kinds, nor in the genius of all perfons. 
 
 The obfervations which we have hitherto 
 made, regard the different operations in which 
 memory is exerted ; and they fhow the influ- 
 ence which thefe feveral operations have upon 
 genius. But there are likewife differences of 
 another fort incident to memory, fuch as affed: 
 all its operations, and produce varieties in its 
 form and power. All thefe differences may 
 be explained from the principles already laid 
 down, either from thofe which regard feparate 
 thoughts, or from thofe which regard their 
 connexions, or from both together. By con- 
 fidering the moft remarkable of thefe differ- 
 ences, thofe principles will be farther con- 
 firmed
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory, 267 
 
 firmed and illuftrated, and fome additional 
 obfervations concerning genius, will be fug- 
 gefted. 
 
 The memory of the fame perfon is not 
 equally perfect in all the periods of his life. 
 Memory is weak in very young children, 
 and in very old men ; but the weaknefs pro- 
 ceeds from diffimilar caufes. The former arc 
 not capable either of beftowing fo clofe atten- 
 tion upon things, or of comprehending them 
 fo perfedlly, as would be neceffary for their 
 making a ftrong or lafting impreflion on the 
 memory. In the latter, all the powers of per- 
 ception are become dull, nothing can flrike 
 them fo deeply as to infix itfelf in the me- 
 mory. That this is the real caufe of the de- 
 cay of memory by age, is evident from the 
 common remark, that old perfons forget what 
 happened yefterday, but remember difi:in6tly 
 what occurred many years ago : could re- 
 cent events afi^e^^ their deadened organs with 
 equal force, their remembrance of them would 
 be equally tenacious (r). In the former part 
 of youth, memory is very firm : many caufes 
 then concur to make all our perceptions ftrong, 
 and confequently durable ; the mind is not 
 
 [r) Ale, 01 T£ er^odfec v;oi x.acl oi yifcvricy ai-A,<iY,u,ov'; hcit peovtri ycift 
 
 pre-
 
 aGS Of the Vay'ieties Part II. 
 
 pre-occupieJ ; the fpirits are lively ; curiofity 
 is high ; every thing being new, ftrikes with 
 its full force ; admirrttion is eafily raifed, and 
 all the paflions ftrong, and fit for communi- 
 cating vigour to the perceptions which occa- 
 fion them. In the age of maturity, many of 
 thefe caufes of flrong remembrance ceafe : but 
 their place is in a confiderable degree fupplied 
 by others ; things are more perfectly undcr- 
 ftood ; the connexions of perceptions are more 
 fully perceived ; and memory is improved by 
 habit. It is in youth and maturity, that ge- 
 nius exerts itfelf with greateft power : in 
 childhood it has fcarce begun to dawn ; in old 
 age it fmks into a glimmering twilight. Were 
 it only on account of the affiftance from me- 
 mory of which it ftands in need, it muft be in 
 fome meafure fubjecl to thefe changes. But 
 this Is not the only or the principal caufe of 
 its being fubjed to them ; the powers on 
 which it has a more immediate and effential 
 dependence, are fubjc6t to the fame changes. 
 It is a general law of our nature, that all our 
 faculties rife gradually to their perfedion, and 
 gradually decline. 
 
 Memory admits much greater varieties 
 in different perfons, varieties both in degree 
 and in kind, 
 
 There
 
 S F. c T . IX. of Memory. 2 69 
 
 There arc chiefly four perfeftlons of Vv'hich 
 memory is capable. Thefe are rarely united 
 in the fame perfon ; and the prevalence of one 
 of them, or the manner and degree in which 
 they are united, produces very great diverfi- 
 tles in the memories of different perfons. 
 Some of the perfedions of memory arife from 
 the llrength with which feparate perceptions 
 are remembered, others from the ability of 
 remembering their connexions firmly. — It is 
 a perfedlion of memory to be fiifceptible, to 
 receive an impreffion quickly : it is likewife 
 a perfedion of memory to be tenacious [s). 
 Both thefe perfedions arife chiefly from a lit- 
 ncfs for remembering feparate perceptions : 
 but they do not always go together ; nay, 
 they who commit a thing quickly to memory, 
 generally forget it fooneft. This may fcem 
 to contradict the maxim, that perceptions ori- 
 ginally ftrong, are firmly remembered. But 
 it is perfedly coniiilent with it. Becaufe the 
 impreflion is made quickly, it does not follow- 
 that it is ftrong : a fufceptible memory, like a 
 foft body, receives fome impreflion at once, 
 and becaufe this impreffion is perceivable at 
 once, we are at no pains to deepen it, we al- 
 
 (^) Ejus duplex virtus, facile percipere, ei fideliter cor.ii- 
 TiCit, Qj_'iNT. Jnji, Ofcit, lib, i. cap, 4. 
 
 low
 
 ^70 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 low It to continue flight : when the memory 
 is, as it were, of a harder contexture, the im- 
 preflion is not made without continued labour, 
 it is deep before it can be at all taken notice 
 of, and therefore it is permanent (/). Some- 
 times thefe perfections are united : the me- 
 mory is of fuch a happy temperature as may 
 be compared to wax, which receives the feal 
 eafily and ftrongly when it is melted, and im- 
 mediately hardens and fufFers it not to be 
 effaced. Of thefe two perfections, the former 
 is in its nature and principles moft congenial 
 to genius ; but the latter is at leaft equally 
 fubfervient to its operations ; for no percep- 
 tion can be fuggefted by fancy or applied to 
 any purpofe, except it be remembered. — It is 
 a perfection of memory to be diflin5l^ to ex- 
 hibit things in their proper form and order : 
 it is alfo a perfection to be ready, to call to 
 mind eafily and quickly fuch ideas as we have 
 occafion for. DiftinCtnefs relates to fuch things 
 as are in our view together ; readinefs, to fuch 
 as make their appearance in fucceffion. They 
 are infeparable, and always take place almoft 
 in the fame degree. They arifc from the fame 
 
 (/) Etiam ilia prsvelox ierc cito effluit, et velut prsfenti 
 ofE^io fiinfla nihil in pofterum debeat, tanquam dimifla dif- 
 cedit. Nee eft mirum magis haerere animo, quae diudus affixa 
 fint. Quint, Inji, Orat, lib. xi. cap, 2, 
 
 principle.
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory. 271 
 
 principle, from a natural aptitude to retain the 
 relations of things. The memory cannot in- 
 deed be diftind, except the feveral feparate 
 perceptions be well retained ; the omiflion of 
 one part or member would deftroy the har- 
 mony of the whole : but diftindnefs arifes 
 immediately from a lively remembrance of 
 their connexions ; if this were wanting, all 
 the particulars would lie jumbled in confufion. 
 It is, in like manner, when the connexions of 
 things are ftrongly perceived, that fome of 
 them introduce others readily. If in fome 
 cafes there be diflindtnefs of remembrance 
 without readinefs of recolledtion, the defe<fl in 
 this latter virtue is owing to the weaknefs and 
 inactivity of imagination, failing to exert it- 
 felf at the proper time. In proportion to the 
 degree in which thefe perfe6i:ions of memory 
 are poffeffed, they mufl render the energies of 
 genius the more perfe<d, and likewife afFe<3: 
 the form of its productions, fo far as it emr 
 ploys in them materials borrowed from me- 
 mory. Confufion in a work may proceed 
 from indiftinCtnefs of remembrance, as well 
 as from irregularity of imagination : not only 
 feeblenefs of imagination, but alfo flownefs of 
 recoUedion, may render a work both labori- 
 ous and meagre. Belides thefs defeats, coa- 
 
 fufioa
 
 272 Of the Varieties Part IL 
 
 fufion and flownefs, which are diredly oppofed 
 to the excellences cf memory now under 
 coniideration, there is an imperfedlion which 
 bears a relation to both thefe excellences, 
 which feems to refemble them, but in truth 
 only mimics them ; I mean, the remembrance 
 of things merely by rote, when a perfon can 
 run over things exadly, in their obfervcd or- 
 der, and be certain of recollecting any part of 
 them by thus running over them, but can re- 
 member nothing, if he be put out of that 
 train. In this cafe, the feparate perceptions 
 are faintly impreffed upon the mind, their ex- 
 perienced connexions ftrongly ; and thefe are 
 the only connexions which influence it, the 
 relations conferred by imagination have none ; 
 the fubjed: likewife is not clearly underftood. 
 Thefe being the caufes of this peculiarity of 
 memory, it can feldom be found along with 
 genius, or indeed with a great degree of any 
 of the intelledual powers. 
 
 Memor Y admits likewife varieties in kind ; 
 and thefe varieties tend more diredly than 
 any hitherto mentioned, to divcrfify the form 
 of genius. 
 
 Many caufes were formerly pointed out, 
 
 •which may render perceptions ftrong and 
 
 ftrongly remembered. Any one of thefe caufes 
 
 I may
 
 Se t T . IX, of Memory, ^ 7 J 
 
 may render any perception or clafs of percep- 
 tions ftrongefl: and moil afFedting to a par- 
 ticular perfon : by fome or other of thefe 
 caufes, different perceptions will unavoidably 
 be rendered ftrongefl: to different perfons ; and 
 thefe will, by confequence, dwell moft in the 
 memory, and take the fafteft hold of It. The 
 objects of ftrong remembrance will thus be 
 neceffarily different in different men : and the 
 difference of thefe will occafion a correfpon- 
 dent difference in the exertions of genius, and 
 that with refpedt both to the perceptions from 
 which it fets out, and to thofe which It after- 
 wards collects. 
 
 First, the peculiar turn of memory will 
 affed: genius, by determining, in many in- 
 ftances, the perception from which it fets out, 
 in its inveftigations or itscompofitions. Ever^^ 
 invention, it was already (hown, takes its rife 
 from fome prefent perception, which fuggefts 
 the other ideas neceffary in the work. If 
 that prefent perception be not adually fab- 
 je<3:ed to the fenfes, it muft be a perception 
 exhibited by memory. Memory will moft 
 readily exhibit thofe perceptions which it re- 
 tains ftrongly ; for it is a never-failing effed: 
 of ftrong remembrance, to caufe a perception 
 occur often, and remain almoft conftantly in 
 
 T our
 
 274 Of the Varieties , Part II. 
 
 our view, fo that it cannot be baniflied with- 
 out difficulty, fometimcs not at all. But the 
 prefent perception, which is thus often fixt by 
 the peculiar caft of memory, determines ge- 
 nius to attach itfelf to fuch ideas as are con- 
 nedled with it, and to follow the read which 
 they point out ; and confequently it influences 
 the whole feries of the thoughts, and contri- 
 butes not a little to the peculiar form which 
 the work affumes. Several different percep- 
 tions being, by means of different principles9 
 ftrongly remembered by the fame perfon, will 
 fit him for exercifmg his genius on different 
 fubjedls : they will alfo lead him to works of 
 different kinds ; for in fome forts of percep- 
 tions one relation is more confpicuous and 
 apteft to lay hold of the imagination, and in 
 other forts another relation ; and our follow- 
 ing one or the other, will produce a work of 
 one fpecies, or of a different fpecies. The 
 perceptions ftrongly remembered being much 
 more various in different perfons, than they 
 can be in the fame perfon, will produce a pro- 
 portionably greater variety, both in the fub- 
 je(fts which they choofe for the exercife of ge- 
 nius, and in the fpecies of works in which 
 they engage. . 
 
 Secondly,
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory. 275 
 
 Secondly, the particular things which arc 
 ftrongly remembered by a perfon, will dirediy 
 influence the ideas introduced, as well as the 
 perception from which he fets out. Imagi- 
 nation can exhibit only fuch ideas as a perfon 
 has ; ideas which he has loft, whatever is for- 
 gotten, cannot poffibly be fuggefted, nor em- 
 ployed in any work of genius. By an inca- 
 pacity of retaining certain forts of ideas firmly, 
 a man may be neceflarily prevented from ufmg 
 materials which he once poirefled, however fit 
 they would have been for compleating or 
 adorning his work. The ideas to which his 
 memory is adapted, compofe the flock which 
 he can employ. Befules, of the ideas which 
 he retains, thofe which are retained moft 
 ftrongly, will recur ofteneft to his view^ and 
 Confequently will be moft familiar to him. On . 
 this account they will occur and be employed 
 by him, more readily than any others. Ideas 
 by being ftrongly remembered, force them- 
 felves frequently into our view, and engage 
 our attention, when there is no particular oc-. 
 cafion to introduce them : undoubtedly then, 
 when they are related to a fubjedt on which 
 we are exercifing our genius, they will be fug- 
 gefted more readily, than other ideas equally, 
 or even more nearly related to that fubjedt, 
 
 T 2 but
 
 2 7 S ^f the Varieties P A R T IL 
 
 but not fo flrongly fixt in our memory. Thus 
 the whole complexion of a work is neceflarily 
 tinged by the kind of thoughts which the 
 memory of the author is fitted to retain with 
 greateft ftrength and clearnefs : and hence 
 muft arife very great diverfity in the produc- 
 tions of different perfons, even on the fame 
 fubje£l ; diverfities proportioned to the num- 
 ber of ways in which the perceptions of me- 
 mory may be ftrong, either in themfelves, or 
 by communication from thofe with which 
 they are^connedled. 
 
 All the obferved connexions of things lay 
 hold of the memory in fome degree ; but they 
 do not all equally lay hold of the memory of 
 every man. One perfon's memory retains fome 
 connexions moft ftrongly ; another perfon's 
 retains chiefly quite different connexions. 
 One confequence of this is, that if two per- 
 fons give an account of any objed: which they 
 remember, their defcriptions of it will be con- 
 fiderably different. Were they to introduce 
 reprefentations of that objed into works of 
 genius, there would be a correfpondent diffi- 
 militude between thefe reprefentations. There 
 would be a difference likewife in the ufes to 
 which they were applied ; for by being put 
 into different attitudes, the fame objed is 
 
 adapted
 
 Sect. IX. of Memory, 277 
 
 adapted to different purpofes. Another con- 
 fequence is, that the memories of different 
 perfons are fuited to different fubjeds. Some 
 are efpecially ready in remembering reafon- 
 ings, and fuch phenomena and proceffes in 
 nature as are the proper fubjc£ts of reafoning ; 
 the connexions of things as caufes and effects, 
 make the flrongefl impreffion on their me- 
 mory. Some retain moft firmly the form and 
 ftru(3:ure of natural bodies, or defcriptions of 
 them ; their memory is chiefly affected by 
 the co-exiftence of the parts. Others retain 
 beft, trains of events, or relations of them in 
 hiftory ; vicinity, order, and that fpecies of 
 caufation by which events depend on one ano- 
 ther, are the connexions which fuit their me- 
 mory. Others are remarkable for eafily re- 
 membering poetry ; the relations of ideas 
 which prevail in it, lay faftefl hold on their 
 memory : many of thefe relations are origi- 
 nally beflowed upon the parts folely by ima- 
 gination ; but after they are beflowed, and the 
 work is read, they become obferved connex- 
 ions of the parts of that work, and are proper 
 objeds of memory. Thofe things which are 
 peculiarly fuitable to a perfon's memory, arc 
 generally thofe to which his underflanding and 
 his tafle are moft adapted. This fuggefts a 
 
 T 3 reafon
 
 078 Of the Varieties of Memory. Part II. 
 
 reafon why they are pecuharly fuitable to his 
 memory : they are the fubjeds to which he 
 can attend mojft eafily and moft clofely, into 
 which he can enter moft deeply, and from 
 which he receives the greateft plcafure ; they 
 cannot therefore fail to make a ftrong and lad- 
 ing impreffion on him. Their making fucli 
 ^n impreffion on him, will neceflarily have an 
 influence on the turn of his genius. Every 
 man will introduce into his works chiefly thofe 
 fubjeds which he remembers beft, if they can 
 at all fait his purpofe. Both the illuflrations 
 and the epifodes of one poet, relate almoft con- 
 ftantly to natural things ; thofe of another are 
 generally taken from hiilorv, or confift of nar- 
 ration ; a third abounds on every occafioii 
 with moral fentiments, or runs out into philo- 
 fophical fpeculations. The peculiar congruity 
 of different connexions to different memories, 
 contributes to produce variety of genius, in 
 the fame manner, though not in fo great a 
 degree, as the predominance of one affociat- 
 ing principle; for exertions of memory enter 
 into every work of genius, though only in 
 fubordination to the exertions of imagination. 
 
 SECT.
 
 [ 179 ] 
 
 SECT. X. 
 
 Of the Varieties of Jjidgment^ and their 
 Influence on Genius. 
 
 IF we recoiled, how conftantly judgment 
 attends imagination, and in how many- 
 ways it aflifts and. regulates it, in all the exer- 
 tions of genius, we cannot doubt that the 
 diverfities of which judgment is fufceptible, 
 will contribute greatly to the variety of ge- 
 nius obfervable among men. To inveftigate 
 the feveral powers of judgment, and to afcer- 
 tain the foundation of our feveral convidions 
 and reafonings, is a principal fubjed in all 
 treatifes concerning human underftanding ; 
 but it is our bufinefs to confider judgment 
 only fo far as its varieties affed the operations 
 of genius. 
 
 When in the analyfis of genius we diftin- 
 guifh judgment from fenfe, memory, and 
 imagination, we ufe the term in its moft ex- 
 tenfive fignification. Taken in this extent, 
 it is of two kinds, judgment of truth, and 
 judgment of beauty. To the former, the 
 name is moft commonly appropriated : the 
 latter is called tafle. 
 
 T 4 Truth
 
 ^8o 0/ the Varieties Part II, 
 
 Truth regards either real exlflence, or 
 the relations of general ideas : judgment is 
 exercifed about both ; and about each it is 
 exercifed in different ways, fometimes intui- 
 tively, at other times by reafoning, fometimes 
 producing certainty, and at other times only 
 probability. It includes all the intelletoal 
 faculties by which we diftinguilh truth from 
 falfehood, embrace and aflent to the one, and 
 difbelieve and rejed the other {a). Men dif^ 
 fer either in the degree in which they poffefs 
 the fame fpecies of judgment, or in the fpecies 
 of judgment which they are moft prone to 
 exercife, and exercife in greateft perfe(fJtion. 
 
 The faculties by which we perceive fuch 
 truths as regard the relations of general ideas, 
 are commonly known. 
 
 Self-evident truths are perceived by in- 
 iuitiouy which exerts itfelf in an infallible 
 convidllon that certain relations belong to the 
 ideas compared, and cannot but belong to 
 
 {a) The author was led, many years ago, by the office 
 which he then held, to enquire with fome care, into the 
 feveral modifications of judgment, the kinds of evidence 
 (porrefpondent to them, and the nature and degree of convic- 
 tion produced by them- New light lias been thrown on feveral 
 branches of this fubjeft, by Dr. Reid's ingenious Inquiry; 
 and the whole of it has been illuftrated with great perfpicuiiy 
 and elegance, in Dr. Beattie's EJay on Truth, Part I. The 
 prcfent defign admite the confideration of this fubje(^, only ia 
 poe very confined point of view? as connefted with the varir 
 fities of genius, 
 
 them;
 
 Sect. X. Of Judgment, 28 r 
 
 them; and this convidion arifes on the mere 
 comparifon of the ideas themfelves, without 
 any reafoning. In all the proper fubjeds of 
 intuition, we perceive the relation to be im- 
 plied in the very nature of the ideas, fo that it 
 muft appear the fame to every being, capable 
 of comparing them. 
 
 Such relations of ideas as are not felf-evi- 
 dent, can be perceived only by reafon. None 
 but the necejfary relations of ideas can be de- 
 duced by reafon, merely by comparifon of the 
 ideas themfelves ; at leafl thefe are the only 
 relations which can be in this way deduced 
 with fuch certainty as to make it worth while 
 to attempt deducing them. The reafoning 
 by which fuch relations are deduced, is called 
 demonftration. In order to our perceiving the 
 force of a demonftration, we muft perceive 
 the truth of all the fteps of which it confifts. 
 But it is not properly by an exertion of rea- 
 fon, that we perceive the truth of each fepa- 
 rate ftep. Often the convidion is intuitive ; 
 as when in the courfe of a demonftration we 
 aflume the equality of two fides of a triangle, 
 which are radii of the fame circle. Even 
 fuch propofitions as have been formerly de- 
 jnonftratcd, when they arc applied in a fub- 
 fequent demonftration, cannot in that cafe be 
 
 ftridly
 
 282 Of the Varieties Part IL 
 
 ftridly afcrlbed to reafon ; for though it was 
 reafoii that firft produced a convidlon of their 
 truth, it is memory that retains, and either 
 memory or imagination that prefents, the 
 convidion in the prefent cafe ; and generally 
 the convidion is prefented alone, without the 
 proofs to which it was originally bwing. In 
 order to our deducing a conclufion from a 
 feries of argumentation, it is necelTary that 
 ■we retain all the fteps of that feries ; if any of 
 them be forgotten, we cannot perceive the 
 evidence of the conclufion ; and it is by me- 
 mory that they are retained. In confequence 
 of all this, a conclufion is inferred from the 
 whole argument: the inferring of this con- 
 clufion, and the produdlon of a convidion 
 of its truth, are the only exertions of reafon, 
 as diftinguifhed from our other intelledual 
 powers. Reafon, lo far as it is employed in 
 demonftration, is that faculty by which we 
 draw inferences from the comparifon of our 
 ideas, or obtain a convidion that a relation 
 fubfifls between two ideas, by our having 
 found that thefe bear certain relations to other 
 ideas. This is an original faculty of the hu- 
 man mind. It is the more perfed, the more 
 cafily, the more quickly, and in the more in- 
 fianceswe can infer conclufions by the compa- 
 rifon
 
 Sect. X. of Judgment, 283 
 
 rifon of our ideas. It is pofTefled by different 
 men in very different degrees of perfedion. 
 Thefe doubtlefs are owing principally to an 
 original diverfity in the faculty of reafon it- 
 felf ; but as it is attended and aided in all its 
 exertions, by memory, and in fome of them 
 by imagination alfo, its varieties may arife in 
 part from the degree of thefe latter powers 
 which men poffefs, and from the particular 
 modification of them which prevails. If a 
 man's memory be remarkably turned for re- 
 taining the relations of ideas, and his imagi- 
 nation for fuggefting them, this will affift him 
 greatly in perceiving the connexion of the 
 feveral fleps of a demonf^ration, and in re^ 
 taining them all, and will thus make his rea- 
 fon appear the more acute. But if his memory 
 and fancy had been ill adapted to fuch fub- 
 jeds, he muft, even with the fame fliare of 
 reafon, have run a rifk of being perplexed in 
 purfuing a long train of argumentation. 
 
 The exiftcnce and the connexions of real 
 things, are the fubjeds of very many of our 
 judgments. The exertions of underflanding 
 employed about them, are different from 
 thofe which are employed about the relations 
 of ideas, and likewife admit great variety. 
 The exiftcnce of real things, and their con- 
 nexions.
 
 284 OJ the Varieties Part II. 
 
 nexions, areperceived intuitively; theyareinfer- 
 red by an immediate judgment of Nature; they 
 are deduced by a train of confequences j they 
 are believed on the teftimony of others : they 
 are known with certainty ; or they are aflented 
 to as probable in a greater or a lefs degree. 
 
 Every man is confcious of his own fenfa- 
 tions, ideas, thoughts, paflions, and the fe- 
 veral operations of his own mind ; and while 
 he is confcious of them, he is convinced of 
 their prefent exiftence. The judgment which 
 produces this convidion, is implied in the 
 very nature of confcioufnefs, and complicated 
 "with every ad of it. It is a judgment dif- 
 ferent in kind from our intuitive perception 
 of the agreement or difagreement of two ideas 
 which we compare ; but it is equally imme- 
 diate, equally unavoidable, and is even a pre- 
 requifite to that perception. 
 
 Every fenfation, every idea, which a mafi 
 has, every operation, every pafTion, of which 
 he is confcious, fuggefts the aotion of him- 
 felf, and enables him, without any exercife 
 of reafon, without any information from ex- 
 perience, by a natural and inexplicable prin- 
 ciple, to infer the exiftence of himfelf as the 
 percipient and agent. The inference is im- 
 mediate, and without any comparifon of 
 
 ideas \
 
 Sect. X. ofjudgment, 285 
 
 ideas ; it is likewife indubitable, the original 
 conftitution of our nature will not allow us to 
 call it in queftion. 
 
 Whenever we have a fenfation by means 
 of our bodily organs, we infer from it fome 
 quality in bodies, which is the caufe or occa- 
 fion of it. There is an inference : but it is 
 made without any reafoning or comparifon of 
 ideas ; we can perceive no neceffary connexion 
 between the fenfation and the quality inferred 
 from it : the inference is made previous to 
 experience : it is made by a judgment of na- 
 ture ; our belief of it arifes from an original 
 and inexplicable principle of the mind, which 
 determines us to it immediately and irrefif- 
 tibly. 
 
 We remember our fenfations, the qualities 
 of bodies which they fuggefted, the paffions 
 and the operations of our minds. The re- 
 membrance of them implies a convidion of 
 their paft exigence, which is, like thofe al- 
 ready mentioned, a judgment of nature, im- 
 mediate, unavoidable, and indubitable, to 
 which every man is determined by his confti* 
 tution, and of which no other account can 
 be given. 
 
 We can compare the fevcral obje£ts about 
 which the mind employs itfelf, whether they 
 
 be
 
 236 Of the Varieties Part IL 
 
 be its own operations, or the qualities of bo- 
 dies ; the comparilbn fuggefts a great variety 
 of connexions and relations belonging to 
 them; and about all thefe, judgment is exer- 
 cifed in many different ways. — It perceives 
 the rcfemhlaiice of fome things, and the diffi- 
 militude of others : it perceives both intui- 
 tively, and it perceives them on comparifon of 
 the things thcmfelvcs or of their ideas. Should 
 we mifs forming the judgment immediately, 
 we can never be brought to form it by argu- 
 ment; we can only be led to beftow greater 
 attention, that, by our becoming more per- 
 fectly acquainted with the objecfts, the intui- 
 tive faculty may exert itfelf to greater advan- 
 tage. When we compare fome things 
 
 together, we perceive their contrariety ; fome- 
 times we perceive it intuitively, and fome- 
 times experience of the things themfelves, or 
 of their caufes, or of their confequences, is 
 
 neceffary for our forming the judgment. 
 
 When things poffefs any quality in common, 
 judgment may be employed in deciding con- 
 cerning the degree of that quality : the judg- 
 ment is often intuitive; it may however be 
 aided by continued and repeated attention; 
 and it is fometimes produced by a mixture of 
 experiment and reafoning. When experi- 
 
 6 ments
 
 Sect.X. of Judgment, 287 
 
 merits are made for enlightening the judg- 
 ment, they tend to exhibit the qualities more 
 perfectly to the mind ; the reafoning that is 
 introduced, regards the caufes or the efFeds 
 of the qualities compared, or ferves for efta- 
 blifhing their connexion with fome pheno- 
 mena which caft up in the courfe of the 
 experiment, and from which their degrees 
 may be inferred. A thermometer is employed 
 for afcertaining the degrees of heat ; it fhows 
 immediately the degrees of expanfion in the 
 fluid ; and experience teaches us the conftaut 
 connexion between thefe degrees and the de- 
 grees of heat. Real things bear to one 
 
 another, certain proportions in their quantity 
 or their number : judgment is exercifed about 
 thefe ; fometimes it perceives them intui- 
 tively, and at other times it deduces them by 
 
 various kinds of reafoning When we 
 
 confider objects which have a continued ex- 
 iftence, we perceive their Identity^ or we 
 judge them to be different from, however 
 fimilar to thofe which we had obferved for- 
 merly. In this cafe, our judgment is fome- 
 times intuitive, on our comparing the prefent 
 object with our idea of that which we had be- 
 fore perceived ; and fometimes it is the refult of 
 reafoning. When it is intuitive, it is, geneirally 
 
 at
 
 ^88 Of the Varieties Part IL 
 
 at leaft, rather a judgment refolvable into 
 our conftitution, than a perception of necef- 
 fary agreement or difagreement : when it is 
 the refult of reafoning, the reafoning is found- 
 ed on our experience of the ordinary dura- 
 tion of the feveral kinds of things, of the 
 changes which they are capable of undergo- 
 ing, and of other circumftances relating to 
 
 themfelves and their caufes. Things have 
 
 different relations in tijne and place: judg- 
 naent cannot difcover thefe by a mere compa- 
 rifon of the things, but by experience and 
 
 obfervation. It is in the fame way, that 
 
 •we judge concerning the co-exiftence of qua- 
 lities : we can perceive intuitively that fome 
 qualities are inconfiftent or incapable of be- 
 in^^ co-exiftent ; in fome few cafes alfo, one 
 quality implies another, fo that their co-ex- 
 iftence is felf-evident, as figure and extenfion 
 are infeparable : but in moft cafes, even after 
 experience has fhown that certain qualities 
 are actually co-cxiftent, we can find out no 
 
 necefTary bond of union among them. 
 
