B 
 
 B W BW WU WBBMBB8atHw 
 
 JgjflfflO 
 
 WIlMtl lUilMW'*"*™ 
 
 «l 
 
 
 HI 
 
 ttis 
 
 nmmK 
 
 HDnnnBinPwQl iiauiDiDDQnflHDlDDiDBMDO 
 
 BntHHHnHBEa m& 
 
 'SBsBBbSSmEugb KhNHH ?HhSs«5S! 
 
 BSflBSRSRHPI 
 
 iil i apM B i tawawjw 
 
 '.•-■■•■■• 
 
 g MWMBlBBDIIMll MW OOQQ O W QBP a ooCi KHZ 
 HBHStBBWWHtltW>C O ftCMBQ» «><W 
 
 ■«■— —■ 
 
 MMHMMNHIHHfflHklMHMII 
 jmi wbBWBwBIBI 
 
 ."..'-■•-•■' bhor BnnfttsmoS 
 
 0OQO00O O 00OC0M0W 
 
 ll 
 
 S8«8»hB BfflS 
 wwwwwB BHL 
 
 „ -HMJIHlWfl«M W
 
 o vwsava vinvs « 
 
 < 
 
 2 
 
 o 
 
 M 
 
 o THE UBRARV OF o 
 
 ifiifc. 
 
 » the university o 
 
 M£
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
 
 OF THE WORK OF 
 
 COUNT PH. DE SEGUR.
 
 LONDON: 
 PIUNTED BY G SCHULZE, 13, POLAND STREET.
 
 °S<j 
 
 NAPOLEON 
 
 'At-fl •*-* «~- A " D C^o" * «- " * 
 
 THE GRAND ARMY 
 
 IN RUSSIA, 
 
 OR A 
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
 
 OF THF WORK OF 
 
 COUNT PH. DE SEGUR, 
 
 l!Y 
 
 GENERAL GOURGAUD, 
 
 LATE FRINCIPAL ORDERLY OFFICER AND AID-DE-CAMP TO THE 
 EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 
 
 •' Render to Cesar the thing! that are Cesar's.' 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 MARTIN BOSSANGE AND Co., 14, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET; 
 AND G. B. WHITTTAKER, AVE MARIA LANK 
 
 1825.
 
 ■ 
 
 23 
 
 S 4- &* 1 3 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 Four editions of the work we are about to exa- 
 mine have already appeared, and our remarks 
 upon it, though long since prepared, are only now 
 emerging from the port-folio. Why has their 
 publication been so long delayed ? and why are 
 they published now ? To these enquiries, which 
 the reader may not unreasonably make, we will 
 reply in a few words. 
 
 The size of Mr. de Segur's work, its high price, 
 the portraits and embellishments which have been 
 successively added to it, seemed to warrant the 
 belief that its circulation would be confined to a 
 class of readers who, by their acquaintance with 
 the men and facts treated of, would be enabled to 
 judge of it correctly for themselves. We had re- 
 marked also, that those journals which had spoken 
 of it in the most flattering terms, had examined it 
 chiefly in a literary point of view : that they com- 
 pared it to the fictions of the illustrious Scotchman ; 
 that, in reading the History of the Grand Army, 
 
 (i
 
 11 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 the name of Walter Scott had spontaneously pro- 
 ceeded from their pen. This species of merit, as- 
 cribed to Mr. de Segur, was not what we were 
 desirous of disputing. It signified but little that 
 his work was greater than the Iliad; that the 
 quorum pars magna fui had been applied to him, 
 as if to a marshal of the empire ; that he was ex- 
 tolled for having forgotten nothing connected with 
 that momentous period but his own services ; the 
 irony was too evident to require notice. The 
 public, to whom the four editions had been pre- 
 sented, was, by that very means, put upon its 
 guard ; and could hardly take for a history, what 
 was offered to it only as a romance. 
 
 But we have just learned that a fifth edition is 
 preparing ; that it will be of small size, without 
 ornament, and of such a price as to put it within 
 the reach of those numerous classes which are too 
 far removed from the sphere of the events re- 
 corded, not to be drawn into errors which the 
 readers of the first editions must have escaped. 
 We have, therefore, thought it incumbent upon 
 us to present the public with our labors ; which, 
 however imperfect they may be, will no longer 
 be without utility. 
 
 An analagous case presents itself to our mind.
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 1JJ 
 
 Courtilz tie Sandras published (in French) to- 
 wards the end of the 17th century : The conduct 
 of France since the peace of Nimeguen ; The Life of 
 Coligny ; Memoirs of Count De Rochfort; The 
 History of the War with Holland from 1 672 to 1677 ; 
 The Life of Marshal De Turenne ; 6fc. Sfc. fyc. 
 " His prolific and frivolous pen, says the Nouveau 
 " Dictionnaire his torique, produced a multitude of 
 " novels published under the designation of his- 
 " tories, which were the more mischievous be- 
 " cause the fictions he invented passed for realities 
 " by virtue of a little truth with which he blend- 
 " ed them." 
 
 These tales acquired a remarkable degree of 
 celebrity. For a long time no one condescended 
 to refute them ; and Sandras was even looked up 
 to as an authority. 
 
 " His name is mentioned here, merely for the 
 " purpose of warning Frenchmen as well as 
 
 " foreigners against relying upon these 
 
 " fictions under the appellation of history." — 
 (Voltaire, Siecle de Louis XIV.) 
 
 The parallel is obvious : we shall add nothing 
 to what we have quoted. 
 
 a 1
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
 
 OF THE WORK OF 
 
 COUNT PH. DE SEGUR. 
 
 A man who is about to write a history, should, 
 after having made himself thoroughly master of 
 his subject, and even before the plan of his work is 
 fixed, collect from the aggregate mass of facts 
 he is about to record, the moral tendency of his 
 book ; unless, indeed, he proposes to adapt those 
 facts to a particular purpose. And those readers 
 who intend to form a judgment of his work, 
 should endeavor to make out which of these two 
 courses the author has pursued. 
 
 Mr. de Segur's predominant object is rendered 
 manifest by his very first chapter. He is about 
 to exhibit Napoleon engaged in the vast project of 
 making himself sole master of Europe. It matters 
 not to him that, by this imputation, he be- 
 comes the echo of those superficial and male- 
 volent spirits who have judged a great man after
 
 VI CRITICAL EXAMINATION. 
 
 his fall ; or of those enemies who, during his 
 prosperity, used it as a weapon for his destruction . 
 He is sure of pleasing one of those classes of per- 
 sons, and of not displeasing the other. He flatters 
 party spirit, and contemporaneous mediocrity : he 
 will be read, and admired. 
 
 This is not all. After exhibiting so great, so 
 imiversal a genius, as wantonly involving himself 
 in a mad enterprize, he will endeavor to prove 
 that, if his temerity was not crowned with success, 
 the cause of his failure is to be found in the prema- 
 ture decay of his health ; and that the great man 
 was an ambitious mortal who grasped at more 
 than the physical powers of his nature enabled 
 him to secure. Such is the author's object. 
 
 As for his plan, we flatter ourselves with being 
 able to shew that he has none : that he writes al- 
 most at random ; blending unconnected facts, and 
 relating them without order; confounding with the 
 events of one epoch, those belonging to another; 
 disdaining to justify his accusations or his praises; 
 adopting without examination, and without that 
 spirit of criticism so indispensable to the historian, 
 the false views of prejudice, of rivalry, orof enmity, 
 and the exagerations of spleen or malevolence ;
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION. VI i 
 
 ascribing actions to some, and words to others, 
 equally incompatible with their situations and 
 characters ; quoting- no witnesses but himself, 
 and no authority but that of his own assertions. 
 
 He treats, both successively and conjointly, of 
 politics and of military facts. 
 
 Politics ! who made him acquainted with them ? 
 A stranger to public affairs, having never ap- 
 proached the cabinet, the council, or the states- 
 men of the day, with whom his duties at head- 
 quarters never connected him, — whence did he 
 derive his information ? From the pamphlets or 
 the conversations of Napoleon's detractors. 
 
 As for the military facts, they consist of a series 
 of inaccurate statements ; distorted pictures; lit- 
 tle anecdotes, for the most part fabricated ; and 
 of copies, often literal, of writings almost invari- 
 ably dictated by malevolence. 
 
 It is true, that it would be unreasonable to 
 require from Mr. de Segur, in a military point of 
 view, more than his book affords. He certainly 
 holds the rank and title of general ; but how 
 should he have acquired the experience of one ? 
 Each successive step in rank he obtained by the 
 exercise of civil functions, to which the usages of 
 the palace annexed embroideries and epaulettes.
 
 Mil CRITICAL EXAMINATION. 
 
 Originally Adjoint to the Adjudans du palais* he 
 became Marechal-des-logis when this new title 
 was applied to the office he held :-f he exercised 
 no other during the Russian campaign, and filled 
 it jointly with Mr. Ernest de Canouville, Auditeur 
 au Conseil d'etat. Mr. de Segur, who from being 
 colonel of light-horse in the parisian national 
 guard, had become a Mareckal de camp£ dis- 
 continued, it is true, on his return from Russia, 
 his duties of Marechal-des-logis, but did not, on 
 that account, enter upon active military service. 
 He was nominated gouverneur des pages, a civil em- 
 ployment which had nothing military about it but 
 the dress. Being afterwards entrusted with the 
 organization of a regiment of gardes d'lwnneur 
 forming at Tours, he was indebted to that cir- 
 cumstance for the advantage of making the cam- 
 paign of 1814 with that corps, and of having an 
 opportunity of tendering the fidelity of his guards 
 to the Prince of Benevento (Talleyrand), whilst 
 the Emperor was yet at Fontainebleau.^ 
 
 * 6th October, 1802. 
 f 24th September, 1806. 
 % 22nd. February, 1812. 
 
 § Extract of Mr. de Segur' s letter to the provisional government. 
 
 " I, this day, offer my 1,600 guards, and myself to the 
 
 " successor and descendant of the kings oi' my ancestors. — I
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION. IX 
 
 The foregoing details are by no means superflu- 
 ous. A new generation which had but just 
 emerged from childhood, when the days of our 
 glory terminated, and the court party for whom 
 that glory has been but an annoyance, on reading 
 on the title page of a work, upon which the jour- 
 nals lavished their fulsome encomiums before it 
 had any other reader : by General Count de 
 Segur, may have concluded that the general who 
 had thus exalted himself into a judge of the great 
 man, had fought by his side ; whilst he was in 
 fact only employed in preparing his lodgings. — 
 They may have regarded him as the competitor or 
 rival, or at least as the comrade of those old 
 generals whose blood and whose atchievements 
 during the last thirty years have rendered so 
 many fields of battle illustrious. They may have 
 taken him, upon his word, for one of those vete- 
 rans of the grand army whom he has designated 
 as his companions in his dedication ; without con- 
 sidering how very slender are his claims to a 
 connection with that illustrious fraternity. It is 
 useful to apprize the readers of Mr. de Segur, that 
 
 " swear fidelity to him, in the name of my officers, of all my 
 " guards, and in my own name, which is a security for my oath." 
 Moniteur of Monday, i \ih April, lssi i.
 
 X CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
 
 his pen is not that of a military character ; although 
 his sword, on the few occasions upon which it lias 
 seen the light, has been that of a brave soldier : 
 and it is but just to absolve him from the blame 
 of numerous errors which a more experienced 
 officer would not have committed. 
 
 But it may perhaps be asked whether the 
 military knowledge in which Mr. de Segur is so 
 deficient, might not have been supplied to him 
 by his situation at head-quarters, and by the con- 
 nection with the public service in which he was 
 placed by the civil duties he had to perform dur- 
 ing the campaign of 1812? In order to reply to 
 this question, which has been already touched 
 upon, we will in a few words explain the nature 
 of those duties. 
 
 On commencing a march, the marechal-des-logis 
 received from the grand-mar echal du palais or his 
 representative, instructions to precede the arrival 
 of the imperial head-quarters at the point where 
 they were to be established. There, having under 
 his orders two quarter-masters, who constituted 
 the entire personnel under his command, he cau- 
 sed the lodgings of the Emperor and his suite to 
 be prepared ; superintended the departments of 
 health, of the table, of the offices, and of the
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION. XI 
 
 stables. These duties fulfilled, M. le Comte de 
 Segur had an opportunity of observing, during 
 his leisure hours, what general officers arrived at, 
 or quitted the imperial head-quarters ; of collect- 
 ing the various reports that were circulated, and 
 the conjectures that were formed among the offi- 
 cers sent upon or returning from missions ; and 
 of noting down the conversations, more or less 
 animated, and the frequently indiscreet clamors 
 of the salon de service, where many officers sola- 
 ced themselves for the fatigues of the day, by vent- 
 ing their spleen upon both men and things. 
 These then are Mr. de Segur's witnesses, his au- 
 thorities, and the sources from which he has de- 
 rived his information. A circumstance which has 
 led a very clever man to describe his book as the 
 written record of the gossip of head-quarters. 
 
 So important and difficult an expedition as thai 
 to Russia required for its historian a man, who, 
 possessing discernment as well as an accurate 
 knowledge of facts, should have been inaccessible 
 to all foreign influence ; who, placing himself in 
 an independent situation, should have seen no- 
 thing but the times and circumstances of which 
 he had to treat ; and who should have been ca- 
 pable of rising superior to the effect of any new
 
 Xll CRITICAL EXAMINATION. 
 
 relation in which he might be placed. Being 
 destitute of these indispensable qualifications, Mr. 
 de Segur has merely succeeded in producing an ill- 
 digested romance, which he has embellished with 
 the title of a history. Dazzled by the success of 
 his own sounding phrases, he has overlooked the 
 inconsistencies into which he has fallen. That 
 grand army, with whose glory the young veteran 
 aspires to connect himself, appears beneath his 
 pen but as a horde of pillagers. The great man, 
 whose grateful admirer he would wish to be 
 thought, and who lavished upon his grandfather, 
 upon his father, and upon himself the treasures 
 of his favor and munificence # , is a madman 
 blindly rushing upon his own destruction. That 
 stupendous genius who invested his own head 
 with so many laurels, and signalized his name by 
 the reconciliation of parties, and by the general 
 prosperity of the country, is represented as a weak, 
 uncertain, irresolute being, without energy or 
 
 * M. Phillipe de Segur was presented by the Emperor, on 
 the 24th September 1806, with an annuity of 10,000 francs 
 upon the great book, on the occasion of his marriage. 
 
 The isth August 1809, presented with a further annuity of 
 10,000 francs. 
 
 The 1st January 1812, a further gratification of 4000 francs, 
 &c.
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION. Xlll 
 
 courage, borne down by fatigue and disease, and 
 who died before his time ! ! 
 
 However, in a few months he repaired all his 
 losses ; his creative hand reorganized that army 
 which, under his command, was victorious at 
 Lutzen, Bautzen, and Dresden. Reduced still 
 more recently to a small number of brave fol- 
 lowers, he kept in check, on the plains of Cham- 
 pagne, the combined forces of all Europe ; and 
 when at length he fell, through treachery, it was to 
 the sound of the cry of victory at Champ-Aubert 
 and Montmirail. A year had scarcely elapsed 
 from the time of his fall, when he re-established 
 himself by an enterprise, of which the conception 
 as well as the execution will be the amazement of 
 future ages. But, again forsaken by fortune, he 
 for six years presented to the world, upon the rock 
 of St. Helena, a memorable example of heroic 
 firmness, and a character invincible. 
 
 Will Mr. de Segur inform us, by what miracle it 
 occurred that this extraordinary man, whom he 
 has described as already in a state of decrepitude, 
 still preserved that energy and power, which were 
 so long afterwards the terror and admiration of his 
 enemies ? Had he written such things immediate- 
 ly upon his return from the Russian campaign,
 
 XIV CRITICAL EXAMINATION. 
 
 the circumstance might have been attributed to 
 the influence of a disordered imagination, and of a 
 gloomy, spirit excited by the aspect of such great 
 disasters as had just occurred : had he written them 
 directly after the events of 1813, 1814, and 1815, 
 he would already have been inexcusable : and it 
 is in 1825 that his work appears ! If he had 
 published, before the death of the hero, his book, 
 greeted as it is by a host of ephemeral suffrages, 
 doubtlessly an eloquent protest against it, arising 
 from the midst of the Atlantic, would have thrown 
 an overwhelming counterpoise into the balance ; 
 and posterity, which will preserve the recollec- 
 tion of Napoleon's words as well as of his actions, 
 posterity, we say, with which the Historian of the 
 Grand Army will have no accounts to settle, 
 would one day have known that the author and 
 the work had existed. Mr. de Segurhas, however, 
 shrunk from this kind of celebrity : and our criti- 
 cisms will not obtain it for him. It is to our con- 
 temporaries only that we aspire to address our- 
 selves. 
 
 Having held the appointment of orderly officer 
 to the Emperor during the campaign of 1812, the 
 orders we had occasion to transmit, the discussions 
 at which we were present, have left us in posses-
 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION. XV 
 
 sion of abundant reminiscences ; but it was most 
 especially at St. Helena that we had facilities of 
 collecting historical documents. There, we lived 
 for three years, in the habitual contemplation 
 of the past ; there, we were enabled to collect 
 from the conversations of the great man, to whose 
 intimacy we were admitted, the most valuable 
 information. 
 
 By these considerations, and still more by our 
 admiration of the Emperor, we have been induced 
 to undertake the present work. It is surely fit- 
 ting, when a detractor presumes upon the silence 
 of the grave, that one voice at least, however 
 feeble it may be, should proclaim the accents of 
 truth. 
 
 M e have also had recourse to the memory of 
 our friends, and have been especially assisted in 
 our labor by a man, who, occupying a place in 
 the cabinet of the Emperor, from the peace of 
 Amiens till the conclusion of his reign, was con- 
 stantly honored with his confidence. 
 
 •to "j
 
 NOTE. 
 
 This Critical Examination ivas made upon the first 
 edition of Mr. de Segur's work : our subdivision into Books 
 and Chapters has reference to his.
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 CHAFFER I. 
 
 The author of the pretended History of Napo- 
 leon and of the Grand Army commences by a se- 
 rious error, and a gratuitous supposition. 
 
 " The Emperor had, by the treaty of Tilsit 
 4C attacked the honor and the interest of Russia." 
 
 If Count de Segur had read this treaty, he 
 would have seen that never was victory less 
 abused. Russia had been thrown back upon her 
 own territory, part of whose inhabitants had 
 hailed our approach. She issued from a disastrous 
 contest, a greater and a more powerful nation 
 than at its commencement ; to the moderation of 
 the Emperor Napoleon she was indebted for the 
 glory of having re-established a kingdom of Prus- 
 sia after it had entirely disappeared. In what 
 way then had the honor of Russia received a blow 
 from the treaty of Tilsit r 
 
 B
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 As to her interests, she judged rightly that they 
 would suffer by the adoption of the continental 
 system ; but she also judged that the continental 
 system was the only means of forcing a peace 
 upon England ; and as the interest of Russia was 
 in a peace, upon this interest she rested her stipu- 
 lations at Tilsit. " I am no less the enemy of 
 England than you are," was the expression of 
 Alexander to Napoleon, when he entered the bark 
 on the Niemen. This feeling instantly brought 
 the two sovereigns together ; and the peace was 
 concluded. 
 
 " France had alienated from herself the nations 
 " of Europe by her conquests, and the monarchs 
 ". by her revolution and her new dynasty." 
 
 Italy, Belgium, the Rhenish provinces enjoyed 
 the benefits of her administration ; the inhabitants 
 of those countries still feel an attachment to what 
 has been left untouched by the policy of their so- 
 vereigns. 
 
 With respect to the revolution, it was not the 
 act of Napoleon. He had reconciled the monarchs 
 to its results ; this could never have been achiev- 
 ed by the republic. The Emperor and the new 
 dynasty had calmed the fears they entertained of 
 the destruction of the monarchical system in 
 Europe, a destruction which the republic had 
 proclaimed. This and the following assertion, 
 that France could no longer look forward to have 
 friends, but merely subjects, have for a tendency to
 
 CHAPTER I. $ 
 
 establish, at the very outset, that Napoleon could 
 rest his power upon nothing short of universal 
 dominion ; a false imputation (be it said by the 
 way, and once for all) the injustice of which has 
 already been partly attested by the experience of 
 the last ten years, and by the working of time 
 that moderates the violence of the passions, and 
 removes all obscurity from truth. We begin to 
 blush at being the echo of foreign cabinets who 
 have designedly filled Europe with their clamors 
 against the ambition of Napoleon, because he 
 used every means at his command towards de- 
 fending and securing France against their own 
 ambition, a duty which the revolution had be- 
 queathed to him. The Emperor had recourse to 
 war for the purpose of forcing a peace upon Eng- 
 land ; and England, in order to keep up the war, 
 excited against him the continental sovereigns. 
 Subsidized by her gold, they became her mere 
 instruments. 
 
 Was Napoleon to remain upon the defensive 
 with means inadequate to repel the attack ? In so 
 doing he would have betrayed the national hopes, 
 and compromised the glory and the prosperity 
 that had been confided to his safeguard. Wield- 
 ing as a man of genius the resources which France 
 placed at his disposal, he triumphed over her 
 enemies, who could not forgive his having raised 
 her to so elevated a rank, though they concealed 
 their resentment under an exterior of submission. 
 In order to secure the future welfare of the nation; 
 
 b 2
 
 4 BO O K 1. 
 
 it became necessary for Napoleon to obtain the 
 pledges of peace, and the means of effecting inter- 
 changes on the occurrence of that event, whilst he 
 deprived his enemies of the power of annoying 
 him. " \apoleon had so much difficulty in con- 
 " cealing this gigantic project (of universal mo- 
 " narchy), that hints of it began to escape him in 
 " all directions." 
 
 There is much of the imposing in the descrip- 
 tion of the immense preparations called for by so 
 gigantic an undertaking ; but no period is as- 
 signed for its being carried into effect. A con- 
 clusion might be drawn from this, that Russia 
 had until then felt perfectly secure, in the faithful 
 performance on her own part of the conditions of 
 the treaty, and experienced no anticipation of the 
 storm which was gathering around her ; whereas 
 it is established, by the admission of Colonel Bou- 
 tourlin, aid-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander, 
 in his History of the Campaign of 1812, that Rus- 
 sia was the first to make preparations for war.* 
 
 * " Austria did not stir ; Prussia no longer existed ; the 
 " Swedes too weak to afford their allies any assistance, could 
 " with difficulty maintain themselves in Stralsund. England, 
 " placed in difficult circumstances, did not seem disposed to 
 " carry on the war with activity. These considerations induced 
 " the Emperor of Russia to urge a reconciliation with the ene- 
 " my. The famous interview upon the Niemen terminated in 
 " the treaty of peace signed at Tilsit." (Page 21 of the first 
 volume of the Military History of the Russian Campaign in 
 1812, by Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp of his Majesty the
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 After having dwelt upon the necessity of an 
 alliance with Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and 
 Turkey, Mr.de Segur goes on to say: Austria 
 voluntarily entered into his plans ; she however did 
 not act blindly. She plunged into them with 
 
 Emperor of Russia, Paris, 1824.) " The Emperor Alexander 
 " could not but be aware of the spirit that guided those dispo- 
 " sitions (of the treaty of Tilsit) ; but in the unfortunate cir- 
 " cumstances in which Europe was involved, it behoved him at 
 11 all hazards to avoid a war. The essential object was to gain 
 " the necessary time for preparing to maintain with due effect 
 *' a struggle, which it was well known might recommence at a 
 " future period." (Vol. i. page 24.) 
 
 " The sacrifices which the treaty of Presburg had exacted 
 " from Austria were too oppressive to be patiently borne by the 
 " cabinet of Vienna. But the disorganized state of her armies, 
 " an unavoidable consequence of the repeated checks they had 
 " suffered, had until then prevented her from attempting torea_ 
 " lize the plans which she secretly cherished. The Empero r 
 " Napoleon was sincere in his wish of avoiding a fresh war that 
 " would have operated as an untoward diversion in Spain. But 
 " all the steps which he took to bring about a reconciliation 
 " were considered by the Austrians as an avowal of his weak- 
 " ness. She (Russia) could not refuse her aid to France, with- 
 " out an open violation of the engagements entered into with 
 " that empire, the sacredness of which had received from Na- 
 11 poleon no infraction. Supposing, however, that the cabinet 
 " of St. Petersburgh, waving those moral considerations for the 
 " sake of the highest political objects, had decided upon giving 
 " its support to Austria, it could not have accomplished it more 
 " effectually, owing to the distance of its armies then engaged 
 " with the affairs of Sweden and of Turkey." (Vol. i.pagesS5, 
 36, and 37.) "The indications of a coldness that began to 
 " shew itself in the intercourse between France and Russia
 
 6 BOOK I 
 
 the hope of aggrandizing herself.* This was not 
 owing to vague promises, but in consequence of 
 a treaty signed on the 14th of March, 1812. Aus- 
 tria had long felt uneasy at the enormous increase 
 
 " could not escape the Emperor Alexander's penetration .(a) He 
 " felt that the alliance concluded at Tilsit and cemented at Er- 
 " furth, being no longer conducive to Napoleon's interests, 
 '* would not be of long duration. From that time he applied 
 " himself to organizing in secret every means of defence which 
 " the immense resources of his extensive dominions enabled 
 " him to dispose of, in order to maintain a struggle, &c." (Vol.i. 
 page 45.) 
 
 " The cabinet of St. Petersburgh did not disguise from itself 
 " that under these circumstances it ought to use every means of 
 " compelling the Turks to make peace, in order to direct her 
 " undivided exertions to a war on the western frontier of the 
 " empire." (Vol. i. page 46.) 
 
 (a) The only indications of coldness alluded to by Colonel Boutourlin, 
 consist, as he pretends, in the circumstance that Napoleon had felt shocked 
 at the difficulties thrown, at St. Petersburgh, in the way of his marriage 
 with one of the grand duchesses, and anxiously sought an opportunity to 
 revenge himself, by making the Emperor Alexander feel all the weight of 
 his overwhelming power. He alledges no other indication. 
 
 * " We sought it (the alliance of Austria with France), and 
 " have reflected well before bringing it to a conclusion." (Mr. 
 deMetternich's expressions to Mr. Otto, quoted in the dispatch 
 from this ambassador to the minister for Foreign Affairs, dated 
 Vienna, the 15th of February, 1813.) 
 
 " The Emperor Alexander thought it necessary to assume a 
 " defensive attitude without further delay, by collecting the 
 " greater part of his forces upon the western frontier of his em- 
 " pire. A division which had remained in Old Finland, ever 
 " since the last war with Sweden, received orders to march 
 " upon the Dwina. The army of the Danube, which, at the end 
 " of 1810, was nine divisions strong, was reduced to four divi-
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 of the Russian power, and had caused represen- 
 tations to be made at St. Petersburgh on the sub- 
 
 " sions ; the remaining five were marched upon the Upper 
 " Dniester." (Vol. i. pages 56 and 57.) 
 
 " On the day following the signature of the treaty with Prus- 
 " sia, Napoleon sent it to St. Petersburgh, with the proposal of 
 " combining their united endeavors in order to remove the 
 " grounds of the misunderstanding between them." 
 
 "It was too well understood by the Emperor Alexander that 
 " the avowed grievances rested only upon objects of an acces- 
 " sorv nature ; but that the real "rounds of the misunderstand- 
 " ing which divided the two empires, could only be removed by 
 " a recourse to arms." (Vol. i. page 71.) 
 
 " The Emperor Alexander instantly quitted St. Petersburgh, 
 " and repaired to Wilna, at which place the head-quarters of 
 " the grand army were established ; he also sent orders to 
 " Prince Kourakin, the Russian ambassador at Paris, to make 
 " known to the French government that the preservation of 
 " Prussia, and its independence of all political compact directed 
 " against Russia, were the more indispensable to the interests 
 " of the Emperor Alexander, as a solid and permanent good 
 " understanding with France could only be established upon 
 " the basis of there being between her and Russia a neutral 
 " country which would not be under theoccupation of the troops 
 " of either power; that the basis therefore of all negotiation 
 M was to be the formal engagement for an entire evacuation of 
 " the Prussian States, and of all the fortresses in that country, 
 " whatever might have been the period or the grounds of their 
 " occupation by French or allied troops. Russia further de- 
 " manded the reduction of the garrison of Dantzig to the footing 
 M on which it stood previously to the 1st January, 1811." (Vol. i. 
 page 72 and 73.) 
 
 •' Previonsly to his departure for Dresden, Napoleon had sent 
 u his aid-de-camp, General Count Narbonne to Wilna with pro- 
 posals of peace. The answer he brought back to Dresden
 
 8 B O OK I. 
 
 ject of the armaments on her frontiers ; but Rus~ 
 sia had taken her determination ; the remon- 
 strances were not attended to. Austria dissatisfied, 
 entered into a treaty of alliance with Napoleon ; 
 and foreseeing- the possibility that the result of 
 the war might bring about the re-establishment 
 of Poland, she demanded the Illyrian provinces 
 as an indemnity for Gallicia ; this was conceded 
 to her. 
 
 By the same treaty Austria engaged to furnish 
 thirty thousand men. According to Mr. de Segur 
 she clandestinely prepared prudent instructions 
 for their guidance. When a fact of this nature 
 is stated, some proof should be exhibited ; but 
 there exists no other than his bare assertion. 
 The Austrian general may have been instructed 
 to keep as near as possible to Austrian Poland. 
 What would have become of those prudent in- 
 structions, if actuated by a feeling of mistrust so 
 foreign to his nature, Napoleon had brought 
 
 " was, that the Emperor of Russia referred entirely to the com- 
 ** munications made at Paris by his ambassador, and that he 
 " could only consent to treat upon those preliminary conditions." 
 (Vol. i. pages 74 and 75.) 
 
 " The brilliant fetes given on this occasion (the meeting- at 
 " Dresden), continued until the return of Mr. de Narbonne from 
 " Wilna. On the following- day, 1 7 (29) May, Napoleon left 
 " Dresden, and took the road to Thorn, where he arrived the 
 " 24th of the same month (5 June). He resolved not to delay 
 " the campaign any longer, in order not to waste away in fruit* 
 " less negotiations the most favorable season for military ope- 
 rations." (Vol. i. pages 76 and 77.)
 
 CH A PTE R I. 9 
 
 into Russia the corps of prince Schwartzenberg, 
 and left the Polish army in Poland ? No 
 other engagement was entered into than that 
 the Austrian corps should not be divided, and 
 that it should remain under the orders of its 
 own generals, though acknowledging absolute 
 obedience to the immediate orders of the Emperor 
 Napoleon. If a fault was committed in leaving 
 this corps too independent and too near its own 
 frontiers, it was the effect of generosity and of 
 confidence. The same fault might be urged in 
 regard to Prussia ; it proceeded from a kindred 
 principle. 
 
 " The success of the war in no degree depended 
 " on the cession of Gallicia, or the difficulties 
 " arising from the Austrian jealousy of that pos- 
 " session ; Napoleon, consequently, might, on his 
 " entrance into Wilna, have publicly proclaimed 
 " the liberation of the whole of Poland, instead of 
 " betraying the expectations of her people, as- 
 " tonishing and rendering them indifferent by ex- 
 " pressions of wavering import. 
 
 There was no necessity for obviating Austrian 
 jealousy, since the treaty was a formal one, and 
 since Austria had never given a more complete 
 assent. In case the kingdom of Poland should 
 have been re-established, Austria willingly ceded 
 a considerable portion of Gallicia, witli the view 
 of recovering Illyria. The first of these provinces 
 was an acquisition which was the ground of self- 
 reproach to her. Illyria, on the contrary, was an
 
 10 BOOK I. 
 
 ancient hereditary country, the loss of which had 
 given to Austria deep regret ; this wound was, at 
 all times, fresh to her. Napoleon, faithful to his 
 treaties, could only claim Gallicia in the event of 
 the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland as 
 a consequence of the war, in other words, on the 
 conclusion of a peace. He would have been 
 wanting- to Austria his ally, who had already felt 
 alarm at seeing an ambassador to the confedera- 
 tion of Poland, if, at the commencement of the war, 
 he had given a sanction, by his expressions, to the 
 re-establishment of that kingdom, an act which 
 would have occasioned the insurrection and for- 
 cible re-union of Austrian Gallicia. He was far 
 from temporising, when he allowed the nature of 
 things to take its course, and equally so from 
 yielding to the wishes of the Poles, and saying : 
 the kingdom of Poland exists ; this would have 
 been equivalent to an acknowledgment of that 
 kingdom. But Napoleon's object was not only 
 to remove from his ally every ground of uneasi- 
 ness ; peace was the aim of war. He would have 
 compromised this aim, had he taken a determi 
 nation which would have rendered peace impos- 
 sible. The author shortly after quotes certain 
 expressions of the Emperor possessing this ten- 
 dency ; it was needless therefore for him to seek 
 elsewhere the grounds of his opinion. 
 
 The Emperor, generally speaking, feared no- 
 thing so much as pledging his future actions, be- 
 cause none knew better the importance of allow-
 
 CHAPTER I. 11 
 
 ing events to grow to maturity ; one of the most 
 signal features in his policy was to be always in 
 readiness to take advantage of events at the mo- 
 ment of their occurrence. 
 
 Mr. de Segur makes it a reproach to Napoleon 
 that he " neglected to clear the southern Polish 
 " provinces of the feeble hostile armies which 
 " kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in 
 " check." 
 
 Could it have been his wish that the Emperor, 
 with all the Russian forces in his front, had ex- 
 tended his right into Podolia, where the Russians 
 were engaged against the Turks ? This inadver- 
 tency is too striking to require a serious comment. 
 There is as little correctness in the following 
 sententious reflection, that " such is the weakness 
 " of great men, that they are always led by imita- 
 " tion either of others or of themselves." 
 
 Observation on the contrary, had hitherto de- 
 monstrated that what stamps the character of 
 great men, is the resource of their genius, and that 
 inexhaustible fecundity which always furnishes 
 them with fresh means, either for extricating 
 themselves out of difficulties, or for securing a 
 rapid success. 
 
 The author adds in support of his sentence, 
 that " Napoleon committed himself to the fortune 
 of battles ; that he expected every thing from 
 victory; that instead of sacrificing every thing 
 to obtain victory, it was by that he looked to 
 obtain every thing ; that he made use of it as a 
 means, when it ought to have been his end'* 
 
 a
 
 12 BOOK I. 
 
 We will not follow Mr. de Segur in the de- 
 velopment of this singular opinion which he has 
 sufficient difficulty in presenting in a clear light. 
 We will ask him, however, whether at Wilna, 
 when the sword was drawn, it was not necessary 
 to commit the event to the fate of battles, and 
 whether in war there is any other arbiter of fate 
 than victory? What was it necessary to sacrifice 
 in order to secure this victory ? To sacrifice every 
 thing is a very vague idea. Does the author well 
 know what he wishes to say ? Let him explain 
 himself. Did he wish for a sacrifice of the time 
 which was requisite to complete the insurrection 
 of Poland ? He ought to have said so ; and since he 
 reasons upon such important events, it behoved 
 him to examine why Napoleon decided to attempt 
 the accomplishment of his expedition in a single 
 year, instead of effecting it in two campaigns. 
 The question is a serious one. It did not even 
 strike the author's mind. 
 
 " Success would have probably crowned the 
 " expedition, if the premature decline of his health 
 " had left to the physical constitution of this 
 " great man all the vigour which his mind still 
 " retained." 
 
