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 Indian Fights & Fighters
 
 THE LAST OF CUSTER 
 Drawing by E. L. Blumenschein
 
 AMERICAN FIGHTS AND FIGHTERS SERIES 
 
 Indian Fights and 
 
 Fighters 
 
 THE SOLDIER AND THE SIOUX 
 BY 
 
 CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY, LL.D. 
 
 Author of "Colonial," " Border," and " Revolutionary" 
 Fights and Fighters 
 
 Illustrated with Original Drawings by 
 Remington, Schreyvogel, Blumenschein, Crawford, Elwell, 
 
 Deming, and Zogbaum, 
 
 With Maps, Photographs, and Sketches from life from original 
 
 Sources, many of which are now published 
 
 For the first time 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 McCLURE, PHILLIPS & CO. 
 MCMIV
 
 Copyright, 1904, by 
 
 McCLURE, PHILLIPS & CO. 
 
 Published, December, 1904, N 
 
 Copyright, 1904, by The Pearson Publishing Company
 
 To that most eminent and useful 
 
 CHURCHMAN AND CITIZEN 
 
 OZI WILLIAM WHITAKER, D.D., LL.D. 
 Of 
 
 Whom I admire as a CLERIC, respect as a 
 MAN, and love as a FRIEND 
 
 3 Dedicate 
 
 q/" the West 
 
 He served so well
 
 PREFACE
 
 T 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 "^HE writing of history requires three operations : 
 (I) The collection of facts; (II) The classifica- 
 tion and arrangement of facts; (III) The 
 presentation and discussion of facts. I have 
 collected the facts related in this book from every source 
 open to me. These sources may be divided into two 
 groups: (i) Published and (2) unpublished, matter. 
 The published matter includes (a) official records; 
 (b) books, and (c) magazine or other ephemeral articles. 
 The unpublished matter includes (a) letters and (b) 
 verbal communications. 
 
 I have made use of all these sources of information in 
 gathering the facts. A list of some of the printed au- 
 thorities consulted follows this preface. In addition 
 thereto, I beg to acknowledge written communications 
 from the following American Army officers, all now on 
 the retired list except Colonels Godfrey and Brainard 
 and Captain Livermore: Lieutenant-General Nelson A. 
 Miles; Major-General Robert P. Hughes; Brigadier- 
 Generals Henry B. Carrington, George A. Forsyth, 
 Louis H. Carpenter, Anson Mills, Charles A. Woodruff 
 and Theo. F. Rodenbough; Colonel Edward E. S. God- 
 frey, commanding the Ninth Cavalry; Colonel David 
 L. Brainard, Commissary of Subsistence; Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Samuel M. Horton; Captains Henry R. Lemly,
 
 Preface 
 
 Francis M. Gibson, Nathan S. Jarvis, George E. Albee 
 and R. L. Livermore, Tenth Cavalry; and the following 
 civilians : President E. Benjamin Andrews ; Doctors 
 T. E. Oertel and D. D. Thompson ; Messrs. W. Kent 
 Thomas, Sigmund Schlesinger, Edward Esmonde, 
 Phineas Towne, W. R. E. Collins, Hugh M. Johnson, 
 Herbert Myrick, R. J. Smyth, William E. Morris, 
 Nicholas E. Boyd, Theo. W. Goldin and Arthur Chap- 
 man ; Mrs. Guy V. Henry and- Mrs. James Powell. 
 
 In addition to these letters I have gathered much 
 information in conversation with officers and others, 
 not only recently but during many years spent in the 
 West, where I was a frequent guest at army posts, in 
 frontier towns, and at some of the Indian reservations. 
 I knew many of the participants in the stirring inci- 
 dents and heard the fascinating stories from their own 
 lips. 
 
 The chapters of the Fort Phil Kearney series have 
 been read and corrected as to matters of fact by General 
 Carrington and Colonel Horton; those referring to the 
 defense of Beecher's Island, by General Forsyth; those 
 describing the relief of Forsyth and the fight on the 
 Beaver, by General Carpenter; those relating to the 
 Little Big Horn campaign, by General Woodruff" and 
 Colonel Godfrey, and the account of the affair at Slim 
 Buttes and the death of American Horse, by General 
 Mills. All of these gentlemen gave me interesting de- 
 tails, anecdotes, etc., besides answering all my inquiries. 
 Several of them put their private papers at my disposal. 
 To Colonel Godfrey I am especially indebted for much 
 interesting matter on the Little Big Horn campaign, 
 and to Captain Gibson for the use of his unprinted ac- 
 count of the Battle of the Washita. The Office of the 
 Secretary of War has been most kind in answering ques-
 
 Preface 
 
 tions and furnishing information not otherwise procur- 
 able. Mr. W. H. Holmes, Chief of the Bureau of Am- 
 erican Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, has decided 
 all questions as to the proper spelling of Indian names,* 
 and has given me the Indian equivalents of the names 
 of prominent chiefs, as Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, etc. 
 
 Several of the papers following are original contri- 
 butions especially prepared for this book. The authors 
 of these papers are indicated hereafter. For all ex- 
 pressions of opinion, for all comments, notes and in- 
 ferences, not specifically attributed to somebody else, 
 I alone am responsible. 
 
 To all who have aided me to make this series author- 
 itative and definitive, my most grateful thanks are here- 
 by heartily expressed. 
 
 I trust that in thus striving to preserve the records of 
 those stirring times I have done history and posterity 
 a service. The majority of those who fought on the 
 plains have passed away. Many of the surviving par- 
 ticipants in the adventures described are growing old. 
 In a short time it would have been impossible to have 
 secured the information here presented unless some 
 one else had gone about it as I have. 
 
 With intervals devoted to other duties, I have been 
 over a year and a half engaged in this congenial task. 
 I have written literally hundreds of letters, to learn, or 
 to verify, a fact, an incident, or a conclusion. It is in- 
 teresting to call attention to the fact that information 
 has been freely and generously given to me from every 
 source whence I have asked it save three, one of which 
 is noted in the appendix. 
 
 The series of historical books of which this forms the 
 
 * Almost every author has a different way of spelling the names of the sub-tribes of 
 the Siouan family.
 
 Preface 
 
 fourth seems to have won a permanent place for itself. 
 The number of copies which found a welcome last year 
 was greater than the number of the year before, al- 
 though there was no new volume issued last fall to call 
 renewed attention to the series. These books are gen- 
 erally spoken of by the title of the first published, 
 "American Fights and Fighters." It has been deemed 
 proper, therefore, to adopt that name, which is suffi- 
 ciently explicit and descriptive, as the generic name of 
 the series. Hereafter all the books that have appeared, 
 and those that are yet to appear in this series, will bear 
 that general name, with the addition of a distinctive sub- 
 title in each instance. The covers of the earlier books, 
 accordingly, have been changed to read as follows: 
 
 1. American Fights and Fighters, Colo- 
 
 nial. 
 
 2. American Fights and Fighters, Revo- 
 
 lutionary 1812. 
 
 3. American Fights and Fighters, Border. 
 
 As I have stated, it is my hope to continue this series 
 of books until I have covered all the wars that have been 
 fought upon the American Continent since Columbus's 
 day. 
 
 So far as the American people are concerned 
 save in the case of the Mexican War their struggles 
 have generally been to establish a broader, nobler con- 
 ception of human freedom. I would not have any one 
 gather from this that our dealings with the Indian in- 
 variably have been characterized by that honesty and 
 honor which should be at the base of every national un- 
 dertaking far from it! In this book, without growing 
 sentimental, I have endeavored to be fair to the Indians;
 
 Preface 
 
 as in previous books, I have tried to deal justly by any 
 and every enemy.* To be honest and to be fair these 
 things are of prime importance in writing history and in 
 living life. 
 
 I am now at work on two other volumes, a book on 
 "South American Fights and Fighters" and a second 
 volume of "Indian Fights and Fighters." In this pro- 
 posed Indian book I shall take up the further struggles of 
 the United States with the Indians of the Northwest, 
 notably Chief Joseph's splendid migration with his Nez- 
 Perces, the dash of the Cheyennes for freedom, Captain 
 Jack and the Modoc War, the Ute War, the last out- 
 break of the Sioux, and various other affairs in the 
 Northwest. Thereafter I contemplate a third book 
 dealing with Arizona and the Apache. 
 
 I take this opportunity of asking every individual, 
 soldier or civilian, who participated in any of these cam- 
 paigns or battles, who has any material bearing upon 
 them, and who is willing to allow me to look over it, 
 kindly to send it to me in care of the publishers of this 
 book, as soon as possible, as I expect to issue the next 
 volume of the series next fall. Any such material will 
 be carefully preserved and returned by express in good 
 
 *For instance: Every time a body of troops engages in a fight with Indians and 
 the troops are outnumbered, or caught at a disadvantage, and the battle is continued 
 until the troops are slaughtered, such an affair is popularly called a "massacre "; as 
 "The Fetterman Massacre," "The Custer Massacre." I believe this to be an unwar- 
 ranted use of the term. Fetterman and Custer attacked the Indians and fought des- 
 perately until they and their men were all killed. I call that a " battle " not a "mas- 
 sacre." When an Indian war party raided a settlement or overwhelmed a train, or mur- 
 dered children and women, that, I think, was a "massacre"; but these two instances 
 were not. Consequently, I have carefully refrained from making use of that term in this 
 book, except where it is justifiable. The reader may not agree with me in this position, 
 but I would like to ask if any one ever heard of the "Massacre of Thermopylae " ? The 
 Greeks fought there until all, save one, were killed. The results there were exactly 
 those of the Fetterman affair and the battle of the Little Big Horn, but I have yet to 
 read in history that the Persians "massacred" the Greeks in that famous pass. What 
 is sauce for the Persians is sauce for the Red Men as well.
 
 Preface 
 
 order, and due credit also a copy of the book! will 
 be given for any which may be of use to me in the 
 next book, as in this one. 
 
 It is getting late, as I said, to write the history of some 
 of these things, and I am actuated by an earnest desire 
 to preserve the records before it is too late. Who will 
 help me ? Since I began writing history I have learned 
 to disregard no authority, however humble, and to 
 neglect no source of information, however obscure it 
 may appear to a casual inspection. Therefore send me 
 what you have or can prepare, and allow me to judge of 
 its value. 
 
 American people are usually more familiar with the 
 story of other peoples than with their own history. How 
 often have I heard the charge made that there is noth- 
 ing romantic or interesting in American history. I do 
 not see how any one could read even the chapter head- 
 ings of a book like this and say a thing like that. Where 
 are there more splendid stories of dauntless heroism, of 
 subtle strategy, of brilliant tactics, of fierce fighting, 
 than are contained in these pages ? I may have told 
 them indifferently and may be the subject of just criti- 
 cism therefor, but the stories at least are there. They 
 speak for themselves. I could not spoil them if I tried. 
 The facts ring like a trumpet-call to American manhood, 
 be it white, or red, or black. 
 
 CYRUS TOWNS END BRADY. 
 Brooklyn, N. Y., 
 
 August I, 1904.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 t 
 
 PART I 
 PROTECTING THE FRONTIER 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. THE POWDER RIVER EXPEDITION .... 3 
 
 II. THE TRAGEDY OF FORT PHIL KEARNEY . . .19 
 
 III. THE THIRTY-TWO AGAINST THE THREE THOUSAND 40 
 
 IV. PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF FORT PHIL KEARNEY AND 
 
 THE WAGON-BOX FIGHT 59 
 
 V. FORSYTH AND THE ROUGH RlDERS OF '68 . . . J2 
 VI. THE JOURNEY OF THE SCOUTS AND THE RESCUE OF 
 
 FORSYTH . . ... . . . . -97 
 
 VII. A SCOUT'S STORY OF THE DEFENSE OF BEECHER'S 
 
 ISLAND 113 
 
 VIII. CARPENTER AND His BRUNETTES. THE FIGHT ON 
 
 BEAVER CREEK . . . . . . . 123 
 
 IX. A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE BEAVER CREEK AFFAIR 136 
 
 X. THE BATTLE OF THE WASHITA 146 
 
 XI. CARR AND TALL BULL AT SUMMIT SPRINGS . . . 170
 
 Contents 
 
 PART II 
 THE WAR WITH THE SIOUX 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. WITH CROOK'S ADVANCE . 183 
 
 II. EX-TROOPER TOWNE ON THE ROSEBUD FIGHT . . 203 
 
 III. THE GRIEVANCE OF RAIN-IN-THE-FACE . . . 209 
 
 IV. THE LITTLE BIG HORN CAMPAIGN .... 216 
 V. THE LAST OF CUSTER . 237 
 
 VI. ONE OF THE LAST MEN TO SEE CUSTER ALIVE . . 263 
 
 VII. THE PERSONAL STORY OF RAIN-IN-THE-FACE . . 279 
 
 VIII. Two INTERESTING AFFAIRS 293 
 
 IX. THE FIRST SUCCESS 304 
 
 X. A DECISIVE BLOW 312 
 
 XI. MILES' GREAT CAMPAIGNING 319 
 
 XII. WHAT THEY ARE THERE FOR A SKETCH OF GEN- 
 ERAL GUY V. HENRY, A TYPICAL AMERICAN SOLDIER 339 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 APPENDIX A BEING A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF GENERAL 
 
 CUSTER'S COURSE IN THE LITTLE BIG HORN CAMPAIGN 359 
 
 APPENDIX B FURTHER LIGHT ON THE CONDUCT OF MAJOR 
 
 RENO 398 
 
 INDEX . . . , ' 407
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 DRAWINGS 
 
 FACING 
 PAGE 
 
 THE LAST OF CUSTER Frontispiece 
 
 LIEUTENANT GRUMMOND SACRIFICING HIMSELF TO COVER THE 
 
 RETREAT 36 
 
 CHARGE OF RED CLOUD ON THE CORRAL AT PINEY ISLAND . 50 
 "BOOTS AND SADDLES:" A START IN THE EARLY MORNING . 60 
 
 ROMAN NOSE LEADING THE CHARGE AGAINST FORSYTH'S DE- 
 VOTED BAND 86 
 
 "SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THEIR ARRIVAL A RATTLESNAKE 
 
 MADE His APPEARANCE" 98 
 
 THE CRUCIAL MOMENT ON BEECHER'S ISLAND . . .116 
 
 THE CHIEF MEDICINE MAN AT BEAVER CREEK . . . 132 
 THE DIFFICULT TASK OF THE HORSE-HOLDERS IN ACTION . . 194 
 THE CAPTURE OF RAIN-!N-THE-FACE . . . . 214 
 
 RAIN-!N-THE-FACE 280 
 
 CHIEF Two MOON OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNES . . . 300 
 MACKENZIE'S MEN IN DULL KNIFE'S VILLAGE .... 316
 
 List of Illustrations 
 
 PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 GROUP OF FAMOUS WAR CHIEFS 10 
 
 CROW KING, RED CLOUD, AMERICAN HORSE, GALL 
 
 THE FORT PHIL KEARNEY FIGHTERS 20 
 
 CAPT. W. J. FETTERMAN, LIEUT. G. W. GRUMMOND, CAPT. FREDK. H. BROWN 
 CAPT. JAMES POWELL 
 
 BEECHER'S ISLAND FIGHTERS 72 
 
 CAPT. LOUIS H. CARPENTER, MAJ. GEORGE A. FORSYTH, LIEUT. FREDK. 
 H. BEECHER, SCOUT JACK STILLWELL 
 
 BEECHER'S ISLAND FIELD 80 
 
 SOME OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY IN THE WASHITA 
 
 EXPEDITION 156 
 
 MAJ. JOEL H. ELLIOTT, CAPT. JAMES M. BELL, CAPT. LOUIS McL. HAMILTON 
 CAPT. J. W. BENTEEN 
 
 GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED GENERAL OFFICERS .... 174 
 
 GEN. GEORGE CROOK, GEN. ELWELL S. OTIS, GEN. EUGENE A. CARR 
 GEN. HENRY B. CARRINGTON 
 
 GEN. GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER 220 
 
 SOME OF CUSTER'S OFFICERS 238 
 
 CAPT. MYLES MOYLAN, LIEUT. E. A. SMITH, MAJ. MARCUS A. RENO 
 CAPT. EDWARD S. GODFREY 
 
 SOME OF CUSTER'S TROOP COMMANDERS ..... 248 
 
 CAPT. THOMAS W. CUSTER, CAPT. GEORGE W. YATES, LIEUT. JAMES CALHOUN 
 CAPT. MILES W. KEOGH 
 
 OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY .... 258 
 
 LIEUT. H. M. HARRINGTON, LIEUT. J. E. PORTER, LIEUT. W. VAN W. RILEY 
 
 ADJ. W. W. COOK, LIEUT. J. STURGIS, LIEUT. J. J. CRITTENDEN 
 
 LIEUT. DONALD McINTOSH, LIEUT. BENJ. HODGSON 
 
 SITTING BULL 268 
 
 SOME FAMOUS INDIAN FIGHTERS 326 
 
 GEN. JOHN GIBBON, GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, GEN. NELSON A. MILES 
 GEN. ALFRED H. TERRY 
 
 GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED INDIAN FIGHTERS .... 340 
 
 COL. RANALD S. MACKENZIE, CAPT. ANSON MILLS, GEN. GUY V. HENRY 
 
 w. f. CODY (BUFFALO BILL)
 
 MAPS AND PLANS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 FORT PHIL KEARNEY 16 
 
 THE FETTERMAN MASSACRE 27 
 
 STOCKADE AT FORT PHIL KEARNEY 33 
 
 THE WAGON-BOX CORRAL ON PINEY ISLAND . . . -45 
 PLAN OF MAGAZINE AT FORT PHIL KEARNEY . . . .63 
 MAP OF FORSYTH'S DEFENSE OF BEECHER'S ISLAND . . -79 
 
 MAP OF MARCHES TO RELIEVE COLONEL FORSYTH AND TO ES- 
 CORT GENERAL CARR 103 
 
 POSITIONS OF WAGONS AND SOLDIERS IN BEAVER CREEK FIGHT 130 
 
 BATTLE OF THE ROSEBUD 197 
 
 MAP OF CUSTER'S DEFEAT ON THE LITTLE BIG HORN . . 230 
 
 MAP ILLUSTRATING THE ROUTE OF THE THREE BATTALIONS AT 
 THE LITTLE BIG HORN 234 
 
 PLAN OF RENO'S DEFENSE ON THE BLUFF 247 
 
 KEY TO MAP OF CUSTER BATTLE-FIELD 287
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 I. The official reports of the Secretary of War, with accompany- 
 ing documents, very kindly lent to me by the United States 
 Government. 
 
 II. Different numbers of the following magazines and journals: 
 Harper's Weekly; The Century; Scribner's Monthly; The 
 Chatauquan; McClure's Magazine; Outdoor Life; Journal 
 of the United States Cavalry Association; Journal of the 
 Military Service Institution. 
 
 III. Files of various contemporary newspapers, notably the 
 
 Chicago Times and the New York Herald. 
 
 IV. Various General Histories. 
 
 V. AB-SA-RA-KA, by General and Mrs. Henry B. Carrington, 
 
 U. S. A. J. B. Lippincott Co. Philadelphia. 1890. 
 VI. ADVENTURES OF BUFFALO BILL, By Col. William F. Cody. 
 
 Harper & Brothers. New York. 1904. 
 
 VII. ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE, by Gen. Theo. F. 
 Rodenbough, U. S. A., and Maj. Wm. L. Haskin, U. S. A. 
 Maynard, Merrill & Co. New York. 1896. 
 VIII. ARMY SACRIFICES, by Col. James B. Fry, U. S. A. D. Van 
 
 Nostrand. New York. 1879. 
 IX. BOOTS AND SADDLES, by Elizabeth B. Custer. Harper & 
 
 Brothers. New York. 1902. 
 X. CAMPAIGNING WITH CROOK, by Captain Charles King, 
 
 U. S. A. Harper & Brothers. New York. 1902. 
 XL CAMPAIGNS OF GENERAL CUSTER IN THE NORTHWEST, by 
 Judson Eliott Walker. Jenkins & Thomas. New York. 
 1881. 
 
 XII. DEEDS OF VALOR, Compiled by W. F. Beyer and O. F. Key- 
 del. Perrien-Keydel Co. Detroit, Mich. 1901. 
 XIII. FOLLOWING THE GUIDON, by Elizabeth B. Custer. Harper 
 & Brothers. New York. 1901.
 
 Bibliography 
 
 XIV. LIFE OF GENERAL G. A. CUSTER, by Captain Frederick 
 
 Whittaker. Sheldon & Co. New York. 1876. 
 XV. MY LIFE ON THE PLAINS, OR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES WITH 
 
 INDIANS, by General G. A. Custer, U. S. A. Sheldon & 
 
 Co. New York. 1876. 
 XVI. ON THE BORDER WITH CROOK, by Captain John G. Bourke, 
 
 U.S.A. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1892. 
 XVII. OUR WILD INDIANS, by Col. Richard I. Dodge, U. S. A. 
 
 A. D. Worthington & Co. Hartford. 1890. 
 XVIII. PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL NELSON A. MILES. 
 
 The Werner Co. Chicago. 1897. 
 XIX. SABRE AND BAYONET, by Gen. Theo. F. Rodenbough, 
 
 U.S.A. G. W. Dillingham Co. New York. 1897. 
 XX. STORY OF THE SOLDIER, THE, by General George A. For- 
 
 syth, U. S. A. D. Appleton & Co. New York. rooo. 
 XXI. STORY OF THE WILD WEST AND CAMP FIRE CHATS, by W. F. 
 
 Cody. (Buffalo Bill.) Historical Publishing Co. Phil- 
 adelphia. 1888. 
 XXII. TENTING ON THE PLAINS, by Elizabeth B. Custer. Harper 
 
 & Brothers. New York. 1895. 
 
 XXIII. THRILLING DAYS IN ARMY LIFE, by Gen. George A. For- 
 
 syth, U. S. A. Harper & Brothers. New York. 1902. 
 
 XXIV. TWENTY YEARS AMONG OUR HOSTILE INDIANS, by J. Lee 
 
 Humfreville (late Captain of United States Cavalry). 
 Hunter & Co. New York. 1903. 
 
 XXV. UNITED STATES IN OUR OWN TIME, THE, by E. Benjamin 
 Andrews. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1903. 
 XXVI. WAR PATH AND BIVOUAC, by John F. Finerty. M. A. Don- 
 ohue & Co. Chicago. 1890. 
 
 RETURN TO 
 ft* H. SCHILLER 
 
 Jt7 FIFTH ST. COR. f
 
 PART I 
 
 Protecting the Frontier
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
 The Powder River Expedition 
 
 I. The Field and the Fighters 
 
 SINCE the United States began to be there never 
 was such a post as Fort Philip Kearney, common- 
 ly called Fort Phil Kearney.* From its establish- 
 ment, in 1866, to its abandonment, some two 
 years later, it was practically in a state of siege. I do 
 not mean that it was beleaguered by the Indians in any 
 formal, persistent investment, but it was so con- 
 stantly and so closely observed by war parties, hidden 
 in the adjacent woods and the mountain passes, that 
 there was little safety outside its stockade for anything 
 less than a company of infantry or a troop of cavalry; 
 and not always, as we shall see, for those. 
 
 Rarely in the history of the Indian wars of the United 
 States have the Indians, no matter how preponderant 
 in force, conducted a regular siege, Pontiac's investment 
 of Detroit being almost unique in that particular. But 
 they literally surrounded Fort Phil Kearney at all times. 
 Nothing escaped their observation, and no opportunity 
 to harass and to cut off detached parties of the garrison, 
 to stampede the herds, or to attack the wagon trains, 
 
 * Although the general for whom this fort was named spelled his name Kearny, 
 the name of the fort is written as above in all official documents I have examined.
 
 4 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 was allowed to pass by. Not a stick of timber could 
 be cut, not an acre of grass mowed, except under heavy 
 guard. Herds of beef cattle, the horses for the cavalry 
 and mounted infantry, the mules for the supply wagons, 
 could not graze, even under the walls of the fort, with- 
 out protection. The country teemed with game. 
 Hunting parties were absolutely forbidden. To take a 
 stroll outside the stockade on a summer evening was to 
 invite death, or worse if the stroller happened to be a 
 woman. There was no certainty about the attacks, ex- 
 cept an assurance that one was always due at any given 
 moment. As old James Bridger, a veteran plainsman 
 and fur trader, a scout whose fame is scarcely less than 
 that of Kit Carson, and the confidential companion ad- 
 viser of Carrington in 1866, was wont to say to him: 
 " Whar you don't see no Injuns thar they're sartin to be 
 thickest." 
 
 Taking at random two average months in the two 
 different years during which the post was maintained, 
 one in the summer, another in the fall, I find that there 
 were fifteen separate and distinct attacks in one and 
 twenty in the other. In many of these, in most, in fact, 
 one or more men were killed and a greater number 
 wounded. Not a wagon train bound for Montana 
 could pass up the Bozeman trail, which ran under the 
 walls of the fort, and for the protection of which it had 
 been established, without being attacked again and 
 again. Only the most watchful prudence, the most 
 skilful management, and the most determined valor, 
 prevented the annihilation of successive parties of emi- 
 grants seeking the new and inviting land. 
 
 The war with the Indians was about the ownership of 
 territory, as most of our Indian wars have been. In- 
 deed, that statement is true of most of the wars of the
 
 The Powder River Expedition 5 
 
 world. The strong have ever sought to take from the 
 weak. The westward-moving tide of civilization had at 
 last pressed back from the Missouri and the Mississippi 
 the Sioux and their allies, the Cheyennes, the largest 
 and most famous of the several great groups of Indians 
 who have disputed the advance of the white man since 
 the days of Columbus, saving perhaps the Creeks and 
 the Iroquois. 
 
 The vast expanse of territory west of the hundredth 
 meridian, extending from the Red River to the British 
 Columbia boundary line, was at the time practically de- 
 void of white settlements, except at Denver and Salt 
 Lake, until the Montana towns were reached in the 
 northwest.* It is a great sweep of land which com- 
 prises every variety of climate and soil. The huge Big 
 Horn Mountains severed that immense domain. The 
 Sweet Water Country and all east of the Wind River 
 Range, including South Pass and the region west of the 
 great bend of the North Platte, had its prairies and fer- 
 tile valleys. Just north of the Big Horn Mountain 
 Range, which took in the territory which formed the 
 most direct route to Central Montana, and the occupa- 
 tion of which was the real objective of Carrington's 
 expedition in the spring of 1866, was the most precious 
 section, controlled by tribes jealous of any intrusion by 
 the whites. 
 
 All along the Yellowstone and its tributaries, in spite 
 of the frequent "Mauvaises Terres," or "bad lands," 
 of apparent volcanic origin, the whole country was 
 threaded with clear streams from the Big Horn Range. 
 The valleys of these were luxuriant in their natural 
 products and their promise. Enormous herds of buffalo 
 
 * The country is roughly comprehended by the boundary lines between which 
 Mountain Standard, or io5th meridian, Time, prevails.
 
 6 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 roamed the plains, affording the Indian nearly every- 
 thing required for his support. The mountains abound- 
 ed with bear, deer and other game in great variety. 
 The many rivers which traversed the territory teemed 
 with fish, the valleys which they watered were abun- 
 dantly fertile for the growing of the few crops which the 
 Indian found necessary for his support. The land was 
 desirable naturally and attracted the attention of the 
 settlers. 
 
 It cannot be gainsaid that the Indians enjoyed a quasi- 
 legal title to this land. But if a comparatively small 
 group of nomadic and savage tribes insists upon re- 
 serving a great body of land for a mere hunting ground, 
 using as a game preserve that which, in a civilized re- 
 gion, would easily support a great agricultural and ur- 
 ban population of industrious citizens seeking relief 
 from the crowded and confined conditions of older com- 
 munities, what are you going to do about it ? Expe- 
 rience has shown that in spite of treaties, purchases and 
 other peaceful means of obtaining it, there is always 
 bound to be a contest about that land. The rights of 
 savagery have been compelled to yield to the demands 
 of civilization, ethics to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 And it will always be so, sad though it may seem to 
 many. 
 
 The close of the Civil War threw many soldiers out 
 of employment. After four years of active cam- 
 paigning they could not settle down to the humdrum life 
 of village and country again. With a natural spirit of 
 restlessness they gathered their families, loaded their 
 few household belongings into wagons, and in parties 
 of varying sizes made their way westward. Railroads 
 began to push iron feelers across the territory. Engi- 
 neers and road builders, as well as emigrants, demanded
 
 The Powder River Expedition 7 
 
 the protection of the government. At first most of the 
 settlers merely wished to pass through the country and 
 settle in the fair lands upon the other side, but the fer- 
 tility and beauty that met their eyes on every hand 
 irresistibly invited settlement on the journey. 
 
 At that time there were four great routes of transcon- 
 tinental travel in use: southward over the famous Santa 
 Fe trail; westward over the Kansas trail to Denver; 
 westward on the Oregon trail through Nebraska and 
 Salt Lake City to California and Oregon; northwestward 
 on the Bozeman trail through Wyoming to Montana. 
 The Union Pacific road was building along the Oregon 
 trail, the Kansas Pacific along the Kansas trail to 
 Denver, while the great Santa Fe system was not yet 
 dreamed of. 
 
 The railroads being in operation for short distances, 
 the only method of transportation was in the huge 
 Conestoga wagon, or prairie schooner which, with its 
 canvas top raking upward fore and aft over a capacious 
 wagon box, looked not unlike the hull of the boat from 
 which it took its name. These wagons were drawn by 
 four or six mules sometimes by oxen, known as " bull 
 teams"- and, stores there being none, carried every- 
 thing that a settler was apt to need in the new land, 
 including the indispensable wife and children. 
 
 I am concerned in this article only with the Bozeman 
 or Montana trail. 
 
 Early in 1866 Government Commissioners at Fort 
 Laramie, Nebraska, were negotiating a treaty with the 
 Sioux and Northern Cheyennes to secure the right of 
 way for emigrants through that territory which, by the 
 Harney-Sanborne treaty, had been conceded to them in 
 1865. Red Cloud, an Oglala Sioux, the foremost of 
 the young warriors, led the objectors to the treaty, even 
 
 V
 
 8 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 to the point of fighting, and opposed the more conserv- 
 ative chiefs who deprecated war as eventually fatal to 
 all their territorial claims. During this council, to an- 
 ticipate later events, Carrington, then approaching with 
 troops, arrived in advance, dismounted, and was intro- 
 duced to the members of the council. Red Cloud, no- 
 ticing his shoulder straps, hotly denounced him as the 
 "White Eagle" who had come to steal the road before 
 the Indian said yes or no. In full view of the mass of 
 Indians who occupied the parade ground he sprang 
 from the platform under the shelter of pine boughs, 
 struck his tepees and went on the warpath. A telegram 
 by Carrington advising suspension of his march until 
 the council came to some agreement was negatived, 
 and although Sunday he pushed forward nine miles 
 beyond the fort before sunset. 
 
 One stipulation upon which the United States in- 
 sisted was the establishment of military posts to guard 
 the trail, without which it was felt the treaty would 
 . amount to nothing. The Brule Sioux, under the lead 
 of Spotted Tail, Standing Elk and others, favored the 
 concession, and ever after remained faithful to the 
 whites. The older chiefs of other Sioux bands, in spite 
 of Red Cloud's defection and departure, remained in 
 council for some days and, although sullen in manner 
 and noisy in protests, finally accepted valuable gifts and 
 indemnities and so far satisfied the Commission that 
 they despatched special messengers to notify the Dis- 
 trict Commander that "satisfactory treaties had been 
 made with the tribes represented at Laramie and that 
 its route was safe." Emigrant trains were also pushed 
 forward with their assurance that an ample force of 
 regulars had gone up the country to ensure their safety. 
 The sequel will appear later.
 
 The Powder River Expedition 9 
 
 II. General Carrington's Romantic Expedition 
 
 Pursuant to the plan, Brigadier-General Henry B. 
 Carrington, Colonel of the Eighteenth Regular Infan- 
 try, was ordered with the second battalion of his regi- 
 ment, about to become the Twenty-seventh Regular 
 Infantry, to establish, organize and take command of 
 what was known as the Mountain District. The Moun- 
 tain District at that time had but one post in it, Fort 
 Reno, one hundred and sixty miles trom Fort Laramie. 
 Carrington was directed to march to Fort Reno, move it 
 forty miles westward, garrison it, and then, with the bal- 
 ance of his command, establish another post on the 
 Bozeman trail, between the Big Horn Mountains and 
 the Powder River, so as to command that valley much 
 frequented by Indians; and, lastly, to establish two other 
 posts, one on the Big Horn, the other on the Yellow- 
 stone, for the further protection of the trail. 
 
 General Carrington was a graduate of Yale College. 
 He had been a teacher, an engineer and scientist, a 
 lawyer and man of affairs, a student of military matters 
 as well as Adjutant-General of Ohio for several years 
 prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. At the begin- 
 ning of that struggle he promptly moved one battery 
 and several regiments of Ohio Militia into West Vir- 
 ginia to take part in the Battle of Phillipi before the 
 State Volunteers could be mustered into the United 
 States service. Without his solicitation, on May I4th, 
 1 86 1, he had been appointed Colonel of the Eighteenth 
 United States Infantry, promoted Brigadier-General 
 November ZQth, 1863, and had rendered valuable and 
 important services during the war. He was a high- 
 minded Christian gentleman, a soldier of large expey
 
 io Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 rience and proven courage, an administrator of vigor 
 and capacity, and, as his subsequent career has shown, 
 a man of fine literary talents.* No better choice could 
 have been made for the expedition. 
 
 After many delays, due principally to difficulties in 
 securing transportation, a little army of seven hundred 
 men, accompanied by four pieces of artillery, two hun- 
 dred and twenty-six wagons, and a few ambulances con- 
 taining the wives and children of several of the officers, 
 set forth from old Fort Kearney, Nebraska, on the iQth 
 of May, 1866. About two hundred of the men were 
 veterans, the rest raw recruits. They were armed with 
 old-fashioned Springfield, muzzle-loading muskets, save 
 a few who had the new Spencer breech-loading carbine, 
 a weapon of rather short trajectory, but a great im- 
 provement on the old army musket from the rapidity 
 of fire which it permitted. A portion of the command 
 was mounted from the discarded horses of a cavalry 
 regiment going east to be mustered out. They were not 
 trained horsemen, however, and at first were rather in- 
 different mounted infantrymen. 
 
 Among the soldiers were artificers and mechanics of 
 every description. The government had provided ap- 
 pliances needed for building forts, including tools, doors, 
 sash, glass, nails, stoves, steel, iron, mowers, reapers, 
 scythes, and two steam sawmills. The officers were in 
 the main a fine body of men, most of whom had learned 
 their soldiering in the Civil War. 
 
 It seems incredible to think that women should ac- 
 company such an expedition, but no grave anticipations 
 
 * Among his literary works he is best known for his "Washington, the Soldier," and 
 his "Battles of the American Revolution," which is the standard work of the kind. In 
 a personal interview he told me he read some portion of the Bible in the original Greek 
 and Hebrew every day for years. Not many army officers can say that, and very few 
 civilians, either.
 
 CROW KING 
 RED CLOUD 
 
 AMERICAN HORSE* 
 GALL 
 
 GROUP OF FAMOUS WAR CHIEFS 
 
 * Killed at Slim Buttcs
 
 The Powder River Expedition n 
 
 of trouble with the Indians were felt by any persons in 
 authority at that time. The Sioux and Cheyennes had 
 consented to the opening of the road, and though they 
 demurred to the forts, they had not absolutely refused 
 the treaty when the government insisted upon it. 
 The expedition was not conceived or planned for war. 
 It was supposed to be a peaceable expedition. In fact, 
 General Sherman, who visited Fort Kearney before the 
 troops began to march, personally advised the ladies to 
 accompany the expedition as very attractive in its ob- 
 ject and wholly peaceful. Had the authorities known 
 what was to happen, a force three times as great would 
 scarcely have been thought adequate for the purpose. 
 But even had there been a full knowledge of the dan- 
 gers incurred, the army women would have gone with 
 their husbands. 
 
 History records no greater instances of romantic devo- 
 tion than those exhibited by the army wife. She stands 
 peculiar among American women to-day in that partic- 
 ular. The army woman in a hostile country risked 
 much more than the men. Her fate when captured was 
 terrible beyond description one long agony of horror 
 and shame until death put an end to it. I have talked 
 with army officers of large experience and have read 
 what others have said, and the universal testimony is 
 that no woman who was ever captured by the plains 
 Indians west of the Missouri was spared. It was com- 
 monly agreed among the officers and men of regiments 
 accompanied by women and fully understood by the 
 women as well that in the last extremity the women 
 were to be shot by their own friends, rather than to be 
 allowed to fall into the hands of the savages; but no such 
 apprehension attended this march. 
 
 The army woman's knowledge of the peril in the
 
 12 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 usual border warfare was not an imaginary one, either. 
 As we may read in letters and books written by army 
 wives, it was brought home to them directly again and 
 again. After every campaign poor, wretched women 
 of stranded and robbed emigrant trains or devastated 
 settlements were brought into the various camps, to 
 whom these army women ministered with loving care, 
 and from whom they heard frightful and sickening de- 
 tails that froze the blood; yet the army wife herself never 
 faltered in her devotion, never failed in her willingness 
 to follow wherever her husband was sent. And, save 
 for the actual campaigning in the field, the army wife 
 was everywhere sometimes there, too. 
 
 In this particular expedition there were several little 
 children, from some of whom I have gleaned details and 
 happenings. One of these lads, while at Fort Kearney 
 before the march, became so expert with the bow and 
 arrow in target shooting with young Pawnee Indians 
 near the fort, that he challenged General Sherman to 
 shoot over the flagstaff. The youngster accomplished 
 it by lying upon his back with feet braced against the 
 bow, and the general squarely withdrew from the con- 
 test, declining to follow the boy's ingenious artifice. 
 
 The march was necessarily a slow one and the dis- 
 tance great some six hundred miles so that it was 
 not until the twenty-eighth of June they reached Fort 
 Reno. There they were menaced by the Indians for 
 the first time and every endeavor was made to stampede 
 their herds. The officers and men were fast becoming 
 undeceived as to the character of their expedition. To 
 abandon Fort Reno, or to remove it, was not prac- 
 ticable. Carrington ordered it re-stockaded and put in 
 thorough repair, garrisoned it from his command, and 
 with the balance, something over five hundred, ad-
 
 The Powder River Expedition 13 
 
 vanced farther into the unknown land on the Qth of 
 July. On the I3th of July, 1866, he established his 
 camp on the banks of the Big Piney Creek, an affluent of 
 the Powder River, about four miles from the superb Big 4~\ 
 Horn Range, with snow-capped Cloud Peak towering 
 nine thousand feet into the heavens, close at hand. A 
 few days later, on a little, flower-decked, grass-covered 
 plateau, bare of trees, which fortunately happened to be 
 just the size to contain the fort he proposed to erect, and 
 which sloped abruptly away in every direction, forming 
 a natural glacis, he began building the stockade. 
 
 III. The Outpost of Civilization 
 
 The plateau lay between two branches of the Piney. 
 To the eastward of the smaller branch rose a high hill 
 called Pilot Hill. West of it was another ridge which 
 they named Sullivant Hills. Southwest of Sullivant 
 Hills was a high ridge called Lodge Trail Ridge, the 
 main branch of the Piney Creek flowing between them, 
 so that the water supply was at the eastern or "Water 
 Gate" of the fort. The Bozeman trail passed west- 
 ward, under Pilot Hill in front of the fort, crossing the 
 Big Piney as it neared Sullivant Hills, and then, circling 
 around Lodge Trail Ridge for easier ascent, advanced 
 northward, twice crossing Peno Creek and its branches, 
 before that stream joined Goose Creek, a tributary to 
 Tongue River, one of the chief forks of the Yellowstone. 
 The first branch of the Peno was five miles from the fort, 
 and the second twelve miles farther, where the garrison 
 had to cut hay, but the branch nearer the fort was es- 
 pecially associated with the events of December 2ist, as 
 well as with the fight of the sixth of the same month. 
 
 The spot was delightful. Adjacent to the fort were
 
 14 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 broad stretches of fertile, brilliantly flowered, grassy, 
 river and mountain creek valleys. The mountains and 
 hills were covered with pines. Game there was in 
 plenty; water was clear and abundant. Wood, while 
 not immediately at hand, else the place would not have 
 been practicable of defense without tremendous labor 
 in clearing it, was conveniently adjacent. 
 
 General Carrington marked out the walls of the fort, 
 after a survey of the surrounding country as far as 
 Tongue River, set up his sawmills, one of them of forty 
 horse-power, capable of cutting logs thirty inches in 
 diameter, established a logging camp on Piney Island, 
 seven miles distant,with no intervening hills to surmount, 
 which made transportation easy, and began the erection 
 of the fort. Picket posts were established upon Pilot 
 and Sullivant Hills, which overlooked approaches both 
 from the east and the road to the mountains. Three 
 times Indians attempted to dislodge these pickets, once 
 at night; but case-shot exploding over them, and each 
 time causing loss of men or ponies, ended similar visita- 
 tions. 
 
 The most careful watchfulness was necessary at all 
 hours of the day and night. The wood trains to fetch 
 logs to the sawmills went out heavily guarded. There 
 was fighting all the time. Casualties among the men 
 A^ were by no means rare. At first it was difficult to keep 
 men within the limits of the camp; but stragglers who 
 failed to return, and some who had been cut off, scalped 
 and left for dead, but who had crawled back to die, 
 convinced every one of the wisdom of the commanding 
 officer's repeated orders and cautions.* 
 
 * Just when the alarms were most frequent a messenger came to the headquarters, 
 announcing that a train en route from Fort Laramie, with special messengers from that 
 post, was corralled by Indians, and demanded immediate help. An entire company of 
 infantry in wagons, with a mountain howitzer and several rounds of grape-shot, was
 
 The Powder River Expedition 15 
 
 To chronicle the constant succession of petty skir- 
 mishes would be wearisome; yet they often resulted in 
 torture and loss of life on the part of the soldiers, al- 
 though the Indians in most instances suffered the more 
 severely. One single incident may be taken as illus- 
 trative of the life of the garrison. 
 
 One afternoon, early in October, the picket reported 
 that the wood train was attacked to the west, and shortly 
 after signalled the approach of a small party of soldiers 
 from the east. Detachments were sent from the post in 
 both directions. It proved to be not a reinforcement 
 of troops or ammunition supplies, but two ambulances 
 with two contract surgeons and an escort of eight men, 
 besides Bailey, the guide, and Lieutenant Grummond, 
 who had just been appointed to the Eighteenth Infantry, 
 and his young bride. As they approached the main 
 gate, accompanied by the mounted men who had been 
 sent out to meet them, they were halted to give passage 
 to an army wagon from the opposite direction. It was 
 escorted by a guard from a wood train, and brought in 
 the scalped, naked, dead body of one of their comrades, 
 a strange welcome, indeed, to the young wife, who, upon 
 leaving Laramie, had been assured of a beautiful ride 
 through fertile valleys without danger, and sadder yet 
 in its sequel two months later. 
 
 Meanwhile the work of erecting the fort was contin- 
 ued. It was a rectangle, six hundred by eight hundred 
 feet, inclosed by a formidable stockade of heavy pine 
 logs standing eight feet high, with a continuous ban- 
 quette, and flaring loopholes at every fourth log. There ^ 
 
 hastened to their relief. It proved to be a train with mail from the Laramie Com- 
 mission announcing the consummation of a "satisfactory treaty of peace with all the 
 Indians of the Northwest," and assuring the District Commander of the fact. The 
 messenger was brought in in safety, and peace lasted until his message was delivered. 
 So much was gained that the messenger did not lose his scalp en route.
 
 16 Indian Fights and Fighters
 
 The Powder River Expedition 17 
 
 were enfilading blockhouses on the diagonal corners, 
 with portholes for the cannon, and quarters for officers 
 and men, with other necessary buildings. The com- 
 manding officer's quarters was a two-story building of 
 framed lumber, surmounted by a watch-tower. The 
 officers' and men's quarters were built of logs. The 
 warehouses, four in number, eighty feet by twenty-four, 
 were framed. 
 
 East of the fort proper was a corral of slightly less 
 area, surrounded by a rough palisade of cottonwood 
 logs, which inclosed the wood train, hay, and mis- 
 cellaneous supplies. Everything stockade, houses, 
 stables, in all their details, blacksmith shops, teamsters' 
 quarters, and so on was planned by Carrington 
 himself.* 
 
 The main fort inclosed a handsome parade ground, 
 in the center of which arose the tall flagstaff planned 
 and erected by a ship carpenter in the regiment. From 
 it, on the 3ist of October, with great ceremony and 
 much rejoicing, the first garrison flag that ever floated 
 over the land was unfurled. The work was by no means 
 completed as it appears on the map, but it was inclosed, 
 and there were enough buildings ready to house the 
 actual garrison present, although the fort was planned 
 for a thousand men, repeatedly promised but not fur- 
 nished, while all the time both cavalry and the First Bat- 
 talion of the Eighteenth were held within the peaceful 
 limits of Fort Laramie's control. 
 
 Early in August Captain Kinney, with two compan- 
 ions, had been sent ninety miles to the northward to 
 establish the second post on the Big Horn, which was 
 called Fort C. F. Smith, and was very much smaller and 
 
 * General W. B. Hazen, upon inspection of this post's stockade, pronounced it "the 
 best he had ever seen,except one built by the Hudson BayCompany,in British America."
 
 1 8 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 less important than Fort Phil Kearney. The third pro- 
 jected post was not established. There were not enough 
 men to garrison the three already in the field, much less 
 to build a fourth
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 
 
 I. How the Fighting Began 
 
 f : ; ""AO summarize the first six months of fighting, 
 from the first of August to the close of the 
 I* year, the Indians killed one hundred and fifty- 
 M four persons, including soldiers and citizens, 
 wounded twenty more, and captured nearly seven 
 hundred animals cattle, mules, and horses. There 
 were fifty-one demonstrations in force in front of the fort, 
 and they attacked every train that passed over the trail. 
 As the fort was still far from completion, the logging 
 operations were continued until mid-winter. On every 
 day the weather permitted, a heavily guarded train of 
 wood-cutters was sent down to Piney Island, or to the 
 heavier timber beyond, where a blockhouse protected 
 the choppers. This train was frequently attacked. 
 Eternal vigilance was the price of life. Scarcely a day 
 passed without the lookout on Pilot Hill signalling 
 Indians approaching, or the lookout on Sullivant Hills 
 reporting that the wood train was corralled and attacked. 
 On such occasions a strong detachment would be mount- 
 ed and sent out to drive away the Indians and bring in 
 the wood train an operation which was invariably 
 successful, although sometimes attended with loss. 
 
 ^9
 
 2o Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Hostile demonstrations were met by prompt forays 
 or pursuits, as circumstances permitted; and on one 
 occasion the general pursued a band that ran off a herd 
 nearly to Tongue River; but flashing mirrors betrayed 
 Indian attempts to gain his rear, and a return was 
 ordered, abandoning the stolen stock. 
 
 One expedition is characteristic of many. On the 
 afternoon of December 6th the lookout on Sullivant 
 Hills signalled that the wood train was attacked, and 
 Captain (Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel) Fetterman, the 
 senior captain present, was detailed with a squad of 
 forty mounted men, including fifteen cavalrymen under 
 Lieutenants Bingham and Grummond, with Sergeant 
 Bowers of the infantry, a veteran of the Civil War, to 
 relieve the wood train and drive the Indians toward the 
 Peno Valley, while Carrington himself, with about a 
 score of mounted infantrymen, would sweep around the 
 north side of Lodge Trail Ridge and intercept them. 
 
 The Indians gave way before Fetterman's advance, 
 hoping to lure the troops into an ambush, but at a fa- 
 vorable spot they made a stand. The fighting there was 
 so fierce that the cavalry, which by a singular circum- 
 x ) stance was without its officers, gave way and retreated 
 headlong across the valley toward the ridge. The 
 mounted infantry stood its ground, and under Fetter- 
 man's intrepid leadership was making a brave fight 
 against overwhelming odds, the number of Indians 
 present being estimated at more than three hundred. It 
 would have gone hard with them, however, had not 
 Carrington and the first six of his detachment sud- 
 denly swept around a small hill or divide and taken the 
 Indians in reverse. The general had been forced to 
 advance under fire, and meeting the fugitive cavalry, 
 ordered them to fall in behind his own detachment.
 
 CAPT. W. J. FETTERMAN 
 LIEUT. G. W. GRUMMOND ; 
 
 CAPT. FREDK. H. BROWN * 
 CAPT. JAMES POWELL 
 
 THE FORT PHIL KEARNEY FIGHTERS 
 
 For portrait of General Carrington, see illustration opposite page 
 * Killed on Lodge Trail Ridge
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 21 
 
 He was filled with anxiety as to the course of the fight 
 on the other side of the ridge. 
 
 Carrington, in his official report,* says : " But six men turned the 
 point with me, one a young bugler of the Second Cavalry, who told me 
 that Lieutenant Bingham had gone down the road around the hill to 
 my right. This seemed impossible, as he belonged to Fetterman's 
 command. I sounded the recall on his report, but in vain. One of 
 my men fell and his horse on him. The principal chief operating 
 during the day attempted to secure his scalp, but dismounting, with 
 one man to hold the horses and reserving fire, I succeeded in saving the 
 man and holding the position until joined by Fetterman twenty min- 
 utes later. The cavalry that had abandoned him had not followed 
 me, though the distance was short; but the Indians, circling round and 
 yelling, nearly one hundred in number, with one saddle emptied by a 
 single shot fired by myself, did not venture to close in." 
 
 The rear detachment and Fetterman soon joined, 
 and by the efforts of the combined parties the Indians 
 were compelled to flight. It was a close call for all, but 
 Lieutenants Grummond and Bingham were yet unac- 
 counted for. Search was instantly made for these two 
 officers and the infantry sergeant, who had become 
 separated from their command while chasing some scat- 
 tered Indians. One of the officers, Lieutenant Bing- 
 ham, was dead. Lieutenant Grummond, after a hand- 
 to-hand fight, was closely pressed by mounted Indians 
 and was barely rescued. Sergeant Bowers had been 
 fearfully wounded and scalped, although he was still 
 alive, but died immediately.^ He had killed three In- 
 dians before he had been overborne. The cavalrymen, 
 mostly recruits, were deeply ashamed of their defection, 
 which was partly due to the incaution of their officers in 
 
 * Published by the United States Senate in 1887. 
 
 t At the burial of Sergeant Bowers, Captain Brown, who had known him during the 
 Civil War, pinned his Army of the Cumberland badge upon his breast, and this was 
 found when the remains were reinterred in 1878.
 
 22 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 leaving them to pursue a few Indians, and they were 
 burning with a desire to retrieve their reputation, which 
 they bravely did with their lives some two weeks later. 
 
 The casualties in the little command were two killed, 
 five wounded. A messenger was sent to the fort for an 
 ambulance, and the command retired in good order 
 without further sight of the Indians. Lieutenant Bing- 
 ham was not the first officer killed; for, five months be- 
 fore, Lieutenant Daniels, riding ahead of a small party 
 of soldiers escorting several officers and the wife of 
 Lieutenant Wands from Fort Laramie, had been killed 
 in full view of the party. He had been horribly tor- 
 tured with a stake before he died, and the savages put 
 on his clothing and danced on the prairie just out of 
 range, in front of the party, which was too small to do 
 more than stand on the defensive. Lieutenant Grum- 
 mond's wife was in the fort during the fighting on the 
 sixth of December, and her joy at her husband's safe 
 return can be imagined. 
 
 On the eighth of December President Andrew John- 
 son congratulated Congress that treaties had been made 
 at Fort Laramie, and that all was peace in the Northwest ! 
 
 On the iQth of December, in this peaceful territory, 
 the wood train was again attacked in force. Carring- 
 ton promptly sent out a detachment under Captain 
 Powell with instructions to relieve the wood train, give 
 
 O 
 
 it his support, and return with it, but not to pursue 
 threatening Indians, for experience had shown that 
 the Indians were constantly increasing in numbers and 
 growing bolder with every attack. Powell efficiently 
 performed his task. The Indians were driven off", and, 
 although he was tempted to pursue them, he was too 
 good a soldier to disobey orders, so he led his men back 
 in safety to the fort.
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 23 
 
 By this time all warehouses were finished, and it was 
 estimated that one large wood train would supply logs 
 enough for the completion of the hospital, which alone 
 needed attention. 
 
 Impressed by Powell's report, Carrington himself ac- 
 companied the augmented train on the 2Oth, built a 
 bridge across to Piney Island to facilitate quick haul- 
 ing, and returned to the fort to make ready for one more 
 trip only. No Indians appeared in sight on that date. 
 Already several hundred large logs had been collected 
 for winter's firewood, besides the slabs saved at the 
 sawmill. 
 
 It cannot be denied that there was much dissatisfac- 
 tion among some of the officers at Carrington's prudent 
 policy. They had the popular idea that one white man, 
 especially if he were a soldier, was good for a dozen 
 Indians; and although fifteen hundred lodges of In- 
 dians were known to be encamped on the Powder River, 
 and there were probably between five and six thousand 
 braves in the vicinity, they were constantly suggesting 
 expeditions of all sorts with their scanty force. Some 
 of them, including Fetterman and Brown, "offered with 
 eighty men to ride through the whole Sioux Nation!" 
 While the mettle of the Sioux Nation had not yet been 
 fairly tried by these men, Carrington was wise enough 
 to perceive that such folly meant inevitable destruction, 
 and his consent was sternly refused. 
 
 The total force available at the fort, including pris- 
 oners, teamsters, citizens and employees, was about 
 three hundred and fifty barely enough to hold the 
 fort, should the Indians make an attack upon it. Be- 
 sides which, details were constantly needed to carry 
 despatches, to deliver the mail, to get supplies, to succor 
 emigrant trains, and so on. The force was woefully in-
 
 24 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 adequate, and the number of officers had been depleted 
 by detachment and other causes until there .were but 
 six left. 
 
 Ammunition was running low. There were at one 
 time only forty rounds per man available. Repeated 
 requests and appeals, both by letter and telegram, for 
 reinforcements and supplies, and especially for mod- 
 ern and serviceable weapons, had met with little con- 
 sideration. The officials in the far East hugged their 
 treaty, and refused to believe that a state of war existed; 
 and, if it did exist, were disposed to censure the com- 
 manding officer for provoking it. In several instances 
 presents given in the treaty at Fort Laramie were found 
 on the persons of visiting Indians, and one captured 
 Indian pony was heavily loaded with original packages 
 of those presents. 
 
 Carrington had done nothing to provoke war, but had 
 simply carried out General Sherman's written instruc- 
 tions, sent him as late as August, to "avoid a general 
 war, until the army could be reorganized and increased; 
 but he defended himself and command stoutly when 
 attacked. Some of the officers, therefore, covertly sneer- 
 ing at the caution of the commander, were burning 
 for an opportunity to distinguish themselves on this 
 account, and had practically determined to make or 
 take one at the first chance. Fetterman and Brown, 
 unfortunately, were the chief of these malcontents. 
 
 II. The Annihilation of Fetterman's Command 
 
 On the 2 1st of December, the ground being free from 
 snow, the air clear and cold, the lookout on Sullivant 
 Hills signalled about eleven o'clock in the morning that 
 the wood train had been corralled, and was again at-
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 25 
 
 tacked in force about a mile and a half from the fort. 
 A relief party of forty-nine men from the Eighteenth 
 Infantry, with twenty-seven troopers from the Second 
 Cavalry, a detachment from which, nearly all recruits 
 and chiefly armed with muskets as their carbines had 
 not reached Laramie, had joined the post some months 
 before, was at once ordered out. 
 
 The command was first given to Captain Powell, 
 with Lieutenant Grummond in charge of the cavalry. 
 Grummond had a wife in delicate health at the post, 
 and he was cautioned by the officers to take care not 
 to be led into a trap, although his experience on the 6th, 
 when he had so narrowly escaped death, was, it would 
 seem, the best warning he could have had. This body- 
 of men was the best armed party at the post, a few of 
 those designated carrying the Spencer repeating car- 
 bines. Each company had been directed to keep forty 
 rounds per man on hand for immediate use in any 
 emergency, besides extra boxes always kept in com- 
 pany quarters. The men had been exercised in firing 
 recently and some of the ammunition had been ex- 
 pended, although they still had an abundant supply for 
 the purposes of the expedition. Carrington personally 
 inspected the men before they left, and rejected those 
 who were not amply provided. 
 
 The situation of the wood train was critical, and the 
 party was assembled with the greatest despatch. Just 
 as they were about to start, Captain Fetterman, who 
 had had less experience in the country and in Indian 
 fighting than the other officers, for he had joined the 
 regiment some time after the fort had been built and 
 expected assignment to command Fort C. F. Smith, 
 begged for the command of the expedition, pleading his 
 senior captaincy as justification for his request. Car-
 
 26 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 rington reluctantly acceded to his plea, which indeed he 
 could scarcely have refused, and placed him in charge, 
 giving him strict and positive instructions to "relieve 
 the wood train, drive back the Indians, but on no ac- 
 count to pursue the Indians beyond Lodge Trail Ridge " 
 and that so soon as he had performed this duty he was 
 to return immediately to the fort. 
 
 Captain Fetterman, as has been said, had frequently 
 expressed his contempt for the Indians, although his 
 fight on December 6th had slightly modified his opin- 
 ions. Carrington, knowing his views, was particular 
 and specific in his orders. So necessary did he think 
 the caution that he repeated it to Lieutenant Grum- 
 mond, who, with the cavalry, followed the infantry out 
 of the gate, the infantry, having less preparation to make, 
 getting away first. These orders were delivered in a 
 loud voice and were audible to many persons women, 
 officers, and men in the fort. The general went so far 
 
 * O 
 
 as to hasten to the gate after the cavalry had left the 
 fort, and from the sentry platform or banquette over- 
 looking it, called out after them again, emphatically 
 directing them "on no account to pursue the Indians 
 across Lodge Trail Ridge." 
 
 The duty devolved upon Captain Fetterman was ex- 
 actly that which Captain Powell had performed so sat- 
 isfactorily a few days before. With Captain Fetterman 
 went Captain Brown, with two citizens, frontiersmen 
 and hunters, as volunteers. These two civilians, 
 Wheatley and Fisher, were both armed with the new 
 breech-loading rapid-fire Henry rifle, with which they 
 were anxious to experiment on the hostiles. Wheatley 
 left a wife and children in the fort. 
 
 Captain Frederick Brown, a veteran of the Civil War, 
 had just been promoted, had received orders detaching
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 27
 
 28 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 him from the command, and was simply waiting a fa- 
 vorable opportunity to leave. He was a man of the most 
 undaunted courage. His position as quartermaster 
 had kept him on the watch for Indians all the time, and 
 he announced on the day before the battle that he " must 
 have one chance at the Indians before he left." It is 
 believed, however, that his impetuous counsel, due to 
 his good luck in many a brush with assailing parties, 
 which he had several times pursued almost alone, 
 largely precipitated the final disaster. 
 
 The total force, therefore, including officers and citi- 
 , - zens, under Fetterman's command, was eighty-one just 
 the number with which he had agreed to ride through 
 the whole Sioux Nation. No one in the command seems 
 to have had the least idea that any force of Indians, 
 however great, could overcome it. 
 
 Captain Fetterman, instead of leading his men direct 
 to the wood train on the south side of Sullivant Hills, 
 double-quicked toward the Peno Valley on to the north 
 side. Perhaps he hoped that he could take the Indians 
 in reverse and exterminate them between his own troops 
 and the guard of the wood train which all told com- 
 prised some ninety men when he rounded the western 
 end of the hills. This movement was noticed from the 
 fort; but, as it involved no disobedience of orders, and 
 as it might be considered a good tactical manoeuver, no 
 apprehension was felt on account of it. 
 
 The Indians surrounding the wood train were well 
 served by their scouts, and when they found that Fet- 
 terman's force was advancing on the other side of the 
 hill, they immediately withdrew from the wood train, 
 which presently broke corral and made its way to the 
 Piney, some seven miles northwest of the fort, unmo- 
 lested. As Fetterman's troops disappeared down the
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 29 
 
 valley, a number of Indians were observed along the 
 Piney in front of the fort. A spherical case-shot from a 
 howitzer in the fort exploded in their midst, and they 
 vanished. The Indians were much afraid of the "gun 
 that shoots twice," as they called it. 
 
 At that time it was discovered that no doctor had gone 
 with the relieving party, so Acting-Assistant Surgeon 
 Hines, with an escort of four men, was sent out with 
 orders to join Fetterman. The doctor hastened away, 
 but returned soon after with the information that the 
 wood train had gone on, and that when he attempted to 
 cross the valley of the Peno to join Fetterman's men he 
 found it full of Indians, who were swarming about 
 Lodge Trail Ridge, and that no sign of Fetterman was 
 observed. Despite his orders, he must have gone over 
 the ridge. 
 
 The alarm caused in the fort by this news was deep- 
 ened by the sound of firing at twelve o'clock. Six shots 
 in rapid succession were counted, and immediately after 
 heavy firing was heard from over Lodge Trail Ridge, 
 five miles away, which continued with such fierceness 
 as to indicate a pitched battle. Carrington instantly 
 despatched Captain Ten Eyck with the rest of the infan- 
 try, in all about fifty-four men, directing him to join 
 Fetterman's command, then return with them to the 
 fort. The men went forward on the run. A little later 
 forty additional men were sent after Ten Eyck. Car- 
 rington at once surmised that Fetterman had disobeyed 
 orders, either wittingly or carried away by the ardor of 
 the pursuit, and was now heavily engaged with the In- 
 dians on the far side of the ridge. 
 
 Counting Fetterman's detachment, the guards of the 
 wood train, and Ten Eyck's detachments, the garrison 
 of the fort was now reduced to a very small number.
 
 30 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 The place, with its considerable extent, might now be 
 attacked at any time. Carrington at once released all 
 prisoners from the guard-house, armed the quarter- 
 master's employees, the citizens, and mustered alto- 
 gether a force of only one hundred and nineteen men 
 to defend the post.* Although every preparation for 
 a desperate defense had been made, there were not 
 enough men to man the walls. 
 
 The general and his remaining officers then repaired 
 to the observatory tower, field glasses in hand, and in 
 apprehension of what fearful catastrophe they scarcely 
 allowed themselves to imagine. The women and chil- 
 dren, especially those who had husbands and fathers 
 with the first detachment, were almost crazed with 
 terror. 
 
 Presently Sample, the general's own orderly, who had 
 been sent with Ten Eyck, was seen galloping furiously 
 down the opposite hill. He had the best horse in the 
 command (one of the general's), and he covered the dis- 
 tance between Lodge Trail Ridge and the fort with 
 amazing swiftness. He dashed up to headquarters with 
 a message from Ten Eyck, stating that "the valley on 
 the other side of the ridge is filled with Indians, who are 
 threatening him. The firing has stopped. He sees no 
 sign of Captain Fetterman's command. He wants a 
 howitzer sent out to him." 
 
 * PHIL KEARNEY GARRISON, 
 
 at date of massacre, from "Post Returns": 
 
 Wood Party, besides teamsters 55 men 
 
 Fetterman's Party (two citizens) 8 1 " 
 
 Ten Eyck's Party (relieving) 94 " 
 
 Helpless in hospital 7 " 
 
 Roll-call, of present, all told 119 " 
 
 Total officers and men 356 men 
 
 Ninety rifles worn out by use on horseback. Citizen employees used their private 
 arms. 
 
 Information furnished by General H. B. Carrington,
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 3 1 
 
 The following note was sent to Captain Ten Eyck : 
 
 " Forty well-armed men, with three thousand rounds, 
 ambulances, stores, etc., left before your courier came 
 in. You must unite with Fetterman. Fire slowly, and 
 keep men in hand. You would have saved two miles 
 toward the scene of action if you had taken Lodge 
 Trail Ridge. I order the wood train in, which will give 
 fifty men to spare." 
 
 No gun could be sent him. Since all the horses were 
 already in the field, it would have required men to haul 
 it. No more could be spared, and not a man with him 
 could cut a fuse or handle the piece anyway. The guns 
 were especially needed at the fort to protect women and 
 children. 
 
 Late in the afternoon Ten Eyck's party returned to 
 the fort with terrible tidings of appalling disaster. In 
 the wagons with his command were the bodies of forty- 
 nine of Fetterman's men; the remaining thirty-two were 
 not at that time accounted for. Ten Eyck very prop- 
 erly stood upon the defensive on the hill and refused to 
 go down into the valley in spite of the insults and shouts 
 of the Indians, who numbered upward of two thousand 
 warriors, until they finally withdrew. After waiting a 
 sufficient time, he marched carefully and cautiously 
 toward Peno Valley and to the bare lower ridge over 
 which the road ran. 
 
 There he came across evidences of a great battle. On 
 the end of the ridge, nearest the fort, in a space about 
 six feet square, inclosed by some huge rocks, making a 
 sort of a rough shelter, he found the bodies of the forty- 
 nine men whom he had brought back. After their 
 ammunition had been spent, they had been stripped, 
 shot full of arrows, hacked to pieces, scalped, and muti- 
 lated in a horrible manner. There were no evidences
 
 32 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 of a very severe struggle right there. Few cartridge 
 shells lay on the ground. Of these men, only four be- 
 sides the two officers had been killed by bullets. The 
 rest had been killed by arrows, hatchets, or spears. 
 They had evidently been tortured to death. 
 
 Brown and Fetterman were found lying side by side, 
 each with a bullet wound in the left temple. Their 
 heads were burned and filled with powder around the 
 wounds. Seeing that all was lost, they had evidently 
 stood face to face, and each had shot the other dead with 
 his revolver. They had both sworn to die rather than 
 be taken alive by the Indians, and in the last extremity 
 they had carried out their vows. Lieutenant Grum- 
 mond, who had so narrowly escaped on the 6th of De- 
 cember, was not yet accounted for, but there was little 
 hope that he had escaped again. 
 
 III. Carrington's Stern Resolution 
 
 The night was one of wild anxiety. Nearly one- 
 fourth of the efficient force of the fort had been wiped 
 out. Mirror signals were flashed from the hills during 
 the day, and fires here and there in the night indicated 
 that the savages had not left the vicinity. The guards 
 were doubled, every man slept with his clothing on, his 
 weapons close at hand. In every barrack a non-com- 
 missioned officer and two men kept watch throughout 
 the night. Carrington and the remaining officers did 
 not sleep at all. They fully expected the fort to be at- 
 tacked. The state of the women and children can be 
 imagined, although all gossip and rumor were expressly 
 prohibited by the commander. 
 
 The next day was bitterly cold. The sky was over- 
 cast and lowering, with indications of a tremendous
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 33 
 
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 34 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 storm. The Indians were not accustomed to active 
 operations under such conditions, and there was no 
 sign of them about. Carrington determined to go out 
 to ascertain the fate of his missing men. Although all 
 the remaining officers assembled at his quarters advised 
 him not to undertake it, lest the savages, flushed with 
 victory, should attempt another attack, Carrington 
 quietly excused his officers, told the adjutant to remain 
 with him, and the bugle instantly disclosed his purpose 
 in spite of dissenting protests. He rightly judged that 
 the moral effect of the battle would be greatly enhanced, 
 in the eyes of the Indians, if the bodies were not recov- 
 ered. Besides, to set at rest all doubts it was necessary 
 to determine the fate of the balance of his command. 
 His own wife, as appears from her narrative,* approved 
 his action and nerved herself to meet the possible fate 
 involved, while Mrs. Grummond was the chief protest- 
 ant that, as her husband was undoubtedly dead, there 
 should be no similar disaster invited by another expe- 
 dition. 
 
 In the afternoon, with a heavily armed force of eighty 
 men, Carrington went in person to the scene of battle. 
 The following order was left with the officer of the day: 
 "Fire the usual sunset gun, running a white lamp to 
 masthead. If the Indians appear fire three guns from 
 the twelve-pounder at minute intervals, and, later, sub- 
 stitute a red lantern for the white." Pickets were left 
 on two commanding ridges, as signal observers, as the 
 command moved forward. The women and children 
 were placed in the magazine, a building well adapted 
 
 * " AB-S A-RA-KA, Land of Massacre,' ' by Mrs. Carrington, of which Oliver Wendell 
 Holmes wrote to General Carrington as follows: "What an interesting record is that 
 of Mrs. Carrington ! I cannot read such a story of devotion and endurance in the 
 midst of privations and danger, without feeling how little most of us know of what life 
 can be when all the human energies are called out by great enterprises and emergencies." 
 
 r
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 35 
 
 for defense, which had been stocked with water, 
 crackers, etc., for an emergency, with an officer 
 pledged not to allow the women to be taken alive, if 
 the General did not return and the Indians overcame 
 the stockade. 
 
 Passing the place where the greatest slaughter had 
 occurred, the men marched cautiously along the trail. 
 Bodies were strung along the road clear to the western 
 end farthest from the fort. Here they found Lieuten- 
 ant Grummond. There were evidences of a desperate 
 struggle about his body. Behind a little pile of rock, 
 making a natural fortification, were the two civilians 
 who had been armed with the modern Henry rifle. By 
 the side of one fifty shells were counted, and nearly as 
 many by the side of the other brave frontiersman. Be- 
 hind such cover as they could obtain nearby lay the 
 bodies of the oldest and most experienced soldiers in 
 Fetterman's command. 
 
 In front of them they found no less than sixty great 
 gouts of blood on the ground and grass, and a number 
 of dead ponies, showing where the bullets of the de- 
 fenders had reached their marks,* and in every direc- 
 tion were signs of the fiercest kind of hand-to-hand 
 fighting. Ghastly and mutilated remains, stripped 
 naked, shot full of arrows Wheatley with no less 
 than one hundred and five in him, scalped, lay before 
 them. 
 
 Brown rode to the death of both a little Indian 
 "calico" pony which he had given to the general's 
 boys when they started from Fort Leavenworth, in 
 November, 1865, and the body of the horse was found 
 in the low ground at the west slope of the ridge, show- 
 
 * The Indians, where possible, remove the bodies of their slain. They did dur- 
 ing this campaign, as few dead Indians ever came into possession of the troops.
 
 36 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ing that the fight began there, before they could reach 
 high ground.* At ten o'clock at night, on the return, 
 the white lamp at masthead told its welcome story of a 
 garrison still intact. 
 
 Fetterman had disobeyed orders. Whether deliber- 
 ately or not, cannot be told. He had relieved the wood 
 train, and instead of returning to the post, had pursued 
 the Indians over the ridge into Peno Valley, then along 
 the trail, and into a cunningly contrived ambush. His 
 men had evidently fought on the road until their ammu- 
 nition gave out, and then had either been ordered to re- 
 treat to the fort, or had retreated of their own motion 
 probably the latter. All the dead cavalry horses' heads 
 were turned toward the fort, by the way. Fetterman 
 and Brown, men of unquestioned courage, must have 
 been swept along with their flying men. There may 
 have been a little reserve on the rocks on which they 
 hoped to rally their disorganized, panic-stricken troops, 
 fleeing before a horde of yelling, blood-intoxicated war- 
 riors. I imagine them vainly protesting, imploring, 
 begging their men to make a stand. I feel sure they 
 fought until the last. But these are only surmises; 
 what really happened, God alone knows. 
 
 The judgment of the veteran soldiers and the fron- 
 tiersmen, who knew that to retreat was to be annihilat- 
 ed, had caused a few to hold their ground and fight until 
 they were without ammunition; then with gun-stocks, 
 swords, bayonets, whatever came to hand, they battled 
 until they were cut down. Grummond had stayed 
 with them, perhaps honorably sacrificing himself in a 
 
 * Once, while loading the bodies in the wagons, a nervous sergeant mistook one of 
 the pickets for Indians in the rear, and gave the alarm. His detail was sharply 
 ordered by the general to "leave their ammunition and get back to the fort as best 
 they could, if they were afraid; for no armed man would be allowed to leave until the 
 last body was rescued."
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 37 
 
 vain endeavor to cover the retreat of the rest of his 
 command. The Indian loss was very heavy, but could / 
 not exactly be determined. 
 
 IV. The Reward of a Brave Soldier 
 
 Such was the melancholy fate of Fetterman and his 
 men. The post was isolated, the weather frightful. A 
 courier was at once despatched to Fort Laramie, but 
 such means of communication was necessarily slow, and 
 it was not until Christmas morning that the world was 
 apprised of the fatal story. In spite of the reports that 
 had been made and fatuously believed, that peace had 
 obtained in that land, it was now known that war was 
 everywhere prevalent. The shock of horror with 
 which the terrible news was received was greater even 
 than that attendant upon the story of the disastrous bat- 
 tle of the Little Big Horn, ten years later. People had 
 got used to such things then; this news came like a bolt 
 from the blue. 
 
 Although Carrington had conducted himself in every 
 way as a brave, prudent, skilful, capable soldier, al- 
 though his services merited reward, not censure, and 
 demanded praise, not blame, the people and the au- 
 thorities required a scapegoat. He was instantly re- ^ 
 lieved from command by General Cooke, upon a private 
 telegram from Laramie, never published, before the 
 receipt of his own official report, and was ordered to 
 change his regimental headquarters to the little frontier 
 post at Fort Caspar, where two companies of his first 
 battalion, just become the new Eighteenth, were sta- 
 tioned, while four companies of the same battalion, 
 under his lieutenant-colonel, were ordered to the relief 
 of Fort Phil Kearney.
 
 \ 
 
 38 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 The weather had become severe and the snow was 
 banked to the top of the stockade. The mercury was 
 in the bulb. Guards were changed half-hourly. Men 
 and women dressed in furs made from wolfskins tak- 
 en from the hundreds of wolves which infested the 
 outside butcher-field at night, and which were poisoned 
 by the men for their fur. Upon the day fixed precisely 
 for the march, as the new arrivals needed every roof 
 during a snow-storm which soon became a blizzard, 
 Carrington, his wife and children, his staff and their 
 families, including Mrs. Grummond, escorting the re- 
 mains of her husband to Tennessee, and the regimental 
 band, with its women and children, began that Febru- 
 ary " change of headquarters." They narrowly escaped 
 freezing to death. More than one-half of the sixty- 
 five in the party were frosted, and three amputations, 
 with one death, were the immediate result of the foolish 
 and cruel order. 
 
 It was not until some time after that a mixed com- 
 mission of soldiers and civilians, which thoroughly in- 
 vestigated Carrington's conduct, having before them all 
 his books and records from the inception of the ex- 
 pedition until its tragic close, acquitted him of all blame 
 of any sort, and awarded him due praise for his suc- 
 cessful conduct of the whole campaign. His course was 
 also the subject of inquiry before a purely military court, 
 all of them his juniors in rank, which also reported 
 favorably. General Sherman expressly stated that 
 "Colonel Carrington's report, to his personal knowledge, 
 was fully sustained," but by some unaccountable over- 
 sight or intent, the report was suppressed and never 
 published, thereby doing lasting injustice to a brave 
 and faithful soldier. 
 
 At the same time the government established the sub-
 
 The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney 39 
 
 post between Laramie and Fort Reno, so earnestly rec- 
 ommended by Carrington, in October, calling it Fort 
 Fetterman, in honor of the unfortunate officer who fell '^SK 
 in battle on the 2 1st of December. 
 
 Perhaps it ill becomes us to censure the dead, but the 
 whole unfortunate affair arose from a direct disobe- 
 dience of orders on the part of Fetterman and his men. 
 They paid the penalty for their lapse with their lives; 
 and so far, at least, they made what atonement they 
 could. A year later opportunity was given the sol- 
 diers at Phil Kearney to exact a dreadful revenge from 
 Red Cloud and his Sioux for the slaughter of their brave 
 comrades.
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
 The Thirty-two Against the Three 
 Thousand 
 
 I. The Improvised Corral on Piney Island 
 
 RED CLOUD, who had been one of the sub- 
 chiefs of the Sioux, gained so much prestige 
 by the defeat and slaughter of Fetterman's 
 men that he became at once the leading war 
 chief of the nation.* The angry braves, flushed with con- 
 quest and eager for blood, hastened to enroll themselves 
 by thousands in his band. 
 
 Fort Phil Kearney had been in a state of siege before : 
 it was more closely invested now than ever. Contrary 
 to their usual avoidance of the war-path in cold weather, 
 throughout the long and bitter winter there was no in- 
 termittence to the watchfulness of the Indians. The 
 
 * Mahapiya-luta, Red Cloud, was one of the most famous of the great Sioux Nation. 
 He was a fierce and ruthless warrior, but withal a man of his word. After the abandon- 
 ment of Fort Phil Kearney he participated in no important actions with the soldiers, 
 although he was elected head chief of the Sioux. In the war of 1876 his camp was 
 surprised by General Mackenzie before he had an opportunity to go on the war-path. 
 His men were disarmed, and with him were detained in the reservation. It was a 
 fortunate thing for the army. 
 
 Recently the old chief was asked to tell the story of his most thrilling adventure. It 
 was a tale of one man against seven, and the old man's dim eyes grew bright and his 
 wrinkled face lighted up with a strange light as he told it. A well-known warrior was 
 jealous of Red Cloud, and, together with six of his followers, waylaid the young brave in 
 a lonely spot. 
 
 Two of them were armed with rifles, the rest carried only bows and arrows, while 
 
 40
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 41 
 
 garrison was constantly in arms. Attacks of all sorts 
 were made with increasing frequency. The letters from 
 the soldiers which got through to the East adequately 
 describe their sense of the dire peril which menaced 
 them. "This may be my last letter" is a frequent 
 phrase. Travel on the trail was abandoned. As soon 
 as possible in the spring, reinforcements were hurried 
 up and the fort was completed, but the same state of 
 affairs continued right along without intermission. 
 
 With the advance of summer Red Cloud gathered his 
 warriors and determined upon a direct attack upon the 
 fort itself. He was tired of skirmishing, stampeding 
 stock, cutting off stragglers, etc. He wanted war, real 
 war, and he got it! If, or when, he captured the fort, 
 he would advance upon the other two forts in succes- 
 sion and so clear the country, once and for all, of the 
 detested invaders, whose soldierly qualities he seems to 
 have held in contempt. For the campaign he proposed 
 he assembled no fewer than three thousand warriors, 
 the flower of the Sioux Nation. Probably half of them 
 were armed with firearms, Winchester rifles, Spencer 
 repeating carbines, or old army muskets, including 
 those that had been captured from Fetterman's party. 
 Under cover of frequent skirmishes, which prevented 
 much scouting on the part of the troops, Red Cloud 
 gathered his warriors undiscovered and unmolested, 
 
 Red Cloud had a Winchester. At the first fire Red Cloud fell with a bullet in his thigh, 
 but from where he lay he contrived to kill every one of his assailants. 
 
 The skill and courage he displayed on that occasion won for him many admiring fol- 
 lowers, and as war after war with the whites broke out and he won fresh laurels his fol- 
 lowers increased in numbers. He joined the various secret societies, passed through the 
 terrible agony of the sun dance, and when, in 1866, the chiefs of the tribe signed a "peace 
 paper," he stood out for and declared war. The fighting men flocked to his standard, 
 and when the awful massacre in which he played so conspicuous a part occurred, he was 
 proclaimed Chief of all the Sioux. 
 
 All the prestige he lost at Piney Island he regained upon the abandonment of 
 the forts by the government, a most impolitic and. unfortunate move.
 
 42 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and prepared to attack about the first of August, 
 1867. 
 
 The limits of the military reservation had been fixed 
 at Washington without adequate knowledge of the 
 ground and in disregard of General Carrington's re- 
 quest and protests so as to exclude the timber land of 
 Piney Island, from which the post had been built, and 
 from which the nearest and most available wood supply 
 must be obtained. The post had been completed, but 
 immense supplies of wood would be required for fuel 
 during the long and severe winter. This was to be cut 
 and delivered at the fort by a civilian outfit which had 
 entered upon a contract with the government for the 
 purpose. One of the stipulations of the contract was 
 that the woodmen should be guarded and protected by 
 the soldiers. 
 
 Wood-cutting began on the 3ist of July, 1867, and 
 Captain and Brevet-Major James Powell, commanding 
 "C" Company, of the twenty-seventh Infantry, which 
 was formerly a battalion of the Eighteenth a part of 
 the command which had built the fort, and to which 
 Fetterman and his men had belonged, was detailed with 
 his company to guard the contractor's party. Captain 
 Powell had enlisted in the army in 1848 as a private 
 soldier. The Civil War had given him a commission 
 in the regular service, and in its course he had been twice 
 brevetted for conspicuous gallantry, once at Chicka- 
 mauga and the second time during the Atlanta campaign, 
 in which he had been desperately wounded. He had had 
 some experience in Indian fighting before and since he 
 came to the post, and had distinguished himself in sev- 
 eral skirmishes, notably in the relief of the wood train, 
 a few days before Fetterman's rashness and disobedi- 
 ence precipitated the awful disaster.
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 43 
 
 Arriving at Piney Island, some seven miles from the 
 post, Powell found that the contractor had divided his 
 men into two parties. One had its headquarters on a 
 bare, treeless, and comparatively level plain, perhaps 
 one thousand yards across, which was surrounded by 
 low hills backed by mountains farther away. This was 
 an admirable place to graze the herds of mules required 
 to haul the wagons. As will be seen, it could also 
 be turned into a highly defensive position. The other 
 camp was in the thick of the pine wood, about a mile 
 away across the creek, at the foot of the mountain. This 
 division of labor necessitated a division of force, which 
 was a misfortune, but which could not be avoided. 
 
 Powell sent twelve men under a noncommissioned 
 officer to guard the camp in the wood, and detailed thir- 
 teen men with another noncommissioned officer to es- 
 cort the wood trains to and from the fort. With the 
 remaining twenty-six men and his lieutenant, John C. 
 Jenness, he established headquarters on the plain in the 
 open. 
 
 The wagons used by the wood-cutters were furnished 
 by the quartermaster's department. In transporting 
 the cordwood, the woodmen made use of the running 
 gears only, the wagon bodies having been deposited in 
 the clearing. In order to preserve their contents and to 
 afford as much protection as possible to their occupants 
 in case of Indian attacks, the quartermaster's depart- 
 ment was in the habit of lining the wagon beds with 
 boiler iron; and, to give their occupants an opportunity 
 to fight from concealment, loopholes were cut in the 
 sides. Almost every authority who has written of the 
 fight has concluded that the particular wagon beds in 
 question were so lined. This is a mistaken though 
 natural conclusion. In a letter to an old comrade who
 
 44 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 wrote an account of the subsequent action,* Powell 
 makes no mention of any iron lining, and it is certain 
 that the wagons were not lined, but were just the ordi- 
 nary wooden wagon beds."}" 
 
 There were fourteen of these wagon bodies. Powell 
 arranged them in the form of a wide oval. At the high- 
 est point of the plain, which happened to be in the cen- 
 ter, this corral was made. The wagon beds were deep, 
 and afforded ample concealment for any one lying in 
 them. I sometimes wonder why Powell did not stand 
 these beds on their sides instead of their bottoms, mak- 
 ing a higher and stouter inclosure, the bottoms being 
 heavier than the sides; but it is clear that he did not. 
 There were plenty of tools, including a number of au- 
 gers, in the camp, and with these Powell's men made a 
 number of loopholes about a foot from the ground, in 
 the outward sides of the wagons. 
 
 At the ends of the oval, where the configuration of the 
 ground made it most vulnerable for attack, especially 
 by mounted men, two wagons complete that is, with 
 bodies and running gears were placed a short dis- 
 tance from the little corral. This would break the force 
 of a charge, and the defenders could fire at the attacking 
 party underneath the bodies and through the wheels. 
 The spaces between the wagon bodies were filled with 
 logs and sacks of grain, backed by everything available 
 that would turn a bullet. The supplies for the soldiers 
 and wood party were contained in this corral. 
 
 Instead of the old Springfield muzzle-loading musket, 
 with which the troops mainly had been armed up to this 
 
 * General Rodenbough, in "Sabre and Bayonet." 
 
 ) This statement is corroborated by private letter from a veteran soldier in the 
 United States Army, who is one of the few survivors of the battle. Surgeon Horton, who 
 was at the post from its establishment until it was abandoned, also says that the wagon 
 beds were of ordinary boards, without lining or other protection.
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 45 
 
 time, Powell's men were provided with the new Allen 
 modification of the Springfield breech-loading rifle. He 
 
 The Wagon-Box Corral on Piney Island 
 
 had enough rifles for his men and for all the civilian 
 employees, and a large number of new Colt revolvers,
 
 46 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 with plenty of ammunition for all. The new rifle had 
 never been used by the troops in combat with the In- 
 dians, and the latter were entirely ignorant of its tre- 
 mendous range and power and the wonderful rapidity 
 of fire which it permitted. They learned much about it 
 in the next day or two, however. A quantity of cloth- 
 ing and blankets was issued to the troops at the fort on 
 the first of August, and supplies for Powell's men were 
 sent down to him. 
 
 II. The Wild Charge of the Sioux 
 
 Having matured his plans, Red Cloud determined to 
 begin his attack on Fort Phil Kearney by annihilat- 
 ing the little detachment guarding the train.* Parties 
 of Indians had been observed in the vicinity for several 
 days, but no attack had been made since Powell's ar- 
 rival until the second of August, when, about nine 
 o'clock in the morning,f a party of some two hundred 
 Indians endeavored to stampede the herd of mules. 
 The herders, who were all armed, stood their ground 
 and succeeded for the time being in beating back the 
 attack. While they were hotly engaged with the dis- 
 mounted force, sixty mounted Indians succeeded in 
 getting into the herd and running it off. At the same 
 time five hundred other Indians attacked the wood train 
 at the other camp. 
 
 The affair was not quite a surprise, for the approach 
 of the Indians had been detected and signalled from the 
 corral on the island a few moments before. In the face 
 
 * On the same day an attack was made in force on Fort C. F. Smith, on the 
 Big Horn. 
 
 t Powell's official report says nine, although a private letter written some time later 
 makes the hour seven. It isn't material, anyway: there was ample'time for all the fight- 
 ing both sides cared for before the day was ended.
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 47 
 
 of so overwhelming a force the soldiers and civilians 
 at the wood train immediately retreated, abandoning the 
 train and the camp. Here four of the lumbermen were 
 killed. The retreat, however, was an orderly one, 
 and they kept back the Indians by a well-directed 
 fire. 
 
 Meanwhile the herders, seeing the stampede of the 
 mules, made an effort to join the party retreating from 
 the wood train. The Indians endeavored to inter- 
 cept them and cut them off. Powell, however, with a 
 portion of his force, leaving the post in command of 
 Lieutenant Jenness, immediately dashed across the 
 prairie and attacked the savages in the rear. They 
 turned at once, abandoning the pursuit of the herders, 
 and fell upon Powell, who in his turn retreated without 
 loss to the corral. His prompt and bold sortie had 
 saved the herders, for they w r ere enabled to effect a junc- 
 tion with the retreating train men and their guards and 
 the soldiers and civilians, and eventually gained the fort, 
 although not without hard fighting and some loss. 
 One thing that helped them to get away from the In- 
 dians was that the savages stopped to pillage the camp 
 and burn it and the train. Another thing was the pres- 
 ence of Powell's command, which they could not leave 
 in the rear. After driving away the others and com- 
 pleting the destruction of the camp, they turned their 
 attention to Powell's corral. 
 
 Some of the clothing that had been received the day 
 before had not been unpacked or distributed, so it was 
 used to strengthen the weak places in the corral. Pow- 
 ell's men lay down in the wagon beds before the loop- 
 holes; blankets were thrown over the tops of the beds 
 to screen the. defenders from observation and in the 
 hope of perhaps saving them from the ill effects of the
 
 48 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 plunging arrow fire, and everything was got reac 
 Everybody had plenty of ammunition. 
 
 Some of the men who were not good shots were to 
 off to do nothing but load rifles, of which there were s 
 many that each man had two or three beside him, on 
 man making use of no less than eight. Four civilian 
 succeeded in joining the party in the corral a welcom 
 addition, indeed, bringing the total number up to thirty- 
 two officers and men. Among this quartet was an old 
 frontiersman who had spent most of his life hunting in 
 the Indian country, and who had been in innumerable 
 fights, renowned for his expertness in the use of the 
 rifle a dead-shot. This was the man to whom the 
 eight guns were allotted. Powell, rifle in hand, sta- 
 tioned himself at one end of the corral; Jenness, similar- 
 ly armed, was posted at the other, each officer watch- 
 ing one of the openings covered by the complete wagons, 
 which were loaded with supplies so they could not be 
 run off easily by hand. 
 
 While all these preparations were being rapidly made, 
 although without confusion or alarm, the surrounding 
 country was filling with a countless multitude of In- 
 dians. It was impossible at the time to estimate the 
 number of them, although it was ascertained that more 
 than three thousand warriors were present and engaged. 
 Red Cloud himself was in command, and with him were 
 the great chiefs of the great tribes of the Sioux, who were 
 all represented Unkpapas, Miniconjous, Oglalas, 
 Brules, and Sans Arcs, besides hundreds of Chey- 
 ennes. 
 
 So confident of success were they that, contrary to 
 their ordinary practices, they had brought with them 
 their women and children to assist in carrying back the 
 plunder. These, massed out of range on the farthest
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 49 
 
 Is, constituted an audience for the terrible drama 
 out to be played in the amphitheater beneath 
 'em. 
 
