\ i THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES f GIFT THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT EUROPE. WITH A VIEW OF THE REVOLUTIONS in ASIA AND AFRICA. THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT EUROPE. VIEW OF THE REVOLUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA, IN A SERIES OF LETTERS TO A YOUNG NOBLEMAN. BY WILLIAM RUSSELL, L. L. D. AUTHOR Or THE HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE. VOL. II* PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY H. MAXWELL, COLUMBIA-HOUSE, roVL WILLIAM YOUNG BIRCH AND ABRAHAM SMALL. 1801. mot THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT EUROPE. LETTER IX. THE REVOLUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA, FROM THE SUB- VERSION OF THE OLD ASSYRIAN EMPIRE TO THE TAKING OF BABYLON BY CYRUS THE GREAT; WITH A RETRO- SPECTIVE VIEW OF THE STATE OF SYRIA AND- EGYPT, IN MORE EARLY TIMES. xxFTER the subversion of the Assyrian em- pire, Cyaxares and Nabocolassar, or Nebuchadnez- zar, the warlike kings of Media and Babylon, who had destroyed Nineveh, threatened the whole earth with subjection. The exulting victors immediately reduced to obedience, either conjunctly or separately, all the nations that had, at any time, owned the sway of the haughty monarchs of Assyria 1 ; and extended their 1. The greatness and fall of the Assyrian empire are finely described by the prophet Ezekiel.^under the similitude of a tree. " Behold, the " Assyrian was a cedar in Lebanon with fair branches, and with a " r.hadowir.g 932G10 8 THE HISTORY OF PART I. their dominion from the borders of Egypt, to the v^"v~w frontiers of India. In the prosecution of these conquests, Nebuchad- nezzar directed his arms chiefly against the nations to the west of the Euphrates, and Cyaxares against those to the east of the Tygris; where, after having subdued all the countries in the neighbourhood of the Caspian sea, he chased the Scythians into the wilds of Sarmatia 2 . Concerning the state of the vast regions to the east of the Tygris, at this early period, we have little information, that can be depended on. But the case is very different, in regard to the countries to the west of the Euphrates. There the most interesting spectacles are presented to our view, by historians both sacred and civil, during the century that pre- ceded the destruction of Nineveh. The Assyrian monarchs, from the foundation of their empire, appear to have claimed dominion, and i " shadowing shroud, and of an high stature, and his top was among " the thick boughs. The waters made him great ; the deep set him " upon high, with her rivers running round about his plants, and sent " out her little rivers unto all the trees of the field. Therefore his " height was exalted above all the trees of the field, and his bought " were multiplied, and his branches became long, because of the multi- " tude of waters, when he shot forth. All the fowls of heaven made- " their nests in his boughs, and under his branches did all the " beasts of the field bring forth their young, and under his shadow " dwelt all great nations. Thus was he fair in his greatness, in the " length of his branches ; for his root was by great waters". (Ezek. *' chap. xxxi. ver. 3 — 7.). " But, because his heart is lifted up in his " height," adds the prophet, in the name of the Lord, " I have de- " livered him into the hand of the mighty one of the heathen. And " strangers, the terrible of the nations, have cut him off. Upon the " mountains, and in all the valleys, his branches are fallen, and his " boughs are broken by all the rivers of the land ; and all the people " of the earth are gone from under his shadow, and have left him. " In the day when he went down to the grave, I caused a mourning; " when I cast him into the pit, I made toe nations shake at the sound " cf his fall." Ezekiel, chap. xxxi. ver. 10 — 16. 27 Ancient U.x'rJ: lli-t. vol. iv. ct aucr. cit. Utterly ANCIENT EUROPE. 8 latterly had rigorously maintained it, over all the LETTER countries between the Euphrates and Nile. These claims descended to Nebuchadnezzar, on the subver- sion of the Assyrian empire, and the rise of the Baby- lonian grandeur on its ruins. And he did not fail to assert them, or to punish such nations as attempted to dispute his sway. But before I relate the future pro- gress of the arms of this mighty conqueror, whose •word smote so many kingdoms, and the terror of whose name was so great upon the face of the earth, it will be proper to take a retrospective survey of the •tate of Syria and Egypt. Under the name of Syria I comprehend, for the sake of perspicuity, the whole country from the Eu- phrates to the Mediterranean sea, and from the foot of mount Taurus to Arabia Petrea, and the frontiers of Egypt 3 . From the southern part of this fine coun- trv, as I have formerly had occasion to observe*, the Israelites or Hebrews, under Joshua, drove the Cana- anites of the inland country to the maritime district, afterward known by the name of Phrenicia; while they gave to the Land of Promise, or the territory in which they settled, the name of Jiidea, and the Greeks, that of Palestine. The northern part, or Syria Proper, was chiefly subject to the kings of Damascus ; who, like all the other Syrian princes and states, were in some measure dependent on the Assyrian emperors. The supine successors of Ninus and Semerimis, Ant. Chr. however, until roused to exertion by the revolt of the w . ' Medes and Babylonians (after the lapse of five hun- xn 1. dred years), had but imperfectly maintained their 3. Straho (Geog. lib. xvi.) gives nearly the same extent to Syria; and Herodotus, in more ancient times, talks familiarly of the Syrian Palestine (Historiar. lib. i ), of Azotus in Syria, and of the bour.dar'cs between Syria and Fgypt. Herodot. lib. ii. 4. Lett. I. sovereignty 4 THE HISTORY OF PART I. sovereignty over the western provinces of their em. v -* rv ^> / pire. Of the exercise of such sovereignty,, before this memorable sera, we have accordingly but one instance on good authority. When Pul, emperor of Assyria, appeared on the confines of Palestine, Menahem king of Israel gave that prince a thousand talents of silver, exacted from his own subjects, to confirm him in the kingdom, which he had usurped 5 . This circumstance happily brings under our observation the state of the people of God. During the long period of Assyrian indolence, and before the Egyptian monarchs attempted to ex- tend their dominion beyond the bottom of the Ara- bian gulf, the Syrian princes acted as independent sovereigns, and waged continual wars with each other 6 . In the course of those wars the Israelites, after having been often subjected to servitude by the neighbouring nations 7 , rose to a distinguished height in wealth and power, under their two celebrated kings, David and Solomon 8 . David, who was a profound politician, and a great captain, rendered many of the Syrian princes tributary to him, at the same time that he extended the bounds of the kingdom of Palestine ; and Solomon, his son and successor, still renowned for his wisdom and splendour, beautified the city and built the temple of Jerusalem, while he civilized his subjects, by introducing among them the arts of peace 9 . Solomon, however, was not supplied merely by his territorial revenues with that wealth which has ap- peared incredible j which enabled him to live in such 5. 2 Kings, chap. xv. ver. 19, 20. And the power of the Assyrian emperors, in more ancient times, to " set up and pull down, whom- *' soever they thought proper," we also learn from scripture, had been great in Syria. 2 Kings, chap. xix. ver. 25, 26. 6. See the books of Judges and Samuel throughout. 7. Ibid. 8. 2 Sam. and 1 Kings, passim. 9r Id. ibid. pomp, ANCIENT EUROPE. S poflfp, and to finish and furnish so many superb build- LETTER ings, but by an extensive and lucrative commerce. His father David having conquered the land of Edom, or Idumea, perceived the advantages that might be made of its two harbours, Elath and Eziongaber, on the eastern coast of the Arabian gulf, or Red Seaj whence he appears to have carried on trade with suc- cess'". And the profits of that trade, added to the accumulated spoils of his vanquished enemies, with their annual tributes, swelled before his death to an immense treasure". p . • \ This treasure devolved to Solomon; whose en- lightened mind furnished him with the widest views, and whose pacific reign allowed him leisure to ex- tend and increase the trade from Elath and Ezionga- ber. And the measures which he pursued, for these ends, were worthy of his high reputation for wisdom. He settled in those advantageous ports colonies of sea-faring people, from the coasts of Palestine and Phoenicia; and there, by the assistance of Hiram, king of Tyre, his friend and ally, who furnished him with naval stores, ship-builders, and expert mariners, he fitted out fleets 12 ; which seem to have traded to the eastern coast of Africa, the southern coast of Arabia, to Persia, and the hither India' 3 . Solomon, in a word, may be said to have formed the first African and India companies ; for, although the principal, he cannot be supposed to have been the sole adventurer and proprietor. Hiram, king of Tyre, « 10. See Prideaux Hist, of the yews and Neighbouring Nations, book i. «t auct. cit. 11. 1 Chron, chap. xxii. ver. 14. 12. 1 Kings, chap. xi. 2 Chron. chap. viii. 13. See Prideaux, ubi sup. The fleets of Solomon, though chiefly- calculated for commerce, appear also to have been designed to act •fFensively, in case of resistance, and in that cas« to have pillaged. 2 Chron. chap. vtti. ver. 18. TOL. II, *. B at IX. 6 THE HISTORY OF PART I. at least, we know had a share in the trade from Elath v^~v~^/ and Eziongaber' 4 . And without the assistance of the Phoenicians the king of Jerusalem could not possibly have furnished the articles of exchange for that trade. One of the most considerable of those articles must have been wrought silver ; of which the eastern na- tions have, in all ages, been remarkably fond, and which then could not fail to bring great returns, as the fleets of Solomon did. And those returns, we find, were chiefly made in gold 15 . The vast abundance of the precious metals in Palestine, during the reign of this great prince, ac- cording to the narration in the sacred books, has af- forded occasion of triumph to infidel writers, and given much trouble to christian commentators. But a certain degree of candour is only necessary on one side, and a competent share of historical knowledge on the other, to admit and establish the credibility of the Jewish records. The countries conquered by David, and subject to Solomon, as well as those to which he traded, have always abounded in gold. We accordingly learn, that his annual revenue, paid in that metal, was immense, exclusive of the imposts arising from internal traffic and foreign commerce 16 . f From Spain the Phoenicians of Tyre imported silver in whole ship loads' 7 ; the Spaniards being then utterly ignorant of its value, and giving it freely in exchange for toys, or permitting it to be dug out of the mine without jealousy' 8 . Part of their bullion the Tyrians wrought into vessels and utensils of va- rious kinds, for the purposes of trade or private use ; yet enough would remain, we may fairly presume, § 14. 1 Kings, chap. x. ver. 11. 2 Chron. chap. viii. ver. 17, 18 ; and chap. ix. ver. 21. 15. 1 Kings, chap. ix. ver. 28. 16. 2 Cbron. chap. ix. ver. 13, 14. 17.Diod. Sicul. lib. v. Strabo, lib. Hi- 18. Id. ibid. to ANCIENT EUROPE. to keep the proportional value of silver as far below > that of gold, in Syria, during the reign of Solomon, as in any other country in ancient or modern times. The Jewish monarch, whose treasury overflowed with gold, could therefore procure what quantity of silver he thought proper with that more precious metal. Hence silver is figuratively said to have been at Jerusalem, in the days of Solomon's grandeur, as plenty as stones' 9 . No wonder, therefore, so opulent and ostentatious a prince thought it too base to form the drinking vessels, or ornamental furniture of his palace 20 . I But the grandeur of the Israelites or Hebrews, as they are indifferently called, was of short continu- ance. During the reign of Rehoboam, the son and successor of the magnificent Solomon, Palestine be- came a prey to civil dissensions, and was divided into two kingdoms; namely, the kingdom of Israel, of which Samaria became the capital, and the king- dom of Judah, the metropolis of which was Jerusa- lem, the former seat of government 21 . In conse- quence of this division, which weakened the Hebrew nation, Palestine was frequently plundered by the kings of Damascus; but especially by Hazael and Rezin, the most powerful princes that had ever reigned in Syria 27 . Hazael 19. 1 Kings, chap. x. ver. 27. 20. 2 Cbron. chap. ix. ver. 15—20. 21. 1 Kings, chap. xii. 2 Cbron. chap. xxi. 22. The manner in whicli Hazael ascended the throne of Damascus ■was not a little remarkable. The language of sacred history only can , do justice to the narration. " And Elisha came to Damascus, and " Benhadad the king of Syria was sick, and it was told, him, saying, *• The man of God is-come hither. And the king said unto Hazael, " take a present in thine hand, an* go meet the man of God, and in- " quire of the Lord by him, saying, Shall I recover of this disease ! — " So Hazael went to meet him, and took a present with him, even of " eVery good thing in Damascus, forty camels burden, and came and " stood before him, and said, Thy son Benhadad, king of Syria, "hath * THE HISTORY OF PART r. Ant. Chr. 740 Kabonass. sera 7. Hazael not only subdued the kingdom of Israel, but tyrannised over it during the greater part of his reign 23 . And the hostile demonstrations of Rezin, who had extended his sway as far as the Arabian gulf, where he took Elath, so much alarmed Ahas, king of Judah, for the safety of Jerusalem, that he applied, in the most abject terms, for assistance from Tilgath-pileser, emperor of Assyria; whom he acknowledged as his superior sovereign, by a present, and bound himself to^bey 24 . Glad of an oppor- tunity of asserting his dominion over the rebelli- ous and warlike provinces to the west of the Eu- phrates, the Assyrian monarch entered the territory, and appeared before the city of Damascus with a for- midable army; and having made himself master of the place, finally subverted that famous kingdom; slew Rezin, and transplanted the inhabitants to a distant part of his empire, on the eastern side of the Tygris 25 . " hath sent me to thee, saying, Shall I recover of this disease? And " Elishasaid unto him, go say unto thy master thou mayest certainly *' recover: hovvbeit, the Lord hath shewed me, that he shall surely " die. And he settled his countenance steadfastly, until he was "ashamed: and the man of God wept. And Hazael said, why " weepeth my lord ? And he answered, Because I know the evil " that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel. Their strong holds " wilt thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the " sword ; and wilt dash their children in pieces, and rip np their " women with child. And Hazael said, but what is thy servant a "dog, that he should do this great thing? And Elisha, answered, " the Lord hath shewed me that thou shalt be king over Syria. So he " departed from Elisha, and came to his master, who said to him, " what said Elisha to thee? And he answered, he told me that thou " shouldest surely recover. And it came to pass on the morrow " that he took a thick cloth, and dipt it in warer, and spread it on " the face of Benhadad: so that he died. And Hazael reigned in " his stead." 2 Kings, chap. viii. ver. 7 — 15. 23. 2 Kings, chap. x. ver. 32, 33. chap. xiii. ver. 3. 7. 22. Hazael also oppressed the kingdom of Judah, 2 Kings, chap. xii. ver. 17, 18. • 24. 2 Kings, chap. xvi. ver. 7. 25. 2 Kings, ver. 9. and Prideaux> Connect, book i. The t ANCIENT EUROPE. The same policy was pursued by the successors of Tilgath-pileser. His son Salmaneser, who had in the beginning of his reign asserted his sovereignty over the Syrian provinces, finding that Hoshea, king of Israel, did not pap him the customary tribute, entered Palestine at the head of a mighty host, and invested Samaria. Hoshea, who had been encouraged in his obstinacy by So or Sabaco, king of Egypt and ./Ethio- pia, made a gallant defence, but received no succours : so that Samaria, after a siege of three years, was com- pelled to submit to the law of the conqueror 26 . And the king of Israel and his subjects, after having seen their capital sacked, were carried captives into Assy- ria 27 . Hoshea was loaded with chains, and thrown into prison at Nineveh, and the Israelites were plan- ted in different districts, toward the frontiers of Media 28 ; while their former country was peopled with the Cusheans, and other rude tribes, brought from the less remote provinces of the Assyrian empire 19 . Immediately after the subversion of the kingdom of Israel, Salmaneser received the submissions of all the cities in Phoenicia, except Tyre. Against that city, therefore, he pointed his vengeance, as soon as he had settled his affairs in Assyria 30 . He made his first attempt by sea, with a fleet which he had fitted out on the coast of Syria Proper. Being worsted by the Tyrians on their natural element, he invested their capital by land. During a siege of five years they baffled all the efforts of his army 3 '. But his death, and other unforeseen events, only perhaps saved Tyre from the speedy execution of the awful LETTER IX. int. Chr. 728. Nabonass. sera 19. Ant. Chr. 721. Nabonass. sera 26. Ant. Chr. 714. Nabonass. sera 33. 26. 2 Kings, chap. xvii. ver. 3 — 6. chap, xviii.ver. 9, 10, 11. 27. 2 Kings, chap. xvii. ver. 6. chap, xviii. ver? 11. Joseph. Antiq. lib. ix. 28. Kings, chap. xvii. ver. 6. 29. 2 Kings, chap. xvii. ver. 24-. and Prideaux, Connect, book i. ">0. Joseph. Antiq. lib. ix. and Prideaux, Connect, book i. 31. Id. ibid. vV judgment r* ■ » 10 THE HISTORY OF PART I. judgment denounced against it by the Jewish pro- N "*" v " s " / phets, and which we shall afterward see executed; a doom that had already overtaken Damascus and Samaria 32 , and which hung suspended over Jerusa- lem 33 . % ft Hezekiah, king of Judah, having withdrawn his allegiance from the emperor of Assyria 34 ; and form- ed, for support in his rebellion, an alliance with the king of Egypt, Sennacherib, the son of Salmaneser, came against him with a strong army, and reduced many of his fortified towns 35 ; notwithstanding the precautions he had taken to prevent the approach of the enemy, by desolating his country. Alarmed at this rapid progress, Hezekiah sent the Assyrian monarch a submissive embassy; and afterward a present of three hundred talents of silver, and thirty of gold, and agreed to pay the same sum annually for the holding of his kingdom 36 . Sennacherib ac- cepted the money and the submission of the king of % Judah; but afterward learning, it appears, his alliance with the king of Egypt, the Assyrian forces were ordered to invest Jerusalem 37 . In the meantime, the Egyptian army being put in motion, Sennacherib advanced against it, overthrew 32. That many of the predictions of the Jewish prophets led to their own completion, no man of sound understanding can doubt, af- ter reading the sacred history; so many, indeed, that were we not taught to consider those holy men as the heralds of God's judgments, we might often suppose them the trumpeters of war, rebellion, usur- pation, and the remote causes of all the horrid consequences of such disorders j the murder of princes, the slaughter of armies, the deso- lation of kingdoms, and the sacking of cities. But as they were merely the organs of the will of Heaven, they must stand exempt from blame. 33. Isaiah, chap. xxix. ver. 1 — 8. 34. 2 Kings, chap, xviii. ver. 7. 35. Ibid. ver. 13. 36. 2 Kings, chap, xviii. ver. 14, 15, 1.6. In regard to the annual tribute, the words are exaness : " that which thou puttest on me, I will bear." 37. Ibid. ver. 17—24. it; ANCIENT EUROPE. 11 it; and after having ravaged Egypt, proposed to renew LETTER the siege of Jerusalem 38 . Hezekiah, however, was delivered from the danger that threatened him, by a burning blast from the Arabian desert, or a pesti- lential distemper, which broke out in the Assyrian camp; cut off great part of the army, and obliged Ant. Chr. Sennacherib to retire in disgrace to Nineveh 39 . This Na £ on " blast, or plague, is called, in the strong language of «ra 37. Scripture, the stroke of the angel of God 4 °. ■ Esar-haddon, the son and successor of Senna- cherib, having reunited, as formerly related 4 ', the An ^' 8 ? hr ' kingdom of Babylon to the Assyrian empire, asserted Nabonass. his right of dominion over the kingdom of Judah; *ra67. transplanted into Assyria the remainder of the in- habitants of the kingdoms of Israel and Damascus, andsupplied their place with foreigners; took Manas- seh the Jewish king prisoner, because of his defec- tion ; bound him with fetters, and sent him captive to Babylon 42 . Meanwhile the Assyrian monarch prosecuted his march toward the Nile, every where commanding un- conditional obedience; reduced Azotus, and entered Egypt 43 . Having plundered that rich country, he returned loaded with prisoners and treasure, through the countries he had subjected to his sway. And finding, on his arrival at Babylon, Manasseh suffi- ciently humbled, he restored him to the tributary throne of Judah 44 . * 08. 2 Kings, chap. xix. ver. 33. Isaiah, chap, xxxvii. ver. 18, 19, 33, 34> 39. 2 Kings, chap. xix. ver. 35, 36. Jsaiab, chap, xxxvii. ver. 36, S7. 2 Cbron. chap, xxxii. ver. 21. 40. Id. ibid. 41. Lett. I. 42. 2 Chron. chap, xxxiii, ver. 11. Joseph. Antiq. lib. x. See also Prideaux, Connect, book. i. et auct. cit. 43. Id. Ibid. 44. Compare Joseph, et Prideaux, ubi sup. with 2 Cbron. chap, xxxiii. ver. 12, 13. The RY 13 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The terror of the Assyrian arms being thus spread v^"V>»^ wide, and the Assyrian power exalted above that of every other people, the nations between the Euphrates and the Nile seem to have made no attempt to reco- ver their independency for almost fifty years, after the expedition of Esar-haddon. During this period, however, the Egyptian monarchy, having gathered new strength, its sovereigns not only recovered what they had lost in Syria, but endeavoured to extend their dominion as far as the frontiers of Baby- lonia 45 . These circumstances naturally lead me to recal your lordship's attention to the affairs of Egypt. The history of this venerable kingdom was former- ly brought down to the reign of Psammitichus 46 ; one of the twelve chiefs, among whom the government was divided, after the anarchy that followed the death of Sethon 47 . The means by which he rose to power 48 , and the particulars of the revolution that gave him possession of the throne 49 , I shall now relate, accord- ing to promise, as an introduction to the second, and more credible part of the history of the Egyptian mo- narchy. Psammitichus, who kept his court at Sais, in Lower Egypt, and under whose jurisdiction was the sea-coast, seems to have been the first Egyptian prince that cultivated commerce, or who shook off the nar- row prejudices of his country 50 . The ancient Egyp- tians having a superstitious horror against maritime 45. 2 Kings, chap, xxiii. ver. 29. 46. Lett. I. 47. Ibid. 48. Vid. Herodotus, lib. i cap. cli — cliv. 49. Id. ibid. 50. Herodot. lib. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. If Sesostris endeavoured to overcome those prejudices, and enlarge commerce, as some authors give us reason to believe, his example seems to have had no influence upon his successors. affairs, ANCIENT EUROPE. *3 affairs, and being restrained by their religion from LETTER, mingling with other nations, the foreign trade of ' Egypt had hitherto been carried on, and monopolized by the Phoenicians 55 ; who submitted to many mean compliances for the favour they enjoyed, and yet were allowed to land only at the port of Naucratis, on the western branch of the Nile 56 . Psammitichus encou- raged the Greeks to visit his harbours, and enter into competition with the Phoenicians ; while he took the utmost care to promote industry, and awaken a spirit of commerce among the people immediately under his government 57 . By this liberal policy, he so greatly increased in wealth and power, as to excite the jea- lousy of all the other Egyptian chiefs 58 . They first confined him to his own district, as formerly observ- ed, excluding him from any share in the general go- vernment of the kingdom; and afterward entered into a league for his destruction 5 ". In order to avert the danger that threatened him, Psammitichus naturally applied to the people with whom he wa3 connected by trade, and who, conse- quently, were interested in his fortune. He was ac- cordingly enabled to reinforce his native troops with a 55. Id. ibid. Strabo, lib. xvii. Plut. Isid. et Ost'r. This neglect of navigation on the part of the Egyptians, and their intimate con- nexion with the Phoenicians, in consequence thereof, enable us to ac- count, in a satisfactory manner, why all the Egyptian emigrations of Greece, and the islands of the JEgzan sea, were made from the coast of Phoenicia or from the Nile, in Phoenician vessels. Want of atten- tion to these circumstances, has involved the narration of several historians, both ancient and modern, in much confusion, and bewil- dered many antiquarians. 56 Herodot. ubisup. 57. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. 58. Id. ibid. 59. Compare Herodot. lib.ji. with Diod. Sicul. lib. i. I have chosen, in general, to follow the account given by Diodorus of the revolu- tion accomplished by this prince, as being more consistent and probabla than that of Herodotus. vol. ii. » body 14 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Ant. Chr. 670 Kabonass. sera 77. body of Arabian mercenaries, probably in Phoenician pay. He was also furnished with a body of Ionians and Carians, from Asia Minor; and who, being clad in complete armour, were terrible to the Egyptians 6 ". With an army composed of these combined forces, he marched toward Memphis; totally defeated his antagonists, who were all either slain in battle or obliged to seek refuge in exile; took possession of that superb capital, and became master of all Egypt 6 '. This revolution was accomplished, as formerly ob- served 62 , in the year six hundred and seventy before the christian aera. Psammitichus, when seated on the Egyptian throne, adhered to the same maxims of policy that had contributed to his aggrandizement. He continued to cultivate commerce; opened his ports to all na- tions, but shewed particular favour to the Greeks 63 ; formed an alliance with Athens and other Grecian states 6 *; gave liberal encouragement to foreign emi- grants and settled his Ionian and Carian auxiliaries on both sides of the eastern branch of the Nile, between Bubastis and Pelusium 65 . There confined to the profession of arms, conformable to the Egyp- tian polity, which obliged the son to follow the occu- pation of his father, these successful soldiers and their descendants long maintained their military charac- ter; and beingjoined by other adventurers of the same description, and employed as the royal guard, the Grecian mercenaries became the support of this prince and his successors in seasons of danger and tumult 66 , 60. Diod. Sicul. et Herodot. ubi sup. 61 Id. ibid. 62. Lett. I. 63. Herodot. lib i. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. 64. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. 65. Herodot. et Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 66. Id. ibid. Yet ANCIENT EUROPE. 15 Yet farther to facilitate intercourse, and eradicate prejudices, Psammitichus put a number of Egyptian boys under the tuition of the more enlightened Greeks, settled in Egypt; in order to be instructed in the Grecian language and discipline 7 . So that the transactions of Egypt were thenceforth intimately known to the people of Greece, who traded to great advantage with that country; and the Egyptians came gradually to have less aversion against stran- gers, when they grew better acquainted with them. If the wisdom of Psammitichus was conspicuous in civil, it was equally so in military affairs. As soon as he had settled the interior government and police of his kingdom, he led an army into Syria; with a view of recovering the frontier towns, which the Assyrian emperors had taken from his predecessors. He accordingly invested Azotus or Ashdod, while his generals subdued the neighbouring country; and made himself master of that important place after a siege or blockade of twenty-nine years 68 . The extraordinary length of this siege can only be accounted for, by the intervention of certain unfore- seen events, which threatened the Egyptian mon- arch with utter ruin. Two hundred thousand of his native troops deserted in a body; because he had given the post of honour and of danger to his Gre- cian mercenaries, in whose valour he could best confide 69 . Perceiving his error, he endeavoured to conciliate them by concessions, but in vain. They re- fused to return to the army, and continued their march into their own country. He followed them ; and strove, by threats, to subdue their refractory spirit. But / 67. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. Herodot. lib. ii. 68. Id. ibid. 69. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. finding 16 THE HISTORY OF PART I. finding them obstinate in disobedience, he prudently \~*-v>~' permitted them to retire into Ethiopia, rather than combat their despair 70 . Ant. Chr. 632. Nabonass. acra 115. That revolt was followed by the approach of at powerful and barbarous enemy. The Scythians, who had, as formerly related 7 ', vanquished the Medes under their warlike king Cyaxares; having ravaged all the countries contiguous to the Euphrates and Tygris, were advancing toward the Nile, when the sagacity of Psammitichus saved Egypt from their hostile fury. Instead of attempting to obstruct their progress, by offering them battle, he advanced into Palestine to meet them, loaded with rich presents, recommended by soothing words: and thus diverted the storm that was ready to break upon his king- dom 77 . Ant. Chr. 616. Nabonass. rra 131. Nechaoh, the son and successor of Psammitichus, pursued the political system of his father, both with respect to naval and military affairs. In his ardour for commercial intercourse he attempted to cut a navigable canal, from the Nile to the Arabian gulf. But in that great project he failed, after the loss of an hundred and twenty thousand men, and a vast ex- pense of treasure 73 . This enlightened monarch, however, was more for- tunate in anotherbold undertaking, intimately con- nected with the former. Having built a fleet in the ports of the Arabian gulf, he put it under the con- ductof Phoenician navigators, whom he orderedtodis- cover the extreme point of Africa toward the south, or what is now known by the name of the Cape of Good Hope.' And these navigators, after a coasting voyage 70. Id. ibid, ct Herodot. lib. ii. 71. Lett. I. 72. Herodot. lib. i. cap. cv. 73 Herodot. lib. ii. of ANCIENT EUROPE. \1 of two years, sailed round the African continent, and returned toEgypt, in the third year, by the mouth of the Mediterranean sea 74 . This is the first voyage of discovery mentioned in history, and one of the most successful. It made known a geographical truth of the utmost importance in navigation, but of which the ancients took little advantage; namely, that Africa is surrounded on all sides by the sea, except at the narrow isthmus that connects it«with Asia. While that grand discovery was making, Nechaoh was not inactive. He had equipped a strong fleet on the Mediterranean, as well as on the Red sea, and en- Ant. Chr. tered Syria at the head of a formidable army 7 - 5 . The „ 610 - , . c ,. ... , , , . Aabonass- object of this expedition seems to have been nothing Xl2i 137. less than the conquest of the whole country from the frontiers of Egypt to the Euphrates. Nor was the idea extravagant. The Assyrian power, as Nechaoh no doubt knew, having been shaken by the Medes before the Scythian invasion, and weakened by the revolt of Nabopolassar, governor of Babylon, was then bending toward its fall, and incapable of any vigorous effort 76 . The Scythians still hung upon the nprthern frontier of the empire, and the Medes and 74. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xlii. 75. Herodot. lib. ii. Joseph, lib. x. 76. I am sensible that Josephus (Jntiq.Wb. x.) has represented the Assyrian empire as already subverted; and makes Nechaoh march in- to Syria, in order to repress the growing greatness of the Medes and Babylonians, " who had dissolved that empire" (Id. ibid.). But this account is as inconsistent with political probability, as with the gene- ral scope of history. Yet have the bold assertions of the Jewish his- torian (who lived in too late an age to be entitled to assume the tone of confidence, in regard to such ancient matters) misled many modern writers, and among others the learned Prideaux. A proper attention to sacred history, however, would have preserved them from thia error; for there we are told, that " Pbaraoh-Necbaob, king of Egypt, came up against the king of Assyria." 2 Kings, chap, xxiii. ver. 29. Babylonian* 13 THE HISTORY OF Babylonians' were ready to sej^ze the first opportunity to accomplish its ruin. The good Josiah, kingof Judah, however, faithful in his allegiance to his superior sovereign, took arms to obstruct the progress of the Egyptian monarch; although no attempt had been made to disturb his re- pose, and many remonstrances were offered to induce him.to remain quiet 77 . Obstinate in his purpose, he accordingly posted himself with his forces in the val- ley of Megiddo; where he was mortally wounded, and obliged to retreat 78 . And the king of Egypt pro- secuted his march toward the Euphrates'. Having taken the city of Charchemish, near that river, and reduced under his obedience all the north- ern part of Syria, Nechaoh returned into Palestine; degraded Jehoiahaz, the younger son of Josiah, who had assumed the sovereignty, and placed Eliakim, the elder brother, whose name he changed to Jehoia- kim, upon the throne of Judah; imposed upon the kingdom an annual tribute of one hundred talents of silver, and a talent of gold; then retired into Egypt^ carrying along with him Jehoiahaz in chains 79 . But Nechaoh had the mortification, before the close of his reign, to see himself stripped of all his Syrian conquests. Nabopolassarfindinghimself firmly seated on the throne of Babylon, and strengthened by the al- liance of Cyaxares I. king of Media, sent his son Nebuchadnezzar with an army into Syria 80 . And that youthful commander, whom his father had associated with himself in the supreme power, reduced the gar- 77. 2 Kingt, chap, xxiii. ver. 29, 30. 2Chron. chap. xxxv. ver. 20, 21. 78. 2 Chron. chap. xxxv. ver. 22, 23. 79. 2 Kings chap, xxiii. ver. 33, 34. 2 Cbron. chap, xxxvi, ver. 1 — 1. 80. Alex. Poljhist. ap. Synceel. Joseph. Antiq. lib. x. rison ANCIENT EUROPE. 19 rison of Carchemish, in defiance of all the force of LETTER Egypt, and drove the Egyptians from every place which they held, from the Euphrates to the bottom of the Arabian gulf 8 '. The name of this warlike prince, whose exploits we have already had occasion to mention, recalls us to the great line of oriental history. Nebuchadnezzar, in expelling the Egyptians from Syria, had brought under his dominion the tributary kingdom of Judah. Having taken Jerusalem, and made Jehoiakim prisoner, he plundered the temple of its most precious vessels, and sent them to Babylon u2 . He also sent thither many captives of high rank, and threatened to include the king of Judah among the number. But on the humble submission of that Ant - Ch >". , , ... 606. prince to the conqueror, he was permitted to retain Nabonass. the Jewish sceptre, and left as a kind of viceroy over *ia 141. the kingdom 83 . Before Nebuchadnezzar had completed the con- quest of Syria, he received an account of the death of his father 8 *. This event made his presence necessary at Babylon ; where, and in the neighbouring country, he spent some years, in fortifying and adorning that city, and in regulating the government of the king- dom of which it was the metropolis 85 . Meantime, Cyaxares having freed his territories from the incur- sions of the Scythians, by the massacre of their chief- tains 86 ; and terminated, through the mediation of Nebuchadnezzar, whom Herodotus calls Labynetus, 81. 2 Kings, chap. xxiv. ver. 7. Jeremiah, chap. xlvl. ver. 2. 82. 2 Kings, chap. xxiv. ver. 1. 2 Cbron. chap, zxxvi. ver. 6,7. Joseph. Antiq. lib. x. 83. Id. ibid. 84. Beros. ap. Joseph. Antiq. lib. Z. 85 Id. ibid. 16. Herodot. lib. i. a war SO THE HISTORY OF PART I. a war in which the Scythians had involved him with *^~*~>*j the Lydians 87 , the kings of Media and Babylon, A "f;nn hr ' w * tn th'eir joint forces, subverted the Assyrian em- Xabonass. pire, and accomplished the destruction of Nineveh, era 147. m the manner we have seen 88 . History, as I have formerly had occasion to ob- serve, has furnished us with no particulars of the siege of Nineveh. Nor do we know, with certainty, any thing concerning the structure of its buildings, or the manners of its inhabitants ; for no ancient historian or geographer, who speaks of it, had seen it before it was destroyed. That it was utterly demolished, Strabo bears witness 89 . All ancient authors however agree, that Nineveh was as large* if not larger, and as populous and superb as Babylon, when it was con- quered by Cyrus the great, or entered by Alexander the Macedonian ; and consequently one of the greatest and most magnificent cities in the ancient world 90 . It was situated on the eastern bank of the Tygris, in a large plain, between that river and the Lycus 9 '. While Nebuchadnezzar was employed in subduing the Assyrian provinces to the east of the Euphrates, 87. Id. ibid. 88. Lett. I. 89. Geog. lib. xvi. init. 90. Diod. Sicul. lib. ii. Strabo, lib. xvi. Plin. lib. vi. According to the prophet Jonah, the only person we read of that ever visited Nineveh during its grandeur, it was " a great city of three days jour. " ney ;" (Jonah, chap. iii. ver. 3.) or about sixty miles, by common computation, in circumference; and contained one hundred and twenty thousand souls " that could not discern between their right " hand and their left;" (Id. chap. iv. ver. 2.) so that the whole num- ber of inhabitants, by the most moderate calculation, must have been about one million. Diodorus Siculus (lib. ii.) gives Nineveh nearly the same dimensions as Babylon. Strabo only says, in general terms, {Geog. lib. xvi. initl) that it was larger than.„that city. 91. Strabo, lib. xvi. init. Jehoiakim, ANCIENT EUROPE. 21 Jehoiakim, king of Judah, threw off tl Babylonian yoke 92 . But he paid dear for his temerity. Harass- ed by enemies on all sides, from the Syrian pro- vinces, that preserved their allegiance to the king of Babylon, and whose governors, at last, invaded Palestine with their collected forces, he was slain in / iT1t chr. the neighbourhood of his capital; and his body being 599. denied the honours of sepulture, was exposed in the Kra 143/ high-way 93 . Jerusalem, which had long been threatened and insulted, was now formally invested ; and after the siege had continued about three months, Nebuchad- nezzar, in person, led an army against it. Jehoiachin, the son of the deceased king, who had assumed the royal dignity, conscious of his inability to hold out, attempted, by submission, to deprecate the vengeance of the incensed monarch. He accordingly walked out in the form of a suppliant, attended by his mother, and his whole court. But his submission availed him nothing beyond the sparing of his life. He was put in chains ; and Zedekiah, the son of Josiah, was placed on the tributary throne of Judah 94 . Nor was this all: m Nebuchadnezzar pillaged a second time the temple, and also the palace of Jerusalem, and carried captive to Babylon the degraded king, Jehoiachin, with hi3 wives, his nobles, and officers both civil and military; seven thousand men habituated to the use of arms, and one thousand artificers 95 . This victorious monarch, after his return to his capital, seems to have spent, as formerly, several years of peace in adorning the seat of his power, and in enjoying the glory of greatness, and the pride of 92. 2 Kings, chap. xxiv. ver. 1, 2. Joseph. Antiq. lib x. 93. Id. ibid. Jeremiah, chap, xxxvi. ver. 30. 94. 2 Kings, chap. xxiv. ver. 10—17. 95. Id. ibid. vol. it. f. dominion, 22 THE HISTORY OF PART I. dominion, in the midst of his courtiers and tributary s -^~ v ^ % ^ princes. But he was again roused to arms by the re- volt of the Jews. Zedekiah, king of Judah, in violation of his oath of fealty to the king of Babylon, had been for some time forming a plan of independency with the neigh- bouring princes; and persisted in his negociation with those princes, notwithstanding the strong decla- ration of the prophet Jeremiah, " That the Lord of " Hosts, the God of the whole earth, had doomed "them all to be servants to Nebuchadnezzar $ that " they should all serve him, his son, and his son's " son; that such as should offer to dispute his sway, " the Lord would punish with the sword, with " famine, and with pestilence; but that those who " quietly submitted their necks to the yoke of the f king of Babylon, should be spared, and permit- " ted to dwell in their own land, and to cultivate " it 9 V Regardless of this declaration, and other prophecies, particularly respecting the kingdom of Judah, Zedekiah, having engaged his principal sub- jects to enter into his views, and received assurances of support from the king of Egypt, broke out into open rebellion against the authority of the king of Babylon 97 . The Jewish king's alliance with the rival power of Egypt, from which the sovereignty of Syria had been formerly wrested, as we have seen, by the youthful arms of Nebuchadnezzar, more than every other cir- cumstance, may be supposed to have provoked the vengeance of that haughty monarch. For A pries or Hophra, the grandson of Nechaoh, who now filled the Egyptian throne, was an ambitious prince; and for- 96. Jeremiah, chap, xxvii. ver. 4 — 11. 97. 2. Chron. chap, xxxvi. ver. 12, 13. midablf ANCIENT EUROPE. 23 midable both by land and sea 98 . The enraged Baby- lonian conqueror, therefore, as if guided by the hand of God, for the correction of his chosen, but sin- ful and perverse people, and animated by the voice of his prophets, entered Palestine, breathing terror, Ant. Chr. at the head of a vast body of forces in hostile array ; j^abonas* bore down all resistance in the field, and invested xra 157. Jerusalem". The king of Judah and his subjects, who had hi- therto proved obstinately hardened against the re- monstrances of the prophet Jeremiah, forewarning them of the fatal consequences of a breach of faith, no sooner saw the holy city formally besieged, than they became sensible of their folly and impiety. They affected repentance, and entered into a solemn cove- nant with the Lord their God ; by which they engaged to worship him only, and faithfully to observe all his laws' 00 . The approach of an Egyptian army, however, dis- sipated the melancholy apprehensions of the Jews, and inspired them with new confidence; gave them the prospect of recovering their independency, or at least of changing their master. They accordingly reverted to their former mode of thinking; and, during the first moments of illusive hope, broke the covenant which they had made with the Lord, through fear 0I . And their fate was worthy of such a fickle and faithless people; a people ever equally regardless of their engagements, sacred and civil. Ant. Chr. 589. Nabonass. sera 153. Nebuchadnezzar, as soon as he was informed of the approach of the Egyptian forces, had raised the 98. Herodot. lib. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. 99. 2 Kings, chap. xxv. ver. i. 100. Jeremiah, chap, xxxiv. ver. 8, 9, 10. 101. Ibid. ver. 11— 2Q. " e S* 24 THE HISTORY OF PART I. siege of Jerusalem, and marched against the gene- v ^ r ~ v '^*^ rals of Apries' 02 . Hence the renewed confidence and impiety of the Jews, who flattered themselves the Babylonians would molest them no more. But they were miserably disappointed. The Egyptians, inti- midated at the appearance of so numerous and well appointed an army, as that under the king of Baby- lon, retired toward their own frontier, without hazard- ing a battle ; and the redoubted Nebuchadnezzar re- returned to his station before Jerusalem, and resumed the siege of that sacred and venerable city 103 . No besieged place had ever less chance of escap- ing the calamities with which it was threatened, than the metropolis of Judea; whether we consider the state of the garrison by which it was defended, or that of the army with which it was invested. The forces of Nebuchadnezzar, equal to the greatest enterprise by their numbers, their experienced valour, their weapons and warlike engines, were elated with the flight of the Egyptians before them, the only ene- my they had to fear; and now considered the plunder of Jerusalem as their certain prey. The king of Judah and his nobles were not destitute of courage ; but the soldiers and citizens were in danger of being driven to desertion or despondency, by the disheartening prophecies of Jeremiah ; who publicly declared, in the name of the Lord, That every one who remained in the city should perish by the sword, by famine, or by pestilence ; but that such as went out, and sub- mitted to the king of Babylon, should be safe 104 . After such a declaration, your lordship will not be surprised, I presume, that the Jewish princes and nobles said to the king, "We beseech thee let this man 102. Joseph. Antiq. lib. x. Jeremiah, chap, xxxvii. ver. 5—10. 103. Id. ibid. 104 Jeremiah, chap, xxxviii. ver. % "be ANCIENT EUROPE. 25 -" be put to death ; for thus he weakeneth the hands of LETTER ." the men of war that remain in the city, and the " hands of all the people, in speaking such words " unto them I — He seeketh not the welfare of this " people, but the hurt' 05 !" The sacred character of prophet, however, and the irresolute temper of Zedekiah, saved Jeremiah from that punishment which rigid policy, at such a crisis, would otherwise instantly have inflicted ; as the just reward of his spiritual audacity, and seditious prog- nostics. He was only thrown into prison, where he acquired the virtue of silence ; and was made sensi T ble, that his heavenly mission ought not to exempt him from his duty as a subject 06 . But his former predictions could not fail to have their influence up- on the minds of the citizens, or to break the nerve of the valour of the soldiers, as their leaders had fore- seen. Yet Jerusalem, under all these disadvantages, sus- tained a close siege of twelve months, against the great and formidable host by which it was invested, without offering to capitulate. At length it was taken by storm' 07 . The king made his escape at one of the gates, surrounded by his guards and chief officers. But he was overtaken by the Babylonians in the plains of Jericho, and made prisoner along with his sons and principal attendants 108 . They were all carried to Ribla in Syria, where Nebuchadnezzar then resided. And that incensed monarch cruelly ordered the sons of Zedekiah, and all the captive nobles of Judah, to be slain in his presence; and after this awful spectacle, (the last he was to behold) the eyes of Zedekiah were Ant. Chr. 588. Nabonass. xra 159. 105. Ibid. ver. 4. 106. Jeremiah, chap, xxxviii. ver. 27. " Then came all the princes " unto Jeremiah and he told them, according to the words that the •* king had commanded." Id. ibid. 107. 2. Kings chap. xxv. ver. 4—7. 108. Id. ibid. put THE HISTORY OF put out, and he was bound with fetters of brass, and sent in that condition to Babylon' 09 . Meanwhile Jerusalem suffered all the horrors of an Asiatic city taken by storm, in ancient times, and which the conqueror was determined to brand with exemplary vengeance. The Babylonian sword, reek- ing with the blood of the brave, smote the unre- sisting from house to house, and from street to street, without regard to age, sex, condition or sanctuary 110 . Fire followed with its devouring rage, and consumed every public and private building. The temple and palace were pillaged and destroyed, and the walls of the city were thrown down 1 ". Such of the inhabi- tants as escaped in the general massacre, were carried captive to Babylon" 2 : and Jerusalem, reduced to a heap of ruins, was left utterly desolate" 3 . From the calamities attending the extinction of the kingdom of Judah, and the destruction of the holy city, the prophet Jeremiah was in some measure exempted. Nebuchadnezzar, sensible thatmuchwas due to the man who had foretold his success, and en- deavoured to enforce obedience to his sway, gave his general particular instructions concerning the safety of his sacred person" 4 ; ordered a reward to be given him, with the offer of an opulent station at Babylon, or, if he should not be disposed to leave his own coun- try, he was consoled with the liberty of residing in whatever part of it he might think proper" 5 . He chose the latter indulgence ; and lived at Mizah, with Gedaliah, whom the king of Babylon had made 109. 2 Kings, ubi sup. Jeremiah, chap, xxxix. ver. 4 — 7. 110. 2 Chron. xxxvi. ver. 17. 111. Ibid. ver. 18, 19. Jeremiah, chap, xxxix. ver. 8. 112. 2 Chron. chap, xxxvi. ver. 20. 21. 113. Id. ibid, and Lamentations, chap. i. ver. 1— r4. 114. Jeremiah, chag. xxxix. ver. 11, 12. 115. Id. chap. xl. ver. 4, 5, 6. governor ANCIENT EUROPE. 27 governor over the land of Judah 1 6 * Gedaliah was the LETTER son of Ahikam, the prophet's former protector, and IX- perhaps owed his elevation to that circumstance. But the good fortune of Jeremiah was of short con- tinuance. Gedaliah was slain in the second or third month of his government, by Ishmael, a Jewish prince of the blood royal, and other refugees, who had returned from the neighbouring countries into Palestine; and who were envious of his greatness, or intemperately zealous of freeing their nation from the Babylonian yoke 7 . They also slew all Geda- liah's guards and attendants, both Jewish and Baby- lonian" 8 . These barbarities completed the expulsion or re- moval of the whole Jewish nation. For, although Ishmael and his followers were again obliged to seek safety in exile, the Jewish chiefs, who had expelled them, were so much afraid of the resentment of the king of Babylon, for the massacre of his officers and troops, that they assembled the miserable remnant of the people ; man, woman, and child, and conducted them into Egypt 19 . And they carried along with Ant. Chr. them the prophet Jeremiah: although he had per- 5 ^ s -' advanced with the whole strength of the Babylonian 585 r monarchy. Ithobal II. a wise and enlightened prince fcabonass. was then upon the throne of Tyre' 48 : and a siege of sra thirteen years, which that city sustained, sufficiently demonstrates his military capacity and the greatness Ant. Chr. of his resources. He appears to have fallen in defence 572. of his capital 49 : which was, at last, taken by the irre- Nabonass. r • xra 175. sistible force, and unremitted operations of Nebu- chadnezzar, who laid it in ruins' 50 . But the king of Babylon found nothing in Tyre to defray the expense of his armament ; or to use the language of Scripture, " he had no wages, nor his " army, for the great service he had caused it to " serve against Tyre ; until every head was bald, and " every shoulder was peeled." 15 ' The Tyrians had previously re'tired, with their most valuable effects, to an island that formed their spacious harbour, and had there built a new city, beyond the reach of the victorious monarch' 52 . They seem, however, to have made submission to the conqueror; as we find them soon after in possession of their continental territory, and flourishing under a republican form of govern- ment' 53 . This revolution makes a few observations neces- sary. The Phoenicians, like all the other Syrian na- tions, had hitherto been governed by kings. But those kings were not absolute princes ; they were only a kind of chief magistrates, similar to the Grecian chief- tains in the heroic times, who could do nothing with- 148. Joseph. Antiq. lib. x. Ezekiel, chap, xxviii. ver. 2 — 5. 149. Ezek. chap, xxriiiver. 8 — 10. 150. Ezck. chap. xxvi. ver. 4 — 12. Joseph. Cont. Apien. lib. i. et Antiq. lib. x. • 151. Ezek. chap. xxix. ver. 18. 152. Prideaux, Connect, part i. book ii. et. auct. cit. 153. Id. ibid, et Joseph, ubi sup. • but ANCIENT EUROPE. 35 out the consent of the people' 54 . Commerce has ever been favourable to the spirit of liberty, and the sense of dquality. We accordingly find the Tyrians in their new city governed for a time, by suffetes or judges ; a kind of magistrates that were also established at Carthage, as we shall have occasion to notice ; and who probably, therefore, had subsisted at Tyre, under its former kings, as a check upon regal authority' 35 . The same prophet, who had turned the sword of Nebuchadnezzar against Tyre, pointed out to him the means of reimbursing himself, for his prodigious ex- penditure, and of requiting the hard and unprofitable service, which his troops had undergone, during the siege of that city : — Ezekiel directed him to the inva- sion of Egypt ; which was then in a disordered state, and promised him the spoils of that rich country as a recompense " for his waste of labour 1 ^ 6 , and as " wages for his army." And the king of Babylon did not slight the words of the divine monitor ; as he found they were dictated by sound policy as well as by the spirit of prophecy. Apries, the grandson of Nechaoh, who still filled the Egyptian throne, was a proud and arrogant prince' 57 . Having been successful in the beginning of his reign, in an expedition into lower Syria, and in a naval enterprise against the island of Cyprus :j8 , he thought nothing able to withstand his power, and seems to have projected the conquest of the whole 154. Gen. Joshua, Judges, passim. 155. I speak with diffidence on this subject, as the Tyrian records are utterly lost, and imperfect transcripts only remain in the Jewish Antiquities of Josephus. 156. Ezek. chap. xxix. ver. 18 — 21. 157. Herodot. lib. ii. Ezek. chap xxix. ver. 3. 158. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. Herodot. lib. ii. country 36 THE HISTORY OF PART I. country from the Nile to the Euphrates'- 39 . But after- v^-n"W ward finding his forces unable to make head against those of Nebuchadnezzar, he relinquished his am- bitious views on that side, and turned them toward Lybia. And thither we must direct our obser- vation. In early times a Grecian colony, originating from Laconia, had been planted in the maritime parts of Lybia, on the eastern side of the greater Syrtican gulf, and had there founded the city of Cyrene. This city became soon the parent of several others, and the capital of an opulent and potent state, under a regal form of government 160 . The prosperity of the Cyre- nians, who were continually extending their territory, naturally excited the jealousy of their neighbours. And the number of Grecian adventurers, who poured in upon that part of the coast of Africa in quest of lands, during the reign of Battus, surnamed the Hap' py , king of Cyrenaica, induced the Lybians to apply for assistance to Apries, king of Egypt ; and offer to put themselves under his protection, as they seemed in danger of being utterly expelled their country' 6 '. Glad of an opportunity of extending his sway to the west of the Nile, the Egyptian monarch sent a powerful army into Lybia. But that army, unable to resist the hardy valour, and bold courage of the rapa- cious Greeks, was almost wholly cut off in the first engagement. And this bloody defeat appeared so un- accountable to the proud and opinionated Egyptians, that the remainder of the forces of Apries revolted ; believing that their companions had been devoted to certain destruction' 62 . 159. This is presumable from his negociationswith Zedekiah, king of Judah, and other Syrian princes, whom he induced to throw off tbsir allegiance to the king of Babylon. 160. Herodot. lib. iv. 161. Id. ibid. 162. Herodot. lib. ii. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 37 The despotic character of the king of Egypt made the same opinion gain ground among the people ; who conjectured he had contrived the slaughter of his na- tive troops, in order that he might govern more arbi- trarily by means of his foreign mercenaries 163 , and the tyrannical behaviour of Apries, after the revolt of his army, completed the defection of his subjects of every class. He sent Amasis, one of his officers, t6 require the troops to return to their obedience. Amasis, however, finding the dissatisfaction incurable, ac- cepted the title of king, with which he was saluted by a leader of the malecontents, and N became their head. Enraged at hearing of this treachery, the in- dignant monarch ordered Patarbemis, an Egyptian nobleman of high reputation, and the only man of rank that adhered to him, to go to the rebellious camp, and bring Amasis to him alive. Patarbemis obeyed to the utmost of his power. But Amasis, when desired to pay his attendance at court, treated the mesage with disdain; and Apries, in the first trans- ports of anger and disappointment, commanded the nose and the ears of Patarbemis to be cut off because he had returned without the rebel chief 1 . The consequence of these tyrannical proceedings was a civil war; for which both parties prepared them- selves with vigour. Apries assembled, in the plains of Momemphis, an army of thirty thousand Grecian mercenaries; while Amasis collected an immense body of Egyptian forces, and marched against his antagonist. The two armies joined battle, and fought Ant. chr. with great fury. At length the troops of Apries, op- j* 70 * pressed by numbers, were obliged to quit the field, ^.a 177. after a desperate struggle for victory, and the king 163. Id. ibid. 164. Herodot. ubi sup. vol. xi. c wa* 38 THE HISTORY OF TART I. was made prisoner' 65 . The conquefor treated him v^~v^/ with much humanity; but his offended subjects de- manded his blood* He was delivered up to them; and his public execution, by strangling, confirmed Amasis in the government of Egypt, and the Egypt- ians in their rights' 66 . During the troubles which preceded this revolu- tion, it was that Nebuchadnezzar invaded Egypt; extended his ravages to the frontiers of Ethiopia, and carried off a booty so vast, as proved a sufficient com- pensation for his disappointment in the plunder of Tyre, and " wages for his army" (to repeat the words of the prophet Ezekiel), every soldier being loaded with spoil' 67 . Thus victorious on all sides, this great and war- like monarch returned in triumph to Babylon, which Ant. Chr. his munificence had raised to an astonishing pitch of Nabonass grandeur. There, in the height of his pride and ex- icra 178. ultation, as he was walking on the balcony of his superb palace, and surveying his magnificent capital, he was deprived of the use of his understanding, and remained in a state of insanity for seven years' 68 . Soon after 165. Id. ibid. 166. Herodot. lib. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. i. 167. Ezek. chap. xxix. xxx. xxxi. xxxii. passim. It may seem ex- traordinary to certain severe thinkers, that I should, on this and other occasions, quote the effusions of the Jewish prophets as historical evi- dence. My answer, however, is ready. Such as believe the Jewish prophets to have been divinely inspired, will believe that they fore- told nothing but what came to pass ; while they, who think other- wise will admit that those prophets were well acquainted with the transactions of the neighbouring nations ; and that what their poli- tical sagacity did not distinctly forsee, before the events they predict- ed took place (for they seldom died during the interval), their sub- sequent information enabled them to correct; and consequently to give to their written prophecies historical accuracy, which is the point in question. 168. Daniel, chap iv. ver. 30 — 36. The words of the prophet are not ANCIENT EUROPE. 39 after his recovery he died, and was succeeded by his LETTER son Evilmerodach 169 . Ix - Ant. Chr. From the accession of this prince, who is said to 561. have been both weak and wicked, and who was de- ^aTo^ 3 ' throned and murdered, in the second year of his reign, by his sister's husband, Neriglissar' 70 , the history of the Babylonian monarchy is involved in confusion and obscurity, until its final subversion by the Medes and Persians under Cyrus. I shall, therefore, my lord, hasten forward to that great event, the most memorable in the revolutions of ancient Asia, without attempting to dispel the cloud with which the intervening period is covered 171 . In the meantime we must take a retrospective view of the history of the Medes, and Persians, as an intro- duction to the reign of the illustrious Cyrus; the conqueror of so many kingdoms, and the founder of the Persian empire. Cyaxares I. king of Media, who acted in con- junction with Nebuchadnezzar, as we have seen, in not a little remarkable: " There fell a voice from heaven, saying, *' O king Nebuchadnezzar! to thee it is spoken the kingdom is de- " parted from thee. And they shall drive thee from men, and thy " dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field. They shall make thee " to eat grass as oxen; seven times shall pass over thee, until thou " know, that the Most High dwelleth in the kingdom of men, and " giveth it to whosoever he will. The same hour was the thing ful- " filled on Nebuchadnezzar; and he was driven from men, and did eat *' grass as oxen; and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, till • his hairs were grown as eagles feathers, and his nails like birds " claws." Id. ibid. 169. 2. Kings, cap. xxv. ver. 27. Beros. ap. Joseph. Cont. Apftion. lib. i. 170. Beros. ubi sup. Joseph. Antiq. lib. x. Ptolem. Canon. Astronom. 171. Such an attempt had been made by the learned and laborious Prideaux; who has, with much ingenuity, endeavoured to reconcile the contradictions of ancient historians and chronologers (Connect. book ii.). An attempt of the same kind has also been made, with great learning and industry, by the candid and inquisitive Dupin, who pursues a different hypothesis. Unix. Lib. des Histor. torn. ii. accomplishing 40 THE HISTORY OF •ART I. accomplishing the subversion of the Assyrian > **" ,>r "^' empire, seems to have held under his dominion all the provinces of that empire to the east of the Tygris, as well as the kingdom of Persia, which had been conquered by his father Phraortes 172 . This extensive monarchy, comprehending Media, Persia, Armenia, and all the countries in the neighbour- hood of the Euxine and Caspian seas, Cyaxares was enabled to hold in subjection by his great mili- tary talents. For we are told by Herodotus, as I have had occasion to notice, that he first formed into distinct bodies of spearmen, cavalry, and arch- ers, the people of Upper Asia; who had been accus- tomed, before his time, to join battle in a confused manner' 73 . So great an improvement, in the military art, could not fail being attended with the most im- portant consequences. And to the troops thus formed and trained, more than to a family alliance, we may conclude Cyaxares was indebted for his security against the arms, and the ambition of that tremendous conqueror, Nebuchadnezzar. Astyages, the son and successor of Cyaxares, also maintained his ground against the king of Ba- bylon. And in order, it should seem, to strengthen his interest; and conciliate the affections of the most warlike and powerful nation that owned his sway, he gave his daughter Mandane in marriage to Cambyses, the son of Achsemenes, tributary king of Persia' 74 . From this marriage sprung the gallant Cyrus' 75 . Astyages died the same year that Neriglissar usurped the throne of Babylon, and was succeeded in the civil administration of the Median monarchy by his son, Cyaxares II. and 172. Hevodot. lib. i. cap cii. 173. Id. ibid. 174. Zenop. Cyrop8 - inflamed the jealousy of Neriglissar, king of Baby- sera 189. Ion. That prince had shewn a desire of repressing the growing power of the Medes, as soon as he usurped the Babylonian throne; and, in order to infuse the same jealousy into the other Asiatic potentates, and thereby engage them to enter into his views, he attempted to work upon their fears. He represented to them the danger to which they were exposed from the ambition of the Medes and Persians, united in arms under so able a commander as Cyrus ; whose fame was already great in the east, and whom no single power could withstand. All the independent princes on the frontiers of the Ba- bylonian empire, and in the peninsula of Asia Minor, were accordingly induced to form a confederacy with Neriglissar. Among these was Crcesus king of Lydia !P \ Thus are we naturally led to consider the rise and exaltation of the Lydian monarchy. The Ly- 181. It is not a little surprising Dr. Gilles should affirm (/jfof. Greece, chap, vii.), that the ancient Scythians fought on foot; whereas it is evident from Herodotus, the most early historian who speaks of them, and who had access to the best information, that they fought chiefly, if not solely, upon horse back, and that they used, in baMl*. the scymetar or curved sword, after discharging a flight of arrows and a javelin. Herodot. lib. iv. passim. 182. Xcnor-h. Cyropaed. lib. i. ii. 1 13 Id. lib. ii. dians, 44 THE HISTORY OF PART I. dians, as we have formerly had occasion to observe l84 , v^v^/ had made considerable progress in arts and civility, at the time of the Trojan war. Assisted by a fer- tile territory, which abounded in the precious metals, they continued to advance in wealth and power, under three races of kings, the second of which took their descent from Hercules 185 ; but without performing any thing memorable, that history ha* transmitted to us, until the reign of Alyattes, the father of Croesus, who was an ambitious and war- like prince. The circumstances attending the revolution, by which the descendants of Hercules were deprived of the Lydian crown, are worthy of being preserved among the anecdotes of ancient Asiatic courts. Candaules, the last prince of the Herculean race, was so vain of the beauty of his wife's person, that the voluptuous enjoyment of it in private did not seem to him enough. He was willing that the world should be made acquainted with his happi- ness; and therefore contrived, without the know- ledge of his consort, to shew her naked charms to Gyges, the captain of his guards. The queen, however, discovered the indignity to which she had been exposed, and severely chastised her husband's indiscretion. She offered herself, in marriage to the man to whom the sight of her secret beauties had been prostituted; and concerted with him the murder of the king, and the means of usurping the throne' 86 . Alyattes was the great-grandson of Gyges. This martial prince, who swayed the Lydian sceptre fifty-seven years, expelled the Cimmerians out of Asia Minor; which they had continued to 184. Lett. III. 185. Herodot. Historiar. lib. i. 186. Id. lib. i. cap. viii — xii. ravage ANCIENT EUROPE. 45 ravage from the first irruption of the Scythians, by whom they had been expelled, as we have seen, from the Chersonesus Taurica, now known by the name of the Crim Tartary. He also waged war for five years, with various success, against Cyax- ares I. king of Media, in favour of. some Scythian chieftains, who had sought shelter in his dominions. And he attempted to bring under his dominion, though without finally accomplishing his purpose, the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast' 87 . Croesus, who ascended the throne of Lydia five hundred and sixty-two years before the christian sera, pursued the ambitious designs of his father Alyattes; and not only subdued the Grecian colo- nies in his neighbourhood, but extended his sway over all the nations of Asia Minor, the Lycians and Cilicians excepted; from the river Halys to the Hellespont, and from the Euxine to the Mediterra- nean sea' 88 . These conquests he was enabled to prosecute by the internal wealth of his native king- dom. The particles of gold rolled down by the river Pactolus, which ran through Sardis, his capi- tal, and the gold mines found near the city of Artaneus' 89 , furnished him with such a quantity of treasure as made his riches proverbial; beside pay for a great body of forces, and the expenses of a splendid court' 90 . Croesus was worthy of his good fortune. No prince seems ever to have treated with more lenity the people whom he had reduced under his dominion, or to have contributed more to the ease and happi- ness of his subjects of all denominations. He was, 187. Herodot. Hittoriar. lib. i. cap. xvj — xxv, 188. Id. lib. i. cap. xxvi — xxviii. 189. Strabo, lib. xiit. xir. 190. Herodot. lib. i. VOL, II. H at 46 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Ant. Chr. 554. ICabonass . sera 193. at the same time, a generous patron of every libe- ral and ingenious art; so that the Asiatic Greeks, among whom those arts were successfully cultivated, and who were permitted to enjoy their own laws and republican government, flourished greatly dur- ing his reign' 9 '* But the prosperity of the Lydian monarchy was soon to suffer a check, and the glory of Crresus to be obscured. Though disposed to cherish the blessings of peace, and apprehensive of the conse- quences of foreign war, he saw the necessity of supporting the king of Babylon against the forces of the Medes and Persians, under the conduct of Cyrus. He therefore led into Assyria an army, consisting of forty thousand light-armed foot, and ten thousand horse 19 \ Meanwhile Cyrus had not been idle. Having reduced to obedience the Armenians, who had at- tempted to throw off the Median yoke, in hopes of recovering their independency, by joining in the general league, he was ready to make head against all his enemies before the arrival of Croesus. He accordingly entered the Babylonian territories, which he prudently resolved to make the scene of war, and found the confederates posted in a large plain, with their camp strongly fortified ' 93 . For some days after his approach, they continued within their en- trenchments. At length they came out in order of battle, and a hot engagement took place. But the combat was unequal. The front battalions of the confederate army were soon broken, and the whole body of infantry routed, though vastly superior in numbers, by the vigorous shock of the Persian foot; 191. Id. ibid. Thucydid. lib. i. 192. Xenoph. Cyropxd. lib. iii. 193. Cyropxd. lib. iv. all ANCIENT EUROPE. 47 IX. all armed for close fight, with swords and pikes. LETTER The Median horse, in like manner, broke the caval- ry of the confederates; and, during the conflict, Neriglissar king of Babylon was slain 94 . Notwithstanding these advantages, Cyrus did not think it prudent, on the evening of battle, to endeavour to force the enemy's camp. He there- fore ordered a retreat. Next morning, however, he returned to the charge; drove the Babylonians, and their allies, from their fortified station, in spite of all the efforts of Crcesus, king of Lydia, who had assumed the chief command on the death of the king of Babylon; took many prisoners, and seized an immense booty ' 95 . The Babylonians in the death of Neriglissar, who was a brave and able usurper, sustained a great misfortune; especially as his son, Laborosoarchod, proved a weak and worthless despot. Gobrias and Gadates, two of the provincial governors of this tyrannical young king, revolted, because of the wrongs they had suffered; and if his violences and 194. Id. ibid. 195. Xenoph. ubi sup. The trophies of war, and the richest part of the booty, Cyrus sent to Cyaxares. But he reserved for himself all the horses that were captured, in order to form for his Persia* army a body of cavalry, which hitherto it had wanted {Cyropxd, lib. v.) ; a circumstance not a little remarkable, as Media abounded with excellent horses, and long supplied almost all Asia with then* (Polyb. lib. x. Excerpt, iv). The prisoners, after delivering up their arms, were permitted by Cyrus to return to their respective countries. Nor did he impose upon them, any o f her obligation, than a promise not to engage in hostilities against him or his allies (Cyro- pxd. lib. v.). Among those prisoners was a princess of singular beauty, whom the victorious army had set apart for the conqueror. She was named Panthaea, and was the wife of Abradates, king of Susiana. When informed of her captivating charms, Cyrus refused to see her, lest he should be tempted to abuse the rights of conquest, or to relax in the prosecution of those great designs he had formed. Id. ibid. cruelties 48 THE HISTORY OF PART I. cruelties had not provoked his subjects to murder v -^" v ^' him, Cyrus might soon have made himself master of the whole Babylonian empire' 96 . That such would have been the event, is, at least, highly probable. For although Nabonadius or Bel- shazzar, the successor of Laborosoarchod, appears to have been a dissolute prince, he was less obnoxious to his subjects; and, if no wiser, he was better advised in regard to the government of his king- dom I97 . Cyrus, who had penetrated to the walls of Babylon, therefore laid aside all thoughts of the immediate reduction of that city ; and having, after his return to Ecbatana, married the daughter and only child of Cyaxares, he employed himself for several years in recruiting his forces, both in Me- dia and Persia, and in forming his armies for every kind of military service ' 98 . In the meantime Crresus, having arrived safe in Lydia with the shattered remains of his army, 196; Cyropcedia, lib. v. 197. Prideaux, Connect, book ii. et auct. cit. 198. CyropteJ. ubi sup. Xenophon relates an anecdote of Cyrus, during his first Babylonian expedition, which does great honour to the character of his hero, if true; and at any rate shews the refined sentiments of the philosophical historian. When the Persian con- queror entered the palace of the satrap Gobryas, who had embraced his cause, he was struck with the magnificence of that nobleman's furniture; but more especially with the rich dress, and rare beauty of his daughter. Gobryas, who had watched, but misunderstood the looks of his royal guest, presented him with several purses of gold, and begged that he would take the young lady under his protection; a genteel mode of offering her, as one of his concubines. " I accept," said Cyrus, " the money, which I give to your daughter, to increase " her dowry; not doubting but she will find, among the officers of " my army, a husband worthy of her good qualities. For without " these, wealth and beauty would be of small estimation with them; " of so little with many of them, that all the treasures of Babylon " could not influence them in the choice of a wife, unless she were " adorned with virtue and merit." Id. ibid. forgot ANCIENT EUROPE. 49 forgot in the elegant pleasures of the court of Sardis, LETTER the loss he had sustained in the plains of Assyria. Here, surrounded with riches and splendour, he en- joyed the conversation of men of learning and genius from all countries, but especially from Greece '".That happiness, however, was interrupted by the death of his beloved son Atys 200 ; and before he recovered from 199. Herodot. lib. i. 200. Id. ibid. Immediately before this misfortune, and during the highest lustre of the Lydian court, is supposed to have happened the memorable conversation between Croesus and Solon the Athenian legislator, on human happiness; though, as I formerly observed, (Lett. VI.) Solon must have been dead before Croesus reached such a height of grandeur. But that conversation, which seems first to have been framed by some Grecian sage, and afterward ingrafted by Herodotus into his narrative, abounds with so much good sense, and is so well calculated to display the character of Croesus, that I shall here give it in substance, as a moral dialogue. After Croesus had ostentatiously shewed Solon, says the father of history, the magnificence of his palace, the immensity of his trea- sures, and the pompous crowd of courtiers by whom he was attended, he asked, in the exultation of his heart, his Athenian guest, who, in the course of his travels and extensive observation, might be ac- counted the most happy man he had ever seen ? — expecting, no doubt, that the decision would be in his own favour. But Solon, too little of a courtier to read the king's meaning, or too much of a philoso- pher to natter him, bluntly answered, "Tellus the Athenian."— " What entitled Tellus to this distinction ?" — replied Croesus, with an air of surprise, mingled with chagrin, arising from mortified pride. — " He had the good fortune," said Solon, " to lite under a M free government; to enjoy good health, and be in no want of the " necessaries of life; to have sons, and grandsons, brave and virtu- " ous, who survived him; and to crown all, when he had lived to " an advanced age, in as much felicity as the condition of human " affairs will admit, he had the happiness to come to the assistance " of his countrymen in a hot and hazardous engagement; to turn the " tide of battle, and die on the field of victory ; where he was buried, " and his funeral honours gratefully celebrated by his fellow-citi- " zens." — " Who then do you esteem," inquired Croesus anxiously, hoping at least to obtain the second place, " who do you esteem to " have been next in happiness to Tellus?" — " Cleobis and Liton," answered Solon firmly; " two Argive youths, remarkable for their " brotherly 50 THE HISTORY OF PART 1. from his deep sorrow, he was alarmed for the hide- <^~**>>~ pendency of his crown, by daily reports of the for- midable power of the Medes and Persians, under their victorious leader. » While the Lydian monarch was deliberating what course he should pursue, in order to avert the threatening danger; whether he should solicit the friendship, or attempt to oppose the arms of Cyrus —he received a visit from the king of Babylon. The remonstrances of Nabonadius, enforced by rich pre- sents, and certain ambiguous responses of the Del- phic oracle, determined Croesus in the choice of war, though strongly inclined to peace 20 '. A new con- " brotherly kindness; who possessed a plentiful fortune, £nd such " strength of body and personal address, to say nothing of their " mental accomplishments, that they were both eminently victorious " in the Olympic games; who did peculiar honour to their mother, " by drawing her in her chariot to the temple of Juno, on a solemn " festival, when her cattle could not be found, amid the acclama- " tions of their admiring countrymen; and who, falling quietly asleep " in the temple, died there the same night, without grief or pain." " And is our condition," cried Crcesus, now keenly incensed at such want of courtesy, " so contemptible in your eyes, Athenian stranger ! " as not te be thought equal to that of private men?" — " King of " Lydia!" replied Solon, " as the gods have given the Greeks but a " moderate portion of riches, they have bestowed on us an indepen- " dent spirit, and a liberal turn of mind, which sets no value upon " the splendours of royalty. We are beside so sensible of the vicis- " situdes of human life, as not to be elated with any present flow of " fortune, or to adore that felicity which is liable to change. Futu- " rity carries in its bosom, for every man, many uncertain events. " He, therefore, whom heaven blesses with success to the last, can " only, in our opinion, be esteemed a happy man. For the happiness " of the man who still lives, however elevated his condition, appears " to us no greater than that of a champion before the combat is de- " cided, and while the victory remains doubtful. In a word, since " the gods frequently bring to utter destruction, those whom they " have shewn to the world in the highest walks of grandeur, and in " all the pomp of prosperity, he only deserves the name of happy, " who finishes his prosperous course in perfect serenity of mind." Herodot. lib. i. Plut. Fit. Solon. 201. Herodot. lib. i. Xenopk. tyropxd. lib. vi. federacy ANCIENT EUROPE. 51 federacy was accordingly formed, in which the king of Arabia, and Amasis king of Egypt, were in- cluded ; and Croesus, as commander in chief of the forces of the league, under the authority of the king of Babylon, made great preparations for in- vading the Median territories 102 . Fully informed of these preparations, of the strength of the Lydian army, and the place of ren- dezvous, Cyrus acted with his usual vigour and promptitude. He led his forces into Asia Minor, and attacked Croesus in the plain of Thymbra, where he had mustered his troops, before he was prepared for action. The battle, however, was ob- stinate and bloody; but, at length, the king of Lydia was obliged to give ground 203 . Cyrus remained all night on the field of victory, and advanced next morning toward Sardis. Though Croesus did not expect so sudden a visit, he took measures for the defence of his capfral, and Hazard- ed a second engagement beneath its walls. He was again defeated, and Sardis was taken the following night, through the treachery of a Persian slave,, in the Lydian seryice 2 ' 4 . ■ The generous conqueror, however, saved the city from pillage, and spared the lives of the inhabitants ; but ordered them, as a ransom, to deliver up all their gold and silver. Croesus gave the example, by bringing forth his immense treasures; and Cyrus, charmed with such ready compliance, shewed the greatest indulgence to the captive monarch 205 ; upon farther LETTER IX. Ant. Chr. 548. Nabonass. acra 199. 202. Id. ibid. 203. Xenoph. Cyropad. lib. vii. 204 Id. ibid. 205. Xenoph. Cyrop*d. lib. vii. Th© singular story told 1>v Her©- dotus, 52 THE HISTORY OF PART I. farther acquaintance, admitted him into his friend- v- ^ %r ^ to/ ship, and ever afterward treated him as a companion and counsellor 106 . No sooner did the Grecian colonies, in Asia Minor, see Cyrus master of Sardis, than they offer- ed to submit to him on the same conditions, which had been granted them by Crcesus. But he treated their advances with disdain, and demanded uncon- ditional submission; because they had refused to treat with him, before his victory over the Lydian monarch 207 . They had, therefore, recourse to arms, and to the assistance of their European brethren. C}tus, however, broke the Ionian confederacy, con- sisting of twelve cities or states, by detaching from it the opulent and powerful city of Miletus and its territory, which he politically took into his friend- ship and protection 208 . And his generals, Mazares and Harpagus, reduced under the Persian dominion all the other Grecian cities and states on the Asiatic coast, Ionian, Dorian, or iEolian; while he himself pursued a more important object, the conquest of the Babylonian empire. dotus (who was fond of the marvellous), of Croesus being ordered to he burnt alive, and placed upon a lighted pile of wood for that pun- ishment, along with fourteen young Lydians, though we are not in- formed of any crime that he or they had been guilty of, is here pur- posely omitted; as utterly void of probability, and inconsistent with the character of Cyrus, even as drawn by that venerable historian. The absurdity of this story did not escape the discernment of sir Walter Raleigh ; who tells us, that the moral part of it hath given it currency, "as to many the like it often doth" (Hitt. of the World, book iii. chap. iii. sect. iv.). This is the truth, but not the whole truth : — the story was evidently told by Herodotus, in order more fully to exemplify the justice of the moral reflections ascribed to Solon, in his supposed conversation with Croesus. And it has been retailed by fanciful historians, in all ages, with a view to the eluci- dation of the same conversation ; though that conversation, as I have endeavoured to shew, never did, or could take place. 206. Zenoph. ubi sup. Herodot. lib. i. 307. Herodot. lib. i. 208. Id. ibid. Of ANCIENT EUROPE. 53 Of all the Grecian cities in Asia Minor, Phocasa was expected to make the most obstinate resistance. The Phocaeans had been distinguished by their early and successful application to maritime affairs, and were accustomed to visit the coasts of Italy, Spain, and Gaul. Become rich by commerce, they had for- tified their city in a manner deemed impregnable in that age ; and which they nattered themselves would long withstand the Persian power, and baffle all the military skill of Harpagus, who had succeeded to the chief command,on the death of Mazares. But they found themselves deceived on his approach. Convinced of their inability to resist so great a force, directed by so able a general, they demanded a truce for one day, in order to consider of a capitulation 209 . That time the Phocseans made use of to embark on board their ships, with their wives, children, and most valuable effects; leaving nothing but empty houses and deserted walls to the besiegers 210 . And, after settling unsuccessfully in different places, the most resolute of the fugitive adventurers sailed to the southern coast of Gaul, where they founded the city of Massilia 2 "; which became, as we shall have occa- sion to see, the capital of a potent and wealthy com- mercial republic. Nor were the Phocaeans the only body of the Asiatic Greeks, who chose to abandon their coun- try, rather than submit to the absolute will of a mas- ter. The Teians, who had made a gallant defence against the victorious enemy, finding their most vigo- rous efforts insufficient to preserve their citv, also embarked on board their ships, and built at Abdera on the coast of Thrace 212 : where their descendants 209 Herodot. ubi sup. 210. Id. ibid. 211 . Pausan. lib. x. Srrabo, lib. iv. 212. Herodot. lib. i. tol. ii, i kmj* 54 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, long resided. And a resolution still more desperate was embraced by the inhabitants of Xanthus, in Lycia. After Harpagus had conquered Ionia, and reduce ed Cnydus, Halicarnassus, and other cities in the Dorian promontory, he invaded Caria and Lycia 2 ' 3 , These countries, and all the inland parts of Asia Minor, he likewise subjected to the Persian sway, but not without many violent struggles. The Ca- rians of Pedasa took post upon a mountain, which they fortified, and there long defended themselves with great bravery 2 ' 4 . And the Lycians of Xanthus had the boldness to quit their fortifications, and give the Persians battle in a plain, in the neighbourhood of their city. There they fought with resolute cou- rage; but finding themselves in danger of being overpowered by numbers, and disdaining to submit, they took shelter within their walls ; and having shut up their wives, children, and all their riches in the ci- tadel, they set fire to the place ; then rushing out upon the enemy, they renewed the combat, and fought to the last man, with their swords in their hands 2 ' 5 . The Lycians of Xanthus were a Cretan colony. While the Persian arms under Harpagus were thus employed, in completing the conquest of the large and beautiful promontory of Asia Minor, Cy- rus had extended his dominion over all the provinces of the Babylonian empire, from the coast of Syria to the banks of the Euphrates and Tygris, and from the Persian gulf to the mountains of Armenia. The reduction of Babylon, the great object of his ambi- tion, alone remained to crown his glory and establish his sway. But that proud metropolis, the chief seat of oriental empire, since the destruction of Nineveh, still ventured to set him at defiance, and treated with derision his most skilful approaches 2 ' 6 , 213. Id. ibid. 214. Herodot:. ubi sup. 215. Id. ibid. 216. Xenoph. Cyropxd. lib. vii. Herodot. lib. i. Nor ANCIENT EUROPE. BB Nor were the Babylonians to be accused of pre- LfeTTEtt sumption, in thinking they could singly repel the efforts of so mighty a conqueror. The strength of their capital, and its internal resources, justified their confidence* The cityof Babylon stood in the great plain of As* syria, or Aturia, near the banks of the Euphrates, and on both sides of that majestic river 217 . It was built so as to form an exact square, and was about sixty miles in compass 2 ' 8 . This immense space, however, was not altogether filled with houses, tem- ples, or palaces; though these were numerous, and superb beyond any thing known even in ancient Asia 2 ' 9 . Extensive gardens also occupied a part} and those, in conjunction with capacious magzines of corn and other provisions, which it was computed could maintain the inhabitants for twenty years, ren- dered Babylon fit to sustain a long siege, without injury to the health of the garrison or citizens 110 * The whole city, on both sides of the Euphrates, Was surrounded with a wide and deep ditch, or moat, at all times filled with water, and defended by a wall of brick cemented with bitumen, as hard and firm as solid rock, three hundred feet in height* and seventy-five in thickness 221 . Behind this formidable rampart, which was fortified with towers, stood ano- ther wall of almost equal strength 112 . These walls were brought down to the banks of the Euphrates, with some inflexion at the extremities ; and thence a wall, of the same solid materials was extended on both sides of the river 223 . Wheri 217. Strabo, Geog. lib. xvi. init. Herodot. lib. i. 218. Id. ibid. 219. Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxviii. 220. Xenoph. et Herodot. ubi sup. Quint, curt. lib. v. cap. i. 221. Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxviii. 222. Id. HUtoriar. cap. clxxix. 223. Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxx. As Herodotus had seen the forti- fications 35 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Ant. Chr. 540. Kabonass. sra 207. When Cyrus advanced toward Babylon, the king; had met him at the head of his forces. But the Ba- bylonians being unable to withstand the victorious army of the Persian conqueror, Nabonadius took refuge in his capital 224 . Cyrus at first attempted to storm the place, by raising against it towers still higher than the walls. Finding, however, that mode of attack impracticable, he turned the siege into a blockade ; in hopes of obliging the Babyloni- ans to surrender, through famine 225 . Almost two years had his army occupied the lines, which he had drawn around the city, without beholding any signs of want or weakness, when certain circumstances encouraged him to think it might be taken by sur- prise. From the main stream of the Euphrates which ran through Babylon, and over which was built a stupendous bridge, a navigable canal, called the Royal-River, was cut above the city, and carried to the stream of the Tygris 226 . Beside this great canal a smaller one was also cut in the same direction, from the bed of the Euphrates above Babylon, hi order to prevent the waters of that river, which an- nually overflows its banks, like the Nile, from delug- ing the country; and a large one was opened nearer the city, on the western side of the river, and which emptied itself into ah immense artificial lake, that served as a reservoir for the benefit of the neigh- bouring lands, in time of drought, as well as a re- Scations of Babylon in a more perfect state than any other ancient historian or geographer, his description is here followed, in pre- ference to that of Diodorus or Strabo; who lived almost five hun- dred years later, when those fortifications were in ruins, and when all information concerning them must have been very imperfect Rfnong the Babylonians. 224. Xenoph. Cyroptd. lib. vii. Herodot. lib. i. 225. Id. ibid. 21S. Herodot. lib. 1. Abydenus ap Euseb. Prcep. Evangel. ceptaclc ANCIENT EUROPE. 37 ecptacle for the superabounding waters at other times" 7 . The mouths of those two canals were shut with strong mounds, when the stream of the Euphrates could be confined within its banks, and opened only when it was in danger of overflowing 128 . Cyrus having surveyed these laborious works, and sounded the depth of the river, saw the practicabi- lity of removing the mounds of all the canals, and of hollowing that which fed the great lake; in such a manner as to make it carry off the remaining waters of the Euphrates, and leave the channel fordable, where it entered and left the walls of Babylon 229 . While occupied with this idea, the Persian hero was informed, That the Babylonians were soon to be employed in celebrating a solemn festival, during which they were accustomed to spend the night in revelling and drinking. That opportunity he seized Ant. Chr. to divert the current, and drain the channel of the N a t, onasl , Euphrates. And having posted one body of his sera 209. troops at the termination of the walls above, and another at the same place below the city, with orders to notice the decrease of the waters, they both enter- ed the bed of the river at the same time, under the conduct of Gobrias and Gadates, their Babylonian guides; passed, without opposition, the gates in the wall along the banks of the Euphrates, which had been left open, through negligence, in the general festivity; marched unobserved to the palace; and there assembling, according to concert, surprised and cut to pieces the guards of Nabonadius 23 ". Roused by the clashing of arms, the king rushed to the door of his banquetting room, attended by his guests ; and drawing his sword, died in a manner worthy of a 227. Id. ibid. 228. Abyden. ubi «up. 229. Herodot. lib. i. cap. exci. 230. Xenoph. Cyropmd. lib. vii. Hcrodet. ubi sup. more 58 THE HISTORY OV PART I. more illustrious prince 23 '. Most of his nobles are w " v ~^ ,/ said to have fallen by his side* The death of the king of Babylon and his nobility, was followed by the submission of his army ; and Cy- rus, next morning, saw himself master of the rich- est and most magnificent city in the ancient world, and lord of the greatest empire that had ever been formed on the face of the earth. The full establish- ment, and future growth of this empire, which ac- quired the name of Persian, from the country of Cyrus its founder, must next engage your lordship's attention. These subjects will furnish scope for another stage in our historical tour, and naturally bring us back to the affairs of Europe. And happily for us, the paths of history, hitherto rugged and obscure, hence- forth become more smooth and obvious* Having thrown behind us the barren deserts of chronology, and the wild labyrinths of fable, we now enter xipon a cultivated country * in which the roads are distinctly marked, and where interesting objects, on every side present themselves to view. 231. Id. ibid. LETTER ANCIENT EUROPE. 59 si • ■ LETTER X. THE REVOLUTIONS IN ASIA AND AFRICA CONTINUED, FPOM THE FOUNDATION OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE TO THE REIGN OF DARIUS HYSTASPES. JL HE subversion of the kingdom of Babylon, or second Assyrian Empire, by Cyrus, is the first great event in the ancient world, in regard to the date of which all historians and chronologers, both civil and sacred, are agreed. This great event hap- pened in the two hundred and ninth year of the Nabonassarean sera, in the third year of the sixtieth Olympiad, and five hundred and thirty-eight years before the christian sera. As soon as Cyrus had settled his affairs at Baby* Ion, and rewarded his conquering army, he paid a visit to Persia, his native kingdom'. On his return, he brought along with him his uncle, Cyaxares, un- derstood to be Darius the Mede of scripture, who took up his residence at Babylon 2 , This prince died after a reign of two years over the Babylonians; and Cyrus succeeded to the throne of Media, as well as to the undivided sovereignty of the vast empire which he had conquered 3 ; all thenceforth known, as already observed, by the name of the Persian Em- pire, The first year of the reign of Cyrus, as sole head Ant. Chr. of that empire, is rendered memorable by the famous oiynip edict which he issued in favour of the captive Jews; '*i. t. 1. Xenoph. Cyropxd. lib. viii. 2. Prideaux, Connect, part. I. book ii. et. auct. cit. v 3. Id. ibid. giving 60 THE HISTORY OF PART I. giving them not only liberty to return into their own v ^^^ > - / country with all their property, and authorising them to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem, but restoring to them the sacred vessels which had been carried away by Nebuchadnezzar, and placed in the temple of Belus at Babylon 4 . This edict is supposed to have been procured through the influence of the prophet Daniel, who was among the number of the Jewish captives; and who having been carried to Babylon by Nebuchad- nezzar in early life, and made an eunuch, had risen to honour and power under that prince and his Assy- rian successors 5 . He had also maintained his credit under Cyaxares II. or Darius the Mede, who ad- vanced him to the rank of chief governor 6 ; and Cyrus retained him in office, as an experienced minister, as well as a faithful servant 7 . That Daniel used his influence with the Persian monarch, in favour of his transplanted countrymen, cannot be doubted. But Cyrus, in restoring the Jews to the possession of their former country, may also be supposed to have indulged that beneficent disposition, which prompted him to seek the hap- piness of all his subjects; and to have pursued that liberal line of policy, which distinguished him from almost every eastern conqueror; in resting the secu- rity of his throne, and the preservation of his do- minion, not on the fear, but on the love of the nations under his sway 8 . For authorising the re-establish- ment of the Jewish worship, he might be actuated by other and hrgher motives. 4. 2. Chron. chap, xxxvi. ver. 22, 23. Ezra, chap. i. ver. 1 — 7. 5. Daniel, chap i. — v. 6. Daniel, chap. vi. ver. 1, 2, 3. 7. Prideaux, ubi sup. et auct. cit. p. Xenoph. Cyropxd. lib. viii. Herodot. lib. i. Though ANCIENT EUROPE. 61 Though the Jews in their own land, before the Babylonish captivity, had shewn a strange propensi- ty to abandon the pure worship instituted by Moses 9 , and to adopt the idolatrous superstitions of the neighbouring nations 10 , they had discovered great firmness, after they were carried captives to Baby- lon, in resisting every species of idolatry, and in ad- hering to the worship of one God, to whom they con* fidently looked up for deliverance from all their cala* mities". This firmness, of which Daniel was a memorable example 12 , could not be unknown to Cyrus, nor could he fail to admire it; for the religion of the ancient Persians was not less pure than that of Moses, and the disciples of Zaroaster had a more fixed abhor- rence against the worship of idols, than those of the Jewish legislator. In what age Zoroaster, or Zurdusht, the Persian prophet and philosopher lived, or whence he derived his knowledge, ancient historians have not been able to inform us. But they refer the promulgation of his doctrines to a very remote antiquity' 3 . And fortu- nately we are not left ignorant of his theological te- nets, or of the religion of the Persians during the reign of Cyrus and his immediate successors, " The Persians," says Herodotus, " hold it un* " lawful to build temples, erect statues, or conse- il crate altars, for the celebration of religious worn 9. See the books of Kings and Chronicles throughout. 10. Ibid. " As the number of thy cities," says the prophet Jero- miah, "are thy gods, O Judah!" Jeremiah, chap. ii. ver. 28. 11. See the book of Daniel, passim. 12. Daniel, chap. vi. ver. 10 — 23. 13. Justin, lib. i. Plut. Isid. et Osir. Eudoxius, ap. Plixi. Nat. Hist. lib. xxx. VOL. H K <' ship^ C2 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " ship' 4 . They even consider it as a mark of insani- <^~*~ > -' " ty in others so to do ; not believing, like the Greeks " (as I conjecture), that the gods have the human " nature or form. They sacrifice to the deity," adds he, " on the tops of the highest mountains, and the " whole circle of the heavens they call Jove. They " sacrifice also to the sun, the moon, the earth; to " fire, water, and the winds: — And to these alone '* they have sacrificed from the beginning' 5 ." Such was the worship of the ancient Persians, as far as it could be understood by an inquisitive and intelligent foreigner. But they themselves maintain, That they have always worshipped one supreme Be- ing (whose glory is displayed in the heavens) before the eye of the sun, and under the symbol of fire ; as the purest emblems of the divine nature, and the most 14. Cicero refines upon this idea. "The Persians think," says he, M that access to the deity ought to be free to every one, and that the " whole world is his house and temple." Cicer. de Legib. lib. ii. 15. Herodotus, lib. i. cap. cxxxi. " When the Babylonians had " sunk into a more complicated idolatry than that of the first Chal- *' deans," says a learned and ingenius writer, " the Persians, who " succeeded to the sovereignty of Asia, renewed those rites which " had, in a great measure, been forgotten" (Bryant, Mythol. vol. ii). And from Herodotus we learn, that the Persians soon adopted some of the Eaby Ionian superstitions (Historiar. lib. i. cap. cxxxi.). He afterward describes the Persian worship, as performed in his time. " When a Persian resolves to sacrifice," says this philosophical tra- veller, "he buHds no altar, kindles no fire, makes no libation; nor " uses either flutes, fillets, or consecrated flour: but wearing a tiara, " garnished chiefly with myrtle, leads the victim to a clean piece of " ground, and invokes the god. He that offers is not permitted to " pray for himself alone; but, as he is a member of the nation, is " obliged to pray for the prosperity of all the Persians, and for the " king in particular. After the victim is slain and prepared for " sacrifice, one of the magi standing up, sings an ode, concerning " the origin of the gods (or in other words the celestial bodies €< and four elements) ; which, they say, has the force of a charm : " and without which no sacrifice can lawfully be offered." Herodot. Ub. i. cap. cxxxii. powerful ANCIENT EUROPE. 