 The excellent health enjoyed by the Emperor at 
 this period could never be doubted for a moment. 
 Independently of the time he gave to business, he 
 bestowed four or five hours in the dav to the chase, 
 to reviewing the troops, &c. How are we to qualify 
 this caution on the part of the author, who, fearful 
 of openly attacking the genius of Napoleon, sup-
 
 CHAPTER I. 13 
 
 poses a premature decline of his health, as his own 
 justification for ascribing faults to this great man 
 which he had never committed? He stretches 
 his hero upon the bed of Procustus ; and contrary 
 to the custom of historians who delight in ele- 
 vating the subject of their history, he detracts 
 from the merit of his own hero, places him in 
 faulty, or ridiculous situations, and with the view 
 no doubt of lowering whilst he excuses him, he 
 afterwards pleads illness in his favor. Is this 
 done also in order to acquit the authors of his 
 premature death ? Napoleon exhibited in the 
 campaign of Russia as much superiority and ac- 
 tivity as he afterwards displayed in the campaigns 
 of 1813 and 1814. His constitution must have 
 been very strong, since it was able to withstand 
 during six years the pains of Prometheus. 
 
 There are few men possessed of the capacity, the 
 courage, and the time requisite for judging of 
 things as they are and by their effects. It is 
 thought much easier to adhere to received notions. 
 Mr. de Segur who was favored on the one hand 
 with those natural qualities which are particu- 
 larly inherents in our variable character, and on 
 the other by the influence of a name which his 
 father has illustrated by his talents and by the ex- 
 alted function confided to him, has determined 
 to write two volumes respecting the Emperor, 
 well assured that the very title of the work would 
 recommend it to many. Those who read with 
 due reflection have easily discovered that he took
 
 14 BOOK I. 
 
 for the basis of his system a course entirely at va- 
 riance with that of writers who have declared 
 themselves the open enemies of Napoleon. With 
 the help of a few oratorical precautions, which he 
 uses as a shelter from the observations of all par- 
 ties, he began by laying down that all the faults of 
 the Emperor had their origin in his habitual state 
 of ill health. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 We run rapidly over the commencement of this 
 very obscure chapter, and over the reflections 
 which the author ascribes to the Emperor, con- 
 cerning the policy of Prussia with regard to the 
 French republic ; we will, nevertheless, examine 
 this subject. 
 
 "Whenever he (Napoleon) followed with 
 "his finger the traces of the Prussian fron- 
 " tiers upon the map, he felt angry at seeing them 
 " still so extensive, and * exclaimed: Is it pos- 
 " sible that I have left this man so large a ter- 
 " ritory ?" 
 
 * As Mr. de Segur always aims at creating an effect, it has 
 appeared to him that the word to exclaim is more sounding than 
 the ordinary expression, has said, said; he therefore makes a 
 constant use of it throughout his work.
 
 CHAPTER II. 15 
 
 Who can have given this information to Mr. de 
 Segur ? where has he learnt it ? The marechal- 
 des-logis of the palace was not in the Emperor's 
 confidence ; he never entered his closet. Had he 
 sometimes heard Napoleon conversing about So- 
 vereigns, he would have learnt that he never used 
 such unbecoming expressions towards them ; that 
 he never said of a crowned head: that man. This 
 expression is indeed of common use in certain 
 societies, when they allude to the Emperor Na- 
 poleon. The application he makes of it to the 
 King of Prussia is no doubt the effect of recollec- 
 tion. This prince driven beyond the Elbe, with 
 his estates bordering upon the Baltic, as far as the 
 mouth of the Niemen, was vulnerable in every 
 direction, and it cannot be discovered how he 
 could be an object of Napoleon's envy. 
 
 " This aversion to a mild and pacific monarch 
 " was surprising. It is worth while to examine 
 "the cause of it." 
 
 If the King of Prussia was always inclined to- 
 wards peace, he was equally prepared to make 
 war. Napoleon knew this ; he felt therefore but 
 little confidence in this prince, though he had no 
 aversion to him. The author however points out 
 two causes of aversion ; the one was the refusal 
 given by Louis XVIII. to the proposals made to 
 him through the intervention of the King of 
 Prussia. In 1803, the Prussian cabinet felt that 
 the withdrawing the princes of the house of Bour- 
 bon from their existing situation would be con-
 
 16 BOOK I. 
 
 ducive to the repose of Europe. With this view 
 he took upon himself to send instructions to Mr. 
 Meyer, the president of the regency of Warsaw, 
 in which city Count de Lille then resided?- This 
 prince returned to the proposal in question a noble 
 reply, which is known to every one. How could 
 Napoleon have felt resentment at a proceeding 
 that had not originated with him, to which he 
 had given his consent out of mere deference to 
 his ally, and which, at any rate, could in no man- 
 ner compromise his authority, since there was 
 not any question as to his rights to the crown of 
 France ? Napoleon, however, attached but little 
 importance to that negotiation ; the love of 
 Frenchmen and the national interests appeared 
 to him sufficient for the consolidation of his power. 
 With respect to the other cause, the remon- 
 strances of Prussia on the arrestation of Mr. 
 Rumboldt; this agent, as well as Messrs. Wick- 
 ham, Drake, Spencer, Smith, etc., availed himself 
 of his character of British Resident in the Hans 
 Towns, in order to foment conspiracies against 
 the first consul. Napoleon had nobly proclaimed 
 his indignation at the violation of the rights of 
 nations in the persons of Irish refugees, who were 
 delivered up by the senate of Hamburgh. He 
 shewed his regard for the same right of nations, 
 by consenting to restore a diplomatic agent to 
 liberty, at the solicitation of the King of Prussia. 
 The proceeding of this monarch, in no manner at 
 variance with the acknowledged principles of the
 
 CHAPTER II. 17 
 
 Emperor, could afford no ground of enmity. If 
 it were not well known that aversion never had 
 the smallest share in the policy of a man so gifted 
 as Napoleon, one might ascribe this feeling to 
 two very different causes; the projects and en- 
 gagements of Prussia previously to the battle of 
 Austerlitz, and the aggression of that power in 
 1806. But Mr. de Segur, who writes a history, 
 appears ignorant of all this. 
 
 " At the beginning of 1805, however, Russia, 
 " Austria, and England, made ineffectual attempts 
 " to engage Frederick into their third coalition 
 " against France." 
 
 A third coalition took place. England per- 
 suaded Russia and Austria to join in it. Her 
 object was to drive the French from Germany and 
 Italy, to restore Piedmont to the King of Sar- 
 dinia, and to deprive France of her allies. The 
 means of the coalition appeared gigantic ; five 
 hundred thousand men and immense fleets were 
 to support those pretensions which vanished before 
 the sun of Austerlitz. Thus was dissolved the 
 third coalition, three months after its formation ; 
 Austria was compelled to sign a peace ; and to the 
 generosity of the conqueror, the Emperor Alex- 
 ander was indebted for the safety of the remains 
 of his army. 
 
 Prussia, who by the treaty of Berlin signed a 
 few months previously to the battle of Austerlitz, 
 had taken part in the league, was indebted to the 
 
 c
 
 18 BOOK I. 
 
 talent of Haugwitz her minister, for an offensive 
 and defensive alliance concluded with France. 
 
 " The possession of Hanover at first tempted 
 " Frederick ; but when the treatv was to be 
 " signed, shame caused him to hesitate. Napo- 
 " leon had no idea of such timid policy." " What," 
 said he, " does this monarch dare neither to make 
 " peace or war, etc. ?" Seeing the Emperor only 
 when he crossed the ante-room, and only hearing 
 him occasionally in his public audiences, does the 
 author draw from his imagination or from his re- 
 collection the expressions which he attributes to 
 him ? If, from recollection, they must have been 
 used in public ; and this was not the case. 
 
 " It is asserted that at the same time there were 
 cc persons, either treacherous or deceived, who 
 " persuaded Frederick that Napoleon was obliged 
 " to shew himself of a pacific disposition, because 
 " that warrior was averse to war ; they added that 
 " he was perfidiously treating for peace with Eng- 
 " land, on the terms of restoring Hanover, which 
 " he was to take back from Prussia." 
 
 These are the negotiations to which the author 
 seems to allude : 
 
 The death of Mr. Pitt had thrown the adminis- 
 tration open to Mr. Fox. The ambition of the 
 latter was to restore peace between France and 
 Great Britain ; and he took the first steps towards 
 this measure. In February 1806, an active cor- 
 respondence was set on foot between the two ca- 
 binets. There was felt a common wish of opening
 
 CHAPTER II. 19 
 
 negotiations upon honorable basis ; but the mode 
 of negotiating was the occasion of misunderstand- 
 ing. England was desirous of treating conjointly 
 with Russia ; and France, considering the third 
 coalition as dissolved, would only treat with Eng- 
 land. This difficulty was removed. England 
 gave way, upon the proposal made by France, of 
 adopting as a preliminary basis of the negotiation 
 that each power might intervene in all maritime 
 or continental affairs. This circumstance, and the 
 arrival of Mr. d'Oubril at Paris, on behalf of 
 Russia, determined Mr. Fox to send Lord Yar- 
 mouth, with the powers requisite for treating. 
 This Lord held regular conferences with the 
 French cabinet. Every thing was agreed on ; 
 England was to keep Malta and the Cape, and to 
 restore every other colony. But, at the moment 
 when the treaty was about to be signed, Fox fell 
 dangerously ill. His dissolution was foreseen, 
 and Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris to retard 
 the negotiation and to break it off. This lord had 
 scarcely arrived when he demanded his passports, 
 unless France would immediately acknowledge 
 the false and novel assertion, that the uti possidetis 
 was the basis agreed upon with Lord Yarmouth, 
 with the single exception of Hanover. England 
 would in this manner have preserved all her con- 
 quests, and France, who held only Hanover as a 
 conquest upon England, would no Jonger have 
 been left with any. 
 
 Notwithstanding the threats of Lord Lauder- 
 
 c 2
 
 20 BOOK I. 
 
 dale, France refused to acknowledge this basis. 
 During the several conferences, the general prin- 
 ciple of the said basis was laid aside, in order to 
 enter fully into the question. But at this time 
 England no longer desired peace, for sheentertain- 
 ed hopes of creating a fourth coalition. Already 
 had she by her intrigues prevented the Emperor 
 Alexander from ratifying the treaty signed by his 
 envoy (Mr. d'Oubril), and provoked a misunder- 
 standing between the cabinets of Berlin and of 
 the Tuileries. The mission of Lord Lauderdale, 
 a man of violence, of dexterity, and of little 
 scruple, had chiefly for its object to force a decla- 
 ration from France regarding Hanover, which 
 might be made available in exciting Prussia 
 against her. The fourth coalition was formed and 
 terminated the negotiations. The enemies of 
 France entertained great hopes from a junction 
 between Prussia, Austria, and England. The 
 Prussian troops had preserved their reputation 
 unimpaired. 
 
 In a final conference the French plenipotenti- 
 aries urged upon Lord Lauderdale, the following 
 argument : " Suppose Prussia should be beaten, 
 4<r as Austria has been, and that the Emperor should 
 " be in Berlin three months after the opening of 
 " the campaign, as was the case at Vienna. Will 
 " it not be a source of regret to you, that you 
 " should have allowed the destruction of this 
 " bulwark which was a protection to Hanover, to 
 " Holland, and to the mouths of the Elbe and the
 
 (( 
 
 St 
 
 it 
 
 tt 
 
 a 
 cc 
 u 
 
 a 
 tc 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 21 
 
 " Weser, all of so much importance to your com- 
 " merce ? Now the Russians are yet far off • be- 
 " fore the middle of October, the encounter will 
 have taken place between the Prussian army 
 covering Berlin, and the French army that de- 
 sires to enter it. If, as it is probable, the Prus- 
 sian army be defeased, it will be destroyed as 
 was the case with the Austrian army ; and the 
 Russians will not be able to do more for Prus- 
 sia after her defeat, than they could do for 
 Austria, a monarchy possessed of much more 
 ample resources." 
 Lord Lauderdale felt the justness of these ob- 
 servations. He foresaw so well that the fourth 
 coalition had expired in its very birth, because it 
 ought not to have declared itself until the arrival 
 of the Russians between the Vistula and the Oder, 
 that he asked, " Whether, in case England should 
 " make peace, the Emperor would not march 
 " against Prussia?" He was answered in the affir- 
 mative. But the British council of ministers only 
 saw the new risks that France was about to run, 
 and did not calculate the probable issue of the 
 campaign : war with Prussia took place. 
 
 Mr. de Segur blames Napoleon for not having 
 dismembered Prussia. 
 
 A question of so grave a nature, which is dis- 
 posed of by the marechal-des-logis of the palace, 
 with so much facility, would call for a long inves- 
 tigation. If Napoleon shrunk from that dismem- 
 berment, he was no doubt actuated by considera-
 
 22 B O O K I 
 
 tions infinitely more important, than the frivolous 
 motives which the author assigns to him, such as 
 the effect of Alexander s presence, etc. If the weak- 
 ness to which Prussia was reduced had the effect 
 of producing in that kingdom so great an exalta- 
 tion, what would not have been the effect created 
 by its entire dismemberment ? 
 
 " This vast conspiracy was that of the friends of 
 " virtue. Its head — was Stein. Napoleon, perhaps, 
 " might have gained him over to his interests ; 
 " but preferred punishing him." 
 
 Baron de Stent was an enemy; Napoleon knew 
 it. But he likewise knew that a man of that 
 stamp was above corruption. No choice was left 
 to him ; he required that an enemy should be re- 
 moved from the court of a friendly prince. 
 
 " In 1809, the first who had ventured to raise 
 the standard of independence against Napoleon, 
 were Prussians. He sent them to the galleys." 
 Major Schillhad infringed the law of nations. 
 In the estimation of the writers and honorable men 
 of every country, Schill and his companions, over- 
 running a part of Germany, and plundering and 
 destroying the French, at a time when Prussia 
 was at peace with France, were guilty of robberies 
 and murders. Their's was the crime of pirates, 
 who, without letters of marque, or in the stillness 
 of peace, direct their attacks against the vessels 
 of a friendly power. The Emperor did not send 
 them to the galleys ; they were tried and con- 
 demned by legally constituted tribunals. Prussia 
 owed this satisfaction ; Prussia herself afforded it. 

 
 CHAPTER If. 23 
 
 markable upon this subject. If Alexander chang- 
 " On the approach of the year 1812, Frederick 
 " uneasy and tired of his subservient position, was 
 " determined to extricate himself by an alliance 
 " or by war. In March 1811, he offered himself 
 " to Napoleon as an auxiliary in the expedition 
 " which was preparing." 
 
 No expedition was preparing at this time. Rus- 
 sia was arming herself, and collecting numerous 
 forces upon the Dniester ; Prussia who saw that 
 the storm was gathering, sought to shelter herself 
 from danger under the protection of a powerful 
 ally. But France had not yet taken a warlike 
 attitude ; explanations were demanded respecting 
 those armaments; negotiations were carrying on. 
 To have accepted the alliance of Prussia would 
 have been an indication of hostile intentions ; it 
 would have been a political error. Napoleon 
 therefore did not accept, though he did not refuse 
 it ; he kept the good intentions of Prussia in re- 
 serve for a favorable occasion. 
 
 That Prussia in her anxiety should have secretly 
 treated with Alexander, as is afterwards stated by 
 the author, would prove no more than that the 
 King of Prussia had not understood how much 
 was imposed upon Napoleon by the dictates of 
 prudence. 
 
 The author reveals to us a singular anecdote ; 
 that ever since 1810 Alexander had been pre- 
 pared to make a sudden attack upon Napoleon ; 
 and Mr. de Segur even tells us something very re-
 
 24 BOOK I. 
 
 ed his determination, it was owing* to his anxiety 
 to have divine justice and the opinion of mankind 
 on his side, by not appearing the aggressor. Mr. 
 de Segur may well suppose that the instigator of 
 the holy alliance intended to deceive mankind ; 
 but it was rather too much to suppose that he in- 
 tended to deceive heaven ! 
 
 If, when the King of Prussia tendered to the 
 Emperor Alexander his fortified towns and his 
 alliance, he was rejected by that sovereign, as is 
 alleged by the author, what must have been the 
 result ? that he would earnestly press his alliance 
 upon France ; but this was not the case. It 
 might thence be inferred that the inferior witness 
 who quoted the Emperor Alexander's reply to 
 Frederick did not speak the truth. For, we repeat 
 it, had Russia refused the alliance of Prussia, the 
 latter would have perseveringly pressed it upon 
 France. No sooner, however, did Napoleon dis- 
 cover that, in spite of his endeavors to effect a 
 peace, there was every probability of a war, he 
 had to make a choice of two alternatives: the alli- 
 ance or the destruction of Prussia. He determined 
 upon the alliance with more readiness than Fre- 
 derick himself. The author allows that this 
 prince hesitated ; and he connects with this cir- 
 cumstance the occupation of Pomerania, and the 
 order given to the Prince of Eckmiihl to hold him- 
 self in readiness to take immediate possession of 
 Prussia, and to seize the person of her sovereign.
 
 CHAPTER II. 25 
 
 The occupation of Pomerania was an impolitic 
 act, not resulting from any combination, but sim- 
 ply from the character of the general who under- 
 took it, and from his exaggerated zeal to give 
 effect to the continental system. He believed, 
 upon false reports, that numerous vessels laden 
 with colonial produce had entered Stralsund, and 
 the harbours of the island of Rugen. He saw the 
 opportunity of taking the Swedish government by 
 surprise, and of giving, at the same time, a deep 
 blow to the interests of England. Marshal Da- 
 voust invaded those Swedish provinces, without 
 any other orders than his instructions against the 
 British commerce. His acts were not disavowed, 
 because the mischief had been done ; a disavowal 
 had afforded no remedy ; his excessive zeal plead- 
 ed his excuse. 
 
 This operation was not in any manner connected 
 with the measures to be taken in order to fix the 
 determination of the court of Berlin. It is not 
 known what are the motives of Mr. de Segur for 
 supposing that an order was given to seize the 
 person of the King of Prussia. He ought to have 
 recollected that after the defection of Yorck's divi- 
 sion,Napoleon had twenty thousand men in Berlin, 
 and as many at Potsdam ; that the political bias 
 and the spirit of agitation in Prussia might, at 
 this time, have afforded him just grounds for 
 seizing the king as hostage ; that he had not so 
 done, but had, on the contrary, given orders to
 
 26 BOOK I 
 
 Augereau, who commanded at Berlin, to shew the 
 highest deference to this monarch. 
 
 The Prince of Eckmuhl had been ordered to 
 hold himself in readiness to enter Prussia, if the 
 treaty of alliance should not be signed. It was 
 in fact requisite that, in circumstances of so criti- 
 cal a nature, Prussia should be our friend or our 
 enemy, and a refusal of forming an alliance with 
 France ought no longer to leave a doubt of the 
 existence of an intercourse between that power 
 and Russia, the timely prevention of which was 
 called for by the most common prudence, on the 
 eve of an impending war. 
 
 This submission (from Prussia) did not alto- 
 gether satisfy Napoleon. To his strength he 
 " added artifice ; his suspicions still led him to 
 " covet the occupation of the fortresses, which 
 " he was ashamed not to leave in Frederick's 
 " hands. He required that every sort of arms 
 " should be taken from them which might be of 
 " use in an insurrection ; he pointed out every 
 " thing of the kind, even to the smallest wea- 
 " pon." 
 
 We quote this passage merely to shew in what 
 spirit Mr. de Segur has written his work. We 
 will not animadvert upon the words artifice and 
 shame, used towards a man so powerful as Napo- 
 leon, whose character always recoiled against the 
 adoption of such contemptible means. Should 
 even the correctness of those assertions be taken 
 
 et
 
 CHAPTER II. 27 
 
 for granted, prudence would justify that excessive 
 precaution towards a power which afforded no re- 
 liance on the sincerity of its friendship. The 
 course of events has demonstrated on the contrary 
 that Napoleon had trusted too much to Prussia 
 when he allowed her to retain a numerous army 
 in Silesia ; and a proof that he did not take any 
 thing away from her, even to the smallest weapon, 
 is afforded by the rapidity with which she armed 
 one hundred thousand Landwehr with reserve 
 muskets, when Yorck's treachery broke out, and 
 provided them with the requisite artillery. 
 
 It was quite natural for the Emperor Napoleon 
 to refuse the twenty-five millions demanded by 
 Prussia at this time through Mr. deHatzfeld, since 
 that power still owed to France a sum approach- 
 ing to eighty millions, and was not besides 
 looked upon with any confidence. With respect 
 to the numerous magazines which, by her treaty 
 of the 24th February, she placed at Napoleon's 
 disposal, this was entirely owing to the impos- 
 sibility she felt of delivering them up to the Rus- 
 sians, for whom they were originally intended. 
 
 Those are the facts. The author, for want of 
 knowing them, loses himself in conjectures ; this 
 is the case of every writer who pretends to speak 
 of what is not known to him, and of course of 
 Mr. de Segur who treats of diplomatic subjects 
 without any knowledge of negotiations, and who, 
 for the rest of his work, will speak of the science 
 of strategy, without any knowledge of military 
 tactics.
 
 28 BOOK I. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 
 " Russia commands the heights of Europe; 
 " her government can only with great difficulty 
 " be driven into a straight, and forced to submit 
 in an almost imaginary space ; without the con- 
 currence of Turkey and Sweden, Russia is less 
 " vulnerable." 
 
 If by these expressions the author means to say 
 that Russia can only be attacked by a power in 
 alliance with Sweden and with Turkey, this will 
 be our reply : 
 
 Great advantage would no doubt have been 
 derived from an alliance with Sweden, as afford- 
 ing the means of threatening Russia with a dan- 
 gerous diversion from the north. By the alliance 
 with Turkey an important object would have 
 been attained, that of still keeping her at war with 
 Russia ; this war would have operated as a power- 
 ful diversion in the south : such was the true na- 
 ture of the assistance which it would have been 
 important to secure. Whatever the author may 
 allege upon the authority of unfounded reports, 
 nothing was neglected that could effect this ob- 
 ject. 
 
 When Mr. de Segur says afterwards, that the 
 most simple soldier in our ranks expected to hear of
 
 CHAPTER HI. 29 
 
 the march of the Grand Vizir towards Kief , he shews 
 himself to have been one of the number. As the 
 Grand Vizir was in front of a Russian army, he must 
 have defeated it repeatedly ere he could march 
 upon Kief. Independently of the treaties con- 
 cluded with Austria and Prussia (which were the 
 most important), and with the princes of the con- 
 federation of the Rhine, negotiations were also 
 carrying on with Sweden and Denmark. With 
 Denmark they succeeded, but not so with Sweden. 
 The negotiation failed with this power, because 
 she imposed a condition, of which honor forbade 
 the acceptance. Success, wherever it was pos- 
 sible, attended our political endeavors. Our 
 alliance with Constantinople was in full force ; 
 our only object was to keep it up ; and this was 
 effected. It was not an offensive alliance as re- 
 spects Russia, because England's influence pre- 
 vailed in the Grand Vizir's camp by a happy 
 stratagem, at the very moment when, in the divan, 
 we appeared certain of success. The Sultan Mah- 
 moud was in the interests of France; he was still 
 in those sentiments, when the news reached him 
 that peace had just been signed by the Grand 
 Vizir. He hesitated a long time in giving his 
 ratification to it. The English had deceived the 
 Grand Vizir, and persuaded him that Count de 
 Narbonne,who was sent to the Emperor Alexander 
 at Wilna, was a negotiator prepared to sign a 
 treaty by which the Porte would be placed at the 
 mercy of Russia. Assurances to that effect, and
 
 30 BOOK I. 
 
 even proofs were afforded by British craft ; the 
 deceived Vizir deceived the Sultan in his turn. 
 
 " The Turkish ambassador was treated with the 
 " greatest distinction in the French camp ; he 
 " accompanied Napoleon in all his reviews : the 
 " most flattering attentions were paid to him ; 
 " and the Grand Equerry was already treating 
 " with him for an offensive and defensive alliance, 
 " when a sudden attack by the Russians inter- 
 " rupted the negotiation. The ambassador re- 
 " turned to Warsaw, &c, 
 
 Mr. de Segur, who is but imperfectly acquaint- 
 ed with facts, who is led on by incomplete no- 
 tions, and by recollections which are inaccurate 
 and rarely his own, and who besides was at this 
 period a prisoner of war in Russia,* has heard 
 of an ambassador who came from the east to our 
 head quarters. He only names a Turkish ambas- 
 sador, to whom he ascribes the well merited re- 
 ception given to another. Had he taken the pains 
 to inform himself previously to recording a cir- 
 cumstance, he would have learnt the following 
 facts : 
 
 Mirza Rizza, a man of eminent merit and of 
 the highest distinction at the court of Tehran, 
 arrived at Finkenstein on the 25th April, 1807, 
 in quality of ambassador extraordinary to the 
 Emperor Napoleon. The Duke of Bassano was 
 
 * He was taken prisoner in December 1806, whilst preparing 
 quarters for the Emperor, in the village of Nasielk.
 
 CHAPTER III. 31 
 
 commissioned to negotiate with him the condi- 
 tions of an offensive and defensive alliance be- 
 tween France and Persia ; and the negotiation 
 was brought, after a few days, to a successful 
 issue. This was the ambassador who accompanied 
 Napoleon in his reviews; to him it was that the most 
 flattering attentions were paid. On the 7th May, 
 he departed on his return to Persia. The circum- 
 stance of a Persian embassy was sufficiently 
 novel, and an alliance between France and Persia 
 sufficiently important to deserve some mention. 
 The event engaged the attention of all Europe, 
 with the exception of Mr. de Segur, who neither 
 found any impression of it in his historical know- 
 ledge, nor turned for information to cotemporary 
 documents. Had he but read the bulletins, which 
 should, at least, be consulted by an author who 
 gives an account of a war, he would have dis- 
 covered that omission*. This fact proves Mr. 
 de Segur's inattention in writing history. Some 
 persons having noticed how unfavorably, in the 
 course of his work, the author treats the minister 
 who was, at that time, commissioned to negotiate 
 
 * Sixty-third bulletin. Elbing, 8th May, 1807. The Per- 
 sian ambassador has received his audience of leave ; he brought 
 splendid presents to the Emperor in the name of his sovereign, 
 and in exchange he received the Emperor's portrait which was 
 most brilliantly set. He returns to Persia direct. He is a per- 
 sonage of great consideration in his own country, and a man of 
 great wit and discernment. His return home had become neces- 
 sary, &c. &c.
 
 32 BOOK I. 
 
 with Mirza Rizza, imagined that he refrained 
 from alluding to the Persian ambassador, in order 
 not to name the French negotiator in a circum- 
 stance which afforded no opportunity for saying 
 any thing in disparagement of him. Had this 
 mission been confided to the Grand Equerry who 
 for a long time bestowed his protection upon the 
 marechal-des-logis of the palace, by whom he is 
 now protected in return, Mirza Rizza might have 
 been honored with some notice. 
 
 Three weeks had elapsed since the Persian am- 
 bassador left the head quarters, when the Turkish 
 ambassador arrived there (the 27th May). 
 
 Early in the year 1807, the Porte sent Emin 
 Wahib Effendi to conclude a treaty of alliance 
 with France. This envoy was for a long time en- 
 gaged at Warsaw in fruitless negociations with 
 M. de Talleyrand. The Emperor, anxious to bring 
 about some result, made this ambassador come to 
 Finkenstein, where he arrived eight days after the 
 Emperor's departure from those head-quarters. 
 The Duke of Vicenza was instructed to confer with 
 him, but could not succeed any better in the ne- 
 gotiation. The Emperor determined to speak to 
 him ; but feeling vexed at the limited understand- 
 ing of this envoy, and having no time to spare for 
 useless conferences, he sent him back to Caulain- 
 court. 
 
 The Emperor quitted Finkenstein, and the am- 
 bassador followed the Duke of Vicenza and the 
 minister for foreign affairs to Dantzig. After three
 
 CHAPTER III. 33 
 
 days of conferences in this city, as unproductive 
 of any result as the preceding ones, the Duke of 
 Vicenza left Dantzig to rejoin the head-quarters, 
 and Emin Wahib was sent on to Paris. 
 
 The mission of this Turk, who proved to be a 
 man of no capacity, and the choice of whom, there 
 was reason to suspect, was owing to Russian in- 
 fluence, had for its object to obtain that France 
 should bind herself not to enter into any treaty 
 with Russia without the concurrence of Turkey. 
 In vain was it represented to him that France 
 could not bind herself in this manner ; that no- 
 thing but obstacles and difficulties could spring 
 out of such a complicated policy ; that, from the 
 friendly intercourse subsisting between the two 
 empires, Turkey ought to rely upon France for 
 the protection of her interests : Wahib Effendi 
 remained unmoved. Napoleon finished by telling 
 him, at a private audience : " You are wrong ; the 
 " Emperor Alexander has already caused propo- 
 " sals of peace to be laid before me. If you will 
 " not come to some arrangement, I will make 
 " peace with him and leave you out of the ques- 
 " tion." This was the only thing that the Ottoman 
 envoy appeared to understand. He offered to 
 dispatch a courier to Constantinople for instruc- 
 tions ; but the events were hurrying on ; and the 
 victories of Heilsberg and Friedland were soon 
 followed by the peace of Tilsit. The Emperor 
 was anxious to draw closer the bonds of alliance 
 between Turkey and France, since he had desired 
 
 D
 
 ce 
 
 34 BOOK I. 
 
 to have the Turkish ambassador near him, and 
 used all his endeavors to bring the negotiations 
 to an issue. If they proved unavailing, the cause 
 can only be found in the selection of the envoy. 
 
 The alliance with Russia, moreover, and the 
 deposition of Selim, which occurred at the same 
 time (29th May), gave a new direction to Napo- 
 leon's policy, and were sufficient reasons to create 
 a coolness on his part towards Turkey. 
 
 But a deputation had just come from Wilna, 
 
 soliciting the restoration of their national inde- 
 " pendence, and professing the same devotion to 
 " his cause as had been shewn by Warsaw, etc." 
 
 The Prince of Eckmiilh entertained those de- 
 puties ; and the Duke de Bassano, to whom they 
 were referred by the Emperor, acted the part of an 
 honest man towards them, in preventing their be- 
 ing observed by the Russians, in undeceiving them 
 in respect to the hopes they had formed, and per- 
 suading them to return back in all haste to their 
 constituents, who, in consequence of a proceeding 
 unattended with any result, would have exposed 
 themselves to the resentment of their sovereign. 
 In the year 1812, they loudly avowed the grati- 
 tude which they owed to this minister. 
 
 ** The Emperor of France continued, there- 
 " fore, to negotiate with Russia ; and the Turkish 
 w Ambassador, neglected and forgotten, wandered 
 " about our camp, without being summoned to 
 " take any part in the negotiations which were 
 " about to terminate the war. He returned to
 
 CHAPTER III. 35 
 
 " Constantinople soon after, in great displea- 
 u sure." 
 
 No Turkish Ambassador had remained in our 
 camps. The one who had returned to Paris was 
 soon apprized of Sultan Selim's deposition, and 
 took the road back to Constantinople. The death 
 of a prince puts an end to the powers of his am- 
 bassador. The latter could not feel dissatisfied 
 with the French government, since the loss of his 
 powers was wholly independent of France. It is 
 well known to every one that this is always the 
 case. Selim was deposed on the 29th May ; he 
 could not, on the 7th July, have had a plenipo- 
 tentiary as a party to the treaty of Tilsit. 
 
 " If we must even tell the whole truth, it is as- 
 " serted that, at the interview at Tilsit and sub- 
 " sequently, a treaty for the partition of Turkey 
 " was under discussion." 
 
 In writing a history, an author should undoubt- 
 edly disguise nothing ; but he ought not to repeat 
 any assertions that are devoid of foundation ; now 
 it is false that there ever was any question at Tilsit 
 respecting the partition of Turkey. 
 
 " So much is certain, that, shortly after the 
 " interview at Tilsit, Alexander's ambition was 
 very sensibly moderated." 
 
 What is certain is, that ideas of partitioning the 
 Ottoman empire were broached long subsequently 
 to Tilsit, and discussed between France and Rus- 
 sia. France renounced them entirely as soon as 
 a misunderstanding began to spring up between 
 
 d 2
 
 36 B O O K I. 
 
 the two countries. The words attributed by Mr. 
 de Segur to the Emperor, are either invented by 
 himself, or by those persons whom he consulted. 
 
 The same obversation applies to the speeches 
 quoted in the following pages. General Sebastiani 
 who is made to perform a part, and Napoleon, 
 knew the geography of Europe too well, to draw 
 the partition in the manner stated by Mr. deSegur, 
 or to observe that the Emperor Alexander %oould be 
 allowed to take possession of Turkey as far as the 
 Danube ; as if Wallachia and Moldavia were in 
 Turkey, and as if Turkey were not altogether on 
 this side of the Danube. 
 
 Mr. de Segur has the laudable custom of follow- 
 ing the example of the great historical writers of 
 antiquity, who put speeches into the mouths of 
 their heroes which are justly admired for their 
 elegance and brilliancy ; he has thereby acquired, 
 with a few complaisant friends, the surname of 
 the Thucydides and the Tacitus of modern times. 
 This is assuredly a great and an uncommon eulogi- 
 um ; but according to us, not a well merited one. 
 Independently of the eloquence and elevation for 
 which their harangues were remarkable, those 
 historians took especial care to state what was 
 founded upon truth, justice, and sound reasoning, 
 as well as appropriate to the character and the 
 position of the personages in their history. Mr. 
 de Segur does not appear to have profited by the 
 study of his models. 
 
 In one of those private conversations, which the
 
 CHAPTER III. 37 
 
 author attributes to Napoleon^ after supposing to 
 him the intention of uniting Spain to France, he 
 makes him use these expressions : As for Joseph, I 
 will indemnify him. Does the marechal-des-logis 
 of the palace endeavour by this insinuation to con- 
 vey a belief that Napoleon intended to seize upon 
 Austria, in order to assign it over to his brother ? 
 
 " The congress of Erfurt took place just after 
 " this. Napoleon was therefore anxious to make 
 " sure of the disposition of Alexander, to conclude 
 " an alliance offensive and defensive with him,&c." 
 
 Such, according to the author, would be the 
 motives of the interview at Erfurt, which he calls 
 a congress. It had been positively agreed upon 
 between the two sovereigns at Tilsit, that they 
 should meet again after the expiration of a twelve- 
 month. That interview was rendered the more 
 necessary, owing to the bombardment of Copen- 
 hagen by the English, the events in Spain, and the 
 fresh encroachments made upon the independence 
 of neutral flags by the British Orders in Council 
 (of November, 1807) Its object was purely to 
 come to an understanding as to the means of com- 
 pelling England to make peace ; this was the con- 
 stant aim of Napoleon's efforts. 
 
 " Obliged to keep terms with Alexander, sen- 
 " sibly grieved at the death of Selim, and full of 
 " detestation of the barbarity of the Mussulmans, 
 " and of contempt for their unstable government, 
 " Napoleon had not for three years returned a re- 
 ' ply to the Sultan, and appeared not to acknow-
 
 .38 BOOK I. 
 
 " ledge him. He was in this position when 
 
 " all of a sudden on the 21st March 1812, etc." 
 