 
 
 We can well imagine the thoughts of that little band 
 ; w thirty-two, surrounded by a force that outnumbered 
 iem one hundred to one. Their minds must have 
 one back to that winter day, some seven months before, 
 vhen twice their number had gone down to defeat and 
 destruction under the attack of two-thirds of their 
 present foemen. It is probable that not one of them 
 ever expected to escape alive. The chances that they 
 could successfully withstand an attack from so over- 
 welming a number of foes of such extraordinary bravery 
 were of the smallest. But not a man flinched, not a 
 man faltered. They looked to their weapons, settled 
 themselves comfortably in the wagon beds, thought of 
 Fetterman and their comrades, and prayed that the at- 
 tack might begin and begin at once. There were no 
 heroics, no speeches made. Powell quietly remarked 
 that they had to fight for their lives now, which was 
 patent to all; and he directed that no man, for any rea- 
 son, should open fire until he gave the order. 
 
 Some little time was spent by the Indians in making 
 preparations, and then a force of about five hundred In- 
 dians, magnificently mounted on the best war ponies 
 and armed with rifles, carbines, or muskets, detached 
 themselves from the main body and started toward the 
 little corral lying like a black dot on the open plain. 
 They intended to ride over the soldiers and end the 
 battle with one swift blow. Slowly at first, but gradu- 
 ally increasing their pace until their ponies were on a 
 dead run, they dashed gallantly toward the corral, while 
 the main body of the savages, at some distance in 
 their rear, prepared to take advantage of any opening
 
 5O Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 that might be made in the defenses. It was a brilliant 
 charge, splendidly delivered. 
 
 Such was the discipline of Powell's men that not a 
 shot was fired as the Indians, yelling and whooping 
 madly, came rushing on. There was something terri- 
 bly ominous about the absolute silence of that little for- 
 tification. The galloping men were within one hun- 
 dred yards now, now fifty. At that instant Powell 
 spoke to his men. The inclosure was sheeted with 
 flame. Out of the smoke and fire a rain of bullets was 
 poured upon the astonished savages. The firing was not 
 as usual one volley, then another, and then silence; 
 but it was a steady, persistent, continued stream, which 
 mowed them down in scores. The advance was thrown 
 into confusion, checked but not halted, its impetus 
 being too great; and then the force divided and swept 
 around the corral, looking for a weak spot for a possible 
 entrance. At the same moment a furious fire was 
 poured into it by the warriors, whose position on their 
 horses' backs gave them sufficient elevation to enable 
 them to fire over the wagon beds upon the garrison. 
 Then they circled about the corral in a mad gallop, seek- 
 ing some undefended point upon which to concentrate 
 and break through, but in vain. The little inclosure was 
 literally ringed in fire. Nothing could stand against it. 
 So close were they that one bullet sometimes pierced two 
 Indians.* 
 
 Having lost terribly, and having failed to make any 
 
 * "I know that my husband never expected to come out of that fight alive. He has 
 told me that during the fight the Indians came up so close to the corral, that one shot 
 would pass through the Indian in advance and kill or wound the one behind. My 
 husband claimed the honor of killing Red Cloud's nephew." Letter from Mrs. Annie 
 Powell to me. Surgeon Horton states that the men told him on their return to the 
 fort that the Indians were crowded so closely together that the conical bullets from 
 their muskets killed four or five Indians in line behind one another. The Indians 
 came up in solid masses on every side.
 
 O e 
 
 u s
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 51 
 
 impression whatever, the Indians broke and gave way. 
 They rushed pell-mell from the spot in frantic confu- 
 sion till they got out of range of the deadly storm that 
 swept the plain. All around the corral lay dead and 
 dying Indians, mingled with killed and wounded horses 
 kicking and screaming with pain, the Indians stoically 
 enduring all their sufferings and making no outcry. In 
 front of the corral, where the first force of the charge had 
 been spent, horses and men were stretched out as if they 
 had been cut down by a gigantic mowing-machine. The 
 defenders of the corral had suffered in their turn. Lieu- 
 tenant Jenness, brave and earnest in defense, had ex- 
 posed himself to give a necessary command and had re- 
 ceived a bullet in his brain. One of the private soldiers 
 had been killed and two severely wounded. The thirty- 
 two had been reduced to twenty-eight. At that rate, 
 since there were so few to suffer, the end appeared inev- 
 itable. The spirit of the little band, however, remained 
 undaunted. Fortunately for them, the Indians had met 
 with so terrible a repulse that all they thought of for the 
 time being was to get out of range. The vicinity of the 
 corral was thus at once abandoned. 
 
 III. Red Cloud's Baptism of Fire 
 
 Red Cloud determined, after consultation with the 
 other chiefs, upon another plan which gave greater 
 promise of success. Seven hundred Indians, armed with 
 rifles or muskets and followed by a number carrying 
 bows and arrows, were told off to prepare themselves as 
 a skirmishing party. Their preparations were simple, 
 and consisted of denuding themselves of every vestige 
 of clothing, including their war shirts and war bonnets. 
 These men were directed to creep forward, taking ad-
 
 52 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 vantage of every depression, ravine, or other cover, until 
 they were within range of the corral, which they were to 
 overwhelm by gun and arrow fire. Supporting them, 
 and intended to constitute the main attack, were the 
 whole remaining body of the Indians, numbering up- 
 ward of two thousand warriors. 
 
 With the wonderful skill of which they were masters, 
 the skirmishing party approached near to the corral 
 and began to fire upon it. Here and there, when a sav- 
 age incautiously exposed himself, he was shot by one of 
 the defenders; but in the main the people of the corral 
 kept silent under this terrible fusillade of bullets and 
 arrows. The tops of the wagon sides were literally 
 torn to pieces; the heavy blankets were filled with ar- 
 rows which, falling from a distance, did no damage. 
 The fire of the Indians was rapid and continuous. 
 The bullets crashed into the wood just over the heads of 
 the prostrate men, sounding like cracking thunder; yet 
 not one man in the wagon beds was hurt. Arguing, 
 perhaps from the silence in the corral, that the defend- 
 ers had been overwhelmed and that the time for the 
 grand attack had arrived, signal was given for the main 
 body of the Indians to charge. 
 
 They were led by the nephew of Red Cloud, a superb 
 young chieftain, who was ambitious of succeeding in due 
 course to the leadership now held by his uncle. Chant- 
 ing their fierce war songs, they came, on arranged in a 
 great semicircle. Splendid, stalwart braves, the flower 
 of the nation, they were magnificently arrayed in all 
 the varied and highly-colored fighting panoply of the 
 Sioux. Great war bonnets streamed from the heads of 
 the chiefs, many of whom wore gorgeous war shirts; the 
 painted bodies of others made dashes of rich color 
 against the green grass of the clearing and the dark
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 53 
 
 pines of the hills and mountains behind. Most of them 
 carried on their left arms painted targets or shields of 
 buffalo hide, stout enough to turn a musket shot unless 
 fairly hit. 
 
 Under a fire of redoubled intensity from their skir- 
 mishers they broke into a charge. Again they advanced 
 in the face of a terrible silence. Again at the appointed 
 moment the order rang out. Again the fearful dis- 
 charge swept them away in scores. Powell's own rifle 
 brought down the dauntless young chief in the lead. 
 Others sprang to the fore when he fell and gallantly led 
 on their men. Undaunted, they came on and on, in spite 
 of a slaughter such as no living Indian had experienced 
 or heard of. The Indians could account for the con- 
 tinuous fire only by supposing that the corral contained 
 a greater number of defenders than its area would indi- 
 cate it capable of receiving. So, in the hope that the 
 infernal fire would slacken, they pressed home the attack 
 until they were almost at the wagon beds. Back on the 
 hills Red Cloud and the veteran chiefs, with the women 
 and children, watched the progress of the battle with 
 eager intensity and marked with painful apprehension 
 the slaughter of their bold warriors. 
 
 The situation was terribly critical. If they came on 
 a few feet farther the rifles would be useless, and the 
 little party of twenty-eight would have to fight hand-to- 
 hand without reloading. In that event the end would 
 be certain; but just before the Indians reached the cor- 
 ral, they broke and gave way. So close had they come 
 that some of the troopers in their excitement actually 
 rose to their knees and threw the augers with which the 
 loopholes had been made, and other missiles, in the faces 
 of the Indians. Others, however, kept up the fire, which 
 was indeed more than mortal humanity could stand.
 
 54 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 What relief filled the minds of the defenders, when 
 they saw the great force which had come on so gallantly 
 reeling back over the plains in frantic desire to get to 
 cover, can easily be imagined. Yet such was the cour- 
 age, the desperation of these Indians, in spite of repulse 
 after repulse and a slaughter awful to contemplate, that 
 they made no less than six several and distinct charges 
 in three hours upon that devoted band. After the first 
 attack made by the men on horseback, not a single 
 casualty occurred among the defenders of the corral. 
 It was afternoon before the Sioux got enough. 
 
 The Indians could not account for this sustained and 
 frightful fire which came from the little fort, except by 
 attributing it to magic. "The white man must have 
 made bad medicine," they said afterwards, before they 
 learned the secret of the long-range, breech-loading fire- 
 arm, "to make the guns fire themselves without stop- 
 ping." Indeed, such had been the rapidity of the fire 
 that many of the gun-barrels became so hot that they 
 were rendered useless. To this day the Indians refer 
 to that battle as "the bad medicine fight of the white 
 man." 
 
 The ground around the corral was ringed with In- 
 dian slain. They were piled up in heaps closer by, and 
 scattered all over the grass farther away. Nothing is 
 more disgraceful in the eyes of an Indian chieftain or 
 his men than to permit the dead bodies of those killed 
 in action to fall into the hands of the enemy. Red Cloud 
 recognizing the complete frustration of his hopes of 
 overwhelming Fort Phil Kearney and sweeping the in- 
 vaders out of the land at that time, now only wished to 
 get his dead away and retreat. In order to do so he 
 threw forward his skirmishers again, who once more 
 poured a heavy fire on the corral.
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 55 
 
 This seemed to Powell and his exhausted men the 
 precursor of a final attack, which they feared would be 
 the end of them. Indeed Powell, in his report, says that 
 another attack would have been successful. From the 
 heat and the frightful strain of the long period of steady 
 fighting, the men were in a critical condition. The am- 
 munition, inexhaustible as it had seemed, was running 
 low; many of the rifles were useless. They still pre- 
 served, however, their calm, unbroken front to the foe, 
 and made a slow, deliberate, careful reply to the firing 
 that was poured upon them. 
 
 Red Cloud, however, had no thought of again at- 
 tacking. He only wanted to get away. Under cover 
 of his skirmishers he succeeded in carrying off most of 
 the dead, the wounded who were able to crawl getting 
 away themselves. A warrior, protecting himself as well 
 as he could with the stout buffalo-hide shield he carried, 
 would creep forward, attach the end of a long lariat to 
 the foot of a dead man, and then rapidly retreating he 
 would pull the body away. All the while the hills and 
 mountains resounded with the death chants of the old 
 men and women. 
 
 At the close of these operations a shell burst in the 
 midst of the Indian skirmishers, and through the trees 
 off to the left the weary defenders saw the blue uni- 
 forms of approaching soldiers, who a moment afterwards 
 debouched in the open. 
 
 An astonishing sight met the eyes of the relief party. 
 Clouds of Indians covered the plain. The little corral 
 was still spitting fire and smoke into the encircling mass. 
 They had got there in time then. Without hesitation 
 the troops deployed and came forward on the run. 
 Their cheers were met by welcoming shouts from 
 Powell and his heroic comrades.
 
 56 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 The herders, woodsmen, and guards who had es- 
 caped from their camp in the morning, had reached the 
 fort at last with the news of Powell's imminent danger. 
 Major Smith, with one hundred men and a howitzer, 
 was at once despatched to his support. No one 
 dreamed that the force of Indians was so great, or per- 
 haps more men would have been sent, although the 
 number at the fort was still insufficient to permit of the 
 detachment of a very large party. It was now three 
 o'clock in the afternoon. The Indians, disheartened 
 and dismayed by their fearful repulse, sullenly re- 
 treated before the advance of the charging soldiers. 
 There was a splendid opportunity presented to them 
 to wipe out Smith's command with their overwhelming 
 force, for they could have attacked him in the open; but 
 they had had enough for that day, and the opportunity 
 was not embraced. 
 
 Major Smith realized instantly that the proper thing 
 for him to do, in the face of such great odds, was to get 
 Powell's men and return with all speed. Carrying the 
 bodies of the dead and wounded, the little band of de- 
 fenders joined the rescuers and returned to the fort, 
 leaving the barren honors of the field to the Indians, 
 who occupied it on the heels of the retiring soldiers.* 
 
 IV. After the Battle. The Scout's Story 
 
 Powell modestly estimated he had killed sixty-seven 
 Indians and wounded one hundred and twenty. Most 
 of his men declared the Indian loss to have been be- 
 tween three and four hundred, but it was not until a 
 
 * Dr. Horton writes me that when Powell's men reached the post they were literally 
 crazed with excitement and the nervous strain of the fight. The health of many of them 
 was completely broken. Powell himself never fully recovered from the strain of that 
 awful day, his wife informs me.
 
 Thirty-two Against Three Thousand 57 
 
 year after the battle that the real facts were ascertained 
 from the Indians themselves. The loss in killed and 
 wounded in the engagement, on the part of the Indians, 
 was one thousand one hundred and thirty-seven. In 
 other words, each of the defenders had accounted for 
 at least thirty-six of the Indians. Amply, indeed, had 
 the little band avenged the death of their comrades 
 under Fetterman. 
 
 As Colonel Dodge justly says, the account reads like 
 a story of Cortes.* At first sight it appears to be in- 
 credible. In explanation of it, the following account, 
 which Colonel Dodge has preserved of a subsequent 
 conversation between the frontiersman to whom the 
 eight guns were allotted and the department commander 
 is of deep interest: 
 
 "How many Indians were in the attack ?" asked the General. 
 
 "Wall, Gin'r'll, I can't say fer sartin, but I think thar wur nigh onto 
 three thousand uv 'em." 
 
 "How many were killed and wounded ?" 
 
 "Wall, Gin'r'll, I can't say fer sartin, but I think thar wur nigh onto 
 a thousand uv 'em hit." 
 
 "How many did you kill ?" 
 
 "Wall, Gin'r'll, I can't say; but gi'me a dead rest, I kin hit a dollar 
 at fifty yards every time, and I fired with a dead rest at more'n fifty of 
 them varmints inside of fifty yards." 
 
 "For Heaven's sake, how many times did you fire ?" exclaimed the 
 astonished General. 
 
 "Wall, Gin'r'll, I can't say, but I kept eight guns pretty well het up 
 for more'n three hours." 
 
 On this occasion Powell received his third brevet for 
 heroism and distinguished conduct on the field. 
 
 The next fall a new treaty was made with the Indians, 
 and the post which had been the scene alike of heart- 
 
 * "Our Wild Indians," by Colonel R. I. Dodge, U. S. A. Mrs. Powell, in a 
 letter to me, also vouches for the anecdote quoted.
 
 58 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 breaking disaster and defeat and of triumph unprece- 
 dented, was abandoned to them. The troops were 
 withdrawn. The Indians at once burned it to the 
 ground. It was never reoccupied, and to-day is re- 
 membered simply because of its association with the first 
 and, with one exception, the most notable of our Indian 
 defeats in the west, and with the most remarkable and 
 overwhelming victory that was ever won by soldiers 
 over their gallant red foemen on the same ground. 
 
 At this writing (September, 1903) the once mighty 
 Red Cloud, now in his eighty-ninth year, is nearing his 
 end, and already various claimants for the now practi- 
 cally empty honor of the Head-Chieftainship of the 
 Sioux have arisen, the two most prominent candidates 
 being young Red Cloud and the son of old Sitting Bull. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 Since the first publication of this article I have received 
 the following letter, which, as it tends to confirm what 
 seems incredible, the terrible Indian loss, I quote in full: 
 
 DEAR MR. BRADY: 
 
 Although I am much nearer three score than fifty, I still enjoy his- 
 torical romance and facts, and I have, I think, read most of your writ- 
 ings. I have just read your last article and it recalls a conversation 
 with Red Cloud twenty years ago. 
 
 He was with my dear old friend, "Adirondack Murray" and, 
 I think, J. Amory Knox and myself. He, Murray and Knox had been 
 photographed in a group. In reminiscing in regard to the Piney Is- 
 land battle, he said he went in with over three thousand braves and lost 
 over half. Murray asked him if he meant over fifteen hundred had 
 been killed then, and he said : 
 
 " I lost them. They never fought again." 
 
 He knew Murray, Knox and myself wielded the pen sometimes 
 but that we never used private talks. I tell you the above for your 
 personal satisfaction. Sincerely, W. R. E. COLLINS, 
 
 3~22-'o4. 1438 Broad Exchange, New York.
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 Personal Reminiscences of Fort Phil 
 Kearney and the Wagon-Box Fight 
 
 By Mr. R. J. Smyth.* 
 
 " Cherokee, la., 6-27-1904. 
 
 A I was a member of the Carrington Powder 
 River Expedition of 1866, 1 take the liberty of 
 sending you a short sketch of happenings 
 about Fort Phil Kearney. Being actively en- 
 gaged with others for some two years in making the 
 history of that place, I think that the account may be 
 of interest. 
 
 I left Fort Leavenworth early in the spring of 1866. 
 At Fort Kearney, Nebraska, we found Col. Carrington 
 and a part of his command, consisting of several com- 
 panies of the Eighteenth Regular Infantry. Early in 
 April we received some recruits for said command, and 
 in a short time started on what at that time was called 
 the Carrington Powder River Expedition. We fol- 
 lowed the overland trail (sometimes called the Salt Lake 
 trail) up the south side of the South Platte River to 
 Julesberg, crossed the river there, then crossed the 
 
 * The serial publication of these articles brought me many letters filled with 
 corrections, suggestions, and other material, written by participants in the events 
 described. Among them all none is more graphic and more interesting than this 
 from Mr. Smyth, formerly Teamster with Carrington, which I count it a privilege to 
 insert in this book in his own words. C. T. B. 
 
 59
 
 60 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 divide to the North Platte. From here we went to 
 Fort Laramie. From this point we marched west to 
 Mussa ranch, crossed Horse Creek, and followed the 
 Bozeman trail. This was a new road, and a short cut 
 to Montana. After following this trail fifteen miles we 
 struck the North Platte at Bridger's Ferry. We 
 crossed here in a ferryboat a large flat boat attached 
 to a large cable rope stretched across the river. 
 
 We followed the North Platte River up on the right 
 side to a point opposite to the present site of Fort Fet- 
 terman. At this point we left the river and struck 
 across the country, crossing Sand Creek and several 
 other small creeks, among which I now remember the 
 North, South, and Middle Cheyennes. They were then 
 merely the dry beds of what would be quite large rivers 
 at the time of the melting of the snow in the mountains. 
 At a point twenty-two miles east of the Powder River 
 we struck the head of the Dry Fork of the Powder 
 River and followed it down to the river. 
 
 There on the west side we found Fort Reno, estab- 
 lished by General Conner in '65 and garrisoned by a 
 few "galvanized soldiers." The garrison had been 
 greatly reduced by desertions during the winter, the 
 soldiers making for Montana. "Galvanized soldiers" 
 was a name given to captured Rebel soldiers who enlisted 
 in the Union Army to do frontier duty in order to get 
 out of prison, and incidentally to draw pay from Uncle 
 Sam. We laid over here for a few days, and on the 
 fourth of July the Indians stampeded the stock of Al. 
 Leighton, the sutler. The colonel made a detail of 
 soldiers and citizens to go out after the Indians and re- 
 cover the stock if possible. 
 
 It was indeed a laughable sight to see the soldiers 
 trying to ride mules that were not broken to ride and
 
 The Wagon-Box Fight 61 
 
 the soldiers knew about as much about riding as the 
 mules did. We followed the Indians to the Pumpkin 
 Buttes and I am free to say for myself that I was very 
 glad that we did not find them. Had we got in touch 
 with them we would have had the smallest kind of a 
 show to save our hair. The soldiers being mounted on 
 green mules, and being armed with the old Springfield 
 musket, and that strapped on their backs, a very few 
 Indians could have stampeded the mules and, in fact, 
 the soldiers as well. 
 
 We, the citizens, had made arrangements that if the 
 Indians attacked us we would stick together and fight 
 it out the best that we could. Jim Bridger, our guide, 
 was with this party. He was an old timer in the moun- 
 tains. I had two years experience in the mountains 
 and plains prior to this time; the rest of the citizens were 
 good men. We returned to the fort safely but did not 
 recover any the stock. 
 
 A day or two later we left the fort. The first day's 
 march was a very hard one, thirty-six miles to Crazy 
 Woman's Fork. This creek was a very fine one, clear, 
 cool, and very rapid. The command was badly de- 
 moralized by this long, hot, and dry march, no water 
 between that point and Fort Reno. The soldiers had 
 been paid off a day or two before, many had been drunk, 
 many more thoughtless, and did not provide for water 
 in spite of orders. I saw five dollars paid for a canteen 
 of water on this march. On our arrival at Crazy Wom- 
 an's Fort, the commanding officer detailed a guard to 
 keep the soldiers from jumping into the creek and drink- 
 ing too much water. 
 
 We laid over here two days, to repair wagons and 
 bring in the stragglers. Had the Indians been on hand, 
 they could have cleaned up many of the soldiers at this
 
 62 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 time. From this creek west to the Big Horn the coun- 
 try is very fine; plenty of wood, water, and grass; in fact, 
 a paradise. We traveled west to the forks of the Pineys. 
 The big and little Pineys fork near where we made our 
 camp, sixty-five miles west of the Powder River. 
 
 On the twenty-fourth day of July we moved to the 
 place where we established Fort Phil Kearney. The 
 grasshoppers were so thick in the air that day that they 
 nearly obscured the sun from sight.* In fact, it did not 
 look bigger than a silver dollar. The fort was built 
 about as you have described it, and from the day that we 
 established it until I left there, in November, '67, the 
 Indians were very much in evidence and plenty of fight- 
 ing nearly all that time. 
 
 I was a teamster on this expedition, driving an am- 
 bulance team. Made several trips to Fort Laramie and 
 to Fort C. F. Smith on the Big Horn. This latter Fort 
 was established by Carrington a short time after the 
 establishment of Fort Phil Kearney, and was a two- 
 company post. 
 
 I was with the hay-making party down the Big Piney 
 during a part of the summer of '66. During one of our 
 trips to the hay field, we were accompanied by a man 
 who represented Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly as 
 an artist. This man rode with me a part of the way. He 
 intended to do some sketching near there but I advised 
 him to stay with our outfit. However, he insisted on 
 stopping by the way. On our return we found him 
 dead, a cross cut on his breast, which indicated that they 
 thought him a coward who would not fight. He wore 
 long, black hair and his head had been completely 
 skinned. Probably it was the work of a band of young 
 Cheyenne bucks; they could cut the scalps into many 
 
 * I have observed similar visitations in other parts of the West years ago. C. T. B.
 
 The Wagon-Box Fight 63 
 
 pieces and thereby make a big show in camp. Was very 
 sorry for this man; he appeared to be a perfect gentle- 
 man. His thought was, that if the Indians found him 
 they would not hurt him, as he intended to show them 
 his drawings, and also explain to them that he was not 
 armed. 
 
 Later on the Indians got so thick that we had to 
 
 A.Cent-TW 
 B Head of Post 
 C.DoulU plank T 
 
 D. Junction of torftir*. 
 
 E. CTOunot- Plan. 
 
 F. CiossScetion. 
 
 P. Pl<mk.3mek*UX. 
 
 R. 
 
 T. 
 
 V. Ventilating ctuct 
 
 X PosttotcaroutttTdoor 
 
 whrv open 
 
 abandon this hay-making business. The day that we 
 broke camp we had a great deal of fighting with the 
 Indians. I remember a soldier named Pate Smith who 
 borrowed a revolver from me that day. This man was 
 mounted. He rode too far ahead of the outfit, the In- 
 dians cut him off. Later we heard from the Crows that
 
 64 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the Sioux caught him, skinned him alive. This man 
 was an old volunteer soldier, but what show has a man 
 with the old-fashioned Springfield musket ? One shot 
 and you are done. 
 
 I was at the Fort at the time of the Phil Kearney mas- 
 sacre and went down with the reinforcements to that 
 sad scene. Our men were all down when we got there, 
 and cut up in the most brutal manner, such as only a 
 red brute would do. We buried them a little east of the 
 fort. They fought a good fight, but were surprised and 
 overpowered. As we approached the scene of action 
 the country was black with Indians to the west. 
 
 The officers were clearly to blame for this slaughter; 
 they disobeyed the colonel's orders, which were to guard 
 the wood train to the fort, and not to engage the Indians 
 unless attacked by them. At a point about two miles 
 west of the fort they left the wood train; crossed the Big 
 Piney Creek; got nearly to the Peno Creek, and were am- 
 bushed by about three thousand Indians, and the entire 
 command killed. This band of Indians included all of 
 the different tribes of the Sioux, also Cheyennes, Black- 
 feet, Arapahoes, and some young renegade Crow bucks. 
 I knew this latter statement to be true, from the fact that 
 one member of Company C, Second Cavalry, had stolen 
 a revolver from me some time before and it was with him 
 in this fight. It was taken from his body by the Indians. 
 Next spring a young Crow came to the fort. I saw the 
 gun under his blanket and took it away from him. If 
 he was in camp on the Big Horn with his people, he 
 could not have got this gun on this field of slaughter. I 
 had been wounded about six weeks prior to this fight 
 and had not reported for duty, but on call for volunteers 
 to reinforce the Fetterman party, reported for duty and 
 went with the command to the scene of the massacre.
 
 The Wagon-Box Fight 65 
 
 You are in error in stating that there was no commu- 
 nication with the outside world during this winter. I 
 made one trip with my ambulance to Fort Laramie. 
 We had an escort of ten cavalry soldiers. We made, I 
 think, three trips after this without an escort, using pack 
 mules, the party consisting of two packers and the mail- 
 carrier, Van Volsey, a very fine man and a brave one, 
 too. Last trip up I saw Indian signs in the dry forks of 
 the Powder River, consisting of the remains of a camp 
 fire, not entirely burned out, and some Indian traps lying 
 around it. I refused to make another trip without an 
 escort. On our arrival at the fort we reported the facts, 
 and demanded an escort for the next trip. But owing to 
 the fact that the stock was in such poor condition on 
 account of the scarcity of food, they could not furnish 
 one mounted. 
 
 They persuaded me to take one more trip with Van 
 Volsey, which I foolishly consented to do. On the first 
 day out I got snow blind and on our arrival at Fort 
 Reno requested him to get a substitute in my place. 
 He refused to do so and insisted that I accompany him 
 to Fort Laramie, but after being on the road a short 
 time, my eyes played out entirely. I had to return to 
 the fort and there secured another man to take my place. 
 They made the trip down all right and returning were 
 accompanied by two or three soldiers, who were going 
 to join their commands. They had got nearly to the 
 head of the dry fork of the Powder River when the In- 
 dians killed the entire party. We found the bones of 
 the men and mules and some of the mail sacks. We 
 buried the men's remains there. 
 
 During the summer of '67 life was one continual 
 round of fighting. We lost a great many men, but 
 damaged the Sioux much more than during the pre-
 
 66 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 vious year. The soldiers had better guns, and were 
 far better Indian fighters. They had learned that it 
 was safer to keep their faces to the Indians, than, as 
 during the previous year, their backs. When you run 
 from an Indian you are his meat. 
 
 On the day of the wagon-box fight, accompanied by 
 my partner, I left the fort before daylight. We went to 
 the foot-hills to get some deer. A short time after day- 
 light we discovered a lot of Indian smoke signals on the 
 hills, and decided that we had better get back to the 
 fort. In making our way back we followed the Little 
 Piney down for some distance, and found that the coun- 
 try was full of Indians. We then struck out for the 
 wood train. The Indians had got between us and 
 it. We then went to the wagon-box corral, and got 
 there none too soon. 
 
 Your description of the corral is correct as I remem- 
 ber it to be. Its location is about right, except that it 
 was not on an island. I never heard of Little Piney 
 Island, and I do not believe such an island existed there 
 at that time.* The wagon boxes were of the ordinary 
 government boxes. They were set off from the wagons, 
 as the wagons were in corral. The intervals between 
 were packed with logs, bales of blankets, clothing, sacks 
 of corn, etc. As to the wagon boxes being lined with 
 iron, you are right. They were not. Up to that time, 
 and during my time on the plains, I never saw wagon 
 boxes so lined. The wagon box that I was detailed to 
 fight in had no such protection, but we had gunny sacks 
 of corn placed on edge two deep on the inside of the box, 
 with a two inch auger hole at the point where the four 
 sacks came together. This made good protection for 
 
 * General Carrington's map on page 27 shows the island. Mr. Smyth's rec- 
 ollection is in error here. C. T. B.
 
 The Wagon-Box Fight 67 
 
 the body when lying down. As stated in your article, 
 the tops of the wagon boxes were literally torn to pieces 
 with the bullets fired at us by the Indians. Without 
 this protection the fight would not have lasted very 
 
 long- 
 There was a surplus of ammunition and guns. I had 
 
 two Spencer carbines, and two revolvers (six-shot army 
 Colt's). During the first charge I emptied the carbines 
 and the revolvers less two shots (reserved for myself in 
 case of a show down). The balance of our men must 
 have fired as many shots as I did. The soldier that was 
 in the box with me had a needle gun and a Spencer; also 
 one or two revolvers. And he kept them busy while he 
 lived. This man was an infantry soldier do not re- 
 member his company. He was shot through the head, 
 dying in about two hours after being shot. 
 
 Lieutenant Jenness had just cautioned me not to ex- 
 pose my person, and to hold my fire until I was sure of 
 getting an Indian at each shot. He had moved a few 
 feet from my box when he was shot through the head. I 
 think he died instantly. He was a grand, good man, 
 and a fearless officer. I told him to keep under cover. 
 He stated he was compelled to expose himself in order 
 to look after his men. 
 
 I got a slight wound in my left hand; a bullet came in 
 through my porthole, which I thought was close shoot- 
 ing for a Sioux. 
 
 This fight lasted about four hours, and was very hot 
 from the start. I had been in several Indian fights 
 prior to this time, but never saw the Indians make such a 
 determined effort to clean us up before. They should 
 have killed the entire party. They certainly had force 
 enough to ride over us, but our fire was so steady and 
 severe that they could not stand the punishment.
 
 68 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Our men stood the strain well, held their fire until the 
 bullets would count. In fact, shooting into such a mass 
 of Indians as charged on us the first time, it would be 
 nearly impossible for many bullets to go astray. In all 
 my experience in fighting Indians prior to this time, I 
 never saw them stand punishment so well as they did at 
 this time; they certainly brought all their sand with 
 them. In charging on our little corral they rode up 
 very close to the wagon boxes, and here is where they 
 failed. Had they pushed home on the first charge, the 
 fight would not have lasted ten minutes after they got 
 over the corral. 
 
 Many dead and wounded Indians lay within a few 
 feet of the wagon boxes. The wounded Indians did not 
 live long after the charge was over. They would watch 
 and try to get a bullet in on some of our men. We had 
 to kill them for self-protection. Anyway, it was evening 
 
 IT- 11 'T-l 11 b 
 
 up the V etterman deal. 1 hey never showed mercy to a 
 wounded white man, and should not expect any different 
 treatment. I had a canteen of water when the fight 
 commenced, and used most of it to cool my guns. 
 
 You state that all of our loss occurred at time of the 
 first charge. This is an error, as the man in my box 
 was shot after he had been fighting nearly an hour. I 
 think that his name was Boyle. Up to the time that he 
 was shot he certainly filled the bill and did his duty, 
 dying with his face to the foe as a soldier should. 
 
 I do not try to estimate the number of the Indians, but, 
 as my partner said, "The woods were full of them." 
 This was the largest gathering of Indians that I ever 
 saw, and the hardest fighting lot that I ever encoun- 
 tered. 
 
 When the reinforcements came in sight we took on a 
 new lease of life, and when they dropped a shell over the
 
 The Wagon-Box Fight 69 
 
 Indians we knew that the fight was won. Indians will 
 not stand artillery fire. They call it the "wagon gun." 
 The reinforcements came just in time. One hour more 
 of such fighting would have exhausted our men and 
 ammunition. 
 
 As to the Indians carrying off all their dead and 
 wounded, here you are again mistaken, as many of our 
 men carried away with them scalps, etc., taken from 
 the bodies of the dead Indians near the corral.* The 
 Indians certainly hauled off all their dead and wound- 
 ed that they could, but did not expose themselves 
 very much in order to get the dead ones near the 
 corral. 
 
 On arrival of reinforcements we immediately re- 
 treated to the fort. Captain Powell was the right man 
 to command under such trying circumstances. No 
 better or braver man ever held a lieutenant's com- 
 mission than Jenness. As to the Indian loss, I think you 
 have overestimated it. We thought that we had killed 
 and wounded some more than four hundred. How- 
 ever, you may be right in your estimates. We had the 
 opportunity to clean up that number, and we certainly 
 did our best to do so. 
 
 After the massacre of '66 (Dec.) we received re- 
 inforcements, as I now remember, four companies of 
 infantry and two companies, L and M, of the 2d Cav. 
 This large additional force, stationed at a four-company 
 fort, and only provisioned for four companies, caused 
 a great deal of suffering during the winter, resulting in 
 
 * Surgeon Horton writes me that the "soldiers brought back to the fort the 
 head of an Indian for a scientific study of Indian skulls!" He afterwards sent it to 
 Washington. He also states that there were a number of dead bodies too near the cor- 
 ral for the Indians to get them during the action. When he and other officers visited the 
 place the next day, after the withdrawal of the Indians, there were no dead bodies to be 
 found, not even the headless one. C. T. B.
 
 yo Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 much sickness and many deaths from scurvy. Nearly 
 all of us were suffering from this disease. I have never 
 fully recovered from the effect of it. 
 
 Colonel Carrington was severely censured by the War 
 Department and many others for the Fort Phil Kearney 
 massacre, and, I think, unjustly. Had Col. Fetterman 
 and Capt. Brown and the other officers in command 
 obeyed his orders, the massacre would not have oc- 
 curred, not, at least, at this time. 
 
 Fetterman and Brown were dare-devil fighters, al- 
 ways anxious for a fight, and took this opportunity to 
 get into one. Capt. Brown, on his "calico" pony, was 
 a familiar figure around this fort the boys called 
 him "Baldy." The Indians were very anxious to kill 
 Brown; he was a thorn in their sides. While we to 
 some extent lay the blame of the massacre on Brown 
 and Fetterman, to be honest, we were nearly all partly to 
 blame. We were always harping at the colonel to send 
 a large force out and fight the Indians, but he always in- 
 sisted on a conservative course. We all thought up to 
 that time that one hundred good men could walk 
 through the entire Sioux Nation. This massacre de- 
 monstrated that in a fight in the open the Sioux should 
 not have over five to one of us. 
 
 I was well posted in regard to the Carrington Pow- 
 der River Expedition of 1866 and the history of Fort 
 Phil Kearney from the date of establishment to Nov., 
 1867, and acquainted with all of the officers and many 
 of the soldiers and citizens. I probably would not 
 have written this little statement of actual history were 
 it not for the fact that in your article you stated that 
 you got some of the record from the only living mem- 
 ber of the celebrated wagon-box fight. I am still in 
 the flesh and will pull down the scale at two hundred
 
 The Wagon-Box Fight 71 
 
 pounds. In all probability there are others alive, as 
 we all were young men at that time. 
 
 The history of the three forts established in 1865 and 
 1866, well written, would make interesting history, as 
 almost every day was full of stirring events. Quite a 
 number of the citizens in that country at this time were 
 discharged volunteer soldiers and some rebel soldiers 
 also. As a rule, they were hard nuts for the Indians to 
 crack. It was noticeable that they would not take 
 chances fighting citizens that they would take with the 
 soldiers. 
 
 After leaving Fort Phil Kearney I went to Cheyenne 
 and followed the Union Pacific R. R. to the finish. Was 
 at Promontory Point in Utah when the Union Pacific 
 and Central Pacific R. Rs. connected; this was one of 
 the mile-stones in the history of the West, and prac- 
 tically solved the Indian problem. The Indians fought 
 hard for this territory. It was the best hunting ground 
 that they had left. There were many half-breeds among 
 them, and they were daring and shifty fighters. 
 Respectfully yours, 
 
 R. J. SMYTH "
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 Forsyth and the Rough Riders of '68 
 
 I. The Original "Rough Riders." 
 
 NO one will question the sweeping assertion 
 that the grittiest band of American fighters 
 that history tells us of was that which de- 
 fended the Alamo. They surpassed by one 
 Leonidas and his Spartans; for the Greeks had a 
 messenger of defeat, the men of the Alamo had none. 
 But close on the heels of the gallant Travis and 
 his dauntless comrades came "Sandy" Forsyth's 
 original "Rough Riders," who immortalized them- 
 selves by their terrific fight on Beecher's Island on the 
 Arickaree Fork of the Republican River, in Eastern 
 Colorado, in the fall of 1868. 
 
 The contagion of the successful Indian attacks on 
 Fort Phil Kearney had spread all over the Central West. 
 The Kansas Pacific was then building to Denver, and its 
 advance was furiously resisted by the Indians. As 
 early as 1866, at a council held at Fort Ellsworth, 
 Roman Nose, head chief of the Cheyennes, made a 
 speech full of insolent defiance. 
 
 "This is the first time," said the gigantic warrior, 
 who was six feet three and magnificently proportioned,* 
 
 * General Fry, in his valuable book, "Army Sacrifices," now unfortunately out of 
 print and scarce, thus graphically describes him: "A veritable man of war, the shock 
 
 7 2
 
 CAPT. LOUIS H. CARPENTER 
 MAJ. GEORGE A. FORSYTH 
 
 LIEUT. FREDK. H. BEECHER * 
 SCOUT JACK STII.LWELL 
 
 BEECHER'S ISLAND FIGHTERS 
 
 * Killed on the Island 
 All contemporary portraits except Stillweli's
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 73 
 
 "that I have ever shaken the white man's hand in 
 friendship. If the railway is continued I shall be his 
 enemy forever." 
 
 There was no stopping the railway. Its progress was 
 as irresistible as the movement of civilization itself. 
 The Indians went on the war-path. The Cheyennes 
 were led by their two principal chiefs, Black Kettle 
 being the second. We shall see subsequently how 
 Custer accounted for Black Kettle. This story deals 
 with the adventures of Roman Nose. 
 
 As fighters these Indians are entitled to every ad- 
 miration. As marauders they merit nothing but cen- 
 sure. The Indians of the early days of the nation, 
 when Pennsylvania and New York were border states, 
 and across the Alleghenies lay the frontier, were 
 cruel enough, as the chronicle of the times abundantly 
 testify; but they were angels of light compared with the 
 Sioux and Cheyennes, the Kiowas, Arapahoes and 
 Comanches, and these in turn were almost admirable 
 beside the Apache. The first-named group were as cruel 
 as they knew how to be, and they did not lack knowl- 
 edge, either. The Apaches were more ingenious and 
 devilish in their practices than the others. The Sioux 
 and the Cheyennes were brutal with the brutality of a 
 wild bull or a grizzly bear. To that same kind of bru- 
 tality the Apaches added the malignity of a wildcat and 
 
 of battle and scenes of carnage and cruelty were as of the breath of his nostrils; about 
 thirty years of age, standing six feet three inches high, he towered giant-like above his 
 companions. A grand head with strongly marked features, lighted by a pair of fierce 
 black eyes; a large mouth with thin lips, through which gleamed rows of strong, white 
 teeth; a Roman nose with dilated nostrils like those of a thoroughbred horse, first at- 
 tracted attention, while a broad chest, with symmetrical limbs on which the muscles 
 under the bronze of his skin stood out like twisted wire, were some of the points of this 
 splendid animal. Clad in buckskin leggings and moccasins elaborately embroidered 
 with beads and feathers, with a single eagle feather in his scalp-lock, and with that rarest 
 of robes, a white buffalo, beautifully tanned and soft as cashmere, thrown over his naked 
 shoulders, he stood forth, the war chief of the Cheyennes."
 
 74 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the subtlety of a snake. The men of the first group 
 would stand out and fight in the open to gain their ends, 
 although they did not prefer to. They were soldiers 
 and warriors as well as torturers. The Apache was a 
 lurking skulker, but, when cornered, a magnificent 
 fighter also.* General Crook calls him "the tiger of 
 the human species." However, from the point of de- 
 testableness there wasn't much to choose between them. 
 
 Perhaps we ought not to blame the Indians for acting 
 just as our ancestors of, say the Stone Age, acted in all 
 probability. And when you put modern weapons and 
 modern whisky in the hands of the Stone Age men you 
 need not be surprised at the consequences. The Indian 
 question is a terrible one any way you take it. It can- 
 not be denied they have been treated abominably by 
 the United States, and that they have good cause for 
 resentment; but the situation has been so peculiar that 
 strife has been inevitable. 
 
 As patriots defending their country, they are not 
 without certain definite claims to our respect. Recog- 
 nizing the right of the aborigines to the soil, the govern- 
 ment has yet arbitrarily abrogated that right at pleasure. 
 At times the Indians have been regarded as independent 
 nations, with which all differences were to be settled by 
 treaty as between equals; and again, as a body of sub- 
 jects whose affairs could be and would be administered 
 willy-nilly by the United States. Such vacillations are 
 certain to result in trouble, especially as, needless to say, 
 the Indians invariably considered themselves as much 
 independent nations as England and France might 
 consider themselves, in dealing with the United States 
 or with one another. And the Indians naturally 
 
 * Chains F. Lummis refers to the Apaches as among the most ferocious and 
 most success *ul warriors in history.
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 75 
 
 claimed and insisted that the territory where their fath- 
 ers had roamed for centuries belonged solely and wholly 
 to them. They admitted no suzerainty of any sort, 
 either. And they held the petty force the government 
 put in the field in supreme contempt until they learned 
 by bitter experience the illimitable power of the United 
 States. 
 
 To settle such a growing question in a word, offhand, 
 as it were, is, of course, impossible, nor does the settle- 
 ment lie within the province of these articles; but it may 
 be said that if the United States had definitely decided 
 upon one policy or the other, and had then concentrated 
 all its strength upon the problem; if it had realized the 
 character of the people with whom it was dealing, and 
 had made such display of its force as would have ren- 
 dered it apparent, to the keenest as well as to the most 
 stupid and besotted of the Indians, that resistance was 
 entirely futile, things might have been different. But it is 
 the solemn truth that never, in any of the Indian wars 
 west of the Missouri, has there been a force of soldiers in 
 the field adequate to deal with the question. The blood 
 of thousands of soldiers and settlers men, women, and 
 children might have been spared had this fact been 
 realized and acted upon. 
 
 The Cheyennes swept through western Kansas like a 
 devastating storm. In one month they cut off, killed, 
 or captured eighty-four different settlers, including 
 their wives and children. They swept the country bare. 
 Again and again the different gangs of builders were 
 wiped out, but the railroad went on. General Sheridan 
 finally took the field in person, as usual with an inade- 
 quate force at his disposal. One of his aides-de-camp 
 was a young cavalry officer named George Alexander 
 Forsyth, commonly known to his friends as "Sandy"
 
 76 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Forsyth. He had entered the volunteer army in 1861 
 as a private of dragoons in a Chicago company. A 
 mere boy, he had come out a brigadier-general. In the 
 permanent establishment he was a major in the Ninth 
 Cavalry. Sheridan knew him. He was one of the two 
 officers who made that magnificent ride with the great 
 commander that saved the day at Winchester, and it was 
 due to his suggestion that Sheridan rode down the re- 
 adjusted lines before they made the return advance 
 which decided the fate of the battle. During all that 
 mad gallop and hard fighting young Forsyth rode with 
 the General. To-day he is the only survivor of that 
 ride. 
 
 Forsyth was a fighter all through, and he wanted to 
 get into the field in command of some of the troops oper- 
 ating directly on the Indians in the campaign under con- 
 sideration. No officer was willing to surrender his com- 
 mand to Forsyth on the eve of active operations, and 
 there was no way, apparently, by which he could do 
 anything until Sheridan acceded to his importunities 
 by authorizing him to raise a company of scouts for the 
 campaign. He was directed, if he could do so, to enlist 
 fifty men, who, as there was no provision for the em- 
 ployment of scouts or civilian auxiliaries, were of ne- 
 cessity carried on the payrolls as quartermasters' em- 
 ployees for the magnificent sum of one dollar per day. 
 They were to provide their own horses, but were allowed 
 thirty cents a day for the use of them, and the horses 
 were to be paid for by the government if they were " ex- 
 pended" during the campaign. They were equipped 
 with saddle, bridle, haversack, canteen, blanket, knife, 
 tin cup, Spencer repeating rifle, good for seven shots 
 without reloading, six in the magazine, one in the barrel, 
 and a heavy Colt's army revolver. There were no
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 77 
 
 tents or other similar conveniences, and four mules con- 
 stituted the baggage train. The force was intended to 
 
 oo o 
 
 be strictly mobile, and it was. Each man carried on his 
 person one hundred and forty rounds of ammunition for 
 his rifle and thirty rounds for his revolver. The four 
 mules carried the medical supplies and four thousand 
 rounds of extra ammunition. Each officer and man 
 took seven days' rations. What he could not carry on 
 his person was loaded on the pack mules; scanty rations 
 they were, too. 
 
 As soon as it was known that the troop was to be or- 
 ganized, Forsyth was overwhelmed with applications 
 from men who wished to join it. He had the pick of the 
 frontier to select from. He chose thirty men at Fort 
 Harker and the remaining twenty from Fort Hayes. 
 Undoubtedly they were the best men in the West for 
 the purpose. To assist him, Lieutenant Frederick H. 
 Beecher, of the Third Infantry, was detailed as second in 
 command. Beecher was a young officer with a record. 
 He had displayed peculiar heroism at the great battle 
 of Gettysburg, where he had been so badly wounded 
 that he was lame for the balance of his life. He was a 
 nephew of the great Henry Ward Beecher and a worthy 
 representative of the distinguished family whose name 
 he bore. The surgeon of the party was Dr. John H. 
 Mooers, a highly-trained physician, who had come to 
 the West in a spirit of restless adventure. He had 
 settled at Hayes City and was familiar with the frontier. 
 The guide of the party was Sharp Grover, one of the 
 remarkable plainsmen of the time, regarded as the best 
 scout in the government service. The first sergeant 
 was W. H. H. McCall, formerly brigadier-general, 
 United States Volunteers. McCall, in command of a 
 Pennsylvania regiment, had been promoted for con-
 
 78 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 spicuous gallantry on the field, when John B. Gordon 
 made his magnificent dash out of Petersburg and at- 
 tacked Fort Steadman. 
 
 The personnel of the troop was about equally divided 
 between hunters and trappers and veterans of the 
 Civil War, nearly all of whom had held commissions in 
 either the Union or Confederate Army, for the command 
 included men from both sides of Mason and Dixon's 
 line. It was a hard-bitten, unruly group of fighters. 
 Forsyth was just the man for them. While he did not 
 attempt to enforce the discipline of the Regular Army, 
 he kept them regularly in hand. He took just five days 
 to get his men and start on the march. They left Fort 
 Wallace, the temporary terminus of the Kansas Pacific 
 Railroad, in response to a telegram from Sheridan that 
 the Indians were in force in the vicinity, and scouted the 
 country for some six days, finally striking the Indian 
 trail, which grew larger and better defined as they pur- 
 sued it. Although it was evident tfciat the Indians they 
 were chasing greatly outnumbered them, they had come 
 out for a fight and wanted one, so they pressed on. 
 They got one, too.* 
 
 II. The Island of Death 
 
 On the evening of the fifteenth of September, hot on 
 the trail, now like a well-beaten road, they rode through 
 a depression or a ravine, which gave entrance into a val- 
 ley some two miles wide and about the same length. 
 Through this valley ran a little river, the Arickaree. 
 They encamped on the south bank of the river about 
 
 * The reason a large body of men had not been detailed for the pursuit was that the 
 greater the number the slower the movement would have been, and the Indians could 
 and would have kept out of the way with ease. If the Indians were laying a trap for 
 Forsyth, he was tempting them to stop and fight.
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 
 
 MAP OF FORSYTH'S DEFENSE OF BEECHER'S ISLAND, ARIKAREE RIVER. COLORADO 
 
 (Drawn by the author from rough sketches and maps furnished by General Forsyth) 
 Explanation of Map: A. Forsyth's camp before attack. B. Rifle-pits on island. C. Low, 
 unoccupied land on island with solitary cottonwood at end. D. Indian charge led by Roman 
 Nose and Medicine Man. EE. Low banks fringed with trees. FF. Dry sandy bed of the 
 river. HH. Indian riflemen on the banks. KK. Indian women and children on bluffs, half a 
 mile from river. L. Ground sloping gently to river. M. Level grassy plain to bluffs.
 
 8o Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 four o'clock in the afternoon. The horses and men 
 were weary with hard riding. Grazing was good. 
 They were within striking distance of the Indians now. 
 Forsyth believed there were too many of them to run 
 away from such a small body as his troop of scouts. 
 He was right. The Indians had retreated as far as they 
 intended to. 
 
 The river bed, which was bordered by wild plums, 
 willows and alders, ran through the middle of the valley. 
 The bed of the river was about one hundred and forty 
 yards wide. In the middle of it was an island about 
 twenty yards wide and sixty yards long. The gravelly 
 upper end of the island, which rose about two feet above 
 the water level, was covered with a thick growth of 
 stunted bushes, principally alders and willows; at the 
 lower end, which sloped to the water's edge, there rose 
 a solitary cottonwood tree. There had been little rain 
 for some time, and this river bed for the greater part 
 of its width was dry and hard.* For a space of 
 four or five yards on either side of the island there was 
 water, not over a foot deep, languidly washing the grav- 
 elled shores. When the river bed was full the island 
 probably was overflowed. Such islands form from time 
 to time, and are washed away as quickly as they develop. 
 The banks of the river bed on either side commanded 
 the island. 
 
 The simple preparations for the camp of that body of 
 men were soon made. As night fell they rolled them- 
 selves in their blankets, with the exception of the sen- 
 tries, and went to sleep with the careless indifference of 
 veterans under such circumstances. 
 
 * In dry seasons I have often seen Western river beds half a mile wide absolutely 
 devoid of water. In the wet season these same beds would be roaring torrents from 
 bank to bank.
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 81 
 
 Forsyth, however, as became a captain, was not so 
 careless or so reckless as his men. They were alone in 
 the heart of the Indian country, in close proximity to an 
 overwhelming force, and liable to attack at any moment. 
 He knew that their movements had been observed by the 
 Indians during the past few days. Therefore the 
 young commander was on the alert throughout the night, 
 visiting the outposts from time to time to see that care- 
 ful watch was kept. 
 
 Just as the first streaks of dawn began to "lace the 
 severing clouds," he happened to be standing by the 
 sentry farthest from the camp. Silhouetted against the 
 sky-line they saw the feathered head of an Indian. For 
 Forsyth to fire at him was the work of an instant. At 
 the same time a party which had crept nearer to the 
 picket line unobserved dashed boldly at the horses, and 
 resorting to the usual devices with bells, horns, hideous 
 yells, and waving buffalo robes, attempted to stampede 
 the herd. 
 
 Men like those scouts under such circumstances slept 
 with their boots on. The first shot called them into 
 instant action. They ran instinctively to the picket 
 line. A sharp fire, and the Indians were driven off at 
 once. Only the pack mules got away. No pursuit was 
 attempted, of course. Orders were given for the men 
 to saddle their horses and stand by them. In a few 
 moments the command was drawn up in line, each man 
 standing by his horse's head, bridle reins through his 
 left arm, his rifle grasped in his right hand ready! 
 Scarcely had the company been thus assembled when 
 Grover caught Forsyth's arm and pointed down the 
 valley. 
 
 "My God!" he cried, "look at the Injuns!" 
 
 In front of them, on the right of them, in the rear of
 
 82 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 them, the hills and valleys on both sides of the river 
 seemed suddenly to be alive with Indians. It was as 
 quick a transformation from a scene of peaceful quiet 
 to a valley filled with an armed force as the whistle of 
 Roderick Dhu had effected in the Scottish glen. 
 
 The way to the left, by which they had entered the val- 
 ley, was still open. Forsyth could have made a running 
 fight for it and dashed for the gorge through which he 
 had entered the valley. There were, apparently, no 
 Indians barring the way in that direction. But For- 
 syth realized instantly that for him to retreat would 
 mean the destruction of his command, that the In- 
 dians had in all probability purposely left him that way 
 of escape, and if he tried it he would be ambushed in the 
 defile and slain. That was just what they wanted him 
 to do, it was evident. That was why he did not attempt it. 
 He was cornered, but he was not beaten, and he did not 
 think he could be. Besides, he had come for that fight, 
 and that fight he was bound to have. 
 
 Whatever he was to do he must do quickly. There 
 was no place to which he could go save the island. 
 That was not much of a place at best, but it was the one 
 strategic point presented by the situation. Pouring a 
 heavy fire into the Indians, Forsyth directed his men to 
 take possession of the island under cover of the smoke. 
 In the movement everything had to be abandoned, in- 
 cluding the medical stores and rations, but the precious 
 ammunition that must be secured at all hazards. 
 Protected by a squad of expert riflemen on the river 
 bank, who presently joined them, the scouts reached 
 the island in safety, tied their horses to the bushes 
 around the edge of it, and in the intervals of fighting 
 set to work digging rifle-pits covering an ellipse twenty 
 by forty yards, one pit for each man, with which to de-
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 83 
 
 fend the upper and higher part of the island They 
 had nothing to dig with except tin cups, tin plates, and 
 their bowie knives, but they dug like men. There was 
 no lingering or hesitation about it. 
 
 The chief of the Indian force, which was made up 
 of Northern Cheyennes, Oglala and Brule Sioux, 
 with a few Arapahoes and a number of Dog Soldiers, 
 was the famous Roman Nose, an enemy to be feared 
 indeed. He was filled with disgust and indignation at 
 the failure of his men to occupy the island, the strategic 
 importance of which he at once detected. It is believed 
 that orders to seize the island had been given, but for 
 some reason they had not been obeyed; and to this over- 
 sight or failure was due the ultimate safety of Forsyth's 
 men. It was not safe to neglect the smallest point in 
 fighting with a soldier like Forsyth. 
 
 With more military skill than they had ever displayed 
 before, the Indians deliberately made preparations for 
 battle. The force at the disposal of Roman Nose was 
 something less than one thousand warriors. They were 
 accompanied by their squaws and children. The latter 
 took position on the bluffs on the east bank of the river, 
 just out of range, where they could see the whole affair. 
 Like the ladies of the ancient tournaments, they were 
 eager to witness the fighting and welcome the victors, 
 who, for they never doubted the outcome, were certain 
 to be their own. 
 
 Roman Nose next lined the banks of the river on both 
 sides with dismounted riflemen, skilfully using such 
 concealment as the ground afforded. The banks were 
 slightly higher than the island, and the Indians had 
 a plunging fire upon the little party. The riflemen on 
 the banks opened fire at once. A storm of bullets was 
 poured upon the devoted band on the island. The
 
 84 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 scouts, husbanding their ammunition, slowly and de- 
 liberately replied, endeavoring, with signal success, to 
 make every shot tell. As one man said, they reckoned 
 "every ca'tridge was wuth at least one Injun." The 
 horses of the troop, having no protection, received the 
 brunt of the first fire. They fell rapidly, and their car- 
 casses rising in front of the rifle-pits afforded added pro- 
 tection to the soldiers. There must have been a rene- 
 gade white man among the savages, for in a lull of the 
 firing the men on the island heard a voice announce in 
 perfect English, "There goes the last of their horses, 
 anyway." Besides this, from time to time, the notes of 
 an artillery bugle were heard from the shore. The cas- 
 ualties had not been serious while the horses stood, but 
 as soon as they were all down the men began to suffer.* 
 
 During this time Forsyth had been walking about in 
 the little circle of defenders encouraging his men. He 
 was met on all sides with insistent demands that he lie 
 down and take cover, and, the firing becoming hotter, he 
 at last complied. The rifle-pit which Surgeon Mooers 
 had made was a little wider than that of the other men, 
 and as it was a good place from which to direct the 
 fighting, at the doctor's suggestion some of the scouts 
 scooped it out to make it a little larger, and Forsyth lay 
 down by him. 
 
 The fire of the Indians had been increasing. Several 
 scouts were killed, more mortally wounded, and some 
 slightly wounded. Doctor Mooers was hit in the fore- 
 head and mortally wounded. He lingered for three days, 
 saying but one intelligent word during the whole period. 
 Although he was blind and speechless, his motions some- 
 
 * As the Indians surrounded the island and the fire came in from all quarters, the men 
 had to dig the earth for protection in rear as well as in front, and the rifle-pits were, in 
 fact, hollows scooped out of the ground just long enough for a man to lie in.
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 85 
 
 times indicated that he knew where he was. He would 
 frequently reach out his foot and touch Forsyth. A 
 bullet struck Forsyth in the right thigh, and glancing 
 upwards bedded itself in the flesh, causing excruciating 
 pain. He suffered exquisite anguish, but his present 
 sufferings were just beginning, for a second bullet struck 
 him in the leg, between the knee and ankle, and smashed 
 the bone, and a third glanced across his forehead, 
 slightly fracturing his skull and giving him a splitting 
 headache, although he had no time to attend to it then. 
 
 III. The Charge of the Five Hundred 
 
 During all this time Roman Nose and his horsemen 
 had withdrawn around the bend up the river, which 
 screened them from the island. At this juncture they 
 appeared in full force, trotting up the bed of the river in 
 open order in eight ranks of about sixty front. Ahead 
 of them, on a magnificent chestnut horse, trotted Roman 
 Nose. The warriors were hideously painted, and all 
 were naked except for moccasins and cartridge belts. 
 Eagle feathers were stuck in their long hair, and many 
 of them wore gorgeous feather war bonnets. They sat 
 their horses without saddles or stirrups, some of them 
 having lariats twisted around the horses' bellies like a 
 surcingle. Roman Nose wore a magnificent war bonnet 
 of feathers streaming behind him in the wind and sur- 
 mounted by two buffalo-horns; around his waist he had 
 tied an officer's brilliant scarlet silk sash, which had been 
 presented to him at the Fort Ellsworth conference. 
 The sunlight illumined the bronze body of the savage 
 Hercules, exhibiting the magnificent proportions of the 
 man. Those who followed him were in every way wor- 
 thy of their leader.
 
 86 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 As the Indian cavalry appeared around the bend to 
 the music of that bugle, the fire upon the island from the 
 banks redoubled in intensity. Forsyth instantly di- 
 vined that Roman Nose was about to attempt to ride 
 him down. He also realized that, so soon as the horses 
 were upon him, the rifle fire from the bank would of 
 necessity be stopped. His order to his men was to 
 cease firing, therefore; to load the magazines of their 
 rifles, charge their revolvers, and wait until he gave the 
 order to fire. The rifles of the dead and those of the 
 party too severely wounded to use them were distributed 
 among those scouts yet unharmed. Some of the wound- 
 ed insisted upon fighting. Forsyth propped himself up 
 in his rifle-pit, his back and shoulders resting against 
 the pile of earth, his rifle and revolver in hand. He 
 could see his own men, and also the Indians coming up 
 the river. 
 
 Presently, shouting their war songs, at a wild pealed 
 whoop from their chief, the Indian horsemen broke into 
 a gallop, Roman Nose leading the advance, shaking 
 his heavy Spencer rifle captured, possibly, from Fet- 
 terman's men in the air as if it had been a reed. 
 There was a last burst of rifle fire from the banks, and 
 the rattle of musketry was displaced by the war songs 
 of the Indians and the yells of the squaws and children 
 on the slopes of the hills. As the smoke drifted away 
 on that sunny September morning, they saw the Indians 
 almost upon them. In spite of his terrible wounds the 
 heroic Forsyth was thoroughly in command. Waiting 
 until the tactical moment when the Indians were but 
 fifty yards away and coming at a terrific speed, he 
 raised himself on his hands to a sitting position and 
 cried, "Now!" 
 
 The men rose to their knees, brought their guns to
 
 Copyright, 1900, ty Cliartcs Schrtyrogel 
 
 ROMAN NOSE LEADING THE CHARGE AGAINST FORSYTH'S 
 DEVOTED BAND 
 
 Drawing by Charles Schreyvogel
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 87 
 
 their shoulders, and poured a volley right into the face 
 of the furious advance. An instant later, with another 
 cartridge in the barrel they delivered a second volley. 
 Horses and men went down in every direction; but, like 
 the magnificent warriors they were, the Indians closed up 
 and came sweeping down. The third volley was poured 
 into them. Still they came. The war songs had ceased 
 by this time, but in undaunted spirit, still pealing his war 
 cry above the crashing of the bullets, at the head of his 
 band, with his magnificent determination unshaken, 
 Roman Nose led such a ride as no Indian ever attempt- 
 ed before or since. And still those quiet, cool men con- 
 tinued to pump bullets into the horde. At the fourth 
 volley the medicine man on the left of the line and the 
 second in command went down. The Indians hesi- 
 tated at this reverse, but swinging his rifle high in the air 
 in battle frenzy, the great war chief rallied them, and 
 they once more advanced. The fifth volley staggered 
 them still more. Great gaps were opened in their ranks. 
 Horses and men fell dead, but the impetus was so great, 
 and the courage and example of their leader so splendid, 
 that the survivors came on unchecked. The sixth vol- 
 ley did the work. Just as he was about to leap on the 
 island, Roman Nose and his horse were both shot to 
 pieces. The force of the charge, however, was so great 
 that the line was not yet entirely broken. The horse- 
 men were within a few feet of the scouts, when the 
 seventh volley was poured into their very faces. As a 
 gigantic wave meets a sharply jutting rock and is parted, 
 falling harmlessly on either side of it, so was that charge 
 divided, the Indians swinging themselves to the sides 
 of their horses as they swept down the length of the 
 island. 
 
 The scouts sprang to their feet at this juncture, and
 
 88 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 almost at contact range jammed their revolver shots at 
 the disorganized masses. The Indians fled precipi- 
 tately to the banks on either side, and the yelling of the 
 war chants of the squaws and children changed into 
 wails of anguish and despair, as they marked the death 
 of Roman Nose and the horrible slaughter of his fol- 
 lowers. 
 
 It was a most magnificent charge, and one which for 
 splendid daring and reckless heroism would have done 
 credit to the best troops of any nation in the world. 
 And magnificently had it been met. Powell's defense 
 of the corral on Piney Island was a remarkable achieve- 
 ment, but it was not to be compared to the fighting of 
 these scouts on the little open, unprotected heap of sand 
 and gravel in the Arickaree. 
 
 As soon as the Indian horsemen withdrew, baffled 
 and furious, a rifle fire opened once more from the 
 banks. Lieutenant Beecher, who had heroically per- 
 formed his part in the defense, crawled over to Forsyth 
 and said: 
 
 " I have my death wound, General. I am shot in the 
 side and dying." 
 
 He said the words quietly and simply, as if his com- 
 munication was utterly commonplace, then stretched 
 himself out by his wounded commander, lying, like 
 Steerforth, with his face upon his arm. 
 
 "No, Beecher, no," said Forsyth, out of his own an- 
 guish; "it can not be as bad as that." 
 
 "Yes," said the young officer, "good-night." 
 
 There was nothing to be done for him. Forsyth 
 heard him whisper a word or two of his mother, and then 
 delirium supervened. By evening he was dead. In 
 memory of the brave young officer, they called the place 
 where he had died Beecher's Island.
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 89 
 
 At two o'clock in the afternoon a second charge of 
 horse was assayed in much the same way as the first 
 had been delivered; but there was no longer a great war 
 chief in command, and this time the Indians broke at 
 one hundred yards from the island. At six o'clock at 
 night they made a final attempt. The whole party, 
 horse and foot, in a solid mass rushed from all sides 
 upon the island. They came forward, yelling and firing, 
 but they were met with so severe a fire from the rifle- 
 pits that, although some of them actually reached the 
 foot of the island, they could not maintain their posi- 
 tion, and were driven back with frightful loss. The 
 men on the island deliberately picked off Indian 
 after Indian as they came, so that the dry river bed 
 ran with blood. The place was a very hell to the 
 Indians. They withdrew at last, baffled, crushed, 
 beaten. 
 
 With nightfall the men on the island could take ac- 
 count of the situation. Two officers and four men were 
 dead or dying, one officer and eight men were so se- 
 verely wounded that their condition was critical. Eight 
 men were less severely wounded, making twenty-three 
 casualties out of fifty-one officers and men.* There 
 were no rations, but thank God there was an abundance 
 of water. They could get it easily by digging in the 
 sandy surface of the island. They could subsist, if 
 necessary, on strips of meat cut from the bodies of the 
 horses. The most serious lack was of medical atten- 
 tion. The doctor lying unconscious, the wounded were 
 forced to get along with the unskilled care of their com- 
 rades, and with water, and rags torn from clothing for 
 dressings. Little could be done for them. The day 
 had been frightfully hot, but, fortunately, a heavy rain 
 
 * Two of the scouts had been left behind, at Fort Wallace, because of illness.
 
 9O Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 fell in the night, which somewhat refreshed them. The 
 rifle-pits were deepened and made continuous by piling 
 saddles and equipments, and by further digging in the 
 interspaces. 
 
 One of the curious Indian superstitions, which has 
 often served the white man against whom he has fought 
 to good purpose, is that when a man is killed in the dark 
 he must pass all eternity in darkness. Consequently, 
 he rarely ever attacks at night. Forsyth's party felt 
 reasonably secure from any further attack, therefore, 
 notwithstanding which they kept watch. 
 
 IV. The Siege of the Island 
 
 As soon as darkness settled down volunteers were 
 called for to carry the news of their predicament to 
 Fort Wallace, one hundred miles away. Every man 
 able to travel offered himself for the perilous journey. 
 Forsyth selected Trudeau and Stillwell. Trudeau was 
 a veteran hunter, Stillwell a youngster only nineteen 
 years of age, although he already gave promise of the 
 fame as a scout which he afterwards acquired. To 
 them he gave the only map he possessed. They were 
 to ask the commander of Fort Wallace to come to his 
 assistance. As soon as the two brave scouts had left, 
 every one realized that a long wait would be entailed 
 upon the little band, if, indeed, it was not overwhelmed 
 meanwhile, before any relieving force could reach the 
 island. And there were grave doubts as to whether, in 
 any event, Trudeau and Stillwell could get through the 
 Indians. It was not a pleasant night they spent, there- 
 fore, although they were busy strengthening the de- 
 fenses, and nobody got any sleep. 
 
 Early the next morning the Indians again made their
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 91 
 
 appearance. They had hoped that Forsyth and his men 
 would have endeavored to retreat during the night, in 
 which event they would have followed the trail and 
 speedily annihilated the whole command. But For- 
 syth was too good a soldier to leave the position he had 
 chosen. During the fighting of the day before he had 
 asked Grover his opinion as to whether the Indians 
 could deliver any more formidable attack than the one 
 which had resulted in the death of Roman Nose, and 
 Grover, who had had large experience, assured him that 
 they had done the best they could, and indeed better 
 than he or any other scout had ever seen or heard of in 
 any Indian warfare. Forsyth was satisfied, therefore, 
 that they could maintain the position, at least until they 
 starved. 
 
 The Indians were quickly apprised, by a volley which 
 killed at least one man, that the defenders of the island 
 were still there. The place was closely invested, and 
 although the Indians made several attempts to approach 
 it under a white flag, they were forced back by the ac- 
 curate fire of the scouts, and compelled to keep their 
 distance. It was very hot. The sufferings of the 
 wounded were something frightful. The Indians were 
 having troubles of their own, too. All night and all day 
 the defenders could hear the beating of the tom-toms 
 or drums and the mournful death songs and wails of the 
 women over the bodies of the slain, all but three of whom 
 had been removed during the night.* These three were 
 
 * The reason why an Indian will sacrifice everything to remove the body of one of his 
 tribe or kin who has been killed, is to prevent the taking of his scalp. The religious be- 
 lief of the Indians is that a man who is scalped cannot enter the happy hunting grounds, 
 but is doomed to wander in outer darkness forever. For that reason he always scalps his 
 enemy, so that when he himself reaches the happy hunting grounds he will not be both- 
 ered by a lot of enemies whom he has met and overcome during his lifetime. Naturally, 
 it was a point of honor for him to get the bodies of his friends away, so that they might 
 not be debarred from the Indian Heaven in the hereafter. Sometimes, however, the In-
 
 92 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 lying so near the rifle-pits that the Indians did not dare 
 to approach near enough to get them. The three dead 
 men had actually gained the shore of the island before 
 they had been killed. 
 
 The command on the island had plenty to eat, such 
 as it was. There was horse and mule meat in abun- 
 dance. They ate it raw, when they got hungry enough. 
 Water was plentiful. All they had to do was to dig the 
 rifle-pits a little deeper, and it came forth in great quan- 
 tities. It was weary waiting, but there was nothing else 
 to do. They dared not relax their vigilance a moment. 
 The next night, the second, Forsyth despatched two 
 more scouts, fearing the first two might not have got 
 through, thus seeking to "make assurance double sure." 
 This pair was not so successful as the first. They came 
 back about three o'clock in the morning, having been 
 unable to pass the Indians, for every outlet was heavily 
 guarded. 
 
 The third day the Indian women and children were 
 observed withdrawing from the vicinity. This cheered 
 the men greatly, as it was a sign that the Indians intend- 
 ed to abandon the siege. The warriors still remained, 
 however, and any incautious exposure was a signal for 
 a volley. That night two more men were despatched 
 with an urgent appeal, and these two succeeded in get- 
 ting through. They bore this message: 
 
 dian did not scalp the body of a particularly brave man, for this reason: It is his belief 
 that if he kills a man in battle and does not scalp him, that man will be his slave or ser- 
 vant in the happy hunting grounds, and although the victim still possesses capacities for 
 mischief, the Indian sometimes risks all in the future glory that will come to him from 
 holding in slavery a brave man, or a noted warrior, as a spiritual witness to his prowess. 
 It is stated that the Indians never scalp the bodies of negroes and suicides. "Buffalo sol- 
 dier heap bad medicine," is their universal testimony when asked why they do not 
 scalp negro troopers whom they have killed or captured. Perhaps they cannot scalp a 
 woolly, kinky-haired black soldier, and that is the reason it is " bad medicine." Suicide 
 is "bad medicine," too, for some unexplained reason.
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 93 
 
 "Sept. 19, 1868. 
 To COLONEL BANKHEAD, or Commanding Officer, 
 
 Fort Wallace : 
 
 I sent you two messengers on the night of the I yth 
 inst., informing you of my critical condition. I tried to 
 send two more last night, but they did not succeed in 
 passing the Indian pickets, and returned. If the others 
 have not arrived, then hasten at once to my assistance. 
 I have eight badly wounded and ten slightly wounded 
 men to take in. ... Lieutenant Beecher is dead, and 
 Acting Assistant Surgeon Mooers probably cannot live 
 the night out. He was hit in the head Thursday, 
 and has spoken but one rational word since. I am 
 wounded in two places in the right thigh, and my 
 left leg is broken below the knee. 
 
 I am on a little island, and have still plenty of am- 
 munition left. We are living on mule and horse meat, 
 and are entirely out of rations. If it was not for so 
 many wounded, I would come in, and take the chances 
 of whipping them if attacked. They are evidently sick 
 of their bargain. ... I can hold out for six days 
 longer if absolutely necessary, but please lose no time. 
 
 P. S. My surgeon having been mortally wounded, 
 none of my wounded have had their wounds dressed yet, 
 so please bring out a surgeon with you." 
 
 The fourth day passed like the preceding, the squaws 
 all gone, the Indians still watchful. The wound in 
 Forsyth's leg had become excruciatingly painful, and 
 he begged some of the men to cut out the bullet. But 
 they discovered that it had lodged near the femoral 
 artery, and fearful lest they should cut the artery and the 
 young commander should bleed to death, they positively 
 refused. In desperation, Forsyth cut it out himself.
 
 94 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 He had his razor in his saddle bags and, while two men 
 pressed the flesh back, he performed the operation suc- 
 cessfully, to his immediate relief. 
 
 The fifth day the mule and horse meat became putrid 
 and therefore unfit to eat. An unlucky coyote wan- 
 dered over to the island, however, and one of the men 
 was fortunate enough to shoot him. Small though he 
 was, he was a welcome addition to their larder, for he 
 was fresh. There was but little skirmishing on the fifth 
 day, and the place appeared to be deserted. Forsyth 
 had half a dozen of his men raise him on a blanket above 
 the level of the rifle beds so that he might survey the 
 scene himself. Not all the Indians were gone, for a sud- 
 den fusillade burst out from the bank. One of the men 
 let go the corner of the blanket which he held while the 
 others were easing Forsyth down, and he fell upon his 
 wounded leg with so much force that the bone protruded 
 through the flesh. He records that he used some severe 
 language to that scout. 
 
 On the sixth day Forsyth assembled his men about 
 him, and told them that those who were well enough to 
 leave the island would better do so and make for Fort 
 Wallace; that it was more than possible that none of the 
 messengers had succeeded in getting through; that the 
 men had stood by him heroically, and that they would 
 all starve to death where they were unless relief should 
 come; and that they were entitled to a chance for their 
 lives. He believed the Indians, who had at last dis- 
 appeared, had received such a severe lesson that they 
 would not attack again, and that if the men were cir- 
 cumspect they could get through to Fort Wallace in 
 safety. The wounded, including himself, must be left 
 to take care of themselves and take the chances of escape 
 from the island.
 
 The Rough Riders of '68 95 
 
 The proposition was received in surprised silence for 
 a few moments, and then there was a simultaneous shout 
 of refusal from every man: "Never! We'll stand by 
 you." McCall, the first sergeant and Forsyth's right- 
 hand man since Beecher had been killed, shouted out 
 emphatically : " We've fought together, and, by Heaven, 
 if need be, we'll die together." 
 
 They could not carry the wounded; they would not 
 abandon them. Remember these men were not regu- 
 lar soldiers. They were simply a company of scouts, 
 more or less loosely bound together, but, as McCall had 
 pointed out, they were tied to one another by something 
 stronger than discipline. Not a man left the island, 
 although it would have been easy for the unwounded to 
 do so, and possibly they might have escaped in safety. 
 
 For two more days they stood it out. There was no 
 fighting during this time, but the presence of an Indian 
 vedette indicated that they were under observation. 
 They gathered some wild plums and made some jelly for 
 the wounded ; but no game came their way, and there was 
 little for them to do but draw in their belts a little tighter 
 and go hungry, or, better, go hungrier. On the morn- 
 ing of the ninth day, one of the men on watch suddenly 
 sprang to his feet, shouting: 
 
 "There are moving men on the hills." Everybody 
 who could stand was up in an instant, and Grover, the 
 keen-eyed scout, shouted triumphantly: 
 
 " By the God above us, there's an ambulance ! " They 
 were rescued at last. 
 
 NOTE. The serial publication of this article called 
 forth another version of this affair, differing from it in 
 some non-essential features, which was written by Mr. 
 Herbert Myrick, and published serially. Mr. Myrick
 
 96 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 accounts for the "mysterious voice "which the scouts 
 heard saying in English, " There goes the last of 
 their horses anyway, " by disclosing the interesting fact 
 that there were two renegade white men among the 
 Indians. One of them was called "Nibsi" or "Black 
 Jack," a notorious desperado, who was afterwards 
 hung for murder. The other was Jack Clybor, once 
 a trooper of the Seventh Cavalry. Having been shot 
 and left for dead in an engagement, the Indians cap- 
 tured him, nursed him back to life, adopted him, and 
 named him "Comanche. " He v/as a singular com- 
 pound of good and evil, and became as notorious for his 
 good deeds as for his bad acts. Mr. Myrick has been 
 collecting a mass of unknown and unpublished Western 
 material for many years, which when published will 
 undoubtedly clear up many mysteries, throw light upon 
 many disputed questions, and prove of the deepest in- 
 terest as well.
 
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
 The Journey of the Scouts and the Rescue 
 of Forsyth 
 
 I. The Adventures of the Scouts 
 
 T 
 
 "^RUDEAU and Stillwell, the first pair of scouts 
 despatched by Forsyth with the story of his 
 desperate situation on Beecher's Island, left 
 their commander about midnight on the even- 
 ing of the first day of the attack. The Indians had 
 withdrawn from the immediate vicinity of the river 
 and were resting quietly in the camps on either side, 
 although there were a number of warriors watching 
 the island. The men bade a hasty good-by to their 
 comrades, received their captain's final instructions, 
 and with beating hearts stole away on their desperate 
 errand. 
 
 They neglected no precaution that experience could 
 dictate. They even took off their boots, tied them 
 together by the straps, slung them around their necks, 
 and walked backward down the bed of the river in their 
 stocking feet, so that, if the Indians by any chance 
 stumbled upon their trail the next morning, it would 
 appear to have been made by moccasined feet and per- 
 haps escape attention, especially as the tracks would 
 point toward the island instead of away from it. Fur- 
 
 97
 
 98 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ther to disguise themselves, they wrapped themselves in 
 blankets, which they endeavored to wear as the Indians 
 did. 
 
 They proceeded with the most fearsome caution. 
 Such was the circumspection with which they moved 
 and the care necessary because of the watchfulness of 
 the foe, who might be heard from time to time moving 
 about on the banks, that by daylight they had pro- 
 gressed but two miles. During most of the time after 
 leaving the river bed they had crawled on their hands 
 and knees. Before sunrise they were forced to seek 
 such concealment as they could find in a washout, a dry 
 ravine, within sight and sound of the Indian camps. 
 Providence certainly protected them, for if any of the 
 Indians had happened to wander in their direction there 
 was nothing to prevent their discovery; and if the sav- 
 ages had stumbled upon their hiding-place it would 
 have been all up with them. Death by torture would 
 have been inevitable if they were taken alive, and the 
 only way to prevent that would be suicide. They had 
 determined upon that. They had pledged each other to 
 fight until the last cartridge, and to save that for them- 
 selves. They had nothing to eat and nothing to drink. 
 The sun beat down upon them fiercely all the long day. 
 After their experience of the one before, it was a day 
 calculated to break down the strongest of men. They 
 bore up under the strain, however, as best they could, 
 and when darkness came they started out once more. 
 
 This night there was no necessity for so much caution 
 and they made better progress, although they saw and 
 successfully avoided several parties of Indians. When 
 the day broke they were forced to conceal themselves 
 again. The country was covered with wandering war 
 parties, and it was not yet safe to travel by daylight.
 
 The Rescue of Forsyth 99 
 
 This day they hid themselves under the high banks of 
 a river. Again they were fortunate in remaining unob- 
 served, although several times bands of warriors passed 
 near them. They traveled all the third night, making 
 great progress. Morning found them'on an open plain 
 with no place to hide in but a buffalo wallow a dry 
 alkali mud-hole which had been much frequented in the 
 wet season by buffalo which afforded scanty cover 
 at best. 
 
 During this day a large party of scouting Indians 
 halted within one hundred feet of the wallow. Simul- 
 taneously with their arrival a wandering rattlesnake 
 made his appearance in front of the two scouts, who were 
 hugging the earth and expecting every minute to be 
 discovered. The rattlesnake in his way was as deadly 
 as the Indians. The scouts could have killed him 
 easily had it not been for the proximity of the Cheyennes. 
 To make the slightest movement would call attention 
 to their hiding-place. Indeed, the sinister rattle of the 
 venomous snake before he struck would probably at- 
 tract the notice of the alert Indians. Between the 
 savage reptile and the savage men the scouts were in 
 a frightful predicament, which young Stillwell, a lad 
 of amazing resourcefulness, instantly and effectually 
 solved. He was chewing tobacco at the time, and as 
 the snake drew near him and made ready to strike, he 
 completely routed him by spitting tobacco juice in his 
 mouth and eyes and all over his head. The rattlesnake 
 fled; he could not stand such a dose. The Indians 
 presently moved on, having noticed nothing, and so end- 
 ed perhaps the most terrible half hour the two men had 
 ever experienced. 
 
 They started early on the evening of the fourth night, 
 and this time made remarkable progress. Toward
 
 ioo Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 morning, however, Trudeau all but broke down. The 
 brunt of the whole adventure thereupon fell on Still- 
 well. He encouraged his older companion, helped him 
 along as best he could, and finally, late at night, they 
 reached Fort Wallace and told their tale. Instantly all 
 was excitement in the post. Captain and Brevet Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Louis H. Carpenter, with seventy men 
 of Troop H, of the Tenth Cavalry (a negro regiment), 
 with Lieutenants Banzhaf and Orleman, Doctor Fitz- 
 gerald and seventeen scouts, with thirteen wagons and 
 an ambulance, had been sent out from the post the day 
 before with orders to make a camp on the Denver road, 
 about sixty miles from the fort. From there he was to 
 scout in every direction, keep off the Indians, and pro- 
 tect trains. 
 
 At eleven o'clock at night a courier was despatched 
 to Carpenter with the following order: 
 
 " Headquarters, Fort Wallace, Kansas, 
 
 September 22, 1868, II :oo P. M. 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel L. H. CARPENTER, loth U. S. 
 
 Cavalry. On Scout. 
 Colonel : 
 
 The Commanding Officer directs you to proceed at 
 once to a point on the "Dry Fork of the Republican," 
 about seventy-five or eighty miles north, northwest from 
 this point, thirty or forty miles west by a little south 
 from the forks of the Republic, with all possible des- 
 patch. 
 
 Two scouts from Colonel Forsyth's command arrived 
 here this evening and bring word that he (Forsyth) was 
 attacked on the morning of Thursday last by an over- 
 whelming force of Indians (700), who killed all the ani- 
 mals, broke Colonel Forsyth's left leg with a rifle ball,
 
 The Rescue of Forsyth 101 
 
 severely wounding him in the groin, wounded Doctor 
 Mooers in the head, and wounded Lieutenant Beecher 
 in several places. His back is supposed to be broken. 
 Two men of the command were killed and eighteen or 
 twenty wounded. 
 
 The men bringing the word crawled on hands and 
 knees two miles, and then traveled only by night on 
 account of the Indians, whom they saw daily. 
 
 Forsyth's men were intrenched in the dry bed of the 
 creek with a well in the trench, but had only horse-flesh 
 to eat and only sixty rounds of ammunition. 
 
 General Sheridan orders that the greatest despatch 
 be used and every means employed to succor Forsyth 
 at once. Colonel Bradley with six companies is now 
 supposed by General Sheridan to be at the forks of the 
 Republic. 
 
 Colonel Bankhead will leave here in one hour with 
 one hundred men and two mountain howitzers. 
 
 Bring all your scouts with you. 
 
 Order Doctor Fitzgerald at once to this post, to re- 
 place Doctor Turner, who accompanies Colonel Bank- 
 head for the purpose of dressing the wounded of For- 
 syth's party. 
 
 I am, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient ser- 
 vant, HUGH JOHNSON, 
 ist Lieutenant 5th Infantry." Actin S Post Adjutant. 
 
 One hour afterward Bankhead himself, with one 
 hundred men and two howitzers and the surgeon, 
 started for the relief of Forsyth. With Bankhead went 
 the undaunted Stillwell as guide. Trudeau had suf- 
 fered so much during the perilous journey that he was 
 unable to accompany the relief party, and he soon after-
 
 IO2 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ward died from the hardships and excitement of the 
 horrible days he had passed through. 
 
 II. The Rescue of Forsyth 
 
 Carpenter had bivouacked on the evening of the 22d 
 of September at Cheyenne Wells, about thirty-five 
 miles from Fort Wallace. He had broken camp early 
 in the morning and had marched some ten miles, when, 
 from a high point on a divide he had reached, which 
 permitted a full view of the Rocky Mountains from 
 Pike's to Long's Peaks, he observed a horseman gal- 
 loping frantically toward them. He was the courier 
 despatched by Colonel Bankhead. Carpenter was a 
 splendid soldier. He had received no less than four 
 brevets for gallantry during the Civil War. He had 
 been on Sheridan's staff with Forsyth, and the two were 
 bosom friends. No task could have been more con- 
 genial to him than this attempt at rescue. 
 
 He communicated the situation of their white com- 
 rades to his black troopers, and their officers crowded 
 close about him. The orders were received with ex- 
 ultant cheers. The regiment had been raised since the 
 war, and had not yet had a chance to prove its mettle. 
 There were no veterans among them, and Carpenter and 
 the other officers had been obliged to build the regiment 
 from the ground up. Now was an opportunity to show 
 what they could do. Carpenter had been trained to 
 obey orders to the letter. In this instance he determined 
 to disobey the command regarding Doctor Fitzgerald. 
 It appeared to him that Bankhead had little hope that 
 he (Carpenter) would find Forsyth, for he had sent him 
 no guide; but Carpenter perceived that if he did find 
 Forsyth and he intended to find him the condi-
 
 The Rescue of Forsyth 103 
 
 tions would be such that the services of a physician 
 would be vitally necessary. He therefore retained the 
 doctor. He also retained the wagon train, having no 
 other way of carrying necessary supplies. For one 
 
 Map of Marches to Relieve Colonel Forsyth and to Escort 
 General Carr, Drawn by General Carpenter 
 
 reason, if he had detached a guard for the train, it would 
 have weakened his force so greatly as to have made it 
 inadequate to the enterprise. The mules were strong 
 and fresh, and he decided to keep the wagons with him. 
 The pace was to be a fast one, and he instructed the 
 wagon masters that, if any of the mule teams gave out,
 
 IO4 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 they should be shot and, if necessary, the wagon should 
 be abandoned. 
 
 There was no one in his command, he found, who 
 had ever been in that territory. Indeed, it is probable 
 that, save Forsyth's men, no white men had ever pene- 
 trated that section of the country before. The map that 
 Carpenter had was very defective. He studied over the 
 matter a few moments, and then led his command 
 toward the place where he supposed Forsyth to be. 
 They advanced at a fast trot, with intervals of walking, 
 and when they camped at night near some water holes 
 they had covered nearly forty-five miles. The mules, 
 under the indefatigable and profane stimulus of their 
 drivers, had kept up with the rest. As soon as it was 
 dawn the next day they started once more, and, after a 
 twenty-mile ride, arrived at the dry bed of a river. 
 
 Whether this was the fork of the Republican, on which 
 Forsyth was besieged, no one could tell. It happens 
 that the Republican has three forks a north fork, the 
 Arickaree, and the south or dry fork. Carpenter was 
 afraid to leave the fork he had found without satisfying 
 himself that Forsyth was not there, so he concluded to 
 scout up the river for some fifteen or eighteen miles. 
 Finding nothing, he then turned northward again until 
 he came to a stream flowing through a wide, grass- 
 covered valley surrounded by high hills. As they entered 
 the valley they came across a very large, fresh Indian 
 trail. The scouts estimated that at least two thousand 
 ponies had passed along the trail within a few hours. 
 Various other signs showed a large village had moved 
 down the trail. 
 
 They had traveled over forty miles this second day, 
 and were apprehensive that the Indians, being so close to 
 them, might attack them. It was nearly evening. A spot
 
 The Rescue of Forsyth 105 
 
 well adapted for defense was chosen near the water, 
 the wagons were corralled, and preparations made for 
 a stout resistance in case of an attack. While the men 
 were making camp, Carpenter with a small escort rode 
 to the top of one of the high hills hordering the valley. 
 He could see for miles, but discovered no Indians nor 
 any other living object in any direction. In front of 
 them, however, on the top of another hill, were a number 
 of scaffolds, each one bearing a human body. The 
 Cheyenne method of burial was instantly recognized. 
 A nearer look developed that the scaffolds had been 
 recently erected. Five of them were examined, and in 
 each case the body contained was that of a Cheyenne 
 warrior, who had been killed by a gunshot wound. 
 This was proof positive that they were some of the In- 
 dians who had been fighting against Forsyth. 
 
 While this was going on, one of the troopers noticed 
 something white in a ravine on the opposite side of the 
 valley. They galloped over to it, and found it to be an 
 elaborate and beautiful tepee or wigwam, made out of 
 freshly tanned white buffalo skins. The colonel dis- 
 mounted, opened the tepee, and entered. There, upon a 
 brush heap, lay a human figure wrapped in buffalo robes. 
 When the robes were taken away the body of a splendid 
 specimen of Indian manhood was disclosed. "He lay 
 like a warrior taking his rest, with his martial cloak 
 around him." His stern and royal look, the iron majesty 
 of his features, even though composed in death, revealed 
 at once a native chieftain. In his breast was a great, gap- 
 ing wound, which had pierced his heart. He lay in his 
 war-gear, with his weapons and other personal prop- 
 erty close at hand. 
 
 After the examination they re-covered him and left 
 him undisturbed. Then they went back to the camp.
 
 io6 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 The corral was watchfully guarded during the night, 
 but no one appeared to molest them. It was decided 
 to follow the Indian trail at daylight, as it would prob- 
 ably lead to the site of Forsyth's fight. Early the next 
 morning, while they were packing up, they saw some 
 horsemen coming over the hills to the south of them. 
 They were white men, led by a scout named Donovan. 
 Two more men had been despatched by Forsyth from 
 the island on the third night of the siege, and being 
 unobserved by the Indians, they had made their way 
 to Fort Wallace. When they arrived there they found 
 that Colonel Bankhead had already gone; whereupon 
 Donovan had assembled five bold spirits and had imme- 
 diately started out on the return journey. Fortunately 
 for Carpenter, Donovan had struck the latter's trail, 
 and had followed it to the camp. 
 
 Carpenter thereupon took thirty of his best mounted 
 troopers and the ambulance loaded with hard-tack, 
 coffee, and bacon, and set out on a gallop in the direc- 
 tion in which they supposed the island lay. Banzhaf 
 was left in command of the rest, with orders to come on 
 as fast as he could. 
 