63 powerful agents of Omnipotence 10 , And that such is the worship of the modern followers of Zoroaster, we have the fullest certainty' 7 . The theological tenets of the ancient Persians, indeed, immediately led them to such a worship. Their fundamental doctrine was, that there are in nature two principles, or supreme agents; Ormuzd, the author of good, and Ahriman, of evil' 8 . The former they represented by light, the latter by dark- ness, as their proper emblems. But, in regard to these two great beings, they entertained different opinions; some believed that both were eternal, while others maintained, that the good being only was eternal, and the author of evil created. But they all agree, that there would be a perpetual op- position between those two principles, till the end of the world; when the good being would prevail over the evil one; and that thenceforth, each would have a world of his own: — the good being a world, where all good men would be united to him; and the evil one a world, in which he would be attended by all his wicked followers in this world' 9 . The reformer of the Persian, or Magian reli- gion 20 , also called Zoroaster (and who is said to have lived under the reign of Cyrus, or his imme- diate successors 21 ), went a step farther. He taught, 16. Hyde, Relig . Vet. Pert. cap. v. Prideaux, Connect, part. i. book vr. 17. Id. ibid. 18. Plut. hid. et Otir. Hyde, Relig. Vet. Pert. cap. ix. et seq. Pri- deaux, ubi sup. 19. Id. ibid. 20. The Persian priests, as I have formerly had occasion to observ* (Lett. VIII.), were called Magi, from the occult sciences in which they afFected to be skilled. And hence, among ancient writers, the name of the priesthood is often given to the religion of the Persians, 21. Ctesias, ap. Arnob. Cont. Gent. Hyde, Relig. Vet Pert, et auct. •it. Prideaux, part. i. book iv. that 64 THE HISTORY OF PART I. that neither Ormuzd nor Ahriman was eternal; but w~v~>»/ that both were created by one supreme being, inde- pendent and self-existent, whose most proper symbol was fire. He maintained, however, the doctrine of two opposite principles; the one the angel of light, the other of darkness, between whom a perpetual war would continue till the end of the world. Then, he affirmed, there would be an universal resurrec- tion, and a day of judgment, in which every one would receive the just award of his actions; that afterward, the angel of darkness and his followers would be shut up in a place , where they would suffer the punishment due to their crimes, involved in eternal obscurity ; and that the angel of light, and his followers* would be conveyed to a region, where they would receive the recompense of their good works, surrounded with eternal splendour; that thenceforth light artd darkness, or good and evil, Would nO more be blended, as in this world, but remain separate through all eternity 22 .— -These doc- trines are still zealously maintained by the remains of the followers of the religion of Zoroaster in India and Persia 23 * No wonder that Cyrus, who had been instructed in the principles of this pure religion, should hate every species of Idolatry, and shew indulgence to the Jews, who seemed also to worship God under the symbol of fire; for the holy fire, which came down from heaven, and descended first upon the altar in the tabernacle, at the consecration of Aaron and his sons* 4 , and afterward upon the altar in the temple of Solomon, at the consecration of that Sacred edifice 25 ; was constantly fed and maintained 22. Hyde and Prideaux, abi sup. et auct. tit. 23. Id. ibid. See also Richardson's Dissertations on the Language mul Manners of the East. 24. Levit. chap. ix. ver. 24. 25. 2. Cbron. chap. vii. vet. 1/ by ANCIENT EUROPE. 65 by the Jewish priests, day and night, and without LETTER ever being suffered to go out 26 . After Cyrus had issued his memorable decree, for rebuilding the temple of Jerusalem, and taken other salutary measures for the ease and comforts of all his subjects, he spent his whole time in regu- lating the government of that great empire of which he was become the head; passing seven months of the year at Babylon, in the heart of his dominions; three at Susa, on the frontier of Persia; and two at Ecbatana, the capital of Media; as well as for the sake of variety of climate* as to endear himself to the various nations under his sway, and hold them in more perfect obedience 17 . But as we know not distinctly what regulations Were framed by Cyrus, and what by his immediate successors, I shall reserve my account of the government and police of the Per- sian empire till a subsequent period, when it became better known to the Greeks; to whom we are in- debted for our information on these important sub- jects. The Persian empire, at the death of Cyrus, ex- tended from the frontiers of India to those of Egypt, and from the Caspian and Euxine seas, to the Per- sian and Arabian gulfs 13 . Cambyses, his eldest son, Ant. Chr. who succeeded him in the government of this im- _f 29 - , . ? . , . . Olymp. mense empire, began his reign with projecting the ixii.4. conquest of Egypt 19 ; a circumstance which incon- testibly proves, that Cyrus did not lose his army, and his life, as commonly reported, in an unsuc- cessful expedition against the Massagetae, a barbar- ous nation on the frontiers of Asiatic Scythia 30 . For, 26. Prideaux, Connect, part i. book iii. ct auct. tit. 27. Xenoph. Cyropted. lib. viii. 28. Id. ibid. 29. Herodot. lib. li. cap. i. 30. Herodot. lib. i. Justin, lib. i. An extract from Cttiiat, pre- served 65 THE HISTORY OF PART I. For, in that event, his successor could not have S -*" V " N **' been in a condition to prosecute conquests of any- kind; and would have had too much danger to ap- prehend from the east, to think of enlarging his em- pire to the west. These considerations, my lord, must induce you to prefer the more consistent, and probable narra- tion of Xenophon, who informs us that Cyrus died in his native kingdom, at an advanced age; in the bosom of his family, and surrounded by his kindred and courtiers; when his empire was in the most prosperous state, and his affairs in the best order 3 '. And the judicious Strabo, not only tells us, that no regard is due to what historians have invented, con- cerning the war of Cyrus with the Massagetse, but that his tomb was to be seen, as late as the time of Alexander the Great, in a garden at Pasargada, the royal residence of the ancient kings of Persia, with an inscription to the following purport; " I am " Cyrus the founder of the Persian empire, and who " was. lord of Asia. Envy me not this memorial 51 . Cambyses, though a less politic prince than his father, pursued his true interest in undertaking the conquest of Egypt. The experience of ages had evinced, that the humiliation of that kingdom was necessary to the peace and security of the western provinces of the Assyrian empire, which had been subjected to the Persian sway 33 . But Egypt was then flourishing in arts and arms, under the wise government of Amasis. served by Photius, countenances the same tradition, with some varia- tion in regard to the issue of the war. But Ctesias is an author of too little credit to deserve refutation. 31. Zenoph. Cyropxd. lib. viii. 32. Strabo, Geog. lib. xi. p. 507, et lib. xv. p. 730. edit. Lutet. ParU. Typ. Reg. 1620. 33. See Lett. ix. et auct. cit. This ANCIENT EUROPE. 67 This prince, whom we have seen assume the Egyptian sceptre 34 , after dethroning his tyrannical master, Apries, was worthy of the exalted station to which he had attained. He greatly improved the internal prosperity of Egypt, by facilitating the com- munication between the country and the Nile, at the same time that he adorned his kingdom with many magnificent buildings 35 . He maintained the respect due to the throne, while he indulged himself in mirth and jollity with his former companions 36 ; devoting only the morning to public business, or the affairs of the cabinet. He preserved good order among his subjects by salutaiy laws, and secured his sway by a body of regular troops, which he posted in the neighbourhood of Memphis 37 . And he pursued th eliberal policy of Psammitichus, in encouraging foreign commerce 38 . Amasis more especially favoured the Asiatic Greeks, whom he encouraged to settle in his domi- nions, and indulged with immunities both civil and religious. He permitted as many Grecian emigrant* as thought proper to remove into Egypt to inhabit the city of Naucratis, on the western or Canopiati branch of the Nile, where they were allowed the ex- ercise of their religion 39 . And to such Grecian ad- venturers as did not choose to reside there, or to aban- don their native country, but who resorted to Egypt for the purpose of trade, he granted the extraordinary 34. Ibid. 35. Herodot. lib. II. cap. clxxv. — clxxvii. 36. Id. lib. it. cap. clxxiii. In apology for this conduct, be replied to his more austere courtiers, who blamed him for it, as unsuitable to the character of a king, " An archer, when he proposes to shoot, " braces his bow ; and when he has done, unbends it. For if always *' kept bent, it would become unfit for shooting, when he should " have occasion to use it. Such is the condition of mankind. He «* that intensely applies to study, without allowing himself any inter- " val of recreation, must gradually break the \igour either of his " hotly or mind." Id ibid. "7. ITerodot lib. ii. cap. oliv. 38. Id. lib. ii. cap. clxxviii. 39. Id. ibid. privilege 68' THE HISTORY OF PART I. privilege of erecting temples, and consecrating altars v^"v^w to their gods, in different parts of his kingdom, where their factories were established* . A magnifi- cent repository for the Grecian deities was accord- ingly raised on the Egyptian shore, at the common expense of the Ionians, Dorians, and iEolians. The people of iEgina built a separate temple to Jupiter, the Samians one to Juno, and the Milesians one tq Apollo 4 '. But Amasis, notwithstanding his high prosperity, was by no means in a condition to resist the Persian power. He, therefore, seems to have made sub- missions to Cyrus, when that great warrior appeared on the frontiers of Egypt, after the conquest of Sy- ria 42 . And the withdrawing of this homage or tribute, on the death of the founder of the Persian empire, is the best reason that can be assigned for the hostile purpose of Cambyses, though Herodotus has ascribed it to other causes 43 , too frivolous to be mentioned. Be the motives of the Persian monarch, however, what they might, for undertaking the conquest of Egypt, the enterprise was truly political; and the measures which he took, for carrying it into execu- tion, were adequate to the end he had in view. Be- ing absolute master of Asia Minor, he compelled the Ionians and jEolians to attend him in his expe- dition, with their whole naval and military strength 44 . The Samians, though not under his dominion, sup- plied him with forty gallies 45 . The Cyprians and Phoenicians, who had voluntarily submitted to his sway, furnished him with a great marine force 46 : he therefore justly boasted, that he was lord of the sea 47 . / 40. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. Ixxviii. 41. Id. ibid. 42. Xenoph. Cyropxd. lib. vii. 43. Historiar, lib. iii. cap. i. et seq. 44. Id. ibid. 45. Herodot. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. xliv. ♦6. Id. lib. ii. cap. xix. 47. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxiv. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 69 The army of Cambyses, which consisted of the veteran troops of Cyrus, reinforced with a body of Asiatic Greeks, marched toward Egypt by land. In this march, and in his whol« expedition, the Persian monarch was much assisted by the counsel and mili- tary skill of Phanes, an Halicarnassean by birth, and lately one of the Grecian mercenaries in the service of the king of Egypt 48 . This experienced officer, disgusted at Amasis, for reasons not known, had made his escape by sea 49 ; and arriving in the Per- sian camp, before Cambyses began his march, offer- ed his seiwice to that prince, and informed him of the state of the kingdom he was preparing to invade 5 ". The advances of Phanes were readily accepted: and, through his means, the hostile army was safely conducted to the frontiers of Egypt; being supplied with water by an Arabian chief in passing through the desert 5 '. Cambyses, on entering the threatened territory, Am. Chr. was informed of the death of Amasis, in the forty- 525 - fourth year of his reign ; and that his son, Psammeni- lxiii. 4 tus, had succeeded him in the Egyptian throne 5 *. This prince lay encamped with his army near the Pe- lusian mount of the Nile, expecting the enemy 53 . 48. Herodotus, Historiar. lib. iii. cap. iv. et seq. 49. Id. ibid. It is not a little surprising, that both Mr. Mitford and Dr. Gillies should ascribe the desertion cf this Greek to the im- politic conduct of Psammenitus, the son and successor of Amasis; whereas Herodotus, whom they quote, as their authority for so say- ing, expressly tells us, that Phanes was disgusied at Amasis, though he owns himself ignorant of the cause {Historiar. lib. iii. cap. iv.). And it is evident from chronology, that Amasis could not be dead, when Phanes left Egypt, as his son Psammenitus reigned only six months (Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xiv.); a space of time too short for the voyage of Phanes, and the operations of Cambyses, before he ac- complished the conquest of Egypt. 50. Herodot. ubi sup. 51. Herodot. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. vli. viii. ix. 52. Id. lib. iii. cap. x. 53. Id. ibid. vol. ii. l When fO THE HISTORY OF PART I. When the Persian forces came within sight, the v^~ v '^>' Grecian mercenaries, in order to shew their detes- tation of the treachery of Phanes, slaughtered his children before his eyes, and drank their blood 54 . That barbarity, however, availed them nothing. It served only to rouse the courage of the Persians. The two armies joined battle, and fought with ob- stinate valour. But the Egyptians and their allies, after numbers had fallen on both sides, were finally broken, and totally routed 55 . The surrender of the city of Pelusium, esteemed the key of Egypt, to the arms of the Persian monarch, seems to have been the immediate consequence of this victory. The king of Egypt took refuge in Memphis, his capital, with the remains of his army. And thi- ther he was followed by Cambyses 56 . Memphis was taken after a short siege, and Psammenitus made prisoner 57 . The unfortunate monarch, who had reigned only about six months, was at first treated with lenity, and furnished with a maintenance suit- ed to his former dignity. But not being able to brook his degraded condition, he attempted to raise a rebellion against the conqueror, and was ordered to drink poison 58 . Before this fatal event, Cambyses had received the submissions of the neighbouring Africans, and of the Greeks of Cyrenaica 59 . Now undisputed master of Egypt, and of the neighbouring parts of Africa to the west, he projected three grand expeditions; one against the Ethiopians, another against the Ammoni- ans, and a third against the Carthagenians 60 . But the latter he was obliged to lay aside, as the Phoenicians, 54. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xi. 55. Id. ibid. 56. Herodot. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. xiii. xiv. 57. Id. ibid. 58. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xv. 59. Id. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. xiii. CO. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. xviii. who ANCIENT EUROPE. 71 who formed the chief strength of his navy, refused LETTER to act against the Carthagenians, whom they called their children 61 . And he did not think it prudent to compel their obedience 6 *. The Persian monarch, therefore, found it neces- sary to confine his ambition to the conquest of Ethio- pia and Ammonia, or the higher part of Lybia. Nor did he, rash and impetuous as he was, and elated with conquest, advance against those unknown re- gions, without exercising some degree of caution. Before he left Memphis, he sent ambassadors into Ethiopia, in order to discover the state of the coun- try 63 . But although these ambassadors carried rich presents along with them, according to the custom of the east, and were ordered to make professions of friendship, they were considered as spies by the king of Ethiopia; who, after reproaching Cambyses with an unjust design upon the liberties of a people that had never injured him, dismissed them con- temptuously with the present of a bozv, which he drew, and unbended in their presence, and desired them to deliver to their master 64 . " And tell the " king of Persia," added he, " that the king of u Ethiopia gives him this advice: — When the Per- " sians can as easily draw so strong a bow, Camby- " ses may make war upon the Ethiopians with his M victorious forces. In the meantime, let him thank " the gods, that have not given the sons of Ethiopia, " a wish to possess any other country but their " own 6 V> Irritated 61. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xix. Carthage, as I have had occasion to observe (Lett, ix.), was founded by a colony from Tyre. 62. Id. ibid. 63. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xx. 64. Ibid. cap. xxi, xxii. 65. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. xxi. I have formerly had occasion to remark, that the Ethiopians, notwithstanding their claims to high antiquity, seem ahvay9 to have remained in a rude or barbarous stat« (Left. T3 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Irritated almost to madness by this insulting mes- \^~>r~> mi / sage, Cambyses acted, from the moment it was deli- vered to him, as if he had been deprived of the use of his understanding 66 ; already shaken by a convul- sive malady, to which he had been subject from his infancy, and occasionally disordered by intempe- rance 07 ; which inflamed the natural violence of his (Lett. i. note 251 ). And this insulting message, and their king's treatment of the Persian present, " a purple robe, a chain for the " neck, and bracelets of gold, an alabaster box of ointment, and a " vessel of palm-wine," prove them to have been little polished in the reign of Cambyses The barbarian monarch laughed, when the curious workmanship of the necklace and bracelets was explained to him ; and said, " that chains of greater strength were to be found " in Ethiopia" (Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxii.). He tasted the wine, however, with pleasure; and owned that the Ethiopians had no liquor equal to it. But he set no value on the purple garment; con- sidering the beautiful dye, in changing the native colour of the fleece, as a mark of deceit characteristic of the friendly professions of the Persians (Id. ibid.). Yet do we find in this barbarian pride and haughty contempt of alliance, a degree of dignity that courtly man- ners cannot bestow; and which had induced men of weak under- standings, and narrow minds, to exalt barbarism above refinement; not reflecting, that to the softenings of the human character we are indebted for the most pleasing enjoyments of social life; that barba- rian stateiiness is less allied to such enjoyments, and consequently less friendly to the happiness of mankind, though it apparently con- tains less deceit. ,It may seem extraordinary, that I should dwell so much on the advantages of refinement, after having given so favourable a picture of the condition of human nature in its first removes from the savage state (Lett. i. passim). But this I do from a feeling of the pleasures of polished life, and from a conviction that the delicate disguises of the passions are essential to the good order of society ; as such habi- tual restraint only can enable us to subdue them. For, although tin- corrupted men associated in small bodies may be safely left to the guidance of their instincts and natural affections, a sense of honour and propriety is no less necessary than the prohibitions of the magis- trate to the well-being of a large community ,- from which it is impos- sible to exclude the vices that spring from luxury and avarice. Oyer these it is requisite, that public decency should throw a veil ; and manners correct, what laws cannot cure. 65. Herodot. Historiur. lib. iii. cap. xxv. 67. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxviii — xxxix. temper, ANCIENT EUROPE. 73 temper, and henceforth often gave to his conduct, both in public and private, the appearance of lunacy 68 . Leaving only the Grecian auxiliaries in Lower Egypt, ^ cl ^7 he put his army instantly in motion, and began his 524. march toward the frontiers of Ethiopia 6 "; without ^iv^U having collected a sufficient supply of provisions, or taken other steps necessary to the success of so dis- tant an expedition 70 . When the enraged monarch arrived at Thebes, he detached fifty thousand men to lay waste the country of the Ammonians, and burn the temple of Jupiter, there so famous for its oracular responses 7 '. The troops that composed this detachment, by the help of guides, reached the city of Oasis in Upper Egypt 72 . But what afterward became of them is not certainly known; as none of them readied the place of their destination, or returned to relate the cause of their failure 73 . They are said to have been overwhelmed by waves of sand in the deserts of Lybia; in conse- quence of a violent south wind, while they were seat- ed at dinner, and all to have perished 74 . Meantime Cambyses had prosecuted his march,, and entered Lower Ethiopia. No enemy appeared to obstruct his progress ; but famine, the most terri- ble of all enemies, compelled him to set limits to his ambition. His soldiers having consumed all their provisions, and even the beasts of burden, were dri- ven to the dreadful necessity of feeding upon wild herbs, and even upon each other 75 , casting lots for the wretched victims, to be devoured by hunger 6 . 68. Id. ibid. 69. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxv. 70. Id. ibid. 71. Herodot. ubi sup. 72. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxvi. 73. Id. ibid. 74. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxvi. 75. This is the first time (as far as I remember) that the eating of human flesh is mentioned by any ancient author; and we find, it \v» by no means from choice. 76. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. xxy. The rt THE HISTORY OF PART I. The haughty and obstinate spirit of the Persian. N ^" v ^-' monarch, had made him persist in his purpose, to this extremity. But seeing no prospect of attaining the object of his enterprise, the conquest of the king- dom of Ethiopia, and his army in danger of being utterly ruined, he returned to Thebes, and thence to Memphis 77 . Ant. Chr. After his return to Memphis, Cambyses was guil- Olym'p ty °f man y extravagances, in his fits of intoxication lxiv. 2. and phrenzy 78 . But the actions of a madman not be- ing fit subjects of reasoning, as no consequences can be fairly deduced from them, I shall take no notice of any anecdotes of that kind except such as concern the Egyptian superstition, I have formerly had occasion to speak of the reli- gion of the Egyptians 79 , and to allude to the enormity of the superstition. Yet they, like all other nations, in the first stage of their civil progress 8 ", appear to have worshipped one true God, under the wide ex- panse of heaven; for we are told, that they boasted of being the first people, who built temples, reared altars, and erected statues to the gods 8; : — a boast which would not have been made, without reference to some period, when they themselves had none. Superstition had now attained its height in Egypt. The Egyptians not only worshipped the host of heaven, or the constellations, under symbolical re- presentations, like the Arabians, Syrians, and Chal- deans, but deified in appearance every thing around them' 2 . Having given many examples of this in 77. Id. ibid. 78. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxvii — xxxix. 79. Lett. i. p. 90—112. 80. See Lett. i. of this work, p. 95, 96. 81. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. iv. 82. JJiod. Sicul. lib. u et Herodot. lib. it. passim. treating ANCIENT EUROPE. 75 treating directly of the religion of the Egyptians, one will here suffice. Not satisfied with worshipping Osiris, or the sun, under the shape of a bull, called Apis, at Memphis they paid their devotions to a real bullock, bearing certain marks, which were sup- posed to indicate his divinity 83 . And when this bestial god died, he was buried with the greatest solemnity, and lamented with the deepest mourn- ing 84 ; and the highest joy was expressed, accompa- nied with the most pompous processions, and uni- versal festivity, when the ingenuity of priestcraft had procured another bullock, bearing the same marks 85 . Such a god the Egyptians had found, when Cam- byses entered Memphis, on his return from his unfortunate expedition against Ethiopia 86 . Conjec- turing that their rejoicing was occasioned by his disasters, and considering it as a daring insult on their disappointed conqueror, the irascible monarch sent for the magistrates of the city, and made them acquainted with his displeasure 87 . They declared the cause of the general festivity; but he, not giving credit to what they said, told them they were liars, and ordered them, as such, to be put to death 83 . He next sent for the priests; and having received the same answer from them, replied, that if any god was so condescending as to shew himself to the Egyptians, he would not be unacquainted with him 89 . And, without more words, ordered Apis to be brought into his presence. The priests complied, through fear; and Cambyses, frantic at the sight, drew his sword; and, making a thrust at the bullock, wounded him mortally, and fell into an immoderate fit of laughter 9 ". 83. Herodot. lib. lii. cap. xxvii. xxviii. 84. Id. ibid. 85. Herodot. ubi sup. 86. Id. ibid. 87. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxvii. 88. Id. ibid. 89. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxviii. iX3. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxir. " O height f6 THE HISTORY OF TART I. " O height of infamy !" — exclaimed he, as soon as v «^" v '^«' / he could recover himself; — " do gods exist com- " posed of flesh and blood, and vulnerable by steel? — " Yet this god is worthy of the Egyptians. But I " will convince you," added he, " that I am not to " be insulted with impunity." And he instantly ordered the priests to be severely whipped, and all the deluded votaries of superstition to be killed, that should be found making public demonstrations Having thus triumphed over the Eyptian god, and overawed the whole nation by the terror of his arms, Cambyses ordered the Asiatic Greeks to return home with their ships, and prepared to follow them with his army. Before he left Memphis, however, he violently entered the temple of Vulcan, and also that of the dii cabirii or mighty gods ; and after ridiculing their images, committed them to the fire 92 . But the reign of this tyrannical conqueror, whose theological tenets led him to make a mockery of the religion of the vanquished, and whose unbridled fury added new horrors to despotism, was henceforth to be of short duration. He died, in his march through 91. Id. ibid. ' 92. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxvii. Diodorus (lib. i.) and Strabo (lib. x. xvii.), have said that Cambyses burned or destroyed the Egyptian temples, not only at Memphis but at Thebes; but as no mention is made of such havoc by Herodotus, who lived soon after the reign of this prince, I have taken no notice of it. They seem to have been imposed en by the Egyptian priests ; who, before their jcra, had invented fabulous accounts (as I have had occasion to ob- serve) of the ancient grandeur of their country. Herodotus beside living nearer to the Persian conquest, being more acute and sceptical, ■was not to be misled; unless by some marvellous tale (which pro- bably he did not believe), that contained a moral. If the temple of Vulcan had been destroyed by Cambyses, Herodotus could not have so distinctly described its porticoes and statues. Hhtariar. lib. ii. passim. Syria, Ant. Chr. ANCIENT EUROPE. f% Syria, of an accidental wound received from his own sword 93 . And, as he left no issue, his death was followed by a kind of interregnum in the Per- sian empire. This interregnum was preceded by an 522. usurpation, the causes of which I must now relate. Dlymp. When Cambyses left Susa, in order to conduct his army against Egypt, he had placed the chief ad- ministration of affairs, during his absence, in the hands of Patizithes, one of the magi 94 . Smerdis, his only brother, accompanied him. But becoming jealous of this prince, while in Egypt, seemingly on account of his favour with the army, he commanded him to return to Persia; and, in a new fit of jealousy, suspecting that Smerdis might aspire to the crown, the cruel monarch sent after him Prexaspes, a con- fidential courtier, by whom he was slain near Susa 05 . The knowledge of this circumstance, and the fran- tic behaviour of Cambyses, after his return from Ethiopia, which had rendered him the terror of his former subjects, as well as of the Egyptians, inspir- ed Patizithes, the magian minister, with the ambi- tious thought of placing his own brother upon the imperial throne. He accordingly made him assume the name and character of the murdered prince, whom he greatly resembled in face and person, and sent heralds to all parts of the empire, commanding obedience to be yielded to Smerdis, the son of Cyrus 96 . One of those heralds met the army of Cambyses, in his return through Syria 97 ; and the rage of that monarch, in mounting his horse, in hopes of taking 93. Id. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxiv — lxvi. 94. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxi. 95. Ibid. cap. xxx. 96. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxi. 97. Id. ibid. vol. 11. m speedy 78 ' THE HISTORY OF PART I. speedy Vengeance upon the usurper, occasioned the wound from his own sword, which proved mortal 98 . Before his death, however, he discovered the in- trigue of the two magi ; by first examining Prexas- pes, and afterward the herald, whom he had ordered to be seized. And finding that his brother, Smerdis, was certainly dead, he lamented his untimely fate; and calling his principal officers around him, made them acquainted with the particulars of the murder, and exhorted them, as they regarded their own happiness, and the honour of the Persian nation, never to suffer a base impostor to sit upon the throne of Cyrus". This pathetic speech, however, had little effect upon the Persian leaders. Strongly attached to Smerdis, they considered all the dying monarch had said, concerning the assassination of that prince, as suggested by rage and resentment at his brother; for daring to rebel against him, and seize the impe- rial sceptre' 00 . And in this opinion they were con- firmed by the mysterious behaviour of Prexaspes; who did not dare to own, that he had killed the son of Cyrus 101 . They, therefore, believed the magian usurper to be the brother of Cambyses; and, after the king's death, paid obedience to him, as the true prince, and rightful heir to the crown 102 . In the meantime Patizithes, who still acted aa prime minister, and who appears to have been a profound politician, took the most prudent means for conciliating the affections of all the subjects of the Persian empire. He issued, in the name of the impostor, a proclamation, offering a general remis- 98. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxii. — lxvi. 99. Id. ibid. 100. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxvi. 101. Id. ibid. 103. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. Ixvii. sion ANCIENT EUROPE. 79 *ion of taxes, and an exemption from military ser- LETTER rice for three years' 03 But this and other popular acts, which endeared the magian usurper to the conquered nations, were not sufficient long to impose upon the Persian nobi- lity, and princes of the blood royal. As the preten- ded son of Cyrus never shewed himself to the peo- ple, or admitted any of the grandees of Persia into his presence, but lived shut up within the walls of his palace, amid eunuchs and women, Otanes, a Persian nobleman of the first rank, grew suspicious of impos- ture, and found means to detect it l0+ . He communi- cated his discovery to Gobryas and Aspathines, two noblemen also of high rank, and approved honour. And these three associated chiefs admitted into a participation of their councils Intaphernes, Mega- bysus, and Hydarnes, all heads of illustrious fami- lies 1 ^. When those six confederates were concerting measures for degrading the impostor, Darius, the son of Hystaspes (descended in a direct line from Achaeinenes, the founder of the royal house of Cy- rus), arrived at Susa, and was thought worthy of their confidence. This young prince, whose father had been appointed governor of Persia by Camby- ses, encouraged the associated nobles in their gener- ous purpose; assured them of the death of Smerdis, the son of Cyrus, and was admitted into their con- federacy' 06 . Meanwhile the magian usurper, and his brother Patizithes, having seemingly gained to their interest the venerable Prexaspes, prevailed upon him to as- cend one of the towers of the palace; whence he promised to declare aloud, to the assembled Persi- 101. Id. ibid. 104. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxviii. lxix. 105. Id. lib. iii. cap. Ixx. et se^. 10G. Herodot. ubi sup. KM X. 80 THE HISTORY OF part I. ans, That to his knowledge, Smerdis, the son of , ^"^ r ^> / Cyrus, and none other, was the reigning king' 07 . But he, filled with remorse at the cruel part he had acted; and detesting the office in which he was enga- ged, began his speech with tracing the genealogy of Cyrus (which he deduced from Achemenes, in the male line), and expatiated on the benefits the Persian nation had derived from that heroic prince 108 . Having finished this part of his oration, Prexaspes disclosed the whole truth. He told the assembled multitude, That the apprehension of the dangers, to which he should be exposed, only had induced him to conceal the secret so long; that now seeing the necessity of revealing it, he thought himself bound to confess, that he, in obedience to the com- mand of Cambyses, had slain Smerdis, the son of Cyrus ; and to declare, that the present possessor of the throne was a magian usurper; then imprecating curses upon the Persians, if they should fail to re- cover the supreme power, and punish the impostor, he threw himself headlong from the tower, and was killed by the fall 100 . Ant. Chr. This unexpected declaration^ from the mouth of OK~mp a man of high rank and character, and the fatal catas- lxiv. 4. trophe by which it was sealed, threw the councils of the magi into the utmost confusion, and embol- dened the seven confederated chiefs to carry their design into immediate execution. Presuming on the respect inspired by their dignity, as grandees of the Persian empire, they resolved to enter the palace without demanding audience' 10 . The guards, as they had foreseen, obsequiously made way, and al- lowed them to pass; but the nobles about his person, 107. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxiv. 108. Ibid. cap. lxxv. 109. Idem. ibid. 110. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. Ixxvii. suspecting ANCIENT EUROPE. 81 suspecting their purpose, attempted to oppose them. This resistance, however, was feeble. The seven compatriots, animating each other, drew their swords; put to death every one that dared to deny, them admission; penetrated to the inmost recess of the palace ; slew the impostor and his brother Pati- zithes, whom they fovind deliberating on the dying testimony of Prexaspes ; and cutting off their heads, carried them out, and shewed them to the people 1 ". Inflamed with rage and indignation at the affront of- fered to their sceptre, the Persians flew to arms, and massacred all the magi they found in Susa 112 . Nothing now remained for the successful confe- Ant. CJir. derates, but to appoint a successor to Cambyses; to oi~mi> divide the government of the Persian empire among lxi. 4. them, or resign to the various nations that composed it, those liberties which God and nature had origi- nally given them. The arguments which Herodotus makes the several chiefs use, on this occasion, are highly ingenious, and shew that he was perfectly acquainted with the advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of government, then known" 3 ; but they are better suited to the meridian of Greece, in which he lived, than that of the south of Asia, where absolute monarchy had been hereditary from time immemorial. I shall, therefore, only observe, that it was ultimately resolved to retain the monarchical form of government, and to preserve the empire of Cyrus unbroken" 4 . The grand difficulty, however, still remained to be determined; namely, who should be the head of that empire? — In order to settle this point, without exciting animosity or jealousy among the confedc- 111. Id. lib. iii.cap. Ixxviii. Ixxix 112. Id. ibid. 113. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. Ixxx — Ixxviii. 114. Id. ibid. rates, *t x , THE HISTORY OF Ant. Chr 521 PART I. rates, it was agreed, that they should ride out next morning at the rising of the sun, the great luminary which the Persians reverenced next to the Supreme Olymp. Being, and fire his pure symbol; and that he, whosft lxiv. 4. horse first neighed, should fill the vacant throne 1 ' 5 . Darius, who had killed the imposter with his own hand, who stood highest in the right of blood, and whose lofty mind aspired after dominion, communi- cated the agreement of the confederates to Oebares, his master of horse. "And that expei't groom assured him of success. In order to make good his promise, Oebares led out the favourite horse of Darius, along with a mare " that the horse loved," (to use the words of the honest historian) and permitted him to cover her on the ground over which he was to pass next morning" 6 . This artifice had the desired effect. When the Persian chiefs rode out, according to concert, the horse of Darius neighed, as soon as he came to the spot, where he had enjoyed his female the night be- fore. At that sign, and a clap of thunder, which happened at the same time, the competitors of Da- rius instantly dismounted; and prostrating them- selves, saluted him as their king" 7 . And the Per- sians, and all the nations, who had been subjected the Persian dominion, acknowledged his sway" 8 . The ether competitors for the throne were not, however, left unrewarded. They, and their descen- dants possessed distinguished honours and privileges, not only during the reign of Darius, but under all his successors. They were considered as the per- petual counsellors of the great king" 9 (as the Per- ils. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxxiv. 116. Id. lib. iii. cap. lxxxv. 317. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. Ixxxvi. 118. Id. lib. iii cap. lxxxviii. 119. Esther, chap. i. ver. 14. sian ANCIENT EUROPE. 8S sian monarch was commonly called by the Greeks), and had access to him, without demanding leave, at all times, unless when he was in private with his women l? °. Their advice was to be asked first, con- cerning all matters relative to the common interests of the empire; and their dignity was made known by their turbans, which they were permitted to wear in a peculiar form 121 . And Otanes, the author of the confederacy, who had declined competition for the throne, was rewarded with yet higher privileges. He enjoyed an exemption from taxes, and was al- lowed to live as an independent prince, unless in what concerned the general laws of the Persian mo- narchy 122 . And the same privileges were extended to his posterity 123 . Darius Hystaspes was worthy of the throne of Cyrus. Equally distinguished as a statesman and a warrior, his long reign of thirty-six years is the most important in the annals of the Persian empire, being better known than that of its founder; and it forms one of the most interesting periods in the history of the ancient world. But the transactions of this period, my lord, must be reserved for another letter. 120. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. Ixxxiv. 121. Id. ibid. 122. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lxxxiiL 123. Id. ibid. LETTER •4 THE HISTORY OF* LETTER XI. TEE AFFAIRS OF THE GREEKS AND PERSIANS, FROM THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS HYSTASPES TO THE BATTLE OF MARATHON. PARTI. J[ he reign of Darius is not only rnemora- Ant. Chr. blc on account of the great events by which it was 52L "' distinguished, but because of its being the sera when Olympiad the government of the Persian empire was establish- ed, on those solid foundations that continued to sup- port it, under his successors, until it was broken in pieces by the irresistible violence of the Macedonian conqueror. This politic prince, in order more firmly to establish his throne, married two daughters of Cyrus the Great; Atossa, and Artystona. He also married, with the same view, Parmys, daughter of the true Smerdis, and Phsedmyma, daughter of Otanes, who had detected the magian impostor 1 . The beginning of the reign of Darius, however^ was by no means free from troubles. He was under the necessity of putting to death Intaphernes, one of his competitors for the imperial crown, because of his audacity 1 . He also found it necessary to cut off Oroites, satrap of Sardis, and chief governor of Asia Minor; who had been guilty of many cruelties, and was suspected of aspiring at independent sovereign- ty 3 . The particulars of the assassination of Oroites, 1. Herodotus, Histor. lib. iii. cap. lxxxviii. 2. Id. lib. iii. cap. cxix. 3. Hcrodot. lib. iii. cap, cxxxvi — cxxviii. and XI. ANCIENT EUROPE. €5 and the Circumstances that led to it, deserve to be LETTER related, as they will throw light on the state of the Asiatic Greeks under the Persian government. I have formerly had occasion to mention the plant- ing of the Grecian colonies on the coast of Asia Mi- nor'; to speak of their early proficiency in arts and literature 5 ; their prosperity under the Lydian mo- narchy; and their brave, but ineffectual resistance, against the Persian forces under Harpagus, the gene- ral of Cyrus 6 . During that struggle for independency, and even after their submission to the Persian power, many of the Grecian inhabitants of Ionia aban- doned their settlements, and took refuge with their contrymen in the neighbouring islands of the iEgean •ea 7 . Those islands had never owned the sway of Croe- sus; and Cyrus, who confined his ambition to the Asiatic continent, made no attempt to subdue them 8 . The naval force of Cambyses, as we have seen 9 , was directed against other objects; so that the Greeks in the Asiatic islands, enjoying uninterrupted com- merce, and enriched by the very misfortunes of their countrymen on the coast of Asia Minor, had risen, in the course of a century, to an extraordinary height of opulence and naval grandeur. Lesbos, Chios, Sa- mos, Rhodes, were accordingly crowned with superb temples, adorned with the polished beauties of archi- tecture; with splendid palaces, magnificent quays, and fortified cities, furnished with all the luxuries and conveniences of life, while the greater part of the European Greeks, perpetually embroiled in public or private wars, had made few removes from barba- rism . 4. Lett. iv. 5. Lett. vii. 6. Lett ix. 7. Herodot. lib. i. passim. 8. Id. ibid. 5. Lett. x. 10. Herodot. et Thucydid. passim. vol. ir. n Unfortunately 85 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Unfortunately, however, for the inhabitants of s^"^^-' those islands, they were not permitted to enjoy their good fortune without allay. Inequality of wealth, the natural consequence of commercial prosperity, ne- cessarily introduced among them inequality of power. And as that wealth could not be acquired without talents, some oppulent and powerful man, in almost every island, usually obtained dominion over his fellow-citizens, and was branded with the odious name, but envied rank of tyrant". This tyranny became more general after the con- quest of Asia Minor by the captains of Cyrus; who, conformable to his general policy, gave the govern- ment of every Grecian city and its territory, on the continent, to some principal citizen, under the con- troul of the satrap of Sardis 2 . Nor was that perni- cious example, in conjunction with inequality of for- tune, the only cause of the change of government i* the Asiatic islands. Those islands had formerly a close connexion with the free states on the continent, with one or other of Which they were in alliance; almost every contigu- ous island belonging either to the Eolian, Ionian, or Dorian confederacy. But after the Persian con- quest of Asiatic Greece, that confederacy was bro- ken. The islanders, therefore, had thenceforth no check upon the ambition of an usurping fellow-citizen, but the virtue of their particular communities; for commercial jealousy prevented the people of one island from interfering in favour of the liberties of those of another 3 . Hence the prevalence of tyranny, or petty despotism, in the principal islands of the JSgean sea. 11. Ibid. 12. Herodot. Jlittorlar. lib. i. iii. passim. 13. Id. ibid. Of ANCIENT EUROPE. 97 Of all the despots that reigned in those islands, LETTER the most illustrious was Polycrates, tyrant of Samos. This extraordinary man, having usurped the govern- ment over his fellow citizens, formed an alliance with Amasis, king of Egypt; who had, like himself, as we have seen 4 , risen to the sovereignty from a private station. And, by his attention to naval affairs, Polycrates raised himself to a degree of power un- known to any other Grecian prince of his time 5 . He maintained a fleet of one hundred gallies, of fifty oars each, on board of which he embarked a thousand archers 6 . With this fleet he acquired the dominion of the iEgean sea; subdued' many of the islands; and took and pillaged several cities on the continent 7 . Every place he attacked submitted to his arms' 8 ; and no ship could escape his pyratical cruisers, which were so constructed as to cut the water quicker than any other vessels then in use' 9 , Polycrates was no less magnificent and liberal, than opulent and powerful. His superb palace was thought worthy of admiration as late as the Au- gustine age 20 . He lived in the utmost splendour; delighted in the conversation of men of learning and genius, who experienced his generosity, and were encouraged by his patronage. Anacreon, the lyric poet, was his constant companion 1 ; and the philoso- pher, Pythagoras, a Samian by birth, was by him recommended to his royal friend Amasis 22 . And 14. Lett. x. 15. Herodot. Hhtoriar. lib. 1*1. cap. xxxix — cxxv. 16. Id. lib. iii. cap. xxxix. 17. Id. ibid. Strabo, lib. xtv. p. 637. Edit Lutet. Parii. 18. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xxxix. 19. Id. ibid, et Plut. Vit. Pericles. 20. Sueton. Vit. Caligula. 21. Strabo, ubi sup. 22. Diog. Laert. Vit. Pjtbag. et Rollin, de la Pbilotapb. Art. Pjtbag. although 88 THE HISTORY OF PART I. although that philosopher did not choose to reside at N-^" v ~w the court of Samos after his return from his travels, he was indebted to the recommendation of Polycrates for the favour that was shewn him in Egypt 23 ; where he was admitted into the arcana of the priests, and is supposed to have acquired the principles of that sublime philosophy, which he afterward taught with so much reputation and success, at Crotona, in Italy* 4 . The great, and uninterrupted prosperity of Po- lycrates, alarmed the fears of Amasis, if we may- credit tradition, for the future fate of his Grecian friend and ally. He accordingly wrote to him a let- ter, which is preserved by Herodotus, desiring him to part with some thing that he highly valued; and if his prosperity still continued, to repeat the experi- ment, in order to arm himself against an awful re- verse of fortune, which he had reason to apprehend. '* For I know," says Amasis, " the envy of the " Gods 2 -." This opinion, that the gods are envious of human happiness, prevailed very generally in Greece, in early times* 6 ; and seems to have arisen from the fre- quent vicissitudes of fortune, in that unsettled coun- try, connected with a secret consciousness, that opu- lence and power were too often acquired by such crimes as deserved the vengeance of heaven. A si- milar sentiment, however, has been common in all ages and countries. " Ah, tremble at the peril of " unmixed prosperity!" has ever been the language of men of melancholy dispositions, or desponding tempers ; and of men of the firmest minds, during the influence of low spirits, or under the pressure of un- expected misfortune. 23. Id. ibid. 24. Isocrat. Paneg. Basir. Strabo, lib. x. p. 263. Diog. Laert. ubi sup. 25. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xl. 26. Homer, et Herodot. passim. Whatever ANCIENT EUROPE. 89 Whatever might be the thoughts of Polycrates on letter that subject, he is said to have thrown a favourite signet, or seal-ring, into the sea, in compliance with the advice of the king of Egypt. But that signet, consisting of an emerald curiously sculptured and set in gold, was soon after found in the belly of a fish; which had been presented to him, by the person that caught it, because of its size and beauty 27 . Proud of his good fortune, the Samian chief communicat- ed the intelligence to Amasis; who instantly sent a herald to Samos, with orders to renounce all friend- ship and alliance with Polycrates; that he might not be involved in the future calamities of that prince, which he now considered as inevitable 28 . Such is the account given, by Herodotus, of this matter. But circumstances make it probable, that the king of Egypt was induced to renounce the friendship of Polycrates, for other reasons than those assigned by the Greek historian; than the fear of having occasion to sympathize with the sufferings of an ally in distress, or even of being obliged to support his desperate cause. Amasis was a great encourager of commerce, and took peculiar pride in patronizing the Greeks, both European and Asiatic, as we have already seen 29 ; and as appears by the magnificent presents, which he made to their tem- ples, in different countries 30 . He must, therefore, have been offended at the piracy of Polycrates, and alarmed at the growth of his naval power; and consequently would wish to throw off all connexion with a predatory prince, whom it was the common interest of all commercial nations to humble. View- ed in this light, his conduct was wise, political, and 27. Herodot. Hittoriar.Wb. iii. cap. xli. xlii. 28. Id. lib. iii. cap. xliii. 29. Lett, x. 30. Herodot. lib. ii. cap. cl.xxx — clxxxii. honourable ; 90 THE HISTORY OF parti, honourable; in the other, superstitious, weak and ^~ y "^«' selfish. Be the motives of Amasis, however, what they might, for renouncing the alliance of the tyrant of Samos, the subtile genius of Polycrates turned that circumstance to his own advantage. When he un- derstood Cambyses was preparing to invade Egypt, he desired him to ask assistance from the Samians; and sent, as we have seen, fortv gallies, to augment the Persian naval force 3 . These gallies the artful tyrant manned with such of the Samians as he sus- pected of seditious designs, and requested the Per- sian monarch never to suffer them to quit his ser- vice 32 . The disaffected Samians, however, returned to their native island. But they were not allowed to remain there, being violently expelled by Polycra- tes 33 . In this extremity, they implored the assist- ance of the Lacedaemonians, who had long consider- ed themselves as the arbiters of Greece. Ever willing to extend their influence, the Lacedaemonians furnished the Samian exiles with an army. That army was embarked on board a Corinthian fleet; and landed, without opposition, in the island of Samos 34 . Polycrates put himself at the head of hi» forces, and repulsed the invaders. He was at length, however, obliged to take refuge within the walls of his capital, whence he made frequent sallies. And the Lacedaemonians, after lying before it six weeks, found themselves under the necessity of raising the siege; and returned, with their Corinthian confe- derates, to Peloponnesus 35 . The Samian exiles, now abandoned to their fate, commenced pirates; 31. Id. HUtoriar. lib. iii. cap. xliv. 32. Id. ibid. 33. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. xlv. 34. Id. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. Ht. 35. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. lvi. and ANCIENT EUROPE. 91 and after plundering several islands, settled in Crete, LETTER where they built the city of Cydonia 3<5 . w-v-^» Thus finally rid of a dangerous body of malecon- tents, who had sought the subversion of his throne, and having resisted the combined force of the two greatest naval and military powers in European Greece, Polycrates became more formidable than ever. Nor did he fear a reverse of fortune. Laying it down as a maxim, " That he made more friends, " by restoring part of the booty he had unjustly seized, " than he could by abstaining from violence," he set no bounds to his piratical depredations 37 . King of the ocean, and in a manner lord of all the islands in the iEgean sea, he aspired at the entire conquest of those islands, and also of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast 38 . • A similar design seems, at the same time, to have been formed by Oroites, satrap of Sardis ; who, having under his command all the Persian forces in Asia Minor, could compel the Asiatic Greeks, on the con- tinent, to assist him with their naval force, in the reduction of the islands. The maritime strength of Polycrates was the chief obstacle to the execution of this ambitious project; which would have rendered Oroites the most powerful governor under the great king, or have enabled him to set his master at defi- ance, and erect an independent sovereignty. In con- formity with such views, the crafty Persian insidi- ously drew Polycrates to Magnesia, in Lydia; and there ordered him to be seized, and ignominiou*lr put to death, by crucifixion 39 . 36 Id. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. lix. 37. Herodor. lib. hi. cap. xxxix.cxxi. 38. Li Hittoriar lib iii. cap. cxxii.— cxxy. Thueydid. lib. i.c»p. ami. Strabo, lib. xiv. p. 638. 39. Herodot. ct Strabo, ubi sup. The 92 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The death of Polycrates, however, was not imme- v^v^w/ diately followed by the submission of Samos to the Persian dominion, or with liberty to its citizens. Maeandrus, who had been secretary to the tyrant, retained possession of the sovereignty, and held his fellow-subjects in obedience 40 . Meanwhile Oroites, taking advantage of the weak state of the Persian government under the magian impostor, had put to death every person in authority, within his juris- diction, that seemed to stand in the way of his am- bition, or who gave umbrage to his pride 4 '. But the restoration of more vigorous councils, supported by legal sway, cut short his life and his tyrannical ad- ministration. Ant. Chr. No sooner was Darius seated on the imperial _, 521 : , throne, than he saw the ambitious views of Oroites, Olympiad. ' . . . lxiv. 4. and the necessity of divesting him oi his authority. And his audacity and cruelty, in ordering a messen- ger, sent to him from the court of Susa, with unwel- come commands, to be assassinated, in his return, made the Persian monarch resolve instantly to ac- complish his ruin 42 . But the government of Darius was not yet so fully established, as to enable him to dispatch an army for that purpose ; and without a strong army it could not be openly effected, as Oroites could assemble a great body of troops, drawn from Phrygia, Lydia, Ionia, and other provinces under his jurisdiction 43 . The new king, therefore, summoned a council of war, and laid his design, and the reasons for carrying it into speedy execution, before the most eminent Persian leaders; then asked, who among them would bring him the body of Oroites dead or alive, without the as- 40. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. cxliii. 41. Id. lib. iii. cap. exxvi. 42. Id. ibid. 4:1. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. exxvii. sistance ANCIENT EUROPE. 93 sistance of an army 44 ?— Thirty of those officers de- letter clared themselves willing to undertake the dangerous *" service. And these competitors having drawn lots, the execution of the enterprise fell to Bagaeus, the son of Artontes 45 . This determined soldier having procured official letters of his own framing, to the governor of Asia Minor, sealed with the signet of Darius, set out for Sardis 4r '. On his arrival there, he waited upon Oroites, and delivered the letters, one after another, to be read aloud by the king's secretary, according to the established custom. And when he found, that the guards shewed no disaffection, but paid great respect to the contents of the first letter, he ventured to put another into the hands of the secre- tary, containing these authoritative words : — " Per- " sians, king Darius forbids you to serve any longer " as guards to Oroites!" — This order the guards no sooner heard, than they dropped their lances. Thus emboldened, Bagaeus delivered his last letter, com- manding, in the king's name, the Persians in Sardis to kill Oroites. That command was no sooner announced, than the guards drew their scimitars, and instantly slew the obnoxious satrap 47 . When Darius was informed of the death of Oroites, he sent the illustrious, and nobleminded Otanes, into Asia Minor, in order to re-establish the government of that important province 48 . And while Otanes resided at Sardis, he undertook an expedition aginst the island of Samos; which, by the assistance of the Asiratic Greeks, on the continent, 44. Id. ibid. 45. Id. Historiar. lib. iii. cap. cxxviii. 46. Herodot. ubi sup. 47. Id. ibid. 48. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. cxli. vol. ii. o he 94 THE HISTORY OF PART r. he reduced under the Persian dominion, and left V -^~ V '~ N »»' under the government of Syloson, brother of Poly- crates, who had claims upon the friendship of the great king 49 . Ant. Cir. During the interval of peace that followed, or ac- 518 • • Olymoia l com P anie d these events, it appears to have been that lxv. 3. Darius issued his memorable decree in favour of the Jews. Though the edict of Cyrus, for rebuilding the temple of Jerusalem, had never been repealed* it had, in a great measure, been rendered ineffectual by the Samaritans, or Cuthians, whom we have seen settled in the kingdom of Israel, and who ob- structed the Jews in the prosecution of their pious work 5 ". They had even procured an order from the magian usurper, for putting an utter stop to the building of the sacred edifice 5 . The decree of Darius not only confirmed that of Cyrus, but fur- nished the Jews with such assistance and support, for the furthering of their undertaking, that the temple was completely rebuilt within four years after the edict had been issued 52 . Meanwhile the Babylonians revolted. Unable to brook the subjection into which they were fallen, under the Persian power, and enraged at the removal of the imperial seat to Susa ; by which the wealth and grandeur of their proud capital, so long mistress of the east, was diminished, they resolved to retrieve their former consequence, by asserting their inde- pendency. They accordingly took advantage of the troubles in the Persian empire, first on the death of Cambyses, and afterward on the murder of the ma- gian usurper, to prepare themselves for. sustaining a siege, by secretly storing their magazine* with arms 49. Id. cap. cxlii — cxlix. et cap. cxxxix — cx\, 50. Ezra, chap. iv. ver. 1 — 10. 51. Id. chap. iv. ver. 11 — 23. 52- Ezra, chap. vi. ver 1—15. and ANCIENT EUROPE. 95 and provisions; and finding their purpose still undis- covered, they broke out into open rebellion 53 . As soon as Darius was informed of this revolt, he appeared before the city of Babylon at the head of a 517. great army, and invested that ancient metropolis 54 . Olympiad. But the Babylonians, from their lofty walls and tow- ers, derided his efforts for almost two years. In vain had he recourse to the stratagem employed by Cyrus: the Babylonians, aware of their danger, so vigilantly guarded the channel of the Euphrates, that no advantage could be taken of the diversion of its waters 55 . Another stratagem, however, was tried with success. ■ Zopyrus, the Persian general, having cut off his nose and ears, and otherwise disfigured his person, presented himself in that condition before Darius. Filled with sorrow and surprise at seeing a man of high rank, and who stood high in his esteem, so cru- elly mangled, the great king hastily rose from his throne, and asked, with a stern look and loud voice, who had dared to be guilty of such outrage? — " I " alone," answered Zopyrus, " am the perpetrator of " the deed; for beside thee, O king! no one has power tf. to have treated me thus. My heart swelled with " indignation, to see the Persians baffled by the £ Assyrians 56 ." " Miserable man!" — exclaimed Darius, " can'st " thou be so utterly lost to reason as to imagine, that M the enemy will surrender the sooner because of thy " wounds?" — " If I had made you acquainted with " my design," replied Zopyrus, " you would not " have agreed to it: I have therefore executed it with- 53. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. «1. 54. Id. Hittoriar. lib. iii. cap. cli. clii. 55. Id. ibid. 5G. Herodotus, lib. iii. cap. cliv.clv. " out m THE HISTORY OF PART L " out your knowledge ; and, unless the Persians be- " have unworthy of themselves, you may now make *' yourself master of Babylon. For I will go over to " the enemy in this lacerated state, and tell them " I have suffered these mutilations from you; and " when I shall have gained their confidence, I make H no doubt of being trusted with the command of part " of their forces 57 ." After some farther explanation, the plan was ful- ly concerted with the king, and Zopyrus affected to desert to the Babylonians. He was received into their city; carried before their great council; and artfully, on his examination, threw the whole blame of the hu- miliating condition, in which he appeared, upon the Persian monarch, because he had advised him to raise the siege, as he saw no prospect of being able to take the place 58 . The Babylonians believed every word that was uttered by Zopyrus; and as he assured them, that he longed for nothing so much as to be revenged upon Darius for the injuries, he had sustained, and to counteract those councils and designs with which he was well acquainted, they intrusted him with the command of a body of troops. At the head of this chosen band, he repeatedly sallied out upon the besiegers: and every sally was attended with suc- cess. In the first attempt he cut off a thousand Persians, who had been thrown in his way by Da- rius; in the second, two thousand; and in the third, four thousand 59 . Those exploits exalted Zopyrus in the estimation of the Babylonians; who, at length, invested him with the chief command of their forces, and with the military government of their city. And he, in concert with his former 57. Id. ibid. 58. Id. Histcriar. lib. iii. crp. civi. 59. Herodot. lib. iii. cap. clvii, master ANCIENT EUROPE. 97 master, put the Persians in possession of that me- tropolis 60 . Ant. Chr. Having thus recovered the sovereignty of Baby- 516. Ion, Darius took the most efficacious measures for 01 y™P la ""v">^/ Scythians were a warlike and barbarous race of men, with a high sense of military honour; and that, like all northern barbarians, they were addicted to drinking. For this vice, indeed, they were so no- torious, that, even among the convivial Greeks, a man who indulged in liquor to violent excess, was said to w play the Scythian 70 ." Drinking and bar- barity, in a word, accompanied their most important civil transactions. In ratifying their treaties, they poured wine into a large earthen vessel, and mingled it with blood drawn from the contracting parties; then having dipt into it a scimitar, a quiver of arrows, and other weapons of war, they mutually uttered many imprecations against the violators of the stipulations, and drank off the liquor 7 '. But the most remarkable feature in the character of the Scythians, considering their stage in the pro- gress of society, was their superstitious veneration for their king, or great chief. Though they lived in a state so friendly to liberty, and without the restraint of positive laws, they were slaves to the will of a despot 72 . The most solemn oath they could take delineated the character of the Scythians. But Herodotus, who wrote four hundred and fifty years before the christian aera, and about sixty years after the expedition of Darius, only could describe the manneri of the Scythians of those times. He had visited their country, and teen what he relates. 70. Herodot. lib. vi cap. lxxxiv. 71. Id. Historiar. lib. iv. cap. lxx. 72. This mixture of barbarism and despotism, among a people in the hunting and herding state, although singular, is not without ex- ample • it has been found in the highlands of Scotland, as well as in the wilds of Scythia. Nor are its causes utterly inexplicable. It may be partly accounted for, from the long continuance of the Scy- thians in that rude state; in consequence of their possessing an ex- tensive champaign country, more fit for pasture than tillage; and partly from their respect, approaching adoration, to the royal race; •supposed to be lineally descended from Jupiter, and a daughter of the ANCIENT EUROPE. lOl take was, to swear by the royal throne ; and the king, LETTER on an accusation of perjury, which it was the interest of his ministers to prove, could order any obnoxious subject to be put to death; confiscate his property, and extirpate his offspring 73 . Nor does it appear, that any opposition was ever made against the exe- cution of such mandate. Such were the people against whom the Persian monarch made war. Conscious of their inability to oppose, in battle, his numerous and disciplined army, the European Scythians, who always fought on horse- back, and who had, on this occasion, been abandoned by their Asiatic confederates, retreated before him; wasting the country, and filling up the springs and wells 74 . By that mode of warfare, in which they hazarded only slight skirmishes, they drew him as far as the deserts beyond the Tanais; sending their wives and children, with the greater part of their catde, into regions still more remote 75 . Thus baffled in his hopes of conquest, and chagrined with disap- pointment, Darius gave over his fruitless pursuit; and, encamping on the banks of the river Oarus, sent a haughty message to Indathyrsus, king of the Scythians, desiring him either to try his strength in the field, or to acknowledge the Persian monarch as his master, by presenting him with earth and water, in testimony of submission 76 . The Scythian prince, proud of his barbarous inde- pendency, returned an answer no less haughty, than the river Eorysthenes, and who had held the throne about a thou- sand years, in uninterrupted succession, at the invasion of Scythia, by Darius Histaspes. Heredot. lib. iv. cap. v. vi. vii. 73. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. lxviii — lxx. In such accusations, the Scythian monarch was assisted by certain prophets or seers ; whose spiritual authority was necessary to the exercise of his temporal despotism, and who were rewarded with the confiscations. Id. ibid. 74. Herodotus, lib; iv. cap. cxx. 75. Id. Histnriar. cap. cxxi — cxxiv. 76. Herodot. lib \n. cap. cxxvii. vofe. ii. p the 102 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the message of the Persian monarch. After telling ^-^^^^^ him, that he never fled from any man out of fear; and that, in declining to give him battle, he was not actuated by that motive, but pursued the mode of war best suited to his circumstances, and the state of his country, " I acknowledge," said he, " no su- " perior, but Jupiter, my progenitor, and Vesta, " queen of the Scythians 77 ." And, instead of pre- senting Darius with earth and water, he sent him, by a herald, a bird, a mouse, a frog, and a quiver of arrows 78 . By this present, some of the Persians seemed to think, that the Scythians had made their submission. But Gobrias, one of the seven chiefs who had /slain the magian usurper, explained it dif- ferently. " By that present," observed he, " the " Scythians mean to let us know, that unless we can " ascend into the air, like birds, conceal ourselves in " the earth, like mice, or plunge into the fens, like •' frogs, we must perish by those arrows 79 ." Satisfied with the justness of this explication, and seeing the danger of losing his army, already much diminished, in an immense country, intersected with lakes and rivers, Darius took the resolution of re- turning into Asia Minor, and began his backward march 80 . Meanwhile the Scythians, having collected their forces, pressed upon his rear. In every en- counter, the barbarous enemy broke the Persian cavalry; but the Persian foot opposed an impenetra- ble barrier against their most furious attacks, and obliged them to seek safety in flight 8 '. At length the Persian monarch approached the Danube. But here a new danger threatened him. 77. Id. ibid. 78. Ferodot. lib. iv. cap. exxxi. 79. Id. Historiar. lib. iv. cap. exxxii. 80. Herodotus, lib. iv. cap. exxviii — exxxvi. 81. Id. ibid. A body ANCIENT EUROPE. 103 A body of Scythians had arrived at the Danube, oy a different rout, and endeavoured to persuade the Asiatic Greeks to remove the bridge of boats, which they had been left to guard ; and by such bold measure, to free themselves and their countrymen from subjection to the Persian power, as Darius and his whole army must, in that event, inevitably perish, either by famine or the weapons of war 82 . This pro- posal was eagerly embraced by Miltiades, prince or tyrant (under the Persian monarch) of Cardia, in the Thracian Chersonesus; and strenuously opposed by Histiauis, chief of Miletus 83 . Histiseus might have reprobated such treachery to a superior sovereign, upon the purest principles of moral justice. That he was actuated by honour- able sentiments, there is reason to believe ; notwith- standing what has been advanced to the contrary by Greek and Roman writers, in their enthusiastic zeal for liberty. But he chose to employ political arguments, as of more certain effect, in order to confirm his brother chiefs in their loyalty to Darius. He, therefore, represented to them, that their autho- rity over their fellow-citizens was intimately con- nected with the dominion of the great king, whose vassals they were ; and that, if they should restore liberty and independency to the Asiatic Greeks, the people of every state would choose a democratical form of government, and no longer submit to the will of a master, or the controul of any one man 84 . Influenced by these arguments, all the other Gre- cian chiefs, in the service of Darius, agreed to pre- serve the bridge, and to wait his arrival, except 82. Cornel. Nep. Vit. Miltiadet, cap. iii. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. exxxvii. 83. Id. ibid. 84. HeroJot. et Cornel. Nep. ubi sup. Miltiades, 104 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Miltiades, who adhered to his former opinion 85 ; and> > ^" >rx -' finding himself obnoxious on that account, he after- ward retired to Athens, his native city, where we shall see him distinguished as a hero and com- mander, and become the champion of the liberties of Greece 86 . The Persian monarch accordingly repass- ed the Danube unmolested, with the remains of his army. And having left eighty thousand men in Thrace, under Megabyzus, one of his generals, to secure the conquest of that country, he proceeded with the main body to Asia Minor, and took up his residence at Sardis, which he made the seat of his court 87 . There he spent the winter, and the greater part of the following year; during which time, he Ant. Chr. accomplished most of the ends he could have pro- Olymp posed to himself by his Scythian expedition, though Ixvii. x. he had not vanquished the roving enemy in battle. While Darius resided at Sardis, Megabyzus, his general in Europe, subdued all the Thracian tribes that refused to acknowledge the Persian sway, and received the submission of Macedonia 88 . This sub- mission was readily yielded by Amyntas, the Mace- donian monarch, who was afraid to resist the arms of the great king. But his son Alexander, a prince of high spirit, ashamed of his father's pusillanimity, and enraged at the licentious behaviour of seven Persian lords (who had been sumptuously entertained on that occasion) to some Macedonian ladies, intro- duced at their request, I and contrary to the custom of Greece, to grace the feast, conspired the destruc- tion of those violators of decency, and the delive- rance of Macedonia from foreign dominion. For that purpose, he disguised, in the dress of virgins, a 85. rd. ibid. 86. Cornel. Nep. Vit. Miltiades, cap. iii. et seq. 87. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. cxliii. et seq. 88. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xiv — xviii. certain ANCIENT EUROPE. 105 certain number of gallant youths ; who, when the letter Persian nobles, heated with wine, attempted to take certain liberties, drew their concealed daggers, and put them all to death 89 . The address of the Macedonian prince, who after- ward ascended the throne, in giving a large sum of money, and his sister Gygea in marriage to Bubares, the officer that came to inquire into the cause of the death of the Persian deputies, prevented this assas- sination from being publicly known 90 . The recal of Megabyzus allowed him no leisure to inquire into the transaction, or to revenge the murder, had he been so disposed. And events of more importance engaged the attention of the Persian monarch. As the preservation of the sovereignty of Asiatic Greece appears to have been Darius's chief motive for invading Europe, and retaining the conquest of 89. Id. Historiar. lib. v. cap. xix — xxi. This is one of the most valuable anecdotes preserved by the venerable father of history, and the first philosophical traveller. From it we learn, that the Persian women were usually present at public entertainments (Id. ibid.) ; and that the Macedonian women, who followed the Grecian customs, were confined to their own apartments, on all occasions, and only seen by their husbands and nearest relations (Herodot. ubi sup.). Be- fore Alexander introduced tfie disguised youths, he desired the Macedonian ladies, who had been insulted, to withdraw, in order to bathe before they went to bed, that they might be more agreeable to their Persian paramours. And when the disguised youths entered, in female attire, he presented them to the Persian nobles, and said, " We have treated you with all kind of variety. We have given " you not only all we had, but whatever we could procure. And " what is yet more, we have not even denied you our wives and " daughters, to complete our hospitality 5 that you may be fully per- " suaded we have paid you all due honours ; and may, at your return, " acquaint the king who sent you, that a Grecian^ prince of Macedo- " nia gave you a good reception, and contributed to your pleasure •' both at table and in bed." Herodot. Historiar. lib. v. cap. xx. 90. Id. lib. v. cap. xxi. Thrace, 105 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Thrace, he took the most politic measures for that v ^" v " v " / end; both during his stay at Sardis, and after his return to Susa. He not only confirmed Histiseus, to whose fidelity he was indebted for his safe retreat over the Danube, in the government of Miletus, but rewarded him with the territory of Myrcinus on the river Strymon in Thrace ; and gave him per- mission there to build a city 9 '. He subjected to his sway several of the islands in the iEgean sea, and committed the government of them to such of the natives, as he had reason to think were firmly attached to his interest 92 . He became even jealous of Histixus, the Milesian, because of his great influ- ence in Ionia, and the power which he was likely to acquire, in consequence of his new city and terri- tory in Thrace 93 . The progress of this jealousy, as related by Herodotus, claims particular notice. When Megabyzus arrived at Sardis, in order to deliver up his command, after he had completed the conquest of Thrace, and received the submission of Macedonia, he thus addressed Darius: — " What " have you done, O king! in permitting a bold and " aspiring Grecian chief to found a city in Thrace? " — a country abounding in materials for shipbuild- " ing; in men fit for the oar, and in mines of gold; " with both Greek and barbarian adventurers, who " want only a leader, in order to execute any ambi- " tious enterprise. Put a stop, therefore, to the " proceedings of Histiauis, if you would avoid the " troubles of intestine war g *." Convinced of the soundness of this reasoning, and aware of the policy of using gentle means, 91. Herodot. lib. y. cap. xi. 92. Id. Historiar. lib. v. cap. xxiii — xxvii. 93. Id. ibid. 94. Herodot. lib. iv. cap. xxiii. Dariu* ANCIENT EUROPE. 10T Darius sent a messenger to invite Histiseus to Sardis. On his arrival, the Persian monarch insi- diously said, " Histiseus ! ever since my return from " Scythia, and thy departure from my presence, my " most ardent wish has been to see and converse " with thee again; persuaded, that a wise and affec- " tionate friend is the most valuable of all acqui- " sitions. And that those qualities are combined u in thee, experience has given me sufficient proof. " Now, since thy company is so acceptable to me, I " will make thee a proposal: — Think no more of " Miletus, or of the city which thou art building in " Thrace, but go with me to Susa, and take part in " all I possess. Be my companion and counsel- " lor 95 ." Histiseus accepted this offer, because he knew hi* refusal would avail him nothing; appointing Arista- goras, his nephew and son-in-law, governor of Mile- tus during his absence 9 ". And Darius departed for Susa, accompanied with the object of his jea- lousy; leaving his brother Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis, and chief governor of Asia Minor 97 . Otanes, the son of Sysamnes, one of the royal judges, and who had himself acted in a judicial capacity, suc- ceeded Megabyzus in the command of the Persian forces in Europe, and reduced Byzantium, with several other places, on both sides of the Pro- pontis^ " der his direction; and I have reason to believe, " that he will undertake any enterprise I shall " suggest 1 "." The Naxians agreed to this expedient, and left the conduct of the negociation solely to Aristagoras ; authorising him to offer such presents as he should think necessary, and engage, in their names, for the repayment of the expense of the armament" 2 . Aris- tagoras accordingly went to Sardis, and laid the busi- ness befose Artaphernes. " Beside Naxus, which " has not yet submitted to the Persian power, you *' will," said he, " by such an expedition, put the 11 great king in possession of Paros, Andros, and " the rest of the cluster of islands that go under the a name of the Cyclades. And to those may be " added Eubosa; a large and wealthy island on the " coast of Attica, and easy to be taken. One hun- " dred ships will be sufficient for the reduction of " the whole" 3 ." " You have proposed," answered Artaphernes, " an enterprise of great advantage to Darius; and " prudently judged in every thing, except the num- " ber of ships. For instead of one hundred, which u you demand, two hundred shall be ready the ensu- " ing spring, in order to ensure success. In the " meantime, the king's consent must be obtained" 4 ". Darius readily agreed to the projected expedition; and Artaphernes having equipped two hundred ships, agreeable to his proposal, and assembled a large body of land-forces, under Megabates, his nephew, sent them to Aristagoras at Miletus" 5 . The armament 111. Herodot. ubi sup. 112. Id. ibid. 113. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xxxi. 114. Id. ibid. 115. Id. lib. v. cap. xxxii. et seq. accordingly Ant. Chr. 501. 'lympiat lxix. 4. ANCIENT EUROPE. 113 accordingly sailed. Nor could it have failed of success, if the pride and jealousy of the Grecian and Persian commanders, had not made them quarrel in the voyage. 501. Olympiad Megabates having confined the captain of a Gre- cian ship for neglect of duty, Aristagoras released him, and insisted that the fleet was under his direc- tion 1 ' 6 . In consequence of this haughty claim, and the disagreement to which it gave birth, Megabates secretly dispatched a vessel to Naxus, to inform the inhabitants of their danger; so that, when the armament arrived at that island, the Naxians had taken the most effectual measures for the defence of their capital. And the Persians, after a siege of four months, found themselves under the necessity of re-embarking without being able to make them- selves masters of the place" 7 . Aristagoras, on his return to Miletus, sensible that his credit with Artaphernes was now ruined; as well on account of his quarrel with Megabates, as the failure of the expedition against Naxus, be- thought himself of the only expedient that remained, to save him from utter destruction. He resolved to throw himself upon the protection of his country- men, the Asiatic Greeks; and to deserve that pro- tection, by encouraging them to throw off the Per- sian yoke, and attempt the recovery of their liberty and independency 1 ' 8 . When Aristagoras had formed this resolution, but before he had taken any measures for carrying it into effect, he received a message from his ui.cle Histisus, soliciting him to provoke the Milesians 116. Id. ibid. 117. Herodot. ubi sup. 118. Id. lib. v. cap. xxxv. to 114 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, to revolt from the Persian monarch"". In enjoying <^~*^>s the pleasures of the court of Susa, and sharing the councils of a great empire, that Grecian chief found himself of less consequence, than in his own country. He, therefore, longed to return to a situa- tion, where he should see no superior, and be under no constraint; his active and aspiring spirit being ill fitted for the luxurious indolence, and servile condition of a dependent upon an oriental throne. But as all his motions were strictly watched, he saw no means of effecting his escape, or recovering his former station, unless he could awaken such troubles in Ionia, as would make his presence there necessary' 21 . Hence the message of Histiaeus to his newphew and son-in-law, at Miletus. Thus impelled by circumstances, and prompted by the advice of his uncle, Aristagoras assembled his friends, and made them acquainted with his resolution of resisting the authority of the great king 21 . They all applauded his fortitude, and en- couraged him in his purpose, except Hecatseus, the historian ; who dissuaded him from such an attempt, and endeavoured to deter him, by enumerating the forces of the Persian monarch. But finding his arguments ineffectual, Hecatanis advised, that before such a bold step was taken, the Milesians should make themselves masters of the sea. And as the means of creating this maritime strength, he recom- mended the seizing of the treasures deposited in the temple of Apollo at Branchidas, within their own territory 122 . Aristagoras pursued a more immediate, and less obnoxious course, for acquiring naval superiority. He sent Itagoras, one of his associates, to seize by force or fraud, the principal Grecian commanders, 119. Id ibid. 120. Herodotus, ubi sup. 121. Id. lib. v. cap. xxxvi. 122. Id. ibid. whfl ANCIENT EUROPE. 115 who had been engaged in the expedition against Naxus, if he could not draw them over by persua- sion to his interest. Itagoras succeeded beyond expectation: he seized all the chiefs he could not persuade :3 . And Aristagoras, rendered confident by his good fortune, determined instantly to set at defiance the power of the Persian monarch. As a prelude to such a measure, he resigned to the Mile- sians their native liberties, and placed himself on a footing with his fellow-citizens; depending solely upon his personal importance, for the lead which he wished to take in their affairs n . From Miletus Aristagoras went to the other Ant, Chr. Ionian cities: every where erecting the standard of ~, o0 °'. . . , Olympiad. liberty, and expelling the tyrants, or Grecian gover- ixx. 1. nors under Darius. So that all Ionia was soon united in a league of freedom and independency 135 . And the iEolian and Dorian cities afterward acceded to that confederacy. Meanwhile Aristagoras, aware that the whole body of the Asiatic Greeks were not able to oppose the arms of the Persian monarch, assisted by the naval force of the Phoenicians, their rivals in com- merce, resolved to engage the European Greeks iu his cause. He accordingly set sail for Greece, and went first to the court of Sparta 126 . The Lacedamonians, as I have frequently had occasion to observe, had been considered as the leading people in Greece, ever since the conquest of Messenia. And they had often asserted their supe- riority with a high hand. They were now governed by Cleomenes and Damaratusj joint kings cf Lace- 123. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xxxvr. 124. Id. ibid. 12: . Herodot. lib. t. cap. xxxix. ,136. Id. ibid. cUemoa 116 THE HISTORY OF PART T. daemon or Laconia^ agreeable to their constitution. v^~v^«/ But the chief authority was vested in Cleomenes, because of his transcendant military talents' 27 . Aristagoras applied to Cleomenes for assistance. " Wonder not," said he, " at the trouble I have u taken to come hither. The business is important. " To behold the posterity of the free-born Ionians u reduced to the condition of slaves, is extremely M grievous and mortifying to their leaders, and must " also be to you; for the Lacedaemonians are the M arbiters of Greece, and the asserters of liberty. " I conjure you, therefore, by the Grecian gods, to " rescue the Asiatic Greeks from barbarian servi- " tude! — The enterprise will not be difficult to a " prince, and a people, who have attained the sum- *' mit of military glory' 23 ." To these arguments, addressed to the pride and generosity of Cleomenes, Aristagoras added others, calculated to work upon his ambition, and that of the Spartan senate. With this view, he produced a plate of brass, on which was engraved a geogra- phical delineation, or map of the world, as far as then known, with all its seas and rivers. To that plate he pointed, and described the rich province of the Persian empire, from Sardis to Susa. The motives for undertaking the conquest of these, he represented as many, and the dangers to be encoun- tered few; as the barbarians were not only inferior to the Greeks in valour, but in weapons of war; in arms both offensive and defensive. You will not have to " contend," said he, " with a people like " the Messenians, Arcadians, or Argives, equal to " yourselves in prowess: and the prize will be in- " finitely greater. For if you should become masters " of Susa, and the treasures of the Persian monarch, 127. Herodotus, lib. v. passim. 128. Id. cap. xl Ik. " all ANCIENT EUROPE. 117 '* all Asia will submit to your sway; and you may LETTER 11 compete with Jove in wealth and power 129 ." Cleomenes, having listened with attention to this artful speech, desired three days to deliberate on the proposal of Aristagoras. What resolution he might have formed, during that interval, is not known. But the Ionian ambassador no sooner entered the pre- sence of the Spartan king, to learn the issue of his negociation, than Cleomenes asked, in what time an army could march from the coast of Ionia to Susa. u In three months," answered Aristagoras unguard- edly. " Begone from Sparta, Milesian stranger I " before the setting of the sun," — said Cleomenes sternly: — " nor farther attempt to engage the Lace- " daemonians in so distant an expedition' 30 ." Sensible of the mistake he had committed at his public audience, in mentioning the distance of Susa, Aristagoras clothed himself in the habit of a sup- pliant, and followed the Spartan prince to his own house. Having gained admittance in this humble character, he attempted to work upon the avarice of Cleomenes; offering him first ten, and afterward fifty talents; or nine thousand, six hundred, and eighty pounds sterling: an immense sum in Greece at that time, if he would persuade the Lacedae- monians to undertake the defence of the Asiatic Greeks. But finding presents as ineffectual as pro- mises, the Ionian chief took his departure from Sparta, according to the former command of the king' 3 '. Aristagoras went next to Athens, in order to prefer his suit. The Athenians, were then in a temper well adapted to his views. Hippias, whom 129. Id. ibid. 130. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. U 131. Id. Hittoriar. lib. v. li. vol. ii. r we 118 THE HISTORY OF PART I. we have formerly seen expelled Attica, because of v - > ~^ w/ his tyrannical administration 132 , after attempting, by various means, to recover his authority over his fel- low-citizens, had applied to Artaphernes, satrap of Sardis. And Artaphernes had ordered the Athen- ians to restore Hippias, if they would avoid the dis- pleasure of the great king 133 . But fully to under- stand the state of Athens at this time, it will be ne- cessary to take a retrospective survey of the affairs of that republic, from the expulsion of the Pisistra- tidse, in the year five hundred and ten before the christian sera, until the arrival of Aristagoras. The Athenians justly dated the sera of their pros- perity, from the recovery of their political freedom. But they had many struggles to encounter, before they could break the machinations of usurping citi- zens, defeat the designs of the exiled tyrant, and establish that freedom on a firm basis. After the banishment of Hippias, two men of illustrious birth swayed, and divided the Athenian republic; Clist- henes, the chief of the Alcmseonids, who was archon at that time, and Isagoras, his rival in politics, a man of superior talents, and also of noble blood' 34 . Clisthenes, in order to preserve the ascendant, which his family connexions and political situation gave him, adopted several popular measures. He formed the Athenian citizens into ten, instead of four, tribes 135 ; and directed fifty senators to be chosen out of each tribe; so that the great council of the state, which had hitherto been composed of four hundred, henceforth consisted of five hundred mem- bers' 36 . And on purpose to secure his consequence, 132. Lett. vi. 133. Herodot. lib. v. cap. cxvi. 134. Id. cap. lxvi. et seq. 135. Id. ibid. 136. Aristot. de Civit Athen. as ANCIENT EUROPE. 119 as he possessed the favour of the people, and to guard the state against the danger of tyranny, he instituted the Ostracism 137 ; a law by which the ma- jority of the Athenians, in the popular assembly, could banish, for ten years, but without the confisca- tion of his estate, any powerful or ambitious citizen, by writing his name upon tiles or shells ; provided the shells, on which his name was inscribed, amounted to six thousand' 38 . Isagoras, thus borne down by his political compe- titor, and in danger of exile, had recourse to the assistance of Cleomenes, king of Sparta; whose friendship he had gained by acts of hospitality, during the expulsion of the Pisistratidae' 3y . Cleo- menes, glad of an opportunity of displaying the power of Sparta at Athens, and of humbling that rival state, which he had formerly been incautiously led to exalt, by a collusive response of the delphic oracle, readily complied with the request of Isa- goras. He sent a herald to Athens, and obtained the banishment of Clisthenes and his principal ad- herents 14 ". He afterward went thither in person, attended by a military force; expelled seven hun- dred Athenian families, at the instigation of Isago- ras; and attempted to dissolve the council of five hundred, and vest the administration of the state in three hundred partizans of that chief' 4 '. 137. /Elian. Var. Hist. lib. xiii. cap. xxiv. 138. Plut. Vit. Tkemist. et Fit. Aristid. " The Athenians," says Diodorys Siculus (lib. xi.), " adopted not this institution so much " with a view to punishment, as from an idea, that spirits too high " and soaring ought to be sent to evaporate in exile." When it was proposed to banish any person by the ostracism, it appears that his friends accused one or more of his reputed enemies, in order to divide the number of shells, and prevent the greatest majority from amounting to six thousand (Plut. Vit. Aristid.). Most of the Gre- cian republics had a similar mode of expelling such of their citizens as excited public jealousy. Aristot. Pint. lib. iii. cap. xiii. 139. Herodot. lib. v. cap. lxx. 140. Id ibid. 141. Herodot. lib v. cap. lxxii. Roused 120 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Roused at this attack upon the freedom of their v-**vn./ constitution, the Athenians flew to arms; obliged Isagoras and Cleomenes to take refuge in the acro- polis, which was immediately invested; and on the third day of the siege, compelled them to surrender on conditions ; the Lacedaemonian king agreeing to evacuate the territory of Attica, and the Athenians to permit him to withdraw his troops without moles- tation 142 . They also permitted Isagoras to accom- pany him; but all the other Athenian citizens, who had joined in the conspiracy against the liberties of their country, were instantly put to death 143 . The Athenians no sooner found themselves in quiet possession of their capital, then they recalled Clisthenes, and the seven hundred familes that had been driven into exile by Cleomenes' 44 . And what- ever might have been the views of Clisthenes before his banishment, he seems henceforth to have res- pected, and restored the constitution of his country, as modelled by Solon; with the exception of the division of the tribes into ten, the augmentation of the council of four to five hundred, and the ostra- cism, which he himself had established' 45 . But 142. Id. ibid. 143. Herodot. ubi sup. 144. Id. lib. v. cap. lxxiii. 145. Various have been the opinions of historians, and philoso- phical politicians, both ancient and modern, concerningthe ostracism. Like all human institutions, it was certainly liable to abuse. But that abuse could only be occasioned by the mistaken sense of the major- ity of the Athenian people, in regard to some great public charac- ter. Such mistake could seldom continue long; and when the peo- ple became sensible of the error they had committed, they could revoke their decree, and repair the injustice before the expiration of ten years, the term ordained by law. That they did so, we are assured by Plutarch (Fit. Aristid.). In being thus banished, there was no dishonour ; and it was certainly better, that worthy indivi- duals should suffer a temporary hardship, than that the state should be convulsed with jealousy, and distracted with apprehensions of tyranny. ANCIENT EUROPE. 121 But the Athenians, though now in full possession of those liberties that contributed to their aggran- dizement, and which, with the relaxation of public virtue, brought on their declension, found themselves in a perilous situation. They had reason to appre- hend the resentment of the Lacedaemonians; and the Lacedaemonians, who still maintained the chief sway, not only in Peloponnesus, but over all Greece, every where attempted to establish an aristocratical form of government, in subordination to their own autho- rity' 46 . The heads of the Athenian republic, there- fore, in this alarming crisis, after looking about in vain for a Grecian ally, able to protect them from the usurping power of Sparta, sent ambassadors to Artaphernes, governor of Sardis, prefering an alli- ance with the Persian court 147 . The haughty satrap asked who the Athenians were, that they presumed to treat, on a footing, with the great king? — Being informed that they were a free people, struggling for independency with ambi- tious neighbours, and with the Lacedemonians, who aspired at th? dominion of Greece, he replied, that they must present the Persian monarch with earth and water, in testimony of submission, before they could hope he would interest himself in their affairs'* 8 . The Athenian ambassadors deliberated together on the humiliating proposal; and more zealous for the safety, than the honour of their country, they agreed tyranny. The Ostracism has accordingly received the approbation of Aristotle (Polit. lib. iii. cap. ix.), and of Montesquieu (L'Etprit cits Loix, liv. xxix. chap, vii.), while it has been reprobated by a herd of declaimers, and decried by all the advocAtes for despotism. No Athenian citizen could be banished by the ostracism, I here repeat, unless the shells against him amounted to six thousand. Plut. Vit. Aristid,. 146. Herodot. et Thucydid. passim. 147. Herodot. lib. v. cap. lxxiii. 148. Id. ibid. to THE HISTORY OF to the ignominious condition' 49 . But, on their return, they were severely blamed by their fellow- citizens, for their compliance' 50 ; and the transaction was disavowed by the state' 5 '. Meanwhile Cleomenes, king of Lacedsemon, ashamed of his disgraceful retreat from Athens, and desirous of humbling that rival republic, had col- lected forces from all parts of Peloponnesus; but without making known his purpose' 52 . And having formed an alliance with the Boeotians, and also with the Chalcideans of Eubeea, who engaged to co-operate with him, he marched toward the territory of Attica at the head of a formidable army, in conjunction with his colleague, Demaratus, and accompanied by Isagoras, whom he meant to invest with the supreme power, or at least make the leader of the aristocra- tical party at Athens. He accordingly entered the district of Eleusis; while the Boeotians, as had been concerted, took Oenoe and Hysia, on the northern frontier of Attica: and the Chalcideans ravaged other parts of the country' 53 . The Athenians, though astonished at the number of their invaders, and distracted by the different directions in which they appeared, were not dismayed. After some deliberation, they boldly resolved to direct their whole strength against the army under the joint kings of Lacedaemon. With this view, they put their troops in motion. But before they reached the hostile camp, a dissention had arisen among the Peloponnesian confederates. And the Corinthians, convinced that the cause, in which they had ignor- antly engaged, was unjust, drew off their forces, 149. Kerodot. ubi sup. 150. Id ibid. 151. Valer. Max. lib. vi. cap. iii. 152. Kerodot. lib. v. cap. lxxiv. 153. Id. Historlar. lib. v. cap. lxxv. when ANCIENT EUROPE. 123 when the two armies were ready to engage. Dema- ratus followed their example; and the other Pelo- ponnesian confederates, seeing the Spartan kings divided in opinion, also led off their forces 154 . This defection obliged Cleomenes to desist frpm his ambi- tious and vindictive enterprise. Elated at the dissolution of the Peloponnesian army, and the inglorious retreat of the Lacedaemo- nians, the Athenians resolved to chastise, with exem- plary severity, the other invaders of their country. In this spirit, they marched first against the Chalci- deans. But finding, when they reached the Euripus, or channel that divides the island of Euboea from the continent, that the Boeotians were come to the support of their confederates, they gave battle to the succouring army; killed great numbers of the Boeotians, and took seven hundred prisoners; then passing over to Euboea, they defeated the Chalci- deans the same day' 55 . And so complete was their victory over the latter, that they settled a colony of four thousand Athenians, in the' lands that had belonged to the more wealthy Chalcide- ans' 56 . The prisoners, both Chalcidean and Euboean, were ransomed at two minae, pr about six guineas a head' 57 ; no small sum, considering the value of money in those days. But the fetters, with which the captives had been chained, were carried to Athens in triumph, and hung up in the acropolis ; where also was placed a chariot, drawn by four horses, formed of brass, with an inscription to the following purport: " Fir'd with just rage, the martial youths " Of Athens, broke, by their subduing arm, 154. Id. ibid. 155. Herodotus, lib. v. cap lxxvii. 156. Id. ibid. 157. Herodot. ubi sup. " The 124 THE HISTORY OF PART. I « The firm Chalcidean and Boeotian bands, v ^" v "" > " / " And bound their foes in fetters ; hence to thee, " Minerva 1 they this offering vow'd, the tenth " Of ransom paid.'''' The ascending star of liberty at Athens was now high, and shone with distinguished brightness ; but storms were fast gathering, which threatened to ob- scure its lustre. The Boeotians, mortified at their late discomfiture, were desirous of taking vengeance upon the Athenians. Finding themselves, however, too weak for that purpose, they had recourse to the assistance of the -/Eginetes, the rivals ot* the Athenians in commerce' 58 . The island of iEgina is situated in the Saronic gulf, and lies off the coast of Attica, nearly opposite the city of Athens, within sight of the land' 59 , and at no great distance from Peloponnesus' 60 . Favoured by their maritime position, the ^Eginetes had early applied themselves to trade and piracy' 6 ', and were at this time equal in naval force to almost any people in European Greece. Become jealous of the rising greatness of the Athenians, against whom they had an old cause of enmity, and afraid of being crushed by the growing navy of the repub- lic, they readily entered into a league with the Boeo- tians, and invaded Attica 16 ^. The Athenians met their combined enemies, and defeated them with great slaughter' 63 . But while the Athenian forces were employed in expelling the Boeo- tians, the iEginetes made a second descent, in the 158. Id. lib. v. cap. lxxx. 159. Hence ./Egina was emphatically termed " the eyesore of the Pirtteus" (Plut. Vit. Periel.), the principal sea-port of Athens. 160. Strabo, lib. viii. 161. Id. ibid. 162. Herodot. lib. v. cap. Ix,\xi. 163. Id. ibid. neighbourhood ANCIENT EUROPE. 125 neighbourhood of the sea-port of Phaleron, and ra- vaged the country, to the great distress of the inha- bitants l6+ . Athens had no fleet ready, to take imme- diate revenge upon the people of iEgina: and more formidable enemies soon engaged her attention. At- tica was menaced with a new invasion from Pelopon- nesus, In the year five hundred and four before the chiistian sera. The causes of this hostile design, my lord, will require some explication. If the pride of Cleomenes, the Spartan king, had been hurt at his first retreat out of Attica, his haughty spirit was inflamed with rage, approaching to madness, at the disgrace of the second. He ascribed the failure of the expedition to the miscon- duct of his colleague, Demaratus; whose inaction, he affirmed, had occasioned the defection of his allies. And so strongly did he impress this opinion upon the minds of the Lacedaemonians, that they enacted a law, providing, That whereas formerly both their kings had been accustomed to accompany the army, only one of them should march out, in future, on any military enterprise, and the other remain at home' 65 . Having thus deprived Demaratus of all share in the command of the army, and eventually of all share in public affairs (as he thenceforth became of small estimation, and was soon after deposed, as we shall have occasion to see, on account of a supposed stain in his birth), Cleomenes awaked the jealousy of his countrymen, by an exaggerated representation of the growing power and aspiring spirit of the Athenians; who had already refused to acknowledge the superu 164. Herodot. ubi sup. 165. Id. Hiatoriar. lib. v. cap. lxxv. vc*.. ii. s ority 126 THE HISTORY OF tart I. ority of Sparta, who would soon claim equality, y «* r "vw and attempt to wrest from her the arbitration of, Greece 66 , In order to enforce these obvious causes of alarm, he told the Spartan senate, That while shut up In the acropolis, he had found access to the Athenian archives, and had not only discovered the collusive response of the Delphic oracle, procured by the Alcmeonids, which had induced him to under- take the expulsion of the Pisisjratidae, but certain secret oracles, portending the humiliation of Sparta, by that turbulent and ambitious republic' 67 . Finding, after this information, the Lacedaemo- nians sufficiently propitious to his views, Cleomenes assured them, that if the Athenians were permitted to remain in possession of their freedom, they would soon attain to so high a degree of prosperity, that no power in Greece would be able to contend with them. He therefore proposed, That they should send for Hippias from Sigeum on the Hellespont (whither he had retired with his family and friends, on his expulsion from Athens), and reinstate him in the sovereignty of Attica' 68 . Hippias was accord- ingly invited to Sparta, and soon arrived in that tapital. But the Lacedaemonians, before they took any step in favour of the exiled chief, assembled the deputies from their Peloponnesian confederates. The Spar- tan orators, who opened the congress, forcibly repre- sented the iniquitous manner in which their coun- trymen had been deceived by the oracle; the neces- sity of humbling Athens; and restoring Hippias, their friend and ally, to the sovereignty of which he had been unjustly deprived' 69 . 166. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xc. xci. 167. Id. ibid. }68. Herodot. ubi snp. m. Id. ibid. These- ANCIENT EUROPE. i2? These arguments did not seem satisfactory to LETTEii the deputies of the confederates, who were glad to see a power rising up in the northern parts of Greece, which would balance that of Sparta. No reply, however, was made except by Sosicles* the Corin- thian deputy* " Surely," said hej " the heavens will " sink beneath the earth, and the earth ascend above 81 the sky; men will live in the sea, and fishes on " the land, when ye, O Lacedaemonians I shall at- " tempt to subvert 'the republics of Greece, and en«- " deavour to establish tyrannies in their stead? il tyranny, the most unjust of all forms of government " known in human society, and the most debasing to " the human character* Yet if it seem to you so " excellent, erect such a government in your own " country, as a proof of your approbation*. But if " the Spartans, among whom tyranny is not known, " and who have so vigilantly guarded against it, " would avoid the experiment, let them beware how " they seek to impose it upon other states. And if " they had felt its pernicious effects, as severely as " we have done, they would think more justly, and " act more wisely' 70 *" After this bold exordium, Sosicles proceeded to recapitulate the history of Corinth, and the mise- ries it had suffered from tyranny 1 r '. That city and its territory, as we have formerly seen, was given by the Heraclidse, in their division of Peloponnesus) after they had conquered it, to Aletes, their kins* man' 72 . This prince and his posterity, commonly known by the name of Bacchidse, from Bacchis, the fifth Corinthian kmg of the blood of Hercules, possessed the throne about three hundred and thirty years. 170. Herodot. lib. V. cap. xcii. 171. Id. ibid. 172. See Lett. iv. et auct. cir. After 128 THE HISTORY Ol' PART I. After the expiration of that term, and the failure of the royal line, in a direct descent, the Bacchidse, consisting of four hundred families, governed Cor- inth ninety years, in the form of an aristocracy; electing annually one of their number, to execute the office of chief magistrate, under the name of Prytanis' 73 . At length the Bacchidse were expelled by Cypselus, son of Etion, a private citizen, who usurped the supreme power, and reigned thirty years' 74 . The beginning of the reign of Cypselus wasi marked with many violences and cruelties. He spared neither the property nor the persons of such citizens as he thought could shake his usurped autho- rity; banishing some, confiscating the estates of others, and putting many to death 175 . But when he found himself firmly established in the sovereignty, he seems to have governed with wisdom and mo- deration; for he enjoyed prosperity to the hour of his death, and was quietly succeeded by his son Periander 176 . Periander has the honour of being numbered among the seven sages of Greece. But, for this honour, he appears to have been more indebted to his love of the company of learned men, his muni- ficence to them, and his encouragement of the ele- gant arts, then in their infancy in Greece, than to any superiority of talents. The beginning of his reign, was milder than that of his father: but the subsequent part was cruel and tyrannical' 77 . He reigned forty years ; and three years after his death, in the third year of the forty-ninth Olympiad, and five hundred and eighty-two years before the chris- tian sera, the citizens of Corinth wrested their free- 173. Diod. Sicul. Frag, dc Corinth. Imper. ap. Euseb. Chron. lib, i. 174. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xcii. 175. Id. ibid. 175. Htrodot. ubi sup 177. Id. ibid. dom ANCIENT EUROPE. 129 dom from the hands of his nephew, and successor, and established a republican government. To the happiness which the citizens of Corinth enjoyed under this government, and the I'emem- brance of their former insecure, if not miserable state ; when every man's life and property depended on the will of a despot, is to be imputed the zeal with which Sosicles declaimed against tyranny, in the congress of the Peloponnesian delegates assembled at Sparta. After he had recapitulated the sufferings of his country, the Corinthian orator thus concluded his speech; — " These, O Lacedaemonians! these are " the certain effects of tyranny. Hence our sur- " prise at finding you had sent for Hippias, and " our astonishment at what we now hear. I there- " fore conjure you, by the gods of Greece! to lay " aside the thought of establishing tyrannies in her " cities. But if you are obstinate in your purpose, " and resolve, in violation of justice, to restore Hip- " pias to the sovereignty of Athens, know that " the Corinthians will take no part in the enter- " prise ' 7 V This animated speech dictated by the generous spirit of liberty, commanded the approbation of the other Peloponnesian deputies, silenced the Spartan orators, and obliged Cleomenes to desist from urging the execution of his ambitious and tyrannical pro- ject' 79 . Hippias, therefore, found himself under the necessity of returning to Sigeum. But he did not long remain there. The projected revolt of the Asiatic Greeks afforded him the prospect of draw- 178. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xcii. In giving the speeches in this work, the author has, in general, been more attentive to the meaning, than to the words of ancient historians. But where he found pecu- liar elegance and propriety in the originals, he has endeavoured to .render them with all possible truth and forc«. 179. Id. H'utoriar. lib. v. cap. xciii. ing Ant. Chr. 501. Olympiad Ixix. 4. Ant. Chr. 500. Olympiad lxx. 1. THE HISTORY OF ing the notice, and engaging in his cause the Per- sian monarch. He accordingly repaired to Sardis, in the year five hundred and one before the chris- tian sera; and, by his accomplishments and address, soon insinuated himself into the favour of Artapher- nes, the brother of Darius' 80 ; already prejudiced, as might be expected, against Athens, for disavow- ing the submission proffered by her ambassadors. The Athenians, however, when informed of the kind reception of Hippias at the satrap's court, again sent ambassadors to Sardis; with instructions to say, that they hoped the Persian governor would not give ear to the Athenian exiles 8 . But Arta- phernes, who had by this time taken his resolution, told the ambassadors, as we have had occasion to observe, that their countrymen must restore Hippias to the sovereignty of Athens, if they would be safe i82 . The haughty proposal was rejected with disdain; and the Athenians, on the return of their ambassadors, prepared themselves for braving the resentment of the great king 83 . At this alarming crisis it was, that Aristagoras, after his unsuccessful negociation at Sparta, arrived at Athens, and implored the assistance of that re- public; for the support of the Asiatic Greeks, strug- gling for independency with the Persian power 184 . In their present temper of mind, glowing with in- dignation, yet agitated with terror, much eloquence could not be necessary to persuade the Athenians to engage in the cause of their Ionian descendants; against an enemy by which they themselves were in danger of being subjected to foreign despotism, or domestic tyranny. 180. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xcvi. 181. Id. ibid. 182. Herodot. ubi sup. 184. Herodotus, lib. t. cap. xcvii. 183. Id. ibid. But ANCIENT EUROPE. 131 But if such eloquence had been wanted, Arista- goras was amply furnished with it. Nor did he fail to make use of it on the present occasion. When in- Ant Chr troduced to the popular assembly of Athens, he de- 500. claimed, as at Sparta, upon the wealth of the Persian ]xx. P l! monarchy, and the facility with which it might be acquired by a martial people} ascribing to the indo- lence and effeminacy of the Persians, their inacquaint- ance with the use of the long spear and large shield' 85 , the arms upon which the Greeks chiefly depended for success in war. And he claimed the assistance of Athens, as the parent state, in defence of her colony of Miletus' 86 , In a word, he omitted no argument that his Ionic fancy could suggest, in order to induce the Athenians to enter into his views. And they, disposed by passion as well as policy, to take part in the Ionian rebellion, voted the Milesians an aid of twenty ships' 87 ; but what number of land forces, we are not informed. The Athenian fleet, equipped with all expedition, and placed under the command of Melanthus, a man of high character, was joined by five ships fitted out by the citizens of Eretria, in the island of Eubcea, as a tribute of gratitude, for former services received from the Milesians' 88 . Before that combined force, the only succour of European Greece, reached Mi- letus, Aristagoras had prepared the minds of his countrymen for great and arduous undertakings. And soon after the arrival of the Athenians and Ere- trians, having assembled his Ionian confederates, it was resolved in a council of war, to attack Sardis 8? , the ancient capital of the Lydian monarchy, and now the seat of the satrap's court. 185. Id. ibid. 186. Herodot. ubi sup. 187. Id. ibid. 188. Herodot. lib. v. cap. xcix. 189. Id. ibid, The Ant. Chr 500 132 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The very boldness of this enterprise seemed to insure it success; and the promptitude with which it was executed, did not disgrace the vigour with Olympiad, which it had been planned. The Grecian and Ionian " fleets left the harbour of Miletus, and sailed in con- sort to Ephesus 9 °. There they disembarked their land forces. The Milesians were commanded by Charopinus, the brother of Aristagoras, and his Ionian confederates by Hermophantus ; Aristagoras, as the head of the confederacy, judging it prudent to remain at home, in order to concert new alliances. The Athenians and Eretrians were commanded by their own leaders. The whole composed a formi- dable army; which marched with such celerity, up the river Cayster, and over mount Tmolus, that Sardis was taken by surprise, before Artaphernes could be said to have any intimation of the design of the enemy' 9 '. The Persian satrap, however, by his courage and conduct, fully compensated for his want of vigilance. Having no suspicion that the Ionians would attempt to penetrate into the country, he was not prepared to receive them. He therefore found it necessary to take refuge in the citadel; and from that fortress, into which he had thrown a strong garrison, he re- pelled all the assaults of the invaders' 91 . Nor was their failure in this siege the only disappointment the Ionians and their European allies met with at Sardis. They were also disappointed in their hopes of booty. A house was accidentally set on fire by a soldier, in the rage of plunder; and the walls of the houses of that city being chiefly built with brick, and the roofs covered with reeds, the flames rapidly spread from house to house, till the whole Lydian capital was in a blaze 93 . 190. Hercdot. Hhtoriar. lib. v. cap. c. 191. Id. ibid. 192, Herodotus, ubi sup. 193. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. ci. Thq ANCIENT EUROPE. 133 The Lydians, and such of the Persians as had not letter Tseen admitted into the citadel, derived advantage XI> from the confusion produced by this calamitous cir- cumstance. Instead of flying to the fields, in order 500. to avoid the conflagration, which had at first raged °Jy m P' ad most violently in the extremities of the city, they crowded into the public square or market-place' 94 . Through that square ran the river Pactolus: which, as formerly observed, bisected the Lydian capital: so that the Lydians and Persians were ranged on both sides of the river' 95 . Thus situated, they saw the necessity of defending themselves, or of supinely perishing with arms by their side ; for arms, to use the language of the vain-glorious Greeks, formed part of the dress of a barbarian' 96 . Confidence is inspired by numbers, and courage by despair. The people of Sardis having both to confirm their resolution, disposed themselves in order of battle, and discovered a spirit of resistance suited to the occasion. The victorious invaders, therefore, when obstructed by the flames in the pursuit of pil- lage, saw with surprise a formidable enemy ready to engage them. Disconcerted by the devouring con- flagration, which had blasted their hopes of Lydian treasures, and intimidated at the growing multitude of their opponents, they retired to mount Tmolus; and decamping the following night, began their march toward their ships' 97 . But they were not suffered to escape with impunity. 194. Id. ibid. 195. Herodot. ubt sup. 196. Thucydid. lib. i.cap. vi. The same respectable author in- forms us, That the Athenians were the first Grecian people who discontinued the custom of wearing swords, unless during military service; and that the Lacedaemonians (a singular exception from •barbarism!) were the first who performed their exercises naked, stripping themselves in public ; the custom of wearing scarfs to cover the pudenda, being formerly in use, even at the Olympic games. Id. ibid. 197. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. ci. vol. ii. T Intelligence 134 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Intelligence of the taking of Sardis, and the flames s^~v~ y *-' with which it was consumed, had spread over Asia An Voo hr " Minor ^ e danger of Artaphernes; and the Persian Olympiad leaders, with their troops, hastened from all quarters lxx - *• to the seat of the satrap' 98 . Finding, on their arrival, that the Greeks had retired, they pursued them with speed, and came up with them in the neighbour- hood of Ephesus 100 . Ashamed of their precipitant retreat, and disdaining to shun the combat, the Ionians and their allies drew up their forces beneath the walls of that city, where an obstinate battle was fought. The Asiatic Greeks, whose liberties were at stake, had every motive for exertion. The native courage of the Athenians and Eretrians shone with distin- guished lustre. But the countrymen of Cyrus, ac- customed to conquer, and emboldened by superior force, bore down all resistance. The Ionians were defeated with great slaughter; and both they, and the European Greeks, were obliged to seek safety in flight 200 . And so much were the Athenians dis- gusted with the unfortunate issue of this enterprise, which they seem to have imputed to the pusillani- mity of the Ionians, that they recalled their ships, and could never afterward be prevailed upon to take any part in the confederacy 201 . Nor do the Eretrians appear to have farther interposed in the affairs of Ionia. But Isagoras was not discouraged by the deser- tion of his European allies, or the loss he had sus- tained at Ephesus. The burning of Sardis placed his name high in the estimation of the Asiatic Greeks, who all now took part in the Ionian con- federacy; and the flame of liberty spread along the Asiatic coast, from the mouth of the Euxine sea to 198. Id. lib. v. cap. cii. 199. Id. ibid. 200. Herodot. ubi sup. 201. Id. Historiar. lib. v. cap. ciii. the ANCIENT EUROPE. 135 the island of Cyprus. An Ionian fleet, sailing north- LETTER ward, reduced Byzantium, with all the Grecian ci- ties on the Propontis, that were under the Persian dominion: then directing its course southward, pro- 499. cured the same deliverance to the Carian and Dorian 01 y ra P' ad cities, and steered for Cyprus 202 . That fertile island, situated toward the east end of the Mediterranean sea, and lying at about an equal distance from the coast of Syria and Cylicia, had been early occupied by the Phoenicians 2 ^; who in- troduced into it the worship of the goddess Venus, for which it continued to be distinguished till the downfal of heathen superstition. But as the Phoe- nicans valued Cyprus chiefly on account of its cop- per mines and ship-timber, it being, when first visited by them, almost one entire forest, they paid little attention to the peopling of it, and still less to its cultivation. They, therefore, permitted Grecian colonies to settle in it at different times, from La- conia, Argolis, Attica, and other districts 204 ; until Cyprus, abounding in corn, wine, and oil, came to be considered as a Grecian island, the largest and most populous on the Asiatic coast 205 . It had been occasionally subject, as we have seen, to the latter Egyptian monarchs, and submitted to the arms of Cambyses, when he became master of the naval force of Phoenicia. From that time, to the present memorable aera, Cyprus had continued under the Persian dominion. Nor can we suppose the Cyprians had greatly suf- fered by such subjection; as they had formerly been governed by a number of petty princes or tyrants, each of whom was absolute and independent, in his own city and its district, and who thenceforth held the same regal authority under the controul of the 202. Id. ibid. 203. Strabo, lib. iv. sub. fiu. 204. Id. ibid. 205. Strabo, ubi sup. great 136 THE HISTORY OF PART I. great king; whose interest it was to restrain hostilities. \^~*r>*^ among them, and to curb oppressions. Ant. Chr. 499 Olympiad Onesilius, king of Salamis, a city which had been Ux. 2. founded by a colony from the Grecian island of the same name, was now the most considerable Cyprian prince. He had acquired the sovereignty of Salamis by the expulsion of his brother Gorgas ; whose servile submission to the Persian sway had filled him with indignation, from the moment he was informed of the Ionian revolt. And no sooner did he find himself possessed of the supreme power, than he persuaded all the Cyprians, except the in- habitants of Amathus, who were of Phoenician origin, to withdraw their allegiance from Darius 206 . Conscious, however, that the Cyprians were not able to resist the arms of the Persian monarch, sup- ported by the naval force of Phoenicia, which he had reason to think would soon be sent to the assist- ance of the Amathusians, Onesilius dispatched ambassadors to the leader of the Ionian confederacy, demanding succour against the common enemy 207 . Aristagoras readily complied with the request of the Cyprian prince ; and the Ionian fleet, which we have seen break the fetters of slavery, from the Thracian Bosphorus to the Dorian promontory, anchored in the bay of Salamis. But before its arrival, a Persian army, from Cilicia, had been landed in Cyprus, un- der cover of a Phoenician fleet, which still hovered on the coast 208 . Artybius, the Persian general, having raised the siege of Amathus, which had been invested by One- silius, marched into the plains of Salamis, where the Cyprian army was posted, while the Phoenician 206. Herodot. lib. v. cap. civ. 207. Id. Hittoriar. lib. v. cap. cviii. 208. Id. ibid. fleet Ixx. 2. ANCIENT EUROPE. 137 fleet advanced against that of Ionia. In conse- quence of these movements, a furious battle was fought on land, and another by sea; and both nearly Ant Chr at the same time, and within sight of each other. 499. Olympiad The Ionians, after an obstinate engagement, de- feated the Phoenician fleet. But neither this for- tunate circumstance, nor the heroic valour of One T silius, who slew the Persian general with his own hand, could inspire the Cyprians with courage or unanimity. During the heat of the action; Stese- nor, tyrant of Curium, deserted to the enemy; and the chariots of war, belonging to Salamis, followed his example 20 * Onesilius was slain in attempting to maintain the unequal combat. With him fell Aris- tocyprus, king of the Solians, an Athenian colony; and the Cyprians were finally broken, and routed with great slaughter 110 . The Ionians, when in- formed of the issue of the battle, and of the fate of Onesilius, returned home with their fleet, and Cyprus was again reduced under the Persian domi- nion 2 ". Meanwhile Darius, having received intelligence of the progress of the Ionian confederacy, took vi- gorous measures for humbling the Asiatic Greeks, and resolved to prosecute, with unrelenting ven- geance, the European abettors of the revolt. When informed of the burning of Sardis, and of the share which the Athenians had in the taking of that city, he is said to have exclaimed, " O Jupiter! grant that I may be avenged of the Athenians!" — then to have ordered one of his domestics, to call thrice every time he sat at table, " King, remember the Athenians 2 '* I" 209. Herodot. lib. v. cap. cix — cxiii. 210. Id. ibid. 211. Id. H's.toriar. lib. v. cap. cxv. 212. JJrrodotus, lib v. cap. cv. Thr 138 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The Persian monarch next sent for Histiaeus, the s -*^ >r> ^ Milesian, whom he had detained at Susa, as we have seen, and accused him of having been con- cerned in the Ionian rebellion ; as Isagoras, his lieu- tenant, had been the prime mover of it. " What " advantage, O king!" replied that supple politician, ** could I propose to myself by exciting a revolt in " Ionia? — I who live in splendour at your court, am " honoured with your friendship, and share your " councils! — Believe rather, O king! that your af- *' fairs in those parts have suffered by my absence " from my native country. 'The Ionians seem only " to have waited for my departure, in order to put " in execution a design, which they had before " formed, against your authority; for if I had con- '* tinued among them, be assured, that not one of " their cities would have dared to revolt from the " great king. Dismiss me therefore speedily, and " send me back to Miletus, that I may remedy the " disorders, and restore the obedience of Ionia 213 . " When I have performed this service," added he, " and put into your hands the Milesian deputy, " who alone has been the author of the confederacy, " I swear, by the gods of the king, that I will not " change the garments I wear, in my journey to " Ionia, until I have rendered all the islands that " crown the iEgean sea tributary to Darius 2 ' 4 ." Deceived by this artful speech, the Persian mo- narch complied with the desire of Histiaeus 2 ' 5 . But he did not rest the recovery of Asiatic Greece upon the professions, or the promises, of that suspected chief. He had already sent into Asia Minor, for the support of his brother Artaphernes, a powerful army, under the command ofHymeas,Daurises, and Otanes, 213. Id. Historiar. lib. v. cap. cvi. 214. Id. ibid. 215. Hecodot. ubi sup. - three ANCIENT EUROPE. 139 three of his sons-in-law. And these generals having LETTER over-run Ionia, and obliged the Milesians to confine themselves to the sea-coast, where they were pro- tected by their naval strength, divided their forces into three bodies, destined to act in different direc- tions, and attempt the reduction of the maritime cities* 16 . Hymeas, with one of those bodies, directed his march to the Propontis; while Daurises, with ano- ther, acted on the coast of the Hellespont. Dau- rises, in a few days, made himself master of Precote, Abydos, Lampsacus, and other towns in his dis- trict" 7 . But he was soon recalled, and employed in an opposite quarter. He was sent against the Carians and Dorians; who having joined in the Ionian confederacy, as already observed, were be- come formidable to the southward. He accordingly passed the Meander; whose winding course, and fertile vales, have so long been adorned by poetic fancy, and gave battle to the enemy on the banks of the Marsya. The dispute was obstinate and bloody; but, at length, the Carians and Dorians, oppressed by numbers, were totally defeated 2 ' 8 . In this action, twelve thousand men are said to have fallen on both sides 2 ' 9 . Such of the Carians and Dorians, as escaped the Persian sword, took refuge in a grove sacred to the military Jupiter; the only place, says Herodotus, where that deity was worshipped under the name of the god of armies 220 . Here, while the Carian fugi- tives deliberated, whether they should utterly aban- don their country, or surrender themselves to the conquerors, they were joined by a body of Ionians. Encouraged by this reinforcement, they hazarded a 216. Id. lib. v. cap. cxvi. cxvii. 217. Id. ibid. 218. Herodot. lib. v. cap. exxiii exxix. 219. Id. ibid. 220. Herodot. ubi sup. new 140 THE HISTORY OF PART I. new battle. It was more obstinately disputed than ^-^■v^w the former; but victory ultimately declared for the Persians 121 . The Asiatic Greeks 222 in that quarter, however, did not yet abandon themselves to despair. Heavy as the second blow was, they still continued to keep the field; and the superior military genius of Hera- clides, the Carian general, formed to rise above misfortune, and take advantage of circumstances, furnished them with great revenge. Understanding that the Persians, tired of a desultory war, intended to fall down to the sea-coast, and reduce the mari- time towns, he placed an ambuscade in certain de- files, which they had to pass. Marching in all the security of conquest, Daurises v/as slain, and his whole army cut off, by the Carians and their allies 223 . But this disaster had no serious influence upon the general progress of the Persian arms. It only served to protract, for a time, the final reduction of Caria and Doria. When Daurises led his army toward those countries, Hymeas had left the Pro- pontis ; and, marching along the coast of the Helles- pont, completed the conquest of the northern part of iEolia; while Otanes, assisted by the experienced counsels, and the presence of Artaphernes, took Cum^, on the southern frontier of iEolia, after having i 221. Id. Historiar. lib. v. cap. cxx. 222. The Carians were not, properly speaking, Greeks; hut they were by this time so much blended with their Grecian neighbours, that they seem often to be confounded with the Dorians by Herodotus (Vid. lib. v. passim.). Their country, which they had inhabited from the most remote antiquity (Herodot. lib. i. cap. clxxi.), was originally of considerable extent, but now contracted to a small district be- tween Ionia and Doria (Id. ibid.). To this narrow situation they had been reduced by the Ionian and Dorian emigrants from Greece, with whom they became partly incorporated. Herodot. ubi sup. 223. Herodot. lib. v. cap. cxxi. reduced ANCIENT EUROPE. 141 reduced Clazomen', and almost every other town in Ionia, except Miletus* 24 . And that famous city, the head of the confederacy, and the pride of Asiatic Greece, was now threatened by the whole body of the Persian forces in Asia Minor. At a crisis so alarming, it might have been ex- pected that Aristagoras, the author of the Ionian revolt, and who had hitherto acted so distinguished a part, would have displayed his vigour and patri- otism, in providing for the defence of Miletus. But that aspiring chief disappointed the hopes of his countrymen and confederates; who, in protracting the unequal struggle for freedom, were less governed by policy than passion. Finding he could no longer oppose, with any prospect of success, the combined armies of a great empire, furnished with all the engines of war that could facilitate the operations of a siege, he advised the Milesians to make prepa- rations for retiring on board their fleet, and to seek a settlement on some European shore, rather than run the hazard of again falling under the Persian dominion 225 . In recommending this project, Aristagoras pro- posed Thrace, or the island of Sardinia, as the place of the new establishment 226 . Hecatseus the historian, who seems always to have had great sway in the councils of his countrymen, declared for a tempo- rary settlement in the island of Lerus; whence the Milesians might return to their former city, after the storm with which it was threatened had spent its force 227 . But none of these proposals being embraced, Aristagoras delivered the government of Miletus into the hands of Pythagoras, an eminent citizen; and embarked with as many adventurers, 224. Id. Historiar. lib. v. cap. cxxii. cxxiii. 225. H«rodotus, lib. v. cap. cxxiv. 226. Id. ibid. 227. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. exxv. cxxvl. vol. ii. v as 142 THE HISTORY OF PART I. as were willing to accompany him, for that territory v-*~v*s./ on the river Strymon in Thrace, which had, as we have seen, been granted to his uncle Histiaeus, and where had been founded the city that excited the jealousy of the great king 228 . We are not informed in what state Aristagoras found this settlement, or in what manner it had been governed during the absence of Histiaeus. But it appears that he took possession of it without opposition, and instantly began to form ambitious views; for he was soon after treacherously slain, with all his followers, beyond the limits of the be- queathed territory, by the inhabitants of a Thracian town, which had agreed to surrender on terms 229 . Thus fell Aristagoras, who seems to have been better calculated to plan than to execute great de- signs, and of whose character it is very difficult to form a decided opinion. He certainly possessed no common share of political talents and address. Nor is there any reason to accuse him of want of valour, prudence, or even of patriotism; for Hero- dotus positively declares, that he did not quit Mile- tus, until he saw that his most vigorous efforts to defend it, by land, would prove ineffectual 130 . He might, however, have gone on board the fleet, and> animated his countiymen and confederates, by sea, as he found the Milesians resolved to sustain a *iege, rather than abandon their city. But persevering fortitude was none of the virtues pf Aristagoras. His bold, but irresolute heart, shrunk from the difficulties with which he was sur- rounded; from the prospect of misfortune, and the possibility of being delivered up to the Persian mo- narch, from whom he could hope for no mercy: while 228. Id. ibid. 229. Herodot. ubi sup. 230. Id. Hutoriar. lib. v. cap. cx.xiv his ANCIENT EUROPE. 143 his versatile genius, fruitful in resources, discovered new situations, with new theatres of glory and ambi- tion. Yet, if he had been properly supported by the European Greeks, he would surely have delivered those of Asia from the Persian dominion. What part he would have then taken in the government, must have been determined by events, brought forward by circumstances, to which time never gave birth. Before Miletus was invested, Histiaeus arrived at Sardis from Susa. The high rank he had held in the court of the great king, and the pretended pur- pose for which he was permitted to return into Asia Minor, gave him reason to expect that he would be employed by Artaphernes, in extinguishing the Ionian rebellion; though his real intention was to inflame it. But that experienced governor, who was better acquainted with his true character than Darius, not only declined entrusting him, with ^ny command, but made him sensible, that he was Ac- quainted with his former intrigues 23 '. And His- tiaeus, after having sown at Sardis, among the Persian officers, the seeds of a conspiracy against the satrap's authority, secretly retired toward the sea-coast, and passed over to the island of Chios 132 . There being taken into custody by the Chians, as an emissary of Darius, the Milesian chief declared his purpose of heading the Ionian confederacy 23 *". And he assigned, as his reason for promoting the revolt, his knowledge that a resolution had been taken in the cabinet of the great king, for planting the Phoenicians in Ionia, and removing the Ionians to Phoenicia 234 ; a piece of secret history which, al- though discredited by Herodotus, is perfectly con- sistent with the line of Persian policy (such removal 231. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. i. 232. Id. Ilutoriar. lib. vi. cap. ii. 23^. Id. ibid. 234. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. iii. Of 144 THE HISTORY OF PART I. of inhabitants being by no means uncommon in that monarchy), and highly favourable to the interests of Darius. For he would, by such a measure, have effectually disjoined the most powerful body of the Asiatic Greeks from their European brethren, and have substituted, in their room, a numerous colony of faithful subjects, equally industrious and expert, as mariners and manufacturers. But whatever truth there might be in this infor- mation, it was readily believed by the Asiatic Greeks, and increased their terror at the progress of the Persian arms 235 . Histiaeus, however, with all his address, could never acquire their confidence. The Milesians, having tasted the sweets of liberty, and remembering his former tyranny, obstinately refused to admit him into their city 236 . And the Chians, though they afforded him protection, would not entrust him with the command of their fleet 237 . In the midst of these disappointments, he received intelligence that the conspiracy at Sardis had been discovered, by means of his letters, and all the Persians concerned in it put to death 238 . This was a severe blast to the hopes of Histiaeus; especially as he understood that the government of Artaphernes, which he wished to overthrow, had only suffered a momentary shake, and was again firmly established. Still, however, undismayed by his adverse fortune, he passed to Mitylene, the capi- tal of the island of Lesbos; and the Lesbians fur- nished him with eight ships, fitted out at their own expense, and manned with their own people 239 . With this small fleet he sailed to Byzantium; and 235. Id. ibid. 236. Kerodot. lib. vi. cap. iv. v. 237. Id. ibid. 238. Herodotus, ubi sup. 239. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. v. cruising ANCIENT EUROPE. 14* cruising off that port, took all the ships that came letter out of the Euxine sea, except such as were com- ^^^^ manded by Grecian masters, willing to enter into his views 140 . Meantime Artaphernes having completed his mi- Ant. Chr. litary preparations, the Persian generals, within his olympiad government, advanced with their united forces to Ixxi. 2. the seige of Miletus; while an Egyptian and Phoe- nician fleet, assisted by some ships from Cyprus and Cilicia, blocked up the harbour, and favoured the operations of the army*' 1 . This enterprise, which struck at the head of the confederacy, occa- sioned great alarm in Asiatic Greece. All the con- federates sent deputies to the Panionian council, or general assembly of Ionia, held in a temple on the promontory of Mycale, where it was resolved, after mature deliberation, that no attempt should be made. to relieve Miletus by land, as none could be made with any prospect of success; but that the whole naval force of Asiatic Greece, both in the islands and sea-ports of the continent, should be speedily manned and equipped, in order to give battle to that of the enemy*' 2 . In consequence of this resolution (which was communicated to the Milesians, for their encourage- ment in the defence of their walls), the ships from the several allied states assembled at the island of Lade, within sight of the port of Miletus 2 '; and formed a fleet of three hundred and fifty-three sail of triremes 214 , or gallies with three banks of oars 215 , the largest ships of war then in u«e; earning each, by '210. Id. ibid. 241. Herodot. Ii!». vi. cap. vi. 242. Id. Hhtoriar. lib. vi. cap. vii. 24J. Id. ibid. 244. Hcrodoius, lib. vi. cap. viii. 215. The manner in which these banks or tiers of oars c:i'J ! e placet], so as to prevent the rowers from obstructing each mint, was long a matter of dou'«;t among modern antiquarians. But the difficulty seems. 146 THE HISTORY OF PART I. by computation, about two hundred men. The v*r-v^»/ enemy's fleet, composed of ships of the same size, Ant. Chr. was f ar m ore numerous: it consisted of six hundred 494- .. a , 6 Olympiad sai1 • lxxi. 2. The Persian commanders, however, were afraid to hazard a naval engagement; and, therefore, en- deavoured to disunite the confederated Greeks. For that purpose, they applied to the Ionian and jEolian tyrants, who had been expelled by Arista- goras; and who, having found refuge, in the satrap's court, were now in the Persian army or on board the fleet 2 * 7 . To these banished chiefs they offered, in the name of Darius, the full restitution of their authority, provided they could prevail upon their former subjects to desert the general confederacy. And they impowered them to promise, that the people of such states as should embrace the gracious proposal, would be again received into favour, and suffer nothing on account of their rebellion; their lives, their property, their houses, and temples would be safe. But if they obstinately persisted in their re- solution of determining the dispute by the sword, that the most frightful calamities awaited them ; that after seems, at last, to have been removed by the ingenuity of general Melville. He conjectured, that the waste part of the ancient gallies rose obliquely above the water's edge; and that upon the inner sides of this waste part, the seats of the rowers were fixed horizontally, in rows. In that conjecture (according to which he constructed a model) he was confirmed by some remains of ancient sculpture and painting in Italy; on one of which was found the figure of a trire- mis, with three tiers of oars, issuing chequerwise from an ohlique side; and, on another, the oars issuing, in the same manner, from the oblique side of such a vessel, and all, without interference, reaching the water (See Pownall's Treatise on the Study of Anti- quities, as the Commentary of Historical Learning, Append, and Gillies's Hist, of Greece, chap. v. note 4.). The quadriremes and quinquiremes, of the ancient ships of war, of the first and second rate, were constructed in the same manner. Id. ibid. ?46. Herodot. ubi sup, 247. Id. lib. vi. cap. ix. being ANCIENT EUROPE. 147 being conquered, they would be reduced to the condi- LETTER tion of slaves ; their youths would be made eunuchs ; XL their virgins be carried captive to Bactria (a pro- Ant c , vince on the north-east frontier of the Persian empire), 494. to satiate the lust of barbarians; and their country, ^j 1 ^ 3 * 1 so dear to them, be given to another people, more deserving the clemency of the great king 248 . The exiled chiefs, as might be expected, dispatch- ed messengers, and used all their interest with the citizens of the several states over which they had presided. But neither the threats, nor the promises of the Persians, were attended with any immediate effect upon any of those states. The people of each particular state, thinking they alone were solicited to betray the common cause, rejected with indigna- tion the proffered rewards for such treachery 249 . And thus the whole confedei - acy was preserved entire. v But other causes produced dissentions in the Gre- cian fleet, and slackened the bands of union among the confederates. Nor can it be supposed but the offers of the Persian monarch, as soon as they were known to have been general, made a secret impres- sion upon the minds of many. — When the whole naval armament assembled off the island of Lade, a council of war was held; in which, after various opinions had been given, in regard to the conduct to be pursued, Dionysius,~the Phocsean leader, spoke to the following purport: ' " Our fate, O IoniansI" said he, " stands upon, a ** needle's point: it is now to be determined, whether M we shall be freemen, slaves, or fugitives. If you " will submit to rigid discipline, you must suffer fa- ° tigue, and endure hardships; but these will enable JR48. Id. ibid. 249. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. ix. " you 148 THE HISTORY OF PART I. u you to vanquish your enemies, and preserve your v-^-v-%^ " freedom. Whereas, if you shrink from toil, and A 4Q/t' hr ' " neglect discipline, I see no hope of your escaping Olympiad " the punishment of rebels. If, however, you will hcxi. 2. u ta k e m y counsel, and conform to my directions, I "pledge myself, the gods aiding our just cause I " that we shall wear such a formidable counte- u nance, that the enemy will x not dare to give us " battle; or if they should, that they will rue the " encounter, nor ever afterward venture to face us " at sea 25 °." This speech was heard with such general approba- tion, that not only the Ionians, but all their confede- rates, agreed to put themselves under the discipline of the Phocsean commander; who acquitted himself in a manner -worthy of an experienced naval officer. He ranged the whole fleet, every day, in order of battle; directed the squadrons frequently to change their stations, that they might habituate the seamen to the labour of the oar; which only was made use of by the ancients in time of action: and he made the soldiers, on board, do duty in their armour ?JI . After these evolutions were performed, the fleet lay at anchor during the remainder of the day 252 . Seven days did the confederates patiently submit to this discipline; so necessary to inure them to the toils, and render them expert in the practice of war. And so long did the hostile fleet remain quiet in harbour. But at length the Ionians, the most effeminate of all the Asiatic Greeks, began to murmur at the hard- ships to which they were exposed. From murmurs they proceeded to complaints, and from complaints to mutiny. They exclaimed against the exhausting 250. Id. Hlstoriar. lib. vi. cap. xi. 251. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xii. 252. Id. ihid. fatigues, ANCIENT EUROPE. 149 fatigues, which they were daily obliged to sustain, LETTER under the burning heat of the sun; fatigues, they said, which had already destroyed many of them, and would soon prove fatal to more; fatigues less tolerable than the worst servitude. " And all these," cried they, " are imposed upon us by an insolent " Phocaean, who brings no more than three ships, " for the support of the common cause 253 !" They accordingly refused any longer to obey the orders of Dionysius; and having formed a camp in the island of Lade, sat down under the shade of their tents, and utterly neglected their naval exercise' 54 . During this season of inaction, the Samians, dis- gusted at the indolence and disorderly behaviour of the continental Ionians, whom they had reason to believe would not acquit themselves like men, pri- vately complied with a message from iEaces, the son of Syloson, their former chief; exhorting them to abandon the Ionian confederacy, and accept the offers of the great king 255 . No sooner was that transaction made known to Ant Chr - the Persian commanders, than their fleet quitted the olympiad harbour of Miletus, and advanced, in order of battle, Ixxi. 3. toward that of the enemy, the Phoenicians leading the van* 66 . The Asiatic Greeks, dividing their fleet into squadrons, also formed a line of battle : though we have reason to believe they observed little con- cert in action, as they mutually accused each other of neglect of duty* 57 . The Grecian fleet was thus disposed. The Ioni- ans, with eighty ships, were ranged at the head of 253. Herodot. nbi sup. 254. Id. ibid. 255. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xiii. 256. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. xiv. 257. Id. ibid. VOL. II. X the 150 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the line, stretching eastward. Next were stationed v, ^™^^ s ^ the Prienians, with twelve ships ; and the Myusians, . n 4 ' 94 ,r " with three; supported by the Teians, with seven- Olympiad teen; and the Chians, with an hundred sail. The centre was composed of the Erythraeans, with eight; the Phocseans, with three, and the Lesbians with seventy sail. The Samians, with sixty sail, formed the rear 158 . We are not particularly informed, in what manner the battle that ensued was conducted, on either side. We only know, that the Samians early hoisted sail, and went out of the line 259 ; a certain signal of their defection, which was understood by the Greeks, as well as by the Persians. The Lesbians, who were stationed next to them, followed their example, as did the greater part of the Ionians^ 60 , The Chians, however, disdaining such treachery" and pusillani- mity, bravely maintained their station: they even advanced against the enemy, and long sustained the whole weight of. the battle. Nor did they retire until they had taken and destroyed many ships of the hostile fleet, and lost a large proportion of their In that awful conflict with superior force, the Chi- ans were vigorously supported by the* captains of eleven Samian ships; who, ashamed of the baseness of their countrymen, and their commander in chief, heroically returned to the charge, fought in defiance of orders, and rendered their names immortal 162 . Nor 258. Herodot. ubi sup. 259. Id. ibid. 260. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xiv. Ey Ionians must here be under- stood the Greeks of Ionia, properly so called; for the Samians, Chians, and Phoc?eans, also were of Ionian origin, and their depu- ties had a scat in the Panionian council, or general assembly of Ionia. Herodot. lib. i. cap. xli — xliii. 261. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xiv. xv. 262. Id. ibid. The community of Samos, in order to transmit the memory Ant. Chr. ANCIENT EUROPE. 151 Nor ought, on this memorable day, to be forgot the valour and conduct of Dionysius, the Phocaean leader. With his three ships, he captured three of the enemy's fleet, and gallantly maintained the com- 494. bat, until he saw the Grecian fleet totally defeated 263 . Olympiad Then, chusing the condition of an exile, rather than a precarious asylum in his native country, which he foresaw must soon be subjected to the Persian domi- nion, he sailed for the coast of Phoenicia; there took many rich prizes, and carried them to the island of Sicily, whence he carried on a piratical war against the enemies of Asiatic Greece 264 . The Persians, now victorious on the watery ele- ment, pressed the siege of Miletus both by sea and land; and, after having employed against it all sorts of warlike engines, and undermined the walls, they made themselves masters of the place, in the sixth year after the revolt of Aristagoras 265 . As the city was taken by storm, it was pillaged, and the greater part of the men were put to the sword 266 . The women and children were made captives ; and together with such of the citizens as had escaped the general slaughter, were carried to Susa, and afterward set- tled in the district of Ampae on the Tygris 267 . The level, and most fertile part of the Milesian territory was divided among the Persian conquerors, and the mountainous tracts were given to the Carians of Pedasis' 68 . On the reduction of Miletus, Histiaeus, its former chief, and the author of many calamities, both to memory of these brave men to posterity with honour, erected a column on which was inscribed their names and families. Uerodot. lib. vi. cap. xv. 263. Id. lib. vi. cap. xvii. 264. Id. ibid. • 265. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. xviii. 266. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xix. 267. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. xx. 263. Id. ibid. himself 152 THE HISTORY OF PART I. himself and his country, left Byzantium, and sailed v- *" Nr> *- / to Chios. There meeting with opposition, he made himself master of the island, through the assistance of the Lesbians, who continued to adhere to his interest* 69 . This success, originating in the mis- fortunes of the bravest of the Asiatic Greeks, who were still weak from the loss they had sustained in combating the Persians at sea, rekindled the ambi- tion of Histiaeus, and inspired him with the hope of yet setting bounds to the power of Darius. He accordingly assembled a number of Ionian and iEo- lian adventurers, and reigned, for a while, tyrant of the ^Egean sea; but imprudently venturing to land on the coast of Asia Minor, at the head of a small body of forces, a period was suddenly put to his new career. He was surprised, routed, and made pri- soner by one of the Persian generals; and being carried to Sardis, he was there crucified, by order of Artaphernes 270 . Such was the fate of Histiaeus, the Milesian, one of the most extraordinary men that Asiatic Greece ever produced; and who, if he had not been deluded into splendid captivity, by the insidious caresses of a jealous monarch, whom he had essentially served, would have acted a great part upon the theatre of human affairs. Ambition was his ruling passion, and his radical vice; but that ambition had for its primary objects the exaltation of his native country, and the limitation of the Persian power. If he failed to accomplish these ends, his miscarriage will be imputed, by your lordship, to the difficulties with which he had to struggle, not to any want of politi- cal or military talents. Ant. Chr. The Persian fleet having wintered at Miletus, Ol ni >'id ea sily reduced, in the spring, the islands of Chios, lxxi. 4. 269. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xxvi. xxvii. 270. Id. H'stonar. lib. vi. cap. xxviii. — xxx. Tenedos, Ant. Chr. ANCIENT EUROPE. 155 Tenedos, and Lesbos; while the army, in conjunc- LETTER tion with a division of the same fleet, took all the Ionian cities on the continent. And the comman- ders, both by sea and land, executed the full ven- 495 geance that had been denounced against the inhabi- Olympiad tants, when they obstinately rejected the proffered terms of submission. Such of the men and women as had not escaped by flight, were subjected to the condition of slaves; the handsomest boys were made eunuchs; and sent, with the most beautiful virgins, to Susa: the houses, and even the temples, were consumed with fire 271 . From the iEgean sea, the hostile fleet sailed to the Propontis ; where all the towns on the Asiatic coast being already brought under the Persian dominion, the incensed conquerors turned their arms against those on the European shore, which they cruelly desolated with fire and sword 272 . The citizens of Byzantium, however, escaped the general slavery imposed upon their neighbours, with many of its attendant calamities. Having retired with their most valuable effects, on the approach of the enemy, they took possession of a territory on the coast of the Euxine sea, and there built the city of Mesam- bria 273 . No sooner was Darius informed of the recovery of Asiatic Greece, than he resolved to prosecute that revenge, which he had meditated, upon the Athenians and Eretrians, for taking part with his rebel subjects; but more especially for having been concerned in the burning of Sardis, an insult which his pride could not brook. As a prelude to the execution of this vindictive enterprise, he recalled his generals, who had completed the reduction of 271. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xxxi. xxxii. 272. Id. Hittoriar. lib. vi. cap. xxxiii. 273. Id. ibid. Ionia; 154 THE HISTORY OF PARTI. Ionia; received the submission of the Carians and y ^~v > —' Dorians, and invested with the chief command of his forces, in the maritime parts of Asia Minor, Mardonius, the son of Gobryas; a young nobleman of high accomplishments, to whom he had given in marriage his daughter Artozostra 274 . Meantime Artaphernes, who seems still to have remained satrap of Sardis, took measures for restoring the prosperity of Ionia. Having made an equal divi- sion of the unappropriated lands, among such of the inhabitants as had adhered, or come over to the Persian interest, and settled the tributes they should pay, he obliged the citizens of the several states to send deputies to him, and come under a solemn engagement to abstain from private hostili- ties 27 *. •^•P""- Mardonius, in going to take possession of hi* Olympiad command, and chastise the European Greeks, led bail l. a great army to the coast of Cilicia. There em- barking on board a fleet, which was ready to receive him, he sailed to Ionia; and went, as may be con- jectured, to Sardis, in order to confer with Arta- phernes; while the land forces, under his generals, marched to the Hellespont 376 . During his residence in Ionia, he carried into execution a measure that discovers great liberality of mind, as well as en- larged views of policy, and for which he must have had the sanction of the venerable satrap: he de- posed all the tyrants who had been restored to their authority, and established a democratical form of government in every Grecian city 277 . Having, 274. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xliii. 275. Id. H'utorlar. lib. vi. cap. xlii. 276. Herodotus, lib. vi cap. xliii. 277. Id. ibid. It is more reasonable to suppose (for Herodotus is silent on the subject) that this measure was adopted in concert with Artaphernes, than that so young a man as Mardonius was appointed satrap ANCIENT EUROPE. 155 Having, by this popular act, secured the fidelity and attachment of the Asiatic Greeks, Mardonius proceeded to the Hellespont, and passed over with h"i3 army into Europe. Marching through Thrace, he entered Macedonia, and added that ancient king- dom to the Persian empire ; while the Persian fleet, having received the submission of the island of Thasus, famous for its gold mines, steered for the coast of Attica, in order to co-operate with the army. But, in attempting to double the promontory of mount Athos, now called Capo Santo; it was at- tacked by a violent storm from the north-east; and three hundred ships were dashed in pieces against the rocks, and twenty thousand men perished in the waves* 78 . This shock was sufficient to have defeated the ex- pedition of Mardonius, as the fleet must have been necessary to the success of the army, in its destined attack upon Athens. But it did not come alone. The camp of Mardonius was forced by night, by the Brygians, a Thracian people: many of his men were killed, and he himself was wounded 279 . He sought revenge, however, upon the barbarous enemy, before he prosecuted his march, and severely chas- tised them 280 ; but having, in the meantime, received information of the destruction of his fleet, and the season being too far advanced for him to think of repairing the loss that year, he led back his army to winter in Asia Minor 28 '. Though the success of Mardonius was not ade- quate to the hopes of Darius, his expedition had satrap of SaidU, in the room of that experienced governor, and in- vested with the civil, as well as the military command, of the mari- time parts of Asia Minor. Yet most modern historians have favoured the latter opinion. 278. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xliv. 279. Id. Hittoriar. lib. vi. cap. xlv. 280. Id. ibid. ^81. Hcrodot. nbi sup. beeo 156 THE HISTORY OF PART I. been productive of an event not a little nattering v^-x^**' to the pride of the Persian monarch. The conquest of Macedonia, a kingdom -which was one day to give law to Greece, could not be considered as a small acquisition. The failure of the enterprise, in its ultimate object, might be imputed to the loss of the fleet, and the inexperience of Mardonius. The great king, therefore, persevered in his resolution of chastising the European Greeks, unless they would acknowledge his sway ; and ordered ships to be built, next summer, in all the ports of Asia Minor, for carrying his ambitious design into exe- cution 282 . Ant. Chr. 491. Olympiad Ixxii. 2. In the meantime, Persian heralds were sent to all the Grecian states, demanding earth and water, in testimony of their submission 283 . Many of the states on the continent, and also of the islands, overawed by the power of Darius, complied with this demand 284 . But the citizens of Athens and Sparta, inflamed with rage and resentment at the insolence of the barbarian (as the Persian monarch was disdainfully called by the more enlightened Greeks), threw some of his heralds into a ditch, and others into a well, and desired them thence to take earth and water for the king 285 . No sooner, however, did the people of those states recover their temper, than they became ashamed of their conduct, and endeavoured to make every reparation in their power, for so flagrant a violation of the laws of nations* 86 . But their re- sentment against the people of such states, as had submitted to the Persian dominion, remained im- placable. This resentment fell with peculiar seve- 282. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. xlviii. 284. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xlix. 285. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxxxiii. 286. Id. ibid, et seq. 283. Id. ibid. rity ANCIENT EUROPE. 157 lity upon the iEginetes, whom the Athenians sus- pected of a design against their republic, in conjunc- tion with the common enemy, and accused in the senate of Sparta, as betrayers of the liberties of Greece 287 . The Spartans, laying aside their jealousy of Athens, eagerly listened to the accusation; and Cleomenes, their warlike king, as the head of the governing state in Greece, went in person to ^Egina, and attempted to seize the leaders, who had advised the obnoxious submission to the Persian monarch* 38 . The iEginetes admitted the supremacy of the Spar- tan state, but refused to comply with the demand of , Cleomenes ; under pretence, that he did not act by public authority, as he was not accompanied by his colleague Demaratus 189 , Cleomenes, not choosing to employ force, return- ed to Sparta without accomplishing his design. And understanding that it had been defeated, by the in- trigues of Demaratus, in his absence, he got that prince deposed, on account of his real or pretended illegitimacy; and Leotychides, the next heir, was advanced to the sovereignty 290 . Demaratus, on being degraded, quitted the dominions of Sparta, and after- ward retired to the court of Susa, where Hippias and his adherents were now in high favour* 91 . Meantime Cleomenes, accompanied with his new colleague, went again to iEgina, and repeated his demand. And ten of the chief citizens being deliver- ed up to him, he sent them to Athens, as pledges 287. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xlix. 288. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. I. 289. Id. ibid, et seq. 290. Herodotus, ubi sup. 291. Id. lib. vi. cap. \xx. et lib. vii. cap. iii. VOL. II. Y of 158 THE HISTORY OF PART I. of the fidelity of the iEginetes to the common cause >^"v>ta> of Greece *\ Cleomenes, soon after, put a period to his own life, in a fit of frenzy or intoxication 29 ' He was succeeded in the sovereignty by his brother, Leonidas; and a naval war was carried on, with various fortune, between Athens and iEgina, until the approach of the public enemy taught the contend- ing powers the necessity of putting a stop to private hostilities 294 . Darius having completed his naval and military preparations, removed Mardonius from the com- mand of his forces in the maritime parts of Asia Minor, and appointed in his stead Datis and Arta- pherncs; the former a Mede, and an officer of ex-, Ant. Chr. perience; the latter son to his brother Artaphernes, ~, '. , satrap of Sardis 10 '. These commanders, as soon Olympiad l .... lxx. 1. as they had received their instructions, and taken leave of the king, advanced with a numerous, and well appointed army, into the plains of Cilicia*' 6 . There they encamped, until the vessels ordered to be built in the ports of Asiatic Greece, for the trans- portation of horse as well as foot, arrived ; it being resolved to avoid the circuitous march into Greece, through Thrace and Macedonia, by landing the forces at once in the threatened territories* 97 . "When the troops were embarked, the whole Per- sian fleet, consisting of six hundred sail, steered for the island of Samos, the place of rendezvous 293 . Here having received the iEolian and Ionian levies, this mighty armament, which had for its object, as 292. Heroilot. lib. vi. cap. Ixxiii. 293. !d. Hlstoriar. lib. vi. cap. lxxv. — Ixxxiv. 294. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. lxxxvii. — xciv. et lib. vii. cap. cxliv. cxlv. 295. Id. lib. vi. cap. xcir. 296. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. xcv, 297\ Id. iSid. 298. Herodotus, ubi sup. already ANCIENT EUROPE. 15D as already observed, the conquest of European Greece, but whose declared purpose was the chas- tisement of Eretria and Athens, began its operations with reducing under the dominion of the great king, the European islands in the lower part of the iEgean sea, known by the name of the Cyclades, Most of those islands had acknowledged the sove- reignty of Darius, by the delivery of earth and water. But that was not thought enough: it was resolved to bring them under more absolute subjection, and to secure their obedience by hostages. The storm fell first upon Naxus. Knowing themselves ob- noxious to the Persian monarch, on account of their former resistance, and sensible of their inability to withstand the force that surrounded their shores, the Naxians abandoned their habitations, and took refuge in their mountains- 9 ". The haughty invaders, en- raged at such desertion, reduced the Naxian capital to ashes, and carried off all the prisoners they could seize 300 . But Delos, the favourite seat of Apollo, and the contiguous islands, were treated with mora lenity. The inhabitants were invited to submission. That they readily yielded, in the manner desired. And the victorious fleet, leaving behind it the Cy- clades, steered for Eretria, on the western coast of the island of Eubosa 301 . The Eretrians, who had been marked out as the objects of exemplary vengeance, could hope for no. indulgence from the Persian commanders, should they even seek to purchase it by voluntary submis- sion. Yet an attempt to resist such a formidable enemy, afforded so little prospect of success, that it could only be considered as a desperate effort, which 299. Id. Hittoriar. lib. vi. cap. xcvi. 300. Id. ibid. 301. Ucro^ot. lib. vi. cap. xcvii. xcviti. might 16d THE HISTORY OF • PART I. might aggravate the calamities of their future condi- s ^~ >^ ^^ l, tion. We cannot, therefore, wonder, if, in those circumstances, their councils were divided; or that some citizens, who had no concern in the public offence, thought of making their peace with the in- censed monarch, at the expense of the interests of the state 302 . Resistance, however, was at last resolv- ed upon, by the majority of votes 303 . In consequence of this resolution, which made a siege necessary, as the Eretrians could not think of meeting the enemy in the field, the Persian com- manders, who had landed their forces in the neigh- bourhood, advanced toward Eretria, and invested that city. For six days did the Eretrians, who had taken refuge within their walls, sustain the assaults of the powerful invaders of their country. Nor can it be said, how long they might have held out, had they not been betrayed by Euphorbus and Philargus ; two of their chief citizens, who put the besiegers in possession of the city 304 . The town thus entered, was delivered up to pillage by the Persian generals', the houses and temples were burnt; and the brave Eretrians, whom policy, not humanity, saved from the sword, were loaded with fetters, in order to be sent in that condition to Susa, there to receive their final sentence from Darius 3 ° 5 . A few days after the taking of .Eretria, the Per- sian forces Were reimbarked, and landed on the coast of Attica; with Hippias, its former king, at their head 306 . By the advice of Hippias, the Persian ge- nerals conducted their army into the plain of Mara- thon 307 . This camp was judiciously chosen. Here 302. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. c. ci. , 303. Id. ibid. 304. Hcrodot. ubi sup. 305, Id. ibid. 306. Herodotus lib. vi. cap. cii. 307. Id. ibid. their ANCIENT EUROPE. 161 their numerous infantry might be drawn up, with- out being greatly impeded; and here their cavalry could act to advantage, if the enemy should think proper to give them battle. The road to Athens was open; and they could be supplied with provi- sions from the fleet, while they remained in that station, whence they could ravage and desolate the country. The inhabitants of Attica, hunted down by the Persian cavalry, might be utterly extirpated; or compelled to take shelter within the walls of their capital, which could be blocked up by sea and land. The Athenians were aware of their perilous situa- tion; and their apprehension of danger was aggra- vated by self-reproach. They now saw, with sor- row and shame, their unwise and ungenerous con- duct, in abandoning the cause of the Asiatic Greeks; but especially in suffering the naval force of Ionia, which might have protected them, to be broken by that of Phoenicia, and turned against them. The unconquerable spirit of liberty, however, preserved them from despair; and the dread of tyranny made them resolve to die free, rather than submit to the will of a despot. The presence of Hippias increased the horror of his countrymen against the Persian power. But how to resist that power, or to prevent the restora- tion of the tyrant, was a question not easy to be an- swered. Thrace and Macedonia had already sub- mitted to the arms of Darius. The Thebans had acknowledged his sway, by the delivery of earth and water. No people, in a word, remained, to whom the Athenians could, in this extremity, ap- ply for aid, except the Lacedaemonians. And the unfeeling disciples of Lycurgus cruelly evaded their request* A* 16* THE HISTORY OF PART I. As soon as informed of the taking of Eretria, the v^">^w Athenian senate had sent a messenger to Sparta, craving the assistance of the Lacedaemonians ; and expressing a hope, that they would not suffer the most ancient of the Grecian cities to be enslaved by the Barbarians 308 . The Spartan senate and popular assembly readily agreed to succour the Athenians j but they could not, they declared, do it immediately. By an ancient, and seemingly obsolete law (for we do not find that on any other occasion it ever ob- structed their operations), their army was forbid, they said, to march beyond the territories of the state before the full moon, and it yet wanted five days of that time 309 . When this answer was received at Athens, her bravest citizens were filled with consternation, and doubtful what course to pursue. The Platosans, in gratitude for former service and support, had promised them a thousand chosen warriors 3 °. But these, and all the men they could muster, appeared so inadequate to the force of the enemy, that the Athenians found it difficult to determine, whether they ought to meet the Persian army in the field, ar rest their safety on the defence of the capital? That momentous question, which seems to have divided the assembly of the people, as well as the council of state, was ultimately decided by the argu- ments of Miltiades, one of the ten generals appointed by the republic, to command the levies of the ten tribes, into which the Athenians were divided, and whose zeal for the independency of Greece we have already had occasion to notice. " Depend 308. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cvi. 309. Id. ibid. 310. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cviii. et Coi-nel. Nep. Vid. MiltiaJ. " not ANCIENT EUROPE. 163 " not upon your walls," said he, " for freedom or LETTER *' safety. Many are the hardships of a siege, and " many the accidents to which it is liable. The " temptations to tieachery are strong, and the " slightest neglect of duty may occasion surprise. " But should you escape these, other dangers await *' you. The spirits of men sink, under the pressure " of famine ; and their courage slackens, when they ** are confined to particular posts. Imbody, there- " fore, your citizens ; boldly lead them forth against " the barbarian host; and patriotism and emulation, u animating valour, will convince you, that victory " does not depend upon numbers 3 ." The opinion of Miltiades was adopted as the reso- lution of the state. And he and his colleagues, con- ducted to the heights of Marathon, nine thousand free Athenians 3 2 , and probably an equal number of armed slaves; and fortified their camp with branches of trees, as a security against the enemy's cavalry. There they were joined by the brave and faithful Platseans 33 ; the whole composing an army of about twenty thousand men 34 . The Persian army, ac- cording to the most moderate computation, con- sisted of one hundred thousand infantry, and ten thousand cavalry 3 5 . The appearance pf so great a body of men accustomed to conquer, and whose name had every where spread terror, renewed the apprehensions of the Athenian generals, and made them hesitate in regard to the propriety of giving battle 36 . 311. Compare Cornel. Nep. Vit. Miltiad. cap. iv. with Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxi. 312. Herodot. lib. vi cap. cviii. Cornel. Nep. Vit. Miltiad. cap. v. 313. Id. ibid. 314. See, on this subject, the conjectures of Mr. Mitford (///*f. Greece, chap. viii. sect, iv.) and Dr. Gillies (chap, ix.) 315. Cornel. Nep. Vit. Miltiad. cap. v. 316. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cix. In 164 THE HISTORY OF PART i. In a council of war, assembled on the occasion, v-*"" v ^»«' five of those generals declared in favour of an im- mediate action, and an equal number against hazard- ing it. Among the former, was the resolute and stout-hearted, Miltiades, who thus addressed him- self to Calimachus, the Polemarch, or archon for military affairs; a magistrate that always attended the army, and who had, in such cases, the privilege of a casting vote 37 . " You, O Calimachus," said he, " have now the choice, whether you will reduce " Athens to the condition of servitude, or preserve " her freedom, and render your name immortal; for " never were her liberties in so much danger, since " the Athenians were a people. If we decline an en- " gagement, the courage of our troops will sink, and " desertion will be the consequence. But if we " face the enemy, with undaunted countenance, the u just gods will behold our triumph. Your voice " must determine, what step we shall take 3 ' 8 ." He gave it for coming to action. But after this difficulty was removed, another still remained, to obstruct the views of Miltiades, The ten Athenian generals held, each, in turn, the chief command of the army for one day 39 ; so that any of those generals might, on such day, decline the combat on any pretence whatever. As a tem- porary remedy for this defect in the military system of the Athenians, (which had arisen from their dread of tyranny, the too common consequence of undivided authority, and which was subversive of that unity of design, so necessary to success in the operations of war) all the generals, who had voted for giving battle, resigned their right of command to the experienced valour of Miltiades 320 . Z17. Id. ibid. 318. Herodot. ubi sup. . 319. Id. flistoriar. lib. vi. cap. ex 520. Id. ibid. Miltiades ANCIENT EUROPE. 165 Miltiades accepted the power; but, in order to LETTER obviate the fatal effects of envy or jealous}', among the other generals, he would not hazard an engage- ment until his own day came 321 . He had made, however, in the meantime, the proper movements, and dispositions for insuring success ; and no sooner did he find himself legally invested with the chief command, than he acquainted his countrymen with his resolution of giving battle to the enemy, and prescribed the order in which they should act. All impatience for the combat, the Athenians and Pla- taeans intrepidly quitted the heights of Marathon, on which they had been encamped, and fearlessly marched down, under the conduct of a leader whom they believed destined by heaven to save Greece from barbarian slavery. Nor did they halt, when they reached the plain ; but ran to meet the haughty invaders, with the ardour of men determined to con- quer or perish. The body of the Athenian citizens, headed by the polymarch, occupied the right wing of the army; the Plataeans, the left; and the armed slaves, supported by the levies of two Athenian tribes, under Themistocles and Aristides, formed the centre 321 . Miltiades was every where present. The Persian generals, when they saw the Greeks Ant. Chr. advancing with such impetuous speed, against a great 49 °- army disposed in order of battle, considered them as ixaii. 3, men ignorant of military discipline; and who, in a fit of despair, were' rushing upon certain destruction; especially as they had neither cavalry nor archers 3 * 3 . But they soon had occasion to discover their mis- take. Miltiades, who was acquainted with the arms, and the manner of fighting, both of the Greeks and 321. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. ex. 322. Id. Rhtoriar. lib. vi. cap. cxi. cxii. Plutarch, Vit. Arittid. 383. Herodot. lib. r't. tap exii. vol. it. 7. barbarians, 166 THE HISTORY OV PART I. barbarians, had desired the Athenians to advance s ^^ v "^^ with rapidity; in order to awaken that enthusiasm of valour, which, spreading from rank to rank, and growing in its progress, as fire is inflamed by the wind, becomes irresistible; as well as to avoid the missile weapons of the enemy 324 . The numerous nations, of which the Persian ar- mies were composed, relied chiefly for their security, and the power of annoying their enemies, upon the use of darts and arrows 3 * 5 . The proper Persian foot alone had any reputation for close fight; and the success of every engagement depended much upon the cavalry, formed of the bravest warriors of each nation 3 ' 6 . The long and weighty Grecian spear was greatly superior to the Asiatic, which was short and light; and that spear, when directed by the phalanx, (which I shall afterward have occasion to describe), could break any troop of horse ; while this firm body could resist the most impetuous shock of cavalry 317 . The strong corslets, the greaves of brass, the massy- buckler of the Greeks, were also far superior to the defensive armour of the Persians 3 * 8 . But the greatest superiority of the troops under Miltiades consisted in their personal prowess. Ac- customed, like all the Greeks, from their infancy to the use of arms, they were expert in every military evolution; and their bodies, toned by gymnastic ex- ercise, had acquired a degree of strength and agility, which made up in force what they wanted in numbers. The battle of Marathon was accordingly fierce and 324. Justin, lib. ii. cap. ix. Cornel. Nep. Fit. Miltiad.cnp. r. 325. Herodot. et Xenoph. passim. 326. Id. ibid. 327. Potter, Arcbxolog. Grtec. book. iii. chap. iv. vi. et auct. cit. 328. Id. ibid. obstinate. ANCIENT EUROPE. 167 obstinate. The Athenian general, in extending his two wings, so as to present a front equal to that of the enemy, had been under the necessity of weaken- ing his centre 319 j which, after a violent struggle, was broken by the enemy's main body, composed chiefly of Persian infantry 33 ". But his two wings defeated those of the Persian army; and, judiciously avoid- ing pursuit, closed upon the victorious main body, which they also defeated, and pursued with great slaughter to the fleet on the coast 33 '. Six thousand three hundred of the barbarians were slain, and seven of their ships were taken. Of the Athenians fell one hundred and ninety -two; among whom were numbered Calimachus, the poly- march, Stesileos, one of the generals, and many other persons of distinction 332 . Among the persons of rank killed, on the side of the Persians, is said to have been included Hippias, the author of the inva- sion 333 ; who here sought the restoration of his autho- rity, at the expense of the liberties and independency of Greece, twenty years after his expulsion from Attica 334 . This battle, however, though decisive, and highly honourable to the victors, did not utterly defeat the designs of the vanquished enemy. The Persian armament was still strong; and no sooner did the fleet put to sea, than the commanders attempted to surprise Athens, by doubling the promontory of Sunium, before the return of the army 33j \ But the vigilance of Miltiades was equal to his conduct and ."329. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. cxi. 330. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. cxiii. 331. Id. ibid. 332. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. xiv — xvii. 333. Justin, lib. ii. cap. ix. 334. Thucydid. lib. vi. cap. lix. . 335. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. cxv. cxvi. valour. 168 THE HISTORY OF PART I. valour. Suspecting the design of the enemy, he de- v>r " Nr> '*" / camped from the plain of Marathon, with the flower of his victorious troops ; and by a rapid march of thirty miles, displayed his triumphant banners on the heights of Cynosarges, which overlook the Athenian capital, when the hostile fleet was prepar- ing to enter port Phaleron 336 . The Persian com- manders, seeing their views frustrated, again put to sea, and steered for the coast of Asia 337 . Thus, my lord, was finally rendered abortive, m consequence of the victory gained at Marathon, the second great effort made by Darius, for enslav- ing the Athenians, and acquiring the dominion of European Greece. But this was not the only con- sequence of that victory. The Lacedaemonians, who arrived on the frontiers of Attica the day after it had been obtained, with two thousand men, reluctantly congratulated their rivals on an event, which they foresaw would give Athens an ascendant among the Grecian states she had not hitherto main- tained; but they desired to be conducted to the field of battle, that they might see the Median habit, the arms, and the bodies of the slain 338 . This was a curiosity worthy of the disciples of Lycurgus ; for the Median habit, which was worn by the Persians as well as the Medes, had hitherto been an object of terror to the Greeks 330 . The victory at Mara- thon dispelled that terror, and made the Greeks sensible of their superiority in weapons, in armour, in valour, and in personal prowess; that, although 336. Id. Hhtotiar. lib. vi. cap. cxvl. 337. Id. ibid. 338. Herodor. lib. vi. cap. cxx. 339. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. cxii. Nor need we be surprised at such terror; "for so many, so powerful, and so warlike," says Plato, " were the nations that had bowed to the Persian yoke, that Darius " seemed to have subdued the very opinions of all mankind." Dialog. Mer.exen. comparatively ANCIENT EUROPE. 169 comparatively few in number, yet while united LETTER among themselves, and animated by the generous spirit of liberty, they were unconquerable, and might set at defiance the myriads of the great king 340 . 3-iO. Plato, in Menexen. et oe Legib. lib. iii. LETTER \70 THE HISTORY OF LETTER XII. THE AFFAIRS OF THE GREEKS AND PERSIANS CON- TINUED, FROM THE VICTORY GAINED BY MILTIADES AT MARATHON TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS, AND THE RETREAT OF XERXES IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS DE- FEAT. PARTI Ant. Chr. JL HE lofty mind of Darius, reposing upon the summit of power, affected to look down with 490. indifference upon the defeat of his army at Mara- Olympiad th on# Instead of being discouraged by his loss, he regarded it only as a new motive for taking ven- geance upon the Athenians, and humbling the whole body of the Grecian states'. His desire of ven- geance, however, was altogether political. It was inconsistent with the dignity of the Persian monarch, and even with the safety of his empire, to let Athens enjoy her triumph, or European Greece glory in his disaster with impunity. But his humanity was, on all occasions, conspicuous toward those unhappy individuals, whom fortune had put in his power. When the Eretrian captives were sent to him by Datis and Artaphernes, in proof that they had not altogether failed in their enterprise, he discovered to those obnoxious enemies the same magnanimous lenity, which he had formerly manifested to the Milesian prisoners. They were not only exempt- ed from punishment, but settled in the fertile dis- trict of Ardarica, about forty miles distant from Susa, where they long preserved the Greek language and manners 2 . 1. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. i. 2. Id. lib. vi. cap. cxix. Meanwhile Olympiad Ixxii. 4. ANCIENT EUROPE. 171 Meanwhile Darius having resolved upon another LETTElt invasion of Greece, ordered preparations to be made, throughout all his extensive dominions, for assem- - „, bling a great naval and military force 3 . This arma- 489 ment he proposed to have conducted in person; but before his preparations were completed, he was informed of the revolt of Egypt 4 . And that disa- greeable event was followed by a dispute among his sons, in regard to the succession to the crown; which it was necessary, according to the laws of the em- pire, that he should settle before he left Susa 5 . Ar- tabazenes, his eldest son by the daughter of Gobryas, pleaded his primogenitui'e ; while Xerxes, his eldest son by Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, urged his right to the throne, as the lineal descendant of the founder of the Persian empire ; and also as the first bom son of Darius, after he was invested with the imperial ensigns 6 . The claim of Xerxes was sustained 7 . But Darius Ant. Chr. died before he could take any steps for the recovery qi i d of Egypt, or the invasion of Greece 8 . Considered lxxiii. 4. in his civil capacity, Darius appears to have been one of the greatest and wisest monarchs that ever reigned in the east. Nor was he destitute of military talents, though, on most occasions, he prudently chose to preside over the administration of govern- ment, rather than appear at the head of his armies ; conscious that the failure of an enterprise, or even the loss of an army, was of small consequence to him, compared with any derangement in the political machine. Xerxes, the son and successor of Darius, inherited the ambition, the power, and the resentments of his 3. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. i. 4. Id. ibid. 5. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. ii. 6. Id. lib. vii. cap. ii. iii. 7. Herodotus, Historiar. lib. vii. cap. iii. 8 Id. lib. vii. cap. iv. father, 172 THE HISTORY OF PART I. father, without being heir to his abilities. He was v-*~*^w not, however, destitute of talents for sway. He was magnificent, generous, brave; and consequently popular, as far as popularity is consistent with abso- lute monarchy. The two first years of his reign were chiefly employed in settling his affairs, and in accomplishing the recovery of Egypt; which he reduced to a state of more abject servility, and com- mitted to the government of his brother Achse- menes 9 . He next proposed, in conformity with the views of his father, to undertake the conquest of Greece. But before I describe his preparations for that enterprise, we must, my lord, take a view of the state of the celebrated country against which it was directed. The Athenians, as I have had occasion to observe, had been rapidly increasing in power, since the re- covery of their political freedom, in consequence of the expulsion of the Pisistratidae. The victory at Marathon gave them an ascendant in the affairs of Greece, which they had never before possessed; and they soon aspired, with their new created navy, at the same dominion by sea, which the Lacedaemo- nians exercised on land. Miltiades, to whom they were chiefly indebted for that victory, was deserv- edly the man of most authority 10 . He proposed to reduce under the Athenian sway, and levy fines upon such of the European islands in the ^Egean sea, as had favoured the Persian monarch". For these purposes, he was furnished with a fleet of seventy sail, and directed his course to the Cy- clades 12 . But instead of conducting himself with moderation, or studying the general good of the 9. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. vii. 10. Id. Historiar. lib. vi. cap. cxxxii. 11. Cornel. Nepot. Vit. M'dtiad. cap. vii. 12. Id. ibid, et Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxxxiii. republic, ANCIENT EUROPE. 173 republic, he gave way to the violent disposition of his naturally haughty and tyrannical heart 3 . Actuated by personal resentment 4 , he instantly appeared off the island of Paros, famous for its marble, and de- manded from the inhabitants a fine of one hundred talents of silver' 5 , or about twenty thousand pounds sterling. The Parians, neither able nor willing to pay so large a sum, denied his request without he- sitation; prepared themselves for resistance, and diligently repaired the walls of their capital' 6 . Mil- tiades disembarked his troops, and invested the place both by sea and land. But after carrying on his ope- rations for twenty-six days, during which he had ravaged the country, and employed in vain every effort to take the obstinate city, he raised the siege, and returned with his unsuccessful armament to Athens' 7 . In a republic, no distinguished man is without enemies ; who are, at all times, ready to take advan- tage of his miscarriages. Xanthippus, an eminent Athenian citizen, and father to the famous Pericles, envious of the high reputation of Miltiades, or jealous of his power, accused him, in the popular 13. That such was the true character of Miltiades, we have the fullest testimony in Herodotus (Historiar. iib. vi. cap. xxxix.). He had violently seized the government of the Thracian Chersonesus (Id. ibid.). In order to support his usurped authority, and give dig- nity to the regal office, he maintained five hundred guards (Herodot. uhi sup.) ; and, as a farther support to his power, he married the daughter of Olerus, king of ihe neighbouring part of Thrace. Id. ibid. 14. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. cxxxiii. 15. Id. ibid. 16. Herodot. ubi sup. 17. Id. Histcriar. lib. vi. cap. cxxxiv. cxxxv. Cornelius Nepos assigns as a reason for Miltiades raising the siege of Paros, the acci- dental burning of a grove on tlie Asiatic coast, which he considered as a signal to the inhabitants of the approach of a Persian fleet, to their assistance (Cornel. Ncp. Vit. Miltiad. cap. vii.) : But no notice is taken of this circumstance by Herodotus. vol. ii. A a assembly, 174 THE HISTORY OF PART I. assembly, of having betrayed the interests of the s "^ Nr ^"' state \ Confined to his bed by a wound, which he had received at Paros, and which may be considered as the true cause of his relinquishing the siege of that place, Miltiades was not able to appear in his own defence 9 . His friends undertook it for him; and urged his former services, in extenuation of his late unaccountable failure 20 . The Athenians, in consideration of these services, exempted their unfortunate commander from the punishment of death, which his accuser urged was due to his crime, by the laws of the republic; but they condemned him to pay a fine of fifty talents of silver, in order to defray the expense of the arma- ment, which had been fitted out at his request 21 . Not being able to raise the sum, he was thrown into pri- son ; where he died, soon after, of a mortification in his thigh, in consequence of his wound 22 . Cimon, the worthy son of Miltiades, engaged to pay his father's fine, that he might be permitted to perform his funeral honours*-:-— and his countrymen, in suc- ceeding times, did justice to his military character 4 . The 18. Herodotus, lib. vi. cap. exxxvi. " For a Persian bribe," says Nepos (Fit. Miltiad. cap. vii.). Herodotus does not carry the accu- sation so far. 19. Id. ibid. 20. Herodot. lib. vi. cap. exxxvi. Considering the high reputation of M:l;fades for courage and conduct, and the formidable armament with which he was entrusted, we car.not w onder that the Athenians were astonished, and enraged at his returning without ei'her wealth or honour (Herodot. lib. vi. cap. exxxv.); or that, under such aggra- vating and suspicious circumstances, his friends did not dare to plead his innocence. 21. Cornel. Xepot. Fit. Mihiad. cap. vii, Herodot. ubi sup. 22. hercdotus, lib. vi. cap. exxxvi. 23. Plut. et Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Cimon, init. 24. A monument was raised to his memory in the plain of Mara- thon (Pausanias, lib. i.) ; his statue, executed by Phidias, was placed in the temple of Apollo at Delphos (Puusau. lib. x.) ; and when the birle ANCIENT EUROPE. 175 The Athenians have been accused of cruelty and ingratitude to Miltiades. But it is impossible, th*t the collective body of any free people can ever for- get the services, or treat with severity a citizen, who has distinguished himself in the cause of his country, unless they have reason to believe he has afterward injured the state, or to apprehend that he is disposed so to do. Miltiades had commanded in chief at the battle of Marathon, which delivered Athens from the danger of Persian slavery, and the dread of the restoration of her former tyrant. But he was only one of ten generals, who had, on that occasion, headed the levies of the ten tribes of the republic: many Athenian citizens accounted them- selves equally worthy of command; all had disco- vered equal courage in action. And it was univer- sally understood, that after a citizen had performed the most gallant exploits, in defence of his country, he had done no more than was his duty. If he aspired at envied honours, or perpetual command, he be- came an object of jealousy. If he employed the forces of the state for the purpose of personal venge- ance, or self-aggrandisement, he was justly held ob- noxious. Greece, perhaps, never produced a more able general, nor Athens a more dangerous citizen than Miltiades. The Athenians seem, therefore, to have wisely judged, that it was better a suspected leader, though innocent, should suffer, than his fellow-citi- zens remain in a state of fear 2 '. They were sensible that, considering the influence of habit upon ambi- tious minds, he had been too long accustomed to battle of Marathon was painted by Polygnotus, at the desire of the Athenian state, and placed in the public gallery called Ptcile, the portrait of Miltiades was drawn in the fore-ground, animating the troops, by his presence and example. Cornel. Nepot, Vit. Miltiad, cap. vi. Plin. Nat. Hist, lib. xxxv. cap. ix. 2$. Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Miltiad. cap. viii. command, 176 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, command, ever to learn to obey; and that he had w^v>^/ too long enjoyed the highest offices, quietly to de- scend to a private station 26 . His degradation was become necessary to the safety of the constitution 27 ; and, in order to accomplish that end, without con- vulsing the state, it was expedient to connect mis- fortune with disgrace, and to construe misapplica- tion of the strength of the republic into treachery or treason. But Xanthippus did not obtain his aim, in turning the resentment of the people against Miltiades. The favour of the Athenians, after the death of that illus- trious captain, was divided between Aristides and Themistocles, two younger men, who had distin- guished themselves in the field of Marathon, by their valour and conduct, and who both possessed great talents, for civil as well as military affairs. These two candidates, for the lead in the govern- ment of Athens, were however persons of very dif- ferent characters. Aristides was a man of austere manners, inflexible justice, and uncorruptible inte- grity; studious of deserving, but above courting popularity 28 . Though only a citizen of small for- tune, he leaned toward the aristocratical part of the constitution 29 ; not from any desire of lording it over his fellow-citizens, but from a conviction, founded on the most perfect, knowledge of the ad- ministration of the republic, that the popular assembly, was now more than a balance for the 26. Id. ibid. 27. If Miltiades had continued to retain the chief command, the Athenian constitution, according to the ideas of the Greeks, would have been subverted; for, as Cornelius Nepos well observes, " all " were accounted, and called tyrants, whose power was perpetual in a '• free state" {Vit. Miltiad, ubi sup.). The courteous affability, and condescending humanity of Miltiades, served only to confirm the Athenians in their jealousy of his ambitious views; he reminded them of Pisistratus. Id. ibid, et Suidas, voc. Miltiad. 28. Plut. et Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Aristid. init. 29. Plut. ubi sup. senate ANCIENT EUROPE. 177 senate and areopagus, the two higher branches of letter the political system. Themistocles was a man of less rigid morals, and less sincere patriotism, than Aristides. He was more ambitious of public favour, than zealous for the public good; and, in order to acquire popula- rity, and procure the employments of the state, he did not scruple to pervert justice, and make use of bribes 3 ". But if inferior to his rival in virtue, he was superior in abilities. He was an eloquent ora- tor, an expert general, a consummate politician; and the better to carry his measures in the popular assembly, he affected to foster the democratical spirit of the people ;: . His memory was tenacious, his judgment clear, and his genius penetrating. Hence he surpassed all his cotemporaries, if not all mankind, in ready recollection, decision, and fore- sight: in the faculty of taking advantage of present circumstances, whether as a statesman or a com- mander, and in conjecturing justly concerning future events 32 . Nor was he less distinguished by his singular acuteness, in discerning the strength or the weakness of arguments on the most intricate sub- jects, how little soever such debates might have hitherto engaged his attention 33 ; and of giving the ascendant to which ever side he inclined, while he seemed only to abet what was incontrovertibly right. The opposite characters of these two extraordi- nary men, and their opposite lines in politics, made them divide upon all public questions 34 . The elo- 30. Plut. Vit. Aristid. et Tbcmist. " May I never sit on a tribunal," «aid Themistocles, when accused of partiality in the distribution of justice, " where my friends shall not find more favour than stran- gers." Plut. Vit. Aristid. 31. Id. ibid. 32. Thucid. lib. i. cap. cxxxviii. 33. Id. ibid. 34. Plut. Vit. Aristid. et Tbemist. quence, 178 THE HISTORY OF PAHT I. quence, the address, and popular arguments of s^vn-' Themistocles generally swayed the assembly of the people. He accordingly obtained the chief com- mand of the naval force of Athens, and was invest- ed with very extensive powers 35 . But the sound understanding, the blameless manners, the benevo- lent disposition, and unbending probity of Aristides, gave a standard weight to his character, which balanced all the splendid qualities of his rival, in the estimation of the more respectable citizens 36 . This upright senator had been chosen archon the year after the battle of Marathon; in consequence, as may be conjectured, of his gallant behaviour in that battle, and his approved honesty in the care of the spoil, which he had been appointed to guard 37 . Aristides discharged the office of archon, the high- est magistracy in the state, and every other civil employment he had filled, with such wisdom and integrity, that he obtained the surname of Just*' ; the most honourable appellation that can be given to any human being, and to which no man seems ever to have been better entitled. But the reputation of Aristides for the godlike virtue of justice proved his misfortune. The peo- ple of Athens had such confidence in his solid judg- ment, and impartial decrees, from his admirable conduct while in office, that they resorted to him for arbitration, in private life; and in such numbers, that the courts of law were overawed by his equi- table decisions, and in a manner deserted 39 . The pride of the Athenian magistrates was hurt, and their choler roused, at such preponderating personal 35. Cornel. Nepot. Fit. Themist. 36. Plut. Fit. Arhtid. 37. Id. ibid. 38. Plut. ubi sup. 39. Id. ibid. influence. ANCIENT EUROPE. 179 influence. And Themistocles blew these discontents LETTER into a flame, that destroyed the credit of his rival. After returning from a naval expedition, in the course of which he had humbled the Corcyreans, and acquired for the Athenians the undisputed em- pire of the iEgean sea, that successful commander amused his friends and the populace with theatrical entertainments, and other public spectacles 40 . Mean- while he made it be secretly whispered among them, that Aristides, by drawing to his own arbitration, the decision of all causes, had established, though without the assistance of guards, a tyranny over the minds of his fellow citizens 41 . The alarm spread An !oS' hr ' from the capital to the country; and the people, Olympiad crowding from all quarters to Athens, banished Aris- !nilL 4 - tides by the ostracism 42 . The firm behaviour of Aristides, on this trying occasion, was worthy of his virtuous and steady character. When the people were inscribing the names on the shells, which were to determine his 40. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Themht. 41. Plut. Vit. Ariatid. 42. Id. ibid. The nature of this judicature I have formerly had occasion to explain. 1 shall, therefore, only here observe, that the popularity of Themistocles must have been very great, and his in- sidious arts many, before he could induce the people to drive into exile " the best and justest man in Athens," to use the words of the honest and candid Herodotus (lib. viii. cap. lxxix.) : And I may venture to add, without incurring the imputation of scepticism, that Aristides must have set too high a value upon his moral character, and have arrogated more personal authority, than was consistent with the equal freedom of republican government at Athens before six thousand citizens could be procured) by any means, to demand his banishment. For that number, we have seen (Lett, xi.), was re- quired to effect an expulsion by the ostracism; and more might be necessary, to produce a majority, though fewer could not obtain a decree of exile (Plut. Vit. Aristid.). Aristides was banished in the sixth year before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Aristid. init. 180 THE HISTORY OF PART I. exile, an illiterate countryman came to the envied ^ > " v ~ >fc ' senator, and giving him a shell, desired him to write Aristides upon it. Surprised at the request, he asked the fellow, if Arstides had ever injured him? — " No," answered he, " nor do I so much as know " his person; but it grieves me to hear him every " where called the Just* 3 ." Aristides coolly wrote his own name upon the shell, and returned it, with- out making any reply 44 . And when he quitted Athens, in submission to his sentence of exile, he lifted up his hands toward heaven, and patriotically prayed, that the Athenians might never see the day, which should make them remember Aris- tides 45 . The expulsion of this truly good, and great man, left full scope for the ambition, and enterprising spi- rit of Them istocles. And, fortunately for Athens, that ambition was directed in a line, which, in her then circumstances, was equally consistent with her glory and safety. Themistocles had early turned his mind to maritime affairs 46 ; and as no man under- stood the interests of his country better, or pursued its prosperity with more undeviating aim, he con- stantly recommended to the Athenians the augmen- tation of their navy 47 . With that view, he had begun, while archon, three years before the battle of Mara- thon, the enlarging and fortifying of the harbour Peirseus 18 . Now, in a manner, absolute disposer of of the resources of the state, he determined to raise Athens to the uncontrouled sovereignty of the sea; as her proper road to wealth and grandeur, as well as her best security against enemies, both Greek and barbarian 49 . 43. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Arhtid. 44. Id. ibid. 45. Plut. ubi sup. 46. Plut. Vit. Tbemist. 47. Id. ibic?'. 48. Thucvdid. lib. i. cap. xciii. 49. Plut. Vit. Tlemitt. In ANCIENT EUROPE. 181 In the prosecution of this project, recommended by his late naval success, he met with few obstacles. The Athenian treasury was already so full, that it had been proposed to divide among the citizens, at ten drachms a head, the annual produce, or revenue arising from the silver mines of Laurium 50 ; a moun- tain between the Piraeus and the promontory of Lau- rium, which was public property. Themistocles re- monstrated against that measure ; and obtained, by his eloquence and influence, a decree of the state, that no such distribution should be made, until two hundred trireme gallies were built 5 '. The pretext for building these gallies was the final humiliation of the iEginetes, the ancient naval ene- mies of Athens, who were again become powerful and insolent 52 . But Themistocles had farther views. He had long foreseen, and foretold, that the victory at Marathon, instead of being considered as the termination of the Persian war, ought only to be regarded as its beginning; as the source of new inva- sions, and of greater battles both by land and sea 53 . He was, by this time, informed of the preparations of Xerxes: and the gallies, which he had ordered to be built, were fit for service, before the impending danger approached the Grecian shores 54 . The first intimation of this danger, is said to have been conveyed to Sparta by Demaratus, the degraded king of Lace daemon 55 ; who, though entertained at 50. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxliv. 51. Id. ibid. These gallies, we are told, were of superior size and construction to any armed vessels hitherto seen in Greece. Plato, de Legib. lib. iii. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xiv. 52. Herodot. ubi sup. Plut. Fit. Tbemitt. 53. Plut. Vit. Themist. 54. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxliv. 55. Id. Hiatoriar. lib. vii. cap. ccxxxix. vol. ii. b b the 182 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the court of Susa, in a manner suitable to his rank, '**~ >< ^*s and considered as a counsellor of the Persian mo- narch, seems still to have retained a secret affection for the cause of Greece. Leonidas, who had (as we have seen), succeeded his brother Cleomenes in the Spartan throne, as the colleague of Leotychides, and who seems to have taken the lead in military affairs, conveyed the alarming intelligence to the several Grecian states 56 ; and it was resolved in the Amphictyonic council, or general assembly of those states, convened at the isthmus of Corinth, that all private hostilities should cease, and measures be taken for opposing the public enemy 57 . Little dependence was, however, to be placed upon any of the confederate states, except Athens and Sparta. The Thebans, jealous of the Athenian power, were secretly disposed to favour the opera- tions of the Persian monarch; as were the Argives, who had long been cruelly harrassed by the inroads and arrogance of the Lacedaemonians 58 . The Thes- salians were exposed to invasion from Thrace and Macedonia, already subjected to the dominion of the great king; and the people of the smaller states, it was to be apprehended, would be awed into sub- mission by the terror of his arms. The preparations of Xerxes were, indeed, such as might have excused, upon prudential considerations, the submission of the whole body of the European Greeks, to the east of the Ionian sea, and even have exempted them from the imputation of cowardice, whether we consider their population, or the extent of their territory. But the political and military insti- tutions of the Greeks, which made every citizen a sol- 56. Id. ibid. 57. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxlv. 08. Id. Hisioriar. lib. vi. vii. passim. dier, ANCIENT EUROPE. 183 dier and a statesman, with the impracticable nature of their country ; intersected by gulfs and stupen- dous ridges of mountains, and excavated by deep bays ; made the conquest of Greece appear so ardu- ous an enterprise, that deliberations on the subject are said to have deeply engaged, and divided the grand council of the Persian monarch, after the third invasion of that illustrious country was projected . These deliberations, as given by Herodotus, throws so much light on the national character of the Per- sians, on the state of their immense empire, extend- ing from the Nile almost to the Ganges, and on the views of the great king, that the substance of them deserves to be related ; especially when we consider, that the invasion of Greece by Xerxes is the most memorable expedition in the history of Ancient Europe. LETTER XII. What time this mighty monarch had recovered possession of Egypt, he assembled at Susa an ex- traordinary council of state; and having desired the princes, noblemen, and chief governors, that com- posed it, to deliver their sentiments with freedom, he spoke to the following purport: " From the sera, " O Persians! that we were freed from the domi- " nion of the Medes, and taught to conquer by " Cyrus, we have never led an inglorious or inactive " life ; but, following the guiding hand of God, have " risen, by hardy deeds, to the summit of human " grandeur. I neednot enumerate to you the achieve- " ments of Cyrus, of Cambyses, or of my father, " Darius; the nations they conquered, or the extent " of empire they acquired: with those matters you " are well acquainted. And since I ascended the " imperial throne, it has been my study to act in a " manner worthy of my illustrious ancestors, and to " seek the farther exaltation of the Persian power. Ant. Chr. 484. Olympiad lxxiv. 1. 59. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. viii. et scq. In 184 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " In thus directing my views, I find we may still w^v^w " earn an accession of glory, with the conquest of a M country not inferior in any respect to those we " now possess, and more abounding in many things, " while we avenge ourselves of our enemies. Hence " I have convoked this general council, that I may " unfold my purpose to the Persian princes, nobles, " and rulers. " I propose to lay a bridge over the Hellespont," said he, " and to lead an army into Greece, through those countries we have conquered in Europe ; in order to punish the Athenians for the injuries they have done the Persians in general, and for their insults to my father, in particular. Darius, you know, had determined to make war against that people ; but death prevented the execution of his vengeance. I therefore think it my duty to right the Persians, and revenge my father's wrongs, by sacking and burning Athens ; whose citizens auda- ciously took up arms, at the instigation of Arista- goras, the Milesian,. our servant; assailed Sardis, without the shadow of injury, and consumed with fire not only the city, but the altars and sacred groves. Their treatment of the Persians, who entered their territory under Datis and Arta- phernes, demanding justice, is too recent to be forgot. " These hostile provocations," continued Xerxes, " and the cruel indignities offered to my father's " heralds, have inflamed me with a violent desire " of making war upon the Athenians. And if we " can subdue them, with their warlike neighbours, " who inhabit Peloponnesus, the Persian empire, " unless political reasonings deceive me, will know " no limits but the heavens; nor shall the sun survey, " in his course, any country exempted from our sway. " For ancient Europe'. iss " For I intend to penetrate, with your concurrence, " to the extremity of Europe, and to combine the " whole world into one empire; being well assured, " that when we shall have achieved the conquest of " Greece, no city or nation upon the face of the " earth will be able to withstand our armies 60 ." Mardonius, who had first awakened the youthful ambition of Xerxes, spoke next, and warmly in favour of the projected enterprise. " You have " wisely resolved, O king!" said he, " to take ven- " geance upon the European Greeks; for, after " we have conquered so many great nations, it " would be the utmost indignity to the Persian " name, to suffer the unprovoked injuries of this " people | to go unpunished. Of what can we be " afraid ? — What forces, what resources have they? " — Have we not already subdued their" descend- " ants, the Ionians, iEolians, and Dorians, who in- " habit the Asiatic coast? — And when your father, " Darius, commanded me to make war upon the " Athenians, I marched into Macedonia, and ad- " vanced almost to Athens ; yet no Grecian people " had the courage to oppose my progress. How " then shall they dare to resist the great king, going " to war with all the forces and ships of Asia? — " From what I know of the Greeks," added he, " I '* cannot think they will proceed to such audacity. " But should I happen to be mistaken, and they, " vainly elated, venture to give us battle, they will " learn, by fatal experience, that we surpass all man- " kind in feats of arms. Let us, therefore, prepare " to put in motion the armament: for, without ex- " ertion, nothing can be performed; but all things, " possible to men, may be accomplished by valour " and fortitude 6 ." 60. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. viii. 61. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. ix. When 186 THE HISTORY OF PART I. When Mardonius had finished this ardent speech, ^^^^*^ in support of the expedition proposed by the king, all the other Persian chiefs remained silent, except Ar- tabanus, the paternal uncle of Xerxes. " As the " purest gold," said he, " is best distinguished by " comparison from baser ore, in like manner, O king! " princes are enabled, by hearing different opinions, " to adopt sound counsels. When Darius, your " father, and my brother, had formed the design of " invading Scythia, a country utterly destitute of " cities, I endeavoured to dissuade him from it. " But he, hoping to subdue the Scythian Nomades, " rejected my advice, and undertook that pompous " expedition against them, in which he lost the flower " of his army. You, O king', propose to carry " war into the territories of a more gallant people " than the Scythians; a people who are highly re- " nowned'for their exploits, both by land and sea. " I therefore think myself bound," continued he, " to mention the difficulties you must expect to " encounter." " When you shall have joined the shores of the " Hellespont by a bridge, and led your forces, let us " say unbroken, into Greece, you will then be under " the necessity of vanquishing the valiant enemy, " and perhaps on both elements, or of suffering the " greatest hardships. And that no feeble effort " will be required, to gain a victory over them on " either element, former experience seems to attest. " If the Athenians alone defeated the vast army " thrown into their country by Datis and Artapher- " nes, what may not be expected from the collective " body of the Greeks? — And should they prove " victorious at sea, as well as on land; and, sailing " to the Hellespont, break down your bridge, how " dreadful will be the event! — Tremble, O king! " to think of the consequences. Hearken, there- fore, ANCIENT EUROPE. 187 " fore to my words: deliberate no more upon this LETTER " matter; nor farther think of exposing yourself to ^^1^^ " so many dangers, without necessity. " You are, indeed, mightier than all other poten- " tates, king of kings I" — added Artabanus; — "but " God takes pleasure in pulling down human gran- " deur, and in frustrating ambitious designs. Hence " we often see an immense army, struck with sud- " den terror by the jealous Power; and, deprived " of its wonted courage, routed by a small body " of men. For the Deity permits transcendant " greatness to be permanently enjoyed by himself " alone" 2 ." Transported with rage, and stung with indigna- tion, at the discouraging speech of Artabanus, Xerxes, after reproaching him with cowardice, replied thus: " Without thee, I shall be able to execute my enter- " prise. Nor should I be the son of Darius, who " derived his blood from Hystaspes, through a long " line of royal ancestors, unless I thirsted for ven- " geance upon the Athenians ; well knowing, that if " we remain quiet, they will not be inactive, but, fol- " lowing the dictates of their restless disposition, will " enter our territories with an army. We may judge " of their future intentions by their past hostilities. " Have they not daretl to invade Asia, and burn " Sardis? Both we and they have advanced too far " to recede, and must either resolve to conquer br " serve. All our dominions must fall under the power " of the Greeks, or their country must become an " accession to the Persian empire. No other alterna- " tive remains, for terminating our mutual enmity. " They were the aggressors; and we must seek " revenge, or sacrifice our national honour 63 ." 62. Herndot. lib. vii. cap. x. 6.3. Id. Hittoriar. lib. vii. cap. xi. The 188 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The invasion of Greece was accordingly resolved ^"*~ v ~>- / upon by the august body of the Persian chiefs, solemn- ly assembled in council: even Artabanus, at last, gave it his sanction 64 . In consequence of this resolution, Xerxes issued orders for levying troops in all the pro- vinces of his extensive empire, and for building ships in all the sea-ports of his dominions, in Europe, Asia, and Africa, from the Thracian Bosphorus to the fron- tiers of Libya 65 . These formidable preparations were vigorously prosecuted for three years; at the expira- tion of which term, the Persian monarch found him- self master of the greatest naval and military force that ever was equipped by any prince, in ancient or modern times, and amply furnished with provisions and stores 6 . Nor had any measure been omitted, that could facilitate the success of this prodigious armament. A navigable canal had been cut through the neck of the stormy promontory of mount Athos, in order to avoid the danger of doubling it with a fleet 67 ; magazines were formed in Thrace and Mace- donia 68 ; and a bridge was thrown over the Hellespont from Sesto.s, on the Asiatic coast, to Abydos on the European shore 69 . When all things were ready for the execution of this grand enterprise, Xerxes joined his oriental forces 64. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xii — xviii. 65. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. xx. et seq. 66. Id. ibid. 67. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xxi — xxiv. The disaster, which the Per- sian fleet had formerly suffered off that promontory, suggested the idea of this canal (Id. ibid.). It was so capacious as to admit two trireme gallies to pass abreast (Herodot. lib. vii. cap xxiv.). The cavils of some modern writers, in regard to the reality of such a work, have been so fully refuted by Mr. Mitford and Dr. Gillies, that I have no occasion to touch upon the subject. The authority of Thucydides (Iil». iv. cap. cix.) added to that of Herodotus, is indeed sufficient to silence the most obstinate incredulity. 68. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. xxv. 69 Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xxxiii. et seq. at ANCIENT EUROPE. 189 at Cratile in Cappadocia; and having crossed the LETTER river Halys, and marched through Phrygia, near the sources of the Meander, he proceeded to Sar- dis with his immense army 70 . There, the troops 481. levied in the western provinces of the empire, had O'y^P'ad been ordered to rendezvous, while the fleet assem- bled near the mouth of the Hellespont; and there the Persian monarch passed the winter 7 '. Soon after his arrival at Sardis, Xerxes sent heralds to all the states of Greece, except Athens and Lacedasmon, demanding earth and water, in tes- timony of their submission 72 . For this honourable distinction, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were indebted to their former barbarous treatment of the Persian heralds, not to any lenity on the part of the great king 73 ; who considered them, as we have seen, as his most formidable and inveterate enemies; and, therefore, was unwilling to hazard a new insult. But the people of the other states, he flattered him- self, would readily deliver the symbols of obedience ; when informed of the immensity of his armament, and its destination. Nor was he altogether deceived; for many of those states either yielded the submis- sion required, or secretly treated with him n ; though they pretended, at the same time, to adhere to the general confederacy, and sent deputies to the isthmus of Corinth (as we shall have occasion to observe), where the Grecian delegates were assembled. Meanwhile the Persian monarch was employed in imbodying his troops, and making preparations for ^70. Id. BUtoriar. lib. xxvi — xxvii. 71. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xxxiii. xxxvii. 72.. Id. lib. vii. cap. xxxii. 73. Id. ibid. 74. Herodotus, lib. vii. passim. The people, who prudently pro* ▼ided for their safety by presenting earth and water to Xerxes, were the Thessalians, Dolopiaas, Enienses, Perrhxbians, Locrians, Mag* netes, Melians, Acharans, Phthiotians, and the Thebans, with all the other Boeotians, except the Thespians a.'id Platauns. Id. lib. vii. cap. cxzxii. vol. II. c c crossing / 190 THE HISTORY OF PART I. crossing the Hellespont. The first bridge throw* over that strait, which is near a mile in breadth, having been broken in pieces by a violent storm, he ordered another to be built by more able artificers 75 . These naval architects, instead of one, formed two bridges; so contrived, as mutually to defend each other against storms in opposite directions; and constructed in the following manner. They bound together, with strong cordage, side by side, a row of gallies, with their prows to the Propontis: securing each galley by its great anchor, to resist the winds from the Euxine sea; and they made fast the whole row of gallies with thick cables, tightened by the force of engines, to moorings on shore 76 . In the same man- ner, they bound together, and moored, a second row of gallies, with their prows to the iEgean sea; and secured by anchors, like the former, against the winds from that sea 77 . Over the surface of each of those rows of gallies, they laid trunks of trees, cut exactly to the breadth of the bridges, and strongly compacted together. Upon these cross beams, they fixed planks, covered with earth; and both bridges were furnished, on each side, with a close ledge of timber, that the horses and other cattle might not tumble over, or be frightened at the sight of the sea 78 . As soon as Xerxes was informed, that the bridges over the Hellespont were finished, and the navigable canal, through the isthmus of mount Athos, secured at each end by a bank of earth, to prevent the flow of the tides from choaking it with sand, he quitted Sardis, and marched with the great body of his forces to Abydos 79 . Here, being desirous to 75. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xxiii — xxxvi. 76. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. xxxvli. 77. Id. ibid. 78. Herodot. tibi sup. 7°. Id. Hist, lib. vii. cap. xxxvii. ct seq. survey ANCIENT EUROPE. 191 survey his mighty armament, on both elements, he LETTER ascended a lofty tower, which he had ordered to be built for the purpose, in the form of an observatory, A „ r Ch whence he could at once view both his fleet and 481. army 8 "; the sea covered with his ships, and the land \J : y'^ with his troops, as far as the eye could reach. He seemed at first highly elated with this magnificent spectacle, and beheld with peculiar pleasure a blood- less naval engagement, exhibited for his amusement, in -which he adjudged the honour of victory to the Sidonians 8 ' ; but afterward reflecting on the shortness and fragility of human life, with the perils to which so many myriads of men must be exposed, in order to gratify his ambition, the triumph of pride gave way to softer emotions, and he could not refrain from shedding tears 82 , Artabanus, the king's uncle, who had observed the change in his countenance, and learned its cause, endeavoured to console him, by remarking, that mankind, during life, inevitably suffer miseries more to be bewailed, than its loss. " Hence," said he, " short as our mortal period is, there breathes no u man among the myriads in your service, or in any " other human condition, who enjoys such a share " of happiness, as not often to be willing to die, " rather than live. For the calamities and diseases, " incident to humanity, are so grievous, that this " short existence seems tediously long; and death " is found the safest shelter from the ills of life* 13 ." " Since human life, Artabanus, is so miserable as " you represent it," said Xerxes, " let us cease to " regard it; nor weakly give way to unavailing " lamentations, when we o tight to cherish the de* 80. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xliv. 81. Id. ibid. 82. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. xlv. xlvi. 83. Id. ibid, " lightful 192 THE HISTORY OF PART T. " Iightful hopes of a prosperous issue to our under- ^•^^^^^ " taking 84 ." Artabanus, however, endeavoured to moderate those hopes, and even ventured to predict the probability of failure, from the very magnitude of the king's naval and military force; the difficulty of suppyling with provisions such an immense army in an enemy's country, and the dangers to which so enormous a fleet must be exposed upon stormy and hostile shores 85 . Xerxes replied in a manner worthy of his exalted station and illustrious descent, " All that you have " said, Artabanus," observed he, "appears to be just. " We must not, however, anticipate misfortunes; " nor minutely inquire into the possible circum- " stances, that may frustrate our designs; otherwise ** we shall never engage in any arduous enterprise, " but remain in a state of inaction more to be shun- u ned than the disasters we fear. Had my prede- M cessors listened to such timid counsels, as those M you offer, our dominion would still have been con- " fined to the mountains of Persia; but they, by ** greatly daring, and despising dangers and difn- " culties, raised this empire to its present height of *' power. I am, therefore, determined to emulate " the exploits of my ancestors; and having provided ** every thing that can render my undertaking suc- ** cessful, and entered upon the execution of it at w the most favourable season of the year, will prose- u cute it with vigour; assured, that no mortal can " certainly foretel the event of human pursuits 86 ." Immediately after this conversation was ended, Artabanus returned to Susa; in order to superin- tend the royal household, and conduct the adminis- tration of government during the king's absence 87 . 84. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xlvii. 85. Id. Hlstoriar. lib. vii, cap. xlviii. xlix. 86. Herodot. lib, vii. cap. 1. 8T. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. Jin. And ANCIENT EUROPE. 193 And Xerxes, having again assembled the Persian LETTER princes and nobles (to whom chiefly was committed the command of his naval and military forces), he spoke to the following effect: " I have called you " together, O Persians! on this occasion, that I may " exhort you to acquit yourselves like brave men; " nor bring, by a contrary conduct, disgrace upon " the great and glorious achievements of your re- " nowned ancestors; but one and all display intre- " pidity, in the common cause in which we are " engaged. For such conduct only can insure suc- " cess. Beside these reasons for exertion," added he, " I am peculiarly desirous of awakening your " courage in the present war; because, I am told we " have to contend with a gallant enemy; and that, '* if we can vanquish the Greeks, we shall meet with " no opposition from any other people. Let us then " boldly begin our march, after we have implored " the protection of the guardian powers, who preside " over the Persian empire 88 . The same day preparations were made for passing the Hellespont; and next morning, before sun-rise, an oblation of all kinds of perfumes was burnt upon the bridges, which were afterward strewed with myrtles 89 . As soon as the sun rose, Xerxes poured a libation into the sea, from a golden phial, and addressed a prayer to that adored luminary, " That he might meet " with no obstruction in his progress, until he had " carried his arms to the extremity of Europe, which " it was his purpose to subdue;" then threw the phial into the Hellespont, together with a golden goblet, and a Persian scymitar 9 ". When these sacred rites had been performed, the Persian army began to pass the bridges; the troops, 88. Id. ibid. 89. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lir. SO. Id. ibid. both 194 THE HISTORY OF PART I. both horse and foot, over that which lay next the w *" v ~^'' Euxine; and the numerous attendants, with the baggage-carriages and beasts of draught, over that which was nearest the iEgean sea; while the fleet weighed anchor, and sailed toward the European coast 91 . After all the forces of Xerxes had completed the passage of the Hellespont, which is said to have employed seven days and nights, they marched through the Chersonesus; and, bending their route westward, encamped in the extensive plains of Do- riscus, near the mouth of the Hebrus, the largest river in Thrace 92 . Here the Persian monarch re- viewed his army, and found it amount to the amaz- ing number of seventeen hundred thousand infantry, and eighty thousand cavalry; beside camel-drivers and charioteers, computed at twenty thousand 93 . The description of the arms and accoutrements of the troops of the various nations, which composed this immense body, as given by Herodotus, forms the most valuable article in the works of that venerable historian; whose writings afford more important information in regard to matters of remote anti- quity, and furnish a more just view of the civil and military state of the world in early times (I shall not even except Homer), than those of all other au- thors extant. This article is too curious to be altogether omitted, and too copious to be here in- serted at full length : I shall, therefore, select such particulars as will most contribute to the advance- 91. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. liv. 92. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lvi — Hx. 93. Compare Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lx — lxxxvii. with cap. clxxxiv. I forbear to quote any other authority ; considering the testimony of the original, and in some measure contemporary historian, as of greater weight than that of any subsequent writer. mcntf ANCIENT EUROPE. 195 ment of your lordship's historical studies, by draw- LETTER ing your attention upon the weapons, and martial attire, of the great nations of Asia and Africa, best known to the Greeks in the reign of Xerxes ; when the Romans were yet an obscure people, unnoticed by their Grecian neighbours 94 , and when our Ger- man, and British ancestors, wandered wild in their native forests. The Persians commanded by Otanes, father of Amestris, the favourite wife of Xerxes, were equip- ped in the following manner. They wore on the , head a tiara or light turban: their body was covered with an iron coat of mail, jointed in the form of fishes scales, with sleeves of various colours; and their legs and thighs were secured by a kind of trow- sers, instead of greaves. They were armed with a wicker shield, a short spear, a large bow, and arrows of cane; with a dagger, or scymitar, on the right thigh, depending from a belt about the waist 9 '. The Medes, commanded by Tygranes, of the an- cient royal house of Persia, were armed and accou- tred in the same manner with the Persians; "for u these weapons and habiliments," observes the dis- criminating historian, " originally belonged to the " Medes, and not to the Persians 96 ." The Saran- ges, Cissians or levies of Susiana, and the Hyrcani- ans, were also armed nearly in the Persian or Median manner 97 ; and were commanded, as were the troops of all the other nations, by Persian leaders. The Sacae, or Asiatic Scythians under the Persian dominion, wore a strong high-crowned cap, by way 94. No mention is made of the Romans, in any Greek author ex- tant, before the reign of Alexander the Gr«at. 95. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxi. 96. MUtoriar. lib. vii. cap. lxii. 97. Id. ibid, et se>i- of 196 THE HISTORY OF PART I. of helmet, and were father defended by greaves. '**~ > '~**' They carried a bow peculiar to their nation, a dag- ger, a scymitar and a battle-ax 98 . The Bactrians wore a turban resembling that of the Persians, and were armed with a bow and a short spear, after the manner of their country". The troops of both those nations were commanded by Hystaspes, the son of Darius by Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus 100 . The Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandari- ans, and Dadicians, were armed like the Bactri- ans 101 . But the Caspians, cloathed in shaggy skins, carried a bow and a scymitar 102 . The Colchians, wore wooden helmets, and carried a shield of raw hides, with a spear and cutting sword 103 . And the Saspirians and Allerodians were accoutred, at all points, like the Colchians. The Assyrians and Chaldseans wore a helmet of brass in a barbarous fashion, not easy to be des- cribed, and a corslet of flax. They were armed with a shield, a spear, a stout sword, and a tre* mendous truncheon, as hard as iron' 04 . The Ara- bians were girt in a cloak called Zira, and carried long and strong cross-bows 105 . The Ethiopians, clad in the skins of lions and leopards were armed with bows not less than four cubits in length, and short arrows, barbed with flint instead of steel. They also carried a spear pointed with goat's-horn, and a hard club, with a ponderous head 106 ; while the Lybi- 98. Herodot. ubi sup. 99. Id. ibid. 100. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. Ixiv. 101. Id. Historiar. lib vii. ap. lxvi. 102. Herodotus, iib. vii. cap. Ixvii. 103. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. lxxxiv. 104. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxiii. 105. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. lxix. 106. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. lxix. As the ancients called all Blacks, and consequently all the inhabitants of the torrid zone, Ethi- opians, the discriminating historian gives us to understand, that these were "the Ethiopians who inhabited the country above Egypt." Id. ibid. ans ANCIENT EUROPE. 197 ans, cased in leather, were armed with a wooden letter * ^T IT lance, hardened at the point by fire 107 . The Paphlagonians wore a helmet composed of several pieces, laced together, and a kind of half- boots. They were armed with a shield, a spear of a moderate size, and also with ajavelin and dagger 08 . The Ligyians, Cappadocians, and some other nations of Asia Minor, were armed in the same manner 00 . The Phrygians carried arms little dif- fering from those of the Paphlagoinians 110 ; and the Armenians, a Phrygian colony, were accoutred like the Phrygians'". The Bithynians, a colony from Thrace, wore a cap of the skins of foxes; a vest, and a coat of various colours, with buskins tied with thongs above the ancle. They were armed with a buckler in the form of an half-moon, and with a javelin and short sword"*. The Lydians were armed nearly in the Grecian manner" 3 . The cavalry in the army of Xerxes, were ac- coutred in all respects like the infantry; unless that some of the Persian horsemen wore a helmet of brass or iron, instead of a turban" 4 . And the whole immense body of infantry, with the exception of ten thousand Persian foot, called the immortal band (because on the death of any of them, the number was instantly filled up, by a draught from other Persian corps), was under the conduct of six supe- rior generals, namely, Mardonius, the son of Gob- ryas; Trintataechmes, the son of Artabanus; Smer- domenes, the son of Otanes; Masistes, the son of Darius, by Atossa; Gergis, the son of Arizus; and 107. Hittoriur. lib. vii. cap. lxxi. 108. Herodot. lib. vii^ cap. Ixxii. 109. Id. Hutoriar. lib. vii. cap. lxxiii. et seq. 110. Id. ibid. 111. Herodotus, ub» Sup. 112. Htrodot. lib. vii. cap. lxxvi. lxxv. 113. Id. ibid. 1H. Hcrodot. lib. vii. cup. lxxxiv. vol. ii. i) d Megabyzus, 198 THE HISTORY OF I'ART I. Megabvzus, the son of Zopyrus' 15 . The immortal v^v"^/ band, consisting of the flower of the Persian infantry, and magnificently decorated with ornaments of gold, was commanded in chief by Hydarnes, son of Hy- darnes, governor of the maritime parts of Asia Minor" . The generals of horse were Harmami- thres and Tithseus, sons of Datis, who commanded in the battle of Marathon. After the Persian monarch had reviewed his land- forces, and divided them into national bodies, he ordered his fleet to be numbered; and found it to consist of one thousand two hundred and seven tri- remes, or ships of war of the largest size then in use, equipped in the following proportions, by the several maritime nations, who seem to have been ex- empted from all military service. The Phoenicians, with the Syrians of Palestine' 7 , furnished three hun- dred ships; the Egyptians, two hundred; the Cy- - prians, an hundred and fifty; the Cilicians, one hundred; the Pamphylians, thirty; the Lyeians, fifty ; the Asiatic Dorians, thirty ; the Carians seventy; the Ionians on the Asiatic continent, one hundred ; the Ionian islanders, seventeen ; the jEoli- ans, sixty ; and the Hellespontine Greeks of Dorian and ^Eolian origin, one hundred" 8 . Each of these ships carried two hundred native seamen, and thirty Persian, Median, or Saca^an soldiers" 9 ; so that the whole number of men, on board the hostile fleet, amounted to two hundred and twenty-seven thousand six hundred and ten. 115. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. lxxxii. ,- 116. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. lxxxiii. et cap. cxxxv. Jir. These peojde, observes Herodotus (lib. vii. cap. lxxxix.), were formerly seated, according to their own account, on the Red Sea. Em afterward, quitting their country, they took possession of that maritime tract in Syria, which borders on Egypt, and now bears the name of Palestine. Id. ibid. 118. Herodotus, lib. vii. cnp. lxxxix. — xcv. 119. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. xcvi. et cap. clxxxiy. As ANCIENT EUROPE. 199 As the army of Xerxes was wholly commanded by Persian leaders, so also was the navy. The Ionian and Carian fleet was under the conduct of Ariabignes, the son of Darius by the daughter of Gobryas ; the Egyptian, under that of Achaemenes, the brother of Xerxes 110 . And the ships of all the other nations were ranged under the command of Prexaspes, the son of Aspathines, and Magabazus, the son of Me- gabates 121 . Subordinate to these, acted many expe- rienced naval commanders; the most distinguished of whom were, Tetramnestus of Sidon, Marten of Tyre, Syennesis of Cilicia, Chibeiniscus of Lycia, Gortus and Timonax of Cyprus, and the famous maritime heroine, Artemisia, of Halicarnassus'"; who reinforced the armada of Xerxes with five ships, superior in size, and construction, to those of any other people, except the Sidonians'* 3 . When the Persian monarch had numbered, and mareschalled his whole forces, by dividing the army, as above related, into distinct bodies, and the fleet into squadrons, he resolved to take a particular sur- vey of the troops, and the ships of each nation. With that view, he mounted a chariot, and was car- ried to the head of each division of his army; and having asked such questions, as he thought most pertinent, he commanded his secretaries to put in writing the answer he received' 24 ; then going on board a Sid#nian galley, he seated himself under a canopy of gold, and passing by the fleet, which was disposed in order of battle, he made the like inqui- ries, and directed them to be noted by his secreta- ries, in the same manner 125 . On purpose to afford 120. Herodotus, lib. v«. cap. xcvii. * 121. Id. ibid. 122. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xcviii. xcix. 123. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. cxiv 124. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. c. 125. Id. ibid. him 200 THE HISTORY OF FART I. him pleasure, in this maritime review, the comman- v-*"v^' ders had put to sea, before Xerxes went on board his galley; and having drawn their ships into a line abreast, at a moderate distance from the land, with their heads pointing in that direction, they armed their men as for fight; so that the king, sailing be- tween the fleet and the shore, saw the whole naval armament distinctly 2<5 . Xerxes having thus satisfied himself in regard to the number, and the state of his forces, called into his presence Demaratus, the degraded Spartan king, who accompanied him in his expedition, and asked, in a tone of exultation, u If he thought the Greeks "-would venture to resist so formidable an arma- " ment?" — Demaratus hesitated in his answer, un- til the Persian monarch desired him to declare the truth without reserve. " Hear then, great king!" said he, " the truth from my lips." " Greece, who had for her nurse Poverty, the " guest of Virtue, was by them, in old times, taught " "wisdom, and inured to discipline; which have en- " abled her to conquer Want, and expel Tyranny. " Hence all the Greeks," observed Demaratus, " are " brave, and bold in the cause of freedom. But " dauntless courage is more peculiar to those of Do- " rian origin; and among the Dorian race, the Lace- " daemonians are eminently distinguished. Of this ** people, therefore," continued he, with pious pre- " deliction, " it will be sufficient to speak; as they " will never tamely suffer you to subject Greece to the " yoke of servitude, but intrepidly meet you in the " field, should all the other Greeks acknowledge your " sway. I need not mention their number; for if they " amount only to a thousand, or even consist of a still 126. Kerodot. ubi sup. " smaller ANCIENT EUROPE. 201 " smaller body of men they will not hesitate to give LETTER " battle to your immense army 127 . The Persian monarch affected to laugh at the folly of Demaratus, in supposing that a free people would voluntarily expose themselves to certain destruction. " The Lacedaemonians," replied the Spartan prince, " are politically free, but the law is their master; " and that sovereign they honour with more implicit " obedience, than your subjects do the lord of Asia. " They cheerfully submit to whatever it enjoins: " and it rigorously commands them to stand firm *f in battle, nor to fly from an enemy how superior " soever in force;, but to keep their ranks, and to " conquer or fall' 23 . Neither offended at the freedom, nor discouraged by the information of Demaratus, ' Xerxes ordered his troops to be put in motion, and throwing the Hebrus behind him, began his march from Doriscus to Acanthus 29 ; a sea-port town in Lower Mace- donia, toward which the fleet was directed to sail. In the prosecution of this march, the Persian army, by the advice of the king, was divided into three great bodies; which, according to their instructions, took different routes. One division, under Mar- donius and Masistes, proceeded along the sea-coast, and in a manner kept company with the fleet; ano- ther, under Trintatsechines and Gergis, advanced by the upper countries; and the third, commanded by Xerxes in person, attended by Smerdomenes and Megabyzus, held a midland route between the other two bodies' 7 '. 127. Id. Ifistoriar. lib. vii. cap. cii. 128. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ciii. civ. 129. Id. Hlsioriar. lib. vii. cap. cviii. 130. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxxi. When 202 THE HISTORY OF PART I. When Xerxes had reached Acanthus, where, and ^^" v "^»' in the neighbouring towns, he and his officers were sumptuously entertained, at the expense of the inha- bitants, he called a council of his naval commanders, and instructed them to pass through the canal of mount Athos; and, holding their course westward, to assemble the fleet in the gulf of Therma, now called Gidfo di Salonkhi; while he marched with his land forces to the city of Therma, afterward known by the name of Thessalonica, toward the bottom of that gulf l3 '. At Therma both the fleet and army arrived safe. And there Xerxes halted, and en- camped his troops along the whole sweep of the Macedonian shore, from Therma and the territory of Mygdonia, to the river Haliacmon, on the frontiers of Thessaly 13 *. The Persian monarch, who had attentively exa- mined in his march, every curious work of nature or art, as well as the manners of several nations he had seen, having from Therma a prospect of the lofty and celebrated Thessalian mountains, Olympus, Ossa, Pelion, and Pindus, was desirous to view the mouth of the river Peneus, and the famous valley of Tempe, between Ossa and Olympus, through which the Peneus enters the sea 133 . He accordingly left his camp, and went on board a Sidonian galley, which he always used on such occasions. And having gratified his curiosity, and expressed his sur- prise at the singular boldness of the channel of that river considered by the Greeks as the work of Nep- tune' 34 : (or, in other words, as the effect of an earth- quake; and which, if shut upby a dyke, as the king sagaciously remarked, would lay all Thessaly, ex- cept the tops of the mountains, under water) ; he 131. Id. ibid, et seq. 132. Herodot. lib vii. cap. cxxxvii. 133. Id. Hittoriar. lib. vii. cap. cxxviii. 134. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxxix. •' returned ANCIENT EUROPE. 203 returned by sea to Therma 135 . Thence Xerxes went to Piera, where he spent some days; part of his troops being employed in opening a passage for the whole army through Upper Macedonia, which had been recommended to him as the safest route into Greece' 36 . Meantime the Persian heralds, who had been sent to the Grecian states, returned to the royal pavilion, with an account of their success' 37 . The people of several of those states, made the required submission, by the delivery of earth and water. Among these were included (as I have already had occasion to remark) the Thessalians, the Locrains, and the Thebans, with all the other Boeotians, except the Thespians and Platseans 138 . For the honour of the Thessalians, however, it must be observed, that they did not offer to make their peace with the Per- sian monarch, until the defence of their country was abandoned by the Grecian confederacy' 39 . This reflection naturally leads us to take a view of the interior state of Greece, when the Persian forces approached its frontiers ; and also to consider the measures taken by the confederated Greeks, for their common defence, from the time that Xerxes left Susa, and began his march toward Sardis. On the first intimation of the danger, with which Greece was threatened, the Amphictyonic council, as we have seen, assembled at the Corinthian isthmus ; instead of Thermopylae or Delphos, its usual places of meeting. And there it was resolved, that all hos- tilities between the citizens of the Grecian state* 135. Id. Hiatoriar. lib. vii. cap. xxx. 136. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xxxi. 137. Id. ibid. 138. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxxxii. 139. Id. H : sto-iar lib. vii cap. clxxiv. should 204 THE HISTORY OF PART I. should cease, and vigorous exertions be made for s -^~^*— / opposing the barbarian enemy; that spies should be sent to Sardis, to view the strength of the Persian army ; while envoys were dispatched to the Grecian colony of Syracuse, already formidable both by sea and land, and to the islands of Crete and Corcyra, requesting assistance ; and representing, that as they all bore the name of Greeks, they all ought to em- brace one common cause with the confederates, and act as if the dangers hanging over Greece were com- mon to all the Grecian people 4 °. Messengers were, at the same time, dispatched to Argos (which seems, on this occasion, to have sent no delegate to the diet of Greece) ; soliciting that ancient state to take part in the general war' 4 '. Before the return of those envoys, and when the issue of their negociation was unknown, the Thes- salians, having received information that Xerxes was preparing to pass the Hellespont, deputed an em- bassy to the Amphictyonic council, still assembled at the Corinthian isthmus; in order to represent, that as their country lay on the Grecian frontier, they would be under the necessity of providing for their own safety, by submitting to the Persian monarch, unless an army was sent by the confederates, to en- able them to defend the entrance into Greece' 42 . In consequence of this remonstrance, a detach- ment of Athenian and Lacedaemonian infantry was embarked for the support of the Thessalians ; under the conduct of the renowned Themistocles, and Evenetus, a Spartan general' 43 . These commanders sailed through the Euripus, or strait between the 140. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxlv. 141. Id. ibid. 142. Herodft. lib. vii. cap. clxxii 143. Id. Hhtoriar. lib. vii. cap. clxxiii. island ANCIENT EUROPE. 205 island of Euboea and the continent; and landing their LETTKll troops in lower Thessaly, marched across the coun- try to the river Peneus, and occupied the pass of Tempe, between Ossa and Olympus' 44 . When they reached that pass, their forces consisted of ten thou- sand haevy armed foot, and a strong body of Thes- salian horse' 45 ; an army sufficient to have long defended a defile not five hundred feet wide, and intersected by the navigable chanel of the Peneus, against the myriads of the great king. The Greeks, however, were induced to abandon their post a few days after they had taken possession of it. Alexander I, king of Macedonia, whom they believed to be their friend, as he was descended from Grecian ancestors, and had shewn, during the life of his father Amyntas, his detestation of Asiatic despotism, by the assassination of the Persian nobles, but who had now learned to temporize — Alexander sent the Greeks intelligence of the immensity of the naval and military forces of Xerxes; and advised them to retire, if they would avoid being trodden under foot by the invading army' 46 . During the apprehensions excited by this alarming message, the Grecian commanders learned, that there was another passage for the barbarian forces into Thessaly; through the territory of the Perrhce- bians, and by the city of Gonnus in Upper Macedo- nia 147 . They, therefore, decamped with their troops; and marching back to their ships, returned by sea to the isthmus of Corinth, in order to concert new 144. Id. ibid. Ii5. Herodot. ubi sup. 146 Id. ibid. 117. Herodotus, lib. xii. cap. clxxiii. vol. ii. e e measures 206 THE HISTORY OF PART T. measures for the defence of a less distant post' 48 . \^~*~*mS And the Thessalians, finding themselves thus de- serted by their allies, no longer hesitated to make their submission to the Persian monarch 1 " 19 . Meantime the affairs of the confederated Greeks wore a very unfavourable aspect. The persons sent to Sardis, in order to reconnoitre the Persian army, had been seized by the generals, and put to the tor- ture, as a prelude to their execution. But Xerxes, with a magnanimity worthy of the grandson of Cyrus, rescued them from their impending doom. He com- manded his guards to bring the Grecian spies into his presence ; when, instead of inflicting upon them the violent death authorised by the laws of nations, he desired they might be gratified with a full view of all his land forces, and dismissed them with im- punity 1 - 50 ; well considering, says Herodotus, that if the spies were put to death, the Greeks would not be informed, that his armament was greater than even fame had reported it; and, that their strength could not be much weakened by the loss of three men' 5 '. And he discovered the same magnanimity, while he remained at Abydos; where, when acquainted by his naval officers, that certain ships, laden with corn for his enemies, were passing through the Hellespont, from the Euxine sea, and ought to be seized, he asked " Whither they were bound;" and being told, " for the ports of Greece," he desired they might be permitted to proceed on their voyage. " For are " not we," observed he, " going thither also? — and do *' not we carry with us corn and other necessaries? — 148. Id. Hhtoriar. lib. vii. cap. clxxiii. clxxv. 149. Hercdot. iil>. vii. cap. clxxiv. 150. Id. Histor. lib. vii. cap. cxlvi. cxlvii. 151. Id. ibid. " Why, XII. ANCIENT EUROPE. 207 " Why, therefore, prevent them from carrying pro- LETTER " visions before us' 52 ?" To these instances of contempt from the avowed and formidable enemy of Greece, was added disap- pointment from her reputed friends. The Argives obstinately refused to take any share in the confede- racy, so long as the Lacedaemonians acted as its head. " They would rather," they said, " submit to the sway of the barbarian, than continue to suf- fer the domination of Sparta' 53 ." The Corcyrians promised assistance by sea; but in such a vague man- ner as made it • evident, that no dependence could be placed on the co-operation of their fleet 154 . The Cretans, more honest, openly declined taking part in the war' 55 ; while Gelon, tyrant of Syrcause, im- periously insisted on such high command, if he should interpose, as the Grecian ambassadors had not power to grant 156 . And before they could re- ceive new instructions, he was threatened with an invasion from Carthage, which made all his forces necessary at home' 57 . The Grecian confederates were even denied the usual consolations of superstition. All the responses of the Delphic oracle, to its numerous supplicants, were dark and discouraging. Those delivered to the Athenians were peculiarly so. They were, by one response, threatened with the destruction of their capital, and the subversion of their state. " O " wretched men'." — exclaimed the prophetess, " why " linger here? Begone 1 desert your houses, and the " swelling bulwarks of your city, and seek refuge in 152. Kerodat. nbi sup. et Plut. Apoptb. 153. HeredoT. lib. vii. cap. clxix. 154. Id. Histcriar. lib. vii. cap. cxlviii. 155. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxix. 156. Id. Histnriar. lib. vii. cap. clviii. — clxiii. 157. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxv. et seq. the 208 THE HISTORY OF TART I. " the uttermost parts of the earth ; for all these wr ~ v " > *'' " shall be broken clown. Fire, and furious Mars, u in the Assyrian chariot, waging horrid war, shall " burn and overthrow not only yours, but many " other cities, with their stately towers, and the " temples of the gods ; which now I see dropping " sweat, and shaking with fear! — their lofty domes, " in anguish, weeping blood! at the prospect of their " tremendous fate. Begone! and nurture your M minds for the sorrows that await you' 58 ." The sacred ministers of Attica, quitted the temple of the soothsaying god, but delayed their return; and through the interposition of one of the chief citizens of Delphos, named Timon, they obtained, before their departure, a second response from the pythia, to the following purport: " Pallas in vain " has strove, by arguments and intercessions, to " soothe the god who reigns upon Olympus. I, " therefore emit again this adamantine truth: All " that is comprehended within the confines of Ce- " cropia, to the hallowed recesses of Cithseron, " shall be ravaged with fire and swoi-d. Jupiter " only grants, to the prayer of Minerva, the wooden " wall, which shall remain impregnable, and afford u refuge to you and your offspring 1 j0 ." When this final answer was carried to Athens, her sages and citizens were much divided concern- ing its meaning; whether it pointed them to some defence on land, or at sea? — But Themistocles, prompt in all his decisions, and by whom the response had probably been suggested, declared that by the wooden wall nothing could be meant but the Athenian fleet' 60 . That interpretation was generally adopted. And it was resolved in the popular assembly, That all 158. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxI. 159. Id. Historiar, lib. vii. cap. cxli. 160. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxliii. the ANCIENT EUROPK. 209 the Athenians, who were fit to bear arms, should go on board those ships which had been built, as we have seen, at the desire of Themistocles, for the security of the republic; and wait the approach of the enemy by sea, in conjunction with the naval forces of such of the other states as should be dis- posed to join them 16 '. Conformable to the order of events, in the nar- ration of Herodotus, this resolution, my lord, appears to have been taken before the Grecian delegates as- sembled at the Corinthian isthmus. But if we judge by circumstances, it must have been embraced after the return of Themistocles from Tempe. For if the Athenians had before resolved to place their safety solely in their maritime force, and to send every able-bodied man on board the fleet, they would not have found soldiers to detach to the defence of a distant post, or have been induced to spare, for such service, their distinguished naval commander. We accordingly find, that thenceforth they took no con- cern in military affairs, till after the battle of Salamis. Be this, however, as it might, Athens had the honour by that bold resolution, to which she firmly adhered, of setting the other Grecian states an ex- ample of intrepidity, in defence of their indepen- dency and common liberties. And a similar reso- lution was now adopted by the Amphictyonic council, for opposing the enemy by land. It was determined to send a body of troops to occupy the pass of Ther- mopylae, on the south-west frontier of Phthiotis' 62 ; and the only opening through which an army could enter Southern Greece. That pass, formed by the branches of mount Oeta, on the west, and by an impracticable morass and the 161. Id. Hittoriar. lib. vii. $ap. cxliv. 1§2. H«rodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxr. sea, 210 THE HISTORY OF TART I. sea, on the east; was only fifty feet broad at 4he v^-n~w widest part; and at the narrowest, so strait as scarcely to afford room for a carriage to drive' 63 . This nar- row pass the Phocaeans had formerly fortified with a wall, then in ruins, in order to defend their country from the inroads of the Thessalians 64 . That wall the confederated Greeks rebuilt, as soon as they had resolved to make a stand at Thermopylae against the army of Xerxes' 65 . The Grecian fleet was, at the same time, ordered to take its station at the promontory of Artemisium, on the north-east side of the island of Eubosa, and almost opposite Thermopylae' 65 . It consisted, when first assembled, of two hundred and twenty-one triremes, and nine vessels of inferior size' 67 . Of the triremes, Athens furnished one hundred and forty-seven; though the Athenians, with the assist- ance of the Platseans (who, although utterly unac- quainted with naval affairs, went cheerfully on board the fleet), were only able to man an hundred and twenty-seven' 68 . The remaining twenty were lent to Chalcis, and manned by the Chalcidians' 69 . The Corinthians equipped, and sent to the common ren- dezvous, forty triremes; the Megareans, twenty; the iEginetes, eighteen; the Sicyonians, twelve; the Lacedaemonians, ten; the Epidaurians, eight; the Eretrians, seven ; the Troezenian3, five; the Styrians, 165. Id. ITistoriar. lib. vii. cap. clxxvi. 164. Herodot. ubi sup. 165. Id. ibid. 166. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxv. clxxvi. 167. Id. Hisior'zar. lib. viii. cap. ii. 168. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. i. As a triremis usually carried two hundred seamen and soldiers, the whole number on board the Athe- nian squadron would amount to about twenty-five thousand four hundred men. 169. Id. ibisi two; ANCIENT EUROPE. 211 two; the Ceans, two, with two gallies of fifty oars; LETTER and the Opuntian Locrians, seven gallies of fifty oars each 70 . v-^^w The land-forces sent from the isthmus of Corinth, to take post at Thermopylae, consisted only of four thousand two hundred heavy-armed men; under the conduct of Leonidas, one of the kings of Sparta 17 '. The small number of these forces may be accounted for from two causes: the narrowness of the pass to be defended, and the selfish policy of the Lacedae- monians 72 ; the natural consequence of their illiberal institutions, which confined patriotism solely to their own state. They pleaded for delay, on the present momentous occasion, as before the battle of Mara- thon, the excuse of religion: and the same excuse was pleaded by the citizens of some other states of Peloponnesus 73 . Although the Lacedaemonians, still considered themselves as the governing people in Greece, were acknowledged to be such by the con- 170. Herodot. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. i. 171. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccii. — cciv. It afterward appears, that there were also many helots or slaves, who acted as light troops (Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxv.), but what proportion they bore to the number of freemen we are not told. 172. This policy is severely reprobated by Herodotus (Historiar. lib. vii. cap. cxxxix.) ; who, at the same time, bears honourable tes- timony in favour of the more benevolent system, and generous spirit of the Athenians (Id. ibid.). If Athens, says he, had shrunk from the impending danger, instead of adventuring, with the whole strength of the state, to oppose the barbarian fleet, all Greece would inevita- bly have sunk under the Persian yoke. For admitting Sparta, and her Peloponnesian confederates, to have been equal to the defence of the fortifications at the Corinthian isthmus, on which she seemed inclined to rest her safety, the several states within that isthmus, being open to invasion by sea, would have been subdued one after another, by the forces of Zerxes ; and the Laceda:moniaiis, confined to iheir own territory, must ultimately have fallen in the field; or been compelled to submit to a power, which they were not able alone to resist. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cxxxix. 173. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. ccvi. federates, 512 THE HISTORY OF PAHTI. federates, and honoured with the chief command N-r ^ r> - / both by land and sea, they detached, therefore, no more than three hundred free men, for the support of the common cause 74 . But these were all tried soldiers, and fathers of families, clad in heavy armour, and prepared to die with their leader' 75 . The mass of the Grecian army was composed of two thousand, one hundred, and twenty Arcadians; furnished by Tegea, Mantneia, and other mountain- ous districts; four hundred Corinthians, and an equal number of Thebans; seven hundred Thespi- ans, with one hundred men from Philus, and eighty from the ancient city of Mycenae' 76 . And, in order to rouse the northern Greeks to exertion; to prevent their submission to the Persian monarch, and aug- ment this slender force, rendered respectable by the presence of Leonidas, and formidable by his chosen band, political address was employed. Messengers were dispatched, by the Amphictyonic council, to the several states on the Thessalian frontier, repre- senting the advanced body, under the Spartan kin g, as only part of the troops destined by the confede- rates to oppose the invader, and secure the entrance into Greece; sa that the army of Leonidas was rein- forced with a thousand Phocseans, beside the whole strength of the Opuntian Locrians 177 . Meantime the Persian monarch, having prose- cuted his march through Upper Macedonia, and crossed Thessaly with his army, had reached the city of Anticyra on the river Sperchios, not far dis- tant from Thermopylae; while his fleet, which had continued its course from the gulf of Therma y ren- 174. Id. Ristariar. lib. vii. cap. ccii. 175. Herodotus, lib vii. cap. ccv. 176. Id. Histor. lib. vii. cap. ccii. 177. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cciil. dezvoused ANCIENT EUROPE. 213 dezvoused in the bay of Casthansea, to the north of LETTER cape Sepias, on the coast of Magnesia' 78 . At both these stations, the sea and land-forces of Xerxes arrived, not only without loss, but with great accession of strength. The Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace, and in the adjacent islands, had augmented his naval armament, according to the computation of Herodotus, with one hundred and twenty ships of war, which carried twenty-four thousand sailors and soldiers' 79 ; and the various tribes of Thracians, Macedonians, and Thessalians, did not furnish the invader with fewer, he calcu- lates, than three hundred thousand infantry and cavalry, equipped for military service' 80 The venerable historian, therefore, estimates the whole forces, by sea and land, which Xerxes brought against Greece, at two millions, six hundred and forty-one thousand, six hundred and ten 8| . And amid that vast multitude, he tells us, none appeared more worthy of being invested with supreme com- mand, than the monarch himself 82 ; who was emi- nently distinguished by his majestic mien, the superior size of his body, and the symmetry of his form 83 . But the fighting men, according to the calculation of the same original historian, composed not above half the myriads that accompanied Xerxes in his Grecian expedition' 84 ; the fleet, consisting of one thousand, three hundred, and twenty-seven trire- mes, carrying two hundred and thirty men eack, 178. Id. Hlstoriar. lib. vii. cap. clxxxiii.clxxxiv. 179. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxxv. 180. Id. ibid. 181. Herodot. ubi sup. 182. Id. Hhtoriar. lib. vii. cap. clxxxvii. 183. Id. ibid. 121. Herodot. lib. \ii. cap. clxxxvi. vol. ii. t f being 214 THE HISTORY OF ?AitT I. being attended by an incredible number of store- V- ^ N ^* W/ ships, transports, and smaller vessels of different constructions, and for various uses 85 ; and the army, computed at two millions of soldiers, beside camp- equipage and its necessary appendages, forage-mas- ters, purveyors, butchers, bakers, conductors and drivers of cattle and carriages, was encumbered with women of pleasure, eunuchs, Indian dogs, and every species of Asiatic pomp and luxury' 86 . Little wonder, my lord, that at the sight of so pro- digious a land-force, headed by a prince of such an august presence, a Thracian Greek exclaimed, " O " Jupiter 1 why art thou come in the Persian habit, " and under the name of Xerxes, with all mankind " waiting thy nod, to tear the Greeks from their an- " cient seats, when thou couldest have accomplished " their extirpation by thy own immortal arm' 87 ?" — Or, that the commanders of the Grecian fleet, on the approach of such an immense naval arma* ment, despairing of success in the open sea, quitted their station at Artemisium, and retired to Chalcis, in order to defend the passage of the Eripus 188 . But the vast army of Xerxes (apparently the great- est that ever was assembled in the ancient or mo- ern world, and to supply which with water, some rivers, both in Europe and Asia, were not equal), was soon to suffer a check ; and his enormous fleet, beneath the weight of which the sea seemed to groan, to sustain a loss, that encouraged the Grecian navy to resume its former station, on the north-east side of the island of Eubcea. The road or bay, between the city of Casthar.aea and cape Sepias, not being sufficiently capacious to 185. Id. ibid. 186. Herodot. ubi sup. 187. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. Ivi. 188. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxxxii. admit ANCIENT EUROPE. 215 admit the whole barbarian fleet to moor on land, ac- cording to ancient custom, the ships which first reached that rendezvous only could be moored in a line along the shore ' 8 '. The greater number, both of ships of war and burden, were therefore obliged to ride at anchor, formed into seven divisions, one behind another, with their heads toward the sea ,co . In this arrangement, they passed the night of their arrival free from danger, as the sea was calm. Next morning, however, about day-break, th« waves began to roll; the clear and serene sky, which brightened the heavens, was suddenly darkened, and a furious wind blew from the north-east into the bay' 9 '. The ships that early perceived the gather- ing storm, and were not prevented, by their station, from eschewing it, took refuge under the land, and there remained safe. But such as were assailed by the tempest at sea, shared a very different fate; for so excessive was its violence, that some were dashed against the cliffs of Pelion, some wrecked upon the promontory of Sepias; others were stranded on the neighbouring shore; while many were driven upon the shallows of Meliboea, and toward the city of Casthanaea, where they bulged' 9 *. The storm raged for three days and nights, during which four hundred ships of war arc said to have been lost' 93 ; with so many store-ships and other vessels, that the barbarians, who escaped from the waves, fortified themselves with the wreck, lest they should be attacked, in their distress, by the Thessa- lians, their new friends, not yet confirmed in alle- giance to the great king 94 . But, on the fourth day, 189. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clxxxviii. • 190. Id. ibid. 191. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. clxxxviii. 192. Id. ibid. 193. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxc. 194. Id. Hiitoriar. lib. vii. cap. exct the 216 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the tempest ceased, when the Persian naval com* \^~*<~*~' manders, observing the sea again calm, weighed anchor; and sailing along the shore, passed cape Sepias and the promontory of Magnesia, and en- tered the Pegasaen or Ptlasgic gulf, which is in a manner land-locked, and took their station, with the bulk of the fleet, between the ports of Pegasaea and Aphite' 9J . Meanwhile the Grecian admirals, having been informed of the blow which the barbarian fleet had received from the storm, had poured a libation to Neptune the Deliverer, and returned with fresh eourage to Artemisium" ;6 . This was a movement of the utmost importance; for, if it had not been made, the Grecian army, encamped at Thermopylae, would not only have been deprived of provisions, but exposed to the attacks of the enemy, both by land and from the sea. Nor was the communication with the army the sole advantage, which the Greeks derived from the return of their fleet to its original station. Fifteen of the enemy's ships, under the conduct of San- doces, governor of Cume, who had lost company with the main body of the armada, overshot the mouth of the Pegasaean gulf, and were captured by the Grecian navy near Artemisium 9/ . On board that division of the barbarian fleet were found seve- ral persons of distinction, beside Sandoces, the ad- miral; and among those Andolis, tyrant of Alaban- dae, in Caria, and Penthylus, command- r of the Paphian squadron, who had lost all his ships in the storm but one ?8 . When the Grecian admirals had 195. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxciii. 196. Id. llhtor'iar. lib. vii. cap. cxcii. 197. Heroclot. lib. vii. cap. cxciv. 198. Id. flistori.tr. lib. vii. cap cxcv. examined ANCIENT EUROPE. 217 examined the prisoners, they sent them, under a LETTER guard, to the isthmus of Corinth, where the Amphic- XIL tyonic council continued assembled". The prospect of Grecian affairs now began to brighten at sea. The sailors were heartened by the interposition of Neptune and Boreas 200 ; and the commanders, along with the acquisition of fifteen triremes, had received information by which they could not fail to profit. But the hostile fleet, now safe in the Pegasaean gulf, was still awfully great: nor were ensigns of the various nations that com- posed it, streaming in the road of Aphite, beheld with indifference at Artemisium 201 . By land the storm of war rolled toward the centre of Greece; and the only hope of security which remained was, that its force might be broken at the pass of Ther- mopylae, and other strong, posts among the ridges of mount Oeta. About the time the barbarian fleet rendezvoused in the Pegasaean gulf, Xerxes passed the river Sper- chios, and the Trachinian rocks, which embosom the Melian bay; and entered the plain of Trachis with his army 22 . Near the middle of that plain, which is between forty and fifty miles in circumfer- ence, stood the city of Trachis. There the Persian monarch fixed his head-quarters, and encamped his troops in the surrounding level 203 . The city of Trachis was situated between the rivers Dyras and Melas; which, descending from the neigh- bouring mountains, intersect the Trachinian plain, and fall into the Melian bay 20 *. To the south of the 199. Id. ibid. 200. Herodot. lib. vli. cap. clxxxix— cxcii. 201. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. iv. 202. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap cxcviii— cci. 203. Id. ibid. 204. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cxcviii. cxcirf Melas, 218 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Melas, and close by one of the ridges of mount Oeta, ^ - *" v * w ran the river Asopus; into which fell the Phoenix, from the. same mountain, in a northern direction; and below the junction of these two rivers, stood the town of Anthela, ia a narrow plain near the sea, and difficult of access from Trachis 205 . In that small plain stood a temple dedicated to the Amphictyonic Ceres ; and the chapel or hall of Am- phictyon, where the Grecian delegates originally held their deliberations* 06 . A little below this place, and about a mile and an half south of the Asopus, lay the pass of Thermopylae, defended by the Greeks under Leonidas 207 . Xerxes was master of all the European continent to the north and east of this pass, as far as the Da- nube and the Euxine sea. He could not, therefore, but be mortified at finding his progress so strongly opposed by the barriei's of nature, as to be obstructed by a small body of men. Though not discouraged, he was disconcerted by the singularity of his situa- tion: nor were the Greeks free from alarm at his approach 208 . He sent one of his officers, on horse- back, to reconnoitre their post, before he attempted to force it 2 ° 9 . But the information gained by that officer was by no means satisfactory, in regard to the number of the army under Leonidas; the Gre- cian forces being all behind the Phocaean wall except the three hundred Spartans, whose turn it was to keep guard without, and who were carelessly em- ployed in performing their gymnastic exercise, or in adorning their persons 210 . 205. Id. Historlar. lib. vii. cap. cxcix. oc. 206. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cc. 207. Id. ibid. 208. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccvii. In a council of war, held on the occasion, Leonidas found it difficult to prevent the Peloponnesian confederates from retiring. Id. ibid. 209. Id. Historlar. lib. vii. cap. ccviii. 210. Id. ibid. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 219 The Persian monarch, on receiving this report, «ould not believe that men, who seemed to be so much at their ease, had come with a resolution to die rather than quit their ground, as he had been told by Demaratus. He therefore, sent for that prince, who was still in the camp, and questioned him on the subject. " Nothing," replied Dema- ratus, " is more certain, than that such is their pur- " pose 2 "." Xerxes, however, waited four days, in hopes they would retire, and save him the trouble of so singular a combat 2 2 j he being still ignorant of the number of the Greeks, and supposing the army under Leonidas consisted only of three hundred men. But, on the fifth morning, finding they had not with- drawn, he imputed their stay to audacious teme- rity 2 ' 3 ; and bursting into rage at their foolish obsti- nacy (for such it appeared to him) he ordered the Medes and Cissiansto march to Thermopylae ; haugh- tily commanding them to seize the Lacedaemonians, and bring them alive into his presence 2 ' 4 . The leaders of the forces of these nations, seeing the army of Leonidas ready to receive them, made a furious attack upon the Greeks; but although fresh troops constantly supplied the place of those that fell, they could gain no ground. Hence, says Hero- dotus, it was evident to every one, as well as Xerxes, " that he had many men, but few soldiers 2 ' 3 ." This action happened in the early part of the day, Ant. Cbr. and about the summer solstice 2 ' 6 , when the days are olympiad long. Therefore, after the Medes, who seem to have Lxxiv. 4. 211. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccix. ccx. 212. II. Histor. lib. vii. cap. ccx. 213. Id. ibid. 214. Herodotus, ubi sup. 215. Histor. lib. vii. cap. ccx. 216. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccx. et lib. viii.'cap. xii. distinguished 220 THE HISTORY OF PART I. distinguished themselves most, could maintain the v -**" v " > *» / battle no longer, they were withdrawn, and the king ordered the immortal band of ten thousand Persians, led by Hydarnes, to advance to the charge 217 ; not doubting but that chosen body would bear down all resistance. The Persians, however, when they came to close fight with the Greeks, made no greater im- pression on the army of Leonidas than the Medes 1 ' 3 . And the cause of their failure is substantially assigned by the enlightened contemporary historian, who alone is to be trusted in regard to the events of this war. As the Persians fought in a narrow pass, they could not, observes he, avail themselves of their numbers; and their spears being shorter than those of the Greeks, and their armour less complete, they were necessarily exposed to the thrusts of their anta- gonists 2 ' 9 . Nor were these the only disadvantages under which the barbarians laboured. The Greeks, but especially the Spartans, discovered great superiority in discipline and military address. When hard push- ed, they gave way, but made their retreat in the firm bands; and while the Persians, in the ardour of pursuit, rushed on with noise and tumult, as to certain victory, they quickly wheeled about upon their exulting enemies, and dextei-ously wounded them in the unguarded breast, during the surprise occasioned by that unexpected evolution 220 . By fre- quently repeating this stratagem, which the blind fury of the enemy enabled them to do successfully, the Spartans slew a great number of the Persian forces, while the Grecian army sustained little loss. Hydarnes was, therefore, obliged to draw off his troops; after he had attempted in vain to open the pass, both with larger and smaller divisions"'. 217. Id. Historiar. lib. vii; cap. ccxi. 218 Id. ibid. 219. Herodotus, ubi sup. *220. Id. Historiar. lib vii. cup. cc:;i. 221. Id. ibid, It ANCIENT EUROPE. 221 It is said that Xerxes, who beheld these encounters from a neighbouring eminence, started thrice from xil. his throne in wild emotion, lest he should lose the ^vv flower of his army 2 "; so hot was the conflict. Next day, however, it was resolved, in a council of war, to make a new effort to dislodge the Greeks; as it was supposed so many of them must now be wounded that they would not be able to maintain another bat- tle 223 . But Leonidas having drawn up his troops in national bodies, in order to inspire them with emula- tion, and in close array, they received the shock of the enemy with firmness ; and repelled the reiterated attacks of the barbarians with such vigour, that the whole army of Xerxes was foiled, in endeavouring to force the Grecian post at Thermopylae 224 . While the Persian monarch, in this desperate crisis of his affairs, remained doubtful what mea- sures he should adopt, Ephialtes, a native of the ter- ritory of Melis, tempted by the hope of a great re- ward, had resolved to betray the cause of Greece 225 . With that view he demanded audience of Xerxes, and acquainted him with a practicable defile in the higher part of the mountains that environed the Gre- cian post; through which a body of men might march, and attack Leonidas in the rear 226 . This narrow pass which had been discovered by the Thes- salians, after the wall was built at Thermopylae, in order to prevent their inroads upon Phoces, though now unfrequented and little known, was not con- cealed from the Grecian commander. Leonidas had been informed of it on his arrival at Thermopylae; and he had appointed the thousand Phocseans, who there joined him, to guard it 22r . 222. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxii. 22,>. Id. ibid. 224. Herodot. uhi sup. 225. Id. lib. vii. cap. ccxiii. 226. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxiv. ccxv. 227. Id. Histor. lib. vii. oap. ccxvi. ccxvii. voi. ii. g g Xerxes . 222 THE HISTORY OF PART l. Xerxes, ignorant of this circumstance, listened v^^w with the highest pleasure and satisfaction to the in- telligence of Ephialtes: and dispatched Hydarnes, with the chosen body of Persian foot under his com- mand, to follow the directions of his guide 228 . That general, who alone seems to have been entrusted by his sovereign with the important secret, which was to open him a passage into Greece, began his march toward evening- 2 ''; and crossing the Asopus, near its junction with the Phoenix, reached before morning, the summit of the mountains that divide Phocis and Locris from the Trachinian plain, and overlook the city of Alpini; where the winding and difficult pas- sage terminated 23 ". On this stupendous ridge was the post the Phocse- ans had undertaken to defend. But their centinels appear to have been wanting in vigilance, as they had not hitherto discovered the approach of the enemy; concealed though they were from view, by the oaks which grew thick on the sides of the moun- tains 23 '. At last taking alarm from the rustling of the leaves, the air being still, the. Phocreans flew to arms; and the first object that met their sight was the Persian detachment, under Hydarnes 232 . The astonishment of both parties, on that trying occasion, was almost equal, as were their apprehen- sions of danger. The Phocsans saw their post ready to be stormed, by an unexpected and formida- ble body of enemies; while the Persians beheld with surprise a party of Greeks stationed, where the obstacles of nature were awfully strong, and where they had never supposed they should meet with a single antagonist. * 228, Id. ibid. 229. Herodot. ubi sup. 230. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. rexvii. cexviii. 231. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. cexviii. 732. Id. ibid. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 223 The Phocseans behaved in a manner unworthy of LETTER the cause in which they were engaged, and of the confederates with whom they acted. Galled by the missile weapons of the Persians, the}- precipitantly quitted their post, and retired to a neighbouring emi- nence 233 . There they resolved to make a stand; but Hydarnes was too consummate a general to give them any farther annoyance. Aware of the impor- tance of his commission, he judiciously prosecuted his march 234 . And the Phocseans permitted him to proceed, without attempting to harass his rear, or otherwise impede his progress. The march of the Persian detachment, by the higher pass in the mountains, was not long unknown to Leonidas. The auger Megistias, who probably had the first intimation of it, had foretold, during the night, that the Greeks, whom Aurora should behold at Thermopylae, were destined to inevitable destruction 235 . Certain deserters, soon after, brought the Spartan king intelligence of his danger 236 ; and his own scouts, by day-break, informed him, that the enemy had forced the Phocaean post 237 . A council of war was instantly held, at which the Grecian leaders were divided in their opinions; some being for maintaining their post, others for abandoning it 238 . In consequence of this diversity of sentiments, all the Peloponnesian confederates returned to the defence of their several states, with the consent, if not by the order of Leonidas, except the Spartans immediately under his command 239 . • 233. Herodot. ubi sup. 234. Id. ibid. 235. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxix. 236. Id. ibid. 237. Herodot. ubi sup. 238. id. ibid. v 239. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxx. ccxxt. The 224 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The Thespians heroically refused to leave him ; and v ^" v ^ w the Thebans he compelled to stay, because he knew they were disposed to join the common enemy 240 . Meanwhile Xerxes having poured a libation to the sun, as soon as that glorious luminary appeared above the horizon, assembled the main body of his forces j and marched, according to concert, with Hy- darnes and Ephialtes, toward Thermopylae, about three hours before noon* 41 . On the approach of the barbarian host,Leonidas left part of his forces to guard the wall, near which the Greeks had fought the two former days, and advanced to the widest part of the pass with his chosen band of Spartans, and the flower of the Thespians; under their leader Demophilus, and his gallant associate Dithyrambus; all men of resolute courage, and determined, if they could not conquer (of which small probability now remained), to fall in defence of the liberties of Greece 212 . Leo- nidas had farther motives for perseverance. He acted in obedience to the laws of his country, which forbade him to quit hi3 ground ; and conformable to a response of the Delphic oracle, that foretold the desolation of Sparta by the Persians, unless a king of the Herculean race should die to save the state 143 . Such being the resolution of every Spartan, in the little army of Leonidas, henceforth the concern of the whole was rather to kill as many of the enemy as possible, than attend to their own personal safety. They accordingly exposed themselves free- ly to danger, at the widest part of the pass, and made dreadful havoc of the barbarians 244 . But 240. Id. lib. vii. cap. ccxxii. 241. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxxiii. 242. Id. ibid. 243. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cexx. 244. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. ccxxiii. the ANCIENT EUROPE. 225 the Persian officers, forcing on their men by blows and menaces, without any regard to the dying, the wounded, or those that were pushed into the sea, gradually gained ground; especially after the Gre- cian spears, blunted and broken by action, became unfit for Service 243 . Then considering the struggle as desperate, the Greeks drew their swords; and furiously closing with the Persians, seemed for a time to turn the tide of battle, by the mortal wounds they inflicted, and the multitude of barbarians that fe*ll around them 246 . In that conflict Leonidas was slain 247 ; and his body was recovered by the Greeks, after it had been four times disputed by the Per- sians 248 ; who were finally obliged to yield the con- test to disciplined valour, animated by patriotism. In this moment of glorious triumph, victory shifted sides. The Greeks being informed of the approach of the Persian troops, under Hydarnes and Ephi- altes, returned to the narrowest part of the strait 249 ; retiring behind the wall, which secured the pass, all except the Thebans, threw themselves into a com- pact body, and took post upon a spot of rising ground, on the side next Alpini 25 " ; where a lion of stone was afterward erected in honour of Leonidas, their fallen leader 25 ', whose venerated corps seems still to have formed the centre of union among them. Demo- philus, the Thespian general, appears also, by this time, to have been slain. But the remainder of the Lacedaemonians, under Dieneces, and the Thespians, under Dithyrambus, intrepidly defended themselves against the combined forces of Xerxes. These forces, under their various leaders, now rushed upon the Greeks on all sides, with triumphant shouts, and bar- 245. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. ccxxiii. ccxxiv. 246. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. ccxxiv. 247. Id. ibid. 248. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. ccxxv. 249. Id. ibid. 250. Herodot. ubi sup. 251. Id. ibid. barous 226 THE HISTORY OF PART I. barous yells of exultation; some breaking down the \^^~><^ wall at Thermopylae, and others entering by the breaches 15 ; while Hydarnes charged in the oppo- site direction, with his chosen battalions of Persian foot 253 . Although the Thebans, resolved to surrender to the victorious enemy, had formed themselves into a distinct body, under their leader Leontiades, they did not escape the fury of the enraged barbarians. Many of them were slain, while with extended hands they were imploring mercy; and declaring they had always been friends to the Persians, and were among the first of the Greeks that had presented the great king with earth and water 254 . And Xerxes, in receiv- ing the submission of those that were spared, is said to have branded them with a mark of infamy; be- ginning with Leontiades, their commander 255 . Very different must have been the sentiments of the Persian monarch, in regard to the patriotic band of Lacedtemonians and Thespians ; who fought sword in hand with mutilated weapons, upon the eminence they had seized, to the last man 256 ; and with such firmness, that their dead bodies covered nearly the same ground, which they had occupied while embat- tled. Among the Spartans, Dieneces peculiarly dis- tinguished himself by acts of valour and prowess; and, among the Thespians, Dithyrambus 237 . Die- neces, when told by a Trachinian, before the attack began, that the Persians, would discharge such a flight of arrows as would cloud the face of the sun, 252. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cexxvi. 253. Id. ibid. 254. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. cexxxiii. 255. Id. ibid. 256. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cexxxiii — cexxxviii. 257. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. cexxxvi. gallantly ANCIENT EUROPE. 227 gallantly replied, " Then we shall have the benefit LETTER '* of fighting in the shade 238 ." His exploits justified Xn - that bold expression. Such were the efforts of the Lacedaemonians and Thespians at Thermopylae, or Pylae, as it was simply called by the inhabitants of the neighbouring coun- try* 59 ; where Xerxes lost two brothers, and twenty thousand of his best troops, besides many other persons of high rank, in opening a passage, by land, into Greece 160 . Nor were the Athenians and their allies, in the meantime, inactive at sea, or the Per- sian naval commanders remiss in their duty. During the three days that Leonidas and his little army strove to defend the pass at Thermopylae, against the myriads of the great king, Themistocles and his maritime associates at Artemisium con- tended, with no less ardour, to prevent the barba- rian fleet from entering the Euripus, and ravaging the coasts of Greece 16 '. The struggle, at both places, as Herodotus judiciously observes, was of the same nature, and the object of both parties the same: the Greeks fought for liberty and independ- ency, the barbarians for victor)' and conquest; which only could be obtained by forcing those straits 26 ' 1 . The Athenian admiral peculiarly distinguished him- self in this struggle. The great superiority of Athens by sea, above the other states of Greece, and his own eminent and approved abilities in naval affairs, it might have been supposed would have elevated Themistocles to the command of the whole Grecian navy; yet had h^ found difficulty, in quietly obtaining the conduct of 258. Id. ibid. 259. Herodot lib. vii. cap. cci. 2C>0. Id. Historlar. lib. vii. c?p ccxxiv. et lib. viii. cap. xxiv. 2G1. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xv. 262 Id. ibid. the 228 THE HISTORY OF PART I. t h e Athenian fleet. His just pretensions to the v ^" v "' w rank of admiral having been opposed by a dema- gogue, named Epicydes, whose eloquence gave him much sway in the popular assembly, he politically silenced his competitor with a bribe* 63 ; in order to secure the object of his ambition, and with it the interests of his country, without distracting the state by the spirit of party. Themistocles discovered the same prudence and political address, with a superior degree of seeming moderation and self-government, when the com- manders of the confederate fleet refused to act under an Athenian admiral, and insisted on having a Lace- daemonian commander in chief 264 . He persuaded the Athenians to wave their claim to the sovereignty of the Grecian seas, at that alarming crisis, as he did his own to supreme authority, and cheerfully served under Eurybiades, the naval commander nominated by the senate of Sparta' 65 . " Well con- *' sidering," says Herodotus, " that dissention " among confederates, engaged in common hostili- " ties, are as much more pernicious than war, as " war is less favourable to public happiness than " peace 266 ." The transcendant genius of Themistocles, how- ever, procured him the actual command of the con- federate fleet, without making him accountable for the success of the measures which he prompted. For these the Spartan admiral alone was responsible. When the Grecian naval commanders, alarmed at the formidable appearance of the vast armada of Xerxes, in the road of Aphite, proposed to abandon 263. Plut. Vtt. T&emist. 264. Id. ibid, et Herodot. lib. viii. cap. ii. 265. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. iii. et Plut. ubi sup. 266. Herodot. Historiar. ubi sup.' their ANCIENT EUROPE. 22q their station a second time, and even to give up the LETTER defence of the Euripus, the inhabitants of Eubcea, " ' after they had in vain entreated Eurybiades to delay his departure, until they could carry off their wives and children, and property, secretly applied to the Athenian admiral 267 . Themistocles, who had inef- fectually opposed a retreat, and who wished for nothing so much as the means of retarding or pre- venting it, demanded a present of thirty talents, as the price of the requested delay 163 . The money was readily paid 20p ; and, if it did not fully answer the end for which it was delivered, it proved of infi- nite service to the cause of Greece. Themistocles gave five talents of this money to Eurybiades, as from his own fund; and by that bribe engaged the consent of the commander in chief, to stay and give battle to the enemy at Artemisium ?7 °. All the other Grecian commanders were induced to accede to the resolution of Eurybiades, except Adimantus, the Corinthian admiral; who still con- tended for a retreat, and declared he would draw off his squadron 271 . To him, therefore, Themisto- cles boldly applied his never failing argument. " By " the gods of Greece!" exclaimed he, " Adimantus, " thou shaft not leave us; for I will give thee a " richer present for remaining here, than the Persian " monarch would send thee, for deserting thy asso- " dates 772 ." He accordingly ordered three talents of silver to be instantly conveyed on board the ship of Adimantus 273 . And thus, by these well-timed presents, he at once discharged his promise to the Euboeans, and prevented the departure or division of the Grecian fleet, while he pocketed a large sum 271 . 267. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. iv. et Plat. Vit. Tbemi.n. 268. Id.. ibid. 269. Herodot. ubi sup. 270. Id. Hhtoriar. lib. viii. cap. v. 271. Id. ibid. 272. Herodot. ubi sup. 273. Id. ibid. 274. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. v. vol. ii. h h For *#) THE HISTORY OF PART I. For those, who received the money, knew nothing s -'~ v ^*' of the manner in which it had been obtained 275 ; and those who paid it, seem never to have inquired, how it was dispensed. The address of Themistocles, in conjunction with other circumstances, brought on an engagement with the barbarians, the same day that the resolution was taken by the Greeks to remain at Artemisium. The Persian commanders, who had assembled in the road of Aphitc, about break of day, that enormous fleet which struck such terror into the Peloponnesian admirals, thought of nothing but capturing the whole Grecian navy, from the moment they observed it did not quit its station 27 ". With this view, they sent two hundred of their best ships, to circumna- vigate the south-east side of the island of Euboea, and take possession of the higher part of the strait between that island and the continent* 77 . The voy- age they expected would be performed by next morning; when a signal was to be given by the divi- sion under sail, for the main body of the armada to advance, and surround the Grecian fleet 27 ". Meanwhile the Persian admirals employed them- selves in taking a review of their naval force remain- ing at Aphite 279 . During the bustle and parade, occasioned by that pompous spectacle, Scyllias, a Thracian Greek, and a most expert diver, deserted to the confederates at Artemisium 230 . He had been peculiarly serviceable to the Persians in recovering part of the treasure sunk in the wreck of their ships, between mount Pelion and cape Sepias, and had converted a considerable sum to his own use 281 . 27.5. Id. ibid. 276. Id. Hhtoriar. lib. viii. cap. vi. 277. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. vii. 279. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. vii. 280. Id. Hittoriar. lib. vii. cap. viii. 278. Id. ibid. 281. Id. ibid. This ANCIENT EUROPE. 2S1 This peculation seemingly, more than attachment to the cause of Greece, had made him anxiously seek an opportunity of escape 282 . In what manner he effected it is not certain 183 ; but probably in a boat, which he had seized in the road of Aphite', and turned adrift before he arrived at Artemisium; in order to give the air of miracle to his adventure, in the eye of the confederates, or the better to elude the pursuit of the barbarians. For the Greeks after- ward affirmed, that he plunged beneath the water at Aphite, and never rose to the surface till he reached Artemisium 284 . It therefore appears, that he must have made his escape partly by his dexterity in swim- ming and diving, and that he brought no boat with him to the confederate fleet. The distance between Aphite and Artemisium was about twenty miles 2 5 , By Scylliasthe Grecian commanders were inform- ed of the state of the barbarian navy, and of the sailing of the division that was sent to circumnavi- gate Euboea* 86 ; and which, on purpose to elude the vigilance of the Greeks, had steered a north-east course round the island of Scyathus, before it took a southern direction 287 . In consequence of this intelligence, the confede- rates called a council of war: where it was resolved, after various opinions had been offered, that they should remain in their station all that day; and, Aveighing anchor about midnight, attack the fleet, which was intended to obstruct their retreat 28 ^. Con- formable to that resolution, they lay at Artemisium till about sun-set. Then, as their cruisers had 232. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. viii. 283. Id. ibid. 284. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. viii. 285. Id. ibid. 23G. Herodot. ubi sup. 287. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. vii. 288. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. ix. brought 232 THE HISTORY OF PART I. brought no notice of the approach of the Persian v.^x^'W division they determined to make trial of the cou- rage of the barbarians in light, and of their skill in seamanship, by giving battle to the main body of the naval armamennt of Xerxes* 39 . This bold measure was immediately carried into execution, to the astonishment of the Persian admi- rals. When they saw the Grecian fleet, so inferior to their own, both in equipment and number of ships, advancing against them, they imputed the challenge to excess of folly, and considered the confederates as delivering themselves up to inevitable destruc- tion 290 . Their chief concern accordingly was, to encompass the Greeks ; not doubting of an easy and speedy victory 19 '. But the Grecian commanders, aware of their danger, drew their fleet into a circle, at a signal given, and turned the heads of all their ships against the extended line of the exulting barbarians 292 . At a second signal, they began the engagement; crowding into a narrow space, and having the enemy in front on every quarter 193 : an advantage of no small import- ance, in the ancient manner of fighting at sea, where the damage was chiefly done by the prows of the hostile gallies, against the sides of their antagonists. The Greeks, therefore, though thus surrounded, took thirty sail of the barbarian fleet in the short season of light that remained to them; and, when darkness drew on, they returned with their prizes to Artemi- siunr 91 . The Persian commanders, at the same time, returned to Aphite' 295 ; little satisfied with the hot reception they had found, and discouraged by the loss they had sustained. 239. Id. ibid. 290. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. x. 291. Id. ibid, 292. !d. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xi. 293. Id. ibid. 294. Herodot. ubi sup. 295. Id. ibid. The ANCIENT EUROPE. . 233 The armada of Xerxes, however, was soon to suffer a ruder shock. The night following the battle, which was fought in the height of summer, the sea was agitated by a tremendous storm, accompanied with loud claps of thunder, bursting from the caverns, and resounding from the rocks of mount Pelion; while dead bodies, and pieces of wreck, were driven in such heaps into the road of Aphit e ', that the oars of the barbarian fleet were impeded, and the seamen filled with the most awful apprehen- sions of impending ruin 296 . In this consternation they remained till morning; for so long did the peals of horrid thunder continue unremitted, the raging fury of the waves, and incessant torrents of 2 77 ram But terror w as the chief distress experienced by the barbarians at Aphite. How different was the fate of the two hundred ships, that were sent to oc- cupy the passage of the Euripus! — Assailed by the thunder-storm in the most open part of the ^Egean sea, with the navigation of which the commanders were very little acquainted, they all either foundered amid the waves, or were driven upon the rocky and excavated shores of Eubcea 298 ; where they were utterly wrecked, and every man on board perished* 99 . " Such was the will of the Deity," observes Hero- dotus, " that the Persian naval armament might be " brought nearer to an equality with the Grecian " fleets." Ignorant of this disaster, the barbarians stationed at Aphite beheld with joy the morning light 3 "' ; and 296. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xii. 297. Id. ibid. 298. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xiii. 299. Id. ibid. It seems to have been the wreck of these ships, which roiled, during the night toward Aphite. 300. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xiii. 301. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xiv. happy 234 THE HISTORY OF PART I happy m having rode out the nocturnal storm, after v^-v^, their unsuccessful engagement, they were content to remain quiet for that day 3 " 2 . But the Greeks, who had the same morning received a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships, and with them the welcome information, that the whole division of the •> barbarian fleet, which had been sent to circumnavi- gate Euboea, had perished in the late convulsion of the elements, were less peacefully disposed 303 En- couraged by these fortunate, and unexpected circum- stances, they resolved again to try the strength and skill of the enemy at sea. They accordingly dis- posed their fleet in order of battle, and advanced toward Aphite about sun-set, as the evening before ; attacked and cut off the Cilician squadron, and re- turned unmolested to Artemisium 304 . T|je following day the Persian commanders, en- raged at having been thus insulted by an inferior force, and fearing the displeasure of Xerxes, adopt- ed more vigorous councils. In order to avoid the disgrace of a third attack from the Greeks, they un- moored their fleet about noon, and advanced to- ward Artemisium, in the form of a crescent 305 . The Grecian adniirals, seeing themselves in danger of being surrounded in their station, also weighed an- chor, and instantly began the fight, by rushing into the bosom of the hostile navy 3 * 6 . By the shock of this sudden and impetuous assault, the barbarian line of battle was broken. Their large and unwieldy ships became ungovernable, and fell foul of each other. Yet did they maintain the action with obstinate courage, ashamed to yield 502. Id. ibid. 303. Herodot. ubi sup. 304. Id. ibid. 305. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xv. xvi. 306. Id. ibid. the ANCIENT EUROPE. 235 the combat to an enemy they deemed so inconsider- able 3 " 7 . In consequence of this gallant effort, the Greeks lost many men and ships; but the barba- rians, a much greater proportion of both 308 . And, after a bloody conflict, which was long and hotly urged, the embattled fleets voluntarily retired, by a kind of tacit consent, to their former stations 500 ; nei- ther of the parties having a right to claim the vic- tory 3 ' . The dead and the wreck, however, remained with the Greeks 3 ". In this great battle, the Egyp- tians distinguished themselves most on the side of the Persians; the Athenians, on that of the Greeks 3 ' 2 . But the confederates, notwithstanding the glory they had acquired, in maintaining their station against such an enormous naval armament, found their ships so much shattered, but especially those of the Athenian division, that they deliberated on abandoning the defence of the Euripus, and retiring to the interior parts of Greece 3 ' 3 . During these deliberations, or at least before any positive resolu- tion had been taken, an advice-boat arrived at Arte- misium, with an account of the fate of Leonidas and his army 3 ' 4 . The Grecian admirals, who intended to have vic- tualled their fleet with the cattle left in the island of Euboea 3 ' 5 (for the inhabitants had not sufficiently availed themselves of the delay procured by The- mistocles), when informed that the forces of Xerxes were in possession of the neighbouring continent, no longer hesitated what course they should pursue, 307. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. xvi. 308. Id. ibid. 309. Herodot. ubi sup. 310. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. x\i. 311. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xviii. 312. Id. Historiar. lib. viii.cap. xvii. 313. Herodot. lib. vii. cap. xviii. 314. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxi. 315. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xix. nor 236 THE HISTORY OF PART I. nor a moment delayed their departure 3 ' 6 : but in- v^ r "v~w stantly crowding sail, steered for the Saronic gulf, between the coast of Attica and Peloponnesus. The Corinthians formed the van, and the Athenians the rear of the confederate fleet, in this abrupt voyage 3 ' 7 . Meanwhile Themistocles, who seems not to have approved of the sudden flight of the confederates from Artemisium, and who had formed hopes of the desertion of the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian monarch 3 ' 8 , sailed in one of the swiftest of the Athe- nian gallies to the usual watering place; and there wrote on the landing-stones, the following inscrip- tion, which was read by the Ionians next day 3 ' 9 . " Men of Ionia! how culpable are you, in engaging " in a league against your progenitors, in order to " reduce Greece to a state of servitude? — But it is " not yet too late to take part with us. If this, how- " ever, you cannot conveniently do; let us conjure " you, at least, to withdraw yourselves speedily " from the Persian cause, and persuade all the Io- " nians to follow your example. Or should strong " necessity compel your adherence, and neither of " these alternatives be found practicable, a middle " course still remains: when we come to an engage - " ment, cease to act with vigour; always remember- " ing, that you are sprung from the Athenians, and " that the enmity between us and the barbarians, " was first excited in your quarrel 320 ." In thus writing, says Herodotus, I conjecture The- mistocles had a double purpose in view: — That if this inscription should be read only by the Ionians, they might be induced to join the confederates ; or if it was made known to the Persian commanders, and re- 316. Id. Kistoriar. lib. viii. cap. xxi. 317. Id. ibid. 318. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xiv. 319. Id. Historian lib. viii. cap. xxii. 320. Id. ibid. ported ANCIENT EUROPE. 237 ported to the king, that the Ionians and all the Asiatic letter Greeks, would fall under suspicion, and thenceforth XIL be trusted with no station in the line of battle 31 '. It appears to have been read only by the Ionians; yet was it not attended with the desired effect, though it could not fail to make an impression upon some of their more generous leaders. As soon as the Greeks quitted their station, an Euboean mariner sailed to Aphitd, and carried intel- ligence of their departure to the barbarians 322 . But the Persian commanders, suspecting the informer, detained him under a guard; while they sent some light vessels, to ascertain the truth of his report 323 . These vessels returned with a confirmation of the fact; and the whole barbarian fleet weighed anchor, about sunrise next morning, and steered for Arte- misium 324 . There they continued till noon, when they proceeded to Histiaea 325 ; took possession of that town, and ravaged the sea-coast in their progress southward 326 . While the naval armament of Xerxes lay on the coast of Eubcea, he sent an invitation to the admi- rals of the several nations that composed it, as well as to the Persian commanders, to come to Thermo- pylae, and witness his triumph 327 . . Thither they re- paired ; and, to their astonishment, saw only expos- ed to view the bodies of one thousand barbarians, though twenty thousand had been slain; nineteen thousand of that number having been secretly inter- red, by order of the king, and their graves strewed with leaves 328 . But they beheld, at the same time, four thousand Greeks, lying in heaps upon the ground 321. Herodot. ubi sup. 322. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxiii. 323. Id. ibid. 324. Herodot. ubi sup. 325. Id. ibid. 326. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xxiii. 327. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxir. 328. Id. ibid. VOL. II. I i where 238 THE HISTORY OF PART I. where they had gallantly fought 329 . These they sup* v-*'"*"^' posed to be all Lacedaemonians and Thespians ; " though there were," adds the candid historian, " also helots among them 330 ." When this pompous farce had been acted, which did not conceal the loss of Xerxes from the pene- trating glance of his subject allies, the naval officers returned to the fleet 351 ; which, after three days, pro- secuted its voyage toward the harbours of Athens ; while he continued his route to that city, through Phocis and Boeotia, with his army 332 . In the meantime, tho Grecian navy had taken its station in the strait between the island of Salamis and the coast of Attica 333 . This station it occupied by the advice of Themistocles 334 ; not only as the most proper place for giving battle to the enemy, but for affording relief to his distressed country- men 335 . That distress was now, in truth, deeper than the powers of language can express. The selfish Peloponnesians, instead of marching into Bceotia with all their forces to meet the army of Xerxes, as Themistocles and the citizens of Athens expected, were employed in strengthening the fortifi- cations of the Corinthian isthmus, in order to secure their own peninsula 336 . The Athenians were, there- fore, thrown into the utmost consternation, at seeing themselves left exposed to the fury of the incensed barbarians. 329. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xxv. This circumstance leads us to conclude, that the number of Greeks, who fought at Thermopylae, was greater than before represented by Herodotus ; but that addi- tional number, he lets us understand, consisted of slaves. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxv. 330. Id. ibid. 331. Herodot. ubi sup. 332. Id. ibid, et seq. 333. Herodot. lib. -viii. cap. xl. Corneil. Nepot. Vit.Tbemist. 334. Id. ibid. 335. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xl. et. seq. 336. Id. Historiar. ubi sup. In ANCIENT EUROPE. 239 In this dreadful extremity, after having in vain implored the assistance of their Peloponnesian con- federates, the Athenian people embraced a resolu- tion worthy of immortal remembrance, and the imitation of all maritime states. Disdaining sub- mission to the Persian monarch, and rising above despair, they determined to abandon that territory so dear to them, and the city which had so long been the sacred seat of freedom, and the general asylum of Greece; the temples of their gods, and the sepul- chres, of their forefathers; and embark on board their fleet, with their wives, children, slaves, and most valuable effects 337 . Conformable to that memorable resolution, which had been prompted by Themistocles, the Athenian fleet left the confederates at Salamis, and sailed to the harbours of Athens 338 . Such of the citizens as were able to bear arms, were employed in manning their unoccupied gallies; in repairing the loss of seamen at Artemisium, or the absence of the Platsean marines, whom they had landed in Bceotia 339 ; while the women, children, slaves, and household goods, were transported to the friendly city of Troezene, on the coast of Argolis, or to the islands of iEgina and Salamis 140 ; some old and indigent men, who refused to desert the acropolis, and the hallowed mansions of their tutelar Minerva, only remaining behind 34 '. When the Athenians had lodged their families in those places of temporary safety, they rejoined the confederate fleet in the straits of Salamis, with one hundred and eighty triremes 342 ; without including 337. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xli. PIul. Vit. Themist. et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. (Edit. Hanov. Typ. Wechelianis, 1604.) vol. ii. p. 12. 338. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xl. xli. 339. Id. Historian lib. viii. cap. xliv. 340. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xli. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 341. Herodot. lib viii. cap. Ii. et Pint. Vit. Tbemiit. 342. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xli — xliv. the 240 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the twenty sail they had lent to the Chalcidians of s.^-v^' Euboea, and which here unbroken also made their appearance 343 . Most of the maritime cities of Peloponnesus furnished an additional number of ships ; some that had sent none to Artemisium, now brought their quotas to the general rendezvous; and all the sea-faring people, from the gulf of Ambra- cia to the confines of Illyria, except the Corcyrians, and their colonies of Epidamnus and Apollonia, joined the confederates with their naval force 344 : so that the Grecian navy, when fully assembled, con- sisted of three hundred and seventy-eight ships of war, beside gallies of fifty oars 345 . Immediately after the Athenians abandoned their country, the barbarian fleet took possession of the harbours of Athens 346 ; and Xerxes having ravaged Phocis, entered Boeotia with the main body of his army 347 . There he was joined by a division of forces, which he had sent by the foot of mount Par- nassus, to pillage the temple of Apollo at Delphos, before he reached Orchomenos 348 . That division advanced within sight of the holy city, but failed in its attempt to seize the treasures of the prophetic god; in consequence of the reli- gious horror infused by the awful solemnity of the place, augmented by a dreadful thunder-storm; which breaking upon the summits of mount Par- nassus, with tremendous explosion, threw down such immense fragments of rocks upon the barbarians, many of whom were worshippers of Apollo, as made them relinquish all thoughts of their sacrilegious 343 Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. xliv. 344. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xlii — xlvii. 345. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xlviii. 346. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxvi. 347. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. 1. 348. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xxxiv. xxxv. xxxviii. enterprise, ANCIENT EUROPE. 241 enterprise, and betake themselves to sudden flight 349 . In this crisis of terror, and uproar of the elements, the Delphians, who had deserted their city on the approach of the enemy, rushing from the caverns of the mountain, where they had concealed themselves under arms, made frightful havoc among the fugi- tives, and completed their apprehensions of divine vengeance 35 ". About the time that the Persian monarch was joined by the remains of this unfortunate division, he burnt the hostile cities of Thespia and Plateea 351 ; whose inhabitants, warm in the cause of freedom, had fled to the Corinthian isthmus 352 . And Xerxes, having left a garrison in Thebes, and all Bceotia in his interest behind him, passed the frontiers of Attica, and proceeded toward Athens, vent- ing his fury upon the deserted towns and villages 353 . Athens made a defence beyond what could have been expected, in its then deserted state. The few old and indigent citizens, who, on the general evacuation of their country and its capital, obstinately refused to quit the acropolis or citadel, and the temple of Minerva, which stood within it, literally interpreting the response of the oracle, that 34§. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. xxxvii. xxxviii. et Diod. Sicul. vol. ii. lib. xi. p. 12. These circumstances were magnified by the Greeks into a miraculous interposition of the Delphic god, for the preserva- tion of his sacred seat ; and two large rocks, torn from the two sum- mits of mount Parnassus, were long shewn to his superstitious wor- shippers, by the ministers of the oracle, in proof of the supernatural deliverance. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. xxxix. Diod. Sicul. vol. ii. lib. xi. p. 12, 13., 350. Herodotus, lib viii. cap. xxxviii. They declared, on their return to the army, that they saw two figures of more than human size, hewing them down, and urging their flight. Id. ibid. 351. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. 1. Diod. Sicul. vol. ii. lib. xi. (Edit, above quoted) p. 13. 352. Id. ibid. 353. Herodot. et Died. Sicul. ubi sup. " the 242 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " the wooden wall should remain impregnable," had v ^^ v> *^ fortified that citadel with pallisades, and gates of wood 334 . These they resolved to defend to the last man 335 . Xerxes, therefore, found himself under the necessity of investing the place ; and was not a little embarrassed how to accomplish its reduction, thus surrounded with a double wall 356 . At length, how- ever, a mode of attack was adopted that promised success. The Persian forces took post upon the hill Areopagus j and having wrapped the heads of their arrows in tow, to which they set fire, shot them into the works of the besieged 337 . In consequence of this artifice, and the vast flights of arrows sent by so prodigious a body of men, the Athenian garrison soon saw the pallisades, in which they had placed so much confidence, involved in , flames 338 ; yet did they persist in holding out, and disdainfully rejected the terms offered through the Pisistradid party in the army of Xerxes 339 . And when the Persians attempted to break open the gates, they were assailed, and repulsed, with large stones, hurled by the defendants from the walls of the acropolis 360 . But these difficulties were at last surmounted ; by the ingenuity, rather than by the arms of the be- siegers. Having discovered an accessible part in the fortifications of the acropolis, behind the gates and the glacis, where the garrison had placed no guard, as they did not suppose that an assault was there practicable, the Persian soldiers conquered the steep ascent, and scaled the wall near the temple of Aglaura, the daughter of Cecrops 36 '. 554. Herodotus, lib. via. cap. li. 355. Id. ibid. 356. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lii. 357. Id. ibid. 358. Herodot. ubi sup. 359. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lii. 360. Id. ibid. 361. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. liii. When ANCIENT EUROPE. 243 When the miserable remnant of the Athenians saw the enemy within the works of the citadel, some threw themselves headlong from the fortifications, while others fled to the temple of Minerva 362 . But that asylum proved no sanctuary. The incensed bar- barians forced open the hallowed gates; and slew, without distinction, all the suppliants who had taken refuge in the sacred mansion 363 . They next pillaged the temple of the guardian goddess; and concluded their bloody triumph, with setting fire to every part of the acropolis 364 . After this devastation,the capital of Attica seems to have been placed under the go- vernment of the Athenians of the Pisistradid party 365 ; who had sought protection at the court of Sardis; accompanied the Persian monarch in his march, and pointed his arms against Greece 366 . As the chastisement of Athens was the leading object in the expedition of Xerxes, he no sooner saw himself master of that city, than he sent off a courier to Susa, to acquaint Artabanus of his suc- cess 367 . When he had dispatched this messenger, and taken measures for securing his conquest, he went on board his fleet in the Phaleron harbour or road, in order to consult his naval officers concern- ing their future operations 368 . For that purpose, he took his seat in the royal galley, and commanded the admirals of the various maritime nations to take seats in council according to their rank 369 . The king of Sidon sat first, the king of Tyre next; and 362. Id. ibid. 363. Herodot. ubi sup. 364. Id. ibid. 365. This inference may be fairly drawn from the proposals made to the garrison, through that party and other circumstances in the subsequent part of the narration of the venerable father of history. Herodot. lib. viii. cap lii. liv. et seq. 366. Herodotus, passim. 367. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. liv. 368. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxvii 369. Id. ibid. all 244 THE HISTORY OF PART I. all the other princes and chiefs in regular subordi- ^-^"^^^^ nation, agreeable to the instructions of the Persian monarch 370 . After the council was fully formed, Xerxes or- dered Mardonius to put the question to each mem- ber separately, " Whether they ought to hazard a " naval engagement?" — Mardonius accordingly took the sense of the whole assembly, beginning with the king of Sidon 37 '. They were all for giving battle to the Grecian fleet except Artemisia, the maritime heroine of Halicarnassus 372 ; who declared against another action at sea, and supported her dissent by very strong arguments. " Tell the king," said she, " Mardonius, that as I " was not backward in the engagement off the island " Eubcea, I have a right to deliver my sentiments u freely in regard to his affairs, without being sus- " pected of wanting zeal in his service. My advice " then is, that he ought to spare his ships, nor hazard " without necessity a sea-fightj for the Greeks are " as much superior to the barbarians in such com- " bats, as men are to women. But where is the " necessity of a naval engagement? — Is he not al- " ready in possession of Athens, for the humiliation " of which the war was undertaken? — Is he not, in " effect, master of the rest of Greece? — for what " power will henceforth attempt to resist his arms " on land? — Nor is this all: he is also master of the " sea. And if he will order his fleet to abstain " from battle, and either remain here with his army, " or march into Peloponnesus, he will finally attain " the object of his enterprise. " If the king adopt the first of these measures," continued Artemisia, " the Grecian navy will not be 370. Herodot. ubi sup. 371. Id. lib. viii. cap. lxviii. 372. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxviii. " long ANCIENT EUROPE. 245 " long in a condition to oppose him; but must dis- " perse, and return to its several harbours. For I " am informed, that there is not provisions in the " island of Salamis, or on board the fleet, to sup- " port it for any length of time. And if he lead " his army into Peloponnesus, all the maritime " powers of that peninsula will return to the defence " of their respective cities; for it cannot be expect- " ed, when their own country is invaded, that they " will maintain their present station, and fight for " the deserted, and now conquered country of the " Athenians. But if the king embrace the resolu- " tion of immediately giving battle at sea, I fear," added she, " that the defeat of his naval armament, " may be followed by a similar disaster to his forces " on land 37 '." When the report of the proceedings of the council was made to Xerxes, he expressed no dissatisfac- tion at the freedom with which Artemisia had de- livered her dissent, though it interfered with his desire of putting a speedy end to the war. On the contrary, as he had always esteemed her for her hero- inism and zeal in his cause, he thenceforth honour- ed her with more peculiar marks of distinction and confidence 374 ; yet did he resolve, in conformity with the opinion of the majority of the naval commanders, to give battle to the enemy at Salamis, as soon as the necessary measures could be taken for that pur- pose 3 '-'. This resolution, if not altogether prudent, was by no means so rash as it has been represented by modern historians. For Herodotus conjectures, that the naval armament of Xerxes was now as large as when it arrived at cape Sepias 376 ; the loss 373. Id. ibid. 374. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. Ixix. ■>75. Id. ibid. 376. Id. Historian lib. viii. cap. lxvi. VOL. II. K k of 246 THE HISTORY OF PART I . of ships, by the storms in the Grecian seas, and the v ^" v ™**" / engagements with the confederated Greeks, being balanced by the subsequent accession of force from the maritime powers of Greece, both in the islands and on the continent; who had swelled the barbarian fleet in its course from Artemisium, and crowded to it in proportion to its progress 377 . But Xerxes had other reasons for wishing to give battle to the enemy at sea, and in their present sta- tion, beside the superiority of his naval strength, and his desire of terminating the conquest of Greece by one great blow 378 . He suspected that his maritime forces had not done their utmost at Aphite and Arte- misium, and resolved to be spectator of the engage- ment at Salamis 379 . The same day this resolution was taken, he ordered his land-forces to march to- ward Peloponnesus 380 . The admirals of the confederated Greeks were less united in their councils, than those of the bar- barian monarch. After their navy was fully assem- bled at Salamis, Eurybiades, the commander in chief, had desired them to deliberate, " Whether he " should i-emain in that station, or sail to the Corin- " thian isthmus, and wait the approach of the barba- " rian fleet on the coast of Peloponnesus 381 ?" — The majority of the council of war declared for sailing to the isthmus; because, if they should there be vanquished, they might return to the defence of their several cities 382 . 377. Id. ibid. 378. If he liad proved victorious at Salamis, all Peloponnesus, the only unconquered country in Greece, must instantly have submitted to him; as he could have landed troops within the fortifications at the Corinthian isthmus, while the main body of his army advanced on the side of Megara. His resolution of hazarding a naval engage- ment, was, therefore, magnanimous. 379. Herodor. lib. viii. cap. lxix. 380. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxi. 581. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. xli.w 382. Id. ibid. When ANCIENT EUROPE. 247 When the Peloponnesian leaders had come to this determination, for by them the majority was formed, Eurybiades received intelligence, that Xerxes had entered the territory of Attica, and was marking his route with fire 383 . These alarming news were speedily followed, by an account of the fall of the citadel of Athens 384 ; which threw the whole council of war into such consternation, that some of the commanders, not waiting the result of its deliberations, went on board their ships, in order to retire : and those that remained adopted the reso- lution of giving battle to the enemy near the Corin- thian isthmus 385 . On the approach of night the council broke up, and the Grecian admirals repaired to their several squadrons 386 . While Themistocles, the Athenian commander in chief, who had ineffectually opposed a change of station, was ruminating on the calamities of his country, in returning to his own ship, he was met by his friend, Mnesiphilos 387 ; a venerable sage, who had early instructed him in the principles of govern- ment and politics, and who still attended him as a companion and counsellor 388 . Mnesiphilos eagerly asked, the issue of the deliberations of the council of war; and being told, that the majority had re- solved to sail to the isthmus, and fight off the coast of Peloponnesus, " Then," exclaimed he, " they «' will not fight at all. For if Eurybiades quit Sala- ** mis, the Peloponnesian chiefs will return to their " respective cities; and neither he, nor any other " commander, will be able to prevent the fleet from " dispersing: so that Greece, in such event, will be " lost for lack of council! — Haste, therefore, to " Eurybiades; press him to get this resolution re- 383. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. 1. 384. Id. Historian lib. viii. cap. lvi. 385. Id. ibid. 386. Herodot. ubi sup. 387. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lvii. 388. Pint. Vit. Themist. " vokcd, 243 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " vokcd, and endeavour to procure one for remain- s-^^/ " inghere 389 ." Struck with the force of this admonition, The- mistocles left Mnesiphilos without making any reply, and went on board the ship of the Spartan admi- ral 390 . Having there obtained an audience of the commander in chief, and permission to deliver his sentiments with freedom, on the important subject that had prompted his unexpected visit, he urged so many, and such weighty arguments, for revoking the determination of the council, that Eurybiades consented to go ashore, and again assemble the great naval officers 39 '. When the new council of war met, Themistocles warmly declaimed on the measures which he thought expedient for the confederated Greeks to pursue, in their present circumstances, before Eurybiades had explained his reasons for convening them a second time 392 . This misplaced ardour was rudely checked by Adimantus, the Corinthian admiral, who was for adhering to the former resolution. " They who, " at the public games, Themistocles, rise before " their turn," said he, " are made to sit down with " stripes 393 ." — " True," replied Themistocles; " but " those that never rise, are never honoured with the " victor's crown 394 ." After this mild retort, which conciliated the favour of the more cool and experienced leaders, Themistocles turned to the commander in chief; and addressed him in a speech equally distinguished by decent moderation, and deep knowledge of naval af- fairs. " The conservation of Greece, O Eurybiades," 389. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lvii. 390. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. Iviii. 391. Id. ibid. 392. Herodot. lib. viii. cap lix. 393. Id. ibid. 394. Herodot. ubi sup. said ANCIENT EUROPE. 249 said he, " in her present perilous situation, depends " upon you. And this deliverance you may effect, " by giving battle to the enemy here, in conformity " with my opinion; but not by following the counsel " of those leaders, who contend for carrying up the " fleet to the Corinthian isthmus. For if we come " to action before the isthmus, we shall fight in an " open sea; a disadvantage to us of no small moment, " because of our inferiority in the size and number " of our ships. But whatever be the issue of such " an engagement, we must, by abandoning our sta- " tion, lose Salamis, iEgina, and Megara 395 ." " Nor will Peloponnesus," continued Themisto- cles, " be safe; for the land-forces of Xerxes will " certainly attend his naval armament. If you con- " suit the dictates of prudence, you will not, there- " fore, lead the barbarians thither, and expose to " danger the last refuge of the unhappy Greeks; " especially as we shall, by remaining in the bay of " Salamis, defend that peninsula as effectually as at " the isthmus; while the Athenians preserve their " children and wives, and all fight with many advan- " tages on their side. For here if we give battle to " the enemy, we shall engage in a narrow strait, " with comparatively few ships against an immense " number; a station which, under such circum- " stances, it ought to be our business to maintain, " as much as theirs to draw us into the open sea 5 ' . " And we may hope," added he, " to derive yet " farther benefit from such a conduct; may reason- " ably hope, should we here defeat the hostile fleet, " as I trust we shall, that it will never advance to " the Corinthian isthmus, nor the barbarian army " beyond the limits of Attica, but both retire in " disorder 397 ." 395. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lx. 396. Id. ibid. 397. Hcrodot. ubi sup. No 250 THE HISTORY OF PART I. No sooner had Themistocles concluded his speech, v -^~ v ^ s - / than Adimantus, the Corinthian admiral, again at- tacked him j sarcastically observing, that he ought to be silent in council, as he had no country to fight for 598 ; alluding to the condition of Attica, then in the hands of the enemy: — and that it would be time enough for him to deliver his opinion, wheji he could say he had a home 399 . Themistocles, thus insulted, threw many just re- proaches upon Adimantus and the Corinthians; and replied, that he had yet a city and a state superior to any they could boast: the Athenians had two hun- dred ships of war, armed and manned by themselves and their associates, and which no power in Greece was able to resist 100 . Having vindicated himself and his country, in this manly manner, he turned to Eury- biades, and keenly said, " If you remain here, you will acquire the reputa- " tion of a patriotic leader; if not, you will be ac- " counted the subverter of the liberties of Greece. " For the issue of the war depends upon the Athe- " nian fleet. But be assured, unless you agree to u give battle at Salamis, that we will take on board " our children and wives, and sail to Siris, on the " coast of Italy; where it has been of old predicted " by the oracle, that we should build a city. And '* you, and your Peloponnesian confederates, may u perhaps remember my advice, when it is too " late 4< V' Alarmed at this threat, the council of war acceded to the opinion of Themistocles ; and the whole confederate fleet made preparations for receiv- ing the attack of the enemy, in its present station 402 . 2J98. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxi. 309. Id. ibid. 400. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. lxi. 401. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxii. 402. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxiii. lxiv. <»» The ANCIENT EUROPE. 251 The Grecian naval commanders, however, were LETTER under no few apprehensions concerning the issue of the expected engagement ; and the Peloponnesian chiefs were still dissatisfied at the thought of fight- ing for the territories of the Athenians, while their own country was in danger 103 . That danger was, indeed, great ; though their country was now better secured, than when they left it. The confederated states of Peloponnesus had, by this time, not only fortified the difficult pass of Sciron which was considered as the key of their peninsula, but had drawn a rampart across the Corinthian isth- mus, from sea to sea 4 " 4 . That wall and ditch, which they meant to defend against the army of Xerxes, if he should force the pass of Sciron, had been finish- ed by the indefatigable labours of the Lacedaemo- nians, Arcadians, Elians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Philasians, Troezenians, and Hermio- nians, under the conduct of Cleombrotus, brother to Leonidas, who had fallen so glorious at Ther- mopylae 101 . All these people were zealous in the cause of their country; but the rest of the Pelopon- nesians forbore to repair to the common standard, although the Olympian and Carnian festivals were past 406 . This remissness of a considerable part of the Pe- loponnesian body, and the rapid progress of the arms of Xerxes by land, as soon as made known to the naval officers from that peninsula, filled them with new apprehensions and discontent. Alarmed at the fate with which their families and friends were threatened, they clamorously accused Eurybiarlc-s of 403. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxx. 404. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. Ixxi. 405. Id Histor. lib. viii. cap. lxxii. 406. llcrodotu*, lib. viii. cap. lxxii. Wmit XII. 252 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, want of firmness; and a third council of war was ^^^^^ called, in order to prevent an open mutiny 407 . In that council the debates were long and warm. The Peloponnesian admirals contended, as formerly, for sailing to the Corinthian isthmus, and there en- countering every danger for the preservation of their country; while they reprobated the idea of maintain- ing their present station, and fighting for a territory already in the hands of the enemy 408 . But the Athe- nians, ^Eginetes, and Megarians, urged the expedi- ency of giving battle at Salamis 4 " 9 . During these debates Themistocles, fearing a divi- sion of the Grecian navy, as he saw no probability of being able to induce Eurybiades, and other Pelo- ponnesian admirals, to confirm their former resolution, left the council; and resolved to bring on by strata- gem, an engagement before the fleet could sepa- rate 110 . With that view he applied to Sicinus; a man who had lived in his family, and been entrust- ed with the education of his sons 411 . This confidential person Themistocles sent in a small vessel, to deliver the following message to the commanders of the barbarian fleet. " The Athenian u admiral, who favours the cause of the Persian mo- " narch, has dispatched me privately to inform you, " that the Grecian naval officers, distracted by fear, " have resolved to seek safety in flight; and that you " have now an opportunity of gaining a complete vic- " tory, unless you negligently permit their escape. " Divided among themselves, they will not only be 407. Id. Hittoriar. lib. viii. cap. Lxxiv. 408. Id. ibid. 409. Herodotus, ubi sup. 410. Id. Historiar. lib viii. cap. Ixxv. 411. Id. ibid. " unable ANCIENT EUROPE. 253 " unable to resist your force, but you will have the LETTER " farther advantage of beholding those commanders, " who are in your interest, fighting against such as " oppose you 4 '*." In consequence of this message, which obtained full credit with the Persian admirals, and even with the monarch himself 4 ' 3 , a body of troops was in- stantly landed in the little island of Psyttalea, lying between Salamis and the continent of Attica 44 ; in expectation (as that island is situated near the place where the battle was likely to be fought), that the most disabled of the Grecian ships would be driven thither, and might be taken or destroyed by the forces there stationed 4 -'. And about midnight the barbarian fleet quitted the road of Phaleron; and forming a semicircle round the western side of the island of Salamis, encurtained the whole Athenian coast, from Munychia to Elusis and the frontiers of Megara, in order to prevent the Grecian navy from escaping; while the troops of Xerxes lined the neighbouring shore, on purpose to cut off all com- munication between the fleet in the bay of Salamis and the Grecian army at the Corinthian isthmus 4 ' 6 . Meantime the leaders of the confederated Greeks, assembled in council, not knowing they were encom- passed by the forces of Xerxes, continued their debates with heat and violence 4 ' 7 . In the midst of those debates, Aristides arrived at Salamis from iEginse 4 ' 8 . Laying aside all personal animosity, and 412. Herodot. ubi sup. 413. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. Ixxvi. Diod- Sicul. lib. xi. p. 14. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Fit. Tbemist. 414. Herodot. ubi sup. 415. Id. ibid. 416. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. Ixxvi. et seq. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 14. Plut. Fit. Tbemist. 417. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxviii. 418. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. lxxix. aroL. ii. lI burning 254 THE HISTORY OF PART I. burning with zeal for the service of his country, he v-*»-n^w sent for Themistocles, his former rival 4 ' 9 ; and through whose intrigues, as we have seen, he had been banished by the ostracism. That sentence had been revoked by the Athenians on the approach of Xerxes 420 ; yet Aristides, whatever might be his motives for such delay, had not hitherto joined the confederates. But now judging his presence neces- sary, and resolved to conquer or perish with his ungrateful fellow-citizens, he had left iEgina, on hearing that the Peloponnesian admirals were deter- mined to retire to the Corinthian isthmus 421 . When Themistocles appeared, Aristides said, " We ought at present, as formerly, to contend, " who is most worthy of the favour of his country. " And, as a prelude to this new competition, I can " assure you, that more arguments are not neces- " sary to prevent the Peloponnesians from with- " drawing their ships; for they cannot now effect a " retreat, as we are encircled with enemies. Go, " therefore, to the council of war, and declare this " danger 422 ." ** The intelligence you bring," replied Themisto- cles, " is as grateful as the manner of announcing it '* is gracious. You tell me you have seen, what I " wished should take place, and endeavoured to " procure ; for necessity required, that those com- ** manders, who would not voluntarily stay here, " and give battle to the barbarians, should be com- " pelled to remain. But this important information u the council must hear from your lips ; as no regard *' will be had to my words, on such a subject 423 ." Aristides accordingly entered the council, and acquainted the Grecian commanders, that, in sailing 419. Id. ibid. 420. Plut. Tit. Arhtld. 421. Herodotus, lit), viii. cap. Ixxix. 422. Id. ibid. 423. Herodotus, lib. viii, cap. lxxx, from ANCIENT EUROPE. 255 from iEgina, he with difficulty eluded the vigilance LETTER of the enemy, whose naval force had surrounded the whole confederate fleet 414 . Fresh dissentions, . ,. n , ' Ant Chr. however, arose among the members of the council; 4S0. the greater number giving no credit to the report of 0l y m P l * <1 the Athenian patriot 425 . These dissentions conti- nued, until a ship, belonging to the island of Tenos, which had deserted from the armament of Xerxes, arrived at Salamis, and confirmed the former intel- ligence 4 * 6 . Now convinced of their danger, all the Grecian commanders made preparations for giving battle 4 * 7 . And when an assembly was held, about day-break, Sept. 22. for that purpose, Themistocles declared his opinion of the event, and exhorted his countrymen and con- federates, to acquit themselves in a manner worthy of the great occasion, and the glorious cause in which they were engaged'' 23 . Thus animated, the Grecian admirals went on board their ships, and weighed anchor; and the barbarians, seeing the confederate fleet in motion, bore down without loss of time. But the Greeks lay upon their oars, and kept off; until the captain of an Athenian galley, breaking out of the line, dashed his armed prow into the side of one of the enemy's largest ships, which vauntingly seemed to bid defiance to every opponent; and by that gallant effort brought on a general engagement, as he could not otherwise be extricated 4 * 9 . The Grecian fleet now consisted of three hundred and eighty triremes, or ships of the line 430 ; and the naval armament of Xerxes of above twelve hundred, 424. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. Ixxxi. 425. Id. ibid. 426. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. Ixxxii. lxxxiii. 427. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxxiii. 428. Id. ibid, et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 14. 429. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. lxxxiv. /Eschyl. Pers «- / the Spartan admiral, gave a new turn to his discourse, *and thus addressed the Athenians: " I have often " seen, and oftener heard, that men, constrained by " necessity, have renewed the combat, and recovered " their former losses. Therefore, since we have " found means to dispel the cloud of enemies, that " threatened us and all Greece with ruin, let us no '" farther pursue the fugitives. But, as our affairs " are in so prosperous a state, having vanquished '* the navy of the great king, let us remain in Greece; " provide for ourselves and our families; rebuild our " houses, and sow our lands with all diligence; de- " ferring our expedition to Ionia and the Hellespont, " until the return of spring^. Themistocles, ever willing to make friends, sen- sible of the turbulence of the Athenian democracy, the versatile humour of the people,- and the proba- bility of his being obliged to seek refuge in the domi- nions of the Persian monarch, seized this opportunity to send a private message to Xerxes, who had not yet quitted Athens^ claiming the merit of having dis- suaded the Greeks from sailing to the Hellespont, and breaking down his bridges 6 ; though, as Thucy- dides observes, nothing could be more false 7 . The next measure of this accomplished statesman and commander has been thought no less selfish. Under pretence of chastising the inhabitants of the Grecian islands, for siding with Xerxes, though he knew they were constrained so to do, he meant to pillage them. On Andros he first made an attack; because the people of that island had refused to com- ply with his demands 8 . He told them the Athenians 5. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cix. (5, Id. lib. viii. cap. ex. 7. Thucvdides, lib. i. cap. cxxxv'u. 8. Hcrodot. lib. viii. cap. cxi were ANCIENT EUROPE. 263 were come thither accompanied bv two powerful LETTER deities, Persuasion and Force; and, therefore, they- .^L_|. must pay the sum required. They replied, that the Athenians, supported by such powerful goddesses, were consequently great and prosperous; but that the Andrians, confined to narrow territory, and having two unpropitious goddesses, Poverty and Impossi- bility, constantly residing among them, they could pay no money, while under the tutelage of those dei- ties; adding, that the strength of Athens was not greater than their inability 9 . Andros was accordingly besieged, though ineffec- tually. And during the time Themistocles lay before it, he sent threatening messages to the other islands, and extorted money from -the inhabitants of several of them; but especially from the Carystians and Pa- rians °. The Parians, by their liberality, escaped the visit of the Grecian fleet 1 ; not so the Carystians, who seem to have been severely handled*. After the Greeks had raised the siege of Andros, and ravaged the territory of Carystus, on the southern side of the island of Eubcea, they returned to Sala- mis' 3 . There a new scene displayed itself; the divi- sion of the spoil. After setting aside what portion they intended to consecrate to the gods, they divi- ded the remaining booty among them' 4 . They then sailed for the Corinthian isthmus; in order to conler the olive crown on the admiral, who should be found most worthy of it, by his behaviour in the battle of Salamis' 5 . 9. Id. ibid. 10. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxii. 11. Id. ibid. 12. Herodot. ubi sup. 13. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxxi. 14. Id. ibid. 15. Id. Hittoriar. lib. viii. cap. cxxiii. The 264, THE HISTORY OF PART I. The Grecian manner of ascertaining the priority s ^" v "*** / of naval merit was not a little solemn. Each of the admirals brought in, and laid upon the altar of Neptune at the Isthmus, the names of the com- manders he judged worthy of the first and second place 6 , But what was truly singular on this occa- sion, and which must astonish your lordship, initiat- ed in the polite manners of modern Europe; " every ** one, thinking he had performed his own part " best, wrote down his own name first, and the *' name of Themistocles second 7 :" — so that setting aside the vanity of self-love, a decisive judgment was given in his favour. Mutual jealousy, however, pre- vented the Grecian admirals from formally giving such decision; and they returned to their several harbours, without bestowing the honorary crown' 8 . Dissatisfied with the conduct of his associates, Themistocles repaired to Sparta, in hopes of there receiving the honour he claimed. The Spartans gave him a splendid reception and treated him with the greatest respect. But, they did not implicitly grant his request. They decreed the prize of valour to their own naval commander, Eurybiades; and that of address and prudence, to Themistocles; ho- nouring each with on olive crown 19 . They also gave to Themistocles the most magnificent chariot in Sparta 20 . And after bearing these testimonies to, his merit, and expressing their approbation of his conduct, three hundred Spartans of the equestrian order attended him to the frontiers of Laconia 21 ; il the single instance we know," says Herodotus, " of any man being accompanied by the Lacedsemo- <{ nians at hjs departure 22 ." While 16. Id. ibid. 17. Herodot. ubi sup. 18. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxxiv. 19. Id. ibid. 20. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxiv. 21. Id. ibid. 22. Historiar. ubi sup. Those honours, however, cost Themistoclet dear. ANCIENT EUROPE. 265 While the Greeks were occupied in dividing the LETTER, spoil, and apportioning the merit of their naval XI11 - commanders, the Persians were more seriously em- s ** m>r> **' ployed. Encouraged by the bold resistance made at Thermopylae, the victory at Salamis, the flight of the barbarian fleet, and the retreat of Xerxes, some Macedonian towns on the Grecian frontier had ven- tured to throw off the Persian yoke 23 . These Arta- bazus undertook to reduce, after he had conveyed his sovereign to the Hellespont; and marched back with his body of sixty thousand men, to the borders of Thessaly 2 4, Against Potidaea, which had first re- volted, Artabazus turned his arms 25 . But finding Olynthus also disposed to revolt, he besieged that place at the same time; and when he had taken it, he brought out the Olynthians to a neighbouring mo- rass, and put them all to the sword 26 . After the reduction of Olynthus, Artabazus di- rected his whole force against Potidaea. But the Potidaeans, hardened by the military execution in- flicted upon the Olynthians, baffled his most vigorous efforts for three months 27 . Then the tides rose so high, and continued so Jong, that the Persian gene- ral, seeing the shore deluged with water, and choked with mud, retired toward Pallene 28 . But before he had completed one half of his march, so great an inundation broke from the sea, in consequence of an unusually high tide, that such of his troops as could not swim, perished in the waves; and the greater part of those that could, were killed by the Potidaeans who had pursued them, in boats 29 . The remainder dear. His acceptance of them awakened a jealousy among the Athe- nians, which occasioned his loss of the command of the fleet. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 22. edit. sup. cit. 23. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. exxvi. 24. Id. ibid. 25. Herodot. Histariar. lib. viii. cap. exxvii. 26. Id. ibid. 27. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. exxix. 28. Id. ibid. 29- Herodot. Hhturi.ir. ubi sup. Artabazus 266 THE HISTORY OF PART I Artabazus conducted to the camp of Mardonius in Thessaly 30 . Ant. Chr. Nothing else memorable happened during the winter, either by sea or land. The army of Mar- donius kept quiet in its cantonments, in Thessaly and Macedonia, and the Persian fleet lay at Cume J ; where it had taken its station after landing Xerxes, and the wretched rabble of his mutilated host, at Abydos 3 *. Spring awakened both the Greeks and Persians 479. ' to action, though with mutual diffidence of each Olympiad other's strength. The Persian fleet advanced to Samos, in order to overawe the Ionians 33 ; and the Grecian naval force assembled at iEgina 34 . The Greeks afterward took station at Delos, and there remained until the latter part of summer, afraid to proceed farther 35 ; and fear also restrained the Per- sians from advancing beyond Samos 36 . An equal degree of diffidence appeared in the. proceedings of both parties by land. Before Mar- donius quitted his camp in Thessaly, he endeavour- ed to detach the Athenians from the Grecian con- federacy. With this view, after consulting the Grecian oracles, he sent Alexander I. king of Mace- donia, to negociate with them, in the name of the Persian monarch 37 . A fitter agent he could not have chosen. Though naturally a man of high spirit, Alex- ander was become a deep and crafty politician who en- joyed the confidence both of the Greeks and Persians. 30. Id. ibid. SI. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxx. 32. Id. ibid. 33. Herodotus, ubi sup. 34. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxxxi, 35. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxxxii. 36. Id. ibid. 37. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxxxti. cxl. In ANCIENT EUROPE. 267 In order to escape punishment, for the assassination LETTER of the Persian nobles, he gave in marriage, as we have seen 38 , his sister Gigea, and a large sum of money, to Bubares 39 ; a Persian of high rank, sent to inquire into that bloody transaction 4 ". And, in- stead of joining the Greeks, and making with them a common stand against the Asiatic invaders, he had politically preserved his fealty to the Persian mo- narch 4 ' ; willing seemingly to see the Grecian repub- lics humbled, and in hopes of profiting by their weakness, after the forces of the great king should be withdrawn. The conduct of Perdiccas, his son, pupil, and successor, justifies this conjecture. But whatever might be the views of Alexander, the Athenians were ignorant of them. They con- sidered him as a prince of Grecian extraction, well disposed to their interests, and endeared to them by mutual acts of friendship and hospitality 42 . They received him accordingly. But, with a liberality peculiar to themselves, they did not admit his pub- lic audience, until the arrival of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors 43 ; that they might convince Sparta, still the governing state, and all Greece, of their magnanimous attachment to the common cause. 28. Let. xi. 39. Herodotus, lib. v. cap. xxi. 45. Id. ibid. 41. Macedonia had been subjected to the Persian dominion, as we have seen, (Lett, xi.) by Mardonius, in the reign of Darius. (Hero- dot, lib. vi. cap. xliv.) Alexander was then on the Macedonian throne ; and, though he affected friendship to Greece, and claimed at Olympia his Grecian descent (Herodot. lib. v. cap. xxii.), he had ever since publicly adhered to the Persian interest. 42. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. exxxvi. 43. Id. Historian lib. viii. cap. cxliii. For they knew that the Lacedaemonians, as soon as they heard of the deputation of the kiry; cf Macedonia, on the part of the barbarian, would send ambassador*. to Athena. Id. ibid. When 2G8 THE HISTORY OF PART I. When the Athenians were assembled 44 , in presence v-^"v^w of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, the king of Ma- cedonia spoke to the following purport. " Men of " Athens, Mardonius hath sent me to inform you$ " that he has received a message from the king, in " these words: — I forgive the Athenians all the in- " juries I have suffered from them. Therefore, " Mardonius, act thus: — Restore them partly their " country, with the power of retaining their own " laws; and grant them part of any other country " they shall choose. Moreover, if they will form a " league with me, rebuild all their temples that I " destroyed 45 *" " These are the instructions that were sent to " me," added Alexander, in the name of Mardonius ; " and I am under the necessity of executing them, " unless you reject the conditions^." He afterward offered several arguments in the character of the Persian general, in favour of the propositions of 44. As the families of the Athenians were still absent (Herodot. lib.viii. cap. cxlii.), at Salamis, Troezene, or on board the fleet, this assembly could consist only of the senators, and other principal citi- zens : who had returned to their desolated capital, for the purpose of transacting public business. For although it does not appear, that Xerxes left any garrison in Athens, it was in too ruinous a state, and too little secure, for the people to return to it, until they were acquainted with the fate of the army under Mardonius. 45. Hei-odotus, lib. vii. cap. cxl. The destruction of the Grecian temples and idols by the Persians, as I have formerly had occasion to observe (Lett, x.) was the natural conseqence of the purity of their national religion; in the principles of which the Persian monarchs were carefully instructed. Hence their detestation of idolatry, and the rage with which they assailed its sacred mansions. The proffer of Xerxes to rebuild the Athenian temples, was, therefore, a greater sacrifice, than the proposed restitution of the territory of the repub- lic, or the addition of any other Grecian domain. In offering only to restore part of the Athenian territory, he seems to have intended* not doubting of the success of Mardonius, to establish a military sta- tion in Attica. 46. Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxl. Xerxes | ANCIENT EUROPE. 269 Xerxes; and then, in his proper character, he said, *' Those, Athenians, are the matters Mardonius cora- " missioned me to declare to you. On my own part, *' I shall forbear to mention my friendship for your " state; because the present is not the only instance ** in which you have experienced it. But let me '* beseech you to hearken to the message of Xerxes; ** for I foresee the impossibility of the Greeks being " long able to contend with the force of the Persian u empire. Had I not been convinced of this, I should u never have consented to bring you such a message. u Accept, therefore, the munificent propositions of * l the Persian monarch. You alone of all the con- " federated Greeks, and the most exposed to depre- " dation, hath he condescended to forgive the injuries " committed against him; and, if you shall embrace " his proffered friendship and alliance, great will be " the power and glory of Athens' 17 ." The arguments of the king of Macedonia roused the Spartan ambassadors; and they spoke to thi3 effect: " The Lacedaemonians have sent us hither " to request that you will introduce no novelties into M the affairs of Greece, nor listen to the propositions " of the barbarian; because such proceedings are M unjust and dishonourable to any Grecian people; " and least of all becoming the Athenians, for many *' reasons. In the first place, you were the authors *' of the war, which has now spread through all •' Greece. And what can be more shameful, than " that the Greeks should be brought into servitude " by means of the Athenians? — who have, in times " past, rescued so many states from slavery. " We affectionately take part in your .sufferings; " we are grieved to see you twice lose the produce 47. Id. ibid. vol. ir. s n "of 270 THE HISTORY OF PART I. « of your lands, and be so long deprived of the com- v ^"" v "^* / " fort of your families and habitations. But, in com- " pensation, the Lacedaemonians and the other con- " federates promise, to provide subsistence for your " wives; and all other persons belonging to you, " unfit to bear arms, until the termination of the war. " Be not, therefore, seduced by the delusive colour- " ing, which Alexander the Macedonian has put " upon the Persian's message to Mardonius. He " acts in conformity with his character and condi- " tion: he aids the tyrant, because he is a tyrant " himself. But if you judge wisely, you will pur- " sue a different line of conduct; for you know that " the barbarians are equally void of faith and truth 48 . **" When the Spartan ambassadors had done speak- ing, the Athenians gave the following answer to the king of Macedonia 49 . " We know the power of the " Persian monarch is much greater than ours; and, " therefore, enlargement on that invidious subject " might, in decency, have been spared. But, in " maintainance of our liberty, we will resist hi3 '* force, as long as we are able. So that your " endeavours, to draw us into a league with the " barbarian, will prove as ineffectual as they are " disgusting. Go then, and tell Mardonius the " Athenians declare, that, while the sun continues " to perform his course, they will never enter into " an alliance with Xerxes; but confiding in the " assistance of their gods and deified heroes, whose " temples and images he has contemptuously de- " stroyed, and devoured with fire, will persist in " prosecuting war against him 50 ." 48 Herodotus, lib. viii. cap. cxlii. 49. According to Plutarch (in Fit. Aristid.), this answer was deli- vered by Aiistides. But Herodotus gives it as the collective sense of the Athenian people, without naming any person. Zanthippus was archon for the year. 50. Herodot. lib. viii. cap. cxliii. Having ANCIENT EUROPE. 271 Having thus answered the king of Macedonia, the Athenians next addressed the Spartan ambassa- dors. " In being apprehensive," said they, " that *' we might form an alliance with Xerxes, the Lace- 11 daemonians have judged rightly on the common u principles of human conduct; but illiberally in " regard to the Athenians, whom they ought better " to have known. No bribes, no promises; not all " the gold in the world, and the offer of the richest " and most beautiful country on the face of the " earth, could induce us to join the Persians, and *' betray the liberties of Greece. Many and power- " ful are the reasons that restrain us from so acting, *.' were we even so disposed. Among these, the " first and strongest is, the destruction of the tem- " pies and images of the Grecian gods; a sacrilege, " which we are bound to avenge, instead of contract- " ing an alliance with the man who has perpetrated " the atrocious crime. Then, as a Grecian people, " connected by blood, and united by one language; " having the same altars and sacrifices, and holding " the same political opinions, the Athenians would " act a disgraceful part, should they become the " betrayers of Greece. Know, therefore, that so " long as one Athenian warrior remains alive, we " will never come to an accommodation with the " barbarians s '." " For your kind attention to us," added they, " in offering to provide for our families, since we " have lost our habitations and harvests, we return " you thanks as gratefully as if we had received the *' benefit. But we shall take care to provide for " them ourselves, and avoid being a burden to you. " We only request, that your army be got in readi- ** ness with all possible expedition; for we have 51. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap. cxliv. " reason 2f2 THE HISTORY OF TART I. " reason to apprehend, that the barbarian general v^"V*«/ " will invade our territory, as soon as he hears " that we have rejected the propositions of Xerxes. " Therefore, to prevent his approach, the most pru- " dent measure will be, to meet him with our com- ** bined forces in Bceotia 5 V The Lacedaemonian ambassadors having received this answer, accompanied with a demand in which they seemed to acquiesce, departed for Sparta. And the measures of Mardonius justified the appre- hensions of the Athenians. No sooner was he informed by the king of Macedonia, of the resolu- tion of the Athenian republic, than he quitted Thes- saly, and began his march toward Attica ; taking with him the forces of all the Greeks, in the Persian, interest, that lay in his route 53 . ■ In the prosecution of this march, Mardonius was encouraged by the Thessalian chiefs; who far from repenting of their former defection, openly espoused the barbarian cause 54 . But when the Persian com- mander entered Boeotia, he received cooler counsel from the Thebans. Though not less zealous for the success of his arms, they deliberated more wisely. They told him that their country was the most eligible of any for him to encamp in ; and if he would advance no farther, but there remain, he might become master of Greece without hazarding a battle ; that the Greeks, when united, were so strong, he had found, as hardly to be conquered by all other nations. " But if," said they, " you will follow " our advice, you may frustrate, without difficulty, " their best laid designs: — Send money to the leading- " men of every state. Thus you will split Greece 52. Id. ibid. 53. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. i. 54. Id. ibid. into ANCIENT EUROPE. 273 " into factions; and that accomplished, you may LETTER " easily subdue all who are not in your interest, and ^-y-^, " also those that have received your bribes 55 . But this prudent counsel did not suit the ardent temper of Mardonius. He, therefore, pursued his march; entered Attica, and proceeded to Athens. He found, however, no Athenians there ; those that had returned to their dismantled capital, having quitted it on hearing of his approach, and returned to Salamis, or on board the fleet, though not till they had lost all hopes of succour from the Peloponne- sians 56 : so that he quietly took possession of the desolated city, in the tenth month after it had been reduced by Xerxes 57 . Mardonius, proud of being master of Athens, and thinking the Athenians, a second time driven from their country, might now listen to proposals of peace and friendship with the king, sent Murchides, a Hel- lespontian Greek, to treat with them at Salamis 58 . Murchides, on his arrival, was admitted to the Athe- nian senate or council of state; and after he had spoken according to his instructions, Lycidas, one of the senators, proposed that the offers of Mardonius should be referred to the assembly of the people. But the Athenians, convened in council, so swelled with rage at this motion; and those without, when informed of it, that Lycidas was instantly stoned to death. And the Athenian women, on learning the cause of the tumult, were inflamed with hate, to such a degree, that, encouraging one another, they went to the house of the execrated senator, and stoned to death his wife and children 59 . 55. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. ii. 56. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. iii. 57. Id. ibid. 58. Herodotus, lib. i,x. cap. iv. 59. Id. lib. ix. cap. v. The 2/4 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The Athenians, thus awakened to indignation and n-^~*' > w resentment, keenly turned their eyes on their deserted condition; and sent ambassadors to Sparta, to re- proach the Lacedaemonians, for having neglected to send their forces into Bceotia, in order to oppose the common enemy, and prevent the return of the barba- rians into Attica. They were also instructed to remind the Lacedaemonians of the vast advantages the Persian general had offered, if they should espouse his master's cause; and to warn them, that unless the Athenians were speedily succoured, they would find unwelcome aid 60 . In this commission, the Athenian ambassadors were joined with those of Plataeaand Megara 6 '. On their arrival at Sparta, they went to the ephori ; and said, " The Athenians have sent us hither to repre- " sent to you, that the Persian monarch is willing to " restore our territory; and not only to form an " alliance with us, on a footing of equality, but to " give us any other territory we shall choose. Our " veneration for the Grecian Jupiter, and our abhor- " rence of betraying the liberties of Greece, have u with-held us from accepting his offers: yet, in " reward of such firmness, we are neglected and be- " trayed by the Lacedaemonians. " We know that we should consult our own inter- " est more, by making peace with the great king, than " by prosecuting the war; but we will never, unless " compelled by necessity, come to an accommodation " with him. This is our manner of demonstrating " our sincere attachment to the confederated Cheeks. " But the Lacedemonians, who were in the utmost " consternation, when we made such avowal, lest we 60. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. vi, 61. Id. ibid. " should ANCIENT EUROPE. 275 " should accept the conditions of Xerxes, were no u sooner informed of our determination never to be- * tray the Grecian cause, and had fortified the wall " upon the Isthmus to their defence, than they threw " off all regard for the safety of the Athenians. For " after they had agreed to meet us in Boeotia, in or- " der to oppose the Persian army, they left us to " shift for ourselves, and looked with indifference " on the irruption of the barbarians into Attica. " Dissatisfied with your past conduct, because " you have neglected to fulfil your engagements, the M Athenians now exhort you, to send your forces to " join them with all possible expedition; that, hav- " ing lost the opportunity of meeting Mardonius in " Bceotia, we may find him in Attica. And the " Thriasion plain is the most convenient place, in " our territory, for joining battle 6 *." When the ephori had heard this remonstrance, they delayed their answer till next day, and from that day to another; studiously protracting time, from day to day, till ten days were elapsed. During this interval, all the Peloponnesians worked with the utmost diligence for finishing the fortifications of the wall at the Corinthian isthmus 63 . The 62. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. vii. 63. Id. Histor'tar. lib. ix. cap. viii. " I can give no other reason," lays this original historian, "for the exertions the Lacedaemonians •• made to prevent the Athenians from taking part with the Persian " monarch, when Alexander the Macedonian was at Athens, and of " their total neglect of them afterward; but that, having secured " the isthmus with a wall, they had no farther need of their Athe- " nian allies. Whereas, when Alexander was at Athens, their wall " was not finished ; but they were hard at work on it, and much " afraid of the Persians" (Herodot. ubi sup.). But he had formerly told us (FJistoriar. lib. i ii. cap. exxxix. et lib. viii. cap. xl.), that the Peloponnesians had secured the Corinthian isthmus with a wall, be- fore the invasion of Attica by Xerxes. He mutt, therefore, here mean 276 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The day before the meeting of the popular asn \^~v~>s sembly, Chileus of Tegea, a man highly esteemed by the Spartans, having learned, from one of the ephori, the substance of the Athenian remonstrance, spoke to the following purport. " The matter thus stands: " if the Athenians separate themselves from you, " and join the barbarian, he will enter Peloponnesus " by passes large enough 64 , notwithstanding the " fortifications erected at the Corinthian isthmus*. " Hearken, therefore, to the Athenians, before they " embrace any resolution hurtful to Greece 65 ." The ephori, having deliberated on the advice of Chileus, sent out the same night, and ^without ac- quainting the ambassadors, five thousand Spartans, all heavy armed, with seven helots to attend each, under the conduct of Pausanias, the son of Cleom- brotus 66 . These troops should have been led by Plistarchus, the son of Leonidas 67 ; Leutchides, the other Spartan king, being on board the fleet. But because Plistarchus was under age, the command of the Lacedaemonian army was intrusted to Pausanias, his guardian and near relation 68 . Knowing nothing of the march of this army, and intending to return to their several states, the ambas- sadors went early next morning to the ephori, and said, "You, Lacedaemonians! are living at your ease, u and celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus 69 , while mean such additional fortifications, as should render that wall im- pregnable, in the opinion of the Peloponnesian confederates. 64. Alluding to the descents that might be made, by sea, after the junction of the Athenian and Persian fleets. 65. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. ix. 66. Id. Htttoriar. lib. ix. cap. x. 6T. Id. ibid. 68. Herodotus, ubi sup. 69. The Hyacinthia was one of the highest festivals in the Spartan calendar. It lasted three days, and was celebrated with alternate mourning and rejoicing. Pausan. in Lacon. " other a ANCIENT EUROPE. 27f other states are exposed to ruin. But know, the LETTER " Athenians betrayed by you, and destitute of sup* " port, will make peace with the Persian monarch H on such terms as they can obtain 70 . When we " have so done, and are become the allies of the u great king," added the Athenian ambassadors, " we shall be obliged to act with him ag-Jnst what- " ever country he shall lead us. And then you will " see the consequence of your selfish councils 7 '." After the ambassadors had thus spoken, the ephori declared to them, that the Spartan army was in full march toward the isthmus, with orders to act against the common enemy 72 . Not comprehending this dis- course, the ambassadors desired to kno'v the mean- ing of it; and when informed of the whole truth, and assured of it upon oath, they took their depar- ture 3 . Five thousand more heavy armed men, drawn from the places adjacent to Sparta, marched out, at the same time, to join Pausanias 74 . So that the Lacedaemonian forces mustered, on this occasion, amounted to forty-five thousand disciplined soldiers; exclusive of the helots, one to each free man 7 ^, that attended the second detachment of five thousand warriors, furnished by the municipal towns and coun- try of Laconia. For the helots that accompanied the five thousand Spartans, seven to each warrior, had been regularly trained to arms 75 . All the helots acted as light troops 77 . While the Lacedaemonian army Was advancing to the isthmus, the Argives sent a messenger to Athens, to acquaint Mardonius of its march, under the con» 70. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xi. 71. Id. ibid. 72. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xi. 73. Id. ibid. 74. Herodot. ubi sup. 75. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxix. 76. Id. ibid. 77. Id. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. xxix. VOL. II. O O dllCt XIII. ara THE HISTORY OF PART I. duct of Pausanias 78 . They had undertaken to oppose s **^*~ > *>' it, but found themselves unequal to the attempt 79 . Mardonius.no sooner received information of the march of the Lacedaemonians, than he resolved to leave Attica; it being, by reason of its irregular sur- face, unfit for cavalry to act in. And he had ano- ther reason for quitting it. If he should there have lost a battle, he had no means of retreat but through narrow defiles, where a small number of troops might have obstructed a great army 80 . Hitherto he had not only foreborn to ravage the country, but in- dulgently spared it, in hopes that the Athenians would make their peace with the Persian monarch 8 '. Understanding, however, that their resolution was now taken for war; and that they would soon make head against him, in conjunction with the Lacedae- monians and other confederates, he determined to retire into Boeotia ; a country more friendly to the operations of cavalry, and where the people were devoted to his master's cause 82 . But before he left Attica, in the fury of rage and chagrin of disappoint- ment, he set fire to Athens; and demolished what- ever remained standing of the walls, houses, or temples of that ancient city, and early seat of learn- ing and civility, laying all in ruins 83 . The Persian commander having quitted Attica, marched toward Megara, where he was informed a body of Lacedaemonians were posted, and sent out his horse to scour the country 84 : but afterward understanding that the combined- forces of the Pelo- ponnesian confederates were assembled at the Corin- thian isthmus, changed his route; and was conducted ~8. Herodot. Historian lib. ix. cap. xii. 79. Id. ibid. £0. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xiii. 81. Id. ibid. 82. Id. Historiar. lib ix. cap. xiii. 83. Id. ibid. 81. Heradot. lib. ix. cap. xiv. by ANCIENT EUROPE. £79 by Boeotian guides, by the way of Sphontlale and LETTEll Tanagra, to Colon, in the territory of Thebes'* 5 . In Kl11 ' that neighbourhood, he chose a defensible station for his army, and fortified it with all diligence, lest he should not have the wished for success in battle 86 . This station, secured by a wall and a ditch, formed a square often furlongs on each side 87 ; and his camp extended from Erythra to the territory of Plata;a, along the river Asopus 8 \ Before Mardonius entered Attica, all the Greeks, in the Persian interest, had joined him in Bo.- >tia with their forces, except the Phoceans; who, against their will, had been compelled to take part with the barbarians 89 . But soon after the return of the Per- sian general to Bceotia, the Phoceans also joined him with a thousand men ; heavy-armed, and led by Harmocydes, a citizen of great authority among them 90 . When they arrived, Mardonius sent out a party of horse, to order them to encamp by them- selves on the plain. This they had no sooner done, than all the cavalry of the Persian army appeared embattled in sight 9 '. In consequence of this hostile array, a rumour was spread among the Grecian forces in the army of Mardonius, that the barbarian horse were com- manded to massacre the Phoceans 93 . The same ru-» mour having found its way into the supposed devoted body, Harmocydes, the Phocean leader, thus address- ed his troops: — " These men, O Phoceans! have " a design to cut us off; and I believe the Thessa- " lians are our accusers. Let me, therefore, exhort 85. Id. lib. ix. cap. xv. 86. Id. ibid. 87. Herodot. Historiar. lil>. ix. cap, xv. Biod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 24. vol. ii. edit. Rhodoman. 88. Id. ibid. 89. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xvii. 90. Id. ibid. 91. Herodot. llistoriar. lib. ix. cap. xvii. 92. Id. ibid. " every 280 THE HISTORY OF PART 1. " every one of you to behave valiantly on this try- \^~*^*-' *' ing occasion ; for it wUl be more honourable for " us to die bravely, fighting in our own defence, than " tamely to suffer ourselves to be slaughtered. Be W it ours then, to convince these barbarians, that " they are not a match for a handful of Greeks, <* whose murder they have purposed 95 ." When Harmodius had thus encouraged his fol- lowers to meet death undismayed, the barbarian cavalry, having surrounded them on all sides, ad- vanced in battalia, brandishing their javelins; but seeing the Phocean phalanx standing firm, combined in the closest order, and fronting every way, they faced about, and joined the Persian army 91 . I can- not certainly tell, says Herodotus 95 , whether this body of cavalry came to destroy the Phoceans, or only to try their courage; but, after its return, Mar- donius sent them a message, in these words: — " Fear no hurt, Phoceans I you have given proof " that you are men of steady valour, and belied the " information I had received of your character. " Bear the toils of this war with fortitude; and rest *' assured, that you will never do more for the king " or for me, than we will for you 9 *." Meantime the Lacedaemonian army, under Pau- sanias, having encamped at the Corinthian isthmus, was there joined by the forces of such of the other Peloponnesians, as had the common cause at heart, or whom the fear of shame incited to arms 97 . After offering their sacrifices auspiciously, the whole body of the Peloponnesian confederates, marched from the isthmus, and advanced to Eleusis 98 . They sacrificed again with the same fortunate presages, 93. Herodotus, Historian uki sup. 94. Id. lib. ix. cap. xviii. 95. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xviii. 96. Herodot. ubi sup. 97. Id Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xix. 98. Id. ibid. at ANCIENT EUROPE. 281 at that celebrated seat of superstition; and having formed a junction with eight thousand Athenians from Salamis, under the command of Aristides, they prosecuted their march for Breotia 00 . On their arrival at Erythra, the Greeks discovered the bar- barian army encamped in the plain between them and the river Asopus; and after holding a council of war, they pitched their camp right opposite that of the enemy, in the branches of mount Cithaeron 100 . Thus strongly posted, the confederated Greeks were in no haste to give battle to the barbarians. They even despised every provocation to draw them down to the plain' 01 . Mardonius, therefore, sent all his cavalry, commanded by Masistius, a general in high estimation among the Persians, to force the Grecian camp" 2 . The barbarian horse advanced to the charge in squadrons; by which mode of attack, they did great execution with their missile weapons. And, glorying in their success, they insultingly chal- lenged the Greeks to fight, under the name of wo- The Megareans, who were most exposed to these insults, as they were posted nearest the plain, sent a trumpeter to the Grecian generals, with a message to the following import. " Friends and allies I M the Megareans say thus: We are not able alone " to sustain the shock of the Persian cavalry; hav- " ing had the same station from the beginning that " we now defend, and in which we have hitherto " maintained ourselves by our valour and fortitude, " though not without much difficulty. And, unless " other forces are sent to our assistance, we must " abandon our post °\" 99. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xix. 100. Id. ibid. 101. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. ax. 10J. Id. ibid. 103. Herodot. ubi sup. 104. Id. Historiar. !.b. ix. cap. xx\. When 282 THE HISTORY OF PART I. When that message was delivered, Pausanias, the v^v^^/ Lacedaemonian general, as commander in chief, sounded the courage of all the confederated Greeks ; to learn if the forces of any one state would volun- tarily offer to march* to the support of the Mega- reans, in their exposed station: but no such offer was made' 05 . After this silent refusal, three hundred • Athenian spearmen, panting for the post of danger, started forth under the conduct of Olympiodorus the son of Lompon; and being accompanied by a party of archers, of their own choosing, long baffled all the efforts of the enemy to break into the Me- garean station 106 . But the barbarian cavalry still continuing to attack in squadrons, the Athenians, perpetually harassed, and hard pressed, were ready to give ground, when Masistius, advancing at the head of the whole body of his troops, in order to make the grand assault, his horse was wounded in the side with an arrow; and rearing, impatient of the pain, threw his rider 107 . The Athenians seeing Masistius fall, immedia- tely surrounded him; and having first. seized his horse, which wore a bridle of gold, and all the other furniture proportionably rich, killed him while he strove to defend himself ° 8 . That, however, they did not effect without difficulty; because, beneath a purple cloak, he wore a cuirass covered with mails of gold' 09 . They tried in vain to penetrate this cuirass. That obstruction, an Athenian perceiving, thrust a spear into his head through the aperture in the hel- met for the eye; and, in consequence of that wound, he fell down dead 110 . The troops of Masistius at first knew nothing of his death; for they neither saw him, when he fell from 105.' Id. ibid. 106. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxii. 107. Id. ibid. 108. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxi. 109. Id. ibid. 110. Herodot. ubi sup. his ANCIENT EUROPE. 283 his horse, nor when he was slain 1 ". But making a halt in their evolution or retreat, to which they had been forced by the exulting Athenians, they found they had no commander; and no sooner were they apprised of the fate of Masi.stius, than, animating one another, they pushed their horses, in one body, against the enemy, in order to carry off the corpse of their general" 1 * When the Athenians found the barbarian cavalry no longer attacked in squadrons, severe as such reite- rated assaults were, but with their whole strength, they demanded succour from the Grecian main body. But before any aid came, the Athenian volunteers, unable to maintain their post, were forced to give ground 1 ' 3 . The enemy's horse, however, abandoned the body of Masistius, when a detachment from the Grecian army advanced to the support of the Athe- nians and Megareans, and retiring to the distance of about two furlongs, to consult together, resolved to return to Mardonius, as they had lost their leader" 4 . I The Greeks having thus sustained, and repelled the attack of the barbarian cavalry, were greatly heartened. And because many of their troops, from a desire to view the body of Masistius, had quitted their ranks, they placed it on a chariot, and carried it through every quarter of the camp" 5 ; "a spectacle " worthy of admiration," says Herodotus, " because " of his stature and comeliness' ." If the Greeks were elated at the death of Masistius, the Persians were depressed in an equal or greater degree. When the cavalry returned to the camp of 111. Id. ibid. 112. Herodotus, lib. ix. cip. xxii. 113. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap xxiii. 114. Id. ibid 115. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxr. 116. Wutoriar. ubi sup. Mardonius, 284 THE HISTORY OF Parti. Mardonius, and related the disastrous fate of their v -^ > °^ / commander, the whole army broke out into the loud- est lamentations; and raised such a voice of mourn- ing, that the howling was heard wide over Boeotia" 7 * Masistius, after Mardonius, stood highest in es- teem, with the king and with the army, of all the Persian leaders 1 8 . The afflicted barbarians, in token of their sorrow for the loss of so able a general, cut Off their hair, and also the manes of their horses and beasts of draught' i9 » The Greeks, however, who ought to have deriv- ed confidence from finding, that they could resist the impulse of the Median and Persian cavalry, and who had the glory and advantage of having deprived them of a gallant commander, resolved to quit their camp near Erythra, and seek a more distant post. They accordingly marched by the foot of mount Cythaeron, while the barbarians were mourning the death of Masistius; and passing by Hisia, into the territory of the Plataeans, encamped in a plain, broken by defiles, in trie neighbourhood of the Gargaphian spring, and the temple of the hero Androcrates' 20 . When they arrived there, a particular station was assigned to the forces of each state 121 . 117. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxiv. 118. Id. ibid. 119. Herodot. ubi sup. et Plut. Vit. Aristid. The death of Masis- tius may be considered as the ruin of the Persian affairs in Europe. For Marddnius had no other experienced general to command his cavalry, nor any on whose fidelity he could depend; Artabazus being envious of his superior rank, and inimical to the Grecian expedition. Herodotus, Histariar. lib. ix. passim. 120. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxv. Herodotus says, the Greeks moved to this place that they might be better supplied with water (Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxv.). Pl-.ttarch makes them choose it from motives of superstition (Vit Aristid). Both probably had their influence ; but it is also probable, that the Greeks, in shifting their camp, sought for, at least, a temporary relief from the attacks of the barbarian cavalry, whose missile weapons had so much galled them. 121. Id. ibid. In ANCIENT EUROPE. 285 In the distribution of these stations, a dangerous dispute arose. The Lacedaemonians occupying, as their pre-eminent post, the right of the army, the Tegeans contested with the Athenians the honour of being posted at the head of the left wing' 22 ; urging both their ancient and recent exploits, as well as established custom, to justify their claim to such station 123 . And to them the second post of honour certainly belonged, in acting only with their Pelo- ponnesian confederates. After the Tegeans had spoken, the Athenians offered their pretensions to the envied station. Hav- ing exhibited, by way of answer, the gallant actions of their countrymen, they magnanimously con- cluded thus: — " The present momentous crisis " being utterly improper for such competitions, we " readily refer the settling of the dispute to you, " Lacedaemonians 1 and will take our station in " whatever quarter you shall think most consistent " with the interest of the common cause of Greece. " Give judgment, therefore, assured t)f our cheer- " ful acquiescence, and hearty co-operation. For, " wherever we are stationed, we shall endeavour " to do our duty as soldiers' 24 ." The Lacedaemo- nians unanimously declared, that the Athenians were more worthy of the post they claimed, than the Arcadians of Tegea' 25 . And the Tegeans sub- mitted to the decision. This competition being happily settled, the Gre- cian forces were arranged in the following line of battle: ten thousand Lacedaemonians, under the im- mediate conduct of Pausanias, the commander in chief, formed the strength of the right wing of the army. And five thousand of these, being citizens 122. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxvi. xxvii. et Pint. Vit. Ariitid, J23. Id. ibid. 124. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxvii. 125. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxviii. VOL. II. P p of 286 THE HISTORY OF PART I. of Sparta, were guarded by thirty-five thousand ^~v~***' helots, lightly armed 116 ; every Spartan,; as already observed, having seven helots about his person, and each provincial Lacedaemonian one: so that the whole Lacedaemonian body consisted of fifty thou- sand men. Next to the Lacedaemonians were stationed the Tegeans, composing a brave band of fifteen hundred heavy armed men; then, in regular series, five thousand Corinthians, with three hun- dred Potidaeans of Pallene ; six hundred Arcadians of Orchomenus; three thousand Sicyonians; eight hundred Epidaurians; one thousand Troezenians; two hundred Lapraeans; four hundred Mycenaeans and Terinthians; one thousand Philasians; three hundred Harmionians; six hundred Eretrkms and Styrians; four hundred Chalcideans; five hundred Ambracians; eight hundred Leucadians and Anac- torians; two hundred Paleans of Cephalonia; five hundred iEginetes; three thousand Megareans; six hundred Plataeans; and last of all, in the post of honour adjudged them, eight thousand Athenians, under the command of Aristides, took their station at the head of the left wing 117 . All these forces, according to the quotas above stated by Herodotus, composed an army of forty thousand heavy armed men: and the light troops, including the forty thousand helots, that accompa- nied the Spartans and provincial Lacedaemonians, amounted to seventy thousand; every heavy armed Greek being attended by a light-armed soldier 128 . Consequently the whole Grecian army, encamped near Plataea, consisted of one hundred and ten thou- sand combatants. Mardonius, after he had celebrated the funeral of Masistius, hearing that the Greeks had quitted their 126. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxviii. 127. Id. ibid. 128. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxix. camp ANCIENT EUROPE. 287 camp at Erythra, and marched into the territory of LETTER the Platseaos, instantly put his army in motion, XIIf ' and took post in the front of their line; disposing his forces in this manner. Over against the Lace- daemonians and Tegeans he stationed the Persians. Next to the Persians he posted the Medes ; fronting the Corinthians, Potidseans, Orcomenians, and Sicyonians. The Bactrians were opposed to the Epida'urians, Troezenians, Lepraeans, Tyrinthians, Mycen»ans, and Philasians; the Indians to the Her- mionians, Eretrians, Styrians, and Chalcideans; the Sacae, to the Ambracians, Anactorians, Leucadians, Paleans, and ^Eginetes. And all the auxiliary Greeks, with the troops of Macedonia and the bordering districts, Mardonius opposed to the Athenians, Pla- taeans, and Megareans 129 . I have been thus circumstantial, my lord, in re- gard to the operations of the Greeks and barbarians; because the event of the battle, depending upon them, was finally to determine the fate of Grecian freedom and independency. But these operations, as de- scribed by Herodotus, henceforth become so compli- cated, that, in order to avoid tediousness, I shall hasten to the awful decision; yet without omitting any important circumstance. The Grecian and barbarian armies remained eight days opposed to each other, in their several stations, without making any hostile attempt 120 . During all 129. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxx. Herodotus computes the Grecian aux- iliaries, in the army of Mardonius, at fifty thousand (Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxxi.) ; but declares, that their number could not he ascer- tained with any degree of certainty, it not having been taken (Id. ibid). Of the number of Macedonians he takes no notice, but probably in- cludes them among the auxiliary Greeks, as we here find them posted together. The barbarian forces of Mardonius he still calculates (ubi iup) at three hundred thousand. 130. Herodorus, lib. ix. cap. xxxviii. that 288 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, that time they were employed in offering sacrifices v, ^ v ^ ,/ for success, and consulting augurs' 3 '; for Mardonius had a Grecian augur in his pay, and the Greeks in his camp another' 32 . On the eighth day Timegenides, a Theban chief, observing the Grecian army conti- nually augmenting, in consequence of the arrival of fresh troops, advised Mardonius to guard the passes of mount Cithseron' 33 . Approving of this counsel, the Persian general sent a party of horse, early in the following night, to take post at the pass of Cithaeron that led to Pla- tsea; called by the Boeotians the Three Heads, but by the Athenians the Heads of Oak' 34 . That de- tachment, passing the mountain-ridge, and entering the plain on the other side, took five hundred cattle carrying provisions from Peloponnesus to the Gre- cian army, with the men that attended the convoy; and after slaughtering, without distinction, both man and beast, carried off what seemed fit to be preserved, and returned to the camp of Mardonius' 35 . Both armies passed many days, after the surprise of this convoy, without coming to a general engage- ment; neither party being willing to give battle' 36 . Meanwhile the cavalry of Mardonius, making perpe- tual excursions, harassed the Grecian camp 137 . In these desultory encounters, the Thebans, hearty in the Persian interest, greatly distinguished them- selves; leading their forces as near as possible to the confederated Greeks, that a battle might take place' 38 . 131. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxxii — xxxvii. 132. Id. ibid. 133. Herodotus, Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxxvii 134. Id. lib. ix. cap. xxxviii. 135. Id. ibid. 136. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xxxix. 137. Id. ibid. 138. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xxxix. And ANCIENT EUROPE. 289 And the Persians and Medes, by whom they were LETTElt supported, gave signal proofs of valour 39 . Ten days having thus elapsed, since the hostile armies had faced each other in the territory of Platsea, Mardonius, tired with such indecisive ope- rations, called a council of war. Artabazus, the only Persian general of high rank that remained, moved ihit they should break up the camp without farther delay, and take post under the walls of Thebes; where they would find plenty of provision for them- selves, and forage for their horses' 40 . Being there encamped he observed, they might accomplish the object of their enterprise at leisure; for having great store of gold, coined and uncoined, with much silver and wrought plate, if they would not be sparing of those treasures, but send them liberally to the popu- lar leaders in each Grecian state, they might subdue all Greece without hazarding the event of a battle' 4 '. The Theban chiefs, assembled on the occasion, se- conded this counsel, as it corresponded with that which they had formerly given to Mardonius. But 139. id. ibid. 140. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xl. If there was plenty of forage arsd provisions at Thebes, the Persian army might have been amply sup- plied with both in its present station. And far more abundantly than the Gfteks, whose provisions were brought from a greater distance, and whose convoys were liable to be i ntercepted by the bar- barian cavalry that guarded the defiles of mount Cithxron ; whereas the convoys of Mardonius could sufler no interruption, in passing from Thebes to Platxa. That Eceotia could long furnish the whole Persian army with forage and provisions, the Thebans often declared (Hcrodot. lib. viii. ix. passim.). I shall, therefore, set at naught every thing that is said, in regard to the scarcity of food, either for man or beast, in the camp of Mardonius; for, as already observed, the Greeks must have been in much greater want. Me had money to purchase, and certain means of supply : they none, but what wore precarious. 141 Id ibid. lie 290 THE HISTORY OF PART I. he, despising such insidious policy, and depending ^-^^"^^ upon the valour of his troops, declared for an imme- diate engagement' 42 . They ought not, he said, to look idly on till farther reinforcements should join the Greeks; nor heed the sacrifices of Hegesistratus, (his Grecian auger) but resolve to fight according to the manner of the Persians' 43 . And he being invest- ed with the chief command, his opinion was not controverted' 44 . When Mardonius had em-braced the resolution of fighting the enemy in contempt of timed counsels, and in defiance of the presages of hireling prophets, he called an assembly of the Grecian generals in his army; and after endeavouring to quiet their fears, in regard to the oracles that threatened the Per- sians with destruction in Greece, he ordered them to put their troops in martial array, and be prepar- ed to give battle next morning' 45 . Mardonius having taken these preparatory mea- sures retired to his tent. The guards were set, and the army sunk in sleep' 46 . But the politic and intriguing king of Macedonia remained awake. When night was far spent, and all seemed still in the Persian camp, he mounted his horse ; advanced to the Athe- nian guard, near which he was posted, and desired to speak with Aristides. Having obtained audience of that general, he informed him of the purpose of Mardonius, and conjured him to conceal the secret intelligence from all men but Pausanias' 47 ; artfully offering a claim upon the generosity of the Greeks, if the war should terminate in their favour. " In that 142. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xl. 143. Id. ibid. 144. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xli. 145. Id. ibid. 146. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap, xliii. 147. Compare Herodot. lib. ix. cap. xliv. with Plut. Vit. Aristid. " event," ANCIENT EUROPE. 291 " event," said he, " they ought to remember the " man who, from a desire of preserving their liber- " ties, and in order to prevent them from being sur- " prised by the barbarians, has voluntarily hazarded " his life. I am Alexander the Macedonian' 48 !" — Having thus concluded, he returned undiscovered to his station' 49 . Aristides, attended by his principal officers, waited upon Pausanias, and communicated the information he had received from the king of Macedonia' 50 . A council of war was called; in which Pausanias, alarm- ed at the prospect of immediately encountering an untried enemy, proposed that the Athenians, being acquainted with the Persian manner of fighting, to which he and his troops were utter strangers, should change stations with the Lacedaemonians, and take post on the right' 5 '. Aristides replied, that the Athenians, as soon as they saw the disposition of the barbarian army, would have made such offer, had they not been affraid it might offend the Spartans' 5 *. The desired change was accordingly effected; the Athenians moving to the right, and the Lacedaemo- nians to the left wing' 53 . This change of stations, though made as soon as light served, was perceived by the Boeotians. They 148. HerodotHS, lib. ix. cap. xliv. 149. Id. ibid. In this perfidious boldness of Alexander I can see nothing generous, or which contradicts my former judgment of his character. Enjoying the favour of the Persian monarch, and willing to secure friends, whatever might be the event of the war, he ven- tured to inform the confederated Greeks of the purpose of Mardo- nius; in order to screen himself from their tesentment, if they should prove victorious, and even to conciliate their friendship. His leading object seems always to have been the same; ambition, skulk- ing under the disguise of the professed friend, and pliant but treacherous tributary. 150. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xlv. et Plut. Vit. Aristid. 151. Id. ibid. 152. Herodot. Historiar. lib ix. cap. xvl. 153. Id. lib. ix. cap. xlvi. et Plut. Vit. Aristid. informed i>92 THE HISTORY OF parti, informed Mardonius of it, and he made a similar v- ^~ v ~ > *»' change in the disposition of his army ; opposing the Persians again to the Lacedaemonians, and the aux- iliary Greeks to the Athenians' 54 . Pausanias, on discovering that new arrangement, returned with his forces to the right of the line ; and Mardonius, in like manner, moved the Persians and Medes to the left' 55 . Fretted at such shifting of posts, in which the morning had been wasted, Mardonius, who wished to engage the Persian foot in close-fight with the Lacedaemonians, whom he had been taught to be- lieve the bravest and firmest of all the confederat- ed Greeks — men, who would rather die than quit their ground — now held them in contempt for their apparent pusillanimity' 56 . He, therefore, in the height of his scorn, sent a herald to challenge Pausanias to meet him with an equal number of men, Spartans against Persians. And thus to decide the quarrel between the Greeks and barbarians ; the rest of the army to look on till the combat was ended, and then to join battle' 57 . Having received no answer to that message, the Persian general swelled into trium- phant exultation ; and, instead of pressing a general engagement, ordered his cavalry again to insult the Grecian camp' 3 ". This attack, which was more furious, and less de- sultory, than any of the former, threw the whole Gre- cian army into disorder; but especially the Lacedae- monian forces,, who were driven from their station, by the showers of javelins and arrows, poured amongst them' 59 . And the cavalry of Mardonius choaked, with their trampling, the Gargaphian spring, in the Lacedsemonian quarter, which solely supplied the 154. Id. ibid. 155. Herodot. ubi sup. 156. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xlvii. 157. Id. ibid. 158. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xlviii. 159. Id. ibid. Greeks ANCIENT EUROPE. 293 Greeks with water; for, although the Asopus was at no great distance, the enemy's horse had deterred them from ever approaching that river' 60 . The Grecian generals, thus circumstanced, des- titute of water for their troops, and put into confu- sion by the barbarian cavalry, held a council of war; in order to deliberate concerning those and other matters' 6 '. Bad as the want of water was, they were still more hardly pressed for want of provi- sions. , These they could only receive from Pe- loponnesus; and the troops of Mardonius being in possession of the passes of mount Cithaeron, none of their convoys could safely reach the camp' 63 . They, therefore, resolved to move nearer Plataea, if the ene- my should defer giving battle that day, and take shel- ter in a creek of the river Asopus, secured by hills and denies; that they might have sufficient supply of water, and be no longer harassed by the attacks of the enemy's cavalry; which, in their present situa- tion, they were not able to sustain' 64 . They also re- solved, that when they should have reached their des- tined station, they would send out one half of their forces, under night, to mount Cithaeron; in order to bring forward a convoy of provisions, that had stop- ped behind the defdes, for fear of the enemy' 65 . Having taken these resolutions, the Greeks re- mained all day in their camp, and suffered much from the barbarian horse'' 66 . But when that hour of night was come, at which they had agreed to decamp, the greater number, lifting their arms, marched away, without any intention of going to the place appointed: whilst others, on the breaking up of the 160. Id. Mstrrrlar. lib. ix. cap. xlviii. 161. HerodotJS, lib. ix, cap. xlix. 162. Id. ibid. 163. Herodot. ubi. sup. 164. Id. Kistoriar. lib. ix. cap. I. 165. Id. ibid. 1C6. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. li. vol. ii, o^q camp, 294 THE HISTORY OF TART r. camp, desirous to avoid the assault of the enemy's v -^ v ~^ / cavalry, hastened toward Platsea' 67 . And arriving at the temple of Juno, which stood before the city •(twenty furlongs distant from theGargaphian spring), there grounded their arms, and encamped' 68 . Pausanias having seen these troops file off, and supposing they were marching to the general rendez- vous, ordered the Lacedaemonians to follow them' 69 . This order was readily obeyed by all the leaders, except Amompharetus, the commander of the Pita- naean division. He declared, that he would not vo- luntarily quit his post, nor willingly bring disgrace upon Sparta' 70 . And persevering in his resolution, in spite of all arguments, he took up a stone with both his hands, and laying it at the feet of Pausanias, said, " There is my vote to testify, that we ought not to flee from the strangers' 7 ' !" meaning the bar- barians, observes Herodotus' 72 . Hence it appears, that the Lacedaemonians, being yet rude themselves, had not hitherto applied the opprobrious appellation of barbarian to the people of foreign nations. The dispute with Amompharetus continued till morning' 73 . Meanwhile the Athenians, at the re- quest of Pausanias, remained in their post' 74 . When light began to appear, Pausanias conjecturing that Amompharetus would not be left behind, gave the signal for marching; and took his route by the hills, with the main body of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans 175 . At the same time, the Athenians marched, in order of battle, by the way of the plain ; but the Spartans, still smarting from the assaults 167. Id. ibid. 168. Herodot. ubi sup. 169. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lii. 170. Id. ibid. 171. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. liv. 172. Historiar. ubi sup. 173. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. Iv. 174. Id. ibid. 17A. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. Iv. of ANCIENT EUROPE. 295 of the barbarian horse, and fearing a new attack, LETTER kept studiously on the higher grounds, above the foot of mount Cithaeron' 76 . When Amompharetus saw that Pausanias, and the main body of the Lacedaemonians, had actually quitted the camp, he led his troops slowly after them' 77 . And they, after a march of about ten fur- longs, halted at the river Molois, where a temple stood, dedicated to the Eleusinian Ceres' 78 : they halted, in order to wait his approach, or return to his assistance, if he and his division should persist in their resolution not to quit their post' 7 ?. Here Amompharetus formed a junction with Pausanias; and the Lacedaemonian army prosecuted its march, but not without being harassed. For the barbarian horse, at sun-rise, going to insult the Grecian camp, as usual, and finding it deserted, pursued the Greeks, and greatly incommoded them in their march' 80 . Intelligence of the decampment of the Greeks, by night, soon reached the ear of Mardonius; who, considering it as a flight, instantly put the Persians in motion, and came up with the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans' 8 '. The other commanders of the bar- Ant. Chr. barian forces, seeing the Persians in pursuit of the s t J4. enemy, also lifted their standards, and hastened Olympiad after them; but without observing any form of dis- cipline, or order in their march, and yelling as if they had been tearing the Greeks in pieces' 82 . Meanwhile Pausanias, finding his troops furiously assaulted by the enemy's cavalry, which first came up with them, had dispatched a messenger on horse- 176. Id. ibid. 177. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lvi. 178. Id. ibid. 179. Herodot. ubi. sup. 180. Id. ibid. 181. H«rodotus, lib. ix.cap lvii.lviii. 182. Id. lib. be. cap. lviii. back lxxv. 2. 296 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, back to Aristides, requiring support; but especially n^-vx./ the aid of a party of archers' 83 . The Athenian gene- ral instantly resolved to succour the Lacedaemonians, but was prevented by the Grecian auxiliaries of IVIardonius' 84 . They had, as we have seen, been opposed to the Athenians, and now attacked them' 8; . Thus deprived of assistance, harassed by the bar- barian horse, and necessitated to engage the Persian forces under the conduct of Mardonius, the Lacdse- monians and Tegeans began to offer their usual sacrifices' 86 . During these sacrifices, which were by no means favourable, they had many men killed, and more wounded; by the great number of arrows, which the Persians shot with force and effect amongst them' 87 . When Pausanias saw the Spartans so ter- ribly galled, and their sacrifices obstructed, he turned his eyes toward the temple of Juno at Plataea, and implored the goddess, that his hopes might not be frustrated' 88 . While he was uttering this supplica- tion, the Tegeans began to advance against the bar- barians' 89 . On the conclusion of the prayer of Pausanias, the Lacedaemonians sacrificed propitiously 190 . And then they also made head against the Persians' 91 , who, laying aside their missile weapons, stood firm, and maintained an obstinate battle near the temple of Ceres 192 . At length, both parties joined in close- fight; and so hot was the conflict, that the Per- sians, finding themselves incommoded by the long spears of the Lacedaemonians, their own being com- paratively short, had the hardiness to take hold of 183. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lix. 184. Id. lib. ix. cap. Ix. 185. Id. ibid. 186. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. Ix. 187. Id. ibid. 188. Herodot. ubi sup. 189. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxi. 190. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxi. 191. Id. ibid. 192. Herodot. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxi. those ANCIENT EUROPE. 297 those dreadful instruments of death, and twist them in pieces' 93 . For in courage and strength, says Herodotus' 94 , the Persians were not inferior to the Greeks; but they were ill armed, little skilled in discipline, and not equal to their anta- gonists in military prudence' 95 . So that when- ever any party of them, whether consisting of a greater or smaller number, broke in among the Lacedaemonians, it was certainly cut off 96 ; they precipitating themselves, in small bodies, upon the enemy's compacted phalanx, and having no thought or method to regain their former station, when oppressed by numbers or force. Yet, in that part of the battle, where Mardonius, mounted on a white horse, fought at the head of a thousand Persians, all chosen men, the Greeks were still vigorously push- ed, and many Lacedaemonians sunk in death' 97 . And, indeed, while he remained alive, the Spartans could with difficulty keep their ground ,oS ; but when he fell, valiantly contending for victory' 99 , and the brave troops that guarded his person were broken, all the Persians turned their backs and fled 200 . The flight of the Persians proved a signal to the foot of the whole barbarian army. When they saw 193. Id. ibid. 194. Historiar. ubi sup. 195. Id. ibid. 196. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxi. 197. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxii. 198. Id. ibid. 199. Diodorus, as well as Herodotus, bears testimony to th« courage of Mardonius. The former declares that he fell bravely fighting at the head of his troops; (Diod. Sicul. Bibliotb. lib. xi. p. 24, vol. ii. edit. sup. cit.) and the latter says, in summing up the degrees of merit of the Greeks and barbarians, al the battle of Platara, that Mardonius was the bravest of all the Persian generals) Herodo r . Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxx.). If Masistius had survived, or if Mar- donius had been properly supported by his remaining leaders, le would have subjected Greece to the Persian dominion. If he had survived himself, he would have crushed tht Lacedarnionians under the barbarian force. His death may, therefore, be regarded as tbs greatest event in the annals of liberty. 200. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxii. the 298 THE HISTORY OF PAMTI. the forces of that conquering nation routed, they ^-*" v> ^«' abandoned the field without striking a blow 20 '; and ran to the fortified station, which Mardonius had chosen in the Theban territory 202 . In their retreat, however, the barbarian infantry were protected by their own cavalry, and also by the Boeotian and Thessalian horse 2 " 3 . Yet many of them fell by the way ; for the Greeks hotly folloAved up their victory, and furiously assailed the fugitives 204 . From the slaughter committed, in this bloody pursuit, forty thousand men, under the command of Artabazus, were exempt. Being adverse to the Grecian war, and inimical to the measures of Mar- donius, this general never joined battle 205 . But ashamed to remain utterly inactive, he led on his forces, late in the action, as if he had intended to charge the enemy 200 ; when, observing the Persians beginning to give ground, he basely betook himself to flight, and conducted his troops with all expedi- tion toward the Hellespont 207 . Holding the route of the midland country, he marched through Thes- saly and Macedonia; proceeded to Byzantium, and was safely landed on the Asiatic coast 208 . I must now return to the Grecian auxiliaries of Xerxes, engaged with the army under the command of Aristides. Many of these behaved ill through de- sign 209 ; but the Boeotians, and especially the The- 201. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxvi. 202. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. lxiv. 203. Id. lib. ix. cap. lxvii. 204. Herodot. ubi sup. 205. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxv. 206. Id. ibid. 207. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxv. 208. Id. lib. ix. cap. Ixxxviii. Many of the troops of Artabazus perished through famine and fatigue; and part were cut off by the Thracians, in his march from the frontiers of Macedonia to Byzan- tium. Id. ibid. 209. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxvi. bans, ANCIENT EUROPE. 299 bans, fought a fierce battle with the Athenians 2 °. letter Unremitted in their efforts, three hundred of their XI1L chief citizens, and most valiant soldiers, were killed on the spot 2 '. And their main body, after being broken and put to flight by the Athenians, did not follow the Persians; nor the barbarian multitude, that fought none, nor discovered any indications of valour 2 2 , but fled toward Thebes 213 . While the Athenians were pursuing the Boeotians, and the Lacedaemonians the Persians, those Greeks who had deserted the general rendezvous, as we have seen, and encamped near the temple of Juno, under the walls of Platsea, having received intelligence of the success of Pausanias, bethought themselves of their misconduct, and attempted to wipe off the dis- grace by coming in for a share in the victory. They accordingly hurried back, without observing regula- rity in their march; the Corinthians by the route of the hills, which led directly to the temple of Ceres, and the Megareans and Philasians by the way of the plain 2 ' 4 . But the Theban cavalry, commanded by Asophodorus, the son of Timander, seeing the Me- garians and Philasians approaching in a disorderly manner, pushed forward their horses, and instantly rushed upon them, killed six hundred upon the spot, and drove the survivors to mount Cithaeron 2 ' 5 . The Corinthians, by keeping on the higher grounds, where cavalry could not act, seem to have suffered no less; and being joined by the remainder of the Philasians, and by the Sicyonians and Troczenians, they en- gaged in a fruitless pursuit of Artabazus 2 ' 6 . 210. Id. ibid. 211. Id. Historian lib. ix. cap. Ixvi. 212. Id. ibid. 213. Herodotus, ubi sup. 214. Id. lib. ix. lxix. 215. Id 'ibid. 216. Compare Herodotus, Historiar. lib. ix. cap. Ixxvi. with Diod. S'ichI. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 25. vol. ii. Meantime, 300 THE HISTOkY OF PART I. Meantime, the main body of the Persians, and also v^-^^w the barbarian multitude, having reached their forti- fied camp, had adopted every measure, the occasion admitted of, for their defence; by manning the towers, and securing the entrenchments 27 . The Lacedaemonians, therefore, when they came up, found a stout resistance; so vigorous, indeed, that until the Athenians returned from the pursuit of the Boeotians, the barbarians proved too hard a match for the forces under Pausanias, who were unskilled in the manner of attacking fortifications 2 ' 8 . But, when the Athenians arrived, the action grew hotter on both sides, and the contest was long and obstinate. At last, however, by their valour and perseverance, the Athenians beat oft the barbarians from the ram- parts; passed the ditch, and opened a passage in the pallisaded wall for the Grecian assailants 2 9 . The Tegeans first entered the breach, and plundered the tent of Mardonius; taking away, as their peculiar prize, a manger of solid brass, admirably wrought, which they afterward dedicated in the temple of the Alean Minerva" . But the rest of the booty they brought to the common heap, and deposited it along with that taken by the other Greeks"'. The barbarians, after the forcing of their entrench* ments, riever rallied again, nor made any regular defence. Terror-struck to see so numerous an army, consisting of the levies of various nations, and speak- ing different languages, hemmed within a fortified station, and deprived of the means of flight, they fell into a stupifying consternation" 2 ; and were so easily cut in pieces by the Greeks, who rivalled each other in deeds of death, and were all alike deaf to the 217. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxix. 218. Id. ibid, et Pint. Vit. Aristid. 219. Hcrodot. Historian lib. ix. cap. lxix. • 220. Id. ibid. 221. Hercdot. ubi sup. 222. Id. ibid. Voice ANCIENT EUROPE. 301 voice of supplication 2 " 3 , that, of three hundred thou- sand men, not full three thousand escaped the sword, exclusive of the forty thousand that fled with Arta- bazus 224 . The division of the spoil now took place ; a booty that exceeded the warmest expectations of the Greeks, and which filled them with wonder and astonishment. This the helots had been ordered to collect 225 ; and although they purloined part of it, which they afterwards sold to the iEginetes 220 , they brought into the common store great quantities of gold and silver, found in the tents of the Persian nobles; couches plated with gold and silver, bowls, and other drinking vessels of gold 127 . Beside these, they discovered vases of gold and silver, lying in sacks upon the baggage -waggons 228 . And they took the gold chains, bracelets, and seymitars with gold hilts, from the bodies of the slain; but left the rich apparel, of various colours, as of no value 229 . The tenth part of this immense spoil, the Greek's dedicated to the gods of their country 230 . And when they had set apart that sacred portion, they distri- buted among themselves the remainder of the booty; consisting of gold, silver, and other treasure, toge- ther with the concubines of the Persians, and the cattle. ' These they distributed according to the 223 Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 25,26. vol. ii. This historian ascribe* the unrelenting cruelty of the Greeks to the policy of Pausanias; who foresaw, that if quarter was given, he should be endangered by the number of prisoners (Biblioth. ubi sup.). But the undistin- guishing slaughter of the barbarians may also be imputed, to th« hostile animosity of the people whose country they had invaded, and whose liberties they had sought to subvert. 224. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxix. 225. Id. Historian lib. ix. cap. lxxix. 226. Id. ibid. 227. Hcrodot. ubi sup. 228. Id. ibid. 229. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxix. 230. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxxx. vol. ii. R r merit 302 THE HISTORY OF PART I. merit of each warrior 23 ', and seemingly according to his rank. For, to Pausanias, the commander in chief, was given the tenth of all; women, horses, camels, treasure, and of every thing else that had been carried to the common heap 23 *. After the Greeks had divided the barbarian spoil, they proceeded to the burial of their dead. The Lacedaemonians made three sepulchres. In one of these, they buried Posidonius, Amompharetus, Phi- locyon, and Callicrates, who were of the priest- hood* 33 . In another, they put the Spartans and free Lacedaemonians, not of the sacred order; and in a third, the helots 234 . The Tegeans buried all their dead together, in one sepulchre; the Athe- nians did the same ; and so also did the Megareans and Philasians 235 . " All these sepulchres," observes Herodotus* 36 , " were filled with the bodies of men; " but the rest, which are seen about Plataea, were " erected (as I am informed) by the citizens of " of those states, who ashamed of being absent from t* the battle, obtained public permission to throw up " funeral mounds near the place of action, in order " to deceive posterity 237 . This was a singular indulgence ; especially if we consider that the leaders of such Grecian states were punished with exile, on their return to their several districts 238 . But the Greeks were zealous of na- tional honour, and desirous of making the repu- tation of it general, while they had a common enemy to oppose. Even after that enemy had ceased to be formidable to the European Greeks, their ap- prehensions of danger from Persian ambition con- 231. Id. ibid. 232. Herodot. ubi sup. 233. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. lxxxiv. 234. Id. ibid. 235. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxiv. 236. Historiar. ubi sup. 237. Id. ibid. 238. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxvi. tinued, ANCIENT EUROPE. 303 tinued, and their love of union; whereas they no LETTER sooner found themselves in security, as we shall see, XI11 - than ambition sprung up among the leading states y ^~ > *~ s ~' of Greece, and a violent passion for mastery 239 . When the confederated Greeks had buried their dead, they assembled a council of war; and in that council, a resolution was taken to lead their com- bined forces against Thebes, and demand the parti- sans of the Medes* 40 ; but especially Timegenides and Attaginus, the ringleaders of the barbarian faction 24 '. And not to desist until they had destroyed that capital, if the Thebans should refuse to de- liver up those abettors of tyranny 242 . Having all assented to this resolution, they lifted their camp the eleventh day after the battle of Platsea,and march- ed to Thebes 243 . On their arrival, they demanded the obnoxious persons; but receiving a denial from the Thebans, they ravaged the country, and made approaches to the walls of the obstinate city 244 . On the twentieth day after the commencement of these hostilities, which the confederated Greeks in- 239. Thucydid. lib. i. ii. passim. Some of these reflections might perhaps have been spared. But they will prepare the mind of the student in history for the calamitous scenes of the reloponnesian war; when Greeks engaged with Greeks, not only with the fury of Greeks against barbarians, but with all the cruel rage of hostile lavages, or of lions and tygers contending for their prey. 240. Herodot. lib. ix. cap. lxxx. On this and some other occasion! Herodotus uses the term Medes, instead of Persians, for the govern- ing people in Asia, under the recent successors of Cyrus ; and Thu- cydides always. Put, for the sake of consistency aud perspicuity, I have generally retained the appellation of Persian ; as being that of the royal race, by the male line. The promiscuous use of the term* Medes and Persians by the early Grecian historians, shews, however, that they were considered as compeers; not the one a conquered, and the other a commanding people. 241. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. Ixxxv. 242. Id. ibid. 243. Herodot. Hittoriar. ubi sup. 244 Id. ibid. cessantly 504 THE HISTORY OF PART I. cessantly prosecuted, Timegenides spoke thus to the s *^" v ^»' Thebans: — " Men of Thebes! since the Greeks are " resolved not to withdraw their forces, until either " they have taken the city, or you have delivered us " into their hands, we are far from desiring that " Boeotia should suffer on our account. If, under the " pretence of demanding our persons, the confede- " rates mean to exact a sum of money, let it be levied " by a general contribution ; for we were not the only " partizans of the Medes, but joined them with gene- " ral consent; or, if they besiege Thebes, because " they would have us delivered up, we are ready to " justify our conduct in their presence 245 ." The Thebans, approving this proposal, which was truly generous, sent to acquaint Pausanias, that they were ready to surrender the persons he demanded" 4 ". Meantime Attaginus made his escape; but, in his stead, his sons were sent out to Pausanias 247 . The Spartan general, however, magnanimously discharg- ed them, saying, " They were too young to have any " share in their father's guilt 243 ." Of the persons de- livered up by the Thebans, some attemped to clear themselves, by pleading their innocence; and some depended for impunity upon the influence of money 249 . But Pausanias, suspecting their purpose, and unwil- ling to rest the decision of their fate on the suffrages of the confederated chiefs, swayed by avarice or humanity, dissolved the army; and earning the pri- soners to Corinth, put them all to death ?5 °. 245. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxvi. 246. Id. ibid. 247. Id. Mstoriar. lib. ix. cap. lxxxvii. 248. Id. ibid. 249. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxvii. 250 Id. ibid. Pausanias was military commander in chief; and consequently bad a right to execute martial law on such as had de- claredly betrayed the common cause of Greece. Therefore all reflec- tions on the want of a formal trial, on this occasion, are frivolous and impertinent. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 305 The same day that the Persians were defeated by LETTER the Greeks at Plat«a, another great battle, between X the hostile nations, was fought at Mycale, on the Asiatic coast 25 '. — In order to make your lordship acquainted with the circumstances that led to this battle, I must relate the maritime operations of the Greeks and barbarians, during the latter part of sum- mer. • The Persian naval force, as we have seen, had taken its station at Samos in the spring, on purpose to prevent the revolt of the Asiatic Greeks; and the Grecian fleet, which had assembled at iEgina, ad- vanced to Delos, and there remained till the approach of autumn. Fear so long restrained the commanders of both armaments from quitting their several sta- tions' 52 . The confederated fleet of Greece, consist- ing of an hundred and ten ships 233 , was commanded by Leutychides, one of the joint kings of Lacedae- mon, of the line of Procles 254 ; and the Athenian division, by Xanthippus, the son of Ariphron 2 ", fa- ther of Pericles, and archon for the year. The fleet of the Persian monarch, commanded by Itha- mitres and Artayntes, amounted to three hundred sail 256 . Late in the summer, the Samians secretly sent ambassadors to the Grecian admirals at Uelos; con- juring them, by the common gods they worshipphed, to deliver the Asiatic Greeks from servitude; encou- raging them to advance against the barbarians, by describing the unwieldiness of their ships, and assur- ing them of the revolt of Ionia 2J7 . Leutychides demanded the solemn promise of these ambassadors, 251. Herodotus, lib ix. cap. lxxxix. 252. 1*1. Hibtoriar. il>. viii. cap. cxxxi. cxxxii. 253. Herodotus, lib. viii.cap. cxxxi. 254. Id. ibid. 255. Herodot. ubi sup. 256. Id. Historiar. lib. viii. cap.cxxx. 25r. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. lxxxix. with 306 THE HISTORY OF PART I. with their faith sacredly pledged, that the Samians *^~*~**s would assist him and his associates. This demand being readily complied with, the Greeks remained in their station all that day, making preparations for sailing; and next day, having sacrificed auspici- ously, their fleet quitted the harbours of Delos, and stood toward Samos 258 . On their arrival, they came to anchor before the temple of Juno, and took the necessary measures for securing success in a naval engagement 259 . But the Persians, informed of their approach, and having determined not to hazard a battle at sea, permitted the Phoenician squadron to return home ; and resolved to sail, with the remain- der of their fleet, to the coast of Ionia 260 . That resolution the Persian admirals were induc- ed to adopt, from a conviction of their inferiority to the Greeks in naval skill and effective force ; and also from a desire of sheltering themselves under cover of their land-forces, which were encamped, to the number of sixty thousand, in the promontory of Mycale, on the neighbouring continent 26 '. This body of troops had been sent by Xerxes to secure the obedience of Ionia, under the conduct of Ti- granes; a man surpassing all the Persian leaders, in dignity of mien and loftiness of stature 162 . Actuated by these motives, the naval comman- ders of Xerxes abandoned their station at Samos, and landed on the Ionian shore, near the venerable temple dedicated to the Eleusinian Ceres 263 . There having drawn their ships ashore, they encompassed them with a wall of timber and stone, secured by a ditch; not doubting, thus entrenched, to be able to sustain a siege, but also to prove victorious 254 . - 258. Id. lib. ix. cap. xci — xcv. 259. Herodotus, Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xcv. 260. Id. ibid. 261. Herodot. ubi sup. 262. Id. ibid. 26;>. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcvi. 264. Id. ibid, et Dlod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 27. When ANCIENT EUROPE. 307 When the Greeks found, that the barbarian fleet LETTER had quitted Samos, and steered for the continent, *• they began to hesitate what course they should pur- sue; whether to return home, or proceed to the Hellespont 165 . But, having weighed both these mea- sures, they resolved to embrace neither, but follow the enemy to the Asiatic coast 266 ; and being pre- pared with ladders for boarding, and all other things necessary in a naval engagement, they sailed to Mycale 267 . On their arrival near the place, the Grecian ad- mirals could discover none of the enemy's ships; but, after bearing down to the coast, they saw the whole barbarian fleet lying within its fortified station, and a numerous army drawn up along the shore* 68 . When Leutychides had surveyed the state of the enemy, and found that the Greeks must fight on land, or retire without effecting any thing, he advanc- ed before the body of the fleet; stood in to the beach before the naval encampment, and ordered a herald thus to address the Ionians, in his name: — " Men of Ionia! when the battle begins, remember " liberty, and that the word is Hebe* 69 . In making this proclamation, says Herodotus 27 *, Leutychides had two views, as Themistocles had in giving a similar admonition at Artemisium. He ex- pected the Ionians would revolt, if his exhortation was concealed from the barbarians; and if made known, that the Asiatic Greeks would be brought under suspicion" 7 '. And it proved more effectual than the inscription of Themistocles, as it was fol- lowed by both these consequences. For the Persian generals were no sooner made acquainted with it, than they disarmed the Samians, whose fidelity they 265. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. xcvii. 266. Id. ibid. 267. Hcrodot. ubi sup. 268. Id. ibid. 269. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcvii. 270. Hiitoriar. ubi »up. 271. Id. ibid. had S08 THE HISTORY OF PART I. had most reason to suspect 272 ; and, on purpose to s -*~ v ^> / detach the Milesians from the scene of action, they were appointed to guard the passes in the mountains behind Mycale 2 ' 5 ; where, as we shall have occasion to notice, they had an opportunity of gratifying their passion for revolt; and repaid suspicion with ven- geance. Ant. Chr. During the apprehensions raised by the address of Olympiad Leutychides to the Ionians, and while these new ar- lxxv. 3. rangements were making, in consequence of it, the Greeks landed without opposition, and formed in order of battle on the shore 274 . And the Persians, after they had taken those precautions against hostile attempts from the most suspected of their Ionian auxiliaries, also put themselves in a posture of de- fence 275 . When the Greeks were advancing toward the barbarians, a herald's staff was found on the shore, and a sudden rumour spread through the army, that the forces under Mardonius had been defeated in Bceotia 276 . This rumour, seemingly raised by Leutychides 177 , had a wonderful effect upon the minds of the Greeks. Before firm, little anxious for their own fate, but alarmed for the safety of Greece, they advanced coolly, determined to die or conquer; but after they heard this report they came forward to the charge with more spirit and alacrity 278 . The barbarians, priding themselves in superior numbers, and the Persian generals, thirsting for revenge, also courted battle 279 . 272. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcvii. 273. Id. ibid. 274. Id. Historiar. ubi sup. 275. Id. ibid. 276. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. xcix. 277. Compare Herodotus (ubi sup.), with Diod. Sicul. (lib. xi. p. 27.). Though Diodorus differs from Herodotus, in some particulars, the information of both leads to the same conclusion. 278. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. c. 279. Id. ibid. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 309 The Athenians, commanded by Xanthippus, with those Greeks stationed in that part of the army which they led, advanced upon the enemy through the plain or along the shore ; so that they were engaged with the Persians whilst the Lacedaemonians, and their associates on the right, were marching through broken ways at the bottom of the hills 2So . The Persians, so long as they were covered with their bucklers, defended themselves strenuously, and gallantly maintained their ground; but when the Athenians and their brave associates advanced upon them, emulous of glory, and ambitious that they, and not the Lacedaemonians, might earn the honours of victory, the state of the action was soon changed. They struck down the shields of the enemy; and, combining themselves in close phalanx, gradually broke the firm ranks of the Persian foot 2 "'. When the Persians, who had met their antagonists with vigour, and displayed every proof of courage, were no longer able to keep the field, they fled to their entrenchments; and the Athenians, with their valiant supporters, the Corinthians, Sicyo- nians, and Troezenians, pursued them so closely, that they entered the camp at the same time with the fugitives* 32 . The barbarians no sooner saw their entrench- ments forced, than they all, except the Persians, betook themselves to flight 283 . But the Persians,^ naturally brave, and still zealous of national honour, though reduced to a small number, continued to defend the abandoned camp against the Greeks, pouring in on all sides 284 . Two of the Persian 280. Herodot. lib. ix. cap.ci. 281. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. ci. 282. Id. ibid. 283. Herodotus, ubi sup. 284. Id. ibid. vol ii. s s leaders 310 THE HISTORY OF PART I. leaders made their escape by fleeing, Artayntes and v *^* v ^ Sw ' Ithamitres, commanders of the naval forces; and two died on the field, Tigranes and Mardontes, generals of the land-forces of the great king 2 " 3 . At length, whilst the Persians were yet fighting, and keeping at bay the Athenians and their associ- ates, the Lacedaemonians arrived with the other division of the Grecian forces, and completed the slaughter 285 ; for the victory was already gained. Meantime the Samians, who were in the Persian camp, though disarmed, had done every thing in their power to aid the Greeks; and the other Ionians at Mycale, animated by their example, boldly revolted, and fell upon the barbarian army 287 : while the Milesians, instead of guarding the passes against the enemies of Xerxes, obstructed the bar- barians in their flight; took many prisoners, and showed more avidity in deeds of blood, than any of the Greeks engaged in battle 288 . After the Greeks had killed great numbers of the barbarians, both in the action and in the pursuit, they set fire to the enemy's fleet; burnt the whole naval encampment, and brought out upon the shore all the spoil, among which were several chests of Persian money 289 ; that long continued to circulate over Greece, and the acquisition of which was con- sidered as the first 3tage toward corruption in the several republics. The Grecian commanders, after their victory, and the division of the spoil, returned to Samos 2s °; and 285. Id. Historian lib. ix. cap. ci. 286. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cii. 287. Id. ibid. 288. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. dii. 289. Id. ibid. 290. Herodot. ubi sup. there ANCIENT EUROPE. 311 there they deliberated, concerning the measures they ought to pursue, for preserving the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, who had contributed to their suc- cess. The Peloponnesian chiefs, having by this time received full information of the victory gained by their countrymen at Plataea, and the total over- throw of the barbarian army, proposed that the peo- ple of those states which had leagued with the Per- sian monarch should be expelled, and the Ionians settled in their territories and cities of commerce 59 '. But the Athenians were of a different opinion : they opposed the removal of the Ionians ; unwilling that their fine country should be relinquished by the victorious Greeks to the vanquished barbarian ene- my. And they expressed displeasure, that the Pelo- ponnesians should presume to interfere in the affairs of their colonies ; for whose protection they had re- solved to exert themselves, and to which they seem to have thought their own state equal. The Pelo- ponnesians yielded to the opinion of the Athenians*' 2 . And the commanders of the Grecian fleet, after they had exacted an oath from the leaders of the Sami- ans, Lesbians, and other islanders, that they would be their constant confederates, sailed for the Hel- lespont; in order to break down the bridges of Xerxes 293 . Meantime the remains of the barbarian forces, which had fled over the heights behind Mycale, has- tened their march to Sardis 294 . On their arrival in that city they found the Persian monarch still there a;5 , but Xerxes, soon after he received information of the burning of his fleet, and the destruction of his army under Mardonius, quitted the Lydian capital, 1291. Id. ibid. 292. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. cv. 293. Id ibid. 2?4. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cvi. 295. Id. ibid. and 312 THE HISTORY OF PART I. and removed to Ecbatana 296 ; leaving the preservation v -^ v "*^' of Asia Minor to the care of his generals. The Grecian fleet, in its way to the Hellespont, being attacked by a storm, was forced to come to an- chor near Lecton 25 ' 7 . Thence proceeding to Abydos, the commanders discovered, that the bridges, which they expected to have found standing, were removed ; and as the destructionof these was the prime objectof their voyage, Leutychides, the commander in chief, determined to return to Greece with the Peloponne- sian navy 1 ' 3 . But Xanthippus, the Athenian admi- / ral, resolved to stay, and make an attempt upon the Thracian Chersonesus 2 ". Accordingly, after the de- parture of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians and their allies sailed from Abydos; and, landing in the Cher- sonesus, besieged Sestos 300 . To that city, as the strongest in those parts, great numbers of people, from the adjacent country, had repaired, when they heard that the Grecian fleet was arrived in the Hellespont; and, among others, 296. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 28, edit. sup. cit. Herodotus takes no notice of the removal of Xerxes to Ecbatana; but lets us un- derstand (Historiar. lib. ix. cap. cvii.) that, about this time, he re- turned to Susa. It seems more probable, however, that he took the way of Ecbatana than Babylon. If so, the story told by Arrian (Expedit. rilexand. lib. vii. p. 430. edict, sup. cit.), and so often re- peated, of his destroying the temple of Belus, in his retreat from Greece, must be regarded as a fable. For, although, it appears, that heordered the Ionian temples to be pillaged and destroyed (Cic. de Legib. lib. ii. Strabo. Geog. lib. xiv.), after the new revolt of the Asiatic Greeks, and before his departure from Sardis, policy would prevent him in the present unprosperous state of his affairs, from provoking the Babylonians by such insults. And I may add, that the Chaldean religion differed so little from tlie Magian, that pious zeal could hardly prompt him to such an outrage. "297. Herodotus, lib. ix. op. cxiii. 298. Id. ibid. 29?. Id. L'itto iar. lib. ix. cap. exit. 300. Id. ibid. Oiobazos, ANCIENT EUROPE. 313 Oiobazos, a Persian officer, who had already ordered all the materials of the bridges to be brought thither 30 *. The inhabitants were ./Eolians; but a great multi- tude of Persians, and their confederates, had drawn together, in order to defend the place 302 . The go- vernment of the whole province was in the hands of Artayctes, a Persian leader of profligate manners; who, by imposing a fraud upon Xerxes, was permit- ted to plunder the shrine and temple of the deified hero Protesilaus, at Eleus, where many rich offer- ings had been made 303 . This governor being now besieged by the Athe- nians in Sestos, was utterly unprepared for defence; having never thought of being attacked by the Greeks, who came upon him unexpectedly 304 . While the Athenians were employed in the siege, autumn set in ; and the soldiers and seamen, uneasy to be so far from home, besought their leaders to conduct them back to their own country 305 . That request the commanders refused; saying they would persevere until they took the place, or were recalled by the people of Athens 300 . Meantime the soldiers in the garrison of Sestos were so severely pressed by famine, as to be reduced to the necessity of boiling the cords of their beds; and when that wretched food failed, Artayctes and Oiobazos, with the remainder of the Persian troops, made their escape by night from the land-side of the wall, at a place where the besiegers had not sta- tioned a sufficient guard 307 . When morning appeared, the citizens opened their gates; and part of the Athenian forces entered the place, while the greater number, informed of the flight of the Persians, went in pursuit of them 308 . 301. Herodotus, lib. i.v. cap. cxiv. 302. Id. ibid. 303. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. cxv. 304. Id. ibid, et scq. 305. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. cxvi. 306. Id. ibid. 307. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. c.xvii. 308. Id. ibid. In 314 THE HISTORY OF PART I. In this service, the Athenians were assisted by v -^" v ~^- / the Thracians of Apsinthus; who, seizing upon Oio- bazos, as he fled through their territory, sacrificed him to Plestorus, a Thracian god, according to their custom, and slew all his associates 309 . The fate of Artayctes and his followers was also severe. Hav- ing quitted Abydos later than the former party, they were overtaken at the river iEgos ; where, after they had gallantly defended themselves, all that escaped the sword, were made captives, and carried back to Sestos 3 ' . Artayctes, in atonement for the robbery of the temple of Protesilaus, offered one hundred talents of silver; and to the Athenians, two hundred talents, if they would spare the life of himself and his son 3 '. But Xanthippus, the Athenian comman- der, Avould not agree to this proposal; partly, because his mind revolted against it, and partly because the people of Eleus insisted on vengeance being taken for the sacrilege committed on the shrine of Protesi- laus 3 a . He, therefore, ordered Artayctes to be im- paled at a stake, and his son to be stoned to death before his eyes 3 ' 3 . When the Athenians and their allies had thus taken Sestos, and perpetrated these cruelties, they returned with their fleet to Athens; carrying, beside other trophies and riches, all the materials of the bridges of Xerxes, in order to be consecrated in the Grecian temples 3 ' 4 ; as memorials of the triumph of liberty, animating disciplined valour over barbarian force and despotic ambition. 309. Herodotur, lib. xi. cap. cxviii. 310. Id. ibid. 311. Id. Historiar. lib. ix. cap. cxix. 312. Id. ibid. 313. Kerodot. ubi sup. 314. Kistoriar. lib. cap. ix. cxx. LETTER ANCIENT EUROPE. 31* LETTER XIV. GREECE, AND THE GRECIAN COLONIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA MINOR, FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESI AN WAR. JL HE recent triumph of the Greeks over the LETTER myriads of the Persian monarch, with the consequent .—^L. re-establishment of their liberty and independency, and the pride of having broken the fetters of their Asiatic colonies; the flourishing condition of the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily; the emulation of talents among the citizens of the same state, and between the members of the different states of the republican body of Greece, during the prosperous period of forty-eight years, from the expulsion of the barbarians to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, gave to the human faculties a spring, and to the hu- man character a degree of energy, that we seek for in vain in the annals of any other people. Then man- ners were polished, and political talents employed, with equal profundity and address; then all the powers of genius were awakened, and all the inge- nuity of art was called forth; then lived the lyric poets Simonides and Bachillides, and Pindar, the prince of lyric poets, who celebrated the peaceful triumphs of the Olympian victors; iEschilus, So- phocles, and Euripides, who progressively brought Grecian tragedy to perfection; and Phidias, who attained to an height of excellence in statuary, that has never perhaps been exceeded; then broke out in the funeral orations of the Athenians, that blaze of cloquenct 316 THE HISTORY OF PART I. eloquence which so long attracted the admiration of v^-v^w mankind j then wrote Herodotus, who has recorded, with the pen of truth, the important events of the Persian war, and whatever he could collect, on good authority, relative to the more early transactions of the Greeks ; then Anaxagoras began to open, at Athens, the sources of true philosophy, and to remove the superstitious fears that had formerly distracted the human race concerning the phenomena of nature. The particular merit of these illustrious men, my lord, I shall afterward have occasion to estimate, in carrying forward the progress of arts, manners, lite- rature, and philosophy in Greece, to the downfal of Grecian freedom and independency. At present we must trace the progress of that political jealousy, between Athens and Sparta, that ultimately gave birth to the Peloponnesian war; and observe the measures, taken by both states, for acquiring the dominion of Greece, with the various pretexts un- der which they endeavoured to conceal their ambi- tious views. The Lacedaemonians, as we have seen, had been jealous of the rising grandeur of Athens, from the expulsion of the Pisistratidee to the beginning of the Persian war'. That jealousy, excited by the pros- perity of the Athenians under a free government, but especially by the growth of their commerce and naval power, provoked the Spartan state to seek the restoration of Hippias 2 . The fear of the barbarians induced the Lacedaemonians to take part in the com- mon cause of Greece; but their aids were always tardy 3 . Their selfish policy had a perpetual reference to the safety of Peloponnesus; whereas the Athenians, 1. Lett. xi. 2. Id. et auct. cit. 2. Lett. xii. xiii. passim. actuated ANCIENT EUROPE. 317 actuated by more generous principles, stood boldly forward, on all occasions, in support of general liber- ty, without particularly regarding the welfare of their own state. They frankly changed stations with the Lacedaemonians at Plataea; they perpetually laid aside punctilio, and little-minded pride ; and, in every battle, whether at land or on sea, they had dis- tinguished themselves by their courage and conduct 4 . The Athenian name accordingly acquired a lustre, that threw Spartan valour into shade. Sparta, however, still asserted her pre-eminence, and attempted to dictate to every other Grecian state. Athens, warranted by public opinion, and conscious of her own power and glory, keenly felt the indignity. And hence, from the termination of the Persian invasion, the jealousy between the two states became mutual. Yet the Athenians who had readily yielded, during the barbarian struggle, the chief command to the Lacedaemonians, both by land and sea, continued to temporise, and seemingly still admitted the controul of Sparta. These reflections, my lord, bring us again into the line of our narration. The Atheniav.3 had de- prived Theinistocles of the command of their fleet, during the last year of the Persian war, in conse- quence of the honours conferred on him at Sparta 5 ; which excited the jealousy of his fellow citizens 6 . But that war was no sooner ended, than popular favour flowed with full tide toward the exalted merit of the conqueror at Salamis. Themistocles was the creator of the Athenian navy; and he had, on all occasions, discovered a degree of patriotism and 4. Id. ibid. 5. Diod. Sicul lib. xi. p. 22, vol. ii edit, sup cir. 6. Herodotus, lib viii. c;ip cw. et Plut Vit. I'bemist. Vbi.. ii. it political 318 THE HISTORY OF PART I. political sagacity^ that entitled him to the confidence v ^~ v ^"' / ' of his countrymen. He was now to give new and signal instances of both. Ant Chr. When the Athenians returned to their desolated _. 4 ' 8 . territory, and the ruins of their city, after the final Olympiad . . J lxiv. 2, 3. expulsion of the Persians, they brought back, from the places of refuge, their wives and children, with all their remaining effects, and vigorously applied themselves to the rebuilding of their capital, and sur- rounding it with walls; only a few pieces of the former fortifications being left standing 7 . But no sooner were the Lacedaemonians informed of the Athenian ardour for restoring this rival city to its former beauty and strength, than they sent an em- bassy to Athens, requiring the Athenians to desist from rebuilding their walls 8 : under pretence, that all the cities without the Corinthian isthmus ought to be unwalled; in order that Xerxes, should he again invade Greece, might not have the power of converting, as fomerly, its fortified towns into mili- tary stations; and urging that, in such emergency, the fortifications of Peloponnesus would afford a safe retreat for the whole Grecian people 9 . Themistocles penetrated the jealous fears of the Lacedaemonians and their confederates, notwithstand- ing the mysterious veil under which their apprehen- sions were concealed. And the Athenians, by his advice replied, that they would send ambassadors to Sparta, to deliberate on the requisition made 10 . No sooner had the deputies of that domineering republic taken their departure, than this accomplished 7- Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxxix. 8. Id. Bell. Peloponne*. lib. i. cap. xc. 9. Id. ibid. Died. Sicul. Bibliotb. lib. xi.p. 31. vol. ii. Cornel. Nepot. et P^ut. in l r i{. ThetnUt. 10. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xc statesman ANCIENT EUROPE. 319 statesman opened to the Athenian senate his purpose of amusing the Lacedaemonians. His plan was ap- proved ; and he was joined in an embassy to Sparta, along with Aristides and Abronychus". He accord- ingly set out for the place of his destination; but his colleagues, at his own request, were to remain at Athens, until the wall of the city was sufficiently high for defence' 2 . Not a little political address was requisite for the management of such a business. But the Athenian legislator was equal to it. When Themistocles arrived at Sparta, he de- manded no public audience; but, by studied eva- sions, protracted time. When pressed on the subject, he answered, that he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained by urgent affairs; expressed his surprise at their delay, and expected they would soon be with him' 3 . As the Lacedaemo- nians had a good opinion of Themistocles, they sus- tained these excuses; but being informed through other avenues, that the wall of Athens was not only rebuilding in the meantime, but raised to a consi- derable height, they could no longer remain incredu- lous' 4 . Apprised of this, Themistocles entreated them not rashly to be biassed by rumours, but to depute, from among their own citizens, a certain number of men of respectability and approved vera- citv, who might, from a view of the works, report the truth' 5 . With that proposal, the Lacedaemonian senate complied. Meanwhile Themistocles sent secret in- structions to the Athenians, to detain the Spartan delegates (though with as little appearance of res- traint as possible), until the return of their own am- 11. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xc. xci. 12. Id. lib. i. cap. xc 13. Id ibid. 14. Thucydid lib i. cap xci 15. Id. ibid. bassadors; 320 THE HISTORY OF PART I. bassadors; for his colleagues were by this time ar- v -^" v " >w ' rived, and had assured him, that the wall of Athens was now fit for defence 6 . But he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when they discovered the true state of the works, would put him and the other ambassa- dors tinder arrest' 7 . From this danger, however, he was happily freed. The Athenians not only attended to his instructions, but the Spartan dele- gates behaved with such insolence, as to be justi- fiably thrown into prison' 8 . Without being informed of this event, Themisto- cles had the boldness, when joined by his colleagues, and furnished with the intelligence they brought, to demand an audience, and declare to the senate of Sparta, that Athens was now so strongly walled, as to be fit for the defence of its citizens ; that, there- fore, in future, when the Lacedaemonians, or their confederates, should send ambassadors thither, they must address themselves to a people, who perfectly understood their own interest, and the interest of Greece; observing, that it would not be possible, with strength inferior to that of a rival power, equally to preserve, and evenly to balance the public welfare of the Grecian body' 9 . The Lacedaemonians, though inwardly enraged at this declaration, politically suppressed all appearance of resentment against the Athenians. The ambassa- dors of each state, therefore, returned home, with- out coming to an open rupture 20 . Thus, adds Thu- cydides 2 ', the Athenians, in a short time, fortified their city: and the very outside of the structure shews that it was built in haste; the foundation being laid with stones of every kind, not hewn in some places 16. Thucydid. ubi sup. 17. Id. ibid. 18. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 31, vol. ii. 19. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xci. 20. Id. lib. i. cap. xcii. 21. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xciii. as ANCIENT EUROPE. 321 as properly to fit, but piled on at random. Many pillars also from sepulchral monuments were blended in the work ; for the circuit of the wall was every where enlarged beyond the former compass of the city. Hence, collecting the materials, not only from the ruins of the old rampart, but from every place with- out distinction, the labour was forwarded with speed 22 ; men, boys, and even women bearing part in it* 3 . The next measure of Themistocles, though not so essential to the present security of Athens, was yet more calculated for the future aggrandizement of his country. He persuaded the Athenians to finish the fortifications of port Peiraeus, begun dur- ing the year he was archon 2+ . This haven was most commodious for shipping, it being formed by nature into three basons or harbours* 5 . And as the Athe- nians, elated with the success of their fleet, during the Persian war, were become more than ever intent on the augmentation of their marine, he foresaw that the fortification of the Peiraeus would contribute greatly to the exaltation of their naval power, and the consequent dominion of the sea, at which he had encouraged them to grasp 26 . Ant. Chr. 477. Olympiad lxxv. 3, 4. The wall of the Peirseus, or principal sea-port of Athens, was much stronger than that of the city. It was of such thickness, that two carts, carrying ma- terials, could pass along it, by one another 77 . The interior part of it was neither filled with mortar nor mud; but the whole structure was one pile of large stones hewn square, so as to close their angles 22. Id. ibid. 23. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. SI, vol. ii. 24. Thucyriid. lib. i. cap. xciii. '25. Id. ibid. 26. Thucydid. ubi sup. This I have formerly had occasion to no- tice, in bringing* forward Themistocles to view. See Lett. xii. to- ward the beginning. 27. Id Hell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xciii. exactly 322 THE HISTORY OF PART I. exactly, and grappled firmly together, on the outside, y^>-»/ with iron cramps, fastened with lead 28 . This wall, however, was not carried up above half the height that Themistocles intended 29 . He planned it, both in heighth and breadth, for an impregnable rampart against hostile attacks 3 ". And he frequently coun- selled the Athenians, that, if ever they were hard pressed by land, they ought to retire into the Peiraeus, and thence v/ith their naval force make head against all opponents 3 '. But there might still have been dan- ger in making such retreat: for the walls of Athens were not yet joined to those of Phaleron and Pei- raeus; the building of the walls of communication, called the long walls, which connected the Athenian capital with its two havens, being only begun under the administration of Pericles 32 . The Lacedaemonians, according to the reports of later writers, menaced Attica with an invasion, while the walls of the Peiraeus were building 33 ; and all the political talents of Themistocles are said to be again called forth, in order to avert the threaten- ing danger 34 . But of such hostile purpose Thucy- dides takes no notice. He informs us, however, that the same summer the farther fortification of the Pei- rseus was begun, Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian admiral, formerly the Grecian commander in chief by land, and now at sea, sailed from Peloponnesus with twenty triremes or ships of the line, and was joined by an Athenian fleet of thirty sail, and by a number of armed ships furnished by their allies 3 ". 28. Id. ibid. 29. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xciii. Yet was it sixty feet high. Potter, Archaelog. Grsec. book i. chap. viii. 30. Id. ibid. 31. Thucydid. ubi sup. 32. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cvii. et Plut. Vit. Pericles. 33. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 32, 33, vol. ii. and most sub sequent historians, both ancient and modern. 34. Id. ibid. 35. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xciv. That ANCIENT EUROPE. 323 That combined fleet steered for Cyprus, and re- LETTER duced most of the Grecian towns in the island, J * lv - which were then subject to the great king 36 . Thence it proceeded for Byzantium, still held by a Persian garrison, and invested and took the city 37 . But Pau- sanias, who seems to have conducted this naval enter- prise with that superiority of courage and conduct, which had acquired him immortal renown at Plataea, became so arrogant in the exercise of his authority, as commander in chief, that all the Greeks, except the Lacedaemonians and their Peloponnesian confe- derates, were strongly disgusted with his behaviour; but especially the Ionians, and all who had been lately emancipated from the royal yoke 8 . The Athenian fleet, on that occasion, was com- manded bv the wise and moderate Aristides, assisted by Cimon the son of Miltiades 39 ; a man of a mild disposition and engaging manners, who inherited the warlike genius of his father, and united the po- litical talents of Themistocles with the probity of Aristides 4 '. To these commanders the Ionians, both of the islands and the Asiatic continent, addressed themselves; entreating the Athenian admirals, by the common tie of consanguinity, to undertake their protection, and rescue them from the insults of Pausanias* . This request was favourably heard by Aristides and Cimon, who expressed their willingness to put a stop to such grievances, and to accommodate matters to the best of their power 4 *. But before any new arrangement had been made, in consequence of these remonstrances, Pausanias was recalled by the senate 36. Id. ibid. "7. Thucydid. ubi sup. "8. Id. Bell. Pt'.opomtet. lib. i.eap. .\cv. 39. Plut. Vlt. ArhtiJ. tt Cimon. * 40. Id. ibid. 41. Thuc)did. lib i. c;ip scv. 42. Id. ibid ct flat, ubi sop. of 324 THE HISTORY OF PART I. of Lacedaemon; many of the Greeks having carried v -^ v ^ v - / accusations to Sparta against him, for the abuse of his power; his behaviour resembling more that of tyrant, than of a commander in chief 43 . Am. Chr. Pausanius was recalled at the very time the con- Olympiad federate Greeks, the Lacedaemonians and their Pe- lxxvi. 2. loponnesian associates excepted, had ranged them- selves under the command of the Athenian admi- rals 4 ^. On his arrival at Sparta, Pausanias was con- victed of malversation in his conduct to the com- manders of some states ; but of the heaviest part of the charge he was acquitted, an attachment to the Persian interest 43 . Yet that was thought too clear to stand in need of proof l6 . I should here, my lord, investigate the causes of the charge against Pausanias: but, for the sake of perspicuity, I shall not enter upon the subject, until I can connect those causes with their consequences; and open up the whole scene of baseness and ambi- tious folly, that led to the fatal catastrophe of the strangely chequered character of the conqueror at Plataea, and the captor of Byzantium. After Pausanias had been recalled, and convicted of misdemeanor in the exercise of the chief com- mand at sea, the senate of Lacedaemon divested him Ant. Chr. of his rank ; and appointed, in his stead, Dorcis with 4 . , some colleagues, to the conduct of their naval force 47 , lxxvi. 2. But the confederated Greeks would not submit to these leaders 48 ; they, therefore, returned home 49 . And the Lacedaemonians being at that time well- 4:3. Thucydid. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xcv. 44. Id. ibid. 45. Thucydid. ubi sup. 46. Id. ibid. 47. Thucydid. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xcv. 48. Id. ibid. 49. Thucydid. ubi sup. affected Ant Chr. ANCIENT EUROPE. 3*5 affected to the Athenians, and desirous to rid themselves of the Persian war, acknowledged the Athenians had good pretensions to the supreme com- mand at sea 5 °; fearing the admirals they should 475. send out, says Thucvdides 5 ', might farther hurt the 9 lvmp,a -, cl . . Ixxvi. 3. Spartan interest, already injured by Pausanias. Having thus obtained the chief command at sea, by the voluntary tender of the whole Grecian confe- deracy, the Athenians fixed the quotas, both of ships and money, that each state was to furnish, for car- rying on hostilities against the Persian monarch ; in order to revenge the injuries which the Greeks had suffered from the invasions of the barbarians 51 . This, at least, was the pretext* for demanding these quo- tas 53 ; and hence the Athenian office of general re- ceivers of Greece, whose business it was to collect the contributions of the several states 54 . The first contribution levied by the Athenians, in consequence of the power with which they were vested, amounted to four hundred and sixty talents 55 , or about ninety thousand pounds sterling. The temple of Apollo, in the island of Delos, was chosen as the common treasury 56 . In that temple, the Athenians, when acknow- ledged sovereigns of the Grecian sea, originally held their deliberations with free and independent confe- derates; who sat in council with them, and had a vote in all public resolutions 57 . But they gradually enlarged their authority with the increase of their naval power 58 : so that, before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the greater number of the confe- 50. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xcv. 51. Id. Ibid. 52. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xcvi. 53. Id. ibid. 54. 'phucydid. ubi sup. 55. Id. Bell. Peloponnes, lib. i. cap. xcvi. 56. Id. ibid, et seq. 57. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xcvii. 58. Id. ibid, et seq. vol. ii. v u derated S26 THE HISTORY OF TART I. derated slates, both of European and Asiatic Greece s -* r " v ~**- / (as we shall have occasion to see), were actually become Athenian tributaries. I must now return to the accusation of Pausanias for treason, and bring forward the grounds of that charge. The barbarian Xerxes (as this great and magnificent monarch is contemptuously called by the Grecian writers), ignorant as he has been repre- sented of his true interest, did not overlook the advantageous situation of Byzantium; destined one day to become the seat of the Roman emperors, and where the sublime sultan still holds his court. In that city, on his retreat from Greece, Xerxes had left a strong garrison 59 ; in order to preserve the obedience of Thrace and Macedonia, his remaining dominions in Europe. Over the troops in the garrison of Byzantium were placed several officers of high rank ; Persian noblemen, and even princes of the blood royal 60 . These, Pausanias treated with lenity, when he made himself master of the fortress ; and, on purpose to ingratiate himself with the great king, he secretly conveyed them to the Asiatic coast, pretending they had made their escape 6 '. This treachery was ma- naged by Gongylus, the Eretrean; a man fit for such a business, and to whose custody Pausanias had committed the prisoners 62 . Gongylus also carried a letter to the Persian mo- narch from Pausanias; containing a proposal of mar- riage with the daughter of that monarch, and an offer 59. Corrpare Thucydid. lib i. cap. xciv. cxxviii. with Diod. Sicul lib. xu p. 34. vol. ii. edit. sup. cit. 60. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxviii. 61. Id. ibid. 62. Thucydid. ubi sup. to ANCIENT EUROPE. m to bring Sparta and Greece under his dominion 63 . " I think I have power," said Pausanias, " to accom- " plish these events, if my schemes could be made " known to thee. Should, therefore, my offer meet , - / ture to solicit an impeachment 82 ; he being nearly allied to the throne, and at that time invested with regal authority, as guardian-regent to his nephew Pleistar- chus, son of Leonidas, yet in his minority 83 . But his late extravagant behaviour, and his affectation of barbarian customs, afforded strong suspicion of his guilt; and infused a general apprehension, that he would never conform to the simplicity and equality of Spartan manners 84 . Other particulars were also now called to mind, in which he had formerly deviated from the austere institutions of his county 85 ; or given way to ambitious vanity, in contradiction to the modest reserve of Spartan pride. Among the latter, the most striking instance was an inscription which he had, of his own authority, ordered to be en- graved on the golden tripod dedicated at Delphos by the confederated Greeks, after the battle of Plataea, as the choicest part of the Persian spoil 86 . That inscription was to the following purpose : — " After Pausanias, general of the Greeks, had routed " the Persian forces, he offered this memorial of his " victory to Phoebus 87 ." Though this inscription was instantly erased, by order of the Lacedaemonians, who placed on the tri- pod, in its stead, merely the names of the several states that had borne part in the overthrow of the barbarians, and joined in making that oblation to Apollo, yet was it now recollected to the prejudice of Pausanias; and, from the circumstances of his late behaviour, considered as a proof that he had been equally guilty in times longer passed* 8 . The Spartan senate had also received information, which, 82. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxxii. 83. Id. ibid. 81. Id. Bell. Peloponnes.Yib. i. cap. cxxxii. 85. Id. ibid. 86. Thucydid. ubi sup. 87. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap cxxxii. 88. Id. ibid. says ANCIENT EUROPE. 331 says Thucy elides, was true 8 °, that he was tampering with the helots; having promised them their liberty, and the privilege of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his command, and co-operate with him in all his designs 90 . But even this information did not induce the La- cedaemonians to bring forward an impeachment of Pausanias. They disdained to place so much confi- dence in the evidence of slaves, as to depart from the forms of their constitution, in order to punish him; but adhered to the ancient maxim of the state, never to be hasty, without unquestionable proof, in proceeding against a citizen of Sparta, to give a sen- tence not to be reversed 9 '. At length, however, the fullest evidence against Pausanias was obtained, through a confidential servant, who was to convey to Artabazus the last letters he had written to the Persian monarch 91 . This man, alarmed at observing, that no person sent on those errands had ever returned, broke open the letters committed to his charge 93 . And finding he was destined to the fate his fears foreboded,, and which had been that of others, his murder being expressly enjoined, he carried the letters to the ephori 94 . But although they were now more than ever convinced of the guilt of Pausanias, they were desirous of farther evidence than the letters afforded, before they would hazard an accusation of treason against him 95 . It was therefore contrived, that his devoted servant should go to the sanctuary at Tcna- rus as a suppliant, and take refuge in a cell divided by 89. Bell. Pe/oponnet. lib. i. cap. exxxii. 90. Id. ibid. 91. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. exxxii. 92. Id. ibid 93. Thucydid ubi sup. 94. Id. Bell. Pelnpor.net. lib. i. cap exxxiii. 95. Id. ibid. a partition ; 332 THE HISTORY OF PART I. a partition ; in the interior part of which might be v^*v>W concealed some of the ephori 96 . Pausanias informed of the supplication of his fa- vourite minjon, and suspected catamite, went to the sanctuary at Tenarus, and asked the cause of his there taking refuge 97 . The man complained bitterly of the clause in the letters relative to himself; and expostulated warmly, " Why he, who had been so " trusty to his master, during the whole course of " his negociations with the king, should now be " doomed to the fate of his meanest tools 98 ." Pau- sanias confessed the truth of all that he alledged ; begged him not to be exasperated at what appeared ; encouraged him to quit his sanctuary, by an assu- rance that he should not be hurt; and earnestly entreated him to go the journey with all possible speed, nor obstruct by his fears the schemes in 99 agitation What answer the destined messenger returned, we are not informed; but it does not appear that he quitted his sanctuary. And Pausanias seems to have had too much reverence for religion, to attempt to drag him from his cell. The ephori, however, satisfied with the avowal of his master, which they had distinctly heard, withdrew ; and being now fully convinced of his treasonous designs, proposed to apprehend him on his return to Sparta 00 . Such an attempt they made; but Pausanias penetrating their purpose, from their menacing look, took shelter in a cell belonging to the temple of Minerva Chalciaeca 101 . There surrounded by guards, in order to prevent his escape, he was starved to death 102 . 96. Thucydiil. ubi sup. 97. Id. ibid. 98. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxxiii. 99. Id. ibid. 100. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxxxiii. 101. Id. ibid. 102. ThuCydid. ubi sup. Thus ANCIENT EUROPE. 33$ Thus perished Pausanias, the successful compe- LETTER titor of Mardonius, and the deliverer of Greece from Asiatic slaver}'. To say that he had not a mind of sufficient strength, to look down unda2zled from that height of renown to which he was exalted, in con- sequence of the victory at Plataea, would perhaps be injurious to his character; but his mind was surely little suited to the austere institutions of Lycurgus, which repressed every approach to luxury or splen- dour. Toward these Pausanias seems naturally to have been strongly borne' 03 ; and, as ambitious rule was his predominant passion, he appears to have been fretted at the thought of being obliged to relin- quish his authority, and sink into the condition of a private subject, when his nephew should attain the age that entitled him to assume the reins of govern- ment, and supreme command. Hence his desire of attaining a superior situation, his treachery to his country, and his proffered alliance with Xei'xes. The extravagance of his conduct may be accounted for from other circumstances. Having fallen in love with a young lady of noble birth, while at Byzan- tium, and forced her to yield to his wishes, he inad- vertantly stabbed her in the dark, as she was coming to his bed'" 4 ; supposing her to be an assassin. Her ghost seemed ever after to haunt him'° 5 ; and the struggles of remorse and treasonous ambition dis- erdered his brain 106 . We must now return to the affairs of Athens. The Athenians, under the conduct of Cimon, soon after they were invested with the supreme com- mand at sea, laid siege to E'l'on, a town on the river Strymon, still possessed by the Persians; took it, 103. Herodotus, lib. ix. cap. exxxi. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. exxx. 104. Plut. Vit. Cimon. 105. Id. ibid. 106. Plut. ubi sup. et Cornel. Nepot. Vit. Pausan. tol. xi. x x and 334 THE HISTORY OF PART I. and sold all the people found in it for slaves' 07 . Suck v-^vw is the concise narration of Thucydides, whom I have chosen to follow, because of his accuracy. But He- rodotus, a primary authority, informs us of other particulars' 08 ; that Boges, the Persian governor of E'j'on, refused to accept of any conditions, lest the king should suspect him of cowardice. And that persisting in this resolution, even after his provi- sions were exhausted, he ordered a great fire to be kindled; and having killed his wife and children, together with his concubines and menial servants, threw their bodies into the flames; then mounting \he walls of the city, threw all the gold and silver remaining into the river Strymon; and, when he had so done, threw himself into the fire' 09 . The Athenians afterwards landed on the island of 3cyros, held by the Delopians; and, having reduced 107. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xcviii. Plutarch says that Cimon left art" Athenian colony at Eion, the neighbouring country being remark* ably beautiful and fertile (Vit. Cimon.) ; ahd that he was there per- mitted to erect three marble hermae, as memorials of his victory, with inscriptions below each. Two of these have much merit. I. " Where Strymon with his silver waves " The lofty tow'rs of Eion laves, " The hapless Mede with famine prest, " The force of Grecian arms confest. II. " Let him, who born in distant days t '' Eeholds these monuments of praise; These forms that valour's glory save, And sees how Athens crowns the brave, " For honour heave the patriot sigh, •* And for his country learn to die !" Plut. Tit Cimuik Among the captives, sold for slaves by Cimon, v/e must not include the Persian garrison; for, we are told by Plutarch (Vic. Cimon), he had the profitable experience, that the Persians redeemed their pri- soners at a great ransom. 108. Jiktoriar. lib. vt:. cap. cvij. 109. Herodot. ul> Eup. it. ANCIENT EUROPE. AJ3 it, treated the inhabitants in the same manner they lf.ttkr did those of Eton, settling in it a colony of their f own people 1 °. They also commenced hostilities against the Carysthians of Euboea, and compelled them to submit on such terms as Athens thought proper to impose" 1 . Against the Naxians, who had revolted from the naval confederacy, the Athenians next made war, and subdued them by a siege". This, observes Thucydides, was the first confederate state, that was enslaved to gratify the aspiring am. bitiou of the Athenians 3 ; but all the rest, as rcr. volts afforded pretence, successively shared the same fate" 4 . The causes of such revolts were various; but they chiefly had their origin in the deficiences of the quotas of the confederates, or in their backward- ness to common service' 3 . Those the Athenians were empowered to exact: and they exerted their authority with rigour; laying heavy loads upon men, who had neither been accustomed, nor were willing to bear oppression' 6 . These impositions, however, the confederates had much facilitated by their own conduct. For, through a reluctance of joining in naval expeditions, the majority of them, in order to redeem their personal attendance, agreed to contribute certain sums of money, adjudged equivalent to the expense qf furnishing the ships at which they were rated" 7 . The sums paid on such occasions to the Athenians, were employed in aug- menting their own navy" 8 : so that the tributary slates, 110. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xcviii. The Athenians, we are told hy Plutarch (Vit. Cimon.), were authorised by the Amphictyomc coun- ty to undertake the reduction of Scyros, the Delopians being, ad- dicted to piracy. 111. Id. ibid. 112. Thucydid. ubi sup. 113. Id. Hell I'oloponnes. lib. i. cap. xcviii. 114. Id. ibid. 115. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xcj.x. 116. Id. ibid. 117. Thucydid. ubi sup. 118. Id. Bell. Pelopownes. lib. i. cap. xcix. Many of these oppres- sions, S36 THE HISTORY OF PART I. states, thus drained, found whenever they presumed s ^" v ~ w/ to revolt, that they had parted with the sinews of war; and, therefore, were under the necessity of sub- mitting' 11 ''. Ant. Chr. 471. Olympiad lxxvii. 2. Themistocles, who had raised the Athenians to sueh a height of naval power, but whom their jea- lousy had excluded from command since the invidious honours conferred on him at Sparta, after the glo- rious battle of Salamis, was expelled by the ostra- cism 120 the same year that Naxus was reduced, and Pausanias punished for treason. This expulsion was effected through the influence of Cimon, now high in popular favour, and the interest of Alcmaeon, head of the long powerful house of that name 12 '; Aristides declining openly to take part in the political intrigue, for the banishment of Themistocles 122 . But a tem- porary exclusion from his country, was not the sorest ill this great man was doomed to suffer. When the Lacedaemonians had punished the trea- son of Pausanias, they sent ambassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles of also carrying on a treason- able correspondence with the Persian monarch 123 . This they pretended to have discovered from the papers of their ill-fated commander 124 . But Plutarch declares, that Themistocles (although he had listened to the propositions of his friend, Pausanias, without betraying him) withstood every temptation, offered stons, as I shall afterward have occasion to shew, were exercised under the'much praised administration of Aristides ; the first gene- ral receiver, and inspector of the quotas and contributions of the Grecian naval confederates. Plut. Vit. Aristid. 119. Id. ibid. 120. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Themist. 121. Plut. Vit. Cimon. et Thenrist. 122. Id. Vit. Aristid. et Themist. 123. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxxv- 124. Id. ibid. by ANCIENT EUROPE. 337 bv the Lacedaemonian chief, to draw him into a con- spiracy against the liberties of Greece "*; The pro- secution against him, may, therefore, be considered as the effect of the vengeance and mortified pride of Sparta; ashamed to have produced, in her vaunted deliverer, the first machinator of Grecian slavery. The Lacedaemonians had many reasons for seek- ing vengeance on Themistocles. He had acquired for the Athenians, that superiority at sea, which enabled them to obtain the supreme command of the Grecian naval force. This, the disciples of Lycur- gas now wished to regain, notwithstanding the pro- hibition of their legislator, as they found it to be intimately connected with sovereignty on land 126 He had walled the city of Athens, as we have seen, so as to be impervious to their attacks; and he had fortified the Peiraeus, for the protection of that navy which he had created, and for the security of the enlarging commerce and growing marine force of the Athenian republic. But the Lacedaemonians had another, and yet stronger reason, for persecuting the exiled Themis- tocles. When the Spartan senate attempted, soon after the victory at Platsea, to exclude from the council of Amphictyons all those states that had taken part with the Persian monarch, this profound politician opposed the motion, and got it set aside 117 . He foresaw, that if the Thessalians, Argives, and Boeotians, were excluded from the assembly of the Grecian delegates, the Lacedaemonians and their Peloponnesian confederates would preserve a pre- ponderating influence, by reason of their superior number of votes' 2y ; and consequently, on every 125. Pint. Vit. TUemht. 126. Diod. Sicu!. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 38. 127. Plut. Vit. Thcniist. 128. Id. ibid. occasion 338 THE HISTORY OF PAHT occasion of jealousy, be able to turn against Athens v^~*" , W the majority of the republican body of Greece. Of the arguments used by Themistocles, on that important occasion, we are but imperfectly informed. We only know, that he awakened the pride of the Amphictyonic council, by shewing the insignificancy into which it would sink, from the exclusion of the defaulting states' 29 ; and that this argument wa-i found sufficient to obstruct the purposed decree against them. Benefits are soon forgot. Yet It appears, that the Thebans for a time laid aside their jealousy of Athens, and retained some degree of gratitude for her interposition in their favour. The Athenians also revered Themistocles, while struggling with difficulties, from which he only could relieve them; but no sooner was their naval superiority established, than they became violently jealous of the man, who had*raised them to such an height of prosperity' 30 . That jealousy was fostered by Aristides; who, al- though he prudently declined appearing as the rival of his former competitor and expeller, so far relaxed in his political principles, in order to humble the towering Themistocles, as to make a sacrifice to popular favour of the balance of the Athenian con- stitution. This he did, in procuring a decree of the public assembly for laying open the office of archon, which had hitherto, conformable to the in- stitutions of Solon, been confined to the first order in the state, to citizens of all the inferior classes "'. Cimon, 129. Plut. ubi sup. 130. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Themist. 131. Pinter/*. Aristid. Aristides had learned to temporize, on fcther occasions. For we are told by Plutarch (ibid.), that when he haul settled the articles of the naval alliance, he called upon the con- federates ANCIENT EUROPE. f$4 Cimon, who had risen to popular favour under letter the wing of Aristides, and through Lacedaemonian X1V - influence 13 *, incited the prosecution of the expelled v ^" v " w Themistocles' 13 ; and Leobotes, the son of Alcmseon, joined the Spartans in accusing him directly of trea- son' 34 . As the illustrious exile could not defend himself in person, he answered by letters the princi- pal articles of the impeachment' 35 ; observing, that he, who was born to command, and incapable of submitting to servitude, could never entertain the thought of selling himself and the liberties of Greece to enemies and barbarians' 36 . The Athenian people, however, whom Themis- tocles had so long governed, and whose versatile humour he had experienced and feared, listened to the arguments of his accusers 3r . An order was accordingly issued for apprehending him, and bring- ing him to answer for his conduct, before an assem- bly of the Grecian delegates, at Sparta' 38 . Finding himself deserted by his countrymen, and exposed to the vengeance of the Lacedaemonians, he declined standing trial} and, having been outlawed for trea- federates to confirm them with an oath, which he himself took on the part of the Athenians ; yet, when the urgency of affairs required the Athenians to govern Greece with a tighter rein tlian those articles justified, he advised them to let the consequences of the perjury rest with him, and pursue the path that expediency pointed out (I'lut. ubi •up.). And when it was debated in council, whether the treasure deposited at Dclos, belonging to the naval confederates, should re- main there, or be brought to Athens, though contrary to the article* of the confederacy? — he said, on its coming to his turn to speak, that " it was not just, but it was expedient!" Plut. Vit. Aristid. 132. Plut. Vit. Themist. 133. Id. Vit. Cimon. et Themist 134. Plut. Vit. Themist.' 135. Id. ibid, et Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 41. 136. Plut. Vit. Themist. 137. Id. ibid. 123. Plut ubi sup. ct Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. *0l. ii. p. 43. 340 THE HISTORY OF I'ART I. son, he quitted Argos, where he had chiefly resided v "^~ y ~>"' since his banishment' 39 , and fled to Corcyra; from Corcyra to the Molossian territory; and thence (being still pursued) to Pydna in Mecedonia, whence he passed into Asia Minor' 40 . When Themistocles landed at Ephesus, he learned that Xerxes, on whose gratitude he had claims, and to whom he meant to apply for protection, no longer filled the oriental throne. Artaxerxes, surnamed Longimanus, the third son of that monarch, had lately obtained the Persian sceptre 14 ' ; in consequence of events too memorable to be omitted, though not immediately connected with the affairs of Greece, or those of her Asiatic colonies. Artabanus, commander of the guards of Xerxes, having conspired the murder of his sovereign, and the usurpation of the crown, communicated his de- signs to the eunuch Mithridates, one of the officers of the king's household. Mithridates entered into the views of Artabanus; who being secretly intro- duced, by night, into the royal bed-chamber, killed Xerxes 42 . No sooner had Artabanus perpetrated this ati-ocious crime, than he hastened to Artaxerxes, and told him that Darius, his eldest brother, had murdered the king in order to get immediate pos- session of the throne; exhorted him to revenge the death of his father, and seize with guiltless hands the sceptre' 43 . 139. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxxv. Unwilling to abandon the nar- ration of Thucydides, yet finding it impossible to reconcile that nar- ration, in what regards the flight of Themistocles, to any system of chronology, I have related the facts without marking the dates, or attempting to reconcile the conjectures of chronologers concerning the coincidence of events. 140. Id. lib. i. cap. exxxvi. exxxvii. 141. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. exxxvii. 142. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 52. 143. Id. ibid. Artaxerxes ANCIENT EUROPE. 341 Artaxerxes listened to the suggestions of Arta- LETTER banus, who offered him the assistance of the royal guards' 44 . The guards were mustered, and Darius c was slain. Artaxerxes instantly assumed the imperial 465. ensiens ; but the murderous Artabanus had resolved Olympiacl . . i if lxXVlll. 4. that his reign should be short. Having assembled his sons, he boastingly told them, that the time for his ascending the throne was arrived. He accord- ingly left them; and waiting upon the king, drew his sword, and wounded him' 45 . The wound, however, happened to be slight; so that Artaxerxes, after bravely defending himself, slew the treacherous as- sassin with his own hand 46 . By this gallant exploit he revenged the murder of his father, and establish- ed himself on the Persian throne; an insurrection raised by his second brother Histaspes, governor of the distant province of Bactria 4r , being suppressed by his vigorous exertions in war' 48 . Artaxerxes reigned with lustre thirty-nine years ; and renewed in the seventh year of his reign, through the influence of Esther, a Jewish concubine, whom he afterward married, the edict of Cyrus for rebuild- ing the city, and temple of Jerusalem' 49 . To this prince, who excelled in beauty of person' 50 , and was eminently distinguished by sweetness of temper and dignity of mind' 3 ', Themistocles sent a letter, when on his journey to Susa' 5 *. That letter 144. Diotl. Siciil. Riblioth. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 53. 145. Id. ibid. 146. Diod. Sicut. ubi sup. 147. Id. ibid. 148. Ctesias, cap. xxxi. 149. Ezra, chap. vii. Esther, passim, and l'rideaox, Connect, book v. with the authors there cited. See also Rollin. Hist. An. cienne, lib. vii. sect. vi. 150. Strabo, lib. xv. p. 735, edit. Casaubon. sup. cit. 151. Plut. Vit. Artaxerxes, init. 152.'Thucydid. lib. i cap. exxxvii. vol. ii, * y wa» 342 THE HISTORY OF PART I. was to the following purport: " Themistocles, who v^*v^/ " of all the Greeks did the greatest mischief to thy " house, while bound to carry on war against thy " father, is coming to thee ; having still a title to " remuneration. For after his duty was discharged,. " and the hazards of Xerxes became imminent, he " did him service so essential, as to overbalance for- " mer injuries. Now persecuted by the Greeks for " his attachment to the Persian cause, he is in thy " dominions, and able to promote thy interest. But " he desires a year's delay, before he shall be called " upon to unfold his designs' 53 ." Admiring the magnanimity of Themistocles, and wishing to enjoy the benefit of his counsels, Ar- taxerxes granted the delay he requested' 54 . And he, during that term of indulgence, applied himself so diligently to the study of the Persian language and the manners of the east, that, at the expiration of the year, when he appeared at court, and obtained audi- ence, he was able to converse with the king not only without the help of an interpreter, but with all the ease of a native of Persia' 55 . This talent proved a new recommendation to The- mistocles; and, in conjunction with his lately acquir- ed knowledge of oriental customs and manners' 56 , raised him to the highest favour at the court of Susa. Artaxerxes, flattered by his pretended projects for the conquest of Greece, and charmed with the frequent instances he gave of superior understanding, took him into his particular friendship and confidence'^ 7 ; 153. Id. ibid. 154. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxxviii. 155. Compare Thucydid. ubi sup. with Cornel Nepot. et Plut. Tit. Themist. 156. Plut. Vit. Themist. 157. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxxviii. and, ANCIENT EUROPE. 343 and, as a distinguished mark of that friendship, as well as confidence, conferred on him the govern- ment of three Greek cities in Asia Minor — Mag- nesia, Lampsacus, and Myus, the revenues of which were appropriated solely to his use' 58 . Themistocles was greatly beloved and respected in his Asiatic government; and, after his death, (which I shall have occasion to notice in the order of events) a magnificent monument was erected to his memory, at the public expense, and his statue was placed in the forum of Magnesia' 59 . That monument remained to the time of Plutarch' 60 : and then his statue was still to be seen in the temple of Diana Aristobule' 6 '; from which it appeared, says the philosophical biographer, that his aspect was as heroic as his soul 102 . I must now, my lord, resume the naval history of Greece. But it will be proper, before we enter upon this subject, to display the civil and political charac- ter of Cimon; whom we have seen invested with the command of the confederate fleet, and whose enterprises were attended with such success. Cimon, after the expulsion of Themistocles, had no equal in Athens; Aristides, his venerated friend, being now in the decline of life, and little more than the spectator of his triumphs. Cimon took a more certain road to popularity, than either Aris- tides or Themistocles. Instead of despising mo- ney like the former, or hoarding it like the latter, unless when expended on some magnificent public spectacle, he paid a prudent attention to wealth, but without discovering any marks of rapacity; and being 158. Id. ibid. 159. Thucydid. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. ubi. sup 160. Plut. Vit. Themist. 161 Id. ibid. 162. Tlut. ubi sup. enriched 144 THE HISTORY OF PART I. enriched by the Persian spoils, he revived the anci- s^-v^ms ent spirit of hospitality 1 J3 . He kept a public table, if not for all the Athenians, at least for his partizans ; and being naturally of a social disposition, he drank deep with his guests 64 . Hence the following verses •f Eupolis, quoted by Plutaixh: " He's not a villain but a debauchee, " Whose careless heart is stole by wine and women." And those of Cratinus, the comic poet, in one of his pieces entitled Archilochi: " Even I Metrobius, though a scrivener, hoped " To pass a cheerful and a sleek old age, " And fare to my last hour at Cimon's table ; *< Cimon ! the best and noblest of the Greeks, " Whose wide-spread bounty vied with that of hea- ven' 6 ^" Gorgias, the Leontine, therefore bears just testi- mony to his character, in saying, That he got riches to use them ; and used them so, as to be honoured on their account 165 . It accordingly appears, that although Cimon, in his convivial meetings, might often exceed the bounds of temperance, his generous hospitality did not lead him to neglect the service of his country. The Am. Chr. year after the taking of Naxus, he sailed with the ,_, : , confederate fleet to the Asiatic coast, and added to Olympiad ... . . lxxvii. 3. the maritime league all the Grecian cities in Caria and Lycia' 67 ; which, on being assured of support, re- volted from the Persian monarch, and put themselves 163. Pint. Vit. Cimoa. 164. Id. ibid. 165. Plut. ubi sup. 166. Id. ibid. 167^ Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 46. under ANCIENT EUROPE. 345 under the protection of Athens 163 . Such towns as letter belonged to the natives, and were held by Persian garrisons, Cimon reduced 6o . While the Athenian admiral, after having made these acquisitions, lay off Cnidus and Triopium, he received intelligence, that a Persian fleet was assem- bled, on the coast of Pamphylia ; and a Persian army mustered on land 70 . Weighing anchor, he stood to sea with two hundred Athenian trireme- gallies' 7 '. Those gallies had been built by Themis- tocles, but were enlarged by Cimon 72 . He met the hostile fleet at the mouth of the river Eurymedon, consisting of three hundred and fifty sail 173 ; gave it battle, defeated it, and took or destroyed two hun- dred triremes' 74 . The Persian army advanced close to the shore. But it appeared to Cimon an arduous undertaking, to make a descent in defiance of such a body of forces; and with men fatigued in the late engage- ment at sea, to encounter on land a superior body of fresh troops 175 . Finding, however, the Greeks ele- vated in courage and spirit by their recent victory, and desirous to be led against the enemy, he disem- barked his heavy-armed infantry, yet warm from the fight. All ardour, they rushed forward with loud shouts. The Persians stood and received their attack with firmness. A sharp conflict ensued; in which the bravest, and most distinguished of the Athenians were slain. But at length, though with much difficulty, the barbarians were broken' 76 : and Cimon had the honour of being victorious both by 168. Id. ibid. 169. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. ubi sup. 170. Plut. Vir. Cimon. 171. Id. ibid. 172. Plut. ubi sup. 173. Id.Vit. Cimon. 174. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. c. 175. Plut. Vit. Cimon. 176. Id. ibid. sea 346 THE HISTORY OF PART I. sea and land, in one day' 77 . Many of the Persians v ^" v "^' / r ere killed, many made prisoners; and a rich booty was found in their camp' 78 . The Persian monarch' 79 , according to Plutarch, was so much humbled by these defeats, that he ac- ceded to a peace, which confined his dominion in Asia Minor to a day's journey on horseback from the Grecian sea; and by which he engaged, that none of his gallies, or ships of war, should ever come within the Cyanean and Chelidonian isles' 80 ; relinquishing to the Athenians the sovereignty of the iEgean, and to the Asiatic Greeks their freedom. But I shall refer this treaty to a later period, on the authority of Diodorus' 8 '; a period, when the Athe- nian naval power was more highly exalted, and when the haughty and exasperated Xerxes no longer swayed the Persian sceptre. The great success of Cimon, at the river Eury- medon, gave new lustre to his already popular and heroic character. And Athens, enriched and adorned 177. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. c. Cornel. Nepot. et Plut. Vit. Cimon. 178. Plut. Vit. Cimon. 179. The monarch here alluded to must have been Xerxes ; for, according to all ancient chronologers, he reigned twenty or twenty- one years. The circumstances connected with the flight of Themis- tocles, as related by Thucydides, form the only objection to this chronology. But, accurate as that historian generally is, it seems more reasonable to suppose he was mistaken in some of those circum- stances, than to subvert the order of events, and throw all history into confusion, in order to render his narrative consistent. If we set aside the single circumstance of Ts'axus being besieged by the Athenians, when Themistocles passed into Asia (Thucydid. lib. i. cap. exxxvii.), all may he reconciled, l'or we know not exactly, when the prosecution against him, for treason, commenced; what time his trial occupied; nor how long he wandered from place to place, in danger of being apprehended, before he left the European t>hore, and sought refuge in the Persian dominions. 180. Plut. Vit. Cimon. 151, Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. vol. ii. p. 74. edict, sup. cit. with ANCIENT EUROPE. 347 with the Persian spoils' 82 , prosecuted, under his liberal administration, new schemes of wealth, of glory, and ambition. Commerce, conquest, and colonization, equally occupied her views; and being now unrivalled mistress of the Grecian seas, she rapidly pressed forward in her naval career. The first object that engaged the avidity of the Athenians, wae a territory on the coast of Thrace, containing gold mines. That territory belonged to the island of Thasus 183 ; and some disputes having arisen with the Thasians, concerning the trade to those coasts, they withdrew themselves from the maritime league' 84 . Cimon seized this occasion of Am. Chr. quarrel to assemble the confederate fleet; sailed to olympiad the refractory island ; defeated the Thasian squad- lxxvii. 4. ron, and disembarked a strong body of forces' 85 . But the Thasians, after losing a battle on land' 86 , took refuge within their walls, and made an obsti- nate resistance. During the siege of Thasus, the Athenians sent a colony, consisting of about ten thousand people to a place on the river Strymon called the Nine- Ways, but afterward Amphipolis' 87 . They became masters of the Nine-Ways, by ex- pelling the Edonians' 88 ; but, advancing farther into the country, they were all cut off at Drabescus, by the united forces of the barbarous natives, who were inimical to the settlement of that new colony 189 . 182. Plut. Vit. Cimon. He first built, says this Grecian biographer, those elegant and noble structures, for disputation and exercise at Athens, that were afterward so much admired. He planted the forum with plane trees; and into the academy, which before was a dry and unsightly spot, he brought water, and sheltered it with groves. Id. ibid. 183 Thucydid. lib. i cap. c. 184. Id. ibid. 185. Thucydid. ubi sup. 186. Id. ibid. 187. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. c. 188. Id. ii>id. 189. Thucydid. ubi sup. Meanwhile Ant. Chr. 468. Olympiad Ixxviii. 1. THE HISTORY OF Meanwhile the Thasians, closely besieged, had implored the assistance of the Lacedaemonians; en- treating them to divert the Athenian force, by break- ing into Attica' 90 . Unknown to the Athenians, the Spartan senate agreed to the request of the Thasi- ans 9 '; but the shock of an earthquake, which laid Sparta in ruins, and other circumstances connected with it precluded the irruption of the Lacedaemo- nians in favour of the Thasians' 92 . The helots, now mostly descendants of the ancient Messenians, and generally known by the name of Messenians' 93 , seized this opportunity to break their fetters, and take vengeance on their cruel and imperious mas- ters. They rose in rebellion, and advanced to Sparta 194 ; but being gallantly opposed by Archida- mus (joint king of Lacedaemon along with Pleistoa- hax, the son of Pausanias), who headed the Spartan army' 95 , they retreated, and took possession of Ithome' o6 j the last resort of the liberty of their brave but unfortunate forefathers, whence they made frequent excursions. Ant. Chr. 467. Olympiad Ixxviii. 2. This intestine war gave full employment to the Lacedaemonians. And the Thasians, deprived of their interposition, surrendered to the Athenians upon terms, after having sustained a siege for three years' 97 . Those terms were, that the Thasians should level their walls; give up their armed ships; pay to the naval confederacy, and to Athens as the head of that confederacy, the whole arrears of their stipulated contribution for the public service ; furnish their proportion punctually in future, and quit all pretensions to their territory on the continent, and to the mines 98 . 190. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. ci. 191. Id. ibid. 192. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. ci. 193. Id. ibid. 194. Thucydid. ubi sup. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 48, vol. ii. et Pint, Fit. Cimon. 195. Diod. Sicul. et Plut. ubi sup. 196. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. ci. 197. Idu ibid. 198. Thucydid. ubi sup. As ANCIENT EUROPE. 349 As the war against the rebels in Ithome ran out LETTER into length, the Lacedaemonians demanded the aid of their allies; and, among others, of the Athe- . c nians' 99 . An Athenian army was accordingly sent 466. to their assistance, under the command of Cimon 200 : 01 . vm P * / size then in use. The Corinthians, however, ven- tured to undertake the support of Epidamnus; en- couraged adventurers to settle in it; and sent thither a body of troops to serve as a garrison 363 . These in order to avoid the danger of being intercepted by the Corcyrsean fleet, marched from the bottom of the Ambracian gulf to Apollonia^ 4 ; which still, it ap- pears, acknowledged the supremacy of Corinth. From Apollonia the adventurers and troops, consist- ing of Corinthians, Leucadians, and Ambracians, seem to have passed to Epidamnus by sea. No sooner were the Corcyrseans informed of the interposition of Corinth, in favour of the Epidamni- ans, than their rage was kindled 365 : and a consequent circumstance blew it into a flame. The Epidamni- an exiles arrived at Corcyra; where, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, and claiming the rights of consanguinity, they conjured the Corcyrseans to undertake their restoration; and drive out the gar- rison and new inhabitants, that Epidamnus had received from Corinth 36 . The Corcyrseans speedily put to sea with a fleet of twenty-five sail, which was soon augmented by a reinforcement; and commanded the Epidamnians to receive their exiles, under peril of their indignation 557 . The Epidamnians disregard- ed the threat, and were deaf to the haughty mandate. The Corcyrasans, therefore, with a fleet of forty sail, and an army on land; composed of the exiles whom they pretended to restore, and a band of Illyrians, 362. Id. Bell. Pelopennes. lib. i. cap. xxv. , 363. Thucydid. lib. i. cap, xxvi. 364. Id. ibid. 355. Thucydid. ubi sup. 366. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxvi. 367. Id. ibid. began ANCIENT EUROPE. srs began hostilities 368 . Having blocked up the city on all sides, they made proclamation, That such of the Epidamnians as were willing, and the strangers, might depart without molestation; but, if they re- mained, that they would be treated as enemies 369 . As that proclamation had no effect, the Corcyraeans and their allies invested Epidamnus, which was seated on an isthmus, arid commenced a regular siege 370 . On receiving intelligence of this siege, the Corin- thians drew their ^forces together 37 '. They also gave public notice, that a new colony was going to Epidamnus, and that all, who engaged in the adven- ture, should have equal privileges with their prede- cessors; that if any person was disposed to have the benefits of the colony, yet unwilling immediately to embark, he might deposit fifty Corinthian drachmas. and be excused his personal attendance 372 . The number who embarked for immediate colonization was large, and also of those that deposited money 37 -*. But the measures of the Corinthians, for the re- lief of Epidamnus, did not stop here. They sent to the Megareans, requiring an aid of ships, that their convoy might not be obstructed by the Corcyraeans; and received a supply of eight sail, with four from the Paleans of Ctphallenia* 74 . The same requisition being made to the Epidaurians, they sent five ships: a single ship, from Harmione, joined the Corinthian fleet; two, from Trcezene; ten fitted out by the Leu- cadeans, and eight by the Ambracians 375 . From the Thebans and Phrlacians, the Corinthians requested money; from the Elians, empty ships and money 375 . "68, Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxvi. ' H. ibid. .370. Thucydid. cbi sup 371. Id lib. i. cap. xxvii. 372. Id. ibid. icydid. ubi s;'p. 374. Id. Bell. Peloponncs. lib. i. cnp. x*vii. Id. ibid. 37G. Thucydid. lib. i cap. ; ..: The 376 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The number of ships, fitted out by the Corinthians v "^" v ~**- / themselves, amounted to thirty, and carried three thousand heavy-armed soldiers 377 . When the Corcyraeans were informed of these preparations, they sent ambassadors into Pelopon- nesus; and endeavoured to negociate with Corinth, through the mediation of the Lacedaemonians and Sicyonians 378 . To the several, proposals of the Cor- cyrsean deputies, the Corinthians answered, that if they would withdraw their fleet, and their barbarian forces from before Epidamnus, they would consider of an accommodation; for, while their friends were suffering the miseries of a siege, they could not, in honour, debate the question of right to the colony 379 . The Corcyraeans replied, That if the Corinthians would recal their forces, they would do the same. And they persisted in declaring (for they had be- fore made such proposal), that they were willing to submit the matter in dispute to a fair trial, in Peloponnesus, before such states as both parties should approve; a suspension of hostilities, in the meantime, to take place at Epidamnus: — and to which ever party the colony should be adjudged, by that it should be held 380 . Ant. Chr. The Corinthians, however, acceded to neither of 439. these alternatives: but, as soon as they had manned lxxxv. 2. their ships, and those of their allies had joined them, they dispatched a herald to declare war against Cor- cyra; then weighing anchor, with a fleet of seventy- five sail, steered for Epidamnus 58 '. When they had • advanced as far as Actium, in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, they were met by a Corcyreean herald, 377. Id. ibid. 378. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxviii. 379. Id. ibid. 380. Thucydid. ubi sup. 381. Id. Esll. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxix. forbidding ANCIENT EUROPE. 37: forbidding them, at tneir peril, to proceed 38 *. Mean- time, the Corcyrseans were busied in equipping and manning their ships; and no sooner did they learn that the herald brought back no pacific proposition from the Corinthians, than their fleet, consisting of eighty sail (forty being employed in the siege of Epi- damnus), went in quest of the enemy; and drawing up against them, brought on an engagement 383 . An undisputed victory was gained by the Corcyraeans, and fifteen Corinthian ships were destroyed 384 . The same day that battle was fought, Epidam- nus surrendered to the Corcyrseans, on the follow- ing conditions: That the strangers found in the place, should be sold for slaves, but the Corin- thians only detained prisoners of war 385 . In token of their naval victory, the Corcyraeans erected a trophy on the lofty promontory of Lucimna, which looked toward the scene of action ; and when they had thus displayed the signal of the triumph of their island, on its eastern ridge, they put to death all the captives they had made, except the Corinthians, whom they held in chains 386 . a Meantime the Corinthian fleet, and the squad- rons of their allies, that had been vanquished in flight, retired to their several harbours 3 ^ 7 . The Corcyrseans, therefore, remained masters of the Io- nian sea with all its bays and gulfs; and sailing first to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, laid waste its territory; then, landing on Peloponnesus, burnt the dock of Cylene, belonging to the Eleans, because they had furnished the Corinthians with ships and money . 382. Id. ibid. 383. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. .vxix. 384. Id. ibid. 385. Thucydid. ubi sup. 386. Id Tell. Pdoponnes. lib. i. op.xxx. 3S7. Id Ibid 3 !8. Thucydid. lib. i. c?.p. xxx. Jn 378 THE HISTORY OF PART I. In this manner the Corcyrseans, during the remain- v-^"v-*^/ der of the season of action, continued to harass the Corinthian colonies and the coasts of their allies 389 . Nor was a check given to their ravages^ until the Ant. Chr. beginning of the following summer. Then a Corin- 438. thian fleet and army were sent to take station at Ixxxv 3. Actium, and along the shore of the Chimerium of Thesprotia 3<;o . There they lay to protect Leucas and other places from the depredations of the ene- my 39 '. And the Corcyrseans, on the arrival of this armament, posted themselves at Leucimna, over against it, with a naval and military force. Yet, neither party venturing to attack the other, they remained quiet, in their opposing stations, during the whole summer; and, on the approach of winter, both parties withdrew to their respective homes 392 . But bolder measures were ripening in the coun- cils of Corinth. Ashamed of their naval defeat, and exasperated against the Corcyraeans, the Corin- thian rulers had employed the remainder of the Ant. Chr. foregoing year, and all this, in building ships of Olympiad wai * 393 « Sparing neither labour nor money to get a lxxxv. 3, 4. formidable fleet ready for sea, they sent agents throughout Peloponnesus, and over all other parts of Greece, to hire mariners into their service 394 . The Corcyrseans, hearing of these vast prepara- tions, were alarmed, and with reason; for they were in league with none of the Grecian states; nor had they ever sought to be comprehended in either the Athenian or Lacedaemonian confederacy 395 . They now, however, saw it prudent to seek the alliance of 389. Id. ibid. 390- Thucydid. ubi sup. 391. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxx. 392. Id. ibid. 593. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxi. 394. Id. ibid. 395. Id. Bell. Peloponnes lib. i. cap. xxxi. xx.xii. Athens, ANCIENT EUROPE. 379 Athens; and, therefore, publicly resolved to send LETTER ambassadors thither, in order to procure the support X1V - of that state 396 . Gaining intelligence of this pur- posed negociation, the Corinthians also dispatched 437. an embassy to Athens; with instructions to prevent, Olympiad lxxxv. 4. by all possible means, the junction of the Athenian naval strength to that of Corcyra 397 . The Athenian popular assembly having met, after the arrival of the deputies of the contending powers, the heads of both rose up to plead the cause of their principals 398 ; and the Corcyrseans spoke to this effect: " Men of Athens! it is but just, that they, " who come, as we do, to implore the aid of a peo- " pie, with whom they are in no alliance, and on " whom they have never conferred any benefit, M should make it appear, that what they request will " be attended with profit, or at least not prejudicial " to the granters. Persuaded they can make this " evident in their own case, the Corcyrseans have u sent us hither to solicit your alliance 3 ^ 9 . " Our invariable maxim hitherto has been, to enter " into no league, that we might not be drawn into " hostile dangers. But now, involved in war with " the Corinthians, we see the necessity of a change " of policy. For, although, with our own strength, " we repulsed them in a naval engagement, they are " again preparing to attack us; and with a force, " which we are apprehensive, we may not be able to " resist. If they subdue us, the danger will be " great to all Greece. It is, therefore, allowable in " us to apply to you, and to every other Grecian u state for succour. And should you comply with 396. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxi. 397. Id. ibid. 398. Thucydid. obi sup. 399. Id Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxxii. 380 THE HISTORY OK PART I. " our request, at this alarming crisis, you will con- ^^>^^m/ " fer an obligation, the memory of which can never " be obliterated. You will; at the same time, acquire " lasting honour, in having lent aid to them that suf- '* fered, not to those that committed injustice. Nor " will your advantages be few, in admitting us into " the number of your confederates 400 . " We, Athenians! are masters of the greatest " naval force in Greece, except vours. It behoves u you then to consider, how 'fair an occasion offers of u the greatest benefit to yourselves, of the greatest " mortification to your enemies; when that power, " the accession of which you would have purchased " at any price, comes voluntarily to throw itself into " your confederacy! And what is yet more, enabling " you, in accepting it, to gain the applause of man- " kind, while you acquire an increase of strength 401 . " If any Athenian think, that a war, in which we " may do service to Athens, will never happen, he " doth not penetrate the views of the Lacedaemo- " nians; nor those of the Corinthians. Alarmed " at your naval force, the Lacedaemonians are now " meditating hostilities; and the Corinthians, alreadv " powerful by sea, have begun with us, in order to 4t open the way for attacking you. This they have iC done, that we might not (united by common " wrongs) make a common defence against them. " Hence it is your interest to accept the alliance we " offer; and counteract their violent designs, before " they are ripe for execution 402 . " Should the Corinthians accuse you of injustice, " for presuming to interfere in the affairs of their 400. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxii. xxxiii. 401. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxiii. 402. Id. lib, i. cap. xxxiii. xxxiv. " colonies, ANCIENT EUROPE. 381 " colonies, let them learn, that a colony payeth LETTER " honour and regard to the mother-city, so long as X1V ' " fostered by her; but, when injuriously treated, it " becomes alienated. For colonists are sent out, in " order to better their condition; to enjoy equal " rights with the people that remain at home, not " to be made their slaves 403 . That the Corinthians " have injured us, is manifest; for, when invited to " submit the controversy concerning Epidamnus to " a judicial trial, they chose rather to appeal to arms " than equity for a decision 404 . Let such behaviour " toward us, their kindred, therefore teach you not " to be seduced by their delusive arguments, nor " delay to comply with our request. " By admitting us into your confederacy, you " will not violate your treaty with the Lacedsemo- " nians, as we are not in league with them; for by " that treaty, it is expressly stipulated, that any Gre- " cian state, not included in the Athenian, or Lace- " daemonian confederacy, may enter into either 405 . " And hard would it be, while the Corinthians have " liberty to man their fleets out of every state com- " prehended in the Lacedaemonian confederacy, and " from all other parts of Greece — to no small amount " even out of places under the Athenian dominion " — hard would it be, should we be debarred not " only your alliance, but every other means of pro- " curing Grecian aid 4 ° 6 . " The advantages of such alliance to you, we have " endeavoured to prove. But the argument that to " us appears of greatest weight, and which we wish " chiefly to press, is this; that our enemies arc cne- " mies also to you, and not weak ones, but able to 403. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxiv. 404. Id. il)id. 405. Id. lib. i. cap. xxxv. 406. Id. ibid. vol. ii. nd " make 584 THE HISTORY OF PARTI. " make those who oppose them feel their ven- s >^~<**—/ " geance 407 . We offer you a naval, not a terrestrial " league: — and the reasons for rejecting the latter, " cannot be equally strong for refusing the former; •' especially to you, Athenians 1 whose chief aim it " should be, to let none be masters of a navy beside " yourselves ; or, if that cannot be effected, to make *' those your friends, who are most powerful at sea 40s " The present deliberation is not confined to Cor- ' cyra: it also very nearly concerns Athens. Be 1 therefore assured, Athenian citizens, that he * among you doth not best provide for the welfare ' of his country, who hesitates to receive into your ' confederacy an island provided with all the requi- * sites of being a serviceable ally, or an injurious ' enemy: — an island so conveniently situated in the ' course to Italy and Sicily, that it can prevent any i fleet from coming thence to Peloponnesus, and 4 conduct any from Peloponnesus, thither 409 ; to say 4 nothing of its commodiousness in other respects. { In conclusion, to reduce all to one short argu- ' ment, wherein every Athenian citizen is con- cerned, and whence it will appear, that we are not to be abandoned — there are in Greece but three naval powers of any consequence; Athens, Corinth, and Corcyra. Now if you suffer two of those powers to be incorporated, by letting us be sub- dued by the Corinthians, you must, in future, make head against the naval force of both Pelo- ponnesus and Corcyra; but, if you admit us into your alliance, you will, with a fleet considerably augmented, have only to contend with the Corin- thians and their Peloponnesian confederates 4 ^." 407. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxv. 408. Id. ibid. 409. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxvi. 410. Id. ibi4. When ANCIENT EUROPE. 38J When the Corcyraean ambassadors had concluded their reasoning, the Corinthians thus addressed the Athenians, by way of reply, " As the Corcyrseans " have not employed their arguments merely to pro- " cure the favour of your alliance, but have accused " us of violence and injustice, we are laid under the " necessity of vindicating ourselves. Though our " colony, they have ever been refractory, and now " wage open war against us; pleading, that they " were not sent out to suffer oppression 4 ". And " we affirm, in our defence, that we did not send " them to the island of Corcyra, to be exposed to " their insults and outrages; but to be held by us, " with fit honour and reverence, in dependence on M the parent-state. Under such dependence are all " colonies held, and such venerated obedience do " they pay usj nor are any other people so much " beloved by their colonies as we. It therefore ** appears, that the Corcyrseans can have no just " cause of complaint; and that, without some fia- 11 grant injury, we should not have been prompted " to declare war against them. But allowing we " had erred in the exercise of our authority, it " would only have been decent in them to have sub- " mitted; and, in that case, it would have been " dishonourable in us to have demanded, what " their moderation yielded, if found oppressive or " unjust 4 \ " To their pride, and the insolence of wealth, the " multiplied transgressions of the Corcyrasans, may " justly be ascribed. Hence it was, that they " claimed no right to Epidamnus, while it wa* " harassed with intestine feuds; but when we came " to its assistance, they seized it, and still detain it " by force 4 3 . Nor was it before they had besieged " that city, but when they thought we were intent 411. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxvii. xxxviii. 412. Id. lib. i. eap. xxxviii. 413. Id. ibid. "on 384 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " on relieving it, that they had recourse to the spe- v *^" v ~ s ^ / " cious pretence of an equitable negociation 4 ' 4 . Yet, " not content with the violences they have there " committed, the Corey raeans are here presuming to " seek an alliance with you; and, on the merit of " being rebels against us, to demand your protec- " tion 4 ' J . But their proper season for an application " to Athens was, what time their affairs securely " flourished, not when they are beset with dangers; " and when you, by no means their accomplices, " must fall under equal censure with them, if you " interpose in the present war 4 ' 6 . " It is now incumbent on us, Athenians! to con- " vince you, that you cannot, without violation of "justice, receive the Corcyraeans into your confe- •' deracy. For, granting it to be expressly stipu- " lated, in the treaty between you and the Lacedse- " monians, That any of the states, not particularly " mentioned, may go into either league at their dis- " cretion; yet the intent of the stipulation extendeth " not to such states, as join one party to the preju- ■' dice of another; but is confined to those that, " having withdrawn from either league, are in need " of support 4 7 . If you join the Corcyraeans, how- " ever, you will not only become auxiliaries to them, " but also enemies to the Corinthians, who are your " allies by treaty 4 8 . " Right, above all things, would it be for you to " preserve a neutrality, But, if that you dislike, join " with us in opposition to the Corcyraeans; for to the " Corinthians you are bound by political engage- " ments, but with the Corcyraeans you have never *' negociated even for a truce 49 . By no means, there- " fore, establish a precedent for receiving revolters *' from the Lacedaemonian league, by abetting the 414. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xxxix. 415. Id. ibid. 416. Thucydid. ubi sup. 417. Id. lib. i. cap. xl. 418. Id. ibid. 419. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xl. " cause ANCIENT EUROPE. 485 w cause of Corcyra 420 . We Corinthians did not, on " the revolt of Samos, give our suffrage against " you, when the Peloponnesian deputies were divid- " ed upon the question, " Whether the Samians " ought to be supported?" Then we publicly main- " tained, that every state hath a right to proceed " against its own dependents 411 . And if you receive, " and undertake the defence of dependents, that have " been refractory, you will find, that the greater " number will come over to the Peloponnesian " confederacy; and that you have established a " precedent, more hurtful to yourselves than to " us 422 . " Having thus cleared up to you, Athenians! the " points of justice, according to the general laws of " Greece, we have only to add a word of advice, " and offer the claim of favour; — such favour, as * we dare affirm, ought not, upon a principle of *■ gratitude, be denied to the Corinthians; who are " not your enemies so far as to injure you, nor ever " were burdensome friends 425 . When formerly (be- " fore the Persian invasion), you were in want of " trireme gallies, in your war with ^Egina, you were " supplied by Corinth with twenty 424 . The service " we then did you, with that more recent concern- " ing Samos, when we prevented it from receiving " any support from the Peloponnesians, enabled you, " on those occasions, to vanquish the iEginetes, and " chastise the Samians 4 * 5 . Recollect these things, " and acknowledge that we ought to be requited." The Corinthian ambassadors now proceeded to enforce their advice, having concluded the plea of 420. Id. ibid. 421. Thucydid. ubi sup. 422. Id. ibid. 42.*. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xli. 424. Id. ibid. 42 ». Thucydid. ubi sup. favour 486 THE HISTORY OF PART I. favour. " The seeds of that war," said they, " from ' the dread of which the Corcyrseans encourage you ' to act unjustly, yet lie in embryo, and should not ' induce you to engage in immediate hostilities with ' us 426 . Besides, it would be prudent, to lessen the ' jealousy between Corinth and Athens, bred by ' the proceedings at Megara* 27 . Meantime, suffer ' not yourselves to be allured by the promised junc- ' tion of a strong naval force from Corcyra; for, ' never to act unjustly against equals, is a firmer ' security of power, than any that can be built on ' temporary plausibilities, in seeking the enlarge- 4 ment of that power through a series of dangers 4 " 8 . " Our present condition, Athenians 1 resembles that in which you were situated, when we openly declared at Sparta, that every state hath a right to proceed, as may seem fit, against its own de- pendents 429 . We now, therefore, hope that you, who have received such suffrage from us, will not prejudice us by yours. Make us the just requital; always remembering, that this is the season, when they that aid us are our chief friends, and those that league against us, our greatest enemies. Re- ceive not then the Corcyrseans into your alliance; nor abet them in their rebellious contempt of our authority. For thus you will best consult your own interest, while you preserve your honour and dignity 430 . Both parties having now been heard, the Athenians met twice in full assembly, in order to deliberate on the arguments offered by the heads of the two embas- bassies. In the first meeting, they were swayed by the 426. Id. Bell.Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xlii. 42?. Id. ibid. 428. Thucvdid. ubi sup. 429. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xliii. 430. Id. ibid. reasoning* ANCIENT EUROPE. 387 Reasonings of the Corinthians; but, in the second, they changed their minds, and came to a resolution to form a defensive alliance with the Corcyrseans 43 '. A war with Peloponnesus seemed to them inevita- ble. They were, therefore, unwilling to leave Cor- cyra, w r hich had so strong a navy, to fall a prey to the Corinthians. They even wished to break those two naval powers against each other; that they might, on any emergency, be the better able to contend with the Corinthians, and the other maritime pow* ers of Greece not included in their own confede- racy 432 . The position of the island of Corcyra had also its weight, in the deliberations of the Athenians; it ap- pearing most conveniently situated in the passage to Italy and Sicily 433 , whither the Athenians had begun to turn their views. — And to the Grecian colonies, flourishing in those fine countries, I shall divert your lordship's attention, before we enter on the massa- cres of the Pelponnesian war. In the meantime, I must carry forward the contest between Corinth and Corcyra, after Athens took part in it; and relate the events that farther awakened the jealousy of Sparta, and furnished her with the pretexts that enabled her to engage her confederates in that war, which so long desolated Greece, and made it a scene of horrors. The Athenians, for the reasons already given, admitted the Corcyrseans into their alliance 434 : and, soon after the departure of the Corinthian ambassa- dors, they sent ten shins to the support of their new confederates !3; ; under the command of Laccdamonius, 431. ThucydiJ. lib. i. cap. xliy. 452. Id. ibid. 433. ThucydiJ. uLi sup. 434. Id. 13c- 1 1 - Fclopoiuies. lib. i. cap. xlr. 4i5. Id. ibid. the 588 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the son of Cimon 436 ; Diotimos, the son of Strombi- '*^" v ~^»' chus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles 437 . Their in- structions were, " by no means to attack the Corin- thians, unless they stood against Corcyra, and endeavoured to make a descent upon that island or some of its dependencies; but if they did, to vise their utmost efforts to oppose them 438 ." These in- structions were delivered, in order to avoid the in- fraction of the treaty of peace 439 , subsisting between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. Ant. Chr. When the Corinthians had completed their naval 436 : , preparations, they steered for Corcyra, with a fleet lxxxv. 4. °f one hundred and fifty sail 14 ". Ten of these ships were fitted out by the Eleans, twelve by the Mega- reans, ten by the Leucadeans, twenty-seven by the Ambracians, one by the Anactorians, and ninety by the Corinthian state 44 . The quotas from the allied cities, had each their respective commanders, who 436. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlv. Cimon, as I have had occasion to observe, was warmly attached to the Lacedaemonians ; by whose interest, at Athens, he had been supported, when he first engaged in public affairs, and set himself in opposition to Themistocles (Plut. Vit. Cimon. et Themist.). Nothing can more strongly prove that at- tachment, than the above-mentioned name of his son, now one of the Athenian naval commanders (Thucydid. ubi sup. ); Lacediemonius .' x name that discovers a degree of partiality seemingly inconsistent with common prudence. Cimon, however, in continuing to manifest his regard for the La- cedemonians, or as it has been termed, his adoration of them (Plut. Vit. Cimon.), after the exaltation of his military character, and the establishment of his political influence in the Athenian administra- / tion, might be actuated by motives of patriotism as well as gratitude. He might wish to moderate the jealousy between Athens and Sparta, and to soften the animosity between the citizens of the two states, by assimilating their manners ; in tempering Athenian levity with a degree of Spartan gravity. 437. Id. ibid. 438. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlv. 439. Id. ibid. 440. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlvi. 441. Id. ibid. are ANCIENT EUROPE. 389 are not named by Thucydides; and the Corinthian LETTER division was commanded by Xenocleides, the son of Euthycles, with four colleagues 441 . This confederate fleet, having rendezvoused off that part of the Grecian continent, which looks to- ward Corcyra, set sail from Leucas, and arrived at the promontory of Chimerium in Thesprotia 443 . There, between the river Acheron and the Thyamis, the Corinthians and their allies fixed their marine station, or naval camp 444 . Meanwhile the Corcyrse- ans, informed of the approach of the Corinthian armament, had manned an hundred and ten ships; under the command of Meiciades, iEsimides, and Eurybatus: and taken their station, accompanied by the Athenian squadron, at one of the little islands named Sybota, situated between Corcyra and the coast of Thesprotia 445 . The Corcyrsean land-forces, augmented with an aid of a thousand heavy-armed Zacynthians, were posted at the promontory of Leucymna, opposite the Sybota* 4 *. Nor were the Corinthians destitute of land-forces. They had ready, on the adjacent con- tinent, a numerous army of barbarians 447 ; the people of that coast having ever been their friends 448 . When the Corinthians were ready for a naval en- gagement, they weighed anchor before day-break, having taken in provisions for three days 449 ; and, steering in quest of the enemy, they discovered by dawn, the Corcyraean fleet then under sail, and ad- vancing against them 450 . Thus opposed to each other, 442. Thucydid. iibi sup. 443. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i.cap. xlvi. 444. Id. ibid. 445. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlvii. 446. Id. ibid. 447. Thucydid. ubi sup. 418. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i.cap. xlvii. 449. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlviii. 450 Id. ibid. vol. ii. 3 i and 390 THE HISTORY OF PART I. and equally eager for fight, both fleets formed in s -^ v ~ > - / order of battle 45 '. In the Corcyrsean right-wing was stationed the Athenian squadron: the main body of the fleet was wholly composed of Corcyrsean ships, divided into three squadrons; each of which was respectively under the command of one of their three admirals 432 . In the right of the Corinthian fleet were stationed the squadrons of the Megareans and Ambracians: in the centre, the ships of the other allies, in their several arrangements ; the Corinthians themselves forming the left wing, as their ships were the best sailers; in order to oppose the Athenians, and the right of the Corcyrseans 433 . The signals were no sooner hoisted 454 , than the hostile fleets ran against each other, and began the engagement; both parties having filled their decks with bodies of heavy-armed men, beside many that drew the bow or tossed the javelin 435 . But their operations still resembled somewhat the aukward method of former times ; for, although the battle was hotly contested, it very much resembled an engage- ment on land, few exertions of naval skill being dis- covered 456 . The greatest hope of victory was placed In the heavy-armed men, fighting on the decks; where, fixed to their posts, they combatted hand to hand, 451. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlviii. 452. Id. ibid. 453. Thucydid. ubi sup. 454. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xlix. The signal was given by hanging oat of the admiral's galley a gilded shield, or a red flag. During the elevation of this signal, the fight continued; and by its depression, or inclination to the right or left, the several squadrons ▼/ere directed, in what manner to attack their enemies or retreat fromthern (Potter, Archrcolog.Gracc. book Hi. chap. xxi. et auct. cit.). The elevation of the signal was attended with the sound of trump- ets ; which was begun in the admiral's galley, and propagated through the whole fleet. Id. ibid, et auct. cit. 455. Id. ibid. 166. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlix. while ANCIENT EUROPE. 391 while the gallies remained motionless 437 . They took no advantage of tacking or shifting of stations; but contended for mastery, merely by dint of strength and courage, without any dexterity in seamanship 438 . The tumult was great on all sides, and the whole action full of disorder; during which, the Athenians) habituated to a more active and improved mode of naval operations, relieved the Corcyra^ans wherever they were hard pressed, and also endeavoured to in- timidate the enemy 439 . But they refrained from any direct attack; remembering with awe, the orders of the Athenian state 4 ' 10 . The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. For the Corcyrseans, stationed on the left, having put their antagonists to flight, chased them, when dispersed, to the continent; and, continuing the pur* suit to their naval camp, landed instantly, and set fire to their abandoned tents, and carried off all the baggage 46 '. In that wing, therefore, the Corin- thians and their allies were vanquished, and the Cor- cyraeans were indisputably victorious; but, in the left wing, where the Corinthians solely engaged, they obtained an easy victory, as twenty of the Cor- cyraan triremes had gone off in pursuit of the ships of the broken right wing 4152 . Seeing the Corcyrseans thus distressed, the Athe- nians came up to their support more openly than before their defeat; they having hitherto forborne any direct attack 4 '\ And when the chace was evi- dently begun, and the Corinthians followed up their 457. Id. ibid. 458. Thucydid. ubi lup. 459. Id. ibid. 460. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. xlbc. 461. Id ibid. 462. Thucydid. ubi sup. 453 Id Bell. Piloponntt. lib i. cap. xlix victory, 392 THE HISTORY OF P\RTI. victory, then every Athenian bestirred himself to v ^" v ^ ,/ fight 464 . There was no longer any leisure for reserve ; Corinthians and Athenians, compelled by necessity, encountered one another 46 *. In the ardour of pursuit, the Corinthians towed not after them the hulks of the vessels they had ren- dered unfit for action, but turned all their attention to the men; cruising at large, more to slaughter than take alive 466 . And having not yet discovered the defeat of their right wing, they slaughtered, through ignorance, their own friends 467 . For, as the accurate contemporary historian observes, the number of ships being great on each side, and co- vering a wide extent of sea, they were not able, after the line of battle was broken, to distinguish the victors from the vanquished; Greeks against Greeks having never engaged in a naval conflict with so large a number of ships 468 . But after the Corinthians had pursued the Cor- cyrseans to Leucymna, they returned to look after the enemy's shattered vessels, and their own dead +6 °. Most of the floating carcases they took up, and carried to Sybota; a desert haven on the coast of Thesprotia, bearing the same name with the adja- cent islands 470 : and there also lay their barbarian auxiliaries 47 '. Having performed this duty to their slain friends, the Corinthians assembled their fleet, and sailed to Leucymna in quest ofjthe Corcyraeans; who, with such of their ships as were fit for service, or able to keep the sea, came out together with the Athenian squadron, to meet the insulting victors, apprehensive that they meditated a descent 472 . 464. Id. ibid. 465. Thucydid. ubi sup. 466. Id. lib. i. cap. 1. 467. Id. ibid. 468. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. I. 469. Id. ibid. 470. Id. Bell. Pcloponnes. lib. i. cap. 1. 471. Id. ibid. 472. ThBcvdid. ubi sup. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 393 The day was then far spent; yet the Corey rgeans LETTER had sung their pecan 473 , and were preparing to renew XIV - the fight, when the Corinthians, to their surprise, suddenly slackened sail 474 . They had descried a squadron of twenty ships, sent from Athens, as they rightly conjectured, to the support of the Corcy- raeans, and gradually fell back 475 . The Corcyraeans, when informed of the approach of these ships, which were concealed from the view of their fleet by the * encircling shore, also fell back, and regained their station at Leucymna. It was then almost dark, and the Corinthians had put about, and dissolved their order of battle 476 . For a while the Corcyraeans were in great consternation, lest the squadron coming up should be an aid to the enemy ; but their fears were quickly dispelled, as the Athenian reinforcement reached their station soon after it had been de- scried 477 . Next morning the Athenian squadron, now con- sisting of thirty sail, accompanied by such of the Corcyraean ships as were fit for sea, weighed anchor, and stood for the coast of Thesprotia, where the Corinthian ships lay; in order to try, whether they would haz;ird a new engagement 478 . But the Co- rinthians declined accepting the challenge; their thoughts being then employed about their return home, and the manner of accomplishing it; lest the Athenians, judging the peace broken, as they had met in hostile opposition, might obstruct their pas- sage 479 . They, therefore, sent an advice-boat, though without the solemn protection of a herald, to sound the purpose of the Athenian commanders 480 . 473. It was usual for the Greeks, before they began an engage- ment, to sing a pxan or hymn to Mars; and one to Apollo, when the light was ended. Suidas, sub. voc. 474. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. li. 575. Id. ibid. 476. Thucydid. ubi sup. 477. Id. £«11. Peloponncs. lib. i. enp li 478. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Mi. 479. Id. ibid. 480. Thucyd'U. ubi sup. The 394 PART I. Ant Chr. 436. Olympiad l.xxxvi. 1. THE HISTORY OF The message delivered was to the following pui< port: — " Men of Athens! ye are guilty of injustice, " in beginning war and violating treaties; for you " hinder us from taking due vengeance on our ene- " mies, by lifting your arms against us. If you are " determined to obstruct our course, either to Cor- " cyra or any other place, whither we are disposed " to go, dissolve the treaty of peace; and, laying " violent hands on the Corinthians here present, " treat them as enemies 43 '." That message was no sooner reported, than the whole body of the Corcyrseans exclaimed, with one voice, " Take, and kill them!" But the Athenians, more moderately disposed, returned this answer:— " Men of Peloponnesus! we neither begin war nor " violate treaties, but have come hither to aid our " Corcyrsean allies. You may, therefore, sail to " whatever place you please: we hinder you not; " but if you make an hostile attempt upon Corcyra, " or any of its dependencies, we will oppose you to " the utmost of our power 4 ***." Having received the foregoing answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians, as a prelude to their re- turning home, erected a trophy at Sybota on the con- tinent 483 . Meantime the Corcyraeans were employed in picking up the wreck of the ships, and the bodies of the dead; which, by favour of the wind and tide, now rolled toward them 4 ^: — and, as if they also had obtained the victory, they erected a trophy in one of the Sybota islands 485 . The grounds of the pretensions of each party are thus assigned by Thucydides: — " The Corinthians set 481. Id. Bell. Pelopennes. lib. i. cap. liii. 482. Id. ibid. 483. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Iiv. 484. Id. ibid. 485. Thucydid. ubi sup. UJ» ANCIENT EUROPE. f.95 up a trophy, because they had maintained superiority in the late naval engagement throughout the day ; and, therefore, had been enabled to pick up the greater part of the wreck and the dead; because they had taken a greater number, not less then one thou- sand prisoners, arid shattered or sunk about seventy of the enemy's ships 486 . The Corcyrzeans raised a trophy, because they had sunk or disabled full thirty of the hostile fleet; and, after the arrival of the Athe- nians, had recovered the dead bodies driving toward them, and the wreck; because the Corinthians, tack- ing about, had retired from them, the preceding evening, as soon as they descried the Athenian rein- forcement; and because, when they went, this morn- ing, to offer them battle at Sybota, they durst not come out to decide the contest 47 ." The Corinthians, in their homeward passage, fraudfully seized the settlement of Anactorium, on the southern side of the Ambracian gulf 4 * 8 . It be- longed, in common to them and the Corcyra>ans; but they now put it wholly into the possession of the Corinthian settlers, and then returned to their own havens 4 ' 9 . Eight hundred of their Corcyraean pri- soners, who had been slaves, the Corinthians sold, on their arrival in their own country, in the public market 49 "; while they retained in safe custodv, and treated not only with lenity but indulgence, two hundred and fifty free inhabitants of Corcyra; in hopes, as many of them were persons of distinction, they might, after their ransom and return, enable Corinth to regain its controul over that refractory colony and valuable island 49 '. 4F.fi. Id. Ii!>. i. cap. liv. 4117. I<1. ibid. 4I!8. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Iv. 4S9. Id. ibid. 4"0. Thucydid. ubi sup. 491. Id. Hell. Pcloponnes. lib. i. Cap. Iv The 396 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The Athenian fleet having, as before related, en- v »^~ v "^' abled the Corcyraeans to maintain their indepen- dency, quitted the Ionian sea, and returned home 492 . But this interference was not forgot: it furnished the Corinthians, and their Peloponnesian confede- rates, with the first ground of quarrel with Athens ; because the Athenian state, while in alliance with them, had assisted the rebellious colony of Corcyra, in a naval engagement against the forces of the mo- ther country 493 . Other causes of quarrel, tending to war, soon arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians 494 . These, my lord, I shall bring forward to view, in a form as concise as possible. The Athenians, conscious the}- had roused the resentment of the Corinthians, and apprehensive of its consequences, commanded the inhabitants of Po- tidsea; a Corinthian colony seated upon the isthmus of Pallene, but allied with, and tributary to Athens 495 : to demolish part of the wall of their city, to give hos- tages for their quiet submission, to dismiss the epi- demiurgi ; and not to receive, in future, the magis- trates so named, annually sent them from Corinth 495 . The deeper reasons of the Athenians, for issuing this order, are thus explained by Thucydides. 492. Id. ibid. 493. Thucydid. uhi sup. 494. Id. lib. i. cap. lvi. 495. Id. ibid. 496. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lvi. These magistrates were such as the Grecian mother-cities usually deputed to superintend the public affairs of their colonies, and regulate their civil government (See Wasse and Ducker's Thucydides, p. 39, note 62, et auct cit.). But how the Athenians consented to let such magistrates be sent from Corinth to Potidaca, after it became tributary to them, is not account- ed for by any commentator on the above-cited passage. . " They ANCIENT EUROPE. 397 " They were apprehensive of the revolt of Potidisea at LETTER the instigation of Perdiccas; the son of Alexander, XIV# king of Macedonia, and of the Corinthians; and of their seducing into the same defection, the other Athenian dependencies in Thrace 497 . For the Co- rinthians were obviously at variance with them ; and Perdiccas, formerly their friend and ally, was now become their enemy 498 ." The causes of the enmity of the king of Macedo- nia are not difficult to trace. He had grown jealous of the Grecian settlements on the coasts of his king- dom, and on those of Thrace, and wished to expel the intruders: but being pliant, artful, and tempo- rizing, like his father Alexander, he concealed his purpose, until his power had gathered such strength as gave him some probability of success; especially with the prospect of turning the two great commer- cial and colonizing powers, Athens and Corinth, against each other. And the Athenians, aware of his designs, had endeavoured to divide his strength, by supporting the pretensions of his brother Philip to a part, or the whole of the Macedonian monar- chy 499 . Alarmed at this attempt to dismember his king- Ant. Chr. dom, if not to deprive him of the regal dignity, Per- ; a j diccas sent confidential agents to Sparta, in order lxxxvi. 2. to stir up against the Athenians a Peloponnesian war 500 ; to draw over the Corinthians to his interest, and bring about a revolt of Potidaea 5 "'. He had also been intriguing with the Chalcidaeans of Thrace, and the Bottixans, in hopes to induce them to revolt at 497. Id. ibid. 498. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lvii. 499. Id. ibid.et lib. ii. cap. c. See also Diod. Steal Fiiblioih. lib. xii. p. 105, vol. ii. 500. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lvii. 501. IC. ibid. VOL, II. 3 t *Hc 393 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the same time 502 ; rightly concluding, that if he could s ^"*" > * / effectuate a combination of the barbarian people, in his neighbourhood, he might hazard a war against the Athenians with greater probability of success 5 " 3 . The Athenians having discovered the machina- tions of Perdiccas, and desirous to prevent the revolt of their tributary cities on the northern shores of the iEgean sea, sent an armament against his ter- ritories; consisting of a fleet of thirty sail, and a thousand heavy-armed men, under the conduct of Archestratus, associated with ten other command- ers 504 . To these commanders they gave positive orders, to take hostages from the Potidseans; to de- molish their walls, and keep a watchful eye over the. neighbouring cities 505 . 502. Thucydid. ubi sup. 503. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. K-ii. Nothing can more fully shew the power of Athens, both by land and sea, than the apprehen- sions of so great a prince as the king of Macedonia, on engaging in hostilities with her. It must, however, be observed, that although the dominions of the Macedonian monarch were extensive, and his subjects numerous and warlike, the various tribes of rude people, that acknowledged his sway, might be said still to live in a state of barbarous independency, under their own chieftains; and would sup- port him in no war, to which they were not disposed by their interest, or actuated by their antipathies (Herodot. lib. viii. ix. et Thucy- did. lib. i. ii. passim.). And I shall here o8er a remark, which I shall often have occasion to repeat, that the power of Athens wanted a proper foundation. Ker own territory formed too narrow a basis, and all beyond it was fluctuating. Her colonies, beside being fac- tious, were liable to expulsion from the countries in which they were settled: and her tributary allies were disposed to revolt. Her best policy, therefore, was the cultivation of peace with her neigh- bours; the worst, the prosecution of war. Her colonies were al- ready sufficiently extensive for the pursuits of commerce, and the support of naval force. The eager grasping at distant territory, as we shall have occasion to see, wrought her ruin. 504. Id, ibid. -505. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lvii. Meanwhil* ANCIENT EUROPE. it* Meanwhile the Potidaeans had sent ambassadors to Athens, in order to dissuade the Athenian admi- nistration from the prosecution of harsh measures against them 506 . And they had, at the same time, dispatched an embassy to Sparta, along with one from Corinth, instructed to procure a promise of redress, if the Athenians should persist in their haughty command 507 . But when their negociation at Athens proved ineffectual, and the Athenian fleet Ant. Chr. had embarked in an expedition both against them olympiad and the king of Macedonia; when the Lacedaemo- lxxxvi. 3. nians had promised to make an irruption into Attica, if the Athenians should act hostilely against Poti- dsea, then all parties prepared for war; Perdiccas, the Potidsans, Chalcideans, and Bottiaeans, combin- ed by a league of mutual defence and support 508 . Nor was this all. Perdiccas prevailed with the Chalcideans, to abandon and demolish their towns upon the sea-coast; and afterward to remove to Olynthus, and fortify and defend that city with their united strength 509 . And to the people, who had thus relinquished their homes, he made a ces- sion of that part of Mygdonia, which lay round the lake of Bolbe; for their subsistence, during the war with the Athenians 510 . Before the arrival of the Athenian fleet of thirty sail, Potidaea and the other tributary cities had re- volted. The commanders, therefore, judging it im- possible, with their present strength, to reduce those cities to obedience, and also act against Perdiccas, directed their course to Macedonia 5 "; thus pursuing 506. Id. lib. i. cap. lviii. S07. Id. ibid. 508. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lviii. 509. Id. ibid. 510. Thucydid. ubi sup. 511. Id. lib. i.cap. lix. the 400 THE HISTORY OF TART I. the primary object of the armament 512 . Having land- s- * r " v " >w/ ed their forces on the Macedonian coast they took 4^4 P art m tne war with Philip and his associates; who Olympiad had made an irruption, at the head of an army, from the higher country 5 ' 3 . lxxxvi. 3. Meantime the Corinthians, anxious for the safety of Potidsea, sent thither sixteen hundred heavy-armed, men, and four hundred, light troops 5 ' 4 . The com- mand of these forces was given to Aristeus, who had ever been a warm friend to the Potidaeans; and for whose sake most of the Corinthian volunteers had engaged in the expedition 5 5 . This reinforce- ment, consisting partly of Peloponnesian mercena- ries, arrived at Potidsa on the fortieth day after the revolt of that city 5 ' 6 . When, the Athenians received intelligence of the revolt of their tributary cities, and of the arrival of the forces under Aristeus at Potidsea, they sent a fleet of forty sail, with two thousand heavy-armed men, for land-service, under the conduct of Callias and four colleagues, in order to re-establish the do- minion of Athens on the northern shores of the .iEgean 5 ' 7 . Callias found the Athenian troops, com- manded by Archestratus, employed in the siege of Pydna; they having already reduced Therme 5 ' 8 . He Am. Chr. joined them with his land-forces, and the whole 434. Olympiad army invested Pydna. But the Athenian com- lxxxvi. 4. manders soon found it necessary to relinquish that enterprise for more important objects; the reduc- tion of the rebellious cities in the isthmus of Pal- lene, and the expulsion of the Corinthian forces under Aristeus 5 ' 9 . They accordingly concluded 512. Id. ibid. 513". Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lix. 514. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lx. 515. Id. ibid. 516. Thucydid. lib. :. cap. lx. 517. Id. lib. i. cap. lxi. 518. Id. ibid. 51?. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxi. with ANCIENT EUROPE. 401 with Perdiccas a hasty alliance, or cessation of arms ; LETTER and evacuating Macedonia, proceeded with their XI1 land forces, consisting of three thousand heavy- armed Athenians, a body of auxiliary foot, and six hundred Macedonian horse, toward Potidaea; while their fleet, amounting to seventy sail, steered along the coast 510 . Expecting the Athenians, the Potidaeans, with the body of Corinthian volunteers and Peloponnesian mercenaries, under Aristeus, had formed a camp near Olynthus 5 * 1 . The command of the whole infantry had been given to Aristeus, by the voice of the confederates, and that of the cavalry to Perdic- cas; for the faithless king of Macedonia had ab- ruptly broken his alliance with the Athenians, and joined the Potidaeans, though he did not personally make his appearance in the field 522 . It was the design of Aristeus, in encamping within the isthmus of Pallene, with the body of infantry un- der his immediate command, to watch the motions of the Athenians, should they come forward; whilst, without the isthmus, the Chalcideans and other allies, with two hundred horse belonging to Perdiccas, were to remain at Olynthus 5 * 3 , And these, if the Atheni- ans offered to attack Aristeus, were ordered to throw themselves in the rear of the enemy; and confine the assailants between two bodies of troops 524 . Callias, the Athenian general, however, in con- cert with his colleagues, detached the Macedonian horse, and some other auxiliaries, to Olynthus, to prevent any sally from that city ; and then breaking up their camp, which they had pitched at Gigonius, Ant. Chr. 438. Olympiad lxxxvi. 4. 521. Tluicydid. lib. i. cap. lxii. 520. Id. ibid. 522. Id. ibid. 523. Id. Bell. Vcloponnes. Jib. i. cap. lxii. 524. Id. ibid. the 402 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the Athenians marched directly for Potidaca 525 . But \^->r>% m ^ when they had advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their enemies drawn up in order of battle, they also formed; and, in a short time, both armies came to action 526 . The Corinthians in the wing under Aristeus, composed of the very flower of his coun- trymen, soon forced their opponents to seek safety in flight; and pursued the vanquished, with execu- tion, to a great distance 527 . But the main body of the Corinthian army, made up of Potidaeans and Peloponnesian mercenaries, was routed by the Athe- nians: and the broken forces were chased to the very walls of Potideea 328 . Aristeus, on returning from the pursuit of the* enemy's opposing wing, perceived the defeat of the main body of the Corinthians and their allies; and knew not which way to hazard a retreat, whether to Olynthus or Potidsea 5 * 9 . At length, however, he re- solved to combine, in firm phalanx, those victorious troops that had spread terror, and still attended him ; and throw himself into Potidsea, as it lay at the shortest distance 530 . This bold resolution he carried into effect, though not without difficulty and loss of men; plunging into the sea, near the abutments of the harbour, amid a shower of missile weapons, he led into the town the greater number of his brave followers 53 '. The confederates, who should have come to the aid of the Potidaeans from Olynthus (which was at no greater distance than sixty stadia, and situated in view), advanced a little way at the beginning of the 525. Thucydid. ubi sup. 526. Id. ibid. 527. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Ixii. 528. Id. ibid. 529. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxiii. 530. Id. ibid. 531. Thucydid. ubi sup. engagement, ANCIENT EUROPE. 40? engagement, when the ensigns were elevated 532 , as if LETTER they had designed to join battle; and the Macedo- A ' nian horse, in the Athenian army, drew up against them, on purpose to keep them back 533 . But as the victory was soon gained by the Athenians, and the ensigns lowered, according to custom, the Potidcean allies retired within the walls of Olynthus, and the Macedonian horse rejoined the Athenian army 534 . Alter the battle, the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a suspension of arms to the Potidaeans for carrying off" their dead 535 : there being killed of the Potidaeans, Corinthians, and other Peloponne- sians, who only were in the action, near three hun- dred men ; and of the Athenians, one hundred and fifty, with Callias their general 535 . The surviving Athenian commanders, without loss of time, threw up works before the city of Poti- daea, on the side that faced the isthmus, and besieged it on that side ; but the side toward the town of Pal- lene, they left as they found it 537 . For they thought their army too small, both to keep garrison within the isthmus, and send men over to the Pallene side, and besiege the place there also; being apprehensive, that thus divided, they might be overpowered by the Potidaeans and their allies 533 . i When the Athenian administration was informed of the siege of Potidaea, and that^no works were 532. The elevation of an ensign was a signal to join battle, the depression to desist. The ensigns of the Greeks were of various forts; but most of them were adorned with the figures of animals, or other things having peculiar relation to the citicr. to which they belonged. The Athenians, for instance, bore in their ensigns the image of an owl ; the bird sacred to Minerva, their tutelary goddess. See Potter's Archxlog. Grxc. book iii. chap. ix. et auct.cit. 533. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Ixiii. 534. Id. ibid. 535. Id. Hell. I'eloponnes. lib. i. cap. Ixiii. 536. Id. ibid. 537. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Ixiv. 531. Id. ibid. raised 404 THE HISTORY OF PART I. raised on the side toward Pallene, they speedily * - ^ v ^*"^ sent thither a body of sixteen hundred heavy-armed men, under the command of Phormio 339 . Landing his troops at Aphytis, and marching easily to Poti- daea, Phormio wasted the country, as he passed through it; and, as he met with no obstruction from the garrison, on his arrival at that city, he quickly raised works against the side of the wall that faced Pallene 540 . Thus was Potidaea strongly besieged by land, and also from the sea by the Athe- nian fleet 54 '. Aristeus no sooner saw the circumvallation of the disputed city fully formed, and every hope of saving it cut off, unless unexpected aid should arrive from Peloponnesus, or something supernatural hap- pen, then he gave this advice; that all the soldiers and citizens, except five hundred men, should seize the first favourable opportunity to quit the place, and make their escape by sea, that the store of pro- visions might longer support the rest; declaring his willingness to be one of those, that should re- main for the defence of the walls 542 . Finding his counsel rejected, and despairing of speedy relief, yet zealous to preserve Potidaea, Aristeus made his escape by sea, undiscovered by the Athenian guard- ships 543 . And rousing to arms the Chalcideans, among whom he took refuge, made what military efforts he could to annoy the enemy; while he en- deavoured, by sending ambassadors to Peloponne- sus, to procure, in that dangerous crisis, assistance to the Potidaeans 544 . Meantime Phormio, having completed the works against the besieged city, ravaged the territories of the Chalcideans and J3ot- tiaeans, with his sixteen hundred heavy-armed Athe- nians, and took some small towns 545 . 539. Bell. Veloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxiv. 540. Id. ibid. 541. Thucydid. ubi sup. 542. Id. lib. i. cap. Ixv. 543. Id. ibid. 544. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Ixr. 545. Id. ibid. These ANCIENT EUROPE. 40* These, says Thucydides 546 , were the reciprocal causes of the dissention between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Corinthians were enraged at the Athenians for besieging Potidaea; a Corinthian colony, and in which were shut up both Corinthians and other Peloponnesians S47 . And the Athenians were stung with resentment at the proceedings of the Peloponnesians, in seducing to revolt a city in alliance with, and tributary to them : and openly taking part, by a voluntary expedition, with the Potidaean re- bels^ 8 . A general war, however, had not yet taken place between the jealous powers: common hostilities were suspended for a time. Hitherto it was only a parti- cular dispute between the Corinthians and Atheni* ans 549 . But no sooner were the Corinthians inform- ed, thatthe circumvallation of Potidaea was perfected^ than their wrath flamed like a fire-brand, and they strove to make the war general. With this view they requested their allies to send ambassadors to Sparta; and thither their own ambassadors repaired, and accused the Athenians of having violated the treaty, concluded for thirty years, and wronged the Peloponnesians 550 . On this occasion, all the Peloponnesian confe- derates seem to have sent ambassadors to Sparta, except the iEginetes. And they, though not openly by an embassy, from a dread of offending the Athe- nians, yet privately instigated the Peloponnesians to war; alleging, that they were not permitted to govern themselves by their own laws, as by the arti- cles of the treaty they ought to have been 55 '. 546. Id. Bell. Peloptmnes. Mb. i. cap. lxv. 547. Id. ibid. 548. Thucydid. ubi sup. 549. Id. Bell Peloporme*. lib. i. cap. lxvi. 550. Thucydid. lib i. cap. lxvii. 551. Id. ibid. vol. ii. 3 g The 406 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The Lacedaemonians, taking advantage of these v -^~ ,r> »-' accusations, summoned to appear before them, as the 432. governing people in Greece byjand, not only the Olympiad delegates of their Peloponnesian confederates, but those of all the other Grecian states, that had any charge to prefer against the Athenians; and when the several ambassadors arrived, they were admitted to the senate or grand council of Sparta, composed of the kings, the nobles, and ephori, and commanded there to represent their grievances 542 . The ambas- sadors of every state laid their accusations ; but the Megarean delegates offered the heaviest charge. They complained, that, contrary to treaty, they were debarred the Athenian markets and havens 55 ". And, last of all, the Corinthian ambassadors, after they had suffered others to exasperate the Lacedaemoni- ans, spoke to the following purport 554 . " Although we have frequently suggested to you, "Lacedaemonians 1 the injuries we were apprehensive " of suffering from the Athenians, yet have you not " deigned to inqire into the grounds of such appre- " hensions. Nor was it to prevent our losses, but " after we had felt their weight, that you convened 552. Thucydid. ubi sup. 553. Id. Bell. Peloporsnes. lib. i. cap. lxvii. 554. This and the subsequent speeches, in the Spartan senate and Athenian popular assembly, during the negotiations preparatory to the Peloponnesian war, throw more light upon the political state of Greece at that time, than all the disquisitions of modern historians and antiquarians; while they confirm some important historical facts, which otherwise would rest solely on the authority of Hero- dotus : I shall, therefore, give the substance of the whole. It is of little consequence to inquire, whether Thucydides used the very words and arguments of the speakers ? — He tells us himself (Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. xxii.) that he could not always do so; but that he h3d adhered to the arguments pertinent in each debate (Id. ibid.). It is enough to know, that he was a contemporary historian, acquainted with the civil and military affairs of Greece; and that he had access to the best information. " these ANCIENT EUROPE. 40T *< these confederates. Now assembled in council, " we ought no longer to deliberate, whether we have u been injured, but how to obtain redress. Having u already planned their measures, the aggressors are 4< not debating what step they shall take, but are ac- " tually making attacks upon the sufferers, who have " yet come to no resolution 555 - " We are not ignorant by what means the Athe- nians, with gradual advances, encroach upon their neighbours. Believing their designs still undisco- " vered, they act with less boldness, because you, La- " cedsemonians ! are deaf to the injuries they com- u mit; but when they find you are alarmed, yet irre- " solute, they will press more daringly forward in the " career of ambition. For you are the only Grecian " people who protect your allies not with arms, but " with promises. You indeed enjoy the reputation " of having been cautious and circumspect ; but for " that reputation you are more indebted to fame than " to truth, as we ourselves know. You suffered the " Persian monarch to advance, from the remotest " parts of the earth, into the heart of Greece, and " endanger Peloponnesus, before you opposed him " as became your state. Even now you forbare to " repress the usurpations of the Athenians, not seat- " ed at a distance, but in your very neighbourhood: " chusing rather to expose yourselves to their inva- " sion, than invade their territory: and thus lay your- " selves open to the hazard of war against a full " grown power, which you might have curbed in its " growth. Have not the Athenians wrested from us " Corcyra? and do not they, at this moment, besiege " Potidaea, by sea and land? — The latter of these " places lies most conveniently for extending our 555. Thncydid. lib. i. cap. lxviii. " s(fttlemenib» <08 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " settlements in Thrace, and the former could have v^~v*w " supplied Peloponnesus with a greater navy, than " any of her confederate states. Yet on neither of " these colonies, so important and valuable, durst the " Athenians have made an attempt, if the Lacedse- " monians had mustered their forces, and those of " their allies, and threatened Attica* 56 . " Let no man in this assembly think, that, in • c speaking thus, we are actuated more by resentment " than reason. If ever the citizens of any state had " cause to throw blame on their confederates, we " surely have. You seem not only void of fellow- " feeling, but unacquainted with the character of the " people against whom you must soon wage war 5s V Here the Corinthian orators drew an exaggerated contrast between the ardent, adventurous, yet perse- vering spirit of the Athenians, and the cool courage, dilatory councils, and hesitating temper of the La- cedaemonians; then added, by way of conclusion, " Such are the people with whom we have to con- " tend. And are not ye, O Lacedaemonians! sen- " sible, that they, who timely prepare for war, and 11 manifest a determined resolution to right them- " selves, whenever they are injured, will longest live " in the enjoymentof peace? — Away, therefore, with " the maxims of that slow-moving policy, which hath " hitherto regulated your affairs. Hasten to relieve " Potid£ea,byaspeedyinvasionof Attica, as you have " promised: leave not your friends and kinsmen at " the mercy of their most inveterate enemies; nor " compel us and others, to seek, in despair, a new " alliance. Bestir yourselves in a manner worthy of (< your ancestors; exert adegreeof strength suited to 556. Id. lib. i. cap. lxviii. lix. 557. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lix. lxx. " that ANCIENT EUROPE. 409 u that high rank which you hold in Peloponnesus ; lest LETTER " Sparta be deserted by her confederates, and her " glory sink with her pre-eminence 553 ." i Ambassadors from Athens happened to be resid- ing at Sparta, for the transacting of other business, when the Corinthian ministers spoke to the forego- ing effect: and they thought proper to demand an audience of the Lacedaemonians, as soon as inform- ed of what had been said to the prejudice of the Athenian state 559 . Having obtained admission into the Spartan senate-hall, where the Peloponnesian deputies were assembled, they delivered their sen- timents in the following manner. " It was not the purpose of our embassy, Lacedae- u monians! to engage in disputations with your con- " federates, but to conduct the affairs we were de- " puted to adjust. Yet being made acquainted with " the clamour raised against the Athenians, we " have (by permission) entered this assembly — not " to answer the accusations of the complaining " states; for you are not the judges, before whom " either they or we ought to plead 560 : we appear only " to prevent you from forming, at the instigation of " your allies, rash and dangerous resolutions, on mat- " ters of the greatest importance to the future welfare " of Athens and of Sparta 56 '. We wish farther to ft convince you, That, notwithstanding the charges " exhibited against us, we possess justly, what we " have hitherto obtained; and that the Athenian " state is worthy of honour and respect 562 ." 558. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxi. 559. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxii. 560. Seemingly alluding to the council of Amphictyon?, or assem- bly of delegates from the states-general of Greece, which on') was competent to judge of such disputes. 561. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxiii. 562. Id. ibid. In 410 THE HISTORY OF VAHT I. j n or( j er to prove this position, the Athenian am- bassadors gave a display of the achievements of their countrymen, and the conduct of their republic dur- ing the Persian war, from the battle of Marathon to the retreat of Xerxes; concluding thus: — " to our " aid, indeed, at last you came; but not until you " were more alarmed for your own safetv, than for " ours. Had we, overcome with fear, gone early " over to the Persian monarch, as others did; or " had we not latterly boldly stood out, and dared to " throw ourselves on board our fleet, the barbarians, " without a struggle, would leisurely have deter- " mined the fate of Greece 563 . " Our power, Lacedaemonians! ought not, there- " fore, to excite that envious jealousy with which " we are beheld bv the Grecian states. Our power, " superior as it is, was by no means the effect of " violent encroachments. For, as j^ou would not " stay with us to glean the reliques of the Persian " war, to us the associated states were forced to have " recourse ; and entreat us to lead them to its com- " pletion 564 . Thus obliged to be in action, by the " necessary contingency of affairs, we have advanced *' our power to its present height; first from a prin- " ciple of fear, then from a principle of honour, and ". latterly from motives of interest s6s . " When blamed by many, when necessitated to " reduce to obedience some confederates, who had " revolted from us; when you, Lacedaemonians 1 " no longer well-disposed toward us, were actuated " by jealousy and envy, we saw it inconsistent " with our interest to endanger our security by giv- 563. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Ixxiv. €4. Id. lib. i. cap. lxxv. 565. Id. ibid. " " in g ANCIENT EUROPE. 411 u ing up our power, as every defection from us would LETTER " have proved an accession of strength to you 566 . Xlv - " No political body will throw any reproach upon " men, who try every expedient to ward off the extre- " mities of danger 567 . " To you, Lacedaemonians! we have little occa- " sion to use such arguments ; for it is your policy " to manage the states of Peloponnesus as best suits " your interest, and to prescribe them law 568 . And " had you remained at the head of the naval confe- " deracy, and persevered in maintaining that invi- " dious superiority by sea, we are well convinced, " that you would soon have become no less odious " to your allies than the Athenians ; and consequent- " ly would have been under the necessity, either of " ruling with rigour or to have risked the loss of your " sway 5»/ " blame. It hath even proved the cause of calum- " ny* 72 ." That seeming paradox the Athenian ambassadors illustrated, by observing, that in suits against their dependents they were often worsted in their own courts; and that, although ever submitting to fair and impartial trials, they were nevertheless reputed tyrannical 573 . " None considering," added they, " that those states that have dominion over others, " and treat not their subject allies with the modera- " tion we observe, are seldom accused of severity. " And for this substantial reason; where tyranny " prevails, there can be no room for appeals to jus- " tice 574 . But our dependents (accustomed to con- " test with us on an equal footing) if they suffer ever " so little damage, either by a judicial sentence or " the exercise of legal authority, take in worse part " the loss they sustain, when they think equity on " their side, than if, setting aside law, we had forci- " bly seized their property 575 . " The Asiatic Greeks long bore with patience the " tyranny of the Persians ; yet our government they " think oppressive. To them it may so seem; for, " to subjects, the present is always grievous 576 . And " if, by our overthrow, you should acquire dominion " over them, you would perceive that friendly dispo- " sition toward Sparta, which a dread of Athens hath " occasioned, quickly to vanish; especially, should " you assert your sway with that high authority " which you did during your short command against " the Persian monarch 577 . Form, therefore your " resolutions on this subject with deliberation; as on 572. Thucydid. ubi sup. 573. Id. lib. cap. lxxvii. 574. Id. ibid. 575. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxvii. 576. Id. ibid. 5 77. Thucydid. ubi sup. " a matter ANCIENT EUROPE. 413 " a matter of great importance: nor hearken so far to " the calumnies of other states, as to embroil your- ** selves with us without reason. Reflect well on the " uncertainties of war, before you engage in it. For, " protracted into length, it generally issues in cala- " mities; from which, at present, we both are " equally distant: and to the lot of which of us they " will fall, can only be determined by the train of " events 578 . " Men, who go rashly to war, are often eager to " execute enterprises that ought, in point of time, to " be second to something more important; and, " when they have failed in their undertakings, they " listen to the dictates of reason 579 . But as we are, ** by no means, guilty of such rashness, nor perceived " it in you, we exhort you, while recourse may be " had to healing measures, not to break the treaty ; " not to violate your engagements, but to let the con- " troversy between us be decided, according to the " articles of the peace, by fair arbitration 58 ". If this " proposal ye reject, Lacedaemonians! we call the " gods, you have sworn by, and who take cogni- " zance of oaths, to bear witness, that if you begin " the war, we will endeavour to avenge ourselves, " by whatever conduct you shall set us an exam- " pie 58 '." When the Lacedaemonians had heard the accusa- tions of their allies against the Athenians, and also what the Athenians had urged in their own vindica- tion, they ordered both parties to withdraw, and entered into serious consultation among themselves. The majority concurred in declaring, that the Athe- nians had acted unjustly; and that a war against them ought to be speedily begun 582 . But Archidamus, 578. Id. Bell. Peloponnea. lib. i. cap. lxxviii. 579. Id. ibid. 580. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxviii. 581. Id. ibid. 582. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxix. vol. ii. 3 n the 414 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the venerable Spartan king, a man of sound under- v- ^ v>1 ^' standing and cool temper, endeavoured thus to mode- rate the ardour of his subjects. " The war, Lacedaemonians, which is at present the subject of your deliberations, you will find, calmly considered, big with important conse- quences; and, therefore, it ought not rashly to be undertaken 583 . For, although in disputes with our Peloponnesian neighbours, we have ever a competent force in readiness, and can quickly re- duce them to reason, the case must be very differ- ent in acting against the Athenians; a people, whose most valuable territories are remote, and whose naval skill and strength is great; a people, who are provided with all the requisites of war — with arms, shipping, horses, and men; with wealth, both public and private, beyond what any other Grecian state can furnish; — a people, who have numerous dependent states, on which they levy tribute. Whence then the motive for sanguinely rushing into war with such an enemy 584 ? " But should we declare war against the Athe- " nians, unprovided as we are, on what can we de- " pend for success? On our naval force? — In that, " we are inferior; and much time would be required, " should we make such declaration, before we f* could equal them at sea 58!) . Or is it on our wealth, " that we shall depend? — In this, we are still more " deficient; for we neither have it in any public fund, " nor can we readily raise it by private contribu- " tion 5 " 36 . Yet some over-confident spirits may per- " haps believe, that we so far exceed the Athenians 583. Id. lib. i. cap. Ixxx. 584. Id. ibid. 585. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. Ixxx. 586. Id. ibid. m ANCIENT EUROPE. 415 " in numbers, and military skill, that we can easily LETTER " march into the territory of Attica, and lay it waste " by repeated incursions. Other territories, how- " ever, of large extent, are subject to Athens. From " these, by sea, she will import all necessary sup- " plies 587 . But should we even be able to induce " the Athenian tributaries to revolt, we shall want a " naval force to support them in their rebellion; as u the majority of them are seated on islands. What " then will be the result of this projected war? For, " if we are not able to contend with the Athenians " at sea, or to divert those revenues by which their " navy is maintained, we shall only, by declaring " war against them, hurt ourselves. And, in such " event, to be obliged to desist from hostilities, will " stain our honour; especially, if we shall be thought " the violators of the treaty 588 . " Be not therefore elated, Lacedaemonians I with " the vain hope, that this war will soon be brought " to a close, if we can lay waste the territory of At- " tica. I see cause, on sure grounds of reasoning, ** to fear that we shall transmit the purposed war as " a legacy to our children; for, it is by no means " consistent with the character of the Athenians, " either to be slaves to their soil, or to shrink from " danger 589 . Yet am not I so void of principle — of " political prudence, generosity, or patriotism, as to " advise you to abandon your confederates to the " outrages of the Athenians, or to connive at the " encroachments of a rival power. I seek only to " persuade you, not hastily to commence hostilities: " nor, in the short space of one day, precipitantly to " determine a question, that involves the fate of so " many cities, so many men, and so much wealth " and honour 590 . 587. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. lxxxi. 588. Id. il>id. 589. Thucydid. ubi sup. 590. Id. licll. I'eloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxxii. Ixxxv. " My 416 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " My advice is, to send ambassadors to Athens; s "' rv ~^' / " in order to remonstrate, before the assembled peo- " pie, concerning the attack of Potidaea, and other " complaints of our allies against the Athenian state; " but without discovering any eagerness for war, or " symptoms of pusillanimity, if war should be found *' necessary 39 '. Meantime, let every thing be got " in readiness for the apprehended rupture. Thus " will our resolutions be more wisely formed, and " our preparations strike into our enemies greater " terror 592 ." The force of this speech, which must have carried general conviction, was diverted by Sthenelaidas, one of the ephori ; who addressed the Lacedaemo- nians, in words to the following effect. " The ha- " rangues of the Athenians, for my part, I cannot " comprehend. They have enlarged exceedingly in " praise of themselves; but they have said nothing " to disprove the charges against them — that they " have done injury to our confederates, and to Pe- " loponnesus. And if they behaved well during the " Persian war, but have acted unjustly since its ter- " mination, they deserve to be doubly punished; " because, instead of improving, they have degene- " rated into ill 593 . But we continue the same peo- " pie we then were; and will not, if we are wise, " overlook the wrongs done to our allies, nor wait " any longer to avenge them, their sufferings being " past bearing. " But the Athenians, forsooth, have a great deal " of money, and ships, and cavalry 1 Be these things " as they may, we have worthy allies, whom we " ought not to desert; nor leave to be defended " by pleadings, since it was not by words they were 591. Id. ibid. 592. Thucydid. lib. i.cap. lxxxv. 593. Id. lib. i. cap. lxxxvi. " injured. ANCIENT EUROPE. 417 " injured. On the contrary, we ought, with all expe- LE TX? R " dition, and with all our strength, to seek revenge 594 . y^~>r*i*s " How we should deliberate, when we have been '* wronged, let no man pretend to inform me; it *' would better have become the perpetrators of vio- " lence to have deliberated before they committed " injustice. Vote then the war, Lacedaemonians 1 " with a spirit becoming the dignity of Sparta; and " neither suffer the Athenians to grow yet greater, 11 nor betray your confederates. But, with the " gods on our side, let us march out against the " authors of usurpation and tyranny 595 ." Sthenelaidas having thus spoken, put the question in the Lacedaemonian senate, by virtue of his of- fice, as president of the college of ephori. But as the members gave their suffrage by vote, and not by ballot, he said that he could not distinguish the majo- rity; and therefore ordered them to divide upon the question, " Whether the Athenians had broken the treaty?" — They accordingly rose up, and divid- ed; and a great majority appeared on the side that held the treaty to be broken* 90 . On this report being given, the Lacedaemonians called in the deputies of their confederates, who had . been ordered to withdraw, and told them that they had come to a resolution, That the Athenians had infringed the treaty, by acts of violence and oppres- sion; but that they were desirous again to put the question, in an assembly of all their confederates, convoked on purpose; that by taking their measures in concert with their allies, they might vigorously carry on the Avar, if voted by common consent w . 594. Thucydid. lib. i.eap. I.xxxvi. 595. Id ibid. 596. Thucydid. lib. i. sap. lxxxvii. 597. Id. ibid. Win n 418 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Ant. Chr. 432. Olympiad lxxxvii. 1. When the Lacedaemonian senate had thus made known its resolution, the Peloponnesian deputies departed for their several homes; and the Athenian ambassadors, having ended their business, stayed not long behind 598 . This vote of the Lacedemonian senate, That " the treaty was violated," observes Thucydides 599 , was passed in the fourteenth year of the peace, concluded for thirty years, after the con- quest of Eubcea 6o °. Ant. Chr. ' 431. Olympiad lxxxvii. 2. The Lacedaemonians, conformable to their late re- solution, having summoned the deputies of all their confederates to attend at Sparta; in order to put to a general vote, " Whether or not war should be undertaken against the Athenians?"— the ambassa- dors of the numerous constituents of their alliance arrived, and assembled in one common council 601 . Various were the arguments offered, by the several deputies; but the majority seemed disposed to de- clare for war. Meanwhile the Corinthians, alarmed for the fate of Potidaea, and zealous for the com- mencement of hostilities, stood up and spoke to the following purport: " We can no longer, confederates! blame the La- cedaemonians : we can neither accuse them of indif- ference nor delay; for they have not only voted the war themselves, but summoned us hither to give their resolution our concurrence. The purpose of the Corinthians, in addressing you, therefore is, to convince you of the necessity of hostilities; and that, although seated on the coast, and depend- ing upon traffic for our prosperity, we are not alto- gether selfish in so advising. For the people plant- ed in places remote from the sea, will soon find that, 598. Thucydid. ubi sup. 599. Cell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. lxxxvii. 600. Id. ibid. 601. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxix. " unless ANCIENT EUROPE. 419 " unless they defend those in lower situations, they " will be obstructed in carrying to the shore the *' fruits of their fields ; and also in receiving those ** needful supplies, with which commerce furnishes " inland territories 002 . Hence we wish to make " them sensible, that if they abandon the defence " of the people rn maritime districts, the danger will " reach the interior country; and, consequently, " they are interested no less than we in the issue of * { the present deliberations 6 " 3 . " Other arguments, we hope, will convince you, M Peloponnesians ! that you ought to make, without " the smallest hesitation, the necessary exchange of M peace for war. For, although it be the maxim of M the prudent to preserve peace as long as they can, " it is the duty of the brave, when injured, to re- " nounce peace, and have recourse to arms ; and, " when successful in arms, to lay them down again " by peaceful treaty 004 . We, having been grossly " injured, and in many instances aggrieved by the " Athenians, are taking up arms; and, when we " shall have avenged ourselves on our enemies, *' will put a stop to hostilities, and offer terms of " peace 605 . " Success in war depends upon many circumstan- " ces; and from many of those we may presume, " that we shall prove victorious. We surpass the " Athenians in numbers, and martial skill on land; f* and being natives of one peninsula, armed and dis- " ciplined alike, we will act with more vigour and ** concert 606 . In naval force the Athenians are su- " perior; but we shall be able to equal them in that, " by employing our private wealth, or borrowing 602. Id. lib. i. cap. cxx. 603. Id. ibid. 604. Thucydid. ul>i sup. G05. Id. Bell. Peloponnc.i. lib. i. cap. cxxi. 606. Id. ibid. 420 THE HISTORY OF TART I. " the treasures laid up at Delphos and Olympia, to v-*"v~>^»/ " equip a navy ° 7 . We may even, by so borrowing, " and giving greater wages, draw oflF all the foreign " mariners in the Athenian service; for the fleets "of Athens are not manned merely with native sea- " men. Her naval strength is rather mercenary ?f than internal; whereas our power, on land, is al- " together self-supported 6oS . And when once we " have gained an equality in maritime skill, our in- 11 born courage will soon secure us victory at sea. " For that dauntless spirit, which we inherit from '* nature, it is impossible for them to purchase ; but " we may acquire, through practice, a superiority " in naval operations 6 " 9 . " The sums of money, by which these ends are " chiefly to be obtained, we must respectively con- " tribute. And while the Athenian dependents are " never slow in sending those quotas that rivet " slavery on them, would it not be a shameful dere- " liction of patriotism in us, who wish to be aveng- " ed on our enemies, and seek to secure our liberty " and independency, should we refuse to submit to " necessary contributions? or to store up wealth " to be plundered by the Athenians, which may " eventually purchase oppressions and miseries for " ourselves 610 . " But we have other expedients within our reach " for the successful prosecution of this war: — the " probability of effecting a revolt of the dependents " of Athens; and, in consequence of that, a dimi- " nution of her revenue, the essence of her strength; " the erecting of forts within her territory; and the " occurrence of many other events, not yet to be " foreseen 6 ' 1 . For war, by no means, yields to the 607. Thucydid. ubi sup. 608. Id. lib. i. cap. cxxl. 609. Id. ibid. 610. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxxi. 611. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxxii. " direction ANCIENT EUROPE. 421 " direction of a preconcerted plan; but, in its pro- LETTER gress, methodises its own course 6 a ~ 6.2 XIV " Through toil to earn virtues, is hereditary to " Peloponnesians. It becomes you, therefore, with *' manly confidence to declare for war. The oracle " of a god prescribes it 6 3 ! that god himself hath " promised his assistance 6 4 : and all the Grecian " states without the isthmus, are ready to join you 6 ' 5 ; " some from a principle of fear, and some from mo- " tives of interest 6 6 . Nor on you will the breach a of the peace be charged. The prophetic god, in " advising war, evidently judges the peace to be " already broken; you will only then, by commenc- " ing hostilities, act in redress of its violation 6 '\ " For breach of faith is not to be imputed to those " that arm to revenge it, but to the faithless ag- " gressors 6 ' 8 . " Reflect, confederates! that our affairs are come " to a momentous crisis; that we have suggested " the most adviseable measures, and give your votes " for \var 6 ' 5 . Be not alarmed at its dangers ; but " animate yourselves with the hope of a long and " advantageous peace produced by it. For peace, " procured by war, is ever the most lasting; and " danger can never be diverted by tamely shrinking " from hostilities through a love of the benefits of 61?. Id. ibid. 613. When the Lacedemonians consulted the oracle of Apollo at Delphos, after the breaking up of the former assembly of the Pelu- ponnesian deputies, " Whether the war voted would be successful ?" — they received this response: — " That if they carried on war with " all their strength, they should be conquerors; and that the (;25, Id, Bell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxxvi. cxxvii. of ANCIENT EUROPE^ 42J Of Potidsea, and permit iEgina to govern itself at LETTKIt its own discretion; but they more especially insisted, That the decree, prohibiting the Megareans the At- tic havens and markets, should be revoked 626 * The Athenians admitted none of these demands. At length the final embassy from Sparta to Athena arrived, under the conduct of Ramphias, Melisippus*. and Agesander; who, setting aside all other points in dispute, spoke thus: — " The Lacedaemonians are " desirous of peace; and peace, therefore, Atheni- " ans! you may have, if you will permit the Greeks u to govern themselves according to their own u laws 627 ;" or, in other words, declare their colonies and tributary states independent* The Athenians summoned the popular assembly*; which consisted of people of all ranks, and in which every one was at liberty to deliver his sentiments* And they determined, after deliberating on all the matters in debate, to return a definitive answer 6 * 3 * Many spoke on this occasion, and several were di- vided in their opinions; some insisting on the neces- sity of war, and others maintaining that peace ought not to be obstructed by the decree in regard to the Megareans, which it was adviseable to repeal' 29 . At length Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, a man of the greatest abilities both for action and debate 63 ", stood up, and spoke to this purpose. " I hold, Athenians! the same opinion, which I " have often had occasion to declare ; — That we " ought not to yield to the demands of the Pelopon- 62G. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. exxxix. car. w. ibid f>28. Thucydid. ubi sup, 629. Id. Brit. Pelopoune*. Ii<> i. cap exxxix. fc^O Id ibid. " nesiaus. 424 THE HISTORY OF PARTI. u nesians. The treacherous designs of the Lacedae- monians against us were formerly evident ; nor are they less manifest at this moment. For, although it is expressly stipulated, in the articles of the treaty between us, That, in all controversies of right, we shall mutually submit to legal decisions; each party, during the dependence of the suit, to hold what it possesses: yet have they never enter- ed such suit against us ; nor will they accept of a judicial trial, when offered by Athens 63 '. Their accusations against us they are determined to sup- port by arms, and not by evidence. And hither they now come, no longer to remonstrate, but to command. They order us to raise the siege of Potidaea; to allow the iEginetes to govern them- selves by their own laws; to repeal the decree against the Megareans; and, lastly, to restore in- dependency to our Grecian colonies and tributa- ries 632 ; the former planted at great expense, the latter acquired by conquest or compact, and both proteced by our arms. " Let not, therefore, one Athenian believe we go to war for a trifling matter, should we only refuse to repeal the decree against the Megareans. The stress the Lacedaemonians lay upon it — name- ly, that if repealed a war will not ensue, is noth- ing but a specious colouring. Nor think there will be any ground for self-accusation, though, for so trifling a matter, you should have recourse to arms ; for that matter, trifling as it may seem, includes within it the full proof of the constancy of Athe- nian spirit 633 . Should we, for example, submit to this demand, we shall soon be required to make some sacrifice of greater moment; as if our conde- scension had been the consequence of fear. But if we, at once, strenuously refuse to listen to the 631. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxl. 633. Thucydid. ubi sup. 632. Id., ibid. " demands ANCIENT EUROPE. 425 " demands of the Lacedaemonians, we shall convince LETTER " them, that they must treat with us, in future, as XIV - " with men who are their equals 634 . " Hence I exhort you, Athenians ! at the present " crisis, either to yield the Lacedaemonians obe- " dience, before you suffer damage from them; or, " if we shall determine on war, which to me seem- " eth most expedient (be the pretext weighty or " light), not to give way to the smallest demand, " lest we render the tenure of what we possess, pre- " carious and unstable 635 . For not only the greatest, " but the least demand, if authoritatively imposed " by equals, hath a tendency to make those that sub- " mit to it slaves 636 . But that we may now hazard " a war, with as fair a prospect of success as our " rivals, permit me to offer the reasons, and attend " to their weight. " The Peloponnesians are a people, who subsist " by their bodily labour, and who have neither pri- " vate wealth nor public funds. Accordingly, with *f wars of long continuance, or wars by sea, they are " utterly unacquainted; and the wars, in which they " have been embroiled with one another, have been " short and transient, in consequence of their pover- " ty 637 . A people so circumstanced can neither fit " out a fleet, nor often send their armies abroad 638 . " Funds of money are, to a state, much surer sup- " ports of war, than contributions exacted by force. " And men, who subsist by the labour of their hands, " are more ready, on momentous occasions, to sup- " port the state with their personal service, than " with their money 639 . For their bodies, though " exposed to danger, they presume will escape death; 634. Id. ibid. 635. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxl* 636. Id. ibid. 637. Id. Bell. Pcl'ponnes. lib. i. cap. cxli. «38. Id. ibid. „ £S9. Thucydid. ubi sup. " but. 42G THE HISTORY OF PART l. "but their money they apprehend will too surely he "-^^^^^ " exhausted, it* the war should run out into length 4 - " The state of the Peloponnesians I judge to be " such, or nearly such as I have described it; but " our state is exempt from the defects, which I have " pointed out in theirs, while it enjoys other advan- " tages far beyond their rivalling' 4 . For, granting " that they may invade our territories by land, we " also can make descents upon theirs by sea. And " whether Peloponnesus or Attica shall be wasted " with (ire and sword, admits of no comparison: for, " in the former case, they will have no other coun- " try to repair to, but what they must acquire by " force of arms; whereas we have large tracts of "land to seek refuge in, both in the islands and on " the continent'' 12 . " Of vast consequence is the dominion of the sea* But regard it with attention! If we, Athenians^ were seated in an island, whether should we or the Peloponnesians be subdued with greater faci- lity? — The solution of the question is easy, con- sidering our naval force: and our present situation is nearly the same with that proposed" 4 ". Let us, therefore, give up the produce of our fields, eva- cuate our villages, and confine our defence to the sea and the city of Athens; nor be so much exas- perated at the Peloponnesians, as to hazard a battle against superior numbers, for the sake of our ter- ritory, but behold unmoved their devastations. And for this important reason, our houses and lands are of small value, compared with the lives of our people; for lands and houses are by men 610. Id. ibid 641. Thucvdid. lib. i. cap. cxliii. 6-42. Id ibid. ',13. Id. Ic!!. Peloponnes. lib. i. cap. cxliii. " acquired ANCIENT EUROPE. 427 <; acquired and possessed, but can never produce LETTF.U " men 644 . Of those we need not fear the want. " Might I presume, Athenians! on my powers of " persuasion, I should enjoin you to inarch out, and " commit the waste with your own hands; in order " to convince the Peloponnesians, that you will nei- " ther meet them in the field, nor submit to their " imperious demands, for all the inroads they can " make* 4 -". And I see many causes to hope for vic- " tory, in this threatening war, if you will not plunge " into unnecessary dangers; for I am more afraid " of our own adventurous spirit, in seeking the en- " largement of dominion, than of the force or skill <{ of the enemy* 5 * 6 , " But these matters I shall afterward have occa« " sion to explain, in the course of the war, if it " should take place. At present, let us dismiss the " Spartan ambassadors, with the following answer: " — That we will open our markets and havens to " the Megareans, provided the Lacedaemonians, in " their prohibition of foreigners, will except us and " our confederates; for neither our act relative to " Megara, nor theirs for the exclusion of foreigners, " is prohibited in the articles of the treaty 6 7 : That " we will also permit the Grecian states, unJtr our " dominion, to govern themselves at their own chs- " cretion, if they had such right when the treaty was " concluded; provided the Lacedaemonians will, at " the same time, withdraw the command they lay " upon the states in their own confederacy, oi regu-. " lating themselves by that form of government " which best suits the Spartan interest, the aristo- " cratical! and allow them the choice of their own 4< polity: That farther, we will submit to a judicial 614. Id. ihid. < 645. ThucvuiJ. ubi buj) 646. Id Hell. Peloponnes. lib. i. cup cxliv. 617. Id. ibid. " decision, 4*8 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " decision, according to the articles of peace ; and v ^" v ^^' " that, although we will not begin war, we will " avenge ourselves on those that shall 648 . Such an " answer is consistent with justice, and becomes the " dignity of the Athenian state 649 ." Pericles having spoken to the foregoing purport, and the Athenians thinking, that what he advised was most for their advantage, voted in conformity to his exhortation 630 . They also returned an answer to the Lacedaemonians according to his directions, though not in the words of his motion; — " That " they would do nothing upon command, but were " ready to submit the matters in dispute to a judicial " decision agreeable to treaty, upon a fair and equal Ant. Chr. " footing 65 ." On this answer being given, the La- Olvmpiad cec kemonian ambassadors took their departure; and Ixxxvii. 2. here all negociation, between the rival states, came to a close 652 . According to the chronological order of events, the Peloponnesian war, my lord, ought now to en- gage our attention. But before we enter on the his- tory of that war, I shall, conformable to my plan, offer to your lordship's notice, by way of introduc- tion, a view of the progress of the Grecian colonics in Italy and Sicily, on which the hostile powers de- pended for support. 648. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxliv. 649. Id. ibid. 650. Thucydid. lib. i. cap. cxlv. 651. Id. ibid. 652. Thucydid. ubi sup. Though hostilities were not immediately begun on the departure of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors from Athens, no communication was thenceforth held between the jealous and suspicious powers, without the intervention of a herald. Thu- cydid. lib. i. cap. cxlvi. LETTER ANCIENT EUROPE, 4*»V LETTER XV. PROGRESS OF THE GRECIAN COLONIES IN ITALY AKU SICILY, TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESI AH WAR, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE SURPRISE OF PLAT£A BY THE THEBANS. X HE planting of the principal Grecian co- LETTER lonies in Italy and Sicily, I have formerly had occa- XV. sion to mention, and also to notice their early N ^~ v *^»' growth'; in consequence of which Sicily suddenly rose to eminence in arts and arms, and the Grecian settlements in that island, and in the more southern part of Italy, soon became so extensive and culti- vated, as to acquire the name of Magna Grecia, or M Great Greece 2 ," Of the progressive advancement of the Sicilian Greeks in arts, polity, naval and military power, we are very fully informed by a native historian 3 , who had made it his business to inquire minutely into their affairs. But of the stages in the progress of the Grecian colonies in Italy, before the Peloponne- sian war, we have little certain information, and few particulars of their history. We only know, that most of them had become wealthy, powerful, and populous; and that they had diffused the know- ledge of arts, literature, and philosophy, among the comparatively barbarous natives; that Rhegium and Tarentum were nourishing cities; that Crotona, 1. See letter v. vol. i. p. 323, 324, and p. 333, 339. 2. Strabo, lib. vi. passim. 3. Diodorus Siculus, or siculiensis. vol. ii, 3k which 430 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, which the Samian philosopher had made his abode, ^^ >r ^*^ and where he kept his crowded school, was the head of a strong and well regulated state; that Sybaris, where luxury and sensuality long reigned, and had risen to such a height of refinement as be- came proverbial, had sunk under the arms and the valour of the Crotonian disciples of Pythagoras ; that the Sybarites, in their distress, had applied to Athens for succour ; that a body of Athenian and other Gre- cian adventurers, among whom was numbered the Ant. Chr. historian Herodotus, embarked for their support ; 446. and founded, in the neighbourhood of the ruins of lxixia.3. Sybaris, the city of Thurium, to which Charondas gave excellent laws*. But before I speak of the laws of Charondas, my lord, I must notice those of an earlier date; of Za- leucus, legislator to the Epizephyrian Locrians; a colony sent to Italy by the Locrians of Ozolis. In what age Zaleucus promulgated his laws, we are not certainly informed. But it must have been before the days of Pindar; for he represents the Epizephyrian Locrians as a civilized people 5 : and no people can be civilized without laws. Zaleucus is said to have been one of the scholars of Pythago- ras 6 . But at whatever time he lived, or by what- ever means he acquired his learning, the preface to his laws is one of the most valuable remains of anti- quity. 4. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii.p. 76. — 83, (vol. ii. edit. sup. cit.) et seq. See also Strabc, lib. v. vi. passim. 5. Pind. Olymp. xi. This ode is addressed to Agesidamus of Lo- cris ; who obtained at the Olympic games, the victory in the exercise of the csestus, in the seventy-fourth olympiad. 6. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 84, vol. ii. Dr. Warburton, however, has endeavoured to prove, that Zaleucus legislated before the time of Py- thagoras. Divine Legation of Moses, book ii. sect. iii. "It ANCIENT EUROPE. 431 ** It is necessary," said he, " that every citizen letter " should, in the first place, firmly believe in the ex- ** istence of the gods. This belief all will readily ** be induced to entertain, when looking up to the " heavens, they contemplate the wonderful beauty " and harmony of the celestial bodies. These, " they will find, could neither be the effect of for- " tuitous causes, nor the work of man! and there- " fore, they must adore the gods, as the bestowers " of all the benefits that mankind enjoy, in conse- " quence of the order of the universe. In so doing, " they ought to purify their minds from vice; for " the gods delight not in costly sacrifices, but in the " just and honourable actions of virtuous men 7 . " But they, whose passions are so impetuous as u not to suffer them to persevere in virtue, and " whose minds have acquired a bias towards vice ; " these, whether men or women, citizens or sojourn- " ers, ought to reverence the gods; meditate upon " their nature, and reflect on the punishments which " divine justice has in store for wicked human " beings. They ought to set before their eyes the " dreadful hour of death, at which all must arrive; " when the memory of past evil' actions will sting " every vicious soul with remorse, accompanied " with the fruitless wish, that they had regulated •' their conduct by the principles of religion and vir- *' tue. Each man, therefore, ought so to watch " over his actions, as if that hour was ever present " to him\" The laws of Zaleucus were worthy of such an in- troduction. His criminal code had the merit of being the first among any European people, that by fixing the penalty for every crime, left not the degree of 7- Apud Diod. Sicul. Eiblioth. lib. xii. p. 85, vol. ii. 8. Apud Stobxum, Serm. xlii. punishment 432 THE HISTORY OF PART I. punishment at the direction of the magistrate 9 . Nor s ^" y "^" / were his civil ordinances less excellent. Taking ad- vantage of those two great springs that actuate hu- man conduct, and supply in many instances, the place of laws, and even of morals — the love of hon- our and the fear of shame, he enjoined, that no citi- zen should he implacable in his resentment against another; but that all should so manage their passions, as soon to be reconciled with their adversaries: — and if any man acted otherwise, that he should be ac- counted no better than a barbarian'". On the same principle, in order to restrain licen- tiousness and wasteful expense, so hurtful to infant communities, Zaleucus enacted a law, that no free- born woman, when she went abroad, should be at- tended by more than one handmaid, unless she were drunk ; that no such woman should walk out under night, unless with an intention to play the harlot; nor wear golden ornaments, or garments embroider- ed with gold, unless with the same intent. And that no man should wear a gold ring, or a purple cloak, unless he had been guilty of fornication or adultery". By these dishonourable exceptions, and conditions of indemnity, which were punishments in themselves, Zaleucus effectually restrained the Locrians of ItaVy from luxury and excess; for none, observes Diodo- rus'% were willing to expose their character to the contempt or derision of their fellow-citizens, by own- ing themselves guilty of such transgressions. From the laws of Zaleucus we are naturally led to consider those of Charondas; who lived, as 9. Strabo, lib. vi. p. SfiO, edit. sup. cit. 10. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 85, vol. ii. 11. Id. ibid. 12. Biblioth. ubi »up. already ANCIENT EUROPE. 433 already observed, in a later age. In the meantime, LETTRE Jmust say a few words of the Grecian colony plant- ed at Thurium, in the territory of Sybaris. The city of Thurium formed an oblong square ; the breadth of which was marked by three parallel streets, and the length, cross-cut by four: and when all these streets were filled with houses, it appeared very compact and beautiful' 5 . But unhappily, the, Thurians continued not long in peace among them- selves. A violent dissention broke out between the old and new people ; in consequence of which a se- dition took place, and all the Sybarites were either expelled or put to the sword 4 . The new comers having thus got the whole city, and also its territory into their power, and finding the country very fer- tile, and more than sufficient for them, invited over adventurers from Greece, in order to cultivate the ground. And among these they divided both the houses in the city that were vacant, and the lands in their district that were unoccupied' 5 . The inhabitants of Thurium soon grew rich; and entering into a league with the Crotonians, thence- forth managed their affairs with much discretion' 6 . Having established a democratical form of govern- ment, on the model of that at Athens, they divided the citizens into ten tribes: to which they gave 13. Diod. Sicol. lib. xii. p. 78. vol. ii. 14. Id. ibid. The causes of this sedition are thus explained by Diodorus. The Sybarites shared all the chief places of magistracy among themselves, leaving only the inferior offices to the new colo- nists; and the wives of the ancient inhabitants were admitted to •acrifice, before those of the late adventurers. Beside these seeds of dissention, the Sybarites engrossed, and divided among them, all the muds near the city; so that none were left for the people, who had rescued them from ruin, but such as lay at a distance. Bibliorh. ubi sup. _ 15. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 16. Id. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 78. names. 434 THE HISTORY OF VAHT I. names, corresponding to the several countries ^^~v~ > >~' whence the settlers had emigrated 7 . And from among the most learned and sagacious of their body, they chose, for their legislator, Charondas; who, after examining the laws of every country, collected what statutes he judged to be best suited to his pur- pose, and digested the whole into one code; adding, at the same time, many laws of his own framing' 8 . .The most remarkable of the latter, I shall offer to your lordship's consideration. Charondas, like Zaleucus, in framing his laws, had generally a reference to the love of honour and the fear of shame. Hence he instituted, that whoever married a second wife, and brought in a step-mother among his children 9 , should be removed from the sen- ate, and excluded the popular assembly; judging that he, who could be so imprudent in the affairs of his own family, could never wisely advise the state. For they that have been once well married, he concluded, ought to rest satisfied with such happiness ; and such as have been unfortunate in their first match, and yet, against their own experience, commit a second fault, in the same line of conduct, deserve justly to be noted as fools 20 . His law against false accusers was still more marking. He enacted, that they should, when convicted, be led through the city crowned with the shrub tamarish, a species of brier, that it might be made evident to all the people, they had been guilty of the most atrocious baseness 2 '. 17. Id. ibid. 81. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 79, vol ii. 19. Id. ibid. 1'or the most shocking and cruel discords, observes Diodorus, (uhi sup.) often arise in families, between parents and children, through the tricks and devices of stepmothers. Hence the frequent, and horrid scenes of baseness of this kind, represented on the stage by tragedians. 20. Diod. Sicul ubi sup. 21. Id. Biblioth. lib xii. p. 79. Charondas ANCIENT EUROPE. 135 Charondas' made likewise a law, never instituted letter by any former legislator, concerning the keeping of - v - bad company; imposing a heavy fine on such as should be convicted of that offence. For he had found by observation, that both the manners and the minds of good and honest citizens were often de- praved by associating familiarly with wicked men; who drew them aside, from the pure paths of virtue, into all the foul sinks of vice; and that such com- pany, like an epidemical disease, infected the best hearts with its corrupting contagion" 2 . But the ordinance of Charondas that has been most admired, as it more eminently marks the liber- ality of his institutions, and their superiority in that respect to those of preceding legislators, was a law relative to the education of rhiklren. He ordained, That all the children of the citizens of Thurium should learn to write; and that the city should pay the wages of their teachers 23 . For he knew, that poor citizens were not able to afford the expense: and, consequently, they must otherwise have lost the benefit of such instruction for their children — of the art of writing, which he, in the first place, justly preferred above all other arts, says Diodorus; as by the help of it many things conducive to the public good are preserved, and transmitted to posterity — suffrages, decrees, wills, laws, the opinions of wise men, the answers of the gods, and the learning of philosophers* 4 . 22. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 80. 23. Id. ibid. 24. Diod. Sicul. obi sup. " Life is due to nature," remarks thk sagacious bistorian," but how to live well, we owe to the writings of the learned; so that Charondas far exceeded those preceding legisla- tors, who had appointed physicians, a: the public charge, for the curing of private men's distempers; for they provided only rcmedie* for the diseases of the body, but he a cure for ignorance, and the diseases of the soul." Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 80. Charondas 436 THE HISTORY OF TART I. Charondas framed other two laws no less worthy y <^~*~ >m ' f his sagacity than the foregoing. The estates of orphans he ordered to be intrusted to the next of kin on the father's side ; but the superintendence of their education, and the custody of their persons, he intrusted to the nearest relations on the mother's side 25 . And for these substantial reasons; — The relations on the mother's side had no interest to make any attempt against the orphan's life, as his estate could never descend to them; and the danger of personal harm was prevented, on the part of the kindred on the father's side, because the orphan's person was not committed to their custody. Be- side, as the estate of the orphan was to devolve, in case of death, to his paternal kinsmen, it was to be presumed, that they would take care to preserve and improve it, on the prospect of the possibility of its becoming theirs 16 . The other law alluded to, was framed for the correction of those, That deserted their station in battle, or refused to lift arms in defence of their country. Former legislators had punished such delinquency with death ; but Charondas only enact- ed, That they, who had been guilty of it, should sit three days in the agora, or market place, cloathed in the habit of women 17 . And this punishment, though more moderate than those decreed in other states, for the same pusillanimity, did so operate upon the people of Thurium, as effectually to deter them from cowardice and effeminacy; they thinking it better to face danger, and die honourably in the field, than to suffer shameful disgrace at home, for neglect of duty 28 . The affairs of Sicily, the largest of all the islands in the Mediterranean, must next engage our attention. 25. Id. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 81. 26. Id. ibid. 27. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup, 28. Id. lib. xii. p. 82. And ANCIENT EUROPE. 