 Th« jre is a principle in our conftitution, which 
 detcjrmines us irrefiftibly, without reafoning 
 or \ )roof, to judge that there is fome caufe of 
 eveiry new exiflence, and of every change 
 whi ch things undergo. We have a natural 
 
 I propenfity
 
 Sect. X* tfjiulgmenti 289 
 
 propenfity to conficler particular things as 
 caufes or efFeds, we pronounce them fuch, 
 not from any comparifon of their qualities, or 
 any perception of the fitnefs of the one to 
 produce the other, but from experience of 
 their conjundion. With refped: to objeds 
 which we have all our lives judged to Hand 
 in this relation, it is often the fubjed of intri- 
 cate and uncertain invefligation, what are the 
 qualities which fit them for bearing this rela- 
 tion to one another, and often we remain 
 altogether ignorant of this. 
 
 There is an original principle in our na- 
 ture, which determines us to judge. That the 
 future will refemble the paft, and inftances of 
 which we have had no experience, thofe of 
 which we have had experience* As God has 
 made the courfe of nature uniform and con- 
 ftant, fo he has formed us for placing implicic 
 confidence in its uniformity and conftancy, 
 for expeding the continuance of thofe con- 
 nexions of things, which we have hitherto 
 obferved. This principle is inexplicable ; the 
 judgment to v/hich it leads us, is immediate 
 and independent upon arguments. It is the 
 foundation of all our reafonings concerning 
 real things. Guided by it, we conclude, 
 what will be, from our experience of what 
 
 U has
 
 290 Of the Varieties Part IL 
 
 has been ; the particular judgments which ex- 
 perience has didated, we extend beyond the 
 inftances of which we have had experience, 
 and render general : we believe that thofe 
 qualities which we have obferved to be co- 
 exiftent, will in all fimilar inftances be co- 
 exiftent, that caufes will conftantly produce 
 fuch efFeds, and efFeds require fuch caufes 
 as they formerly have. It is to this original 
 principle in human nature, that we owe our 
 convidion in all our reafonings from expe^ 
 rience. But this principle, fimple and uni- 
 form in itfelf, admits great variety, and is 
 complicated with many exertions of the un- 
 derftanding, in its application to particular 
 fubjeds. It will therefore be proper to make 
 feme oblervations upon it. 
 
 Our experience of the paft and of what we 
 are acquainted with, is the ground on which 
 we form all our judgments concerning the 
 future, and what is unknown to us. Expe- 
 rience is the refult of a number of particular 
 obfervations. Attention to the feveral in- 
 ftances as they occurred, and diftind remem- 
 brance of them afterwards, are neceflary for 
 our acquiring experience ; and men's expe- 
 rience in the fame circumftances, will be 
 greater or lefs in proportion to their propen- 
 
 fity
 
 Sect. X. of "judgment, 2gt 
 
 flty to attend to what pafles before them, and 
 their ability to remember it.—- — In every in- 
 ftance, the circumftances which are of im-. 
 portance for forming experience, are found 
 in conjundicn with others which are of no 
 importance : there is a natural fagacity fit for 
 diftinguifliing thefe, which different men pof- 
 fefs in very different degrees ; s^nd in propor- 
 tion to the degree of it which a man poffeffes, 
 his experience will be more or lefs exadt and 
 preclfe. Experience is not merely the re- 
 membrance of a number of unconneded ob- 
 fervations : it is a judgment formed with 
 fagacity from them all together [h). It is 
 formed by means of a fort of abflra€ting 
 power, which feparates the neceffary circum- 
 ftances from the accidental : and the kind and 
 degree of convidion that attends it, corre- 
 fponds to the particular relation or connexion 
 of the things, on which our obfervation is 
 fixt. In fome cafes, there is little difficulty 
 in forming fuch a judgment with precifion ; 
 there are few accidental and unimportant cir- 
 cumftances joined with the neceffary and im- 
 
 {b) TlpuTOi cs rrti dmyfa^r,/; rpowof, o ^i« Tun ccia'Br,tTii>>ii , cctar^a.- 
 
 c<)io5»tf£»? "SJoX^ut (AtnyLczi yetuvroci, t&te (pa(Tl^ lyiiv if/.iueiolix.t' e^wsi^jiat 
 ydf ifi To tun «/xo£io«/» OT^iJjSo;. nAQYTAPX. 'sij) tut ap<r«. Tei"? 
 ^iAoo-e^. Sit, $. »t<p, i«. 
 
 U 2 portant
 
 292 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 portant ones. In other cafes, the unimportant 
 circumftances are ib many, and fo mud], 
 blended with the important, that it requires 
 fuperior acutenefs to feparate them : though 
 the particular inftances be perfectly remem- 
 bered, yet often no experience is derived 
 from them, or experience very inaccurate, 
 and unfit for being applied to any ufe. This 
 difficulty is the primary caufe of all the un- 
 certainty and all the intricacies which attend 
 our reafonings from experience, and of all 
 the errors into which we are apt to fall in 
 fuch reafonings. For want of a degree of 
 acutenefs fufficient to furmount the difficulty, 
 we form falfe judgments of the connexions of 
 things, in the very inftances which we have 
 had accefs to obferve : and if we attempt to 
 reafon from thefe inftances, the falfehood 
 cannot fail to be communicated to all the con- 
 clufions which we infer. 
 
 After we have collected experience, in 
 order to our reafoning from it, it is neceflary 
 that it be recollected and brought into our 
 view when we have occafion for it. This is 
 the work of imagination. The inftance con- 
 cerning which we want to draw a conclufion, 
 is aftbciated with the fimilar inftances of which 
 we have had experience, and fuggefts them. 
 
 Their
 
 Sect. X. of judgment, 293 
 
 Their being readily and perfedly fuggefted, 
 depends partly on the force of the memory 
 retaining them diftindly, and partly on the 
 vigour of the imagination, on the ftrength 
 and adivity of that aflbciating principle which 
 conneds them with the prefent inftance. 
 Often when we have had very extenfive ex- 
 perience, we are rendered incapable of draw- 
 ing a conclufion from it, by its not being 
 fuggefted at the time when it would be ufe- 
 ful. In all our experimental reafonings, 
 imagination mufl: be exerted ; and confe- 
 quently men's capacity for fuch reafonings, 
 muft in fome meafure depend on the degree 
 in which they poffefs that faculty (r). 
 
 When our paft experience is fuggefted, we 
 compare the thing of which we want to judge, 
 with that experience, that we may difcern 
 whether it correfponds to it or not. The 
 power of determining this juftly, is of the 
 lame kind with that fagacity which enables 
 
 {c) Perceptions of fight fuggelting ideas of tangible quali- 
 ties, have been confidered by feme philofophers as a judgment, 
 by others as an efFeft of afrociation. What has been juft now 
 faid, accounts for this difference, and fhows that both are 
 partly right. Both judgment and imagination are concerned. 
 There was a judgment originally formed of the connexion be- 
 r*veen the vifible and the tangible qualities ; but it is imagina- 
 tion that enables the perception of the former to fuggeft the 
 idea of the latter, and to fuggeft it fo quickly and eafily, that 
 icxh idea is confounded with that perception. 
 
 U 3 US
 
 294 Of the Varieties Part 11. 
 
 us to collect accurate experience : it is the 
 fame principle exerted in a different manner, 
 and in fomewhat different circumftances : and 
 on our having this power in perfedion, found- 
 nefs of judgment in all our reafonings from 
 experience, very much depends. Thofe men 
 who are defective in it, draw their conclufions 
 from inftances nowife fimilar; and therefore 
 their conclufions are erroneous or inaccurate. 
 
 When experience is colled:ed, fuggefted, 
 and applied to the inflance in queflion, a coji- 
 clufion is drawn wholly by means of that ori* 
 ginal principle already mentioned, which leads 
 us to exped: the continuance of things and 
 their connexions, according to our pafl ex- 
 perience. When our paft experience has been 
 both extenfive and uniform, and the prefent 
 inftance exadly correfponds to it, we draw 
 the conclufion with certainty : if any of thefe 
 three circumflances be wanting, if we have 
 had experience only in a few inftances, or if 
 there has been a contrariety in our experi- 
 ence, or if the inftances of which we have 
 had experience, do not exadly refemble the 
 prefent inftance, the conclufion is attended 
 only with probability^ and embraced with 
 different degrees of opinion proportioned to 
 the degrees of probability. The laft of thefe 
 
 cafe»
 
 Sect. X. of [judgment, 295 
 
 cafeS is difllnguiflied by the nanie oi analo- 
 gical reafoning. The varieties of aflent in all 
 of them, neceflarily refult from the nature of 
 that principle to which they are owing. 
 
 The feveral operations of the mind which 
 are thus united in reafoning from experience, 
 affift and promote one another. A propenfity 
 to obferve and attend to the feveral inftances 
 which occur to us, gives fagacity a great ad- 
 vantage for collecting general experience from 
 them; it fixes them alfo deeply in the me- 
 mory ; and renders it eafier for imagination 
 to {\xg<^t^ them when we have occafion for 
 them. A natural fagacity in gathering cor- 
 rect experience, promotes, in its turn, atten- 
 tion to the objects which fall under our obfer- 
 vation, and gives it fuch a diredion as makes 
 it rnoft ufeful, by rendering our ideas of the 
 experienced inftances determinate and diftind; 
 it likewife gives imagination the means of 
 introducing them. It was obferved already, 
 that a capacity of acquiring accurate experi- 
 ence, is abfolutely necefTary for our drawing 
 juft conclufions : it is proper to obferve on 
 the other hand, that the faculty employed in 
 drawing fuch conclufions, when improved by 
 exercife, gives great afliftance in acquiring 
 ferther experience. The conclufions them- 
 
 U 4 felvei
 
 2C)6 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 felves alfo which we have deduced from ex- 
 perience, are ufeful for cnabhng us to collect 
 'experience with greater eafe, and with greater 
 corre<5lnefs. Every jufl; conclufion with which 
 we become acquainted, throws new light on 
 the face of nature, gives us a more extenfive 
 view of its courfe and its laws, and enables 
 us to corre<^ fome error, to afcertain fome 
 ambiguity, or to define fome indiftindlnefs, 
 in our former obfervations even concerning 
 objedl:s w^hich are moft familiar to us. Our 
 ptiinary experience is derived from particular 
 inftances which have fallen under our obfer- 
 vation : from it we deduce conclufions, which 
 "we adopt and reft in : and the maxims im-- 
 plied in thefe conclufions, form a fort of 
 J'econdary experience, by which the primary 
 is extended, limited, or correded, and by 
 which fagacity is aided in forming nev;r expe- 
 riences with greater acutenefs, facility, and 
 afi^urance, This fecondary experience has 
 been in fome meafiire acquired, and the habit 
 formed of applying it to ufe, by every man, 
 Jong before he comes to the age of reflection, 
 or begins to attend to the operations of his 
 own mind. Even that principle which leads 
 vs to judge, that the future will refemble the 
 paft, and inftances of which we have not had 
 
 experience,
 
 Sect. X. Of 'Judgment, ii.)'j 
 
 experience, thofe of which we have, is 
 ftrcngthened and exerts itfelf with greater 
 aflurance, in confequence of our being accuf- 
 tomed to draw concluhons from experience. 
 By means of this, we often allow certain be- 
 lief to conclufions founded on experience of a 
 very few inftances, fometimes even on a 
 fmgle trial ; we take it for granted that every 
 fimilar trial will turn out in the fame way ; 
 for we have experience of the ftability of the 
 courfe of Nature, and this general experience 
 in fome meafure fupplies the place of expe- 
 rience in that particular cafe. 
 
 As there are thus feveral powers jointly 
 exerted in all our reafonings from experience, 
 it is only when all thefe powers exift in full 
 vigour, that the faculty of reafoning from 
 experience can be perfedl. The different de- 
 grees of thefe powers in different men, will 
 produce correfpondent degrees of judgment 
 in matters of experience. The different pro- 
 portions in which thefe powers are united, 
 will occafion varieties in the form which this 
 kind of judgment affumes, and in the fubje6ts 
 to which it is adapted. 
 
 Finally, there is in our nature, an ori- 
 ginal determination to give credit to the tef- 
 
 timony
 
 298 Of the Varieties P a R t TI. 
 
 timony of others [d]. Did this determination 
 exert itfelf without any reftraint, it would 
 lead us to bolieve whatever is faid by others. 
 It would exert itfelf without reftraint, if we 
 had never found ourfelves deceived by others. 
 But experience teaches us that others are of^ 
 ten deceived, and that they fometimes intend 
 to deceive, and, in confequence of this difco- 
 very, leads us to examine their teilimony 
 before we aifent to it. We confider the cha- 
 racters and the number of the witneffes, the 
 ends which they may ferve by deceiving us, 
 the motives which may urge them to attempt 
 it, their opportunities of knowing the truth ; 
 and we eftimate by thefe circumftances, the 
 degree of credibility which belongs to their 
 reports. We compare the fubjedt of their 
 teftimony with our own experience, and give 
 greater or lefs credit to it according to it? 
 probability. In all this, there is ample fcope 
 for the exercife of judgment. It is chiefly 
 the kind of judgment employed in reafoning 
 from experience, that is exercifed in eftimat- 
 ing the degree of affent due to a particular 
 teftimony : and it is by the conclufions and 
 
 {d) See Campbell's Diferiation on Miracles, part i. 
 fea. I, 2. where this fpecies of belief is explained with great 
 ingenuity. 
 
 -^ 5 maxims
 
 Sect. X. ef Judgment. 299 
 
 maxims which we have deduced from expe- 
 rience, that we reftrain and limit our afTent to 
 teftimony. On the other hand, the informa- 
 tion which we receive from the teftimony of 
 others, is added to our own obfervations, be- 
 comes a part of our experience, and extends 
 it, and is built upon as a foundation in our 
 experimental reafonings. 
 
 We judge of beauty, as well as of truth ; 
 the faculty by which we judge of it, is diftin- 
 guifhed by the name of tafte. It likewife is 
 fufceptible of great varieties, which contribute 
 to diverfify the forms and exertions of genius. 
 The influence of tafte does not, like that of 
 judgment, extend to all the kinds of genius ; 
 and therefore we have not hitherto been led 
 to a particular confideration of it : it is fufE- 
 cient to obferve in general, That it influences 
 genius in producing beauty, in the fame ways 
 in which judgment influences all the exertions 
 of genius. Indeed the effects formerly afcrib- 
 ed to judgment (^), proceed in a great mea- 
 fure from that fpecies of it which we call 
 tafte, in all fuch works of genius as are pro- 
 per objeds of tafte. 
 
 The varieties of tafte are either in degree 
 or in kind. In every inftance, it is a corn- 
 er) Part I. feft. 4. 
 
 pound
 
 Soo Of the Varietiet Part II. 
 
 pound of judgment properly fo called, and of 
 the internal fenfes {f). Both thefe may be 
 pofTefl'ed in very different degrees of ftrength ; 
 and every difference in the degree of either, 
 will produce a correfpondent difference in the 
 
 degree of tafte. The tafle of one man holds 
 
 chiefly of judgment, the tafte of another man, 
 chiefly of the internal fenfes. This will ren- 
 der their taftes different in kind. One fet of 
 qualities are the proper objedls of judgment, 
 another fet immediately affed and exercife 
 the internal fenfes : the one fet or the other 
 will be principally attended to and perceived 
 by a perfon, according as judgment or inter- 
 nal fenfe is the prevailing principle in his 
 
 tafte. Each of thefe principles alfo is fuf- 
 
 ceptible of great varieties. The varieties of 
 judgment have been juft now enumerated : 
 feveral of them enter into thofe exertions 
 which regard the objeds of tafte, fit men for 
 taking different views of thefe objedts, and 
 give tafte diffunilar turns. One judges beft 
 of the proportion of the parts, another of 
 utility ; each is moft pleafed with and fets the 
 higheft value upon that quality of which he 
 is the moft capable judge. The internal 
 fenfes are many, and are adapted to different 
 
 fubjeds,
 
 Sect. X. of Judgment, • .3-01 
 
 fubjeds, or to the different qualities of the 
 fame fubjed (g) : the predominance, there- 
 fore, of any one of thefe fenfes will give tafte 
 a correfpondent form. One man is fufcep- 
 tible of ftrong impreffions from grandeur and 
 fublimity ; another has a quick feeling of the 
 beautiful and elegant : one has a tafte for the 
 harmony of founds, another for the graceful- 
 uefs of forms. 
 
 The perfedion of tafte confifts xwfmjih'ility^ 
 refinement y corrednefsy and the jiifi proportion 
 of its principles (/j). In all thefe refpeds, the 
 taftes of dift'erent men dift*er extremely : we 
 find in individuals, all the intermediate de- 
 grees between an almoft total want of any of 
 thefe qualities, and the utmoft perfedian of 
 it. — A perfon maylikewife poflbfs one of thefe 
 perfedions, while he is defective in the reft: 
 or, without being remarkably defcdive in any 
 of them, he may be eminent in one. Hence 
 will fpring diflimilar kinds of tafte. 
 
 Of the kinds of judgment which have been 
 enumerated, fome belong in a nearly equal 
 degree to all men. Such is that intuitive 
 faculty by which we perceive the felf-evident 
 relations of general ideas : fuch are our na- 
 
 Kg) Ejr^y OH TaJ}e, Part I. 
 
 (Jj) Itid, Part 11, fea. 4, 5, 6, 7. 
 
 I tural
 
 30 J> Of the Varieties P A r t 11. 
 
 tural judgments concerning the exiftence of 
 our perceptions and of the qualities and be- 
 ings immediately fuggefted by them. Any 
 defeat in thefe fpecies of judgment, would 
 totally difqualify men for ordinary life. 
 Thefe admitting no variety, can produce no 
 diverfities of genius. Some philofophers 
 have not, indeed, allowed thefe their due 
 weight, and in confequence of that, have 
 attempted to eftablifh paradoxes, and intro- 
 duce fcepticifm inconfiftent with them. But 
 this has not proceeded from their being defti- 
 tute of thefe powers, or from their poflefTing 
 therri^ in a lefs degree than other men ; for 
 their behaviour in common life fliows that 
 they pay fufficient regard to them ; but it 
 has proceeded from their not refleding upon 
 them, and explaining them to themfelves, in 
 analyzing human nature. It is, therefore, 
 only an error in their theories, not a fign of 
 any imperfed:ion in their conftitution. 
 
 Other powers of judgment are pofTefTed 
 by different men in very different degrees ; 
 and fome who excel in one kind, are defec- 
 tive in another. They who have great 
 acutenefs in mathematical and demonftrative 
 reafoning, fometimes betray great weaknefs in 
 arguing from experience, and judging con- 
 cerning
 
 Sect.X. ofjudgmsnt, 303 
 
 cerning matters of fadl. On the other hand, 
 there have been inftances of perfons, who 
 could fcarce perceive the evidence of the ea- 
 fieft demonftration in Euclid's Elements, and 
 were incapable of apprehending mathematical 
 reafonings of length and intricacy ; but could 
 judge very prudently in common life, drav/ 
 cOnclufions from experience with great ex- 
 a^nefs, and underftand all the fciences which 
 confift of fuch conclufions. It is not furprif- 
 ing that it ihould be fo : for not only is that 
 feafon by which we perceive the relations of 
 general ideas, different from that judgment 
 to which we owe our conviction in matters of 
 experience; but alfo in theie two kinds of 
 reaibning, memory and imagination are ex- 
 erted about different fubjeds, to which dif- 
 ferent modifications of thefc powers are 
 adapted. Some have a talent in philofophical 
 reafonings, deducing the caufes and the ge- 
 neral laws of things from their phenomena, 
 or tracing the appearances which will refult 
 from any fuppofed caufes or laws, who never- 
 thelefs are ill qualified for unravelling hifto- 
 rical doubts, or tracing the motives and the 
 confequences of human actions. Others are 
 greAt mailers in reafoning concerning human 
 Ufa, who have no great abilities for reafon- 
 
 ings
 
 304 Of i he Varieties Part IL 
 
 ings concerning human nature, the fubject of 
 philofophical inveftigation moft nearly allied 
 to that. Though conclufions of tliefe dif- 
 ferent kinds, be fometimes deduced from the 
 very fame fads, yet for the dedudion of 
 them, thefe fads muft be fet in different 
 lights, different circumftances of them muft 
 be attended to, and a different fort of abftrac- 
 tion exercifed, as well as a different kind of 
 inftances faggeftcd by fancy for fupporting 
 the conclufion. It happens much more fre- 
 quently, that a perfon, along with great 
 powers of reafon, poffeffes but imperfed 
 tafte, or that a perfon of line tafte, is not 
 remarkable for vigour or depth of underftand- 
 ing. Every man will be prone to exercife 
 that kind of judgment in which he excels, 
 and to fludy the fubjeds which give fcope to 
 it ; and he will fhun fuch fubjeds as require a 
 kind of judgment in which he is deficient: 
 the former kind will be improved by habit, 
 the latter will be impaired by negled. Hence 
 the original differences of judgment will be 
 increafed. The kinds of judgment which 
 thus admit variety in themfclves, are they 
 that divcrfify the form and the exertions of 
 genius. In what manner they diverfify them, 
 will appear from the following obfcrvations. 
 
 Imagination
 
 Sect. X. of Judgment, ^0^ 
 
 Imagination cannot in any cafe perfedt 
 its difcoveries without the ailiftance of judg- 
 ment. Imagination colleds materials ; a cer- 
 tain kind and degree of judgment is neceflary 
 for applying them to ufe. If they are not 
 applicable to any purpofe which fuits a per- 
 fon*s turn of underftanding or tafte, or if he 
 has not a degree of thefe powers fufficient for 
 difcerning that purpofe and adapting the ma- 
 terials to it, they will be thrown afide as iife- 
 lefs, or at mofi: preferved in their indigefted 
 form. Since the revival of natural philofo- 
 phy, many have tried multitudes of experi- 
 ments, who wanting the judgment neceffary 
 ^for difcerning the refult of them, have not 
 been able to deduce any general conclufions 
 from them. There is a degree of imagina- 
 tion requifite for contriving experiments; 
 'there may be genius fhown in condudting and 
 varying them ; but it is genius only for na- 
 tural hiftory. Along with a turn of imagi- 
 nation fit for leading from one experiment to 
 another, there is a (Irong propenfity to atterrd 
 to the circumftances of particular fads : but 
 •there is a weaknefs in the abftrading power, 
 and a defed: in the other faculties employed 
 in reafonJng from fadts, which prevent the 
 mind's advancing to general dedu^ions of 
 
 X laws
 
 3c6 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 laws and caufes. In order to produce philo- 
 fophical genius, there muft be fuperadded, 
 acutenefs in difcerning the refult of experi- 
 ments, and comparing them together, an ap- 
 titude for recolle£ling obfervations as they be- 
 come neceflary, a propenfity to fearch for 
 caufes and connexions. A perfon poflefled 
 of this caft of mind, will draw conclufions 
 from the appearances obferved by others, 
 ■which they themfelves could never have 
 thought of : and yet this perfon has not per- 
 haps the turn of imagination, or the degree 
 of attention neceflary for making all the trials 
 which they made. Pofl^efled of genius for 
 natural y^zV?^^^, he may be rather defe<3:ive in 
 that kind of genius which ferves to promote 
 natural hi/lory. Boyle had an admirable turn 
 for making experiments, he made many w^ith 
 great accuracy on a variety of fubjetts ; he 
 made fome concerning the appearance of light 
 by the prifm, he obierved the oblong image 
 of rays refradted by means of it, he diftin- 
 guiflied that image into live diff'erent colours, 
 .and he made fome remarks upon this pheno- 
 menon (2) ; but he thought not of inferring 
 from it, the different degrees of refrangibility 
 in the rays of light. A different kind of 
 
 [i) Boyle Exper. et Confiderat, de Colerihus^ Par. III. Exp. 4. 
 
 judgment,
 
 Sect.X. of Judgment, .307 
 
 judgment, orafuperiordegree of the fame kind 
 of judgment, enabled Newton, from the fame 
 phenomenon, to form many conclufions on 
 this fubjea {k]. Ever fmce eledricity began 
 to attradl the attention of the curious, many 
 perfons have employed themfelves in making 
 experiments relating to it, and have difplayed 
 confiderable ingenuity in making them ; but 
 moft of thefe have not difcovered philofophi- 
 cal or fcientific ingenuity. It is to a very 
 few in the large catalogue of eledricians, that 
 philofophical genius can be afcribed ; for to 
 a very few is confined all that has been done 
 in accounting for the phenomena of electrical 
 experiments, and deducing important prin- 
 ciples from them. 
 
 When a perfon wants the kind or degree 
 of judgment neceffary for applying the mate- 
 rials which imagination has collected, to that 
 purpofe of invention to which they might be 
 iubfervient, his genius is repreffed, the dif- 
 appointment tends to prevent his indulging 
 himfelf in again amafling materials of the 
 fame fort, and to make him turn his fancy to 
 fuch works as, being more fuitable to the turn 
 of his judgment, he can profecute with fuc- 
 cefs. By this means, his genius will be, flill 
 more than it originally was, confirmed in that 
 
 (-f) Optics, Book I. 
 
 X 2 diredion
 
 3"eS Of the Varimes Pa r t II. 
 
 dlredion to which his powers of judgment 
 are beft adapted. There are not wanting in^ 
 fiances of' perfons who, finding their turn of 
 judgment and tafte imperfedly adapted to 
 that fpecies of exertion to which their imagi- 
 nation ha^d firft prompted them, have quitted 
 it for another fpfecies to which they fount! 
 thefe powers more adequate, and in which 
 'they could therefore become more corredt. 
 
 The fame materials may be applied to dif- 
 ferent purpofes. They will be applied by 
 ' every, perfon chiefly to that purpofe which his 
 judgment beft enables him to accomplifh. If 
 the imaginations of two men were fo fimilar 
 'as to colle<5l the very fame materials, or to 
 fuggeft the fame ideas ; yet if their turns of 
 judgment be diflimilar, they will apply thefe 
 to purpofes as diffimilar, and be unlike in the 
 ' particular form and in all the exertions of 
 their genius. 
 
 Judgment not only receives the materials 
 fcledted by imagination, and forms them for 
 ufe, but alfo excites imagination, and fets it 
 a- working. The decifions of judgment, as 
 well as our fenfations and ideas, are percep- 
 tions which may give an impulfe to imagina- 
 tion, and direft it into a particular track of 
 thinking. Men's decifions upon the mate- 
 rials
 
 Sect. X. ofJiLdgment. 309 
 
 rials before them, will be different, accordinij 
 to the fpecies of judgoient in which they ex- 
 cel ; and will give proportionably different 
 impulfes to the imagination, and make it to 
 move in proportionably different directions. 
 On this account, judgment muft have a flrong 
 tendency to diverfify the form of genius. 
 Genius takes very few fteps in any invefliga- 
 tion, in any train of fentiment and thinking, 
 or in forming any defign, without receiving 
 an impulfe from judgment : through its whole 
 progrefs, conclufions and determinations are 
 intermixed clofely and at very fhort intervals, 
 •with the fuggeftions of fancy ; and the con- 
 clufions and determinations thus intermixed, 
 will always be fuch chiefly as proceed from 
 that modification of judgment in which the- 
 perfon excells. A prevailing tafte for th^ 
 ludicrous, determined the genius of Peter di 
 Cofimo, though fit for producing greater 
 works,, to fuch fubjeds of painting as ad- 
 mitted only fatyrs, harpies, and the like 
 whimfical and monftrous figures It was the. 
 corredeft tafte for beauty, continually regu- 
 lating and inftigating a fine imagination, that 
 produced the purity of defign, the fweetnefs 
 of difpofition, the propriety and grace, by 
 which Raphael is charaderifed. A defed: in 
 
 X 3 that
 
 ^10 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 that tafte rendered Correggio in fome refpeds 
 incorredt and ungraceful, while a ftrong relifli 
 for the fublime, prompting and directing an 
 imagination well formed for producing it, 
 beflowed upon him a peculiar greatnefs of 
 manner (/). 
 