 It would appear that Sultan Mahmoud was not 
 acknowledged by Napoleon, and that for the last 
 three years up to the list of March 1812, no reply 
 had been returned to him. And yet there was a 
 French embassy at Constantinople, and an Otto- 
 man embassy at Paris. How will Mr. de Segur 
 account to us for these friendly relations between 
 sovereigns who did not acknowledge each other ? 
 Can he inform us how it happens that no answer 
 should have been returned for three years to a go- 
 vernment which was treated with by the means of 
 ambassadors ? 
 
 Mr. de Segur was not with the army in 1807, 
 when the Persian Ambassador was seen by every 
 one at Finkenstein. In Paris, his functions of 
 marechal- des-logis did not require of him any ser- 
 vice at the palace. A stranger to what was going 
 on, whether in the cabinet or in the circles of the 
 Tuileries, it is quite excusable that he should be 
 ignorant on the most simple points. He cannot, 
 however, be excused for having neglected to in- 
 form himself of them, when he assumed the task 
 of writing a history. If he had but taken the 
 trouble to open the almanack, he Would have 
 found in it that we had General Sebastiani at Con- 
 stantinople in 1808 and 1809, and Mr. de Latour 
 Maubourg in 1810, 1811. and 1812; and that 
 Mouhib Effendi was ambassador at Paris during 
 the above period. The latter did not succeed
 
 CHAPTB It nr. 39 
 
 until the early part of 1812, in obtaining his re- 
 call, which he had himself solicited. Having re- 
 ceived every mark of attention in France, his feel- 
 ings towards us, which, in the first years, had been 
 unfavorable, were so entirely changed at the 
 time of his departure, that, upon his arrival at 
 Constantinople, he proved, in the Divan, the zeal- 
 ous supporter of the closest union between the 
 two powers. His political views were so well 
 known, that Sultan Mahmoud, who likewise en- 
 tertained them, gave him admission into the coun- 
 cil, in which the ratification of the treaty of Buch- 
 arest was discussed, although, notwithstanding 
 this assistance, the influence of the Mufti and of 
 the Janissaries prevailed. 
 
 It can hardly be supposed that Napoleon was 
 ignorant of the invariable custom of the Mus- 
 " sulmans, which prevented the Grand Signor 
 from ever appearing in person at the head of 
 his army." 
 
 What could not have been supposed is the ig- 
 norance of the author on a historical point which 
 it was so easy to clear up. If he had taken the 
 trouble to open the history of the Ottoman empire, 
 he would have found that from Otman, first em- 
 peror of the Turks, down to Mahmoud the reign- 
 ing sovereign, fourteen sultans have commanded 
 in person their armies (*), and that a sultan per- 
 
 (t 
 
 
 (*( Otman I, in 1299 Selim I, in 1512 
 
 Orchan 11, 1325 Solirnan 1, 1520
 
 40 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 forms, according to his faith, a meritorious action, 
 which raises him in the estimation of his subjects, 
 when he tears himself away from the pleasures of 
 the seraglio, in order to lead his troops against the 
 infidels. 
 
 Every thing that is stated by Mr. de Segur re- 
 garding Turkey is as correct as may be expected 
 from a historian who is even ignorant of what may 
 be found in almanacks. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 This chapter, which has reference to our rela- 
 tions with Sweden and with Bernadotte, contains 
 some correct facts. But as the author possesses 
 no positive information upon any subject, and 
 only writes from hearsays, without taking the 
 trouble to enquire into them, he frequently falls 
 into mistakes. And yet when an author is relat- 
 
 Amurat 1, 
 
 1359 
 
 Mahomet III, 1595 
 
 Bajazet I, 
 
 1*389 
 
 Osman 1, 1617 
 
 Mahomet I, 
 
 1413 
 
 Amnrat IV, 1622 
 
 Amurat II, 
 
 1421 
 
 Soliman II, 1687 
 
 Mahomet II, 
 
 1451 
 
 as far as Sophia in Bulgaria 
 
 Bajazet II, 
 
 1481 
 
 Mustapha II, 1695
 
 (C 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 41 
 
 ing contemporary facts, it is not expecting too 
 much of him, that he should, at least, make himself 
 tolerably acquainted with what has taken place. 
 
 " In the course of the same night, ten de- 
 " puties of the council of five-hundred, held a 
 
 " secret meeting at the house of S ; thither 
 
 " Bernadotte repaired. They agree that, at nine 
 " o'clock on the next morning, the council should 
 open its sittings, to which those only should be 
 invited who were of their own way of thinking ; 
 " that it should be therein decreed, that, in imita- 
 " tion of the council of ancients, which had pru- 
 " dentlv named Bonaparte general of its guard, 
 " the council of five-hundred selects Bernadotte 
 " to command theirs ; and that the latter, properly 
 " armed, should be in readiness to be summoned 
 
 " to it. It was at S *s house that this plan was 
 
 " formed. S himself immediately afterwards 
 
 " ran to Napoleon, and disclosed the whole. A 
 " threat from the latter was quite sufficient to keep 
 " the conspirators in order ; not one of them dared 
 Ai show his face at the council, and the next day 
 " the revolution of the 18th brumaire was com- 
 « pleted ." 
 
 It was on the 18th, and not on the 17th, that the 
 council of ancients conferred upon general Bona- 
 parte the command of the troops of the first mili- 
 tary division, which included the guard of the 
 legislative body. The council of five-hundred had 
 no private guard, any more than the council of 
 ancients. There existed, therefore, no command
 
 42 BOOK I. 
 
 to be bestowed upon Bernadotte. Mr. de Segur is 
 even ignorant of the date of" an event whieh formed 
 the foundation of the power of Bonaparte, of whom 
 he has constituted himself the historian. 
 
 After speaking of Bernadotte's conspiracy in the 
 west, he adds : u This time Bernadotte was lost, 
 " had Napoleon been able to convict him of it." 
 
 The first consul was possessed of more proofs 
 than were necessary for putting* Bernadotte upon 
 his trial. He kindly yielded to the entreaties of 
 Joseph and his wife ; he forgot every thing. As 
 for Bernadotte, he could not forgive to Napoleon 
 this act of mercy. There are men who can only 
 feel hatred, and a desire of doing injury, in return 
 for the favors conferred upon them. 
 
 " Fortune favored Bernadotte, who was already 
 " at Rochefort, by delaying his embarkation* un- 
 " til the war with England was renewed. He 
 " then refused to go, and Napoleon could no longer 
 " compel him." 
 
 Fortune helping to delay an " embar cation" 
 what a style ! it is no doubt for the sake of a rhe- 
 torical figure that the author substitutes small 
 vessel for the act of embarking. It is exchanging 
 the cause for the effect. We must also no doubt 
 ascribe to a mere figure of rhetoric, his assertion 
 that the British declaration of war took away from 
 
 * The expression in the original is " embarcatiun" (which 
 literally means a large boat or a small vessel). It should have 
 been embarq ucment. — tran slator.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 43 
 
 Napoleon the power of enforcing the obedience of 
 one of his generals. The truth is, that Napoleon, 
 seeing that the war was springing up, felt the ne- 
 cessity of retaining general Bernadotte in France, 
 and would not, by sending him to America, ex- 
 pose him to be captured by the enemies who were 
 already spread over the sea. 
 
 " Napoleon was soon heard to reproach Berna- 
 " dotte with his envious and treacherous inaction 
 " during the battle of Auerstadt, his order of the 
 " day at Wagram.. .Bernadotte, on his part, de- 
 " manded why Napoleon had placed him in so 
 " dangerous and false a position ; why the report 
 " of that victory had been so unfavorable to him r 
 " etc." 
 
 Placed by the Emperor at Dornburgh, on the 
 occasion of the battle of Auerstadt, Bernadotte, 
 from a jealousy against Marshal Davoust, and 
 without any motive in which Napoleon was con- 
 cerned, would not assist his colleague in gaining 
 the victory ; and in this manner he compromised 
 the fate of the battle. By an order of the day, at 
 variance with the truth which had been witnessed 
 by the whole army, he bestowed extravagant 
 praises upon the Saxon corps under his orders at 
 Wagram, although it had exhibited a timorous 
 conduct. Napoleon contented himself with cor- 
 recting the misrepresentation of facts ; this was 
 his duty ; he ought even to have punished so inso- 
 lent a conduct. He had not placed Bernadotte in 
 a more false position than Massena. They both
 
 44 B OO K I. 
 
 occupied the left, where, through the fault of the 
 Saxon troops, a sudden manoeuvre of the enemy 
 was on the point of succeeding-. Napoleon, by a 
 change of front along the whole line, came to the 
 assistance of Bernadotte and Massena, and suc- 
 ceeded in restoring order. 
 
 " Bernadotte also felt that he owed his crown to 
 " chance, which made him of the same religion as 
 " the Swedes." 
 
 Who can be ignorant that in France Bernadotte 
 openly professed the Roman Catholic religion, and 
 that he was compelled, on his arrival at Gotten- 
 burgh, to make abjuration of it, and in a solemn 
 ceremony to adopt the Lutheran religion. The 
 following expression is even attributed to him : 
 " Henry IV. consented to go to mass in order to 
 recover a kingdom ; I may well do without mass 
 in order to acquire one." 
 
 There is a want of accuracy in the details given 
 by Mr. de Segur concerning Bernadottes eleva- 
 tion to the throne. The truth is as follows :— -At 
 the time of the evacuation of Pomerania by the" 
 Swedes in 1807, the two brothers, Morner, officers 
 in the regiment of that name, having been taken 
 prisoners, were presented to Bernadotte, who 
 assigned his own residence for their prison, and 
 after the lapse of about one month sent them back 
 to Sweden. In June 1810 one of those officers, 
 at this time a colonel, causes himself to be an- 
 nounced to Bernadotte, who resided at Paris, in 
 the rue d'Anjou, requests a private conversation
 
 CHAPTERIV. 45 
 
 with him, and communicates that a few Swedes 
 have fixed their views upon him, to replace the 
 Prince Royal who had just died of apoplexy. 
 Bernadotte receives this overture with a smile, 
 and without attaching any importance to it ; and 
 until it be communicated to him in a more serious 
 manner, determines not to take any steps towards 
 the French government on the subject. He is 
 visited four or five days afterwards by the Swedish 
 minister in Paris (baron Lagerbielke), who con- 
 firms what colonel Morner had said to him, and 
 solicits his answer. This was on a Saturday; 
 Bernadotte proceeds on the following day to St. 
 Cloud, previously to the levy, and communicates 
 all that had passed to the Emperor, who said to 
 him : " I know every thing ; I leave you at liberty 
 to refuse or to accept, and will agree to whatever 
 you think proper. I certainly had other views, 
 and had commissioned Alquier to propose a re- 
 gency, and wait for the issue of events. The son 
 of the late king might have been recalled at a 
 later period ; but Sweden will no longer have this 
 family. Accept, therefore, the offer made to you ; 
 I prefer seeing you there than any one else ; you 
 shall have the support of my consent. Take your 
 measures accordingly." Bernadotte dispatches to 
 Stockholm a young man, a relation of Signeul 
 the Swedish consul, to confer with his adherents, 
 and authorises to promise any sum of money that 
 may be required. Nothing however was given ; 
 the fifteen hundred thousand francs advanced by
 
 46 BOOK I. 
 
 the Emperor, and the loan of about a million from 
 General Gerard, were the only sums that were 
 lodged by Bernadotte into the bank of Sweden, in- 
 stead of the fourteen millions which had been pro- 
 mised by him. 
 
 In conclusion, the choice of the Swedes was 
 not promoted by any intrigue ; they fixed their 
 thoughts upon Bernadotte, only because he was 
 allied to the Emperor, because they were ignorant 
 of the secret misunderstanding which the envious 
 disposition of this general had created between 
 him and the Emperor, and because they thought 
 of securing in this manner the favor and protec- 
 tion of the French sovereign. 
 
 '.* At the reading of a letter conceived in this 
 " new and unexpected style, Bonaparte was seized 
 
 with rage and astonishment. He exclaimed, 
 
 striking violently on the letter, and on the table 
 " upon which it lay open : He, the rascal ! he pre- 
 " sume to give me advice ! to dictate the law to me ! 
 " to dare propose such an infamous act to me ! 
 " etc. From that moment his instructions to his 
 " minister bore the impress of that disposition ; 
 " the latter, it is true, softened the bitterness of 
 " them ; but a rupture became inevitable." 
 
 When Mr. de Segur talks of negotiation, he 
 confounds every thing. The language which he 
 attributes to the Emperor is absurd. The measures 
 he ascribes to his cabinet are not those that were 
 resorted to. He places at the commencement of 
 the negotiations, the proposal of the cession of 

 
 CHAPTER IV. 47 
 
 Norway, which was only the last act of it. It 
 would appear to have reached the Emperor whilst 
 he was in Paris, whereas he only received it upon 
 his departure from Dresden for the expedition to 
 Russia. It is well known to every one that the 
 diplomatic communications of the minister for 
 foreign affairs were accompanied by others of a 
 confidential nature, of which the princess royal, 
 with a truly French feeling, consented to be the 
 channel. She wrote under the ministers dictate, 
 and she had for couriers the very officers about 
 her person. A final letter which, after fresh ex- 
 hortations, announced all the wished for conces- 
 sions, was forwarded to Sweden in the care of Mr. 
 de Signeul, Swedish consul general at Paris, who 
 was selected and dispatched on the occasion. 
 This agent, on his return from his mission, gave an 
 account of it to the minister, at Dresden, on the 
 29th May. He had brought back a note dictated 
 by the prince royal, who made the alliance of 
 Sweden depend solely upon the guarantee of Nor- 
 way to her. Bernadotte was thus deceiving Alex- 
 ander, with whom he had concluded a treaty two 
 months before this period. Napoleon was in his 
 closet, when he received the letter from his mi- 
 nister : " I will not purchase a doubtful ally, at 
 the expense of a faithful friend." This plain 
 statement is perhaps more interesting, it is cer- 
 tainly more true, and less at variance with proba- 
 bility, than the violent anger of which Mr. de 
 Segur has so well invented the effusions.
 
 48 B O K I. 
 
 We cannot dwell too strongly upon the author's 
 evident ignorance of the temper of the Emperor, 
 whom he always represents to us as giving vent to 
 an ungovernable passion in indiscreet and mis- 
 placed expressions. It is repugnant to our feel- 
 ings to suspect Mr. de Segur's good faith ; we 
 willingly believe that, if he had approached this 
 prince, and heard him converse with his ministers, 
 he would not have made a violent madman of him 
 who had every command of himself in matters of 
 importance, and whose profound penetration shed 
 over a question a sudden light, the effect of which 
 was to present the question in its true and proper 
 colors.
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 u Napoleon meanwhile was still at Paris, in the 
 f midst of his great officers, who were alarmed at 
 " the terrible encounter which was preparing." 
 
 We will now find the great officers remaining 
 silent, and immediately afterwards the same offi- 
 cers speaking, or rather made by Mr. de Segur to 
 speak out. How could he have heard them ? He 
 could neither have access to the cabinet nor to the 
 councils ; his place was no further than the ante- 
 room of the palace. 
 
 The first person brought forward is Cambaceres, 
 who wishes that Napoleon should, before under- 
 taking any other measure, subject and partition 
 the states immediately around him ; he proba- 
 bly means the confederation of the Rhine, and 
 a part of Prussia, with which an alliance had 
 just been contracted. Such language directed to 
 the Emperor could only be supposed to proceed 
 from a madman, and to be addressed to a person 
 as little gifted with wisdom ; but Mr. de Segur is 
 not at all impeded by these difficulties. He as- 
 
 E
 
 50 BOOK II. 
 
 cribes a reply to Napoleon which the latter could 
 neither have ut tered nor have dreamt of, that such 
 had been his project in 1809, but that the misfor- 
 tune of Essling had deranged his plan. True it 
 is that, after the misfortune of Essling, Napo- 
 leon must have bestowed all his attention to 
 repairing- his losses and defeating the enemy. 
 But, on the day after the victory of Wagram, the 
 plan was much more easy of execution than on the 
 eve of the battle of Essling. That victory was 
 complete ; the Austrians had only the remains of 
 an army left; their dispersed landwehr refused 
 to return to their arms ; the Archduke Charles 
 was thrown back upon Bohemia, and the Arch- 
 duke John upon Moravia; their communication 
 with Hungary was about to be entirely intercept- 
 ed, and a battle might drive them to their extreme 
 western frontiers ; disaffection had rapidly gain- 
 ed ground ; and the people of the Austrian do- 
 minions, fatigued of so many wars undertaken 
 without necessity and carried on without glory, 
 had reached such a state of indifference as to be- 
 hold intuitively and without dread the dissolution 
 of the monarchy by a separation of the states 
 which composed it. Such was the internal situa- 
 tion of Austria : externally, she was without allies 
 upon the continent. The day, however, which 
 followed the battle of Wagram, the Emperor con- 
 sents to an armistice, because there has been too 
 much effusion of blood, and because he desires
 
 CHAPTER I. 51 
 
 peace *. He had, therefore, no wish to subject and 
 partition the states immediately around him, and 
 he could not have said in 1812 that in 1800 he 
 had entertained this plan. 
 
 " At the time of the peace of Tilsit he had, by 
 " the intervention of Mu rat, endeavored to con- 
 " nect himself with Russia by marriage ; but the 
 " refusal of the Russian Princess, and her preci- 
 " pitate union with the Duke of Oldenburgh, had 
 " decided the Emperor upon marrying an Aus- 
 " trian Princess." 
 
 Murat's influence was useless. If Napoleon, 
 whose intercourse with the Emperor Alexander 
 was soon upon a footing of intimacy, did not 
 think proper, in their long conferences together, to 
 throw out any hints respecting a family alliance, he 
 had with him the Prince of Benevento, who, by his 
 close acquaintance with Prince Kourakin, was the 
 fittest man for exploring the subject. But the Rus- 
 sian Princess was not refused at Tilsit, where 
 she could not have been asked in marriage; for, at 
 this period, there had not yet been any question 
 of divorce. It was only a long time afterwards, 
 that a daring attempt of Fouche excited some sus- 
 picions about it in the public mind. It was not 
 spoken of in 1809, on the occasion of the precipi- 
 
 * In front of Znaim, at the moment when Prince John of 
 Lichtenstein came to propose an armistice, Bessieres strongly 
 urged Napoleon to give battle : No, replied the Emperor, enough 
 of blood has been shed ; and he signed the armistice. 
 
 E 2
 
 52 BOOK IT. 
 
 tale marriage of the Grand Dutchess of Olden- 
 burgh, a precipitancy not at all connected with any 
 contemplated marriage of the Emperor Napoleon. 
 He was acquainted with the resolute character of 
 this princess, which would have been sufficient to 
 oppose his entertaining any idea of uniting himself 
 to her. If, besides, he had had such a thought, 
 there was nothing to prevent his making the pro- 
 posal at Erfurt, at a time when the intercourse of 
 the two sovereigns had generated a friendship be- 
 tween them. 
 
 When the divorce was decided upon in 1810, 
 Napoleon turned his thoughts to the Grand 
 Dutchess Ann. To suppose, that if the Grand 
 Dutchess Catherine had been refused to him, he 
 would have solicited the hand of the sister, is to 
 form a very false idea of his character. The nego- 
 tiation, which was set on foot at this period, had 
 not a successful result. The Emperor Alexander 
 asked for some delay to obtain his mother's con- 
 sent ; but another negotiation commenced at the 
 same time with the Austrian ambassador at Paris, 
 had completely succeeded. In this manner the 
 evasions of Russia brought the Emperor to marry 
 an Austrian princess. 
 
 " The pride of Napoleon was still wounded by 
 " the refusal which Russia had made of his hand 
 " in 1807 ; since he had exposed himself to a war 
 " by dispossessing the Russian Princess ofOlden- 
 " burgh of her duchy." 
 
 There are as manv errors as words in this alle-
 
 u 
 
 CHAPTER I. 53 
 
 gation. We have explained what credit is due to 
 that pretended refusal ; it is needless we should 
 point out the ridicule of supposing that Napoleon 
 was induced by an exasperated feeling to include 
 Oldenburgh in the thirty-second military division. 
 The author himself adds immediately afterwards 
 that "all those passions which so despotically 
 govern other men possessed but a feeble influ- 
 ence over so firm and comprehensive a genius. 
 '< (Napoleon's)." 
 
 What, then, can be the meaning of the pre- 
 ceding passage ? 
 
 The geographical position of the Duchy of Ol 
 denburgh made it necessarily share the fate of the 
 Hans-Towns by which it is circumscribed. The 
 continental system, established by the treaty of 
 Tilsit, could only prove of effectual annoyance to 
 England, in so far as it was carried into complete 
 effect by closing every port against British com- 
 merce ; and yet the whole of Germany was sup- 
 plied with English merchandize by the Baltic and 
 North Seas. The possession of Oldenburgh hav- 
 ing been guaranteed to the Duke by the treaty of 
 Tilsit, the Emperor offered as an indemnity for it 
 the principality of Erfurt and the Seignory of 
 Blankenhayn; but this exchange was refused on 
 the plea of its not being an adequate equivalent. 
 Russia eagerly seized this fresh pretence for a 
 rupture, and addressed to the ministers of the 
 courts of Europe a protest, which, in its form no
 
 54 BOOK II. 
 
 less than in its real tendency, was a serious offence 
 offered to an ally. 
 
 Nothing, besides, could be more easy than to 
 come to a fair understanding in respect to the 
 Duchy of Oldenburgh. But Russia, instead of 
 frankly meeting the question according to the 
 spirit of the system that so closely united the two 
 empires, availed herself with eagerness of this op- 
 portunity, to disguise her intention of coming to a 
 rupture with France, and of yielding to the influ- 
 ence of England. 
 
 " An obvious fact, was enough to hurry him, 
 " sooneror later, into that decisive struggle — that 
 " was, the existence of an empire, which rivalled 
 " his own in greatness, etc. It was evident that 
 " war alone could decide this awful contention — 
 
 this great and eternal struggle of the poor 
 
 against the rich, etc." 
 
 The author had already stated that the origin 
 of the war had reference to England, and to the 
 necessity of maintaining the continental system, 
 as the only means of forcing the British cabinet 
 into a peace. If to this real cause he added that 
 the result of such a war would be productive of 
 advantage to Europe and of glory to the Emperor, 
 whom it would proclaim as the defender of civili- 
 zation against barbarism, he would be understood 
 by men of candor. But when such important 
 interests are under discussion, what can be the 
 meaning of that vague, and rather silly decima- 
 
 te
 
 CHAPTER I. 55 
 
 tion, notwithstanding its philosophical pretention ; 
 that this war was the struggle of the poor against 
 the rich P 
 
 " The Grandees who formed the court of Napo- 
 lion were alarmed at this additional war." 
 
 Those great officers are the ministers of the 
 treasury and of finances, whom it was rather 
 strange to confound with the courtiers. The 
 author, conformably to his plan, causes them to 
 speak out. The oue Count Mollien, says that hit 
 finances required repose ; a very insignificant ex- 
 pression from so exact a man. The other, the 
 Duke of Gaeta, declares that never had the slate 
 of his revenues been more flourishing. How are 
 the two opinions to be reconciled ? To be sure, 
 the Duke of Gaeta, who understood his business 
 so well, is going to speak about rations of bread 
 and forage like a minister of war, and of tar, 
 masts and tow, like a minister of marine. How 
 admirably contrived ! But the best invention is 
 that of which the author gives all the credit to the 
 Emperor. His allies, and not his enemies, shall 
 be made to pay the expenses of the war. The na- 
 ture of the invention may be easily perceived, and 
 no less so its absurdity. The allies of Napoleon 
 were Prussia, who still owed him considerable 
 sums, and from which he had nothing to ask, 
 Denmark, who had nothing to give, and Austria, 
 who would have resisted any attempt. 
 
 " It was that perhaps which drew upon him the 
 " reproach of availing himself of a method he had
 
 56 BOOK II. 
 
 (C rejected in the Austrian war, and of which the 
 " celebrated Pitt had set the example in 1793." 
 
 Does the author mean thereby to insinuate that 
 Napoleon reckoned upon a measure which, al- 
 though sometimes resorted to in politics, is dis- 
 owned by morality ? History no doubt reproaches 
 the memory of Frederick the Great and of Pitt, 
 with their want of scruple in this respect. In 
 our days we have seen certain agents who, un- 
 known to their employers, have carried on those 
 dark practices. Napoleon's proud character 
 always recoiled at the exercise of similar frauds. 
 If he had intended to circulate false Russian bank 
 notes in Russia, nothing could have been more 
 easy to a man who held one half of Europe at his 
 disposal, and who had more than one point of con- 
 tact with the Russian dominions. The author 
 who shortly afterwards says that Napoleon did 
 not resort to this measure, was therefore perfectly 
 free to leave the subject unnoticed. One might 
 be inclined to believe that he was unwilling to 
 lose the opportunity of aspersing the hero of his 
 history.
 
 57 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 tt 
 
 u Prince Poniatowski, however, to whom this 
 " expedition appeared to hold out the prospect of 
 a throne, generously united his exertions with 
 those of the Emperor's ministers, to demonstrate 
 " its danger. He depicted Lithuania as an im- 
 " practicable desert ; its nobility as already be- 
 " come half Russian, etc." 
 
 The opinion of Prince Poniatowski was entirely 
 different from that which the author attributes to 
 him. He must have been quite unacquainted with 
 Lithuania, had he described it as a desert and 
 rugged country. What a desert in fact is the 
 rich and fertile Samogitia, which forms part of 
 the government of Lithuania ! Had not the author 
 made the campaign of Russia, he might then 
 have credit for sincerity. The prince knew too 
 well that the whole of Lithuania had remained 
 heartilv attached to Poland as the mother coun- 
 try ; and Mr. de Segur himself notices the 
 arrival at Tilsit of a deputation from Wilna 
 coining to solicit of him (Napoleon) the restoration 
 of their national independence, and professing the 
 same devotion to his cause as had been shewn at 
 Warsaw. It is not surprising that the mareehaL
 
 58 BOOK II. 
 
 des-logis of tne palace, having only vague notions, 
 should alternately contradict his own assertions. 
 But since he pretends to write history, how does 
 it happen that he should not have endeavoured to 
 know the truth, and especially to avoid falling 
 into repeated contradictions with himself? 
 
 " He once more addressed himself to three of 
 his great officers."* 
 
 The author gives us in this place the minutes of 
 a kind of council of his own invention, where the 
 actors he exhibits are made to speak according to 
 his own fancy. This will be found to be an indif- 
 ferent copy of a passage in the dialogue between 
 Eucrates and Sylla, which he uses without stating 
 from whence it is derived ; and which is certainly 
 the most entertaining of this part of the work. 
 When he afterwards causes one of his three per- 
 sonages to speak out respecting the bad condition 
 of the army, he does not record any answer of Na- 
 poleon on so essential a subject. No doubt he 
 thought that the Emperor had sufficiently an- 
 swered it by the result of the first battle. The 
 reader, however, may easily appreciate the import- 
 ance which Mr. de Segur endeavors to ascribe 
 to the advices of those three personages. One of 
 them, the Duke de Frioul, had twice performed 
 the journey from St. Petersburgh to Memel with 
 dispatches. Allowing the possibility of knowing 
 
 * The Duke de Frioul, the Count de Segur (the author's fa- 
 ther), the Duke de Vicenza.
 
 CHAPTER II. 59 
 
 a country by travelling express through it, the 
 Duke de Frioul could have only become acquaint- 
 ed with Esthonia, Ingria, and Livonia, which, 
 properly speaking, are no part of Russia. Ano- 
 ther, the Count de Segur,* must j^ave known the 
 Russian monarchy and its politics in the days of 
 Catherine ; but his ideas, belonging as they did to 
 a period so remote, were not applicable to exist- 
 ing circumstances. As for the third personage, 
 (the Duke of Vicenza), he had been residing at 
 St. Petersburgh many years; his opinion would 
 have carried more weight, had not Napoleon been 
 well aware of his predilection for the Russians. 
 
 After endeavoring to establish the resemblance 
 between the expedition of St. Louis to Africa, and 
 that of Napoleon to Russia, the author adds :" the 
 " latter was indispensable to the completion of a 
 " great design on the point of being accomplished ; 
 " its object was not out of reach ; the means 
 " for reaching it were not inadequate." Strange 
 conclusion of a chapter, the whole object of which 
 was to prove the contrary. The great design on 
 the point of being accomplished, was to force a 
 peace upon England by the continental system. 
 To say that its completion was indispensable, that 
 the object was not out of reach } that the means for 
 reaching it was not inadequate, is tantamount to a 
 justification, in every point of view, of that great 
 undertaking. This, nevertheless, is not Mr. de 
 Segur's motive for writing his work. 
 
 *The author's father.
 
 60 BOOK II. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 We have just seen Napoleon at variance with 
 his great dignitaries, his ministers, his great offi- 
 cers ; we will now see " that mysterious man, giv- 
 " ing to his features, so formidable to multitudes, 
 " the expression of a mild and affecting benevolence, 
 " yielding to the impulse of the most frank and con- 
 " fiding disclosure, addressing you with a caressing 
 " voice, exercising a kind of magnetic influence 
 u over the military man, over a minister* of high 
 " rank under the ancien regime, cutting matters 
 " short with superficial and inexperienced indivi- 
 '" duals, before whom he neither wished to explain 
 " himself nor to dissemble, and saying to them : 
 " You understand nothing of all this ; you are ig- 
 " norant of its antecedents and its consequents" 
 
 We would be inclined to believe that the mare 1 - 
 chal-des-logis of the palace reckons himself in the 
 number of those who assisted at the council ; for 
 the latter expression cannot apply to any one more 
 appropriately than to the author of the campaign 
 of 1812. 
 
 Next in turn come the princes of the empress 
 Josephine's family, and cardinal Fesch who is se- 
 
 * Count MoU.
 
 C H A PTE R III. 61 
 
 verely rebuked for his obstinacy in refusing- to see 
 a star at mid-day. 
 
 These personages are made to speak according 
 to the fancy of the author, who attributes speeches 
 to Napoleon which no one heard^im utter, and lie 
 less than any one, since he rarely approached the 
 Emperor. This prince always unmoved at the 
 sight of the greatest dangers, and more indefati- 
 gable than ever, is represented in this chapter,as 
 being pre-occupied with the idea of his own death, 
 and as already experiencing so great a decline of 
 strength as to have a difficulty in enduring the 
 shortest field sports, even the gallop of the most 
 gentle horse. 
 
 At the moment of telling us " that one great in- 
 quietude possessed Napoleon : it was the idea of 
 " his death" the author shews us " the emperor's 
 " intellect as both too strong and too enlightened 
 " to permit such vast events to depend upon a 
 " weakness." 
 
 Whilst he exhibits him as determined upon a 
 war " to consolidate the fabric of the great empire, 
 " by driving- back the Russian power beyond the 
 " Boristhenes," and makes him say " that peace 
 " was to be conquered at Constantinople, that is 
 " to say at the extremity of Europe," (take notice 
 of this charitable insinuation), he represents him 
 as adding, " that in going to Russia it was the 
 
 English alone whom he meant to attack ; that the 
 
 campaign would be short ; that afterwards France 
 :i would be at rest," 

 
 62 BOOK II. 
 
 Whilst presenting to our view " his precipita- 
 " tion in commencing this dreadful war," he shews 
 him as waking up his mind to it only after a course 
 of painful hesitation, and when he breaks out in 
 the audience of t?he 3rd August, 1811, " that burst 
 " of indignation, which was the presage of war, was 
 " an additional proof of his repugnance to com- 
 " mence it — and a menace by which he imagined 
 " he might arrest the preparations of Alexander." 
 
 The reflecting reader will hurry over those pages 
 which afford him no information, except that the 
 author does not even know to what opinion he 
 is to adhere. 
 
 In order to conclude by an attractive incident, 
 he relates that singular dialogue between Napoleon 
 and an ambassador just returned from the seat of 
 his mission, where he had not observed the pre- 
 parations made by Russia, although they command- 
 ed the attention of all Europe. " And you too have 
 " become a Russian. You have been seduced by the 
 " Emperor Alexander — Yes, Sire, because I view in 
 " him a Frenchman." Napoleon would have been 
 justified in charging M. de Vicenza of being a 
 Russian, had this minister thought like Alexan- 
 der ; but is it probable, that the minister should 
 have confessed that he had been seduced, and that, 
 during his stay at St. Petersburgh, he had found a 
 French Emperor in the Emperor of Russia? The 
 author, however, who does not feel sensible of the 
 improbability and the ridicule of the anecdote, 
 fancies that he is writing a history.
 
 CHAPTER IV, 63 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 In a chapter of five pages, devoted to the nego- 
 tiation which had in view to bring the two parties 
 together, and to prevent a war, the author exhibits 
 Napoleon as preserving the secret of his oi«m embar- 
 rassment ; and does not perceive that he who de- 
 liberates has not come to a decision of being the 
 aggressor. The Emperor, whom he has hitherto 
 represented to us as so ardent in the prosecution 
 of his undertaking, who, two pages farther on, is 
 found to dream only of Moscow, discovers all of 
 a sudden what he had not yet suspected, that the 
 state of his affairs does not allow him to engage in 
 the war. His reverses in Spain, his disputes with 
 the pope, the checks experienced by the Turks, the 
 uneasiness he felt respecting the means of subsist- 
 ence of France, which now reckons only "old 
 " men, children, wives, and mothers in tears, and 
 " bowed in sadness to the earth, which but for 
 " them would remain uncultivated." * All this 
 is revealed to him in one " of those long winter 
 " nights when its star seemed to shine upon him in 
 
 * The census of the French nation, made after Napoleon's 
 downfall, the result of which shows that the population of France 
 had augmented by five millions, affords a victorious refutation 
 of this charge.
 
 64 B O O K I I. 
 
 " all its brilliancy." The different ruling genii of 
 the vanquished nations appear in threatening- atti- 
 tudes before him. Perplexed at this airy vision, 
 " he became thoughtful and agitated. He collect- 
 " ed accounts of the actual condition of the differ- 
 Ci ent powers of Europe ; * he ordered an exact 
 " and complete summary of them to be made." 
 
 In perusing- the foregoing phrases, we lose all 
 trace of the genius of Napoleon, in whom boldness 
 was so much tempered with circumspection, who 
 approached no question without examining- it un- 
 der every aspect, who carried his conceptions into 
 rapid execution, only because he had long- and 
 deeply meditated them ? Was it the author's in- 
 tention to write a melo-drame or a history ? Na- 
 poleon felt an anxious desire to bring the affairs of 
 Spain to an issue. He regretted being compelled 
 to neglect them, in order to repel a powerful ene- 
 my raised against him by the indefatigable hatred 
 of England. He would not have run the risk of 
 compromising his work, for the dazzling, but un- 
 seasonable glory of adding the surname of Russian 
 to his other titles as a conqueror, unless he be 
 supposed of unsound mind. If this is not what 
 Mr. de Segur desired to prove, such, however, is 
 the morality to be deduced from his work. 
 
 He places himself by the side of the Emperor, as 
 a witness of his agitations " in the midst of those 
 
 * What can be meant by the actual condition of the different 
 powers of Europe?
 
 tc 
 
 IS 
 
 C H A P T E R IV. ()5 
 
 " long wintry nights, when individuals are left 
 :e more than usually to their own reflections," and 
 forgets that Napoleon's nights, during which he 
 teas left to his own reflections were uninterrupted 
 by witnesses ; and yet the author has seen him 
 " reclined on a sofa, start up convulsively, fancy- 
 " ing he heard his name, and exclaiming : who 
 " calls me?" Not unlike the Orestes of Crebillon, 
 or the drunkard from whom the tragedian borrow- 
 ed that sublime movement. 
 
