LtpRARY^ 
 
 CALIFORNIA 1 
 SAN 0lE©O I 
 
 *.- A
 
 ^rioudu^ 
 
 IRC . • • C:
 
 BATTLE FIRE 
 TRAINING 
 
 CAPTAIN GfS: TURNER 
 
 WD 
 
 CAPTAIN J. J. FULMER 
 U. S. ARMY. 
 
 mhr (Cnllrciintr ^rr«« 
 
 GEORGE RANTA PUHLISHING COMPANY 
 MENASHA. WISCONSIN
 
 Copyrighted 1917 
 
 by 
 
 CAPTAIN G. S. TURNER 
 
 and 
 CAPTAIN J. J. FULMER
 
 CONTENTS i^^ 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Musketry 1 
 
 Determination of Ranges: 
 
 By Eye 8 
 
 By Trial Volleys 13 
 
 From Other Troops 21 
 
 By Instruments 21 
 
 Use of Mil Scale 22 
 
 Table Illustrating Influence of Incorrect 
 
 Estimate 31 
 
 Tarokt Designation 33 
 
 Units of Measure 41 
 
 Horizontal Clock Face 52 
 
 Vertical Clock Face 55 
 
 Sight System 57 
 
 Right Angle System 58 
 
 Auxiliary Aiming Point System 61 
 
 Fire Distribution 69 
 
 Ii\ Defense 71 
 
 In Attack 72 
 
 Communication, Signals, and Transmission of 
 
 Fire Data 91 
 
 Fire Discipline 107 
 
 Attention to Orders 108 
 
 Care in Sight Setting 108 
 
 Rate of Fire 112 
 
 Application of Fire 128 
 
 Adjustment of Fire 129 
 
 Effect of Ground 133 
 
 Employment of Fire Units 136 
 
 Kinds of Fire 145 
 
 Time of Opening Fire 147 
 
 Combined Sights 148 
 
 Night Firing 151 
 
 Indirect Fire 153 
 
 Fire of Position 153 
 
 -Vulnerability 155 
 
 SiPPi.Y oi- A:\rMUNiTioN 159 
 
 Conduct of Fire 167 
 
 Battalion Exercises in Attack and Defense. . 187-204 
 
 Combat Practice 224 
 
 Appendix 255 
 
 Casey Problem 255 
 
 Records 263 
 
 Signals 290
 
 EXERCISES 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Range Estimation: 
 
 For Company (No. 1) 10 
 
 For company using range finder (No. 2) 11 
 
 For company in attack formation 11 
 
 Use of Mil Scale 22 
 
 Target Designation: 
 
 To teach how to measure properly from a refer- 
 ence point 50 
 
 To train in accurate and clear description of tar- 
 gets (Exercise No. 1) 66 
 
 To train men to locate target solely from descrip- 
 tion (Exercise No. 2) 67 
 
 Target Distribution: 
 
 Individual 79 
 
 Squad 79 
 
 Squad leaders 79 
 
 Platoon leaders 80 
 
 Company 84 
 
 Communication and Signals: 
 
 To acquaint men to use of (Nos. 1 and 2) 98 
 
 To train officers and units to observe and execute 100 
 
 Battalion exercises in 100 
 
 To accustom men to properly transmit and receive 
 
 fire data 104 
 
 Transmission of fire data along entire front .... 105 
 To hold fire in designated sector 106 
 
 Fire Discipline: 
 
 To train men to set sights quickly 108 
 
 To train men to set sights quickly without cessa- 
 tion of fire Ill 
 
 To train men to aimed fire and proper rate of fire 118 
 To train men to fill places of leaders killed or 
 wounded in action 123 
 
 Supply of Ammunition: 
 
 To train in the supply of ammunition to the firing 
 
 line ' 163 
 
 To train battalion to draw and issue ammunition 
 from combat train 165 
 
 Company Fire Problem: 
 
 Conijiany combat exercise in attack 243 
 
 Casey ])roblem 2-55 
 
 Battalion Problems: 
 
 Battalion fire problem in attack 187 
 
 Battalion fire problem in defense 204 
 
 Battalion combat exercises in attack 250
 
 PREFACE 
 
 A necessity exists for tlic adoption through- 
 out our army of a uniform s3^stem of collective 
 training in battle fire. A system, by means of 
 which, the highly skilled individual shots we 
 regularly develop in time of peace may produce 
 the greatest possible collective effect in time of 
 war. If given time and opportunity our School 
 of Musketry, which has such a system, will 
 supply this necessity. The present exigencies 
 of the service, however, prevent the operation 
 of this school. Meanwhile time goes on and 
 we adopt no uniform system. 
 
 This book is offered in the hope that it may 
 assist towards the adoption of a uniform system. 
 and thus aid, even though it be in a small way, 
 the furthering of the work so necessary for 
 success on the field of battle. 
 
 The system outlined herein is based upon the 
 principles laid down in the various manuals 
 upon the subject of fire and fire tactics pub- 
 lished by the War Department. The practical 
 application of these principles to concrete 
 cases, and the method by which they are 
 embodied in terrain exercises are largely derived 
 from a series of "Musketry Bulletins" written 
 by a board of officers. Also from a personal 
 observation, in a supervisory capacity, of 
 forty-eight companies of infantry during four
 
 months' training devoted almost exclusively to 
 "musketry." The system of indoor training by 
 means of landscape targets and the complete 
 development of the various methods of target 
 designation and distribution are the results of 
 some three years' work, by one of the writers, 
 with the Disciplinary Battalion at the Fort 
 Leavenworth Disciplinary Barracks. 
 
 Few of the methods outlined for control, 
 communication, designation, distribution, etc., 
 have received the test of actual war. They 
 have, however, all been applied by a number of 
 independent organizations over an extended 
 period of time, and with uniformly excellent 
 results. In the light of this knowledge and with 
 the lessons of military history as a guide, it 
 may be stated as a fact that this, or some other 
 similar system, is not only applicable in war 
 but necessary to its successful prosecution. 
 
 By permission of the authorities of the 
 School of Musketry the pamphlets issued by 
 that school have been freely drawn upon and 
 acknowledgment is here offered. 
 
 To Colonel Sedgwick Rice, Commandant, 
 United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort 
 Leavenworth, Kansas, whose interest, help, and 
 support made possible the application to indoor 
 work of many of the principles herein con- 
 tained; to Major H. E. Eames and Captains 
 W. A. Kent and C. H. Mason, who, with one 
 of the writers composed the board referred to
 
 above, and to Captain James D. Taylor and 
 F. B. Davis our sincere thanks arc due. 
 
 The following books liave been consulted : 
 Eames' Rifle in War; Morrison's Training 
 Infantry; Technique of Modern Tactics, Bond 
 and McDonough ; Fire Problems, Pilchcr ; 
 Musketry Bulletins, Twelfth U. S. Infantry; 
 Studies in Minor Tactics and Problems in 
 Troop Leading, Military Art Department, 
 Leavenworth ; and the manuals bearing upon 
 tlic subject published by the War Department. 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 Fort Bayard, New Mexico. 
 
 April, 1907.
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The broad doctrine that only with the aid of 
 superior fire is it possible to carry through a 
 successful attack, has been confirmed on every 
 battlefield of the present great war. Given a 
 superiority of fire, infantry can advance and 
 suffer only losses that can be borne; without 
 superiority of fire, the finest troops will be 
 stopped by the ruinous losses they receive. The 
 opposing lines in western Europe have remained 
 for many months practically stationary, and 
 consequently embody every refinement of the 
 engineer's art. In the preparation of such 
 fjaborate entrt'iichments for assault, the havoc 
 of the artillery becomes, therefore, more impor- 
 tant than that of the rifle. Yet, with all of its 
 tremendous modern power, artillery alone is not 
 able to drive the enemy from his trenches. To 
 do this, even in the war of position in France 
 today, requires the attack of infantry; and for 
 infantry, notwithstanding the extensive use of 
 machine guns and grenades which this sta- 
 tionary war permits, the rifle remains the para- 
 mount weapon. 
 
 There is little chance of the employment in 
 the United States of masses sufficiently large 
 ever to rest both flanks on impassable obstacles. 
 Consequently, we are not likely to find warfare 
 in the United States reduced to a standstill as
 
 is now the case in western Europe. Our cam- 
 paigns will be campaigns of maneuver, in which 
 events will follow with too little intermission to 
 permit the emplacement and use of almost 
 unlimited masses of artillery and machine guns. 
 In such mobile operations, the infantry rifle, 
 properly used, will always furnish the great 
 majority of casualties, and is, therefore, the 
 supreme weapon for the attainment of victory. 
 
 The effective use of the rifle requires that the 
 men shall individually be good shots; that, in 
 action, ranges shall be determined with consid- 
 erable accuracy; that the targets shall be so 
 clearly designated that the men recognize them 
 and aim as desired; and that their fire is so 
 distributed as to cause all parts of the hostile 
 line to suffer therefrom. In other words, to 
 produce effective results in the aggregate, the 
 fire of good shots must be so directed and con- 
 trolled by their officers that all will act together 
 as members of a highly trained team in the 
 application of fire against a common objective. 
 
 The work of our Army on the target range 
 produces a high average of good individual 
 target shots and fulfills, accordingly, the first 
 requisite for effective fire. But the methods 
 used in training for direction and control of 
 the collective fire of organizations differ rather 
 widely in the several regiments, with the result 
 that our companies and battalions do not have 
 the uniformly excellent teamwork that is neces- 
 sary today in an army for successful action.
 
 Tin- miisketrv training at Galveston in 1913 
 produced a liigh and very uniform standard in 
 field firing in tlie organizations of the 5th 
 Brigade. The autliors have put in this book a 
 concise description of the methods that gave 
 the best results in the long series of outdoor 
 exercises and problems of the 5th Brigade, and 
 have made the text readily understood by 
 numerous and excellent drawings. They have 
 also embodied the methods for indoor instruc- 
 tion that have given excellent results with a 
 wide variety of men at the Fort Leavenworth 
 Disciplinary Barracks. In the chapters on 
 Determination of Ranges, Target Designation, 
 Fire Distribution, Communications, Signals, 
 Fire Discipline, Application of Fire, Supply 
 of Ammunition, and Conduct of Fire, the text 
 describes the means and methods that should be 
 applied on the battlefield, and then gives 
 di'tailed suggestions for peace-time training in 
 ill of these important musketry functions. 
 Finally, the text describes several company and 
 battalion problems for unknown ground that 
 were found highly satisfactory in the work of 
 Hie 5th Brigade, and that will frequently bo 
 easily adapted to terrain which permits any 
 kind of ball practice. 
 
 The musketry training of the Army needs 
 standardizing to produce a more uniform excel- 
 lence. This text furnishes a clear statement of 
 methods, which in practical application, have
 
 proven their efficiency ; it should, therefore, 
 constitute a splendid manual of musketry train- 
 ing for the attainment of the desired standard. 
 H. B. FisKE, 
 
 Major of Infantry
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 MUSKETRY 
 
 Musketry is understood in some of the for- 
 eign armies to embrace any instruction, indi- 
 vidual or collective, pertaining to the use of the 
 rifle. In our service the term "Musketry" is 
 looked upon as embracing the p rinciples relat - 
 ing to cpllec tivejire and it is so treated in these 
 pages. 
 
 Perfecting the individual in rifle shooting is 
 but the primary step in our instruction, the 
 next and final is the binding of individuals into 
 a flexible, controlled, and ^e^endable fir e uni t 
 in which each individual plays his own part in 
 adding strength to the whole. The ability to 
 do this naturally rests on the degree to which 
 a man has been trained both individually and 
 collectively. 
 
 The process of perfecting the units of a 
 machine is but the first stage, to be followed 
 by the perfect assembling, to insure the func- 
 tioning of the parts as a whole. An automo- 
 bile has its gears, bearings, and parts perfectly 
 made, but without an intelligent joining of the 
 parts and careful adjustment of all oiAtshotur- 
 ings and elements, a machine results^ncapjible 
 of proper functioning. How many goals would 
 be scored by a football team in wliich each unit
 
 2 Battle Fire Training 
 
 represented the last word in training in his own 
 particular work and nothing more? A tackle 
 for instance, who could down a man without 
 failure, a man who could punt the length of 
 the field, one who could land on a ball from the 
 quarter with such unerring accuracy as to ever 
 preclude his missing? What would happen on 
 the day of contest, when for the first time, 
 these perfectly trained parts are put together 
 to perform the work of a team? Can any more 
 results be expected relatively on the field of 
 battle with an organization trained until every 
 man is an individual expert but not trained to 
 act as a part of an harmonious whole? What 
 about the rate of fire, the control, the centering 
 of fire on a particular target, the distribution 
 of fire, and the many other elements of mus- 
 ketry which are indisputably necessary to 
 obtain the sine qua non of success in battle — 
 fire superiority? 
 
 It might be assumed that the necessity and 
 value of musketry training are admitted by all. 
 Such, unfortunately, is not the case. This is 
 due largely to the fact that we have no definite 
 doctrine of musketry throughout the service 
 and, also, to the fact that the unquestionable 
 results produced by the School of Musketry 
 have not become generally known. When the 
 excellent course now contemplated at the 
 School becomes available to the Army, it may
 
 Musketry 3 
 
 be confidently lioped that such benighted con- 
 ditions will rapidly disappear, but until such 
 time wc must present some facts to sustain our 
 contentions as to the value of musketry in 
 general. 
 
 If, as has been stated, musketry training 
 produces such valuable results, why has it been, 
 until quite recently, so generally neglected in 
 the Army? It is not for us to answer this 
 (juestion bc3'ond pointing out the fact that cer- 
 tainly it is not because writers of authority in 
 the Service have failed to emphasize the neces- 
 sity and value of this training. Could anything 
 be more plain than General Morrison's Train- 
 ing Infantry in this regard.'' Does not Eames 
 in The liifle in War show results to be 
 expected from improperly controlled shots.'' 
 And finally, among many others, see the stress 
 laid by Major Fiske and the iVIilitary Art 
 Department of Leavenworth upon control and 
 distribution of fire in the officially published 
 Minor Tactics, 1915, and Frohlcms in Troop 
 Leading, 1916. 
 
 So much for the authorities. Now examine 
 the results of one or two problems actually 
 fired on the target range. 
 
 A company of Expert Riflemen, properly 
 trained to fire collectively but improperly led 
 as to fire control, shot a given problem. They 
 were immediately followed on the range by a
 
 4 Battle Fire Training 
 
 company composed of men who, while they 
 were trained on the gallery range in individual 
 fire, had never fired a service charge. The 
 third phase of this problem was the firing of 
 the company of Expert Riflemen properly con- 
 trolled and directed. The results are tabulated 
 below : 
 
 Hits Figures Hit 
 Company of Expert Riflemen — 
 
 1st firing 7 7 
 
 Untrained Company, 1st firing .... 47 31 
 
 Company of Expert Riflemen — 
 
 2d firing 122 76 
 
 Untrained Company, 2nd firing .... 71 48 
 
 This problem was in defense ; the main points 
 involved were: Correct determination of the 
 initial range and its transmission to the firing 
 line; accurate and quick sight setting; the 
 maintenance of the correct range during the 
 problem, and its rapid and accurate transmis- 
 sion while firing. All these points may well be 
 considered under one single head of the subject 
 of musketry in general, i. e.. Range. A system 
 of training, one phase of which can produce 
 results as far-reaching as those given above, is 
 certainly valuable, to say the least. 
 
 Take a second problem, one in which practi- 
 cally the whole subject of musketry, as far as 
 it pertains to a company acting alone, was 
 covered.
 
 Musketry 5 
 
 Problem: To advance from about 1,200 
 yards to assaultin/^ position. Time, 30 min- 
 utes. Rounds, 90 per man. Rate of advance 
 to be governed by hits and distribution made 
 each minute. Data being signaled from the 
 pit to the firing line. 
 
 In this problem comparisons will be made of 
 the positions at the end of thirty minutes of 
 the following: a company of selected shots 
 from the Militia; a company of selected shots 
 from a Regular regiment; and the average of 
 fort3'-eight companies of Regular Infantry. 
 The two companies of selected shots had not 
 been especially trained for collective firing, 
 while the forty-eight regular companies had 
 completed a course in musketry. About thirty 
 per cent of each of the latter companies were 
 qualified marksmen ; many contained a per- 
 centage of five months' recruits. 
 Militia company, 24% reaches 1076 yds.; 76% reaches 
 
 976 yds. 
 Selected company, U. S. A., 100% reaches 700 yds. 
 Average 48 Co's, U. S. A., 100% reaches 600 yds. (with 
 6 to 26 rounds of ammunition in each belt). 
 
 There were many regular companies which 
 in from twenty to twenty-five minutes pro- 
 gressed to about 300 yards from the target at 
 which point they were stopped by an impass- 
 able stream. These companies had from five to 
 ten rounds of ammunition per man remaining
 
 6 Battle Fire Training 
 
 and under the conditions of the problem could 
 easily have advanced to the target itself. Cer- 
 tainly there can be no gainsaying the value of 
 training which can produce such results as 
 these. 
 
 The opinion is so often expressed that in 
 battle any system of fire control, target desig- 
 nation, and musketry in general will fail to 
 produce expected results. Undoubtedly war 
 will furnish many instances where the character 
 of the engagement or tactical requirements will 
 be such as to preclude the possibility of pre- 
 liminary target designation ; on the other hand 
 there will be frequent occasions when all the 
 details of designation may be well cared for 
 before fire is opened. So, also, with all the 
 other elements of musketry there will be times 
 when thpy will be reduced to a minimum or dis- 
 appear altogether and times when they may be 
 fully applied. However, admitting that the 
 principles of musketry are not always appli- 
 cable on the field of battle in no way warrants 
 the omission from our instruction schedules of 
 a thorough training in these principles, for a 
 study of the results produced in peace firing 
 by such training indicates a wonderful increase 
 in fire efficiency, and a study of the details of 
 military history will disclose many instances 
 where the full effect of such training might
 
 Musketry 7 
 
 have been reaped in battle. We state, as an 
 indisputable fact, that a battle uni^ untrained 
 in musketry is a unit in name only. 
 
 The phases of musketry instruction will be 
 treated of under the following heads: — 
 
 (1) Determination of Ranges. 
 
 (2) Designation of Targets and Sectors. 
 
 (3) Distribution. 
 
 (4) Communication, Signals, and Trans- 
 
 mission of Fire Data. 
 
 (5) Fire Discipline. 
 
 (6) The Application of Fire. 
 
 (7) The Supply of Ammunition to the 
 
 Firing Line. 
 
 (8) Conduct of Fire. 
 
 (9) Combat Practice. . 
 
 Determination of Ranges: — 
 
 The necessity for correct sight setting and 
 methods for determining ranges is pointed out 
 in the authorized manuals. 
 
 Means of Determining Ranges: — 
 
 1. Estimation by eye. 
 
 2. By observation of fire and trial volleys. 
 
 3. From other troops. 
 
 4. By instruments. 
 
 5. From maps. . 
 
 6. By sound. 
 
 7. Measuring distance on the ground.
 
 8 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Estimation by Eye: — 
 
 While estimation bj eye, until mechanical 
 range finders are more liberally issued, will 
 probably be the method most generally used, it 
 must be borne in mind that many thousands of 
 estimates by this method have proved that it 
 results in anayerage error of 12^ per cent. 
 Such an error wiU at tlmeslBcTfatal to good fire 
 effect (see table) ; therefore, no opportunity 
 should be neglected to apply other methods in 
 conjunction with estimation by eye. There 
 should be a constant and never failing effort to 
 verify and correct the range. 
 
 The average of a number of estimates will, 
 of course, give more nearly correct results than 
 an individual estimate. Advantage of this fact 
 should be taken whenever possible, in the com- 
 pany, in the battalion, and even at times in the 
 regiment. Individual estimates in the company 
 should be averaged by the first sergeant, com- 
 pany estimates in tlie battalion by the adju- 
 tant, and battalion commanders of adjacent 
 battalions might well take means to ascertain 
 ranges from the battalions on the right and 
 left. 
 
 In addition to the usual method, the follow- 
 ing, which is sometimes called the over and 
 short method, will be found to give good results 
 but like any other character of work requires
 
 Musketry 9 
 
 practice to produce proficiency. It has often 
 been known to result in errors of less than ten 
 per cent and within a time limit which has been 
 set at about thirty seconds. 
 
 Method: — 
 
 Assuming a company in fire position with tlie 
 objective announced by the fire director (cap- 
 tain). In each platoon are two selected range 
 estimators, one having been trained to assume 
 the over or maximum range as, for example, 
 the objective cannot be beyond a certain num- 
 ber of yards ; the other, the shorter or minimum 
 of that range; in other words, that the objec- 
 tive cannot be under a certain number of yards. 
 When they have decided their oum estimates, 
 either one, according to previous designation, 
 calls on the otiicr for his estimate, which he 
 adds to his own, and halves the sum ; the result 
 he gives or signals to his platoon leader, who in 
 turn gives or signals it to the first sergeant 
 The latter takes the estimate of all the range 
 estimators, averages tlum and reports the 
 result to the captain. This same system should 
 be used when each estimator simply estimates 
 the range without the over and short method. 
 It may be advantageous to assemble the range 
 finders while the captain is absent receiving the 
 attack order, then upon his return they will
 
 10 Battle Fire Training 
 
 be immediately available. Whatever method is 
 used it should be borne in mind that the results 
 sought for are accuracy and speed. 
 
 Estvmation Exercises: — 
 
 No. 1 : An officer, accompanied by several 
 markers, may be sent to the vicinity of the 
 range a short time before target practice. 
 When he arrives at a point previously desig- 
 nated he sends out his markers in different 
 directions with instructions to move toward 
 selected points a certain number of yards, to 
 halt, and remain under cover until signaled to 
 kneel or rise. 
 
 The company arrives at the position afad is 
 faced in the direction of one group of markers 
 Avhich is signaled to make itself visible. Each 
 man estimates the range and announces it to 
 his corporal. In similar manner the estimates 
 are determined to the other markers; the true 
 ranges then announced to each group ; com- 
 parisons made; the men given time to figure 
 their errors ; and the company moved on to the 
 range having been halted about fifteen minutes. 
 It is , of course, necessary that the markers b e 
 instructed in pacing andj inder sta nd there 
 tjon3heir pac es bear to 100 yards . Attention 
 may be called to the appearance of men, 
 objects, or animals, at different distances.
 
 Musketry 11 
 
 No. 2 : If a range-finding instrument is 
 available, considerable practice can be given in 
 a limited period of time; as many as twenty 
 estimates in ten minutes. 
 
 (1) A company can estimate ranges to mov- 
 ing or stationary objects and within a 
 certain time limit of, say thirty sec- 
 onds ; range is announced as indicated 
 by instrument. 
 
 (2) After several drills, of about twenty 
 minutes daily, have been devoted to com- 
 pany instruction as indicated in preced- 
 ing paragraph, the company should be 
 divided into squads, the ranges esti- 
 mated by the men, recorded by their 
 corporal, and compared with the instru- 
 mental finding. 
 
 The use of an instrument of the contained 
 base type affords the utilization of any object 
 in view for this practice and records distance 
 with so small an error and in so brief a period 
 of time that interest — the big factor — can be 
 held without difficulty. 
 
 Attack: — 
 
 The foregoing exercises and discussion refer 
 mainly to the determination of the initial 
 range. The question of the maintenance of 
 the range throughout an action must now be
 
 12 Battle Fire Training 
 
 considered. After fire has been opened, the 
 commander of the attack unit which first estab- 
 lishes a new firing position is especially charged 
 with the duty of making an accurate estimate 
 of the distance covered by his rush. This he 
 does either by counting his own paces, dele- 
 gating this duty to an assistant, or by estima- 
 tion. Each unit of a company, as it arrives 
 on the line, takes its range by signal from the 
 portion already established in the new position. 
 The captain, also by signal, must after each 
 advance assure himself that the ranges used by 
 the several platoons are as desired. In bat- 
 talion, each company maintains its own range. 
 Reenforcing companies not previously partici- 
 pating in the fire fight take their range from 
 the nearest unit. It is the duty of the battalion 
 commander to harmonize the ranges of the sev- 
 eral companies. 
 
 It is necessary, during the progress of the 
 advance, to check the range being used by all 
 of the several methods which are applicable at 
 the time and to use the system of check out- 
 lined above. If these precautions are not taken 
 one of two things will invariably result, either 
 an original error in the initial range will be 
 maintained or a. correct initial range will be 
 lost.
 
 Musketry 13 
 
 Estimation Exercise No. 3 : A company or 
 larger force deployed facing a similar force at 
 as great a range up to 1,600 yards, as the ter- 
 rain will permit. The companies to be invisible 
 one from the other at the initial deployment. 
 At a signal, cither by bugle or flag, both lines 
 advance simultaneously. After the advance is 
 continued for a short distance both lines are 
 halted and thirty to forty-five seconds allowed 
 for an estimate of the distance to the opposing 
 line. The exercise is continued by a simul- 
 taneous advancing and halting of the lines. 
 The exercise will run smoothly if the director 
 takes post midway between the two lines in a 
 conspicuous position. He should by a system 
 of preconcerted signals indicate the moment 
 for advancing and halting but the actual com- 
 mands should be given by the company com- 
 manders themselves. Stakes should be driven 
 at each halt for subsequent checking of the 
 ranges. This exercise may be varied by using 
 only company commanders and range estima- 
 tors, or any part of a unit up to a brigade. 
 Part of the advance may be in double time or 
 the regular method of advance by rushes may 
 be used. The results produced by an organi- 
 zation on its first attempt at this kind of work 
 will he amply indicative of the necessity for 
 further training.
 
 14 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Defense: — 
 
 In the attack each platoon will probably 
 cover for its target all or half of the company 
 objective, depending upon the size of the 
 organization. They will, consequently, usually 
 maintain the same elevation. On the defensive, 
 however, the initial distribution will be quite 
 different due to the necessity for covering the 
 various fractions of the enemy's rushes. Here 
 the platoon objectives will usually be dependent 
 upon the character of the opposing rushes. 
 After fire has once been opened it becomes nec- 
 essary, therefore, for each fraction of a com- 
 pany having a separate objective to maintain 
 a system of estimation of the length of the 
 enemy's rushes or his present range. This is 
 usually accomplished by the file closers. The 
 captain with the first sergeant and the com- 
 pany buglers maintains a check and harmonizes 
 the ranges. In the battalion the major must, 
 as far as practicable, take advantage of every 
 opportunity to keep his battalion working as a 
 unit. Variations of Exercise No. 3, to cover 
 the defense, will produce results commensurate 
 with the effort expended. 
 
 Observation of Fire: — 
 
 Range may be determined by observing the 
 simultaneous strike of a number of bullets, i. e.,
 
 Musketry 15 
 
 volleys; by observing irregular firing, or fire 
 at will; and by observing the strike of sliots 
 fired by several expert riflemen. 
 
 The volley will give, under similar condi- 
 tions, better indications than will the same 
 number of shots which are not fired simul- 
 taneously. It is, therefore, desirable when pos- 
 sible to use the volley for ranging. In order 
 that this method may produce results commen- 
 surate Avith the effort made there are certain 
 conditions wliich must be fulfilled : — 
 
 1. The target must be stationary. 
 
 2. The ground must be of such character 
 
 that the strike of bullets may be seen. 
 
 3. The target must be so situated that the 
 
 ground in its vicinity is visible. 
 The application of this method is usually about 
 as follows: 
 Having estimated the range, two platoons 
 are selected to fire, the first with an elevation 
 about 200 yards over the estimated range ; the 
 second with one about 200 yards under. The 
 second platoon should fire a few seconds after 
 the first. The target should be included 
 between these shot groups and the range may 
 be estimated from the relative position of the 
 three points. If the target is not included 
 within the shot groups, changes in elevation 
 should be made so that it will be included, bear-
 
 16 Battle Fire Training 
 
 ing in mind that positive changes will produce 
 quicker results than a slight shifting of the 
 sight leaves. No more than two volleys should 
 usually be necessary to adjust the fire. 
 (Selected shots give a smaller shot group which 
 is more easily located.) 
 
 In order that the strike of the bullets may 
 be properly interpreted it is necessary that the 
 form of the shot group on various kinds of 
 ground be thoroughly understood, so that the 
 center of impact may be quickly recognized. 
 On horizontal ground the form of the shot 
 group is somewhat that of an ellipse with its 
 longer axis in the direction of the line of fire. 
 Ground rising at the target shortens the ellipse. 
 The length of the ellipse, of course, varies with 
 the different ranges from 300 yards at 100 
 yards to 64 at 2,000 for the mean or fifty per 
 cent zone, that is, the zone in which half the 
 hits will be found. 
 
 The table of dispersion given in the S. A. 
 F. M. should be studied in this connection so 
 that allowance may be made for wild and scat- 
 tered shots which will always occur. 
 
 In war it will frequently be difficult, if not 
 impossible, for commanders to distinguish indi- 
 cation of their own fire from that of other 
 troops. Tactical situations will not often 
 admit of trial volleys. Troops firing volleys
 
 Musketry 17 
 
 should not tlienisclvcs be under fire. For these 
 reasons and for those previously given it is 
 apparent that the opportunities for the use of 
 volleys for ranging are limited ; however, this 
 fact does not detract from the value of the 
 method and practice in it should be given in 
 order that, when applicable, it may be used. 
 To interpret properly the range from a group 
 fired at will is, of course, more difficult than 
 with the volley and it is from the former class 
 of fire that we will in battle be obliged to deduce 
 our fire effect. We have, however, in addition 
 to the indications given by the strike of the 
 bullets the effect of fire upon the enemy as a 
 l)a.sis for estimation. Good glasses, training, 
 and constant, keen observation for indications 
 which may be interpreted into terms of range 
 are requisite before results of any value can 
 be obtained from observation of fire. 
 
 Taking into consideration that hits on the 
 target will pass through and afford indications 
 in rear, it may be taken as an approximation 
 that fire directed at a stationary target is 
 adjusted properly when about one-third of the 
 shots appear to strike in front of it. 
 
 If circumstances will permit, perhaps one of 
 the most favorable methods of finding the range 
 is by the fire of expert riflemen who, with an 
 estimated range, fire at a prominent object.
 
 Musketry 19 
 
 The fire of the company is adjusted from tlu' 
 strike of their bullets. 
 
 The following plates give an approximation 
 of the appearance of fire when viewed from 
 different points in relation to the firing line: 
 
 Plate 1. Observing fire from in rear of 
 firing point, dust will appear somewhat above 
 actual point of impact. 
 
 Plate 2. If observation is made from rear 
 of firing point, hits appear on the side opposite 
 to the direction of the wind (wind from the 
 right). The best position from which to 
 observe fire is in rear of and above the firing 
 point, but it must be remembered that from this 
 position bullets which fall short will be more 
 easily * seen and consequently will appear to 
 strike further from the objective than bullets 
 which strike an equal distance beyond. 
 
 Plate 3. If observation is made on or 
 beyond the flank, shots which pass over the 
 objective will appear to fall toward the side on 
 which posted and those which fall short toward 
 the opposite side. The first view is from the 
 position of the firing line, the second view from 
 the position of the observer, of hits over and 
 short of the objective.
 
 
 ^^t^^^ 
 
 
 
 n^L~ \ 
 
 AiV/^ 
 
 
 Sp-<^^\L-is<» — 
 
 ^wSI 
 
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 ^flHyfl^^VB^BSHI^HHuiL 
 
 (Mi7^™ 
 
 ■ ^^— f^KfT'^ ' ■ — ^ 
 
 y^yMji ■ imwmb 
 
 e:^€=f?)3$1 
 
 ira 
 
 ^1^-w"'^^ 
 
 
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 ^K 
 
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 Sg^'-
 
 Musketry 21 
 
 From Other Troops: — 
 
 The artillery by the nature of its fire quickly 
 (letcrmiiies ranges and from it, at times, this 
 valuable information can be obtained. 
 
 By Instruments : — 
 
 The use of the "contained base instruments" 
 will largely eliminate difficulties but there are 
 two points to be borne in mind in this connec- 
 tion. First, we can never hope to supply all 
 units with the mechanical range finders. 
 Patrols, subdivisions of covering forces, and 
 individual soldiers will frequently be called 
 upon to estimate ranges, and therefore, the 
 issue of instruments should not be the signal 
 for omitting instruction in the other methods. 
 Second, range finders make errors and in addi- 
 tion the distance to the target is not always the 
 best elevation to use; hence we must not cease 
 to correct by observation. On some foreign 
 ranges the range for the day is announced not 
 from the reading of the instruments but from 
 the results obtained by specially selected shots. 
 It is obvious that where range finders are issued 
 for only a portion of a command arrangements • 
 should be made for the transmission throughout 
 the unit of the data obtained by these valuable 
 adjuncts. Considerable practice is necessary 
 even with the simplest form of range finder to 
 obtain accuracy and speed.
 
 22 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Use of the Mil Scale for Range Determinatiok 
 
 (From Infantry Journal — Article by Capt. H. E. Eames, 
 
 28th Infantry) 
 
 „ W X 1,000 T, T, -A 
 
 R —^ ! R — Range in yds. 
 
 2. 
 
 ^^ RXM 
 
 ~ 1,000 
 
 W = Width or height in yds. 
 
 3. 
 
 ^ W X 1,000 
 R 
 
 M = Number of mils. 
 
 The following examples of the application 
 of these formulae indicate their practical use: 
 Example 1 : (Estimation of range) 
 
 A certain tree is estimated to be 45 feet high 
 (15 yds.). It covers 15 mils of the scale. It is 
 therefore (estimated) 1,000 yards away, for: 
 
 T, W X 1,000 15 yards X 1,000 15,000 , ... , 
 
 R = ! = — £ 5 — I = — I = 1,000 yards. 
 
 M 15 mils 15 ^ 
 
 The telegraph poles seen on a distant rail- 
 road are known (from previous measurement of 
 such poles) to be 44 yards apart; the distance 
 f between two adjacent poles is 40 mils; the 
 range to the railroad is therefore 1,100 yards, 
 
 for : 
 
 „ W X 1,000 44 yards X 1,000 44,000 , ^„„ , 
 
 ^ = TH •= ICK n — it; — ~ 1,000 yds. 
 
 M 40 mils =40
 
 Mnskctrij 23 
 
 Example 2: (Estimation of fronts) 
 
 A line of skirmishers at about one man per 
 yard of front covers 40 mils of the scale ; the 
 range is known to be 800 yards. How many 
 
 men are there in the skirmish line? 
 
 _ R X M 800 yards X 40 mils 32,000 \ 32 yards 
 ^^~ 1,000 " 40 mils " 1,000 \ (or men). 
 
 A column of infantry in "fours" is seen by a 
 patrol at a range of 1,200 yards. It covers 
 120 mils from head to rear of column. How 
 many men are in the column.'' 
 
 RXM 1,200 yards X 120 mils lt4,000 f 144. yds. 
 
 W- 1,000- ■ 1,000 1,000 1 288 men. 
 
 Example 3: (Determination of mils — in dis- 
 tributing fire) 
 A hostile force known to contain about 100 
 mtn is deployed in position 1,000 yards away 
 but so concealed that its flanks cannot be seen 
 or determined definitely. The company com- 
 mander decides to cover a front of 200 yards 
 with his fire, 100 yards each side of a visible 
 group of heads in the battle line. How many 
 
 mils or "sights" should be covered.'' 
 ^ _ W X 1,000_200 yards X 1,000_2CO,000 ( 200 mils or 
 R ~ 1,000 ~ 1,000 I 4 sights. 
 
 A machine gun platoon known to contain two 
 guns is concealed at a range of 900 yards with 
 one of its guns visible through glasses near a 
 small bush. The company commander decides 
 to cover a front of 50 yards on each side of the
 
 Musketry 25 
 
 visible gun. How many mils or "sights" should 
 be covered? 
 
 _W X 1,000 _ 100 X 1,000 100,000 \ 111 mils or 
 
 ^~ R " 900 " 900 " [ 2.2 sights. 
 
 Hi/ Maps: — 
 
 It is to be expected tliat the use of maps for 
 range finding will be limited by the very nature 
 of campaign, except in prolonged engagements, 
 or when time and opportunity affords the 
 making of reliable data, as in defensive 
 positions. 
 
 If time permits a sketch, which is always a 
 valuable supplement to a report or for use as 
 a fire chart, can be made. Supposing a land- 
 scape, as Plate 4, is under consideration; rule 
 off on a paper witji a mil scale horizontal and 
 vertical lines as shown in Plate 5. 
 
 Hold the mil scale, as indicated in Plate 4, a 
 suitable distance from the eye with the button 
 on the string held in the mouth and obtain the 
 horizon, the location of prominent landmarks 
 and features of terrain covered by the scale 
 which is sketched in the corresponding squares 
 on the ruled paper; proceed along the width 
 of the proposed sketch in a similar manner. 
 Then hold the rule vertically and locate the 
 boundaries and by a series of horizontal and 
 vertical intercepts data is obtained for filling 
 out the sketch. Thus far the sketch, as shown
 
 Musketry 29 
 
 in Plati- 6, lias been completed. The value of a 
 transparent material for a mil scale is apparent 
 in this work. 
 
 When completed the skrtch should approxi- 
 mate that shown in Plate 7. 
 
 On the completed sketch, as in Plate 7, mark 
 the ranges to the j)rominent points and turn it 
 over. to the troops occupying the position, and 
 the matter of transmission of ranges is simpli- 
 fied. If opportunity does not afford time for 
 the above method, a valuable range card can 
 be made by the following method (applying to 
 landscape of Plate 7), which would be of great 
 value in defense work. 
 
 In making this range card, first locate the 
 position of observer, then a reference point, 
 and mark them plainly. Any one using such a 
 card, sights on the reference point and orients 
 the card. (Plate 8) 
 By Sound: — 
 
 Sound travels at the rate of 1,100 feet, or 
 366 yards, per second. If the number of sec- 
 onds between the flash or smoke and the report 
 is taken and multiplied by 366 the result will 
 closely approximate the range. A stop watch 
 is the best means for determining this time 
 interval, but a little practice in counting will 
 produce very good results by adding some syl- 
 lable or sound that will about make up the
 

 
 Musketry 
 
 31 
 
 difference in time wlien c()untin<r inniilxi-s as, 
 1, ah, 2, ah, 3, ah, 4, ah, 5, ah, C, ah, etc. 
 By Mcasurh}g Distance on the Ground: — 
 
 This metliod is apph'cahle on the defense 
 onl}'. Range cards shouhl be made and fur- 
 nished to all company commanders. Distance 
 should be measured to prominent objects; if 
 there are none, artificial marks should be con- 
 structed. The application of tliis method shouM 
 not be left until the battle field is reached. 
 
 From Ml 
 
 isketry 
 
 Bulletin :- 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Illustrating the Influence of 
 
 AN 
 
 Incourec't 
 
 EsTIM 
 
 ate 
 
 
 
 
 The Range 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ranqe 
 
 
 
 
 Error 
 
 in Yards 
 
 
 
 
 Used 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 JOO 
 
 150 
 
 200 
 
 250 
 
 300 
 
 350 
 
 .',00 
 
 iOO ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 96 
 
 83 
 
 67 
 
 49 
 
 32 
 
 21 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 i50 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 95 
 
 81 
 
 62 
 
 43 
 
 27 
 
 16 
 
 9 
 
 6 
 
 .500 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 93 
 
 78 
 
 57 
 
 36 
 
 21 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 550 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 92 
 
 74 
 
 60 
 
 30 
 
 15 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 (iOO . . . 
 
 . 100 
 
 91 
 
 69 
 
 43 
 
 23 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 650 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 90 
 
 64 
 
 38 
 
 18 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 700 ... 
 
 . IOO 
 
 88 
 
 59 
 
 32 
 
 13 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 750 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 86 
 
 55 
 
 27 
 
 10 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 800 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 84 
 
 50 
 
 22 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 850 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 82 
 
 46 
 
 18 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 000 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 80 
 
 41 
 
 13 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i)50 . . . 
 
 . 100 
 
 78 
 
 37 
 
 11 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,000 . . . 
 
 . 100 
 
 75 
 
 32 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,0.50 . . . 
 
 . 100 
 
 73 
 
 30 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,100 . .. 
 
 . 100 
 
 70 
 
 27 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,1,50 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 69 
 
 24 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 .200 . . . 
 
 . 100 
 
 67* 
 
 20 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,2.50 . . . 
 
 . 100 
 
 65 
 
 18 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,300 ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 63 
 
 15 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,3.50 . . . 
 
 . 100 
 
 59 
 
 13 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i,too ... 
 
 . 100 
 
 55 
 
 10 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,450 .;. 
 
 . 100 
 
 64 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 

 
 32 Battle Fire Training 
 
 1,500 
 
 100 
 
 53 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 1,550 .... 
 
 100 
 
 51 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 1,600 .... 
 
 100 
 
 49 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 I,fi50 .... 
 
 100 
 
 47 
 
 () 
 
 
 
 1,700 . . . . 
 
 100 
 
 45 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 1,750 .... 
 
 100 
 
 43 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 1,800 . . . . 
 
 100 
 
 40 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 1,850 . . . . 
 
 100 
 
 39 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 1,900 . . . . 
 
 100 
 
 38 
 
 3 
 
 
 1,950 
 
 100 
 
 37 
 
 2 
 
 
 2,000 .... 
 
 100 
 
 3() 
 
 2 
 
 
 Note 
 
 : Theab( 
 
 3ve ti 
 
 able 
 
 of experimental firing at the School of Mus- 
 ketry by a class of riflemen who were regarded 
 as slightly above the average company in indi- 
 vidual proficiency, all of the men being either 
 expert riflemen or sharpshooters. 
 
 If "good marksmen" shooting at .... yards 
 with sights set correctly make 100 hits b}'^ firing 
 a certain number of rounds, then the same men 
 firing at the same-target and range and the same 
 number of rounds but with a sight setting .... 
 yards in error will make .... hits. To illus- 
 trate "Good" marksmen at 800 yards with a 
 correct sight setting will make 100 hits (the 
 number of rounds necessary to make the 100 
 hits is immaterial), but if the sights are set at 
 900 yards, or 100 yards in error, they will 
 make but 41 hits, as will be seen from the table 
 by looking along the "900 yard" line until the 
 100 yard error column is reached, where the 
 figure 41 Avill be found.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 TARGET DESIGNATION 
 
 "Under this head arc inchidcd the ability of 
 commanders to describe the objectives to be 
 attacked or the sectors to be defended and the 
 ability of thv individual solditr to understand 
 and transmit to other soldiers such descrip- 
 tions. This implies a uniformity in the method 
 of designating targets throughout those units 
 which may become mixed in battle, such as 
 liattalion, regiment, and brigade." 
 