 If a man be defedive in the fpecles of 
 judgment requifite for any particular deter- 
 minations or conclufions, fo as not to form 
 them at all, or to form them wrong, when 
 they become neceflary, his fancy will be at 
 a ftand, his genius will be unable to carry 
 the work farther forward, or to improve it to 
 a higher degree of excellence. Did the judg- 
 ment of an artift enable him to perceive the 
 particulars in which he is faulty, his genius 
 would often be fufficient to corred them j 
 their remaining therefore in his works, fliows 
 that his judgment was not able to fcrutinize 
 them properly : Titian relinquifhed the dry 
 manner of his mafter, w'hich appeared in his 
 firft paintings, as foon as his judgment was 
 improved enough to perceive and to difapprove 
 it ; though Ludovico Carracci for fome time 
 fhowed little genius for painting, yet after 
 his judgment was improved by the diligent 
 Jludy of the works of great painters, it gave 
 
 (/) Fkeskoy's Judgment of Painters. 
 
 his
 
 Sect. X. of Judgment. 311 
 
 his fancy fo powerful an impulfe, that he be- 
 came excellent in defign, colouring, and 
 grace [m) : without that improvement of judg- 
 ment, the genius of thefe artifts mufl have 
 remained defective. In every part of natural 
 fcience, experiments have been made with 
 great accuracy, by fome who were not turned 
 for obferving all the circumftances of the ex- 
 periments ; thefe circumftances have been 
 minutely obferved by fome who, for want of 
 the power of abftracftion, could not determine 
 the refult of the experiments ; and fome who 
 were capable of determining this, have been 
 hindered from purfuing the conclufions to 
 which it might have led, not only for want 
 of imagination fufficient for carrying on the 
 inveftigation, but alfo for want of the fpecies 
 of judgment which muft have been employed 
 in it. 
 
 The fame materials may give occafion for 
 determinations and conclufions of different 
 forts : if a perfon poffefs only the kind of 
 judgment fit for forming one of thefe forts, 
 immediately on forming them, he will leave 
 the road purfued by another who, poflefllng 
 a different kind of judgment, had formed 
 diffimilar conclufions, he will go forward in 
 
 (w) Fresnoy, ibid. Graham's account of painter?. 
 
 X 4 apccu-
 
 ^12 Of the Varieties Part II, 
 
 a- peculiar track, and arrive at a very diftant 
 point. Nev/ton formed a judgment concern- 
 ing the unequal refradion of the rays of light, 
 6"om fome of the fimpleft prifmatical experi- 
 ments:: it vFas this judgment that fuggefted 
 to liim: the fubfequent experiments proper for 
 afcertaining that principle, and gradually 
 opened up the wonderful courfe of obferva- 
 tions and the noble train of difcoveries which 
 he made concerning light and colours ; and 
 in the profecution oFthefe, both the moft vi- 
 gorous power of abftradion, and the moll 
 piercing judgment of mathematical truth, 
 were continually exerted. Boyle was inferi- 
 iDur to Newton in the former of thefe powers, 
 and poflefTed no great degree of the latter ; 
 his turn of underftanding led him not to form 
 the fame conclufion from the moft obviou? 
 experiments ; by not having formed it, his 
 genius was at a ftand in deducing the laws of 
 refraction, he quitted the prifmatic experi- 
 ments without applying them to any ufe : but 
 he poflefTed judgment of another kind, and 
 by means of it, from a multitude of experi- 
 ments deduced conclufion s of a different na- 
 ture, concerning the immediate caufes of co- 
 lours in particular bodies^ and the methods of 
 producing them. 
 
 It
 
 Se c T. X. of Judgment, 3 1 3 
 
 It was already fliown, That regularity of 
 imagination is an eflential conftituent of ge- 
 nius ; tliat this regularity confifts in a capa- 
 city of keeping the end of a work fteadily in 
 •view, and a propenfity to fubordinate the 
 parts to that end ; and that, though it be pri- 
 marily founded in a particular turn of the 
 imagination, it is promoted by the exercife 
 of judgment, and could not, without this, 
 attain tolerable perfedion. It is judgment 
 that perceives when imagination deviates from 
 the paths which lead to the end propofed ; it 
 is owing to this perception, that imagination 
 is recalled from its wanderings, and made to 
 fet out anew in the right road ; and it is the 
 frequent exercife of judgment in this employ- 
 ment, that gives imagination an habitual re- 
 gularity and corred;nefs. This excellence of 
 imagination muft therefore have a great de- 
 pendence both on the degree and on the kind 
 of judgment which a perfon poflefTes, 
 
 The acuter any fpecles of judgment is, the 
 more readily, the more certainly, and the 
 more conftantly, it will obferve and check 
 every improper excurfion of fancy. Genius 
 will therefore, in every man, acquire a degree 
 pf correftnefs in fome meafure proportioned 
 tt) the exa«5lnefs of his judgment. 
 
 fURTHEF,
 
 314 Of the Varieties Part II. 
 
 Further, the means adapted to different 
 ends, are conneded with thefe ends by diffe-. 
 rent relations, and promote them in different 
 manners. According therefore to the variety 
 of the ends propofed, a different kind of judg- 
 ment is neceffary, for difcerning, whether 
 the materials colle(fied, have or have not a 
 tendency to promote them. On this account, 
 men's diverfity in point of judgment will give 
 their imaginations different forts of regula- 
 rity, and confequently mould their genius 
 into different forms. Hence a perfon who 
 thinks and compofes with great corredlnefs. 
 on one kind of fubjed:, often runs into great 
 wildnefs and irregularity on a different kind. 
 No tvv'o arts are more analogous than poetry 
 and eloquence ; but the poet aims chiefly at 
 pleafmg, and the orator at moving. The 
 poet may have a very nice difcernment of the 
 qualities which are fit to pleafe, and may 
 condudt a poem with the utmoft regularity ; 
 and yet may be incapable of producing a re- 
 gular oration : the qualities which tend to 
 move, are different in fome refpedls from thofe 
 which pleafe ; to move, objects mull be fet 
 in a different light, and defcribed in a diffe- 
 rent manner, from what pure poetry would 
 require ; to difcern their tendency to move, 
 
 a fort
 
 Sect. X. ofjiidg^nent, 31^ 
 
 a fort of judgment different from the poeti- 
 cal, is neceffary ; if the poet have not this 
 fort of judgment, he cannot fucceed in elo- 
 quence, the parts of his oration, though fe-" 
 parately beautiful, will be often improper and 
 mifplaced. Indeed a poet always runs a rifk 
 of becoming florid, defultory and incorrect, 
 in an oration ; he cannot efcape it, except he 
 poffefs judgment of another kind, as well as 
 that which pure poetry would demand. 
 
 In thefe feveral ways which have been 
 mentioned, in fitting men for applying their 
 ideas to different purpofes, in leading imagi- 
 nation into different tracks, and in beftowing 
 on it different kinds of regularity, judgment 
 is adtive in diverfifying the forms of genius. 
 But it may likewife be obferved. That, inde- 
 pendent of this influence of judgment upon 
 genius, there will always be a confiderable 
 analogy in the form of thefe two powers. In 
 all cafes, fome exertions of imagination are 
 intermixed with thofe of judgment. In ma- 
 thematical reafonings, truths felf-evident, or 
 already demonftrated, are feafonably fuggefted 
 by fancy ; in experimental reafonings, parti- 
 cular fad:s and conclulions from them, are in 
 like manner fuggefted ; in experimental rea- 
 fonings of different kinds, different forts of 
 
 facts
 
 31 6 Of the Varieties of Judgment. Part II, 
 
 fa£l& and conclufions are brought into view ; 
 in the fine arts, fancy is continually employed 
 in exhibiting to tafte, thofe qualities- concern- 
 ing which it pronounces. In confequence of 
 this, every man has an advantage for excel- 
 ling in that fpecies of judgment, which i& 
 moft congruous to the turn of his imagina- 
 tion : and on the other hand, his imagination 
 will take that turn which is moft fuitable to 
 the peculiarity of his judgment. Thus, by^ 
 the influence which thefe two powers mutu- 
 ally exert on one another, each of them is fa 
 moulded and altered, that their habitual form; 
 and charader becomes in a great meafure the 
 Came* 
 
 B A R 1^
 
 [ 517 1 
 
 PART iir. 
 
 Of the Kinds of Genius, 
 
 IT HER TO we have endeavoured to 
 inveftigate feparately the fources from 
 which the diverfities of genius fpring. kt 
 this inveftigation, it was neceffary to fearch 
 out the varieties incident to thofe powers 
 which are any ways concerned in the opera- 
 tions of genius ; for thefe varieties are the 
 fimple principles, by the combination of feveral 
 of which every diftin<St kind or form of genius 
 'is conftituted. We muft now purfue a dif- 
 ferent method. Every kind of genius de- 
 rives its denomination moft properly from the 
 nature of the obje(ft about which it is em- 
 ployed, or of the end to which it is adapted. 
 The diftindion, therefore, of the kinds of ge- 
 nius, may be moft commodioufly deduced 
 from the difference of their objects and ends : 
 and diftinguifhing them according to thefe, we 
 muft explain each, by combining the prin- 
 ciples already eftabliftied, and purfuing tiie^m 
 through their natural confequences. 
 
 SECT.
 
 3i8 Genius for Science, Part IIL 
 
 S E C T. I. 
 
 Genius tzuofold ; for Science^ or for the Arts, 
 
 THE ends to which Genius may be 
 adapted, are reducible to two ; the 
 difcovery of truths and the production of 
 beauty. The former belongs to the fciences^ 
 the latter to the arts. Genius is, then, the 
 power of invention, either in fcience or in the 
 arts, either of truth or of beauty. 
 
 There are great differences between one 
 fcience and another, and between one art and 
 another. On account of thefe differences, 
 each fcience and each art requires fomething 
 peculiar in the genius which is fuited to it. I 
 intend not, at prefent, to defcend to the invefti- 
 gation of thefe minuter peculiarities : it would 
 . be curious ; but it would be likewife intricate : 
 at any rate it is naturally pofterior to th-e illuf- 
 tratlon of the more general difllnctions of 
 . genius. 
 
 There is likewife a general analogy among 
 all the fciences, and among all the arts ; and 
 therefore we may exped: to find fome charac 
 ters common to fcientific genius in all the 
 forms which it affumes, and other characters, 
 diffimilar to thefe, common to all the kinds of 
 
 genius
 
 Sect. I. or for the Ar-ts, 319 
 
 genius which are exerted in the arts. Thefe 
 are the charad:ers which I (hall endeavour to 
 afcertain. 
 
 Some difference between genius for fcience, 
 and genius for the arts, arifes neceffarily from 
 the very diverfity of their ends. I begin with 
 this. Scientific genius addreffes its difcove- 
 ries to the underflanding ; their end is infor- 
 mation : genius for the arts addreffes its pro- 
 ductions to tafte, and aims at pleafmg by 
 them. It is a property of genius, that it keeps 
 the end of the work continually in view, and 
 by the view of it, modifies all the parts of the 
 work, and feleCIs the means which it employs 
 fo as they may be fubfervient to that end. 
 This contributes to diftinguifh thefe two kinds 
 of genius, and to render all their operations 
 and efforts very diffimilar : they confider all 
 their objeds in perfectly different lights. 
 
 Scientific genius leads a perfon to look 
 out only for fuch objecfts and ideas as imply 
 fome truth, or fuggeft fome new conclufion. 
 Affifted by the conftant perception of this end, 
 any relation is fufficient for introducing fuch 
 objedts and ideas; all the affociating princi- 
 ples are put upon the fearch for them; every 
 obje<St which thefe principles prefent, is ffed- 
 dily contemplated in that point of view in 
 5 which
 
 320 Genius for Science, Par Till. 
 
 ■which It contributes to this purpofe ; all the 
 circumftances of it which contribute to this 
 purpofe, are ftudioufly fought out and exa- 
 mined with care ; objeds and circumftances 
 of objciSts, which contribute nothing to it, ei- 
 ther are not at all fuggefted, or are inftantly 
 perceived to be ufelefs, and difmifled without 
 the fmalleft notice. Genius for the arts ren- 
 ders the perfon who poffeffeth it, equally in- 
 tent on pleafmg tafte by his work. In con- 
 fequence of its impulfe, objects and ideas fit 
 to gratify tafte, are very readily fuggefted to 
 him ; they are drawn into his view by their 
 relation to the defign, as well as by the rela- 
 tions which they bear to one another ; as foon 
 as they are fuggefted, they are moulded into 
 that form, and placed in that attitude, in 
 which they promote this defign, and they are 
 contemplated in that form and attitude alone : 
 fuch objects and fuch circumftances of objeds 
 as are unfit to pleafe, either do not at all occur 
 to the artift, or, being perceived at one glance 
 to be unfit, are immediately rejeded. 
 
 By this fixt aflbciation of fo difiimilar ends, 
 the two kinds of genius become very unlike 
 in all their exeriions. In every complex ob- 
 je(ft that can engage our attention, there are 
 two forts of qualities J there are fome which 
 
 give
 
 Sect. L or for the Arts, 321 
 
 give us pleafure or pain, and there are others 
 which convey perceptions of an indifferent 
 nature. Genius for the arts directs the at- 
 tention chiefly to the former fort, and it leads 
 to confider them only fo far as they either im- 
 mediately produce, or remotely contribute to 
 pleafure or pain. Qualities which appear In- 
 different to fenfe, gratify tafte in fome fitu- 
 ations : whenever they do, they attracSt the 
 notice and employ the powers of genius for 
 the arts. The mere perception of extenfion 
 is indifferent ; but the largenefs of Its quan- 
 tity produces grandeur, its terminations form 
 figures either beautiful or fignificant ; a juff 
 reprefentation of It often difplays flvill : in all 
 thefe cafes It Is a fource of pleafure, and en- 
 gages the notice and employs the abilities of 
 the poet and the painter. Both thofe quali- 
 ties of things which give pleafure or pain, 
 and thofe which give neither, enter into the 
 fciences and affect the genius adapted to them. 
 But the former are generally confidered ab- 
 Itradedly from the pleafure or pain which 
 they give ; and even when thefe are taken Into 
 the account, the philofopher proceeds as if he 
 were infenfible to them, makes them the fub- 
 je(ft of cool enquiry, examines what truLh 
 
 Y they
 
 32 2 Genius for Science, PartIIL 
 
 they indicate, analyzes the feelings, or traces 
 the caufes ?.^d cfFe^ls of them. 
 
 The philofopher defcribes minutely all the 
 appearances of his obje<ft : his defign requires 
 it J everyone of them involves fome truth; 
 inattention to any one of them may prevent 
 the dilcovery of truth, or occafion error ; thofe 
 of them which feem leall ftriking, often lead 
 moft diredly to truth, or lead to the moft im- 
 portant truths. A poet, on the contrary, 
 would overlook by far the greatefl part of 
 thefe appearances ; they are unfit to. pleafe, 
 and for that reafon attradt no fhare of his at- 
 tention : he fixes on a few that are mofl: firik- 
 ing, and labours to fet thefe in a ftriking light. 
 The obfervation of many minute circum- 
 ftances, and a variety of exadl menfurations, 
 were abfolutely neceifary for afcertaining the 
 laws of light and colours ; and Newton*s ge- 
 nius gave him a propenfity to attend to them : 
 thefe would make no figure in poetry ; and a 
 poet, though perfectly acquainted with them, 
 would never oncethinkof them while engaged 
 in compofition ; he would catch fome general 
 appearances, and be fatisfied with thele. 
 
 A GEM I us for fcience is iormtd hj pene- 
 
 tratiouy a genius for the arts, by brightnefs, 
 
 2 There
 
 S E c T . I. or for the Arts. 323 
 
 There are, perhaps, no general characters by 
 which thefe two kinds of genius can be more 
 properly difcriminated. Each of thefe cha- 
 racters is produced by certain pecuHar quali- 
 ties of thofe powers on which genius has a 
 dependence. In the one of them are combined 
 modifications of imagination, memory, and 
 judgment, different from thofe modifications 
 of the fame powers, v^'hich are combined in 
 the other : thefe powers likewife are combined 
 in different proportions. 
 
 SECT. It. 
 
 OJ the StniSlure oj Imagination^ %vhich di/iin-^ 
 giilfics the tvoQ kinds of Gen'nis, 
 
 OTH penetration and brightnefs imply 
 a great extent and compafs of imagi- 
 tiation, or great vigour of the aflbciating prin- 
 ciples; but they imply different forts of com- 
 pafs and vigour. Penetration implies fuch a 
 force of imagination as leads to the compre-*" 
 hcnfion and explication of a fubjeQ : bright-^ 
 nefs of imagination fits a man for adorning 
 a fubje(!l. A penetrating mind emits' the rays 
 by which truth is difcovcrcd : a bright fancy 
 fupplies the colours by whicli beaiity is pro- 
 duced. There are many peouliatities of imct- 
 
 Y 2 ginatiouj
 
 
 124 0/ the Stniclvre of Imagination Part IlL 
 
 2:lnation, which contribute to the formation 
 of thefe oppofite characters : by tracing out 
 thefe, our general defcription of the diftinc- 
 tion between genius for fcience and genius 
 for the arts, will be juftified, and a more par- 
 ticular view will be obtained of the difference 
 of thefe two kinds. 
 
 Acute NESS of judgment is eflential to pe- 
 netration, but cannot alone produce it. It 
 would produce corrednefs and readinefs in 
 ' deciding upon materials which were in our 
 view : but penetration implies, over and above 
 this, a capacity of bringing quickly and com- 
 pletely into view, whatever materials are ne- 
 ceffary for our prefent purpofe. This capa- 
 city can arife only from itiiagination. In ge- 
 neral, penetration requires that conlirudion 
 of imagination, which fits a man for fixing 
 his view fteddily on one thing, or on thofe 
 connected with it by clofe and important re- 
 lations, for attending to all the circumflances 
 belonging to that thing, and, as it were, ex- 
 haufling its qualities. This conflrudion of 
 imagination Is evidently adapted to the end 
 of fcience, the inveftlgation of truth. For 
 the conclufions of fcience lie deep, and muft 
 efcape the tranfient glance of the fuperficial 
 obferver : they occur by our attending to fuch 
 
 qualities
 
 Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius, 325* 
 
 qualities in things as are leafl: ftriking and 
 lead apt to force themfelves on our attention, 
 and by our pondering and contemplating in a 
 variety of lights, fuch qualities as cannot be ' 
 perfedly comprehended by a perfon who dwells 
 not on the fame objed for any length of time. 
 — Brightnefs of imagination is of an oppofite 
 nature : it is fuch a ftrength of imagination 
 as makes every prefent objedt fuggeil a mul- 
 titude of ideas, and hurries the mind quickly 
 from one thing, to others not very ftridly 
 conneded with it. This charader is no lefs 
 evidently accommodated to the purpofe of the 
 arts, than penetration to that of the fciences. 
 A quick fucceffion, or a copious exhibition of 
 different objeds fit to pleafe, is a great mean 
 of producing the beauty fought after in all the 
 arts. In poetry, for inftance, the intricacy of 
 the fable, that is, the variety and difTimilarity 
 of the incidents, and the diverfity, the num- 
 ber, and a proper remotenefs of the images, 
 are reckoned among the furefl: teds of real 
 genius. ^ 
 
 It would appear to be one confequence of 
 what has been faid, that penetration implies 
 an aptnefs to be affeded only by the clofefl: and 
 ftrongeft relations of things ; and that bright- 
 
 Y 3 nefs
 
 326 Of the Struclure of hnaginat'ion Part III. 
 
 nefs implies a propenfity to be influenced by 
 fuch relations as are {lighter and more re- 
 mote : for the latter propenhty tends to draw 
 off the mind to a gre^t diftance from its ob- 
 je£t ; but the former allows it to continue 
 nearer to it, and makes it eafier to recur quickly 
 to iht contemplation of it. The confequence 
 is juft ; and the confideration of it will farther 
 determine our idea of the difference between 
 a genius for fcience and a genius for the arts. 
 When ideas are fuggefted to men of thefe dif- 
 ferent kinds of genius, by means of the fame 
 relation, it will be found that, generally, the 
 ideas connedted with the prefent objeO: by the 
 ffronger degree of that relation, are fuggefted 
 to the philofopher, and thofe connected by the 
 weaker degree of it, to the artift. The former 
 fort are thofe about which the dedudions of 
 fcience are commonly employed ; the latter 
 fupply the decorations neceffary in the fine 
 arts. Any comparifon by which a philofopher 
 would illuftrate or confirm a theory, muft be 
 fuch as is exadly parallel ; it is enough for a 
 poetical comparifon, and even heightens its 
 beauty, that it agree with the fubjed to which 
 it is applied, only in fome of its circumftances, 
 When ji philofopher explains the caufes of 
 
 any
 
 Sect. II. in the Hvo Kinds of Genius. 3.27 
 
 any appearance, or traces out the effedls of 
 any principle, he proceeds regularly through 
 them all, according to the difrerent degrees of 
 their dependence : let a poet introduce the 
 fame fuhjed: ; he will defcribe, not all the 
 caufes or efTcds, but fome of them ; he will 
 often omit the neareft and moil dired:, and 
 take notice only of fuch as are more diftant 
 and indiredl ; he will not give a full delinea- 
 tion of any one caufe or effect, but mark each 
 by fome leading or Rriking circumftances. 
 Thefe differences in manner are natural con- 
 fequences of the difference in the principles 
 of aflbciation, now under confideration ; and 
 that they take place, miglit be Ihown by an 
 induQion of many particulars. The fubjedt 
 of Lucretius's poem is fcieatilical ; feveral of 
 the Epicurean theories which he deicribes poe- 
 tically, are philofophically deduced "in the 
 writings of the ancients : compare his account 
 of any part of the Epicurean fyftcm, with the 
 account of the fame part in Cicero's philofo- 
 phical works, for inftance, and the differences 
 juft now remarked will appear. If in any 
 inftances they do not appear, it will be found 
 either that the former is not there properly 
 poetical, or that the latter has dreffed up phi- 
 lofophy in a rhetorical garb approaching near 
 
 Y 4 to
 
 328 of the Stnicliire of Imagination Part III. 
 
 to the poetical (^7). Thomfon introduces feve- 
 ral parts of the Newtonian philofophy ; com- 
 pare his account of thefe with the fame parts 
 as delivered by fyftematic writers, and you will 
 find the fame differences. 
 
 {a) All thefe cafes may be exemplified in different paflages 
 of thefe two writers. They both give an account, for in- 
 flance, of Epicurus'?, dodrine concerning the motion of atoms. 
 Lucretius's account of their moving downward, is given in a 
 manner confiderably poetical, and in which we may remark 
 many of the peculiarities juft now mentioned, as charafterif- 
 tical of genius for the arts : 
 
 Nunc locus ell: (ut opinor) in his illud quoque rebus 
 
 Coniirmare tibi, nullam rem poffe fua vi 
 
 Corpoream furfum ferri, furfumque meare. 
 
 Ncc tibi dent in eo flammarum corpora fraudem : 
 
 Surfus enim vorfus gignuntur, ct augmina fumunt. 
 
 Kt furfam nitidse fruges, arbuftaque crefcunt : 
 
 Pondera, quantum in fe eft, quom deorfum cunfla ferantur : 
 
 Nee quom fubfiliunt ignes ad tefta domorum, 
 
 Et celeri flamma degullant tigns, trabeifque. 
 
 Sponte fuafacere id fine vi fubigente putandum eft. 
 
 Quod genus, e noftro quom milTus corpore fanguis 
 
 Emicat exfultans alte, fpargitque cruorem. 
 
 Nonne vides etiam, quanta vi tigna trabeifque 
 
 R.efpuat humor aqua; ? nam quam magi' merfimus altam 
 
 Direda, et magna vi multi prefnmas isgre : 
 
 Tam cupide furfum revomit magis, atque remittit : 
 
 Plus ut parte foras emergant, exfiliantque. 
 
 Nee tan-ien hasc, quantu'll in fe, dubitamus, opinor, 
 
 Qnin vacuum per inane deorfum cunfta ferantur. 
 
 Sic igitur debent fiamms quoque pofle per auras 
 
 Aeris expreflls furfum fuccedere, quanquam 
 
 Pondera, quantum in fe eft, deorfum deducere pugnent. 
 
 NoQurnafque faceis coeli fubiime voianteis 
 
 Nonne vides longos flammarum ducere traclus. 
 
 In quafcunque dedit'parteis natura meatum ? &c. 
 
 liib, ii. ver. 154, 
 
 Cicero gives an account of the fame do£lrine, in a manner 
 very onlike, in the fimple cool manner fuitable to iciehce : 
 
 But
 
 Sect. II. hi the Hvo Kinds of Genius. 329 
 
 But a propenfity to be afFe(5led with the 
 clofer or the {lighter degrees of relation, is not 
 alone fufficient to account for the difference 
 between brightnefs and penetration, or to ex- 
 plain how one genius is fit for fcience, and ano- 
 ther for the arts. It muft be obferved farther, 
 that the peculiar predominance of fome of the 
 aflbciating principles contributes to form pe- 
 netration, and the predominance of others of 
 them, to form brightnefs of imagination ; and 
 that in feveral ways. 
 
 There are fome of the relations of things 
 which lead the mind more quickly, and to a 
 
 *' Cenfet enlm, eadem ilia individua, et folida corpora ferre 
 fuo deorfum pondere ad lineam : hunc naturalem eiTe omnium 
 corporum motum." DeFin. lib. i. and in feveral other places. 
 *rhe poet's account of the declination of the atoms, has little 
 poetical in it ; 
 
 lUud in his quoque te rebus cognofcere avemus : 
 Corpora cum deorfum reftum per inane feruntur 
 Ponderibus propriis : incerto tempore firme, 
 Incertifque locis, fpatio fecedere paullum, 
 Tantum quod nomen mutatum dicere poffis. 
 Quod nifi declinare folerent, omnia deorfum, 
 imbris uti guttse, caderent per inane profundum : 
 Nee foret offcnfus natus, ncc plaga creata 
 Frincipiis. Ita nil unquam natura creaifet. 
 
 Jbid. ver. 216. 
 
 and in eonfequence of this, it differs very little from Cicero's 
 account of the fame tenet ; " Deinde ibidem homo acutus, 
 cum illud occurreret, fi omnia drorfum e regione ferrentur, 
 et, ut dixi, ad lineam, numquam fore, ut atomus altera alte- 
 ram poffet attingere : itaquc declinare dixit atomum 
 
 perpaullum : Ita effici complexiones, et copulationes, et; 
 
 adhsefiones atomorum inter fe : ex quo efficeretur mundus, 
 omnefque partes mundi, quasque in eo e/Dnt." Uid. Many 
 ^ther ^^amples migh: be produced. 
 
 greater
 
 33^ Of the Struclure of Imagination Part III, 
 
 greater diftance, from thefe things, than other 
 relations would lead it: the former will by 
 this very circumftance, according to what has 
 been already evinced, be mod favourable to 
 brightnefs, the latter to penetration. There 
 are fome qualities in every objeS:, which lay 
 a foundation for relations between it and 
 many other objecfts : thus the obvious fenfible 
 .qualities of bodies produce an infinity of re- 
 femblances or contrails to a multitude of other 
 things. A ftrong propenfity to attend to thefe 
 qualities, and to be affeded by the relations 
 correfpondent to them, will be highly condu- 
 cive to brightnefs of fancy ; it will produce 
 furprifing aflemblages, agreeable imagery, and 
 unexpeded ornaments. But it is unfavour- 
 able to penetration ; it produces afTociations 
 which mull lead the mind through many ob- 
 jects in a rapid fuccefTion, allowing it to take 
 but a fuperficial view of each. It will there- 
 fore contribute to penetration, at lead it will 
 remove one obflruction to the exercife of this 
 power, that the imagination be not readily or 
 ilrongly afFedcd by thofe (lighter relations 
 which the mofl obvious qualities form among 
 a great multitude of things unconneded in 
 other refpeds. Accordingly, I do not fay all, 
 but moll philofophers who were really in- 
 ventors,
 
 Sect. II. in the tzvo Kinds of Genius. 331 
 
 ventors, have fhown no great turn for adorn- 
 ing their writings with fuch images and com- 
 parifons as form the graces of poetry. There 
 are in all objeds, qualities llkewife of an op- 
 pofite kind, which do not form obvious con- 
 nexions between them and a multitude of 
 other objeds. Such are the mutual influence 
 of the qualities of the fame thing, the various 
 phenomena of thefe qualities, their caufes and 
 their confequences. Thefe, inftead of impel- 
 ling the mind to wander through a wide ex- 
 tent of things, rather confine it to one thing, 
 or to fuch as are intimately conneded with it 
 in fome important refpedt. A prevailing pro- 
 penfity, therefore, to attend chiefly to fuch 
 qualities, will not hurry the mind with rapi- 
 dity from one thing to others ; and will there- 
 fore be unfavourable to brightnefs : but it \n\\\ 
 leave it at leifure to dwell on its prefent ob- 
 jedt, and difpofe it, that it may find employ- 
 ment, to contemplate it in every light; and 
 will thus be conducive to penetration. 
 