 So far there is no negotiation ; we now come to 
 it. 
 
 On the 25th March, 1812, Czernicheff was 
 the bearer of new proposals to his sovereign. 
 " Napoleon offered to make a declaration that he 
 " would contribute, neither directly nor indirect- 
 " ly, to the re-establishment .of the kingdom of 
 " Poland." He had given his consent a year be- 
 fore to this declaration, and precisely in the same 
 terms. 
 
 On the 1st of January, 1811, the Duke of 
 Vicenza had signed with Mr. de Romanzoflf a 
 treaty, which was sent to Paris with the Emperor 
 Alexander's ratification. France, by the first 
 article, engaged that the kingdom of Poland should 
 not be re-established. Many other articles were ex- 
 tremely favorable to the views of aggrandizement 
 entertained by Russia. But Napoleon was par- 
 ticularly offended at the first article. " I can- 
 not command fate," said he, " all that I can do 
 is to engage not to contribute, directly or indi-
 
 66 BOOK II. 
 
 rectly, to the restoration of the kingdom of Po- 
 land." The first article having been thus modified, 
 the Emperor made no other alteration in the 
 others. He signed the treaty, and sent it to St. 
 Petersburgh. Alexander expressed himself morti- 
 fied at Napoleon's refusing to give a pure and 
 simple ratification to a treaty which he, Alexander, 
 had ratified. These discussions, the increase of 
 the Russian army on the frontiers of the dutchy 
 of Warsaw, Russia's insisting upon receiving 
 Dantzig in exchange for Oldenburgh, all tended 
 to confirm the suspicions of Napoleon as to Alex- 
 ander's intention of availing himself of the ob- 
 stacles which France had to encounter in Spain, 
 in order to seize upon Poland. 
 
 Negotiations had therefore been going on for a 
 twelvemonth ; andJVIr. de Segur, who wishes to 
 compress the subject within a page and a half, 
 sees the opening of the negotiation on the 17th 
 April, with the view of bringing it in a few days 
 to a conclusion. In those few lines he certainly 
 exhibits the Emperor as always ready to treat, the 
 Russian Emperor evading negotiations, and the 
 Russian Ambassador , almost at the same time, de- 
 livering the ultimatum, or, in other words, a de- 
 claration of war from his master. The author, 
 who is not easily at a loss, still represents Napo- 
 leon as the aggressor. He will not fail, however, 
 to inform us in another place, that unable to draw 
 the Ambassador out of the circle of Popilius, Na- 
 poleon causes his Minister to write a letter to
 
 CHAPTER IV. 67 
 
 Count de Romanzoff, in order to attempt a recon- 
 ciliation through that direct channel ; that for the 
 same purpose he sends Count de Narbonne to 
 Wilna with a letter to the Emperor Alexander, 
 that not discouraged by the failure of his pacific 
 endeavors, he orders his ambassador, Count de 
 Lauriston, to demand admission to the Russian 
 head-quarters, in order to renew his solicitations, 
 and proposals, and that not until after the inutility 
 of those repeated attempts, does he acquire the 
 certainty that his enemy cannot be disarmed, and 
 that since negotiations were out of the question, 
 peace could no longer be obtained but through a 
 war. Goaded by the Emperor Alexander's con- 
 duct, Napoleon at last takes his departure ; he 
 proceeds against his will to a struggle, which his 
 persevering efforts were not able to avert, and 
 against an enemy who had, for the last two months, 
 declared war against him. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Mr. de Segur bestows six pages to this chapter, 
 which is to bring all the negotiations to an issue ; 
 he might have been more concise, for there is not 
 a word of negotiations in it. It is replete with 
 trifling anecdotes which have no reality, and are 
 
 f2
 
 ce 
 
 08 BOOK II. 
 
 collected in order to afford an opportunity of be- 
 stowing praise upon many persons in whom the 
 Emperor reposed some confidence, and of throw- 
 ing out unfavorable insinuations with respect to 
 one of them. 
 
 First of all Mr. de Talleyrand, " was to be sent 
 " to Warsaw ; but the jealousy of a rival and an 
 " intrigue again involved him in disgrace. Na- 
 " poleon, deluded by a calumny, adroitly circu- 
 " lated, believed that he had been betrayed by 
 " him. His anger was extreme ; his expression 
 " terrible. Savary (the only protector of Talley- 
 rand) made vain efforts to undeceive him." 
 The author omits nothing that will enable us to 
 guess who he means by this jealous and intriguing 
 rival ; it was the Duke de Bassano. The anecdote 
 is as true as the imputation cast upon the cha- 
 racter of that minister. It had in fact occurred 
 to Napoleon to entrust Mr. de Talleyrand with an 
 embassy to bring about the revolution of Poland. 
 He hesitated yet, and this intention was still a 
 secret, when he learnt by private accounts from 
 Vienna that the secret was already known. He 
 did not believe that he had been betrayed ; his 
 anger was not extreme; nor was his expression terri- 
 ble ; the matter did not deserve so much notice. 
 He gave up his plan, and that was all. A letter 
 was written by Mr. de Talleyrand to Wilna at a 
 later period, and Napoleon did not, as is alleged 
 by the author, " compel his secretary to send that 
 letter to the very minister who stood most in
 
 
 CHAPTER V. 09 
 
 dread of Talleyrand's influence. Was it necessary 
 to compel Napoleon's secretary to send a letter 
 upon political matters to the minister who was at 
 the head of that department, because the said 
 minister would have dreaded the influence of 
 Talleyrand, who had entirely lost it for many 
 years ? What has history to do with such idle 
 trash ? 
 
 Next comes another anecdote on the subject of 
 the same minister. " He was heard to repeat, that 
 the Emperor was not sufficiently great ; that it 
 was necessary for him to become greater still, in 
 Jf order to be able to stop." By whom was he 
 heard? was it by Mr. de Segur? Mr. deBassano 
 may have often treated him with kindness ; but no 
 one will believe that he ever communicated his po- 
 litical ideas to him. It is very possible that mini- 
 sters may have been known to approve loudly of 
 the Emperor's plans, and to blame them in a low 
 voice, when the events had pronounced against 
 them. Others have been found to give a courage- 
 ous opposition, though in the hearing of Napoleon 
 only, to resolutions that were in contemplation, 
 but refrain from blaming them, as soon as they 
 had been decided upon, and had become a decree 
 of the sovereign. The latter were performing a 
 double duty. But they have probably not boast- 
 ed of it ; and it is easy to conceive, that Mr. de 
 Segur, who had no intercourse with ministers, ex- 
 cept when he was invited by them to a dinner or 
 to a ball, should not have penetrated very deeply 
 into ministerial secrets.
 
 70 B O O K II. 
 
 He knows, however, as he says, that one mini- 
 ster remained silent ; that if another flattered the 
 Emperor, others did not withhold the truth from 
 him ; the one sighing, the other turning pale, a 
 third reddening with anger ; that the ministers 
 and aids-de-camp of Napoleon " have frequently 
 " been seen to put an end to those discussions, 
 " by bluntly retiring from his presence, and clos- 
 " ing the door with violence after them." * 
 
 Can the marechal-des-logis of the palace, who 
 has, perhaps, had an occasional sight of the out- 
 ward door of the closet, have witnessed those fine 
 sights, when no one else had noticed them ? Mr. 
 de Segur, nothing daunted, adds General Rapp 
 and General Lauriston to this list of opponents. 
 There is but one difficulty in the way ; the first 
 was at Dantzig, and the other at St. Petersburg!). 
 It is, however, well known to all, that the mini- 
 sters and aids-de-camp were too well bred, and 
 Napoleon too sensible of what was due to him, to 
 admit of the possibility of such insults. One might 
 almost believe that the author never approached 
 Napoleon, his ministers, or his aids-de-camp. 
 " He has entered into these details, because 
 they are imperfectly known, because Napoleon 
 in his closet was quite different from the Em- 
 peror in public, and because this portion of the 
 palace has hitherto remained a secret." 
 If it has remained a secret, how has it come to 
 
 * These words are omitted in the translation of Mr. de 
 Segur's work. — translator. 
 
 a 
 tt 
 ct
 
 CHAPTER V. 71 
 
 the knowledge of Mr. deSegur, who, whether as 
 adjutant, or as marechal-des-logis of the palace, 
 never could, upon any plea, have access to its in- 
 terior. The idea which the author pretends to give 
 of the court of the Tuileries, is, in fact, a novel 
 one, and will certainly upset that which Europe 
 had hitherto entertained of it. 
 
 " In that new and serious court, there was little 
 " conversation." 
 
 In that new and serious court, the Emperor was 
 always spoken of with becoming respect, and no 
 secrets were intrusted to those, who, by the nature 
 of their duty, had no business to known them. 
 
 " All were rigorously classed, so that one salon 
 ° knew not what passed in another." How then 
 could Mr. de Segur have become acquainted with 
 what was not known to the ante-room ? 
 
 " It is difficult to comprehend the great events 
 " of history, without a perfect knowledge of the 
 (i character and manners of the principal person- 
 " ages." By this reflection, the author criticises 
 the picture he has drawn ; but he is confident of 
 its correctness. Let us congratulate posterity for 
 having such a guarantee. 
 
 " Meantime a famine threatened France — Na- 
 " poleon was compelled to suspend his departure 
 " . . . .that war, in which the loss of every hour 
 tc was irreparable, was delayed for two months 
 " longer." The author will tell us, in the follow- 
 ing phrase, that those hours were not lost, since 
 " the delay allowed time for the new crops in
 
 72 BOOK II. 
 
 " Russia to grow." But what matters it ; Mr. 
 de Segur will again tell us, at the beginning of the 
 first chapter in the following book, that Napoleon, 
 immediately after he received the ultimatum of 
 the Russian Ambassador, quitted Paris on the 
 9th of May. In fact, that delay of two months had 
 no more existence than the cause of it. So far back 
 as the 15th of August, 1811, and in the midst of the 
 rejoicings on that day, Napoleon, being informed 
 that the harvest did not present a favorable ap- 
 pearance, had, on a sudden, with the aid of seve- 
 ral of his privy councillors, who were brought to 
 St. Cloud by the festivals of that occasion, assem- 
 bled a council, the object of which was to consi- 
 der of the future provisioning of France. On that 
 day he decided upon precautionary measures, the 
 successive development of which was productive 
 of abundant resources against the apprehended 
 calamity. Those measures were so effectual, that, 
 at the end of that very year, he had secured to 
 France all the supplies of provisions which it might 
 stand in need of; so that long before he quitted Paris, 
 his directions had had their complete execution. 
 This was done at an expense to France of only twelve 
 millions ; and the evil was averted. This fact de- 
 served perhaps a place in history : but it conferred 
 too much honor upon Napoleon's government ! ! ! 
 If the author is of opinion that Napoleon ought 
 to have left Paris sooner, instead of discovering an 
 imaginary motive for the delay, he might have 
 found a much more simple one in the advantage
 
 C H A PT E R V. /3 
 
 of allowing- to Austria and Prussia sufficient leisure 
 for preparing to carry into execution the treaties 
 signed in March ; in the necessity of allowing 
 time for the troops upon the Oder to reach the 
 Niemen, and of not neglecting the last hopes of 
 effecting a reconciliation. Whilst a reply to Prince 
 Kourakin was delayed, because it could not have 
 been done without accepting the alternative of 
 war, the minister for foreign affairs communicat- 
 ed directly in writing with Count de Romanzoff. 
 The answer of that minister was expected. It was 
 hoped that he would disavow Kourakin's hostile 
 injunctions. 
 
 Mr. de Segur, however, has decided within 
 himself to let Napoleon leave Paris, but he alleges 
 that he went in quest of a battle. " Such were his 
 anticipations. .. .says our historian, such was 
 Napoleon. Those founders of empires, he adds, 
 are arrested neither by wars, nor earthquakes, 
 nor all the scourges which Providence permits, 
 without deigning to explain their salutary pur- 
 i% pose to its victims?" 
 
 Upon this common-place reflection, which as- 
 sumes to be a philosophical one, and which, from 
 its nature, belongs rather to a sermon than to a 
 historical work, we will merely observe, that the 
 founders of empires, the scourges and earthquakes 
 to which our marechal-des-logis alludes, have had 
 no fatal consequences either to himself or to his 
 family. 
 
 iC 
 
 (t 
 a 
 a 
 tt
 
 74 
 
 BOOK III 
 
 CH AFTER I. 
 
 Napoleon, on his road through the French de- 
 partments, was intoxicated with the proofs of con- 
 fidence aud devotion which he received ; but, says 
 Mr. de Segur, he met with hss affection in Ger- 
 many. This reflection will not, perhaps, be deem- 
 ed uncandid. 
 
 In the meeting at Dresden, which, for an histo- 
 rian worthy of the name, would have originated in 
 serious and important motives, Napoleon, accord- 
 ing to the marechal-des-logis, had no other object 
 than to display and to enjoy his power. But he 
 soon afterwards changes his mind, when he makes 
 the Emperor say to General Desolles : Since the 
 meeting of Dresden has not had the effect of per- 
 suading Alexander to make peace, war alone can 
 accomplish that object. This meeting at Dresden 
 must therefore have arisen out of weighty consi- 
 derations. A person so well informed as Mr. de 
 Segur, might have afforded us some less trivial 
 information respecting that important circum- 
 stance in the life of the Emperor. For, of course, 
 Mr. de Segur is a man of universal information ; 
 at Paris, he penetrates into the councils, and pro-
 
 CHAPTER I. 75 
 
 nounces his opinion upon political matters and 
 upon men ; he sees every thing ; he attends the 
 meeting of sovereigns, their banquets, their most 
 private conversations ; he penetrates into the in- 
 most recesses of hearts ; therein he discovers the 
 workings of humiliation, of resentment, and of 
 hatred. The very secrets of Empresses are con- 
 fided to him : the one is ertvious of her step-daugh- 
 ter's attire ; the other weeps if Napoleon beseeches 
 her to retrench a part of her ornaments, in order 
 to spare her step-mother from humiliation. The 
 marechal-des-logis of the palace thus becomes a 
 mediator between the Empress and her husband. 
 " Meantime, from the very first days of the 
 " meeting, surprise was expressed at the absence 
 " of the King of Prussia from the imperial court : 
 " but it was soon understood that he was in some 
 " measure prohibited from coming. This prince 
 * f was the more alarmed in proportion as he had 
 " less deserved such treatment. His presence 
 would have been embarassing. Encouraged, 
 however, by Narbonne, * he resolved upon 
 making his appearance. His* arrival is an- 
 " nounced to the Emperor, who, in a moment of 
 " irritation, refuses to receive him. What did 
 « this prince want with him? Was it not enough 
 to be importuned with his letters and his inces- 
 sant complaints? Why persecute him also with 
 his presence ? What did he come to ask of him ? 
 
 H 
 
 a 
 
 k 
 
 * Mr. de Narbonne was at Wilna at this period.
 
 76 BOOK III. 
 
 " Duroc insists ; he reminds Napoleon of the ne- 
 " cessity Prussia is to him against Russia : in- 
 " stantly the doors of the Emperor are thrown 
 " open to the monarch, etc." 
 
 The author, according to his practice, omits 
 nothing, quotes the very expressions, names the 
 witnesses. Those witnesses, long dead, will cer- 
 tainly not contradict him ; but we stand in no 
 need of them ; the naked facts are sufficient to 
 shew that, in all those five pages, there is not one 
 word of truth. 
 
 Napoleon was expected at Berlin ; the palaces 
 which were destined for him were prepared. He 
 gave up this journey ; but, desirous as he was to 
 please the King of Prussia, he hastened to com- 
 municate to him the motives which had obliged 
 him to alter his intentions, and to invite him to 
 meet at Dresden the illustrious guests of the 
 King of Saxony. Mr. Benoit, who was attached 
 to the department for foreign affairs, was sent to 
 Berlin with a letter from the Duke of Bassano to 
 the king, and with dispatches for Mr. de Harden- 
 berg and Mr. de St. Marsan. These letters met 
 with a most eager welcome. The king hastened 
 to accept of the invitation ; he proceeded to Dres- 
 den, and the reception he met with upon his ar- 
 rival, was such as was to be expected from what 
 already had taken place. In the warmth of his 
 feelings, he offered his son to Napoleon as his 
 aid-de-camp, and presented him to the Emperor's 
 aids-de-camp, soliciting their friendship for their 
 illustrious companion.
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 What becomes of that intervention of Count de 
 Narbonne, and of the resistance of the irritated 
 Emperor, who refuses to see the King of Prussia? 
 What becomes of the opposition of Duroc tasking 
 his master, and of the charitable insinuation that 
 the King of Prussia was the more alarmed in pro- 
 portion as he had less cause for self-reproach/ 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The object of Mr. de Segur, in this chapter, 
 seems to be to represent the army as a host of 
 plunderers. He goes so far as to say that some 
 of the leaders set the example, " that there was a 
 " positive emulation in evil." The author de- 
 scribes Napoleon as always threatening, but to no 
 purpose, and unable to command obedience. He 
 pretends that " he might reproach himself as the 
 " cause of the disorders which provoked him." 
 What does Mr. de Segur understand by this? 
 Does he wish to insinuate that they are encourag- 
 ed by the Emperor, or that he has neglected the 
 means to prevent them? Assuredly not, since he 
 states that Napoleon is desirous to maintain order ; 
 that he gives a smart rebuke to a foreign prince, 
 the king's son, on account of the disorders com- 
 mitted by his troops ; " that immense quantities
 
 it 
 it 
 a 
 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 
 78 BOO K III. 
 
 " of provisions, adequate to the immensity of the 
 " undertaking, were accumulated ; no detail had 
 been neglected. The active and impassioned 
 genius of Napoleon was then entirely directed 
 towards that most important and most difficult 
 " department of his expedition ; in that he was 
 profuse of exhortation, orders, and even money 
 .... His days were employed in dictating in- 
 structions upon the subject ; at night, he fre- 
 quently rose to repeat them, etc." 
 What inference are we to draw from these con- 
 tradictions? How could Napoleon direct these 
 reproaches to himself, when he is represented by 
 the author as blameless ? 
 
 Not content with exhibiting the army as in a 
 state of disorganization, previously to the opening 
 of the campaign, he presents the Marshals as at 
 variance with each other. He fancies a warm al- 
 tercation between Davoust and Berthier, whose 
 hatred for each other is, according to him, of 
 many years' standing. 
 
 " In 1809, he says, Berthier was Davoust's 
 " chief for some days, during which the latter 
 " gained a battle, and saved the army by disobey- 
 " ing his orders. Hence arose a terrible hatred 
 " between them." Here again the author is 
 grossly mistaken respecting facts which are known 
 to every one. In 1809, the Emperor arrived at 
 the army in the night of the 16th to the 17th 
 April. The Austrians had crossed the Inn, and 
 were marching towards the Iser. No battle had
 
 C H A P T E R II. 79 
 
 taken place ; there had been nothing more than 
 a few skirmishes between the Austrians and the 
 Bavarian troops. Napoleon did not approve of 
 Berthier's arrangement up to that time ; and he 
 hastened to send orders to the several corps of his 
 army. The execution of those orders gave rise to 
 the engagements of Paffenhoffen and of Tann on 
 the 19th, of Abensberg on the 20th, of Landshut 
 on the 21st, and to the battle of Eckmiihl on the 
 22d. In Napoleon's estimation, the engagement 
 of Abensberg, the manoeuvre of Landshut, and 
 the battle of Eckmiihl are amongst the boldest, 
 the most scientific, and most brilliant of his ope- 
 rations. How then can the author assert that 
 Davoust gained a battle and saved the army by 
 acting in disobedience of Berthier's orders, since, as 
 we have just pointed out, there had been no battle 
 until the Emperor's arrival, and since those that 
 took place were fought by his own orders, and 
 under his immediate command? And yet he 
 makes Davoust accuse Berthier of treachery, with 
 a view to introduce this incredible exclamation 
 of Napoleon :— " It sometimes happens that I en- 
 " tertain doubts of the fidelity of my oldest com- 
 " panions in arms ; but at such times my head is 
 " bewildered with grief, and I hasten to repel so 
 f cruel a suspicion." It requires a head organized 
 like that of Mr. de Segur, to invent such ideas. It 
 is very clear that his work was written since the 
 year 1814.
 
 80 BOOK III. 
 
 Something more extraordinary is forthcoming. 
 Davoust' s army is completely provided with every 
 thing. " He had anticipated every want ; all 
 " means of supplying them were ready." The 
 author continues : " Such great exertions ought 
 " to have given satisfaction ; they had a contrary 
 " effect." How are we to characterize such a 
 reflection ? What ! could it be possible to dis- 
 please Napoleon, by obeying his orders ? 
 
 " This marshal, the Emperor was told, assumes 
 (C to have foreseen, directed, and executed every 
 " thing. Is the Emperor, then, to be no more 
 " than a spectator of this expedition ? Must the 
 " glory of it devolve upon Davoust ?" Who would 
 not expect that the Emperor would check the man 
 who could hold this language to him. Such, how- 
 ever, is not the case. The gentle Napoleon, as 
 if struck with a ray of light, exclaims in perfect 
 simplicity : " In fact, one would think that it was 
 " Davoust who commanded the army." 
 
 To speak plain, all this empty talk is quite 
 absurd. Napoleon felt himself much beholden 
 to Davoust for the skill which he displayed in 
 leading his troops and in providing to their wants ; 
 he held up the administrative talents of this gene- 
 ral as a model ; and those who really approached 
 the Emperor have often observed with what com- 
 placency he dwelt upon such praises. Davoust 
 possessed a peculiar merit on this point ; it has 
 never been contested to him ; and it would have
 
 CHAPTER II. 81 
 
 been very strange if Napoleon, to whom he ren- 
 dered such indispensable services, had expressed 
 dissatisfaction in return for them. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 This chapter opens with a faithful description, 
 upon which the reader delights to rest, as a relief 
 from the painful feelings that have oppressed him 
 from the very commencement of the work. These 
 pages inspire us with regret that the same stamp 
 of truth should not have marked the whole of Mr. 
 de Segur's production ; but he hastens to abandon 
 this plain and candid course, and to fall again 
 into the crooked road of conjectures and wan- 
 derings. 
 
 He presents a very incorrect account of the 
 strength of the army. It is proved by official do- 
 cuments in our possession, which are covered 
 with annotations in Napoleon's own hand writing, 
 that the army reckoned, at the passage of the 
 Niemen, 325,000 fighting men, namely : 150,000 
 Frenchmen, and 170,500 allied soldiers, and 984 
 pieces of cannon. 
 
 Mr, de Segur estimates at 445,200 men the 
 number of troops that entered Russia on the 
 opening of the campaign. This exceeds the 
 amount laid down in the statement procured by 
 Mr. de Czernicheff for the Russian staff, through 
 
 G
 
 82 BOOK II. 
 
 the bribery of a person employed in the war de- 
 partment, who lost his life by that treasonable 
 act. This statement exhibited only 414,600 
 men ; and if it be borne in mind that each 
 corps is therein laid down at its full complement, 
 if we take into account the losses which they 
 must necessarily have experienced on their 
 marches towards the frontiers of Russia, there 
 will be no difficulty in accounting for the great 
 exaggeration in Mr. de Segur's statement. 
 
 In the subtile and metaphysical analysis of the 
 sentiments with which the army is inspired, we 
 vainly seek for those sentiments most familiar to 
 Frenchmen, honor and the love of country, names 
 not even mentioned. Is this a mere omission? 
 Or is the author so unfortunate as not to have 
 felt their charm ? He mentions impulses as fri- 
 volous as they are devoid of elevation. " To 
 " these," he says, " must certainly be added the 
 " hope of plunder ; for the exacting ambition of 
 " Napoleon had as often disheartened his soldiers, 
 " as the disorders of the latter had tarnished his 
 " glory. A compromise was necessary : ever 
 " since 1805, there was a sort of mutual under- 
 " standing, on his part to wink at their plunder, 
 " on theirs, to yield to his ambition." 
 
 How could a French soldier be found to assign 
 the hope of plunder as an incentive ? How odious 
 is the act which he dares to present to our ideas ! ! 
 On perusing those lines, which we feel a repug- 
 nance in quoting, the French veterans will indig-
 
 CHAPTER III. 83 
 
 nantly reject the dedication the author makes to 
 them of a work in which he offers them so griev- 
 ous an affront. Our bitterest enemies have never 
 ventured upon an accusation so disgraceful to 
 French renown. It was reserved for the mare- 
 chal-des-logis of the palace to load himself with 
 the responsibility. 
 
 Have we not all witnessed the Emperor's anx- 
 iety to repress every disorder in the army ? Eager 
 to be made acquainted with the truth, he ques- 
 tioned the inhabitants as well as his officers. 
 Whenever he was approached by any one coming 
 from a division or corps of his army, or from the 
 road which the troops had inarched over, his 
 first questions were directed to ascertaining what 
 was taking place in the rear. No sooner was the 
 truth made known to him, than he instantly took 
 his resolution. He formed moveable columns ; 
 he wrote to the generals, to the commandants of 
 towns on the route of the army ; he threatened 
 with his displeasure, if the disorders were not 
 immediately checked. He constantly repeated 
 that plunder disgraces an army, and destroys the 
 resources of a well disciplined soldier. If we are 
 to select an occasion when his anxiety was more 
 particularly displayed, we take up the very period 
 pointed out by the author as that of the disgrace- 
 ful occurrence by which he endeavors to tar- 
 nish the glory of the chief, of the army, and of 
 France. Mr. de Segur was ignorant of all this, 
 because Mr. de Segur has neither witnessed, noi 
 
 g 2
 
 84 BOOK III. 
 
 had it in his power to witness any thing. The 
 opportunities for his petty observations were con- 
 fined, by his inferior situation, within too narrow 
 a sphere. How does it happen, however, that he 
 is unacquainted with the severe orders of the day 
 dated at St. Poelten in 1805, etc. etc. ? How, is 
 he not aware that, amongst other examples, the 
 Emperor caused a grenadier of the guards to be 
 tried and shot at Berlin in 1806, as well as two 
 soldiers of the light troops also belonging to the 
 guards, when at Madrid in 1808, because they 
 had been convicted of plunder ? etc. 
 
 How are we to reconcile the odious imputations 
 in page 109, with what the author says in page 
 112, which contains this remarkable disavowal ? 
 " We love to see in him the companion of our 
 " toils, the chief who led us on to renown ; our 
 " self-love was flattered by the wonder and admi- 
 ration which he inspired — period of intoxication 
 and prosperity, during which the French sol- 
 dier, lord of every thing by victory, held him- 
 self in greater estimation than the ruler or even 
 " the monarch whose estates he was traversing ! 
 " To him it appeared that the kings of Europe 
 " only reigned with the permission of his chief and 
 " of his armies." 

 
 85 
 
 BOOK IV 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 " Napoleon satisfied, now declares himself." 
 
 Such is the beginning of this chapter. The 
 author forgets that, in the preceding pages, he has 
 represented the Emperor as being constantly 
 " irritated and dissatisfied." What, then, can 
 give him satisfaction, now that all attempts at a 
 peace have proved unavailing, and that he is com- 
 pelled to have recourse to arms ? Has the object 
 of Mr. de Segur been to insinuate that Napoleon's 
 eager desire for peace was assumed with the hope 
 of obtaining war ? If it had been his wish to 
 write an impartial history, he would not have 
 passed unnoticed an important fact which was 
 known to all Europe ; namely, that the return of 
 Mr. Prevost, the secretary of legation, who arrived 
 at Gumbinen on the 19th of June, brought the 
 first intelligence to the Emperor, that the order 
 given to General Lauriston to repair to the pre- 
 sence of the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, could 
 not be carried into effect, in consequence of his 
 having been refused passports ; and that the 
 last hope of maintaining peace was consequently 
 destroyed. The Emperor's proclamation to
 
 86 BOOK III. 
 
 his army was not issued until three days after- 
 wards. 
 
 " At Tilsit," said Napoleon, " Russia swore 
 " an eternal alliance with France, and war to 
 " England. She now infringes her oath. She 
 a refuses to afford any explanation of her extra- 
 " ordinary conduct, until the French eagles shall 
 " have re-crossed the Rhine, and thereby left our 
 " allies at her mercy." 
 
 Such were the true motives of the war, and they 
 are candidly laid down. The author alludes to 
 the Emperor Alexander's proclamation, merely 
 to give it the advantage over that of Napoleon ; 
 he finds it both candid and moderate. Candid ! 
 When the Emperor turns a political war into a 
 war of religion and fanaticism. Moderate no 
 doubt it was ; but why was it so ? because this 
 prince was frightened at the false position in 
 which he was placed. 
 
 Ever since 1810, all his actions had for object 
 an invasion of the Dutchy of Warsaw. The ar- 
 rival of the Russian divisions from Moldavia to 
 the frontiers of Poland ; the extraordinary re- 
 cruiting effected throughout the Russian empire, 
 at a period when, with the exception of the garri- 
 sons in the Prussian fortresses, there was no other 
 French army in Germany than a small corps at 
 Hamburgh ; the dark intrigues carrying on with 
 the cabinet of Berlin, such were the indications 
 of the projects of Russia. If any doubt could be 
 entertained on the subject, the distribution of
 
 CHAPTER I. 87 
 
 the Russian armies, ranged along the borders of 
 Prussia and of Poland, the immense stores col- 
 lected at Wilna, Minsk, etc. would carry convic- 
 tion to the mind of the most sceptic. 
 
 Had Alexander merely intended to hold him- 
 self upon the defensive, assuredly he would not 
 have stationed his troops along a range of fron- 
 tiers sixty leagues in extent, nor would he have 
 established such immense magazines on his first 
 line. Having been taken unawares by the skil- 
 ful manoeuvres of the Emperor, and by the rapi- 
 dity of his marches, he found his centre driven 
 back, and the safety of his left wing brought into 
 imminent danger. We must add, that, whilst he 
 was issuing his proclamation, he sent Balachoff, 
 his minister of police, to Napoleon's head quarters, 
 with a view to arrest the progress of the French 
 army under the pretence of negotiations. To 
 these causes is to be ascribed the moderate tone 
 of Alexander's proclamation. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 We are now come to the passage of the Nie- 
 
 men. 
 
 Napoleon," says the author, " who had tra- 
 ' veiled thus far in a carriage, now mounts his 
 6 horse." Does Mr. de Segur mean to insinuate
 
 88 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 that Napoleon disdained to share the fatigues of 
 the common soldier, and comfortably seated in 
 his carriage, conducted the war in this manner ? 
 Those who have known him are aware that when 
 no object of importance required his attention 
 upon the road, he afforded himself, in a carriage, 
 that rest which his various engagements other- 
 wise prevented him from enjoying. It more fre- 
 quently, however, afforded him an opportunity of 
 continuing his occupations. " Napoleon recon- 
 " noitred the Russian river (the Niemen) without 
 " disguising himself, as was falsely asserted." As 
 Mr. de Segur attaches some importance to being 
 thought well informed of a fact which in itself is 
 very trifling, he ought to have made himself better 
 acquainted with it. He would have been correct 
 had he stated that on the 23d of June the Em- 
 peror, accoutred in the cloak and police cap of a 
 Polish light horseman belonging to the squadron 
 of his guard upon duty, proceeded to recon- 
 noitre the Niemen. Napoleon did not go under 
 cover of the night ; first, because the obscurity 
 would have prevented his selecting a spot from 
 whence he might cross over ; next, because, in 
 this country, it is already day-light at two o'clock 
 in the month of June 
 
 How can Mr. de Segur assert that Napoleon, 
 in this reconnoitring, crossed the frontier, when it 
 was only on the 23d, at ten o'clock at night, that 
 the army began to cross over ? Did he make that 
 incorrect assertion, merely with the view to pre-
 
 CHAPTER II. 89 
 
 sent the following* coincidence : " that five months 
 " afterwards Napoleon was only enabled to re- 
 " cross this frontier under cover of the same ob- 
 " scurity ;" a fact as incorrect as the intention is 
 unfriendly. 
 
 The author's description of the passage of the 
 river, and of the night during which it was ef- 
 fected, would lead one to suppose that he had 
 never slept at the bivouac. What a strange idea 
 military men will form of him, when they read 
 his lamentations at having passed a fine sum- 
 mer's night under the canopy of heaven ! Fortu- 
 nately the French soldiers had not suffered so 
 much in their moral by that night in a bivouac, 
 as was the case with Mr. de Segur. It had not 
 cooled their courage, " since their ardour was so 
 " great that two divisions of the advanced guard 
 " contended for the honor of being the first to 
 " pass, and were near coming to blows." Soon 
 afterwards he stations Napoleon at the entrance 
 of the bridge, which he crossed over without hesi- 
 tation, in order to encourage the soldiers with his 
 looks. These are the very soldiers he has just 
 been describing to us as on the point of coming to 
 blows. " They appeared more animated than 
 " he did ; whether it was that he felt oppressed 
 " by so great an aggression, that his enfeebled 
 " frame could not support the weight of the ex- 
 " cessive heat, or that he was already amazed at 
 " finding nothing to conquer." 
 
 Mr. de Segur does not know that when it is
 
 90 BOOK III. 
 
 question of crossing a river without the knowledge 
 of the enemy, the manoeuvres are carried on in 
 such a manner as to avoid meeting them on the 
 opposite side. When this object has been accom- 
 plished, how can there be felt any amazement at 
 finding nothing to conquer ? The only existing 
 obstacle, was the river itself; and that had been 
 conquered. 
 
 Mr. de Segur, however, is unconquered. He 
 has more than one reserve at hand : the enfeebled 
 frame of Napoleon could not support the weight of 
 an excessive heat. So that a general who so often 
 braved the climate of Italy during the dog-days, 
 who, in the midst of the sands of the desert, had 
 patiently borne the heat of a Syrian sky, now, on 
 the banks of the Niemen, was unable to endure 
 the heat of the north of Europe on the 24th of 
 June. The reader is almost inclined to suppose 
 that another Napoleon is alluded to. And, in 
 fact, the picture drawn of him by Mr. de Segur, 
 and exhibited throughout his work, no more re- 
 sembles the general of the army of Italy than it 
 does the general who conquered at Lu tzen,Champs- 
 Aubert, and Montrnirail in the following years. 
 
 Our author admits that what he relates appears 
 improbable ; but this does not at all embarrass 
 him. Napoleon is no longer affected by the heat; 
 he ceases to be amazed at finding no enemy ; a 
 moral cause operates upon him : he feels oppressed 
 by so great an aggression. The phrase is not a 
 French one ; the sentiment is less so. Mr. de
 
 CHAPTER II. 91 
 
 Segur forgets that, in his preceding chapters, he 
 lias represented Prince Kourakin dictating an 
 ultimatum which left no other alternative than 
 that of war ; he forgets that the Russian army had 
 been collected together long before the French 
 army, and that the Emperor Alexander was at 
 the head-quarters of the grand army, before Napo- 
 leon had even quitted Paris on his way toDresden; 
 he forgets those proceedings which are related by 
 himself, and are connected with the refusal to re- 
 main at peace. By introducing the conjunction 
 although, and the often repeated alternative whe- 
 ther, figures to which he strongly adheres, he pre- 
 sents enigmas to his reader, and leaves him to 
 unravel them. But unfortunately amongst the 
 many solutions which he suggests, he never points 
 out the true one. 
 
 te All at once he dashes across the country into 
 " the forest whichfgirts the bank of the river. He 
 " was riding on at full speed ; in his ardour he 
 appeared as if anxious to come singly into con- 
 tact with the enemy, etc." 
 How can a writer, who holds a military rank, 
 presume thus to parody into an extravagance 
 worthy of Don Quixote, the very natural act of a 
 commander-in-chief who is reconnoitring the 
 ground upon which his operations are to be car- 
 ried on ? The Emperor was not guilty of the folly 
 ascribed to him by Mr. de Segur, of riding alone 
 through the woods. He headed a strong recon- 

 
 92 hook iv. 
 
 noitring party of cavalry, and sent others in va- 
 rious directions, in order to obtain some intelli- 
 gence of the enemy. But the marechal-deslogis 
 is ignorant of all this ; he had probably remained 
 near the tents, where his functions retained him. 
 
