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'I 
 
 I 
 
 THE BALKAN 
 WARS 
 
 LECTURES 
 
 OELIVERED A I 
 
 tmp: army service schools 
 
 FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 
 
 BY 
 
 Clyde Sinclair ford 
 
 MAJOR MEDICAL CORPS, I' "-. * 
 
 THE ARMY 8ERYICE SCHOOLS 
 
 1915 
 
THE BALKAN 
 WARS 
 
 BEING A SERIES OF 
 
 . LECTURES 
 
 DELIVERED AT 
 
 THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 
 
 FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 
 BY 
 
 CLYDE SINCLAIR FORD 
 
 MAJOR, MEDICAL CORl'S, U. S. A. 
 
 PRESS OF THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 
 
 1915 
 
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 So 
 
 vUH.Hi 
 
Introduction 
 
 IN ACCEPTING the burden of proof for my presumption, as 
 a non-combatant, in addressing a body of officers of the 
 
 combatant arms of the service on such a subject as " The 
 Balkan Wars," I feel it incumbent upon me to give a brief 
 account of my contact with the Balkan situation, covering a 
 period of eighteen months, which afforded the opportunity 
 for my observations. 
 
 About the 1st of July, 1912, I landed in Trieste on sick 
 leave of absence which was later arranged to terminate with 
 the end of the year. From this port I took passage for a tour 
 of the Dalmatian coast, on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, 
 stopping at Pola, the principal Austrian naval base, Sebinicio, 
 Spalato, Ragusa, and as far south as Cattaro, at the head of 
 the Bays of Cattaro, which form a harbor much like that of 
 New York with the sea as far away from the port as Sandy 
 Hook is from Castle Garden. Cattaro, while Austrian and one 
 of the finest naval harbors in the world, is the logical port of 
 Cetenje, the capital of Montenegro. As an automobile post- 
 route line between Cattaro and Cetenje was discovered, I con- 
 tinued my journey to Cetenje and the Lake of Scutari. On 
 returning to the northern Adriatic by the same route, I landed 
 at Flume, crossed by rail to Trieste and thence by sea to 
 Venice. 
 
 In September, 1912, I went by rail from Vienna, through 
 Buda-Pest, Belgrade, Sofia and Adrianople, to Constantinople, 
 where I remained three weeks with my friend. Major J. R. M. 
 Taylor, our capable and accomplished military attacM. There 
 were, at that time, echoing about Constantinople large and 
 glowing rumors of the coming war, but as one can always hear 
 anything and everything, both true and false, anywhere in 
 the near East, and not knowing what or whom to believe, I 
 grew so impatient in waiting for the long-advertised and often 
 postponed "Balkan conflagration'* that I sought refuge again 
 in the less distrustful environments of Paris, returning there 
 by way of the Black Sea through Constanza and Bucharest. 
 
 War was actually declared between the Balkan States 
 and Turkey on October 17, 1912. In the last days of October 
 
 '" 333434 
 
the interest of the Parisian public seemed to be divided 
 between the two great and absorbing world's events— the 
 debacle of the Turkish army in Thrace, which promised the 
 celebration of another Christian mass in the Mosque of St. 
 Sofia, and the progress of the Becker murder trial in New 
 York, which revealed a police conspiracy of a magnitude 
 that threatened the security of the American Republic, My 
 own personal interests were so unpatriotically prejudiced that 
 on the last day of October I abandoned my own country to its 
 destiny, completed my monthly personal report with a re- 
 putable European capital as my temporary address and, after 
 nightfall, boarded a sleeping-car which carried me through 
 Roumania to Constanza, whence I sailed for Constantinople 
 to arrive November 3d, or just about the time the Turkish 
 army began to dig itself in on the Chatalja line for the stubborn 
 defense of Constantinople. 
 
 A local chapter of the American National Red Cross 
 Society, formed under the presidency of the late lamented 
 Mr. Rockhill, the American ambassador, had been at work for 
 several weeks assembling material and collecting funds, but a 
 field party had not been organized. Five thousand dollars 
 had been received from the American National Red Cross 
 Society and many times that amount had been secured from 
 private sources at home and abroad, through the personal in- 
 fluence of Mr. and Mrs. Rockhill, Mr. Hoffman Philip of our 
 Embassy, Dr. Gates of Roberts College, Dr. Patrick of Con- 
 stantinople College, and other members of the American 
 colony. I deeply regret that neither the time nor this oppor- 
 tunity permits further mention of that personal service which 
 the American ambassador and ambassadress rendered in their 
 most capable and devoted administration of the American 
 National Red Cross Chapter in Constantinople. 
 
 On the day of my arrival I was named as chief surgeon of 
 the Red Cross field party and began at once its organization 
 and a search for a field of labor. After much importunity and 
 in the face of the great obstacles of inertia in Turkish adminis- 
 tration, we found a service in a large, crude military hospital 
 which had just been improvised in the old military barracks 
 of Tash Kishla, well within the European quarter of Con- 
 stantinople. We assumed the professional care, administration 
 and financial support of an operating room and two wards 
 with a total of 120 beds and as many wounded soldiers. After 
 about a month's service when I was due to leave Constanti- 
 nople on account of the termination of my sick leave, I was 
 placed on a duty status at the American Embassy, on the re- 
 iv 
 
quest of the American ambassador. Our service was continued 
 six months, and we treated atTashKishla Hospital 600 patients 
 with three deaths and no complete amputations. For the 
 second two weeks of this period, in company with Mr. Hoff- 
 man Philip and the Rev. Robert Frew, a Scotch Presbyterian 
 minister of Constantinople, I also had personal charge of our 
 specially organized Red Cross party which assumed the pro- 
 fessional management, subsistence and financial support of 
 the cholera camp at San Stephano, in the suburbs of Con- 
 stantinople, where we had corraled in a compound, with the 
 aid of an efficient guard, 600 Turkish soldiers, among whom 
 there were 400 cholera cases with 200 deaths. 
 
 During the period of the second armistice, or, in April 
 1913, I made two visits to the Chatalja line. On the first 
 occasion the Sanitary Inspector General, Abdul Selim Pasha, 
 sent me in an automobile through the camps and sanitary 
 stations on the right wing of the army from Heydemkeui, the 
 rail base, to the Black Sea. When I returned, some days later 
 1 accompanied this distinguished and courteous officer on a 
 special two-daj^ sanitary inspection trip through all the camps 
 and sanitary stations on the left wing, extending from the 
 same starting point to the Sea of Marmora, and including the 
 advanced left flank beyond Buyuk-Checkmudje. 
 
 The Second Balkan War began began July 1, 1913, and on 
 July 11th I was able to accompany a gentleman, whose transit 
 had been arranged through foreign offices, from Constanti- 
 nople by way of the Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of 
 Burghas, thence by rail to Sofia. A few days later I was as- 
 signed to regular military duty with a Bulgarian evacuation 
 hospital for wounded on the Macedonian frontier atKustendil, 
 which was also the headquarters of the 5th Bulgarian Field 
 Army. 1 remained there for a month, during which time 
 about one half of the 10.000 cases which passed through this 
 hospital during the war were admitted. During the armistice 
 which terminated hostilities, I was taken by the chief surgeon 
 over the positions of the 5th Army and through the camps and 
 sanitary stations. 
 
 After the conclusion of peace, in company with the 
 American and British iniMtsLvy attaches in Sofia, who secured the 
 permission of the Servian War Office,! went from Sofia to Nish 
 and from there to Komanovo and as far as Kochina, in the 
 Valley of the Bregalnitca, in Macedonia, covering the battle- 
 fields of the Servian armies which were opposed to the Bul- 
 garian 4th and 5th Armies with which I had had my service. 
 I returned to Constantinople late in September, 1913, by way 
 
 V 
 
of the Danube, Coiistaiiza and the Black Sea. In October, 
 just one year after the defeat of the Turkish army in Thrace, 
 but after the unopposed Turkish reoccupation of that province, 
 I went to Adrianople and from there followed the route from 
 the field of its defeat to Chorlu, where the headquarters took 
 the train in flight to the Chatalja line. My return to Con- 
 stantinople was by the Port of Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora. 
 Later, I went again to the Chatalja district to view the scene 
 of devastation wrought by the five different mihtary move- 
 ments which had swept over Thrace in a year. My return 
 from this trip was by way of JSilivri and the Marmora. In 
 December, 1913, I took my leave of Constantinople by way of 
 the Oriental Railway, stopping at Belgrade, and continuing 
 through Buda-Pest and Vienna on my return to Paris. 
 
 VI 
 
irst Lecture 
 
 The Causes and Course of the 
 Balkan Wars 
 
 WHILE some recent events in the Balkan Penin- 
 sula may be cited as providing occasion for the 
 Turko-Balkan War of 1912, the causes, obscured by 
 racial prejudices, religious traditions and political 
 aspirations, are so confused with the early history of 
 Eastern Europe and even with that of Asia, that an 
 understanding of the fundamental forces must involve 
 a cursory survey extending back, at least, beyond the 
 time of the Moslem invasion of Christian Europe to 
 the earlier period when the eastern flank of the 
 Roman Empire was the bulwark for Europe against 
 the barbaric hordes advancing from the East and 
 North. 
 
 A settlement on the Bosphorus, founded by the 
 Megarian Greeks in the Seventh Century b. c. (658), 
 was first called Byzantium, but after a well-seasoned 
 maturity of 1,000 years (330 A. D.) it replaced Rome 
 as the capital of the Roman Empire and since has 
 been known as Constantinople from the emperor 
 who made the change, Constantine the Great. The 
 inhabitants of the city at this time were almost 
 entirely Greeks and the language of the people and 
 commerce was Greek. Only the ruling classes and 
 the aristocrats, whom Constantine induced to come 
 from Rome, spoke the official Latin, and later, after 
 the fall of the Latin Empire in the Thirteenth Century 
 (1261), the language of the court and the people alike 
 was again Greek. For this reason the region that 
 
— 2— 
 
 was once the Eastern Empire is still cherished by the 
 modern Greek as their patrimony. This spirit was 
 most ingeniously revivified when Napoleon paid some 
 attention to the Greeks. From their philology of his 
 name and the fact of early Greek immigration to 
 Corsica, he was hailed as a descendent of their race, 
 and it is said that the women of Maina kept a lamp 
 lighted before his portrait "as before that of the 
 Virgin.'' In the dreams of ''the glory that was 
 Greece'' the Hellenic race saw visions of the restora- 
 tion of the Byzantine Empire under the Greek 
 Emperor, Napoleon I. The victories of two years 
 ago have revived again the vision of ancient empire, 
 currently known as ''The Great Idea." 
 
 History did not wait until the beginning of the 
 Eighteenth Century for an appreciation of the 
 strategical advantages or a desire for possession of 
 Constantinople, like that of Peter the Great who 
 said: "Whoever shall reign there will be the true 
 master of the world." In the Fourth Century B. c. 
 (390) Philip of Macedon laid an almost successful 
 siege to the Greek Byzantium, until Demosthenes 
 aroused the Athenians to send a relief expedition 
 which saved the city until the Romans came several 
 centuries later. The siege habit thus formed 
 became so chronic that the great sieges of Con- 
 stantinople, down to the present time, are said to 
 number about thirty. The Roman emperors had not 
 reigned a century (405-450, Theodosius II) before the 
 capital was threatened by the Huns who came again 
 within the next hundred years (527-562, Justinian) 
 and made an almost successful assault. 
 
 The Slavs followed the Huns into the Balkan 
 Peninsula and they in their turn battled at the walls 
 of Constantinople. Late in the Sixth Century (580- 
 600) the Slavs likewise in their turn were overrun 
 and suffered the outrage of their "culture and 
 
.— 3— 
 
 civilization'' by a yet fiercer and wilder horde, de- 
 tached from a biological glacier of Northern Asia, 
 which swept from the banks of the Volga across the 
 Danube and out onto the Balkan plateau. This grim, 
 raw, invading race was called by the Greeks Voul- 
 garia, and Gibbon interpreted this name of a ''Volga- 
 folk'' into the form in which it occurs today as 
 *'Bulgar" or ''Bulgarian." The very name of these 
 people, once an epithet of hatred and contempt of 
 the Byzantine culture of the Seventh Century, is still 
 cherished by the modern Greeks as a term of bitter 
 scorn applied to the derided and alleged civilization 
 of the simple but worthy people bearing that name 
 today. The racial characteristics of these invading 
 Bulgars, despite the recent studies of the modern 
 Greeks who have discovered that they once had 
 hoofs, horns, and hairy bodies, were so little opposed 
 to the good manners of the comparative civilization 
 and culture of the Balkan Slavs whom they conquered, 
 that within a century they were racially absorbed by 
 their subject people and left only their name, as a 
 mark of their passing dominance, to an empire which 
 pushed its frontier almost to the Bosphorus at the 
 time a Bulgarian prince laid siege to Constantinople 
 early in the Ninth Century. We can thus see how 
 in origin the people of the Balkan Peninsula are so 
 confused and how futile has been their struggle to 
 unravel the ethnological tangle that has been so 
 complicated by their many changes of sovereignty. 
 The Goths, Huns and Vandals passed elsewhere 
 without leaving trace of their few centuries of 
 sojourn. But there are people in the Balkans today, 
 living in different colonies, who trace their origin 
 to the Illyrians, Thracians, Greeks, Romans, Slavs 
 and Bulgars, and upon these several boasted ances- 
 tries they are still striving to perpetuate race and to 
 erect national institutions. 
 
The Slavs in the western part of the Balkan 
 Peninsula who were undefiled by the blood of the 
 Northern Asiatics preserved their racial entity and 
 developed national aspirations out of which arose the 
 ancient Kingdom of Greater Servia. At one time or 
 another, in the Middle Ages, a Bulgarian or a Servian 
 Empire covered the greater part of the Balkan Pen- 
 insula. In the Tenth Century (892-927) the Bulgarian 
 Czar Simeon assumed the somewhat confident title of 
 *'Czar of the Bulgars and Autocrat of the Greeks/' 
 His successor Samuel extended the empire until 
 Bulgaria, in this heroic age, reached from Adrianople 
 to the Adriatic. As Macedonia was embraced by 
 these boundaries, the ''Macedonian Question, '' which 
 still remains unsolved after all the attempts of ten 
 centuries, was thus incidentally opened. It seems to 
 have started, however, with those characteristic 
 attributes, which, still preserved in the form of 
 ''atrocities," have continually re-echoed the cry, 
 "Come over into Macedonia and help us!'' It may 
 be that the "Macedonian Question" was made some- 
 thing of a permanent issue by the Bulgarian Czar 
 Simeon, who had such bad manners as to send back 
 to Emperor Leo in Constantinople the Roman noses 
 which he had removed from the latter's vanquished 
 legions. 
 
 But the tide turned, as it has so often turned in 
 the Balkans, and the Bulgarians were suppressed for 
 a century and a half. Then the Orthodox Christian 
 Emperor Basil in Constantinople, not wishing to 
 be outdone in convincing cultural methods, sent to 
 the Bulgarian Czar Samuel 15,000 Bulgarian prisoners 
 whom he had blinded, except for one eye left to 
 every hundredth man to lead his sightless comrades 
 back to Samuel, who is said to have died from grief 
 for their wretched plight. So it seems that atrocities 
 are indigenous to the Balkans and were practiced by 
 
Christian races, at least in their grosser forms, be- 
 fore the Turks came to add some of their own peculiar 
 refinements. 
 
 About the end of the Twelfth Century, when the 
 Bulgarian Empire was almost identical in extent 
 with the ''New Bulgaria,'' delimited by the treaty of 
 San Stefano in 1877, the Byzantine Empire was 
 hurrying to its end. Then Servia became so for- 
 midable that in another century Bulgaria was en- 
 gulfed by a Servian Empire with a real czar like 
 Duzan, who, in 1346, proclaimed himself ''Czar of 
 Macedonia, Monarch of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians 
 and people of the Western Coast.*' With traditions 
 of such a monarch, how could any people forget 
 their national destiny? 
 
 About this time a new and graver complication 
 menaced the Balkan Peninsula, when the Turks, in 
 1359 A. D., crossed the Dardenelles and made their 
 first entry into Europe. This was the real occasion 
 for the first Balkan League, for, at that time, had 
 the Bulgars and Serbs joined the Greeks against the 
 Turks, they could have prevented the injection into 
 Europe of an element that has always been non- 
 assimilable and which must some day be returned to 
 the shores of Asia. Von der Goltz Pasha, who, as 
 military adviser, was with the Turks for twelve 
 years prior to 1895, has told them repeatedly, and he 
 said again, just before the last war, that their place 
 was in Asia and their only hope and salvation lay in 
 return to Anatolia to establish their capital on the 
 ancient site of their early grandeur at Konia. 
 
 The Turks soon occupied Thrace and established 
 an European capital at Adrianople. Then, as the 
 Bulgarian state had been absorbed by the Servian 
 Empire, the Balkan Slavs (Serbs and Bulgarians) 
 under the Servian Czar Lazar, made their last stand 
 against the Turks at Kossovo in Northwestern 
 
—6— 
 
 Macedonia in 1389. With their defeat, the Turkish 
 inundation of the Balkan Peninsula was complete 
 except for Montenegro, which alone was unsub- 
 merged. This little state began its existence at this 
 time with a remnant of the Servian army which fled 
 to the Black Mountains on the Adriatic, where they 
 have since remained with the unique distinction and 
 intense personal satisfaction of being the only people 
 in Southeastern Europe to have escaped the Turkish 
 yoke. 
 
 The Turkish possession of the Balkan Peninsula 
 was completed when Mohammed the Conqueror 
 crossed the Bosphorus and captured Constantinople 
 in 1452, when Columbus was yet a boy. 
 
 In the Sixteenth Century, the Ottoman Empire, 
 in the reign of Suleman the Magnificent (1520-1586) , 
 attained the zenith of its glory, when it reached 
 from the Persian Gulf to Buda-pest, although a 
 century later (1683) the western border was tem- 
 porarily advanced to the walls of Vienna, from where 
 the armies of the decadent sultans were turned back 
 on that long recession, which, at last, bids fair to go 
 beyond the Bosphorus. In the following or Eighteenth 
 Century the Turks were driven out of Hungary and 
 Transylvania, and, with Roumania always from that 
 time on more of a Russian than a Turkish province, 
 the Ottoman Empire had entirely receded within the 
 Balkan Peninsula and became a wholly eastern state, 
 lying south of the Danube and the Save and between 
 the Adriatic and the Black Sea. In this period and 
 state of repose of the Ottoman Empire, the ''Eastern 
 Question'^ assumed its modern form. It has been 
 described as "the problem of filHng up the vacuum 
 created by the disappearance of the Turk from 
 Europe," and now, after the diplomatic conferences 
 and wranglings of two or three centuries, an approved 
 solution seems about to be submitted by the more 
 
— 7— 
 
 definite processes of war. In the next or Nineteenth 
 Century, Greece waged a successful war of indepen- 
 dence (1815-21). 
 
 Servia, after passing through various vicissitudes, 
 somewhat influenced by Austrian and Russian di- 
 plomacy and intervention in Turkish affairs, was 
 offered, in 1820, recognition by the Porte as a sort of 
 an autonomous province. Servian delegates sent to 
 Constantinople for negotiations were kept there under 
 observation for five years; then, after another revo- 
 lution and when Turkey was involved in Egypt, the 
 Porte finally recognized the Servian principality and 
 thus liberated the latent forces of racial and national 
 sentiment which developed into a powerful factor in 
 the later disruption of European Turkey. 
 
 The next eventful discussion of the ** Eastern 
 Question," in 1854, assumed the form of the Crimean 
 War, and although the Turk and his territory were 
 the unconfessed elements of contention, the cause 
 was given to the world in the sublime spectacle of 
 two Christian nations (Russia and France) flying at 
 each others' throats over the custody of the tomb of 
 Christ, which happened to be in the keeping of the 
 followers of Mohammed. It came about by Russia's 
 thinking the final collapse of Turkey was near and 
 demanding the recognition of her protectorate over all 
 the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Sultan. But 
 as this was equivalent to the destruction of the Otto- 
 man Empire, France, England and Sardinia supported 
 the Turks and defeated Russia. The only result of 
 this belligerent discussion of the "Eastern Question'' 
 was the treaty of Paris (1856) which bound the 
 signatories "to respect the independence and terri- 
 torial integrity of the Ottoman Empire." 
 
 This period was followed by the development of 
 a Bulgarian national spirit which had been gradually 
 awakening to consciousness from the beginning of 
 
the century, although it had been persistently and 
 maliciously suppressed— not by the Turks, but by the 
 Greek national spirit, exhibited through the political 
 organization of the Orthodox Church in which all 
 Bulgarians were communicants. But the Turkish 
 government, at last, in 1870, in conformity with its 
 long established policy of playing both ends against 
 the middle, saw its opportunity to array one subject 
 race against another, in order to keep them so occu- 
 pied with their own troubles that they would be of 
 less trouble to their masters. The Sultan then 
 established an independent Bulgarian Church and 
 placed its ecclesiastical machinery in the hands of a 
 Bulgarian hierarchy under a Bulgarian exarch. 
 
 In this connection one might recall the incident 
 of 300 years before, when, in 1472, twenty years 
 after the fall of Constantinople, the separation of 
 the Church of Constantinople and the Church of 
 Rome was announced— the former taking the name 
 of ''Orthodox*' and the latter remaining ''Roman.'' 
 The Greeks charged to the Latin Pope of Rome the 
 responsibility for the desertion of the Bulgarians 
 from the Orthodox Church and the Pope construed 
 the event as a just and natural consequence of the 
 schism of the Greeks. The Greeks, naturally out- 
 raged, resented the blow to their civilization and 
 culture in the turning over to such a barbarous people 
 as the Bulgarians a perfectly good religion which 
 they had held in custody so long, and, besides, they 
 maintained vehemently that it was all the worse, 
 because there were no Bulgarians. Horrible spiritual 
 atrocities, administered with vengeance and vin- 
 dictiveness, were perpetrated by the Greeks upon 
 the Bulgarians in the form of excommunications and 
 damnation. The Bulgarians, however, had some 
 little claim to a specialized religion of their own, if 
 they wanted one, because their Czar Boris accepted 
 
— 9— 
 
 Christianity in the middle of the Seventh Century 
 and became such an enthusiastic advocate of the 
 newly adopted system of worship that he gave his 
 subjects the choice of the new faith or one of his 
 several favorite forms of extermination. The new 
 faith became immediately very popular among the 
 Bulgars. 
 
 Two Greek monks, Cyril and Methodus, went as 
 missionaries to Bulgaria; Cyril invented an alphabet 
 and reduced the Bulgarian language to written form. 
 From the Cyrillic alphabet the Russian written lan- 
 guage was derived and in this language the Russian 
 Orthodox religion was taught. The Bulgarians, 
 however, seemed to thrive on the expurgated religion 
 of the Greeks as they used their own ecclesiastical 
 organization so effectively in the awakening of a 
 national spirit in their people that they produced, 
 after only a few years (1876), an insurrection in 
 Macedonia that was far from being contemptuous 
 and which was reechoed in the Herzegovnia. The 
 Turks were held to have practiced such cruel atrocities 
 in the efforts to suppress these uprisings that Russia 
 again espoused the cause of the Sultan's Christian 
 subjects. The Russo-Turkish War in 1877 was the 
 direct result. 
 
 This war was closed, after the complete defeat 
 of the Turks, with the prevention of the entry 
 of the Russians into Constantinople by the armed 
 protest of Europe. Peace was established at San 
 Stephano in 1878 by direct negotiations between the 
 belligerents. Though the terms were Slavonic and 
 the principal provisions of this treaty established an 
 independent state of Bulgaria, of about the same 
 extent as the empire of the Middle Ages, it might 
 have succeeded, if it had remained in effect, in 
 establishing the equilibrium of the Balkans by bring- 
 ing a homogeneous people under one national govern- 
 
—10— 
 
 ment. And if the Treaty of San Stephano had not 
 been supplemented by the Treaty of Berlin, the sub- 
 sequent attempts to make the ethnographic conform 
 to geographic boundaries in Macedonia might have 
 been indefinitely postponed. 
 
 The local interests of the Balkans could not be 
 isolated from the politics of Europe, which were 
 united against Russia and forced the Treaty of Berlin 
 as a substitute for the Treaty of San Stephano, and 
 thereby effected a Teutonic instead of a Slavonic 
 settlement. As England at this time feared more 
 the aggression of the Slav than the Teuton, Beacons- 
 field supported Bismarck in the determination to 
 prevent an eastern extension of the strong Slavonic 
 frontier in the form of a new and strong Slav state. 
 
 The dissatisfaction of Europe with the Treaty of 
 San Stephano was so definite that the suggestion for 
 its revision at Berlin was not made without some 
 demonstration. England ordered her Indian troops 
 to Malta and called out her reserves. Austria 
 mobihzed. England at this time feared more from 
 Russia than she cared for Macedonian Christians, 
 but Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary 
 who negotiated the Berlin Treaty, afterwards said 
 that, in her support of the Turks, * * England backed the 
 wrong horse.'' 
 
 What the Treaty of San Stephano had formed 
 into one state, the Treaty of Berlin divided into 
 three parts, namely: The Turkish principality of 
 Bulgaria, the Turkish province of Eastern Roumelia 
 with a Christian governor, and Macedonia, restored 
 to Turkey with certain reforms in government im- 
 posed. Besides this, Austria was permitted to occupy 
 and administer Bosnia and the Herzegovnia and to 
 establish garrisons and other controls in the Sanjak 
 of Novi Bazar, which, as Turkish territory, extended 
 to the Bosnian frontier between Montenegro and 
 
—11— 
 
 Servia, and thus effectually separated these two 
 Slav states. 
 
 While all these details may be tedious and are of 
 little interest to Americans, the man-in-the-street in 
 Europe is quite well versed in them. My first and 
 violent projection into the maze of European politics 
 was occasioned by an Austrian whom I met in a 
 railway carriage in his country, much after the 
 fashion in which one meets the representative 
 American in the smoking compartment of a Pullman 
 car in this country. He said something about the 
 ' ' Sanjak of Novi Bazar. ' ' In my ears the unfamiliar 
 name seemed to awaken some sort of association 
 with, perhaps, the wandering Sinbad the Sailor, or 
 the adventures of Robinson Crusoe, but my Austrian 
 friend informed me that his country would be com- 
 pelled to go to war if any nation violated the treaty 
 rights and economic supervision that Austria exer- 
 cised over the * 'Sanjak of Novi Bazar." This was 
 more than two years ago, and this gentleman was 
 neither a politician nor a diplomat; he was only a 
 doctor. This irritating geographical blight is not 
 really funny— except its name, and even that is very 
 ordinary, after all. Turkish administrative divisions 
 are *'vila jets'' or states and ''sanjaks'' or counties, 
 and in this particular sanjak there is the town of 
 Novi Bazar; hence the name. 
 
 While the Treaty of Berlin was made to suit the 
 convenience of Europe as a bond of peace for thirty- 
 six years, it received several little jolts before it was 
 entirely jarred to pieces by Austria's recent ultimatum 
 to Servia. 
 
 In view of the decidedly opposed opinions of at 
 least two of America's **first citizens" as to whether 
 a treaty is really a ''peace bond" or only a "scrap 
 of paper," it may be interesting to quote, in refer- 
 ence to the Berlin Treaty, the words of a contempor- 
 
—12— 
 
 ary historian (William Miller), who, in March, 1913, 
 long before the current controversy arose, wrote the 
 last pages of his ''Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913,'" 
 After giving a number of instances in which almost 
 every signatory power and more than one small state 
 had violated their solemn international agreements, 
 he concludes: **But to regard the tattered Berhn 
 Treaty as an inviolable law of nature is to ignore 
 the fact that in the imperfect world of politics, inter- 
 national arrangements are only binding as long as 
 the contracting parties choose to be bound by them 
 or the population concerned are weak and disunited. 
 When for the first time in history, the * Little 
 Neighbors' of Turkey joined hands against her with 
 the double strength of enthusiasm and organization, 
 the Treaty of Berlin, like all artificial creations, 
 succumbed before the force of nature/' An Areo- 
 pagus seems now to be sitting through a winter 
 session in both Belgium and Poland, which is de- 
 voting itself to the revision of this now obsolete 
 document. 
 
 Bulgaria's national existence began under Prince 
 Alexander of Battenburg in 1878. From the be- 
 ginning, this young and patriotic ruler— he was only 
 23 years of age when he was called to his brand-new 
 Bulgarian throne— showed more interest in the future 
 of his state than in [respecting Russia as its parent 
 and regarding himself as the tutor of her child. 
 There is no doubt that Russia intended to do what 
 her political antagonists believed she would do; and 
 that was to turn Bulgaria into an outpost for the 
 Slavonic advance on the Bosphorus. In fact, Europe 
 did not believe that Russia's southern progress had 
 been stopped. It was known that her advance was 
 only retarded, and it was also realized that another 
 checking process would have to be applied on the 
 sign of her next move. 
 
—13— 
 
 But the Bulgarians had no intention, after their 
 escape from the oppression of one master, to accept 
 the rule of another, even though the latter had been 
 their benefactor. This attitude, however, has eminent 
 historical precedent, for Bismarck has said that a lib- 
 erated people are always most exacting of their Hber- 
 ators. In 1885, after seven years of Bulgaria's na- 
 tional existence, Prince Alexander annexed Eastern 
 Roumelia, after the almost entirely Bulgarian popu- 
 lation had begun a revolution against Turkish sover- 
 eignty. Russia was offended and Servia was induced 
 to declare war on Bulgaria on account of the threat- 
 ened disturbance of the balance of power in the Balk- 
 ans. Russia's intention to discipline her ungrateful 
 offspring was shown in her malicious efforts to cripple 
 the defense of Bulgaria, so as to render her an 
 easy prey to Servia. At the time of Servians 
 declaration of war, Bulgaria's army was concen- 
 trated in Eastern Roumelia, on the Turkish frontier, 
 in anticipation of a conflict with the Turks. The 
 strength of this army, including reserves and about 
 35,000 volunteers from Eastern Roumelia, was about 
 90,000 men, which represented the entire military 
 resources of the state. 
 
 The military instruction of the Bulgarians had 
 been begun by and was then in the hands of Russian 
 officers, with a Russian Minister of War. For the 
 eight years of the Bulgarian army's existence, the 
 educational system had produced enough Bulgarian 
 officers to fill all the subaltern grades and about half 
 of the captaincies. All other commissioned grades 
 in line and staff, from the Minister of War down, 
 were filled by Russians. With this organization of 
 the army, and with Turkey as a likely enemy to pre- 
 vent the annexation of Eastern Roumelia, the Czar 
 delivered a thunderbolt to the Bulgarians when he 
 ordered all Russian officers to return to Russia just 
 
—14— 
 
 at the time Servia declared war. It was for Russia 
 to visit upon recalcitrant Bulgaria just retribution. 
 The offish and uppish Bulgarian braggarts were to 
 receive their fitting reward, as the Servians would 
 march at once on Sofia to find everything in disorder 
 and to achieve an easy victory. Crushed and humili- 
 ated, Bulgaria could then be brought to terms. On 
 the day that war was declared the Servians had at 
 least 70,000 men mobilized on their frontier, ready 
 for immediate action. Whatever disadvantage this 
 situation may have had for the state, it certainly 
 made a fine day for promotion in the Bulgarian 
 army. Captains, overnight, became Minister of 
 War, lieutenant, major and brigadier generals, 
 saying nothing of the few score of colonelcies and 
 majorities that were scattered around. The success- 
 ful work of army reorganization and the leading of 
 the Bulgarian army to decisive victory, which dis- 
 persed the Servian army amply demonstrated the 
 capacity of these young officers to discharge the 
 functions of their new offices. The Bulgarians could 
 and certainly would have marched to Belgrade but 
 for Austria's warning that her troops would be met 
 there in that event. 
 
