Blll >r<X » n > |Mi <lli n m iliui l iiij|/i mn?<T..-n., 
 
 L^^mimimiiiu: 
 
 )rnia 
 al 
 
 J 
 
 
 ! 
 1 
 
 fl 
 
 iiiii 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 i
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 SANTA BARBARA 
 
 fO 
 
 1 
 
 FROM THE LIBRARY 
 OF F. VON BOSCHAN
 
 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 1911—1914
 
 All rights reserved.
 
 THE 
 
 NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 191 I 1914 
 
 A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN 
 NATIONAL MOVEMENTS AND WARS 
 
 BY 
 
 HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, Ph.D. 
 
 author of 
 "the foundation of the ottojian empire" 
 
 LONDON : DUCKWORTH & CO. 
 
 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN
 
 Published December, 1914.
 
 To MY CHILDREN 
 
 CHRISTINE ESTE 
 
 0/ Adana 
 
 LLOYD IRVING 
 
 Of Constantinople 
 AND 
 
 EMILY ELIZABETH 
 
 Of Paris 
 
 BORN IN THE MIDST OF THE WARS AND CHANGES 
 
 THAT THIS BOOK DESCRIBES, 
 
 MAY THEY LEAD LIVES OF PEACE !
 
 " There are general causes, moral or physical, 
 which act in each State, elevate it, maintain it, or 
 cast it down; every accident is submitted to these 
 causes, and if the fortune of a battle, that is to say 
 a particular cause, has ruined a State, there was a 
 general cause which brought it about that that 
 State had to perish by a single battle." 
 
 Montesquieu. 
 
 Vll
 
 FOREWORD 
 
 On a July day in 1908, two American students, who 
 had chosen to spend the first days of their honeymoon 
 in digging the musty pamphleteers of the Ligue out of 
 the Bodleian Library, were walking along the High 
 Street in Oxford, when their attention was arrested by 
 the cry of a newsboy. A halfpenny invested in a 
 London newspaper gave them the news that Niazi bey 
 had taken to the Macedonian Highlands, and that a 
 revolution was threatening to overthrow the Absolutist 
 regime of Abdul Hamid. The sixteenth century was 
 forgotten in the absorbing and compelling interest of 
 the twentieth. 
 
 Two weeks later the students were entering the 
 harbour of Smyrna on a French steamer, which was 
 bringing back to constitutional Turkey the Young 
 Turk exiles, including Prince Sabaheddine effendi of 
 the royal Ottoman house. From that day to this, the 
 path of the two Americans, whose knowledge of his- 
 tory heretofore had been gained only in libraries, has 
 led them through massacres in Asia Minor and Syria, 
 and through mobilizations and wars in Constantinople, 
 Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, and Albania, back west- 
 
 ix
 
 X ' FOREWORD 
 
 ward to Austria-Hungary, Italy, and France, following 
 the trail of blood and fire from its origin in the Eastern 
 Question to the great European conflagration. 
 
 On the forty-fourth anniversary of Sedan, when 
 German aeroplanes were flying over Paris, and the 
 distant thunder of cannon near Meaux could be heard, 
 this book was begun in the Bibliotheque Nationale by 
 one of the students, while the other yielded to the 
 more pressing call of Red Cross work. It is hoped that 
 there is nothing that will offend in what is written 
 here. At this time of tension, of racial rivalry, of 
 mutual recrimination, the writer does not expect that 
 his judgments will pass without protest and criticism ; 
 but he claims for them the lack of bias which, under 
 the circumstances, only an American — of this genera- 
 tion at least — dare impute to himself. 
 
 What is written here is incomplete and brief. Neces- 
 sarily it lacks perspective, for only the historian of a 
 future generation can make an adequate appreciation 
 of contemporary events. On the other hand there is, 
 perhaps, a gain that sets this off. The changes that 
 are bringing about a new map of Europe have come 
 within the intimate personal experience of the writer. 
 
 If footnotes are rare, it is because sources are so 
 numerous and so accessible. Much is what the writer 
 saw himself, or heard from actors in the great tragedy, 
 when events were fresh in their memory. The books 
 of various colours, published by the Ministries of 
 Foreign Affairs of the countries interested, have been
 
 FOREWORD xi 
 
 consulted for the negotiations of diplomats. From 
 day to day through these years material has been 
 gathered from newspapers, especially the Paris Temps, 
 the London Times, the Vienna Freie Presse, the Con- 
 stantinople Orient and other journals of the Ottoman 
 capital. The writer has used his own correspondence 
 to the New York Herald, the New York Independent, 
 and the Philadelphia Telegraph. For accuracy of dates, 
 indebtedness is acknowledged to the admirable British 
 Annual Register. 
 
 I am indebted to my friends, Alexander Souter, 
 D.Litt., Professor of Humanity in Aberdeen University, 
 and Mrs. Souter, for reading the proofs of this book and 
 seeing it through the press. Dr. Souter's keen interest 
 in, and broad knowledge of, contemporary France, 
 Spain, Italy, and Germany is sometimes a jealous rival 
 of that wonderful wealth of Latin and Greek classical 
 and patristic learning of which British scholarship 
 has just reason to be proud. 
 
 Paris, 
 November, 1914.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 fA'.E 
 
 Foreword - - - - - ix 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. Germany in Alsace and Lorraine - - i 
 
 II. The German Weltpolitik - - - zo 
 
 III. The Bagdadbahn - - - - 55 
 
 IV. Algeciras and Agadir - - - 68 
 V. The Passing of Persia - - - 80 
 
 VI. The Partitioners and their Poles - - 91 
 
 VII. Italia Irredenta - - - - 113 
 
 VIII. The Danube and the Dardanelles - 124 
 
 IX. Austria-Hungary and her South Slavs - 134 
 
 X. Racial Rivalries in Macedonia - - 151 
 
 XI. The Young Turk Regime in the Otto.alvn 
 
 Empire . . . _ - 169 
 
 XII. Crete and European Diplomacy - - 206 
 
 XIII. The War between Italy and Turkey - 225 
 
 XIV. The War between the Balkan States and 
 
 Turkey . _ . . . 246 
 
 XV. The Rupture between the Allies - - 298 
 
 XVI. The War between the Balkan Allies - 308 
 
 xiii
 
 xiv CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 XVII. The Treaty of Bukarest - - - 319 
 
 XVIII. The Albanian Fiasco - - - - 326 
 
 XIX. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Servia 342 
 
 XX. Germany forces War upon Russia and 
 
 France _____ 358 
 
 XXI. Great Britain enters the War - - 370
 
 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 1911—1914 
 
 XV
 
 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 I. 
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 
 
 The war of 1870 added to the German Confederation 
 Alsace and a large portion of Lorraine, which the 
 Germans had always considered as theirs historically 
 and by the blood of the people who lived in them. 
 In annexing Alsace and Lorraine, the thought of 
 Bismarck and von Moltke was not only to bring back 
 into the German Confederation territories which had 
 formerly been a part of it, but also to secure the newly 
 formed Germany against the possibility of French 
 invasion in the future. For this it was necessary to 
 have undisputed possession of the valley of the Rhine 
 and the crests of the Vosges. 
 
 From the academic and military point of view, the 
 German thesis was not indefensible. But those who 
 imposed upon a conquered people the Treaty of Frank- 
 fort forgot to take into account the sentiments of the 
 population of the annexed territory. Germany annexed 
 land. That was possible by the right of the strongest. 
 She tried for over forty years to annex the population, 
 but never succeeded. The makers of modern Germany 
 were not alarmed at the persistent refusal of the
 
 2 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Alsacians to become loyal German subjects. They 
 knew that this would take time. They looked forward 
 to the dying out of the party of protest when the next 
 generation grew up — a generation educated in German 
 schools and formed in the German mould by the 
 discipline of military service. 
 
 That there was still an Alsace-Lorraine " question " 
 after forty years is a sad commentary either on the 
 justice of the annexation of Alsace - Lorraine by 
 Germany or on the ability of Germany to assimilate 
 that territory which she felt was historically, geo- 
 graphically, and racially a part of the Teutonic Empire. 
 In 1887, when " protesting deputies " were returned to 
 the Reichstag in overwhelming numbers, despite the 
 governmental weapons of intimidation, disenfranchise- 
 ment, and North German immigration, Bismarck was 
 face to face with the one great failure of his career. 
 He consoled himself with the firm belief that all would 
 be changed when the second generation, which knew 
 nothing of France, and to which the war was only a 
 memory, peopled the unhappy provinces. 
 
 But that second generation came. Those who par- 
 ticipated in the war of 1870, or who suffered by it, were 
 few and far between. The hot-heads and extreme 
 francophiles left the country long before, and their 
 place was taken by immigrants who were supposed to 
 be loyal sons of the Vaterland. Those of the younger 
 indigenous brood, whose parents brought them up as 
 irreconcilables, ran away to serve in the French 
 Foreign Legion, or went into exile, and became 
 naturalized Frenchmen before their time of military 
 service arrived. And yet the unrest continued. Stras- 
 bourg, Metz, Mulhouse, and Colmar were centres of
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 3 
 
 political agitation, which an autocratic government 
 and Berlin police methods were powerless to sup- 
 press. 
 
 The year 1910 marked the beginning of a new period 
 of violent protest against Prussian rule. Not since 
 1888 was there such a continuous agitation and such a 
 continuous persecution. The days when the Prussian 
 police forbade the use of the French language on tomb- 
 stones were revived, and the number of petty police 
 persecutions recorded in the local press was equalled 
 only by the number of public demonstrations on the 
 part of the people, whose hatred of everything Prussian 
 once more came to a fever heat. 
 
 Let me cite a few incidents which I have taken 
 haphazard from the journals of Strasbourg and Metz 
 during the first seven months of 1910. The Turnverein 
 of Robertsau held a gymnastic exhibition in which two 
 French societies, those of Belfort and Giromagny, were 
 invited to participate. The police refused to allow the 
 French societies to march to the hall in procession, as 
 was their custom, or to display their flags. Their two 
 presidents were threatened with arrest. A similar 
 incident was reported from Colmar, At Noisseville 
 and Wissembourg the fortieth annual commemoration 
 services held by the French veterans were considered 
 treasonable, and they were informed that they would 
 never again be allowed to hold services in the 
 cemetery. At Mulhouse the French veterans were 
 insulted by the police and not allowed to display their 
 flags even in the room where they held their banquet. 
 At the college of Thann a young boy of twelve, who 
 curiously enough was the son of a notorious German 
 immigrant, whistled the " Marseillaise," and was locked
 
 4 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 up in a cell for this offence. The conferring of the 
 Cross of the Legion of Honour on Abbe Faller at Mars- 
 la-Tour created such an outburst of feeling that the 
 German Ambassador at Paris was instructed to request 
 the French Government to refrain from decorating 
 Alsacians. A volunteer of Mulhouse was reprimanded 
 and refused advancement in the army because he used 
 his mother tongue in a private conversation. On July i 
 twenty-one border communes of Lorraine were added 
 to those in which German had been made the official 
 language. On July 25, for the first time in the history 
 of the University of Strasbourg, a professor was hissed 
 out of his lecture- room. He had said that the Prussians 
 could speak better French than the Alsacians. 
 
 The most serious demonstration which has occurred 
 in Metz since the annexation, took place on Sunday 
 evening, January 8, 19 10, when the police broke up 
 by force a concert given by a local society. The news- 
 papers of Metz claimed that this was a private gathering 
 to which individual invitations had been sent, and was 
 neither public nor political. The police invaded the 
 hall, and requested the audience to disband. When 
 the presiding officer refused, he and the leader of the 
 orchestra were arrested. The audience, after a lively 
 tussle, was expelled from the hall. Immediately a 
 demonstration was planned to be held around the 
 statue of General Ney. A large crowd paraded the 
 city, singing the " Sambre-et-Meuse " and the " Mar- 
 seillaise." When the police found themselves powerless 
 to stop the procession without bloodshed, they were 
 compelled to call out the troops to clear the streets 
 with fixed bayonets. 
 
 These incidents demonstrated the fact that French
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 5 
 
 ideals, French culture, and the French language had 
 been kept alive, and were still the inspiration of the 
 unceasing — and successful — protest of nearly two 
 million people against the Prussian domination. The 
 effervescence was undoubtedly as strong in Alsace- 
 Lorraine " forty years after " as it had been on the 
 morrow of the annexation. But its francophile 
 character was not necessarily the expression of desire 
 for reunion with France. The inhabitants of the " lost 
 provinces " had always been, racially and linguistically, 
 as much German as French. Now that the unexpected 
 has happened, and reunion with France seems probable, 
 many Alsacians are claiming that this has been the 
 unfailing goal of their agitation. But it is not true. 
 It would be a lamentable distortion of fact if any such 
 record were to get into a serious history of the period 
 in which we live. 
 
 The political ideal of the Alsacians has been self- 
 government. Their agitation has not been for separa- 
 tion from the German Confederation, but for a place 
 in the German Confederation. A great number of the 
 immigrants who were sent to " Germanize " Alsace and 
 Lorraine came to side with the indigenous element in 
 their political demands. If the question of France and 
 things French entered into the struggle, and became 
 the heart of it, two reasons for this can be pointed 
 out. France stood for the realization of the ideals of 
 democracy to the descendants of the Strasbourg heroes 
 of 1793 ; and the endeavour to stamp out the traces of 
 the former nationality of the inhabitants of the pro- 
 vinces was carried on in a manner so typically and so 
 fooHshly Prussian that it kept the fire alive instead of 
 extinguishing it. Persecution never fails to defeat its
 
 6 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 own ends, for human nature is keen to cherish that 
 which is difficult or dangerous to enjoy. 
 
 To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question, from 
 the internal German point of view, it is necessary to 
 explain the political status of these provinces after the 
 conquest, and their relationship to the Empire. Thus 
 we can show that their continued unrest and unhappi- 
 ness was not due to a ceaseless and stubborn protest 
 against the Treaty of Frankfort. 
 
 When the German Empire was constituted, in 1872, 
 it comprehended twenty-five distinct sovereign king- 
 doms, duchies, principalities, and free cities, and, in a 
 subordinate position, the territory ceded by France, 
 which was made a Reichsland, owned in common by 
 the twenty-five confederated sovereignties. The King 
 of Prussia was made Emperor of the Confederation, 
 and given extensive executive powers. Two assemblies 
 were created to legislate for matters affecting the 
 country as a whole. The Bundesrath is an advisory 
 executive body as well as an upper legislative assembly. 
 It is composed of delegates of the Sovereigns of the Con- 
 federated States. The Lower Imperial House, or Reichs- 
 tag, is a popular assembly, whose members are returned 
 by general elections throughout the Empire. In their 
 internal affairs the Confederated States are autonomous, 
 and have their own local Parliaments. This scheme, 
 fraught with dangers and seemingly insurmountable 
 difficulties, has survived, and, thanks to the predomin- 
 ance of Prussia and the genius of two great Emperors, 
 the seemingly heterogeneous mass has been moulded 
 into a strong and powerful Empire. 
 
 In such an Empire, however, there never has been any 
 place for Alsace-Lorraine. The conquered territory
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 7 
 
 was not a national entity. It had no Sovereign, and 
 could not enter into the confederacy on an equal 
 footing with the other twenty-five states. The 
 Germans did not dare at the time to give the new 
 member a sovereign, nor could they conjointly under- 
 take its assimilation. Prussia, not willing to risk the 
 strengthening of a South German state by the addition 
 of a million and a half to its population, took upon 
 herself what was the logical task of Baden or 
 Wiirtemberg or Bavaria. 
 
 So Alsace-Lorraine was an anomaly under the scheme 
 of the organization of the German Empire. During 
 forty years the Reichsland was without representation 
 in the Bundesrath, and had thus had no real voice in 
 the management of imperial affairs. By excluding the 
 " reconquered brethren " from representation in the 
 Bundesrath, Germany failed to win the loyalty of her 
 new subjects. Where petty states, with a tithe of her 
 population and wealth, have helped in shaping the 
 destinies of the nation, the Reichsland had to feel the 
 humiliation of " taxation without representation." It 
 was useless to point out to the Alsacians that they had 
 their vote in the Reichstag. For the Bundesrath is the 
 power in Germany. 
 
 Nor did Alsace-Lorraine have real autonomy in 
 internal affairs. The executive power was vested in a 
 Statthalter, appointed by the Emperor, and supported 
 by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign police force. 
 Before the Constitution of 1911, there was a local Par- 
 liament, called the Landesausschuss, which amounted to 
 nothing, as the Imperial Parliament had the privilege 
 of initiating and enacting for the Reichsland any law it 
 saw fit. Then, too, the delegates to the Landesaus-
 
 8 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 schuss were chosen by such a complicated form of 
 suffrage that they represented the Statthalter rather 
 than the people. And the Statthalter represented the 
 Emperor ! 
 
 In the first decade after the annexation, Prussian 
 brutality and an unseemly haste to impose military 
 service upon the conquered people led to an emigration 
 of all who could afford to go, or who, even at the 
 expense of material interest, were too high-spirited to 
 allow their children to grow up as Germans. This emi- 
 gration was welcomed and made easy, just as Austria- 
 Hungary encouraged the emigration of Moslems 
 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. For it enabled Bis- 
 marck to introduce a strong Prussian and Westphalian 
 element into the Reichsland by settling immigrants on 
 the vacant properties. But most of these immigrants, 
 instead of Prussianizing Alsace, have become Alsacians 
 themselves. Some of the most insistent opponents of 
 the Government, some of the most intractable among 
 the agitators, have been those early immigrants or their 
 children. This is quite natural, when we consider that 
 they have cast in their lot definitely with the country, 
 and are just as much interested in its welfare as the 
 indigenous element. 
 
 The revival of the agitation against Prussian govern- 
 ment in 1910 was a movement for autonomy in internal 
 affairs, and for representation in the Bundesrath. The 
 Alsacians wanted to be on a footing of constitutional 
 equality with the other German States. One marvels 
 at the Prussian mentality, which could not see — in the 
 case either of the Poles or of the Alsacians — that fair 
 play and justice would have solved the problems and 
 put an end to the agitation which has been, especially
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 9 
 
 during these past few years, a menace to the existence 
 of the Empire, both on the east and on the west. 
 
 Something had to be done in the Reichsland. The 
 anomalous position of almost two million German 
 subjects, fighting for their political rights, and forming 
 a compact mass upon the borders of France, was a 
 question which compelled the interest of German 
 statesmen, not only on account of its international 
 aspect, but also because of the growing German public 
 sentiment for social and political justice. The Reichs- 
 tag was full of champions of the claims of the Alsacians 
 — champions who were not personally interested either 
 in Alsace-Lorraine or in the influence of the agitation 
 in the Reichsland upon France, but who looked upon 
 the Alsace-Lorraine question as a wrong to twentieth- 
 century civilization. 
 
 On March 14, 1910, Chancellor von Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg announced to the Reichstag that the Government 
 was preparing a Constitution for Alsace-Lorraine, which 
 would give the autonomy so long and so vigorously 
 demanded. He had, however, in his mind, not a real 
 solution of the question, but some sort of a compromise, 
 which,while satisfying the Confederated States, and mol- 
 lifying the agitators of the Reichsland, would at the same 
 titne preserve the Prussian domination in Alsace-Lorraine. 
 In June, Herr Delbriick, Secretary of State for the 
 Interior, was sent to Strasbourg to confer with the local 
 authorities and representatives of the people concern- 
 ing the projected constitution. It was during this visit 
 that the Alsacians were disillusioned. A dinner, now 
 famous, or notorious, whichever you like, was given by 
 the Statthalter, to which representative (!) members of 
 the Landesausschuss were invited. At this dinner the
 
 10 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 real leaders of the country, such as Wetterle, Preiss, 
 Blumenthal, Weber, Bucher, and Theodor — the very 
 men who had made the demand for autonomy so 
 insistent that the Government could no longer refuse 
 to entertain it — were conspicuous by their absence. 
 Those bidden to confer with Herr Delbriick in no way 
 represented, but were on the other hand hostile to, the 
 wishes of the people. 
 
 We cannot go into the involved story of the fight in 
 the Reichstag over the new Constitution. The Delbriick 
 project was approved by the Bundesrath on December 
 i6, 1910, and debated in the following spring session of 
 the Reichstag. Despite the warnings of the Deputies 
 from the Reichsland, and the brilliant opposition of the 
 Socialists, the Constitution given to Alsace-Lorraine on 
 May 31 was a pure farce. In no sense was it what the 
 people of the Reichsland had wanted, although repre- 
 sentation in the Bundesrath was seemingly given to 
 them. The new Constitution preserved the united 
 sovereignty of the Confederated States, and its delega- 
 tion to the Emperor, who still had the power to appoint 
 and recall at will the Statthalter, and to initiate legisla- 
 tion in local matters. A Landtag took the place of the 
 Landesausschuss. The Upper Chamber of the Landtag 
 consists of thirty-six members, representing the religious 
 confessions, the University and other bodies, the 
 Supreme Court of Colmar, and the municipalities and 
 Chambers of Commerce of Strasbourg, Mulhouse, 
 Metz, and Colmar, to the number of eighteen; and the 
 other eighteen chosen by the Emperor. The Lower 
 Chamber has sixty members, elected by direct universal 
 suffrage, with secret ballot. Electors over thirty-five 
 possess two votes, and over forty-five three votes.
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE ii 
 
 By the forcing of this Constitution upon Alsace- 
 Lorraine, the interests of Prussia and of the House of 
 Hohenzollern were considered to the detriment of the in- 
 terests of the German Empire. A glorious opportunity for 
 reconciliation and assimilation was lost. The Emperor 
 would not listen to the admission of Alsace-Lorraine to 
 the Bundesrath in the only logical way, by the creation 
 of a new dynasty or a republican form of government, 
 so that the Alsacian votes would represent a sovereign 
 State. Prussia in her dealings with Alsace-Lorraine 
 has always been afraid, on the one hand, of the addition 
 of Bundesrath votes to the seventeen of Bavaria, 
 Saxony, Baden and Wiirtemberg, and, on the other 
 hand, of the repercussion upon her internal suffrage 
 and upon other problems with the Socialists. 
 
 Since 191 1 the eyes of many Alsacians have been 
 directed once more towards France as the only — if 
 forlorn — hope of justice and peace. What words could 
 be found strong enough to condemn the suicidal folly 
 of the German statesmen who allowed the disappoint- 
 ment over the Constitution to be followed by a series 
 of incidents which have acted like the rubbing of salt 
 into a raw wound ? 
 
 The first Landtag, in conformity with the Constitution 
 of 191 1, was elected in October. It brought into life a 
 new political party, called " The National Union," led 
 by Blumenthal, Wetterle, and Preiss, who united for 
 the purpose of demanding what the Constitution had 
 not given them — the autonomy of Alsace and Lorraine. 
 This party was badly beaten in this first election. But 
 its defeat was not really a defeat for the principles of 
 autonomy, as the German Press stated at the time. 
 The membership of the new Landtag was composed.
 
 12 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 in majority, of men who had been supporters of the 
 demand for autonomy, but who had not joined the new 
 party for reasons of local politics. Herr Delbriick had 
 given universal suffrage (a privilege the Prussian 
 electorate had never been able to gain in spite of its 
 reiterated demands) to the Reichsland in the hope that 
 the Socialists would prevent the Nationalists from con- 
 trolling the Alsacian Landtag. Many Socialists, how- 
 ever, during the elections at Colmar and elsewhere, did 
 not hesitate to cry in French, " Vive la France ! A 
 has la Prusse !" 
 
 The Prussian expectations were bitterly deceived. 
 The Landtag promptly showed that it was merely the 
 Landesausschuss under another name. The Nationalist 
 struggle was revived ; the same old questions came up 
 again. The Government's appropriation " for purposes 
 of State" was reduced one- third, and it was provided 
 that the Landtag receive communication of the purposes 
 for which the money was spent. The Statthalter' s ex- 
 penses were cut in half, and a Bill, which had always 
 been approved in previous years, providing for the 
 payment of the expense of the Emperor's hunting-trips 
 in the Reichsland, failed to pass. 
 
 In the spring of 1912 the Prussians showed their 
 disapproval of the actions of the new Landtag by with-^ 
 drawing the orders for locomotives for the Prussian 
 railways from the old Alsacian factory of Grafenstaden, 
 near Strasbourg. This was done absolutely without 
 any provocation, and aroused a violent denunciation, 
 not only among the purely German employes of the 
 factory and in the newspapers, but also in the Landtag, 
 which adopted an order of the day condemning most 
 severely the attitude of the Imperial Government
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 13 
 
 towards Alsace - Lorraine, of which this boycott 
 measure was a petty and mean illustration. 
 
 The indignation was at its height when Emperor 
 Wilhelm arrived in Strasbourg on May 13. Instead of 
 acting in a tactful manner and promising to set right 
 this wrong done to the industrial life of Strasbourg, 
 the Emperor addressed the following words to the 
 Mayor : 
 
 " Listen. Up to here you have only known the 
 good side of me ; you might be able to learn the other 
 side of me. Things cannot continue as they are; if 
 this situation lasts, we will suppress your Constitution 
 and annex you to Prussia." 
 
 This typically Prussian speech, which in a few lines 
 reveals the hopelessly unsuccessful tactics of the 
 German Government towards the peoples whom it has 
 tried to assimilate the world over, only served to 
 increase the indignation of the inhabitants of the 
 Reichsland ; in fact, the repercussion throughout all 
 Germany was very serious. 
 
 The arbitrary threat of the Emperor was badly 
 received in the other federated States, whose news- 
 papers pointed out that he had exceeded his authority. 
 It gave the Socialists an opportunity to attack 
 Emperor Wilhelm on the floor of the Reichstag. Four 
 days after this threat was made an orator of the 
 Socialist party declared: 
 
 " We salute the imperial words as the confession, 
 full of weight, and coming from a competent source, 
 that annexation to Prussia is the heaviest punishment 
 that one can threaten to impose upon a people for its 
 resistance against Germany. It is a punishment like 
 hard labour in the penitentiary with loss of civil rights."
 
 14 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 This speech caused the Chancellor to leave the room 
 with all the Ministry. On May 22 the attack upon the 
 Emperor Wilhelm for his words at Strasbourg was 
 renewed by another Deputy, who declared that if such 
 a thing had happened in England, " the English would 
 shut up such a King at Balmoral, or find for him some 
 peaceful castle, such as that of Stemberg, or the Villa 
 Allatini at Salonika." 
 
 The answer of the Landtag to Emperor Wilhelm's 
 threat was the passing of two unanimous votes, one 
 demanding that hereafter the Constitution could not 
 be modified except by the law of the country and not 
 by the law of the Empire, and the other demanding for 
 Alsace-Lorraine a national flag. 
 
 One could easily fill many pages with illustrations of 
 senseless persecutions, most of them of the pettiest 
 character, but some more serious in nature, which 
 Alsace and Lorraine have had to endure since the 
 granting of the Constitution. Newspapers, illustrated 
 journals, clubs, and organizations of all kinds have been 
 annoyed constantly by police interference. Their 
 editors, artists, and managers have been brought 
 frequently into court. Zislin and Hansi, celebrated 
 caricaturists, have found themselves provoked to bolder 
 and bolder defiances by successive condemnations, and 
 have endured imprisonment as well as fines. Hansi 
 was sentenced to a year's imprisonment by the High 
 Court of Leipsig only a month before the present war 
 broke out, and chose exile rather than a Prussian 
 fortress. 
 
 The greatest effort during the past few years has been 
 made in the schools to influence the minds of the 
 growing generation against the " souvenir de France,"
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 15 
 
 and to impress upon the Alsacians what good fortune 
 had come to them to be born German citizens. 
 
 Among the boys the influence of this teaching has 
 been such that over 22,000 fled from home during the 
 period 1900 to 1913 to enlist in the Foreign Legion of 
 the French Army. The campaign of the German news- 
 papers in Alsace-Lorraine, and, in fact, throughout 
 Germany, was redoubled in 191 1 . Parents were warned 
 of the horrible treatment accorded to the poor boys 
 who were misguided enough to throw away their 
 citizenship, and go to be killed in Africa under the 
 French flag. The result of this campaign was that the 
 Foreign Legion received a larger number of Alsacians 
 in 1912 than had enlisted during a single year since 
 1871 ! 
 
 Among the girls the German educational system 
 flattered itself that it could completely change the 
 sentiments of a child, especially in the boarding-schools. 
 Last year the Empress of Germany visited a girl's 
 school near Metz, which is one of the best German 
 schools in the Reichsland. As she was leaving she 
 told the children that she wanted to give them some- 
 thing. What did thay want ? The answer was not 
 sweets or cake, but that they might be taught a little 
 French ! 
 
 Since 1910 the German War Budget has carried 
 successively larger items for the strengthening of forts 
 and the building of barracks in Metz, Colmar, Mulhouse, 
 Strasbourg, Neuf-Brisach, Bischwiller, Wissembourg, 
 Mohrange, Sarrebourg, Sarreguemines, Saarbruck, Thi- 
 onville, Molsheim, and Saverne, The former French 
 provinces have been flooded with garrisons, and have 
 been treated just as they were treated forty years ago.
 
 i6 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 The insufferable spirit of militarism, and the arrogance 
 of the Prussian officers in Alsacian towns, have served 
 to turn against the Empire many thousands whom 
 another policy might have won. For it must be 
 remembered that by no means all the inhabitants of 
 the Reichsland have been by birth and by home 
 training French sympathizers. Instead of crushing 
 out the " souvenir de France," the Prussian civil and 
 military officials have caused it to be born in many a 
 soul which was by nature German. 
 
 The most notorious instance of military arrogance 
 occurred in the autumn of 19 13 in Saverne. Lieutenant 
 von Forstner, who was passing in review cases of disci- 
 pline, had before him a soldier who had stabbed an 
 Alsacian, and had been sentenced to two months' 
 imprisonment. " Two months on account of an 
 Alsacian blackguard !" he cried. " I would have given 
 you ten marks for your trouble." The story spread, 
 and the town, tired of the attitude of its garrison, 
 began in turn to show its contempt for the Kaiser's 
 soldiers. Windows in von Forstner's house were 
 broken. Every time officers or soldiers appeared on 
 the streets they were hooted. Saverne was put under 
 martial law. Threats were made to fire upon the 
 citizens. One day Lieutenant von Forstner struck a 
 lame shoemaker across the forehead with his sword. 
 The affair had gone so far that public sentiment in 
 Germany demanded some action. Instead of ade- 
 quately punishing von Forstner and other officers, 
 who had so maddened the civil population against 
 them, the German military authorities gave the guilty 
 officers nominal sentences, and withdrew the garrison. 
 
 All these events had a tremendous repercussion in
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE 17 
 
 France. It is impossible to exaggerate the ill-feeling 
 aroused on both sides of the Rhine, in Germany, in 
 Alsace-Lorraine, and in France, by the persecutions in 
 the Reichsland. Only one who knows the French 
 intimately can appreciate their feeling — or share it — 
 over the Zislin and Hansi trials, the Saverne affair, 
 the suppression of the Souvenir Frangais, the Lorraine 
 Sportive, and other organizations, and the campaign 
 against the Foreign Legion. It has given the French 
 soldiers in the present war something to fight for 
 which is as sacred to them as the defence of French 
 soil. The power of this sentiment is indicated by the 
 invasion of Alsace, the battle of Altkirch, and the 
 occupation of Mulhouse at the beginning of August. 
 The French could not be held back from this wild 
 dash. Strategy was powerless in the face of the senti- 
 ment of a national army. 
 
 The Alsacian leaders themselves have seen the peril 
 to the peace of Europe of the German attitude towards 
 their country. They did not want France drawn into 
 a war for their liberation. They were alarmed over 
 the possibility of this, and desired it to be understood 
 that their agitation had nothing international in it. 
 The attitude of all the anti-Prussian parties may be 
 summed up in the words of Herr Wolff, leader of the 
 Government Liberal party, who declared that " all that 
 the inhabitants of the Reichsland had as their political 
 ambition was the elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to the 
 rank of an independent and federated state, like the 
 other twenty-five component parts of the German 
 Empire." Their sincerity and their desire to preserve 
 peace is proved by the motion presented by the leaders 
 of four of the political groups in the Reichsland, which
 
 i8 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 was voted on May 6, 1912, without discussion, by the 
 
 Landtag. 
 
 " The Chamber invites the Statthalter to instruct the 
 representatives of Alsace-Lorraine in the Bundesrath to 
 use all the force they possess against the idea of a war 
 between Germany and France, and to influence the 
 Bundesrath to examine the ways which might possibly 
 lead to a rapprochement between France and Germany, 
 which rapprochement will furnish the means of putting 
 an end to the race of armaments." 
 
 The mismanagement of the Reichsland has done more 
 than prevent the harmonious union of the former 
 French provinces with Germany. It has had an effect, 
 the influence of which cannot be exaggerated, upon 
 nourishing French hopes of revenge, and the resent- 
 ment against the amputation of 1870. On neither side 
 of the Vosges has the wound healed. The same folly 
 which has kept alive a Polish question in Eastern 
 Prussia for 125 years has not failed to make the 
 Prussianizing of Alsace-Lorraine impossible. The 
 Germans have never understood how to win the con- 
 fidence of others. There has been no Rome in their 
 political vision. As for conceptions of toleration, of 
 kindness, and of love, they are non-existent in 
 Prussian officialdom. Nietzsche revealed the character 
 of the Prussian in his development of the idea of the 
 Ubermensch. The ideal of perfect manhood is the 
 imposition of one will on another will by force. Mercy 
 and pity, according to Nietzsche, were signs of weak- 
 ness, the symbols of the slave. 
 
 Under the circumstances, then, we are compelled, 
 after forty -five years, to revise our estimate of 
 Bismarck's sagacity. His genius was limited by the
 
 GERMANY IN ALSACE ANDtLORRAINE 19 
 
 narrow horizon of his own age. He did not see that 
 the future of Germany needed other things that France 
 could give far more than she needed Alsace and 
 Lorraine. In the judgment of posterity Bismarck 
 would have had a greater place had he, in the last 
 minutes of the transactions at Versailles, given back 
 Alsace and Lorraine to France, waived the war 
 indemnity, and asked in return Algeria or other 
 French colonies. 
 
 But would it have been different if Germany had 
 tried to establish her authority in the French colonies ? 
 A Herrero, employed in the Johannesburg mines, sent 
 a letter to a brother who lived in German South- West 
 Africa, in which he said (I am citing this on the au- 
 thority of the German Governor-General Lutwein) : 
 " The country of the English is truly a good country. 
 There are no ill-treatments. There is much money; 
 and even if your superior is present, he doesn't strike 
 you, and if he strikes you and goes thus beyond legal 
 limits, he is punished like anyone else."
 
 II. 
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 
 
 When the transrhenane provinces of the old German 
 empire were added to France in the eighteenth century, 
 the assimilation of these territories was a far different 
 proposition to their refusion into the mould of a new 
 German empire in 1871. In the first place, the old 
 German Empire was a medieval institution which, in 
 the evolution of modern Europe, was decaying. Alsace 
 and Lorraine were not taken away from a political 
 organism of which they were a vital part. The ties 
 severed were purely dynastic. In the second place, 
 the consciousness of national life was awakened in 
 Alsace and Lorraine during the time that they were 
 under French rule, and because they shared in the 
 great movement of the birth of democracy following 
 the French revolution. 
 
 France, then, by the Treaty of Frankfort, believed 
 that she had been robbed of a portion of her national 
 territory. The people of the annexed provinces, as 
 was clearly shown by the statement of their repre- 
 sentatives at Bordeaux, did not desire to enter the 
 German Confederation. 
 
 Germany failed to do the only thing that could 
 possibly have made her new territories an integral part 
 of the new empire — i.e., place Alsace-Lorraine upon a 
 
 20
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 21 
 
 footing of equality with the other states of the con- 
 federation, and make their entry that of an autonomous 
 sovereign state. Consequently, neither in France nor 
 in the Reichsland was the Treaty of Frankfort accepted 
 as a permanent change in the map of Europe. Ger- 
 many had always been compelled, in her international 
 politics, to count upon the possibility of France 
 making an attempt to win back the lost provinces. 
 She has sought to form alliances to strengthen her own 
 position in Europe, and to keep France weak. France, 
 the continued object of German hostility, has found 
 herself compelled to ally herself with Russia, with 
 whom she has never had anything in common, and to 
 compound her colonial rivalries in Africa with her 
 hereditary enemy. Great Britain. This is the first 
 cause of the unrest in Europe that has culminated in 
 a general European war. 
 
 The second cause is the Weltpolitik of Germany, 
 which has brought the German Empire into conflict 
 with Great Britain and France outside of Europe, and 
 with Russia in Europe. 
 
 On the map of Europe, Russia, Great Britain, and 
 France, are, in 1914, practically what they were in 
 1815. The changes, logical and in accordance with the 
 spirit of centralization of the nineteenth century, 
 have transformed middle and south-eastern Europe. 
 The changes in south-eastern Europe have been 
 effected at the expense of the Ottoman empire, and 
 have been a gradual development throughout the 
 century, from the outbreak of the Greek revolution 
 in 1822 to the Treaty of London in 1913. In middle 
 Europe, during the twelve years between 1859 ^-^d 1871, 
 the three Powers whose national unity, racially as well
 
 22 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 as politically, was already achieved at the time of the 
 congress of Vienna, were brought face to face with 
 three new Powers — united Germany, united Italy, and 
 the Dual Monarchy of Austria- Hungary. 
 
 The nineteenth century has been called the age of 
 European colonization. Europe began to follow its 
 commerce to other continents by the imposition of 
 its civilization and its political system upon weaker 
 races. Checked by the rising republic of the United 
 States from encroaching upon the liberties of the 
 peoples of North and South America, there have been 
 no acquisitions of territory by European nations in 
 the western continents since the Congress of Vienna. 
 European expansion directed itself toward Africa, 
 Asia, and the islands of the oceans. There was no 
 oriental nation strong enough to promulgate a Monroe 
 doctrine. 
 
 In extra-European activities. Great Britain, France, 
 and Russia were the pioneers. That they succeeded 
 during the nineteenth century in placing under their 
 flag the choicest portions of Africa and the backward 
 nations of Asia, was due neither to the superior enter- 
 prise and energy, nor to the greater foresight of the 
 Anglo-Saxon, French, and Russian nations. They had 
 achieved their national unity, and they were geo- 
 graphically in a position to take advantage of the great 
 opportunities which were opening to the world for 
 colonization since the development of the steamship 
 and the telegraph. 
 
 But the other three Powers of Europe came late 
 upon the scene. It has only been within the last 
 quarter of a century that Germany and Italy have been 
 in the position to look for overseas possessions. It
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 23 
 
 has only been within the last quarter of a century that 
 Austria, finding her union with Hungary a durable 
 one, has been able to think of looking beyond her 
 limits to play a part, as other nations had long been 
 doing, in the history of the outside world. 
 
 By very force of circumstances the three new States 
 — threatened by their neighbours, who had looked with 
 jealous, though powerless, eyes upon their consolida- 
 tion — were brought together into a defensive alHance. 
 The Triple Alliance, as it is called, has drifted into a 
 spirit of common general aims and ambitions, if not 
 of particular interests, against their three more fortu- 
 nate rivals, who had been annexing the best portions 
 of the Asiatic and African continents, while they were 
 struggling with internal problems. 
 
 Oceans of ink have been wasted upon polemics 
 against the peace-disturbing character of the Triple 
 AUiance. Especially has Germany and her growing 
 Weltpolitik been subject to criticism, continuous and 
 untiring, on the part of the British and French press. 
 But the question, after all, is a very simple one: the 
 three newer Powers of Europe have not been willing 
 to be content with an application in practical world 
 poUtics of the principle that " to him that hath shall 
 be given." Germany and Italy, transformed under 
 modern economic conditions into industrial states, 
 have been looking for outside markets, and they have 
 wanted to enjoy those markets in regions of the globe, 
 either actually under their flag, or subjected to their 
 political influence. In other words, they have wanted 
 their share in the division of Africa and Asia into 
 spheres under the control of European nations. 
 Is a logical and legitimate ambition to play a part
 
 24 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 in the world's politics in proportion to one's popula- 
 tion, one's wealth, one's industrial and maritime 
 activity, necessarily a menace to the world's peace ? 
 It has always been, and, I suppose, always will be, 
 in the nature of those who have, to look with alarm 
 upon the efforts of those who have not, to possess 
 something. Thus capital, irrespective of epoch or 
 nationality, or of religion, has raised the cry of alarm 
 when it has seen the tendency for betterment, for 
 education, for the development of ideals and a sense 
 of justice on the part of labour. In just the same way 
 Russia, with her great path across the northern half 
 of Asia, and her new and steadily growing empire in 
 the Caucasus and central Asia; France, with the greater 
 part of northern and central Africa, and an im- 
 portant corner of Asia under her flag; and Great 
 Britain, with her vast territories in every portion of 
 the globe, raised the cry of " Wolf, wolf !" when the 
 Powers of the Triple Alliance began to look with 
 envious eye upon the rich colonies of their neighbours, 
 and to pick up by clever diplomacy — and brute force, 
 if you will — a few crumbs of what was still left for 
 themselves. 
 
 The result of these alarming ambitions of the Triple 
 Alliance has been the coming together of Russia, 
 France, and England, hereditary enemies in former 
 days, but now friends and allies, in the maintenance 
 of the colonial " trust." 
 
 The great cry of the Triple Entente is the mainte- 
 nance of the European equilibrium. In this they have 
 reason. Europe could know no lasting peace under 
 Teutonic aggression. But is there not also to the 
 account of the Triple Entente some blame for the
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 25 
 
 unrest in Europe and for the great catastrophe which 
 has come upon the world ? For while their policy 
 has been the maintenance of the European equilibrium, 
 it has been coupled with the maintenance of an extra- 
 European balance of power wholly in their favour. 
 
 The sense of justice, of historical proportion, and the 
 logic of economic evolution, makes one sympathize, in 
 abstract principle, not only with the Weltpolitik of 
 Germany, but also with Austria-Hungary's desire for 
 an outlet to the sea, and with Italy's longing to have 
 in the Mediterranean the position which history and 
 geography indicated ought to be, and might again be, 
 hers. 
 
 But sympathy in abstract principle is quite another 
 thing from sympathy in fact. In order to appreciate 
 the Weltpolitik of Germany, and to be able to form an 
 intelligent opinion in regard to it — for it is the most 
 vital and burning problem in the world to-day — ^we must 
 consider it from the point of view of its full significance 
 in practice in the history of the world. 
 
 Bismarck posed as the disinterested "honest courtier" 
 of Europe in the Congress of Berlin. The declaration 
 he had made, that the whole question of the Orient "was 
 not worth the finger-bone of a Pomeranian grenadier," 
 was corroborated by his actions during the sessions of 
 the Congress. We have striking illustrations of this 
 in the memoirs of Karatheodory pasha, who recorded 
 from day to day during the memorable sessions of the 
 Congress, his astonishment at the indifference which 
 Bismarck displayed to the nationalities of the Balkans 
 and to the complications which might arise to Europe 
 from their rivalries. 
 
 Bismarck did not see how vital for the future of the
 
 26 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 nation he had built the Balkan question was to be. 
 Nor did he see the intimate relationship between the 
 economic progress of united Germany and the question 
 of colonies. One searches in vain in the speeches and 
 writings of the Iron Chancellor for any reference to 
 the importance of the two problems, in seeking the 
 solution of which the fabric of his building is threatened 
 with destruction. 
 
 Perhaps it is easy for us, in looking backwards, to 
 point out the lack of foresight which was shown 
 by Bismarck in regard to the future of Germany. 
 Forty-five years later we are able to pass in review 
 the unforeseen developments of international politics 
 and the amazing economic evolution of contemporary 
 Europe. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect that 
 much attention and thought should have been given 
 by the maker of modern Germany to the possible 
 sphere that Germany might be called upon to play in 
 the world outside of Europe. 
 
 For we must remember that the new Germany, after 
 the Franco- Prussian War, was wholly in an experi- 
 mental stage, and that the duty at hand was the im- 
 mediate consolidation of the various states into a 
 political and economic fabric. There was enough to 
 demand all the attention and all the genius of Bis- 
 marck and his co-workers in solving these problems. 
 Cordial relationship with Austria had to be re-estab- 
 lished. The dynasties of the south Geiman kingdoms 
 and of the lesser potentates, whose names still re- 
 mained legion in spite of the Reichsdeputationshaupt- 
 schluss of 1803, had to be carefully handled. There 
 were four definite internal problems which confronted 
 Bismarck: the relationship of the empire to the Catholic
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 27 
 
 Church; the reconciliation of the different peoples into 
 an harmonious whole ; the establishment of represen- 
 tative government, without giving the strong socialistic 
 elements the upper hand ; and the development of the 
 economic wealth of Germany. 
 
 There was little time to think of Germany's place 
 in the world's politics. In foreign affairs, it was con- 
 sidered that the exigencies of the moment could be 
 met by adopting a policy of conciliation towards both 
 Russia and Austria, and the winning of the friendship 
 of Italy. The Kulturkampf, the creation of the 
 Bundesrath under Prussian hegemony, and the for- 
 mation of the Triple Alliance, and the events connected 
 with them, are important in an analysis of Germany's 
 international politics. Unfortunately we cannot bring 
 them into the scope of this book. We can mention 
 only the various factors that have been directly re- 
 sponsible for giving birth to what is called the Welt- 
 politik. 
 
 These factors are the belief of the German people 
 in the superiority of their race and its world-civilizing 
 mission; their connotation of the word " German"; 
 the consciousness of their military strength being dis- 
 proportionate to their political influence; the rapid 
 increase of the population, and the development of 
 the industrial and commercial prosperity of the 
 empire ; and the realization of the necessity of a strong 
 navy, with naval bases and coaling-stations in all parts 
 of the world, for the adequate protection of commerce. 
 
 The belief of the German people in the superiority of 
 their race and its world-civilizing mission is a sober fact. 
 It pervades every class of society, from the Kaiser 
 down to the working-man. It is heralded from the
 
 28 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 pulpit, taught in the schools, and is a scientific state- 
 ment in the work of many of Germany's leading 
 scholars. The anthropologist Woltmann said that 
 " the German is the superior type of the species homo 
 sapiens, from the physical as well as the intellectual 
 point of view." Wirth declared that " the world owes 
 its civilization to Germany alone," and that " the time 
 is near when the earth must inevitably be conquered 
 by the Germans." The scientific book — a serious one 
 — in which these statements occur was so popular 
 that five editions were sold in three years ! Paulsen re- 
 marked that " humanity is aware of, and admires, 
 the German omnipresence." Hartmann taught that 
 the European family is divided into two races, male 
 and female, of which the first, of course, was ex- 
 clusively German, while the second included Latins, 
 Celts, and Slavs. " Marriage is inevitable." Goethe 
 expressed in Faust the opinion tha.t the work of the 
 Germans was to make the habitable world worth 
 living in; while Schiller boasted, " Our language shall 
 reign over the whole world," and that " the German 
 day lasts until the end of time." Schiller also prophe- 
 sied that " two empires shall perish in east and west, 
 I tell you, and it is only the Lutheran faith which shall 
 remain." Fichte, one hundred years ago, exhorted the 
 Germans to be " German patriots, and we shall not 
 cease to be cosmopolitan." Heine believed that " not 
 only Alsace and Lorraine, but all France, shall be ours." 
 To show the German state of mind towards those 
 whom they have not hesitated to provoke to arms, 
 the remarkable teaching of Hummel's book, which is 
 used in the German primary schools, is a convincing 
 illustration. Frenchmen are monkeys, and the best
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 29 
 
 and strongest elements in the French race asserted to 
 be German by blood. The Russians are slaves, as 
 their name implies . Treitschke's opinion of the British 
 is that " among them love of money has killed all 
 sentiment of honour, and all distinction of just and 
 unjust. Their setting sun is our aurora." One of 
 the leading newspapers of Germany recently said: 
 " The army of the first line at the disposal of Ger- 
 many from the first day of the mobilization will be 
 sufficient to crush France, even if we must detach a 
 part of it against England . If England enters the war, 
 it will be the end of the British Empire, for England 
 is a colossus with feet of clay." 
 
 The Kaiser has been the spokesman of the nation 
 in heralding publicly the belief in the superiority of 
 the German people and its world mission. It was at 
 the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the 
 Empire that the scope of the Weltpolitik was announced 
 by Wilhelm II. He said: 
 
 " The German Empire has become a world empire 
 {ein Weltreich). Everywhere, in the most distant 
 lands, are established thousands and thousands of our 
 compatriots. German science, German activity, the 
 defenders of the German ideal, pass the ocean. By 
 thousands of millions we count the wealth that Ger- 
 many transports across the seas. It is your duty, 
 gentlemen, to aid me to establish strong bonds between 
 our empire of Europe and this greater German empire 
 {dieses grosser e Deutsche Reich) .... May our German 
 Fatherland become one day so powerful that, as one 
 formerly used to say, Civis romanus sum, one may in 
 the future need only to say, Ich bin ein deutscher Bilrger." 
 
 At Aix-la-Chapelle, on June 20, 1902, he revealed 
 his ambition in one sentence: " It is to the empire of
 
 30 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 the world that the German genius aspires." Just before 
 leaving for the visit to Tangier in 1905 — the visit 
 which was really the beginning of one of the great 
 issues of the present war — he said at Bremen: " If 
 later one must speak in history of a universal domina- 
 tion by the Hohenzollern, of a universal German 
 empire, this domination must not be established by 
 military conquest. . . . God has called us to civilize 
 the world: we are the missionaries of human progress." 
 This idea was developed further at Miinster, on Sep- 
 tember I, 1907, when the Kaiser proclaimed: "The 
 German people will be the block of granite on which 
 our Lord will be able to elevate and achieve the 
 civilization of the world !" 
 
 This attitude of mind is as common among the dis- 
 ciples of those wonderful leaders who founded the in- 
 ternational movement for the solidarity of interests of 
 labour, as it is among the aristocratic and intellectual 
 elements of the nation. The German Socialist has pro- 
 claimed the brotherhood of man, and the common 
 antagonism of the wage-earners of the world against 
 their capitalistic oppressors. But, for all his preach- 
 ing, the German Socialist is first of all a German. 
 He has come to believe that the mission of Socialism 
 will be best fulfilled through the triumph of Ger- 
 manism. This belief is sincere. It is a far cry from 
 Karl Marx to the militant — or rather mihtarist — 
 German Socialist bearing arms gladly upon the battle- 
 fields of Europe to-day because he is inspired by the 
 thought that the triumph of the army in which he 
 fights will aid the cause of Socialism.* 
 
 * While the Landtage of the German states are mostly 
 controlled by Conservative elements, owing to restricted
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 31 
 
 There is a striking analogy between the German 
 Socialist of the present generation and the Jacobins 
 of 1793. The heralders of LtbertS, Egalite et Fraternite 
 fought for the spread of the principles of the Revolu- 
 tion through God's chosen instruments, the armies of 
 France, and were carried away by their enthusiasm 
 until they became the facile agents for saddling Europe 
 with the tyranny of Napoleon. Love for humanity 
 was turned into blood-lust, and fighting freedom into 
 seeking for booty and glory. Are the profound 
 thinkers of the German universities, and the visionaries 
 of the working-men's forums, following to-day the same 
 path ? Does the propagation of an ideal lead in- 
 evitably to a blind fanaticism, where the dreamer be- 
 comes in his own imagination a chosen instrument of 
 God to shed blood ? 
 
 There is undoubtedly an intellectual and idealistic 
 basis to German militarism and to German arrogance. 
 
 Their connotation of the word " German " has led the 
 Germans to look upon territories outside of their 
 political confines as historically and racially, hence 
 rightfully, virtually, and eventually theirs. A geo- 
 graphy now in its two hundred and forty-fifth edition 
 in the primary schools (Daniel's Leitfaden der Geo- 
 graphie) states that " Germany is the heart of Europe. 
 Around it extend Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, 
 Luxemburg, and Holland, which were all formerly 
 
 suffrage, the Reichstag is one of the most intelligently demo- 
 cratic legislative bodies in the world. Its social legislation is 
 surpassed by that of no other country. During thirty years 
 the Sociahst vote in Germany has increased 1,000 per cent. 
 It now represents one-third of the total electorate. But the 
 Socialists are to a man behind the war.
 
 32 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 part of the same state, and are peopled entirely or in 
 the majority by Germans." 
 
 When German children have been for the past 
 generation deliberately taught as a matter of fact — 
 not as an academic or debatable' question — that 
 Deutschland ought to be more than it is, we can under- 
 stand how the neutrality of their smaller neighbours 
 seems to the Germans a negligible consideration. No 
 wonder the soldiers who ran up against an implacable 
 enemy at Liege, Namur, and Charleroi thought there 
 must be a mistake somewhere, and were more angered 
 against the opposition of those whom they regarded 
 as their brothers of blood than they later showed 
 themselves against the French. No wonder that the 
 sentiment of the whole German nation is for the re- 
 tention of Belgium, their path to the sea. It was 
 formerly German. Its inhabitants are German. Let 
 it become German once more ! 
 
 But to the Germans there are other and equally 
 important elements belonging to their nation outside 
 of the states upon the confines of the empire. These 
 are the German emigrants and German colonists in 
 all portions of the world. In recent years there has 
 come to the front more than ever the theory that 
 German nationality cannot be lost by foreign residence 
 or by transference of allegiance to another State : once 
 a German, always a German. 
 
 Convincing proof of this is found in the new citizen- 
 ship law, sanctioned with practical unanimity by the 
 Reichstag and Bundesrath, which came into effect on 
 January i, 1914. According to Article XIII. of this 
 law, " a former German who has not taken up his 
 residence in Germany may, on application, be natural-
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 33 
 
 ized." This applies also to one who is descended from 
 a former German, or who has been adopted as the child 
 of such ! According to Article XIV., any former 
 German who holds a position in the German empire 
 in any part of the world, in the service of a German 
 religious society or of a German school, is looked upon 
 as a German citizen " by assumption." Any foreigner 
 holding such a position may be naturalized without 
 having a legal residence in Germany. The most in- 
 teresting provision of all is in Article XXV., section 2 
 of which says: " Citizenship is not lost by one who, 
 before acquiring foreign citizenship, has secured on 
 application the written consent of the competent 
 authorities of his home state to retain his citizen- 
 ship." 
 
 Germany allows anyone of German blood to become 
 a German citizen, even if he has never seen Germany, 
 and has no intention of taking up his residence there ; 
 and Germans who have emigrated to other countries 
 the amazing opportunity to acquire foreign citizenship 
 without losing their German citizenship. 
 
 The result of this law, since the war broke out, has 
 been to place a natural and justifiable suspicion upon 
 all Germans living in the countries of the enemies of 
 Germany. It is impossible to overestimate the peril 
 from the secret ill-will and espionage of Germans re- 
 siding in the countries that are at war with Germany. 
 There are undoubtedly many thousands of cases 
 where Germans have been honest and sincere in their 
 change of allegiance, but how are the nations where 
 they have become naturalized to be sure of this ? 
 A legal means has been given to these naturalized 
 Germans to retain, without the knowledge of the nation 
 
 3
 
 34 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 where their oath of allegiance has been received in good 
 faith, citizenship in Germany. 
 
 German emigration and colonization societies, and 
 many seemingly purely religious organizations for 
 " the propagation of the faith in foreign lands," have 
 been untiring in their efforts to preserve in the minds 
 of Germans who have left the Fatherland the prin- 
 ciple, "once a German, always a German." The 
 Catholic as well as the Lutheran Church has lent itself 
 to this effort. Wherever there are Germans, one finds 
 the German church, the German school, the Zeitung, 
 the Bierhalle, and the Turnverein. Deiitschtum is 
 sacred to the Germans. One cannot but have the 
 deepest respect for the pride of Germans in their 
 ancestry, in their language, in their church, and in 
 the preservation of traditional customs. There is no 
 better blood in the world than German blood, and one 
 who has it in his veins may well be proud of it : for it 
 is an inheritance which is distinctly to a man's intel- 
 lectual and physical advantage. But, in recent years, 
 the effort has been made to confuse Deutschtum with 
 Deutschland. Here lies a great danger. We may 
 admire and reverence all that has come to us from 
 Germany, but the world cannot look on impassively 
 at a propaganda which is leading to Deutschland Uber 
 Alles ! 
 
 When we take the megalomania of the Germans, 
 their ambition to fulfil their world mission, their belief 
 in their peculiar fitness to fulfil that mission, and their 
 idea of the German character of the neighbouring 
 states, and contrast the dream with the reality, we see 
 how they must feel, especially as they are conscious of 
 the fact that they dispose of a military strength dispro-
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 35 
 
 portionate to their position in world politics. Great 
 Britain, with one-third less population, " the colossus 
 with the feet of clay," owns a good fourth of the whole 
 world; France, the nation of " monkeys," which was 
 easily crushed in 1870, holds sway over untold millions 
 of acres and natives in Africa and Asia; while Russia, 
 the nation of " slaves," has a half of Europe and Asia. 
 
 The most civilized people in the world, with a world 
 mission to fulfil, is dispossessed by its rivals of inferior 
 races and of inferior military strength ! The thinking 
 German is by the very nature of things a militarist. 
 
 But even if the logic of the Weltpolitik, under the 
 force of circumstances, did not push the German of 
 every class and category to the belief that Germany 
 must solve her great problems of the present day by 
 force of arms, especially since her military strength 
 is so much greater than that of her rivals, the nature 
 of the German would make him lean towards force 
 as the decisive argument in the question of extending 
 his influence. For from the beginning of history the 
 German has been a war man. He has asserted himself 
 by force. He has proved less amenable to the refining 
 and softening influences of Christianity and civili- 
 zation than any other European race. He has wor- 
 shipped force, and reHed wholly upon force to dominate 
 those with whom he has come into contact. The 
 leopard cannot change his spots. So it is as natural 
 for the German of the twentieth century to use the 
 sword as an argument as it was for the German of the 
 tenth century, or, indeed, of the first century. We 
 cannot too strongly insist upon this fatal tendency 
 of the Gennan to subordinate natural, moral, legal, 
 and technical rights to the supremacy of brute force.
 
 36 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 There is no conception of what is called " moral 
 suasion " in the German mind. Although some of 
 the greatest thinkers of the world have been, and are 
 to-day, Germans, yet the German nation has never 
 come to the realization that the pen may be mightier 
 than the sword. Give the German a pen, and he will 
 hold the world in admiration of his intellect. Give 
 him a piano or a violin, and he will hold the world in 
 adoration of his soul. But give him a sword, and he 
 will hold the world in abhorrence of his force. For 
 there never was an iibermensch who was not a devil. 
 Else he would be God. 
 
 But the Weltpolitik has had other and more tangible 
 and substantial causes than the three we have been 
 considering. It is not wholly the result of the German 
 idea that Germany can impose her will upon the world, 
 and has the right to do so. The power of Germany 
 comes from the fact that her people have been workers 
 as well as dreamers. The rapid increase of the popula- 
 tion and development of the industrial and commercial 
 prosperity of the Empire has given the Germans a wholly 
 justifiable economic foundation for their Weltpolitik. 
 
 United Germany, after the successful war of 1870, 
 began the greatest era of industrial growth and pros- 
 perity that has ever been known in the history of the 
 world. Not even the United States, with all its annual 
 immigration and opening up of new fields and terri- 
 tories, has been able to show an industrial growth 
 comparable to that of Germany during the past forty 
 years. In this old central Europe cities have grown 
 almost over-night. Railways have been laid down, 
 one after the other, until the whole empire is a net- 
 work of steel. Mines and factories have sprung into
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 37 
 
 being as miraculously as if it had been by the rubbing 
 of Aladdin's lamp . The population has increased more 
 than half in forty years. 
 
 It was as her population and her productive power 
 increased far more quickly and far beyond that of her 
 neighbours that Germany began to look out into the 
 extra- European world for markets. She had reached 
 the point when her productivity in manufacturing 
 hues had exceeded her power of consumption. Where 
 find markets for the goods ? German merchants, and 
 not Prussian militarists, began to spread abroad in 
 Germany the idea that there was a world equilibrium 
 as important to the future of the nations of Europe 
 as was the European equilibrium. Germany, looking 
 out over the world, saw that the prosperity of Great 
 Britain was due to her trade, and that the security 
 and volume of this trade was due to her colonies. 
 
 Who does not remember the remarkable stamp 
 issued by the dominion of Canada to celebrate the 
 Jubilee of Queen Victoria ? On the mercatorial pro- 
 jection of the world the British possessions were given 
 in red. One could not find any corner of the globe 
 where there were not ports to which British ships in 
 transit could go, and friendly markets for British com- 
 merce. The Germans began to compare their in- 
 dustries with those of Great Britain. Their population 
 was larger than that of the great colonial power, and 
 was increasing more rapidly. Their industries were 
 growing apace. For their excess population, emigra- 
 tion to a foreign country meant annual loss of energetic 
 and capable compatriots. Commerce had to meet 
 unfair competition in every part of the world. Out- 
 side of the Baltic and North Seas, there was no place
 
 38 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 that a German ship could touch over which the German 
 flag waved. 
 
 It was not militarism or chauvinism or megalomania, 
 but the natural desire of a people who found themselves 
 becoming prosperous to put secure and solid founda- 
 tions under that prosperity, that made the Germans 
 seek for colonies and launch forth upon the Weltpolitik. 
 
 The first instance of the awakening on the part of 
 the German people to a sense that there was something 
 which interested them outside of Europe was the 
 annexation of the Fiji Islands by Great Britain in 1874, 
 with which German traders had just begun, at great 
 risk and by painstaking efforts, to build up a business. 
 This was the time when the government was engaged 
 in its struggles with the church and socialism, and 
 when the working of the Reichstag and the Bundesrath 
 was still in an experimental stage. Nothing could be 
 done. But there began to be a feeling among Germans 
 that in the future Germany ought to be consulted con- 
 cerning the further extension of the sovereignty of a 
 European nation over any part of the world then un- 
 occupied or still independent. But Germany was not 
 in a position either to translate this sentiment into a 
 vigorous foreign policy, or to begin to seize her share 
 of the world by taking the portions which Great Britain 
 and Russia and France had still left vacant. 
 
 German trade, still in its infancy, received cruel set- 
 backs by the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and 
 of Egypt in 1883, the French occupation of Tunis in 
 1881, and the Russian and British deahngs with central 
 Asia and Afghanistan. The sentiment of the educated 
 and moneyed classes in Germany began to impose 
 upon the government the necessity of entering the
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 39 
 
 colonial field. The action in Egypt and in Turns 
 
 brought about the beginning of German colonization. 
 
 Bismarck had just successfully finished his critical 
 
 struggle with the socialists. The decks were cleared 
 
 for action. In 1882 a Bremen trader, Herr Liidritz, 
 
 by treaties with the native chiefs, gained the Bay of 
 
 Angra-Pequena, on the west coast of Africa. For two 
 
 years no attention was paid to this treaty, which was 
 
 a purely private commercial affair. In 1884, shortly 
 
 after the occupation of Egypt, a dispute arose between 
 
 the British authorities at Cape Town and Herr Liidritz. 
 
 Bismarck saw that he must act, or the old story of 
 
 extension of British sovereignty would be repeated. 
 
 He telegraphed to the German Consul at Cape Town 
 
 that the imperial government had annexed the coast 
 
 and hinterland from the Orange River to Cape Frio. 
 
 Other annexations in Africa and the Pacific followed 
 in the years 1884-1886. In Africa, the German flag 
 was hoisted over the east coast of the continent, north 
 of Cape Delgado and the River Rovuma, and in 
 Kamerun and Togo, on the Gulf of Guinea. In the 
 Pacific, Kaiser Wilhelm's Land was formed of a por- 
 tion of New Guinea, with some adjacent islands, and 
 the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, and 
 the Marshall Islands were gathered in. Since those 
 early years of feverish activity there have been no 
 new acquisitions in Africa other than the portion of 
 French Congo, ceded in 1912 as "compensation" for 
 the French protectorate of Morocco. In the Pacific 
 in 1899, after the American conquest of the Philippines, 
 the Caroline, Pelew, and Marianne groups and two of 
 the Samoan Islands were added. 
 
 In China Germany believed that she had the right
 
 40 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 to expect to gain a position equal to that of Great 
 Britain at Hong Kong and Shanghai, of France at 
 Tonkin, and Russia in Manchuria. She believed that 
 it was just as necessary for her to have a fortified port 
 to serve as a naval base for her fleet as it was for the 
 other Powers, and that by a possession of territory 
 which could be called her own she would be best able 
 to get her share of the commerce of the Far East. 
 From 1895 to 1897 Germany examined carefully all 
 the possible places which would serve best for the 
 establishment of a naval and commercial base. At 
 the beginning of 1897, after naval and commercial 
 missions had made their reports, a technical mission 
 was sent out whose membership included the famous 
 Franzius, the creator of Kiel. This mission reported 
 in favour of Kiau-Chau, on the peninsula of Shantung, 
 in north China. 
 
 When negotiations were opened with the Chinese, 
 the answer to the Chinese government was to send 
 soldiers to guard the bay ! The Kaiser, in a visit 
 to the Czar at Peterhof in the summer of 1897, secured 
 Russian " benevolent neutrality." The murder of 
 two missionaries in the interior of the province, on 
 November i of the same year, gave Germany her 
 chance. Three German war vessels landed troops on 
 the peninsula, and seized Kiau-Chau and Tsing-Tau. 
 After five months of tortuous negotiations, a treaty 
 was concluded between Germany and China on March 6, 
 1899. Kiau-Chau, with adjacent territory, was leased 
 to Germany for ninety-nine years. To German capital 
 and German commerce were given the right of prefer- 
 ence for every industrial enterprise on the peninsula, 
 the concession for the immediate construction of a
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 41 
 
 railway, and the exclusive right to mining along the 
 line of the railway. Thus the greater part of the 
 province of Shantung passed under the economic 
 influence of Germany. 
 
 The entry of Japan into the war of 19 14 is due to 
 her desire to remedy a great injustice which has been 
 done to Japanese commerce in the province of Shan- 
 tung by the German occupation, to her fear of this 
 naval base opposite her coast (just as she feared Port 
 Arthur), and probably to the intention of occupying 
 the Marianne Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the 
 Eastern and Western Carolines, in order that the 
 Japanese navy may have important bases in a possible 
 future conflict with the United States. 
 
 When Germany leased Kiau-Chau, she declared 
 solemnly that the port of Tsing-Tau would be an open 
 port, ein fret Hafen fiir alle Nationen. But Japanese 
 trade competition soon caused her to go back on her 
 word. She conceived a clever scheme in 1906, by which 
 the Chinese customs duties were allowed to be collected 
 within the Protectorate in return for an annual sum of 
 20 per cent, upon the entire customs receipts of the 
 Tsing-Tau district. In this way she is more than 
 recompensed for the generosity displayed in allowing 
 Gennan goods to be subject to the Chinese customs. 
 She reimburses herself at the expense of the Japanese ! 
 Berlin could not have been astonished at the ultimatum 
 of August 15 from Tokio. 
 
 There has always been much opposition in Germany 
 to the colonization policy of the Government. The 
 dissatisfaction over the poor success of the attempts 
 at African colonization led Chancellor Caprivi to state 
 that the worst blow an enemy could give him was to
 
 42 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 force upon him more territories in Africa ! The Ger- 
 mans never got on well with the negroes. Their 
 colonists, for the most part too poor to finance agricul- 
 tural schemes properly, lived by trading. Like all 
 whites, they cheated the natives and bullied them into 
 giving up their lands. In South- West Africa a for- 
 midable uprising of the Herreros resulted in the 
 massacre of all the Germans except the missionaries 
 and the colonists who had established themselves 
 there before the German occupation. The suppres- 
 sion of this rebellion took more than a year, and cost 
 Germany an appalling sum in money and many lives. 
 But it cost the natives more. Two-thirds of the 
 nation of the Herreros were massacred; while only 
 6,000 or 7,000 were in arms, the German official report 
 stated that 40,000 were killed. The Germans confis- 
 cated all the lands of the natives. 
 
 In 1906, after twenty-one years of German rule, 
 there were in South- West Africa 16,000 prisoners of 
 war out of a total native population of 31,000. All 
 the natives lived in concentration camps, and were 
 forced to work for the Government. In commenting 
 upon the Herrero campaign. Pastor Frenssen, one of 
 the most brilliant writers of modern Germany, put 
 in the mouth of the hero of his colonial novel the 
 following words : " God has given us the victory because 
 we were the most noble race, and the most filled with 
 initiative. That is not saying much, when we com- 
 pare ourselves with this race of negroes ; but we must 
 act in such a way as to become better and more active 
 than all the other people of the world. It is to the 
 most noble, to the most firm that the world belongs. 
 Such is the justice of God."
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 43 
 
 German opposition has been bitter also against the 
 occupation of Kiau-Chau. For traders have claimed 
 that the political presence of Germany on the Shantung 
 peninsula and the dealings of the German diplomats 
 with the Pekin court had so prejudiced the Chinese 
 against everything German that it was harder to do 
 business with them than before the leasehold was 
 granted. They actually advocated the withdrawal of 
 the protectorate for the good of German commerce ! 
 
 But German pride was at stake in Africa after the 
 Herrero rebelHon. And in China, Kaiu-Chau was 
 too valuable a naval base to give up. In 1907 a 
 ministry of colonies was added to the Imperial Cabinet. 
 Since then the colonial realm has been considered an 
 integral part of the Empire. 
 
 At every point of this colonial development Germany 
 found herself confronted with open opposition and 
 secret intrigue. The principal strategic value of 
 South-West Africa was taken away by the British 
 possession of Walfisch Bay, and of East Africa by the 
 protectorate which the Sultan of Zanzibar allowed 
 to the British Crown. Togoland and Kamerun are 
 hemmed in by French and British possession of the 
 hinterland. The Pacific islands are mostly "left- 
 overs," or of minor importance. In spite of the un- 
 promising character of these colonies, the commerce 
 of Germany with them increased from 1908 to 1912 
 500 per cent., and the commerce with China through 
 Kiau-Chau from 1902 to 1912 nearly 1,000 per cent. 
 
 And yet, in comparison to her energies and her 
 willingness — let us leave till later the question of 
 ability and fitness — Germany has had little oppor- 
 tunity to exercise a colonial administration on a large
 
 44 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 scale. She must seek to extend her political influence 
 over new territories. Where and how ? That has 
 been the question. Most promising of all appeared 
 the succession to the Portuguese colonies, for the 
 sharing of which Great Britain declared her willingness 
 to meet Germany half-way. An accord was made in 
 1898 against the eventuality of Portugal selling her 
 colonies. But since the Republic was proclaimed in 
 Portugal there has been little hope that her new 
 Government would consider itself strong enough to 
 part with the heritage of several centuries. 
 
 For the increase of her colonial empire Germany has 
 felt little hope. So she has tried to secure commercial 
 privileges in various parts of the world, through which 
 political control might eventually come. We have 
 already spoken of her effort in China. Separate 
 chapters treat of her efforts in the three Moslem 
 countries, Morocco, Persia, and Turkey, and show how 
 in each case she has found herself checkmated by the 
 intrigues and accords of the three rich colonial Powers. 
 
 Long before the poHtical union of the German states 
 in Europe was accomplished, there were German 
 aspirations in regard to the New World, when pan- 
 germanists dreamed of forming German states in 
 North and South America. 
 
 These enthusiasts did not see that the Civil War had 
 so brought together the various elements of the United 
 States, the most prominent and most loyal of which 
 was the German element, that any hopes of a separatist 
 movement in the United States was chimerical. As 
 late as 1885, however, the third edition of Roscher's 
 Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung stated 
 that " it would be a great step forward if the German
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 45 
 
 immigrants to North America would be willing to 
 concentrate themselves in one of the states, and trans- 
 form it into a German state. For different reasons 
 Wisconsin would appear to be most particularly indi- 
 cated." 
 
 As early as 1849 the Germans commenced to organize 
 emigration to Brazil through a private society of 
 Hamburg {Hamburger Kolonisationverein), which 
 bought from the Prince de Joinville, brother-in-law 
 of Dom Pedro, vast territories in the state of Santa 
 Catharina. There the German colonization in Brazil 
 began. It soon extended to the neighbouring states of 
 Parana and Rio Grande do Sul. There are now about 
 350,000 Germans, forming 2 per cent, of the popu- 
 lation. In no district are they more than 15 per cent. 
 However, in Rio Grande there is a territory of 200 
 kilometres in which the German language is almost 
 wholly spoken, and a chain of German colonies binds 
 Sao Leopoldo to Santa Cruz. 
 
 Among the pangermanists the three states of 
 southern Brazil have been regarded as a zone particu- 
 larly reserved for German expansion. The colonial 
 congress of 1902 at Berlin expressed a formal desire 
 that hereafter German emigration be directed towards 
 the south of Brazil. An amendment to include Argen- 
 tina was rejected. The decree of Prussia, forbidding 
 emigration to Brazil, was revoked in 1896, in so far 
 as it was a question of the three states of Parana, Santa 
 Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul. 
 
 It has not been very many years since diplomatic 
 incidents arose between Brazil and Germany over 
 fancied German violation of Brazilian territory by the 
 arrest of sailors on shore. But Germany has not
 
 46 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 entertained serious hope of getting a foothold in 
 South America. Brazil has increased greatly in 
 strength, and there is to-day in South America a tacit 
 alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to sup- 
 port the American Monroe Doctrine. Germany found, 
 when she was trying to buy a West India island from 
 Denmark, that she had to reckon not only with Wash- 
 ington, but also with Buenos Ayres, Rio, and Santiago. 
 
 Finding herself so thoroughly hemmed in on all sides, 
 in the New World and in the Old World, by alliances 
 and accords directed against her overseas political 
 expansion, modern Germany has repeated the history 
 of the Jews. Deprived of some senses, one develops 
 others extraordinarily. Deprived of civil and social 
 rights for centuries, the Jews developed the business 
 sense, until to-day their wealth and influence in the 
 business world is far beyond the proportionate numbers 
 of their race. Deprived of the opportunity to ad- 
 minister and develop vast overseas territories, the 
 Germans have turned to intensive military develop- 
 ment at home and extensive commercial development 
 abroad, until to-day they are the foremost military 
 Power in Europe, and are threatening British com- 
 mercial supremacy in every part of the globe. 
 
 The German counterpart of the British and French 
 and Russian elements that are directing the destinies 
 of vast colonies and protectorates is investing its 
 energy in business. During the past generation the 
 German campaign for the markets of the world has 
 been carried on by the brightest and best minds in 
 Germany. There have been three phases to this cam- 
 paign: manufacturing the goods, selling the goods, 
 and carrying the goods. German manufactures have
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 47 
 
 increased so greatly in volume and scope since the 
 accession of the present emperor that there is hardly 
 a line of merchandise which is not offered in the markets 
 of the world by German firms. 
 
 Articles " made in Germany " may not be as well 
 made as those of other countries; but their price is 
 more attractive, and they have driven other goods 
 from many fields. One sees this right in Europe in 
 the markets of Germany's competitors and enemies. 
 Since the present war began French and British 
 patriots are hard put to it sometimes when they find 
 that article after article which they have been accus- 
 tomed to buy is German. In my home in Paris the 
 elevator is German, electrical fixtures are German, the 
 range in my kitchen is German, the best lamps for 
 lighting are German I have discovered these things 
 in the past month through endeavouring to have them 
 repaired. Interest led me to investigate other articles 
 in daily use. My cutlery is German, my silverware is 
 German, the chairs in my dining-room are German, 
 the mirror in my bathroom is German, some of my food 
 products are German, and practically all the patented 
 drugs and some of the toilet preparations are German. 
 Curiously enough, while my beer is French, my milk 
 is German ! 
 
 All these things have been purchased in the Paris 
 markets, without the slightest leaning towards, or 
 preference for, articles coming from the Fatherland. 
 I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German 
 things. They sold themselves — the old combination 
 of appearance, convenience, and price, which will sell 
 anything. That I am unconsciously using German 
 manufactured articles is largely due to the genius of
 
 48 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 the salesman. It is a great mistake to believe that 
 salesmanship is primarily the art of selling the goods 
 of the house you represent. That has been the British 
 idea. To-day it is exploded. Is it because the same 
 type of Britisher that is devoting his brains and energy 
 to the solution of the problems of inferior people in dif- 
 ferent parts of the world is among the Germans devoting 
 his energies to German commerce in those same places, 
 that the Germans have found the fine art of salesman- 
 ship to be quite a different thing ? It is studying the 
 desires of the people to whom you intend to sell, 
 finding out what they want to buy, and persuading 
 your house at home to make and export those articles. 
 From the Pari<iian and the Londoner and the New 
 Yorker down to the naked savage, the Germans know 
 what is wanted, and they supply it. If the British 
 university man is enjoying a position of authority and 
 of fascinating perplexity in some colony, and feels that 
 he has a share in shaping the destinies of the world, 
 the German university man is not without his revenge. 
 Deprived of one sense, has he not developed another — 
 and more practical one ? 
 