 This chapter, generally speaking, is written 
 with a view to create an effect ; the author appears 
 accordingly to have placed great dependence upon 
 it. It presents materials for a melo drame. First 
 we find the Emperor reclining in his tent ; de- 
 prived of all strength, in the midst of a breathless 
 atmosphere and a suffocating heat. The night fol- 
 lowed : a few sappers cross the river in a small 
 boat ; they only find an officer of cossacks, who 
 enquires of them who they are — Frenchmen was 
 their reply — What do yon want, rejoined the officer, 
 and wherefore do you come into Russia ? A sapper 
 briskly answered: to make war upon you? to take 
 Wilna ! to deliver Poland ! Upon this the cossack 
 flies hack into the woods ; three musket reports are 
 heard ; this was the signal of the commencement of a 
 mighty invasion. The French columns now debouch. 
 "The genius of conquests kindles our imagina- 
 " tions. Napoleon is seen hastening to plant his 
 " foot on the Russian territory, and taking without 
 " hesitation this first step towards his ruin." The 
 genius of conquests is succeeded by the ge- 
 nius of storms. Omens are not forgotten by the 
 author. " Napoleon's horse stumbles — the day 
 " becomes overcast, the wind rises, a storm comes
 
 CHAPTER II. 93 
 
 " on as great as the enterprise in which we were 
 " engaged." The army would not recognize in 
 this accident the reprobation of so great an aggres- 
 sion. The bridge over the Vilia is broken down; 
 Napoleon is exasperated against it : He is another 
 Xerxes ordering the Hellespont to be chastised. 
 " He affects to despise this obstacle, like every 
 " thing else that opposes him, and orders a Polish 
 " squadron to swim across the river." They all 
 perish. This conclusion of the melo drame sub- 
 stitutes a feeling of abhorrence in lieu of the ridi- 
 cule it had hitherto created. The author casts 
 upon the memory of the Emperor, the imputation 
 of having sacrificed so many brave men to a sense- 
 less anger. Now for the real facts. 
 
 When Napoleon came up to the Vilia, he found 
 that the bridge was broken down. Being desirous 
 to obtain intelligence of the enemy, he ordered a 
 squadron of the regiment of Polish light horse, be- 
 longing to the guards,* to swim across the river, 
 as was the practice of the Cossacks. Some men, 
 who were inferior in horsemanship to the rest, were 
 separated from the squadron ; the only one who 
 perished was a light horse lancer of the first com- 
 pany, named Trzcinski. An officer of the same 
 
 * This was the first squadron, commanded by Kozietulski, and 
 consisting - of the first company, Captain Zaluski, and the 5th, 
 Captain Szeptycki. General Krasinski, who commanded the 
 regiment, plunged into the river in order to save one of his 
 soldiers.
 
 94 BOOK III. 
 
 squadron, Count Joseph Zaluski, then a captain, 
 and now aid-de-camp to the King of Poland, hav- 
 ing abandoned his horse, was on the point of being 
 drowned ; he was saved by some sappers and sol- 
 diers of the light infantry. What becomes of Mr. 
 de Segur's lamentations ? What becomes of that 
 feeling of mingled horror and admiration which he 
 attributes to the army ? 
 
 The case is the same with respect to the storm 
 as great as the enterprise ; it must be reduced to a 
 plain shower of rain. The error into which our 
 historian has fallen, originates in his having read 
 inLabaume, that a storm fell at the moment when 
 the corps of the Viceroy was crossing the Niemen 
 on the 29th of June. He makes it occur when 
 the Emperor passed the Niemen at Kowno on the 
 24th, without reflecting upon the interval of five 
 days that intervened between the two operations. 
 But Mr. de Segur is not so particular. Besides, 
 by presenting this storrn as occurring on the Em- 
 peror's passage of the river, he gave to his narra- 
 tive a much more dramatic coloring, and found 
 an opportunity of grouping together round this 
 pretended phenomenon, the mystical reflections 
 which are so much in accordance with his peculiar 
 turn of mind. It was only after the torrents of 
 rain to which Labaume has alluded, that a great 
 number of horses perished, owing to [a sudden 
 change of the atmosphere to cold. 
 
 Such is the account of the passage of the Nie- 
 men, which is now said to be written in a roman-
 
 C H A P T E R II. 95 
 
 tic style, because it is overloaded with descrip- 
 tions and with trifling details related with high- 
 sounding expressions. We can only qualify it as 
 extravagant ; for such ought to be the designation 
 of a history in which truth comes in for the minor 
 part. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The author carries us to Wilna, which he re- 
 presents as given up to all the transports of joy ; 
 but he takes care to inform us, that this " enthu- 
 (e siasm, unreflecting in some, and the mere effect 
 " of excitement in others, was of short duration." 
 That unreflecting enthusiasm is presented in the 
 same page as the effect of a patriotism still burn- 
 ing ; now a long existing patriotism cannot be 
 an unreflecting sentiment. According to our 
 author, that enthusiasm was excited ; and yet he 
 says that it displayed itself in a general effusion. 
 But an excited sentiment can be nothing more 
 than factitious. Mr. de Segur should inform us 
 in what way it had been kindled. Did the police 
 of Paris precede the advanced guard, in order to 
 prepare applauses for the army on its entrance 
 into Wilna ? 
 
 The Emperor receives here an address from the 
 diet of Warsaw, to which he returns an answer.
 
 96 , B O K IV. 
 
 Mr. de Segur hastens to accuse him of having 
 damped the zeal of the Poles, by the reply which 
 he. made to them. " They were unable," he says, 
 " to comprehend the cause of its circumspection ; 
 " they began to doubt of the intentions of Napo- 
 " leon — even those around him asked each other 
 " what could be the motives of a prudence which 
 u appeared so unseasonable ?" 
 
 If by those around Napoleon are to be under- 
 stood the marechaux-des-logis of his palace, and a 
 few officers who only saw in this campaign the 
 deprivation of the enjoyments of Paris, it is very 
 immaterial to history, that it should be known 
 what was asked of each other by those around the 
 prince. These gentlemen were very far from pos- 
 sessing at that time the importance to which they 
 now lay claim ; and the Emperor will not be 
 judged according to their opinions. 
 
 Does the reader wish to know why the Emperor 
 avoids saying " the kingdom of Poland exists," as 
 the deputies from the confederation of Poland so- 
 licited him to do ? This is the reason. The Em- 
 peror had many interests to reconcile, many duties 
 to fulfil. To obtain a peace was his first duty ; 
 his first interest was to enter into no engagement 
 that might bind him to other interests besides 
 those of France. If Napoleon, whose every word 
 was a law, had said : " The kingdom of Poland 
 " exists," he could not have laid down his arms 
 until it had been actually in existence. If that 
 kingdom owed its existence to the unanimous
 
 CHAPTER III. 97 
 
 efforts of a population covering countries so distant 
 and so extensive, the obligation of not acknow- 
 ledging it, could not have been imposed upon him, 
 any more than the obligation of destroying it 
 when once in existence. It was one thing for 
 him to be pledged by circumstances, and another 
 to be so of his own free will. He had obtained 
 the consent of Austria to the cession of a part of 
 Gallicia, merely in the event of the kingdom of 
 Poland being re-established, as a consequence of the 
 war : (these were the terms of the treaty of al- 
 liance.) What had been understood by a conse- 
 quence of the war} Such a peace as, in bringing 
 war to a termination, would have set Poland free. 
 An insurrection could not be meant, which, when 
 the war was scarcely commenced, would, at the 
 bare utterance of these words, Poland exists, 
 spread itself in Austrian Gallicia, a province con- 
 taining as many hearts devoted to the country, as 
 those provinces in which the most enthusiastic 
 feeling of independence was prevalent. Austria 
 knew this, and was not without apprehensions. 
 
 Was Napoleon so situated at Wilna, as to be 
 justified in pronouncing the solemn expressions 
 which would have realized the fears of that power, 
 or in avoiding those which were alone calculated 
 to quiet her ? Are his duties, his interests, and his 
 conduct sufficiently explained ? The above are not 
 mere conjectures or reports at head-quarters ; 
 they are the substance of the instructions given to 
 Count Otto at the time. In the campaign of 
 
 H
 
 it 
 it 
 
 98 BOOK IV. 
 
 1806, against Prussia, when Prussian Poland 
 alone was in question, Napoleon had maintained 
 the same reserve, because then, as well as now, 
 peace was, with him, the only object of war. 
 
 Mr. de Segur, after explaining to us the politics 
 of the ante-room, describes the " coldness of Li- 
 " thuania, to the public feeling of which province 
 
 a forced direction was given, which placed it, 
 
 as well as Napoleon, in a false position, wherein 
 " everything terminated in errors, contradictions, 
 " and half measures." 
 
 To crown all, it is added that Napoleon per- 
 mitted the formation of a provisional government, 
 the " selection of which was in some respects un- 
 " lucky, and displeased the jealous pride of an 
 " aristocracy at all times difficult to satisfy." It 
 is a pity for the historian, that no part of this state- 
 ment is founded on fact. The Lithuanian govern- 
 ment, composed of seven members, reckoned six 
 amongst them of the highest nobility ; they were 
 Count Soltan, Prince Alexander Sapieha, Count 
 Potocki, Count Sierakowski, Count Prozor, and 
 Count Tysenhaus. The seventh, Mr. Sniadecki, 
 had been appointed representative for the cele- 
 brated university of Wilna, of which he was presi- 
 dent. The above selections were received with 
 unanimous applause. 
 
 " Napoleon calculated upon four millions of 
 " Lithuanians ; he was only seconded by a few 
 " thousand." The whole of the population joined 
 his cause, and gave it every support.
 
 C HAPTKK IV. 99 
 
 . r . 
 
 A guard of honor," says Mr. de Segur, " had 
 " been decreed to him ; only three horsemen fol- 
 " lowed him." Napoleon had left VVilna upwards 
 of a month, when Prince Sapieha offered him a 
 guard of honor, of which he sent him the list ; 
 the Emperor, who was not inclined to accept the 
 offer, refused to receive more than fifty men. 
 This guard was soon considerably augmented, and 
 by Napoleon's orders, it became the nucleus of a 
 second regiment of Polish light horse of the guard ; 
 and the command of it was given to the brave 
 general Konopka. Mr. de Segurhas not seen them; 
 he has not even heard of their fate ; otherwise he 
 would no doubt inform us that several hundreds of 
 those young men, belonging to the most distin- 
 guished families of Lithuania, were surprised at Slo- 
 nim, by a division of cavalry under the orders of 
 General Czaplitz, aid-de-camp of the Emperor of 
 Russia, and fell into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 This event should not have escaped the historian, 
 who keeps an account of three Polish gentlemen 
 who followed the head-quarters, and whom the 
 Prince of Neufchatel had attached to his staff in 
 quality of interpreters. There are few pages in 
 his history, that do not exhibit similar mistakes. 
 We say nothing of the warm discussion between 
 the Polish generals who accompanied the Emperor, 
 and some of the officers doing duty near his per- 
 son. According to the author's system, these con- 
 versations have been prepared in his imagination, 
 merely to afford proofs of the indifference of the 
 
 h 2
 
 (C 
 
 1 00 B O O K IV. 
 
 Lithuanians. The sacrifices, and the misfortunes 
 of that noble and devoted country might have 
 suggested inspirations of a more elevated nature. 
 u This victory, which was so eagerly sought for, 
 was postponed in consequence of the retreat of 
 the enemy. The Emperor might have waited 
 " for his convoys. But he did not wish to forego 
 " his advantage. He pushed forward on the 
 " track of the Russians four hundred thousand 
 " men, with twenty day's provisions (how anxious 
 " the author is to add this, lest any praise should 
 " be bestowed upon such activity,) into a country 
 " which had been unable to maintain the twenty 
 " thousand Swedes under Charles XII." 
 
 The plan of the Emperor had completely suc- 
 ceeded. At the very opening of the campaign, 
 he had separated the left wing commanded by 
 Prince Bagration, the corps of Doctoroff, and the 
 Russian division Dorokow,* from the centre of 
 the Russian army, which was compelled to fly 
 towards its camp at Drissa, in the direction of the 
 Dwina, and to abandon the immense supplies it 
 had accumulated in Lithuania and in Samogitia, 
 leaving us in possession of those two provinces. 
 
 * This division forming the advanced guard of Count Schou- 
 walof, was posted at Orany, where it had been left unprotected, 
 owing to the confusion created at head-quarters by the Empe- 
 ror's movement. It was under the necessity of following the 
 movement of Bagration upon Smolensko. Doctorow's corps only, 
 was enabled to return to the camp at Drissa, by abandoning its 
 baggage and a great number of stragglers.
 
 C HA PT K R III. 101 
 
 On his arrival at Wilna the Emperor did not 
 push forward four hundred thousand men upon 
 the track of the enemy. He caused the first and 
 fourth corps to manoeuvre in such a manner as to 
 prevent a junction, upon the Dwina, of the di- 
 vided corps of the Russian army, whilst he march- 
 ed in person upon Barclay de Tolly with the main 
 body. The result of these operations might have 
 been the destruction of Bragation, who, foretalled 
 by Marshal Davoust, having the viceroy upon his 
 flank, and pressed by the King of Westphalia at 
 the head of upwards of sixty thousand men, could 
 not have passed the Dnieper, without fighting a 
 battle against forces that would have overpowered 
 him by their great superiority of numbers. 
 
 CHAFFER IV. 
 
 Mr. de Segnr allows himself an ample range in 
 this chapter ; he enumerates the plunders, the 
 conflagrations, the disorders, the wretchedness 
 which he pretends to have marked the passage 
 of the army. We will offer but one remark, 
 which is, that in the wars during the brilliant 
 epoch of the reign of Louis XIV, in those of Mar- 
 shals de Saxe and de Broglie, in the glorious cam- 
 paigns of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wag- 
 ram, a writer who would have amused himself in 
 minutely describing whatever took place in the
 
 102 BOOK IV. 
 
 rear of the army, might have presented pictures 
 similar to those of Mr. de Segur, and have created 
 the same emotions in the circles and the boudoirs 
 of Paris. That historian delights in scenes of disor- 
 der and plunder ; he has really the vocation of a 
 painter of calamities. We subjoin, however, a 
 specimen of his style in this character, which 
 will probably not open to him the doors of the 
 academy. In order not to fatigue our reader, we 
 will make our extracts from a single page. 
 
 " Excesses were brought on by so critical a po- 
 " sition. 
 
 " These rude men with arms in their hands, 
 "when assailed by wants so numerous and im- 
 " moderate,could not keep within moderatebounds. 
 
 " They revenged themselves of the proprietors 
 " by destroying their property. 
 
 " There were some who put an end to their ex- 
 " istence, rather than proceed to such extremities. 
 
 " But many became hardened ; one excess led 
 " them into another, just as anger is often in- 
 " flamed in the act of inflicting blows. 
 
 " In the midst of so inauspicious an aspect of 
 " nature, the feelings of nature became blunted. 
 
 " They imagined that their own sufferings jus- 
 " tified their infliction of sufferings upon others/' 
 
 Faithful to his practice of always contradicting 
 himself, Mr. de Segur shortly afterwards informs 
 us, " that these disorders were, however, of rare 
 occurrence in Lithuania." 
 
 He then supposes that a marshal comes to 
 communicate to the Emperor that several soldiers
 
 CHAPTER IV. 103 
 
 of the young guard have died of hunger. He re- 
 presents Napoleon as abruptly interrupting the 
 report, and makes him exclaim (for the Emperor 
 never speaks, he always exclaims) : " This is im- 
 " possible ! where are their twenty days provi- 
 ' sions ? Soldiers well commanded never die of 
 " hunger." 
 
 This reply was very just; but the officer of the 
 palace attributes it to the wish of avoiding distress 
 of mind, by disbelieving- the reports. 
 
 We are next favored, as usual, with the pre- 
 tended gossip of head-quarters. We ought to 
 have the names of those to whom the mar- 
 shal, just returned from Spain, went to make his 
 complaints, and who were no doubt authorised to 
 listen to them. It is a question whether they 
 would confirm the language attributed to them. 
 As to those conversations made up after the event, 
 and in which it was stated " that the health of 
 " their leader was impaired —that he made light 
 " of difficulties — in order to preserve the energy 
 " of mind necessary to surmount them ; that 
 " already disturbed and fatigued by the new and 
 " critical situation into which he had thrown 
 " himself — he was about to push his army for- 
 ward, always forward, in order to bring matters 
 sooner to a termination." They are only wor- 
 thy of remark as displaying the natural inco- 
 herency of ideas in a writer who does not exactly 
 know what he intends to say. 
 
 He closes the chapter by saying that the ar- 
 
 ts
 
 (I 
 (t 
 it 
 {( 
 
 104 BOOK IV. 
 
 rangements of Napoleon " were dictated by the 
 most prudent foresight, but that he suffered 
 himself to be hurried away by habit, by the ne- 
 cessity of short wars, rapid victories, and sudden 
 treaties of peace." This is an ill-founded re- 
 flection. When a question of moment occurred 
 to the mind of Napoleon, he examined it under 
 every aspect, with that extraordinary quickness 
 of perception which, as applied to genius, is like 
 the glance darted from an eagle's eye ; he had no 
 sooner discovered its advantages, than his deci- 
 sion followed with the rapidity of thunder. It is 
 that promptness of execution which led superficial 
 observers to imagine that he was carried away 
 by the violence of his passions, and trusted too 
 much to chance. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 • 
 The Russians are retreating in every direction. 
 Mr. de Balachoff, the bearer of terms from Alex- 
 ander, makes his appearance at Wilna. " Bala- 
 " choff, however," adds Mr. de Segur, " presented 
 " no fresh overtures, either verbal or written — 
 " Napoleon did not hesitate. He had found it 
 " impossible to stop when at Paris ; could he re- 
 treat when at Wilna ?" 
 
 The author appears not to know that Mr. de 
 Balachoff came to propose to Napoleon the con-
 
 CHAPTER V. 105 
 
 elusion of an armistice, and to enter into negotia- 
 tions for a peace, on condition that the French 
 army should recross the Niemen. The Emperor 
 did not hesitate, and ought not to have hesitated, 
 in rejecting those proposals. His anxiety however 
 for peace, induced him to answer, that he would 
 willingly negotiate without concluding an armis- 
 tice, each army retaining possession of the coun- 
 try which they occupied. Would the marechal- 
 des-logis have wished Napoleon to recross the 
 Niemen with all his troops, and abandon the ad- 
 vantages which the success of his plan of cam- 
 paign had secured to him, thus allowing time for 
 the Russians to form a junction in the direction 
 of their entrenched camp at Drissa ? The ac- 
 ceptance, however, of the proposals in question 
 would have been attended with the above results. 
 
 The author has found out, in the mission of 
 Mr. de Balachoff, what no one but himself had 
 hitherto discovered, " that Alexander could no 
 " longer address Napoleon, nor even return an 
 " answer to him." Mr. de Segur appears to have 
 only one object in view, which is to represent our 
 enemies in the most favorable light, and to cast 
 upon us the reproach of the aggression. The in- 
 jurious expressions he ascribes to the Emperor, 
 when he is made to speak to Mr. de Balachoff of 
 Alexander and of his generals, carry with them 
 their own refutation. 
 
 Then pointing out Caulaincourt to the Russian 
 minister, "There," said he, " is a knight of your
 
 106 BOOK IV. 
 
 " Emperor ; he is a Russian in the French 
 " camp." We next have a long debate be- 
 tween Caulaincourt and Napoleon. The details 
 of it must be incorrect, for it is quite indecorous, 
 and no individual about the Emperor's person 
 would have presumed to fail in the respect due to 
 him. How are we, besides, to account for the 
 pretended anger of the Duke of Vicenza, at being 
 called a Russitm by the Emperor, since, accord- 
 ing to Mr. de Segur, this duke when accused by 
 Napoleon of having become a Russian, and of 
 having been won over by the Emperor Alexander, 
 had boldly replied to him : Yes, sire, because I be- 
 lieve him a Frenchman. It does not seem likely 
 that Mr. de Caulaincourt should have refused at 
 Wilna a title of which he had felt proud when at 
 Paris. 
 
 After a superficial sketch of the march of the 
 King of Naples towards the Dwina, and of 
 our right against Doctoroff and Bagration, Mr. 
 de Segur thus expresses himself: " Several 
 " persons have pretended that there was too much 
 " circumspection, or too much negligence in this 
 " first movement of the invasion, etc." 
 
 The author therefore reproaches Napoleon with 
 being dilatory ; he forgets that he had, until now, 
 accused him of precipitation. 
 
 Not unlike those who, to give more weight to 
 their assertions, present details and circumstances 
 which originate in their own fancy, Mr. de 
 Segur, in order to convince his reader that he
 
 CHAPTER VI. 107 
 
 has carefully studied the Emperor, both in his 
 physical and in his moral capacity, describes him 
 at Wilna, " as extended over his maps, which he 
 " was obliged to examine in this manner, on ac- 
 " count of near-sightedness, a defect in which he 
 " resembled Alexander the Great and Frederick 
 " the Second." Napoleon was not near-sighted. 
 The marechal-des-logis of the palace is not aware 
 that it is necessary to look very closely upon a 
 map, in order to examine it in a military point of 
 view. We should not have noticed this error, 
 unimportant as it is, if it did not afford a fresh 
 proof that Mr. de Segur has never seen the Empe 
 ror in the interior of his closet. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Our right wing was in presence of " a general 
 " and a country equally difficult to conquer." 
 And yet, since the opening of the campaign, this 
 general so difficult to conquer, endeavors to re- 
 treat upon the centre of the Russian army, from 
 which he has been separated. His endeavors 
 being baffled by the skilful manoeuvres of Napo- 
 leon, he has no other resource left, than to enter 
 the marshes in his rear, in order to reach the 
 Dnieper before the French shall have come up. 
 If Davoust on the one side, and the King of
 
 108 BOOK IV. 
 
 Westphalia on the other, carry into effect the or- 
 ders they have received, all the issues from those 
 marshes will be closed against Bagration. From 
 one moment to another, Napoleon is in expecta- 
 tion of intelligence that the Russian general has 
 surrendered with his forty thousand men. He 
 remains at Wilna, with a strong reserve, and pre- 
 pared to receive the reports from his right and left 
 corps, as well as an account of the movements of 
 the enemy in his front. He could not leave that 
 central position so long as Bagration might threat- 
 en to attack it, and whilst he remained in igno- 
 rance of that general's proceedings. He is en- 
 gaged in the meanwhile in organizing the govern- 
 ment of Lithuania, in erecting fortifications round 
 its capital, in acquiring a thorough knowledge 
 of the enemy's plans, in hastening the arrival of 
 his pontoon carriages, his parks of artillery, and 
 his numerous convoys of provisions ; and lastly, 
 in keeping up the enthusiasm of the Polish na- 
 tion. 
 
 To these powerful motives for the Emperor's 
 sojourn at Wilna, Mr. de Segur thinks proper to 
 add that of a pretended decay in his health. This 
 opinion, which he incessantly repeats, and which 
 suggests to him the cause of the errors he attri- 
 butes to the Emperor, is, as we have already ob- 
 served, entirely devoid of foundation. He makes 
 those who approached the Emperor say, that a 
 vigorous constitution no longer seconded, as hereto- 
 fore, that mighty genius ; his corpulancy, the baths
 
 CHAPTER VI. 109 
 
 which he used, are to them so many grounds of 
 regret and of sad reflections. 
 
 From his early age, Napoleon was in the habit 
 of taking baths, " not as an indispensable relief 
 " from a bodily ailment of an alarming character, 
 " which his policy took pains to conceal." But, 
 in the first place, because his constitution stood in 
 need of them, and, in the next, because the unre- 
 mitting labours of the closet, and the fatigues 
 which he had to endure, rendered them necessary 
 to him. The man has no more been wanting to the 
 hero, than the hero to the man. The author often 
 sacrifices truth to the wish of introducing a bril- 
 liant antithesis. 
 
 The failure of this expedition, which he had 
 until now represented as unseasonable, and which 
 he now characterises as perhaps the most useful for 
 Europe, was not to be ascribed to a stormy day, 
 or to a sudden attack of fever. Whatever was 
 within the power of man has been attempted and 
 accomplished. The battle of Moskwa has had all 
 the success that could be expected. The failure of 
 this European enterprise is no more to be attri- 
 buted to the state of ill-health of the chief of the 
 French army, than to the skill of the Russian gene- 
 rals ; a premature cold was the only cause of it. 
 
 By his forcible description of the Beresina, the 
 author seems to think that he cannot communi- 
 cate too soon the misfortunes which our army ex- 
 perienced there on its return. The geographical 
 knowledge which he displays on the occasion is
 
 110 BOOK IV. 
 
 likewise defective, when he states that " all the 
 " rivers, which in this country run in the direction 
 " from one pole to another, have their eastern 
 " bank commanding the western, as Asia com- 
 " mands Europe." Europe in its northern part 
 forms an elevated plane, of which Moscow may 
 be considered the centre. Beyond this capital 
 the slope of the plane has therefore the contrary 
 effect of making the eastern banks of all the rivers 
 in that quarter less elevated than their western 
 banks. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 As soon as Napoleon ascertained that Bagra- 
 tion had it no longer in his power to reach Wilna, 
 and that the army of Barclay de Tolly had concen- 
 trated itself in the entrenched camp at Drissa, he 
 directed his march to the central position of Glu- 
 bokoe\ The Russians, on being apprized of this 
 movement, became apprehensive that Napoleon 
 would arrive before them at Vitepsk, where they 
 hoped to form a junction with Bagration ; they 
 therefore hastened to reach this city. When Na- 
 poleon was informed of the evacuation of the 
 camp at Drissa, he guessed their plan, and 
 inarched in that direction.
 
 CHAPTER VII. Ill 
 
 The Emperor Alexander being compelled to 
 abandon the extensive depots he had formed upon 
 his line of operation through Pskow, left his army 
 to repair to Moscow, and to muster up fresh re- 
 sources in men and money. The proclamations 
 which he issued at this time, are not remarkable 
 for that spirit of moderation which was so much 
 praised by Mr. de Segur, when he spoke of the 
 proclamation published at Wilna. Are we to in- 
 fer from this, that the character of Alexander had 
 undergone a change? If, as our historian says, 
 the first afforded evidence of his character, the 
 latter must have borne the same stamp. Therein 
 Napoleon is designated by the name of Moloch, 
 and the French are compared to a host of locusts 
 which dry up the earth, and which the earth will 
 reject, as oppressive to its defiled bosom. To what 
 are we to ascribe this difference." Might it not 
 be that the Emperor Alexander had no longer the 
 same occasion for disguise ? They are the arrows 
 which were shot by the Parthians in their flight. 
 
 Napoleon directs his central force towards Be- 
 zenkowiski. He repairs to Kamen, " always tra- 
 " veiling at night in a carriage, either from neces- 
 sity, or, perhaps, with a view to keep the army 
 in ignorance of the inability of its chief to share 
 in its fatigues." 
 Those insinuations would prove that the author 
 is entirely ignorant of the details of the Emperor's 
 life during a war, or that he was always inclined, 
 through a spirit of injustice, to present the Em- 
 
 n 
 
 (C 
 
 (C
 
 112 BOOK IV. 
 
 peror in an unfavorable light. We cannot better 
 reply to his allegations, than by stating how Na- 
 poleon's days were employed when he was with the 
 
 army. 
 The active life he led in camps was always in 
 
 harmony with the military operations. Habitu- 
 ally he kept up with the army at a slow pace, when 
 close to, or following the enemy. When the army 
 was performing grand manoeuvres, and the oper- 
 ations took place, he waited until the corps that 
 were marching had nearly reached the positions 
 assigned to them. He then remained at his head- 
 quarters. There he bestowed his attention to the 
 internal administration of France, and answered 
 the reports that were daily addressed to him from 
 Paris by his ministers. For he governed the em- 
 pire, at the same moment that he directed the 
 operations of the army. Sparing of his time, he 
 calculated the epoch of his departure, so as to be 
 at the head of his army at the moment when his 
 presence became necessary. He travelled to it 
 in a carriage, with the greatest rapidity. But, 
 even during the journey, he did not allow himself 
 rest. His time was taken up in reading his dis- 
 patches, and he generally received in this way the 
 reports of his officers, and instantly returned an- 
 swers to them. He was sometimes overtaken, at 
 the same moment, by several estafettes from Paris. 
 By the aid of a light which had been contrived at 
 the bottom of his carriage, he was enabled to work 
 at night as if he had been in his closet, His aids-
 
 C HAPTER Vir. 1 13 
 
 de-camp and orderly officers rode on both sides of 
 the carriage, and a brigade of saddle horses fol- 
 lowed with his escort. 
 
 He had thus staid at Wilna whilst some corps 
 of his army were directing their march towards 
 the Dwina. He did not quit that city until the 
 16th, at 10 o'clock at night.* Early on the 17th 
 he reached Swentziani, and upon receiving here 
 the intelligence that the enemy had re-crossed 
 the Dwina at Druia, and surprised the cavalry 
 under Sebastiani's command, he dispatched fresh 
 orders to the several corps of the army, and ar- 
 rived, in the midst of his troops at Glubokoe* on 
 the 18th at mid-day. He marched in this manner 
 upon Kamen and Bezenkowiski, where he arrived 
 at the same moment with the corps which had 
 been ordered to march in that direction. 
 
 Such was the peculiar organization of this man, 
 so extraordinary in every thing, that he could 
 take an hour's sleep, be awakened to issue some 
 order, fall asleep again, be awakened a second 
 
 * It has already been observed, that the corps of Marshal 
 Davoust was marching towards Minsk. It arrived there on the 
 8th July, and left on the 13th, always outflanking the left of 
 Bagration; passing through Ygumen, the division crossed the 
 Beresina at Beresino, reached Mohiloffon the 20th, and thus 
 prevented the junction of Bagration with Barclay's army upon 
 the Dwina. On the 7th, the corps of the Viceroy left Neutroki, 
 in the vicinity of Wilna, and passing through Ochmiana, arrived 
 at Dokszitzi on the 17th. Marshal Mortier with the guard and 
 the Bavarian cavalry, arrived at Gluboko6 on the 1 6th. 
 
 I
 
 1]4 BOOK IV. 
 
 time, without any injury to his rest or his health. 
 Six hour's sleep was sufficient for him, whether 
 he enjoyed them at once, or whether he took them 
 at various intervals in the twenty-four hours. 
 
 On those days which preceded any great battle, 
 he was constantly on horseback, reconnoitring 
 the strength and position of the enemy, studying 
 his field of battle, going through the bivouacs of 
 the several corps of his army. Even at night, he 
 went over the line in order to satisfy himself again 
 of the strength of the enemy by the number of 
 their fires ; and he fatigued many horses in a few 
 hours. On the day of battle, he took a central 
 position, from which he could see whatever was 
 going on. He had with him his aids-de-camp 
 and orderly officers. He sent them in every di- 
 rection to carry his orders. At some distance in 
 his rear were four squadrons of the guard, one of 
 each class ; but when he quitted that position, he 
 only took one troop for his escort. He gene- 
 rally pointed out to his marshals the spot which 
 he had selected, in order that he might be easily 
 found out by the officers who might be sent to 
 him. As soon as his presence was called for in 
 any quarter, he proceeded to it at full gallop. 
 
 How can Mr. de Segur be so simple as to say 
 that it was no puerile vanity that induced Na- 
 poleon to cross the Dwina? To whose mind 
 could such a puerile notion have occurred ? The 
 Emperor crossed the Dwina in order to recon- 
 noitre in person, and in order to ascertain whether
 
 CHAPTER VII. 115 
 
 Barclay de Tolly's army had already passed that 
 point on its march upon Witepsk ; he accordingly 
 ascertained it. 
 
 After eulogising the precision in the inarches of 
 all the corps, which after a month's separation, 
 and though at a distance of a hundred leagues 
 from the point where they had separated, arrived 
 at Bezenkowiski on the same day and at the same 
 hour, Mr. de Segur gives us an exaggerated de- 
 scription of the tumult occasioned in the town by 
 that junction. He cannot, however, but be aware 
 that every army in the world presents the same 
 picture, when a great number of troops arrive at 
 a given point. Is this a circumstance quite pe- 
 culiar to our soldiers, or is it the author's wish to 
 exhibit them as an undisciplined horde ? 
 
 " On the 25th of July, Murat proceeded to- 
 " wards Ostrowno with his cavalry. At the dis- 
 " tance of two leagues from that village, Dumont, 
 " Du Coetlosquet, Carignan, and the 8th hussars 
 " were advancing in columns." 
 
 On perusing this passage, would it not be ima- 
 gined that Messieurs Dumont, Coetlosquet, Ca- 
 rignan, were at least general officers, since he 
 names them, as he does Murat, without designat- 
 ing them by any title ? This would be a great 
 mistake ; those gentlemen were merely officers of 
 the 8th hussars, and if we enquire what they now 
 are, we will easily discover why they are singled 
 out by the author. 
 
 The corps of Osterman attempts to defend the 
 
 i2
 
 116 BOOK IV. 
 
 defiles of Ostrowno ; a brisk engagement takes 
 place. Mr. tie Segur does not perceive that he 
 is arraigning the honor of one of our brave regi- 
 ments (the eighty-fourth of the line) when he says 
 that many soldiers " under- the plea of supporting 
 " the wounded, or of being wounded themselves, 
 " successively abandoned their ranks." This 
 would be casting a gratuitous stain upon French 
 glory. The warechal-dcs-Iogis of the palace was 
 not present at this action. He can as little assert 
 that he saw Murat at the head of a regiment of 
 Polish lancers charging against his inclination, 
 and pushed forward by " the Polish lances which 
 " were ready couched and condensed behind 
 him." The author's knowledge of military science 
 should be sufficient to inform him that the interval 
 between the squadrons would have enabled the 
 King of Naples to retire, had not his personal 
 bravery led him to take a share in the charge. 
 
 We come to another assertion, which again 
 attacks the fame of a French regiment. The Rus- 
 sians were defending a wood ; " the 92nd regiment 
 " astounded at the heavy fire issuing from it, and 
 " bewildered by a shower of balls, remained mo- 
 " tionless, neither daring to advance nor to re- 
 " treat, restrained by two opposite fears — the 
 "dread of danger and the dread of shame — and 
 " unable to escape from either." How can the 
 marechal-des-logis of the palace take upon himself 
 to expose in this manner the honor of our regi- 
 ments ? As he was not present at the engage-
 
 CHAPTER VII. 117 
 
 ment, he ought to have read Prince Eugene's re- 
 ports ; therein he would have found that the 
 Prince, in alluding to this regiment, expresses 
 himself as follows : " The success of so difficult 
 " an attack required nothing less than the valor 
 " of the troops and the perseverance of the general 
 " in command." 
 