 It is obfervable likevv^fe, that the qualities 
 laft mentioned form the moft important and 
 interefting relations among things ; thefe will, 
 therefore, influence the imagination and pro- 
 mote penetratipn, in much the fame manner 
 with the jftronger degrees of any one relation : 
 
 the
 
 335 Of the StniSl lire of Imagination Part III. 
 
 the relations which are formed by the others, 
 are much more trivial, and will affect the 
 fancy and produce brightnefs, in the fame 
 manner with the (lighter degrees of any rela- 
 tion. 
 
 The more important relations of things, 
 will alfo be tliofe which lead mod naturally 
 to the difcovery of truths concerning them ; 
 the more trivial relations are, on the other 
 hand, naturally adapted to amufement and 
 pleafure, which is the objed: of the arts. 
 This difference fuggefls an obfervation of con- 
 fiderable confequence for explaining the dif^ 
 tindion between the two kinds of genius now 
 under confideration. We fhall find on exa- 
 mination, that thofe relations which have 
 been already mentioned, as conducive to pe- 
 netration, by the predominance of their in- 
 fluence en the imagination, are the relations 
 chiefly concerned in the difcovery of truth. 
 Thefe relations are all reducible to the dif- 
 ferent modes of caufation and co-exiftence ; 
 and fome or other of the modes of thefe, are 
 the immediate fubje^ts of moft of the conclu- 
 fions in the feveral fciences. In the fcience 
 both of bodies and of the mind, the enquiry 
 i« principally about the caufes of phenomena, 
 their concomitants, the effeds proceeding 
 
 from
 
 Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius. 333 
 from caufes, and the confequences of general 
 laws. Many propofitions in mathematics 
 regard the properties which are co-exiftent in 
 figures and numbers, or which neceflarily re- 
 fult from their nature. Even when other 
 relations are the immediate objedts of fcien- 
 tifical conclufions, yet it is chiefly by means 
 of caufation and co-exiftence that they are 
 inferred. In mathematics, the proportions of 
 quantities and numbers are deduced as necef- 
 fary confequences from principles formerly 
 known. In hydroftatics, the fpecific gravi- 
 ties of bodies, which are properly degrees of 
 a common quality, are deduced from certain 
 effei^s of the weight of bodies. This being 
 the cafe, the predominance of thefe relations, 
 caufation and co-exiftence, as principles of 
 affociation in the fancy, cannot fail to pro- 
 duce penetration, and to fit genius peculiarly 
 for the fubje(^s of fcience. It direds the 
 mind into the very track where truth lies ; it 
 furnifhes it with the very inftruments by 
 which truth may be difcovered. — It is no lefs 
 true, that thofe which have been mentioned 
 as the more trivial relations, and by their 
 prevalence conducive to brightnefs, or fome 
 of them at leaft, are moft adapted to the ob- 
 jed and the end of the arts. The fine arts 
 
 are
 
 » 
 
 334 Of the Striicliire of Imagination Part IIL 
 
 are commonly called imitative : were they all 
 purely and totally fuch, there could be no 
 difficulty in pronouncing that rcfsmblance is 
 the relation which would lead fancy to con- 
 trive works of art. In painting, for inftance, 
 which is ftridlly imitative, the figures, the 
 attitudes, the expreffion, the colouring, are 
 but fo many means of rendering the pidture a 
 juft and ftriking reprefentationof theftandard, 
 whether actual or ideal, which the artift had 
 in view ; and the conception of this ftandard 
 fuggefts them all to the fancy by the afTociat- 
 ing principle of refemblance. But even in 
 cafes where the arts are leaft imitative, it will 
 appear on attention that this principle is pre- 
 dominant. A difcovery in fcience is fome- 
 times defcribed poetically : fuch a defcription! 
 will, perhaps more clearly and ftrikingly than 
 any other inftance, fliow how much poetry is 
 employed about refemblances, and confe- 
 quently how eifential it is to poetic genius, 
 that this be the predominant principle of alfo- 
 ciation. Thomfon thus defcribes Newton's 
 optical difcoveries ; 
 
 Even light itfelf, which every thing difplays. 
 Shone undifcover'd, till his brighter mind 
 Untwifted all the (hining robe of day ; 
 And, from the whitening undidinguifh'd blaze. 
 
 Col-
 
 Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius, 33 j 
 
 Colledling every ray into his kind. 
 To the charm'd eye educ'd the gorgeous train 
 Of parent-colours. Firft the flaming Red 
 Sprung vivid forth ; the tawny Orange next -, 
 And next delicious Yellow ; by whofe fide 
 Fell the kind beams of all-refrefhing Green. 
 Then the pure Blue, that fwells autumnal fkies. 
 Ethereal play'd ; and then, of fadder hue, 
 Emerg'd the deepened Indico, as when 
 The heavy-fkirted evening droops with frofl, 
 While the laft gleamings of rcfrafted light 
 Dy'd in the fainting Violet away (b). 
 
 All that is poetical in the defcrlption, is pro- 
 duced by the metaphors and comparifons, 
 (evidently fuggefted by the principle of re- 
 femblance) which are here introduced, and 
 implied in fuch expreffions as thefe, untivi/Ied 
 all the Jfmiing robe of day — the gorgeous train 
 of parent-colours — the flaming red — the taivny 
 orange — kind beams of green — bine that fiv ells 
 autumnal jldes^ ethereal play d — indico of fad- 
 der huCi as ivhen the heavy-Jkirted evenmg 
 droops luith frofl — dy''d in the fainting 'uiolet 
 aivay [c). 
 
 Whatever relation is the predominant 
 principle of aflbciation in a particular perfon, 
 
 {h) Poem to the memory of Sir I. Newton, ver, 96— 1 1 1 . 
 
 (f) The fame obfervation is applicable to his defcrlption of 
 the Rain-bow, immediately fubjoined, ver. 112-^-115. 
 
 that
 
 336 Of the Stniclure of Imagination PartIIL 
 that perfon is always dirpofed to fix his atten- 
 tion chiefly on thofe cjualitles in objeds which 
 lay a foundation for that relation ; and he is 
 difpofed to confider every quality in the light 
 in which it is fitteft for fuggcfting ideas by 
 means of that relation (<:/). This difpofition 
 is, perhaps, one caufe of the predominance 
 of a particular aflbciating principle : it cer- 
 tainly adds to the force of the predominant 
 principle, and affifls it in forming a correfpon- 
 dent turn of genius. The man, for inftance, 
 whofe imagination is under the influence of 
 caufation and co-exiftence, not only ftrongly 
 feels the force of thefe relations when they 
 are perceived, but is alfo prone to perceive 
 them, prone to confider every objed before 
 him, in that attitude in which it can mofi: 
 readily fuggefl its caufcs, its efredts, its con- 
 comitants, and the like. This will contri- 
 bute very much to render his genius pene- 
 trating ; both to dired it to the inveftigations 
 which belong to fcience, and to fit it to enter 
 deeply into them. He is continually bufy in 
 turning every object that comes in his way, 
 to fome ufe in the difcovery of truth. He 
 has the fame advantage for invention, that 
 the merchant who is intent on every oppor- 
 (</) See above, Part II. feft. 7. 
 
 tunlty
 
 Sect. il. in the iivo Kinds of Genius, 337 
 
 tunlty of gain, has for enriching himfelf. 
 Juft fo, if refertiblance be the predominant 
 principle of aflbciation, the niind, continually 
 in fearch of refemblances, \vill eagerly fet 
 every obje<5t in fuch a point of view that it 
 may fuggeft them ; and confequently it will 
 be fuccefsful in finding them out, and exhi- 
 biting them, as well as ftrongly afFeded by 
 them when they are found. The colours of 
 light refradlcd by the prifm, have been ob- 
 ferved by the poet, as well as by the philofo* 
 pher, but they are confidered by thefe in dif- 
 ferent points of view, lead them into very 
 different trains of thinking, and are applied 
 to very different purpofes. Pope applies them 
 as an image for illuflrating a refembllng fub- 
 jed, and is led away quickly from the contem- 
 plation of them to that fubjcd: ; 
 
 Falfe eloquence, like the prifmatic glafs. 
 Its gaudy colours fpreads on ev'ry place ; 
 The face of Nature we no more furvey. 
 All glares alike, without diflindlion gay : 
 But true expreffion, like th' unchanging fun. 
 Clears and improves whatever it Ihines upon. 
 It gilds all objefls, but it alters none {e). 
 
 The obfervation of them gave Newton*s mind 
 a very different impulfe : his attention was 
 
 (f) EfTay on Criucifm, ver. jii — 318. 
 
 Z fixt 
 
 }
 
 33^ Of the StruBurc of Imagination Part IIL 
 
 fixt upon thefe colours themfelves; he confi- 
 dered them as an efFecft which requires a fuit- 
 able caufe, and was led to contrive a curious 
 fet of experiments for afcertaining that caufe. 
 Some of thefe experiments exhibit phenome- 
 na which the poet might defcribe for their 
 own fakes, or the painter find an occafion to 
 rcprefent on canvafs : but Newton attended 
 only to thofe circumftances which indicated 
 fome of the laws of light and colours ; and 
 how flrongly he was impelled to attend to 
 thefe, any perfon may judge by recolleding 
 "what a prodigious number of appearances and 
 eircumftances, minute in themfelveSj and, 
 abftraded from the inveiligation in which he 
 was engaged, unimportant and uninterefting, 
 he took notice of, and delineated vdth fcru- 
 pulous exadlnefs, in his feveral experiments. 
 . I.^DEED, as we obferved formerly [f)., no 
 one principle of aiTociation is fufficient for 
 invention on any fubjed, alone, or without 
 the affiftance of other principles, ading m 
 fubordination to it. On this account, the 
 predominance of refemblance, or of caufation 
 and co-exiftcnce, appropriates genius ta the 
 arts or to the fciences, not merely by the ex- 
 ertion of thefe principles themfelves, but alfa 
 
 (/) Part II. fea. 7, 
 
 by
 
 Sect. II. in the tivo Kinds cf Genius. 339 
 
 by determining other affociatlng principles to 
 ad: in fubfervience to them, i here are two 
 ways in which one afibciating principle may 
 make others ad in fubfervience to it. 
 
 First, It may determine them to fuggefl 
 chiefly fuch ideas as are fuitable to it, and ap- 
 plicable to its purpofes. Very various ideas 
 are connedcd with any prefent objed: by the 
 fame relation; all thefe are in themfelves 
 equally fit to be fuggefled by that objed : but 
 if fome of them correfpond to the predomi- 
 nant principle of aflbciation, or to the defigii 
 which it leads a perfon to propofe and to keep 
 in view, thefe will be introduced in prefer- 
 ence to others which have no fuch correfpon- 
 dence. A double relation belongs to them, 
 and draws them into view by a double power. 
 The fubordinate principles exert themfelves 
 by their own force ; but the predominant one 
 gives their exertions a particular diredion ; 
 it likewife makes them, in that diredion, ad 
 with greater vigour than they would in any 
 other ; it, as it were, infufes its own fpirit into 
 them. In genius for the arts, refemblance, 
 the predominant principle of afiociation, 
 continually operates along wixh. all the other 
 principles, and, by uniting its force to theirs, 
 caufes them fuggefl only, and fugged quickly, 
 
 Z 2 fuch
 
 340 Oj the St run lire of Imagination Part Hf, 
 
 inch ideas as are conducive to the imitation or 
 reprefcntation which the artift has in view. 
 The attributes, quahties, and circumftances 
 of any fubjcd, are connected with it hy co- 
 cxiftencc, and arc naturally fuggeftcd to the 
 imagination by this relation : the predomi- 
 nance of rcfcmblancc as an aflbciating prin- 
 ciple in the poet or the painter, will make 
 thefe to be fuggefted, w^henever they are nc- 
 ccllary for marking diflin6l:ly the objedt which 
 he defciibcs or reprefents ; and it will make 
 thofc of them to occur moft readily W'hich are 
 propereft for this purpofe, even though they 
 be in ihemfelves remote. Nealces painting a 
 naval engagement between the Egyptians and 
 the Perfians, and wanting to intimate that it 
 had happened on the Nile, the waters of 
 which are of the fame colour with the fea, 
 contrived to accomplilli his aim, by drawing 
 an afs drinking on the banks, and a crocodile 
 endeavouring to furpriz.c him [g). In every 
 good pidlure, in every good poetical defcrip- 
 lion, we perceive the iniluence of co-exiftence 
 operating on the imagination, under the di- 
 
 (j) Slquidemcuni pralium navale ^ITgyptiiSrum et Perfarum 
 pinxilfet, quod in N'ilo, cujus aqua eil niari iimilis, factum 
 i.olcbaC intelligi ; argiimcnioqiie declaravir, quod arte non 
 poierat : aiellLini eniin in 11 tcic bil;eincn-i pinxit, et crocodi- 
 ium iur.uianiem ci. I^l.'n. Aa/, /////. lib. x.\xv. cap. lo. 
 
 redion
 
 Sect. II. in the tzvo Kinds -of Genius. 341 
 
 redlon of refemblance : whenever it does net 
 operate, precifion is wanting, nothing is ap- 
 propriated, every thing is common and inde- 
 terminate; whenever it is not direded by 
 refemblance, there are fuperfluous, ufelefs, or 
 ill-adapted circumftances. A defeat in the 
 former refped:, produces poverty of genius ; 
 a defed: in the latter refped, irregularity, ^ 
 Both defects are obfcrvable in fome works 
 even of the mofl ingenious artifts, and are 
 acknowledged to take fomething from their 
 merit, and to indicate a failure in the exer- 
 tion of genius. It has often been remarked 
 3,8 a blemifli in Pope's Windfor Forefl, and it 
 has fometimes been urged as a proof of his 
 not having much genius for dcfcriptive poe- 
 try, that he defcribes rural beauty in general, 
 rather than the peculiarities of that place ; 
 the apology made for him by his advocates, 
 that the place had at that time fcw^ peculiar 
 beauties, fuppofes the juftnefs of the prin- 
 ciple on which the remark proceeds, and, if 
 it be allowed, will imply that the fubjed: was 
 ill-chofen for a difplay of poetic genius ; and 
 will thus confirm the obfervation which we 
 have made. Cowley's poem On the ^cens 
 repairing Somcrfet-houfe^ is rather, a minute 
 ddincatiou of its fituation and the objects 
 
 Z 3 fur rounding
 
 34- Of the StruHure of Imagination Part III. 
 
 furrounding it, than a poetical defcrlption by 
 a proper feledion of its beauties. Every epi-. 
 thet which is as applicable to almofl: any other 
 fiibjed: as to that to which it is applied, every 
 defcription w^hich is vague and not charac-* 
 teriftical of its original, every chara6:er that 
 is not diftindly marked, is an inftance of 
 the former defect in genius. Every circum- 
 ftance in a defcription which counterad:s the 
 effed of the whole, or even which contributes 
 nothing to it, every incident not fufficiently 
 conneded with the main fubjed, is an inftance 
 of the latter. Either of thefe defedts, if it 
 be great and permanent, is acknowledged to 
 be inconfiftent wuth any confiderable degree of 
 real genius. — What has been faid concerning 
 co-exiftence, may be eafily applied to all the 
 other relations. For inftance, no perform- 
 ance in any of the arts, can be carried on 
 without the introdudion of caufes and of 
 effeds ; it is often by means of thefe that the 
 fubjcds are marked, and a diftin<^ refemblance 
 or reprefentation of them, produced. The 
 principle of refemblance, keeping the artift: 
 intent on the produdion of this, will render 
 caufation a(fiive in fuggefting ideas conducive 
 to it; we ftiall perceive in his work many 
 jlluftrations of things by their caufes or their 
 
 confequences,
 
 Sect. II. in the tivo Kinds of Genius. 343 
 
 confequences, which (how that the aflbciating 
 principle of caufation has been very active ; 
 and we fliall perceive the fitnefs of them all 
 for giving a precife and lively conception of 
 the object, which Ihows that its adivity was 
 influenced and direded by refemblance. In 
 confequence of both thefe circumftances, the 
 piece is both rich and corred. In the greatest 
 part of poetical dcfcriptions, one principal 
 means of conveying a ftriking defcription, 
 is the fuggeftion of caufes or effeds : in the 
 very firft defcription in Thomfon's Spring, 
 it is almofl the only means employed ; 
 
 And fee where furly Winter pafles off 
 
 Far to the north, and calls his ruffian blails : 
 
 His blafts obey, and quit the howling hill. 
 
 The fhattered foreft, and the ravag'd vale ; 
 
 While fofter gales fucceed, at whofe kind touch, 
 
 DifTolving fnows in livid torrents loft. 
 
 The mountains lift their green heads to the fky {h). 
 
 In like manner, the predominance of refem- 
 blance makes contrariety to fuggefl, not any 
 ideas which happen to bear that relation to 
 the prefent objed:, but fuch as form contrails 
 and oppofitions fit to render the conception 
 of it clearer and more ftriking. All the con- 
 trafts which are approved, in painting, in 
 
 , {b) Ver, II — 17. 
 
 Z 4 mufic.
 
 544 Of the Struffure of Imagination Part III, 
 
 mulic, or in poetry, arc fuch as contribute tQ 
 this purpofc. As it is thus eflential to genius 
 for the arts, that all the ajTociating principles 
 a^t in fubordination to reremblance, fo their 
 acfling in this fubordination, with vigour and 
 quicknefs, muft contribute greatly to bright- 
 nefs and richnefs of imagination : they are 
 like a multitude of fervants, bufied In provid- 
 ing abundance of all things for their prince. 
 The degree of perfedlon in genius, will al- 
 ways bp proportioned to the vigour of all the 
 aflbciating principles, and the ftridnefs of 
 their fubjedtion to the leading one. 
 
 After what has been faid, it will be eafy 
 to explain, how caufatlon and co-exiftence, 
 the one or the other of which is always the 
 predominant principle of affoclation in fcienr. 
 tific genius, determine all the other principles 
 to introduce fuch ideas as lead to the difcovery 
 of truth, and, by imparting vigour to them 
 while they ad: in this direction, enable then; 
 to introduce fuch ideas readily and in abun- 
 dance. It will be fufficlent to illuftrate this, 
 with refpedt to one principle of aflbciation. 
 In every fort of fcientific genius, refemblance 
 muft have confiderable influence on the ima- 
 gination ; in mathematics, fimilitude of ratios 
 is often a means of invention ; in philofophy, 
 
 one
 
 Sect, IL if^ the two Kinds of Genius. 345 
 
 one experiment fuggefts others which have a 
 Ijkenefs to it, and one conclulion leads to ano- 
 ther analogous conclufion. The prefent ob- 
 ject might fuggefl many others, by means of 
 their refemblance to it, which would contri- 
 bute nothing to a new difcovery : it is when 
 the predominant principle of aflbciation, ad- 
 ing powerfully on a perfon, fixes his atten- 
 tion on the reference of the prefent objed: to 
 the difcovery of a particular truth, and, ia 
 confequence of this, makes it fuggefl only 
 fuch, from among the fimilar objects, as have 
 the fame reference, that the principle of re- 
 femblance promotes penetration, and contri- 
 butes to the fertility of fcientific genius. Ex- 
 periments in electricity have gradually and 
 fucceffively fuggefted a great multitude of 
 other experiments on the fame fubjeCt ; all 
 thefe experiments have been frequently re- 
 peated by many perfons ; the feveral circum- 
 flances of them have been accurately obferved 
 and recorded ; and they have been furprif- 
 ingly varied : but very many of them ferve 
 only to diverfify the appearances, to aftonifh 
 or amufe, but lead not to any difcovery con- 
 cerning the nature, the caufe, or the Jaws of 
 eledrlcity. Some of thofe who have made 
 the moft experiments, deduced no general 
 
 conclufjons
 
 34^ Of the ^triiEliire of Imagination Part III, 
 
 concliifions from them, or were inaccurate 
 and erroneous in thofe which they attempted 
 to deduce : they poiTelTed, in a confiderable 
 degree of ftrength, the aflbciating principle 
 of refemblance, and thofe other affociating 
 principles which were neceifary for leading 
 them from one experiment to another, and 
 for enablino- them to contrive and conducSt 
 
 o 
 
 experiments, but they were defective in thofe 
 principles of affociation which mud be predo- 
 minant in order to form a genius for fcienti- 
 fical dedudiions, and without acting in fub- 
 ordination to which, thefe former cannot pro- 
 mote this purpofe. Others have deduced 
 fome general conclufions from fome of their 
 experiments, but have likewife made many 
 experiments which tend to no fuch conclu- 
 fions : in them the principles of aifociation 
 which muft take the lead in forming fcien- 
 tific genius, have had fome degree of force, 
 yet not force enough to render them uni- 
 formly and habitually predominant ; and in 
 confequence of this the other affociating prin- 
 ciples have adled in fubordination to them, 
 ^only in fome inflances, not conftantly or in 
 all their experiments. There is no eledrician 
 who has difplayed a greater fhare of real fci- 
 entific genius, than Franklin. His experi- 
 ments
 
 Sect. IL in the two Kinds of Genius. 347 
 
 ments are not fo numerous as thofe of many 
 others : this proceeds not from an inferiority 
 to any, in the fpecies of ingenuity requifite 
 for contriving and condudling experiments ; 
 on the contrary in all his experiments there is 
 a peculiar neatnefs, beauty, and variety ; but 
 it proceeds from his poffeffing the aflbciating 
 principle of caufation in very great vigour, 
 fo that it conftantly exerts itfelf, and makes 
 all the other aflbciating principles ad in per- 
 fect fubfervience to it. Accordingly there is 
 fcarce one of his experiments fuperfluous, 
 unmeaning, or indefinite ; they all contribute 
 ■ to eftablifh general conclufions, they are un- 
 dertaken with this view, and they are con- 
 ducted in the manner fitteft for accomplifhing 
 it. His experiments for inflance on the 
 Leyden phial, area regularly connected feries 
 fit for eftablifhing the difference between po- 
 fitive and negative eledricity, for afcertaining 
 the feveral circumftances of that difference, 
 for tracing out its feveral confequences, and 
 for fetting them in fuch lights as may render 
 them mod fubfervient both to the contrivance 
 of new experiments and to the deduction of 
 ntw conclufions. The effed of pointed 
 bodies in drawing off the eledrical fire, is 
 difcovered by a fet of experiments well con- 
 trived
 
 34B Of the Struclure of Imagination Part III. 
 
 trived for the purpofe ; and Is immediately 
 applied to new experiments proper for invef- 
 tigating the exadt fimilarity of eleO:ricity to 
 thunder and lightning, experiments con- 
 ducted with a fteady view to the eftablifhment 
 of this dodirine, and with the corredeft fub- 
 fervience to it : and that fimilarity is applied 
 to important pra<5tical purpofes, with a readi- 
 nefs and addrefs which fhows a mind intent 
 on invefligating effects and confequences, ac- 
 tuated by that afTociating principle which in- 
 ftigates to the inveftigation of them, putting 
 in motion all the other principles which lead 
 to the means of profecuting that inveftigation, 
 and making them operate with vigour in the 
 life of thefe means (z). 
 
 Secondly, As each of the afTociating prln» 
 ciples is fufceptible of various modifications (^), 
 the predominant principle may make the reft 
 adt in fubordination to itfclf, by difpofmg us 
 to be afFeded by thofe modifications of them, 
 which are mofl coincident with it, and fittefl 
 for promoting its defigns. This feems to be 
 one of the chief ways in which the predomi- 
 nant principle determines any other principle 
 
 (/■) Fadls amply fufficient H^r fupporting all the obfervations 
 made in this illuftration, will be found in Prikstlv's ////^cr;^ 
 of EkSiricity^ Parti. 
 
 (^) See Part II. fed. 6, 
 
 to 
 3
 
 Sec r-. II. in the two Kinds of Genius, 349 
 
 to fuggeft fome ideas in preference toothers ; 
 and therefore the taking notice of it, ferves 
 to explain farther the obfervations made un- 
 der the Lift head. When we confider how- 
 many and how diflimilar modifications every 
 alTociating principle admits, we muft be fea- 
 fible that the power of the predominant prin- 
 ciple to modify the others fuitably to its own 
 defigns, w^ill introduce great variety into their 
 sfFeds, and give birth to very different kinds 
 of genius. Refemblance, forinftance, which 
 is the leading inftrument of invention in the 
 arts, is often a fubordinate inftrument of in- 
 vention in fcience. But refemblance is of 
 very different kinds. The refemblances which 
 influence the poet or the painter, are for the 
 moft part fuch as belong to the fenfible qua- 
 lities or the general appearances of things, 
 fuch as are ftriking, and fach as the artift can 
 make to be eafily and ftrongly conceived by 
 others. Such refemblances are of little con- 
 fequence in the inveftigations of fcience, and 
 have little influence on the imagination of 
 the philofopher. It is his aim to difcover 
 caufes, laws, or effeds : intent on this, he 
 obferves, and is affe<0:ed by, fuch fimilitudes 
 as regard the manner of conducing experi- 
 ments, fuch as are indications of things pro- 
 ceeding
 
 350 Of the St ruSlure of Imagination Part III, 
 
 ceeding from the fame caufes with the prefect 
 objed:, or from fimilar caufes, of their being 
 produced in the fame manner, of their having 
 fimilar confequences, or of their bearing 
 fimilar relations to any object, and the like. 
 Such forts of refemblance are congruous to 
 the predominant principle of caufation ; they 
 are fubfervient to its operations ; they are the 
 forts which make one proportion, one expe- 
 riment, or one conclufion fuggeft others : 
 and that principle caufes thefe, rather than 
 other forts of refemblance, to a<fl vigoroufly 
 and pour in ideas upon the mind. One can 
 conceive m.any objc<3:s which the appearances 
 of light refradted by the prifm, would have 
 naturally fuggefted to a poet ; but they would 
 have all been fuch as bear fome refemblance 
 or analogy to thefe appearances themfeives. 
 The prifmatic experiments fuggefted to New- 
 ton other experiments or obfervations on 
 bubbles and plates of air, of glafs, and of 
 water, on fpeculums, on heated fteel, melted 
 metals, coloured powders, falts, vitriols, al- 
 lum, borax, nitre, camphire, diamonds, and 
 a great variety of other fubftances. None of 
 them would have come within the range of 
 poetical genius ; fome of them are too ex- 
 adly fimilar to ferve for images or compa- 
 
 rifons,
 
 Sect. II, in the tni'o K'nids of Genius. 351 
 
 rifons, others are too remote to be applicable, 
 in their obvious appearance, to the purpofe 
 of illuftration, others have nothing fit to ftrike 
 the fancy, or to promote the poet's views : 
 but they v^ere the very trials applicable to 
 Newton's defign ; and his predominant prin- 
 ciple of affociation, keeping that defign fix- 
 edly in his view, excited and gave vigour to 
 the forts of refemblance which could fugged 
 objeds fubfervient to it. In like manner, the 
 relation of caufe and efFe£l, which is a lead- 
 ing principle of affociation to the philofopher, 
 is very often employed by the artifl: as a fub- 
 ordinate principle ; and, by being in him 
 fubordinate, it is modified in particular ways : 
 he is influenced, not by every fpecies of it, 
 but by thofe fpecies which can enliven or de- 
 fine the reprefentation of an objed:. The 
 philofopher is affeded, for inflance, by the 
 clofer and more proper kinds of caufation ; 
 thefe alone are of ufe in his defigns : the poet 
 is mofl frequently affeded by the lefs proper 
 kinds, and the remoter degrees of this rela- 
 tion ; thefe are generally the fitteft for enter- 
 ing into flriking defcriptions. This will alfo 
 hold true of co-exiftence ; it is of little ufe to 
 the philofopher, and is little employed by 
 him, except in its ftridefl: forms ; it is ufed 
 
 5 ' by
 
 352 Of the StruSiure of Imagination Part lit. 
 
 by the artift in all its forms, chiefly in fuch 
 as are more loofe. Contrariety is employed 
 both in fclcnce and in the arts, as a fubordi- 
 nate principle of afTociation ; but different 
 kinds of it operate in thefe two fubje^fts, ac- 
 cording to their congruity to the predomi- 
 nant principle in each, and their fubfervience 
 to the refpeftive ends of each. The philofo- 
 pher is influenced chiefly by contrarieties in 
 the caufes and the effects of things ; a genius 
 for the arts, though not infenfible to thefe, 
 is alfo, and perhaps more, affected by oppo- 
 litions and contrails in the appearances of 
 things themfelves. 
 