 Carpenter went forward at a rapid gallop, and after 
 traveling eighteen miles, while it was yet early in the 
 morning, came to a spur of land from which he had 
 a view of the surrounding country for miles. As he 
 checked his horse on the brink, he saw to the right of 
 him a valley through which meandered a narrow silver 
 stream. 
 
 In the center of the valley there was an island. From 
 it rose a solitary cottonwood. Men could be seen mov- 
 ing about the place. Donovan recognized it instantly. 
 The horses of the detachment were put to a run, and the 
 whole party galloped down the valley toward the island.
 
 The Rescue of Forsyth 107 
 
 The scouts swarmed across the river with cries of joy, 
 and welcomed the soldiers. The faithful mules dragged 
 the ambulance close behind. There was food for every- 
 body. Carpenter was struck with the wolfish look on 
 the faces of the hungry men as they crowded around the 
 ambulance. Later one of them brought him a piece of 
 mule or horse meat which was to have been served for 
 dinner that day, if the rescuers had not appeared. Car- 
 penter could not endure even the odor of it. 
 
 Galloping across the river bed, the first to enter the 
 rifle-pits on the island was Carpenter. There, on the 
 ground before him, lay Forsyth. And what do you sup- 
 pose he was doing ? He was reading a novel ! Some 
 one had found, in an empty saddle-bag, an old copy of 
 Oliver T^vist. Forsyth was afraid to trust himself. He 
 was fearful that he would break down. He did not dare 
 look at Carpenter or express his feelings. Therefore 
 he made a pretense of being absorbed in his book. 
 
 The black cavalry had arrived in the very nick of 
 time. Forsyth was in a burning fever. Blood-poison- 
 ing had set in, and his wounds were in a frightful con- 
 dition. Another day and it would have been too late. 
 Everything was gone from him but his indomitable reso- 
 lution. Many others were in like circumstances. It was 
 well that Carpenter had brought his surgeon with him, 
 for his services were sadly needed. The men were taken 
 off the island, moved half a mile away from the terrible 
 stench arising from the dead animals; the wagon train 
 came up, camps were made, the dead were buried on 
 the island they had immortalized with their valor, and 
 everything possible done for the comfort of the living 
 by their negro comrades. 
 
 The doctor wanted to amputate Forsyth's leg, but 
 he protested, so that the amputation was not performed,
 
 io8 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and the leg was finally saved to its owner. One of the 
 scouts, named Farley, however, was so desperately 
 wounded that amputation had to be resorted to. The 
 doctor performed the operation, assisted by Carpenter. 
 A military commander in the field has to do a great 
 many things. 
 
 The next day Bankhead made his appearance with 
 his detachment. He had marched to the forks of the 
 river and followed the Arickaree fork to the place. He 
 was accompanied by two troops of the Second Cavalry, 
 picked up on the way. He did not find fault with 
 Carpenter for his disobedience in retaining Doctor 
 Fitzgerald. On the contrary, such was his delight 
 at the rescue that he fairly hugged his gallant sub- 
 ordinate. 
 
 As soon as it was possible, the survivors were taken 
 back to Fort Wallace. Forsyth and the more severely 
 wounded were carried in the ambulance. It took four 
 days to reach the fort. Their progress was one long 
 torture, in spite of every care that could be bestowed 
 upon them. There was no road, and while the drivers 
 chose the best spots on the prairie, there was, neverthe- 
 less, an awful amount of jolting and bumping. 
 
 Forsyth was brevetted a brigadier-general in the 
 Regular Army for his conduct in this action. This was 
 some compensation for two years of subsequent suffer- 
 ing until his wounds finally healed. 
 
 III. The End of Roman Nose 
 
 On the way back the men stopped at the white tepee 
 in the lonely valley. Grover and McCall rode over to 
 the spot with the officers and examined the body of the 
 chieftain. They instantly identified him as Roman
 
 The Rescue of Forsyth 109 
 
 Nose. With a touch of sentiment unusual in fron- 
 tiersmen they respected his grave, and for the sake of 
 his valor allowed him to sleep on undisturbed. His 
 arms and equipments, however, were considered legiti- 
 mate spoils of war, and were taken from him. It was a 
 sad end, indeed, to all his splendid courage and glorious 
 defiance of his white foemen. 
 
 The loss of the Indians in the several attacks was 
 never definitely ascertained. They admitted to seventy- 
 five killed outright and over two hundred seriously 
 wounded, but it is certain that their total losses were 
 much greater. The fighting was of the closest and 
 fiercest description, and the Indians were under the fire 
 of one of the most expert bodies of marksmen on the 
 plains at half pistol-shot distance in the unique and 
 celebrated battle. The whole action is almost unparal- 
 leled in the history of our Indian wars, both for the 
 thrilling and gallant cavalry charge of the Indians and 
 the desperate valor of Forsyth and his scouts. 
 
 IV. A Few Words About Forsyth's Men 
 
 The heroism and pluck of the men in the fight had 
 been quite up to the mark set by their captain. A 
 man named Farley had fought through the action with 
 a severe bullet wound in the shoulder, which he never 
 mentioned until nightfall; his father was mortally 
 wounded, but he lay on his side and fought through the 
 whole of the long first day until he died. Another man 
 named Harrington was struck in the forehead by an 
 arrow. He pulled out the shaft, but the head remained 
 imbedded in the bone. An Indian bullet struck him a 
 glancing blow in the forehead and neatly extricated the 
 arrow rough surgery, to be sure, but it served. Har-
 
 no Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 rington tied a rag around his head, and kept his place 
 during the whole three days of fighting. 
 
 When they first reached the island one of the men 
 cried out, "Don't let's stay here and be shot down like 
 dogs! Will any man try for the opposite bank with 
 me ?" Forsyth, revolver in hand, stopped that effort 
 by threatening to shoot any man who attempted to leave 
 the island. In all the party there was but one coward. 
 In looks and demeanor he was the most promising of the 
 company a splendid specimen of manhood apparently. 
 To everybody's surprise, after one shot he hugged the 
 earth in his rifle-pit and positively refused to do any- 
 thing, in spite of orders, pleadings, jeers, and curses. 
 He left the troop immediately on its arrival at Fort 
 Wallace. 
 
 Per contra, one of the bravest, where all but one were 
 heroes, was a little, eighteen-year old Jewish boy, who 
 had begged to be enlisted and allowed to go along. He 
 had been the butt of the command, yet he proved himself 
 a very paladin of courage and efficiency when the fight- 
 ing began.* 
 
 * In General Fry's entertaining story of "Army Sacrifices," the following little poem 
 about him appears: 
 
 " When the foe charged on the breastworks 
 
 With the madness of despair, 
 And the bravest souls were tested, 
 The little Jew was there. 
 
 " When the weary dozed on duty, 
 Or the wounded needed care, 
 When another shot was called for, 
 The little Jew was there 
 
 u With the festering dead around them, 
 
 Shedding poison in the air, 
 When the crippled chieftain ordered, 
 The little Jew was there."
 
 The Rescue of Forsyth in 
 
 One of the last acts of the recent Congress was the 
 setting apart of one hundred and twenty acres of land 
 in Yuma County, Colorado, as a national park. This 
 reservation forever preserves Forsyth's battlefield and 
 the vicinity from settlement. On the edge of the river 
 bank, on what was once Beecher's Island, which the 
 shifting river has now joined to the bank, is a wooden 
 monument to Beecher and the other scouts who were 
 buried somewhere in those shifting sands.* 
 
 The few survivors of the battle have formed them- 
 selves into an association which holds an annual reunion 
 on the battlefield. Soon there will be none of them 
 left. Would it not be a graceful act for some one who 
 honors courage, manliness, and devotion to duty to 
 erect a more enduring monument to the memory of 
 Beecher and his comrades than the perishable wooden 
 shaft which now inadequately serves to call attention to 
 their sacrifice and their valor ? 
 
 NOTE. The following interesting communication 
 slightly modifies one of the statements in the above 
 article. It certainly shows prompt decision upon the 
 part of Lieutenant Johnson, who was left in command 
 of the post after Bankhead's departure. 
 
 Great Barrington, Mass., August 5th, 1904. 
 Dr. Brady says " Donovan had assembled five bold 
 spirits, and had immediately started out on the return 
 journey." As a matter of fact, Donovan did no such 
 
 * " To-day cattle stand knee-deep in the Arickaree. The water no longer ripples 
 around the island, as the shifting sands have filled the channel to the south. But if one 
 digs under the cottonwoods he can find bullets, cartridges, and knives. And near at 
 hand is the simple white shaft that tells where Beecher and Roman Nose, typifying all 
 that is brave in white man and red, forgot all enmity in the last sleep that knows no 
 dreams of racial hatred." I cut this from a newspaper the other day. How well writ- 
 ten, frequently, are the modestly unsigned articles in the daily press !
 
 ii2 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 thing. The departure of General Bankhead's relief 
 column stripped the garrison of Fort Wallace to seven 
 enlisted men, took away the last horse, and placed me 
 in command. Forsyth's second note, brought by Don- 
 ovan, fell into my hands. It was telegraphed in full to 
 General Sheridan, who ordered me to spare no expense 
 of men, money, and horses to hasten relief to Forsyth. 
 By the promise of $100 each, four citizens of the neigh- 
 boring town of Pond Creek were induced to seek the 
 Carpenter command. Donovan I persuaded to guide 
 them, promising him $100 in addition to his pay as a 
 scout. This party started at daylight, on government 
 mules, rode all day, all night, and found Carpenter's 
 command on the south fork of the Republican River, 
 about ten miles southeast of the scene of the fight. 
 Guided by these men, Carpenter pushed out, and For- 
 syth and his men were relieved some hours in advance 
 of the arrival of the other relief commands. 
 
 The country from Fort Wallace to Arickaree Fork I 
 passed over the following December, in an unsuccessful 
 endeavor to secure the bodies of those killed in the fight. 
 We surprised a village of Indians at the scene of the 
 fight, fought them off, and found the body of one of 
 the scouts, but Lieutenant Beecher's and Dr. Mooers' 
 graves were empty. Yours very truly, 
 
 HUGH M. JOHNSON, 
 Late Lieutenant 5th U. S. Infantry.
 
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 A Scout's Story of the Defense of 
 Beecher's Island 
 
 BY great good fortune I am permitted to insert 
 here a private letter to me from Mr. Sigmund 
 Schlesinger, the Jewish boy referred to in 
 Chapter Six, which, as it contains an original 
 account of the defense of Beecher's Island from the 
 standpoint of one of the participants, is an unique 
 document in our Western historical records: C.T.B. 
 
 For several days we had been following an Indian 
 trail so broad that it looked like a wagon-road. Those 
 in our command experienced in Indian warfare told us 
 that we must be on the track of an Indian village on the 
 move, with a large herd of horses. Evidently they 
 knew that we were behind them, and seemed to be in 
 a hurry to get away, for we found camp utensils, tent- 
 poles, etc., which had been dropped and no time taken 
 to pick them up. Among other things we saw fresh 
 antelope meat, quarters, etc., and although our rations 
 were nearly, if not all, gone, except some coffee and very 
 little " sow-belly," we did not dare eat the Indians' 
 remnants. 
 
 The night of Sept. i6th, before the attack next morn- 
 
 "3
 
 H4 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ing, Scout Culver, who was killed next day, pointed out 
 to a few of us some torch-lights upon the hills that were 
 being swung like signals. I knew that something " would 
 be doing" soon, but, like a novice, I was as if on an anx- 
 ious seat, under a strain of anticipation, expecting some- 
 thing strange and dangerous. The next thing that I 
 now recall was that I was awakened just before day- 
 light by a single cry, " Indians!" so loud and menacing 
 that when I jumped up from the ground I was bewil- 
 dered and felt as if I wanted to ward off a blow, coming 
 from I knew not where, for it was still quite dark. That 
 cry I will never forget. Soon I perceived a commotion 
 among our horses and mules. The Indians, about a 
 dozen, tried to stampede them. I could see in the dawn- 
 ing light the outlines of a white horse in the distance, 
 and from the noise I realized that they were driving 
 some of our stock before them. Later, in the daylight 
 we could recognize some of our ponies on a neighboring 
 hill in the possession of the Indians. 
 
 As soon as we crossed from the north bank of the 
 river to the island, just before the attack, we tied our 
 horses and pack mules to shrubs as best we could. 
 During the day a mule with a partial pack on his back 
 got loose and wandered around the vicinity of my pit. 
 He had several arrows sticking in his body and seemed 
 wounded otherwise, which caused him to rear and pitch 
 to such an extent that Jim Lane, my neighbor, and I, 
 decided to kill him. After shooting him he fell and lay 
 between us, and served us the double purpose of food 
 and barricade. 
 
 My horse was securely tethered to the underbrush on 
 the island, and later that day I saw the poor beast 
 rearing and plunging in a death struggle, having been 
 shot and killed like the rest of our horses and mules.
 
 He also furnished me with several meals during the siege, 
 even after he began to putrefy. There was little to 
 choose between horse and mule meat under such cir- 
 cumstances both were abominable. 
 
 When day broke that Tuesday, the seventeenth of 
 September, 1868, we saw our pickets riding toward 
 camp as fast as their horses could carry them, excited- 
 ly yelling: "Indians! Indians!" As I looked up the 
 valley toward the west I beheld the grandest, wildest 
 sight such as few mortals are permitted to see and live 
 to tell about. Many hundreds of Indians in full war 
 paraphernalia, riding their splendid war ponies, rushed 
 toward us en masse. Some were galloping in one di- 
 rection, others cantering in another, their lances topped 
 with many-colored streamers, the fantastic Indian cos- 
 tumes lending an awful charm to the whole. About 
 this time those among us who had any had boiled some 
 coffee and were preparing to cross over to the island. 
 
 I will frankly admit that I was awed and scared. I 
 felt as if I wanted to run somewhere, but every avenue 
 of escape was blocked. Look where I might I per- 
 ceived nothing but danger, which increased my agita- 
 tion; so I naturally turned to Colonel Forsyth as a pro- 
 tector, as a young chick espying the hawk in the air 
 flutters toward the mother wing. Under such condi- 
 tions of strain some things engrave themselves vividly 
 upon your mind, while others are entirely forgotten. I 
 remember that distinctly as in my trepidation I in- 
 stinctively kept close to the colonel. I was reassured 
 by his remarkable self-possession and coolness. While 
 stirring every one to activity round us, he consulted with 
 Lieutenant beecher and the guide, Sharp Grover, giv- 
 ing directions here, advice there, until most of the com- 
 mand had crossed; then he crossed himself and posted
 
 n6 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the men, telling them where to take up their ;tt 
 
 positions. Meantime the Indians were comin < 
 
 I was just behind the colonel when the first s 
 the enemy came flying seemingly over our h 
 heard him say, smilingly, "Thank you," but imr ,'tfie- 
 afterward he ordered every one of us to lie flat irjt I 
 ground, while he, still directing, kept on his fee 
 ing around among us, leading his horse. Th i 
 
 began coming thicker, and many of us yelled to . 
 lie down also. How long after this I do not k 
 but I heard the colonel cry out that he was s 
 and I saw him clutch his leg and get down in a sitti 
 position. 
 
 I was lying alongside of Lou McLaughlin; some tall 
 weeds obscured my vision, so I asked Lou to crouch lower 
 and I rolled over him to the other side and was there 
 kept busy with my carbine, for the Indians were onto us. 
 They were circling around while others were shooting. 
 Very soon I heard Lou growl and mutter. I looked at 
 him and saw that he was hit, a bullet coming from the 
 direction where I was lying struck his gun-sight and 
 glanced into his breast. He told me what had hap- 
 pened, but I could give him no attention, for there 
 seemed lots of work to do before us. But later, after the 
 repulse of the attack, I looked at Lou and was surprised 
 to see him lying in a wallow. In his pain he had torn 
 up the grass and dug his hands into the sand. In an- 
 swer to my question whether he was hurt bad, he told 
 me not bad, and advised me to dig into the sand and 
 make a hole, as it would be a protection. 
 
 I am not sure at this time, but I am now under the 
 impression that I told Colonel Forsyth of this; and from 
 that time on we began to dig with our hands or what- 
 ever we could use, and kick with our heels and toes in
 
 I 
 
 THE CRUCIAL MOMENT ON BEECHER'S ISLAND 
 Drawing by R. F. Zogbaum
 
 Defense of Beecher's Island 117 
 
 the sand, and some of us soon had holes dug deep 
 enough to protect the chest, at least. 
 
 Time seemed out of our calculations. I heard some 
 one call, "What time is it ?" An answer came, " Three 
 o'clock." I had thought it was about ten A.M. We had 
 nothing to eat or drink all day and, strange to say, I 
 was not hungry, which may have been the reason why 
 I thought it was still early. Word was passed that 
 Lieutenant Beecher and Scouts Wilson and Culver were 
 killed, Colonel Forsyth wounded again, also Doctor 
 Mooers shot in the head and others hurt whose names I 
 do not now remember. 
 
 We fought steadily all day. After dark the Indians 
 withdrew; then nature began to assert itself. I got 
 hungry; there was nothing to eat in the camp that I knew 
 of, except some wild plums that I had gathered the day 
 before, which were in my saddle-bags, still on the body 
 of my horse. I got out of my hole, creeping on hands 
 and knees toward where I knew the poor animal lay. 
 As I felt my way in the darkness I touched something 
 cold, and upon examination found that it was Wilson's 
 dead hand. He lay where he fell; it was a most horrible 
 feeling. The shivers ran up and down my back, but I 
 got to my horse at last, and tugging, I finally secured the 
 bag and my plums. I also found in it a piece of bacon, 
 the size of two fingers, which I reserved for a last emer- 
 gency, and was still in possession of that rusty piece of 
 fat when relief came. 
 
 On my way back to my hole I passed one where Doc- 
 tor Mooers lay wounded, moaning piteously. I put a 
 plum in his mouth, and I saw it between his teeth next 
 morning. He died on the night of the iQth. All our 
 wounded were very cheerful, and to look at Colonel For- 
 syth and talk to him as he lay there helpless, no outsider
 
 n8 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 would have suspected that he was crippled. We used 
 to gather round him in his pit and hold conversation, not 
 like men in a desperate situation, but like neighbors 
 talking over a common cause. 
 
 Colonel Forsyth was the right man in command of 
 such a heterogeneous company. Like the least among 
 us, he attended to his own horse when in camp, and 
 many times have I seen him gather buffalo chips to 
 supply the mess fuel. While he was our commander in 
 practice he was our friend, and as such we respected 
 him, followed and obeyed him. 
 
 On about the fifth day, as the Indians began leaving 
 us, we began to walk about and look around. About 
 fifteen or twenty feet from my pit I noticed a few of our 
 men calling to the rest of us. I ran to the place, and 
 there, against the edge of the island, I saw three dead 
 Indians. Their friends evidently could not reach them 
 to carry them off, which explained to us the persistent 
 fighting in this direction. When I got there the Indians 
 were being stripped of their equipments, scalps, etc. 
 One of them was shot in the head and his hair was clot- 
 ted with blood. I took hold of one of his braids and ap- 
 plied my knife to the skin above the ear to secure the 
 scalp, but my hand coming in contact with the blood, 
 I dropped the hair in disgust. 
 
 Old Jim Lane saw my hesitation, and taking up the 
 braid, said to me: "My boy, does it make you sick ? " 
 Then inserting the point of the knife under the skin, he 
 cut around, took up the other braid, and jerked the scalp 
 from the head. I had been about three years in that 
 country and four years in America, and life on the plains 
 under such hardships as I had undergone hardens the 
 sensibility, yet I was not quite ripe for such a cutting 
 affray, even with a dead Indian.
 
 Defense of Beecher's Island 119 
 
 After this we were not molested, but devoted our time 
 to looking around for something to eat besides the rotten 
 horse and mule meat, which we boiled several times in 
 water and powder, not to get it soft, but to boil out the 
 stench as much as possible. We found some cactus 
 fruit, and killed a coyote, of which the brains and a rib 
 were my portion. Aside from this we had nothing but 
 horse and mule during the siege, which soon told on 
 our bowels; but in spite of all this, I do not remember a 
 despondent man in our crowd. 
 
 One morning, being the ninth since we were attacked, 
 I was lying outside of my pit, having done some guard 
 duty during the night; I was half dozing and dreaming 
 of home and a good meal. I felt so homesick and so 
 hungry when I heard some one call attention to some- 
 thing moving on the hill. 
 
 I was all attention at once. Soon I heard again "I 
 think that's Doctor Fitzgerald's greyhound." Whoever 
 it might be, we would welcome. We would even have 
 been pleased to have the Indians attack us again, in 
 hopes of killing one of their horses for fresh meat; but 
 it was soon evident that help was coming, and when I 
 fully realized this fact, enfeebled as I was, I jumped up 
 and joined in a lunatics' dance that was in progress all 
 around us. Those on the hill must have seen us, for 
 there was a rush of horsemen down the hill toward us, 
 followed by one or two ambulance wagons. 
 
 They were as eager to reach us as we were to greet 
 them, and as I ran uphill I noticed a soldier on a white 
 horse coming full tilt. The momentum carried him 
 past me, but in passing I grabbed his saddle-bag and 
 was taken off my feet, but it would have taken more than 
 one horse to drag me from my hold. I suspected some 
 eatables in there, and as soon as he could stop, without
 
 I2O Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 dismounting he assisted me to open that bag. With 
 both hands I dived in, and with each hand I clutched 
 some hardtack, but only one hand could reach my 
 mouth; my other was in the grip of one of our men, 
 who ravenously snatched the " tacks." We ate, cried, 
 laughed, and ate, all in a breath. 
 
 As soon as possible we put our dead in the ground. 
 Those that died at one end of the island were cared for 
 by those in that vicinity, and others in their vicinity, so 
 that one part of the island was not aware of the location 
 of the corpses of the other part; at least I did not know 
 where the bodies lay of those killed on the eastern end 
 of the island. So one time, as I walked around among 
 the pits, I noticed something red and round sticking out 
 of the sand, like a half-buried red berry. I kicked it, 
 but by so doing it was not dislodged; I kicked again, but 
 to no result. I then looked closer and discovered that 
 it was the nose of a dead man. I called others to my 
 assistance, and we fixed matters so that no desecration 
 was possible again. 
 
 Our mortally wounded were made as comfortable as 
 possible before they died. I assisted at such ministra- 
 tions given to Lieutenant Beecher. We removed his 
 boots, coat, etc., and, of course, these things were not re- 
 placed on the body after he was dead, but lay around 
 unnoticed. My shoes were quite badly worn, especial- 
 ly after being used for digging in the sand, so when re- 
 lief came and we were preparing to leave the island, I 
 put on his shoes, which were just about my size, and wore 
 them even after I got back to New York City, leaving 
 my old shoes in their stead on the island. 
 
 At one of our " sittings " around Colonel Forsyth in 
 his pit, the incident of killing the coyote was discussed, 
 and plans were suggested for the killing of more of them.
 
 Defense of Beecher's Island 121 
 
 Along with others, I also suggested a scheme, but it 
 was ridiculed, and I soon retired to my pit, which was 
 near enough to the colonel's, so that I could hear what 
 was said there. One of the men remaining was saying 
 uncomplimentary things about me, when the colonel 
 silenced him, telling him that I was but a boy unused 
 to such things and that, under the circumstances, I was 
 doing better than some of the older men. Colonel 
 Forsyth is unconscious of the fact that I am very grate- 
 ful to him for his kindness to that strange "boy" among 
 those strangers, and that I still hope some day that I 
 may have the opportunity to show my appreciation. 
 
 Jack Stillwell and I were the only boys in the com- 
 pany, and naturally gravitated toward each other. We 
 were friends as soon as we met and chums before we 
 knew each other's names. When the colonel asked for 
 volunteers to go to Fort Wallace for help, Jack was 
 among the first to announce himself. I wanted to go 
 with him, but the colonel gave no heed to my request; 
 even Jack discouraged me, for he knew I was too inex- 
 perienced. After Colonel Carpenter came to our relief 
 Jack was not with him, which made me and others feel 
 very uneasy. The day after Colonel Carpenter's arrival 
 we saw the mounted sentinel that had been posted by 
 Colonel Carpenter on a high eminence in the hills about 
 three miles from the island, signaling that a body of men 
 was approaching, which created a flutter of excitement, 
 but there was a strong sensation of security, mingled 
 with a sense of dependence upon our black rescuers 
 permeating our emaciated party, after being cooped up, 
 so to say, for so long a period in dread and suspense. At 
 least that was my sensation. I remember watching that 
 vedette, horse and rider turning around and around, 
 being the only moving object in that dim distance, indi-
 
 122 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 eating to the anxious watchers that either friend or foe 
 was in the vicinity. As he showed no inclination to leave 
 his post, it was soon evident he had no fear of the ap- 
 proaching column, and that friends were coming. Not 
 long after a few horsemen were seen coming around the 
 bend of the river bed, and among them was my friend 
 Jack Stillwell. Nearly all of us ran to meet the party. 
 Soon Jack jumped from his horse, and in his joy to see 
 so many of us alive again, he permitted his tears free flow 
 down his good honest cheeks. I kept up correspond- 
 ence with him all these years past. Last year he died.* 
 He was a big-hearted, jovial fellow, brave to a fault. 
 
 * Stillwell studied law, and ultimately became a judge in Texas. He was a friend 
 of Generals Miles and Custer also of " Wild Bill " Hickock, " Texas Jack " Omo- 
 hundro, and other famous figures on the frontier; and when he died, a couple of 
 years ago, he was the subject of glowing tributes from high and low alike. C. T. B.
 
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 Carpenter and His "Brunettes."* The 
 Fight on Beaver Creek 
 
 CARPENTER had performed a very com- 
 mendable thing in his march of over one 
 hundred miles in two days for the relief of 
 Forsyth. And it is marvelous that he had 
 been able to find him in that vast expanse of country. 
 He received high praise for it, which he fully de- 
 served; but the battle which, with his black com- 
 rades, he fought three weeks later, elicited still more 
 praise. The fight was one of the prettiest and most 
 typical of any in our Indian campaigns; and I am 
 fortunate in being able to give it in General Carpenter's 
 own words, written especially for this book, the notes 
 appended being my own contribution. C. T. B. 
 
 While on the forced march to relieve the party of 
 scouts with Colonel George A. Forsyth, surrounded by 
 Indians on the Arickaree fork of the Republican River, 
 the troops under my command discovered a large trail 
 of the Indians who had been engaged in that fight 
 on the south fork of the Republican. 
 
 * Negro troops were often so styled by their white comrades in the service. 
 C. T. B. 
 
 123
 
 124 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 The scouts discovered that this trail left the valley 
 of the stream a short distance below and struck across 
 country in the direction of the Beaver Creek. After the 
 relief of Forsyth, on my return to Fort Wallace with the 
 survivors and wounded, a report was made to General 
 Sheridan, then to the east of Fort Hayes, Kansas, of the 
 probable whereabouts of the Indians; and the Fifth 
 Cavalry, which had just arrived from the East by rail, 
 was disembarked between Hayes and Wallace and or- 
 dered to move north under Major Royall, and strike the 
 savages, if possible, on the Beaver. A day or two after 
 the Fifth had left, Brevet-Major-General Eugene A. 
 Carr reported for duty to General Sheridan. Carr had 
 been a general officer of volunteers during the Civil War 
 with an excellent record, and now reverted to his rank 
 in the regulars of Major in the Fifth Cavalry. 
 
 Sheridan was anxious to have Carr join his regiment 
 because of his experience with Indians and his general 
 reputation, and therefore sent him to Fort Wallace with 
 orders to have the two troops of cavalry there go under 
 my command and escort Carr and overtake the Fifth, 
 if possible, to enable him to join his regiment. The 
 troops consisting of Troops H and I, Tenth Cavalry, 
 were officered by myself and Captain Graham, Lieu- 
 tenants Banzhaf, Amick, and Orleman, and were soon in 
 readiness for the duty required. We had returned from 
 the relief of Forsyth Oct. 1st, and we started with Carr 
 at ten A.M. Oct. I4th. 
 
 I concluded to march north so as to strike the Beaver 
 as soon as possible, and then to follow down that creek 
 with the expectation of finding the Fifth Cavalry or of 
 striking its trail. On the I5th I reached the Beaver at 
 about one P.M., and after proceeding some miles down, 
 went into bivouac. As we expected, we found a very
 
 The Fight on Beaver Creek 125 
 
 large Indian trail about two weeks old, over which over 
 two thousand head of ponies had been ridden or driven, 
 going in the same direction. 
 
 The next day we continued our journey down the 
 stream, rinding plenty of water, a fine bottom covered 
 with grass and timber, and still observing the Indian 
 trail, which ran to a point about twenty miles east from 
 the place where we first struck the Beaver. At this lo- 
 cality the signs showed that the Indians had encamped 
 for the night. The ground was covered for acres with 
 old fire-places, pieces of wood, and the manure of ponies; 
 and a little distance off we found a dead Cheyenne, 
 wrapped in his robes, lying upon a scaffolding in a tree, 
 a protection against ravenous wolves. The trail then 
 struck south toward Short Nose Creek, the Indian name 
 for a stream about twenty miles south of the Beaver. 
 We continued our course, however, on the Beaver, until 
 we made about thirty miles, and then stopped for the 
 night. 
 
 As there was no pack outfit at Wallace, I was com- 
 pelled to take wagons to carry our supplies, and had 
 eleven with me. The mules, dragging heavy loads over 
 rough country, were made to trot in order to keep up 
 with the cavalry column. We had now moved down 
 the Beaver about forty-five miles without finding any- 
 thing about the Fifth, and it began to look as if some- 
 thing had taken the regiment in another direction. 
 
 The next morning I sent Lieutenant Amick and ten 
 men well mounted with Sharp Grover, the famous scout, 
 with orders to proceed as quickly as possible across 
 country to the Short Nose to look for signs of the Fifth 
 Cavalry and to keep a sharp lookout for Indians. 
 
 Grover, who, it will be remembered, had been with 
 Forsyth, afterward joined my command. He had mar-
 
 126 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ried a Sioux woman and had lived for years with the 
 Indians before the outbreak of hostilities. He could 
 speak their language and knew their ways and customs, 
 and was perfectly trained in reading signs. It was in- 
 teresting to see how he could read what the tracks meant, 
 as if they had been books. He could tell how long since 
 the tracks were made, whether they were made by horses 
 or ponies, shod or unshod, how many were ridden, 
 how many were driven, whether it was a war party or a 
 party changing camp. If Indians stopped for the night 
 he could tell how many men or squaws were in the party, 
 to what tribe they belonged, from the shape of their 
 moccasins, and many more details. Like most of his 
 ilk, Grover drank heavily on occasion. When the In- 
 dians went on the war-path Grover could not stay longer 
 with the Sioux, as his life was not safe, and he entered 
 the government employ, where he rendered heroic and 
 invaluable services. Later he was killed in a row at 
 Pond City, near Fort Wallace. 
 
 Amick and his party soon disappeared over the hills 
 to our right and we kept on down the stream, the general 
 course of which was to the northeast. I began to feel cer- 
 tain that the Fifth Cavalry had never reached the Beaver, 
 and that we would probably be attacked by the Indians 
 if this was the case. Under these circumstances I felt 
 that it would be wise to be cautious and on the lookout 
 against surprise. The road we passed over was very 
 rough and the stream in most places ran through deep- 
 cut banks several feet high, with very few places suitable 
 for crossing. 
 
 As night came on a place was selected for a camp in a 
 bend of the creek where the wagons could be placed 
 across, giving room inside to graze the animals without 
 fear of a stampede from howling savages. Amick re-
 
 The Fight on Beaver Creek 127 
 
 turned just before night, having scouted some miles 
 beyond the Short Nose without discovering any trace of 
 the Fifth Cavalry. Grover told me that as they passed 
 across the divide between the Beaver and the Short 
 Nose he came across a single Indian pony track. This 
 track was coming from a direction to our rear, and 
 showed that the pony was going at a rapid gallop. 
 Grover inferred from this that it was probably an Indian 
 hunter returning homeward who had most likely 
 crossed our trail behind us, discovered our presence in 
 the country, and was riding as fast as possible to carry 
 the news to the Indian camps somewhere to our front 
 and not far off. 
 
 After a council over the situation General Carr came 
 to the conclusion, after having traveled some sixty miles 
 down the Beaver without finding the Fifth, that the regi- 
 ment had never reached that stream and that therefore 
 he would give it up and start on our return in the morn- 
 ing. About seven A.M. on the next day, Oct. I5th, 
 Captain Graham expressed a wish to make a scout for 
 a short distance to the front, and rode forward with two 
 men. The command was ordered saddled up and every- 
 thing made in readiness to move. In view of the fact 
 that the south side of the creek was hilly and difficult 
 and offered opportunities for ambuscades, I determined 
 to go back by the north side, which was comparatively 
 open. The afternoon before I had sent Lieutenant 
 Orleman with a detachment to dig down the sides of the 
 creek and prepare a practicable passage for the wagons 
 and troops. 
 
 Graham had hardly ridden a thousand yards when 
 twenty-five Indians suddenly dashed over the hill to his 
 rear, with the evident intention of cutting him off. They 
 were almost upon Graham before he discerned them, but
 
 128 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 he instantly struck spurs into his horse and dashed for 
 the creek, the Indians firing a volley at short range upon 
 the party. One of the bullets passed through Graham's 
 hat, another through his coat, and a third through his 
 leggings without wounding him. One of the horses was 
 shot through the shoulder and fell. His rider succeeded 
 in getting into the creek and behind the bank along with 
 the other soldiers, and they commenced firing upon the 
 Indians. Graham's girth burst as his horse sprang 
 away at the first fire, but as his saddle gave way he seized 
 his horse's mane and dragged himself forward on the 
 animal. He then dashed the horse over the bank of the 
 creek, about ten feet to the bottom. He fell from his 
 horse in this jump, but the horse, fortunately, ran in 
 our direction.* 
 
 By this time I started out thirty men under Lieutenants 
 Amick and Orleman to cover the retreat of Graham's 
 men. As they charged toward the hill the savages rushed 
 from the creek to avoid being cut off, and were hotly pur- 
 sued by our men. Judging that the presence of these 
 Indians indicated that a large party could not be far 
 ofF, I thought it best to be prudent and sent a trumpeter 
 to overtake Amick and tell him to discontinue the pur- 
 suit and fall back slowly to camp. Without further 
 delay I now broke up the camp, crossed the creek with 
 wagons and troops, and, having dismounted the men, de- 
 ployed them as riflemen to cover the retreat of Amick. 
 
 In a few minutes the absent party made its appear- 
 ance on the hills, with bodies of Indians, numbering at 
 least a hundred, skirmishing on our flank and rear. 
 
 * Luckily for Graham, just as he fell from his horse Arrack's men charged the 
 Indians, who thereupon retreated. One of the troopers caught the horse and held him 
 until the captain came running up. Carpenter's prompt action in instantly throwing 
 Amick's detachment on the savages undoubtedly saved the lives of Graham and his 
 men. As it was, it was a fearfully narrow escape for them. C. T. B.
 
 The Fight on Beaver Creek 129 
 
 They slowly fell back toward the creek, and when within 
 range the dismounted men on the banks opened fire on 
 the advancing savages, and under cover of this Amick 
 crossed and joined the command, while the Indians 
 kept at a respectful distance. 
 
 The wagons were now placed in double column 
 so as to make everything as compact as possible.* 
 H Troop was assigned on the flanks and advance, 
 deployed in open order. Troop I covered the rear in 
 the same manner, with one platoon under Graham as 
 a reserve. These arrangements being completed, we 
 moved steadily up the creek bottom. As soon as this 
 movement commenced, a large body of Indians made 
 their appearance and charged toward us, taking advan- 
 tage of ravines, trees, and bluffs to fire from the south 
 side of the creek. Some of the balls were well aimed 
 and came close. 
 
 I soon saw that if we continued down the creek bot- 
 tom the enemy would harass us immensely under cover 
 of the timber and banks, and therefore changed our 
 course so as to leave the valley and take the higher 
 ground or divide. The Indians followed, showing 
 about two hundred strong, and acted boldly in their 
 attacks on the rear and flanks. The men and officers 
 behaved very coolly, facing toward the enemy and driv- 
 ing them back without stopping the progress of the 
 column. 
 
 At one point we passed near a deep ravine, and the 
 enemy, quick to observe cover of any kind, occupied it 
 with quite a number of warriors and opened up a seri- 
 ous fire. The reserve platoon under Graham charged 
 at the place as we were passing and, arriving at the edge 
 of the ravine, poured in a volley at close range on the 
 
 * Sir wagons on one side, five on the other. L.H.C.
 
 130 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
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 Position of Wagons and Soldiers in Beaver Creek Fight 
 
 T, Troopers Surrounding Wagons; H, Horses Inside the Incloiurc 
 Drawn by General Carpenter
 
 The Fight on Beaver Creek 131 
 
 savages. A number must have been hurt and the In- 
 dians certainly lost no time in getting out of their posi- 
 tion. Afterward they were more cautious in occupying 
 ground too close to us. The flankers, under Banzhaf 
 and Orleman, also repulsed the Indians on several occa- 
 sions. 
 
 One Indian carried a red flag with some white device 
 upon it, and by his movements the whole force seemed 
 more or less governed. They were all stripped to the 
 waists, and were decorated by various ornaments hang- 
 ing from their heads and their shields, quivers, and bri- 
 dles, so as to glisten and shine in the sun at every turn 
 of the ponies. Up to this time five Indians were known 
 to be killed at various points and quite a number 
 wounded. 
 
 At one P.M. the enemy seemed to stop the fight and 
 apparently withdrew, and I supposed that I had seen the 
 last of them; but half an hour afterward, hearing an ex- 
 clamation, I looked back and saw the Indians appearing 
 again on the hills to our rear. On they came, one body 
 after another coming in sight until it was estimated by all 
 present that at least six hundred warriors were in view. 
 Emboldened by their number they rushed forward, di- 
 recting themselves toward our front, flanks and rear, 
 making things look rather serious. I soon saw that we 
 could not continue the march and meet this force, but 
 that we must select a position and make a stand. 
 
 In the first attack in the morning I had offered the 
 command to General Carr, as the senior officer pres- 
 ent, but he declined it, stating that he considered him- 
 self simply as a passenger to be escorted, and I there- 
 fore continued to direct the operations.* 
 
 * General Carr, while he used a rifle efficiently during the whole of the action, did not 
 interfere with Carpenter's arrangements; with rare self-restraint he refrained even from
 
 132 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 I looked around and saw a small knoll or rise a short 
 distance to the front, from which the ground fell in 
 every direction, and this point was immediately selected. 
 The teamsters were directed to take the trot, aim for 
 this place, and on arrival at the knoll immediately to 
 form a circular corral, half a circle on either side, with 
 the mules facing inward, affording a shelter within and 
 something of a fortification. As soon as we increased 
 our pace the Indians evidently thought we were run- 
 ning from them, and sent up a yell which made shivers 
 run down the backs of some of our recruits. We kept 
 on, however, at a fast gait, and the moment we struck 
 the highest ground, the wagons were corralled with six 
 wagons one side, five wagons on the other, and the 
 troops were rushed inside at a gallop and dismounted. 
 The horses were tied together inside the corral with 
 some men to watch them, and the rest were formed out 
 side the corral in open order.* This was done in aboi 
 two minutes and then the advance of the Indians w; 
 upon us. 
 
 A fire commenced from our seven-shooter Spencei 
 which sounded like the fire of a line of infantry. TI 
 
 offering suggestions. Although he showed plenty of nerve and was entirely calm a 
 collected throughout the hot affair, he is reported to have said after the fight that 
 thought he was in the tightest box in which he was ever caught in his life, and that thi 
 was nothing left for them all to do but to sell their lives as dearly as possible. He h 
 never served on the plains with negro troopers before, and had no knowledge as to ho 
 they would behave against Indians nobody had, for that matter. C. T. B. 
 
 * When there are many wagons, the corral is formed with the wagons close together, 
 axles touching, tongues and mules inward; but in this case they had to form an open 
 corral with about twenty feet between the wagons. The horses, to the number of one 
 hundred the troops being reduced to that number by illness, hard work, and other 
 causes were forced inside the wagons in columns of four, each set of fours being tied 
 together, with horse-holders detailed to look after them. The duty of the horse- 
 holders was most important. They had always to be on watch to prevent a stam- 
 pede. If the troops had been deprived of their horses on that open knoll their position 
 would have been hopeless indeed. The dismounted men were formed in front and rear 
 and on both sides of the corral, as Indian attacks must be expected from every direction. 
 The plan made by General Carpenter explains the situation perfectly. C. T. B.
 
 THE CHIEF MEDICINE MAN AT BEAVER CREEK 
 
 Drawing by Will Crawford
 
 The Fight on Beaver Creek 133 
 
 Indians charged up around the wagons, firing rapidly 
 and seriously wounded some of the men, but in a very 
 short time they were driven back in wild disorder, leav- 
 ing the ground covered with ponies, arms, and some 
 bodies. Three dead warriors lay within fifty feet of the 
 wagons. One man who was killed here was carried off 
 by his comrades. 
 
 The chief Medicine Man, on a fine looking horse, rode 
 out in front of our line about two hundred yards off, 
 after the retreat of the Indians, to try to show that 
 his medicine was good and the white man's bullets 
 could not hurt him. I directed several men near me 
 to aim carefully at him. They fired and the Medicine 
 Man went down, accompanied by a howl from the more 
 distant Indians. After the repulse the men rushed for- 
 ward from the wagons, seized and hauled in ten bodies 
 of the Indians. The savages, disheartened and sur- 
 prised at this reception, withdrew out of gunshot and 
 assembled, apparently for council.* 
 
 The men carried corn sacks and made breastworks 
 near the wagons and we waited, expecting a renewal of 
 the attack, for about an hour, when it became evident 
 that some of the Indians were withdrawing. The day 
 was very warm, we had been engaged about eight hours, 
 and in the hot sun men and animals were suffering very 
 
 * Just after the first repulse of the Indians, Graham went to General Carr very im- 
 properly (he had no business to communicate with him except through Carpenter, his 
 immediate commanding officer), and suggested that he order the wagons abandoned, 
 the teamsters mounted on the mules, and the whole party to retreat in that fashion as 
 fast as possible. Carr, of course, referred the matter to Carpenter, who promptly re- 
 fused to sanction any such manoeuver. To leave the wagons, which afforded some pro- 
 tection on the hill, would be to enable six or seven hundred Indians to surround the hun- 
 dred troopers in his command and invite annihilation. Carpenter assured Carr that as 
 he had defeated the Indians once, he was certain that he could do it again. Carr wisely 
 persisted in his determination not to interfere, and Graham had his suggestion decisively 
 negatived by Carpenter. Graham deserved reprobation for his un military action, 
 as well as for hit foolish suggestion. C. T. B.
 
 134 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 much from thirst. I made up my mind to move for 
 water, and keeping the wagons in double column, the 
 horses inside and the men dismounted on the outside, 
 we marched for the Beaver. A large party of Indians 
 followed up to where their dead comrades lay and set 
 up a mournful howl over their remains. Their loss in 
 this fight, added to what they had suffered the month 
 before in the conflict with Forsyth, must have had a 
 sobering effect. 
 
 We now proceeded to the creek without further inter- 
 ference, and selecting a wide bottom encamped for the 
 night, preparing some rifle-pits to cover our outlying 
 pickets and to enable them to receive the enemy if an 
 attack were made in the morning. We heard them 
 around us all night imitating coyotes, but they did not 
 find a weak place and refrained from molesting us. 
 The next morning the Indians were gone and we 
 marched by the shortest route to Fort Wallace, arriving 
 there on the 2ist. 
 
 On our return journey we passed through Sheridan 
 City, a frontier town located at the then terminus of the 
 Kansas Division of the Union Pacific R. R. It was full 
 of taverns, saloons, gambling houses and dens, and of 
 a rather tough lot of citizens and desperadoes. These 
 people and others crowded into the streets when we 
 passed through, and when they saw the troopers and 
 their horses decorated with the spoils from the Indians 
 whose dead bodies we had captured, they knew that we 
 had been in a successful fight and they gave us a perfect 
 ovation. 
 
 The savages suffered a considerable loss, but we es- 
 caped with a few men wounded (some of them seriously) 
 and none killed. General Carr found the Fifth Cavalry 
 had returned to the railroad, and through mistake they
 
 The Fight on Beaver Creek 135 
 
 never reached the Beaver. He took command of the 
 regiment, marched again and pursued the Indians over 
 the Platte River, and followed them on a long campaign. 
 
 This was one of the smartest and most successful In- 
 dian fights on record. Carpenter's tactics throughout 
 had been admirable. General Carr was much sur- 
 prised and pleased at the conduct of these black troop- 
 ers, and on his return to Fort Wallace telegraphed to 
 General Sheridan that "the officers and troops behaved 
 admirably." General Sheridan published a general 
 order highly commending the commander, the officers 
 and the men for this brilliant and gallant affair. Car- 
 penter was brevetted colonel in the Regular Army (his 
 fifth brevet), and afterward received a medal of honor 
 for this fight and the relief of Forsyth. Well did he 
 deserve them both. C. T. B.
 
 CHAPTER NINE 
 
 A Further Discussion of the Beaver 
 Creek Affair 
 
 WHEN General Carpenter's account of the 
 fight on the Beaver Creek was published 
 serially, General Carr took exception to it in 
 a public letter to the editor of the periodical 
 in which it appeared. I am permitted by the editor to 
 make extracts from this letter, which, with my own com- 
 ment and General Carpenter's rejoinder, appear as 
 follows : 
 
 I. General Carr's Account 
 
 I do not think that General Sheridan sent orders for 
 my escort to go under command of Colonel Carpenter. 
 I know that, after waiting with General Sheridan at 
 Fort Hayes for several days, he ordered me to go to 
 Fort Wallace, take an escort and go to find Royall, who 
 had not been heard from as expected. 
 
 While we were going over the "rough hills" Colonel 
 Carpenter, and perhaps some of the others, came up and 
 remonstrated with me for marching the command so 
 hard; said they could not be responsible for its effect 
 on the horses, and when I insisted, asked me to take 
 command and be responsible. I said, "All right, I 
 
 136
 
 The Beaver Creek Affair 137 
 
 will take command; but you must attend to the details. 
 I will not appoint an adjutant and take the office work'* 
 (detailing guards, stable duties, etc., etc.). 
 
 I had with me an officer of my regiment, Captain 
 Kane, Fifth Cavalry, and now wish I had appointed him 
 adjutant and taken formal command. 
 
 Finding that the stream (Beaver Creek) was persist- 
 ently hugging the south side of the valley, on which we 
 were traveling, creating bluffs and ravines over which it 
 was difficult to move the wagons, I determined to cross 
 to the north side, where the valley consisted of a gentle 
 and smooth slope. 
 
 I selected the camp in an "ox bow" bend of the creek, 
 putting the tents and wagons across the entrance, the 
 guard at the bow and the animals inside, selected a place 
 for crossing, and ordered the banks to be cut down to the 
 bed of the creek, so that the wagons and animals could 
 cross. 
 
 In the Indian country I always had my commands up 
 and under arms before daylight, which is the most dan- 
 gerous time; and next morning we were up, had break- 
 fast, the tents struck and the wagons packed, and were 
 standing 'round the camp fire when Amick called out 
 "Indians!" 
 
 I had intended to move camp across trie creek and get 
 fresh grass. Graham had started on his trip, following 
 a narrow path between the bluff and the river bank. 
 He was riding a fine horse called "Red Eye," which had 
 a very deep chest and thin barrel. As he told me after- 
 ward, his saddle began to slip back, but he waited to get 
 down to fix it till he should reach a more open place 
 ahead at the mouth of a ravine, when bang, bang ! came 
 some shots. His horse dodged and jumped down the 
 bank into the creek, slipping the saddle farther back and
 
 138 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 kicking it clear, while Graham landed on the shoulders 
 of the horse and from there on the bed of the creek. 
 He turned back with his gun toward the bank, which 
 protected him while he fired, till I sent Lieutenant 
 Amick with some skirmishers, who covered his retreat. 
 His two men jumped their horses down into and up out 
 of the creek and fell back, and when we got the men all 
 in I moved the command up to and over the crossing I 
 had prepared and out to the open slope on the north side 
 of the valley. As we had not found Royall but had 
 found the Indians, or, rather, they had found us, it was of 
 no use to go farther down the Beaver, and I determined 
 to move toward home. 
 
 The Indians kept coming out from those bluffs, cross- 
 ing the creek and following us, and I arranged the wag- 
 ons in two columns, with Carpenter's company in front 
 and on the flanks, and Graham's company in rear, where 
 I was also. 
 
 Some of the Indians got on our flanks as skirmishers, 
 a few in front and more in rear, while the main body got 
 into two columns, about like the two halves of a regi- 
 ment in columns of four, marching steadily and gradu- 
 ally, closing on us by increasing their gait. I estimated 
 them at seven hundred warriors; we had about one hun- 
 dred colored soldiers. Their chiefs were marching be- 
 tween the heads of their columns; they had a flag and a 
 bugle. I sent word to Carpenter to turn more toward 
 the higher ground, away from the timber along the creek, 
 which Indians were using for cover. Pretty soon he be- 
 gan to trot, and I had to send Captain Kane to him with 
 orders to go slower, for fear of a stampede. I was in the 
 rear near Graham's troop. He was one of the bravest 
 men I ever saw. He would amuse himself with the In- 
 dians by concealing men in hollows, taking away their
 
 The Beaver Creek Affair 139 
 
 horses till Indians came up for them to shoot at, then 
 charging up with their horses, mounting and bringing 
 them off. Most of the men were cool, but I saw one 
 man loading and firing when the Indians were a mile 
 away. I called to him to stop, but he paid no attention, 
 seemed to be dazed, and I had to go up and lay my hand 
 on him before he obeyed my order. As the Indians got 
 closer, one of the men dismounted to shoot. When he 
 tried to remount, his horse got scared and edged away 
 from him, and I rode up on the off-side, got hold of the 
 rein, and let his horse come against mine. Then he put 
 his foot in the stirrup, made a leap and got his leg over, 
 when we both cantered off just in time. He lost his 
 cap, and we lost a dog which was playing about be- 
 tween us and the Indians, interested in the shooting till 
 he got near enough to them to be killed. These were 
 our only losses. 
 
 As the main body of the Indians got closer and in- 
 creased their gait to the charge, the leading wagons 
 turned toward each other and stopped. The others 
 turned their mules inside of those in front of them, lap- 
 ping onto and tying to the wagons, forming a corral in 
 shape of a flat-iron, and the horsemen rode inside, dis- 
 mounted, tied their horses, and began to fire at the 
 Indians who were thronging around us. One Indian, 
 on a clay-bank pony and wearing a red blanket, with no 
 arms, rode 'round and 'round us within fifty or one hun- 
 dred yards, and seemed to bear a charmed life. I shot at 
 him several times, and Grover said he also shot at him 
 till he began to think the Indian had strong medicine 
 which protected him Grover was a squaw man and 
 had imbibed some of their superstitions. He was shoot- 
 ing a Sharp's carbine, and, taking it down to reload, 
 happened to notice that he had the sight set for five
 
 140 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 hundred yards and had been shooting over the 
 Indian's head. 
 
 I had a Spencer carbine which had been sent me by 
 the company for trial. With it I shot down an Indian, 
 who fell and lay within thirty yards of the corral. He 
 was not dead, and I afterward talked with him through 
 Grover. He said his name was Little Crow, and men- 
 tioned the name of his father, whom Grover said he 
 knew. He was young about eighteen. I asked him 
 why they attacked us. He said because we came on 
 their creek. He told where their camp was, so that 
 one week from that day, which was Sunday, October 
 1 8th, 1868, I found them with my own regiment, the 
 Fifth, had a fight lasting two days and two nights, and 
 drove them out of Kansas. 
 
 While the fight was going on our soldiers showed 
 great bravery. While inside the wagon corral they 
 would rush from one side to the other, wherever the In- 
 dians appeared, so as to fire at them. Their officers 
 did not seem to keep them in their places, and, after 
 it was over, I reprimanded them for not commanding 
 their men. After the Indians were repulsed we went 
 around and rearranged the wagons, got out sacks, 
 cracker-boxes, etc., fixed breastworks in anticipation 
 of another attack, and then sat down and ate our lunch. 
 
 It was two o'clock. Our soldiers wanted to scalp the 
 dead Indians, of whom about ten were lying too near 
 the corral for their friends to carry off. We prevented 
 this till, while we were going around the corral rearrang- 
 ing, the soldiers got the chance to scalp them. Two 
 were lying wounded when two soldiers approached 
 them; one drew his bow and sent an arrow through the 
 thighs of one of the men. The arrow passed through 
 the fleshy part of one thigh and entered the other and
 
 The Beaver Creek Affair 141 
 
 stopped against the bone. It had to be cut in two to 
 extract it. Years after, at Fort Leavenworth, a first ser- 
 geant showed me an arrow-head with the point marred, 
 and said he was that man. 
 
 The other wounded Indian had a pistol, and shot the 
 other soldier in the calf of his leg. These were the only 
 men we had hurt. It was then that there was some 
 talk of abandoning the wagons and going direct for the 
 railroad. With the wagons, we had, of course, to go by 
 routes over which wheeled vehicles could travel. I do 
 not recall whether Captain Graham advocated this, but 
 there would have been no impropriety in his stating his 
 views to me. Any officer can talk to his commander, 
 and I had been giving orders from time to time directly 
 to him and his men. We sat there eating our lunch and 
 talking with each other and the wounded Indian who lay 
 in front of us, when he made a motion with his hand 
 back toward me. I asked Grover what he meant. 
 He said, "He wants you to go away; says his heart is 
 bad." This pleased me very much. I had been watch- 
 ing the Indians, who had fallen back to some rising 
 ground nearly a mile off. They were moving about, 
 pow-wowing, and, I supposed, preparing for a new at- 
 tack. They seemed to be diminishing in numbers, but 
 I thought they were trying to get around to some place 
 where they would have a better chance at us. I really 
 did not expect to get out of that fix. If those Indians 
 had had sufficient resolution, being seven to one, they 
 ought to have used us up. When the wounded Indian 
 made this motion, I took it to mean that he knew they 
 were giving up. He could see them as well as we could, 
 and knew better what they were doing. I suppose that 
 those who remained were the friends of the dead, wait- 
 ing for us to go.
 
 142 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 I gave orders to reload the wagons and move out. 
 Some of the Indians followed us for several miles, but 
 did not again attack. 
 
 Colonel Carpenter did not offer the command to me 
 at the first attack in the morning, nor did I decline it. 
 I was exercising the command all the time. One of the 
 articles of war provides that "when troops join and do 
 duty together the highest in rank of the line of the army 
 shall command the whole, and give the orders needful 
 for the service," and I could not have avoided the re- 
 sponsibility. 
 
 The foregoing narrative shows that I was not a "pas- 
 sive spectator, " nor did I " refrain from advice or sugges- 
 tion," nor from giving orders as required. 
 
 I, no doubt, said that I was a guest, and did not inter- 
 fere unnecessarily; but my long experience on the plains 
 and with Indians rendered it incumbent on me to exer- 
 cise my judgment. 
 
 EUGENE A. CARR, 
 Brevet Major-General and Congressional Medallist. 
 
 With reference to this letter from General Carr I beg 
 to point out: 
 
 That General Carr in his letter practically admits in 
 two places that he was not in command. First, when 
 he writes of Captain Kane, "I wish I had appointed him 
 adjutant and taken formal command." Second, when 
 he writes: "I, no doubt, said that I was a guest, and 
 did not interfere unnecessarily." 
 
 I do not see, therefore, that there is really any serious 
 discrepancy between the account of General Carpenter 
 and that of General Carr. I presume, if there is, I am 
 more to blame than any one for the note to which Gen- 
 eral Carr takes exception. The original wording of
 
 The Beaver Creek Affair 143 
 
 that note was, possibly, not happy, and probably con- 
 veyed more than I intended. I did not suppose that 
 any one thought that General Carr sat around and 
 twiddled his thumbs while the fighting was going on. 
 I have made changes in the note, which appears in this 
 book in its amended form. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that General Carpenter re- 
 ceived his medal of honor in part for this fight, and he 
 certainly would not have received it had he not been in 
 command. 
 
 Here follows a communication from General Carpen- 
 ter on the subject. This discussion, I think, settles the 
 matter in a way which I trust will be satisfactory to the 
 friends of both of these distinguished officers. 
 
 II. General Carpenter's Reply 
 
 I was very much surprised in reading General Carr's 
 contention that he was in command of the troops who 
 constituted his escort to enable him to join the Fifth 
 Cavalry, and who were in the action on the Beaver in 
 October, 1868. The account I wrote is from my recol- 
 lection, and from letters written home at the time$ and I 
 repeated what I thought there was no question about, 
 and had no desire to ignore General Carr or any one 
 concerned. 
 
 The two troops of the Tenth Cavalry, a portion of the 
 garrison at Fort Wallace, under my command as the 
 senior officer, were ordered to act as escort for General 
 Carr, then Major, Fifth Cavalry. 
 
 I am quite positive that General Carr was offered the 
 command by me, knowing him to be senior, and that 
 he declined it. Many officers have been escorted by 
 troops without taking command of the escort although
 
 144 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 of senior rank. As the troops were to escort this officer, 
 of course he was consulted about the direction of the 
 march, the time for camping, and concerning many 
 other details of greater or less importance, but he never 
 took formal command. If he did not, then, it would be 
 manifestly improper for him to issue orders directly to 
 subordinate officers or men. The officers and men were 
 mentioned in General Orders by General Sheridan in 
 1868 for their gallantry and bravery in this action, and 
 it is stated that they were escorting General Carr. 
 
 Thirty-five years have passed since the affair, and I 
 never heard of any question about who commanded the 
 troops engaged. This length of time naturally accounts 
 for some difference of memory, and no two narratives 
 may be expected altogether to agree. As mentioned 
 before, Carr was consulted frequently during the expe- 
 dition and his wishes were carried out, as was proper 
 under the circumstances. 
 
 Some of the details mentioned by General Carr I do 
 not remember, but I certainly regarded myself as being 
 in command of the troops during the fight and gave di- 
 rections as I have stated in accordance with my recollec- 
 tion, and selected the ground on which the wagons were 
 corralled and the Indians repulsed. 
 
 I do not know of any officers being reprimanded, 
 but when we returned to Fort Wallace we were in- 
 formed that General Carr had reported to General 
 Sheridan that "the officers and men had behaved 
 admirably." 
 
 I inclose a copy of General Field Orders, No. 4, 
 Headquarters Department of the Missouri, dated 
 October 27, 1868, issued by order of General Sheridan 
 to commend the conduct of the troops engaged in the 
 combat on the Beaver, October 18, 1868:
 
 The Beaver Creek Affair 145 
 
 Headquarters Department of the Missouri. 
 In the Field, Fort Hays, Kansas, October 27, 1868. 
 
 General Field Orders, No. 4. 
 
 The attention of the officers and soldiers of this department is 
 called to the engagement with hostile Indians on Beaver Creek, 
 Kansas, October 18, 1868, in which a detachment of cavalry (escort- 
 ing Brevet Major-Gen'l E. A. Carr, Major, Fifth Cavalry to his 
 Regiment) under the command of Brevet Lient-Col. Louis H. 
 Carpenter, Captain, Tenth Cavalry, consisting of Companies I, Tenth 
 Cavalry, under Capt. George W. Graham and 1st Lieut.-Major J. 
 Amick, and H, Tenth Cavalry, under 1st Lieut. Charles Banzhaf 
 and ad Lieut. Louis H. Orleman, engaged about five hundred (500) 
 Indians for several hours, inflicting a loss on the savages of ten (10) 
 killed and many wounded, losing three (3) enlisted men wounded. 
 
 The major-general commanding desires to tender his thanks for 
 the gallantry and bravery displayed by this small command against 
 so large a body of Indians. 
 
 By command of Major-General Sheridan. 
 
 J. SCHUYLER CROSBY, 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Col. A. D. C. 
 
 A. A. A. General. 
 
 It is expressly stated that the detachment of cavalry 
 (escorting Brevet Major-General Eugene A. Carr, 
 Major, Fifth Cavalry, to his regiment) was "under the 
 command of Brevet Lieut.-Col. Louis H. Carpenter, 
 Captain, Tenth Cavalry." 
 
 The records show, further, that Brevet Lieut.-Col. 
 Louis H. Carpenter was brevetted colonel for gallant 
 and meritorious conduct in the engagement with Indians 
 on Beaver Creek, Kansas, October 18, 1868. This 
 appointment was made on the recommendation of 
 General Sheridan, and was undoubtedly conferred on 
 this officer as being in command of the troops during 
 the fight. Others behaved gallantly and their conduct 
 deserved recognition, but this was the only brevet given 
 at the time. Louis H. CARPENTER.
 
 CHAPTER TEN 
 The Battle of the Washita 
 
 I. Custer and the Famous Seventh Cavalry 
 
 A FIGHTER of fighters and a soldier of sol- 
 diers was that beau sabreur of the American 
 Army, Giorge Armstrong Custer, "Old 
 Curly" to }iis men, "The White Chief with 
 the Yellow Hair," or, more briefly, "Long Hair" 
 to the Indians. Frorn Bull Run to Appomattox his 
 career was fairly meteoric. Second lieutenant in the 
 Army of the Potomac ^at twenty-one, fresh from West 
 Point, a brigadier-general at twenty-three, a major- 
 general at twenty-four, and commander of the third cav- 
 alry division, which, in the six months preceding the 
 downfall of the Confederacy, had taken one hundred and 
 eleven guns, sixty-five battle-flags, and over ten thousand 
 prisoners of war, without losing a flag or gun, and with- 
 out a failure to capture whatever it went for such 
 was his record.* 
 
 I have heard my father tell of the impression made by 
 the dashing young soldier whose spirited horse ran away 
 on Pennsylvania Avenue at the Grand Review in Wash- 
 
 * This statement has been called in question. The facts are taken from Custer's 
 farewell order to his division, April 19, 1865, as published in Captain Frederick 
 Whittaker's " Complete Life of General George A. Custer," Sheldon & Co., New 
 York, 1876. There is no possible doubt as to the correctness of the statement. 
 
 I 4 6
 
 The Battle of the Washita 147 
 
 ington, in spite of the efforts of his rider a peerless 
 horseman to restrain him. Custer's hat fell off, his 
 long, yellow curls floated back in the wind, making a 
 dashing and romantic picture. He was a man of su- 
 perb physique and magnificent strength. I saw him 
 when I was a boy, and I have never forgotten him. His 
 devoted wife, in one of the three charming books in 
 which she has told the deathless romance of their mar- 
 ried life on the frontier, relates how, on one occasion, 
 riding by her side, with his left arm he lifted her out of 
 the saddle high in the air, held her there for a moment or 
 two, then gently replaced her on her horse. No fatigue 
 was too great for him to surmount, no duty, however 
 arduous, ever caused him to give back.* 
 
 Reams have been written about Kis unfortunate cam- 
 paign upon the Little Big Horn, in which he went down 
 to such awful destruction, but little is known of some of 
 the exploits of his early career on the plains. After the 
 war, more fortunate than most of the younger general 
 officers who were forced to content themselves with cap- 
 taincies or less, General Custer was appointed Lieuten- 
 ant-Colonel of the new Seventh Regular Cavalry, a 
 regiment which was born with him, lived with him, and 
 a large part of which died with him. 
 
 The officers of the regiment were a set of unusual 
 men. Custer himself was allowed considerable voice 
 in the selection of them, and such a body of officers had 
 been rarely assembled in one command. Most of the 
 troopers were not at first of the high grade to which they 
 afterward attained. The best men, in the ranks at 
 least, at the close of the Civil War, had had enough of 
 
 * It is interesting, in view of his great services to his country, to learn that the first 
 American ancestor of the Custer family was a Hessian officer who was captured at Sara- 
 toga in 1777.
 
 148 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 fighting. They wanted to get back to civil life once 
 more. Not frequently it was only the inferior soldiers 
 who could be induced to re-enlist from the volunteer 
 into the regular regiments which were being organized 
 or reorganized. 
 
 There were in the ranks, however, a leaven of vet- 
 erans who were soldiers from love as well as from habit. 
 With these as a nucleus, Custer and his officers, by a 
 judicious weeding out and a rigorous course of disci- 
 pline, soon gathered a body of troopers than which there 
 were none finer in the service of the United States, nor, 
 in fact, in any other service. Owing to the fact that the 
 colonel, a distinguished general officer in the war, was 
 on detached service commanding a department, the 
 regiment was practically continuously under the com- 
 mand of Custer until his death in 1876. 
 
 The duty that devolved upon it was the protection of 
 the settlers in Kansas. The job was no sinecure. In 
 the last half of the year 1868 statistics, which do not 
 pretend to be comprehensive, for they are only facts re- 
 ported officially to the headquarters of the Department of 
 the Missouri, show one hundred and fifty-seven people 
 killed, fifty-seven wounded, including forty-one scalped, 
 fourteen women outraged and murdered, one man, four 
 women and twenty-four children taken into captivity, 
 one thousand six hundred and twenty-seven horses, 
 mules and cattle stolen, twenty-four ranches or settle- 
 ments destroyed, eleven stage coaches attacked, and 
 four wagon trains annihilated. This with a total loss to 
 the Indians of eleven killed and one wounded. Truly 
 there was a reign of blood upon that frontier. Every 
 man murdered was also frightfully and disgustingly 
 mutilated. This record takes no account of soldiers 
 who were killed.
 
 The Battle of the Washita 149 
 
 In one instance ten troopers under Lieutenant Kid- 
 der, of the Second Cavalry, with a message for Custer's 
 command, then in the field, were overtaken and slaugh- 
 tered to a man after a desperate defense. When Cus- 
 ter came upon the scene of battle the bodies were so 
 mutilated that it was impossible to tell one from the 
 other. The only distinguishing mark upon any one of 
 them was a shirt neckband made of a material of a 
 peculiar marking, which was yet a common article of 
 wearing apparel at that time. It was by this shirt collar 
 that the body of Lieutenant Kidder was subsequently 
 identified by his mother and taken East for burial. 
 
 As usual, there was strife between the Indian agents 
 and the army. There always has been, there always 
 will be. The agents invariably declared that there was 
 peace in the land and sought to embarrass the army in 
 its efforts to protect the frontier. Popular indignation, 
 however, at last forced the government to act, and the 
 campaign was long and arduous during the latter part 
 of the summer of 1868. 
 
 The success of the soldiers was not pronounced at 
 first. The extent of territory was great, the force avail- 
 able small, the Indians exceedingly mobile, and the 
 troopers had as yet scarcely learned the rules of the 
 game, so that it was a matter of extreme difficulty to 
 get at any considerable body of Indians and inflict a 
 crushing blow. As we have seen, General Forsyth's com- 
 mand barely escaped annihilation in the great battle 
 of the Arickaree. Matters dragged on, however, with 
 nothing decisive happening until the summer and fall 
 had slipped away and winter was at hand. The Indians v 
 rarely did any fighting in the winter. It was difficult /\ 
 and dangerous for horsemen to move on the exposed 
 prairies in the winter season, and hitherto fighting had
 
 150 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 been abandoned with the advent of the cold. The In- 
 dians, during the winter, naturally tended southward, 
 seeking a less severe climate if it might be had, and from 
 November to April had been considered a closed season. 
 
 II. The March in the Blizzard 
 
 General Sheridan, however, who had command of the 
 department, determined to inaugurate a winter cam- 
 paign in the hope that the Indians, who would naturally 
 congregate in large villages in secluded spots sheltered 
 by trees along the river banks, might be rounded up and 
 defeated decisively. The force at his disposal for these 
 projected operations consisted of eleven troops of the 
 Seventh Cavalry, four companies of infantry, and the 
 Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, a regiment of 
 settlers and old soldiers which had been organized for 
 the campaign. 
 
 The expedition was under command of Sheridan him- 
 self. The rendezvous was at Camp Supply, in the In- 
 dian Territory, about one hundred miles south of Fort 
 Dodge, Kansas. No Indians in any considerable body, 
 that is had been seen by any of the scouts sent out, 
 and no outrages were reported. It was evident that the 
 hostiles were lying snugly concealed somewhere for the 
 winter season. Sheridan determined to detach Custer 
 and his regiment from the command and send them 
 scouting farther southward, while with the rest of the 
 force, so soon as it should be in condition to march, he 
 himself would explore the country in other directions. 
 
 Custer received his orders on the 22d of November, 
 late at night. Reveille was sounded at four o'clock on 
 the twenty-third. The thermometer was below zero. 
 There was a foot of snow upon the ground, and it was
 
 The Battle of the Washita 151 
 
 still coming down furiously when Custer reported to 
 Sheridan that he was ready to move. 
 
 "What do you think of this?" asked Sheridan, 
 alluding to the weather. 
 
 "It's all right," answered Custer, cheerfully; "we 
 can move. The Indians can't." 
 
 There was a hasty breakfast, coffee and hardtack, 
 each trooper standing by the head of his horse, and the 
 column moved off. The undaunted band of the regi- 
 ment, surely made up of the most heroic and hardy musi- 
 cians that ever tooted horn or thumped sheepskin, in 
 gallant style played them out and into the terrible bliz- 
 zard then raging, with the old marching tune "The 
 Girl I left Behind Me," which was more fancy than 
 truth, for there were no "girls" with that expedition, 
 save one hard-featured old campaigner, red-headed at 
 that, who went along as the commanding officer's cook 
 at her own earnest request. 
 
 No one can realize the force of a blizzard on the plains 
 who has not, as I have, experienced it. The guides al- 
 most immediately declared themselves unable to lead 
 the regiment. Every cavalry officer in the field carries {X 
 a pocket compass. Custer knew where he wanted to 
 go. With his own compass to show the way he led the 
 regiment forward. The men stumbled on through the 
 awful snow and hurricane until two o'clock, when they 
 were stopped on the bank of Wolf Creek, fifteen miles 
 from the starting point. First caring for the exhausted 
 horses, they made camp, and as the wagons came up 
 fires were soon burning, meals were prepared, and some 
 of the effects of the deadly cold were dissipated. 
 
 The next morning, November 24th, they marched 
 down Wolf Creek. The snow had stopped falling, but 
 the temperature stood at seven degrees below zero. The
 
 152 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 25th they continued the march. Many another com- 
 mander would have been stopped by the fearful weather; 
 but Custer was known as a man who would press on 
 as long as the mules could draw the wagons, and when 
 they could not he would abandon the wagons and 
 live off the mules. He kept on. On the twenty-sixth, 
 Thanksgiving Day, arriving at the north bank of the 
 Canadian River, he despatched Major Elliott, the sec- 
 ond in command of the regiment, with three troops on 
 a scouting expedition up the river, which he proposed 
 to cross with the balance of his men. There was no 
 Thanksgiving dinner awaiting them, and the remem- 
 brance of the holiday spent under happier circumstances 
 but aggravated their present condition. 
 
 The river was frozen, but not sufficiently so to bear 
 the regiment. They had to break through the ice and 
 find a ford in the icy water, and it was after eleven 
 o'clock in the morning before the whole command suc- 
 ceeded in passing to the south side. Scarcely had they 
 done so when they noticed a horseman galloping at full 
 speed toward them on the other side. As soon as he 
 came near they recognized him as Scout Corbin, one of 
 Elliott's guides. He brought the startling news that 
 Elliott had come upon the trail of an Indian war party, 
 at least one hundred and fifty strong, and not twenty- 
 four hours old, which led to the south side of the river. 
 The scout was given a fresh horse and ordered to return 
 to Elliott, who was directed to follow the trail cautiously 
 until eight o'clock at night, at which time he was to halt 
 and wait for Custer, who would leave the wagon train 
 and follow him immediately. 
 
 Calling the officers to him, Custer briefly gave his 
 orders for the advance. The wagon train was to be 
 left under the care of an officer and eighty men. Each
 
 The Battle of the Washita 153 
 
 trooper was to take one day's rations of coffee and hard- 
 tack and one hundred rounds of ammunition upon his 
 person, together with a little forage for his horse, and 
 the regiment was to push on at the highest possible 
 speed to join Elliott. 
 
 When it came to designate an officer to remain with 
 the train, the detail fell upon Captain Louis McLane 
 Hamilton, whose turn it was to act as officer of the day 
 in camp. This young man bore two historic names. 
 McLane was the second in command of Light Horse 
 Harry Lee's famous cavalry in the Revolution, and he 
 was the grandson of the great Alexander Hamilton. 
 He demurred bitterly to being left in the rear in com- 
 mand of the train under such circumstances. There 
 was no help for it, however, until Custer finally in- 
 formed him that if he could get any one to take his 
 detail he could go. 
 
 It was discovered upon inquiry that one of the officers 
 of the regiment had become almost helpless from snow 
 blindness, the glare of the ice and snow being some- 
 thing terrible, especially upon an open prairie such as 
 they were then traversing. This officer was entirely 
 unfit for active campaigning, but such was his zeal to go 
 forward that he concealed his ailment until Hamilton's 
 scrutiny brought it forth. To him, therefore, was com- 
 mitted the charge of the wagon train, much against his 
 wish, and Hamilton was allowed to go at the head of his 
 troop. 
 
 III. The Trail in the Snow 
 
 It had grown somewhat warmer during the day. 
 The top crust of the snow became soft, and the horses 
 sank through it to their knees. There was no road or
 
 154 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 trail, of course, but the command advanced straight 
 across the open prairie toward the point where Corbin 
 had indicated that Elliott had picked up the trail. The 
 several troops were successively placed in the advance 
 for the fatiguing and arduous labor of breaking up the 
 road. There was every desire to spare the horses, but 
 they were nevertheless urged to the last limit to overtake 
 Elliott. Under such circumstances it was problemati- 
 cal whether they would find him alive; for the Indians, 
 who were believed to be in great force, might discover 
 him, ambush him, attack him, and wipe him out as Fet- 
 terman had been annihilated, or as Forsyth had been 
 overwhelmed. 
 
 During the afternoon Custer and his command struck 
 Elliott's trail, but it was not until nine o'clock at night 
 that they overtook him. They found him encamped on 
 the banks of a litttle stream and thoroughly concealed 
 in the timber. With relief the regiment halted, and 
 taking advantage of the deep ravine through which the 
 creek ran, they managed to build a few fires, which, be- 
 ing well screened, were invisible a short distance away. 
 Over the fires the men made coffee, which, with the 
 hardtack, constituted their only meal since morning 
 a Thanksgiving dinner indeed. 
 
 Elliott had followed the trail, which was still well de- 
 fined, until eight o'clock, and then had halted in accord- 
 ance with the orders of Custer, and had waited for his 
 commander. A hasty council was held and some were 
 for taking up the advance at once. But it was pointed 
 out that the moon would rise in one hour and by waiting 
 they would have the benefit of the moonlight in following 
 the Indian trail. Besides, the short rest would do the 
 command good. Saddles were taken off, the horses 
 rubbed down and sparingly fed from the scanty supply
 
 The Battle of the Washita 155 
 
 of forage. At ten the march was once more resumed 
 in this order: 
 
 First of all, riding some distance ahead of the main 
 body, were two Osage Indian scouts. One of these was 
 Little Beaver, who was chief of a small band of Indian 
 auxiliaries which had volunteered for the campaign. 
 Next to them came other Indians, several famous fron- 
 tiersmen, California Joe and Scout Corbin, and a hideous 
 half Negro, half Indian interpreter whose name was Ro- 
 mero, but whom the soldiers facetiously dubbed Romeo, 
 because he was so ugly; then General Custer and his 
 staff, and then, some distance in rear, the successive 
 troops of the regiment in a column of fours. About 
 three miles from their camping place Little Beaver 
 came back to Custer in considerable agitation and de- 
 clared that he smelled fire. Nobody else smelled any- 
 thing, but at his insistence the command was halted, and 
 he and one of his men went forward with Custer and one 
 or two of the scouts until they had gone a mile from the 
 halting place. 
 
 Sure enough, after surmounting a little hill, they saw 
 ahead of them and some distance away the embers of a 
 fire. The advance party halted. Little Beaver and 
 the other Indians snaked their course over the ground, 
 taking advantage of every cover to learn what they could. 
 With beating hearts the general and the others watched 
 them. Would they stumble upon the foemen then and 
 there ? They waited, concealed beneath the hillock, un- 
 til Little Beaver returned to tell them that the fire had 
 evidently been kindled by the boys guarding the herds 
 of ponies during the day. At any rate it had almost 
 gone out, no one was there, and the way was safe for 
 the present, although the main camp was probably not 
 far distant.
 
 156 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Orders were sent back to the regiment to advance but 
 to keep its present distance behind Custer and the 
 scouts. The command proceeded with the utmost 
 caution, with an excitement in their veins at the stealthy 
 approach with its possible consequences which made 
 them almost insensible to the frightful cold. About 
 half after twelve o'clock on the morning of the twenty- 
 seventh, Custer saw the leading Indian suddenly sink 
 down behind a hill and wave his hand quickly back- 
 ward. The whole party dismounted, and the com- 
 manding officer with one of his scouts crawled to the 
 hill where the Indian lay. Whispering a word or two, 
 Little Beaver pointed straight in jfront of him. 
 
 Half a mile away a huge black blotch was tremu- 
 lously moving on the snow in the moonlight. Expe- 
 rienced eyes recognized a herd of ponies. Where the 
 ponies were there were the Indians also. Custer 
 watched the scene for a moment, and upon the still air 
 the wind had died and the night though bitter cold was 
 intensely quiet he heard the sound of a bell, evidently 
 tied to the neck of the leader of the herd. Dogs barked, 
 and as they waited they marked the thin, shrill cry of a 
 little child. It was an Indian camp beyond perad- 
 venture. Beyond it, among the bare and leafless trees, 
 gleamed in the moonlight the ice-bound shores of a half- 
 frozen river the Washita. 
 
 The general, as tender-hearted a man as ever lived, 
 and as kindly for all his fights, tells us how strangely 
 that infant's cry heard on that bitter winter night 
 moved him, appealed to him. It filled his mind with 
 natural regret that war had to be waged and an attack 
 delivered upon a camp in which there were women and 
 children; but the stern necessities of the case permitted 
 no other course.
 
 MAJ. JOEL H. ELLIOTT * CAPT. LOUIS McL. HAMILTON ' 
 
 CAPT. JAMES M. BELL CAPT. J. W. BENTEEN 
 
 SOME OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY 
 IN THE WASHITA EXPEDITION 
 
 * Killed in the Battle
 
 The Battle of the Washita 157 
 
 The band of Indians under his gaze was that of Black 
 Kettle,* Head Chief of the Cheyennes since the death 
 of Roman Nose, one of the most ferocious and brutal 
 of the Plains Indians. The blood of scores was upon 
 his hands and upon the hands of his followers as well. 
 Torture, infamy, treachery, shame beyond estimation, 
 had stained that band. Even then in the camp there 
 were helpless captives, poor women whose fate cannot 
 be described or dwelt upon. 
 
 When Custer had satisfied himself at last that he had 
 found the camp for which he had been searching 
 which appeared to be a very large one from the number 
 of lodges which they thought they could make out in the 
 distance leaving the scouts to observe the Indians, 
 he tramped back through the snow to the command, 
 and by messengers summoned the officers about him. 
 Taking off their sabers for the moment, so that their 
 clanking would not betray them, the officers crept to the 
 crest of the hill and made themselves as familiar with 
 the situation as they could by such inspection. 
 
 There Custer gave them their final orders. The 
 regiment was divided into four squadrons; Major El- 
 liott, with three troops, G, H, and M, was ordered to cir- 
 cle cautiously to the left and get in the rear of the Indian 
 camp. Captain Thompson, with troops B and F, was 
 directed to make a long detour to the right and join 
 Elliott. Captain Myers, with troops E and I, was com- 
 manded to move a shorter distance to the right and take 
 position on the left of Thompson, while Custer himself, 
 with the four remaining troops Captain Hamilton 
 commanding one squadron, comprising troops A and C, 
 Captain West, another, of troops D and K, with the 
 
 * Mo-ke-ta-va-ta. Letter from Mr. W. H. Holmes, Chief of the Bureau of 
 American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution.
 
 158 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Osages and scouts and forty sharp-shooters under Ad- 
 jutant Cook was to approach the village from the 
 point where they then stood. 
 
 Not a sound was to be made, not a shot fired, not a 
 signal given. The attack would be delivered at dawn. 
 When they heard the bugler sounding the charge in the 
 still air of the morning they were to rush in immedi- 
 ately. In order not to impede their movements the men 
 were directed to remove their overcoats and leave them 
 in care of the guard in the rear before the attack was 
 delivered. Then, after hearty handshakes and whis- 
 pered salutations, the officers assembled their several 
 squadrons and silently started out upon the long de- 
 tours necessary to enable them to reach their designated 
 positions. 
 
 The Indian village was located in the valley of a small 
 river in the Indian Territory, an affluent of the Canadian 
 called the Washita. It was in a deep depression, below 
 the surrounding country, and was well sheltered by trees 
 on the banks of the stream, here easily fordable. By the 
 time all preparations had been made in Custer's own 
 detachment it still wanted some four hours to dawn. 
 The troops with Custer had nothing to do but wait where 
 they were, and a weary, freezing wait it was. So in- 
 sistent was the general that there should be no noise 
 that he refused to allow the men even to beat their 
 breasts to keep up circulation, or to stamp their feet to 
 ward off the numbing cold. Conversation was for- 
 bidden. They were dealing with a warrior who was the 
 most watchful of foemen, with men who could detect an 
 enemy, as the Osage had the fire a mile away, seemingly 
 by instinct. They must take every precaution. The 
 men dismounted and stood uncomplainingly by the side 
 of their horses. Some of them wrapped themselves in
 
 The Battle of the Washita 159 
 
 their overcoats, and attaching their bridle reins to their 
 wrists, lay down on the ground and actually went to 
 sleep. 
 
 About an hour before dawn Custer despatched the 
 last squadron under Captain Myers, who had but a short 
 distance to go, and then, as the first pale grayness of the 
 morning began to steal over the eastern hills and mingle 
 with the moonlight, he gave orders to call the troops to 
 attention. The first sergeants went through the ranks 
 and by a touch of the hand woke the sleeping men. 
 Stiff and numb with the cold, they staggered to their feet, 
 took off their overcoats, left them under the care of a 
 small guard, and mounted their horses. Their sabers 
 had been left behind and they were armed with revol- 
 vers and Spencer carbines. The officers quickly formed 
 up their troops and with whispered words placed them- 
 selves at the head. 
 
 The troops were deployed in line, Hamilton's squad- 
 ron to the right, West's to the left. Cook's sharp- 
 shooters were about forty yards in advance of the left, 
 dismounted, their horses being left with the guard. 
 Some distance in front of all the rest rode Custer. Fol- 
 lowing him was his bugler. Next to the bugler was the 
 indomitable regimental band. The orders were, in 
 Hamilton's last words, "Now men, keep cool; fire low, 
 and not too rapidly." 
 
 The Osages had been somewhat doubtful as to the 
 issue of the attack. They had made medicine, war- 
 painted themselves and arrayed themselves for battle, 
 but with a great deal of trepidation. They expected 
 the white soldiers would be beaten, and they reasoned 
 that in that case their allies would endeavor to purchase 
 their own salvation by surrendering the Osages to the 
 vengeance of their enemies. They determined to take
 
 160 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 such a position as would enable them to be governed by 
 circumstances in their movements so they could either 
 fight or fly. They knew the reverence with which the 
 soldiers regarded their flag. Never having been in 
 action with the white man, they concluded that the flag 
 would be kept in a place of safety and if they stood 
 religiously close to the banner they would be in a good 
 position to attack or retreat as circumstances required. 
 Consequently, they rallied on the flag. For once the red 
 man's reasoning led him into trouble, for, as it happened, 
 and as it was to be expected, the flag was in the thick of 
 the fight, and, to give them credit, after they saw their 
 mistake and saw no means of rectifying it, the Osages 
 fought as bravely and as efficiently as the rest. 
 
 The command went silently down the hill, making for 
 the center of the valley and the trees where lay the In- 
 dian camp. The excitement of the situation was in- 
 tense. Nobody knew just what he was about to en- 
 counter. No one could tell whether the other troops 
 had succeeded in getting within supporting distance or 
 not. But Custer knew his officers, and he, rightly in 
 this instance alas, that it might not have been so in 
 other cases ! depended upon them. Nearer and nearer 
 the line approached the village. Clearer and clearer 
 came the light from the pale sky. Little, hazy clouds of 
 smoke floated above the tepees under the trees, but aside 
 from that there was yet no evidence of life among them. 
 
 However cautiously it was conducted the advance 
 of such a body of men over the snow made a great deal 
 of noise. They had come so near the camp that they 
 could not hope to remain undiscovered another moment. 
 At the instant Custer was about to give the signal a rifle 
 shot was heard on the other side of the camp. At first it 
 was thought to be an accidental discharge from one of
 
 The Battle of the Washita 161 
 
 the other attacking parties. It was afterward learned 
 that shot was fired by Black Kettle himself, who had 
 heard the noise of the advancing troops, for every 
 squadron had reached its appointed place, and prac- 
 tically at the same time they commenced their advance 
 upon the devoted town. So soon as the crack of the 
 rifle broke upon the still air the bugle sounded the 
 charge. 
 
 With the first notes Custer turned to the band. Each 
 trumpeter had his trumpet to his lips, each drummer his 
 drum-sticks in the air. 
 
 "Play!" he shouted, and for the first time in action 
 the stirring notes of the tune now peculiar to the 
 Seventh Cavalry as its battle music- "Garry Owen" 
 - broke on the air. Three answering bugle calls rang 
 out from the different squadrons on all sides of the 
 village. The cavalry charged, the dismounted soldiers 
 advanced on the run. They all cheered. 
 
 IV. The Attack in the Morning 
 
 The village was strung along the banks of the creek 
 and the troopers fell upon it like a storm. The Indians, 
 completely surprised, nevertheless did not lose a mo- 
 ment. They poured out of the lodges, and seeking the 
 shelter of the trees or standing knee-deep in the icy 
 water of the river, with the banks acting as rifle-pits, re- 
 turned the fire of the white men. A few of them suc- 
 ceeded in breaking away, but most of them had to fight 
 where they were, and right well they fought. 
 
 Brave Captain Hamilton, who had sought the detail 
 with such zeal, was shot from his horse and instantly 
 killed. Captain Barnitz received a wound through the 
 breast under his heart. Here and there others fell.
 
 162 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Strict orders had been given to spare the women and 
 children. Most of the squaws and children remained 
 hidden in the tepees. Others took part in the defense. 
 The various troops scattered throughout the village and 
 the fighting was hand-to-hand of a most vigorous char- 
 acter. Captain Benteen, galloping forward, was ap- 
 proached by an Indian boy about fourteen years of age 
 on horseback. The boy was armed with a revolver. 
 As the captain drew near he called out to the lad that 
 his life would be safe if he would throw away his weapon. 
 Fearing he could not understand him he made peace 
 signs to him. For reply the boy leveled his weapon and 
 shot at the captain. The bullet missed him. The 
 Indian fired a second time and the bullet cut through 
 the sleeve of Benteen's coat. The captain was still mak- 
 ing signs of amity and friendship when the boy fired a 
 third time and hit his horse. As he raised the pistol to 
 fire a fourth time the officer was forced to shoot him 
 dead. 
 
 One squaw seized a little white boy, a captive, and 
 broke for the river. She got into hiding in some under- 
 brush where she might have remained unmolested, but 
 such was her malignity that she busied herself by taking 
 pot-shots at the galloping troops with her revolver. 
 They captured her when her revolver was empty and 
 then discovered that she had been fighting them in spite 
 of a broken leg. 
 
 The Indians rallied in certain places favorable for 
 defense. In their desperation seventeen braves threw 
 themselves into a little depression in the ground and re- 
 fused to surrender, fighting until all were killed. In a 
 ravine running from the river thirty-eight made a heroic 
 defense until they were all shot. In all, one hundred 
 and three were killed, including Black Kettle, the chief.
 
 The Battle of the Washita 163 
 
 The furious fighting had lasted one hour. The 
 village was now in possession of the troops. A number 
 of officers and men had been wounded and a temporary 
 hospital was established in the middle of the village. 
 Details were sent through the lodges to rout out the 
 squaws and children, and a roll-call was ordered. 
 
 Custer was dismayed to find that Major Elliott and 
 fourteen men, including Sergeant-Major Kennedy and 
 three corporals, were missing. Where they had gone to 
 no one at first could imagine. Finally a trooper stated 
 that a number of Indians had escaped in the gap bet- 
 tween Elliott and Thompson, and that he had seen 
 Elliott with a few troopers break away in pursuit of 
 them. An order was given for a troop to search for 
 them, but before it could get away Indians were per- 
 ceived in a heavy force on the bluffs directly in front of 
 the command. Custer had succeeded in killing prac- 
 tically the whole of Black Kettle's band, and as the In- 
 dians who had escaped had been forced to run for their 
 lives, naked as they came from the lodges, he could not 
 understand the appearance, just out of range of his men, 
 of this portentous and constantly increasing force ar- 
 rayed in full war panoply. 
 
 Inquiry among the captives disclosed the fact that the 
 valley had been chosen as the winter headquarters for 
 the principal bands of the Kiowas, Arapahoes, Chey- 
 ennes, "Dog Soldiers,"* Comanches, and even a wan- 
 dering band of Apaches. There were at least two 
 thousand warriors in this assemblage. At that moment 
 
 * Dog Soldiers were bands of especially ruthless Indians who could not brook even 
 tribal restraint. They included members of different tribes and were unusually formi- 
 dable. Possibly they got their name from a perversion of Cheyennes, i.e., Chiens-dogs. 
 Another account describes them as a sort of mercenary police at the service of a chief of a 
 tribe, with which he enforced his commands upon the recalcitrant and generally kept 
 order. In any case they were men of exceptional courage and bravery.
 