 "Within the regiment, it implies an ability on 
 the part of the regimental commander to 
 describe an objective and its subdivisions from 
 the map as well as from the ground, and such 
 training on the part of his subordinates as will 
 insure a correct translation of his map desig- 
 nation into terms of actual terrain." 
 
 "Wifhiti the battalion, it implies not only an 
 ability on the part of the battalion commander 
 to describe an objective without ambiguity but, 
 also, a uniformity of training throughout the 
 battalion, Avhich will enable the men of one com- 
 pany to describe intelligently to men of other 
 companies of the battalion both targets and 
 fronts in language and by methods with which 
 both are familiar."
 
 34 Battle Fire Training 
 
 "Within the company, it implies an ability on 
 the part of the company commander to describe 
 the objectives for his platoons within the limits 
 assigned to the company. It also implies an 
 ability to cover the whole target of the com- 
 pany during a forward movement of part of 
 the company.'' 
 
 "Within the platoon, it implies an ability on 
 the part of the platoon leaders to' understand 
 the company commander's designation of the 
 target and to transmit that information to 
 their platoons in such a manner as to insure an 
 equal distribution of their fire within the front 
 assigned them as objectives, not slighting the 
 less visible parts." (MusKctry Bulletin) 
 
 Targets in the field will be either — 
 
 (1) Visible throughout entire extent. 
 
 (2) Partly visible. 
 
 (3) No portion visible. 
 
 When a target is visible throughout its entire 
 extent, or partly visible, no elaborate system 
 of designation is necessary for its location ; 
 when partly visible its extent may te estimated 
 by some medium of intercept measurement, and 
 when no portion is visible its location may be 
 determined as described in the following pages. 
 
 Before taking up instruction in target 
 designation, men should become thoroughly 
 acquainted with the following, wherein lies the 
 basis of all description:
 
 Target Designation 35 
 
 1. Familiarity witli military and topographical 
 
 terms so as to rccognizL' all features of 
 military importr.ncc. 
 
 2. Ability to point out on a landscape target 
 
 or actual terrain, features, as — 
 
 sk^'line, valley, gentle slope, steep slope, 
 dense cover, crest, military crest, ridge, 
 hill, peak, saddle, etc. 
 
 3. Ability to <leterniino different kinds of trees, 
 
 tlieir shape and size, undergro\\i;h, color 
 of crops, etc. 
 
 4. Ability to approximate size of objects — 
 
 if large or small 
 if of moderate size 
 if tall, short, wide, or narrow. 
 
 5. Ability to understand changing aspect of 
 
 terrain during an advance (Paragraph 
 ir,7, I. D. R.). 
 
 In action, the target, as a rule, will not be 
 visible to the in.iividual soldier and there must 
 be some (juick and fairly accurate method of 
 conveying to every man on the firing line its 
 location and extent. 
 
 The description of targits in such mayner 
 as to enable the quick understanding of what 
 is intended, can be appreci.ated only by those 
 who on the firing line have given commands, 
 entirely satisfactory and apparently clear and 
 simple to themselves, but, in reality, so vague
 
 38 Battle Fire Training 
 
 that only a small portion of their organization 
 seemed to understand. 
 
 It becomes the duty, therefore, of unit com- 
 manders to give fire orders properly, clearly, 
 and in simple language, which will stand the 
 test — "do the men understand?'' 
 
 "It has been reported that in the South 
 African War at least 75% of the shots fired 
 were wasted owing to bad indication and the 
 men, therefore, had no recognition of targets." 
 It should be noted here that in giving loca- 
 tion, terms should be used which describe the 
 appearance of a Za/zJscape witliout glasses. Use 
 field glasses to become acquainted with all the 
 details- of terrain and target, then make the 
 description as it appears to the eye unaided. 
 
 The top portion of Plates 9-A and 9-B illus- 
 trates the appearance of a landscape to unaided 
 vision; the lower portion, how a particular 
 section appears when using field glasses. 
 With glasses — No. 1 shows a line of men with 
 
 supports in rear. 
 With glasses — No, 2 shows a small house to the 
 
 right of the mill with a small 
 
 trench in its front. 
 With glasses — No. 3 shows a line of intrench- 
 
 ments. 
 With glasses — No. 4 shows a machine gun at 
 
 fence opening.
 
 Target Designation 
 
 39 
 
 Details are iisuall}' not visible to the naked 
 eye; therefore all target descrijition should be 
 so given as to afford a ready understanding 
 from the appearance of the landscape itself, 
 based upon the detail as shown by glasses. 
 
 If in a section of terrain, as shown in Plate 
 10, a niacliine gun is located at A, or a 
 
 liostile line at B C, it seems perfectly clear 
 
 to say : 
 
 (1) "A machine gun to the right of that 
 clump of trees" — (pointing to the clump of 
 trees). This would probably give sufficient 
 data were it not for the fact that there are 
 three clumps of trees and such command 
 received under fire might easily be understood 
 to mean any of the three clumps of trees; or — 
 
 (2) "A hostile line on ridge from that 
 clump of trees to the road." Again the same 
 objections. Such description will fit any one 
 of the clumps of trees.
 
 40 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 If some system is used that permits of the 
 designation of a reference point, if possible 
 before the time for action arrives, when all are 
 more receptive for instruction, a point may be 
 established from which positions may be located 
 with reasonable accuracy as they develop. In 
 the above case, before or after arrival on the 
 firing line the high peak is impressed on all — 
 "That is Reference Point." With this start, a 
 simple command given later : 
 
 (1) "At 10 o'clock, near side, of clump of 
 trees, machine gun," conveys the idea of the 
 proper clump of trees, and no other clump of 
 trees fits this description. 
 
 (2) "Hostile line, on ridge, extends 1 sight 
 right." 
 
 It will be noted that according to the various 
 systems used, a reference point in one case 
 means a point ; in another, a point through 
 which a line to the observer is imagined, and
 
 Target Designation 41 
 
 targets arc then located to the 'riglit or left 
 of this iinaginar}'^ line. 
 
 On a hindscape the difficulty of locating a 
 target might be further appreciated when we 
 look at Plate 11 and are told that machine guns 
 are located at A, or a hostile line extended from 
 B to C. 
 
 Of tin- imthods of target designation given 
 herein, each has its limitations, defects, and 
 advantages under various conditions of terrain, 
 fire, etc., hut a wise selection of one, modified 
 hy part of another, or a combination of two or 
 more will prove a material factor in efl^cicncy. 
 
 Units ok Measure 
 
 A common term should be applied to mil, 
 finger, and sight leaf, such as "sight," and 
 throughout our service such a term should 
 convey one meaning; for example, a sector 
 1/20 of the range = 50 mils = 1 sight leaf 
 = 1 finger measurement. 
 
 A MIL is an angular measurement (approxi- 
 mately 3 minutes of arc) whose tangent is 
 1/1000 of the radius. In other words, 1 mil 
 will cover at 1,000 yards 1 yard intercept; 
 50 mils will cover 50 yards or 1/20 of range. 
 If a 50 yard trench is placed perpenrlicular to 
 a position at a point of 1,000 yards away and 
 a mil scale held U]), 50 mils will just cover the 
 trench. A mil scale can easily be made by
 
 42 Battle Fire Training 
 
 reproducing the graduations of a ruler, show- 
 ing inches divided into tenths and held 20 
 inches from the eye. 
 
 THE SIGHT LEAF equals the intercept of 
 1/20 of range, as 50 yards at 1,000 yards 
 (when eye is held 13% inches from sight leaf 
 or about one inch in rear of small of stock) . 
 The position of the eye relative to the stock 
 can be temporarily marked with a pencil or 
 permanently with a file. If intercept is made 
 with lowered sight leaf, the notch of open sight 
 affords a means of obtaining half "sights." 
 
 A FINGER so held as to intercept 1/20 of 
 the range or 50 yards at 1,000 yards. Finger 
 widths differ in individuals, hence the distance 
 from the eye to the finger must be ascertained 
 in each case. The finger position can be deter- 
 mined by holding a mil scale as indicated above, 
 on an object, wall, or landscape, noting the 
 intercept and adjusting the finger to cover such 
 intercept ; or take a sight leaf intercept with a 
 rifle on the landscape or wall and adjust the 
 finger position so as to cover the intercept ; or 
 measure one foot on an object, move twenty 
 feet away, and cover the measurement by a 
 finger. 
 
 In using the finger measurement, teach men 
 to cover a sector as indicated in the foregoing, 
 and when accurately covered to swing the arm,
 
 Target Designation 
 
 18 
 
 50 mils 
 
 Sipht Leaf 11/16' 
 
 Finper Width 
 
 Distance from Eye 
 
 20" 
 15" 
 10" 
 
 20 
 
 20 
 
 7/.siii,g oiilji the .shoulder joint, until the hand 
 rcaclu's the side of the body and note posiHon 
 of hand rclativu to holt, packet, etc. Re(|iiirt' 
 Miem, after a few moments, to trv this niethod 
 '^f obtaining arm position. 
 
 To improvise a rule quickly, a pencil or stick 
 can be notched at intervals to obtain the pro- 
 portions of 1/20 as indicated below: 
 
 Width of Measuring _.. , , „ 
 
 ,,' ,. •' Distance from Eye 
 
 : 20" 
 
 133//' 
 : (to 1)0 detcniiiiiefl) 
 
 Notched Pencil or 
 Stick 
 
 1" 
 
 %" 
 
 Vs" 
 
 With the alove, there are three methods of 
 measuring. "Why three methods.''" A man 
 has his rifle and the sight leaf is naturally 
 the normal measuring medium for him to 
 use, as he can use it while in a prone position 
 with only a slight change in the position of his 
 head, or he can use the finger measurement. 
 A fire director has only his rule with which he 
 sy)eaks in the same terms as the man with the 
 sight leaf. Suppose the rule is lost, he can at 
 once I'esort to the finger measurement. All 
 officers from battalion commanders down should 
 be supplied with some means for measuring 
 sectors.
 
 Target Designation 45 
 
 In announcing a reference point a good plan 
 during practice, if conditions warrant the 
 exposed position, is to stand as illustrated in 
 Plate 12, looking directly towards the reference 
 f)oint, with the arms in a plane perpendicular 
 to the line of the reference point. Reference 
 point (control or initial point) may be defined 
 as some prominent, very distinct object on the 
 landscape, near the target or where the target 
 is expected to be, easily described and quickly 
 seen, upon which the atte;ntion of the men can 
 be centered, and from which targets are located 
 by some means of measurement. 
 
 Abbreviations sometimes used in explaining 
 the following systems : — 
 
 Horizontal Clock Face H. C. F. 
 
 \'crtical Clock Face ^^ C. F. 
 
 Right Angle System R. A. S. 
 
 Sight System S. S. 
 
 In announcing reference points the use of the 
 horizontal clock system will 1 e an aid when first 
 establishing its direction. In Plate 12 A — 
 
 1. First establish direction of 12 o'clock — as high 
 
 trees on ridge to our front (pointing). 
 
 2. Using the following o'clock lines — 
 at 10 o'clock 1. left edge of mill. 
 
 2. west end of fence enclosing mill. 
 11 o'clock 3. distant peak y^ sight west. 
 
 4. ridge, east of mill. 
 
 5. road.
 
 46 Battle Fire Tr aiming 
 
 12 o'clock 6. road. 
 
 7. trees, near road 
 
 8. top of ridge. 
 
 9. distant peak % sight west. 
 
 1 o'clock 10. road. 
 
 11. line of trees. 
 
 12. ridge. 
 
 2 o'clock 13. road. 
 
 14. house. 
 
 An advance moving forward from a position 
 indicated by the clock in Plate 12 A, would 
 have the trees on the ridge to their front as a 
 reference point; if moving in the direction of 
 10 o'clock, as appears from the picture, the 
 mill ; towards 1 o'clock, the end of the ridge ; 
 towards 2 o'clock, a house. 
 
 The distant horizon in this case is so uniform 
 that to give any one of the small peaks as a 
 reference point Avould very likely result in a 
 misunderstanding. Again, during an advance 
 towards 12 o'clock, the small ridge would com- 
 pletely obscure the horizon as soon as the foot 
 of the hill was reached. 
 
 Measuring with Mil Scale: — (Plate 13) 
 
 Reference point — end of road. 
 
 3 "sights" right — that house. 
 
 Measuring xcith Sight Leaf: — (Plate 14) 
 
 Reference point — same. 
 
 3 "sights" right — that house. 
 
 Measuring with Finger: — (Plate 15)
 
 50 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Reference point — same. (Some men prefer to 
 turn back of hand towards 
 object.) 
 3 "sights" right — that house. 
 Exercise : — 
 
 Purpose: — To accustom men to take mea- 
 surements properly from a reference point. 
 A target such as Plate 30 is of great value 
 for this exercise or, in its absence, a wall, 
 side of tent, or an}' surface will answer the 
 purpose. 
 
 Situation:-' — Men step to the testing point 
 when called. Position for the testing point 
 should be determined by the sector widths. 
 If a twelve inch sector is intended on the tar- 
 get the position should be twenty feet awa}'. 
 After a reference point is indicated the man 
 is told to take one, two, or any number 
 (including halves) of sights — right or left. 
 The estimate is indicated and corrections 
 made. 
 
 This exercise may be adapted to the terrain 
 in the following manner: — (A) Select any 
 prominent object on or near the horizon. Call 
 the men to tlic testing point one at a time and 
 require each individual to apply his sight any 
 given number of times to the right or left of 
 the selected object and describe accurately the 
 point upon which the last intercept falls. (B)
 
 Target Designation 51 
 
 Select, two proiiiiiicnt objects and require each 
 man to state the number of sight widths 
 between them. 
 
 In the use of the siglit leaf during the first 
 exercises, considerable variance will be noted by 
 reason of the inability of the men to determine 
 where the leaf width ends when moving the rifle 
 and to know where to begin the next measure- 
 ment. Often no object affords a tie-in point 
 for the successive leaf measurements and a little 
 practice will be necessary to correct this error. 
 Some men are able to get a better and more 
 accurate reading by sighting along the top of 
 the leaf.
 
 
 
 o 5 
 
 
 
 IPLE 
 
 900. 
 o'clo 
 ile \ 
 
 
 
 
 
 n - ^^ 
 
 
 
 3 S^^ 2 
 
 
 
 W C "C 
 
 
 
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 Target Designation 
 
 Q5 
 
 Trench D;ita : — -It is to be noted in this con- 
 nect ion that our target reguhvtions provide no 
 course of training in firing standing from a 
 trench or from loop holes. Such training, in 
 view of the developments in the European War, 
 is deemed most necessary. 
 
 To further facilitate the assignment of com- 
 pany sectors in each trench a small board may 
 be placed similar to Plate 3 showing ranges. 
 In front of each company trench, stakes ma}' 
 be driven which from a common point of obser- 
 vation serve to give a definite apportionment 
 of sectors to the men, as shown in Plate 24<. 
 
 
 A machine gun commander must reach his 
 gun pointers onlv with fire data. l*late 25 
 
 PLATE. 2S.
 
 66 Battle Fire Training 
 
 illustrates a small strip of paper which the 
 machine gun commander makes to conform to 
 the reading of his mil scale, with sectors and 
 targets marked, passes it on to each gun, and 
 from it sectors are easily obtained. This can 
 be applied in a limited way, in defense, to the 
 transmission of fire data to platoon comanders. 
 Plate 25 applies to Example B in Plate 19. 
 
 The following exercises are offered as sugges- 
 tions for training in target designation and 
 range finding. As will be seen, they are also 
 adapted to training in distribution. 
 Exercise 1. 
 
 Purpose: — To train officers and noncom- 
 missioned officers in concise, accurate, and 
 clear description of targets, and to train men 
 to interpret such descriptions quickly and 
 correctly. 
 
 Situation: — The squad is deployed facing 
 to the rear. The corporal is at the firing 
 point, where rests have been provided for 
 seven rifles. 
 
 Action: — At a signal from the instructor 
 the target is outlined by the display of a flag 
 at each flank. When the corporal states he 
 understands the position of the target, th< 
 flags are withdrawn. The squad is thf/i 
 brought to the firing point, placed in a proxie 
 position, and each man required to estimute
 
 Target Designation 67 
 
 the Ffinge, set his sight, and to sight his rifle 
 on tlie target as he understands it from the 
 description of the corporal. The corporal's 
 errors may be checked from the actual ter- 
 rain. Those of the men are pointed out by 
 requiring each man to rise and leave his rifle, 
 properly pointed, on the rest provided. 
 In this exercise the time allowed the corporal 
 to locate his target should be reduced as profi- 
 ciency is acquired. The time allowed the men 
 should also be reduced as instruction pro- 
 gresses. The period required to balance the 
 rifle accurately on the sand bag rest will be 
 found to vary to such an extent with the difi'er- 
 ent rests that it is hardly practicable to make 
 this exercise competitive as far as time is con- 
 cerned. The exercise is suitable for larger 
 units than the squad. The width of the target 
 and the distance thereto should vary with the 
 size of the unit undergoing instruction. 
 
 Exercise 2. 
 
 Purpose: — To train officers and noncom- 
 missioned ofl'icers as in Exercise 1, and to 
 train the individual soldier to locate a target 
 solely from a description thereof. 
 
 iSituntion: — The men are placed so as not 
 to be able to see the target. Rests are pro- 
 vided as in the preceding exercise. For indi- 
 viduals the target should be a rock, a bush, or
 
 68 Battle Fire Traming 
 
 some other suitable feature of the landscape ; 
 for a unit, a line whose flanks, in the earlier 
 stages of instruction, should be clearly 
 defined. 
 
 Action: — The instructor indicates the tar- 
 get to the commander who, having described 
 it, causes the unit or individual to move so 
 as to see the target, locate it, estimate the 
 range, set sight, and place the rifle on the 
 rest properly directed. 
 
 After some instruction with plainly dis- 
 cernable targets, more indistinct ones should 
 be selected. 
 
 Illustration: Reference point, rocky hill top 
 at 10 o'clock. 
 Target, right, three sights, 
 dark green bush.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 FIRE DISTRIBUTION 
 
 "III a decisive battle success depends upon gaining 
 and maintaining fire superiority." — I. D. R. 
 
 To gain and hold this fire superiority certain 
 things are necessary,* among wliich is a proper 
 distribution of fire upon the target. What is 
 meant by a proper distribution of fire will be 
 explained later. It is apparent, however, that 
 no regular distribution of any kind can be 
 expected unless the objective is divided into sec- 
 tors and these sectors assigned to the various 
 units taking part in the action. In this connec- 
 tion a pamphlet issued by the School of Mus- 
 ketry says : "Commanders of all degrees assign 
 that part of the general objective given them to 
 their commands in such manner that there will 
 be none of the target that is not receiving its 
 proportional part of the fire." The pamphlet 
 then continues, showing the evil results which 
 follow a disregard of this principle, which, of 
 ceurse, are in addition to the loss of a proper 
 distribution of fire: "The division of the objec- 
 tive into parts and the assignment to units must 
 be made with great care. If the adjacent flanks 
 of two organizations advancing from slightly 
 different directions guide on the same point in 
 
 •(Balk's Infantry Tactics, 370.)
 
 70 Battle Fire Training 
 
 the enemy's line during the advance, they will 
 arrive in a continuous line upon its front. If 
 the point is in advance of the line there will be 
 crowding or overlapping. This is objec- 
 tionable as it causes confusion and may subject 
 a portion of one line to the fire of the other. 
 Casualties during the advance may tend to 
 reduce the difficulty. If the guiding point is 
 in rear of the enemy's lino, there may be a gap 
 between the two organizations, which, however, 
 may be filled if that is desirable." .... 
 
 Maps for the purpose of subdividing the 
 objective will not always be available, nor, if 
 available, will their use always be desirable. In 
 the absence of maps the methods by which com- 
 manders may accomplish this subdivision are 
 explained in the chapter on Target Designation. 
 While the text refers mainly to the company 
 and the subdivisions thereof, the principles are 
 applicable to larger units, and should bo 
 applied. It must be borne in mind that while 
 the brigade and regiment may be able to include 
 the divisions of the objective in their initial 
 order, such will rarely be the case in the bat- 
 talion. The battalion commander must usually 
 pass through the zone of artillery fire for a mile 
 or more before he can pick out his first firing 
 position and assign objectives. If possible the 
 company reference point should not be selected
 
 Fire Distribution 71 
 
 until one can be picked up in the enemy's line. 
 The necessity for as early an assignment of 
 objectives as is expedient is discussed under 
 the battalion attack problem in Chapter 8. 
 
 The critiques which follow were given by the 
 Musketry Board of the Fifth Brigade in con- 
 nection with the problems in target designation 
 on the defense and in the attack. They indi- 
 cate not only the errors which occur through 
 improper methods of division but also empha 
 size the necessity for a uniform system of angu- 
 lar measurement such as the "Sight." 
 
 The Defense 
 
 (a) The front was described as extending 
 "200 yards north from the reference point." 
 
 (b) As extending 4 (5 or 6) fingers north 
 from the reference point. 
 
 (c) As extending from the reference point 
 northward for a definite distance "to that tall 
 windmill." 
 
 "The first is objectionable as being indefi- 
 nite. In practice it leads to misunderstandings 
 as to the width of the front, to the adoption of 
 a front narrower than that ordered by the 
 colonel, and gaps in the center of the line which 
 were assumed by no company, or an excessive 
 overlapping at that point with a consequent 
 loss of fire effect on each front. Had the
 
 72 Battle Fire Training 
 
 company commanders been versed in readily 
 translating the yard measure into some known 
 standard, as a mil scale, or had it been given 
 in mils, it would have been satisfactory." 
 
 "The second is objectionable unless the 
 expression 'finger^ is a definite width, known 
 and recognized by all, or, if the men are trained 
 to use the rear sight leaf as a measure of width, 
 it should be so used in designating targets." 
 
 "The third is considered the best method of 
 the three because it leaves no doubt as to the 
 target's width, indicates a definite intention 
 on the part of the battalion commander, but 
 it presumes an ability on the part of the bat- 
 talion commander to recognize his front from' 
 the colonel's order and to transform that order 
 into terms appropriate to the concrete prob- 
 lems presented to the battalion." 
 
 "It is to be understood that rarely will two 
 physical points be present." 
 
 The Attack 
 
 "In apportioning the battalion target to the 
 companies on the firing line, the difference 
 between the battalion in defense and in attack 
 should be noted. In defense, the division of the 
 battalion sector should be made by a reference 
 to physical objects as has been stated in a 
 previous critique.
 
 Fire Distribution 73 
 
 In the attack, however, this will often not be 
 practicable and seldom desirable because of the 
 chan^inf^f aspect of the sector or target as the 
 battalion advances. 
 
 Generally it will be sufficient with trained 
 troops to acquaint them with the width of the 
 battalion sector or part of the target, the 
 direction line, and the apportionment of this 
 wjiole line which the battalion commander 
 wishes to make, assuming that he desires to 
 depart from some prearranged and obvious 
 system of apportionment, such as where each 
 company takes its proportion of the whole 
 target depending upon the number of com- 
 panies in the line." 
 
 It is clear from the foregoing that without 
 a uniform system of angular measurement a 
 clear designation of targets is a difficult mattei". 
 In training, therefore, great stress should be 
 laid upon the exercises and principles given 
 under Target Designation. 
 
 The assignment of sectors is usually made 
 from a central point where the commanders. of 
 the subdivisi^s are assembled for orders. 
 
 In this connection it is to be noted by all 
 commanders that a target once assigned must 
 be kept under observation when changing posi- 
 tion. This is to guard against the apparent 
 shifting of the objective when viewed from
 
 74 Battle Fire Travning 
 
 different angles. For example, the battalion 
 sector and the subdivision thereof will appear 
 different when viewed from the position of the 
 major and when viewed from the positions of 
 the several companies. 
 
 Referring to a proper distribution of fire, 
 spoken of above, the Infantry Drill Regulations 
 states: "The purpose of fire superiority is to 
 get hits whenever possible, but at all events to 
 keep down the enemy's fire and render it harm- 
 less. To accomplish this, the target must he 
 covered with fire throughout its whole extent. 
 .... No part of the target is neglected " 
 
 By covering all parts of the target with fire 
 and only by covering all parts, is proper dis- 
 tribution obtained. The methods by which the 
 companies in the battalion and the platoons in 
 the company are assigned sectors so as to 
 accomplish this, will be explained in the chapter 
 on Application of Fire. 
 
 In Plate 26 a position appears apparently 
 occupied at intervals. The tendency among 
 untrained troops is to fire at prominent objects 
 or toward the center of a hostile line. It is to 
 be expected, therefore, that under the condi-
 
 Fire Distribution 
 
 75 
 
 tions shown in tlie plate, the visible targets will 
 be hit. If, however, the concealment afforded 
 by the brush is by some means removed, a line 
 miffht be confronted, as in Plate 27, of which 
 
 "•-'^•"'yfrr'-l'r 
 
 I ■t^liiiS Yff^fSri^. 
 
 a large portion is receiving no hits. The neces- 
 sity for covering all parts of the line with fire 
 thus becomes apparent, for, from the portions 
 not covered a deadly, uninterrupted, and 
 undisturbed fire is beinff delivered. 
 
 >^ 
 
 TO-:*r9^TO ''r ' o ^^ W ^^^> ^^^^^ ^-' 
 
 4 
 
 ^^"^uM^^cl-K -' 
 
 ' ■ ^ 
 
 ^"^ 
 
 -^gg>- 
 
 PUATd 2 A
 
 Fire Distribution 77 
 
 When first instructing men in collective dis- 
 inbution a large extent of target or landscape 
 should be presented for division. Figure A, 
 Plate 28, indicates a landscape divided by a 
 squad in such a manner that the centers of 
 impact are equally distributed along the entire 
 front. Such distribution over a large front in 
 the first stages of instruction permits of the 
 correction of errors. After the idea of appor- 
 tioiunent of a target is learned, then practice 
 siiould be given on smaller fronts until such as 
 Figure B can be properly divided, for it must 
 be understood that a company might have a 
 target of apparently less extent than in 
 I'Mgure C. 
 
 In some field problems, when the flanks of a 
 target are located, the methods of closing the 
 center of impact of the flank fire unit as in 
 Figure D, d' may be adopted. For a fire prob- 
 lem, it no doubt adds a trifle to the number of 
 hits as compared to d'', where a certain portion 
 of a shot group falls without the target. 
 
 In action the advantage of covering thor- 
 oughly the apparent flank and a little more 
 extent as in d", seems the better plan, for the 
 fianks are favorable positions for observers and 
 others aiding in fire direction, and their exact 
 location is difficult to determine. * 
 
 Plate 29 shows a target which, or something 
 similar to serve the purpose, may be easily
 
 78 Battle Fire Training 
 
 drawn on a card and a duplicate, Figure 29 A, 
 of same placed underneath and used in the fol- 
 lowing manner : 
 
 With a pin or other sharp instrument, 
 make a hole in the target to indicate your 
 point of aim, assuming for example the fol- 
 lowing pj-oblem : "Your squad will cover a 
 hostile skirmish line extending on the top 
 (or other) target, from right to left. You 
 are No. 4 (or 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8)." 
 The extent of the target can be changed to 
 cover half or a small portion of target, or the 
 problem can embrace the following: 
 
 "Your company of 8 squads cover, on top 
 (or other) target from .... to Indi- 
 cate the center of impact of the 7th squad, 
 of the 5th squad, of the 3d squad, etc." 
 Variations of the above will suggest themselves 
 as the target is used. 
 
 A landscape target of about the size 36" 
 X 14' placed indoors or in the company street 
 in camp will afford an excellent means for not 
 only teaching distribution but many of the 
 principles of musketry. Plate 30 represents 
 such a landscape, and at about 30 feet from it 
 are lined a number of sand bags. Any other 
 kind of suitable rests may be improvised for 
 rifles or sighting bars for the following exer-
 
 Fire Distribution 
 
 79 
 
 ^EiXiE^ 
 
 A*/./i7"£- JO. 
 
 lat iijjuerciiie — muiviauaUy (woinvut rip-es) 
 
 A hostile line begins at . . . and ends at .... 
 You arc the 3d man from the right in your 
 squad; indicate your point of aim and say 
 "hold" when I move this small bull's eye along 
 target to the point you determine. 
 2d Exercise — In Distribution (for a squad) 
 
 A hostile line begins at . . . and ends at .... 
 Each man is instructed to align his rifle on 
 the target at a point he understands to be his 
 point of aim. Each rifle is verified and errors 
 pointed out. 
 3d Exercise — For squad leaders 
 
 Each corporal with two rifles, sight and 
 indicate the limits of your scjuad sectors. Your 
 platoon of 4 squads covers the target from 
 to
 
 80 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Jfth Exercise — For platoon leaders (in similar 
 manner as for corporals) 
 After the principles of distribution are thor- 
 oughly learned a practical application can be 
 given with gallery rifles on a target similar to 
 
 Plate 31, which consists of two frames, with 
 the same landscape on each. The one in rear 
 has the sector lines drawn as shown in Plate 32. 
 
 /^JLA7-£: 3Z 
 
 Plate 32 shows the result of three problems 
 fired by a squad with gallery rifles at a distance
 
 Fire Distribution 81 
 
 of 60 feet, target aimed at similar to 31 — and 
 recorded by target 32. 
 
 At top target (following fire commands were 
 given) : 
 
 1. A hostile line extends across entire 
 
 target. 
 
 2. Fire 5 rounds. 
 At middle target 
 
 1. Reference point, right edge of frame. 
 
 2. 1 sight left. 
 
 3. A hostile machine gun. 
 
 At lozver target 
 
 1. Reference point — same. 
 
 2. A hostile line. 
 
 3. Extends 1 sight left.* 
 
 7^he following problem may be worked out on 
 a landscape target such as is shown in Figure 
 33. Its use requires a system of recording- 
 somewhat different from tlie small gallery target 
 
 *Note: a target such as is described in Plates 31 
 and 32 can be made in the followinp manner: — Two 
 frames made of ^''xiy," material about 4'x2V2'; the 
 roar frame just small enough to fit in the other, or, the 
 two frames can l)e made the same size. 
 
 The frames are covered with larfrct clotli on whicli 
 is pasted ordinary wrapping paper. If the ability is 
 not at hand to make the necessary landscapes, three 
 heavy, roTigh lines will answer the same purpose. The 
 rear target should have the sector lines drawn upon it.
 
 82 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 - — Ji b 
 
 just described. The rear side is marked with 
 squares and numbered. When a problem is 
 given, a small frame with a strip of ■ paper 
 tacked upon it, is hung on the rear side cover- 
 ing the section that will be fired upon as indi- 
 cated by the squares. By placing a new strip 
 of paper on the rear frame for each problem 
 an accurate record may be kept of the firing 
 and the front target can be almost cut to 
 pieces with shots before it need be replaced 
 
 Example of the use of target, Plate 33 : — 
 A patrol was formed, inspected, deployed, and 
 moved along a road at the side of which was 
 placed this target in such manner that the 
 point would come upon it unexpectedly. The 
 patrol was given the usual orders and in addi- 
 tion was instructed to return any fire. 
 
 When the point reached the target he was 
 
 told "You are being fired upon from there" — 
 
 (indicating target 90 feet distant). 
 
 Reference point — Cross roads. 
 
 Hostile line extends along road, 1 sight left 
 
 (which extended target near the house).
 
 Fire Distribution • 83 
 
 The point signaled "Enemy," the patrol 
 assembled, the fire data was transmitted by 
 him to the corporal when he arrived, and by 
 the corporal to the remainder of the patrol. 
 Fire was opened with the results as indicated 
 on Plate 33. 
 
 The second problem was conducted in a 
 similar manner, except that the target was 
 indicated. 
 
 "Extends 1 sight right" (which extended 
 target to stone fence). 
 
 As fire opened it was desired to swing to a 
 new target. Several men had fired, each one 
 shot when the signal was given. 
 
 1. "Machine gun 1 sight riglit." 
 
 The results of both problems are indicated 
 on the target. 
 
 It will be noticed that the patrol 
 
 1. Went through the initial steps of 
 
 patrolling. 
 
 2. Fire opened on it requiring its 
 
 assembly. 
 
 3. Fire data transmitted. 
 
 4. Fire was controlled. 
 
 Such problems ma}' be conducted indoors by 
 eliminating the patrol dispositions and many 
 valuable principles learned equally as well as 
 on the actual terrain. 
 
 The following problem, while given here pri- 
 marily as an exercise in J.arget designation
 
 84 ' Battle Fire Training 
 
 and distribution, contains many other valuable 
 features of musketry training. Many of the 
 possibilities are pointed out at this time both 
 to avoid repetition later and to illustrate the 
 practicability of combining several of the 
 principles of musketry training in a single 
 problem, thus saving much time and labor in 
 arranging for this form of exercise. 
 
 Company Problem on Terrain: — 
 
 Object: To train company commanders 
 and all other company officers in target 
 designation and target distribution and the 
 company estimators in estimating the range. 
 
 If troops are used the other elements of 
 fire control and direction and fire discipline 
 are included. 
 
 Situation: The enemy is in a defensive 
 position, visible in part. Two rifles with 
 rests are provided for the company com- 
 mander and set up a distance apart equal 
 to the front of the company when deployed. 
 
 Similarly, rifles are provided for each pla- 
 toon leader and set up opposite the points 
 where the flanks of their platoons would rest 
 upon the company front. 
 
 Action: The company commander, the 
 platoon leaders, and the estimators are called 
 up and assigned their appropriate positions.
 
 Fire Distribution 85 
 
 A problem is then given the company com- 
 manders along these lines : 
 
 A hostile company has just deployed with 
 its right opposite .... (some suitable land- 
 mark), about 200 yards in front of .... 
 (some suitable landmark). Cover it with 
 the fire of your company. 
 
 The company commander locates the posi- 
 tion of the target, calls upon the estimators 
 for the distance, determines the width of the 
 target, and gives the appropriate commands 
 to his platoon leaders. 
 
 He then directs the rifles assigned him 
 upon what he believes to be the flanks of the 
 target, sights properly set. 
 
 The platoon leaders in a like manner direct 
 their rifles upon the flanks of their targets 
 with the sights correctly set. If auxiliary 
 aiming points are used the platoon rifles 
 should be directed at these points opposite 
 the flanks of the platoon target, and the 
 platoon leaders required to describe the aim- 
 ing points as they would to their platoons. 
 
 If combined sights arc used, one sight 
 should be set at each range. 
 
 The target may vary from one wholly 
 visible to one wholly invisible ; the latter 
 should be located by reference to features 
 of the terrain.
 
 86 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Concealed markers, provided with flags, 
 should be stationed at each flaYik of the com- 
 pany target. When all rifles are laid, the 
 flags should be signalled into a visible posi- 
 tion for the purpose of checking and point- 
 ing out errors. 
 
 This exercise may also be given to the pla- 
 toons of the company only, or simultaneously 
 to the four companies of a battalion. In the 
 latter case the distance between rifles may be 
 reduced to facilitate supervision. 
 
 The director should assure himself of the 
 following : 
 
 (a) Were the rifles of the company com- 
 mander laid on the correct target with sights 
 properly set.'' 
 
 (b) Were the platoon commanders' rifles 
 laid as directed and with the ordered eleva- 
 tions.'' 
 
 (c) Was the target properly covered.'' 
 
 (d) Did the company commander calculate 
 the front of the hostile unit correctly.'' 
 
 (e) Were the platoon rifles covering the 
 proper portion of the target as ordered or 
 according to a prearranged method in the 
 company.'' 
 
 (f) Was the range correct.'' 
 
 (g) Was the proper sight used, \. e., single 
 elevation or combined sights.''
 
 Fire Distribution 87 
 
 (h) Was the time consumed in giving orders, 
 etc., satisfactory? 
 
 (i) Should auxiliary aiming points have 
 been given by the platoon commanders and, if 
 so, were they properly selected and properly 
 described? 
 
 (j) If the target was indistinct or invisible 
 was the zone beaten by fire, wider and deeper 
 than the target, so as to assuredly cover it? 
 
 (k) Were all commands properly given? 
 
 The training of troops may be included in 
 this exercise by having the units actually 
 present in strength and checking the targets, 
 aiming points, and ranges used by the men. 
 This may be done by providing a number of 
 rests scattered along the company front or by 
 an inspection of the rifles of the men while they 
 are in the act of simulating fire. 
 
 If troops are used in this problem the direc- 
 tor should assure himself of the following, in 
 addition to the points given above: 
 
 (a) Did the platoon guides watch the firing 
 line and assist in fire control? 
 
 (b) Did squad leaders transmit commands 
 and properly supervise their squads? 
 
 (c) Were sights set as ordered? 
 
 (d) Did the men fire as ordered? 
 
 (e) Was prompt attention given to orders? 
 
 (f) Was the rate of fire correct?
 
 88 Battle Fire Training 
 
 The following example of commands and 
 action is given as a satisfactory solution of the 
 problem. The example departs from the exact 
 forms given under Target Designation to 
 emphasize the fact that there is no set rule 
 which is applicable to all problems, but a sys- 
 tem which must be adapted to meet the require- 
 ments of the case in hand. Every problem has 
 several solutions which would be satisfactory 
 and the example is but one of these. The 
 details of the landscape which are used in the 
 following example to describe the target are 
 taken from an actual solution of the problem 
 on the terrain. 
 
 The Company Commander : — 
 
 On receiving his instructions from the direc- 
 tor the company commander returns to his 
 company, keeping track of the changing aspect 
 of the target as he does so. Arriving at the 
 center of his company, he is met by his platoon 
 leaders and range estimators who have assem- 
 bled in his absence, and says: 
 
 Target: The target is a line of skirmishers 
 visible in part. It may be seen between us and 
 that long line of green bushes which begins one 
 finger to the right of that red water tower at 
 11 o'clock, and it extends well beyond the 
 bushes to the right and left.
 
 Fire Distribution 89 
 
 (At this point the range estimators begin 
 their estimations and the captain pauses until 
 the first sergeant or other designated person 
 automatically announces the average estimate 
 of the range, saying, "Range 1100." The 
 captain calculates mentally 1/20 of 1100 
 equals 55, therefore each "sight" is 55 yards. 
 My target is a company or 150 yards, 3 sights 
 will cover it.) 
 
 The captain then resumes, saying: The sec- 
 tor assigned to this company is three fingers 
 long and extends from that group one finger 
 to the right of the water tank to a point four 
 fingers to the right of the water tank. Range 
 1050 and 1150. Fire at will at my signal. 
 Posts. 
 
 Platoon Leaders: — 
 
 The platoon leaders then hasten to the center 
 of their platoons and "Put into execution the 
 commands and directions of the captain, having 
 first taken such precautions to insure a correct 
 sight setting and clear description of the aim- 
 ing point as the situation permits or requires." 
 (Par. 251, I. D. R.) by saying: 
 
 "Range 1050 and 1150. 
 
 Target: The target is a line of skinnislicrs 
 about 1100 yards to our front, only part of 
 which is visible.
 
 90 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Reference Point: That long line of bushes 
 about 1300 yards to left front. The company 
 sector is three fingers long and lies between us 
 and that reference point, extending one-half 
 finger beyond each end of the bushes. 
 
 Aiming Point: The bottom of the line of 
 bushes." 
 
 As soon as the range is announced each 
 front rank man sets his sight at 1050 and each 
 rear rank man at 1150. Squad leaders, from 
 their position in rear of their squads, assure 
 themselves that sights are set and that the men 
 of their squads understand the aiming point 
 and sector and then signal "I am ready." 
 Similarly the platoon leaders signal "I am 
 ready." When the captain sees that all of his 
 platoons are ready he gives the signal to com- 
 mence firing. At the captain's signal, each 
 platoon leader commands : Fire at will. 
 
 Firing then begins at a rate of about three 
 shots per minute. (Par. 147, I. D. R.)
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 COMMUNICATION, SIGNALS, AND TRANSMISSION OF 
 FIRE DATA 
 
 The subject of communication is of such 
 importance that a brief review of tlie general 
 scheme is desirable in order to grasp the rela- 
 tion of the whole service to that which relates 
 particularly to the transmission of firing data. 
 
 When the Signal Corps with its means of 
 electrical communication and its special equip- 
 ment has properly fulfilled its functions, the 
 units of an army are linked together by lines 
 of communication down to and including 
 brigade headquarters.* Between the regiments 
 of a brigade and between the subdivisions of 
 these regiments (except artillery which is pro- 
 vided with equipment for electrical lines) visual 
 communication must be maintained. This is 
 accomplished by a personnel detailed directly 
 from the combatant troops. 
 
 Ample provisions are made in the regulations 
 for training signal men with both the signal 
 and semaphore flags. Specific provisions 
 
 •Note: The so-called "Outpost Company," proposed 
 l)y tlie Signal Corj)s but not y«t organized, is intended 
 to furnish wire communication down to and including 
 regimental headquarters.
 
 92 Battle Fire Training 
 
 exist also for the detail at brigade headquarters 
 of mounted orderlies from each regiment, and 
 these orderlies, under existing orders, must be 
 trained as signalists. In a similar manner 
 signal men are detailed at regimental, battalion, 
 and squadron headquarters. Companies and 
 troops furnish their own trained personnel. 
 
 This network of visual signalists, which 
 spreads over an army from brigade headquar- 
 ters to its smallest tactical unit, is charged with 
 the maintenance of communication between the 
 units to which it is assigned under all condi- 
 tions of field service. On the march and in 
 bivouac it supplements the lines of communi- 
 cation established by the Signal Corps between 
 the main body and its covering detachments 
 and between parts of these units. In battle it 
 opens communication throughout the command 
 in the initial stages and continues it to the 
 conclusion of the action. 
 
 The Tables of Organization provide for the 
 several headquarters the following personnel, 
 which may be used as agents of communica- 
 tions and which should be trained as signalists. 
 Brigade Headquarters: 
 
 Two mounted orderlies from each regi- 
 ment.
 
 Communications, Signals, Fire Data 93 
 
 Regimental Headquarters : 
 
 Regimental adjutant, sergeant major, 
 trumpeter sergeant, and six mounted 
 orderlies. 
 Battalion Headquarters : 
 
 Battalion adjutant, sergeant major, 
 and two mounted orderlies. 
 Company Headquarters : 
 
 First Sergeant (when not commanding 
 a platoon). 
 
 Platoon guides (when not commanding 
 a platoon). 
 
 Company huglers. 
 It is obvious that some of these men must at 
 times be used as horse holders, but tlie greater 
 number will usually be available. 
 