 Thus in every kind of genius, the prin- 
 ciple of afTociation which is in that kind pre- 
 dominant, keeps the end in view, renders the 
 mind intent upon it, gives it a difpofition to 
 run into what can promote it, and to reje(£t 
 what is unferviceable for it : by means of all 
 this, that predominant principle gives all the 
 other principles a propenfity to fuggeft fucli 
 ideas, and to afTume fuch forms as are moft 
 coincident with it, and moft fubfervient to 
 the end of the work. In every kind of ge- 
 nius, all the affociating principles muft ope- 
 rate vigoroully : but the predominant prin- 
 ciple operates by its own inherent vigour, 
 
 like
 
 Sect. II. in the tnvo Kinds of Genius, %^i 
 
 like the fun which fhines with his own light ; 
 and the fubordinate principles may be com- 
 pared to the moon, which fliines with bor- 
 rowed light, and refleds it only on that fide 
 which is turned to the fun ; they have their 
 vigour imparted to them by the predominant 
 principle, and they a£t in a diredion fuitable 
 to it. It will confirm the juftnefs of this 
 diftindion, and farther illuftrate our fubjed, 
 to obferve. That the conRant operation of 
 the predominant principle along with the 
 fubordinate ones, is always clearly perceiv- 
 able, not only in the fubfervience which it 
 gives thefe to its defigns, but alfo in the fe- 
 parate effeds which it produces. Let one 
 experiment, for inftance, fuggeft a fimilar 
 one to a philofopher, he not only applies it 
 to the inveftigation in which he was profelT- 
 edly engaged ; but, if it fuggefl: any other 
 conclufions by means of any of its circum- 
 ftances, he readily takes notice of them alfo, 
 and thus fliows how much and how uninter- 
 ruptedly the relation of caufe and cffed influ- 
 ences his imagination. Innumerable inftances 
 of the imagination being in this manner- in- 
 fluenced, might be colleded from the works 
 of philofophers. To hint but at a very fev/ ; 
 Newton refted not in applying his optical 
 
 A a experiments
 
 554 Of the St ruclure of Imagination PartIIL 
 
 experiments to the difcovery of the proper* 
 ties of light and colours, which was his im- 
 mediate view in making them, but confidered 
 alfo how they might be applied to the expli- 
 cation of animal motion, attraction, and other 
 phenomena (/). Wheeler having found by 
 experiments, that bodies to which eledtricity 
 is communicated, repel one another, was led 
 by the circumftances of thefe experiments, to 
 obferve, that it fuggefts a reafon for a very 
 different phenomenon, for the diflblution of 
 bodies in menftrua, viz. that the particles of 
 the folvend, having imbibed particles of the 
 menftruum, fo as to be faturated with them, 
 the faturated particles become repulfive of 
 one another, feparate and fly to pieces [m). 
 Defaguliers was led in like manner to think 
 of transferring the refult of his eledrical ex- 
 periments, to account for the fixing of air by 
 llcams of fulphur, and for the afcent of va- 
 pours [n]. And later electricians have thought 
 of applying their experiments and conclu- 
 llcns to account, not only for thunder, light- 
 ning, and meteors, but alfo for water-fpouts, 
 hurricanes, and earthquakes (o). A poet 
 
 (/) optics, Qu. 24. 31, &c. 
 
 (w) V^xtsThY's HiJ}. of Eleciricitj, Part I. per. 4.- 
 
 («) Ibid. per. 6. 
 
 (0) Ibid. per. 10. kCt. 12* 
 
 fometimes
 
 Sect. II. in the two Kinds of Genius* ^^^ 
 
 fometimes introduces a feries of caufes and 
 efFeds ; but he always defcrlbes them In a 
 manner different from the philofopher : how- 
 much his imagination is under the power of 
 refemblance, appears from his illuftrating 
 every part of the defcription by epithets, 
 huages, metaphors, and comparifons. The 
 paffage already quoted from Thomfon, con- 
 cerning the prifmatic image, may ferve as an 
 ilhiftration of this. Many other examples 
 might be produced (/>). 
 
 (p) Many paflages in Lucretius, of which the fubjedl is 
 purely fcientihcal, are in this manner rendered beautifully 
 poetical. Whenever Virgil introduces a fubje(!'l of fcience, 
 the prevalence of a poetic genius is confpicuous through the 
 whole of it. The two following paflages are inltances of this. 
 
 Iccirco certis dimenfum partibus orbem 
 Per duodena regit mundi fol aureus allra. 
 Quinque tenent cceIuhi zouje : quarum unum corufco 
 Semper fole rubens, et torrida femper ab igni : 
 Quam circum extremae dextra l^evaque trahuntur, 
 Ca;rulea glacie concretae, atque imbribus atris. 
 Has inter, mediamque, du.'e mortalibus a;gris 
 MunereconcefliE divum : et via feda per ambas, 
 Obliquus qua fe fignorum verterct ordo. 
 Mundus ut ad Schythiam Riphseafque arduus arceis 
 Confurgit ; premitur Libyan devexus in Auflros. 
 Hie vertex nobis femper fublimis : at ilium 
 Subpedibus Styx atra videt, Manefque profundi : 
 Maximus heic flexu fmuofo elabitur anguis 
 Circum, perque duas in morem fliiminis Arftos: 
 Arftos, oceani metuenreis xquore tingi, 
 lllic, ut perhibent, aut intempclla filet nox 
 Semper, et obtenta denfantur no£te tenebrs: 
 Aut redit a nobis Aurora, dicmque i,;dacit: 
 
 A a 2 One
 
 35<^ Of the Stru5iurc of Imagination Part III. 
 
 One remarkable difference between the 
 two kinds of genius, remains yet to be men- 
 tioned. In fcientifical invefligations, the 
 imagination can receive no affiftance from the 
 paffions : few pafTions can mix with thefe in- 
 veftigations ; and if thefe few were allowed 
 to interfere, they would infed: our conclu- 
 fions, and obftrud: our difcoveries. Where 
 truth is the object, the paffions can produce 
 only prejudices fit to lead away from it. But 
 genius for the arts can never exift where the 
 paffions have not great power over the imagi- 
 nation, in affeding the train and aflbciation 
 of perceptions. An imagination eafily af- 
 feded by the paffions, is peculiar to genius 
 for the arts ; and it is eflential to it in all the 
 forms which it can affiime. There is fcarce 
 any of the fine arts which is not fufceptible 
 of the pathetic, and in which the pathetic is 
 
 Nofque ubi primus equis oriens afflavlt anhells, 
 lUic fera rubens accendit lumina Vefper. 
 
 Georgic. lib. i. v. 23 J, 
 
 Me vero primum dulces ante omnia Mufe 
 Quarum facra fero ingenti perculfus amore, 
 Accipiant ; ccelique vias, et fydera raonflrent : 
 Defeilus Solis varies, Lunaeque labores ; 
 Unde tremor terris : qua vi maria alta tumefcaDt 
 Obicibus ruptis ; rurfufque in fe ipfa refidant : 
 Quid tantum oceano properent fe tingere foles 
 Hyberni, vel quae tardis mora noftibus obllet. 
 
 Lib, ii. V. 475. 
 
 not
 
 Sect. II. in the tivo Kinds of Genius* 357 
 
 not a capital excellence. In painting, in 
 mufic, in poetry, in eloquence, it is often 
 nccefTary to exprefs the paflions and afFedions 
 of the foul : they can be exprefled only by 
 the perfon whofe fenfibility of heart enables 
 him to conceive the pafFion with vivacity, to 
 catch it as by infedlion, and whofe imagina- 
 tion immediately receives an impulfe from it, 
 and pours in the ideas of the proper charac- 
 ters of the feveral paflions, of thofe efFedls, 
 imitable in the particular art, by which each 
 paflion naturally fhows itfelf. Every artift 
 muft often excite the paflions : they are ex- 
 cited chiefly by being well exprefled : they 
 are excited alfo by ftrong reprefentations of 
 their objects and their caufes ; but it is the 
 fancy, excited by the lively conception of the 
 paflion, running into the fame thoughts 
 which the paflion, if really working, would 
 fuggeft, and placing the artift in the fituation 
 in which he would then be, that puts it in 
 his power to imagine, and confcquently to 
 reprefent, its caufes and its objeds in a way 
 proper for infufing it into others [q). 
 
 {q) Summa enim (quantum ego quidem fentio) circa mo- 
 
 vendos affeAus in hoc pofita ell, ut moveamur ipfi. Nee 
 
 incenditnifi ignis, nee madcfcimus nifi humore: nee res ulla 
 dat alteri colorem, quem ipfa non habet. Primum eft igitur, 
 ut — afficiamur antcquam afficere conemur. At quomodo fiet 
 
 A a 3 In
 
 35^ Hoiv the tnjoo Kinds ofGenms Part III. 
 
 In thefe feveral ways, brightnefs and pene- 
 tration, a genius for the arts and a genius for 
 the fciences, arife from a difference in the 
 turn and conftru6:ion of the imagination. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Hoiv the tivo Kinds of Genius differ in refpecl' 
 of the AJJiJlance zvhicb they derive front 
 Memory, 
 
 JOTH in genius for the arts, and in ge- 
 nius for fcience, imagination is afTifted 
 by memory, operating in fubordination to it, 
 and operating continually along with it. But: 
 it is not, in thefe two kinds, affifted equally, 
 by memory, nor affifled by the fame fpecies 
 of memory. 
 
 utafficiamur? Neque enim fiint motus in noftra poteflate. 
 Tentabo etiam de hoc dicere, Quas <pacT«o-ta? Giasci vocant, 
 nos fane vifiones appellemus : per quas imagines rerum ab^> 
 fentium ita repr^cfentantur animo, ut eas cernere oculis, ac pra;- 
 fentes habere videamur: has quifquis bene conceperit, is erit;, 
 in affedlibus potentiffimus. Hunc quidcm dicunt i^^avrjic-iiroi, 
 qui fibi res, voces, actus, fecundum verum optime finget:' 
 quod quidem nobis volentibus facile continget. — Infequetur 
 Evap^ta, quae a Cicerone illuRratio et evidentia nominatur ; 
 qu</non tarn dicere videtur, quam oftendere : et afFeftus non 
 aliter quam fi rebus ipfis interfimus, fequentur. Qoint. Inji, 
 Orat. lib. vi. cap. 3. Sed cum fint alii veri afFeclus, alii fifti 
 et imitati, — hi carent natura, ideoque in his primum eft bene 
 affici, et concipere imagines reruni, et tanquam veris moveri. 
 Hid. lib. xi. cap. 3. 
 
 In
 
 Sect. III. differ in refpecl of Metnory. 359 
 
 In fcientifical invention, memory is exerted 
 in a much greater degree, and its afliftance is 
 more indifpenfably necefiary than in the arts. 
 All the experiments, all the obfervations, all 
 the principles, employed In phllofophlcal in- 
 vefligationsj miift be fuch as have been actu- 
 ally obferved or afcertalned, and are exadly 
 remembered, elfe they can be of no ufe for 
 eflabllfhing a juft theory. Memory muft at- 
 teft the phenomena as really obferved, and the 
 principles as already verified, and produce a 
 full convidllon of their having been obferved 
 and verified, elfe the philofopher would never 
 think of applying them to the fupport of his 
 theory. Phenomena not experienced, but ima- 
 gined, could lead to none but chimerical con- 
 clufions. At one time electricians imagined 
 that they faw In their experiments the power 
 of electricity affedted by the colours of bodies, 
 and light bodies performing a regular motion 
 from weft to eaft round an elcCtrified ball [a] : 
 had thefe faCts been taken for granted, and 
 Gonclufions deduced from them, the conclu- 
 fions muft have been altoc-ether fanciful. 
 
 ^fc>' 
 
 Often indeed men can in fome degree Imagine 
 beforehand what will be the rcfult of an ex- 
 periment, or what the appearances which It 
 
 {a) pRiEc;i.y's Hijlory of Ehdricity, Part I. per. v. 
 
 A a 4 will
 
 360 How the two Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 will difclofe ; nay, cannot reflraln themfelvea 
 from conjectures concerning this. But it is 
 only intimate acquaintance with the fubjed!:,, 
 extenfive knowlcge of the laws of nature, ac- 
 curate remembrance of the appearances which 
 have attended analogous experiments, difcern- 
 ment of the variation of circumf^ances in the 
 experiment propofed, and judgment of the 
 probable confequences of that variation, that 
 can enable them to conjecture right. Some 
 of Bacon's anticipations, and many of New- 
 ton's conjedures in his queries, were juft, and 
 have been fmce eftablilhed by adual trial§. 
 But if, without thefe requifites, by the mere 
 force of imagination, a perfon venture to guefa 
 in this manner, he will almoft certainly guefs 
 wrong ; and, if he proceed to reafon from it, 
 will produce a fantaftical hypothefis. Scarce 
 any man can poITefs the requifites mentioned, 
 in fo great a degree, as to render it fafe for 
 him to build upon the fuppofed refult, with- 
 out firft bringing it to adtual trial, and making 
 himfelf certain of the fa.Ct. Even when ^ 
 man may naturally think that he has the belt 
 foundation for his conjedure, the refult may, 
 on trial, turn out not only different, but di- 
 reClly oppofite. When all the experimenta 
 at that time made feemed to fhow, that the 
 
 electrical
 
 S E G T . I II . differ in refpe5i of Memory, 361 
 
 eledlrical fire is contained In the glafs itfelf^^ 
 and when it was known that the earth or a 
 floor draws off this fire from a globe or tube 
 in which it has been excited, it was natural 
 to conjedure that the electrical power would 
 be ftrengthened by preventing its being thus 
 drawn off, by fiipporting the machine and the 
 operator on fome fiibftance which is not a con- 
 ductor of electricity ; the conjecture was 
 formed by feveral electricians, and was in the 
 higheft degree plaufible : but when they made; 
 the trial, the very reverfe of their expectation 
 happened, the power w^as very much weak- 
 ened ; and this unlooked for cfFeCt led fome 
 of them to corrcCt the fpecious error which 
 had occafioned their conjecture, to conclude 
 that the eleCtric fire Is only collected, not pro- 
 duced, in the glafs by friCtion, and to difcover 
 the twofold electricity, the pofitive and the 
 negative [h), FaCts imagined, or rafhly taken 
 for granted, have produced numberlefs errors 
 in fcience. All the faCts on which true fci- 
 ence can be built, niull be exhibited by me- 
 mory; the operation by which they are im- 
 mediately applied, is recollection. This re- 
 CoUeCtion is indeed under the influence of a 
 
 {I) Prikstly's W_fi, of Ekaddty, Parti, per. vll. and 
 per. viii. fedt. 3. 
 
 • • 
 
 piercing
 
 362 Hoiju the two Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 piercing imagination. Imagination excited by 
 a prefent perception, puts us upon fearching 
 for the proper experiments and obfervations ; 
 it is often by relations fit to afFed: itfelf alone, 
 that it gives us the firft hint of thefe, but me- 
 mory is the power which it fends, as it were, 
 in fear ch of them, and by means of which it 
 finds them. Imagination inlligates us to recol- 
 lection, and gives our recoiledion the proper 
 aim ; but it is by memory that this aim is ac- 
 complifhed. It is the only guide to truth, the 
 obje£i; and the end of fcience. 
 
 It is not fo in the arts. V/hen the painter 
 draws a figure or a landfcape, when the poet 
 conceives a defcription, a character, or an 
 event, it may be fuch as he has really ob- 
 ferved, and remembers, and may be only by 
 fancy drawn out of the repofitory of memory, 
 and applied in the proper place. But it is not 
 of importance whether it be or not ; its be- 
 ing attefted by memory, its being exactly like 
 to fomething obferved, are not the circum- 
 ftar.ces to which the artift principally attends : 
 though it has never httn obferved, it may be 
 produdiive of beauty, and' this is all that is re- 
 quired in the arts. Human invention is not 
 fo fertile, as to be able to diverfify its produc- 
 tions fufficiently, without ever employing 
 
 memory
 
 Se c T . III. differ in refpe^l of Memory, 363 
 
 memory to copy from the reality of things ; 
 and therefore this latter faculty is a neceflary 
 and ufeful auxiliary to fancy [c]. Many 
 figures and fcenes in the works of the molt 
 original painters, are fuch as they remem- 
 bered to have feen : many defcriptions, cha- 
 raders, and details, in the works of the mofb 
 inventive poets, are fuch as memory retained. 
 Even Michael Angelo is faid to have transfer- 
 red into his Lajl 'Judgment^ feveral entire 
 figures from the paintings of Luca Signorelli. 
 Giacomo da Porte took the ideas of moll of his 
 figures in very numerous and highly efleemed 
 hillory-paintings, from his own family and 
 acquaintance. Francifco Albani defigned his 
 Venufes and his Cupida by his own wife and 
 children. Moft of the fables of Shakefpear 
 himfelf, are fuch as he found already con- 
 trived. But when fancy has force enough to 
 produce fcenes, figures, characters, fables, or 
 beauties of any kind, without that aid from 
 memory, we are fo far from being difpleafed 
 with the want of it, that, on the contrary, pro- 
 
 (0 It is a juft obfervation of the ingenious and elegant au- 
 thor of A Critical Dijj'ertaticn on the Poems of OJjian, ',' Truth 
 ** makes an impreffion on the mind far beyond any fiiflion j 
 and no man, Jet his imagination be ever fo ftrong, relares 
 *' any events fo feelingly as^hofe in which he has been in- 
 *• terefted ; paints any fcene fo naturally as one which he has 
 •♦ feen ; or draws any charafters in fuch Itrong colours as thofe 
 ■ *' which he has perfonaliy known." 
 
 vided
 
 364 Hoiv the tzuo Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 vided memory and judgment have been con- 
 fulted fo far as to enable fancy to reprefent 
 things as they may have been, we regard genius 
 as the greater and the more original for not 
 Handing in need of farther aid. Deviations 
 from the reality of things, which would dif- 
 grace fcience, and be abfolutely inconfiftent 
 with its genuine end, contribute to perfedion 
 in the arts. 
 
 Oenius for fcience and genius for the arts, 
 are iikewife aiiifted, principally, by different 
 fpecies of memory. A capacity of ftrongly 
 remembering feparate objcds, is far from be- 
 ing unnecefTary in the inveftigations of fci- 
 ence : many of the phenomena v/hich Nature 
 exhibits, or which experiments difclofe, are 
 fimple objects ; and every phenomena muft 
 be attended to and retained, elfe the confe- 
 quence will be, either that no conclufion can 
 be formed, or that the conclufion muft be 
 wrong. But a turn for accurately remem- 
 bering the connexions of things is Iikewife 
 abfolutely neceiTary, and of capital import- 
 ance. To retain lively ideas of the feveral 
 feparate appearances, will contribute little 
 to promote fcience, except we alfo have ob- 
 ferved and remember the precife fituation in 
 which the appearances occurred, all the cir- 
 
 cumftances
 
 Sect. HI. differ in refpeB of Memory. 365 
 
 cumflances which attended them, what ap- 
 pearances preceded, what were confequent, 
 and what contemporary, how they came on^ 
 varied, and again went off. That fluids alcend 
 in exhaufted tubes, was always known ; but 
 no legitimate conclufion could be drawn from 
 this appearance, as long as it was taken for 
 granted that they would afcend to any height : 
 it was only when the exadl heights to which 
 they rife were obferved, that a difcovery was 
 made of the caufe of their afcent, the prefl'ure 
 of the air ; a difcovery which has led for- 
 ward to many others both curious and ufeful. 
 Phenomena imperfectly obferved, can produce 
 no juft conclufions ; and a confufed or im- 
 perfedl remembrance of phenomena, will ob- 
 ftru£t the juftnefs of the conclufions, as much, 
 and in the fame ways, as if fome of their ef- 
 fential circumftances had been wholly over- 
 looked. 
 
 In the arts, the memory of feparate objects 
 muft be very ftrong and lively : the artift muft 
 conceive them ftrikingly, that he may be able 
 to reprefent them ftrikingly. Memory of the 
 connexions of things is often of great utility : 
 but it is not always abfolutely ncceflary to re- 
 tain all their real connexions with precifion. 
 5 Even
 
 ^66 Hoiv the tijuo Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 Even in a profelTed imitation of a real object, 
 a full and minute exhibition of all its circum- 
 flances is not infifted upon ; a feledlion of 
 fuch as, according to the art by which the 
 imitation is made, will produce the greateft 
 beauty, is not only allowed, but approved. In 
 a portrait or a landfcape, likenefs to the ori- 
 ginal is indifpenfable ; yet in both it is ex- 
 pected that real genius will fet that original 
 in an advantageous light, heightening its ex- 
 cellences, and extenuating its defeds. What 
 has been obferved in one fituation, is often ac- 
 commodated by the artift to his own fubjedt ; 
 but he is at liberty to reprefent it independent 
 of the things in connexion with which it was 
 obferved, to transfef* it into a different fitua^ 
 tion, and to alter many of its circumftances ; 
 nay, if he take not this liberty, he will be 
 blamed as too fervile and painful a copier of 
 Nature, and accufed of poverty of invention. 
 Though the artiil's remembrance of real 
 things be accurate, fancy muft not borrow the 
 whole, but fnatch what fuits its purpofe, and 
 make it its own. A fpecies of memory more 
 accurate than it is allowed to make ufe of in 
 the arts, cannot be reckoned neceflary to ge- 
 nius for the arts : on the contrary, it might 
 
 hurt
 
 & E c T . III. differ in refpeB of Memory, 367 
 
 hurt this genius, by leading into minute de- 
 tails, and too circumftantial deferiptions or de- 
 lineations. 
 
 The natural appearances which are ufeful 
 in productions in the arts, muft always be 
 fuch as are in fome refped: ftriking. To ren- 
 der memory, therefore, fubfervient to genius 
 for the arts, it is fufficient that it be fit for re- 
 taining ideas of fuch appearances as have made 
 a ftrong impreflion on the fenfes, as have 
 forced attention, as have pleafed tafte, as have 
 excited fome paffion or emotion, as have 
 feemed peculiar and diftinguifhing. It is in 
 a perfon whofe perceptions are readily ren- 
 dered ftrong and durable by thefe circum- 
 ftances, that memory will be qualified for depo- 
 fiting materials fit for being employed in the 
 arts. But the appearances which are of im- 
 portance in fcientific invefligations are of a 
 different fort, generally noways ftriking in 
 themfelves, often apparently inconfiderable. 
 The perceptions of them being thus weaker 
 than thofe of the other fort, a greater natural 
 ftrength of memory is necefl^ary for retaining 
 them. The memory muft likewife be turned 
 for deriving ftrength from fuch circumftances 
 as fuit the nature of thefe appearances. The 
 mind muft be prone to clofe and continued 
 
 attentioiij,
 
 3 68 Honv the two Kinds of Genius Part lit* 
 
 attention, that this may infix in the memory 
 perceptions too weak for laying hold of it by 
 their own power. It muft: be prone to fup- 
 pofe importance in appearances feemingly 
 trifling and unpromifing ; to look forward to 
 their tendency and confeqiiences with a high 
 curiofity and eager pre-expedation, that, if 
 they turn out in the manner that was looked 
 for, the gratification of that principle may im- 
 prefs them indelibly on the mind, or, if they 
 turn out otherwife, that principle may be 
 again excited, which will imprefs them no 
 lefs indelibly. It is when circumftances of 
 this kind have the principal influence on ren- 
 dering remembrance ftrong, that memory is 
 fit for giving afliflance in fcientifical difco- 
 veries. In the writings of every perfon who 
 has been remarkable for fuch difcoveries, we 
 perceive plain evidences how much power 
 thefe circumftances had over his mind. 
 
 The connexions of things which muft be 
 reprefented in the arts, are not the fame with 
 thofe connexions which muft be obferved in 
 the fciences. The artift is concerned chiefly 
 with the refemblances of things, and thefe of 
 the more fenfible and ftriking kinds ; and, ia 
 fubordination to thefe, with their obvious con- 
 trafts, their peculiar and difcriminating cir- 
 cumftances,
 
 Sect. III. differ in refpeB of Memory . 3 ^9 
 
 cumftances, and their more fignal caufes and 
 effects : the philofopher is concerned with 
 their caufes^ effeds, and laws ; and, as con- 
 ducive to the difcovery of thefe, with their 
 precife qualities and adjunds, their more hid- 
 den fimilitudes and analogies, and their more 
 fecret differences and contrarieties. Memory 
 is adapted to genius for the one, or genius for 
 the other, according as it is turned mofl for 
 being aifedted with the former fort of con- 
 nexions, or with the latter. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Hoiv the tivo Kinds of Genius differ in refpeSl 
 of the AJJi/lance '^juhich they derive front 
 fiidgment. 
 
 sY imagination, with all the afTiftance 
 which it can receive from the heft 
 adapted memory, neither brightnefs nor pene- 
 tration is completed. But in this refpedl 
 there is a confidcrable difference betv/een them. 
 Some degree of brightnefs may arife merely 
 from the imagination ; but no degree of pene-^ 
 tration can ; the lowell: degree of this cannot 
 poffibly exift without acutenefs of judgment* 
 Accordingly, though we may with great pro- 
 priety fpeak of brightnefs of fancy, it would 
 
 B b be
 
 370 Hozu the Hvo Kinds of Genius Part 111. 
 
 be abfolutely improper to ufe any expreffions 
 which implied our afcribing penetration to 
 this faculty alone. 
 
 That judgment affifls genius of every 
 kind, in fuggefling fuch ideas as fuit the pur- 
 pofe, was formerly fhown. In the fciences, 
 in producing the materials lit for the invefti- 
 gation of truth, this affiftance is indifpenfably 
 neceflary. The decifions of judgment con- 
 cerning objedls or ideas already produced, con- 
 (idered, and compared, fuggefl to the imagi- 
 nation other ideas aflbciated with thefe deci- 
 fions, and fit for carrying forward the invefli- 
 galion. Judgment is employed in giving fuch 
 decifions, at every ftep that is taken ; and they 
 are the only means by which we can be car- 
 ried forward another ftep. In the arts too, the 
 decifions of judgment do often fuggeft new 
 ideas ; but the ideas abfolutely neceiTary may, 
 in many cafes, be fuggefted by other means. 
 A rapid imagination often, without giving 
 judgment time to interpofe, pours in, by its 
 own force, a great abundance of conceptions, 
 fo proper, that when they are afterwards re- 
 viewed, the acuteft underftanding, and the 
 niceft tafte, <ran fcarce find fault with them- 
 In the arts, this rapidity of imagination, which 
 waits not for the interpofition of judgment, 
 
 often
 
 S E c T . I V. differ in refpeSi of Judgment. 3 7 1 
 
 often produces a noble boldnefs and freedom 
 of manner ; in fcience it could produce only 
 abfurdity and error. 
 