 As an illustration of the hardy vigor of the Bul- 
 garians in this campaign, an incident of their march- 
 ing capacity may be worthy of mention in passing. 
 A regiment, which had maintained its full strength 
 of 5,000 men through a number of days of hard 
 marching from the eastern toward the western Bul- 
 garian frontier, arrived in the evening at Ischkeman, 
 a town fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) east of 
 Sofia. As a decisive engagement with the Servian 
 army seemed imminent within a day or two, this 
 regiment was ordered to proceed with all possible 
 expedition towards the western frontier. 
 
 Without camping for the night, the march was 
 
—15— 
 
 resumed and Sofia was reached by morning. As 
 there were some foot-sore and sick which could not 
 keep the pace of the column, a rather ingenious 
 device was employed to help them along. There 
 were at Sofia, at that time, 300 unbroken, untrained 
 Hungarian remounts which could not be used in any 
 regular military service. From the civilian com- 
 munity a fleet-footed leader— woman, boy, or old 
 peasant unfit for military service— was turned out 
 for each horse. The horses were led along the road 
 until they met the regiment, when two stragglers 
 were mounted on each led horse, and all were able 
 to keep pace with the column as it arrived in Sofia. 
 Here the peasantry had turned out along the roadside 
 with rations prepared for the entire regiment, which 
 fell out to eat and rest on the spot for four hours. 
 The march was then continued for thirty-three 
 kilometers (twenty-one miles) to Slivetza, where the 
 decisive engagement had begun, and, as the regi- 
 ment had not been previously engaged and had 
 maintained its full strength, its arrival contributed 
 materially to the Bulgarian victory. 
 
 This regiment had thus marched fifty-two miles 
 in twenty-four hours. Packs and all equipment 
 except rifle, ammunition and overcoats were aban- 
 doned, by order, as the indication arose along the 
 line of march. 
 
 While this reference may be a diversion from the 
 subject, the incident furnishes details that are of 
 sufficient interest to be reviewed again under the 
 caption of "A Forgotten Campaign.'' 
 
 As it did not suit the convenience of the Ottoman 
 government to make armed resistance against the 
 Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Roumelia, and as 
 Europe acquiesced in this violation of the Treaty of 
 Berlin, rather than risk the general dangers of 
 readjustment. Eastern Roumelia became a part of 
 
—16— 
 
 Bulgaria and the territorial limits of the Bulgarian 
 principality so remained, as thus established, until 
 again disturbed by the Turko-Balkan War. 
 
 Following this successful accomplishment of 
 Prince Alexander, Russian intrigues resulted In his 
 abdication. Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg then 
 accepted an invitation to the Bulgarian throne. 
 About this time the Bulgars, as well as the Serbs, 
 seriously and studiously renewed their active and 
 forceful protest against the Turkish administra- 
 tion in Macedonia, through well organized and gen- 
 erally supported societies which were called "com- 
 mittees,*' with agents known as "comitajies.'* 
 These comitajies sought to avenge the wrongs of 
 their brothers in Macedonia, who still bore the gall- 
 ing weight of the Turkish yoke, and they also hoped 
 to create such a disturbance as to induce the Christian 
 world to release the Macedonian Christians from 
 Moslem oppression. These Servian and Bulgarian 
 comitajies, as agents of retaliation and discord, were 
 *' patriots '* to their own race, either in or out of 
 Macedonia, although they were ''brigands'' to the 
 Turks. It was one of these Bulgarian comitajies, 
 operating in Macedonia, who through his adventurous 
 enterprise in holding for ransom our own Miss Stone, 
 embarrassed the Turkish government into an ac- 
 knowledgment of its helplessness to suppress such 
 depredations, and held up the American missionary- 
 supporting public for 13,000 pounds of Turkish gold, 
 or about 59,000 American dollars. I saw this enter- 
 prising financier — Sandansky, by name — in Sofia at 
 the time the National Assembly there granted him 
 amnesty. I also learned the details of the money 
 transaction from Mr. Peet, the manager of American 
 missions in Constantinople, who counted out the 
 Turkish gold to the *' patriot-brigand" in a Mace- 
 donian village while under the surveillance of an 
 
—17-- 
 
 escort of a squadron of Turkish cavalry, charged 
 with the duty of preventing the American ransom 
 from passing into the comitajie's hands. A personal 
 friend of Sandansky, whom I knew well in Sofia, 
 assured me that Sandansky had not applied to his 
 personal advantage a cent of the American contribu- 
 tion, but that it had all been spent in thecause of 
 Macedonia. 
 
 In defense of the methods of the Macedonian 
 revolutionists and the Bulgarian comitajies, it may 
 be said that their cause could only be advanced by 
 violence and that their resistance was made against 
 a Turkish administration which every creditable 
 European observer has invariably pronounced as 
 economically abominable and personally intolerable 
 to any but a crushed, spiritless and hopeless people. 
 But the Turk's faults were in his methods of ad- 
 ministration more than in his natural cruelty. His 
 massacres and atrocities were no more than economic 
 expediences, which to his form of government were 
 necessities. The Turkish government in Europe has 
 never been more than that of an army of occupation, 
 and its subject and resentful races were disciplined 
 by military methods which grew harsher with in- 
 creased and repeated insubordination. The unhappy 
 conditions in Macedonia continued, as the reforms, 
 though always promised, were never executed, re- 
 gardless of the assurances of the Treaty of Berlin. 
 Outrages against Turkish authority were answered 
 by Macedonian massacres. 
 
 The "Powers of Europe'' had so long regarded 
 the troubles in the Balkans as within their own par- 
 ticular sphere for adjustment, and the Christian 
 inhabitants had so often appealed to this supreme 
 authority for relief that the powers, viewing only 
 their own selfish interests, seemed to overlook the 
 possibility of the Balkan States themselves under- 
 
—18— 
 
 taking the solution of that part of the Eastern 
 Question which they had come to conclude was their 
 own immediate concern. This very situation arose 
 when Bulgaria, Servia, Greece and Montenegro 
 entered into an alliance in 1911 to make a common 
 cause against the Turk and settle by force of arms 
 the grievances which 400 years of Eastern inter- 
 ference had failed to assuage. The chancelleries of 
 Europe were all the while, secretly at least, advised 
 of the progress of this project, but being unable to 
 trust any one of their own number to exercise police 
 authority or guarantee protection, the Balkan States 
 were simply admonished that whatever they started, 
 the powers would see that their disturbances did not 
 result in territorial rearrangement. 
 
 Just a little while before, however, the attention 
 of Europe was drawn to the Ottoman Empire by an 
 event that created the favorable season for the Allies 
 to settle with the Turks their long standing grudge. 
 This was the breaking out of the Constitution, for 
 Turkey had long since shown a tendency to catch the 
 Constitution, which seemed to erupt on the exposed 
 portion of her body in the form of a transitory rash 
 and which tended to act as a sort 6f vaccination 
 against any of the more serious contagious diseases 
 which so often threatened her dissolution. Turkey 
 first caught the Constitution in the beginning of the 
 reign of Abdul Hamid, just before the Russo-Turkish 
 War, when Russia was pressing the Porte for some 
 atonement for the Macedonian massacres of that 
 time. Then the crafty Sultan turned to the Con- 
 stitution as a means of escape from Russian chastise- 
 ment. The personal liberty and other things guar- 
 anteed by a Constitution, the Sultan argued, ought 
 to be sufficient answer to Russian claims. 
 
 But as the war actually came on and the Con- 
 stitution had no further purpose to serve, it was 
 
—19— 
 
 withdrawn to await thirty years for a recrudescence. 
 This second attack came, in spite of Abdul Hamid, in 
 the summer of 1908 when Nazi Bey, a major of 
 infantry and an enthusiast of the Young Turk Party 
 which was then well organized in the army, marched 
 his battalion up into the mountains of Macedonia, 
 beyond the railhead of Monastir, and announced 
 himself in arms against the Sultan. Two weeks 
 later at Salonika the Constitution was proclaimed by 
 Major Enver Bey, now Enver Pasha, Minister of 
 War of the Ottoman Empire and one of the three 
 men who, for the while at least, hold in their hands 
 the destiny of the empire. The Young Turks were 
 not quite prepared, but their revolution was precipi- 
 tated by an unmistakable indication of a preparation 
 of the powers for another interference in Macedonian 
 affairs. The Sultan, however, making virtue of 
 necessity, accepted the situation and announced the 
 restoration of the Constitution which had been sus- 
 pended since 1878. He started off by fulfilling its 
 provisions for a National Assembly. 
 
 This change in the Ottoman government, and its 
 threatened invigoration, suggested an Austrian ad- 
 vance on the Balkans, especially as Russia at this 
 time had not recovered her military strength which 
 was somewhat debilitated by the Manchurian war, 
 and, being at this time unable to defend Slavonic 
 interests in the Balkans, the Germanic influences 
 were free to operate without fear of material opposi- 
 tion. The psychological moment thus arrived for 
 Prince Ferdinand to proclaim himself *' Tzar of the 
 Bulgars" October 5, 1908, and, two days later, for 
 Austria to annex Bosnia and Herzegovnia. The Bul- 
 garian army was ready; the Prince had met the 
 Austrian Emperor at Buda-Pest only a short time 
 before; the Austrian army would support the Bul- 
 garians. The Turks were fatalistically resigned, as 
 
—20— 
 
 they were unable to resort to arms, but the Servians 
 wailed bitterly, though helplessly, for the defeat of 
 their national aspirations to regain Bosnia and the 
 Herzegovnia which they regarded as their lost 
 provinces, because they were once a part of a Servian 
 kingdom of the Middle Ages. Servia was on the 
 point of declaring war against Austria, and Monte- 
 negro, always spoiling for a fight, was eager to join 
 her, but European diplomacy intervened, because no 
 great power was ready to espouse Servians cause. 
 
 The formal annexation of Bosnia and the Herze- 
 govnia by Austria, after the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 
 had specified the limited functions of Austria's 
 occupation of these Turkish provinces, in the words 
 of Prince von Buelow, the German ex-Chancellor, 
 *'led up to a great crisis.'' He states very frankly 
 that Emperor Nicholas showed his great wisdom 
 in his resignation to a diplomatic acceptance and that 
 this incident was the first test of the Austro-German 
 AlHance as **the German sword had been thrown 
 into the scale of European decision." 
 
 Turkey's bleeding wounds were soothed by an 
 immediate application of a financial balm in the form 
 of an Austrian indemnity of $5,000,000 and then she 
 demanded $25,000,000 from Bulgaria. At this junc- 
 ture Russian diplomacy played a tactful and tender 
 part which, in a way, wooed Bulgaria away from the 
 Austrian blandishments to which it had so lately 
 yielded. Bulgaria offered only sixteen and three 
 quarters millions for the twenty-five million demanded 
 by Turkey. Russia effected a settlement by assum- 
 ing the Bulgarian obligation to Turkey and accepting 
 from Bulgaria in small annual installments the six- 
 teen and three quarters millions which Bulgaria had 
 offered to Turkey. Russia thus satisfied Turkey's 
 Bulgarian claim by cancelling forty of the seventy- 
 four annual installments which Turkey owed to 
 
—21— 
 
 Russia as an indemnity for the Turko-Russian War. 
 Turkey, in turn, was able to negotiate another 
 foreign loan upon the resources relieved from the 
 Russian mortgage and all contentions were thus 
 happily reconciled. 
 
 On the 19th of April, 1910, the Porte finally 
 recognized the independence of Bulgaria and this 
 peaceful passing of the last of the Sultan's vassal 
 states in the Balkans made identical the real and 
 pretended frontiers of Turkey in Europe. 
 
 The Constitution, which was restored in August, 
 1908, had been received throughout the Ottoman 
 Empire with such wild and hysterical delight that a 
 Bulgarian dignatory actually embraced a Greek 
 bishop; Turks bowed reverently to Armenian prayers 
 in Armenian cemeteries for the repose of the souls of 
 the Armenian victims of Turkish massacres; the 
 Bulgarian brigand Sandansky was received like a 
 prodigal son; a Turkish officer actually imprisoned a 
 Moslem for insulting a Christian and Sir Edward 
 Grey announced: **The Macedonian Question and 
 others of a similar character will entirely dis- 
 appear.'' Enver Bey made the beautiful and assur- 
 ing announcement that "arbitrary government had 
 disappeared. Henceforth there will be no Bulgars, 
 Greeks, Roumanians, Jews or Musselmen; under 
 the same blue sky we are all equal and we all glory 
 in being Ottomans." 
 
 Less than a year was passed by all Ottoman 
 subjects in this hysterical enjoyment of the fancied 
 benefits of constitutional government, as this time 
 was necessary for the Sultan to secure the loyalty of 
 the garrison of Constantinople. In April, 1909, 
 Abdul Hamid gave a regimental review in the hall of 
 the National Assembly, as a ceremony in honor of its 
 adjournment sine die, which he offered as a celebra- 
 tion of the recovery of the nation from the late 
 
—22— 
 
 outbreak of the Constitution. Coincident with this 
 event was another but more tragic one in Armenia, 
 at Adana, in which several thousands of Armenians 
 and two American missionaries were massacred. 
 These were really the concluding functions of the 
 *'Red Sultan's'' long reign, for in less than two 
 weeks the Army Corps of Salonika, under Mahmoud 
 Shefket Pasha, marched to Constantinople, attacked 
 and subdued the Sultan's loyal garrison, hanged 
 forty of its officers and deposed Abdul Hamid. A 
 new Sultan was made by girding the sword of Osman 
 on Abdul Hamid's brother, who had been his brother's 
 prisoner and had not read a newspaper for years. 
 The Constitution was again proclaimed and the 
 counter-revolution was complete. 
 
 The Young Turk government again restored, it 
 was soon inspired with fatuous and fanatical dreams 
 of "Turkification" of the Ottoman Empire, by which 
 the various races and regions were to be reduced to 
 the dead level of Turkish uniformity, and, in- 
 cidentally, induced to adopt the Turkish language. 
 This form of pernicious activity awoke the Sultan's 
 non-Turkish subjects— Arabs, Albanians and Chris- 
 tians alike— from the hysteria with which they had 
 accepted the Constitution as a balm for all their woes 
 and gave all the Balkan Christians, both in European 
 Turkey and in the neighboring states, a new and 
 sharp incentive to forget their own differences and 
 unite against a constitutional tyranny more de- 
 structive to their hopes and aspirations than any- 
 thing that had been conceived in the darkest days of 
 the Hamidean reign. 
 
 The Young Turks were soon awakened from 
 their wild ideaHsm by the following disturbances: 
 (1) Bulgarian protests against Moslem immigration 
 from Bosnia into Macedonia; (2) renewed activities of 
 Macedonian revolutionists and comitajies; (3) the 
 
—23— 
 
 murder of a Greek bishop; (4) protests and threats 
 from Crete; (5) a revolution of Moslems in Albania; 
 (6) the appearance of a new Madhi in the Yamen; 
 and (7) the Italian war. 
 
 The prophecy of an European ambassador (Neli- 
 doff ) that surely twenty months of the Young Turks 
 would be worse for Turkey than twenty years of 
 Abdul Hamid seemed to come true. This reactionary 
 policy laid the way for the Balkan League, which 
 was founded on the suggestion and with the aid of | 
 an Englishman — a Mr. Bourchier, the Sofia cor- 
 respondent of the London Times and one of those 
 accompHshed Britishers who spend their lives in 
 voluntary exile among a people whose affairs and 
 language they learn and whose councillors or advisors 
 they become. He first brought about an agreement 
 between Bulgaria and Servia, and then Greece and 
 Montenegro were eager to join. 
 
 A little incident in connection with the forma- 
 tion of the Balkan League may not be without 
 interest in relation to some recent accusations against 
 monarchs in leading their people into war. The 
 Servian minister in Constantinople was calling on an 
 ambassador to the Sublime Porte at the time when 
 rumors of the preparation of the Balkan States to 
 make war on Turkey were passing. The ambassador 
 asked the minister if he (the minister) did not think 
 it possible that some European diplomacy might 
 influence his King to withdraw from the Balkan 
 League. 5The minister replied rather significantly, 
 ''In Servia we kill kings.'' 
 
 General Savoff had completed the reorganization 
 of the Bulgarian army. A French military commis- 
 sion had done much for the Greek army, and English 
 naval officers had tuned up the Greek navy. The 
 Bulgars, too, were well advised as to the actual 
 progress made in the German reorganization in the 
 
—24— 
 
 Turkish army. As a vassal state Bulgaria could 
 only maintain a commercial agency in Constantinople 
 which did not include a military attache, I met in 
 Bulgaria an officer who had been rated as a clerk in 
 the Bulgarian agency in Constantinople. He was 
 selected for this service because of his knowledge of 
 English, and, while he did not enjoy the social status 
 of a military attache, he was able to discharge such 
 duties, through his confidential relations with the 
 British military attache who gave him all the material 
 that was sent to the British War Office. 
 
 The Balkan League did not long await an occasion 
 to present its demands to Turkey, for in August, 
 1912, the signs of the coming storm were so plain to 
 diplomatic meterologists that they definitely fore- 
 casted ''unsettled,'' ''threatening,'' and then 
 "stormy weather" in the Balkans. About this time 
 the comitajies set off a bomb among some Moslem 
 officials in the little town of Kochina in Macedonia, 
 and the Turks responded promptly and reliably in 
 quite a spirited massacre of a considerable number 
 of Bulgarian and other Christian residents of the 
 village. This not unusual incident was repeated in 
 Berane and Ishtip, where Servians and Greeks were 
 the victims. I was in Kochina about a year after 
 these incidents and just after the close of the second 
 Balkan War, when the Servians were finally in con- 
 trol, although the Bulgars had taken the town first 
 from the Turks and had alternated, several times 
 after then, its occupation with the Servians. The 
 quiet little village has a most attractive site at the 
 foot of a mountain valley from which a clear, cool 
 stream tumbles past several primitive mill sites and 
 the usually pleasantly disposed cafes and furnishes 
 that characteristic feature of "good water" of most 
 every Macedonian community. The town bore 
 numerous and unmistakable scars of the bitter strife 
 
—26— 
 
 that had been so recently waged in the alternating 
 supremacy of hereditary enemies. 
 
 Map. Of 
 South Eastern Europe 
 
 1912 
 
 Army Service Schools 
 
 t? 
 
 
 " """ I 
 
 There is a conventional sign of a prejudice 
 recently expressed by the Moslem against the Chris- 
 tian group, or vice versa, in any Turkish village. It 
 is seen in the quarter last to be disciplined, in the 
 suggestive absence in all dwellings of doors, windows 
 and sometimes roofs, and all easily removable and 
 usable pieces of lumber. This despoilation not only 
 gives a very uninhabitable character and appearance 
 
—26— 
 
 to the places of abode, but also stimulates quite a 
 visible building boom in the dominating portion of 
 the village. 
 
 These latest Macedonian outrages gave the 
 Balkan Allies splendid occasion to deliver on October 
 14, 1912, to the Sublime Porte an ultimatum, which 
 they knew would be rejected, although they were 
 able to base it on the high and just grounds of a 
 demand for the immediate enforcement of the 23d 
 Article of the Treaty of Berlin, guaranteeing Mace- 
 donian reforms, which the Ottoman government for 
 thirty-four years had entirely failed to respect. This 
 ultimatum was just like that more recent one that 
 marked the beginning of a greater war. A demand 
 was made on a government which the government 
 could not force the people to accept. The Porte 
 answered with characteristic insolence by the seizure 
 of forty-five Creusot guns, then en route through 
 Constantinople to Servia, and by the detention of all 
 Greek shipping in the Bosphorus. Bulgaria then 
 became a bit peevish and expressed some annoyance 
 at the so-called Turkish "maneuvers'' in Thrace, 
 although Bulgaria had not overlooked her own mili- 
 tary preparations, which had been continued from 
 the time of her maneuver mobilization in August. 
 All of this diplomatic conversation was held in the 
 first weeks of October, and I passed over the Oriental 
 Railway from Sofia, through Adrianople, to Con- 
 stantinople in September when the sidings at every 
 station were filled with military trains carrying 
 forage, stores, horses, wagons and field guns so new 
 that their bright, fair leather muzzle caps showed 
 the first few greasy finger-prints. Everything 
 seemed to be moving toward the Turkish frontier. 
 Every culvert and bridge on the line had a guard of 
 a few soldiers with their shelter tents pitched nearby. 
 Maybe Bulgaria was not mobilizing, but at any rate 
 
—27— 
 
 she was moving a few hundred thousand men with 
 rifles and munitions of war to her eastern frontier, 
 by which timely providence she was able to complete 
 her mobilization with the wonderful rapidity that 
 startled Europe and enabled the Bulgarian army to 
 cross the Turkish frontier one day after the declara- 
 tion of war. 
 
 The powers, though concerned only with their 
 own larger interests in near Eastern affairs, became 
 greatly alarmed at the military activity of the rude 
 little Balkan States and gravely admonished all con- 
 cerned that the powers would prevent, in case of 
 conflict, any modification of the territoral statu quo. 
 In the course of these diplomatic conversations, little 
 Montenegro, on October the 8th, became impatient 
 and fired the first shot at the great and invincible 
 Ottoman Empire, and the world was amused if not 
 amazed. 
 
 On October the 17th, Turkey declared war on 
 Bulgaria and Servia; the next day Greece declared 
 war on Turkey; and so in answer to the question 
 *'Who started it?'' the measure of responsibility can 
 be equally divided. 
 
 On the following day, October 18th, a Bulgarian 
 army crossed the Turkish frontier to attack Adrian- 
 ople, and in the next two days two more Bulgarian 
 armies had crossed the northern border of Thrace 
 and started south for Kirk Kilisse. In about a week 
 after the first contact, the Turkish army was in a 
 confused and disorderly mass, in mad flight towards 
 the Chatalja lines, thirty miles west of Constantinople, 
 where Nazim Pasha, the Turkish generalissimo, was 
 able to reorganize and intrench his frightened mob 
 so as to repulse the Bulgarian attack which was made 
 two weeks later. 
 
 In the meantime, the Servian main army started 
 down the Valley of Morava, while one corps passed 
 
—28— 
 
 through western Bulgaria to cross into Macedonia. 
 At Komanovo, on October 24th, near the field of 
 Kossovo, where the Turks had vanquished the Serbs 
 500 years before, the Servian army gained a decisive 
 victory in a three days' battle. Less than a year 
 later I was on the field of Komanovo with two mili- 
 tary attacheSy and I give it as their opinion, rather 
 than my own, that it possessed the physical features 
 that should provide a sense of tactical delight for 
 either attack or defense as well as that splendid 
 avenue for retirement— of which the Turks were 
 glad to enjoy the benefits. It surely seemed to both 
 the Bulgars and the Serbs that the victories over the 
 Turks were not only the result of superior arms, but 
 a divine answer, though somewhat delayed, to their 
 Christian prayers of centuries for deliverance from 
 their Moslem masters. 
 
 The Bulgars marched to a battle song, not lack- 
 ing in many of the qualities of the ''Marsellaise,'' 
 with its refrain, "On to the Maritza,'' which they 
 sang as they went out to avenge their defeat on the 
 banks of that river centuries before, and it was on 
 this same Maritza, at Adrianople, that their prayers 
 were answered. 
 
 The Serbs, in their battle hymn, had sung "Re- 
 member Kossovo'' as they marched against their 
 ancient enemy to meet him so nearly on the field of 
 Kossovo that they could regard his utter defeat as 
 none other than providential. 
 
 And so it is httle wonder that these hereditary 
 enemies of the Turks marched and fought with a fire 
 and frenzy which gave them strength, endurance 
 and impetus that might have vanquished even better 
 soldiers than the Turks. After Komanovo, the 
 Servians, like the Greeks at Salonika, were invited 
 to enter Uskub, which they at once rechristened 
 "Skoplje," as this was its name when capital of 
 
—29- 
 
 their ancient empire. Then, after an engagement 
 that could be called a battle, at Monastir, the Serbs 
 completed the conquest of their portion of Macedonia. 
 The Greeks crossed their frontier in two columns, 
 one into Epirus and the other into southern Mace- 
 donia. They invested and laid siege to Janina, near 
 their own frontier, and then, hurrying on in a mad 
 rush to beat the Bulgars to Salonika, arrived No- 
 vember the 18th, just as a Bulgarian division appeared 
 before another quarter of that city. On November 
 10th, or two days after the arrival of the Bulgarians, 
 the Turkish commander surrendered to the army of 
 the Greek Crown Prince, who refused to share the 
 honors with the rival forces. The Bulgarian troops 
 entered the eastern part of the city by their own 
 leave, very much to the irritation of the Greeks, who 
 stopped short, for the time, of using arms to drive 
 them away. The Bulgarian division was reduced to a 
 battalion during the course of the first war, and the 
 force was at this strength when the second war 
 began. 
 
 The Montenegrins, in their comic opera splendor 
 and with ferocious valor, had fought their way to- 
 wards Scutari, the Turkish stronghold that not only 
 resisted the longest but still more tragically, was to 
 be denied them finally through the intervention of 
 European politics. The British military observer, 
 who was with the Montenegrin army throughout 
 their campaign, told me that these unconquerable 
 mountaineers fought with a courage that was abso- 
 lutely fearless as individuals, but with tactics that 
 were entirely ridiculous as soldiers. 
 
 So it was that in four weeks after the first en- 
 gagement of the Turkish army with the enemy, all 
 that was left of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, 
 except for the beleagured and hopeless cities of 
 Adrianople, Janina and Scutari, and the Peninsula of 
 
—30— 
 
 Gallipoli, which forms the western littoral of the 
 Dardenelles, was the very tip of the Balkan Pen- 
 insula extending twenty miles from Constantinople. 
 An armistice was declared between Turkey and all 
 the Allies except Greece, who continued her hostihties 
 during the following two months of suspended hos- 
 tilities. 
 
 The Ottoman government at this time was in the 
 hands of a party which had shortly before deposed 
 the Young Turks. The most palpable defeat of 
 Turkish arms could no longer be denied, and on 
 November 29th, the ambassadors in Constantinople 
 were requested by the Turkish government to inter- 
 cede for peace. Nazim Pasha and General Savoff 
 met between their lines on December 3d, and an 
 armistice was signed between Turkey and all the 
 Allies except Greece. 
 
 A conference was held shortly after in London, 
 and on January 22, 1913, after much wrangling, the 
 Turkish government agreed to accept the conditions 
 demanded by the Allies. On the following day, 
 while the Grand Council, in session at the Sublime 
 Porte, was drafting the document of acceptance, 
 Enver Bey and Tallat Bey, with a street crowd of 
 not more than fifty partisans, entered the council 
 chamber, murdered Nazim Pasha, the Minister of 
 War, and forced the resignations of the Grand Vizier 
 and Cabinet. Perhaps this event was more of a 
 coup d'etat than a revolution, but whatever it may 
 be called, there was no public manifestation of con- 
 cern and but Httle evidence of the overthrow to be 
 seen in the street. The Young Turks with Mahmoud 
 Shefket Pasha would not commit the sacrilege, as 
 they said, of ceding besieged Adrianople and the 
 ''tombs of the Sultans,'' notwithstanding the fact 
 that none are buried there, nor could they sully the 
 glory of the empire by sacrificing the ^gean and 
 
—Si- 
 Mediterranean islands, which had already been lost 
 in war. 
 
 On February 3d, the armistice was denounced 
 and war was renewed. There was no rational hope 
 of relieving Adrianople, for the Bulgars were at least 
 as secure on the west of the Chatalja line as the 
 Turks had been on the east. Early in March, 1913, 
 Enver Bey personally conducted a pathetic and frantic 
 expedition from Constantinople with the purpose of 
 landing on the north shore of the Marmora at 
 Rodosto to take the Bulgars at Chatalja in the rear 
 and to relieve Adrianople. The effort failed in its 
 beginning with unorganized troops without rations, 
 suitable transport or landing facilities. 
 
 I saw the daily progress of the preparation as 
 made in Constantinople. The only seaworthy trans- 
 port in the fleet was tied up at the dock adjoining 
 the great floating bridge across the Golden Horn. 
 The decks were crowded for several days with sol- 
 diers arranged in the same order that exists on a 
 Coney Island boat on the Fourth of July, and these 
 troops almost starved before the transport put to 
 sea. The other craft in the fleet were of the New 
 York ferry boat variety, equipped for shore water 
 supply, and they were almost ruined by being 
 kept at sea for two weeks with salt water in their 
 boilers. A German doctor, who accompanied Enver 
 Bey personally, and who saw the landing operations 
 from the pilot house of the "flag ship,'' told me that 
 only one battalion were able to get ashore and they 
 were soon driven back to the beach by the Bulgarian 
 batteries on the hills above the town. This is an 
 incident of the frantic but misguided energy of 
 which the desperate and fatalistic Turk is capable at 
 times. 
 
 After this last gasp of Turkish arms, there was 
 no other important event in the Eastern theater until 
 
—32— 
 
 the fall of Adrianople on March 26, 1913. The 
 fortress of Janina had fallen to the Greeks on March 
 6, 1913. The Servians had gone to the aid of the 
 Montenegrins, who were still struggling before 
 Scutari, and the last vestige of hope for the only 
 remaining Turkish outpost in Europe thus passed. 
 Hostilities for the second time were suspended on 
 the Chatalja lines. 
 
 With the fall of Scutari, April 23d, the mailed 
 fist of Europe appeared once more in Balkan affairs. 
 Austria, stinging from the wound that Servia and 
 Montenegro had given her parental pride by their 
 forcible adoption of her cherished child in their joint 
 occupation of the Sanjac of Novi Bazar, turned 
 frantically for maternal solace to Albania, as the 
 product of a violent and vicarious accouchement force, 
 and wildly warned the world that not a hand should 
 be lifted against the waif. Scutari was the head of 
 Albania and Austria would not permit the savage 
 Montenegrins to bite it off. This cannibal act was 
 prevented by th-e rattling of European sabers, which 
 restored Scutari to Albania and left the Montenegrins 
 again smarting under Austria's wrongs. Here in 
 this remote and obscure corner of the Balkans, after 
 the local conflagration had passed, lay the still burn- 
 ing embers which so soon spread into the tinder box 
 of Europe. On May 21st, the second peace conference 
 assembled in London. On May 30th, peace prelimi- 
 naries were signed with the delimitation of the 
 Turkish frontier on a line running from Enos on the 
 iEgean to Media on the Black Sea. The Bulgarians 
 had been in undisputed possession of the western 
 littoral of the Marmora, except the Peninsula of 
 Gallipoli which formed the eastern shores of the 
 Dardenelles, but the interest of Europe demanded 
 the removal westward of the Bulgarian frontier to 
 
—33— 
 
 leave in the custody of the Turks the great highway 
 from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. 
 