 Conmiunication on the march is usually con- 
 fined to the use of flags and the drill signals. 
 In battle the flags are used in the earlier stages 
 and in those localities where protecti(Tn from 
 the enemy's fire and observation may be 
 obtained. As the action progresses, to avoid 
 undue losses, the use of the flag must be dis 
 continued. In the latter stages of an engage 
 ment while the maneuvering of troops is usually 
 reduced to advances and retreats there yet 
 remains much control which must be exercised 
 and which necessitates the transmission of 
 information and orders. The use of messengers
 
 94 Battle Fire Training 
 
 and staff officers carrying verbal messages is 
 impossible, for no matter what their qualifica- 
 tions they will be unable to move in the fire 
 swept zone with any reasonable degree of assur- 
 ance that they will arrive at their destination. 
 
 The means now used are the arm signals and 
 the letter codes prescribed in the drill regula- 
 tions of the several arms, the bugle, the whistle, 
 and the voice. The noise accompanying an 
 action precludes the possibility of using the 
 voice except by squad leaders to the individuals 
 of their units. The whistle may be used to 
 attract attention, but its principal function is 
 to cause a cessation of fire. Its use for any 
 other purpose should be reduced to a minimum ; 
 if this is not done the soldier will rapidly 
 become indifferent to its note. If the system 
 of communication is properly established there 
 should be little occasion for the use of the whis- 
 tle to attract attention except by the platoon 
 leader to his squad leaders. The bugle, like 
 the whistle, is limited by regulations to certain 
 specific signals. Bugle signals ordinarily will 
 be ordered only by regimental and higher 
 commanders. 
 
 It will thus be seen that units in battle are 
 necessarily deprived of any means of communi- 
 cation except with the hands and arms. By a 
 proper use of agents of communication at each
 
 Communications, Signals, Fire Data 95 
 
 headquarters and by thorough instruction and 
 training, these signals may be made to supply 
 means of communication which, under the cir- 
 cumstances, will be equalled only by electrical 
 equipment. 
 
 After drill and training, the next most 
 important requisite to perfect this means of 
 communication is constant observation under all 
 conditions of action. As before stated, neither 
 the whistle nor the bugle should he used to 
 attract attention; the voice is often impossible; 
 therefore, in order that information and orders 
 may pass rapidly through the necessary chan- 
 nels, observers must be detailed with each head- 
 quarters to insure a constant lookout for sig- 
 nals. As the lines of communication run both 
 to and from each headquarters, observation of 
 both higher and lower units is necessary ; nor 
 must adjoining units on the line be neglected. 
 By such a system only, can free and prompt 
 communication along its prescribed channels be 
 assured. In the absence of continuous observa- 
 tion no *fissurance exists that in the roar and 
 confusion of battle information or orders can 
 be either obtained or transmitted when desired, 
 and therefore complete failure of the system 
 at the most critical stage will most certainly 
 result. 
 
 In this connection the following authorities 
 are quoted:
 
 96 Battle Fire Training 
 
 I. D. R. : "The voice is generally inadequate 
 for giving commands during fire and must b-e 
 replaced by signals of such character that 
 proper fire direction and control is assured." 
 
 "Officers and men behind the firing line can- 
 not ordinarily move freely along the line, but 
 must depend upon mutual watchfulness and the 
 proper use of the prescribed signals." 
 
 General Morrison in his Training Infantry 
 speaking of communication in battle says: 
 "The method by signals given in our I. D. R. 
 answers the requirements. The text of it can 
 be learned in a few minutes but to train a bat- 
 talion so that it will fully respond under danger 
 requires hours of practice." 
 
 The arrangements of the agents of communi- 
 cation at the several headquarters will, of 
 course, vary with different tactical situations, 
 but the following may be taken as a guide to 
 be adjusted to suit the particular requirements 
 of each occasion. 
 
 Regimental Headquarters : 
 
 Sergeant major in immediate cliarge of 
 the details of communication. Orderlies, 
 dismounted, to watch each battalion head- 
 quarters and brigade headquarters, one 
 for each unit. Two orderlies, dismounted, 
 to carry verbal or written messages. Two 
 orderlies, mounted, near at hand, to carry
 
 Communications, Signals, Fire Data 97 
 
 messages where mounted delivery is prac- 
 ticable. 
 Battalion Headquarters: 
 
 The adjutant to observe the enemy and 
 the companies on the firing line. The ser- 
 geant major to observe regimental head- 
 quarters. An orderly, dismounted, observ- 
 ing the support or flanking patrols. 
 Company Headquarters : 
 
 The first sergeant observing the enemy 
 and the company. One bugler observing 
 battalion headquarters. One bugler observ- 
 ing the platoon leaders. 
 Platoon Headquarters : 
 
 The platoon guide or a private taken 
 from the line observing the company 
 headquarters. 
 In attack, these agents of communication are 
 usually deployed at each headquarters (on one 
 line). In defense their positions will, of course, 
 be regulated by the requirements of the situ'i- 
 tion. The privates sometimes taken from the 
 firing line in lieu of the platoon guides may be 
 returned to their proper places in ranks during 
 the latter stages of the action. It is believed 
 that the first sergeant should act as the cap- 
 tain's adjutant, so to speak. In this position 
 he will be able to render more valuable service 
 than while commaifding a platoon.
 
 98 Battle Fire Training 
 
 There is one point vital in the whole system 
 of communication by visual signaling which 
 must be touched upon with emphasis, and that 
 is the absolute necessity for all agents of com- 
 munication not only to be proficient in the 
 several codes but to be experts therein. While 
 certain agents of communication have been spe- 
 cially mentioned it is not intended to convey 
 the idea that they are all the individuals in a 
 company who should be proficient in signaling; 
 indeed, those mentioned are but a small part of 
 the number who should be so equipped in a well 
 trained organization. Officers below the grade 
 of lieutenant colonel should be expert in the 
 semaphore code and hand and arm signals. 
 Exercise 1. 
 
 Purpose: To acquaint men with the use of 
 
 signals. 
 
 Situation: A company in line, during rest 
 
 period when waiting for assembly before 
 
 formation, or any time when a few minutes 
 
 are available. 
 
 Procedure : The captain, platoon or squad 
 
 leaders give a signal and call on a man for 
 
 the interpretation of it. The entire list of 
 
 signals can be given and interpretation-^ 
 
 made within two minutes. 
 
 Example 1 : The captain signals — 
 Range 900 yards, 
 or.
 
 Communications, Signals, Fire Data 99 
 
 Change 50 yards, 
 
 or, 
 As skirmishers guide center, 
 
 or. 
 Suspend firing, 
 
 or, 
 What range are von using?, etc. 
 "Jones (or the man indicated), what did 
 that signal mean?" 
 Example '2: The captain by command gives 
 examples as above, and says — 
 "Smith, give the proper signal for that 
 command." 
 
 It is better first to have the squad, then the 
 platoon leaders work with their men, when all 
 are reported proficient, the above exercises. 
 A failure by a man, in front of his company, 
 to call a signal properly after reasonable 
 instruction, is not so likely to be repeated, for 
 squad and platoon pride will take a hand to 
 correct the deficiency. No opportunity should 
 be lost during extended order drills for prac- 
 tice in signalling with hand and arm. 
 
 The exercises outlined below may all be 
 ordered by means of the signals now in use, 
 adding one signal for "Company." The fol- 
 lowing signal has been used over an extended 
 period of time and has been found satisfactory ; 
 palms of the hands held towards the person to
 
 100 Battle Fire Training 
 
 receive the signal, fingers extended and joined, 
 and pointing upward, thumbs interlocked, arms 
 elevated sufficiently to insure clear observation. 
 
 Exercise 2. 
 
 Purpose: To train officers and units to 
 observe and execute quickly and correctly 
 all signals. 
 
 Situation: Company or battalion at drill. 
 Example 1 : Company deployed, advancing, 
 captain signals — 
 To first and fourth platoons ; halt and assemble. 
 To second and third platoons ; platoon columns. 
 To first platoon; squads left. 
 To fourth platoon; squads right. 
 
 When heads of platoons about to meet. 
 To first platoon ; squads right, platoon column. 
 To fourth platoon ; squads left, platoon column. 
 To all platoons ; as skirmishers. 
 To first platoon ; reenforce right of line. 
 To fourth platoon ; reenforce in intervals. 
 Example 2: Battalion in column at route 
 step, major signals — 
 Squads left. 
 
 To first and fourth companies ; halt. 
 To second and third companies; platoon col- 
 umns. 
 When some distance has been gained: 
 To second and third companies; as skirmishers. 
 To first and fourth companies ; squad columns.
 
 Communications, Signals, Fire Data 101 
 
 To second and third companies ; halt, lie down, 
 rant^e 800, commence firing, (captains to 
 designate targets, etc.) 
 To first and fourth companies ; as skirmishers, 
 
 halt, lie down. 
 To second and third companies ; elevate 100, 
 
 shift fire two sights to right, fire faster. 
 To fourth company ; change direction to left, 
 double time, fix bayonets, battle sight, com- 
 mence firing. 
 To first company; rcenforce j-iglit of line. 
 To fourth company ; cease firing, reenforce in 
 
 intervals. 
 To battalion, with interval between signals ; fix 
 bayonets, fire faster, cease firing, forward 
 double time, charge, halt, assemble, squads 
 right. 
 
 While these combinations of movements or 
 others like them have no direct application on 
 the battle field, it has been found that drill and 
 training in them does much to cause the unit 
 while deployed to act quickly in obedience to 
 the will of the commander. As General Morri- 
 son has pointed out, a large amount of training 
 is necessary to produce the desired effect, and 
 this is particularly true in the battalion where 
 so often tlie command for deployment creates 
 four units where there should be but one.
 
 102 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Company commanders in giving signals to 
 the entire company, as range, change to range, 
 etc., must swing the arm in a horizontal arc to 
 enable its interpretation by the flank platoon 
 leaders, as Plate 34 A. 
 
 Battalion commanders must particularly 
 observe this when giving signals. If they 
 occupy a position about 150 yards or greater 
 in rear of a battalion with three companies in 
 the line, the distance is sufficient to make the 
 understanding of signals difficult unless prop- 
 erly given. When in a prone position, depend- 
 ing upon the background, sometimes the hand 
 must be held above the head to be readily 
 understood. 
 
 The system of company communication is 
 illustrated in Plate 34 B.* 
 
 Transmission of Fire Data: 
 
 I. D. R. : — "In the training of men in the 
 mechanism of the firing line, they should be 
 
 *Note: Better control results if the squad leaders 
 remain in rear of their squads until the latter stages of 
 an action or until their fire is needed.
 
 104 Battle Fire Training 
 
 practiced in repeating to one another, target 
 and aiming point designation." 
 
 Men should be trained in the transmission of 
 fire data without it appreciably affecting the 
 rate of fire. 
 
 Exercise: 
 
 Purpose: To accustom men to properly 
 transmit and receive fire data. 
 
 Situation: A company in prone position 
 facing a landscape which affords suitable 
 targets for designation, or a number of 
 men facing a target indoors, as illustrated 
 in Plate 30. 
 
 Procedure: Give certain elevation or 
 deflection; certain apportionment of tar- 
 get; certain rate of fire ; or certain target 
 data and make a change in same, known to 
 one or a few men, which requires transmis- 
 sion by them to the remainder of the men 
 not so informed. 
 
 Example 1 : A unit having been given a 
 certain aiming point on which with a certain 
 range they are simulating fire — Reenforce- 
 ments are sent forward and deployed in the 
 intervals on the line. The original line is with- 
 drawn after thirty seconds. The men who 
 joined as reenforcements are inspected as to 
 sight setting and target designation. In
 
 Communications, Signals, Fire Data 105 
 
 obtaining sight setting, men will be aided in 
 addition to the signal by looking at leaf of man 
 nearest him. Data which requires transmis- 
 sion by voice should be obtained by each man 
 placing his ear as near as possible to the mouth 
 of the man giving the data. 
 
 In similar manner, exercises covering the 
 apportionment of sectors, rate of fire, etc., can 
 be given. 
 
 Example 2: A unit in position having 
 received and put into effect certain fire data — 
 A change of same is given the flank man requir- 
 ing transmission along the entire front. After 
 a minute, in case of a squad, verify the result. 
 
 Verification is facilitated if the problem is so 
 arranged that a rest is provided for each rifle 
 and the men are caused to withdraw, leaving 
 their rifles in position to indicate their point of 
 aim, sight setting, sectors, etc. 
 
 Rests of this character should not be of a 
 permanent nature or variations in the terrain 
 which are necessary to proper training will not 
 be possible. Temporary rests may be provided 
 by placing sacks of earth on the tripods used 
 for pyramidal tents or more easily by carrying 
 empty sacks to the drill ground and there filling 
 them with earth, using the company intrench- 
 ing tools for this purpose.
 
 100 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Example 3: On landscape, as Plate 34, or 
 
 terrain, is given a target sector, A B. The 
 
 right and left being covered by other troops. 
 As the reenforcements move forward as in 
 Example No. 1, above cited, to the line, a signal 
 causes a body of troops at C to advance into 
 view in another company's sector. In the first 
 exercise of this nature it will be safe to say the 
 rifles of the reenforcements will be on line at C, 
 instead of their own sector, A B. 
 
 It must be remembered in this connection 
 that, imless under very exceptional circum- 
 stances, neither an individual nor a unit should 
 direct its fire outside of the assigned sector 
 without orders from the immediate commander. 
 
 Example J^: A unit in position as in Exam- 
 ple 2 — Changes in firing data given to the 
 corporal and transmitted as outlined in Exer- 
 cise No. 1 under sight setting in chapter Firk 
 Discipline.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 KIR-K DISCIPLINE 
 
 Fire discipline may be defined as that condi- 
 tion of tlie personnel of a fire unit, resulting 
 from training and practice, which enables the 
 commander to obtain an orderly and efficient 
 delivery of fire. 
 
 That the individual obeys is not sufficient; 
 together with obedience must be the ability to 
 use initiative for the accomplishment of a com- 
 mon end, all of which embraces — 
 
 1. Constant attention to orders. Care as 
 to position and extent of target, sight set- 
 ting, and delivery of fire, 
 
 2. Economy of ammunition. 
 
 3. Use of ground to advantage. 
 
 4. Ability of men to command units whose 
 leaders are lost in action. 
 
 5. Observation of enemy. 
 
 (y. That if separated from leaders — 
 
 (a) Men will direct effective fire on target. 
 
 (b) Men will increase fire when target is 
 
 favorable. 
 
 (c) Men will cease fire when enemy disappears. 
 7. Thorough knowledge of ca])abilities, 
 
 noiiu lU'hiturc, and liimtation of the rifle. 
 Jams or failure in loading should be cor-
 
 108 Battle Fire Training 
 
 rectcd without removing the eyes from the 
 target. 
 
 1 — Attention to Orders: — 
 
 The various exercises outlined under "Com- 
 munications" will be an aid in instilling the 
 habit of attention in our men, without which 
 success is impossible. 
 
 2 — Care in Sight Setting: — 
 Exercise 1 : 
 
 Purpose: To train men to set sights 
 quickly and accurately. 
 
 Situation: The company is formed in 
 single rank, at the ready, with the rear 
 sight set at zero. 
 
 How Executed: The range is announced 
 by command or signal, sights are set, and 
 each man comes to port arms or steps four 
 paces to the front, upon completion of 
 operation. 
 
 Time: Is taken from last word of com- 
 mand or signal and should be within 15 
 seconds. 
 Example 1 : Bij Command : Range 500 ; 
 sight setting, verified. 
 
 2: By Command: Range 500, 2 
 points left windage ; verification of 
 sight settirrg. 
 
 3 : By Signal : Range 500, verifi- 
 cation.
 
 Fire Discipline 
 
 109 
 
 4: By Command or Signal to pla- 
 toon commanders ; by them to cor- 
 porals ; by corporals to men ; the 
 verification. 
 Interest may be held in these exercises by 
 making them competitive in the squad and pla- 
 toon. Time may be recorded cither for the 
 period consumed by the entire unit or for the 
 sum of the individual requirements. The former 
 method is much the quicker, but the latter 
 stimulates individual eiTort. Penalties, in terms 
 of seconds, should be added for errors. 
 
 An aid to sight setting is to operate tlie 
 thumb screw with the thumb and forefinger of
 
 110 Battle Fire Training 
 
 the right hand wliile the slide is moved by the 
 thumb of the left hand by slight pressure 
 against the side of slide, as Plate 35 A. 
 
 One of the requisites of effective fire is that 
 its volume should be uniform ; that is, the rate 
 of fire should not rise or fall except by will of 
 the commander. With this in mind, it will be 
 seen that training in some system of sight set- 
 ting is necessary, or a marked decrease, even a 
 cessation of fire, will occur when changes of ele- 
 vation are made during the fire fight. 
 
 There are several methods of accomplishing 
 this end — 
 
 (a) At command, first odd numbers, then 
 even numbers ; or, first front rank and then 
 rear rank, fix the sights. 
 
 (b) Beginning with two men on each side 
 of the corporal, sights are set by pairs work- 
 ing towards the flank in each squad. 
 Under (a) half the unit ceases fire at one 
 
 time and sights are set by alternate men. This 
 is the more rapid method of the two, but causes 
 a marked decrease in the volume of fire and 
 increases the difficulties in the transmission of 
 data. Under (b) the time required to accom- 
 plish the change is increased, but only two men 
 per squad cease firing at once and the transmis- 
 sion of data is facilitated, easily supervised by
 
 Fire Discipline 111 
 
 the corporal. Both methods have their appli- 
 cation. At times, it may even be advantageous 
 to suspend firing altogether, while sights are 
 changed. By this latter method fire at the new 
 range can be opened more quickly than by any 
 other means but the loss of fire effect is a factor 
 which must be given consideration. Whether 
 it is advisable to change sights quickly with the 
 attendant loss of fire, or more slowly while the 
 vohnne of fire is maintained, is a matter which 
 rests not with the individual soldier but witli 
 the company commander. The latter should 
 decide the question, basing his decision upon 
 the tactical situation, the size and actions of 
 the target, and the effectiveness of tlie enemy's 
 fire. 
 
 The following exercise and modifications 
 tiiereof are recommended — 
 Exercise 1 : 
 
 Purpose: To train nu-n to set sights 
 quickly and accurately witiiout cessation 
 of fire. 
 
 Situation: The squad or platoon de- 
 ployed, lying down, firing. 
 
 Horv Kxccnted : Range is announced by 
 command or signal. Kacli corporal causes 
 sights to be set beginning with the men on 
 his right and left and working towards 
 the flank in each squad. As each man
 
 112 Battle Fire Training 
 
 finishes setting his sight, he holds his rifle 
 upright, butt resting on the ground. 
 
 Time: From last word of command, or 
 from signal until all sights are changed. 
 Additions in seconds should be added to the 
 total time for errors in elevation. 
 
 Rate of Fire: — 
 
 Effective rifle fire in battle is gauged by the 
 number of men disabled in a unit of time and 
 is dependent upon — 
 
 1. Percentage of hits, which depends upon 
 dispersion, which in turn depends upon — 
 
 (a) Precision of arm. 
 
 (b) Designation of target. 
 
 (c) Estimation of range. 
 
 (d) Distance of target. 
 
 (e) Visibility of target. 
 
 (f) Prevailing atmospheric conditions. 
 
 (g) Fire discipline, training and in- 
 structions of troops, their physical 
 and normal state at the time. 
 
 2. Number of targets hit. 
 
 3. Time of execution. 
 
 4. Number of rifles employed. 
 
 5. Number of shots fired. 
 
 6. Rate of fire. 
 
 The question of rate of battle fire has 
 received considerable discussion and it is neces-
 
 Fire Discipline 113 
 
 sary to consider many factors before arriving 
 at a conclusion. It is well to note here that a 
 high rate of fire resulting from excitement is 
 not the high rate developed by systematic 
 training, or as a direct result of control and 
 discipline. 
 
 I. D. R. : — "Men are taught that the rate of 
 fire will depend upon the visibility, proximity, 
 and size of tlie target and that the proper rate 
 will ordinaril}' suggest itself to each trained 
 man, usually rendering cautions and commands 
 unnecessary." 
 
 Practice in peace time inculcates habits which 
 are prominent in action. Men might then be 
 accustomed to look upon each round of ammuni- 
 tion in such manner as to scarcely admit of any 
 monetary comparison, and it should be a cardi- 
 nal principle that one of the first things all 
 must appreciate upon entering into action is 
 "To weigh the value of each round of ammuni- 
 tion they fire." 
 
 When the situation will admit, the suspension 
 of fire, by units for brief periods during an 
 advance is one of the best ways of retaining 
 fire control. 
 
 Our Firing Regulations give the following 
 on the rate of fire : — 
 
 "The time of execution is important in that 
 the gaining of fire superiority is dependent less
 
 114 Battle Fire Training 
 
 upon obtaining high percentage of hits than 
 upon making an absolutely large number of 
 hits in a unit of time. There is necessarily a 
 limit to the rapidity of fire which, if exceeded, 
 will result in some loss of accuracy. With tar- 
 gets of a fair degree of visibility, the following 
 may be taken as standard rates of fire for 
 troops who have been given suitable training in 
 target practice — 
 
 200 yards] 
 
 300 yards ^. . . .10 shots per minute. 
 
 400 yards] 
 
 500 yards] 
 
 600 yards [►. . . .7.5 shots per minute. 
 
 TOO yardsj 
 
 800 yards] 
 
 900 yards ^ .... 5 shots per minute. 
 1000 yardsj 
 
 Greater ranges — 3 shots per minute. 
 The rates given should not exclude higher rates 
 of fire in case of large and conspicuous targets. 
 On the other hand, Avhen objectives, or marks 
 used as aiming points, are very indistinct, the 
 requirement of correct aiming imposes rates of 
 fire somewhat lower than the standard rates 
 given, even for well-instructed men."
 
 Fire Discipline 
 
 115 
 
 The following is a tabic showing the results 
 of a firing experiment at the musketry school, 
 and will give a comparison of hits in different 
 units of time. 
 
 
 }; 
 
 
 U3 
 
 
 ■; 
 
 
 c 
 
 
 f 1 1 
 
 o 
 
 tn 
 
 3 
 tJU 
 
 t° 
 
 c |; 
 
 3 
 
 2g 
 
 
 Z I 
 
 £ 
 
 s 
 
 c 
 
 c 1 
 .2 !'■ 
 
 ■ ^ : 
 .2' 
 
 .S 
 
 — o 
 
 O 3 
 
 O 1 
 
 11 
 
 O 
 
 u 
 
 V 
 
 1 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 3 
 
 - c 
 
 -2 
 
 tC3 
 
 a 
 
 /^ 
 
 z 
 
 <J 
 
 Q|l 
 
 K 
 
 ClH 
 
 3 
 
 2,500 
 
 330 
 
 98 
 
 13.2 
 
 78 
 
 39 
 
 11.7 
 
 5 
 
 2,500 
 
 394 
 
 99 
 
 15.7 
 
 78 
 
 79 
 
 19.8 
 
 7>/. 
 
 2,300 
 
 290 
 
 98 
 
 11.6 
 
 78 
 
 87 
 
 28.4 
 
 10 
 
 2,500 
 
 257 
 
 84 
 
 10.2 
 
 67 
 
 102 
 
 33.6 
 
 From which it is found that the time neces- 
 sary to obtain the above hits i.s — 
 
 8 shot rate 8 1/3 minutes 
 
 5 shot rate 5 minutes 
 
 7Y2 shot rate 3 1/3 minutes 
 
 10 shot rate 2 1/2 minutes 
 
 Make a comparison, with this as a basis, of 
 four different organizations beginning fire at 
 the same moment, firing with the same compara- 
 tive results and each at the different rates men- 
 tioned, with 25 rounds per man. At the end of 
 214 minutes we have —
 
 116 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Rate 
 
 Shots Fired 
 
 Hits 
 
 Figures Hit 
 
 Remaining 
 Ammunition 
 
 3 
 
 750 
 
 97 
 
 29 
 
 1,750 
 
 5 
 
 1,250 
 
 197 
 
 49 
 
 1,250 
 
 'iVz 
 
 1,875 
 
 217 
 
 71 
 
 625 
 
 10 
 
 2,500 
 
 255 
 
 84 
 
 
 
 To which apply the probability of hits under 
 battle conditions by arbitrarily assuming the 
 loss to be 9/10 of peace time results and we 
 have — 
 
 Rate per Minute Figures Hit 
 
 3 2.9 
 
 5 4.9 
 
 71/2 ^-^ 
 
 10 8.4 
 
 If these different organizations had started 
 an advance against the enemy from a common 
 fire point it may be assumed, considering no 
 other factors, that the effective fire directed 
 against them was reduced an amount equal to 
 the above losses. The organization using the 
 low rate of fire has reduced the enemy's effec- 
 tiveness three men, with an expenditure of 750 
 rounds and in the same time, the one employing 
 the high rate, 8 men, with an expenditure of 
 2,500 rounds. 
 
 In defense the question of the supply of 
 ammunition is ordinarily not serious, but it is
 
 Fire Discipline 117 
 
 clurinfT an advance, when the firing line pushes 
 forward to successive fire positions, that the 
 consideration of supply affecting the rate of 
 fire becomes a big factor. 
 
 Fighting, such as might be expected judging 
 from the past, will cover a period of from a few 
 hours to several days for the determination of 
 tlie outcome of nu advance. I^et it be assumed 
 for discussion an engagement covering ten 
 hours, from the initial advance at a range of 
 under 1.000 yards to where the bayonet takes 
 the place of the bullet for decision. In that 
 ten hours it is placing rather a low estimate to 
 consider, say, an hour of continuous firing 
 wliich will result in the following expenditure 
 of anmiunition : — 
 
 Hate Rounds 
 
 3 180 
 
 5 300 
 
 71/j 450 
 
 10 600 
 
 Where arc we to get the ammunition and how, 
 if we have it, are we to get it to the firing line.'' 
 I'A'en at the slow rate one belt 100 rounds, 
 anfl one and one-third bandoleers have been 
 expended. It will be seen, therefore, that the 
 (juestion of ammunition supply is one which 
 must receive serious consideration by all com- 
 manders. It would seem that in the absence of
 
 118 Battle Fire Training 
 
 some means of readily supplying the firing line 
 with ammunition the only other alternative is 
 to push the line much further forward before 
 opening fire than is now contemplated by the 
 drill regulations, say four or five hundred yards. 
 
 If ammunition is plentiful and can be sup- 
 plied to the firing line, then, without question, 
 the highest rate of fire consistent with good 
 shooting should be employed. If an attack 
 appears to have the possibilities of a drawn out 
 affair and ammunition is not over plentiful and 
 difficult to supply to the firing line, a rate of 
 fire somewhat more conserved must be adopted. 
 It appears that the rate of fire is largely depen- 
 dent, as are so many military problems, on local 
 conditions. 
 
 Exercise 1 : 
 
 Purpose: To accustom men to aimed 
 fire and proper rate of fire. 
 
 Situation: A company in prone position 
 at "ready." 
 
 How Executed: By command — the ob- 
 jective and number of shots (to be simu- 
 lated) is given. When each man completes 
 the designated number he indicates the 
 fact by holding the rifle upright, butt rest- 
 ing on the ground. 
 
 Time: Is kept by a stop watch or ordi- 
 nary watcli.
 
 120 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Example: 
 
 Range 800. 
 
 That house. 
 
 Fire 10 rounds. 
 If the rate of fire is proper according to the 
 table given in our Firing Regulations the time 
 for execution should be two minutes. The ten- 
 dency of untrained men even in peace time is 
 to fire much too rapidly. Impress on the men 
 the fact that aimed iire is necessary, that they 
 must aim on the objective as if they were firing 
 to get a bull's eye. 
 
 2 — Taking Advantage of Ground Advancing 
 upon a Position: — 
 
 1. Make use of all cover. 
 
 2. Seek hidden lines of approach. 
 
 3. If possible, avoid ground upon which 
 projectiles are seen to fall. 
 
 4. Make use of pack as cover when neces- 
 sary to halt on exposed ground. 
 Anything which distorts or partly eliminates 
 
 the familiar outlines of an object in the field 
 tends to add to its concealment from view. A 
 small bush or bunch of grass might, as in Plate 
 35 B, give ik) concealment at about 100 yards, 
 hut beyond that distance concealment is 
 complete. 
 
 Points to be considered in making an 
 advance —
 
 Firv Discipline 121 
 
 Plate 36 : 
 
 1. Group of men on the sky line. 
 
 *2, Group of imn iicai-cr hut having- darker 
 background. 
 
 li. (iroup of men scarcely visikle by reason 
 of dark background. 
 
 4, Group of men ])artially visibK- by rea- 
 son of background. 
 
 5. Group of men apparently at closer 
 ranges by reason of light background. 
 
 Making a trench during advance under fire. 
 "Thei/ dig because forced to hcdt." 
 
 One squad or platoon suspends fire and 
 makes advance, under protection of the fire of 
 aiu)tlier scjuad or platoon, in the following 
 manner: 
 
 By crawling a man works forward to a 
 favorable position, where he makes a small, 
 shallow trench on his right, being ])rotected by 
 his pack and the earth obtained from the trench. 
 If in ]iairs, the one continues firing while the 
 other digs, as in Plate 37 A. The remainder 
 of the s(juad crawls forward and enlarges the 
 trench until cover is ])rovided. As soon as the 
 advanced squad is able to })rovidi' sufficient fire, 
 the rear s(juads begin their advanci- to the new 
 ))osition ( Plat^ 37 B) until cover is provided 
 for the entire ormmization.
 
 
 f'l.ATEi 37-
 
 Fire DiscijiUne 123 
 
 ',i To Prox'idc-for Leaders: — 
 
 K;ich company, })l;it()on, or s<|u;i(l slioulcl 
 have a number of substitutes to take the phicc 
 of the reguhir leaders. 
 
 Exercises: For a company, platoon, or squad. 
 
 Purpose: To accustom men to step in 
 and fill the places of leaders killed or 
 wounded in action. 
 
 Situdtion : A company in skirniisji order. 
 Thi- captain })laces tiie command under a 
 subaltern and constitutes himself an obser- 
 ver or uiiij)ire. Assuming that an advance 
 is about to be made and the preparatory 
 connnands given. The umpire causes the 
 squad leader, platoon or company com- 
 mander, to "pl(nj dead" in such a manner 
 as to attract the least attention. 
 
 The next in command of the unit or 
 units should immediate] u note the fact, 
 take command, carry out the orders, push 
 on the advance, and contiinie in such 
 cap/icity until the completion of the prob- 
 lem. This procedure is carried out during 
 an advance until each unit has had sev- 
 eral changes in leaders, 
 
 A scjuad shoidd have, at least, three sub- 
 stitute leaders ; a ]ilatoon would naturally 
 have its guide and, say, four corporals. 
 For practice it might be well to work a few
 
 124 Battle Fire Training 
 
 privates up to the point wbere they could 
 lead platoons. 
 Example: Compan}', platoon, and squad 
 leaders are instructed that when the 
 crowns of their hats are touched by a mes- 
 senger of the umpire it is indicative of 
 immediate incapacitation and they should 
 at once assume a position indicating that 
 fact by falling prone and making no fur- 
 ther movement (any other system will 
 answer but it has been found that this 
 method works well without attracting 
 attention). 
 
 S'ltuaHon: The company had begun an 
 
 advance by squad rushes from the right. 
 
 As the third squad corporal was about to 
 
 spring through the line he received a touch 
 
 on the crown of his hat. The appointed 
 
 substitute must note the fact of his leader's 
 
 incapacitation without being told and 
 
 immediately advance the squad. 
 
 Success depends largely upon the ability of 
 
 the umpire to, first, select or by his messengers 
 
 designate men so as to attract no attention ; 
 
 otherwise it becomes an eas}^ matter fbr each 
 
 substitute to note the position of the umpire 
 
 and expect the usual results. Second, a leader 
 
 should be put out of action just before he gives
 
 Fire Discipline 125 
 
 a command or just after he has given one. He 
 may also be directed to drop out after covering 
 50 yardi? of the next rush, etc. The different 
 leaders, during the critical phases of the 
 advance, are eliminated and other men imme- 
 diately take their places and carry out the 
 movement. 
 Fixing Bayonets: — 
 
 What has been said regarding simultaneous 
 sight setting is also largely applicable to fixing 
 bayonets. It should be remembered, however, 
 that the moment for fixing bayonets will usually 
 arrive at the height of the fire fight when a 
 marked cessation of fire might have serious 
 consequences, hence the method recommended 
 under (b) above should be used for this pur- 
 pose. Competitive exercises by squad and pla- 
 toon will facilitate training in this particular. 
 The Rush: — 
 
 It is not always possible to wholly separate 
 fire and battle tactics. Such is the case 
 with regard to the rush. Recollecting that the 
 volume of fire should be uniform it is apparent 
 that the cessation of fire by a fraction of the 
 line preparatory to and during a rush is, no 
 matter how necessary, a positive disadvantage. 
 U liile a fraction of the line is rushing forward 
 something of value is actually being accom- 
 plished by gaining ground to the front. True,
 
 126 Battle Fire Training 
 
 the all important fire effect suffers a loss but 
 that is a necessary evil. The same is not true, 
 however, of the period from the suspension of 
 fire preparatory to a rush until the rush, or of 
 the time that elapses from the instant the rush- 
 ing fraction reaches the new position until fire 
 is opened. It is upon these periods, when the 
 unit is neither gaining ground to the front nor 
 firing, that training must be concentrated in 
 order to reduce them to the minimum. 
 
 Rushing units should be trained to suspend 
 firing and move forward in a minimum of time; 
 to halt instantly and simultaneously at signal ; 
 and to open fire without loss of time. Proper 
 rushes cannot be made without a great amount 
 of drill in which painstaking care is given to 
 details. 
 
 Our regulations recognize another expedient 
 also for minimizing the effect of the loss of the 
 fire of the rushing unit. 
 
 This plan calls for an increase in the rate of 
 fire of those portions of the line not moving 
 forward which are covering the same target as 
 the rushing unit. It has been stated that the 
 rush should halt simultaneously. While a dis- 
 cussion of this point might not be considered 
 to lie within tlic purview of "musketry," it is so 
 intimately related to training in rushes that it 
 is taken up here. A straggling halt in which
 
 Fire Discijdine 127 
 
 the mon arrive one at a time upon tlie new line 
 serves to accentuate tliat line to tlie enemy and 
 so increase his fire effect. A line which disap- 
 pears quickly and simultaneously into cover 
 offers the minimum of opportunity for target 
 designation. A few practical exercises with this 
 point in view will be convincing. The rush 
 should be at top speed, consistent with the ter- 
 rain and distance covered. As the rusli leader 
 throws himself upon the ground the entire frac- 
 tion does likewise, inequalities in the line being 
 rectified by those in rear of the line crawling 
 to their proper places. It requires time, 
 patience, and good judgment to properly train 
 men in this particular.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 APPLICATION OF FIRE 
 
 Our system of individual target practice, 
 while not perfect, results in producing a large 
 number of excellent shots. To gain the full 
 effect in battle of the great amount of time and 
 effort we expend annually on this class of train- 
 ing, the men must not only be taught to fire 
 collectively but officers must ]iave a thorough 
 knowledge of the proper application of this 
 fire and of the means of applying it under the 
 varying conditions of service. 
 
 Fire superiority is the goal ; for without it, 
 success is beyond reach. Fire superiority does 
 not mean the killing or disabling of all the 
 enemy, but that fire is so accurate the enemy's 
 morale is shaken and he is shooting wildly. 
 With the knowledge of peace firing, this, at first 
 glance, looks easy ; but when it is remembered 
 that fire efficiency in battle is estimated to be 
 reduced from 1/10 to 1/80 of that expected 
 under peace conditions, the difficulty of reach- 
 ing the goal is apparent. There will be times 
 in battle when the firing of a unit will closely 
 approach peace time accuracy and others when 
 it will differ widely therefrom. After passing 
 a certain point, the variance from the peace
 
 Application of Fire 129 
 
 standard will he in direct proportion to the 
 training of the unit. The excuse for these 
 remarks lies in the desire to emphasize, as 
 strongly as possihlc, the necessity for thorough, 
 intelligent, and uniform training ill all features 
 of battle fire which we are liable to be called 
 upon to use in the face of the enemy. 
 
 Under the head of Application of Fire the 
 following will be discussed: — 
 
 Adjustmejit of Fire. 
 
 Effect of Ground. 
 
 Employment of Fire Units. 
 
 Kinds of Fire. 
 
 Time of Opening Fire. 
 
 Combined Sights. 
 
 Night Firing. 
 
 Indirect F'ire. 
 
 Fire of Position. 
 
 Vulnerability. 
 
 Adju.stincnt of Fire: — 
 
 Stationary Targets: The ever present ])rob- 
 lem in combat firing and in service is to place 
 the center of impact of the collective group on 
 the center of the target, thus insuring the 
 greatest possible number of hits. Two elements 
 enter into this; (a) the troops, (b) tlu' com- 
 inanrler. 
 
 Troops: When troops have aimed correctly 
 at the indicated target with distribution and
 
 130 Battle Fire Training 
 
 elevation as ordered and have fired steadily and 
 at the proper rate, they have solved their share 
 of the problem. These requirements are mat- 
 ters of training. 
 
 Commander : The commander, assuming that 
 he has chosen the proper target, given the 
 proper distribution and rate of fire, and seen 
 to the assignments of aiming points, must bring 
 the shot group upon the center of the target. 
 This is primarily a matter of determination 
 of range. Battle ranges, except in prepared 
 defensive positions will usually be in error. 
 The degree of error depends upon the ability to 
 estimate range and the range finding appliance 
 furnished. With a modern "contained base" 
 range finder, with which our troops should 
 be furnished, the error is reduced to a minimum. 
 By estimation it often approaches a maximum. 
 In either case we are quite safe in assuming 
 that some error will exist. As the shot group 
 grows smaller with the degree of perfection of 
 the individuals in the group, it will be seen that 
 the better the shots the greater the effect pro- 
 duced by errors in elevation. Therefore, no 
 degree of perfection in individuals will compen- 
 sate for errors in adjustment; on the contrary 
 it but magnifies them. In instances of mis- 
 placement poor shots with great dispersion will 
 many times get hits where good shots with
 
 Application of Fire 131 
 
 small dispersion will get none. It is thus made 
 plain how important the correct placement of 
 the center of impact becomes and how depen- 
 dent it is on the ability of the commander to 
 determine the range. 
 
 If, as is probable, instruments and estima- 
 tion result in initial errors, some other means 
 must be used in conjunction with them. These 
 are found in "observation of fire" and "obser- 
 vation of the enemy." Peace offers no examples 
 of the latter, but a little thought will show 
 what actions indicate a well-placed center of 
 impact. No opportunity should be lost to 
 i)ec()mc familiar with the appearance of shot 
 groups under different conditions of ground, 
 light, and range. 
 
 It must be constantly borne in mind that a 
 simple error in range, and frequently a small 
 one, will utterly waste the effect of years of 
 excellent training in the individual. With the 
 captain, and with him alone, rests the burden 
 of this responsibility. 
 
 Moving Targets: A correct placement of 
 the center of impact is just as important with 
 moving targets as with stationary ones, but, 
 unfortunately, it is much more difficult to 
 obtain. Changes in the position of the target, 
 of course, make it impossible to maintain a 
 correct placement with a single sight setting.
 
 132 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Changes in sight setting cause a loss of time 
 and multiply the opportunities of error. Here 
 two conflicting conditions are confronted. The 
 answer is, of course, a compromise. A change 
 of sight setting is necessary, but the number of 
 these changes is reduced to the minimum con- 
 sistent with effective fire. Against a steadily 
 advancing target (not one that advances by 
 leaps as do the simulated advances on the 
 target range) an initial setting must be selected 
 well within the estimated range, fire opened, 
 and continued while the target moves into the 
 center of impact. As the target approaches 
 and leaves this center the fire effect will be less 
 than when exactly in it, and, of course, dimin- 
 ishes as the distance becomes greater. Outside 
 the 75% zone (reference to table S. A. F. M., 
 page 123) the effect falls off to such an extent 
 that a change in elevation is necessary. The 
 change must be large enough to obviate the 
 necessity of frequent sight manipulation and 
 not so large as to remove fire effect completely 
 from the target. Experience and a study of 
 dispersion have shown that a change of about 
 200 yards is satisfactory. This change should 
 be made while the target is stationary and 
 offers its least area. When it Is in motion and 
 presents its greatest front and when in the 
 center of impact, the firing should reach its
 
 Application of Fire 133 
 
 maximum volume. Against rapidly approach- 
 ing targets, as cavalry, the battle sight should 
 be used at all ranges. Against retreating tar- 
 gets fire should be opened at the estimated 
 range and sight settings of 200 yards differ- 
 ence, set off as the distance is increased. 
 Against targets moving perpendicular to the 
 line of fire some allowance must be made for 
 their rate of advance. Fire upon the head of 
 a column produces a greater effect than at any 
 other point. 
 
 Training along these lines should be con- 
 ducted accordingly. 
 Effect of Ground: — 
 
 A method which proves valuable in illus- 
 trating the effects of a cone of shots on different 
 slopes of ground is to take a hand mirror and 
 throw the sun's rays on a surface held at differ- 
 ent angles. A small hand electric lamp with a 
 cylindrical roll of paper, such as a rolled call- 
 ing card, pushed over the bulb to center the 
 rays of light and prevent diffusion, will work 
 equally as well. 
 
 If, in the foregoing experiment, it is assumed 
 the sun's rays, as they are received on the sur- 
 face held at different angles, to be the zone 
 beaten by a cone of fire, it is seen at once that 
 the depth of this zone is decreased when the 
 surface of reception inclines upward and is
 
 increased when the surface inclines downward. 
 So also does the ground rising and falling with 
 respect to the line of sight increase and decrease 
 the width of a fire beaten zone. If, therefore, 
 the space in rear of a firing line is considered 
 which is swept by fire, from practically the 
 same level as the line, it is found that where 
 this space slopes upward the beaten zone is 
 decreased and where it slopes downward the 
 beaten zone is increased. The practical appli- 
 cation of this knowledge lies in the ability to 
 use it in reference to the positions of the sup- 
 ports and reserves. Upon ground rising in 
 rear of the firing line and in respect to the line 
 of sight, the supports may be brought much 
 closer to the firing line than upon ground which 
 slopes away from the firing line and from the 
 line of sight. Defiladed spaces in rear of the 
 line are, of course, not considered. For those 
 who care to pursue this subject further a refer- 
 ence to the table on page 128, S. A. F. M., is 
 made. This table gives the effects upon the 
 beaten zone of different degrees of slope at 
 various ranges. 
 