 The young German, brought up in an overpopu- 
 lated country, unable to enter a civil service which 
 will keep him under his own flag — and remember how 
 intensely patriotic he is, this young German, just as 
 patriotic as the young Frenchman or the young 
 Britisher — must leave home. He is not of the class 
 which voluntarily becomes an emigrant. His ties are 
 all in Germany; his love is all for Germany. So he 
 becomes a German resident abroad, in close connection 
 with the Fatherland, and always working for the 
 interests of the Fatherland. He goes to England or
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 49 
 
 to France, where he studies carefully and methodically, 
 as if he were to write a thesis on it (and he often does), 
 the business methods of and the business opportunities 
 among the people where he isdwelHng. He is giving his 
 life to put Deutschland uber Alles in business right in the 
 heart of the rival nation, and he is succeeding. During 
 October, 1914, when they tried to arrest in the larger 
 cities of England the German and Austrian subjects, 
 they had to stop — there was not room in the gaols for 
 all of them. And in many places business was para- 
 lyzed. 
 
 To carry the products of steadily increasing volume 
 to steadily growing markets, Germany has been 
 sensible enough to make those markets pay for the cost 
 of transport. Up to the very selling price all the money 
 goes to Germany. The process is simple : from German 
 factories, by German ships, through German salesmen, 
 to German firms, in every part of the world — beginning 
 with London and Paris. 
 
 Germany's merchant marine has kept pace with the 
 development of her industry. Essen may be the ex- 
 pression of one side of modern Germany, which is 
 said to have caused the European war. But one is 
 more logical in believing that Hamburg and Bremen 
 and the Kiel Canal have done more to bring on this 
 war than the products of Krupp. During the last 
 twenty-five years the tonnage of Germany's merchant 
 marine has increased 250 per cent., a quarter of which 
 has been in the last five years from 1908-1913. There 
 are six times as many steamships flying the German 
 flag as when Wilhelm H. mounted the throne. In 
 merchant ships Germany stands to-day second only to 
 Great Britain. The larger portion of her merchant 
 
 4
 
 50 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 marine is directed by great corporations. The struggle 
 against Great Britain and France for the freight- 
 carrying of outside nations has been most bitter — and 
 most successful. Before the present war there was no 
 part of the world in which the German flag was not carried 
 by ships less than ten years old. 
 
 With the exception of Kiau-Chau, the colonies of 
 Germany have never been of much practical value, 
 except as possible coaling and wireless stations for the 
 German fleet. But here also the opposition of her 
 rivals has minimized their value. Walfisch Bay and 
 Zanzibar have, as we have already said, lessened the 
 strategical value of the two large colonies on either side 
 of the African continent. In the division of the 
 Portug"uese colonies agreed to by Great Britain, it was 
 " the mistress of the seas " who was to have the 
 strategic places — not part of them, but all of them — 
 the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Azores. 
 
 As Germany's commerce and shipping have so rapidly 
 developed, the seeking for opportunities to extend her 
 political sovereignty outside of Europe has not been 
 so much an outlook for industrial enterprise as the 
 imperative necessity of finding naval bases and coaling- 
 stations in different parts of the world for the adequate 
 protection of commerce. The development of the 
 German navy has been the logical complement of the 
 development of the German merchant marine. Ger- 
 many's astonishing naval programme has kept pace 
 with the astonishing growth of the great Hamburg and 
 Bremen lines. Germany has had exactly the same 
 argument for the increase of her navy as Great Britain 
 has had. Justification for the money expended on the 
 British navy is that Great Britain needs the navy to
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 51 
 
 protect her commerce, upon which the life of the 
 nation is dependent, and to guarantee her food-supplies. 
 The industrial evolution of Germany has brought 
 about for her practically the same economic conditions 
 as in Great Britain. In addition to the dependence 
 of her prosperity upon the power of her navy to pro- 
 tect her commerce, Germany has felt that she must 
 keep the sea open for the sake of guaranteeing un- 
 interrupted food-supplies for her industrial population. 
 It must not be forgotten that Germany is flanked on 
 east and west by hereditary enemies, and has come 
 to look to the sea as the direction from which her 
 food-supplies would come in case of war. 
 
 This last factor of the Weltpolitik, the creation of a 
 strong navy, must not be looked upon either as a 
 provocation to Great Britain or as a menace to the 
 equlibrium of the world. If it has brought Germany 
 inevitably into conflict with Great Britain, it is because 
 the navy is the safeguard of commerce. The Welt- 
 politik is essentially a Handelspolitik. The present 
 tremendous conflict between Great Britain and Ger- 
 many is the result of commercial rivalry. It is more 
 a question of the pocket-book than of the sacredness of 
 treaties, if we are looking for the cause rather than the 
 occasion of the war. It has come in spite of honest 
 efforts to bring Great Britain and Germany together. 
 
 Lord Haldane, in February, 1912, made a trip to 
 Berlin to bring about a general understanding between 
 the two nations. But while there was much discussion 
 of the question of the Bagdad Railway, Persian and 
 Chinese affairs, Walfisch Bay, and the division of 
 Africa, nothing came of it. On March 18 Mr. Churchill 
 said to the House of Commons: " If Germany adds two
 
 52 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 ships in the next six years, we shall have to add four; 
 if Germany adds three, we shall have to add six. 
 Whatever reduction is made in the German naval 
 programme will probably be followed here by a corre- 
 sponding naval reduction. The Germans will not get 
 ahead of us, no matter what increase they make ; they 
 will not lose, no matter what decrease they make." 
 This was as far as Great Britain could go. 
 
 In the spring of 1912 the British fleet was concen- 
 trated in the North Sea, and an accord was made with 
 France for common defensive action in the North Sea 
 and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, during 
 M. Poincare's trip to Petrograd, an accord was signed 
 between France and Russia for common naval action 
 in time of war. 
 
 The pangermanic movement in recent years has not 
 been a tool of the government, but rather a party 
 including other parties, banded together more than 
 once to oppose the German government in an honour- 
 able attempt to preserve peace with the neighbours 
 in the west. 
 
 It is a tremendous mistake — and a mistake which 
 has been continuously made in the French, British, and 
 American press since the beginning of the war — to 
 consider the WeltpoUtik as an expression of the senti- 
 ments of the German Emperor and his officials. Since 
 it was forced upon Bismarck against his will, pan- 
 germanism has been a power against which the Emperor 
 William II. has had to strive frequently throughout 
 his reign. For it has never hesitated to force him into 
 paths and into positions which were perilous to the 
 theory of monarchical authority. The Kaiser has 
 resented the pressure of public opinion in directing
 
 THE GERMAN WELTPOLITIK 53 
 
 the affairs of the empire. Pangermanism has been a 
 striking example of democracy, endeavouring to have 
 a say in governmental policies. The Naval and Army 
 Leagues, the German Colonial Society, and the Pan- 
 germanic Society are private groups, irresponsible from 
 the standpoint of the Government. They have de- 
 clared the governmental programme for an increase 
 in armaments insufficient, and have bitterly denounced 
 and attacked them from the point of view exactly 
 opposite to that of the socialists. The Pangermanic 
 Society refused to recognize the treaty concluded 
 between Germany and France after the Agadir inci- 
 dent. Said Herr Klaas at the Hanover Conference 
 on April 15, 1912: " We persist in considering Morocco 
 as the country which will become in the future, let 
 us hope the near future, the colony for German emigra- 
 tion." The same intractable spirit was shown in 
 Dr. Pohl's address at the Erfurt Congress in September, 
 1912. 
 
 We hear much about the Kaiser and the military 
 party precipitating the war, A review of the German 
 newspapers during the past few years will convince 
 any fair-minded reader that German public opinion, 
 standing constantly behind the pangermanists, has 
 frequently made the German Foreign Oihce act with 
 a much higher hand in international questions than it 
 would have acted if left to itself, and that German 
 pubhc opinion, from highest classes to lowest, is for 
 this war to the bitter finish. It is the war of the people, 
 intelligently and deliberately willed by them. The state- 
 ment that a revolution in Germany, led by the de- 
 mocracy to dethrone the Kaiser or to get him out of 
 the clutches of the military party, would put an end
 
 54 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 to the war, is foolish and pernicious, for it leads us 
 to false hopes. It would be much nearer the truth to 
 say that if the Kaiser had not consented to this war, 
 he would have endangered his throne. 
 
 The principle of the Weltpolitik, imposed upon 
 European diplomacy by the German nation in the 
 assembling of the Conference of Algeciras, was that no 
 state should be allowed to disturb the existing political 
 and territorial status quo of any country still free, in 
 any part of the world, without the consent of the other 
 Powers. This Weltpolitik would have the natural 
 effect, according to Karl Lamprecht, in his Zur Jmigsten 
 Deutschen Vergangenheit, of endangering a universal 
 and pitiless competition among the seven Great Powers, 
 in which the weakest would eventually be eliminated
 
 III. 
 
 THE BAGDADBAHN 
 
 In the development of her Weltpolitik, the most for- 
 midable, the most feasible, and the most successful 
 conception of modern Germany has been the economic 
 penetration of Asiatic Turkey. She may have failed 
 in Africa and in China, but there can be no doubt 
 about the successful beginning, and the rich promise 
 for the future, of German enterprises in the Ottoman 
 Empire. 
 
 The countries of sunshine have always exercised a 
 peculiar fascination over the German. His literature 
 is filled with the Mediterranean and with Islam. 
 From his northern climate he has looked southward 
 and eastward back towards the cradle of his race, 
 and in imagination has lived the Crusades over again. 
 As long as Italy was under Teutonic political influence, 
 the path to the Mediterranean was easy. United Italy 
 and United Germany were born at the same time. But 
 while the birth of Italy threatened eventually to close 
 to Germany the trade route to the Mediterranean, the 
 necessity for a trade route to the south became more 
 vital than ever for the new German Confederation 
 as the result of the union. 
 
 When her political consolidation was completed and 
 her industrial era commenced, Germany began to look 
 
 55
 
 56 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 around the world for a place to expand. There were 
 still three independent Mohammedan nations — 
 Morocco, Persia, and Turkey. In Morocco she found 
 another cause for conflict with France than Alsace- 
 Lorraine. In Persia and Turkey she faced the bitter 
 rivalry of Russia and Great Britain. 
 
 The rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
 fact that its sovereign was khalif of the Moslem world, 
 led German statesmen to believe that Constantinople 
 was the best place in the world to centre the efforts 
 of their diplomacy in the development of the Welt- 
 politik. Through allying herself with the khalif, 
 Germany would find herself able to strike eventually at 
 the British occupation of India and Egypt, and the 
 French occupation of Algeria and Turns, not only by 
 joining the interests of panislamism and pangermanism 
 but also by winning a place in Morocco opposite Gib- 
 raltar, a place in Asia Minor opposite Egypt, and a place 
 in Mesopotamia opposite India. 
 
 The certainty of economic success helped to make 
 the political effort worth while, even if it came to 
 nothing. For Asia Minor and Mesopotamia are 
 countries that have been among the most fertile and 
 prosperous in the whole world. They could be so 
 again. The present backward condition of Asia Minor 
 and Mesopotamia is due to the fact that these countries 
 have had no chance to live since they came under 
 Ottoman control, much less to develop their resources 
 proportionately to other nations. The natives have 
 been exploited by the Turkish officials and by foreign 
 holders of concessions. Frequently concessions have 
 been sought to stop, not to further, development. If 
 there have been climatic changes to account for lack of
 
 THE BAGDADBAHN 57 
 
 fertility in Asia Minor, this is largely due to deforesta- 
 tion. Ibn Batutah, the famous Moorish traveller of 
 the first half of the fourteenth century, and Sheha- 
 beddin of Damascus, his contemporary, have left 
 glowing accounts of the fertility and prosperity of 
 regions of Asia Minor, now hopelessly arid, as they 
 existed on the eve of the foundation of the Ottoman 
 Empire. Not only have all the trees been cut down, 
 but the roots have been torn up for fuel ! One fre- 
 quently sees in the markets of Anatolian towns the 
 roots of trees for sale. The treatment of trees is typical 
 of everything else. The country has had no chance. 
 In Mesopotamia the new irrigation schemes are not 
 innovations of the twentieth century, but the revival 
 of methods of culture in vogue thousands of years 
 before Christ. 
 
 The Romans and Byzantines improved their in- 
 heritance. The Osmanlis ruined it. 
 
 In addition to sunshine and romance, political ad- 
 vantages, and prospects of making money, another 
 influence has attracted the Germans to the Ottoman 
 Empire. There is a certain affinity between German 
 and Osmanli. The Germans have sympathy with 
 the spirit of Islam, as they conceive it to be interpreted 
 in the Turk. They admire the yassak of the Turk, 
 which is the counterpart of their verboten. The von 
 Moltke who later led Prussia to her great victories had 
 at the beginning of his career an intimate knowledge 
 of the Turkish army. He intensely admired the blind 
 and passive obedience of the Turk to authority, his 
 imperturbabihty under misfortune, and his fortitude 
 in facing hardship and danger. " Theirs not to reason 
 wh^' : theirs but to do and die," is a spirit which German
 
 58 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 and Turk understand, and show, far better than Briton, 
 with all due respect to Tennyson. A Briton may obey, 
 but he questions all the same, and after the crisis is 
 over he demands a reckoning. Authority to the 
 Anglo-Saxon rests in the body politic, of which each 
 individual is an integral — and ineffaceable — part. 
 
 The Turkish military and official caste is like that 
 of the Germans in three things: authority rests in 
 superiors unaccountable to those whom they command ; 
 the origin of authority is force upholding tradition; 
 and the sparing of human life and human suffering 
 is a consideration that must not be entertained when 
 it is a question of advancing a political or military end. 
 I have seen both at work, and have seen the work of 
 both; so I have the right to make this statement. 
 For all that, I have German and Turkish friends, and 
 deep affection for them, and deep admiration for many 
 traits of character of both nations. The trouble is 
 that the people of Germany and the people of Turkey 
 allow their official and military castes to do what their 
 own instincts would not permit them to do. The 
 passivity of the Turk is natural : it is his religion, his 
 background, and his climate. The passivity of the 
 German is inexcusable. He will not exorcise the devil 
 out of his own race. It must be done for him. 
 
 In 1888 a group of German financiers, backed by 
 the Deutsche Bank, which was to have so powerful a 
 future in Turkey, asked for the concession of a rail- 
 way-line from Ismidt to Angora. The construction 
 of this line was followed by concessions for extension 
 from Angora to Csesarea, and for a branch from the 
 Ismidt-Angora line going south-west from Eski Sheir 
 to Konia. The extension to Csesarea was never made.
 
 THE BAGDADBAHN 59 
 
 That was not the direction in which the Germans 
 wanted to go. The Eski Sheir-Konia spur became the 
 main Hne. The Berlin-Bagdad-Bassorah " all-rail 
 route " was born. The Germans began to dream of 
 connecting the Baltic with the Persian Gulf. The 
 Balkan peninsula was to revert to Austria-Hungary, 
 and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Germany. The 
 south Slavs and the populations of the Ottoman 
 Empire would be dispossessed (the biologist Haeckel 
 actually prophesied this in a speech in 1905 before the 
 Geographical Society of Jena). Russia would be cut 
 off from the Mediterranean. This was the pan- 
 germanist conception of the Bagdadhahn. 
 
 From the moment the first railway concession was 
 granted to Germans in Asia Minor, which coincided 
 with the year of his accession, Wilhelm II. has been 
 heart and soul with the development of German 
 interests in the Ottoman Empire. His first move in 
 foreign politics was to visit Sultan Abdul Hamid in 
 1889, when he was throwing off the yoke of Bismarck. 
 This visit was the beginning of an intimate connection 
 between Wilhelmstrasse and the Sublime Porte which 
 has never been interrupted — excepting for a very 
 brief period at the beginning of the First Balkan War. 
 The friendship between the Sultan and the Kaiser 
 was not in the least disturbed by the Armenian mas- 
 sacres. The hecatombs of Asia Minor passed without 
 a protest. In fact, five days after the great massacre 
 of August, 1896, in Constantinople, where Turkish 
 soldiers shot down their fellow-citizens under the eyes of 
 the Sultan and of the foreign ambassadors, Wilhelm II. 
 sent to Abdul Hamid for his birthday a family photo- 
 graph of himself, with the Empress and his children.
 
 6o THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 In 1898 the Kaiser made his second voyage to Con- 
 stantinople. This voyage was followed by the con- 
 cession extending the railway from Konia to the Per- 
 sian Gulf. It was the beginning of the Bagdadhahn 
 in the official and narrower sense. After this visit 
 of the Kaiser to Abdul Hamid, the pilgrimage was 
 continued to the Holy Land. At Baalbek there is 
 a stone of typically German taste set in the wall of 
 the great temple to commemorate the visit of the 
 man who dreamed he would one day be master of the 
 modern world. If this inscription seems a sacrilege, 
 what name have we for the large gap in the walls of 
 Jerusalem made for his triumphal entry to the Holy 
 City ? The great Protestant German church, whose 
 corner-stone was laid by his father in 1869, was 
 solemnly inaugurated by the Kaiser. As solemnly 
 he handed over to Catholic Germans the title to land 
 for a hospital and religious establishment on the road 
 to Bethlehem. Still solemnly, at a banquet in his 
 honour in Damascus, he turned to the Turkish Vali, 
 and declared: " Say to the three hundred million 
 Moslems of the world that I am their friend." To 
 prove his sincerity, he went out to put a wreath 
 upon the tomb of Saladdin. 
 
 Wilhelm II. at Damascus is reminiscent of Napoleon 
 at Cairo. Egypt and Syria and Mesopotamia have 
 always cast a spell over men who have dreamed of 
 world empires; and Islam, as a unifying force for con- 
 quest, has appealed to the imagination of others 
 before the present German Kaiser. I have used the 
 word "imagination" intentionally. There never has 
 been any solidarity in the religion of Mohammed; 
 there is none now; there never will be. The idea of
 
 THE BAGDADBAHN 6i 
 
 community of aims and community of interests is 
 totally lacking in the Mohammedan mind. Solidarity 
 is built upon the foundation of sacrifice of self for 
 others. It is a virtue not taught in the Koran, nor 
 ever developed by any Mohammedan civilizations. 
 The failure of all political organisms of Mohammedan 
 origin to endure and to become strong has been due 
 to the fact that Mahommedans have never felt the 
 necessity of giving themselves for the common weal. 
 The virility of a nation is in the virile service of those 
 who love it. If there is no wilhngness to serve, no 
 incentive to love, how can a nation live and be strong ? 
 
 The revelation of Germany's ambition by the 
 granting of the concession from Konia to the Persian 
 Gulf, and the application of the German financiers 
 for a firman constituting the Bagdad Railway Com- 
 pany, led to international intrigues and negotiations 
 for a share in the construction of the line through 
 Mesopotamia. It would be wearisome and profitless 
 to follow the various phases of the Bagdad question. 
 Germany did not oppose international participation 
 in the concession. The expense of crossing the Taurus 
 and the dubious financial returns from the desert 
 sections influenced the Germans to welcome the 
 financial support of others in an undertaking that they 
 would have found great difficulty in financing entirely 
 by German capital. The Bagdadhahn concession was 
 granted in 1899; the firman constituting the company 
 followed in 1903. 
 
 Russia did not realize the danger of German influ- 
 ence at Constantinople, and of the eventualities oi 
 the German " pacific penetration " in Asia Minor. 
 She adjusted the Macedonian question with Emperoi
 
 62 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Franz Josef in order to have a free hand in Manchuria, 
 and she made no opposition to the German ambitions. 
 She needed the friendly neutrahty of Germany in her 
 approaching struggle with Japan, Once the struggle 
 was begun, Russia found herself actually dependent 
 upon the goodwill of Germany. It was not the time 
 for Petrograd to fish in the troubled waters of the 
 Golden Horn. 
 
 The situation was different with Great Britain. 
 The menace of the German approach to the Persian 
 Gulf was brought to the British Foreign Office just 
 long enough before the Boer crisis became acute for 
 a decision to be made Germany had sent engineers 
 along the proposed route of her railway. She had 
 neglected to send diplomatic agents 1 
 
 The proposed — in fact, the only feasible — terminus 
 on the Persian Gulf was at Koweit. Like the Sultan 
 of Muscat, the Sheik of Koweit was practically inde- 
 pendent of Turkey. While showing deference to the 
 Sultan as khalif , Sheik Mobarek resisted every effort of 
 the Vali of Bassorah to exercise even the semblance 
 of authority over his small domain. In 1899 Colonel 
 Meade, the British resident of the Persian Gulf, signed 
 with Mobarek a secret convention which assured to 
 him " special protection," if he would make no cession 
 of territory without the knowledge and consent of the 
 British government. The following year a German 
 mission, headed by the Kaiser's Consul -General at 
 Constantinople, arrived at Koweit to arrange the con- 
 cession for the terminus of the Bagdadhahn. They 
 were too late. The door to the Persian Gulf was shut 
 in the face of Germany. 
 
 Wilhelm II. set the Sultan in motion. The
 
 THE BAGDADBAHN 63 
 
 Sublime Porte suddenly remembered that Koweit 
 was Ottoman territory, and began to display great 
 interest in forcing the Sheik to recognize the fact. 
 A Turkish vessel appeared at Koweit in 1901. But 
 British warships and British bluejackets upheld the 
 independence of Koweit ! Since the Constitution of 
 1908 all the efforts of the Young Turks at Koweit 
 have been fruitless. Germany remains blocked. 
 
 British opposition to the German schemes was not 
 limited to the prevention of an outlet of the Bagdad- 
 bahn at Koweit, In 1798 the East India Company 
 established a resident at Bagdad to spy upon and 
 endeavour to frustrate the influence of the French, 
 just beginning to penetrate towards India through 
 the ambition of Napoleon to inherit the empire of 
 Alexander. Since that time British interests have not 
 failed to be well looked after in Lower Mesopotamia. 
 After the Lynch Brothers, in i860, obtained the right 
 of navigating on the Euphrates, the development of 
 their steamship lines gradually gave Great Britain 
 the bulk of the commerce of the whole region, in the 
 Persian as well as the Ottoman hinterland of the Gulf. 
 In 1895 Gennan commerce in the port of Bushir was 
 non-existent, while British commerce surpassed 
 12,000,000 francs yearly. In 1905 the market was 
 shared about equally between Great Britain and Ger- 
 many. In 1906 the Hamburg- American Line estab- 
 lished a service to Bassorah. British merchants 
 began to raise the cry that if the Bagdadhahn appeared, 
 the Germans would soon have not only the markets of 
 Mesopotamia, but also that of Kermanshah. The 
 Lynch Company declared that the Bagdadhahn would 
 ruin their river service, and their representations were
 
 64 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 listened to at London, despite the absurdity of their con- 
 tention. The Lynches were negotiating with Beriin also. 
 This mixture of politics and commerce in Mesopotamia 
 is a sordid story, which does not improve in the telling. 
 
 The revolution of 1908 did not injure the German 
 influence at Constantinople as much as has been 
 popularly supposed. The Germans succeeded during 
 the first troubled year in keeping in with both sides 
 through the genius of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 
 in spite of the Bosnia-Herzegovina affair. Germany 
 was fortunately out of the Cretan and Macedonian 
 muddles, in which her rivals were hopelessly entangled. 
 Mahmud Shevket pasha was always under German 
 influence, and the Germans had Enver Bey, " hero of 
 liberty," in training at Beriin. German influence at 
 Constantinople succeeded also in withstanding the 
 strain of the Tripolitan war, although it grew in- 
 creasingly embarrassing as the months passed to be 
 Turkey's best friend, and at the same time the ally 
 of Italy ! During the first disastrous period of the 
 war of the Balkan Allies against Turkey, it seemed for 
 the time that the enemies of Germany controlled the 
 Sublime Porte. But the revolver of Enver bey in 
 the coup d'etat of January, 1913, brought once more 
 the control of Turkish affairs into hands friendly to 
 Germany. They have remained there ever since. 
 
 Germany strengthened her railway scheme and her 
 hold on the territories through which it was to pass 
 by the accord with Russia at Potsdam in 1910. 
 
 The last clever attack of British diplomacy on the 
 Bagdadhahn was successfully met. In tracing the ex- 
 tension of the railway beyond Adana, it was suggested to 
 the Department of Public Works that the cost of con-
 
 THE BAGDADBAHN 65 
 
 struction would be greatly reduced and the usefulness 
 of the line increased, if it passed by the Mediterranean 
 littoral around the head of the Gulf of Alexandretta. 
 Then the control of the railway would have been at the 
 mercy of the British fleet. When the " revised " plans 
 went from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry 
 of War, it was not hard for the German agents to per- 
 suade the General Staff to restore the original route 
 inland across the Amanus, following the old plan 
 agreed upon in the time of Abdul Hamid. More than 
 that, the Germans secured concessions for a branch 
 line from Aleppo to the Mediterranean at Alexandretta, 
 and for the construction of a port at Alexandretta. 
 The Bagdadhahn was to have a Mediterranean terminus 
 at a fortified port, and Germany was to have her naval 
 base in the north-east corner of the Mediterranean, 
 eight hours from Cyprus, and thirty-six hours from the 
 Suez Canal ! This was the revenge for Koweit. 
 
 A month before the Servian ultimatum Germany 
 had contracted to grant a loan to Bulgaria, one of the 
 conditions of which was that Germany be allowed to 
 build a railway to the ^gsean across the Rhodope 
 Mountains to Porto Laghos, and to construct a port 
 there, six hours from the mouth of the Dardanelles. 
 There was a panic in Petrograd. 
 
 The events in Turkey since the opening of the war 
 are too recent history, and as yet too little understood 
 to dwell upon. But the reception accorded to the 
 Goeben and Breslau at the Dardanelles, their present 
 anomalous position in " closed waters," in defiance of 
 all treaties, the abolition of the foreign post offices, 
 the unilateral decision to abrogate the capitulations — 
 all these straws show in which direction the wind is 
 
 5
 
 66 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 blowing on the Bosphorus. A successful termination 
 of the German campaign in France, which at the 
 moment of writing seems most improbable (in spite of 
 the fact that the Germans are at Compiegne, and their 
 aeroplanes pay us daily visits), would certainly draw 
 Turkey into the war — and to her ruin.* 
 
 On the other hand, the German reliance upon em- 
 barrassing the French and British in their Moslem 
 colonies, through posing as the defenders of Islam and 
 Islam's khalif, has not been well founded. On the battle- 
 field of France thousands of followers of Mohammed 
 from Africa and Asia are fighting loyally under the 
 flags of the Allies. The Kaiser, for all his dreams and 
 hopes, has not succeeded in getting a single Moham- 
 medan to draw his sword for the combined causes of 
 pangermanism and panislamism. Have the 300,000,000 
 Moslems forgotten the declaration of Damascus ? 
 
 In seeking for the causes of the present conflict, it 
 is impossible to neglect Germany in the Ottoman 
 
 * This chapter was written before the sudden and astonish- 
 ing act of war on the part of Turkey, the sinking of a Russian 
 ship and the bombardment of Odessa and other open Russian 
 ports of the Black Sea on October 29, 1914, which naturally 
 led to the withdrawal from Constantinople of the diplomatic 
 representatives of Russia, Great Britain, France, and Servia. 
 It is evident that Enver pasha and his associates, in their blind 
 infatuation for the German cause, feared to await the result of 
 the effort to occupy the Channel Ports of France. The one 
 characteristic which the extreme Young Turk party of Enver 
 pasha and Talaat bey can boast of is consistency and deter- 
 mination to destroy the Ottoman Empire. If, at the last 
 moment, the cool and sane leaders (and there are some at 
 Constantinople) are successful in keeping Turkey from throwing 
 in her fortunes with Germany, it will only be by driving out 
 of power the unionists who murdered Nazim pasha in the coup 
 d'etat of January 23, 1913-
 
 THE BAGDADBAHN 67 
 
 Empire. As one looks up at Pera from the Bosphorus, 
 the most imposing building on the hill is the German 
 Embassy. It dominates Constantinople. There has 
 been woven the web that has resulted in putting Ger- 
 many in the place of Great Britain to prevent the 
 Russian advance to the Dardanelles, in putting Ger- 
 many in the place of Russia to threaten the British 
 occupation of India and the trade route to India, and 
 in putting Germany in the place of Great Britain as 
 the stubborn opponent of the completion of the 
 African empire of France . The most conspicuous thread 
 of the web is the Bagdadhahn. In the intrigues of 
 Constantinople we see develop the political evolution 
 of the past generation and the series of events that made 
 inevitable the European war of 1914.
 
 IV. 
 
 ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 
 
 In 1904 an accord was made between Great Britain 
 and France in regard to colonial policy in Northern 
 Africa. Great Britain recognized the " special " in- 
 terests of France in Morocco in exchange for French 
 recognition of Great Britain's " special " interests in 
 Egypt. There was a promise to defend each other in 
 the protection of these interests, but no actual agree- 
 ment to carry this defence beyond the exercise of 
 diplomatic pressure. The accord was a secret one. 
 Its exact terms were not known until the incident of 
 Agadir made necessary its publication in November, 
 1911. 
 
 But that there was an accord was known to all the 
 world. Germany, which had long been looking with 
 alarm upon the extension of French influence in 
 Morocco, found in 1905 a favourable moment for 
 protest. Russia had suffered humiliation and defeat 
 in her war with Japan. Neither in a military nor a 
 financial way was she at that moment a factor to be 
 reckoned with in support of France. Great Britain 
 had not recovered from the disasters to her military 
 organization in the South African campaign. Her 
 domestic politics were in a chaotic state. The Con- 
 servative Ministry was losing ground daily in by- 
 
 68
 
 ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 69 
 
 elections; the Irish Question was coming to the front 
 again. 
 
 German intervention in Morocco was sudden and 
 theatrical. On March 31, 1905, a date of far-reaching 
 importance in history, Emperor William entered the 
 harbour of Tangier upon his yacht, the Hohenzollern. 
 When he disembarked, he gave the cue to German 
 policy by saluting the representative of the Sultan 
 with peculiar emphasis as the representative of an 
 independent Sovereign. Then, turning to the German 
 residents in Morocco who had gathered to meet him, 
 he said: " I am happy to greet in you the devoted 
 pioneers of German industry and commerce, who are 
 aiding in the task of keeping always in a high position, 
 in 2Lfree land, the interests of the mother-country." 
 
 The repercussion of this visit to Tangier in France 
 and in Great Britain was electrical. It seemed to be, 
 and was, a direct challenge on the part of Germany 
 for a share in shaping the destinies of Morocco. It 
 was an answer to the Anglo-French accord, in which 
 Germany had been ignored. Great Britain was in no 
 position to go beyond mere words in the standing 
 behind France. France knew this; so did Germany. 
 After several months of fruitless negotiations between 
 Berlin and Paris, on June 6 it was made plain to France 
 that there must be a conference on the Moroccan 
 Question. 
 
 M. Delcasse, at that time directing with consum- 
 mate skill and courage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
 urged upon the Cabinet the necessity for accepting 
 Germany's challenge; but the Cabinet, after hearing 
 the sorrowful confessions of the Ministers of War and 
 Navy, and learning that France was not ready to
 
 70 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 fight, refused to accept the advice of the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs. M. Delcasse resigned. A blow had 
 been struck at French prestige. 
 
 For six months the crisis continued in an acute 
 stage. The chauvinistic — or shall we say patriotic ? 
 — elements were determined to withstand what they 
 called the Kaiser's interference in the domestic affairs 
 of France. But France seemed isolated at that 
 moment, and prudence was the part of wisdom. 
 M. Rouvier declared to the Chamber of Deputies on 
 December i6: " France cannot be without a Moroccan 
 policy, for the form and direction which the evolution 
 of Morocco will take in the future will influence in a 
 decisive manner the destinies of our North African 
 possessions." France agreed to a conference, but won 
 from Germany the concession that France's special 
 interests and rights in Morocco would be admitted as 
 the basis of the work of the conference. 
 
 On January 17, 1906, a conference of European 
 States, to which the United States of America was ad- 
 mitted, met to decide the international status of 
 Morocco. For some time the attitude of the German 
 delegates was uncompromising. They maintained the 
 Kaiser's thesis as set forth at Tangier — the complete 
 independence of Morocco and sovereignty of her Sultan. 
 But they finally yielded, and acknowledged the right 
 of France and Spain to organize in Morocco an inter- 
 national police. 
 
 The convention was signed on April 7. It provided 
 for — (i) Police under the sovereign authority of the 
 Sultan, recruited from Moorish Moslems, and distrib- 
 uted in the eight open ports ; (2) Spanish and French 
 officers, placed at his disposal by their Governments,
 
 ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 71 
 
 to assist the Sultan ; (3) limitation of the total effective 
 of this police force from 2,000 to 2,500, of French and 
 Spanish officers, commissioned sixteen to twenty, and 
 non-commissioned thirty to forty, appointed for five 
 years; (4) an Inspector-General, a high officer of the 
 Swiss army, chosen subject to the approval of the 
 Sultan, with residence at Tangier; (5) a State Bank of 
 Morocco, in which each of the signatory Powers had 
 the right to subscribe capital ; (6) the right of foreigners 
 to acquire property, and to build upon it, in any part 
 of Morocco; (7) France's exclusive right to enforce 
 regulations in the frontier region of Algeria, and a 
 similar right to Spain in the frontier region of Spain; 
 (8) the preservation of the public services of the Empire 
 from alienation for private interests. 
 
 Chancellor von Billow's speech in the Reichstag on 
 April 5, 1906, was a justification of Germany's attitude. 
 It showed that the policy of Wilhelmstrasse had been 
 far from bellicose, and that Germany's demands were 
 altogether reasonable. The time had come, declared 
 the Chancellor, when German interests in the remain- 
 ing independent portions of Africa and Asia must be 
 considered by Europe. In going to Tangier, and in 
 forcing the conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid 
 down the principle that there must be equal oppor- 
 tunities for Germans in independent countries, and 
 had demonstrated that she was prepared to enforce 
 this principle. 
 
 When one considers the remarkable growth in popu- 
 lation, and the industrial and maritime evolution of 
 Germany, this attitude cannot be wondered at, much 
 less condemned. Germany, deprived by her late 
 entrance among nations of fruitful colonies, was find-
 
 72 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 ing it necessary to adopt and uphold the policy of 
 trying to prevent the pre-emption, for the benefit of 
 her rivals, of those portions of the world which were 
 still free. 
 
 Neither France nor Spain had any feeling of loyalty 
 toward the Convention of Algeciras. However much 
 may have been written to prove this loyalty, the facts 
 of the few years following Algeciras are convincing. 
 After 1908 Spain, provoked and led on by the tre- 
 mendous expenditures entailed upon her by the Riff 
 campaigns, began to consider the region of Morocco in 
 which she was installed as exclusively Spanish terri- 
 tory. French writers have expended much energy and 
 ingenuity in proving the disinterestedness of French 
 efforts to enforce loyally the decisions of Algeciras; 
 but they have explained, they have protested, too 
 much. There has never been a moment that France 
 has not dreamt of the completion of the vast colonial 
 empire in North Africa by the inclusion of Morocco. 
 It has been the goal for which all her military and 
 civil administrations in Algeria and the Sahara have 
 been working. To bring about the downfall of the 
 Sultan's authority, not only Press campaigns were 
 undertaken, but anarchy on the Algerian frontier was 
 allowed to go on unchecked, until military measures 
 seemed justifiable. 
 
 In a similar way, the German colonists of Morocco 
 did their best to bring about another intervention of 
 Germany. Their methods were so despicable and 
 outrageous that they had frequently to be disavowed 
 officially. In 1910 the German Foreign Office found 
 the claims of Mannesmann Brothers to certain mining 
 privileges invalid, because they did not fulfil the re-
 
 ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 73 
 
 quirements of the Act of Algeciras. But the Mannes- 
 mann mining group, as well as other German enter- 
 prises in Morocco, were secretly encouraged to make 
 all the trouble they could for the French, while de- 
 fending the authority of the Sultan. The Casablanca 
 incident is only one of numerous affronts which the 
 French were asked to swallow. 
 
 Great Britain had her part, though not through 
 official agents, in the intrigues. There is much food 
 for thought in the motives that may, not without 
 reason, be imputed to the publication in the Times of 
 a series of accounts of Moroccan anarchy and of Muley 
 Hafid's cruelties. 
 
 In the spring of 191 1 it was realized everywhere in 
 Europe that the Sultan's authority was even less than 
 it had been in 1905. The Berber tribes were in arms 
 on all sides. In March, accounts began to appear of 
 danger at Fez, not only to European residents, but 
 also to the Sultan. The reports of the French Consul, 
 and the telegrams of correspondents of two Paris news- 
 papers, were most alarming. On April 2 it was an- 
 nounced that the Berber tribes had actually attacked 
 the city, and were besieging it. Everything was pre- 
 pared for the final act of the drama. 
 
 A relief column of native troops under Major Br6- 
 mond arrived in Fez on April 26. The very next day, 
 an urgent message for relief having been received from 
 Colonel Mangin in Fez, Colonel Brulard started for the 
 capital with another column. Without waiting for 
 further word, a French army which had been carefully 
 prepared for the purpose entered Morocco under General 
 Moinier. On Maiy 21 Fez was occupied by the French. 
 They found that all was well there with the Europeans
 
 74 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 and with the natives; but, fortunately for the French 
 plans, Muley Hafid's brother had set himself up at 
 Mequinez as pretender to the throne. The Sultan 
 could now retain his sovereignty only by putting him- 
 self under the protection of the French army. Morocco 
 had lost her independence ! 
 
 Germany made no objection to the French expedi- 
 tionary corps in April, She certainly did not expect 
 the quick succession of events in May which brought 
 her face to face with the fait accompli of a strong 
 French army in Fez. As soon as it was realized at 
 Berlin that the fiction of Moroccan independence had 
 been so skilfully terminated, France was asked " what 
 compensation she would give to Germany in return 
 for a free hand in Morocco." The pourparlers dragged 
 on through several weeks in June. France refused to 
 acknowledge any ground for compensation to Germany. 
 She maintained that the recent action in Morocco had 
 been at the request of the Sultan, and that it was a 
 matter entirely between him and France. 
 
 Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary . On 
 July I the gunboat Panther went to Agadir, a port on 
 the Atlantic coast of Morocco. To Great Britain and 
 to France the despatch of the Panther was represented 
 as due to the necessity of protecting German interests, 
 seeing that there was anarchy in that part of Morocco. 
 But the German newspapers, even those which were 
 supposed to have official relations with Wilhelmstrasse, 
 spoke as if a demand for the cession of Mogador or 
 some other portion of Morocco was contemplated. The 
 Chancellor explained to the Reichstag that the sending 
 of the Panther was " to show the world that Germany 
 was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one side."
 
 ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 75 
 
 But in the negotiations through the German Am- 
 bassador in Paris it was clear that Germany was play- 
 ing a game of political blackmail . The German Foreign 
 Office shifted its claims from Morocco to concessions in 
 Central Africa. On July 15 Germany asked for the 
 whole of the French Congo from the sea to the River 
 Sanga, and a renunciation in her favour of France's 
 contingent claims to the succession of the Belgian 
 Congo. The reason given for this demand was that, if 
 Morocco were to pass under a French protectorate, it 
 was only just that compensation should be given to 
 Germany elsewhere . France for the moment hesitated . 
 She definitely refused to entertain the idea of com- 
 pensation as soon as she had received the assurance of 
 the aid of Great Britain in supporting her against the 
 German claims. 
 
 On July I the German Ambassador had notified Sir 
 Edward Grey of the despatch of the Panther to Agadir 
 " in response to the demand for protection from Ger- 
 man firms there," and explained that Germany con- 
 sidered the question of Morocco reopened by the 
 French occupation of Fez, and thought that it would 
 be possible to make an agreement with Spain and 
 France for the partition of Morocco. On July 4 Sir 
 Edward Grey, after a consultation with the Cabinet, 
 answered that Great Britain could recognize no change 
 in Morocco without consulting France, to whom she 
 was bound by treaty. The Ambassador then ex- 
 plained that his Government would not consider the 
 reopening of the question in a European conference, 
 that it was a matter directly between Germany and 
 France, and that his overture to Sir Edward Grey had 
 been merely in the nature of a friendly explanation.
 
 76 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Germany believed that the constitutional crisis in 
 Great Britain was so serious that the hands of the 
 Liberal Cabinet would be tied, and that they would 
 not be so foolhardy as to back up France at the moment 
 when they themselves were being so bitterly assailed 
 by the most influential elements of the British elec- 
 torate on the question of limiting the veto power of 
 the House of Lords. It was in this belief that Ger- 
 many on July 15 asked for territorial cessions from 
 France in Central Africa. Wilhelmstrasse thought 
 the moment well chosen, and that there was every 
 hope of success. 
 
 But the German mentality has never seemed to 
 appreciate the frequent lesson of history — that the 
 British people are able to distinguish clearly between 
 matters of internal and external policy. Bitterly 
 assailed as a traitor to his country because he advo- 
 cates certain changes of laws, a British Cabinet Minister 
 can still be conscious of the fact that his bitterest 
 opponents will rally around him when he takes a stand 
 on a matter of foreign policy. This knowledge of 
 admirable national solidarity enabled Mr. Lloyd George 
 on July 21, the very day on which the King gave his 
 consent to the creation of new peers to bring the 
 House of Lords to reason, at a Mansion House banquet, 
 to warn Germany against the danger of pressing her 
 demands upon France. The effect, both in London 
 and Paris, was to unify and stiffen resistance. It 
 seemed as if the Panther's visit to Agadir had put 
 Germany in the unenviable position of having made a 
 threat which she could not enforce. 
 
 But the ways of diplomacy are tortuous. Through- 
 out August and September Germany blustered and
 
 ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 77 
 
 threatened. In September several events happened 
 which seemed to embarrass Russia and tie her hands, 
 as in the first Moroccan imbroglio of 1905 ; for Premier 
 Stolypin was assassinated at Kiev on September 14, 
 the United States denounced its commercial treaty 
 with Russia on account of the question of Jewish pass- 
 ports, and the Shuster affair in Persia occupied the 
 serious attention of Russian diplomacy. Had it not 
 been for the splendidly loyal and scrupulous attitude 
 of the British Foreign Office towards Russia in the 
 Persian Question, Germany might have been tempted 
 to force the issue with France. 
 
 German demands grew more moderate, but were not 
 abandoned ; for members of the House of Commons, of 
 the extreme Radical wing in the Liberal party, began 
 to put the British Government in an uncomfortable 
 position. Militarism, entangling alliances with a Con- 
 tinental Power, the necessity for agreement with Ger- 
 many — these were the subjects which found their way 
 from the floor of the House of Commons to the public 
 Press. A portion of the Liberal party which had to 
 be reckoned with believed that Germany ought not to 
 have been left out of the Anglo-French agreement. 
 So serious was the dissatisfaction that the Govern- 
 ment deemed it necessary to make an explanation to 
 the House. Sir Edward Grey explained and defended 
 the action of the Cabinet in supporting the resistance 
 of France to Germany's claims. The whole history of 
 the negotiation was revealed. The Anglo-French 
 agreement of 1904 was published for the first time, 
 and it was seen that this agreement did not commit 
 Great Britain to backing France by force of arms. 
 
 Uncertainty of British support had the influence of
 
 78 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 bringing France to consent to treat with Germany on 
 the Moroccan Question. Two agreements were signed. 
 By the first, Germany recognized the French protec- 
 torate in Morocco, subject to the adhesion of the signers 
 of the Convention of Algeciras, and waived her right 
 to take part in the negotiations concerning Moroccan 
 spheres of influence between Spain and France. On 
 her side, France agreed to maintain the open door in 
 Morocco, and to refrain from any measures which 
 would hinder the legitimate extension of German com- 
 mercial and mining interests. By the second agree- 
 ment, France ceded to Germany certain territories in 
 the southern and eastern Cameroons in return for 
 German cessions. 
 
 There was a stormy Parliamentary and newspaper 
 discussion, both in France and Germany, over these 
 two treaties. No one was satisfied. The treaties were 
 finally ratified, but under protest. 
 
 In France the Ministry was subjected to severe criti- 
 cism. There was also some feeling of bitterness — • 
 perhaps a reaction from the satisfaction over Mr. Lloyd 
 George's Mansion House speech — in the uncertainty of 
 Great Britain's support, as revealed by the November 
 discussions in the House of Commons. This uncer- 
 tainty remained, as far as French public opinion went, 
 until Great Britain actually declared war upon Ger- 
 many in August, 1 9 14. 
 
 In Germany the Reichstag debates revealed the 
 belief that the Agadir expedition had, on final analysis, 
 resulted in a fiasco. An astonishing amount of enmity 
 against Great Britain was displayed. It was when 
 Herr Heydebrand made a bitter speech against Great 
 Britain, and denounced the pacific attitude of the
 
 ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR 79 
 
 German Government, in the Reichstag session of 
 November 10, that the Crown Prince made public his 
 position in German foreign poHcy by applauding 
 loudly. 
 
 The aftermath of Agadir, as far as it affected 
 Morocco, resulted in the establishment of the French 
 protectorate on March 30, 1912. The Sultan signed 
 away his independence by the Treaty of Fez. Foreign 
 legations at Fez ceased to exist, although diplomatic 
 officials were retained at Tangier. France voted the 
 maintenance of 40,000 troops in Morocco " for the pur- 
 poses of pacification." The last complications disap- 
 peared when, on November 27, a Franco-Spanish 
 treaty was signed at Madrid, in which the Spanish 
 zones in Morocco were defined, and both States prom- 
 ised not to erect fortifications or strategic works on 
 the Moroccan coast. 
 
 But the aftermath of Agadir in France and Germany 
 has been an increase in naval and military armaments, 
 and the creation of a spirit of tension which needed 
 only the three years of war in the Ottoman Empire to 
 bring about the inevitable clash between Teuton and 
 Gaul. Taken in connection with the recent events in 
 Alsace and Lorraine, and the voting of the law in- 
 creasing military service in France to three years, the 
 logical sequence of events is clear.
 
 V. 
 
 THE PASSING OF PERSIA 
 
 The weakness of the Ottoman Empire and of Morocco 
 served to bring the colonial and commercial aspirations 
 of Germany into confUct with other nations of Europe. 
 The recent fortunes of Persia, the third — and only other 
 — independent Mohammedan state, have also helped 
 to make possible the general European War. 
 
 The first decade of the twentieth century brought 
 about in Persia, as in Turkey, the rise of a consti- 
 tutional party, which was able to force a despotic 
 sovereign to grant a constitution. The Young Per- 
 sians had in many respects a history similar to that 
 of the Young Turks. They were for the most part 
 members of influential families, who had been educated 
 in Europe, or had been sent into exile. From their 
 reading they had deeply imbibed the spirit of the 
 French Revolution, and had at the same time developed 
 a narrow and intense nationalism. But to support 
 their revolutionary propaganda they had allied them- 
 selves during the period of darkness with the Armenians 
 and other non- Moslems. As Salonika, a city by no 
 means Turkish, was the foyer of the Young Turk 
 movement, so Tabriz, capital of the Azerbaidjan, a 
 city by no means Persian, was the centre of the oppo- 
 sition to Persian despotism. 
 
 80
 
 THE PASSING OF PERSIA 8i 
 
 Young Turks, Young Persians, Young Egyptians, 
 Young Indians, and Young Chinese have shown to 
 Europe and America the peril — and the pity — of our 
 Western and Christian education, when it is given to 
 Eastern and non-Christian students. They are born 
 into the intellectual life with our ideas, and are inspired 
 by our ideals, but have none of the background, none 
 of the inheritance of our national atmosphere and 
 our family training to enable them to live up to the 
 standards we have put before them. Their disillusion- 
 ment is bitter. They resent our attitude of superiority . 
 They hate us, even though they feign to admire us. 
 Their jealousy of our institutions leads them to console 
 themselves by singling out and forcing themselves to 
 see only the weak and vulnerable points in our civiliza- 
 tion. Educated in our universities, they return to 
 their countries to conspire against us. The illiterate 
 and simple Oriental who has never travelled, is fre- 
 quently the model of fidelity and loyalty and affection 
 to his Occidental master or friend. But no educated 
 non-Christian Oriental, who has travelled and studied 
 and lived on terms of equality with Europeans or 
 Americans in Europe or America, can ever be a sincere 
 friend. The common result of social contact and 
 intellectual companionship is that he becomes a foe, — 
 and conceals the fact. Familiarity has bred more than 
 contempt. 
 
 The Young Persians would have no European aid. 
 They waited and suffered . Finally , after a particularly 
 bad year from the standpoint of financial exactions, 
 the Moslem clergy of the north were drawn into the 
 Young Persia movement. A revolution, in which the 
 Mohammedan ^nullahs took part, compelled the dying 
 
 6
 
 82 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Shah, Muzaffereddin, to issue a decree ordering the 
 convocation of a medjliss (committee of notables) on 
 August 5, 1906. This improvised Parliament, com- 
 posed only of delegates of the provinces nearest the 
 capital, drafted a constitution, which was promulgated 
 on New Year's Day, 1907. The following week 
 Muzaffereddin died, and was succeeded by his son, 
 Mohammed Ali Mirza, a reactionary of the worst type. 
 Mohammed Ali had no intention of putting the Con- 
 stitution into force. A serious revolution broke out in 
 Tabriz a few weeks after his accession. He was com- 
 pelled to acknowledge the Constitution granted by his 
 father. In order to nullify its effect, however, the new 
 Shah called to the Grand Vizierate the exiled Ali Asgar 
 Khan, whom he believed to be strong enough to over- 
 rule the wishes of the Parliament. The Constitutional- 
 ists formed a society oifedavis to prevent the return to 
 absolutism. At their instigation Ali Asgar Khan was 
 assassinated. The country fell into an anarchic state. 
 Constitutional Persia, as much because of the inex- 
 perience of the Constitutionalists as of the ill will of the 
 Shah, was worse off than under the despotism of 
 Muzaffereddin. There was no money in the Treasury. 
 The peasants would not pay their taxes. One can 
 hardly blame them, for not a cent of the money ever 
 went for local improvements or local government. 
 Throughout Persia, even in the cities, life was unsafe. 
 The Persians, no more than the Turks, could call forth 
 from the ranks of their enthusiasts a progressive and 
 fearless statesman of the type of Stambuloff or 
 Venizelos. In their Parliament they all talked at once. 
 None was willing to listen to his neighbour. It may 
 have been because there was no Mirabeau . But could
 
 THE PASSING OF PERSIA 83 
 
 a Mirabeau have overcome the fatal defects of the 
 Mohammedan training and character that made the 
 Young Persians incapable of realizing the consti- 
 tutionalism of their dreams ? Every man was sus- 
 picious and jealous of his neighbour. Every man 
 wanted to lead, and none to be led. Every man 
 wanted power without responsibility, prestige without 
 work, success without sacrifice. 
 
 It was at this moment that one of the most sig- 
 nificant events of contemporary times was helped to 
 fruition by the state of affairs in Persia. Great Britain 
 and Russia, rivals — even enemies — in Western and 
 Central Asia, signed a convention. Their conflicting 
 ambitions were amicably compromised. Along with 
 the questions of Afghanistan and Thibet this accord 
 settled the rivalry that had done much to keep Persia 
 a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue, like Macedonia, ever 
 since the Crimean War. 
 
 In regard to Persia, the two Powers solemnly swore 
 to respect its integrity and its independence, and then 
 went on to sign its death-warrant by agreeing upon 
 the question of " the spheres of influence." In spite 
 of all sophisms, this Convention marked the passing of 
 Persia as an independent State. Persia is worse off 
 than Morocco and Egypt. For one master is better 
 than two ! 
 
 Here enters Germany. For many years German 
 merchants had looked upon Persia as they looked upon 
 Morocco and Turkey. Here were the legitimate fields 
 for commercial expansion. Probably there were also 
 dreams of political advantages to be gained later. In 
 their dealings with the three Moslem countries that 
 were still " unprotected " when they inaugurated
 
 84 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 their Weltpolitik, the Germans had been attentive 
 students of British policy in the days of her first entry 
 into India and into Egypt. There were many Germans 
 who honestly believed that their activities in these 
 independent Moslem countries would not only give 
 them their "place in the sun," and a legitimate field 
 for the overflow of their population and national 
 energy, but that it would also be a distinct advantage to 
 the peace of the world. Great Britain and Russia and 
 France had already divided up between them the larger 
 part of Asia and Africa. In the process Great Britain 
 had recently almost come to blows with both her rivals. 
 If Germany stepped in between them, would this not 
 prevent a future conflict ? But the rivals " divided 
 up." Germany was left out in the cold. It is not a 
 very far cry from Teheran and Koweit and Fez to 
 Liege and Brussels and Antwerp. Belgium is paying 
 the bill. 
 
 The Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907, 
 was the first of three doors slammed in Germany's face. 
 The Anglo-French Convention of May 8, 1904, had been 
 an attempt with the same object. But by Emperor 
 William's visit to Tangier in 1905 Germany got in her 
 foot before the door was closed ! In Persia there was 
 no way that she could intervene directly to demand 
 that Great Britain and Russia bring their accord 
 before an international congress. 
 
 Germany began to work in Persia through two 
 agencies. She incited Turkey to cross the frontier of 
 the Azerbaidjan, and to make the perfectly reasonable 
 request that the third limitrophe state should be taken 
 into the pourparlers which were deciding the future of 
 Persia. Then she sent her agents among the National-
 
 THE PASSING OF PERSIA 85 
 
 ists, and showed them how terrible a blow this Con- 
 vention was to their new constitutionalism. Just at 
 the moment when they had entered upon a consti- 
 tutional life, Great Britain and Russia had conspired 
 against their independence. Such was the German 
 thesis. 
 
 If only there had been sincere goodwill towards the 
 Constitution in the heart of the Shah, and an ability 
 among the leaders of Young Persia to establish a really 
 constitutional regime, the Anglo-Russian accord might 
 have proved of no value. But, unfortunately for Persia 
 and for Germany, the Shah, worked upon skilfully by 
 Russian emissaries and by members of his entourage, 
 who were paid by Russian gold, attempted a coup d'etat 
 against the Parliament in December, 1907. He failed 
 to carry it through. With a smile on his lips and rage 
 in his heart he once more went through the farce of 
 swearing to be a good constitutional ruler. But in 
 June, 1908, he succeeded in dispersing the Parliament 
 by bombarding the palace in which it sat. 
 
 It would be wearisome to go into the story of the 
 revolts and anarchy in all parts of Persia in 1908 and 
 1909. After a year of fighting and Oriental promises, 
 of solemn oaths and the breaking of them, the Con- 
 stitutionalists finally drove Mohammed Ali from 
 Teheran in July, 1909. The Shah saved his life by 
 taking refuge in the Russian Legation. A few days 
 later he took the road to exile. He has since reappeared 
 in Persia twice to stir up trouble in the north. On 
 both occasions it was when the Russians were finding 
 it hard to justify their continued occupation of the 
 northern provinces. 
 
 Mohammed Ali was succeeded by his son, Ali Mirza,
 
 86 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 a boy of eleven years, who was still too young to be 
 anything more than a mere plaything in the hands of 
 successive regents. 
 
 The civil strife in Persia gave Great Britain and 
 Russia the excuse for entering the country. In accord 
 with Great Britain, Russia sent an expedition to occupy 
 Tabriz on April 29, 1909. Later, Russian troops 
 occupied Ardebil, Recht, Kazvin, and other cities in 
 the Russian sphere of influence. Owing to the anarchy 
 in the south during 1910, Great Britain prepared to 
 send troops " to protect the safety of the roads for 
 merchants." This was not actually done, for con- 
 ditions of travel slightly ameliorated. But Persia has 
 rested since under the menace of a British occupation. 
 
 Every effort made to bring order out of chaos in 
 Persia has failed. Serious attempts at financial reform 
 were undertaken by an American mission, under the 
 direction of a former American official in the Philippine 
 Islands. This mission failed, and only increased the 
 humiliation of the Persian Government . The American 
 Treasurer-General had more zeal than common sense. 
 He failed to recognize the fact that the Anglo-Russian 
 accord of 1907 was more than a mere bit of writing. 
 The sphere of influence had become far from imaginary. 
 One day in the summer of 191 1 I was walking along 
 the Galata Quay in Constantinople. I heard my name 
 called from the deck of a vessel just about to leave for 
 Batum. Perched on top of two boxes containing type- 
 writers was a young American from Boston, who was 
 going out to help reform the finances of Persia. I had 
 talked to him the day before concerning the extreme 
 delicacy and difficulty of the task of the mission whose 
 secretary he was. But his refusal to admit the political
 
 THE PASSING OF PERSIA 87 
 
 limitations of Oriental peoples made it impossible for 
 him to see that constitutional Persia was any different, 
 or should be treated any differently, from consti- 
 tutional Massachusetts. From the sequel of the story 
 it would seem that the chief of the mission had the 
 same attitude of mind as his secretary. The American 
 Treasurer- General was dismissed because he refused to 
 accept the reaUty of the Anglo-Russian accord. 
 
 When Germany saw that the Russian troops had 
 entered Northern Persia with the consent of Great 
 Britain, and had come to stay, there was nothing for her 
 to do but to treat with Russia. 
 
 In November, 1910, when the Czar was visiting the 
 Kaiser, Russian and German Ministers exchanged 
 views concerning the ground upon which Germany 
 would agree to the fait accompli of Russia's exclusive 
 political interests in Northern Persia and the Russian 
 military occupation. Satisfactory bases were found 
 for an agreement between Russia and Germany con- 
 cerning their respective interests in Persia and Asiatic 
 Turkey. The Accord of Potsdam, as it is called, was 
 made in the form of a note presented by the Russian 
 Government to Germany, and accepted by her. Russia 
 declared that she would in no way oppose the realiza- 
 tion of the project of the Bagdad Railway up to the 
 Persian Gulf, and that she would construct to the 
 border of Persia a railway to join a spur of the Bagdad 
 Railway from Sadije to Khanikin. In return for this 
 Germany was to promise not to construct railway lines 
 outside of the Bagdad Railway zone, to declare that 
 she had no political interests in Persia, and to recog- 
 nize that " Russia has special interests in Northern 
 Persia from the political, strategic, and economic
 
 88 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 points of view." The German Government was to 
 abandon any intention of securing a concession for a 
 trans- Persian railway. On the other hand, Russia 
 promised to maintain in Northern Persia the " open 
 door," so that German commercial interests should not 
 be injured. 
 
 The accord between Russia and Germany was badly 
 received everywhere. France feared that Germany 
 was trying to weaken the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
 Great Britain did not look with favour upon a recog- 
 nition by Russia of German interests in Asiatic Turkey. 
 The Sublime Porte felt that Russia and Germany had 
 shown a disregard for the elementary principles of 
 courtesy in discussing and deciding questions that were 
 of tremendous importance to the future of Turkey 
 without inviting the Sublime Porte to take part in the 
 negotiations. Turkey in the Potsdam Accord was 
 ignored as completely as Morocco had been in the 
 Algeciras Convention and Persia in the Russo-British 
 Accord. 
 
 The Potsdam stipulations brought prominently 
 before Europe the possible significance of Germany's 
 free hand in Anatolian and Mesopotamian railway 
 constructions. It also aroused interest in the possi- 
 bility of an all-rail route from Calais to Calcutta, in 
 which all the Great Powers, except Italy, would par- 
 ticipate. 
 
 The trans-Persian and other railway schemes in 
 Persia came to nothing. Between 1872 and 1890 
 twelve distinct railway projects had received con- 
 cessions from the Persian Government. One of these, 
 the Renter group, actually started the construction of 
 a line from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. A
 
 THE PASSING OF PERSIA 89 
 
 French project for a railway from Trebiz to Tabrizond 
 had gained powerful financial support. All these 
 schemes were frustrated by Russian diplomacy. In 
 1890 Russia secured from the Persian Government the 
 exclusive right for twenty-one years to construct 
 railways in Northern Persia. Needless to say, no 
 lines were built. Russia had all she could do with her 
 trans-Siberian and trans-Caucasian schemes. But she 
 deliberately acted the dog in the manger. By pre- 
 venting private groups from building railways which she 
 would not build herself, Russia has retarded the 
 economic progress, and is largely responsible for the 
 financial, military, and administrative weakness of 
 contemporary Persia. By the Accords of 1907 with 
 Great Britain and 191 1 with Germany, Russia secured 
 the connivance of these rival Powers in still longer con- 
 tinuing this shameful stagnation. To this day no 
 railroad has been built in the Shah's dominions. 
 
 Just a month before the outbreak of the European 
 War the boy Shah of Persia was solemnly crowned at 
 Teheran. It was an imposing and pathetic ceremony. 
 The Russians and British saw to it that full honour 
 should be given to the Sovereign of Persia. The 
 pathos of the event was in the fact that the Russian 
 and British Legations at Teheran paid the expenses of 
 the coronation. The Shah received his crown from 
 the hands of his despoilers. A similar farce had been 
 enacted a little while before in Morocco. Turkey alone 
 of Moslem nations remains. 
 
 The last effort of Persia to shake off the Russian 
 octopus was made on October 8, 1914, when Russia 
 was requested once more to withdraw her troops from 
 the Azerbaidjan. The Russian Minister at Teheran,
 
 90 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 without going through the form of referring the request 
 to Petrograd, answered that the interests of Russia 
 and other foreign countries could be safeguarded only 
 by the continued occupation. To this response his 
 British colleague gave hearty assent. 
 
 The importance to the European cataclysm of the 
 passing of Persia is twofold. It shows how in one more 
 direction Germany found herself shut out from a pos- 
 sible field of expansion. Through the weakness of 
 Persia, Great Britain and Russia, after fifty years of 
 bitter struggle, were able to come to a satisfactory com- 
 promise. It was in Persia that their animosity was 
 buried, and that co-operation of British democracy 
 and Russian autocracy in a war against Germany was 
 first envisaged. The failure of the Persian constitu- 
 tional Government was a tremendous blow to Germany. 
 It strengthened the bases of the Triple Entente. For 
 the events of 1908 and 1909 put the accord to severe 
 test, and proved that it was built upon a solid founda- 
 tion. The agony of one people is often the joy of 
 another. Has Persia suffered vicariously that France 
 may be saved ?
 
 VI. 
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES* 
 
 When Russia, Austria, and Prussia partitioned Poland 
 at the end of the eighteenth century there were at the 
 most 6,000,000 Poles in the vast territory stretching 
 from the Baltic nearly to the Black Sea. Of these a 
 large number, especially in Eastern Prussia and in 
 Silesia, had already lost their sense of nationality. 
 Poland was a country of feudal nobles, whose inability 
 to group under a dynasty for the formation of a modern 
 State made the disappearance of the kingdom an 
 inexorable necessity in the economic evolution of 
 Europe, and of ignorant peasants, who were indifferent 
 concerning the political status of the land in which 
 they lived. 
 
 To-day there are 20,000,000 Poles. Although they 
 owe allegiance to three different Sovereigns, they are 
 more united than ever in their history. For their 
 national feeling has developed in just the same way 
 that the national feeling of Germans and Russians 
 has developed, by education primarily, and by that 
 remarkable tendency of industrialism which has 
 
 * This chapter has not been written without giving con- 
 sideration to the Russian point of view. There is an excellent 
 book on Russia since the Japanese War (from 1906 to 1912) by 
 Peter Polejaieff. 
 
 91
 
 92 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 grouped people in cities, and brought them into closer 
 association. This influence of city life upon the 
 destinies of Poland comes to us with peculiar force 
 when we realize that since the last map of Europe was 
 made Warsaw has grown from 40,000 to 800,000, Lodz 
 from 1,000 to 400,000, Posen from a few hundreds to 
 150,000, Lemberg and Cracow from less than 10,000 
 to 200,000 and 150,000 respectively. These great 
 cities (except Lodz, which Russia foolishly allowed to 
 become an outpost of pan-Germanism in the heart of a 
 Slavic population) are the foyers of Polish nationalism. 
 The second and third dismemberments of Poland 
 (1793 and 1795) were soon annulled by the Napoleonic 
 upheaval. The larger portion of Poland was revived 
 in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Congress of 
 Vienna, just 100 years ago, made what the repre- 
 sentatives of the partitioning Powers hoped would 
 be a definite redistribution of the unwelcome ghost 
 stirred up by Napoleon. Posnania was returned to 
 Prussia, and in the western end of Galicia a Republic 
 of Cracow was created. The greater portion of Poland 
 reverted to Russia, not as conquered territory, hut as a 
 separate State, of which the Czar assumed the kingship 
 and swore to preserve the liberties. The unhappiness, 
 the unrest, the agitation, among the Poles of the 
 Muscovite Empire, just as among the Finns, came from 
 the breaking of the promises made by Russia to Europe 
 when these subjects of alien races were allotted to her. 
 The story of modern Poland is not different from 
 that of any other nationalistic movement. A sense 
 of nationality and a desire for racial political unity are 
 not the phenomena which have been the underlying 
 causes of the evolution of Europe since the Congress of
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 93 
 
 Vienna, In Italy, in Germany, in Poland, in Alsace- 
 Lorraine, in Finland, among the various races of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkan peninsula, 
 as well as in Turkey and Persia, the underlying cause of 
 political agitation, of rebellions and of revolutions, has 
 been the desire to secure freedom from absolutism. 
 Nationalism is simply the tangible outward manifesta- 
 tion of the growth of democracy. There are few 
 national movements where separatism could not have 
 been avoided by granting local self-government. Mixed 
 populations can live together under the same govern- 
 ment without friction if the lesser races are granted 
 social, economic, and political equality. But nations 
 that have achieved their own unity and independence 
 through devotion to a nationalistic movement have 
 shown no mercy or wisdom to smaller and less for- 
 tunate races under their domination. The very 
 methods that European statesmen have fondly believed 
 were necessary for assimilation have proved fatal to it. 
 The Polish question, as we understand it to-day, has 
 little connection with the Polish revolutions of 1830 
 and of 1863. These movements against the Russian 
 Government were conducted by the same elements of 
 protest against autocracy that were at work in the 
 larger cities and universities throughout Europe during 
 the middle of the nineteenth century. Nationalism 
 was the reason given rather than the cause that 
 prompted. The revolutions were unsuccessful because 
 they were not supported by the nation. The mass of 
 the people were indifferent to the cause, just as in 
 other countries similar revolutions against despotism 
 failed for lack of real support. The apathy of the 
 masses has always been the bulwark of defence for
 
 94 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 autocracy and reactionary policies. Popular rights do 
 not come to people until the masses demand them. 
 Education alone brings self-government. This is the 
 history of the evolution of modern Europe. 
 
 The Poles, as a nation, began to worry their par- 
 titioners in the decade following the last unsuccessful 
 revolution against Russia. To understand the con- 
 temporary phases of the Polish question it is necessary 
 for us to follow first its three-fold development, as a 
 question of internal policy in Russia, Germany, and 
 Austria. Only then does its significance as an inter- 
 national question become clear. 
 
 The Poles in Russia since 1864. 
 
 The troubles of Russia in her relationship to the 
 Poles have come largely from the fact that the dis- 
 tinction between Poland proper, inhabited by Poles, 
 and the provinces which the Jagellons conquered but 
 never assimilated, was not grasped by the statesmen 
 who had to deal with the aftermath of the revolution. 
 What was possible in one was thought to be possible 
 in the other. What was vital in one was believed to 
 be vital in the other. In the kingdom of Poland, as it 
 was bestowed upon the Russian Czar by the Congress 
 of Vienna, there were massed 10,000,000 Poles who 
 could be neither exterminated nor exiled. Nor was 
 there a sound motive for attempting to destroy their 
 national life. The kingdom of Poland was not an 
 essential portion of the Russian Empire, and was not 
 vitally bound to the fortunes of the Empire. So un- 
 essential has the kingdom of Poland been to Russia, 
 and so fraught with the possibilities of weakness to its 
 owner, that patriotic and far-sighted Russian pub-
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 95 
 
 Heists have advocated its complete autonomy, its inde- 
 pendence, or its cession to Germany. Because it was 
 limitrophe to the territories occupied by the Poles of 
 the other partitioners, there was constant danger that 
 the defences of the Empire might be weakened and that 
 international complications might occur. Through 
 failing to treat these Poles in such a way that they 
 would be a loyal bulwark against her enemies, Russia 
 has done irreparable harm to herself as well as to them. 
 The Polish question in Lithuania, Podolia, and the 
 Ukraine, was a totally different matter. These prov- 
 inces had been added to Russia in her logical develop- 
 ment towards the west and the south-west. Their 
 possession was absolutely essential to the existence of 
 the Empire. Their population was not Polish, but 
 Lithuanian, Ruthenian, and Russian. From the 
 Baltic to the Black Sea, the acquisition of these terri- 
 tories made possible the entrance of Russia into the 
 concert of European nations. They had been con- 
 quered by Poland during the period of her greatness, 
 and had naturally been lost by her when she became 
 weak. In these portions of Greater Poland the Poles 
 were limited to the land-owning class, and to the more 
 prosperous artisans in the cities and villages. They 
 were the residue of an earlier conquering race that had 
 never assimilated the country. They had abused their 
 power, and were heartily disliked. These provinces 
 were vital to Russia, and she was able to carry out the 
 policy of uprooting the Poles. Their villages were 
 burned, their fortunes and their lands confiscated, the 
 landed proprietors deported to Siberia, and others so 
 cruelly persecuted that, when their churches and 
 schools were closed and they found themselves for-
 
 96 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 bidden to speak their language outside of their own 
 homes, they emigrated. In Lithuania the Lithuanian 
 language was also proscribed. The Russians had no 
 intention of blotting out a Polish question in order to 
 make place for a Lithuanian one. 
 
 Where the Poles were few in number, these measures, 
 which were exactly the same as the Poles had them- 
 selves employed in the same territories several cen- 
 turies before, were successful. The peasants were glad to 
 see their traditional persecutors get a taste of their own 
 medicine. It was not difficult to make these provinces 
 Russian. They have gradually been assimilated to the 
 Empire. In all fairness, one can hardly condemn the 
 Russian point of view, as regards the Poles in Lithu- 
 ania, Podolia, and the Ukraine. Only youthful Polish 
 Irredentists still dream of the restoration of the Empire 
 of the Jagellons. 
 
 In the kingdom of Poland the situation was entirely 
 different. This huge territory had been given to 
 Russia by the Congress of Vienna upon the solemn 
 assurance that it was to be governed as a separate 
 kingdom by the Romanoffs. There was no thought in 
 the Congress of Vienna of the disappearance of the 
 Poles as a separate nationality from the map of 
 Europe. But the autonomy of Poland was suppressed 
 after the rebellion of 1830. 
 
 After the rebellion of 1863 Russia tried to assimilate 
 the kingdom of Poland as well as the Polish marches. 
 The repression was so severe that Polish nationalism 
 was considered dead. The peasants had been in- 
 different to the movement. Not only had they failed 
 to support it, but they had frequently shown them- 
 selves actually hostile to it.
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 97 
 
 It was because the nobles and priests were believed 
 to be leaders of nationalistic and separatist movements, 
 not only in Poland, but in other allogeneous portions 
 of the composite empire, that Czar Alexander II. 
 emancipated the serfs. The policy of every auto- 
 cratic government, when it meets the first symptoms 
 of unrest in a subject race, is to strike at their church 
 and their aristocracy. The most efficient way to 
 weaken the power of the nobles is to strengthen the 
 peasants. Alexander himself may have been actuated 
 by motives of pure humanity, but his ministers would 
 never have allowed the ukase to be promulgated, had 
 they not seen in it the means of conquering the ap- 
 proaching revolution in Poland. For the moment it 
 was an excellent move, and accomplished its purpose. 
 The Polish peasants were led to believe that the Czar 
 was their father and friend and champion against the 
 exactions of the church and the landowner. Was not 
 emancipation proof of this ? 
 
 But in the long run the emancipation of the serfs 
 proved fatal to Russian domination in Poland. For 
 the advisers of Alexander had not realized that free- 
 men would demand and attend schools, and that 
 schools, no matter how careful the surveillance and 
 restrictions might be, created democrats. Democrats 
 would seize upon nationalism to express their aspira- 
 tion for self-government . The emancipation of the serfs, 
 launched as a measure to destroy Poland, has ended 
 in making it. Emancipation created Polish patriots. 
 It was a natural and inevitable result. The artificial 
 aid of governmental persecution helped and hastened 
 this result. The Irishman expressed a great tmth when 
 he said that there are things that are not what they are. 
 
 7
 
 98 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 A flock of hungry Russian functionaries descended 
 upon Poland in 1864. They took possession of all 
 departments of administration. The Polish language 
 was used in courts only through an interpreter, and was 
 forbidden as the medium of instruction in schools. 
 No Polish signs were tolerated in the railways or post- 
 offices. In the parts of the kingdom where there were 
 bodies of the Lithuanians, their nationalism was en- 
 couraged, and they were shown many favours, in con- 
 tradiction to the policy adopted towards the Lithu- 
 anians of Lithuania. Catholics who followed the 
 Eastern Rite were forced to join the national church. 
 •There was a clear intention to assimilate as much as 
 possible the populations of the border districts of 
 Poland. 
 
 After thirty years of repression, Russia had made no 
 progress in Poland. In 1897 Prince Imeretinsky 
 wrote to the Czar that the policy of the government 
 had failed. Polish national spirit, instead of disap- 
 pearing, had spread remarkably among the peasant 
 classes. The secret publication and importation of 
 unauthorized journals and pamphlets had multiplied. 
 The number of cases brought before the courts for 
 infraction of the " law of association," which forbade 
 unlicensed public gatherings and clubs, had so in- 
 creased that they could not be heard. Heavy fines 
 and imprisonment seem to have had no deterring 
 effect. 
 
 Could Russia hope to struggle against the tendencies 
 of modern life ? Free press and free speech are the 
 complement of education. When men learn to read, 
 they learn to think, and can be reached by propaganda. 
 When men increase in prosperity, they begin to want
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 99 
 
 a voice in the expenditure of the money they have to 
 pay in taxes. When men come together in the indus- 
 trial Hfe of large cities, they form associations. No 
 government, no system of spies or terrorism, no laws, 
 can prevent propaganda in cities. From 1864 to 1914 
 the kingdom of Poland has become more Polish than 
 ever before in her history. Instead of a few students 
 and dreamers, fascinated by the past glories of their 
 race, instead of a group of landowners and priests, 
 thinking of their private interests and of the church, 
 there is awakened a spirit of protest against Russian 
 despotism in the soul of a race become intelligently 
 nationalistic. 
 
 The issue between Russia and her Poles has become 
 clearer, and for that reason decidedly worse, since the 
 disastrous war with Japan. The Poles have demanded 
 autonomy in the fullest sense of the word. The 
 Russians have responded by showing that it is their 
 intention to destroy Poland, just as they intend to 
 destroy Finland. There is an analogy between the 
 so-called constitutional regimes in Russia and Turkey. 
 In each empire the granting of a constitution was 
 hailed with joy by the various races. These races, 
 who had been centres of agitation, disloyalty, and 
 weakness, were ready to co-operate with their govern- 
 ments in building up a large, broad, comprehensive, 
 national life upon the principles of liberty, equality, 
 and fraternity. But in both empires the dominant 
 race let it soon be understood that the Constitution was 
 to be used for a destructive policy of assimilation. In 
 the Ottoman Empire, the Constitution was a weapon 
 for destroying the national aspirations of subject races. 
 In Russia it has been the same.
 