 In fcience, an acute and vigorous judgment 
 is neceffary for making any ufe of the concep- 
 tions which imagination has fuggefted. It is 
 the precife bufmefs of fcience to deduce con- 
 clufions from certain obfervations, experi- 
 ments, or ideas ; but the dedudion of thefe is 
 altogether the work of judgment, and will be 
 performed with greater or lefs advantage, in 
 proportion to the degree of its acutenefs. 
 We fometimcs meet with perfons v/ho are re- 
 markable for making uncommon reflections 
 on the triteft fubjed:s, or dravving new con- 
 clufions from the moil familiar facts : this is 
 acknowledged to imply real ingenuity; butic 
 Ihows chiefly acutenefs of judgment. The 
 commonnefs of the fads or the fubjedts, makes 
 no great force of imagination requifite for 
 bringing them into view; they had actually 
 been in the view of hundreds : but thefe had 
 not the quicknefs of underftanding which has 
 led to the new conclufions or reflexions,. 
 Many of the fads on which Nev^'ton founds 
 his theory of gravitation, and that of light 
 and colours, require no great degree of ima- 
 
 B b 2 gination
 
 372 Hoiv the two Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 gination to bring them into view, and had 
 actually been obferved by many. That the 
 fame conclufions were not by thefe deduced 
 from them, may be afcribed partly to a defedt 
 of imagination, preventing their being fet in 
 that light in which they would have readily 
 fuggefted the conclufions, and partly to the 
 want of fuch depth of judgment as was fufE- 
 cient for deducing them. Depth of judgment 
 contributed perhaps more than vigour of ima- 
 gination, to enable that great phiiofopher to 
 perceive the tendency of common fadls with 
 furprifrng quicknefs, and to trace their confe- 
 quences with fmgular accuracy. It was in 
 the contrivance of new experiments, proper 
 and decifive, that the vigour of his imagina- 
 tion fhowed itfelf. Any one propofition in ' 
 Euclid's Elements, follows neceifarily from 
 thofe which precede it ; and the work of ima- 
 gination neceflary for the demonftration of 
 it, is in a great meafure performed by the 
 laying down of thefe in a natural order and 
 feries. Suppofe then a perfon perfectly ma- 
 iler of the lirft forty-fix proportions ; he has 
 all the principles neceffary for demonftrating 
 that the fquare of the hypothenufe of a right- 
 angled triangle, is equal to the fquares of the 
 2 other
 
 Sect. IV. differ hi refpecl of judgment, 373 
 
 other two fides. To conceive this propofitioii 
 of one's felf, would, however, fhow a great 
 degree of genius, a vigour of imagination as 
 well as of judgment. If the propofition were 
 mentioned to him, and he w^ere informed, 
 that it is deducible from the propofitions al- 
 ready demonftrated, it would ftill require a 
 confiderable vigour of both thefe faculties, to 
 conceive the figure neceflary for the demon- 
 ftration, and to make out the feveral lleps of 
 it, without affiftance. If even the figure were 
 defcribed, it would Indicate fome degree of 
 genius, immediately to perceive the whole 
 train of the proof: but in this cafe, a very 
 great part of the work of imagination is per- 
 formed by the teacher ; it is chiefly acutenefs 
 of judgment that is neceflary for accomplifli- 
 ing what remains. In the more intricate 
 parts of mathematics, it requires greater vi-~ 
 gour of judgment, as well as of imagination, 
 to fee feveral fteps before us ; and to be ca- 
 pable of this, fliows a higher degree of ge- 
 nius. Thus, from the very nature and end 
 of fcientifical invention, judgment is ccn- 
 ftantly and intimately conned:ed with imagi- 
 nation in all the operations of genius ; and a 
 great acutenefs of judgment is neceflary for 
 
 B b 3 enabling
 
 374 ^^'^ t^J^ i'^'o Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 enabling genius to fliow itfelf. But in the 
 
 arts, the ideas collcded r.re not applied to the 
 dedudion of conclufions, which is the proper 
 work of judgmentj and requires reafoning. 
 They are applied to a quite different purpofe, 
 to the produ6lion of beauty, which imagina- 
 tion can in fome meafure accomplifh by itfelf: 
 and therefore it is not abfolutely neceflary, 
 either that the operations of judgment be fo 
 intimately blended with thofe of fancy, or 
 that fo great a degree of judgment be pof- 
 fefled. 
 
 There is an efl'ential difference between 
 thofe relations which are predominant in ge- 
 nius for the arts, and thofe which are predo- 
 minant in fcientific genius. The former are 
 intuitively perceivable, the latter are not. 
 Both of them can affe^ the imagination and 
 fuggeft ideas, by them connected with the 
 prefent object, without our having prevloufly 
 perceived by an exercife of judgment, that 
 thefe relatipns belong to the ideas : but it is 
 natural for us, after ideas have been in this 
 manner fuggefted, to refled: on the relation 
 which fubfifts between them and the objeds 
 that fuggefted them, and to form judgments 
 concerning it. Now when refemblauce, the 
 
 predominant
 
 Sect. IV. differ hire fpcB of Jiidgmejit. 375 
 
 predominant relation in genius for the arts, 
 has fuggefted an image, a fmgle glance of 
 thought is fufficient for perceiving the reality 
 of the refemblance; it is felf-evident , it re- 
 quires no fenfible exertion of mind. This is 
 not the cafe with the relations of caufe and 
 efi^dl, and co-exiftence, the prevalent rela- 
 tions in fcientific genius. They are not intui- 
 tive relations; they are perceived to belong 
 to objedis, only in confequence of experience; 
 they are afcertained by a careful examination 
 and indudion. This implies a fenfible and 
 continued exertion of judgment and reafon. 
 A confiderable degree, therefore, of the exer- 
 cife of thefe faculties is rendered eflential to 
 fcientific genius, by the nature of thofe rela- 
 tions about which it is ultimately converfant. 
 Were thefe the only relations with v^^hich 
 fcientifical deductions are concerned, and re- 
 femblance the only relation that afFedts the 
 imagination in invention in the arts, there 
 would be a very great difference with refpe£t 
 to the degree and kind of judgment neceffary 
 for affifting genius in thefe two provinces. 
 But both in fcience and in the arts, all the 
 relations w^hich perceptions can bear to one 
 another, are, in f«bordination to thefe predo- 
 
 B b ^ minant
 
 376 Hoiv the tivo Kinds of Genius Part 111, 
 
 minant ones, employed for introducing pro- 
 per conceptions ; and confequently there- is 
 fcope in both, for the exerclfe of the kinds of 
 judgment adapted to all the claffes of rela- 
 tions. This makes the difference much lefs; 
 every fpecies of judgment may give fomc 
 affiftance, both in fcience and in the arts. 
 Yet ftill the difference is very confiderable ; 
 for even when the fame fpecies of judgment is 
 employed in thefe two, one modification of it 
 is ufefiil in the one, and a different modiiica- 
 tion in the other. A judgment, for inflance, 
 adapted to the perception of mathematical 
 truths, is in fome meafure neceflary to the 
 painter ; but it is a judgment rather of the 
 practical refult of the truths demonftratcd, 
 than of the precife connexion of thcfe truths 
 -^uth the principles on which they depend. 
 The painter and the poet, as well as the phi- 
 lofopher, muft pay a regard to experience ; 
 but fo exact an agreement to what we have 
 experienced, is not neceffary for our approv- 
 ing the works of the artif^, as for our admit- 
 ting the conclufions of the philofopher. In 
 general, the exadter forms of every fpecies of 
 judgment are requifite in fcience, the loofer 
 forms are fufEcient for the arts j the more 
 
 laborious
 
 Sect. IV. differ in refpeci of 'Judgment. 377 
 
 laborious exertions fuit the former, the rea- 
 dier exertions, the latter ; the fciences de- 
 mand uncommon depth and force of reafon, 
 the arts need rather a certain quicknefs of 
 difcernment. 
 
 The moft remarkable difference between 
 genius for fcience, and genius for the arts, 
 in refpect of the affiftance which they receive 
 from judgment, is, that tafte, or the judg- 
 ment of beauty, is efTentially neceiTary to the 
 latter, but enters not at all into the former. 
 This is an article of fuch importance, that it 
 will require a particular confideration ; but 
 fome obfervations may be made for farther 
 illuflrating the diftinction between the two 
 kinds of genius, which are fo much connedled 
 with what has been now faid, that it will be 
 proper to make them, before we proceed to 
 that. 
 
 SECT.
 
 3 7 S 37?^ tivo Kinds of Genius Pa r t IIT. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 The tivo Kinds of Genius farther compared 
 and di/iinguijtjed, 
 
 IT is a diftindtion between genius for the 
 arts, and genius for fcicnce, implied in 
 what we have faid of the affiftance which they 
 receive from judgment, or at leaft eafily de- 
 ducible from it, That in the arts, imagination 
 in fome meafure fketches the whole work ; in 
 fcience, it cannot. The plan of a poem or a 
 pidture may be conceived by the fole power of 
 fancy. The affbciating principles may fug- 
 geft abundance of materials fuited to the de- 
 fign. The fame principles will naturally 
 give thefe materials different degrees of attrac- 
 tion, proportioned to their feveral degrees of 
 lelation to one another, by means of which 
 the moft nearly related will fall regularly into 
 the fame member, and the whole will ac- 
 quire, in a good meafure, a proper order and 
 arrangement. The exertion of judgment will 
 no doubt contribute much to render the work 
 more complete; it will cut off redundancies, 
 redify diforders, and even fupply defeds : 
 
 but 

 
 S E c T . V. farther compared. 379 
 
 but fiill without it, a pidlure or a poem may 
 acquire fome degree of form. In fcience, on 
 the contrary, imagination alone cannot pro- 
 duce even the rudcft draught or the mofl im- 
 perfe(fl iketch of an invention : it can only 
 fuggeft the materials from which judgment 
 may colled: that invention ; it muft put them 
 into the hands of judgment, and fubjed: them 
 to its fcrutiny conftantly as it fuggefts them ; 
 and it is judgment alone that applies them to 
 life. 
 
 This leads us naturally to an obfervatlon 
 which will give us an opportunity of examin- 
 ing and afcertaining fome fentiments and 
 maxims concerning genius, which are fome- 
 times exprefl'ed without fufficient precifion : 
 the obfervation is, That genius for the arts 
 holds more of imagination, than fcientific 
 genius. This obfervation is fo obvious, that 
 it has been often afferted, That imagination 
 is neceflary only for productions in the arts, 
 not at all for difcoveries in fcience. In confe- 
 quence of this received opinion, productions 
 in the arts have been called exclufively, works 
 of imagination. The opinion is not juft ; but 
 it would not have been adopted fo generally 
 as it has been, if it had not, in appearance, 
 
 ii flrong
 
 3B0 The tivo Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 a ftrong foundation. It was juft now ob- 
 iervcd, that in the arts imagination goes far- 
 ther towards perfeding its effedls, than it can 
 in fcience; this contributes to make its in- 
 fluence moft confpicuous in the arts. In one 
 view too, genius for the arts does require 
 greater flrength of imagination, than pene- 
 tration requires ; it implies a great delicacy 
 and adivity of the aflbciating principles, fit- 
 ting them for being affeded by very flender 
 relations : this alfo renders the operation of 
 fancy more obvious and more ftriking. Be- 
 fides, the afTociating principles which are 
 chiefly implied in brightnefs, are more com- 
 monly referred to the imagination, than thofe 
 which are predominant in penetration. The 
 caufe of this feems to be, that the former are 
 perceived without reafoning, are applied ge- 
 nerally to the purpofe of pleafing, and, even 
 when they give rile to judgments, occafion 
 not any procefs of argumentation, but only 
 intuitive decifions, which give little exercife 
 to the underftanding, and are fcarce taken 
 notice of; but the latter cannot be perceived 
 without the exercife of reafon, they are prin- 
 cipally ufed for deducing concluflons, and the 
 concluflons to which they lead, imply a con- 
 tinued.
 
 Se c T . V. farther compared, 381 
 
 tinued, often a laborious exercife of judg- 
 ment, which cannot fail to be refle<f^ed on. 
 Hence it is natural to regard the former as 
 qualities which affedt the imagination, and 
 the latter as relations about which the judg- 
 ment is employed ; and confequently, if men 
 do not think with great precifion, to refer 
 only genius for the arts to imagination. It 
 may be added that genius for the arts makes 
 ufe of a greater variety of aflbciating princi- 
 ples than fcientific genius, and employs them 
 in a greater extent, and with lefs limitation ; 
 it avails itfelf of all the different forms and 
 modifications of each of them, while very few 
 forms of any of them can be rendered fubfer- 
 vient to the inveftigation of truth ; and it 
 alone is influenced by the aflbciating power 
 of the paffions. In all thefe refpedls, it may 
 be aflerted vsfith reafon, that genius for the 
 arts holds more of imagination, than fcientific 
 genius, and that its effeds may be termed 
 peculiarly works of imagination. But it is 
 not true, either that fuch genius is completed 
 by imagination alone, or that it is the only 
 kind that implies imagination. 
 
 Scientific genius has been defcribed 
 with a like inaccuracy ; it has been confidered 
 
 as
 
 ^82 The Hvo Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 as requiring only judgment, and not at all 
 implying imagination. We have feen that it 
 holds much more of judgment, than genius 
 for the arts does : this has given occafion for 
 afcribing it wholly to that faculty ; but it is a 
 miftake. A very ingenious and profound 
 philofopher has given his fandion to this 
 miftake ; fpeaking of a work which indicates 
 a very great degree of fcientific genius, not 
 only uncommon clear nefs and depth of judg- 
 ment, but alfo ftrength and even livelinefs of 
 imagination, he difclaims genius, and inti- 
 mates that the nature of his work required it 
 not ; " I claim no other merit, than that of 
 ' having given great attention to the opera- 
 ' tions of my own mind, and of having ex- 
 ' prefled, with all the perfpiculty I was able, 
 ' what, I conceive, every man who gives 
 ' the fune attention, will feel and perceive. 
 ' The produOiions of imagination require a 
 ' genius which foars above the common 
 ' rank; but the treafures of knowlege are 
 ' commonly buried deep, and may be reach- 
 
 * ed by thofe drudges who can dig with 
 
 * labour and patience, though they have not 
 ' wings to fly (rt).'* The author's modefty 
 
 (a) Rezd's Inquiry into the Human Mind^ Dedication. 
 
 under-
 
 Se c T . V. farther compared, 383 
 
 under-rates his own abilities, and in this in- 
 ftance renders his decifion inaccurate. That 
 turn of imagination which fits a perfon for 
 produdions in the arts, may no doubt be 
 moft properly faid to foar, to fly, and to 
 have wings. To dig with labour and pa- 
 tience, is a metaphor which may with equal 
 propriety be applied to the inveftigation of 
 philofophical truth ; it is ftrongly expreffive 
 of the intenfe and continued exertion of judg- 
 ment, which is requlfite in obferving all the 
 circumftances of the feveral experiments, dif- 
 cerning which of them are effential, compar- 
 ing them together, and tracing out the refult 
 of the whole : but the metaphor mull not be 
 overftrained, it muft not be underftood io 
 ftridlly as to reprefent the philofopher as a 
 mere drudge, deftitute of fancy; without great 
 vigour and adivity of imagination, the expe- 
 riments and obfervations made ufe of in that 
 curious work, or in any philofophical enquiry 
 of a lij^e nature, could not be contrived, 
 Ifuggefted, and arranged, fo as to lay a foun- 
 dation for legitimate conclufions. The In- 
 quiry into the Human Mind^ on the Principles 
 of Common Senfe^ (hows not merely great acute- 
 nefs of judgment, but alio a very high degree 
 
 of
 
 3^4 ^^^ ^"^^ Kinds of Genius Part IIL 
 of that penetration in which force of imagi- 
 nation is an indifpenfable ingredient. After 
 the author has unfolded his important difco- 
 veries, another man may feel and perceive 
 the feveral operations which he defcribes, by 
 giving even lefs attention than he beftowcd, 
 and without poffefTrng any {hare of geniiis ; 
 but genius was abfolutely neceflary to the 
 making of the difcoveries. The v/ork is not, 
 in the ordinary fenfe, a production of imagi- 
 nation ; but it difplays imagination and ge- 
 nius, though of a different kind from what 
 is difplayed in a pidure or a poem, yet foar- 
 ing as much above the common rank. In 
 fcience, the operation of judgment is more 
 obvious and flriking than in the arts ; it is 
 it, not imagination, that finilhes the work ; 
 and therefore even that part of the work, 
 which imagination alone can accomplifh, and 
 which indicates genius, has been afcribed to 
 judgment. 
 
 In commending a pcrfon, it is coiUmon to 
 beflow all excellence upon him, and to deny 
 others their real merit in order to exalt him,* 
 The fame caufe from which this appearance 
 proceeds in ordinary life, has produced the 
 inaccurate defcriptions of genius now men- 
 tioned*
 
 S £ c T . V. farther compared. 385 
 
 tioned. Becaufe Imagination can do a great 
 deal in the arts, genius for them has been 
 placed in imagination alone. Becaufe it can 
 by itfelf do little in the fciences, it has been 
 excluded from fcientific genius ; and becaufe 
 judgment has a great ihare in the whole pro- 
 cefs of every difcovery which belongs to this 
 department, all has been afcribed to it. But 
 as a fenfible man allows thofe whom he com- 
 mends, their proper kind and precife degree 
 of merit, fo we ought, with a juft difcernment, 
 to give each of thefe faculties its real fhare 
 in forming every kind of genius. 
 
 Genius has been defined by fome to con- 
 fift in the union of a fine imagination and a 
 fine judgment. According to them, its origin 
 may be referred v/ith equal propriety to either 
 of thefe faculties, or rather a great perfedtion 
 of both is alike neceflary for its exiftence. 
 The extenfive influence of judgment in pro- 
 ducing works of genius has given occafion to 
 this definition. But genius ought notwith- 
 ftanding to be confidered as a modification of 
 the imagination. It is no reafon againft our 
 confidering it in this light, that judgment 
 attends it in all its exertions. It has been 
 obferved already, that intelledual powers, 
 
 C c eOentially
 
 386 The two Kinds of Genius Part Ilf. 
 
 eflentlally diftind: in themfelves, are fre- 
 quently complicated together in their exer- 
 ciie. Ileafon, for inftance, cannot perceive 
 the evidence of a demonftration, except me- 
 mory be exerted in retaining the feveral 
 fleps : forgetfulnefs of thefe would as effec- 
 tually prevent our obtaining a conviction of 
 the truth of the conclufion, as an incapacity 
 of difcerning the evidence of any of the pro- 
 portions included in the proof: but it would 
 be improper, on this account, to confound 
 reafon with memory. In like manner, though 
 genius needs the afhflance of judgment, yet 
 it ought to be confidered as a faculty diftindt 
 from judgment. Genius confifls eifentially 
 in the vigour and in a particular economy or 
 conftru6tion of the imagination : it is in this 
 that a man muft excel, in order to be eminent 
 for genius : where Nature has beftowed this 
 in a confiderable degree, an uncommon accu- 
 racy of judgment is not requifite for found- 
 ing a claim to real genius ; a moderate fhare 
 of it will be fufEcienr. 
 
 Could the defcription be at all admitted, 
 it would be applicable only to fcientific ge- 
 nius. With refpe^l to this fpecies, the ex- 
 tenfive and continued exercife of judgmenS 
 
 in
 
 S E c T. V. farther compared, 387 
 
 in profecuting difcoveries, gives the defcrip- 
 tion a confiderable appearance of proprietye 
 Yet even here it has not entire propriety, 
 A perfon may pofTefs ftrength of judgment 
 in a very high degree, and the kind of judg- 
 ment perfedly adapted to fcience, and yet 
 be deftitute of fcientific genius : he may be 
 an accurate critic on the inveftigations of 
 others, and yet hirafelf no inventer. Many 
 perfons who could never have made original 
 difcoveries, have explained the difcoveries of 
 others with great difl:ind:nefs, and decided 
 between contending theories with great acute- 
 nefs and folidity. On the ccntrary, a per- 
 fon who poffefl'es that particular form of ima- 
 gination which fits for fcientifical difcoveries, 
 is never wholly deilitute of fcientific genir.6 ; 
 no fuch perfon is ever found without a de- 
 gree of judgment fufficient for enabling him 
 to make fome difcoveries. If his judgment 
 be not fo deep and found as to prevent his 
 falling into miflakes, yet his inveftigations 
 will fliow ingenuity notwitliRanding his 
 miftakes. The theories of Des Cartes, Leib- 
 nitz, Malebranche, Berkeley, muft be acknow- 
 leged to be ingenious, though in many par- 
 ticulars they be not juft ; thefe philofophers 
 
 C c 2 " had
 
 388 The tivo Kinds of Genius P A R T III. 
 
 had genius, they pofleffcd very confiderable 
 powers of imagination, but not judgment 
 proportionably piercing. Even in fcientific 
 genius, therefore, imagination is the leading 
 faculty : where it prevails and is fuitably 
 conftruded, fuch genius is never totally 
 wanting ; and without this, no degree of 
 fuch genius ever can exifl:. 
 
 But in genius for the arts, an uncommon 
 ftrength of judgment is fo far from being 
 neceflary, that a degree of imagination which 
 would have produced genius, if it had been 
 joined to an ordinary judgment, may be 
 rendered abortive, and unable to difplay itfelf, 
 by being united to a very nice judgment. 
 The great acutenefs of this faculty will dif- 
 cover every the fmalleft blemifh in what 
 fancy produces, and will, by fcrupuloufly 
 canvafling it and requiring greater excellence 
 than the imagination can attain, extinguifh 
 its ardor, and make it give over attempting to 
 invent, or elfe enervate its inventions, deprive 
 them of force and fpirit, and fubftitute an 
 infipid corrednefs in its place [b). It is al- 
 
 {b) Evenit plerumque ut hac diligentia deterior etiam fiat 
 
 oratio. Nam ilia qua; curam fatentur, et fifta atque 
 
 compofita videri etiam volunt, nee gratiam confequuntur, &c. 
 Quint, InJl.Qrai. lib. viii. procem. Nec promptum eft 
 
 moft
 
 S E c T . V. farther compared, 3 89 
 
 moft better to give fancy an uncontrouled 
 range, than to break its -vigour by the con- 
 tinual reftraint of an overfcrupulous judg- 
 ment. Puntormo is faid to have poflefled a 
 degree of genius fufficient for producing pic- 
 tures which obtained the approbation of 
 Raphael and Michael Angelo ; but the excef- 
 five fcrupuloufnefs of his judgment rendered 
 his genius in a great meafure ufelefs ; he not 
 only was extremely tedious, but alfo could 
 never pleafe himfelf, or be fatisfied with any 
 of his own works. It was the fame caufe 
 that made Virgil enjoin his friends to burn 
 the ^neid ; it was not finlflied with all the 
 exad:nefs that the nicety of his judgment re- 
 quired : had the injundion been obeyed, it 
 would have been a fir iking inflance of the 
 effeds of very great genius blafted by an ex- 
 cefFive degree of judgment [c\ In the arts, 
 
 dicere, utros peccare validius putem, quibus omnia fua pla- 
 ccnt, an quibus nihil. Accidit enim etiam ingeniofis adolef- 
 centibus frequenter ut labore confumantur, ct in filentium 
 ufque defcendant nimia bene dicendi cuplditate. Id. lib. x. 
 cap. 3. 
 
 {/) Protogenes, whom Apelles blamed {or hurting his 
 works by correding them too much, and Leonardi da Vinci, 
 who left many of his pidures unfinifhed, becaufe he could not 
 finlfh them fuitably to his high idea of perfedlion, are appo- 
 fite examples here ; but having had occafion to quote them 
 dfevvhere, the former, EJfay on T'ajle, Part 11. fed. 6. the 
 latter, Ibid. fed. 5. Iwas unwilling to ufe a repetition. 
 
 C c 3 then.
 
 39^ The tivo Kinds of Genius Part III. 
 
 then, an uncommon acutenefs of judgment 
 is fo far from conftituting genius, that it will 
 abfolutely deftroy genius, unlefs the imagi- 
 nation be as uncommonly comprehenfive. 
 The former faculty muft not have greater ac- 
 curacy than is proportioned to the extent and 
 vigour of the latter. Judgment muft pre- 
 ferve imagination from lofing itfelf in its ex- 
 curfions, without obftruding its vifiting freely 
 all the regions of nature. It muft prevent 
 imnatural afTociations, w^ithout checking fuch 
 as are bold. It muft regulate, but not deftroy 
 the impetuofity and ardor of the foul. It has 
 been obferved that, though fyftems of pre- 
 cepts in the arts, direct and improve the 
 judgment, they rather curb and reftrain ge- 
 nius. They render men fo ftudious to avoid 
 faults, that they fcarce aim at beauties. It 
 is remarked that, when works of imagination 
 have been brought to the utmoft degree of 
 corrednefs in any age or nation, there has 
 been afterwards very little difplay of original 
 or extenfive genius. This may have been 
 owing in part to natural caufes, which feem 
 never to fuff'er an age illuftrious for arts and 
 fciences, to be of long continuance : but it 
 has probably been owin^ in part likewife to 
 
 the
 
 Sect. V. farther compared, 391 
 
 the caufe that is more commonly affigned 5 
 That a tafte for corrednefs being once gene- 
 rally eftabliilied, the neceflity which artifts 
 were under of producing this quality, in 
 order to gain approbation, cramped their 
 imaginations and difplrited their works. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Tajle ejfential to Genius for the Arts, 
 
 ^ 
 
 TH E obfervations which were formerly 
 made upon the difference between ge- 
 nius for the fciences, and genius for the artsj 
 in refpedt of the alTiftance which they receive 
 from judgment, regarded chiefly the degree 
 and manner in which judgment is exercifed 
 in their operations. But thefe two kinds of 
 genius imply likewife different kinds of judg- 
 ment. 
 
 Scientific genius requires only that kind 
 of judgment which has truth for its object ; 
 but it requires great flrength of judgment in 
 that kind. As that kind includes feveral 
 fpecies, the predominance of one or another 
 of thefe, will adapt genius to the correfpon- 
 dent fubje(St of invefligation : but any one of 
 
 G c 4 thefe
 
 392 Tajle ejfential to Part III. 
 
 thefe fpecles prevailing along with a congru- 
 ous turn of imagination, will produce fome 
 form of fcientific genius. 
 
 Genius for the arts does not exclude that 
 kind of judgment which perceives truth : 
 it demands not, however, an eminent degree 
 of it. But another kind of judgment, that 
 which pronounces concerning beauty^ and is 
 ordinarily called tajie, is eflential to fuch ge- 
 nius. This is at once a diftindive character 
 of genius for the arts, and a common characr 
 ter of genius in all the arts. 
 
 Taste, as has been already obferved in 
 general, influences genius for the arts, in 
 all the fame ways in which the difcernment 
 of truth influences genius of every kind : 
 and the varieties of tafte, and thofe of judg- 
 ment, have fimilar eff'edls in diverfifying the 
 forms of genius. Tafte regulates fancy, in- 
 ftigates it, and contributes to give it habitual 
 regularity ; it performs thefe offices more or 
 lefs perfectly, and performs them in one 
 manner or one refpedt, or in another, accord- 
 ing to the degree in which it is poflefl'ed, and 
 the fpecies of it which predominates. 
 
 In the artift, tafte exerts itfelf continually, 
 yeftraiping, regulating, and directing fancy ; 
 
 furveying
 
 Sect. VI. Cen'ms for the Arts, 393 
 
 furveying the conceptions which that facuhy 
 has fuggefted, approving them when they are 
 fuitable to it, perceiving what is faulty, re- 
 jedling what is redundant, marking what is 
 incomplete, correcting and perfeding the 
 whole. Without this exercife of tafte, the 
 firft rude conception of a defign could never 
 be improved, nor any finifhed work produced. 
 Tafte defers not its decifions till the concep- 
 tion be exprefled or the defign executed ; it 
 not only intermixes them with the execution, 
 but makes them to prevent and dired: the ex-^ 
 ecution. Where there is true genius, fancy 
 exhibits its creations fo diftindly in the very 
 moment of their produdion, that an acute 
 tafte can perceive what they will be when 
 they are executed, and judge beforehand of 
 their eft'edt. Acutenefs of tafte fufficient for 
 this, is neceflary to the artift. If he had 
 only fuch a degree of tafte as could pronounce, 
 upon a leifurely examination, when the work 
 were actually executed, he muft have the 
 whole to begin anew, wherever tafte difap- 
 proved ; and fo many things would require 
 alteration, that the labour of finiftiing any 
 work would be infinite. An imagination 
 truly poetical conceives its ideas in a moment, 
 
 fo
 
 394 Tajle ejfential to Part IIL 
 
 fo clearly and forcibly, that a vigorous tafte 
 is able to approve or difapprove them before 
 they are put in words or fet off by the har- 
 mony of numbers. Were the painter inca- 
 pable of forming a judgment of his defigns 
 till he had actually put them upon canvas, 
 he could fcarce ever finifh a fmgle pidure. 
 Every inventer in the fine arts, muft poflefs ' 
 that livelinefs of imagination, and that quick- 
 nefs of tafte, which, when united and jointly 
 exerted, can put it in his power to forefee the 
 effedl of his conceptions and defigns. If his 
 tafte be in any refpedl imperfed, the kinds 
 of faults which that imperfection unfits him 
 for perceiving, cannot be corrected, but will 
 remain blcmifhes in his works. 
 