 There is another effect of sloping ground 
 which must be considered and that is its effect 
 upon the position of the target. A column on 
 ground rising in rear of the firing line is, so to 
 speak, tipped up to receive the fire ; that is, the 
 rear of the column is elevated and thus offers
 
 '■/K.f'f/cal
 
 136 Battle Fire Training 
 
 a vertical target which will not be present upon 
 level or falling ground. A reference to Plate 
 38, in which is shown a cone of fire directed 
 upon a column target, both on rising and fall- 
 ing ground, will make this clear. It is plain 
 that a line on rising ground will offer no 
 increase in vertical target over one on level or. 
 falling ground. 
 
 From the foregoing it is seen that upon 
 rising ground line formations and not column 
 should be taken. Ground which falls with ref- 
 erence to the line of sight, lowers, so to speak, 
 the rear of the column and presents as a target 
 the front and not the depth. Columns present 
 less front than lines and are desirable forma- 
 tions for falling ground. The practical appli- 
 cation of this second effect of ground is found 
 in the formations for supports and reserves. 
 Upon ground rising in rear of the firing line 
 and in respect to the line of sight, line forma- 
 tions should be adopted. Upon ground falling 
 in roar of the firing line and in respect to the 
 line of sight, small column formations should 
 obtain. 
 * Employment of Fire Units: — 
 
 In Defense, sectors are assigned. The proper 
 employment of a unit is accomplished when the 
 
 *Note: a section is a portion of the line occupied 
 by defending troops and sector an area over which they 
 fire. These terms are frequently taken as inter- 
 changeable but not properly so.
 
 /=>LAT£: 3 9.
 
 l'S8 Battle Fire Training 
 
 entire target is covered by the fire of that unit as 
 sliown in A (Plate 39). Each man fires at that 
 part of the target directly opposite him. Any 
 of the following assignments of platoons will 
 work equally as well, but the necessity therefor 
 in defense is not so apparent. 
 
 In Attack, objectives are assigned. Differing 
 from defense where a unit remains in position 
 and delivers fire, in attack either individuals, 
 squads, platoons, or entire companies, push 
 forward to successive fire positions. If a com- 
 pany covers a section of the enemy's line from 
 which a fire is being delivered capable of making 
 a certain number of hits, then when the fire 
 ceases on that portion of the enemy's line their 
 fire increases in quality and volume, resulting 
 in more hits on the attacking lines. 
 
 A force advancing against a hostile position 
 thoroughly covered by its own fire, moves for- 
 ward with the best possible protection. If a 
 unit depends upon its own fire for protection 
 then some method must be adopted which will 
 permit of an advance of a portion of the unit, 
 at the same time keeping up, if possible, a fire 
 along the entire position of the enemy. 
 
 1. Switch Method: Figure B. A target 
 assigned to a four platoon company is divided 
 into three parts and assigned to three platoons.
 
 Application of Fire 139 
 
 the fourtli ucting Jis a switch to cover the por- 
 tion of tlie target on whicli fire has been tem- 
 porarily suspended by reason of an element 
 making an advance. 
 
 A disadvantage: This requires a higli degree 
 of training and control on the part of the 
 switch platoon to cover properly in turn each 
 vacated part of the objective. 
 
 2. By assigning two adjoining platoons to 
 each half of the target, Figure C. This method 
 permits of the advance of a platoon while the 
 fire on that half of the target is reduced one- 
 half in volume. In Plate 40 it will be noticed 
 in the lower illustration that the fire on the left 
 clement, 4th squad, 3d platoon, crosses the line 
 of advance of the 4th platoon and would 
 endanger the flank of that platoon during an 
 advance. The fire of the right element paral- 
 lels tijc advance of the 2d platoon. 
 
 To provide against this either: 
 
 (1) A squad or portion of squad must 
 temporarily suspend fire or shift their fire, 
 as 4th squad on 1st squad target, 1st squad 
 on 4th squad target. The advisability of 
 such shifting is questionable. Or 
 
 (2) Intervals must be kipt between 
 platoons of about 6 yards, or 
 
 (3) Platoons must, during advance, 
 slightly incline to the flank.
 
 S! 
 
 
 ^sSjo; 
 
 V 
 
 
 ^ ^ ^ ; 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 r~T^ 
 
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 L 

 
 Application of Fire 141 
 
 Considering tlie fire of the 3d platoon during 
 .ulvaiifc of the Mil, the suspension of fire of the 
 ■ith squad causes tlie fire of the 3d squad to 
 cross Ihe line of advance at about 250 yards. 
 If the 3d squad's fire is suspended, the fire of 
 the 2d squad meets the line of advance of 4th 
 platoon at the target. 
 
 3. Assignment of each platoon to the entire 
 target, Figure C. The advantages appearing 
 with this assignment are: 
 
 (1) Easier for the elements to dis- 
 tribute their fire. 
 
 (2) If, as often happens, some platoons 
 contain a greater number of good shots, 
 the distribution^over the whole target is 
 improved. 
 
 (3) Dui-ing an advance of a platoon 
 the" entire target remains under fire, 
 reduced only in volume by the suspended 
 fire of the platoon making the advance, 
 plus a slight addition explained later. 
 
 (4) No change of target results during 
 the advance and fire should possess greater 
 eflficiency. 
 
 (5) If, during an advance, it should on 
 rare occasions become necessary to cover 
 with fire, a portion not in the assigned 
 sector, a flank platoon is always available 
 without affecting the fire of the unit except 
 its reduction in volume.
 
 142 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Disadvantages : 
 
 (1) When a hostile Hne is located on 
 rolling ground it will be often impossible 
 for the interior element of a flank platoon 
 to see its portion of the target, as exam- 
 ple — Plate 40, 4th squad 1st platoon on 
 section of 4th squad target. 
 
 (2) In the initial advance no doubt this 
 disposition will work satisfactorily. As 
 the advance closes with the enemy the ten- 
 dency will be to switch to the method shown 
 in A, Plate 39, in which each man fires at 
 the target directly to his front. 
 
 (3) Top illustration, Plate 40: Consid- 
 ering the left element of a platoon's fire 
 together with the danger to the advance 
 of adjoining platoon we have the fol- 
 lowing : — 
 
 Platoon 
 Firing 
 
 Crosses near flank of advancing platoon 
 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 525 yards 
 415 yards 
 nr. f g. point 
 
 270 yards 
 nr. f g. point 
 
 nr. fg. point 
 
 
 2 
 
 nr. fg. point 
 415 yards 
 525 yards 
 
 3 
 
 nr. fg. point 
 270 yards 
 
 4 
 
 nr. f g. point 
 
 
 
 
 
 The greatest danger of hits from our own 
 fire shows up in this formation, when a flank 
 platoon is still in rear the remainder having 
 made their advance to the new position. 
 Assuming that the 1st, 2nd, and 3d platoons 
 have advanced 100 yards, the right of the 4th
 
 Application of Fire 143 
 
 platoon's fire at 100 yards crosses a point 
 about 10 yards in from the left flank of the 
 .'3d platoon; the right of the 3d squad, 4th 
 platoon, 1 yard from the left flank of the 3d 
 platoon; the right of the 2d squad, 4th pla- 
 toon, crosses the left flank of the 3d platoon's 
 line of advance at 250 yards. This is the maxi- 
 mum cross fire resulting from this formation. 
 When no intervals exist between platoons and 
 when they advance straight to the front and 
 not slightly to the flank, the flank platoons 
 firing from a position in rear must suspend the 
 fire of two squads. However, this suspension 
 takes place for a brief period, for the 4th pla- 
 toon will start its advance as soon as the 3d 
 reaches its position and begins fire. 
 
 Another method is to cause the flank pla- 
 toons to move ahead of the line to be established 
 l)y the other platoons. This results in an echelon 
 formation and reduces the danger of our own 
 Hre as above explained. For example, an 
 advance of about 60 yards is about to be made 
 bc'giiuiing on the right. The 1st platoon 
 advances about 90 yards, the 2d and 3d — GO 
 yards, and the 4th — 90 yards. This resulting 
 echelon formation affords in a small degree a 
 poorer target to the hostile fire, but is more 
 difficult to control. 
 
 Wiiatever the methml used, it is the duty of 
 the platoon leaders to see that proper steps are
 
 144 Battle Fire Training 
 
 taken to prevent their fire from endangering 
 their comrades. 
 
 The initial assignment of the companies of 
 a battalion and the battalions of a regiment to 
 sectors in defense and targets in attack has 
 been mentioned in the chapter on Distribution 
 of Fire. In defense as well as in attack the 
 cardinal principle is that the whole target must 
 be covered with fire. In attack it is usually 
 not advisable or practicable to assign the same 
 target to different companies in a battalion. 
 In the regiment the case would be rare indeed 
 where different battalions were given the same 
 objective. We may assume, therefore, that the 
 target both in the battalion arid regiment will 
 be subdivided into parts ; the number of which 
 will depend upon the number of units placed in 
 the firing line upon the initial deployment. In 
 the regiment the oxder for attack should always 
 include the assignment of objectives to the bat- 
 talions. In the battalion a prearranged method 
 of distribution is recommended. This obviates 
 the necessity for including it in the battalion 
 commander's order, saves time and assures that 
 in an emergency, without orders, the target will 
 be properly covered. Each company in the 
 firing line, upon initial deployment, takes its 
 proportionate share of the battalion target; 
 that is, if there are two companies they share
 
 AppUcat'wn of Fire 146 
 
 the target ociuaily, if three each takes one-third, 
 and so on. Supporting companies if deployed 
 ill the intervals between skirmishers take the 
 target of the company which they support. 
 If they are deployed on the flank they should 
 cover that portion of the target which, in the 
 judgment of their captains, is the most dan- 
 gerous; or orders must be issued to them. In 
 this connection it may be arranged in the bat- 
 talion that companies recnforcing on the flanks 
 take the same target as the company with which 
 they connect. 
 
 By this method the battalion commander is 
 able without verbal orders to distribute the fire 
 of supporting companies over the \\h()]e target 
 or place it on either flank, as he may desire. 
 
 The following abbreviations have been found 
 to work well and to he easily memorized :— 
 
 11 R A — Rcenforce right of "A" company. 
 
 R L B— Reenforce left of "1?" company. 
 
 R A — Rcenforce "A" c()mj)any intervals. 
 
 R W L— Reenforce ^\h()]e line in intei-^'als. 
 
 h'liuls of Fire: — 
 
 There are three classes of fire used in our ser- 
 vice; Volley, At Will, and Clip. 
 
 VoUeif Firing should be used for i-anging; 
 it also has a limited application in Fire of 
 Position.
 
 146 Battle Fire Training 
 
 At Will is the only class of fire which need 
 be given much consideration. It is this class 
 of fire which will usuall}^ be applied in battle. 
 It is the fire for almost every situation. To 
 reap its full effects, however, there must be a 
 high state of fire discipline and fire control 
 which results only from thorough training. 
 
 Clip Fire is an expedient resorted to with the 
 idea of limiting the number of rounds fired 
 without a pause in the firing. 
 
 With proper fire discipline clip fire is not 
 necessary; without proper fire discipline it 
 cannot be delivered with success. 
 
 There is another class of fire, which, while it 
 is not advocated in our army, has been recom- 
 mended abroad; that is. Rolling Fire. This 
 fire is executed about as follows ; the front rank 
 runs forward about fifteen paces and opens fire, 
 the rear rank in the meantime advancing at 
 quick time. As the rear rank passes the front 
 rank the latter ceases firing while the former 
 takes up the double time for about fifteen paces, 
 when it halts and opens fire. The advance thus 
 continues without pauses and fire is continuous. 
 It requires much training to execute this class 
 of fire even in peace time. Its application in 
 war will probably be limited to occasions upon 
 which the enemy is completely demoralized. 
 This class of fire, it is reported, has been fre-
 
 Application of Fire li 
 
 (jiKiitly used on the Frt'iich I'loiit during' the 
 past Iwo years. 
 
 Time of Opening Fire: — 
 
 In the attack the firing lines must be pushed 
 close to the enemy's position before fire is 
 opened. The attack which halts to fire at long 
 ranges is lost. On the defense, however, wliere 
 ammunition is very easily supplied, ranges more 
 nearly correct, and the target larger, fire may 
 be opened at greater range with chance of suc- 
 cess. In attack, fire should not be opened 
 i)eyond 800 yards unless absolutely necessary. 
 Reports from the present war indicate that 
 attacks have frequently been pushed to within 
 four or five hundred yards of the enemy's posi- 
 tion before fire was opened. In defense, unless 
 particularly favorable targets are presented, 
 fire should not be opened until heavy losses can 
 be inflicted. This will as a rule be between 
 1 ,200 and 800 yards. 
 
 Long range fire usually fails to produce hits 
 ill proportion to the amnnuiition exjx'nck'd ; it 
 uses the strength of the firers without coninuii- 
 surate results; and it increases the morale of 
 the enemy and decreases that of the firers, the 
 one breeding a contcm])t for the ability of the 
 defenders, the other by raising doubts as to the 
 possibility of stopping the attack.
 
 148 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Long range fire is permissible in pursuits and 
 should be resorted to in holding and delaying 
 actions which are not intended to be fought to- 
 a finish. 
 
 Fire to be effective must be so from its begin- 
 ning. A ragged, scattered opening will almost 
 certainly insure a grave loss of effect. Men 
 will fire before they have their sights set, before 
 they have the target, will fire nervously and 
 excitedly, if fire is not opened simultaneously 
 throughout a unit. In the problems given 
 herein attention has been called to the methods 
 by which fire may be so opened. Throughout 
 instruction and training care and attention 
 must be given to this point. 
 Combined Sights: — 
 
 When the exact detennination of ranges is 
 not possible, and other means fail in giving cor- 
 rect data for fire adjustment, an expedient 
 known as combined sights may be used. A 
 greater depth of beaten zone is created and a 
 loss of concentration results. Our regulations 
 prescribe that "this expedient will not usually 
 be employed by bodies of les« strength than a 
 battalion." 
 
 Error in range estimation varies greatly. 
 The average error is 121^%. Assuming an 
 error of 10%, then at 1,000 yards a sight set- 
 ting might be 900 or 1,100 yards. How near
 
 A'pplicat'wn of Fire 149 
 
 to tliL' target will a beaten zone fall in either 
 
 case? ]\y reference to the following table: — 
 
 Table of Dispebsion 
 
 a\'£baoe shots 
 
 Range Longitudinal 75% Zone 
 
 500 yards 373 yards 
 
 ()00 yards 315 yaj-ds 
 
 700 yards 2G(i yards 
 
 800 yards 229 yards 
 
 900 yards 201 yards 
 
 1,000 yards 180 yards 
 
 1,100 yards 163 yards 
 
 1,200 yards 152 yards 
 
 1,300 yards 143 yards 
 
 1,400 yards 13G yards 
 
 1,500 yards 129 yards 
 
 It is seen the beaten zone is 180 yards, or if 
 the estimate is 900 yards, extending from range 
 810 to 990 yards; if 1,100 yards, from 1,010 
 to 1,190 yards. The target, therefore, suffers 
 from nothing but a few ricochets if the estima- 
 tion is short and if over the fire is very poorly 
 centered. "If the prohahJc error of estimation 
 does not exceed one half of the zone considered 
 (75% of zone) the.n the objective must he some- 
 where •mthin that zone." Our error is 100 
 yards and one half of the 75% zone (180) is 90. 
 This does not fulfill the above requirement and 
 it is apparent we require another sight setting 
 to bring the shots on the target. (The heavy 
 black lines in Plate 41 indicate the limits of the 
 beaten zone.) Two sight settings differing 
 from each other by the width of the beaten zone
 
 150 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 (180 yards), with an estimate of 900 yards, 
 result in the elevations 810 and 990 creating 
 a beaten zone extending from 720 to 1,080 
 yards. 
 
 I 
 
 600 
 
 
 ?29 
 
 So 
 
 ror short 
 mf — ^ 
 
 iiT 
 
 T/\RG£r. 
 
 Ti^if—- — n9o 
 
 fOO 
 
 ZOO 
 
 90 
 
 /io 
 
 100 
 
 nog 
 
 166 
 
 HO 
 
 1200 
 
 /6l 
 
 aoo 
 
 I4i 
 
 /SO 
 
 1400 
 
 lid 
 
 140 
 
 tSOO 
 
 ti9 
 
 At i,5u0 yards tlirce settings are necessary, 
 one setting at the estimated range, one over, 
 and one under, the difference being the depth 
 of the zone at that range. 
 
 In practice the two points which arise with 
 respect to combined sights are: At what range 
 should these sights first be used? What sliould 
 be the difference between the elevations set off?
 
 ApiMcation of Fire 151 
 
 'J'lu' fii"st (juc'stion can be decided only after a 
 consideration of the combined effect of probable 
 errors in range, the size of the cone of disper- 
 sion produced by the various classes of marks- 
 men, and the width of the zone beaten by one 
 sight and that by two. Without going into 
 the details by which a conclusion is reached, it 
 may be stated that with our present methods of 
 range estimation the average company should 
 use combined sights at ranges of 1,000 yards 
 and over on level ground. On ground rising 
 with respect to the line of sight combined sights 
 should be used at 800 yards and over. The 
 second question is answered by statilig that In 
 practice it has been found satisfactory to set 
 the sights fifty yards over and fifty yards under 
 the estimated range. Do not use combined 
 s'ujltts if the range is knoxcn. 
 
 Considering (uiuler) estimation ( range 1,500) 
 
 Range Avould be 1,.*J50 
 
 Beaten zone at 1,500 y/irds. . 1,'JO yards 
 
 Sight settings 1,225 
 
 1 ,350 
 1,480 
 Xi(jh f Fi ring : — 
 
 In the attack recourse should be iiad to tlie 
 l)ayonet. In the defense, where rests or other 
 expedients are constructed so that aimed fire 
 may sweep the front of a position, night firing
 
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 Application of Fire 153 
 
 may be resorted to with good results. Artificial 
 illumination also will afford opportunities for 
 this kind of fire, \ight firing will be effective 
 Old}' at short ranges. 
 
 Indirect Fire: — 
 
 By this is meant fire which is directed over 
 an intervening obstacle which screens the target 
 from the firers. It will require a particularly 
 fortuitous combination of circumstances to 
 render such fire possible. If such a combina- 
 tion exists this kind of fire may be delivered by 
 the use of auxiliary aiming points. Plate 20. 
 
 Fire of Position: — 
 
 In the attjick, selected bodies of troops may 
 be posted on the flanks or on high ground from 
 which they can fire over the firing line to assist 
 in its advance. Fire delivered by such troops is 
 known as "fire of position" and sometimes as 
 "covering fire." 
 
 As the range remains the same, the troops 
 stationary and outside the zone of the enemy's 
 fire, the effect produced by this fire will usually 
 be sufficient to warrant its application when 
 circumstances permit. In the application of 
 fire of position and indirect fire it must be 
 remembered that infantry must not attempt 
 to usurp the functions of machine guns and 
 artillery.
 
 oiTveaC yV/^g. 
 
 ,5 «*•«• eg t rt^f -/'■/re 
 
 Concentrated jfffC: 
 
 -45.
 
 Application of Fire 155 
 
 Vulnernbiliti/ of Formations: — 
 
 The vulnerability to fire of any formation is 
 (IcpeiuKnt upon: — 
 
 1. The kind of fire directed against it. 
 
 2. The formation. 
 
 3. The character of ground. 
 
 In top portion of Plate 43 is shown a firing 
 line "A" and in rear the supports or reenforce- 
 ments "B." Fire directed at "A" will be ^limed 
 and the centers of impact closely located along 
 the target line as shown by the shaded lines "A" 
 (lower portion Plate 43). When the shots reach 
 the point occupied by troops at "B" (top), 
 dispersion results creating a shot group more 
 or less uniformly distributed as shown by "B" 
 (lower), which might be called sweeping or 
 unaimed fire. Another kind of fire to be con- 
 sidered is concentrated fire as shown in "C" 
 where a numl)er of rifles are directed against 
 a connnon point. 
 Unaimed Fire: 
 
 Unaimed, or sweeping, fire is met with in 
 rear of a firing line, which misses it and hits 
 objects beyond. Assuming that this fire is 
 uniformly distributed over a given area, then it 
 appears that objects will receive hits in pro- 
 portion to the square area of target surface 
 presented. 
 
 Plate 44 sjiows relative vertical targets 
 afl'orded, considering only the target fronts.
 
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 Application of Fire 157 
 
 of a line of skirmishers, squad columns, platoon 
 columns, and a column of squads. If a man 
 presents 6/10 of a square yard of target sur- 
 face, then in the following formations we have 
 the following sized targets (not considering 
 column leaders and file closers in column of 
 squads) : 
 
 Targets Men Fronts 
 Line of skirmishers.. 96 96 57.6 sq. yds. 
 
 Squad column 12 12 7.2 sq. yds. 
 
 Platoon column 4 8 4.8 sq. yds. 
 
 Column of squads ... 1 4 2.4 sq. yds. 
 
 To which must be added the danger space 
 occurring in targets having depth, as columns. 
 Without going into the mathematics of the fac- 
 tors involved it may be safely concluded that 
 under the assumptions made, formations are the 
 hast vulnerable in the following order:* 
 
 1. Column of squads. 
 
 2. Platoon colunins. 
 
 3. Squad columns. 
 
 4. Line of skirmishers. 
 Under Aimed Fire. 
 
 Assuming that the fire is not directed against 
 the heads of columns, but equally distributed 
 along the whole line, as lower A, Plate 43, a 
 slightly different result is obtained. Here fire 
 is laterally distrilnited, l)ut vertically the sliots 
 arc clustered around the line running through 
 the centers of impact. A column of sufficient 
 
 *Note: Consider the targets as shown in Plate 44 
 as applied to lower A and B, Plate 43.
 
 158 Battle Fire Training 
 
 depth to lie wholly within this portion of the 
 shot group will receive proportionately more 
 hits than when the formation against unaimed 
 fire is considered. The order of vulnerability 
 of formations under these conditions appears 
 below, beginning with the least vulnerable :* 
 
 1. Platoon column. 
 
 2. Squad column. 
 
 3. Column of squads. 
 
 4. Line of skirmishers. 
 Concentrated Fire. Plate C-43. 
 
 The full effects of concentrated fire can only 
 be expected at the shorter ranges, under 600 
 yards, or against machine guns. Assuming the 
 fire is efficient and concentrated the following 
 comparisons may be made : — 
 
 Fire capable of a hit per yard, per unit of 
 time, on a lineal target 100 yards long, when 
 distributed, would expose 100 men to 60% of 
 hits. The same fire effectively concentrated on 
 12 squad columns would result in 8 1/3 hits 
 per yard of target front per minute, or five hits 
 per man front. 
 
 On platoon columns the result would be 15 
 hits per head of each platoon, 121/4 per yard, 
 or 7l/r> per man front. 
 
 On column of squads, 60 hits per head of 
 column, 25 per yard, or 15 per man front. 
 
 *Note: Consider the targets as shown in Plate 44 
 as applied to lower A and B, Plate 43.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION 
 
 How often liiis the word from the firing Hne 
 been sent to the rear — "Out of Ammunition," 
 and how often has the supply of ammunition 
 determined the result of an engagement? 
 
 Usually a man enters into an engagement 
 with 100 rounds in his belt (of which 30 is for 
 emergency and never fired without an officer's 
 order) ; 120 or 180 rounds in two or three 
 bandoleers; total of 220 or 280 rounds. 
 
 Provided for each man in tiie field is the 
 following: — 
 
 Base or intermediate station. . . . 680 
 Ammunition Column at or near 
 
 advance depot 340 
 
 Ammunition I'raiii 120 
 
 Com})(it Tr(tin 120 
 
 In the Belt 100 
 
 making a total of 1,360 rounds. 
 
 The number of rounds carried into action 
 depends on local supply, nature of engagement, 
 and carrying capacity. One round of ammuni- 
 tion weighs approximately 9 10 of an ounce. 
 Considering the ammunition alone, the weight 
 of 280 rounds is about 16 pounds. We might 
 at this point, consider the* firing capacity of a
 
 160 Battle Fire Training 
 
 man. Although the "kick" of our present 
 "springfield" is not the vicious one of the old 
 "45," yet few can fire any number of rounds 
 beyond 50 without it leaving a noticeable effect 
 on their muscles and nervous system. True, the 
 excitement of battle will postpone the realiza- 
 tion of this fact, but beyond the 50 round point 
 firing will begin to show loss in accuracy. As 
 to the limit of the number of rounds which the 
 average man can fire with reasonable effect, it 
 might be placed between two and three hundred. 
 
 It has been frequently noticed that after an 
 engagement lasting part of a day in which men 
 fired approximately this number of rounds, 
 without any great amount of fatigue before the 
 engagement, complete exhaustion was evident, 
 due not only to the strain incident to battle, 
 but in a large measure to the shock of gun 
 recoil. 
 
 Taking 220 rounds as an average amount to 
 carry into action as previously noted, consider- 
 ing the three round per minute rate there 
 results 1 and 1/5 hours of potential firing, that 
 more ammunition will be needed can be put 
 down as a certainty in nearly every case, and 
 the question naturally arises how will the firing 
 line be supplied after it is once launched into 
 action and separated from the ammunition 
 supply by a fire swept zone.
 
 Supply of Ammunition 161 
 
 In a battalion the supply is governed by the 
 major. 'V\w ways afforded for replenishment 
 
 1. From wounded. 
 
 2. From reenforcements. 
 
 3. From improvised means, in limited cases. 
 We should look upon the following rules gov- 
 erning ammunition as of the greatest impor- 
 tance : — 
 
 1. Appreciation of the value of each round 
 of ammunition. 
 
 2. That reenforcements are always sent 
 forward with an extra amount of ammunition. 
 
 3. That ammunition should be sent, if pos- 
 sible, to an indicated unit so as to provide 
 for its proper distribution. 
 
 4. That if ammunition is delivered to a 
 unit, the commander himself will provide for 
 proper distribution in that unit. 
 
 (a) In a platoon or company, several men 
 crawling or rolling along in rear of the line 
 giving out ammunition results in better dis- 
 tribution than j)assing or throwing it along 
 the line, which affects the rate and volume of 
 fire and poor distribution of ammunition. 
 
 (b) That if occasion arises where ammu- 
 nition can be delivered only at one point on 
 an extended line, it is the duty of the innne- 
 diate commanders to see that a proper por-
 
 162 Battle Fire Training 
 
 tion thereof is passed on to the next organi- 
 zation. 
 
 5. Squad, platoon, and company comman- 
 ders should provide for the utilization of the 
 ammunition of the wounded and dead. 
 Orders to the commander of a line of reen- 
 forcements should clearly point out the portion 
 of the line needing ammunition and reenforce- 
 ments, and instructions should clearly state — 
 "Reenforce that portion of the line beginning 
 and ending there." Before starting forward, 
 several men of the line of reenforcements should 
 be selected and instructed "upon arrival on the 
 firing line to collect extra ammunition carried 
 forward by reenforcements and distribute to the 
 men low in ammunition." This, of course, under 
 direction of the unit commander already on the 
 line. 
 
 In cases where the supporting units are to be 
 placed in intervals between units of the firing 
 line, men should be detailed as ammunition car- 
 riers and deployed on the flanks of the support 
 in rear of the troops they are to supply. This 
 does away with the necessity of moving along 
 the firing line, which creates confusion and is 
 both difficult and dangerous. 
 
 Whatever the method of absorbing the sup- 
 ports or reenforcements in the firing line, 
 whether by intervals between men or intervals
 
 Supply of Ammunition 163 
 
 between groups, the distribution of .unmunition 
 is better accomplished as before mentioned by 
 men crawling or rolling along in rear of the line 
 than by passing or throwing it along the line. 
 Ammunition should be distributed without 
 aflfecting the rate of fire delivery. As before 
 stated one solution of this question lies in with- 
 holding firq until a position close to the enemy 
 is reached. 
 Exercise : 
 
 Object: Training in the supply of 
 ammunition to the firing line. 
 
 Situation: Two companies of the bat- 
 talion deployed, firing; two companies 
 some distance to the rear in support. 
 
 Action: Orders are issued, by signal, 
 for one .supporting company to reenforce 
 the left company in the intervals between 
 skirmishers and the second supporting 
 company to reenforce the left of the line. 
 The supporting companies should be sup- 
 plied with at least two bandoleers per man. 
 Firing may be simulated. 
 The Field Serxnce liegulations under the head 
 of Ammunition Service and the Infantry Drill 
 Regulations under the head of Ammunition 
 Supply cover the proper use of the divisional 
 ammunition train and the combat trains. These 
 instructions make it mandatory for the bat-
 
 164 Battle Fire Training 
 
 talion commander, unless he himself be the com- 
 mander, to direct the issue of ammunition from 
 the battalion combat train "upon separating 
 from it to enter an engagement." If the regi- 
 mental commander or higher commander does 
 not desire an issue of ammunition from the 
 trains he must so order. In making his decision 
 upon this point he will take into consideration 
 the following: 
 
 (a) Probable duration of impending 
 action. 
 
 (b) Probable amount of ammunition 
 which will be expended. 
 
 (c) Whether or not he is able to imme- 
 diately replace ammunition expended. 
 
 In this connection the Military Art Depart- 
 ment of the Army Service Schools says that in 
 making his decision the higher commander will 
 be assisted by a consideration of the following: 
 
 (a) "If ammunition is plentiful, better 
 lose a wagon load than that a single company 
 on the firing line should lack a bandoleer." 
 
 (b) "Marching with extra bandoleers on 
 the person is much slower and more 
 fatiguing." 
 
 (c) "Ammunition discarded maybe recov- 
 ered in an advance but not so readily in 
 retreat." 
 
 (d) "Resupplying is easier in a retreat 
 (not a route) than in an advance, as the
 
 Supply of Ammunition 165 
 
 required aiiununition may be dropped by tbe 
 wagons in sheltered spots and picked up»by 
 the passing troops." 
 
 (e) "Think carefully before you allow 
 issues to go on prior to short advance guard 
 and rear guard actions, or in positions in 
 readiness. In the latter there may be no 
 combat or you may march again, and some 
 majors may issue, particularly if they are 
 ordered to occupy a tentative line." 
 
 (f) "The cream of the discussion is that 
 the foot soldier carries on his person one 
 hundred rounds. Is that enough for his 
 purpose in carrying out your orders and 
 can you quickly resupply the amount he 
 expends thereafter.''" 
 
 Exercise : 
 
 Purpose: To train the battalion to draw 
 and issue ammunition from its combat train. 
 
 Situation: The battalion in route march 
 followed by its combat train properly loaded. 
 
 Action: Upon the order from the battalion 
 commander "Issue Ammunition," the first 
 and third companies halt and clear the road. 
 The second and fourth companies continue 
 to march until their heads are opposite the 
 first and third companies respectively, when 
 they halt and clear the road. The battalion 
 is then in double eoltunn with the roadway
 
 166 Battle Fire Training 
 
 clear between the columns. The ammunition 
 wagons are driven between the columns ; the 
 first to near the head of the first two com- 
 panies, the second to opposite the intervals 
 between the companies, and the third to 
 opposite the tail of the rear companies. 
 
 A detail of one noncommissioned officer 
 and two privates, previously made, enter each 
 wagon, let down the tail gate, and throw the 
 ammunition on the ground at the rate of 
 about three boxes per platoon. The sergeant 
 in charge of the wagons, should there be one, 
 supervises the issue, otherwise a detail should 
 be made for this purpose. 
 
 Each squad leader reports to his platoon 
 commander as soon as his squad is supplied, 
 the platoon commanders similarly report to 
 the company commander, who in turn reports 
 to the battalion commander. 
 
 Under direction of the first sergeant, 
 ammunition is issued to the file closers, 
 guides, and company buglers. 
 
 The company officers should also be sup- 
 plied. 
 
 The issue should not require over ten. 
 minutes.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 CONDUCT OF FIRE 
 
 Conduct of fire is tlie performance of those 
 duties by the individuals of a unit which enable 
 that unit to develop its maximum efficiency in 
 battle. They comprise not only those which 
 arise in connection with the actual fire figlit, 
 but many wliich are necessary prior to an 
 action to insure a systematic and orderly 
 entrance into battle with the greatest possible 
 chance of success. 
 
 In a study of this subject the fact is empha- 
 sized that the dividing line between fire and 
 maneuver tactics is often so indistinct that the 
 two subjects appear to merge one into tlie 
 other. For this reason, therefore, a thorough 
 knowledge of fire tactics includes some under- 
 standing of its relation to maneuver tactics. 
 With this idea in view it has been thought nec- 
 essary to broaden the scope of this chapter and 
 in a few instances to mention subjects which 
 ordinarily are not included under fire tactics 
 proper. 
 
 It has been stated that the conduct of fire 
 consists in the performance of certain duties 
 by the individuals of a unit. Exactly what the 
 duties are may be determined by a study of fire
 
 168 Battle Fire Training 
 
 direction, fire control, and fire discipline; for 
 in meeting the requirements of these three fac- 
 tors certain duties are made obligatory upon 
 the individuals of a command. The coordina- 
 tion and performance of these duties consti- 
 tutes "Conduct of Fire." 
 
 Fire direction is exercised mainly by the 
 company commander, but really includes cer- 
 tain functions of the several commanders from 
 the captain to the brigadier. Above the grade 
 of captain, as we shall see, the direction is 
 mainly tactical. 
 
 Fire control is the function of the comman- 
 der of the fire unit; the platoon. 
 
 Fire discipline, of course, applies to the indi- 
 vidual soldier. 
 
 Fire direction and control are thoroughly 
 explained in the Infantry Drill Regulations. 
 Fire discipline has been defined in a previous 
 chapter. 
 
 There remains, therefore, only the necessity 
 for pointing out in detail the duties of the indi- 
 viduals of a unit which are necessary for proper 
 conduct of fire. These, as has been stated, are 
 determined by a study of fire direction, control, 
 and discipline. 
 
 It would possibly have been more attractive 
 to the general reader to present the subject- 
 matter of this chapter in more or less of a
 
 Conduct of Fire 169 
 
 narrative form, but to the student, who wants 
 facts, tlie arrangement adopted is thought more 
 suitable.* 
 
 The Colonel 
 
 Imlcpcmlcnt Commander: Upon serious con- 
 tact with the enemy tlie colonel should take 
 position well towards tlie front of his command 
 so that he may receive information promptly, 
 and personally reconnoiter. This enables him 
 to issue his order intelligently and without 
 delay. Such a position, also, permits him to 
 control the situation with regards to his own 
 troops, and to begin the action, if such is his 
 desire, strictly in accordance with his own 
 wishes. 
 
 Subordinate Commander: After receiving 
 ills orders the colonel should ]) recede his com- 
 mand as stated above and for the same reasons. 
 He should direct the advance' of his regiment 
 until the time arlves for issuing the regimental 
 order. The formation adopted depending upon 
 requirements of the situation, usually column, 
 or line of colunms. 
 
 •Note: The Hrranfrcinciit and the details of this cliap- 
 ter liave been taken ahiiost wliolly from a conijiilatiou 
 on the subject by the School of Musketry. This compi- 
 lation is based with few exceptions upon the ]irovisions 
 of the Infantry Drill Regulations and the Field Service 
 Regulations.
 
 170 Battle Fire Training 
 
 General Duties: 
 
 a. Assign targets and sectors or tasks to 
 battalions and special units. 
 
 b. Provide for the necessary reconnaissance 
 to the front and flanks. 
 
 c. Announce his position and that of the next 
 higher commander. 
 
 d. Control the reserve as the tactical situa- 
 tion demands. 
 
 e. Regulate ammunition supply. 
 
 f. Establish communication with next higher 
 commander. 
 
 g. Use his regimental staff to assist him in 
 the performance of his duties. 
 
 h. During the progress of an action take a 
 position from which he can observe the progress 
 of events, receive and transmit messages and 
 orders, and be in constant, direct, and easy 
 communication with the reserve. 
 
 The Major 
 
 Independent Commander: The general rules 
 for a colonel apply. 
 
 Subordinate Commander: When an action 
 is imminent the major should talce position 
 where he can best observe the progress of events 
 and still retain control of his unit. 
 
 After an action has opened the major should 
 be where he can best direct the reenforcing of
 
 Conduct of Fire 171 
 
 the firing line, anxl maintain contact with rcgi- 
 nuiital headquarters. 
 
 After the supports have joined the firing line 
 he should be with that line. 
 
 General Duties: 
 
 a. Conducts his battalion according to the 
 mission assigned him. 
 
 b. By tactical orders directs initial deploy- 
 ment of the battalion. 
 
 c. Controls support and sends forward reen- 
 forccments from it to the firing line 
 
 d. Controls movements of the battalion sub- 
 sequent to its initial deployment, 
 
 e. Regulates ammunition supply. 
 
 f. Maintains contact with adjoining troops. 
 
 g. May harmonize ranges used by the com- 
 j)anies on the firing line. 
 
 h. Determines when bayonets shall be fixed. 
 
 i. Subject to orders from higher authority 
 determines the point from which the charge is 
 to be made. 
 
 j. Orders the charge. 
 Special Duties: In Attack. 
 
 a. May select formation in which companies 
 advance. 
 
 b. Designates : 
 
 1. The diri'ction of the objective. 
 
 2. The companies for the firing line. 
 Ji. The companies f()r the support. 
 
 4. The order and front of the companies 
 in the firing line.
 
 172 Battle Fire Training 
 
 m 
 
 5. The right or left company of the 
 firing line as the base company. 
 
 In Defense 
 
 a. Describes front of each company. 
 
 b. Assigns sector of fire. • 
 
 c. Locates fire, communicating, and cover 
 trenches. 
 
 d. Directs preparation of obstacles, 
 
 e. Assigns companies to construct trenches 
 and obstacles. 
 
 f. Details troops to occupy trenches. 
 
 g. Causes firing line and supports to fix 
 bayonets when a charge by the enemy is 
 imminent. 
 
 h. Seeks opportunities for counter attack. 
 
 Battalion Staff 
 In action the battalion adjutant and sergeant 
 major are with the major. In attack, usually 
 on the same line with some interval. In defense, 
 where they can best perform the duties assigned 
 them. One orderly is usually a horse holder, 
 the other is with the major. The major divides 
 the following duties among his staff according 
 to their qualifications : 
 
 a. Reconnaissance. 
 
 b. Observation of the firing line. 
 
 c. Maintaining contact with regimental head- 
 quarters.
 
 Conduct of Fire ,173 
 
 d. Maintaining contact with the support. 
 
 e. Maintaining contact with adjoining units. 
 
 f. Receiving, communicating, and sending 
 visual signals from and to front and rear. 
 
 g. Observing fire effect and progress of 
 events. 
 
 h. Keeping copies of all orders, messages, 
 and other data necessary for his war diary. 
 
 i. Determination of ranges, if the battalion 
 is equipped with only one instrument for this 
 purpose. 
 
 All members of the battalion staff should 
 understand all signals and the semaphore code. 
 The orderlies and the sergeant major, the Inter- 
 national Code as well. 
 
 A sergeant should be temporarily added to 
 the battalion staff, who, under the direction 
 of the major: — 
 
 a. Conducts coml)at train as far to the front 
 with the battalion as directed. 
 
 b. Supervises issues of anmiuiiition to tjic 
 battalion. 
 
 c. Takes comi)at train to niule/vous for 
 refilling, under the direction of the regimental 
 commander. 
 
 d. Rejoins battalion, if it is not in action, 
 or, if it be engaged, joins or establishes com- 
 munication with the regimental reserve.
 
 174 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Captain 
 
 In action the captain is where he can best 
 control his platoons, observe fire effect, sec the 
 major and platoon chiefs. 
 
 Duties: 
 
 a. Conducts his company to place of deploy- 
 ment assigned by the major's orders in the best 
 manner. 
 
 b. Designates the target, and allots part to 
 each platoon. 
 
 c. Determines the range. 
 
 d. Announces the sight setting. * 
 
 e. Indicates class of' fire. 
 
 f. Indicates time to open fire. 
 
 g. Informs his subordinates as to the loca- 
 tion of the battalion commander, and, when 
 necessary, announces his own position. 
 
 h. Observes fire effect and maintains a check 
 on the rate of fire. 
 
 i. Maintains a check on the range, har- 
 monizes ranges in the platoons, and corrects 
 material errors in elevations. 
 
 j. Maintains communication with battalion 
 headquarters and when necessary with adjoin- 
 ing units. 
 
 k. Prevents exhaustion of ammunition supply. 
 
 1. Distributes ammunition received from rear. 
 
 m. Provides for the collection and distribu- 
 tion of the ammunition of the dead and 
 wounded.
 
 Conduct of Fire 175 
 
 n. In the absence of express directions from 
 Hie major, if commanding a flank company, 
 determines when advances by rushes shall be 
 attempted. 
 
 o. Indicates size of fractions to rush. 
 . • p. Leads a rush by the entire company. 
 
 q. Leads the charge, 
 
 r. When necessary, designates new platoon 
 leaders and sees that new squads are organized 
 and new leaders designated to replace those 
 disabled. 
 
 s. Must understand all signals and sema- 
 phore code. 
 
 Buglers 
 
 The captain divides the following duties 
 between the two buglers : 
 
 a. Join the captain when the comp.uiv 
 deploys. (Both) 
 
 b. Watch platoon leaders for signals. 
 
 c. Transmit signals to platoon leaders. 
 
 d. W^•lt^h the major for signals and repeal 
 them back. 
 
 e. 'J'ransmit information to the major. 
 
 f. Act as messenger. 
 
 g. Repeat bugle signal "Charge." (Both) 
 
 h. Must understand all signals, semaphore. 
 Mild International codes.
 
 I'yC Battle Pire Training 
 
 " Range Estimators 
 
 Range estimators, as we have seen, are 
 trained in the several methods of determining 
 range. They may or may not be assembled 
 when making their estimates. In either case 
 they transmit the result of their individual esti- 
 mates to the first sergeant either by signal or 
 verbally. Having once been given the target 
 they should be prepared at any time to 
 announce their estimate of the distance thereto. 
 
 First Sergeant 
 Duties : 
 
 a. Joins the captain when the company 
 deploys. 
 
 b. Observes the enemy. 
 
 c. Observes the target. 
 
 d. Observes fire effect. 
 
 e. Observes firing line and progress of events. 
 
 f. Averages estimates of estimators. 
 
 g. Keeps check on range. 
 
 h. Keeps copies of all orders, messages, and 
 other data necessary for rendering proper 
 reports. 
 
 i. Must understand all signals and semaphore 
 code. 
 