 100 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 After the Russo-Japanese War Czar Nicholas and his 
 ministers had their great opportunity to profit by the 
 lessons of Manchuria. But the granting of a Constitu- 
 tion was a pure farce. Blind to the fact that the en- 
 lightened Poles were interested primarily in political 
 reforms, and in securing equity and justice for the 
 kingdom of Poland, and not for the advancement of a 
 narrow and theoretical nationalistic ideal, the Russians 
 repulsed the proferred loyalty of the Poles to a free and 
 constitutional Russian Empire. In the second Duma, 
 Dmowski and other Polish deputies unanimously voted 
 the supplies for strengthening the Russian Army. 
 They stated that the Poles were willing to cast in their 
 lot loyally and indissolubly with constitutional Russia. 
 Were they not brethren, and imbued with the same 
 pan-Slavic ideal ? Was it not logical to look to 
 Russia as the defender of all the Slavs from Teutonic 
 oppression ? 
 
 But Poland, like Finland, was to continue to be the 
 victim of Russian bureaucracy and of an intolerant 
 nationalism which the Russians were beginning to feel 
 as keenly and as arrogantly as the Prussians. Is the 
 Kaiser, embodying the evils of militarism, more obnox- 
 ious and more dangerous to civilization than the Czar, 
 standing for the horrors of bureaucratic despotism and 
 absolutism ? Have not the Armenian massacres, 
 ordered from Constantinople, and the Jewish pogroms, 
 ordered from Petrograd, associated Christian Czar 
 with Mohammedan Sultan at the beginning of the 
 twentieth century ? 
 
 The first deliberate violation of the integrity of the 
 kingdom of Poland was sanctioned by the Russian 
 Duma in the same session in which it approved viola-
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES loi 
 
 tion of Russian obligations to Finland. A law separat- 
 ing Kholm from the kingdom of Poland was voted on 
 July 6, 1912. The text of the law declared that Kholm 
 was still to be regarded as a portion of the kingdom of 
 Poland, but to be directly attached to the Ministry of 
 the Interior without passing by the intermediary of the 
 Governor-General of Warsaw ; and to preserve the 
 Polish adaptation of the Code Napoleon for its legal 
 administration, but to have its court of appeal at 
 Kief. 
 
 The elections from the kingdom of Poland to the 
 Duma in 19 13 gave a decided set-back to the party of 
 Dmowski, who had so long and so ably pled for a policy 
 of pan-Slavism through accommodation with Russia. 
 The law concerning Kholm had been the response of 
 the Duma to Dmowski's olive-branch. The moderates 
 were discredited. But the failure of the radical 
 nationalists to conciliate the Jewish element caused 
 their candidates to be rejected both at Warsaw and at 
 Lodz. 
 
 The birth of an anti-Semitic movement has been dis- 
 astrous to Polish solidarity during recent years. The 
 Polish nationalists suspected the Jews of working 
 either for German or for Russian interests. They 
 were especially bitter against the Litvak, or Lithuanian 
 and south Russian Jews, who had been forced by 
 Russia to establish themselves in the cities of Poland. 
 Poland is one of the most important pales in the 
 Empire. The Jewish population is one-fifth of the 
 total, and enjoys both wealth and education in the 
 cities. Their educated youth had been courageous and 
 forceful supporters of Polish nationalism. Before the 
 Russian intrigues of the last decade and the introduc-
 
 102 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 tion of these non- Polish Jews there had never been a 
 strong anti-Semitic feeling in Poland. The Polish 
 protests against the encroachment of the Russians 
 upon their national liberties have been greatly 
 weakened by their antagonism to the Jews. The anti- 
 Semitic movement, which has carried away both the 
 moderate party of Smowski and the radical nation- 
 alists, as was expected, has played into the hands of 
 Russia. 
 
 The Muscovite statesmen, while endeavouring to use 
 the Balkan Wars for the amalgamation of South Slavic 
 races under the wing of Russia against Austria, have 
 treated the Poles as if they were not Slavs. During 
 1913 and the first part of 1914 the policy of attempting 
 to Russianize the Poles has proved disastrous to their 
 feeling of loyalty to the Empire. The Government 
 announced definitely that the kingdom of Poland would 
 be " compensated " for the loss of Kholm by a law 
 granting self-government to Polish cities. This 
 promise has not been kept. The municipal self- 
 government project presented to the Duma was as 
 farcical in practical results as all democratic and 
 liberal legislation which that impotent body has been 
 asked to pass. 
 
 The Poles in Austria-Hungary since 1867. 
 
 The disappearance of Austria from Germany after 
 the battle of Sadowa led to the organization of a 
 new state, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We must 
 divorce in our mind the Austria before 1867 from the 
 Austria- Hungary of the Dual Monarchy. The political 
 situation changed entirely when Austrians and Hun-
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 103 
 
 garians agreed to live together and share the Slavic 
 territories of the Hapsburg crown. Austria no longer 
 had need of her Galicians to keep the Hungarians in 
 check. But there was equally important work for them 
 to do. 
 
 The Austrians have always treated the Poles very 
 well. Galicia, which had been Austria's share in the 
 partition of Poland, was given local self-government, 
 with its own Diet, and proper representation in the 
 Austrian Reichsmth. Poles were admitted in generous 
 numbers to the functions of the Empire. 
 
 The Polish nationalists of Russia and Prussia feel 
 vei"y bitter about the indifference of the Galicians to the 
 nation at large — or rather, in captivity. They claim 
 that the lack of national feeling among the Austrian 
 Poles is due to the fact that they have been bribed by 
 the Austrians to desert not only their brethren of 
 Russia and of Prussia, but also their fellow Slavs of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Empire. I have heard this criti- 
 cism ably and feelingly presented, but I do not think 
 it just. Since national aspirations are awakened and 
 sustained by the effort to secure political equality and 
 justice, the enjoyment of these takes away need or 
 desire to plot against the government. The Poles of 
 Austria are like the French of Canada. Their nation- 
 alism is literary and religious in character: there is no 
 reason for its being anti-governmental. 
 
 Of late years, however, there has been a national 
 Polish agitation in Galicia. It is directed not against 
 the government, but against the Ruthenians, who, to 
 the number of 3,000,000 — nearly 40 per cent, of the 
 total population — inhabit the eastern section of 
 Galicia. This local racial conflict, which has strength-
 
 104 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 ened rather than weakened the attachment of the Poles 
 to the Vienna Government, arose after the introduction 
 of universal suffrage, when eastern Galicia began to 
 send Ruthenian Deputies in large numbers to the 
 Galician Diet and to the Austrian Parliament. 
 
 On April 12, 1908, Count Potocki was assassinated by 
 a Ruthenian student, whose death sentence was com- 
 muted to twenty years' imprisonment. With the com- 
 plicity of warders, the assassin escaped from gaol after 
 three years. There has never been peace between the 
 Poles and the Ruthenians since that time. After 
 serious disorders at the University of Lemberg, where 
 the Ruthenian students were treated disgracefully, 
 Polish and Ruthenian leaders tried to find common 
 ground for reconciliation in December, 191 1, The 
 Ruthenians demanded electoral reform with greater 
 representation, and the creation of a Ruthenian 
 university. The Imperial Government communicated 
 to the representatives of the two nationalities the pro- 
 ject of a decree of public instruction in Galicia in 
 January, 1913. The project was a marvel of in- 
 genuity. A Ruthenian university was to be estab- 
 lished after four years, but if by October i, 1916, the 
 law voting credits for it was not yet passed, a special 
 school for Ruthenians would be attached to the Univer- 
 sity of Lemberg until their own university was a 
 reality. The teaching of the Ruthenian language 
 would cease in the University of Lemberg when this 
 " special school " was inaugurated. The Ruthenians 
 were suspicious of a trick in the project. They could 
 not understand its vagueness. It looked as if they 
 would be giving up their present rights in the Univer- 
 sity of Lemberg, limited as they were, for an uncer-
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 105 
 
 tainty. Why was no definite date for opening speci- 
 fied, or indication given of the new University's 
 location ? Would it be maintained by Galicia with a 
 budget appropriation in proportion to the taxes paid by 
 Ruthenians ? 
 
 The Ruthenian question in Galicia has been cited 
 here to show how there are wheels within wheels in the 
 complex questions of nationalities. European racial 
 questions seem to follow the law of the animal world. 
 The smallest animals are eaten by little animals, which 
 in turn serve as food for larger animals. Nations which 
 have suffered most cruelly from race persecution 
 are generally themselves relentless and fanatical when 
 the power to persecute is in their hands. 
 
 The Ruthenian question shows also how Poles and 
 Austrians work together, and are content with the 
 mutual advantages of their union. I have never met 
 an Austrian Pole, who lived in Galicia and had a 
 settled profession or business there, who was not a 
 loyal — even ardent — supporter of the Hapsburg mon- 
 archy. Austrian Poles are dismayed as they face the 
 terrible dilemma of union with Russia or Germany. 
 
 The Poles in Germany since 1870. 
 
 Germany, like Russia, has had a two-fold Polish 
 question. The acquisition of Polish territory on 
 either side of the Vistula to the Black Sea was as essen- 
 tial to the creation of a strong Prussian kingdom as was 
 the acquisition of Pomerania. The portion of Poland 
 which, before the partition, cut off Eastern from 
 Western Prussia was fully as much German as Polish — 
 in fact, more so. It became German by logical and
 
 io6 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 natural conquest in the course of Prussia's evolu- 
 tion. 
 
 The situation was different in Posnania. This terri- 
 tory of the later partition reverted to Prussia at the 
 Congress of Vienna. In 1815 its population was only 
 20 per cent. German. For fifty years the process of 
 Germanization went on naturally — in no way forced. 
 When the German Empire was formed, nearly half of 
 Posnania was German. Many of the leading Poles had 
 lost their sense of Polish nationality. They had be- 
 come German in language and in culture. How many 
 families there are in Prussia whose Polish origin is 
 betrayed only by their names ! 
 
 But the Germanized Poles, for the most part, 
 retained their religion. The notorious Kulturkampf oi 
 Bismarck aroused again the sense of nationality which 
 had been lost, not only among the prosperous Poles of 
 Posnania, but even of Silesia. Only the bureaucratic 
 classes were unaffected by this renaissance of national- 
 ism awakened by revolt against religious persecution. 
 
 Just after the formation of the Empire, when Prussia 
 needed all her strength and force to preserve her 
 hegemony in the new confederation and to lead modern 
 Germany in the path of progress and civilization, on 
 either side of her kingdom she had to cope with nation- 
 alist movements of Danes and of Poles. But she did 
 not fear to undertake also the assimilation of Alsace and 
 Lorraine ! 
 
 Since the Kulturkampf the Polish renaissance in 
 Prussia has thrived in spite of persecution. As in 
 Russia, the Polish language was banished. Polish 
 teachers were transferred to schools in other parts of 
 the Empire, and about 40,000 Poles of Russian
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 107 
 
 and Austrian nationality were expelled from the 
 country. The persecution has been carried on in the 
 schools, in the Army, and in the Church, School- 
 children have been forbidden to pray in the Polish 
 language. Two unconstitutional laws have been passed 
 by the Prussian Diet. The first of these forbade 
 the Poles to speak Polish in public gatherings. The 
 second, sanctioned by the Landtag on March 8, 1908, 
 authorized the Government to expropriate land owned 
 by Poles /or the purpose of selling it to Germans. 
 
 The Prussian scheme for getting rid of the Poles was 
 to drive them from their lands and instal German 
 colonists. Private enterprise was first tried. A 
 "colonization society" was formed, with a large 
 capital, and given every encouragement by Prussian 
 officialdom. But economic laws are not controlled by 
 politics. The colonists were boycotted. Enormous 
 sums of money were lost in wasted crops. The farms 
 of the colonists had to be resold by the sheriff, and were 
 bought in by Poles. To discourage the buying back of 
 the German farms, a law was passed forbidding Poles to 
 build upon land acquired by them after the date of the 
 colonization society's failure. The Poles got around 
 this law most cleverly, li one goes into Posnania to-day, 
 he will see farmhouses, barns, dairies, stables — even 
 chicken-coops — on wheels. The people live in glorified 
 waggons. They do not build. Will there be a law now 
 against owning waggons ? 
 
 When the failure of private enterprise was demon- 
 strated, the Prussian Government announced its inten- 
 tion of applying the law of expropriation " for the use 
 of the commission of colonization." This was in 
 October, 1912. At the beginning of 1913 the Polish
 
 io8 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Deputies to the Reichstag brought before their col- 
 leagues of all Germany the question of the expropria- 
 tion of Polish lands in Prussia. They asked the repre- 
 sentatives of a supposed advanced and constitutional 
 nation what they thought of this injustice. Chancellor 
 von Bethmann-Hollweg tried to keep the question from 
 being debated. He argued with perfect reason that it 
 was a purely internal Prussian matter, which the 
 Imperial Parliament was incompetent to discuss. But 
 the Catholic Centre and the Socialist Left combined to 
 vote an order of the day allowing the discussion of the 
 Polish lands question. 
 
 In the history of the German Confederation, it was 
 the first time that an Imperial Chancellor had received 
 a direct defiance. This vote is mentioned here to show 
 how Prussian dealings with the Poles, just as with 
 Alsace-Lorraine, have tended to weaken the purely 
 Prussian substructure of the German Confederation, 
 and to arouse a dangerous protest against Prussian 
 hegemony. Contempt for the elementary principles of 
 justice has been the keynote of Chancellor von Beth- 
 mann-Hollweg's career. His mentality is typical of 
 that of German bureaucracy — no, more than that — 
 of German statesmanship. It is possible to have 
 sympathy with German national aspirations, but not 
 with the methods by which those aspirations are being 
 interpreted to the world. 
 
 To show how little regard he had for Parliamentary 
 opinion in the German Confederation, the Chancellor 
 forced through the Prussian Landtag, on April 22, 
 1913, only three months after his rebuke from the 
 Reichstag, an infamous law, voting 125,000,000 
 marks for German colonization in Prussian Poland.
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES 109 
 
 Shortly before the European War broke out, 
 another unconstitutional law was passed, which 
 makes possible the arbitrary division of large landed 
 properties owned by Poles. 
 
 The International Aspect of the Polish 
 
 Question. 
 
 During the war with Japan the Czar and the Kaiser 
 understood each other perfectly on the Polish ques- 
 tion. The neutrality of Germany was essential to 
 Russia at that time. The Russians owe much to Ger- 
 many for her benevolent attitude of those trying days. 
 The Poles have since paid the bill. 
 
 As in Pnissia, the Poles of Russia have seen their 
 liberties menaced more than ever before during the 
 past decade, and have had to struggle hopelessly 
 against a policy of ruthless extermination. If, on the 
 one hand, the Prussian persecution is more to be con- 
 demned because Germany asks the world to believe 
 that she is an enlightened, constitutional nation, and 
 " the torch-bearer of civilization," while Russia is 
 admittedly reactionary and still half barbarous, on the 
 other hand there is less excuse for the Russian perse- 
 cution of the Poles. For in Russia it is not Teuton 
 against Slav, but Slav against Slav. 
 
 Germany and Russia have had the common interest 
 of fellow-criminals in their relation to the Polish nation. 
 Russia has not hesitated to co-operate with Germany 
 through diplomatic and police channels in riveting 
 more securely the fetters of the Poles. Her champion- 
 ship of the South Slavs against Teutonic aggression 
 has been supposed to be due to " burning love
 
 110 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 for our brothers in slavery, in whose veins runs the 
 same blood as ours." The sham and hypocrisy of 
 this attitude is revealed when we consider the fact that 
 Russia has never protested to Germany against the 
 treatment of the Poles of Posnania, nor shown any 
 inclination to treat her own Poles with equity. Here 
 are " brothers in slavery " nearer home. There is 
 ground for suspicion that her interest in the South 
 Slavs has been purely because they are on the way to 
 Constantinople and the Mediterranean ! One who 
 reads the recent history of Russia stultifies himself if 
 he allows himself to believe that Russia has entered 
 into the present war to defend Servia from Austrian 
 aggression through any love for or humanitarian interest 
 in the Servians. If Russia gets the opportunity, will 
 her treatment of Seryian national aspirations be any 
 different from that of Austria-Hungary ? When we 
 try to answer this question, let us think of Bulgaria 
 after 1878 (the last "war of liberation"), and of 
 Poland in 1914. 
 
 On August 16, 1914, when I read the proclamation 
 of Czar Nicholas to the partitioned Poles, promising to 
 restore administrative autonomy to the kingdom of 
 Poland, and posing as the liberator of Poles now under 
 the yoke of Austria and of Prussia, it was hard to be 
 enthusiastic. For the Jews of Odessa and Kief, and 
 the Finns of Helsingfors, rise up to add their cry of 
 warning to the bitter comments of Polish friends. 
 Only two years ago I saw in those cities subjects of the 
 Czar suffering cruelly from fanaticism and broken 
 promises, and deprived of that which is now being 
 held out as a bait to the Poles, and as a sop to 
 Russia's allies.
 
 THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES iii 
 
 Austria-Hungary has been able to use the Russian 
 treatment of Poland as a means of strengthening her 
 own hold on the border regions of the Empire. It was 
 at the instigation of Ballplatz that the Galician Deputies 
 on December i6, 191 1, made a motion in the Reichsrath, 
 inviting the Minister of Foreign Affairs " to undertake 
 steps among the Powers who signed the Conventions 
 at Vienna in 1815 to assure the maintenance of the 
 frontiers of the kingdom of Poland, of which Russia, 
 in violation of her international obligations, was 
 threatening the integrity . For the separation of Kholm 
 from Poland is an attack upon Polish historic and 
 national consciousness." It was tit for tat with the 
 two Eastern Powers. Russia burned with indigna- 
 tion for the feelings of Servia, when Austria-Hungary 
 annexed Bosnia - Herzegovina. Austria - Hungary 
 burned with indignation for the feelings of her own 
 loyal Polish subjects when Russia separated Kholm 
 from Poland. Both had violated international treaties. 
 Russia had no genuine interest in the Servians, and 
 Austria none in the Poles. They merely seized upon 
 weapons with which to attack each other. 
 
 It is a mystery how French and British public 
 opinion, always so traditionally favourable to down- 
 trodden races, and especially to the Poles, can hail the 
 Russian entry into Lemberg as a " victory for civiliza- 
 tion." To the Austrian Poles the coming of the Cos- 
 sacks is as the coming of the Uhlans to the Belgians. 
 They look upon the Russian invasion of Galicia as a 
 calamity to their national life. Fighting with the 
 Austrians are 30,000 young Poles, who call them- 
 selves Sokols (falcons). Their organization is some- 
 thing like the German turnverein, but more purely
 
 112 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 military. The Poles of Austria- Hungary are a unit 
 against Russia. 
 
 One can make no such positive statement about the 
 attitude of the Poles of the other two partitioners. 
 They have little hope of any amelioration of their lot 
 from a change of masters through the present war. 
 As I write, the thunder of German cannon is heard at 
 Warsaw, and the unhappy kingdom of Poland is the 
 centre of conflict between Russia and Germany, The 
 Poles are fighting on both sides, and Polish non-com- 
 batants are suffering from the brutality of both 
 " liberating " armies. The situation is exactly ex- 
 pressed by a Polish proverb which is the fruit of cen- 
 turies of bitter experience: Gdzie dwoch pa now sie hije, 
 chlop w skure dostaje — When two masters fight, the 
 peasant receives the blows.
 
 VII. 
 
 ITALIA IRREDENTA 
 
 Irredentism grew inevitably out of the decisions of 
 the Congress of Vienna, whose members were subjected 
 to two influences in making a new map of Europe. 
 The first consideration, so common and so necessary 
 in all diplomatic arrangements, was that of expediency. 
 The second consideration was to prevent the rise of 
 liberalism and democracy. The decisions on the ground 
 of the first consideration were made under the pressure 
 and the play and the skill of give and take by the 
 representatives of the nations, who fondly believed 
 that they were making a lasting peace for Europe. 
 The decisions on the ground of the second consideration 
 were guided by the idea that the checking of national 
 aspirations was the best means of preventing the growth 
 of democracy. 
 
 The decisions of Vienna, like the later modifications 
 of Paris and Berlin, could not prevent the development 
 of the national movements which have changed the 
 map as it was rearranged after the collapse of the 
 Napoleonic regime. 
 
 During the past hundred years ten new states have 
 appeared on the map of Europe — Greece, Belgium, 
 Servia, Italy, the German confederation, Rumania, 
 Montenegro, Norway, Bulgaria, and, possibly, Albania. 
 
 113 8
 
 114 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 With the exception of Albania (and is this the reason 
 why we have to qualify its viability by the word 
 ■possibly ?), all of these states have appeared upon the 
 map against the will, and in defiance of, the concert 
 of the European Powers. They have all, again with 
 the exception of Albania, been born through a rise 
 of national consciousness preceded and inspired by 
 a literary and educational revival. The goal has been 
 democracy. None of them, in achieving independence, 
 has succeeded in including within its frontiers all the 
 territory occupied by people of the same race and the 
 same language. Irredentism is the movement to secure 
 the union with a nation of contiguous territories in- 
 habited by the same race and speaking the same language. 
 It is the call of the redeemed to the unredeemed, and 
 of the unredeemed to the redeemed. 
 
 If we were to regard the present unrest in Europe 
 and the antagonism of nations from the standpoint 
 of nationalism, we could attribute the breaking out of 
 contemporary wars to five causes: the desire of nations 
 to get back what they have lost, illustrated by France 
 in relationship to Alsace-Lorraine; the desire of 
 nations to expand according to their legitimate racial 
 aspirations, illustrated by the Balkan states in re- 
 lationship to Turkey and Austria-Hungary, and Italy 
 in relationship to Austria-Hungary; the desire of 
 nations to expand commercially and politically because 
 of the possession of surplus population and energy, illus- 
 trated by Germany in her Weltpolitik ; the desire of 
 nations to prevent the commercial and political ex- 
 pansion of their rivals, illustrated by Great Britain 
 and Russia; and the desire of nations to stamp out the 
 rise of national movements which threaten their terri-
 
 ITALIA IRREDENTA 115 
 
 to rial integrity, illustrated by Austria- Hungary and 
 Turkey. 
 
 The irredentism of the Balkan states led, first, to 
 their war with Turkey ; second, to their war with each 
 other; and third, to Servia becoming the direct cause of 
 the European war. The aspirations of none have been 
 satisfied. Rumanian irredentism has stood between 
 Rumania and the Triple Alliance. The irredentism ol 
 Italy has not yet led to anything, but it is so full of 
 significance as a possible factor in bearing upon and 
 changing the whole destinies of Europe during the 
 winter of 1914-1915, that it cannot be overlooked in 
 a study of contemporary national movements and 
 wars. 
 
 The entrance of Italy into an alliance with the Teu- 
 tonic Powers of Central Europe was believed by her 
 statesmen to be an act of self-preservation. 
 
 The opposition of the French clerical party to the 
 completion of the unification of Italy during the last 
 decade of the Third Empire destroyed whatever 
 gratitude the Italian people may have felt for the de- 
 cisive aid rendered to the cause of Italian unity at 
 Solferino. On the part of the moving spirits of Young 
 Italy, indeed, this gratitude was not very great. For 
 the first great step in the unification of Italy had been 
 accompanied by a dismemberment of the territories 
 from which the royal house of Piedmont took its 
 name. Young Italy felt that the French had been 
 paid for their help against Austria, and paid dearly. 
 The cession of his birthplace, at the moment when the 
 nation for which he had suffered so terribly and 
 struggled so successfully cam.e into being, hurt Gari- 
 baldi more than the French bullets lodged in his body
 
 ii6 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 eight years later at Mentana. When the French look 
 to-day with joy upon Italian irredentism as the hope- 
 less barrier between Italy and Austria-Hungary, they 
 should not forget that, even though fifty years have 
 passed, Italian irredentism includes also Savoy and 
 Nice. 
 
 After the Franco-German war there were two ten- 
 dencies in the policy of the Third Republic to prevent 
 an understanding between France and Italy. The first 
 of these was the recurrence in France of the old bitter 
 clericalism of the Empire. Italy feared that French 
 soldiers might again come to Rome. The second was 
 the antagonism of France to the budding colonial 
 aspirations of Italy. When France occupied Tunis, 
 Italy felt that she had been robbed of the realization 
 of a dream, which was hers by right of history, geo- 
 graphy, and necessity. 
 
 So Italy joined the Triple Alliance. It is argued 
 with reason in France that the alliance of Teuton and 
 Latin was unnatural. Since Italy had become wholly 
 Guelph to realize its unity, why this sudden return to 
 Ghibellinism ? The alliance of Italy with Germany 
 and Austria- Hungary, however, was not more para- 
 doxical than the alliance of increasingly democratic, 
 socialistic and anti - clerical France with medieval 
 Russia. The reasons dictating the alliances were 
 practically the same. 
 
 But there was this difference : Italy entered into an 
 alliance with a former enemy and oppressor, who was 
 still holding certain unredeemed territories of the united 
 Italy as it had existed in the minds of the enthusiasts 
 of the middle of the nineteenth century. 
 
 Too many books have been written about the dis-
 
 ITALIA IRREDENTA 117 
 
 tribution of populations in the Austro-Hiingarian 
 empire to make it necessary to go into the details 
 of the Italian populations of the Austrian Tyrol and 
 of the Austrian provinces at the north of the Adriatic 
 Sea. The Tyrolese Italians are undoubtedly Italian 
 in sympathies and characteristics. But is their union 
 with Italy demanded by either internal Italian or ex- 
 ternal European political and economic considerations 
 more than would be the union with Italy of the Italian 
 cantons of the Swiss confederation ? 
 
 Italian irredentism in regard to the Adriatic littoral 
 is a far more serious and complicated problem. One 
 is struck everywhere in the Adriatic, even as far south 
 as Corfu, by the Italian character of the cities. Cattaro, 
 Ragusa, Spalato, Zara, Fiume, Pola, and Trieste, all 
 have an indefinable Italian atmosphere. It has never 
 left them since the Middle Ages. It is in the buildings, 
 however, rather than in the people. One hesitates 
 to attribute even to the people of Fiume and Trieste 
 Italian characteristics in the narrower sense of the 
 word. On the Dalmatian coast the Slavic element 
 has won all the cities. In Fiume and Trieste it is 
 strong enough to rob these two cities of their dis- 
 tinctive Italian character. One's misgivings con- 
 cerning the claims of Italian irredentists grow when he 
 leaves the cities. There are undoubtedly several 
 hundred thousands of Italians in this region. Italian 
 is the language of commerce, and on the Austrian- 
 Lloyd and Hungaro-Croatian steamship lines Italian 
 is the language of the crews. But the people who 
 speak Italian are not Italians, in every other case you 
 meet, nor do they resemble Italians. Why is this ? 
 
 Nationality in the twentieth century has a mental
 
 ii8 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 and civic rather than a physical and hereditary basis. 
 We are the product of our education and of the political 
 atmosphere in which we live. This is why assimilation 
 is so strikingly easy in America, where we place the 
 immigrant in touch with the public school, the news- 
 paper, and the ballot. Just as the Italians and Ger- 
 mans and French of Switzerland are Swiss, despite 
 their differences of language, so the Italians of the 
 Adriatic littoral are the product of the dispensation 
 under which they have lived. Unlike the Alsacians, 
 they have never known political freedom and cultural 
 advantages in common with their kin across a frontier 
 forcibly raised to cut them off; unlike the Poles, they 
 have not been compelled to revive the nationalism of 
 an historic past as a means of getting rid of oppression ; 
 unlike the Slavs of the Balkans, their national spirit 
 has not been called into being by the tyranny of a race 
 alien in civilization and ideals, because alien in re- 
 ligion. 
 
 I have among my clippings from French newspapers 
 during the past five years a legion of quotations from 
 Vienna and Rome correspondents, concerning the 
 friction between Austria-Hungary and Italy, and be- 
 tween the Italian-speaking population of Austria and 
 the Viennese government, over the question of dis- 
 tinct Italian nationality of Austro-Hungarian subjects. 
 There have been frontier incidents; there have been 
 demonstrations of Austrian societies visiting Italian 
 cities and Italian societies visiting Trieste; there has 
 been much discussion over the creation of an Italian 
 Faculty of Law at the University of Vienna, and the 
 establishment of an Italian university at Trieste or 
 Vienna; and there have been occasional causes of
 
 ITALIA IRREDENTA 119 
 
 friction between the Austrian Governor of Istria and 
 the Italian residents of the province. But the general 
 impression gained from a study of the incidents in 
 question, and the effort to trace out their aftermath, 
 lead to the conclusion that these irredentist incidents 
 have been magnified in importance. A clever campaign 
 of the French press has endeavoured to detach Italian 
 public opinion from the Triple Alliance by publishing 
 in detail, on every possible occasion, any incident 
 that might show Austrian hostility to the Italian 
 " nation." 
 
 In 1844 Cesare Balbo, in his Speranze d'ltalia — a 
 book that is as important to students of contemporary 
 politics as to those of the Risorgimento — set forth 
 clearly that the hope of Italy for the exclusion of 
 Austria from Lombardy and Venetia was most reason- 
 ably based upon the extension of the Austrian empire 
 eastward through the approaching fall of the Ottoman 
 Empire. Balbo was a man of great vision. He looked 
 beyond the accidental factors in the making of a nation 
 to the great and durable considerations of national 
 existence. He grasped the fact that the insistence 
 of the Teutonic race upon holding purely Italian terri- 
 tories in subjection, and its hostility to the unification 
 of the Italian people, were based upon economic con- 
 siderations. Lombardy and Venetia had been for a 
 thousand years the pathway of German commerce to 
 the Mediterranean. If Austria, Balbo argued, should 
 fall heir to a portion of the European territories of 
 the Ottoman Empire, she would have her outlet to 
 the Mediterranean more advantageously than through 
 the possession of Lombardy and Venetia, Once these 
 Ottoman territories were secured, Austria would be
 
 120 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 ready to cede Lombardy and Venetia to a future 
 united Italy. 
 
 After the unity of Italy had been achieved, and 
 Austria had been driven out of Lombardy and Venetia, 
 she did receive compensation in Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, and, just as Balbo predicted, there was born 
 the Austrian ambition to the succession of Macedonia. 
 That this ambition has not been realized, and that Russia 
 was determined to prevent the attempt to revive it, explains 
 the Austro- Hungarian willingness to fight Russia in the 
 summer of 1914. 
 
 Austria and Hungary, from the very beginning of 
 their existence as a Dual Monarchy, have been caught 
 in the vice between Italian irredentism and Servian 
 irredentism. They have not been able to secure their 
 outlet through Macedonia to the ^Egaean Sea. They 
 have been constantly threatened by their neighbours 
 on the south-east and south-west with exclusion 
 altogether from the Adriatic, their only outlet to the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 From the economic point of view, one cannot but 
 have sympathy with the determination of the Austrians 
 and Hungarians to prevent the disaster which would 
 certainly come to them, if the aspirations of Italian 
 and Servian irredentism were realized. The severity 
 of Hungary against Croatia and the oppression of the 
 Servians in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia by 
 Austria have been dictated by the same reasons which 
 led England and Scotland to attempt to destroy the 
 national spirit of Ireland for so many centuries after 
 they had robbed her of her independence. They could 
 not afford to have their communications by sea 
 threatened by the presence and growth of an indepen-
 
 ITALIA IRREDENTA 121 
 
 dent nation, especially since this nation was believed 
 to be susceptible to the influence of hereditary enemies. 
 
 It has been fortunate for Austria-Hungary that the 
 claims of the irredentists at the head of the Adriatic 
 have overlapped and come into conflict in almost the 
 same way that the claims of Greece and Bulgaria have 
 come into conflict in Macedonia. From time imme- 
 morial the Italian and Greek peoples, owing to their 
 position on peninsulas, have been seafaring. Conse- 
 quently, it is they who have developed the commercial 
 life of ports in the eastern Mediterranean. Every- 
 where along the littoral of the iEgaean and the Adriatic 
 Greeks and Italians have founded and inhabited, up to 
 the present day, the chief ports. But, by the same 
 token, those engaged in commercial and maritime 
 occupations have never been excellent farmers, shep- 
 herds, or woodsmen. So, while the Italians and Greeks 
 have held the predominance in the cities of the littoral, 
 the hinterland has been occupied by other races. Just 
 as the hinterland of Macedonia is very largely Bul- 
 garian, the hinterland of the upper end of the Adriatic 
 is very largely Slavic. Just as the realization of the 
 dreams of Hellenic irredentists would give Greece a 
 narrow strip of coast-line along European Turkey to 
 Constantinople, with one or two of the larger inland 
 commercial cities, while the Slavs would be cut off 
 entirely from the sea, the realization of the dreams of 
 ItaUan irredentists would give to Italy the ports and 
 coast-line of the northern end of the Adriatic, with no 
 hinterland, and the Slavs, Hungarians, and Germans 
 an enormous hinterland with no ports. 
 
 Italian irredentism, so far as the Tyrol goes, is 
 not unreasonable. But its realization in Istria and
 
 122 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 the Adriatic littoral is impracticable. Our modern 
 idea of a state is of people living together in a political 
 union that is to their economic advantage. Only the 
 thoughtless enthusiasts could advocate a change in 
 the map of Europe by which 50,000,000 people would 
 be cut off from the sea to satisfy the national aspira- 
 tions of a few hundred thousand Italians. 
 
 The Italian Society Dante AUghieri has got into 
 the hands of the irredentists, and, before the Tripolitan 
 conquest, was successful in influencing members of 
 Parliament to embarrass the Government by inter- 
 pellations concerning the troubles of Italians who are 
 Austrian subjects. This society has advocated for 
 Italy the adoption of a law so modifying the legislation 
 on naturalization that Italians who emigrate can pre- 
 serve their nationality, even if they acquire that of 
 the countries to which they have gone. It was a 
 curious anticipation of the famous Article XXV. of the 
 German Citizenship Law of 1914. In 1911 a Lombard 
 deputy tried to raise the old cry of alarm concerning 
 German penetration into Italy, and emphasized the 
 necessity of a return to the policy of the Ghibelline 
 motto, " Fuori i Tedeschi " — " Expel the Germans." 
 
 Italian statesmen, however, have never given 
 serious attention to the claims of the irredentists. 
 The late Marquis di San Giulano deplored their sense- 
 less and harmful manifestations. In trying for the 
 impossible, and keeping up an agitation that tended to 
 make friction between Italy and Austria- Hungary, he 
 pointed out that they harmed what were the real and 
 attainable Italian interests. 
 
 The antagonism between Italy and Austria-Hungary 
 has had deeper and more logical and justifiable founda-
 
 ITALIA IRREDENTA 123 
 
 tion than irredentism. The two nations have each 
 been apprehensive about allowing the other to gain 
 control of the Adriatic. Up to 1903 Spezzia was the 
 naval base for the whole of Italy. Since that time 
 Tarento has become one of the first military ports, 
 important fortifications have been placed at Brindisi, 
 Bari, and Ancona, and an elaborate scheme has been 
 drawn up for the defence of Venice. The Venetians 
 have been demanding that Venice become a naval base. 
 
 Italian naval and maritime activity having in- 
 creased in the Adriatic, there has naturally been more 
 intense opposition and rivalry between the two Adriatic 
 Powers over Albania. The spread of Austro-Hun- 
 garian influence has been bitterly fought by the Italian 
 propaganda. This problem was becoming a serious 
 one for the statesmen of the two nations while Albania 
 was still under Turkish rule. Since, at the joint wish 
 of Italy and Austria-Hungary, Albania has been 
 brought into the family of European nations, the 
 question of the equilibrium of the Adriatic has only 
 become more unsettled; for free Albania turned out 
 to be a fiasco. 
 
 If the relations between Austria-Hungary, fighting 
 for life, and her passive ally of the Triple Alliance 
 have become more strained since the European war 
 began, let it be hoped for the future stability of Europe 
 that it has not been because Italian irredentism has 
 gained the upper hand at Rome. For if Italy were to 
 intervene in the war for the purpose of taking away 
 from Austria-Hungary the Adriatic littoral inhabited 
 by Italians, she would be menacing her own future, 
 and that of Switzerland as well . To entertain the hope 
 of taking and keeping Trieste would be folly.
 
 VIII. 
 
 THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 
 
 The River Danube and the Straits leading from the 
 Black Sea to the iEgiean Sea have been the waterways 
 of Europe, whose fortunes have had the greatest 
 influence upon the evolution of international relations 
 during the last half-century. The control of these two 
 waterways, as long as the Ottoman Empire remained 
 strong, was not a question of compelling interest to 
 Europe. It was only when the decline of the Ottoman 
 power began to foreshadow the eventual disappearance 
 of the empire from Europe that nations began to think 
 of the vital importance of the control of these water- 
 ways to the economic life of Europe. 
 
 There is an extensive and interesting literature on 
 the history of the evolution of international law in 
 its relationship to the various questions raised by the 
 necessarily international control of the Danube and 
 the Dardanelles. In a book like this, an adequate 
 statement of the history and work of the Danube Com- 
 mission, and of the various diplomatic negotiations 
 afiecting the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, their 
 freedom of passage, their fortifications, their light- 
 houses, and their life-saving stations, cannot be at- 
 tempted. It is my intention, therefore, to treat these 
 great waterways only in the broader aspect of the im- 
 
 124
 
 THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 125 
 
 portant part that the questions raised by them have 
 played in leading up to the gigantic struggle which 
 foreshadows a new political reconstruction of the 
 world. 
 
 The Danube is navigable from Gennany all the way 
 to the Black Sea. On its banks are the capitals of 
 Austria, Hungary, and Servia. It traverses the entire 
 Austro-Hungarian empire, forms a natural boundary 
 between Austria and Servia, Rumania and Bulgaria, 
 and then turns north across Rumania, to separate 
 Rumania and Russia for a short distance before finally 
 reaching the Black Sea. 
 
 The volume of traffic on the Danube has increased 
 steadily since the Crimean War. It has become the 
 great path of export for Austrian and Hungarian 
 merchandise to the Balkan States, Russia, Turkey, and 
 Persia, and for Servian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian 
 products to Russia and Turkey. The passenger 
 service on the Danube has kept pace with the compe- 
 tition of the railways. Eastward, it is frequently 
 quicker, cheaper, and more convenient than the railway 
 service. You can leave Vienna or Buda-Pesth in the 
 evening, and reach Buda-Pesth or Belgrade in the 
 morning. From Belgrade to the Hungarian and Ru- 
 manian frontier towns the Danube furnishes the 
 shortest route. From Bulgaria to Russia the Danube 
 route, via Somovit and Galatz to Odessa, is in many 
 ways preferable to the through train service. It is 
 by spending days on the Danube that I have come to 
 realize how vital the river is to freight and passenger 
 communications between Austria- Hungary, the Balkan 
 states, and Russia. Travel gives life and meaning 
 to statistics. The Danube interprets itself.
 
 126 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 The Congresses of Paris and Berlin carefully con- 
 sidered the entrance of the Danube question into 
 international life through the enfranchisement of the 
 Balkan states. International laws, administered by 
 an international commission, govern the Danube. It 
 is a neutral waterway. Problems similar to those of 
 the Scheldt have arisen, however, in the present war 
 between Austria-Hungary and Servia. If Rumania 
 and Bulgaria should join in the European war, no 
 matter on which side they should fight, the whole 
 Danube question would become further complicated. 
 When war actually breaks out, the rulings of inter- 
 national law concerning neutrality are invariably 
 violated. States act according to their own interests. 
 
 In its larger European aspect, the Danube, as an 
 international waterway, is dependent upon the Dar- 
 danelles. Were Rumania to close the Danube to 
 navigation, or were she to preserve its neutrality, she 
 would only be preventing or assisting the commerce 
 of the riverain states with the Black Sea. Unob- 
 structed passage to the outside world for Danube 
 commerce depends upon the control of the outlet from 
 the Black Sea to the iEgaean Sea. The Hungarian 
 and Servian peasant looks beyond his own great river 
 to the narrow passage from the Sea of Marmora. The 
 question of the Danube is subordinated to the question 
 of the Dardanelles. 
 
 That the passage from the Black Sea to the outside 
 world remain open and secure from sudden stoppage 
 or constant menace is of vital importance to the 
 riverain Danube states, Austria-Hungary and Servia, 
 to the states bordering the Black Sea, Russia, Rumania, 
 and Turkey, and to Persia, whose nearest communica-
 
 THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 127 
 
 tions with Europe are by way of the Black Sea. 
 Austria-Hungary, however, has another outlet through 
 the Adriatic, Servia is pressing towards the Adriatic 
 and the ^Egsean, Bulgaria has recently secured an 
 iEgaean littoral, Persia is dependent upon Russia, and 
 Turkey holds the straits. There remain Russia and 
 Rumania, to whom the question of the Dardanelles 
 is a matter of life and death. 
 
 The international position of Rumania is most un- 
 fortunate. She must make common cause with Ger- 
 manic Europe or with Turkey, to prevent her only 
 waterway to the outside world from falling into the 
 hands of Russia, or she must ally herself with Russia, 
 and, by adding Bukovina and Transylvania, increase 
 her numbers to the point where she can hope to resist 
 the tide of Slavs around her. In discussing the 
 neutrality of Rumania, the French and British press 
 have given too much emphasis to the loyalty of King 
 Carol for the Hohenzollern family, of which he was a 
 member, as the cause of the failure of Rumania to join 
 the enemies of the Germanic Powers, and to the hope 
 that the death of the sovereign who made Rumania 
 may result in a favourable change in the policy of the 
 Bukarest Cabinet. The new sovereign, King Ferdi- 
 nand, is also a Hohenzollern. The hesitation of Ru- 
 mania has not been, and is not, primarily because of 
 the family ties of her rulers. The Rumanians in 
 Hungary may call for union with their enfranchised 
 brethren, just as the Italians in Austria may call for 
 union with the Italians who were liberated in 1859 
 and 1866. But is irredentism the only factor in 
 influencing the policy of Italy and Rumania ? For 
 Rumania, at l^ast, the hope of acquiring Transj^lvania
 
 128 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 and Bukovina in the international settlement following 
 the war is balanced by the apprehension of seeing 
 Russia at the Dardanelles. 
 
 The Dardanelles has been the scene of struggles for 
 commercial supremacy since the days of the Pelopon- 
 nesian wars. It was in the Dardanelles that the great 
 battle was fought which brought about the downfall 
 of Athenian hegemony. It was over the question of 
 fortifying the island of Tenedos that Venice and Genoa 
 in the latter half of the fourteenth century fought the 
 war during which the Genoese occupation of Chioggia 
 nearly caused the destruction of Venice. Then came 
 the Ottoman occupation to put a stop to international 
 jealousies until modern times. 
 
 The political development of Russia from Moscow 
 has been a consistent forward march towards ocean 
 waterways. There have been six possible outlets for 
 Russia: the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the White Sea, 
 the Yellow Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic. 
 At different periods of her history Russia has expended 
 her efforts continuously in these various directions. 
 To reach the Baltic, Peter the Great built Petrograd. 
 One has to stand on the Kremlin on a beautiful summer 
 day and look out over the sacred city of the Russians 
 to grasp the fulness of the sacrifice and the marvellous 
 daring of the man who abandoned Moscow to build 
 another capital on piles driven into dreary salt marches. 
 It was for the sea and contact with the outside world ! 
 To reach the Pacific Ocean, Russia patiently conquered 
 the former empire of the Mongols, steppe by steppe, 
 and when she thought the moment of realization had 
 arrived, did not hesitate to throw a band of steel across 
 the continent of Asia. To reach the Persian Gulf, she
 
 THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 129 
 
 crossed the Caucasus and launched her ships upon the 
 Caspian Sea. To reach the Black Sea, she broke the 
 military power of the houses of Jagello and Osman, 
 building laboriously upon the ruins of Poland and the 
 Ottoman Empire. Is it to reach the Adriatic that her 
 forces are now before Przemysl ? 
 
 In spite of her struggles through three centuries, 
 Russia is still land-locked. The ice is an insurmount- 
 able barrier to freedom of exit from the White Sea, her 
 only undisputed outlet. Japan has arisen to shatter 
 the dreams of the future of Port Dalny, and make 
 useless the sacrifices to gain the Pacific. The control 
 of Germany to the exit from the Baltic Sea has been 
 strengthened in recent years by the construction and 
 fortification of the Kiel Canal, The Persian Gulf has 
 been given up by the accord of 1907 with Great Britain. 
 There has remained what has always been the strongest 
 hope, and the one for the realization of which Russia 
 has made consistent and stupendous efforts. 
 
 Radetsky, in his memoirs, has summed up the atti- 
 tude of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire in words 
 that give the key to the whole Eastern Question 
 during the past century : 
 
 Owing to her geographical position, Russia is the 
 national and eternal enemy of Turkey. . . . Russia 
 must therefore do all she can to take possession of 
 Constantinople, for its possession alone will grant to her 
 the necessary security and territorial completeness." 
 
 Three times during the nineteenth century Russia 
 endeavoured to destroy the Ottoman Empire in 
 Europe so that she might gain control of the exit to 
 the iEgaean Sea. In 1828 her armies reached Adri- 
 anople, and half a century later the suburbs of Con- 
 
 9
 
 130 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 stantinople. In both instances, especially the second, 
 it was the opposition of Great Britain that forced 
 Russia to make peace without having attained her end. 
 In 1854 France and Italy joined Great Britain in the 
 invasion of the Crimea to preserve the integrity of the 
 Ottoman Empire, In 1856, at the Congress of Paris, 
 Russia saw the western Powers uphold the principle 
 that the Czar had no right to sovereignty even on the 
 Black Sea, a half of which his ancestors had wrested 
 from the Turks. It was no use for Russia to plead that 
 she had " special interests " in her own territorial 
 waters. The Black Sea was neutralized. The ex- 
 pression, " selon nos convenances etinterets," was under- 
 stood by Great Britain to refer only to British interests ! 
 It was by right of might that Russia was held in check. 
 In 1870 Bismarck purchased the neutrality of Russia 
 in his war against France by agreeing to Russia's 
 denunciation of the Paris treaty clauses, which held her 
 impotent in the Black Sea. But again, in 1878, Great 
 Britain interfered to bottle up Russia. Since then 
 the Russian navy has been a prisoner in the Black Sea. 
 Will it continue to be so after the war of 1914 ? 
 
 Just when Ottoman power was receding, the rapid 
 development of steam-power began to make southern 
 Russia the bread-basket of Europe. Steam machinery 
 increased the yield of these vast and rich lands, steam 
 railways enabled the farmers to send their harvests 
 to Black Sea ports, and steamships made possible the 
 distribution of the harvests throughout Europe. I 
 used to live on the Bosphorus, and from my study- 
 window I could see every day the never-ceasing pro- 
 cession of grain-ships of all nations going to and coming 
 from the Black Sea. In May, 1912, when the Dar-
 
 THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 131 
 
 dandles were closed for a month during the Italian 
 war, 200 steamships lay at anchor in the harbour of 
 Constantinople. 
 
 Another influence whose importance cannot be over- 
 estimated has constantly turned the eyes of Russians 
 towards Constantinople. Slavs are idealists. For an 
 ideal one makes sacrifices that material considerations 
 do not call forth. To the Russians, Constantinople 
 is Tsarigrad, the city of the emperor. It is from Con- 
 stantinople that the Russians received their religion. 
 Their civilization is imbued with the spirit of By- 
 zantium. Just as one sees in the Polish language the 
 influence of Latin in the construction of the sentence, 
 one sees in the kindred Russian tongue the influence of 
 Greek. I have frequently been struck with the close 
 and vital relationship between Constantinople and 
 Russia during the period of the development of the 
 Russian nation. Now that Russia seems to he entering 
 upon a period of national awakening, the sentiment is 
 bound to he irresistible among the Russians that they are 
 the rightful inheritors of the Eastern Empire, eclipsed 
 for so many centuries by the shadow of Islam, and now 
 about to he born again. 
 
 On a July evening in 1908, when the constitutional 
 revolution in Turkey was beginning to occupy the atten- 
 tion of Europe, I sat with my wife in the winter garden 
 of the Grand Hotel in Paris. We were listening to 
 a charming and intelligent Russian gentleman explain- 
 ing to us the aims of the political parties in the Duma 
 of 1907. A waiter came to tell us that our baggage 
 was ready. "Where are you going?" asked the 
 Russian. " To Constantinople," we answered. An 
 expression of wistful sadness or joy — you can never
 
 132 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 tell which it is meant to be with a Russian — came 
 across his face. " Constantinople !" he murmured, 
 more to himself than to us. " This revolution will 
 fail. You will see. For we must come into our own." 
 
 The political aspect of the question of the Darda- 
 nelles has changed greatly since Great Britain and 
 France fought one war with Russia, and Great Britain 
 stood ready to fight a second, in order to prevent this 
 passage from falling into Russian hands. 
 
 Almost immediately after the crisis of San Stefano, 
 and the resulting revision of the Russo-Turkish treaty 
 at Berlin, the interests of Great Britain were diverted 
 from the north-east to the south-east Mediterranean. 
 She decided that her permanent route to India was 
 through the Suez Canal, and made it secure by getting 
 possession of the majority of the shares of the Canal 
 and by seizing Egypt. The Bulgarians began to show 
 themselves lacking in the expected docility towards 
 their liberator. British diplomats realized that they 
 had been fearing what did not happen. They began 
 to lose interest in the Dardanelles. This loss of in- 
 terest in the question of the straits as a vital factor 
 in their world interests has grown so complete in recent 
 years that Russia has no reason to anticipate another 
 visit of the British fleet to Besica Bay if — ■ — I re- 
 frain from prophesying. It is safe to say, however, 
 that London has forgotten Mohammed Ali, the Crimea, 
 and the Princes' Islands, while the traditions of Unkiar 
 Skelessi are still dominating the foreign policy of 
 Petrograd. 
 
 For, while the future of the Dardanelles has come 
 to mean less to Great Britain, it means more than ever 
 to Russia. Russia has been turned back from the
 
 THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES 133 
 
 Pacific. The loss of Manchuria in the war with Japan 
 caused her once again to cast her eyes upon the outlet 
 to the Mediterranean. To the increase in her wheat 
 trade has been added also the development of the 
 petroleum trade from the Caucasus wells. Since the 
 agreement for the partition of Persia with Great Britain 
 in 1907, and the mutual " hands off " accord with 
 Germany at Potsdam in 1910, the expectations of a 
 brilliant Russian future for northern Persia and the 
 Armenian and Kurdish corner of Asiatic Turkey have 
 been great. 
 
 Since the Congress of Berlin Germany has come 
 into the place of Great Britain as the enemy who 
 would keep Russia from finding the ^gaean Sea. The 
 growth of German interests at Constantinople and 
 Asia Minor has become the India — in anticipation — of 
 Germany. When Russia, after her ill-fated venture 
 in the Far East, turned her efforts once more towards 
 the Balkan peninsula, it began to dawn upon her 
 that the Drang nach Osten might prove a menace 
 to her control of the Dardanelles, fully as great as was 
 formerly the British fetish of the integrity of the Otto- 
 man Empire to keep open the route to India. Diplo- 
 macy endeavoured to ward off the inevitable struggle. 
 But the Balkan wars created a new situation that 
 broke rudely the accords of Skiernewice and Potsdam. 
 Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and Germany in Asia 
 Minor became the nightmare of Russia.
 
 IX. 
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SOUTH SLAVS 
 
 It has often been predicted in recent years that the 
 union between Austria and Hungary would be broken 
 by internal troubles. Hungary has been credited with 
 desiring to cut loose from Austria, The frequent and 
 serious quarrels between the members of the Dual 
 Monarchy have caused many a wiseacre to shake his 
 head and say: "The union will not outlive Franz 
 Josef !" But the Austro-Hungarian Empire has been 
 founded upon sound political and economic principles, 
 which far transcend a single life or a dynasty. Austrians 
 and Hungarians may be unwilling yoke-fellows. But 
 they know that if they do not pull together, they 
 cannot pull at all. They have too many Slavs around 
 them. 
 
 The principle upon which Austrians and Hungarians 
 have founded a Dual Monarchy is the old Latin proverb 
 divide et impera. In the Empire Austrians and Hun- 
 garians are in the minority. In each kingdom, by 
 dividing the Slavs cleverly between them, they hold 
 the upper hand. The German race is, therefore, the 
 dominant race in Austria, and the Hungarian race is 
 the dominant race in Hungary. 
 
 If one looks at the map, and studies the division of 
 the Empire, he will readily see that it is much more 
 
 134
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 135 
 
 durably constructed than he would have reason to 
 believe from statistics of the population. The Slavic 
 question in the Dual Monarchy is not how many Slavs 
 of kindred races are to he found in Austria- Hungary , hut 
 how they are placed i?i relationship to each other and to 
 neighhouring States. It is a question of geography 
 rather than of census. The student needs a map 
 instead of columns of figures. 
 
 In only one place is the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 very weak, and that is in the south. The sole port 
 for the thirty millions of Austria is Trieste. To 
 reach Trieste one passes through a band of Slavic terri- 
 tory, and Trieste itself is more Italian than German. 
 The sole port of Hungary is Fiume. To reach Fiume 
 one passes through a band of Slavic territory, and 
 there are hardly any Hungarians in Fiume itself. The 
 Slavs which cut off Fiume from Hungary, and the 
 Slavs of the Dalmatian coast and of all Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, belong to the same family. They speak 
 practically the same language as the Servians and 
 Montenegrins. 
 
 The Hungarians, then, have exactly the same interest 
 as the Austrians in every move that has been made 
 since the proclamation of the constitution of Turkey 
 to prevent the foundation of a strong, independent 
 Servian State on the confines of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire, and to prevent the Slavs from reaching the 
 Adriatic Sea. 
 
 Austria has not been necessarily influenced in her 
 attitude towards the Balkan problem by Germany. 
 Although her Drang nach Osten is frequently inter- 
 preted as a part of the pan-Germanic movement, the 
 Germans of Austria have needed no German sentiment
 
 136 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 and no German prompting to arrive at their point of 
 view in regard to the Balkan nationalities. It must be 
 clearly kept in mind that the convention of Reichstadt 
 in 1876, which was the beginning of Austria's con- 
 sistent policy towards the Balkan Peninsula, was signed 
 before the alliance with Germany, that it was the con- 
 ception of a Hungarian statesman, and that the occu- 
 pation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had nothing whatever 
 to do with pan-Germanism. It was a measure of self- 
 protection to prevent these remote provinces of Turkey 
 from forming a political union with Servia, should the 
 Russian arms intervening on behalf of the South Slavs 
 against Turkey prove successful. The extension of 
 sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was to 
 prevent the constitutional regime from trying to 
 weaken the hold of Austria-Hungary upon these pro- 
 vinces. Austria- Hungary certainly would have pre- 
 ferred the more comfortable status of an occupation 
 to the legal adoption of a Reichsland. But she could 
 take no chances with the Young Turks. Her military 
 occupation of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar was inspired 
 as much by the necessity of preventing the union of 
 Montenegro and Servia as by the desire to provide for 
 a future railway extension to Salonika. 
 
 Hungary has had to grapple with two Balkan prob- 
 lems — the rise of Rumania and the rise of Servia. She 
 has had within her kingdom several million Rumanian 
 subjects and several million South Slavic subjects. 
 Most of her Rumanians, however, have been separated 
 from Rumania by the natural barrier of the Car- 
 pathian Mountains, and have not found their union 
 with Hungary to their disadvantage. For the Ru- 
 manians of Hungary enjoy through Buda-Pesth and
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 137 
 
 Fiume a better outlet to the markets of the world, and a 
 cheaper haul, than they would find through Rumania. 
 They have benefited greatly by their economic union 
 with Hungary. It is not the same with the Croatians. 
 They are situated between Buda-Pesth and the Adriatic. 
 They have a natural river outlet to the Danube. They 
 are not separated by physical barriers from their 
 brothers of race and language in Servia, Bosnia and 
 Dalmatia. Were they to separate from Hungary they 
 would not find their economic position in any way 
 jeopardized. 
 
 Many South Slavs have advocated a trialism to 
 replace the present dualism. They have claimed that 
 the most critical problems of the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire could be solved in this way. Added to 
 Hungary and Austria, there could be a Servian king- 
 dom, perhaps enlarged by the inclusion of independent 
 Servia and Montenegro, whose crown could be worn by 
 the Hapsburg ruler. 
 
 But this solution has never found favour, simple and 
 attractive though it sounds on first sight, with either 
 Hungarians or Austrians. For it would mean the 
 cutting off of both kingdoms from the sea. The 
 Hungarians would be altogether land-locked, and sur- 
 rounded on all sides by alien races. Austria would be 
 forced into hopeless economic dependence upon Ger- 
 many. The Germans of Austria, and the Hungarians 
 of Hungary, have felt that their national existence 
 depended upon keeping the South Slavs in political sub- 
 jection, and upon repressing mercilessly any evidences 
 of Italian irredentism upon the littoral of the Adriatic. 
 ItaHan irredentism is treated in another place. The 
 repressions of national aspirations among the South
 
 138 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Slavs, which interest us here, has been the corner-stone 
 of Austro-Hungarian poHcy in the Balkans. For 
 Hungary it has also been an internal question in her 
 relationship with Croatia, 
 
 The Serbo-Croatian movement in southern Hungary 
 has been repressed by Hungary with the same bitter- 
 ness and lack of success that have attended the attempts 
 to stifle national aspirations elsewhere in Europe. No 
 weapon has been left unused in fighting nationalism in 
 Croatia, Official corruption, bribery, manipulation of 
 judges, imprisonment without trial, military despotism, 
 gerrymandering, electoral intimidation — this has been 
 for years, and is still, the daily record in Croatia. If 
 there were a Slavic Silvio Pellico,the world would know 
 that the Ministers of the aged Franz Josef are not very 
 different from the Ministers of the young Franz Josef, 
 who crushed the Milanese and tracked Garibaldi like a 
 beast. Radetzkys and Gorzkowskis are still wearing 
 Austrian livery. To Austria and Hungary, Salonika 
 and Macedonia may have been the dream. But 
 Trieste, Fiume, and Dalmatia have always been the 
 realities. If Hungary took her heel off the neck of the 
 Croatians, Buda-Pesth might become another Belgrade 
 and Hungary another Servia — land-locked, with no 
 other outlet than the Danube. This does not excuse, 
 but it explains. In this world the battle is to the 
 strong. The survival of the fittest is a historical as 
 well as a biological fact. 
 
 In spite of their juxtaposition, the Serbo-Croats have 
 never been able to unite. There have been more reasons 
 for this than their political separation. They are 
 divided in religion. The Servians are Orthodox, and 
 the Croatians and Dalmatians Catholic, In Bosnia
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 139 
 
 and Macedonia, the race adheres to both confessions, 
 though in majority Orthodox, and has also a strong 
 Mohammedan element. The Orthodox Servians of 
 Servia use the Cyrillic alphabet, and the Catholic 
 Croatians and Dalmatians of Austria- Hungary the 
 Latin alphabet. 
 
 Until the recent Balkan wars, the Croatians and 
 Dalmatians considered themselves a much superior 
 branch of the race to the Servians. They have certainly 
 enjoyed a superior education and demonstrated a 
 superior civilization. The probable reason for this is 
 that they did not have the misfortune to be for centuries 
 under the Ottoman yoke. The Croatians have never 
 been willing to play understudy to the Servians. 
 Agram has considered itself the centre of the Serbo- 
 Croat movement rather than Belgrade. It is a far 
 more beautiful and modern city than Belgrade. Few 
 cities of all Europe of its size can equal Agram for 
 architecture, for municipal works, and for keen, stimu- 
 lating intellectual life. Its University is the foyer of 
 Serbo-Croat nationalism, and of risorgimento literature. 
 It was here that the one Roman Bishop of the world, 
 who dared to speak openly in the Vatican Council of 
 1870 against the doctrine of Papal Infallibility and 
 remain within the Church, gave to his people the 
 prophetic message that nationality transcended creeds. 
 Here also another Catholic priest taught the oneness 
 of Servians and Croatians in language and history, and 
 proved by scholarly research, which is universally 
 admired, that Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia formed 
 a triune kingdom, whose juridic union with the Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire was wholly personal connection 
 with the Hapsburg crown, and had never been sub-
 
 140 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 jection to the Magyar. The Hungarians, during the 
 past few years of bitterest persecution at Agram, have 
 not been able to drive away the ghosts of Strossmayer 
 and Racki. In Croatia the pen has proved mightier 
 than the sword. 
 
 Until recently Austria-Hungary has not felt uneasy 
 about the relationship between the Croatians and the 
 Servians of the independent kingdom. But there has 
 never been a minute since the annexation of 1908 that 
 the statesmen of the Ballplatz have not been nervous 
 about the Servian propaganda in Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina. To keep Catholic Croatians and Orthodox 
 Servians in antagonism with each other and with the 
 Moslems, to prevent the education and economic eman- 
 cipation of the Orthodox peasants, and to introduce 
 German colonists and German industrial enterprises 
 everywhere, has been the Austro-Hungarian pro- 
 gramme. 
 
 Vienna has used the Catholic Church and the propa- 
 ganda of Catholic missions for dividing the Orthodox 
 Servians in Bosnia from their Croatian brothers of the 
 Catholic rite. Missionaries give every encouragement 
 to Servians to desert the Orthodox Church. In the 
 greater part of Bosnia, the Government has made it 
 absolutely impossible for a child to receive an education 
 elsewhere than in the Catholic schools. There are only 
 268 schools supported by the Government, of which one- 
 tenth are placed in such a way that they serve exclu- 
 sively other populations. The Bosnian budget provides 
 four times as much money for the maintenance of the 
 gendarmerie as for public schools. 
 
 Moslem law provides that all conquered land belongs 
 to the Khalif. He farms it out in annual, life, or
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 141 
 
 hereditary grants. In the Ottoman conquest of the 
 Balkan peninsula, the territories acquired were 
 granted to successful soldiers on a basis which pro- 
 vided for a feudal army. The feudal proprietors, or 
 beys, left the land to the peasants who occupied it, in 
 consideration of an annual rental of a third of the yield 
 of the land. The peasants had in addition to pay their 
 tenth to the tax-collectors of the Sultan. In territories 
 that were on the borders of the Ottoman Empire, like 
 Bosnia and Albania, the lands were largely retained by 
 their former proprietors, who became Moslems. So the 
 landed aristocracy remained indigenous. 
 
 The lot of the peasants in Bosnia, who were largely 
 Orthodox Servians, was not intolerable under Turkish 
 rule, except when Moslem fanaticism was aroused by 
 Christian separatist propagandas. Austria-Hungary 
 claimed, however, that her occupation of the province 
 was a mccisure dictated by humanity to ameliorate 
 the lot of the enslaved Christians. But the Austrian 
 administration has accomplished just the opposite. 
 The new Government from the beginning supported its 
 authority upon the Moslem landowners, upon whose 
 goodwill they were dependent to prevent the awaken- 
 ing of national feeling among the peasants. Vienna 
 was more complacent in overlooking abuses of the beys 
 than had been Constantinople. For the Turks held 
 their beys in check when exactions grew too bad. 
 The Sublime Porte was afraid of giving an excuse for 
 Christian intervention. But the Austrians encouraged 
 the exactions of the beys in order to keep in abject 
 subjection the Servian peasant population. 
 
 From the first moment of the Austro-Hungarian 
 occupation, the peasants found that they would no
 
 142 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 longer enjoy undisturbed possession of their lands. 
 The exodus of Mohammedan Bosnians, who, as we have 
 seen elsewhere, were urged to follow the Ottoman flag, 
 gave the Germans the opportunity of settling colonists 
 on the vacated lands. This process of colonization was 
 afterwards pursued to the detriment of the indigenous 
 Christian population. Ernst Haeckel, the great 
 biologist, once said in a lecture at Jena that " the 
 work of the German people to assure and develop 
 civilization gives it the right to occupy the Balkans, 
 Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and to exclude 
 from these countries the races actually occupying them, 
 which are powerless and incapable." This statement, 
 publicly made before a body of distinguished German 
 thinkers, reveals the real ulterior ideal of the Drang 
 nach Osten. Professor Wirth, dealing specifically with 
 present possibilities, stated that the policy of Austria- 
 Hungary in Bosnia must be to keep the peasantry in 
 slavery and, as much as possible, to encourage them 
 by oppression to emigrate. The reason given for this 
 was: " To render powerful the Bosnian peasant is to 
 render powerful the Servian people : which would he the 
 suicide of Germany." Can we not see from this how 
 public sentiment in Germany has stood behind the 
 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia ? 
 
 From 1890 to 1914 the theory of Haeckel and the 
 advice of Wirth have been followed by the Austrian 
 functionaries in Bosnia. No stone has been left un- 
 turned to drive the peasants from their lands. Right 
 of inheritance has been suppressed, a tax-collector has 
 been introduced between the hey and his peasants, the 
 taxes have been raised in many cases arbitrarily to the 
 point where the peasants have been compelled to
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 143 
 
 abandon their land. To German immigrants have been 
 given communal lands which were necessary to the 
 peasants for pasturage, and the forests where their 
 swine fed on acorns. 
 
 The population of Bosnia hardly surpasses thirty -five 
 inhabitants to the kilometre. The total population 
 is about 2,000,000, of whom 800,000 are Orthodox, 
 600,000 Moslem, and 500,000 Catholic. But practically 
 all of this population — except 100,000 who are Jews, 
 Protestants, and other German immigrants — is Servian 
 or Servian-speaking. There are 35,000 Germans, as 
 opposed to 1,800,000 Slavs. And yet German is the 
 language of the administration, and the only language of 
 the railways and posts and telegraphs, which in Bosnia 
 have not ceased to be under the control of the military 
 government. Many functionaries after thirty years 
 of service in Bosnia do not know the language of the 
 country. Two German newspapers are supported at 
 the expense of the public budget to attack indigenous 
 elements. In German schools pupils are taught the 
 history of Germany, but in Slavic schools the history 
 of the South Slavs is excluded from the curriculum. 
 There are fourteen schools for 10,000 Germans, and 
 only one school for every 6,000 Slavs.* 
 
 * The von Kallay who, as Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
 so bitterly fought the rise of national feeling among the 
 Servians through the teaching in their schools, is the same 
 von Kallay who, in his earlier days, wrote a scholarly history 
 of Servia, which I have had occasion to use, and have found 
 admirably written and accurate in detail. As a research 
 scholar, von Kallay believed that Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats 
 were the same race, and supported this thesis. As an Austrian 
 official, he disclaimed such dangerous teaching by placing the 
 ban upon his own book, which he forbade to b^ introduced into 
 the provinces of which he was governor !
 
 144 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 In the administration of Bosnia, only 31 out of 322 
 functionaries are Servians, only 12 out of 125 pro- 
 fessors of lyceums, only 31 out of 237 judges and 
 magistrates. And yet the Orthodox Servians form 
 44 per cent, of the population. The young Bosnians 
 who have graduated from the Austro-Hungarian Uni- 
 versities find themselves excluded from public life. 
 Turning to commercial life, they find 80 per cent, of 
 the large industries controlled by German capital and 
 managed exclusively by Germans. Turning to agri- 
 culture, they find economic misery and hopeless ignor- 
 ance among the peasants of their race, and every effort 
 made by the Government to prevent the bettering of 
 their lot. Turning to journalism and public-speaking 
 to work for their race, they find an unreasoning censor- 
 ship and a law against assemblies. As one of them 
 expressed it to me, " We must either cease to be Slavs 
 or become revolutionaries." 
 
 Did Austria- Hungary need to look to Servian propa- 
 ganda, to influences from the outside, to find the cause 
 of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand ? Political 
 assassinations were not new in the South Slavic prov- 
 inces of the Monarchy. A young Bosnian student 
 attempted to assassinate the Governor of Bosnia at 
 Sarajevo on June 6, 1910, at the time of the inaugura- 
 tion of the Bosnian Sahor (Diet). Two years later the 
 Royal Commissioner in Croatia was the object of an 
 attempt at assassination by a Bosnian at Agram. In 
 September of the same year a Croatian student shot 
 at the Ban of Croatia. The same Ban, Skerletz, was 
 attacked again at Agram by another young Croatian 
 on August 18, 1913. These assassinations preceded 
 those of the Archduke and his wife. They were all
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 145 
 
 committed by students of Austro-Hungarian nation- 
 ality. Only the last one had ever been in Servia. 
 
 In theory Bosnia has had since February 20, 1910, 
 a Constitution with a deliberative Assembly. But the 
 Sabor can discuss no projects of law that have not been 
 proposed by the two masters. Once voted, a law has 
 to pass the double veto of Vienna and Buda-Pesth. 
 As if this were not enough, the Viennese bureaucracy 
 has so arranged the qualification of the electorate and 
 the electoral laws that the suffrage does not represent 
 the country. Then, too, the Constitution decides 
 arbitrarily that the membership of the Sabor must be 
 divided according to religions, one Jew, sixteen 
 Catholics, twenty-four Moslems, and thirty-one Ortho- 
 dox. The Government has reserved for itself the 
 right of naming twenty members ! The Constitution 
 provides for individual liberty, the inviolability of 
 one's home, liberty of the Press and speech, and 
 secrecy of letters and telegrams. This enlightened 
 measure of the Emperor was heralded to the world. 
 But of course there was the joker, Article 20. Vienna 
 held the highest card ! In case of menace to the 
 public safety, all public and private rights may be 
 suspended by a word from Vienna. Public safety 
 always being menaced in Bosnia, the Constitution is 
 perpetually suspended. The Government even goes 
 as far as to prosecute Deputies for their speeches in 
 Parliament. Newspapers are continually censored. 
 Their telegraphic news from Vienna and Buda-Pesth is 
 suppressed without reason. Particularly severe fines 
 — sometimes gaol sentences — are passed upon offend- 
 ing journalists. 
 
 Is it necessarily because of instigation and propa 
 
 10
 
 146 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 ganda from Belgrade that of the three Servian political 
 parties in Bosnia two (the Narod and the Otachbina) 
 are closely allied to the pan-Servian society Narodna 
 Obrana, and that these two parties openly support the 
 Separatist movement ? 
 
 In Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia in 1914 the bureau- 
 cracy of Vienna has been engaged in the same pro- 
 cess of repression and police persecution as in Italy 
 during the half century from 1815 to the liberation of 
 Italy. The local constitutions have been suspended 
 everywhere. Why have the Austrians, in spite of the 
 lessons of the beginning of the present reign, dared to 
 tempt Providence in exactly the same way after the 
 Golden Jubilee ? 
 
 The victories of the Allies in the Balkans were a 
 terrible blow to Austria-Hungary. Not only was her 
 dream of reaching the iEgsean Sea through the Sandjak 
 of Novi Bazar and Macedonia shattered by the Greek 
 occupation of Salonika, but the aggrandizement of 
 Servia, caused by a successful war, threatened to have 
 a serious effect upon the fortunes of the Empire. The 
 appearance of the Servians on the Adriatic would mean 
 really the extension of Russian influence through 
 Bulgaria and Servia to the Austrian and Italian 
 private lake, and would cut off Austria for ever 
 from her economic outlet to the ^gaean. But there 
 was more than this to cause alarm both in Austria 
 and in Hungary. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and 
 Dalmatia — would they remain loyal to the Empire, if 
 once they came under the spell of the idea of Greater 
 Servia ? Leaving Russia entirely out of the calcula- 
 tion, an independent, self-reliant, and enlarged Servia, 
 extending towards the Adriatic and .^gaean Seas, if
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 147 
 
 not actually reaching it — would it not be, as Professor 
 Wirth declared, " the suicide of Germany "? The 
 statesmen of the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg Empires 
 determined that it should not occur. 
 
 From the very moment that the Servian armies 
 drove the Turks before them, Austria-Hungary began 
 to act the bully against Servia. The Austrian Consuls 
 at Prisrend and Mitrovitza were made the first cause of 
 Austrian interference. It was pretended that Herr 
 Prochaska had been massacred and mutilated at 
 Prisrend, and that the life of Herr Tahy had been 
 threatened, so that he was forced to flee for safety from 
 Mitrovitza. A formal inquest showed that the first of 
 these Consuls was safe, and that the trouble had been 
 merely a discussion between Servian officers and Herr 
 Prochaska over some fleeing Albanians who had 
 taken refuge in the Consulate. In the other case, 
 there seemed to be no ground at all for complaint. 
 But on January 15, 19 13, the Servians acceded to the 
 demand of Austria that reparation be granted for the 
 Prisrend incident. A company of Servian soldiers 
 saluted the Austro-Hungarian flag as Consul Prochaska 
 solemnly raised it. This incident seems too petty to 
 mention, but in that part of the world and at that 
 moment we thought it very serious. For it showed 
 how anxious Austria- Hungary was to pick a quarrel 
 with Servia in the midst of the Balkan War. 
 
 Two other incidents of an even more serious 
 character immediately followed. Servia refused the 
 Austrian demand that Durazzo be evacuated, support- 
 ing herself by the hope that Russia would intervene. 
 During December and January, deluded by unofficial 
 representations of Russian public sentiment and by
 
 148 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 demonstrations against Austria-Hungary in Moscow 
 and Petrograd, Servia held out. It was only when she 
 saw that Russian support was not forthcoming that she 
 withdrew from Durazzo. The international situation 
 during January, 1913, was similar to that during July, 
 1914, and the cause of the crisis was practically the 
 same. In both cases Servia climbed down, but the 
 second time Austria-Hungary and Germany deter- 
 mined to provoke the war which they believed would 
 be the end of Servia and the destruction of Russia's 
 power to influence the political evolution of the Balkan 
 peninsula. 
 
 After Durazzo, it was Scutari. Servia for the third 
 time bowed before the will of Austria. 
 
 The next move against Servia was the annexation 
 on May 12, 1913, of the little island of Ada-Kaleh on 
 the Danube, which had curiously enough remained 
 Turkish property after the Treaty of Berlin. It had 
 actually been forgotten at that time. This island, 
 situated in front of Orsova, would have given Servia a 
 splendid strategic position at the mouth of the river. 
 Austria-Hungary anticipated the Treaty of London. 
 
 It was to reduce Servia that secret encouragement 
 was given to Bulgaria to provoke the second Balkan 
 War. There is no doubt now as to the role of the 
 Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia in allowing this 
 crisis to be precipitated. 
 
 Had Germany been willing to stand behind her at 
 Bukarest, Austria- Hungary would have prevented the 
 signing of the treaty between the Balkan States by 
 presenting an ultimatum to Servia. But Germany did 
 not seem to be ready. The reason commonly given 
 that Emperor William did not want to embarrass King
 
 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SLAVS 149 
 
 Carol of Rumania, a prince of his own house, and his 
 brother-in-law, the King of Greece, does not seem 
 credible. In view of the events that have happened 
 since, the signing of the Treaty of Bukarest is a mystery 
 not yet cleared up. 
 
 The second Balkan War acted as a boomerang to 
 Austria- Hungary. It increased tremendously the 
 prestige of Servia abroad, and the confidence of the 
 Servians in themselves. The weakness of the 
 Turkish armies in the first Balkan War had been so 
 great that Servia herself had hardly considered it a 
 fair test of her military strength. To have measured 
 arms successfully with Bulgaria was worth as much to 
 Servia as the territory that she gained. 
 
 We have seen how strained were the relationships of 
 Austria-Hungary as separate kingdoms and together 
 as an Empire in their relationship with their South 
 Slavic subjects. The Croatians, the Dalmatians, and 
 a major portion of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herze- 
 govina were Servian in language and sympathies. 
 They had never thought of political union with Servia, 
 the petty kingdom which had allowed its rulers to be 
 assassinated, and which seemed to be insignificant in 
 comparison with the powerful and brilliant country of 
 which they would not have been unwilling, if allowed 
 real self-government, to remain a part. But a large 
 and glorified Servia, with an increased territory 
 and a well-earned and brilliant military reputation — 
 would this prove an attraction to win away the dis- 
 satisfied subjects of the Dual Monarchy ? 
 
 Austria-Hungary, by the annexation of Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina, had taken to herself more Servians in a 
 compact mass than she could well assimilate. They
 
 150 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 were not scattered and separated geographically like 
 her other Slavic subjects. It was a danger from the 
 beginning. After the Balkan Wars, it became an 
 imminent peril . 
 
 The death sentence of Servia was decided by the 
 statesmen of Austria-Hungary and Germany the 
 moment their newspapers brought to them the story of 
 the Battle of Kumonova. 
 
 I shall never forget my presentiment when I heard 
 on June 29, 1914, down in a little Breton village, that a 
 Bosnian student had celebrated the anniversary of the 
 Battle of Kossova by assassinating the Archduke Franz 
 Ferdinand. The incident for which Austria was wait- 
 ing had happened. There came back to me the words 
 of Hakki Pasha : " If Italy declares war on Turkey, the 
 cannon will not cease to speak until all Europe is in 
 conflagration."
 