 In this war thus closed, the most interesting and 
 important feature was the Bulgarian campaign in 
 Thrace where the Turkish Army of the East was so 
 quickly and decisively defeated. Whatever the 
 other Allies accomplished, in the defeat of the 
 Turkish Army of the West, is only incidental to 
 the Bulgarian success in the east, without which 
 the other Allies could not have brought their cam- 
 paigns to so definite an issue. The Greeks con- 
 tributed a very important part by keeping the Turkish 
 fleet in the Dardenelles and preventing the transport 
 of Turkish troops by sea, and the Servians brought 
 an important support to the investment and final 
 reduction of Adrianople; but for all this, Bulgaria 
 had the brunt of the hardest battles and endured the 
 stress of the longer campaign. 
 
Second Lecture 
 
 The Campaign in Thrace 
 
 WHAT little I know in a general way of the 
 campaign in Thrace I shall relate in the form 
 of a story of a visit I was permitted to make to 
 Adrianople and to the battlefields and terrain of the 
 rout of the grande armee of the Ottoman Empire 
 just one year after that event had passed into history. 
 The details of the strategy and tactics of the cam- 
 paign may be found in the very complete report of 
 the German General Staff. Mahmoud Moukhtar 
 Pasha, who commanded the 3d Corps of the Turkish 
 Army of the East, has written an apologetic narrative 
 of about the same import in which he defends his 
 own tactical efforts and professional capacity. I had 
 with me Mahmoud Moukhtar' s report and the 
 Austrian General Staff maps from which it was not 
 difficult to locate any of the positions. I arrived in 
 Adrianople with letters from Tallat Bey, the triumvir 
 Minister of Interior of the Ottoman Empire, to the 
 Civil Governor, and from Izzet Pasha, the Minister 
 of War to the Commandant de Place. These letters 
 conveyed in true Oriental form an acknowledgment 
 of obligation for my moral and material support, 
 which had done so much to sustain the empire in 
 an hour of peril, and instructions to all civil and mili- 
 tary authorities to make such signs of appreciation 
 as might seem appropriate and discreet. The 
 courteous and distinguished commandant, Mahmet 
 
 34 
 
—35— 
 
 Ali Pasha, told me that I had shown commendable 
 zeal in paying him the distinction of a visit to his 
 command because any city, if it were the birthplace 
 of a great man, the place of signature of a great 
 treaty, or a scene of defense against a great siege, 
 might well become a shrine. 
 
 During the course of my reception, a tall, sol- 
 dierly officer attracted my attention as he cracked 
 his heels before his chief, with whom he exchanged 
 a few formal words. After the officer had retired, 
 the Pasha asked me if I had noticed him and if I 
 knew who he was. I could assure his excellency 
 that I had not failed to observe his visitor, but that 
 I was deeply humiliated by my ignorance of his 
 identity. The Pasha then treated me to what I felt 
 I was expected to appreciate as a most interesting 
 revelation: "That officer you have just seen,'' he 
 said, *'is none other than the son of the great Osman 
 Pasha, the defender of Plevna.'' As sieges in gen- 
 eral, and that of Adrianople in particular had just 
 been under discussion, it seemed quite appropriate 
 to have thus awakened the memory of one of the 
 Ottoman Empire's most distinguished soldiers, who 
 had won his fame in one of the great defensive 
 operations, upon which the later military glory of 
 the Turks seems to have rested. 
 
 On the following morning the Pasha sent his 
 best automobile and his favorite aide de camp for a 
 daylight start on a tour of inspection of both the 
 offensive and defensive positions concerned with 
 the siege. We went first to the southwest sector 
 at Kartal Tepe, a height from which the city and 
 many positions can be viewed and which was the 
 scene of the first desperate and successful strug- 
 gles in the course of the Bulgarian investment in an 
 effort to secure the observation station. The morn- 
 ing was hazy and damp; the automobile was left on 
 
—36— 
 
 a road. We reached on foot the summit of Kartal 
 Tepe just as a heavy fog fell which not only veiled 
 the anticipated panorama, but entirely defeated, for 
 more than a hour, all the strategy and tactics of our 
 party in a reconnaissance fired in an heroic endeavor 
 to locate the position of our transportation. Had it 
 not been for the exercise of some considerable force, 
 if not skill, in the art of vocal signalling, our units 
 would have been so hopelessly separated that rescue 
 could have been effected only by the noonday sun. 
 While enduring the failure of our line of communica- 
 tion and waiting for the fog to raise we may turn to 
 some conditions that are of interest in relation to the 
 siege of Adrianople. 
 
 The city rests in a depression surrounded by a 
 
 Contour Interval 40 Meters 
 
 TURKS, Black. BULGARS.BIue. 
 
 Army Service Schools 
 
—37— 
 
 ring of hills which form a natural defense, except on 
 the southwest, where the ridge is broken by the 
 broad Valley of the Arda. To the northeast, the 
 slopes are gradual towards the town, but drop away 
 more abruptly to the front. It requires no great 
 military sagacity for an observer to appreciate the 
 natural elements of defense in this quarter which is 
 of particular interest as it is the site of the assault 
 which terminated the siege. Three confluent rivers 
 (Arda, Maritza and Tunga) within the fortified area 
 provide important strategical elements. The domi- 
 nating architectural feature is the Mosque of Sultan 
 Selim, said by many critics to be the most perfect 
 Turkish mosque, with its four tall minarets visible 
 a dozen miles in every direction, and, on a clear day, 
 from the environs of Kirk Kilisse, thirty-five or forty 
 miles away. On the other hand, as the minarets 
 commanded a far view of surrounding country, they 
 were used as observation stations during the siege. 
 In peace times the civil population of Adrianople 
 was about 80,000, but, by the influx from surround- 
 ing villages, it must have increased to 100,000 during 
 the siege. Among the inhabitants there were more 
 Turks than Christians, with the Bulgarians predomi- 
 nating among the latter. 
 
 The strategic value of Adrianople has always 
 been appreciated and it has been frequently spoken 
 of as the **Key to Constantinople.'^ Its natural ad- 
 vantages have not been developed by the construc- 
 tion of roads in Thrace, although the value of its 
 position as a base or pivot for operations against the 
 Bulgarian frontier was recognized. 
 
 The railway from Sofia to Constantinople runs 
 two miles south of the city through the station village 
 of Karagach. There are only a few scattered trees 
 in or out of Adrianople, except on that island in the 
 Tunga, known in the turcophile romance of Pierre 
 
—38— 
 
 Loti as **The Isle of Anguish. '^ Adrianople had been 
 fortified in some way since it first became the 
 European capital of the Turks in 1363. Plans for its 
 defensive rehabilitation, directed by Von der Goltz 
 Pasha prior to 1896, were never entirely or perfectly 
 executed. The works, all more or less remodeled 
 ancient structures, consisted of thirty permanent re- 
 doubts not at all well concealed, protected by a com- 
 plete circle of wire entanglements constructed a very 
 short time before the war. The perimeter of the 
 line of fortification is about thirty miles with axes 
 varying from eight to ten miles. I think it has been 
 generally conceded that Adrianople at the time of 
 the siege was not a modern fortress, although the 
 the work began under German direction, especially 
 in the northwest sector— which might have been 
 finished in several years— would have added con- 
 siderable strength. Communication was not very 
 good, because of a failure to provide sufficient bridges 
 for the movement of troops over the several un- 
 fordable streams within the fortress area. The 
 British military consul, who was in the siege and had 
 been stationed at Adrianople for four or five years 
 prior to the event, told me that the Turks had no 
 good working maps of the fortress and that the only 
 reliable and complete ones were to be found in Sofia 
 and London. The British Military Consular Service 
 is a 'Peculiar hybrid diplomatic institution, but it 
 serves quite effectually the ends of the British War 
 Office in gaining military information in the remotest 
 quarters of the world where the interests of the 
 empire are vested, by assigning army officers to 
 consular stations where, although they are known 
 to be military officers, all the nominal and apparent 
 duties are diplomatic and civil. I understand, how- 
 ever, that there is no regulation which prevents an 
 officer on such duty from working overtime or at 
 
—so- 
 night in a purely professional way. To the pro- 
 fessional industry of the incurhbent of the office in 
 Adrianople, at the time of which I speak, I have 
 reason to believe, is due the satifactory military 
 information on Adrianople which the British War 
 Office possessed. 
 
 Shukri Pasha, a general of artillery, who com- 
 manded the artillery in Thrace, was in command 
 during the siege. The garrison in time of peace was 
 an army corps of about 25,000 men, but at the time 
 of the siege it has been estimated at from 50,000 to 
 55,000 men. But as the Bulgarians reported 60,000 
 military prisoners at the time of the capitulation, 
 and as the losses probably were at least 15,000, the 
 garrison must have been at least 75,000. The dis- 
 crepancy in numbers is probably due to the many 
 impressed Christians gathered from the surrounding 
 villages. The investing force, before the armistice 
 and when the fortress was only blockaded, was about 
 80,000, including two Servian army corps. After 
 the armistice, when it was determined to take the 
 fortress by assault, the besieging army consisted of 
 105,000 Bulgarians with 342 guns and 47,000 Servians 
 with 98 guns, a total of 152.000 men with 440 guns. 
 One observer remarks: ''The garrison was large, 
 but badly trained; the artillery was strong, but badly 
 sited, and at the head was a man irresolute and weak 
 in character.'' 
 
 It is said that for fifteen years General Fitcheff, 
 the Bulgarian chief of staff during the war, devoted 
 himself entirely to the preparation for the attack of 
 Adrianople. On the study and secret reconnaissance 
 of officers and agents in the preparation of a military 
 map of Adrianople, the Bulgarians spent annually 
 from $10,000 to $12,000 for a number of years. The 
 work was finished in July, 1911— just a little over a 
 year before the war. It was complete and accurate 
 
—40— 
 
 up to that date, but it failed to show the most 
 recently constructed positions and the barbed wire 
 entanglements. Correct information on this de- 
 tail had been submitted by agents, but it was not 
 accepted as rehable because the locations seemed so 
 absurd. The Turkish officer in charge of the con- 
 struction of these obstacles, when the responsibility 
 for this practical joke on the Bulgarian War Office 
 was being passed around, explained that the wire 
 was put up by soldiers during his absence and with- 
 out his direction. 
 
 The attack on Adrianople was provided for in 
 the mobilization and concentration of the three field 
 armies with which Bulgaria organized for the 
 Thracian campaign. The First Army was disposed 
 for an attack on the center of the Turkish front 
 extending from Kirk Kilisse to Adrianople. The 
 Third Army was prepared for a descent from the 
 north on the Turkish right at Kirk Kilisse. The 
 Second Army was formed for a direct attack on 
 Adrianople and was placed near Mustapha Pasha, 
 the Turkish frontier station from which the railway 
 and highway lines lead directly to Adrianople. This 
 entire arrangement was not consistent with the 
 Turkish understanding of Bulgarian strategy, for the 
 Turks had been told by Von der Goltz, in words often 
 quoted, that Kirk Kilisse was * ' so strong that only a 
 Prussian army could capture it and then only after a 
 three months' siege.** Subsequent events, however, 
 seem to have shown that even a German general can 
 be mistaken, if, indeed, he were not joking or trying 
 to intimidate the Bulgarians. It was considered by 
 the Turks impracticable for the Bulgarians to ad- 
 vance in force from the north on Kirk Kilisse over 
 the very rough and roadless country that intervened, 
 and, expecting the Bulgarians to attempt to turn 
 their left flank by way of Demotika, thirty miles 
 
—41— 
 
 south of Adrianople on the Salonika railway, the 
 Turks laid great stress on the defense of Adrianople. 
 
 In the first phase of the war, before the armistice, 
 the Second Bulgarian Army accomplished its task of 
 investing Adrianople with the aid of two Servian 
 divisions, which arrived November 12th, soon after 
 the battle of Komanovo, in which the Servians de- 
 feated the main Turkish army in Macedonia. At 
 this time Adrianople was not much more than 
 blockaded and it was not until after hostilities were 
 resumed that it was definitely and resolutely de- 
 termined to take the fortress by assault. Bombard- 
 ment was first begun on November 25th, Kartal Tepe 
 was taken, as it was required for an observation 
 station and attacks were frequently made to develop 
 the strength of defensive positions. Artillery fire 
 was continued from time to time with the object of 
 rendering residence in the city undesirable, but no 
 general assault was attempted during the first phase 
 of the war. 
 
 In the possession of Adrianople the enemy im- 
 posed upon the Bulgarian operations a great em- 
 barassment by the interruption of rail communication 
 from Sofia to Chatalja. The railway line ran for 
 several miles within the fortress area, where it also 
 crossed the Arda on a bridge of some proportion and 
 of great importance. This break in the railway 
 necessitated a detour of thirty miles over bad roads, 
 from a station west of Adrianople, for ten miles along 
 the west bank of the Arda to SeminH, where the river 
 was crossed, and from there to Demotika on the 
 railway to Salonika. 
 
 The map prepared by the Bulgarians had marked 
 on it in red stars the ''strong positions'' to be occu- 
 pied in making the investment. This arrangement 
 aided materially in both the early and later stages of 
 the siege, as orders could be issued in simple form 
 
—42— 
 
 for units to take definite positions. The preparations 
 made for the final assault were very complete and it 
 was fully believed by General Ivanhoif, the Bul- 
 garian commander, that, except for some unforseen 
 and almost impossible accident, the operation would 
 be successful. Two elements determined the sector 
 that was to be assaulted. First, the burden must be 
 borne by the Bulgars, rather than the Serbs, as the 
 moral right belonged to the former on account of 
 their greater interest; and, as it was not feasible to 
 make changes in the positions of the troops which 
 had already been relocated several times, only the 
 sector invested by the Bulgarians could be considered. 
 Second, in the Bulgarian invested sectors, the posi- 
 tion of the greatest natural strength was believed to 
 be most vulnerable on account of the bad tactical 
 handling of the defense and it was thought that the 
 greatest surprise could be effected there because the 
 garrison would least expect a determined attack at 
 that point. 
 
 These considerations determined the northeast 
 sector as the place of assault. An engineer ofl^icer of 
 high professional attainment and Russian military 
 education, General Vasov, was selected to conduct 
 the strictly ''one man*' fire control, which was de- 
 cided upon. Double lines of communication cables 
 were laid from all positions to the fire control station. 
 In order to conceal from the Bulgarian troops the 
 date selected for the attack, General Vasov was 
 given a fake leave order and it was widely advertised 
 that he would be absent for the time covering the 
 period for which the attack was set. 
 
 At 1:00 p.m., March 23, 1913, the artillery 
 preparation was commenced on all sides except the 
 northeast sector, where the heavy guns were not 
 fired in order to mislead the fortress garrison. The 
 final objective was to be the three forts in the 
 
—43— 
 
 northeast sector— Tash Tabija, Avas Baba and Aiji- 
 Yolu. The artillery fire was continued with full 
 force until 8:00 p.m., when under cover of darkness 
 the infantry advance began. Some artillery fire 
 continued all night. In the darkness two divisions 
 of infantry advanced on the east and the reenforced 
 56th Regiment advanced on the north until each met 
 the Turkish infantry fire at about 800 yards' range. 
 Here the attacking infantry halted until 5:00 a.m., 
 March 24th. Then the 100 heavy guns placed to the 
 north and east opened fire. The Turks in their 
 advanced position fled to their nearby forts, pursued 
 by the Bulgarians, until the former encountered 
 their own wire entanglements where they were 
 nearly all killed or captured by the Bulgarians. 
 Twenty field guns and several machine guns which 
 were taken were at once turned on the Turks. The 
 greater part of this melee had occurred in the dim 
 light of the early dawn. 
 
 By 7:00 a.m. the fire of the Turkish forts in the 
 northeast sector had been silenced, when a heavy 
 fog fell which gave the Turks a chance to recover 
 and caused the Bulgarians to suffer heavily while 
 digging themselves in at the foot of the hill, within 
 150 to 200 yards of the fort lines. In this trying 
 situation part of the 56th Regiment found a dead 
 space beneath the glacis of Avas Baba. The attack- 
 ing force from the east found some shelter in the 
 captured advanced positions, but the northern group 
 fared badly in the Provadiisca Valley, where they 
 received, at dawn, a heavy flank fire from the Tash 
 Tabija fort. All day long the Bulgarians were pro- 
 tected by their artillery fire which made most all of 
 the Turkish trenches untenable and reduced the 
 Turkish artillery response. When night came, March 
 24th, covered by the full strength of their artillery 
 fire, the Bulgarian pioneers opened passages in the 
 
—44— 
 
 wire entanglements. The pioneers were divided into 
 parties of four or five, to each of which some in- 
 fantry from the 54th and 56th Regiments was 
 assigned. Along this whole front about forty pas- 
 sages were cut, each from four to forty yards wide 
 and from five to fifty yards apart. The entire front 
 through which these openings were made was about 
 one mile long. The loss due to this operation was only 
 about sixty men. At 2:00 p.m. the final assault was 
 made and the forts were entered. Shukri Pasha 
 could not believe that his favorite forts were the first 
 to fall. He had been deceived, also, by the vigorous 
 demonstrations on the south sector, to which he had 
 ordered all of his reserves. The fort Aiji Yolu was 
 entered some little time before Avas Baba, but with 
 no resistance to the final charge by the fleeing Turks. 
 Other positions were not taken by assault, but sur- 
 rendered from necessity as they were defenseless 
 against attack from the rear. 
 
 The losses in the besieging armies in the final 
 operations has been given as follows: 
 
 
 KILLED 
 
 WOUNDED 
 
 Bulgarians 
 Servians 
 
 Officers Men 
 24 1274 
 
 6 268 
 
 Officers Men 
 
 82 6573 
 
 7 1166 
 
 Total 30 1542 89 ^ 7739 
 
 In the final siege the Bulgarians lost 8.5 per cent 
 and the Servians 4.5 per cent of their troops engaged. 
 The total casualties were 9,300 or about 6 per cent. 
 Including all, the losses arising during the entire four 
 months of the siege, the casualty rate was hardly 
 greater than 10 per cent. The Turkish losses during 
 the siege as estimated by the Bulgarians were about 
 15,000 killed and wounded, or about 20 per cent, as 
 the prisoners numbered 60,000 men and 2,000 officers. 
 
 The Turkish medical officer in command of the mil- 
 
—45— 
 
 itary hospital at Adrianople, the time of my visit, told 
 me substantially the same. He said that a garrison of 
 about 60,000 men had surrendered. Ten thousand 
 wounded had been admitted to the hospitals with but 
 a small mortality -2 per cent to 5 per cent. Two 
 thousand were killed and there were thirty cases of 
 cholera. There were two hospitals: one, the regular 
 military hospital of the garrison adjoining the bar- 
 racks near the town; the other, an Ottoman Red 
 Crescent hospital at Karagach, near the railway 
 station. There were no foreign Red Cross missions 
 in Adrianople during the siege. The comparatively 
 slight cost paid by the attacking forces and the 
 heavy losses of the defenders seem to be due to the 
 efficient plan and execution of the assault, to the 
 tactical errors in the conduct of the defense, and to 
 the technical faults in the construction of the fortress. 
 
 The Scene of the Assault 
 
 The fog which covered Kartal Tepe and veiled 
 the panorama of the fortress of Adrianople, which 
 we had hoped to view, left nothing to be seen except 
 the ground beneath our feet, which showed the 
 enormous amount of digging that had been done to 
 provide, first for the Turks and afterwards for the 
 Bulgars, shelter for the living and graves for the 
 dead. The dogs of that yellow cur variety— so 
 closely akin to the coyote— had already opened many 
 of the graves and spread about the bleached evi- 
 dences of the passed struggle for this position. A 
 particularly fine specimen showing the effect of a 
 gunshot wound, which I carried away from Kartal 
 Tepe and preserved for a long time, has finally 
 slipped out of my possession — by the accidents of 
 travel, I believe, rather than by the cupidity of man. 
 
 The automobile finally recovered, the reestab- 
 
lished line of communication enabled us to reach the 
 northeast front where the greatest interest lay about 
 the fort Avas Baba, which the Bulgarians carried by- 
 direct assault. The commandant's aide tried in vain 
 to induce a sentry who guarded the sally-port to 
 admit us to the interior of this somewhat delapidated 
 structure. There was no magic or open sesame in 
 the name or "by the order'' of the commanding 
 general, for the soldier insisted that his own military 
 acquaintance did not extend beyond his immediate 
 and personal commanding officer, who, though in- 
 definitely absent, had left him with instructions to 
 admit no one— under the penalty of having his eyes 
 gouged out or being subjected to some other and 
 more terribly devastating form of mutilation. In- 
 spection was limited, therefore, to the surroundings 
 of this position which at that time— more than a 
 year after the siege operations— appeared as though 
 some great hog had rooted it full of waist-deep 
 craters. The barbed wire entanglements still 
 stretched about the foot of the glacis with suggestive 
 gaps at frequent intervals, but with no signs of de- 
 struction by artillery projectiles. The aide very 
 politely recalled an order which strictly forbade the 
 use of a camera, but while his attention was diverted 
 by my companion, a few harmless exposures were 
 made. 
 
 There was one characteristically Turkish in- 
 dication of recent military activity, seen in the 
 almost completed work of regrading the glacis, so as 
 to remove the dead space that had sheltered the 
 Bulgarians in their assault, and on which, no doubt, 
 complacent and comforting Oriental resignation had 
 placed the whole tangible responsibility for the fall 
 of Adrianople. The aide told me that the shrapnel 
 fire was so destructive that *'only dead men could 
 live*' in the infantry trenches about the fort, and, 
 
—47— 
 after several regiments had been almost destroyed 
 and driven out, it was found impossible to induce 
 soldiers to return to them. There had been much 
 rifle fire both going and coming about the wire en- 
 tanglements as most every one of the angle-iron 
 standards had one or more bullet holes flanged on 
 either side, indicating a heavy fire in both directions. 
 The trenches on the bank of the little stream about 
 500 yards from the foot of the bluff were much in evi- 
 dence, and it was said that the greatest Bulgarian 
 casualties occurred here where the right flank was 
 exposed to the enfilading machine gun fire from Fort 
 Tash-Tabija, which killed every man in the right 
 sector. It is quite likely that the husky Bulgarian 
 soldier, in digging himself in under these inspiring 
 conditions, made a world's record on hasty intrench- 
 ments that, probably, will not soon be broken. 
 
 From Avas Baba and the crescent ridge of the 
 northeast sector we motored to Fort Hederlick, the 
 headquarters during the siege, of the fortress com- 
 mander, Shukri Pasha, which could be seen near the 
 opposite rim when one looked toward the southeast 
 across the great shallow bowl which held the city. 
 This position had no defensive value, as it lay behind 
 the crest of the second ridge. It was the site of the 
 radio station, by which communication with Con- 
 stantinople was kept up during all of the siege. 
 The original apparatus had been destroyed just before 
 the surrender, but a duplicate, an ordinary field radio 
 set mounted on a specially constructed wagon truck, 
 was then in operation. By the time we returned to 
 the city the afternoon had passed and there was not 
 time remaining for an inspection of other positions, 
 although I had had the opportunity of seeing the 
 positions from which the operations began and where 
 they finished -the beginning and the end of the 
 siege of Adrianople. 
 
A visit was made to that island in the Tunga 
 where the Bulgars concentrated their prisoners im- 
 mediately after the capture of the city. Pierre Loti 
 has described the situation there (without seeing it) 
 as a harrowing scene of Turkish suffering and of 
 Bulgarian cruelty when he gave it romantic publicity 
 as "The Isle of Anguish/' I refer to this one in- 
 cident because ''atrocities in time of war'' is a 
 current subject and we can appreciate the difficulties 
 besetting the search for the truth, even when the 
 accusations and denials concern the several most 
 loudly self-acclaimed standard bearers of ** civiliza- 
 tion." I have seen recently in the public press the 
 "Isle of Anguish" incident finally settled by a quota- 
 tion from the Carnegie Commission's Report of the 
 Balkan Wars. The assertion that 1,800 prisoners 
 were confined on an island in the Arda (?) River and 
 that 200 of these died of hunger, cold and disease is 
 supported by the following from the Carnegie Report: 
 
 "A member of the commission visited the island. He 
 saw how the bark had been torn off the trees, as high as a 
 man could reach, by the starving prisoners. He even met on 
 the spot an aged Turk who had spent a week there, and said 
 he had himself eaten the bark. A little Turkish boy, who 
 looked after the cattle on the island, said that from across 
 the river he had seen prisoners eating the grass." 
 
 It all came about through the unwise heroism of 
 Shukri Pasha in his destruction of Turkish commis- 
 sary stores and his demolition of the railway bridge 
 over the Arda which interrupted communication with 
 the source of future Bulgarian supplies. The Bul- 
 garians simply segregated all Turkish prisoners on 
 this island in the Tunga — not the Arda— fed them 
 from the remaining Turkish commissary stores, and 
 left the sick with only that medical attention which 
 the Turkish medical officers might give. The British 
 military consul told me that this treatment of the sick 
 was the most atrocious thing the Bulgarians did. He 
 
—49— 
 
 said that to his personal knowledge a fair ration was 
 always issued and that, too, even before the railway 
 communication was restored. Loti, however, pub- 
 lished a heartrending account of the suffering of the 
 Turkish prisoners who were so starved that they ate 
 the bark from the trees. It is true that the bark of 
 trees is gone, but it went for firewood rather than 
 food. Our Turkish carriage driver began to give us 
 the usual assurance that the Bulgarians starved their 
 prisoners into "eating the bark off the trees like 
 animals,'* but our companion and guide, a Heutenant 
 colonel in the Turkish Medical Corps, contemptuously 
 asked the driver if he had no sense of shame in 
 affronting the intelligence of his auditors by such a 
 monstrous assault upon verisimiltude and the truth. 
 This officer then assured me that no intelligent per- 
 son could be expected to believe the bark-eating 
 romance. 
 
 From Adrianople to Kirk Kilisse we made a 
 comfortable journey of nearly forty miles in about 
 eight hours. The country showed none of the tech- 
 nical battle scars of trenches and earthworks, but 
 the incidental signs of military devastation and 
 reprisal were painfully evident in every village in 
 this region, as in all other parts of Thrace. This 
 wretched country had known in the year, just then 
 passed the scourge of five, pillaging punitive armies, 
 which came in the following order: First, the Turks 
 when they advanced towards the Bulgarian frontier; 
 and second, when they retreated; third, the Bul- 
 garians when they pursued; and fourth, when they 
 withdrew; and fifth, when the Turks returned to 
 Adrianople. As the villages in Thrace are either 
 Christian or Moslem, each army as it passed through 
 a community of the opposite religious faith played 
 the role of foreign invaders. Many of the wretched 
 people we saw in the villages had returned to poke 
 
—50— 
 
 around in the charred or crumpled remains of their 
 homes in a struggle to find enough material to make 
 shelter for the coming winter. 
 
 From Kirk Kilisse we journeyed again by car- 
 riage to the villages of Petra and Eskipolos, about 
 ten miles from the Bulgarian frontier, from where 
 could be seen the field of the first disaster of the 
 Turkish Army of the East in its initial contact with 
 the Bulgarians. Eskipolos marks the site of one of 
 the fortified cities, extending from Adrianople through 
 Bunar Hissar to Visa and then on to the Black Sea. 
 They formed a line of frontier forts of the Byzantine 
 Empire and are attributed to Justinian in the Seventh 
 Century. It seemed rather fatalistic that the 
 strategic position of these ancient citadels should 
 again mark the line of battle in a conflict which 
 would again change the frontier of a state, Each 
 one of these ancient forts surmounted an acropolis. 
 From the ruined citadel of Eskipolos I could see the 
 Bulgarian frontier and the openings of the valleys 
 through which the 1st and 3d Bulgarian Armies in- 
 vaded Thrace. We were insistently assured by the 
 merry villagers who flocked with us that on a clear 
 day we could see the minarets of the Mosque of 
 Sultan Selim in Adrianople. The field of the first 
 engagement of the Thracian campaign lay before us. 
 
 Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha, who commanded the 
 3d Corps of the Turkish Army of the East, in a pub- 
 fished volume entitled *'My Command in the Balkan 
 Campaign, '^ to which I have already referred, has 
 thrown a few spotlights on his command which seem 
 to clearly illuminate the unhappy internal condition 
 of the whole Turkish army and to frankly reveal 
 some of the causes which led to its defeat. This 
 officer, who may be accepted as one of the most 
 aristocratic and distinguished of the Turkish service, 
 was for many years under instruction in German 
 
—51- 
 
 military schools and the German army. His report 
 naturally confesses the otherwise well-known dis- 
 astrous results of his operations, but its greater 
 burden seems to be a defense of his own military 
 conduct and training. His high standing and pro- 
 fessional accomplishments may be better appreciated 
 when it is known that both prior to and during his 
 incumbency as a corps commander he was Minister 
 of Marine in the Turkish cabinet and that, after he 
 left the army on account of wounds he received at 
 Chatalja, he became the Ottoman ambassador in 
 Berlin. 
 
 Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha joined his corps 
 October 17th, five days before its engagement. He 
 was promoted to command of the 2d Field Army 
 November 1, and returned to his corps when the army 
 was reorganized at Chatalja. In the beginning of 
 his report he speaks naively of the innumerable diffi- 
 culties which arise at the last moment in what he 
 calls ''bringing an organization to the height of 
 modern standards. ' ' 
 
 "It had been the custom of corps headquarters to work 
 until 2:00 a.m. which naturally prevented any work at all 
 during the following morning. I gave positive orders at once 
 for everybody to abandon such habit and to commence work 
 at 7:00 a.m. and for clerks to begin at 5:00 a.m. From 9:00 to 
 12:00 officers were ordered to mount and go to the troops. 
 At 3:00 p.m. all officers were to assemble at headquarters, but 
 it was not possible to abandon the offices completely from 9:00 
 a.m. to 3:00 p.m." 
 
 On October 22d, one of his division commanders 
 made the following report concerning an incident of 
 a disordered retreat of the night before in the neigh- 
 borhood of Petra and Evikler: ''Only the men who 
 knew the cause of the noise remained in position. 
 A certain number of officers, thinking of the fortunes 
 of their families, left the ranks and disappeared, 
 and, as a good many soldiers were natives from the 
 
—52— 
 
 surrounding towns, they, too, took advantage of the 
 darkness to return to their homes. ' ' (Page 38. ) 
 
 Djemil Bey, then a division commander in the 
 3d Army Corps, but at the present time one of the 
 triumvirs of the Ottoman Empire and the Minister 
 of Marine, seemed to have been most energetic and 
 discerning. He reported to his chief the cause of 
 the rout in the retreat on Visa as follows: ''If we 
 have not succeeded in reorganizing the troops, the 
 fault is due more to the lack of instruction than to 
 moral force. The companies generally had only one 
 officer, who often did not know what to do. At the 
 least difficulty these officers would cross their hands, 
 remain inert, and, in some cases, would quit the 
 ranks and leave their men to get out of their awk- 
 ward positions without assistance, saying at the 
 time: 'They do not obey us.' '' (Pages 46-47.) 
 
 On October 29th, Ali Bey sent the following 
 report to Mahmoud Moukhtar: "When the enemy 
 threatened our left with two battalions, our men 
 yielded, crying out: 'We do not want to stay with- 
 out artillery support, our troops are now retreating 
 towards the town; nothing can stop them.' '' (Page 
 61.) 
 