 164 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the men who had been guarding the overcoats and the 
 lead horses came running in saying that they had been 
 driven off by a heavy force of Indians. The situation 
 was indeed critical. 
 
 Something had to be done at once. Custer dis- 
 mounted his men, threw them out in a half circle about 
 the camp, and prepared for battle. The Indians did not 
 delay in delivering it. Led by Little Raven, an Arap- 
 ahoe, and Satanta,* a famous Kiowa, and Black Kettle's 
 successor, Little Rock, they at once attacked. A fierce 
 battle was on and Custer's ammunition was running low. 
 The troops were now fighting for their lives. They had 
 not expected anything of this kind. Fortunately, at this 
 critical juncture a four-mule wagon came dashing 
 through the Indian line. The Indians, being occupied 
 in fighting, did not observe it until it was right upon 
 them. Driving the wagon was Major Bell, the quar- 
 termaster, from the train. With him was a small es- 
 cort. He had loaded the wagon with ammunition and 
 galloped toward the sound of the fighting. With the 
 fresh supplies, therefore, the troops at last made a bold 
 charge which drove the Indians headlong down the 
 valley, during which Little Rock, striving to rally his 
 braves, was killed. 
 
 Custer now set fire to the lodges, totally destroying 
 them and their contents. What to do with the ponies of 
 the herd which had been captured in spite of the efforts 
 of the squaws to run ofF with them, was a problem. It 
 was impossible, under the circumstances, to drive them 
 back to the camp. To turn them loose would have 
 allowed them to fall into the hands of other Indians 
 for use in future warfare. They had to be shot. It 
 
 *A corruption of Set-t'a-int-e, " White Bear." Letter from Mr. W. H. Holmes, 
 Chief of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution.
 
 The Battle of the Washita 165 
 
 was a most unpleasant and repulsive duty for the 
 soldiers, but there was no alternative. The whole herd 
 was slaughtered. It took an hour and a half to kill 
 them, and those engaged in the work said they had never 
 done anything so harrowing and distressing. 
 
 By this time it was late in the afternoon. The In- 
 dians from the other villages, rinding they were pursued 
 but a short distance, had reassembled and once more 
 prepared for attack. It was necessary for Custer to 
 retreat at once. He put every available man on horse- 
 back, threw out skirmishing parties, the colors were 
 brought up, the indefatigable band started playing, and 
 the party advanced gaily up the valley toward the In- 
 dians. As he hoped and planned, they immediately 
 reasoned that he would not advance with such confi- 
 dence against such an overwhelming force, unless he 
 was supported by heavy reinforcements to his com- 
 mand. After a short resistance they broke and fled. 
 
 It was night by this time, and Custer lost no time in 
 getting out of the valley. The weather was still fright- 
 fully cold, and his men were without their overcoats, for 
 they had, of course, not recovered them, and were almost 
 perishing. They got back in safety, however, to Camp 
 Supply, having accomplished the object of their ex- 
 pedition in dealing a decisive blow to the Indians. 
 More than that, they had shown the Indians, who trusted 
 for immunity to the season, that winter and summer 
 were alike to the American soldier. 
 
 The Indian loss was one hundred and three killed in 
 the village, including Black Kettle; an unknown num- 
 ber, believed to be large, killed and wounded during the 
 all-day fighting, including Little Rock; the capture of 
 fifty-three squaws and children; eight hundred and 
 seventy-five ponies, eleven hundred and twenty-three
 
 166 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 buffalo robes and skins; the destruction of over five 
 hundred pounds of powder and one thousand pounds 
 of lead; four thousand arrows, seven hundred pounds 
 of tobacco, besides rifles, pistols, saddle-bows, lariats, 
 immense quantities of dried beef, and other winter 
 provisions; in short, the complete destruction of the 
 village and the annihilation of the band. 
 
 The losses of the regiment in the engagements were 
 one officer and fourteen men missing (Elliott and his 
 party), one officer and five men killed, three officers and 
 eleven men wounded. General Sheridan called the 
 affair the most complete and satisfactory battle ever 
 waged against the Indians to that time. 
 
 Custer had marched through that blizzard and over 
 the snow-clad plains to victory. His stealthy approach, 
 the skill with which he had surrounded the village, the 
 strength with which the attack had been delivered, and 
 the battle which he had fought with the unexpected 
 Indian force, the ruse by which he had extricated him- 
 self, and, last but not least, Bell's gallant dash with the 
 ammunition wagon, were all given the highest praise. 
 And well they merited it. 
 
 One or two incidents of the battle are worthy of espe- 
 cial mention. When the troops obtained possession of 
 the village, they found the dead body of a white woman. 
 The fact that she still had some vestige of civilized 
 clothing upon her, quite new, proved that she had been 
 but recently captured. She had been shot dead by the 
 Indians at the moment of attack to prevent her rescue; 
 and there was also the body of a little white child, who 
 had been killed by those who had him in charge, lest he 
 should be returned to his family again. 
 
 The squaws, of course, were in great terror. They 
 thought they would be instantly put to death when
 
 The Battle of the Washita 167 
 
 they were routed from their tepees. Black Kettle's sis- 
 ter, Mah-wis-sa, who seemed to be the leading woman 
 of the village, made a long oration to Custer. telling him 
 that she was a good Indian, and that she had tried to 
 restrain Black Kettle in his nefarious career which was 
 all a lie, of course. She wound up by bringing the come- 
 liest of the young Indian maidens to Custer, and, after 
 solemnly placing the hand of the girl in that of the Gen- 
 eral, mumbled some kind of a gibberish over the two. 
 The General observed Romeo standing near with a 
 broad grin upon his face, and asked him what Mah- 
 wis-sa was doing. He was told that she was marrying 
 him to the beauty of the tribe to propitiate him. That 
 marriage did not stand. 
 
 V. The Fate of Elliott and his Men 
 
 The fate of Elliott's detachment remained a mystery. 
 His comrades hoped that he had escaped, but as the 
 days passed and he did not return to the regiment, and 
 as nothing was heard from him, they abandoned hope 
 in despair. This was not, by any means, the end of the 
 winter campaigning; and some time after, Custer and 
 his men, this time heavily reinforced, again marched 
 up the valley of the Washita. A short distance from 
 the place where Black Kettle's band had been annihi- 
 lated they found the remains of Elliott and his men. 
 The evidence of the field and what was afterward 
 learned from Indian captives told the sad story. 
 
 Pursuing the fleeing Indians, Elliott and his party 
 suddenly ran into the midst of a horde of braves coming 
 down the valley to help Black Kettle and the men who 
 had been engaged with Custer. To fly was impossible. 
 They dismounted from their horses, formed themselves
 
 i68 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 in a semicircle a few feet in diameter, stood back to 
 back, as it were, and fought until they died. There were 
 evidences of a terrible conflict all around them. Right 
 dearly had they sold their lives. 
 
 The last survivor of that gallant little band had been 
 Sergeant-Major Kennedy, the finest soldier in the regi- 
 ment. He was not wounded, it appeared, but had ex- 
 pended all his ammunition for both rifle and revolver. 
 Being an officer, he wore a sword. Seeing him, as they 
 supposed, helpless, the Indians resolved to take him 
 alive for the purpose of torturing him. There was 
 not a soldier who knew of the habits of the Indians who 
 would not chose death to captivity any time. The 
 brave Kennedy stood alone in the midst of the bodies 
 of his comrades, fronting death, sword in hand. I like 
 to think of the courage of that heroic man in the midst 
 of that savage, ravening assemblage. 
 
 With wily treachery the Indians made peace signs, 
 and walked toward him with hands outstretched, 
 saying: "How, How!" Kennedy, who knew the true 
 value of such proceedings, waited until the chief of the 
 band approached him nearly, then thrust his sword up 
 to the hilt into the Indian's breast. When they found 
 Kennedy's body he had been pierced by no less than 
 twenty bullets. The other troopers had received one 
 or two bullet wounds each. They were all stripped, 
 scalped, and mutilated.* 
 
 There was a great outcry when this battle became 
 known, and Custer was accused of slaughtering helpless, 
 inoffensive, gentle Indians! Unmerited obloquy was 
 heaped upon him, but those who lived near enough to 
 feel the effects of the Red Scourge realized that he had 
 done for the settlers the best thing that could be done. 
 
 * " Our Wild Indians," Colonel Richard I. Dodge, U. S. A.
 
 The Battle of the Washita 169 
 
 People who knew, and his superior officers, not only 
 sustained but commended him. 
 
 Custer again, in command of a much larger force, 
 surprised a more populous village later in this same win- 
 ter. It was completely in his power. He could have 
 wiped it from the face of the earth, although it contained 
 a force of Indians nearly equal to his own; but he stayed 
 his hand, and said he would spare the savages if they 
 would deliver to him two wretched women, one a young 
 bride, the other a young girl, whom they held in cap- 
 tivity and for whose deliverance the campaign had been 
 undertaken. By masterly skill Custer captured Satanta 
 the Infamous, and held him until the captives were given 
 up. With the expedition was the brother of one of the 
 captives. Custer tells, in his simple, terse manner, with 
 what feelings that whole army watched the poor women 
 brought into camp, and how the boy, the last of his 
 family, stood trembling by the general's side until he 
 recognized, in one of the wrecks of humanity which the 
 Indians handed over, the sister whom he was seeking.* 
 The red-headed cook, referred to above, was with the 
 army again, and proved herself, in her rude way, an 
 angel of mercy and tenderness to these, her wretched 
 sisters. 
 
 "... and at the last the brief reference to that episode when he (Custer) 
 let glory of battle go, to save two white women! 
 
 " Has any one told you that the long line of soldiers and officers drawn up to 
 witness the return of the two captives wept like women, and were not ashamed 
 when the poor creatures came into the lines ? Will you not write that story up some 
 day, Dr. Brady ? 1 will give you some addresses of officers who were eye-witnesses. 
 They cannot seem to put such a picture before the public, but they do talk well." > 
 Private letter to me from the wife of an officer present on the occasion noted. 

 
 CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
 Carr and Tall Bull at Summit Springs 
 
 I. A Brilliant Little Fight 
 
 GENERAL Eugene A. Carr, in command of 
 the Fifth Cavalry, did some brilliant skirmish- 
 ing and fighting in 1868-9 m western Kansas 
 and Colorado. His most notable exploit was 
 the surprise of Tall Bull's camp. Next to Black 
 Kettle, Tall Bull was probably the most vicious and 
 diabolical of the Indian raiders in these two states. 
 
 Carr, with five troops of the Fifth Cavalry and with 
 W. F. Cody (Buffalo Bill) as chief guide, learning where 
 Tall Bull's camp was, marched one hundred and fifty 
 miles in four days in pursuit of him. Halting when he 
 believed he had reached the vicinity of the camp, he sent 
 Buffalo Bill with some of his Pawnee Indian auxiliaries 
 to find out exactly where the Indians were located. 
 
 Cody, having discovered the location of the village, re- 
 turned to General Carr and advised him to take a wider 
 detour, keeping his forces concealed among the hills, 
 so that he could approach the Indians from the north, 
 a direction from which they would not be expecting 
 attack, and whence they might be the more easily sur- 
 prised. The advice was followed, the command made 
 its encircling march without detection, and formed up 
 
 170
 
 Carr and Tall Bull 171 
 
 in line of troops, each troop two abreast, in the ravines 
 about twelve hundred yards from the village. 
 
 They were between the Indians and the Platte River. 
 The camp was located at Summit Springs, Colorado. 
 Every preparation having been made, Carr ordered the 
 bugler to sound the charge. The man was so excited 
 that he was unable to produce a note. Twice Carr gave 
 the command. Finally, Quartermaster Hayes snatched 
 the bugle from the agitated musician and sounded the 
 charge himself, and the whole regiment rushed out into 
 the open. 
 
 The Indians made for their ponies and advanced to 
 meet the charge. The rush of the soldiers was too 
 threatening, however. After a hasty fire they broke and 
 fled on their horses, the whole party, soldiers and Indian 
 scouts, following after at full speed through the village. 
 The attack was a complete success. Fifty-two Indians 
 were killed, two hundred and seventy-four horses and 
 one hundred and forty-five mules were captured. The 
 soldiers had one man wounded, with no other casualties. 
 
 In the camp were found the bodies of two unfortunate 
 white women, who had been captured. Swift as had 
 been the dash of the soldiers, the Indians had taken time 
 to brain one of the women with a war-club, while the 
 second was shot in the breast and left for dead. She 
 was given every possible attention by the soldiers, who 
 took her back to Fort Sedgwick, and her life was even- 
 tually spared. Her sufferings and treatment had been 
 beyond description. Fifteen hundred dollars in money 
 in gold, silver, and greenbacks strange to say, had 
 been found in the camp. This sum the soldiers, by per- 
 mission of the general, donated to the poor woman, 
 as an expression of their sympathy for her. 
 
 According to some accounts, Tall Bull, who was chief
 
 172 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 of the camp, and one of the head chiefs of the Sioux, 
 was killed in this attack. Buffalo Bill tells another story.* 
 The day after the fight the various companies of the 
 Fifth Cavalry which had remained in the camp all the 
 ensuing day and night, at the insistence of the plucky 
 commander, in spite of the pleas of some of the officers, 
 who, fearing an attack in force, suggested retiring imme- 
 diately separated in order the more effectively to pur- 
 sue the flying Indians. Several days after the surprise 
 the detachment for which Cody was guide was attacked 
 by several hundred Indians. The soldiers fought 
 them off, killing a number. The chief of this party 
 was believed by Cody to be Tall Bull. 
 
 Buffalo Bill crept through a ravine for several hun- 
 dred feet, unobserved by the Indians, until he reached an 
 opening whence he had the savages in range. Watching 
 his opportunity as the Indians were careering wildly 
 over the prairie, he drew a bead on the chief and shot 
 him dead. Whether that was Tall Bull or not, one fact 
 is clear that he was killed either then or before, for he 
 was certainly dead thereafter. 
 
 When the troops were following the Indian trails on 
 the march to Summit Springs, at every place where the 
 Indians had camped they found marks of white wo- 
 men's shoes. It was this knowledge that gave additional 
 determination and fire to their magnificent attack. 
 
 General Carr deservedly gained great reputation for 
 his dash and daring. 
 
 Here I include a letter describing this battle from the 
 standpoint of a soldier, which is a most interesting con- 
 tribution to the story of the affair: 
 
 * I have written several times to General Carr, asking information as to this and 
 other points, but have not received any. C. T. B.
 
 Carr and Tall Bull 173 
 
 II. Account of the Battle of Summit Springs 
 
 Written by J. E. Welch to his comrade, Colonel Henry O. Clark, of 
 
 Vermont.* 
 
 The next spring, 1869, 1 heard that General Eugene 
 A. Carr, commanding a detachment of the Fifth U. S. 
 Cavalry, was organizing an expedition to go after a large 
 band of Indians (Sioux and Cheyennes) who had been 
 raiding and murdering through Colorado, New Mex- 
 ico, and Kansas. Some other fellows and myself went 
 to Fort McPherson and offered our services as volun- 
 teers to serve without pay. The general could not ac- 
 cept our services, but he said we could go along and act 
 with the scouts so along we went. 
 
 The expedition consisted of about four hundred cav- 
 alry, one hundred and fifty Pawnee scouts, under Colo- 
 nel Frank North, and about twenty civilians. Buffalo 
 Bill was the guide. He struck out for the Republican 
 River, and the first night after we got there the hostiles 
 tried to stampede our horses; they came near accom- 
 plishing their object, too, but they only succeeded in 
 wounding a teamster and killing a mule. Next day we 
 found the trail of their main body and followed it, but 
 soon found that we could not gain an inch on them; we 
 kept on, however, until we came to a place where the 
 trail divided. The trail to the right was very plain, 
 while the one to the left was scattered and so dim it was 
 evident to the most inexperienced man in the command 
 that the trail they intended us to follow was the one to 
 the right. So General Carr detached two troops of 
 
 * This letter, which is dated Edith, Coke County, Texas, June 16, 1891, was 
 furnished me for publication by Dr. T. E. Oertel. I am informed that the writer has 
 since died C. T. B.
 
 174 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 cavalry and some Indians, under Major Royall, caused 
 them to make as big a show as possible and take the de- 
 coy trail, while the main body was kept back in a low 
 place for a day in order that any hostile scouts who 
 might be watching us would think the whole command 
 had gone on the decoy trail. Next day we started on 
 the dim trail, and before night we became satisfied that 
 we were on the trail of the main body of the hostiles. 
 Major Royall followed the decoy trail until it scattered, 
 then turning the head of his column to the left he inter- 
 cepted and rejoined the command. We now found 
 that we were gaining on the game we were after. They 
 evidently thought they had fooled us, and were taking 
 their time. 
 
 On the tenth of July we marched sixty-five miles, 
 passing three of their camps. On the eleventh we were 
 on the march before daylight. The trail was hot, the 
 Indians making for the Platte. Every one knew that if 
 they succeeded in crossing the river the game was up. 
 By noon we had marched thirty-five miles, at which 
 time Buffalo Bill, who had been far in advance of the 
 command all day, was seen approaching as fast as his 
 tired horse could come. As soon as he reached the 
 column he called for a fresh horse, and while transfer- 
 ring his saddle told General Carr that he had en- 
 countered two bucks who were hunting and that the 
 Indian camp was about twelve miles ahead. 
 
 The general, knowing the bucks who had been run off 
 by Cody would make every effort to reach their camp 
 ahead of us in order to give the alarm, gave the com- 
 mand " Trot." Both horses and men seemed to brighten 
 up, and we put real estate behind us at a rapid rate. 
 When within a mile of the hostile camp a halt was called 
 to let the Pawnees unsaddle, as they flatly refused to go
 
 GEN. GEORGE CROOK 
 GEN. ELWELL S. OTIS 
 
 GEN. EUGENE A. CARR 
 GEN. HENRY B. CARRINGTON 
 
 GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED GENERAL OFFICERS
 
 Carr and Tall Bull 175 
 
 into action with saddles on their horses. They began 
 daubing their faces with paint and throwing off their 
 clothing. They were made to retain enough of the latter 
 to enable us to distinguish them from the hostiles. Af- 
 ter this short delay we moved forward at a sharp trot, 
 and in a few moments we were looking down at "Tall 
 Bull's" camp in a small valley below us. In a moment 
 the camp was alive with Indians running in every di- 
 rection. 
 
 General Carr, taking in the situation at a glance, 
 gave utterance to a few words of command, winding up 
 his remarks with the order, given loud and clear and 
 sharp: 
 
 "Charge!" 
 
 Every horse leaped forward at the word, and in a 
 twinkling we were among them and the fight was on. 
 It did not last long. There was rapid firing for about 
 five minutes, when all was over except an occasional 
 shot as some fellow would find an Indian who had failed 
 to secure a horse and escape. 
 
 The result of the fight was about as following: no 
 white men killed, four or five horses killed, about one 
 hundred and eighty-eight dead Indians, forty of whom 
 were squaws and children;* one hundred and five lodges 
 captured, many rifles, five tons of dried buffalo meat 
 baled for winter use, a very ample supply of ammuni- 
 tion, consisting of powder, lead, etc., and a greater num- 
 ber and variety of brass kettles than I ever saw before. 
 
 Of their live stock we captured five hundred and sixty 
 head of ponies and mules. 
 
 To pursue those who had fled was out of the question, 
 our horses being too badly done up. As we charged 
 the camp, we saw a white woman run from among the 
 
 * These figures, which are evidently from memory, are certainly in error. C.T.B.
 
 176 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Indians, one of whom fired at her as she ran. We 
 shouted to her to lie down, which she did, our horses 
 leaping over her without a hoof touching her. She 
 was wounded in her side, but not fatally. Almost at the 
 same moment we saw an Indian seize another white 
 woman by the hair and brain her with a tomahawk. 
 Some of us rode straight for that Indian, and there was 
 not a bone left in his dead carcass that was not broken 
 by a bullet. I dismounted in the midst of the hubbub 
 to see if I could help the woman, but the poor creature 
 was dead. (She had the appearance of being far gone 
 in pregnancy.) I mounted my horse again with a very 
 good stomach for a fight. 
 
 After firing a few shots, I happened to see a Red 
 mounted on a large paint pony making off by himself, 
 and driving four fine mules ahead of him. I gave chase 
 and gained on him rapidly, which he soon perceived, 
 dropping his mules and doing the best he could to get 
 away. But it was no use. " Sam," my horse, was Ken- 
 tucky bred, and walked right up on him. When I was 
 within seventy-five or one hundred yards of him he 
 wheeled his horse and fired, the bullet passing through 
 the calf of my leg and into my horse. The Indian threw 
 his gun away and rode at me like a man, discharging 
 arrows as he came. The third arrow split my left ear 
 right up to my head. It was then my turn, and I shot 
 him through the head. This Indian's name was 
 " Pretty Bear." He was chief of a band of Cheyennes. 
 The Pawnees knew him and were anxious to secure his 
 scalp, which I was glad to give them as I soon became 
 disgusted with the ghastly trophy. "Pretty Bear" had 
 on his person the badge of a Royal Arch Mason, with 
 West Springfield, 111., engraved on it. I sent the badge 
 to the postmaster at Springfield with a statement as to
 
 Carr and Tall Bull 177 
 
 how it came into my possession. "Pretty Bear" had 
 five or six scalps on the trail of his shield, one of 
 which was that of a woman. The hair was brown, 
 very long, and silken. 
 
 "Tall Bull," the Sioux chief, was killed by Lieuten- 
 ant Mason, who rode up to him and shot him through 
 the heart with a derringer. After I had taken the scalp 
 of" Pretty Bear" I found that Sam was shot through the 
 bowels. I unsaddled him and turned him loose to die, 
 but he followed me like a dog and would put his head 
 against me and push, groaning like a person. I was 
 forced to shoot him to end his misery. I had to try two 
 or three times before I could do it. At first to save 
 my life I could not do it. He kept looking at me with 
 his great brown eyes. When I did fire he never knew 
 what hurt him. He was a splendid horse, and could 
 do his mile in 1.57. 
 
 My wounds being slight, I rustled around and soon 
 managed to catch a small mule, which I mounted bare- 
 back, intending to scout around a little. I did not carry 
 out my intention, however. The brevet horse ran into 
 the middle of the Indian camp, threw me into a big 
 black mud-hole, my boot was full of blood, my ear had 
 bled all over one side of me, so that when I crawled out 
 of that mud-hole I was just too sweet for anything. By 
 this time the fight was over. A friend of mine, Bill 
 Steele, went with me to the spring that ran into the mud- 
 hole, where he washed me as well as he could, bandaged 
 my leg, sewed my ear together with an awl and some 
 linen thread. He made a good job of it, and I was all 
 right except that my leg was a little sore and stiff. 
 
 After the fight we found we had one hundred and 
 seventeen prisoners, four squaws, and fifteen children. 
 They were turned over to the Pawnees. The Pawnees
 
 178 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 did not fight well. They skulked and killed the women 
 and children. I have never seen Indians face the music 
 like white men. We camped where we were that night. 
 Men were coming into camp all night. In fact, they did 
 not reach the scene of action until about ten o'clock next 
 day. They were fellows who had been left along the 
 trail by reason of their horses giving out. 
 
 Our first duty next day was to bury the poor woman 
 they had so foully murdered the day before. Not hav- 
 ing a coffin, we wrapped her in a buffalo robe. General 
 Carr read the funeral service and the cavalry sounded 
 the funeral dirge, and as the soft, mournful notes died 
 away many a cheek was wet that had long been a stran- 
 ger to tears. The other woman was found to be all 
 right with the exception of a wound in the side. She 
 was a German, unable to speak English. Both of the 
 women had been beaten and outraged in every conceiv- 
 able manner. Their condition was pitiful beyond any 
 power of mine to portray. 
 
 The Indian camp and everything pertaining thereto 
 was destroyed, after which we took up our line of march 
 for Fort Sedgwick, where we arrived in due time without 
 any mishap. 
 
 I think it just as impossible to make a civilized man 
 of the Indian as it would be to make a shepherd dog of 
 a wolf, or a manly man of a dude. They do not in my 
 opinion possess a single trait that elevates a man above 
 a brute. They are treacherous, cowardly, and ungrate- 
 ful, Cooper to the contrary notwithstanding. I knew a 
 Greek in Arizona who came to the country with camels 
 for the government. After the camels died he married 
 an Apache squaw, learned the language, and was em- 
 ployed by the United States government as an inter- 
 preter. This man told me that in the Apache dialect
 
 Carr and Tall Bull 179 
 
 there was no word, or combination of words, whereby 
 they could convey the idea that we do by using the 
 word Gratitude. What do you think of that ? 
 
 Well, old man, I have been writing half the night, 
 and have only got as far as the nth of July '69. I am 
 discouraged, and right here I quit you like a steer in the 
 road. How long am I to wait for that picture ? I am 
 curious to see how much of a change old dad Time has 
 wrought in you. He has played h 1 with me. 
 
 As ever, 
 
 J. E. WELCH. 
 
 P. S. The photo has come. I could have known you 
 anywhere. You have changed a little for the better, 
 I think. J. E. W.
 
 PART II 
 
 The War With the Sioux
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
 With Crook's Advance 
 
 I. The Cause of the Fighting 
 
 LATE in 1876 the government determined 
 that thereafter all Indians in the Northwest 
 must live on the reservations. For a long 
 time the Interior Department, to which the 
 management of Indian affairs was committed, had 
 been trying in vain by peaceable means to induce 
 them to do this. The Indians were at last definitely 
 informed that if they did not come into the reservation 
 by the first of January, 1876, and stay there, the task 
 of compelling them to do so would be turned over to 
 the War Department. They did not come in; on the 
 contrary, many of those on the reservations left them 
 for the field; and thus the war began. 
 
 The principal adviser and most influential head man 
 among the Sioux Nation and its allied tribe, the Chey- 
 ennes, was Sitting Bull,* an Unkpapa chief and a 
 great medicine man. He does not seem to have been 
 much of a fighter. The Indians said he had a big head 
 but a little heart, and they esteemed him something of 
 a coward ; in spite of this, his influence over the chiefs 
 
 * TatA n ka I yoti n ka, according to a letter from Mr. W. H. Holmes, Chief 
 of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution. 
 
 183
 
 184 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and the Indians was paramount, and remained so 
 until his death. 
 
 Perhaps he lacked the physical courage which is 
 necessary in fighting, but he must have had abundant 
 moral courage, for he was the most implacable enemy 
 and the most dangerous because of his ability, 
 which was so great as to overcome the Indians' con- 
 tempt for his lack of personal courage that the 
 United States had ever had among the Indians. He 
 was a strategist, a tactician everything but a fighter. 
 However, his lack of fighting qualities was not serious, 
 for he gathered around him a dauntless array of war 
 chiefs, the first among them being Crazy Horse, an 
 Oglala, a skilful and indomitable, as well as a brave 
 and ferocious, leader. 
 
 The Sioux country was encircled by forts and agen- 
 cies. The Missouri River inclosed it on the east and 
 north. On the south were the military posts along the 
 line of the Union Pacific Railroad. To the west were 
 the mountains. Sitting Bull and his followers took 
 position in the valleys of the Big Horn near the sources 
 of the Powder River, right at the center of the encir- 
 cling forts and agencies. It was a situation whence 
 they could move directly upon the enemy in any di- 
 rection as necessity required. 
 
 For years unscrupulous and mercenary traders had 
 supplied the savages with high-grade firearms in spite 
 of government protests. The Indians were better 
 armed than the soldiers, and possessed ammunition in 
 plenty. Their numbers in the field have been esti- 
 mated at from twelve hundred to six thousand war- 
 riors, with their wives and children. Those who have 
 studied the war from the Indian point of view have put 
 the number at the lower figure; nearly every one else at
 
 With Crook's Advance 185 
 
 from three thousand up. Whatever the facts, there were 
 enough of them to give the United States Army the 
 busiest time that it had enjoyed since the Civil War. 
 
 Three expeditions were planned for the winter, 
 which were to be launched upon the Indians simul- 
 taneously. One, under General Gibbon, was to come 
 eastward from western Montana; another, under Gen- 
 eral Crook, was to advance northward from southern 
 Nebraska; and the third, under Custer, was to strike 
 westward from Fort Lincoln. It was believed that 
 any one of the three, each of which comprised more 
 than a thousand men, would be strong enough to de- 
 feat the Indians, the only problem being to catch 
 them or corner them. 
 
 The well-known disinclination of Indians to fight 
 pitched battles is a factor which enters largely into 
 every campaign. Somehow or other, the Indians in this 
 campaign did not seem to be so disinclined that way. 
 One cannot but admire the skill with which they 
 manoeuvered and the courage with which they fought. 
 Putting aside all questions of their cruelty and brutality 
 and what else could be expected from them ? they 
 were patriots fighting for the possession of their native 
 land. Bravely they fought, and well. They were fully 
 apprised of the movements of the troops, and resolved 
 to attack them in severalty and beat them in detail. 
 We shall see how completely they did so, and with 
 what brilliant success they battled, until they were 
 run down, worn out, scattered, killed, or captured. 
 
 II. Reynolds' Abortive Attempt 
 
 The weather was something frightful. Indeed, all 
 through the ensuing spring it was unprecedentedly in-
 
 1 86 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 clement. Neither Ouster's expedition nor Gibbon's 
 got away in winter. Crook did advance, and first 
 came in touch with the enemy with results not alto- 
 gether satisfactory. General Joseph J. Reynolds, with 
 ten troops from the Second and Third Cavalry, sur- 
 prised and took possession of Crazy Horse's village, 
 on the Powder River, on the morning of March 17, 
 1876. The troops had partially destroyed the village 
 while under a severe fire from the Indians who had 
 rallied on bluffs and hills round about it, when Rey- 
 nolds abandoned the position and retreated. He was, 
 of course, pursued by the Indians, grown bolder than 
 before, if possible, as they saw the reluctant soldiers 
 giving up their hard-won prize. 
 
 So precipitate was Reynolds' withdrawal, in fact, 
 that the bodies of several troopers who had been shot 
 in the action were abandoned to the malignity of the 
 savages, and there was a persistent whisper, which will 
 not down, to the effect that one wounded man was also 
 left behind. 
 
 As to this, an army officer of high rank personally 
 stated to me that Reynolds was in such a state of ex- 
 citement, as the afternoon wore away and Crook did 
 not join him in the village, that he finally perempto- 
 rily ordered the troops to mount and go away, in spite 
 of the fact that the work of destruction was not com- 
 plete. This was bad enough, but my informant sol- 
 emnly asserted that Reynolds, in spite of plea and 
 even remonstrance, compelled him to leave behind a 
 wounded trooper, who must necessarily have been 
 tortured by the Indians so soon as they re-occupied 
 the village. Captain Bourke has gone on record in 
 his " On the Border with Crook," expressing his belief in 
 the truth of this charge, which forever stains the name
 
 With Crook's Advance 187 
 
 of the commander of the expedition. The whole af- 
 fair was a disgrace to the army, and many of the offi- 
 cers of the command, capable and brave men, felt it 
 keenly. They chafed for a chance to show their 
 qualities, which they had later on. 
 
 The cold was intense, the temperature dropping to 
 thirty degrees below zero. The soldiers suffered 
 greatly in the retreat. The Indians, who seemed im- 
 pervious to cold, pursued them and succeeded in re- 
 capturing their pony herd of some seven hundred 
 head, which Reynolds was endeavoring to bring 
 away with him. Crook, bringing up the infantry and 
 wagons, was furious when he met the retreating cav- 
 alry and heard its story. 
 
 There were a number of courts-martial subsequent- 
 ly, but little came of them, and the matter was finally 
 allowed to drop upon the retirement or resignation of 
 some of the officers chiefly concerned. It was a dis- 
 graceful affair, and all the honors rested with Crazy 
 Horse. The Indians were greatly encouraged. The 
 loss of the troops was four men killed and six wound- 
 ed, and sixty-six men badly frozen or otherwise in- 
 capacitated by the cold. 
 
 III. The March to the Tongue River 
 
 After the ignominious outcome of Reynolds' attack 
 upon the village of Crazy Horse, the various expeditions 
 noted spent the greater part of the spring in preparing 
 for the grand advance of the converging columns which 
 were to inclose the recalcitrant Indians in a cordon 
 of soldiers, force them back on the reservations, and 
 thus, it was sincerely hoped, end the war. It will be 
 necessary to follow the movements of the several col-
 
 1 88 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 umns separately. As that of Crook first came in con- 
 tact with the Indians, its history will be first discussed. 
 
 The reorganized command for the campaign, which 
 assembled at Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, included fif- 
 teen troops of cavalry about nine hundred men ten 
 of the Third, under command of Colonel Evans, and 
 five of the Second, under Major Noyes, the whole being 
 under the command of Colonel William B. Royall, of 
 the Third.* There were also three companies of the 
 Ninth Infantry and two of the Fourth, a total of three 
 hundred men, under the command of Colonel Chambers. 
 
 There was an abundance of transportation, a long 
 wagon train, and an invaluable pack train. The troops 
 were generously provided with everything necessary for 
 the hard work before them. It was the largest, and it 
 was believed to be the most efficient, force which had 
 ever been sent against the Indians in the West. 
 
 Crook, an officer of large experience, especially in In- 
 dian fighting, assumed personal command of the ex- 
 pedition on the 28th of May, 1876. On the 2Qth the 
 march began. The objects of the campaign were the 
 
 * General King, in his fascinating book, "Campaigning with Crook," has preserved 
 a characteristic anecdote of Royall, which I venture to quote as illustrating the way 
 they have in the army, and as throwing some light on the temperament of the peppery 
 old fighter: 
 
 "A story is going the rounds about Royall that does us all good, even in that dismal 
 weather. A day or two before, so it was told, Royall ordered one of his battalion com- 
 manders to 'put that battalion in camp on the other side of the river, facing east.' A 
 prominent and well-known characteristic of the subordinate officer referred to was a 
 tendency to split hairs, discuss orders, and, in fine, to make trouble where there was a 
 ghost of a chance of so doing unpunished. Presently the colonel saw that his instruc- 
 tions were not being carried out, and, not being in a mood for indirect action, he put 
 spurs to his horse, dashed through the stream, and reined up alongside the victim with: 
 
 " 'Didn't I order you, sir, to put your battalion in camp along the river, facing 
 east ? ' 
 
 " 'Yes, sir ; but this ain't a river. It's only a creek.' 
 
 " ' Creek be d d, sir! It's a river a river from this time forth, by order, sir. Now 
 do as I tell you ! ' 
 
 "There was no further delay."
 
 With Crook's Advance 189 
 
 villages of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull, which were 
 believed to be somewhere on the Rosebud River. The 
 topography of that country is well known now, but then 
 it was more or less of a terra incognita rather more 
 than less, by the way. Certainly, this was true after the 
 Tongue River was reached. The advance was made 
 at first up the Bozeman trail, past Fort Reno, and over 
 the battle-fields around the ruins of abandoned and de- 
 stroyed Fort Phil Kearney, which were objects of much 
 interest to the soldiers. 
 
 On the Qth of June the army encamped on the south 
 side of the Tongue River, near the point where that 
 stream intersects the Montana boundary line. Crazy 
 Horse * had been fully advised by disaffected Indians at 
 the agencies and military posts, as well as by his own 
 daring scouts, of all these preparations that were being 
 made to overwhelm him. He had sent to Crook a 
 specific warning not to cross the Tongue River, and 
 declared his intent to attack him immediately he 
 reached that stream. To prove that his threat 
 was no idle boast, he mustered his warriors, and at 
 half after six o'clock on the evening of the Qth, from 
 the high bluffs on the other side, opened fire upon 
 the camp. 
 
 Through a fortunate mistake the Indians directed 
 their fire to the tents of the camp, imagining that they 
 would be full of men. They happened to be empty. 
 The Sioux soon got the range, and the camp was 
 swept with bullets. They ripped open mess chests, 
 
 * " Crazy Horse was the personification of savage ferocity; though comparatively 
 a young man, he was of a most restless and adventurous disposition, and had arrived 
 at great renown among the warriors, even before he was twenty-six years of age. In 
 fact, he had become the war chief of the southern Sioux and the recognized leader 
 of the hostile Oglalas." " Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, 
 V, 5, A."
 
 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 shattered the sides of the wagons, destroyed the bag- 
 gage, killed a few horses, but did little damage to 
 the men.* 
 
 The Third Cavalry was divided into three battal- 
 ions, one of four, and two of three troops each. 
 Captain Mills commanded the first battalion, Captain 
 Henry the second, Captain Van Vliet the third. 
 Crook acted promptly. He sent forward three com- 
 panies of his infantry, deploying them as skirmishers, 
 to line the river bank and open fire on the Indians 
 in plain view on the bluff on the other side. At 
 the same time he ordered Captain Mills to take his 
 battalion across the river and charge the enemy. The 
 Sioux were already unsettled by the accurate fire of 
 the infantry with their long-range rifles, and as Mills' 
 battalion deployed, dashed through the water and at 
 the steep bluffs on the other side, they broke and fled, 
 having suffered little or no loss, and not having inflicted 
 much more. 
 
 IV. The Flying Column 
 
 The skirmish was simply a grim earnest of the deter- 
 mined purpose of the Indian chief. No pursuit was 
 attempted at that time. Negotiations had been entered 
 into between the Crows, who were the hereditary ene- 
 mies of the Sioux, and the Shoshones, with a view to se- 
 curing a body of Indian auxiliaries to the troops, whose 
 services would be invaluable for scouting. Persuaded 
 
 * One bullet smashed the pipe of a small camp stove in Captain Mills' tent. When 
 the Eastern papers learned the interesting fact that Mills' stovepipe had been smashed, 
 that gallant officer was severely censured, and much ridicule was heaped upon him, un- 
 der the impression that he wore a "stovepipe" hat in action. By the way, when Cap- 
 tain Broke, of the British frigate Shannon, boarded the American frigate Chesapeake, 
 Captain Lawrence, in the War of 1812, he wore just such a hat !
 
 With Crook's Advance 191 
 
 thereto by Frank Gruard,* a celebrated scout, some- 
 thing less than two hundred Crows, with eighty odd 
 Shoshones, joined the army on the I5th of June. 
 
 To pursue Indians while incumbered with infantry 
 and a wagon train was well nigh a hopeless task. Crook 
 determined to park the wagons and baggage, leave 
 them under the command of Major Furey, the quarter- 
 master, strip his command to the lightest marching or- 
 der, and make a dash for the Rosebud River and the 
 Indian country. One hundred infantrymen, protest- 
 ing most vehemently against their orders, to their credit, 
 be it said, were detailed to remain with the train. Two 
 hundred others, who professed to have some skill in 
 riding, were mounted on the mules of the wagon train 
 to accompany the cavalry. 
 
 The morning of the I5th was spent in accustoming 
 the infantrymen to the mules and the mules to the infan- 
 trymen. The cavalrymen and the Indian allies enjoyed 
 the circus which ensued when the mules were bridled 
 and saddled for the first time, and mounted by men 
 who had never before straddled anything more formi- 
 dable than a fence rail. It took the whole morning 
 before the infantrymen and the mules learned to get 
 along with each other, even in a half-hearted way. 
 
 * "Frank Gruard, a native of the Sandwich Islands, was for some years a mail rider 
 in northern Montana, and was there captured by the forces of 'Crazy Horse'; his dark 
 skin and general appearance gave his captors the impression that Frank was a native 
 Indian, whom they had recaptured from the whites; consequently, they did not kill him, 
 but kept him a prisoner until he could recover what they believed to be his native tongue 
 the Sioux. Frank remained several years in the household of the great chief 'Crazy 
 Horse,' whom he knew very well, as well as his medicine man, the since renowned 
 ' Sitting Bull.' Gruard was one of the most remarkable woodsmen I have ever met; 
 no Indian could surpass him in his intimate acquaintance with all that pertained to the 
 topography, animal life, and other particulars of the great region between the head of 
 the Piney, the first affluent of the Powder on the west, up to and beyond the Yellowstone 
 on the north; no question could be asked him that he could not answer at once and cor- 
 rectly. His bravery and fidelity were never questioned; he never flinched under fire, and 
 never growled at privation," " On the Border with Crook ? " Captain John G. Bourke.
 
 192 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 At five A.M., on the i6th, the force, numbering a 
 little less than eleven hundred men, with two hundred 
 and fifty Indian auxiliaries, crossed the Tongue River 
 and marched to the Rosebud.* They bivouacked that 
 night on the banks of the Rosebud, on a level depres- 
 sion surrounded by low bluffs on all sides, forming a 
 sort of natural amphitheater, on the top of which the 
 pickets were stationed. Each man carried four days' 
 rations of hardtack, coffee, and bau,- in his saddle- 
 bags and one hundred rounds of ammunition upon his 
 person. The pack train was limited to two mules car- 
 rying the medical supplies. There being little to do at 
 the wagon camp on Goose Creek, a number of mule 
 packers, led by a veteran, Tom Moore, accompanied 
 the expedition to help the foot soldiers to manage their 
 mules, and incidentally to take part in the fighting. 
 There were no tents, of course, and but one blanket (a 
 single blanket at that) for each man. This blanket 
 barely kept off the heavy dew, and the night was a 
 thoroughly uncomfortable one. 
 
 At three A.M. on the iyth of June reveille was sound- 
 ed. After breakfast and the care of the horses and 
 mules, six o'clock found the troops on the march down 
 the Rosebud. At eight o'clock they halted and unsad- 
 dled their animals to give them a nibble of grass and 
 a little rest, preparatory to a farther advance later on, 
 while the Crows and Shoshones were sent on ahead to 
 scout. The place in which they had stopped was an 
 amphitheater, like their camp ground of the night be- 
 fore, a rolling bit of boggy prairie, inclosed on all sides 
 by bluffs, every point being within rifle shot of the cen- 
 ter. Through this amphitheater ran the Rosebud 
 River, here a mere creek, its general direction being 
 
 *So called from the quantity of wild roses which grew along its banks in season.
 
 With Crook's Advance 193 
 
 from west to east. Toward the east side of the amphi- 
 theater the creek was diverted to the left, the north- 
 eastward, and plunged into a gloomy and forbidding 
 canon, called the Dead Canon of the Rosebud. The 
 course of the river was marked by a rank undergrowth 
 of grass, small trees, etc. 
 
 Mills' battalion of the Third Cavalry halted on the 
 south bank of the creek. In rear of Mills was Noyes' 
 battalion of the Second Cavalry. Across the creek were 
 Henry's and Van Vliet's battalions of the Third Cavalry, 
 the mounted infantrymen, and the small pack train with 
 the packers. Crook desired to keep his movements 
 secret, but it had been impossible to restrain the impet- 
 uosity of the Indian auxiliaries the day before. They 
 had come across a herd of buffalo and had made great 
 slaughter of the helpless animals, killing one hundred 
 and fifty of them, for which they had no use at all. It 
 is certain that so able a general as Crazy Horse had 
 scouts watching Crook all the time, and would have dis- 
 covered his advance in any event; but with all the noise 
 made by the Indians in the buffalo hunt, there was no 
 possibility of a surprise. As a matter of fact, it was 
 Crazy Horse who began the game. Crook was ready 
 for him. 
 
 V. The Battle of the Rosebud 
 
 About half after eight o'clock in the morning, the 
 resting soldiers were called to attention by the sound of 
 shots from the bluffs in front of them, over which their 
 allies had disappeared. It was at first supposed that 
 these friendly Indians had run across another herd of 
 buffalo, but a few moments told the practised troopers 
 that the firing was the beginning of a battle rather than
 
 194 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 that of a hunt. At the same time the Indian auxilia 
 came galloping back to the main body at full spe 
 yelling: 
 
 "Sioux, Sioux! Heap Sioux!" 
 
 Without waiting for orders, the troopers saddled theii 
 horses and fell in. They got ready none too soon, for 
 right on the heels of the fleeing Crows and Shoshones 
 came the Sioux. In front of them to the right, the left, 
 the low bluffs inclosing the plain, were ringed with In- 
 dians in full war-gear. As one observer described it to 
 me, they looked like swarms of blackbirds, there were 
 so many of them and in such rapid motion. They kept 
 coming and coming into view, and as they dashed up to 
 the brink of the hills upon their war ponies they opened a 
 long-range fire upon the soldiers, which from the distance 
 did little damage. There were at least a thousand of 
 them in plain sight. How many others there might be, 
 no one could tell. It was a safe guess that those in 
 sight constituted but a small part of the force. 
 
 It is said that there were at least six thousand war- 
 riors that day under the command of Crazy Horse, but 
 that most of them were not engaged. Crazy Horse had 
 planned an ambush for General Crook, and he had 
 hoped to defeat him by luring the soldiers into it, or by 
 separating the army into small detachments and over- 
 whelming them in detail. His plans were well devised, 
 and came very near being successful. That they did 
 not succeed is probably due more to the acts of the 
 Indians themselves than because of the wariness of the 
 soldiers. 
 
 Crook acted at once. Sending his staff officers to 
 rally the Crows and Shoshones, he directed them to cir- 
 cle to the right and left, and make ready to fall on the 
 flanks of the Indians. Mills, who had behaved so gal-
 
 With Crook's Advance 195 
 
 lantly at the Tongue River, was ordered to charge the 
 Indians straight up the valley to the bluff to the north- 
 ward, the front. Two troops of Van Vliet's squadron 
 were rushed off to the southward, the rear, to seize a 
 commanding position to prevent the Indians from cir- 
 cling around in that direction and getting in Crook's 
 rear. The infantry and part of the Second Cavalry were 
 dismounted, a^d thrown forward as skirmishers around 
 the foot of the bluffs. Royall took Henry's battalion, 
 with Van Vliet's remaining troop, one of Mills' troops 
 which he detached while the battalion was on the 
 gallop, and another of Noyes' troops, and charged the 
 Indians on the left. 
 
 Mills' charge was most gallantly delivered. The sol- 
 diers struggled through the bog, raced across the bot- 
 tom land for about eight hundred yards, and scrambled 
 up the bluffs in twenty minutes, finding themselves, 
 when they reached the top, within fifty paces of the 
 Sioux. There was no time to use carbines. Firing 
 revolvers, the battalion rushed at the Indians. The 
 savages fired ineffectively, gave way, and fled instantly 
 to higher ground six hundred yards further on, where 
 they opened fire. In their excitement they shot badly. 
 Mills dismounted his battalion, deployed them as skir- 
 mishers, rushed the second ridge and cleared it, the 
 Indians sullenly retiring before him, and again opened 
 fire on the troops, to which the cavalrymen made effec- 
 tive reply. The Sioux galloped rapidly to and fro, yell- 
 ing and firing from their horses, kicking up clouds of 
 dust, but doing little harm. 
 
 Royall, Henry, and Van Vliet had a similar success on 
 the left, where the ground was much more open and un- 
 favorable for defense, although the Indians were massed 
 more heavily in that quarter than before Mills.
 
 196 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Meanwhile the Crows and Shoshones had fallen upon 
 the flanks of the Sioux, but not very effectively. Every 
 one in the field except a small reserve was now hotly en- 
 gaged. The pressure on Mills became stronger, but he 
 drove the Indians from him by another gallant attack. 
 Thereafter he was reinforced by Noyes' battalion. The 
 front of his line was finally partially cleared by this last 
 dash. The Indians who had been attacking him there- 
 upon left him, and joined the others before Royall and 
 Henry. 
 
 Crook now withdrew Mills' command from the battle- 
 field, and Mills was ordered to take his three troops 
 down the Dead Canon of the Rosebud and attack the 
 villages which it was believed the Indians were defend- 
 ing. Mills' movements were supported by the five troops 
 of the Second Cavalry under Noyes. Crook promised 
 to follow up the movement, and support it with the re- 
 maining cavalry and infantry. We will follow this 
 movement later. 
 
 Mills' place in the line was occupied by Tom Moore 
 and his packers and some other auxiliaries from the 
 camp, and a smart fire was kept up in that direction. On 
 the left the firing was fast and furious. The Indians from 
 the front cleared by Mills joined their associates on the 
 left, and again and again attacked Royall, Henry, and 
 Van Vliet, who had joined the other two, with the 
 most determined courage. Charge and counter charge 
 were made over that portion of the field. Now the 
 troops gave way before the Indian advance, now the 
 soldiers were rallied and hurled back the Indians, now 
 the Indians retreated before some desperate counter- 
 charge. So went the varying fortunes of the hour. 
 The number of savages increased with every passing 
 moment. To the eyes of the astonished soldiers they
 
 With Crook's Advance 
 
 197 
 
 seemed to spring from the ground. If one fell in the 
 line, a dozen were ready to take his place. 
 
 In one of the charges Captain Henry was shot through 
 the face and frightfully wounded. The troopers had 
 dismounted, but the officers remained mounted. Henry 
 
 SKtTCM BV THE 
 AUTHOR MAOt 
 F-POM NOTE'S 
 AMD DESCRIPTIONS 
 F-URNISHCO Bv 
 GENERAL MILLS 
 
 BATTLE OF THE 
 ROSEBUD 
 
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 , .*' 
 
 ,, , <M. 
 
 % m ? *.'\* ?*..,.-' 
 
 ^ ..*' m-;'> 
 .*** *r -^^ <i %* iiis* 
 
 * ^ -"*'' o" 5 ' ^'oi,/*^""*""W,,, *"" 
 
 / ** &%" &&} \\""''<,, m- 
 
 I, <S5T'*5L * , \ x :A 
 
 ' *s*J( ,&" ^-^r^<-'""> ~ -^>~ S'<i ' 
 -^x ^,- r y , t - f ) 
 
 SlOUX AND 
 CHtVtMNtS 
 
 OOOOO F"RI6NOLV 
 
 INDIANS 
 
 SOLOIEBS 
 
 A- MILLS' BATTALION 
 B - Moves' 
 C - HCNBVS 
 
 D-VANVutT'S 
 
 t - MOUNTCO INF-ANTRV 
 AMD PACK TRAIN 
 
 a a a- MlLLS MARCH 
 UP THE CARON AMD 
 PtTUQN TO THE FIELD 
 
 tit- RtTRtAT OF- 
 
 INDIAMS AROUND REAR 
 OP C BOOK'S ARMY 
 f~- INDIAN VILLAGE 
 
 G - DAM AND AMBUSCADE- 
 
 reeled in his saddle as the bullet pierced both his cheek 
 bones and tore out the whole front of his face below the 
 eyes. Although, as an eye-witness has it, he was spit- 
 ting blood by the handful, he continued on the battle 
 line. The situation of Royall's wing of Crook's army
 
 198 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 was precarious. Henry's battalion held the extreme 
 left flank. It was his duty to remain there. Vroom's 
 troop L, of the Third Cavalry, had become separated from 
 the main body during the battle, and was caught ahead 
 of the line and surrounded by Indians, in imminent 
 danger of annihiliation. Crook had ordered Royall 
 to bring his men back to their horses, in order to mount 
 them and prepare for a general charge. The Indians 
 took this movement for a retreat, and came dashing 
 after the retrograding troopers. Only the cool courage 
 of Royall and Henry, and the magnificent way in which 
 they handled their forces when they went forward to the 
 rescue, prevented the annihilation of Vroom's troops. 
 
 It was in the midst of this operation that Henry re- 
 ceived his fearful wound and stayed on the line.* Pres- 
 ently he fell from his horse. As he did so, the sol- 
 diers, dismayed by his fall, began to give back before 
 the Sioux. The impetuous Indians charged over the 
 place where Henry lay. Fortunately, he was not struck 
 by the hoofs of the galloping horses. His men rallied 
 and rushed to his rescue. Old Chief Washakie and his 
 Shoshones at this period of the fighting displayed splen- 
 did courage. The fight actually raged over the body of 
 Captain Henry until the Indians were driven off, and 
 Henry was rescued from what would otherwise have 
 been certain death. After this fierce struggle, part 
 breaking through the line and part turning the flank, 
 the Indians galloped down the valley between the river 
 and the troops, and finally disappeared on the other side 
 of the Dead Canon, their retreat accelerated by the 
 movement of Mills toward the villiage. The fighting 
 had lasted a little more than two hours. 
 
 * For a sketch of General Henry and an account of his experiences in this battle 
 and elsewhere, see the last chapter of this book.
 
 With Crook's Advance 199 
 
 VI. Mills' Advance down the Canon 
 
 Meanwhile Mills and his men, in a column of twos, 
 trotted down the gloomy depths of the Dead Canon, the 
 rocky walls of which, towering on either side, would have 
 afforded abundant cover for Indian riflemen. Before 
 entering the canon, they had cleared the mouth of it of 
 a body of Sioux by a smart charge, and they were there- 
 after unmolested. They advanced rapidly but with cau- 
 tion, although what they could have done if attacked it is 
 hard to see, and how caution would have saved them it 
 is difficult to tell. They had their orders to go through 
 the canon and attack the village. There was nothing to 
 do but obey. Sending them forward was a mistake 
 which might have resulted in a terrible disaster, al- 
 though nobody believed that then. The soldiers had 
 not yet realized what fighters these Indians were. The 
 Custer disaster was still to come, and no one imagined 
 that so large a body as that commanded by Mills and 
 Noyes could be defeated. If Crook had followed with 
 his whole force, the troops under his command would 
 have been annihilated; it is probable that not one of 
 them would have come out of that canon. 
 
 When Crook began to prepare to follow Mills with 
 the rest of his force, he discovered that he had a much 
 larger number of wounded than he had thought possible, 
 and the doctors protested against their being left with a 
 feeble guard while Crook with the best of the force went 
 up the canon. The protest was justified by the situa- 
 tion. Besides, the attack on Royall and Henry had not 
 yet ceased. Crook reflected, concluded that he could not 
 leave the field, and that Mills' force was too weak for the 
 work assigned it. The general thereupon depatched
 
 2OO Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Captain Nickerson, of his staff, attended by a single or- 
 derly, at the imminent peril of their lives, with orders to 
 ride after Mills and tell him to leave the canon, defile to 
 the left, and rejoin him at once. Crook hoped that 
 Mills, on his return to the field, might succeed in get- 
 ting in the rear of any Indians who might be lurking 
 in the hills before Royall's shattered line. 
 
 So rapid had been Mills' movements, that Nickerson, 
 although going at the full speed of his horse, did not over- 
 take him until he had penetrated some seven miles down 
 the canon. Fortunately for all concerned, the com- 
 mand had halted where a cross canon made an opening 
 toward the west, and on that side the canon was so 
 broken and so sloping that it could be scaled by the 
 troopers. Firing was heard to the front, and the In- 
 dians were detected massing to attack Mills' detach- 
 ment. A halt had been ordered for the purpose of 
 making final preparations for the attack. 
 
 "Mills," said Nickerson, as he came galloping up, 
 " Royall has been badly handled there are many 
 wounded. Henry is severely hurt, and Vroom's troop 
 is all cut up. The General orders that you and Noyes 
 defile by your left flank out of this canon and return to 
 the field at once. He cannot move out to support you 
 and the rest on account of the wounded." 
 
 Never was order more unwelcome. The officers at 
 the head of the column urged Mills to go on. The In- 
 dian village was in sight. Crook could not have known 
 how near they were, or he would not have recalled them. 
 Mills, however, was a thorough soldier. In his mind 
 orders were to be obeyed, and he silenced the objectors 
 and advisers, and did as he was directed, although with 
 great disappointment and reluctance. Never was obedi- 
 ence better justified. General Mills admits now that, had
 
 With Crook's Advance 201 
 
 he disobeyed Crook, his command would have been 
 annihilated. 
 
 The canon was the mouth of Crazy Horse's trap. A 
 short distance farther on, it ended in a great dam covered 
 with broken logs, making a dangerous abattis. Here 
 the main body of the Indians had been massed. Here 
 they expected, seeing the confident advance of the eight 
 troops of cavalry up the canon, to fall upon them and 
 kill them all, which they might easily have done. Nick- 
 erson got there just in time. 
 
 Mills instantly turned to the left and led his troops 
 up the broken wall of the canon to the high ground on 
 the farther side; fortunately, he had been overtaken at 
 about the very point where the ascent was practicable 
 for troops. Presently the detachment rejoined the main 
 body, their progress being unmolested. 
 
 There were ten soldiers killed and twenty-seven se- 
 riously wounded, besides a great number of slightly 
 wounded. Most of the casualties were in Royall's 
 command, Vroom's troop having lost heavily while it 
 was in such peril. 
 
 Crook camped for the night on the battle-field. The 
 dead were buried, the wounded looked after tempo- 
 rarily, and the next morning the soldiers withdrew. 
 They went back to their camp at Goose Creek and 
 stayed there. The battle was in one sense a victory for 
 the white soldiers, in that they drove the Indians from 
 the field, forcing them back at least five miles. In an- 
 other, and a larger and more definite sense, it was a de- 
 cided victory for Crazy Horse. He had fought Crook 
 to a standstill. He had forced him back to his base of 
 supplies. He had stopped the farther progress of that 
 expedition. He had protected his villages and had 
 withdrawn his army in good order.
 
 2O2 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 If Mills' command had not been recalled, it is cer- 
 tain that it would have been annihilated. As it was, the 
 Indians had done remarkably well. Crazy Horse, free 
 from further apprehension of pursuit by Crook for the 
 present, had leisure to turn his attention to the other two 
 expeditions, which there is no doubt he was well aware 
 had been launched against him. 
 
 While technically it was perhaps a drawn battle, as a 
 feat of arms the battle of the Rosebud must go down 
 to the credit of the Indians. It was more like a pitched 
 battle than any that had been fought west of the Mis- 
 souri heretofore. The individual officers and soldiers 
 of the army did splendidly; so did the Indians. Mills 
 had displayed commendable dash and daring in all his 
 charges. Royall, Henry and Van Vliet, and Cham- 
 bers with the infantry, had fought skilfully and bravely 
 against an overwhelming force. Crook's dispositions 
 were good on the field, and were well carried out by his 
 subordinates. The same may be said of Crazy Horse, 
 his subchiefs, and their warriors. 
 
 Crook had nearly exhausted his ammunition in the 
 hard fighting, the larger part of his supplies had been ex- 
 pended, and he had a number of very seriously wounded 
 on his hands. There was not one chance in a thousand 
 that he could catch the Indians now. There was nothing 
 left for him to do but go back to the main camp, send 
 his wounded back to Fort Fetterman for treatment, order 
 up more supplies and more troops, and await a favor- 
 able opportunity to attack again. 
 
 To anticipate events, it may be noted that, owing to the 
 disaster to Terry's column, Crook did not advance until 
 August.
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
 Ex-Trooper Towne on the Rosebud Fight 
 
 I AM afraid that any attempt on my part to comply 
 with your request will be a very feeble attempt 
 to describe to you the Battle of the Rosebud, 
 which took place on June i/th, 1876. There are 
 many men living who participated in that battle who 
 can describe more fully and more comprehensively than 
 I the details of that day. However, I will do my best. 
 On the i6th day of June, 1876, General Crook with 
 his command was camped on the Tongue River await- 
 ing the arrival of three hundred Crow and Shoshone 
 Indians to be used as scouts, under Frank Gruard, a 
 noted scout of the Indian country, it being Crook's in- 
 tention thoroughly to scout the whole country from the 
 Powder and Tongue Rivers north to the Yellowstone, 
 and to co-operate with the other columns in the field 
 under Custer, Terry, and Gibbon. 
 
 At about five P.M. on the afternoon of June i6th the 
 three hundred scouts came into our camp, and shortly 
 afterward General Crook gave orders to the command 
 to prepare for a night march. Extra ammunition and 
 extra rations were issued, and at about eight P.M. we 
 
 O 
 
 broke camp and mounted into the saddle to commence 
 our march into the Indian country, which was overrun 
 
 203
 
 2O4 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 by the Oglalas, Brules, Unkpapas, and Miniconjous, 
 the four most powerful tribes of Sioux Indians on the 
 plains, for it is to be remembered that the whole Sioux 
 Nation had left their reservations and was then on the 
 war-path. 
 
 General Crook had, on the morning of the i6th, sent 
 out scouts to find and report any Indian signs that might 
 be found. Numerous signs were found which indi- 
 cated that a large party of Indians had recently passed 
 that way going in a northerly direction, with the evident 
 intention of joining those from the Brule agency on the 
 Yellowstone. It was General Crook's purpose to 
 cut them off. Thus the forced march of the night of 
 the i 6th.* 
 
 After a long and tiresome journey of all night, about 
 seven A.M. of the i/th Indians were seen on the hills 
 to our front and left who were evidently watching our 
 movements. It was reported to General Crook by the 
 scouts that we had gotten into a country that was com- 
 pletely alive with hostile Indians and that we were near 
 an immense Indian camp. 
 
 General Crook at about 7.30 A.M. went into camp 
 with the intention of making another night march and, 
 if possible, overtake their camp the next day. As we had 
 been in the saddle all night, men and horses needed a 
 few hours rest. 
 
 After going into camp we unsaddled and put our 
 horses to graze, but first hobbling them to prevent any 
 stampede that might be attempted. While we were 
 putting our horses to graze the whole range of hills in 
 our front became literally alive with Indians, and at the 
 
 * Trooper Towne is in error here ; there was no night march, according to Captain 
 Bourke. See his "On the Border with Crook," See also "War Path and Bivouac," 
 b7 Finerty. C. T. B.
 
 Towne on the Rosebud Fight 205 
 
 same time the Crow and Shoshone Indians with us com- 
 menced their warlike preparations by daubing them- 
 selves with war paint and riding their ponies in a circle 
 one behind the other, and at the same time singing their 
 war songs. 
 
 After riding in this manner a short while, the circle 
 broke and the whole group of Indian scouts charged up 
 the hill toward their enemies. It is a well known fact 
 that the Sioux and Crow Indians were enemies toward 
 each other at that time. I have seen the Crow Indians 
 shoot buffalo an"d let them lie where they fell, not even 
 undertaking to remove the hide, because, they would say, 
 "Sioux Buffalo no good," which indicated that as the 
 Sioux Indians were their enemies, so were the buffalo 
 found in the Sioux country their enemies also. Every- 
 thing in the Sioux country was an enemy to the Crow 
 Indian. 
 
 While our Indians were making their charge upon the 
 Sioux, General Crook gave orders to saddle up, for well 
 he knew that a battle was on hand. After we had sad- 
 dled and formed in line, my troop, F, Third Cavalry,* 
 was placed on the left flank of the command, and it with 
 two other troops were detailed as skirmishers and were 
 ordered to make a flank movement to our left and gain 
 the hills, where we dismounted, leaving each fourth 
 trooper to hold the horses. We then formed the skir- 
 mish line on foot, which was commanded by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Royall. 
 
 At this time I witnessed a most daring act by a bugler 
 by the name of Snow, who was carrying a despatch from 
 General Crook to Colonel Royall. General Crook was 
 stationed on one of the hills to our right, near the center 
 
 *This troop was commanded by Lieutenant Reynolds, and was in Henry's, 
 battalion. C. T. B.
 
 206 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 of the line,* where he could view all that was taking 
 place. Wishing to send an order to Colonel Royall, he 
 directed his orderly, Bugler Snow, to carry it with all 
 haste. The most direct route was down a steep hill 
 and across a level plain and then up another hill, where 
 Colonel Royall was. All chances of reaching there 
 alive were against him. 
 
 When I saw him he was coming as fast as his horse 
 could carry him, while two Indians were after him with 
 the intention of capturing him. Seeing that they could 
 not capture him, they finished the game by shooting at 
 him, and proved their good marksmanship as poor Snow 
 fell from his horse, shot through both arms, but he 
 delivered his orders all right. 
 
 After remaining on the skirmish line for perhaps two 
 hours, we were ordered to fall back and remount our 
 horses to take a new position (our horses were held in 
 check in a ravine), as it was impossible to hold our pres- 
 ent position against such overwhelming odds. I must 
 say that I never saw so great a body of Indians in one 
 place as I saw at that time, and I have seen a great many 
 Indians in my time. It seemed that if one Indian was 
 shot five were there to take his place. If we had re- 
 mained in our first position we would all have been 
 killed, and I consider that we retreated in the right 
 time. 
 
 I had not gone more than one third of the distance 
 from our position to where the horses were when I over- 
 took three other soldiers of my own troop carrying a 
 sergeant by the name of Marshall, who had been shot 
 through the face. I knew that time was precious and 
 none to lose. I could not give them the cold shoulder 
 by passing them without giving a helping hand. Glanc- 
 
 * Crook was right in the fighting ; his horse was shot under hinjt C, Ti B.
 
 Towne on the Rosebud Fight 207 
 
 ing back, I saw the hostiles coming over the hill. I said 
 to the others, "Quick, here they come! " 
 
 At that instant my comrades, to save themselves, 
 dropped the wounded sergeant and hastened to their 
 horses. The sergeant, seeing that I was the only one 
 left, said: 
 
 " Save yourself if you can, because I am dying. Don't 
 stay with me." I replied: 
 
 "Dave, old boy, I am going to stay right here with 
 you and will not desert you." 
 
 Grasping him with all my strength, I carried my com- 
 rade until it was useless to carry him any farther, for he 
 was dead. I then laid him down and left him and hur- 
 ried to get away. 
 
 I don't think that I had gone more than ten yards 
 when I was surrounded by about twenty or more of the 
 most murderous looking Indians I ever saw. You can 
 talk of seeing devils; here they were in full form, painted 
 in the most terrifying manner, some with their war bon- 
 nets adorned with horns of steers and buffalo. It was 
 enough to strike terror to anyone's heart. 
 
 I knew that my time had come, I knew that I would 
 be taken prisoner. I fought, but it was fighting against 
 terrible odds. There I was down in that ravine, alone 
 and in the midst of a lot of murderous savages. 
 
 Taking my carbine from me and throwing a lariat 
 over my head and tightening it about my feet, I was 
 helpless. This was all done in an instant, while I strug- 
 gled and fought in vain, until I was struck on the head 
 with something which rendered me unconscious and 
 caused me to fall. As I went down a bullet struck me 
 in the body. 
 
 I think that when the bullet struck me I regained 
 my consciousness, because I realized I was being
 
 2o8 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 dragged at a lively pace over the ground by a pony at 
 the other end of the lariat. It was, I think, the inten- 
 tion of the Indians either to drag me to death at the 
 heels of the pony or after getting me away to torture 
 me in some other manner. 
 
 They captured one other comrade of mine by the 
 name of Bennett, of L Troop, Third Cavalry, and com- 
 pletely cut him in pieces. His remains were buried in 
 a grain sack. 
 
 After I was dragged in this manner for some distance, 
 my captors were charged by one of the troops of cavalry, 
 and to save themselves from capture abandoned me and 
 made their escape. Thus was I enabled to regain my 
 liberty. 
 
 I was immediately sent to the field hospital, and three 
 days later I, with eighteen other wounded men, was 
 sent to the post hospital at Fort Fetterman. You ask 
 in your letter did I get a medal of honor for trying to get 
 my sergeant away. I am very sorry to say that I did 
 not, although I do think that even at this late day had I 
 some one who would speak a good word in my behalf 
 I think that my case would be taken up and that I might 
 get one.* 
 
 I receive a very small pension for the wound received 
 in this Indian battle, and that is all my recompense. 
 
 Hoping that this narrative of my experience in the 
 Battle of the Rosebud may be of interest, I have the 
 honor to remain, 
 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 c T -AT PHINEAS TOWNE. 
 
 St. Louis, Mo. 
 
 * The official records show that Marshall was killed and Towne wounded in the bat- 
 tle. If this account falls under the eye of any one in authority, I trust an investigation 
 may be made, and that the medal may be awarded, if it has been earned. C. T. B.
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
 The Grievance of Rain-in-the-Face 
 
 I. The Yellowstone Expedition of 1873 
 
 H 
 
 AVING thus disposed of the most formi- 
 dable column, Crook's, in so summary and 
 so effective a manner, the Indians under 
 their able leadership turned their attention 
 to Custer and Gibbon. 
 
 Before the Little Big Horn campaign is discussed, 
 however, in order the better to understand the most 
 terribly dramatic episode in the most disastrous of our 
 Indian battles, it will be necessary to go back a little 
 and take up the thread of the discourse later. 
 
 The country watered by the Yellowstone and its 
 affluents, traversed by the Black Hills and other ranges 
 of mountains, and protected by the almost impassable 
 Bad Lands in Dakota, had been up to 1873 practical- 
 ly a terra incognita. However, the Northern Pacific 
 Railroad was even then surveying a route across it. 
 Gold had been discovered, and miners and settlers were 
 crowding in. The Indians, since the treaty of 1868, 
 which had resulted in the abandonment of Fort Phil 
 Kearney and the other posts, had been ugly in mood and 
 troublesome in action. They welcomed neither rail- 
 road nor men. 
 
 209
 
 2io Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 An expedition of some seventeen hundred men under 
 General Stanley was sent into the country in 1873. Cus- 
 ter and the Seventh Cavalry formed a large part of the 
 command. There were no guides. The country, espe- 
 cially in the Bad Lands, was a terrible one to cross, and 
 Custer volunteered to take two troops of cavalry and 
 ride some miles ahead of the main body every day to 
 mark a road. Custer possessed a faculty for this sort 
 of work which was simply marvelous. He was a born 
 pathfinder, better even than Fremont. 
 
 On the 4th of August he left camp at five o'clock in 
 the morning with the troops of Moylan and Tom Cus- 
 ter, eighty-six men, five officers, and a favorite Arik- 
 ara scout, called Bloody Knife. At ten A.M., reach- 
 ing the crest of some bluffs along the river bank, they 
 saw spread before them a beautiful village, through 
 which the river gently meandered between the tree-clad 
 banks. They advanced two miles up the valley, and 
 made camp under the trees for a noonday rest. They 
 had come at a smart pace and were far ahead of the 
 main column, which was out of sight in the rear. The 
 passage through the valley was easy, and there was no 
 necessity for them to press on. The weather was hot. 
 After picketing the horses, partaking of their noonday 
 meal and posting sentries, officers and men threw them- 
 selves on the grass and fell asleep. 
 
 At one o'clock the sentry on the edge of the timber 
 gave the alarm. A small party of Indians was ap- 
 proaching, in the hope of stampeding the horses. All 
 Indian attacks begin that way. After the horses are 
 stampeded the soldiers have to fight where they are, 
 and, as the Indians are mounted, the dismounted 
 troopers are at a disadvantage. Custer was on his feet 
 in an instant, shouting:
 
 Grievance of Rain-in-the-Face 211 
 
 "Run to your horses, men!" 
 
 The troopers were no less alert. Before the Indians 
 could stampede the horses, each man had reached his 
 animal and led him back into the timber. A few shots 
 drove off the little party of savages, the horses were sad- 
 dled, and the men moved out. As they did so, six mount- 
 ed Indians appeared on the crest of a little hill. Custer 
 led the way toward them. They retreated slowly, keep- 
 ing just out of range. In this manner they drew the sol- 
 diers some two miles up the valley. 
 
 Finally, in the hope of getting near to them, Custer 
 took twenty men, with his brother and Lieutenant Var- 
 num in command, and rode out some two hundred 
 yards ahead of the remainder under Captain Moylan, 
 who were directed to keep that distance in rear of the 
 advance. Custer, accompanied only by an orderly, 
 rode about the same distance ahead of the advance, 
 making peace signs to the six Indians whom they had 
 pursued. As he approached nearer to them, their pace 
 slackened and they suddenly stopped. 
 
 To the left of the soldiers was a thick wood. It 
 occurred to Custer that Indians might be concealed 
 therein, and he sent his orderly back to the advance to 
 caution them to be on their guard. Scarcely had the 
 orderly reached the advance when the Indians they 
 had been pursuing turned and came at full gallop 
 toward Custer, now alone in the valley. At the same 
 instant, with a terrific war whoop, three or four hundred 
 splendidly mounted Sioux burst out from the trees on 
 the left. 
 
 Custer was riding a magnificent thoroughbred. In a 
 second he was racing for his life toward the advance- 
 guard. The Indians had two objects in view. They 
 wanted to intercept Custer and also cut oflF the advance
 
 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 party from Moylan's men, who were coming up at a 
 gallop. Only the speed of Custer's horse saved his life. 
 As he galloped toward them, he shouted to Tom Custer 
 to dismount his men. He was not heard in the con- 
 fusion, but young Custer knew exactly what to do. 
 While five men held the horses, the other fifteen threw 
 themselves on the ground. On came the Indians after 
 Custer. As soon as they were within easy range, the 
 dismounted men blazed away right in their faces. 
 The troopers were armed with breech-loaders, and the 
 first volley was succeeded by a second. Several of the 
 savages were hit and many of their horses. They reeled, 
 swerved, and Custer rejoined his men. A few moments 
 after, Moylan came up with the main body. 
 
 Custer now dismounted most of his men, and keep- 
 ing a bold front to the Indians, retreated in the timber, 
 fighting hard all the way. Reaching the river, they made 
 good their defense. The Indians tried all their devices 
 to get them out. They set fire to the grass, but it was 
 green and did not burn readily. All their efforts to 
 dislodge the troopers failed, and late in the afternoon 
 a heavy squadron came up on the gallop from the main 
 body under Stanley and put them to flight. It was a 
 sharp affair, and the Indians suffered severely. 
 
 The only losses to the expedition on that day were 
 two civilians: Doctor Honzinger, a fat old German, who 
 was the veterinarian of the regiment, and Mr. Baliran, 
 the sutler. They were both quiet, inoffensive, peace- 
 able men, very much liked, especially the doctor. They 
 were amateur naturalists, and frequently wandered 
 away from the main body on botanizing excursions. 
 They had done so that morning, following Custer's ad- 
 vance, and the Indians had fallen upon them and mur- 
 dered them. It was the discovery of the remains of
 
 Grievance of Rain-in-the-Face 213 
 
 these two men which had caused General Stanley to 
 despatch the cavalry to the relief of the advance. 
 
 Bitter was the anger of the officers and men over this 
 
 O 
 
 murder of unarmed non-combatants, and deep and 
 abiding was their thirst for vengeance on the Indians 
 who perpetrated it. 
 
 II. The Capture of Rain-in-the-Face 
 
 The next year, 1874, the Seventh Cavalry being sta- 
 tioned at Fort Abraham Lincoln, near Bismarck, on the 
 upper Missouri, word was brought to Custer by a scout 
 that a famous Sioux, called by the picturesque name of 
 Rain-in-the-Face, was at Standing Rock Agency, some 
 twenty miles away, boasting that he had killed Doc- 
 tor Honzinger and Mr. Baliran. Rain-in-the-Face was 
 
 O 
 
 already a renowned warrior, of more than ordinary 
 courage. That he should have left the hostiles under 
 Sitting Bull to come to the agency was a thing implying 
 peculiar bravery; and that he should there openly boast 
 of the murder was even more extraordinary. Custer 
 immediately determined upon his capture, although to 
 effect it would be a matter of difficulty and danger. 
 
 The agency was filled with Indians waiting for the 
 issue of rations; and, though they were on a peaceable 
 errand, they were always unruly, insubordinate, and 
 on the alert. Captain Yates and Captain Tom Custer, 
 with one hundred troopers, were detailed to make the 
 arrest. The arrival of one hundred men at the agency 
 instantly excited the suspicion of the Indians. To di- 
 vert it from the real object, Captain Yates ostentatiously 
 detached a lieutenant with fifty men to ride to some 
 villages ten miles away in quest of certain Indians who 
 had some time before raided a settlement and run off
 
 214 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 some stock, killing the herders. With the remainder 
 he purposed to wait for the return of the detachment. 
 Meanwhile it was learned from a scout that Rain-in-the- 
 Face was in the sutler's store. 
 
 Tom Custer, with five picked men, was ordered to 
 enter the store and make the arrest. The store was full 
 of Indians. The weather was very cold, and the Indians 
 kept their blankets well around their faces. It was im- 
 possible to tell one from another. Tom Custer had 
 received a good description of Rain-in-the-Face, how- 
 ever, but it availed him nothing under the circumstances. 
 He and his men, therefore, mingled freely with the 
 Indians from time to time, making small purchases of 
 the sutler to divert suspicion as they lounged about the 
 store. They deceived the savages entirely, in spite of 
 their watchful scrutiny and suspicion. At last one In- 
 dian dropped his blanket and stepped to the counter, 
 either to speak to the trader or to make a purchase. 
 
 It was Rain-in-the-Face. Custer recognized him im- 
 mediately. Stepping behind him, he threw his arms 
 about him and seized him in an iron grasp. The In- 
 dian, who had observed the movement too late, attempt- 
 ed to fire his Winchester; but Custer was too quick for 
 him. The five troopers sprang to the side of their cap- 
 tain, disarmed Rain-in-the-Face, and presented their 
 guns to the astonished and infuriated Indians. The 
 
 O 
 
 room was filled with seething excitement in a moment. 
 The Indians surged toward the troopers, and perhaps 
 would have made short work of them, had not Captain 
 Yates at this juncture entered the room with a detail 
 of his men. 
 
 Rain-in-the-Face, a magnificent specimen of Indian 
 manhood, had ceased to struggle the moment he was 
 convinced that it was unavailing. He was led outside,
 
 Grievance of Rain-in-the-Face 215 
 
 securely bound and mounted on a horse. The troopers 
 were assembled, and in spite of threats and menaces by 
 the Indians, who did not venture to attack, they started 
 back to Fort Lincoln with their prisoner. 
 
 Messengers were sped in every direction to the dif- 
 ferent bands of Indians to mass a force to release Rain- 
 in-the-Face, who was a man of such importance, being 
 the brother of Iron Horse, one of the principal chiefs of 
 the Unkpapas, that no price was counted too great to 
 secure his liberty; indeed, before starting, they had 
 offered Yates two warriors in exchange for him. The 
 rapidity with which the troops moved was such that the 
 prisoner was safely imprisoned at Fort Lincoln before 
 anything could be done. 
 
 Rain in-the-Face stubbornly refused to say anything 
 for a day or two, but finally made full confession that he 
 had shot Mr. Baliran and wounded Doctor Honzinger, 
 who had fallen from his horse, whereupon he had 
 crushed his head with stones. He was put in the guard- 
 house preparatory to being tried for murder, and kept 
 there in spite of the efforts to release him that were made 
 by many prominent Indians. In the same guard-house 
 were some civilians who had been caught stealing grain. 
 One bitterly cold night, during a raging blizzard, the ci- 
 vilians, with some outside assistance, succeeded in mak- 
 ing their escape. Rain-in-the-Face took advantage of 
 the opportunity and left also. He joined the hostiles 
 under Sitting Bull, and sent back word that he intended 
 to have his revenge on the Custers for the treatment he 
 had received.
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 
 
 I. Custer Loses His Command 
 
 TO return to the spring of 1876. When the 
 column which Custer was to have commanded 
 moved out, Custer led his own regiment, while 
 Major-General Alfred H. Terry was in per- 
 sonal command of the column. I give the reason 
 in the words of General George A. Forsyth in a recent 
 letter to me: 
 
 " For some reason Custer, one of the most splendid 
 soldiers that ever lived, hated General Belknap, the 
 Secretary of War. He was a good hater, too. When 
 General Belknap was imprisoned and undergoing trial 
 Custer wrote that he knew of certain things regarding 
 the appointment of post-traders on the upper Missouri 
 River, which things the prosecution thought were what 
 they needed to insure conviction. As a matter of fact, 
 Custer did not know anything. He had heard disap- 
 pointed men who had failed to get said post-trader- 
 ships curse Belknap and say that they knew Belknap 
 had sold the traderships to the appointees. It was not so. 
 Belknap had given these appointments to certain able 
 Iowa politicians for their friends, in order to secure their 
 influence in the next campaign for United States Senator 
 
 216
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 217 
 
 from Iowa, as he had determined to try for a senatorship 
 from his state, viz., Iowa. 
 
 "It was entirely within his own right to make these 
 appointments and there was really nothing wrong in 
 doing so. Of course the disappointed applicants were 
 furious, and especially certain men who had served with 
 Belknap during the Civil War and who thought they 
 had a claim on him. They could not tell lies fast 
 enough about Belknap and especially to Custer, who was 
 thoroughly honest and believed what they said. This 
 was what Custer thought he knew. 
 
 "Custer was summoned to Washington of course. 
 When he was questioned by the House Committee of pros- 
 ecution it was apparent that he did not know anything. 
 His evidence was all hearsay and not worth a tinker's 
 dam. The President General Grant was indignant 
 at Custer's statements regarding Belknap, which turned 
 out to be all hearsay. . . . The President directed 
 General Sherman not to permit Custer to take the field 
 against Sitting Bull undoubtedly to punish him. 
 
 "You will recall that Belknap was in a sort of 
 Scotch verdict way, ' Not proven, my lord ' - acquit- 
 ted. It was only upon the strong, insistent and urgent 
 request of General Sheridan to General Sherman the 
 then Commanding General of the Army that the 
 President finally said that if General Sheridan regarded 
 Custer's services of great importance in the campaign, 
 Sherman might authorize Sheridan to permit him to 
 join his regiment and serve under General Terry, who 
 was appointed to command the expedition. Sherman 
 wired Sheridan what the President said, and Sheridan 
 at once applied for Custer as in his opinion 'necessary.'* 
 
 * It was General Terry's urgent representations which were the main-springs of 
 Sheridan's action. C. T. B.
 
 218 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 "I was in Europe at the time of the Custer disaster, 
 and on my return to General Sheridan's headquarters 
 I saw all the correspondence in the case." 
 
 Therefore, instead of commanding the column, Custer 
 was placed under Terry, who was to command Gibbon's 
 column as well, when the junction had been made be- 
 tween the two. On the iyth of May the command left 
 Fort Lincoln. The seriousness of the situation was felt 
 as never before in an Indian campaign. It was realized 
 that no child's play was before the troops, and it was 
 with unusual gravity that the regiment marched away. 
 Mrs. Custer tells how General Terry ordered the force 
 to parade through Fort Lincoln to reassure the women 
 and children left behind by the sight of its formidable 
 appearance. 
 
 The best part of the expedition was the Seventh 
 Cavalry, six hundred strong, with Custer at its head. 
 The band played "Garry Owen," the famous battle 
 tune of the Washita, as they marched away. They 
 halted on the prairie afterward, and an opportunity was 
 given to the officers and men to say good-by to the 
 dear ones to be left behind; then, to the music of "The 
 Girl I Left Behind Me," they started on that campaign 
 from which half of them never came back. 
 
 They reached the Powder River without mishap, and 
 were there joined by General Gibbon, who reported his 
 command encamped along the Yellowstone, near the 
 mouth of the Big Horn. Major Reno, of the Seventh 
 Cavalry, with six troops had been sent on a scouting 
 expedition to the southward, and had discovered a big 
 Indian trail leading westward toward the Big Horn 
 country. On the iyth of June Reno's men had been 
 within forty miles of the place where Crook was righting
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 219 
 
 his fierce battle, although, of course, they knew nothing 
 of it at this time. On the 22<i Custer was ordered to 
 take his regiment with fifteen days' rations and march 
 down the Rosebud, thoroughly examining the country 
 en route until he struck the Indian trail reported by 
 Reno. 
 
 II. Did Custer Obey His Orders ? 
 
 And now we come to the most important question of 
 this remarkable campaign. On the one hand, General 
 Terry has been severely censured for its dire failure; 
 the death of Custer and the escape of the Indians have 
 been laid at his door. On the other hand, it has been 
 urged that Custer disobeyed his orders, broke up Terry's 
 plan of campaign, and by his insubordination brought 
 about a terrible disaster and let slip the opportunity for 
 administering a crushing defeat to the Indians, which 
 probably would have ended the war and prevented a 
 deplorable loss of life, to say nothing of prestige and 
 treasure. Both officers had, and still have, their 
 partizans, and the matter has been thoroughly threshed 
 out. 
 
 As between Custer and Terry, I profess absolute im- 
 partiality, although, if I have any natural bias, it is 
 toward Custer, whose previous career, as I have inves- 
 tigated it, appeals to me more than Terry's, distin- 
 guished as were the latter's services. I have studied the 
 situation carefully, examining all the evidence published 
 by both sides, and very reluctantly, in spite of my liking 
 for poor Custer, I am compelled to admit that he 
 did disobey his orders; that his action did break up a 
 most promising plan, which, it is highly probable, would 
 have resulted in a decisive battle with the Indians and
 
 22O Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the termination of the war; and that he, and he alone, 
 must be held resronsible for the subsequent disaster. 
 
 General Terry's order to Custer, which follows, is en- 
 tirely clear and explicit: 
 
 Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, M. T., 
 
 June 22d, 1876. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, 7th Cavalry. Colonel: 
 
 The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, 
 as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the 
 march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of 
 the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno 
 a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you 
 any definite instructions in regard to this movement, 
 and were it not impossible to do so, the Department 
 Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, 
 energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise 
 orders which might hamper your action when nearly in 
 contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to 
 you his own views of what your action should be, and 
 he desires that you should conform to them, unless you 
 should see sufficient reasons for departing from them. 
 He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud 
 until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the 
 trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it 
 appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn 
 toward the Little Horn,* he thinks that you should still 
 proceed southward, perhaps as far as the head-waters of 
 the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feel- 
 ing constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude 
 the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south 
 or southeast by passing around your left flank. The col- 
 
 * At the time this was written, it was not generally understood that the full Indian 
 appellation of this stream was Little Big Horn. C. T. B.
 
 GEN. GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER 
 Killed with half his regiment at the Little Big Horn
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 221 
 
 umn of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth 
 of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will 
 cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the 
 forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future 
 movements must be controlled by circumstances, as they 
 arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little 
 Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns 
 that their escape will be impossible. 
 
 The Department Commander desires that on your 
 way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the 
 upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should en- 
 deavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's 
 column, with information of the result of your examina- 
 tion. The lower part of this Creek will be examined by 
 a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command. The 
 supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far 
 as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that 
 distance, and the Department Commander, who will 
 accompany the command of Colonel Gibbon, desires 
 you to report to him there not later than the expiration 
 of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in 
 the meantime you receive further orders. 
 
 Very respectfully your obedient servant, 
 
 E. W. SMITH, 
 Captain i8th Infantry, 
 Acting Assistant Adjutant General. 
 
 Custer was directed to march southward until he 
 struck the trail Reno had discovered. If, as Terry sup- 
 posed, it led across the Rosebud, he was not to follow it 
 westward to the Little Big Horn, or until he met the In- 
 dians, but he was to turn to the southward until he 
 struck the head-waters of the Tongue River. If he 
 found no Indians there, he was to swing northward
 
 222 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 down the valley of the Little Big Horn, toward the spot 
 where Terry supposed the Indians to be, and where, in 
 reality, they were. Meanwhile Gibbon was to come up 
 the Little Big Horn from the north toward the same 
 spot. In the general plan of the campaign, Crook and 
 his force were supposed to prevent the Indians from 
 moving south which they did, by the way. Custer was 
 to keep them from going east, and, as he advanced, was 
 "to feel to his left" to preclude all possibility of their slip- 
 ping between him and Crook, while Gibbon was to keep 
 them from going off to the north. The Indians would 
 have no direction open to them for flight except westward, 
 and in that case the troops hoped to overtake them in a 
 difficult country, inclosed by mountains and rivers. 
 
 Terry, although he was not an experienced Indian 
 fighter, had divined the position of the Indians with re- 
 markable accuracy, and he fully expected to find them 
 on the Little Big Horn. If Custer had followed Terry's 
 orders, he would have reached the Indians on the day 
 that Gibbon's men, as we shall see, rescued Reno. After 
 the disaster Terry magnanimously strove at first to con- 
 ceal from the public the fact that Custer had disobeyed 
 his orders. Custer had paid the penalty for his disobe- 
 dience with his life, and Terry was willing to bear the 
 odium of the defeat and failure. His self-sacrifice was 
 noble and characteristic; but a mistake, caused by the 
 carelessness of General Sherman, coupled with the en- 
 terprise of a brilliant newspaper reporter, who posed as 
 a regularly accredited government messenger, defeated 
 Terry's intent, and instead of the first report, which 
 made no allusion to the disobedience of orders, being 
 made public,* a second report, which told the whole 
 
 * It was delayed in transmission, owing to the cutting of the telegraph wires by the 
 Indians.
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 223 
 
 story, and which was intended for the authorities alone, 
 wasgiven to the press and immediately spread broadcast. 
 The first report soon turned up, andTerry thereafter was 
 made the victim of unmerited obloquy by Custer's par- 
 tizans, who said that the absence of any mention in the 
 original report of any disobedience on the part of Custer, 
 and the alleged failure to allude to the plan of com- 
 paign which Custer had frustrated, was evidence that no 
 importance was attached to the plan by Terry or any 
 one until after the failure and consequent popular 
 indignation. Terry's answer to this was a noble silence, 
 to save Custer's reputation. The living assumed the 
 responsibility to protect the fame of the dead honor 
 to him! 
 
 General Gibbon also has gone on record in a letter to 
 Terry regarding the situation: 
 
 "So great was my fear that Custer's zeal would carry 
 him forward too rapidly, that the last thing I said to him 
 when bidding him good-by after his regiment had filed 
 past you when starting on his march was, 'Now, Custer, 
 don't be greedy, but wait for us.' He replied gaily as, 
 with a wave of his hand, he dashed off to follow his 
 regiment, 'No, I will not.' Poor fellow! Knowing 
 what we do now, and what an effect a fresh Indian trail 
 seemed to have had upon him, perhaps we were expecting 
 too much to anticipate a forbearance on his part which 
 would have rendered cooperation of the two columns 
 practicable.* 
 
 " Except so far as to draw profit from past experience, 
 it is perhaps useless to speculate as to what would have 
 been the result had your plan, as originally agreed upon, 
 been carried out. But I cannot help reflecting that in 
 
 * Italics mine. C. T. B.
 