 CiiAPTER VIII. 
 
 The French army, after defeating the Russians at 
 the engagement of Ostrowno, continues its march 
 upon Witepsk. On the 27th, the Russian army is 
 discovered in regular order of battle near that 
 city. The French advanced guard prepares to 
 approach the enemy ; the presence of the Emperor 
 increases the ardor of the troops. 
 
 " The King of Naples, who was intoxicated at 
 " being an object of so much attraction, yielded to 
 " his impetuosity, and made the chasseurs of the 
 t; Ifith rush upon the whole body of the Russian 
 " cavalry. All eyes beheld with terror that feeble 
 " French line, interrupted on its march by the 
 " deep ravines which intersected the ground, and 
 " advancing to attack the enemy's masses. These 
 " unfortunate men, feeling that they were sacri- 
 '\fieed, proceeded with hesitation to certain death-
 
 118 BOOK IV. 
 
 " Consequently, on the first movement made by 
 " the lancers of the Russian guard, they took to 
 " flight. But the ravines, which it was necessary 
 " to pass, obstructed their flight, etc. ; they were 
 " thrown into these shoals, where many perished." 
 
 This stateinent is related to the advantage of 
 the Russians, with as much correctness as par- 
 tiality. We regret to perceive what little justice 
 is rendered in it to a handful of brave men. 
 
 After crossing the small bridge which separated 
 us from the enemy, the 16th chasseurs, preceded 
 by two companies of voltigeurs of the 9th regi- 
 ment of the line, was to form itself in order of 
 battle in advance of the defile, with the view 
 of facilitating the passage to the other corps that 
 Were coming up. The left of the 16th chasseurs 
 was supported by the voltigeurs who had reached 
 the banks of the Dwina. The 16th did not ad- 
 vance under the command of the King of Naples 
 to charge the enemy, but merely to gain ground, 
 and to prevent any obstruction upon the bridge. 
 This was the moment when the cavalry of the 
 Russian guard, protected by the fire from a bat- 
 tery of twelve pieces of cannon, charged that re- 
 giment which had General Pire* at its head. The 
 16th chasseurs attempted a manoeuvre which had 
 often proved successful ; it stood the charge with- 
 out moving, and at the distance of thirty paces 
 commenced a fire from its carbines. The speed 
 of the Russian cavalry could not be arrested by 
 this fire, which had no other effect than to throw
 
 CHAPTER VIII. ] 19 
 
 the ranks of the 16th into confusion. This regi- 
 ment was forced back upon our infantry; but its 
 loss was inconsiderable, and much inferior to that 
 of the Russians. The latter lost many men in at- 
 tempting to carry off the two companies of volti- 
 geurs, who had been left behind, and who raised a 
 rampart of men and horses by the fire they main- 
 tained against the enemy. Where, then, can our 
 officer of the palace have found that the brave 
 chasseurs of the 16th, feeling that they were sacri- 
 ficed, proceeded with hesitation to certain death, and 
 took to flight on the first movement of the Russians ? 
 Such pusillanimous sentiments find no place in 
 the hearts of conquering French soldiers. In a 
 work dedicated to the veterans of the French 
 army, and which contains so many trifling details, 
 Mr. de Segur ought to have mentioned the names 
 of two brave officers who commanded the com- 
 panies of the 9th (Captains Guillard and Savary.) 
 It is true that these are plebeian names. 
 
 The author represents Napoleon as hesitating 
 to attack the enemy in the position they occupied. 
 " The soldiers, he says, were astonished at this 
 inactivity, at the moment of overtaking an 
 army." He shews us Murat unable " to make 
 " his chief decide on an attack, and rashly pro- 
 " ceeding to pitch his tent almost in the midst of 
 " the enemies." That our soldiers, fired at the 
 sight of the Russians, should have expressed the 
 strongest desire to attack them, may easily be 
 conceived ; but to suppose that the King of Naples 

 
 120 BOOK IV. 
 
 should urge the Emperor to attack an army of one 
 hundred thousand men in its positions, with the 
 scanty forces which he had in line, is to attribute 
 words and opinions to that Prince which his habits 
 of war could not have suggested to him. The 
 most skilful man, the man most gifted with ex- 
 perience, genius, and activity, cannot take less 
 than a day to reconnoitre effectually an army oc- 
 cupying more than a league of ground. The first 
 reconnoitring conveys only a general idea ; a se- 
 cond, in the middle of the day, is necessary to 
 settle the plan of attack ; and a third, at night, 
 assists in confirming the arrangements already 
 made. Then, only, he issues his orders for the 
 following day ; the night is employed in determin- 
 ing, by the situation of the fires, whether the 
 enemy's line has undergone any change. 
 
 General Barclay altered his determination, and, 
 during the night, the Russian army retired in every 
 direction. 
 
 Let us attend to Mr. de Segur's description of 
 the Russian camp : " Every thing about it ex- 
 " hibited the science of war ; its advantageous 
 fe position ; the symmetry of all its parts ; the 
 " exact and exclusive nicety in the use to which 
 " each of them had been destined ; the order and 
 " neatness which was the result — there appeared 
 " more order in their defeat than in our victory, 
 " etc. etc." 
 
 It seems that Mr. de Segur, whose functions 
 called him to Witepsk, to prepare the imperial
 
 te 
 
 CHAPTE R Villi. 121 
 
 quarters, did not see this boasted camp. We, who 
 were instructed to examine it in all its details, 
 could discover nothing but great filth, great irre- 
 gularity, and such a state of disorder as to render 
 it impossible to estimate the number of men and 
 animals that had bivouaked on the spot. 
 
 As to the lessons which the mar echo l-des-logis 
 pretends to have been given to us by the Russians 
 in their flight, we only allude to them in order to 
 shew what spirit appears to have dictated his 
 work, and what nation he endeavors to gratify. 
 As soon as the Emperor had made up his 
 mind, he returned to Witepsk with his guard. 
 There, on the 28th of July, when he entered the 
 " imperial quarters, he ungirded his sword, and 
 " abruptly laying it upon the maps with which 
 " his tables were covered, he exclaimed : here I 
 " must stop, here I must look around me, take 
 " some repose, rally my army, and organize Po- 
 "land. The campaign of 1812 is over; that of 
 " 1813, will do the rest." 
 
 The Emperor, when he marched with rapidity 
 upon Wilna, had the double object in view of 
 reaching that city before Barclay's army, and of 
 preventing Bagration's junction with that army. 
 As soon as he was informed of Barclay's precipi- 
 tate retreat upon Smolensko to unite himself to 
 Bragation, who had escaped from the pursuit of 
 the fifth and eighth corps, it behoved him to stop. 
 The motives for that repose to which Mr. de 
 Segur makes allusion are very natural ; but, as if
 
 1 22 BOOK IV. 
 
 consistency were too great an effort for the author, 
 he ascribes these words to the Emperor : " The 
 campaign of ^ 812 is over ; that o/1813 will do the 
 rest. He develops this idea in the following- 
 chapter. 
 
 It never would have occurred to the mind of a 
 military man that the taking up his winter quar- 
 ters in the month of July could have been con- 
 templated by Napoleon.
 
 123 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 " Lithuania once conquered, the object of the 
 " war was attained." Has the author then forgot 
 what he stated in the first chapter of his work, 
 that a war was about to be carried on against 
 England in the heart of Russia; that the Russians 
 were to be driven back into Asia ; that this expe- 
 dition was indispensable to the completion of a great 
 design oh the point of being accomplished ; that its 
 object was not out of reach ; that the means for 
 reaching it were not inadequate. 
 
 The real object of the war was to compel the 
 Emperor Alexander to make peace, and return to 
 the alliance he had sworn with Us against Eng- 
 land. But Mr. de Segur commences his chapter 
 in the above manner, merely to introduce this 
 consequence: the Emperor is to stop at Witepsk. 
 
 After speaking of the various establishments 
 formed in that city, he adds : " Utility was not 
 " alone attended to ; embellishments were also to 
 " be sought. Some houses obstructed the square 
 ix of the palace ; the Emperor ordered them to be 
 " pulled down." Might it not be believed, on
 
 124 BOOK V. 
 
 reading this, that Napoleon was seriously intent 
 upon embellishing the town of Witepsk ? If he 
 has had old houses thrown down, which obstruct- 
 ed the square in front of his residence, he did so 
 in order to pass his troops in review. There is, 
 besides, some utility in preventing any interrup- 
 tion to the approaches to head quarters. 
 
 Murat comes to apprize Napoleon that " the 
 " Russian army was panic-struck ; that his light 
 " cavalry alone was sufficient to put it to flight." 
 To that ebullition of ardour Napoleon is made to 
 return this serious reply : " Two great rivers 
 " mark out our position ; let us raise block - 
 " houses along that line ; let our fires cross each 
 " other in all directions ; let us form in a square 
 " battalion, with cannons at the exterior and on 
 " its angles. Let the space within contain our 
 " cantonments and our magazines." 
 
 The author ought to have afforded us some ex- 
 planation of this grand square battalion, tvith its 
 Jires crossing each other in all directions. He 
 seems, however, to understand well those arrange- 
 ments, since he adds: " Thus his genius conceiv- 
 " ed every thing in masses ; his eye embraced an 
 " army of 400,000 men as it did a regiment." 
 Mrfde Segur now represents Napoleon as giving 
 no orders, except for laying siege to Bobruisk (a 
 fortress in the midst of swamps) hy means of 
 cavalry. Such absurdities fall of themselves to 
 the ground. The division Dombrowski which the 
 author supposes to be reduced to twelve hundred
 
 CHAPTER I. 125 
 
 men, consisted of twelve battalions and a brigade 
 of light cavalry, amounting together to nine 
 thousand men. It was destined to watch the 
 Russian division of General Hcertel and the for- 
 tress of Bobruisk. With his infantry General 
 Dombrowski was to invest this fortress, which 
 was in a bad state of defence, and his cavalry was 
 to scour the neighbouring country. He was pro- 
 vided with twenty pieces of cannon. The author 
 says in another place that Macdonald received 
 neither instructions nor the means of obtaining 
 possession of Riga, whilst he had at his command 
 the numerous battering train from Dantzig, and 
 that before quitting Wilna, the Emperor had made 
 him acquainted with his intentions. 
 
 Our marechal-des-logis soon forgets what he 
 has related of Napoleon's determination to plant 
 his eagles upon Witepsk, and yet he bears in mind 
 that prince's exclamation upon entering it : Do 
 you imagine I came so far merely to conquer these 
 huts ? 
 
 Mr. de Segur, who delights in descriptions, 
 ought to have presented us that of the imposing 
 ceremony which took place on the reception of 
 the new colonel of foot grenadiers of the guard. 
 But he dwells so lightly upon this, that one might 
 suppose it to be the reception of an ordinary 
 officer, instead of one of the most distinguished 
 generals, holding one of the first commands in the 
 army. The author, who has so often named ordi- 
 nary officers, might well have mentioned General
 
 
 126 BOOK V. 
 
 Count Friant, less known, no doubt, than they 
 are, in the salons, but so much famed among the 
 brave. He ought to have stated that the Emperor 
 drew his sword, received him in person, and em- 
 braced him, saying : " This is the reward of your 
 brilliant and worthy services ; but I still have 
 need of you. Continue to command your divi- 
 " sion during this campaign ; you are more use- 
 " ful to me there than at the head of your grena- 
 V diers, who are always under my own eyes." 
 
 Who could recognize the Emperor in the fol- 
 lowing picture : " Napoleon grew impatient. . . . 
 " he is observed to grow restless .... The image of 
 " captured Moscow besets him ... a great irre- 
 " solution affects his whole person .... he is seen 
 " wandering about his apartments, as if pursued 
 by that dangerous temptation. . . he walks a- 
 " bout without an object, inquires the hour, 
 " watches the weather, and stops completely ab- 
 " sorbed ; he then hums a tune with an absent 
 " look, and continues his walk. . . .enquiring of 
 " those he meets : well, what shall we do ? shall 
 u we stay where we are, shall we move forward ? 
 " etc." 
 
 Mr. de Segur at one time represents him in bed ; 
 at another in his shirt; and after the fine reason- 
 ings in the preceding chapter, on the necessity of 
 remaining at Witepsk, he tells us that " the same 
 " danger which perhaps ought to have recalled 
 " him to the Niemen, or kept him upon the Dwi- 
 " na, urges him on to Moscow. . . .that having at 
 
 u
 
 CHAPTER II. 127 
 
 "last formed his determination, he suddenly 
 " arises, full of the fire which his mighty con- 
 " ception had kindled ; that he appears possessed 
 *f by the genius of war, that his voice grows deeper, 
 " his eyes flash fire, and his countenance dark- 
 " ens ; that his attendants withdraw from his pre- 
 " sence with awe." 
 
 The historian of the grand army has no doubt 
 taken his model from Charenton.* 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Mr. de Segur, without alluding to the new cir- 
 cumstances which may have occurred to operate a 
 change in the views of Napoleon, represents him 
 as solely occupied with the idea of leaving Wi- 
 tepsk, and of marching forward. 
 
 " His resolution once taken, he was anxious 
 ' c not to create discontent among those around him; 
 it was by their sentiments that he was enabled to 
 judge of those of the army : he felt ill at ease, 
 ""' when surrounded by disapproving looks." We 
 ought from this to conclude that his intentions 
 met with general disapprobation ; that he stood 
 alone against all. Napoleon's thoughts were but 
 
 * A suburb of Paris, containing a receptable for insane 
 persons. — translator. 
 
 a
 
 128 BOOK V. 
 
 little bestowed on those around him. He neither 
 had the weakness to feel uneasy at disapproving 
 looks, nor the folly to judge of the sentiments of 
 the army by those of individuals, who owed all 
 their self-consequence to the duties he had entrust- 
 ed to them as connected with the service. With 
 a single frown, he would have caused the dis- 
 approving looks to give way. As to the dis- 
 content, it sometimes existed ; but it seldom 
 broke out. Was not Napoleon well aware that 
 courtiers are mnrmurers by nature? Did he not 
 likewise know what allowance ought to be made 
 for human weakness ? And if he felt indulgence 
 for the ill-humorcreated by fatigues and privations, 
 if he was too just to be offended at it, he was also 
 wise enough not to take it into account in form- 
 ing his determinations. He was wise enough 
 especially, not to judge of the real sentiments of 
 the army from the sentiments of those who held 
 no command with the troops, and who did not 
 live with them. Napoleon knew how to appreci- 
 ate men and things, a knowledge to which our 
 officer of the palace is an entire stranger. 
 
 The author renews here the scenes which he 
 has caused to be represented in Paris, and he does 
 so by means of the same actors. If we are to be- 
 lieve him, the Emperor has had mere idle talkers, 
 or men without education, in his train. 
 
 Notwithstanding the observations that are made 
 to him, " he determines to march upon Moscow 
 " and St. Petersburg!! at the same time, in order
 
 CHAPTER ir. 129 
 
 " to destroy every thing in the one, and preserve 
 " every thing- in the other." This is a strange dis- 
 tributive justice ! It is unfortunate that the Duke 
 de Frioul, to whom such a secret was revealed, 
 should be no longer in existence to explain to us 
 its originality. This conversation with Duroc is 
 designed to introduce the Emperor's reply, that 
 " if the w r ar in Russia should not hold out any 
 " advantageous prospect, he would turn his arms 
 " against Prussia, and make her pay the expenses 
 " of the war." How are we to suppose that, 
 whilst the Prussians were inarching under the 
 banners of Napoleon, he was meditating their 
 ruin ! General Yorck may have said so to excuse 
 his defection ; but what motive can Mr. de Segur 
 assign for this invention ! He makes Mr. Daru 
 say, that the war is not a national one. Mr. Daru 
 cannot have held such a language. The libera- 
 tion of Poland rendered that war more national 
 than any other of Napoleon's enterprises. After 
 the war respecting the limits of the Rhine, it was 
 the most national of any that could have been 
 undertaken. 
 
 Throughout this chapter, the author exhibits to 
 us Napoleon endeavoring to convince the great 
 officers, to combat their opposition, and to obtain 
 from them that they would make a last effort to pro- 
 ceed as far as Smolensko. Napoleon cajoles 
 them ; when interrupting them, he does so by 
 " subtle reasonings .... His deportment is rernark- 
 " able for ease, simplicity, and good nature, etc. 
 
 K
 
 1 30 BOOK V. 
 
 " all which sufficiently explains why, after so 
 " many misfortunes, he is still beloved by those 
 " who were on terms of intimacy with him." 
 The marechal-des-logis of the palace has not lived 
 with him upon this footing of intimacy ; he proves 
 it by the spirit which dictated his work. 
 
 If this be a faithful picture of those who were 
 about Napoleon's person, it must be admitted 
 that the Prince was attended by servants not re- 
 markable for their devotedness to his person, and 
 strangely obstinate in their resistance. No gene- 
 ral engaged in a distant country, can succeed 
 when he meets with so much opposition. The 
 very soldiers say, that they only saw him on the 
 day of battle, when they had to die for him, but 
 never when it was question to supply them with the 
 means of existence. What becomes of that minute 
 care which the Emperor takes that the soldier 
 may be fed, and of those stores as immense as the 
 enterprise, which he has caused to be collected. 
 
 The magic wand of Mr. de Segur performs every 
 metamorphosis ; all the masks are changed ; we no 
 longer recognize any one. 
 
 Napoleon has no longer a will ; he can no longer 
 command obedience. 
 
 Berthier is no longer the anxious executor of 
 his orders. 
 
 Mouton is no longer that proud military tri- 
 bune, whom Csesar has compelled to yield.* 
 
 * When Count de Lobau was colonel of the third regiment 
 of the line, his vote was opposed to Napoleon's elevation to the
 
 C H A PTE R II. 131 
 
 Caulincourt is no longer that exact and correct 
 servant, who lays aside his own feelings, and 
 knows nothing but his duty. 
 
 Duroc is no longer the discreet confident, who 
 retains the secret entrusted to him, when it is not 
 indispensable to repeat his master's words. 
 
 Mr. Daru is divested of his real character as a 
 laborious and rigid administrator ; he is converted 
 into a political talker, in presence of the man who 
 commanded all his respect. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The second corps obtained, on the road to Sebej, 
 an important advantage over a Russian brigadej 
 and repulsed it upon the Drissa. Mr. de Segur 
 states the loss of the enemy upon this occasion at 
 only two thousand men and eight pieces of can- 
 non, whereas it in fact amounted to three thou- 
 sand men and fourteen pieces of cannon. A 
 Russian general, who was killed in this affair, fur- 
 nishes the author with a theme for pompous eulo- 
 
 iraperial throne. The Emperor who had at heart to bind <o his 
 service an officer of so much distinction, sent for him : a short 
 conversation won over to him that colonel, who was soon named 
 his aid-de-camp. 
 
 k2
 
 132 BOOK V. 
 
 gium : his death, he says, was heroic. He then 
 enters into elaborate details upon the subject, 
 which could have been furnished to hirn only by 
 the Russians. Without meaning to make thepraises 
 bestowed upon our enemies by the officer of the 
 palace a matter of reproach against him, we can- 
 not but observe that the loss of the French gene- 
 rals who fell in this campaign is far from inspir- 
 ing him with similar sentiments of regret : he 
 scarcely mentions their names. 
 
 The author supposes that it was not till towards 
 the conclusion of his stay at Witepsk that the Em- 
 peror became acquainted with the proclamations 
 of Alexander, dated Polosk the 18th July, of 
 which we have already spoken. He says that 
 Napoleon was hurt at the gross abuse which they 
 contained. He is mistaken ; it merely excited 
 his smile. 
 
 Whilst stationed at Witepsk, Napoleon enter- 
 tained hopes that the enemy's armies, which were 
 collected in the neighbourhood of Smolensko, 
 would make some injudicious movements, of 
 which he might take advantage. The attack 
 made by the Russians upon General Sebastiani 
 at Inkowo, presently confirmed him in the idea 
 that Barclay's entire army was quitting the envi- 
 rons of Smolensko for the purpose of attacking 
 him. His decision was immediate, and Mr. de 
 Segiir is right in saying that it ivas great and bold 
 as the undertaking. He conceived the idea of 
 gaining, by a rapid movement, the left bank of
 
 CHAPTER III. 133 
 
 the Dnieper ; and by following; the course of that 
 river, proposed to reach Smolensko before the 
 Russians ; a movement which would place us 
 upon the flank or rear of the enemy's forces ; four 
 days sufficed for him to remove to Liadoui the 
 detachment under Davoust as well as the troops 
 that accompanied himself. The boldness of this 
 manoeuvre, which even the Russians have ad- 
 mired,* and the rapidity with which it was exe- 
 cuted, triumphantly refute all that the author has 
 said about the indecision and apathy of the Em- 
 peror. 
 
 * See L'histoire militaire de la Campagne de Russie, en 
 1812, by Colonel Boutourlin, aid-de-camp to His Majesty the 
 Emperor of Russia. (Vol. i. page 252.)
 
 134 
 
 BOOK VI 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The author, who is no enemy to repetitions, again 
 relates to us Napoleon's masterly manoeuvre, of 
 which he spoke at the end of the preceding chap- 
 ter. That movement, which is represented by 
 our enemies as one of the finest military opera- 
 tions of Napoleon, nevertheless furnishes the 
 marechal-des-logis of the palace with a subject of 
 censure : so sparing is he in the distribution of 
 of his praises, and profuse in the application of 
 blame ! In this instance the subject of his la- 
 mentations is a division which an ill-written order 
 occasioned to wander for four-arid twenty hours in 
 the ivoods : a circumstance of no importance, and 
 which a judicious historian would have abstained 
 from mentioning. But when the Emperor fur- 
 nishes the author with no matter for criticism, he 
 directs his attacks against the army, which he 
 represents as marching in a state of general confu- 
 sion.
 
 135 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 In our advance to Smolensko, along the left bank 
 of the Dnieper, we met at Krasnoi with the Rus- 
 sian division Newerowskoi, which it is difficult to 
 imagine why the Russians had placed there. 
 This division was on the point of being completely 
 overpowered ; and Mr. de Segur supposes that the 
 circumstance of its not having been so in fact, 
 was owing to the tardiness of Grouchy. The 
 truth is, that, from the rapidity of its flight, it 
 was impossible to overtake and attack it, except 
 by the cavalry. The artillery, which had been 
 retarded in passing the defile at Krasnoi, could 
 not be brought to bear upon it, notwithstanding 
 all the author has said upon the subject. If it 
 had arrived in time, that division would have 
 been entirely destroyed. Our historian, in con- 
 formity with his general system, omits to mention, 
 that, in one of the brilliant charges of our cavalry, 
 Colonel Marbeuf was mortally wounded. 
 
 On the occasion of the 15th August, Prince 
 Eugene came to compliment the Emperor, who 
 observed to him : Every thing is preparing for a 
 battle; I shall gain it ; and we shall see Moscow. 
 Eugene, according to our historian, was silent ;
 
 136 BOOK VI. 
 
 but on retiring, anxiously remarked to Marshal 
 
 Mortier : Moscow will be oiir ruin. Duroc the 
 
 most reserved of all, said, he could not foresee the 
 period of our return. So that, adds the author, 
 disapprobation began already to be manifested. It 
 would seem, however, from all he has stated in 
 the preceding chapters, that the commencement 
 of this disapprobation was of much earlier date. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Napoleon had availed himself so dexterously of 
 the hesitation and injudicious movements of the 
 Russian generals in their march towards Witepsk, 
 that it was only at Smolensko that they became 
 aware of the danger which threatened them. This 
 place was on the point of being taken. Mr. de 
 Segur represents Marshal Ney as having been in- 
 flamed at the sight of this town ; and reproaches 
 him with having endeavored to obtain possession 
 of it immediately. " A ball struck him on the 
 " neck. In the moment of irritation he ordered 
 " a battalion against the citadei — the Russian 
 " walls were alone able to arrest the progress of 
 " his men." Marshal Ney was too much habi- 
 
 •
 
 CHAPTER III. 1,37 
 
 tuated to balls, to be irritated at receiving one in 
 his clothes : it was not therefore in order to re- 
 venge himself, that he ordered a battalion of the 
 46th to advance, but for the purpose of compelling 
 the enemy to retire within the citadel, and in 
 order, at the same time, to reconnoitre it. It is to 
 be regretted that he did not persevere in his first 
 intention, and make a vigorous attack upon the 
 place ; as it would infallibly have been taken : the 
 citadel was merely flanked with earth. The officer 
 of the palace, who pays but little regard to mili- 
 tary operations, gives no exact account of the po- 
 sition of the French army round Smolensko. The 
 following is his description : 
 
 " Davoust, and afterwards Count de Lobau de- 
 " ployed to the right of Ney, the guard at the 
 " centre, in reserve ; and farther on, the army of 
 
 Italy. The place of Junot and the Westphalians 
 
 was marked out ; Murat and Poniatowski formed 
 " the right of the army." 
 
 The author should have informed us what corps 
 Count de Lobau commanded, since Marshal Da- 
 voust had taken from him the divisions which had 
 been confided to his direction. Shortly afterwards 
 he adds : " The French army, being thus placed, 
 " was backed by defiles and precipices : but the 
 " means of retreating occupied but little of Na- 
 " poleon's attention : he thought of nothing but 
 " victory." The marechal-des-logis, who seems 
 desirous of giving the Emperor some lessons in 
 military tactics, should have known that the re- 

 
 138 BOOK VI. 
 
 treat of our army was secured by two high roads ; 
 that the fourth division, (that commanded by 
 Prince Eugene) as well as the Pajol division had 
 been stationed at Goritnia, to clear the banks of 
 the Dnieper to our left ; and that our right was 
 flanked, a little towards the rear, by the corps of 
 the Duke of Abrantes. Mr. de Segur, who appears 
 so well acquainted with the plans and disposition 
 of Barclay de Tolly, should also have informed us 
 why he sentBagration, not to Elnia, as stated by 
 our historian, but to Dorogobouje, and why he 
 remained with his army at Smolensko. Either Bar- 
 clay desired a battle, or he did not : if the for- 
 mer, he should have united his forces ; if the latter, 
 he should have evacuated Smolensko. The officer 
 of the palace assigns as a reason for Barclay hav- 
 ing remained in that town, " That, having before 
 " him a colossal enemy, he must naturally have 
 " expected gigantic movements." We confess our 
 inability to understand this : if Barclay had to do 
 with a colossal enemy, could he think to increase 
 his forces by dividing them. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Napoleon, having ascertained that a portion of 
 the Russian army had quitted Smolensko and 
 taken the road to Moscow, resolved to attack it. 
 Then is brought forward the brave " Murat,
 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 139 
 
 " who was all prudence when not stimulated by 
 " the presence of the enemy, combating this reso- 
 " lution." The author even assures us '• that he 
 " threw himself at the feet of his brother, and con- 
 " jured him to pause — for that Moscow would be 
 " our ruin. 
 
 Mr. de Segur has not the talent of diversifying 
 either the ideas he ascribes to his personages, or 
 the mode of expressing them. Murat merely re- 
 peats here, what was attributed a few pages back, 
 to Prince Eugene. To describe the King of 
 Naples as expressing himself in this manner, is to 
 represent him as a very inexperienced general. 
 How could the Emperor stop before Smolensko? 
 Would the officer of the palace have wished him 
 to retrace his steps ? There was nothing else to be 
 done but to take the place. Besides, having 
 passed a part of the night with the King of Naples, 
 and in the tent of the Emperor, we are enabled to 
 affirm, that the conversations reported to have 
 taken place, are untrue. Every one was anxious 
 that Smolensko should fall into our hands. The 
 attack once resolved on, Napoleon caused the 
 town to be invested both above and below the 
 bridges, for the purpose of storming those 
 passages, and so determining the enemy to eva- 
 cuate it. 
 
 It was in one of the batteries constructed with 
 this view, (that to our right,) that Mr. de Segur 
 represents Murat, in despair as to the issue of the 
 war, as anxious to be killed. — A most complete 
 absurdity.
 
 140 BOOK VI. 
 
 The author who has no precise ideas of military 
 movements, tells us that "Napoleon was desirous 
 " that the artillery of the guard should, at the 
 " same time, open a fire upon the great wall with 
 "its twelve-pounders. The artillery refused to 
 " obey." This charge of disobedience would be 
 disgraceful to the guard, were it well founded ; 
 but it is not. The Emperor, at the same time 
 that he was vigorously cannonading the bridges, 
 directed a few twelve-pounder shots to be fired 
 upon the wall, in order to observe the effect 
 they would produce ; and having ascertained 
 that it would require too much time, and am- 
 munition to effect a breach, he ordered the en- 
 gineers to undermine it. 
 
 " In advancing to the assault, our columns of 
 " attack left a long and broad train of wounded, 
 " of blood, and of slain." To the assault of what, 
 M. Vofficier du palais? There were no out-works; 
 the suburbs were merely guarded by troops, and 
 not intrenched. There was therefore nothing to 
 assault. 
 
 " The fault which Ney had caused to be com- 
 " mitted the day before by a single battalion, 
 " was now repeated by the whole army." Who 
 would believe that a man invested with the 
 title of General could write such things ! What 
 possible way could there be of taking the place, 
 except by first expelling the enemy from the 
 suburbs ? 
 
 " Count de Lobau, having made himself master
 
 CHAPTER IV. 141 
 
 " of the Jbssd, directed bombs to be thrown into 
 " the town ...... So great a disaster, which he 
 
 regarded as his own work, alarmed Count de 
 Lobau." 
 
 Here we have two difficulties to unravel. The 
 first is to make out what corps Count de Lobau 
 commanded : for, by the author's own shewing-, 
 we find round Smolensko, on the left, Ney, whose 
 right extended to the division of D&voust, who 
 had his right supported by Poniatowski. Where 
 then was Count de Lobau's corps stationed ? Mr. 
 de Segur should have informed us on this point. 
 In the second place we have to enquire how it 
 happened that Count de Lobau, after ordering 
 shells to be thrown into the town, was alarmed 
 at their having set it on fire. Is the marechal- 
 des-logis ignorant that this is the effect which 
 shells must be expected to produce ? 
 
 The brave Polish General Grabowski,was killed 
 on entering the town : a circumstance which the 
 author has not mentioned. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Emperor traverses the field of battle ; — " a 
 ft sad review of the dead and dying ; a melancho- 
 " lv account either to make or to render." Upon
 
 142 BOOK VI. 
 
 this point Mr. de Segur gives us to understand 
 that care was taken to bury our dead, in order 
 to obviate unfavorable impressions upon the 
 minds of our soldiery. But could such facts be 
 easy of concealment when the whole army was 
 present ? Does he mean to intimate that French 
 soldiers fear death ? The little vanity of shining 
 by verbal amplifications, is, with him, paramount 
 to every other consideration. He represents Na- 
 poleon, surrounded as he was by Ney, Davoust, 
 Mortier, Duroc, etc. as holding a conversation, 
 as it were, aside; and adds that it was " from 
 " the necessity he experienced of unburthening 
 " his heart of the solicitude which oppressed 
 
 " him that he indulged in the most vio- 
 
 " lent declamation against the general and the 
 " army of the enemy; as if he could vanquish 
 " by argument, what he had been unable to sub- 
 
 " due by force That his words served but 
 
 " to shew his dissappointment, &c." 
 
 All the asperity of invective against the Rus- 
 sians thus ascribed to the Emperor, has been 
 mentioned merely to introduce the sounding eu- 
 logium upon that people which the author has 
 thought proper to oppose to it : " The Russians," 
 he observes, "are just at that point in the scale 
 " of moral advancement, at which all the primi- 
 " tive virtues are retained, and some of the ac- 
 " quired virtues have already been added to 
 " them." Presently afterwards an aid-de-camp 
 comes to announce that, at our right, Regnier and
 
 CHAPTER V. 143 
 
 Prince Sehwarzenberg had obtained an important 
 advantage over Tormasof, and had driven him 
 back into Volhynia. Napoleon is represented as 
 immediately exclaiming " Do you see ! The ani- 
 " mals ! They suffer themselves to be beaten 
 " even by the Austrians." Is it probable that the 
 Emperor should have the impurdence to insult the 
 Austrians, at the very moment they were entitled 
 to his praise ? Connecting this exclamation with 
 the design ascribed by the author to Napoleon at 
 Witepsk, of directing his operations against Prussia, 
 and making that country defray the expenses of the 
 war, in case the Russian campaign should hold out 
 no prospect of a favorable issue, might one not be 
 tempted to believe that our historian was anxious 
 to justify beforehand the conduct afterwards 
 adopted by those two cabinets, and so to diminish 
 the odium of their defection ? 
 
 He represents some of the generals that were 
 the nearest to Napoleon's person as having said 
 that : "If Europe were to rise against him, his 
 ** soldiers would become his only subjects, and 
 " his camp his empire ; and that even of these, a 
 u third part consisting of foreigners would become 
 " his enemies." Was it possible that such ideas 
 should arise at that epoch in the mind of any 
 one ? This anachronism is a further proof that 
 the romance we have been examining is written 
 in the spirit of new opinions, and not founded 
 upon recollection. 
 
 The author then exhibits to us some scenes of
 
 144 BOOK VI. 
 
 murmuring, which are but a repetition of those 
 at Wilna, Witepsk, etc. etc. Surely his inventive 
 genius might have furnished us with something 
 newer. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 How unfortunate is the Emperor Napoleon ! It 
 is not enough that he should hear in every direc- 
 tion the incessant lamentations of Murat, Caulin- 
 court, Daru, Berthier, Ney, Lobau, etc. ; he must 
 now have to do with two new murmurers, Rapp, 
 and Lauriston. Rapp speaks on the occasion; 
 he comes from Dantzig ; but this circumstance 
 does not prevent his giving an account of the 
 disorder prevailing among our soldiers in Ger- 
 many, from the Elbe to the Oder, and from the 
 Oder to the Vistula. He concludes by saying 
 that the troops complain of being kept constantly 
 marching. Not content with affording to Rapp 
 the aid of his eloquence, Mr. de Segur himself 
 presents of our soldiers the following picture: 
 " Agitated by a vague inquietude, they inarched 
 " on amid the dull uniformity of the vast and 
 " silent forests of dark pines : They crept* along 
 
 * Does the author mean to say that our soldiers climbed the 
 trees.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 145 
 
 <( 
 
 (£ 
 
 (S 
 it 
 
 these large trees, bare and stripped to their very 
 tops, and were affrighted at their weakness 
 amid this immensity. They then conceived 
 
 gloomy and absurd notions.". 
 
 The most daring authors of melodramatic per- 
 formances on the boulevards would have hesitated 
 to make their buffoon give utterance to so gro- 
 tesque a description. 
 
 The declamations against the soldiery on the 
 departure from Wilna are still borne in mind. 
 We now have another frightful picture of the 
 number of victims which were left scattered along 
 the road, and whom the author does not estimate 
 at less than one fourth of the French, and one 
 half of the allied armies. 
 