 October 30th, Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha pub- 
 lished an order which, in the following paragraphs, 
 reveals something of the sanitary situation: "The 
 wounded will be gathered by the men from the regi- 
 ments and then transferred to Karakal with the 
 means available at the time. Their transfer to Visa 
 will be effected afterwards, using the empty ration 
 and ammunition wagons.'' (Page 84.) This corps 
 in its first engagement, one week before, had had 
 six [field hospitals, and while 1 do not find it so re- 
 corded, I have no doubt that at this time the Bul- 
 garians had them. On the follwing day, October 
 31st, Mahmoud Moukhtar issued an order which 
 
—53— 
 sought to set aright some slight deficiencies which 
 had arisen in his supply department: 
 
 "1. In order to assure the subsistence of your division, 
 organize two kitchens. Use the battalions in the neighbor- 
 hood of the banks of the Soghudjuk. Have a company 
 prepare dinner for everybody. The company commander 
 will report immediately to the corps commander and will then 
 receive orders from the chief of staff. 
 
 *'The detachment of engineers attached to the corps is 
 directed to procure the necessary wood and to build ovens. 
 
 "The battahon from the Denzli Division will furnish the 
 necessary men for transportation." (Page 91.) 
 
 Of the situation on this day, Mahmoud Moukhtar 
 makes the following comments: 
 
 '* Besides, the convoys were pillaged en route, 
 and on this account some of the troops occupying 
 the trenches remained without bread and water. 
 On account of the small number of officers it was not 
 possible to prevent the disorganized battalions from 
 abandoning their positions and going after rations/' 
 
 On November 1st, orders from the same source 
 were published, of which the following is a para- 
 graph: "As it appears necessary to provide rations 
 for the men who have not drawn bread, in the last 
 few days, two flocks of 100 sheep will be driven, one 
 towards the left bank of the stream, the other to- 
 wards Porgalikoj. To the flank guard (three bat- 
 talions and one battery) there will be sent hardtack 
 and the necessary sheep.'' (Page 101.) 
 
 On the night of October 31st, Lieutenant Colonel 
 Raghib made this report to Djemil Bey, his division 
 commander: ''Under such conditions, the detach- 
 ment fled to a more favorable position where they 
 spent the night. Two hundred men failed to answer 
 reveille and were counted missing, as no one knew 
 what had become of them. The companies had just 
 been formed out of irregular elements, so that no 
 one knew his neighbor. The Egerdu Battalion, 
 
—54— 
 
 which fell into an ambuscade, had lost eight wounded 
 and two dead. My men were already crying with 
 hunger at the time of leaving Visa and have received 
 nothing to eat since then. I ask that orders be sent 
 me relative to their supply.'' The stern Djemil 
 Bey, shocked by this brutal outrage of the first com- 
 mandment of the art of war, but unmoved to pity by 
 this cry of bread, gave back this cruel stone: "If 
 your detachment has fallen into an ambuscade, it 
 shows that you have not taken the precautions pre- 
 scribed by Field Service Regulations. The responsi- 
 bility for this incident, so definitely prohibited, falls 
 upon the commander. Stay were you are and occupy 
 the important points.*' (Pages 104-105.) 
 
 On November 1st, Lieutenant Mahmed Sia 
 Effendi, a subordinate officer with a battery attached 
 to two infantry battalions, made the following report: 
 **At this critical moment all of the advance battalions 
 began to run away and no attention was paid to any 
 command." (Page 105.) 
 
 Mahmoud Moukhtar, after he had discovered a 
 very filthy condition in his camp on the Chatalja 
 lines, issued another sanitary order of some signifi- 
 cance: ' ' By reason of cholera, the intensity of which 
 is increasing, there will be established in each camp, 
 latrines of one meter in depth. These will be filled 
 up every other day and new ones dug. There will 
 be an inspection by the corps commander in person." 
 (Page 155.) 
 
 Communication and information was not very 
 good at any time. Two days after the first action 
 the right wing was out of communication with 
 Abdulla Pasha (the army commander) and all official 
 correspondence was addressed to Nazim Pasha, the 
 generalissimo and Minister of War at Tscherkesol. 
 Out of this situation difficulties arose, as Abdulla 
 
—55— 
 
 decided to retreat to the bank of the Ergene, and 
 Nazim ordered a stand at Karach-dere. 
 
 On October 28th-29th, Nazim telegraphed Mah- 
 moud Moukhtar the following information: 
 
 *' Vienna newspapers announce the right wing of the 
 Bulgarian army at Adrianople, and its left is about to envelop 
 Kirk Kilisse where they expect great results. 
 
 "The correspondent of the Reichpoat informs me that the 
 Bulgarian revictualing is complete and that their march is 
 resumed. The west wing of Dimitrieff' s army is on the line 
 Jenikoj-Baba-Eski. The center is about Kawalki. The right 
 wing is advancing on Bunar Hissar -Visa- Sara j. The Bul- 
 garians seek to cut the Turks off from Constantinople and 
 terminate the campaign in one week." 
 
 This information proved substantially correct, 
 and, as it was received by a very roundabout way 
 from newspaper sources, it seems to have some bear- 
 ing upon the place of a newspaper correspondent 
 with an army. 
 
 The Turkish commanders, however, seemed to 
 have held the tactical aid of Providence in somewhat 
 higher esteem than did Napoleon, because Mahmoud 
 Moukhtar, in an order informing his corps of an 
 offensive movement, said: "With the aid of Allah 
 the enemy has been compelled to retreat.'' About 
 this time, November 1st, Mahmoud Moukhtar was 
 given command of the 2d Field Army and Nazim 
 telegraphed him: ''May Allah wish that your 
 offensive may be crowned with success.'' Mahmoud 
 Moukhtar telegraphed his acknowledgment of his 
 new appointment to Nazim and said: "Allah has 
 permitted the 3d Corps to cause the enemy to retreat 
 today." (Page 116.) 
 
 The history of the Thracian campaign might 
 almost be written in tragic incidents which marked 
 the conduct of the Turkish army. A story which I 
 heard in Bulgaria and which is given in the German 
 General Staff report would fittingly make the first 
 
—56— 
 
 record. On October 18th, the day war was declared, 
 the 2d Bulgarian Army, concentrated on the railroad, 
 started by that route to march on Adrianople and 
 crossed the frontier about noon. In the morning of 
 this day the commander of the Turkish frontier 
 guard sent over to the Bulgarian outpost a polite 
 request for a few rations of bread, as the Turkish 
 commissary had grown so poor about then that his 
 men had not had much to eat for several days. The 
 bread was supplied, but it had hardly been expended 
 before the Bulgarian advance guard wandered down 
 the railroad track and explained their business so 
 definitely that the Turkish guard surrendered without 
 resistance. 
 
 There were a few Turkish battalions and batteries 
 near Mustapha Pasha, the first town on the railroad 
 and on the Maritza, which were so astonished at the 
 appearance of a large number of Bulgarians that 
 they hurried on to Adrianople without much discus- 
 sion. There was a very important bridge over the 
 Maritza at this point which had been prepared for 
 demolition, but only part of the explosive charge 
 was detonated. A bit of the bridge railing and a 
 piece of the roadbed was blown up, but was at once 
 repaired and did not delay the Bulgarian column at 
 all. Not even the telegraph line was touched, so 
 that the whole railroad system fell into Bulgarian 
 hands and enabled them to establish their base at 
 once beyond the Maritza River, which could have 
 been made a serious obstacle to their advance. 
 
 The Campaign 
 
 The general features of the Thracian campaign, 
 jipart from the investment of Adrianople by the 2d 
 Army, may be briefly sketched in the advance from 
 the Bulgarian frontier (October 18th) of the 1st and 
 
—57— 
 
 3d Bulgarian Armies, with a total strength of 75,000 
 each, or a combined force of 150,000, which comprised 
 about one half of the total of 300,000 Bulgarian 
 fighting men then in the field. 
 
 The Turkish Army of the East, exclusive of the 
 garrison of Adrianople, was at this time incompletely 
 mobilized in two armies, with a front along the line 
 Adrianople— Kirk Kilisse, and a strength of from 
 110,000 to 120,000 men. The 1st Bulgarian Army, 
 marching towards the south, met the advance guard 
 of the 1st Turkish Army a little in advance of the 
 center of the line Adrianople — Kirk Kilisse (October 
 23d at Seliolu) in an engagement which, while not of 
 a general character, is said to have been one of the 
 fiercest incidents of the campaign, as one Bulgarian 
 regiment lost 250 killed and 750 wounded. 
 
 The 3d Bulgarian Army, marching as the ad- 
 vanced left wing to the southeast in the direction of 
 Kirk Kilisse, encountered with some resistance the 
 Turkish 2d Army, or right wing (October - 23d at 
 Petra and Erikler), a few miles in front of Kirk 
 Kilisse. During the night following these two en- 
 gagements, both of the Turkish forces became de- 
 moralized and retreated in disorder under conditions 
 which Mahmoud Moukhtar Pasha has described in 
 his report already quoted. The 3d Army passed on 
 to Kirk Kilisse without obstruction, as the Turks had 
 fled towards Luli Burgas and Visa, but it delayed at 
 Kirk KiHsse three days without pursuing the ad- 
 vantage so unexpectedly gained. The 1st Army was 
 not permitted to advance, as under instructions from 
 general headquarters it was held back between the 
 two other armies to await the results of their opera- 
 tions. 
 
 A bitter controversy has lately arisen between 
 General Dimitrieff, commanding the 3d Army, and 
 General Fitcheif, Chief of the General Staff, con- 
 
—58— 
 
 cerning the delay in the advance of both armies 
 which, in the Hght of subsequent events, was fatal 
 to the Bulgarian prospects of a termination of the 
 war shortly after this time. General Dimitrieff says 
 that he wished to advance at once from Kirk Kilisse, 
 and that, after his enforced three days' delay, when 
 he again attacked the Turkish right in a movement 
 which developed into the battle of Lull Burgas, the 
 1st Army did not come up to his support until the 
 last of the three days of hard fighting. 
 
 The action about Luli Burgas, which has all the 
 attributes of a real battle, covered a period of five 
 days (October 28th to November 1st, inclusive) which, 
 with the development of the positions on the first 
 day and the retirement of the Turks on the last day, 
 left three days of the severe engagement. The 
 Turkish army made its stand on the rampart-like 
 slopes of the eastern bank of a creek (Karakatch-dere) 
 which flows from the north past Luli Burgas. The 
 front of twenty to twenty-five miles' length extended 
 between the only two roads running east and west 
 through Thrace; one on the south through and from 
 Luli Burgas towards Constantinople, and the other 
 on the north from Kirk Kilisse to Bunar Hissar and 
 Visa. These two roads limited the operations and 
 extreme flanks of both armies. Abdulla Pasha, the 
 Turkish commander (October 30th, at Saskiskny), 
 stood on a prehistoric mound, rising from a slightly 
 predominating ridge four or five miles behind the 
 center of his line, where other commanders in the 
 unnumbered wars in Thrace may just as well have 
 stood, and, like him, they might have viewed the 
 splendid spectacle of an army in desperate action 
 along its fifteen to twenty miles' front. But as he 
 was more of a privileged observer than an active 
 commander, all day long on the hardest fought day 
 of the battle, and on the day following as well, he 
 
—59— 
 
 was entirely out of communication with his right 
 wing and only the coming and going of an occasional 
 orderly and a few staff officers gave him the appear- 
 ance of directing the movements of the left wing. 
 He had no telegraphic nor telephonic communication 
 with any part of the field, and, after viewing the 
 tragic spectacle of the defeat of the *' Grand Armee'' 
 of the Ottoman Empire, he could only hasten to lead 
 his routed legions in their retreat. Only the persist- 
 ing patience of the Turkish soldier, even though he 
 found himself in the midst of disorder, to which he 
 is so thoroughly accustomed, could have endured the 
 hunger, fatigue and fright with so little tendency to 
 those excesses which make such situations so horrible. 
 Only the Turkish soldier could have maintained his 
 tranquility so as to permit himself to be reformed 
 into a new army behind the defenses of Chatalja. 
 
 It may be said for Abdulla Pasha that, as he 
 realized the mobilization of his army to be incomplete, 
 it was his plan to stand behind the upper reaches of 
 the river Ergene, where the railroad would have 
 served his line of communications better, and where 
 he might have gained some time in collecting his 
 forces. Some of his corps commanders, however, 
 interceded with Nazim Pasha, the Generalissimo, 
 who ordered the position which precipitated the 
 battle of Luli Burgas. In the battle of Luli Burgas 
 and in those incidental and preliminary engagements 
 in front of the Adrianople— Kirk Kilisse Hne, the 
 Bulgarian losses were about 20,000, and more than 
 90 per cent of the number were borne by the 3d 
 Army, 
 
 The Turkish losses have been variously reported, 
 but it is hardly possible that the actual numbers 
 can ever be known, no matter what "official'' 
 statistics may be prepared later; a fair estimate 
 seems to be at least 30,000. With about 140,000 
 
—60— 
 
 Bulgarians and 110,000 Turks participating, the 
 losses were at least 15 per cent and 25 per cent, 
 respectively. 
 
 Just a year later I made a little journey over the 
 Thracian battlefields, without having then any defi- 
 nite knowledge of their details or a prearranged 
 itinerary. I started out to visit the more important 
 points and as many as possible of the towns I had 
 heard of, in the course of the local gossip of the war. 
 I had learned the names of the scenes of a number 
 of engagements from my hospital patients. I went 
 everywhere that ordinary carriage transportation 
 and other facilities permitted. When my trip was 
 all over and I began to check up, I was surprised to 
 find that I had visited every scene of action of any 
 importance, except that of the 1st Bulgarian Army, 
 a Httle in advance of the line between Adrianople 
 and Kirk Kilisse (at Seliolu). I have since thought 
 that this coinidence is somewhat suggestive, as, in 
 the movements of the opposing armies and my subse- 
 quent peregrination, there was no place else to go, 
 and if one goes anywhere in this region in Thrace, 
 unless he uses an aeroplane or resorts to sapping 
 operations, he must follow very closely the same 
 route. After reaching Luli Burgas, I went out to 
 the villages (Saskiskny and Ahmedbey), five and 
 seven miles eastward, where Abdulla Pasha had 
 spent his three nights and where, also, he had 
 watchfully waited during the three days of his last 
 battle. From a little ridge between these villages, 
 and within a radius of fifteen miles, the entire field 
 can be viewed without intervening obstruction, as 
 one can readily locate the horizon positions of Luli 
 Burgas, Bunar Hissar, Visa, and, finally, Tchorlu, 
 the railroad station where Abdulla entrained and 
 thus formally terminated his Thracian campaign. 
 The country at this time could be traversed in almost 
 
—61— 
 
 any direction by a carriage and going was generally 
 better across country than on any of the wretched 
 roads— as we have known it in Cuba and the Philip- 
 pines in the dry season. 
 
 During the campaign, however, the rainy season 
 had made any sort of going anywhere almost im- 
 possible, as the whole country was then virtually a 
 quagmire. It has been said— and a look at this 
 region surely seems to support the statement— that 
 had the weather conditions of October, 1913, pre- 
 vailed in October, 1912, the Bulgarian successes 
 would have been prompt and decisive. The rather 
 frequent streams which flow into the Ergene from 
 the north, in shallow valleys and only a few abrupt 
 banks, divide the surface into easy going swails 
 and low, rolUng hills, over which any sort of trans- 
 portation can be taken in any general direction when 
 the season is favorable. After the abandonment of 
 the field, the terminal phase of the campaign was 
 completed by the defense of the Chatalja line, which 
 was taken in a natural position about twenty-five 
 miles in front of Constantinople and which had been 
 further prepared years before for just such an event. 
 The peninsula at this point, about twenty-five miles 
 in width from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora, 
 takes its name from a nearby town. It is further 
 narrowed by two bodies of water, extending in from 
 each coast, to about sixteen miles. A broad valley, 
 running north and south, except from a short dis- 
 tance towards the north, separates two prominent 
 ranges of hills and jutting-out hogbacks. The Turkish 
 position was on the east of this valley and the Bul- 
 garians on the west. The two weeks following the 
 battle of Luli Burgas, before the Bulgarians could 
 prepare their attack (November 17th-18th), gave the 
 Turks time enough to dig themselves in and to hold 
 their position. A short time after what is known as 
 
—62— 
 
 the battle of Chatalja, as it was apparent to the 
 Turks that they could not assume the offensive, the 
 Turkish government asked for intervention which 
 resulted in an armistice (December 3d.) Hostilities 
 were again resumed and again suspended by another 
 armistice. (See chronological table of events, Appen- 
 dix.) During this latter period of inactivity, the 
 Bulgarians withdrew their right wing six or seven 
 miles along the coast of the Marmora to simplify 
 their difficult problem of supply, as a glance at the 
 map will indicate. Shortly afterwards, the Turks 
 advanced their left wing across the bay of Bujuk 
 Chelmudje, under the pretense of doing something 
 in a military way, although they never induced the 
 Bulgarians to change their lines from the position in 
 which they were reformed. The reorganized Turkish 
 10th Army Corps which formed this advanced left 
 flank was no doubt the result of some political in- 
 dication. 
 
 When I accompanied the chief surgeon of the 
 Chatalja army on a special sanitary inspection, he 
 made a special point of one visit to the 10th Army 
 Corps with which we spent a night at Kalalratia. 
 This command seemed to base its principal claim to 
 distinction on the presence of a young officer who was 
 its chief of staff, as he was none other than the then 
 hero-worshipped patriot and now the Ottoman Em- 
 pire's Man on Horseback. Although he was only a 
 lieutenant colonel and the chief of staff of a pasha 
 and general of division, commanding the 10th Army 
 Corps, the entire command was keenly alert in the 
 sense of appreciation of the supreme honor of Enver 
 Bey's presence. Turkish hospitality, to even a 
 stranger, is always impressive, not only in form but 
 in substance as well, when the latter observation is 
 economically practicable. The chief surgeon of the 
 10th Army Corps was particularly happy in his 
 
—63— 
 
 opportunity to meet the special indication of enter- 
 taining his dignified chief, Abdul Selim Pasha, the 
 chief surgeon of the army and the latter's honored 
 guest, as the chief surgeon could support the form of 
 his hospitality with the real substance of a presenta- 
 tation to Enver Bey. "You have heard of Enver 
 Bey; did you know that he was here— the Chief of 
 Staff-and that you can see him?'' was almost my first 
 word of greeting. 
 
 The evening was very dull because this alluring 
 and glittering promise could not be fulfilled as it was 
 rather reluctantly revealed to me that ''Enver Bey'' 
 —the name spoken almost with bated breath— *' was 
 fatigued and begged to be excused." But the new 
 day brought its sunshine and the fulfillment of its 
 promise in a reception for which the corps commander 
 and his headquarters was used as a setting, as Enver 
 Bey entered at just that time which the rules of the 
 drama so carefully prescribe. He appeared as a 
 young man of pleasing and noticeable appearance, 
 carefully dressed and faultlessly groomed -even 
 without the credits of the discount for field service 
 conditions. He bore himself with an air of calm but 
 supreme confidence, which, in the light of his boldly 
 romantic career, might easily be attributed to a 
 fanatical inspiration. His manner was formal and 
 martially precise, and, incidentally, his time was 
 short. Later in the day as we were leaving the 
 western shore of Bujuk Chekmudje and about to 
 cross the bridge, we encountered the Corps Com- 
 mander and his staff. The dignified old gentleman, 
 riding up to the Sanitary Pasha and myself, greeted 
 us both pleasantly, thanked us for the honor of a 
 distinguished visit and confided us, hopefully, to the 
 care of Allah. Then a clatter of hoofs, just approach- 
 ing, which attracted our attention, enabled us again 
 to gaze upon Enver Bey as he galloped by, stiffly 
 
—64— 
 
 saluting, with an escort of soldiers vastly more pre- 
 tentious than that of the pasha whom we had just 
 left. As we took our leave of the escort from the 
 10th Army Corps, the chief surgeon in receiving my 
 thanks and appreciation of his bountifully generous 
 hospitality, found his greatest comfort in my ex- 
 pression of rapturous satisfaction in having seen 
 Him— Enver Bey. There can be doubt that Enver 
 Pasha, as the new honors of Minister of War and 
 Generalissimo, which he has modestly conceded to 
 himself now entitles him to be addressed, is a man 
 of vision, possessed of a courage and a nerve com- 
 bined with ready initiative and fanatical determina- 
 tions which, now that he is actually in the saddle 
 instead of being merely master of the ring, will very 
 shortly determine the destiny of the Ottoman 
 Empire. 
 
 It will be remembered that in the second war, 
 after the Roumanians had crossed the Danube and 
 the Bulgarians had been several weeks away from 
 their position on the Chatalja lines, Enver Bey, in 
 violation of the orders of the Generalissimo, marched 
 with a cavalry column to the ''capture'' of defenseless 
 Adrlanople, and, in this feat of recovering the first 
 European capital of the Osmanli Turks, he became 
 once more the nation's hero and the empire's un- 
 doubted Man of Destiny. 
 
Third Lecture 
 
 The Second Balkan War 
 
 ^T^HE Second Balkan War, much more definitely 
 ^ than the first, was but a flash of the steel in a 
 minor event of the great Slavo-Teutonic contest. 
 The Balkan States were only playing the part that 
 fell incidentally to their unhappy lot in holding the 
 bag and washing the dirty linen of the principal 
 contestants. 
 
 Just a reference to an event that followed the 
 Berlin Treaty will suffice to establish this relation of 
 the greater politics of Europe to the Balkan States. 
 In 1881 and 1889 Austria-Hungary formally declared, 
 in secret treaties with Servia, that she ** would sup- 
 port Servia, in the event of the latter's finding a way 
 of extending her southern boundary, the exception 
 being made of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, and that 
 she would aid in the extension of Servia in the 
 direction of the Vardar Valley.'' The perfidy of this 
 platitude is evident when it is recalled that the 
 Austrian occupation of Bosnia had solidly blocked 
 Servians natural extention into that Slav territory, 
 while the inviolability of the sacred Sanjak of Novi 
 Bazar had made hopeless the coalescence of Servia 
 and Montenegro. Austrian diplomacy thus turned 
 Servian ambition for extension toward Macedonia, 
 whose population, up to 1870, the Servians had un- 
 questionably conceded to be Bulgarian. 
 
 The organization of a Bulgarian National Church 
 in 1870, which gave formal character to the Bulgarian 
 65 
 
—6Q— 
 
 communities throughout Macedonia, stimulated a 
 Servian national movement towards the south, after 
 the Austrian check was placed on extention towards 
 the west. In 1903 the murder of King Alexander, 
 which was so popularly approved in Servia though 
 disapproved elsewhere— especially in royal circles- 
 removed a dynasty, and, by releasing Servia from 
 the influence of Austria, gave a new impetus to a 
 Servian national spirit. 
 
 A Bulgarian (Liouben Karavelow) wrote in 1870: 
 
 *'The Greeks show no interest in knowing what kind of 
 people live in such a country as Macedonia. It is true that 
 they say that the country formerly belonged to the Greeks 
 and therefore ought to belong to them again. * * * But we 
 are in the Nineteenth Century and historical and canonical 
 rights have lost all significance. Every people, like every 
 individual, ought to be free, and every nation has a right to 
 live for itself. Thrace and Macedonia ought then to be Bul- 
 garian since the people who live there are Bulgarians." 
 
 It is no doubt easy for the Christian world to 
 appreciate the traditional emnity that existed be- 
 tween the Bulgarians and Turks, as it is so readily 
 attributable to differences in religion, but there has 
 been some surprise occasioned by the bitterness and 
 ferocity of the strife that so soon arose between the 
 Christian Bulgarians, Servians and Greeks, after 
 their common enemy, the Turk, had been eliminated. 
 The cause of the differences between the Bulgarians 
 and Servians can be dismissed in a word; it was the 
 result of extraneous political influences which set 
 these two similar and almost identical people against 
 one another in fratricidal war. But the Bulgar and 
 the Greek have been separated by a breach that 
 began to widen almost with the dawn of history. 
 The Greeks and Bulgars had been allies for only a 
 year, and when their common enemy had been 
 removed, their individual differences became more 
 acute on account of the jealousies aroused by the 
 
—67— 
 
 conflict of their respective claims to territorial ex- 
 tensions in Macedonia. 
 
 The soldiers of the three alhed armies — counting 
 the Servian and Montenegrin as one— had together 
 fought the first war to a successful finish. They felt 
 they had achieved their ends and the second war 
 seemed to them inexplicable. If the Turks had 
 accepted the conditions demanded by the Allies, in 
 the course of the first armistice, and if the first war 
 had terminated, as it would have done in January, 
 1913, —but for a government revolution in Constanti- 
 nople,— it is most probable that the second war could 
 not have been fought, as none of the armies— always 
 excepting the Montenegrins— could not have been 
 induced at that time to fight again. It was necessary 
 for the Greek press to inflame their people, and for 
 the Bulgars to learn that their brother Servians were 
 about to betray them, in the violation of a sacred 
 treaty. The Servians had absolutely nothing to do 
 but stand pat, as they were in possession of and 
 proposed to retain that portion of Macedonia which, 
 by treaty, they had conceded to Bulgaria. This 
 treaty became more sacred to the Bulgars as a 
 **bond of peace'' and grew more profane to the 
 Serbs as a ''scrap of paper,'' while the final adjust- 
 ment of the first war was pending. The Greeks 
 have a press, but the Bulgars have not. The Greeks 
 are the peddlers, traders and advertisers of the 
 East, and they spent, most industriously, the first six 
 months of 1913 in proving the Bulgars to be ruthless 
 and inhuman savages, and inspiring the Greek sol- 
 dier with his mission as '*an appointed avenger of 
 civilization against a race which stood outside the 
 pale of civiHzation." 
 
 With the exception of Bulgaria, the first war was 
 practically over, so far as the AlHes were concerned, 
 at the end of 1912. The formal termination was 
 
—68— 
 
 marked by the treaty of peace, signed in London, 
 June 30, 1913. In this interval of six months the 
 Servians and Greeks had Httle to do, except to ar- 
 range themselves in their conquered territory in 
 Northern and Southern Macedonia respectively, 
 while the Bulgarians, from January to June, 1913, 
 bore the constant burden of holding the Turk in his 
 place on the Chatalja line. 
 
 The question of partition of the territory wrested 
 from the Turk was a matter of vital concern, 
 especially to Bulgaria, because her allies were in 
 actual possession of a part of Macedonia, which 
 Bulgaria thought she had just right to claim. Bul- 
 garia's contention was based upon a treaty, duly and 
 solemnly signed, sealed and attested by both Bul- 
 garia and Servia, in which the delimitation of the 
 Servian and Bulgarian portions of Macedonia were 
 specifically defined. 
 
 This instrument, popularly known as the ''Secret 
 Treaty," was signed at Sofia, February 29, 1912, or 
 about seven months before the declaration of the 
 first war, but it was given to the public by a news- 
 paper in Paris in the spring of 1913, when the second 
 war was brewing. Besides the definite meandering 
 of a line which both parties agreed would separate 
 the new Servian from the new Bulgarian Macedonia, 
 there remained another area, confessed to be in 
 dispute, which was left to arbitration. As the issues 
 of the first war were practically settled, Bulgaria 
 asked Servia to evacuate that portion of Macedonia 
 which the secret treaty had granted to Bulgaria, but 
 which Servia still occupied. Servia proposed arbitra- 
 tion. Bulgaria was pleased and ready to arbitrate 
 the matter left for arbitration by the treaty. Servia 
 demanded arbitration of the entire matter of the 
 division of Macedonia, which was, in fact, a dis- 
 regard for the the terms of the treaty which Bulgaria 
 
insisted was valid, and should become effective 
 without arbitation. 
 
 Bulgaria had conducted her campaign and had con- 
 tributed much the strongest force in the war against 
 the Turks, in confidence that the treaty would secure 
 her rights in Macedonia, although she knew the 
 fortunes of war must send the Servian army there 
 to take it away from the Turk. These, then, were 
 definite positions in the controversy. Both parties 
 were perfectly willing to submit something to the 
 arbitration of the Russian Czar, but they could not 
 agree upon the question to be arbitrated. It was 
 simply a little matter of either sacred or profane 
 regard for a treaty, and, at that time, the self-styled 
 "civilized world'' lost patience with these wild 
 Balkan people for fighting over as sordid thing as the 
 spoils of the first war. Maybe some ex post facto 
 process of the civilized world's international courts 
 will some day restore to the barbaric Balkan States 
 the good character of which they were despoiled by 
 the self-righteous judgment of a '* higher civiliza- 
 tion." The Russian Czar threatened to hold ** re- 
 sponsible "—whatever he meant by that— the state 
 which started a fight, and for that reason neither 
 Servia nor Bulgaria felt privileged to strike the first 
 blow. Not so, however, with Greece, for she was 
 without the pale of Russian influence or punishment, 
 and was free to indulge her petulance. 
 
 Servia urged, as her reason for not respecting 
 the treaty, that the conditions at that time differed 
 from what they were when the treaty was signed, as 
 Austria, through her insistence on the autonomy of 
 Albania, had driven her back from the Adriatic, and 
 had robbed Servia of that which she coveted most — 
 an opening to the eea. 
 
 Austria could not deprive Servia of all the fruits 
 of her victory. The Servian occupation of the San- 
 
—70— 
 
 jak of Novi Bazar, in conjunction with Montenegro, 
 could not be disputed by Austria, in addition to 
 Austria's prevention of Servians occupation of Albania. 
 With the San jak of Novi Bazar lost, Austria was so 
 determined that Servian access to the sea should be 
 prevented by the creation of an autonomous Albania, 
 that in the spring of 1913 she mobilized in Bosnia 
 eight to ten army corps, with a strength of about 
 200,000 men at a cost of $84,000,000. As about one 
 half of this sum was expended for military stores, 
 which might be used again, the cost of the mobiliza- 
 tion was really about 40 to 50 million dollars — not a 
 trifling amount for Austria to spend in merely 
 ** bluffing'' Russia. Russia was not ready, and the 
 game was closed for the while. Austria's hat was 
 in the ring, but Russia's was not ready to be tossed. 
 While this little incident would hardly be noticed in 
 America, in Europe it was the cause of great con- 
 cern, and for a reason more apparent to us now than 
 then. 
 
 This process of diplomatic settlement was favor- 
 able to the Teutonic interests, because it enabled 
 Austria to take even a better strategical position, 
 from which to execute the movement assigned to her 
 by the Germanic Alliance, which was the ultimate 
 advance of her eastern flank to Salonika, and the 
 establishment there of a naval base, from which the 
 ^gean might be controlled and the Dardanelles 
 guarded against the emergence of the Slav into the 
 Mediterranean. Austrian interference with the 
 territory taken from the Turks by the Servians is, 
 no doubt, the crux of the situation which led to the 
 second war, because, if Austria had not blocked so 
 effectually Servia's advance to the sea, Servia would 
 have been so pleased with this realization of her 
 fondest hope that in her gratitude she would certainly 
 have had no thought of disregarding her treaty, and 
 
_71— 
 
 she also might have conceded to Bulgaria the dis- 
 puted Macedonian area, which the secret treaty had 
 left for arbitration. 
 
 The long delay in the settlement of the issues 
 had brought Bulgaria to the rather urgent necessity 
 of getting some action at once, or resigning herself 
 to what the Servians and Greeks saw fit to offer her. 
 Her army was exhausted, and the peasant soldiery, 
 believing that they had won what they had been 
 fighting for, were feeling the call to their fields, in 
 the time of the approaching harvest. 
 