 X. 
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 
 
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the peace 
 of Europe was twice disturbed, and terrible wars 
 occurred over the question of the integrity of the Otto- 
 man Empire. Since it is still the same question which 
 has had most to do — directly, at least — with bringing 
 on the general European War of 1914, it is important 
 to consider what has been, since the Treaty of Berlin, 
 the very heart of the Eastern question in relation to 
 Europe, — the rivalry of races in Macedonia. 
 
 When the European Powers, following the lead of 
 Great Britain, intervened after the Russo-Turkish War 
 of 1877-78 to annul the Treaty of San Stefano, they 
 frustrated the emancipation from Moslem rule of the 
 Christian populations in Macedonia. A Balkan terri- 
 torial and political status quo was decided upon by a 
 Congress of the Powers at Berlin in 1878. In receiving 
 back Macedonia, Turkey solemnly promised to give 
 equal rights to her Christian subjects. In taking upon 
 themselves the terrible responsibility of restoring 
 Christians to Turkish rule, the Powers assumed at the 
 same time the obligation to watch Turkey and compel 
 her to keep her promises. 
 
 The delegates of the Powers brought to the Con- 
 gress of Berlin a determination to solve the problems of 
 
 151
 
 152 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 South-Eastern Europe, according to what they believed 
 to be the personal selfish interests of the nations they 
 represented. From the beginning of the Congress to 
 the end, there was never a single thought of serving the 
 interests of the people whose destinies they were pre- 
 suming to decide. They compromised with each 
 other " to preserve the peace of Europe." This 
 formula has always been interpreted in diplomacy as 
 the getting of all you can for your country without 
 having to fight for it ! 
 
 Practically every provision of the Treaty of Berlin 
 has been disregarded by the contracting parties and 
 by the Balkan States. The policy of Turkey in this 
 respect has not been different from that of the 
 Christian Powers. Great Britain and France, as their 
 Colonial Empires increased, ignored the obligations of 
 the treaty which they had signed, because they feared 
 the effect upon their commercial and colonial interests 
 overseas, were they to press the Khalif. The only 
 effective pressure would have been force of arms. 
 When popular sympathy was stirred to the depths by 
 the cruelty of Abdul Hamid's oppression and mas- 
 sacres, successive British and French Cabinets washed 
 their hands of any responsibility towards the Chris- 
 tians in Turkey. Pan-Islamism was their nightmare. 
 They had an overwhelming fear of arousing Moham- 
 medan sentiment against them in their colonies. 
 Germany refused to hold Abdul Hamid to his 
 promises, because she wanted to curry favour with him 
 to get a foothold in Asiatic Turkey. Russia and 
 Austria, the Powers most vitally interested in the Otto- 
 man Empire, because they were its neighbours, were 
 agreed upon preserving the Sultan's domination in the
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 153 
 
 Balkan Peninsula, no matter how great the oppression 
 of Christians became. Neither Power wanted to see 
 the other increase in influence among the Balkan 
 nationalities. 
 
 The centres of intrigue were Bulgaria, Albania, 
 Thrace, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, the 
 portions of the peninsula which had been refused 
 emancipation by the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria 
 worked out her own emancipation. She refused the 
 tutelage of Russia, annexed Eastern Rumelia in 
 defiance of the Powers in 1885, and proclaimed her 
 independence in 1908. The fortunes of Albania will 
 be followed in another chapter. Thrace was too 
 near Constantinople — the forbidden city, too unimpor- 
 tant economically, and too largely Moslem in popula- 
 tion to be coveted by the Balkan States. Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, administered by Austria-Hungary since 
 1878, were annexed in defiance of treaty obligations in 
 1908. The principal victim of the mischief done by the 
 Congress of Berlin was Macedonia. 
 
 The future of Macedonia has been the great source of 
 conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and 
 between the Balkan States. At Athens, Sofia, Bel- 
 grade, Bukarest and Cettinje, the diplomats of Russia, 
 Austria- Hungary and Turkey, from the morrow of the 
 Berlin Congress to the eve of the recent Balkan Wars, 
 played a game against each other, endeavouring always 
 to use the Balkan States as pawns in their sordid strife. 
 Turkey was backed by France and England, whenever 
 it suited opportune diplomacy to do so. Austria- 
 Hungary was backed by Germany, who at the same 
 time did not hesitate to play a hand with the Turks. 
 Russia has always stood more or less alone in the
 
 154 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Balkan question, even after the conclusion of the 
 alliance with France. Except at Cettinje, Italian 
 activity in this diplomatic game has never been 
 particularly marked. 
 
 What has been the object of the game ? This is 
 difficult to state categorically. Aims have changed 
 with changing conditions. For example, during the 
 five years immediately following the Congress of 
 Berlin, British diplomacy was directed strenuously 
 towards keeping down emancipated Bulgaria, and 
 towards preventing the encroachment of Servia in the 
 direction of the Adriatic and the ^Egsean. But when 
 she saw that Bulgaria had refused to be the tool of 
 Russia, and when her problem of the trade route of 
 India had been solved by the buying up of the majority 
 of shares in the Suez Canal and the occupation of 
 Egypt, Great Britain championed Bulgaria and sus- 
 tained her in the annexation of Eastern Rumelia. 
 British policy remained anti-Servian for thirty years. 
 There was more in the withdrawal of the British 
 Legation from Belgrade than disapproval of a das- 
 tardly regicide. But the moment British commerce 
 began to fear German competition, and an accord had 
 been made with Russia to remove causes of conflict, 
 the British Press began to change its tone towards 
 Servia. What a miracle has been wrought in the 
 decade since " an immoral race of blackguards, with 
 no sense of national honour," has become " that brave 
 and noble little race, spirited defenders of the liberties 
 of Europe !" I quote these two sentiments from the 
 same newspapers. If Premier Asquith is sincere in 
 his belief that this present war is to defend the principle 
 of the sanctity of treaties, will he insist, when peace is
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 155 
 
 concluded, that Servia make good her oath to Bulgaria, 
 and Russia her international treaty obligations in 
 regard to the kingdom of Poland ? Great Britain is 
 the least of the offenders when it comes to diplomatic 
 cant and hypocrisy. For the British electorate has a 
 keen sense of justice, and an intelligent determination 
 that British influence shall be exerted for the better- 
 ment of humanity. Cabinets must reckon with this 
 electorate when they decide questions of foreign policy. 
 
 But we do not want to lose ourselves in a maze of 
 diplomatic intrigue, which it is fruitless to follow, even 
 if we could. We must limit ourselves to an exposition 
 of the ambitions of Austria- Hungary and of the Balkan 
 States to the possession of this coveted province. 
 
 Since the creation of modern Italy the great German 
 trade-route to the Mediterranean has been changed. 
 The influence in Teutonic commercial evolution of the 
 passing of Lombardy and Venetia from the political 
 tutelage of a thousand years has been of tremendous 
 importance, for the connection between Germany and 
 Italy had always been vital. It was the first Napoleon 
 who broke this connection. It was the third Napoleon 
 who nullified the effort of the Congress of Vienna to re- 
 establish it. United Italy gave a new direction to 
 Teutonic expansion. United Germany gave to it a 
 new impulse. The Drang nach Osten was born. 
 
 By the Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, Austria- 
 Hungary secured from Russia the promise of the 
 Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
 return for her neutrality in the " approaching war of 
 liberation " of Russia against Turkey. In order to 
 liberate some Slavs, Russia changed the subjection of 
 others. The Convention of Reichstadt is really the
 
 156 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 starting-point of the quarrel which has grown so 
 bitterly during the last generation between Austria 
 and Russia over the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula. 
 Russia paid dearly for a " free hand " with Turkey in 
 1877. She is paying still. 
 
 In her attitude towards the Balkans Austria has had 
 three distinct aims: The prevention of a Slavic outlet 
 to the Adriatic ; the realization of a German outlet to 
 the ^gaean ; and the effectual hindrance of the growth 
 in the Balkans of a strong independent South Slavic 
 State, which might prove a fatal attraction to her own 
 provinces of Croatia and Dalmatia. It was this triple 
 consideration that led her to the occupation and 
 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the 
 policy of hostility to Servia, which is developed in 
 another chapter. Desiring to possess for herself the 
 wonderful Port of Salonika, on the .^ggean Sea, to 
 reach which her railroads would have to cross Mace- 
 donia, the policy of Austria-Hungary towards Mace- 
 donia has been consistently to endeavour to uphold the 
 semblance of Turkish authority, and at the same time 
 to make that authority difficult to uphold through 
 the exciting of racial rivalry between Greece, Servia, 
 Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania in this turbulent 
 country, Turkey and Austria met on the common 
 ground of " keeping the pot boiling," although with a 
 different aim. By keeping the pot boiling Turkey 
 thought that her sovereignty was safe, while Austria 
 hoped that when Turkey and the Balkan States had 
 worn themselves out, each opposing the other, she could 
 step in and capture the prize. 
 
 Turkey and Austria- Hungary, then, conspired to- 
 gether to create as many points of conflict as possible
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 157 
 
 among the Macedonians of different races. The most 
 devilish ingenuity was constantly exercised in stirring 
 up and keeping alive the hatred of each race for the 
 other. While frequently aroused to the point of 
 making perfunctory protests, the other nations of 
 Europe, with the exception of Russia, let Austria and 
 Turkey do as they pleased, just as Turkey was allowed 
 a free hand in massacring the Armenians. The laissez- 
 faire policy of the Powers was a denial of their treaty 
 obligations. 
 
 It was only when the Balkan States awoke to the 
 realization of the fact that they were regarded as mere 
 pawns upon the chess-board of world politics, to be 
 sacrificed without compunction by the European 
 Powers whenever it was to their interest, that they 
 buried differences for a moment, and worked out their 
 own salvation. If the Balkan Wars have brought the 
 present terrible disaster upon Europe, it is no more 
 than the contemptible diplomacy of self-interest and 
 mutual jealousy could expect. 
 
 Why was the Austro-Turkish policy possible, and 
 why did it succeed for a whole generation ? 
 
 The Ottoman Empire was founded in the Balkan 
 Peninsula by rulers whose military genius was coupled 
 with their ability to use one Christian population 
 against the other. The Osmanlis never fought a battle 
 in which the Balkan Christians did not give valuable 
 assistance in forging the chains of their slavery. The 
 Osmanlis conquered the Balkan peoples by means of 
 the Balkan peoples. They kept possession of the 
 country just as long as they could pit one chief against 
 another, and then, when national feeling arose, one 
 race against another.
 
 158 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Gradually, in the portion of the Balkans where one 
 race was predominant, nationalities began to form 
 States, which secured independence as soon as they 
 demonstrated the possibility of harmony. Greece was 
 the first, and was followed by Servia, Moldavia and 
 Wallachia united into the principality of Rumania. 
 Last of all came Bulgaria. After having gained 
 autonomy, independence was only a matter of form. 
 But in the central portion of the Balkan Peninsula, 
 from the Black Sea to the ^Egsean, through Thrace, 
 Macedonia, and Albania, the sovereignty of Turkey, 
 restored by the Treaty of Berlin, was able to endure. 
 For the people were mixed up, race living with race, 
 and in no place could the Christians of any one race 
 claim that the country was wholly theirs. 
 
 As emancipated Greeks, Servians, and Bulgarians 
 formed independent States, they looked towards Mace- 
 donia as the legitimate territory for expansion. But 
 here their claims, both historically and racially, over- 
 lapped. Greece regarded Macedonia as entirely Hel- 
 lenic. Had it not always been Greek before the 
 Osmanlis came, from the days of Philip of Macedon 
 to the Paleologi of the Byzantine Empire ? The 
 Servians, on the other hand, invoked the memory of 
 the Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan, who, in the 
 fourteenth century, on the eve of the Ottoman con- 
 quest, was crowned " King of Romania " at Serres. It 
 was from the Servians, and not from the Greeks, that 
 the Osmanlis conquered Macedonia in the three battles 
 of the Maritza, Tchernomen, and Kossova. The Bul- 
 garians invoked the memory of their medieval domina- 
 tion of Macedonia and Thrace. It was by the Bul- 
 garians that Northern Thrace was defended against the
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 159 
 
 Ottoman invasion; a Bulgarian prince was the last 
 independent ruler of Central Macedonia ; and long before 
 the ephemeral Servian empire of Stephen Dushan, the 
 Bulgarian Czars were recognized from Tirnova to 
 Okrida. This latter city, in fact, was the seat of the 
 autonomous Bulgarian patriarchate in the Middle Ages. 
 
 These historical claims, to us of western Europe, 
 would have only a sentimental value. They had been 
 forgotten by the subject populations of European 
 Turkey for many centuries. The first revival of 
 political ambitions was that of Hellenism. Modern 
 Greece, divorcing itself from the impossible and pagan 
 dream of a restoration of classic Greece, with Athens as 
 its capital, which had been woven for it by western 
 European admirers during the first half-century of its 
 liberation, began to take stock of its Byzantine and 
 Christian heritage during the latter part of the reign of 
 Abdul Aziz. The new Hellenism, as the prestige of the 
 Ottoman Empire decreased, took the definite form of a 
 determination to succeed the Ottoman Empire, as it 
 had preceded it, with Constantinople as capital. 
 
 The Greeks believed themselves to be the unifying 
 Christian race of the Balkan Peninsula. They had a 
 tremendous advantage over the Slavs, because the 
 ecclesiastical organization, to which all the Christians 
 of the Balkan Peninsula owed allegiance, was in their 
 hands. When Mohammed the Conqueror entered 
 Constantinople, he gave to the Patriarch of the Eastern 
 Church the headship of the Balkan Christians. The 
 spirit of Moslem institutions provides for no other 
 form of government than a theocracy. Religion has 
 always been to the Osmanli the test of nationality. 
 The Christians formed one millet, or nation. This
 
 i6o THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 millet was Greek. During all the centuries of Ottoman 
 subjection the Balkan Christians owed allegiance to 
 the Greek Patriarchate. Whatever their native tongue, 
 the language of the Church and of the schools was 
 Greek, 
 
 Unfortunately for Hellenism, the new Greek aspira- 
 tions came into immediate conflict with the renaissance 
 of the Bulgarian nation. Russia had long been en- 
 couraging, for the purposes of pan- Slavism, the awaken- 
 ing of a sense of nationality in the South Slavs. Her 
 agents had been long and patiently working among the 
 Bulgarians. But they overshot their mark. When 
 Bulgarian priests and the few educated men of the 
 peasant nation turned their attention to their past 
 and their language, it was not the idea of their kinship 
 with the great Slavic Power of Eastern Europe that 
 was aroused, hut the consciousness of their own par- 
 ticular race. Bulgaria had been great when Russia 
 was practically unknown. Bulgaria could be great 
 once more when, by the disappearance of Ottoman 
 rule, the Bulgarian Empire of the Middle Ages would 
 be born again in the Balkans. 
 
 One can readily appreciate that the first necessity of 
 Bulgarian renaissance was liberation from the Greek 
 Church. Russia strenuously opposed this separatist 
 agitation. What she wanted was a Slavic movement 
 within the bosom of the Greek Orthodox Church, 
 which, if bitterly persecuted by the Patriarchate, would 
 throw the South Slavs upon the Russian Synod for 
 protection, or, if tolerated, would give Russia a power- 
 ful voice in the councils of the Orthodox Church in the 
 Ottoman Empire. But the Bulgarians had progressed 
 too far on the road of religious separation from the
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA i6i 
 
 Greeks to be arrested by their Russian godfather. It 
 was a prophecy of the future independent spirit of the 
 Bulgarian people, which Beaconsfield and Salisbury 
 unfortunately failed to note, that the Bulgarians 
 determined to go the length of uniting with Rome in 
 order to get free from Phanar. Another Uniate sect 
 would have been born had Russia not yielded. With 
 bad grace her ambassador obtained from Sultan Abdul 
 Aziz the firman of March ii, 1870, creating the 
 Bulgarian Exarchate. 
 
 The cleverness of the Bulgarians outwitted the 
 manoeuvre made to have the seat of the Exarchate at 
 Sofia. The Greeks realized that a formidable com- 
 petitor had entered into the struggle for Macedonia. 
 From that moment there has been hatred between 
 Greek and Bulgarian. In spite of the Treaty of 
 Bukarest, the end of the struggle is not yet. The 
 policy and ambition of the modern state are dictated 
 by strong economic reasons, of which sentimental 
 aspirations are only the outward expression. If wars 
 and the treaties that follow them were guided by honest 
 confession of the real issues at stake, how much easier 
 the solution of problems, and how much greater the 
 chances of finding durable bases for treaties ! The 
 whole effort of Bulgaria in Macedonia may be explained 
 by the simple statement that the Bulgarian race has 
 been seeking its natural, logical, and inevitable outlet 
 to the ^gsean Sea. 
 
 During the middle of the nineteenth century Servian 
 national aspirations were directed towards Croatia, 
 Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Servians 
 thought only in terms of the West. It was the founda- 
 tion of the Austro-Hungarian dual Monarchy in 1867, 
 
 n
 
 i62 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 followed by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herze- 
 govina and of the sandjak of Novi Bazar, that led 
 Servia to enter into the struggle for Macedonia. 
 
 As soon as Russia saw that she could not control 
 Bulgaria, she began to favour a Servian propaganda in 
 the valley of the Vardar. Russian intrigues at Con- 
 stantinople led to the suppression of the Bulgarian 
 bishoprics of Okrida, Uskub, Kiipriilii (Veles), and 
 Nevrokop. Bulgaria secured the restoration of these 
 bishoprics through the efforts of Austria- Hungary and 
 Great Britain. The story of Macedonia is full of 
 instances like this, of intrigue and counter-intrigue by 
 European Powers at the Sublime Porte. Combina- 
 tions of interests changed sometimes overnight. Is 
 it any wonder that the Turks grew to despise the 
 European alliances, and to laugh at every " joint note " 
 of the Powers in relation to Macedonia ? 
 
 Austria-Hungary opposed the Russian aid given to 
 Servia by introducing a new racial propaganda. Ever 
 since the Roman occupation there had been a small, 
 but widely diffused, element in the population of 
 Macedonia, which retained the Roman language, just as 
 the Wallachians and Moldavians north of the Danube 
 had done. Diplomatic suggestion at Bukarest suc- 
 ceeded in interesting Rumania in these Kutzo-Wal- 
 lachians, as they came to be called. Rumania did not 
 have a common boundary with European Turkey, 
 but her statesmen were quick to see the advantage of 
 having " a finger in the pie " when the Ottoman 
 Empire disappeared from Europe. So Rumania 
 became protector of the Kutzo-Wallachian. The 
 Sublime Porte gladly agreed to recognize this pro- 
 tectorate. The development of a strong Rumanian
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 163 
 
 element in Macedonia would help greatly to preserve 
 Turkish sovereignty. For Rumania could have no 
 territorial aspirations there, and would look with dis- 
 favour upon Rumania being swallowed up by Greece, 
 Servia, or Bulgaria. Another propaganda, well financed, 
 and encouraged by the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish 
 governments, was added to the rivalry of races in 
 Macedonia. 
 
 We cannot do more than suggest these intrigues. 
 After 1885 the Macedonian question became gradually 
 the peculiar care of the two " most interested " Powers. 
 There was little to attract again international attention 
 until the question of Turkey's existence as a state 
 was brought forward in a most startling way by the 
 repercussion throughout the Empire of the Armenian 
 massacres of 1893-96. By refusing to intervene at that 
 time the Powers, who fondly thought that they were acting 
 in the interest of the integrity of the Empire, were really 
 contributing to its further decline. 
 
 Elsewhere we have spoken of the Cretan insurrection 
 of 1896, and the train of events that followed it, ending 
 in the formation of the Balkan alliance to drive Turkey 
 out of Europe. Here we take up the other thread 
 which leads us to the Balkan wars. Bulgaria, remem- 
 bering the happy result of her own sufferings from the 
 massacres of twenty years before, was keen enough to 
 see in the Asiatic holocausts of the " Red Sultan " a 
 sign of weakness instead of a show of strength. The 
 statesmen of the European Powers had not acted to 
 stop the massacres of the Armenians. But their 
 indecision and impolitic irresolution was not an expres- 
 sion of the sentiments of the civilized races whom they 
 represented. The time was ripe for an insurrection in
 
 i64 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Macedonia. Public opinion in Europe would sustain 
 it. The movement was launched from Sofia. 
 
 From that moment Turkish sovereignty was doomed. 
 Turkey did not realize this, however. Instead of 
 adopting the policy of treating with Bulgaria, and 
 giving her an economic outlet to the ^gaean Sea, the 
 Sublime Porte was delighted with the anticipation of a 
 new era of racial rivalry in Macedonia; for they knew 
 that Bulgaria's efforts to secure Macedonian autonomy 
 would be opposed by Servia and Greece. In fact, the 
 Greeks were so alarmed by the Bulgarian activity that 
 immediately after their unhappy war with Turkey they 
 gave active support to the Turks in putting down the 
 Bulgarian rebels. The services of the Greek Patriarch- 
 ate were particularly valuable to Turkey at this 
 time. 
 
 Nor did Austria- Hungary and Russia appreciate the 
 significance of the Bulgarian movement. In 1897 they 
 signed an accord, solemnly agreeing that the status quo 
 be preserved in the Balkan peninsula. Russia was 
 anxious for this convention with Austria. For the 
 moment all her energies were devoted to developing 
 the policy in the Far East, that was to end so abruptly 
 eight years later on the battle-field of Mukden. Austria- 
 Hungary was delighted to have the solution of the 
 Macedonian problem delayed. She felt that every year 
 of anarchy in European Turkey would bring her nearer 
 to Salonika. The Drang nach Osten was to be made 
 possible through the strife of Servian, Bulgarian, and 
 Greek. 
 
 The moment was favourable for the Bulgarian pro- 
 paganda. Russia was too much involved in Manchuria 
 to help the Servians. The Greeks had lost prestige
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 165 
 
 with the Macedonians by their easy and humiliating 
 defeat at the hands of Turkey. Gathering force with 
 successive years, and supported by the admirably laid 
 foundation of the Bulgarian ecclesiastical and scholastic 
 organizations throughout Macedonia, the Bulgarian 
 bands gradually brought the vilayets of Monastir, 
 Uskub, and Salonika into a state of civil war. In 1901 
 and 1902 conditions in Macedonia were beyond descrip- 
 tion. But the Powers waited for some new initiative 
 on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia. 
 
 Emperor Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas met at 
 Miirszteg in the autumn of 1903. Russia, more and 
 more involved in Manchuria, and on the eve of her 
 conflict with Japan, found no difficulty in falling in 
 with the suggestion of the Austrian Foreign Secretary, 
 that the two Powers present to the signers of the 
 Treaty of Berlin a programme of " reforms " for 
 Macedonia. Europe received with delight this new 
 manifestation of harmony between Austria-Hungary 
 and Russia. 
 
 In 1904 the " programme of Miirszteg " was imposed 
 upon Turkey by a comic-opera show of force on the 
 part of the Powers. An international gendarmerie was 
 their solution of the Macedonian problem. Different 
 spheres were mapped out, and allotted to officers of 
 the different Powers. Germany refused to participate 
 in this farce, just as she had refused to participate in 
 " protecting " Crete. 
 
 The international " pacification " failed in Macedonia 
 for the same reasons that it had failed in Crete, and 
 was to fail a third time ten years later in Albania. It 
 was a compromise between the Powers, dictated by con- 
 siderations which had nothing whatever to do with the
 
 i66 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 problem of which it was supposed to he the solution. 
 This is the story of European diplomacy in the Near 
 East. 
 
 From the very moment that Turkey found herself 
 compelled to accept the policing of Macedonia by 
 European officers, she set to work to make their task 
 impossible. Hussein Hilmi Pasha was sent to Salonika 
 as Governor. An accord was quickly established 
 between him and the Austro-Hungarian agents in 
 Macedonia. Where the Bulgarians were weak, the 
 Turks and the Austrian emissaries encouraged the 
 Bulgarian propaganda. Where the Greeks were weak, 
 Hellenic bands were allowed immunity. Where the 
 Servians were weak, the Servian propaganda made 
 great strides, with the connivance of the government. 
 The European gendarmerie was powerless to struggle 
 against Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan in- 
 trigues. The correspondence of the European officers 
 and consuls, and of journalists who visited Macedonia 
 during this period, makes interesting reading. Their 
 point of view is almost invariably that of their surround- 
 ings. It just depended upon the part of Macedonia 
 in which one happened to be, or the company in 
 which one travelled, whether a certain nationality were 
 " noble heroes suffering for an ideal " or " blood- 
 thirsty rufiians." Why are so many writers who pre- 
 tend to be impartial observers, like chameleons ? 
 
 Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria were alike guilty of 
 subsidizing bands of armed men, who imagined that 
 they were fulfilling a patriotic duty in bmtally forcing 
 their particular nationality upon ignorant peasants, 
 most of whom did not know, or care, to what nation 
 they belonged. There was little to choose between the
 
 RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA 167 
 
 methods and the actions of the different bands. 
 Everywhere pillage, incendiarism, and assassination 
 were the order of the day. When Christian propa- 
 gandists let them alone, the poor villagers had to 
 endure the same treatment from Moslem Albanians 
 and from the Turkish soldiery. 
 
 In order to give the " reforms " of the programme of 
 Miirszteg a chance, Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade osten- 
 sibly withdrew their active support of the bands. But 
 the efforts of the Powers had still not only the secret 
 bad faith of Austria-Hungary and Turkey to contend 
 with, but also the determination of the Macedonians 
 themselves not to be " reformed " d V europeenne — 
 that is to say, d la turque. The powerful Bulgarian 
 "interior organization" in Macedonia kept up the 
 stniggle in the hope that the continuation of anarchy 
 would bring the Powers to see that no other solution 
 of the Macedonian question was possible than the 
 autonomy of Macedonia under a Christian governor. 
 Greeks and Servians opposed the project of autonomy, 
 however, because they knew that it would result 
 eventually in the reversion of Macedonia to Bulgaria. 
 The history of Eastern Rumelia would be repeated. 
 In considering the Macedonian problem it must never 
 be forgotten that the great bulk of the population 
 of Macedonia is Bulgarian, in spite of all the learned 
 dissertations and imposing statistics of Greek and 
 Servian writers. But the difficulty is that this Bul- 
 garian population is agricultural. In the cities near 
 the sea, and all along the seacoast from Salonika to 
 Dedeagatch the Greek element is predominant. No 
 geographical division of Macedonia can be made, viable 
 from the economic point of view, which satisfies racial
 
 i68 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 claims by following the principle of preponderant 
 nationality. 
 
 After her disasters in the Far East, Russia began to 
 turn her attention once more to the Near East. A 
 reopening of the Macedonian question between Austria- 
 Hungary and Russia was imminent when the Young 
 Turk revolution of July, 1908, upset all calculations, 
 and brought a new factor into the problem of the future 
 of European Turkey. Austria-Hungary boldly chal- 
 lenged — more than that, defied — Russia by annexing 
 Bosnia- Herzegovina. In this action she was backed 
 by Germany. Russia and France were not ready for 
 war. Great Britain and Italy, each involved in an 
 internal social revolution of tremendous importance, 
 could not afford to risk the programmes of their 
 respective cabinets by embarking upon uncertain 
 foreign adventures. 
 
 The Balkan states were left to solve the Macedonian 
 problem by themselves. Their solution was the Treaty 
 of Bukarest. The success of Servia in planting herself 
 in the valley of the Vardar, and in occupying Monastir, 
 is the result of the struggle of races in Macedonia. It 
 is the direct immediate cause of the European War of 
 1914.
 
 XI. 
 
 THE YOUNG TURK R£GIME IN THE OTTOMAN 
 
 EMPIRE 
 
 No event during the first decade of the twentieth cen- 
 tury was heralded throughout Europe with so great 
 and so sincere interest and sympathy as the bloodless 
 revolution of July 24, 1908, by which the regime of 
 Abdul Hamid was overthrown and the Constitution of 
 1876 resuscitated. 
 
 Although the world was unprepared for this event, 
 it was not due to any sudden cause. For twenty years 
 the leaven of Liberalism had been working in the minds 
 of the educated classes in the Ottoman Empire, 
 Moslems as well as Christians had been in attendance 
 in large numbers at the American, French, Italian, 
 and German schools in Turkey, and had gone abroad 
 to complete their education. Just as in Italy and in 
 Germany, Young Turkey had come into existence 
 through contact with those free institutions in the 
 outside world which other races enjoyed, had been 
 emancipated from superstition and from the stulti- 
 fying influences of religious formalism, and had grown 
 in the army to numbers sufficient to dictate the policy 
 of the Government. 
 
 From the beginning of his reign, Abdul Hamid had 
 done all in his power to prevent the growth of the 
 
 169
 
 170 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Liberal spirit. The result of thirty years, in so far as 
 civil officials of the Government were concerned, had 
 been the stamping out of every man who combined 
 ability with patriotism and devotion to an ideal. The 
 best elements had taken the road to death, to im- 
 prisonment, or to exile, so that from the palace down 
 to the humblest village the Turkish Civil Service was 
 composed of a set of men absolutely lacking in inde- 
 pendence and in honour, and devoted to the master 
 who ruled from Yildiz. But in the army this same 
 policy, though attempted, had not wholly succeeded. 
 A portion at least of the officers received an educa- 
 tion; many of them, indeed, had been sent abroad to 
 Germany and to France in order to keep abreast with 
 the development of military science, so essential to the 
 very existence of Turkey. In the army, then, hundreds 
 of officers of high character and high ideals were able 
 to avoid the fate which had come to other educated 
 Moslems in Turkey. They learned to love their 
 country, and with that love came a sense of shame for 
 the results of the despotism under which they existed. 
 To have lived in Paris or in Berlin was enough to 
 make them dissatisfied ; to have visited Cairo or Alex- 
 andria, Sofia or Bukarest or Athens, and have con- 
 trasted the conditions of life in these cities, recently 
 their own, with Constantinople, Salonika, and Smyrna, 
 was sufficient. 
 
 It is impossible in the limits of this book to tell how 
 this bloodless revolution was planned by exiles abroad 
 and officers at home. It was successful, as well as 
 bloodless, because the army refused to obey the orders 
 of the Sultan. To save his life and his throne, Abdul 
 Hamid was compelled to resuscitate the Constitution
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 171 
 
 which he had granted and then suppressed at the 
 beginning of his reign. 
 
 We who lived through those dream days of the 
 beginning of the new regime will never forget the sense 
 of joy of an emancipated people. The spy system was 
 abolished, newspapers were allowed to tell the truth 
 and express their own opinions, passports and teskeres 
 (permissions to travel from one point to another 
 within the Empire) were declared unnecessary, bak- 
 shish was refused at the Custom-House and police- 
 station . Moslem ulema and Christian clergy embraced 
 each other in public, rode through the streets in triumph 
 in the same carriages, and harangued the multitudes 
 from the same platform in mosque and church. A 
 new era of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, they 
 said, had dawned for all the races in Turkey. The 
 Sultan was the father, Turkey the fatherland ; barriers 
 and disabilities of creed and race had ceased to exist. 
 It seemed incredible, but these scenes were really 
 happening from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf. 
 
 Optimism, hope for the future, was so strong that 
 one had not the heart to express very loudly his belief 
 that no real revolution was ever bloodless, that no real 
 change in political and social life of the people could 
 come in a single day or as a result of an official docu- 
 ment. No one could think of anything else but the 
 Constitution, which had broken the chains for Moslem 
 and Christian alike, the Constitution which was going 
 to restore Turkey to its lawful place among the nations 
 of Europe, the Constitution which was to heal the Sick 
 Man and solve the question of the Orient. In Smyrna, 
 in Constantinople, in Beirut, and in Asia Minor, I 
 heard the same story over and over again. But there
 
 172 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 was always the misgiving, the apprehension for the 
 future, from which the foreigner in Turkey is never 
 free. It seemed too good to be true; it was too good 
 to be true. It was against the logic of history. The 
 most wonderful Constitution that the world has ever 
 known is that of Britain. It does not exist on paper; 
 there is no need for a document. It is good, and it 
 has endured, because it has been written in blood, in 
 suffering, and in the agony of generations, on the pages 
 of eight centuries of history. Could Turkey hope to 
 be free in a day ? 
 
 The first test of the Constitution came, of course, 
 with the election and composition of the Parliament. 
 The election was held quietly, in some parts of the 
 Empire secretly even; and when the Parliament 
 assembled at Constantinople, one began to see already 
 the handwriting on the wall, for its composition was in 
 no way in accordance with the distribution of popula- 
 tion in the Empire. The Turk — and by the Turk I 
 mean the composite Moslem race which has grown up 
 through centuries of intermarriage and forcible con- 
 version — had always been the ruling race. With the 
 establishment of a constitutional regime, the Young 
 Turks did not mean to abdicate in favour of Moslem 
 Arabs or Christian Greeks and Armenians. They had 
 " arranged " the elections in such a way that they 
 would have in the Parliament a substantial majority 
 over any possible combination of other racial elements. 
 
 One cannot but have sympathy with the natural 
 feeling of racial pride which is inborn in the Turks. 
 A race of masters, who could expect that they would 
 be willing to surrender the privileges of centuries ? 
 But they forgot that a constitutional regime and the
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 173 
 
 principles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, must 
 necessarily imply the yielding of their unique position 
 in the Empire. The Turk as a race is composed of two 
 elements — a ruling class of landowners and military 
 and civil officials, arrogant though courteous, corrupt 
 though honest in private life, parasitical though self- 
 respecting; and a peasant class, hopelessly ignorant, 
 lacking in energy, initiative, ambition, aspirations, and 
 ideals. The great bulk of the Turkish element in the 
 Empire looked with the indifference of ignorance and 
 the hostility of jealous regard for their unique position 
 in the community upon the granting of a Constitution. 
 I doubt if 5 per cent, of the Turkish population of the 
 Empire has ever known what a constitutional regime 
 means, or cared whether it exists or not. 
 
 There remains the 5 per cent. Of these, the great 
 bulk belong either to the corrupt official class, whose 
 subjection to the tyranny of Yildiz Kiosk had totally 
 unfitted them for service under the new regime on 
 which they were entering, or to the landowners, whose 
 wealth was dependent upon the unequal privileges that 
 the law allowed to them as Moslems, and whose in- 
 terests were totally at variance with the spirit of the 
 Constitution. There are left small groups of younger 
 army officers and of professional men, who had been 
 educated in foreign schools or by foreign teachers in 
 Turkey and abroad. They were, for the most part, 
 either without the knowledge of any other metier than 
 the army, or, if civilian, unfitted by training and ex- 
 perience for governmental executive and administra- 
 tive work. Consequently, from the very beginning 
 the genuine Young Turks who were honest in their 
 idealism had to make a compact with the higher army
 
 174 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 officers and with corrupt civil officials of Abdul Hamid. 
 When the real Young Turks controlled the Cabinet, 
 their disasters were those of theorists and visionaries. 
 When they yielded the control of affairs to men more 
 experienced than they, it was simply the renewal of 
 the tyranny of Abdul Hamid. It was because these 
 two elements were united in the firm resolution to keep 
 the control in the hands of Moslem Turks that the 
 constitutional regime in Turkey has gone from Scylla 
 to Chary bdis without ever entering port. 
 
 From the very beginning, thoughtful men pointed 
 out that there was only one way of salvation and of 
 Liberal evolution for the Ottoman Empire. That was 
 an honest and sincere co-operation with the Christian 
 elements of the Empire, and with the Arabic and 
 Albanian Moslem elements. Fanaticism and racial 
 pride prevented the Young Turks from adopting the 
 sole possible way of establishing the constitutional 
 regime. From the very beginning, then, they failed, 
 and it is their failure which has plunged Europe into 
 the series of wars that has ended in the devastation of 
 unhappy Belgium, so far remote from the cause, and 
 so innocent of any part in the events which brought 
 upon her such terrible misfortunes. One could write 
 a whole book upon the events of the first five years of 
 constitutional government in Turkey, and could show 
 beyond a shadow of a doubt how from the very be- 
 ginning there was no honest and loyal effort made to 
 apply even the most rudimentary principles of con- 
 stitutional government. Despotism means the subjec- 
 tion of a country to the will of its rulers. Constitu- 
 tionalism means the subjection of the rulers to the 
 will of the country. The Young Turks, embodied in
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 175 
 
 the " Committee of Union and Progress," merely con- 
 tinued the despotism of Abdul Hamid. They were 
 far worse than Abdul Hamid, however, for they were 
 irresponsible and unskilled. One handling the helm, 
 knowing how to steer, might have kept the ship of 
 State afloat, all the more easily, perhaps, because the 
 waters were so troubled. Many hands, none knowing 
 where or how to go, steered the Ottoman Empire to 
 inevitable shipwreck. 
 
 Although the vicissitudes of various Cabinets and 
 Parliaments can have place in our work only so far as 
 they have a direct bearing on foreign relations, there 
 are six matters of internal policy which must be men- 
 tioned in order to explain how rapidly and surely the 
 Ottoman Empire went to its destruction: the treat- 
 ment of Armenians before and after the Adana mas- 
 sacres; the attempt to suppress the liberties of the 
 Orthodox Church; the Cretan Question, ending in the 
 Greek boycott ; the Macedonian policy ; the Albanian 
 uprisings ; and the lack of co-operation and sympathy 
 with the Arabs. 
 
 The Armenians and the Adana Massacres. 
 
 Among the various races of the Ottoman Empire, 
 none was so overcome with joy at the proclamation of 
 the constitutional regime as were the Armenians. 
 Scattered everywhere throughout the Empire, and in 
 no region an element of preponderance, the Armenians 
 had always made themselves felt in the commercial 
 and intellectual life of Turkey far out of proportion to 
 their numerical strength. They appreciated and under- 
 stood best, of all the Christian populations, the signifi- 
 cance of constitutional government. Honestly applied,
 
 176 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 it meant more to them than to any other element of 
 the Empire. 
 
 In the first place, the burden of Turkish and Moslem 
 oppression had fallen most heavily on them. It was 
 not only the massacres of 1894 to 1896, horrible as 
 they were, which had put the Armenians in continual 
 fear for their lives. It was the centuries-old petty 
 persecution, from which they believed they were now 
 to be freed. Turkish officialdom had grown rich in 
 extorting the last farthing from the Armenians. Only 
 those who had seen this persecution and extortion can 
 realize how large a part it played in the daily life of 
 the Armenians, and how continuous and rich a source 
 of revenue it was to the official Turk. For every little 
 service the official expected his fat fee, always charging 
 up to the limit his victim was able to pay. You could 
 not carry on your business, you could not build a 
 house, you could not enlarge or alter or repair your 
 shop, you could not get a tax on your harvest esti- 
 mated, you could not travel even from one village to 
 another for the purpose of business or pleasure or study, 
 without paying the officials. Very frequently between 
 the local Turkish official and the Armenian stood a 
 middle man, who must also be paid for the purpose of 
 carrying the fee or bribe to the official in charge. How 
 people could have lived under such a regime and have 
 prospered is beyond the comprehension of the Occi- 
 dental. It speaks eloquently for the business acumen 
 of the Armenian race, as well as for its devotion to the 
 religion of its fathers. 
 
 Naturally, the Armenians expected that the Con- 
 stitution would bring to them a complete relief from 
 economic repression, as well as from the terrors of
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 177 
 
 massacre. They were led to believe this by the Young 
 Turks, who had so long plotted the overthrow of Abdul 
 Hamid's despotism. During the campaign from 1890 to 
 1908, the Young Turks needed the money and the 
 brains of Armenians in the larger centres of popula- 
 tions where they had their foyers, and in the cities 
 abroad where they lived in exile. It cannot be doubted 
 that there was among the Young Turks, during the 
 period when they had to keep alive their ideals in the 
 fire of hope, an honest intention to give the Armenians 
 a share in the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire; 
 but as soon as they realized their ambitions, racial and 
 religious fanaticism came to them with such force that 
 they forgot the brilliant promises and the affectionate 
 intercourse of the days of suffering and struggle. 
 
 In the second place, the Armenians, unlike the Greeks, 
 the Macedonians, and the Arabs, had as a race no 
 separatist tendencies. They were not looking towards 
 another State to come and redeem them. They feared 
 Russia. They were too scattered to hope to form, by 
 the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, a State of their 
 own. They loved the land in which they lived with 
 all the passion of their nature. In many regions 
 Turkish was their native tongue. They were indus- 
 trious tillers of the soil, as well as merchants. The 
 Sultan could have had no more loyal subjects than 
 these, had he so desired. 
 
 Although the composition of the new Parliament 
 chosen in October, 1908, and of the first constitutional 
 Cabinet, was a prophecy of how they were to be left 
 out in the cold, the Armenians were throughout that 
 winter, when the Constitution was new, firm and 
 loyal, as well as intelligent, supporters of regenerated 
 
 12
 
 178 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Turkey. The wish was father to the thought. For 
 them there was no longer the barrier of race and creed. 
 All were Osmanlis, and willing to lose their identity in 
 the politically amalgamated race. The reign of Abdul 
 Hamid was a nightmare, quickly forgotten. The 
 future was full of hope. If only the Young Turks had 
 realized what a tremendous influence the Armenians 
 could have played in the creation of new Turkey, if 
 only they had been willing to use these allies, we 
 might have been able to write a different history of 
 the past few years in Europe. 
 
 But the awakening was to be cruel. It came in a 
 region of the Empire that never before experienced 
 the horrors of a general massacre, where Christians 
 felt not only at ease, but on friendly terms with their 
 Moslem neighbours. 
 
 On April 14, 1909, on a morning when the sun had 
 risen upon the peaceful and happy city of Ad ana, out 
 of a clear sky came the tragedy which was the beginning 
 of the end of the Ottoman Empire. Without provoca- 
 tion, the Moslem population began to attack and kill 
 the Christians. The Governor of the province and his 
 military officials not only did nothing whatever to stop 
 the bloodshed, but they actually handed out arms and 
 munitions to the blood-frenzied mob of peasants who 
 were pouring into the city. For three days killing, 
 looting, and burning of houses, was aided by the 
 authorities. The massacres spread west through the 
 great Cilician Plain to Tarsus, and east over the 
 Amanus Range into Northern Syria as far as Antioch, 
 where the followers of Jesus were first called Chris- 
 tians. The world, horrified by the stories which soon 
 made their way to the newspapers, realized that the
 
 THE YOUNG TURK R£GIME 179 
 
 " bloodless revolution " had not regenerated Turkey. 
 The blood had come at last, and without the regenera- 
 tion ! The Great Powers sent their warships to Mer- 
 sina, the port of Tarsus and Adana. Even from the 
 distant United States came two cruisers, under pres- 
 sure, over 6,000 miles. 
 
 In the meantime, events of great importance, but 
 not of equal significance in the future of Turkey, were 
 taking place at Constantinople. On the eve of the 
 first Adana massacre, Abdul Hamid, having corrupted 
 the soldiers of the Constantinople garrison, set in 
 motion a demonstration against the Constitution. The 
 soldiers shot down their officers in cold blood, marched 
 to Yildiz Kiosk, and demanded of the Sultan the 
 abolition of the Constitution, which they declared was 
 at variance with the Sheriat, the sacred law of Islam. 
 Abdul Hamid gladly consented. Popular sympathy 
 in Constantinople and throughout the Empire was 
 with the Sultan as far as the object of the revolution 
 went. But the way in which it was brought about 
 made it impossible for the Sultan to remain within the 
 pale of civilization. Of all nations, none relied on its 
 army more than Turkey. Were the assassination of 
 the officers to go unpunished, the disintegration of the 
 Empire necessarily followed; so the military hierarchy, 
 " Old " Turks as well as " Young," rose against the 
 Sultan. The army corps in Salonika, under the com- 
 mand of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, marched against 
 the capital, and with very little resistance mastered 
 the mutiny of the Constantinople garrison. Abdul 
 Hamid was deposed, and sent into exile at the Villa 
 Alatini at Salonika. His brother, Reschid Mohammed, 
 came to the throne under the title of Mohammed V.
 
 i8o THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 As soon as the Young Turks found themselves again 
 in control of the situation, even before the proclama- 
 tion of the new Sultan, they sent from Beirut to Adana 
 a division of infantry to " re-establish order." These 
 regiments disembarked at Mersina on April 25, the 
 day Mohammed V. ascended the throne. Immediately 
 upon their arrival in Adana, they began a second mas- 
 sacre, which was more horrible than the first. Thou- 
 sands were shot and burned, and more than half the 
 city was in ruins. This second massacre occurred in 
 spite of the fact that a dozen foreign warships were by 
 this time anchored in the harbour of Mersina. 
 
 It is impossible to estimate the losses of life and 
 property in the vilayets of Cilicia and Northern Syria 
 during the last two weeks of April, 1908. Not less 
 than 30,000 Armenians were massacred. The losses 
 of property in Adana alone were serious enough to 
 cause the foremost fire insurance company in France 
 to fight in the courts for two years the payments of 
 its claims. But it is not in the realm of our work to 
 follow out the local aftermath of this terrible story. 
 We are interested here only in its bearing on the for- 
 tunes of the Empire and of Europe. 
 
 From the very beginning, the Young Turks, now 
 re-established in Constantinople with a Sultan of their 
 own creation, and having nothing more to fear from 
 the genius and bad will of Abdul Hamid, protested 
 before Europe that the massacres were due to the old 
 regime, and that they had been arranged by Abdul 
 Hamid, whose deposition cleared them of responsi- 
 bility. But the revelations of the New York Herald, 
 the Tribuna of Rome, and the Berliner Tagehlatt, 
 translated and reprinted in the British, French, and
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME i8i 
 
 Russian Press, were so moving that it was necessary 
 for the Young Turks to send special commissions to 
 the capitals of Europe to counteract the impression of 
 these articles. 
 
 Europe was willing to accept the explanation of the 
 Constantinople Cabinet, and to continue its faith, 
 though shaken, in the intentions of the Young Turks 
 to grant to the Christians of Turkey the regime of 
 equality and security of life and property which the 
 Constitution guaranteed. Even the Armenians, ter- 
 rible as this blow had been, were also willing to forgive 
 and forget; but the condition of forgiveness and the 
 proof of sincerity of the declarations of the Young 
 Turks, both to the outside world and to the Armenians, 
 would be the punishment of those who had been guilty 
 of this most horrible blot upon the civilization of the 
 twentieth century. This was to be the test. 
 
 The court-martial sent to Adana from Constanti- 
 nople after the new Sultan was established upon the 
 throne, and the Young Turks were certain of their 
 position, had every guarantee to enable it to do its 
 work thoroughly and justly. It was not influenced or 
 threatened. There was, however, no honest intention 
 to give decisions impartially and in accordance with 
 the facts that the investigation would bring forth. 
 The methods and findings of the court-martial were a 
 travesty of justice. Its members refused absolutely to 
 go to the bottom of the massacre, and to punish those 
 who had been guilty. I happen to be the only foreign 
 witness whose deposition they took. They refused to 
 allow me to testify against the Vali and his fellow- 
 conspirators. The line of conduct had been decided 
 before their arrival. The idea was to condemn to
 
 i82 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 death a few Moslems of the dregs of the population, 
 who would probably have found their way to the gal- 
 lows sooner or later any way. With them were to be 
 hanged a number of Armenians, whose only crime was 
 that they had defended the lives and honour of their 
 women and children. The Vali of Adana, who had 
 planned the massacre and had carried it out, and two 
 or three Moslem leaders of the city who had co-operated 
 with him and with the military authorities in the effort 
 to exterminate the Armenians, were not even sent to 
 prison. No testimony against them was allowed to 
 be brought before the court-martial. They went into 
 exile " until the affair blew over." 
 
 When historians of a future generation are moved to 
 make researches into the downfall of the Young Turk 
 constitutional regime in Turkey, they will probably 
 find the beginning of the end in the failure to punish 
 the perpetrators of the Adana massacres. For this was 
 a formal notification to the Christians of Turkey that 
 the constitutional regime brought to them no guarantees 
 of security or justice, but, on the other hand, made their 
 position in the Empire even more precarious than it 
 had been under the despotism of Abdul Hamid. After 
 Adana the Armenian population became definitely 
 alienated from the constitutional movement, and was 
 convinced that its only hope lay in the absolute dis- 
 appearance of Turkish rule. 
 
 The Attempt to suppress the Liberties 
 OF THE Orthodox Church. 
 
 When Mohammed the Conqueror entered Con- 
 stantinople in 1453, he showed a wise determination to 
 continue the policy of his predecessors by preserving
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 183 
 
 the independence of the Orthodox Church. For he 
 knew well that the success of the Osmanlis had been 
 due to religious toleration, and that no durable empire 
 could be built in Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula, 
 by a Moslem Government, unless the liberties of the 
 Christian inhabitants were assured through the recog- 
 nition of the Greek patriarchate. The first thing that 
 Mohammed did was to seek out the Greek Patriarch, 
 and confirm him in his position as the political, as well 
 as the religious, head of Christian Ottoman subjects. 
 
 Islam is a theocracy. The spirit of its Government 
 is inspired by the sacred law, the Sheriat, based upon 
 the Koran and the writings of the earliest fathers of 
 Islam. Down to the smallest details, the organization 
 of the State, of the courts of justice, and of the social 
 life, of Mohammedan peoples, is influenced by ecclesi- 
 astical law, and by the power of the Church. As this 
 law does not provide for the inclusion of non-Moslem 
 elements either in the political or social life of the 
 nation, it has always been evident that people of 
 another religion, within the limits of a Moslem State, 
 can exist only if they have an ecclesiastical organization 
 of their own, with well-defined liberties, privileges, and 
 safeguards. 
 
 This principle was recognized by the Osmanlis for 
 over five hundred years; even the most despotic of 
 Sultans never dreamed of abandoning it. There might 
 be persecutions, there might be massacres, there might 
 be even assassination of Patriarchs, but until the Young 
 Turk regime no Ottoman Ministry ever dreamed of 
 destroying the organism which had made possible the 
 life of Moslem and Christian under the same rule. 
 
 The thesis of the Young Turks was, from a theoretical
 
 i84 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 standpoint, perfectly sound and just. They said that 
 ecclesiastical autonomy was necessary under a des- 
 potism, but that it had ceased to have a raison d'etre 
 under a constitutional government. The Constitution 
 guaranteed equal rights, irrespective of religion, to all 
 the races of the Empire. Therefore the Greek Church 
 must resign its prerogatives of a poHtical nature, for 
 they were wholly incompatible with the idea of con- 
 stitutional government. 
 
 Many foreigners, carried away by the reasonableness 
 of this argument, severely condemned the Orthodox 
 Church for continuing to resist the encroachments of 
 the new Government upon its secular privileges — 
 secular in both senses of the word. They attributed 
 the attitude of the Greek ecclesiastics to hostihty to the 
 Constitution, to the reactionary tendency of every 
 ecclesiastical organization, and to selfish desire to hold 
 firmly the privileges which enabled them to keep in 
 their clutches the Greek population of Turkey, and 
 continue to enjoy the prestige and wealth accruing to 
 them from these privileges. Such criticism only 
 revealed ignorance of history and a lack of appreciation 
 of the real issue at stake. 
 
 No ecclesiastical organization can, under a consti- 
 tutional government, continue indefinitely to be a 
 State within a State, and to enjoy peculiar privileges 
 and immunities. But the application of the Con- 
 stitution must come first. It must enter into the life 
 of the people. It must become the vital expression of 
 their national existence, evolved through generations 
 of testing and experimenting. The Constitution is 
 finally accepted and supported by a nation when and 
 because it has been found good, and has come to reflect
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 185 
 
 the needs and wishes of the people. Then, without 
 any great trouble, the ecclesiastical organization will 
 find itself gradually deprived of every special privilege. 
 For the privileges will have become an anachronism. 
 
 But, just as in the establishment of the Constitution, 
 in their attitude toward the Greek Church the Young 
 Turks acted as if the work of generations in othei 
 countries could be for them, in spite of their peculiarly 
 delicate problems and the differences in creed involved, 
 the act of a single moment. This mentality of the 
 half-educated, immature visionary has been shown in 
 every one of the numerous senseless and disastrous 
 decisions which have brought the Ottoman Empire so 
 speedily to its ruin. 
 
 The Greek Church resisted bitterly every move of the 
 Young Turks to bring about the immediate millennium. 
 The Patriarch was a man of wide experience, of sound 
 common-sense, and of undaunted courage. Backed by 
 the lay Assembly, which hab always been an admirable 
 democratic institution of the Orthodox Church, he 
 refused to give up realities for chimeras. With all its 
 privileges and all its power, it had been hard enough for 
 the Orthodox Church to protect the Greek subjects of 
 Turkey. The Patriarch did not intend to surrender 
 the safeguards by which he was enabled to make 
 tolerable the life of his flock, for illusory and untested 
 guarantees. Let the Constitution become really the 
 expression of the will of the people of Turkey, let it 
 demonstrate the uselessness of any safeguards for pro- 
 tecting the Christians from Moslem oppression, let the 
 era of Liberty and Equality and Fraternit}' actually be 
 realized in the Ottoman Empire, and then the Church 
 would resign its privileges. For they would be anti-
 
 i86 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 quated, and fall naturally into desuetude. But in 
 Constitutions, as in other things, the proof of the 
 pudding is in the eating. 
 
 What the Young Turks attempted to do was to 
 destroy the privileges of the Orthodox Church, on the 
 ground that these privileges were a barrier to the 
 assimilation of the races in the Empire. Americans, 
 above all nations, have deep sympathies for, and well- 
 justified reasons for having faith in, the policy of 
 assimilation. Have not the various races of Europe, 
 different in religion and in political and social customs,- 
 passed wonderfully through the crucible of assimilation 
 on American soil ? But by assimilation the Young 
 Turks meant, not the amalgamation of races, each co- 
 operating and sharing in the building up of the Father- 
 land, as in America, but the complete subjection and 
 ultimate disappearance of all other elements in the 
 Empire than their own. They intended, from the very 
 first days of the constitutional regime, to make Turkey 
 a nation of Turks. Theirs was the strong, virile race, 
 into which the other races would be fused. Turkey 
 was weak, they declared, because it was the home of a 
 conglomeration of peoples. If Turkey was to become 
 like the nations of Europe, these different nationalities 
 must be destroyed. To destroy them the Government 
 had first to aim at the foyer of national life, the eccle- 
 siastical hierarchies. 
 
 I have talked with many a zealous Young Turk. 
 What I have written here is not only the logical 
 interpretation of the facts. It is also the faithful ex- 
 pression of the ideas of the most earnest and intelligent 
 Turkish partisans of the new regime. They pointed 
 out, with perfect logic, that this process had gone on
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 187 
 
 in every European country, and that it was the only 
 way in which a strong nation could be built. So far they 
 were right. But, aside from the fact that in Europe 
 this political and social evolution had taken centuries, 
 there was also the working of the law of the survival 
 of the fittest. In European nations it had been the 
 element, always composite, which deserved to live that 
 formed the nucleus of a nationality. The whole root 
 of the question in Turkey was, were the Young Turks 
 justified in believing that the Turk was this element ? 
 
 There is not space to discuss the reasons for the 
 supremacy of the Osmanli in the Ottoman Empire. Up 
 to the eighteenth century the Osmanli was undoubtedly 
 the " fittest " element. For the past two hundred years 
 the continued domination of Turk and the continued 
 subjection of Christian populations in Turkey has been 
 due to causes outside of the Empire. The Turk has 
 remained the ruling race. But is he still the fittest ? 
 One may examine the different elements of the Ottoman 
 Empire, and measure them by the tests of civilization. 
 From the intellectual standpoint, from the business 
 standpoint, from the administrative standpoint, the 
 Turk is hardly able to sustain his claim to continue to 
 be, in a twentieth-century empire, the element which 
 can hope to assimilate Greek, Armenian, Albanian, 
 Slav, and Arab. He is less fit than any of the others, 
 especially than the Greek and Armenian in intellectual 
 and business faculties, and than the Albanian in 
 administrative faculties. There remains, then, as his 
 sole claim to dominate the other races, his physical 
 superiority. By history and by legend he is the 
 fighting man, and rules by right of conquest and force. 
 
 It was always the sane — and only safe — policy of the
 
 i88 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Turks to keep Christians out of the army . They saw to 
 it that the metier of arms remained wholly to the 
 Moslems. In spite of the increasing wealth and educa- 
 tion of the Christian elements of the Empire, the ascen- 
 dancy was preserved to the Turk through the army. 
 But at what a sacrifice ! By reason of military service 
 the Turkish peasant has been kept in economic and 
 intellectual serfdom, while his Christian neighbour 
 progressed. The Turkish population has actually 
 decreased, and the ravages of garrison life, due to 
 dyspepsia and syphilis, have diminished fearfully the 
 physical vigour of the race. By the same token, the 
 upper classes, knowing only the life of army officers, 
 have been removed from the necessity of competing 
 in the world for position and success. Can manhood 
 be formed in any other mould than that of competition, 
 where the goal is achievement, and is reached only by 
 continued effort of will and brain ? The upper-class 
 Turk is a parasite, and, like all parasites, helpless when 
 that upon which he feeds is taken from him. 
 
 The attack of the Young Turk party upon the Greek 
 Church failed. The Patriarch refused to surrender his 
 privileges. The Greek clergy and the Lay Council 
 held out under persecution and threats. In October, 
 1910, when the Lay Council met in Constantinople, its 
 members were arrested and thrown into gaol. In 
 Macedonia and Thrace, in the ^gasan Islands, along 
 the coast of Asia Minor, the Bishops and clergy suffered 
 untold persecutions. Some were even assassinated. 
 I shall never forget a memorable interview I had with 
 Joachim III. in the midst of that crisis. His Holiness 
 untied with trembling fingers the dossier of persecu- 
 tions, which contained letters and sworn statements
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 189 
 
 from a dozen dioceses. " They treat us like dogs !" he 
 cried. " Never under Abdul Hamid or any Sultan 
 have my people suffered as they are suffering now. 
 But we are too strong for them. We refuse to be 
 exterminated. I see all Europe stained with blood 
 because of these crimes." How prophetic these words 
 as I record them now ! 
 
 The Turk could not hope to assimilate the Greek 
 by peaceful methods, because he was his intellectual 
 inferior. When he planned to use force, the Balkan 
 alliance was formed. The Battle of Lule Burgas took 
 away from the Turk his last claim to fitness as dominant 
 race. He could no longer fight better than Christians. 
 The first Balkan War gave the coup de grace to the final 
 — and has it not been all along the only ? — argument 
 for Turkish racial supremacy. 
 
 The Cretan Question and the Greek Boycott. 
 
 The island of Crete had long been to Turkey, in 
 relation to Greece, what Cuba had been to Spain in 
 relation to the United States. In both cases, and about 
 the same time, wars of liberation broke out. But 
 Greece was not as fortunate in her efforts for the 
 emancipation of an enslaved and continually rebellious 
 population as was the United States. Powerless and 
 humiliated, after the war of 1897, Greece could no 
 longer hope to have a voice, by reason of her own 
 force, in the direction of Cretan affairs. Crete became 
 the foundling of European diplomacy. 
 
 Together with the declaration of Bulgarian inde- 
 pendence and the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina by Austria- Hungary, the Young Turks had to 
 face a decree of the Cretan Assembly to the effect that
 
 190 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Crete was indissolubly united to the kingdom of Greece. 
 The Young Turks could do nothing against Bulgaria. 
 For the ceremony of Tirnovo had been no more than 
 the de jure sanction of a de facto condition. The only 
 cause for conflict, the question of the railroads in 
 Eastern Rumelia, was solved by Russian diplomacy. 
 Against Austria- Hungary a boycott was declared. It 
 resulted in a few successful attempts to prevent the 
 landing of mails and freights from Austrian steamers, 
 and in the tearing up of several million fezes which 
 were of Austrian manufacture. These, by the way, 
 were soon replaced by new fezes from the same fac- 
 tories. The Sublime Porte settled the Bosnia-Herze- 
 govina question by accepting a money payment from 
 Austria- Hungary . 
 
 All the rancour resulting from these losses and 
 humiUation, all the vials of wrath, were poured upon 
 the head of Greece. The Cretan Question became the 
 foremost problem in European diplomacy. The Cre- 
 tans stubbornly refused to listen to the Powers, and 
 decided to maintain their decision to belong to Greece. 
 But Greece was threatened with war by Turkey if she 
 did not refuse to accept the annexation decree voted 
 by the Cretans themselves. In order to prevent 
 Turkey from attacking Greece, the Powers decided to 
 use force against the Cretans. Turkey, not satisfied 
 with the efforts of the Powers to preserve the Ottoman 
 sovereignty and Ottoman pride in Crete, demanded still 
 more of Greece. She asked that the Greek Parliament 
 should not only declare its disinterestedness in Crete, 
 but should take upon itself the obligation to maintain 
 that disinterestedness in the future. 
 
 To go into all the tortuous phases of the Cretan
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 191 
 
 question up to the time of the Balkan War would 
 make this chapter out of proportion; and yet Crete, 
 like Alsace-Lorraine, has had such a vital influence 
 upon the present European war, that I have allowed 
 myself the privilege of treating it at length in the next 
 chapter. The one point to be emphasized here is 
 that, to bring pressure to bear upon Greece in defining 
 her attitude toward Crete, the Young Turks decided 
 to revive the commercial boycott which they had used 
 against Austria. I have seen from close range the 
 notorious Greek boycott of 1910 to igi2. It was far 
 more disastrous to the Turks than to the Greeks of 
 Turkey. It threatened so completely, however, the 
 economic prosperity of Greece, which is a commercial 
 rather than an agricultural country, that it forced 
 Greece into the Balkan alliance much against her will, 
 for the sake of self-preservation. 
 
 If this boycott had been carried on against the 
 Greeks of Greece alone, it would not have affected 
 vitally the prosperity of the Greeks in the Ottoman 
 Empire. Their imports come from every country, and 
 for their exports the freight steamers of all the Euro- 
 pean nations compete. But it was directed also against 
 the Greeks who were Ottoman subjects. In Salonika, 
 Constantinople, Trebizond, Smyrna, and other ports, 
 commerce was entirely in the hands of Greeks. They 
 owned almost every steamer bearing the Ottoman flag. 
 They owned the cargoes. They bought and sold the 
 merchandise. The Young Turks, working through the 
 hamals, or longshoremen, and the boatmen who manned 
 the lighters — all Turks and Kurds — succeeded in tying 
 up absolutely the commerce of Ottoman Greeks. The 
 Greek mercbants and shippers were ruined. It was
 
 192 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 urged cleverly that this was the chance for Moslems 
 to get the trade of the great ports of Turkey into their 
 own hands. The Government encouraged them by 
 buying and maintaining steamship lines. But the 
 Turks had no knowledge of commerce, no money to 
 buy goods, and no inclination to do the work and 
 accept the responsibiUties necessary' for successful 
 commercial undertakings. The result was that im- 
 ports were stopped, prices went up, and the Moslems 
 were hurt as much as, if not more than, the Christians. 
 After several voyages the new Government passenger 
 vessels were practically hors de combat. There was no 
 longer first, second, and third class. Peasants squatted 
 on the decks and in the saloons. Filth reigned supreme, 
 and hopeless confusion. No European could endure a 
 voyage on one of these steamers, and no merchant 
 cared to entrust his shipments to them. 
 
 The boycott died because it was a hopeless under- 
 taking. For many months the Government lost 
 heavily through the falling off in the Custom-House 
 receipts. The labouring class (almost wholly Moslems) 
 of the seaports suffered terribly, as our labouring class 
 suffers during a prolonged strike. The boycott was 
 removed, Greeks were allowed to resume their business, 
 so essential for the prosperity of the community, and, 
 as is always the case in Turkey, everything worked 
 again in the same old way. 
 
 But just as the failure to punish the perpetrators 
 of the Adana massacre alienated definitely and irrev- 
 ocably the sympathy and loyal support of the Arme- 
 nian element from the constitutional regime, so the 
 boycott, iniquitous and futile, lost to the Young Turks 
 the allegiance of the Greeks of the Empire. Already
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 193 
 
 alarmed by the attack upon the liberties of the patri- 
 archate, the Greeks began to look to Greece for help ; 
 and in the islands of the ^gaean and in Macedonia the 
 hope was strong that a successful war might put an 
 end to what they were suffering. 
 
 The Greeks of Turkey are not free from the uni- 
 versal characteristic of human nature. You can per- 
 secute and browbeat a man, you can bully him and do 
 him physical injury, you can refuse him a share in the 
 Government, and put him in an inferior social position, 
 and he will continue to endure it. But rob him of 
 the chance of making a livelihood, and he will com- 
 mence to conspire against the Government. A man's 
 vital point is his pocket-book. That vital point the 
 Young Turks threatened by their boycott. 
 
 The Young Turks and the Macedonian Problem. 
 
 It was at Salonika that the Young Turk Movement 
 first gained its footing in the Ottoman Empire, and 
 until the loss of European Turkey, after the disastrous 
 war with the Balkan States, Salonika continued to be 
 the centre of the " Committee of Union and Progress." 
 Its congresses were always held there. From Salonika 
 the Third Army Corps went forth to suppress, in April, 
 1909, the counter-revolution in Constantinople. To 
 the Young Turks, Salonika seemed the safest place in 
 all the Ottoman dominions for the imprisonment of 
 Abdul Hamid. Many of the leading members of the 
 party were natives of Macedonia. In fact, it was 
 because the Young Turks saw clearly that European 
 Turkey would soon be lost to the Empire, unless there 
 was a regeneration, that they precipitated in 1908 the 
 revolution which had so long been brewing. 
 
 13
 
 194 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 It is natural, then, that the Macedonian problem 
 should be the first and uppermost of all the many 
 problems that had to be solved in the regeneration of 
 Turkey. The " Committee of Union and Progress " 
 saw that immediate action must be taken to strengthen 
 Ottoman authority, so severely shaken since the war 
 with Russia in the European vilayets. 
 
 We have already shown in the preceding chapter how 
 the struggle of races in European Turkey had made 
 Macedonia the bloody centre of Balkan rivalry, and 
 had reduced the vilayets of Uskub and Salonika to 
 anarchy. 
 
 Up to the coming of the constitutional regime, there 
 had been a very strong element in Macedonia, princi- 
 pally Bulgarian, which saw — oh, how prophetically ! — 
 that the liberation of Macedonia from Turkish rule 
 would endanger, rather than aid, the propaganda for 
 eventual Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. 
 These Bulgarians, wise in their day and generation 
 beyond their emancipated brethren, advocated the 
 intervention of Bulgarian arms, not to secure inde- 
 pendence, but autonomy. They felt that, by the crea- 
 tion for a period of years of an autonomous province 
 of Macedonia under the suzerainty of the Sultan, the 
 felicitous history of Eastern Rumelia would repeat 
 itself. 
 
 The Young Turks decided to solve the Macedonian 
 problem by strengthening the Moslem element in every 
 corner of the vilayets of Salonika and Uskub. The 
 means of doing this were at hand. After the annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish agents began 
 to work among the Moslem population in these countries 
 to induce them to emigrate and come under the do-
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 195 
 
 minion of the " Padishah," as the Sultan is called by 
 his faithful subjects. They were brought in and 
 settled, with the help of the Government, in those 
 districts of Macedonia where the Moslem element was 
 weak. This was a repetition of the policy of Abdul 
 Hamid after the Congress of Berlin, when in Eastern 
 Rumclia and Thrace, to oppose the Bulgarians, Circas- 
 sians from the lost Caucasus were settled, and, to oppose 
 the Servians, Albanian immigration into Old Servia 
 and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar was encouraged. 
 
 In addition to this, the Young Turks decided to 
 secure the loyalty of their Christian subjects in Euro- 
 pean Turkey by abolishing the karadj (head-tax), 
 which exempted Christians from military service, 
 Bulgarians, Greeks, and Servians, were summoned to 
 serve in the Ottoman Army. 
 
 The first of these measures should never have been 
 adopted. The bitter experience of former years 
 should have taught the Young Turks the lesson that 
 immigration of this nature not only tended to arouse 
 religious fanaticism, but also introduced an element 
 ignorant and unruly, and wholly worthless from the 
 economic point of view. It has often been recorded 
 that Moslems, prompted to the sacrifice of abandoning 
 everything for their love of remaining Turkish subjects, 
 have made these " treks " after the unsuccessful wars 
 of Turkey of their own initiative. Nothing is farther 
 from the truth. There has never been an exodus of 
 this sort which has not been due to the instigation of 
 political agents. From the very fact that large indus- 
 trious and influential Moslem elements have remained 
 and prospered under Russian, Bulgarian, and Austrian 
 rule, it can be inferred that those who yielded to the
 
 196 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 solicitation of Turkish agents were the undesirable 
 Moslem element who, never having acquired anything 
 where they were, had nothing to lose by making a 
 change. If one excepts a certain portion of the Cir- 
 cassians, the statement may well be made that these 
 emigrants — muhadjirs they are called in Turkish — are 
 an element forming the lowest dregs of the population, 
 as worthless and shiftless as the great majority of the 
 Jews whom the Zionist Movement has attracted to 
 Palestine. More than this, the muhadjirs have been 
 fanatical and lawless, and it is they whose massacres 
 of Christians have invariably ended in irretrievable 
 disaster for Turkey. 
 
 In Macedonia the muhadjirs, in conjunction with 
 the Albanian Moslem immigrants, were responsible for 
 the succession of massacres in 1912, such as those of 
 Ishtip and Kotchana, which helped to bring about the 
 Balkan alliance. The same thing is happening to-day 
 in the coast towns of Asia Minor and Thrace, where the 
 brutality and blood lust of the muhadjirs since 1913 
 will eventually cause another attack of Greece upon 
 Turkey. 
 
 The second policy — that of enrolling Christians in 
 the army — was recorded, back in the days of the first 
 attempt at the emancipation of Christians, the Tanzi- 
 mat of 1839, ^s a measure which would ameliorate 
 their lot and bring about equality. The idea was 
 splendid, but its application was impracticable. Otto- 
 man Christians are so wholly incompatible, from their 
 social and educational background, with Ottoman 
 Moslems, that they cannot be placed in the army in 
 mixed regiments without incurring humiliation, de- 
 gradation, and persecution of the most cruel sort.
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 197 
 
 The only way in which Christians could have been 
 called to serve in the Ottoman Army would have been 
 the formation at first of separate regiments, where 
 the soldiers would enjoy immunity from persecution. 
 When this reform was made, there should have been 
 also a provision from the very first that the ranks of 
 officers be recruited from the Christian elements in 
 the Empire, in proportion to their numerical strength. 
 But with both Christians and Jews obligatory army 
 service was used from the beginning — it is still used 
 to-day — as a means of extorting money from those 
 who could pay, and terrorizing and reducing to slavery 
 those who could not raise the £40 required for 
 exemption. Even if there were no religious fanati- 
 cism, even if it were not necessary for Christians of 
 intelligence to serve in an army wholly officered by 
 Moslems, the terrible and criminal conditions of service 
 which they were called upon to suffer would have 
 justified the Christians in adopting every possible 
 measure to avoid military service. 
 
 Throughout the Empire intelligent Christians who 
 could not purchase their freedom from this obligation 
 preferred exile to military service. From 1909 to 1914 
 Turkey has lost hundreds of thousands of its best 
 young blood. 
 
 The result in Macedonia of the coming of the mn- 
 hadjirs and the taking of Christians for the army was 
 that the Macedonians abandoned their advocacy of 
 autonomy, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and 
 looked to the Balkan States for freedom from Turkish 
 rule.
 
 198 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 The Albanian Uprisings. 
 
 Albania was never fully conquered by the Osmanlis. 
 Like the Montenegrins, the Albanians were always 
 able to resist the extension of Turkish authority in 
 their mountains. Not only did the nature of the 
 country favour them, but their proximity to the 
 Adriatic, and their ability to call at will for Italian 
 and Austrian help, made it advisable for the Supreme 
 Porte to compromise with them. Many Albanians, 
 including principally, as in Bosnia, the landowning 
 families, were converted to Mohammedanism, and 
 attached themselves to the fortunes of Turkey. With- 
 out ever giving up their local independence, these 
 renegade Albanians became the most loyal and efficient 
 supporters of Ottoman authority outside of Albania. 
 
 Turkey has gained much from the Albanians. Her 
 higher classes, endowed with extreme intelligence and 
 physical activity, have been the most valuable civil 
 and military officials that the Government has ever 
 experienced. Because they were Moslems, they were 
 able to take high positions in the army and Government 
 service. It is one of the most remarkable facts of 
 Ottoman history that the great majority of the really 
 great statesmen and soldiers of the Empire, if not of 
 Christian ancestry, have been, and still are, Albanians, 
 In strengthening the Turkish domination in the Euro- 
 pean provinces, after the period of decline set in, the 
 Albanians have been indispensable. Their emigration 
 from their mountains into Epirus, Old Servia, the 
 valley of the Vardar, and the coast towns of Macedonia, 
 checked for a long time the conspiracies and rebellions 
 of the Christian elements.
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 199 
 
 The Sultans of Turkey and their counsellors have 
 always recognized the value of the Albanians. In 
 return for their great services to the Empire, they were 
 allowed to retain their local privileges, This meant 
 independence, in reality, rather than autonomy. They 
 gave what taxes they pleased, or none. Military ser- 
 vice was rendered upon their own tenns. Christian 
 Albanians, as well as Moslem, have preferred Ottoman 
 sovereignty to any other. They have never thought 
 of independence, because this would have brought 
 them responsibilities and dangers from which, under 
 the fetish of " the integrity of the Ottoman Empire," 
 they were free. So they resisted every effort of Italian, 
 Austrian, Slav, and Greek, to weaken their allegiance 
 to the Sultan. Turkey also allowed them to remain 
 under the medieval conditions in which they lived 
 back in the fourteenth century. They wanted neither 
 railways, roads, nor ports. Among all the subjects of 
 the Sultan, the Albanians were best satisfied with the 
 absolute lack of progress under Moslem rule. These 
 are the reasons why the majority of Albanians want to 
 return once more to the fold of Turkey. 
 
 The Young Turks were no more felicitous in their 
 treatment of the Albanians than of the Greeks and 
 Arnienians. Without any consideration of the peculiar 
 problems involved, they decided immediately, tackling 
 every problem at once, that Albania must be civilized, 
 and that Ottoman sovereignty must work there in 
 exactly the same way as in any other part of the 
 Empire. Albanians must render military service, and 
 submit to being sent wherever the authorities at Con- 
 stantinople decided. Local independence must cease. 
 Taxes must be paid regularly. When the Albanians
 
 200 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 resisted, as they did immediately, an army was sent to 
 pacify the country. 
 
 One cannot but sympathize with the principle laid 
 down by the Minister of the Interior at Constantinople, 
 that the central authority must be recognized, and that 
 the only way to stamp out the Albanian anarchy was 
 to disarm the population. But the Young Turks knew 
 no other way of doing this than by force. They did 
 not realize that anarchy and lawlessness disappear 
 only with education and economic progress. Instead 
 of starting to " civilize " the Albanians by establishing 
 schools and opening up the country with railways, they 
 sent rapid-firing guns. In the summer of 1909 the 
 rebellion was stamped out with ruthless cruelty by the 
 burning of villages, the destruction of crops, and the 
 seizing of cattle. Such measures were a very poor 
 argument for the Albanian to induce him to comply 
 with the disarmament decree. Under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances an Albanian would rather lose his leg 
 than his gun. Under these circumstances, he preferred 
 risking his Kfe to giving up what he considered his only 
 means of defence. 
 
 Every year the Albanian rebellion broke out afresh. 
 Every year the Young Turks exhausted the strength 
 and spent the resources of their armies in European 
 Turkey against the invulnerable mountains of Albania. 
 After every " pacification," Albania in arms was just 
 as certain each May as the coming again of summer. 
 
 In 1912, when affairs were in a critical state as 
 regards their Christian neighbours, the Cabinet in 
 Constantinople was once more engaged in the hopeless 
 task of subduing Albanian opposition. The Albanians, 
 however, seemed to gain strength rather than lose it.
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 201 
 
 In September, 1912, I was in Uskub just four weeks 
 before the Balkan War broke out. The Albanian 
 chieftains were there, having made a truce for Ramazan 
 (the sacred month of the Moslem fasting). They said 
 to me that the next year, if the Turks did not stop 
 persecuting them, they would take their army to 
 Constantinople. Others were to get ahead of them, 
 and they were to win their independence without 
 having to fight the Turks again. The poor showing 
 of the Turkish arms against the Greeks and Servians 
 is very largely due to the exhaustion which had come 
 to them through continuous and unsuccessful attempts 
 to get the better of the Albanian uprisings. The 
 Balkan States knew how severely the western Mace- 
 donian army had suffered in July and August, 1912. 
 It was one of the considerations which decided them 
 to strike at that moment. 
 