 224 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 that case my column, supposing the Indian camp to 
 have remained where it was when Custer struck it, 
 would have been the first to reach it; that with our infan- 
 try and Catling guns we should have been able to take 
 care of ourselves, even though numbering only about 
 two-thirds of Ouster's force; and that with six hundred 
 cavalry in the neighborhood, led as only Custer could 
 lead it, the result to the Indians would have been very 
 different from what it was." 
 
 With regard to Gibbon's generous suggestion that 
 Custer was suddenly carried away by the opportunity 
 presented, the testimony of the late General Ludlow is 
 interesting. According to him, Custer stated on the 
 8th of May, in St. Paul, Minnesota, that he intended, at 
 the first chance he got in the campaign, to "cut loose 
 from (and make his operations independent of) General 
 Terry during the summer;" that he had "got away from 
 Stanley and would be able to swing clear of Terry." * 
 
 It is difficult, nay, it is impossible, therefore, to acquit 
 Custer of a deliberate purpose to campaign on his own 
 account so soon as he could get away from General 
 Terry. The sentence of Terry's orders commencing: 
 " It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite in- 
 structions," etc., and expressing confidence in his zeal 
 and energy, and Terry's unwillingness to hamper him 
 with precise directions, when nearly in contact with the 
 enemy, did not warrant Custer in disobeying his orders. 
 It was only to govern his conduct when he should be in 
 contact with the enemy, in which case, of course, he would 
 have to be the sole judge of what was best to be done. 
 
 * Journal of the Military Service Institution in the United States, Vol. XVIII., 
 No. LXXTX.: " The Campaign Against the Sioui in 1876," by Major-General Robert 
 P. Hughes, U. S. A;
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 225 
 
 His conduct in that case will be considered later. In 
 any event it has no bearing on the question of disobedi- 
 ence, for the crux is here: had Custer obeyed orders, 
 he would not have come in contact with the enemy when 
 and where he did. The conditions would have differed 
 greatly. 
 
 Every student of military matters knows that the 
 words used, "He desires that you should conform to 
 them (his own views) unless," etc., convey a direct, pos- 
 itive command.* 
 
 The abstract question of disobedience of orders is 
 one that has often been discussed. It is impossible 
 to maintain the position that an officer should never, 
 under any circumstances, disobey his orders. Circum- 
 stances sometimes compel him to do so. But when an 
 officer commanding troops which are supposed to act in 
 cooperation with other troops receives orders to carry out 
 a certain specified detail of a stated general plan, and in 
 the exercise of his own discretion concludes to disobey 
 his orders and do something other than what he was 
 directed to do, he takes upon himself the onus of success 
 or failure, not merely of his own immediate manoeuver, 
 but of the whole general plan. If the plan miscarries 
 
 *In Terry's report to the Secretary of War, under date of November 21, 1876, he 
 gives his own understanding of his orders, which is fully warranted, in the following 
 paragraph: 
 
 "At a conference which took place on the 2ist between Colonel Gibbon, Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Custer, and myself, I communicated to them the plan of operations 
 which I had decided to adopt. It was that Colonel Gibbon's column should cross 
 the Yellowstone near the mouth of the Little Big Horn, and thence up that stream, 
 with the expectation that it would arrive at that point by the 26th; that Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Custer with the whole of the Seventh Cavalry should proceed up the Rose- 
 bud until he should ascertain the direction in which the trail discovered by Major 
 Reno led; that if it led to the Little Big Horn it should not be followed, but that 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Custer should keep still further to the south before turning 
 toward that river, in order to intercept the Indians should they attempt to pass 
 around to his left, and in order, by a longer march, to give time for Colonel Gib- 
 bon's column to come up."
 
 226 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 through his disobedience, whatever may have been his 
 motives, woe be unto him! If by his disobedience he 
 brings about the end at which the original plan aimed, 
 the defeat of the enemy, that is another proposition. 
 The event has then justified his disobedience. 
 
 Every soldier understands that reasons for disobedi- 
 ence must be so clear, so convincing, and so unexpected, 
 that he is warranted in taking so prodigious a risk. Dis- 
 regarding for the moment, for the sake of argument, 
 General Ludlow's testimony as to preconceived and 
 deliberate intent on Custer's part to disobey, supposing 
 Custer's disobedience to have been caused by some ex- 
 igency or crisis, we may ask ourselves what were the rea- 
 sons that caused him entirely to disregard Terry's plan 
 and so to manoeuver as to bring himself directly in touch 
 with the Indians in the shortest possible time, without 
 attempting either to examine Tullock's Creek* or to in- 
 cline to the southward "feel with his left"? These 
 reasons if any there were can never be known, owing 
 to Custer's death. It can only be said that no satisfac- 
 tory reasons appear which justify Custer's action. 
 
 The best that can be urged in defense of Custer is con- 
 tained in the following paragraph taken from Colonel 
 Godfrey's Century article. f 
 
 "Had Custer continued his march southward that 
 is, left the Indian trail the Indians would have known 
 of our movements on the 25th and a battle would have 
 been fought very near the same field on which Crook had 
 been attacked and forced back only a week before; the 
 
 * I have not discussed the Tullock's Creek matter. It is not material, except that the 
 failure to examine it and to send a scout to Gibbon some of Gibbon's men had been 
 detailed with Custer for the purpose with a report, was simply a further disobedience, 
 and is, perhaps, a confirmation of Custer's deliberate purpose. 
 
 f Century Magazine,Vol. XLIII., No. 3: " Custer's Last Battle," by Colonel E. S. 
 Godfrey, U. S. A.
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 227 
 
 Indians would never have remained in camp and al- 
 lowed a concentration of the several columns to attack 
 them. If they escaped without punishment or battle, 
 Custer would undoubtedly have been blamed." 
 
 It may be pointed out with due reverence to Colonel 
 Godfrey whom I consider one of the ablest officers in 
 the United States Army, by the way that it is hard to 
 see how Custer could have been blamed for obeying his 
 orders, and that it is by no means certain that the In- 
 dians would have discovered Custer's column. Indeed, 
 his previous success in concealing his movements and 
 surprising the Indians (witness the Washita campaign) 
 leads me to believe that he could have carried out his 
 orders without observation. If Gibbon had struck the 
 Indians first and had held them in play Custer could 
 have annihilated them. General Fry's comments in 
 the Century (appended to Colonel Godfrey's article) on 
 Custer's action are entirely wrong. 
 
 As to what would have happened if Custer had been 
 successful, it is more or less idle to speculate. Certainly, 
 if he had overwhelmingly defeated the Indians, I do not 
 think he would have been court-martialed; but if he had 
 been in Reno's place and had been besieged with heavy 
 loss, then I feel certain that Terry would have been in 
 duty bound to prefer charges against him. All this is 
 beside the main question, however, and it is now time 
 to return to the history of the expedition. 
 
 Terry offered Custer four troops of the Second Cavalry 
 and two Catling guns, which were refused. Custer said 
 that any force that was too big for the Seventh Cavalry 
 alone to deal with would be too big for the Seventh Cav- 
 alry plus the four troops, and urged that the guns would 
 hamper and harass his movements. Terry, who elected 
 to go with Gibbon's infantry column, agreed with him.
 
 228 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Neither Terry nor Custer nor any one expected to 
 meet more than one thousand warriors. They had no 
 knowledge whatever of the large numbers of the so- 
 called peaceable Indians, for whom rations had been 
 regularly issued, who had broken away from the agen- 
 cies and joined the hostiles. They did not know of 
 Crook's defeat, and the great effect it had in inducing 
 wavering bucks to give their allegiance to the brave 
 men on the war-path. It will, perhaps, be fair to esti- 
 mate the number of Indian warriors in the field at a 
 mean between the white and Indian accounts, which 
 range from twelve hundred on the one hand to three 
 thousand on the other. To be on the safe side, I shall 
 call it at least two thousand.* Whatever their number, 
 there were enough of them. 
 
 In their way they were two thousand of the fiercest 
 and most desperate fighters on the face of the globe 
 While they were undisciplined, untrained, and not en- 
 tirely amenable to one will, as were the soldiers, they 
 were, nevertheless, a fearfully formidable force. Their 
 common hatred of the white man gave them sufficient 
 coherence to form a rude but effective organization. 
 They were led by experienced chiefs and were used to 
 fighting. From 1868, after the close of the treaty by 
 which the frontier posts were abandoned and the coun- 
 try restored to the Sioux and the Cheyennes, to 1876, 
 no less than two hundred distinct fights, like that 
 described in the account of the Yellowstone expedi- 
 tion, had occurred between the soldiers and the 
 Indians. They were now to be tried in a real battle, 
 and, as we shall see, they were not found wanting; 
 for, in the end, all the honors of the campaign rested 
 with them. 
 
 * Personally, I believe there were many more.
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 229 
 
 III. Ouster's Expedition 
 
 The Seventh Cavalry left the camp at the mouth of 
 the Powder River at twelve o'clock icon, on the 22d of 
 June, 1876. Generals Terry, Giboon, and Custer re- 
 viewed it as it marched away. With the column were 
 fifty Ankara ("Rees") Indian auxiliaries, a few Crows, 
 and a number of white scouts and newspaper corre- 
 spondents. At four o'clock, after they had progressed 
 twelve miles, the march was halted, and that evening the 
 officers were summoned to Custer's headquarters, and 
 marching instructions were given them. No bugle-calls 
 were to be sounded. The march was to be made with 
 the greatest possible rapidity; every officer was to look 
 carefully to his men and horses. Squadron and bat- 
 talion formations were abandoned; each troop com- 
 mander was to report to Custer in person. 
 
 Custer was usually very uncommunicative. Ordi- 
 narily, he kept his plans to himself until the time to strike 
 arrived. On this occasion, however, he announced his 
 purpose, which was to follow the trail until they found 
 the Indians, and then " go for them. " He was not '' car- 
 ried away" by anything, and this declaration is further 
 evidence of his deliberate purpose. His manner, at all 
 times blunt and peremptory, not to say brusque, was 
 now entirely changed. He was usually full of cheerful- 
 ness and confidence. There appeared to be a marked 
 absence of both qualities in this instance. Officers have 
 recorded that he seemed worried and depressed. It may 
 be that he was feeling the displeasure of Grant, which his 
 imprudent conduct had brought about. Perhaps the 
 serious character of the risk he was taking by his inde- 
 pendent move weighed upon him. If he succeeded, he
 
 230 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 would regain all he had lost in the censure. If he failed 
 well, he would not anticipate that. It was enough to 
 give a man serious thoughts. His letters to his wife 
 seem as cheerful and confident as ever, but, perhaps, 
 he may have affected that for her sake. At any rate, 
 the testimony as to his mental condition is unequivocal. 
 However he may have -felt, he acted with his usual 
 energy. Starting at five on the morning of the 23d, the 
 regiment went into camp at five in the afternoon, having 
 covered thirty-three miles over an execrable marching 
 country the " Bad Lands. " On the 24th they marched 
 twenty-eight miles over an. even worse territory. In- 
 dian signs were abundant. Hundreds of Indians evi- 
 dently had passed. As no one could tell how near they 
 were to the hostiles, after supper on the 24th fires were 
 put out and the men were allowed to sleep until half 
 after eleven, while the officers and scouts examined the 
 trail. It was reported to Custer that it led straight 
 across the divide separating the Rosebud and the Little 
 Big Horn. At half after eleven the men were routed out 
 and marched ten miles toward the crest of the Little Big 
 Horn Mountains, which they reached at two o'clock in 
 the morning of Sunday, the 25th. A further halt was 
 made, and at eight o'clock the advance was taken up 
 once more. 
 
 They marched ten miles farther, and concealed them- 
 selves in a large ravine near the devide and about 
 sixteen miles from the little Big Horn, about half after 
 ten in the morning. Smoke was seen trembling in the 
 air by the scouts in the crow's nest on the top of the 
 divide, and there were other evidences of Indians down 
 the valley of the Little Big Horn. It is believed that 
 Custer intended to remain in hiding during the day, and 
 deliver his attack on the next morning. Unfortunately,
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 231 
 
 however, his trail had been crossed by the Indians. A 
 box of hard bread had fallen from one of the pack-mules 
 during the night march. When its loss was discovered, 
 a squad of men had been sent back for it. They found 
 an Indian trying to open it. He made his escape, and 
 would undoubtedly alarm the villages they were ap- 
 proaching. 
 
 And now we come to another problem. As the result 
 of his disobedience he was now practically in contact 
 with the enemy, although he should not have been. Be- 
 ing in contact, however, what was he to do ? There 
 were no orders to govern him now. He was thrown on 
 his own resources just what he wanted, and what he 
 had schemed and planned for. How was he to deal 
 with his self-created opportunity ? 
 
 Believing, as he and every one else did, that the Indian 
 force did not greatly outnumber his own, an attack was 
 entirely feasible. Should he deliver that attack, or 
 should he wait to be attacked ? The advantage is usu- 
 ally with the attacking party in Indian warfare. Should 
 he seize or yield that ? Suppose he decided not to at- 
 tack the Indians, and they moved away and escaped ? 
 Would he not be censured for allowing them to get away, 
 since he had got in touch with them ? 
 
 Suppose remote contingency he were not entirely 
 successful in his attack on the Indians ? Gibbon must 
 be somewhere in the vicinity. A day or two would prob- 
 ably bring him to the rescue. Could he not fight a wait- 
 ing battle, if necessary, until the other column arrived on 
 the field ? Was it not absolutely incumbent upon him 
 to embrace the opportunity presented to him ? He had 
 what he believed to be the finest regiment of cavalry in 
 the service. He had tried it, tested it, on many fields; he 
 knew, or thought he knew, the temper of his officers and
 
 232 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 men. He decided to attack. Indeed, there was nothing 
 else for him to do. Fight he must. In the opinion of 
 distinguished military critics who have expressed them- 
 selves upon the point, from General Sheridan down, he 
 was justified in his decision. In that opinion I concur. 
 And there is no evidence that he ever contemplated 
 doing anything else. He had arranged matters to bring 
 about the opportunity, and he had no hesitation in em- 
 bracing it. Evidently, he had absolutely no premoni- 
 tion of defeat or disaster. 
 
 A little before noon he communicated his intention 
 to his officers and men. He divided his regiment into 
 three battalions. To Major Marcus A. Reno,* an 
 officer with no experience in Indian fighting, he gave 
 
 * As the conduct of Major Reno was so decisive in the subsequent fighting, and since, 
 upon his conduct as a pivot, the fortunes of the day turned, it is well to say something of 
 his record, which I have compiled from official sources. 
 
 He was graduated from West Point in 1857, and was immediately appointed to the 
 First Dragoons, and had risen to a captaincy in the First Cavalry at the outbreak of the 
 Civil War. His career during the war was one of distinction. He was brevetted major, 
 March 17, 1863, for gallant and meritorious services at Kelly's Ford, and lieutenant- 
 colonel for gallant and meritorious services at the Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 
 1864. On January i, 1865, he was appointed colonel of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Vol- 
 unteer Cavalry, and was brevetted brigadier-general of Volunteers at the close of the 
 war. Here is a brave and honorable record. Would that it might never have been 
 tarnished ! 
 
 He joined the Seventh Cavalry December 19, 1869, as major. Ke had had no Indian 
 service prior to that time, and his services up to the present campaign comprised a three 
 months' scouting expedition in Colorado in the summer of 1870. In 1879, upon his own 
 application, a court of inquiry was convened for the purpose of investigating his con- 
 duct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. It was the opinion of the court that no further 
 proceedings were necessary in the case. One sentence of the record is significant: "The 
 conduct of the officers throughout was excellent, and while subordinates in some in- 
 stances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did 
 Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion from this 
 court." 
 
 His relations with General Custer had not been friendly; so inimical were they, 
 in fact, that Custer was begged, before starting on the fatal campaign, not to intrust 
 the command of any supporting movement to Reno. Custer refused to allow any 
 such personal considerations to prevent Reno receiving the command to which his 
 rank entitled him. 
 
 In 1880 Major Reno was found guilty, by a general court-martial, of conduct unbe- 
 coming an officer and a gentleman. While in an intoxicated condition he had engaged
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 233 
 
 Troops A, G, and M; to Captain Benteen, a veteran and 
 successful Indian fighter, Troops D, H, and K; Captain 
 McDougall, with Troop B, was ordered to bring up the 
 mule train and take it in charge; Custer himself took the 
 five remaining troops, C, E, F, I, and L. 
 
 They left the ravine, and about noon crossed the di- 
 vide which separated them from Little Big Horn Valley. 
 Benteen was ordered to swing over to the left and search 
 the country thoroughly in that direction, driving any 
 hostiles he might come across into the village and pre- 
 venting any escape of the Indians to the southward and 
 westward. Reno was to follow a small creek, some- 
 times called Reno's Creek, to its junction with the Little 
 Big Horn and strike the head of the village, supposed to 
 be there. Custer's movements would be determined 
 subsequently, although for the present he followed Reno. 
 McDougall came last, following their trail with the 
 slow-moving train, which dropped rapidly to the rear 
 as the others proceeded at a smart pace. Benteen at 
 once moved off to the westward, while Reno, followed 
 by Custer, started down toward the valley of the Little 
 Big Horn. 
 
 This river is a rapid mountain stream of clear, cold 
 water, with a pebbly bottom, from twenty to forty yards 
 wide. The depth of the water varies from two to five 
 feet. While it is very tortuous, the general direction of 
 the stream is northward to the Big Horn, which flows 
 
 in a brawl in a public billiard saloon, in which he assaulted another officer, destroyed 
 property, and otherwise conducted himself disgracefully. The court sentenced him to 
 be dismissed from the military service of the United States. The sentence was approved 
 by President Hayes, and Major Reno ceased to be an officer of the Army in April, 1880. 
 It is painful to call attention to these facts, especially as Major Reno has since died; 
 but the name and fame of a greater than he have been assailed for his misconduct, and 
 in defense of Custer it is absolutely necessary that Reno's character and services should 
 be thoroughly understood. For a further discussion of Major Reno's conduct, see 
 Appendix B.
 
 234 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 into the Yellowstone. The valley, from half a mile to a 
 mile in width, is bordered by the bare bluffs. Along the 
 river in places are thick clumps of trees. The Indian 
 camp, the end of which they could see as they crossed 
 the divide, was strung along the valley for several miles. 
 
 MAP TO ILLUSTRATE 
 THE: ROUTEOP TH E 
 THREE BATTALIONS 
 AT THE LiTTLE-BiG 
 
 HORN 
 
 DRAWN FROM MOTES 
 
 ADD SKETCHES BY 
 
 CAFTAIM R.L.LIVERMORE. U.S.A. 
 
 N < 
 
 APPPOXIMATe SCALt 
 I MILE 
 
 Reno's advance down the creek took him near to the 
 east bank of river. Custer had followed him, slightly 
 on his right flank. When Reno discovered the head of 
 
 O 
 
 the village in the valley, he crossed the creek to Custer 
 and reported what he had seen. Custer directed him to 
 cross the river, move down the valley, and attack in 
 force, informing him that he would be "supported" by
 
 The Little Big Horn Campaign 235 
 
 Custer's battalion. Reno accordingly put his battalion 
 to a fast trot in columns of four, crossed the Little Big 
 Horn River beyond the mouth of the creek, and pro- 
 ceeded onward for perhaps half a mile. Then he threw 
 his troops in line, reaching from the river to the bluffs 
 on the left, with the Ankara scouts on the left flank, 
 and galloped down the valley for a mile farther.* 
 
 Reno stated subsequently that he believed that Cus- 
 ter intended to keep behind him all the time; and he 
 fully expected, should he come in contact with Indians, 
 that Custer would be on hand to join in the attack. 
 Custer, however, had not continued down the creek or 
 crossed the river with Reno, but had swung off to the 
 high bluffs on the right bank of the creek, east of the 
 river. Reno mistook the purport of Custer's statement. 
 In order to support an attack, it is not necessary to get 
 behind it. A flank attack or a demonstration in force, 
 from some other direction, frequently may be the best 
 method of supporting an attack. Custer's plan was en- 
 tirely simple. Reno was to attack the end of the village. 
 Benteen was to sweep around and fall on the left of it, 
 Custer on the right. The tactics in the main were those 
 which had been used so successfully in the Battle of the 
 Washita (q-v.), and were much in vogue among our 
 Indian fighters during the Indian wars. 
 
 Dividing forces in the face of an enemy to make sev- 
 eral simultaneous attacks is dangerous, because it is 
 almost impossible to secure a proper cooperation 
 between the attacking units. A skilful general will con- 
 centrate his force upon the separately approaching and 
 more or less isolated units and beat them in detail. 
 Washington's tactics at Germantown were similar to 
 
 * Sure proof that the horses were not, as is sometimes urged, utterly worn out by 
 the hard marching.
 
 236 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 those of Custer; and his force, which would have swept 
 the British from the field if his plans had been carried 
 out, was beaten in detail for lack of coordination in the 
 separate attacks. Some of Napoleon's most brilliant 
 battles were fought when he occupied interior lines and 
 by successive attacks broke up converging columns. 
 
 Still, the Indians were not believed to be veteran tac- 
 ticians, although everybody underestimated their quali- 
 ties. They were extremely liable to panic. A sudden 
 attack or a surprise almost always disorganized them 
 and threw them into confusion. Under the peculiar cir- 
 cumstances, I think there is little question that Custer's 
 tactics were entirely sound and well considered, although 
 this conclusion is often disputed. Where Custer made 
 a mistake appears to be in his failure to take greater pre- 
 cautions that the attacks should be delivered simulta- 
 neously. He had a much longer distance to go than Reno 
 and over a much worse country before he could attack, 
 and he was not at all sure as to where Benteen was or 
 when he could join. Nevertheless, the chances of suc- 
 cess were many, the chances of failure few, and I have 
 no doubt that Custer would have been successful had 
 there not been a woeful lack of conduct on the part of his 
 principal subordinate.
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 The Last of Custer 
 
 I. Reno's Failure at the Little Big Horn 
 
 IT will be necessary, in order clearly to comprehend 
 the complicated little battle, to treat each of the 
 three operations separately, and then see how they 
 were related to one another. 
 
 As Reno's men trotted down the valley, they saw, 
 some distance ahead of them and to the right across the 
 river on a line of high bluffs, Custer attended by his staff. 
 The general waved his hat at them encouragingly, and 
 disappeared over the brow of the hill. That glimpse of 
 Custer, standing on that hill with outstretched arm gal- 
 lantly waving his troopers on to battle, was the last any 
 one of his comrades in the valley had of him in life; and 
 it is certain that Reno must have realized then that 
 Custer was not following him, and that he was expected 
 to attack in his front alone. 
 
 However, Reno, having drawn near to the village, 
 deployed his skirmishers, and slowly advanced down 
 the valley. In a few moments they were hotly engaged 
 with a constantly growing force of Indians. 
 
 Now, one thing about the battle that followed is the 
 utter unreliability of the Indian reports of their move- 
 ments. It is alleged that fear of punishment made them 
 
 237
 
 238 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and keeps them reticent and uncommunicative. Differ- 
 ent Indians tell different stories. Most of these stories 
 disagree in their essential details, and it is impossible to 
 reconcile them. It may be that the faculties of the In- 
 dians are not sufficiently alert to enable them to recall 
 the general plan of the battle, or at least to relate it, 
 although they knew well enough how to fight it at the 
 time. Their accounts are haphazard to the last degree. 
 Some say that they knew nothing of the advent of the 
 troops until Reno's men deployed in the valley. At any 
 rate, they had sufficient time, on account of his dilatory 
 and hesitating advance, to assemble in heavy force. 
 Reno had less than one hundred and fifty men with him. 
 Even if Dr. Eastman's estimate,* that the Indians num- 
 bered but twelve hundred warriors, be true, they still 
 outnumbered Reno, although, owing to the fact that the 
 villages were strung along the river for several miles, only 
 a portion of them were at first engaged with the troops. 
 Flushed with their previous victory over Crook a short 
 time before, these Indians now fell upon Reno like a 
 storm. 
 
 Reno's line extended clear across the valley, which was 
 quite narrow where the battle was joined, the right flank 
 protected by the river, the left by the bluffs. Recover- 
 ing from their alleged panic, possibly because of the 
 feeble advance of the soldiers, the Indians rallied, and 
 with wonderful generalship massed their attack on the 
 left flank, which was most unfortunately held by the 
 Arikara scouts. No Ankara that ever lived was a 
 match for the Sioux or the Cheyennes. The Rees, as 
 these Indian auxiliaries were called, broke and fled in- 
 
 * Charles A. Eastman, M. D., a full-blooded Sioux, a graduate of Dartmouth and the 
 Boston University School of Medicine, who has published an interesting account of the 
 battle from his investigations among the Sioux. See The Chautauquan, Vol. XXXI., 
 No. 4, July, 190x3.
 
 CAPT. MYLES MOYLAN 
 LIEUT. A. E. SMITH * 
 
 MAJ. MARCUS A. RENO 
 CAPT. EDWARD S. GODFREY 
 
 SOME OF CTJSTER'S OFFICERS 
 
 * Killed with Custer at the Little Big Horn
 
 The Last of Custer 239 
 
 continently. They never stopped until they reached the 
 supply camp on the Powder River, miles away. At the 
 same time the horses of two troopers in the command 
 ran away with them, and plunged straight into the 
 Indian lines with their riders. Their fate was plain. 
 
 As the Ree scouts broke, the Indians turned Reno's 
 left flank. The troopers gave way at once. There was 
 no reserve which could be thrown upon the Indians until 
 the line was restored. The whole force was slammed 
 back, like a door, into the timber on the bank of 
 the river. 
 
 Here Reno made a serious mistake. After rallying 
 his men, he ordered them to dismount. Cavalry may 
 be dismounted for defense, but sound judgment and 
 military usage demand that for an attack, especially 
 upon an Indian village of that kind, they should charge 
 upon horseback. As one veteran cavalryman has 
 written me, "I never could understand why Reno did 
 not charge desperately on the Indians in front of him. 
 His dismounting his men was against all sound military 
 judgment. 'Audacity, always audacity,' is the motto 
 for a cavalryman. "* Had Reno been governed by this 
 principle and charged, as he should have done, the 
 result would have been different. f 
 
 The position was instantly surrounded by yelling 
 Indians galloping madly to and fro, firing upon the 
 troops. So far, Reno had lost but one wounded and 
 the two who had galloped into the Indian line. His 
 second position was admirable for defense. Sheltered 
 by the trees, with his flanks and rear protected by 
 
 * General G. A. Forsyth. 
 
 f The unanimous testimony of the Indians who have discussed the battle subsequently 
 is that they were panic-stricken by Reno's approach, and would have fled if his attack 
 had been pressed home. This is about the only statement upon which the Indians all 
 agree.
 
 240 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the river, he could have held the place indefinitely. 
 However, he had not been detailed to defend or hold 
 any position, but to make a swift, dashing attack. Yet, 
 after a few moments of the feeblest kind of advance, he 
 found himself thrown on the defensive. Such a result 
 would break up the most promising plan. It certainly 
 broke up Ouster's. In spite of the defection of the 
 Rees, a vigorous countercharge down the valley would 
 have extricated Reno and might have saved Custer. 
 
 It is a painful thing to accuse an army officer of mis- 
 conduct; yet I have taken the opinion of a number of 
 army officers on the subject, and every one of them con- 
 siders Reno culpable in a high degree. One at least has 
 not hesitated to make known his opinion in the most 
 public way. I am loath to believe that Major Reno was 
 a coward, but he certainly lost his head; and when he 
 lost his head, he lost Custer. His indecision was pitiful. 
 Although he had suffered practically no loss and had no 
 reason to be unduly alarmed, he was in a state of pain- 
 ful uncertainty as to what he should do next. The sol- 
 dier, like the woman, who hesitates in an emergency 
 which demands instant decision, is lost. 
 
 How long the troops stayed under the trees by the 
 river bank cannot be determined accurately. Some 
 have testified that it was a few moments, others an hour. 
 Personally I think it was a few moments, which fear and 
 apprehension lengthened to an impossible period. There 
 had as yet been no panic, and under a different officer 
 there would have been none; but it is on record that 
 Reno at last gave an order for the men to mount and 
 retreat to the bluffs. Before he could be obeyed, he 
 countermanded this order. Then the order was repeated, 
 but in such a way that nobody save those immediately 
 around him heard it, because of the din of the battle
 
 The Last of Custer 241 
 
 then raging in a sort of aimless way all along the line, and 
 no attempt was made to obey it. It was then repeated 
 for the third time. Finally, as those farther away saw 
 those nearest the flurried commander mounting and 
 evidently preparing to leave, the orders were gradually 
 communicated throughout the battalion, and nearly the 
 whole mass got ready to leave. Eventually they broke 
 out of the timber in a disorderly column of fours, striv- 
 ing to return to the ford which they had crossed when 
 they had entered the valley. 
 
 Reno calls this a charge, and he led it. He was so ex- 
 cited that, after firing his pistols at the Indians who came 
 valiantly after the fleeing soldiers, he threw them away.* 
 The pressure of the Indians upon the right of the men 
 inclined them to the left, away from the ford. In fact, they 
 were swept into a confused mass and driven toward the 
 river. All semblance of organization was lost in the mad 
 rush for safety. The troops had degenerated into a mob. 
 
 The Indians pressed closely upon them, firing into the 
 huddle almost without resistance. Evidently in their 
 excitement the Indians fired high, or the troops would 
 have been annihilated. The Indians supposed, of 
 course, that they now had the troops corralled between 
 them and the river, and that all they needed to do 
 was to drive them into it. Chief Gall, who with Crazy 
 Horse and Crow King was principally responsible for 
 the Indian manceuvers, seeing the retreat of Reno to the 
 river, summoned a large body of warriors, left the field 
 and crossed the river farther down, intending to sweep 
 down upon the other side and attack Reno's men as they 
 struggled up the steep bank in case any of them suc- 
 ceeded in crossing. This was, as it turned out, a fortu- 
 nate move for the Indians. 
 
 * This statement is elsewhere denied.
 
 242 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Meanwhile, Reno's men providentially found a pony 
 trail which indicated a ford of the river. On the other 
 side the trail led into a funnel-shaped amphitheater, 
 surrounded by high, slippery bluffs. Into this cul-de- 
 sac the whole fleeing body plunged, the Indians pressing 
 the rear hard. The men jumped their horses from the 
 bank into the water, and finding that the trail stopped at 
 the bluff on the other side, actually urged them up the 
 steep slopes of the hill. 
 
 There is no denying that they were panic-stricken. 
 Although some of the veterans opened fire upon the sav- 
 ages, the bulk of the troopers did nothing but run. Dr. 
 DeWolf was one of the coolest among those present. He 
 stopped his horse deliberately, and fired at the Indians 
 until he was shot dead. Lieutenant Macintosh, striv- 
 ing to rally his men, was shot just as they left the timber. 
 Lieutenant Hodgson, reaching the river bank, had his 
 horse shot. In his agony the animal stumbled into the 
 river and fell dead. The same bullet which killed 
 the horse broke Hodgson's leg. He cried for help, and 
 Sergeant Criswell rode over to where he lay. Hodg- 
 son took hold of the sergeant's stirrup, and under a heavy 
 fire was dragged out on the bank, which he had scarcely 
 reached before a second bullet struck him in the head, 
 killing him instantly. Criswell was swept on by his 
 men, but so soon as he could he rode back under a furi- 
 ous fire and brought off the body, as well as all the am- 
 munition in the saddle-bags on several dead horses. He 
 received a medal of honor for his courage. 
 
 If Gall had completed his projected movements, 
 Reno's men would have been annihilated then and there. 
 As it was, they reached the top of the bluffs without 
 further molestation. They had lost three officers and 
 twenty-nine men and scouts killed; seven men were
 
 The Last of Custer 243 
 
 badly wounded, and one officer, Lieutenant DeRudio, 
 and fifteen men were missing.* These had been left 
 behind in the confusion of Reno's " charge. " 
 
 It was now somewhere between half after one and two 
 o'clock in the afternoon, and during the fighting Reno 
 was joined by Benteen's battalion. The Indians kept 
 up a desultory fire on the position, but they seemed to 
 have diminished in numbers. Reno occupied the next 
 hour in reorganizing his force, getting the men into their 
 accustomed troops, and taking account of casualties. 
 
 II. With Benteen's Battalion 
 
 In accordance with his orders, Benteen had moved off 
 to the westward. He speedily became involved in al- 
 most impassable country, full of deep ravines, in which 
 progress was slow and difficult. Water was very scarce 
 in the country over which the regiment had marched 
 until it reached the valley of the Big Horn. What water 
 they had found that morning was so alkaline that the 
 horses and mules, although they had been nearly a day 
 without water, would not drink it. The horses were 
 naturally tired, having marched over fifty miles since the 
 morning of the day before , and the terrible up-and-down 
 hill work exhausted them still more, although they were 
 by no means played out. No Indians were seen by Ben- 
 teen, and the condition of the country was such that it 
 was evident there were none before him. 
 
 He turned to the right, therefore, and struck into the 
 valley of the Big Horn, just ahead of McDougall and 
 the pack train, intending to cross the river and attack 
 the village or join Reno, as the case might be. He had 
 
 * DeRudio and one other man joined the command on the night of June 26th ; the 
 others succeeded in crossing the river to Reno's position late in the afternoon.
 
 244 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 just watered his horses at a little brook following out a 
 morass, when a sergeant from Caster's battalion passed 
 by on a gallop, with a message for the supply train to 
 come at once. As the trooper raced along the line he 
 shouted exultantly, "We've got 'em, boys!" Benteen's 
 men took this to mean that Custer had captured the 
 village. A few moments after, Trumpeter Martini gal- 
 loped up with a message from Custer to Benteen, signed 
 by Cook, the adjutant, which read as follows: 
 
 " Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring 
 packs. 
 
 "P. S. Bring packs." 
 
 The need for the spare ammunition with the pack- 
 train was apparently so urgent that in his hurry Cook re- 
 peated the last two words. At the same time the sound 
 of distant firing was heard in the valley. Making ready 
 for instant action, Benteen led his troopers forward at a 
 gallop down the valley. Tired though the animals were, 
 they responded nobly to the demands of their riders, and 
 the whole party swept across the hills in the direction 
 whence the trumpeter had come until they overlooked 
 the valley. Every one supposed that Custer had entered 
 the valley and was driving the Indians before him. 
 That he expected to have a big fight on his hands was 
 indicated by the reiteration of his request that the 
 pack train should be rushed forward, evidently to bring 
 the reserve ammunition. 
 
 The valley was filled with dust and smoke; the day 
 was frightfully hot and dry. Bodies of men could be 
 distinguished galloping up and down. Benteen would, 
 perhaps, have crossed the river and charged down the 
 valley had his attention not been called to a body of 
 men in blue on the bluff on the same side of the river to 
 the right. They were, assuredly, hotly engaged, but there
 
 The Last of Custer 245 
 
 were also evidences of fierce fighting far down the valley. 
 What was happening ? What should he do ? At this 
 junction one of the Crow scouts these Indians had not 
 fled with the cowardly Rees, but remained with the com- 
 mand, fighting bravely came up driving a small bunch 
 of captured ponies, and he indicated that the principal 
 battle was on the bluff. Benteen accordingly galloped 
 around the bend of the river, and joined the demoralized 
 Reno without opposition. 
 
 It is interesting to speculate what might have hap- 
 pened if Benteen had crossed the river and had charged 
 down the valley. In that case, if Reno had recrossed 
 the river and again attacked, the day might still have 
 been won, but in all probability Reno would not have 
 recrossed and Benteen would have been annihilated. 
 At any rate, Benteen did the only thing possible when 
 Reno's whereabouts and need were made known to him 
 by the scout. 
 
 Reno had lost his hat in his famous "charge," and had 
 his head tied up in a handkerchief. He was much ex- 
 cited, and apparently had no idea as to what he should do 
 next. The officers of his battalion made no bones about 
 admitting to the newcomers that they had been badly 
 beaten and were in a critical condition. None of them 
 could tell anything about Custer. 
 
 III. The Battle on the Bluffs 
 
 Benteen's men were ordered to divide their ammuni- 
 tion with Reno's. A line of skirmishers was thrown out 
 around the bluffs, and an effort to get water from the 
 river was made, the supply in the canteens having been 
 long ago exhausted. The Indian fire prevented this. 
 There was, of course, not a drop of water on the bluffs,
 
 246 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and the wounded suffered greatly, to say nothing of the 
 thirsty men. The officers collected in groups on the 
 edge of the bluffs overlooking the field, and discussed 
 the question. They were not molested by the Indians 
 at this time. 
 
 The general impression was that Custer had made the 
 mistake of his life in not taking the whole regiment in 
 together. Possibly Reno's men took that view because 
 they had been so badly mauled themselves. The valley 
 had been filled with Indians, but, about three o'clock 
 or a little after, most of them galloped down the river 
 and were soon out of sight. The river banks were still 
 lined with Indians under cover, who kept up a smart fire 
 on Reno's men if they attempted to descend the bluffs 
 and approach the water; but the main force had evi- 
 dently withdrawn. 
 
 Firing was heard far away to the northward. It was 
 heavy and continuous. There could be but one expla- 
 nation of it. Custer's detachment had at last met the 
 Indians and was engaged. This should surely have 
 been a stimulus to Reno. Custer was fighting ; Reno 
 was not menaced what should he do? Later in the 
 afternoon two heavy volleys in rapid succession were 
 remarked. This was so unusual under the circumstances 
 that it was finally felt to be a signal from Custer. He 
 must surely be in grave peril, then, and calling for help. 
 How, in the name of all that was soldierly, could such 
 an appeal be neglected ? Many and anxious were the 
 questions the officers and men put among themselves as 
 to why Reno did not do something. It was felt by every- 
 body that Custer was in grave jeopardy, and that Reno 
 should move at once. He had about three hundred 
 men under his command, one-half of whom had not 
 been engaged.
 
 The Last of Custer 
 
 247
 
 248 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Captain Weir, of D Troop, on the right of Reno's com- 
 mand, having cleared away the Indians in front of him, 
 at last boldly took matters in his own hands. After 
 pleading again and again for permission,* he started 
 alone without it toward the sound of the firing to see 
 what he could. Lieutenant Edgerly, his second, sup- 
 posed that he had received orders to advance, and he 
 accordingly put the troop in motion. Weir was on the 
 bluff, Edgerly lower down in a small ravine. The In- 
 dians moved to attack Edgerly, when Weir signaled him 
 to lead his men up the bluff, which he did without loss. 
 The troop, unsupported and in defiance of Reno's 
 orders, advanced to the point where Custer had been 
 last seen to wave his hat, and there stopped. The men 
 could overlook the ridges and valleys beyond them for a 
 great distance. 
 
 A mile and a half or two miles away they could see, 
 through the defiles in the ridges, great clouds of mounted 
 Indians. Reports of rifles indicated that the battle, 
 whatever it was, was still being waged. It was impos- 
 sible for Weir and Edgerly to do anything with their 
 single troop. Although they were not seriously attacked 
 in their bold advance, Reno at first made no movement 
 to support them. 
 
 At half after four Captain McDougall and the pack 
 train joined Reno. They had not been molested in any 
 way. At last, about five o'clock, Reno yielded to the 
 urgent and repeated representations of the angry officers, 
 and marched along the ridge to the position Weir and 
 
 * " The splendid officers of the Seventh, who had followed Custer so faithfully, begged 
 Major Reno to ht them try to join the general. They cried like women, they swore, 
 they showed thiir contempt of that coward, but the discipline of their lives as soldiers 
 prevented them disobeying until it was too late. You know Colonel Weir and Lieu- 
 tenant Edgerly tried." Private letter to me from the wife of an officer who was killed 
 in the battle.
 
 CAPT. THOS. W. CUSTER 
 CAPT. GEORGE W. YATES 
 
 LIEUT. JAMES CALHOUN 
 CAPT. MILES W. KEOGH 
 
 SOME OF CUSTER'S TROOP COMMANDERS 
 
 All killed with him at the Little Big Horn
 
 The Last of Custer 249 
 
 Edgerly had reached. He came up to this point at half 
 after five. The firing on the bluffs far ahead was prac- 
 tically over. The Indians could still be seen and some 
 shooting was going on, but there did not appear to be a 
 battle raging. They learned afterward that it was the 
 Indians shooting into the bodies of the dead. 
 
 It was evident to every one that whatever might have 
 been done earlier in the afternoon, there was no use in 
 advancing now. Indeed, the Indians came sweeping 
 back in great force in front of Reno, and at once attacked 
 him. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to the 
 most defensible position he could find, and endeavor to 
 hold his ground. Custer and his men, if they still sur- 
 vived, must be left to face as best they could whatever 
 fate had in store for them. Reno accordingly retreated 
 to the place on the bluff whence he had just come. 
 Lieutenant Godfrey, of K Troop, the rear guard, with- 
 out orders deployed and dismounted his men, and, 
 ably seconded by his junior, Lieutenant Luther R. Hare, 
 by hard fighting kept off the Indians till the retreat was 
 safely made by the rest, whom he and his troopers suc- 
 ceeded in joining. It was well that he did this, for his 
 coolness and courage saved the command. 
 
 There was a little depression back of a ridge, which 
 afforded some cover for the horses and pack train. Dur- 
 ing the retreat an incident occurred worthy of mention. 
 One of the pack mules, loaded with precious ammuni- 
 tion, broke away and galloped toward the Indian line. 
 Sergeant Hanley, of C Troop, sprang to his horse and 
 raced after it. Officers and men called to him to come 
 back, but knowing how priceless was the ammunition, 
 he persisted in his course. He succeeded in heading 
 off the animal, which turned and ran parallel to the In- 
 dian line, along which he galloped under a perfect
 
 250 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 shower of bullets, none of which, fortunately, touched 
 him. He captured the mule, and brought it back with the 
 ammunition intact. For this exploit he received a medal 
 of honor. 
 
 The men took position around the ridge, across the 
 depression and on a hill to the right, so as to protect 
 the packs and the field hospital from all sides except 
 on the river side, where the height of the bluffs and the 
 distance prevented any Indian attack from that direc- 
 tion. Benteen's Troop H was placed on the right. They 
 were on top of the break of the ridge and were without 
 cover, the ridges being entirely bare of trees. Farther 
 off, to the right, Benteen's position was commanded by 
 higher ridges. At first the brunt of the fighting fell on 
 the left, but the Indians soon surrounded the position 
 and the engagement became general. The men threw 
 themselves on the ground, and dug rifle-pits with their 
 knives, tin pans anything they could get. The fighting 
 soon became severe, but gradually slackened as dark- 
 ness approached, and stopped at about nine o'clock at 
 night. The village in the valley was the scene of tri- 
 umphant revel that night, and the shouting of the In- 
 dians could plainly be heard on the bluffs. 
 
 The early part of the night was full of wild confusion, 
 but before long the soldiers recovered their equanimity 
 and set to work strengthening their position. They 
 were now completely surrounded; but most of them were 
 under cover except Benteen's men, whose position, as 
 has been stated, was overlooked by higher ridges within 
 easy range. At two A.M., contrary to their usual hab- 
 it, the Indians opened fire, but no attack was made. 
 The next morning the battle began again in grim 
 earnest. 
 
 The Indians pressed the party closer and closer. Ben-
 
 The Last of Custer 251 
 
 teen's exposed line suffered more than any other position. 
 That experienced fighter saw that the Indians were 
 massing in front of him, evidently intending to deliver a 
 charge. If it fell upon his single troop it would not be 
 possible to withstand it, and the whole force on the hill 
 would be taken in reverse and annihilated. His men 
 had nearly exhausted their ammunition, several had 
 been killed, and there were a number of wounded to be 
 attended to. 
 
 Ordering Lieutenant Gibson to hold the line at all 
 hazards, Benteen ran to Reno, explained the situation, 
 and begged for a reinforcement. After much urging 
 he succeeded in getting Troop M, Captain French, sent 
 over to the hill. Then he entreated Reno to allow the 
 two troops to charge. Reno hesitated. Benteen urged 
 him again and again, pointing out that if something were 
 not done immediately, the position would be rushed and 
 the command wiped out. At last he wrung a reluctant 
 permission from Reno. He ran back to his position on 
 the hill, and not a moment too soon formed his men up 
 for the charge, putting himself at their head. 
 
 "All ready now, men!" he cried gallantly. "Now's 
 your time! Give 'em hell! Hip! Hip! Here we go!" 
 
 The Indians had also given the word to charge, but 
 Benteen was too quick for them. Leading his men with 
 splendid bravery, revolver in hand, he rushed at the In- 
 dians. There was a brief hand-to-hand melee and the 
 Indians broke and fled. Reno, seeing the effect of Ben- 
 teen's gallant dash, actually led out a portion of his com- 
 mand on the other side of the hill and drove back the In- 
 dians in that direction. Benteen's magnificent courage 
 had saved the day for the present. 
 
 The fire having slackened somewhat about eleven 
 o'clock in the morning, volunteers were called to get
 
 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 water for the command, especially for the wounded. 
 The Indians swept the banks of the river with their fire, 
 and the attempt was hazardous to a degree. Nineteen 
 men offered their services. Four of the best marks- 
 men Geiger, Windolph, Voit, and Mechling, of Troop 
 H were detailed to cover the others by taking an ex- 
 posed position on the brink of the bluffs overlooking the 
 river, as near as they could get to it. The other fifteen, 
 one of whom has told me about the attempt, carrying 
 canteens and camp-kettles, but without arms, crawled 
 down through the bushes and ravines to the open space 
 on the bank of the river, and then, covered by the rapid 
 fire of the four men stationed above them, dashed for 
 the stream. The Indians, who were execrable shots, 
 opened a heavy fire upon them, but the men succeeded 
 in filling the vessels they had brought, and though many 
 of these vessels were hit and some of the men wounded, 
 none of them was killed. A scanty supply of water it 
 was, but it was a godsend. These nineteen also re- 
 ceived medals of honor. 
 
 At three o'clock in the afternoon the firing, which 
 had been maintained intermittently since noon, finally 
 stopped, and later the men on the hill saw the Indians 
 withdrawing from the valley. They set fire to the grass 
 to screen their movements, but about seven o'clock in 
 the evening they were distinctly seen moving out with 
 all their possessions toward the mountains of the Big 
 Horn. Eighteen troopers had been killed on the hill, 
 and fifty-two wounded. 
 
 IV. The Last of Custer 
 
 Now let us turn to Custer. 
 
 Nobody knows exactly what he did. The testimony
 
 The Last of Custer 253 
 
 of the field is not clear, and the statements of the Indians 
 are contradictory. Dr. Eastman, an educated Sioux, 
 has investigated the subject among many of his people, 
 and arrives at one conclusion; Colonel Godfrey, one 
 of the troop commanders who was with Benteen, and 
 who has subsequently examined the field in company 
 with Benteen and other officers, taking the testimony 
 of Chief Gall, holds another. According to Eastman, 
 whose account agrees with the popular understanding, 
 Custer attempted to ford the river at a place now called 
 Reno's Creek,* and fall on what he supposed to be the 
 rear of the village, but which was really the middle of 
 the upper half, and was driven back to the hills, where 
 the final tragedy took place. 
 
 Godfrey, on the contrary, says that Custer, from the 
 point where he was last seen by Reno's men, had a view 
 of the village for several miles, although not for its whole 
 length; that he must have been confident that he had it 
 below him then, and that he made a wide detour in or- 
 der to fall on the rear of the village. It was from this 
 point that he sent the hurry-up message to Benteen. 
 When at last, having gone far enough, as he thought, to 
 take the village in the rear, or what he supposed was the 
 rear, he turned toward the river, and was at once met by 
 the Indians in great force. 
 
 It was probably about half after two in the afternoon. 
 Reno had been forced back and driven across the river. 
 Chief Gall, it will be recalled, had taken a large body 
 of men across the river to intercept Reno on the other 
 side. Before he could move down to the right for this 
 purpose, Custer's men suddenly appeared on the hills. 
 
 * Not the Reno's Creek referred to above, down which Reno marched to the 
 Little Big Horn. This Reno's Creek may be seen in the largest map between Reno's 
 final position and the Custer Hill, where the general's battalion was overwhelmed.
 
 254 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Ouster's manoeuvering had been fine, and his appear- 
 ance was a complete surprise, which at first greatly 
 alarmed the Indians. Gall, however, did not lose his 
 head. Rightly judging that Reno was temporarily elimi- 
 nated from the game, he at once determined to attack 
 Custer. He sent word of the situation to Crazy Horse, 
 who was pressing Reno. Leaving just enough warriors 
 to make a demonstration before the demoralized Reno, 
 Crazy Horse galloped headlong down the valley, fol- 
 lowed by his men and joined by others from the far end 
 of the village, who had as yet taken no part in the 
 fighting. They too crossed the river at the point where 
 a deep ravine concealed their movements and enabled 
 them to obtain a position on Custer's right flank. A 
 similar ravine enabled Gall to menace the left flank. 
 The Indians were in sufficient force completely to sur- 
 round Custer. In the twinkling of an eye he found him- 
 self attacked in front and on both sides. Instead of ad- 
 vancing, he was forced to defend himself against an over- 
 whelming attack. The troops were dismounted, horses 
 moved to the rear, and Custer's men occupied the 
 ridges. 
 
 Calhoun's troop was posted on the left, followed by 
 those of Keogh, Smith, and Yates, with Tom Custer's 
 on the extreme right. The last three troops happened 
 to have the best defensive position upon the highest hill. 
 With them was Custer. The Indians attacked at once. 
 Riding at full gallop along the front of the line on their 
 ponies, they poured a heavy fire from their long-range 
 rifles upon the soldiers, to which the latter made a brave, 
 steady, but not very effective reply with their inferior 
 carbines. Keogh's and Calhoun's horses were stam- 
 peded at the first fire. 
 
 The force menacing them was so great that Custer
 
 The Last of Custer 255 
 
 dared not leave his position on the hills. To retreat was 
 hopeless, to advance impossible. They must stand on the 
 defensive and pray that the advance of Reno's command 
 up the valley, which they probably hoped that Benteen 
 would reinforce, would compel the withdrawal of the 
 Indians from their front. They fought on, therefore, 
 coolly and resolutely, husbanding their ammunition and 
 endeavoring to make every shot tell on their galloping, 
 yelling foemen. They were, I imagine, by no means 
 without ultimate hope of victory. The Indians in their 
 accounts speak of the cool, deliberate courage of num- 
 bers of the officers and men, whom they singled out for 
 their bravery. 
 
 Yet the troopers suffered great loss as the afternoon 
 wore on. Their ammunition began to run low, and the 
 contracting, whirling circle of Indians drove them closer 
 and closer together. The remaining horses of the other 
 three troops were at last stampeded, and with them 
 went all of the reserve ammunition. The situation had 
 evidently become so serious that Custer, in the vain 
 hope that Reno would understand his peril at last, 
 fired the two volleys which have been referred to. It 
 appears at this time that he must have endeavored to 
 send a message to Reno, for the body of a solitary 
 soldier, Sergeant Butler, was found after the battle at a 
 point half way between Custer's and Reno's commands. 
 A little heap of cartridges lay near his body, evidencing 
 that he had sold his life dearly. The Indians were 
 acute enough so they say, and probably with truth 
 to pick out the officers with Custer, and the mortality 
 among them was fearful. It was evident to all on the 
 hill, as the afternoon drew toward its close, that they 
 were doomed. It was hardly possible that a counter- 
 attack by Reno would save them now, and there were
 
 256 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 no evidences whatever that he was anywhere in the 
 vicinity. 
 
 "Where, in God's name," they must have asked 
 themselves in their despair, "can Reno be ?" 
 
 One of the Crow scouts has said although his ac- 
 count is generally disbelieved that he went at last to 
 Custer, as yet unharmed, and told him that he thought 
 he could get him away, and that Custer, of course, 
 refused to leave the field. The Crow altered his ap- 
 pearance by draping a blanket about him so as to look 
 as much like a Sioux as possible, and in the confusion of 
 the fight got away safely.* He was the only human 
 survivor of the field. f What occurred after is a matter 
 of conjecture, based upon the contradictory and in- 
 adequate testimony of the Indians themselves. 
 
 Gall and Crazy Horse now determined to end the af- 
 fair. Massing their warriors in the ravine, they fell on 
 both flanks at the same time that Crow King and Rain- 
 in-the-Face led a direct charge against the front of the 
 thinned and weakened line. They swept over the little 
 band of men, probably now out of ammunition, in a red 
 wave of destruction. There was a fierce hand-to-hand 
 struggle with clubbed guns, war-clubs, and tomahawks, 
 and all was over. Some twenty or thirty men, without 
 their officers, who had probably all been killed where 
 they stood, for their bodies were found grouped around 
 that of Custer on the highest hill, endeavored to break 
 through on the right. They were slaughtered to a man 
 before they reached the river. A few scattered bodies, 
 here and there in different parts of the field, indicated 
 
 * It is believed that this man, who was named Curley, secreted himself in a ravine. 
 before the fighting began, and stole away at nightfall. 
 
 f Captain Keogh's horse "Comanche," badly wounded, was found on the field the 
 second day after the battle. His life was saved, and for many years he was the particu- 
 lar pet of the regiment.
 
 The Last of Custer 257 
 
 that separate men had made futile dashes for freedom. 
 But the bulk of the command was found just where it had 
 fought, with the troopers in line, their officers in position ! 
 They had been beaten and killed. Not an officer or man 
 lived to tell the story, but they had not been disgraced. 
 
 There, the second day afterward, Terry, with Gibbon, 
 having relieved Reno's men, found them on the hills 
 which they had immortalized by their desperate valor. 
 They had been stripped and most of them mutilated. 
 Custer's body was shot in two places, in the side and in 
 the temple. It was not scalped or mutilated. Colonel 
 Dodge, an authority on Indian customs, declares that if 
 Custer's body was neither scalped nor mutilated, he is 
 convinced that the general committed suicide. None 
 of the officers with whom I have communicated who 
 inspected the body is willing to indorse this statement; 
 on the contrary. Therefore, I am sure Colonel Dodge 
 must be in error. The Indians give no particular in- 
 formation as to Custer's death. All that is known is 
 that his body was there with those of his brave men. 
 
 With Custer in that fight perished many gallant souls. 
 His brother, Captain Tom Custer, was the only man in 
 the United States Army who held two medals for cap- 
 turing two flags with his own hands in the Civil War. 
 Rain-in-the-Face had accomplished his terrible revenge, 
 for after the battle he had cut open the breast of the 
 brave young soldier and had eaten his heart. Calhoun, 
 of L Troop, was Custer's brother-in-law. With him 
 was young Crittenden, a lieutenant of infantry, who had 
 sought an assignment with Custer for this campaign. 
 Smith was the captain of E, the Gray Horse Troop. At 
 the storming of Fort Fisher, after two color-bearers had 
 been killed, he had led his regiment to the attack, colors 
 in hand. His shoulder had been smashed by a musket
 
 258 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ball in that attack. He could never afterward put 
 on his coat without assistance. With him was young 
 Sturgis. Yates, a veteran of the Civil War, was captain 
 of F, the Bandbox Troop; and with him was Riley, the 
 youngest lieutenant there. Keogh, of I Troop, the old- 
 est soldier of them all, and not the least brave, had been 
 an officer of the Papal Zouaves in early life. He had 
 a gallant record in the Civil War, too. With him was 
 Porter, and with the others who had done their parts 
 were Cook, the adjutant, and Lord, the doctor. 
 
 Others worthy of note fell on that fatal field : Mark 
 Kellogg, a newspaper correspondent; Charlie Reynolds, 
 the famous scout; Boston Custer, the General's brother, 
 who was civilian forage-master of the regiment, and 
 Autie Reed, the General's nephew a mere boy, who 
 wanted to see something of life in the West and who 
 had welcomed with joy his opportunity to make the cam- 
 paign. Well, he saw it, poor fellow! Indeed, the Custer 
 family was almost wiped out on that fatal Sunday. 
 
 Premonitions of disaster, such as loving women may 
 feel, were in the air that afternoon. Back at Fort Abra- 
 ham Lincoln, the devoted wife tells how the women of 
 the garrison assembled in her quarters in an agony of 
 apprehension. There were words of prayer. Some 
 one at the piano started " Nearer My God to Thee, " and 
 the women tried to sing it, but they could not finish it. 
 It was not until the 5th of July that they received the 
 news that at that very hour their loved ones were dying 
 on the hill. 
 
 V. After the Battle 
 
 On the morning of the ayth of June Terry and Gib- 
 bon rescued Reno. The next day the surviving troops 
 of the regiment, with some individuals from the other
 
 LIEUT. H. M. HARRINGTON 
 
 LIEUT. J. E. PORTER * 
 LIEUT. W. VAN W. RILEY ! 
 
 ADJ. W. W. COOK 
 LIEUT. J. STURGIS : 
 
 LIEUT. J. J. CRITTENDEN f 
 
 LIEUT. DONALD McINTOSH J 
 
 LIEUT. BENJ. HODGSON J 
 
 OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY 
 
 All killed at the Little Big Horn 
 * Killed with Custer. t loth Infantry, attached to Custer's command. Killed, I Killed with Reno
 
 The Last of Custer 259 
 
 command, marched to the scene of Custer's defeat to 
 identify and bury the dead. The bodies upon the dry 
 grass had all been stripped and left, white and ghastly 
 save for the red stains of wounds. The bodies of 
 Doctor Lord, Lieutenants Porter, Harrington, and 
 Sturgis, with those of a number of men, were not re- 
 covered. What became of them is not known to thiy 
 day. They may have been captured alive and taken by 
 the Indians to the village, and there tortured to death 
 and their bodies disposed of. This, however, is un- 
 likely. The Indians positively deny that they took any 
 prisoners, and it is probable that they did not. There 
 are quicksands near the bed of the Little Big Horn, and 
 possibly those bodies were engulfed in them. But all 
 this is only surmise. No one can tell anything about it, 
 except that they were undeniably killed. And we may 
 be certain they died as brave men should. 
 
 They buried two hundred and twelve bodies on the 
 hill, and the total losses of the regiment in the two days of 
 fighting were two hundred and sixty-five killed and fifty- 
 two wounded over fifty per cent. The losses of the 
 Indians were never ascertained. They did not, however, 
 begin to equal those of the soldiers. It is grossly un- 
 fair to speak of the battle as the "Custer Massacre," as 
 is often done. Custer attacked the Indians, and they 
 fought him until all the white men were killed. There 
 was no massacre about it. 
 
 The cause of the disaster must, first of all, be laid to 
 Custer's disobedience of orders. In spite of that, how- 
 ever, I think it is probable that he might have won the 
 battle, or at least made good his defense until relieved by 
 Terry and Gibbon, although sustaining heavy loss, had 
 it not been for three happenings. The first was the 
 vastly greater number of Indians in the field than any
 
 260 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 one expected to encounter. The next, and to me this is 
 absolutely decisive, was Reno's failure to press his at- 
 tack. If he had gone in with the dashing gallantry 
 which was expected of him, while it is certain that he 
 could not alone have whipped the Indians, yet he could 
 have so disorganized them as to have maintained his po- 
 sition in the valley in the midst of the village without the 
 greatest difficulty, until Custer could fall upon the rear 
 of those attacking him, and Benteen, with the pack train, 
 could reinforce them both. The Indians say that they 
 were demoralized for the time being by Reno's sudden 
 appearance, and that the squaws were packing up get- 
 ting ready for flight when the weakness of Reno's ad- 
 vance encouraged them to try to overwhelm him. Cus- 
 ter had a right to expect that Reno would do his duty as 
 a soldier and take a bold course which was, as usual, 
 the only safe course. 
 
 Colonel Godfrey, in his account, suggests still a third 
 cause. The carbines of the troopers did not work well. 
 When they became clogged and dirty from rapid firing, 
 the ejectors would not throw out the shells, and the men 
 frequently had to stop and pick out the shells with a 
 knife. The chambers of the carbines at that time were 
 cylindrical, and the easily accumulated dirt on the car- 
 tridges clogged them so that the ejectors would not 
 work properly. The chambers were afterward made 
 conical, with good results. The Indians had no such 
 trouble. Their weapons were newer and better than 
 those of the soldiers. If the indifferent weapons of the 
 troopers failed them, their annihilation in any event 
 would have been certain.* 
 
 * It is possible that if Custer had kept the regiment together, he would have won the 
 battle; but this is by no means certain, and authorities differ. I think he would have 
 been forced eventually on the defensive.
 
 The Last of Custer 261 
 
 I have censured Custer somewhat severely in this ar- 
 ticle, and it is a pleasure to me to close it with a quota- 
 tion from Captain Whittaker's life of his old commander. 
 In this quotation Lawrence Barrett, the eminent actor, 
 who was an old and intimate friend of Custer, has sum- 
 marized the character of the brave captain in exquisitely 
 apposite language; and, in his words,! say good-by to the 
 gallant soldier whose errors were atoned for by an heroic 
 death in the high places of the field: 
 
 "His career may be thus briefly given: He was born 
 in obscurity; he rose to eminence; denied social advan- 
 tages in his youth, his untiring industry supplied them; 
 the obstacles to his advancement became the stepping- 
 stones to his fortunes; free to choose for good or evil, 
 he chose rightly; truth was his striking characteristic 
 . his acts found his severest critic in his own 
 breast; he was a good son, a good brother, a good and 
 affectionate husband, a Christian soldier, a steadfast 
 friend. Entering the army a cadet in early youth, he be- 
 came a general while still on the threshold of manhood; 
 with ability undenied, with valor proved on many a 
 hard-fought field, he acquired the affection of the nation; 
 and he died in action at the age of thirty-seven, died as 
 he would have wished to die, no lingering disease prey- 
 ing upon that iron frame. At the head of his command, 
 the messenger of death awaited him; from the field of 
 battle where he had so often 'directed the storm,' his 
 gallant spirit took its flight. Cut off from aid, aban- 
 doned in the midst of incredible odds . . . the 
 noble Custer fell, bequeathing to the nation his sword; 
 to his comrades an example; to his friends a memory, 
 and to his beloved a Hero's name. " 
 
 NOTE. The question concerning Custer's conduct is
 
 262 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 so important a one that I have included in Appendix A 
 the opinions, pro and con, of several officers with whom 
 I have corresponded; and in which I have indicated 
 some other sources of information by which the reader 
 may settle the debatable question for himself.
 
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
 One of the Last Men to See Custer Alive 
 
 MR. THEODORE W. GOLDIN, of Janes- 
 ville, Wisconsin, formerly a trooper of the 
 Seventh Cavalry, now Chairman of the Re- 
 publican State Central Committee of Wis- 
 consin, was the last, or perhaps the next to the last, man 
 to see Custer alive. He has prepared an account of his 
 personal experiences in the battle, which is one of 
 the most interesting of the contributions that have 
 been made to this volume. His description of the 
 death of Hodgson is splendidly dramatic, as is his story 
 of the brief conversations between Custer and Keogh, 
 Reno and Weir, and Benteen and Wallace. 
 
 What a magnificent picture is that presented by Hodg- 
 son, determined to retreat no longer, facing about, 
 drawing his revolver, and dying at last, face to the foe, 
 weapon in hand! Mr. Goldin contradicts the popular 
 impression, as repeated by Colonel Godfrey and others, 
 that Reno threw away his pistols in his "charge." 
 
 Milwaukee, Wis., August n, 1904. 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 I am in receipt of your letters of July 28th and August 
 2d, asking me for a few reminiscences of personal ex- 
 
 263
 
 264 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 periences and touching on my acquaintance and knowl- 
 edge of Gen. Custer and his last fight. 
 
 The years that have elapsed since that stirring event 
 may have somewhat dimmed my recollections, and the 
 time at my disposal at this time is so very limited, that 
 what I may say must, of necessity, be somewhat frag- 
 mentary. Your articles on this subject, as well as the 
 entire series, have been read with great interest, and I 
 am very much pleased to know they are to be pub- 
 lished in book form. 
 
 In reply to your request, I will say that I had known 
 Gen. Custer from the time I joined the regiment in 
 1873 up to the time of his tragic death, and had cam- 
 paigned with him and with the regiment with the ex- 
 ception of the year 1875, when the troop to which I was 
 attached was stationed in the South. 
 
 Early in the spring of '76, we received word that an 
 expedition was being organized against the Sioux, and 
 that three large columns were to take the field, and a few 
 weeks later our marching orders came, and our battalion 
 changed station from near Shreveport, La., to Fort Lin- 
 coln, D. T. 
 
 At the time of our arrival Gen. Custer was in 
 Washington before some investigating committee, and 
 only joined the regiment a few days before our column 
 took the field, he having been ordered under arrest at 
 Chicago while en-route from Washington. 
 
 I will not take the time or space to touch on our march 
 from Fort Lincoln to the Yellowstone, which we struck 
 near the mouth of the Powder River. Here we re- 
 mained a few days while outfitting our pack train, as 
 it had been determined that we would abandon our 
 wagons here and establish a supply camp. Maj. Reno 
 had left us a few days before on a scout, expecting
 
 One of the Last to See Custer 265 
 
 to rejoin us near the mouth of the Tongue River on 
 June i yth. 
 
 After arranging to leave our wagon train and some 
 dismounted recruits and the regimental band at the 
 Powder River, we moved camp to the mouth of the 
 Tongue, where we lay on the iyth of June, the day on 
 which Gen. Crook had his big fight with the Indians 
 on the Rosebud. During the day we watched every 
 distant dust cloud that whirled across the river bottom, 
 hoping that it meant the approach of Maj. Reno's 
 command, but as nothing was heard from him, we 
 broke camp on the morning of the i8th and moved up 
 the valley, where we effected a junction with Reno soon 
 after noon. During the previous days we could not 
 help but note the fact that Gen. Custer seemed moody 
 and discontented, and, entirely different from his usual 
 habit, appeared nervous and excited to some extent. 
 
 When Reno came in with his report he became a 
 changed man. His old-time energy and snap were made 
 apparent by the manner in which he hustled the com- 
 mand into marching order and took the trail for the 
 Rosebud, where Gen. Terry on our supply steamer 
 the " Far West " had already preceded us in the hope 
 of striking the command of Gen. Gibbon, who was 
 known to be somewhere in that vicinity. Our march 
 was prolonged far into the night, but we finally struck 
 the Yellowstone and went into camp, assured that if the 
 steamer was below us we were bound to intercept it. 
 
 The following morning we were in the saddle early, 
 and soon after noon we sighted the wagon train of 
 Gen. Gibbon's command moving slowly up the river 
 and a few moments later the "Far West" steamed 
 into sight. Couriers were sent out to advise them of 
 the fact that Reno had discovered the trail of a consid-
 
 266 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 erable body of Indians, and in a short time we were in 
 camp near the mouth of the Rosebud and a council 
 of war was held at which we understood that Reno's 
 report was discussed in detail. 
 
 The following day arrangements were made for a vig- 
 orous campaign. A final council was held on the 
 steamer on the night of the 2ist, as I now recollect it, 
 at which time Gen. Custer received his final orders, 
 substantially as you have stated them. At this council, 
 and just about the time it was breaking up, the question 
 was asked Gen. Gibbon as to what time he could 
 reach the mouth of the Little Big Horn River, and he 
 replied, 
 
 "Not before noon of the 26th." 
 
 At this conference it was reported that Custer had 
 been offered the battalion of the Second Cavalry and 
 the artillery which had been brought up on the steamer, 
 but declined both, claiming that he knew his command 
 so well that he preferred to trust himself with them 
 alone, and that he feared the artillery might delay his 
 march when nearly in presence of the enemy. Many 
 of the officers and men felt that it was but a part of a 
 preconceived scheme to secure an independent com- 
 mand, such as he had been used to having for years, 
 but be that as it may his request was granted. 
 
 On the afternoon of June 22d we passed in review 
 before Gen. Terry and Gen. Gibbon, and soon struck 
 the trail described by Maj. Reno. From that time 
 until Reno struck the Indian village we did not 
 deviate from it except when it became necessary to 
 find a satisfactory camping ground. No attempt was 
 made to scout the country as we had been directed to 
 do, nor was any attempt made to send a courier across 
 to Gen. Gibbon, although a man named Herndon,
 
 One of the Last to See Custer 267 
 
 a scout, had been attached to our command for that 
 purpose. 
 
 Our marches were long and our movements very 
 rapid until the night of the 24th, when we moved off the 
 trail some distance and apparently settled down for the 
 night. But this was only a ruse to mislead the Indians, 
 as we had received orders not to unpack our saddles and 
 to be prepared for a night march. 
 
 From the hour we left the Rosebud Gen. Custer 
 acted in many respects like another man, his old-time 
 restless energy had returned, and he seemed to think of 
 nothing but to reach and strike the Indians. In this 
 connection it might be well to say that the trail we were 
 following led from the direction of the Missouri River 
 and indicated, according to the estimate of Bloody Knife 
 and some of our Crow scouts, a band of from a thousand 
 to twelve hundred Indians, whom we afterward learned 
 came from the Missouri River agencies and consisted 
 almost entirely of warriors. 
 
 About eleven o'clock we received word to saddle up 
 and lead into line. In the meantime a scouting party of 
 Crows and Rees, with some of our officers, Lieut. 
 Varnum and, I think, Lieut. Hare, had pushed on 
 ahead of us to scout the trail across the divide and seek 
 to locate the Indians if possible. Leaving our bivouac, 
 we again struck the trail and pushed forward, seeking 
 to cross the divide and get into the shelter of the foot- 
 hills along the Little Big Horn before daybreak the fol- 
 lowing morning. Owing to the roughness of the coun- 
 try and the difficulty in scouting the trail, we were un- 
 able to do this, and daybreak found us in a ravine at the 
 foot of a range of high bluffs, just how far from the river 
 we did not know. 
 
 Some time during the night it was said Gen. Custer
 
 268 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 had pushed ahead and joined the scouts, and that 
 just after daybreak they told him they had located 
 the village in the valley of the Little Big Horn, but 
 Gen. Custer replied that he did not believe them. In 
 the meantime it became apparent that our presence in 
 the country was known, as, during the night a box of 
 ammunition* had been lost and a detachment sent back 
 to recover it came across some Indians trying to open 
 the box. On this being reported to Gen. Custer, he 
 seemed to decide on an immediate advance. 
 
 In the talk, just about the time the division was made 
 in the command, Mitch Bowyer, a half-breed Crow 
 interpreter, said to Gen. Custer that he would find 
 more Indians in that valley than he could handle with 
 his command. Custer replied that if he (Bowyer) was 
 afraid to go he could stay behind. Bowyer replied that 
 he was not afraid to go wherever Custer did, or some- 
 thing to that effect, but that if they went in there neither 
 of them would come out alive. 
 
 Just before the advance was made I was detailed by 
 Lieut. Mclntosh to report to Gen. Custer for duty as 
 orderly, and at once did so. The general directed 
 me to ride with Lieut. Cook, our regimental adjutant, 
 and perform any duties he might assign to me. 
 
 During our brief halt the men had thrown themselves 
 on the ground and were most of them asleep, while the 
 horses were grazing among the sage brush. Gen. Cus- 
 ter ordered the advance, saying that the company in 
 each battalion first ready should have the right of the 
 line, and in a few minutes we were all in the saddle. 
 During the halt it had been ordered that Benteen with 
 
 * Mr. Goldin's recollection is in error, according to Colonel Godfrey, who is 
 positive that the box contained hard bread. However, the difference is not material 
 it was a box, anyway ! C. T. B.
 
 Copyright by D F. Barry 
 
 SITTING BULL 
 
 Chief Medicine Man of the Sioux Nation
 
 One of the Last to See Custer 269 
 
 his battalion should move off to the left, scouting the 
 country in that direction, driving before him any Indians 
 he might discover, and sending word to the command 
 of anything he might find. Reno was to follow the 
 trail, while Gen. Custer with the five troops under 
 him struck ofF to the right, leaving McDougall with the 
 pack train to follow as best he could. 
 
 We immediately took up the line of march in accord- 
 ance with these orders, and after probably a half hour's 
 hard ride the impassibility of some of the hills and ra- 
 vines forced the column under Gen. Custer to veer 
 off to the left and we soon came up with the command 
 of Maj. Reno, which was pushing ahead on the trail 
 as fast as the roughness of the ascent would permit. 
 After a hard climb we reached the top of the ridge, 
 where we saw before us a rolling plateau sloping off 
 toward the foot-hills of the river, which was perhaps 
 some five or six miles away. 
 
 As our command dashed over the divide we could 
 see Reno some distance in front of us, moving rapidly 
 down the trail, while several miles to our left was the 
 command of Col. Benteen, scouting the bluffs as he 
 had been ordered. For some distance we followed the 
 general course of Reno's advance, but were some dis- 
 tance in his rear and to his right. 
 
 O 
 
 To those of us who were near him it seemed that Cus- 
 ter was chafing at the apparent slowness of our advance, 
 as he would at times dash ahead of the column and 
 then rein in and await our approach and again off he 
 would go. Just about this time we discovered a huge 
 dust cloud moving down the river valley, but could not 
 determine the nature of it. As soon as this was dis- 
 covered Custer rode over toward the river accompanied 
 only by his orderly trumpeter, and stopped for a mo-
 
 270 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ment on the top of a high pinnacle, where we saw him 
 wave his hat, apparently in salutation to some one in 
 the distance, and then come dashing back toward the 
 head of the column which was headed by Capt. 
 Keogh and "I" Troop, veterans of a dozen fights. 
 With his eyes snapping in his excitement, Custer rode 
 up to Keogh and said, somewhat excitedly: 
 
 " Keogh, those Indians are running. If we can keep 
 them at it we can afford to sacrifice half the horses in 
 the command." 
 
 Calmly as though on dress parade, Keogh turned in 
 his saddle and looked back at the long line of eager, 
 bronzed, bearded faces, and turned to Custer with the 
 remark: 
 
 "General, we will do all that man and horse can do." 
 
 A moment later the bugles blared out the charge, the 
 first bugle note we had heard since leaving the Rosebud, 
 and away we thundered northward down the river, two 
 or three times seeking to find a place where we could 
 work down into the valley below us, but without suc- 
 cess. 
 
 After perhaps the third unsuccessful trial, Gen. Cus- 
 ter talked hurriedly with Capt. Cook for a moment, and 
 Cook pulled out his pad and dashed off a line or two, 
 which he folded up, at the same time calling for an 
 orderly. I happened to be the first one to reach him, 
 and he handed me the paper with the order. 
 
 "Deliver that to Maj. Reno, remain with him until 
 we effect a junction, then report to me at once," and he 
 was gone. 
 
 An instant later the rear of the column dashed past 
 me and was lost to sight in the ravines. For an instant 
 I looked after them, and then realizing that I was in a 
 dangerous country and alone, I lost no time in heading
 
 One of the Last to See Ouster 271 
 
 in the direction of Reno's command, which I was able 
 to locate by the dust cloud that hovered over them. 
 Fortunately, I was not molested to any great extent. A 
 few long-range shots were fired at me, which only served 
 to accelerate my speed and materially added to my de- 
 sire to be among friends. 
 
 A ride of some five or six miles and I overtook Reno 
 just as he was dismounting to fight on foot. I delivered 
 my dispatch, the contents of which I did not know. 
 Reno glanced at it somewhat hurriedly and stuck it in 
 his pocket. About this time the Ree scouts stampeded 
 and, as we afterward learned, did not recover their sand 
 until they reached the Powder River and the shelter 
 of the wagon train. It soon became apparent that the 
 Indians were passing our flank and coming in behind 
 us, and we were forced to face about and endeavor to 
 repel their advances until we could get our horses into 
 the timber, in which attempt several horses were shot 
 and two or three stampeded. Soon after this we re- 
 tired into the timber, where we had better protection 
 and resumed the fight. Sheltered by the timber and 
 the river bank, we were able to make a much better 
 defense for a short time. 
 
 Soon after this we noticed that Capt. Moylan was 
 mounting his troop and Lieut. Wallace, who stood near 
 me on the skirmish line, called to Capt. French, who was 
 commanding the center company, and asked what the 
 orders were. French replied that he hadn't received 
 any but would try and find out, and in a few minutes he 
 called to us saying he understood they were going to 
 charge, that he had not received any orders, but we 
 might as well mount and support them. 
 
 We were ordered to get to our horses, and while doing 
 this we found that some fifteen of our men were dis-
 
 272 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 mounted either because of the shooting or stampeding 
 of their horses. Lieut. Mclntosh had lost his horse 
 and took one belonging to a trooper named McCormick, 
 who gave him up with the remark that we were all 
 dead anyway, and he might as well die dismounted as 
 mounted. Swinging into the saddle, we moved out of 
 the timber and to our surprise discovered that instead of 
 "charging the Indians" Reno was executing a masterly 
 charge on the bluffs on the opposite side of the river. 
 
 As soon as the Indians discovered this, they massed on 
 our flanks and opened a heavy fire on the retreating 
 column. Fortunately, they were poor marksmen mount- 
 ed, and our loss was comparatively small at this stage 
 of the stampede, for that is what it was. 
 
 It is reported that Reno became so excited that he 
 emptied his revolver at the Indians and then threw the 
 weapon from him. I happen to know this was not so, as 
 the revolver is now in the possession of Gen. Benteen 
 or his family, or was a few years ago. 
 
 During the progress of this retreat I was riding on the 
 left of our column and near the timber, and when al- 
 most in sight of the river my horse fell, throwing me into 
 a bunch of sage brush, but without doing me serious in- 
 jury save to exterior cuticle. As I scrambled to my feet 
 Lieut. Wallace passed me, shouting for me to run for 
 the timber as my horse was killed. I did not stop to 
 verify his report, but took his advice, striking only one or 
 two high places between where the horse fell and the 
 timber, which I presently reached. 
 
 From where I was concealed I could see our men 
 force their horses into the river and urge them across the 
 boulder-strewn stream. I saw Lieut. Hodgson's horse 
 leap into the stream and saw him struggling as though 
 wounded, I saw the lieutenant disengage himself from
 
 One of the Last to See Custer 273 
 
 the stirrups and grab the stirrup strap of a passing 
 trooper and with that aid make his way across the 
 stream. No sooner had he reached the bank than it 
 became apparent he had been wounded, but he pluck- 
 ily held on, and the trooper seemed to be trying to help 
 him up behind him on the saddle, but without daring 
 to stop his horse. An instant later Hodgson seemed 
 to be hit again, for he lost his hold, fell to the ground, 
 staggered to his feet and sought to reach another com- 
 rade who reined in to aid him, and just as it seemed that 
 he was saved I saw the second trooper throw up his arms, 
 reel in the saddle and fall heavily to the ground. Hodg- 
 son started to make his way toward the ravine up which 
 the command was disappearing, he staggered forward 
 a few steps, stumbled, struggled to his feet again, only 
 to fall once more. He apparently decided that further 
 effort to retreat was useless, as I saw him turn and face 
 the Indians, draw his revolver and open fire. An in- 
 stant later three or four shots rang out from my side of 
 the river, and I saw Hodgson reel and fall and I knew it 
 was all over. 
 
 In the meantime our men had succeeded in crossing 
 the river and made their way up a neighboring ravine, 
 all save those who had met their fate at the ford, which 
 was one of the worst along the river for many rods. 
 Left alone, I began to wonder what my own fate was 
 likely to be, but I was not observed and therefore not 
 molested, the Indians being busy stripping and mutilat- 
 ing the bodies of our dead along the banks of the stream. 
 
 About this time I could hear sounds of heavy firing 
 down the river, and made up my mind that Custer was 
 engaging the Indians, and from the momentary glimpses 
 I had of the village I felt that he was as badly out- 
 numbered as we were. Most of the Indians in our
 
 274 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 front melted away and I could see them lashing 
 ponies as they hurried to join their friends at the K 
 end of the village. 
 
 About this time I saw the scout, Herndon, some lift* 
 distance from me, making his way toward the river, and 
 called to him, and we were soon together. He told me 
 that the fifteen dismounted men of our outfit had made 
 their way to a point in the timber about a couple of hun- 
 dred yards from where we were, but that in order to get 
 nearer the river they had to cross an open space and 
 every time they tried it the Indians fired on them. Be- 
 fore leaving us the Indians had set the river bottom on 
 fire, evidently with a design of concealing their move- 
 ments, or of smoking or roasting out our wounded. 
 This smoke proved to be our salvation, as under its 
 cover we made our way to the river, forded it with some 
 difficulty, and stumbled on to one of our Crow scouts, 
 who pointed out to us the location of the command, 
 which we soon joined. 
 
 We found that Benteen and his battalion had reached 
 it and that nothing was known of the location of Custer 
 and his command. We reported what we had heard and 
 seen, and just about this time some one discovered a 
 white flag waving from a point in the river bottom near 
 where Herndon and myself had been concealed. Lieut. 
 Hare, at the risk of his life, crept down to a point of bluffs 
 overlooking the valley, and after considerable signaling 
 satisfied the party we were friends and they made their 
 way across the river and soon joined us, proving to be 
 the dismounted men who had been left to their fate 
 when Reno made his retreat. 
 
 I omitted to state that when we started on our retreat 
 Lieut. Mclntosh, mounted on McCormick's horse, was 
 several rods in front of me and I noticed that in some
 
 One of the Last to See Ouster 275 
 
 MJ fis lariat had become loosened and was dragging on 
 ground, the picket pin striking sage brush and other 
 racles, and rendering his immediate vicinity very 
 jkngerous. Several of the men sought to call his atten- 
 tion to it, but evidently he did not hear them. A mo- 
 ment after this I saw his horse go down, but whether 
 he was shot or not I do not know. All I could see as I 
 passed was that the lieutenant was lying where he fell, 
 and was either dead or stunned, probably dead, as we 
 found him in the same place the day after the Indians 
 left us. 
 
 As we were standing on the bluffs looking down into 
 the valley I heard some loud talk near me, and turning 
 in that direction, I heard Capt. Weir say: 
 
 "Well, by G d, if you won't go, I will, and if we ever 
 live to get out of here some one will suffer for this." 
 
 He strode away, and a few moments later I saw " D " 
 Troop mount up and move down the valley in the direc- 
 tion of the distant firing. Apparently without orders, 
 the entire command followed them in no sort of military 
 order with the exception of the two troops under Ben- 
 teen and Godfrey. In this way we pushed down the 
 valley some distance, when we discovered Weir and his 
 troop falling back before a largely superior body of 
 Indians. 
 
 Hastily forming a line, we held back the advancing 
 horde until Weir and his command had passed our lines 
 and formed some distance in our rear, where, with the 
 support of some of our men who were near them, they 
 formed a line and opened fire, permitting us to fall back 
 and re-form again in their rear. In this way we fell back 
 some little distance, when Col. Benteen, who seemed to 
 be the leader in our section of the field, spoke to Lieut. 
 Wallace, saying:
 
 276 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 "Wallace, there is no use falling back any further. 
 Form your troop, your right resting here, and we will 
 make a stand." 
 
 Wallace grinned and said, 
 
 " I haven't any troop, only two men." 
 
 Benteen laughed grimly and answered, 
 
 " Form yourself and your two there, and I will tell you 
 more about it when I find out myself." 
 
 That was the nucleus of our line of defense. Others 
 soon joined us and we sheltered ourselves behind sage 
 brush and hurriedly heaped piles of dirt and opened fire, 
 keeping the Indians at a respectable distance until dark- 
 ness came to our relief. During the night we changed 
 our position a trifle, located our corral and hospital, 
 and put in the night intrenching ourselves as best we 
 could. At daybreak the fight opened again and con- 
 tinued without intermission until about three in the 
 afternoon, when to our surprise the Indians began 
 to take down their tepees, pack their travois, and in a 
 few hours were moving up the river valley, a great mass 
 of ponies, travois and Indians, unfortunately just out of 
 rifle range. 
 
 Twice during the afternoon volunteer parties had 
 gone for water, each time being fired upon by the In- 
 dians, but it was only on the second trip that any one 
 was hit. Poor Madden, of "K" Troop, was the un- 
 fortunate, his leg being shattered three times between 
 the ankle and the knee. We carried him back to the 
 hospital, where his leg was amputated that night. 
 
 On the following day Gen. Terry and Gen. Gibbon 
 came to our relief, and through them we received 
 the first authentic information as to the fate of our 
 comrades of the other battalion. On the 28th, after 
 having transported our wounded across the river,
 
 One of the Last to See Custer 277 
 
 we visited the scene of the battle and buried such of 
 Ouster's men as we found. Aside from General Custer, 
 we found hardly a body on the field that had not been 
 mutilated in some manner or another, but as I recollect 
 now, we found no marks of mutilation on our dead 
 leader. 
 
 In the space at my disposal it is not possible to deal 
 in incidents of the fight or go into detailed descriptions. 
 In fact, those have been well covered in your article 
 already. 
 
 Since the fight I have discussed it with many officers 
 of the army, and others who have had experience on the 
 frontier, and the general opinion seemed to be that there 
 were two, possibly three, main causes for this disaster. 
 
 First: A division of the command into practically 
 four separate columns while still some fifteen miles from 
 the battle-field, and without accurate knowledge as to the 
 exact location or approximate strength of the enemy, 
 and the separation of those columns so that at a critical 
 period of the fight no two of them were in supporting 
 distance of one another. 
 
 Second: The fact that Custer came into the pres- 
 ence of the enemy practically twenty-four hours ahead 
 of time. 
 
 Third: The loss of the horses and with them much 
 of the surplus ammunition of Custer's command. 
 
 This subject has been so often discussed by men much 
 abler than myself that I will not attempt it here. 
 
 My experiences with Gen. Custer always led me to 
 look upon him as somewhat recklessly brave, disposed 
 to take chances without fully considering the odds 
 against him. 
 
 I have always felt that one possible reason for the 
 course he followed, in the face of the orders he received,
 
 278 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 might be attributed to the fact that he was feeling keenly 
 the apparent disgrace of the treatment accorded him by 
 the President, and that he thought that by a brilliant 
 dash and a decided victory, similar to his Washita fight, 
 he might redeem himself and once more stand before 
 the people as a leader and an Indian fighter second to 
 none. Whatever may have been his motive, we must all 
 admit that he made a most gallant fight and gave his life 
 at the side of the comrades who had ridden with him to 
 victory in many a previous battle. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 THEO. W. GOLDIN.
 
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 The Personal Story of Rain-in-the-Face 
 
 BY 
 
 W. Kent Thomas 
 
 NOTE. It is rare, indeed, to get the Indian side of a 
 story in so clear, so connected, and so dramatic a form as 
 is the following account of the Battle of the Little Big 
 Horn from one who played a great part in it and in the 
 events that led up to it. This is a unique document in 
 our records, and is inserted here by kind permission of 
 Mr. Thomas. It originally appeared in Outdoor Life, 
 Vol. XL, No. 3, for March, 1903. Its accuracy and 
 fidelity to fact are so attested as to be beyond 
 question. C. T. B. 
 
 r ^HE 
 
 V \ 
 
 at i 
 I Isla 
 
 A oft 
 
 writer saw much of the "Custer Indians" 
 at the World's Fair and afterward at Coney 
 Island, and had a good chance to know some 
 of them well. The following leaves from a 
 diary kept at that time show how the Indians regarded 
 the Custer fight; they considered that the white men 
 were simply outgeneraled by Sitting Bull: 
 
 Coney Island, N. Y., Aug. 12, 1894. 
 Rain-in-the-Face (Itiomagaju) hobbled into the tent 
 to-night, as McFadden and I were discussing the events 
 
 279
 
 280 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 of the day, and seating himself, unbidden, with true In- 
 dian stoicism, he grunted out that one word of all words 
 so dear to a Lakota, "Minnewaukan!" which, literally 
 translated, means "Water of God," but which by usage 
 has been interpreted as "fire-water." Since the other 
 Indians were all away from camp on a visit to their 
 friends, the Oglalas at Buffalo Bill's camp, I decided to 
 yield for once to Rain's oft-repeated demand, which had 
 been hitherto as regularly denied. 
 
 He took my flask, and with a guttural " How! " drained 
 it at one gulp, without straining a muscle of his face. 
 "Ugh! good! like Rain's heart," he remarked, as he 
 handed the empty bottle to "Mac" with a self-satisfied 
 look. Then, after a long pause, he joined in our hearty 
 laughter, and added: " Wechasa Chischina (Little Man, 
 as he always calls me) good! Potoshasha (Red Beard, 
 his name for McFadden) good! Minnewaukan good! 
 All heap good!" 
 
 "Something's come over the old man," laughed Mac. 
 "His heart's good to-night. Suppose we take advan- 
 tage of it, as the boys are all over at the Oglala tepees, 
 and get Rain to turn his heart inside out. Here, give me 
 my hat and I'll get the flask refilled and bring back 
 Harry with me to interpret. " Off he went like a shot, 
 leaving me to entertain Rain as best I could with my 
 small knowledge of the Sioux lingo and signs. 
 
 McFadden soon returned, bringing Harry McLaugh- 
 lin, our interpreter. It didn't take long to get Rain 
 started; after he had had another pull at the flask, he 
 said: 
 
 " If you want a story, I will tell a true one. It's about 
 myself. I was a bad man and dangerous to fool with 
 before I had to walk with crutches. My heart's good 
 now, but it was all the time bad when I was a fighter and
 
 1 
 
 
 RAIN-IN-THE-FACE 
 
 From a sketch from life made in 1894 by Edward Esmonde
 
 The Story of Rain-in-the-Face 281 
 
 a hunter. The maidens admired me, but the bucks 
 were afraid of me. I would rather fight than eat. The 
 long swords (soldiers) trembled when they knew I was 
 near, and the Rees and Crows always felt of their hair 
 every morning to see if their scalps were still on when 
 Rain was near by." 
 
 Here Harry headed him off, for it's natural for an In- 
 dian to boast, and if any one will listen he will sing his 
 own praises for hours at a stretch. 
 