 The second war was one of most informal begin- 
 ning, although its course was one of great intensity. 
 There was no formal declaration, and as the first 
 war ended formally June 30th, after a long delay 
 following the actual cessation of actual hostilities, 
 the Allies had had time to array themselves in de- 
 fense of their respective interests. In order to make 
 history easy, it may be said that the second war 
 began July 1st, the day after the first war ended. 
 
 On June 21, 1913, General Savoff , the Bulgarian 
 generalissimo, sent the following telegram to the 
 commander of the 4th Bulgarian Army, who was at 
 Seres: 
 
 "I. — There is an alliance between the Servians and the 
 Greeks, whose object is to hold and divide the whole territory 
 of Macedonia on the right bank of the Vardar .... for 
 the Servians; Salonica and the regions of Pravishta and 
 Nigrita for the Greeks. 
 
 *'II. — The Servians do not recognize the treaty and do 
 not admit arbitration within the limits of the treaty. 
 
 "III. — We insist that the arbitators start from the basis 
 laid down in the treaty, i.e., concern themselves solely with 
 the contested zone. Since the non-contested territory belongs 
 to us according to the treaty, we desire that it should be 
 evacuated by the Servians or, at least, occupied by mixed 
 armies for such time as the pourparlers are going on. We 
 make the same proposition to the Greeks. 
 
 "IV. — These questions must be settled within ten days 
 and in our sense, or war is inevitable. Thus within ten days 
 
—72— 
 
 we shall have either war or demobilization, according as the 
 government's demands are accepted or refused. 
 
 "V. — If we demobilize now, the territories mentioned 
 will remain in the hands of the Greeks and the Servians, since 
 it is difficult to suppose that they will be peacefully handed 
 over to us. 
 
 "VI. — The discontent which has recently manifested 
 itself in certain parts of the army gives ground for supposing 
 that there is a serious agitation against war. The attention 
 of intelligent soldiers must be directed to the fact that should 
 the army become disorganized and incapable of action, the 
 result will be as described in paragraph V. Reply with least 
 possible delay whether the state of the army is such that it 
 can be counted on for successful operations." 
 
 The Bulgarian premier told the cabinet that the 
 Servians would more than likely make war on them 
 after any arbitration which would give Bulgaria her 
 claimed advantages, and that he thought it better to 
 fight it out then. 
 
 Servia consented unreservedly to arbitration. 
 The sentiment of the Bulgarian cabinet was not in 
 favor of war, but it is now certain that public opinion 
 and General Savoff, whose military glory had ex- 
 tended his influence into politics, were for war. 
 
 On June 28th, General Savoff sent another tele- 
 gram to the commander of the 4th Army: 
 
 "In order that our silence under Servian attacks may 
 not produce a bad effect on the state of mind of the army, and 
 on the other hand to avoid encouraging the enemy, I order 
 you to attack the enemy all along the line as energetically as 
 possible, without deploying all your forces or producing a 
 prolonged engagement. Try to establish a firm footing on 
 Krivolak on the right bank of the Bregalnitca. It is prefera- 
 ble that you undertake a fusillade in the evening and make 
 an impetuous attack on the whole line during the night and 
 at daybreak. The operation is to be undertaken tomorrow, 
 June 29th, in the evening." 
 
 General Savoff also sent a letter of instructions 
 to the 5th and 6th Armies, outlining several details 
 of his conception of the political situations, in which 
 he said: "Since our enemies are in occupation of 
 
—73— 
 
 territories which belong to us, let us try by our arms 
 to seize new territory until European powers inter- 
 vene to stop our military action/' 
 
 It is imputed that the King gave Savoff his in- 
 structions, but the General remains silent on the 
 subject. At any rate, consequent unhappy results 
 of Savoff' s actions demanded some sort of an ex- 
 planation, as an order of a regimental commander 
 directing a part of the attack on the Servian lines 
 soon became pubhc. Savoff was made the diplomatic 
 and official **goaf by his relief from the command 
 of the army without any other official assignment. 
 The official reports of the junction of the 2d and 4th 
 Armies in the last days of the Macedonian Campaign 
 state that these armies, on account of the common 
 task assigned to them, were placed under one com- 
 mander whose name is not given. This man was 
 Savoff, as I believe I know from my personal rela- 
 tions, to the situation at Kustendil where I saw 
 General Savoff. 
 
 Bulgaria suffered sorely from the disadvantage 
 of her position, as she was compelled to keep her 
 main army at Chatalja until the terms of peace were 
 signed. The other Allies had months to entrench 
 themselves in their positions where the Bulgarsmust 
 meet them. Bulgaria had, at the very first, to 
 abandon the Chatalja Hnes, with the Turkish Army 
 still on her newly guaranteed frontier, and to con- 
 centrate all her forces on her west and southwest 
 borders. 
 
 The Greeks with their main army in Salonika, 
 started their part of it by an attack on the battalion 
 that the Bulgars had maintained at that point. The 
 Bulgars nudged the Servians in Macedonia, but the 
 latter said they were not fighting. It was claimed 
 to be an outpost contact. The Bulgars defended 
 their western frontier against the Serbs, and met the 
 
—74— 
 
 Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks in Macedonia south 
 of Western Bulgaria. There in Macedonia, in the val- 
 leys of the Bregalnitca and the Struma, the campaign 
 continued through the month of July, while the wily 
 Turks slipped back into Adrianople, and the Rouman- 
 ians crossed the Danube on their way to Sofia. With 
 this new enemy within a few days' march of her de- 
 fenseless capital, Bulgaria was compelled to sue for 
 peace. An armistice was declared August 1, 1913, 
 and the treaty of Bucharest followed. This instru- 
 ment not only gave to her former allies all that was 
 in dispute, but it took from Bulgaria some of the ter- 
 ritory she had won from the Turks, and dehvered 
 '*the most unkindest cut of alP' by robbing her of an 
 intergral part of her original domain. So the Second 
 War ended in a state of local tension greater than 
 that with which the first began. There has been 
 left among Christians animosities and hatreds more 
 bitter than had existed between Christian and Mos- 
 lem, and all factions only wait for a favorable op- 
 portunity to resort again to arms. 
 
 Bulgaria, today, by reason of the advantage 
 taken of her in the treaty of Bucharest, in August, 
 1913, cherishes a most bitter resentment for the 
 parties to the ''hold up,'' namely, Roumania, Greece 
 and Servia, which she will exhibit in arms when her 
 first opportunity arrives. This, too, will not be an 
 action of the government in pursuit of a diplomatic 
 policy; it will be an expression of a deep and enduring 
 sentiment of her people. Under present conditions 
 Servia, Greece and Roumania are not free to assume 
 any other mihtary burdens, and Bulgaria, therefore, 
 holds the * 'balance of peace" in the Balkans, though 
 not for her inherent interest in the abstract prin- 
 ciples of peace. 
 
 With the neutrality of Bulgaria assured and 
 guaranteed, which is manifestly impossible under 
 
—76-- 
 
 present conditions, it is probable that both Roumania 
 and Greece by this time would have allied themselves 
 with one of the sides in the European War. Roumania 
 must make the first move in placating Bulgaria by 
 the restoration of the stolen province of the Dobrudza. 
 Such action will leave Bulgaria free to turn her front 
 towards Servia and Greece. Servia, being sufficiently 
 occupied at present, Greece alone remains to restrain 
 Bulgaria's pressure. As Greece has ambitions in the 
 JEgesLii and Albania, which could be better pursued 
 after securing Bulgarian neutrality, she might see 
 her way clear to return to Bulgaria her (Greece's) 
 portion of the loot of Bucharest. After that, Bulgaria's 
 enforcement of her secret treaty with Servia, which 
 caused the Second Balkan War, would be a matter of 
 simple military migration into Servian Macedonia, 
 which the treaty gave to Bulgaria. Then all the 
 Balkan States would be free to make their align- 
 ments in the great war and Bulgaria's position would 
 be determined to the extent of enforcing the terms 
 of the Treaty of London, which gave her the Enos- 
 Media line as her frontier with Turkey, but which 
 the Turks violated by their return to Adrianople 
 after the Bulgarian army was withdrawn from 
 Chatalja, at the beginning of the Second War. 
 
 This movement for Bulgaria would not heavily 
 tax her resources, as the Turks are now engaged in 
 other military adventures so critically affecting their 
 destiny as to make the defense of Thrace a mere in- 
 cident. With the recovery of the province of 
 Dobrudza, and the undisputed occupation of Mace- 
 donia and Thrace, Bulgaria's ambitions would be so 
 wholly realized that her consequent desire to enjoy 
 the blessings of peace might permit the Balkan 
 States, as far as they, themselves, are concerned, to 
 live happily ever after. 
 
 It is my purpose to attempt to describe with the 
 
—76- 
 
 aid of a campaign chart the general movements of 
 the Bulgarian armies in the Second War. But to 
 safeguard you against the dangers of accumulating 
 misinformation I will quote a warning given by one 
 of the most careful and experienced students of 
 Balkan affairs, who has written several books on 
 subjects pertaining to the Near East, and who says: 
 
 *'I have seen enough of Eastern countries to entertain the 
 utmost distrust of any specific statement of fact, with regard 
 to occurrences which are alleged to have taken place there, 
 no matter on what authority the statement is based." 
 
—77— 
 
 The Campaign 
 
 Although in the tactical operations of the Second 
 Balkan War, the Bulgarian Army seemed almost to 
 run the gamut of misadventure and misfortune, 
 which began with the inherent difficulties of her po- 
 litical situation and ended in her humihation and dis- 
 aster, these unhappy results were brought about not 
 by her former Allies alone but through foreign politi- 
 cal influence and by the intervention of another 
 enemy. I believe that there is enough evidence at 
 hand to show that Bulgaria was about to extricate 
 herself from her generally considered insuperable 
 difficulties with the Servians and Greeks, when 
 Roumania intervened and prevented the successes 
 which she was about to achieve and which would 
 have won her certainly more favorable terms in set- 
 tlement with the allies if not a complete victory. 
 
 The sketch (Page 76) which shows the territory, 
 lost by the Turks, as it was occupied by the several 
 allies on July 30th, at the time the Second War be- 
 gan, will readily reveal the difficulties encountered 
 by Bulgaria in making her military distribution with- 
 out indicating a preparation for war. On the other 
 hand Servia and Greece enjoyed the great advantage 
 of the six months of military preparation, quietly 
 though energetically made during the time that 
 Bulgaria was detained in Thrace pending her set- 
 tlement with the Turks. 
 
 General Savoff was Commander-in-Chief when 
 hostilities began as the result of Bulgaria's political 
 blunder which was rather too highly seasoned with 
 military adventure, for an event not accompanied by 
 a declaration of war. This mistake was almost im- 
 mediately realized, but the attempt to correct it, by 
 stopping the aggressive, which was only meant to be 
 a demonstration, proved futile because the Allies in 
 
—78— 
 
 their turn assumed the offensive and thus compelled 
 Bulgaria to continue the war. 
 
 In an attempt to describe the general features 
 of this campaign, it is not without profound regret 
 that we approach the disquieting indication for the 
 employment of the so-called ''names'' of places and 
 even of persons (not to be mistaken for harsh 
 epithets), which are portrayed by groups of phonetic 
 symbols, so vicious in assortment and vile in arrange- 
 ment that they suggest to the Christian eye some 
 heathen blasphemy, or, more happily perhaps, only 
 unutterable sounds. But as the accompanying map 
 bears the names of all the places mentioned, it is 
 hoped that this unhappy situation, resulting from too 
 many centuries of philological carelessness and con- 
 fusion to be corrected at this time may outrage no 
 more than the eye and that the tongue at least may 
 remain pure. 
 
 General Savoff 's strategic plan for the conduct 
 of the war provided for an immediate invasion of 
 Old Servia, with an interruption of the line of com- 
 munications of the Servian army in Macedonia, which 
 would at once place it in an untenable situation and 
 leave a sufficiently large Bulgarian army to conquer 
 the Greeks. On the other hand, it was the plan of 
 the Allies for the Servians to advance slowly, while 
 the Greeks pushed back the Bulgarians as. speedily 
 as possible, thus bringing about the contact of the 
 Servian right with the Greek left for a final effort 
 that would either crush or envelop the Bulgarians. 
 
 Five Bulgarian armies were distributed for the 
 tactical execution of this strategy as follows: The 
 1st Army of forty battalions was concentrated on 
 the Servian frontier south of the railroad in the 
 Pirot district, opposed to sixteen Servian battalions. 
 The 3d Army of forty battaHons was placed at 
 Vlassina, near the pass south of that occupied by the 
 
—79— 
 
 railroad, for an attack on sixteen Servian battalions 
 at Surdulica. The 5th Army of forty battalions 
 was on the Macedonian frontier beyond Kustendil in 
 front of Egri Palanka. The 4th Army was on the 
 line from the Valley of the Strumica to Istip and 
 Kochina in the Valley of Bregalnitca with reinforce- 
 ments available to place ninety-six battalions in this 
 section. The main Servian army, in front of the 
 4th Army, consisted of about eighty battalions 
 in five divisions, placed on the line from Egri Palanka 
 (near the Bulgarian frontier), along the western 
 slopes of the Valleys of the Zletovska and the Bregal- 
 nitca and then down the Valley of the Vardar to 
 Lake Do j ran. The 2d Army was distributed 
 from Kukus to Kavala, so as to contain the Greek 
 army, but without any real concentration.- While its 
 organization consisted of two divisions of fifty-seven 
 battalions, including six battalions of railroad guards, 
 it had an actual strength of only 35,000 men. The 
 entire Greek army concentrated about Salonika num- 
 bered about 120,000. 
 
 The combined Bulgarian armies had a strength 
 of about 220,000, to which was opposed about 115,000 
 Servians and 120,000 Greeks, or an allied army of 
 235,000. The Bulgarian concentration had been 
 started a month before the beginning of the war, 
 but all of the divisions of the 4th Army were not 
 in position on July 29th. The Bulgarian disadvantage 
 in this situation may be appreciated when it is 
 remembered that the entire Servian and Greek 
 armies had held their positions for six months with 
 nothing to divert their attention from constructing 
 defenses and making other arrangements for the 
 campaign. 
 
 The left wing of the 5th Bulgarian Army rested 
 on Rujen, a mountain 2,235 meters high, on the 
 southwest frontier, which was connected by a broad 
 
—80— 
 
 saddle, fit to be called a causeway, to an adjacent 
 Macedonian mountain, Car-Vrh (Sultan Tepe), 2,104 
 meters high. On the latter, the Servians mounted 
 heavy guns and built an automobile road for fifteen 
 or twenty miles from Egri Palanka towards Kochina 
 in the Bregalnitca Valley. I have been over this 
 terrain from Komonovo to Egri Palanka and Kochina, 
 where every position had been most elaborately 
 prepared by the Serbs against Bulgarian attack and 
 for their own retreat. There were miles of trenches 
 that were, never occupied. As the Bulgars had no 
 road to Rujen, and so could not avail themselves of 
 its superior tactical advantage, they were unable on 
 this terrain to make any advance and could only 
 conduct a guerre in place. 
 
 The political complications with which the cam- 
 paign began so muddled up the military arrange- 
 ments that it was not possible for the Bulgarian 
 strategy to realize any of its inherent advantages. 
 General Savoff was relieved from command on July 
 3d, the fourth day of the war, with some political 
 fan-fare and a telegram to St. Petersburg, it is said, 
 announcing the summary dismissal from office of the 
 culprit who, without authority, had started the war. 
 In the second week of the war it was rumored in 
 Sofia that General Savoff was in disgrace and had 
 been dismissed from the army. Sometime later he 
 was really, though informally and almost sur- 
 reptitiously, sent to command the 4th and 5th 
 Armies at Kustendil, where I saw him in the third 
 week of the war. 
 
 General Dimitrieff became commander-in-chief, 
 and, whatever may have been his virtues and abilities, 
 the venerable though disaster-inviting process of 
 swapping horses while crossing a stream, which 
 permits a new commander to execute or muss up the 
 plans of his predecessor, already in operation, was 
 
-81— 
 
 bound to work to the great disadvantage of the 
 Bulgarian army. It seems that everything went 
 amiss from the very first. The 1st and 3d Armies 
 moved into Servia on July 6th, to be recalled on 
 July 9th, and instead of cutting the Servian army 
 off from its base, while the 4th Army immobilized 
 it in its front, the Servian army was left free to 
 attack the 4th Army in superior numbers from a 
 most favorable position. 
 
 This surprising and disrupting change in strategy 
 is attributed to the Russian demand upon Bulgaria 
 to confine the conflict to the disputed zone and not 
 to muss up any new territory. There can be no 
 doubt that that abrupt change was made only on some 
 demand or threat from a foreign source, for which 
 Bulgarian commanders were not responsible. The 
 same restraint being imposed upon Servia, the entire 
 theater of operations was then confined to Bulgaria's 
 Macedonian frontier. The 1st Army was then 
 broken up and distributed to the 4th and 5th 
 Armies as the progress of the campaign indicated, 
 and, more particularly, as the greater difficulties of 
 transportation permitted. The impetuosity with 
 which these movements were made was revealed in 
 the unintentional separation of battahons from their 
 regiments and companies from their battalions, as I 
 certainly know from personal observation. 
 
 After the first week of the war, as there was no 
 important change in the position of the 5th Army or 
 of the Servian Army concentrated against it, the 
 principal interests in the campaign lies in the theater 
 occupying the valleys of the Bregalnitca, Strumitca 
 and Struma, where the Bulgarian 2d and 4th Armies 
 met their first reverses against the Greeks and Ser- 
 vians. 
 
—82— 
 Position In the Servian Theater 
 
 In the evening of June 29th, the 4th Army made 
 its unexpected, though unfortunate, attack upon the 
 Servian Division on the western slopes of theZletov- 
 ska valley, which was renewed from the positions 
 thus gained on the morning of July 30th. The Com- 
 manding Officer of the 4th Army then received an 
 order to discontinue hostilities and to open negotia- 
 tions with the Servians for an armistice. The brigade 
 commanders received their orders about noon and at 
 once suspended the action. The men, believing the 
 fighting over, left their positions and were separated 
 from their arms. The Serbs did not receive the par- 
 limentaires but made an unexpected attack which 
 routed the Bulgarians with great losses. Following 
 this advantage the Serbs occupied a position which 
 commanded Istip, from which, in a few days, the 4th 
 Army was compelled to retire, with the right wing 
 passing up the valley of the Bregalnitca to Kochina 
 and the left wing into the valley of the Strumitca. 
 As the line of supply of both the 1st and 4th Armies, 
 which had been maintained by rail from Adrianople 
 through Drama and Seres, would be interrupted and, 
 as both armies would then be based on Sofia through 
 the valley of the Struma, it became necessary to pro- 
 tect the new line of communications. 
 
 As the Commanding Officer of the 4th Army re- 
 ceived orders to retire and to protect the right flank 
 of the 2d Army, on July 7th, he sent the artillery 
 and wagon trains of his left wing through the valley 
 of the Strumitca to enter the valley of the Struma at 
 Petric, in withdrawal towards the Bulgarian frontier. 
 
 Position on the Greek Theater 
 
 The battalion of 1,000 men is the conventional 
 unit of measure of strength in the Balkan armies, 
 
-83— 
 
 although the division unit is used in a more technical 
 sense. The Bulgarian division, however, is much 
 larger than the Servian or Greek divisions, as the 
 former consists of three brigades of two regiments 
 each and the latter do not use brigades but assign four 
 regiments to a division. As four battalions form a 
 regiment, in all of these armies, the normal composi- 
 tion of a Bulgarian division is twenty-four battalions 
 while that of the Greek or Servian is sixteen battalions. 
 
 In the 2d Bulgarian Army, all of the organiza- 
 tions were so depleted that with fifty-seven battalions, 
 thirty-five batteries and ten escadrons (one fourth 
 mounted) the total strength was only 35,000 men. In 
 the entire Greek Army, which opposed the 2d Bul- 
 garian Army, all of the organizations were at full 
 strength, as it had taken a very subordinate part in 
 the war against Turkey and it had had sufficient 
 opportunity after that time to complete the cadres, so 
 that the ninety battalions with about 1,200 men each, 
 eighty-four batteries and ten escadrons made a force 
 of about 120,000 men. The Bulgarian organization as 
 it is here given is taken from Bulgarian reports, which 
 also estimates the Greek army as a little more than 
 twice the Bulgarian strength ; but from Greek sources 
 I have the Greek strength as 120,000. The Greeks 
 had a greatly superior advantage in artillery suit- 
 able for the mountainous terrain of the campaign, 
 in that they had sixty mountain guns while the 
 Bulgars had only twelve. 
 
 For the graphic description of the general tacti- 
 cal features of the campaign, the 2d Bulgarian Army 
 may be fairly represented by six brigades of 6,000 
 men and the whole Greek Army by ten divisions of 
 12,000 men each. 
 
 Positions 
 
 The Bulgarian 2d Army was distributed along 
 
—84— 
 
 a front of 130-140 km. (80-85 miles) in length extend- 
 ing from the left (east) bank of the Vardar at 
 Guevgueli to Kavala. 
 
 The Greek Army was concentrated in three main 
 groups from the right (west) bank of the Vardar to 
 Lake Tashino, and beyond, along the coast to the 
 Bay of Leftero. 
 
 Greek Offense 
 
 The plans were: (1) To drive the Bulgars away 
 from the left bank of the mouth of the Struma and 
 out of the Pravisteh district; to cut the railway from 
 Drama to Seres, which supplied the 2d and 4th 
 Armies, and also to isolate the Bulgarian left wing. 
 (2) To advance their left wing from Guevgueli toward 
 Lake Dojran; to cut the pass leading from Dojran to 
 Strumitca, and thus to interrupt communications 
 between the 2d and 4th Bulgarian Armies. 
 
 Bulgarian Defense 
 
 The Belasica Mountains, lying north of the lower 
 valleys of the Vardar and Struma, which separate 
 this theater from the valley of the Strumitca, can 
 only be crossed by two passes; one north of Lake 
 Dojran and the other at Rupel, where the Struma 
 emerges from the most wretchedly mountainous 
 country in Macedonia. The only possible retreat to- 
 wards the Bulgarian frontier for the 2d Army and 
 for the left wing of the 4th Army, which had fallen 
 back into the valley of the Strumitca, as well as the 
 only line of supply for these forces, was through 
 Rupel pass and the valley of the Struma. The pos- 
 session of both these passes were absolutely neces- 
 sary to the Bulgars in case of either fight or flight. 
 
 General Ivanoff, commanding the 2d Army 
 published the Bulgarian plan in the following order: 
 
 1. The left wing will advance, drive the Greeks 
 
—86— 
 
 to the right (west) bank of the mouth of the Struma 
 and take position with shortened front and holding 
 the left (east) bank at the mouth of the Struma, in 
 order to protect the railroad. 
 
 2. The right wing will cross the Vardar at 
 Guevgueli, establish a bridgehead on the west (right) 
 bank and if compelled to retire will destroy the 
 bridge. 
 
 These movements were executed and a brigade 
 from the Pravistha district was sent by rail to rein- 
 force the force at Kukus. 
 
 The Bulgarian battalion, which had remained in 
 Salonica since the surrender of the Turks, was 
 crushed by the Greeks. 
 
 Then on July 3d, the commander of the 2d 
 Army wired to the Commander-in-Chief: "If we 
 are forced to retreat, shall we retire into the valley 
 of the Struma or from Drama?'' He was answered: 
 ''The task of your army is to secure the flank and 
 the rear of the 4th and 5th Armies; in case of re- 
 treat, retire slowly, keeping up energetic resistance, 
 into the valleys of the Struma and the Vardar/' 
 There is certainly some evidence in this order to 
 support the contention that the Commander-in-chief 
 did not fully and clearly understand the position of 
 either the 2d or the 4th Army, for there was no 
 chance of escape for either army in the valley of the 
 Vardar and only the 2d Army could have retired 
 from Drama. The assignment to cooperation with 
 the 4th Army, however, determined the valley of the 
 Struma as the line of retreat. 
 
 On the following day the Greeks attacked all 
 along the line. On the Bulgarian left, a futile at- 
 tempt was made to land at Tusla under the protec- 
 tion of gunboats. On the center the Bulgarians 
 were driven back toward the Belasica Mountains, 
 the left center resting on Seres. On the Bulgarian 
 
—86— 
 
 right, the force holding the Guevgueli bridgehead 
 was driven back and in its hasty retirement the 
 bridge was not destroyed. This force, however, re- 
 tired in good order and took up a position covering 
 the pass leading from Dojran to Strumitca. As an 
 incident illustrating the determined defense of the 
 Bulgarians against overwhelming forces, it may be 
 mentioned that five Greek divisions attacked Colonel 
 Rebavoff 's Brigade near Kukus inflicting a loss of 
 seven officers and 500 men. Protecting the retire- 
 ment of this defeated force, the machine gun de- 
 tachment of the 32d Nova Zagora Regiment remained 
 in position until all its officers and men were either 
 killed or wounded. 
 
 On July the 7th, the Greeks renewed the attack 
 on the Bulgarian right and left, with their original 
 purpose of preventing their enemy's retreat into the 
 valleys of the Strumitca or the Struma. They suc- 
 ceeded, on the right, in crossing to the east bank of 
 the Struma at Seres and interrupting the railroad, 
 but only after all of the wagon trains and artillery 
 of the Bulgarian left wing had been withdrawn 
 towards Rupel Pass. The infantry of the left wing 
 concentrated at Drama and retired into the valley 
 leading to Nevikop. The center withdrew, unmo- 
 lested, from the Belasica Mountains towards Rupel 
 Pass. The right wing retired toward Strumitca 
 while the brigade of Colonel Kavarvalijev held the 
 pass at Dojran during the day and night with almost 
 a disastrous loss and the death of the commander. 
 The artillery and wagon trains of this right wing 
 were hurried from Strumitca toward Petric, while 
 the brigade ^as holding its position. 
 
 At this same time, the 4th Army had met with 
 serious reverses which forced it back with a separa- 
 tion of the right from the left wing at Istip. The 
 two divisions of the right wing had already retired 
 
—87— 
 
 with their trains and artillery along the Bregalnitca 
 to Kochina and the other two divisions forming the 
 left wing were withdrawn towards Strumitca, from 
 where the infantry could and did later retire over 
 the mountains in a northeast direction towards 
 Pechova, although the artillery and trains could only 
 escape by a flank march through the valley of the 
 Strumitca, towards Petric, and thence to the valley 
 of the Struma. General Kovatcheff, (Commanding 
 the 4th Army) at this time so feared a catastrophe 
 that he telegraphed General Headquarters urgently 
 recommending intervention, as a means to suspend 
 hostilities * 'before the fatal hour arrives.'' He re- 
 ceived a very elaborate order directing a movement 
 against the Servians, which had already been at- 
 tempted with such disastrous results that two of his 
 divisions had sustained a loss of 30 per cent. 
 
 The heroic temper of the Commander-in-chief 
 rose sublimely above his appreciation of the situation 
 in the reply to the Commanding Officer of the 4th 
 Army, in which he instructed the latter to place no 
 confidence in intervention but to trust only to the 
 force of arms and * *to attack the Greeks energetically 
 and roll up their left wing— or else die in honorable 
 battle. In so sacrificing yourself you will save the 
 2d Army.'' General Kovatcheff, (Commanding 4th 
 Army) thought "the idea superb but inopportune" as 
 the infantry on his left wing was then on the way to 
 the upper Bregalnitca, near Pechovo and Carevocelo, 
 and its artillery, except a battalion with the rear 
 guard, and all the wagon trains had gone to the val- 
 ley of the Struma. 
 
 On July 9th, the rear guard brigade, with its 
 artillery and train, as it was in a critical position in 
 the valley of the Strumitca, with the Greeks press- 
 ing on the Belasica Mountains, was ordered to march 
 without halting to Petric, in order to reach the 
 
-88- 
 
 Struma valley road. This order was given, notwith- 
 standing the request of the brigade commander for 
 delay on account of the greatly fatigued condition of 
 his men, who had been in continuous operations for 
 two frightfully hot days, clad in winter clothing. In 
 spite of these orders the column halted for the night, 
 but the 2d Army fell back during the night from 
 Belasica Mountain and in the morning, as the march 
 of the brigade was resumed, the Greeks attacked 
 them in flank in superior force and the artillerymen 
 unhooked the horses and abandoned their guns. The 
 infantry retired to the north over the mountains. 
 
 Two days later, when General Kovatcheff reached 
 Pechora, he was relieved of his command by the 
 King because he had "lost faith in his army and 
 himself. '' 
 
 In this way both the 2d and 4th Armies were 
 extricated from a most diflficult position. With 
 the exception of the lost battalion of artillery, the 
 trains of both armies had been collected from a wide 
 front and sent over the most available road for their 
 escape from lower Macedonia. 
 
 When the flank march through the Valley of the 
 Strumitca began, the hospitals at Radovista and 
 Strumitca contained 2,500 sick and wounded of the 
 Fourth Army whose transportation added much to 
 the burden of the retreat. The early interruption of 
 the line of communications by rail, before the more 
 difficult and more tedious route by road was estab- 
 lished, left the army with a ration reduced to one 
 half a loaf or one pound of bread. 
 
 The Fourth Army was reformed on the Bregal- 
 nitca, in front of Caravocelo, with its left flank in 
 contact with the right flank of the 2d Army, 
 which had fallen back through Kresna Pass. This 
 Bulgarian movement prevented a junction of the 
 Servian and Greek armies, as the former was then in 
 
—89— 
 
 the lower Bregalnitca and the latter in the Struma 
 Valley. 
 
 Then, on July 15th, the last straw was added to 
 the almost crushing weight of Bulgarian disaster, 
 when the Roumanian army crossed the Danube and 
 began its march on Sofia, which, under the existing 
 conditions, could be met only by a decision to make 
 no resistance to this advance. 
 
 As the Greeks were not moving energetically 
 into the Valley of the Struma, General Ivanhoff 
 prepared for an advance of the 2d Army, even 
 though another menace then confronted the Bul- 
 garians, when one regiment of his right wing was 
 reported to have three fourths of its strength 
 disabled by ''gastro-enteritis,'' which most probably 
 was cholera, as 10,000 cholera cases were later re- 
 ceived in evacuation hospitals of the 2d and 4th 
 Armies. General Ivanhoff was not permitted to 
 advance because he was informed the political con- 
 ditions indicated the continuation of the defensive. 
 
 The events of July 24th probably mark the 
 critical stage and the turn of fortune in the Bul- 
 garian campaign, as on this day the Servians made 
 a determined attack and were defeated with great 
 loss (at Banjatchuka, Povijen and Calimanovi) 
 and the 2d Army received strong reenforcements. 
 After this encouragement a strategic retirement of 
 the 2d Army was ordered, with the purpose of 
 drawing the Greeks out of the mountains and into 
 the upper Valley of the Struma beyond Kresna Pass, 
 where the Bulgarians hoped to used their field ar- 
 tillery to better advantage than in the mountains, 
 where the preponderance of Greek mountain guns 
 had given the latter a great advantage in the earlier 
 stages of the campaign. Positions were taken in 
 front of Dzuemaja on both banks of the Struma and 
 
—go- 
 frantic entrenching efforts were exhibited to the 
 Greeks which induced them to advance. 
 