43r And these will bring under our view those of Car- LETTER thage. The early progress of the Carthaginian commerce I have formerly had occasion to notice °. And they had attained such an height in naval power at the beginning of the fifth century before the christian sera, that their alliance was courted by Xerxes, when he proposed to invade Greece 3 ". They 29. Lett. ix. 30. Diod. Sicul lib. xi. p. 1, vol. ii. To such an alliance Xerxes would naturally be led by the Phoenicians, his most powerful naval confederates ; who, though they owned his sway, were still governed by their own kings. And the kings of Sidon and Tyre sat, in solemn deliberations, above all other subject princes; the former on the right, and the latter on the left hand of the Persian monarch (Hero- dotus, lib. viii. cap. lxvii. Ixviii.). Hence we learn, that Tyre was still regarded as the " daughter of Sidon," as Carthage was of Tyre. The close connexion between the Tyrians and Carthaginians, marking blood-relationship, is indeed manifested through the scope of their history. — And the affection of the whole Phoenician people for the Carthaginians seems to have been so strong as even to have prevented any quarrels arising from rivalry in commerce They would, there- fore, be induced, by motives of friendship as well as policy, to place the Carthaginian stale under the protection of the great king ; that it might escape his sword, should he prove victorious, by making with him and them a common cause against the aspiring Greeks; their rivals in trade and naval force, who had expelled them the islands in the /Egean sea, and who daily pressed upon their colonie* in Cyprus and Sicily. The only substantial objection to this alliance is, That no men- tion is made of it by Herodotus. Ent the positive and circum- stantial evidence of Diodorus (lib. xi. p. I. 16. 21. vol. ii.), is mora than a balance to such negative argument, setting aside what I have before stated on the subject ; especially as he, being a native of Sicily, haf! better access to information than Herodotus, who owns that he drew his information of the Carthaginian invasion of that island chiefly from Sicilian reports (Herodot. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clxv. cixvi. clwii.). Diodorus had *lso an opportunity, by his residence in Italy, and his travels in Africa, after the conquest of Carthage by the Romans, to be informed of the Carthaginian aflairs in times past; formerly concealed from foreigners by the jealousy of the govern- ment of that republic. That the Carthaginians were at that time sufficiently powerf;:l to be thought worthy of such alliance is evident, not only trom their vol, ii. " k more 438 THE HISTORY OF PART I. They acceded to his alliance 31 ; but their force was s- *'~ v " > *' broken, as we shall have occasion to see, by the Grecian colony of Syracuse, then under the sover- eignty of Gelon. With the rise of Gelon to the head of the Syracu- sian government, I shall resume my account of the Grecian colonies in Sicily. But before I enter on that subject, I must say a few words of the former inhabitants of this island. The Cyclops and Lestrygons, observes Thucydi- des 3 % are said to have been the most ancient inhabi- tants of Sicily; but he declares, that he could neither discover their race, whence they came, nor whither they afterward betook themselves 33 . Poetical amuse- ments, adds he, must here suffice ; or such informa- tion, as every man picks up for his own use 34 . What information the Greeks picked up concern- ing these ancient people, we know not; but Homer, the most early Grecian poet, whose works have been preserved, and whose testimony is considered as his- torical evidence, has represented both as barbarous and cruel monsters, who delighted in shedding human blood, and in gorging human flesh, without more early treaty with the Romans, concluded twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes; whence it appears, that they were then in possession of the coast of Africa from the Sirtut Minor, almost to the pillars of Hercules; of the western coast of Sicily, and of the whole island of Sardinia (Polyb. lib. iii. cap. xxii. xxiii): but also from the testimony of Herodotus (lib. vii. cap. clxv ), in speaking of their invasion of Sicily, during the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, with an army of three hundred thousand men (id. ibid.); composed partly of native troops, and partly of troops collected from various nations under their sway, or procured with their money, as mercenaries. 31. Died. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 16. 21. vol. ii. edit. sup. cit. 32. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. vi. cap. ii. 33. Id. ibid. ,*4 Thucydid ubi sup. the ANCIENT EUROPE. 439 the preparation of roasting or boiling 35 ; and Virgil, the prince of Roman poets, degraded them into the character of low mechanics 36 . But a learned modern antiquarian 37 has endeavoured to rescue the Cyclops from such degradation; and to shew, that they were ingenious artists, great builders, and skilled in the forging of metals; at a time when the European na- tions and the greater part of mankind, were unac- quainted with that art 38 . After the disappearance of the Cyclops and Lestri- gons, Sicily is said to have been inhabited by the Si- cani 39 ; an Iberian people, who had been compelled to remove from the banks of the Sicanus 40 ; now the Segre, a river of Catalonia in Spain. From them, Sicily, which had formerly been called Trinacria, from its triangular figure, formed by its three promon- 35. Horn. Odyss. lib. ix. x. passim. This venerable bard, how- ever, has preserved a reply of the Cyclops, to Ulysses and his com- panions, that places their character (at least in their own estimation) in a higher point of view. " Know then, we Cyclops are a race above " Those air-bred people, and their goat-nurs'd Jove." Horn. Odyss. lib. ix. 36. ^Eneid. lib. viii. ver. 424, 425. Here we find them represent- ed as mere blacksmiths : " Ferrum exercebant vasto Cyclopes in antro, " Brontcsque, Steropesc/ue, et nudus membra Pyracmon." Id. ibid. 57. Mr. Bryant. 38. See New System of Ancient Mythology, vol. i. p. 495 — 516. " Thus," concludes Mr. Bryant, " have I endeavoured to shew the true history and antiquity of this people. And we may learn from their works, that there was a time when they were held in high esti- mation. The notion of the Cyclops framing the thunder and light- ning for Jupiter, seems to have arisen from tiieCyclopians engraving hieroglyphics of this sort upon the temples of the solar deity. They were denominated from their worship Culops; Cu-C'oel-Ops, " Domiv. Coeli Pythonis." And their chief deity, the sun, among other titlts, was stiled Acmon, and Pyracmon." 39. Thucydid. lib. vi. cap. ii. 40. Id. ibid. tories, 440 THE HISTORY OF part I. tories 4 ', received the name of Sicania 42 . The Sicani N- ^~ v ^^»' were supplanted in their most valuable possessions by the Siceli or Siculi, an ancient Italian tribe 43 ; who, flying before the arms of the Opici, crossed the Si- cilian strait on rafts ; and, having vanquished the Sicani in battle, drove them from the central lands to the southern and western districts, and changed the name of the island from Sicania to Sicelia, Sicu- lia, or Sicilia 44 . And they retained possession of the midland and northerly parts of that island, to the time of Thucydides 45 , or the aera of the Pelo- ponnesian war. The Phoenicians had early formed settlements all round the Sicilian coast 46 . They secured the capes and bays, together with the small circumjacent isles, for the benefit of trading with the natives 47 . But when the Greeks began to pass over to Sicily in considerable numbers, and there to fix their abode, the Phoenicians abandoned the bulk of their settle- ments; and, uniting together, seated themselves at Motya, at Saloeis, and Panormus, now Palermo, near to Elemi, secure of the safety of their settle- ments in these quarters from their alliance with this people, and because the passage from Panormus to Carthage was short 48 . The ancestors of the Elemi were Trojan adventurers; who, after the subversion of the kingdom of Priam, and the destruction of Troy by the Greeks, had landed on the Sicilian shore. They occupied the country in the neighbour- hood of the Sicani, and took the general name of Elemi 49 . Their cities were Erix and Egesta 5 °. 41. Strabo, lib. vi. p. 265. 42. Thucydid. lib. *i. cap. ii. 43. Diod. Halicarnassensis, lib i. cap. ix. 44. Thucydid. lib. vi. cap. ii. Diod. Sicul. lib. v. init. Diod. Ha- licarnassensis, lib. i. cap. xxii. 45. Bell. Peloponncs. lib. vi. cap. ii. 46. Id. ibid. 47. Thucydid. lib. vi. cap. ii. 48. Id. ibid. 49. Thucydid. lib. vi. cap. ii. 50. Id. ibid. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 441 • The first Greeks that settled in Sicily were the Chalcidaeans of Eubcea 5 '. Thucles led the colony; built the city of Naxus, and erected the altar of Apollo the Guide 52 ; which was still to be seen in the time of Thucydides 53 , and on which the deputies, sent from that city, to consult the oracles of the solar deity, offered sacrifice before they began their voyage 54 . The year after the establishment of the Chalcidaeans at Naxus, in Sicily, Archias, a Corin- thian of the race of Hercules, heading a colony, gave a beginning to the city of Syracuse 45 . Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, each lead- ing a band of adventurers, founded the city of Gela in conjunction, on the river of the same name, forty- five years after the founding of Syracuse 56 . But our information concerning the Grecian colo- nies in Sicily is very imperfect, until the reign of Gelon; king or tyrant of Syracuse, as the Greeks called him, in their abhorrence of monarchical rule. This extraordinary man was a native of the city of Gela 57 , whence he probably derived his name. He greatly signalized himself in the wars, which Hippo- 51. Thucydid. lib. vi. cap. iii. 52. Id. ibid. Every Grecian colony was sent out under the pa- tronage of some deity, whose oracle had been consulted concerning its success (Cicero, Nat. Doer. lib. i.); but chiefly under the guardi- anship of Apollo (Id. ibid.). Hence Callimachus, " 'Tis through Apollo's tutelary aid " That men go forth to regions distant far, " And cities found : Apollo ever joys " In founding cities." Hymn, ad Apoll. 5.1. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. vi. cap. iii. 54. Id. ibid. 55. Thucydid. lib. vi. cap. iii. The fifth year after the founding of Syracuse, the Chalcidxans of Naxus, having driven back the Siccli, built the city of Leontium j and afterward Catana. Id. ibid. 56. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. vi. cap. iv. In the hundred and eighth year aficr the founding of Gela, tbeGeloans built Acragas(id. ibid), or Agrigentum. 57. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cliii. crates, 442 THE HISTORY OF PART I. crates, prince of Gela, carried on against the neigh- *^~v^—' bouring states 53 . Many of these he subjected; and he had almost made himself master of Syracuse, after having defeated the forces of that state 39 . But al- though he failed in this enterprise, he obliged the Syracusians to deliver up to Hippocrates the city of Camarina, which they had founded, and continued to hold under their jurisdiction 60 . Hippocrates afterward made war on the Siceli, or Siculi, and was slain at the siege of Hybla 6 '. On this event, under pretence of asserting the rights of Euclides and Cleander, the sons of Hippocrates, whose authority the Geloans refused to own, Gelon had recourse to arms, and subjected his fellow-citi- zens; but, instead of supporting the young princes in the government, he seized the sovereignty of Gela for himself 62 . Cther circumstances contributed to his aggrandizement, while they served to confirm and extend his sway. The democratical party in Svracuse, having- ex- pelled the heads of the aristocratical faction, Gelon undertook to restore the exiles. They had taken re- fuge in Casmene, a Syracusian town. Thence Gelon conducted them to Syracuse; and so great was the terror of his name, and the confidence in his cha- racter, that the citizens readily opened their gates; readmitted the exiles, and put him in possession of the supreme power 63 . No sooner did Gelon find himself master of this large and strong city, which he valued above all 58. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. cliv. 59. Id. ibid. Syracuse was saved by the interposition of the Corin- thians and Corcyrxians. Herodot. ubi sup. 60. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cliv. 61. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. civ. *2. Id. ibid. 62. Herodot. ubi sup. others, ANCIENT EUROPE. 442 others, than he placed Gela under the government of his brother Hiero, confining his attention chiefly to Syracuse 64 . And it was worthy of his highest regard; its situation being commanding, its har- bours commodious, and its territory remarkably fer- tile" 5 . Gelon needed such a place, in order to en- able him to maintain his sway over his lately acquired territories ; comprehending many consider- able towns, and extending along the whole eastern coast of Sicily 66 . His first care was, to augment the population of his capital. For this purpose, he destroyed the city of Camarina, and transferred the inhabitants to Syracuse 67 . He also carried thither part of the inhabitants of Gela, granting to both, the privilege of citizens 68 . Gelon likewise conferred the same privilege on part of the Megarean and Euboean colonists, who had resisted his authority. Having vanquished them in the field, he reduced their towns, and trans- planted the more wealthy and respectable inhabitants into his favourite city; allowing them all the rights 64. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clvi. 65. Strabo, lib. vi. p. 273, edit. sup. cit. The whole island of Sicily early was, and still is, distinguished for its fertility. To iu early and natural fertility, Homer bears testimony : " The soil untill'd a ready harvest yields, " With wheat and barley wave the golden fields; " Spontaneous wines from weighty clusters pour, " And genial Jove descends in every show'r." Odys*. lib. ix. And Diodorus informs us, that in the territory of Leontium, and many other parts of Sicily, wheat grew without culture in his time. (Bibltoth, lib. v. init.) The island was, therefore, sacred to Ceres; who thence is said to have communicated her blessings to mankind (Id. ibid.). And surely, adds the Sicilian historian (ubi sup.), none can confer greater benefits than those bestowed by her (the art of husbandry, and the laws to which it gave birth), which include both being and well-being. See also Cicero, Ad Verri m, passim. 66. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. cliv. 67. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clvi 68. Id. ibid. of 444 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Ant. Chr. 480. Olympiad Ixxv. 1. of denizens 69 . But sensible of the difficulty of governing a numerous and disaffected populace, he ordered the inferior class of free people to be .sold in the market of Syracuse for slaves; and under the express condition, that they should be transported out of the island of Sicily 70 . Through the military efforts, and wise policy of Gelon, whose peculiar study it was to promote agri- culture and every useful art, the Syracusians rapidly rose to an astonishing height of power and grandeur; so that the friendship of this prince was courted not only by the Grecian colonies in Sicily and Italy, but also by the ancient Grecian states. The Lacedaemonians and Athenians, the leading people among the confederated Greeks, sent ambas- sadors (as I have formerly had occasion to ob- serve 71 ), soliciting the aid of Gelon against Xerxes, the tremendous Persian monarch, when he was pre- paring to invade Europe with the myriads of Asia 72 . The reply of Gelon, on that occasion, is full of his- torical matter, and highly worthy of regard. " Men of Greece!" said he, " your presumption is great, in desiring me to take part with you, for repelling the barbarian king; seeing you denied me your aid, when I implored it against the barbarian army of the Carthaginians 73 . I am surely under no obligation to states that refused to assist me in my necessity; and left all I now possess to the hazard of falling into the hands of barbarians. But because my affairs have taken a favourable turn, and the barbarian war is carried on against 69. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clvi. 70. Id; ibid. 71. Lett. xii. 72. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clvii. 73. Id. Historiar. lib. vii. cap. clviii. " Greece, ANCIENT EUROPE. 445 w Grecee, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians now LETTER ** condescend to remember Gelon 74 . " I might retaliate contempt, were I so disposed; " hut I shallnot imitate your example. On the contrary, *' I am ready to supply you with two hundred ships, " twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, two thousand " heavy-armed cavalry, two thousand bowmen, two " thousand slinger9, and two thousand light-horse 7 -\ " I will also undertake to supply the whole Grecian " army with corn, during the continuance of the war. li But I cannot agree to perform these engagements, " unless I am made commander in chief of the " Greeks. Nor will I appear in the field, or send " any succour to Greece, unless on these condi- " tions 76 ." Syagrus, the Spartan ambassador, on the conclu- sion of this speech exclaimed, " How would Aga- " memnon, the grandson of Pelops, grieve to hear, u that the Lacedaemonians had yielded the supreme " command to Gelon and the Syracusians! For- " bear, therefore," added he, " to mention this " proposal again. If you are willing to aid Greece, " resolve to march under the conduct of the Lace- " daemonians; for, if you are too proud to act under " their command, we will not accept your assist- " ance 77 . " Spartan friend!" replied Gelon, " though insult* " ing language hath a natural tendency to rouse the " indignation of men, I shall not retort your inso- " lence. But as you so passionately affect the su- " preme command, I cannot forbear to tell you, that " I might, with more justice aspire to that honour, 74. Id. ibid. 75. Id. Historiur. lib. vii. cap. clviii. 76. Id. ibid. 77. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clix. vol. ii. in " because 446 THE HISTORY OF PAIL r I. " because I have a far greater number than you, both v -^ v ^- / " of marine and land-forces 78 . However, as you " are so averse from the requisition I have made, I " will abate something of my first pretensions. If " you insist on commanding the army, I shall have " the conduct of the fleet; or, if you would rather " command at sea, I will be commander on land 79 . " One of these conditions vou must resolve to accept, u or return home, without obtaining any succour " from me 80 ." When Gelon had made this proposal, the Athe- nian ambassador, preventing the answer of the Lace- daemonian delegate, answered thus: — " King of " Syracuse! the Greeks have sent us to you, not to " request a general, but an army. We offered no " objection to the demand you made of command- " ing all the Greets, both by land and sea; because " we were satisfied, that the answer of the Spartan " ambassador would, on that subject, be sufficient " for the honour and interest of both states. But as " you have thought proper to require, since your " relinquishing the whole command, the supreme " command by sea, we must inform you, that al- " though the Lacedaemonians should be willing to " comply with that demand, the Athenians will never " allow you such pre-eminence. For the honour of " the command by sea belongs to us, unless the La- " cedasmonians themselves shall take it: if they have " that intention, we will not oppose them; but we " will never yield the naval command to the people " of any other state"'." To this declaration Gelon made the following reply: — " Athenian stranger! you seem to abound " as much in men who would command, as destitute 7S. Id. Histcriar. lib. vii. cap. clx. , 79. Id. ibid. 80. Herodot. ubi sup. et Aristot. Polilit. lib. viii. cap. xii. 81. Herodotus, lib. vii. cap. clxi. " of ANCIENT EUROPE. 447 " of those who should obey; and as you and the La- LETTER " cedsemonians seem resolved to retain the whole " power in your own hands, depart from my domi- " nions 82 ." The disappointed ambassadors accord- ingly quitted Sicily. From the offer of Gelon to assist the Greeks with so great a naval and military force, if they would in- vest him with the chief command, it appears that he was unacquainted with the treaty between Xerxes and the Carthaginians, or at least with its object; the subjection of the Grecian colonies in Sicily and Italy to the Persian monarch 83 . Gelon seems even to have been ignorant of the hostile purpose of the Carthaginians; who, soon after, invaded Sicily with an army of three hundred thousand men 8 **; composed not only of native troops, but of Phoenicians, Afri- cans, Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians, Sardinians, and Corsicans 85 ; conveved in three thousand transports and victualling ships, accompanied by two thousand ships of war 86 . Such an armament could not have been assembled to revenge a petty quarrel between the Sicilian ty- rants, or princes of Himera and Agrigentum, at the instigation of the tyrant of Rhegium, as Herodotus injudiciously relates 87 . It must have been prepared by the utmost efforts of the Carthaginian state, assist- ed by the money of Xerxes; in order to accomplish the reduction of the Grecian settlements in Sicily and Italy, as Diodorus informs us . 82. Id. lib. vii.cap. clxii. 83 Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 1. 16. vol. ii. S4. Herodotus, Historian lib. vii. cap. cl.xv. Diod. Sicul Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 16, vol. ii. 85. Id. ibid. 86. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 87. Historar. ul>i Bup. 88. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 1. 16, vol.ii. If the Carthaginians were not in alliance with Xerxes, or hired to promote his views, they acted most unwisely in attempting the conquest of an island, to which his arms were expected speedily to extend. Herodot. lib. vii cap. clxiii. Rut 448 THE HISTORY OF PART I. But whatever may be the motives of nations for s, '^^ w/ committing hostilities, they generally endeavour to exhibit a decent pretext for their violences, and take advantage of some circumstance that will favour their purpose. Terillus, prince of Himera, had been dispossessed by Theron, prince or tyrant of Agrigentum 89 . When the Carthaginian forces, under Hamilcar, the son of Hanno. landed in Sicily, they pretended to revenge the quarrel of Terillus 9 ". Dis- embarking at Panormus, they accordingly directed their efforts against Himera, then in the possession of Theron, whose daughter Gelonhad married^ 1 . Theron, seeing this city invested by so numerous an army, dispatched messengers to Gelon, imploring his speedy aid 92 . The tyrant, or prince of Syracuse, on the first notice he had of the danger of Theron, assembled an army of fifty thousand foot, and fiva thousand horse, and marched with all expedition to the assistance of his father-in-law 93 . Hamilcar, on investing Himera, which was a place of great strength, had ordered two large camps to be completely fortified 94 . In one of these he placed his land-forces; and in the other, his ships, which he directed to be drawn ashore; posting in the naval camp all his mariners, and the troops de- signed for sea-service, to protect the fleet 95 . Gelon, in his march to Himera, intercepted a courier carrying letters from the inhabitants of Seli- 89. HerodotHS, lib. vii. cap. clxv. clxvi. 90. Id. ibid. 91. Diodorus Siculus, lib. xi. p. 16, 17, vol. ii. The Carthaginian fleet had been attacked by a storm, on the coast of Africa ; and the ships, on board -which the horses and war-chariots had been embark- ed, were lost. Id. ibid. 92. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 17, vol. ii. 93. Id. ibid. 94. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. ubi sup. 95. Id. ibid. nus. ANCIENT EUROPE. 449 bus, confederates of the Carthaginians, to Hamilcar; by which he was let to understand, that the Cartha- ginian general was to offer next morning, in the naval camp, a solemn sacrifice to Neptune; and that he had directed the Selinuntian cavalry to join him, that day, in the same camp <;0 . Taking advan- tage of this intelligence, Gelon selected an equal number of his own cavalry, ordering them to ad- vance to the enemy's camp, at the appointed hour, as if they had been the Salinutines yr . His orders were put in execution; and the body of Syracusian cavalry was admitted without the smallest suspicion, into the Carthaginian naval encampment 98 . i Hamilcar was then engaged in sacrificing, and the greater number of the marine forces were attend- ing him unarmed". The Syracusian cavalry, there- fore, advancing without opposition to the Carthagi- nian leader, slew him according to the command of Gelon; cut in pieces most of his men, and set fire to the Carthaginian fleet 100 . Gelon, who in th'13 critical conjuncture, had notice of the success of his stratagem, by a signal given from the top of a neighbouring mountain, drew out his army, and attacked the Carthaginian military camp' 01 . The hostile army at first made a gallant resistance; but when intelligence arrived of the death of Hamilcar, their commander in chief; and when they, at the same time, saw all their fleet in a blaze, the troops betook themselves to a precipitant flight' 02 . Then the slaughter was dreadful. No fewer than a hundred and fifty thousand men wc are told, were killed in the battle and pursuit 103 . 90. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 17, vol. ii. 97. Id. lib. xi. p. 18. 98. Id. ibid. 99. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 100. Id. ibid. 101. Id. Bibliotb. lib. xi. p. 18, vol. ii. U)2. Id. ibid. 103. Diod. Sicul ubi rup. The 450 THE HISTORY OF PART I. The remains of the Carthaginian army retired to <^~v~ > —' an eminence, where they made a bold stand against the Greeks; but surrounded On all sides, and having no hopes of relief; being utterly destitute of provi- sions, and in want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion 104 . Gelon, after the battle near Himera, rewarded all his troops, that in action, had signalised themselves; but especially the body of horse, to which he was chiefly indebted for his victory 105 . The richer part of the Carthaginian spoils, which were of an im- mense value, Geloh offered to the gods; adorning with them the temples of Syracuse and Himera 106 . The captives he shared with his ally Theron, who employed them in public works ; and so many were taken, belonging to the Carthaginian fleet and army, that, to use the words of the Sicilian historian, " all " the inhabitants of Africa seemed to have been " transplanted into Sicily 07 ." Some of the citizens of Agrigentum, that had more eminently distin- guished themselves, got each five hundred slaves lo8 . They were all put in chains, and set apart for public labour; and, on this occasion it was, that the Agri- gentines built their famous temple, and constructed those sewers, so much admired by the ancients, and called Pheaces, from Pheax, the overseer and de- signer of the works' 00 . Twenty ships onlv, of the two thousand ships of war, and three thousand transports and victuallers, of which the Carthaginian fleet is said to have consisted, happening to be out at sea, made their escape; and these, before they reached Carthage, were all wrecked in a storm ' °. But a few men, being saved in a small 104. Id. ibid. 105. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 19, 20, vol. ii. 106. Id. ibid. 107. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii. 108. Id. ibid. 109. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 110. Id. Bibliotb. lib. xi. p. 19, vol. ii. boat, ANCIENT EUROPE. 451 boat, carried to the Carthaginian capital intelligence LF.TT£1* of the total defeat of the army of the republic, and the destruction of its fleet"'. The grief, consternation, and despair, which such an unexpected disaster occasioned in that 'city, no language can express. During the first impressions of this consternation, the Carthaginians dispatched ambassadors to Sicily, with injunctions to make peace with Gelon upon any terms" 2 . The ambassadors, on landing at Syracuse, threw themselves at the conque- ror's feet, and begged him to receive their republic into favour" 3 . Gelon listened to them with generous magnanimity; and, being softened into compassion, granted them peace, on the following terms: — That they should pay two thousand talents of silver, in or- der to defray the expenses of the war; build two tem- ples in which the articles of the treaty should be lodg- ed, and held sacred; and that, for the future, they should abstain from offering human sacrifices I4 . But humiliating as these conditions may appear, the Carthaginians did not think them too high a price for peace, which was become absolutely necessary to them in the then state of their affairs; especially as the defeat of the Persian fleet at Salamis, and the consequent retreat of Xerxes, had deprived them of all hopes of succour from their great ally" 5 . They 111. Id. ibid. 112. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 20, 21, vol. ii. 113. Id. ibid. 114. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. This last arti- cle shews the humanity of Gelon's disposition. And it must have been peculiarly mortifying to the Carthaginians ; for nothing is so humbling to a people, ah any alteration prescribed in their religi- ous rites. 115. According to Herodotus (Historian lib. vii. cap. cl.wi .), the Creeks defeated the Armada of Zerxes at Salamis, on the same day that Gelon gained the victory over the Carthaginian forces, in th« neighbourhood of Himera. 452 THE HISTORY OF PART I. even cxceded the articles of the treaty, by sending to v "^^ r ' Si - / Demaretia, Gelon's wife, a crown of gold, valued at three hundred talents of that metal" 6 . This crown Gelon converted into money; and coined pieces of gold, called Demaretia" 7 ; which are admired by modern "antiquarians for the beauty of their exe- cution 1 k n8 Nothing can so fully demonstrate the prodigious overthrow, which the Carthaginians suffered on this occasion, and their loss both of naval and military force, as their total inaction, on the side of Sicily, for almost a century, after the battle fought near Himera. Meantime the Sicilian Greeks made rapid advances in wealth and power: and surpassed all the neighbouring nations in civility, refinement, and attention to the elegant arts. Gelon, soon after his victory, having received in- formation of the defeat of the armada of Xerxes at Salamis, and of the retreat of that magnificent mo- narch, the declared enemy of the Grecian name, dis- banded his forces' 10 . His native troops he ordered to retire to their several homes; and his mercenaries he quartered in places at a distance from the me- tropolis 120 . During this season of peaceful tranquillity, Gelon summoned a general assembly of the inhabitants of Syracuse ; desirjng them to come armed, as if they had been to encounter an enemy 121 . When they met, he appeared among them, in the habit of a 11G. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii. 117. Id. ibid. 118. Mem. de Travoux, l'Ann. 1727, p. 1449. Mitford, Hist, of Greece, cap. xi. sect. i. 119. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii. \'w\. Far. Hist. lib. xiii. cap. xxxvii. 120. Id. ibid. 121. Diod. Sicul. et /Elian, ubi sup. private ANCIENT EUROPE. 453 private citizen, unarmed, and unattended 12 *; and gave them an account of his whole conduct, in peace and in war; shewing to what uses he had applied the sums of money with which he had been entrusted, and in what manner he had exercised his authority: — observing, that he had never in view any thing but the public good; yet, if they thought he had abused his authority, they might inflict on him what punish- ment they thought fit, as he was unarmed, and without guards, and they all armed, and in force to execute vengeance' 23 . The Syracusians, charmed with so candid a de- claration, but more especially with the confidence reposed in them, applauded with loud acclamations the speech of Gelon; styling him their benefactor, their deliverer, their king 124 . This last title, which Gelon had hitherto declined, the citizens obliged him to accept before he quitted the assembly; and en- treated him to continue in the exercise of sovereign- ty 125 . Nor did their gratitude stop here. A decree was instantly passed, settling the succession to the kingdom of Syracuse, after the death of Gelon, on two of his brothers, Hiero and Thrasybulus. And because he had, by coming without arms or guards into the assembly, put his life into the hands of the people, the Syracusians (willing to transmit to the latest posterity the memory of a circumstance so much to his honour) ordered a statue to be erected, representing him in the simple civic habit in which he had then appeared 120 . The citizens of Syracuse had no reason to repent of having invested Gelon with the ensigns of royalty; 122. Id. ibid. 123. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 21, vol. ii. Elian, Var. Bin. lib. xiii. cap. xxxvii. 124. Id. ibid. 125. Diod. Sicul. et Elian, ubi sup. 126. Id. ibid. vol. ii. 3 n for 454 THE HISTORY OF PA.KT I. for he was so attentive to the happiness of his sub- v ^~' r "' w ' jects, that he made monarchy appear the best of governments, to a people ever jealous of freedom 127 . He took care, however, to secure his sway against the danger of democratical tumults, by bestowing all the rights of Syracusian citizens on ten thousand foreign soldiers' 23 ; who had acted under him as mercenaries, and distinguished themselves by their valour and fidelity. Nor does this strong measure seem to have given violent disgust; for Gelon con- tinued to preserve not only the love and esteem, but to command the admiration of his subjects to the end of his reign' 29 . These regards he owed to his humanity, truth, and sincerity; never wilfully injuring any one, nor ever making a promise, which he did not fulfil to the extent of his power' 30 . The encouragement of agriculture was one of the chief objects of Gelon's policy. With this view, he took much pains to make his subjects consider the cultivation of the ground as an honourable employ- ment. He even animated the husbandmen by his presence; and set them an example of industry, by spending his leisure hours in labouring in the fields' 3 '. But his purpose, in promoting agriculture, was not merely to render the Syracusian territory, naturally rich and fertile, more productive: he sought also to inure his subjects to useful toil, and by these to preserve them from the many disorders, which inevi- tably attend on a life of indolence and sloth' 52 . Ade- clared enemy to luxury, pomp, and soft indulgence, he used his utmost efforts to banish from his dominions 127. Plut. Vit. Died. 128. Died. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. S3, vol. ii. 129. Id. p. 20. 130. Plut. in Apophth. p. 175, edit. Lutet. Tans, 162i. 131. Id ibid. 132. Plut. ubi sup. the ANCIENT EUROPE. 455 the practitioners of all the arts that have a tendency to debauch the manners, or enervate the courage of a people' 33 . Through the prudent policy, and wise govern- ment of Gelon, regulated by the strictest maxims of equity, plenty abounded over the whole Syracusian territory, and the laws were respected in every city' 34 . And, in consequence of his signal victory over the Carthaginians, who no longer approached the Sici- lian shores, together with the conciliating measures he employed to quiet dissensions among the several states, Sicily enjoyed profound peace during the reign of Gelon 135 : a short, but happy period. He died in the sixth year after he had been publicly de- Anr.Chr. clared king' 36 . He was buried within the nine tow- olympiad ers, where his queen had been interred; stupendous lxxvi. 3. edifices, twenty-five miles distant from Syracuse: — and thither his funeral was attended by the whole body of the citizens' 37 . The Syracusians erected a magnificent monument over his grave, and decreed him the honours due to deified heroes' 38 . This monument, observes Diodorus' 39 , was after- ward destroyed by the Carthaginians, in warring against the Syracusians; and the nine towers were demolished, through envy, by the tyrant Agathoc- les. But, adds the Sicilian historian, neither vio- lence, nor envy, nor time, which ruin all things, could extinguish the lustre of Gelon's name, or efface the memory of his illustrious actions''"; en- graved by love and gratitude in the hearts of the Syracusians' 4 . Gelon 133. Id. Apoppth. p. 173. 134. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi.p. 29, 30, vol. ii. 135. Id. ibid. 136. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi.p. 30. 137. Id. ibid. 138. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 139. Jiiblioth. lib. xi. p. 30, vol. ii. 140. Id. ibid. 141. Nothingcan more r.trongly demonstrate the sincere love and ve- neration of the Syracusiaru for the memory of Gelon, than the respect which 456 THE HISTORY OF PART I. Gelon was succeeded in the Syracusian throne by s-^~^^w his brother Hiero, who reigned eleven years and eight months' 42 . This accomplished prince sullied the glory of the beginning of his reign, by an un- manly jealousy of his brother Polyzelus; whom he suspected, because of his popularity, of a design to usurp the sceptre' 43 . He, therefore, became diffi- dent of the Syracusians, and disgusted them by em- ploying only foreigners to attend upon his person, and form his guards 144 . Nor did the jealousy of Hiero confine itself to these precautions. Having raised an army to assist the Sybarites, besieged by the Crotcnians, he proposed that Polyzelus should head it, and pass into Italy; both to remove him to a distance, and in hopes that he might fall in battle' 45 . But Polyzelus, suspecting his brother's purpose, re- fused the command; and, in order to avoid the resentment of Hiero, sought refuge in the court of Theron, king of Agrigentum' 46 . Hiero made great preparations for war, designing to take vengeance on the fugitive, and also on his protector 47 . Meantime the inhabitants of Himera, being grievously oppressed by Thrasideus, the son of Theron, their governor, and not daring to complain to his father, whose partiality they dreaded, secretly sent ambassadors to Hiero; offering to deliver up to him their city, and join him against his rival, the which they paid to his statue, an hundred and thirty years after his death. When Timoleon was rescuing them from the tyranny of Dionysius the younger, and the statues of their former kings were ordered to be removed from their pedestals, and sold to defray the expenses of the war (Plut. Vit. Timol.), the statue of Gelon was honourably e?;cepted (id. ibid.) ; and allowed singly to maintain its place, amid all the rage of democratic fury. 142. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 20. 143. Id. p. 37. 144. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 37, vol. ii. 145. Id. ibid. 116. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup 147. Id. ibid. king ANCIENT EUROPE. 457 king of Agrigentum' 43 . But the Syracusian monarch, detesting such treachery, discovered the negotiation of the Himerians to Theron' 49 ; who, warmed with x gratitude, laid aside all rivalry, and became his con- fidential friend; interposed his influence in favour of Polyzelus, and prevailed upon Hiero to receive him into favour' 50 . Henceforth, perfect harmony seems to have subsisted between the kings of Syra- cuse and Agrigentum, during the remainder of the reign of Theron. During this term of Sicilian tranquillity, Hiero and Theron, the most illustrious and munificent princes of their time, were eminently distinguished by their triumphs at the Olympic and other Grecian games; by their liberality to men of learning and genius, who were hospitably entertained, and patron- ised at their splendid courts' 5 '; and who repaid their patronage, by celebrating their virtues and vic- tories. The immortal Pindar thus rapturously speaks of Theron: " Ye Choral Hymns, harmonious lays, " Sweet rulers of the Lyric string ! " What God, what Hero's godlike praise ** What mortal shall we sing ? " With Jove, with Pisa's'^ 2 guardian god, " Begin, O Muse .' th' Olympic Ode. " Alcides, Jove's heroic son, " The second honours claims ; 148. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. xxxvii. 149. Id. ibid. 150. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 151. Xer.oph. Hieron.et Schol. in Pind. 152. Pisa and Olympia have been mistaken for the same place; but they were distinct. Olympia stood in the territory of Pisa, and at no great distance from that city. « Who 458 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " Who, offering up the spoils from Augeas won, s^«"V*Nb/ » Establish'd to his sire th' Olympic games ; " Where, bright in wreaths of conquest, Theron shone. u Then of victorious Theron sing, U of Theron hospitable, just, and great ! " Fam'd Agrigentum's honour'd king, " The prop and bulwark of her towering state ; " A righteous prince ! whose flowering virtues grace " The venerable stem of his illustrious race. " A race long exercised in woes, " Ere, smiling o'er her kindred flood, " The mansion of their wish'd repose, " Their sacred city stood ; " And through amaz'd Sicilia shone " The lustre of their fair renown. " Thence, as the milder fates decreed, " In destined order born, " Auspicious hours with smoother pace succeed ; " While power and wealth the noble line adom, " And Public Favour, Virtue's richest meed. " Forth from this venerable root " .Enesidamus'53 and his Theron spring; " For whom I touch the Dorian flute, « For whom triumphant strike my sounding string. " Due to his glory is the Aonian strain, " Whose virtue gain'd the prize on famed Olympia's plain. " Alone in fam'd Olympia's sand » " The victor's chaplet Theron wore ; " But with him on th' Isthmxan strand, " On sweet Castalia's shore' 54, 153. Theron's father. 154. The Isthmxan games were celebrated at the isthmus of Cor- inth, whence they took their name; and the Pythian games, on the banks of the river or brook Castalia, in Phocis, proceeding from a fountain at the foot of mount Parnassui. " The ANCIENT EUROPE. 45* " The verdant crowns 1 55, the proud reward LETTER " Of victory, his brother 1 S 5 shared; xv - " Copartner in immortal praise, " As warm'd with equal zeal " The light-foot courser's generous breed to raise, " And whirl around the goal the fervid wheel. u The painful strife Olympia's wreath 1 5? repays: " But wealth with nobler virtue join'd, " The means and fair occasions must procure; " In glory's chace must aid the mind u Expense, and toil, and danger to endure : " With mingling rays they feed each other's flame, " And shine the brightest lamp in all the sphere of fame. " Come on ! thy brightest shafts prepare, " And bend, O Muse ! thy sounding bow ; " Say, through what paths of liquid air " Our arrows shall we throw ? " On Agrigentum fix thine eye ; " Thither let all thy quiver fly. " And thou, O Agrigentum, hear ! " While with religious dread, " And taught the laws of virtue to revere, " To Heavenly Vengeance I devote my head, " If aught to Truth repugnant now I swear ; " Swear, that no state revolving o'er " The long memorials of recorded days " Can shew, in all her boasted store, " A name to parallel thy Theron's praise ; " One to the acts of friendship so inclined, " So famed for virtuous deeds, and love of humankind. « Yet 155. The Isthmian crown was composed either of parsley, or the branches of the pine-tree, and the Pythian crown was formed of the branches of the laurel. 156. Xenocrates. 157. The Olympian wreath or crown was formed of the branches of the sacred olive, which grew near the temple of Minerva at Athens. As the victors passed along the stadion, after they had received the crown, thty were saluted with the acclamations of the tpcctatu'i, 460 * THE HISTORY OF PART I. " Y et natn - obstreperous Envy sought to drown v^-v-%./ " The goodly music of his sweet renown ; " While, by some frantic spirits borne along " To mad attempts of violence and wrong, " She turned against him Faction's raging flood, " And strove with evil deeds to conquer good 1 * 8 . " But who can number every sandy grain " Washed by Sicilia's hoarse-resounding main ? " Or who can Theron's generous works express, " And tell how many hearts his bounteous virtues blessW The Theban bard addresses Hiero, in language no less expressive of approbation. " Who along the desert air " Seeks the faded starry train, " When the sun's meridian car " Round illumes th' stherial plain ? " Who a nobler theme can chuse " Than Olympia's sacred games? " What more apt to fire the muse, " When her various songs she frames ? " Songs in strains of wisdom dress'd, " Great Saturnius to record, " And by each rejoicing guest " Sung at Hiero's festive board. " In pastoral Sicilia's fruitful soil, " The righteous sceptre of imperial pow'r " Great Hiero wielding, with illustrious toil, " Plucks every blooming virtue's fairest flow'r, spectators, accompanied with a shower of herbs and flowers poured on them from every side. See West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games, sect. xvi. et auct. cit. 158. The poet here alludes to a sedition raised against Theron, by- two of his kinsmen, who had received many obligations from him. Schol. in Pind. Olymp ii. 159. Pind. Olymp. ii. West's Translat. " His ANCIENT EUROPE. 4G1 " His royal splendour to adorn : LETTER " Nor doth his skilful hand refuse xv - " Acquaintance with the tuneful Muse ^^^^s^ u When round the mirthful board the harp is borne li \ " Down then from the glittering nail " Take, () Muse ! thy Dorian lyre 16 '; " If the love of Pisa's vale " Pleasing transports can inspire ; " Or the rapid footed steed " Could with joy thy bosom move, " When unwhipt, with native speed, " O'er the dusty course he drove ; *' And where deck'd with olive, flows " Alpheus ! thy immortal flood' 62 , " On his Lord's triumphant brows . " The Olympic wreath bestow'd : — " Hiero's royal brows, whose care " Tends the courser's noble breed ; " Pleas'd to nurse the pregnant mare, " Pleas'd to train the youthful steed. u Now on that heroic land " His far beaming glories beat ; " Where, with all his Phrygian band " Pelops lix'd his honour'd seat ; " Pelops, by the god beloved, " Whose strong arms the globe embrace' 6 ; " When, by Jove's high orders moved, " Clotho bless'd the healing vase. 160. This, it seems, was a custom among the ancient Greeks, that every one might discover his skill in music, by touching the instru- ment. 161. The term Dorian is here given to the lyre, In order to inti- mate, that this ode was adapted to the Dorian mood, the most solemn of the three kinds of Grecian music; namely, the Dorian, Lydian, and Phvgian. 162. The Alpheus was a river hi Ellis, on whose banks the Olympic games were celebrated. 163. Neptune. vol. II. 2 9 " Forth 462 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " Forth from the cauldron to new life restored, v^-v^w " Pleased with the lustre of his ivory arm 16 *. " Young Pelops rose ; so ancient tales record, " And much those tales unheeding mortals charm ; " While gaudy Fiction, decked with art, " And dress'd in every winning grace, " To Truth's unornamented face " Preferr'd, seduces oft the human heart. " Happy he, whose glorious brow " Pisa's honour'd chaplets crown; " Calm his stream of life shall flow, " Shelter'd by his high renown. " That alone is bliss supreme ; " Which, unknowing to decay, " Still with ever-shining beam . " Gladdens each succeeding day. " Then for happy Hiero weave " Garlands of JLolian strains ; " Him these honours to receive " The Olympic law ordains. " Nor more worthy of her lay " Can the Muse a mortal find ; " Greater in imperial sway, " Richer in a virtuous mind. 164. The fabulous story of Pelops is to the following purport. Tantalus, king of Phrygia, the father of Pelops, being to give, in his turn, a dinner to the gods; but, having nothing fit to offer them, killed his son Pelops : and, after having cut him in pieces and boiled him, set his flesh upon the table. Jupiter, however, having discovered the impious cheat, ordered Mercury to put the members again into the cauldron ; whence, by the power of the Fates, the handmaids of Jupiter, Pelops came out alive again. And to supply the loss of his arm, devoured by some of the hungry deities, who were unwilling to be defrauded of their expected meal, the Fates bestowed upon him an arm of ivory. *« Heaven, ANCIENT EUROPE. " Heaven, O King ! with tender care " Waits thy wishes to fulfil, " Then 'ere long will I prepare, " Placed on Chronium's sunny hill' 6 *, *' Thee in sweeter verse to praise, " Following thy victorious steeds ; *' If to prosper all thy ways, " Still thy guardian god proceeds. 463 LETTER XV. " Fate has in various stations placed mankind : " In royal power the long gradations end : " By that horizon prudently confined, " Let not thy hopes to farther views extend. " Long may'st thou wear the regal crown, " And may thy bard his wish receive ; " With thee, and such as thee to live, t* Around his native Greece for wisdom known ,66 ." But the ardour of Hiero to obtain the Olympic crown, or the honour of victory in other Grecian games, did not divert his mind from political objects, either internal or external. The same year, that he came to a reconciliation with Theron, he transplant- ed the inhabitants of Catana and Naxus to Leon- tium ; re-peopled those cities and their districts with five thousand men, invited 1 from Peloponnesus, and an equal number sent from Syracuse; and gave to Catana the name of Etna' 67 , from the famous moun- tain so called, in its neighbourhood. He also sent a fleet to the assistance of the Grecian colony of Cumn, in Italy, then sorely oppressed at sea by the Tyrrhenians or Etruscans 6K . And the Syracu- sians defeated the Etruscans in a great naval engage- ment; sunk many of their ships; and utterly broke 165. This hill was so near Olympia, that thence might he seen all the races in the stadion. 160. Find. Ofymp. i. West's Trarulat. 167. Diod. Sicul. MiUiotb. lib. xi. p. 37, vol ii. 168. Id V 39. the 464 THE HISTORY OF PART I. the maritime force' 69 of that ancient, and long pow- v- ^ v ^^'^ erful people. Some years after these events, Hiero was victor in the chariot race at the Pythian games. On that occasion, Pindar addressed to him the following ode, pregnant with historical matter. " Hail, Golden Lyre ! whose heaven-invented string " To Phoebus and the black-hair'd Nine belongs ; " Who in sweet chorus, round their tuneful king, " Mix with thy sounding chords their sacred songs. 11 The Dance, gay Queen of Pleasure ! thee attends ; " Thy jocund strains her listening feet inspire ; " And each melodious tongue its voice suspends, " Till thou, Great Leader of the Heavenly Quire ! " With wanton art preluding givest the sign : — " Swells the full concert then with harmony divine. " Then of their streaming lightnings alldisarm'd " The smouldering thunderbolts of Jove expire ; " Then by the music of thy numbers charm'd, " TheBirds' fierce monarch 70 drops his vengeful ire: " Perch 'd on the sceptre of the Olympian King, " The thrilling darts of harmony he feels ; " And indolently hangs his rapid wing, "While gentle sleep his closing eye-lids seals ; " And o'er his heaving limbs, in loose array, " To every balmy gale the ruffling feathers play. " Ev'n Mars, stern god of violence and war, u Soothes with thy lulling strains his furious breast ; " And, driving from his heart each bloody care, " His pointed lance consigns to peaceful rest. " Nor less enraptured, each immortal mind " Owns the soft influence of enchanting song ; u When, in melodious symphony combined, " T\v oon, Latona ! and the tuneful throng 162. Diod. SIcuL ubi sup. 170. The eagle. « Of ANCIENT EUROPE. 465 " Of Muses, skill'd in wisdom's deepest lore, " The subtle powers of Verse, and Harmony explore. " But they on Earth, or the devouring Main, " Whom righteous Jove with detestation views, " With envious horror hear the Heavenly strain, " Exiled from Praise, from Virtue, and the Muse. " Such is Typhoeus 171 , impious foe of Gods, " Whose hundred-headed form Cilicia's cave " Once foster'd in her infamous abodes; " Till daring with presumptuous arm to brave " The might of thundering Jove, subdued he fell, " Plunged in the horrid dungeons of profundest Hell. " Now under sulphurous Cuma's' 71 sea-bound coast, " And vast Sicilia lies his shaggy breast 1 ^ ; " By snowy iEtna, nurse of endless frost, " The pillar'd prop of Heaven ! forever press'd. " Forth from those nitrous caverns issuing rise " Pure liquid fountains of tempestuous fire, " And veil in ruddy mists the noon-day skies : " While, wrapp'd in smoke the eddying flames aspire ; " Or, gleaming through the night, with hideous roar " Far o'er the reddening main huge rocky fragments pour. *, But he, Vulcaniun monster ! to the clouds " The fiercest, hottest inundations throws, " While with the burthen of incumbent woods, " And ./Etna's gloomy cliffs o'erwhelm'd, he glows. 171. Typochus appears to have been an allegorical personage, re- presentative of the sulphureous lire contained in the bowels of th« earth, and which has broke out in various countries, both in an- cient and modern times: but in Lurope, chiefly from the craters in the mountains /Etna and Vesuvius (Strabo, lib. v. p. 217, 243, edit, sup cit.), to the eruptions of which Pindar confines his descripiion. 172. Cuma stood in the neighbourhood of mount Vesuviu,. Stra- bo, lib. v. p. 248. 173. Pindar seems here to insinuate, and Strabo supports the pot- tical conjecture (C>eog. lib. v. p. 248), that the ignited matter ex- tended from Sicily to Italy; and that there was a communication, by •averns, between ^tna and Vesuvius " There 486 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " There, on his flinty bed, outstretch'd he lies, v ^" v "^- / " Where pointed rock his tossing carcase wounds ; " There with dismay he strikes beholding eyes, " Or frights the distant ear with horrid sounds. " O save us from thy wrath, Sicilian Jove ! " Thou that here reign'st, adored in .-Etna's sacred grove. " iEtna, fair forehead of this fruitful land ! " Whose borrowed name adorns the Royal Town ; " Raised by illustrious Hiero's generous hand, " And rendered glorious with his high renown. " By Pythian heralds were her. praises sung, " When Hiero triumph'd in the dusty course ; " When sweet Castalia with applauses rung, " And glorious Laurels crown'd the conquering Horse. " The happy city for her future days " Presages hence increase of victory and praise. " Thus when the mariners, to prosperous winds, " The port forsaking, spread their swelling sails, " The fair departure cheers their jocund minds " With pleasing hopes of favourable gales ; " While, o'er the dangerous desert of the main, " To their loved country they pursue their way : " Ev'n so, Apollo ! thou whom Lycia's plain, " Whom Delos and Castalia's springs obey, " These hopes regard, and .Etna's glory raise " With valiant sons, triumphant steeds, and heavenly lays. " For Human Virtue from the Gods proceeds ; " They the wise Mind bestow'd, and smooth'd the Tongue " With Elocution, and for mighty deeds " The nervous arm with manly .vigour strung. " All these are Hiero's : these to rival lays " Call forth the Bard. Arise then, Muse ! and speed " To this contention ; strive in Hiero's praise, " Nor fear thy efforts shall his worth exceed : « Within ANCIENT EUROPE. 467 " Within the lines of Truth secure to throw, LETTER. " Thy dart shall still surpass each vain attempting foe 17 *. xv - " So may succeeding ages, as they roll, " Great Hiero still in wealth and bliss maintain j " And joyous health recalling, on his soul " Oblivion pour of life-consuming pain' 7 *. " Yet may thy memory with sweet delight " The various dangers and the toils recount, " Which in intestine wars and bloody fight " Thy patient virtue Hiero did surmount; " What time, by Heaven above all Grecians crown'd, " The prize of sovereign sway with thee thy brother found 1 ' 6 . " Then, like the son of Psean, didst thou war, " Smit with the arrows of a sore disease ; " While, as along slow rolls thy sickly Car, il Love and amaze the haughtiest bosoms seize. " In Lemnos pining with th' envenom'd wound " The son ofPxan, Philoctetes lay 177 : " There, after tedious quest, the heroes found, " And bore the limping archer thence away ; " By whom fell Priam's tow'rs, so Fate ordain'd, " And the long harass'd Greeks their wish'd repose ob- tain'd. 174. The metaphor here used by Pindar is borrowed from ore of the five exercises of the pentathlon; namely, darting, in which, he who threw his dart farthest, within certain lines, was declared vic- tor; whereas he, whose dart struck without those lines, whatever might be the length of the throw, had no title to claim the envied crown. See West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games, sect. ix. 175. Hiero was afflicted with the stone or gravel. Schol. in Pind. Pyth. i. 176. Hiero, as I have had occasion to observe, on the airhority of Herodotus (Hi- toriar. lib. vii cap. clvi.), was invested with the so- vereignty of Gela, by his brother Gelon, when the latter prince ob- tained possession of Syracuse. 177. Tin story of Philoctetesis too well known to require expli- cation. " May 468 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " May Hiero too, like Paean's son, receive ^-^-vsw' " Recover'd vigour from celestial hands ; " And may the Healing God proceed to give " The power to gain whate'er his wish demands. " But now, O Muse ! address thy sounding lays " Toyoung Dinomenes'? 3 , his virtuous heir, " Sing to Dinomcnes his father's praise ; " His father's praise shall glad his filial ear. " For him hereafter shalt thou touch the string, " And chant in friendly strains fair ^Etna's future king. " Hiero for him th' illustrious city rear'd'79, " And fill'd with sons of Greece her steely tow'rs ; " Where, by the free-born citizen revered " The Spartan laws exert their virtuous powers. " For by the statutes which their father's gave, " Still must the restive Dorian youth be led ; " Who, dwelling once on cold Eurota's wave, " Where proud Taygetus exults her head, " From the great stock of Hercules divine, " And warlike Pamphylus deriv'd their noble line. " These from Thessalian Pindus rushing down, " The walls of famed Amyclse once possess'd ; " And in rich Fortune's gifts and high renown, " Dwelt near the Twins of Leda, while they press'd " Their milky coursers, and the pastures o'er " Of neighbouring Argos ranged, in arms supreme. " To King and People, on the flowery shore " Of lucid Amena, Sicilian stream ! " Grant the like fortune, Jove ! with like desert, " The splendour of their race with glory to assert. 178. Dinomenes bore the name of his grandfather. 179. The Syracusians having nominated Hiero, and his brother Thrasybulus, after him, as the successor of Gelon, when they for- mally invested that great man with the sovereignty of Syracuse, (Schol. in Pind. Pyth. i.), Hiero was naturally led to seek a regal succession for his son. And he accordingly built and peopled for him the city of ./Etna, in the territory of Catana, one of the most fertile districts in Sicily. « And ANCIENT EUROPE. 469 u And do thou aid Sicilia's hoary Lord LETTER " To form and rule his son's obedient mind ; xv - " And still in golden chains of sweet accord, v^"v^-/ " And mutual peace the friendly people bind. " Then grant, O son of Saturn ! grant my pray'r, " The bold Phoenician on his shore detain ; " And may the hardy Tuscan never dare " To vex with clamorous war Sicilia's main ; " Remembering, Hiero ! how on Cuma's coast, " Wreck'd by his stormy arms their groaning fleet was lost. " What terrors, what destruction them assail'd ! " Hurl'd from their riven decks, what numbers died ! " When o'er their might Sicilia's chief prevail'd, " Their youth o'erwhelming in the foamy tide' 80 , " Greece from impending servitude to save' 8 '. " Thy favour, glorious Athens ! to acquire " Would I record the Salaminian wave, " Famed in thy triumphs; and my tuneful Lyre " To Sparta's sons, with sweetest praise, should tell " Beneath Cithaerou's shade what Median archers fell. " But on Himera's fair wide-water'd shores " Thy sons, Dinomenes' 8 *, my lyre demand; u To grace their virtues with the various stores " Of sacred verse, and sing the illustrious band "Of 180. Pindar, in compliment to Hiero, seems here to have blended the victory gained by this prince over the Tyrrhenians or Etruscans off the coast of Cnma, with that gained by Gelon and Theron over the Carthaginians, near Himera; in which battle, it appears (Schol. in Pind. Pjtb. i.) Hiero had a share. 181. This hint of a contemporary writer, That the efforts of Gelon were essential to Grecian liberty, together with the allusion that follows, to the battle of Salamis, and the destruction of the Cartha- ginian fleet on the coast of Sicily, corroborates the narration of Dio- dorus ; and prove-;, That the Carthaginians were then in alliance, or co-operating with Zcrxes, as auxiliaries, for the extinction of Gre- cian freedom. 182. The father of Gelon, Hiero, and Thrasybulus ; who seem all 470 THE HISTORY OF PART I. " Of valiant brothers, who from Carthage won v-^-vn»/ " The glorious meed of conquest, deathless praise! " A pleasing theme ; but Censure's dreaded frown " Compels me to contract my spreading lays : u In verse, conciseness pleases every guest, " While each impatient blames, and loaths a tedious feast. <* Nor less distasteful is excessive fame " To the sour palate of the envious mind ; " Who hears with grief his neighbour's goodly name, M And hates the fortune that he ne'er shall find. " Yet in thy virtue, Hiero ! persevere ; " Since to be envied is a nobler fate " Than to be pitied. Let strict justice steer, " With equitable hands, the helm of state ; " And arm thy tongue with truth ; O king ! beware " Of every step ; a prince can never lightly err. " O'er many cities art thou set to deal " The goods of fortune, with impartial hand ; {< And ever watchful of the public weal, " Unnumber'd witnesses around thee stand. " Then would thy virtuous ear for ever feast " On the sweet melody of well-earn'd fame, H In generous purposes confirm thy breast, " Nor dread expenses that will grace thy name j *' But scorning sordid and unprincely gain, " Spread all thy beauteous sails, and launch into the main, " When in the mould'ring urn the monarch lies, " His fame in lively characters remains ; " Or graved in monumental histories, " Or deck'd and painted in Aonian strains. " Thus fresh and fragrant, and immortal, blooms " The virtue, Croesus ! of thy gentle mind ; « While fate to infamy and hatred dooms to have distinguished themselves in gaining the victory over th« Carthaginians near Himera; where the naval and military force of Carthage was totally cut off or destroyed. « Sicilian ANCIENT EUROPE. * Sicilia's tyrant' 8 ?, scorn of human kind; LITTEli tl Whose ruthless bosom swell'd with cruel pride, xv - W " When in the Brazen Bull the broiling wretches died. v ^^ v ^^^ " Him, therefore, nor in sweet society " The generous youth conversing ever name ; " Nor with the harp's delightful melody " Mingle his odious inharmonious fame. " The first, the greatest bliss on man conferr'd, " Is in the acts of virtue to excel ; " The second to obtain the high reward, " The soul-exalting praise of doing well : " Who both these lots attains is bless'd indeed, " Since fortune here below can give no richer meed' 8 *. Hiero, soon after his Pythian victory, found him- self engaged in a war with the Agrigentines; under the conduct of Thrasideus, the son of Theron, who had succeeded his father in the sovereignty But he was very unlike that good and generous prince; for he no sooner assumed the sceptre, than he began to oppress his people in a tyrannical manner' 85 . Hiero, from the respect which he bore to the memory of Theron, advised his son and successor to treat his subjects with more lenity. But this whole- some advice was lost on Thrasideus: and so pro- voked that new monarch, who was naturally a man of an irascible temper, that he entered the Syracu- sian territory with an army of twenty thousand horse and foot' 85 . Hiero took the field against the en- raged invader, at the head of a respectable body of forces. The Agrigentine prince did not decline the combat, which was bloody; six thousand men, on 183. P'jalaris, whose story, false or true, is too well known to re- quire explication, but too ill authenticated to be ingrafted into th« page of history. 184. Pind. Pytb. i. West's Trantlat. 385. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 39, 40, vol. ii. 186. M. Ibid. both 472 THE HISTORY OF 'ART I. both sides, being slain: two thousand Syracusians, -*" v ^' / and four thousand of the invading army' 87 . The Syracusians, however, gained a complete vic- tory. And Thrasideus, abdicating the government of Agrigentum, in consequence of his defeat, sought refuge in the territory of the Misean Megareans; where, being condemned to suffer the punishment of death, he laid violent hands upon himself l38 . On that abdication, the Agrigentines recovered their freedom, and entered into an alliance with Hiero' 8 °. This magnanimous prince died soon after at the city of Catana, to which he had given the name of ./Etna, and was there buried with great funeral pomp. 90. Hiero was succeeded in the government of Syra- cuse by his younger brother Thrasybulus, who prac- tised all sorts of cruelty upon his subjects 9 '. Every one that gave him the least disgust was assassinat- ed; and the most wealthy citizens, on false accusa- tions and unjust judgments, had their estates confis- cated, and were either punished with death, or con- demned to perpetual exile' 92 . These inhuman and tyrannical proceedings soon grew insupportable to the Syracusians; who, enter- ing into an association, had recourse to arms, and declared Thrasybulus an enemy to the state 93 . That cruel and rapacious prince, seeing the whole body of his people become hostile to him, attempted at first to appease them by fair words; but, finding they were resolute, he took refuge with his guards and mercenaries in the division of the city called Acradina, and of the adjoining island of Ortygia,/ 187. Id. Eiblioth. lib. xi. p. 40. 189. Diod. Sicul. lib xi. p. 40. 191. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 50, vol. i'd 192. Id. lib. xi. p. 51 183. Id. ibid. 190. Id. ibid. 193. Id. ibid. the ANCIENT EUROPE. . 47J the original city, which formed the great harbour: LETTER and thence made frequent sallies upon the insur- gents, who were masters of the higher and more con- siderable division of the city, called Tyche' 94 . The Syracusians sent messengers to Gela, Agri- gentum, and other Sicilian cities, desiring the inhabi- tants to join in the common cause of liberty, and send speedy aid to their support; as on the fate of the ca- pital depended the whole Syracusian territory 93 . On this intimation, the people every where ran to arms; and, joining the Syracusians, encouraged them to ha- zard a general engagement with Thrasybulus and h'13 mercenaries' 96 . This engagement was attended with success. Thrasybulus was defeated both by sea and land; and, being closely besieged, in Acradina and the island of Ortygia, he sent deputies to capitulate with his justly incensed people' 97 . The only terms he could obtain, it appears, were these: That his life should be spared, on condition that he should resign the sovereignty of Syracuse, and retire out of Sici- ly' 98 . Compelled to submit; and having divested himself of all power and authority, he retired to Lo- cris^, in Italy, where he led a private life' 99 . On the resignation of Thrasybulus, Syracuse and the other cities, that had been subject to him, were declared free, and a popular government was eveiy where established and maintained, within the Syra- cusian territory and its dependencies 210 . Thus res- tored to their former liberty, the Syracusians called a general assembly, in which it was unanimously de- creed, That a colosseal statue should be erected to Jove the deliverer; that on the anniversary of the happy day, on which they had regained their frcc- 194. Diod. Sicul. Diblioth. lib. xi. p. '51, vol. ii. 195. Id. ibid. 196. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 52. 1! 7. Id. ibid. 198. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 52. 199. Id il>id. 200. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi p. 55, vol. ii. dom, xv. 474 THE HISTORY OF PART I. dom, public games should be annually exhibited ; that four hundred and fifty bulls should be annually sacrificed, in thanksgiving to the gods, and all the people feasted with the flesh 2o: . The Syracusians at the same time decreed, that magistrates, according to ancient custom, should be chosen from among the chief citizens; and that none of the foreigners, who had been made denizens by Gelon, should be permitted to enjoy any civil office 20 *. This decree incensed the foreigners, who could not brook such odious distinction, after they had been put by Gelon, for their services, upon an equality with the native citizens 203 . Having, therefore, complained in vain of the obnoxious decree, which deprived them of their ci- vil rights, the naturalised foreigners, to the number of seven thousand, united together; and resolving to extort, by force of arms, what they could no longer obtain by other means, they seized Acradina and Ortygia 204 , and thence annoyed the upper part of the city of Syracuse 205 . t These foreign insurgents fortified themselves so strongly in their posts, that the native Syracusians, though far superior in numbers, could not dislodge them, after they had driven them within their walls 206 . They therefore, having vanquished them at sea, shut 201. Id. ibid. 202. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 203. Id. ibid^ 201. Ortvgia, where the Corinthians, who founded the city of Syracuse, first settled, appears then to have been an island (Thu- Cydid. lib. vi. cap. iii.); but before the sera of the Peloponnesian xvslt, it was no longer washed round by the sea (Id. ibid.). And, consequently was no longer an island, though generally so called by historians. '205. Diod. Sicul. Bib'ioth. lib. xi. p. 56, vol. ii. 206. Id. lib. xi. p. 57. then* ANCIENT EUROPE. 475 them up closely on all sides, that they might receive LETTER no supply of provisions ; and thus resolved to compel them by famine either to surrender at discretion, or to come out and hazard an engagement 307 . The besieg- ed malecontents, who greatly surpassed their antago- nists in military skill 208 , chose the latter alternative. They quitted their fortifications; joined battle with the native Syracusians ; killed many, and were almost all cut off before they gave ground. But at last, they were totally routed! and the victorious Syracusians ~ bestowed a chaplet, and pecuniary reward upon six hundred citizens that had eminently distinguished themselves in the action 209 . The inhabitants of the other Grecian cities in Sicily, after the example of Syracuse, entered into an alli- ance against the mercenaries and naturalised foreign- ers ; who had been endowed with lands and houses by different princes, in reward of their services; drove them from their possessions and restored the for- mer proprietors to their estates and habitations 10 . So that all the Grecian cities in that island were, in a short time, freed from foreigners; and the form of popular government, w r hich had originally prevailed in each state, was re-established 2 ". But although the princes, denominated tyrants, and those considered as their abettors, were every where expelled in Sicily, yet in the minds of many there lay a concealed species of tyranny; which fre- quently disturbed the public peace, in the several states, and occasioiaed various tumults and commo- tions* 2 . In Syracuse, one Tyndarion, a loquacious 207. Id. ibid. 208. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 57, vol. K 209. Id. ibid. 210. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 57, 58, vol. ii. 211. Id. ibid. 212. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 58, vol. ii. demagogue 176 THE HISTORY OF PART I. demagogue, having gained, by his benefactions and v -^" v ^ ,/ plausible harangues, a powerful party among the lower order of citizens, attempted to assume the su- preme power; but, being detected, both he and his accomplices were put to death for conspiring to enslave the state 23 . The punishment of this demagogue and his adhe- rents did not, however, deter others from forming ^ the like ambitious projects ; for no sooner had any ci- tizen acquired an ample fortune, than he began to entertain thoughts of wearing a diadem; and with that view, courted the favour of the people 2 ' 4 . In order to prevent the evils arising from such attempts, and bring down the aspiring minds of the opulent citizens, the Syracusians had recourse to a law re- sembling the Athenian ostracism. For as, at Athens, every citizen was to write on a shell the name of the person he believed most likely, on account of his wealth or influence,' to aspire at the supreme power; in the same manner, at Syracuse, every citizen was to write en a leaf the name of the man he apprehend- ed to be so powerful as to usurp the sovereignty, by means of his adherents 213 . When the leaves were counted, he who had most suffrages against him was banished for five years 2 ' 6 . This new adopted method of weakening the interest of the opulent citizens, was therefore called Peta- lism, from the Greek word petalon, which signifies a leaf 217 . That law, however, was attended with many ill consequences : for they, who were most able to govern 213. Id. lib. xi. p. 65. 214. Id. ibid. 215. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 65, 66, vol. ii. 216. Id. ibid. 217. Id. ibid. The leaf used, in taking the suffrages, was that of the olive-tree. the ANCIENT EUROPE. 477 the state, being expelled, and the administration committed to the meanest of the people, many of -the chief citizens, that were capable of rendering essential service to their country, fearing to fall un- der the punishment of petalism, withdrew from the city of Syracuse, and led private lives; not choosing, at such hazard, to concern themselves in public affairs 2 ' ". Hence all public offices being filled by men ofMio ability or experience, the Syracusian state, ready to fall into anarchy, was on the brink of ruin. The law of petalism was, therefore, repealed soon after it had been enacted; and the reins of govern- ment were again put into the hands of men, who knew better how to manage them 2 9 . Meanwhile Ducetius, a chieftain of the Siceli or Siculi, having brought under his command all the cities of that ancient people except Kybla, united them under one government 2 * . This prince, being both wise and brave, aimed at the expulsion of the rapacious Greeks; by whom his countrymen, who had been compelled to seek shelter in the moun- tainous and interior parts of the island, were perpe- tually pillaged. With that view, he removed the citizens of Neas, the place of his birth, from the hills to the low country; and built a city near the temple of the Palici, the venerated gods of his an- cestors, to which he gave the name of Palieon 321 . In founding the metropolis of his nation, in the neighbourhood of this celebrated seat of superstition, Ducetius discovered great political sagacity. Por Diodorus informs us*' 2 , that the temple of the Paliti being built over a volcano, which emitted fiery and 218. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 21'). Id. ibid. 220. Diod. Sicul. Eibliotb. lib. xi. p. 67, vol. ii. 221. Id. ibid. 222. Riblioth. lib. xi. p. 67. vol. ii. 3(i. aqueous 478 THE HISTORY OF PART I. aqueous vapours, or eruptions, was peculiarly calcu- s "^" v ^ / lated to inspire holy fear, and awful reverence. His words are to the following purport. " Within this temple, there are hollows in the earth, called era- tors; not very large in compass, but of incredible depth, whence break out sparks of fire and water, as- from boiling pots or cauldrons. The water cast forth resembles so many streams of fire. But there is no saying what it is, as no one hitherto ever durst ^ap- proach it. For the violent irruption of the matter is so extraordinary, that it seems to be the imme- diate effect of some divine power! — The matter smells like brimstone, and the bottomless gulf roars, and makes a most dreadful and horrid noise. But what is most wonderful, that river of fire, though in continual motion, neither flows any length, nor makes any stay upon the land; but, with amazing force, hurls itself up into the air 223 . " This temple, therefore, by these striking tokens of divine presence," adds the Sicilian historian 224 , " being accounted peculiarly sacred, the most solemn oaths, in matters of controversy, were here accustom- ed to be taken; and due punishment was in such cases instantly executed, by divine vengeance, upon the perjured person 225 . " The temple of the Palici was also a place of re- fuge, whither injured servants especially fled to shel- ter themselves from the cruelty of their severe mas- ters; for they thence could not be dragged, but continued safe., until mutual oaths were taken for the faithful performance of what was covenanted on both sides 226 . And so great was the veneration for the place, that it was never known any master broke 223. Id. p 67, 68, 224. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 68, vol it. 225 Id. ibid. 226 Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. ubi sup. his ANCIENT EUROPE. 4*3 his faith, there pledged, to his servant; with such an letter awe, through the fear of the presiding gods, was zv every one affected." 7 ." ^-vw Ducetius, after he had fortified his new city, named Palicon, divided the adjacent country among the inhabitants; who grew rich and powerful in a short time, both by reason of the fertility of the soil, and the number of the people there assembled 228 . In consequence of this increase of strength, Duce- tius was encouraged to attempt the accomplishment of his purpose of expelling the Greeks from Sicily. His first effort was against the city of ^Etna, which he took 229 . He afterward led his victorious army against the country of the Agrigentines, and be- sieged Motya. The Agrigentines, assisted by the Syracusians, endeavoured to relieve it; but their combined forces were defeated by the Siculian prince, and the place was taken 230 . Winter approaching, all the troops of the hostile parties returned to their several cities; and the Syra- cusians put to death Bilco, their general, suspected of holding a treasonable correspondence with Duce- tius, and to whom they imputed the loss of their army 23 '. On the return of the season of action, they chose another general, and put under his com- mand a new army, well appointed in all respects; with strict orders to accomplish, if possible, the destruction of the Siculian prince and his adhe- rents* 32 . The Syracusian general accordingly led out the forces of the state, and found Ducetius encamped near Noma?. There a bloody battle was fought: 227. Id. ibid. 228. Diod. Steul. lib. xi. p. 68. 229. Id. ibid. 230. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 68, 6~>, vol. li 331. Id. p. 69. 232. Id. ibid. manv 480 THE HISTORY OF PART I. many were killed on both sides: Ducetius, after a s -^ >r> ^ / gallant resistance, was forced to give ground; and great slaughter of the vanquished was made, by the Syracusians, in the pursuit 233 . Most of the Siceli or Siculi, who escaped in the general carnage, fled to the forts and strong-holds in the mountains; for few had hearts so warmed with courage, as to adhere to the desperate cause of Ducetius 234 . Meantime the Agrigentines retook the fortress of Motya, in which was a Siculian garrison: then marched to join the victorious Syracusians: and both armies encamped together" 3 '; in order to determine the issue of the war, between the Greeks and the more ancient inhabitants of Sicily. But Ducetius having lost all his treasure, in the late engagement, was brought to the brink of ruin 236 ; and, therefore, incapable of opposing them. To this distress he was reduced, not only by the loss of men and mo»ey, which he had sustained, but also by other circumstances; partly through the treachery of some of his followers, and partly through the cowardice of others, who had deserted him 237 . At length seeing matters brought to so desperate an extremity, that such of his countrymen, as still adhered to him, were ready to make a violent attempt upon his life, Ducetius fled from them dur- ing the night; went to Syracuse; and, while it was yet dark, entered the Agora or market-place; fell down before the altars ; and, as an humble suppliant, gave up both himself and his country into the hands of his enemies 23 ". 233. Dior!. Sicul. ubi sup. 234. Id. ibid. 235. Diod. Sicul. Bibliotb. lib. xi. p. 69, vol. ii. 236. Id. ibid. 23r. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 238. Id. ibid. The ANCIENT EUROPE. 481 The singularity of such submission drew toge- ther, in the morning, a concourse of people. And a general assembly being called, by the magistrates, it was debated, " What should be the fate of Duce- tius 23 ''?" — The popular demagogues endeavoured to enflame the minds of the citizens, and incite, them to take vengeance on the Sicilian prince, for his acts of hostility against them 240 . But the wiser, and more sober senators, then present, declared that the suppliant ought to be preserved; that a reverend re- spect must be paid to the providence of the gods, who had delivered him into their power; and that they should not have so much regard to what Duce- tius deserved, as what was proper for them to do, in such case ; that to slay one, whom Providence had laid, as a suppliant, at their feet, was equally unjust and ungenerous; and that to maintain the laws of piety toward the gods, and humanity toward man, but especially to such as humbly claimed mercy, peculiarly became the Syracusians 14 '. On this representation, the people unanimously cried out, " Let the suppliant be safe 4 "!" — Thus delivered from the vengeance of an incensed popu- lace, Ducetius was sent by the Syracusians to Cor- inth, their mother-city; and assured, that he should be supplied, during the remainder of his life, with a comfortable maintenance, at the expense of the state, provided he did not return into Sicily 243 . After the submission of Ducetius, the Agregen- tines became jealous of the power of Syracuse; and this jealousy, in conjunction with certain circum- stances, soon kindled the flames of war between the people of the rival states. The haughty spirit o! 239. Id. Biblioth. lib. xi. p. 69, vol. ii. 240. Id ibid. 241. Diod. Sicul. lib. xi. p. 09. 242. Id. ibid. 24.5. Diod. fjicul. ubi sup. Duc< tiua 482 THE HISTORY OF PARTI. Ducetius revolting against a private life at Corinth, '-^~ v ^ > *^ he broke all his engagements with the Syracusians: and pretending he was commanded by the oracle to people the pleasant sea-coast of Sicily, he got toge- ther a number of adventurers to settle there, and arrived with them in that island 144 . Some of the Siculian chiefs joined him; and, among others, one Archonides, prince of Erbita 243 . While Ducetius was engaged in founding his set- tlements, the Agrigentines, partly out of envy of the Syracusians, and partly because they had spared the Siculian prince, their common enemy, without asking consent, commenced hostilities against the Syracu- sian state 246 . Great armies were raised by both par- ties: some of the Siculian tribes joined one party, some the other; and war was carried on with vigour. At length, operations being brought to a crisis, the two armies encamped opposite to each other, near the river Himera: they joined battle; and, after a furious conflict, the Syracusians remained masters of the field, having killed a thousand of the Agrigen- tines* 47 . Deeply affected with their loss, and the dis- comfiture of their army, the citizens of A,grigentum sent ambassadors to Syracuse, craving peace 248 . And they obtained it on such terms, as their victorious rivals thought proper to prescribe 249 . The Syracusians, who now gave law to all the cities in Sicily, except Trinacia 25 °, resolved to re- 244. Id. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 76, vol. ii. Mr. Mitford affirms (Hist, of Greece, chap, xviii. sect, i.), that the Syracusian chiefs brought back Ducetias from Corinth, " to make him instrumental to their own views, for advancing the power of their commonwealth;" but Diodorus, the only author he quotes, affords no room for stfch a conjecture. 245. Id. ibid. 246. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 76. 247. Id. ibid. 248. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 249. Id. ibid. 250. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 83, vol. ii. ducc ANCIENT EUROPE. 483 duce that last strong-hold of the Siculi. For this purpose, they assembled their forces, and those of their Grecian confederates, and marched united against the place 25 '. The Trinacians, a brave and high-minded people (who had everpreserved their in- dependency), though altogether unsupported 2 -' 2 , went valiantly out to meet their ambitious enemies. The battle that followed was obstinately disputed. But, at last, the gallant body of Trinacians was broken, and all the Siculian warriors died upon the spot; for none fled; and such as were wounded, preferring death to slavery, intrepidly slew themselves 253 . The remain- ing inhabitants of Trinacia (consisting, as may be conjectured, chiefly of women and children) were made captives, and the town was utterly destroyed 254 . The Syracusians having thus reduced the last independent city in Sicily, took measures for secur- ing their sway. They exacted tribute from all the cities in the island: and with the money so raised, they augmented their naval and military force 255 . Hence, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Syracuse, by the extent of its dominion, as weU as by its real strength, was one of the most powerful republics of the people bearing the Grecian name, and using the Grecian language. Consequently its aid was of the utmost importance to both the lead- ing powers engaged in that hostile contest. As a Do- rian people, the Syracusians were disposed to favour the Lacedaemonians, and were actually in alliance with Sparta 256 ; but living under a democratical, or 251. Id. ibid. 252. Diod. Sicul. lib. xii. p. 90. Ducetius might have assisted them ; but that prince falling sick, while establishing his settlements, had already paid the debt of nature; and with his life perished his bold designs. Diod. Sicul. Biblioth. lib. xii. p. 89, vol ii. 253. Id. ibid. ■ 254. Diod. Sicul. ubi sup. 255. Id. lib. xii. p. 90, et seq. 256. Thucydid. Bell. Peloponncs. lib. ii cap. vii. mixed 484 THE HISTORY OF PARTI, mixed form of government, they were not hearty v^'v^*' in the cause of a state, which had for the object of its ambition the establishment of universal aris- tocracy* 3 '. Having had occasion to mention the Peloponne- sian war, I shall conclude this letter with an event that immediately led to general hostilities. The event to which I allude, my lord, was the surprize of Plataa by the Thebans. The city of Plataea, though seated in the heart of Bceotia, and possessed only of a territory about six miles square, had long resisted the controul of Thebes, the head of the Boeotian league 2 ^ 8 ; and pre- served its independency, through the support of Athens. The grateful returns of the Plataans to their Athenian protectors, and their valiant exer- tions in the cause of freedom, I have had occasion to display 219 . But in all states there are men, who, actuated by ambition, or influenced by avarice and rapacity, will attempt to enslave their country, or sell its independency iao ; and in every Grecian republic "257. That this was the great object of the Lacedaemonian, or Spar- tan state, appears from the whole scope of its history ; both before the beginning, and after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. 258. The Boeotian league, or confederacy, exclusive of Platxa, consisted of eleven cities ; the deputies from which, under the name of rulers, sat at Thebes; and being divided into four councils, there directed all public affairs. Vid. Thucydid. lib. iv. v. passim. 2.59. See Lett, xi.xii. passim. 260. The Athenians were so fully convinced of the truth of this remark, that they precluded men of dissipated characters from speak- ing in the papular assembly ; " it being scarce probable," observed they, " that persons of wicked lives, or desperate fortunes , should endea- " vour any thing conducive to the peace and prosperity of the state; but " rather that they should design the confusion and ruin of it, that them-* " selves might be enriched -with the spoils of honest men, and be enabled " to take their full career in licentious pleasures." Potter, Archa:- olog. Grxc. book i. chap. xvii. et auct. cit. there ANCIENT EUROPE. 485 there generally were, as we have seen, two hostile factions, one belonging to the aristocratical, and one to the democratical party, that violently struggled against each other. In Plataea, one Nauclides and his associates, seem- ingly of the aristocratical faction (for Thucydides is silent on the subject), having formed a project for the aggrandisement of themselves, and the destruction of all their fellow citizens, adverse to their designs, agreed with Eurymachus, the leading man at Thebes, to deliver their city into the hands of the Thebans 26 '. For the Thebans, although peace was still maintain- ed, and consequently war not actually declared, yet foreseeing war unavoidable, had a strong desire to get possession of Plataea, which had been at perpetual enmity with them* 62 . And the general tranquillity being such that no regular watch was yet kept in the city; Eurymachus was under no apprehensions of be- ing debarred entrance 3 . A body of Thebans, somewhat above three hun- dred, was accordingly assembled, under the conduct of two of the rulers of Bceotia, and got into Plataea Ant. Chr. about the first sleep 264 . When they had gained ad- o\ymp\»i mission, they formed in order of battle in the agora, Ixxxvii. 2. or place of public meeting; and, contrary to the sanguinary plot devised by the conspirators, of pro- ceeding to the houses of their political enemies, and putting them to the sword, they directed a herald to proclaim aloud, that all who were willing to enter into league, according to the ancient custom of t he Boeotians, should come and join arms with them^. 261. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. ii. 262. Id. ibid. 263. Thucydid. ubi tup. 264. Id. Bell. Pcloponnci. lib. ii. cap. ii. 265. Id. ibid. vol. ii. 3 * B y 4*6 THE HISTORY OF PART I. By this declaration, the Theban commanders hoped N "^" v ^ s, " / to draw the citizens of Platsea into an amicable accommodation, and gain the place without blood- shed" 66 . And it had in some measure the desired effect. For the Plateeans being in great consternation, when they found the Thebans had surprised the town, soon came to a composition; and, accepting the terms offered, made no resistance, as they found vio- lence was offered to no man 167 . The quiet produced by this composition enabling the Platseans to discover, that the Thebans were fewer in number than they had supposed, thought they might easily overpower them, if they ventured an attack : for the body of the people had not the least inclination to throw off the alliance of Athens 268 . The Platseans, therefore, after conferring together, agreed that such an attack should be made ; and when they had got every thing ready, in the best manner they could, having watched till the night was far spent, they rushed from their houses against the Thebans before day-break; that their enemies might be intimidated by being charged in the dark, and labour under disadvantage from their ignorance of the city 2 " 9 . The attack was immediately begun, and both par- ties soon came to action. The Theban leaders, when they found themselves circumvented, had thrown their troops into a globular form ; and, wherever as- saulted, made a firm and successful resistance. Twice or thrice they beat back the Plataeans. But when the attacks were, with loud noise, reiterated; and when the women and menial servants, shouting and 266. Thucydid. ubi sup. 267. Id. Bell. Peioponnes. lib. ii. cap. iii. 263. Id. ibid. 269. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. iii. screaming ANCIENT EUROPE. 487 •screaming from the houses on all sides, threw stones and tiles among the Thebans, otherwise incommo- ded with the rain, which had copiously fallen that night, they were seized with fear; and, dissolving their order, fled in confusion 1 ' . Running therefore in the dirt and the dark, and not knowing the pas- sages by which they could get out of the city, while pursued by men acquainted with every avenue of it, many of them were slain 17 '. The gate by which the enemy had entered, and w r hich alone had been opened by the conspirators, was by this time shut 272 : so that, pursued around the city, some of the Thebans mounted the walls, and hurled themselves over; but most of these were killed by the fall 273 . Others were separately slain, in different parts of the city. But the greater number, consist- ing of those who had k spt in a body, threw them- selves into a large house contigious to the walls (the door of which happened to be open), believing the door of that house to be one of the city gates, and a certain passage for escape 274 . There inclosed by the Platseans, and threatened with being consumed by fire, they agreed to give up their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners at discretion 275 . Meanwhile a second body of Thebans, intended for the support of the former, had entered the terri- tory of Plat*a; and would have arrived before this time, had not the troops been retarded in their march by the swelling of the river Asopus, in consequence of the heavy rain that had fallen 1 '. When informed of the disaster of their countrymen, by some lugi- 270. Id. lib. ii. cap. iv. 2"L Id. ibid. 272. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. iv. 273. Id. ibid. 274. Id. Bell. I'cloponnes. lib. ii. cap. iv, 275. Id. ibid. 276. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. v. Hves, 488 THE HISTORY OF PART [. tivcs, the Thebans resolved to turn their arms against v "^ v ~^ p ' the Plataeans without the city, unsuspectingly em- ployed in the labours of husbandry ; and to attempt to seize prisoners, in order to exchange for such of their unfortunate division, as might still be alive 277 . But the Plataeans, apprehensive of some such de- sign, dispatched a herald to the Theban invaders, repesenting to them the injustice of the hostile at- tempt already made ; they having treacherously en- deavoured to take the city before any declaration of war, and while the treaty of peace remained unvio- lated 278 . The Plataeans next required the Thebans to beware of offering any violence to their citizens living in the country; declaring, if the}'- so did, that they would put all the Theban prisoners to the sword 279 . The Thebans, in consequence of this threat, re- tired out of the Plataean territory: but the justly en- raged Platseans, regardless of their implied promise of safety to the Theban prisoners, put them all to death ; as soon as they had brought into the city the husbandmen, the implements of agriculture, and their most valuable effects, from the country 28 ". The number of Theban prisoners massacred amounted to one hundred and eighty; and among these wa3 Erymachus, who had concerted with the Plataean traitors the surprize of the city* 8 '. The Plataeans having thus executed vengeance on their ambitious and perfidious enemies, dispatched a third messenger to Athens (for they had sent two 277. Id. ibid. 278. Thucydid. ubi sup. 279. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. v. 280. Id. ibid. 281. Thucydid. ubi sup. before), ANCIENT EUROPE. 489 before), and restored to the Thebans their dead LETTER undertruce 282 . And then they regulated the affairs of their republic in the manner most suitable to their present situation 183 . — A few observations, my lord, will here be necessary. The Platseans had dispatched a messenger to Athens on the first irruption of the Thebans ; and a second, as soon as they were defeated and made prisoners 284 . But the Athenians, being still igno- rant of the fate of those prisoners, had sent a herald to Plataea, on the arrival of the second messenger, with orders, that no punishment should be inflicted on the Theban captives, until the Athenian admi- nistration had sent its determination concerning them 185 . The herald, however, on his arrival, found they had all been put to death 286 . Yet the Athe- nians, notwithstanding this too hasty proceeding, carried to Plataea a supply of provisions ; left a gar- rison in the city; and brought away, together with the women and children, all the hands that would be useless in a siege 287 . After this surprize of Plataea, so manifest a breach of the general peace, the Athenians made all neces- sary preparations for immediate war 288 . The Lace- daemonians and their confederates also took similar measures; and both parties were employed in dis- patching ambassadors to the Persian monarch, Artaxerxes Longimanus, and other barbarian pow- ers, with whom they had any hope of forming bene- ficial treaties: nor did they spare any pains to draw 282. Id. Rcll. l'eloponnes. lib. ii. cap. vi. 28.3. Id. ibid. 284. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. vi. 285. Id. ibid. 286. Thucydid. ubi sup. 287. Id. ibid. 288. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. vii. int« 490 THE HISTORY OF PART I. into their alliance those Grecian cities, which had v^n^«> hitherto maintained their independency 2?9 . Beside the ships already fitted out for the Lace- daemonian league, in Italy and Sicily, the confede- rates there were ordered to furnish a new quota, that the whole number of armed ships might amount to five hundred sail 290 . They were also ordered to get a certain sum of money in readiness; but, in other respects, to remain quiet: and, until their preparations were completed, never to admit within their ports, at a time, above one Athenian vessel 29 . The Athenians likewise made a careful survey of the strength of their own confederacy, and sent pressing embassies to the people seated round the western coast of Peloponnesus; to the Corcyrseans, to the Cephallenians, to the Acarnanians, and to the Zacynthians 292 : sensible, that if these maritime people were in their interest, they might advantage- ously attack the hostile peninsula on all sides 293 . The hearts of both parties, not a little elated, were eager for war. For it is natural for man, on the commencement of every important undertaking, to be sanguine of success. The young men especially, who at that time were numerous in Peloponnesus; numerous also in Attica, were, for want of expe- rience, fond of the rupture 29 K And all the rest of Greece stood attentively at gaze, on this contention between its two principal states 295 . 289. Id. ibid. 290. Thucydid. nbi sup. 2^1. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. vii. 292. Id. ibid. 293. Thucydid. ubi sup. 294. Id. Bell. Peloponnes. lib. ii. cap. viii. 295. Id. ibid. Many ANCIENT EUROPE. 491 Many responses of oracles were bandied about; the soothsayers sung abundance of predictions among those states that were going to enter on the hostile competition, and even in the states that were yet neutral' 96 . The sacred island of Delos had lately been shaken by an earthquake, a phenomenon, that had never occurred within the memory of man - "' 7 . It was said, and indeed believed, this was a prog- nostic of something extraordinary to happen; and all other " accidents of an uncommon nature," ob- serves Thucydides" 9 , " were sure of being wrested " to the same meaning' 99 :" — So agitated were the minds of the Greeks at the prospect of that domes- tic war into which they were going to enter. The states in league with the two rival powers, at the beginning of the hostile struggle, are thus enu- merated by Thucydides: — In league with the Lace- daemonians were all the people within the Corinthian isthmus, the whole Peloponnesian body, except the Argives and Achaians 300 ; " for these had treaties " subsisting with both parties 301 ." Without Pelo- ponnesus, were confederated with the Lacedaemo- nians, the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambracians, Leucadians, and Anactorians 302 . In league with the Athenians, were the Chians, Lcs- 296. Thucydid. ubi sup. 297. Id. ibid. 298. Bell. Pcloponnes. lib. ii. cap. viii. 299. Id. ibid. 300. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. ix. 301. Id. ibid. It appears, however, that the people of Pallcne, an Achaian city, took early part with the Lacedamonians. Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. ix. 302. Thucydid. ubi sup. Of those, they were supplied with ship- ping by the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, rallenians, Elcant, Ambracians, and Leucadians; with cavalry, by the Hceotian% Pho- cians, and Locrians (Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. ix.). The oilier confe- derates furnished them with infantry. Id. ibid. biani, 492 THE HISTORY, &c. PARTI, bians, Platseans; the Messenians of Naupactus; most v -*~ v '**^' of the Acarnanians; and the Corcyrseans, Zacyn- thians, and all the people and states tributary to them in many countries; namely, the people of the mari- time parts of Caria; the Dorians bordering upon the Carians; Ionia; the Hellespont; the Grecian cities on the coast of Thrace; all the islands lying between Peloponnesus and Crete; and all the Cyclades, ex- cept Melos and Thera 3 ° 3 . Such were the alliances on both sides, my lord, and such the ability of both parties for war. 303. Id. lib. ii. cap. ix. Of those, they were supplied with shipping by the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyrseans (Thucydid. liW.ii. cap. ix.). The other allies supplied them with foot, and with money (Id. ibid.). By the Thessalians (though not included in this eumeration, of the Athenian confederates), they were furnished with cavalry, in conse- quence of an ancient league (Thucydid. lib. ii. cap. xxii.). I shall here take occasion to remark, that, in the foregoing enumeration of the Athenian confederates, no mention is made of the Samians or Eubce- ans ; and that Samos and Eubcea, being conquered islands, and not far distant from Attica, seem at this time to have been considered as part of the Athenian territory. END OF THE SECOND VOLUME. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. R£ u . *j ORC 3 1 8 19 3 JUIU51 )UE 2 WKS FROM r REC'D LD-URL AU6 1 3 W91 DECEIVED jm-8,'57(,C8680s4)444 L006 339 246 b UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY -in urn mil mil iiiii ill""" AA 000 096171 4 '•-'- iiP iiF