 When tafte has condemned what the artift 
 had imagined, he will of courfe endeavour 
 to fet imagination again a working, and to 
 dire£t it into another track, that it may fug- 
 geft fomething which will be approved. 
 Often it is tafte itfelf that in this cafe infti- 
 gates imagination. Its decifions are percep- 
 tions which excite the fancy, give it an im- 
 pulfe, and fuggeft trains of ideas conneded 
 with them. When tafte condemns, the very 
 nature of the fault which it perceives, often 
 
 fuggefts
 
 Sect.VL Geniusfor the Arts. 395 
 
 fuggefts fomethlng that will be approved. 
 When it approves, the view which it takes of 
 its objed, may lead to the conception of 
 fomething which it will ftill more highly ap- 
 prove. But it is not only by being thus ex- 
 ercifed about a perfon's own produdions, 
 that tafte gives an impulfe and diredion to 
 fancy. All the fine arts are, in fome fenfe, 
 imitative of Nature j invention in thefe art-s, 
 is only obferving and copying Nature in a 
 certain manner : natural objedls and appear- 
 ances are obferved by the artift, they are con- 
 ceived with diRindnefs and with force, their 
 charaderiftical circumftances are feleded, and 
 fo expreffed as to imprint the whole form on 
 the minds of others, with the like ckarnefs 
 and vivacity with Vv^hich he himfelf appre- 
 hended it. But, in mofi: inftances, it is tafte 
 alone, that direds and animiates his obferva- 
 tion of Nature, makes fancy retain a lively 
 conception of it, and run into the view of 
 every thing that can contribute to exprefs it. 
 Without an impulfe from tafte, imagination 
 could not begin to act. Natural appearances 
 and objects lie open to the obfervation of all ; 
 they are feen by ordinary perfons, as well as 
 by the poet and the painter. The former 
 
 take
 
 396 Tajle effcntlal to Part III. 
 
 take no notice of them, they have no tafte to 
 perceive their beauties ; but by the latter, 
 thefe beauties are beheld with delight, and 
 make a ftrong impreffion, which roufes ima- 
 gination to fpirited exertions. The former 
 perceives what is expofed to his view, but 
 grofsly, faintly, and confufedly ; it can give 
 no determinate direction to fancy : the tafte 
 of the latter enables him to perceive every 
 feature, character, and circumftance of his 
 objed with precifion and with force ; and in 
 confequence of this, fancy produces a flrik- 
 ing likenefs, a delineation of it lively and 
 precifely marked. A perfon may have fine 
 tafte, and yet not be a painter or a poet ; he 
 may want that brightnefs of fancy, which 
 thefe arts require : but if a perfon be pofTefled 
 of this, nothing is necefTary to make it blaze 
 forth, but a high tafte of forne objcd: adapted 
 to it. Every peculiarity of tafte, by giving 
 a man peculiar feelings from the objects 
 which he obferves, leads him into peculiar 
 tracks of thinking, correfpondent to it. 
 Many artifts in every way, have propofed to 
 themfelves, fome of the moft illuftrious of 
 their predeceflbrs, as their ftandard and their 
 model : in the choice, they were directed by 
 
 the
 
 Sect. VL Genius for the Arts, 397 
 
 the peculiarity of their own tafle, approving 
 moft the diftingulfhing excellences of that 
 mafter ; and that tafte has been generally 
 powerful enough to give their fancy a direc- 
 tion, and to ftamp their performances with a 
 charader, fimilar to his. In all imitations, 
 it is tafte that gives genius its particular form 
 and track. Whenever the degree of perfec- 
 tion to which any art has already arrived, 
 leads forward to new improvements, it does 
 fo chiefly by means of tafte ; its judgments 
 on the works already produced, point out 
 new roads of invention to the imagination. 
 In like manner, with refpeiSt to the great ar- 
 chetype, Nature, every difference of tafte 
 ■will occafion a correfpondent difference in 
 the appearances which engage the attention, 
 and arreft the fancy, and in the point of view 
 in which they are confidered ; and the range 
 which fancy makes, and the cffeds which it 
 produces, will always be fuitable and analo- 
 gous to thofe peculiar perceptions of tafte, 
 by which it was put in motion. 
 
 Taste is likewife neceffary for forming 
 genius in the arts, to regularity and corre<Sl- 
 nefs. It is tafte principally that, in this de- 
 partment, perceives when any of the concep- 
 6 tions
 
 39^ Tafte ejfential to Part III. 
 
 tions produced by fancy, are unfuitable to 
 the end of the work : without its interpofing 
 its judgment on that end being fuggefted, 
 fuch conceptions could not be rectified ; witii- 
 out its being in the ufe of interpofing its 
 judgments, imagination could never acquire 
 the habit of generally avoiding them. Irre- 
 gularity in works of art, is moft commonly 
 owing to fome defed in tafte; it proceeds 
 from fome wildnefs of imagination, which 
 a perfedly good tafte would have fubdued. 
 A luxuriant and undifciplined imagination 
 may introduce into a pidlure fome figure or 
 attitude, or into a poem fome fcene or de- 
 fcription or image, which counteracts the 
 general effect, or is inconfiflent with the pre- 
 vailing qualities of the piece ; it may blend 
 fomething mean with a great fubjed, or 
 fomething ludicrous with a folemn one : tafie 
 fufficiently acute would perceive the incon- 
 gruity with fo high difguft, as to prevent 
 imagination from dwelling upon it fo long as 
 fully to conceive it, as at leaft to rejed: it 
 whenever it faw it reprefented, and as to take 
 from imagination by degrees all propenfity 
 to run into what were fo abhorrent from its 
 views. The kind of irregularity into which 
 
 any
 
 Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts. 39^ 
 
 any artift runs, will always be that which his 
 particular tafte is moft unable to corred. 
 
 By ad:ing upon imagination in thefe feve- 
 ral ways, by checking, by inftigating it, by 
 giving it regularity, tafle has very great in- 
 fluence on genius, and the varieties of tafte 
 contribute much to diverfify the form of ge- 
 nius. A perfon's genius and his tafte are cor- 
 refpondent. What he approves, and what he 
 can produce, are of the fame kind, and marked 
 with the fame character. Every peculiarity 
 of tafte ftiows itfelf in a man's decifions con- 
 cerning the works of others ; it fhows itfelf 
 alfo in his own VvTorks, for by it his fancy is, 
 in a great degree, influenced in producing 
 them. 
 
 Both judgment and tafte intermix them- 
 felves with the operations of fancy ; but they 
 aff'edt theie operations in refpedrs fomevk^hat 
 difi^erent. While reafon reftrains imagina- 
 tion from conceptions which are contrary to 
 truth, or fuggefts fuch as are conformable ta 
 it, tafte condemns thofe which are defective In 
 fublimity or grace, and prompts to fuch as have 
 thefe qualities. The former rejed:s what 
 would render the work falfe or abfurd ; the 
 latter, what would render it in any degree 
 unpleafmg. 
 
 3 Though
 
 400 Tajie cjfential to Part III. 
 
 Though judgment be a neceffary ingre- 
 dient in good tafte, it can never produce it 
 without acutenefs of the internal fenfes. If 
 judgment be ftrong, but thefe fenfes weak or 
 wanting, the exertions of genius may be re- 
 gular and vigorous, fo far as judgment could 
 affed them ; but they will be feeble and ir- 
 regular in thofe qualities which are the proper 
 objects of tafte. This is obfervable in almofl 
 all the produdions of rude ages and unpolifhed 
 nations, often to a very great degree. In every 
 age, fome perfon, even among thofe who are 
 in feveral refpedls approveable, betrays, in 
 fome one particular, a coarfenefs of genius in- 
 confiftent with good tafte. Images which are 
 low or coarfe, may illuftrate a fubjedt with 
 great exadnefs or force ; to mere reafon they 
 would therefore appear unexceptionable ; but 
 the leaft delicacy of tafte would be difgufted 
 with them, and prevent their admiiTion. To 
 authors who indulge themfelves in the ufe of 
 them, we may allow ftrength of judgment, 
 but muft refufe tafte : they may have force, 
 but want elegance of genius. In the moft ju- 
 dicious and eloquent compofitions of our fore- 
 fathers who lived fome centuries ago, fimili- 
 tudes, allufions, and incidents are introduced, 
 fo homely or fo indelicate, that a nice tafte 
 
 would
 
 Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts, 401 
 
 would be difgufted with the very repetition of 
 them as examples. Every one has heard of 
 the low and dirty reprefentations introduced 
 into fome of the Dutch paintings. When 
 fuch appearances are very ftrong, we enter 
 readily into the diftindion between judgment 
 and tafte ; we pronounce the author deftitute 
 of the latter, and to this caufe afcribe the 
 grofsnefs of his genius ; though the appear- 
 ances be not {q palpable, we pronounce that 
 incorredinefs or indelicacy of tafle has infeded 
 his genius : in both cafes we can perceive the 
 difference between that influence which judg- 
 ment has upon works of genius, and that 
 which the internal fenfes have. 
 
 These fenfes may, on the contrary, be 
 ftrong where judgment is inaccurate. In this 
 cafe, the artift is qualified for fuch particulars 
 as contribute to the beauty and elegance of 
 his work, but not for thofe which render it 
 jufl: and folid. The materials which imagi- 
 nation prefents, will be applied fo as to pleafe 
 on a fuperficial view, rather than to fatisfy on 
 a careful examination. This effed is obferv- 
 able in poets who are brilliant without foli- 
 dity, and in orators who are florid but not 
 argumentative, 
 
 D d Consist-
 
 4©2 Tajie ejfential to Part liL 
 
 Consistently with goodnefs of tafte, ei- 
 ther judgment or internal fenfe may predomi- 
 nate in its compofition i a work will always, 
 bear marks of the predominance of the one or 
 the other. Congreve pofleffed an elegant tafte, 
 as well as a fparkling imagination ; but a 
 nicer judgment would have repudiated many 
 of his flafhes of wit, as being unnatural. In 
 the performances of Pietro Tefta, fublime and 
 noble ideas, a profufion of figures ftrongly 
 marked, elegance and exadlnefs of drawing, 
 iliow exuberance of fancy and enthufiafm of 
 genius, united to tafte in many refpeds ex- 
 quilite ; but incoherence of defign, and a jum- 
 ble of unconnected figures, render it difticult to 
 difcover his aim, and turn many of his works 
 into groupes of monfters and chimeras : the 
 exertion of a more accurate and better in- 
 formed judgment, would have prevented this 
 wildnefs and extravagance [a). Correggio- 
 ftiows exquifite judgment in the condud: of 
 his pieces and the union of his painting ; un- 
 gracefulnefs in feme of his attitudes, an un- 
 pleafing difpofition of his groupes, and incor- 
 rednefs of drawing, betray a tafte not, in. 
 all refpeds, fully proportioned to it. Accu- 
 
 [a) E/faj on PritstSy chap. 3.. 
 
 rate:
 
 Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts, 403 
 
 fate judgment of the anatomy of the human 
 body, rendered his drawings perfed;Iy correct ; 
 a t^Jic as accurate, would have rendered them 
 equally elegant (Z>). The orations of Demof- 
 thenes and of Cicero bear plain marks of a 
 diverfity of tafte, as well as of imagination; 
 they fhow that the tafte of the former held 
 very much of judgment, and the tafte of the 
 latter, of fentiment or feeling. Demollhenes 
 js the more convincing, Cicero the more pleaf- 
 ing orator. The fermons of Barrow and of 
 Seed, are both eloquent ; but in very different 
 ways : the former fhows a copious imagina- 
 tion linited to the founded underftanding ; the 
 latter a bright and flowing fancy combined 
 with quick and elegant feelings. 
 
 There are different qualities in the works 
 of genius which fall under the immediate cog- 
 nizance of judgment, and which require dif- 
 ferent kinds of judgment. If an artift be 
 defedive in the kind of judgment adapted to 
 any one of the fe qualities, he cannot direct his 
 imagination in producing it, though in pro- 
 ducing other qualities, to which his under- 
 ftanding is adapted, he may be very judicious. 
 Both the difpofition, for inftance, of the whole 
 
 [F\ Fresnov's 'Judgment of Painters, 
 
 D d 2 perfor-
 
 404 Tafe eifcntial to PartIIL 
 
 performance, and the juftnefs of particular 
 parts, arc objedls of judgment ; a work may 
 be perfedl in one of thefe refpeds, and infe- 
 riour or faulty in the other. Among the an- 
 cient painters, Amphion excelled in the for- 
 mer, Afclepiodorus in the latter {c). 
 
 In like manner, if a perfon poflefles any 
 one of the internal fenfes in great perfedlion, 
 his imagination will never want a prompter 
 and a guide in producing the qualities which 
 are the proper objeds of that fenfe ; while it 
 may fail much in producing the qualities 
 adapted to fuch other fenfes as he poflefles in 
 an inferiour degree. Zeuxis was efteemed the 
 firft of the ancient painters in refpedl of co- 
 louring ; Euphranor was admired for the ful>- 
 limity of his works ; both were cenfured for 
 negledling proportion in fome particulars (d) : 
 the former fhowed an exquihte fenfe of one 
 fpecies of beauty, that of colours ; the latter, 
 a tafte for the grand and noble ; . tafte for the 
 
 {c) Nee debebat Amphioni de difpofitione, nee Afcleplo- 
 doro demenfurls. Plin. AW. ////?. lib. xxxv. cap. 10. Eadem 
 astate Afclepiodorus fuit, quern in fymmetria mirabatur 
 Apelles. Ibid. 
 
 . {d) Deprehenditur tamen Zeuxis grandior in capitibus ar- 
 ticulifque. Plin. /Z/V. cap. 9. Euphranor — primus videtur et 
 exprefllffe dignitates, infignia heroum, et ufurpafie fymme- 
 triani : fed fuit in univerfitate corporum exilior, capitibus, 
 articulifque grandior. /^/V. cap. u, 
 
 beauty
 
 Sect. VL Genius for the Arts, 405 
 
 beauty of proportion was not perfed in either. 
 Ariftides was defeGive in the particular in 
 which Zeuxis excelled, in tafte for beauty and 
 ibftnefs of colouring, as well as in the power 
 of producing it : but in expreffing the paflions 
 and afFedions, he excelled all his predecef- 
 fors [e) ; he poffeifed a quicknefs and acute- 
 nefs of feeling, which fitted him for con- 
 ceiving ftrongly, and confequently for expref- 
 fing forcibly, the traces with which the in- 
 ward emotions mark the features and the atti- 
 tude. It was the chara<3:er of Pyreicus, that he 
 painted only mean fubjedls, but painted them 
 with great beauty (/) : this Ihowed tafte, in 
 one refped: grovelling, and in another refpe^t 
 elegant. A fimilar conjunction is very re- 
 markable in Swift : his writings put it beyond 
 doubt that he was ingenious, in many refpeds 
 judicious, and pofleiled of a tafte for corred- 
 nefs and elegance of compofition ; but they 
 abound with low fubjeds, grofs ideas, and 
 dirty images, inconfiftent with delicacy of 
 fentiment, 
 
 {is Is omnium primus animum pinxit, et fenfus omnes ex- 
 preffit, quos vocant Grseci -^JS? ; item perturbationes : durior 
 paullo in coloribus. Plin. Ibid. cap. lo. 
 
 (/) Humilia quidem fecutus, humilitatis tamen fummam 
 adeptus ell gloriam. Plin. /^/V. 
 
 D d 3 Sensi-
 
 4o6 Tafte ejfential to Part III, 
 
 Sensibility of tafte, is neceflary to its 
 perfection ; it makes a perfoii feel ftrongly 
 every beauty or blemifh which he perceived. 
 A lively imagination can never exift where 
 fenfibility of tafte is wanting ; or if it could, 
 all that it produced would be frigid and fpi- 
 ritlefs ; no objecfl could make an impreffion 
 fufEcient to give it a brifk and aftive motion. 
 A great degree of fenfibility, if the other per- 
 fections of tafte were wanting, joined with a 
 fancy proportionably lively, would carry an 
 artift into wildnefs and extravagance. But if 
 the fenfibility be not exceflive, and if it be ac- 
 companied by the other perfections of tafte, it 
 will only raife vivacity of imagination to a 
 proper pitch. It is enraptured by every ftrik- 
 ing form, it fills the foul with hi^h enthu- 
 fiafm, it fets the fancy on fire, it pufties it for- 
 ward with impetuofity, renders all its concep- 
 tions glowing, and beftows a freedom and be- 
 coming negligence on its productions. When 
 a tafte of this conftruCtion exercifes itfelf about 
 what fancy Is producing, it approves with fo 
 high a relifti, or difapproves with fo quick a 
 difguft, as communicates new vivacity and 
 force to the efforts of imagination. Great fen- 
 fibility of tafte contributed not a little to Gior- 
 
 gione*s
 
 Sect. VL G aims for the Arts, 407 
 
 gione's freedom of drawing, flrength of co- 
 louring, and of relief; and to the boldnefs, 
 rapidity, and even extravagance, which are 
 remarked in Tiiitoret's manner. 
 
 Refinement and elegance of tafle has an 
 €iFed on fancy, in fome refpeds oppofiie to 
 thofe of fenfibillty. Where it prevails, it 
 hinders many forms and appearances ftriking 
 to others, from yielding it fuch gratification 
 as may make an imprefiion on the fancy. 
 There is no rifk of its running into extrava- 
 gance ; the danger is, left it deviate into 
 quaintnefs, affedation, and fubtilty. Vicious 
 refinement is pleafed with thefe, and fends 
 imagination in fearch of them ; they are 
 adopted, and ufurp the place of natural beau- 
 ties. But true refinement of tafte leads ima- 
 gination to rejed: whatever is coarfe, or even 
 of inferiour beauty, and, penetrating into fuch 
 beauties as are mod latent, feeling fuch as are 
 moft delicate, and comprehending fuch as arc 
 moft complex, it enables them to affed: and 
 give an impulfe to fancy, and direds it to pro- 
 duce not only what is beautiful, but what is 
 elegant, not only what pleafes, but aifo w^hat 
 fills the tafte, to produce according to the par- 
 ticular ftrudure of the imagination, the grace- 
 
 D d 4 ful.
 
 4o8 Tajle ejfcnt'ial to Part III. 
 
 ful, the profound, or the extraordinary. The 
 artifts of limple ages, can fcarce attain fo great 
 a refinement of tafte, as to avoid, in every in- 
 ftancc, ideas which will appear grofs and be- 
 come unpleaiing in politer times. Even Ho- 
 mer admits images in fome degree coarfe and 
 indelicate; Virgil, bred in the elegance of the 
 Auguflan age, was diredled by an improved 
 tafte, when he imitated him mofl clofely, to 
 rejc61: fome of thefe images altogether, and to 
 avoid the offenfive part of others. It is the 
 want of perfe£l elegance of tafte formed by ac- 
 quaintance with the beft models, that has mixt 
 ftiffnefs and ungracefulnefs with the great 
 excellences of Albert Durer, Hans Holbein, 
 Rembrandt, and even Rubens. 
 
 Correctness of tafte fecures a perfoa 
 from approving any but real beauties, or dif- 
 approving any but real faults, and enables 
 him to perceive the precife kind and degree 
 of both. The juftnefs of its decifions often 
 gives occafion to a new exertion of imagi- 
 nation, where otherwife it would not have 
 ^een attempted. But it influences imagination 
 principally, not by inftigating, but by reftrain- 
 ing and direding it, and forming it to regu- 
 larity. A great degree of corre(5tnefs will 
 
 perfectly
 
 Sect. VI. Genius for the Arts, 409 
 
 perfedly chill a weak imagination, and pre- 
 vent its producing any thing. It is related 
 of Andrea Verrochio, that he was fo fenfible 
 of the inferiority of his own figures to one 
 which Leonardo da Vinci, then his fcholar, 
 had by his order painted in one of his 
 pieces, that he never afterwards attempted 
 painting ; had his tafte determined lefs juftly, 
 he might have continued to produce works 
 deferving approbation. If It does not totally 
 chill a moderate fancy, it will at leaft check it 
 fo much as to produce a mediocrity, where 
 nothing is faulty, but nothing pleafes highly. 
 It is the chara6:er of Andrea del Sarts, that he 
 is careful, diligent, and corred:, but defedlve 
 in life and fplrit. Even the line genius of 
 Protogenes fuffcred, in the opinion of Apelles, 
 by the too great corredlnefs of his tafte leading 
 him to difpirit his pictures by exceifive care. 
 Corredtnefs of tafte has difciplined Pope's ge- 
 nius fo much, that fome have refufed him all 
 pretenfions to imagination. It Is an imagi- 
 nation uncommonly bright and vigorous, that 
 can bear all the reftraints which a correal tafte 
 lays it under. It requires thefe reftraints ; 
 without them, great blemiflies will be inter- 
 niixed with great beauties in its works : by 
 
 fubmittlng
 
 410 Tqfte ejjential to Part III. 
 
 fubmittlng to them, the immortal works of 
 Milton would have been cleared of the con- 
 ceits and quibbles which difgrace them. 
 
 Perfection of tafte requires the union, 
 the due proportion, and the regular adjuftment 
 of all its principles. If any principle of tafte 
 be wanting, or weak in comparifon with the 
 reft, imagination mifTes both the regulation 
 and the impulfe which that principle would 
 have given it ; and its productions bear marks 
 of its having mifled them. Every poet, every 
 painter, every artift, who leaves in his works 
 what is difgufting to one of the principles of 
 tafte, while he fatisfies the other principle, 
 fhows a defed: in their comparative vigour. 
 They were never perhaps united in any man 
 in a proportion perfectly exadt ; while none is 
 wanting or remarkably defecflive, fome degree 
 of imperfeOiion is always perceivable in fome 
 one of them, and fome other is fo exquifitely 
 perfect as to give tafte its predominating cha- 
 radter ; but ftill the vigour in which they all 
 cxift, is fufticient for giving tafte enlargement 
 and regularity. When a tafte fo perfedl is 
 united to a vigorous imagination, it produces 
 genius in fome fenfe univerfal, fit for render- 
 ing its work really, though not equally, ex- 
 cellent
 
 Sect. VI. Genhis for the Arts, 411 
 
 cellent in all refpeds, marked with features 
 correfpondent to the charadteriftical form of 
 that tafte. It is a piercing imagination thus 
 directed by a fine tafte, that has entitled a few 
 artifts in every way to the firft rank. Nei- 
 ther Homer nor Virgil is abfolutely faultlefs ; 
 each has his principal and diftindive excel- 
 lence ; but both have fo much excellence in 
 every kind, as could not have been attained 
 without perfedlion of tafte, as well as of ima- 
 gination. Titian's tafte in drawing was not 
 exadly corre(£l: ; ftrength and beauty of co- 
 louring was his leading excellence, and fliowed 
 the prevailing turn of his tafte, which was, 
 at the fame time, in all other refpe<Sts fo good 
 as to guide his fancy and his pencil into great 
 delicacy of drawing, agreeable refemblance of 
 Nature, fpirited and charaderiftical touches, 
 diverfified and graceful attitudes, pleafing ne- 
 gligence of drapery, and in a word no ordi- 
 nary degree of every excellence. It was the 
 praife of Raphael, that, though he fell ftiort 
 of fome in colouring, yet while he furpafled 
 in grace, he likewife was mafter of more of 
 the excellent parts of painting than any other 
 artift. It was a like univerfality of tafte, along 
 with great power of imagination, that enabled 
 
 Hannibal
 
 412 Tajle ejjentuil to PartIIL 
 
 Hannibal Carracci to unite in himfelf the per- 
 fedions of all former artiils, and to imitate 
 them at his pleafure. 
 
 In a word, every work of genius muft, in 
 its charadleriftical excellences and defeds, bear 
 plain marks of the degree in which its au- 
 thor poflefled any of the perfedions of tafte. 
 Every man's peculiar tafte, exerting itfelf 
 along with his imagination, puts him on 
 fearching for fuch conceptions as it moft re- 
 lifhes, on moulding them into that form which 
 fuits it beft, on adopting fuch as it approves, on 
 avoiding and rejeding whatever it difapproves. 
 
 I SHALL take occafion here to remark a 
 difference between genius for fcience, and ge- 
 nius for the arts, refulting from the diverfity 
 of all the powers employed in thefe two de- 
 partments, and of the manner in which they 
 are employed, a difference that, for this rea- 
 fon, falls not properly under any of the par- 
 ticular heads hitherto confidered. The exer- 
 tions of fcientific genius have in their nature 
 a certain fedatenefs, gravity, and aufterity : 
 genius for the arts operates with a kind of 
 fprightlinefs, gaiety, vivacity, or impetuofity. 
 This difference may be accounted for from the 
 obfervations which we have already made. 
 
 It
 
 Sect.VI. Genius for the Arts, 413 
 
 It arifes in fome meafure from the different 
 degrees and manners in which judgment is 
 exercifed in thefe two kinds of genius. All 
 the exertions of judgment about truth, are in 
 their nature cool and compofed ; and in the 
 operation of fcientific genius, thefe exertions 
 are almoft uninterrupted. An idea is no fooner 
 fuggefted than it is examined, fcrutinized, 
 and reafoned upon, and deliberately purfued 
 through all its confequences : this exercife 
 calms, and as it were depreffes the foul, and 
 gives a caft of ferioufnefs to the operation of 
 genius in inveftigating truth. Invention in 
 the arts, requires not fo continual an exercife 
 of judgment, and therefore wants that cafl:. 
 The exertion of judgment has a greater de- 
 gree of fedatenefs, and more depreffes the foul, 
 when reafoning is neceffary, than when the 
 decifion is intuitive ; and the more intricate 
 and laborious the reafoning is, the greater is 
 the fedatenefs and ferioufnefs vv^ith which it is 
 purfued. In fcientific invention, judgment is 
 exercifed chiefly in reafoning. But in the 
 arts, an idea fuggefted, generally appears fit or 
 unfit at firft fight, and is adopted or rejeQed 
 in an inftant ; even when it needs to be 
 canvaffed, this is done without a laborious 
 
 fcrutiny,
 
 414 Tajle ejfemlal to Part III. 
 
 fcrutiny, and therefore without introducing 
 Iblemnity of difpofition. 
 
 The perception of truth is an indifferent 
 feeUng ; the fentiments oi tajle dxo, not indif- 
 ferent : the conclufions which the philofopher 
 forms in the courfe of his inveftigation, are 
 apprehended without any fenfatioa of plea- 
 fure ; the work of the artift, in the feveral 
 ileps of his progrefs, is continually gratifying 
 his tafle, giving him fenfations of delight, and 
 by means of thefe elevating his mind and en- 
 livening his temper. The inventer in fcienjce 
 has often indeed high pleafure from the con- 
 fcioufnefs of fuccefs ; but the artift enjoys this 
 in common with him, and has all the plea- 
 fures of taRe fuperadded to it. If the philo- 
 fopher's pleafure in the gratification of his cu- 
 riofity is to be confidered as diftind from the 
 agreeable confcioufnefs of fuccefs., yet it is a 
 fatisfadion of a more fedate nature than moft 
 of the gratifications of tafte, and therefore lefs 
 fit for enlivening the foul. 
 