 "Yes, we know you were a bad man and a fighter 
 from 'way back," said Harry, "but we want to hear 
 about the time Tom Custer made you take water. If 
 you were such a brave man, how did it happen that a 
 little man like Tom Custer got the best of you ?" 
 
 This had the desired effect, and Rain winced under 
 such a reflection on his bravery, for he measured forty- 
 six inches around his chest, stood five feet nine inches, 
 and weighed about 195 pounds at that time, while 
 Captain Tom Custer was under the average weight and 
 height. 
 
 With great deliberation and much gesticulation, Rain 
 told his version of the incident in question, and much to 
 our surprise he continued on and related his version of 
 the "Custer Massacre." 
 
 Now, since nearly all the officers in the Regular Army, 
 as well as all the agents of the Interior Department, have 
 failed to get him even to speak of this fight (their trying, 
 coaxing, and threatening for years has been in vain), and 
 since Rain gets the credit of being the slayer of Custer, 
 and has been immortalized in verse by Longfellow, it was 
 a pleasant surprise to have this unexpected revelation. 
 I am writing it down as nearly like McLaughlin inter- 
 preted it as I can. 
 
 "Two years before the big fight," he said, "Gall and
 
 282 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Sitting Bull had their camp at Standing Rock. All were 
 hostiles. They were Unkpapa Sioux and fighters who 
 never feared an enemy any more than a buffalo calf. The 
 Yanktonais (friendly Indians) were coffee coolers (cow- 
 ards) and hung around the agency which was at Lincoln 
 then (Fort Abraham Lincoln on the upper Missouri 
 now). We used to have great times in the hostile camp, 
 dancing, running races, shooting and playing games. 
 Buffalo and deer w T ere plenty, and we had many ponies. 
 I was a great fellow with the girls. They used to tease 
 me to get me mad when I got mad I knew no reason, 
 I wanted to fight. One night a girl dared me to go up to 
 Fort Lincoln and kill a white man. I told her it was too 
 risky, as the long swords always kept watch. Besides, 
 the Rees (another tribe of Indians, employed by the gov- 
 ernment as scouts) had their lodges on the hill back of 
 the fort. The wood-choppers were camped between the 
 fort and the river. She said: 
 
 "'A brave man fears nothing. If you are a coward, 
 don't go. I'll ask some other young man who isn't 
 afraid, if he hasn't danced in the Sun Dance.' (This 
 was a torture dance in which Rain-in-the-Face sub- 
 sequently underwent the most horrible self-torture ever 
 inflicted.*) 
 
 * The Sun Dance is that ceremonial performance in which the young Sioux aspirant 
 gives that final proof of endurance and courage which entitles him to the toga virilis of a 
 full-fledged warrior. One feature of it is the suspension in air of the candidate by a raw- 
 hide rope passed through slits cut in the breast, or elsewhere, until the flesh tears and he 
 falls to the ground. If he faints, falters, or fails, or even gives way momentarily to his 
 anguish during the period of suspension, he is damned forever after, and is called and 
 treated as a squaw for the rest of his miserable life. 
 
 Rain-in-the-Face was lucky when he was so tied up. The tendons gave way easily, 
 and he was released after so short a suspension that it was felt he had not fairly won his 
 spurs. Sitting Bull, the chief medicine man, decided that the test was unsatisfactory. 
 Rain-in-the-Face thereupon defied Sitting Bull to do his worst, declaring there was no 
 test which could wring a murmur of pain from his lips. 
 
 Sitting Bull was equal to the occasion. He cut deep slits in the back over the kidneys 
 the hollows remaining were big enough almost to take in a closed fist years after
 
 The Story of Rain-in-the-Face 283 
 
 "The other girls laughed, but the young men who 
 heard it didn't. They feared me. I would have killed 
 them for laughing. I went to my lodge and painted 
 sapa (black, the color used when they go on the war- 
 path), took my gun, my bow, my pony. Sitting Bull 
 had forbidden any one to leave camp without his permis- 
 sion. I skipped off under cover of darkness and went up 
 to Lincoln (forty-five miles north, opposite the present 
 site of Bismarck, North Dakota). I hung around for 
 two days, watching for a chance to shoot a long sword. 
 I had plenty of chances to kill a Ree squaw, plenty to 
 kill a wood-chopper, but I wanted to carry back the 
 brass buttons of a long sword to the girl who laughed at 
 me. I did so, and she sewed them on her shawl. One 
 morning I saw the sutler (store keeper) and a horse medi- 
 cine man (U. S. Veterinary Surgeon Hontzinger) go out 
 to a spring; Long Yellow Hair (General Custer) and his 
 men were riding back about 100 yards. I rushed up 
 and shot the sutler and brained the horse medicine man 
 with my war club; then I shot them full of arrows and 
 cut off some buttons. Long Yellow Hair heard the shot 
 and his troop charged back. I didn't have time to scalp 
 the men I got. I jumped on my pony and yelled at them 
 
 and passed the rawhide rope through them. For two days the young Indian hung sus- 
 pended, taunting his torturers, jeering at them, defying them to do their worst, while 
 singing his war songs and boasting of his deeds. The tough flesh muscles and tendons 
 would not tear loose, although he kicked and struggled violently to get free. Finally, 
 Sitting Bull, satisfied that Rain-in-the-Face's courage and endurance were above proof, 
 ordered buffalo skulls to be tied to his legs, and the added weight with some more vigor- 
 ous kicking enabled the Indian stoic to break free. It was one of the most wonderful 
 exhibitions of stoicism, endurance, and courage ever witnessed among the Sioux, where 
 these qualities were not infrequent. Rain-in-the-Face had passed the test. No one 
 thereafter questioned his courage. He was an approved warrior, indeed. It was while 
 suspended thus that he boasted of the murder of Dr. Hontzinger, and was overheard by 
 Charlie Reynolds, the scout, who told Custer and the regiment. 
 
 Mr. Edward Esmonde, a companion of Mr. Thomas during the season he had Rain- 
 in-the-Face and his fellows at the World's Fair in Chicago and afterward at Coney Island 
 in his charge, gave me the information in this note. C. T. B.
 
 284 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 to catch me. They chased me to the Cannon Ball (a 
 small river twenty-five miles south). Charlie Reynolds 
 (a scout) knew me and told Long Yellow Hair who did 
 this brave deed. 
 
 "Next winter I went to the agency store at Standing 
 Rock. I drew no rations I hadn't signed the paper. 
 (All the Indians who signed a peace treaty and con- 
 sented to live on the reservation, under military orders, 
 were furnished with rations by the government twice a 
 month. The hostiles had to live by hunting.) Istok- 
 scha (One Arm, the Hon. H. S. Parkin) was running the 
 store then. I wasn't afraid of any of them. Little Hair 
 (Capt. Tom Custer) had thirty long swords there. He 
 slipped up behind me like a squaw, when my back was 
 turned. They all piled on me at once; they threw me 
 in a sick wagon (ambulance) and held me down till they 
 got me to the guard-room at Lincoln. 
 
 " I was treated like a squaw, not a chief. They put me 
 in a room, chained me, gave me only one blanket. The 
 snow blew through the cracks and on to me all winter. 
 It was cold. Once Little Hair let me out and the long 
 swords told me to run. I knew they wanted to shoot me 
 in the back. I told Little Hair that I would get away 
 some time; I wasn't ready then; when I did, I would 
 cut his heart out and eat it. I was chained to a white 
 man. One night we got away. They fired at us, but 
 we ran and hid on the bank of Hart river in the brush. 
 The white man cut the chains with a knife (a file). They 
 caught him next day. 
 
 " I rejoined Sitting Bull and Gall. They were afraid to 
 come and get me there. I sent Little Hair a picture, on 
 a piece of buffalo skin, of a bloody heart. He knew I 
 didn't forget my vow. The next time I saw Little Hair, 
 ugh! I got his heart. I have said all. "
 
 The Story of Rain-in-the-Face 285 
 
 And, Indian-like, he stopped. 
 
 We all knew that the greater part of this was true, 
 since it tallied with the government account of the death 
 of the sutler and Surgeon Hontzinger. But we wanted 
 to hear how he took Tom Ouster's heart. McFadden, 
 who is quite an artist as well as an actor of note, had 
 made an imaginary sketch of " Custer's Last Charge. " 
 He got it and handed it to Rain, saying: 
 
 "Does that look anything like the fight ?" 
 
 Rain studied it a long time, and then burst out 
 laughing. 
 
 "No," he said, "this picture is a lie. These long 
 swords have swords they never fought us with swords, 
 but with guns and revolvers. These men are on ponies 
 they fought us on foot, and every fourth man held the 
 others' horses. That's always their way of fighting. We 
 tie ourselves onto our ponies and fight in a circle. These 
 people are not dressed as we dress in a fight. They look 
 like agency Indians we strip naked and have ourselves 
 and our ponies painted. This picture gives us bows and 
 arrows. We were better armed than the long swords. 
 Their guns wouldn't shoot but once the thing wouldn't 
 throw out the empty cartridge shells. (In this he was 
 historically correct, as dozens of guns were picked up on 
 the battle-field by General Gibbon's command two days 
 after with the shells still sticking in them, showing that 
 the ejector wouldn't work.) When we found they could 
 not shoot we saved our bullets by knocking the long 
 swords over with our war clubs it was just like killing 
 sheep. Some of them got on their knees and begged ; 
 we spared none ugh ! This picture is like all the white 
 man's pictures of Indians, a lie. I will show you how it 
 looked." 
 
 Then turning it over, he pulled out a stump of a lead
 
 286 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 pencil from his pouch and drew a large shape of a letter 
 S, turned sideways.* "Here," said he, is the Little Big 
 Horn river; we had our lodges along the banks in the 
 shape of a bent bow." 
 
 "How many lodges did you have ?" asked Harry. 
 
 "Oh, many, many times ten. We were like blades of 
 grass. (It is estimated that there were between four and 
 six thousand Indians, hence there must have been at 
 least a thousand lodges.) 
 
 "Sitting Bull had made big medicine way off on a hill. 
 He came in with it; he had it in a bag on a coup-stick. 
 He made a big speech and said that Waukontonka (the 
 Great Spirit) has come to him riding on an eagle. Wau- 
 kontonka had told him that the long swords were com- 
 ing, but the Indians would wipe them off the face of the 
 earth. His speech made our hearts glad. Next day 
 our runners came in and told us the long swords were 
 coming. Sitting Bull had the squaws put up empty 
 death lodges along the bend of the river to fool the Ree 
 scouts when they came up and looked down over the 
 bluffs. The brush and the bend hid our lodges. Then 
 Sitting Bull went away to make more medicine and 
 didn't come back till the fight was over. 
 
 "Gall was head chief; Crazy Horse led the Chey- 
 ennes; Goose the Bannocks. I was not a head chief - 
 my brother Iron Horn was but I had a band of the 
 worst Unkpapas; all of them had killed more enemies 
 than they had fingers and toes. When the long swords 
 came, we knew their ponies were tired out; we knew they 
 were fooled by the death lodges. They thought we were 
 but a handful. 
 
 * Rain-in-the-Face afterward drew a picture or map of the battle of the Little Big 
 Horn, on the back of a handsome buckskin hunting-shirt. A cut of this picture 
 appears on the following page. It is believed to be the only map of the battle drawn 
 by one of the Indian participants therein. C. T. B.
 
 Key to map of Custer battle-field. Drawn on back of buckskin coat 
 by Rain-in-the-Face for Edward Esmonde. Said to be the only map 
 of the battle-field ever made by an Indian. 
 
 A, Camp of the Indians ; B, Reno's Skirmish Line ; C, Timber Where Reno's 
 Horses Were; D, Reno's Retreat; E, Reno Joined Benteen ; F, Cutter's Trail; 
 G, Custer' $ First Stand ; H, Squaws and Children Crossed River ; I, Where Squaws 
 Went Into Camp After Re-crossing River; J, Where Last Stand Was Made and Custer 
 Was Killed.
 
 288 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 "We knew they made a mistake when they separated. 
 Gall took most of the Indians up the river to come in 
 between them and cut them off. When we saw the Ree 
 scouts had stayed back with Long Yellow Hair, we were 
 glad. We saw them trotting along, and let them come 
 in over the bluffs. Some of our young men went up the 
 gully which they had crossed and cut them off from 
 behind. 
 
 "Then we showed our line in front, and the long 
 swords charged. They reeled under our fire and start- 
 ed to fall back. Our young men behind them opened 
 fire. Then we saw some officers talking and pointing. 
 Don't know who they were, for they all looked alike. I 
 didn't see Long Yellow Hair then or afterward. We 
 heard the Rees singing their death song they knew we 
 had them. All dismounted, and every fourth man held 
 the others' ponies. Then we closed all around them. 
 We rushed like a wave does at the sand out there (the 
 ocean beach) and shot the pony holders and stampeded 
 the ponies by waving our blankets in their faces. Our 
 squaws caught them, for they were tired out. 
 
 "I had sung the war song, I had smelt the powder 
 smoke. My heart was bad I was like one that has no 
 mind. I rushed in and took their flag; my pony fell 
 dead as I took it. I cut the thong that bound me. I 
 jumped up and brained the long sword flag-man with 
 my war club, and ran back to our line with the flag. 
 
 "The long sword's blood and brains splashed in my 
 face. It felt hot, and blood ran in my mouth. I could 
 taste it. I was mad. I got a fresh pony and rushed 
 back, shooting, cutting, and slashing. This pony was 
 shot, and I got another. 
 
 "This time I saw Little Hair. I remembered my 
 vow. I was crazy; I feared nothing. I knew nothing
 
 The Story of Rain-in-the-Face 289 
 
 would hurt me, for I had my white weasel-tail charm on.* 
 (He wears the charm to this day.) I don't know how 
 many I killed trying to get at him. He knew me. I 
 laughed at him and yelled at him. I saw his mouth 
 move, but there was so much noise I couldn't hear his 
 voice. He was afraid. When I got near enough I 
 shot him with my revolver. My gun was gone, I don't 
 know where. I leaped from my pony and cut out his 
 heart and bit a piece out of it and spit it in his face. I 
 got back on my pony and rode off shaking it. I was sat- 
 isfied and sick of fighting; I didn't scalp him. 
 
 " I didn't go back on the field after that. The squaws 
 came up afterward and killed the wounded, cut their 
 boot legs off for moccasin soles, and took their money, 
 watches, and rings. They cut their fingers off to get 
 them quicker. They hunted for Long Yellow Hair to 
 scalp him, but could not find him. He didn't wear his 
 fort clothes (uniform), his hair had been cut off, and the 
 Indians didn't know him. (This corroborates what Mrs. 
 Custer says about her husband's having his long yellow 
 
 * Notwithstanding his "white weasel-tail charm," Rain-in-the-Face was wounded 
 in this battle. A bullet pierced his right leg above the knee. Among the plunder 
 which fell to him after the action was over was a razor taken from the person of some 
 dead soldier. With this razor the wounded man essayed some home-made surgery. 
 First he cut deeply into the front of his leg, but failed to reach the bullet. Then he 
 reached around to the back of his leg and chopped recklessly into the flesh from that 
 quarter. He got the bullet, also several tendons, and narrowly missed cutting the artery 
 and bleeding to death. He was lame and had to walk on crutches all his life thereafter. 
 
 Statement of Mr. Esmonde. 
 
 Colonel Godfrey, in his Century article, relates a similar instance of courage and 
 endurance on the part of one of his troopers: 
 
 "Among the wounded was Saddler 'Mike Madden,* of my troop, whom I promoted 
 to be sergeant on the field for gallantry. Madden was very fond of his grog. His long 
 abstinence had given him a famous thirst. It was necessary to amputate his leg, which 
 was done without administering any anaesthetic; but after the amputation, the surgeon 
 gave him a good stiff drink of brandy. Madden eagerly gulped it down, and his eyes 
 fairly danced as he smacked his lips and said: 
 
 " ' M-eh, doctor, cut off my other leg.' " C. T. B.
 
 290 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 curls cut at St. Paul some weeks before he was 
 killed.) 
 
 "That night we had a big feast and the scalp dance. 
 Then Sitting Bull came up and made another speech. 
 He said: 'I told you how it would be. I made great 
 medicine. My medicine warmed your hearts and made 
 you brave/ 
 
 " He talked a long time. All the Indians gave him 
 the credit of winning the fight because his medicine 
 won it. But he wasn't in the fight. Gall got mad 
 at Sitting Bull that night. Gall said : ' We did the fight- 
 ing, you only made medicine.' It would have been 
 the same anyway. Their hearts were bad toward each 
 other after that, always. 
 
 "After that fight we could have killed all the others 
 on the hill (Reno's command) but for the quarrel be- 
 tween Gall and Sitting Bull. Both wanted to be head 
 chief. Some of the Indians said Gall was right and went 
 with him. Some said Sitting Bull was. I didn't care, I 
 was my own chief and had my bad young men; we 
 would not obey either of them unless we wanted to, and 
 they feared us. 
 
 " I was sick of fighting I had had enough. I wanted 
 to dance. We heard more long swords were coming 
 with wheel guns (artillery, Catlings). We moved camp 
 north. They followed many days till we crossed the 
 line. I stayed over there till Sitting Bull came back, 
 and I came back with him. That's all there is to tell. 
 I never told it to white men before. " 
 
 When he had finished, I said to him: "Rain, if you 
 didn't kill Long Yellow Hair, who did ?" 
 
 " I don't know. No one knows. It was like running 
 in the dark." 
 
 "Well," asked Mac, "why was it Long Yellow Hair
 
 The Story of Rain-in-the-Face 291 
 
 wasn't scalped, when every one else was ? Did you con- 
 sider him too brave to be scalped ?" 
 
 "No, no one is too brave to be scalped; that wouldn't 
 make any difference. The squaws wondered afterward 
 why they couldn't find him. He must have laid under 
 some other dead bodies. I didn't know, till I heard it 
 long afterward from the whites, that he wasn't scalped." 
 
 "How many Indians were killed in the fight ?" 
 
 " I don't remember, but about ten and four or ten and 
 six." 
 
 "How about Curley, the Crow scout, who claims to 
 have escaped ?" asked Mac. 
 
 "Ugh! I know Curley. He is a liar. He never 
 was in the fight. His pony stumbled and broke some- 
 thing. He stayed behind to fix it. When he heard the 
 firing, he ran off like a whipped dog. One long sword 
 escaped, though; his pony ran off with him and went 
 past our lodges. They told me about it at Chicago. I 
 saw the man there, and I remembered hearing the squaws 
 tell about it after the fight." 
 
 Rain-in-the-Face (Itiomagaju) is about sixty years of 
 age now, and is the only chief that survives to tell the 
 tale of the Custer fight. Gall and Sitting Bull have both 
 gone to hunt the white buffalo long since. Rain can 
 write his name in English. I taught him to do it at 
 the World's Fair in order to sell Longfellow's poem, enti- 
 tled "The Revenge of Rain-in-the-Face." He doesn't 
 know the significance of it after he writes it. His knowl- 
 edge of English is confined to about thirty words, but he 
 can't say them so any one can understand him, though 
 he can understand almost anything that is said in Eng- 
 lish. Like all other Indians, his gratitude is for favors 
 to come and not for favors already shown. He is utterly 
 heartless and unprincipled, physically brave but morally
 
 292 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 a coward. His redeeming feature lies in the fact that 
 you can depend upon any promise he makes, but it takes 
 a world of patience to get him to promise anything. Even 
 at the age of sixty he is still a Hercules. In form and 
 face he is the most pronounced type of the ideal Feni- 
 more Cooper, dime novel Indian in America.
 
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 Two Interesting Affairs 
 
 I. The Fight on the War Bonnet 
 
 BEFORE entering upon a detailed description 
 of the larger events of the campaign after the 
 Battle of the Rosebud and Little Big Horn, two 
 smaller affairs are worthy of mention. One, 
 though nothing but a skirmish, was of great impor- 
 tance in determining the final result. The other well 
 illustrates something of the adventurous life and perilous 
 duty of a soldier in Indian warfare. 
 
 On Saturday, July 15, 1876, the Fifth Cavalry, under 
 General Wesley Merritt, was marching toward Fort 
 Laramie, under orders to join Crook. At noon word was 
 received from the agency that a body of Cheyennes, num- 
 bering, perhaps, one thousand warriors, who had here- 
 tofore remained quiet on the reservation at the Red 
 Cloud Agency, on the White River, South Dakota the 
 Pine Ridge Agency was about to break away and join 
 the Indians in the field. Their minds had been in- 
 flamed by the story of Crook's defeat and the account of 
 the disaster to the Seventh Cavalry. They thought they 
 saw unlimited opportunities for plunder, scalp-taking, 
 and successful fighting therefore they decided to go on 
 the war-path without delay. There were not troops 
 
 293
 
 294 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 enough near the agency to prevent this action, which was 
 entirely unsuspected anyway. 
 
 The orders for Merritt to join Crook were imperative; 
 but, in view of this news, the general decided to disregard 
 them for the present. He realized that he could per- 
 form no better service than heading off this body of 
 Cheyennes, and either defeating and scattering them or, 
 better still, forcing them back to the agency. 
 
 The trail they would have to take would cross a creek 
 in the extreme southeast corner of South Dakota, called 
 the War Bonnet,* some eighty-five miles, by the only 
 practicable route, from where the Fifth Cavalry then 
 was. The Indians were a much shorter distance from it. 
 Merritt would have had to march around, practically, 
 three sides of a square, owing to the configuration of the 
 country, to reach that point, which was the best place for 
 miles around, within the knowledge of W. F. Cody (Buf- 
 falo Bill), his chief scout, to intercept the flying Chey- 
 ennes. 
 
 Merritt did not hesitate an instant after learning the 
 news. He put his command in motion immediately, and 
 by a forced march of thirty-one hours, got to the crossing 
 in good time. There was no evidence that the Chey- 
 ennes had passed. The troopers concealed themselves 
 in ravines under the bluffs, and waited for the Indians. 
 
 Early on the morning of July iyth, the pickets, com- 
 manded by Lieutenant Charles King,"]- observed the 
 approach of the Indians. At about the same time Mer- 
 ritt's wagon train, under Lieutenant Hall, with two hun- 
 dred infantrymen spoiling for a fight, concealed in the 
 wagons as a guard, was observed toiling along, some four 
 
 *The frontiersmen translate this to " Hat Creek "; and that is the name it bears 
 to-day more's the pity ! 
 
 f Afterward brigadier-general of volunteers in the Spanish-American War, and the 
 author of many fascinating romances of army life.
 
 Two Interesting Affairs 295 
 
 miles to the southwest, in an endeavor to reach the ren- 
 dezvous on the War Bonnet. The regiment remained 
 carefully concealed, and the Indians, in high glee, 
 thought they had the train at their mercy. 
 
 So soon as he sighted the Cheyennes, Lieutenant Hall 
 despatched two troopers of his small cavalry escort 
 ahead to the crossing to apprise Merritt that the In- 
 dians were at hand. An advance party of Cheyennes, 
 superbly mounted and led by a gorgeous young chief, 
 determined to intercept these troopers, who were igno- 
 rant of their peril. The two soldiers came down one 
 trail which led through a ravine, the Indians came up 
 another which led through another ravine. The troop- 
 ers and the Cheyennes were hidden from each other, 
 but both were in plain view of the picket on the hill. The 
 two trails joined at the foot of the hill. The plain back 
 of the wagon-train was black or red, rather with In- 
 dians coming up rapidly, although they were not yet 
 near enough to attack. 
 
 Merritt and one or two other officers, with Buffalo 
 Bill and a few of his scouts and several troopers, joined 
 King on the hill. The main body of the Indians was too 
 far away to attack, so the little advance party determined 
 to wait until the Cheyennes, who were endeavoring to 
 cut off the two soldiers, were close at hand and then fall 
 upon them. Everybody withdrew from the crest of the 
 hill except Lieutenant King, who was to give the signal, 
 when the party below should sally around it and fall on 
 the Cheyennes. 
 
 King, who has described the situation with masterly 
 skill in his "Campaigning with Crook," flattened him- 
 self out on the brow of the hill, with nothing showing 
 but the top of his hatless head and his field glass, and 
 watched the soldiers rapidly galloping up one trail and
 
 296 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the Indians more rapidly rushing down the other. He 
 waited until the Indians had almost reached the junc- 
 tion. Then he gave the signal. Merritt's escort and 
 Cody's scouts raced around the base of the hill, and 
 dashed slap into the faces of the astonished Cheyennes. 
 Two Indian saddles were emptied in the twinkling of 
 an eye. Such was the impetus of their charge that the 
 Indians scarcely had time to rein in their steeds before 
 the white men were upon them. 
 
 Buffalo Bill shot the leader of the war party, a famous 
 young chief named Yellow Hand, through the leg. The 
 bullet also pierced the heart of the pony Yellow Hand 
 was riding. Both crashed to the earth. In spite of his 
 pain, Yellow Hand dragged himself to his feet and fired 
 at the scout, killing his horse. The two, not twenty 
 paces apart, exchanged shots the next instant. The 
 Indian missed, but Buffalo Bill sent a bullet through 
 Yellow Hand's breast. The Indian reeled, but before 
 he fell Cody leaped upon him and drove his knife into 
 his gallant enemy's heart. Yellow Hand was a dead In- 
 dian when he struck the ground. "Jerking the war 
 bonnet off," he says, "I scientifically scalped him in 
 about five seconds. "* 
 
 Yellow Hand had recognized Buffalo Bill, and had 
 virtually challenged him to this duel. "The first scalp 
 for Custer!" shouted Cody, waving his trophy in the air. 
 
 Some of the other Indians had now come within range. 
 They opened fire upon the little party; the bullets zipped 
 around them in every direction, one narrowly grazing 
 General Merritt. They nicked a horse here and there, 
 but, as usual, their marksmanship was execrable. 
 
 As the little party charged the Indians, Merritt had 
 
 *" The Adventures of Buff alo Bill." By Colonel William F. Cody. Harper & 
 Brothers, 1904.
 
 Two Interesting Affairs 297 
 
 directed King to order the rest of the regiment to 
 advance. In the midst of the firing, the splendid 
 troops of the dandy Fifth came bursting through the 
 ravines and over the hills, making for the Cheyennes 
 on the gallop. At the same time Lieutenant Hall's 
 infantrymen scrambled out of their wagons and sent a 
 few volleys at the Cheyennes at long range. 
 
 A more astonished body of Indians the United States 
 has probably never contained. They hadn't the slight- 
 est idea that there was a soldier within five hundred 
 miles, except those in the wagon train which they had 
 expected to capture. They had anticipated no trouble 
 whatever in joining Sitting Bull, and now they found 
 themselves suddenly face to face with one of the finest 
 cavalry regiments in the service. What were they to 
 do ? They hadn't much time to decide, for the cavalry 
 were after them at full gallop. They turned and fled 
 incontinently. They stood not on the order of their 
 going, but went at once. 
 
 If they could get back to the reservation, they would 
 be free from attack. They fled at the highest possible 
 speed of their horses, throwing aside everything they 
 possessed, save their guns and ammunition, in their 
 frantic desire to get away. For thirty miles Merritt and 
 his men pursued them with the best will in the world to 
 come up with them; but the horses of the soldiers were 
 more or less tired from their long march of the day be- 
 fore, and the Indians, lightly equipped and on fresh 
 horses, finally succeeded in escaping. By nightfall the 
 whole party was back on the reservation. Thereafter 
 care was taken that they found no further opportunity 
 to go on the war-path. 
 
 The cooperation of this splendid body of Indians 
 with that under the command of Crazy Horse might
 
 298 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 possibly have turned the scale in some of the hotly con- 
 tested battles, and Merritt's promptness was greatly 
 commended by the authorities. Buffalo Bill received 
 the chief glory of the little adventure from his dramatic 
 duel with Yellow Hand, in full view of soldiers and 
 Indians. 
 
 II. The Sibley Scout 
 
 The other event is known in army records as The Sib- 
 ley Scout. While General Crook was waiting for re- 
 inforcements and additional supplies at his camp on 
 Goose Creek, near the Tongue River, he decided to 
 send out a scouting party to see what had become of 
 his friend, Crazy Horse, who had handled him so 
 severely at the Rosebud a few weeks before. 
 
 Lieutenant Frederick W. Sibley, of E Troop, of the 
 Third Cavalry, an enterprising but cool-headed young 
 officer, was given command of twenty-five picked men 
 from the regiment. With him went scouts Frank 
 Gruard and Baptiste Fourier, commonly known as "Big 
 Bat," to distinguish him from another scout, Baptiste, 
 a smaller man. To the party also were attached John 
 Becker, mule packer, and the indefatigable Finerty, 
 the war correspondent of the Chicago Times, making 
 a total of thirty men. 
 
 Each man carried one hundred rounds of ammunition 
 on his person, and a few days' rations in his saddle-bags. 
 They started on the 6th of July. On the yth they had 
 reached the Rosebud, some fifty miles away from Crook's 
 camp. There they came across the Indians. Gruard 
 and Fourier observed them from the top of a hill, behind 
 which the rest of the expedition halted. There were 
 hundreds of them, apparently, and the scouts rejoined
 
 Two Interesting Affairs 299 
 
 the command immediately. To take the back track 
 was impossible. Therefore, they struck westward over 
 the mountains, leading their horses. The Indians, 
 marching slowly southward, soon came upon the trail of 
 the party, and followed it at some distance. Urged by 
 the imminence of their peril, the men, led by the uner- 
 ring Gruard, who was familiar with all the ramifications 
 of the Big Horn Range, since he had often hunted there 
 during his captivity with the Sioux, did some rapid moun- 
 tain climbing, and finally thought they had escaped pur- 
 suit, especially as no one could ride up the trail up which 
 they had climbed, and these Indians were poor trailers 
 when on foot. Having progressed some five miles over 
 terrific trails, they halted in a little glade under the shade 
 of some trees, unsaddled their horses, made coffee, and 
 ate dinner. Feeling themselves safe from pursuit, they 
 rested for several hours, and it was not until late in the 
 afternoon that they took up their march again. 
 
 The going here was easier than before, and they could 
 mount their horses once more. Presently they trotted 
 into a level, thickly wooded valley. The trail led along 
 the right side of the mountain, which was broken and 
 rugged. There were woods to the left and in front of 
 them, and high rocks and open timber on the right. 
 John Becker, who brought up the rear, suddenly alarmed 
 everybody by the shout of "Indians, Indians!" 
 
 The next instant the timber and boulders to the right 
 were alive with a war party of Sioux and Cheyennes, not 
 two hundred yards away not the same party they had 
 seen in the valley, by the way. So soon as the Indians 
 appeared they opened fire. Again their shooting was 
 bad. Not a trooper was hurt, although a number of 
 horses were hit, some seriously. Sibley acted with 
 prompt decision. A word with Gruard determined him
 
 3OO Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 in his course. Under a spattering fire from the Indians, 
 the party turned to the left and raced for the thick tim- 
 ber as fast as they could go. They threw themselves to 
 the ground in a semi-circular line so soon as they reached 
 the woods, tied their horses to the trees back of them, 
 and taking advantage of fallen logs and boulders as a 
 breastwork, opened fire upon the Indians, who, on their 
 part, sought concealment and commenced firing in ear- 
 nest. The soldiers were well protected in the forest, 
 however, and although the Indians killed many of the 
 horses, they did not hit any of the troopers. 
 
 The party was now overwhelmingly outnumbered. 
 There were already several hundred Indians engaged. 
 Their leader was a magnificent young Cheyenne chief, 
 dressed in a suit of white buckskin. It was afterward 
 learned that his name was White Antelope. Gruard 
 was recognized by the Indians, who were desirous of 
 taking him alive. After firing for perhaps half an hour, 
 White Antelope led the Indians on foot in a direct 
 charge on the woods. 
 
 Sibley ordered his men to hold their fire until they 
 could make every shot tell. They mowed the advanc- 
 ing Indians down in scores. White Antelope was seen 
 to leap into the air and fall. He had been pierced, it 
 was afterward learned, by several bullets, and started 
 for the happy hunting grounds then and there. The 
 charge was handsomely repulsed, and the Indians re- 
 tired in confusion, although still keeping up a severe fire. 
 
 It was evident to every one that the Indians would 
 hold the soldiers in play until they were joined by other 
 war parties indeed, their numbers were increased al- 
 ready when Sibley's detachment would be surrounded 
 and exterminated. Gruard, therefore, proposed aban- 
 doning the horses most of them had been killed any-
 
 CHILF TWO 
 NORTHERN CHEY ENN ' E; 
 
 CHIEF TWO MOON OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNES 
 
 Allies of the Sioux at Little Big Horn 
 Painted from life by F. A Burbank
 
 Two Interesting Affairs 301 
 
 way and that the whole party should steal away 
 through the timber and endeavor to escape over the 
 mountains on foot. Firing two or three volleys and 
 then keeping up a scattering fire for a short time to make 
 the Indians think they were on the alert, the troopers, 
 exercising the greatest caution, one by one crawled 
 through the underbrush until they were hidden by the 
 forest trees. Then everybody got up on his feet and 
 ran like mad. 
 
 Gruard, whose instincts as a guide were of the highest 
 order, led them over magnificent mountains, through 
 gloomy canons, past overhanging cliffs, along impossi- 
 ble trails on the sides of tremendous precipices, one of 
 which stretched for several hundred feet below them and 
 three hundred feet above them, almost sheer. Not being 
 mountaineers, they would have been utterly unable to 
 have followed the scout had it not been for the Red Ter- 
 ror that lurked behind. They had succeeded in getting, 
 perhaps, a mile away from and some distance above the 
 valley, when they heard several heavy volleys, followed 
 by a series of wild yells, which apprised them that the 
 Indians had at last rushed their camp. They were so 
 confident of escape now that they actually burst into 
 roars of laughter at the thought of the Indian disap- 
 pointment when the attackers found their victims had 
 decamped. Those Indians were not accustomed to 
 hunt on foot. An Indian off a horse is about as awk- 
 ward as a sailor on one. The pursuit was soon aban- 
 doned, and the soldiers left to follow their course un- 
 molested. Theirs had been a lucky escape. Without 
 Gruard, they had all been killed. 
 
 The day was frightfully hot. The fast going caused 
 by the exigencies of the occasion and the desperate 
 nature of the climbing increased their discomfort. The
 
 3O2 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 men threw away everything in the way of superfluous 
 clothing which would impede their progress or tire them 
 in their hurry, save their weapons and ammunition. 
 They camped that night, or halted, rather, for there was 
 nothing with which to camp, on the crest of the range. 
 It turned very cold, a terrible storm arose, and they 
 suffered severely. They had nothing to eat; their pro- 
 visions had been in their saddle-bags, and they had not 
 dared to take them in their attempt to escape, lest the 
 suspicions of the Indians should be excited by their 
 efforts. 
 
 The next day, the Qth of July, they started down the 
 mountain. Gruard's instincts were not at fault. He 
 led them to the foot-hills overlooking Crook's main camp 
 far away. In order to reach the plain they had to cross 
 a rapid mountain brook, the water of which came al- 
 most up to their necks. Two men who could not swim 
 and who were in a very nervous condition from their ex- 
 citing adventures, stubbornly refused to try to cross the 
 stream, even with the assistance of their comrades. They 
 chose rather to hide themselves where they were, and 
 begged that help might be sent back to them. The rest 
 of the party managed to cross and started for the camp, 
 still about fifteen miles distant. They were met in the 
 evening by a scouting party of soldiers, who brought 
 them back to camp. 
 
 Their clothing and shoes were torn to ribbons, and 
 they were greatly exhausted from the terrible strains and 
 hardships to which they had been subjected. That they 
 escaped at all was a miracle, due to the coolness of young 
 Sibley and the marvelous skill of Gruard. A detach- 
 ment went back for the two men who had remained 
 behind and brought them back to the camp. 
 
 Lieutenant Sibley reported to General Crook that he
 
 Two Interesting Affairs 303 
 
 had found the Indians, but whether that statement is 
 accurate is a question. It would, perhaps, be more truth- 
 ful to say that the Indians had found him. Sibley and 
 Gruard were highly complimented by Crook; and Mr. 
 Finerty, who had displayed great courage, wrote a 
 graphic account of it, from which this brief sketch has 
 been abridged.
 
 CHAPTER NINE 
 The First Success 
 
 I. Crook and Mills at Slim Buttes 
 
 AFTER the defeat of General Custer, and the 
 successful retreat of the Sioux and Cheyennes 
 from the Little Big Horn, the government 
 hurried reinforcements into the field, and 
 ordered Crook and Terry to press the pursuit of the 
 Indians with the greatest vigor. It was not, however, 
 until nearly a year after the disaster on the Little Big 
 Horn that the Sioux war was concluded, and it was not 
 until after the Indians had met with several crushing 
 defeats and had been pursued until they were utterly 
 exhausted that peace was declared. 
 
 The greatest individual factor in bringing about this 
 much desired result was General George Crook, a cele- 
 brated cavalryman during the Civil War, and a more 
 celebrated Indian fighter after its close. With un- 
 wearied tenacity and vigor he pursued the savages, strik- 
 ing them through his subordinates whenever and wher- 
 ever they could be found. The terrible persistence with 
 which he urged his faint, starving, foot-sore, tattered 
 soldiers along the trail, to which he clung with a resolu- 
 tion and determination that nothing could shake, entitles 
 him to the respect and admiration of his countrymen 
 
 304
 
 The First Success 305 
 
 a respect and admiration, by the way, which was fully 
 accorded him by his gallant and equally desperate foes. 
 
 After Crook, the men who brought about the result 
 were, first and foremost, Nelson A. Miles singularly 
 enough not a cavalryman, but the Colonel of the Fifth 
 Infantry; and, next to him, Colonel Ranald S. Macken- 
 zie, of the Fourth Cavalry, and Captain Anson Mills, of 
 the Third, whom we have already noted doing gallant 
 service at the Battle of the Rosebud. Miles had been 
 ordered into the field to reinforce Terry's shattered 
 and depleted column. 
 
 After much marching and scouting, the columns of 
 Terry and Crook combined; but Terry's forces were in 
 bad condition, and his command was soon withdrawn 
 from the field. What was left of the Seventh Cavalry 
 was sent back to Fort Lincoln, whence they had started 
 out with such bright hopes a few months before. Gib- 
 bon's command was returned to Montana, where it had 
 been made up, on account of the threatening aspect of 
 things in that quarter, and Terry retired from active 
 campaigning to resume command of his department. 
 Miles, as we shall see, was sent to the Yellowstone. 
 
 Crook was left alone in the active pursuit. Space and 
 time are lacking to describe the details of the wonderful 
 marches he made on the trails of the Indians now 
 under burning suns, which parched the ground until it 
 was as bare as the palm of a hand; again through tor- 
 rents of drenching rains, which succeeded the fierce 
 heat; and, finally, through the snows and cold of a 
 winter of unexampled severity. During the summer 
 there was no forage for the horses of the cavalry nor for 
 the very small pack train, and rations for the men be- 
 came snorter and shorter. Finally, early in September, 
 the supply of provisions was reduced to two and a half
 
 306 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 days' rations. Crook calculated that they could march 
 two weeks on that amount. 
 
 They supplemented the rations by living on horse 
 and mule meat and a few wild onions which they could 
 gather from time to time in spots which had escaped the 
 universal baking of the summer. At last the command 
 literally reached the end of its resources. The Indians 
 were in bad condition, too, but their situation was not 
 nearly so desperate as was that of Crook and his men. 
 The Indians were worn out and exhausted by the 
 energetic and relentless pursuit which had been hurled 
 after them by the indomitable commander, but they 
 still had plenty to eat, and they had managed to keep 
 ahead of him, and to avoid various scouting columns. 
 
 On the 7th of September, 1876, Crook realized that 
 his men had reached the limit of their endurance, and 
 that forage and food must be procured or they would 
 all die in the wilderness. The Indians had swept the 
 country bare of game, and the sun had swept it clean of 
 fodder. One hundred and fifty of the best men that is, 
 those who showed the fewest signs of the hardships 
 they had undergone with the best horses and the last 
 of the mules, were formed into an advance party under 
 Captain Anson Mills, of the Third Cavalry. Mills had 
 instructions to push on to Deadwood City, one of the 
 new towns in the Black Hills, to get provisions, "Any 
 kind of provisions, for God's sake!" which he could bring 
 back to the rest of the army, now in a destitute condition. 
 
 Mills was not expected to hunt for, or to fight, In- 
 dians primarily, that is. He was to go for food in 
 order to keep the army from starving ; but as he 
 marched southward, his scouts discovered a large village 
 of forty or fifty lodges at a place called Slim Buttes, in 
 the northwest corner of South Dakota. The tepees
 
 The First Success 307 
 
 had been pitched on a little rising from the banks of a 
 small stream called Rabbit Creek. The place was in- 
 closed on three sides by a series of tall cliffs, whose 
 broken sides seemed here and there to have been cut 
 in half-formed terraces, making the ascent easy. Little 
 ravines and small canons ran through the buttes, 
 gradually ascending until they met the plateau on top. 
 
 Mills instantly determined to attack the camp a wise 
 and soldierly action on his part. He made his dispo- 
 sitions with care. Reaching the vicinity of the camp, 
 he halted in a deep gorge on the night of September 8, 
 and prepared for battle early the next morning. The 
 night was dark, cold, and very rainy, and the tired men 
 suffered greatly. Marching out at dawn, Mills succeeded 
 at daybreak in surprising the camp, which proved to 
 be that of a band of Sioux led by American Horse, 
 one of the most prominent chiefs. Leaving Lieutenant 
 Bubb with the pack train and the lead horses, Mills 
 directed Lieutenant Schwatka, afterward so well known 
 from his Arctic explorations, to charge directly into the 
 village with twenty-five mounted men. The remainder 
 of his force he dismounted and divided into two parties, 
 under Lieutenants Von Luettwitz and Crawford, re- 
 spectively, with orders to move on the camp from differ- 
 ent sides. 
 
 The attack was a complete success. The village 
 was taken with but little loss. Some of the Sioux were 
 killed and others captured, but most escaped through 
 the ravines to the plateau surrounding the valley. One 
 heroic but unfortunate little band, consisting of Ameri- 
 can Horse and four warriors, with fifteen women and 
 children, was driven into one of the canons which 
 ended in a cave. One or two of the soldiers had been 
 wounded in the attack. Lieutenant Von Luettwitz,
 
 308 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 who had fought all through the Franco-Austrian War 
 in Italy, and who was a veteran of the Civil War, was 
 shot in the knee and so badly wounded that his leg had 
 to be amputated on the field. 
 
 Being now in complete command of the village, the 
 pack train was ordered up and the captured village was 
 examined. To the joy of Mills and his soldiers, an 
 immense quantity of provisions, in the shape of meat, 
 forage, and other stores, was discovered. 
 
 There still remained the little band of savages in the 
 ravine to be dealt with. A detachment was ordered to 
 drive them out. The Indians had been busy making 
 rifle-pits, and as the soldiers advanced to storm the cave, 
 they were met with a rapid and well-directed fire. Two 
 of them were shot dead and others wounded.* The 
 Indian position appeared to be impregnable. An inter- 
 preter crept near enough under cover to make himself 
 heard, and asked their surrender. They replied to his 
 command with taunts and jeers. They incautiously 
 informed him, however, that Crazy Horse with his 
 warriors was in the vicinity, and on being apprised of 
 their situation by some of the fugitives, he would un- 
 doubtedly come to their rescue. Crazy Horse could 
 have made short work of Mills and his hundred and 
 fifty. Meanwhile the survivors of the village, which 
 had contained a hundred warriors, formed an extended 
 line on the buttes and opened fire on the soldiers. 
 
 * One of the scouts killed in this battle was a great admirer of Buffalo Bill, whose 
 manners, methods, and appearance he aped as well as he could. He rejoiced in an unfor- 
 tunate sobriquet, which was received in this wise: General Sheridan, seeking Buffalo Bill 
 to lead a hunting expedition on one occasion, was met by this swaggerer, with the remark 
 that Buffalo Bill was gone away, and when Buffalo Bill was gone he was Buffalo Bill 
 himself. "The h 1 you are!" said Sheridan contemptuously. "Buffalo Chip, you 
 mean!" The poor braggart never got away from the name of "Buffalo Chip Charlie." 
 He was a brave man for all his vanity, and the soldiers were sorry enough for their mock- 
 ery when they buried him that night at the foot of the buttes, where he had fallen in the 
 attack on the cave.
 
 The First Success 309 
 
 Mills acted promptly. He despatched a courier to 
 Crook on the best horse in the command, to report the 
 situation and ask him for reinforcements at once. 
 Incidentally, he mentioned that a great quantity of pro- 
 visions had been found. Then he made preparations to 
 hold the place, and at the same time to prosecute his 
 attack against the cave, all the time keeping up a smart 
 fight with the men on the buttes. So soon as Crook 
 received the message, he started forward, intending to 
 take with him a select body of men; but the whole army, 
 spoiling for a fight and hungry for a square meal, in- 
 sisted on going along. They made a forced march, and 
 reached Mills about half after eleven in the morning. 
 
 Crook immediately proceeded to dislodge the Indians 
 in the cave. The men were led forward under a galling 
 fire, to which the general, in spite of the entreaties of 
 his staff, exposed himself with indifference. When they 
 got in a position to command the cave, Crook, willing to 
 spare his brave foemen, again asked them to surrender. 
 His request was met by a decided negative. The men 
 opened fire, and searched every cranny and recess of the 
 cave with a storm of bullets. Gruard, one of the 
 scouts, taking advantage of cover, crept to the very 
 mouth of the cave, remained there unobserved, watched 
 his opportunity, seized a squaw who incautiously ex- 
 posed herself, and with her as a shield dashed forward 
 and shot one of the warriors, escaping in safety him- 
 self. 
 
 II. The Death of American Horse 
 
 After two hours of firing, the death-chants of the 
 squaws induced Crook to order a cessation for another 
 parley. This time his request that the Indians sur-
 
 3io Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 render met with some response; for the squaws and 
 children, to the number of thirteen, came reluctantly 
 forth on his positive assurance that they would be pro- 
 tected. The braves refused to give up. They were 
 confident that Crazy Horse would succor them. The 
 engagement at once began again, but after it had lasted 
 some little time the fire of the Indians ceased. 
 
 The offer of mercy was made a fourth time. A young 
 Indian stepped out and received additional assurance 
 that no harm should come if they surrendered. He 
 went back into the cave and presently reappeared with 
 another young warrior, supporting between them the 
 tall, splendid figure of brave old American Horse. He 
 had been shot through the bowels, and his intestines 
 protruded from the wound. He was suffering frightful 
 agony, and was biting hard upon a piece of wood to 
 control himself. He handed his gun to Crook and gave 
 up the contest. The surgeons with the command did 
 everything they possibly could for him, but his wound 
 was beyond human skill. That night, surrounded by 
 his wives and children, he died, as stoically and as 
 bravely as he had lived. 
 
 Inside the cave the rocky walls were cut and scored 
 by the rain of bullets which had been poured into it, 
 and lying on the floor were the bodies of the two Indian 
 warriors, together with a woman and a child, who had 
 been killed. The soldiers had not known, until the 
 squaws came out, that there were any women or 
 children there. The little band had sold their lives 
 dearly. Even the women had used guns, and had dis- 
 played all the bravery and courage of the Sioux. 
 
 Too late Crazy Horse, with some six hundred war- 
 riors, appeared on the scene. Imagining he had only 
 to deal with Mills' small force, he galloped gallantly for-
 
 The First Success 311 
 
 ward to the attack at about five o'clock. He was great- 
 ly astonished at the number of antagonists developed 
 thereby. He retired to the top of the buttes, and the 
 soldiers in gallant style dashed after him. They scaled 
 the cliffs, finally gaining the level plateau. Crazy 
 Horse made one or two attempts to break through the 
 line, but it was impossible, and seeing himself greatly 
 outnumbered, he wisely retired, having sustained some 
 loss. 
 
 The battle was one of the most picturesque ever 
 fought in the West. Crook and his officers stood in the 
 camp, the center of a vast amphitheater ringed with fire, 
 up the sides of which the soldiers steadily climbed to get 
 at the Indians, silhouetted in all their war finery against 
 the sky. The loss of life on either side was not great, 
 but the capture of the village and the provisions which 
 had been accumulated for the winter was a serious one. 
 
 In the camp were discovered many articles that had 
 belonged to the Seventh Cavalry a guidon, money, one 
 of Captain Keogh's gauntlets, marked with his name, 
 orderly books, saddles, etc. Among other things, were 
 letters written by officers and soldiers to friends in the 
 East, some of them still sealed and ready for mailing. 
 They must have come like voices from the dead when 
 they reached those to whom they had been written.
 
 CHAPTER TEN 
 A Decisive Blow 
 
 I. Mackenzie's Winter Battle 
 
 CROOK now gave over the pursuit, and re- 
 turned to Fort Fetterman to organize a winter 
 campaign. This expedition was one of the 
 best equipped that ever started on an Indian 
 campaign. It contained all arms of the service, 
 with an abundance of everything necessary to suc- 
 cess. To follow its marches to the Big Horn Range 
 would reveal little of interest; but late in November it 
 was learned, from a captured Cheyenne, that the prin- 
 cipal Cheyenne village was located in a canon through 
 which flowed one of the main sources of Crazy Woman's 
 Fork of the Powder River. Colonel Ranald S. Macken- 
 zie was ordered, with the Indian scouts and ten troops of 
 cavalry from the Second, Fourth, and Fifth regiments, 
 to find and destroy the village. 
 
 The Cheyennes were not so numerous as the Sioux, 
 and the greater number of their allies has sometimes 
 caused people to minimize the quality of the Cheyennes; 
 but no braver, more magnificent fighters ever lived than 
 this same tribe. They had some of the Homeric qual- 
 ities of the ancient Greeks. I believe it will generally 
 be admitted that they were the finest of the Plains In- 
 
 312
 
 A Decisive Blow 313 
 
 dians. They were foemen worthy Mackenzie's or any- 
 body else's steel. The battle which ensued was in some 
 respects one of the most terrible in Western history, 
 and in its results exemplified, as few others have done, 
 the horrible character of the war. It was, perhaps, as 
 great a contribution to the downfall of the Sioux as any 
 single incident that occurred. 
 
 Mackenzie's men left the main encampment on the 
 23d of November. The ground was covered with snow. 
 The weather was arctic in its severity. The scouts 
 and friendly Indians Pawnees, Crows, Shoshones, 
 the hereditary enemies of the Cheyennes, including cer- 
 tain Cheyennes also who had entered the service of the 
 United States* had located the camp in Willow 
 Creek Canon. Some of the Indians had kept the camp 
 under observation while Mackenzie brought up his 
 troops. He had seven hundred and fifty cavalrymen and 
 three hundred and fifty Indians. Halting at the mouth 
 of the canon, which he reached on the night of the 24th, 
 he resolved to await the still hours before the break of 
 day the next morning before delivering his attack. 
 
 The canon was a gloomy gorge in the Big Horn Moun- 
 tains. A swift, ice-bound river rushed over the rocks 
 between precipitous walls, which soared into the sky 
 for perhaps a thousand feet on either side. Number- 
 less icy brooks poured their contents into the main 
 stream through lateral canons scarcely less forbidding 
 in their appearance than the main one, and which made 
 the trail of the creek almost impossible. Here and 
 there the canon widened, and in one of these open 
 
 * It is a singular thing to note the looseness of the tie with which the members of the 
 various tribes were bound. Frequently we find bands of the same tribe fighting for and 
 against the United States on the same field. One of the most fruitful causes of the suc- 
 cess of our arms has been this willingness on the part of the Indians to fight against their 
 own people, of which the government has been quick to avail itself.
 
 314 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 places the Cheyennes, under the leadership of Dull 
 Knife, had pitched their camp. They fondly believed 
 the place impregnable as, indeed, with careful guard- 
 ing it would have been. The greatest precaution was 
 taken by Mackenzie to prevent his men from making 
 any noise. They stood in ranks by their horses in the 
 snow in that polar cold, waiting for the order for the 
 advance. Presently the moon rose, flooding the recesses 
 of the ravine with silvery light, which sparkled with 
 dazzling brilliancy upon patches of snow here and there 
 on the dark walls. 
 
 Mackenzie, calculating that day would be breaking 
 just about the time he would reach the camp from his 
 present position, at last gave order to take up the march. 
 With what relief the benumbed troopers sprang to 
 their saddles and urged their shivering horses forward, 
 can scarcely be imagined by dwellers in peaceful lands 
 around warm firesides. As they struggled up the canon 
 they could hear the sound of dancing and revelry in the 
 Indian camp, faintly blown back to them by the night 
 wind. They learned afterward that the Cheyennes had 
 just returned from a successful raid on the Shoshones, 
 and that the dance was in celebration of an important 
 victory they had gained. They halted again, therefore, 
 until all was silence, before they once more advanced. 
 Day was beginning to break as they reached the village. 
 
 The sleeping Indians in the camp had not the slightest 
 suspicion that the enemy was within a hundred miles. 
 The troops, cheering and shouting, burst upon them 
 like a winter storm. Indians, when not apprehensive 
 of attack, invariably sleep naked. The Cheyennes had 
 just time to seize rifles and cartridge belts, while the 
 women caught hasty blankets about the children, when 
 the soldiers were upon them. Indeed, so quick and
 
 A Decisive Blow 315 
 
 sudden was the attack that some of the warriors could 
 not get out of the tepees. With their knives they 
 slashed the wigwams, and from these openings fired 
 upon the soldiers as they galloped through the village. 
 Many were shot dead where a few moments before 
 they had slept in peace. 
 
 Most of the pony herd was captured, and the village 
 in a short time was in possession of Mackenzie. The 
 Cheyennes, though overwhelmed, were undismayed. 
 They had retreated headlong up the canon, but were 
 soon rallied by their subchiefs. Dull Knife, their leader, 
 was found in the village with half a dozen bullets in him. 
 He had fought gallantly in the open until he died. 
 
 Presently the Indians came swarming back along 
 the side of the canon. They occupied points of vantage, 
 and, naked though they were in the frightful weather, 
 with the thermometer ranging from ten to twenty 
 degrees below zero during this campaign, they opened 
 fire upon their opponents. Unless they could be dis- 
 lodged, Mackenzie's position was untenable. He sent 
 his Shoshone and other Indian scouts, who, animated 
 with bitter hatred of the Cheyennes, were eager to obey 
 his commands, to the summits of the cliffs to clear the 
 Indians from them. 
 
 Meanwhile he directed Lieutenant John A. McKin- 
 ney, with his troop, to charge and drive the Indians 
 from a rocky eminence where they were concentrating 
 and from which they were pouring a hot fire upon the 
 soldiers. McKinney's charge was entirely successful, 
 for he drove the Cheyennes back until he was stopped by 
 a ravine. Wheeling his men, he attempted to find a 
 crossing, when he was fired upon by a flanking party 
 of Indians and instantly killed, being hit no less than 
 six times. Six of his troopers were wounded, and a
 
 316 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 number of horses were shot. The troop was thrown 
 into confusion, and some of the men started to retreat. 
 Mackenzie, observing the situation, immediately ordered 
 Captain John M. Hamilton and Major G. A. Gordon 
 to charge to the rescue. The charge was gallantly 
 made and stubbornly resisted. 
 
 The fighting was hand to hand, of the fiercest descrip- 
 tion; and the Cheyennes, while keeping the rest of Mac- 
 kenzie's forces engaged, began concentrating on these 
 two troops, which had been joined by Captain Davis, 
 with his men. There was no reserve; the cavalry were 
 all in, and this detachment might have been wiped out 
 had it not been for the success of the Shoshones and 
 other Indians, who cleared the key to the position on 
 the summit of the plateau above the canon, and then 
 came to the assistance of the sorely beset soldiers. 
 Twenty Cheyennes were killed here and several of the 
 soldiers. 
 
 Relieved in a measure by these two movements, 
 although not altogether, for the Cheyennes with their 
 superior knowledge of the topography of the country 
 could not be entirely dislodged from their position, and 
 kept up a fierce fire upon the soldiers all day long, to 
 which he could make little reply, Mackenzie sent back 
 word to Crook of his success, and meanwhile began the 
 destruction of the village. All the winter supplies for 
 over a thousand Indians were there. The Cheyennes 
 were a forehanded, prosperous tribe of Indians, as In- 
 dians go, and the property destroyed was enormous. 
 
 II. The Sufferings of the Cheyennes 
 
 What must have been the despair of the surprised 
 warriors, with their women and children, naked, shiver-
 
 A Decisive Blow 317 
 
 ing in the hills, as they saw their belongings consumed 
 by the flames! It was simply impossible for them to 
 maintain their position during the night. They had 
 to move away or die of cold. As it was, twelve little 
 Indian babies froze to death that awful night. Many 
 of the older men and women were kept alive only by 
 having their hands and feet, and in the case of the chil- 
 dren, their whole bodies, thrust into the warm bodies 
 of the few ponies not captured by the soldiers, which 
 had been disemboweled for the' purpose. 
 
 There was no fighting on the 26th. The Cheyennes 
 took up a strong position six miles farther up the canon, 
 from which Mackenzie could not dislodge them, and on 
 the zyth he started on his return to the camp. Crook, 
 who made a forced march night and day, with Colonel 
 Dodge and the infantry, who came forward with aston- 
 ishing speed in spite of storm and cold, met Mackenzie 
 retiring just after he left the canon, and the whole army 
 returned to the encampment. 
 
 The subsequent sufferings of the Indians were fright- 
 ful. Naturally, they repaired to Crazy Horse, expect- 
 ing that he would succor them, feed them, and clothe 
 them. The Sioux and the Cheyennes had been warm 
 friends and allies, and had fought together on many a 
 field. Had they come in their prosperity, Crazy Horse 
 would have given them a warm welcome. As it was, 
 he had little with which to support his own band dur- 
 ing the winter, owing to Crook's pursuit of him, and 
 with short-sighted, yet natural from an Indian point 
 of view policy, he refused to receive these Cheyennes, 
 or to share anything with them. 
 
 Exasperated beyond measure by their treatment by the 
 Sioux, and swearing eternal vengeance uponCrazy Horse, 
 the wretched band struggled into the nearest agency
 
 318 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and surrendered, and in the following spring moved 
 out with the soldiers against Crazy Horse and his men. 
 
 It is appalling to think of that night attack in that awful 
 weather upon that sleeping camp to read of those wret- 
 ched women and children, wandering naked in that bitter 
 cold; to learn of those little ones frozen to death; of the 
 old men and women abandoned by the road to die yet 
 there is another side to the picture, scarcely less horrible. 
 
 In this Indian camp also were found many relics of 
 the Custer battle. So far as that is in question, I may 
 say that I consider that action to have been a fair and 
 square stand-up fight, in which one side was defeated 
 and its members all died fighting.* Naturally, the In- 
 dians despoiled the slain for trophies. White soldiers 
 have done the same when conditions have been reversed, 
 as has been noted in the preceding chapters of this book. 
 Of course, the Indians mutilated the dead and tortured 
 the living, but some instances of both practices are 
 found among white men, and we cannot judge the In- 
 dian by our standards, anyway. 
 
 But in the camp there were other evidences of savage 
 ferocity, from which the soul shrinks in horror, and which 
 showed that these Indians were among the most cruel 
 and ruthless on the continent, and that they were only 
 getting what they had given. Two instances will suf- 
 fice. The troops took from the body of a dead warrior 
 an unique necklace of human forefingers, which had 
 been displayed with pride upon his barbaric breast; "f 
 and a bag was found which contained the right hands of 
 twelve little Shoshone babies and children, which had 
 been recently cut from little arms to give some ruthless 
 warrior a ghastly trophy. 
 
 * See Preface for discussion of the term "Massacre." 
 
 f A picture of a similar necklace may be seen in Captain J. Lee Humfreville's 
 interesting book, " Twenty Years Among Our Hostile Indians."
 
 CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
 Miles 7 Great Campaigning 
 
 I. Miles and His Foot Cavalry Defeat Sitting Bull 
 
 NOW let us turn to Miles and his men. 
 General Miles was ordered to march his 
 command up the Yellowstone to the mouth 
 of the Tongue River, and establish a tem- 
 porary post or cantonment there for the winter. He 
 was an officer in whom great confidence was reposed, 
 and from whom much was to be expected. He had 
 as brilliant a record in the Civil War as Custer, and 
 had practically fought one decisive battle in the closing 
 campaign on his own responsibility, with splendidly 
 successful results. He was a natural-born soldier, and 
 he never showed his talents to better advantage than in 
 the operations which followed. His career before and 
 after this period is still fresh in the minds of a grateful 
 people. 
 
 While Crook and his men were hammering away in 
 one portion of the field, Miles was doing splendid service 
 in the other. The original intention had been to place 
 under his command some fifteen hundred men, but the 
 force he really received amounted only to about five 
 hundred. With these he was not expected to do more 
 than maintain his position, and acquire such informa- 
 
 3*9
 
 32O Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 tion as he could in preparing for the spring and sum- 
 mer campaign of the following year. That was not, 
 from his point of view, a satisfactory program. 
 
 Veteran Indian fighters in the Northwest informed 
 him that it would be useless to try to reach the Indians 
 in the winter; but Miles was not that kind of a soldier. 
 If the Indians could live in tepees in that season, he saw 
 no reason why white soldiers should not move against 
 them in spite of the weather. He had one of the finest 
 regiments of infantry in the service the Fifth. Based 
 upon the report of courts-martial, discipline, etc., no regi- 
 ment surpassed or even equaled its record. Miles him- 
 self proved to be the most successful commander against 
 Indians that the war produced, and his success was not 
 due to what envious people called good luck. It was 
 well merited and thoroughly earned. 
 
 The government, upon the representations of Sheri- 
 dan and Sherman, which were based upon Miles' pre- 
 vious successful fighting with the Southwestern Indians, 
 allowed the young colonel everything he asked for. If 
 his troops were not completely equipped for the work in 
 which their commander designed to employ them, it 
 would be his fault. With wise forethought, he provided 
 the soldiers as if for an arctic expedition. They cut up 
 blankets for underwear. They were furnished with fur 
 boots and the heaviest kind of leggings and overshoes. 
 Every man had a buffalo overcoat and a woolen or fur 
 mask to go over his face under his fur cap. Their hands 
 were protected by fur gloves. It was well for them that 
 they were thus provided, for the winter of 1876-7 was one 
 of the most severe that had ever visited that section of the 
 country. The mercury frequently froze in the thermom- 
 eter, and on one occasion a temperature of sixty degrees 
 below zero was recorded by the spirit thermometer.
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 321 
 
 Busying themselves during the late fall, which was, in 
 effect, winter, in the erection of the cantonment on the 
 Tongue and Yellowstone, the first important touch they 
 got with the Indians was on the i8th of October, when 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Elwell S. Otis, commanding a bat- 
 talion of four companies of the Twenty-third Infantry, 
 escorting a wagon-load of supplies from Glendive, Mon- 
 tana, to the cantonment, was attacked by a large force of 
 hostiles. The attack was not delivered with any great 
 degree of force at first, but it grew in power until the 
 troops had to corral the train. The soldiers had a hard 
 fight to keep the animals from being stampeded and the 
 train captured. Having beaten off the Indians, the 
 train advanced, fighting, until Clear Creek was reached. 
 During a temporary cessation of the attacks a mes- 
 senger rode out from the Indian lines, waving a paper, 
 which he left upon a hill in line with the advance of the 
 train. When it was picked up, Colonel Otis found it to 
 be an imperious message probably written by some 
 half-breed from the chief whom he had been fighting. 
 It ran as follows: 
 
 " Yellowstone. 
 
 " I want to know what you are doing traveling on this 
 road. You scare all the buffalo away. I want to hunt 
 in this place. I want you to turn back from here. If 
 you don't, I'll fight you again. I want you to leave what 
 you have got here, and turn back from here. 
 
 I am your friend, 
 
 SITTING BULL. 
 
 " I mean all the rations you have got and some powder. 
 Wish you would write me as soon as you can. " 
 
 I consider this document unique in the history of In- 
 dian warfare, and it well illustrates not only the spirit,
 
 322 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 but the naivete of the great chief. Otis despatched a 
 scout to Sitting Bull with the information that he intend- 
 ed to take the train through to the cantonment in spite 
 of all the Indians on earth, and if Sitting Bull wanted to 
 have a fight, he (Otis) would be glad to accommodate him 
 at any time and on any terms. The train thereupon 
 moved out, and the Indians promptly recommenced the 
 fight. But the engagement was soon terminated by a 
 flag of truce. A messenger appeared, who stated that the 
 Indians were tired and hungry and wanted to treat for 
 peace. Otis asked Sitting Bull to come into his lines, 
 but that wily old chief refused, although he sent three 
 chiefs to represent him. 
 
 Otis had no authority to treat for peace or anything 
 else, but he gave the Indians a small quantity of hard- 
 tack and a couple of sides of bacon, and advised them to 
 go to the Tongue River and communicate with General 
 Miles. The train then moved on, and after following a 
 short distance, with threatening movements, the Indians 
 withdrew. 
 
 On the same night Otis fell in with Miles and his 
 whole force. Miles, being alarmed for Otis' safety, had 
 marched out to meet him. The train was sent down to the 
 cantonment, and the troops, numbering three hundred 
 and ninety-eight, with one gun, started out in pursuit of 
 Sitting Bull. They overtook him on the 2 1st of Octo- 
 ber at Cedar Creek. With Sitting Bull were Gall and 
 other celebrated chiefs, and one thousand warriors of 
 the Miniconjous, San Arcs, Brules, and Unkpapas, to- 
 gether with their wives and children, in all over three 
 thousand Indians. Crazy Horse, with the Oglalas 
 and Two Moon's band of the Northern Cheyennes, were 
 not with Sitting Bull, while Dull Knife's band, as we 
 have seen, had gone to Wyoming for the winter.
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 323 
 
 The reason for this separation is obvious. They 
 could better support the hardships of the winter, more 
 easily find shelter, and with less difficulty escape from 
 the pursuing soldiers, if they were broken up in smaller 
 parties. 
 
 Sitting Bull asked Miles for an interview, which was 
 arranged. He was attended by a subchief and six war- 
 riors, Miles by an aide and six troopers. The meeting 
 took place between the lines, all parties being on horse- 
 back. 
 
 Sitting Bull wanted peace on the old basis. The In- 
 dians demanded permission to retain their arms, with 
 liberty to hunt and roam at will over the plains and 
 through the mountains, with no responsibility to any 
 one, while the government required them to surrender 
 their arms and come into the agencies. The demands 
 were irreconcilable therefore. The interview was an in- 
 teresting one, and although it began calmly enough, it 
 grew exciting toward the end. 
 
 Sitting Bull, whom Miles describes as a fine, power- 
 ful, intelligent, determined looking man, was evidently 
 full of bitter and persistent animosity toward the white 
 race. He said no Indian that ever lived loved the white 
 man, and that no white man that ever lived loved the In- 
 dian; that God Almighty had made him an Indian, 
 but He didn't make him an Agency Indian, and he didn't 
 intend to be one. 
 
 The manner of the famous chief had been cold, but 
 dignified and courteous. As the conversation progressed, 
 he became angry so enraged, in fact, that in Miles' 
 words "he finally gave an exhibition of wild frenzy. 
 His whole manner seemed more like that of a wild beast 
 than a human being. His face assumed a furious ex- 
 pression. His jaws were tightly closed, his lips were
 
 324 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 compressed, and you could see his eyes glisten with the 
 fire of savage hatred."* 
 
 One cannot help admiring the picture presented by 
 the splendid, if ferocious, savage. I have no doubt that 
 General Miles himself admired him. 
 
 At the height of the conference a young warrior stole 
 out from the Indian lines and slipped a carbine under 
 Sitting Bull's blanket. He was followed by several 
 other Indians to the number of a dozen, who joined 
 the band, evidently meditating treachery. Miles, who, 
 with his aide, was armed with revolver only, promptly 
 required these new auxiliaries to retire, else the confer- 
 ence would be terminated immediately. His demand 
 was reluctantly obeyed. After some further talk, a sec- 
 ond meeting was appointed for the morrow, and the 
 conference broke up. 
 
 During the night Miles moved his command in posi- 
 tion to be able to intercept the movement of the Indians 
 the next day. There was another interview with the 
 picturesque and imperious savage, whose conditions of 
 peace were found to be absolutely impossible, since they 
 involved the abandonment of all the military posts, the 
 withdrawal of all settlers, garrisons, etc., from the coun- 
 try. He wanted everything and would give nothing. 
 He spoke like a conqueror, and he looked like one, al- 
 though his subsequent actions were not in keeping with 
 the part. Miles, seeing the futility of further discussion, 
 peremptorily broke up the conference. He told Sitting 
 Bull that he would take no advantage of the flag of truce, 
 but that he would give him just fifteen minutes to get 
 back to his people to prepare for fighting. Shouting 
 defiance, the chiefs rode back to the Indian lines. 
 
 There was " mounting in hot haste" surely, and hur- 
 
 * Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. A.
 
 Miles 7 Great Campaigning 325 
 
 ried preparations were made for immediate battle on 
 both sides. Watch in hand, Miles checked off the min- 
 utes, and exactly at the time appointed he ordered an 
 advance. The Indians set fire to the dry grass, which was 
 not yet covered with snow, and the battle was joined 
 amid clouds of flame and smoke. Although outnumbered 
 nearly three to one, the attack of the soldiers was pressed 
 home so relentlessly that the Indians were driven back 
 from their camp, which fell into the possession of Miles. 
 
 The Sioux were not beaten, however, for the discom- 
 fited warriors rallied a force to protect their flying wom- 
 en and children, under the leadership of Gall and 
 others, Sitting Bull not being as much of a fighter as a 
 talker. They were led to the attack again and again by 
 their intrepid chiefs. On one occasion, so impetuous 
 was their gallantry that the troops were forced to form 
 square to repel their wild charges. Before the battle 
 was over and it continued into the next day the In- 
 dians had been driven headlong for over forty miles. 
 
 They had suffered a serious loss in warriors, but a 
 greater in the destruction of their camp equipage, winter 
 supplies, and other property. Two thousand of them 
 came in on the third day and surrendered, under prom- 
 ises of good treatment. Several hundred broke into 
 small parties and scattered. Miles' little force was too 
 small to be divided to form a guard for the Indians who 
 had been captured; and besides, he had other things 
 to do, so he detained a number of the principal chiefs as 
 hostages, and exacted promises from the rest that they 
 would surrender at the Spotted Tail or Red Cloud Agen- 
 cy a promise which, by the way, the great majority of 
 them kept. Sitting Bull, Gall, and about four hundred 
 others refused to surrender, and made for the boundary 
 line, escaping pursuit for the time being.
 
 326 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 This was the first and most serious defection from the 
 Indian Confederacy. It was followed by others. In a 
 subsequent campaign, in the depth of winter, a battalion 
 under Lieutenant Baldwin struck Sitting Bull's depleted 
 and starving camp on two separate occasions, inflicting 
 further loss upon that implacable chieftain.* 
 
 II. Miles' Crushing Defeat of Crazy Horse at Wolf 
 Mountain 
 
 Late in December Miles, having practically eliminat- 
 ed Sitting Bull from the game, moved out against Crazy 
 Horse. He had with him five companies of the Fifth 
 Infantry and two of the Twenty-second, in all four hun- 
 dred and thirty-six officers and men and two Napoleon 
 guns. These guns were fitted with canvas wagon-tops, 
 and were so disguised as exactly to resemble the supply 
 wagons of the train. The men left the cantonment on 
 the 29th of December, 1876. It had been learned that 
 Crazy Horse was in the valley of the Tongue River, 
 south of the Yellowstone. There were sharp skirmishes 
 on the first and third of January between the advance 
 and war parties of Indians, who were moving gradually 
 up the Tongue toward the mountains. On the evening 
 of the 7th of January, 1877, a young warrior and a wom- 
 an were captured, belonging to those Cheyennes who 
 were still with Crazy Horse and the Unkpapas, and were 
 
 *As an instance of Miles' capacity in handling men, this is what Baldwin says in a 
 private letter, afterward made public, of the orders he received : "When I was given 
 command of this battalion opposite the mouth of Squaw Creek, and the General took 
 command of a less number of men, it was a question as to which would find the hostile 
 Indians, and with the only order or suggestion given by him in that earnest manner char- 
 acteristic of him, he said, 'Now, Baldwin, do thejbest you can. I am responsible for 
 disaster, success will be to your credit; you know what my plans are, and what we are 
 here for.* " There is a dashing, manly ring about such words which I rejoice to rec- 
 ognize. It is a great soldier who can first choose and then trust his subordinates.
 
 thl collection of J. Robert Colter 
 
 GEN. JOHN GIBBON 
 GEN. WESLEY MERRITT 
 
 GEN. NELSON A. MILES 
 GEN. ALFRED H. TERRY 
 
 SOME FAMOUS INDIAN FIGHTERS
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 327 
 
 related to some of the principal members of the band. 
 From them much was learned of the situation of the 
 Indian position. 
 
 The next morning, the weather being bitterly cold, the 
 men moved out to attack the Indian camp. Crazy 
 Horse's warriors numbered between eight and nine hun- 
 dred. He had posted his men on the cliffs surmounting 
 a valley in the Wolf Mountains, a spur of the Big Horn 
 Range, not far from Crook's battle-ground on the Rose- 
 bud. The troops entered the valley in full view of the 
 Indians occupying the heights. The position was well 
 chosen; for in order to make the attack, the soldiers 
 would have to climb straight up the walls to get at the 
 Indians, who were enabled, by the configuration of the 
 ground and by their numbers, almost to surround the 
 soldiers. One reason why Crazy Horse was willing to 
 fight was because of his great desire to get possession of 
 the Indians recently captured. 
 
 Seeing that Crazy Horse was willing to accept battle, 
 Miles made his preparations deliberately. The troops, 
 out of range of the Indians, calmly had breakfast and 
 made their camp secure. Having done everything at 
 his leisure, Miles moved out to the attack. 
 
 The Sioux were plainly visible on the cliffs. They 
 could be seen shaking their fists and brandishing their 
 rifles as the soldiers slowly advanced through the deep 
 snow which covered the ground. The Indians seemed 
 absolutely confident that Miles was marching into a trap, 
 that when he got into the canon he would be unable to 
 scale the slopes, and they would have him at their mercy. 
 There was no ambush about it. The whole thing was 
 open and plain. They had chosen their position and 
 had invited the soldiers to make at them. There. was, 
 indeed, no other way for Miles to get to them, so cun-
 
 328 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ningly had they taken advantage of the ground, except 
 the way which lay open before them. As the troops 
 drew nearer, the gestures of defiance and contempt were 
 accompanied by yells and jeers. Among the things 
 they shouted in their confident assurance of success were 
 these significant words: 
 
 "You have had your last breakfast!" 
 
 Indeed, the grim prophecy did not seem unlikely of 
 fulfilment. 
 
 It might have been supposed that men, encumbered as 
 were the soldiers with their heavy, winter clothing, could 
 never have scaled those heights, especially in the face of 
 such opposition as the redoubtable warriors of Crazy 
 Horse would offer. If they did not succeed in clearing 
 the cliffs of the Indians, they would probably be shot 
 down in scores in the valley. They would then be forced 
 to retreat to their train, if any of them were left alive to do 
 so, and stand a siege; and as they were three or four hun- 
 dred miles from any possible relieving force, and in the 
 depth of a Dakota winter, that would mean a speedy an- 
 nihilation. It was a serious risk to take, but no battle 
 was ever won without taking risks, and the nice art of the 
 soldier consists in knowing what risks to take and when 
 to take them. Not the least of Miles' claims to admi- 
 ration as a commander was his determination, under all 
 circumstances, to fight then and there. 
 
 Undaunted by the threatening prospect and unmoved 
 by the savage shouts and jeers, although some of the 
 scouts who knew the Sioux language retorted in kind, 
 the troops deployed, and at as rapid a pace as they could 
 manage, started for the hills. The artillery was ex- 
 posed and unlimbered, and the shells thrown into the 
 Indian position caused great surprise and consternation. 
 The key to the position was a high elevation upon the
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 329 
 
 left. The Indians who held it were led by Big Crow, 
 the chief medicine man. As the battle began he exposed 
 himself freely between the lines, dressed in a magnifi- 
 cent Indian war shirt and bonnet, running up and down 
 and yelling like a fiend. 
 
 Miles massed a little column against Big Crow and 
 the warriors defending the eminence. At the same 
 time he ordered a general escalade of the clifF along the 
 whole line. Under a heavy fire, which, however, like 
 most plunging fires down the sides of mountains or 
 slopes, did but little damage, the troops slowly toiled up 
 the icy, snow-covered bluffs.* Led by Major Casey 
 and Captains McDonald and Baldwin, the charge was 
 delivered with the utmost resolution. It was not a dash. 
 No men, encumbered as were those soldiers, could move 
 rapidly up icy cliffs, covered, wherever the sharpness 
 of the acclivity permitted, with from one to three feet of 
 snow. It was rather a slow, dogged, determined crawl, 
 with a stop every few moments to fire at some Indian 
 silhouetted above them on the gray sky-line of that winter 
 morning. 
 
 The fighting for the high clifF on the left of the line 
 was spirited and desperate. Finally, the men came to a 
 hand-to-hand struggle. The Indians clung tenaciously 
 to the post until Big Crow was shot, when the soldiers 
 succeeded in dislodging them. This bluff commanded 
 the lines. It was occupied by the troops, who poured an 
 enfilading fire upon the army of Crazy Horse. The In- 
 dian position, therefore, became untenable, and fighting 
 
 * At the battle of King's Mountain, in the American Revolution, the small loss of life 
 among the Americans was due to the fact that the English, trained marksmen though 
 they were, firing down the slopes of the mountain, overshot their opponents, although 
 they had them in full view all the way up the slope; and it is the tendency of troops 
 always to do the same thing. Troops on a level usually fire too low, and the ground 
 between the advancing lines of soldiers is often plowed up by bullets from the depressed 
 muzzles, which should have gone into the breasts of the approaching enemy.
 
 330 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 sullenly and stubbornly, they withdrew in good order, 
 though closely pursued by the troops. In the latter 
 part of the advance snow began to fall, and before the 
 battle was closed the combatants were fighting in the 
 midst of a blinding storm. Miles says that the moment 
 at which the Indians turned their backs and began the 
 retreat was one in which he felt relief scarcely to be ex- 
 pressed, so desperate had been the fighting, so difficult 
 the ascent, and so doubtful the result. 
 
 The Indians were pursued for some distance, and a 
 large portion of their camp equipage, with supplies, was 
 captured. On the whole, they had suffered a most dis- 
 heartening and disorganizing defeat. Their ammuni- 
 tion was about gone, their confederates in other tribes 
 had been captured, the main body of the redoubtable 
 Cheyennes had been crushed and were starving, the 
 Unkpapas, the Miniconjous, the Sans Arcs, and the 
 Brules had surrendered. The game was up. There 
 was nothing for Crazy Horse and the exhausted rem- 
 nant which remained faithful to him to do but to sur- 
 render, which they accordingly did in the early spring. 
 
 III. The Capture of Lame Deer's Village 
 
 There remained, then, in the field practically but one 
 band of sixty lodges,* under Lame Deer and Iron Star, 
 who refused positively to surrender. The indefatigable 
 and brilliantly successful Miles pursued this band, over- 
 took it, surprised it one morning in May, captured the 
 village, dispersed the greater portion of the Indians, and 
 succeeded in isolating and surrounding Lame Deer and 
 Iron Star, with half a dozen principal warriors. Miles 
 was very desirous of taking them alive. He advanced 
 
 * Each lodge accounted for from 6ve to ten persons.
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 331 
 
 with some of his officers toward the desperate little body 
 of Indians who had been cut off from the fleeing mass of 
 savages, making peace signs and crying peace words. 
 
 The Indians were tremendously excited and remained 
 on guard, but committed no act of hostility. Miles rode 
 up, and leaning over the saddle, extended his hand to 
 Lame Deer. The intrepid chieftain, who was quiver- 
 ing with emotion under his Indian stoicism, grasped the 
 general's hand and clung to it tightly. Iron Star took 
 Baldwin's hand. The other Indians came forward, 
 reluctantly, with hands extended, and all was going 
 well. 
 
 At this juncture one of the white scouts, not knowing 
 what was going on, dashed up to the group, and pos- 
 sibly under a misapprehension that the life of the com- 
 manding officer was threatened, covered Lame Deer 
 with his rifle. The Indian, probably thinking that he 
 was to be killed in any event, resolved to die fighting. 
 Miles strove to hold him and to reassure him, but by a 
 powerful wrench he freed himself, lifting his rifle as he 
 did so, and pointing it straight at the general. 
 
 Miles had been in many battles, but he was never 
 nearer death than at that moment. His quickness and 
 resource did not desert him. Just as the Indian's finger 
 pressed the trigger he dug his spurs into his horse and 
 swung the animal aside in a powerful swerve. Lame 
 Deer's bullet, which missed him by a hair's breadth, 
 struck one of the escort and instantly killed him. Iron 
 Star also drew away from Baldwin and raised his rifle, 
 as the other Indian had done. None of them were so 
 quick, however, as Lame Deer had been. The soldiers 
 closing in had seen Lame Deer's motion, and before any 
 further damage was done by the Indians they were over- 
 whelmed by a rapid fire, which stretched them all dead
 
 332 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 upon the ground. The fighting had been short, but 
 exceedingly sharp. The troops lost four killed and 
 seven wounded, the Sioux fourteen killed and a large 
 number wounded. The band was completely broken 
 up, and most of the Indians surrendered soon after.* 
 
 Of all the Indians who had borne prominent parts in 
 this greatest of our Indian wars with the savage tribes, 
 there remained at large only the indomitable Sitting 
 Bull, and he had escaped capture because, with a 
 wretched band of starving but resolute followers, he 
 succeeded in crossing the British Columbia boundary 
 line. 
 
 Crook's persistence, Mills' bold stroke, Mackenzie's 
 desperate dash up Willow Creek Canon, Miles' splendid 
 campaigning, his hard fighting at Cedar Creek and Wolf 
 Mountain, his pursuit of Lame Deer, his policy and skill 
 in dealing with the critical situations which had arisen, 
 at last brought peace to the blood-drenched land. The 
 most important work ever done by the United States 
 Army outside of the greater wars of the nation had been 
 successfully and brilliantly accomplished. 
 
 IV. Farewell to a Great Chief and His Hopes 
 
 A note of the fate of the two chief antagonists of the 
 United States may fittingly close this chapter. Sitting 
 Bull returned to the United States, and surrendered to 
 the army a few years later. Ever a malcontent, he was 
 one of the moving spirits in the Ghost Dance uprising, 
 which culminated in the battle of Wounded Knee in 
 1890, and he was killed by the Indian police while re- 
 sisting arrest. ) 
 
 * See close of this chapter for another account of the Lame Deer Fight, 
 t These affairs are to be discussed at length in a forthcoming volume.
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 333 
 
 The end of Crazy Horse came sooner, in a melee in a 
 guard-house on the 7th of September, 1877. He was 
 stabbed in the abdomen, and died from the effects of the 
 wound. He was dissatisfied always, in spite of his sur- 
 render, and had been conspiring to take the war-path 
 again. Believing that his intentions had become known 
 and that he would be rigorously dealt with on account 
 of the discovery, he started to run amuck, with a knife 
 of which he had become possessed by some means, in the 
 guard-house. When the fracas was over, he was found 
 on the ground, with a desperate wound in the abdomen. 
 Whether the wound was given by the bayonet of the sen- 
 try at the door, whether the blow was delivered by some 
 of the Indians who threw themselves upon him, and with 
 whom he struggled, is a matter which cannot be deter- 
 mined. However it was come by, it was enough, for 
 from the effects he died in a short time. 
 
 So that was the melancholy end of Crazy Horse, the 
 protagonist of these tales, and one of the most famous 
 Indians that ever lived. Captain Bourke * thus describes 
 him: 
 
 " I saw before me a man who looked quite young, not 
 over thirty years old, five feet eight inches high, lithe and 
 sinewy, with a scar in the face. The expression of his 
 countenance was one of quiet dignity, but morose, 
 dogged, tenacious, and melancholy. He behaved with 
 stolidity, like a man who realized that he had to give in 
 to Fate, but would do so as sullenly as possible. . . . 
 All Indians gave him a high reputation for courage and 
 generosity. In advancing upon an enemy, none of his 
 warriors were allowed to pass him. He had made him- 
 self hundreds of friends by his charity toward the poor, as 
 it was a point of honor with him never to keep anything 
 
 * " On the Border With Crook," Captain John G. Bourke, U. S. A.
 
 334 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 for himself, excepting weapons of war. I never heard 
 an Indian mention his name save in terms of respect. In 
 the Custer Massacre, the attack by Reno had first caused 
 a panic among the women and children and some of the 
 warriors, who started to flee; but Crazy Horse, throwing 
 away his rifle, brained one of the incoming soldiers with 
 his stone war-club, and jumped upon his horse." 
 
 Crazy Horse was a born soldier, whose talents for war- 
 fare and leadership were of the highest order. He had 
 repulsed Reynolds on the Powder River, wresting a vic- 
 tory from apparent defeat. He had thrown himself in 
 succession upon the columns of Crook on the Rosebud 
 and of Custer on the Little Big Horn ; and it must be ad- 
 mitted that he had not only checked, but had driven 
 back, Crook by a crushing attack upon him, while he had 
 annihilated half of Custer's command. He had fought 
 a desperate, and, from a military point of view, 
 highly creditable, action with Crook's vastly superior 
 forces at Slim Buttes. The only man who had fairly 
 and squarely defeated him was Miles at Wolf Moun- 
 tain, and even there Crazy Horse managed to keep his 
 force well in hand as he withdrew from the field. 
 
 He would probably never have surrendered, had it not 
 been for the defections around him, and for the disas- 
 trous defeat of the Cheyennes by Mackenzie, and the 
 destruction of so much of his camp equipage at Wolf 
 Mountain. As it was, he might have continued the 
 fighting, had not his warriors been freezing and starving, 
 and almost entirely out of ammunition. There was 
 nothing left for the Indians but surrender. As one of 
 them said to Miles: 
 
 "We are poor compared with you and your force. We 
 cannot make a rifle, a round of ammunition, or a knife. 
 In fact, we are at the mercy of those who are taking pos-
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 335 
 
 session of our country. Your terms are harsh and 
 cruel, but we are going to accept them, and place our- 
 selves at your mercy. " 
 
 That summed up the situation, although the terms 
 granted the Indians were very far from being harsh or 
 cruel. 
 
 So passed out of history the great war chief of the 
 Sioux, one of the bravest of the brave, and one of the 
 most capable and sagacious of captains in spite of his 
 absurd name. He had many of the vices, perhaps all the 
 vices, of his race; but he had all their rude virtues, too, 
 and great abilities, which most of them lacked. Sitting 
 Bull, wise, crafty, indomitable as he was, was not to be 
 compared with him for a moment. 
 
 It was a tragedy any way you look at it. You cannot 
 but feel much admiration for those Sioux and Chey- 
 ennes cruel, ruthless though they were. I bid good-by 
 to them with a certain regret. 
 
 Some one has said, as the Rosebud and the Little Big 
 Horn marked the high-water of Indian supremacy in 
 the Northwest, so the forgotten grave of Crazy Horse 
 marks an ebb from which no tide has ever risen. 
 
 As he passes to the happy hunting-ground in the land 
 of the Great Spirit, I stand and salute him with a feeling 
 of respect which I have gathered not only from a study 
 of his career, but from the statements and writings of 
 men who could best judge of his qualities for they were 
 the soldiers who fought him. 
 
 O 
 
 NOTES ON THE LAME DEER FIGHT 
 
 By Colonel D. L. Brainard, U. S. A.* 
 
 The command, consisting of four troops of the Second Cavalry, 
 "F," "G," "H," and "L," two companies of the Fifth Infantry, two 
 * Colonel Brainard won his commission by his heroic conduct in the Greely Arctic 
 Expedition, 1881-4. c - T - B -
 
 336 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 of the Twenty-second Infantry, and a company of mounted scouts, all 
 under command of Colonel Nelson A. Miles, left the cantonment on 
 Tongue River May 1, 1877, and marched up Tongue River, with a 
 view of intercepting a band of hostile Indians, under Lame Deer, 
 known to be at or near the head-waters of the Rosebud River. The 
 transportation consisted of bull teams, mule teams, and a few pack 
 animals. The command marched up Tongue River four days, when 
 the train was left in charge of a small guard, the main command push- 
 ing on with pack trains, the cavalry leading and the infantry following 
 more slowly, striking across country toward the Rosebud River, 
 marching day and night, stopping only long enough to make coffee for 
 the men, and to rest and graze the animals. 
 
 We bivouacked on the evening of the 6th in a deep valley near Little 
 Muddy Creek, and about two o'clock the following morning were 
 again in the saddle, moving silently and swiftly down the valley toward 
 the Indian camp, which had been located the previous evening by 
 White Bull, Brave Wolf, Bob Jackson, and the other scouts. The scouts 
 had reported that the camp was only about six miles distant, but it was 
 soon discovered that it was much farther than this, and at early dawn 
 we were still some distance away. The command had been moving at 
 a trot, but the gallop was immediately taken up, and just as the sun ap- 
 peared above the horizon, we rounded a bend in the valley and came in 
 sight of the Indian camp, which was located on the right side, close to 
 the hills. 
 
 At first we saw no Indians except a few boys guarding the ponies, 
 which were grazing a little distance beyond the camp, but they came 
 out immediately, and dropping in the grass, began to fire in our direc- 
 tion, though without effect. As we charged down on the camp, these 
 Indians, together with squaws and children, ran for the hills, driving 
 with them the few horses that were near the tepees. "H " Company, 
 under command of Lieutenant Lovell H. Jerome, charged through the 
 camp and beyond, capturing the pony herd. The other companies, all 
 under command of Captain Ball, charged to the village, formed line to 
 the right, deployed as skirmishers, and pursued the Indians up the 
 hill. 
 