 The Platoon Leader 
 
 In action the platoon leader is where he can 
 best control his platoon, observe the target and
 
 Conduct of Fire 177 
 
 Hrc cifect, and observe the company commander 
 for signals or commands. 
 
 Duties: 
 
 1. Receives liis orders from the company 
 commander, 
 
 2. If necessary, may indicate tlie fire posi- 
 tion that has been ordered. 
 
 .*i. Announces sight setting. 
 
 •i. Points out designated target to his pla- 
 toon, if practicable, otherwise to his corporals 
 only. 
 
 5. When the target cannot be seen indicates 
 an aiming target. 
 
 6. Assigns targets so as to insure that the 
 entire front or sector given him by the company 
 commander will be covered with fire. 
 
 7. (lives class of fire. 
 
 8. Amiomiees I'ati' of fire. 
 
 9. If commaiKJiiig a flank platoon, dciails a 
 man to watch for signals from the combat 
 patrols. 
 
 10. When his platoon is ready to open fire, 
 signals "I am ready." 
 
 11. Repeats captain's signal to connnence 
 firing to the corporals.
 
 178 Battle Fire Training 
 
 12. Observes fire effect. 
 
 13. When platoon is not firing, provides for 
 constant observation for movements of the 
 enemy. 
 
 14. Changes sight setting of his platoon 
 when necessary. 
 
 ,15. Regulates rate of fire. 
 
 16. Increases rate of fire when large and 
 distinct targets appear and decreases it when 
 the target becomes small and indistinct. 
 
 17. Prevents decrease in rate of fire when: 
 
 a. Changing sight setting. 
 
 b. Preparing for rushes.. 
 
 c. Fixing bayonets. 
 
 d. Transmitting firing data. 
 
 e. Distributing ammunition. 
 
 18. Increases rate of fire to cover advances 
 of adjoining units. 
 
 19. Sees that the fire from the flanks of his 
 platoon does not endanger a rushing unit. 
 
 20. Is on the alert for signals from the cap- 
 tain ; for this purpose he may use his platoon 
 guide, but it is preferable to detail a private 
 for this purpose. See Communication. 
 
 21. Must understand all signals and sema- 
 phore code. 
 
 22. Leads his platoon in advancing and 
 charging. 
 
 23. Prevents changing fire to unauthorized 
 targets.
 
 CoiuJuct of Fire 1T9 
 
 24. Insures dishihulion i»f animunilion from 
 vv.iv and from ckad and wounded. 
 
 25. In coming up with rcL-nforcements, he 
 takes over the duties of disahled phitoon leaders 
 of the platoon which lie joins, or if some other 
 section of the line needs his services he goes 
 there. 
 
 26. Endeavors to preserve the integrity, of 
 the squads by designating leaders to replace 
 those lost, and placing each man in a squad. 
 
 27. Causes his platoon to rush with a mini- 
 mum loss of time after suspending fire, and to 
 open fire immediately upon halting or after a 
 minimum of time for fixing sights. 
 
 28. In "Advancing by thin lines," leads odd 
 numbered line. 
 
 29. If platoon is leading unit in a rush, must 
 select ])oint of terminating such, with a view to 
 its use as a jww firing position for (■oiHj)aiiv or 
 battalion. 
 
 Platoon GuinKS 
 
 Behind the firing line the platoon guides arc 
 on the loft of the platoon leader, advancing 
 "By thin lines" leading even numbered lines. 
 
 Duties: 
 
 1. The platoon leaders' assistant; mav bo 
 assigned any duty under him. 
 
 2. Keeps adjoining units under observation, 
 particularly those having the same target.
 
 180 Battle Fire Training 
 
 3. Watches firing line. 
 
 4. Checks every breach of fire disciph'ne. 
 
 5. Prevents skulking of men leaving the 
 ranks to care for the wounded. 
 
 6. Insures prompt and orderly advance. 
 
 7. On joining firing line from support takes 
 over duties of disabled sergeants. 
 
 8. If the platoon leader is disabled, he takes 
 over his duties, hence he should be in touch with 
 the progress of events and understand the mis- 
 sion of the platoon commander and his plans 
 for accomplishing it. 
 
 9. Assists the platoon leader in maintaining 
 the integrity of the squads. 
 
 10. If called out of line to act as platoon 
 leader, notifies senior corporal. 
 
 11. Must understand all signals and sema- 
 phore code. 
 
 CORPORAIi 
 
 When marching as skirmishers the corporal 
 is the center skirmisher of his squad, when the 
 line is halted he is immediately in rear of his 
 squad. While this latter position is not yet defi- 
 nitely prescribed it is so obviously the correct 
 one that We may expect it to receive definite 
 authorization in a short time. 
 
 Duties: 
 
 1. Receives his instructions from the platoon 
 leader.
 
 Conduct of Fire 181 
 
 2. Points out indicated objective to his 
 scjuad. 
 
 3. Takes as his target tliat portion of the 
 platoon target wliicli corresponds to the posi- 
 tion of his squad iti the platoon. 
 
 4. Announces sight setting and sees that it 
 is set correctly by each man. 
 
 5. Announces class and rate of fire. 
 
 6. When his squad is ready to open fire sig- 
 nals "I am ready." 
 
 7. Makes all fire carefully. 
 
 8. Makes all use ordered rate of fire. 
 
 9. Insures that his squad fires at the desig- 
 nated objective. 
 
 10. Prevents slighting of invisible portions 
 of the target for more visible parts. 
 
 11. Prevents men from changing to unau- 
 thorized targets. 
 
 12. Maintains constant observation to the 
 front; when the squad is firing, for fire effect — 
 wlicn squad is not firing, for movements of the 
 enemy. 
 
 13. Insures prompt obedience to orders to 
 suspend and cease firing. 
 
 14. Causes men to utilize full effect of 
 ground as cover. 
 
 15. Sees that the fire of his squad does not 
 fall off when: changing sight settings; pre- 
 paring for rushes; fixing bayonets; transmit- 
 ting fire data; and distributing ammunition.
 
 182 Battle Fire Training 
 
 16. Prevents increase of vulnerability in 
 squad when preparing for a rush, rushes as soon 
 after cease firing as possible, and opens fire 
 after rush with greatest possible celerity. 
 
 17. Increases the rate of fire in his squad 
 when other units which have the same target 
 are rushing. 
 
 18. In rushing causes all men to spring to 
 their feet to run at full speed, all men drop to 
 the ground at the same time, and those who are 
 in rear to crawl up to the line. 
 
 19. When reenforcing he takes over the 
 duties of disabled squad leaders, moving to the 
 right or left if this is necessary. If there are 
 no vacancies he enters the line and assists the 
 squad leaders in his vicinity. 
 
 20. Prevents waste of ammunition. 
 
 21. Prevents use without orders of 30 rounds 
 of ammunition in right pocket section of belt. 
 
 22. Distributes extra ammunition received 
 from all sources. 
 
 23. Looks to the rear only when the platoon 
 leader calls him with his whistle. 
 
 24. Adds the fire of his rifle to his squad only 
 when control is lost at the shorter ranges or ho 
 is ordered in by the platoon commander to 
 increase fire effect at latter stages. 
 
 25. To control his squad he rolls along 
 behind the line and keeps down.
 
 Conduct of Fire 188 
 
 26. Takes advantage of every opportunity 
 to reorganize his squad and increase his control. 
 
 27. Checks ever}' hreac}i of fire discipline, 
 abates excitement, and prevents men from going 
 to the rear for any purpose. 
 
 28. If called out of line to act as guide, noti- 
 fies private designated to act in his place. His 
 entire squad is informed of this designation. 
 
 29. Leads his squad in moving to front or 
 rear. If squad is leading unit in a rush selects 
 halting point with a view to its use as a new 
 firing position. 
 
 JJO. Must know all signals and semaphore 
 code and have a good practical knowledge of 
 tlie theory of fire. 
 
 31. In rushing, prevents his squad from 
 blanketing fire of units in rear and sees that his 
 fire docs not endanger other units. 
 
 The Private 
 
 When possible each enlisted man should be 
 thoroughly' trained in the duties of the next 
 higher grade. A squad of 8 corporals is more 
 efficient than a squad of one corporal and 7 
 privates. 
 
 The individual soldier must he trained: — 
 
 1. To quickly recognize targets from de- 
 scription. 
 
 2. To describe and define targets.
 
 184 Battle Fire Training 
 
 3. To use rear sight in describing targets. 
 
 4. To use systems of target designations 
 given herein either singly or in combination. 
 
 5. To set sights quickly and accurately as 
 ordered. 
 
 6. To aim carefully and deliberately from 
 habit and to reload quickly. 
 
 7. To fire at the ordered rate. 
 
 8. To fire at his proper place on the target 
 as determined by correct distribution. 
 
 9. Not to change his fire from designated 
 target unless ordered. 
 
 10. Not to slight invisible parts of target. 
 
 11. To maintain constant observation to the 
 front. 
 
 12. To utilize accidents of ground as cover. 
 
 13. To select firing positions. 
 
 14. To fire from all positions, from behind 
 hillocks, trees, etc., ditches, doorways, windows, 
 etc. 
 
 15. To obey orders immediately to suspend 
 and cease firing. 
 
 16. To ignore all whistle signals except sus- 
 pend firing. 
 
 17. To watch closely for reappearance of 
 expected target after a suspension of fire. 
 
 18. To obey promptly all orders from his 
 squad leader.
 
 Conduct of Fire 185 
 
 19. When rcenforcing in the intervals be- 
 tween skirmishers to obey the orders of the 
 nearest corporal. 
 
 20. To transmit firing data rapidly and 
 accurately without decreasing his rate of fire. 
 
 21. To call for range and target when reen- 
 forcing. 
 
 22. To have confidence in his ability to hit. 
 
 23. Set sights, fix bayonets without delay, 
 and by a system to avoid decrease of volume 
 of fire in the unit. 
 
 24. To prepare for rushes with the niiniiiunn 
 loss of fire. 
 
 25. To rush as described under 18, The Cor- 
 poral. 
 
 26. To avoid bunching in rushes. 
 
 27. To make his rush directly to the front 
 so as not to blanki't fii-c. 
 
 28. To remain with his company but if acci- 
 dentally detached from company or squad to 
 join the nearest one. 
 
 29. To maintain silence except when trans- 
 mitting data and charging. 
 
 30. To retain presence of mind. 
 
 31. Not to waste ammunition. 
 
 32. To use his reserve 30 rounds only u{)on 
 the order of an officer. 
 
 33. To remain with the tiring line, after 
 bringing up ammunition.
 
 186 Battle Fire Training 
 
 34. Never attempt to attend to dead or 
 wounded in action. 
 
 35. To have confidence in his ability w^ith 
 the bayonet. 
 
 36. To have a firm determination and desire 
 to close with the enemy. 
 
 37. To preserve the line in charging. 
 
 38. To understand that the charge should 
 be slow and steady. 
 
 39. To form immediately after the charge 
 and take up pursuing fire. 
 
 40. To recognize service targets. 
 
 41. To count distant groups of objects or 
 beings. 
 
 42. To understand that it is suicidal to turn 
 his back to an enemy, if he cannot advance to 
 dig in and wait for darkness while holding his 
 position. 
 
 43. Never to fire until he understands 
 
 WHAT the target IS, AT WHAT PART HE IS TO 
 FIRE, AND WITH WHAT SIGHT SETTING. 
 
 The following problems are given in the hope 
 that they will serve as guides or examples in 
 framing combat drill problems. They -were 
 drawn to fit a particular piece of terrain. It 
 is hardly probable that ground will be found 
 wiiich will permit of their application without 
 modification, however, if the general idea is car- 
 ried out, much excellent training will result.
 
 Conduct of Fire 187 
 
 It is to be noted that the number of com- 
 panies deployed in the problems, three in attack 
 and two in defense, is the reverse of the usual 
 procedure. The method followed was adopted 
 with the idea that it would better illustrate cer- 
 tain features of training and is not intended 
 to suggest, in any way, a change in the form of 
 deployment recommended by the Infantry Drill 
 Hcgtdations. 
 
 Battalion Exercise — In Attack 
 (Time: about 1^4^ hours) 
 
 In the following problem the advance to near 
 the initial firing position is simulated, and the 
 order for the movement is not given to the com- 
 mander until the battalion is deployed in the 
 selected position. This is done in order to 
 eliminate features which do not relate directly 
 to the fire of the unit, and to save time. It is 
 perfectl}' feasible, of course, to include the 
 entire advance in the attack, or to begin tlie 
 attack at any point, the stage being set accord- 
 ingly. It is desirable, as this is a terrain 
 exercise, that the situation and orders for the 
 commander be withheld until his unit is deployed 
 upon tile ground and everything ready to begin 
 the action. 
 Object: 
 
 To train the battalion in the details of the 
 
 attack.
 
 188 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Situation: 
 
 The battalion is assumed to be the center 
 of the regiment deployed in attack. 
 
 After a simulated advance, during which 
 time the reference point or the direction of 
 advance has been known but the target has 
 been invisible, it arrives at a position, from 
 which the target is visible. There are three 
 companies deployed in the first line and one 
 in support. The supporting company is a 
 suitable distance to the rear in platoon col- 
 umns. The scouts are out some distance to 
 the front. In this position the firing line is 
 receiving some fire, but while prone is well 
 coverpd by a rise in the ground to its imme- 
 diate front. The line occupied 'by the scouts 
 should be chosen so that a correct solution 
 of the problem requires an advance to that 
 point before fire is opened and the features 
 of the ground, either real or imaginary, 
 make such an advance possible. All orders 
 should be given to the battalion commander 
 ty the director in person. 
 
 Each soldier on the firing line carries 5 
 rounds of blank ammunition in the belt. The 
 supporting company carries 20 rounds of 
 blank ammunition per man in bell and 60 in 
 bandoleers. It is assumed that the battalion 
 is equipped with a range finder.
 
 Conduct of Fire 189 
 
 Tiirgets : 
 
 Tlie targets should extend beyond both 
 flanks of the front assigned to the battalion. 
 They may be the ordinary cardboard silhou- 
 ettes, some of the prone figures and some of 
 the kneeling. An irregular arrangement of 
 these figures will give the appearance of a 
 line occupied with intervals, and will afford 
 an excellent opportunity to test the distribu- 
 tion of the companies. When using the sil- 
 houettes, however, unless a particularly 
 favorable piece of ground is available, they 
 will probably become visible to the attack 
 before it is desired that they should. Thus 
 opportunities will be afforded for obtaining 
 information and making adjustments which 
 are not contemplated in the problem. The 
 most desirable target consists of a cooperat- 
 ing battalion, under cover at the desired 
 point, or moved forward to it from a con- 
 cealed position at the proper time. If the 
 men composing the target are allowed to rest 
 by assuming at will a kneeling, sitting, or 
 prone position the irregular appearance 
 spoken of above will be produced. 
 
 As it is desirable to furnish the attacking 
 battalion with a target at least visible in 
 part, the posture and arrangement of the 
 figures or men composing it, will depend upon
 
 190 Battle Fire Training 
 
 the amount of cover at the selected position 
 with some regard to an assumed necessity 
 for a free field of fire. 
 
 First Phase 
 
 Action: 
 
 After the battalion has been placed as 
 indicated above, the problem is handed the 
 battalion commander and he is given time 
 •to study it. Meanwhile, the situation is being 
 explained to the companies. When this is 
 accomplished the targets appear and it is 
 assumed that fire is being received. There- 
 after dangerous grouping and undue expo- 
 sure is penalized by "killing" the offenders. 
 About 30% to 40% of casualties should be 
 assessed during the exercise to test the 
 arrangements for succession of command. 
 
 The problem should include: 
 
 (a) A description of the tactical situation. 
 This should demand an attack. 
 
 (b) The direction of advance. 
 
 (c) The width of the battalion target. 
 
 (d) The character of the position occupied 
 by the scouts, if such is not plainly discernable. 
 
 (e) The character of the fire received at 
 initial position. This should be designed to 
 demand an advance by thin lines.
 
 Conduct of Fire 191 
 
 (f) A requirement for the battalion com- 
 mander to proceed with the exercise under the 
 orders received. 
 
 Second Phase 
 
 After simulated fire has oeen opened and 
 continued a sufficient length of time to permit 
 of determining the character of fire direction, 
 control, and discipline, the battalion commander 
 is directed to begin the advance by rushes. This 
 phase is continued until ample opportunity is 
 afforded the umpires for observation of the 
 conduct of fire throughout the battalion. 
 Third Phase 
 
 When the advance by rushes, in the opinion 
 of the director, has progressed sufficiently, the 
 battalion commander is directed to reenforce, 
 with the fourth company, in the intervals 
 between skirmishers. Fire is then opened b}' 
 the firing line with blank cartridges. It should 
 reach its maximum volume as the supports join 
 the line. This phase is continued until extra 
 ammunition is distributed, and at least one rush 
 made by the battalion to test the ability to 
 control the reenforcements absorbed in the line. 
 Bayonets are fixed during the completion of 
 the last rush.* 
 
 *Note: Tn order that the fiO rounds of ainniunitioTi 
 suggested may lie sufficient for this exercise, the rush 
 after recnforceinent should be bj' company, and should 
 be started promptly and be continued as rapidly as 
 possible. Preliminary practice in this particular will 
 indicate what is desirable.
 
 192 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Fourth Phase 
 
 Before the supply of blank ammunition is 
 exhausted, the "charge" should be sounded. 
 The point from which the charge is launched 
 should not be the conventional 200 yards, so 
 that the battalion may be tested, without pre- 
 vious warning, as to its ability to cease firing 
 promptly, and immediately move forward, 
 smoothly, as a unit. The exercise may be ter- 
 minated with the charge, or the battalion may 
 be again halted and pursuing fire opened until 
 the remaining ammunition is expended. 
 
 The following qre suggested as among the 
 most important details which the director and 
 his assistant should have in mind during the 
 exercise : — Each officer acting as umpire should 
 have these points, and others thought neces- 
 sary, arranged in a systematic manner in his 
 notebook. If this is not done it will be found 
 at the conclusion of the exercise that the 
 umpiring in the several companies has pro- 
 ceeded along quite different lines. It is 
 desirable, of course, to retain as much of the 
 competitive feature as possible, and for this 
 reason a uniform system of checking is neces- 
 sary. In addition, if some such method is not 
 adopted, many points will be overlooked in the 
 confusion and rush of the problem. The 
 critique following the exercise is a most impor-
 
 Conduct of Fire 193 
 
 taut feature. A comprehensive critique can- 
 not be held unless the umpiring is complete and 
 uniform. The director in charge should be 
 with the battalion commander, and -there should 
 be at least one umpire with each company. 
 
 First Phase 
 
 Battalion Commander: 
 
 1. Did he have a definite idea of what he 
 wanted to do, and did his order express clearly 
 that idea.'' 
 
 2. Did he describe the battalion target 
 clearl}' and correctly.'' 
 
 3. Was he able to give his order promptly, 
 and without dangerous grouping and unneces- 
 sarv exposure.'' 
 
 4'. Did he issue orders to the support? 
 
 5. Did he designate the initial firing position? 
 
 6. Did ho allow sufficient time to the com- 
 panies for obtaining and disseminating initial 
 firing data? 
 
 7. Did the battalion move forward, and open 
 fire, as a unit? 
 
 8. Did he order an advance by thin lines? 
 Companies : 
 
 1. 1, 2, 3, above, as applied to a company. 
 
 2. Was there a satisfactory system in the 
 company for obtaining and disseminating ini- 
 tial firing data?
 
 194 Battle Fire Training 
 
 3. Was the company target described clearly 
 and correctly by the platoon commanders, 
 guides, and corporals? 
 
 4. Was the advance by thin lines correctly 
 made, and were there sufficient subordinate 
 commanders with the first line to insure against 
 premature opening of fire? 
 
 5. Were combined sights desirable? If so, 
 were they used? 
 
 Second Phase 
 Battalion Commander: 
 
 1. Was the first rush started when he desired, 
 and by the designated unit? 
 
 2. Was he able to change the size of the 
 rushing unit, change the rushes from the right 
 to the left flank, and make a slight change in 
 the direction of the advance? Was this done 
 by means of signals and without confusion? 
 
 3. Was he in a correct position? 
 Companies : 
 
 1. Same as 1 above. 
 
 2. Were the rushes correctly made, to include 
 opening of fire at the conclusion? 
 
 3. Did the unit inaugurating the rush select 
 for its halting place a point suitable for a fire 
 position for the battalion? 
 
 4. Was the target properly covered during 
 rushes: i. e., was the fire withdrawn by the 
 rushing unit replaced by increase of fire in 
 adjacent units having the same target?
 
 Conduct of Fire 195 
 
 5. Did the supporting company follow in 
 correct formation at a suitable distance, taking 
 advantage of cover? 
 
 Third Phase 
 Battalion Commander: 
 
 1. Was he able to place the supporting com- 
 pany in the line promptly and without confu- 
 sion ? 
 
 2. Did he himself then join the line? 
 
 3. Was he able to cause bayonets to be fixed 
 promptly? 
 
 Companies: 
 
 1. Was the firing data asked for and received 
 by the support, including officers and noncom- 
 missioned officers? 
 
 2. Were new squads formed, and did sup- 
 porting leaders take over the duties of those 
 lost through casualties? 
 
 3. Was ammunition promptly and evenly 
 distributed? 
 
 Fourth Phase 
 Battalion Commander: 
 
 1. Was he able to cause a prompt cessation 
 of fire followed immcdiatdy by an even, simul- 
 taneous, and spirited charge? 
 
 2. Did he lead the charge? 
 Companies : 
 
 1. Did all the officers cooperate to produco 
 the greatest possible cohesion in the charge?
 
 196 Battle Fire Training 
 
 In General 
 
 1. Was the battalion target covered? 
 
 2. Were the company targets covered? 
 
 3. Was the fire in the correct sector at all 
 times? 
 
 4. Was the direction line of attack adhered 
 to? 
 
 5. Was there an interruption of fire while : 
 
 (a) Changing sight setting? 
 
 (b) Fixing bayonets? 
 
 (c) Transmitting fire data to supports? 
 
 (d) Distributing ammunition? 
 
 6. Was the rate of fire correct at the various 
 ranges ? 
 
 7. Was the initial range correct, and was 
 the range finder used to the best advantage 
 throughout the action? 
 
 8. Were the ranges harmonized, throughout 
 the action, in the company and by the battalion 
 commander? 
 
 9. During rushes, were the sight settings 
 changed and was there a system in the com- 
 panies for maintaining the range during the 
 advance? 
 
 10. Was the system of communication 
 throughout the battalion capable of transmit- 
 ting information at all times without delays due 
 to inattention or faulty arrangements and were 
 signals used when under service conditions the 
 voice would have been inadequate?
 
 Conduct of Fire 197 
 
 11. Were there proper arrangements for 
 succession of command? 
 
 12. Did tlie battalion staff occupy its proper 
 position, and function correctly.'' 
 
 13. Did the musicians and first sergeant 
 assist the captain, and the platoon guides the 
 platoon commander.'' 
 
 14. Did the platoon commanders exercise 
 proper fire control.'' 
 
 15. Did the squad leader-s control and com- 
 mand their squads. f* 
 
 16. Was there unnecessary exposure.? 
 
 17. Did the men aim carefully and deliber- 
 ately, and load quickly.'' 
 
 18. Were there at any time, confusion, loss 
 of control, or avoidable delays.'' 
 
 The following is offered as one of several 
 satisfactory solutions of the foregoing exercise : 
 
 After a study of his order the battalion 
 commander estimates the situation and arrives 
 at a decision. (This must be to attack, under 
 the terms of the probhnn.) He then moves for- 
 ward to a point just in rear of the crest which 
 is protecting his firing line, accompanied by the 
 adjutant and the sergeant major, the latter 
 carrying the battalion range finder. The com- 
 pany commanders at the same time being sig- 
 naled to join him. Upon being assembled the 
 battalion commander says : "Do you under-
 
 198 Battle Fire Training 
 
 stand the conditions of the problem? The 
 battalion will attack upon its present front. 
 Company 'D' in support will follow in rear of 
 the center at 400 yards. Signal me when firing 
 data has been transmitted and you are ready to 
 advance; then at my signal move forward in 
 thin lines, to the line now occupied by the 
 scouts. Signal me from that line when you are 
 ready to fire, but await my order to commence." 
 He then moves forward cautiously to the crest, 
 accompanied by the company commanders 
 and adjutant. Upon reaching the hill top the 
 sergeant major, who in the meantime had been 
 taking the range, says : "Range to hostile line 
 at 12 o'clock 1100." The battalion commander 
 continues : "Reference point ... at ... o'clock. 
 Range 1100. Target four sights right and five 
 left. Divide the target." The captains, begin- 
 ning with the commander of the base company, 
 after studying the front with their glasses, 
 define their targets thus : 
 
 "Company 'A' begins four sights right at 
 edge of hill, extends three sights left to fence 
 post." 
 
 "Company 'B' begins one sight right at fence 
 post, extends three sights left to small bush." 
 
 "Company 'C begins two sights left at small 
 bush, extends three sights left, no mark." 
 
 These limits are verified by the battalion 
 commander as they are being made. If satis-
 
 Conduct of Fire 199 
 
 ficd, he continues: "Correct. Any questions? 
 (There being none) I will be between the firing 
 line and the support. Posts." He then directs 
 the adjutant: "When the firing line advances, 
 signal the support forward. Wait here and 
 give the support the order, thert join me." 
 
 A Company Commander 
 At the command "Posts" the company com- 
 mander places himself at the crest line in front 
 of his company, requiring the first sergeant, 
 platoon commanders, and duty sergeants to 
 join him. He says: "You all understand the 
 problem.'' The battalion attacks in its present 
 order, moving in thin lines to the line now occu- 
 pied by the scouts. Fire will be opened from 
 that line at my signal. Firing data here. Sig- 
 nal me when you are ready to advance. Refer- 
 ence point. ... at .... o'clock. Range 1100. 
 Target: Begins four sights right at edge of 
 hill, extends three sights left to fence post. 
 Divide target." The platoon commanders here- 
 upon divide the target as described above for 
 company commanders. They and the sergeants 
 using their glasses meanwhile to the best advan- 
 tage. After the target is divided, the company 
 commander continues : "Any questions .'* (There 
 being none) Posts." 
 
 The company commander then causes the 
 company to move forward to a position imme-
 
 200 Battle Fire Training 
 
 diately in rear of the crest, to halt and lie down. 
 He then says : "Designate targets," or some 
 other suitable expression. The chiefs of pla- 
 toons cause their squad leaders to crawl to the 
 crest, and divide the target as heretofore 
 explained. The company commander's orders 
 are repeated to the squad leaders and they are 
 directed to transmit the data to the men. Each 
 squad leader causes his squad to join him by 
 crawling, points out and divides the target, and 
 assures himself that all the men understand. He 
 then withdraws his squad behind the crest and 
 repeats the company commander's order, after 
 which he signals the platoon commander "I am 
 ready." The platoon commander, when his 
 platoon is ready, repeats the signal to the com- 
 pany commander. The company commander 
 similarly signals to the battalion cotamander. 
 
 The first sergeant explains the situation and 
 orders to the buglers. 
 
 All men are cautioned not to expose them- 
 selves unnecessarily on the crest, and to with- 
 draw a few paces as soon as they have received 
 their instructions. 
 
 When the three companies are ready, the 
 battalion commander signals : "Forward, by 
 thin lines," As each man arrives on the new 
 line, he is cautioned by the nearest noncommis- 
 sioned officer to locate his target and take
 
 Conduct of Fire 201 
 
 cover. As the squads arc formed, the corporals 
 signal as before indicated, and when all are 
 ready, the battalion commander signals: "Com- 
 mence Firing." 
 
 Further details on conduct of fire have been 
 included in previous exercises. 
 
 Discussion 
 
 It will be noted that the designation of the 
 l:ase company is omitted from the order. This 
 is allowable when standing orders exist, that in 
 the absence of instructions, the right company 
 of the firing line is the base company. There is 
 no division of the target by the battalion com- 
 mander for it is assumed that a prearranged 
 plan' exists for dividing it equally among the 
 companies of the firing line. It is to be noted 
 also, that the battalion commander might him- 
 self have indicated the limits of the company 
 targets and required the captains to check as 
 he proceeded. The method adopted, however, 
 is thought to be more rapid and to afford more 
 positive assurance that the target is fully cov- 
 ered. A captain receiving information from 
 the battalion commander might think he under- 
 stood thoroughly, when, as a matter of fact, 
 he did not. As the battalion connnander fol- 
 lows the description from right to left, he can 
 assure himself positively that no part of his
 
 202 Battle Fire Training 
 
 target is neglected. He can not otherwise be 
 certain of this, unless he requires the captains 
 to repeat back his description. This repetition 
 would, of course, increase the time consumed. 
 
 While the method given above is a very delib- 
 erate opening of fire it will be found that the 
 time spent in this manner, unless carried to an 
 extreme, will be fully justified by results. A 
 careful and detailed method of distributing and 
 dividing targets should be followed whenever 
 possible and should only be omitted when the 
 exigencies of the service make it imperative. 
 
 The advance by thin lines has been incor- 
 porated in the exercise for it is believed that 
 this formation brings out more clearly than any 
 other certain features of the attack which must 
 not be neglected in instruction. 
 
 In the gradual building up of a firing line 
 close to the enemy's position and under his fire, 
 as is done by thin lines, the danger of a prema- 
 ture opening of fire by the individual soldier is 
 emphasized. This is an ever pre.<ent danger in 
 any formation, and must be guarded against. 
 The remedy lies in a high class of fire disci- 
 pline; in maintaining with the advance unit, 
 whatever its form, a sufficient number of leaders 
 to insure strict control; and in certain cases 
 in the opening of fire by the commander, even 
 thouffh it be at variance with his order for
 
 Conduct of Fire 203 
 
 .ittack. Of these remedies the first two are 
 phiin, the third requires some exphmation. 
 
 The thin Hne formation again comes to our 
 aid, for it lends itself readily to presenting 
 situations under which the commander would be 
 justified in departing from his original plan. 
 If the battalion in the exercise, during its 
 advance by thin lines, suffers such losses that 
 the lines in rear cannot be moved forward, then, 
 as a last resort, the commander might order the 
 part of the line already in position to open fire, 
 and under cover of that fire assemble his unit at 
 the advanced position. Similarly, if, for any 
 reason during the advance the men already on 
 the line show signs of demoralization it might 
 l)ccome imperative to allow them to "shoot up 
 their pluck." In general terms then, the com- 
 mander would be justified in departing from 
 his original plan in regard to fire, .when his line 
 has reached a point from which it can not 
 advance without protection of its own fire, or 
 when, due to severe losses or other causes, the 
 individual soldiers are becoming demoralized 
 nnd it is apparent that if not ordered to fire 
 they will presently do so of their own accord. 
 
 It is plain from the above that, in spite of all 
 precautions, when within a reasonable distance 
 of the enemy control of the situation may be 
 taken from the commander at any time and he
 
 204 Battle Fire Training 
 
 be forced to choose between opening fire before 
 he had planned or a demoralization of his unit. 
 A little thought will make it clear that, if such 
 conditions exist, little or nothing can be 
 expected in the way of target distribution and 
 designation at that time. Fire opened under 
 these conditions without firing data will be wild, 
 ineffectual, and demoralizing. Knowing the 
 conditions, then, which he may be obliged to 
 face, there is no excuse for the commander per- 
 mitting himself to be drawn into a position 
 which may require fire and be unprepared .to 
 deliver it. He must, therefore, seize an early 
 opportunity for the transmission of initial 
 firing data. With the target clearly defined 
 and carefully divided he is prepared for eventu- 
 alities, and if the initiative be taken from him 
 and he be obliged to open fire against his will, 
 then, at least, he will have done all that lies in 
 his power to lay the foundation for a well- 
 directed, well-distributed, and hence effective 
 fire. 
 
 Battalion Exercise — In Defense 
 (Time: about 50 minutes) 
 Object: 
 
 To train the battalion in certain details 
 of the defensive. 
 Situation: 
 
 In a meeting engagement the battalion has 
 taken up a defensive position with two com-
 
 Conduct of Fire 205 
 
 panics in tlic firing line and two companies 
 in support. The supporting companies are 
 occupying a position, about 200 yards in 
 rear of the firing Hnc, from which the targets 
 are not visible. Other troops are assumed 
 to be on the right and left. The enemy is 
 expected in about ten minutes. He will 
 attack. The battalion is equipped with one 
 range finder. 
 
 Targets : 
 
 As it is desired that the targets should 
 appear on signal, and at different times in at 
 least two parts of the sector, they should 
 be furnished by cooperating units. If a large 
 numher gf silhouette targets are available 
 and arrangements at hand for manipulating 
 thoin, they may be used. The target should 
 full}' cover the battalion sector and may be 
 extend'.'d beyond both flanks. It should con- 
 sist of from 300 to 400 figures and be divided 
 for the purpose of operation, into two parts. 
 Part 1, the smaller, should appear on signal, 
 deployed; advance a short distance, halt, and 
 open fire. Part 2, should ajjpear in column 
 of squads or platoon columns, advance a 
 short distance, deploy, and move forward 
 towards the line occupied by Part 1. If 
 sufficient fire is directed on Part 2, it should, 
 at signal, halt, open fire, and advance by
 
 206 Battle Fire Training 
 
 rushes. Any other similar arrangement and 
 movement will do as well, provided it causes 
 the target to appear at different times in at 
 least two parts of the sector and presents a 
 dense group for a limited period. The idea 
 being, that by a special arrangement of the 
 figures, certain features of fire direction, con- 
 trol, and discipline may be more readil}' 
 emphasized. 
 
 The foregoing arrangement is intended to 
 indicate that Part 1 is stopped by the fire of 
 the defense and must await reenforcements 
 before it can advance. Part 2 is intended to 
 represent these reenforcements and is moved so 
 as to require support for the firing line, switch- 
 ing of fire, and an increase in its rate. 
 
 Action: First Phase 
 
 When the troops have been placed in the 
 position as indicated, the problem is handed the 
 battalion commander. He is allowed a rea- 
 sonable time in which to estimate the situation 
 and arrive at a decision. Upon his statement 
 that he is ready to proceed, time is taken. Ten 
 minutes is allowed in which to prepare the bat- 
 talion for action. At the end of the allotted 
 time Part 1 of the target appears. This phase 
 is continued a sufficient length of time to permit 
 observation of the action taken, and such 
 detailed inspection of the troops as is desired.
 
 Conduct of Fire 207 
 
 The problem should include: 
 
 1. A statement of the situation which requires 
 the defensive. 
 
 2. Information that the enemy is expected 
 to attack in ten minutes. 
 
 3. A statement that there are troops on both 
 flanks. 
 
 4. An order to occupy the selected position 
 in the desired formation, 
 
 5. The width or limits of the sector assigned 
 to the battalion for defense. 
 
 6. An order that, upon signal from the direc- 
 tor, the original firing line will cease firing, 
 move to the rear, and be considered out of the 
 exercise. This, to satisfy the requirements of 
 the problem. (See Third Phase.) 
 
 Second Phase 
 
 At the conclusion of the first phase. Part 2 
 of the target is signaled to appear. It is 
 assumed that the battalion commander will 
 reenforce at the appearance of the second part 
 of the target. If this is not done, orders should 
 be issued requiring it. The second phase is 
 continued, after rciinforcements reach the line, 
 until a reasonable period has been allowed for 
 the transmission of firing data, say a minute 
 or a minute and a half. 
 
 In order that the battalion may be tested as 
 to its methods of transmitting data to com-
 
 208 Battle Fire Training 
 
 panies reenforcing both on the flank and in the 
 intervals, one company should be placed in a 
 position on the flank and the other required to 
 reenforce in the intervals between skirmishers. 
 The problem is drawn with the idea of inviting 
 this method of reenforcing. Incorrect dispo- 
 sitions by the battalion commander, if they 
 interfere with the essential elements of the exer- 
 cise, should be modified. 
 
 Third Phase 
 
 After the time allowed for the transmission 
 of the data has expired, the original line, upon 
 intimation from the director, is marched to the 
 rear. The exercise is continued until the sup- 
 porting companies have been inspected.* This 
 affords a means of determining the ability of 
 the battalion to transmit data while firing.* 
 
 The details of fire direction, control, and 
 discipline may be examined into by the director 
 and his assistants, as thoroughly as desired. 
 Many of these details and others, have been 
 covered in the previous problem and will not 
 be again noted here. With these exceptions 
 
 *Note: Inspection of many of the most important 
 phases of this exercise will be facilitated, if rests are 
 provided for the rifles. This may be done as heretofore 
 explained, or before the exercise begins the battalion 
 may be permitted to throw up a small parapet. Later, 
 if it is desired to take full advantage of the labor per- 
 formed, the work may be continued to include the com- 
 plete trench.
 
 Conduct of Fire 209 
 
 the following arc some of the more important 
 points : 
 
 First Phase 
 
 Tiie Battalion Commander : 
 
 1. Was he able to meet the requirement of 
 prompt action, and issue his order without 
 depriving the companies of the time necessary 
 to communicate initial firing data? 
 
 2. In his desire to be ready did he omit from 
 his order, among other necessary things : state- 
 ment wJiich would enable the command to grasp 
 the situation; time of opening fire; definition 
 and division of sector, etc.? 
 
 3. Did he see that ranges were taken to 
 prominent objects and that they were trans- 
 mitted to the companies? 
 
 4. Did he, in his desire to coiriplete the 
 preparations, assume the duties of his subordi- 
 nates or instead of indicating xchat should l)r 
 df)ne indicate how things should be done? 
 
 5. If his order provided that fire should be 
 opened upon his signal, did he give that signal 
 promptly, upon the appearance of the enemy? 
 
 6. Did he direct the fire of both of his com- 
 panies upon Part 1 of the target? If so, was 
 he able to do this by signal? (Part 1 appears 
 in the sector of one company only.) 
 
 7. Did he select the best available position 
 for himself and staff?
 
 210 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Companies: 
 
 1. Were the captains able to complete their 
 preparations in the allotted time? If not, whose 
 fault was it? 
 
 2. Did the men know the ranges to at least 
 two prominent objects? 
 
 3. Were they familiar with the situation, and 
 did tlicj know from which direction to expect 
 the enemy? 
 
 4. Was there constant observation for signs 
 of the enemy, and was his presence made known 
 to the commander? 
 
 5. Was every possible means used to prevent 
 exposure of the position while preparing for 
 defense and afterwards? 
 
 6. Was the sector properly divided between 
 the platoons of the companies? 
 
 7. Was fire opened promptly and with cor- 
 rect data? 
 
 8. Was the company, which was directed to 
 open fire outside of its sector able to do this in 
 a reasonable time and with proper adjustment? 
 
 Sennnd Phase 
 Battalion Commander: 
 
 1. When Part 2 of the target appeared, did 
 he assure himself that the company in whose 
 sector it advanced opened fire upon it? 
 
 2. In the absence of standing orders for 
 reenforcing companies, did he designate the
 
 Conduct of Fire 211 
 
 target for the company, placed on the flank, 
 before it reached the line? 
 
 3. Was the greater part of the fire, of the 
 supporting companies directed upon tlie proper 
 target? i. e., Part 2 (Part 1 being licid in its 
 position, unable to advance). 
 
 4, Was the range promptly taken to both 
 parts of the target when they appeared, and 
 promptly transmitted to the proper companies? 
 Companies : 
 
 1. When Part 2 of the target appearied, did 
 the company in whose sector it advanced, turn 
 its fire upon it with increased rate and without 
 orders? If so, was it able to do this promptly? 
 Was the elevation changed? 
 
 2. Did the supporting companies move 
 quickly and in correct formations? 
 
 3. Did the supporting companies open fire 
 promptly? 
 
 Third Phase 
 Battalion Commander: 
 
 1. Was he able to move the original firing 
 line to the rear promptly and without confu- 
 sion? (This feature has, of course, no direct 
 connection with the tactics of the occasion, but 
 furnishes an excellent indication of the charac- 
 ter of the control exercised by the battalion 
 commander.)
 
 212 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Companies : 
 
 1. Did the supporting companies fire at the 
 target ordered and with correct elevations? 
 
 In General 
 
 1. Was there at any time too great haste, 
 loss of time, or confusion? 
 
 2. Was there any firing outside the assigned 
 sectors without orders? 
 
 3. Were verbal orders and commands given 
 when signals should have been used? 
 
 4. Were the changes in sight settings made 
 in conformity \Vith the principles laid down for 
 defense? 
 
 5. Excluding those mentioned above, were 
 the requirements of fire direction, control, and 
 discipline complied with, in as far as it was 
 intended to test them in this exercise? 
 
 The following is suggested as a possible solu- 
 tion of the foregoing exercise: 
 
 When the battalion commander has arrived 
 at his decision, he announces that he is ready 
 to proceed with the exercise. He immediately 
 assembles the captains of the companies on the 
 first line, causing them to move at a double time. 
 While they are assembling he directs the adju- 
 tant : "The enemy may be expected in ten min- 
 utes, troops are assumed to be on the right 
 and left, the battalion will take up a defensive
 
 Conduct of Fire 213 
 
 position here. Our sector extends from ... to 
 .... Take ranges at once." To the sergeant 
 major: "Take notes of my order as I give it, 
 and when completed transmit it to the captains 
 of the companies of the second line." To the 
 orderly: "Take my glasses, keep a lookout in 
 that direction (pointing) for signs of the 
 enemy." When the officers are assembled he 
 states: "The enemy is expected to attack within 
 ten minutes from that direction (pointing). 
 Troops are assumed to be on our right and left. 
 The battalion assumes the defensive in its pres- 
 ent position. A and B companies, firing line; 
 C and D support. Our sector begins at . . . (Do 
 you all see it.'') and extends to . . . (Do you all 
 see it.'') . . . marks its center. (Do you all see 
 it.'') Get ranges from the adjutant. Open fire 
 at my signal." The commander, in order to 
 comply with instructions, should then add: 
 "To satisfy the requirements of the problem, 
 A and B companies will at my signal 'To the 
 rear,' given at any time, cease firing, and move 
 to the rear. Their participation in the exer- 
 cise terminates at that time. I will be at .... 
 (pointing). Any questions.? Posts." The 
 Ijattalion commander then takes his position, 
 and while the companies arc preparing, occupies 
 liimself by observing them, and a study of 
 the terrain. When the adjutant joins, he is 
 Informed of the order issued.
 