 The exertions of the imagination have in 
 themfelves fomething brifk and fprightly ; 
 but thofe exertions of it, which enter into fci- 
 entific genius, have lefs of this charatSter than 
 ^he flights of fancy roaming tlu'jugh all the 
 3 remotefl
 
 Si:cT. VI. Genius for the Arts, 415 
 
 remoteft relations, and often likewife animated 
 by the influence of the pafTions, which take 
 place in the arts : and confequently, fcientific 
 genius would be more fedate and compofed 
 than the other kind, though the continued 
 and laborious interpofition of judgment did 
 Bot check the natural gaiety and impetuofity 
 of imagination. The mind is perhaps occu- 
 pied with equal intenfenefs in both kinds of 
 invention ; and hence enthufiafm is common 
 to both kinds of genius : but the mind is oc- 
 cupied in different ways ; different faculties 
 of it are principally engaged. In fcience, 
 judgment is employed as much as imagina- 
 tion ; and in fcientific genius, that complexion 
 is predominant which marks the exertions of 
 the former : its operations are fedate and com- 
 pofed, and it is generally attended with foli- 
 dity of temper, and with a character whofe 
 very peculiarities have a certain gravity and 
 ftayednefs. In the arts, judgment is lefs fre- 
 quently interpofed, and it is interpofed with 
 lefs labour, imagination is left at liberty to 
 purfue its courfe without a continual check,, 
 and therefore purfues it with a fort of ala- 
 crity and chearfulnefs, heightened by the ever 
 returning approbations of tafle: genius for 
 
 the
 
 41 6 Power of Execution necejjary Part III. 
 
 the arts, partakes generally in this tempera- 
 ment of imagination ; it Is Tprightly in all its 
 motions, and is often accompanied with a 
 turn of charaQier gay, unftaid, or defultory. 
 Sometimes indeed a melancholy call is found 
 along with great genius in the arts; when it 
 is, it proceeds either from a fimilar call of 
 imagination, or from quick fenfibility, the 
 common attendant of a lively fancy and a de- 
 licate talle, too llrongly affected by the gloo- 
 mier views of human life. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 The Poiver of Execution neceffary to Genius 
 
 for the Arts, 
 
 CIENTIFIC genius compleats its 
 operations by invention ; at leaft, very 
 ordinary talents are fufficient for expreffing its 
 difcoveries, and it is not confidered as fufFer- 
 ing a very great diminution of its proper 
 merit, from the want of ability for elegant 
 expreflion: but genius for the arts implies, 
 in every cafe, not only the power of inven- 
 tion, but alfo the power of execution. In 
 different arts, the manners of expreflion, or 
 6 the
 
 Sect. VII. to Genius for the Arts, 417 
 
 the iiiftruments of execution are fo different, 
 that, without entering into the peculiarities of 
 thefe, it is not poffible to explain fully this 
 ' part of genius. But a capacity of employing 
 fome inftrument, fo as to exprefs the concep- 
 tions of the imagination, is common to ge- 
 nius for all the arts. Some obfervations will, 
 therefore, be proper, Goncerning that capa- 
 xity, ifi far as, it is thus common. This is all 
 that we fliall attempt at prefent. 
 
 A CAPAGITY for execution is fometimes 
 found in a perfon who has no power of inven- 
 tion; but when It Is, it implies not any de- 
 ■gfee'of geniu^.^ There are ^mechanics who 
 can execute a machine from *»» model or pat- 
 ^tem, with gr^at dexterity anrf* neatnefs, who 
 could not haA^e contrived that machine, who 
 'could not fo-'iHuch as have conceived it from 
 ^'a defcripticn, and who could not make any 
 ^improvement on the ftru(£ture of the fimpleft 
 -utenfily There ,^ic perfons who can paint 
 "^ very exadly after a copy, but could not de- 
 f'fign^an'hiftorlcalipfdure, or a land (cape, nor 
 *^ even' draw a: portrait from the life. Perfons 
 *^' incapable of mufical'iinVention, may yet be 
 "^admirable performers., 'Iti^^ poetry, a power 
 of execution feparated fi,;orn^, every degree of 
 ' - E e the 
 
 ■■f. f : >
 
 4i8 Potvei' of Execution necejfary Part III. 
 
 the correfpondent invention, is perhaps more 
 rare than in any of the other artsj yet there 
 are tolerable verfifiers, who could not derive 
 from their ow^n fund, any part of the plan of 
 a poem. It would be an impropriety to attri- 
 bute genius to fuch perfons ; it is fcarce ever 
 attributed to them, by thofe who think with 
 the leaft precifion ; the capacity which they 
 fhow, is fometimes termed ingenuity, but it 
 is always diftinguifhed from that fort of inge- 
 nuity which belongs to invention : 
 
 Diftat ab ingenio longe manus,— (^:) 
 
 fays a writer on painting ; the obfervation is 
 applicable to all the arts. 
 
 On the other hand, there may be fome 
 degree of invention in a particular art, with- 
 out a capacity of correfpondent execution. A 
 perfon may compofe in mufic, who cannot 
 perform. Many have invented the fubjeit of 
 a pidure, and in idea deligned the whole of 
 it, fo that, from their defcription of their 
 conception, a mailer might execute it, though 
 they themfelves never ufed the pencil. Others 
 might proceed a ftep farther; they could 
 fketch out the piece, without being able to 
 
 {a) Fresnoy de arte graph, ver. 494. 
 
 colour
 
 Se c T . VII. to Genius for the Arts, 4 1 9 
 
 colour it. It is remarked of Pietro Tefta, 
 that in drawings, his execution is both ma- 
 fterly and correct, but notwithftanding this, 
 and notwithftanding his having poflelTed in- 
 vention fublime and exuberant, he attempted 
 often, without fuccefs, to acquire the art of 
 colouring. In like manner, a perfon may con- 
 ceive the whole plan of a poem, and even 
 exprefs it agreeably in profe, who cannot 
 cloath it with numbers. The Telemachus 
 of Fenelon is a dired example of this. Such 
 perfons poflefs real genius, and perhaps a high 
 degree of it, fo far as it extends : but they 
 fhow not a genius complete in the art to which 
 it points. In order to compleat genius in any 
 of the arts, a man mull poflefs the power of 
 employing a proper vehicle, congruous to the 
 nature of that art, for conveying the concep- 
 tions of his imagination to the fenfes and the 
 fouls of other men. It is this that puts it in 
 the power of genius to fhow itfelf : without 
 this, its fineft conceptions would perifh, like 
 an infant in the womb ; without this, the 
 brighteft imagination would be like a vigo- 
 rous mind confined in a lame or paralytic 
 body. Want of fkill in execution was, per- 
 haps, the only thing that hindered fome of 
 
 E e 2 the
 
 426 Power of Execution necejfary Part III. 
 
 the earlieft painters, and fome of the firft re- 
 ftbrers of the art, who* are now neglected and 
 almoft fbfg5tten, from obtaining a Very high 
 
 .H.ivj ^,,, 
 
 rank." "'"'^ 
 
 In every art, expreflion contains fomething 
 ihechahidal. : In painting, the management of 
 the pebcil; in -niufic, the ufe of the inftru- 
 feentjmJbeVry/ the:. artifice of numbers, or 
 dexterity in verll'fying, are in a great meafure 
 mechanical. So far, expreffion rtiay be learn- 
 ed ; and' without exercife, no perfon can be- 
 come perfe(3;' iti it. The greatcfl geniufes 
 ^^ve bden fehfibfe of this: Apelles made it 
 a rule to paint fomething every day (b), Ti- 
 . tian for' mahy years copied whatever he im- 
 (dertbolj:,' with great labour and care, that he 
 Itnlght thiis acquire an eafy manner (r). But 
 there are many whom no exercife or inftruc- 
 'tion will be fufEcient for rendering mafters of 
 it. ' A certain, turn of mind is neceffary for 
 'acquiring It V^ arid that turn of mind which 
 *fits a . perfon for learning eafily and welt- the 
 "mechanical' part of 'expreiflion" in any particu- 
 
 -^-*(.^). Apelli. ffiit .^lip^uin perpetua confuetudo, nunquain 
 
 "tant occufJatam diem agendi, ut non, lineam ducendo, exer- 
 
 xie'ret artenv; quod ab eo irtproverbiom venit. ' Flin. Nat. 
 
 -Jiiji. lib, x;^-xv. Qap. 10. 1. ■. ^ . . ' . 
 
 ■^,A*'^-' -•■- ,--44. -,> 'vr, - -'i \UiK> Dilj {Ctjra 
 \c) Fkbsnoy z juifgmsfit c/ Fawterr, ^ * 
 
 ~^4^^-3 -> -■ <.^ lop
 
 S,EC r. VII. to Genius for ths Arts^ 45 1 
 
 lar art, is an ingredient in genius for that 
 art- 
 
 A GOOD deal of previous knpwlege is like- 
 wife neceflary for a perfon's executing in any^ 
 of the arts. Knowlege, for itiffaiice, of the 
 words of a language, of its ftrudture,' of th^ 
 meafures which fuit it, is prerequifite to the' 
 poet; knowlege of anatomy, of perfpc^tive,'' 
 of the nature of colours, to the pointer. But 
 a turn of mind congruous to the particular 
 kind of knowlege, will affift him greatly m 
 acquiring it ; and an imagination fuited to 
 any of the fine arts, is atfolutely neceltary fot 
 enabjing him to perceive, nay for prompting 
 him to confider, how his knowlege may b^ 
 applied to that art. In the moment of execu- 
 tion alfo, imagination is employed in fuggeft- 
 ing this knowlege, and rendering it fubfervieiit 
 to. the prefent purpofe. Such a turn of mindi^, 
 and fuch a ftru6ture of imagination, as fits 
 for this, is neceflary for compleating a geniu^ 
 ipr the arts. ^, - '* 
 ^'^HE power of expreflion, fo far as it dif- 
 fers both from mechanical dexterity, and from 
 Kovvlege acquired by uudy^, confifts jierhaps 
 entirely iT^ a ciap^^^^ of fe'tVirig abjeds in fuch 
 a light that they may kffe^ Others with the 
 ^ E fe 3 ^ fame
 
 422 Power of ExecutioniuceJJary Part III. 
 
 fame ideas, aflbciations, and feelings, with 
 which the artift is afFeded. This capacity 
 arifes chiefly from fuch force of imagination 
 as at once renders the conception of things 
 precife and definite, and leads a perfon to 
 forefee readily what effedl every touch in the 
 expreflion will produce, or to conceive quickly 
 the proper means of producing any defired 
 effed. This is obvioufly refolveable into aflb- 
 ciation, and therefore will, in every art, be 
 found to fpring from the fame principles of the 
 mind, which form the fource of invention in 
 that art. It is quicknefs and readinefs in thus 
 forefeeing and conceiving, that in a great mea- 
 fure renders the execution fpirited ; it alone 
 can prevent the neceflity of frequently alter- 
 ing and retouching, which never fails to pro- 
 duce deadnefs and languor. 
 
 It fometimes happens that particular cir- 
 cumftances render it impoffible to employ the 
 moft obvious and direct means of producing a 
 certain effect. It fhows great power of ex- 
 preflion to contrive readily, in fuch a cafe, 
 fome other means lefs obvious. The moft 
 natural means of marking the principal figure 
 in a piifture, is by the ftrength of the lights ; 
 a peculiarity in the difpofition.may fometimes 
 
 prevent
 
 Sect. VII. to Genius for the Arts, 423 
 
 prevent the painter from ufing this means, 
 and he may notwithftanding render his prin- 
 cipal figure confpicuous, by a peculiarity in 
 the colouring. The contrivance of Timan- 
 thes, an ancient painter, is well knov^rn, and 
 has been often applauded : in the facrifice of 
 Iphigenia, being unable to give to the father 
 a greater degree of forrow than he had given 
 to the other fpedators, he produced the fame 
 efFe<Sl by concealing his face {d]. 
 
 It always fhows real genius to execute 
 one's beautiful inventions by the inftruments 
 and in the manners which are well known, 
 and have been long in ufe. But a much 
 greater degree of genius was difplayed by 
 thofe artifts who firft brought thefe inftru- 
 ments into ufe, or who confiderably improved 
 the manner of ufing them. If it be true that 
 
 {^) Ejus enim eft Iphigenia, oratorum laudlbus celebrata : 
 qua ftante ad aras peritura, cum moeftos pinxiflet omnes, prre- 
 cipue patrem ; cum triftitiai omnem imaginem confumpfiflet, 
 patris ipfius vultum velavit, quem digne non poterat often- 
 dere. Plin. Nat. Hi'^. lib. xxxv. cap. lo. Ut fecit Ti- 
 mantes, ut opinor, Cithnius, in ea tabula qua Colotem 
 Teium vicit. Nam cum in Iphigeniae immolatione pinxilfet 
 triftem Calchantem, triftiorem Ulyffem, addidiflct Menelao 
 quem fummum poterat ars efficere moerorem, confumptis aiFec- 
 tibus, non reperiens quo digne modo patris vultum pofTct 
 exprimere, velavit ejus caput, et fuo cuique animo dedit ^fti- 
 mandum. Quint. Inji. Orat. lib. ii. cap. 15, See alfo 
 Valer.Max. lib. viii. cap. 11. 
 
 £04 Apol-
 
 ji^^lf Poiuer of ExecutioHneceJfary PatitHL' 
 
 Apollodorus was the firft who had the art of 
 expreffing the lights arid fliades in painting, 
 he by this fhowed a higher genius in expref- 
 Aori, than they who have, even with the 
 greateil fuccefs, pfadiifed that art, fiace he 
 difcovered it. Correggio fhowed great origi-' 
 nality by introducing a new and pccuHar. 
 manner of diftribtiting hghts, fo as to give 
 uncommon force and roundnefs to his pic- 
 tures (<?). The poet who firft introduced a 
 meafure adapted to a pafticiilar Toft of fub- 
 jed-S, and ufed it properly, haS a claim to 
 genius in exprefTion, fuperidrio' thcir's who. 
 . have afterwards written poems in that fuit- 
 able meafure. Spenfer's' ftanza may be re- 
 garded as one indication of his genius, though 
 the irnitation of it by others has been fomejr. 
 times cenfured as injudicious. 
 
 It generally happens, that the expreflion 
 of an artift, bears the fame chara61:er with his' 
 invention. It is natural that it.fliould; the 
 imagination influences both, by many of the 
 fame principles. ' Pindar^s fancy was wild, 
 his verfmcation alfQ.isirregulaTk.. Pope's ima- 
 gination was correct,,; fb^, is .|?is^. -i^l^^ru^rB^ 
 fometimes, the invention ahd the expreflionf 
 
 : .,.:...■■ ,:u. ., ; . 1-, ■ ■'■■ 
 
 (*) F R E s N Y 's 'Judgment of Painters^ 
 
 "^ are
 
 SECTiVII. to CBnius for the Jrts. 425 
 
 are of different complexions. In invention 
 Pietro Tefta was enthufiaftic and incoherent, 
 but his drawing was elegantly corredt. Such 
 diflbnance between the. two Qperations of ge- 
 nius in the arts, may arife from a^diflimila- 
 rity in the turn of his imagination and his 
 tafte. It may arifc iikewife from a defedt, or 
 from an excellence, in the mechanical part of 
 expreffion. A defed: in this will render the 
 organs unable to do juftice to the' conceptions. 
 The. beft poet may exprefs his ideas , to great 
 difadvantage by writing in a dead or foreign 
 language. Freedom and eafinefs of invention 
 is afcribed to Simon Memmi, but the art of 
 painting was in his time fo much in its infan- 
 cy, that hia execution could not throv%^ off the 
 tpmrary character of liiffnefs. The earlieft 
 works even of Raphael and Titian, fhow fome 
 drinefs in the execution,, incongruous to their 
 other excellences, ovv^ing either to the v\'ant 
 of pradice, or >td^ the imperfed: manner of 
 their mafters [f). On the other hand, a 
 great dexterity in "the" mechanical -part, may 
 taife the executioA'tQ a degree or kind of ex- 
 cellence, far beyond the artift's power of in- 
 vention. Many painters have very liapplly 
 
 ij") Ibid,- iindiOh/er'OatU'ns on' htT jirt of Painting, 
 
 '^ 5 copied 

 
 4^6 Of the Union of Part III. 
 
 copied a manner of execution very unlike to 
 their own turn of genius. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of the Union of different Kinds of Genius, 
 
 TH E fum of what has been faid, is 
 this : fcientific genius arifes from fuch 
 "vigour of imagination as difpofes a perfon to 
 be affected chiefly by the ftrongeft and moft 
 important relations of things, particularly by 
 caufation and co-exiftence, operating power- 
 fully, giving a propenfity to fet every objedt 
 in that attitude in which it lays a foundation 
 for thefe relations ; and making all the other 
 principles of affociation to adt in fubordination 
 to thefe ; and it requires the afliftance both of 
 an exad: and folid judgment, and of an accu- 
 rate and diftind: memory. Genius for the 
 arts fprings from fuch livelinefs of imagina- 
 tion as difpofes a perfon to attend chiefly to 
 thofe qualities of things, which lay a founda- 
 tion for relations between them and many 
 others, to be aff'eded by the flighter degrees 
 of relation, or by the more trivial relations, 
 efpecially to be aduated by refemblance, as 
 his predominant and leading principle of aflb- 
 
 ciation ;
 
 Sect. VIIL different Kinds of Genius. 427 
 
 elation; with a memory fimllarly turned; 
 and it requires for compleating it, a quicknefs 
 of difcernment, and great acutenefs and live- 
 linefs of tafte; together with the power of 
 imparting, by means of fome fenfible inftru- 
 ment, his own fentiments and conceptions to 
 other men. 
 
 All the principles combined in genius, 
 are very differently modified in thefe two 
 fpecies of it ; in fome principal refpedts, the 
 modifications are even oppofite. This abun- 
 dantly expofes a conceit, which has been very 
 crudely thrown out by fome (^), in oppofition 
 to the plaineft experience, That a man who 
 has genius in one way, wiH have equal ge- 
 nius in any other way to which he is pleafed 
 to turn himfelf with equal application ; nay, 
 that there is no original difference between 
 thofe who difplay the greateft genius, and 
 thofe who fhow none : but that all the differ- 
 ence between genius and no genius, between 
 genius of one kind and of another, arifes 
 from education, ftudy, adventitious caufes, 
 and acquired habits. The affertion is irrccon- 
 cileable to the commonefl appearances in hu- 
 man life ; and in the whole courfe of this 
 
 (<») See Rv FFHE ad's Z//?o/^ /*«/?. 
 
 enquiry,
 
 428 Q/^^ ^/"^.^ '^.;,i .P^^T^fe 
 
 enquiry,; we have found that the^e are, In the 
 principles of human nature, originaj and per-, 
 manent varieties which «niuft produce jremark- 
 able differences in point of genius*, . •^ , ', .;: 
 .From thefe varieties it. would jrather leerti . 
 tou follow^ that genius, foj: fcierice, ^nd ^e- 
 nius for the arts, are incompatible. But this 
 would be the Qant;rary,, extreme : experience 
 fhows that they are not. Net to mention 
 
 thofe -:who lipf^b^en^jbpLth^^^^^^ 
 
 orators ; even mor^ediifimilar forms pf genius 
 have been united. Among the ancients, Pam- 
 philus was. at once a j)airiter, and a mathema- 
 tician {b)i . Metrodorua was reckoned ohe of 
 the moft ■iearned philofophers,- and, Hkewife. 
 one of the, inoft fkilf ul paiiiters,^ that Athens 
 
 produced" 11?: "hi^ ^"'^M- V ^i"^i^^#3f 
 derns, Leonardi da Vinci was a painter, fcujp- 
 
 cif ue srithmetka .«r| gepmeArij*. PtiN. Nat. uyi, YtQ.'XfXf* 
 cap. 10. . . - ^ , ^ 
 
 (f) Eodem tempore erat Metfodorus piftor, idemqaiirphilo. 
 ibphur, magnae in utr?que fcientia audoritatis, luque cum 
 Lucius Paulus, devidlo Perfeo, j>etiiiTet' ab Athenicnfibus," ut 
 quem probaaffimu»Ti philofoplium riiitferefit fibi/^ad ■efudktCh 
 dos liberos,,.iteinquepidGrem a,d tnuijiphum e5<;c9lendum, 
 Athenienfes MetrOdorum elegeru'rit ; profeffi eundtiti' iit iltrb- 
 que deflderio piTjftantilfiir.um. Plin. ib. cap. 11, 
 
 ^^■''^-- ^-^s-^-^i^i tor. 
 
 »,■•-■ ^ At* ^
 
 ^E'd^i Vill. different Hinds of Genius. 429 
 
 tor, archited:, mufician, and at the fame time 
 a chemifl and mathematician. Aiiguftine 
 Carrachi was a very good painter, excelled in 
 ^ilgi^aving, fucceeded in poetry^ and fhowed 
 a turn-alfo fortnufic, rhetoric, natural philo* 
 fcphy, and mathematics. It is remarkable 
 that both Titian's fon Horatio, and Parme^ 
 giano, entered fo deep into chemical refearches. 
 Eft ''by-nthediii' to --empoverifh themfelves. 
 ^iivg3Lrti^s j4nafyjis df Beauty fhows that he 
 ^aid' g€ftius forr^philofophical inveftigation ; 
 sffidliiB genius in his own art, was very high^. 
 ^Blkll^y, with a great degree of mathematical 
 ^g'eniu'Si fhowed fome degree of the poetical. 
 B€i%tie^sEJfayGtt Truth fhows him to be it 
 philofopher; his genius in poetry is confefled. 
 Aft ianioh of different kinds of :genius cannot 
 take place except when all the affociating 
 p)rincipl€S have— -a* Confiderable degree of 
 ftrerigthi add the iniagination is, at the fame 
 tim:e capable of a Very lively and command'- 
 ing impreffion from the particular end that is 
 M view. 'It arifes diredly from x\\2it flexibi- 
 lity of ■ ithaginatiott^ which was fufficiently 
 explained already [d]^ Great flexibility join- 
 ed even to at moderate fancy, will produce a 
 
 -"'«='" ■t4-f«.ti?reii: si" »''2'-'^"rf' ,) 
 
 •'"-•'■-' ■ little
 
 43 o Of the Union of Part III* 
 
 little genius in various departments ; joined 
 to a fine imagination, it will enable a man to 
 excel in various ways : the fined imagination, 
 with little flexibility, will be confined to one 
 way, or at moft be excellent but in one. 
 
 Indeed, even when a perfon unites in him* 
 felf different kinds of genius, it will be gene- 
 rally found, that he excels only in one de- 
 partment, and that in others his genius is of 
 an inferior order. In the fubje(St to which 
 his genius is moft adapted, it exerts itfelf 
 with vigour ; it follows the aflbciating prin- 
 ciple which is naturally prevalent. In the 
 fubjedt to which it is lefs adapted, it operates 
 more heavily ; it follows an affociating prin- 
 ciple which is hy foreign caufes forced into a 
 temporary predominance. The efFe(Sts of ge- 
 nius in the former cafe, are like fruits fuit- 
 able to the climate, which attain their perfed 
 flavour ; in the latter, they are like fruits 
 raifed by artificial heat, in a climate not pro- 
 per for them, which remain infipid, and ne- 
 ver reach their full maturity. Under the 
 guidance of the principle of aflbciation na- 
 turally predominant, the other principles 
 operate with fuch alacrity as fubjeds fhow in 
 ferving their rightful king ; under the gui- 
 dance
 
 Sect. VIII. different Kinds of Genius. 43 1 
 
 dance of any other principle, their operation 
 refembles the fpiritlefs backwardnefs with 
 which a people obey an ufurper or a con- 
 queror. 
 
 When a perfon's genius is naturally turned 
 to one of thefe objedts, fcience or the arts, it 
 will require very powerful caufes to lead him 
 to exert it about the other. It will perhaps 
 be found, that almoft no perfon has done fo> 
 except when he was impelled to it by a pecu- 
 liar education, by very forcible example, by 
 being thrown into a way of life which required 
 it, or by circumllances of the like nature. 
 
 It may likewife be remarked, that, in fome 
 inftances, perhaps in fome of thofe formerly 
 produced, the union of thefe dijQTimilar forms 
 of genius, is only apparent, not real. Ge^ 
 nius in one way, has been accompanied, not 
 by the power of invention, but merely by 
 capacity^ in the other way. It muft be own- 
 ed, that generally Nature is more frugal of 
 her gifts, than to lavifh on one man, very 
 , unlike modifications of genius. The greatelt 
 inventers in fcience, have fcarce ever fhowu 
 genius in the arts. Ariftotle was perhaps the 
 moft inventive among the ancient philofo- 
 phers ; and his ftile, though very precife, 
 
 exatf^,
 
 432 vAirA^'(y//7<? Union of Part III. 
 
 exadi, and fuitable to. .tbefubtility of philo- 
 fophy, fhows a turn of imirid, little adapted 
 either to poetry or to eloquence; even his 
 critical works difplay more of cool judgment^ 
 ipatient a<"tention, and deep refledlion, than of 
 that ardor of tafte, Vv-hich never fails to attend 
 geniiis for the fine arts. On the other^hahd^ 
 the grea'tefli geniufes 'for the arts, have gene- 
 rally betrayed a want iof that precifion and 
 depth which are neceflary for fcientilic invefr 
 tigations. nl .ro'inonbr 
 
 Some have fuppofed a diftin<5felve peculi^ 
 arity fo ilrongly impreiled by Nature, on every 
 man of genius, as to aflert, that the fame 
 perfon can fcarce excel in two different arts, 
 however analogous; that no writer* for ex- 
 ample, ever almoft fucceeded both in verfe 
 and profe ; nay, that the fam.e perfon cannot 
 excel in both the fpecies of dramatic poetry, 
 tragedy and comedy (J). In fupport of fuch 
 afi'ertions it is remarked, that none of the 
 ancients undertook both thefe fpecies pf .the 
 drama ; and with the fame view, the wretch- 
 ednefs of the Roman orator's poetry is often 
 mentioned. It would be unjuft, however, 
 to eftimate the compafs of human genius 
 
 {d) Rambler, No, 169. '" ''^ 
 
 from
 
 Sect. VIII. different Kinds of Genius, 433 
 
 from fuch inftanees. Homer, the father of 
 the epic poem, hath left a work wholly of the 
 ludicrous kind. It would perhaps be difficult 
 to determine whether Shakefpear poffefled 
 greater excellence in tragedy or in comedy ; 
 that he pofleffed very great excellence in both, 
 is unqueftionable. In both, feveral other mo- 
 derns have fhown real genius. Many have 
 likewife been both orators and poets. But 
 after all, it muft be owned that, in moft cafes, 
 a man's genius fits him not only for faience 
 alone, or for the arts alone, but alfo for one 
 fcience, or for one art. Many have fhown 
 genius either in mathematics, or in natural 
 philofophy, or in the philofophy of the mind, 
 who have difcovcred none in the refl: of thefe 
 branches. It appears from Pope's letters, 
 that he applied to painting with confiderable 
 eagernefs, it does not appear that he diico- 
 vered any great degree of genius for paint- 
 ing; for mufic, it is faid that he had not 
 even a confiderable capacity, though he fhows 
 the quickefl: fenfe of the harmony t.: verfe; 
 if it be true, it would appear that, among the 
 arts, his genius confmed him almcH: wholly 
 to poetry. In humorous painting, Hogarth 
 was unrivalled j he attempted portrait-paint- 
 
 F f ing,
 
 434 Of the Union, &c. Part III* 
 
 ing, it is faid, with the moll wretched fuc- 
 cefs. 
 
 It feems then to be the common, though 
 not ftridly the univerfal, law of human na-» 
 ture, that genius fits the perfon who is endued 
 with it, for invention in fome one particular 
 art, or particular fcience. Still, therefore, 
 there is room for enquiring, by what minuter 
 varieties of the powers combined in genius, 
 thefe fubordinate differences of its form are 
 6xt. The enquiry would be laborious and 
 intricate, but it would be curious, and, per-* 
 haps, not without utility. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 » A
 
 ERRATA: 
 
 In the Text. 
 
 Page 76. line 19. /orconftrufting, reinventing. P. 84.' 
 I. 14. /or altogether, read all together. P. 125. I S, 9. 
 read in making them to fuggeft one another. P. 2c^. L 9. 
 for bring, read brings. P. 409. 1. 14. /or Sarts, read Sitto. 
 P. 410. U 14. /or principle, r^«</ principles. 
 
 In the Notes* 
 
 Page 11. 1. ult. read magnumque. P. 20. 1. %. for (;), 
 place (,) after yxha^i. lb. 1 g. for ^Zxt read^ux. P. 24. 
 1. 6. /or videre, r^«</ videri. P. 29. 1. 2. /or aiaSflrK* r^a^ 
 «»<79wK. 1. ^» for fMYifioHuttt read ^ivniMnvui* 1. 6» /or ^t?r»faw9aj»
 
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