 The hills were so steep at this point that it was necessary to dismount 
 the command and advance on foot, the horses being sent around by an 
 easier route to join us later near the summit of the hill. The line as 
 formed was "F" troop (Tyler) on the right, "L" troop (Norwood) 
 center, and "G" troop (Wheelan) on the left. The Indians were 
 driven up over the hills, where they scattered like quail. Our horses
 
 Miles' Great Campaigning 337 
 
 were brought up, and mounting, we charged across the country for 
 two or three miles, and later returned to the village. 
 
 As my recollections serve me, four soldiers and fourteen Indians 
 were killed, ten soldiers being wounded, myself being one of the num- 
 ber. About four hundred ponies were captured, which were after- 
 ward used for mounting a batallion of Infantry, which later performed 
 much effective work in the field. There were over sixty tepees, in 
 which we found tons of dried buffalo meat, a few arms, some ammu- 
 nition, and a great many buffalo robes, saddles, and an assortment of 
 camp property, all of which were burned that afternoon, thus so effect- 
 ually crippling the band that the remnant came in and surrendered a 
 few weeks later. 
 
 We camped on the battle-ground that night, the following day mov- 
 ing back in the direction of our wagon train. 
 
 One of the most interesting incidents of the fight occurred just as the 
 troop to which I belonged ("L") charged on the village. I saw Gen- 
 eral Miles riding toward the first tepee, near which were two Indians, 
 followed by his orderly. He called out something to these Indians 
 which I did not understand, but I later understood he had called on 
 them to surrender. One of these was evidently the Chief, Lame Deer, 
 for he wore a long head-dress of eagle feathers, the head-dress reaching 
 to the ground. As Miles approached on horseback, the Chief walked 
 rapidly toward him, with his hand extended, as though to shake hands, 
 but when within ten or twelve feet of him, the Indian in the rear, who 
 was said to be Iron Star, a son of Lame Deer, and also a medicine man 
 of the tribe, called sharply to Lame Deer, presumably warning him of 
 the approaching troops, and urging him to follow the other Indians to 
 the hills. 
 
 Lame Deer stopped, turned, hesitated, then ran back a few steps, 
 and picking up a loaded carbine from the ground, fired point blank at 
 General Miles, who, seeing the movement, wheeled his horse sharply 
 and bent forward. The bullet passed over him, striking his orderly 
 in the breast, killing him instantly. The Chief then ran up the steep 
 hill, accompanied by the other Indian. The head-dress made a very 
 conspicuous mark, and many shots were immediately fired in that di- 
 rection. From his tottering steps we saw that the Chief was badly 
 wounded, and at this point his companion, instead of escaping as he 
 could have done, placed his arm around the Chief's waist, and sup- 
 ported him up the hill. About this time the Chief drew a revolver, and 
 without turning about, held it in rear of him and fired in our direction, 
 the bullets striking the ground only a few feet in his rear. This act,
 
 338 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 we assumed, was one of defiance of a man who knew he could not es- 
 cape, but who was game to the last. Iron Star supported the Chief 
 until the latter fell, when he escaped over the hill, only to be killed by 
 "G" troop, which had been pushing up on that side. After the devo- 
 tion and bravery he had displayed in supporting Lame Deer up the hill, 
 we were almost sorry he had not escaped alive. 
 
 A few days later Bob Jackson told me that, on examining Lame 
 Deer's body after the fight, he had found that he had been hit seven- 
 teen times. 
 
 Another incident which illustrates the valor of the United States 
 soldier was that of Private Leonard, Troop " L, " Second Cavalry, who 
 had dropped behind to readjust his saddle, a couple of miles from the 
 Indian camp. The command was moving rapidly, and the Indians 
 slipped in between the rear of the column and this lone soldier. How- 
 ever, when he saw them he rode to the top of a hill, and lying down 
 behind some rocks, held these Indians at bay for several hours until re- 
 lief came to him. It was fortunate that relief came as it did, for he had 
 nearly exhausted his ammunition in firing at these Indians, who had 
 several times charged his position.
 
 CHAPTER TWELVE 
 
 What They Are There For 
 A Sketch of General Guy V. Henry, a 
 Typical American Soldier 
 
 I. Savage Warfare 
 
 r "^HE 
 
 taki 
 
 sern 
 
 A littl 
 
 most thankless task that can be under- 
 taken by a nation is warfare against savage or 
 semi-civilized peoples. In it there is usually 
 little glory; nor is there any reward, save the 
 consciousness of disagreeable duty well performed. The 
 risk to the soldier is greater than in ordinary war, since 
 the savages usually torture the wounded and the cap- 
 tured. Success can only be achieved by an arduous, 
 persistent, wearing down process, which affords little 
 opportunity for scientific fighting, yet which demands 
 military talents of the highest order. 
 
 Almost anybody can understand the strategy or the 
 tactics of a pitched battle where the number engaged 
 is large, the casualties heavy, and the results decisive; 
 but very few non-professional critics appreciate a cam- 
 paign of relentless pursuit by a small army of a smaller 
 body of mobile hostiles, here and there capturing a 
 little band, now and then killing or disabling a few, 
 
 339
 
 340 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 until in the final round-up the enemy, reduced to per- 
 haps less than a score, surrenders. There is nothing 
 spectacular about the performance, and everybody won- 
 der's why it took so long. 
 
 And as injustice and wrong have not been infrequent 
 in the preliminary dealings between the government 
 and the savages, the soldier, who has only to obey his 
 orders, comes in for much unmerited censure from those 
 who think darkly though they speak bitterly. Espe- 
 cially is he criticized if, when maddened by the suffering, 
 the torture, of some comrade, the soldier sinks to the 
 savage level in his treatment of his ruthless foeman. 
 No one justifies such a lapse, of course, but few there be 
 who even try to understand it. The incessant cam- 
 paigning in the Philippines, with its resulting scandals, 
 is an instance in point. 
 
 Long before the Spanish-American War and its 
 Philippine corollary, however, our little army had shown 
 itself capable of the hardest and most desperate cam- 
 paigning against the Indians of the West as difficult 
 and dangerous a work as any army ever undertook. 
 There was so much of it, and it abounded with so many 
 thrilling incidents, that volumes could be written upon 
 it without exhausting its tragedy, its romance. There 
 were few soldiers who served beyond the Mississippi 
 from 1865 to 1890 who did not participate in a score 
 of engagements, whose lives were not in peril more 
 than once in many a hard, but now forgotten, campaign. 
 
 One of the bravest of our Indian fighters was Guy 
 V. Henry. Personally, he was a typical representative 
 of the knightly American soldier. Officially, it was his 
 fortune to perform conspicuous services in at least three 
 expeditions subsequent to the Civil War. He was a 
 West Pointer, and the son of another, born in the service
 
 COL. RANALD S. MACKENZIE 
 CAPT. ANSON MILLS 
 
 From tht colltction of J. Robert Costll 
 GEN. GUY V. HENRY 
 
 w. F. CODY (BUFFALO BILL) 
 
 GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED INDIAN FIGHTERS 
 
 All except General Henry from contemporary photographs
 
 What They Are There For 341 
 
 at Fort Smith in the Indian Territory. Graduating in 
 1861, a mere boy, he participated in four years of the 
 hardest fighting in the Civil War, from Bull Run to Cold 
 Harbor. At the age of twenty-three, his merit won him 
 the appointment of Colonel of the Fortieth Massachu- 
 setts Volunteers, "a regiment that was never whipped." 
 The tall, brawny Yankees fairly laughed at the beardless 
 stripling who was appointed to command them. " They 
 laugh best who laugh last," and Henry had the last 
 laugh. He mastered them, and to this day they love 
 his memory. 
 
 He was thrice mentioned in despatches, and brevetted 
 five times for conspicuous gallantry in action during 
 the war, out of which he came with the rank of brigadier- 
 general. For heroic and successful fighting at Old 
 Cold Harbor, he received the highest distinction that 
 can come to a soldier, the medal of honor. Having 
 two horses shot from under him in the attack upon the 
 Confederate lines, he seized a third from a trooper, 
 mounted him under a withering fire, and led his soldiers 
 forward in a final assault, which captured the enemy's 
 intrenchments; this third horse was shot under him 
 just as he leaped the breastworks. 
 
 "Thin as a shoestring and as brave as a lion," he was 
 a past-master of military tactics and a severe disci- 
 plinarian. " I tell you he is a martinet," cried one young 
 officer angrily, smarting under a well-deserved reproof. 
 "You are wrong," replied a wiser officer, who knew 
 Henry better; "he is trying to make your own record 
 better than you could ever make it yourself." Sudden 
 as a thunderbolt and swift as a hawk when he struck the 
 red Sioux, in his family and social relations he was a 
 kindly, considerate, Christian gentleman. He could kill 
 Indians but never cruelly, mercilessly, only in open
 
 342 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 warfare and teach a class in Sunday-school. I've seen 
 him do the latter, and no man did it better; the boys of 
 his class simply idolized him. And his men in the army 
 did the same. Cool and tactful, a statesman, for all his 
 fiery energy, he was perhaps the best of our colonial 
 governors. When he died the people of Porto Rico 
 mourned him as a friend, where the little children had 
 loved him as a father. 
 
 II. A March in a Blizzard 
 
 At the close of the Civil War he was transferred to 
 the Third Cavalry, a regiment with which he was 
 destined to win lasting renown. It must have been 
 hard for men who had exercised high command, and 
 who had proved their fitness for it, to come down from 
 general officers to subalterns; but Henry accepted the 
 situation cheerfully. He was as proud of his troop of 
 cavalry as he had been of his regiment and brigade of 
 volunteers. His new detail took him to Arizona, where 
 for two years he commanded a battalion engaged in 
 hard scouting among the Apaches. The winter of 1874 
 found him at Fort Robinson in the Black Hills. While 
 there he was ordered to go into the Bad Lands to remove 
 certain miners who were supposed to be there in de- 
 fiance of treaty stipulations. 
 
 The day after Christmas, with his own troop and fif- 
 teen men of the Ninth Infantry under Lieutenant Car- 
 penter, with wagons, rations, and forage for thirty days, 
 the men set forth. The expedition involved a march 
 of three hundred miles, over the worst marching coun- 
 try on the face of the globe, and in weather of unimagin- 
 able severity, the cold continually ranging from twenty 
 to forty degrees below zero. The miners were not found,
 
 What They Are There For 343 
 
 and on the return journey the command, which had suf- 
 fered terrible hardships, was overtaken by a blizzard. 
 
 When, in an Eastern city, the thermometer gets down 
 to the zero mark, and it blows hard, with a heavy snow 
 for twenty-four hours, people who are not familiar with 
 the real article call such insignificant weather mani- 
 festations a blizzard. Imagine a fierce gale sweeping 
 down from the north, filled with icy needles which draw 
 blood ere they freeze the naked skin, the thermometer 
 forty degrees below zero, a rolling, treeless country with- 
 out shelter of any sort from the blinding snow and the 
 biting wind, and you have the situation in which that 
 expedition found itself. The storm came up an hour 
 after breaking camp on what was hoped to be the last 
 day on the return journey. To return to the place of 
 the camp was impossible. To keep moving was the 
 only thing to^be done. The cold was so intense that 
 it was at first deemed safer to walk than ride. The 
 troops dismounted and struggled on. Many of the men 
 gave out and sank exhausted, but were lifted to their 
 saddles and strapped there, Henry himself doing this 
 with his own hands. Finally, the whole party got so 
 weak that it was impossible for them to proceed. In 
 desperation, they mounted the exhausted horses and 
 urged them forward. Henry had no knowledge of 
 direction, but trusted to the instincts of his horse. He 
 led the way. Many of the men had to be beaten to 
 keep them awake and alive to sleep was death. 
 
 Finally, when hope and everything else was aban- 
 doned, they came to a solitary ranch under the curve of 
 a hill, occupied by a white man and his Indian wife. 
 They were saved; that is, they had escaped with their 
 lives. The horses were put in shelter in the corral, the 
 men crowded into the house, and the painful process of
 
 344 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 thawing out was begun. The ranch was fifteen miles 
 from Fort Robinson, and when the blizzard abated the 
 next day wagons and ambulances were sent out, and the 
 helpless soldiers were carried back to the post. 
 
 Most of them were in a terrible condition, and few 
 had escaped. They were broken from the hardships they 
 had undergone, especially from the freezing, which 
 those who have suffered from declare causes a prostra- 
 tion from which it is difficult to recover. When Henry 
 entered his quarters his wife did not recognize him. 
 His face was black and swollen. His men cut the 
 bridle reins to free his hands, and then slit his gloves 
 into strips, each strip bringing a piece of flesh as it was 
 pulled off. All his fingers were frozen to the second 
 joint; the flesh sloughed off, exposing the bones. One 
 finger had to be amputated, and to the day of his death 
 his left hand was so stiff that he was unable to close 
 his fingers again. As he was a thin, spare man, with no 
 superfluous flesh, he had suffered more than the rest. 
 Yet he made no complaint, and it was only due to his 
 indomitable persistence that the men were not frozen 
 to death that awful day. Henry's winter march is still 
 remembered, by those in the old service, as one of the 
 heroic achievements of the period. 
 
 III. A Ghastly Experience 
 
 The heroism and sufferings of the young soldier were 
 nothing, however, to what he manifested and under- 
 went two years later. Just before the Custer Massacre, 
 General Crook, with some eleven hundred men, moved 
 out from Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, on the expedition 
 that culminated in the battle of the Rosebud. Colonel 
 W. B. Royall had command of the cavalry of Crook's
 
 What They Are There For 345 
 
 little army. One morning in June the Sioux and the 
 Cheyennes, under Crazy Horse, who as a fighter and 
 general was probably second to few Indians that ever 
 lived, attacked Crook's men. The left wing, under 
 Royall, was isolated in a ravine and practically sur- 
 rounded by a foe who outnumbered them five to one. 
 The rest of the army, heavily engaged, could give them 
 no succor. The Indians made charge after charge 
 upon the troops, who had all dismounted except the 
 field officers. Henry had command of the left bat- 
 talion of Royall's force. Cool as an iceberg, he rode 
 up and down the thin line, steadying and holding his 
 men. At one time, by a daring charge, he rescued an 
 imperiled company under a brother officer. 
 
 At last, in one of the furious attacks of the Sioux, he 
 was shot in the face. A rifle bullet struck him under 
 the left eye, passed through the upper part of his mouth 
 under the nose, and came out below the right eye. The 
 shock was terrific. His face was instantly covered 
 with blood, his mouth filled with it. He remained in the 
 saddle, however, and strove to urge the troops on. In 
 the very act of spurring his horse forward to lead a 
 charge, he lost consciousness, and fell to the ground. 
 
 At that instant the war-bonneted Indians, superbly 
 mounted, delivered an overwhelming onslaught on the 
 left flank of the line. The men, deprived of their 
 leader, for a time gave back. The Indians actually 
 galloped over the prostrate figure of the brave soldier. 
 Fortunately, he was not struck by the hoofs of any of the 
 horses. A determined stand by Chief Washakie, of the 
 friendly Shoshones, our Indian allies in that battle, 
 who with two or three of his braves fought desperately 
 over Henry's body, prevented him from being scalped 
 and killed.
 
 346 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 The officers of the Third speedily rallied their men, 
 drove back the Indians, and reoccupied the ground 
 where Henry lay. He was assisted to his horse and 
 taken to the rear where the surgeons were. Such was 
 the nature of his wound that he could not speak above 
 a whisper; he could not see at all, he could scarcely 
 hear, and he had great difficulty in breathing. As the 
 doctor bent over him he heard the wounded man mum- 
 ble out, "Fix me up so that I can go back! " 
 
 There was no going back for him that day. Through 
 the long day he lay on the ground while the battle raged 
 about him. There was little water and no shelter; 
 there wasn't a tent in the army. Although it was 
 bitter cold during the nights in that country at that sea- 
 son, at midday it was fearfully hot. He was consumed 
 with thirst. His orderly managed to give him a little 
 shade by holding his horse so that the shadow of the 
 animal's body fell upon the wounded man. His wound 
 was dressed temporarily as well as possible, and then 
 he was practically left to die. 
 
 One of the colonel's comrades came back to him dur- 
 ing a lull in the fight. There he lay helpless on the 
 bare ground, in the shadow of the restive horse, which 
 the orderly had all he could do to manage. No one 
 else could be spared from the battle line to attend to 
 Henry's wants, although, as a matter of fact, he ex- 
 pressed no wants. The flies had settled thickly upon 
 his bandaged face. The officer bent over him with an 
 expression of commiseration. 
 
 "It's all right, Jack," gurgled out from the bleeding 
 lips; "it's what we're here for."* 
 
 * John F. Finerty, who was present as the correspondent of the Chicago Times, and 
 who relates the incident, says that Henry, immediately after this remark, advised Finerty to 
 join the army. Encouraging circumstances to back up such a recommendation !
 
 What They Are There For 347 
 
 Royall's forces were finally able to effect a junction 
 with the main body by withdrawing fighting, and Henry 
 was carried along any way in the hurried movement. 
 The Indians at last withdrew from the field (the bat- 
 tle must be considered a drawn one), and then there 
 was time to consider what was to be done with the 
 wounded. The facilities for treatment were the slender- 
 est. The column had been stripped of its baggage, in 
 order to increase its mobility, to enable it to cope with 
 the Indians. All they had they carried on their per- 
 sons, and that included little but the barest necessities. 
 
 Nobody expected Henry to survive the night. He 
 didn't expect to live himself, as he lay there through 
 the long hours, listening to the men digging graves for 
 those who had fallen, and wondering whether or not 
 he was to be one of the occupants thereof. The next 
 day they sent him to the rear. He was transported in 
 what is called a travois. Two saplings were cut from 
 the river bank; two army mules, one at each end, were 
 placed between the saplings, which were slung over the 
 backs of the animals. An army blanket, or piece of 
 canvas, was then lashed to the poles, and on them 
 the sufferer was placed. There were a number of 
 wounded none of them, however, so seriously as 
 Henry. It was some two hundred miles to Fort Fetter- 
 man, and they carried him all that distance that way. 
 
 The weather at night was bitterly cold. In the day- 
 time it was burning hot. The travois was so short 
 they had to take what poles they could get, of course 
 that several times the head of the rear mule hit the 
 wounded officer's head, so that finally they turned him 
 about, putting his head behind the heels of the foremost 
 animal, where he was liable to be kicked to death at 
 any moment,
 
 348 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 On one occasion one of the mules stumbled and fell 
 and pitched Henry out upon his head. The officers of 
 the little escort stood aghast as they saw him fall out; 
 but it is a matter of record, solemnly attested, that such 
 was Henry's iron self-control that he made no sound, 
 although the agony was excruciating. In fact, on the 
 whole journey he made no complaint of any sort. His 
 only food was broth, which was made from birds shot 
 by the soldiers as they came upon them, and he got this 
 very infrequently. 
 
 Finally, the little cortege reached Fort Fetterman. 
 The last mishap awaited them there. The river was 
 crossed by a ferryboat, which was pulled from shore to 
 shore by ropes and tackles. The river was very high 
 and the current running swiftly, and as they prepared 
 to take the wounded officer across, the ropes broke, 
 and the whole thing went to pieces, leaving him within 
 sight, but not within reach, of clean beds, comforts, 
 and medical attention he hoped to secure. Some of the 
 escort, rough soldiers though they were, broke into 
 tears as they saw the predicament of their beloved offi- 
 cer. He himself, however, true to his colors, said 
 nothing. Finally, they offered to take him across the 
 raging torrent in a small skiff the only boat avail- 
 able if he were willing to take the risk. Of course, 
 if the skiff were overturned, he would have been 
 drowned. He took the risk, and with two men to 
 paddle and an officer to hold him in his arms, the pas- 
 sage was made. 
 
 IV. An Army Wife 
 
 Three hundred miles away, at Fort D. A. Russell, 
 his wife was waiting for him. Long before he reached
 
 What They Are There For 349 
 
 Fort Fetterman, she heard through couriers the news 
 of his wound, which was reported to her as fatal, al- 
 though he had taken care to cause a reassuring message 
 to be sent her with the first messenger. With the 
 heroism of the army wife, although she was in delicate 
 health at the time, she immediately made preparations 
 to join him. The railroad at that time ran as far as 
 Medicine Bow. Beyond that there was a hundred- 
 mile ride to Fort Fetterman. All the troops were in the 
 field; none could be spared from the nominal garrisons 
 for an escort. Again and again Mrs. Henry made 
 preparations to go forward, several times actually start- 
 ing, and again and again she was forbidden to do so by 
 the officers in command at the various posts. It was 
 not safe to send a woman across the country with a 
 few soldiers; the Indians were up and out in all direc- 
 tions. There was no safety anywhere outside the 
 forts or larger towns; she had to stay at home and 
 wait. Sometimes the devoted wife got word from her 
 husband, sometimes she did not. The savages were 
 constantly cutting the wires. Her suspense was agon- 
 izing. 
 
 Finally, the arrival of troops at Fort Fetterman en- 
 abled a stronger escort to be made up, and Henry was 
 sent down to Fort D. A. Russell. The troops arrived 
 at Medicine Bow on the third of July. The train did 
 not leave until the next day. They were forced to go 
 into camp. The cowboys and citizens celebrated the 
 Fourth in the usual manner. That night the pain- 
 racked man narrowly escaped being killed by the reck- 
 less shooting of the celebrators. Two bullets passed 
 through the tent in which he lay, just above his head. 
 The next morning found him on the train. His heart 
 action had been so weakened by chloral and other medi-
 
 35O Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 cines which they had given him, that at Sherman, the 
 highest point on the journey, he came within an inch of 
 dying. 
 
 His thoughts all along had been of his wife. When 
 he got to the station he refused to get in an ambulance, 
 in order to spare her the sight of his being brought home 
 in that way. A carriage was procured, and supported 
 in the arms of the physician and his comrades, he was 
 driven back to the fort. With superhuman resolution, 
 in order to convince his wife that he was not seriously 
 hurt, he determined to walk from the carriage to the 
 door. Mrs. Henry had received instructions from the 
 doctor to control herself, and stood waiting quietly in 
 the entrance. 
 
 "Well," whispered the shattered man, as she took 
 him tenderly by the hand, alluding to the fact that it 
 was the Fourth of July, "this is a fine way to celebrate, 
 isn't it?" 
 
 After the quietest of greetings think of that woman, 
 what her feelings must have been! he was taken into 
 the house and laid on the sofa. The doctor had said 
 that he might have one look at his wife. The bandages 
 were lifted carefully from his face, so that he might 
 have that single glance; then they were replaced, and 
 the wife, unable to bear it longer, fled from the room. 
 The chaplain's wife was waiting for her outside the door, 
 and when she got into the shelter of that good woman's 
 arms she gave way and broke down completely. 
 
 "You know," said the chaplain's wife, alluding to 
 many conversations which they had had, "that you 
 asked of God only that He should bring him back to 
 you, and God has heard that prayer." 
 
 Everybody expected that Henry would die, but die he 
 did not; perhaps it would be better to say die he would
 
 What They Are There For 351 
 
 not. And he had no physique to back his efforts, only 
 an indomitable will. He never completely recovered 
 from that experience. He lost the sight of one eye per- 
 manently, and to the day of his death was liable to a 
 hemorrhage at any moment, in which there was grave 
 danger of his bleeding to death. 
 
 He took a year's leave of absence, and then came back 
 to duty. In 1877, when his troop was ordered to the 
 front in another campaign under Crook against the 
 redoubtable Sioux, he insisted upon accompanying 
 them. He had been out an hour or so when he fell 
 fainting from the saddle. Did they bring him back ? 
 Oh, no! He bade them lay him under a tree, leave two 
 or three men with him to look after him, and go ahead. 
 He would rejoin them that night, when it became cooler 
 and he could travel with more ease! What he said he 
 would do he did. A trooper rode back to the post on his 
 own account and told of his condition. An order was 
 sent him by the post commander to return. Henry 
 quietly said he would obey the first order and go on. 
 He remained with the troop for six weeks, until finally 
 he was picked up bodily and carried home, vainly 
 protesting, the doctor refusing to answer either for 
 his eyesight or for his life if he stayed in the field 
 any longer. 
 
 V. The Buffalos and Their Famous Ride 
 
 Thirteen years after that Henry was commanding the 
 Ninth Cavalry, with headquarters at Fort McKinney. 
 The Ninth Cavalry was a regiment of negroes. From 
 the overcoats which they wore in Wyoming in the winter 
 they were called the "Buffalos," and sometimes they 
 were facetiously referred to as "Henry's Brunettes,"
 
 352 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Whatever they were called, they were a regiment of 
 which to be proud. 
 
 In 1890 occurred the last outbreak of the Sioux under 
 the inspiration of the Ghost Dancers, which culminated 
 in the battle of Wounded Knee. Troops from all over 
 the United States were hurried to the Pine Ridge 
 Agency as the trouble began. On the 24th of Decem- 
 ber Henry and the "Brunettes" were ordered out to the 
 former's old stamping ground in the Black Hills on a 
 scouting expedition. It was bitter cold that Christmas 
 Eve, but, thank God ! there was no bli/zard. Fifty miles 
 on the back of a trotting horse was the dose before them. 
 They rested at four A.M. on the morning of Christmas 
 Day. Some of the garments the men wore were frozen 
 stiff. They had broken through the ice of the White 
 River in crossing it. How the men felt inside the 
 frozen clothing may be imagined. Eight miles farther 
 they made their camp. They did not have much of a 
 Christmas celebration, for as soon as possible after estab- 
 lishing their base at Harney Springs they went on the 
 scout. They hunted assiduously for several days, but 
 found no Indians. These had gone south to join their 
 brethren concentrated about the agency. One day 
 they rode forty-two miles in a vain search. They got 
 back to camp about seven o'clock. At nine a courier 
 from the agency fifty miles away informed them of the 
 battle of Wounded Knee, and that five thousand Og- 
 lala Sioux were mustering to attack the agency. 
 
 "Boots and Saddles!" instantly rang out, and the 
 tired troopers mounted their jaded horses again. This 
 time the camp was broken for keeps, and tents were 
 struck, wagons packed to abandon it. It was a bitter 
 cold night. There was a fierce gale sweeping through 
 the valley, blowing a light snow in the faces of the men
 
 What They Are There For 353 
 
 wrapped to the eyes in their buffalo coats and fur 
 caps. They pushed steadily on in spite of it, for it was 
 Henry's intention to reach the agency in the dark in 
 order to avoid attack by the Indians. 
 
 It was thought advisable, therefore, to leave the 
 wagon train under an escort of one company and press 
 forward with the rest. The men arrived at the agency 
 at daybreak, completing a ride of over ninety miles in 
 less than twenty hours. Fires were kindled, horses 
 picketed, and the exhausted men literally threw them- 
 selves on the ground for rest. They had been there but 
 a short time when one of the men from the escort came 
 galloping madly in with the news that the wagon-train 
 was heavily attacked, and that succor must be sent at 
 once. Without waiting for orders, without even stop- 
 ping to saddle the horses, Henry and his men galloped 
 back over the road two miles away, where the escort 
 was gallantly covering the train. A short, sharp skir- 
 mish, in which one man was killed and several wounded, 
 drove back the Indians, and the regiment brought in 
 the train. 
 
 It was ten o'clock now, and as the negro troops came 
 into the agency, word was brought that the Drexel 
 Mission, seven miles up the valley, was being attacked, 
 and help must be sent immediately. There were two 
 regiments of cavalry available, the Seventh and the 
 Ninth. For some unexplained reason, the Ninth was 
 ordered out. In behalf of his men, Henry made pro- 
 test. They must have a little rest, and so the Seventh 
 was despatched, and was soon hotly engaged. Two 
 hours later a messenger reported that the Seventh, in 
 the valley where the mission was situated, was heavily 
 attacked by the Indians, who had secured commanding 
 positions on the surrounding ridges. Unless they could
 
 354 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 be relieved, they would probably be overwhelmed. 
 Again the trumpet call rang out, and the tired black 
 troopers once more climbed into their saddles and 
 struck spurs into their more tired horses, galloping away 
 to the rescue of their hard-pushed white comrades. 
 The ridges were carried in most gallant style, and after 
 some sharp fighting the Indians were driven back. The 
 Seventh was extricated and the day was saved. 
 
 In thirty-four hours of elapsed time, the Ninth Caval- 
 ry had ridden one hundred and eight miles the actual 
 time in the saddle being twenty-two hours. They had 
 fought two engagements and had rested only two hours. 
 Marvelous to relate, there wasn't a sore-backed horse in 
 the whole regiment. One horse died under the pressure, 
 but aside from that and their fatigue, horses and men 
 were in excellent condition. 
 
 That was probably the most famous ride ever per- 
 formed by troops in the United States. For it Henry 
 was recommended for a further brevet, as major-general 
 - the sixth he had received. 
 
 The Spanish-American War was too short to afford 
 Henry an opportunity to distinguish himself in the field, 
 but in Porto Rico he showed that his talents were not 
 merely of the military order. In the brief period his 
 health permitted him to remain there, he accomplished 
 wonders, and did it all in such a way as to gain the 
 respect nay, the affection of the people over whom, 
 with single-hearted devotion and signal capacity, he 
 ruled. He stayed there until he broke down. I, sick 
 with typhoid fever on a transport at Ponce, saw him 
 just before he collapsed. We were old friends, and he 
 came off to the ship to visit me. I was not too ill then 
 to realize that his own time was coming. He would 
 not ask to be relieved.
 
 What They Are There For 355 
 
 "Here I was sent," he said; "here I will stay until 
 my duty is done." 
 
 He was the knightliest soldier I ever met, and I have 
 met many. He was one of the humblest Christians I 
 ever knew, and I have known not a few. It was his 
 experience at Porto Rico which finally brought about 
 his death; for it is literally true that he died, as a soldier 
 should, in his harness. In those trying times at Ponce, 
 when life and health were at a low ebb, he wrote, in 
 the sacred confidence of his last letter to his faithful 
 wife, words which it was not his custom to speak, but 
 which those of us who knew him felt expressed his 
 constant thought: 
 
 " I am here alone. One by one my staff officers have 
 fallen ill and gone home. Home! let us not speak of 
 it. Jesus is here with me, and makes even this deso- 
 lation home until a brighter one is possible." 
 
 So, his memory enshrined in the hearts that loved 
 him, his heroic deeds the inspiration of his fellow- 
 soldiers, passed to his brighter home Guy V. Henry, 
 a Captain of the Strong
 
 APPENDICES
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 Being a Further Discussion of General Ouster's 
 Course in the Little Big Horn Campaign.* 
 
 I. 
 
 WHETHER General Custer did, or did not, obey General 
 Terry's orders; whether these orders were, or were not, 
 well considered, and such as could be carried out; whether, 
 if General Custer did disobey General Terry's orders he was war- 
 ranted in so doing by the circumstances in which he found himself, 
 are questions of the deepest interest to the student of military matters 
 and the historian thereof. I presume the problem they present will 
 never be authoritatively settled, and that men will continue to differ 
 upon these questions until the end of time. 
 
 The matter has been discussed, pro and con, at great length on 
 many occasions. A number of books and magazine articles have been 
 written upon different phases of the situation. I have come to the 
 conclusion indicated in my own article, as I said, against my wish. 
 In view of his heroic death in the high places of the field, I would fain 
 hold General Custer, for whom I have long cherished an admiration 
 which I still retain, entirely innocent. I have only come to this con- 
 clusion after a rigid investigation including the careful weighing of 
 such evidence as I could secure upon every point in question. 
 
 This evidence consists, first, of a great variety of printed matter; 
 second, of personal conversations with soldiers and military critics, 
 which, as any record of it would necessarily be hearsay and second- 
 hand, I have not set down hereafter save in one instance; third, of let- 
 
 * All notes in this appendix are signed by the initials of their writers to identify 
 them. C. T. B. 
 
 359
 
 360 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ters which have been written me by officers who, from their participa- 
 tion in the campaign, or from unusual opportunities to acquire knowl- 
 edge concerning it which they have enjoyed, have become possessed of 
 information which they were willing to give to me. 
 
 The object of this appendix is to set down, so that it may be here 
 preserved in permanent and available form for future reference, such 
 evidence in these letters as may be pertinent and useful; also to refer 
 the student, who desires to go deeper into the subject, to some of the 
 more valuable printed accounts which are easily accessible. 
 
 I am glad that some of the communications I have received, notably 
 those from Colonel Godfrey, make a stout defense of General Custer. 
 Perhaps upon consideration of Colonel Godfrey's points and argu- 
 ments, which are not only strong and well taken, but also admirably 
 put, the critic may be inclined to differ from my conclusion. For the 
 sake of General Custer's fame, I sincerely hope so. I should be glad 
 to be proved to be mistaken. 
 
 Without specifically noting the various descriptions of the campaign 
 and battle, which are interesting, but irrelevant to my purpose,* Cus- 
 ter's conduct has been critically considered at some length by per- 
 sons whose standing requires that their opinions should be respect- 
 fully received in several publications which I note in such order as 
 best serves the purpose of this discussion without regard to the order 
 in which they appeared. 
 
 Colonel Edward S. Godfrey ,f U. S. A., now commanding the Ninth 
 Cavalry, who, as a lieutenant, commanded K Troop, in Benteen's bat- 
 talion, which joined that of Reno in the battle of the 26th of June, 1876, 
 wrote a most interesting account of the battle, containing some valua- 
 ble reflections upon some disputed points, which was published in the 
 Century Magazine, Vol. XLIII., No. 3, January, 1892. To this article, 
 in the same number, were appended certain comments by Major-Gen- 
 eral James B. Fry, U. S. A., since deceased. 
 
 This article and these comments came to the notice of Major-Gen- 
 eral Robert P. Hughes, U. S. A. (retired), then Colonel and Inspector- 
 General. General Hughes was General Terry's aide-de-camp during 
 the Little Big Horn Campaign. He wrote an exhaustive criticism on 
 
 * Such as Congressman Finerty's graphic account in his book, " War-path and 
 Bivouac;" Dr. Charles S. Eastman's paper in the Chautauqua Magazine, Vol. XXXI., 
 No. 4, 1900; and Mr. Hamlin Garland's report of Two Moon's account of the battle in 
 McClure's Magazine, Vol. XI., No. 5, September, 1898. C. T. B. 
 
 t General G. A. Forsyth writes me that he considers Colonel Godfrey one of the 
 ablest officers in the United States Army in which opinion I concur. C. T. B.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 361 
 
 Fry's comments to Godfrey's article, which was in effect a discussion of 
 the main proposition that Custer disobeyed his orders and thereby 
 precipitated the disaster, for which he was therefore responsible. This 
 campaign was also considered in an article by Dr. E. Benjamin An- 
 drews, president of the University of Nebraska, who was then presi- 
 dent of Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, which appeared 
 in Scribner's Magazine for June, 1895. A fuller reference to Dr. An- 
 drews' position will be made later. 
 
 General Hughes' article was offered to the Century, but was not ac- 
 cepted, and was finally published in the Journal of the Military Service 
 Institution, Vol. XVIII., No. 79, January, 1896. 
 
 Among the many books in which the matter has been discussed, 
 three only call for attention. 
 
 In " THE STORY OF THE SOLDIER," by Brigadier-General George 
 A. Forsyth, U. S. A. (retired), the following comment appears: 
 
 ( "Under the peculiar condition of affairs, bearing in mind the only 
 information he could possibly have had concerning Sitting Bull's 
 forces, was Custer justified, in a military sense and within the scope 
 of his orders, in making the attack ? 
 
 " In the opinion of the writer he was within his orders, and fully 
 justified from a military standpoint in so doing." 
 
 General Forsyth gives no reason for his decision, but it is to be pre- 
 sumed that he did not arrive at that decision hastily and carelessly, 
 and as he is a very able and distinguished officer and military critic, 
 due weight should be accorded his views. 
 
 In " THE UNITED STATES IN OUR OWN TIME," by Dr. E. Benja- 
 min Andrews, published by Chas. Scribner's Sons, edition of 1903, 
 pages 190-1-2-3, there is a concise discussion of the question, based on 
 the article in Scribner's Magazine, referred to above, with some addi- 
 tional reflections on General Hughes' paper. 
 
 In "PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, 
 U. S. A.," chapter xv., pages 198-210, there is a further discussion by 
 the Lieutenant-General, lately in command of the United States Army. 
 
 In order clearly to understand what follows the student should refer 
 to each of the sources mentioned and examine carefully into what is 
 therein set forth. It is not practicable to quote all these authors at 
 length. I have corresponded with every one of the authors mentioned 
 except General Fry. I print their letters to me, having made no 
 change except once in a while breaking a page into paragraphs and
 
 362 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 supplying a missing word here and there which had no especial bearing 
 upon the point at issue. Some of the letters were written in pencil 
 amid press of duties. Most of these documents I print without com- 
 ment. It is necessary, however, that I should call attention to some 
 features brought out by the correspondence. 
 
 President Andrews says, in the book referred to : 
 
 "Much turns on the force of Custer's written orders, which, judged 
 by usual military documents of the kind, certainly gave Custer a much 
 larger liberty than Colonel Hughes supposed. There is an affidavit of 
 a witness who heard Terry's and Custer's last conversation together at 
 the mouth of the Rosebud, just before Custer began his fatal ride. 
 Terry said: 'Use your own judgment and do what you think best if 
 you strike the trail; and whatever you do, Custer, hold on to your 
 wounded."^ 
 
 General Miles says, in his book: 
 
 "But we have positive evidence in the form of an affidavit of the 
 last witness who heard the two officers in conversation together on the 
 night before their commands separated, and it is conclusive on the 
 point at issue. This evidence is that General Terry returned to Gen- 
 eral Custer's tent,* after giving him the final order, to say to him that 
 on coming up to the Indians he would have to use his own discretion 
 and do what he thought best. This conversation occurred at the 
 mouth of the Rosebud, and the exact words of General Terry, as quoted 
 by the witness, are: 
 
 " ' Custer, I do not know what to say for the last.' 
 
 " Custer replied : 'Say what you want to say.' 
 
 "Terry then said: 'Use your own judgment, and do what you 
 think best if you strike the trail; and, whatever you do, Custer, hold 
 on to your wounded.' \ 
 
 " This was a most reasonable conversation for the two officers under 
 the circumstances. One had won great distinction as a general in the 
 
 * These two authorities seem to differ as to just when the conversation took place. 
 Andrews, apparently quoting Miles, says: "Just before Custer began his fatal ride." 
 Miles, quoting the mysterious and unknown affiant, says the conversation took place 
 the night before, and at Custer's tent. The difference is radical and, in view of Colonel 
 Godfrey's suggestion below, is material. Besides, the regiment marched away at noon 
 on the 226, and that is the date of the order; hence, Custer had no orders the night 
 before. The regiment passed Generals Terry, Gibbon, and Custer in review as it 
 marched away. When, then, was the precise hour at which this alleged conversation 
 took place ? C. T. B.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 363 
 
 Civil War; was an able lawyer and department commander, yet en- 
 tirely without experience in Indian campaigns. The other had won 
 great distinction as one of the most gallant and skilful division com- 
 manders of cavalry during the war, commanding one of the most suc- 
 cessful divisions of mounted troops; he had years of experience on the 
 plains and in handling troops in that remote country, and he had 
 fought several sharp engagements with hostile Indians." 
 
 If General Terry spoke such words to General Custer the last thing 
 before Custer's departure, those remarks have a very important, almost 
 a decisive, bearing on the matter at issue. The only question then ex- 
 isting would be, how far the verbal order ought to be considered as 
 superseding the written one. It ts my opinion that the charge that Cus- 
 ter disobeyed orders would fall to the ground if the truth of the alleged 
 remarks could be established. By giving him this verbal order, Terly 
 would make Custer an absolutely free agent. The vital importance of 
 establishing this affidavit is therefore obvious. 
 
 I call attention to the fact that Terry nowhere refers to this conver- 
 sation, which it would be incumbent upon a gentleman to declare im- 
 mediately Custer was charged with disobeying Terry's written order, 
 and that Terry, in that portion of his report which is quoted by me on 
 page 225, virtually not only fails to exculpate but actually charges 
 that Custer did disobey his order, by saying he did the very thing that 
 he was not expected to do. 
 
 To establish this affidavit, I wrote to President Andrews, asking his 
 authority for stating that such an affidavit existed and requesting a 
 copy of it. Here is his reply. I insert it without comment. 
 
 The University of Nebraska, Chancellor's Office, 
 
 Lincoln, November 22d, '03. 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 Replying to your esteemed favor of the eleventh inst. I regret to 
 say that I have no means of recalling with certainty the source of my 
 information touching the Custer affidavit. My impression is, how- 
 ever, that my informant was Gen. Miles, with whom I communicated 
 on the subject while I was writing my account. I also conversed per- 
 sonally with Hughes and with a very intimate friend, now deceased, of 
 Gen. Terry's. 
 
 I shall be extremely pleased to read your views upon this subject. 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 E. BENJ. ANDREWS.
 
 364 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 I also wrote to General Miles and received the following reply from 
 him: 
 
 1 736 N Street, N.W., 
 
 Washington, D. C., November 20, 1903. 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 In reply to your two letters, you will find in my book, " Personal 
 Recollections, or from New England to the Golden Gate," published 
 by Werner & Co., Akron, Ohio, perhaps all the information you 
 will require. I can not give the time now to going over the cam- 
 paign in detail. I presume you will find the book in most libraries.* 
 You will notice in it a chapter on the Custer campaign. ( General 
 Custer did not disobey orders. When General Terry divided his com- 
 mand, taking one portion of it with him up the Yellowstone, and send- 
 ing General Custer with the other portion far out in the Indian coun- 
 try, it necessarily put from seventy-five to one hundred miles between 
 the two commands, and therefore placed upon General Custer the re- 
 sponsibility of acting on the offensive or defensive, for he could have 
 been attacked by the whole body of the combined tribes, and, on the 
 other hand, if he allowed them to escape without attacking them, he 
 would have been severely censured. It would be silly to suppose 
 that Indian chiefs like Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse would per- 
 mit two columns to march around over the country with infantry, 
 cavalry, wagon trains, etc.,f and wait for them to come up on both 
 sides simultaneously, and one must believe the American people very 
 gullible if they thought such a proposition had military merit. > 
 4 Yours very truly, 
 
 NELSON A. MILES. 
 
 I immediately wrote General Miles a second letter asking him for 
 the name of the affiant and any statement he might be willing to make 
 about the affidavit. I pointed out to him what he very well knew 
 the prominence given to the story in his own book indicates that the 
 importance of the affidavit in establishing General Custer's position 
 and defending him against the charge of disobedience. I received no 
 answer to this letter. 
 
 Meanwhile the question of the affidavit was taken up by General 
 Hughes in his several communications to me which appear below. 
 
 In order not to break the thread of the discourse I will anticipate 
 
 * I have it in my own library, of course, and have consulted it frequently. C. T. B. 
 
 f This is overdrawn. Custer had neither infantry, artillery nor wagons with him ; 
 
 Gibbon had cavalry, infantry and artillery, but no wagons, be it remembered. C . T. B.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 365 
 
 events and here insert a third letter which I wrote to General 
 Miles, after carefully considering General Hughes' remarks. The 
 letter was sent to General Miles by registered mail. I hold the regis- 
 try receipt showing that he received it. To this inquiry I have as yet 
 received no reply. 
 
 455 East iyth Street, Flatbush, 
 Brooklyn, N. Y., March 3Oth, 1904. 
 Lieutenant-General NELSON A. MILES, U. S. A., 
 
 1736 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 
 My Dear General Miles: 
 
 A few months since I addressed to you a letter asking you for 
 the name of the person, alluded to in your book, who made the affi- 
 davit as to the last remark of General Terry to General Custer. This 
 letter has probably never reached you since I have never received any 
 answer to it. 
 
 The statement is questioned by a number of officers, and in the in- 
 terest of historical accuracy and for the sake of bringing forward every 
 particle of evidence tending to clear General Custer of the charges 
 which are made against him in that campaign, I most respectfully ask 
 you to give me the name of the affiant together with such other state- 
 ments concerning the affidavit as may be conclusive. How did you 
 become possessed of the affidavit, for instance ? Did you see it ? Did 
 you know the affiant ? Was he a person whose testimony was to be 
 implicitly relied upon ? Is he alive now ? In short, any information 
 concerning it will be most acceptable as well as most useful. 
 Very sincerely yours, 
 
 CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY. 
 
 I do not desire to comment on General Miles' refusal further than 
 to say that if he has in his possession the affidavit he should either sub- 
 mit it to the inspection of impartial observers, give it to historians, 
 state who made it, where it was made, furnish a certified copy of it to 
 the public, or otherwise establish it. If he is not willing to do this he 
 should at least say why he is not willing. I submit that no man, what- 
 ever his rank or station, ought to make statements which affect the 
 fame and reputation of another man without giving the fullest publicity 
 to his sources of information, or stating why the public must be content 
 with a simple reference thereto. 
 
 While I am on the subject of the affidavit, I call the student's atten- 
 tion to a possible suggestion in Colonel Godfrey's second communica- 
 tion below.
 
 366 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 It is twenty-eight years since the Battle of the Little Big Horn. If 
 the alleged affiant is now alive, what reason can exist to prevent him 
 coming out and acknowledging his affidavit ? If he is dead, why 
 should secrecy about it longer exist ? Why does not General Miles 
 break his silence ? The whole matter turns on the production of this 
 affidavit, with satisfactory evidence as to the character of the affiant. 
 
 The other position taken in General Miles' letter above, which of 
 course is a summary of his views as set forth in his book, is discussed 
 later on by General Woodruff. 
 
 II. 
 
 I now refer the student to the following letter in answer to one from 
 me asking information and calling General Hughes' attention to Presi- 
 dent Andrews' book, which has just been reissued in a new and 
 amplified edition: 
 
 New Haven, Conn., 
 
 iSthNov., 1903. 
 Dear Sir: 
 
 Your letter of the I3th was duly received. I had not heard of 
 Dr. E. Benjamin Andrews' book prior to receipt of your letter, but 
 have looked it up since. 
 
 After a careful examination of what he says about the Sioux cam- 
 paign of 1876, I cannot find any good and sufficient reason for chang- 
 ing aught that was stated in the article published in the Journal of the 
 Military Service Institution, in January, 1896. I do find, however, 
 that something could be added to the statement of the case in reply to 
 new matter which he has injected into it in his book. These items are 
 three in number, to wit: 
 
 1st. General Miles does not agree with the views therein expressed. 
 
 zd. New evidence in the form of an affidavit made by some indi- 
 vidual, name not given. 
 
 3rd. The writer of the book dissents from my view of the case. 
 
 We will take these items up severally : 
 
 First: "General Miles is strongly of the opinion that Custer was not 
 guilty of disobeying any orders." 
 
 It is not a new experience to learn that the views of General Miles 
 and myself are at variance. Indeed, it seems that they are seldom in 
 accord. But, in this instance, my views are supported by the late 
 General P. H. Sheridan, who states as follows: 
 
 " General Terry, now pretty well informed of the locality of the In-
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 367 
 
 dians, directed Lieutenant-Colonel George A. Custer to move with the 
 Seventh Cavalry up the Rosebud, until he struck the trail discovered 
 by Major Reno, with instructions that he should not follow it directly to 
 the Little Big Horn, but that he should send scouts over it and keep his 
 main force farther south." * 
 
 General Gibbon, in a letter to General Terry, written after having 
 reached his post, Fort Shaw, Montana, and bearing date November 
 5th, 1876, writes as follows, speaking of the " Conference": 
 
 "We both impressed upon him (Custer) that he should keep con- 
 stantly feeling to his left, and even should the trail turn toward the 
 Little Big Horn that he should continue his march southward along 
 the headwaters of the Tongue, and strike west toward the Little Big 
 Horn. So strong was the impression upon my mind and great my fear 
 that Custer's zeal would carry him forward too rapidly, that the last 
 thing I said to him when bidding him good-by, after his regiment had 
 filed past you when starting on the march, was, 'Now, Custer, don't 
 be greedy, but wait for us.' Poor fellow! Knowing what we do now, 
 and what an effect a fresh Indian trail seemed to have on him, perhaps 
 we were expecting too much to anticipate a forbearance on his part 
 which would have rendered cooperation between the two columns 
 practicable." 
 
 The foregoing clearly shows that no doubt existed in the minds of the 
 Division Commanders and the third party present at the conference 
 as to what the instructions required and that those instructions were 
 not complied with. 1 
 
 Second : Dr. Andrews states that there was a listener at the last 
 conversation between Terry and Custer at the mouth of the Rosebud, 
 just before Custer began his fatal ride, and that his affidavit sets up 
 that: 
 
 "Terry said: 'Use your own judgment and do what you think 
 best if you strike the trail and, whatever you do, Custer, hold on to 
 your wounded.'" 
 
 It is quite evident that this is the same affidavit which General Miles 
 refers to in his book. My attention was called to that reference in the 
 winter of 1896, and in behalf of the family and friends of General 
 Terry I asked to see the affidavit, saying that I might wish to make 
 a copy of it. My request was refused by General Miles, with 
 
 * Report of Secretary of War, Vol. L, 1876, page 443. Italics in quotation above 
 are mine. C. T. B.
 
 368 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 the further information that it had been in his possession for nineteen 
 years, which carried the date back to a time when Colonel Miles was 
 commanding a post in General Terry's Department. The value of 
 the document could have been very readily determined at that time 
 by General Terry himself, and I am thankful to say its worthlessness 
 is still capable of proof. 
 
 The quotations given by Dr. Andrews would alone be sufficient to 
 condemn the paper with any one familiar with General Terry and the 
 situation. 
 
 It will be noticed that h is represented as saying, " If you strike 
 the trail." Terry was sending, with Custer, Reno and six troops of 
 cavalry, who had followed the trail for many weary miles only three 
 days before, and there was no "if" in the case. 
 
 The other quotation is equally incredible. General Terry had an 
 enviable reputation throughout the army for his exceptional courtesy 
 on all occasions and under all circumstances, to all those serving in his 
 command. To have made the remarks quoted, "Whatever you do, 
 hold on to your wounded," would have been tantamount to saying 
 to one of his Lieutenant-Colonels, to whom he was confiding the finest 
 command in his department, that he considered it necessary to caution 
 him on the elementary principle of the position assigned him. To 
 an officer of General Custer's experience and gallantry such a caution 
 would have been far from agreeable, and such action would have been 
 entirely foreign to the life-long conduct of General Terry. 
 
 But, fortunately, we are not dependent upon deductive evidence in 
 this instance. There are still living a good many people who were wit- 
 nesses of that "march past" and parting of Generals Terry and Cus- 
 ter. By personal observation I positively know that any one, General 
 Gibbon excepted, who makes affidavit to the effect that, at the said 
 parting at the Rosebud, there was a conversation between Terry and 
 Custer to which he was the only listener, is guilty of perjury. 
 / When the notice came that the command was ready to take up its 
 march I was sitting with Terry and Gibbon. General Terry invited 
 General Gibbon to go with him and see it. They walked off a few 
 yards from the bank of the stream and stood together when Custer 
 joined them. The three remained together until the command had 
 filed past and the final good-by was said. Custer mounted his horse 
 and rode off, and Terry and Gibbon came back to where I had re- 
 mained. The last remark made to Custer was by Gibbon. If any 
 change was made at that time in Custer's orders it was perforce known 
 to Gibbon, who was alongside of Terry, and the only one who was with
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 369 
 
 him and Custer. j Now let us see what Gibbon said in a letter written 
 to General Terry twenty-seven years ago, when he could not foresee 
 for what purpose his words would be quoted : 
 
 "Except so far as to draw profit from past experience it is, perhaps, 
 useless to speculate as to what would have been the result had your 
 plan been carried out. But I cannot help reflecting that, in that case, 
 my column, supposing the Indian camp to have remained where it was 
 when Custer struck it, would have been the first to reach it ; that with 
 our infantry and Catling guns we should have been able to take care of 
 ourselves, even though numbering only two-thirds of Custer's force." 
 
 The only person actually in the presence of Terry and Custer at that 
 final parting, happened to be the third member of the conference, who 
 knew the "plan," and on the fifth of the November following he writes 
 as above, of what would have been the result had "your plan" (Ter- 
 ry's conference plan) been carried out. 
 
 It so happened that(l went over this whole subject with General Gib- 
 bon personally only a short time before his death. He certainly knew 
 nothing of any change in the "conference plan" at that time^ Any 
 historian who makes use of the affidavit General Miles had some years 
 ago, would do well to look carefully into the facts. 
 
 Third: Andrews states: "He (Hughes) adduced many interesting 
 considerations, but seemed to the writer not at all to justify his 
 views." 
 
 I am, by no means, sure that this dissent would have disturbed me if 
 I had depended on my own judgment alone in submitting the article* 
 for publication, but it so happened that I did not do so. The tragedy 
 discussed being of an exceedingly grave character, and both the re- 
 sponsible heads having passed away, rendered it unusually important 
 that every possible precaution should be taken against mistakes. For 
 this reason, after the "many interesting considerations" were pre- 
 pared for publication, ft submitted the article to different competent 
 military men with the simple question, " Is it conclusive ?" 
 
 The final review was made by General Henry L. Abbott, U. S. Army, 
 who enjoys a world-wide reputation for military ability and scholarly 
 attainments. The gentlemen who revised the article were unani- 
 mously of the opinion that the statement was absolutely conclusive, 
 
 * The reference is to the article in the Journal of the Military Service Institution 
 mentioned above. C. T. B.
 
 370 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and with the support of such men I have felt little anxiety about the 
 criticisms that have been made ji 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 R. P. HUGHES. 
 
 Thereafter I wrote again to General Hughes about some matters 
 repeated to me in conversation by General Carrington, who told me 
 that Custer actually got down on his knees to Terry and begged him, 
 for the sake of Custer's honor and fame as a soldier, to get the orders 
 detaining him at Fort Lincoln revoked, so that he might be spared the 
 disgrace of seeing his regiment march to the front leaving him behind. 
 Carrington's recollection was that the scene took place in Terry's bed- 
 room. 
 
 Here is General Hughes' letter on that point: 
 
 New Haven, Conn., 
 
 27th Nov., 1903. 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 Yours of the 27th at hand. Carrington is all right except as to 
 location the incident occurred in General Terry's office in St. Paul, 
 corner Fourth and Wabashaw Streets. It drew from Terry a request to 
 the President to permit Custer to go with him, the answer being through 
 Sherman, "If Terry wishes Custer let him take him along." Just 
 after notifying Custer of the reply and telling him he would take him 
 along, Custer met Ludlow on the street and made the "swing clear" 
 remark which is spoken of in Andrews' history and is referred to in 
 my article in the journal. I shall have to apply for a copy of the Sec- 
 retary of War's report for 1876, which has the reports of Sheridan, 
 Crook, Terry, Gibbon, Reno, etc., pages 439-487.* 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 R. P. HUGHES. 
 
 III. 
 
 Meanwhile I had communicated with Colonel Godfrey, who had 
 already furnished me with much data in addition to that contained in 
 his valuable and interesting paper, calling particular attention to some 
 of the statements made by General Hughes in his article in the Journal 
 
 * I have had them before me constantly for the past six months, and have examined 
 them most carefully again and again, verifying quotations, etc. C. T. B.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 371 
 
 of the Military Service Institution. ( From Colonel Godfrey I received 
 the following paper: 
 
 MEMORANDA FOR REV. C. T. BRADY 
 
 A semi-official account entitled "Record of Engagements with Hos- 
 tile Indians in the Division of the Missouri, from 1868 to 1882," was 
 published by the Division of the Missouri. This paper is now being 
 reprinted in the United States Cavalry Journal, Fort Leavenworth, 
 Kansas. The part relating to the Little Big Horn, is in the October, 
 1903, number. This account reads: 
 
 ] About two o'clock in the morning of July 25th, the column halted 
 for about three hours, made coffee, and then resumed the march, 
 crossed the divide, and by eight o'clock were in the valley of one of the 
 branches of the Little Big Horn." 
 
 This is misleading and not altogether true. We halted about two 
 A.M., till eight A.M., then marched till ten A.M., halted, and it was 
 not until nearly noon that we crossed the divide. We were in a nar- 
 row valley. The march is correctly described in my article. The 
 inference is that Custer was so very eager that he crossed the divide 
 into the valley pf the Little Big Horn and put himself where he could 
 be discovered. ) General Hughes' article is a special plea to clear Gen- 
 eral Terry from the odium that he and his family seemed to think was 
 heaped upon him for failure to push forward with the information they 
 had on June 25th and 26th, and that General Custer's family and 
 friends were supposed to hold him (Terry) responsible for the disaster 
 in a measure. I do not remember a charge of disobedience as having 
 been made at any time during this campaign; nor, on the other hand, 
 do I recall that much was said that Terry and Gibbon did not do as 
 they thought best on June 25th and 26th. 
 
 The marching distance from the Yellowstone, where(Gibbon's com- 
 mand was crossed, to the Little Big Horn, was about forty-six miles. 
 East of the Big Horn, the country over which Gibbon's forces marched, 
 was rough bad lands. Thet Second Cavalry on its march June 25th, 
 saw the " big smoke " (from the fire in the bottom at the time of Reno's 
 attack) and at once sent word to General Gibbon (and Terry) that they 
 thought a fight was going on, or something to that effect. I don't 
 know when they saw this "big smoke," but my recollection is that 
 it corresponded or tallied very well with the time of Reno's attack. 
 The Second Cavalry got to the Little Big Horn, four or five miles 
 above the mouth, about nine-thirty, June 26th. They were then dis-
 
 ; 
 
 372 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 tant from the battlefield about eight or ten miles an infantry officer 
 says six miles. They arrived in the vicinity of our position about 
 eleven A.M., June 27th, nearly two days after the "signs," the " big 
 smoke " of the fight, had been communicated.) 
 
 (That the country between the Yellowstone and the Little Big Horn 
 was rough; that the 25th of June was hot; that the water was scarce, 
 we all know; but we thought it strange that, after they learned from 
 the Crow scouts say at ten-thirty, June 26th, on the Little Big Horn 
 that a disaster had occurred, it took them so long to get a move. 
 Yet none of us blamed them for being cautious at that time. ) 
 
 General Terry was not an Indian fighter and would never have 
 made a success of getting Indians on the plains. /The idea is prepos- 
 terous * that a force can march through the open country (a great big 
 country like we had) pass by the Indians fifty or sixty miles south, 
 then turn round and find them in the same place, and crush them be- 
 tween that force and another from the opposite direction. They don't 
 linger that way. Our march from eleven P.M., June 24th, was in a 
 close country and not exposed was in a close valley, a branch of 
 the Rosebud. The Indians who discovered us and sent word to the 
 village would have discovered our trail and consequently informed 
 them of our movements. ) 
 
 General Custer did not intend to attack until June 26th, the date 
 Terry was to be at the Little Big Horn.'j' Herandeen was the scout 
 that was to take the information through to Terry, but developments 
 made it necessary, in General Custer's opinion, if we were to strike the 
 Indians at all, that we should do it at once. Even then he expected 
 only a running fight. Their stand and concentration were unex- 
 pected, because the chance of "surprise" was gone, and he probably 
 did not send Herandeen, as was intended, to communicate with Terry 
 for the reason that he did not think he could get through. 
 
 Now, suppose the Indians had been located on the headwaters of 
 the Rosebud or Tongue, or Powder, and not on the Little Big Horn, 
 and we had bumped up behind them on the north, should Custer have 
 backed away, sent a scout through to Terry, made a detour so as to get 
 
 * If the orders were preposterous, or involved movements that were profitless and 
 absurd, why did not Custer point out these patent absurdities to Terry and Gibbon 
 before he started? There had been no change in conditions; the trail, the Indian 
 position, and everything else were just as the orders predicted. C. T. B. 
 
 f The time of the arrival of Terry at the Little Big Horn is assumed to be June 
 26th. What authority there is for that assumption I do not now recall. It is not 
 embodied in the " instructions." We of the command knew nothing of it till after 
 the battle ; after Terry's arrival, that is. E. S. GODFREY.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 373 
 
 to the south side ? Terry's instructions had fairly located the Indians, 
 but it was a mere guess.* On the I7th they had fought Crook to a 
 retreat, then they concentrated upon the Little Big Horn. 
 { In my opinion, if our attack had been delayed even a few hours we 
 would not have found the Indians all in the village.) When we got to 
 the divide their pony herds were still out grazing; when the attack was 
 made all herds had been driven into the village; they did not have time 
 to strike their tepees and steal away. I don't believe they had a long 
 warning of our advance. The Indian runners had the same, or a 
 greater, distance to get back than we had to advance. It was their 
 evident purpose to drop out of sight of our scouts who were in position 
 for observation before daylight, and did not see them returning down 
 the valley on the trail. Therefore, they must have made a wide de- 
 tour. 
 
 Again, when they discovered us we were probably in bivouac and, 
 at all events, an ordinary day's march distant from the village. The 
 time of warning, I think, could be safely conjectured as the time of 
 arrival of the few warriors that came out to meet the advance and at- 
 tack Reno.,- All those warriors that had their ponies handy, I believe, 
 were assembled at once to come out and meet the troops. The rapid 
 advance didn't give the Indians a chance to collect their belongings 
 and mature any plans to escape; otherwise I believe the expected 
 "scattering" would have taken place. And in just so much was the 
 attack a "surprise." 
 
 ( That General Custer deliberately disobeyed Terry's orders I do not 
 believe. Custer was intensely in earnest and fully determined to find 
 the Indians and, when found, to attack them, even if it took him back 
 to the agencies. Suppose Custer had asked Terry "If I find these In- 
 dians shall I attack, or wait for you?" Undoubtedly Terry would 
 have replied "Attack!") He was too good a soldier not to appreciate 
 opportunity, but he was not enough of a cavalryman or Indian fighter 
 to appreciate the flash-like opportunities for hitting the Indians on the 
 broad prairies. 
 
 Custer was what in these modern days is styled a "strenuous" man. 
 Terry was not. He was the personification of gentleness and deliber- 
 ateness. And(besides, Terry's instructions gave the necessary latitude. 
 He told Custer what he thought should be done but, after all, left it to 
 Custer's judgment and discretion when so nearly in contact with the 
 
 * Having located them, guess or not, the conditions were exactly those contemplated 
 in the orders. C. T. B.
 
 374 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 enemy.*} If Custer had passed on south and the Indians had escaped, 
 or had gone forth and attacked him, as they had Crook, and defeated 
 him, would these instructions have shielded him ? Not much. He 
 would have been damned as cordially for the failure of the expedition 
 as he is now, by those same men, for courting disaster, f I have no 
 doubt in my mind, that if Custer had passed south even one more day, 
 the Indians would have attacked us as they had General Crook, and 
 upon almost the same ground, just one week before. f/ 
 /Terry says, in his instructions, "He will indicate to you his own 
 views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should 
 conform to them unless you should see sufficient reason for departing 
 from them." |"\ Custer was an experienced war soldier, a thorough 
 cavalryman, and an experienced Indian campaigner. So why not give 
 him the benefit of "sufficient reason "? Were Terry's instructions 
 "definite and explicit"? Terry himself says in his order that 
 " definite instructions " were " impossible." 
 
 There was not an officer or soldier of the Seventh Cavalry but that 
 expected a fight when we were preparing to leave the mouth of the 
 Rosebud. Where the fight would take place we knew not, but I ven- 
 ture to say that never was there a thought that the Indians would take 
 a position and wait there for us to go through a lot of manoeuvers. 
 Reno's scout had not brought any definite information. I find my 
 notes (June aoth) say that it was generally thought the trail, when they 
 left it, was about three weeks old and the indications showed perhaps 
 three hundred and fifty lodges. I don't think General Terry had any 
 later information than Reno's scout on which to guess the location of 
 the Indians on the Little Big Horn. ^General Custer's statement that 
 he would follow the trail until he found the Indians, even if it took us 
 to the agencies on the Missouri or in Nebraska, does not indicate that 
 he expected them to wait in position on the Little Big Horn or else- 
 where. This statement was made after it had been decided that we 
 should go over the trail, June 2ist, but probably before the general 
 instructions had been made out.y 
 
 As it turned out(l think Custer did make a mistake in going in with 
 a divided force, not that the division of itself would have been fatal, 
 but because Reno failed to hold a leg even if he couldn't skin. 
 
 If Custer had followed Reno the latter, in my opinion, would never 
 
 * But if Custer had followed his orders, he would not have been nearly in contact 
 Vith the enemy there's the rub! C. T. B.) 
 
 f This I consider a good point in Custer's favor. C. T. B. 
 j Italics mine. E. S. GODFREY.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 375 
 
 have dared to halt, or even hesitate, in his attack. If Reno had even 
 held to the bottom, the overwhelming forces would have been divided. 
 There was nothing in Reno's past career that would indicate con- 
 fidence should not be placed in his courage./ Custer could not have 
 anticipated a faint-hearted attack or that Reno would get stampeded| 
 
 i I believe that Reno was dismayed when he saw the showing in front 
 of him, and when he failed to see the "support" promised, I think he 
 lost his nerve, and then when his Ree scouts stampeded and he found 
 his force being surrounded in the bottom, I^believe he abandoned him- 
 self to his fears, then stampeded to the hills&nd lost his reason, throw- 
 ing away his ivory handled pistols. If Reno had held to the bottom, 
 Custer's left flank (Keogh and Calhoun) would not have been so quick- 
 ly overwhelmed (for the Indians leaving Reno made that envelop- 
 ment), and it is reasonable to suppose Custer would have had a better 
 show to withdraw and rejoin other forces. 
 
 I If Custer had followed up Reno he would have taken matters in 
 his own hands, held and concentrated his men in such manner as 
 to control the situation until Benteen and the packs came up.] The 
 Indians, as a rule, will not stand punishment unless cornered. (I 
 went over the ground in the bottom where Reno was when he con- 
 cluded to go to the hills, and I believe he could have held the position.) 
 I talked the matter over with General Gibbon and he practically 
 agreed with me. I know many others think otherwise, including 
 some who were in that part of the fight. 
 
 J have doubts about the saving of Custer if Reno had advanced after 
 the packs joined us, for I think the fight was practically over then.^) 
 To have advanced before then might possibly have done something in 
 favor of Custer, but probably not. I am of the ^pinion that part of 
 the fight was settled quickly} (Custer's battalion had practically no 
 shelter and no time to make any. While a good many horses were 
 killed, I fear that most of those getting away carried their reserve am- 
 munition, and it didn't take long to get away with fifty rounds in a 
 fight, i With a different commander than Reno we might have created 
 a diversion by advancing as soon as the ammunition packs came up. 
 which was some little time before McDougall arrived with all the packs^ 
 Reno was apparently too busy waiting for further orders from Custer 
 to take any initiative. (Weir asked permission to take his troop to re- 
 connoiter in the direction of the firing on Custer, and Reno would not 
 give it. > Weir started on his own hook, and Edgerly (Weir's Lieu- 
 tenant) supposing permission had been given for the troop, followed 
 Weir with the troop. I think Reno subsequently tried to make it ap-
 
 376 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 pear that this advance of Weir was by authority. I don't think Reno 
 was drunk, for I don't believe there was enough whiskey in the com- 
 mand to make a "drunk." J 
 
 ( At the Reno Court of Inquiry I was asked if I thought Reno had 
 done all he could as a commanding officer, and I replied "No." That 
 was about the effect of the question and answer. The testimony and 
 proceedings were reported in full in the Chicago Times. The New 
 York Herald had an able correspondent, Mr. Kelly, that joined our 
 forces on the Yellowstone in July or August, and wrote, giving all the 
 information he could gather from all sources that pervaded the com- 
 mand, that he could get at. There were a "whole lot" of correspond- 
 ents in the field after the fight, but Mr. Kelly was considered one of 
 the ablest. Being in the field till September a6th, we saw but few 
 newspapers from the east. 
 
 E. S. GODFREY. 
 
 On the receipt of this memoranda I sent Colonel Godfrey all the 
 papers printed above, and asked him further to discuss these papers. 
 They were returned to me with the following letter, accompanied by 
 these additional notes; 
 
 Headquarters, Ninth United States Cavalry, 
 
 Fort Walla Walla, Washington, 
 
 February 12th, 1904. 
 My Dear Doctor: 
 
 I return to-day the letters sent to me by registered mail. I am very 
 sorry to have kept them so long from you, but I have been suffering 
 from a sprained knee which has laid me up, and have been otherwise 
 under the weather. 
 
 ^ I feel that I have not in my memoranda done justice to the subject. 
 It is largely one of sentiment, and the best rule is to put yourself in his 
 place and act under the lights then exposed to view. That Custer 
 may have been actuated by other motives I do not doubt. The main 
 question to me was whether he was justified from a military point, in a 
 campaign against Indians, in his conduct of the march and battle. J 
 If we could have foreseen as we now look back and see! 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 E. S. GODFREY. 
 
 J Colonel Godfrey made this statement in answer to a question from me. On this 
 point see Appendix B. C. T. B.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 377 
 
 / ADDITIONAL NOTES BY COLONEL GODFREY. ) 
 
 The statement of General Sheridan, quoted by Hughes, was 
 made in his annual report for 1876, and of course from data 
 furnished by General Terry. It is but natural that he should 
 reflect more or less the views of Terry. He could have had only 
 the newspaper and other unofficial accounts. Of course I recognize 
 that "unofficial accounts" very often give more inside information 
 than the official report. 
 
 [A word as to that affidavit. I don't know anything about it and am 
 ready to take Hughes' say-so as to what officers were present, but I 
 suggest a possible solution : When Custer dismounted he had his or- 
 derly and generally his flags with him; naturally the orderly would be 
 somewhat retired, and when Custer went to mount his horse Terry 
 may have gone aside to accompany him and spoken the caution to him 
 in a subdued voice so that Gibbon would not have heard him, but the 
 orderly might have heard.*) 
 
 ;In going over a lot of letters relating to the campaign, etc., I find one 
 from General J. S. Brisbin (now dead), then Major, commanding 
 Second Cavalry Battalion.) It is dated January 1st, 1892, just two 
 weeks before his death. In it he is very bitter against Custer. He 
 says that Custer disobeyed : 
 
 "If not in letter, then in spirit, and I think and have ever thought, in 
 letter as well as spirit. Terry intended, if he intended anything, that 
 we should be in the battle with you. I was on the boat, Creamer Far 
 West, Captain Grant Marsh, the night of the aist, when the confer- 
 ence took place between Gibbon, Custer and Terry, to which you re- 
 fer, and I heard what passed. .Terry had a map and Custer's line of 
 march up the Rosebud was blocked out on it by pins stuck in the table 
 through the paper. Terry showed Custer his line of march and, being 
 somewhat near-sighted as you know, Terry asked me to mark the line, 
 and I did so with a blue pencil. Custer turned off that line of march 
 from the Rosebud, just twenty miles short of the end of the pins and 
 blue line."/ 
 
 Just how much dependence can be placed on Brisbin's statements I 
 don't know. He may have been present at this conference, but Hughes 
 
 * Again I ask General Miles if this is the explanation of the affidavit ? If so, how 
 does it accord with the statement that the conversation occurred the night before the 
 command separated ? Or, has General Miles written carelessly " the night before," 
 and does he mean just before the final march past ? C. T. B.
 
 378 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 makes no mention of him; in fact, entirely ignores him and may have 
 forgotten him. I will make another quotation from Brisbin : 
 
 "I read the order you print as being the one given by Terry to Cus- 
 ter for this march. If that is the order Custer got it is not the order 
 copied in Terry's books at Department Headquarters. You will re- 
 member that after Custer fell Terry appointed me chief of cavalry. I 
 looked over all the papers affecting the march and battle of Little Big 
 Horn and took a copy of the order sending you up the Rosebud. The 
 order now lies before me and it says 'you should proceed up the Rose- 
 bud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above 
 spoken of leads (Terry had already referred to the trail Reno followed). 
 Should it be found, as it appears almost certain that it should be found, 
 to turn toward the Little Big Horn, he thinks (that is, the Department 
 Commander thinks) that you should still proceed southward, perhaps 
 as far as the headwaters of the Tongue River, and then ('then' under- 
 scored in order) turn toward Little Big Horn, feeling constantly, how- 
 ever, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the 
 Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. 
 It is desired that you conform as nearly as possible to those instruc- 
 tions and that you do not depart from them unless you shall see 
 absolute necessity for doing so.' " 
 
 That part of the quotation from "It is desired " to "necessity for 
 doing so," is omitted in the order as printed in the report of General 
 Terry. Not having seen the original order I cannot vouch for either 
 being the true copy, but the omission looks peculiar to say the least, 
 if omission there was.* 
 
 1 1 do not know that I can add very much to what I have already sent 
 to you on the question of disobedience. Here is a commander who has 
 had experience in war, civilized and Indian, sent in command of his 
 regiment against an unnumbered foe, located we know not where 
 (although well conjectured in the instructions, as it turned out); given 
 instructions to preclude their escape; to cooperate with another column 
 separated from fifty to one hundred miles, having infantry and artil- 
 lery, marching over a rough, untried country. Now if that command- 
 er thought that to go on farther south before he had located the foe 
 (when he was on the trail) was to leave an opening and an almost cer- 
 
 * Personally I do not believe that the sentence in question was in the order given to 
 Custer. For if it was, why should Terry suppress it, since it only confirms his own 
 claims ? Besides I should be loath to believe that Terry would suppress anything. 
 The sentence may have been in a rough draft of the orders, and not in the final 
 copy. C.T.B.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 379 
 
 tainty of their escape, if they wanted to do so, is it reasonable to expect 
 him to leave the trail and go on "in the air " ? The commander who 
 gives him his instructions cannot be communicated with. Is this iso- 
 lated commander not allowed to act on his own responsibility, if he 
 thinks he cannot preclude the escape by leaving the very trail that will 
 locate the enemy ? ) 
 
 Hughes in his article, and the official reports, make it appear that 
 we were at or near the "Crow's Nest" at daylight and crossed the 
 divide at eight A.M. The scouts were at the "Crow's Nest," but at 
 eight A.M. we took up the march to near the divide and "Crow's 
 Nest,"arriving at ten o'clock, A.M.; that is, we were in the Rosebud 
 Valley, one mile from the divide. We did not cross the divide till 
 nearly noon. Hughes seems to pooh-pooh the idea that we were not 
 to attack till the morning of the 26th. We had Custer's own statement 
 as to that. He said so himself when he called the officers together 
 on the night of June 24th and again reiterated the statement before 
 crossing the divide. 
 
 During the second or third day (23rd or 24th) up the Rosebud, sev- 
 eral times we thought we (I mean some of us) saw smoke in the direc- 
 tion of the Tullock, and finally we spoke of it to the General (Custer) 
 at one of the halts. He said it could not be, that he had scouts over 
 on that side and they most certainly would have seen any such "signs" 
 and report to him, and he reiterated that there were scouts out looking 
 toward Tullock's Valley. After this assurance we made it a point 
 to watch this "smoke business" and we discovered the illusion was 
 due to fleecy clouds on the horizon and the mirage, or heated air, ris- 
 ing from the hills on that side. The air was full of dust from our 
 marching columns, which helped the illusion. 
 
 With reference to my slip that "about eighteen hundred had gone 
 from one agency alone." I took that from my diary, as I had been in- 
 formed by some one who got the information from Department Head- 
 quarters. I had never seen the despatch and put down the item as it 
 came to me. It was a matter of common report in the camp. 
 
 Another point occurs to me: "For Custer to be in cooperating 
 distance on the only line of retreat if the Indians should run away." 
 (Hughes' magazine article, page 36.) (Hughes intimates that there 
 was only one line of retreat, presumably up the valley of the Little Big 
 Horn. The Indians certainly could have retreated over their trav- 
 eled route, or could have cut across the headwaters of the Tullock for 
 the Yellowstone had Custer gone south. Hughes seems to forget that 
 an almost impassably rough country the Wolf Mountains would
 
 380 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 lie between Custer and those lines of retreat. : Yet he would insist 
 that it was good generalship to leave these routes open to close up 
 one other. The Indians were in light marching order and could travel 
 faster than Gibbon over the Tullock Divide, and there would have 
 been a long-distance, "tail-end " pursuit for Custer when he descended 
 the Little Big Horn (by following the "plan") and found the enemy 
 had escaped over the very trail he had left behind him, or had struck 
 for the Yellowstone, passing Gibbon's left. 
 
 It has been the criticism almost ever since Indian fighting began that 
 commanders were too prone to follow some strategic theory and fail to 
 bring the Indians to battle give them a chance to escape. It was 
 Custer's practice to take the trail and follow it, locate the enemy and 
 then strike home by a surprise attack. Custer knew the ridicule and 
 contempt heaped on commanders who had failed to strike when near 
 the enemy; or who had given the enemy opportunity to escape when 
 nearly in contact with them. Whatever may be the academic discus- 
 sions as to his disobedience, I hold that he was justified by sound 
 military judgment in making his line of march on the trail.* 
 
 IV. 
 
 General Hughes and Colonel Godfrey may be considered fairly 
 enough as representatives of the opposing views on the question. I 
 thought it would be well to have the papers discussed by an officer who 
 might be considered as taking an impartial view of the matter. ( I 
 therefore sent them to Brigadier-General Charles A. Woodruff, U. S. A. 
 (retired), and his review of the whole question is as follows : 
 
 103 Market Street, 
 San Francisco, May 3, 1904. 
 My Dear Dr. Brady: 
 
 I have read with a great deal of pleasure, your three articles on 
 "War with the Sioux," and I have taken the liberty of making various 
 marginal notes and corrections on the manuscript. I have also read 
 the letters from General Miles, Professor Andrews, General Hughes, 
 and Colonel Godfrey. 
 
 General Miles, in his letter of November 20, 1903, dismisses the 
 matter very curtly. He says "Custer did not disobey orders," and he 
 
 * This also is very interesting and seems to point to the order as a "preposterous" 
 one under the circumstances. It may be so; but if so, I wish Custer had pointed it out 
 to Terry before he started. C. T. B.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 381 
 
 states as military dictum that, in sending General Custer seventy-five 
 or one hundred miles away, Terry could not indicate what Custer 
 should do, and that, practically, Custer was not under any obligations 
 to execute Terry's orders, even when he found conditions as Terry had 
 expected and indicated.* 
 
 The order states explicitly "Should it the trail up the Rosebud 
 be found (as it appears almost certain it will be found) to turn toward 
 the Little Big Horn, then you should still proceed southward." Now, 
 when he found that it turned toward the Little Big Horn, instead of 
 going south or stopping where he was and scouting south or southwest 
 and west and try to locate the village, or examining Tullock Creek, or 
 sending scouts to Gibbon, he made that fatal night march with the 
 deliberate intention of trying to locate and strike the village before 
 Gibbon could possibly get up.) 
 
 Gibbon says (page 473, Vol. I., Report of the Secretary of War for 
 1876), "The Department Commander (Terry) strongly impressed 
 upon him (Custer) the propriety of not pressing his march too rapidly." 
 ( Whether Custer's written instructions were based upon a "guess" of 
 the actual condition, as Colonel Godfrey suggests, or had no "military 
 merit," as General Miles states, the facts remain : First : That they 
 were based upon a "foresight" as good as the present "hindsight," 
 which is often not the case. Second : That Custer accepted them with- 
 out demur. Third: No further information was gained to suggest a 
 modification, or, to use the words of the letter: "unless you see suffi- 
 cient reason for departing from them." On the contrary, the sup- 
 posed turn of the trail was found to be an actual fact.) 
 I Therefore, Custer did not obey his written instructions, in letter or 
 spirit, and had no proper military justification for not doing so, unless 
 General Terry afterwards told him, "Use your own judgment and 
 do what you think best," which, in my opinion, would have made the 
 instructions advisory rather than positive orders. If these facts (I ig- 
 nore the unproduced affidavit) do not constitute disobedience of orders, 
 I do not see how it is possible for the charge of disobedience of orders 
 to hold against any man, under any circumstances, when away from 
 his superior. * 
 
 Here is a trifling sidelight on the matter. On the night of June 23d, 
 General Gibbon, in reply to an optimistic remark of mine, told me in 
 effect, "I am satisfied that if Custer can prevent it we will not get into 
 the fight." The meaning I gathered was that Gibbon thought that 
 
 * Would General Miles excuse subordinates for such obedience ( ?) of his orders 
 for a combined movement ? C. A. WOODRUFF.
 
 382 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Custer was so eager to retrieve the good opinion that he might have 
 lost owing to his controversy over post traderships, that he would 
 strike when and where he could. 
 
 While Terry, with Gibbon's command, was camped at Tullock's 
 Creek. Saturday night and Sunday morning, June 24th and 25th, he 
 was looking for a message from Custer very anxiously, so I was told 
 at the time. 
 
 Colonel Godfrey speaks of the odium Terry's family seemed to 
 think was "heaped upon him for the failure to push forward on the 
 information they had on June 25th and 26th." Now let me say a few 
 words with reference to that. 
 
 The smoke that is spoken of as having been seen by Terry's com- 
 mand and I saw it myself was on the afternoon of June 25th. It 
 was occasioned, I understood, by attempts to drive some of Reno's 
 stragglers out of the brush, and must have been somewhere from two to 
 four o'clock in the afternoon. Nov/let me quote from a telegram of 
 General Terry, dated June 27,}and found on page 463, Vol. I., Report 
 of the Secretary of War of 1876, to show that Gibbon's command did 
 not; linger by the wayside: 
 
 f Starting soon after five o'clock in the morning of the 25th, the in- 
 fantry made a march of twenty-two miles over the most difficult coun- 
 try which I have ever seen. In order that the scouts might be sent into 
 the valley of the Little Big Horn, the cavalry, with the battery, was 
 then pushed on thirteen or fourteen miles farther, reaching camp at 
 midnight.) The scouts were sent out at half-past four in the morning 
 of the z6th. They soon discovered three Indians, who were at first 
 supposed to be Sioux; but, when overtaken, they proved to be Crows, 
 who had been with General Custer. They brought the first intelli- 
 gence of the battle. Their story was not credited. It was supposed 
 that some fighting, perhaps severe fighting, had taken place; but it was 
 not believed that disaster could have overtaken so large a force as 
 twelve companies of cavalry. The infantry, which had broken camp 
 very early, soon came up, and the whole column entered and moved up 
 the valley of the Little Big Horn." 
 
 I want to say thatfthe infantry broke camp about four o'clock on the 
 morning of the 26th. It had rained that preceding night and the lash 
 ropes of the packs were soaked with water and, as we moved, they 
 stretched continuously and we were stopping constantly to replace the 
 packs, and besides that, mind you, traveling in adobe mud was very 
 trying. I continue the quotation as follows : 
 
 "During the afternoon efforts were made to send scouts through to
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 383 
 
 what was supposed to be General Custer's position, to obtain infor- 
 mation of the condition of affairs; but those who were sent out were 
 driven back by parties of Indians, who, in increasing numbers, were 
 seen hovering in General Gibbon's front.) (At twenty minutes before 
 nine o'clock in the evening, the infantry had marched between twenty- 
 nine and thirty miles. The men were very weary and daylight was 
 fading. The column was therefore halted for the night, at a point 
 about eleven miles in a straight line from the mouth of the stream. 
 This morning the movement was resumed, and, after a march of nine 
 miles, Major Reno's intrenched position was reached.'*} 
 
 It was the general opinion from indications found next day just be- 
 yond where we halted for the night, that had we proceeded five hun- 
 dred yards more, we would have been in the midst of a night attack 
 from the Sioux Indians, who came to meet us as a means of guarding 
 their fleeing village. 
 
 In reference to the number of Indians, the same telegram of General 
 Terry's says: "Major Reno and Captain Benteen, both of whom are 
 officers of great experience, accustomed to seeing large masses of 
 mounted men, estimate the number of Indians engaged at not less 
 than twenty-four hundred. Other officers think that the number was 
 greater than this. The village in the valley was about three miles in 
 length and about a mile in width. Besides the lodges proper, a great 
 number of temporary brushwood shelters were found in it, indicating 
 that many men, besides its proper inhabitants, had gathered together 
 there." 
 
 I am under the impression now that we counted positions occupied 
 by twelve hundred lodges. 
 
 I I coincide with your view that had Reno proceeded in his attack, with 
 the audacity that should characterize, and usually does characterize, a 
 cavalry charge, there would have been a different story to tell; perhaps 
 as many men would have been killed, but they would have been divid- 
 ed among at least eight, if not eleven, troops of cavalry rather than 
 concentrated in five, which meant annihilation for those. J 
 
 I have been told, or was told at the time, that it was thought that 
 about sixty lodges were a few miles up the Little Big Horn above the 
 main village, and that, in the early morning, when Custer's proximity 
 was discovered, that this small village, knowing that they were but a 
 mouthful for Custer's command, hurriedly packed up and dashed down 
 the valley. It can readily be understood that sixty lodges, with the 
 horses and paraphernalia, moving rapidly down the valley, might well 
 create the impression that a very large force was in retreat.
 
 384 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Now, if the Indian village was in retreat, Custer's division of his 
 forces was not altogether bad. One command to hurry them up and 
 continue the stampede, his main force to attack them in the right flank 
 if they turned that way, which was most probable, Benteen's to attack 
 them if they turned to the left, which was possible but not as probable. 
 
 Unfortunately for Custer they were not fleeing. J Colonel Godfrey 
 rather dwells upon the fact that Custer had to attack these Indians or 
 they would have gotten away from him. The fact is, as I have stated 
 above, when he left the Rosebud he did not know where they were, 
 had not located them, was not in visual contact even with them, and 
 a glance at the map will show that, standing on the Rosebud, where the 
 trail left it to go over to the Little Big Horn, Custer was in the best 
 possible position for intercepting these Indians on three of their four 
 lines of retreat.) For having passed into the Little Big Horn Valley, 
 there were only four practicable routes of flight for the Indians, north, 
 toward Gibbon, or east, northeast, or southeast. From the point 
 where he left the Rosebud, Custer was in a position to strike either one 
 of the three last lines of flight, whereas, if, after making the forced 
 night march with his fatigued animals, he had struck the Little Big 
 Horn, and a reconnaissance had shown that the village had left the Lit- 
 tle Big Horn, going northeast, on the 24th of June, he would have been 
 two days' march behind them. 
 
 , Had he sent a scout, on the night of the 24th, to Gibbon, whose 
 exact whereabouts was almost known to him, that scout would have 
 reached Terry or Gibbon, on Tullock's Fork, a few miles from the 
 Yellowstone, on the morning of Sunday, and by Sunday night Gibbon's 
 command would have been within less than ten miles of what is desig- 
 nated as Custer Peak, the hill on which Custer perished. Then, with 
 Custer moving on the morning of the 26th, Gibbon's infantry and 
 Catling guns could have forced those Sioux out of the village on to the 
 open ground, extending from the Little Big Horn to the Big Horn, and 
 Custer's twelve troops of cavalry and Gibbon's four, sixteen troops in 
 all, between them would have made the biggest killing of Indians who 
 needed killing ever made on the American continent since Cortez in- 
 vaded Mexico. While this is a speculation, and an idle one, it is to my 
 mind a rather interesting one. 
 
 I think myself that General Hughes makes out his case in reference 
 to that affidavit that General Miles has so carefully treasured for so 
 many years. It would be a very interesting historical document, but it 
 would have been more satisfactory if it had been produced while Terry 
 or General Gibbon or both were alive. I doubt very much whether
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 385 
 
 Major Brisbin's supposed copy of the order book at Terry's head- 
 quarters was compared with the original after Brisbin had 
 made it. 
 
 I regret to say that my paper upon this campaign was lost, and I have 
 not even the notes from which it was written. I found one brief page, 
 which I quote merely as indication of my reasons for believing that 
 there were more than two thousand Indian warriors in the battle of 
 June 25th: "Before May loth of '77 more than one thousand war- 
 riors came in and surrendered, not including the warriors killed in that 
 battle or the half dozen other engagements, nor the individual war- 
 riors by the hundreds that sneaked back to the agencies and those who 
 went to British America under Sitting Bull, numbering, it was under- 
 stood, over two thousand warriors." 
 
 I do not think you are too severe upon Major Reno. I conversed 
 with most of the officers of that command at one time or another, 
 while in the field, and nearly all were very pronounced in their severe 
 criticism of Reno.) The testimony at the Reno court of inquiry was less 
 severe than the sentiments expressed within a few days, weeks, and 
 months after the occurrence. That was perhaps natural. It is barely 
 possible that some of it was due to the fact that Captain Weir, one 
 of General Custer's most pronounced friends and one of Major Reno's 
 most bitter critics, died before the court of inquiry met. 
 
 I do not think that Sturgis, Porter, etc., were captured and tortured. 
 I found most of the lining of Porter's coat in the camp, which showed 
 that the bullet that struck him must have broken the back and passed 
 in or out at the navel. (My theory has been, with reference to those 
 whose bodies could not be found, that most of them made a dash into 
 the Bad Lands in the direction of the mouth of the Rosebud, where 
 they had last seen General Gibbon's command. It would have been 
 easy for them to have perished from thirst in the condition they were 
 in, and if they reached the Yellowstone and undertook to swim it, the 
 chances were decidedly against their succeeding, 
 
 Very sincerely, 
 
 C. A. WOODRUFF, 
 Brigadier-General, United States Army, Retired. 
 
 V. 
 
 So soon as this appendix as above was in type, I sent printed proofs 
 of it to Generals Hughes, Woodruff, and Carrington, and to Colonel 
 Godfrey for final revision and correction before the matter was plated.
 
 386 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 In returning the proof, General Carrington and Colonel Godfrey both 
 add further communications, which I insert below. 
 