 Rapp is not sparing in his details ; but the 
 Emperor does not enter into any explanation 
 with him ; another general is more in possession 
 of his confidence ; this is Sebastiani, who reminds 
 Napoleon " of his having declared to him, at 
 " Wilna, that he would not cross the Dwina : he> 
 " like the rest, laid great stress upon the state 
 of the army. Its condition is dreadful, replied 
 the Emperor : from Wilna half of it consisted 
 " of stragglers ; now they form two thirds ; there 
 " is, therefore, no time to be lost." It is evident, 
 according to this calculation, that the march 
 ought to be rapid, if Napoleon wishes that any of 
 his soldiers should reach Moscow. For, even at 
 Smolensko, where scarce one half the distance has 
 been' performed, there would only remain one 
 
 L 

 
 
 146 BOOR VI. 
 
 third of the army fit for active service, a ridi- 
 culous assertion which carries with it its own 
 refutation. 
 
 Mr. de Segur finds that the Emperor contra- 
 dicts himself in the words he addresses to his 
 generals. The evil is no doubt contagious ; for, 
 in the preceding chapter, Count de Lobau, on his 
 entrance into Smolensko, is made by that historian 
 to say : " What a fine head cantonment ! this was 
 the same thing as advising him to stop there ; 
 but the Emperor returned no other answer to 
 " this counsel than a stern look." And yet a few 
 pages afterwards, Napoleon is made to repeat 
 Count de Lobau's expressions in the presence of 
 Davoust and of his generals. He considered Smo- 
 lensko, he said, as an excellent head cantonment, 8$c. 
 Now, continued he, addressing Davoust, my line 
 is well covered ; we will stop here ! He however 
 sends him at this time to join Ney and Murat in 
 pursuit of the Russians. He wishes to avoid from 
 henceforth any serious affair, and he commits the 
 pursuit of the enemy to the two rashest of his 
 officers. Unknown to Davoust, who is the prudent 
 Marshal, he places him under the command of' the 
 impetuous King of Naples. Thus, says our author, 
 the contradictions of his words seem to he com- 
 municated to his actions. 
 
 It is easy for Mr. de Segur to ascribe contradic- 
 tions in words and in actions to the imaginary 
 personages of his own creating. But history will 
 not form its jndgment of Napoleon upon frivolous
 
 CHAPTER VII. 147 
 
 prattle. This prince never said that he would 
 stop at Smolensko, for he never entertained the 
 thought of doing so. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 As soon as the bridges are restored, Marshal 
 Ney passes the Dniester in order to follow up the 
 enemy ; but not, as is alleged by our officer of the 
 palace, with anxious eye and attentive ear. How 
 can the author assert that, when they found no 
 enemy, those brave troops, led on by an equally 
 brave commander, were relieved from the weight 
 of a great apprehension P Let him bestow praise 
 upon the Russians, when it is well merited ; no- 
 thing more proper. But at least let him not say 
 that the French soldiers dreaded them. The cam- 
 paign, however disastrous, has sufficiently proved 
 the contrary. 
 
 It has been seen in the preceding chapter, that, 
 as early as the 17th August, the corps of Bagration 
 was sent by General Barclay in the direction of 
 Dorogobouje. Barclay de Tolly himself aban- 
 doned Smolensko on the 18th at day break, and 
 moved along the road of Poreczie, from whence 
 he marched his corps in two columns, by cross 
 
 l2
 
 148 BOOK VI. 
 
 roads, so as to fall into the road from Smolensko 
 to Moscow, the left column at Prouditchi, the 
 right at Loubino. They were both in this man- 
 ner to march over the arc of a circle, the cord of 
 which was formed by part of the road from Smo- 
 lensko to Moscow; a very imprudent movement ; 
 for, independently of the long winding which 
 Barclay had to take, and the bad condition of the 
 cross roads which he had to travel over in order 
 to gain the road to Moscow, the latter offered no 
 other impediment to our march, than four regi- 
 ments of cossacks, left there by Bagiation, under 
 the command of General Karpof. To this weak 
 rear-guard alone was thus committed the duty of 
 covering the two outlets through which the two 
 columns of Barclay's army were to fall again into 
 the high road. The Russian General had no 
 sooner entered those defiles, than he discovered the 
 danger that threatened him. He sent in all haste 
 an advanced guard, under the command of Gene- 
 ral Touczkof to recover the high road by forced 
 marches, and to proceed afterwards in the di- 
 rection of Smolensko, with the view of affording 
 assistance to the cossacks under Karpof. 
 
 " At length, says Mr. de Segur, after an ar- 
 " duous march, the head of the enemy's convoy 
 came in sight of the high road at the moment 
 when, in order to reach that outlet, the French 
 had only to force the height of Valontina, and 
 the passage of the Kolowdnia. Ney had just 
 " succeeded in carrying that of the Stubna." 
 
 a 
 a 
 ec
 
 CHAPTKR VII. 149 
 
 Marshal Ney, after passing the Dniester, had 
 continued his march between the two roads of St. 
 Petersburgh and of Moscow, in the direction of 
 Gorbounowo, and his light troops drove out of it 
 sOme detachments of Baggavvouth's corps (belong- 
 ing to the right column) which they met in the 
 town. The Marshal now ascertained that the 
 Russians were proceeding towards the Moscow 
 road, and followed them in the same direction. 
 The enemy, as already stated, having retained to- 
 wards Smolensko, no other troops than cossacks 
 upon this road, Ney met with few obstacles 
 until he arrived at Valontina. " But Korf, driven 
 " back upon Valontina, had summoned to his aid 
 " the column which preceded him." This fact is 
 not correctly laid down. After defending the 
 suburb of Smolensko against Ney, General Korf, 
 who commanded Barclay's rear-guard, took the 
 road towards Paloniewo (that of Poreczie) in 
 which Barclay had preceded him. He did not 
 therefore make his retreat, as the author repre- 
 sents it, by the high road to Moscow,* neither 
 did he fight at Valontina. 
 
 Towards eleven, Marshal Ney attacked the ene- 
 my's corps which he met on the Moscow road. 
 
 * When the troops of Marshal Ney attacked Gorbounowo, 
 they cut off the rear-guard, and Barclay sent to its relief the 
 division of Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, which retook Gor- 
 bounowo, at the time when Marshal Ney was proceeding in the 
 direction of Valontina.
 
 150 BOOK VI. 
 
 and briskly drove them beyond a swampy brook, 
 where fresh Russian divisions had come up to 
 their assistance , the enemy obstinately maintain- 
 ed their ground. General Barclay felt of what 
 importance it was to arrest the progress of the 
 French at all hazards. He repaired to that po- 
 sition, and successively brought up other divi- 
 sions, in the order in which thev debouched from 
 the cross roads, and entered upon the high road. 
 The Emperor being informed that Ney met 
 with some resistance, sent Gudin's division, which 
 he placed under the orders of that Marshal. 
 
 This division approached the scene of action 
 towards four in the afternoon. Having formed 
 itself into a column by platoons, it marched up 
 to the enemy, who occupied a height that inter- 
 cepted the road, and was protected by the swampy 
 brook, with a small wooden bridge over it, which 
 it was necessarv to cross before an attack could 
 be made upon the height. This narrow defile was 
 battered in all directions by the Russian artillery. 
 The seventh light infantry, with arms shouldered, 
 and General Gudin at their head, took the lead to 
 force the pass. Each platoon, as it crossed the 
 brook, answered the numerous cannon shots of 
 the Russians by the enthusiatic cries of long live 
 the Emperor. That regiment was followed by the 
 twelfth, the twenty-first, and the hundred and 
 twenty- first ; but at this moment the brave Gene- 
 ral Gudin had both his legs shattered by a cannon 
 bail. Count Gerard took his place. The en-
 
 CHAPTER VII. 151 
 
 gagement became very brisk. The French, how- 
 ever, reached the opposite height. Four times the 
 Russian columns rushed upon them ; four times 
 Gerard drove them back. The whole corps of 
 Baggowouth, the divisions of Alsuwief, and of 
 Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, had come up to 
 the engagement which lasted until ten at night. 
 The enemy being unable to recover the position, 
 which Gerard's division had taken from them, 
 now began their retreat. 
 
 u There was almost as much glory in their de- 
 feat as in our victory." 
 
 Having been present at this engagement, we 
 know that the Russians fought with the utmost 
 bravery; but the author should say that, besides 
 a superiority in numbers over the corps of Mar- 
 shal Ney and Gerard's division, the enemy held an 
 excellent position, and that their numerous ar- 
 tillery had an advantage over us so much the 
 greater, as we were prevented on our side, by 
 the nature of the ground, from making a full 
 display of our own. In spite, however, of all these 
 obstacles, the attack of Gerard's division suc- 
 ceeded in securing to us that formidable position, 
 which none but French troops could have carried. 
 We do not fear to be contradicted by any mi- 
 litary man, when we affirm that this engage- 
 ment was one of the most glorious exploits that 
 our armies have achieved. 
 
 " One of the enemy's generals, the only one left 
 " unhurt on this field of carnage, endeavored to
 
 '.' V -
 
 '.■t>rit 

 
 154 BOOK VI. 
 
 not return lo his head-quarters until live of the 
 afternoon, when he thought the engagement was 
 over. Previous, however, to quitting that position, 
 he sent to the King of Naples, his orderly officer 
 Gourgaud, under whose command he placed se- 
 veral others (Mr. Rohan Chabot among the 
 rest.)* He directed him to follow the attack 
 which was making upon the road to Moscow, and 
 to cause the movements of Marshal Ney, of the 
 King of Naples, and of the Duke of Abrantes, to 
 coincide simultaneouslv with each other. This 
 officer was to send his reports of the engagement 
 to the Emperor. It was only after having taken 
 this precaution that Napoleon re-entered Smo- 
 lensko. 
 
 According to the direction laid down by the 
 Emperor, the Russians could not have defended 
 the position of Valontina. He must have suppos- 
 ed that the Duke of Abrantes, after passing the 
 Dnieper, would have continued his march to- 
 wards the high road, and thus out-flanking the 
 left of the Russian position, have compelled them 
 to make a precipitate retreat. He knew that 
 Morand's division, belonging to the corps of Da- 
 voust, by taking the left of the high road, would 
 also out-flank the right of the Russian position. 
 Could he foresee that these arrangements would 
 not be carried into effect ? In spite of the entrea- 
 
 * Mr. Rohan Chabot was aid-de-eamp to General Count de 
 Narbonne.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 155 
 
 ties of the King of Naples, in spite of the orders 
 and instructions from the Emperor, which the 
 orderly officer communicated to him, Junot con- 
 stantly refused to take the road in the rear of the 
 Russians. It appears that this general, who had 
 given so many proofs of the most brilliant valour, 
 was beginning to feel the symptoms of the com- 
 plaint of which he died soon afterwards. The 
 orderly officer, seeing that the general would not 
 execute the order of which he was the bearer, 
 said to him : " Duke, what am I to report to the 
 " Emperor ?" The Duke of Abrantes was sur- 
 rounded by his staff, and appeared very dejected. 
 He replied with peevishness : " You will report, 
 " sir, that I have taken up a position, because 
 " night has overtaken me." In vain the orderly 
 officer observed that there yet remained four hours 
 of day-light, that Marshal Ney suffered much 
 from the attack he was obliged to make in 
 front ; all his remonstrances were to no purpose ; 
 the Duke of Abrantes would not make any move- 
 ment. When the engagement was over, the 
 orderly officer returned to Smolensko, and pre- 
 sented himself to the Emperor at midnight, to 
 give him an account of it. Napoleon sensibly af- 
 fected at the useless effusion of blood at Valon- 
 tina, and at the death of General Gudin, asked 
 why Junot had not carried his orders into execu- 
 tion. The officer communicated what had taken 
 place. The Emperor then sent for Berthier, and 
 said to him : " It appears that Junot has enough
 
 15(> BOOK Vf. 
 
 i 
 
 i ( of it ; he lias refused to turn the position of the 
 " Russians. He is the cause of our having had a 
 " very sanguinary engagement, of our having lost 
 
 " General Gudin 1 will not allow him to 
 
 " command the Westphalians any longer ; he 
 " must he replaced by Rapp, who speaks German, 
 " and who will be a proper leader for them." The 
 Prince of Neufchatel wrote the orders relating to 
 this change, but in the course of a few hours Mar- 
 shal Duroc and other great officers, old compa- 
 nions in arms of Junot, succeeded in pacifying 
 Napoleon, and that general retained his com- 
 mand. 
 
 "The Emperor gave orders to Davoust to sup- 
 " port Ney and Murat." 
 
 In the preceding chapter Mr. de Segur has 
 already sent him on to that destination, and made 
 it a ground of reproach, that the marshal, the most 
 prudent, should be placed under the orders of the 
 rashest. These two chapters, which dwell upon 
 the same movement, are so deficient in arrange- 
 ment, that they appear to treat of events occur- 
 ring at an interval of two months from each 
 other. But all is confusion in Mr. de Segur's ac- 
 counts, as well as in his recollections. .
 
 157 
 
 CHAFFER VIII. 
 
 The picture given by the author, of the distri- 
 bution of the rewards decreed by Napoleon, pos- 
 sesses some interest ; but it is deficient in details. 
 Mr. de Segur, who, in general, is lavish of them, 
 has omitted amongst others the following : The 
 Emperor, on visiting the position of Valontina, 
 said to General Gerard : *' This is a field of battle 
 " to my liking ; four Russians to one Frenchman; 
 " Gerard, this is quite right." He then praised 
 the courage of the troops, repeatedly recommend- 
 ed order and discipline to them, and on coming up 
 to the seventh light infantry, desired all the cap- 
 tains to form a circle around him, and said to 
 them : " Point out to me the best officer in the 
 ". regiment. — Sire, they are all good officers. — 
 " Come, point out the best. — Sire, they are all 
 te good officers — Why, this is no answer to my 
 " question ; speak as Themistocles did : I am the 
 " first ; the second is my neighbour." They then 
 named Captain Moncey, who was wounded, and 
 absent at this moment. " What, said the Emperor,' 
 " Moncey who was my page, the son of the Mar- 
 shal ? Now name me another. — Sire, he is the 
 best officer. — Well! I give him the decoration." 
 Mr. de Segur allows the mind of his reader no 

 
 158 BOOK VI. 
 
 rest ; after this review he immediately presents 
 us with a sight of the hospitals, where he makes a 
 display of his taste for afflicting scenes. He does 
 not stop at Smolensko ; he falls back upon Wi- 
 tepsk and even upon Wilna, where he goes to 
 borrow his darkest colors. He appears to find 
 fault with the Emperor for the sufferings and the 
 state of want of the soldiers, of which he presents 
 the most exaggerated description. 
 
 Injustice we must say, and without fear of con- 
 tradiction, that of all ancient or modern generals, 
 Napoleon is the one who shewed the most tender, 
 the most unceasing care to the wounded, that the 
 intoxication of victory never made him forget 
 them, and that his first thought, after every battle, 
 has been for them. If his soldiers have sometimes 
 stood in need of provisions, of beds, medicines, 
 or other articles necessary for the dressings of 
 their wounds, the author might direct his re- 
 proaches to the intendant general of the army. 
 The Emperor had given every requisite order, and 
 supplied the military administration with means, 
 in men and horses, as abundant as those for the 
 artillery. The latter branch of the service, not- 
 withstanding the engagements that had taken 
 place, was never in want of ammunition. When 
 the administration set in motion a materiel so con- 
 siderable as to consist of several thousand car- 
 riages, it could have no difficulty in procuring 
 the transport of some hospital waggons ; this 
 would have spared the intendant of the army the
 
 CHAPTER IX . 
 
 159 
 
 necessity of requesting at Smolensko* that general 
 Lariboisiere, who commanded the artillery of the 
 army, would cause him to be provided with the 
 tow which is used for lining the caissons, in order 
 that he might supply it to the purpose of dressing 
 the wounded. 
 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The author says, " that Napoleon had employed 
 " two of his officers to sound the sentiments of the 
 " Russian people, in order to encourage them to 
 rise, but that the attempt had only served to 
 put them on their guard against him.*' And 
 immediately afterwards he adds, that " this ex- 
 
 * The materiel of the artillery of the army before Smolen- 
 sko (the guards, the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th corps, and the 
 reserve of cavalry) was as follows: 
 
 57 12 pounders. 
 
 267 6 do. 
 
 32 4 do. 
 
 2 3 do. 
 
 10 obuses of 6^ inches. 
 
 122 do. 5| do. 
 
 490 field-pieces, 
 
 and 2477 caissons loaded with ammunition ; forming 
 
 a total of 2967 carriages, exclusive of pontoon carriages, forges, 
 spare gun carriages, &c
 
 160 BOOK VI. 
 
 
 pedient was repugnant to Napoleon, and that 
 subsequently several heads of families offered 
 "themselves to head insurrections, but were re- 
 " jected." Thus in the same page we are present- 
 ed with two important contradictions. We must 
 not wonder at it ; the author has made us fa- 
 miliar with them. He says further on, " that the 
 " sight of us excited their horror. . . that the Em- 
 " peror then perceived the magnitude of his en- 
 " terprise ; that so long as he only encountered 
 (i kings, their defeats were but sport ; that the 
 " kings being conquered, he had now to do with 
 " nations ; that it was another Spain he had found 
 " at the opposite extremity of Europe." In Spain 
 the population had risen against us, being driven 
 to fanaticism by the monks, amongst whom each 
 family reckoned one of its members. That popu- 
 lation was the leading party in the war, and car- 
 ried it on in person, if the expression may be al- 
 lowed. On our entrance into Russia, on the con- 
 trary, the only fighting men were the regular 
 troops. The state carried on the war, the state 
 had ordered the nation to tall back at our ap- 
 proach, or rather had enjoined the soldiers to set 
 fire to every dwelling in their retreat, a sure means 
 of compelling the inhabitants to remove. This is 
 what took place, and what ought to have been 
 known to Mr. de Segur. But where has he seen 
 Russian PiieriUasP In what encounters have our 
 troops had to face the peasantry? Let Mr. de 
 Segur inform us, and we may then discover with
 
 
 C H A PTE R IX. 161 
 
 liim that Spain which he has found out at the other 
 extremity of Europe ; but nothing of all this was 
 the case. Here, as in every page of his work, 
 there is exaggeration, confusion, and supposition. 
 It was only after the battle of the Moskwa, and 
 during our retreat, that a few peasants, excited 
 by the allurement of plunder, murdered some of 
 our wounded who had remained in their power. 
 He (Napoleon) was daunted, he hesitated, he 
 
 paused .... a fever of hesitation attacked him ; 
 " his looks were directed towards Kief, St. Peters- 
 " burgh, and Moscow." 
 
 " At Kief he should envelop Tchitchakof and 
 " his army. By marching in concert with Saint- 
 " Cyr upon St. Petersburg^, he should surround 
 C( Wittgenstein. On the other hand, he should, in 
 " Moscow, be striking at the very heart of Russia. 
 
 " Of these three plans the latter appeared to 
 
 "him the only one practicable and yet, 
 
 " adds the author, the history of Charles XII was 
 " present before him.'* 
 
 Ought it not to be inferred from those ex- 
 pressions that Charles XII was his guide in the 
 plan of marching upon Moscow ; whilst, on the 
 contrary, the Swedish monarch committed the 
 fault of not marching upon that capital. To 
 know this, it was not necessary to be a military 
 man ; nothing more was requisite than a perusal 
 of the history of Charles XII, we will not even 
 say that of the chamberlain Alderfeld, but simply 
 Voltaire's history. It is universally acknowledged 
 
 M
 
 162 BOOK VI. 
 
 that the march of Charles XII, up to his arrival 
 at Smolensko, was in strict conformity with the 
 rules of strategy, since his line of operations and 
 his communications were secured, and since 
 Poland and Riga were in his power. The fault 
 committed by the king, was his having left the 
 Moscow road in order to take the direction of the 
 Ukraine ; this was the cause of all his disasters, 
 by making him lose his line of operations, 
 and by preventing the arrival of Lewenhaupt 
 with a supply of men and provisions to his as- 
 sistance. 
 
 The position of Napoleon at Smolensko, which 
 he converted into a large depot and a point dap- 
 pui, allowed him to proceed with perfect security 
 to Moscow, which was not at a greater distance than 
 ten days' march. Besides, we really did not enter 
 an enemy's country until leaving Smolensko. The 
 magazines of Minsk and of Wilna were at eight 
 days' march in our rear; those of Kowno, Grodno, 
 and Bialistock were on the third line. On the 
 fourth line were those of Elbin, Marienwerder, 
 Thorn, Warsaw, etc. ; further back in the rear 
 those of Dantzig, Bromberg, Posen ; lastly, on 
 the sixth line, upon the Oder, were the magazines 
 established in the fortified towns in which we had 
 garrisons.
 
 163 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The author gives the particulars of a victory ob- 
 tained at Polotsk. It was of so much importance 
 as to place the Emperor perfectly at rest, and 
 secure that the enemy would not, for a long time, 
 attempt to stir in that direction. This victory pro- 
 cured for General Saint-Cyr the staff of marshal 
 of the empire. "Notwithstanding this success, 
 " the determination to proceed beyond Smolensko 
 " was too perilous for Napoleon to decide on it 
 " alone ; it was necessary to draw him into it." 
 How can it be supposed that the Emperor, once 
 in possession of Smolensko, should have stopped 
 there, when the armies of Bagration and of Bar- 
 clay were retiring upon Moscow, and when there 
 was no well-founded motive for abstaining to 
 follow and fight them in that direction ? For the 
 Emperor was certain that the enemy would give 
 battle in order to protect his capital. In the 
 eyes of all reflecting people, a victory and the 
 capture of Moscow held out a prospect of peace. 
 The author himself, in the expressions which he 
 ascribes to the Emperor, in his conversations with 
 his generals in the preceding chapters, respecting 
 the disorganized state of the army, the great num- 
 ber of stragglers, etc., makes him say, that there is 
 
 m2
 
 1(>4 15 O O K VI. 
 
 no time to be lost, that peace must be extorted, that 
 it awaits them at Moscow. Were we to admit the 
 truth of these perpetual hesitations on the part 
 of the Emperor, we should have to acknowledge 
 that this great man had lost his mental faculties. 
 But Mr. de Segur's insinuations are invariably 
 contradicted by the facts. 
 
 At Wilna, at Witepsk, Napoleon is represented 
 to us as a being devoid of energy, of will, even 
 of reason, not knowing what to do, what may 
 become of him, giving no orders, and appearing 
 to depend upon chance for every thing. And 
 yet we find him forseeing every thing, directing 
 military and political measures at the same time. 
 We see him entirely upsetting the Russian plan 
 of campaign on the very first march, separating 
 their army into two bodies, compelling them to 
 abandon their line of operation, their magazines, 
 their entrenched camp, their communications, and 
 to resign to us the whole of Lithuania almost with- 
 out a struggle. At Witepsk, when, according to 
 Mr. de Segur, the Emperor is buried in a deep 
 torpor, the Russian Generals come in a body to 
 attack him ; this is what he desired. They ima- 
 gine that he is going to bear with the French 
 army upon their right ; they manoeuvre accord- 
 ingly ; whilst, with the rapidity of lightning, he 
 crosses the Dnieper and appears upon their left 
 flank. These important movements are so judici- 
 ously combined, they are executed with so much 
 precision, that Barclay and Bagration, notwitli-
 
 CHAPTER X. 165 
 
 standing all their light troops, notwithstanding 
 their numerous agents and partisans in the 
 country, are only apprized of the danger that 
 threatens them, by the attack made upon their 
 rear, against Smolensko, by that great captain 
 whom they had hoped to surprise by their right in 
 scattered cantonments, and whom Mr. de Segur 
 exhibits to our view as fallen into an almost con- 
 tinual state of torpor and indecision. 
 
 We have just demonstrated how false is Mr. de 
 Segur's assertion ; may we be allowed to add our 
 personal testimony on this point ? We received 
 our orders direct from the Emperor; we. saw him 
 at all times, whether when he issued those orders 
 to us, or when we rendered an account to him of 
 their execution, and we have never seen him 
 such as he is described by the marec/utl-des-logis 
 of the palace.* 
 
 * Extract from a confidential letter of the Duke de Frioul, 
 grand marshal of the palace, which is in our possession. 
 
 Bivouac, before Witepsk, 28 July, at night. 
 
 " The army, after constant fighting for the last three days, 
 " and driving back the enemy, has arrived before Witepsk. All 
 " the corps will be united to-night, and there will be a battle to- 
 " morrow, unless the enemy should retire, as we are given to 
 " apprehend, from the position which he has taken up in front 
 " of us, with the view of covering Witepsk. Yesterday and to- 
 " day, in the various encounters tin t have taken place, and in 
 " which only a few of our troops were engaged, the Russians 
 " have always been vigorously repulsed. Thpy have lost sumo
 
 166 BOOK VI. 
 
 Is there not an injustice in saying, at the be- 
 ginning of this chapter, that his lieutenants seem- 
 ed to have done more than himself? Is it then 
 indispensable, that the commander-in-chief of an 
 army of nearly four hundred thousand men should 
 be present at every engagement? He cannot be 
 everywhere at one and the same time, and this is 
 a misfortune. He issues his orders and his in- 
 structions, communicates a general idea of his 
 plans ; and it then becomes the duty of each of 
 his generals to conform to them, as far as circum- 
 stances and localities will permit. 
 
 Assuredly, had Napoleon been with the fifth, 
 seventh, and eighth corps, Bagration would not 
 have crossed the Dnieper ; he, and his army, 
 would have been lost to Russia. Had Napoleon 
 been with Schwartzenberg, the corps of Torma- 
 sow would have experienced a similar fate ; had 
 Napoleon been with Ney, the Russian army, on 
 its quitting Smolensko, would have paid dearly 
 for the fault which its generals had committed of 
 marching in a circuitous direction, in the midst 
 of almost impracticable cross roads, in order to 
 
 " prisoners and several pieces of cannon. The Emperor is in 
 " the enjoyment of excellent health. We have lost General 
 " Roussel of the array of Italy ; he was accidentally killed by a 
 " patrole. The colonel of artillery Lideot has been mortally 
 " wounded in reconnoitring. Ferrerihas had a leg shot off. We 
 " are impatient here to learn that the Duke of Tarentum has 
 " passed the Dwina, and sent forward the battering train."
 
 u 
 
 a 
 
 CHAPTER X. 167 
 
 regain the high road to Moscow and the Dnieper 
 at Soloniewo. * 
 
 Marshal Davoust who, in the 6th chapter, had 
 been placed against his knowledge under the or- 
 ders of the King of Naples, appears, in this chap- 
 ter, to emerge from his ignorance ; he obeys with 
 an ill grace. Fortunately, says Mr. de Segur, 
 Barclay having fallen back without resistance 
 nearly as far as Dorogobouje, Murat had no 
 need of Davoust." We do not exactly see what 
 other resistance, except that founded upon honor, 
 could have prevented Barclay from retreating; 
 this was certainly not what was meant by Mr. de 
 Segur. The enemy soon makes a show of resist- 
 ance ; the King of Naples prepares to attack him ; 
 he wishes to give the left to Davoust, who insists 
 upon retaining the right. 
 
 " If there exists a spirit of discord in our ad- 
 " vanced guard, it reigns also in the Russian 
 " camp." The admissions of Mr. de Segur are 
 worthy of remark. " Confidence in their com- 
 mander was wanting, he says ; each step seem- 
 ed a blunder, each resolution the most injudi- 
 cious. The loss of Smolensko had soured all." 
 
 
 * A General (Moreau) whom some persons have long set in 
 opposition to the Emperor, being consulted by our coalesced 
 enemies, as to the best plan of attack that could be adopted 
 against him, replied, " Fight Napoleon wherever he is not." 
 It would appear that our officer of the palace is not of this 
 opinion. 1*
 
 168 BOOK IV. 
 
 These few expressions of the author appear to us 
 a complete refutation of the praises which he ha s 
 bestowed upon the ability of the chiefs, and th e 
 order prevailing in the Russian armies. Mr. de 
 Segur falls from one contradiction into another, 
 because he never knows what he says any more 
 than what he intends to say. 
 
 Upon receiving the intelligence that the Russians 
 appeared desirous of offering battle, Napoleon had 
 quitted Smolensko. The author might reproach 
 him " with having neglected the hostile armies of 
 " Essen at Riga, of Wittgenstein, before Polosk, of 
 " Hartel, before Bobruisk, of Tchitchagof in Vol- 
 " hynia, forming a total of one hundred and 
 " twenty thousand men, by which he suffered 
 " himself, with indifference, to be surrounded." 
 But according to his custom of being at variance 
 with himself, he tells us, a few lines lower down : 
 " one hundred and fifty seven thousand men would 
 " have been sufficient to destroy the Russian 
 " army, and to seize upon Moscow ;" and he 
 hastens on to a calculation that represents us as su- 
 perior to the same hostile corps of which mention 
 has already been made. " He would thus, said 
 he, have supported himself upon two hundred 
 and eighty thousand men, so as, with one hun- 
 " dred and fifty five thousand, to invade a coun- 
 " try ninety three leagues in extent, for such is 
 " the distance from Smolensko to Moscow." All 
 this mighty enumeration of forces, acting upon 
 various points, has no other object in view than 

 
 CHAPTER X. 169 
 
 to afford matter of blame that "those two hun- 
 " dred and eighty thousand men were command- 
 " ed by six different leaders .... the most elevated 
 " of whom. . . .he who occupied the centre. . . . 
 " was a minister of peace and not of war." What 
 could Mr. de Segur have wished ? Could a single 
 army, under a single chief, have occupied so ex- 
 tended a space as that from the Baltic to the con- 
 fines of Turkey ? The minister of peace held no 
 military command. His functions, as well as the 
 title given to him by Mr. de Segur, were purely 
 of a pacific nature. The Emperor was the real 
 chief of all those armies. He was in direct com- 
 munication with them, and stood in need of no 
 intermediate agent.
 
 170 
 
 BOOK VII 
 
 CHAFrER I. 
 
 On leaving Dorogobouje, the army marches to- 
 wards Moscow, with the Emperor, Murat, Da- 
 voust, and Ney in the centre, Poniatowski on the 
 right, and the army of Italy on the left. The 
 centre column, which followed the road taken by 
 the Russians, could obtain but little subsistence 
 upon it. " In order to live better, says our officer 
 " of the palace, it ought to have set out later every 
 " day, halted earlier, and then given greater ex- 
 " tent to its flanks during the night." The object 
 was not solely to obtain better subsistence, but 
 also to march in military order. Mr. de Segur 
 could not resist here his inclination to murmur, 
 though he acknowledges that what he points out 
 is scarcely possible. 
 
 " It was a curious sight to observe the volun- 
 " tary and continual efforts of so many men to 
 " follow a single individual to such great dis- 
 " tances." The author knows full well, that in 
 every army in the world, the multitude are led by 
 one man. What is his object in making this re- 
 flection ? Mr. de Segur, it is true, sees in the 
 French army, an army of volunteers commanded
 
 CHAPTER I. 171 
 
 by the Emperor, who was not, however, accus- 
 tomed to consider as volunteers the soldiers under 
 his orders. 
 
 This chapter embraces details on the mode of 
 living" of the soldiery, whose existence appears a 
 prodigy to the author, and on the precautions 
 taken by the military administration. It exhibits 
 exaggerations that are familiar to the author, such 
 as the animosities between the soldiers, " which 
 
 would have infallibly led to most sanguinary 
 
 intestine conflicts had not all been subsequently 
 " overtaken by the same misfortune, and involved 
 " in the horrors of a common disaster. 
 
 The word happily is the only one wanting in 
 this phrase. 
 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 We have again Mr. de Segur refuting himself. 
 In the preceding chapter he has shewn us Napo- 
 leon without foresight ; and at the opening of the 
 present one, he informs us that, in the vicinity of 
 Dorogobouje, this prince sends orders to Marshal 
 Victor to advance to Smolensko. 
 
 The author blames Napoleon for " dating from 
 " the heart of old Russia a number of decrees." 
 Was he not then aware that the Emperor, when 
 he quitted France, had left no regency behind, and
 
 172 BOOK VII. 
 
 that his government was so well organized, that, 
 from the extremity of Russia, he governed France 
 as if he had been at the Tuileries ? 
 
 What does he mean by alluding- to a bridge 
 which his guard was ordered to protect, which they 
 burn from thoughtlessness, and which is afterwards 
 repaired ? In relating a fact of that nature, does 
 not the author wish it to be believed, that such 
 was the state of disorder in the French army, that 
 the most disciplined corps joined in it from mere 
 thoughtlessness P 
 
 Respecting an affair of the advanced guard, in 
 which the King of Naples, carried away by his 
 impetuosity, was for a moment in great danger, 
 the author says : " at the moment of the most im- 
 " minent danger, a battery twice refused to fire ; 
 " its commanding officer pleaded his instructions, 
 " which forbade him, upon pain of being broke, 
 " to fight without orders from Davoust." A mar- 
 shal could have had no right to break an officer ; 
 all he could do was to ask of the Emperor his dis- 
 missal, on giving an account of the facts ; and as- 
 suredly Napoleon would not have broke an officer 
 for obeying the King of Naples, and firing upon 
 the Russians, when he had his battery in front of 
 them. This fact, besides, is as correct as the re- 
 fusal of the artillery of the guards to fire when at 
 Smolensko, as related in chapter IV of the . 6th 
 book. 
 
 Was this pretended insubordination of a picked 
 body of men brought forward by Mr. de Segur,
 
 CHAPTER II. 17 
 
 merely with the view.of shewing that there reigned 
 great disorder in the army? It is more probable 
 that he introduced this incident merely as evidence 
 of a misunderstanding between Davoust and Mu- 
 rat. He takes advantage of it, on the one hand, 
 to make a pompous eulogium on the Russians, 
 which coming from Marshal Davoust is at least 
 out of place, and on the other to censure the man- 
 ner in which Murat led on his troops. What he 
 says on the subject is incorrect ; for the cavalry, 
 thus led on, could not have resisted the fatigue of 
 a few day's march . It is a pity that the author has 
 not presented us with Murat's reply ; but he adds, 
 " that there was something in the rnisunderstand- 
 " ing between these chiefs which did not displease 
 " the Emperor." The Emperor saw, no doubt with 
 pleasure, any spirit of emulation which was pro- 
 ductive of advantage to the service ; but if any 
 misunderstanding had existed, it would have sen- 
 sibly affected him. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The author falls into a fresh contradiction. He 
 has just asserted that there was something not 
 displeasing to the Emperor, in the misunder- 
 standing of his chiefs ; he now says that quarrels 
 between his chiefs, gave him uneasiness.
 
 174 BOOK VII. 
 
 The quarrel between Murat and Davoust. 
 which engrossed nearly the whole of the second 
 chapter, begins again with the present one, and 
 forms the concluding part of it. These rivalries 
 and jealousies, related with so much self-satisfac- 
 tion, are ridiculously exaggerated. They may 
 have engaged the attention of the idlers in the 
 ante-room, but were of such little importance, or 
 influence over the progress of affairs, that the men- 
 tion of them, at such lengths, may lead into error, 
 and convey of our army a very false notion. It 
 is besides a parody upon the disputes of Ajax and 
 Achilles ; even Patrocles performs a part in them* 
 In the Emperor's army, all gave obedience. One 
 might fancy that Mr. de Segur's heroes, like those 
 of Homer, were princes who brought into the 
 train of the king of kings, armies composed of 
 their own subjects, over whom they held sovereign 
 sway, and who ceased to fight as soon as it was 
 the hero's wish to shut himself up in his tent. 
 