 214 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Company 
 The company commander joins his company, 
 and directs the first sergeant to obtain the 
 ranges from the adjutant. These are trans- 
 mitted to the platoon commanders as soon as 
 obtained. The first sergeant draws a rough 
 sketch which he exhibits to the platoon com- 
 manders. Later, if time permits, the sketch 
 should be copied. After his order to the first 
 sergeant the company commander turns to the 
 buglers and directs : "Observe in that direction 
 (pointing) for signs of the enemy." If condi- 
 tions are such that he can make himself heard 
 throughout the company from his position in 
 the rear, instructions are given from that point. 
 If such is not the case, the platoon commanders 
 and sergeants must be assembled, having due 
 regard to unnecessary exposure. The company 
 commander then states : "The enemy is expected 
 to attack from that direction (pointing) in . . . 
 minutes." Time consumed by the battalion 
 commander being deducted. "Other troops are 
 assumed to be on our right and left. The bat- 
 talion assumes the defensive here. The first ser- 
 geant will give ranges to the platoon command- 
 ers. Our sector begins at .... and extends 
 to .... Do you all see these points .'' Open fire 
 at my signal. The battalion commander is at 
 . . . (pointing). The regimental commander is
 
 Conduct of Fire 215 
 
 at .... Any questions.'' Divide sector simul- 
 taneously."* If circumstances permit, the com- 
 pany commander will verify this division. He 
 then occupies himself by observing his company 
 and the terrain. 
 
 Each platoon leader hurries to the rear of 
 the center of his platoon, and directs the pla- 
 toon guide to observe the front for indications 
 of the enemy. From his position, he states 
 briefly the situation, and the company com- 
 mander's orders. He then points out the limits 
 of his sector. The corporals point out the 
 squad sectors. When the first sergeant reaches 
 the platoon with ranges, the platoon commander 
 announces one or two, selecting prominent 
 objects. More might cause confusion: If time 
 permits, more detailed information may be 
 givin by means of the rough sketch referred to 
 above. When all is ready, the platoon com- 
 manders signal the fact to the company com- 
 mander, who in turn, repeats it to the battalion 
 commander. 
 
 When Part 1 of the target is exposed, the 
 battalion commander signals the company in 
 whose sector it appears (for example, Company 
 "A") to open fire. The other company ("B") 
 
 "Note: Tlie word simultaneously is used to indicate 
 that the Captain desires the platoon commanders to 
 divide the sector at the same time, and not in rotation 
 as described in the problem in attack.
 
 216 Battle Fire Training 
 
 does not fire. Observation by the battalion com- 
 mander indicates that the remainder of the bat- 
 talion sector is vacant. Thereupon he signals 
 Company' "B" to swing its fire into the occupied 
 sector. Upon the appearance of Part 2 of the 
 target, "B" company's commander returns its 
 fire to the company's proper sector, and the 
 platoon leaders increase the rate. 
 
 The battalion commander signals to the right 
 company of the support, "D": "D RR B" 
 ("D" reenforce right of "B"). To left com- 
 pany, "C": "C R W L" ("C" reenforce whole 
 line in intervals). 
 
 Upon the signal to swing its fire, "B" com- 
 pany's commander repeats the signal to the 
 platoon commanders who, in turn, repeat it to 
 their squad leaders. The signal should indicate 
 approximately how many "sights" of change arc 
 desired. It is obvious that this cannot always 
 be exact. The platoon and squad leaders, 
 therefore, should be trained to meet such situa- 
 tions by instruction in the application of fire. 
 With a good workable knowledge of this subject 
 they should be able to comprehend instantly 
 what is desired. It is plain, in this case, that 
 the company commander desires to cover the 
 enemy's present position. Hence, squad leaders 
 direct their fire at a portion of the target cor- 
 responding to their position in the company.
 
 Conduct of Fire 217 
 
 Siinilarl}', wIkmi the company is directed to 
 return its fire to its original sector, the pLatoon 
 and squad leaders should see immediately that 
 a rapid, concentrated fire is required. Later, 
 when Part 2 deploys, the several platoons and 
 squads should cover tiieir proper portion of th'.' 
 target and drop the rate of fire. 
 
 When Part 1 of the target appears, the ser- 
 geant major, who, in the meantime, has relieved 
 the adjutant of the range finder, immediately 
 determines its distance and signals it to Com- 
 pany "A." It is probable that "B" company, 
 which has not as 3'et opened fire, will catch this 
 signal and will have the necessary information 
 when ordered to fire. If such is not the case, it 
 is a simple matter for it to obtain the range 
 from Company "A." When Part 2 appears, its 
 distance is similarly signaled to Company "B." 
 The reenforcing companies will, of course, get 
 their elevations from the companies on the line. 
 
 With regard to the sectors for the support- 
 ing comjianies, several courses are open. 
 
 If there is a prearranged method for division 
 in the battalion, no instructions will be neces- 
 sary. In this case the company which reen- 
 forces in the intervals between skirmishers will 
 obtain its targets from the company or com- 
 panies it reenforces. The company reenforcing 
 on th(> flank will take the sector of the company
 
 218 Battle Fire Training 
 
 next to it. In this exercise it has been assumed, 
 in order to make a thorough test of the ability 
 to transmit data under fire, that such action 
 was impossible. For this reason the support 
 was placed where it could not see the targets. 
 
 If no prearranged plan exists in the bat- 
 talion, the men who reenforce in the intervals 
 must be directed to take the target of their 
 next neighbor. The other company must, how- 
 ever, be reached by an order, or the choice of 
 the sector which it will cover, be left to the com- 
 pany commander. Probably the surest means 
 of transmitting the order to the supporting 
 company is to have the orderly work himself 
 to a point in its line of advance, and as it 
 passes, inform the captain : "Take 'B' com- 
 pany's sector." If more detailed instructions 
 are necessary a written order will have to be 
 sent, or signal flags used. In either case, when- 
 ever possible, the division of sectors should be 
 explained to the men before they move forward 
 to support, so that a minimum of data is neces- 
 sary after they reach the line. 
 Discussion 
 
 Referring to the definition and division of 
 sectors by the several commanders in this exer- 
 cise, it will be noted that there has been a radi- 
 cal departure from the method suggested in the 
 exercise in attack. It has already been stated
 
 Conduct of Fire 219 
 
 tlijit, wlitn circumstances permit, detailed and 
 painstaking care should be used in obtaining 
 and transmitting initial firing data. In the 
 exercise in attack, time was not an important 
 element. In this case, however, time is an 
 important element. Hence, if the battalion is 
 to be ready in the allotted period, it cannot stop 
 for the detailed methods adopted when time is 
 not a factor. To meet the requirements of this 
 particular situation, each commander must 
 state clearly what he desires in the way of divi- 
 sion, and trust to his immediate subordinates 
 to carry out his wishes correctly. If practi- 
 cable, a verification should be made later. 
 
 Fortunately it is generally much easier to 
 define and divide sectors on the defense than it 
 is to designate and divide targets in attack. 
 This is true because natural features which 
 provide the easiest means of contrast arc 
 usually available in the defense. This latter 
 statement becomes clear when it is remembered, 
 that in attack, the line of the enemy's position 
 must be divided, while in the defensive, any line 
 may be chosen, provided it lies a reasonable dis- 
 tance in the background. The liberty thus 
 accorded the commander on the defensive, 
 usually enables him to select a line containing 
 prominent features. 
 
 In this problem it may be necessary for the 
 battalion or other commander to tie in to the
 
 220 Battle Fire Training 
 
 chosen line by means of a reference point. If 
 such is the case, he will, of course, act accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 Nothing has been said about the position of 
 the battalion commander at the time of receipt 
 of the order. It has been assumed that he was 
 near the two advanced companies. For this 
 reason he did not desire to await the arrival of 
 the captains from the companies in the rear to 
 issue his order. If he happened to be mounted 
 at the time, he should have ridden towards the 
 advanced companies. In general, his action 
 should have been such as to facilitate a rapid 
 transmission of his instructions. 
 
 If the sergeant major is sufficiently well 
 trained, the duty of taking the ranges might 
 have been left to him and the adjutant directed 
 to deliver the order verbally to the supporting 
 companies. As the taking of the ranges in a 
 defensive position involves more than a single 
 operation of determining the distance to a hos- 
 tile line, it was left to the adjutant with his 
 superior knowledge and training. 
 
 The question is asked whether the battalion 
 commander selected the best available position 
 for himself and staff. His position should have 
 been in rear of the firing line at a point where 
 hp could sec the cncm}^ and at the same time 
 be in communication with the support. He
 
 Conduct of Fire 221 
 
 should be under cover if practicable. His staff 
 would ordinarily he with him. 
 
 Ke^ardint;' the direction of the fire of the 
 right company upon the target in the sector of 
 the left company; the commander's immediate 
 mission is to prevent the advance of the enemy. 
 He may best accomplish this by directing all his 
 available fire upon the first serious attempt to 
 advance. This he does. He is temporarily 
 successful, for the enemy remains in position. 
 When in this situation, reenforcements appear. 
 If he can stop these the advance for the present 
 will cease. In other words, he must check this 
 increase in the enemy's force, and at the same 
 time hold the original hostile line in position. 
 He accomplishes this by substituting half the 
 fire of "C" compan}^ for the fire of "B" com- 
 pany, the latter being automatically withdrawn 
 and turned on the enemy's reenforcements. Also 
 he puts "D" company on the flank of "B" com- 
 pany with "B" company's target. Had he sent 
 "C" company into the intervals of "A" com- 
 pany and "D" company into the intervals of 
 "B," he would not have placed the greatest 
 volume of fire on the most dangerous target, 
 and he would have lost the value of the "D" 
 company machine by merging it with that of 
 "B." The desired distribution of fire would 
 have been obtained had both rcenforcing com-
 
 222 Battle Fire Training 
 
 panics been placed on the flank, giving one the 
 entire battalion sector and the other "B" com- 
 pany's sector. It is believed, however, that the 
 arrangement adopted would produce the great- 
 est possible effect in the shortest period of time. 
 
 The arrangements made by all commanders 
 for observation of the front, were temporary in 
 character, and were designed to meet the imme- 
 diate requirements of the situation. It is the 
 duty of the platoon commanders to provide 
 observation to the front. Had the situation 
 continued for any length of time they should 
 have established a regular system of observa- 
 tion. This would have been supplemented by 
 any further observation which the battalion 
 or company commanders thought necessary. 
 Under normal con(titions observation to the 
 front would have been established by the com- 
 panies upon halting, but, as the situation was 
 not known to them until the battalion comman- 
 der issued his order this was not done. 
 
 It is apparent that a prearranged system of 
 reenforcing solves many difficulties. No disad- 
 vantages accrue from its use, for it may always 
 be changed by order. The issuing of orders at 
 such a time is attended with great difficulties, 
 it is true, but without a prearranged plan they 
 must be issued in every case, with such a plan 
 only in exceptional cases.
 
 Conduct of Fire 223 
 
 It has been assumed tliat the battalion has 
 been trained in the proper application of fire 
 as a unit. If such is not the case, the battalion* 
 commander would have been obliged to supple- 
 ment his order with instructions about as fol- 
 lows: "Each company is responsible for the 
 targets in its sector. It will not fire in any 
 other sector without my order. If so ordered 
 it will return to its own sector when a target 
 appears therein. Companies will provide con- 
 stant observation to the front and will report 
 the appearance of the enemy to me. Establish 
 signal communication with me." 
 
 The small amount of time allowed for prepa- 
 ration makes it impossible to clear the fore- 
 ground or attempt the construction of obsta- 
 cles. 'I'iiiie permitting, no well-trained unit will 
 neglect these important aids to effective fire.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 COMBAT PRACTICE 
 
 No system of "musketry" training is com- 
 plete without combat practice, for in this prac- 
 tice will be found, among other necessary things, 
 the ultimate peace test of the fire efficiency of a 
 unit. The subject, however, has been quite 
 thoroughly covered in official publications 
 accessible to all, such as: Small Arms Firing 
 Manual, Regulations Prescribing Standard for 
 Field Firing and Propciency Test, and an excel- 
 lent bulletin, "Combat Practice," recently 
 issued to the service from the School of Mus- 
 ketr3\ It is believed that a full repetition of 
 matter which has been thoroughly discussed and 
 explained in official publications would, in this 
 case, be of no particular value, hence this chap- 
 ter has been considerably curtailed. It will be 
 found that many features have been omitted 
 from the text which at first sight appear neces- 
 sary to a thorough understanding of the sub- 
 ject. It is hoped, however, that this explana- 
 tion will satisfactorily account for their 
 absence. 
 
 The Object of Combat Practice: 
 
 The object of musketry instruction is to 
 train the soldier in the fundamental principles
 
 Combat Practice 225 
 
 of marksmanship, and the unit in the conduct 
 of fire. Combat Practice is the last phase of 
 this training. The Small Arms Firing Manual 
 states, that in combat practice " Indi- 
 viduals learn cooperation, and commanders and 
 leaders how to obtain the maximum efficiency 
 of fire by a judicious coordination of the skill 
 and efforts of all the individuals of the group 
 or unit." In other words, learn conduct of fire. 
 It is not believed that this statement is meant 
 to be taken literally, for under the present sys- 
 tem of instruction, neither sufficient time nor 
 juiimunition are available to teach conduct 
 of fire by means of combat practice. It is 
 doubtful if sufficient time can be allotted for 
 this purpose without seriously curtailing other 
 piiases of instruction. It is certain that the 
 cost of ammunition will always operate to pre- 
 vent more than a limited amount of combat 
 practice. However, even if time and ammuni- 
 tion were available, which they arc not, combat 
 practice, with its distracting noise, its strain 
 upon tiie individual, and its possible danger 
 tlirougli carelessness, is the poorest possible 
 iiiediuin of instruction for most of the elements 
 of conduct of fire. There are exceptions to 
 this, in such subjects as observation and adjust- 
 ment of fire. These, of course, must be taught 
 principally during combat practice. This prac-
 
 226 Battle Fire Training 
 
 tice then, should not be regarded as a means 
 of teaching conduct of fire, except in a very 
 limited way. Combat practice is the culmina- 
 tion of the season's instruction. It is a means 
 by which units and commanders are taught cer- 
 tain phases of fire direction and control which 
 cannot be fully learned elsewhere, and a means 
 by which they are trained to adhere to previ- 
 ously mastered principles of conduct of fire, 
 under the nearest possible approach to battle 
 condition*. 
 Preliminary Training: 
 
 It is clear from the foregoing, to produce the 
 best results, preliminary training must precede 
 combat practice. This is true, not only because 
 certain phases of conduct of fire are more easily 
 learned before combat practice is reached, but 
 also because this costly and limited form of 
 training should not be used to teach things 
 which may be taught as well elsewhere, lest it 
 be at the expense of things which can only be 
 taught therein. 
 
 Preliminary training for combat practice is 
 just as important as preliminary training for 
 individual practice. Without preliminary train- 
 ing the results of individual practice are 
 materially reduced. So also, combat practice 
 without preliminary training, results in but a 
 pleasing departure from routine work, accom-
 
 Combat Practice 227 
 
 panii'd by a great waste of ammunition and a 
 small amount of instruction. Unfortunately 
 the Small Arnts Firing Manual, which explains 
 at I'jngth the importance of preliminary train- 
 ing for individual practice and prescribes a 
 thorough system of instruction therein, contains 
 hut one short paragraph on preliminary train- 
 ing for combat practice. 
 
 The net result of the manual's ex})lanation 
 of the object of combat practice, and its failure 
 to strongly emphasize the importance of pre- 
 h'minary training therefor, is, that the service 
 has no S3'stem of preliminary instruction 
 in this important subject. In consequence of 
 which such instruction is generally neglected. 
 
 In addition to the system of preliminary 
 training outlined in the preceding chapters, in 
 order that a command may approach combat 
 practice, equipped to derive the greatest benefit 
 therefrom, it is recommended that commanders 
 of all grades be trained in the preparation and 
 solution of preliminary' combat firing exercises. 
 
 By preliminary combat firing exercises arc 
 meant : combat firing exercises in the form of 
 map problems; in the form of terrain exercises; 
 and in the form of drill exercises. The appli- 
 cation of the latter form of exercise has been 
 covered in the preceding chapters. These three 
 forms of exercises are prepared and solved by
 
 228 Battle Fire Training 
 
 an application of the same principles which 
 govern the preparation and solution of the 
 combat firing exercise proper ; that is, the 
 exercise with ball ammunition. These forms of 
 exercises are sometimes called combat firing 
 problems, firing problems, or simply combat 
 problems. 
 
 Th,e Co7nhat Firing Exercise Proper: 
 
 Combat practice usually consists in the firing 
 of a number of combat firing exercises. All 
 authorities agree that such exercises are diffi- 
 cult things to prepare. Authorities also agree 
 that, until the ability to prepare good exercises 
 has been acquired, the subject is not mastered. 
 A consideration, then, of their preparation is 
 necessary. This is so, not only for the fore- 
 going reasons, but, as these exercises must be 
 prepared in order to hold combat practice, 
 training therein is necessary. Examples are 
 available in the authorized publications. These 
 examples indicate the form and general nature. 
 
 The following outline covers the most impor- 
 tant points which must be considered in their 
 preparation. 
 
 The exercise should contain : 
 
 A definite lesson in fire tactics. 
 A mission which can be readily deter- 
 mined from the situation.
 
 Combat Proct'ice 229 
 
 A tactical principle, tlic violation of 
 which, if possible, would prevent the 
 accomplishment of the mission. 
 
 A tactical situation, which may be any 
 phase of an action, provided it demands 
 fire, and selected with the idea of best pre- 
 senting the lesson to be learned. 
 In reference to this latter requirement the 
 School of Musketry sa3's : "While it is true 
 tiiat the fire problem must involve a tactical 
 situation with a definite mission, it must be 
 remembered that the fire feature of the problem, 
 requiring the fire estimate and orders, must be 
 the dominant factor in the situation." 
 Consideration should be given to: 
 
 1. The element of time in: (a) The amount 
 of time required for the entire exercise in order 
 that it may not be excessive, (b) The time 
 necessary to fire the number of rounds required 
 by the situation, based on the proper rate of 
 fire for the various ranges. 
 
 2. The amount of ammunition necessary to 
 accomplish the desired mission, deduced from 
 the amount that will probably be necessary to 
 produce the required number of hits. This with 
 a view of obtaining the greatest results from 
 the season's allowance. 
 
 3. The number of targets, pits, and men 
 necessary to stage the situation, usually one
 
 230 Battle Fire Training 
 
 target for each man. This with regard to the 
 available supply, and due economy. 
 
 4. The terrain available, in order that the 
 situation involved ma}'^, as far as possible, be 
 free from imaginary restrictions and limita- 
 tions, and be new to the commander or at l#ast 
 involve different pits and angles. 
 
 5. The possible presence of any factor which 
 might prevent the desired lesson being taught. 
 
 6. The desirability of simplicity in all 
 arrangements. 
 
 7. The necessity for arrangements to prevent 
 the location of the targets, ranges, situation, 
 etc., from being known in advance by the first 
 organization to fire or any which may follow. 
 
 In combat firing exercises, as in tactical 
 problems, the commander must first "estimate 
 the situation" and then issue his order. In such 
 exercises these are called the "Fire Estimate" 
 and the "Fire Order." 
 
 The School of Musketry gives the following 
 details as those which must be considered and 
 covered in the fire estimate and fire order. 
 The Fire Estimate: 
 
 Location, strength, and intentions of the 
 
 enemy. 
 Observation of Targets both before and 
 
 during firing. 
 Determination of Range.
 
 Combat Practice 231 
 
 Relative Importance of Targets. 
 
 Strength of Firing Line. 
 
 Location of Fire Positions. 
 
 Class of Fire, i. e., Volley, Clip, or At Will. 
 
 Rate of Fire. 
 
 Time of Opening Fire. 
 
 Formation in Advancing Under Fire. 
 
 Ammunition Supply. 
 The Fire Order : 
 
 Designation of Targets. 
 
 Assignment of Troops to Targets. 
 
 Directions as to Occupation of Fire Posi- 
 tions. 
 
 Announcement of Sight Setting. 
 
 Rate of Fire. 
 
 Class of Fire. 
 
 Time of Opening Fire. 
 
 Position of Leader During Firing. 
 In connection with these details of the fire 
 estimate and the fire order the School of Mus- 
 ketry says: "There will be few occasions in 
 wjiich all of the factors enumerated above will 
 have to be thought out in the estimate and 
 announced in the fire orders. In fact the sim- 
 plicity of most problems, particularly those 
 conducted on 'A' ranges, will make it unneces- 
 sary to give any consideration to many of them. 
 Again, it must be remembered that at the 
 moment when the fire orders must be issued
 
 232 Battle Fire Training 
 
 many of the factors embraced in the estimate 
 will have been considered, some of them in an 
 involuntary manner. On some occasions the 
 fire order may be as simple as 'Fire at Will.' " 
 
 The methods followed by the School of Mus- 
 ketry in keeping records of combat firing exer- 
 cises, together with the forms used, are given 
 under "Records." 
 The Critique: 
 
 Every exercise should be followed by a cri- 
 tique. This should be given, if practicable, on 
 the target range and immediately following the 
 exercise, so that the details will be fresh in the 
 minds of all and the features of the ground 
 visible. 
 
 The critique is based on the conduct of the 
 exercise and the results obtained in accuracy, 
 distribution, and time, as shown by the umpire's 
 record. 
 
 With reference to the critique the Regula- 
 tions Prescribing Standard for Field Training 
 states : "In field firing exercises over unknown 
 ground, the accuracy to be expected from aver- 
 age shots, assuming an error of 5%to have been 
 made in the estimation of the range, is consid- 
 ered to be a proper standard of proficiency in 
 case the performance has been good in other 
 respects. 
 
 "It is not admissible, however, merely to say 
 that a command is proficient, or deficient, or to
 
 Combat Practice 233 
 
 characterize a firing exercise as 'good,' 'satis- 
 factory,' or 'poor.' If not more than this be 
 said no one will know what faults have been 
 committed or how they should be corrected. 
 The critique should begin with a statement of 
 the exercise, including a description of the tar- 
 gets — kind, number, location, front covered, or 
 intervals between figures, the actual range, the 
 estimated range, the time required for firing, 
 and the computed percentage of hits to be 
 expected by average shots under good leaders, 
 and also by good shots under the same circum- 
 stances. This should be followed by a brief 
 outline of the tactical idea involved in the 
 proper execution of the exercise and this in turn 
 followed by comments on the manner in which 
 the idea was actually carried out. 
 
 "The accuracy obtained as shown in the 
 actual number of hits made in the exercise 
 should be compared with that to be expected 
 from average and good shots under favorable 
 conditions, and in case of deficiency the reasons 
 therefor should be stated. 
 
 "The same cuurse should be followed with the 
 results obtained in distribution and time, which 
 should be taken up in turn. 
 
 "The operation which precedes the actual 
 firing may be spoken of as preparation. This 
 phase of a firing exercise has a somewhat remote
 
 234 * Battle Fire Training 
 
 $ 
 
 bearing on the .actual results obtained in firing, 
 but must receive some consideration. Assum- 
 ing correct tactical procedure, the chief element 
 for consideration is the matter of time, and in 
 judging the time consumed prior to opening 
 fire one must consider all the difficulties that 
 have been encountered and then determine 
 whether or not there has been an unreasonable 
 delay which would not have occurred had the 
 leadership been good and the organization 
 properly trained. 
 
 "This part of the critique might be worded: 
 'The preparation was completed with reason- 
 able celerity,' or 'the preparation consumed 
 twelve minutes.' This is considered too long 
 and is mainly due to: 
 
 "1. Lack of familiarity with range find- 
 ing methods. 
 
 "2. Lack of training in describing objec- 
 tives. 
 
 "3. Inadequate reconnaissance resulting 
 in several changes of position before the 
 firing line was so placed that the targets 
 could be seen. 
 
 "Further training in these subjects would 
 tend towards greater promptness in opening 
 fire. 
 
 "It will usually be sufficient merely to com- 
 ment on minor errors committed in the course
 
 Combat Practice 235 
 
 of the preparation, but in case of serious and 
 unnecessary delays in opening fire, which in 
 combat would give an active enemy a decided 
 advantage, weight should be given in propor- 
 tion to the faults committed. It should be 
 borne in mind, however, that in passing judg- 
 ment as to proficiency and deficiency the actual 
 results obtained in firing by a detachment or 
 organization must remain the chief basis, how- 
 ever nmch this judgment may need to be modi- 
 fied through faults committed in the prepara- 
 tion." 
 
 The critique is a means of instruction. It 
 should not be in the nature of a reprimand, but 
 to produce the greatest results, should be in 
 the nature of a tactical summing up of the 
 errors committed, with comments upon features 
 particularly well performed. It should point 
 out the means of correcting errors made and 
 the lines along which further training is 
 necessary. 
 
 Umpire's Duties: 
 
 In addition to delivering the critique, the 
 umpire has general charge of the exercise from 
 the time of arrival of the troops near the target 
 grounds until the exercise is completed. Suffi- 
 cient assistants should be furnished him to per- 
 mit of complete observation of all features of 
 inij)ortaiice connected with the exercise. The
 
 236 Battle Fire Training 
 
 umpire is generally charged also with the duty 
 of making known to the commander the 
 assumed character and effectiveness of the ene- 
 my's fire and the results of its effect upon the 
 firing unit. That is, he must inform the com- 
 mander, for instance, "The enemy has fire 
 superiority and you cannot advance," or "a 
 certain part of your unit may advance, the 
 enemy's fire at will being somewhat wild." 
 Suggestions: 
 
 Except in the earlier stages of instruction, 
 when a combat firing exercise is once started it 
 should be allowed to proceed without interrup- 
 tion, except to prevent accidents. It should bo 
 conducted by the usual signals and commands 
 and in a manner laid down in Drill Regulations, 
 This is true, not only because it is the pre- 
 scribed way, but, because this is the only means 
 provided for training in these necessary fea- 
 tures while firing. 
 
 The position of the targets, the intervals 
 between targets, and their form should, as a 
 rule, conform to service conditions. At the 
 beginning of an exercise the targets should bo 
 either pointed out or their location made known 
 by the firing of blank ammunition in their 
 vicinity. If targets are well hidden and no 
 means provided for indicating their location 
 little will be accomplished except an irritation
 
 Combat Practice 237 
 
 of the firiiif^ unit. Combat jiriicticc is not Hie 
 place to teach the h)cation of inflistiiict targets. 
 In attack exercises the greatest possible 
 benefit will be derived if the information, rela- 
 tive to fire effect transmitted by the umpire, 
 is based upon the actual result of the fire being 
 delivered at the time. This entails the necessity 
 for some arrangement by means of which hits 
 may be recorded and their number transmitted 
 to the umpire from time to time, without inter- 
 rupting the firing. If this is done, then by a 
 table previously prepared, it may be deter- 
 nu'ned what fraction, if any, of a unit may 
 advance, assuming that the more accurate the 
 enemy's fire, the smaller the fraction which 
 may advance. The length of time which the 
 advance may be continued may also be deter- 
 mined, and if desired the probable number of 
 casualties which would result. If such an 
 arrangement is undertaken, then, in the prepa- 
 ration of the table the probable number of hits 
 which should be made by average marksmen at 
 the various ranges must be used as the basis for 
 determining Mhether or not the fire superiority, 
 in any degree, has been obtained. Thus, if with 
 average marksmen and with the number of 
 targets exposed, at the range used X number 
 of men should make Y number of hits on Z 
 number of targets and the unit firing falls
 
 238 Battle Fire Tr aiming 
 
 below this standard, complete fire superiority 
 is not obtained. A sliding scale downward may 
 be arranged, if desired, upon which to base 
 decision as to whether or not the hits made are 
 sufficient to enable a fraction of the unit to 
 advance. As it is impossible to determine the 
 probable number of hits, for every possible 
 distance from the target the target ground 
 should be divided into a number of zones, and 
 the range to the extreme limits of each zone 
 used as the basis for calculation. In this class 
 of exercise, in arriving at a general figure of 
 proficiency, values may be assigned to the dis- 
 tances covered in advances. This is illustrated 
 in the Casey problem given herein. 
 
 The arrangements necessary to provide 
 means by which hits may be read while firing is 
 in progress may be difficult to obtain, but it is 
 believed any efforts made with this idea in view 
 will be more than repaid by the excellent effect 
 upon the firing unit, the splendid opportunity 
 it affords commanders to actually adjust their 
 fire by its true effect, and to learn by observing 
 fire when it is in adjustment. If some such 
 method as this is not adopted the rulings of the 
 umpire regarding the effect of the fire being 
 delivered, both by the enemy and the firing 
 unit, must be in the nature of a guess and may 
 possibly be entirely erroneous. Hence the com-
 
 Combat Practice 239 
 
 niandcr may assume that a certain appearance 
 of the sliot group on the ground indicates that 
 his fire is adjusted, when as a matter of fact it 
 is not. He may assume that his range finding 
 methods are correct, when they are not. He 
 may assume that his rate of fire is correct, 
 when it is not. In fact he may make any num- 
 ber of assumptions connected with conduct of 
 fire, based on the ruHngs of the umpire, and all 
 these assumptions may be drawn from false 
 premises. There are firing exercises, of course, 
 in which this arrangement is not necessary or 
 desirable. For any exercise, however, which 
 purports to be a means of training in those 
 features of conduct of fire which can only be 
 taught by fire, which attempts to emphasize 
 emphatically the advantage of effective fire, 
 and to teach commanders to draw conclusions 
 from correct premises, this plan is necessary. 
 In other words, by means of such arrangements 
 the nearest possible approach to actual condi- 
 tions ill battle is obtained. The situation is 
 clear to the commander and he can base his 
 actions on the tangible results of his fire. 
 Without these arrangements a commander is 
 surrounded with a lia7,e of doubt which may or 
 may not be dispelled by the rulings of the 
 umpire. '' 
 
 The amount of ammunition available for 
 combat practice is necessarily limited; there-
 
 240 Battle Fire Training 
 
 fore it should be expended in exercises which 
 provide the greatest amount of training. Too 
 often the limited supply of ammunition leads 
 to tlie selection of a number of exercises of 
 short duration, rather than a few exercises of 
 long duration. It must be remembered that 
 combat practice has two main objects; to teach 
 certain features of conduct of fire which cannot 
 be taught elsewhere, and to train a unit to 
 function true to its training while firing ball 
 ammunition. The short exercise is suitable to 
 train noncommissioned officers and small units 
 in parts of their duties, but as a rule it is not 
 a suitable means of training platoons, com- 
 panies, or battalions in the larger and more 
 important phases of conduct of fire. In the 
 short exercise it is impossible for a commander 
 to observe his fire a sufficient length of time to 
 deduce anything from it. Even if he were able 
 to arrive at some conclusion, which he is not, 
 there will be no time available to apply the 
 information obtained in a practical way. When 
 only five or ten rounds are fired, how is it pos- 
 sible to observe and adjust fire.'' Unfortunately 
 this hit or miss variety of firing problem is all 
 too common ; a hasty estimate of the range, a 
 hasty designation of targets, a few brief sec- 
 onds of fire, and the succeeding organization 
 takes its place on the range to blaze away 
 costly ammunition.
 
 Combat Practice 241 
 
 A few long exercises are much better tlian a 
 number of sliort ones. In the problem of con- 
 siderable duration the commander is given an 
 opportunity to judge his fire effect, to correct 
 errors therein, and to actually control his fire. 
 Opportunity is afforded to train the company 
 and battalion machinery to function while in 
 the midst of a noisy and disconcerting fire; to 
 see the cr.rors of individuals, to correct them, 
 and to see the corrections put into effect ; to 
 actually transmit firing data while firing, to 
 fix bayonets, to control fire, to advance, and, 
 finally to charge. How otherwise can a unit 
 learn to perform these things instinctively in 
 battle.'' Training, before the class (B) range 
 is reached, is not sufficient. The firing of short 
 exercises covering one small phase and designed 
 to illustrate one principle is not sufficient. The 
 solution of fire problems in which artificial fea- 
 tures are dominant is not sufficient. There is 
 no short cut to success here. .There is no 
 means of training an organization to function 
 while firing except by training it to function 
 while firing. To accomplish this, fire problems 
 must be of sufficient duration to permit of drill 
 therein. Moreover, a greater amount of 
 instruction may be imparted in a given period 
 of time with less expenditure of ammunition if. 
 in these problems, the action of the unit is con-
 
 242 Battle Fire Training 
 
 trolled by its actual fire effect, determined 
 while firing is in progress. 
 
 The problem which follows is along the lines 
 of one prepared by the board of officers hereto- 
 fore mentioned. It is given here because it 
 contains features which have been emphasized 
 in the foregoing discussion. This exercise in 
 one season was fired by 48 companies and 12 
 battalions and in every instance its value was 
 unmistakable. 
 
 If in order to meet local conditions, as was 
 true in the foregoing instance, it is necessary 
 to use one locality for both company and bat- 
 talion training, the exercise may be made con- 
 tinuous and include the fire of both units. If 
 this is done many points of maneuver and fire 
 tactics will be brought out that might other- 
 wise have been omitted, and an excellent oppor- 
 tunity will be afforded to illustrate team work 
 in the battalion. 
 
 Local features of the terrain which were 
 included in the original problem, to avoid con- 
 fusion, have been omitted here. It is to be 
 noted that this problem as written was framed 
 for a particular piece of ground. If used, 
 details may have to be changed to conform to 
 the terrain available.
 
 Combat Practice 243 
 
 Problem 
 Time: 30 minutes. 
 Rounds for company, 50 ; for battalion, 45. 
 
 Object: 
 
 To train the company and battalion to func- 
 tion as a unit under full control while firing; 
 to train commanders to exercise fire direction 
 and control; to observe and adjust fire; to 
 train individual soldiers in fire discipline. To 
 illustrate the necessity for celerity of move- 
 ment, proper rate of fire, accuracy of firing 
 data, good marksmanship, and team work. 
 Situatioii: 
 
 The battalion following a successful engage- 
 ment, is in close pursuit of a retreating enemy. 
 The remainder of the regiment which is follow- 
 ing with additional ammunition is about an 
 hour in rear. The ammunition supply is low. 
 No time has been available since the engage- 
 ment to redistribute. The company which is 
 detached (to fire the problem) is assumed to 
 liave fifty rounds per man. The battalion com- 
 mander's orders are to push on and occupy a 
 certain place in advance of the regiment. (In 
 preparing the problem for presentation to 
 troops this place must be selected so as to 
 require the desired action.) When a suitable 
 point is reached near the target range, the bat- 
 talion commander is informed that a company
 
 244 Battle Fire Training 
 
 of the enemy, somewhat smaller in number than 
 
 the companies of the battalion, has taken up a 
 
 position on his flank and he cannot advance 
 
 further without driving the enemy therefrom. 
 
 He is directed to detach a company for this 
 
 purpose. 
 
 Action: The Company 
 
 The detached company is conducted to a 
 point from which it can see the targets and 
 still be protected from fire. The situation is 
 handed to the company commander and he is 
 given a reasonable time to reach a decision. 
 When all is ready the company is permitted to 
 advance, in proper formation, until the point 
 selected for opening fire is reached, say between 
 800 and 900 yards. At this point the company 
 commander is informed that the accuracy of 
 the enemy's fire prevents further advance 
 except under covering fire. Once fire is opened, 
 the further advance of the company is depen- 
 dent upon the number of hits made. The exer- 
 cise is continued until the enemy is assumed to 
 be driven away, the ammunition is exhausted, 
 or the time limit of 30 minutes has expired. 
 Each company in turn fires the exercise. 
 Targets : 
 
 Fifty F targets spaced a distance apart suffi- 
 cient to give the desired width to the whole 
 target. Five E targets in rear will indicate
 
 Condxit Practice 245 
 
 the director and controllers. These afford a 
 ready means of picking up the target.- Hits on 
 these latter targets are disregarded until the 
 conclusion of the exercise. A strip of canvas 
 19 inches high and somewhat longer than the 
 target is wide, is placed immediately in rear of 
 the line of E targets. The canvas is held in 
 an upright position by means of wooden strips 
 nailed together from both sides of the canvas 
 throughout its width, and spaced throughout its 
 length sufficiently near together to hold it taut 
 and straight. These strips extend above and 
 below the canvas, at which points they fit into 
 greased slots held in position by wooden sup- 
 ports. At either end of the target, wooden 
 latticed drums are placed in an upright posi- 
 tion and provided with handles for turning. 
 These drums should be protected from the 
 front by a revetted mound or a combination 
 of mound and ditch. Each end of the canvas 
 strip is made fast to a drum. When the drums 
 are turned the strip unwinds from one and 
 winds upon the other, the upright strips sliding 
 in the slots. As the canvas passes behind the 
 targets it receives hits which are marked and 
 recorded as it is wound on the drum. It was 
 found by practice that about two minutes were 
 required to mark the hits on about 50 yards 
 of canvas. It will be noted that shots passing
 
 246 Battle Fire Training 
 
 between the targets as well as those passing 
 through them will be received upon the canvas 
 and hence recorded, but no particular harm is 
 done by recording "near hits." If desired the 
 actual hits may be counted at the completion 
 of the exercise. From its description this tar- 
 get might be thought too visible but experience 
 has shown that if properly placed in relation 
 to the background it offers a difficult aiming 
 target. 
 
 Method of Scoring: 
 
 The following method of scoring is designed 
 to give the highest score to that company which 
 by its collective shooting and fire tactics would 
 probably make the greatest success were the 
 assumed situation real. The object of this 
 exercise is to drive the enemy from his position 
 as quickly as possible and with the least expen- 
 diture of ammunition compatible with that end. 
 To carry out this mission the company must 
 inflict so considerable a loss upon the enemy in 
 a short space of time that he will be forced 
 from his position by these losses and by the 
 aggressive forward movement of the attacker. 
 An accurate delivery of fire in adequate volume 
 would not avail if undistributed ; hence the rate 
 of movement toward the enemy would depend 
 upon the number of figures hit in a given unit 
 of time. Hits on the canvas are treated as hits
 
 Combat Practice 247 
 
 on figures. For a proper conduct of the attack, 
 therefore, an arbitrary table of losses must be 
 prepared based upon which the company would 
 be allowed to advance during the problem in 
 various sized units. In preparing this table a 
 computation must be made of the maximum 
 number of hits per minute that may be expected 
 of good marksmen firing with correct data at 
 the various ranges used. For instance, if the 
 target ground is divided into four zones, 900, 
 800, 700, and 600 yards, the computation will 
 be made using these ranges as a basis for calcu- 
 lation. This table must be elastic enough to 
 provide for various sized companies and various 
 tactical dispositions. Arrangements must be 
 made for recording the ninnber of hits during 
 the advance and reporting these hits to the 
 umpire, for instance, every two minutes. Based 
 upon these reports of hits the company is per- 
 mitted to advance by individuals, squads, pla- 
 toons, etc. No limit should be placed upon the 
 length of the rushes. The units halting at the 
 end of the rush wherever in the opinion of the 
 leader it should have been stopped in war. It 
 is well to assume that if the company reached 
 a point 500 yards from the enemy in 30 min- 
 utes the enemy would be defeated by his losses 
 and the fierceness of the attack, and that as the 
 company approaches this critical range the
 
 248 Battle Fire Training 
 
 hostile fire will gradually grow less effective. 
 The tcihle, therefore, should provide for an 
 increasingly difficult advance from 900 to 600 
 yards, and a gradually decreasing requirement 
 from 600 to 500 yards. 
 
 For the purpose of comparison tlie following 
 four factors may be considered: 
 
 (a) Accuracy, or per cent of hts to shots 
 fired. 
 
 (b) Distribution or percentage of figures 
 hit, the per cent being based on the number 
 that should have been struck with the ammu- 
 nition actually fired. 
 
 (c) Time required to defeat the enemy 
 (if successful). 
 
 (d) Distance covered in the advance. 
 The method of determining (a) is obvious. 
 
 In determining (b) one has first to consider 
 how many figures should have been hit by 
 "good" marksmen using accurate data and 
 properly distributed fire over the whole target, 
 (d) should be determined from a table of values 
 for distance advanced, the values varying regu- 
 larly from for no advance to' 100 for an 
 advance of 500 yards. An arbitrary valbc of 
 say 100, if successful, may be attached to (c), 
 that is, the whole company reaches 500 yards 
 in 10 minutes. This value to be decreased to 
 for success in 30 minutes. The per cents
 
 Combat Practice 249 
 
 reached by the above process may be changed 
 to "Points" for the purpose of scoring in the 
 following manner. The per cent of accuracy 
 obtained should be referred to the per cent con- 
 sidered possible, and the quotient callerl 
 "Points." Thus, if 20 per cent is the possible 
 per cent of accuracy and a company makes 
 232 hits with 1,981 rounds of ammunition, 
 or 11.7','', which is 58.5% of the possible, its 
 score therefore for accuracy would be 58.5. 
 The per cent of distribution attained is consid- 
 ered as "points" thus : 36 figures hit of 50 
 exposed by a company firing 1,981 round-; 
 would give a per cent of 72, which are called 
 "points" for distribution. It is to be noted 
 that in this instance a company firing 1,981 
 rounds should hit all figures. If a company 
 "succeeded" in 23 minutes 20 seconds, their 
 "points" for success would be 33, and if at the 
 end of the exercise it had all of its men at 500 
 yards, the "points" gained for "progress" 
 would be 100. The following example taken at 
 random from the scores of a nunil)er of com- 
 ])anics will illustrate the process. It is assumed 
 in this instance that the company should have 
 
 made 207o of hits: 
 (a) Accuracy: 
 
 JiW hits .^,^ '2.r.7r',:^-^^J" Uivrs 12.S.V;;, or 12.9. 
 1,904, shots 20.0
 
 250 Battle Fire Training 
 
 (b) Distribution: 
 
 °^ — gives 54.0% of the possible, or 54.0. 
 
 60 figures 
 
 (c) Time, or success. Did not succeed. Value 00.0. 
 
 (d) Progress: 
 
 7 men at 755 yards, is 16.2% of the company at 755. 
 36 men at 810 yards, is 83.8% of the company at 810. 
 16.2% X .36 gives 5.83 (755 yds. from table "is 36). 
 83.8% X .23 gives 19.30 (810 yds. from table is 23). 
 
 25.13 
 
 Recapitulation: 
 
 First Case Second Case 
 
 (a) Accuracy 58.5 12.9 
 
 (b) Distribution 72 54 
 
 (c) Time 33 00 
 
 (d) Progress 100 25.1 
 
 263.5 92.0 
 
 • The following plan for the transmission of 
 information from the pit to the umpire has 
 been found satisfactory. Telephone connec- 
 tions from the pit to a convenient point in rear 
 of the first firing position. At this point a 
 post is erected which can be plainly seen from 
 all parts of the range. A movable arm is 
 fastened on the post and the size of the unit 
 which is permitted to advance is indicated by 
 the position of the arm. An assistant to the 
 umpire, provided with the necessary tables, is 
 charged with the duty of indicating the size 
 of the unit to advance. 
 