 The Treatment of the Arabic Element. 
 
 In Asiatic Turkey there are supposed to be about 
 eight million Arabic-speaking inhabitants. These 
 figures may be an exaggeration, for no census has ever 
 been taken. But the vilayets are occupied almost 
 exclusively by Arabs and races speaking Arabic. They 
 form a half of the Empire's dominions in Asia, starting 
 with the Taurus and Amanus Ranges, south through 
 Syria to Arabia, and east and south-east through 
 Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. 
 
 These large stretches of territory were never thor- 
 oughly conquered by the Turks. They did not settle 
 there in the way they had done in the Balkan Peninsula, 
 outside of Albania and Montenegro, and in Asia Minor, 
 The race from which they had taken their religion, and
 
 202 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 from which they soon absorbed whatever culture and 
 art they can be said to possess, was never assimilated 
 by the Turks. Their simple warrior and herdsman 
 language was enriched by Arabic substantives, as 
 Anglo-Saxon was enriched by the Latin got through 
 the Normans and through the Church. But there was 
 no racial fusion. 
 
 Only in appearance did Turkish officialdom and the 
 authority of the Sultan ever get a real hold over the 
 Arabs, By habit they came to respect the Sultan as 
 Khalif. The allegiance which they gave him as ruler 
 was altogether without value — a pure matter of form. 
 An aggressive pasha found it easy to detach Egypt 
 from Turkish rule. It was conglomerate populations 
 and a lack of natural boundaries for forming States 
 that prevented the other Arabic portions of the Otto- 
 man Empire from following Egypt. In Arabia proper, 
 and in the larger portion of Mesopotamia, up to the 
 present day, the Arabs have been as independent of 
 the Sublime Porte as have been the Albanians. 
 
 In the reign of Abdul Hamid, when the idea of the 
 pan-Islamic movement was conceived, the importance 
 of joining the sacred cities of Medina and Mecca more 
 closely with the Turkish Empire was recognized. 
 French interests were building a railway across the 
 Lebanon Mountains to Aleppo and Damascus. The 
 Germans had launched their project for the Bagdadhahn. 
 Abdul Hamid decided to create a railway, directly 
 under Government control, from Damascus to Medina 
 and Mecca. For the first time since they were joined 
 to the Ottoman Empire the Arabic provinces saw them- 
 selves in prospective connection with the capital. It 
 had been for a long time easier and quicker to go from
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 203 
 
 Constantinople to the United States or to China than to 
 Baghdad or to Mecca. The railways would have one 
 of two results. Either the Arabs would be brought 
 more closely into connection with the Empire, or they 
 would be definitely alienated from it. 
 
 The Arabic Question stood thus when the Con- 
 stitution was re-established in 1908. There are many 
 Arabs among the Young Turks, but these, like the Slavs 
 in the military and official service of Austria- Hungary, 
 have been definitely alienated from their own nation- 
 ality. Here was the opportunity to bring into sym- 
 pathy with the constitutional movement the millions 
 of Arabic-speaking subjects of the Sultan, who formed 
 the most numerous Moslem element in the Empire. 
 But the Young Turks were no more tactful in the 
 treatment of the Arabs, who were mostly of their own 
 religion, than of the Greeks and Armenians. In the 
 first Parliament they were almost as unfair to Moslem 
 Arabs as to Christians. In the apportionment of places 
 in the Cabinet the Arabs were ignored. It is tnie that 
 some Cabinet members, some high officials both in 
 the military and civil administration, and some mem- 
 bers of the inner council of the " Committee of Union 
 and Progress," were of Arabic origin. But they must 
 be counted practically as Turks, for they had lived so 
 long away from their own country and their people that 
 they had lost all Arabic sympathies. Some who were 
 called Arabs were in reality members of the old Turkish 
 families, who in Mesopotamia, as in Syria and Egypt, 
 had received large tracts of land at the time of the 
 conquest, and had always been Turks by interests and 
 by atmosphere. The younger nationalistic Arabic 
 element, educated and living by professional or business
 
 204 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 interests in cities of the Arabic portion of the Empire, 
 was from the very beginning ignored. 
 
 Two things soon became evident. In the first place, 
 the Young Turks tried to impose their language in 
 local administration as the sole official language of 
 the Empire. In many places in Syria and Mesopo- 
 tamia, civil officials, even in the courts of justice, were 
 appointed without a knowledge of the language of the 
 people among whom they had to serve. In the 
 Balkans and in Asia Minor, where there were so many 
 races and so many tongues, the Turks were acting 
 reasonably and sensibly in imposing their own lan- 
 guage as a medium for the transaction of Government 
 business; but in vilayets which were wholly Arabic- 
 speaking the foisting of the Turkish language upon the 
 people could be likened to a bastard child endeavouring 
 to rule the branch of his family from which he had 
 received his best and purest blood. Before a year had 
 passed the educated, intellectual Arabs were wholly out 
 of sympathy with the new regime. Many of them 
 began to dream of the revival of the Arabian khalifate, 
 and looked to the nationalistic movement in Egypt as 
 the seed from which their pan-Arabic tree would some 
 day grow. Others, older and less sentimental, did not 
 hesitate to express a desire to see British or French 
 sovereignty extended over Syria and Mesopotamia. 
 
 In the second place, among the quasi-independent 
 tribes of the Syrian hinterland and of the Arabian 
 peninsula, the attempt of the Turks to destroy their 
 privileges ended in the same way as it had done in 
 Albania. From 1908 up to the outbreak of the Balkan 
 War millions of treasure and thousands of the best 
 soldiers of the Empire were lost in fruitless efforts to 
 realize the aspirations of the Young Turks. We cannot
 
 THE YOUNG TURK REGIME 205 
 
 even enumerate these rebellions. They were as peren- 
 nial as the Albanian uprisings, and as disastrous to the 
 Turkish Army. In Arabia rebellious Arabs treated 
 with the Italians. In Syria, beyond the Jordan, they 
 made a practice of tearing up the tracks and burning the 
 stations of the Hedjaz Railway. In Mesopotamia they 
 refused to respond to the obligation of military service. 
 
 This incomplete summary of the Young Turk regime 
 in the Ottoman Empire has been given to throw light 
 upon the collapse of the constitutional regime and of 
 the military reputation of Turkey. I have refrained 
 from going into a discussion of party politics, of in- 
 trigues, and of the bickerings of Parliament. Enough 
 has been told to show that the constitutional regime 
 was marked for failure from the beginning for three 
 reasons. There was no honest attempt to bring 
 together the various races of the Empire in a common 
 effort for regeneration. The Young Turks, having no 
 statesman among their leaders, depended upon un- 
 trained men and upon those Abdul Hamid had trained 
 in sycophancy and despotism. In spite of the heroic 
 and able efforts of the German military mission and 
 the British naval mission, no progress was made in 
 reforming the only force by which the Young Turks 
 could have held in respect and obedience the Sultan's 
 own subjects, as well as those foreign nations who were 
 looking for the opportunity to dismember the Empire. 
 
 If the hopes of the true friends of Turkey had been 
 realized, if only the Constitution had been applied, if 
 only there had been the will to regenerate Turkey, all 
 the wars of the past few years, including the one which 
 is now shaking Europe to its foundations, would have 
 been avoided.
 
 XII. 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 
 
 On November 19, 1910, the Cretan General Assembly 
 made a stirring appeal " to the four Great Powers who 
 are protectors of the island, to the two Great Powers 
 of Central Europe, to the great Republic of the New 
 World, to the liberal and enlightened Press of two 
 continents, and, in general, to all Christians, in favour 
 of the rights of the Cretan people which it represents — 
 rights acquired and made legal by so man}^ sacrifices 
 and sufferings." The Cretans definitely included the 
 United States and the American Press in this mani- 
 festo. They wanted the American people to become 
 acquainted with what was known to the Chancelleries 
 of Europe as " the Cretan question." For one-fifth 
 of the Cretans have members of their families in 
 America. There are few hamlets in the island into 
 which the spirit and influence of " the great Republic 
 of the New World " has not penetrated. 
 
 A review of the relationship between Crete and the 
 European Powers is as necessary in trying to throw 
 light upon the events which led up to the war of 1914 
 as is the exposition of the later phases of the Albanian 
 question. It helps us to grasp the attitude of the 
 Powers towards Turkey in the years immediately after 
 the proclamation of the Constitution, the tremendous 
 
 206
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 207 
 
 power of Hellenism under the wise and skilful guidance 
 of a statesman such as M.Venizelos has proved himself 
 to be, the importance of the Cretan question in pre- 
 cipitating the Balkan Wars, and the impotence of 
 European diplomacy to preserve the status quo, and 
 decide ex cathedra the destinies of countries like Crete 
 and Macedonia, whose emancipated kinsfolk had ac- 
 quired the spirit of the soldiers who sang: " As Christ 
 died to make men holy, let us die to make men free." 
 
 A century ago Crete was cut off from the out- 
 side world. It had been for 250 years under the 
 Turks, who took a pecuUar pride in the island from 
 the fact that it was their last great conquest. Its 
 Christian inhabitants, although forming the majority 
 of the population, lived, or rather existed, under the 
 same hopeless conditions as prevailed throughout 
 Turkey. In the seacoast towns the Christians pros- 
 pered better than the Moslems, owing to their aptitude 
 for commerce, but the bulk of the Christian population 
 was in abject slavery to the Turkish beys, who were 
 the great landowners. 
 
 The Greek war of liberation was shared in by the 
 Cretans, who lent valuable aid to their brethren of the 
 mainland. They endured all the sufferings of the war, 
 but reaped none of its rewards. It is quite possible 
 that they might have thrown off the Turkish yoke at 
 that favourable moment had it not been for the astute 
 policy of the Turks, who, seeing the danger of losing 
 Crete, handed it over to Mehemet AU in 1830 as a 
 reward for Egyptian aid in the Greek war and compen- 
 sation for the ships destroyed at Navarino. With the 
 downfall of Mehemet Ali's schemes of conquest in 1840, 
 the island reverted to Turkey. At this time the
 
 2o8 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Powers could easily have united Crete with Greece, 
 but deliberately sacrificed the Cretans to their com- 
 mercial rivalries. 
 
 Turkey never succeeded in gaining her former 
 ascendancy in Crete. Insurrection after insurrection 
 was drowned in blood. During two generations the 
 Turks sent into the unhappy island successive armies, 
 whose orgies of cruelty and lust are better left un- 
 described. But the tortures of hell could not extin- 
 guish the flames of liberty. Every few years the 
 Cretans would rise again and repay blood with blood 
 until they were overwhelmed by Anatolian soldiers, of 
 whom Turkey possesses an unlimited supply. 
 
 At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Greeks pled 
 with much force for the privilege of annexing Crete. 
 As we read them to-day, the arguments of M. De- 
 lyannes are a prophecy. The Powers put Crete back 
 under Ottoman control, subject to a reformed consti- 
 tution called the Pact of Helepa, which provided a 
 fairly good administration, if a capable and sincere 
 governor were chosen. Everything went well until 
 Sultan Abdul Hamid, in 1889, practically annulled the 
 solemn agreement he had made by appointing a Moslem 
 Governor-General, and reducing the representation in 
 the General Assembly in such a way that the Moslem 
 minority in the island came into power again. It 
 would be fruitless to go into the complex history of the 
 next seven years, during which the lawlessness of 
 former times was revived. 
 
 Christian refugees fled to Greece and carried the tale 
 of their sufferings. A massacre in Canea in February, 
 1897, engineered by Turkish officers fresh from similar 
 work in Armenia, had such a repercussion in Greece
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 209 
 
 that King George would have lost his throne had he 
 remained deaf to the popular demand that aid be sent 
 to the Cretans. Greek soldiers crossed to the stricken 
 island. This meant war with Turkey. In a few weeks 
 Greece was overwhelmed in Thessaly, and the Powers 
 were compelled to intervene. Much ridicule has been 
 cast upon Greece for her impotence in the war of 1897. 
 Her defeat was a foregone conclusion, and she was 
 severely blamed for having jeopardized the peace of 
 Europe, just as the Balkan States are being blamed 
 to-day. 
 
 But there are times when a nation simply has to fight. 
 So it was with Greece in 1897. In exactly similar cir- 
 cumstances, but with conditions less serious and an 
 issue not so long outstanding or so vital to national 
 well-being, the United States a year later declared war 
 on Spain. There was great similarity between the 
 Cretan situation in 1897 and those in 1912 in Crete and 
 in Macedonia. Refugees, crossing the borders and 
 telling unspeakable tales to their brothers of blood and 
 religion, were continually before the eyes of the Bul- 
 garians, and Servians, and Montenegrins, and Greeks, 
 since the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. 
 Each nationality suffered by massacres in Macedonia, 
 which were followed by no serious punishment. 
 
 Even though defeated in 1897, Greece forced the 
 hand of the Powers and of Turkey. Crete was given 
 autonomy, and placed under the protection of Italy, 
 Great Britain, France, and Russia, who occupied the 
 principal ports of the island. For a year and a half 
 they searched for a " neutral " Governor for the 
 Cretans. The Turkish troops, however, remained at 
 Candia, leaving the rest of the island to the revolu- 
 
 14
 
 210 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 tionaries. It was not until the British were attacked 
 in the harbour of Candia, and their Vice-Consul mur- 
 dered, that the Powers moved. But, as at Alexandria 
 in 1882, it was a bluff Admiral and not the diplomats 
 who settled the status of the island. The Turkish 
 troops were compelled to withdraw, and the Powers 
 were told that they would either have to appease the 
 Cretans by some encouragement of their aspirations or 
 conquer the island by force, A way out of the dilemma 
 was found in the appointment of Prince George of 
 Greece as High Commissioner of the protecting Powers 
 in Crete. 
 
 Here is where the Powers, if they had at that time 
 any intention of " preserving the rights of Turkey " in 
 Crete, made the first of their blunders. To call the son 
 of the King of Greece to the chief magistracy of an 
 island which had so long aspired to political union 
 with Greece was, in the eyes of the people, a direct en- 
 couragement to their aspirations. How could they 
 think otherwise ? The Turkish Cretans, too, regarded 
 this step as the end of Ottoman sovereignty, for they 
 emigrated in so great a number that soon the Moslem 
 population was reduced to 10 per cent. Prince 
 George's appointment, made in December, 1898, was 
 for three years, but really lasted eight. In 1906 he 
 withdrew because he had become hopelessly involved 
 in party politics, and had " backed the wrong 
 horses." 
 
 Now comes the second blunder, unless the Powers 
 were preparing Crete for union with Greece. They sent 
 a letter to the King of Greece, asking him to appoint a 
 successor to his son ! Let me quote from the exact 
 wording of this letter :
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 211 
 
 " The protecting Powers, in order to manifest their 
 desire to take into account as far as possible the aspira- 
 tions of the Cretan people, and to recognize in a prac- 
 tical manner the interest which His Hellenic Majesty 
 must always take in the prosperity of Crete, are in 
 accord to propose to His Majesty that hereafter, when- 
 ever the post of High Commissioner of Crete shall 
 become vacant, His Majesty, after confidential consul- 
 tations with the representatives of the Powers at 
 Athens, will designate a candidate capable of exer- 
 cising the mandate of the Powers in this island. ..." 
 
 Turkey naturally protested against the change in the 
 status quo which such a step implied, and pointed out 
 that it was a virtual destruction even of the suzerainty 
 of the Sultan. The Powers, however, did not object 
 to the publication of their note to the King of Greece 
 in the newspapers of Crete. M. Zaimis, a former 
 Prime Minister of Greece, was appointed High Com- 
 missioner. The island had its own flag and postage 
 stamps, and laws identical with those of Greece. 
 Cretan officers in Greek uniform commanded the 
 militia and constabulary of the island. Turkey treated 
 Crete as a foreign country. For this statement there 
 is no more conclusive proof than the records of the 
 Custom-Houses at Smyrna and Salonica, which show 
 that Cretan products were subjected to the same 
 duties as were applied to all foreign imports. 
 
 It would seem, then, that Crete was in practically 
 the same position as Eastern Roumelia in 1885, or, in 
 fact, as Bulgaria herself. Nothing was more natural 
 than that the establishment of a constitutional regime 
 in Turkey should lead to a proclamation of union with 
 Greece. The motives which led to this action were 
 identical with those which Austria- Hungary put forth
 
 212 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 as an explanation of her annexation of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina. The Cretans quite justly feared that 
 the Young Turks would repudiate the obligations 
 assumed by Abdul Hamid, and endeavour to bring 
 Crete back into the Turkish fold. At the moment 
 Turkey was so engrossed in the question of the Austrian 
 annexation and the Bulgarian declaration of inde- 
 pendence and seizure of the railways in Eastern 
 Roumelia that she contented herself with a formal 
 protest against the action of the Cretan Assembly. 
 
 What did the Powers do ? Turkey, at the moment, 
 could have done nothing had they recognized the union 
 with Greece. But they did not want to go so far as 
 that. On the other hand, they did not want to offend 
 Greece and the Cretans. They made no threats, and 
 took no action, although their troops were in the island. 
 Inaction and indecision were made worse by the follow- 
 ing note, which was sent by the four Consuls at Candia 
 to the self-appointed Provisional Government : 
 
 " The undersigned agents of France, Great Britain, 
 Italy, and Russia, by order of their respective Govern- 
 ments, have the honour of bringing to the knowledge 
 of the Cretan Government {sic) that the protecting 
 Powers consider the union of Crete to Greece as depend- 
 ing upon the assent of the Powers who have contracted 
 obligations with Turkey. Nevertheless they would not 
 refuse to envisage with kindly and sympathetic interest 
 the discussion of this question with Turkey, if order 
 is maintained in the island and if the safety of the 
 Moslem population is secured." 
 
 That diplomatic sanction would sooner or later be 
 given to the action of the Cretans, if they showed their 
 ability to preserve order in the island and treat the 
 Moslems well, is an altogether justifiable interpreta-
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 213 
 
 tion of this note of the Powers. Otherwise, would they 
 not have protested against the illegahty of the Pro- 
 visional Government, and have forbidden the Cretan 
 authorities to promulgate their decrees in the name of 
 King George ? Although the High Commissioner had 
 disappeared, and the Cretans were running the island 
 just as if the annexation were an assured fact, the 
 Powers, far from protesting, announced their intention 
 of withdrawing their troops of occupation ! 
 
 What were their intentions concerning Crete, and 
 what was their understanding of the status quo at the 
 moment of withdrawal ? This question they did not 
 answer then, nor did they answer it afterwards. They 
 simply withdrew from the island without stating what 
 legal power was to succeed them. This was in the 
 summer of 1909. M. Venizelos, then Prime Minister 
 of Crete, asked the Powers definitely to state their 
 intentions. He said that he did not wish to run counter 
 to the orders of the Powers, but that he would have to 
 raise the flag of Greece over the island when their troops 
 left, unless they formally forbade him to do so. With 
 admirable clearness and irrefutable logic he pointed 
 out to the Powers that the only other alternative 
 would be anarchy. But the Powers, pressed by their 
 Ambassadors at Constantinople, were afraid to assent 
 to annexation. They were equally averse to taking 
 the opposite course. So they contented themselves 
 with giving M. Venizelos " friendly counsels " not to 
 hoist the Greek flag. The result was the ludicrous 
 spectacle of the cutting down of the Greek flag by 
 marines landed from eight warships. It was like a 
 scene from a comic opera, and M. Venizelos must have 
 formed then the opinion which every succeeding action
 
 214 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 of the Powers strengthened and to which he gave 
 expression after the Balkan War was declared — that 
 the Powers were " venerable old women," 
 
 Crete now began to be menaced by the insensate 
 chauvinism of the Young Turks, who thought they 
 could avenge the loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
 Bulgarian declaration of independence by destroying 
 the autonomy of Crete and re-establishing the authority 
 of the Sultan in this island which had been repudiating 
 the Ottoman Government for eighty years. In the 
 spring of 1910 the Tanine, at that time the official organ 
 of the Committee of Union and Progress, laid down 
 five points as the minimum which the Porte would 
 accept in the definite and permanent solution of the 
 status of Crete : 
 
 1. Formal recognition of the rights of the Sultan. 
 
 2. The right of the Sultan to name the Governor- 
 General of the island among three Cretan candidates 
 elected by the General Assembly. 
 
 3. The right of the sheik-ul-Islam to name the 
 religious chiefs of the Cretan Moslems. 
 
 4. Establishment in the Bay of Suda of a coaling- 
 station for the Ottoman fleet, and the maintenance 
 there of a permanent stationnaire like the stationnaires 
 of the Embassies at Constantinople. 
 
 5 . Restriction of the rights of the Cretan Government 
 in the matter of conclusion of treaties of commerce and 
 agreements with foreign powers. 
 
 What the " rights of the Sultan " might be was not 
 specified then, nor has it been since; but articles four 
 and five were enough to throw the whole of Crete into 
 a state of wildest excitement. The Turks, after having 
 lost the island, were trying to win it back. 
 
 Left to themselves (as they had every reason to
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 215 
 
 believe), the Cretans convoked the National Assembly 
 for April 26, 1910. The Assembly was opened in the 
 name of George L, King of the Hellenes. The Moslem 
 deputies immediately presented a protest in which they 
 rejected the sovereignty of Greece over Crete. The 
 deputies were then asked to take the oath of allegiance 
 in the name of King George. A second petition was 
 presented by the Moslem deputies, declaring that, as 
 the Sultan of Turkey held " sovereign rights " in the 
 island, they, in the name of their Moslem constituents, 
 protested against such an action. They refused to 
 take the oath. Should they be excluded from the 
 Assembly, or be allowed to sit without taking the 
 oath ? 
 
 Instead of insisting on the admission of the Moslem 
 deputies, the Powers again gave " friendly counsels." 
 Once more M. Venizelos pleaded that they speak out 
 their mind in the matter of the legal status of the 
 island. The diplomats " temporized " again, and the 
 warships reappeared to assure to the Moslem deputies 
 " their lawful rights." When M. Venizelos could get no 
 statement from the Powers as to the grounds upon 
 which these " lawful rights " rested, he saw that all 
 hope of help from the Powers was over, and that he was 
 only wasting his time. Like Cavour, when he turned 
 with disgust from his efforts to interest the Powers and 
 had the inspiration, Italia faro da se, the Cretan leader 
 abandoned the antechamber of the Chancelleries. 
 While the Powers still sought a modus vivendi for 
 Crete, M. Venizelos made one. From that moment the 
 Balkan War was a certainty. 
 
 The Young Turk Cabinet, arrogant and drunk with 
 the success of their boycott against Austria-Hungary,
 
 2i6 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 and at the same time knowing that they must turn 
 pubUc attention away from the loss of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, began to press the Powers for the restora- 
 tion in Crete of the status quo as it had existed before the 
 diplomatic blunders I have outlined above, and, in 
 addition, for the coaling-station and for control over 
 Crete's foreign relations. At the same time, they 
 demanded of the Athens Cabinet that Greece renounce 
 formally, not only for the present, but also for the future, 
 any intention of annexing Crete. The Young Turks 
 represented that public opinion in Turkey was so 
 wrought up over the Cretan question that war with 
 Greece would certainly follow. To illustrate to the 
 Powers and to Greece the force of this public opinion, a 
 widespread boycott against everything Greek in Turkey 
 was started. This economic warfare is described in 
 another chapter. In some parts of Turkey the boycott 
 has never ceased . 
 
 There is no doubt that this boycott was one of the 
 most important factors in bringing on the Balkan 
 War; for it taught the Greeks, who were continually 
 being bullied and threatened with an invasion in 
 Thessaly, the imperative necessity of reconciliation 
 with Bulgaria by a compromise of rival claims in 
 Macedonia. 
 
 Thinking that he could serve his country better in 
 Greece than in Crete, M. Venizelos posed his candidacy 
 to the Greek Chamber in the summer of 1910. Seem- 
 ingly, he was abandoning Crete to its fate, and he had to 
 bear many unjust reproaches from his fellow-country- 
 men. His wonderful personality and extraordinary 
 political genius soon brought him to the front in Greece. 
 The Cretan revolutionary became Prime Minister of
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 217 
 
 Greece. Steadfast in his purpose, he began to negotiate 
 with the other Balkan States and with Russia. He 
 was able to accomplish the impossible. The war with 
 Turkey is largely his personal success. No statesman 
 since Bismarck has had so brilliant a triumph. 
 
 In 1910 M. Venizelos took the step which was the 
 turning-point in his career and in the history of Greece. 
 Firmly persuaded that Crete could be annexed to 
 Greece only by Greece proving herself stronger than 
 Turkey, and not by diplomatic manoeuvres, he decided 
 to desert Cretan politics, and enter the larger sphere 
 open to him at Athens. It was easy to secure a seat in 
 the Greek Parliament, but that was the only easy part 
 about it. When one considers the fickle character of 
 the Greek people in their poHtics, the selfish narrowness 
 and bitter prejudices of their leaders, the inefficiency of 
 the army and navy, whose officers had been ruined by 
 political activity, the emptiness of the Treasury, the un- 
 popularity of the Royal Family, and the general disorder 
 throughout the country, it seems incredible that 
 M. Venizelos should have been willing to assume the 
 responsibility of Government, let alone succeed in his 
 self-imposed task. Had you asked the leading states- 
 men of Europe five years ago what country presented 
 the most formidable and at the same time most hopeless 
 task for a Premier, there would have been unanimity in 
 selecting Greece. 
 
 But for Eleutherios Venizelos there was no difficulty 
 which could not be overcome. It is the nature of the 
 man to refuse to see failure ahead. " If one loves to 
 work, and works for love," he has declared, " failure 
 does not exist." 
 
 Called to be Prime Minister in August, 1910, M.
 
 2i8 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Venizelos began to reform everything in sight. His 
 first step was to endow Greece with a new Constitution, 
 whose most important changes were a Council of 
 State, chosen for Hfe and irremovable, to act as a 
 Senate (Greece has single-chamber government), legal- 
 izing the state of siege, sanctioning the employment of 
 foreigners in the service of the Government, fixing 
 twenty-four hours as the maximum delay for bringing 
 one who had been arrested before a magistrate, for- 
 bidding the publication of uncensored news relative to 
 military and naval operations in time of war, establish- 
 ing free, obligatory primary instruction, excluding 
 from Parliament directors of incorporations, and 
 facilitating the expropriation of property for public 
 purposes. I have given enough to show the practical 
 character of the new Constitution. 
 
 Although strongly urged to do so, both by the King 
 and by the political leaders, M. Venizelos refused to 
 turn his Constituent Assembly into an ordinary Parlia- 
 ment, and proceed to the legislation made possible 
 by the new Constitution. Seeing clearly that durable 
 and effective ministerial power could be derived only 
 from the people, and supported only by their intelli- 
 gent good-will, he balked the intrigues of the poli- 
 ticians, and overcame the dynastic fears of the King. 
 The Constituent Assembly was dissolved. M. Veni- 
 zelos went before the people, travelling everywhere, 
 and explaining his programme for the reformation of 
 the country. The result was a triumph such as no 
 man has ever received in modern Greece. In No- 
 vember, 1910, followers of M. Venizelos were returned 
 in so overwhelming a majority that he could afford 
 to ignore the Athenian politicians, who saw in him a
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 219 
 
 menace to their personal rule, their sloth, and their 
 " graft." 
 
 Since that day M. Venizelos has been the idol of 
 Greece. Never has trust in public man been more 
 amply justified. Every administration of the State 
 was completely transformed within eighteen months. 
 Even to outline what M. Venizelos hcis accomplished 
 reads like a fairy tale. Only those who knew the 
 Greece before his arrival, and are able to contrast it 
 with the Greece of to-day, can appreciate the immensity 
 of his labours and the radical character of the changes 
 he has made. I cannot dwell on the talent shown by 
 this Cretan in matters of financial reform. But his 
 military and naval reforms and his foreign policy have 
 been so important in making the Balkan alliance and 
 its successes possible, that they cannot be passed over. 
 
 M. Venizelos, when he first came to Athens, saw what 
 was the matter with the Greek military and naval 
 establishments. Like Peter the Great and the 
 Japanese, he realized that the Greeks must learn from 
 Europe by submitting to European teachers. To 
 persuade his fellow-countrymen, who have a very 
 exalted opinion of their own ability (the Greeks are 
 always sure they were born to command, without 
 having learned first to obey !), that they must not only 
 call in foreign advisers, but must submit to their 
 authority, has been the most Herculean of the tasks 
 this great man set before him. Article Three of the 
 new constitution had authorized the appointment of 
 foreigners as officers of the Government, and given 
 them temporarily Hellenic citizenship. From England 
 was asked a naval mission, from France a military 
 mission, and from Italy officers to reorganize the
 
 220 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 gendaimerie. In Greece the foreign officers were able 
 to accomplish more in eighteen months than the 
 foreign " advisers " of Turkey had accomplished in 
 many long years. This is no assertion of personal 
 opinion. The facts of the Balkan War speak for them- 
 selves. Why is this ? In Turkey the foreign teachers 
 have never been given any real authority, and have 
 seen every effort they put forth nullified by the in- 
 souciance, self-sufficiency, and cursed apathy of the 
 Turk. The Greeks, on the contrary, " became as 
 little children," and lo ! a miracle was wrought ! 
 
 When foreigners who visited Greece within recent 
 years read about the successes of the Crown Prince at 
 Salonika and Janina, the assassination of King George, 
 the mourning of the Greek people, and the hearty 
 acclamation of King Constantine, the national hero, 
 they could think back to less than four years ago, 
 when the Crown Prince was practically banished from 
 Greece, after having been dismissed from his command 
 in the army by a popular uprising, and when the por- 
 trait of the King was removed from every coffee-house 
 in Athens. What is the cause of the complete revul- 
 sion in public feeling towards the dynasty ? It is 
 due to the common sense of M. Venizelos. He saw 
 that the present dynasty was necessary for Greece, 
 and that the Crown Prince must come back and take 
 command of the army. In defiance of public opinion, 
 he insisted on this point. This attitude was a bitter 
 disappointment to many who imagined that M. Veni- 
 zelos would be antidynastic in his policy. As a result 
 of his success in reconciling the Greeks to their sove- 
 reign and his family, the sympathies of Russia and Ger- 
 many and Great Britain were not alienated from the
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 221 
 
 Greek people, as was rapidly becoming the case. 
 Emperor William especially, whose sister is wife of the 
 new Greek King, was so delighted with the success of 
 M. Venizelos in rehabilitating his brother-in-law that 
 he asked the Greek Premier to visit him at Corfu. 
 
 This visit of the former Cretan revolutionary to the 
 German Emperor in April, 1912, was hardly commented 
 upon by the European Press. But epoch-making 
 words must have been spoken in the villa Achilleion, 
 for immediately after that visit the semi-ofhcial 
 German press began to prepare the public for the 
 events which were to take place in the Balkans. The 
 eloquence and remorseless logic which had carried the 
 day among Cretan insurgents and Greek electors was 
 not lost on the "war-lord of Europe." Emperor 
 William carried back to Berlin the conviction that no 
 diplomacy could outwit the Greek Premier's deter- 
 mination that Turkey should disappear from Crete and 
 Macedonia. 
 
 I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that 
 when the Young Turks, by their insensate chauvinism, 
 caused M. Venizelos to despair of saving Crete through 
 Crete itself, they signed their own death-warrant. If 
 they had refrained from their boycott, and let Crete 
 alone, would M. Venizelos have gone to Greece ? I 
 think not. It is one of those strange coincidences of 
 history that on the very day when Mahmoud Shevket 
 Pasha, in the Ottoman Parliament, declared that if 
 Greece did not make a public statement to the effect 
 that she had no intention at any time to extend her 
 sovereignty over Crete, a million Turkish bayonets 
 would gleam upon the plains of Thessaly, Eleutherios 
 Venizelos was quietly leaving Crete for Athens.
 
 222 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 To bring together Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and 
 Montenegro into an alliance which would drive the 
 Turk out of Europe was in the mind of M. Venizelos 
 as far back as the summer of 1909, when he saw the 
 international fleet at Canea land marines to cut down 
 the Greek flag which he had raised. It became an 
 obsession with him. It was possible, because he 
 believed it was possible. But no one else regarded it 
 as more than an idle dream. The rare friends to whom 
 M. Venizelos vaguely hinted that such an alliance was 
 the only way of solving the Balkan question called it 
 the " acme of absurdity." I quote the words of an 
 eminent diplomat to whom this solution was men- 
 tioned. At the opening of the Italian War, when I 
 suggested to the Turkish Grand Vizier that such an 
 alliance was possible, he looked at me pityingly, and 
 said: " The questions you ask display your ignorance 
 of conditions in this part of the world. My time is 
 too valuable to discuss such an impossible hypothesis. 
 Go to Hussein Hilmi Pasha, and ask him if he thinks 
 the Greeks and Bulgarians could ever unite." Hussein 
 Hilmi Pasha referred me to every single book that has 
 ever been written about the Macedonian question. " I 
 do not care which you read," said the ex-Governor- 
 General of Macedonia, " they all tell the same story." 
 
 But M. Venizelos was not asking himself, " Can I 
 do it ?" but " How shall I do it ?" Once more he saw 
 clearly. The pan-Hellenic national ideal must be 
 given up. Greece must content herself with Epiros, 
 the ^gaean Islands, Crete, and a slice of Macedonia 
 west of the Vardar — possibly including Salonika, if 
 the army proved as victory-winning as those of Bul- 
 garia and Servia. Everything else must be left to
 
 CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 223 
 
 Bulgaria and Servia. When first proposed to the 
 leaders of Greece, this proposition seemed so pre- 
 posterous that M. Venizelos was* accused of being a 
 traitor to Hellenism. He is still denounced by the 
 fanatics, after all that he has accomplished. But 
 patiently he built up his argument, using all his mag- 
 netism and his eloquence to convince his colleagues. 
 He showed how Greece was being constantly humili- 
 ated and menaced by the chauvinism of the Young 
 Turks, how the boycott was mining Greek shipping, 
 how Crete itself would gradually get to like indepen- 
 dence better than union with Greece, and how in- 
 evitable it was that the Slavs should in the course of 
 time come to possess Thrace and Macedonia. " In- 
 stead of sacrificing everything to Bulgaria," he main- 
 tained, " this is our only chance to get any part of 
 European Turkey. We must give up our ideal, because 
 it is impracticable. With Bulgaria, we can crush 
 Turkey. Without Bulgaria, Turkey will crush us. 
 And if Bulgaria helps, we must pay the price." It 
 may be years — not until archives are open to his- 
 torians and memoirs of present actors are published — 
 before everything is clear concerning the formation 
 of an alliance which was as great a surprise to Europe 
 as it was to Turkey. But the famous telegram which 
 M. Gueshoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, addressed to 
 his colleagues at Athens after the first successes of the 
 war were won is sufficient testimony to the essential 
 part played by M. Venizelos in forming the coalition. 
 
 After M. Venizelos left Crete, a last blunder made 
 the protecting Powers the laughing-stock of Europe. 
 The Cretans elected deputies to the Greek Chamber, 
 and the warships of the Powers played hide-and-seek
 
 224 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 with small Cretan craft in a fruitless endeavour to 
 prevent the chosen deputies from proceeding to Athens. 
 This move was altogether unnecessary, for they had 
 not yet learned the matchless worth of their opponent. 
 M. Venizelos, knowing that Greece and her new allies 
 were not yet ready for war with Turkey, " tipped off " 
 both the Cretans and the leaders in the Greek Parlia- 
 ment that they would have to wait one or two years 
 longer. But, to satisfy the hoi polloi on the one hand 
 and the diplomats on the other, a little comedy was 
 enacted before the Parliament House in Athens which 
 threw wool over everybody's eyes. 
 
 As soon as he saw that war was inevitable, and that 
 his alhes were ready, M. Venizelos admitted the Cretan 
 deputies. Europe was face to face with difait accompli. 
 The Cretan and Macedonian questions were settled by 
 war. The hand of Turkey and the diplomats was forced . 
 
 Now we see the importance of the Cretan question. 
 The Balkan War could have been avoided by a 
 courageous and straightforward policy of efficient 
 protection of Christians who lived under the Ottoman 
 flag. It is because the Powers did not fulfil the obliga- 
 tions of the Treaty of Berlin, and sacrificed Cretans 
 and Bulgarians and Servians and Greeks to the further- 
 ings of their commercial interests at Constantinople, 
 that all Europe is now stained with blood. By flatter- 
 ing the Turk and condoning his crimes, the Powers 
 succeeded in destroying " the integrity of the Ottoman 
 Empire," which they professed to uphold. In trying 
 to be the friends of the Turk they proved his worst 
 enemies. 
 
 The Cretan question is a commentary upon the utter 
 futility of insincere and procrastinating diplomacy.
 
 XIII. 
 
 THE WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 
 
 Since the days when Mazzini, looking beyond the 
 almost irrealizable dream of Italian unity, said in his 
 Paris exile, " North Africa will belong to Italy," a new 
 Punic conquest has been the steadfast hope of the 
 Italians. France had already started her conquest of 
 Algeria when Mazzini spoke, and was mistress of the 
 richest portion of the southern Mediterranean littoral 
 before the Italian unification was completed. Late 
 though they were in the race, the Italians began to 
 try to realize their dream by sending thousands of 
 colonists to Egypt and to Tunis. But the events of 
 the years 1881-1883 in these two countries, consum- 
 mated by the Convention of London in 1885, gave 
 Egypt to England and Tunis to France. Italy was 
 too weak at the time to protest, and Germany had not 
 yet begun to develop her Weltpolitik. 
 
 For some years Italian colonial aspirations were 
 directed towards Somaliland and Abyssinia. The 
 Battle of Adowa in 1896 was a death-blow to the hopes 
 of founding an Italian empire of Erythrea. Ten years 
 ago Giolitti received a portfolio in the Zanardelli 
 Ministry, and ever since then there has been a new 
 Cato at Rome, crying, " Tripoli must be taken !" By 
 the Franco-Italian protocol of 1901, it was agreed 
 
 225 15
 
 226 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 that, if France should ever extend her protectorate 
 over Morocco, Italy should have the Tripolitaine and 
 Barca, with the Fezzan as a hinterland. This " right " 
 of Italy was recognized at the international conference 
 of Algeciras in 1906, and has since been accepted in 
 principle by the European Cabinets. 
 
 Throughout the past decade Italy was quietly pre- 
 paring to seize Tripoli — peacefully, if possible, and if 
 not, by force. Had Italy been ready, Turkey would 
 have lost Tripoli in the autumn of 1908, when Bulgaria 
 declared her independence and Austria annexed Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina. Internal politics made a bold 
 stroke impossible at that favourable moment. 
 
 To accomplish her purpose, Italy worked along two 
 lines. She tried to make her economic position so 
 strong in Tripoli that the country would virtually 
 belong to her and be exploited by her without any 
 necessity for a change in its political status, until 
 Arabs and Berbers, choosing between prosperity under 
 Italy and poverty under Turkey, would of their own 
 accord expel the Turks. Foreseeing a possibility of 
 failure in this plan, she at the same time prepared for 
 a forcible occupation of the country. 
 
 Immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, the Italian 
 Ministries of War and Marine began to make a study 
 of the question of transporting troops and landing 
 them under the cover of a fleet. Tourists who were 
 in Italy during the summer of 1904 will remember the 
 famous dress rehearsal of the Tenth Army Corps. 
 Some 6,000 men, completely provided with horses, 
 ammunition, artillery, and provisions, were embarked 
 in eleven hours. The convoy put to sea, escorted 
 by a squadron of battleships and torpedo-boats, in
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 227 
 
 two columns of five transports each. Despite a heavy 
 swell, these troops and all their stores were landed 
 in the Bay of Naples in sixteen hours. I wonder 
 if many who were watching and applauding on that 
 memorable day understood why Italy was practising 
 so assiduously landing from transports — and under 
 the protection of the fleet. For what war was she 
 preparing in time of peace ? In 1907 the Minister 
 of Marine announced in the Italia Militare that Italy 
 could send 70,000 troops upon a distant expedition 
 oversea, and 114,000 for a short journey not exceedwg 
 two nights at sea ! 
 
 The peaceable conquest of Tripoli was cleverly con- 
 ceived, and has been faithfully tried. Branches of the 
 Banco di Roma were established at Tripoli and Ben- 
 ghazi and for the first time since the days of Imperial 
 Rome a serious attempt was made to develop the 
 agricultural and commercial resources of the country. 
 The natives were encouraged in every enterprise, and 
 managed in such a way that they became — in the 
 vicinity of the seaports and trading-posts, at least — de- 
 pendent for their livelihood upon the Banco di Roma. 
 Italian steamship lines, heavily subsidized, maintained 
 regular and frequent services between Tunis and Tripoli 
 and Benghazi and Derna and Alexandria. The more 
 enterprising natives travelled for a few piastres to 
 Alexandria, and the object-lesson of contrast was 
 left without words to work its effect upon them. The 
 admirable Italian parcel post system — one of the 
 most successful in Europe — extended its operations into 
 the hinterland, and captured the ostrich feather trade. 
 The Italians began to talk of making secure the routes 
 to Ghadames and Ghat and Murzuk, and of establishing,
 
 228 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 for the interior, postal and banking facilities that these 
 regions could never hope to have under Turkish ad- 
 ministration. Railways were contemplated as soon as 
 they could be financed entirely by Italian capital. 
 
 The Italian schemes were working beautifully, when 
 the birth of New Turkey in the revolution of July, 1908, 
 changed the whole situation. The indolent and corrupt 
 officials of the Vilayet of Tripoli and Sanjak of Ben- 
 ghazi, whose attention had been turned from Italian 
 activities by Italian gold pieces, were replaced by 
 members of the Union and Progress party. These new 
 officials, owing to their utter inexperience and their 
 sense of self-esteem, may have been no better than the 
 old ones; probably they proved as inefficient, for 
 executive power is not inherent in the Turkish charac- 
 ter. But they were men who had passed through the 
 fire of persecution and suffering for love of their father- 
 land, and the renaissance of Turkey was the supreme 
 thing in their lives. Their patriotism and enthusiasm 
 knew no bounds. Their ambitions for Turkey may 
 have been far in advance of their ability to serve her. 
 But criticism is silent before patriotism which has 
 proved its willingness to sacrifice life for country. 
 
 One can imagine the feelings of the Young Turks 
 when they saw what Italy was doing. It is easy enough 
 to say that they should have immediately reformed 
 the administration of the country, and given to the 
 Tripolitans an efficient government. Reform does not 
 come in a twelvemonth, and the Young Turks had to 
 act quickly to prevent the loss of Tripoli. They took 
 the only means they had. They began to thwart and 
 obstruct every Italian enterprise, to extend the mihtary 
 frontiers of Tripoli into the Soudan, to bring all the
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 229 
 
 Moslem tribes of Africa into touch with the Constanti- 
 nople khalifate. 
 
 Italy saw her hopes being destroyed as other colonial 
 hopes had been destroyed one after the other. Repre- 
 sentations at Constantinople were without effect. The 
 more her Ambassador tried, the more he realized the 
 hopelessness of his case. Surely it was a fruitless 
 diplomatic task to persuade Young Turkey that her 
 officials in Tripoli and Benghazi should be forbidden 
 to hinder the onward march of Italian " peaceable 
 conquest." The Italian economic fabric in Tripoli, so 
 carefully and so patiently built, seemed to be for 
 nothing. Austria-Hungary had begun the disintegra- 
 tion of the Ottoman Empire by the annexation of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. No Power had suc- 
 cessfully protested, much less the helpless Turks. So 
 Italy began to prepare her coup. 
 
 The crisis could not be precipitated. Italian public 
 opinion, wary of colonial enterprises since the terrible 
 Abyssinian disaster, and opposed to the imposition of 
 fresh taxes, had to be carefully prepared to sustain the 
 Ministry in a hostile action against Turkey. 
 
 In January, 191 1, the Italian Press began to publish 
 articles on Tripoli, dilating upon its economic value 
 and its vital importance to Italy, if she were to hold 
 her place among the Great Powers of Europe. Every 
 little Turkish persecution — and there were many of 
 them — was made the subject of a first-page bit of 
 telegraphic news. The Italian people were worked 
 up to believe that not only in Tripoli, but elsewhere, 
 the Young Turks were showing their contempt for 
 Italian officials and for the Italian flag. An Italian 
 sailing vessel was seized at Hodeidah in the Red Sea;
 
 230 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 the incident was magnified. An American archaeo- 
 logical expedition was granted a concession in Tripoli ; 
 a similar concession had been refused to Italian appli- 
 cants. The newspapers pretended that the Americans 
 were really prospecting for sulphur-mines, whose de- 
 velopment would mean disaster to the great mines in 
 Sicily ! French troops reached the Oasis of Ghadames ; 
 the hinterland of Tripoli was threatened by the ex- 
 tension of French sovereignty into the Sahara. At this 
 moment the reopening of the Morocco Question by the 
 Agadir incident gave Italy the incentive and the en- 
 couragement to show her hand. 
 
 In September the Press campaign against the Turkish 
 treatment of Italians in Tripoli became daily and 
 violent. Signor Giolitti succeeded in getting all parties, 
 except the extreme Socialists, to promise their sup- 
 port. 
 
 It was not until the last moment that the Sublime 
 Porte realized the danger. On September 26 the 
 Derna, a transport, arrived at Tripoli with much- 
 needed munitions of war. There had been a shameful 
 neglect to keep up the garrisons in the African prov- 
 inces, and when it was too late — as is so often the case 
 at Constantinople — there dawned the realization that 
 the provinces were practically without defence. 
 
 On September 27 the first of the series of ultimatums 
 which have brought all Europe into war was delivered 
 to the Sublime Porte. Italy gave Turkey forty -eight 
 hours to consent to the occupation of Tripoli, with the 
 proviso of the Sultan's sovereignty under the Italian 
 protectorate, and the payment of an annual subsidy 
 into the Ottoman Treasury. In Italy two classes were 
 mobilized : General Caneva embarked his troops upon
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 231 
 
 transports that had already been prepared, and the 
 Italian fleet proceeded to Tripoli. 
 
 The Turks did not believe that there would be war. 
 On the afternoon of September 29 the Grand Vizier, 
 as far-seeing in his understanding of international 
 affairs as he was blind in grasping what was best for 
 Turkey's interests, told me that he was sure Italy 
 would hesitate before entering upon a war that would 
 be the prelude to the greatest catastrophe that the 
 world has ever known. " Italy will not draw the 
 sword," he declared, " because she knows that, if she 
 does attack us, all Europe will be eventually drawn into 
 the bloodiest stmggle of histor}^ — a struggle that has 
 always been certain to follow the destruction of the 
 integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Hakki Pasha was 
 right, except in one important particular. Perhaps 
 Italy did know what an attack upon Turkey would 
 eventually lead to. But two hours after my con- 
 versation with the Grand Vizier he received a declara- 
 tion of war. 
 
 Simultaneously with the news of the declaration of 
 war Constantinople learned that the first shots had 
 already been fired. Without waiting for any formali- 
 ties, the Italian fleet had attacked and sunk Turkish 
 torpedo-boats off Preveza, at the mouth of the 
 Adriatic. The Turkish fleet had just left Beirut to 
 return to Constantinople, and for three days it was 
 feared that the Italians would follow up their offensive 
 by destroying the naval power of Turkey. They did 
 not do so, although it would have been an easy victory. 
 For it was the hope of the Giolitti Cabinet that there 
 would be no real war. 
 
 The attack at Preveza had the double purpose of
 
 232 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 preventing the torpedo-boats from interfering with 
 the Italian commerce, and of striking terror into the 
 hearts of the Turks. The Italians did not want to 
 widen the breach and draw upon themselves the hatred 
 and enmity of Turkey by sinking her navy. Such an 
 action would make difficult the negotiations which 
 they still hoped to pursue. It was not war against 
 the people of Turkey that they had declared : that was 
 a mere form. What they wanted was a pretext for 
 seizing Tripoli. So naval and military operations were 
 directed, not against Turkey, but against the coveted 
 African provinces. 
 
 The Italian warships opened fire upon Tripoli on 
 September 30. On October 2 and 3 the forts were 
 dismantled and the garrison driven out of the city by 
 the bombardment. On October 5 Tripoli surrendered. 
 The expeditionary corps disembarked on the nth. 
 The next transports from Italy went farther east. 
 Derna capitulated on the 8th, but a heavy sea prevented 
 the troops from landing until the i8th. General 
 Ameglio took Benghazi at the point of the bayonet on 
 October 19. Homs was occupied on the 21st. 
 
 The Turks and Arabs attempted to retake Tripoli 
 on October 23. While the Italian soldiers were in the 
 trenches, they were fired upon from behind by Arabs 
 who were supposed to be non-combatants. Discovery 
 of the assailants was practically impossible, because 
 many clothed themselves like women and hid their 
 faces v/ith veils. The Italians had to repress this move 
 from the rear with ruthless severity. They did what 
 any other army would have done under the circum- 
 stances. For their safety depended upon putting down 
 the enemy that had arisen in their rear. Failure to
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 233 
 
 act quickly and severely would have encouraged a 
 revolution in the city and its suburbs. Horror was 
 excited throughout the world by the highly-coloured 
 stories of this repression. Details of Italian cruelty 
 were emphasized. No effort was made to explain 
 impartially the provocation which had led to this 
 killing. There was an unconscious motive in these 
 stories to embarrass Italy in her attempt to build a 
 colonial empire, just exactly as there had been in the 
 time of the Abyssinian War in 1896. The American 
 Consul at Tripoli has assured me that the correspon- 
 dents who were guests of the Italian Army at the time 
 did not give the facts as they were. 
 
 The French and English newspaper campaign against 
 Italy was as violent as it had been against Austria in 
 1908, at the time of the first violation of Ottoman 
 territorial integrity. Attempts were made to denounce 
 the high-handed act of piracy of which Italy had been 
 guilty, and to poison the public mind against the 
 Italian Army. It is significant to note this attitude 
 of the Press of the two countries, which are now so 
 persuasively extending the olive branch to Italy, 
 Great Britain and France were alarmed over the 
 menace to the " equilibrium " of the Mediterranean, 
 This is wh}^ they did not hesitate to denounce un- 
 sparingly the successful effort of Italy to follow in their 
 own footsteps ! The tension between France and Italy 
 was illustrated by the vehement newspaper protests 
 against the Italian use of the right of search for contra- 
 band on French ships, Italy was taken to task for acting 
 in exactly the same way that France has since acted 
 in arresting Dutch ships in August and September, 1914. 
 
 The attempt of October 23 failed, in spite of the con-
 
 234 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 spiracy behind the lines. A second attempt on the 
 26th was equally unsuccessful. On November 6 the 
 garrison of Tripoli started to take the offensive. But 
 progress beyond the suburbs of the city was found to 
 be impossible. 
 
 A decree annexing the African provinces of Turkey 
 was approved by the Italian Parliament on Novem- 
 ber 5. The Italian " adventure," as those who looked 
 upon Italy's aggression with unfriendly eyes persisted 
 in calling it, was now shown to be irrevocable. Turkey's 
 opportunity to compromise had passed. 
 
 In Tripoli, as well as in the other cities, it took the 
 whole winter to make the foothold on the coast secure. 
 From November 27 to March 3 Enver Bey made three 
 attempts to retake Derna. From November 28 to 
 March 12 six assaults of Turks and Arabs were made 
 upon Benghazi, The Italian positions at Homs were 
 not secure until February 27. Italy was practically 
 on the defensive everywhere. 
 
 Hakki Pasha found himself compelled to resign when 
 the war was declared. In fact, he considered himself 
 fortunate not to be assassinated by army officers, who 
 declared that he had been negligent to the point of 
 treason in laying Turkey open to the possibility of 
 being attacked where and when she was weakest. Said 
 Pasha became Grand Vizier; he had held the post six 
 times under Abdul Hamid. Five members of the 
 former Cabinet, including Mahmud Shevket Pasha, 
 remained in office. 
 
 The first appearance of Said Pasha's Cabinet before 
 Parliament is a scene that I shall never forget. No 
 pains had been spared to make it a brilliant spectacle. 
 The Sultan was present during the reading of his
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 235 
 
 speech from the throne. Everyone expected an 
 important pronouncement. The speech of Said Pasha 
 was typically Turkish. Instead of announcing how 
 Turkey was to resist Italy, he gave it to be understood 
 in vague language that diplomacy was going to save 
 the day once more, and that Turkey was secure 
 because the preservation of her territorial integrity 
 was necessary for Europe. 
 
 The action of Italy, however, had upset the calcula- 
 tions of the Young Turks in the game they were trying 
 to play in European diplomacy. It was their dream — 
 more than that, their belief — that Turkey held the 
 balance of power between the two great groups of 
 European Powers. They thought that the destinies 
 of Europe were in their hands. I heard Mahmud 
 Shevket Pasha say once that " the million bayonets of 
 Turkey would decide the fortunes of Europe." Turkey 
 was essentially mixed up in the European imbroglio. 
 But it was the absence of those million bayonets, of 
 which Mahmud Shevket Pasha boasted, that changed 
 the fortunes of Europe. The military weakness of the 
 Ottoman Empire has brought us to the present 
 catastrophe. 
 
 The embarrassment of the Young Turks was that 
 Italy belonged to the Triple Alliance, and that Germany, 
 while professing deep and loyal friendship, stood by 
 and saw Turkey attacked by her ally, Italy, just as she 
 had stood by in 1908 when the other partner of the 
 Triple Alliance had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 Those who had based their hopes of Turkey's future 
 upon the pan-Germanic movement had a bitter 
 awakening. In what sense could Wilhelm II. be 
 called " the defender of Islam " ?
 
 236 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 I frequently attended sessions of Parliament during 
 the five weeks between the outbreak of the war and 
 the passing of the decree by which the African posses- 
 sions of Turkey were annexed to the kingdom of Italy. 
 Before this step had been taken by Italy there was a 
 possibility of saving the situation. But the Turks, 
 instead of presenting a united front to the world, and 
 finding ways and means of making a successful resist- 
 ance against Italy, wasted not only the precious month 
 of October, when there was still a way out, but also the 
 whole winter that followed. In November the Oppo- 
 sition in the House and Senate formed a new party, 
 which they called the " Entente Liberale." The prin- 
 cipal discussions in Parliament were about whether the 
 Hakki Pasha Cabinet should be tried for high-treason, 
 and whether the Chamber of Deputies could be pro- 
 rogued by the Sultan without the consent of the Senate. 
 The Opposition grew so rapidly that the Committee of 
 Union and Progress induced the Sultan to dissolve 
 Parliament on January i8, 1912. 
 
 The new elections were held at the end of March. 
 Throughout the Empire they were a pure farce. The 
 functionaries of the Government saw to it that only 
 members of the Committee of Union and Progress were 
 returned. While the Young Turks were playing their 
 game of parties, anarchy was rife in different parts of 
 the Empire. The " Interior Organization " had been 
 revived in Macedonia. The Albanians, who had been 
 left entirely out of the fold in the new elections, were 
 determined to get redress. In Arabia the neutrality of 
 Iman Yahia in the war with Italy was purchased only 
 by the granting of complete autonomy. It was the 
 surrender of the last vestige of Turkish authority in
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 237 
 
 an important part of Arabia. Said Idris, the other 
 powerful chief in the Yemen, refused to accept 
 autonomy, and continued to harass the Turkish Army. 
 The Committee of Union and Progress was not 
 allowed to enjoy long its fraudulent victory. In the 
 army, an organization which called itself the " Military 
 League for the Defence of the Country " was formed, 
 and received so many adhesions that Mahmud Shevket 
 Pasha was compelled to leave the Ministry of War on 
 July 10, and Said Pasha the Grand Vizirate eight 
 days later. Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha accepted the task 
 of forming a new Cabinet. The Unionist Parliament 
 refused to listen to his programme. So he secured from 
 the Sultan a second prorogation of Parliament on 
 August 5. The weapon the Unionists had used was 
 turned against them. 
 
 While Turkey showed herself absolutely incapable 
 of making any military move to recover the invaded 
 provinces or to punish the invader, Italy had none the 
 less a difficult problem to face. A few Turkish officers 
 had succeeded in organizing among the Arabs of 
 Tripoli and Benghazi a troublesome resistance. General 
 Caneva went to Rome at the beginning of February, 
 and told the Cabinet very plainly that it would take 
 months to get a start in Africa, and years to complete 
 the pacification of the new colonies, unless the Turks 
 consented to withdraw the support of their military 
 leadership and to cease their religious agitation. 
 
 The question was. How could Turkey be forced to 
 recognize the annexation decree of November 5 ? The 
 Italian fleet could not be kept indefinitely, at tre- 
 mendous expense and monthly depreciation of the 
 value of the ships, under steam. The Turkish fleet did
 
 238 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 not come out to give battle, so the Italians were 
 immobilized at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Italian 
 commerce in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean 
 was at a standstill. Upon ItaHan imports into Turkey 
 had been placed a duty of loo per cent. Where, out- 
 side of Tripoli, was the pressure to be exercised ? 
 
 Premier San Giuliano had promised before the war 
 started that he would not disturb political conditions 
 in the Balkan Peninsula. The alliance with Austria- 
 Hungary made impossible operations in the Adriatic. 
 But it was clear that something must be done. Public 
 opinion in Italy had been getting very restless. It did 
 not seem to the Italians that the considerations of 
 international diplomacy should stand in the way of 
 finishing the war. Were they to burden themselves 
 with heavy taxes in order to spare the feelings of the 
 Great Powers ? Had Russia hesitated in the Caucasus ? 
 Had Great Britain hesitated in Egypt ? Had Austria 
 hesitated in Bosnia-Herzegovina ? 
 
 As a sop to public opinion, and also as a feeler to see 
 how the move would be taken by the other Powers, the 
 Cabinet decided upon direct action against Turkey. 
 The fleet appeared before Beirut on February 24, and 
 sank two Turkish warships in the harbour. It was not 
 exactly a bombardment of the city, but many shells did 
 fall on the buildings and on the streets near the quay. 
 Neither Turkey nor Europe paid much attention to this 
 demonstration. In April Italy had come to the point 
 where she felt that she must cast all scruples to the 
 winds. A direct attack upon Turkey was decided. 
 Italy, at the moment of writing the only neutral 
 among the Great Powers of Europe, took the action 
 which brought Balkan ambitions to a ferment, and
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 239 
 
 caused the kindling of the European conflagration. 
 Her declaration of war on Turkey and the annexation 
 of Tripoli inevitably led to this. On April 18 Admiral 
 Viala bombarded the forts of Kum Kale at the Dar- 
 danelles, and on the same day the port of Vathy in 
 Samos. Four days later Italian marines disembarked 
 on the Island of Stampali. On May 4 Rhodes was 
 invaded, a battle occurred in the streets of the town, 
 and the Turks withdrew to the interior of the island. 
 They were pursued, and surrendered on the 17th. 
 Ten other islands at the mouth of the iEgsean Sea 
 were occupied. 
 
 A demonstration at Patmos for union with Greece 
 was vigorously repressed. Italy protested her good 
 faith in regard to the islands. But the dismemberment 
 of the Ottoman Empire, arrested at San Stefano in 
 1878, had begun again. 
 
 Turkey responded to the bombardment of Kum Kale 
 by closing the Dardanelles, and to the occupation of 
 Rhodes by attempting to expel from Turkey all Italian 
 residents. The expulsion decree, however, was carried 
 out with great humanity and consideration by the 
 Turks. During the Italian War and during the Balkan 
 War Turkish treatment of subjects of hostile states 
 living in Ottoman territory was highly praiseworthy. 
 The Christian nations of Europe would to-day do well 
 to follow their example ! 
 
 The closing of the Straits lasted for a month. It 
 disturbed all Europe. Never before has the question 
 of the Straits been shown to be so vital to the world. 
 From April 18 to May 18 over two hundred merchant- 
 vessels of all nations were immobilized in Constanti- 
 nople. It was a sight such as one sees once in a life-
 
 240 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 time. For these ships were not lost in a maze of 
 basins, docks, and piers. They lay in the stream of 
 the Bosphorus and at the entrance to the Sea of 
 Marmora. You could count them all from the Galata 
 Tower. The loss to shipping was tremendous. 
 Southern Russia is the bread-basket of Europe. No 
 European resident could remain unaffected by a 
 closing of the only means of egress for these billions 
 of bushels of wheat. Angry protests were in vain. 
 Turkey reopened the Straits only when assurance had 
 been given to her that the attack of the Italian Fleet 
 would not be repeated. 
 
 Little had been gained by Italy as far as hastening 
 peace was concerned. She had done all that she could. 
 Turkey still remained passive and unresisting, because 
 she knew well that any vital action, such as the bom- 
 bardment of Salonika or Smyrna, or the invasion of 
 European Turkey by way of Albania or Macedonia, 
 would bring on a general European War. Italy could 
 not take this responsibility before history. So for 
 months longer it remained a war without battles. 
 Many Italian warships had not fired a single shot. 
 
 During May, June, and July the Italians pushed on 
 painfully to the interior of Tripoli. There was no 
 other way. In August the Turkish resistance on the 
 side of Tunis was finished. In September a desperate 
 attack of Enver Bey against Derna was repulsed. 
 The Italian forces were in a much better position than 
 before. But the attacks of the Arabs were of such a 
 character that they could not be suppressed even by the 
 overwhelming numbers of trained men at the disposal 
 of the Italians. It was a guerilla warfare with the 
 oases of the desert as the background. The Italians
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 241 
 
 felt that the Arabs, if left to themselves, would soon 
 tire of the conflict. For they were, after all, traders, 
 and were dependent upon the outlets for their caravan 
 trade, which was now completely in the hands of 
 Italians. It was the mere handful of Turkish troops 
 and Turkish officers who kept the Arabs stirred up to 
 fight. 
 
 As early as June Italian and Turkish representatives 
 met informally at Ouchy, on Lac Leman, to discuss 
 bases for a solution of the conflict which had degener- 
 ated into an odd impasse. Italy was anxious to con- 
 clude peace for several reasons. Her commerce was 
 suffering. Her warships badly needed the dry-dock. 
 While Turkey could no longer prevent the conquest 
 of Tripoli and Benghazi, the absence of Turkish 
 direction in keeping the tribesmen of the interior 
 stirred up, and the cessation of the propaganda against 
 the Italian occupation on the ground of religion would 
 help greatly in the pacification of the provinces. Since 
 the Albanian revolution had assumed alarming pro- 
 portions, Turkey also became anxious for peace. She 
 was uncertain of Italy's attitude in case of an outbreak 
 in the Balkans. Unofficially Italy had let it be known 
 that there was a limit to patience, and that the 
 development of a hostile attitude by the Balkan States 
 against Turkey would find her, in spite of Europe, in 
 alliance with them against her. In reality, however, 
 the Italian Ministers at the Balkan Courts had all along 
 done their best to keep Greece and Bulgaria from being 
 carried away by the temptation to take advantage 
 of the situation. This had been especially true in 
 April and May, during the period of Italian activity in 
 
 the iEgean. 
 
 16
 
 242 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Turkey knew perfectly well, before the pourparlers at 
 Ouchy, what were the Italian terms. In March, when 
 the five other Powers had offered to mediate, Italy had 
 laid down the following points : Tacit recognition of the 
 Italian conquest, and withdrawal of the Turkish Army 
 from Africa; recognition by the Powers, if not by 
 Turkey, of the decree of annexation. Italy promised, 
 if this were done, to recognize the Sultan as Khalif in 
 the African provinces (this meant purely religious 
 sovereignty) ; to respect the religious liberty and cus- 
 toms of the Moslem populations ; to accord an amnesty 
 to the Arabs; to guarantee to the Ottoman Public 
 Debt the obligations for which the customs-duties of 
 Tripoli had been mortgaged; to buy the properties 
 owned by the Ottoman Government; to guarantee, in 
 accord with the other Powers, the (future 1) " integrity 
 of the Ottoman Empire." Turkey had refused these 
 terms, in spite of the pressure of the Powers at the 
 Sublime Porte. Then followed the loss of Rhodes and 
 the other islands. 
 
 The first pourparlers at Ouchy had been interrupted 
 by the fall of Said Pasha. They were resumed on 
 August 12 by duly accredited delegates. After six 
 weeks an accord was prepared, and sent to Constanti- 
 nople. The Ministry, although facing a war with the 
 Balkan States, tried to prolong the negotiations. Italy 
 then addressed an ultimatum on October 12. The 
 Sublime Porte was doing its best to prevent war with 
 the Balkan States. Italy was determined now to go 
 to any length to wring peace from her stubborn 
 opponent. For the Balkan storm was breaking, and 
 she wanted to get her Ambassador back to Constanti- 
 nople to take part in the councils of the Great Powers.
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 243 
 
 The continuance of a state of war with Turkey was 
 never more clearly against her interests. When the 
 ultimatum arrived, Turkey yielded. The preliminaries 
 of Ouchy were signed on October 15. 
 
 There were two distinct parts to the Treaty of 
 Lausanne, as it is generally called. In order to save 
 the pride of Turkey, nothing was said in the text of the 
 treaty about a cession of territory. Turkey was not 
 asked to- recognize the Italian conquest. The un- 
 official portion of the treaty consisted of a firman, 
 granting complete autonomy to the African vilayet, and 
 appointing a personal religious representative of the 
 Khalif , with functions purely nominal ; and the promise 
 of amnesty and good administration to the ^gean 
 Islands. 
 
 The text of the treaty provided for the cessation of 
 hostilities; the withdrawal of the Turkish Army from 
 Tripoli and Benghazi, and the withdrawal of the 
 Italian Army from the islands of the iEgean; the 
 resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations; 
 and the assumption by Italy of Tripoli's share of the 
 Ottoman Public Debt. 
 
 Italy had no intention of fulfilling the spirit of the 
 second clause of this treaty, which was that the islands 
 occupied by her be restored to Turkey. The text of 
 the treaty provided that the recall of the Italian troops 
 be subordinated to the recall of the Turkish troops 
 from Tripoli. It was easy enough to quibble at a 
 later time about the meaning of " Turkish." As long 
 as there was opposition to the Italian pacification, the 
 opponents could be called Turkish, Italy said that 
 the holding of the Dodecanese was a guarantee of 
 Turkish good faith in preventing the continuance
 
 244 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 secretly of armed opposition to her subjugation of the 
 new African colonies. As long as an Arab held the 
 field against the Italian Army, it could still be claimed 
 that Turkey had not fulfilled her side of the promise in 
 Article 2. At the moment, Turkey was quite willing to 
 see the Italians stay in the southern islands of the 
 iEgean. For otherwise they would have inevitably 
 fallen into the hands of the Greeks when the Balkan 
 War broke out. 
 
 Since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed the Italians 
 have remained in the Dodecanese. Not only that, 
 but they have used their position in Rhodes to begin a 
 propaganda of Italian economic influence in South- 
 western Asia Minor. Before the present European 
 War Italy might have found herself compelled to 
 relinquish her hold on these islands. But now her 
 advantageous neutrality has put into her hands the 
 cards by which she can secure the acquiescence of 
 Europe to the annexation of Rhodes. 
 
 The outbreak of indignation in Turkey against Italy 
 at the beginning of the war was even more vehement 
 than that against Austria-Hungary when she had 
 annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. Hussein Djahid 
 Bey, in the Tanine, wrote an editorial, in which he said : 
 " Never shall we have any dealings with the Italians in 
 the future. Never shall a ship bearing their flag find 
 trade at an Ottoman port. And we shall teach our 
 children, and tell them to teach their children, the 
 reasons for the undying hatred between Osmanli and 
 Italian as long as history lasts." Having read the 
 same sort of a thing in 1908, 1 was interested in seeing 
 just how long the hatred would last. Just a year from 
 the day war was declared and this editorial appeared,
 
 WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY 245 
 
 the Italian Ambassador returned on a warship to 
 Constantinople, the Italian post-offices opened, and 
 all my Italian friends began to reappear. This is told 
 here to illustrate the fact that cannot be too strongly 
 emphasized: There is no public opinion in Turkey. 
 
 The chief importance of the year of " the war that 
 was no war " is not in the loss of Tripoli. It is in the 
 fact that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, secure 
 since 1878, had been attacked by violence. The example 
 given by Italy was to be followed by the Balkan States. 
 What Europe had feared had come. This war was the 
 prelude to Europe in arms.
 
 XIV. 
 
 THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES 
 
 AND TURKEY 
 
 During the year 191 1 there had been a perceptible 
 drawing together of the Balkan States in the effort to 
 find a common ground for an offensive alliance against 
 Turkey. The path of union was very difficult for the 
 diplomats of the Balkan States to follow. It was clear 
 to them in principle that they would never be able to 
 oppose the policy of the Young Turks separately. 
 They were not even sure whether their united armies 
 could triumph over the large forces which the Ottoman 
 Empire was able to put in the field, and which were 
 reputed to be well trained and disciplined. This 
 reputation was sustained by the unanimous opinion 
 of the military attaches of the Great Powers at Con- 
 stantinople. And then, there were the mutual anti- 
 pathies to be healed, and the problem of the terrible 
 rivalry in Macedonia, of which we have spoken before, 
 to be solved. Most formidable of all was the uncer- 
 tainty as to the benefit to the different Balkan nations 
 of a successful war against Turkey. 
 
 It is impossible to explain here all the diplomatic 
 steps leading up to the Balkan alliance against Turkey. 
 They have been set forth, with much divergency of 
 opinion, by a number of writers who were in intimate 
 
 246
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 247 
 
 touch with the diplomatic circles of the Balkan capitals 
 during the years immediately preceding the formation 
 of the alliance. We must confine ourselves to a state- 
 ment of the general causes which induced the Balkan 
 States, against the better judgment of many of their 
 wisest leaders, to form the alliance, and to declare war 
 upon Turkey. 
 
 Both Bulgaria and Greece had sentimental reasons: 
 the terrible persecution of the Christians of their own 
 race in Macedonia seemed cause enough for war. But 
 while Bulgaria had long held the thesis of Macedonian 
 autonomy, which was sustained by the Bulgarian 
 Macedonians themselves, Greece was afraid that the 
 creation of such a regime would in the end prove an 
 irrevocable blow to Hellenic aspirations. It was well 
 known to the Greeks that the population of Macedonia 
 was not only largely Bulgarian, but aggressively so, 
 and that its sense of nationality had been intelligently 
 and skilfully awakened and fostered by the educational 
 propaganda. Above all things Hellenism feared the 
 Bulgarian schools. Under an autonomous regime 
 their influence could not be combated. 
 
 The possibility of the Balkan alliance was really 
 in the hands of Greece, for it was recognized that, no 
 matter how large and powerful an army Bulgaria and 
 Servia could raise, the co-operation of the Greek navy, 
 which would prevent the use of the ^Egean ports of 
 the Macedonian littoral for disembarking troops from 
 Asia, was absolutely essential to success. In spite of 
 their fears for the future of Macedonia, the Greeks 
 were converted to the idea of an alliance with the 
 Slavic Balkan states to destroy the power of Turkey 
 by the continual bullying of the Young Turks over
 
 248 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Crete, and by the economic disasters from the boycott. 
 It is not too much to say that the attitude of the Young 
 Turks towards the Cretan question, and their institu- 
 tion of the boycott, were two factors directly responsible 
 for the downfall of the empire. 
 
 The visit of 300 Bulgarian students to Athens in 
 Easter week, 1911, should have been a warning to 
 Turkey of the danger which attended her policy of 
 goading the Greeks to desperation. I was present on 
 the Acropolis at the memorable reception given by 
 the students of Athens to their guests from the Univer- 
 sity of Sofia, and remember well the peculiar political 
 significance of the speeches of welcome addressed to 
 them there. Later in the same year Greece followed 
 the example of the other Balkan States in sending her 
 Crown Prince to Sofia to join in the festivities attendant 
 upon the coming of age of Crown Prince Boris. 
 
 Bulgaria was drawn into the Balkan alliance, and re- 
 luctantly compelled to abandon the policy of Mace- 
 donian autonomy, by the attitude of the Young Turks 
 toward Macedonians. The settlement of immigrants 
 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the conscription for 
 the Turkish Army, led to reprisals on the part of Bul- 
 garian bands. These were followed by massacres at 
 Ishtib and elsewhere. In the first week of August, 
 1 9 12, the massacre of Kotchana was for Bulgaria the 
 last straw on the camel's back. I was in Sofia at the 
 end of August, when the National Congress, called to- 
 gether wholly without the Government's co-operation, 
 declared that war was a necessity. Seated one evening 
 in the public garden at a cafe — if I remember rightly, 
 it was September i — I heard from the lips of one of 
 the influential delegates at this congress that public
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 249 
 
 opinion in Bulgaria was so wholly determined to force 
 war that the King and the Cabinet would have to 
 yield. 
 
 In Servia and Montenegro it had long been recog- 
 nized that any opportunity to unite with Bulgaria 
 and Greece to bring pressure to bear upon Turkey 
 could not but be beneficial to these two kingdoms. 
 There was the Sandjak of Novi Bazar to be divided 
 between Montenegro and Servia. There was the 
 possibility of an outlet to the Adriatic. As far as 
 Macedonia was concerned, if we believe that she was 
 honest and sincere in the treaty of partition with 
 Bulgaria, Servia was quite content with the idea of 
 a possible annexation of Old Servia, and the oppor- 
 tunity to drive back the Moslem Albanians, who had 
 been established on her frontiers under the Young Turk 
 regime, and were ruthlessly destroying Slavs wherever 
 they got the opportunity. 
 
 One does not have any hesitation in declaring that 
 the political leaders in power in the Balkan States at 
 first hoped to avoid a war with Turkey. That they 
 did not succeed in doing so was due to the pressure of 
 public sentiment upon them. This public sentiment 
 forced them to action. Every Balkan Cabinet would 
 have fallen had the Ministries remained advocates of 
 peace. Over against the fear of the Turkish army, 
 which — let me say it emphatically — was very strong 
 among the military authorities in each of the Balkan 
 States, was the feeling that the time was very favour- 
 able to act, and the chances of success in a common war 
 against Turkey were greater in the autumn of 1912 
 than they would be later. For the Young Turks were 
 spending tremendous sums of money on army re-
 
 250 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 organization. At that moment they were coming to 
 the end of a demoralizing war with Italy, and the Mace- 
 donian army had suffered greatly during the summer by 
 the Albanian uprising. 
 
 Early in September, Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and 
 Montenegro decided that peace could be preserved 
 only by the actual application, under sufficient guar- 
 antees, of sweeping reforms in Macedonia. They 
 appealed to the Powers to sustain them in demanding 
 for Macedonia a provincial assembly, a militia re- 
 cruited within the limits of the province, and a Chris- 
 tian governor. The Great Powers, as usual, tried to 
 carry water on both shoulders. Blind to the fact 
 that inaction and vague promises would no longer keep 
 in check the neighbours of Turkey, they urged the 
 Balkan States to refrain from " being insistent," and 
 pointed out to Turkey the " advisability " of making 
 concessions. The Turks did not believe in the reality 
 of the union of the Balkan States. They could not 
 conceive upon what grounds their neighbours had 
 succeeded in forming an alliance. Neither the Balkan 
 States nor Turkey had any respect for the threats or 
 promises or offers of assistance of the Powers. 
 
 In order to convince the Balkan States that they 
 had better think twice before making a direct ulti- 
 matum, the Turks organized autumn manoeuvres 
 north of Adrianople, in which 50,000 of the 61ite 
 army corps were to take part. The answer of the 
 Balkan States was an order for general mobilization, 
 issued simultaneously in the four capitals. This was 
 on September 30, The next day Turkey began to 
 mobilize. All the Greek ships in the Bosphorus and 
 the Dardanelles were seized. Munitions of war, dis-
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 251 
 
 embarked at Salonika for Servia, were confiscated. 
 It was not until then that it began to dawn upon 
 Turkey and her sponsors, the Great Powers, that the 
 Balkan States meant business. The question of 
 reforms in Macedonia had been so long the prerogative 
 of the Powers that they did not realize that the mo- 
 ment had come when the little Balkan States, which 
 they called " troublesome," were no longer going to 
 be put off with promises. The absolute failure of con- 
 certed European diplomacy to accomplish anything 
 in the Ottoman Empire was demonstrated from the 
 results in Macedonia, and also in Crete. 
 