 On July 27th the 2d Army was given to 
 General Savoff, who was already in command of 
 the 4th and 5th Armies, and he directed the com- 
 bined operations against both the Servians and the 
 Greeks. The Bulgarian left wing was then reenf orced 
 by the column which came from Sofia by way of 
 Samakov. The left wing of the 4th Army was 
 included in the movement so to form the right wing 
 in the attack which was made against both Greek 
 wings, with the object of enveloping them and the 
 cutting off their retreat. The Greek right was 
 struck in the Valley of the Metza (at Dobninishteh), 
 driven both north (from Nehomija) into Predel Pass 
 and south towards Novokop, with the loss of two 
 guns and the wagon trains which carried the bag- 
 gage of the officers and the outgoing mail bags of 
 the 7th Greek Division. 
 
 This incident may be worthy of passing notice, 
 as some of the letters of the Greek soldiers, which 
 have been published in fac simile by the Bulgarian 
 governnient, are printed in translation in the report 
 of the Carnegie "International Commission for the 
 Investigation of the Balkan Wars,'' as the expressions 
 of Greek soldiers seem to show the manner in which 
 their campaign was conducted. 
 
-91- 
 
 31111 I 
 
 j2 o -I- ■•- •«- 
 
 ^ < (S ID iS 
 
 The Greek left was attacked with equal success 
 from the Valley of Zlenitca. 
 
 On July 30th, when the armistice was announced 
 and the order for cessation of hostilities was most 
 reluctantly given, the Bulgarian line lay in the form 
 of a horseshoe with its center massed at the *'toe'' 
 (in front of Djumica), the right wing at one "heeF' 
 (near Nevokop) and the left wing at the other 
 "heer* (at Pechovo). The main body of the Greek 
 army faced directly against the inside of the *'toe/' 
 
—92— 
 
 The Greeks in their retreat, with the center of the 
 2d Army in pursuit, would have had to have made a 
 longer march than that of the Bulgarian wings in 
 closing in on the only road by which the Greeks could 
 escape. 
 
 While this report is taken largely from Bulgarian 
 official reports, I have the personal accounts of Bul- 
 garian officers and of most creditable observers in 
 the person of two German doctors who were battalion 
 surgeons with the troops engaged, and all corroborate 
 some of the related incidents. As it is quite probable 
 that the submerging levels of the "hydrostatic para- 
 dox of controversy'' may long obscure the historic 
 surface of these events, which have already sunk 
 into insignificance in comparison with the vastly 
 more important military history that is now in mak- 
 ing, and as any evidence that may support the Bul- 
 garian account of their own operations may not be 
 out of place, I feel able myself to verify in a general 
 way, at least, some of these incidents, because I 
 arrived on July 24th at Kustendil, the headquarters 
 of General Savoff and of General Tocheff, command- 
 ing the 5th Army, just at that time when fortune 
 first seemed to favor Bulgarian arms. 
 
 Concerning this day, it may be remembered, 
 two critical events are recorded: one was what the Bul- 
 garians called their "success against the Servians,'' 
 and the other was the timely reenforcement of 
 the 2d Army. The effect of these two fortunate 
 incidents had not then been felt at Kustendil, On 
 that same day the order of the day before for the 
 evacuation of the hospitals was then being executed 
 as the preliminary step to the evacuation of the 
 town, the Valley of the Struma and the withdrawal 
 of the 5th Army from the frontier to the defile 
 through which the river emerges, a few miles east 
 of town, in its course from Sofia. The daily in- 
 
—OS- 
 creasing number of trench-line scars could be seen 
 on the mountain sides. The whole situation was one 
 of military activity under the strain of a stern 
 resignation, moaning laments and bitter accusations 
 of responsibility for the ''ruin of Bulgaria.'' Un- 
 broken lines of bullock wagons were creaking night 
 and day on the road to Carovocelo and to the 4th 
 Army with ammunition and supplies. They were 
 returning as regularly with wounded— a thousand in 
 the first day of my service and from three to five 
 hundred daily for several days after. 
 
 The 2d Army was based on Dubnitca— Sofia 
 and I knew nothing personally of that line. 
 
 Regiments marched through the town at night, 
 but in what numbers I did not know. Artillery was 
 detrained and rattled off to Carovocelo. I saw as 
 many as a dozen guns on the way. Cafes were 
 closed, and gendarmes, such as there were - grizzled 
 and stooped old men in sheepskin coats carrying 
 obsolete arms -ordered the dispersion of the groups 
 that gathered in the streets to talk with great in- 
 terest labout something. The next day the coffee- 
 houses were opened; the following day they were 
 closed again, and I then learned that the coffee- 
 house was the barometer of public tension, as the 
 commanding general ordered them closed when there 
 was any unhappy or disquieting rumors in circulation, 
 and then ' 'lifted the lid'' when the news was good. 
 On the second day before the armistice the 
 barometer was away up; the "lid was off;" the coffee- 
 houses were open and almost everybody was reck- 
 lessly ordering the second and even third cup of 
 coffee at one sitting. My colleague let me into the 
 secret; he told me of the "great success" that the 
 Bulgars were about to attain in the capture of the 
 Greek army, as it was then almost surrounded and 
 
—94— 
 
 there were sufficient troops available to complete the 
 movement. 
 
 Then I saw the outbursts of indignation and 
 heard the protests of injustice and wails of despair 
 when the announcement of the armistice cut short 
 the campaign and denied to the Bulgars the few 
 days necessary to their confidently expected achieve- 
 ment. I heard the commanding general of an army 
 utter his '' miser ahles'' and other more impressive 
 though less intelligible expressions which must have 
 done him a great deal more good. There could have 
 been no doubt to any one there in Kustendil that the 
 Bulgars on the 24th day of July feared they had lost 
 their campaign and that on July 30th they were 
 wholly confident that they had won it. Besides, 
 there is at least one historical fact which supports 
 their position. The King of Greece did telegraph 
 the King of Roumania on July 30th demanding an 
 " immediate '^ armistice, and the King of Roumania, 
 with his army then within a few miles of Sofia, did 
 enforce the Greek demand upon Bulgaria and com- 
 pelled her to accept the armistice just as she was 
 about to capture the Greek army. 
 
 Three commanders of this war, Generals Savoff, 
 Ivanhoff and Dimitrieff, have been variously and 
 vigorously traduced for the disaster they are said to 
 have brought to Bulgarian arms, although it does 
 seem that each one of them has escaped with a few 
 shreds of reputation, because General Savoff was 
 sent as the Bulgarian plenipotentiary to negotiate 
 the treaty with Turkey, General Ivanhoff was deco- 
 rated by the King with an order so high that the 
 King himself was the only other member, and General 
 Dimitrieff has gone to command a Russian division in 
 a greater war. 
 
 But in the advantages she has taken of the 
 possibilities for controversy in placing the responsi- 
 
96- 
 
 bility for her defeat, Bulgaria has shown to the 
 world an appreciation as keen as that of other en- 
 lightened nations for making the most of these rich 
 opportunities for excitement which come as the 
 aftermath of war. 
 
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 Map Of 
 South Eastern Europe 
 
 
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 1914 
 
 Army Service Schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ourth Lecture 
 
 NOTES ON THE BALKAN AND 
 TURKISH ARMIES 
 
 Strength 
 
 T^HE population of Bulgaria is about four and one- 
 -■- fourth million. The peace footing of the army 
 is about 60,000 which is raised to war strength by 
 the addition of trained reserves, provided for in 
 cadres of 200,000, which are increased by additional 
 calls to 300,000, or an extreme limit of 400,000, so 
 that one- tenth of the population is normally available 
 for military service, as more than this number were 
 under arms during the last war. 
 
 The population of Servia is about three million. 
 The peace strength of the army is about 30,000, with 
 a provision for war strength of 200,000. 
 
 Montenegro, with a population of only 250,000, 
 exacts military service from every male, who is big 
 enough to carry a gun and not too old to climb a 
 mountain. They had under arms from 45,000 to 
 50,000 in the last war which shows that they con- 
 tributed one fifth of their population, which is, no 
 doubt, the factor of extreme limit in the military 
 strength of any people. 
 
 The population of Turkey is at present, and 
 always has been unknown. It has been given as about 
 twenty- four million. Foreign officials living in Turkey 
 have not been able to make the estimate so high. I 
 have been told by those in a position to know, in 
 Constantinople, that, considering the territorial losses 
 
 96 
 
—97— 
 
 Turkey has sustained in the last few years, the popu- 
 lation at present is about fourteen million. Before 
 the first war Turkey had under arms 300,000 men, 
 which represented her standing army, but they were 
 standing around over such a widely dispersed area 
 that she did not have at the beginning of the war 
 that many regular troops in action. The practical 
 limit of her effective military strength is probably 
 about 500,000. Prior to 1909 only Moslems were 
 eligible for military service, but after that time all 
 Ottoman subjects became amenable to conscription. 
 The Christian contingent was not added to the army 
 at once, but 25% was taken each year, and the pre- 
 caution was invariably observed to send the Christian 
 recruits to stations farthest from their homes. 
 
 At the beginning of the Balkan Wars the allied 
 armies at first numbered about 625,000. The Turk- 
 ish Nizam and Redifs together numbered 300,000. 
 During the course of the war the allies had under 
 arms about 800,000 and the Turks 600,000. 
 
 Organization 
 
 In the Balkan and Turkish armies the military 
 unit of strength is the battalion, and in all except 
 the Turkish armies the normal strength of the bat- 
 talion is 1,000 rifles. The larger Bulgarian units 
 were brigades, divisions and armies. The Serbs did 
 not employ the brigade, while the Turks divided 
 their armies into corps and divisions without brigades. 
 The Bulgarian infantry regiment consisted of four 
 battalions of four companies of 250 rifles each an d^ a 
 few unarmed men, and the regiment was considered 
 as carrying 4,000 rifles, and drawing 5,000 rations. 
 Two regiments comprised the brigade, and three 
 brigades the division, or twenty-four battalions. 
 The Bulgarian cavalry did not seem to be of much 
 efficiency or very well trained and it was poorly 
 
—OS- 
 mounted. The squadron consisted of about 200 men, 
 and there were four of them to the regiment, and 
 ten regiments in the army. The artillery was of 
 two classes, the modern Schneider-Cruesot quick 
 firing guns of 7.5 cm., with three battalions of three 
 batteries of four guns each, or 36 guns. The older 
 materiel was the Krupp 7.5 and 8.7 cm. non-quick 
 firing guns, formed in two battalions of three bat- 
 teries of four guns each, or twenty-four guns. 
 
 The Servian infantry units were the same as the 
 Bulgarian, but their companies were divided into 
 tenths. They did not employ the brigade formation 
 but their division consisted of four regiments, or 
 sixteen battalions. Their cavalry was organized like 
 the Bulgarian, and they had the same number, ten 
 regiments. The peace footing was only five regi- 
 ments, but soldiers taken from the reserves who 
 '*loved horses'' made up the extra units. The 
 Servian artillery was of modern Schneider-Cruesot 
 7.5, 8, 12 and 15 cm. The field regiments consisted 
 of three battalions of three batteries, of four guns 
 each. 
 
 The Montenegrin infantry was about the same as 
 the Servian, but the artillery was made up of rich 
 and rare varieties of ordnance, as the most of 
 their pieces had been presented to the King. 
 
 The Turkish infantry regiments consisted of 
 three battalions of three companies, 500 men to the 
 battalion, or 1,500 to the regiment. The cavalry 
 organization consisted of four squadrons of 100 to 
 125 men each, approximately 500 men to the regi- 
 ment. This arm was poorly organized and trained 
 and was badly mounted. It was largely used as a 
 remount service for mounted officers who were un- 
 able to provide their own horses, and the most of the 
 officers seem to have been mounted in this way. The 
 German instructors had tried to introduce into the 
 
—go- 
 cavalry organization that superior social caste that it 
 found in some of the crack cavalry organizations in 
 Western Europe. 
 
 An example of this spirit may be found in a regi- 
 ment of lancers that had permanent station at Con- 
 stantinople, and was commanded by a German cavalry 
 officer of great energy, who devoted his efforts 
 largely to establish the social caste of this organiza- 
 tion, in teaching the officers the graceful and easy 
 manners of the Cafe habitue' and fox hunter. He 
 met with some difficulty as the social system of the 
 country did not make it easy for the Turkish officers 
 to take their proper place among the membership of 
 the hunting clubs. However, the unhappy day came 
 when this regiment went to war. Some months after 
 when a lady in diplomatic circles asked this German 
 commander of the 1st Constantinople Lancers what 
 had become of his regiment and how he was then 
 occupying his time, he replied that his regiment was 
 engaged at the battle of Luli Burgas where he had 
 hoped they might render some service to the cause 
 of the Sultan, but something had happened that not 
 only led to its disorganization but to its complete dis- 
 appearance. 
 
 The Turkish artillery, of Krupp material and 
 about one-half modern, was poorly handled and ren- 
 dered i nefficient service. The difficulty of developing 
 an efficient artillery service in the Turkish army is 
 almost insurmountable, owing to the scarcity of sol- 
 diers who have enough elementary education and 
 mechanical competency to enable them to be trained 
 into gunners. Some of their batteries show rather 
 good form in the way of superficial manifestation at 
 drill and maneuvers, but the more technical accom- 
 plishments seem to be quite lacking. 
 
—100— 
 Mobilization 
 
 The mobilization of the allied armies was carried 
 out promptly and effectively and all the cadres were 
 regularly filled at the time the war began. 
 
 The Turkish Army, however, was mobilized in 
 disorder and confusion. In the effort to increase the 
 strength of regular organizations by their reserves, 
 some of the Nizam, or regular regiments, were filled 
 with more reserves, or untrained recruits, than regu- 
 lars. There were no reserve lists prepared, and 
 when mobilization was ordered and reserves called 
 out, these reservists were assembled with recruits 
 without classification. The military authorities sent 
 requisitions to certain villages for their contributions 
 of men and the gendarmerie rounded up in various 
 communities the numbers that the head man was 
 ordered to supply. There was very little, if any, 
 efficient physical examination and the results of this 
 omission were very evident in the hospital service at 
 Constantinople, where all sorts of physical defects 
 were gathered for ultimate elimination. I terminat- 
 ed my medical service there with a series of opera- 
 tions for hernia which ranged in size from oranges 
 to watermelons. The reservists and recruits, gathered 
 at concentration centers, were subjected to most try- 
 ing forms of neglect. They were oftimes provided 
 with no shelter, and remained literally out in the 
 rain for days, and in some instances were partly if 
 not wholly starvedbefore joining their organizations. 
 
 The Bulgarian and Turkish 
 Soldier 
 
 Citizenry 
 
 As the qualities of the soldier depend to such a 
 great extent upon his condition as a citizen, the ma- 
 
terial that Bulgaria found in her citizenry to form 
 her army, may be best presented by a few quotations 
 from a description of the Bulgarian people, written 
 some years ago by an author well qualified to discuss 
 the subjects, under the title of '^Bulgaria: The Pea- 
 sant State.'* 
 
 "The Bulgarians are not an engaging or attractive people; 
 they have no literature, no artistic taste, no intellectual cul- 
 ture, and no dramatic qualities; they are simply a race of 
 peasants with all the peasant's meanness, but with also all the 
 peasant's virtues of industry and frugality. They live roughly, 
 thriftily, and one might say sordidly, but they have suflacient 
 to eat; they are warmly if coarsely clothed, and they enjoy a 
 certain amount of rude comfort. They work hard but they 
 work for themselves. Poverty in our sense does not exist. 
 There are no labor troubles and no strikes, no conflicting in- 
 terests of workmen and employers— thanks to themselves. 
 If you want work done in Bulgaria you can get it done more 
 cheaply if you employ Bulgarian workmen by the day rather 
 than for the job or by piece work. Under the exterior of the 
 peasant, cunning and superstitious, in accordance with peasant 
 nature, the common Bulgarian conceals a shrewd and observ- 
 ant mind." 
 
 Every Bulgarian has two passions; that of sex 
 and that for land. No Bulgarian swain has the 
 effrontery to ask the father for the hand of his daugh- 
 ter if he cannot base his claim upon possession of 
 some property. It is his ambition to own a farm. 
 It is a greater offense to the Bulgarian peasant to 
 trespass upon his land than on his person. 
 
 The Turk, on the other hand, exhibits a different 
 social system. He has two extreme classes— the 
 Pashas and the peasants. There is no middle class, 
 but its void is filled by functionaries, or office-holders, 
 as almost every public office in the Ottoman Empire 
 is held by a Turk. The administration of the govern- 
 ment is based largely upon the principle of creating 
 sufficient public places to employ the Turkish civil 
 army of occupation. The Pashas are the administra- 
 
tors or gentlemen pensioners living in some way on 
 the revenues of the government. The peasants are 
 the lowliest social order and exist in a primitive state 
 of poverty and abject humility. They seldom own 
 property and are almost always tenants of the land 
 they till. They feel that they exist by sufferance of 
 some illustrious person who holds their lives in his 
 hands. But few of them can read and they show no 
 other disposition than that humble desire of being 
 simply permitted to live. They seldom go far from 
 their villages and the recruits presented a pathetic 
 aspect as they entered Constantinople in droves, 
 timidly holding each others hands, but wholly re- 
 signed to their unknown fate. 
 
 Military Training 
 
 The Turk serves nominally three years with the 
 colors, but virtually they are dismissed when the 
 military authorities find it convenient, and many of 
 them serve much longer. Much of their service is 
 garrison duty where they are stationed to preserve 
 the authority of the empire. In late years, under 
 German instruction, there has been all sorts of educa- 
 tional schemes devised for the benefit of both officers 
 and soldiers, but the method has been better suited 
 to German society, as it has developed a sense of su- 
 periority on the part of the oflficer, which has led him 
 to keep aloof from the men, to the extent of taking 
 no part in their instruction, which is done entirely 
 by non-commissioned officers. The organization of 
 the army under German instruction has taken away 
 that class of company officers who used to control the 
 company as a head man rules his village, but the new 
 system has not developed a satisfactory substitute 
 for what it removed. 
 
 The Bulgar, on the other hand, has taken his 
 
—103— 
 military training very seriously and always with a 
 deep personal interest. The two years he spends 
 with the colors in the infantry, and the three years 
 in mounted and other services, together with subse- 
 quent periods of instruction, makes him a competent 
 soldier. By attaining certain merit in his course of 
 instruction he may shorten the period of two years 
 to eighteen months, and that of three years to thirty 
 months. 
 
 Endurance 
 
 The endurance of the Eastern soldier is his 
 greatest characteristic, both as regards hardships 
 and patience. The Turkish soldier is a particularly 
 patient creature, and one should never do him the 
 injustice to even think of him as ''terrible.'' His 
 waiting capacity is admirable, as while he waits 
 he does not have to be watched. He will wait 
 in the rain, in the cold, without food, and without 
 question— after he has been told to do so. I have seen 
 hundreds of them in the public square and streets of 
 the village, which was the cholera camp, where the 
 houses had been vacated by their tennants who fled 
 in terror. These soldiers were forbidden to trespass 
 upon the property of the village, and many of them 
 died from the mere want of shelter without breaking 
 a window pane. In one dooryard, in which there 
 was a well, I saw a group of plainly sick soldiers 
 struggling for water, but they had been driven to 
 this infraction of discipline by abnormal thirst. One 
 half-delirious soldier did threaten an attack on a 
 front gate, but a non-commissioned officer drew a 
 pistol and he staggered back to the gutter. 
 
 When the Bulgarian soldier waits he must be 
 watched, for he wants to know what it is all about— 
 what he is waiting for, and, most probably, what he 
 is going to do next; but when it comes to sheer 
 
physical exertion, his qualities are not much less than 
 superb, and his superior is hard to find. 
 
 I have a story of a Bulgarian march that may 
 furnish an illustration, as it was told by the regi- 
 mental apothecary, who accompanied the column on 
 foot throughout the march. A regiment of about 
 5,000 men had fought three days at Adrianople, with 
 a loss of killed and wounded of 302, when it was 
 ordered, with a battery of artillery, to proceed in all 
 haste to the Chatalja line, some 150 miles distant. 
 The march was begun immediately, and continued 
 literally night and day for eleven days; the men 
 slept at night only when the pioneers were making 
 roads for the artillery. Each day the progress was 
 from twelve to twenty miles, though one day on 
 good roads a march of twenty-five miles was made. 
 The average night's march was from a mile to a 
 mile and a half. The column arrived four days 
 in advance of the wagon train, during which time 
 the men were issued no rations, and their only sub- 
 sistence, during these four days, was the uncooked 
 wheat or corn which they found in the villages. 
 Two days after the arrival of the wagon train, the 
 first fresh meat was received, in the form of goats, 
 which could be driven faster than sheep, and thus 
 was made to form the component of an emergency 
 ration, which in this instance at least put the despised 
 and usually delinquent goat in the first place. The 
 apothecary said that everything went well, except 
 for one terrible infraction upon discipline, which 
 occasioned the loss of three loaves of bread which he 
 and the doctor had sequestered in the ambulance 
 cart. 
 
 Incidentally, cholera began its invasion about 
 this time, as all the Bulgarian troops in that position 
 suffered from lack of commissary supplies. Eight 
 thousand deaths in the Bulgarian troops followed in 
 
—105— 
 
 the ensuing weeks. This epidemic was a considerr 
 able factor in preventing the success of the Bul- 
 garian attack, which was made about two weeks 
 after this time. 
 
 The Officers' Corps— Proportion to Soldiers 
 
 In the Bulgarian permanent establishment there 
 were 2,670 officers and 60,000 enlisted men. As the 
 army was to be increased in time of war to 300,000, a 
 provision was made for the production of reserve 
 officers by establishing an academy for reserve 
 cadets in Sofia. As conscription is universal, an 
 option on taking this course is given to men of 
 certain educational qualifications, who can pass an 
 examination in one year. Upon passing a final ex- 
 amination, the cadet attains the status of a reserve 
 officer of a certain grade, but if he fails he has to 
 complete his military service in the ordinary way. 
 The training of reserve officers in this way has been 
 most highly commended by military observers. 
 
 In the Servian army there are 2,050 officers and 
 30,000 men in the regular establishment, which 
 makes about the same number of officers to about 
 half the number of men as in the Bulgarian army. 
 The Servians had no academy for reserve cadets, but 
 produced their reserve officers by promotion of non- 
 commissioned officers from the regular service. 
 
 The Turks had no system of providing reserve 
 officers, and the result was an awful shortage of 
 officers in all their organizations, after their army 
 was mobilized. 
 
 Physique 
 
 Physically the Bulgarian officer is a pretty good 
 hardy specimen, the most of them rather short, stocky 
 and dark, but a number are of the Russian type, 
 rather tall, robust and blond. The Turkish officers as 
 
—106— 
 
 a class are certainly physically inferior to the Bul- 
 garian. While their physical proportions in many 
 instances are superb, they are generally anaemic, 
 and looked as though they had been accustomed to 
 indoor rather than outdoor life. 
 
 Education and Training 
 
 The Bulgarian officers are home-made at their 
 military academy in Sofia by a course of two years, 
 which is followed by six months service before they 
 are commissioned. They are eligible for admission 
 to the academy between the ages of 16 and 21. There 
 is a system of honors and distinctions to be attained 
 in the course, upon which is based certain subsequent 
 educational opportunities at home and abroad. Quite 
 a number of them are sent each year to take military 
 courses in Russia, Italy and France, and such officers 
 as successfully complete their studies abroad en- 
 ter a preferred class to which advancement comes 
 more readily than to others, and they wear always 
 as part of their uniform a distinctive badge, which 
 indicates the character of their foreign military educa- 
 tion. 
 
 The Turks have a military academy in Constan- 
 tinople, but the cadet's course was affected by so 
 many elements of political and social favoritism, that 
 no military educational system of any real worth ex- 
 isted. Many young officers are sent abroad, but 
 they are usually selected on political or family grounds, 
 and when they return to their own service, their 
 subsequent military careers are largely affected by 
 the same factors. 
 
 Relation to Soldiers 
 
 The relation of the Bulgarian officer to the sol- 
 dier, is based upon the principles of stern discipline, 
 but bears no evidence of assumption of personal su- 
 
—107— 
 
 periority, and shows no glaring mark of class distinc- 
 tion. Soldiers are particularly respectful and readily 
 obedient in the discharge of their duties and in the 
 endurance of hardships, but they seem to bear no 
 pious regard for the sacred personality of the officer. 
 During the progress of the Second War, I was riding on 
 a troop train, comfortably installed in the first class 
 compartment of a car, the roof of which was filled 
 to its capacity with soldiers on the way to join their 
 regiments. The soldiers maintained a somewhat 
 frivolous enthusiasm, by an almost continuous fusil- 
 lade, while the train was waiting at the station. It 
 soon became manifest that there was an element of 
 danger to anybody who appeared in the immediate 
 or somewhat remote vicinity. An officer standing on 
 the ground, gave the order to ''cease firing'', which 
 was only very imperfectly executed. He then 
 mounted the roof of the car, and while he went around 
 among the men and instructed them individually, 
 they obeyed his order while he was standing near 
 them and treated him with due respect, but they 
 continued to fire occasional joyousness after he had 
 passed on and until the train started. 
 
 The Turkish officer on the other hand, bears an 
 entirely different relation to the Turkish soldier. 
 Everything about his attitude is one of personal su- 
 periority and absolute control of life and limb. He 
 does not hesitate after the first loud words of admoni- 
 tion, reproach and certain hyperbolical forms of most 
 terrible threats, to strike the soldier on the cheek 
 with his open hand or, if the form has a little more 
 military character, he uses the flat of his saber. 
 
 I have seen a Military Pasha call on the carpet a 
 non-commissioned officer, with whom I had something 
 to do and, after storming about in a most frantic way, 
 announce that he was at that time suffering the last 
 drain upon his patience, and that on the very next 
 
—108— 
 
 occasion for reproval, he would gouge out the sol- 
 dier's eyes. Then, to be more impressive, he assumed 
 a dramatic attitude, extending the two separated 
 fingers of his right hand with a hooking gesture 
 toward the soldier's eyes which indicated quite clearly 
 the process he intended to employ. As a fit climax 
 to the whole proceeding, after the soldier had faced 
 about and was near the door, the Pasha, lowering 
 his voice to a tone that was almost gentle, called the 
 soldier back to make another reference to the penalty 
 with which he was threatened. The soldier was in- 
 formed that the Pasha had forgotten to tell him that, 
 if the occasion arose, the Pasha would take particu- 
 lar delight in executing personally this summary 
 sentence. When the soldier had finally withdrawn. 
 His Excellency turned to me in the gentlest manner 
 and said with a little smile, that he had just shown 
 me the best way to observe discipline. He also re- 
 marked that the Turkish soldiers were so dense and 
 stupid and bestial that only such methods were ef- 
 fective. I have seen too many instances of this same 
 method of discipline to be mistaken about its custom- 
 ary employment. 
 
 Promotion 
 
 Bulgarian officers, except for special preference 
 based upon educational qualifications, are promoted 
 by seniority with an age limit retirement, as follows: 
 
 Captains retire at 48 
 
 Majors " '' 52 
 
 Lt-Colonels '' " 55 
 
 Colonels '* " _ 58 
 
 General officers retire at . 65 
 
 The promotion of Turkish officers can hardly be 
 fairly considered unless it is taken in relation with 
 that other process which affects so frequently their 
 
—109— 
 
 careers, namely, demotion. They have, however, a 
 scheme of promotion by seniority, and age limit re- 
 tirement, under which second lieutenants retire at 
 41. and Field Marshals at 68. Whatever may be the 
 effect of this penalty upon officers, it is convention- 
 ally modified by the gentle and sympathetic process 
 of administration. Pensions are very small, but they 
 are eternally enduring, and often descend from one 
 generation to another. 
 
 The retrograde progress sometimes made by 
 Turkish officers, even those of distinction, will be 
 indicated by a story or two concerning individuals 
 whose names are associated with recent events. 
 
 Nazim Pasha had been minister of war for less 
 than a year before his assassination. Before he came 
 into that office he had only recently returned to the 
 active practice of his chosen profession, as Abdul 
 Hamid some years before had sent him to Bagdad, 
 where he carried a hod for a bricklayer for a period of 
 years. A prominent foreign official told me he would 
 always regard Nazim's death as untimely, because he 
 believed so much in his gentle and appreciative dis- 
 position that he thought that had Nazim lived for 
 the requisite number of years he would have repaid 
 a little loan that this foreign official extended to him 
 about the time he returned from Bagdad. The 
 official was crossing the Floating Bridge, which is 
 the Rialto of Constantinople, when he was accosted 
 by a ragged and unkempt individual who addressed 
 him in familiar and almost affectionate terms. After 
 a more careful inspection, he recognized in the 
 stranger the familiar features and personality of his 
 erstwhile friend Nazim. The latter told the official 
 of his arrival just that day in Constantinople from 
 the enforced and fatiguing sojourn in far off Bagdad. 
 But as he had not only returned to the Mecca of the 
 Europeanized Turk, but to his former rank in the 
 
—110— 
 
 army, it seemed incumbent upon him to provide him- 
 self with the outward evidence of his position. The 
 official loaned Nazim $40.00 with which Nazim thought 
 he would be able to purchase the uniform of a general 
 of brigade which he was expected to wear. Although 
 some years had passed since that time, and Nazim 
 had repaid the loan, under pressure of subsequent 
 circumstances he had again negotiated it, and the 
 official felt that had sufficient years been allotted in 
 Nazim's career, the loan would finally have been 
 discharged. 
 
 After Nazim's assassination he was succeeded by 
 Izzet Pasha as Generalissimo. Izzet, in his day had 
 suffered some of the inconveniences of demotion 
 that had befallen Nazim, and was sent away from 
 Constantinople by Abdul Hamid for station in 
 Damascus, where his duties confined him to a rock 
 pile. It seems that while Izzet, in his early career, 
 was the Turkish miHtary attache in Berlin, the 
 Kaiser knew him favorably and well. Not many 
 years ago, while on a visit to the Sultan, the Kaiser 
 mentioned Izzet's name to a friend of the latter, and 
 it was revealed to the Kaiser that Izzet was then 
 cracking rock in Damascus, in compliance with the 
 Sultan's express wishes. Izzet's friend suggested 
 to the Kaiser that he make a casual but interested 
 inquiry of the Sultan as to the whereabouts of the 
 attractive young Ottoman officer whom he had known 
 while attached to the Sultan's embassy in Berlin. 
 The Sultan regretted that this distinguished officer 
 was absent on a somewhat prolonged tour of duty in 
 a part of the empire so remote as Damascus. Later 
 during his tour the Kaiser reached Damascus, where 
 he was greeted by the official representative of the 
 Sultan in the person of Izzet Pasha, as a general of 
 brigade, although this high dignitary of the hour 
 had been but a colonel at the time he had incurred 
 
— Ill— 
 the displeasure and distrust of the Sultan which sent 
 him in disgrace to Damascus. 
 
 General Staff 
 
 The Bulgarian General Staff is a very carefully 
 selected military hierarchy. Only officers who have 
 graduated from the military schools of Russia, Italy 
 and France are eUgible to detail, and then their 
 subsequent advancement is determined by their 
 service and efficiency records. They return while in 
 the lower grades for periods of service with troops, 
 and many of them, when they attain advanced rank, 
 come into command of higher units. 
 