 Situation: Battalion 
 
 In the battalion problem it is assumed that 
 the detached company was unsuccessful. If
 
 Combat Practice 251 
 
 such WHS nctuiilly the case the initial firing 
 position of the battalion is placed at a point 
 in the advance corresponding to the point 
 reached by the advance of the average com- 
 pany. Thus, if "A" company reaches 600 
 yards, "B" 650 yards, "C" 675 yards, "D" 
 700 yards, tlic initial battalion position would 
 be about 656 yards. If the companies are 
 successful the initial point must be chosen with 
 the idea of meeting the requirements of the 
 problem. Three companies of the battalion are 
 located at or near the point at which their 
 advance was originally assumed to have been 
 stopped. The fourth company is in position 
 at the point selected for opening fire. The 
 situation is assumed to be that at the beginning 
 of the last 10 minutes of the preceding problem, 
 the company in the line has 10 rounds of ammu- 
 nition, the balance of its allowance of 45 rounds 
 is in bandoleers in the hands of the other com- 
 p.Miies. It is assumed that this ammunition 
 was obtained by a redistribution in the 
 battalion. 
 Action: 
 
 When all is ready the battalion is made 
 acquainted with the situation. When sufficient 
 time has been allowed to transmit this informa- 
 tion to the companies, a message is handed to 
 the battalion commander from the company on
 
 252 Battle Fire Training 
 
 the firing line. This message states: "Enemy 
 reenforced by about one company. Losses 
 heavy. Am unable to advance further. Ten 
 rounds of ammunition per man left." When the 
 battalion commander digests this infornlation, 
 fire is opened by the company in position and 
 the problem begins. The tactical situation is 
 designed to require reenforcing by two com- 
 panies at once. The final company being 
 thrown into the line upon the initiative of the 
 battalion commander or upon the intimation 
 of the umpire that its fire is necessary. The 
 action is continued until the ammunition is 
 practically . exhausted, when the battalion is 
 tested in its ability to charge. Extra ammuni- 
 tion for the first company on the line is deliv- 
 ered to it by the first supports sent forward. 
 In order that reenforcemcnts may reach the 
 company on the line- before its ammunition is 
 exhausted the place of the receipt of the mes- 
 sage by the battalion commander may have to 
 be arbitrarily assumed. 
 
 Targets: 
 
 The original company targets plus additions 
 necessary to bring the target to a size sufficient 
 for a battalion. If facilities are available these 
 additional targets should be made to appear at 
 intervals so as to finally require the absorption 
 of the entire support or reserve into the firing
 
 4 
 Combat Practice 253 
 
 liiic. In the probk-in from wliicli tliis exercise 
 was taken F targets placed on sleds were drawn 
 into position to represent reenforcements. 
 Unfortunately, witli such a large number of 
 targets it is not possible to read hits as made. 
 Movements of the battalion forward, therefore, 
 cannot he controlled by its fire effect. Much 
 training, however, can be given in switching, 
 concentrating, and crossing fire without any 
 movement forward, if it is desired to omit this 
 feature. Such adjustments of fire being made 
 to meet assumed phases of the situation, a 
 description of which is transmitted verbally 
 by the umpire to the battalion commander. 
 
 Scoring: 
 
 The following method of scoring by which 
 percentages made may be reduced to points for 
 purposes of comparison is practicable. 
 
 (a) Per cent of hits to shots fired. 
 
 (b) Per cent of figures hit to shots fired. 
 The highest percentage of hits to shots fired 
 
 is given the value of 1,000. All other per cents 
 Diade by other battalions are proportional to 
 
 this value. Thus: 
 
 3d Rn. X Inf. (Tlie highest l)attali(>n). Percentage of 
 
 hits 10.82. Value 1,000. 
 1st Bn. Y Inf. Percentage of hits 9.01. Vahie 833, for 
 
 10.82 : 1,000 :: 9.01 : 833. 
 
 TJie iu'ghest percentage of figures hit to 
 shots fired is similarly given the value of 1,000
 
 254 Battle Fire Training 
 
 and all other percentages referred to this stan- 
 dard in a similar manner, thus : 
 3d Bn. X Inf. (The highest battalion). Percentage of 
 
 figures struck to shots fired 2.321. Value 1,000. 
 1st Bn. Y Inf. Percentage of figures struck to shots 
 
 fired was 1.608. Value 692, for 
 
 2.821 : 1000 :: 1.608 : 692. 
 
 The score would be : 
 
 3d Bn. X Inf. 1st Bn. Y Inf. 
 
 (a) 1,000 (a) 833 
 
 (b) 1,000 (b) 692 
 
 2,000 1,525 
 
 If it is desired to include the element of 
 time a third percentage may be included, as 
 (c) Percentage of figures hit to seconds of 
 firing. In this event the possible total would 
 be 3,000.
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 THE CASEY FIRING PROBLEM 
 Durinp the 1913 national and international matches 
 at Camp Perry, tiiere was tried out a problem in field 
 firinp, devised by Ca])tain K. K. V. Casey, Adjutant, 
 2d Infantry, N. G. P., which seems so well adapted for 
 use on tiie ordinary target range, alid so full of inter- 
 esting possibilities, that the following description and 
 comments are given out in hope that out of any discus- 
 sion of them may come some good to the service in 
 general. 
 
 Statement of the Problem 
 
 In brief, a representation is made of an attack by a 
 platoon of infantry over open ground upon a prepared 
 position defended by an inferior force. The jilatoon 
 consists of four squads, and the target represents a line 
 of 16 men. 
 
 Ground: The ground required is a strip about 1,300 
 yards long and 200 yards wide, with suital)le protection 
 for the observers at the target; such a strij) as may be 
 found on most service target ranges. 
 
 Target: The target is mounted on eight fi' x 12' 
 target frames, so as to form a continuous target 12 feet 
 high and 48 feet long. It is divided by horizontal lines 
 into six zones, each two feet high. The background is 
 of buff or neutral tinted pa])er. On each of the eight 
 sections of the target are stenciled or pasted two of the 
 ordinary jirone silhouettes, in olive drab color, with the 
 bottoms of the figures on the center horizontal line, and 
 so placed as to be 3 feet apart from center to center. 
 Each figure is marked with a number 10, that lieing the 
 value assigned to a figure hit. The zones from the l)ot- 
 tom upward are marked in succession with the value 
 assigned to hits in each, namely: 1, 3, .'5, G (remaining 
 space in the zone of figures), 4, and 2. 
 
 Firing Line: 'I'he firing line is a platoon of .T2 men, 
 properly organized as in I. D. R., with a j)latoon leader 
 
 Notk: This same problpin was fired at Oalvpston, Texas, in 
 1913. The (arcet jircscnted for fire was similar to the one 
 drRorihpd. In addition, a sorondary tarpnt was placed in a pit 
 in rear of the first which consisted of a series of targets such as 
 are used on the target range. This i)prniitted of an accurate 
 record of hits inade each minute of firing. Plate 46.
 
 11 
 
 
 1- 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 
 . „ 
 
 - 
 
 r~t V 
 
 d 
 
 - " 
 
 - 
 
 e 
 
 d 
 d 
 
 « « 
 
 <p 
 
 ,. , 
 
 d 
 d 
 
 « o 
 
 
 
 d 
 
 d 
 
 rf> *o 
 
 - 
 
 
 d 
 d 
 
 « 'n 
 
 - 
 
 \ 
 
 d 
 d 
 
 ^ f^ 
 
 1 
 
 1^
 
 Combat Practice 25' 
 
 aiicl ;i platoon guitlc. Ninety rounds of hall cartridges 
 are issued. 
 
 Other Arrangeiucnlx : In the ])it tiicre should he an 
 ohserver for each section of the tarj^et, and a chief 
 ol); ervcr, who is connected l)y a field telephone with the 
 officer conducting the test. The latter is accompanied 
 by a musician with a trumpet. Under the control of the 
 chief ohserver is a large flag or disk so arranged that it 
 liiay be jilaced vertically, lowered to an angle of 45° 
 or withdrawn from sight. 
 
 Conduct of the Test : The platoon, when the target 
 is ready, is deployed into line of skirmishers, with an 
 interval, for safety, of 20 yards between squads. The 
 officer conducting the test then causes the musician to 
 sound "Attention"; "Conunence Firing." No other com- 
 mands will he given by him excejiting in ca.-^e of acci- 
 d'-nt, iiiiringemcnt of the rules, or interruption of the 
 (vcrci'e. Tiie conduct of the jilatoon is in the hands of 
 the platoon leader. 
 
 When "("onmience Pairing" is sounded, the platoon 
 Degins its advance and the chief o!).' ervcr at the pit is 
 notified; also as it reaches a j)oint about 1,200 yards 
 from the target, when he causes the flag to be raised 
 ••'crtically. The chief obi-erver is also notified at what 
 ranges the firing is taking j)lace. Firing may begin 
 \' hen the line has pas.' ed the 1,200 yard point, and the 
 time is taken as it passes that point. In thirty minutes 
 Ti-om tliat tin:e the director causers "Cease Firing," 
 Assemble," to l)e sounded and the exercise ceases. 
 
 Rules: The principles of attack over open ground 
 will be observed. If the director believes that the 
 advance is i)eing improjierly conducted, or that signals 
 are not being olieyed, he uiay cause "Halt" to i)e 
 mounded, when all will cease firing. When the nuitter 
 has been adjusted, "Commence Firing" is again sounded. 
 \o time is taken out for such j)ause>. 
 
 While the flag is vertical, no advance may be made; 
 when it is at 45°, advance may be made by individuals, 
 and when it is withdrawn, advance may be made by 
 squad. 
 
 Wlien "C'ea'e firing, Assemble" is .sounded, firing will 
 cease and the jTlatoon will a^^scmljle. If time ])erinits it 
 may i)e marciied close ♦^o the targets to observe the effect. 
 
 Method (if (isrcrtdinintj tchen superior. ty of fire is 
 obtained: Each observer at the jiit endeavors to keep
 
 Combat Practice 259 
 
 account of the number of liits per minute on his section 
 of the tarfret, and at short intervals tiie chief oi)server 
 asks for results, governing the ])osition of tlie flag 
 accordingly. y\n arbitrary rule nuist govern in order to 
 obtain results for com])arison. 
 
 The question of distrii)uti()n and the dctcrniiiiation 
 of when to change the signal flag, was tentatively solved 
 by the following arbitrary rule + hits of value below 
 four not counted: 
 Distance Shots per minute Distribution Unit 
 
 in proper zone on target , to advance 
 
 1,200—1,000 1 6 out of 8 Squad 
 
 4 out of 8 Individual 
 1,000— 800 2 G out of 8 Squad 
 
 4 out of 8 Individual 
 800— 600 3 6 out of 8 Squad 
 
 4 out of 8 Individual 
 600— 500 4 6 out of 8 Squad 
 
 4 out of 8 Individual 
 This arbitrary rule was determined upon after giving 
 due weight to the following points: 
 
 1. In actual service the attacking line will not open 
 fire at such extreme ranges as 1,200 yards unless their 
 losses are so great .as to make it absolutely necessary. 
 In the case under consideration it is assumed that the 
 attackers came under effective rifle fire as soon as they 
 emerged from the woods — in other words, at about 1,200 
 yards, and that the advance was to h€ made over ground 
 without cover of any kind. At tlie extreme ranges, fire 
 superiority would be obtained by fewer hits, or near hits, 
 than would be necessary at the shorter ranges. One hit 
 per minute on six out of eight targets at 1,200 yards was 
 assumed to give fire superiority, and one bit ]ier minute 
 on four out of eight targets was assumed to be sufficient 
 to permit an advance to be made I)y individuals. 
 
 2. As the attacking line advanced to the .shorter 
 ranges, its fire would hecome more accurate, but, at the 
 same time, the fire of the defenders would also increase 
 in accuracy and the greater number of hits per minute 
 would be necessary in order to obtain fire superiority. 
 This increase in the number of hits was assumed to 
 require two hits ])er minute at 800 to (iOO yards, and 
 four hits per minute at 600 yards and closer — all with 
 the same distribution. As a matter of fact, it is believed
 
 260 Battle Fire Training 
 
 that the distribution should have been 7/8 and 5/8 at the 
 decisive ranges in order to obtain superiority. 
 
 3. The rate of fire at the long ranges, to obtain good 
 results, must be much less than at tfie shorter ranges, 
 and this applies to both attackers and defenders. This 
 was an additional reason for requiring an increase in the 
 number of hits to obtain fire superiority as the attacking 
 line approached the objective. 
 
 Deterviining the Relatire Efflc'ency : At the termi- 
 nation of the exercise, the number of hits in each zone 
 is counted, and the values are given as indicated on the 
 target. The method of attributing values to hits on 
 different zones of the target is this: 
 
 The success of the attack depends primarily on 
 superiority of fire. This is obtained when the enemy's 
 fire is kept down, and anything that makes him keep 
 his head under cover contributes to superiority. So. 
 shots striking close in front or between the figures are 
 valued next to actual hits, and next come shots just 
 overhead. (See diagram of target, Figure 45.) 
 
 Valuation for proper distriliution of fire is obtained 
 as follows: The target is divided into four groups of 
 two sections each. The value of hits in each group is 
 determiried separately. Then the totals are multiplied 
 by the following weights : the two highest, by 1 ; the 
 next highest, by 2; the lowest, by 3; and the totals 
 added. 
 
 It is readily seen that credit is thus given for distri- 
 bution of fire. For example, one platoon has made hits 
 of a total value of 400, distributed equally on all four 
 sections; the score would be: 
 
 1st Section 100 X 1 = 100 
 
 2nd Section 100 X 1 = 100 
 
 3rd Section 100 X 2 = 200 
 
 4th Section 100 X 3 = 300 
 
 Total 700 
 
 Another platoon has the same total value of hits, but 
 unevenly distributed, then: 
 
 1st Section IGO X 1 = 160 
 
 2nd Section 150 X 1 = 150 
 
 3rd Section 60 X 2 = 120 
 
 4th Section 30 X 3 = 90 
 
 Total 620
 
 Coi/thdt Fmctice -01 
 
 N'ahiation is also pivcn for llie distance advanced by 
 tilt" j)lat()on, as follows: 
 
 At tlie termination of tlie exercise, note is made of 
 the position of the fractions of the line. For purpose of 
 valuation the range is divided into 50-yard zones and 
 vahics assigned as in tlie table below. The numlier of 
 men wiu) ha\e a(l\a/iced into any zone is multiplied i)y 
 the value given for the /.one, and tiie total is added to 
 the target score. 
 
 Zone Value 
 
 1,200 
 
 1,150 10 
 
 1,100 20 
 
 1,050 30 
 
 1,000 40 
 
 950 50 
 
 900 00 
 
 850 65 
 
 800 70 
 
 750 76 
 
 700 80 
 
 (i50 85 
 
 ()00 90 
 
 650 95 
 
 500 100 
 
 For example, if 12 men have reached the 700-yard 
 zone, and 20 men were at 750 yards, the total score for 
 distance will be: 
 
 (80 X 12 = 960) + (76 X 20 = 1,500) = 2,460 
 
 Comments 
 The foregoing problem affords an excellent means of 
 drilling the company in most of tlie features of the 
 conduct of fire. It will be found that imjiroper distrii)u- 
 tion, incorrect range, inattention to signals, indifferent 
 rushes, improjicr rate of fire, and in general ]ioor fire 
 direction, control, and discijiiine will react very jironrptly 
 and to the great disadvantage of the firing unit. The 
 rate of advance, that is the attainment of success, is in 
 delicate adjustment with the projier conduct of fire. 
 Even slight errors make themselves manifest very 
 (|uickly. It is this condition that gives the problem, per- 
 haps, its greatest value. This results from the fact that 
 commanders of all grades are almo.st in.stantly niad*
 
 262 Battle Fire Training 
 
 aware that they have failed in some particular. It 
 becomes at once incumbent upon them not only to dis- 
 cover their error but to apply the remedy. The burden 
 of the fault is placed where it belongs and this in so 
 conspicuous a manner that improvement is almost sure 
 to follow, for publicity of error is a strong incentive for 
 advancement. 
 
 The problem is an artificial one and therefore it is 
 to be expected that artificial conditions will arise in its 
 solution. As long as good results are produced these 
 conditions will do no harm provided it is made plain to 
 all that they are artificial and not those to be expected 
 upon the battlefield. In this connection may be men- 
 tioned the extreme range at which fire is opened, the 
 intervals between squads, the obliquing of the rushes, 
 for which there would be no room in battle, to avoid 
 danger, the absence of a tactical idea, the absence of a 
 support or reserve, and the necessity which might at 
 times arise for individuals other than unit leaders to 
 control rushes according to the position of the flag. 
 
 It was found in practice, that to obtain the best 
 results, long and fairly slow rushes should bf made and 
 that other things being equal the rush should halt on the 
 edge of a zone instead of crossing into it, even though 
 a slightly better firing position might be obtained a little 
 farther in advance. These are mere expedients which do 
 very well to meet the conditions at hand but like the 
 points mentioned above must be explained to the men 
 and ofBcers so that erroneous inferences will not be 
 drawn. 
 
 While the wording of the problem is rather indefinite 
 with regard to the stopping of a rush once started, it 
 will be found more satisfactory if a unit on its feet and 
 advancing is allowed to continue the advance to its 
 logical conclusion. That is to the most advanced posi- 
 tion at that time occupied by the platoon. If this is 
 not done the platoon may be split into several echelons 
 which increases the danger and gives rise to unsatisfac- 
 tory conditions. If, however, any fraction of a unit is 
 advancing to a firing position not as yet occupied it 
 should be required to halt at once if fire superiority is 
 lost.
 
 Combat Practice 263 
 
 THE RECORDS 
 
 (From pamphlet on Combat Firing by The School 
 of Musketry) 
 
 TitKRE AHK TWO DISTINCT TYl'ES OI' RECORDS, THE "UmFIUe's 
 
 Record" and the "Statistical Record." 
 Ttc'o Types: 
 
 The "Umpire's Record" furnishes the basis for the 
 critique delivered by the umpire, on the ground, at the 
 completion of the exercise, and consists of two parts. 
 The first part covers the tactical phase of the exercise, 
 fire direction, control, and disci]iline, as a result of the 
 ()l)servation of the umpire. The second part is statistical 
 in character and covers essential data from which the 
 umpire draws conclusions and expresses an opinion 
 uj)on the effectiveness of the fire as affecting the accom- 
 l)lishment of the mission. The "Statistical Record" is a 
 memorandum of the data essential to a thorough 
 analytical study of the exercise, both as to its execution 
 and the material results obtained. 
 
 The U.'mpire's Record 
 The form for the RECtfRu should be simple — The num- 
 ber OF figures hit is the deciding factor — The 
 Umpire's Reit-:rence Tables. 
 Simplicity of Form: 
 
 The data for tiiis record should be of such a character 
 that it can lie ol)tainod quickly without reference to long 
 forunilas, numerous tal)l('s of factors, etc. II must l)c 
 as simple as the ITmpire's Record in a maneuver prob- 
 lem, if not simpler, for tiie criticpic i)ased u])()n this 
 record is never carried into tiie "lecture tent" but deliv- 
 ered on the ground. 
 
 It will l)e noted that the Umpire's Record as ex- 
 l)lained iierein contains all data (except numijcr of hits 
 i'x])ected) referred to in "records," par. 22fi, S. A. F. M., 
 and tliat the excepted data is contained in the "Statis- 
 tical Record." 
 
 The following idea, which controls decisions in man- 
 euvers, should govern in the determination of the char- 
 acter of the "l'in])ire's Record" in a combat exercise: 
 
 "The effect of fire is influenced by so many considera- 
 tions that it is impossil)le to predict the result with 
 accuracy.
 
 264 Battle Fire Training 
 
 "Tliere are many factors whose effect cannot be com- 
 puted. However, by practice in calculating losses in 
 liypotlietical cases, a kiiowledfre of the principal faclors 
 governing the effect of fire is obtained, and a faculty 
 acquired of quickly estimating their influence or effect 
 upon troops. This faculty, umpires are supposed to have 
 acquired by previous study and experience. At maneu- 
 vers there is no time to make complicated calculations 
 or to consult a table of losses ; the umpires, therefore, 
 decide promptly according to their best judgment." — 
 Par. 16, Regulations for Field Maneuvers, U. S. Army. 
 
 Distribution Factor: 
 
 The considerations influencing the effect of fire are 
 numerous and while some of them can be clearly shown 
 in terms of hits made, or figures struck, there are many 
 which must be based entirely on observation and oj^inion. 
 However, so soon as the prikcipal factors are known, 
 ironi a consideration of the record of any firing, a 
 trained umpire can at once express an intelligent deci- 
 sion as to the probable result of the action. What is 
 wanted is a proTupt decision from the best obtainable 
 judgment as to the efficacy of the fire and the solution 
 of the fire problem. 
 
 In order to add force to the decision, it is sometimes 
 advisable to make a comparison with average shots. In 
 order that this comparison may not involve "complicated 
 calculations" various tal)les have been combined in order 
 that the percentage of figures struck may be taken from 
 the t;ii>!(' at a glance and without computation. The 
 combined table represents the result expected from aver- 
 age shots firing at a correct maximum rate and distrib- 
 uting their fire perfectly while using the correct sight 
 setting. 
 
 It must be remembered that the Accomplishment 
 OF THE Mission in a fire problem is based usually ox 
 
 THE number of TARGETS DISABLED. ThE "COMPARISON," 
 therefore, is BASED ON THIS FACTOR. 
 
 Ah Ca])tain Eames expresses it: "The ultimate mea- 
 sure of efficiency is not the percentage of hits, nor the 
 number of hits, l)ut the number of figures disabled in a 
 giien space of time.'' 
 
 Umpire's Reference Tables: 
 
 The tables for use by the umpire in making the com- 
 parison are shown and their use explained below.
 
 Combat Pr/ict'ice 
 
 26t 
 
 The two tallies whicli follow, if printed on both sides 
 of a card of convenient size, would be of value to umpires 
 not only as a ready reference in Judfjiiif; of the results 
 of fire, but also in formulating problems with ball 
 cartridges. 
 
 There are problems in which the use of these tables 
 would lie neither feasible nor necessary, and others in 
 wliich the decision of the umj)ire is amply supported by 
 his own judpnent. So it is not to be understood that 
 the use of these tables is in any sense mandatory, but 
 rather that, when the umpire believes their use possil)le 
 and desirable, they may serve liim as a guide in arriving 
 at a decision or as a st;mdard whereby he may fortify 
 or confirm a decision already made. 
 
 "In all cases wiiere it is a matter of passing on 
 the merits of a combat firing exercise, individual judg- 
 ment must come into play and numerous modifications 
 and allowances be made to suit the particular circum- 
 stances of the case." — Mclver. 
 
 (Oltvorse) 
 
 UMPIRE'S REFERENCE TABLE 
 Pkonk FiurRis 
 Time — Minutes 
 
 Yards 
 
 V4 
 
 66 
 63 
 
 % 
 
 1 
 
 \.\<2 
 
 99 
 
 .991 
 
 99 ,100 
 09 \ 100 
 
 3'/^ 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 15 
 
 20 
 
 25 
 
 30 
 
 200 
 
 4i 
 39 
 
 80 Soi 96 
 7S ftVi 93 
 
 
 300 
 
 30 
 30 
 
 23 
 23 
 
 52 
 51 
 
 41 
 41 
 
 66 
 63 
 
 55 
 
 77 iJ9 
 76 88 
 
 94| 98| 99 
 .9^ 9S. 99 
 
 99 
 99 
 
 98 
 98 
 
 99 
 99 
 
 99 
 99 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 400 
 
 66 
 66 
 
 80 
 80 
 
 88 
 88 
 
 93] 96 
 9»| 96 
 
 
 500 
 
 19 
 16 
 
 ir, 
 
 12 
 
 34 
 29 
 
 28 
 
 22 
 
 46 
 40 
 
 38 
 
 31 
 
 57 
 30 
 
 48 
 
 40 
 
 71 
 63 
 
 62 
 
 5:< 
 
 81 
 
 7.5 
 
 8S; 92 
 sa. 87 
 
 95 
 91 
 
 90 
 
 83 
 
 97 
 94 
 
 92 
 
 87 
 
 99 
 98 
 
 "^ 
 
 92 
 
 99 
 9.9 
 
 98 
 
 95 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 600 
 700 
 
 73 
 63 
 
 80| 86 
 721-78 
 
 -- 
 
 800 
 
 9 
 
 17 
 
 25 
 
 32 
 
 44 
 
 54 
 
 62 68 
 
 5l| 58 
 
 1 
 41| 47 
 
 74 
 64 
 54 
 
 79 
 68 
 57 
 
 85 
 76 
 66 
 
 90 
 
 ~82 
 72 
 
 98 
 94 
 
 88 
 
 99 
 99 
 96 
 
 100 
 99 
 
 100 
 99 
 
 
 900 
 
 7 
 
 13 
 
 19 
 
 25 
 
 35 
 
 44 
 35 
 
 
 1,000 
 
 5 
 
 10 
 
 15 
 
 19 
 
 27 
 
 100 
 
 Note: Figures in body of table indicate the percentage of figures that 
 should be struck. Those in italic indicate "battle sight."
 
 266 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 (Reverse) UMPIRE'S REFERENCE TABLE 
 
 Kneeling Figures 
 Time — Minutes 
 
 Range | | 
 Yards I Vi 1 1/2 
 
 I I 
 1111/2 
 
 73l86 
 72185 
 
 98| 99 
 9S\ 99 
 
 93| 99 
 921 98 
 
 I i 
 
 2 2% 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 100 
 100 
 
 31/2 
 
 I. I 
 
 
 \36 
 
 \39 
 
 174 
 
 \84 
 
 \93\ 
 
 98\ 
 
 96 
 
 88 
 
 99\ 
 
 99 
 
 100\ 
 
 
 
 
 
 500 
 
 32 
 24 
 
 54 
 41 
 
 69 79 
 55\66 
 
 90 
 SO 
 
 98 
 93 
 
 99 
 96 
 
 99 
 98 
 
 100 
 99 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 
 
 600 
 
 26 
 
 46 
 
 60 
 
 70 
 
 84 
 
 91 
 
 95 
 
 99 
 
 99 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 
 
 
 700 
 
 21 
 
 38 
 
 51 
 
 61 
 
 76 
 
 85 
 
 91 
 
 94 
 
 97 
 
 98 
 
 99 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 
 800 
 
 17 
 
 30 
 
 42 
 
 52 
 
 66 
 
 77 
 
 84 
 
 89 
 
 92 
 
 95 
 
 98 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 
 900 
 
 13 
 
 24 
 
 34 
 
 ■ 
 
 42 
 
 56 
 
 67 
 
 75 
 64 
 
 81 
 71 
 
 85 
 
 89 
 
 94 
 87 
 
 97 
 
 
 
 91 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 1,000 
 
 .0 
 
 18|26 
 
 331 46 
 
 1 
 
 56 
 
 76 
 
 80 
 
 99|100 
 
 1 
 
 Note: Figures in body of table indicate the percentage of 
 figures tliat siiould be struck. Tliose in italic indicate "battle 
 sight." 
 
 Use of Tables ik Judging Results of Fire 
 
 General Use in Judging Results — Description of the 
 Tables — Use under Normal Conditions — Use under 
 Variable Conditions. 
 
 General Use in Judging Results: 
 
 All tables of expected results are based on the theory 
 of probability. The tabulated results are therefore 
 "probable" results. Any concrete case is mathematically 
 as likely to result in a higher as in a lower figure and in 
 a great number of cases there will be as many on one 
 side of the "probable" as on the other. 
 
 This fact applied to tables of expected hits from 
 average shots means tliat average shots firing an indefi- 
 nite number of identical problems will have an average 
 result in direct hits equal to that shown in the table,- 
 but with as many results below as above the "probable." 
 When we seek to compare the result attained by a firing
 
 Combat Practice 267 
 
 group in a concrete case with the tabulated probable 
 result of average shots, we should renieniljcr that the 
 averaL'c sliots tluMiisi-ives in the firing would often attain 
 a number of hits higher (or lower) than the probable 
 and that the purpose of the comparison with the prob- 
 ai)le is merely that we may have some standard of com- 
 parison. We would not exj^ect average shots to hit upon 
 this same standard every time they fired nor would we 
 expect the firing group in any concrete case to do so. 
 Judgment is needed to determine whether the departure 
 in the concrete case is normal or abnormal in amount. 
 The fact tliat it is above or below is al)solutely imma- 
 terial, it is only the amount of the departure that is of 
 value in forming a judgment from the comparison. 
 
 Description: 
 
 The amounts in the body of the table indicate the ' 
 percentages of figures that should be struck by any 
 number of average shots firing at an equal number of 
 figures arranged to represent a linear target occupying 
 a front of one yard per figure. These results are based, 
 too, on the further assumption that the correct elevation 
 and rate of fire is used, that the fire is distributed 
 equally throughout the entire front occupied by the 
 target, and that the visibility is normal. 
 
 Of tliese i^ven factors, tlie following four are depen- 
 dent upon the skill and leadersliij) of the firers, i. e., the 
 use of correct elevation and rate of fire, the equal dis- 
 tribution of the fire, and the marksmanship of the indi- 
 vidual rifleman (whether he is good, average, or poor 
 shot). As these factors are, in a .sen.se, within the con- 
 trol of the firers, they may be considered as constant in 
 so far as the use of the table is concerned, or, rather, 
 variable only in that they would serve to indicate whether 
 the jierformance had been good, bad, or indifferent. 
 
 The other three factors — number of figures in the 
 target, number of figures in the target per yard front, 
 and the degree of visil)ility of the target — may vary 
 with every target and exercise, and visibility may vary 
 even for the same target at different hours of the day. 
 
 The object of these tables is to give to the umpire a 
 means, with the minimum of computation, of finding a 
 standard with whicli to compare the results of any firing. 
 The standard adojited is the single amount representing 
 the percentage of casualties that should have been
 
 2(58 Battle Fire Training 
 
 obtained in the ranks of the enemy (number of figures 
 in the target that should have been struck) in a given 
 time. 
 
 In order that the percentages of figures hit can be 
 re;id dircvtiy fro:u the tnlile and thus avoid unnecessary 
 computations in the field, it is suggested, when the char- 
 acter of the problem permits, that the target contain as 
 many figures as there are rifles firing and that the figures 
 be spaced on a frontage of one per yard. 
 Normal Conditions : 
 Example 1. 
 
 At a range of 900 yards, 100 men fire for two minutes 
 nt a line of iOO kneelin<r fifzures on a front of 100 yards. 
 Visibility perfect. In this firing they strike 24 figures. 
 
 'What is the judgment of this result? 
 
 Consult the table headed "Kneeling figures." 
 
 In the column headed "Range, yards" find the amount 
 900. Follow this line to the right until entering the 
 column headed "2" (this corresponds to the time, 2 min- 
 utes, duriilg which the ^fire continued), where is found 
 the amount 67, which is the percentage of figures that 
 should have been struck. How does this compare with 
 the result that was obtained? 
 
 First reduce the percentage of figure* that should 
 have been' struck, 67, to number of figures, in this 
 case G7. 
 
 Then at a glance the umpire can see that, in the 
 allotted time, the firing resulted in a little more than 
 one-third the casualties it should have produced. 
 Variable Conditions : 
 Example 2. Reduced visibility. 
 
 Fifty men fire at 50 prone figures — normal front — for 
 two minutes, at a range of 600 yards. The figures are 
 not well defined. It is manifest that the same results 
 can not be expected on a target of this character as in 
 one that is clearly visible, hence it would seem advisable 
 to lower the standard. It is only a question of how and 
 how much. This is a matter resting entirely upon the 
 judgment of the imipire, who makes an estimate of the 
 increased difficulties presented to the firers and arrives 
 at a decision which he expresses simjily as an opinion, 
 "The visibility of the target is such in this problem that 
 a reduction of efficiency is to be expected. In my
 
 Combat Practice 2G9 
 
 judjriiicnt tlic firing of this organization is satisfactory 
 (deficient, etc.)." 
 
 Should tlic uiii])irc wish to base this opinion upon a 
 computation lie may do so in tlic manner shown below. 
 
 The umpire, knowing the range to i)c (iOO yards, for 
 example, says to himself, "While this actual range is 
 600 yards, the targets aj)pcar to me to jircsent all the 
 difficulties of a clearly visible target at 800 yards and, 
 as there is no aiming point that can be used which is as 
 clearly outlined as the targets themselves, I will judge 
 of this firing by the 800 yard standard." 
 
 Assume .that the fire resulted in 20 figures being 
 struck. Then in the table at the intersection of the 
 SOO yard line and the 2-minute column is found the 
 amount 5t, which is the percentage that should have been 
 struck, in this case 27 figures. 
 Example 3. 
 Numiier of firers differing from the number of figures 
 
 Ml the target. 
 
 Eighty men fire at 40 prone figures for one minute 
 at a range of 700 yards. 
 
 In this case it becomes simj)ly a question of deter- 
 mining in what time it would take a number of riflemen 
 e(jiial to the number of figures in the target to deliver 
 an amount of fire equal to that actually delivered. 
 
 In this case 10 men firing for 2 minutes would give 
 the same amount of fire as 80 men for 1 minute, and 
 therefore .should strike ()39'f, or 25 of the figures. 
 Example 4. 
 'I'argcts on front other than 1 figure jier yard. 
 
 Sixty men fire at fiO prone figures on ci front of 120 
 yards for two minutes at a range of fiOO yards. As the 
 vuliieraliility of this thin line is only half that of a line 
 of normal density, then the standard is sought in the 
 column indicating half the time actually consumed. In 
 this case the amount sought is at the intersection of 
 the f;00-yard line and the 1-minute column and is found 
 to be 18'^, or 29 figures, which is the number of figures 
 that should have been struck. 
 These Tables jiay be used also ix ueteusiinino Com- 
 
 i>Aii;s()N Fact.ws of Time Axn Men — ^And in 
 
 FORMIII-ATING PnOBI.EJIS WITH BaI.I, CAnmilKiES AS TO 
 ni'IlATlON OF FIRE AND Nl'.MBER OF ROUNDS TO BE ISSUED.
 
 270 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Time and Men Comparison: 
 
 (a) What time should have been required by the 
 firers to have gotten the result obtained? 
 
 (I)) How many men with proper sight setting, rate, 
 and distribution could have produced the same number 
 of casualties in the actual time consumed by the firers? 
 
 Considering the first question (a) and referring to 
 the example where 100 men fired for two minutes at a 
 range of 900 yards on 100 kneeling figures on a front 
 of 100 yards with a result of 24 figures, or 24%, struck, 
 visibility perfect: 
 
 Follow the range line (900) to the right until encoun- 
 tering an amount approximately equal to the percentage 
 of figures actually struck. The heading of the time 
 column in which tliis amount is found will be the answer 
 sought, In this example, the percentage 24, is found on 
 the 900-yard line. As this amount, ^4, is found in the 
 yg-minute column, the umpire arrives at the conclusion 
 that the firers should have accomplished what they did 
 in one-half minute. 
 
 Considering the second question (b) and referring 
 to the same example: 
 
 This is answered by solving this simple proportion: 
 
 The time actually consumed : The time that should 
 have been consumed :: Number of men actually firing 
 : The numlier of men required. 
 
 In this example it would be 2 : i/^ : : 100 : x, or 
 X = 25. That is, 25 men should have been able to strike 
 24 out of 100 targets in two minutes' firing. 
 
 Just how many of these bases of comparison are used 
 by the umpire depend upon the nature of the problem 
 and whether, in his judgment, the tactical situation calls 
 for additional emphasis of the need for economy of time 
 or economy of men. 
 Duration of Fire and Number of Rounds: 
 
 (a) How long to continue the fire at any particular 
 target? 
 
 (b) How much ammunition to issue for any par- 
 ticular problem? 
 
 (a) It is obvious that if the fire is continued too 
 long at a target, the percentage of figures struck ceases 
 to be an indication of the efficacy of fire. Thus, for 
 example, no conclusions of value could be drawn from 
 the results of fire continued for more than one minute 
 on kneeling figures at 200 yards, or for more than Sy^ 
 minutes at prone figures at 400 yards.
 
 Combat Practice 271 
 
 Hence in drawinjr tip the jirohleni the uinjiire may 
 decide on what j)erccntaf.'e of iifrurcs lie desires to have 
 strucli in any tariret, and then (from the tal)le) he can 
 determine for what period he can allow thfc fire to 
 continue. 
 
 For exain|)lc: How lonp shall fire, continue in order 
 to strike 30 out of 100 prone fifrures normal front at 
 KOO yards:- From the tahle, ojiposite Ran^e 800 in the 
 1-minute column, is found 32, the nearest percentage 
 to 30. 
 
 For an equal number of rifles, this would he about 
 1 minute. 
 
 For 200 rifles, half the time. 
 
 For .50 rifles, double the time. 
 
 For half the density of target (1 figure per two yards 
 of front), double the time. 
 
 (h) To estimate the amount of ammunition to issue 
 for any ])articular exercise, multi])ly the duration of 
 fire by the correct rate for that range (See Taiile I, 
 under "Statistical Record") or by the umpire's estimated 
 rate. It is advisable to add 10% to this estimate in 
 order to provide ammunition to men who.se rate of fire 
 is greater than that ordered. This is to equalize the 
 ammunition unexpended by men who are using a slower 
 rate than ordered due to either lack of training, ground, 
 or vegetation preventing vitw of assigned targets, to 
 jams, etc. 
 
 Assume an exercise in which four targets of ]>rone 
 figures were to be used and fire to be continued until 
 30 to iO ])er cent of the figures have been struck. The 
 range to Target No. 1 is about 800 yards, to No. 2 is 
 700 yards, to No. 3 is (500 yards, and to No. t is 500 
 yards. 
 
 The issue of anununition would be computed as 
 follows: 
 
 Target Ranqc Time Hate Rounds 
 
 1 80*0 1 5.8 5.8 
 
 2 . . -. 700 1 6.6 6.6 
 
 3 COO % 7.5 5.6 
 
 4 500 % 8.3 6.2 
 
 24.2 
 Add 10% 2.4 
 
 26.6
 
 272 Battle Fire Training 
 
 That is, in this exercise, 30 rounds per man would be 
 • issued — 30 instead of 27 merely to save time by issuing 
 only full clips. 
 
 The Umpire's Record should embody sufficient data 
 concerning the troops on which to b^vse a decision 
 
 AS TO 
 
 1. Leadership and Conduct. 
 
 A. Judged from the Position of the Troops. 
 B> Judged from the Position of the Target. 
 
 2. Fire Effect. 
 
 3. The Accomplishment of the Mission. 
 
 The form should provide for the principal points to 
 observe in the leadership and conduct of troops. It 
 should include such basic factors in the result of their 
 "fire effect" as will assist in quick decisions. The ele- 
 ments considered in 1 and 2 above, taken in connection 
 with a decision as to tlie estimated enemy targets' "fire 
 effect" (a factor too frequently neglected) should form 
 the basis for the umpire's decision as to the accomplish- 
 ment of the mission, expressed above in 3. 
 
 In order to aid the umpire in delivering the critique, 
 the form in detail should cover the following points: 
 1. Leadership and Conduct: 
 
 (A) Judged from the PasUion of the Troops. 
 
 The Major General: 
 
 (a) Effective supervision of battalion. 
 
 (b) Harmonizing ranges. 
 
 (c) Tactical orders. 
 
 (d) Regulating ammunition supply. 
 
 (e) Control of supports. 
 
 (f) Primary apportionment of target. 
 
 (g) Provision for flank protection. 
 
 (h) Observation of enemy and adjoining troops, 
 (i) Depth of de])loyment, extent and density of 
 
 firing line, 
 (j) Fixing bayonets, 
 (k) The charge. 
 fn Attack: 
 
 (a) Selection of formation in which to advance. 
 (1)) Direction of advance. 
 
 (c) Objective for each company. 
 
 (d) The general object or special problem for each 
 
 company or the order and front of each 
 company.
 
 ('o)uh(it Pntct'ice 27*} 
 
 (e) Tlie base ooinpany. 
 
 (f) 'rime or place for optMiiiij^ lire. 
 In Defense: 
 
 (a) Assigninout of sectors. 
 
 (b) Detcriiiination of ranges. 
 
 (c) Coniiminicalioii to companies. 
 Captain. 7.v{ Sergeant, and IhKjlcrs: 
 
 (a) Leader's kiio\vled.ij;e of tlie situation. 
 
 (b) Explanation of the situation to the company. 
 
 (c) Reconnaissance of the target. 
 
 (d) Use of field glasses. 
 
 (e) Dangerous grouping of platoon leaders and 
 
 e-itiiiiators. 
 
 (f) Estimation of tlie range. 
 
 (g) Designation and a])j)ortionTiient of target, 
 (h) Clearness of fire orders to subordinates. 
 
 (i) Advance of the unit to the first firing position. 
 
 (J) Concealment. 
 
 (k) Time of jirepciration from receipt of situation 
 
 to "Commence firing." 
 (1) Oi)servation of fire effect. 
 
 (m) Correction of material errors in sight setting, 
 (n) Orders, if any, for distribution of ammunition. 
 
 Its economical and judicious e.\])endiiu. 
 (o) The position of the 1st Sergeant and Buglers 
 
 and duties performed, 
 (p) Time of cease firing, 
 (q) Signals. 
 
 Plalonn Leaders and Guides: 
 ^.t) Execution of the ca])tain's commands and diree 
 
 tions. 
 (!)) Announcement of correct sight setting. 
 
 (c) (Mearncss in designation of target or aiming 
 
 point. 
 
 (d) Additional instructions given to carry out cap- 
 
 tain's will. 
 
 (e) Correction of sight setting. 
 
 (f) Designation of an aiming jioint. 
 
 (g) Oiiservation of fire effect, 
 (h) U.se of field glasses. 
 
 (i) Orders to platoon guides. 
 (.1) Use of signals. 
 
 (k) Constant communication between jjlatoon lead- 
 ers and captain.
 
 274 Battle Fire Training 
 
 (1) Observation and regulation of the rate of fire, 
 (m) Their positions. 
 Coiyorals : 
 
 (a) Alertness for commands and signals. Proper 
 
 transmission of signals. 
 
 (b) Observation of the conduct of the squad. 
 
 (c) Assistance in enforcing fire discipline and abate- 
 
 ment of excitement. * 
 
 (d) Participation in the firing. 
 
 (e) Their positions. 
 The Privates: 
 
 (a) Use of cover. 
 