 So the Balkan States were not in the proper frame of 
 mind to receive the joint note on the status quo, which 
 will remain famous in the annals of European diplo- 
 macy as a demonstration of the futility of concerted 
 diplomatic action when there is no genuine unity 
 behind it. On the morning of October 8 the Ministers 
 of Russia and Austria, acting in the name of the six 
 " Great Powers," handed in at Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, 
 and Cettinje, the following note: 
 
 " The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments 
 declare to the Balkan States : 
 
 " I. That the Powers condemn energetically every 
 measure capable of leading to a rupture of peace. 
 
 "2. That, supporting themselves on Article 23 of 
 the Treaty of Berlin, they will take in hand, in the 
 interest of the populations, the realization of the re- 
 forms in the administration of European Turkey, on 
 the understanding that these reforms will not diminish 
 the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan 
 and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; 
 this declaration reserves, also, the liberty of the Powers 
 for the collective and ulterior study of the reforms.
 
 252 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 " 3. That if, in spite of this note, war does break out 
 between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, 
 they will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any 
 modification in the territorial status quo in European 
 Turkey . 
 
 " The Powers will make collectively to the Sublime 
 Porte the steps which the preceding declaration makes 
 necessary," 
 
 The shades of San Stefano, Berlin, Cyprus and 
 Egypt, Armenian massacres, Mitylene and Munster- 
 berg, Bagdad Railway, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tripoli 
 and Rhodes, haunted this declaration, and made it 
 impotent, honest effort though it was, to preserve the 
 peace of Europe. It was thirty-six years too late. 
 
 For, one hour after it was delivered, the charge 
 d'affaires of the Montenegrin Legation at Constanti- 
 nople, evidently as a result of an anticipation of a 
 joint note from the Powers, left at the Sublime Porte 
 the following memorable declaration of war: 
 
 " In conformity with the authorization of King 
 Nicholas, I have the honour of informing you that I 
 shall leave Constantinople to-day. The Government 
 of Montenegro breaks off all relations with the Ottoman 
 Empire, leaving to the fortunes of arms of the Monte- 
 negrins the recognition of their rights and of the rights 
 scorned through centuries of their brothers of the 
 Ottoman Empire. 
 
 " I leave Constantinople. 
 
 " The Royal Government will give to the Ottoman 
 representative at Cettinje his passports. 
 
 " Plamenatz. 
 
 "October 8th, 1912." 
 
 There could no longer be any doubt of the trend of 
 things. Inevitable result, this declaration of war, of
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 253 
 
 the action of Italy one year before, just as the action 
 of Italy harked back to Russian action in the Caucasus, 
 British action in Egypt, Austrian action in Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina, and French action in Morocco. Inevit- 
 able precursor, this declaration of war, of the Eviropean 
 catastrophe of 1914. Who, then, is presumptuous 
 enough to maintain that the cause is simple, and the 
 blame all at one door ? Europe is reaping in blood- 
 lust what all the " Great Powers " have sown in land- 
 lust. 
 
 The Chancelleries made strenuous efforts to nullify 
 what their inspired organs called " the blunder," or 
 " the hasty and inconsiderate action " of King Nicholas. 
 There was feverish activity in Constantinople, and a 
 continual exchange of conferences between the Em- 
 bassies and the Sublime Porte. The Ambassadors 
 gravely handed in a common note, in which they 
 offered to avert war by taking in hand themselves the 
 long-delayed reforms. Had they forgotten the institu- 
 tion of the gendarmerie in 1903, and Hussein Hilmi 
 Pasha at Salonika ? 
 
 On this same day the Montenegrin ex-Minister at 
 Constantinople, whose declaration of war had been so 
 theatrical, was reported as having said at Bukarest on 
 his way home: " Montenegro wants territorial aggran- 
 disements, and will not give back whatever conquests 
 she makes. We do not fear to cross the will of the 
 Great Powers, for they do not worry us." These 
 words express exactly the sentiments of the other 
 Allies, both as regards their possible conquests and 
 their attitude towards the dictum of the Powers. 
 
 Events moved rapidly during the next ten da^'S. 
 On October 13 the Balkan States responded to the
 
 254 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Russo-Austrian note, thanking the Powers for their 
 generous offices, but declaring that they had come to 
 the end of their patience in the matter of Turkish 
 promises for Macedonian reform, and were going to 
 request of the Ottoman Government that it accord 
 " without delay the reforms that have been demanded, 
 and that it promise to apply them in six months, with 
 the help of the Great Powers and of the Balkan States 
 whose interests are involved." This response was not 
 only a refusal of mediation, it was an assertion, as 
 the last words show, that the time had come when the 
 Balkan States felt strong enough to claim a part in the 
 management of their own affairs. 
 
 Acting in accordance with this notification to the 
 Powers, on October 14, Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria 
 demanded of Turkey the autonomy of the European 
 provinces, under Christian governors ; the occupation 
 of the provinces by the allied armies while the reforms 
 were being applied ; the payment of an indemnity for 
 the expenses of mobilization ; the immediate demobili- 
 zation of Turkey; and the promise that the reforms 
 would be effected within six months. The demand 
 was in the character of an ultimatum, and forty-eight 
 hours were given for a response. 
 
 It was now evident that unless the Powers could 
 compel the Balkan States to withdraw this sweeping 
 claim, war would be inevitable. For no independent 
 State could accept such a demand and retain its self- 
 respect. The representatives of Turkey at Belgrade 
 and Athens were quite right in refusing to receive the 
 note and transmit it to Constantinople. 
 
 The Sublime Porte did not answer directly the 
 ultimatum of the Allies. An effort was made to antici-
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 255 
 
 pate the Balkan claims, and get the Powers to inter- 
 vene, by reviving the law of reform for the vilayets, 
 which provided for the organization of communes and 
 schools, the building of roads, and the limitation of 
 military service to the vilayet of recruitment. But 
 the fact that this law had been on the statute book 
 since 1880, and had remained throughout the Empire 
 a dead letter, gave little hope that it would be seriously 
 applied now. 
 
 On October 15 fighting began on the Serbo-Turkish 
 frontier. The war had already brought about Turkish 
 reverses at the hands of the Montenegrins. Greece 
 threw an additional defiance in the face of Turkey by 
 admitting the Cretan Deputies to the Greek legislative 
 chamber. 
 
 To gain time — for she was unprepared, and her 
 mobilization progressing very slowly — Turkey made 
 desperate efforts to delay the declaration of war by 
 offering to treat at Sofia, on the basis of a cessation of 
 Moslem immigration into Macedonia, and the suspen- 
 sion of enrolment of Christians in Moslem regiments. 
 These points, as we have already shown, were the two 
 principal reasons why the Bulgarians of Macedonia had 
 changed their policy from autonomy to independence. 
 But Bulgaria, feeling that cause for hesitation over 
 a war of liberation had been removed by her secret 
 partition treaty with Servia, remained obdurate. 
 
 Then the Turkish diplomats turned their attention 
 to Athens, and tried to detach the Greeks from the 
 alliance by agreeing to recognize the annexation of 
 Crete to Greece, and promising an autonomous govern- 
 ment for some of the ^gean Islands. This failed. 
 But, to the very last, the Turks believed that Greece
 
 256 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 might stay out of the war. For this reason her repre- 
 sentative at Athens was instructed to do all in his 
 power to remain at his post, even if war were declared 
 by the Sublime Porte on Bulgaria and Servia. 
 
 Peace was hurriedly concluded with Italy at Ouchy 
 on October 15. On the i6th, when the forty-eight 
 hours of the ultimatum had expired, and there was no 
 answer from Turkey, everyone expected a declaration 
 of war from the Allies. None came. On the i8th, to 
 preserve her dignity, Turkey saw that she must be the 
 one to act. It was no longer possible to sit and wait 
 until the Allies were " good and ready." She declared 
 war on Bulgaria and Servia. Greece waited till after- 
 noon to receive a similar declaration. None came. 
 So Greece declared war on Turkey. 
 
 The First Period of the War. 
 
 While the diplomats were still agitating and bluster- 
 ing, while Turkey was procrastinating and trying to 
 put off the evil day, and while the larger Balkan States 
 were quietly completing their mobilization, Montenegro 
 entered into action. On October 9, the day following 
 her declaration of war, the Montenegrins entered the 
 sandjak of Novi Bazar, and surrounded the frontier 
 fortress of Berana. This was captured after six days 
 of fighting. On the same day Biepolje fell. Nearly 
 1,000 prisoners, fourteen cannon, and a large number 
 of rifles and stores were captured by the Montenegrins. 
 In the meantime two other Montenegrin columns 
 had marched southward, reached San Giovanni di 
 Medua, at the mouth of the Boyana, and cut Scutari 
 off from the sea. Scutari was invested, but the Monte-
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 257 
 
 negrins, who had been able to put into the field scarcely 
 more than 30,000 men, found themselves mobilized for 
 the entire winter. The great fortress of Tarabosh, a 
 high mountain, towering over the town of Scutari and 
 the lower end of the lake, was too strong for their forces 
 and for their artillery. Inside the city of Scutari it 
 was the Albanians fighting for their national life, and 
 not the Turks, who organized and maintained the 
 splendid and protracted resistance. 
 
 The mobilization in the other Balkan States was 
 not completed until the i8th, when the declaration of 
 war was made on both sides. 
 
 Most important of the foes of Turkey were the Bul- 
 garians, whose military organization had for some 
 years been attracting the admiration of all who had 
 been privileged to see their manoeuvres and to visit 
 their casernes. Bulgaria had been carefully and 
 secretly preparing her mobilization long before the 
 crisis became acute. I had the privilege of travelling 
 in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of July, and of 
 spending the month of August along the frontier be- 
 tween Thrace and Bulgaria. Everywhere one could 
 see the accumulation of the soldiers of the standing 
 army already on war footing, and of military stores, at 
 a number of different places. During August and 
 September every detail of the mobilization had been 
 carefully arranged. When war was declared, Bulgaria 
 had four armies, with a total effective of over 
 300,000. Three of them were quickly massed on the 
 frontier, fully equipped. No army has ever entered the 
 field under better auspices. 
 
 On the day of the declaration of war the Czar Fer- 
 dinand issued a proclamation to his troops which 
 
 17
 
 258 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 clearly defined the issue. It was to be a war of libera- 
 tion, a crusade, undertaken to free the brothers of 
 blood and faith from the yoke of Moslem oppression. 
 In summing up, the Czar said : " In this struggle of the 
 Cross against the Crescent, of liberty against tyranny, 
 we shall have the sympathy of all those who love justice 
 and progress." At the time bitter criticism was 
 directed against the Czar for having used words which 
 brought out so sharply the religious issue. The pro- 
 clamation of a crusade could bring forth on the other 
 side the response of a djehad (holy war). This, above 
 all things, was what the European Powers wished to 
 avoid ; for they feared not only that it would make the 
 war more bitter and more cruel between the opponents 
 in the field, but that it would awaken a wave of fanati- 
 cism among the Moslems living under European control 
 in Asia and in Africa. How many lessons will it need 
 to teach Europe that the political menace of pan- 
 Islamism is a phantom, a myth ! 
 
 According to the plan adopted by the Allied States, 
 the offensive movement in Thrace, in which the bulk of 
 the Turkish army would be met, was to be undertaken 
 solely by Bulgaria. Only a Bulgarian army of second- 
 ary importance was to enter Eastern Macedonia, to 
 protect the flank of the main Bulgarian army from a 
 sudden eastward march of the Turkish Macedonian 
 army. Its objective point, though not actually agreed 
 upon, was to be Serres. 
 
 The role of Servia and Greece, who in the general 
 mobilization were expected to put about 150,000 
 troops each into the field, was to keep in check the 
 Turkish army in Macedonia, and to prevent Albanian 
 reinforcements from reaching the Turkish army in
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 259 
 
 Thrace. In addition to this, Servia and Montenegro 
 were expected to prevent the possible surprise of 
 Austrian interference, while the fleet of Greece would 
 perform the absolutely necessary service of preventing 
 the passage of Turkish forces from Asia Minor to a 
 Macedonian port. 
 
 The allies expected a bitter struggle and, in Mace- 
 donia and Thrace at least, the successful opposition of 
 a Turkish offensive, rather than the destruction of the 
 Turkish armies. 
 
 The mobilization in Turkey was described by many 
 newspaper men who had come to Constantinople for 
 the war in the most glowing terms. The efforts of 
 Mahmud Shevket Pasha to prepare the Turkish army 
 for war were declared to be bearing splendid fruits in 
 the first days of the mobilization. Wholly inaccurate 
 accounts were written of the wonderful enthusiasm of 
 the Turkish people for the war. Naturally, what even 
 the residents of Constantinople saw at the beginning 
 was the best foot foremost. We knew that tremendous 
 sums had been expended for four years in bringing the 
 army up to a footing of efficiency. We had seen with 
 our own eyes the brilliant manoeuvres on the anniver- 
 sary of the Sultan's accession in May, and on the anni- 
 versary of the Constitution in July. The work accom- 
 plished by the German mission had cast its spell over 
 us. We saw what we were expecting to see during 
 the first days of the mobilization. The " snap judg- 
 ments " of special correspondents have little value, 
 other than freshness and naivete, except to readers 
 even less informed than they are. But the East is a 
 sphinx even to those who live there. After you have 
 figured out, from what you call your " experience,"
 
 26o THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 what ought to happen, the chances are even that just 
 the opposite comes true. In spite of the misgivings 
 which had been awakened by a trip into the interior of 
 Asia Minor, as far as Konia, during the third week of 
 September, I beheved that the Turkish army was going 
 to give a good account of itself against the Bulgarians, 
 whose spirit and whose organization I had had oppor- 
 tunity to see and admire during that very summer. 
 
 Everyone was mistaken. There were large bodies 
 of splendidly trained and well-equipped troops in 
 Thrace. Spick-and-span regiments did come over from 
 garrison towns in Asia. We saw them fill the trains at 
 Stambul and at San Stefano. But we over-estimated 
 their number. The truth of the matter is that the 
 trained and well- equipped forces of the Thracian army, 
 officered by capable men, did not amount to more than 
 80,000. In retrospect, after going over carefully the 
 position of the forces which met the Bulgarians, I feel 
 that these figures can be pretty accurately established. 
 But even these 80,000 soldiers of the nizam (active 
 army) could have done wonders in the Thracian cam- 
 paign, if they had been allowed to go ahead to meet 
 the Bulgarians, and to form the first line of battle. But 
 this was not done. 
 
 There are three time-honoured principles that cannot 
 afford to be neglected at the beginning of a campaign. 
 The army used for initial offensive action against the 
 enemy should be composed wholly of soldiers in active 
 service. The army should be concentrated to meet 
 the attack of, or to attack, one opposing army first, 
 leaving the others until later. Armies must be kept 
 mobile, and not allow themselves to be trapped in 
 fortresses. The fortresses in the portions of territory
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 261 
 
 which may have to be abandoned temporarily to the 
 invasion of the enemy may easily be overstocked with 
 defenders, but never with provisions and munitions of 
 war. In spite of the instructions of Von der Goltz 
 Pasha, the Turks showed no regard for the first two, at 
 least, of these elementary principles. The mobile army 
 in Macedonia, outside of the fortresses, was not recalled 
 to Thrace, and redifs (reservists) were mixed with 
 nizams (actives) in the first line of battle. The neglect 
 of these principles was the direct cause of the Turkish 
 disasters. 
 
 After the nizams, most of whom were already in 
 Thrace, came the redifs from Asia Minor. They arrived 
 at Constantinople and at San Stefano in huge numbers, 
 and without equipment. I saw many of them with 
 their feet bound in rags. There were no tents over 
 them or other shelter; there was no proper field equip- 
 ment for them; and, even while they were patiently 
 waiting for days to be forwarded to the front, they 
 lacked (within sight of the minarets of Stambul !) bread 
 to eat, shoes for their feet, and blankets to cover them 
 at night. More than that, among them were many 
 thousands who did not know how to use the rifles that 
 were given to them, and who had not even a rudimen- 
 tary military education. In defensive warfare, as they 
 proved at Adrianople and at Tchataldja, they could fight 
 like lions. But for an offensive movement in the field 
 the great majority of the redifs were worse than useless. 
 
 The Turks were absolutely sure of victory. The 
 press of the capital, on the day that war was declared, 
 stated that the army of Thrace was composed of 
 400,000 soldiers, and that it was the intention 
 to march direct to Sofia. Turkish officers of my
 
 262 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 acquaintance told me that they were all taking their 
 dress uniforms in their baggage for this triumphal 
 entry into Sofia, and that the invasion of Bulgaria 
 would commence immediately. 
 
 On October 19 the Bulgarian army appeared in 
 force at Mustafa Pasha, the first railway-station after 
 passing the Turkish frontier on the line from Sofia to 
 Constantinople, and about eighteen miles north-west of 
 Adrianople. It was the announced intention of the 
 Bulgarians to attack immediately the fortress of 
 Adrianople, whose cannon commanded the sole rail- 
 way-line from Bulgaria into Thrace. Two of the Bul- 
 garian armies were directed upon Adrianople, and the 
 third army, under General Dimietrieff, received similar 
 orders. In Bulgaria, as well as in Turkey, everyone 
 expected to see an attack upon Adrianople. Had not 
 General Savoff declared openly that he would sacrifice 
 50,000 men, if necessary, as the Japanese had done at 
 Port Arthur, in order to capture Adrianople ? 
 
 A strict censorship was established in Bulgaria. No 
 one, native or foreigner, who by chance saw just what 
 the armies were doing could have any hope of sending 
 out the information. Postal and telegraphic com- 
 munications were in the hands of the military authori- 
 ties. None who happened to be in the region in which 
 the troops were moving forward was allowed to leave by 
 train, automobile, bicycle, or even on foot. Never in 
 history has the world been so completely in the dark 
 as to the operations of the army. But the attacks of 
 the outposts of Adrianople, and the commencement 
 of the bombardment of the forts, seemed to indicate 
 the common objective of the three Bulgarian armies. 
 Adrianople had the reputation of being one of the
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 263 
 
 strongest fortresses in the world. This reputation was 
 well justified. 
 
 Some miles to the west of Adrianople, guarding the 
 mountains of the south eastern frontier of Bulgaria, was 
 Kirk Kilisse, which was also supposed to be an impreg- 
 nable position. Here the Ottoman military authorities 
 had placed stores to form the base of supplies for the 
 offensive military operation against Bulgaria. Shortly 
 before the war a branch railway from the sole line 
 between Constantinople and Adrianople, going north 
 from Lul6 Burgas, was completed. It furnished direct 
 means of communication between the capital and Kirk 
 Kilisse. 
 
 The General Staff at Constantinople wisely decided 
 to leave in Adrianople only a sufficient garrison to 
 defend the forts and the city. It was their intention to 
 send the bulk of their Thracian army north-west from 
 Kirk Kilisse, using that fortress as a base, in order to cut 
 off the Bulgarians from their supplies, and throw them 
 back against the forts of Adrianople. In this way they 
 intended to put the Bulgarians between two fires and 
 crush them. Then they would commence the invasion 
 of Bulgaria. The plan was excellent. If Turkey had 
 actually had in the field half a million men well trained 
 and well equipped, well officered, and with a spirit of 
 enthusiasm, and — most important of all — properly fed, 
 it is probable that the Bulgarians could have been held 
 in check. But this army did not exist. The millions 
 spent for equipment had disappeared — who knows 
 where ? There were not enough horses, even with the 
 requisitions in Constantinople, for the artillery and for 
 the cavalry reserves. That meant that there were no 
 horses at all for the commissariat department. The
 
 264 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 only means of communication with the front was a 
 single railway track. Roads had never been made in 
 Thrace since the conquest. The artillery and the 
 waggons had to be drawn through deep mud. 
 
 Beyond the needs of the nizam (active) regiments, 
 there were hardly any officers. The wretched masses 
 of redifs (reservists) were without proper leadership. 
 Not only was this all-important factor for keeping up 
 the morale of the soldiers lacking, but, from the moment 
 they left Constantinople — even before that — there was 
 insufficient food. Nor did the soldiers know why they 
 were fighting. There was no enthusiasm for a 
 cause. The great mass of the civil population, if not, 
 like the Christians, hostile to the army, was wholly 
 indifferent. I do not believe there were 10,000 
 people in the city of Constantinople who really cared 
 what happened in Thrace. Since I have been in the 
 midst of a mobilization in France, and have seen how 
 the French soldiers are equipped for war and fed, and 
 how they have been made to feel that every man, 
 woman and child in the nation was ready to make any 
 sacrifice — no matter how great — for "the little 
 soldiers of France," I feel more deeply the tragedy of 
 the Turkish redifs. My wonder is that they were able 
 to fight as bravely as they did. The world has no use 
 for the government — for the " system " — which caused 
 them to suffer as they did, and to give their lives in a 
 wholly useless sacrifice. 
 
 The story of the Thracian campaign I heard from the 
 lips of many of those who had taken part in it, when the 
 events were still fresh in their memory. It is fruitless 
 to go into all the details, to discuss the strategy of the 
 generals in command, and to give a technical descrip-
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 265 
 
 tion of the battles, and of the retreat. Turkish and 
 Bulgarian officers, as well as a host of foreign correspon- 
 dents, have published books on this campaign. Most of 
 them hide the real causes of the defeat under a mass of 
 unimportant detail, and seem to be written either to 
 emphasize the writer's claim as a " first-hand " wit- 
 ness to take to task certain generals, or to prove the 
 superiority of French artillery, and the faultiness of 
 German military instruction. When all these issues 
 are cast to one side, the campaign can be briefly 
 described. 
 
 We have already anticipated the debdcle of the 
 military power of Turkey by giving the causes. This is 
 not illogical. For these causes existed, and led to the 
 inevitable result, before the first gun was fired. 
 
 On October 19 the Bulgarians began the investment 
 of Adrianople from the north and west. There was no 
 serious opposition. The Turkish garrison naturally 
 fell back to the protection of the forts, for the Turks 
 had not planned to oppose, beyond Adrianople, the 
 Bulgarian approach. The Ottoman advance-guard, 
 composed of the corps of Constantinople and Rodosto, 
 under the command of Abdullah and Mahmud Mukhtar 
 Pashas, was ordered to take the offensive north of Kirk 
 Kilisse. They were to be followed by another army. 
 This movement was intended to cut off the Bulgarians 
 from their base of supplies, and throw them back on 
 Adrianople. The remainder of the Turkish forces in 
 Thrace were to wait the result of this movement. If 
 the Bulgarians moved down the valley of the Maritza, 
 leaving Adrianople, they would meet these imposing 
 forces which covered Constantinople, and would have 
 behind them the garrison of Adrianople and the army
 
 266 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 of Abdullah and Mahmud Mukhtar threatening their 
 communications. If they besieged Adrianople, the 
 second army would take the offensive, and the Bul- 
 garians would be encircled. 
 
 The outposts of the Turkish army came into contact 
 with the Bulgarians on October 20. Believing that 
 they had to do with the left of the army investing 
 Adrianople, Mahmud and Abdullah decided to begin 
 their encircling movement immediately. On the 21st 
 and 22nd the two columns of the Turkish army were 
 in fact engaged with the advance-guards of the first 
 and second Bulgarian armies. But in the meantime 
 General Dimitrieff and the third army (which they 
 believed was on the extreme Bulgarian right, pressing 
 down the Maritza to invest the southern forts of 
 Adrianople) had quietly crossed the frontier almost 
 directly north of Kirk Kiliss6, and fell like a cyclone 
 upon the Turks. The Turkish positions were excellent, 
 and had to be taken at the point of the bayonet. 
 From morning till night on October 23 the Bulgarian 
 third army captured position after position, without the 
 help of their artillery, which was stuck in the mud some 
 miles in the rear. In the evening, during a terrible 
 storm, two fresh Bulgarian columns made an assault 
 upon the Turkish positions. It was not until then that 
 the Turks realized that they were fighting another 
 army than that charged with the investment of Adria- 
 nople. A wild panic broke out among the redifs, who 
 were mostly without officers. They started to retreat, 
 and were soon followed by the remainder of the army. 
 At Uskubdere they met during the night reinforce- 
 ments coming to their aid. Two regiments fired 
 on each other, each mistaking the other for Bui-
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 267 
 
 garians. The reinforcements joined in the disorderly 
 retreat, which did not end until morning, when, ex- 
 hausted and still crazed by fear, what remained of the 
 Turkish army had reached Baba Eski and Bunar 
 Hissar. 
 
 The army was saved from annihilation by the dark- 
 ness and the storm. For not only were the Bulgarians 
 ignorant of the abandonment of Kirk Kilisse, but, 
 along the line where they knew the enemy were re- 
 treating, their cavalry could not advance in the dark- 
 ness and mud, nor could their artillery shell the retreat- 
 ing columns. On the morning of the 24th, when 
 General Dimitrieff was preparing to make the assault 
 upon Kirk Kiliss6, he learned that the Turkish army 
 had fled, and that the fortress was undefended. 
 
 By the capture of Kirk Kiliss6 the Bulgarians gained 
 enormous stores. They had a railway line open to 
 them towards Constantinople. The only menace to a 
 successful investment of Adrianople was removed. 
 The victory, so easily purchased, was far beyond their 
 dreams. But it would not have been possible had it 
 not been for the willingness of the Bulgarian soldiers to 
 charge without tiring or faltering at the point of the 
 bayonet. The victory was earned, in spite of the 
 Turkish, panic ; for the Bulgarian steel had much to do 
 with that panic. 
 
 As soon as he realized the extent of the victory of 
 Kirk Kilisse, General Savoff ordered a general advance 
 of the three Bulgarian armies. Only enough troops 
 were left around Adrianople to prevent a sortie of the 
 garrison. Notwithstanding the unfavourable condi- 
 tion of the roads, the Bulgarian armies moved with 
 great rapidity. The cavalry in two days made recon-
 
 268 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 naissances on the east as far as Midia, and on the south 
 as far as Rodosto . The main — and sole — armies of the 
 Turks were thus ascertained to be along the Ergene, 
 and beyond in the direction of the capital. On the 
 left the third army of General Dimitrieff, not delaying 
 at Kirk Kilisse, was in contact with the Turks at Eski 
 Baba on the 28th. On the afternoon of the same day 
 the Bulgarians drove the Turks out of the village of 
 Lule Burgas, on the railway to Constantinople, east of 
 the point where the Dedeagatch-Salonika line branches 
 off. 
 
 For three days, October 29 to 31, the Turkish armies 
 made a stand along the Ergene from Bunar Hissar to 
 Lul6 Burgas. Since Gettysburg, Sadowa, and Sedan, 
 no battle except that of Mukden has approached the 
 battle of Lule Burgas in importance, not only because 
 of the numbers engaged, but also of the issue at stake. 
 Three hundred and fifty thousand soldiers were in 
 action, the forces being about evenly divided. For two 
 days, in spite of the demonstration of Kirk Kilisse, the 
 Turks fought with splendid courage and tenacity. 
 Time and again the desperate charges of the Bulgarian 
 infantry were hurled back with heavy loss. Not until 
 the third day did the fighting seem to lean decisively 
 to the advantage of the Bulgarians. Their artillery 
 began to show marked superiority. From many 
 points shells began to fall with deadly effect into the 
 Turkish entrenchments. The Turks were unable to 
 silence the murderous fire of the Bulgarian batteries. 
 The soldiers, because they were starving, did not have it 
 in them to attempt to take the most troublesome 
 Bulgarian positions by assault. 
 
 The retreat began on the afternoon of the 31st. On
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 269 
 
 November i, owing to lack of officers and of central 
 direction, it became a disorderly flight, a sauve qui 
 peut. Camp equipment was abandoned. The soldiers 
 threw away their knapsacks and rifles, so that they 
 could run more quickly. The artillerymen cut the 
 traces of their gun-waggons and ammunition-waggons, 
 and made off on horseback. Everything was aban- 
 doned to the enemy. Nazim Pasha, generalissimo, 
 and the general staff, who had been in headquarters at 
 Tchorlu, without proper telegraphic or telephonic com- 
 munication with the battle front, were drawn into the 
 flight. The Turkish army did not stop until it had 
 placed itself behind the Tchataldja line of forts, which 
 protected the city of Constantinople. 
 
 The battle of Lule Burgas marked more than the 
 destruction of the Turkish military power and the 
 loss of European Turkey to the empire. It revealed 
 the inefficiency of Turkish organization and adminis- 
 tration to cope with modern conditions, even when in 
 possession of modern instruction and modern tools. 
 With the Turks it is not a question of an ignorance 
 or a backwardness that can be remedied. Total 
 lack of organizing and administrative ability is a fault 
 of their nature. Courage alone does not win battles 
 in the twentieth century. 
 
 The Bulgarians were without sufficient cavalry and 
 mounted machine-guns to follow up their victory. 
 The defeat of the Turks, too, had not been gained with- 
 out the expenditure of every ounce of energy in the 
 army that had in those three days won undying fame. 
 The problem of pursuit was difficult. There was only 
 a single railway track. Food and munitions for the 
 large army had to be brought up. The artillery ad-
 
 270 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 vanced painfully through roads hub-deep in mud. It 
 took two weeks for the Bulgarian army to move from 
 the Ergene to Tchataldja, and prepare for the assault 
 of the last line of Turkish defence. 
 
 An immediate offensive after Lule Burgas would 
 have found Constantinople at the mercy of the vic- 
 torious army. The two weeks of respite changed the 
 aspect of things. For in this time the forts across the 
 peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea 
 were hastily repaired. They were mounted with guns 
 from the Bosphorus defences, the Servian Creusots 
 detained at Salonika at the beginning of the war, 
 and whatever artillery could be brought from Asia 
 Minor. The army had been reformed, the worthless, 
 untrained elements ruthlessly weeded out, and 100,000 
 of the best soldiers, among whom the only redifs were 
 those who had come fresh from Asia Minor, and had 
 not been contaminated by the demoralization of Kirk 
 KiHsse and Lul6 Burgas, were placed behind the forts. 
 The Turkish cruisers whose guns were able to be fired 
 were recalled from the Dardanelles, and anchored off 
 the end of the line on either side. 
 
 On November 15 the Bulgarians began to put their 
 artillery in position all along the Tchataldja line from 
 Buyuk-Tchekmedje, on the Sea of Marmora, to Derkos 
 Lake, near the Black Sea. At the same time they en- 
 trenched the artillery positions by earthworks and 
 ditches, working with incredible rapidity ; for they 
 had to take every precaution against a sudden sortie 
 of the enemy. In forty-eight hours they were ready. 
 The attack on the Tchataldja lines commenced at 
 six o'clock on Sunday morning, November 17, by 
 machine-gun and rifle fire, as well as by artillery.
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 271 
 
 The forts and the Turkish cruisers responded. In the 
 city and in the villages along the Bosphorus we could 
 hear the firing distinctly. On the 17th and i8th the 
 Bulgarians delivered assaults in several places. Near 
 Derkos they even got through the Hues for a short 
 while. These were merely for the purpose of testing 
 the Turkish positions, however. Several of the 
 assaults were repulsed. The Bulgarians suffered 
 heavily on the i8th, when the first and only prisoners 
 of the war were made. On the 19th the artillery 
 fire grew less and less, and there were no further at- 
 tacks. Towards evening it was evident that the Bul- 
 garians had abandoned their advanced lines, and did 
 not intend to continue the attack. No general assault 
 had been delivered. 
 
 It seems certain that General Savoff had in mind 
 the capture of Constantinople on November 17. 
 Turkish overtures for peace, opened on the 15th, had 
 been repulsed. Every preparation was made for the 
 attempt to pierce Tchataldja. Why was the plan 
 abandoned before it was actually proved impossible ? 
 Did General Savoff fear the risk of a reverse ? Was 
 he short of ammunition ? Had the Turkish defence of 
 the 17th and i8th been more determined than he had 
 expected ? Was it fear of a cholera epidemic among 
 his soldiers ? Or was the abandonment of the attempt 
 to capture Constantinople — for that is what a triumph 
 at Tchataldja v/ould have meant — dictated by political 
 reasons ? 
 
 Perhaps there was a shortage of ammunition. But 
 it is impossible to believe that General Savoff ceased 
 the attack because he feared a failure, or because he 
 paused before the heavy sacrifice of life it would in-
 
 272 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 volve. The Bulgarians were too fresh from their 
 sudden and overwhelming victories to be halted by 
 the unimportant fighting of the 17th and i8th. They 
 were not yet aware of the terrible danger from cholera. 
 
 At the time it was the common belief in Constanti- 
 nople — I heard it expressed in a number of intelligent 
 circles — that the Great Powers — in particular, Russia — 
 had informed Bulgaria that she should halt where she 
 was. A second San Stefano 1 This seems improbable. 
 Even in the moment of delirium over Lul^ Burgas the 
 Bulgarians had no thought of occupying Constantinople 
 permanently. They knew that this would be a task 
 beyond their ability as a nation to undertake. If 
 there was a thought of entering Constantinople, it was 
 to satisfy miUtary pride, and to be able to dictate 
 terms of peace more expeditiously and satisfactorily. 
 
 The real reason for the halt of Tchataldja, and the 
 willingness to conclude an armistice, must be found 
 in the alarm awakened in Bulgaria by the Servian and 
 Greek successes. Greece had settled herself in Salonika, 
 and the King and royal family had come there to 
 live. Is it merely a coincidence that on November 18 
 the Servians captured Monastir, foyer of Bulgarianism 
 in western Macedonia, and on the following day a tele- 
 gram from Sofia caused the cessation of the Bulgarian 
 attack upon Tchataldja ? 
 
 At Adrianople a combined Bulgarian and Servian 
 army, under the command of General Ivanoff, which 
 had been hampered during the first month of operations 
 by the floods of the Maritza, and by daring sorties of 
 the garrison, after receiving experienced reinforce- 
 ments on November 22, began a determined bombard- 
 ment and narrow investment of the forts. Ten days
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 273 
 
 later a general attack was ordered, probably to hurry 
 the Turks in the armistice negotiations. The investing 
 army had made very little progress on December 2 and 3, 
 when the signing of the armistice caused a cessation 
 of hostilities. 
 
 But while the Bulgarians were vigorously pressing 
 the attack upon Adrianople, they were inactive at 
 Tchataldja. 
 
 At the beginning of the Thracian campaign a por- 
 tion of the Turkish fleet started to attack the Bul- 
 garian coast. The Bulgarians had only one small 
 cruiser and six torpedo boats of doubtful value. But 
 their two ports, termini of railway-lines, were well 
 protected by forts. On October 19 two Turkish battle- 
 ships and four torpedo boats appeared before Varna, 
 and fired without effect upon the forts. Then they 
 bombarded the small open port of Kavarna, near the 
 Rumanian frontier. On the 21st they succeeded in 
 throwing a few shells into Varna, but did not risk ap- 
 proaching near enough to do serious damage. This 
 was the extent of the offensive naval action against 
 Bulgaria. A short time later, the Hamidieh, which 
 was stationed on the Thracian coast of the Black Sea 
 to protect the landing of redifsirom Samsun, was sur- 
 prised in the night by Bulgarian torpedo boats. Two 
 torpedoes tore holes in her bow. She was able to 
 return to Constantinople under her own steam, but had 
 to spend ten weeks in dry dock. The only service 
 rendered by the Turkish fleet against the Bulgarians 
 was the safeguarding of the transport of troops from 
 Black Sea ports of Asiatic Turkey and the co-operation 
 at the ends of the Tchataldja lines during the Bul- 
 garian assaults of November 17 and 18. 
 
 18
 
 274 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 The Servian campaign was a good second to the 
 astounding successes of the Bulgarians in Thrace. 
 The third army entered the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, so 
 long coveted by Servia, and expelled the Turks in five 
 days. A portion of this army next occupied Prisrend 
 and Diakova, descended the valley of the Drin through 
 the heart of northern Albania to Alessio, where it 
 joined, on November 19, the Montenegrins, who were 
 already at San Giovanni di Medua. On the 28th they 
 occupied Durazzo. The Servians had reached the 
 Adriatic ! 
 
 While the third army was in the Sandjak of Novi 
 Bazar, the second Servian army crossed into Old 
 Servia, passed through the plain of Kossova, where 
 the Turks had destroyed the independence of Servia 
 in 1389, and occupied Pristina on October 23. This 
 gave them control of the branch railway from Uskub 
 to the confines of the Sandjak. 
 
 The flower of the Servian fighting strength was re- 
 served for the first army, under the command of 
 Crown Prince Alexander. This force, considerably 
 larger than the two other armies combined, mustered 
 over 70,000. Its objective point was Uskub, covering 
 which was the strong Turkish army of Zekki Pasha. 
 Battle was joined outside of Kumanova on October 22. 
 After three days of fighting, during which the Turkish 
 cavalry was annihilated by the Servian artillery, and 
 the Servian infantry took the Turkish artillery posi- 
 tions at the point of the bayonet, the army of Zekki 
 Pasha evacuated Kumanova. No attempt was made 
 to defend Uskub, which the Servians entered on 
 October 26. The Turkish army retreated to Kuprulu 
 on the Vardar, towards Salonika. When the Servians
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 275 
 
 continued their march, Zekki Pasha retreated to 
 Prilip, where he occupied positions that could not 
 well be shelled by artillery. After two days of con- 
 tinuous fighting the Servians' bayonets dislodged the 
 Turks. They withdrew to Monastir with the Servians 
 hot upon their heels. 
 
 Together with Kumonova, in which the bulk of 
 Prince Alexander's forces did not find it necessary to 
 engage, the capture of Monastir is the most brilliant 
 feat of an army whose intrepidity, agility, and intelli- 
 gence deserve highest praise. Into Monastir had been 
 thrown the army of Tahsin Pasha, pushed northward 
 by the Greeks, as well as that of Zekki Pasha, harried 
 southward by the Servians. The Servians did not 
 hesitate to approach the defences of the city on one 
 side up to their arm-pits in water, while on the other 
 side they scaled the heights dominating Monastir — 
 heights which ought to have been defended for weeks 
 without great difficulty. The Turks were compelled 
 to withdraw, for they were at the mercy of the Servian 
 artillery. They tried to retreat to Okrida, but the 
 Servian left wing anticipated this movement. Only 
 10,000 escaped into Epirus. Nearly 40,000 Turks 
 surrendered to the Servians on November 18. Monastir 
 and Okrida were captured. The Turkish armies of 
 Macedonia had ceased to exist. 
 
 The Greeks were eager to wipe out the shame of 
 the war of 1897. Fifteen years had wrought a great 
 difference in the morale of the Greek army. A new 
 body of officers, who spent their time in learning their 
 profession instead cf discussing poUtics at caf6 tenasses, 
 had been created. The French military mission, 
 under General Eydoux, had been working for several
 
 276 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 years in the complete reorganization of the Greek 
 army. I had the privilege at Athens of enjoying the 
 hospitality of Greek officers in their casernes at several 
 successive Easter festivals. Each year one could 
 notice the progress. They were always ready to show 
 you how the transformation of their artillery, and its 
 equipment for mountain service as well as for field- 
 work, would make all the difference in the world in 
 the " approaching " war with the Turks. The results 
 were beyond expectations. What the Greeks had been 
 working for was mobility. This they demonstrated 
 they had learned. They had also an esprit de corps 
 which in fighting made up for what they lacked of 
 Slavic dogged perseverance. Neither in actual combat 
 nor in strategy, except in the case of Janina, were 
 the Greeks put to the test, or called upon to bear the 
 burden, of the Bulgarians and Servians. But, especi- 
 ally when we take into consideration the invaluable 
 service of their fleet, there is no reason to belittle 
 their part in the downfall of Turkey. If the effort 
 had been necessary, they probably would have been 
 equal to it. 
 
 The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus. The bulk 
 of their forces, following a sound military principle, 
 were led into Thessaly by the Crown Prince Constan- 
 tine. They crossed the frontier without resistance, 
 fought a sharp combat at Elassona on the 19th, in 
 which they stood admirably under fire, and broke down 
 the last Turkish resistance at Servia. The army of 
 Tahsin Pasha was thrown back upon Monastir. The 
 battles of the next ten days were hardly more than 
 skirmishes, for the Turkish stand was never formid- 
 able. At Yanitza the only real battle of the Greek
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 277 
 
 campaign was fought. The Turks fled. The way to 
 Salonika was open. 
 
 The battle of Yanitza (Yenidje-Vardar) was fought 
 on November 3. On October 30 a Greek torpedo-boat 
 had succeeded, in spite of the strong harbour fortifica- 
 tions, equipped with electric searchlights, and the 
 mined channel, in coming right up to the jetty at 
 Salonika during the night, and launching three tor- 
 pedoes at an old Turkish cruiser which lay at anchor 
 there. The cruiser sank. On his way out to open 
 sea the commander of the torpedo boat did not hesi- 
 tate to fire upon the forts ! 
 
 This daring feat, and the approach of the Greek 
 army, threw the city into a turmoil of excitement. The 
 people had been fed for two weeks on false news, and 
 telegrams had been printed from day to day relating 
 wonderful victories over the Servians, Bulgarians, and 
 Greeks. But the coming of the refugees, fresh thousands 
 from nearer places every day, and the presence in the 
 streets of the city of deserters in uniform, gave the lie 
 to the " official " news. When the German stationnaire 
 arrived from Constantinople and embarked the prisoner 
 of the Villa Allatini, ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, the most 
 pessimistic suspicions were confirmed. 
 
 Although he had 30,000 soldiers and plenty of 
 munitions, Tahsin Pasha, commandant of Salonika, 
 did not even attempt to defend the city. He began 
 immediately to negotiate with the advancing Greek 
 army. When the Crown Prince refused to accept any 
 other than unconditional surrender, and moved upon 
 the city, Tahsin Pasha yielded. Not a shot was fired. 
 On November 9, without any opposition, the Greek 
 army marched into Salonika.
 
 278 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 In other places the Turks at least fought, even if 
 they did not fight well. At Salonika their surrender 
 demonstrated to what humiliation and degradation the 
 arrogance of the Young Turks had brought a nation 
 whose past was filled with glorious deeds of arms. 
 
 The Bulgarian expeditionary corps for Macedonia, 
 under General Theodoroff, had crossed the frontier on 
 October i8. Joined to it were the notorious bands of 
 comitadjis, under the command of Sandansky, who 
 afterwards related to me the story of this march. 
 General Theodoroff 's mission was to engage the portion 
 of the Turkish Fifth Army Corps, which was stationed 
 in the valleys of the Mesta and Struma, east of the 
 Vardar, thus preventing it from assembling and making 
 a flank movement against the main Servian or Bul- 
 garian armies. The Bulgarians were greeted every- 
 where as liberators, and, although they were not in 
 great numbers, the Turks did not try to oppose them. 
 Soldiers and Moslem Macedonians together fled before 
 them towards Salonika. 
 
 When General Theodoroff realized the demoraliza- 
 tion of the Turks, and heard how the Greeks were ap- 
 proaching Salonika without any more serious oppo- 
 sition than that which confronted him, he hurried his 
 column towards Salonika. The Bulgarian princes 
 Boris and Cyril joined him. They were not in time to 
 take part in the negotiations for the surrender of the 
 city. The cowardice of Tahsin Pasha had brought 
 matters to a climax on November 9. But they were 
 able to enter Salonika on the loth, at the same time 
 that Crown Prince Constantine was making his tri- 
 umphal entry. Sandansky and his comitadjis hurried 
 to the principal ancient church of the city, for over
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 279 
 
 400 years the Saint Sophia of Salonika, and placed the 
 Bulgarian flag in the minarets before the Greeks knew 
 they had been outwitted. On the 12th King George 
 of Greece arrived to make his residence in the city that 
 was to be his tomb. 
 
 After the capture of Monastir the Servians pressed 
 on to Okrida on November 23, and from there into 
 Albania to Elbassan, which they reached five days 
 later. It was their intention to join the other column 
 of the third Servian Army, of whose march down the 
 Drin we have already spoken, at Durazzo. But the 
 threatening attitude of Austria-Hungary necessitated 
 the recall of the bulk of the Servian forces to Nish. 
 This is the reason they were not able, at that stage 
 of the war, to give the Montenegrins effective assistance 
 against Scutari. 
 
 The left wing of the Thessalian Greek army, after 
 the capture of Monastir by the Servians, pursued 
 towards Albania the Turks who had escaped from 
 Monastir. With great skill they managed to prevent 
 the Turks from turning north-west into the interior 
 of Albania. After the brilliant and daring storming of 
 the heights of Tchangan, what remained of the Turkish 
 army was compelled to retreat into Epirus towards 
 Janina. 
 
 On October 20 the Greek fleet, under Admiral Koun- 
 douriotis, appeared at the Dardanelles to offer battle 
 to the Turks. Under the cover of the protection of 
 their fleet the Greeks occupied Lemnos,Thasos, Imbros, 
 Samothrace, Nikaria, and the smaller islands. The in- 
 habitants of Samos had expelled the Turkish garrisons 
 on their own initiative at the outbreak of the war. 
 Mitylene was captured without great difficulty on
 
 28o THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 November 21. The Greeks landed at Chios on the 24th. 
 Here the Turkish garrison of 2,000 retired to the moun- 
 tainous centre of the island, and succeeded in pro- 
 longing their resistance until January. When he saw 
 that no help was coming from Asia Minor, whose shores 
 had been in sight during all the weeks of combat and 
 suffering, the heroic Turkish commander surrendered 
 with 1,800 starving men on January 3. It was only 
 because Italy, by a clause of the Treaty of Ouchy, still 
 held the Dodecanese, that all of the ^gsean Islands 
 were not " gathered into the fold " by Greece. 
 
 There had been less than six weeks of fighting. 
 The Balkan allies had swept from the field all the 
 Turkish forces in Europe. The Turkish armies were 
 bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople, Janina, and 
 Scutari, with absolutely no hope of making successful 
 sorties. Except at Constantinople, they were be- 
 sieged, and could expect neither reinforcements nor 
 food-supplies. The Greek fleet was mistress of the 
 iEgaean Sea, and held the Turkish navy blocked in 
 the Dardanelles. No new armies could come from 
 Asiatic Turkey. This was the situation when the 
 armistice was signed . The Ottoman Empire in Europe 
 had ceased to exist. The mihtary prestige of Turkey 
 had received a mortal blow. 
 
 The Armistice and the First Conference of 
 
 London. 
 
 The hopelessness of the outcome of the war with 
 Italy, the dissatisfaction over the foolish and arbitrary 
 rule of its secret committees, had weakened the hold 
 of the " Committee of Union and Progress " over the
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 281 
 
 Army. Despite its success in the spring elections of 
 1912, its position was precarious. In July Mahmud 
 Shevket Pasha, who was suspected of planning a 
 military pronunciamiento , resigned the Ministry of 
 War. The Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, soon followed 
 him into retirement. The Sultan declared that a 
 Ministry not under the control of a political party 
 was a necessity. 
 
 Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, after much difficulty, suc- 
 ceeded in forming a Ministry, in which a distinguished 
 Armenian, Noradounghian Effendi, was given the 
 portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The Unionist majority 
 in the Lower House of Parliament proved intractable. 
 Its obstructionist tactics won for the Chamber of 
 Deputies the name of the " comic opera-house of 
 Fundukuli." (Fundukuli was the Bosphorus quarter 
 in which the House of Parliament was located.) With 
 the help of the Senate, and the moral support of the 
 army, the Sultan dissolved Parliament on August 5. 
 Only the menace of the Albanian revolution prevented 
 the Committee from attempting to set up a rival 
 Parliament at Salonika. This was the unenviable 
 internal situation of Turkey at the opening of the 
 Balkan War. 
 
 The disasters of the Thracian campaign led to the 
 resignation of the Ghazi Mukhtar pasha cabinet. The 
 aged statesman of the old regime, Kiamil pasha, was 
 called for the eighth time to the Grand Vizirate. He 
 retained Nazim pasha, generalissimo of the Turkish 
 army, and Noradounghian effendi, in the Ministries of 
 war and foreign affairs. The most influential of the 
 Young Turks, who had bitterly opposed the peace 
 with Italy, and were equally determined that no nego-
 
 282 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 tiations should be undertaken with the Balkan States, 
 were exiled. Kiamil pasha saw clearly that peace was 
 absolutely necessary. His long experience allowed him 
 to have no illusions as to the possibility of continuing 
 the struggle. Before the Bulgarian attack upon Tcha- 
 taldja, he began pourparlers with General Savoff. 
 After the repulse of November 17 and 18, he was just 
 as firm in his decision that the negotiations must be 
 continued. He won over to his point of view the 
 members of the Cabinet, and notably Nazim pasha. 
 
 The conditions of the armistice, signed on Decem- 
 ber 3, were an acknowledgment of the complete debdcle 
 of the Turkish army. Bulgaria forced the stipulation 
 that her army in front of Tchataldja should be re- 
 victualled by the railway which passed under the guns 
 of Adrianople, while that fortress remained without 
 food ! Greece, by an agreement with her allies, refused 
 to sign the armistice, but was allowed to be represented 
 in the peace conference. The Allies felt that the state 
 of war on sea must continue, in order that Turkey 
 should be prevented during the armistice from bringing 
 to the front her army corps from Syria and Meso- 
 potamia and Arabia ; while Greece, in particular, was 
 determined to run no risk in connection with the 
 ^gaean Islands. The peace delegates were to meet in 
 London. 
 
 Orientals, Christian as well as Moslem, are famous 
 for bargaining. Nothing can be accomplished without 
 an exchange of proposals and counter-proposals ad 
 infinitum. In the Conference of London, the demands 
 of the Allies were the cession of all European Turkey, 
 except Albania, whose boundaries were not defined ; of 
 Crete; and of the islands in the iEgaean Sea. A war
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 283 
 
 indemnity was also demanded. Turkey was to be 
 allowed to retain Constantinople, and a strip of terri- 
 tory from Midia on the Black Sea to Rodosto on the 
 Sea of Marmora, and the peninsula of the Thracian 
 Chersonese, which formed the European shore of the 
 Dardanelles. The boundaries of Albania, and its 
 future status, were to be decided by the Powers. 
 
 I had a long conversation with the Grand Vizier, 
 Kiamil pasha, on the day the peace delegates left for 
 London. He was frank and unhesitating in the state- 
 ment of his belief that Turkey could not continue the 
 war. He denounced unsparingly the visionaries who 
 were clamouring for a continuance of the struggle. 
 " It is because of them that we are in our present 
 humiliating position," he said. " They cry out now 
 that we must not accept peace, but they know well 
 that we cannot hope to win back any portion of what 
 we have lost." 
 
 There were a number of reasons why the position of 
 Kiamil pasha was sound. First of all, the army 
 organization was in hopeless confusion. Although the 
 Bulgarians were checked at Tchataldja, the conditions 
 on the Constantinople side of the forts were terrible. 
 The general headquarters at Hademkeuy were buried 
 in filth and mud. Although the army was but twenty- 
 five miles from the city, there were days on end when 
 not even bread arrived. Cholera was making great 
 ravages. Soldiers, crazed from hunger, were shot dead 
 for disobeying the order which forbade their eating 
 raw vegetables. There was no fuel, no shelter, no 
 blankets. Winter was at hand. At San Stefano, one 
 of the most beautiful suburbs of Stambul, in a con- 
 centration camp the soldiers died by the thousands of
 
 284 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 starvation fever. It was one of the most heart- 
 rending tragedies of history. 
 
 All the while, in the cafes of Pera, Galata, and 
 Stambul, Turkish officers sat the day long, sipping 
 their coffee, and deciding that Adrianople must not be 
 given up. Even while the fighting was going on, when 
 the fate of the city hung in the balance, I saw these 
 degenerate officers hy the hundreds feasting at Pera, 
 while their soldiers were dying like dogs at Tchataldja 
 and San Stefano. This is an awful statement to make, 
 but it is the record of fact. Notices in the newspapers, 
 declaring that officers found in Constantinople without 
 permission would be immediately taken before the 
 Court-Martial, had absolutely no effect. 
 
 The navy failed to give any account of itself to the 
 Greeks, who were waiting outside of the Dardanelles. 
 Finally, on December 16, after the people of the vicinity 
 had openly cursed and taunted them, the fleet sailed 
 out to fight. An action at long range did little 
 damage to either side. The Turkish vessels refused to 
 go beyond the protection of their forts. They returned 
 in the evening to anchor. The mastery of the sea 
 remained to the Greeks.* 
 
 * In this connection we should be forgetting to pay tribute 
 to a remarkable exploit if we omitted mention of the raid of the 
 Hamidieh during the late winter. One Ottoman officer at 
 least chafed under the disgrace of the inaction of the Ottoman 
 navy. With daring and skill Captain Reouf Bey slipped out 
 into the ^Egaean Sea on the American-built cruiser, the 
 Hamidieh. He evaded the Greek blockaders, bombarded some 
 outposts on one of the islands, and sank the auxiliary cruiser, 
 the Makedonia, in a Greek port. The Hamidieh next appeared 
 in the Adriatic, where she sank several transports, and bom- 
 barded Greek positions on the coast of Albania. The cruiser 
 was next heard of at Port Said. She passed through the Suez
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 285 
 
 If the army and the navy were powerless, how about 
 the people of the capital ? From the very beginning 
 of the war the inhabitants of Constantinople, Moslem 
 as well as Christian, displayed the most complete 
 indifference to the fortunes of the battles. Even 
 when the Bulgarians were attacking Tchataldja, the 
 city took little interest. Buying and selling went on as 
 usual. There were few volunteers for national defence, 
 but the cafes were crowded, and the theatres and dance- 
 halls of Pera were going at full swing. The refugees 
 came, and camped in our streets and in the cemeteries 
 outside the walls. Those who did not die passed on 
 to Asia. The wounded arrived, and crowded our hos- 
 pitals and barracks. The cholera came. The soldiers 
 starved to death at San Stefano. The spirit of Byzan- 
 tium was over the city still : 1913 began as 1453 began. 
 
 The government tried to raise money by a national 
 loan. It could get none from Europe, unless it agreed 
 to surrender Adrianople and make peace practically 
 on the terms of the Allies. An appeal must be made 
 to the Osmanlis; for how could the war be resumed 
 without money ? There are many wealthy pashas at 
 Constantinople. Their palaces line both shores of the 
 Bosphoms. They spend money at Monte Carlo Hke 
 water. They live at Nice, as they live at Constanti- 
 
 Canal into the Red Sea for a couple of weeks, and then 
 returned boldly into the Mediterranean, although Greek 
 torpedo boats were lying in wait. Captain Reouf Bey ran 
 again the gauntlet of the Greek fleet, and got back to the 
 Dardanelles without mishap. This venture, undertaken with- 
 out permission from the Turkish admiral, had no effect upon 
 the war. For it came too late. But it showed what a little 
 enterprise and courage might have done to prevent the Turkish 
 dib&cle if undertaken at the beginning of the war.
 
 286 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 nople, like princes — or like American millionaires ! 
 One of the sanest and wisest of Turkish patriots, a 
 man whom I have known and admired, was appointed 
 to head a committee to wait upon these pashas, many 
 of them married to princesses of the imperial family, 
 and solicit their contributions. The scheme was that 
 the subscribers should advance five years' of taxes on 
 their properties for the purposes of national defence. 
 The committee hired a small launch, and spent a day 
 visiting the homes of the pashas. On their return, 
 after paying the rental of the launch, they had about 
 forty pounds sterling ! Was it not £3,000,000 that 
 was raised for the Prince of Wales's Fund recently 
 in London ? Was not the French loan " for national 
 defence," issued just before the present war, subscribed 
 in a few hours forty-three times over the large amount 
 of £32,000,000 asked for ? 
 
 In face of these facts, the Young Turks were 
 vociferous in their demand that the war be con- 
 tinued. Adrianople must not be surrendered ! 
 Kiamil pasha decided to call a " Divan," or National 
 Assembly, of the most important men in Turkey. 
 They were summoned by the Sultan to meet at 
 the palace of Dolma-Baghtche on January 22, 1913. 
 I went to see what would happen there. One would 
 have expected that the whole of Constantinople would 
 have been hanging on the words of this council, whose 
 decision the Cabinet had agreed to accept. A half- 
 dozen policemen at the palace gate, a vendor of 
 lemonade, two street-sweepers, an Italian cinemato- 
 graph photographer, and a dozen foreign newspaper 
 men — that was the extent of the crowd. 
 
 The Divan, after hearing the exposes of the Ministers
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 287 
 
 of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, decided that 
 there was nothing to discuss. The decision was in- 
 evitable. Peace must be signed. That night Kiamil 
 pasha telegraphed to London to the Turkish Commis- 
 sioners, directing them to consent to the reddition of 
 Adrianople and the other fortresses which were still 
 holding out, and to make peace at the price of ceding 
 all the Ottoman territories in Europe beyond a line 
 running from Enos, on the iEgsean Sea, at the mouth 
 of the Maritza River, to Midia, on the Black Sea. 
 
 On the following day, January 23, a coup d'etat was 
 successfully carried out. 
 
 Enver bey, the former " hero of liberty," who had 
 taken a daring and praiseworthy part in the revolution 
 of 1908, had been ruined afterwards by being appointed 
 military attache of the Ottoman Embassy at Berlin. 
 There was much that was admirable and winning in 
 Enver bey, much that was what the French call " ele- 
 vation of soul." He was a sincere patriot. But the 
 years at Berlin, and the deadening influence of mili- 
 tarism and party politics mixed together, had changed 
 him from a patriot to a politician. He went to Tripoli 
 during the Italian War, and organized a resistance in 
 Benghazi, which he announced would be "as long as 
 he lived." But it was a decision d la turque. The 
 Balkan War found him again at Constantinople — not 
 at the front leading a company against the enemy, but 
 at Constantinople, plotting with the other Young 
 Turks how they could once more get the reins of 
 government in their hands. The decision of the 
 " Divan " was the opportunity. Enver bey led a small 
 band of followers into the Sublime Porte, and shot 
 Nazim pasha and his aide-de-camp dead. The other
 
 288 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 members of the Cabinet were imprisoned, and the tele- 
 phone to the palace cut. Enver bey was driven at full 
 speed in an automobile to the palace. He secured from 
 the Sultan 3. firman calling on Mahmud Shevket pasha 
 to form a new Cabinet. The Young Turks were again 
 in power. 
 
 The bodies of Nazim pasha and the aide-de-camp 
 were buried quickly and secretly. For one of Enver's 
 companions, a man of absolutely no importance, who 
 had been killed by defenders of Nazim, a great military 
 funeral was held. 
 
 Mahmud Shevket pasha, who had been living in 
 retirement at Scutari since the war began, accepted the 
 position of Grand Vizier. I heard him, on the steps of 
 the Sublime Porte, justify the murder of Nazim pasha, 
 on the ground that there had been the intention to give 
 up Adrianople. The new Cabinet was going to redeem 
 the country, and save it from a shameful peace. 
 
 When the news of the coup d'etat reached London, it 
 was recognized that further negotiations were useless. 
 The peace conference had failed. 
 
 The Second Period of the War. 
 
 It is very doubtful if Mahmud Shevket, Enver, and 
 their accomplices had any hope whatever of retrieving 
 the fortunes of Turkish arms. They had prepared the 
 coup d'etat to get back again into ofhce. This could 
 not be done without the tacit consent of the army. At 
 the moment of the " Divan," the army was stirred up 
 over the surrender of Adrianople. It was the moment 
 to act. At any other time the army would not have 
 acquiesced in the murder of its generahssuno. The
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 289 
 
 Sultan's part in the plot was not clear. His assent 
 was, however, immediately given. Living in seclusion, 
 and knowing practically nothing of what was going on, 
 he signed the firmans, accepting the resignation of the 
 Kiamil pasha cabinet, and charging Mahmud Shevket 
 with the formation of a new Cabinet, either by force, 
 or by playing upon his fears of what might be his own 
 fate, should the agreement to surrender Adrianople 
 lead to a revolution. 
 
 On January 29 the Allies denounced the armistice, 
 and hostilities reopened. The Bulgarians at Tcha- 
 taldja had strongly entrenched themselves, and were 
 content to rest on the defensive. They did not desire 
 to capture Constantinople. But the Turks wanted to 
 relieve Adrianople. The offensive movement must 
 come from them. The Young Turks had killed Nazim 
 pasha, they said, because they believed Adrianople 
 could be saved. The word was now to Mahmud 
 Shevket and Enver. Let them justify their action. 
 
 Enthusiastic speeches were made at Constantinople. 
 We were told that the army at Tchataldja had moved 
 forward, and was going to drive the Bulgarians out of 
 Thrace. The Turks did advance some kilometres, but, 
 like their fleet at the Dardanelles, not beyond the pro- 
 tection of the forts ! They did not dare to make a 
 general assault upon the Bulgarian positions. The 
 renewal of the war, as far as Tchataldja was concerned, 
 was a perfect farce. Everyone in Constantinople knew 
 that the army was not even trying to relieve Adrianople 
 by a forward march from Constantinople. 
 
 Enver bey, who realized that he must make some 
 move to justify the coup d'etat of January 23, gathered 
 two army coips on the small boats which serve the 
 
 19
 
 290 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Bosphorus villages and the Isles of Princes. It was 
 his intention to land on the European shore of the 
 Dardanelles, and take the Bulgarians in the rear. A 
 few of his troops — the first that were sent — disem- 
 barked at Gallipoli, and, co-operating with the Dar- 
 danelles garrison, attempted an offensive movement 
 against the Bulgarian positions at Bulair, which were 
 bottling the peninsula. The attack failed ignomini- 
 ously. For the Bulgarians, after dispersing the first 
 bayonet charge by their machine guns, were not content 
 to wait for another attack. They scrambled over their 
 trenches and attacked the Turks at the point of the 
 bayonet. The army broke and fled. Some 6,000 
 Turks were left on the field. The Bulgarian losses 
 were trifling. On the same day, February 8, and 
 the following day, the rest of Enver Bey's forces tried 
 to land at several places on the European shore of the 
 Sea of Marmora. For some reason that has never been 
 explained, the Turkish fleet did not co-operate with 
 Enver Bey's attempted landings. Naturally the Turks 
 were mowed down. At Sharkeuy it was simply 
 slaughter. Three divisions were butchered. Those 
 few who succeeded in getting foot on shore were driven 
 into the sea and bayoneted. The two corps were 
 practically annihilated. 
 
 After this exploit, Enver bey returned to Constanti- 
 nople, and received the congratulations of the Grand 
 Vizier whom he had created, by a murder, to redeem 
 Turkey and recover Adrianople. 
 
 The inability to advance at Tchataldja and at Bulair, 
 and the failure to land troops on the coasts of Thrace, 
 entirely immobilized the Turkish armies during the 
 second period of the war. They were content to sit
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 291 
 
 and watch the fall of the three fortresses of Janina, 
 Adrianople, and Scutari. At the moment of the coup 
 d'etat I telegraphed that the whole misetable affair was 
 nothing more than a party move of the " outs " to oust 
 the " ins." The events confirmed this judgment. 
 Mahmud Shevket pasha had no other policy than that 
 of Kiamil pasha and Nazim pasha. He and the 
 Young Turk party did absolutely nothing to relieve 
 the situation. As soon as they thought they were safe 
 from those who swore to avenge Nazim's death, they 
 began again negotiations for peace, and on exactly the 
 same terms. 
 
 In the meantime the Greeks, who had not signed 
 the armistice, decided that they must take Janina by 
 assault. The worst of the winter was not yet over, 
 but plans were made to increase the small Greek forces 
 which had been practically inactive since the siege 
 began. Janina had never been completely invested. 
 When the Crown Prince arrived, he planned to capture 
 the most troublesome forts, and from them to make 
 untenable the formidable hills which commanded the 
 city. The Greeks followed the plan with great skill 
 and courage. Position after position was taken, until 
 the city was at the mercy of their artillery. During 
 the night of March 5 Essad pasha sent to Prince Con- 
 stantine emissaries to surrender the city, garrison, and 
 munitions of war without conditions. 
 
 The Crown Prince returned to Salonika in triumph. 
 A few days later the assassination of King George 
 made him king. From this time the diplomatic posi- 
 tion of Premier Venizelos, in his endeavour to keep 
 within bounds the military party which had the ear 
 of the new king, became most difficult. Even his
 
 292 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 great genius could not prevent the rupture with Bul- 
 garia. 
 
 After the fall of Janina, the Bulgarian general staff 
 realized that it was essential for them to force the 
 capitulation of Adrianople, or to take the city by 
 assault. As they had to keep a large portion of their 
 army before Tchataldja and Bulair, it was decided 
 that 45,000 Servians, with their siege cannon, should 
 co-operate in the attack upon Adrianople. It was 
 afterwards given by the Servians, as an excuse for 
 breaking their treaty with Bulgaria, that they had 
 helped in the fall of Adrianople. But it must be re- 
 membered that the Bulgarian army, by its maintenance 
 of the positions at Tchataldja and Bulair, was rendering 
 service, not to herself alone, but to the common cause 
 of the Allies. Greece and Servia will never be able to 
 get away from the fact that Bulgaria bore the brunt 
 of the burden in the first Balkan War, and that her 
 services in the common cause were far greater than 
 those of either of her allies. One cannot too strongly 
 emphasize the point, also, that the capture and pos- 
 session of Adrianople did not mean to Bulgaria, either 
 from the practical or from the sentimental standpoint, 
 what Salonika meant to the Greeks and Uskub to the 
 Servians. The Servian contingent before Adrianople 
 was not helping Bulgaria to do what was to be wholly 
 to the benefit of Bulgaria. The Servians were co- 
 operating in an enterprise that was to contribute to 
 the success of their common cause. 
 
 Adrianople had been closely invested ever since the 
 battle of Kirk Kilisse. No army came to the relief of 
 the garrison since the fatal retreat of October 24. The 
 Bulgarians had not made a serious effort to capture the
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 293 
 
 city during the first period of the war. The armistice 
 served their ends well, because each day lessened the 
 provisions of the besieged. Inside the city Shukri 
 pasha had done all he could to keep up the courage of 
 the inhabitants. He himself was ignorant of the real 
 situation at Constantinople. Perhaps it was in good 
 faith that he assured the garrison continually that the 
 hour of deliverance was at hand. By wireless, the 
 authorities at Constantinople, after the coup d'etai 
 especially, kept assuring him that the army was ad- 
 vancing, and that it was a question only of days. So, 
 in spite of starvation and of the continual rain of shells 
 upon the city, he managed to maintain the morale of 
 his garrison. The allies finally decided upon a sys- 
 tematic assault of the forts on all sides of the city at 
 once. In this way the Turks were not able to use their 
 heavy artillery to the best advantage. Advancing with 
 scissors, the Bulgarians and Servians cut their way 
 through the tangle of barbed wire. On the 24th and 
 25th the forts fell one after the other. Czar Ferdinand 
 entered the city with his troops on March 26. 
 
 It was at the moment of this heroic capture, in 
 which there was glory enough for all, that the clouds 
 of trouble between Bulgaria and Servia began to appear 
 on the horizon. Shukri pasha, following the old policy 
 of the Turks, which had been so successful for centuries 
 in the Balkan peninsula, tried to surrender to the 
 Servian general, who was too loyal to discipline to fall 
 into this trap. But the Servian newspapers began to 
 say that it was really the Servian army which had cap- 
 tured the city, and that Shukri pasha recognized this 
 fact when he sent to find the Servian commander. 
 There was an unedifying duel of newspapers between
 
 294 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Belgrade and Sofia, which showed that the material 
 for conflagration was ready. 
 
 In the second period of the war the Servians gave 
 substantial aid, especially in artillery, to the Monte- 
 negrins, who had been besieging Scutari ever since 
 October 15. I went over the mountain of Tarabosh on 
 horseback with an Albanian who had been one of its 
 defenders. He related graphically the story of the 
 repeated assaults of the Montenegrins and Servians. 
 Each time they were driven back before they reached 
 those batteries that dominated Scutari, and made im- 
 possible the entry to the city without their capture. 
 The loss of life was tremendous. The bravery of the 
 assailants could do nothing against the miles and miles 
 of barbed wire. No means of stopping assault has ever 
 proved more efficacious. The besiegers were unable 
 to capture Tarabosh ; so they could not enter the city. 
 
 At the beginning of the war Scutari was under the 
 command of Hassan Riza pasha. In February he was 
 assassinated by his subordinate, Essad pasha, an 
 Albanian of the Toptani family, who had been a 
 favourite of Abdul Hamid, and had had a rather ques- 
 tionable career in the gendarmerie during the days of 
 despotism. After the assassination of the Turkish 
 commandant, it was for Albania, and not for Turkey, 
 that Essad pasha continued the resistance. In March 
 Austria began to threaten the Montenegrins, and 
 assure them that they could not keep the city. The 
 story of how she secured the agreement of the Great 
 Powers in coercing Montenegro is told in another 
 chapter. Montenegro was defiant, and paid no atten- 
 tion to an international blockade. But on April 13 
 the Servians, fearing international complications, with-
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 295 
 
 drew from the siege. It was astonishing news to the 
 world that after this, on April 22, Essad Pasha surren- 
 dered Scutari to the king of Montenegro, with the 
 stipulation that he could withdraw with his garrison, 
 his light artillery, and whatever munitions he might 
 be able to take with him. 
 
 The Ottoman flag had ceased to wave in any part of 
 Europe except Constantinople and the Dardanelles. 
 The war was over, whether the Young Turks would have 
 it so or not. Facts are facts. 
 
 The Treaty of London. 
 
 Nazim pasha had been assassinated on January 23. 
 The armistice was denounced on the 29th. On Feb- 
 ruary 10 Mahmud Shevket pasha began to sound the 
 Great Powers for their intervention in securing peace. 
 It was necessary, however, now that the war had been 
 resumed, that the impossibility of relieving Adrianople 
 be demonstrated, so that it might not continue to be a 
 stumbling-block in reopening the negotiations. The 
 Great Powers were willing to act as mediators, but 
 could not make any acceptable overture until after the 
 fall of Janina and Adrianople. 
 
 On March 23 they proposed the following as basis 
 for the renewal of the negotiations at London : 
 
 1. A frontier line from Enos to Midia, which would 
 follow the course of the Maritza, and the cession to the 
 Allies of all the territories west of that line, with the 
 exception of Albania, whose status and frontiers would 
 be decided upon by the Powers. 
 
 2. Decision by the Powers of the question of the 
 iEgaean Islands. 
 
 3. Abandonment of Crete by Turkey.
 
 296 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 4. Arrangement of all financial questions at Paris by 
 an international commission, in which the representa- 
 tives of Turkey and the Allies would be allowed to sit. 
 Participation of the Allies in the Ottoman Debt, and 
 in the financial obligations of the territories newly 
 acquired. No indemnity of war, in principle. 
 
 5. End of hostilities immediately after the accept- 
 ance of this basis of negotiations. 
 
 Turkey agreed to these stipulations. The Balkan 
 states, however, did not want to commit themselves 
 to the Enos-Midia line " as definitely agreed upon," 
 but only as a basis for pourparlers. They insisted that 
 the iEgaean Islands must be ceded directly to them. 
 They wanted to know what the Powers had in mind in 
 regard to the frontiers of Albania. In the last place, 
 they refused to relinquish the possibility of an indem- 
 nity of war. 
 
 Notes were exchanged backward and forward 
 among the chancelleries until April 20, when the 
 Balkan states finally agreed to accept the mediation 
 of the Powers. They had practically carried all their 
 points, however, except that of the communication 
 of the Albanian frontier. Hostilities ceased. There 
 really was not much more to fight about — at least, as 
 far as Turkey was concerned. 
 
 It was a whole month before the second conference 
 at London opened. The only gleam of hope that the 
 Turks were justified in entertaining, when they decided 
 to renew the war, had been the possible outbreak of a 
 war between the Allies. If only the quarrel over 
 Macedonia had come, for which they looked from week 
 to week, they might have been able to put pressure on 
 Bulgaria for the return of Adrianople, and on Greece 
 for the return of the ^gaean Islands. But the rupture
 
 THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY 297 
 
 between the Allies did not take place until after they 
 had settled with Turkey. Why fight over the bear's 
 skin until it was actually in their hands ? 
 
 The negotiations were reopened in London on 
 May 20. On May 30 the peace preliminaries were 
 signed. The Sultan of Turkey ceded to the Kings of 
 the allied states his dominions in Europe beyond the 
 Enos-Midia line. Albania, its status and frontiers, 
 were entrusted by the Sultan to the sovereigns of the 
 Great Powers. He ceded Crete to the allied sover- 
 eigns, but left the decision as to the islands in the 
 iEgsean Sea, and the status of Mount Athos, to the 
 Great Powers. 
 
 The war between the Allies enabled Turkey to 
 violate this treaty. They won back from Bulgaria, 
 without opposition, most of Thrace, including Adrian- 
 ople and Kirk Kilisse. Later, treaties were made 
 separately with each of the Balkan States. But as 
 it seems to be a principle of history that no territories 
 that have once passed from the shadow of the Crescent 
 return, it is probable that the Treaty of London will, 
 in the end, represent the minimum of what Turkey's 
 former subjects have wrested from her.
 
 XV. 
 
 THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 
 
 To those who knew the centuries-old hatred and race- 
 rivalry between Greece and Servia and Bulgaria in the 
 Balkan peninsula, an alliance for the purpose of liber- 
 ating Macedonia seemed impossible. The Ottoman 
 Government had a sense of security which seemed to 
 be justifiable. They had known how to keep alive and 
 intensify racial hatred in European Turkey, and be- 
 lieved that they were immune from concerted attack 
 because the Balkan states would never be able to agree 
 as to the division of spoils after a successful war. 
 
 The history of the ten years of rivalry between 
 bands, which had nullified the efforts of the Powers to 
 " reform " Macedonia by installing a gendarmerie 
 under European control, had taught the diplomats 
 that they had, working against the pacification of 
 Macedonia, not only the Ottoman authorities, but also 
 the native Christian population and the neighbouring 
 emancipated countries. They were ready to believe 
 the astute Hussein Hilmy Pasha, vali of Macedonia, 
 when he said: "I am ruling over an insane asylum. 
 Were the Turkish flag withdrawn, they would fly at 
 each other's throats, and, instead of reform, you would 
 have anarchy." 
 
 If the Balkan states had realized how completely 
 
 298
 
 THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 299 
 
 and how easily they were going to overthrow the mili- 
 tary power of Turkey, they probably would not have 
 attempted it. This seems paradoxical, but it is true 
 all the same. 
 
 The Allies did not anticipate more than the holding 
 of the Ottoman forces in check, and the occupation of 
 the frontiers and of the upper valleys of the Vardar 
 and Strumna, Greece felt that she would be rewarded 
 by a slight rectification of boundary in Thessaly and 
 Epirus, if only the war would settle the status of Crete 
 and result in an autonomous regime for the ^Egsean 
 Islands. At the most, the Balkan states hoped to 
 force upon Turkey the autonomy of Macedonia under 
 a Christian Governor. So jealous was each of the 
 possibility of another's gaining control of Macedonia 
 that this solution would have satisfied them more than 
 the complete disappearance of Turkish rule. Both 
 hopes and fears as to Macedonia were envisaged rather 
 in connection with each other than in connection with 
 the Turks. 
 
 Between Servia and Bulgaria there was a definite 
 treaty, signed on March 13, 1912, which defined future 
 spheres of influence in Upper Macedonia. But Greece 
 had no agreement either with Bulgaria or Servia. 
 
 The events of October, 1912, astonished the whole 
 world. No such sudden and complete collapse of the 
 Ottoman power in Europe was dreamed of. I have 
 already spoken of how fearful the European Chancel- 
 leries were of an Ottoman victory. Had they not 
 been so morally certain of Turkey's triumph, they 
 would never have sent to the belligerents their famous 
 — and in the light of subsequent events, ridiculous — 
 joint note concerning the staHis quo.
 
 300 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 But if the great Powers were unprepared for the 
 succession of Balkan triumphs, the allies were much 
 more astonished at what they were able to accomplish. 
 Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas gave Thrace to Bulgaria. 
 Kumanovo opened up the valley of the Vardar to the 
 Servians, while the Greeks marched straight to Salonika 
 without serious opposition. 
 