 The Turkish General Staff is a very exclusive 
 body, selected nominally on the educational attain- 
 ments of the officer and his training in foreign schools 
 and armies, but the usual conditions which affect all 
 Turkish administration, that of favoritism and family 
 influences, obtains in this branch of the Turkish 
 army. Whatever may be the regulations governing 
 officers of the general staff, the fact is that when 
 once estabhshed in this preferred situation, they 
 lose contact with troops and have little or no field 
 service. Whatever individual accomplishments some 
 of these officers possess, they were unable to exhibit 
 them in their late opportunities. 
 
 Supply Service 
 
 There is no special corps of Bulgarian supply 
 officers. Details are made from the line after three 
 years' service with troops followed by a course in a 
 special school in Sofia. With every division there is 
 an officer of the Intendance Department. He some- 
 times has some junior officer assistants, but most of 
 the work is done by civiUans. What system there is 
 in the Turkish army I do not clearly understand, 
 
—112— 
 
 except that the principle is German and the applica- 
 tion is Turkish. But one can be morally certain that 
 the same elements of favoritism and personal relation 
 determines the details to the supply service. 
 
 Pay 
 
 The soldier's pay in all Eastern armies is hardly 
 munificent enough to create the habits of a spend- 
 thrift; in fact, the schedule seems to be carefully 
 based on a principle which sturdily encourages the 
 virtue of frugality. The Bulgarian soldier is paid 
 $0.20 a month, and the Servian soldier receives $0.30, 
 while the rate of pay for the Turkish soldier is $0.90 
 a month. One might think that the Turk is overpaid 
 as a warrior, but he is not. His munificent stipend 
 is only promised, and he seldom gets it. Sometimes 
 his fortune fares well, as it did while the army was 
 assembled on the Chatalja line, for then he received 
 his pay regularly, as it was necessary to sweeten his 
 disposition and suppress his inclination to interest 
 himself in politics. When I left Constantinople, the 
 civil list was six months behind in its payment. 
 
 Clothing 
 
 The color of the Bulgarian soldier's uniform is 
 hard to describe as it is something of a mixture of 
 gray and red. It has nothing of the drab or olive 
 shade, but might be called a brownish gray; a solid 
 color, about as dark in its density as olive drab. It 
 looks much the same from a distance and aifords 
 about the same advantage of invisibility. There is a 
 collar and cuff facing indicating the various arms of 
 the service. The blouse is of the ordinary military 
 form, with dark buttons and standing collar. The 
 trousers are of the same material as the blouse, baggy 
 at the knees, without cut to conform to the calf of 
 the leg. The ofl^icers wear olive drab very similar to 
 
—113— 
 
 our own service uniform, but somewhat lighter and 
 a little more of the fawn color, with a very conspicu- 
 ous shoulder strap. Both the Turkish officers and 
 soldiers wear the English service olive drab made by 
 an English firm in Smyrna, of very good woolen 
 cloth of domestic manufacture. 
 
 Head Dress 
 
 The Bulgarian officer and soldier and every other 
 official in Bulgaria wears, ever and always without 
 exception, the Russian cap. 
 
 The Turkish soldier is somewhat hampered by 
 his religious tenets in the selection of suitable head- 
 dress for campaign, as the Mohammedan must wear 
 on his head some sort of a device that has no rim or 
 visor to prevent him from making his prayers by 
 touching his forehead to the carpet. As a Moslem 
 wears a fez in civil life, and wears it all the time, 
 indoors or out, asleep or awake, when he becomes a 
 soldier he must wear a head gear that will enable him 
 to observe these conditions. 
 
 Formerly the Turkish army wore the familiar 
 red fez with a black tassel, but when the army was 
 reformed some years ago and put into olive drab, the 
 red fez was changed to the same color. Later an- 
 other device was adopted, which gave better service 
 in campaign, and was made of the same grayish ma- 
 terial as the overcoat. This device, which most of 
 the Turkish soldiers wore in the late war, was based 
 in construction on the principle of the turban which 
 enabled it to conform to religious requirements. It 
 consisted of a hood, much like that of our military 
 overcoat with very long ear-laps which are conven- 
 tionally worn wrapped around the head, but which, 
 for purposes of protection, were lowered and wrapped 
 around the neck. 
 
—114— 
 Footwear 
 
 The most interesting and important element of 
 the clothing of both the Bulgarian and the Turkish 
 armies, was the footwear. The Bulgarian peasant 
 wore a combination of layers of felt in larger or 
 smaller pieces, wrapped around his feet and legs, 
 with the sole of the foot covered with a rawhide san- 
 dal, which combination he calls an "opanken.*' This 
 device was employed almost exclusively by the foot 
 troops of the Bulgarian army, although the mounted 
 troops were furnished boots. In their regular mili- 
 tary service the boot is part of the uniform of all the 
 mounted soldiers but there seemed to be a scarcity 
 of supply in the Second War. The soldiers who came 
 from villages displayed their urbanity by showing a 
 preference for boots to the "opanken. " The peasants 
 who regularly wore this footgear were very well 
 pleased with it as it had many advantages. The 
 layers of wrapping could be increased to suit conditions 
 of winter weather, although it afforded no protection 
 against the wet. There was a compensation in this 
 disadvantage, however, because if the soldier's feet 
 became wet, and he had a chance to seek shelter, he 
 could dry them at once by inverting the cloth and 
 wrapping around his foot the dry portion, that had 
 served as a legging, so as to permit the portion that 
 had become wet to dry by evaporation when wrapped 
 around the calf. But the greatest advantage this 
 footwear had served was the preparation of the Bul- 
 garian for military service by saving his feet from 
 the deforming influence of modern shoes. As a class 
 the feet of the Bulgarians were absolutely normal. 
 
 The Turkish army, in its reformation, had adopted 
 as a uniform shoe, a low brogan of the type of for- 
 mer issues in our own service with which an olive 
 drab woolen puttee leggin was worn. This imposed 
 something of a very marked departure from the ordi- 
 
—115— 
 
 nary habits of the Turkish peasant, whose footgear 
 conformed to Oriental requirements. The Oriental's 
 normal state is an indoor one in which he wears no 
 shoes. When he goes out of doors he sHps on a tem- 
 porary foot covering, much ^s a lady, who goes out 
 to a party in winter time, covers her slippers with 
 goloshes. So, when the Turk has to adopt a footgear 
 for continuous out-of-door service, he is a bit out of 
 his element. The Turkish soldier simply loves slip- 
 pers and when he reverts to them with his puttee 
 leggings it makes rather a weird combination. 
 
 Rations 
 
 The Bulgarian ration when written on paper is 
 all right in every element of food value. You may 
 be satisfied to know that it consists of nine well-bal- 
 anced components, with sufficient fuel value to meet 
 the physiological demands of able-bodied soldiers en- 
 gaged in a hard day's work. The provision for mak- 
 ing substitutions can be so arranged that it compares 
 favorably with the ration of an American soldier. 
 No doubt, in time of peace, this ration is supplied, or 
 at least as much of it as the Bulgarian soldier wishes 
 to eat, but in time of war all that it promises to the 
 dietary of the soldier is not fulfilled. But with all 
 its shortcomings the soldier does not feel that he has 
 been cheated so long as he is supplied with bread. 
 
 In civil life the peasant's principal ration com- 
 ponent is bread of a very good quality, and very 
 ample quantity, supplemented by a meaty element 
 usually in a form of cheese, but occasionally in the 
 form of real meat. When he gets meat it is almost 
 invariably mutton. When the peasant is enduring 
 military service he never expects a bit more than he 
 gets at home, and is satisfied with less. The hungry 
 soldier without food, when he makes inquiry about 
 his expected ration, only uses the word ''bread", for 
 
—116— 
 
 this is all he actually demands, although whenever a 
 favorable opportunity offers he is sometimes bold 
 enough to expect cheese or meat. The meat comes 
 to him in form of mutton on the hoof, and he always 
 understands the difficulties of producing this article 
 of diet when it is not forthcoming. If his bread is 
 ample, he does not complain. When the fortunes of 
 war favor him and he has something like his full ra- 
 tion, and a reasonable chance to expect a little recrea- 
 tion, he does not seek it in alcoholic relaxation, but 
 searches for peppers and onions with which to satiate 
 that longing for stimulation that so many other peo- 
 ple find in alcohol. 
 
 I saw hundreds of Bulgarian soldiers during the 
 time of demobilization, when they were free to roam 
 about the town and seek some form of recreation 
 contrasting with the hardships which they had just 
 escaped on the actual battle line. They did not 
 celebrate by a method with which we are so familiar, 
 that involves the saloon as a necessary element, but 
 they were seen about the market buying peppers and 
 onions and garlic, and preparing individual messes 
 brought up to their own delectable culinary standard 
 by the addition of these savory elements. In Kus- 
 tendil as many as 40,000 men passed through that 
 town and I saw only one drunken Bulgarian soldier. 
 Perhaps *' drunk*' is too severe a term to apply to 
 him, for he was only pleasantly enough intoxicated 
 to recognize me, as I was about to pass him on a 
 narrow path, with a very precise military salute, 
 and to show his willingness to allow me the right of 
 way by jumping into a mud puddle. 
 
 The ration of the Turkish soldier, as set down 
 on paper, is copied from the German army, with a 
 few local flourishes added which promises the soldier 
 some of the particular components he likes the most, 
 but which the Germans do not care about. The 
 
—117— 
 
 sanitary inspector of the army at Chatalja told me 
 with great assurance and with apparent satisfaction 
 that the ration of the Turkish army had a greater 
 calorific Vfelue than that of any other European 
 army. In practice, however, there was little more 
 ever found in the Turkish soldier's mess than bread 
 and mutton, but under very favorable conditions some 
 vegetables were added which permitted the meat to 
 be rendered in the form of a delectable stew. The 
 Turkish peasant's principal element of food is bread, 
 although he consumes a great deal of rice. Perhaps 
 a form of rice cooked with meat and condiments, 
 which is called *'pilaf/' together with a peculiarly 
 curdled milk called ''yourgert,'' is the customary diet 
 of the Turkish peasant. At home, both the Turkish 
 and Bulgarian peasants have but one hot or cooked 
 meal each day and that is served about noon. The 
 day is begun with a cup of tea or coffee, with a 
 permissible addition of bread and cheese, and is 
 ended usually with bread alone. I have seen this 
 diet prepared regularly in a Turkish hospital for six 
 months. 
 
 Kitchens 
 
 The Bulgarian army was equipped with a limited 
 number of portable kitchens of the Austrian army 
 type, with a capacity of about 250 men per wagon. 
 I saw only one of these, but it seemed to be a very 
 satisfactory device, and it might well be employed in 
 some form in our own service. 
 
 At the beginning of the war it is said the Turkish 
 army was extravagantly supplied with all sorts of 
 appliances that any agent of military goods in 
 Europe had to sell them. The purchasing officers 
 had been very much attracted by the liberal com- 
 missions the European dealers were able to offer, 
 and they devoted a great deal of energy to their 
 
—US- 
 purchases. The army had all the mechanical devices, 
 in some quantity, that any army had ever used. 
 Among other things they had field bakeries. Mah- 
 moud Moukhtar Pasha, to whose campaign-in Thrace 
 I have referred, accounts for two field bakeries in 
 his train at the beginning of the campagin. 
 
 The Bulgarian kitchens in the field were very 
 simple. Each company was supplied with three 
 large and one small soup kettles; the latter were 
 used for company, platoon and squad messing, and 
 the larger vessels were employed when a company 
 mess was conducted. Two of the two larger copper 
 kettles were of the conventional wash boiler type, 
 and they were used on pack animals to carry the 
 mess, which was always prepared in the form of a 
 stew, for the troops when they were in an advanced 
 position and it was necessary to set up the kitchen in 
 the rear. I saw one Bulgarian kitchen down in the 
 valley where water and wood were available, which 
 prepared the mess for a regiment that was in posi- 
 tion on a mountain crest about a mile or a mile and 
 a half away, and from there the stew was carried up 
 to the troops once a day on pack animals. 
 
 The Turkish field kitchens which I saw on the 
 Chatalja line would hardly be identified as such by 
 one whose military observations had been confined 
 to an experience with American troops. There was 
 frequently no shelter more than a small tent or 
 shack for stores, and a cauldron or two placed in the 
 ground so that wood could be burnt under them. 
 At mess time the small copper pots were brought 
 from companies for the food to be issued to the 
 squads. The Turkish soldier carried a wooden spoon, 
 the handle of which was stuck into the top of his 
 puttee legging, so that it was always under his eye 
 and ready for instant service. 
 
 I saw a Bulgarian field bakery at Kustendil 
 
—119— 
 
 which illustrates the manner in which the Bulgarians 
 handle their food problem in the field. As they 
 have no equipment of this kind that pretends in any 
 way to be portable, the bakery was set up out of 
 material that was found in the town with the em- 
 ployment of the skilled laborers of the locality and 
 but little assistance from the supply department of 
 the army. It consisted of a rough shed twenty feet 
 wide and 150 feet long, along one side of which was 
 built twelve brick ovens about ten by fifteen feet. 
 The floor of the ovens was laid on the ground and 
 trenches were dug in front of the ovens for the 
 bakers to stand in. There were two troughs pro- 
 vided for each oven, and racks were erected at the 
 side of each oven to hold the loaves of dough until 
 they were ready to be baked. One qualified baker 
 was assigned to each oven and all the other person- 
 nel were ordinary details from the troops. There 
 were two non-commissioned officers in charge, one of 
 whom, in this particular case, was a gentleman of 
 some educational qualifications. He was a graduate 
 of the University of Brussels, and had intended to 
 return for a course in political economy. It was he 
 who gave me the data. The personnel numbered 
 168. They worked in night and day shifts. The 
 proper number of men were assigned to assist the 
 baker at each oven, the baker acting only as 
 superintendent in the preparation of the dough, all 
 the manual work being done by the baker^s as- 
 sistants; but he personally attended to the firing of 
 the oven and the actual baking of the bread. The 
 dough was carefully weighed to make a loaf of one 
 kilogram. This was the ration for one day. No 
 pans were used. The bread was transferred from 
 the troughs to the ovens on boards, and then placed 
 on the brick floor of the oven for baking. The ovens 
 were fired eight times in twenty-four hours. At the 
 
120— 
 
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 Ml 
 
 M 
 
 
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 ID 
 
 3" 
 
 ^ 
 
—121- 
 
 time of my visit the plant was running at more than 
 25,000 two-pound loaves per day. It had an ordi- 
 nary daily capacity of 35,000 loaves, which could 
 have been increased under pressure. It took three 
 or four hours from dough to bread. The bakery 
 was constructed in five days. 
 
 The Bulgarians also used hardtack in about the 
 form in which we know it, which they called military 
 biscuit. Six of these were tied in a bundle and sealed 
 with a red seal, providing an emergency ration which 
 could only be opened by the soldier on special and 
 specific orders. Every Bulgarian town has a village 
 bakery as no Bulgarian family bakes its own bread. 
 They find it too expensive, as the fuel economy is 
 greater in community baking. The troops in march- 
 ing depend largely on the baking facilities of the vil- 
 lages when they do not construct special field bakeries. 
 I saw many of the village bakeries making hard 
 bread. It seemed to be an art that most of the Bul- 
 garian bakers were skilled at. Many of the bakeries 
 in the villages were left in the hands of women, who 
 seemed able to conduct them with great energy and 
 efficiency in the absence of their husbands. 
 
 Arms— The Rifle 
 
 The rifle of the Bulgarians was the Mannlicher 
 of 8 mm. caliber. The Servian rifle was a Mauser of 
 7 mm. caliber. The Greek rifle was a Mannlicher of 
 6.5 mm. caliber. These small arms used a blunt or 
 ogival projectile, the difference in caliber being suffi- 
 cient to be distinguished by careful comparison. The 
 Turkish army was equipped with the Mauser of 7 
 mm. caliber. The projectile was different from the 
 others in that it had a sharp nose. It seemed to be 
 the consensus of opinion that the sharp nosed bullet, 
 under certain ballistic conditions, caused the more 
 humane wound on account of its smaller puncture 
 
—122— 
 
 but, as its center of gravity in much nearer the base 
 than in the blunt pointed bullet, it had a disposition 
 to tumble more readily under certain conditions, 
 thereby making a much more mutilating wound. 
 
 Bayonet 
 
 The Bulgarian bayonet was of the short type. 
 The experience of the Bulgars in the late wars has 
 satisfactorily confirmed their judgment in the selec- 
 tion of a short rather than a long bayonet. They do 
 not believe that there is any advantage in the reach 
 of a longer arm, and they are convinced that the 
 sturdiness and leverage qualities of the short bayonet 
 makes it superior. The Bulgarians always preferred 
 to fix bayonets before going into action, as they 
 feared the loss of time and the insecurity of attach- 
 ment, if bayonets were fixed after firing began. 
 
 The Turkish bayonet was quite long, but I think 
 it must have been of some advantage to the morale 
 of the Turkish soldier, in that it made him feel that 
 he had that much advantage over the Bulgarian. I 
 don't know what the Turkish ordnance experts think 
 of this equipment after their late experience. 
 
 Ammunition 
 
 The Bulgarian soldier carried 150 rounds of am- 
 munition in leather boxes on the belt, (two in front 
 and one behind), and in the haversack. There were 
 30 rounds in each of the two boxes in front, 40 rounds 
 in the box behind, and 50 in the haversack. There 
 were 50 rounds on pack animals, and 100 in the divi- 
 sion train, making 300 rounds per man in all. 
 
 The Servian soldier carried 135 rounds on his 
 person, 60 in the ammunition wagon and 100 in the 
 division park; 295 in all. 
 
 The Turkish soldier carried 150 rounds on his per- 
 son. The army was provided with a great number 
 
—123— 
 
 of battalion ammunition wagons of German type, of 
 light structure, short coupled, with a body in the 
 form of a large box, with compartments to hold the 
 ammunition in baskets. They were to be drawn by 
 horses, but were not employed on account of the 
 scarcity of these animals. In Constantinople, during 
 the war, there were several arsenals and depots, in 
 which hundreds of these wagons could be seen parked. 
 Bullock carts were used in the field, instead of this 
 specially designed equipment. 
 
 Equipment 
 
 Pack 
 
 I do not know what the Field Service Regulations 
 prescribed in the way of the composition of the sol- 
 dier's pack in any of the armies. I saw a lot of 
 Turkish, a lot of Bulgarian, and a lot of Servian sol- 
 diers in heavy marching order, and there is not much 
 difference in the appearance of the pack. They ap- 
 peared to prefer the blanket roll, and they were all 
 normally supplied with blankets. The Turks and 
 Bulgarians carried a haversack much like that of our 
 old infantry equipment, and the Servian soldiers in 
 addition carried knapsacks. All carried the canteen. 
 The Bulgarian used his haversack largely for his 
 food, and small articles, and carried the rest of his 
 belongings in his blanket roll, which contained the 
 occasional shelter half. The regulation weight of the 
 Bulgarian soldier's pack is 32 Kg. (70 lbs,) 
 
 Shelter Tent 
 
 The Bulgarian and Turkish shelter tents were of 
 rectangular pieces of canvas, making about the same 
 size of tent as our old pattern without the triangular 
 
—124— 
 
 flap which in it formed the rear wall. The shape of 
 this shelter half enabled it to be used in the forma- 
 tion of large tent units as was seen in every Turkish 
 camp. The Turks lost most all of their conical tents 
 in their campaign with the Bulgarians, but there 
 seemed to be a very liberal supply of shelter tents, 
 which they buttoned together to make into tents of 
 larger form. The shelter tent poles of the Turkish 
 equipment was particularly good because they were 
 made of hard wood, with sockets and ferrules of 
 turned brass on either end, so that several poles 
 could be screwed together into quite a length. In 
 this way a tent pole could be made which would sup- 
 port a large area of canvas formed by buttoning to- 
 gether a number of shelter half pieces. 
 
 Shelter in the Field 
 
 The Bulgarian soldier in camp had no tentage 
 except the shelter half he carried on his person. The 
 officers had individual cubical tents with pointed 
 roof, with a very light center pole, somewhat longer 
 than the four side poles. In the campaign in Thrace 
 the Turkish army had a great many conical tents for 
 camps, but the Bulgarians got the most of those and 
 they used them very readily after getting possession. 
 The Bulgarians suffered many hardships on the 
 Chatalja line during the hard winter for want of 
 heavy tentage. Many suffered from frost-bite and 
 a number were frozen; many might have perished if 
 they had not been fortunate enough to get so much 
 shelter from the Turks. Later, in the 2d war, after 
 most of the Turkish heavy tentage was expended and 
 many of the soldiers were without shelter tents, they 
 built huts of brush. Even some of the field hospitals 
 made up their shortage of tentage by the construc- 
 tion of brush huts. 
 
—126— 
 Intrenching Tools 
 
 The Bulgarians were well supplied with equip- 
 ment for field intrenching, as each man carried a 
 tool of some class. Every three men carried a shovel, 
 and the fourth carried a short-handled pick, or a 
 hatchet. After the fall of Adrianople, when a great 
 deal of Turkish equipment fell into the hands of the 
 Bulgarians and Servians, the utility of the shovel 
 was so appreciated that each soldier, not equipped 
 with one of these handy little chest and head pro- 
 tectors, added one of them to his outfit on his own 
 initiative. 
 
 I was told repeatedly by Bulgarian soldiers that 
 they had employed their shovels as head shelters, in 
 advancing under artillery fire, first at their own in- 
 stance, and later, by instruction of their officers. 
 The shovel had no special virtue over our own, ex- 
 cept that it was sharpened on one edge, and this 
 proved very valuable in making personal shelter, as 
 much of that shelter was formed out of brush. The 
 Servians carried a man's-size long-handled pick, 
 which did not seem to be as much in the way as one 
 might think. 
 
 The Turkish intrenching tools were about the 
 same, but I am not sure how they were distributed 
 among the men. 
 
 Transport— With Troops 
 
 The Bulgarians on a peace or war footing had 
 no transportation to be used, either in field or supply 
 trains, as a part of the equipment of the army. They 
 depended upon carefully prepared plans for impro- 
 vising their trains, by the employment in the various 
 districts of mobilization, of the peasants' wagons, 
 most of which were bullock carts. The civil admin- 
 istration was employed to assemble this transporta- 
 
—126— 
 
 tion where it was called for. The bullock carts were 
 divided into columns, and two non-commissioned of- 
 ficers and a few armed men, as guards, were assigned 
 a certain number of carts, and the train was complete. 
 The wagons drawn by horses, as long as the supply 
 lasted, went to the field trains. The peasant owner 
 accompanied his own outfit, and this plan assured 
 good attention to the stock. 
 
 The regulations provided, for each battalion, four 
 pack animals for ammunition and one pack animal to 
 carry cooking utensils and the baggage of the officers. 
 I think all regiments usually succeeded in getting a 
 wagon for each company. Horse drawn wagons were 
 small, as were the animals, and they could not possi- 
 bly carry more than a thousand pounds under favor- 
 able conditions. I saw a number of battalions en- 
 train at the time of the demobilization and each 
 company seemed to have one small two-horse wagon. 
 
 The Turks had attempted to provide a special 
 field and supply train, and had in service a great 
 many specially constructed wagons of an uniform type. 
 They were all of such size that they could be drawn 
 by two horses, but as they had difficulty in finding 
 the horses, they practically had to adopt the method 
 of the Bulgarians. 
 
 Motor Transportation 
 
 Automobiles seemed to be essential to the head- 
 quarters of the larger commands, which were liberally 
 supplied with them. General Tochef, commanding 
 the 5th Army, had his headquarters at Kustendil, 
 ten miles from the center of the line, which he could 
 approach over a splendid macadamized road. In an- 
 other direction the headquarters of the 4th Army lay 
 fifteen or twenty miles beyond the reach of a good 
 road and automobiles could not be used for personal 
 transportation. 
 
—127— 
 Motor Trucks 
 
 According to the account I obtained from the 
 agent of the Benz Automobile Company in Constan- 
 tinople, who supplied all the motor transportation, 
 the Turkish army had forty motor trucks in use at the 
 beginning of the war. Fifteen of these were in 
 Adrianople, with large quantities of motor supplies, 
 and the Bulgars took them all. Three sizes of trucks 
 were used; two, three, and five ton. The oldest had 
 been in use for four years aad was still doing duty. 
 They were used only about Constantinople and on 
 occasional short lines of communication where there 
 were good roads. The Bulgars had a few motor 
 trucks besides the fifteen they had captured at Adrian- 
 ople. They were of very great service in the second 
 war because of the number of good macadamized 
 roads by which they were able to connect their lines 
 on the southern frontier, with the railroad. But it 
 was not possible to employ them in any way except 
 on good roads. 
 
 Motor trucks were used to some extent in the 
 transport of wounded from those evacuation hospitals 
 that were connected by macadamized roads with the 
 railroad, but they proved to be somewhat unsuited 
 for this purpose, which is quite contrary to what one 
 might naturally imagine. When I interviewed a num- 
 ber of patients by the roadside without much to ac- 
 count for their presence, they told me they were there 
 because the driver of an automobile truck had an- 
 swered their prayers to be placed out on the road 
 rather than to be subjected to the pain of further 
 jolting. They had concluded they would fare better 
 by taking their chances of being picked up by the 
 bullock carts than continuing with the more rapid 
 transportation that the motor truck afforded. With 
 all their humility, the bullock carts still have their 
 
—128— 
 
 advantages. The difficulties they overcame in the 
 Bulgarian advance from Kirk Kilisse might not have 
 been accomplished by more modern forms of trans- 
 portation. It is very likely that the bullock carts in 
 the present state of development of Bulgarian mili- 
 tary resources are quite superior to any other form of 
 transportation for her army. 
 
Fifth Lecture 
 
 Some Sanitary Observations 
 
 T ARRIVED in Constantinople November 3, 1912, or 
 ^ three days after the formation of the Chatalja 
 lines following the defeat of the Turkish army in the 
 field. About two weeks later the Bulgarian assault 
 on the Chatalja line, which occupied three days, was 
 made and failed. By this successful defense Con- 
 stantinople was saved. The wounded from the field 
 campaign were still coming to Constantinople at the 
 time of my arrival, and an epidemic of cholera, which 
 had begun its rage in the Turkish troops of the 
 Chatalja lines, was acknowledged about this time in 
 Constantinople. The victims of the disease were 
 arriving in the outskirts of Constantinople at San 
 Stephano at the rate of several hundred a day from 
 the railhead of the defenses at Heydemkui. While 
 the cholera camp that was established at San Stephano 
 had become known to the world as a great pest-hole, 
 and while thousands of sick were at first without 
 shelter and were never well housed, two things must 
 be said in extenuation of the harsh criticisms of the 
 Turkish administration. First, the Ottoman Empire 
 was in great peril and all the resources of trans- 
 portation and supply were desperately needed and 
 duly impressed in the service of strengthening the 
 defenses of the capital; and, second, such expedients 
 as were employed, though harsh and abrupt, were 
 
 129 
 
—ISO- 
 efficient in saving Constantinople from a cholera 
 invasion. All trains carrying soldiers from the front, 
 whether sick from any cause, or stragglers or de- 
 serters, were impounded together without shelter 
 and treated alike. The sick were not separated from 
 the well and all were sheltered as facilities became 
 available. Later, many cases were taken to the 
 mosques in Constantinople where a careful and 
 efficient guard system kept all the soldiers separate 
 from the civilian population and saved the latter 
 from infection. 
 
 From my own experience, in charge of a cholera 
 camp at San Stephano, there were about 600 soldiers 
 under guard in a compound where all were sheltered 
 in permanent buildings, sheds or tents and probably 
 200 were not infected. Of the remaining 400, all were 
 undoubtedly cholera cases. Though 200 of them 
 died, the death rate diminished from fifty per day to 
 one per day in the first ten days of my service. 
 This diminunition in the death rate was in direct ratio 
 to the progress of rough but substantial sanitary 
 measures. At this time I will not presume to esti- 
 mate accurately the number of cases of cholera in 
 the Turkish army, and I am sure there can never be 
 any reliable statistical data prepared, but there must 
 have been more than 10,000 deaths. The mortality 
 was about 50 per cent in my cases, but I believe that 
 the rate is relative to the conditions under which the 
 cases are treated. I believe that, with the same 
 virulence of the infecting organism, the same re- 
 sistance of the patients, and the same conditions of 
 shelter, sanitation and treatment as are generally 
 available in the treatment of typhoid fever, for 
 instance, the mortality of cholera might be no 
 greater than that of typhoid fever. In other words, 
 if cholera were treated'with the same care and under 
 the same conditions as typhoid fever is treated to 
 
—131— 
 
 establish its best mortality statistics, the mortality 
 in cholera — in some epidemics, at least — would not 
 be greater than that in typhoid fever. 
 
 My service in Constantinople, in an improvised 
 military hospital, covered a period of six months, 
 with an admission of 500 surgical cases. I was act- 
 ing there in the capacity of chief surgeon of the 
 local chapter of the American Red Cross Society, 
 which financed our establishment and we assumed 
 complete charge of 120 beds which we found occupied 
 by wounded. This provisional hospital, known as Tash 
 Kishla, the last military hospital to be established, 
 was filled with the sick and wounded last to arrive in 
 Constantinople from the defeated army. 
 
 During the activities on the Chatalja line we 
 received some new patients, and later, after hos- 
 tilities were resumed, following the armistice on 
 February 3, 1913, received some more patients. 
 After that time all our patients were received by 
 transfer from other and better hospitals where more 
 active services were maintained. In fact Tash 
 Kishla became the dumping ground or clearing house 
 of the military hospital system of Constantinople, so 
 that the cases we received in the last months were 
 the class of old infections or convalescents which 
 had lost their surgical interest and were transferred 
 to us from other hospitals to make room for their 
 more interesting cases. It may be observed, in this 
 connection that the Turkish medical service in 
 Constantinople was conducted with the same enter- 
 prise and surgical zeal that sometimes characterizes 
 hospital administration in more enlightened countries. 
 
 It is naturally incumbent upon a surgeon with 
 any pretention to professional efficiency or scientific 
 accomplishment, when he has completed a service of 
 any kind, to prepare a report in which statistics are 
 compiled with an exactness and precision that ex- 
 
—182— 
 
 tends into several decimal points, from which he 
 may draw conclusions for the instruction of his 
 colleagues. In the surgery of civil life such pro- 
 cesses can only be commended, for they may be of some 
 professional value and can hardly be fraught with 
 any danger. The same may be said of the surgery 
 of war, except that the conclusions drawn from an 
 individual service, however active, may represent an 
 experience confined to some local phase of military 
 activity or administration to which the cause, char- 
 acter and frequency of wounds is peculiar. 
 
 I have seen reports of two eminent and distin- 
 guished surgeons, with the character of whose re- 
 spective services I am personally familiar. These 
 reports carry an accurate and interesting account of 
 their special work which no doubt will be of exceed- 
 ingly great professional value and will find permanent 
 place in medical annals. But I believe that their 
 personal experience or that of any other operating 
 surgeon, in the course of any war, is not sufficient to 
 enable them to draw conclusions that will establish 
 reliable statistics on the wounds of war because such 
 can only be prepared from the reports of all phases 
 and conditions of the military activity of all the cam- 
 paigns of the war. The character and cause of the 
 wounds, admitted to military hospitals must always 
 be carefully considered in relation to the particular 
 form of military activity from which they have re- 
 sulted. In different actions there must be a variable 
 preponderance of wounds from the different arms 
 by which the wounds were inflicted and the course of 
 these wounds, thus received, must be determined 
 largely by the nature of the campaign and by its suc- 
 cesses or reverses, which determine the condition of 
 neglect to which wounds are subjected either at in- 
 cidence or in subsequent course. 
 