 (b) Excitement or confjision. 
 
 (c) Use of announced sight setting and change.-. 
 
 directed. 
 
 (d) Firing on designated objective or in the assigned 
 
 sector and change of target when directed. 
 
 (f) Readily responding to the signals, particularly 
 
 "Commence," "Suspend," and "Cease Firing." 
 (f) Unnecessary cessation of fire, particularly when 
 bayonets were being fixed, sight setting 
 changed, or when supports joined the firing 
 line. 
 
 (B) Judged from the Position of the Target. 
 
 In order that the umpire may draw a more accurate 
 conclusion of the "Leadership and Conduct," an assis- 
 tant, accompanied by a competent signalist, should 
 observe the troo])s, and report on their conduct, from 
 the viewpoint of the enemy. When ball ammunition is 
 not used the assistant should take a position similar to 
 and among the targets. When ball ammunition is used, 
 the assistant should be provided with a periscope (or 
 improvised one), and take a position in the pit or on 
 one flank and on line with the target. In order to aid 
 the assistant who observes the troops from the position 
 of the enemy, the following points may be noted, or a 
 memorandum given him by the umpire; 
 
 Advance of troops discerned from noticeable 
 effect of movement in the animal and plant life, from 
 noises, or from sounds of the voice, bugle, or whistle. 
 
 Formations, preparatory to deployment. 
 
 Groups, exposed in observation. 
 
 Deployment, under fire.
 
 Combat Practice 
 
 275 
 
 Movements by the flank of units and individuals 
 wliile under lire. 
 
 Concealnient of tlie fire direetor and controllers 
 and of the various ])arls of tlie line. 
 Cover of tlie trooi)S while advancing. 
 Signals (flag, arm, and hand) and conclusions 
 drawn from the jjarticular signal observed. For 
 example, SSS, AM, etc. 
 
 Location of the leader by observing messengers 
 going to and from his position, or l)y location of 
 signal flag near him, etc. 
 
 Individual movements, in rear of the firing line. 
 In order that the assistant observing tlie target may 
 better make his report of the exercise, all umjiires and 
 observers near the troojis will remain in rear of the line 
 i)ccu])ied by the leader and will attach a white pocket 
 liaiulUerchicf over the crown of their head-dress. 
 2. Fire Effect. 
 
 1 
 
 Data 
 
 Tahoets 
 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 Accuracy 
 True range 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Estimated range 
 
 
 Direct hits on assigned targets 
 
 Ricochet hits on assigned targets . . . 
 
 Distribution 
 Figures in target 
 
 
 Figures hit (direct hits) 
 
 
 Volume 
 Number of men firing 
 
 
 Number of shots fired 
 
 
 Time 
 
 
 Rate 
 
 
 Comparison — Average Shots 
 Figures hit 
 
 
 
 
 General Comment.
 
 276 Battle Fire Training 
 
 :?. Wan the Mission Accomplished? 
 
 (Umpire) 
 
 2. The Statistical Record. 
 The Statistical Record, bv whoji kept — Its Disposi- 
 
 Tiox — The Form for Record. 
 By Whom Kept : . 
 
 The Statistical Record of combat firing Is kept by 
 the Statistical Officer under the direction of the Umpire. 
 
 Disj^osition: 
 
 The Statistical Officer makes such disposition of the 
 records as the Umpire may direct. 
 
 The Form,: 
 
 ■ The form shown below is a convenient one, though 
 no particular form is prescribed. It is believed, how- 
 ever, tliat the data included on this form are essential 
 to a thorough analysis of any firing. 
 
 The columns lieaded "Target 1," "Target 2," etc., 
 may be used to record the results on several targets, on 
 a single target from several firing points, on several 
 fractions of a single line, or, when the firing is at a 
 single target from a single firing point, to record the 
 results obtained by successive "orders," thus keeping, 
 on a single sheet, the results of as many repetitions of 
 the same exercise as there are columns in which to 
 record them. 
 
 In case certain items of the record are found to be 
 not pertinent to certain exercises, they may be omitted 
 at the discretion of the Umpire. 
 
 Both the "Umpire's Record" and the "Statistical 
 Record" should be printed on yellow or green unglazed 
 paper in order to reduce the glare and resulting eye- 
 strain when used in the bright unshaded sunlight of the 
 target range. 
 
 Statistical Record of Combat Firing 
 
 Organization Commanding. 
 
 Exercise Order School of Musketry, 
 
 Ft. SiU, Okla., 19...
 
 Coinhdt Pfdctirc 
 
 277 
 
 Tlit^ 
 
 
 ^1 
 
 e 
 
 
 6-1 
 
 
 Hits: 
 Direct, in sector or on 
 assigned ob jective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ricochet, in sector or on 
 assifrned ob jective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Outside sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 True range 
 
 
 
 
 
 Visibility | 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kstirnated ranee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Firing data used: 
 
 Elevation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Deflection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Aiming point 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figures in target: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Numi)er and kind in sector 
 or ob jective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Nunii)er per yard of front. . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Struck by ricochets only 
 
 
 
 
 
 Struck outside sector or 
 ob jective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Center of impact 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 278 
 
 Battle Fire Training 
 
 RESULT COMPARED WITH STANDARD 
 
 (Same time and s 
 
 trength) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 00 
 
 "i 
 
 CO 
 
 
 e 
 
 s 
 
 e 
 
 
 s 
 
 00 
 
 
 8 
 
 e 
 
 00 
 
 Accuracy : 
 Hits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Distribution: 
 Figures struck 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Volume: 
 Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Time 
 
 
 Shots 
 
 
 Men 
 
 
 
 
 Ricochets included, 
 yes or no 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 COMPARISONS ON OTHER BASES 
 
 (a) Comparative 
 
 strengths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (b) Comparative 
 
 time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (c) Hits expected for 
 shots fired 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (d) Distribution ex- 
 pected for hits 
 made 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Remarks 
 
 Statistical Officer. 
 
 Statistical Officer's Sources of Information 
 The information required by the Statistical Officer 
 for the completion of his record is obtained, in 
 general, by observation — From the Umpire — From
 
 Combat Practice 279 
 
 THE Range Okiker Fuo.-m the C'd.^uiander of the 
 
 FIRING unit — By computation. 
 By Observation: 
 
 Estimated range. 
 
 Firing data used. 
 
 Time. 
 From the Umpire: 
 
 Visibility. 
 
 Ricochets included, yes or no. 
 From the Range Officer: 
 
 True range. 
 
 Number of figures in target per yard front. 
 
 Number and kind of figures within the sector, or 
 assigned ol)jective. 
 
 Hits, direct and ricochet, obtained within and without 
 the sector or assigned objective. 
 
 Figures struck within and without the sector, or 
 assigned ol)jectlve. 
 
 Figures struck by ricochets only. 
 
 Center of impact. 
 From the Commander of the un't firing: 
 
 Number of men firing. 
 
 Number of .shots fired. 
 By Computation: 
 
 Such further entries as are recjiiircd in tlio record, 
 lie obtains by comjiutation. 
 
 Entries in the Record 
 Entries in the Record should inci.i'de Hits True 
 
 Range — Visibii.itv — Estimated Range — Pairing Data 
 
 USED — Figures in the Target- Center ok Iimtact. 
 Hits: 
 
 After tlie firing is completed and the targets have 
 been marked, the Statistical Ollicer secures a record of 
 the hits obtained, direct and ricochet, within and without 
 the sector, or assigned objective, from the Range Officer 
 or from tlie signal sfpiad as is most convenient. In case 
 the Statistical Officer's post is some distance from the 
 signal station, then arrangements sliould be made to have 
 this information sent to him jiromptly iiy messenger. 
 
 In case all the figures in tlie target lie within the 
 limits of the olijective or sector, then, obviously, there 
 would be no entry on the line "outside sector." 
 
 Whether or not ricochets are to be scored and 
 recorded separately will depend upon the nature of the
 
 280 Battle Fire Training 
 
 exercise and will be decided in each case by the umpire. 
 However, it must be noted that the tables are based on 
 direct hits only. 
 True Range: 
 
 This is obtained from the Range Officer and should 
 be the result of an exact measurement, not an estimate. 
 Visibility : 
 
 The tables from which the standard of comparison is 
 obtained, as explained hereafter, are based upon the 
 hypothesis that the target or aiming point is clearly 
 visible, thus expressing- the probable maximum of 
 expectancy. 
 
 When this condition does not exist — and it seldom 
 does in field firing — it becomes necessary to modify the 
 standard by reducing it to meet existing conditions. The 
 amount of this reduction is termed the "visibility," and 
 is the opinion of the umpire expressed in terms of range. 
 For example, the true range to a target being 600 yards, 
 the umpire may estimate the visibility as "650." That is 
 to say, it is his belief that the conditions are such that 
 the probable maximum result to be expected is the same 
 as when firing at a clearly visible target at 650 yards, 
 and that the standard is to be computed on that basis. 
 Estimated Range: 
 
 The estimated range may or may not agree with the 
 sight setting announced. 
 
 During the progress of the exercise, the Statistical 
 Officer remains in the vicinity of the commander of the 
 unit engaged in the practice and, by close observation, 
 learns the estimated ranges. Should the result of his 
 observation leave him doubtful as to the correct figures, 
 he may inquire of the unit commander after the firing 
 is completed or at such other time as not to interrupt 
 the progress of the exercise. 
 Firing Data Used: 
 
 Elevation. 
 Deflection. 
 Aiming point. 
 
 The Statistical Officer obtains this information in the 
 same manner in which he obtains the estimated range, 
 i. e., by observation and inquiry. 
 
 When an auxiliary aiming point is used, it is recorded 
 briefly as "tree," "bush," "rock," "house," "hedge," etc., 
 and it sometimes may be of advantage also to note its
 
 Combat Practice 281 
 
 distance and direction from tlic target. This may be 
 done by recording the distance (in mils) in Arabic 
 immerals, followed by the direction (clock notation — tar- 
 get at center of vertical clock) recorded in Roman 
 numerals. Thus "Tree-50-IV" would mean that the 
 aiming point was a tree 50 mils from the target in the 
 direction of four o'clock. 
 Figures in Target: 
 
 Number and kind in sector, or assigned objective. 
 Number per yard of front. 
 Struck by ricochets only. 
 Struck outside sector, or assigned objective. 
 This information is obtained !)y the Statistical Officer 
 from the Range Officer. The first two items may be 
 obtained from the statement of the exercise. 
 Center of Iinpnct: 
 
 This information is obtained from the Range Officer 
 or from the Signal Squad, as is most convenient. The 
 Statistical Officer is informed as to whether the fire was 
 equally distrii)uted throughout the entire front of the 
 target or v^as concentrated in one or more well-defined 
 .shot groups. The record should be brief, and, merely 
 for the sake of uniformity, the following abbreviations 
 are suggested. With reference to the target, R, L, and C 
 refer to its right, left, and center. 
 
 Right R 
 
 Left L 
 
 Center C 
 
 Right center quarter RC/4 
 
 Left center fifth LC/5 
 
 Center third C/3 
 
 Right half R/2 
 
 Di.stril)uted Dist. 
 
 Should there be any a]>pareiit necessity for more 
 precise information than can be given in this manner, 
 it is better to divide the front of the objective into .sev- 
 eral parts and to obtain a separate record of the hits 
 and distribution in each part. Certain exercises might 
 retjuire that a record be kejit of the numiier of hits on 
 each figure in the target. In such cases, this informa- 
 tion would l)e recorded on a separate sheet and attached 
 to the record, when entries in the body of the record 
 might lead to confusion or misunderstanding.
 
 282 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Result Compared with Standard 
 There are several standards by which the materlal 
 results of combat firing may be judged, but the 
 one here used is an expression of the probable 
 
 result to be expected from an equal NU3IBER OF 
 
 avt:rage shots firing at the correct rate and with 
 
 THE correct elevation AND FOR THE SAME LENGTH 
 OF TIME. 
 
 Entries under Standard should include Hits — 
 Figures Struck — Rate — Tijie — Shots — Men — Rico- 
 chets included, yes or no. 
 
 To compute the standard, the Statistical Officer must 
 have at hand the following data: 
 Visibility, 
 
 Time, or endurance of the fire, in minutes. 
 Number of men firing, and 
 Number and kind of figures in the target. 
 An example will serve best to show the method of 
 arriving at the standard. 
 
 Assume the following data: Range 500, Visibility 
 G50, time 2 minutes, men 100, figures in target 100 
 kneeling. 
 Hits : 
 
 Consult Table I. In the left hand column, headed 
 "Range Yards," find tlie figure "650" (visibility). Fol- 
 low this 650 line to the right until entering the sub- 
 column "Kneel" (kinds of figures in the target) in the 
 column "No. of hits." Here is found the amount 
 "1.074," which is the numljer of hits to be expected from 
 one average shot in one minute. This amount multiplied 
 by 2 (time) gives 2.148, or the number of hits to be 
 expected from one average sliot in two minutes. This 
 product multiplied by 100 (men) gives 214.8, which is 
 the number of hits to be expected from 100 men firing 
 for two minutes and is vhe standard souglit. Fractions 
 less than y^ ordinarily are disregarded and so this 
 would be recorded as 215. 
 Figures Struck: 
 
 Taking the probable number of hits (215) as the 
 basis, first find the number of times each figure in the 
 target would be struck on the average. As there are 
 100 figures in the target and there are 215 hits, then 
 215 divided by 100 would give the average number of 
 hits per figure, or 2.15. Consult Table II. In the col-
 
 Combat Prdctice 283 
 
 limn "!1" fiiul tlu- amount 2.15. Tlicii tlic amount on 
 tlu- same line in tlic adjacent colunni "D" to the ripht 
 cxj)re.s.se.s the jicroontafrc of figures in the tarjret that 
 should he strucic witii a fire equally di.strii)uted throufih- 
 out the entire front of the ohjectivc. In the jiresent 
 instance the amount 2.15 is found in column H. Dis- 
 regardinp fractions less than Va as equal to 1, the 
 amount taken from column D is 88. As this amount 
 expresses percentage only as it is a number that is 
 sought, then 88 multiplied by the number of figures in 
 the target (100) and this product divided by 100 will 
 give the number of figures that should have been struck. 
 In this case, as the numl)cr of figures in the target is 
 an even 100, the number and percentage are the same, 
 88. Using the Umpire's Reference Table, Kneeling 
 Figures, and interpolating for Range ()50 in the 2-niinute 
 column, the percentage is found to be 88. 
 Rate: 
 
 The expected rate of fire, expressed in shots per man 
 per minute, is found in Table I at the intersection of the 
 line corresponding to the visii)ility G50 with the column 
 headed "Rate of Fire." In this example it is 7.0. 
 Time: 
 
 The time recorded under "Standard" and under 
 "Result" are identical, i. e., it is the actual duration of 
 the fire in minutes. 
 
 The Statistical Officer often will find his computa- 
 tions simplified if, in recording the time, he will express 
 fractional parts of a minute decimally instead of as 
 .seconds. 
 Shot a: 
 
 This is the numl)cr of shots that would have i)eon 
 fired had the correct rate l)cen used. Multiply the rate 
 l)y the time and this ])roduct by the number of men. 
 
 In this example, 7 (the rate as found in the table) 
 times 2 (the time in minutes) times 100 (the number 
 of men firing) equals 1,4'00, which is the number of sliots 
 that should have been fired. 
 Men: 
 
 This is the numiier of men in the firing line who did 
 or should have used their rifles in the exercise in ques- 
 tion. The men recorded under "Standard" and "Result" 
 are the same.
 
 284 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Ricochets Included, Yes or No: 
 
 Under certain conditions, it might be expected that 
 a given number of ricochets would occur in addition to 
 tiie direct hits found from Table I. In such a case, the 
 Umpire would decide upon whether or not he desired 
 to consider the ricochets separately and if so, he would 
 notify the Statistical Officer as to the percentage to be 
 expected. The recording of this amount as "20%," for 
 example, under "Standard," would indicate that ricochets 
 were to be included and that 20% were to be expected 
 in addition to the direct hits. If the Umpire decides 
 that ricochets are not to be considered, then the word 
 "No" appears in place of the percentage. 
 
 In case ricochets are considered, the Statistical Officer 
 increases the expected hits as found in the table by the 
 percentage of ricochets as announced by the Umpire. 
 He then uses this increased number of hits in his fur- 
 ther computations. 
 The entries under Result should include Hits — 
 
 Figures Struck — Rate— Time — Shots — Men — Rico- 
 chets Included, Yes or No. 
 Hits and Figures Strvck: 
 
 These amounts are the ones obtained from the Range 
 Officer as explained above, and include ricochets or not, 
 as directed by the Umpire. 
 Rate: 
 
 This is the rate of fire actually obtained and is 
 found by dividing the total number of cartridges fired 
 by the product of the men and time. 
 Time, Shots, Men: 
 
 This is merely a record of fact as to the duration 
 of the fire, the total number of shots fired, and the num- 
 ber of men in the firing line who did or should have 
 used their rifles during the exercise. 
 Ricochets Included, Yes or No: 
 
 This is a statement as to whether or not the results 
 recorded under hits and figures struck include rico- 
 chets. It would be unusual to include ricochets in the 
 standard and not in the result, or vice versa. 
 
 COJIPARISONS ON OTHER BaSES SHOULD INCLUDE CoMPARA- 
 
 Ti\TE Strengths — Comparativt: Time — Hits expected 
 
 FOR shots fired DISTRIBUTION EXPECTED FOR HITS 
 
 MADE. 
 
 Comparative Strengths : 
 
 A given firing line produces a given number of 
 casualties in the enemy's ranks (strikes a given number
 
 Combat I'rtictice 285 
 
 of figures in the target) in a given time. What is sought 
 tlien is how many riflemen of average ability, using the 
 correct elevation and rate, and distributing their fire 
 equally tiiroughout tiie entire front of the target will be 
 required to produce the same munber of casualties in 
 tiie same time. 
 
 This may be found from the "Um])ire's Reference 
 Tables," as previously explained, or, if more precise 
 results are desired, by. the solution of the following 
 equation: 
 
 H N 
 
 Ms = , in which 
 
 BTF 
 M is the number of men (standard conditions) 
 
 producing results. 
 H is an amount found from the distribution 
 
 table. Table II, as hereinafter shown. 
 N is the number of figures in the target — within 
 
 the sector, or assigned objective. 
 B is an amount found from Table I, as herein- 
 after shown. 
 T is tlie time or duration of the fire in minutes. 
 F is the number of figures in the target per j^ard 
 of front. 
 To find the value of H, multiply the number of fig- 
 ures struck by 100 and tlien divide this jiroduct by the 
 number of figures in the target. Consult Table II and 
 find an equal amount to this quotient in Column D. 
 The amount on the same line, in column H to the left, 
 is the value of H sought. 
 Example: 
 
 Numi)cr of figures in target, 50. 
 Number of figures struck, 2(). 
 Tlien 2H X 100 : .50 - 52, and in the cohmm D of 
 Table II (fourtli column from the left) is found the 
 amount 51.8, whicii is the closest ajiproximation to 52. 
 In the column II to the left and on the same line is 
 found the amount 0.73, which is the value of H sought. 
 To find the zHilue of B. consult Table I. In the col- 
 umn "No. of Hits," select tlie apj)ro])riate sui)-column 
 dej>cnding upon the kind of fitrures (kneeling or ]>rone) 
 in the target. The value of B sought will be found at
 
 286 Battle Fire Training 
 
 the intersection of this sub-column with the line corre- 
 sponding to the visibility. 
 Example: 
 
 Prone figures. 
 Visibility, 800. 
 Follow the 800 line to the right until entering the 
 column "No. of hits, prone," there is found the amount 
 .384, which is the value of B sought. 
 
 Example of use of equation: 
 Number of figures struck, 43. 
 Number of figures in target, 65 kneeling. 
 Visibility, 950. 
 
 Figures in target per yard of front, i/o. 
 Time, 2 minutes. 
 Substituting in the equation: 
 
 1.08 (H) X 65 (N) 70.20 
 
 M, = = = 148. 
 
 0.474 (B) X 2 (T) X 1/3 (F) .474 
 That is, it would take 148 average shots, to strike 43 
 out of 65 kneeling figures in two minutes. 
 
 Comparative Time: 
 
 How much time should be used by average shots of 
 a given number to strike a given number of figures? 
 
 This can be found, in the same manner as the com- 
 parative strength, from the Umpire's Reference Table, 
 or, with greater precision, by a transposition of the 
 above equation to read 
 
 HN 
 "p n= 
 
 BMF 
 
 The values are the same as in the original equation 
 except tliat T c is the time or duration of the fire in 
 minutes (standard conditions) producing equal results. 
 
 Hits expected for shots fired: 
 
 Consult Table I. Multiply the percentage of hits, 
 as found on the line corresponding to the visibility, by 
 the number of shots fired. The product is the number 
 of hits expected for shots fired. 
 
 Distribution expected for hits made: 
 
 Solve as "figures struck" under "Standard."
 
 Combat Practice 
 
 281 
 
 SrATisTiCAr. Oi-i'ickh's Tabi.ks 
 The Rate ok Fiue and the Percektage and Number ok 
 Hits, on the prone and kneeling figures, expected 
 
 AT EACH RANGE, ARE SHOWN IN TaBI.E I. TlIE PER- 
 CENTAGE OF Figures in a Linear Target that should 
 
 BE STRUCK BY AN EVENLY DISTRIBUTED FIRE, BASED ON 
 THE AVERAGE NU.MBER OF HITS PER FIGURE, IS SHOWN 
 
 IN Table II. 
 
 TABLE I 
 
 Range 
 
 Rate of 
 Fire 
 
 % of Hits 
 
 No. of 
 
 Hits 
 
 Yards 
 
 Prone 
 
 Kneel 
 
 Prone 
 
 Kneel 
 
 200 
 
 10.833 
 
 20.05 
 18.52 
 
 33.41 
 33.05 
 
 2.172 
 2.006 
 
 3.619 
 3.580 
 
 250 
 
 10.416 
 
 16.78 
 16.01 
 
 29.19 
 28.61 
 
 1.748 
 1.668 
 
 3.041 
 2.980 
 
 300 
 
 10.000 
 
 14.49 
 14.08 
 
 25.87 
 25.59 
 
 1.449 
 1.408 
 
 2.587 
 2.559 
 
 350 
 
 9.583 
 
 12.91 
 12.89 
 
 23.40 
 2i.41 
 
 1.237 
 1.235 
 
 2.242 
 2.148 
 
 400 
 
 9.166 
 
 11.67 
 11.62 
 
 21.40 
 19.72 
 
 1.070 
 1.065 
 
 1.962 
 1.808 
 
 450 
 
 8.750 
 
 10.79 
 10.05 
 
 19.88 
 16.13 
 
 .944 
 .980 
 
 1.740 
 1.411 
 
 500 
 
 8.333 
 
 10.00 
 8.30 
 
 18.57 
 12.86 
 
 .833 
 .692 
 
 1.547 
 1.072 
 
 550 
 
 7.916 
 
 9.30 
 
 17.35 
 
 .736 
 
 1.374 
 
 600 
 
 7.500 
 
 8.65 
 
 16.22 
 
 .649 
 
 1.217 
 
 650 
 
 7.083 
 
 8.05 
 
 15.16 
 
 .570 
 
 1.074 
 
 700 
 
 6.666 
 
 7.54 
 
 14.17 
 
 .503 
 
 .945 
 
 750 
 
 6.250 
 
 7.03 
 
 18.27 
 
 .439 
 
 .829 
 
 800 
 
 5.833 
 
 6.59 
 
 12.45 
 
 .384 
 
 .726 
 
 850 
 
 5.416 
 
 6.18 
 
 11.71 
 
 .335 
 
 .034 
 
 900 
 
 5.000 
 
 5.78 
 
 11.00 
 
 .289 
 
 .550 
 
 950 
 
 4..'.8:< 
 
 5.42 
 
 10. ;m 
 
 .248 
 
 .474 
 
 1.000 
 
 4.100 
 
 5.12 
 
 '.>.77 
 
 .213 
 
 .407 
 
 Amounts in italic indicate "battle sight." 
 
 The degree of preci.sion desirable in the u.se of thi.s 
 table i.s dependent upon the duration of tlu- fire and ujion 
 the anif)unt of aininunition cx|)end(d. In "Rate of Fire" 
 and "No. of Hits," use one ]iiace of deciniais wIumi firinp 
 les.s than ~> minutes, two ])laces wlien firirifr less tlian 10 
 minutes, and three places when firinp more than 10 min- 
 utes. In "% of Hits," use no fraction when less than
 
 288 Battle Fire Training 
 
 100 shots are fired, one place of decimals when less than 
 1,000 are fired, and two places when more than 1,000 
 are fired. 
 
 The amounts in the body of the table under "Rate 
 of Fire" indicate shots per man per minute when firing 
 at the correct rate. 
 
 The amounts under "% of Hits" indicate the percent- 
 ages of hits to be expected from average shots on lines 
 of prone or kneeling figures occupying a frontage of 
 one yard per figure. For different spacing of the tar- 
 gets, multiply the amount in the table by the number of 
 figures per yard of front. 
 
 The amounts under "No. of Hits" indicate the num- 
 ber of hits to be expected from one average shot in one 
 minute (correct rate and elevation being used) on lines 
 of prone or kneeling figures occupying a frontage of 
 one yard per figure. For different spacing of targets, 
 multiply the amount given in the table by the number 
 of figures per yard front. 
 
 The amounts in the body of the table are based upon 
 the further supposition that the targets are clearly 
 visible.
 
 Combat Practice 
 
 289 
 
 TABLE II 
 
 H D 
 
 H D H D H D 
 
 H D 
 
 0.01 
 
 1.0 
 
 0.41 133.6 
 
 0.81 
 
 55.5 
 
 1.42 
 
 75.8 
 
 2.55 
 
 92.2 
 
 0.02 
 
 2.0 
 
 0.42 
 
 34.3 
 
 0.82 
 
 56.0 
 
 1.44 
 
 76.3 
 
 2.60 
 
 92.6 
 
 0.03 
 
 3.0 
 
 0.43 
 
 34.9 
 
 0.83 
 
 56.4 
 
 1.46 
 
 76.8 
 
 
 
 0.04 
 
 3.9 
 
 0.44 
 
 35.6 
 
 0.84 
 
 56.8 
 
 1.48 
 
 77.2 
 
 2.65 
 
 92.9 
 
 0.05 
 
 4.9 
 
 0.45 
 
 36.2 
 
 0.85 
 
 57.3 
 
 1.50 
 
 77.7 
 
 2.70 
 
 93.3 
 
 0.06 
 
 5.8 
 
 0.46 
 
 36.9 
 
 0.86 
 
 57.7 
 
 1.52 
 
 78.1 
 
 
 
 0.07 
 
 6.8 
 
 0.47 
 
 37.5 
 
 0.87 
 
 58.1 
 
 1.54 
 
 78.6 
 
 2.75 
 
 93.6 
 
 0.08 
 
 7.7 
 
 0.48 
 
 38.1 
 
 0.88 
 
 58.5 
 
 1.56 
 
 79.0 
 
 2.80 
 
 93.9 
 
 0.09 
 
 8.6 
 
 0.49 
 
 38.7 
 
 0.89 
 
 58.9 
 
 1.58 
 
 79.4 
 
 
 
 0.10 
 
 9.5 
 
 0.50 
 
 39.4 
 
 0.90 
 
 59.3 
 
 1.60 
 
 79.8 
 
 2.85 
 2.90 
 
 94.2 
 94.5 
 
 0.11 
 
 10.6 
 
 0.51 
 
 40.0 
 
 0.91 
 
 59.8 
 
 1.62 
 
 80.2 
 
 
 
 0.12 
 
 11.3 
 
 0.52 
 
 40.5 
 
 0.92 
 
 60.2 
 
 1.64 
 
 80.6 
 
 2.95 
 
 94.8 
 
 0.13 
 
 12.2 
 
 0.53 
 
 41.1 
 
 0.93 
 
 60.6 
 
 1.66 
 
 81.0 
 
 3.00 
 
 95.0 
 
 0.14 
 
 13.1 
 
 0.54 
 
 41.7 
 
 0.94 
 
 60.9 
 
 1.68 
 
 81.4 
 
 
 
 0.15 
 
 13.9 
 
 0.55 
 
 42.3 
 
 0.95 
 
 61.3 
 
 1.70 
 
 81.7 
 
 3.25 
 
 96.4 
 
 O.IC 
 
 14.8 
 
 0.56 
 
 42.9 
 
 0.96 
 
 61.7 
 
 1.72 
 
 82.1 
 
 3.50 
 
 97.8 
 
 0.17 
 
 15.6 
 
 0.57 
 
 43.4 
 
 0.97 
 
 62.1 
 
 1.74 
 
 82.4 
 
 
 
 0.18 
 
 16.5 
 
 0.58 
 
 44.0 
 
 0.98 
 
 62.5 
 
 1.70 
 
 82.8 
 
 3.75 
 
 98.3 
 
 0.19 
 
 17.3 
 
 0.59 
 
 44.6 
 
 0.99 
 
 62.8 
 
 1.78 
 
 83.1 
 
 4.00 
 
 98.7 
 
 0.20 
 
 18.1 
 
 0.60 
 
 45.1 
 
 1.00 
 
 63.2 
 
 1.80 
 
 83.5 
 
 4.50 
 
 99.0 
 
 0.21 
 
 18.9 
 
 0.61 
 
 45.7 
 
 1.02 
 
 63.9 
 
 1.82 
 
 83.8 
 
 5.00 
 
 99.3 
 
 0.22 
 
 19.7 
 
 0.62 
 
 46.2 
 
 1.04 
 
 64.7 
 
 1.84 
 
 84.1 
 
 
 
 0.23 
 
 20.5 
 
 0.63 
 
 46.7 
 
 1.06 
 
 65.4 
 
 1.86 
 
 84.4 
 
 5.50 
 
 99.5 
 
 0.24 
 
 21.3 
 
 0.64 
 
 47.2 
 
 1.08 
 
 66.0 
 
 1.88 
 
 84.7 
 
 6.00 
 
 99.8 
 
 0.25 
 
 22.1 
 
 0.65 
 
 47.8 
 
 1.10 
 
 66.7 
 
 1.90 
 
 85.0 
 
 
 
 0.26 
 
 22.9 
 
 0.66 
 
 48.3 
 
 1.12 
 
 67.4 
 
 1.92 
 
 85.3 
 
 
 
 0.27 
 
 23.7 
 
 0.67 
 
 48.9 
 
 1.14 
 
 68.0 
 
 1.94 
 
 85.6 
 
 
 
 0.28 
 
 24.4 
 
 0.68 
 
 49.4 
 
 1.16 
 
 68.6 
 
 1.96 
 
 85.9 
 
 
 
 0.29 
 
 25.2 
 
 0.69 
 
 49.8 
 
 1.18 
 
 69.3 
 
 1.98 
 
 86.2 
 
 
 
 0.30 
 
 26.0 
 
 0.70 
 
 50.3 
 1 
 
 1.20 
 
 69.9 
 
 2.00 
 
 86.5 
 
 
 
 0.31 
 
 26.7 
 
 0.71 
 
 50.8 
 
 1.22 
 
 70.5 
 
 2.05 
 
 87.1 
 
 
 
 0.32 
 
 27.4 
 
 0.72 
 
 51.3 
 
 1.24 
 
 71.1 
 
 2.10 
 
 87.7 
 
 
 
 0.33 
 
 28.1 
 
 0.73 
 
 51.8 
 
 1.26 
 
 71.6 
 
 2.15 
 
 88.4 
 
 
 
 0.34 
 
 28 8 
 
 0.74 
 
 52.3 
 
 1.28 
 
 72.2 
 
 2.20 
 
 88.9 
 
 
 
 0.35 
 
 29.5 
 
 0.75 
 
 52.8 
 
 1.30 
 
 72.7 
 
 2.25 
 
 89.5 
 
 
 
 0.3C 
 
 30.2 
 
 0.76 
 
 53.2 
 
 1.32 
 
 73.3 
 
 2.30 
 
 90.0 
 
 
 
 0.37 
 
 30.9 
 
 0.77 
 
 53.7 
 
 1.34 
 
 73.8 
 
 2.35 
 
 90.4 
 
 
 
 0.38 
 
 31.6 
 
 0.78 
 
 54.2 
 
 1.36 
 
 74.3 
 
 2.40 
 
 90.9 
 
 
 
 0.39 
 
 32.3 
 
 0.79 
 
 54.6 
 
 1.38 
 
 74.8 
 
 2.45 
 
 91.4 
 
 
 
 0.40 
 
 32.9 
 
 0.80 
 
 55.0 
 
 1 
 
 1.40 
 
 75.3 
 
 2.50 
 
 91.8 
 
 
 
 If every fiprure in the target is hit H times on the 
 average, then from table, D ])cr cent of tlie figures will 
 be hit.
 
 290 Battle Fire Training 
 
 INFANTRY DRILL REGULATIONS 
 
 Arm Signals 
 
 43. The following arm signals are prescribed. In 
 making signals either arm may be used. Officers who 
 receive signals on the firing line "repeat back" at once 
 to prevent misunderstanding. 
 
 Forward, march. Carry the hand to the shoulder; 
 straigiiten and hold the arm horizontally, thrusting it in 
 direction of marcli. 
 
 This signal is also used to execute quick time from 
 double time. 
 
 Halt. Carry the hand to the shoulder; thrust the 
 hand upward and hold the arm vertically. 
 
 Double lime, march. Carry the hand to the shoulder; 
 rapidly tlirust the hand upward the full extent of the 
 arm several times. 
 
 Squads right, march. Raise the arm laterally until 
 horizontal; carry it to a vertical position above the head 
 and swing it several times between the vertical and 
 horizontal positions. 
 
 Squads left, m,arch. Raise the arm laterally imtil 
 horizontal; carry it downward to the side and swing it 
 several times between the downward and horizontal 
 positions. 
 
 Squads right about, march (if in close order) or. 
 To (he rear, march (if in skirmish line). Extend the 
 arm vertically above the head; carry it laterally down- 
 wai-d to tiie side and swing it several times between the 
 vertical and downward positions. 
 
 Change direction or Column right (left), march. The 
 hand on the side toward which the change of direction 
 is to be made is carried across the body to the opposite 
 shoulder, forearm horizontal; then swing in a horizontal 
 plane, arm extended, pointing in the new direction. 
 
 As skirmishers, march. Raise both arms laterally 
 until horizontal. 
 
 As skirmishers, guide center, march. Raise both arms 
 laterally until horizontal; swing both simultaneously 
 upward until vertical and return to the horizontal; 
 repeat several times. 
 
 As skirmishers, guide right (left), march. Raise both 
 arms laterally until horizontal; hold the arm on the 
 side of the guide steadily in the horizontal position; 
 swing the other upward until vertical and return it to 
 the horizontal; repeat several times.
 
 Signals 291 
 
 .{.iKcnihle, mnrch. Raise tlic arm vertically to its full 
 extent and describe Iiorizoiital circles. 
 
 Ranffe, or Chancre elevation. To announce rarKje, 
 extend the arm toward the leaders or men for wVioni the 
 signal. is intended, fist closed; by oju-ninf; and closing 
 llie fist, exjiose thunii) and fingers to a number ecpial to 
 the hundreds of yards; to add 50 yards describe a short 
 horizontal line with forefinger. To chaiu/e elevation, 
 indicate the amount of increase or decrease by fingers as 
 above; ))oint u])ward to indicate increase and downward 
 to indicate decrease. 
 
 Svspend firing. Raise and hold the forearm steadily 
 in a horizontal {position in front of the forehead, j)aliu 
 of the hand to the front. 
 
 Cease firing. Raise the forearm as in suspend firing 
 and swing it up and down several times in front of ihe 
 face. 
 
 Platoon. Extend the arm horizontally toward the 
 platoon leader; descrii)e small circles with the hand. 
 (See par. H.) 
 
 Squad. Extend the arm horizontally toward tlr. })la- 
 toon leader; swing the hand up and down from the wri.st. 
 (See par. 44.) 
 
 Rush. Same as double time. 
 
 44. The signals platoon and squad are intended ))ri- 
 marily for communication l)etween the captain a"d liis 
 platoon leaders. The signal platoon or squad indicates 
 tliat the platoon conunander is to cause the signal uliich 
 follows to be executed by platoon or scjuad. 
 
 iNrANTRY DrII.I, REGULATIONS 
 ClIANGEa I 
 
 No. 14. \ 
 
 War Dkpartment, 
 
 Washington, May 18, lOlG. 
 raragra|)h 43, Infantry Drill Regulations (corrected 
 to November, 1913), is changed as follows: 
 
 Insert after eighth line, ])age 19, the following: 
 What range are i/ou using.' or What is the range? 
 Extend the arms toward the yierson addressed, one hand 
 open, palm to the front, resting on the other hand, fist 
 clo.sed.
 
 292 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Are you ready? or / am ready. Raise the hand, 
 fingers extended and joined, pahii toward the person 
 addressed. 
 
 Commence firing. Move the arm extended in full 
 length, hand palm down, several times through a hori- 
 zontal arc in front of the body. 
 
 Fire faster. Execute raj)idly the signal "Commence 
 firing." 
 
 Fire slower. Execute slowly the signal "Commence 
 firing." 
 
 To stt'intj the cone of fire to the right, or left. Extend 
 the arm in full length to the front, palm to the right 
 (left); swing the arm to right (left), and point in the 
 direction of the new target. 
 
 Fi.c bayonet. Simulate the movement of the right 
 hand in "Fix bayonet" (paragraph 95). — C. I. D. R., 
 No. 14, May IS, 1916. 
 
 Changes \ 
 No^l3. j War Department, 
 
 Washington, February 4, 1916. 
 Paragraph 47, Infantry Drill Regulations (edition 
 approved August 19, 1911, and edition corrected to 
 November, 1913), as amended by C. I. D. R. No. 9, 
 W. D., 1914, is rescinded and the following substituted 
 therefor: 
 
 47. (1) For communication between the firing line 
 and the reserve or commander in the rear, the subjoined 
 signals (Signal Corps codes) are prescribed and should 
 be memorized. In transmission, their concealment from 
 the enemy's view should be insured. In the absence of 
 signal flags, the headdress or other substitute may be 
 used.
 
 Signals 
 
 21);j 
 
 I-ptter «if 
 
 If signaled from the rear 
 
 If signaled from the firing 
 
 alphabet 
 
 to the firing line 
 
 line to the rear 
 
 A M 
 
 Ammunition going for- 
 ward. 
 
 Ammunition required. 
 
 C C C 
 
 Charge (mandatory at 
 
 Am about to charge if no 
 
 
 all times). 
 
 instructions to the con 
 trarv. 
 
 C F 
 
 Cease firing 
 
 Cease firing. 
 
 n T 
 
 Double time or "rush". . 
 
 Double time or "rush." 
 
 F 
 
 Commence firing 
 
 Commence firing. 
 
 F B 
 
 Fix bavoncfs 
 
 Fix bayonets. 
 
 F L 
 
 Artillery fire is caiising 
 
 Artillery fire is causing 
 
 
 us losses. 
 
 us losses. 
 
 G 
 
 Move forward 
 
 Preparing to move for- 
 ward. 
 
 H H n 
 
 Halt 
 
 Halt. 
 
 K 
 
 
 
 L T . ... 
 
 I.eft 
 
 Left. 
 
 
 
 What is the (R. N. etc.) ? 
 
 What is the (R. N. etc.) ! 
 
 
 Interrogatory. 
 
 Interrogatory. 
 
 (Ardois and 
 
 
 
 semaphore 
 
 
 
 onlv.) 
 
 
 
 
 What is the (R. N. etc.) ? 
 
 What is the (R. N. etc.) ! 
 
 (All methods 
 
 Interrogatory. 
 
 Interrogatory. 
 
 but ardois 
 
 
 
 and sema 
 
 
 
 phore. 
 
 
 
 P 
 
 Affirmative 
 
 Affirmative. 
 
 R 
 
 
 Acknowledgment. 
 Range. 
 
 H N 
 
 Range 
 
 R T 
 
 Right 
 
 Right. 
 
 Supjjovt needed. 
 
 S S S 
 
 Support going forward. . 
 
 SUP 
 
 Suspend firing 
 
 Suspend firing. 
 
 T 
 
 Target 
 
 Target. 
 
 
 
 (2) The Two-arm Semaphore Code 
 
 (See illustrations on page 295) 
 
 CAVALRY SERVICE REGULATIONS 
 Changes ) 
 No. 2. I 
 
 War DEPAnT.-MKNT, 
 
 Washin;rt()n, Fchniary l, Ifllfi. 
 The Cavnlry Service Ilepulation.s (Experimental), 
 1914, are changed as follow.s:
 
 294 Battle Fire Training 
 
 Appendix B, pages 329 and 330, as amended by 
 C. C. S. R., No. 1, W. D., 1915, is rescinded and the 
 following substituted therefor: 
 
 Appendix B 
 
 1. Semaphore Code for Cavalry 
 
 A M Ammunition going forward (if signaled 
 
 from the rear to the front). 
 Ammunition required (if signaled from 
 
 the front). 
 C C C Charge (if signaled from the rear to the 
 
 front). 
 About to charge if no instructions to the 
 
 contrary (if signaled from the front). 
 
 C F Cease firing. 
 
 D T Double time, rush, or hurry. 
 
 F Commence firing. 
 
 F L Artillery fire is causing us losses. 
 
 G Move forward (if signaled from the rear 
 
 to the front). 
 Preparing to move forward (if signaled 
 
 from the front). 
 H H H ... Halt. 
 
 K Negative. 
 
 L T Left. 
 
 M Bring up the horses (if signaled from front 
 
 to rear). 
 Horses going forward (if signaled from 
 
 rear to front). 
 () What is the (R. N., etc.)? Interrogatory. 
 
 (Ardois and semaphore only.) 
 What is the (R. N., etc.)? Interrogatory. 
 
 (All methods but ardois and semaphore.) 
 
 P Affirmative. 
 
 R Acknowledgment. 
 
 R N Range. 
 
 R T Right. 
 
 S S S Support going forward (if signaled frofn 
 
 the rear to the front). 
 Support needed (if signaled from the 
 
 front). 
 
 S U F Suspend firing. 
 
 T Target. 
 
 2. The Two-arm Semaphore Code 
 
 fSee illustrations on page following.)
 
 
 ^^i 
 
 :.0 
 
 !^ 
 
 o^CS 
 
 *^fe 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^^ 
 
 n 
 
 
 I I 
 
 I I ' I • 
 
 .111;: I . I ; . I 
 I I • I ! • I : :. I I I , . 
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