 The victories of the Servians and Greeks, so easily 
 won, were to the Bulgarians a calamity which over- 
 shadowed their own striking military successes. They 
 had spilled much blood and wasted their strength in the 
 conquest of Thrace, which they did not want, while 
 their allies — but rivals, for all that — were in possession 
 of Macedonia, the Bulgaria irredenta. To be encircling 
 Adrianople and besieging Constantinople, cities in 
 which they had only secondary interest, while the 
 Servians attacked Monastir and the Greeks were 
 settling themselves comfortably in Salonika, was the 
 irony of fate for those who felt that others were reaping 
 the fruits for which they had made so great and so 
 admirable a sacrifice. 
 
 When we come to judge dispassionately the folly of 
 Bulgaria in provoking a war with her comrades in arms, 
 and the seemingly amazing greed for land which it 
 revealed, we must remember that the Bulgarians felt 
 that they had accomplished everything to receive 
 nothing. Salonika and not Adrianople was the city of 
 their dreams. Macedonia and not Thrace was the 
 country which they had taken arms to liberate. The 
 ^gsean Sea and not the extension of their Black Sea 
 littoral formed the substantial and logical economic 
 background to the appeal of race which led them to 
 insist so strongly in gathering under their sovereignty
 
 THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 301 
 
 all the elements of the Bulgarian people. European 
 writers have not been able to understand how little 
 importance the Bulgarians attached to their territorial 
 acquisitions in Thrace, and of how little interest it was 
 for them to acquire new possessions in which there were 
 so few Bulgarians. 
 
 Then, too, the powerful elements which had pushed 
 Bulgaria into the war with Turkey, and had contrib- 
 uted so greatly to her successes, were of Macedonian 
 origin. In Sofia the Macedonians are numerically, as 
 well as financially and politically, very strong. I had a 
 revelation of this, such as the compilation of statistics 
 cannot give, on the day after the massacre of Kotchana. 
 The newspapers called upon all the Macedonians in 
 Sofia to put out flags tied with crepe. In the main 
 streets of the city it seemed as if every second house 
 was that of a Macedonian. To these people, ardent and 
 powerful patriots, Macedonia was home. It had been 
 the dream of their lives to unite the regions from which 
 they had come — once emancipated from the Turks — to 
 the mother country. From childhood they had been 
 taught to look towards the Rhodope Mountains as the 
 hills from which should come their help. Is it any 
 wonder, then, that, after the striking victories of 
 their arms, there should be a feeling of insanity — for it 
 was that — when they saw the dreams of a lifetime 
 about to vanish ? 
 
 But the mischief of the matter, as a Scotchman 
 would say, was that Greeks and Servians felt the same 
 way about the same places. Populations had been 
 mixed for centuries. At some time or other in past 
 history each of the three peoples had had successful 
 dynasties to spread their sovereignty over exactly the
 
 302 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 same territories. Each, then, could evoke the same 
 historical memories, each the same past of suffering, 
 each the same present of hopes, and the same prayers of 
 the emancipated towards Sofia and Athens and Belgrade. 
 
 After the occupation of Salonika by the Greeks, the 
 Bulgarian ambitions to break the power of Turkey 
 were not the same as they had been before. Had 
 Salonika been occupied two weeks earlier, there might 
 not have been a Lul6 Burgas. An armistice was hur- 
 riedly concluded. During the trying period of negotia- 
 tions in London, and during the whole of the second 
 part of the war, the jealousies of the allies had been 
 awakened one against the other. Between Greeks and 
 Bulgarians it had been keen since the very first moment 
 that the Greek army entered Macedonia. The crisis 
 between Servia and Bulgaria did not become acute 
 until Servia saw her way blocked to the Adriatic by the 
 absurd attempt to create a free Albania. Then she 
 naturally began to insist that the treaty of partition 
 which she had signed with Bulgaria could not be carried 
 out by her. In vain she appealed to the sense of 
 justice of the Bulgarians. The treaty had been signed 
 on the understanding that Albania would fall under the 
 sphere of Servian aggrandisement. Nor, on the other 
 hand, had it been contested that Thrace would belong to 
 Bulgaria. If the treaty were carried out, Bulgaria 
 would get everything and Servia nothing. Servia 
 also reminded the Bulgarians of the loyal aid that had 
 been given them in the reduction of Adrianople. But 
 Bulgaria held to her pound of flesh. 
 
 Under the circumstances of the division of territory, 
 Bulgaria's claim to cross the Vardar and go as far as 
 Monastir and Okrida would not only have given her
 
 THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 303 
 
 possession of a fortress from which she could dominate 
 both Servia and Greece, but would have put another 
 state between Servia and Salonika. Bulgaria was, in 
 fact, demanding everything as far as Servia was con- 
 cerned. Servia cannot be blamed, then, for coming to an 
 understanding with Greece, even if it were for support in 
 the violation of a treaty. For where does history give 
 us the example of a nation holding to a treaty when it 
 was against her interest to do so ? 
 
 After their return from London, the Premiers 
 Venizelos and Pasitch made an offensive and defensive 
 alliance for ten years against the Bulgarian aspirations. 
 In this alliance, concluded at Athens shortly after King 
 George's death, the frontiers were definitely settled. 
 In the negotiations, Greece showed the same desire to 
 have everything for herself which Bulgaria was dis- 
 playing. Finally she agreed to allow Servia to keep 
 Monastir. Without this concession, Servia would have 
 fared as badly at the hands of Greece as at the hands of 
 Bulgaria. It is only because Greece feared that Servia 
 might be driven to combine with Bulgaria against her 
 that the frontier in this agreement was drawn south of 
 Monastir. The Greek army officers strongly opposed 
 this concession, but Venizelos was wise enough to see 
 that the maintenance of Greek claims to Monastir might 
 result in the loss of Salonika. The Serbo-Greek alliance 
 was not made public until the middle of June. Bul- 
 garia had also been making overtures to Greece, and at 
 the end of May had expressed her willingness to waive 
 her claim to Salonika in return for Greek support 
 against Servia. Venizelos, already bound to Servia, 
 was honourable enough to refuse this proposition. 
 
 But the military reputation of Bulgaria was still
 
 304 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 so strong in Bulgarian diplomacy, that Servia and 
 Greece were anxious to arrive, if possible, at an arrange- 
 ment without war. Venizelos proposed a meeting at 
 Salonika, Bulgaria declined. Then Venizelos and 
 Pasitch together proposed the arbitration of the Czar. 
 Bulgaria at the first seemed to receive this proposition 
 favourably, but stipulated that it would be only for the 
 disputed matter in her treaty with Servia. At this 
 moment the Russian Czar sent a moving appeal to the 
 Balkan states to avoid the horrors of a fratricidal war. 
 Bulgaria then agreed to send, together with her allies, 
 delegates to a conference at Petrograd . 
 
 All the while, Premier Gueshoff of Bulgaria had been 
 struggling for peace against the pressure and the 
 intrigues of the Macedonian party at Sofia. They 
 looked upon the idea of a Petrograd conference as the 
 betrayal of Macedonians and Bulgarians by the mother 
 country. Unable to maintain his position, Gueshoff 
 resigned. His withdrawal ruined Bulgaria. For he 
 was replaced by M. Daneff , who was heart and soul with 
 the Macedonian party. A period of waiting followed. 
 But from this moment war seemed inevitable to those 
 who knew the feeling on both sides. Daneff and his 
 friends did not hesitate. They would not listen to 
 reason. They believed that they had the power to 
 force Greece and Servia to a peace very nearly on their 
 own terms. Public opinion was behind them. For 
 news was continually coming to Sofia of Greek and 
 Servian oppression of Bulgarians in the region between 
 Monastir and Salonika. These stories of unspeakable 
 cruelty, which were afterwards established as true by 
 the Carnegie Commission, had much to do with making 
 the second war possible.
 
 THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 305 
 
 It was not difficult for the Macedonian party at Sofia 
 to precipitate hostilities. The Bulgarian general 
 staff, in spite of the caution that should have imposed 
 itself upon them by the consideration of the exhausting 
 campaign in the winter, felt certain of their ability to 
 defeat the Servians and the Greeks combined. Then, 
 too, the army on the frontiers, in which there was a 
 large element — perhaps 20 per cent. — of Macedonians, 
 had already engaged in serious conflicts with the 
 Greeks, 
 
 In fact, frontier skirmishes had begun in April. The 
 affair of Nigrita was really a battle. After these out- 
 breaks, Bulgarian and Greek officers had been com- 
 pelled to establish a neutral zone in order to prevent the 
 new war from beginning of itself. At the end of May 
 there had been fighting in the Panghaeon district, east of 
 the river Strymon. The Bulgarian staff had wanted 
 to prevent the Greeks from being in a position to cut the 
 railway from Serres to Drama. In the beginning of 
 June Bulgarian coast patrols had fired on the Averoff. 
 By the end of June the Bulgarian outposts were not far 
 from Salonika. 
 
 The first Bulgarian plan was to seize suddenly 
 Salonika, which would thus cut off the Greek army 
 from its base of supplies and its advantageous com- 
 munication by sea with Greece. There were nearly 
 1,500 Bulgarian soldiers in Salonika under the 
 command of General Hassapsieff. How many comi- 
 tadjis had been introduced into the city no one 
 knows. I was there during the last week of June, 
 and saw many Bulgarian peasants, big strapping 
 fellows, who seemed to have no occupation. When I 
 visited the Bulgarian company, which was quartered in 
 
 20
 
 3o6 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 the historic mosque of St. Sophia, two days before their 
 destruction, they seemed to me to be absolutely sure of 
 their position. At this moment the atmosphere among 
 the few Bulgarians in Salonika was that of complete 
 confidence. 
 
 Among the Greeks a spirit of excitement and of 
 apprehension made them realize the gravity and the 
 dangers of the events which were so soon to follow. 
 Perfect confidence, while highly recommended by the 
 theorists, does not seem to win wars. Nervousness, on 
 the other hand, makes an army alert, and ready to 
 exert all the greater effort, from the fact that it feels it 
 needs that effort. In all the wars of which this book 
 deals has this been true — Italian confidence in 191 1, 
 Turkish confidence in 1912, Bulgarian confidence in 
 1913, and German confidence in 19 14. 
 
 On June 29, when I left Salonika to go to Albania, it 
 was the opinion of the Greek officers in Salonika that 
 the war — which they viewed with apprehension — would 
 be averted by the conference at Petrograd. When I 
 got on my steamship, the first man I met was San- 
 dansky, who had become famous a decade before by the 
 capture of Miss Stone, an American missionary. He 
 had embarked on this Austrian Lloyd steamer at 
 Kavalla, with the expectation of slipping ashore at 
 Salonika, if possible, to prepare the way for the trium- 
 phal entry of the Bulgarian army. But he was only 
 able to look sorrowfully out on the city, for the police 
 were waiting to arrest him. What bitter thoughts he 
 must have had when he saw the Bulgarian flag, which 
 he had planted there with his own hands, waving from 
 the minaret of St. Sophia, and he unable to organize its 
 defence ! A week later I saw Sandansky at a cafe in
 
 THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES 307 
 
 Valona. The war had then started, and he was prob- 
 ably trying to persuade the Albanians to enter the 
 struggle and to take the Servians in the rear. 
 
 Up to June 29 Servians and Bulgarians were frater- 
 nizing at their outposts, and joking about how soon 
 they would be getting back to their everyday occupa- 
 tions, for which months of war and excitement had 
 begun to unfit them. In several places Servians and 
 Bulgarians ate together. I know of one outpost where 
 the patrols were photographed together on a bridge. 
 Little did they realize the horrible plot that was being 
 coolly planned at Sofia, and which would cause a new 
 period of bloodshed and destruction in Macedonia, 
 frustrate all the efforts of the European chancelleries 
 and bring in its wake the world-wide war.
 
 XVI. 
 
 THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 
 
 On Sunday night, June 29, without any declaration of 
 war or even warning, General Savoff ordered a general 
 attack all along the Greek and Servian lines. There 
 was no direct provocation on the part of Bulgaria's 
 allies. 
 
 The responsibility for precipitating the war which 
 brought about the humiliation of Bulgaria can be 
 directly fixed. Two general orders, dated from the 
 military headquarters at Sofia on June 29, have been 
 published. They set forth an amazing and devilish 
 scheme which stands out as a most cold and bloody cal- 
 culation, even among all the horrors of Balkan history. 
 General Savoff stated positively that this energetic 
 action was not the commencement of a war. It was 
 merely for the purpose of occupying as much territory 
 as possible in the contested regions before the inter- 
 vention of the Powers. It had a two-fold object: to 
 cut the communications between the Greeks and 
 Servians at Veles (Kuprulu) on the Vardar, and to 
 throw an army suddenly into Salonika. The fighting 
 began in the night time. The Bulgarians naturally 
 were able to advance into a number of important 
 positions. 
 
 When the news became known at Salonika on the 
 
 308
 
 WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 309 
 
 morning of the 30th, General Hassapsieff, on the 
 ground that he was a diplomatic agent, was allowed 
 to leave. Before his departure he gave an order to his 
 forces to resist, if they were attacked, as he would 
 return with the Bulgarian army in twenty-four hours. 
 
 Early in the afternoon the Greeks sent an ultimatum 
 ordering the Bulgarians in Salonika to surrender by 
 six o'clock. Their refusal led to all-night street-fight- 
 ing. Barricaded in St. Sophia and several other build- 
 ings, they were able to defend themselves until the 
 Greeks turned artillery upon their places of refuge. 
 Not many were killed on either side. Salonika was 
 calm again the next day. One thousand three hundred 
 Bulgarian soldiers and a number of prominent Bulgarian 
 residents of Salonika, under conditions of exceptional 
 cruelty and barbarism, were sent to Crete. The 
 Greek forces in Salonika, among whom were some 
 20,000 from America, were hurried to the outposts 
 for the defence of the city. 
 
 There was no diplomatic action following the 
 treachery of the Bulgarians towards their allies. The 
 Greek foreign minister stated that Greece considered 
 the Bulgarian attack an act of war, and that the Greek 
 army had been ordered to advance immediately to 
 retake the positions which the Bulgarians had cap- 
 tured. Nor did Servia show any disposition to treat 
 with Bulgaria. No official communications reached 
 Sofia from a Great Power. There had been a mis- 
 calculation. Bulgaria was compelled, as a conse- 
 quence of her ill-considered act, to face a new war. 
 There was no withdrawal possible. 
 
 From the purely military point of view, it seems hard 
 to believe that the Bulgarians really thought that their
 
 310 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 night attack would bring about war. Their army had 
 borne the brunt of the campaign against the Turks, 
 and had suffered terribly during the winter spent in the 
 trenches before Tchataldja. They were not in a good 
 strategic position, for the army was spread out over a 
 long line, and the character of the country made con- 
 centration difficult. Adequate railway communica- 
 tion with the bases of supplies was lacking. The 
 Greeks and Servians, on the other hand, held not only 
 the railway from Salonika to Nish through the valley 
 of the Vardar, but even were it successfully cut, had 
 communication by railway with their bases at Salonika, 
 Monastir, Mitrovitza, Uskub, and Nish. 
 
 General Ivanoff, in command of the second Bul- 
 garian army, was charged with confronting the whole 
 of the Greek forces, in a line passing from the ^Egsean 
 Sea to Demir-Hissar on the Vardar, between Serres 
 and Salonika. When we realize that General Ivanoff 
 had less than 50,000 men, a portion of whom were 
 recruits from the region of Serres, and that he had 
 to guard against an attack on his right flank from 
 the Servians, we cannot help wondering what the 
 Bulgarian general staff had counted upon in provoking 
 their allies to battle. Did they expect that the Greeks 
 and Servians would be intimidated by the night attack 
 of June 29, and would agree to continue the project of 
 a conference at Petrograd ? Or did they think that 
 the Greek army was of so little value that they could 
 brush it aside, and enter Salonika, just as the Greeks 
 had been able to enter in November ? Whichever 
 hypothesis we adopt, it shows contempt for their 
 opponents and belief in their own star. The proof of 
 the fact that the Bulgarians never dreamed of any-
 
 WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 311 
 
 thing but the success of their " bluff," or, if there 
 was resistance, of an easy victory, is found in the few 
 troops at the disposal of General Ivanoff, and in the 
 choice of Doiran, so near the front of battle, as the base 
 of supplies. At Doiran everything that the second 
 army needed in provisions and munitions of war was 
 stored. From the financial standpoint alone, Bulgaria 
 could not afford to risk the loss of these supplies. 
 
 On July 2 the Greek army, under the command of 
 Crown Prince Constantine, took the offensive against 
 the Bulgarians, who had occupied on the previous day 
 the crests of Beshikdag, from the mouth of the Struma 
 to the plateau of Lahana, across the road from Salonika 
 to Serres, and the heights north of Lake Ardzan, com- 
 manding the left bank of the Vardar. The positions 
 were strong. If the Greek army had been of the 
 calibre that the Bulgarians evidently expected, or if 
 General Ivanoff had had sufficient forces to hold the 
 positions against the Greek attack, there would un- 
 doubtedly have been pourparlers, and a probable cessa- 
 tion of hostilities, just as the Bulgarians expected. 
 
 But the Greeks soon proved that they were as brave 
 and as determined as their opponents. Their artillery 
 fire was excellent. There was no wavering before the 
 deadly resistance of the entrenched Bulgarians. After 
 five days of struggle, in which both sides showed equal 
 courage, the forces of General Ivanoff yielded to 
 superior numbers. The Bulgarians were compelled to 
 retreat, on July 6, in two columns, towards Demir- 
 Hissar and Strumitza. The retreat was effected in 
 good order, and the Greeks, though in possession of 
 mobile artillery, could not surround either column. 
 Victory had been purchased at a terrible price. The
 
 312 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Greek losses in five days were greater than during 
 the whole war with Turkey. They admitted 10,000 
 hors de combat. The Greeks had received their first 
 serious baptism of fire, and had demonstrated that 
 they could fight. The Turks had never given them 
 the opportunity to wipe out the disgrace of 1897. 
 
 It is a tribute to the quickness of decision of the 
 Crown Prince Constantino and his general staff, and 
 to the spirit of his soldiers, that this severe trial of five 
 days of continuous fighting and fearful loss of life was 
 not followed by a respite. The Greek quarter-general 
 was moved to Doiran on the 7th. It was decided to 
 maintain the offensive as long as the army had strength 
 to march and men to fill the gaps made by the fall of 
 thousands every day. The Bulgarians, although they 
 desperately contested every step, were kept on the 
 move. On the right the Greeks pushed through to 
 Serres, joining there, on July 11, the advance-guard of 
 the detachments which the Greek fleet had landed at 
 Ka valla on the 9th. 
 
 The advance of the Greek armies was along the 
 Vardar, the Struma, and the Mesta. On the Vardar the 
 Bulgarian abandonment of Demir-Hissar on the loth 
 enabled the Greeks to repair the railway and establish 
 communication with the Servian army. The right 
 wing, advancing by the Mesta, occupied Drama. On 
 July 19 the Bulgarian resistance was concentrated at 
 Nevrokop. When it broke here, the Greek right wing 
 was able to send its outposts to the foothills of the 
 Rhodope Mountains, on the Bulgarian frontier. 
 
 The Greeks began to speak of the invasion of Bul- 
 garia, and of making peace at Sofia. But the bulk 
 of their forces met an invincible resistance at Simitli
 
 WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 313 
 
 From the 23rd to the 26th they attacked the Bulgarian 
 positions, and believed that the advantage was theirs. 
 But on the 27th the Bulgarians began a counter-attack 
 against both wings of the Greek army at once. On 
 the 29th the Greeks began to plan their retreat. On 
 the 30th they realized that the retreat was no longer 
 possible. The Bulgarians were on both their flanks. 
 It was then that the armistice saved them. 
 
 While the Greek anny was gaining its victories in 
 the hinterland of Macedonia, the ports of the ^Egsean 
 coast — Ka valla, Makri, Porto-Lagos, and Dedeagatch 
 — were occupied without resistance by the Greek fleet. 
 Detachments withdrawn from Epirus were brought to 
 these ports. Some went to Serres and Drama. Others 
 garrisoned the ports, and occupied Xanthi and other 
 inland towns in the neighbourhood. 
 
 The Bulgarians may have had some reason to dis- 
 count the value of the Greek army, for it had not yet 
 been tried. But the Servians had shown from the 
 very first day of the war with Turkey that they pos- 
 sessed high military qualities. The courage of their 
 troops was coupled with agility. They had had more ex- 
 perience than the Bulgarians and Greeks, both of quick 
 marches, and of breaking up their forces into numerous 
 columns. There is probably no army in Europe to-day 
 which can equal the Servians in mobility. It is in- 
 credible that the Bulgarians could have hoped to 
 surprise the Servians and find a weak place anywhere 
 along their lines. On the defensive, in localities which 
 they had come to know intimately by nine months in 
 the field, it would have taken a larger force than the 
 Bulgarians could muster to get the better of soldiers 
 such as the Servians had proved themselves to be.
 
 314 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Whether it was by scorn for the Greeks, or by appre- 
 ciation of the Servian concentration, the Bulgarians 
 had planned to confront the Servians with four of 
 their five armies. We have already seen that General 
 Ivanoff had the second army alone to oppose to the 
 Greeks, and that even a few battalions of his troops 
 were needed on the Servian flank. 
 
 The engagements between the Bulgarians and the 
 Servians had two distinct fields of action — one in Mace- 
 donia, and the other on the Bulgaro-Servian frontier. 
 
 In Macedonia the Bulgarians experienced the same 
 surprise in regard to the Servians as in regard to the 
 Greeks. Their sudden attack of June 30 did not 
 strike terror in the hearts of their opponents. Instead 
 of gaining for them a favourable diplomatic position, 
 they found that the Servians did not even suggest a 
 parley. On July i the Servians started a counter- 
 attack, and kept a steady offensive against their former 
 allies for eight days. Gradually the Bulgarians along 
 the Bregalnitza gave ground, retreating from position 
 to position, always with their face towards the enemy. 
 The battle, after the first day, was for the Bulgarians 
 a defensive action all along the line. 
 
 On July 4 General Dimitrieff assumed the functions 
 of generalissimo of the Bulgarian forces. He tried 
 his best to check the Servian offensive. But the 
 aggressive spirit had gone out of the Bulgarian army. 
 Lule Burgas could not be repeated. It was incapable 
 of more than a stubborn resistance to the Servian 
 advance. On July 8 the Servians were masters of the 
 approaches to Istip, and had cleared the Bulgarians 
 out of the territory which led down into the valley of 
 the Vardar. Then they stopped. From this time on
 
 WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 315 
 
 to the signing of the armistice the Macedonian Servian 
 army was content with the victories of the first week. 
 
 Along the Servian-Bulgarian frontier the Bulgarian 
 army had some initial success. But General Kutin- 
 chef did not dispose of enough men to make a success- 
 ful aggressive movement towards Nish possible. From 
 the very first, when the Macedonian army failed to 
 advance, the Bulgarian plans of an invasion of Servia 
 fell to the ground. They had based everything upon 
 an advance in Macedonia to the Vardar. So the for- 
 ward movement wavered. The Servians, now sure 
 of Rumanian co-operation, advanced in turn towards 
 Widin. General Kutincheff was compelled by the 
 Rumanian invasion to fall back on Sofia. Widin was 
 invested by the Servians on July 23. 
 
 Rumania had watched with alarm the rise of the 
 military power of Bulgaria. She could not intervene 
 in the first Balkan War on the side of the Turks. The 
 civilized world would not have countenanced such a 
 move, nor would it have had the support of Rumanian 
 public opinion. Whatever the menace of Bulgarian 
 hegemony in the Balkan peninsula, Rumania had to 
 wait until peace had been signed between the Allies 
 and the Turks. But, as we have already seen, during 
 the first negotiations at London, her minister to Great 
 Britain had been instructed to treat with Bulgaria for 
 a cession of territory from the Danube at Sili stria to 
 the Black Sea, in order that Rumania might have the 
 strategic frontier which the Congress of Berlin ought 
 to have given her, when the Dobrudja was awarded to 
 her, without her consent, in exchange for Bessarabia. 
 As Rumania had helped to free Bulgaria in 1877-78, 
 and had never received any reward for her great
 
 3i6 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 sacrifices, while the Bulgarians had done little to win 
 their own independence, the demand of a rectification 
 of frontier was historically reasonable. Since Ru- 
 mania had so admirably developed the Dodnidja, and 
 had constructed the port of Constanza, it was justified 
 from the economic standpoint. For the possession of 
 Silivria, and a change of frontier on the Dodnidja, was 
 the only means by which Rumania could hope to defend 
 her southern frontier from attack. 
 
 At first the Bulgarians bitterly opposed any com- 
 pensation to Rumania. They discounted the import- 
 ance of her neutrality, for they knew that she could 
 not act against them as long as they were at war with 
 Turkey. They denounced the demands of Rumania, 
 perfectly reasonable as they were, as " blackmail." 
 They were too blinded with the dazzling glory of their 
 unexpected victories against the Turks to realize how 
 essential the friendship of Rumania — at least, the 
 neutrality of Rumania — was to their schemes for 
 taking all Macedonia to themselves. When, in April, 
 they signed with very ill grace the cession of Silivria, 
 as a compromise, and refused to yield the small strip 
 of territory from Silivria to Kavarna on the Black Sea, 
 the Bulgarians made a fatal political mistake. It was 
 madness enough to go into the second Balkan War in 
 the belief that they could frighten, or, if that failed, 
 overwhelm the Servians and Greeks. What shall we 
 call the failure to take into their political calculations 
 the possibility of a Rumanian intervention ? Even 
 if there were not the question of the frontier in the 
 Dobrudja, would not Rumanian intervention still be 
 justified by the consideration of preserving the balance 
 of power in the Balkans ? By intervening, Rumania
 
 WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES 317 
 
 would be acting, in her small corner of the world, just 
 as the larger nations of Europe had acted time and again 
 since the sixteenth century. 
 
 The Rumanian mobilization commenced on July 3. 
 On July 10 Rumania declared war, and crossed the 
 Danube. The Bulgarians decided that they would 
 not oppose the Rumanian invasion. How could they ? 
 Already their annies were on the defensive, and hard 
 pressed by Greeks and Servians. There is a limit to 
 what a few hundred thousand men can do. It is 
 possible, though not probable, that the Bulgarian 
 armies might have gained the upper hand in the end 
 against their former allies in Macedonia. But with 
 Rumania bringing into the field a fresh army, larger 
 than that of any other Balkan states, Bulgaria's case 
 was hopeless. The Rumanians advanced without op- 
 position, and began to march upon Sofia. They occu- 
 pied, on Juty 15, the seaport of Varna, from which 
 the Bulgarian fleet had withdrawn to Sebastopol. 
 
 It would have been easy for the Rumanians to have 
 occupied Sofia and waited there for the Servian and 
 Greek armies to arrive. The humiliation of Bulgaria 
 could have been made complete. Why, then, the 
 armistice of July 30 ? Why the assembling hastily 
 of a peace conference at Bukarest ? Political and 
 financial, as well as military, considerations dictated 
 the wisdom of granting an armistice to Bulgaria. 
 
 Greece and Servia were exhausted financially, and 
 their armies could gain little more than glor^^ by con- 
 tinuing the war. The Greek army, in fact, was in a 
 critical position, and ran the risk of being surrounded 
 and crushed by the Bulgarians. The Servians had not 
 shown much hurry to come to the aid of the Greeks.
 
 3i8 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 The tmth of the matter is, that after the battle of the 
 Bregalnitza, which ended on July lo, the Servians 
 began to get very nervous about the successes of their 
 Greek allies. They knew well the Greek character, 
 and feared that too easy victories over the Bulgarians 
 might necessitate a third war with Greece over Monas- 
 tir. So, on July ii, with the ostensible reason that 
 such a measure was necessary to protect their rear 
 against the Albanians, the Servian general staff with- 
 drew from the front a number of the best regiments, 
 and placed them in a position where they could act, if 
 the Greeks tried to seize Monastir. On the other hand, 
 Rumania gave both Greece and Servia to understand 
 that she had entered the war, not from any altruistic 
 desire to help them, but for her own interests. To see 
 Bulgaria too greatly humiliated and weakened was 
 decidedly no more to the interest of Rumania than to 
 see her triumphant. 
 
 As for Montenegro, she had entered the second 
 Balkan War to give loyal support to Servia, from 
 whom she expected in return a generous spirit in 
 dividing the Sandjak of Novi Bazar. Her co-opera- 
 tion, however, as I am able to state from having been 
 in Cettinje when the decision was taken to send 10,000 
 men against Bulgaria, was not made the subject of any 
 bargain. So, when Servia thought best to sign the 
 armistice, Montenegro was in thorough accord. 
 
 After a month of fighting, in which the losses had 
 been far greater than during the war with Turkey, and 
 the treatment of non-combatants by all the armies 
 horrible beyond description, the scene of battle shifted 
 from the blood-stained mountains and valleys of 
 Macedonia to the council chamber at Bukarest. Ru- 
 mania was to preside over a Balkan Congress of Berlin.
 
 XVII. 
 
 THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 
 
 When the delegates from the various important capitals 
 reached Bukarest on July 30, the armies were still 
 lighting. Everyone, however, seemed anxious to 
 come to an understanding as soon as possible. The 
 first session of the delegates was held on the afternoon 
 of July 30. Premier Pasitch for Bulgaria and Premier 
 Venizelos for Greece were present. But Premier 
 Daneff, who had so wanted the war, did not have the 
 manhood to face its consequences. The Bulgarians 
 were represented in Bukarest by no outstanding 
 leader, either political or military. Premier Majoresco 
 of Rumania presided over the conference. The first 
 necessity was the decision for an armistice. A sus- 
 pension of arms was agreed upon to begin upon 
 August I at noon. On August 4 the armistice was 
 extended for three days to August 8. 
 
 In the conference of Bukarest, Bulgaria, naturally, 
 stood by herself. It was necessary, if there was to be 
 peace, that her delegates should come to an under- 
 standing as to the sacrifices she was willing to make 
 with each of her neighbours separately. Conse- 
 quently the important decisions were made in com- 
 mittee meetings. The general assembly of delegates 
 had little else to do than to ratify the concessions 
 
 319
 
 32C) THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 wrung from Bulgaria in turn by each of the oppo- 
 nents. 
 
 Rarely have peace delegates been put in a more 
 painful position than the men whom Bulgaria sent to 
 Bukarest. It will always be an open question as to 
 whether the military situation of Bulgaria on July 31, 
 as regards Servia and Greece, was retrieyable. But 
 the presence of a Rumanian army in Bulgaria made 
 the continuance of the war absolutely impossible. 
 Consequently there was nothing for Bulgaria to do but 
 to yield to the demands of Greece and Servia. The 
 only check upon the Servian and Greek delegates was 
 the determination of Rumania not to see Bulgaria too 
 greatly weakened. She had entered into line to gain 
 her bit of territory in the south of the Dobrudja. But 
 she had also in mind the prevention of Bulgarian 
 hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, and she did not 
 propose to see this hegemony go elsewhere. This 
 explains the favourable terms which Bulgaria received. 
 
 The Bulgarian and Rumanian delegates quickly 
 agreed upon a frontier to present to the meeting of 
 August 4. By this, the first of the protocols, Bulgaria 
 ceded to Rumania all her territory north of a line from 
 the Danube, above Turtukaia, to the end of the Black 
 Sea, south of Ekrene. In addition, she bound herself 
 to dismantle the present fortresses, and promised not 
 to construct forts at Rustchuk, Schumla, and the 
 country between and for twenty kilometres around 
 Baltchik. 
 
 On August 6 the protocol with Servia was presented. 
 The Servian frontier was to start at a line drawn from 
 the summit of Patarika on the old frontier, and to 
 follow the watershed between the Vardar and the
 
 THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 321 
 
 Struma to the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, with the 
 exception of the upper valley of the Strumnitza, which 
 remained Servian territory. 
 
 The following day the protocol with Greece was 
 presented. The Greek- Bulgarian frontier was to run 
 from the crest of Belashitcha to the mouth of the 
 river Mesta, on the ^gsean Sea. Bulgaria formally 
 agreed to waive all pretensions to Crete. The pro- 
 tocol with the Greeks was the only one over which the 
 Bulgarians made a resolute stand. When they signed 
 this protocol, they stated that the accord was only 
 because they had taken notice of the notes which 
 Austria-Hungary and Russia presented to the con- 
 ference, to the effect that in their ratification they 
 would reserve for future discussion the inclusion of 
 Ka valla in Greek territory. 
 
 The Bulgarians insisted on a clause guaranteeing 
 autonomy for churches and schools in the condominion 
 of liberated territories. Servia opposed this demand 
 mildly, and Greece strongly. They were right. The 
 question of national propaganda through churches and 
 schools had done more to arouse and keep alive racial 
 hatred in Macedonia than any other cause. If there 
 were to be a lasting peace, nothing could be more 
 unwise than the continuance of the propaganda which 
 had plunged Macedonia into such terrible confusion. 
 
 Rumania, however, secured in the Treaty of Bukarest 
 
 from each of the States what they had been unwilling 
 
 to grant each other. Rumania imposed upon Bulgaria, 
 
 Greece, and Servia the obligation of granting autonomy 
 
 to the Kutzo-Wallachian churches, and assent to the 
 
 creation of bishoprics subsidized by the Rumanian 
 
 government. 
 
 21
 
 322 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 A rather amusing incident occurred on August 5 by 
 the proposition of the United States Government 
 through its Minister at Bukarest, that a provision be 
 embodied in the Treaty according full religious liberties 
 in transferred territories. The ignorance of American 
 diplomacy, so frequently to be deplored, never made a 
 greater blunder than this. It showed how completely 
 the American State Department and its advisers on 
 Near Eastern affairs had misunderstood the Macedonian 
 question. Quite rightly, even the consideration of this 
 request was rejected as superfluous. M. Venizelos 
 administered a well-deserved rebuke when he said that 
 religious liberty, in the right sense of the word, was 
 understood through the extension of each country's 
 constitution over the territories acquired. 
 
 Much has been written concerning the intrigues of 
 European Powers at Bukarest during the ten days of 
 the conference which made a new map for the Balkan 
 peninsula. It will be many years, if ever, before these 
 intrigues are brought to light. Therefore we cannot 
 discuss the question of the pressure which was brought 
 to bear upon Rumania, upon Bulgaria, and upon 
 Servia and Greece to determine the partition of terri- 
 tories. Germany looked with alarm upon the possi- 
 bility of a durable settlement. Austria was deter- 
 mined that Bulgaria and Servia should not become 
 reconciled. 
 
 Austria-Hungary and Russia, though for different 
 reasons, were right in their attitude toward the matter 
 of Greece's claim upon Kavalla. Greece would have 
 done well had she been content to leave to Bulgaria a 
 larger littoral on the iEgsean Sea, and the port which 
 is absolutely essential for the proper economic develop-
 
 THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 323 
 
 ment of the hinterland attributed to her. By taking 
 their pound of flesh the Greeks only exposed themselves 
 to future dangers. The laws of economics are inexor- 
 able. Bulgaria cannot allow herself to think sincerely 
 about peace until her portion of Macedonia, by the 
 inclusion of Kavalla, is logically complete. It would 
 have been better politics for Greece to have shown 
 herself magnanimous on this point. As Georges Sand 
 has so aptly said : " It is not philanthropy, but our own 
 interest, which leads us sometimes to do good to men 
 in order that they may be prevented in the future from 
 doing harm to us." 
 
 When we come to look back upon the second Balkan 
 war, and have traced out the sad consequences and 
 the continued unrest which followed the Treaty of 
 Bukarest, it is possible that Servia's responsibility 
 may be considered as great as, if not greater than, that 
 of Bulgaria in bringing about the strife between the 
 Allies. In our sympathy with the inherent justice 
 of Servia's claim for adequate territorial compensa- 
 tion for the toils and sufferings she had endured 
 to effect the Turkish debdcle in Europe, we are apt 
 to overlook three indisputable facts: that Servia 
 repudiated a solemn treaty with Bulgaria, on the basis 
 of which Bulgaria had agreed to the alliance against 
 Turkey ; that the territories granted to Servia, south of 
 the line which she had sworn not to pass in her territorial 
 claims, and a portion of those in the " contested zone " 
 of her treaty with Bulgaria, were beyond any shadow 
 of doubt inhabited by Bulgarians; and that since these 
 territories were ceded to her she has not, according to 
 the tacit understanding at Bukarest, extended to them 
 the guarantees and privilegesof the Servian constitution.
 
 324 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 The Treaty of Bukarest, as far as the disputed 
 territories allotted to Servia are concerned, has created 
 a situation analogous to that of Alsace and Lorraine 
 after the Treaty of Frankfort. And Servia started to 
 cope with it by following Prussian methods. What 
 Servians of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia have 
 suffered from Austrian rule, free Servia is inflicting 
 upon the Bulgarians who became her subjects after the 
 second Balkan war. 
 
 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the 
 population of Macedonia, as a whole, of whatever race 
 or creed, would welcome to-day a return to the Ottoman 
 rule of Abdul Hamid. The Turkish " constitutional 
 regime " was worse than Abdul Hamid, the war of 
 "liberation" worse than the Young Turks, and the 
 present disposition of territories satisfies none. Poor 
 Macedonia ! 
 
 After the disastrous and humiliating losses at 
 Bukarest, Bulgaria still had her former vanquished 
 foe to reckon with. The Turks were again at Adrian- 
 ople and Kirk Kiliss^. Thrace was once more in their 
 power. The Treaty of Bukarest, while attributing 
 Thrace to Bulgaria on the basis of the Treaty of London, 
 actually said nothing whatever about it. Nor were 
 there any promises of aid in helping Bulgaria to get 
 back again what she had lost, without a struggle, by 
 her folly and treachery. 
 
 A new war by Bulgaria alone in her weakened 
 military condition and with her empty treasury, to 
 drive back the Turks once more south of the Enos- 
 Midia line, was impossible. Bulgaria appealed to the 
 chancelleries of Europe to help her in taking possession 
 of the Thracian territory ceded to her at London. The
 
 THE TREATY OF BUKAREST 325 
 
 Powers made one of their futile overtures to Turkey 
 requesting that she accept the Treaty which she had 
 signed a few months before. 
 
 But no one could blame the Turks for having taken 
 advantage of Bulgarian folly. Who could expect them 
 meekly to withdraw behind the Enos-Midia line ? 
 Bulgaria could get no support in applying the argument 
 of force. 
 
 In the end the victors of Lul6 Burgas had to go to 
 Constantinople and make overtures directly to the 
 Sublime Porte. They fared very badly. The Enos- 
 Midia line was drawn, but it took a curve northward 
 from the Black Sea and westward across the Maritza 
 in such a way that the Turks obtained not only 
 Adrianople, but also Kirk Kiliss6 and Demotica. The 
 Bulgarians were not even masters of the one railway 
 leading to Dedeagatch, their sole port on the ^Egaean 
 Sea. 
 
 The year 1913 for Bulgaria will remain the most 
 bitter of her history. She had to learn the lesson 
 that the life of the nations, as well as of individuals, is 
 one of give as well as take, and that compromise is the 
 basis of sound statesmanship. Who wants all, most 
 often gets nothing.
 
 XVIII. 
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 
 
 The world has not known just what to do with the 
 mountainous country which comes out in a bend on 
 the upper western side of the Balkan peninsula directly 
 opposite the heel of Italy. It caused trouble to the 
 Romans from the very moment that they became an 
 extra-Italian power. Inherited from them by the 
 Byzantines, fought for with varying fortunes by the 
 Prankish princes, the Venetians and the Turks, Albania 
 has remained a country which cannot be said to have 
 ever been wholly subjected. Nor can it be said to have 
 ever had a national entity. Its present medieval con- 
 dition is due to the fact that, owing to its high moun- 
 tains and its being on the road to nowhere, it has not, 
 since the Roman days at least, undergone the influences 
 of a contemporary civilization. 
 
 Venice recognized the importance of Albania during 
 the days of her commercial prosperity. For the 
 Albanian coast, with its two splendid harbours of 
 Valona and Durazzo, effectively guards the entrance 
 of the Adriatic into the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
 But Albania did not demand attention a hundred 
 years ago when the last map of Europe was being made 
 by the Congress of Vienna. The reason for this is 
 
 simple. Italy was not a political whole. The head of 
 
 326
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 327 
 
 the Adriatic was entirely in the hands of Austria. 
 There was no thought at that time of our modern 
 navies, and of the importance of keeping the Straits 
 of Otranto open. It was the Dalmatian coast, north 
 of Albania, which Austria considered essential to her 
 commercial supremacy. Then, too, Greece had not 
 yet received her freedom, and the Servians had not 
 risen in rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. There 
 were no Slavic, Hellenic, and Italian questions to 
 disturb Austria in her peaceful possession of the 
 Adriatic Sea. 
 
 It was not until the union of Italy had been accom- 
 plished, and the south Slavic nationalities had formed 
 themselves into political units, that Albania became a 
 " question " in the chancelleries of Europe. 
 
 Austria-Hungary determined that Italy should not 
 get a foothold in Albania. Italy had the same deter- 
 mination in regard to Austria- Hungary. Since the 
 last Russo-Turkish war, Austria-Hungary and Italy 
 have had the united determination to keep the Slavs 
 from reaching the Adriatic. For the past generation, 
 feeling certain that the end of the Ottoman Empire 
 was at hand, Austria and Italy, through their mis- 
 sionaries, their schools, and their consular and com- 
 mercial agents, have struggled hard against each other 
 to secure the ascendancy in Albania. Their intrigues 
 have not ceased to this day. 
 
 When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzego- 
 vina, and the Young Turk oppression of the Albanians 
 aroused the first expression of what might possibly be 
 called national feeling since the time of Skander bey's 
 resistance to the Ottoman conquest, the rival Powers, 
 instead of following in the line of Russia and Great
 
 328 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Britain in Persia, and establishing spheres of interest, 
 agreed to support the Albanian national movement, as 
 the best possible check upon Servian and Greek national 
 aspirations. This was the status of Albania in her 
 relationship to the Adriatic powers, when the war of 
 the Balkan states against Turkey broke out. The 
 accord between Austria and Italy had stood the strain 
 of Italy's war with Turkey. Largely owing to their 
 fear of Russia and to the pressure of Germany, it stood 
 the strain of the Balkan war. But both Italy and 
 Austria let it be known to the other Powers that if the 
 Turkish Empire in Europe disappeared, there must be 
 an independent Albania. 
 
 This dictum was accepted in principle by the other 
 four Powers, who saw in it the only possible chance of 
 preventing the outbreak of a conflict between Austria 
 and Russia, which would be bound to involve all 
 Europe in war. No nation wanted to fight over the 
 question of Albania. Russia could not hope to have 
 support from Great Britain and France to impose upon 
 the Triple Alliance her desire for a Slavic outlet to the 
 Adriatic. For neither France nor Great Britain was 
 anxious for the Russian to get to the Mediterranean. 
 The accord between the Powers was shown in the 
 warning given to Greece and Servia that the solution 
 of the Albanian question must be reserved for the 
 Powers when a treaty of peace was signed with Turkey. 
 The accord weathered the severe test put upon it by 
 the bold defiance of the Montenegrin occupation of 
 Scutari. 
 
 We have spoken elsewhere of the policy of the Young 
 Turks towards Albania. This most useful and loyal 
 corner of the Sultan's dominions was turned into a
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 329 
 
 country of perennial revolutions, which started soon 
 after the inauguration of the constitutional regime. 
 In the winter of 1911-12, when the group of Albanian 
 deputies in the Ottoman Parliament saw their demands 
 for reforms rejected by the Cabinet, and even the right 
 of discussion of their complaints refused on the floor 
 of Parliament, the Albanians north and south, Catholic 
 and Moslem, united in a resistance to the Turkish 
 authorities that extended to Uskub and Monastir. 
 After the spring elections of 1912 the resistance became 
 a formidable revolt. For the Young Turks had rashly 
 manoeuvred the balloting with more than Tammany 
 skill. The Albanians were left without representatives 
 in Parliament ! Former deputies, such as Ismail 
 Kemal bey, Hassan bey, and chiefs such as Isa 
 Boletinatz, Idris Sefer, and Ali Riza, joined in a 
 determination to demand autonomy by force of arms. 
 
 When, in July, the Cabinet decided to move an 
 army against the Albanians, there were wholesale 
 desertions from the garrison of Monastir, and of 
 Albanian officers from all parts of European Turkey. 
 Mahmoud Shevket pasha was compelled to resign the 
 Ministry of War, and was followed by Said pasha and 
 the whole Cabinet. The Albanians demanded as a 
 sine qua non the dissolution of Parliament. The 
 Mukhtar Cabinet agreed to the dissolution, and 
 accepted almost all the demands of the rebels in a 
 conference at Pristina. 
 
 For the tables had now been turned. Instead of a 
 Turkish invasion of Albania for "pacification," as in 
 previous summers, it was a question now of an Albanian 
 invasion of Turkey. In spite of the conciliatory spirit 
 of the new Cabinet the agitation persisted. It was
 
 330 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 rumoured that the Malissores and the Mirdites were 
 planning a campaign against Scutari and Durazzo. I 
 was in Uskub in the early part of September. Isa 
 Boletinatz and his band were practically in possession 
 of the city. A truce for Ramazan, the Moslem fast 
 month, had been arranged between Turks and 
 Albanians. But the Albanians said they would not 
 lay down their arms until a new and honestly consti- 
 tutional election was held. 
 
 Immediately after Ramazan came the Balkan War. 
 Albania found herself separated from Turkey, and in 
 a position to have more than autonomy without having 
 to deal further with the Turks. 
 
 During the Balkan War the attitude of the Albanians 
 was a tremendous disappointment to the Turks. One 
 marvels that loyalty to the empire could have been 
 expected, even from the Moslem element, in Albania. 
 And yet the Turks did expect that a pan- Islamic 
 feeling would draw the Albanian beys to fight for the 
 Sultan, just as they had expected a similar phenomenon 
 on the part of the rebellious Arabs of the Arabic 
 peninsula during the war with Italy. 
 
 From the very beginning the Albanians adopted an 
 attitude of opportunism. They did not lift a hand 
 directly to help the Turks. Had they so desired, they 
 might have made impossible the investment of Janina 
 by the Greeks. But nowhere, save in Scutari, did the 
 Albanians make a stubborn stand against the military 
 operations of the Balkan allies. Almost from the 
 beginning they had understood that the powers would 
 not allow the partition of Albania. They knew that 
 the retention of Janina was hopeless after the suc- 
 cesses of the Allies during October. But they received
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 331 
 
 encouragement from both Austria-Hungary and Italy 
 to fight for Scutari. 
 
 The heroic defence of Scutari, which lasted longer 
 than that of any of the other fortified towns in the 
 Balkan peninsula, cannot be regarded as a feat of the 
 Turkish army. During the siege the general com- 
 manding Scutari had been assassinated by order of 
 Essad pasha, who was his second in command. Essad 
 then assumed the charge of the defence as a purely 
 Albanian defence. He refused to accept the armistice, 
 and continued the struggle throughout the debates 
 in London. Scutari is at the south end of a lake 
 which is shared between Albania and Montenegro. 
 Commanding the city is a steep barren hill called 
 Tarabosh. With their heavy artillery on this hill the 
 Albanians were able to prevent the capture of their 
 city indefinitely. Servians and Montenegrins found 
 themselves confronted with the task of taking Tarabosh 
 by assault, if they hoped to occupy Scutari. This was 
 a feat beyond the strength of a Balkan army. On the 
 steep slopes of this hill were placed miles of barbed 
 wire. The assailants were mowed down each time they 
 tried to reach the batteries at the top. As Tarabosh 
 commanded the four corners of the horizon, its cannon 
 could prevent an assault or bombardment of the city 
 from the plain. The allies were unable to silence the 
 batteries on the crest of this hill. 
 
 During the winter the principal question before the 
 concert of European powers was that of Scutari. 
 Austria-Hungary was so determined that Scutari 
 should not fall into the hands of the Montenegrins and 
 Servians that she mobilized several army corps in 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the Russian frontier of
 
 332 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Galicia, at Christmas time, 1912. The New Year 
 brought with it ominous forebodings for the peace of 
 Europe. Diplomacy worked busily to bring about an 
 accord between the Powers, and pressure upon the 
 besiegers of Scutari. In the middle of March it was 
 unanimously agreed that Scutari should remain to 
 Albania, and that Servia should receive Prizrend, Ipek, 
 Dibra, and Diakova as compensation for not reaching 
 the Adriatic, and the assurance of an economic outlet 
 for a railroad at some Albanian port. The European 
 concert then decided to demand at Belgrade and 
 Cettinje the raising of the siege of Scutari. 
 
 Servia, yielding to the warning of Russia that nothing 
 further could be done for her, consented to withdraw 
 her troops from before Scutari, and to abandon the 
 points in Albanian territory which had been allotted 
 by the Powers to the independent Albanian state which 
 they intended to create. Servia had another reason 
 for doing this. Seeing the hopelessness of territorial 
 aggrandisement in Albania, she decided to denounce 
 her treaty of partition, concluded before the war, with 
 Bulgaria. To realize this act of faithlessness and 
 treachery she had need of the sympathetic support of 
 the Powers in the quarrel which was bound to ensue. 
 We see here how the blocking of Servia's outlet to the 
 Adriatic led inevitably to a war between the Balkan 
 Allies. 
 
 But with Montenegro the situation was entirely 
 different. She had sacrificed one-fifth of her army in 
 the attacks upon Tarabosh, and Scutari seemed to her 
 the only thing that she was to get out of the war with 
 Turkey. Perched up in her mountains as she was, there 
 was little harm that the Powers could do to her. Just
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 333 
 
 as King Nicholas had precipitated the Balkan War 
 against the advice of the Powers the previous October, 
 he decided on April i to refuse to obey the command 
 of the Powers to raise the siege of Scutari. From what 
 I gathered myself from conversations in the Monte- 
 negrin capital two months later, I feel that the King of 
 Montenegro can hardly be condemned for what the 
 newspapers of Europe called his " audacious folly " in 
 refusing to give a favourable response to the joint note 
 presented to him by the European Ministers at 
 Cettinje. The Montenegrins are illiterate moun- 
 taineers, who know nothing whatever about considera- 
 tions of international diplomacy. If their king had 
 listened to words written on a piece of paper, and had 
 ordered the Montenegrin troops to withdraw from 
 before Scutari, he would probably have lost his throne. 
 So the Powers were compelled to make a show of 
 force. Little Montenegro, with its one port, and its 
 total population not equal to a single arrondissement 
 of the city of Paris, received the signal honour of an 
 international blockade. On April 7 an international 
 fleet, under the command of the British Admiral 
 Burney, blockaded the coast from Antivari to Durazzo. 
 While all Europe was showing its displeasure in the 
 Adriatic, the Montenegrins kept on, although deserted 
 by the Servians, sitting in a circle around Scutari, only 
 twenty-five miles inland from the blockading fleet. 
 On April 23, after the Balkan War was all finished, 
 Europe was electrified by the news that the Albanians 
 had surrendered Scutari to Montenegro. The worst 
 was to be feared, for Austria had announced her deter- 
 mination to send her troops across the border from 
 Bosnia into Montenegro. Such an action would cer-
 
 334 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 tainly have brought on a great European war; for 
 neither at Rome nor at Petrograd could Austrian 
 intervention have been tolerated. 
 
 No Power in Europe was at that moment ready for 
 war. Largely through pressure brought to bear at 
 Cettinje by his son-in-law, the King of Italy, King 
 Nicholas decided on May 5 to deliver Scutari to the 
 Powers. The Montenegrins withdrew, and ten days 
 later Scutari was occupied by detachments of marines 
 from the international squadron. The blockade was 
 raised. The peace of Europe was saved. 
 
 The Treaty of London, signed on May 30, 19 13, put 
 Albania into the hands of the Powers. The northern 
 and eastern frontiers had been arranged by the promise 
 made to Servia in return for her withdrawal from the 
 siege of Scutari. But the southern frontier was still an 
 open question. Here Italy was as much interested as 
 was Austria in the north. With Corfu in the possession 
 of Greece, Italy would not agree that the coast of the 
 mainland opposite should also be Hellenic. The Greeks, 
 on the contrary, declared that the littoral and hinter- 
 land, up beyond Santi Quaranta, was part of ancient 
 Epirus, and inhabited principally by Greeks. It should 
 therefore revert logically to greater Greece. Athens 
 lifted again the old cry: " Where there are Hellenes, 
 there is Hellas." The Greeks were occupying Santi 
 Quaranta. They claimed as far north as Argyro- 
 kastron. But they consented to withdraw from the 
 Adriatic, north of and opposite Corfu, if interior points 
 equally far to the north were left to them. An inter- 
 national commission was formed to make a southern 
 boundary for Albania. Its task has never been satis- 
 factorily completed. The question is still open.
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 335 
 
 What was to be done with this new state, foster-child 
 of all Europe, with indefinite boundaries, with guar- 
 dians each jealous of the other, and neighbours waiting 
 only for a favourable moment to throw themselves upon 
 her and extinguish her life ? 
 
 I visited Albania in July, 1913, during the second 
 Balkan War, At Valona, in the south, I found a pro- 
 visional government, self-constituted during the pre- 
 vious winter, whose authority was problematical out- 
 side of Valona itself. At the head of the government 
 was Ismail Kernel, whom I had known as the champion 
 of Albanian autonomy in the Ottoman Parliament at 
 Constantinople. He talked passionately of Albania, 
 the new state in Europe, with its united population and 
 its national aspirations. He was eager to have the 
 claims of Albania to a generous southern frontier pre- 
 sented at London. He assured me that I could write 
 with perfect confidence in glowing terms concerning 
 the future of Albania, that a spirit of harmony reigned 
 throughout the country, and that the Albanians of all 
 creeds, freed from Turkish oppression, were looking 
 eagerly to their new life as an independent nation. 
 When I expressed misgivings as to the role of Essad 
 pasha, the provisional president asserted that the 
 former commander of Scutari was wholly in accord 
 with him, and cited as proof the fact that he had that 
 very day received from Essad pasha his acceptance of 
 the portfolio of Minister of the Interior. 
 
 But that indefinable feeling of misgiving which one 
 always has over the enthusiasm of Orientals caused me 
 to withhold judgment as to the viability of Albania 
 until I had seen how things were going in other portions 
 of the new kingdom.
 
 336 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 At Durazzo, the northern port of Albania, the friends 
 of Essad pasha were in control of the government. 
 Things were still being done d la turque, and there was 
 a feeling of great uncertainty concerning the future. 
 Few had any faith whatever in the provisional govern- 
 ment at Valona, and it was declared that the influence 
 of Essad pasha would decide the attitude of the 
 Albanians in Durazzo, Tirana, and Elbassan. Essad 
 was chief of the Toptanis, the most influential family 
 in the neighbourhood of Durazzo. He had " made his 
 career " in the gendarmerie, and had risen rapidly 
 through the approval and admiration of Abdul Hamid. 
 This is an indication of his character. He was credited 
 with the ambition of ruling Albania. To withdraw his 
 forces and his munitions of war intact, so that he could 
 press these claims, is the only explanation of his " deal " 
 with King Nicholas of Montenegro to surrender Scutari. 
 Essad had sacrificed the pride and honour of Albania to 
 his personal ambition. 
 
 From Durazzo I went to San Giovanni di Medua, 
 which was occupied by the Montenegrins, just as I had 
 found Santi Quaranta in the south occupied by the 
 Greeks. Going inland from this port (one must use 
 his imagination in calling San Giovanni di Medua a 
 port) by way of Alessio, I reached Scutari, from whose 
 citadel flew the flags of the Powers. In every quarter 
 of this typically and hopelessly Turkish town one ran 
 across sailors from various nations. Each Power had 
 its quarter, and had named the streets with some 
 curious results. The Via Garibaldi ran into the Platz 
 Radetzky. On the Catholic cathedral was a sign 
 informing you that you were in the Rue Ernest 
 Renan.
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 337 
 
 This accidental naming of streets was a prophecy of 
 the hopelessness of trying to reconcile the conflicting 
 aims and ideals of the Powers whose bands were 
 playing side by side in the public garden. In the 
 dining-room of the hotel, when I saw Aiistrians, 
 Italians, Germans, British, and French officers eating 
 together at the long tables, instead of rejoicing at this 
 seeming spirit of European harmony, I had the pre- 
 sentiment of the inevitable result of the struggle 
 between Slav and Teuton, to prevent which these men 
 were there. Just a year later I stood in front of the 
 Gare du Montparnasse in Paris reading the order for 
 General Mobilization. There came back to me as in a 
 dream the public garden at Scutari, and the mingled 
 strains of national anthems, with officers standing 
 rigidly in salute beside their half-filled glasses. 
 
 In the palatial home of a British nobleman who had 
 loved the Albanians and had lived long in Scutari 
 Admiral Burney established his headquarters. I 
 talked with him there one afternoon concerning the 
 present and the future of Albania, and the relationship 
 of the problem which he had before him with the 
 peace of Europe. Never have I found a man more 
 intelligently apprehensive of the possible outcome of 
 the drama in which he was playing a part, and at the 
 same time more determinedly hopeful to use all his 
 ability and power to save the peace of Europe by 
 welding together the Albanians into a nation worthy 
 of the independence that has been given to them by 
 the European concert. Such men as Admiral Burney 
 are more than the glory of a nation: they are the 
 making of a nation. The greatness of Britain is due 
 to the men who serve her. High ideals, self-sacrifice, 
 
 22
 
 338 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 ability, and energy are the corner-stones of the British 
 overseas empire. 
 
 There was little, however, that Admiral Burney, or 
 anyone in fact, could do for Albania. No nation can 
 exist in modern times, when national life is in the will 
 of the people rather than in the unifying qualities of a 
 ruler, if there are no common ideals and the determina- 
 tion to attain them. Albania is without a national 
 spirit and a national past. It is, therefore, no unit 
 capable of being welded into a state. The creation by 
 the Ambassadors of the Powers in London may have 
 been thought by them to be a necessity. But it was 
 really a makeshift. If the Albanians had done their 
 part, and had shown the possibility of union, the make- 
 shift might have developed into a new European state. 
 As things have turned out, it has remained what it was 
 in the beginning, a fiasco. 
 
 Among the many candidates put forward for the 
 new throne. Prince William of Wied was finally decided 
 upon. He was a Protestant, and could occupy a 
 position of neutrality among his Moslem, Orthodox, 
 and Catholic subjects. He was a German, and could 
 not be suspected of Slavic sympathies. He was a 
 relative of the King of Rumania, and could expect 
 powerful support in the councils of the Balkan Powers. 
 
 It would be wearisome to go into the story of Prince 
 William's short and unhappy reign. At Durazzo, 
 which was chosen for the capital, he quickly showed 
 himself incapable of the role which a genius among 
 rulers might have failed to play successfully. Lost in 
 a maze of bewildering intrigues, foreign and domestic, 
 the ruler of Albania saw his prestige, and then his 
 dignity, disappear. He never had any real authority.
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 339 
 
 He had been forced upon the Albanians. They did not 
 want him. The Powers who had placed him upon the 
 throne did not support him. In the spring, the usual 
 April heading, " Albania in Arms," appeared once more 
 in the newspapers of the world. Up to the outbreak 
 of the European war, when Albania was " lost in the 
 shuffle," almost daily telegrams detailed the march of 
 the insurgents upon Durazzo, the useless and fatal 
 heroism of the Dutch officers of the gendarmerie, the 
 incursions of the Epirote bands in the south, and the 
 embarrassing position of the international forces still 
 occupying Scutari. What the Albanians really wanted 
 none could guess, much less they themselves ! 
 
 The European war, in August, 1914, enabled the 
 Powers to withdraw gracefully from the Albanian 
 fiasco. Their contingents hurriedly abandoned Scutari, 
 and sailed for home. The French did not have time to 
 do this, so they went to Montenegro. Since the 
 catastrophe, to prevent which they had created 
 Albania, had fallen upon Europe, what further need 
 was there for the Powers to bother about the fortunes 
 of Prince William and his subjects ? Italy alone was 
 left with hands free, and her interests were not at stake 
 so long as Greece kept out of the fray. For Prince 
 William of Wied Italy felt no obligation whatever. 
 
 Without support and without money, there was 
 nothing left to Prince William but to get out. He did 
 not have the good sense to make his withdrawal from 
 Albania a dignified proceeding. The palace was left 
 under seals. The Prince issued a proclamation which 
 would lead the Albanians to believe that it was his 
 intention to return. It may be that he thought the 
 triumph of the German and Austrian armies in the
 
 340 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 European war would mean his re-establishment to 
 Durazzo. But after he was once again safely home at 
 Neu-Wied, he did what he ought to have done many 
 months before. A high-sounding manifesto announced 
 his abdication, and wished the Albanians God-speed 
 in the future. After this formality had been accom- 
 plished, the former Mpret of Albania rejoined his 
 regiment in the German army, and went out to fight 
 against the French. 
 
 With Prince William of Wied and the international 
 corps of occupation gone, the Albanians were left to 
 themselves. At Durazzo a body of notables, calling 
 themselves the Senate, adopted resolutions restoring 
 the Ottoman flag and the suzerainty of the Sultan, 
 invited Prince Burhaneddin effendi, a son of Abdul 
 Hamid, to become their ruler, and solemnly decreed 
 that hereafter the Turkish language should be restored 
 to its former position as the official language of the 
 country. 
 
 But Essad pasha thought otherwise. The psycho- 
 logical moment, for which he had been waiting ever 
 since his surrender of Scutari to the Montenegrins, had 
 come. In the first week of October he hurried to 
 Durazzo with his followers, had himself elected head 
 of a new provisional government by the Albanian 
 Senate, and announced openly that his policy would be 
 to look to Italy instead of to Austria for support. 
 After rendering homage to the Sultan as Khalif , asking 
 the people to celebrate the happy spirit of harmony 
 which now reigned throughout Albania, and prophe- 
 sying a new era of peace and prosperity for Europe's 
 latest-born independent state, the former gendarme of 
 Abdul Hamid entered the palace, broke the seals of the
 
 THE ALBANIAN FIASCO 341 
 
 international commission, and went to sleep in the bed 
 of Prince William of Wied. 
 
 One wonders whether the new ruler of Albania will 
 have more restful slumbers than his predecessor. In 
 spite of all protests, Greece is still secretly encouraging 
 the Epirotes in their endeavour to push northward the 
 frontier of the Hellenic kingdom. Italy has two army 
 corps at Brindisi waiting for a favourable moment to 
 occupy Valona. The Montenegrins and Servians are 
 planning once more to reach the Adriatic through the 
 valleys of the Boyana and Drin, after they have driven 
 the Austro-Hungarian armies from Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina. Only an Austrian triumph could now save 
 Albania from her outside enemies. But could any- 
 thing save her from her inside enemies ? When I read 
 of Essad pasha in Durazzo, self-chosen Moses of his 
 people, there comes back to me a conversation with the 
 leading Moslem chieftain of Scutari, whose guest I had 
 the privilege of being in his home in the summer of 
 1913. When I mentioned Essad pasha, he rose to his 
 feet before the fire, waved his arms, and cried out: 
 " When I see Essad, I shall shoot him like a dog !"
 
 XIX. 
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 
 TO SERVIA 
 
 In discussing the relations of the Austrians and Hun- 
 garians with their south Slavic subjects, and the 
 rivalries of races in Macedonia, the general causes 
 behind the hostile attitude of Austria-Hungary to the 
 development of Servia have been explained. Specific 
 treatment of the Servian attitude towards the annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reserved for this 
 chapter, because the events of the summer of 19 14 are 
 the direct sequence of the events of the winter of 
 1908-09. 
 
 On October 3, 1908, Marquis Pallavicini, Austro- 
 Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople, notified 
 the Sublime Porte verbally that Austria-Hungary had 
 annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina, whose administration was entrusted to her by 
 the Treaty of Berlin just thirty years before. Austria- 
 Hungary was willing to renounce the right given her 
 by the Treaty of Berlin to the military occupation of 
 the Sandjak of Novi Bazar (a strip of Turkish territory 
 between Servia and Montenegro), if Turkey would 
 renounce her sovereignty of the annexed provinces. 
 
 This violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria- 
 Hungary aroused a strong protest not only in Servia 
 
 342
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 343 
 
 and in Turkey, but also among the other Powers who 
 had signed at Berlin the conditions of the maintenance 
 of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The protest 
 was especially strong in London and Petrograd. But 
 Austria- Hungary had the backing of Germany, whose 
 Ambassador at Petrograd, Count de Pourtales, did not 
 hesitate several times during the winter to exercise 
 pressure that went almost to the point of being a threat 
 upon the Russian Foreign Office to refrain from 
 encouraging the intractable attitude of Servia towards 
 the annexation. 
 
 With Germany's support Austria-Hungary did not 
 have much difficulty in silencing the protests of all 
 the Great Powers. She had a free hand, thanks to 
 Germany, in forcing Turkey and Servia to accept the 
 fait accompli of the annexation. 
 
 Turkish protests took the form of the boycott of 
 which we have spoken elsewhere. On November 22 
 Austria- Hungary threatened to put the whole status of 
 European Turkey into question by convoking the 
 European Congress to revise the Treaty of Berlin. 
 This is exactly what Austria- Hungary herself did not 
 want. But neither did Turkey. Both governments 
 had a common interest in preventing outside interven- 
 tion in the Balkan peninsula. The boycott, as evidenc- 
 ing anti- Austrian feeling, was rather Young Turkey's 
 sop to public opinion, and a blind to the Powers 
 to hide the perfect accord that existed between Ger- 
 many and Turkey at the moment, than the expression 
 of hostility to Austria-Hungary. After several months 
 of pourparlers, an agreement was made between Con- 
 stantinople and Vienna on February 26, 1909. Turkey 
 agreed to recognize the annexation in return for
 
 344 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 financial compensation. The negotiations at Con- 
 stantinople concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina are a 
 monument to the diplomatic finesse and skill of the late 
 Baron Marschall von Bieberstein and of Marquis 
 Pallavicini. 
 
 To lose something that you know you can no 
 longer keep is far different from losing the hope of 
 possession. It is always more cruel to be deprived of 
 an anticipation than of a reality. Turkey gave up 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina with her usual fatalistic 
 indifference. Her sovereignty had been only a fiction 
 after all. But Servia saw in the action of Austria- 
 Hungary a fatal blow to her national aspirations. 
 The inhabitants of the two Turkish provinces on her 
 west were Servian; Bosnia-Herzegovina formed the 
 centre of the Servian race. Montenegro on the south 
 was Servian. Dalmatia on the west was Servian. 
 Croatia on the north was Servian. Everything was 
 Servian to the Adriatic Sea. And yet Servia was land- 
 locked. The Servians determined they would not 
 accept this annexation. They appealed to the signa- 
 tory Powers of Berlin, and succeeded in arousing a 
 sentiment in Europe favourable to a European con- 
 ference. They threatened to make Austrian and Hun- 
 garian sovereignty intolerable, not only in Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, but also in Croatia and Dalmatia. 
 
 Austria-Hungary was more than irritated; she was 
 alarmed. She appealed to her ally, and pictured the 
 danger to the Drang nach Osten. The powerful inter- 
 vention of the German Ambassadors in the various 
 European capitals succeeded in isolating Belgrade. 
 Russian support of Servia would have meant a Euro- 
 pean war. Rather than risk this France begged
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 345 
 
 Russia to yield. Russia, not yet recovered from the 
 Manchurian disaster, ordered Servia to yield. Austria- 
 Hungary was allowed to force Servia into submission. 
 Friendless in the face of her too powerful adversar}^ 
 Servia directed her minister at Vienna on March 31, 
 1909, to make the following formal declaration to the 
 Austro -Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
 
 " Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights 
 by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she 
 will therefore adapt herself to the decisions at which 
 the Powers are going to arrive in reference to Article 25 
 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the 
 powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of 
 protest and resistance which she has assumed since last 
 October, relative to the annexation, and she binds her- 
 self further to change the direction of her present policies 
 towards Austria- Hungary, and, in the future, to live 
 with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations." 
 
 The crisis passed. Servia's humiliation was the 
 price of European peace. Germany had shown her 
 determination to stand squarely behind Austria- 
 Hungary in her dealings with Servia. It was a lesson 
 for the future. Five years later history repeated 
 itself — except that Russia did not climb down ! 
 
 We have already told the story of Austria- Hungary's 
 dealings with Servia after the first victorious month of 
 the Balkan War with Turkey; how Servia was com- 
 pelled, owing to lack of support from Russia, to give 
 satisfaction to Austria-Hungary in the Prochaska 
 incident, to withdraw her troops from Durazzo and 
 from before Scutari; and how the Powers saved the 
 peace of Europe in May, 1913, by compelling Monte- 
 negro to abandon Scutari. 
 
 Ever since the Treaty of Bukarest, Austria-Hungary
 
 346 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 watched Servia keenly for an opportunity to pick a 
 quarrel with her. It is marvellous how the Servians, 
 elated as they naturally were by their military suc- 
 cesses against Turkey and Bulgaria, avoided knocking 
 the chip off the shoulder of their jealous and purposely 
 sensitive neighbour. 
 
 It was one thing to be able to keep a perfectly 
 correct official attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian 
 government. This the Servian government had 
 promised to do in the note wrung from it on March 31, 
 1909. This it did do. But it was a totally different 
 thing to expect the authorities at Belgrade to stifle 
 the national aspirations of 12,000,000 Servians, the 
 majority of whom were outside of her jurisdiction. 
 Even if it had been the wiser course for her to pursue — 
 and this is doubtful — could Servia have been able to 
 repress the thoroughly awakened and triumphant 
 nationalism of her own subjects who had borne so suc- 
 cessfully and so heroically the sufferings and sacrifices 
 of two wars within one year ? 
 
 Individual Servians, living within the kingdom of 
 Servia, were irredentists, but without official sanction. 
 They were undoubtedly in connection with the revo- 
 lutionaries created by Austrian and Hungarian methods 
 in the Servian provinces of the Dual Monarchy. There 
 was undoubtedly a dream of Greater Servia, and a 
 strong hope in the hearts of nationalists on both sides 
 of the frontiers that the day would dawn by their efforts 
 when Greater Servia would be a reality. No govern- 
 ment could have continued to exist in Servia which 
 tried to suppress the Narodna Ohrana. I make this 
 statement without hesitation. King Peter did not 
 intend to become another Charles Albert.
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 347 
 
 Ought the Vienna and Berlin statesmen to have 
 expected Servia to do so ? What answer would 
 Switzerland or Holland or Belgium or Brazil receive 
 were their ministers to present a note at Wilhelm- 
 strasse or Ballplatz calling attention to the menace 
 to their independence of the pangermanic movement, 
 citing speeches delivered by eminent professors in 
 universities, books written by officials of the imperial 
 governments, and asking that certain societies be 
 suppressed and certam geographies be removed from 
 use in German schools ? Their cause would have been 
 as just, and their right as clear, for exactly the same 
 reasons as that of the Austrian Government in its 
 attitude towards Servia. The only difference between 
 panservianism and pangermanism — and you must 
 remember that the latter is not only encouraged, but 
 also subsidized, by the Berlin and Vienna governments 
 — is that the former is the aspiration of 12,000,000, 
 while the latter is the aspiration of 90,000,000. Is not 
 the answer the old Bismarckian formula that " might 
 makes right " ? 
 
 During the winter following the Treaty of Bukarest 
 the Austro-Hungarian agents and police continued 
 their careful surveillance of the Narodna Obrana, and 
 followed all its dealings with Servians of Austro- 
 Hungarian nationality. But it could find no casus 
 belli. The attitude of the Servian government was 
 perfectly correct at all times. Traps were laid, but 
 Servian officials did not fall into them. The occasion 
 for striking Servia came in a most tragic way. 
 
 It seems like tempting Providence to have sent the 
 Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife to Sarajevo 
 on the anniversary of the battle of Kossova. Things
 
 348 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 had been going from bad to worse in Bosnia, Flags 
 of the Dual Monarchy had been burned in Sarajevo 
 and Mostar, and the garrisons called upon to intervene 
 to restore order. The constitution of 1910 had been 
 modified in 1912, so that the military governor was 
 invested with civil power. The local Bosnian Diet had 
 been twice prorogued. In May, 1913, the constitution 
 was suspended, and a state of siege declared in Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina. Throughout the winter of 19 13- 14 
 incipient rebellions had to be checked by force in many 
 places. It was known to the police that Servian secret 
 societies were active, and that the provinces were in a 
 state of danger and insecurity. The Servian govern- 
 ment was apprehensive concerning the announced visit 
 of the heir to the Austro- Hungarian throne. In fact, 
 so greatly was it feared that some attempt might be 
 made against the life of Franz Ferdinand, and that this 
 would be used as an excuse for an attack upon Servia, 
 that the Servian Minister at Vienna, a week before the 
 date announced for the visit, informed the government 
 that there was reason to fear a plot to assassinate the 
 Archduke. 
 
 On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
 and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assas- 
 sinated in the streets of Sarajevo. Austria-Hungary 
 realized that her moment had come. Germany was 
 sounded, and found to be ready to prevent outside 
 interference in whatever measures Vienna might see 
 fit to take with Belgrade. 
 
 In the spring of 19 14 the Pasitch Cabinet had almost 
 succumbed in the struggle between civil and military 
 elements. Premier Pasitch retained his power by 
 agreeing to a dissolution of Parliament, and binding
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 349 
 
 himself to the necessity of following the leadership of 
 the military party. So far were the chiefs of the military 
 party from being in a mood to consider the suscepti- 
 bilities of Austria-Hungary that they were actually, 
 according to a telegram from a well-informed source 
 in Agram on June 26, 1914, debating the means of 
 uniting Servia and Montenegro. The difficult question 
 of dynasties was in the way of being solved, and, despite 
 Premier Pasitch's misgivings, the hallon d'essai of the 
 project of union had been launched in Europe. It was 
 at this critical and delicate moment for the Belgrade 
 Cabinet that the storm broke. 
 
 I was surprised by the spirit of optimism which 
 seemed to pervade the French press during the period 
 immediately following the assassination of Franz 
 Ferdinand. For three weeks the telegrams from 
 Vienna repeated over and over again the statement 
 that the ultimatum which Austria-Hungary intended 
 to present at Belgrade as a result of the Sarajevo 
 assassination would be so worded that Russia could not 
 take offence. This optimistic opinion, which seems 
 to have been given almost official sanction by Ball- 
 platz, was shared by the French government. France 
 is a country in which the inmost thoughts of her 
 statesmen are voiced freely in the daily newspapers of 
 Paris. If there had been any serious misgivings the 
 protocol for the visit of President Poincare to Petrograd 
 and to the Scandinavian capitals would certainly have 
 been modified. 
 
 The President of France sailed for the Baltic on 
 July 15. At six o'clock in the evening of the 23rd 
 the note of the Austro-Hungarian government con- 
 cerning the events of the assassination of Sarajevo was
 
 350 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 given to the Servian government. It commenced by 
 reproducing the text of the Servian declaration of 
 March 31, 1909, which we have quoted above. Servia 
 was accused of not having fulfilled the promise made 
 in this declaration, and of permitting the panservian 
 propaganda in the newspapers and public schools of 
 the kingdom. The assassination of the Archduke 
 Franz Ferdinand was stated to be the direct result of 
 Servian failure to live up to her declaration of March 31, 
 1909. Austria-Hungary claimed that the assassination 
 of the heir to her throne had been investigated, and 
 that ample proof had been found of the connivance of 
 two Servians, one an army officer and the other a 
 functionary, who belonged to the Narodna Ohrana ; 
 that the assassins had received their arms and their 
 bombs from these two men, and had been knowingly 
 allowed to pass into Bosnia by the Servian authorities 
 on the Serbo- Bosnian frontier. Being unable to endure 
 the panservian agitation longer, of which Belgrade was 
 ihe foyer and the crime of Sarajevo a direct result, the 
 Austro-Hungarian government found itself compelled 
 to demand of the Servian Government the formal 
 assurance that it condemned this propaganda, which 
 was dangerous to the existence of the Dual Monarchy, 
 because its final end was to detach from Austria- 
 Hungary large portions of her territory and attach 
 them to Servia. 
 
 After this preamble, the note went on to demand that 
 on the first page of the Journal Officiel of July 26 the 
 Servian Government publish a new declaration, the 
 text of which is so important that we quote it in full : 
 
 " The Royal Servian Government condemns the 
 propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 351 
 
 entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to separ- 
 ate from the Aiistro-Hungarian monarchy territories 
 belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly 
 consequences of these criminal actions. 
 