 I also sent the same proof to Mrs. Elizabeth B. Custer, widow of 
 General Custer, and to Mrs. John H. Maugham, his sister, with an 
 expression of my willingness nay, my earnest desire to print any 
 comment they or either of them might wish to make upon the ques- 
 tion under discussion. 
 
 At Mrs. Custer's request I sent the appendix to Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Jacob L. Greene, U. S. V., now president of the Connecticut Mutual 
 Life Insurance Company, who was Custer's adjutant-general during 
 the war and his life-long friend thereafter. His able defense of his old 
 commander is printed as the last of this interesting series of historic 
 documents. 
 
 Desiring that Custer, through his friends, may have the final word, 
 I print it without comment, save to say that I fully join Colonel Greene 
 in his admiration for the many brilliant qualities and achievements of 
 his old commander. 
 
 GENERAL CARRINGTON'S LETTER 
 
 Hyde Park, Mass., Sept. 25, 1904. 
 Dear Dr. Brady: 
 
 I appreciate the favor of reading the proof-sheets of the appendix 
 to your papers upon the Custer massacre. When it occurred I was 
 greatly shocked by an event so similar in its horrors to that of the Phil 
 Kearney massacre, in 1866. A previous interview with General Custer 
 came to mind, and I attended the sessions of the court of inquiry 
 at Chicago, taking with me, for reference, a map which I had carefully 
 prepared of that country, with the assistance of James Bridger, my 
 chief guide, and his associates. 
 
 The evidence indicated that when Custer reached the "Little Big 
 Horn" (so known upon that map) and sent Benteen up stream, with 
 orders that, "if he saw any Indians, to give them hell," ordering Reno 
 to follow the trail across the river and move down toward the Indian 
 camps, while he moved down the right bank, detaching himself from 
 the other commands, he practically cut the Indians off from retreat to 
 the mountains, which was part of his special mission; but, in the flush 
 of immediate battle, lost thought of the combined movement from 
 the Big Horn, which had for its purpose the destruction of the entire 
 Indian force by overwhelming and concentrated numbers. 
 
 Indeed, the court of inquiry did not so much discredit the conduct
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 387 
 
 of Reno as reveal the fact that he faced a vastly superior force with no 
 assurance that he could have immediate support from the other bat- 
 talions, so vital in a sudden collision with desperate and hard-pressed 
 enemies, j The succeeding fight, on the defensive, protracted as it was, 
 with no information of Custer's position, or possible support from him, 
 was a grave commentary upon the whole affair. 
 
 The. interview with General Custerj referred to was in 1876, when, 
 upon leaving the lecture platform of the Historical Society in New York, 
 he made the remark, on our way to his hotel, '/It will take another 
 Phil Kearney massacre to bring Congress up to a generous support of 
 the army." We spent several hours together, while/he discussed his 
 troubles with the authorities at Washington. He recalled the events of 
 1867, and felt that General Sherman had severely judged his operations 
 on the Republican, but that the time was near when he might have an 
 opportunity to vindicate himself, and that, "if he again had a chance 
 he would accomplish it or die in the attempt."} He was practically on a 
 leave of absence, and its extension was not his choice. Colonel Smith 
 was sick, and he claimed the right to command his regiment, since it 
 had been ordered to report as part of General Terry's command. 
 
 The famous sutlership scandal was fully discussed/and here there 
 has been confusion as to Custer's position. /He had nothing to do with 
 the popular complaint that Belknap was farming out sutlerships for 
 personal emolument. Neither is it technically correct that the Secre- 
 tary of War could make original appointments of the kind complained 
 of. Post commanders, with their councils of officers, had both the 
 selection of their sutler, and fixed the prices of articles to be sold. 
 The Secretary simply issued the appointment thus designated, unless 
 for good reasons declined, thereby requiring another selection by the 
 officers. In cases of troops in campaign, or detached, or on distant ser- 
 vice, the commanding General confirmed the officer's choice. Cus- 
 ter's position was manly, legal, and just; but his assertion of this right, 
 so far as made, offended Belknap, at the expense of officers whose 
 rights were overruled by non-military influence. 
 
 Custer was not under charges that would militate against his assign- 
 ment to the rightful command of his regiment when ordered into field 
 service. I did not hesitate to urge him to press his claim, but could 
 not entertain the idea that he would go to Bismarck, or otherwise to 
 make his claim in person, except through Washington Headquarters. 
 
 If ever a man had an incentive to dare odds with his regiment, this 
 fearless fighter and rider, whose spirit reached the verge of frenzy in 
 battle, was the man for the occasion.
 
 388 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 (Through all the papers cited by you, there runs the same subtle 
 suggestion that he who, as an independent commander of aggressive 
 cavalry in the Civil War, was almost expected to take into the field a 
 large discretion as to his actions (whereby he had formerly achieved 
 success) when confronted by the enemy, within striking distance in the 
 Little Big Horn Valley, lost all sense of danger and all thought of 
 prescribed details of action in the confidence that, somehow, the old 
 Seventh could not be whipped by any savage force whatsoever J } 
 
 I I have always regarded Terry's general plan as well conceived, for 
 Reno's prior scouting had almost assured the inevitable course of the k 
 Indian trail westward, and events confirmed Terry's judgment./ 
 General Hughes had served upon Terry's staff during the Civil War 
 with credit, as well as captain in the 1 8th Infantry on the frontier, 
 and his assurances that General Terry fully explained to Custer 
 the reasons why Washington authorities distrusted his discretion and 
 was more precise in giving him this detached command, cannot be im- 
 peached by an asserted affidavit that whispered hints, unheard by 
 officers by his side, allowed him to be his own master in a matter where 
 a combined movement of three commands was the prime factor in 
 complete success. 
 
 (Neither is there any doubt whatever that Custer's earnest plea, that 
 he be trusted to fulfil the exact duties assigned to his command, 
 secured not only the sympathy and confidence of Terry in his behalf, 
 but that on that condition only did the Washington authorities author- 
 ize General Terry to vacate the order for his arrest because of going 
 to his command without orders.] 
 
 As already stated, Custer's confidence in the Seventh Cavalry was 
 well deserved. It, with him, was a veritable thunderbolt in action; 
 but it was not omnipotent. That over-confidence which dissolved its 
 unity at the supreme crisis was fatal. Even then, a realized success 
 of which Custer had no doubt, would have minimized the rashness of 
 his dash and have largely condoned his fault. 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 HENRY B. CARRINGTON. 
 
 COLONEL GODFREY'S FINAL REMARKS 
 
 I have no desire to pose as the special champion of General Custer, 
 and it is still further from my desire to pose as inimical to General 
 Terry. / My only purpose is to demonstrate the truth, not only for this 
 discussion, but for history.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 389 
 
 This subject surely has gotten to the stage of academic discussion. 
 I am not willing to admit that the phrase "he desires that you should 
 conform to them (his views) unless," etc., conveys a direct, positive 
 command which could not be more explicit. Nor do I admit that 
 orders given by a commander, in which he uses the words "desires," 
 "wishes," and equivalents, convey positive commands under all cir- 
 cumstances. In personal or social matters, such words convey the idea 
 of what is wanted and what is expected; and in such matters the 
 expressed wishes and desires are usually conveyed to personal friends, 
 who loyally conform thereto, if not in letter, in spirit and in results. 
 In such relations a commander does not want to use language that 
 would appear dogmatic. I further admit that in personally giving 
 orders a commander may accentuate the expression of his desires, 
 wishes, etc., so as to leave no doubt about his intentions, and to convey 
 positiveness thus expressed to his commands. When a commander 
 gives written orders through official channels, the words "commands," 
 "orders," and "directs," or the use of the imperative, leave little ambi- 
 guity or doubt as to what is ordered or intended. 
 
 (Developments subsequent to the campaign or battle leave little 
 doubt that General Terry had about him men or influences that were 
 suspicious, inimical, or hostile to General Custer. I sincerely believe 
 General Terry was too high minded knowingly to allow himself to 
 be influenced by any sinister motive] 
 
 j That the "instructions" give rise to this discussion shows they were 
 vague.] Was this vagueness intentional ? General Terry was a law- 
 yer. He was a soldier. As lawyer and soldier his trained mind 
 should have weighed the words embodied in these instructions. Now 
 read them: t "It is of course impossible* to give you any definite in- 
 structions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to 
 do so, the Department Commander places too much confidence in your 
 zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which 
 might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy," 
 and then goes on to indicate what he thinks should be done; or, in other 
 words, indicates what he (Terry) himself would do if he found condi- 
 tions as expressed.) | Custer evidently saw "sufficient reasons for de- 
 parting from them'* and did what a reasonable interpretation of the 
 instructions contemplated, made his own plans.* I interpret the phrase 
 "when so nearly in contact with the enemy" to refer to the immediate 
 time or place (June 21, mouth of Rosebud) of writing it.f] 
 
 * No italics in original. E. S. GODFREY. 
 
 t This is interesting, and is the first suggestion I have met with that the phrase refers
 
 3QO Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 ( As to the location of the Indians. Terry believed they were on the 
 Little Big Horn; we found them on that river about 15 miles above 
 its forks with the Big Horn. Had the village been at the forks, the 
 attack would have been delivered on the 25th of June, as the village 
 would not have been located by Custer from the divide. It is possible 
 the two columns might have joined in the attack. Now, suppose the 
 village had been located 50 or 60 miles farther south, it would have 
 still been within Terry's guess, but it would have been a far cry to Gib- 
 bons' column which, under the instructions, would have remained at 
 the forks. It must be remembered that Custer would have had the 
 Wolf Mountains (Rosebud Mountains on later maps) between him 
 and the Little Big Horn had he ignored the trail and gone on 
 southward up the Rosebud, as Custer's critics would have us believe 
 were the intentions of the instructions. 
 
 General Woodruff would have him stop at the camp of June 24 
 and scout to locate the village, etc. Would that have complied with 
 Woodruff's interpretation of the instructions ? And from that position 
 he says: "Custer was in a position to strike either one of the three 
 last lines of flight (east, northeast or southeast), whereas if, after mak- 
 ing the forced * night march with his fatigued animals, he had struck 
 the Little Big Horn, and a reconnaissance had shown that the village 
 had left the Little Big Horn going northeast, on June 24 he would 
 have been two days' march behind them. That " forced " night march 
 was about eight miles, and every mile made was in the direction to 
 place us in the best position to intercept any flight to the northeast and 
 east. Instead of being two days behind them, we would have met 
 them almost "head on." 
 
 Of what practical use to send scouts through to Gibbon June 24? 
 
 There was no fresh or new positive information to send to him; 
 Terry had "guessed" it all. 
 
 Now let us repeat the marches made: June 22, twelve miles; 
 Jitine 23, thirty-three miles; June 24, twenty-eight miles ; June 25, 
 eight miles to the bivouac; and ten miles to the divide, and then say 
 fifteen miles to the village. That is to say, ninety-one miles up to noon 
 June 25, when it was decided to attack, and one hundred and six miles 
 in all four days. That doesn't indicate that we made forced marches.) 
 
 to the position of Terry and Custer when the orders were prepared or delivered, and not 
 to the time anticipated when Custer should meet the Sioux. I regret that I cannot 
 agree with this interpretation. Still, it is possible that such an interpretation is cer- 
 tainly a point for Custer. C. T. B. 
 * Italics mine. E. S. GODFREY.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 391 
 
 i 
 
 Woodruff further states that "he made that fatal night march with 
 the deliberate^ ?) intention of trying to locate and strike the village be- 
 fore Gibbon could possibly get up." I say that statement is deliberately 
 unfair, and contradicts the twice-told statement by Custer, that he did 
 not intend to attack the village until the a6th, once before he knew the 
 location of the village, the night of the 24th, and again when he called 
 the officers together after the discovery at the divide. 
 
 Reno's position in the bottom, in the old river bed, was sheltered 
 from fire from the hills by heavy timber, and was nearly a mile from 
 the hills. I have never before heard that he was fired upon from those 
 hills; but he was fired upon from the woods on the opposite side of the 
 river. General Gibbon and I both thought the hills were too far away 
 to give any effective fire. It must be remembered that the river bot- 
 tom was heavily timbered for some distance above and below this 
 position. This timber subsequently was cut for the construction of 
 Fort Custer. 
 
 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GREENE'S DEFENSE OF CUSTER 
 
 Hartford, Conn., September I, 1904. 
 
 My Dear Sir : 
 
 I have read with great interest your discussion of the question of 
 General Custer's alleged disobedience of orders, both in the narrative 
 of the Battle on the Little Big Horn and in the appendix to the volume, 
 and upon which you have asked my comment. 
 
 For whatever bearing it may have upon the propriety of any com- 
 ment of mine, let me say that General Custer was my intimate friend, 
 and that his first act after receiving his appointment in the Civil War 
 as a brigadier-general was to secure my appointment and detail to him 
 as adjutant-general, which relation I held until his muster out of the 
 volunteer service in 1866. I think no one knows better his quality as 
 a soldier and as a man. I know his virtues and his defects, which were 
 the defects of his virtues. He was a fborn soldier, and specifically a 
 born cavalry man. The true end of warfare was to him not only a 
 professional theory it was an instinct. When he was set to destroy an 
 enemy, he laid his hand on him as soon as possible, and never took it 
 off. He knew the whole art of war. But its arts and its instruments 
 and their correct professional handling were not in his eyes the end all of 
 a soldier's career, to be satisfied with a technical performance. They 
 were the means and the tools in the terms of which and by the use of 
 which his distinct military genius apprehended and solved its practical
 
 392 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 and fateful problems. When he grappled his task it was to do it, not 
 to go correctly through the proper motions to their technical limit, and 
 then hold himself excused. 
 
 ( He was remarkable for his keenness and accuracy in observation, 
 for his swift divination of the military significance of every element of 
 a situation, for his ability to make an instant and sound decision, and 
 then, for the instant, exhaustless energy with which he everlastingly 
 drove home his attack. And the swiftness and relentless power of his 
 stroke were great elements in the correctness of his decisions as well as 
 in the success of his operations. He was wise and safe in undertaking 
 that in which a man slower in observation, insight and decision, and 
 slower and less insistent in action, would have judged wrongly and 
 failed.) 
 
 I knew Custer as a soldier when he was a brigade and division com- 
 mander under Pleasanton and Sheridan, the successive commanders 
 of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Those who knew the 
 estimate in which those great commanders held him the tasks they 
 committed to his soldierly intelligence and comprehension, his fidelity 
 and skill need no reminder that in nothing of all their dependence 
 upon and confidence in him did he ever fail in letter or spirit. \l know 
 how absolutely loyal he was under the conflicting conditions which 
 sometimes confront every subordinate charged with grave responsi- 
 bilities, and which test the sense of duty to the utmost. He was true 
 as steel. He was depended upon for great things because he was 
 dependable.) 
 
 In temperament he was sanguine and ardent. He loved his friends; 
 he was impatient of every form of inefficiency and of pretense; he did 
 not highly esteem mere professionalism; he was impulsive and some- 
 times abrupt in manner, but kind of heart; he was sensitive only to 
 unjust criticism; he despised intrigue, chicane and all meanness; he 
 was independent in opinion and judgment, and frank in their expres- 
 sion; he was open in opposition, and fair to an enemy./ 
 
 And it goes without saying that such a man had enemies men who 
 were envious of his abilities, his achievements and his fame; men whom 
 he never sought to placate, and who sought envy's balm in detraction 
 and hatred; men who could not measure him or be fair to him, but 
 men who in a pinch would have turned to him with unhesitating trust, 
 whether in his ability or his soldierly faith. 
 
 Did this man, this soldier, whose service throughout the Civil War 
 and a long career of frontier warfare was for eighteen years unequaled 
 for efficiency and brilliancy within the range of its opportunities and
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 393 
 
 responsibilities, who never failed his commanders, who never disobeyed 
 an order, nor disappointed an expectation, nor deceived a friend - did 
 this man, at the last, deny his whole life history, his whole mental and 
 moral habit, his whole character, and wilfully disobey an understood 
 order, or fail of its right execution according to his best judgment, 
 within the limits of his ability under the conditions of the event; and, 
 what is worse and this is what his detractors charge (did he not 
 only disobey, but did he from the inception of the enterprise plan 
 to disobey to deceive his commander who trusted him, in order that 
 he might get the opportunity to disobey ? ; 
 
 To any man who knew Custer, except those who for any reason hold 
 a brief against him, not only is the charge of premeditated, deliberate 
 disobedience absurd, but it is a foul outrage on one of the memories 
 that will never fail of inspiration while an American army carries and 
 defends an American flag.J 
 
 In one of Mrs. Custer s letters to me, narrating what took place 
 during the days of preparation for the General's departure, she wrote: 
 
 "A day before the expedition started, General Terry was in our 
 house alone with Autie (the General's pet name). A.'s thoughts were 
 calm, deliberate, and solemn. He had been terribly hurt in Washing- 
 ton. General Terry had applied for him to command the expedition. 
 He was returned to his regiment because General Terry had applied 
 for him. I know that he (Custer) felt tenderly and affectionately 
 toward him. On that day he hunted me out in the house and brought 
 me into the living-room, not telling me why. He shut the door, and 
 very seriously and impressively said: 'General Terry, a man usually 
 means what he says when he brings his wife to listen to his statements. 
 I want to say that reports are circulating that I do not want to go out 
 to the campaign under you.' (I supposed that he meant, having been 
 given the command before, he was unwilling to be a subordinate.) 
 ' But I want you to know that I do want to go and serve under you, not 
 only that I value you as a soldier, but as a friend and a man.' The 
 exact words were the strongest kind of a declaration that he wished 
 him to know he wanted to serve under him." 
 
 That was Custer all over. And to any one who knew him to any 
 one who can form a reasonable conception of the kind of a man he 
 must needs have been to have done for eighteen years what he had 
 done and as he had done it, and won the place and fame he had won 
 that statement ends debate. Whatever of chagrin, disappointment, 
 or irritation he may have felt before, however unadvisedly the sore- 
 hearted, high-spirited man may have spoken with his lips when all was
 
 394 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 undetermined, and his part and responsibility had not been assigned, 
 this true soldier, knowing the gossip of the camp, conscious possibly it 
 was not wholly without cause, however exaggerated, but facing now 
 his known duty and touched by the confidence of his superior as Cus- 
 ter never failed to be touched, could not part from his commander with 
 a possible shadow resting between them. He knew the speech of men 
 might have carried to Terry's mind the suggestion of a doubt. And 
 yet Terry had trusted him. He could not bear to part without letting 
 General Terry know that he was right to trust him. That statement to 
 Terry was a recognition of whatever folly of words he might before 
 have committed in his grief and anger; it was an open purging of an 
 upright soldier's soul as an act honorably due alike to superior and 
 subordinate; it was, under the circumstances, the instinctive response 
 of a true man to the confidence of one who had committed to him a 
 trust involving the honor and fame of both. Disobedience, whether 
 basely premeditated, or with equal baseness undertaken upon after- 
 deliberation, is inconceivable, unless one imputes to Custer a charac- 
 ter void of every soldierly and manly quality. With such an one discus- 
 sion would be useless. 
 
 Upon the discussion itself, which is presented in the narrative and in 
 the appendix, I have little to say. In the opening paragraph of the 
 appendix, you say: "I presume the problem . . . will never 
 be authoritatively settled, and that men will continue to differ upon 
 these questions until the end of time." 
 
 I In other words, the charge of disobedience can never be proved. 
 The proof does not exist. The evidence in the case forever lacks the 
 principal witness whose one and only definite order was to take his 
 regiment and go "in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered 
 by Major Reno a few days since." j They were the objective; they 
 were to be located and their escape prevented. That was Custer's 
 task. All the details were left, and necessarily left, to his discretion. 
 All else in the order of June 22d conveys merely the "views" of the 
 commander to be followed "unless you should see sufficient reasons 
 for departing from them." [The argument that Custer disobeyed this 
 order seems to resolve itself" into two main forms. One is trying to 
 read into the order a precision and a peremptory character which are 
 not there and which no ingenuity can put there, and to empty it of a dis- 
 cretion which is there and is absolute ; the other is in assuming or 
 asserting that Custer departed from General Terry's views without 
 "sufficient reasons." And this line of argument rests in part upon the 
 imputation to Custer of a motive and intent which was evil throughout.
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 395 
 
 and in part upon what his critic, in the light of later knowledge and the 
 vain regrets of hindsight, thinks he ought to have done, and all in utter 
 ignorance of Custer's own views of the conditions in which, when he 
 met them, he was to find his own reasons for whatever he did or did 
 not do. Under that order, it was Custer's views of the conditions 
 when they confronted him that were to govern his actions, whether they 
 contravened General Terry's views or not. If in the presence of the 
 actual conditions, in the light of his great experience and knowledge in 
 handling Indians, he deemed it wise to follow the trail, knowing it 
 would reach them, and deeming that so to locate them would be the 
 best way to prevent their escape, then he obeyed that order just as 
 exactly as if, thinking otherwise, he had gone scouting south- 
 ward where they were not, and neither Terry nor he expected 
 them to be. 
 
 To charge disobedience is to say that he wilfully and with a wrong 
 motive and intent did that which his own military judgment forbade; 
 for it was his own military judgment, right or wrong, that was to gov- 
 ern his own actions under the terms of that order. The quality of his 
 judgment does not touch the question of obedience. If he disobeyed 
 that order, it was by going contrary to his own judgment. That was 
 the only way he could disobey it. If men differ as to whether he did 
 that, they will differ. 
 
 Respectfully yours, 
 
 JACOB L. GREENE. 
 
 VI. 
 
 To sum up, I suggest this as a possible line of investigations by which 
 the student may determine the question for himself: 
 
 First. Were Terry's written orders definite and explicit ? 
 
 Second. Were they intelligent orders capable of execution ? 
 
 Third. Did these orders admit of more than one meaning ? 
 
 Fourth. What are the various meanings, if more than one ? 
 
 Fifth. Did Custer carry them out in any of their meanings ? 
 
 Sixth. Did Custer depart from them ? 
 
 Seventh. If so, how far ? 
 
 Eighth. Such being the case, was he justified in so departing by the 
 exigencies of the situation ? 
 
 Ninth. Were the consequences of such a departure serious ? 
 
 Tenth. Did Custer receive verbal orders from Terry at the last 
 moment ?
 
 396 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 Eleventh. If so, when f 
 
 Twelfth. Did these verbal orders supersede the written orders ? 
 
 In closing, I repeat that I should be glad to be convinced that I have 
 erred in my conclusions; and that if any one can convince me that 
 Custer did not disobey, or that in doing so he was justified in his dis- 
 obedience, I shall make the fullest public amends for my expression 
 of opinion that he did and that he was not.* 
 
 * At the risk of tiring the reader, but because I am sensitive in the matter and anx- 
 ious not to be misunderstood, I append here a/letter written by me to a sister of 
 General Custer, who had expressed the hope that I would not take the position that he 
 disobeyed his orders , 
 
 July 1 3th, 1904. 
 My Dear Madam: 
 
 I have received and read and reread your letter of the izth inst. That letter and 
 the thought of Mrs. Custer, whose character, in common with all Americans, I respect 
 and admire, taken in connection with the position which my conscience, much against 
 my will, has compelled me to assume, has filled me with deep regret. 
 
 Having read thus far, you will undoubtedly divine that ft am compelled to say that I 
 believe General Custer did disobey his orders. I have nowhere stated that I consider 
 him guilty of rashness. I have also made it plain, I think, that even though he did dis- 
 obey his orders, the ultimate annihilation of his battalion was due to the cowardice or 
 incapacity of Major Reno. 
 
 I remember to have seen General Custer when I was a boy in Kansas. My father, 
 who was a veteran of the Civil War, had a great admiration for him. I was present 
 when the bodies of the officers of the Seventh Cavalry were brought back for reinter- 
 ment at Fort Leavenworth. My wife, a Southern woman, is a cousin of the late 
 General Dod Ramseur, who was General Custer 's intimate friend. The family have 
 never forgotten General Custer's kindness when Ramseur was killed. 
 
 I did, and still have, a warm admiration for the brilliant and soldierly qualities of 
 General Custer. He was, and is, my beau ideal of a cavalry soldier. When I began to 
 write these articles, I would not hear the charge that he had disobeyed orders. But I 
 have been compelled by my investigations to take that position. I cannot tell you how 
 painful it has been to me, and it is, to come to this conclusion. I have thought long 
 and deeply over the matter. 
 
 t Of course I read General Hughes' now famous article. I did not, however, allow 
 that article alone to determine me; but I carefully considered every account. I exam- 
 ined every discussion which I could find. J Not only that, I corresponded with a num- 
 ber of officers, among them being Lieutenant-General Miles, Major-General Hughes, 
 Brigadier-General C. A. Woodruff, Brigadier-General Carrington, and Colonel God- 
 frey. The remarks of these officers were submitted to one another. Their statements 
 were weighed and digested with the utmost care by me. I could come to no other 
 conclusion than that I have arrived at. 
 
 As an Appendix I have inserted in full my correspondence with different officers con- 
 cerning the matter. I have been glad to print all that Colonel Godfrey, who has in- 
 deed been a powerful advocate in opposition to my views, has written. 1 1 have called 
 attention to one significant fact which, in my opinion, would fully clear General Custer
 
 Little Big Horn Campaign 397 
 
 from the charge of disobedience. That is the affidavit of an alleged witness to the last 
 conversation between Terry and General Custer. ) 
 
 General Miles refers to this affidavit in his book, "Personal Recollections of General 
 Nelson A. Miles." President E. Benjamin Andrews also refers to it in his book, "The 
 United States in our Own Time." I wrote to President Andrews, who gave Miles as 
 his authority. I wrote to General Miles three times, registering the last letter, asking 
 him to substantiate the affidavit, the existence of which was doubted by many army 
 officers. General Miles has made no reply. I take it for granted, therefore, that he 
 cannot substantiate the affidavit. 
 
 I have said frankly that if he can prove this affidavit and establish the credibility of 
 the affiant, I will make public amends in the most ample manner for having said 
 General Custer disobeyed his orders. I have said that if anybody can convince me 
 that I have been wrong in my concluison ; if any evidence can be produced which 
 will establish the contrary, I shall be most happy to retract what I have said in any 
 possible way that may be suggested to me. 
 
 I beg you to believe that I have written in no spirit of animosity to General Custer. 
 My real feelings for General Custer can easily be seen from my article on the Battle of 
 the Washita, to which you have referred. It would be most agreeable to me if you 
 would forward this letter to Mrs. Custer. 
 
 Again deploring the unfortunate conclusion I am conscientiously compelled to ar- 
 rive at, and regretting more than I can express that I must give pain to Mrs. Custer, to 
 you, and to the friends of General Custer, I am, 
 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY. 
 
 If this Appendix shall cause any light to be thrown on the affidavit 
 so often referred to, it will serve an excellent purpose; for, I say again, 
 I shall consider the establishment of that affidavit as settling the 
 question. 
 
 The subject is now left with the student. Perhaps I cannot more 
 fitly close the discussion than by this quotation from the confidential 
 report of General Terry by General Sheridan, dated July 2, 1875: 
 
 "I do not tell you this to cast any reflection on Custer, for whatever 
 errors he may have committed he has paid the penalty, and you cannot 
 regret his loss more than I do; but I felt that our plan must have been 
 successful had it been carried out, and I desire you to know the facts."
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 Further Light on the Conduct of Major Reno 
 
 AFTER the publication of the Custer article censuring Reno, 
 my attention was called to the following editorial, which 
 appeared in the Northwestern Christian Advocate, of Sep- 
 tember 7, 1904: 
 
 WHY GENERAL CUSTER PERISHED 
 
 General George A. Custer was and will always be regarded as one of 
 the most brilliant officers of the United States Army. His career 
 abounds in romantic interest; and his death, together with that of 
 every officer and soldier fighting with him, was one of the most tragic 
 and memorable incidents in Indian warfare. The story of Custer's 
 last fight with the Indians, which took place on the Little Big ^Horn 
 River in the summer of 1876, is graphically described by Cyrus Town- 
 send Brady. It is not our purpose to relate the story of the battle, but 
 to call attention to the real cause of Major Reno's conduct, which 
 resulted in Custer's defeat and death. 
 
 After describing the movements by which Custer distributed his 
 force, and the task assigned to Major Reno, who displayed remarkable 
 indecision and errors of judgment, which would have been inexcusable 
 even in an inexperienced young officer, and caused Reno to retreat 
 instead of vigorously attacking the Indians, Mr. Brady says: 
 
 " His [Reno's] second position was admirable for defense. Sheltered by the 
 trees, with his flanks and rear protected by the river, he could have held the place 
 indefinitely. He had not, however, been detailed to defend or hold any position, 
 but to make a swift, dashing attack ; and after a few moments of the feeblest kind 
 of advance, he found himself thrown upon the defensive. Such a result would break 
 up the most promising plan. It certainly broke up Custer's. 
 
 " It is a painful thing to accuse an army officer of misconduct, but I have taken 
 
 398
 
 The Conduct of Major Reno 399 
 
 the opinion of a number of army officers on the subject, and every one of them con- 
 siders Reno culpable in a high degree. One, at least, has not hesitated to make 
 known his opinion in the most public way. I am loath to believe that Major Reno 
 was a coward ; but he certainly lost his head, and when he lost his head he lost Ouster. 
 His indecision was pitiful. Although he had suffered practically no loss and had no 
 reason to be alarmed, he was in a state of painful uncertainty as to what he should 
 do next. The soldier like the woman who hesitates in an emergency which 
 demands instant decision is lost. 
 
 " There had, as yet, been no panic, and under a different officer there would have 
 been none; but it is on record that Reno gave an order for the men to mount and 
 retreat to the bluffs. Before he could be obeyed he countermanded this order. 
 Then the order was given again, but in such a way that nobody, save those imme- 
 diately around him, heard it because of the din of the battle then raging in a sort of 
 aimless way all along the line, and no attempt was made to obey it. It was then 
 repeated for the third time. Finally, as those farthest away saw those nearest the 
 flurried commander mounting and evidently preparing to leave, the orders were 
 gradually communicated throughout the battalion and nearly the whole mass got 
 ready to leave. Eventually they broke out of the timber in a disorderly column of 
 fours, striving to return to the ford they had crobsed when they had entered the 
 valley. 
 
 " Reno calls this a charge, and he led it ! He was so excited that, after firing 
 his pistols at the Indians, who came valiantly after the fleeing soldiers, he threw 
 them away. The pressure of the Indians upon the right of the men inclined them 
 to the left, away from the ford. In fact, they were swept into a confused mass and 
 driven toward the river. All semblance of organization was lost in the mad rush 
 for safety. The troops had degenerated into a mob." 
 
 Major Reno was not a coward, as many believe. His career in the 
 army during the Civil War and his promotion for gallant and meritori- 
 ous services at Kelley's Ford, March 17, 1863, and at the battle of 
 Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, are evidence of his courage. What, 
 then, was the explanation of his conduct at the Battle of the Little Big 
 Horn ? Dr. Brady does not give it. Perhaps he does not know. But 
 Major Reno himself told the late Rev. Dr. Arthur Edwards, then edi- 
 tor of the Northwestern, that his strange actions were due to the fact 
 that HE WAS DRUNK. Reno's conduct in that battle lost him many 
 of his military friends. To Arthur Edwards, who knew him well, and 
 continued his faithful friend, Major Reno often unburdened his heart, 
 and on one occasion in deep sorrow said that his strange actions were 
 due to drink, and drink ultimately caused his downfall. His action at 
 the Battle of the Little Big Horn was cited as one instance of the result 
 of his use of intoxicating liquor. Liquor finally caused his expulsion 
 from the army in disgrace. In 1880 he was found guilty, by a general 
 court-martial, of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. 
 While in an intoxicated condition he engaged in a brawl in a public 
 billiard saloon, in which he assaulted another officer, destroying prop-
 
 4OO Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 erty and otherwise conducted himself disgracefully. For this offense 
 the court sentenced him to be dismissed from the army. 
 
 It had occurred to me that probably the explanation of Reno's con- 
 duct lay in the fact that he might have been intoxicated. I asked 
 Colonel Godfrey if he thought so, and his reply has been noted above 
 in Appendix A. 
 
 After reading the article in the Advocate, I wrote to the editor, Dr. 
 David D. Thompson, asking for further evidence of the statement 
 quoted. Here follows his letter: 
 
 Chicago, September 30, 1904. 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 Doctor Arthur Edwards, the former editor of the Northwestern 
 Christian Advocate, was chaplain in the army during the Civil 
 War. He was a soldier by instinct, and kept up his interest in military 
 and naval affairs and his acquaintance with army and naval officers 
 during all his life. In the army he won the confidence of his fellow- 
 officers by his character and moral courage. 
 
 He was requested, by a number of officers, to wait upon General 
 Hooker, then in command of the army, and express to him the 
 great anxiety felt by the officers over his intemperate habits. 
 Doctor Edwards waited upon General Hooker, and told him 
 what the officers had requested him to say. He did it in so manly 
 and delicate a way that General Hooker thanked him, and told him 
 the army would not again have occasion to fear ill results because 
 of his habits. 
 
 The story of this incident came to the knowledge of Mr. H. I. Cleve- 
 land, an editorial writer on the Chicago Herald, who published it sev- 
 eral years ago over his own name in that paper. I had never before 
 heard the story from Doctor Edwards, and when I saw Mr. Cleveland's 
 article I asked Doctor Edwards about it. He related the story to me, 
 and, after doing so, told the story of Reno as I give it briefly in the 
 Northwestern. 
 
 From all that I can learn of Reno, the feeling in the army against him 
 was not due to his drinking habits, but to his conduct in his relations 
 with others. Doctor Edwards told me that Reno told him that all of his 
 trouble in his contact with his fellow-officers was due, primarily, to his 
 drinking habits, which had undermined his moral character. Doctor 
 Edwards knew Reno very well, and told me he believed that drink- 
 ing was, as Reno himself stated, the cause of all his trouble. He had
 
 The Conduct of Major Reno 401 
 
 known him in the army during the Civil War, and spoke highly of his 
 character as a soldier at that time. 
 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 D. D. THOMPSON. 
 
 P. S. Doctor Edwards intended at some time to publish this story, 
 but died in April, 1901, before doing so. 
 
 II. 
 
 As I have always been most willing and anxious to give the accused 
 a hearing in every case, it gives me great pleasure to insert here a letter 
 recently received from Mr. William E. Morris, an attorney, who is also 
 an alderman of Greater New York. In this letter will be found a 
 spirited defense of Major Reno, with interesting details of his fight. 
 Although Mr. Morris dissents from many of my conclusions, and 
 differs radically from the printed accounts of Colonel Godfrey and 
 others, I am glad to place the other side before my readers. I only 
 regret that this paper was received too late to be included in the body 
 of the book. 
 
 Haven, Maine, 
 September 21, 1904. 
 Dear Sir: 
 
 I have read your article entitled "War with the Sioux," and as a 
 survivor of Reno's Battalion desire to enter an earnest protest against 
 the many incorrect statements of alleged facts. 
 
 Col. Reno was cruelly libeled while he was alive, and took his medi- 
 cine manfully, knowing that he had the respect of every officer and enlist- 
 ed man who served under him on the 25th and 26th days of June, 1876. 
 
 The 7th Cavalry had no use for cowards, and had Reno showed the 
 white feather, he would have been damned by every member of his 
 command. 
 
 As a matter of fact, we revere his memory as that of a brave and gal- 
 lant officer, who, through circumstances over which he had no control, 
 was blamed by the public, who had no personal knowledge of the facts 
 for the result of the Battle of the Little Horn. 
 
 It is quite evident to me that you have never interviewed- a single 
 member of Reno's Battalion, to wit: Troops "A," "G," and "M," 
 for if you had you would not misstate the facts, as I assume that you 
 intend to be fair, and would not intentionally mislead the public mind.* 
 
 * I have been in communication with a number of persons who belonged to this 
 battalion. C. T. B.
 
 4O2 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 I was a member of Capt. Thomas H. French's Troop "M," 7th 
 U. S. Cavalry, and I submit the following as a concise statement of the 
 facts : 
 
 We lost sight of Custer, whose command was on our right, at least 
 thirty minutes before we crossed the Little Horn River. 
 
 We saw a party of about one hundred Indians before we reached the 
 river; we pursued them across the Little Horn and down the valley. 
 As soon as we forded, Reno gave the command, "Left into line, gallop 
 forward, guide, center," and away we went faster than I had ever 
 ridden before. The Indians rode as fast as they could, and the battalion 
 in line of battle after them. A body of at least two thousand came up 
 the valley to meet the one hundred or more we were pursuing. They 
 immediately made a flank movement to our left and a stand, opened a 
 galling fire, causing some of our horses to become unmanageable. John 
 R. Meyer's horse carried him down the valley through the Indians, 
 some of whom chased him two or three miles over the hills and back to 
 ford. He escaped with a gun-shot wound in the neck. Rutten's horse 
 also ran away, but he succeeded in making a circle before reaching 
 the Indians, and received only a gun-shot wound in the shoulder. We 
 were then abreast the timber; to continue the charge down the valley 
 meant (to the mind of every one) immediate destruction of the battal- 
 ion, which consisted of about one hundred and twenty men (the old 
 guard, of ten men from each troop, being with the packs). 
 
 Reno, very properly, gave the command "Battalion halt prepare 
 to fight on foot dismount!" He directed French to send ten men 
 from the right of his troop to skirmish the woods, before the "numbers 
 four " proceeded there with the horses. We immediately deployed as 
 skirmishers and opened fire. The odds were at least thirty to one, as 
 our line with the fours out did not exceed seven officers and ninety men. 
 We had, however, a few Indian scouts and civilians. We had entire 
 confidence in our officers and in ourselves, and went to work smiling 
 and as cool as if we were at target practice. In less time than it takes 
 to relate it, the Indians were on three sides of us. We were ordered to 
 lie down, and every man that I could see, except Reno and French, 
 were fighting lying down. Reno walked along the line giving in- 
 structions to the men, while French was calling his men's attention to 
 his own marksmanship with an infantry long-torn that he carried. 
 
 While in this position, the man next on my right, Sergeant O'Hara, 
 was killed. The smoke obscured the line, but bullets were taking effect 
 all along it. We were perfectly cool, determined, and doing good execu- 
 tion and expected to hear Custer attack. We had been fighting lying
 
 The Conduct of Major Reno 403 
 
 down about fifteen minutes when one of our men came from the timber 
 and reported that they were killing our horses in the rear. Every 
 troop had, at this time, suffered loss and the enemy was closing in, de- 
 spite our steady and deadly fire. Reno then made his only error; he 
 gave the command, "Retreat to your horses, men!" French immedi- 
 ately corrected the mistake with the command, "Steady, men fall 
 back, slowly; face the enemy, and continue your fire." "M" troop 
 fell back slowly and in perfect order, held the Indians in check until 
 "A" and "G" had mounted. Several of their horses had been shot, 
 and their riders, consequently, very much disturbed. 
 
 "M" Troop left Sergeant O'Hara and Private Smith on the skir- 
 mish line. Isaiah, the colored interpreter of Fort Rice, Bloody Knife, 
 the Chief of the Rees Scouts, and a civilian also remained. Lawrence 
 was hit in the stomach when about to mount. I went to his relief, 
 which caused me to be the last man to leave the timber, with the com- 
 mand, with the exception of Lieutenant Hare, who passed me in the 
 bottom. Sergeant Charles White was wounded in the arm and his 
 horse killed. He was left in the woods, as was also " Big Fritz, " a Nor- 
 wegian, whose surname I do not remember, but whose horse was 
 killed. "A" and "G" had men left in the timber also, and they all 
 reached the command on the hill during the night with De Rudio, or 
 about the same time. 
 
 I give more details in regard to " M " than the other troops, because 
 of a personal acquaintance with each member. Corporal Scollen and 
 Private Spmmers fell in the charge from the timber to the ford. It was 
 a charge and not a retreat, and it was led by Reno. Every man that I 
 saw used his revolver at close range. I was at least twenty yards be- 
 hind the rear of the command. The Indians closed in, so I was com- 
 pelled to jump my horse off the bank, at least fifty yards below the 
 ford, and while in the river had an excellent view of the struggle. It 
 was hand to hand, and Mclntosh was certainly there at the ford and 
 sold his life as dearly as he possibly could. When I reached the cut in 
 bank, I found Turley and Rye mounted and Lieutenant Hodgson 
 wounded and dismounted. He was waist-deep in the water. He 
 grasped my off stirrup strap with both hands. Rye let Turley go ahead 
 through the cut, and he was killed as he reached the top; Rye followed 
 without receiving a scratch. The lieutenant held onto my stirrup for 
 two or three seconds, and was dragged out of the water. He was hit 
 again, and let go as my horse plunged up the cut. Sergeant Criswell 
 may have assisted him out of the water, but if he did he went back into 
 it again. To say that any man could or did ride back down that cut is
 
 404 Indian Fights and Fighters 
 
 to suggest, to my mind, the impossible. Upon reaching the level above 
 the cut I dismounted and led my horse as fast as possible up the bluff, 
 and overtook Tinker, Bill Meyer and Gordon about half way up the 
 bluff. We stopped a moment to rest. The bodies of the fallen sol- 
 diers were plainly visible. They marked the skirmish line and the line 
 of the charge from the timber to the ford, and were in the river and at 
 the top of the cut. At this instant a shower of lead sent Meyer and 
 Gordon to the happy hunting-ground, and a fifty caliber passed 
 through the left breast of your humble servant. Our horses were also 
 hit. I continued up the hill alone and joined the command ; was 
 then assisted to the improvised hospital. 
 
 Reno at this time had lost, in killed, wounded, and left dismounted 
 in the woods, over 30 per cent, of his battalion (there were over ten 
 left in the woods). Lieutenant Hare was particularly conspicuous, 
 and distinguished himself by his cool and determined manner when he 
 ordered the men to fall in at the top of the hill, and whatever demoral- 
 ization there was, was immediately dispelled by that courageous 
 young Texan. Benteen, arriving about an hour later, came up as 
 slow as though he were going to a funeral. By this statement I do not 
 desire to reflect in any way upon him ; he was simply in no hurry; and 
 Miiller, of his troop, who occupied an adjoining cot to mine in the hos- 
 pital at Fort Abraham Lincoln, told me that they walked all the 
 way, and that they heard the heavy firing while they were watering 
 their horses. 
 
 Benteen was, unquestionably, the bravest man I ever met. He held 
 the Indians in absolute contempt, and was a walking target from the 
 time he became engaged until the end of the fight at sundown on the 
 26th. He took absolute charge of one side of the hill, and you may 
 rest assured that he did not bother Reno for permission of any kind. 
 He was in supreme command of that side of the hill, and seemed to en- 
 joy walking along the line where the bullets were the thickest. His 
 troop, "H," did not dig rifle-pits during the night of the 25th, as the 
 other troops did, and in the morning their casualties were increased 
 on that account. He ordered "M" out of their pits to reinforce his 
 troop. There was some dissatisfaction at the order, as the men 
 believed that the necessity was due solely to the neglect of "H," in 
 digging pits. They obeyed, however, and assisted Benteen in his 
 famous charge. 
 
 It was rumored, subsequently, that French recommended his First 
 Sergeant, John Ryan, a sharpshooter, and some other men for medals, 
 and that Benteen refused to indorse the recommendation as to Ryan,
 
 The Conduct of Major Reno 405 
 
 because he failed immediately to order the men out of their pits at his 
 end of the line at his (Benteen's) order. It was claimed that French 
 thereupon withdrew his list. Ryan was in charge of the ten men 
 that Reno sent to skirmish the woods. 
 
 I was very much amused to learn, from your article, that Windolph 
 received a medal. I remember him as the tailor of "H" troop, and 
 have a distinct recollection of his coming into the field-hospital, bent 
 almost double and asking for treatment for a wound which, his ap- 
 pearance would suggest, was a mortal one, but which the surgeon 
 found, on removing his trousers, to be only a burn. The surgeon or- 
 dered him back to the line amid a shout of laughter from the wounded 
 men. Mike Madden of "K " lost his leg, and Tanner of "M" his 
 life, in the dash for the water for the wounded. I hope Madden 
 received a medal. 
 
 In view of the conflict between the foregoing and the statements con- 
 tained in your article, I ask you to investigate the matter further, with a 
 view to correcting the false impression that your readers must have 
 concerning Reno and his command. In conclusion, I ask you "how, 
 in God's name," you could expect Reno, with one hundred and 
 twenty men, to ride through upwards of three thousand armed Sioux, 
 and then be of assistance to Custer or any one else ? I say we were 
 sent into that valley and caught in an ambush like rats in a trap. That 
 if we had remained ten minutes longer, there would not have been one 
 left to tell the tale. That the much abused Reno did charge out of 
 the timber, and that we who survive owe our lives to that identical 
 charge which he led. We, at least, give him credit for saving what he 
 did of his command. I am, sir, 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 WM. E. MORRIS, 
 Late private Troop "M," Seventh U. S. Cavalry. 
 
 TO 
 . SCHILLER, Doniis
 
 INDEX
 
 INDEX 
 
 AB-SA-RA-KA, Land of 
 Massacre," book written 
 by Mrs. Carrington, 34 
 note 
 
 Allen breech-loading rifle, 45, 46 
 
 American Horse, Sioux chief, sur- 
 prised by Capt. Mills, 307; 
 killed, 310 
 
 Amick, Lieut., 124, 137; sent in 
 search of Fifth Cavalry, 125- 
 127; covers Graham's retreat, 
 128, 138 
 
 Andrews, Dr. E. B., on Custer's 
 Little Big Horn campaign, 361 
 
 Apache Indians, cruelties of, 73 
 
 Arapahoe Indians, 64 
 
 Arikara scouts in Reno's com- 
 mand flee from the Sioux, 
 238 
 
 Arickaree Fork, Republican 
 River, 72; Gen. Bankhead's 
 march to, 108, in note, 112 
 
 Army woman's devotion in Ind- 
 ian warfare, n, 12 
 
 B 
 
 BAD LANDS" of Dakota, 
 of volcanic origin, 5,209,230 
 Bailey, Indian guide, 15 
 
 Baliran, M., naturalist, killed by 
 Rain-in-the-Face, 212, 213, 215 
 
 Ball, Capt., 336 
 
 Bankhead, Col., Forsyth's letter 
 to, from Beecher's Island, 93 
 
 Banzhaf, Lieut., assists in Col. 
 Forsyth's rescue, 100, 106, 124; 
 repulses Indians, 131 
 
 Barnitz, Capt., Seventh Cavalry, 
 killed, 161 
 
 Barrett, Lawrence, actor, his eul- 
 ogy on Gen. Custer, 261 
 
 Battle of Beaver Creek, 131-140; 
 of Big Horn, 243-250; of Little 
 Big Horn, 216-236; Battle of 
 Little Big Horn, the personal 
 story of, by Rain-in-the-Face, 
 279-292; Rosebud River, 191- 
 198,203-208; Summit Springs, 
 170-179; Washita, 146-169; of 
 Wounded Knee, 352 
 
 Beaver Creek, Captain Carpen- 
 ter's fight on, 123-135; map of 
 position of wagons and soldiers, 
 130, 132 note; further discus- 
 sion of fight on, 136-145 
 
 Becker, John, mule packer, in the 
 Sibley scout, 298, 299 
 
 Beecher, Lieut. Frederick H., 
 second in command to Capt. 
 Forsyth, 77; killed, 88; mona- 
 
 409
 
 4io 
 
 Index 
 
 ment to, in; attention to, be- 
 fore dying, 120 
 
 Beecher's Island, fight of Rough 
 Riders at, 72; named, 88; 
 siege of, 90-96; a scout's story 
 of the defense of, 113-122 
 
 Belknap, Gen., Secretary of War, 
 his relations with Gen. Custer, 
 216-218 
 
 Bell, Major, Seventh Cavalry, 
 164, 1 66 
 
 Benteen, Cpl., in battle of Wash- 
 ita, 162; 'in battle of Big Horn, 
 233 235, 236, 243-246, 250; his 
 magnificent courage, 251, 253, 
 274-276; Gen. Terry comes to 
 his relief, 276 
 
 Big Crow, Indian chief, defeated 
 by Gen. Miles, 329, 330 
 
 Big Horn Mountains, controlled 
 by jealous Indian tribes, 5 
 
 Big Horn Range, streams from, 5 
 
 Big Piney Creek, Gen. Carring- 
 ton establishes camp on banks 
 of, 13, 64 
 
 Bingham, Lieut., under Gen. 
 Carrington, 20; killed, 21 
 
 Black Hills, 209; gold discovered 
 in, 209 
 
 Black Kettle (Mo-ke-ta-va-ta), 
 73; head chief of the Cheyen- 
 nes, brutality of, 157; killed, 162 
 
 Blackfeet Indians, 64 
 
 Blizzard, Gen. Custer's march in 
 a, 150-161 
 
 Bloody Knife, Arikara scout with 
 Custer, 210, 267 
 
 Bourke, Capt John G., his books, 
 "Campaigning with Crook," 
 quoted, 186; "On the Border 
 with Crook," 191, 204,333 
 
 Bowers, Sergeant, in fight with 
 Indians, 20; scalped, 21; badge 
 found when reinterred, 21 note 
 
 Bowyer, Mitch, Crow interpreter, 
 warns Gen. Custer, 268 
 
 Bozeman trail, 4, 7, 9, 13, 60; 
 army post on, 9, 189 
 
 Brainard, Col. D. L., notes on the 
 Lame Deer fight, 335-338 
 
 Brave Wolf, scout, 336 
 
 Bridger, James, fur trader and 
 scout, adviser of Gen. Carring- 
 ton, 4, 61 
 
 Bridger's Ferry, 60 
 
 Brown, Capt. Frederick, rash- 
 ness of, 23; malcontent con- 
 duct of, 24; joins Capt. Fet- 
 terman, 26; promotion of, 26; 
 death of, 32 
 
 Brule, Sioux Indians, faithful to 
 whites, 8; attack Capt. Powell's 
 corral, 48 
 
 "Brunette" regiment, see Tenth 
 Cavalry 
 
 Brunettes, Gen. Henry's, 351-355 
 
 Buffalo Bill, see Cody, Wm. F. 
 
 Buffalo Chip, scout, killed, 308 
 note 
 
 Buffalo, herds of, in Montana 
 valleys, 5 
 
 "Buffaloes," Gen. Henry's, and 
 
 ^ their rides, 351-353 
 
 "Bull teams," for prairie 
 schooners, 7 
 
 /CALIFORNIA JOE, scout, 
 vJ 155 
 
 Camp Supply, Indian Territory,
 
 Index 
 
 411 
 
 Canadian River, Gen. Custer's 
 march on, 152 
 
 Carpenter, Captain Louis H., 
 Tenth Cavalry, sent to rescue 
 Gen. Forsyth, 100; the story of 
 his "brunettes," 123-135; pro- 
 motion of, 135 
 
 Carr, Major-Gen. Eugene A., or- 
 dered to Fort Wallace, 124; in 
 fight on Beaver Creek, 131, 
 132; pursues Indians over the 
 Platte River, 135; his account 
 of the fight on Beaver Creek, 
 136-140; Carr and Tall Bull at 
 Summit Springs, 170-179 
 
 Carrington, Gen. Henry B., in 
 Central Montana, 5; effects 
 treaty with Indians at Fort 
 Laramie, 8; romantic expedi- 
 tion of, 9-13; sketch of, 9; 
 repairs and garrisons Fort 
 Reno, 12; establishes camp on 
 Big Piney Creek, 13; in desp- 
 erate fight at LodgeTrail Ridge, 
 2O, 21; inadequate force of, 
 23, 24; carries out Gen. Sher- 
 man's instructions, 24; specific 
 instructions to Capt. Fetter- 
 man, 26; his stern resolution, 
 32-37; used as a scapegoat, 37; 
 acquitted of all blame by a 
 mixed commission, 38; also by 
 a military court and by Gen. 
 Sherman, 38; his views on 
 Custer's Little Big Horn cam- 
 paign, 386-388 
 
 Carrington Powder River expe- 
 dition, reminiscences of, 59-71 
 
 Central Montana, objective of 
 Gen. Carrington's expedition, 5 
 
 Chambers. Col.. 188 
 
 Cheyenne Indians dispute ad- 
 vance of the white man, 5; Har- 
 ney-Sanborne treaty with, 7; 
 attack Capt. Powell's corral, 
 48; cruelty of, 73; break away 
 from Red Cloud Agency, 293; 
 Gen. Merritt heads them off, 
 294; bravery of, 312, 313; their 
 winter stores destroyed, 316; 
 sufferings of, 316-318; sur- 
 render and turn against Crazy 
 Horse, 318; savage ferocity of, 
 
 3? 1 
 
 Civil War, soldiers of the, emi- 
 grate to the West, 6 
 
 Civilization, the demands of, 6; 
 the outpost of, 13-18 
 
 Clear Creek, Montana, 321 
 
 Cloud Peak, 13 
 
 Clybor, Jack, adopted by Indians 
 and named "Comanche," 96 
 
 Cody, William F. (Buffalo Bill), 
 Gen. Carr's guide at Summit 
 Springs, 170, 173, 174; scout 
 for Gen. Merritt, 294, 295; 
 duel with Yellow Hair, 296, 297 
 
 Coffee Coolers, 282 
 
 Collins, W. R. E., letter of, in ref- 
 erence to Red Cloud's losses 
 in wagon-corral attack, 58 
 
 "Comanche," Capt. Keogh's 
 horse, in Custer's last fight, 256 
 note 
 
 Conestoga wagons, only method 
 of transportation before rail- 
 road, 7 
 
 Conner, Gen., establishes Fort 
 Reno, 60 
 
 Contest for Indian lands, 6 
 
 Cook, Adjutant, Seventh Cavalry, 
 158,159; killed with Custer,258
 
 412 
 
 Index 
 
 Cook, Capt., 268, 270 
 
 Cooke, Gen., relieves Gen. Car- 
 rington of his command, 37 
 
 Corbin, scout, in Gen. Custer's 
 command, 152, 154, 155 
 
 Crawford, Lieut., 307 
 
 Crazy Horse, an Oglala chief, 
 184; his village surprised and 
 taken, 186, 187; warns Gen. 
 Crook, 189; sketch of, 189 note; 
 begins attack, 193; plans am- 
 bush for Crook, 194; success- 
 ful stand against Crook, 201, 
 202; opposed to Maj. Reno, 
 241, 254; attacks Custer, 256; 
 defeated by Gen. Crook at 
 Slim Buttes, 310, 311; refuses 
 to succor Cheyennes, 317; 
 meets crushing defeat by Gen. 
 Miles, 326-330; surrenders, 
 330; stabbed in guardhouse, 
 333; Captain Bourke's de- 
 scription of, 333; a born sol- 
 dier, 334 
 
 Crazy Woman's Fork, 61, 312 
 
 Criswell, Sergeant, bravery of, in 
 fight with Indians, 242 
 
 Crittenden, Lieut., Custer's 
 brother-in-law, killed, 257 
 
 Crook, Gen. George, opinion of 
 Apache Indians, 74; his ad- 
 vance against Indians in the 
 Northwest, 183-202; assumes 
 command of expedition, 188; 
 Ex-Trooper Towne's account 
 of his fight on the Rosebud, 
 203-208; joined by Gen. Mer- 
 ritt at Fort Laramie, 293; at 
 Slim Buttes, 304-309; his de- 
 plorable condition for want of 
 supplies, 305, 306; defeats 
 
 Crazy Horse at Slim Buttes, 
 
 S 10 ^ 1 * 
 
 Crow Indians, auxiliaries in Gen. 
 Crook's expedition, 190, 205 
 
 Crow King, Indian chief, opposed 
 to Major Reno, 241, 256 
 
 Curley, Crow scout, only survivor 
 of Custer's command, 256 
 
 Custer, Boston, civilian forage- 
 master, killed with Gen. Cus- 
 ter, 258 
 
 Custer, Gen. George Armstrong, 
 in command of Seventh Cav- 
 alry, 146-150; record of, 146, 
 147; selects his own officers, 
 147; protects Kansas settlers, 
 148; his march in a blizzard, 
 150-153; has command under 
 Gen. Stanley, 210; his faculty 
 for scouting, 210; loses his com- 
 mand, 216-219; his relations 
 with Gen. Belknap, 216; ques- 
 tion as to whether he obeyed 
 Gen. Terry's orders, 219-228; 
 Gen. Terry's letter of instruc- 
 tions, 220, 221 ; various opinions 
 about Terry's instructions to 
 Custer, 224-228; account of his 
 last expedition, 229-236; his 
 officers under Reno tried to join 
 him, 248 note; his fine manoeu- 
 vering, 254; signals to Reno, 
 255; killed, 256, 257; Mr. 
 Theodore W. Goldin's remin- 
 iscences of, 263-278; a further 
 discussion of his course in the 
 Little Big Horn campaign, 
 359-397; various opinions on 
 Custer's campaign Col. Ed- 
 ward S. Godfrey, 360, 371- 
 380, 388-390; Major -Gen.
 
 Index 
 
 413 
 
 James B. Fry, 360; Major- 
 Gen. Robert P. Hodges, 360, 
 366-370; Brig.-Gen. George 
 A. Forsyth, 361 ; Dr. C. B. An- 
 drews, 361; Gen. Nelson A. 
 Miles, 361-365; Gen. Gibbon, 
 367; Brig.-Gen. Charles A. 
 Woodruff, 380-385; Gen. Hen- 
 ry B. Carrington, 386-388; 
 Lieut.-Col. Jacob L. Gillore, 
 
 391-395 
 Custer, Capt. Tom, brother of 
 
 Gen. Custer, 210, 212, 213; 
 
 captures Rain-in-the-Face, 214; 
 
 in the Big Horn Fight, 254; 
 
 killed, 257; called Little Hair 
 
 by Rain-in-the-Face, 284; story 
 
 of his killing, 289 
 Custer family, disaster to, 258 
 "Custer Massacre," 259, 281 
 
 D 
 
 DANIELS, Lieut., killed, 22 
 Davis, Capt., 316 
 
 Dead Canon of the Rosebud, 193, 
 196, 198 
 
 Denver, Col., white settlements 
 at, 5 
 
 DeRudis, Lieut., 243 
 
 DeWolf, Dr., killed by Indians, 
 242 
 
 Dodge, Col. R. I., his book, 
 "Our Wild Indians," quoted, 
 168; claims Gen. Custer com- 
 mitted suicide, 257 
 
 Dog Soldiers, 163 note 
 
 Donovan, scout, assists in Col. 
 Forsyth's rescue, 106 
 
 Drexel Mission attacked by Ind- 
 ians, 353 
 
 Dry Fork, 60 
 
 Dull Knife, Cheyenne chief, at- 
 tacked by Mackenzie, 313-315; 
 killed, 315 
 
 T^ASTMAN, Charles A., M. 
 
 ' D., a full-blooded Sioux, his 
 account of Reno's fight at Lit- 
 tle Big Horn, 238; with Gen. 
 Custer, 253 
 
 Edgerly, Lieut., 248 
 
 Eighteenth Regular Infantry in 
 the Mountain District, 9, 25; 
 at Fort Kearney, 59 
 
 Elliott, Major, Custer's second 
 in command, 152; in battle of 
 the Washita, 157; fate of, 166- 
 169 
 
 Emigrants, protected by Fort 
 Phil Kearney, 4 
 
 Evans, Col., Third Cavalry, 188 
 
 FAR WEST," Gen. Terry's 
 supply steamer on the Rose- 
 bud, 265 
 
 Farley, scout, wounded, 108; 
 bravery of, 109 
 
 Fetterman, Capt., fight with In- 
 dians at Lodge Trail Ridge, 
 20; rashness of, 23; annihila- 
 tion of his command, 24-32; 
 begs command of expedition 
 from Gen. Carrington, 25; 
 map of massacre of his com- 
 mand, 27; death of, 32; result 
 of his disobeying orders, 36, 39 
 
 Fifth Cavalry, in battle of Sum-
 
 414 
 
 Index 
 
 mit Springs, 172; other en- 
 gagements, 293, 294, 312 
 
 Fifth Infantry, 326, 335 
 
 Finerty, John F., Chicago Times 
 correspondent, joins the Sibley 
 scout, 298, 303; account of 
 Gen. Henry's ghastly experi- 
 ence, 346 
 
 Fisher, civilian volunteer, 26; 
 killed, 35 
 
 Fitzgerald, Dr., 100 
 
 Forsyth, George Alexander 
 ("Sandy"), and the Rough 
 Riders of '68, description of, 
 72-96; aide to Gen. Sheridan, 
 75; sketch of, 76; desperate 
 situation of, on Beecher's Is- 
 land, 97; adventures of Scouts 
 Trudeau and Stillwell to res- 
 cue, 97-112; map of march to 
 relieve Forsyth and escort 
 Gen. Carr, 103; a few words 
 about Forsyth's men, 109-112; 
 his battlefield preserved, in; 
 letter of, on the relations be- 
 tween Gen. Custer and Gen. 
 Belknap, 216-218; on Custer's 
 Little Big Horn campaign, 
 361 
 
 Forsyth Association, in 
 
 Fort Abraham Lincoln, Seventh 
 Cavalry stationed at, 213, 214; 
 Rain-in-the-Face imprisoned 
 at, 215; Gen. Terry at, 21 8; 
 Mrs. Custer at, 258 
 
 Fort Caspar, Gen Crook's head- 
 quarters, 37 
 
 Fort C. F. Smith established, 17, 
 25, 62; attacked, 46 note; 
 
 Fort D. A. Russell, Gen. Henry 
 at, 349 
 
 Fort Ellsworth, Indian council 
 held at, 72 
 
 Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, es- 
 tablished, 39; actions at, 188, 
 202, 208, 312, 344, 348, 349 
 
 Fort Laramie, Nebraska, govern- 
 ment commissioners negotiate 
 treaty with Indians at, 7, 293 
 
 Fort Phil Kearney, establishment 
 and abandonment of, 3, 209; 
 constantly surrounded by Ind- 
 ians, 3; Montana emigrants 
 protected by, 4; plan of, 16; 
 the tragedy of, 19-39; working 
 plan of, 33; troops ordered to 
 relief of, 37; closely invested, 40, 
 41; fort completed, 41; Red 
 Cloud's attack on, 46; burned 
 by Indians, 58; Mr. R. J. 
 Smyth's personal reminiscences 
 of, and the wagon-box fight, 
 59-71; Gen. -Crook at, 189; 
 
 Fort Reno, removal of ordered, 9; 
 repaired and garrisoned, 12; 
 construction of, 15-17; plan of, 
 1 6; established by Gen. Con- 
 ner, 60; Gen. Crook at, 189 
 
 Fort Wallace, Kansas, temporary 
 terminus of Kansas Pacific 
 Railroad, 78; orders issued 
 from, to rescue Col. Forsyth, 
 100; Capt. Carpenter arrives 
 at, 134 
 
 Fourth Cavalry, 312 
 
 Fourth Infantry, 1 88 
 
 French, Capt., 251, 271 
 
 Frontier, protecting the, 3-179 
 
 Fry, Gen. James B., his book, 
 "Army Sacrifices," quoted, 72; 
 on Custer's Little Big Horn 
 campaign, 360
 
 Inde: 
 
 415 
 
 Furey, Major, with Gen. Crook, 
 191 
 
 G 
 
 ALL, Indian chief, opposed 
 to Reno, 241, 253, 254; 
 attacks Custer, 256, 286; at 
 big feast after the Custer battle, 
 290; attacks Gen. Miles, 325 
 "Galvanized soldiers," 60 
 "Garry Owen," played in battle 
 of the Washita, 161; at Fort 
 Lincoln, 218 
 
 Ghost Dancers, Sioux, 352 
 Gibbon, Gen. encamps on the 
 Yellowstone, 218; letter to 
 Gen. Terry regarding Gen. 
 Custer's situation, 223, 224; 
 relieves Reno and finds Cus- 
 ter's body, 257; his conference 
 with Custer, 266; goes to re- 
 lief of Col. Benteen, 276; his 
 command returned to Mon- 
 tana, 305 
 
 Gibson, Lieut., 251 
 Godfrey, Col. Edward S., 249, 
 his article in Century Magazine 
 "Custer's Last Battle," quot- 
 ed, 226, 227, 253; his account 
 of Custer's defeat, 260; on Cus- 
 ter's Little Big Horn Cam- 
 paign, 360, 371-380, 388-390 
 Gold discovered in the Black 
 
 Hills, 209 
 
 Goldin, Mr. Theodore W., one of 
 the last to see Custer alive, his 
 reminiscences of the general, 
 263-278 
 
 Goose Creek, 13, 192, 201, 209 
 Gordon, Major G. A., 316 
 Graham, Capt., Tenth Cavalry, 
 
 124; scouts on the Beaver, 127; 
 retreat of, 128; unmilitary 
 action of, 133 note 
 
 Grant, President U. S., indignant 
 at Gen. Custer's statements re- 
 garding Gen. Belknap, 217 
 
 Greene, Lieut-Col. Jacob L., his 
 views on Custer's Little Big 
 Horn campaign, 391-395 
 
 Grover, Sharp, guide, 77; his ac- 
 quaintance with Indian signs 
 and customs, 125-127, 139 
 
 Gruard, Frank, celebrated scout, 
 with Gen. Crook, 191, 203; 
 sketch of, 191 note; his clever 
 scouting, 298, 301, 302, 309 
 
 Grummond, Lieut., Eighteenth 
 Infantry, 15, 20, 22; in charge 
 of cavalry at Fort Phil. Kear- 
 ney, 25, 26; killed; 35, 36 
 
 H 
 
 TTALL, LIEUT., 294, 295 
 ^ - Hamilton, Capt. John M., 
 316 
 
 Hamilton, Capt. Louis McLane, 
 in Gen. Custer's winter expe- 
 dition, 153, 157, 159; killed, 161 
 
 Hanley, Sergeant, 249 
 
 Hare, Lieut. Luther R., 249, 267, 
 274 
 
 Harney-Sanborne treaty with In- 
 dians, 7 
 
 Harrington, Lieut., killed with 
 Custer, 259 
 
 Hat Creek, see War Bonnet 
 
 Hazen, Gen. W. B., inspects Fort 
 Reno, 17 note 
 
 Henry, Gen. Guy V., Third Cav- 
 alry, 190, 193, 195, 196, 198;
 
 4i6 
 
 Index 
 
 wounded, 197; in Dead Canon, 
 200, 201; sketch of, 339-355; 
 his march in a blizzard, 342-344; 
 a ghastly experience, 344-348; 
 bravery of his wife, 348-351 ; his 
 "Buffaloes" and their famous 
 rides, 351-355; in the Spanish- 
 American War, 354; in Porto 
 Rico, 354; dies there, 355 
 
 Henry rifle, breech-loading rapid 
 fire, use of, 26, 35 
 
 Herndon, scout, 266, 267, 274 
 
 Hines, Acting-Assistant Surgeon, 
 sent to join Capt. Fetterman,29 
 
 Hodgson, Lieut., killed by In- 
 dians, 242; account of his 
 death, 263, 272, 273 
 
 Honzinger, Dr., veterinarian, kill- 
 ed by Rain-in-the-Face, 12, 
 213, 215, 283 note, 285 
 
 Horse Creek, 60 
 
 Horton, Surgeon, on wagon- 
 beds, 44 note, 50, 56, 69 
 
 Howitzers, Indian fear of, 29 
 
 Hughes, Major-Gen. Robert P., 
 his book, "The Campaign 
 Against the Sioux," quoted, 
 224; Little Big Horn cam- 
 paign, 360, 366-370 
 
 Humfreville,Capt.J.Lee,his book 
 "Twenty Years Among Our 
 Hostile Indians" quoted, 318 
 
 Hunting ground, Indian title to, 6 
 
 Hunting parties forbidden at Fort 
 Phil Kearney, 4 
 
 TNDIAN attacks on Fort Phil 
 
 A Kearney, 4, 37-71 
 
 Indian fights at Beaver Creek, 
 
 123-140; on Beecher's Island, 
 97; at Fort C. F. Smith, 46 
 note; at Fort Phil Kearney, 
 40-56; at Glendive, Mont., 
 321; at Lodge Trail Ridge, 
 20, 21; on the Rosebud River, 
 191-198; 203-208; at Slim 
 Buttes, 304-309; at Summit 
 Springs, 170-179 
 Indian fighters and their field, 
 
 3: 8 
 
 Indian police kill Sitting Bull, 
 
 332 
 Indian skulls, scientific study of, 
 
 69 
 Indian traders, their mercenary 
 
 policy, 184 
 Indian wars, cause of, 4; seiges 
 
 in, 3 
 
 Indian's dread of scalping, 91-92 
 note 
 
 Indians, annihilate Capt. Fetter- 
 man's command outside Fort 
 Phil Kearney, 30-32 
 
 Indians as patriots, 74, 185; 
 looseness of tie binding tribes, 
 313 note 
 
 Indians, Montana, jealous of in- 
 trusion by whites, 5 
 
 Iron Star, Indian chief, attacked 
 by Gen. Miles and killed, 330- 
 332 
 
 Island of Death, the, 78-85 
 
 Itiomagaju, see Rain - in - the- 
 Face 
 
 JACKSON, Bob, scout, 336, 
 338 
 Jenness, Lieut. John C., detailed
 
 Index 
 
 417 
 
 under Capt. Powell to protect 
 woodcutters, 43; killed, 51, 67 
 
 Jerome, Lieut. Lovell H., 336 
 
 Jewish boy's bravery in Gen. 
 Forsyth's fight, no; Gen. 
 Fry's poem on, no note 
 
 Johnson, Hugh, Adjutant, sends 
 Captain Carpenter to succor 
 Col. Forsyth, 100, 101; prompt 
 action of, in, 112 
 
 Johnson, President Andrew, con- 
 gratulates Congress on peace 
 with Indians, 22 
 
 Julesberg, 59 
 
 K 
 
 KANE, Capt., Fifth Cavalry, 
 in Beaver Creek fight, 137, 
 
 138 
 
 Kansas Pacific Railroad, build- 
 ing of, resisted by Indians, 7-72 
 
 Kansas trail, 7 
 
 Kansas, Western, swept and de- 
 vastated by Cheyennes, 75 
 
 Kellogg, Mark, newspaper cor- 
 respondent, killed with Custer, 
 
 258 
 Kennedy, Sergeant-Major, 7th 
 
 Cavalry, brave death of, 168 
 Keogh, Capt., killed with Custer, 
 
 258, 259 
 Kidder, Lieut., Second Cavalry, 
 
 slaughtered, 149 
 
 King, Gen., his book, "Cam- 
 paigning with Crook," quoted, 
 
 1 88 
 King, Lieut. Charles, fighter and 
 
 author, 294 
 Kinney, Capt., sent to establish 
 
 FortC.F. Smith, 17 
 
 LAME DEER, Indian chief, 
 attacked by Gen. Miles and 
 killed, 330-332; notes on the 
 fight, 335-338 
 
 Laramie Commission, announce- 
 ment of, 15 note 
 Leighton, Al., sutler, Indians 
 
 stampede stock of, 60 
 Little Beaver, Indian scout, 155 
 Little Big Horn, battle of, the story 
 of by Rain-in-the-Face, 279-292 
 Little Big Horn Campaign, the, 
 
 216-236; map of, 234 
 Little Big Horn Valley, 233 
 Little Crow, Indian,wounded,l4O 
 Little Hair (Tom Custer), 284 
 Little Muddy Creek, 336 
 Little Raven, Arapahoe Indian 
 
 chief, 164 
 Little Rock, Indian chief, killed, 
 
 164 
 
 LodgeTrail Ridge, 1 3, 20,26,29-31 
 Longfellow's poem, "The Re- 
 venge of Rain-in-the-Face," 
 sold by the Indian himself at 
 the World's Fair, 291 
 Long Hair, Gen. Custer's Indian 
 
 name, 146 
 Lord, Dr., killed with Custer, 
 
 258, 259 
 Luettwitz, Lieut. Von, 307; 
 
 wounded, 308 
 Lummis, Charles F., on the 
 
 Apache Indians, 74 note 
 
 M 
 
 MACKENZIE, Ranald S., 
 Col. Fourth Cavalry, 305; 
 his winter battle, 312-316; at-
 
 4i8 
 
 Index 
 
 tacks Indians at Willow Creek 
 
 Canon, 313- 
 Maclntosh, Lieut., killed by 
 
 Indians, 242, 268, 272, 274 
 Mahapiya-luta, see Red Cloud 
 Mah-wis-sa, Black Kettle's sister, 
 
 endeavors to marry Gen. Cus- 
 
 ter to an Indian girl, 167 
 "Mauvaises Terres," or "bad 
 
 lands," 5 
 McCall, Sergeant W. H. H., 77, 
 
 78 
 
 McDougall, Capt., joins Maj. 
 Reno with pack train, 248; 
 serves under Custer at the Little 
 Big Horn, 233 
 
 McKinney, Lieut. John A., 
 charges Cheyennes at Willow 
 Creek Canon, 315; shot, 315 
 
 Medicine Man, daring of a, 133 
 
 Merritt, Gen. Wesley, ordered to 
 join Gen. Crook at Fort Lara- 
 mie, 293; his fight with Chey- 
 ennes, 295-297 
 
 Miles, Gen. Nelson A., his "Per- 
 sonal Recollections" quoted, 
 189; his Indian campaigning, 
 305; his great campaigning, 
 319-338; his foot cavalry de- 
 feat Sitting Bull, 319-326; in- 
 terview with Sitting Bull, 323, 
 324; his crushing defeat of 
 Crazy Horse, 326-330; his ca- 
 pacity for handling men, 326; 
 attacks and captures Lame 
 Deer's village, 330-332; his 
 views on Custer's Little Big 
 Horn campaign, 361-365 
 
 Mills, Capt. Anson, Third Cav- 
 alry, 190, 193, 195, 196; his ad- 
 vance down Dead Canon, 199- 
 
 202; sent on foraging expedi- 
 tion, 305, 306 
 Mimiconjou Indians attack Capt. 
 
 Powell, 48 
 
 Montana, emigrants and wagon- 
 trains to, annihilated by In- 
 dians, 4; white settlements at, 5 
 Mooers, Dr. John H., 77; killed, 
 
 84 
 
 Moore, Tom, veteran, 192, 196 
 Morris, William E., on the con- 
 duct of Major Reno, 401-405 
 Mountain District,armypostsin,9 
 Mountain game in Montana 
 
 ranges, 6 
 
 Mountain standard time, 5 
 Mo-ke-ta-va-ta, see Black Kettle 
 Moylan, Capt., with Custer, 211, 
 
 212, 271 
 
 Mussa ranch, 60 
 
 Myers, Capt., Seventh Cavalry, 
 '57, '59 
 
 N 
 
 XJAPOLEON guns, 326 
 
 ^ Nickerson,Capt.,in Crook's 
 
 command, 200 
 
 Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer 
 Cavalry, in Sheridan's winter 
 campaign against Indians, 150 
 Ninth Cavalry, 351-355 
 Ninth Infantry, 188, 342 
 North, Col. Francis, in Summit 
 
 Springs battle, 173 
 North Platte, 5, 59, 60 
 Northern Pacific Railroad, sur- 
 vey of, 209 
 
 Northwestern Christian Advo- 
 cate on the conduct of Major 
 Reno, 398-400 

 
 Inde: 
 
 419 
 
 Noyes, Major, Second Cavalry, 
 188, 193, 196 
 
 
 
 /"\GLALA IndiansattackCapt. 
 
 ^-^ Powell's corral, 48 
 
 Oregon trail, 7 
 
 Orleman, Lieut., assists in Col. 
 Forsyth's rescue, 100, 124; in 
 expedition to Beaver Creek, 
 127; covers Graham's retreat, 
 128; repulses Indians, 131 
 
 Osage Indians, with Custer in 
 battle of the Washita, 159, 160 
 
 Otis, Lieut.-Col. Elwell S., at- 
 tacked by Indians at Glendive, 
 Mont., 321; Sitting Bull's 
 letter to, 321 
 
 PAWNEE scouts at battle of 
 Summit Springs, 173-177 
 
 Peno Creek, 13, 20, 64 
 
 Peno Valley, 28, 31, 36 
 
 Phil Kearney Garrison, post re- 
 turn of, 30 note 
 
 Pilot Hill, 13, 14, 19 
 
 Pine Ridge Agency, 293 
 
 Piney Island, logging camp on, 
 14; the improvised corral on, 
 40-46; wood-cutting on, 43; 
 wagon-box corral illustrated, 
 
 45 
 Porter, Lieut., killed with Custer, 
 
 258, 259 
 Pourier, Baptiste (Big Bat) scout 
 
 with Gen. Crook, 298 
 Powder River, Indians encamped 
 
 on, 23; Sitting Bull at, 184; 
 
 Gen. Reynolds captures Crazy 
 Horse's village on the, 186; 
 Gen. Terry at, 218, 265, 312 
 
 Powder River Expedition, the, 
 3-18; reminiscences of, 59-71 
 
 Powell, Capt. James, 22; report 
 of, to Gen. Carrington, 23; 
 command of relief party given 
 10,25; detailed to guard wood- 
 cutting party, 42; sketch of, 
 42; his gallant fight in the 
 wagon-corral against Red 
 Cloud, 48-55; promotion of, 
 
 57. 
 
 Prairie schooners, early use of, 7 
 Pretty Bear, Cheyenne chief, 
 
 killed, 176, 177 
 Pumpkin Buttes, 61 
 
 R 
 
 "D ABBIT Creek, 307 
 
 -*-*- Rain-in-the-Face (Itioma- 
 gaju), Indian chief, his griev- 
 ance, 209-215; capture of, 213- 
 215; escapes, 215; attacks Cus- 
 ter, 256; his revenge, 257; his 
 personal story of the fight, 
 279-292; boasts of murdering 
 Dr. Honzinger, 283; his map 
 of Custer's battlefield, 287; 
 wounded, 289 note 
 
 Red Cloud (Mahapiya-Iuta), 
 Sioux chief, opposes treaty with 
 Gen. Carrington, 7,8; revenge 
 on, for massacre at Fort Phil 
 Kearney, 39; becomes leading 
 war chief, 40; surprised and 
 disarmed by Gen. Mackenzie, 
 40 note; his most thrilling ad- 
 venture, 40, 41, note; deter-
 
 420 
 
 Index 
 
 mines to capture Fort Phil 
 Kearney, 41; his attack, 46; 
 his baptism of fire, 51-56; his 
 losses in the attack on Capt. 
 Powell's wagon-corral, 58 
 
 Red Cloud Agency, 293 
 
 Rees, Indian auxiliaries, 238, 240, 
 267 
 
 Religious belief of Indians in re- 
 gard to scalping, 91-92 note 
 
 Reno, Major Marcus A., in the 
 Big Horn country, 218; Cus- 
 ter gives command to, 232; 
 record of, 232 note; his ad- 
 vance, 234-236; his failure at 
 the Little Big Horn, 237-243; 
 plan of his defence on the bluff, 
 247; his failure to press his at- 
 tack, 260; his report to Custer, 
 265; further light on the con- 
 duct of Major Reno, 398-405 
 
 Reno's Creek, 233, 253 
 
 Reynolds, Charlie, famous scout, 
 killed with Custer, 258 
 
 Reynolds, Gen. Joseph J., sur- 
 prises and takes Crazy Horse's 
 village, 1 86 
 
 Riley, Lieut., killed, 258 
 
 Rodenbough, Gen., his "Sabre 
 and Bayonet" quoted, 43, 44 
 
 Roman Nose, Indian chief, inso- 
 lent speech of, 72, 73; attacks 
 Capt. Forsyth, 83-85; charge 
 of his five hundred warriors, 
 85-88; killed, 87; his tepee 
 discovered by Capt. Carpenter, 
 105, 108, 109 
 
 Romero, Indian interpreter, 155, 
 167 
 
 Rosebud River, Crook's advance 
 against Indians on the, 189, 
 
 191-193; battle of the, 193- 
 198; map of battle, 197; Ex- 
 Trooper Towne's account of 
 the battle on, 203-208 
 Rough Riders of '68, the, 72-96 
 Royall, Col. William B., Fifth 
 Cavalry, ordered to attack In- 
 dians on Beaver Creek, 124; 
 given command under Gen. 
 Crook, 1 88; anecdote of, 188 
 note; charges Indians at the 
 Rosebud, 195, 196, 198 
 
 SALT LAKE, white settle- 
 ments at, 5 
 
 Salt Lake trail, 59 
 
 Sample, Gen. Carrington's order- 
 ly, reports on Fetterman's 
 command, 30 
 
 Sand Creek, 60 
 
 Sans Arc Indians attack Capt. 
 Powell's corral, 48 
 
 Santa Fe trail, 7 
 
 Satanta, Kiowa Indian chief, 
 164; captured by Custer. 169 
 
 Savage warfare, 339-344 
 
 Savagery, the rights of, 6 
 
 Scalping, Indian belief in, 91-92 
 note 
 
 Schlesinger, Sigmund, his brav- 
 ery in Gen. Forsyth's fight, 1 10; 
 Gen. Fry's poem on, no note; 
 his story of the defense of 
 Beecher's Island, 113-122 
 
 Schwatka, Lieut., Arctic explorer, 
 successful attack on Sioux by, 
 
 307 
 
 Second Cavalry, in tragedy of 
 Fort Phil Kearney, 25, 60.:
 
 Index 
 
 other engagements, 188, 195, 
 196, 312, 335 
 
 Settlers on Indian lands, 6-7 
 Seventh Cavalry, Gen. Custer in 
 command of, 146; formation of 
 regiment, 147; protects Kan- 
 sas settlers, 148; in Sheridan's 
 winter campaign, 150; other 
 engagements, 213, 218, 229, 
 
 293 305, 355 
 
 Sheridan, Gen. Philip, attacks 
 the Cheyenne Indians, 75; in- 
 augurates winter campaign 
 against Indians, 150 
 
 Sheridan City, terminus of Union 
 Pacific Railroad, 134 
 
 Sherman, Gen., advises ladies to 
 join Gen. Carrington's ex- 
 pedition, n; boy's challenge 
 to, 12; acquits Gen. Carring- 
 ton of all blame for disaster at 
 Fort Phil Kearney, 38 
 
 Short Nose Creek, 125, 127 
 
 Shoshone Indians, auxiliaries in 
 Gen. Crook's expedition, 190, 
 205 
 
 Sibley, Lieut. Frederick W., 
 Third Cavalry, his scouting 
 after Crazy Horse, 298-303 
 
 Sioux Indians dispute the ad- 
 vance of the white man, 5; 
 Harney-Sanborne treaty with, 
 7; accept valuable gifts from 
 Gen. Carrington, 8; invest 
 Fort Phil Kearney under Red 
 Cloud, 40-42; wild charge of 
 46-51 
 
 Slim Buttes, South Dakota, Gen. 
 Crook and Capt. Mills at, 
 
 304-309 
 Sitting Bull, Unkpapa Indian 
 
 chief, his character, 183, 184; 
 outgenerals Custer, 279; in the 
 sun dance, 282 note; strategy 
 of, 286; at big feast after the 
 Custer fight, 290; sends letter 
 to Col. Otis, 321; interview 
 with Gen. Miles, 323, 324; at- 
 tacked by Lieut. Baldwin, 326; 
 escapes to British Columbia, 
 332; surrenders to United 
 States army, 332; a moving 
 spirit in ghost dance uprising, 
 332; killed by Indian police, 
 
 332 
 Smith, Capt. Gray Horse Troop, 
 
 killed with Custer, 257 
 Smith, Captain E. W., Eighteenth 
 
 Infantry, sends Gen. Terry's 
 
 instructions to Gen. Custer, 
 
 220, 221 
 Smith, Major rescues Capt. 
 
 Powell in wagon-corral fight, 
 
 56 
 
 Smyth, R. J., reminiscences of 
 the Carrington Powder River 
 Expedition, 59-71 
 
 Snow, Bugler, shot, 206 
 
 South Pass, 5 
 
 South Platte River, 59 
 
 Spencer breech-loading carbine, 
 10, 25, 41, 67, 76 
 
 Spencer rifle, 132, 140, 159 
 
 Spotted Tail, Brule Sioux chief, 8 
 
 Springfield muzzle-loading mus- 
 kets, 10, 61, 64; breech-loading 
 rifles, modification of, 45 
 
 Standing Elk, Brule Sioux chief, 
 8 
 
 Standing Rock, 282 
 
 Standing Rock Agency, Rain-in- 
 the-Face captured at, 213
 
 422 
 
 Index 
 
 Stanley, Gen., sent on expedi- 
 tion to the Black Hills, 210 
 Stillwell, John, scout, 90; ad- 
 ventures of, to rescue Gen. 
 Forsyth, 97-112; volunteers to 
 go to Fort Wallace, 1 2 1 ; studied 
 law and became a judge, 122 
 note; death of, 122 
 Sturgis, Lieut., killed, 258, 259 
 Sullivant Hills, 13, 14, 19, 24, 25 
 Summit Springs, Col., Gen. 
 Carr's fight with Tall Bull at, 
 170-179; account of battle of, 
 173-179 
 
 Sun Dance, the, description of, 
 282 note 
 
 TALL BULL, Indian chief, 
 Gen. Carr's fight with at 
 Summit Springs, 170-179; 
 killed, 172, 177 
 
 Ten Eyck, Capt., sent to Capt. 
 Fetterman's relief, 29; returns 
 with tidings of disaster, 31 
 
 Tenth Cavalry (negro regiment), 
 sent to the rescue of Gen. For- 
 syth, 100 
 
 Terry, Major-Gen. Alfred H., 
 takes command of Custer's 
 column, 216; did Custer obey 
 orders ? 219-228; text of his 
 letter to Custer, 220, 221; his 
 report to the Secretary of War 
 on his orders to Custer, 225 
 note; relieves Maj. Reno, 257; 
 finds Custer's body, 257; goes 
 to relief of Col. Benteen, 276; 
 a discussion on his orders to 
 Gen. Custer, 359-397 
 
 Third Cavalry, 188, 190, 193, 
 198, 205, 342 
 
 Thomas, W. Kent, the personal 
 story of Rain-in-the Face by, 
 279-292 
 
 Thompson, Capt., Seventh Cav- 
 alry, 157 
 
 Thompson, David D., editor 
 Northwestern Christian Ad- 
 vocate, on the conduct of Ma- 
 jor Reno, 398-400 
 
 Tongue River, a fork of the Yel- 
 lowstone, 13, 20, 221, 265, 298, 
 319, 326, 336; Gen. Crook's 
 march to, 187-190, 192 
 
 Towne, Phineas, Ex-Trooper, on 
 the Rosebud fight, 203-208 
 
 Trudeau, scout, 90; adventures 
 of, to rescue Gen. Forsyth, 97- 
 112 
 
 Tullock's Creek, 221, 226 
 
 Twenty-second Infantry, 326,336 
 
 Twenty-seventh Regular Infan- 
 try in the Mountain District, 9; 
 detailed to protect wood-cutting 
 party, 42 
 
 Twenty-third Infantry, attacked 
 at Glendive, Montana, 321 
 
 u 
 
 TTNION PACIFIC RAIL- 
 *-' Road, building of, 7; mili- 
 tary posts along, 184 
 Unkpapa Indians attack Capt. 
 Powell's corral, 48 
 
 VAN VLIET, Capt., Third 
 Cavalry, 190, 193, 195, 196
 
 Index 
 
 423 
 
 Varnum, Lieut., 
 
 211, 267 
 Vroom, 
 
 198, 201 
 
 with Custer, 
 Third Cavalry, 
 
 W 
 
 " W AGON GUNS '" 6 9 
 
 * Wagons made for de- 
 fence in Indian wars, 43 
 
 Wallace, Lieut., 271, 272, 276 
 
 War Bonnet, (creek in South Da- 
 kota), the fight on the, 293-298 
 
 War Department censures Gen. 
 Carrington unjustly, 70 
 
 Warfare against savages, 339- 
 
 344 
 Washakie, Shoshone Indian chief, 
 
 198 
 
 Washita, battle of the, 146-169 
 Weir, Capt. of D troop, under 
 
 Major Reno, 248, 275 
 Welch, J. E., letter of, to Col. H. 
 
 O. Clark on battle of Summit 
 
 Springs, 173-179 
 West, Capt., Seventh Cavalry, 
 
 157, 159 . 
 Wheatley, civilian volunteer, 26; 
 
 killed, 35 
 White Antelope, Cheyenne chief, 
 
 killed by Lieut., Sibley, 300 
 White Bull, scout, 336 
 "White Eagle," name given to 
 
 Gen. Carrington by Indians, 8 
 Whittaker, Capt. Frederick, his 
 
 "Complete Life of General 
 
 George A. Custer," quoted, 
 
 146; extract from, 261 
 Willow Creek Canon, Big Horn 
 
 Mountains, Mackenzie attacks 
 
 Cheyennes at, 313 
 Winchester rifles, Sioux armed 
 
 with, 41 
 Wolf Creek, Custer's march 
 
 down, 151 
 Wolf Mountains, Big Horn 
 
 Range, 327 
 
 Women, in Gen. Carrington's ex- 
 pedition, n; fate of, in Indian 
 
 warfare, II 
 Woodruff, Brig.-Gen. Charles A., 
 
 on Custer's Little Big Horn 
 
 campaign, 380-385 
 Wounded Knee, battle of, 352 
 
 , 282 
 
 Yates, Capt. assists in cap- 
 ture of Rain-in-the-Face, 214; 
 killed, 258 
 
 Yellow Hand, Indian chief, shot 
 by Buffalo Bill, 296 
 
 Yellowstone expedition of 1873, 
 209-213 
 
 Yellowstone River, threaded with 
 streams from the Big Horn 
 Range, 5; army post estab- 
 lished on, 9 
 
 Yuma County, Col., 
 
 syth's battlefield preseired in 
 national park there, in 
 
 THE MOCLURE PRESS, NEW YORK 
 
 DR. M.
 
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