 With this preface and caution I will presume to 
 
—133— 
 
 give a brief numerical statement of my own exper- 
 ience at Tash Kishla hospital In 317 gun shot wounds 
 there were 32% shrapnel and 68% rifle wounds. In 
 another group of 68 cases in the same hospital, that 
 came under my observation, but without my admin- 
 istration, there were 37% shrapnel wounds and 63% 
 rifle wounds. These ratios, however, apply only to 
 these particular groups of cases, which, from the 
 circumstances of their collection at this particular 
 place, will give a greater proportion of shrapnel 
 wounds than occurred in the particular battle in 
 which they were received, because many of them 
 came to us for the reason that they were old infected 
 cases and infection undoubtedly occurs with a great 
 deal more frequency in shrapnel than in rifle wounds. 
 In Constantinople there is a Turkish military 
 hospital in Stamboul, known as Giilhani, which is 
 under the direction of the German Professor Weiting 
 Pasha, who has held his position as medical instruc- 
 tor in the Turkish army for 12 years. This hospital 
 enjoyed the advantage of location at the terminus of 
 the line of railways which led into Constantinople, so 
 that hospital trains could be stopped nearby to permit 
 patients to be carried by litter directly into the hos- 
 pital. The advantage of this location brought to this 
 service, at all the stages of the war, the more seriously 
 wounded cases, which were retained until convales- 
 cence was established; when they were transferred 
 to make room for other serious cases. The service 
 here was undoubtedly the most active in the city, 
 with always a greater proportion of seriously wounded 
 cases in the wards. The lighter cases were only ad- 
 mitted when the supply of serious cases had fallen 
 below the capacity of the hospital. So it may be said 
 that while the statistical reports of even this hospital 
 will be of undoubted surgical value, they will not show 
 the relative proportion of the wounds of war in re- 
 
—134— 
 
 spect to their gravity course and relative frequency 
 of their causation. 
 
 I have here a table showing such statistics from 
 almost 1000 cases as Professor Wei ting Pasha had 
 prepared at Giilhani Hospital at the time of my de- 
 parture from Constantinople, but he warned me that 
 his statistics would not show the frequency, charac- 
 ter, and result of wounds as they occurred through- 
 out the war. 
 
 Wounds of the Extremities 
 
 (Exclusive of head, thorax and abdomen) ^^^r,ri 
 
 
 Rifie 
 
 Shrapnel Total 
 
 Flesh Wounds 
 
 317 
 
 129 446 
 
 Penetrating 
 
 8% 
 
 23% 
 
 Perforating 
 
 92% 
 
 77% 
 
 Aseptic . 
 
 82% 
 
 72% 
 
 Infected 
 
 18% 
 
 28% 
 
 Deaths 
 
 4 
 
 2 equals 1.3% 
 
 
 Rifle 
 
 Shrapnel 
 
 Joint Wounds 
 
 146 
 
 55 102 
 
 Aseptic 
 
 75% 
 
 69% 
 
 Infected 
 
 25% 
 
 31% 
 
 Deaths 
 
 7 
 
 5 equals 6% 
 
 
 Rifle 
 
 Shrapnel 
 
 Bone Wounds 
 
 254 
 
 95 349 
 
 Aseptic 
 
 68% 
 
 29% 
 
 
 Rifle 
 
 Shrapnel 
 
 Infected 
 
 32% 
 
 71% 
 
 Deaths 
 
 16 
 
 11 equals 8% 349 
 
 TOTAL 
 
 117=71% 
 
 279=29% 996 
 
 \ Aseptic 
 
 .--- 76% 
 
 -- 58% 
 
 "i Infected. 
 
 -.-- 24% 
 
 -_. 42% 
 
 Total deaths: 
 
 45 or 4.5% caused by sepsis, gas bacillus 
 
 
 infection and tetanus. 
 
 Typhus was epidemic among the Turkish troops 
 at all times. I visited a hospital on the Chatalja Line 
 
— i35— 
 
 where the cases were segregated, as many of them 
 came from a certain portion of the line which this 
 hospital served. An interesting story with some re- 
 lation to the means of transmission of typhus was 
 told me there. A medical officer from this hospital 
 went to Constantinople and, in the house of a friend, 
 discarded his underclothing in theprocess of personal 
 renovation. These garments were appropriated and 
 utilized by his undiscriminating friend who died, af- 
 ter several days from typhus, without other cases 
 occurring in the neighborhood. 
 
 At the beginning of the Second War I went to 
 Bulgaria for another season of professional activity. 
 Time will not permit more than a reference to my 
 field service there in the Evacuation Hospital of 700 
 beds capacity on the Macedonian frontier. All our 
 cases came to us after a four day journey in bull carts. 
 In my first day's service my division, conducted by 
 an English-speaking Bulgarian reserve medical of- 
 ficer and myself, which admitted half of the cases, 
 received nearly 500 wounded which were treated in 
 some sort of a way before they were passed into the 
 wards. In four weeks my division admitted 2,000 
 patients, all wounded, which was about one half of 
 the total number admitted in that time. I was sur- 
 prised to note the comparatively few major opera- 
 tions that were indicated in this number of 4,000 cases. 
 There were not more than 20 cases taken to the op- 
 erating room for anesthaesia and formal preparation. 
 I am inclined to believe that something like this pro- 
 portion of niajor operations will hold in a group of 
 cases which include all of the casualties occurring in 
 one military zone. Formal surgical interference 
 should be delayed until a base hospital is reached, 
 where the best skill and facilities are available and 
 where the convalescence of the patient can be estab- 
 lished or the autopsy performed. The cases admitted 
 
—136— 
 
 to hospitals in advanced positions deserve the max- 
 imum of surgical judgment with the minimum of 
 surgical activity. 
 
 Abdominal cases were of two classes— with and 
 without peritonitis. The first class uniformly suc- 
 cumbed to operation and the second needed no inter- 
 ference. I am confident that the military rule of 
 non-interference in abdominal cases in the field is 
 correct and should be applied. Cranial wounds did 
 not do well after operation, and I believe better re- 
 sults would have followed if the most of them had 
 been sent back to the base without {formal operation 
 in the field. 
 
 In our cases there seemed to be an unusual pro- 
 portion of compound fractures of the thigh compared 
 with the humerus. These cases all deserve the most 
 conservative treatment and immediate transporta- 
 tion to the rear. Plaster dressings were used with- 
 out rhyme or reason. I believe that any medical 
 service in the field will not suffer if plaster of paris 
 be not supplied. 
 
 The first aid dressing and its indication you know 
 about. Its employment in the field justified its rep- 
 utation for keeping clean a great many wounds to 
 which it was applied. 
 
 The therapeutic agents most indicated and em- 
 ployed were iodine, benzine, alcohol, balsam of peru 
 and a nascient oxygen preparation, Merck's 'Terhy- 
 dror' which has three times the strength of the of- 
 ficial hydrogen peroxide and is therefore three times 
 as efficient in the same bulk. Iodine has its uses and 
 is the most valuable of all antiseptics in military sur- 
 gery, but its recent rise to fame had so impressed 
 the Bulgarian surgeons that their gunshot wounds 
 often had a hard run for the terminal stages of con- 
 valescence against the persistent and heroic iodine 
 treatment. 
 
—137— 
 Sanitation — Personal 
 
 There is little to be said about the personal 
 hygiene of the Bulgarian soldier because he went 
 along with the army just about as he had done in 
 civil life, and the conditions under which his military 
 service was spent were hard and exacting. He had 
 little else to think about other than the mere problem 
 of his existence which he solved in his primitive way. 
 For the Turk, something more may be said because 
 his religious forms prescribe a bath on Thursday, as 
 he goes to the Mosque on Friday for his special 
 weekly devotion, and at any other time that he says 
 his prayers with proper formality he must wash his 
 feet. As a good many prayers are said between the 
 days of formal worship, thefe is a constant alertness 
 on the part of the Turk to perform this libation. The 
 Moslem's religiously prescribed method of attending 
 to the other necessary demands of nature contributes 
 directly to his personal sanitation. 
 
 Camps 
 
 I saw all the camps of the army at Chatalja 
 during the second armistice and, at that time, a sur- 
 prisingly great number of sanitary principles were 
 observed. Sinks were all properly removed from 
 the tents and a guard was placed over them, to en- 
 force the sanitary orders. The penalty for any dere- 
 liction was flogging, and I was told that it was not 
 often necessary to administer this punishment. The 
 water supply of these camps, which was very widely 
 distributed, was all posted so as to indicate the quality 
 of the water: w^hether potable, suitable for animals 
 or washing clothes, or use prohibited. At the base 
 hospital at the center of the line, there was a labora- 
 tory where water was examined. One sanitary com- 
 pany had its drinking water kept in the keg in which 
 
—138— 
 
 it had been transported from its source by pack 
 animals and from which the water was drawn off by 
 a spigot. I saw a picket line that was clean enough 
 for a sanitary inspector in our own army at a maneu- 
 ver camp. The manure sometimes did not reach the 
 ground before it was carried off by an orderly to the 
 nearby incinerator where fire was said to be constantly 
 burning. Everything was scrupulously clean, as 
 there was absolutely no conscience on the part of the 
 officers in keeping their men at work policing camp 
 when there was no other duty to perform. 
 
 Medical Service with Organizations 
 
 The Bulgarian medical service with organizations 
 was generally deficient, both in personnel and equip- 
 ment. There was a regimental medical service, 
 which gave a medical officer to each of the four bat- 
 talions in a regiment, but in one regiment, I know, 
 the medical service was in the hands of a dentist and 
 two medical students. Bulgaria accepted her sani- 
 tary organization rather heroically as it was not pos- 
 sible to bring it up to the more elaborate standard of 
 modern armies, because there was not sufficient medi- 
 cal personnel in the country to permit it. There are 
 only 650 doctors in Bulgaria. Two hundred of these 
 are in the regular military establishment, but all of 
 the others are taken from civil life, conscripts to 
 military service, during the war. There is a system 
 of subordinate medical service in Bulgaria which is 
 something like that of the '*practicante'' of the Span- 
 ish countries. These partly qualified medical attend- 
 ants were called 'Teldchers*' in their civil practice, 
 and all of them capable of performing military duty 
 were absorbed in some capacity by the army. 
 
 I saw one regimental hospital that seemed quite 
 well enough equipped, in personnel and material, to 
 do fairly good work. It was one mile behind the line 
 
—139— 
 
 of the regiment to which it belonged, and down in 
 the valley at the foot of the hill on which the regi- 
 ment was placed. It was close enough to have some 
 of i ts transportation destroyed by shells . A telephone 
 line connected it with the regimental headquarters 
 on the hill and an operator was kept constantly at 
 the telephone. 
 
 Turkish field service organization was superb on 
 paper as it is copied from the German army in almost 
 its entirety. In its application was its shortcomings. 
 It was able to do practically nothing in the first war 
 in the campaign in Thrace, because in this disorgan- 
 ized army medical officers lost their equipment, and 
 the Turkish medical officer has very little resource 
 when he is taken away from his formal relation with 
 his duties. 
 
 Field Medical Service 
 
 The Bulgarian field medical service was entirely 
 insufficient. There were only nine organizations that 
 were called field hospitals and two large evacuation 
 hospitals in their army organization. When the war 
 began, however, hospitals were organized in some of 
 the larger towns and went into service as military 
 hospitals. On the whole, the medical department 
 did well with what resources they had at hand. 
 
 The Turkish field medical service was well or- 
 ganized on paper. They had an abundance of ma- 
 terial, but the great disorder attending the retreat 
 of their army prevented its employment and resulted 
 in its loss. I have this information from the sanitary 
 inspector general of the Turkish army. 
 
 Evacuation of Battlefields 
 
 My late observations in the evacuation of battle- 
 fields has not extended from the firing line to the 
 base hospitals. I have only seen the results of the 
 
—140— 
 
 work performed at the first aid stations, regimental 
 and field hospitals. Cases first came under my 
 notice in an evacuation hospital, twenty miles in a 
 direct line, but forty miles by road behind the 
 battlefield, from which four days were required for 
 their transportation to this hospital. I know some- 
 thing of the manner in which the first stage of this 
 work was performed by the direct testimony of those 
 who did it, and from the inspection of regimental 
 and field hospitals during an armistice. The diffi- 
 culties under which all this work was carried on in a 
 rough country, with part of it without roads, was 
 very great. The amount of equipment at hand in 
 some instances was very meager, although in other 
 locations it was quite ample. In one army, where 
 the war was one of position, and where material 
 could be gathered in abundance, on account of a 
 railroad terminal within a few miles of the center of 
 the position, the work was carried on without much 
 defect and in some instances in a very satisfactory 
 way. In another army, which was moving con- 
 stantly in the field, hospital bases were only reached 
 over improvised roads, and the work of caring for the 
 wounded was attended by incomparably greater diffi- 
 culties. In the latter case the regimental hospitals 
 consisted of little more equipment than could be 
 carried on a sanitary personnel and there was abso- 
 lutely no shelter except what could be constructed 
 from brush. 
 
 Every Bulgarian battalion was supplied a light 
 two-horse wagon, with a very small bed, which 
 would haul one recumbent patient. This vehicle 
 was given up to the sanitary service, to be employed 
 as roads would permit. The field hospitals were 
 some distances from the rear, but their position was 
 determined by the topography of the country which 
 often gave no alternative in location. The trans- 
 
—141— 
 
 portation facilities for the wounded, while they 
 consisted solely of bullock wagons, were not as bad 
 as one might think, because, in their plodding pace, 
 these lumbering vehicles on rough, impassable roads 
 were much better than any other form of transpor- 
 tation. Their structure is somewhat flexible and 
 whenever the animals feel the resistance of an 
 obstruction their pull becomes more steady and 
 causes smoother riding, no doubt, than traction of 
 any other kind. 
 
 In any army in the field, it should be understood 
 that the wounded man can never be cared for as he 
 would be in the hands of friends or under conditions 
 that are provided by the public in civil life. Only a 
 small portion of military resources can be diverted 
 to the care of casualties from the real function of pro- 
 ducing military strength. Casualties are bound to 
 occur, at times in greater number than can be cared 
 for with the best sanitary equipment an army can 
 afford. The wounded soldier under the very best con- 
 ditions is a ''poor devil out of luck,'' and all of those 
 responsible for his care should understand the princi- 
 ples upon which the evacuation of battlefields are 
 based and they must be able to reconcile themselves 
 to the many unhappy conditions that are bound to 
 result. The effort of a sanitary department at the 
 front is directed primarily to a protective dressing 
 and the removal of the casualties and not to their 
 further treatment. Only the rough measures that 
 can be employed to protect the wounded from further 
 accident are possible, and all of the military personnel, 
 both in the combatant department and in the sanitary 
 corps, should have this understanding, so that they 
 may all play their proper and appropriate parts. 
 
 Battlefield Casualties 
 
 The wounds of the battlefield which do not in 
 
—142— 
 
 their incidence invade vital spots or destroy enough 
 tissue to cause death, sooner or later, while they may 
 be classed primarily as slight or severe, depend 
 almost entirely in their course and cure upon their 
 sterility or infection. The gravity of the infection 
 (without considering the resistance of the individual 
 patient) depends upon the character or virulence of 
 the germ which causes the infection by its growth 
 in the wound. Some germs, known as the ordinary 
 germs of suppuration, which may cause large quanti- 
 ties of pus, do not, by their growth in the tissues, 
 produce by-products or excreta, which are particularly 
 poisonous when absorbed. Other germs, however, 
 when they once begin their growth in a wound, 
 produce a poison that is so virulent, or so readily 
 absorbed, that the wound at once becomes grave or 
 fatal. 
 
 There are two common classes of virulent in- 
 fection of battlefield wounds. The first is caused by 
 the group of germs, producing by their growth a 
 gas which is indicated by the gross appearances of 
 swelling, blisters and a crackling sound on pressure 
 over an area near or surrounding the injury. 
 Wounds in which such germs grow are tritely 
 spoken of by surgeons as "gas-bacillus infections.'' 
 The secondiis caused by the tetanus bacillus, or the 
 germ of lock-jaw. In wounds of the battlefield these 
 two kinds of infection are always liable to occur, and 
 when they do, the mortality hovers around 100 per 
 cent. These infections occurred in my experiences 
 in the Balkans with about that mortality, but with 
 much less frequency than they are being reported 
 now from the European battlefields. This is to be 
 expected, however, as the fields being fought over 
 in Europe are germ-ladened by a population denser 
 than that of the Balkans. 
 
 These germs abound in some localities, and under 
 
—143— 
 
 military conditions which prevent the best sanitary 
 service and they are liable to be transmitted from one 
 wound to another. So, it follows that in all cases 
 the prevention of infection is the primary object of 
 a sanitary service in the treatment of battlefield 
 wounds. 
 
 Rifle Wounds 
 
 Rifle wounds are the most frequent of the battle- 
 field and as the modern small calibre, high velocity, 
 rifle projectile generally destroys little tissue, if a 
 vital spot is not invaded a cure may generally be ex- 
 pected if the wound be not infected. This was my 
 observation in Constantinople and Bulgaria. It was 
 particularly so in the wounds of the Turkish army, 
 because the only patients we had in our hospital were 
 those who made their way to the rear unaided, ex- 
 cept by their own efforts or by comrades, and their 
 wounds were, necessarily not very grave in their in- 
 cidence. 
 
 Shrapnel Wounds 
 
 Shrapnel wounds have been the subject of more 
 general and even professional interest than other 
 battlefield casualties in recent years. There are only 
 three characteristics of shrapnel wounds which give 
 them a separate class: first, multiplicity; second, 
 slight penetration ; and third, greater laceration than 
 in rifle wounds, which makes greater susceptibility 
 to infection. The shrapnel ball does not so often 
 penetrate vital structures and under conditions favor- 
 able for treatment, is not so fatal as a rifle ball. 
 
 There has been much recent and wild speculation 
 on the relative frequency of rifle and shrapnel wounds, 
 sometimes by civil surgeons, who may have seen 
 considerable service in the treatment of wounds 
 of war. But in the great majority of instances 
 their group of cases was selected by the various 
 
—144— 
 
 incidents and accidents of the distribution of pa- 
 tients from the battlefield to the hospitals and they 
 do not represent all classes and conditions of wounds. 
 As an example, I may mention one of the most dis- 
 tinguished civil surgeons of Europe whom I knew in 
 Constantinople to have the same class of cases that 
 came under my care. His report as a surgeon, on 
 the professional aspects of his cases is beyond ques- 
 tion, but his numerically limited experience could 
 hardly qualify him to deduce that the preponderence 
 of shrapnel wounds, in modern wars, has inverted 
 the old ratio of 10% shrapnels to 90% rifle wounds. 
 This gentleman was so impressed with this conclusion 
 that, through his efforts, a resolution was passed by 
 the Imperial Ottoman Medical Society, calling on the 
 civilized nations of the world to agree to discontinue 
 the use of field artillery on account of its capacity for 
 inhumanly murderous destruction of life in battle. 
 
 This surgeon, Prof. Depage of the University of 
 Brussels, is now on the personal staff of King Albert 
 with the Belgian army, and with all due respect to 
 his eminent professional attainments, I believe that 
 his statistics when compiled after he finishes his 
 present tragic service, will probably be more valuable 
 because they will be based on a vastly larger exper- 
 ience. 
 
 In Kustendil there passed through my hospital 
 most all of the wounds — about 10,000 in number — from 
 one army, and the proportion of shrapnel to rifle 
 wounds was about 20 to 80. This is something of an 
 increase over the ratio of shrapnel to rifle wounds of 
 older statistics, but the nature of the campaign was 
 such that the field artillery employed was greater 
 than the usual proportion engaged in the field of 
 operations of an army. 
 
—145— 
 Shell Wounds 
 
 Shell wounds include all degrees of lacerations 
 and destruction of tissues, depending, naturally, 
 upon the proximity of the victim to the exploding 
 shell. Their severity, as a class, is always greater 
 than those resulting from small arms or shrapnel, 
 but their frequency in comparison might well be 
 called rare. 
 
 Bayonet Wounds 
 
 Bayonet wounds are of interest in a military hos- 
 pital largely because of their infrequency, but this, 
 in a measure, is due to the fact that a much smaller 
 percentage of these than any other class of battlefield 
 wounds reach the hospital or need the surgeon's care. 
 I saw only a few of them, but in one case I was for- 
 tunate enough to be able to do an autopsy as the sol- 
 dier who died under my care was without a diagnosis. 
 His wound was in the left chest below the arm pit 
 and the laceration suggested a shell fragment or pos- 
 sibly a shrapnel ball as its cause. The autopsy re- 
 vealed a deep penetration, downward, and the stir- 
 ing up of viscerae as might be expected from the 
 prying or rotary movement given to the causative 
 weapon. 
 
 Traumatic Gangrene 
 
 As this opportunity is unfavorable for a review 
 of the entire subject of Military Surgery, I will only 
 mention another surgical condition, namely, the 
 gangrenes incident to military service. The condi- 
 tions that are due to the graver and more advanced 
 forms of infections, in all classes of wounds, may be 
 passed over, as the type I wish to mention is particu- 
 larly and peculiarly incident to such military service 
 as I saw in the Turkish army. It may be called 
 **traumatic" or ^'constrictive'* gangrene, as it pri- 
 marially is due to the constriction of the shoes and 
 
—146— 
 
 leggings in connection with such injury or trauma- 
 tism to the feet in hard n^arching that causes the 
 feet to swell. These cases in the Turkish army, af- 
 ter the first campaign, were quite numerous. 
 
 The Turkish peasant normally wears slippers, 
 and when he was given shoes and spiral puttee leg- 
 gings, he had no experience upon which to form any 
 judgment concerning their use. 
 
 After some abuse of the feet from marching in 
 ill-fitting, water-soaked and,* perhaps, sand or mud- 
 filled shoes, the feet swelled enough to fill the shoes 
 to the point of constriction which caused some swell- 
 ing above the shoe and which the wet and illy applied 
 spiral legging further constricted. The result was a 
 partial and then a complete interruption of the circu- 
 lation, beginning in the skin and tips of toes and 
 then gradually extending toward the knee as the 
 condition persisted. I have the authoritive history 
 of one of my cases who had worn his shoes between 
 three and four weeks while marching in the rain and 
 mud by day and sleeping without shelter at night, 
 because he never could find what he considered a 
 proper or necessary opportunity to take off his shoes, 
 namely, a place indoors. In another case, the soldier 
 said he was kept marching all the time and his officer 
 prevented him from taking off his shoes as he was 
 required to keep himself in readiness to march. His 
 shoes were not removed for more than two weeks. 
 I do not offer these cases as a general indictment of 
 the puttee leggings, which I believe to be all right 
 in its proper use, but only as a most pathetic conse- 
 quence of its abuse. 
 
 These cases presented an interesting surgical 
 phase, because they were generally not infected, and 
 if properly treated, natural processes effected a 
 separation between the dead and living tissue with 
 only a slight assistance from the surgeon. The line 
 
—147— 
 
 of natural demarkatiou was invariably very much 
 nearer the extremity than a formal amputation would 
 have made it. Unhappily for a great many of these 
 unfortunate victims, surgical impatience or some 
 other non-commendable attribute was responsible for 
 needless amputations, because the cases were mis- 
 taken for the gangrene of the ordinary surgical 
 variety. Some cases were fatally infected by the 
 operation for this condition which most probably 
 would have been spontaneously cured by nature and 
 a little sanitary attention. 
 
 Vaso-Motor Gangrene 
 
 I saw in Constantinople another type of gangrene 
 which must have resulted indirectly from the con- 
 traction of the blood vessels caused by an effect on 
 the brain by concussion from a high explosive. A 
 soldier was rendered unconscious by a "great ex- 
 plosion,'' as he described it, which hurled him many 
 feet and covered him with much earth and many 
 bruises, but no open wounds. After slowly regaining 
 consciousness, his hands and feet remained numb and 
 gradually became gangrenous, until various portions 
 of the extremities separated and left the unfortunate 
 victim with an odd variety of stumps. One hand 
 was left with only enough digital remnants to give 
 him gripping power sufficient for him to feed him- 
 self, and both legs carried short stumps below the 
 knee. 
 
Appendix 
 
 Chronological Table of the Principal Events 
 
 of the Balkan Wars 
 1912 
 
 Oct. 8. —Montenegro declared war. 
 Oct. 13. — Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian note to Turkey. 
 Oct. 14. — Montenegrin capture of Touzi. 
 Oct. 15. —Peace signed between Turkey and Italy. 
 Oct. 16. — Berane captured by the Montenegrins. 
 Oct. 17. —Turkey declared war on Bulgaria and Servia, who 
 accepted the challenge. 
 
 Greece declared war on Turkey. 
 Oct. 18. — Moustafa Pasha captured by Bulgarians. 
 
 Elassona occupied by Greeks. 
 Oct. 20. — Bulgarian advance on Adrianople. 
 Oct. 21.— Greek landing in Lemnos. 
 Oct. 22.— Prishtina captured by Servians. 
 Oct. 23. — Novi Bazar captured by Servians. 
 
 Dedeaghadj captured by Bulgarians. 
 
 Heavy fighting at Adrianople. 
 Oct. 24. —Capture of Kirk Kilisse by Bulgarians. 
 
 Capture of Koumanovo by Servians. 
 Oct. 26. — Bombardment of Adrianople. 
 Oct. 26.— Capture of Uskiib by Servians. 
 Oct. 27.— Capture of Ishtib by Servians. 
 Oct. 28.— Capture of Veria by Greeks. 
 Oct. 29. — Battle in Thrace begun at Bunar Hlssar. 
 Oct. 30.— Capture of Thasos by Greeks. 
 Oct. 31. — Rout of the Turks at Lule Bourgas by Bulgarians. 
 
 Capture of Ipek by Montenegrins. 
 
 Capture of Prizrend by Servians. 
 Nov. 3.— Capture of Preveza by Greeks. 
 
 Bombardment of Shkodra by Montenegrins begun 
 Nov. 4. — Turkish appeal for mediation. 
 Nov. 5.— Turks retreat on Chatalja. 
 
 International squadron comes to Constantinople. 
 Nov. 9. —Capture of Salonika by Greeks. 
 Nov. 13.— Negotiations for an armistice. 
 148 
 
—149— 
 
 Nov. 17. — Bombardment of Chatalja begun. 
 
 Montenegrins entered San Giovanni di Medua. 
 Nov. 18.— Fall of Monastir before Servians. 
 Nov. 20.— Hostilities suspended at Chatalja. 
 Nov. 21.— *'Hamidie" torpedoed by Bulgarian flotilla, 
 Nov. 22. — Mitylene occupied by the Greeks. 
 Nov. 24.— Scio occupied by Greeks. 
 Nov. 26. — Ottoman and Bulgarian plenipotentiares meet at 
 
 Bakhshaiskeuy. 
 Nov. 28.— Durazzo occupied by Servians. 
 Dec. 3. — Armistice signed by Turkey with Bulgaria, Servia 
 
 and Montenegro. 
 Dec. 16.— Peace Conference met in London. 
 Dec. 16. — Naval engagement outside Dardenelles. 
 Dec. 20.— Kortcha captured by Greeks. 
 
 1913 
 
 Jan. 16.— "Hamidie" sinks Greek transport "Makedonia'* 
 
 in Syra harbor. 
 Jan. 17.— Collective Note of Powers to Turkey. 
 Jan. 18.— Naval battle off Tenedos. 
 
 Jan. 22.— Ottoman National Assembly declares for peace. 
 Jan. 23. — Unionist coup d'Etat; Nazim Pasha killed. Mah- 
 
 moud Shevket Pasha Grand Vizier. 
 Jan. 30. — Ottoman reply to note of Powers delivered. 
 Feb. 3. — Armistice ended. Bombardment of Adrianople 
 
 renewed. 
 Feb. 10.— Gunboat "Asar-i-Tewfik" stranded in Black Sea. 
 Feb. 8-10.— Battle of Boulair. 
 March 6.— Capture of Yanina by Greeks. 
 March 11. — "Hamidie" sinks Greek transport at S. Giovanni 
 
 di Medua. 
 March 16.— Samos occupied by Greeks. 
 March 18. — King George I of Greece assassinated. 
 March 22.— Powers send identical note to Allies. 
 March 23.— Djavid Pasha surrenders to Servians at Skumbi. 
 March 26. — Capture of Adrianople by Bulgarians and Servians. 
 April 2. — Funeral of King George of Greece. 
 April 16. — Cessation of hostilities at Chatalja agreed on. 
 April 23. — Shkodra captured by Montenegrins. 
 May 21.— Peace delegates meet in London. 
 May 30.— Peace preliminaries signed in London, with Turko- 
 
 Bulgarian frontier established on Enos-Media 
 
 line. 
 
—ISO- 
 June 29.— Bulgarians attack Servians in valleys of the Var- 
 dar, Bregalnitca and Zletovska. 
 
 June 30. Greeks crush Bulgarian battalion at Salonika. 
 
 July 15. —Roumanians cross the Danube at Rostchuk. 
 
 July 18.— Turks advance from Chatalja lines and occupy 
 Adrianople. 
 
 July 30.— Bulgarian Army received orders to supend opera- 
 tions. 
 
 Jul}' 31. — Armistice for four days beginning at 1:00 p.m., 
 this day. 
 
 Aug 6. — Armistice extended three days from this day. 
 
 Aug. 9.— Treaty of Peace signed at Bucharest by Bulgaria, 
 Roumania. Servia, Montenegro and Greece. 
 
 Sept. 29.— Treaty of Constantinople established Turko- 
 Bulgarian frontier. 
 
 Economic Effect of the Results of the War Upon the Resources of 
 the Ottoman Empire 
 
 While this observation may be a little out of sequence, I 
 have the data on such good and reliable authority that they 
 have a positive value in their authenticity, whatever may be 
 their portion of interest. I made the note at the time of con- 
 versation with an European in high official position in the 
 Turkish fiscal service. He said that he could speak with con- 
 fidence because he had very recently compiled a financial 
 statement which contained the figures which he easily re- 
 membered. The statement was made in answer to the ques- 
 tion: "What effect will the loss of the European Provinces 
 have upon the resources of the Ottoman Empire," and, the 
 answer was that the effect would be much to the Empire's 
 economic advantage, for the following reasons : the annual 
 military expenditures directly chargeable to the support of 
 the army maintained in the "valayet of Adrianople," as the 
 province of Thrace is called in the Turkish administration 
 system, was 1,300,000 pounds Turkish. The annual revenues 
 from all sources was 1,100,000 pounds Turkish, which left an 
 annual deficit of 200,000 pounds Turkish for the province of 
 Thrace alone. 
 
 The annual military expenditure for the support of the 
 army maintained in Macedonia had exceeded the total 
 revenues, in the preceding years, from 600,000 to 800,000 
 pounds Turkish. Of the entire disbursements in the Euro- 
 pean Provinces, the Ottoman Empire expended one third or 
 more on the military establishment maintained there. 
 
 The value of a Turkish pound is about $4.50. 
 
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