 " The Royal Servian Government regrets that 
 Servian officers and officials have participated in the 
 propaganda cited above, and have thus threatened the 
 friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal 
 Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its 
 declaration of March 31, 1909. 
 
 " The Royal Government, which disapproves and 
 rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing 
 the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria- 
 Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically 
 to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the 
 entire population of the kingdom, that it will hereafter 
 proceed with the utmost severity against any persons 
 guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which 
 it will make every effort." 
 
 Simultaneously with the publication in the Journal 
 Offidel, Austria-Hungary demanded that the declara- 
 tion be brought to the knowledge of the Servian army 
 by an Order of the Day of King Peter, and be published 
 in the official organ of the army. The Servian govern- 
 ment was also asked to make ten promises : 
 
 " I. To suppress any publication which fosters 
 hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian 
 monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed 
 against the latter's territorial integrity ; 
 
 "2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the 
 society Narodna Ohrana, to confiscate its entire means 
 of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner 
 against the other societies and associations in Servia 
 which occupy themselves with the propaganda against 
 Austria-Hungary, and to take the necessary' measures 
 that the dissolved societies may not continue their 
 activities under another name or in 9,oother form ;
 
 352 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 n 
 
 3. To eliminate without delay from the public 
 instruction in Servia, so far as the teaching staff as well 
 as the curriculum is concerned, whatever serves or 
 may serve to foster the propaganda against Austria- 
 Hungary ; 
 
 "4. To remove from military service and public 
 office in general all officers and officials who are guilty 
 of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose 
 names, with a communication of the evidence which 
 the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against 
 them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves 
 the right to communicate to the Royal Government ; 
 
 "5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of mem- 
 bers of the official machinery (organes) of the Imperial 
 and Royal Government in the suppression of the move- 
 ment directed against Austro-Hungarian territorial 
 integrity ; 
 
 "6. To commence a judicial investigation {enquHe 
 judiciaire) against the participants in the conspiracy 
 of June 28, who are on Servian territory — members of 
 the official machinery {organes) delegated by the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government will take part in the researches 
 (recherches) relative thereto ; 
 
 "7. To proceed immediately to arrest Major Voija 
 Tankositch and a certain Milan Ciganovitch, a func- 
 tionary of the Servian State, who have been compro- 
 mised by the result of the preliminary investigation at 
 Sarajevo; 
 
 " 8. To prevent, by effective measures, the partici- 
 pation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of 
 arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and 
 punish severely the functionaries at the frontier at 
 Shabatz and at Loznica, guilty of having aided the 
 authors of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their 
 crossing of the frontier; 
 
 " 9. To give to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
 explanations concerning the unjustifiable remarks of 
 high Servian functionaries, in Servia and abroad, who, 
 in spite of their official position, have not hesitated, 
 after the crime of June 28, to express themselves in
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 353 
 
 interviews in a hostile manner against the Austro- 
 Hungarian monarchy. 
 
 " 10. To notify without delay to the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government the execution of the measures 
 included in the preceding points." 
 
 Annexed to the note was a memorandum which 
 declared that the investigation of the police, after the 
 assassination of the Archduke and his wife, had estab- 
 lished that the plot had been formed at Belgrade by the 
 assassins with the help of a commandant in the Servian 
 army, that the six bombs and four Browning pistols 
 with their ammunition had been given at Belgrade to 
 the assassins by the Servian functionary and the 
 Servian army officer whose names were cited in the 
 note, that the bombs were hand-grenades which came 
 from the Servian army headquarters at Kragujevac, 
 that the assassins were given instruction in the use of 
 the arms by Servian officers, and that the introduction 
 into Bosnia and Herzegovina of the assassins and their 
 arms was facilitated by the connivance of three 
 frontier captains and a customs official. 
 
 The wt)rding of this note seemed to have been 
 entirely unexpected. The intention of the ultimatum 
 was clear. It was understood that Russia would not 
 accept an attack upon the integrity of Servia. Six 
 years had passed since 1908, and two since 1912. 
 Russia had recuperated from the Japanese war, and 
 her Persian accord with Great Britain had borne much 
 fruit. She was sure of France. Was this not a 
 deliberate provocation to Russia ? 
 
 Forty-eight hours had been given to Servia to 
 respond. Russia and France had both counselled 
 Servia to give an answer that would be a general 
 
 23
 
 354 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. 
 Neither France nor Russia wanted war. So anxious 
 were they to avoid giving Austria- Hungary the oppor- 
 tunity to precipitate the crisis before they were ready 
 for it that /or the third time in six years Servia was asked 
 to swallow her pride and submit. On the night of 
 July 24, a memorable council was held in Belgrade. 
 The Premier and the leaders of the opposition, together 
 with some members of the Narodna Ohrana, were 
 shown clearly what course they must follow if they 
 expected the loyal support of Russia. The answer to 
 the ultimatum must be worded in such a way that 
 Austria-Hungary would have no ground upon which 
 to stand in forcing on the war immediately. Servia 
 must once more " eat humble pie." But this time the 
 promise of Russian support was given to defend the 
 territorial integrity and the independence of Servia. 
 
 The Servian answer was far more conciliatory than 
 was expected . The allegations of the Austro-Hungarian 
 preamble were denied, but the publication of the 
 declaration in the Journal Officiel and in the Army 
 bulletin, and its incorporation in an order of the day 
 to the army, were promised. But there were to be 
 two changes in the text of the declaration. Instead of 
 " the Royal Servian Government condemns the propa- 
 ganda against Austria- Hungary," the Servians agreed 
 to declare that " the Royal Servian Government con- 
 demns every propaganda which should be directed against 
 Austria-Hungary," and instead of " the Royal Govern- 
 ment regrets that Servian officers and functionaries . . . 
 have participated in the propaganda just referred to," 
 the Servian King could say no more than " the Royal 
 Government regrets that according to a communication
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 355 
 
 of the Imperial and Royal Government certain officers 
 and functionaries . . . etc." 
 
 The German White Book makes a special point of the 
 bad faith of Servia in altering the text of the declaration 
 in this way. But what government could be expected 
 to admit what was only a supposition, and what king 
 worthy of the name would openly denounce as a regicide 
 before his army one of his officers upon the unsupported 
 statement of a political document ? The Austro- 
 Hungarian ultimatum had given no proof of its charges 
 against the man named in its note, and forty-eight 
 hours was too short a time for the Servian govern- 
 ment to investigate the charges to its own satisfac- 
 tion. 
 
 In order to make clear just what was the nature of 
 the demands which Austria-Hungary made upon 
 Servia I have cited the ten articles in full. 
 
 One can readily see that the demands of articles i, 
 2, and 3, in their entirety, meant the extinction of the 
 panservian movement and Servian nationalism. 
 Austria-Hungary was asking of Servia something that 
 neither member of the dual monarchy had succeeded in 
 accomplishing in its own territories ! The German 
 White Book attempts to sustain the justice of the 
 demands of its ally in striking at the press, the 
 nationalist societies, and the schools. The methods of 
 arousing a nationalistic spirit in the Servian people 
 through the press, through the formation of societies, 
 and through the teaching of irredentism by school- 
 books, were borrowed from Germany. But Servia 
 agreed to make her press laws more severe, to dissolve 
 the Narodna Obrana and other societies, and " to 
 eliminate from the public instruction in Servia anything
 
 356 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 which might further the propaganda directed against 
 Austria-Hungary, provided the Imperial and Royal 
 Government furnishes actual proofs." 
 
 Article 4 was agreed to only as far as it could be 
 actually proved that the officers and officials in question 
 had been " guilty of actions against the territorial 
 integrity of the monarchy." To promise to remove all 
 who were " guilty of propaganda against Austria- 
 Hungary " would have meant the disbanding of the 
 Servian army and the Servian government ! Is there 
 any man with red blood in his veins who can be pre- 
 vented from having hopes and dislikes and expressing 
 them ? Could Servia prevent Servians from stating 
 how they felt about the political status of their race in 
 Croatia and in Bosnia ? Did Austria-Hungary ever 
 make a similar request to her ally, Italy, about irre- 
 dentist literature and speeches ? 
 
 Articles 5 and 6 are open to discussion. There is no 
 doubt that the newspapers of nations hostile to Austria- 
 Hungary and Germany have been unfair in their 
 interpretation and in their translation of these two 
 articles. The Servian answer deliberately gives a 
 false meaning to the Austrian request here, and repre- 
 sents it as an attack upon the independence of her 
 courts. Servia had enough good grounds for resistance 
 to the ultimatum without equivocating on this point. 
 In her answer she refused what had not been actually 
 demanded, a co-operation in the enquete judiciaire of 
 Austro-Hungarian organes. What Austria-Hungary 
 demanded was the co-operation of her police officials 
 in the recherches. 
 
 Articles 7 to 10 were accepted by Servia in toto. As 
 a proof of her good faith, the Servian answer declared
 
 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM 357 
 
 that Major Tankositch had been arrested on the evening 
 of the day on which the ultimatum was received. 
 
 In conclusion, Servia offered, if her response to the 
 ultimatum were found insufficient, to place her case in 
 the hands of the Hague Tribunal and of the different 
 Powers at whose suggestion she had signed the declara- 
 tion of March 31, 1909, after the excitement over the 
 Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina. 
 
 The answer to the ultimatum was taken by Premier 
 Pasitch in person to the Minister of Austria-Hungary 
 at Belgrade before six o'clock on the evening of July 25. 
 Without referring the response to his government, the 
 Austro-Hungarian minister, acting on previous instruc- 
 tions that no answer other than an acceptance in every 
 particular of the ultimatum would he admissible, replied 
 that the response was not satisfactory. At half-past six 
 he left Belgrade with all the members of the legation. 
 
 While the European chancelleries were trying to find 
 some means to heal the breach, Austria-Hungary form- 
 ally declared war on Servia on the morning of July 28. 
 The same evening the bombardment at Belgrade from 
 Semlin and from the Danube was begun. The Servian 
 government retired to Nish. 
 
 Only the intervention of Germany could now prevent 
 the European cataclysm.
 
 XX. 
 
 GERMANY FORCES WAR UPON RUSSIA 
 AND FRANCE 
 
 The title of this chapter seems to indicate that I have 
 the intention of taking sides in what many people 
 believe to be an open question. But this is not the 
 case. The German contention, that Russia caused the 
 war, must be clearly distinguished from the contention, 
 that Russia forced the war. There is a great deal of 
 reason in the first contention. No impartial student, 
 who has written with sympathy concerning Great 
 Britain's attitude in the Crimean War can fail to give 
 Germany just as strong justification for declaring war 
 on Russia in 1914 as Great Britain had in 1854. But 
 when we come down to the narrower question of 
 responsibility for launching the war in which almost all 
 of Europe is now engaged, there can be no doubt that 
 it was deliberately willed by the German government, 
 and that the chain of circumstances which brought it 
 about was carefully woven by the officials of Wilhelm- 
 strasse and Ballplatz. There may be honest difference 
 of opinion as to whether Germany was justified in 
 forcing the war. But the facts allow no difference of 
 opinion as to whether Germany did force the war. 
 
 A war to crush France and Russia has for many 
 years been accepted as a necessary eventuality in the 
 
 358
 
 GERMANY FORCES WAR 359 
 
 evolution of Germany's foreign policy. That when 
 this war came, Great Britain would take the oppor- 
 tunity of joining in order to strike at German commerce, 
 which had begun to be looked upon by British mer- 
 chants as a formidable rival in the markets of the 
 world, was thought probable. The leading men of 
 Germany, especially since the passing of Morocco and 
 Persia, have felt that this war was vital to the existence 
 of the German empire. During recent years the 
 questions, " Ought there to be a war ?" and " Will 
 there be a war ?" ceased to be debated in Germany. 
 One heard only: " Under what circumstances could the 
 war be most favourably declared ?" and " How soon 
 will the war come ?" 
 
 Germany has believed that the events of the past 
 decade have shown the unalterable determination of 
 Great Britain and France to make impossible the 
 political development of the Weltpolitik, without which 
 her commercial development would always be insecure. 
 This determination has been consistently revealed in 
 the hostility of her western rivals to her colonial expan- 
 sion in Africa and Asia. The world equilibrium, 
 already decidedly disadvantageous to the overseas 
 future of Germans at the time they began their career 
 as a united people, has been disturbed more and more 
 during the past forty years. 
 
 The Balkan wars, resulting as they did in the aggran- 
 disement of Servia, threatened the equilibrium of the 
 near East, where lay Germany's most vital and most 
 promising external activities. We must remember, 
 when we are considering the reasons for the consistent 
 backing given to Austria-Hungary by Germany in her 
 treatment of Servian aspirations, the words of Wirth:
 
 36o THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 " To render the Servian people powerful would he the 
 suicide of Germany." 
 
 Germany has had as much reason, in the develop- 
 ment of the present crisis, for regarding Servia as the 
 outpost of Russia as had Great Britain for awarding 
 this role to Bulgaria in 1876. Germany has had as 
 much reason for declaring war on Russia to prevent 
 the Russians from securing the inheritance of the 
 Ottoman Empire as had Great Britain and France to 
 take exactly the same step in 1854. The extension in 
 1914 of Russian influence in what was until recently 
 European Turkey would be just as disastrous to the 
 interests of Germany and Austria- Hungary, as it would 
 have been to Great Britain and France sixty years 
 ago, or rather, far more so. What she has in Asia 
 Minor to-day is as great a stake for Germany to fight 
 for as what Great Britain had in India in the middle 
 of the nineteenth century. 
 
 There is, however, this important difference. Ger- 
 many, in supporting the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, 
 was not responding to the overt act of an enemy. She 
 calculated carefully the cost, waited for a favourable 
 moment, and, when she decided that the favourable 
 moment had come, deliberately provoked the war. 
 
 Germany, looking for the opportunity to strike her 
 two powerful neighbours on the east and west, believed 
 that the propitious moment had come in the summer 
 of 1914. Her rivals were facing serious internal 
 crises. Russia was embarrassed by the menace of a 
 widely-spread industrial strike. But Russia did not 
 count for much in the German calculations. It was 
 the situation in France that induced the German statesmen 
 to take advantage of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.
 
 GERMANY FORCES WAR 361 
 
 The spring elections had revealed a tremendous senti- 
 ment against the law recently voted extending military 
 service for three years. The French Parliament had 
 just overthrown the admirable Ribot Cabinet for no 
 other reason than purely personal considerations of a 
 bitter party strife. An eminent parliamentarian had 
 exposed publicly from the tribune the alarming unpre- 
 paredness of France for war. The trial for murder of 
 the wife of the former Premier Caillaux bade fair to 
 complicate further internal Parliamentary strife. 
 
 These were the favourable circumstances of the end 
 of June and the beginning of July. 
 
 But the decision had wider grounds than the advan- 
 tages of the moment. The German government was 
 finding it more and more difficult every year to secure 
 the credits necessary for the maintenance and increase 
 of her naval and military establishments. Socialism 
 and anti-militarism were making alarming progress in 
 the German Reichstag. On the other hand, the Russian 
 military reorganization, commenced after the Japanese 
 war, was beginning to show surprising fruits. And 
 was France to be allowed time for the spending of the 
 805,000,000 francs just borrowed by her in June to 
 correct the weak spots in her fortifications and war 
 material, and for the application of the loi des trois ans 
 to increase her standing army ? 
 
 Furthermore, would Great Britain be able to inter- 
 vene on behalf of France and Russia ? The crisis over 
 the Home Rule Bill seemed to have developed so 
 seriously that civil war was feared. Sir Edward 
 Carson, leader of the Protestant irreconcilables in the 
 north of Ireland, had formed an army that was being 
 drilled in open defiance of the Government.
 
 362 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
 and the Duchess of Hohenberg came at this advan- 
 tageous moment. A casus belli against Servia, so 
 provokingly lacking, had at last been given. Austria- 
 Hungary was only too ready for the chance to crush 
 Servia. If there were any misgivings about the risk of 
 doing this, they were immediately allayed by Germany, 
 who assured Austria-Hungary that she would not 
 allow Russia even to mobilize. Austria-Hungary was 
 given by Germany carte blanche in the matter of her 
 dealings with Servia. It is possible, as the German 
 ambassador at Petrograd declared to M. Sasonow, that 
 the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had not 
 been submitted beforehand for the approval of 
 Wilhelmstrasse. But the general tenor of the ulti- 
 matum had certainly been agreed upon. Germany 
 knew well that the ultimatum would be so worded as 
 to be a challenge to Russia. Either Russia would 
 accept once more the humiliation of a diplomatic 
 defeat and see Servia crushed, or she would intervene 
 to save Servia. In the latter contingency Germany 
 could declare war upon Russia on the ground that 
 her ally, Austria- Hungary, had been attacked. The 
 Franco-Russian Alliance would then be put to the test, 
 as well as whatever understanding there might be 
 between Great Britain and France. 
 
 Subsequent events proved that Germany left no 
 means, other than complete submission to her will, to 
 France and Russia for avoiding war. Negotiations 
 were so carried on that there would be no loophole for 
 escape either to Servia, or to the Great Powers that were 
 her champions. She did not even wait for Russia to 
 attack Austria- Hungary, or for France to aid Russia.
 
 GERMANY FORCES WAR 363 
 
 As for Great Britain, it is not yet clear whether Germany 
 really thought that she was making an honest effort to 
 keep her out of the war ! 
 
 From the very beginning of the Servian crisis 
 Germany associated herself " for better or for worse " 
 with Austria- Hungary. On the day that the ulti- 
 matum to Servia was delivered, Chancellor von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to the German Ambassadors 
 at London, Paris, and Petrograd, requesting them to 
 call upon the Foreign Ministers of the governments to 
 which they were accredited, and point out that the 
 ultimatum was necessary for the " safety and integ- 
 rity " of Austria- Hungary, and to state with special 
 " emphasis " that " in this question there is concerned 
 an affair which should be settled absolutely between 
 Austria-Hu)igary and Servia, the limitation to which it 
 must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure. 
 We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict, 
 because any intervention by another Power would, on 
 account of the various alliances, precipitate incon- 
 ceivable consequences." 
 
 The position of Germany is admirably stated in 
 these instructions, which I quote from Exhibit I. 
 of the German Official White Book. To this position 
 Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg consistently held 
 throughout the last week of July. In the four words, 
 " localization of the conflict," the intention of Germany 
 was summed up. There was to be a conflict between 
 Austria- Hungary and Servia. That could not be 
 avoided. The only thing that could be avoided was 
 the intervention of Russia to prevent the approaching 
 attack of Austria-Hungary upon Servia. If the Powers 
 friendly to Russia did not prevail upon the Czar to
 
 364 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 refrain from interfering, there would be, " on account of 
 the various alliances, inconceivable consequences." 
 
 The next day, July 24, a telegram from the German 
 Ambassador at Petrograd to the Chancellor stated that 
 M. Sasonow was very much agitated, and had " de- 
 clared most positively that Russia could not permit 
 under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian 
 difficulty be settled alone between the parties con- 
 cerned." 
 
 There was still time for Germany, warned by the 
 attitude taken by Russia, to counsel her ally to accept 
 whatever conciliatory response Servia might give. 
 But this was not done. As we have already seen in the 
 previous chapter, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at 
 Belgrade, without communicating with his govern- 
 ment, declared the Servian response unsatisfactory, 
 even though it gave an opening for further negotiations, 
 and withdrew from Belgrade with all the members of 
 the legation staff. 
 
 This precipitate and, in view of the gravity of the 
 international situation, unreasonable action could have 
 been avoided, had Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg 
 telegraphed the word to Vienna. 
 
 Not only was the Austro-Hungarian Minister allowed 
 to leave Belgrade in this way, but, after three days had 
 elapsed, Austria-Hungary took the irrevocable step of 
 declaring war on Servia. 
 
 During these three days Sir Edward Grey requested 
 the British Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna and 
 Berlin to make every possible effort to find ground 
 for negotiation. On the morning of July 27, Sir 
 Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, 
 submitted to Count Berchtold the proposition of Sir
 
 GERMANY FORCES WAR 365 
 
 Edward Grey, which was made simultaneously at 
 Petrograd, that the question at issue be adjusted in a 
 conference held at London. In the meantime, after a 
 conversation with Sir Rennell Rodd, the Marquis di 
 San Giuliano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 telegraphed to Berlin suggesting that Germany, France, 
 Great Britain, and Italy mediate between Austria- 
 Hungary and Russia. In sharp contrast to the efforts 
 being made by the British Ambassadors, the German 
 Ambassador at Paris, in an interview with Premier 
 Viviani, insisted upon the impossibility of a conference 
 of mediation, and announced categorically that the 
 only possible solution of the difficulty was a common 
 French and German intervention at Petrograd. In 
 other words, France could avoid war by assisting her 
 enemy in humiliating her ally ! 
 
 On July 28 the German position was " that Austria- 
 Hungary must be left a free hand in her dealings with 
 Servia, and that it must be pointed out to Russia, if 
 France and Great Britain really wanted to save the 
 peace of Europe, that she should not mobilize against 
 Austria-Hungary." Diplomatic intervention, then, 
 could do nothing except attempt to force Russia to 
 refrain from interfering between Austria-Hungary and 
 Servia. Gerrnany would aid the other Powers in 
 coercing Russia, but she would not urge herself, or aid 
 them in urging, upon Austria-Hungary, who had started 
 the trouble, the advisability of modifying her attitude 
 towards Servia, and postponing hostilities that were 
 bound to lead to a I'^uropean war. 
 
 Germany had refused all intervention at Vienna. 
 She agreed, however, to prove her goodwill by letting 
 it be known that Austria-Hungary was willing to make
 
 366 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 the promise to seek no territorial aggrandisement in 
 her war with Servia, but to limit herself to a " punitive 
 expedition." But this suggestion did not come until 
 Russia had already committed herself to defend Servia 
 against invasion. 
 
 There was another way in which the peace of Europe 
 could have been saved, and that was by a declaration on 
 the part of Germany that she would allow Russia and 
 Austria-Hungary to fight out the question of hegemony 
 in south-eastern Europe. But there was no propo- 
 sition from Germany to France suggesting a mutual 
 neutrality. On the other hand, Germany let it be 
 known that she would stand by Austria-Hungary if 
 Russia attacked her, and, in the same breath, warned 
 France against the danger of being loyal to the 
 Russian alliance ! 
 
 On July 29 it was announced from Petrograd that a 
 partial mobilization had been ordered in the south and 
 south-east. The German Ambassador in Petrograd, 
 in an interview with M. Sasonow, pointed out " very 
 solemnly that the entire Austro-Servian affair was 
 eclipsed by the danger of a general European confla- 
 gration, and endeavoured to present to the Secretary 
 the magnitude of this danger. It was impossible to 
 dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could now 
 be deserted by Russia." On the same day Ambassador 
 von Schoen at Paris was directed by the German 
 Chancellor to " call the attention of the French Govern- 
 ment to the fact that preparation for war in France 
 would call forth counter-measures in Germany." An 
 exchange of telegrams on the 29th and 30th between 
 the Kaiser and the Czar showed the irreconcilability 
 between the Russian and German points of view.
 
 GERMANY FORCES WAR 367 
 
 The idea of the Kaiser was that the Czar should give 
 Austria-Hungary a free hand. The idea of the Czar 
 was that the attack by Austria-Hungary upon Servia 
 absohitely demanded a Russian mobihzation " directed 
 solely against Austria- Hungary." 
 
 On July 31 the German Ambassador at Petrograd 
 was ordered to notify Russia that mobilization against 
 Austria-Hungary must be stopped within twelve hours, 
 or Germany would mobilize against Russia. At the 
 same time a telegram was sent to the German Ambas- 
 sador at Paris ordering him to " ask the French 
 Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a 
 Russo-German War." 
 
 On August I, at 7.30 p.m., the German Ambassador 
 at Petrograd handed the following declaration of war 
 to Russia : 
 
 " The Imperial Government has tried its best from 
 the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful 
 solution. Yielding to a desire which had been ex- 
 pressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in accord with 
 England, was engaged in accomplishing the role of 
 mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and of 
 Petrograd, when Russia, without awaiting the result of 
 this mediation, proceeded to the mobilization of its 
 forces by land and sea. 
 
 " As a result of this threatening measure, which was 
 actuated by no military preparation on the part of 
 Germany, the Gennan Empire found itself facing a 
 grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial Govern- 
 ment had failed to ward off this danger, it would com- 
 promise the security and very existence of Germany. 
 Consequently the German Government saw itself forced 
 to address itself to the Government of His Majesty, the 
 Emperor of All the Russias, insisting upon the cessation 
 of the said military acts. Russia having refused to
 
 368 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 accede, and having manifested by this refusal that this 
 action was directed against Germany, I have the 
 honour of making known to Your Excellency the fol- 
 lowing order from my Government : 
 
 " His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, 
 in the name of the Empire, accepts the challenge, and 
 considers himself in the state of war with Russia." 
 
 The same afternoon President Poincare ordered a 
 general mobilization in France. What Ambassador 
 von Schoen tried to get from Premier Viviani, and what 
 he did get, was expressed in his telegram sent from 
 Paris three hours before the call to mobilization was 
 issued : 
 
 ' ' Upon the repeated definite inquiry whether France 
 would remain neutral in the case of a Russo- German 
 war, the Premier declared that France would do that 
 which her interests dictated." 
 
 Germany violated the neutrality of Luxembourg on 
 August 2, and of Belgium on August 3, after vainly 
 endeavouring to secure permission from Belgium for 
 the free passage of her troops to the French frontier. 
 On Sunday morning, August 2, French soil was invaded. 
 But Ambassador von Schoen stayed in Paris until 
 Monday evening " waiting for instructions." Then he 
 called at the Quai d'Orsay, and handed the following 
 note to Premier Viviani, who was acting also as 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs : 
 
 " The German civil and military authorities have 
 reported a certain number of definite acts of hostility 
 committed on German territory by French military 
 aviators. Several of these have clearly violated the 
 neutrality of Belgium in flying over the territory of this 
 country. One of them tried to destroy structures near 
 Wesel; others have been seen in the region of Eiffel;
 
 GERMANY FORCES WAR 369 
 
 another has thrown bombs on the railway near 
 Karlsruhe and Niirnberg. 
 
 " I am charged, and I have the honour to make 
 known to Your Excellency that, in the presence of 
 these aggressions, the German Empire considers itself 
 in state of war with France by the act of this latter 
 Power. 
 
 " I have at the same time the honour to bring to the 
 knowledge of Your Excellency that the German 
 authorities will detain the French merchant ships in 
 German ports, but that they will release them if in 
 forty-eight hours complete reciprocity is assured. 
 
 " My diplomatic mission having come to an end, 
 there remains to me no more than to beg Your Excel- 
 lency to be willing to give me my passports and to take 
 what measures you may judge necessary to assure my 
 return to Germany with the staff of tfie embassy, as 
 well as with the staff of the legation of Bavaria and 
 of the German Consulate-General at Paris." 
 
 In communicating this declaration of war to the 
 Chamber of Deputies on the following morning, 
 August 4, Premier Viviani declared formally that " at 
 no moment has a French aviator penetrated into 
 Belgium; no French aviator has committed either in 
 Bavaria or in any part of the German Empire any act 
 of hostihty." 
 
 24
 
 XXI. 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 
 
 The balance of power in European diplomacy led 
 inevitably to a rapprochement between France and 
 Russia and Great Britain to be a set-off to the Triple 
 Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary and Italy. 
 
 The Triple Alliance, however, while purely defensive, 
 was still an alliance. It had endured for over thirty 
 years, and the three Powers generally sustained each 
 other in diplomatic moves. Their military and naval 
 strategists were in constant communication, and ready 
 at any time to bring all their forces into play in a 
 European war. 
 
 France and Russia had also entered into a defensive 
 aUiance. This had not been accomplished without 
 great difficulty. Were it not for the constant menace 
 to France from Germany, the French Parliament would 
 not have ratified the alliance in the first place, nor 
 would it have stood the strain of increasing Radicalism 
 in French sentiment during the last decade. While 
 there is much intellectual and temperamental affinity 
 between Gaul and Slav, there is no political affinity 
 between democratic France and autocratic Russia. 
 
 The commercial rivalry of Great Britain and Germany 
 led to a rivalry of armaments. The struggle of German 
 industry for the control of the world markets is the 
 
 370
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 371 
 
 real cause of the creation and rapid development of the 
 German navy to threaten the British mastery of the 
 seas. It is possible that the statesmen of Great 
 Britain, by a liberal policy in regard to German 
 colonial expansion in Africa and Asia, and in regard 
 to German ambitions in Asiatic Turkey, might have 
 diverted German energy from bending all its efforts to 
 destroy British commerce. It is possible that such 
 a policy might have enabled the German democracy 
 to gain the power to prevent Prussian militarism from 
 dominating the Confederation. But that would have 
 been to expect too much of human nature. Nations 
 are like individuals. There never has been any excep- 
 tion to this rule. What we have we want to keep. 
 We want more than we have, and we try to get it by 
 taking it away from our neighbour. Thus the world 
 is in constant struggle. Until we have the millennium, 
 and by the millennium I mean the change of human 
 nature from selfishness to altruism, we shall have war. 
 Then, too, the British have seen in themselves so 
 striking an illustration of the proverb that the appetite 
 grows with eating that they could hardly expect any- 
 thing else of the Germans, were they to allow them 
 voluntarily " a place in the sun." 
 
 The rapid growth of Germany along lines similar 
 to the development of Great Britain has made 
 the two nations rivals. As a result of this rivalry 
 Great Britain has been forced to prepare for the 
 eventuality of a conflict between herself and Germany 
 by giving up the policy of " splendid isolation," and 
 seeking to enter into friendly relationship with those 
 European Powers that were the enemies of her rival. 
 The first decade of the twentieth century saw British
 
 372 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 diplomacy compounding colonial rivalry with France 
 in Africa and with Russia in Asia. The African accord 
 of 1904 and the Asiatic accord of 1907 marked a new 
 era in British foreign relations. Since their conclusion 
 Great Britain has drawn gradually nearer to France 
 and Russia. 
 
 But British statesmen have had to reckon with the 
 development of Radical tendencies in the British 
 electorate. These tendencies have become more and 
 more marked during the very period in which British 
 foreign policy found that its interests coincided with 
 those of Russia and France. British democracy had 
 the same antipathy to a Russian alliance as had French 
 democracy. But the menace of Germany, which threw 
 France into the arms of Russia, has not seemed as real 
 to the British electorate. There was also the sentiment 
 against militarism, which has made it difficult for the 
 Liberal Cabinet to secure from Parliament sufficient 
 sums for the maintenance of an adequate naval 
 estabHshment,and has blocked every effort to provide 
 even a modified form of compulsory military service 
 and military training in Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 When one considers all that Sir Edward Grey has 
 had to contend with during the years that he has held 
 the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the British Cabinet, 
 admiration for his achievements knows no limits. It 
 is never safe to make comparisons or form judgments 
 in the appreciation of contemporary figures in history; 
 but I cannot refrain from stating my belief that 
 British foreign policy has never passed through a more 
 trying and critical period, and British interests have 
 never been more ably served, than during the years 
 since the conference of Algeciras.
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 373 
 
 The menace of a war between Great Britain and 
 Germany has disturbed Europe several times during 
 the past decade. There has not been, however, a 
 direct crisis, involving the interests of the two rival 
 nations, to make an appeal to arms inevitable, or even 
 probable. But although British public sentiment 
 might have been slow in supporting the intervention 
 of the Cabinet in favour of France, had Germany 
 attacked France in 1905, in 1908, or in 1911, to have 
 stayed out of the war would have been suicidal folly, 
 and Great Britain would soon have awakened to 
 this fact. 
 
 The crisis over the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to 
 Servia became acute after the terms of the ultimatum 
 were known. Sir Edward Grey, seconded by as skilful 
 and forceful ambassadors as have ever represented 
 British interests on the continent of Europe, honestly 
 tried to prevent the outbreak of war. It was not to 
 the interests of Great Britain that this war should be 
 fought. All sentimental considerations to one side, 
 the moment was peculiarly unfavourable on purely 
 material grounds. The British Parliament was facing 
 one of the most serious problems of its history. The 
 confidence of the country in the wisdom of the measures 
 in Ireland that the Government seemed determined to 
 carry out was severely shaken. The interest of the 
 British public in the troubles between Austria-Hungary 
 and Servia was not great enough to make the war 
 popular. The efforts of Lord Haldane had done much 
 to improve the relationship between Great Britain and 
 Germany. Sympathy with Russia had been alienated 
 by the increasingly reactionary policy of the Czar's 
 government towards the Poles, the Finns, and the
 
 374 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Jews. The British press was disgusted by the over- 
 throw of the Ribot Ministry, and by the revelations 
 of the Caillaux trial. 
 
 As there was no actual alliance between Great Britain 
 and France, and no understanding of any nature what- 
 ever with Russia, French public opinion was far from 
 being certain that British aid would be given in the 
 approaching wa.v, and British public opinion was far from 
 being certain as to whether it would be necessary to give 
 this aid, or whether it wanted to do so. I am speaking 
 here of the feeling among the electorate, which, 
 accurately represented by Parliament, is the final court 
 of appeal in Great Britain. There was no doubt about 
 the opinion of Sir Edward Grey and the majority of 
 his colleagues in the Cabinet, as well as of the leaders 
 of the Opposition. There was, however, very serious 
 doubt as to the attitude of Parliament. Would it 
 sustain France and Russia over the question of Servia, 
 at a time when there was so serious a division in the 
 nation concerning the Home Rule Bill — even the open 
 menace of civil war ? 
 
 When Germany decided to declare war on Russia, 
 and it was seen that France would be drawn into the 
 struggle, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg declared 
 to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to Ger- 
 many, that " the neutrality of Great Britain once 
 guaranteed, every assurance would be given to the 
 Cabinet at London that the Imperial Government did 
 not have in view territorial acquisitions at the expense 
 of France." Sir Edward questioned the Chancellor 
 about the French colonies, " the portions of territories 
 and possessions of France situated outside of the con- 
 tinent of Europe." Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 375 
 
 answered that it was not within his power to make any 
 promise on that subject. 
 
 There was no hesitation or equivocation in the 
 response of the British Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs to this proposition. He said that neutrality 
 under such conditions was impossible, and that Great 
 Britain could not stand by and see France crushed, 
 even if she were left her European territory intact, for 
 she would be reduced to the position of a satellite of 
 Germany. To make a bargain with Germany at the 
 expense of France would be a disgrace from which 
 Great Britain would never recover. It was pointed out 
 to the Chancellor that the only means of maintaining 
 good relations between Great Britain and Germany 
 would be for the two Powers to continue to work 
 together to safeguard the peace of Europe. Sir Edward 
 Grey promised that all his personal efforts would be 
 directed towards guaranteeing Germany and her allies 
 against any aggression on the part of Russia and France, 
 and hoped that, if Germany showed her good faith in 
 the present crisis, more friendly relations between 
 Great Britain and Germany would ensue than had been 
 the case up to that moment. 
 
 This dignified and manly response could have left 
 no doubt in the minds of German statesmen as to the 
 stand which the British Cabinet intended to take. 
 Did they believe that Parliament and the people would 
 not support Sir Edward Grey ? 
 
 The position of Great Britain was explicitly put 
 before the House of Commons on the evening of 
 August 3. Because of her naval agreement with 
 France, by which the French navy was concentrated 
 in the Mediterranean in order that the British Admir-
 
 376 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 ally might keep its full forces in home waters, Great 
 Britain was bound in honour to prevent an attack of 
 a hostile fleet upon the Atlantic seacoast of France. 
 If Germany were to make such an attack, Great Britain 
 would be drawn into the war without any further 
 question. There had also been since November, 1912, 
 an understanding between the British and French 
 military and naval authorities concerning common 
 action on land and sea " against an enemy." But, at 
 the time this understanding was made, it was put in 
 writing that it was merely a measure of prudence, and 
 did not bind Great Britain in any way whatever to 
 act with France either in a defensive or offensive war. 
 
 Great Britain was drawn into the war by the Geiman 
 violation of the neutrality of Belgium. 
 
 On Sunday evening, August 2, at seven o'clock, 
 Germany gave the following ultimatum to Belgium : 
 
 " The German Government has received sure news, 
 according to which the French forces have the intention 
 of marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur ; 
 this news leaves no doubt of the intention of France 
 to march against Germany by way of Belgian territory. 
 The Imperial German Government cannot help fearing 
 that Belgium, in spite of its very good will, will not be 
 able to repulse, without help, a forward march of 
 French troops which promises so large a development. 
 
 " In this fact we find sufficient certitude of a threat 
 directed against Germany ; it is an imperious duty for 
 self-preservation for Germany to forestall this attack 
 of the enemy. 
 
 " The German Government would regret exceedingly 
 should Belgium regard as an act of hostility against it 
 the fact that the enemies of Germany oblige her to 
 violate, on her side, the territory of Belgium. In order
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 377 
 
 to dissipate every misunderstanding, the German 
 Government declares as follows : 
 
 " (i) Germany has in view no act of hostility against 
 Belgium, if Belgium consents, in the war which is going 
 to commence, to adopt an attitude of benevolent 
 neutrality in regard to Germany . The German Govern- 
 ment, on its side, promises, at the moment of peace, to 
 guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their 
 entire extent : (2) Germany promises to evacuate 
 Belgian territory, under the condition above pro- 
 nounced, immediately peace is concluded: (3) If 
 Belgium observes a friendly attitude, Germany is 
 ready, in accord with the authorities of the Belgian 
 Government, to buy, paying cash, all that would be 
 necessary for her troops, and to indemnify the losses 
 caused to Belgium: (4) If Belgium conducts herself 
 in a hostile manner against the German troops, and 
 makes in particular difficulties for their forward march 
 by an opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or 
 by the destruction of roads, railways, tunnels, or other 
 constructions, Germany will be obliged to consider 
 Belgium as an enemy. 
 
 " In this case Germany will make no promise in 
 regard to the kingdom, but will leave the subsequent 
 adjustment of the relations of the two states one 
 toward the other to the decision of arms. 
 
 " The German Government has the hope with reason 
 that this eventuality will not take place, and that the 
 Belgian Government will know how to take the neces- 
 sary measures suitable for preventing it from taking 
 place. 
 
 " In this case, the relations of friendship which unite 
 the two neighbouring states will become closer and 
 more lasting." 
 
 Belgium did not hesitate to respond promptly as 
 follows : 
 
 " By its note of August 2, 1914, the German Govern- 
 ment has made known that, according to sure news, the
 
 378 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 French forces have the intention of marching on the 
 Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, 
 in spite of her very good will, would not be able to 
 repulse without help the forward march of the French 
 troops. 
 
 " The German Government would believe itself under 
 the obligation of forestalling this attack and of violating 
 the Belgian territory. In these conditions Germany 
 proposes to the Government of the King to adopt in 
 regard to her a friendly attitude, and she promises at 
 the moment of the peace to guarantee the integrity of 
 the kingdom and of its possessions in their entire 
 extent. 
 
 " The note adds that if Belgium makes difficulty for 
 the forward march of the German troops, Germany will 
 be obliged to consider her as an enemy, but will leave 
 the subsequent adjustment of the relations of the two 
 states one towards the other to the decision of arms. 
 
 " This note has aroused in the Government of the 
 King a deep and grievous astonishment. The inten- 
 tions that it attributes to France are in contradiction 
 with the formal declarations which have been made to 
 us on August I, in the name of the Government of the 
 Republic. 
 
 " However, if in opposition to our expectation a 
 violation of the Belgian neutrality is going to be com- 
 mitted by France, Belgium would fulfil all her inter- 
 national duties, and her army would oppose itself to 
 the invader with the most vigorous resistance. The 
 treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, make 
 sacred the independence and the neutrality of Belgium 
 under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the 
 Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia. 
 
 " Belgium has always been faithful to her inter- 
 national obligations, she has accomplished her duties 
 in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no 
 effort to maintain and to make respected her neutrality. 
 The attack upon her independence with which the 
 German Government menaces her would constitute a 
 flagrant violation of international law.
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 379 
 
 " No strategic interest justifies the violation of inter- 
 national law. The Belgian Government, in accepting 
 the propositions of which it has received notice, would 
 sacrifice the honour of the nation at the same time as 
 it would betray its duties toward Europe. Conscious 
 of the r61e that Belgium has played for more than 
 eighty years in the civilization of the world, it does not 
 allow itself to believe that the independence of Belgium 
 can be preserved only at the price of the violation of 
 her neutrality. If this hope is deceived, the Belgian 
 Government is firmly decided to repulse by every 
 means in its power every attack upon its rights." 
 
 As I record these two statements, there is before me 
 a cartoon from a recent issue of Punch. The Kaiser, 
 with a leer on his face, is leaning over the shoulder of 
 King Albert, who is looking out with folded arms upon 
 the smoking ruins of his country and the long defile of 
 refugees. The Kaiser says: " See, you have lost all." 
 King Albert answers: " Not my soul." 
 
 To be just to Germany, it is necessary for us to quote 
 the explanation of this action made by Chancellor von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag, on August 4, when 
 Germany had commenced to carry her threat into 
 execution : 
 
 " Here is the truth. We are in necessity, and neces- 
 sity knows no law. 
 
 " Our troops have occupied Luxembourg, and have 
 perhaps already put their foot upon Belgian territory. 
 
 "It is against the law of nations. The French 
 Government has, it is true, declared at Brussels that it 
 would respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the 
 enemy respected it. We knew, however, that France 
 was ready for the aggression. France could wait; we, 
 no. A French attack upon our flank in the Lower 
 Rhine might have been fatal to us. So we have been 
 forced to pass beyond the well-founded protestations of
 
 38o THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 Luxembourg and the Belgian Government. We shall 
 recompense them for the wrong that we have thus 
 caused them as soon as we shall have attained our 
 military end. 
 
 " When one is as threatened as we are, and when one 
 fights for that which is most sacred to him, one can 
 think only of one thing, that is, to attain his end, cost 
 what it may. 
 
 " I repeat the words of the Emperor : ' It is with pure 
 conscience that Germany goes to the combat.' " 
 
 On the afternoon of August 3, as Sir Edward Grey 
 was leaving for Parliament to make his expose of Great 
 Britain's position in the European crisis, he received 
 from the King a telegram that had just arrived from 
 King Albert of Belgium : 
 
 " Remembering the numerous proofs of friendship of 
 Your Majesty and of your predecessor, and the friendly 
 attitude of Great Britain in 1870, as well as of the new 
 gage of friendship that she has just given me, I address 
 a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of 
 Your Majesty to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 
 
 Sir Edward Grey read this telegram to Parliament, 
 and explained that the diplomatic intervention asked 
 for had already been made both at Paris and Berlin, 
 for this eventuality had been foreseen. To the 
 questions of the British ambassadors concerning their 
 intentions towards Belgium, to respect and maintain the 
 neutrality of which each of these Powers was equally 
 hound with Great Britain by the treaty of 1839, France 
 responded : 
 
 " The French government is resolved to respect the 
 neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in the case 
 where some other Power would violate the neutrality 
 that France might find herself in the necessity of acting 
 otherwise."
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR 381 
 
 Germany answered : 
 
 " The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is in the 
 impossibility of giving a response before having con- 
 sulted the Emperor and the Chancellor." 
 
 When Sir Edward Goschen expressed the hope 
 that the answer would not be delayed, Herr von 
 Jagow gave him clearly to understand that he 
 doubted whether he could respond, " for any response 
 on his part would not fail, in case of war, to have the 
 regrettable effect of divulging a part of the German 
 plan of campaign " 1 
 
 There was no doubt about the sentiment of Parlia- 
 ment. The Cabinet saw that party lines had been 
 obliterated, and that the country was behind them. 
 The following day, August 4, Great Britain presented 
 an ultimatum to Germany, demanding an assurance 
 that the neutrality of Belgium should be respected. 
 Germany gave no answer. Her army had already 
 invaded Belgium. A few hours after the reception of 
 the British ultimatum the advance on Liege was 
 ordered. After waiting until evening Great Britain 
 declared war on Germany. 
 
 It is probable that Germany counted the cost before 
 she invaded Belgium. Whatever may have been said 
 at Berlin, the intervention of Great Britain was not 
 the surprise that it has been represented to be. In 
 deciding to violate Belgian neutrality, in spite of the 
 British ultimatum, the German argument was: It is 
 morally certain that Great Britain will intervene if we 
 enter Belgium. But what will this intervention mean ? 
 She has no army worth the name. Her navy can do 
 practically nothing to harm us while we are crushing 
 France and Russia. The participation of Great Britain
 
 382 THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE 
 
 in the war is a certainty a few weeks later. By pre- 
 cipitating her intervention we are less harmed than we 
 would be by refusing to avail ourselves of the advantage 
 of attacking France through Belgium. 
 
 In believing that the eventual participation of Great 
 Britain was certain, even if there were no Belgian 
 question, Germany was right. The violation of the 
 neutrality of Belgium was not the cause, but the 
 occasion, of Great Britain's entry into the war. It 
 was, however, a most fortunate opportunity for the 
 British Cabinet to secure popular sympathy and sup- 
 port in declaring war upon Germany ; for it is certain 
 that Great Britain ought not to have delayed entering 
 the war. The nation might have awakened too late to 
 the fact that the triumph of Germany in Europe would 
 menace her national existence. There is no room in 
 the world for the amicable dwelling side by side of 
 British idealism and German militarism. One or the 
 other must perish. 
 
 In August, 1914, the only way to have avoided the 
 catastrophe of a general European war would have 
 been to have allowed Germany to make, according to 
 her own desires and ambitions, the new map of Europe. 
 
 BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD
 
 A LIST OF THE LIBRARIES 
 AND SERIES OF COPYRIGHT 
 BOOKS PUBLISHED BY 
 DUCKWORTH ^ CO. 
 
 3 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN 
 LONDON, W.C.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 
 
 THE LIBRARY OF ART 
 
 Embracing Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, etc. Edited 
 by Mrs S. Arthur Strong, LL.D. Extra cloth, with 
 lettering and design in gold. Large cr. Svo (7I in. by 
 5f in.), giVt top, headband. 55-. net a volume. Inland 
 postage, ^d. 
 
 LIST OF VOLUMES 
 
 DONATELLO. By Lord Balcarres, M.P. With 58 plates. 
 
 Great Masters of Dutch and Flemish Painting. By Dr 
 W. Bode. With 48 plates. 
 
 Rembrandt. By G. Baldwin Brown, of the University of Edinburgh. 
 With 45 plates. 
 
 Antonio Pollaiuolo. By Maud Cruttwell. With 50 plates. 
 
 Verrocchio. By Maud Cruttwell. With 48 plates. 
 
 The Lives of the British Architects. By E. Beresford 
 
 Chancellor. With 45 plates. 
 
 The School of Madrid. By A. de Beruete y Moret. With 48 
 
 plates. 
 William Blake. By Basil de Selincourt. With 40 plates. 
 Giotto. By Basil de Selincourt. With 44 plates. 
 
 French Painting in the Sixteenth Century, By L. Dimier. 
 With 50 plates. 
 
 The School of Ferrara. By Edmund G. Gardner. With 50 plates. 
 
 Six Greek Sculptors. (Myron, Pheidias, Polykleitos, Skopas, 
 Praxiteles, and Lysippos. ) By Ernest Gardner. With 81 plates. 
 
 Titian. By Dr Georg Gronau. With 54 plates. 
 
 Constable. By M. Sturge Henderson. With 48 plates. 
 
 PiSANELLO. By G. F. Hill. With 50 plates. 
 
 Michael Angelo. By Sir Charles Holroyd. With 52 plates. 
 
 MEDliEVAL Art. By W. R. Lethaby. With 66 plates and 120 
 drawings in the text. 
 
 The Scottish School of Painting. By William D. McKay, 
 R.S.A. With 46 plates. 
 
 Christopher Wren. By Lena Milman. With upwards of 60 plates, 
 
 CORREGGio. By T. Sturge Moore. With 55 plates.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 3 
 
 The Library of Art — continued 
 
 Albert Durer. By T. Sturge Moore. With 4 copperplates and 50 
 half-tone engravings. 
 
 Sir William Beechey, R. A. By W. Roberts. With 49 plates. 
 
 The School of Seville. By N. Sentenach. With 50 plates. 
 
 Roman Sculpture from Augustus to Constantine. By Mrs 
 S. Arthur Strong, LL.D., Editor of the Series. 2 vols. With 
 130 plates. 
 
 THE POPULAR LIBRARY OF ART 
 
 Pocket volumes of biographical and critical value on the 
 great painters, with very many reproductions of the 
 artists' works. Each volume averages 200 pages, i6mo, 
 with from 40 to 50 illustrations. To be had in different 
 styles of binding: Boards gilt, is. net; green canvas, or 
 red cloth, gilt, 2s. net ; limp lambskin, red and green, 
 25. bd. net. Several titles can also be had in the 
 popular Persian yapp binding, in box, 2s. 6d. net each. 
 
 LIST OF VOLUMES 
 
 Botticelli. By Julia Cartwright (Mrs Ady). Also in Persian yapp 
 binding. 
 
 Raphael. By Julia Cartwright (Mrs Ady). Also in Persian yapp 
 binding. 
 
 Frederick Walker. By Clementina Black. 
 
 Rembrandt. By Auguste Breal. 
 
 Velazquez. By Auguste Breal. Also in Persian yapp binding. 
 
 Gainsborough. By Arthur B. Chamberlain. Also in Persian yapp 
 binding. 
 
 Cruikshank. By W. H. Chesson. 
 
 Blake. By G. K. Chesterton. 
 
 G. F, Watts. By G. K. Chesterton, Also in Persian yapp binding. 
 
 Albrecht Durer. By Lina Eckenstein. 
 
 The English Water-Colour Painters. By A. J. Finberg. Also 
 in Persian yapp binding. 
 
 Hogarth. By Edward Gainett.
 
 4 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 
 
 The Popular Library of hva— continued 
 
 Leonardo da Vinci, By Dr Georg Gronau. Also in Persian yapp 
 binding. 
 
 Holbein. By Ford Madox Hueffer. . 
 
 ROSSETTI. By Ford Madox Hueffer. Also in Persian yapp binding. 
 
 The Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. By Ford Madox Hueffer. 
 Also in Persian yapp binding. 
 
 Perugino. By Edward Hutton. 
 
 Millet, By Romain Rolland, Also in Persian yapp binding. 
 
 Watteao. By Camille Mauclair. 
 
 The French Impressionists. By Camille Mauclair. Also in 
 Persian yapp binding. 
 
 Whistler. By Bemhard Sickert, Also in Persian yapp binding. 
 
 MASTERS OF PAINTING 
 
 With many illustratiofis in photogravure. 
 
 A series which gives in each volume a large number of 
 examples reproduced in photogravure of the works of its 
 subject. The first series of books on art issued at a popular 
 price to use this beautiful method of reproduction. 
 
 The letterpress is the same as the volumes in the Popular 
 Library of Art, but it is reset, the size of the volumes being 
 8f ins, by sf ins. There are no less than 32 plates in each 
 volume. Bound in cloth with gold on side, gold lettering 
 on back: gilt top, picture wrapper, y. 6d. net a volume, 
 postage 4^. 
 
 This is the first time that a number of photogravure 
 illustrations have been given in a volume published at a 
 popular price. The process having been very costly has 
 been reserved for expensive volumes or restricted to perhaps 
 a frontispiece in the case of books issued at a moderate 
 price. A new departure in the art of printing has recently 
 been made with the machining of photogravures ; the 
 wonderfully clear detail and beautifully soft effect of the 
 photogravure reproductions being obtained as effectively as 
 by the old method. It is this great advance in the printing 
 of illustrations which makes it possible to produce this series.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 5 
 
 The volumes are designed to give as much value as pos- 
 sible, and for the time being are the last word in popular 
 book production. 
 
 It would be difficult to conceive of more concise, suggestive, 
 and helpful volumes than these. All who read them will be 
 aware of a sensible increase in their knowledge and apprecia- 
 tion of art and the world's masterpieces. 
 
 The first six volumes are : 
 
 1. Raphael. By Julia Cartwright. 
 
 2. Botticelli. By Julia Cartwright. 
 
 3. G. F. Watts. By G. K. Chesterton. 
 
 4. Leonardo da Vinci. By Georg Gronau. 
 $. Holbein. By Ford Madox Hueffer. 
 
 6. Rossetti. By Ford Madox Hueffer. 
 
 THE CROWN LIBRARY 
 
 The books included in this series are standard copyright 
 works, issued in similar style at a uniform price, and are 
 eminently suited for the library. They are particularl7 
 acceptable as prize volumes for advanced students. Demy 
 8vo, size 9 in. by 5I in. Cloth gilt, gilt top. 5^. net. 
 'Postage ^d. 
 
 The RubA'iyAt of 'Umar Khayyam (Fitzgerald's 2nd Edition). 
 Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by Edward Heron Allen. 
 
 Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. By 
 Emile Boutroux. 
 
 Wanderings in Arabia. By Charles M. Doughty. An abridged 
 edition of "Travels in Arabia Deserta." With portrait and 
 map. In 2 vols. 
 
 The Intimate Life of Alexander Hamilton. By Allan McLane 
 Hamilton. Illustrated. 
 
 Folk-Lore of the Holy Land : Moslem, Christian, and Jewish. 
 By J. E. Hanauer. Edited by Marmaduke Pickthall. 
 
 Life and Evolution. By F. W. Headley, F.Z.S. With upwards 
 of lOO illustrations. New and revised edition (1913). 
 
 The Note-Books of Leonardo da Vinci. Edited by Edward 
 McCurdy. With 14 illustrations. 
 
 The Life and Letters of Leslie Stephen. By F. W. Maitland. 
 With a photogravure portrait.
 
 6 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 
 
 The Crown Library — continued 
 
 The Country Month by Month. By J. A. Owen and G. S. 
 
 Boulger. With notes on Birds by Lord Lilford. With 20 black 
 
 and white illustrations. 
 *^* A new special edition of this book, with 12 illustrations in colour 
 and 20 in black and white, is published. Price ds. net. 
 
 Spinoza : His Life and Philosophy. By Sir Frederick Pollock. 
 The English Utilitarians. By Sir Leslie Stephen. 3 vols. 
 
 Vol. \. James Mill. 
 
 Vol. IL Jeremy Bentham. 
 
 Vol. in. John Stuart Mill. 
 
 Critical Studies. By S. Arthur Strong. With Memoir by Lord 
 Balcarres, M.P. Illustrated. 
 
 Medieval Sicily : Aspects of Life and Art in the Middle Ages. 
 By Cecilia Waern. With very many illustrations. 
 
 MODERN PLAYS 
 
 Including the dramatic work of leading contemporary 
 writers, such as Andreyef, Bjornson, Galsworthy, Hauptnnann, 
 Ibsen, Maeterlinck, Eden Phillpotts, Strindberg, Sudermann, 
 Tchekofif, and others. 
 
 In single volumes. Cloth, 2s. net ; paper covers, \s. 6d. net 
 a volume ; postage, 3^/. 
 
 The Revolt and the Escape. By Villiers de L'Isle Adam. 
 
 (Cloth binding only.) 
 Hernani. a Tragedy. By Frederick Brock. {Cloth binding only .) 
 Tristram and Iseult. A Drama. By J. Comyns Carr. 
 Passeks-By. By C. Haddon Chambers. 
 The Likeness of the Night. By Mrs W. K. Clifford. 
 A Woman Alone. By Mrs W. K. Clifford. 
 The Silver Box. By John Galsworthy. 
 Joy. By John Galsworthy. 
 Strife. By John Galsworthy. 
 Justice, By John Galsworthy.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 7 
 
 Modern Plays — cotitinued 
 
 The Eldest Son. By John Galsworthy. 
 
 The Little Dream. By John Galsworthy. {Cloth, is. 6d. net ; 
 paper covers, \s. net.) 
 
 The Fugitive. By John Galsworthy. 
 
 The Mob. By John Galsworthy. 
 
 The Pigeon. By John Galsworthy. 
 
 The Coming of Peace. By Gerhart Hauptmann. {Cloth biitding 
 only.) 
 
 Love's Comedy. By Henrik Ibsen. {Cloth binding only.) 
 
 The Divine Gift. A Play. By Henry Arthur Jones. With an 
 Introduction and a Portrait, {y. 6d.net. Cloth binding only.) 
 
 The Widowing of Mrs Holroyd. A Drama. By D. H. 
 Lawrence. With an Introduction. {Cloth only, y. 6d. net.) 
 
 Three Little Dramas. By Maurice Maeterlinck. (Cloth binding 
 only. ) 
 
 St Francis OF Assisi. A Play in Five Acts. By J.-A. Peladon. 
 
 {Cloth only, 3^. dd. net.) 
 
 Peter's Chance. A Play. By Edith Lyttelton. 
 
 The Mother. A Play. By Eden Phiilpotts. 
 
 The Shadow. A Play. By Eden Phiilpotts. 
 
 The Secret Woman. A Drama. By Eden Phillpots. 
 
 Curtain Raisers. One Act Plays. By Eden Phillpots. 
 
 The Father. By August Strindberg. {Cloth binding only.) 
 
 Creditors. Pariah. Two Plays. By August Strindberg. {Cloth 
 binding only. ) 
 
 Miss Julia. The Stronger. Two Plays. By August Strindberg. 
 ( Cloth binding only. ) 
 
 There are Crimes and Crimes. By August Strindberg. {Cloth 
 binding only. ) 
 
 Roses. Four One Act Plays. By Hermann Sudermann. {Cloth 
 binding only. ) 
 
 MORITURI. Three One Act Plays. By Hermann Sudermann. 
 ( Cloth binding only. ) 
 
 The Joy of Living. A Play. By Hermann Sudermann. {Cloth 
 only, 4J. dd. net.) 
 
 Five Litti.e Plays. By Alfred Sutro. 
 
 The Two Virtues. A Play. By Alfred Sntro.
 
 8 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 
 
 Modern Plays — continued 
 
 The Dawn (Les Aubes). By Emile Verhaeren. Translated by 
 Arthur Symons. {Cloth binding only.) 
 
 The Princess of Hanover. By Margaret L. Woods. {Cloth 
 binding otily. ) 
 
 Plays. By Leonid Andreyef. Translated from the Russian, 
 with an Introduction by F. N, Scott and C. L. Header. 
 Cr. 8vo, cloth gilt. 6i". 
 
 Plays. (First Series.) By Bjornstjerne Bjornson. (The 
 Gauntlet, Beyond our Power, The New System.) With an 
 Introduction and Bibliography. In one vol. Cr. Svo. 6s. 
 
 Plays. (Second Series.) By Bjornstjerne Bjornson. (Love 
 and Geography, Beyond Human Might, Laboremus.) 
 With an Introduction by Edwin Bjorkman. In one 
 vol. Cr. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 Three Plays. By Mrs W. K. Clifford. (Hamilton's Second 
 Marriage, Thomas and the Princess, The Modern Way.) 
 In one vol. S^. cr. Svo. 6s. 
 
 Plays (Volume One). By John Galsworthy. Three Plays 
 (Joy, Strife, The Silver Box) in one vol. S^. cr. Svo. 6s. 
 
 Plays (Volume Two). By John Galsworthy. Three Plays 
 (Justice, The Little Dream, The Eldest Son) in one 
 vol. S^. cr. 2>vo. 6s. 
 
 Plays (Volume Three). By John Galsworthy. Three 
 Plays (The Pigeon, The Fugitive, The Mob) in one vol. 
 Sq. cr. Svo. 6s. 
 
 Four Tragedies. By Allan Monkhouse. (The Hayling 
 Family, The Stricklands, Resentment, Reaping the 
 Whirlwind.) In one vol. Cr. Svo, cloth gilt. 6s. 
 
 Plays. (First Series.) By August Strindberg. (The Dream 
 Play, The Link, The Dance of Death, Part I. ; The 
 Dance of Death, Part II.) In one vol. Cr. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 Plays. (Second Series.) By August Strindberg. (Creditors, 
 Pariah, There are Crimes and Crimes, Miss Julia, The 
 Stronger.) In one vol. 6s.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 9 
 
 Modern Plays — continued 
 
 Plays. (Third Series.) By August Strindberg. (Advent, 
 Simoom, Swan White, Debit and Credit, The Spook 
 Sonata, The Black Glove.) Cr. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 Plays. By Anton Tchekoff. (Uncle Vanya, IvanofF, The 
 Seagull, The Swan Song.) With an Introduction. 
 Cr. Svo. 6s. 
 
 THE READERS' LIBRARY 
 
 A new series of Copyright Works of Individual Merit and 
 Permanent Value — the work of Authors of Repute. 
 
 Library style. Cr. Svo. Blue doth gilt, round backs. 
 2s. 6d. net a volume ; postage, /^d. 
 
 AVRIL. By Hilaire Belloc. Essays on the Poetry of the French 
 Renaissance. 
 
 EsTO Perpetua. By Hilahe Belloc. Algerian Studies and Impressions. 
 
 Men, Women, and Books : Res Judicat^e. By Augustine Birrell. 
 Complete in one vol. 
 
 Obiter Dicta. By Augustine Birrell. First and Second Series in 
 one volume. 
 
 Memoirs of a Surrey Labourer. By George Bourne. 
 
 The Bettesworth Book. By George Bourne. 
 
 Studies in Poetry. By Stopford A. Brooke, LL.D. Essays on 
 Blake, Scott, Shelley, Keats, etc. 
 
 Four Poets. By Stopford A. Brooke, LL.D. Essays on Clough, 
 Arnold, Rossetti, and Morris. 
 
 Comparative Studies in Nursery Rhymes. By Lina Eckenstein. 
 Essays in a branch of Folk-lore. 
 
 Italian Poets since Dante. Critical Essays. By W. Everett. 
 
 Villa Rubein, and Other Stories. By John Galsworthy. 
 
 Faith, and other Sketches. By R. B. Cunninghame Graham. 
 
 Hope, and other Sketches. By R. B. Cunninghame Graham. 
 
 PROGREaa, AND OTHER SKETCHES. By R. B. Cunninghame Graham. 
 
 Success, and other Sketches. By R. B. Cunninghame Grahame. 
 
 A Crystal Age : a Romance of the Future. Jiy W. H. Hudson.
 
 lo DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 
 
 The Readers' Library — continued 
 
 Green Mansions. A Romance of the Tropical Forest. By W. H. 
 Hudson. 
 
 The Purple Land. By W. H. Hudson. 
 
 The Critical Attitude. By Ford Madox Hueffir. 
 
 The Heart of the Country. By Ford Madox HuefFer. 
 
 The Soul of London. By Ford Madox Hueffer. 
 
 The Spirit of the People. By Ford Madox Hueffer. 
 
 After London— Wild England. By Richard Jefferies. 
 
 Amaryllis at the Fair. By Richard Jefferies. 
 
 Bevis. The Story of a Boy. By Richard Jefferies. 
 
 The Hills and the Vale. Nature Essays. By Richard Jefferies. 
 
 The Greatest Life. An inquiry into the foundations of character. 
 By Gerald Leighton, M.D. 
 
 St Augustine and his Age. An Interpretation. By Joseph McCabe. 
 
 Between the Acts. By H. W. Nevinson. 
 
 Essays in Freedom. By H. W. Nevinson. 
 
 Principle in Art : Religio Poet^. By Coventry Patmore. 
 
 Parallel Paths. A Study in Biology, Ethics, and Art. By T. W. 
 Rolleston. 
 
 The Strenuous Life, and other Essays. By Theodore Roosevelt. 
 
 English Literature and Society in the Eighteenth Century. 
 By Sir Leslie Stephen. 
 
 Studies of a Biographer. First Series. Two Volumes. By Sir 
 Leslie Stephen. 
 
 Studies of a Biographer. Second Series. Two Volumes. By Sir 
 Leslie Stephen. 
 
 The Black Monk, and other Tales. By Anton Tchekoff. 
 
 Interludes. By Sir Geo. Trevelyan. 
 
 Essays on Dante. By Dr Carl Witte. \ 
 
 THE ROADMENDER SERIES. 
 
 The volumes in the series are works with the same tendency 
 as Michael Fairless's remarkable book, from which the 
 series gets its name : books which express a deep feeling 
 for Nature, and a mystical interpretation of life. Fcap. 
 8vo, with designed end papers. 2S. td. net.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES ii 
 
 The Roadmender Series — continued 
 
 Women of the Country. By Gertrude Bone, 
 
 The Sea Charm of Venice. By Stopford A. Brooke. 
 
 Magic Casements. By Arthur S. Cripps. 
 
 A Martyr's Servant. By Arthur S. Cripps. 
 
 Thoughts of Leonardo da Vinci. Selected by Edward McCurdy. 
 
 The Roadmender. By Michael Fairless. Also in limp lambskin, 
 3^. 6a. Persian yapp, i,s. net. Velvet calf yapp, ^s. net. Illus- 
 trated Edition with Black and White Illustrations by W. G. Mein, 
 cr. Svo, 55. net. Also Special Illus*lrated edition in colour from oil 
 paintings by E. W. Waite, 7^. 6d. net. Edition de Luxe, 151. net. 
 
 The Gathering of Brother Hilarius. By Michael Fairless. 
 Also limp lambskin, 35. dd. net. Persian yapp, 4-?. net. Velvet 
 calf yapp, 5^. net. 
 
 Also a Special Illustrated Edition in Colour from Paintings by Elinor 
 Fortescue Brickdale. 75. dd, net. 
 
 The Grey Brethren. By Michael Fairless. Also limp lambskin, 
 35. 6a'. net. Persian yapp, \s. net. Velvet calf yapp, 51. net. 
 
 A Special Illustrated Edition of the Children's Stories, which appear 
 in The Grey Brethren, is published under the title of "Stories Told 
 to Children." The Illustrations in Colour are from Drawings by 
 Flora White. 
 
 Michael Fairless : Life and Writings. By W. Scott Palmer 
 and A. M. Haggard. Also persian yapp, ^s. net. 
 
 A Modern Mystic's Way. By Wm. Scott Palmer. 
 
 From the Forest. By Wm. Scott Palmer. 
 
 Pilgrim Man. By Wm. Scott Palmer. 
 
 Winter and Spring. By Wm. Scott Palmer. 
 
 The Plea of Pan. By H. W. Nevinson, author of " Essays in 
 Freedom," "Between the Acts." 
 
 Bedesman 4. By Mary J. H. Skrine. 
 
 Vagrom Men. By A. T. Story. 
 
 Light and Twilight. By Edward Thomas. 
 
 Rest and Unrest. By Edward Thomas. 
 
 Rose Acre Papers : Hor/e SolitarI/^?. By Edward Thomas. 
 
 SOCIAL QUESTIONS SERIES. 
 
 Makers of Our Clothes. A Case for Trade Boards. By Miss 
 Clementina Black and Lady Carl Meyer. Demy 8vo. 55. net.
 
 12 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 
 
 Social Questions Series — continued 
 
 SwK\TED Industry and the Minimum Wage. By Clementina 
 Black. With Preface by A. G. Gardiner. Cloth, crown %vo. 
 2s. net. 
 
 Women in Industry: From Seven Points of View. With 
 Introduction by D. J. Shackleton. Cloth, crown Svo. 2s. net. 
 
 The Worker's Handbook. By Gertrude M. Tuckwell. A hand- 
 book of legal and general information for the Clergy, for District 
 Visitors, and all Social Workers. Cr. Svo. 2s. net. 
 
 STORIES OF ANIMAL LIFE, Etc. 
 
 Illustrated by Charles Livingston Bull. 
 
 Uniform binding. Large crown Zvo. 6s, 
 
 Under the Roof of the Jungle. A Book of Animal Life 
 in the Guiana Wilds. Written and illustrated by Charles 
 Livingston Bull. With 6o full-page plates drawn from 
 Life by the Author. 
 
 The Kindred of the Wild. A Book of Animal Life. By 
 Charles G. D. Roberts, Professor of Literature, Toronto 
 University, late Deputy-Keeper of Woods and Forests, 
 Canada. With many illustrations by Charles Livingston 
 Bull. 
 
 The Watchers of the Trails. A Book of Animal Life. 
 By Charles G. D. Roberts. With 48 illustrations by 
 Charles Livingston Bull. 
 
 The Story of Red Fox. A Biography. By Charles G. D. 
 Roberts. Illustrated by Charles Livingston Bull. 
 
 The Haunters of the Silences. A Book of Wild Nature. 
 By Charles G. D. Roberts. Illustrated by Charles 
 Livingston Bull. 
 
 Plantation Stories. By Andrews Wilkinson. Illustrated 
 by Charles Livingston Bull.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 13 
 
 STUDIES IN THEOLOGY 
 
 A New Series of Handbooks, being aids to interpretation in 
 Biblical Criticism for the use of the Clergy, Divinity 
 Students, and Laymen. Cr. 8vo. 2s. 6d. net a volume. 
 
 The ENVIRONM2NT OF Early Christianity. By the Rev. Professor 
 Samuel Angus, Professor of New Testament Historical Theology 
 in St Andrew's College, University of Sydney. Cr. Sfo. 2s. 6d. net. 
 
 Christianity and Ethics. By the Rev. Archibald B. D. Alexander, 
 M.A., D.D., author of "A Short History of Philosophy," "The 
 Ethics of St Paul." 
 
 The Christian Hope. A Study in the Doctrine of the Last Things. 
 By W. Adams Brown, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Theology in the 
 Union College, New York. 
 
 Christianity and Social Questions. By the Rev. William 
 Cunningham, D.D., F.B.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cam- 
 bridge, Hon. Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, 
 Archdeacon of Ely, formerly Lecturer on Economic History to 
 Harvard University. 
 
 A Handbook of Christian Apologetics. By the Rev. A. E. 
 Garvie, M.A., Hon. D.D., Glasgow University, Principal of New 
 College, Hampstead. 
 
 A Critical Introduction to the Old Testament. By the Rev. 
 George Buchanan Gray, M.A., D. Litt., Professor of Hebrew and 
 Old Testament Exegesis in Mansfield College, Oxford. 
 
 Gospel Origins. A Study in the Synoptic Problem. By the Rev. 
 William West Holdsworth, M.A., Tutor in New Testament 
 Language and Literature, Hands worth College ; author of "The 
 Christ of the Gospels," " The Life of Faith," etc. 
 
 Faith and its Psychology. By the Rev. William R. Inge, D.D., 
 Dean of St Paul's, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Cam- 
 bridge, and Bampton Lecturer, Oxford, 1899. 
 
 Christianity and Sin. By the Rev. Robert Mackintosh, M.A., 
 D.D., Professor of Apologetics in Lancashire Independent 
 College ; Lecturer in the University of Manchester. 
 
 Protestant Thought before Kant. By A. C. McGiffert, Ph.D., 
 D.D., of the Union Theological Seminary, New York. 
 
 The Theology of the Gospels. By the Rev. James Moffat, B.D., 
 D.D., of the U.F. Church of Scotland, sometime Jowett Lecturer, 
 London, author of "The Historical New Testament."
 
 14 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 
 
 Studies in Theology — continued 
 
 A History of Christian Thought since Kant. By the Rev. 
 Edward Caldwell Moore, D.D., Parkman Professor of Theology 
 in the University of Harvard, U.S.A., author of "The New 
 Testament in the Christian Church," etc. 
 
 Revelation and Inspiration. By the Rev. James Orr, D.D., 
 Professoi of Apologetics in the Theological College of the United 
 Free Church, Glasgow. 
 
 A Critical Introduction to the New Testament. By Arthur 
 Samuel Peake, D.D., Professor of Biblical Exegesis and Dean of 
 the Faculty of Theology, Victoria University, Manchester ; some- 
 time Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. 
 
 Philosophy and Religion. By the Rev. Hastings Rashdall, 
 D.Litt. (Oxon.), D.C.L. (Durham), F.B.A., Fellow and Tutor 
 of New College, Oxford. 
 
 The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament. By the Rev. H, 
 Wheeler Robinson, M.A., Tutor in Rawdon College; sometime 
 Senior Kennicott Scholar in Oxford University. 
 
 Text and Canon of the New Testament. By Alexander Souter, 
 M.A., D.Litt, Professor of Humanity at Aberdeen University. 
 
 The Christian Doctrine of God. By W. R. Thomson, D.D. 
 
 Christian Thought to the Reformation. By Herbert B. 
 Workman, M.A., D.Litt., Principal of the Westminster Training 
 College. 
 
 THE WINDERMERE SERIES OF COLOUR BOOKS. 
 
 A New Series of Standard Books, well illustrated in colour, 
 bound in cloth with picture wrapper in colour, designed 
 end-papers. Illustrated by Milo Winter and by Hope 
 Dunlop. Cover design by Charles Robinson. Royal 
 '^vo. Cloth gilt. Picture wrappers in colour, ^s. net. 
 
 The Arabian Nights. Gulliver's Travels. 
 
 Robinson Crusoe. Hawthorne's Wonder Book. 
 
 Grimm's Fairy Tales. Tanglewood Tales.
 
 DUCKWORTH & CO.'S LIBRARIES AND SERIES 15 
 
 The " Story Box " Series of Books for Children. 
 Stories 01 Wonder and Fancy. With Illustrations in 
 Full Colour and in Line, From 12 to 16 Illustrations 
 in each Volume. Boards, with coloured cover inset, 
 picture end-papers, attractive wrapper. Sqtmre cr. "^vo. 
 IS. net a volume. 
 
 The Buccaneers. By A. E. Bonsor. 
 
 The Fortunate Princeling. By A. D. Bright. 
 
 Wanted a King. By Maggie Browne. 
 
 The Enchanted Wood. By S. H. Hamer. 
 
 The Four Glass Balls. By S. H. Ilamer. 
 
 Peter Pink Eye. By S. H. Hamer. 
 
 The Adventures of Spider & Co. By S. H. Hamer. 
 
 Gervas and the Magic Castle, By B. S. Harvey. 
 
 The Magic Dragon. By B. S. Harvey. 
 
 The Little Maid who Danced. By Helena Nyblom. 
 
 The Strange Little Girl. By B. Sidney Woolf. 
 
 Golden House. By B. Sidney Woolf. 
 
 Duckworth & Co.'s Shilling Net Series 
 
 The Brassbounder : A Tale of the Sea. By David W. Bone. 
 Cloth. With picture jacket by E. F. Hodgson. 
 
 Wrack : A Tale of the Sea. By Maurice Drake. Cloth. With 
 picture jacket by E. F. Hodgson. 
 
 Beyond The Rocks. By Elinor Glyn. Picture Paper Covers. 
 
 The Reason Why. By Elinor Glyn. Picture Paper Covers. 
 
 The Visits of Elizabeth. By Elinor Glyn. Picture Paper Covers. 
 
 Vicissitudes of Evangeline. By Elinor Glyn. Picture Paper 
 
 Covers. 
 When the Hour Came. By Elinor Glyn. Picture Paper Covers. 
 Scottish Stories. By R. B. Cunninghame Graham. Cloth. 
 South American Sketches. By W. IL Hudson. Cloth. 
 
 Sahib Log: An Anglo-Indian Tale. By John Travers. Picture 
 Paper Covers.
 
 BOOKS ON APPROVAL 
 
 Messrs DUCKWORTH l'. CO.'s Publications may be obtained 
 
 through any good bookseller. Anyone desiring to examine a. 
 
 volume should order it subject to approval. The bookseller can 
 
 obtain it from the publishers on this condition. 
 
 The following Special Lists and Catalogues will be sent 
 Post Free on request to any address : — 
 
 A LIST OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
 A GENERAL CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS 
 
 A COLOURED PROSPECTUS OF NEW ILLUSTRATED 
 CHILDREN'S BOOKS 
 
 A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF "THE READERS' LIBRARY" 
 
 A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF "MASTERS OF PAINTING," 
 "THE LIBRARY OF ART," "THE POPULAR 
 LIBRARY OF ART " 
 
 A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF "THE CROWN LIBRARY" 
 
 A LIST OF THEOLOGICAL WORKS 
 
 A LIST OF MODERN PLAYS 
 
 DUCKWORTH & COMPANY 
 3 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON
 
 a 
 
 3 5 
 / 7 / ^i 
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 Santa Barbara 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 ■«T7«tf3E|TrfBELOW. 
 
 "1 
 
 a. 
 
 I 
 
 fioi-ioQ Qd so
 
 !• ]| 
 
 'llil Ijiilifi 1 iiiiil!