 The fact is, that General Compans, whose divi- 
 sion appears to have been the occasion of the dis- 
 pute between the King of Naples and Marshal 
 Davoust, never had, directly nor indirectly, any 
 discussions with the Prince. Murat, in his pur- 
 suit of the enemy, led his cavalry on as every 
 good general ought to do, and not as our officer 
 of the palace represents him to have done. In- 
 fantry was indispensable to him on many occasions. 
 Marshal Davoust had some difference with him on 
 the subject, in the neighbourhood of Viazma.
 
 CHAPTER III. 175 
 
 The King sent General Belliard to submit to the 
 Emperor, that he stood in need of a division of 
 infantry, and to communicate to him the difficul- 
 ties which Marshal Davoust threw in the way. 
 Napoleon, after listening to Belliard, sent for Ge- 
 neral Compans, and said to him: Well General! 
 what can be the meaning of this quarrel ? It de- 
 lays our march. Compans replied, that he knew 
 not what misunderstanding could exist between 
 the King of Naples and Marshal Davoust, but he 
 thought the advanced guard would proceed more 
 rapidly, if some infantry were attached to the 
 king's cavalry, which was often detained on its 
 march by the smallest defile, or in order to repair 
 a bridge ; whereas, with the aid of some infantry, 
 such obstacles would not occur. I am of your 
 opinion, said Napoleon; very well: return to your 
 division. A few moments afterwards, the Em- 
 peror sent the Prince of Neufchatel to Marshal 
 Davoust, to acquaint him that Compans' division 
 should march henceforward in the advanced guard 
 under the orders of the King of Naples. A salu- 
 tary effect was soon derived from this arrangement.
 
 176 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The author ascribes to the Russians a bitter cen- 
 sure of Barclay de Tolly, in order to have an op- 
 portunity of replying to it by a brilliant apology 
 of the conduct and character of the hostile com- 
 mander. He admits that Barclay had erred in 
 suffering himself to be surprised at Wilna . . ,• but 
 it was remarked that, subsequently, at Witepsk and 
 at Smolensko, he had forestalled Napoleon, etc. 
 We will request of Mr. de Segur to explain to us 
 the manoeuvres of that Russian General whom he 
 so highly praises, when he quitted the vicinity of 
 Smolensko to attack us in our cantonments at 
 Witepsk, and committed the mistake of supposing 
 that we were upon his right, whilst we were 
 marching upon his left flank. We will ask him 
 to explain all the marches and countermarches of 
 the Russian armies, from Smolensko to Roudnia 
 and Madwa at this period. We will ask him to 
 explain why, if Bat clay had fixed upon the plan 
 of retiring before us, he fought at Smolensko, in- 
 stead of only retaining a rear-guard in that city, 
 having already sent the corps of Bagration in the 
 direction of Dorogobouje. Lastly, we will inquire 
 of him what was Barclay's motive for exposing
 
 CHAP T K R IV. 177 
 
 the whole of his army to be attacked and over- 
 thrown by ours, during- his retreat by cross-roads, 
 at the time when the high road to Moscow, which 
 presented a much shorter distance to that city, 
 was left to the protection of a rear-guard of cos- 
 sacks. This resolution was one of so much im- 
 prudence, that, if the Duke of Abrantes had carried 
 into execution the movement assigned to him, the 
 troops which Barclay directed to return towards 
 Smolensko by the road of Moscow, with the .view 
 of affording assistance to that rear-guard, and of 
 impeding our march, would have been entirely 
 taken prisoners, and the remainder of his army 
 would have had every difficulty in regaining the 
 road to Moscow. 
 
 In the same chapter Mr. de Segur states, on the 
 subject of a flag of truce : " Our advanced posts 
 " did not keep a proper watch ; every where the 
 " same negligence was perceptible — evert/ one was 
 " asleep." We have only one observation to offer 
 upon this point, which is, that the marechal-des- 
 logis of the palace never went to the out-posts ; 
 he cannot, therefore, have any certainty of the 
 correctness of his assertion. This episode is more- 
 over, not to the purpose ; if we kept so bad a 
 look out in presence of a general of such experi- 
 ence as Barclay de Tolly, why did he not cany off 
 the Emperor and his staff ? 
 
 N
 
 178 
 
 bo o k vrr. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Since Kutusoff has assumed the command, every 
 thing announces au approaching battle. The 
 Emperor is no longer the same in Mr. de Segur's 
 opinion. He is no longer a man harrassed, un- 
 nerved, worn down by the weight of his under- 
 taking, or driven on by fatality to his own ruin ; 
 he is a superior genius, preparing his dispositions 
 " with that tranquillity of mind peculiar to extra- 
 " ordinary men — he surveyed the whole country 
 " with that eye of a conqueror which sees every 
 " thing at once, and without confusion, which 
 " penetrates through obstacles, sets aside acces- 
 " sories, discovers the object of his attraction, and 
 " fixes it with an eagle's eye, etc." 
 
 Despairing at last of being able to give an ade- 
 quate picture of the greatness of his hero, he ex- 
 claims : " How much the historian is at a loss for 
 words to define the coup (Tceil of a man of ge- 
 nius." 
 
 As, however, such rare praises stand in need of 
 some corrective, he presents humanity to our 
 view, as was done by the slave, who every day 
 reminded the kings of Persia that they were men ; 
 and he says : " That, at the sight of the Gjatz, 
 " which pours its waters into the Volga, he was
 
 C H APTK R V. 179 
 
 " heard to boast of being the master of those 
 " waves destined to visit Asia — as if they were 
 " proceeding to announce his approach, and to 
 " open the way for him to that quarter of the 
 " globe." Those hyperboles are the language of 
 a rhetorician ; and Napoleon did not lay claim to 
 this character. 
 
 " Compans skilfully avails himself of the undu- 
 " lations of the ground ; its elevations served as 
 " platforms to his guns for battering the redoubt, 
 " and screened his infantry, whilst drawing up 
 " into columns of attack. The sixty-first marched 
 " foremost ; the redoubt was taken by a single 
 " effort, and with the bayonet ; but Bagration sent 
 " reinforcements, by which it was retaken. Three 
 " times did the sixty-first recover it from the 
 '• Russians, aud three times was it driven out 
 " again. But, at length, it maintained itself in it, 
 " covered with blood and half destroyed." 
 
 There are nearly as many false assertions as 
 words in the above statement. But the author is 
 perhaps excusable; he could not have been an eye- 
 witness to what he relates. He had no other 
 guide than the accounts published respecting the 
 Russian war, accounts chiefly drawn up by per- 
 sons who were not present at the military events 
 which they describe, and who took no part in 
 them. 
 
 This redoubt mounted with twelve pieces of 
 cannon, had been raised upon a breast-work 
 erected between the village of Schwardino, and 
 
 n2
 
 180 BOOK VII. 
 
 the wood which covers the old road from Smo- 
 lensko to Moscow. On the side of the village, 
 the slope of the elevation was less uneven than 
 on the other side ; but between this slope and the 
 wood, a rather extensive plain intervened. In 
 advance of the redoubt, and at the distance of 
 about one hundred and twenty yards a small emi- 
 nence presented itself. General Compans who, 
 in the preceding' chapters, is found marching with 
 the advanced guard, was specially directed by the 
 Emperor to attack the redoubt. Napoleon at- 
 tached great importance to carrying that very 
 night (5th September), this position which covered 
 the left centre of the Russian line. For this rea- 
 son, he ordered the attack, without waiting the 
 arrival of the other divisions of the first corps. In 
 the rear, and upon the flanks of the redoubt, 
 strong Russian columns were seen, consisting of 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to the number of 
 upwards of fifteen thousand men. 
 
 General Compans quickly drove the enemy 
 from the villages of Fomkino and Doronino, and 
 compelled him to retire into his position on the 
 flanks of the elevation. He established five or 
 six companies of light troops upon the little emi- 
 nence already mentioned. Being scattered about 
 the eminence, and availing themselves of such 
 shelter as it could afford, they were directed to 
 keep up a continual fire upon the men who worked 
 the artillery of the redoubt, where very little in- 
 fantry was stationed. A battalion was placed in
 
 C H A l» T K R V. 18 L 
 
 the rear of the eminence in order to support these 
 marksmen. 
 
 The artillery of Compans' division: :tj©ok up a 
 position to batter the redoubt and the Russian 
 troops which were placed on its flanks. Part of 
 the King of Naples' cavalry came up between 
 Compans' right and the wood ; but it was kept in 
 check by the artillery and cavalry of the enemy. 
 General Compans, at the head of the fifty-seventh 
 and sixty-first regiments, proceeded to the right 
 of the elevation upon which the redoubt was 
 established. He ordered General Dupelain to 
 inarch upon the left with the twenty-fifth regi- 
 ment, in the direction of Schwardino. He sta- 
 tioned the hundred and eleventh still more to the 
 left, in order to turn the right flank of the Rus- 
 sians. In this movement General Compans was 
 attacked by whole masses of cavalry, but he took 
 a skilful advantage of the inequalities of the 
 ground, and of the protection afforded by a fence, 
 which allowed him to prosecute his movements in 
 spite of those masses of cavalry, and even to drive 
 them back with a severe loss. A most murderous 
 fire soon commenced in this quarter, between the 
 two regiments of Compans, and the Russian in- 
 fantry that supported the left flank of the redoubt. 
 The distance between them did not exceed twenty 
 yards ; but the troops upon the two opposite 
 slopings of the ground, were covered breast high. 
 This sanguinary firing lasted three-quarters of an 
 hour ; its rapidity and the noise, prevented the
 
 182 BOOK VII. 
 
 men from bearing the general's command to march 
 forward with fixed bayonets ; a manoeuvre which 
 would have occasioned much less destruction to 
 our ranks. 
 
 The Russian Generals, on their side, who suf- 
 fered more than we did from this close firing, 
 made fruitless attempts to induce their troops to 
 march up to ours ; night was approaching ; no- 
 thing yet appeared to be decided. Compans de- 
 termined at all hazards to extricate himself from 
 this dreadful situation, took with him a battalion 
 of the fifty-seventh, and ordering the fence to be 
 opened on his right, he made it advance in close 
 column by divisions, concealing four pieces of ar- 
 tillery loaded with grape shot which followed in 
 its rear. He led this battalion on to the extreme 
 left of the Russians who flanked the redoubt, and, 
 at the distance of a hundred yards, opened a 
 battery of grape shot which made a tremendous 
 havoc amongst the enemy Compans taking 
 advantage of the disorder into which their ranks 
 had fallen, charged with his battalion with fixed 
 bayonets. The enemy gave way upon this point, 
 and the disorder having communicated itself from 
 the left to the right, they abandoned the position 
 which they had so long defended, and retired upon 
 their second line, leaving the redoubt in our pos- 
 session. This battalion of the fifty-seventh which 
 decided the contest, lost its chief, and had two 
 hundred men killed and wounded in the space 
 which it had marched over to come up to the 
 enemy.
 
 CHAPTE It V. 183 
 
 Whilst this was going on upon our right, the 
 hundred and eleventh regiment upon our left fol- 
 lowed the general movement ; but the fire, which 
 gained the village of Schwardino, having enabled 
 the Russian general to discover through its glare 
 that he was pursued in this direction by one regi- 
 ment only, he ordered his cavalry to charge it. 
 The regiment stood the shock with great firm- 
 ness; but it lost, in this charge, its two regimental 
 field pieces. 
 
 The Emperor had calculated that Prince Ponia- 
 towski's march upon the right would have mainly 
 assisted the attack of the redoubt. But in spite 
 of all the endeavors of this prince, his march 
 was retarded by the obstacles he met with in the 
 woods ; only one of his batteries could take any 
 share in the action. 
 
 The redoubt was not carried by storm ; the 
 Russians abandoned it when the movement made 
 by the battalion of the fifty-seventh compelled 
 them to give up their position. We found there 
 all the pieces of cannon which had defended it. 
 Artillery men, horses, all had been destroyed by 
 the firing of our light troops. It is untrue that the 
 redoubt, once in our power, was ever re- taken by 
 the enemy ; not a single Frenchman could there- 
 fore have been found killed in that redoubt. 
 
 " Next day, when the Emperor reviewed that 
 " regiment (the sixty-first), he enquired where was 
 " its third battalion — In the redoubt was the re- 
 "ply of the Colonel."
 
 184 BOO K VII. 
 
 From the account we have just given of the 
 events that occurred upon this point, it will 
 easily be seen how ridiculous is the answer attri- 
 buted to the colonel of the sixty-first ; to tell the 
 truth, however, Mr. de Segur is not the author of 
 it. He borrowed that anecdote from the work of 
 Labaume, who received it no one knows where. 
 The fact is that no French battalion forced an 
 entrance into the redoubt. It was, as we have 
 explained it, the brilliant attack of the battalion 
 of the fifty-seventh that decided the retreat of the 
 Russian corps appointed to defend the elevation 
 upon which the redoubt was established ; by that 
 movement, we were left masters of the redoubt. 
 The author says it was chiefly the boldness of a 
 Spanish regiment that foiled the enemy. This 
 fact also is inaccuratelv stated. When the hun- 
 dred and eleventh regiment moved forward to- 
 wards the enemy's right, and was charged by the 
 Russian cavalry, the regiment Joseph Napoleon, 
 forming part of Friant's division, came up to its 
 assistance; but the fire of the hundred and eleventh 
 had alone sufficed to make the Russians fall back. 
 The whole of this chapter savors of the author's 
 ignorance respecting what took place in this 
 action of the 5th September.
 
 18.i 
 
 CHAPITER VI. 
 
 The first rays of the sun of the 6th September, 
 displayed to our view the Russian army in the 
 same position in' which it had been discovered 
 on the preceding day ; and, we will agree in this 
 with Mr. de Segur, it occasioned a general feel- 
 ing of exultation. 
 
 " At last there was an end to this vague, inef- 
 " fectual and moveable warfare, in which, however 
 " deeply we plunged into it, our efforts were 
 paralysed. We were on the eve of reaching 
 the goal ; and every thing was about to be 
 
 it 
 
 " decided 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Whilst the Emperor is engaged in examining the 
 position of the Russians, the Prince of Eckmiihl 
 comes to announce to him that he has closely 
 surveyed their left, and submits to him a plan for 
 turning it with his five divisions, and with the 
 corps of Poniatowski. Napoleon refuses ; Marshal 
 Davoust insists, but to no purpose. This plan is 
 probably of the invention of Mr. de Segur, and
 
 186 BOOK VII. 
 
 laid down from the reports of certain individuals, 
 as to what might have been done at the battle of 
 the Moskwa. He sends Davoust back to his post, 
 murmuring against such an excess of prudence. 
 Amongst the variety of reasons that might be 
 given in justification of the Emperor's refusal, why 
 does the author mention his age, which had render- 
 ed him less enterprising. Was Napoleon an old 
 man at forty three years of age ? The fact is that 
 even to this day, knowing as we do all the forces 
 which the Russians brought to that field of battle, 
 no one can affirm what might have happened, if 
 $> the movement proposed by Davoust had been 
 carried into execution. With a view to its suc- 
 cess, it ought to have been carried into effect dur- 
 ing the night. Now, the inconveniences attendant 
 upon such marches in a wooded and unknown 
 country, almost without a guide, are well known. 
 When it was question of much easier manoeuvres, 
 the consequences of which were of less importance, 
 we see what occurred to the corps of Junot, both 
 before and after the battle of Smolensko. It is, 
 moreover, very probable, that the enemy, owing 
 to his immense number of light troops, would 
 have been soon apprised of the movement; this 
 would have occasioned counter measures on his 
 part, or made him fall back, and the battle we so 
 eagerly desired would have been again put off. 
 
 After having described the army to us as dis- 
 organized, dying with hunger and fatigue, weak- 
 ened and dispirited, why does Mr. de Segur tell
 
 CHAPTER VII. 187 
 
 us " that it was sound, supple, vigorous, like 
 " those manly bodies, who, having just lost the 
 " plumpness of youth, display forms more mascu- 
 " line and strongly marked i Still he finds it 
 a silent like nature just before a violent storm, 
 " or crowds at the moment of an imminent 
 " danger. The temerity of the situation into which 
 " Napoleon had urged his army," appears to the 
 author quite evident ; " there was no rest for it 
 " but in death or victory." But what does he 
 reckon upon? Upon the curiosity of the soldiers, 
 who "will wish to see Moscow. .. .perhaps to 
 " plunder it." 
 
 Always plunder ! In youth there is a difficulty 
 in repressing the exaltation of any feeling ; and 
 the influence which glory, a spirit of companion- 
 ship, and gratitude, exercise over our judgment is 
 not of rare occurrence. But our officer of the pa- 
 lace is superior to those weaknesses. Neither the 
 glory of the army, the sentiment which is felt for 
 companions in arms, nor gratitude for his bene- 
 factor, can prevent him from discovering that the 
 army and the soldiers are plunderers, and that the 
 chief who commands them favors the spirit of 
 plunder. 
 
 The proclamation to the army will some day be 
 deemed admirable, says Mr. de Segur ; but why 
 should it not be so considered now ? What is 
 grand and sublime possesses at all times that 
 character.
 
 188 BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The author represents Kutusoflf to us as endea- 
 voring, in the name of religion, to stir up the 
 fanaticism and enthusiasm of his semi-barbarian 
 soldiers. Insults are heaped upon Napoleon. 
 Both proclamations may well be compared to- 
 gether. Mr. de Segur tell us, that the inhabi- 
 tants of an uncivilized nation, who are governed 
 " by the impulse of their bodily sensations, are 
 " on that very account, the more formidable as 
 " soldiers . . . Confined by slavery within a narrow 
 " sphere of action, they are reduced to a small 
 " number of sensations, which are the only sources 
 " of wants, of wishes, and of ideas." 
 
 Our mar dchal-des-logis of the palace has formed 
 to himself a strange notion of a soldier! What! 
 the soldier is the more formidable, in proportion 
 to the greater rudeness of the people to which he 
 belongs? This maxim is rather contradicted by 
 the history of the Greeks and of the Romans, who, 
 at the periods of their most splendid triumphs, 
 were the most civilized nations in the world ; and 
 it will not be borne out by the example of the 
 French military, who, although they belonged to 
 the most polished nations of modern times, were 
 not therefore the /ess formidable. However un- 
 palatable to Mr. de Segur the assertion may be,
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 189 
 
 the glory of the French soldiers belongs as much 
 to their innate bravery, as to that crowd of sensa- 
 tions which arises out of a perfectioned state of 
 civilization, and is productive of a thirst after 
 warlike celebrity. 
 
 Shortly afterwards, he supposes the Russians to 
 be rather idolators than christians, and " that they 
 " had converted the christian religion into one 
 " entirely physical and material, to bring it to the 
 " level of their brute and limited capacity." 
 
 These may be very fine reflections, but the 
 reader does not look for a dissertation upon meta- 
 physics, or upon ideas, from the pen of an historian 
 who presents a relation of the imposing battle of 
 Moscow; the simple recital of facts would, for 
 him, have possessed greater charms. 
 
 To the correct account which the author affords 
 of the reception of the King of Rome's portrait, 
 he might have added the following expressions of 
 the Emperor, which indicate his deep emotion, 
 and the feelings which agitated him in the midst 
 of the deafening acclamations of his soldiers : 
 " Take it away ; it makes its appearance too 
 soon upon a field of battle." 
 
 Colonel Fabvier, aid-de-camp of Marshal Mar- 
 mont, came to announce to the Emperor the loss 
 of the battle of Arapiles (Salamanca). Mr. de 
 Segur tells us, that " the Emperor gave a kind 
 reception to the aid-de-camp of the vanquished 
 general, feeling disposed to shew indulgence for 
 a defeat, on the eve of a battle, the result of 
 
 a 
 it 
 te
 
 190 B O K 711. 
 
 " which was doubtful." There is a total absence 
 of accuracy in the statement of this fact, and of 
 the reflections which follow it. The Emperor ex- 
 pressed the greatest displeasure, when he learnt 
 that Marshal Marmont had exposed the French 
 army, in order to gratify a purely personal ambi- 
 tion, by giving battle without waiting, in con- 
 formity to his instructions, until the arrival of the 
 corps of Soult, which was to enable him to secure 
 the victory. Colonel Fabvier, a man possessed 
 of the most elevated and refined feelings, consider- 
 ed his honor as impeached by the Emperor's re- 
 proaches, and the army witnessed him the next 
 day fighting on foot, as a volunteer, in the hottest 
 of the action, as if to shew that the soldiers of the 
 army in Spain, yielded not in bravery to those 
 of the army in Russia. 
 
 The details given to us by the author, respect- 
 ing the night passed by Napoleon, are a heap 
 of unconnected ideas, ill-gathered expressions, 
 broken conversations, constantly interrupted soli- 
 loquies. Is it possible to recognize in this picture, 
 the general who held the chief command in fifty 
 pitched battles ? One would suppose that Napo- 
 leon had never fought any. This paragraph can 
 only have been written upon notes supplied by 
 some valet-de-chambre, to an historian too little 
 acquainted with the Emperor, to estimate them 
 at their real value. 
 
 Napoleon, whose mind became more at rest 
 when he found " his army sound, supple, vigor-
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 191 
 
 (t 
 
 it 
 ii 
 
 u 
 
 ous, etc., is frightened at its destitute state. 
 How," as he is made by Mr. de Segur to say, 
 weak and famished as they are, could they sup- 
 port a long and terrible shock?" Be it recollect- 
 ed, that his observations relate to the same army, 
 and to expressions purporting to have been utter- 
 ed on one and the same day. There is a similar 
 contradiction in his picture of the Emperor, whom 
 he represents as being by day calm, gifted toith 
 the eye of an eagle — extraordinary — and at night, 
 as being the victim of the terrors and anxieties of 
 a feeble child, who finds himself suddenly placed 
 in an unexpected situation. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 At five in the morning of the 7th September, Na 
 poleon took up his position near the redoubt 
 which was carried two days before. From this 
 central position, he dispatched several officers to 
 watch the execution of the orders he had issued 
 during the night. The author says that " the 
 Emperor's attention was then directed towards 
 his right, when, all at once, near seven o'clock, 
 the battle began on his left." This is altogether 
 incorrect. The firing commenced from the battery 
 upon our right, could it have been the intention 

 
 192 BOOK VII. 
 
 of our officer of the palace, when stating it to 
 have commenced by the left, to open his account 
 of the battle with the partial attack of a regiment 
 (the hundred and sixth), which owed its safety 
 entirely to the ninety-second. It might thence 
 be inferred that, from the very beginning, there 
 was not even a general officer upon this point, to 
 give orders, and to have them obeyed. We will 
 observe by the way that this ninety-second is the 
 same regiment which, on the occasion of the 
 battle of Ostrowno, had fallen under Mr. de Se- 
 gur's censure. 
 
 " It was Napoleon himself who had just ordered 
 " his left wing to make a violent attack. He 
 multiplied his orders, under the most violent 
 state of excitation, and engaged a battle in 
 front, the plan of which he had conceived in an 
 oblique order." 
 Conformably to the general arrangement for 
 the battle, Prince Eugene was, by a feint attack 
 upon Borodino, to draw the enemy's attention to 
 their centre and right wing, with the view, first, 
 to facilitate the movement which Prince Ponia- 
 towski was to make in the direction of the old 
 road from Smolensko to Moscow. Secondly, to 
 prevent the enemy from withdrawing troops from 
 his right, in order to reinforce his extreme left, 
 upon which Marshal Davoust was to make his 
 attack. 
 
 " Rapp rushing to replace Compans, again led 
 " his soldiers on, with fixed bayonets, and at a 
 * running pace against the enemy's redoubt." 
 
 a 
 
 a
 
 CHAPTER IX. 193 
 
 The Emperor pleased at the manner in which 
 General Compans had carried, on the 5th, the re- 
 doubt of Schwardino,* had committed to his 
 charge the attack of the redan of the extreme left 
 of the Russian position. This general had under 
 his orders his own division and that of General 
 Desaix. As soon as the cannonading commenced, 
 he formed his division in two parallel masses. 
 The right one was destined to keep the enemy 
 out of the wood, and in this manner to cover the 
 movement of the left brigade which marched 
 straight up to the redan. Desaix's division re- 
 mained as a reserve on the second line. At the 
 moment when General Teste (with the twenty-fifth 
 and fifty-seventh regiment) was penetrating into 
 the redoubt (it was then half-past seven in the 
 morning), Compans received a wound in the 
 shoulder. This general, who was replaced by 
 
 * Onthe6th, the eve of the battle, the Emperor sentfor Com- 
 pans, to inform this officer that he destined him to attack the 
 enemy's redoubt which stood on our extreme right. Marshal 
 Ney was present. Compans proposed to make his division 
 pass through the wood, in order to avoid the discharges of 
 grape-shot. It was urged by Ney that this might breakthrough 
 the uniformity of the movement ; but Compans having repre- 
 sented that the wood which he had reconnoitred was a copse that 
 offered no obstacle to the march, the Emperor approved of his 
 plan. General Compans added, that his only apprehension was 
 that the enemy might advance into the wood upon his right, and 
 take a position between Poniatowski and himself. Napoleon 
 said to him : You are right ; in order to obviate this danger, 
 I place Desaix' s division at your disposal. 
 
 O
 
 194 BOOK VII. 
 
 General Dupelain in the command of his division, 
 consigned the order of attack to General Desaix, 
 who was likewise severely wounded a short time 
 afterwards. This was the officer whom General 
 Rapp came to succeed. Marshal Davoust, who 
 was on the right of the great battery, was wound- 
 ed nearly at this time.* It was a great misfor- 
 tune that these several commanders should have 
 been wounded almost at the same moment. The 
 wound of General Compans, who was well ac- 
 quainted with the Emperor's intentions, was an 
 event particularly fatal to us ; the first corps 
 showed some indecision in its movements. 
 
 According to our historian, General Rapp, who 
 was wounded at the head of Compans' division, 
 comes to inform the Emperor that the guards were 
 wanted to complete the business. Mr. de Segur 
 probably imagines that General Rapp's wound 
 had affected his head. Would he not, in fact, 
 have exhibited some proof of folly, had he pro- 
 posed to the Emperor, in the commencement of 
 
 * General Sorbier, sent by Napoleon to the Prince of Eck- 
 muhl, was joining him at the moment when a cannon ball struck 
 his horse. The muzzle of one cf his pistols which was forced in 
 the holster, gave the Marshal so severe a contusion, that he was 
 thrown from his saddle. General Sorbier at first thought he 
 was dead, and came to communicate the accident to the Emperor, 
 who made no reply. But an officer soon after arrived, who in- 
 formed Napoleon that the 'Prince of Eckmiilh was at the head of 
 his troops. * The Emperor feelingly exclaimed : God be 
 praised ! •
 
 CHAPTER IX. 195 
 
 the battle, to bring up the reserve ? But the au- 
 thor will have heard the reasonings of some gene- 
 rals on the subject of the battle, subsequently to the 
 event ; he will have heard, that if the guards, both 
 infantry and cavalry, had come up, the victory 
 would have been attended with much more brilli- 
 ant results. In his system of criticising Napoleon, 
 he has laid hold of this idea, which he continually 
 puts forward through the whole course of his nar- 
 rative, without, however, taking into considera- 
 tion the moment at which such an operation 
 might be made available. The author would have 
 suggested the commencement of the action as the 
 seasonable moment for an attack of the guards, 
 which ought not to take place in any case, except 
 with the view of securing the victory, or of ren- 
 dering it more complete. He must have but little 
 knowledge of the military science, who does not 
 know that it is laid down as a principle, that the 
 reserve should only be engaged in the last extre- 
 mity, and that the skill of a general consists in 
 using all his endeavors to compel the enemy to be 
 the first to bring up his reserve. Had Mr. de 
 Segur observed attentively the different battles 
 fought by the Emperor, he would have found that, 
 to an application of this maxim, he was generally 
 indebted for his victories. 
 
 Nay, then, with his three divisions, reduced 
 to ten thousand men, rushes into the plain." 
 Marshal Ney's corps was placed in the centre, 
 with its second line formed by the corps of the 
 
 o 2 
 
 (C
 
 196 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 Due of Abrantes. Its right supported the left of 
 Marshal Davoust. He neither rushed into the 
 plain, nor hastened to Davoust's assistance. He 
 executed the Emperor's orders to attack, con- 
 jointly with Marshal Davoust, the three redoubts 
 that covered the enemy's left. The wounds of 
 Generals Compans and Desaix, and of Marshal 
 Davoust, having caused some hesitation in the ma- 
 noeuvres of the first corps, the attack made by that 
 corps did not produce all the effect that had been 
 expected from it. The movement of Ney's three 
 divisions, having been executed with the utmost 
 precision, was completely successful. Encouraged 
 by that attack, the two divisions of Davoust re- 
 peated theirs, and the three redoubts remained in 
 our power ; it was then nine o'clock in the morn- 
 ing. 
 
 According to Mr. de Segur, the Russians, to- 
 wards mid-day marched to retake the redoubts. 
 " The French," he says, " who were still in the 
 " disorder consequent upon victory, were asto- 
 " nished and fell back." This account appears to 
 have been copied from the Russian Gazettes. It 
 is untrue that, during any part of the battle, the 
 French abandoned the three redoubts of which 
 they had taken possession at its commencement. 
 The corps of Ney and Davoust proved adequate to 
 maintain the redoubts against the reiterated at- 
 tempts of the Russians to dispossess them. Their 
 general perceiving, at the very first attacks, that he 
 had placed his right in a disadvantageous position,
 
 CHAPTER IX. 197 
 
 hastened to withdraw Baggowouth to his left, 
 which had been already so much weakened by the 
 taking of the redoubts. 
 
 The movement which Mr. de Segur supposes to 
 have been made by the Westphalians, the mistake 
 which he attributes to them of firing upon our 
 troops, the disorder healleges to have followed this, 
 are untrue all equally untrue. The Westphalians, 
 as we have already noticed, were in reserve behind 
 Marshal Ney. The Emperor observing the failure 
 ofDavoust's attack, sent them to the right of that 
 marshal, and thus united his corps with that of 
 Poniatowski, which was in the direction of Utitsa. 
 It was consequently at the commencement, and 
 not the middle of the action, as stated by the au- 
 thor, that this corps was placed upon Marshal 
 Davoust's right, in order to support his attack, 
 and not with a view of affording assistance to the 
 Polish troops. It would appear from the details 
 given to us by Mr. de Segur on the subject, that 
 he did not go, as an amateur, to see the engage- 
 ment upon this point. Who can have informed 
 him that our soldiers, pursued by the enemy's ca- 
 valry, " ran round the parapet (of the redoubt) in 
 a state of the greatest panic, and that they only 
 wanted an outlet to run away." Further on he 
 tells us : " at the same time Ney had again form- 
 " ed his division." Where did he find that they 
 were ever broken ? All these assertions are defi- 
 cient in truth, as well as the picture he gives us of 

 
 198 book vir. 
 
 Murat, " who alone in the midst of the enemies, 
 " was seen fighting with one hand, and with the 
 " other waving his plume." The author not hav- 
 ing been present at this battle, has suffered him- 
 self to be carried away by his recollections of the 
 Iliad, so far as to imitate a passage of it, without 
 reflecting that the times and the weapons are en- 
 tirely altered. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 " This vigorous action (the taking of the village 
 " of Semenowskoi) opened the road of victory to us. 
 " It was necessary to rush into it ; but Murat, 
 " Ney, and Davoust were exhausted. They 
 " halted, and whilst rallying their troops, they 
 " sent to ask for reinforcements. Napoleon was 
 " then seized with a hesitation which he had never 
 " before displayed." 
 
 It is rather strange that Murat, Ney, and Da- 
 voust should, after obtaining a victory, be made 
 by Mr. de Segur to ask for reinforcements, at a 
 moment when he tells us that Bagration has 
 withdrawn his left to Psarewo, or three-quarters 
 of a league in the rear; which would have left us 
 masters of the whole field of battle originally oc-
 
 CHAPTER X. 199 
 
 cupied by the left of the Russian army. The 
 hitherto unknown hesitation of Napoleon, shews, at 
 least, on the part of the historian, a want of me- 
 mory. Until now, in fact, has he not constantly 
 presented him to us as tormented with a fever of 
 hesitation ? 
 
 Now, however, Bagraticn returns from Psarewo 
 to the attack of Semenowskoi ; Priant's division 
 is in advance of the village. Our officer of the 
 palace tells us that his soldiers began to give way, 
 that Murat seized one of their leaders by the col- 
 lar, whilst in the act of retreating, and cries out 
 to him: What are you about} that the Colonel 
 answered : You see well enough that it is no longer 
 possible to stand here. Why! I remain, exclaims 
 the King ! " These words stopped the officer ; he 
 looked the King steadily in the face, and coolly 
 e rejoined : You are right. Soldiers, face the 
 enemy ; let us go and be killed." Without en- 
 quiring who can have related to Mr. de Segnr this 
 conversation, we will observe, that Friant's divi- 
 sion was not thrown into disorder for a single 
 moment ; until that occasion it had remained in 
 reserve, owing to which circumstance the Emperor 
 had selected it to take Semenowskoi, and to keep 
 possession of it. In this division, which contributed 
 so much to the victory, as in the whole French 
 army, there was not a single colonel who, at the 
 head of his regiment, stood in need of being led on 
 by the collar against the enemy, or who would 
 have given this silly word of command ! Soldiers, 
 
 a 
 
 <.>.
 
 
 200 BOOK VII. 
 
 face the enemy; let us go and be killed/ If everv 
 thing were true, which Mr. deSegur relates upon 
 this subject, that single expression : face the ene- 
 my, let us go and be killed, would have convinced 
 the King of Naples, that he who spoke in such a 
 manner was incapable of suiting the action to the 
 word. 
 
 " Meanwhile Murat had sent Borelli to the Em- 
 peror to ask for assistance — Borelli insisted, 
 and the Emperor promises his young guard ; 
 " but he had scarcely advanced a few paces, when 
 " Napoleon called out to him to halt." At the 
 moment when our right wing obtained the advan- 
 tage, the enemy sent the whole of Platow's and 
 General OuwarofFs cavalry across the Kolocza, 
 and ordered them to make a vigorous attack upon 
 our left. The light cavalry of General Ornano 
 was thrown back, and our infantry in this quarter 
 was under the necessity of forming itself, by regi- 
 ments, into squares. Prince Eugene ran some 
 danger. It was also at this moment that the Em- 
 peror was informed of the arrangements made by 
 the enemy to resume the offensive upon our right. 
 It was therefore natural for him not to send the 
 reserve to the right, without knowing what was 
 taking place upon the left. As to the pressing 
 request of Boreili, an individual whose rank is 
 not mentioned by the author, does he suppose that 
 any one will give credit to such tales ? 
 
 We will not refute the ridiculous assertion 
 respecting the guard which, under pretence of
 
 CHAPTER X. 201 
 
 dressing the line, made its advances slowly, by Count 
 de Lobau's orders. Could so considerable a body 
 carry a movement by stealth, as it were, under the 
 very eyes of the Emperor ? 
 
 " The artillery of the reserve advanced at this 
 " moment. — Lauriston had obtained the Em- 
 " peror's consent to that manoeuvre." If we are 
 to believe Mr. de Segur, not only Napoleon had 
 given no order, but his generals would have been 
 compelled to extort them from him. The artillery 
 of the guard, commanded by General Sorbier, was 
 ranged in battery ever since the commencement 
 of the action. The Emperor observing that all 
 the reserves of the enemy, infantry, cavalry, and 
 artillery, were in motion to recover the position of 
 SemenowskoT, ordered the corps ofNey, the cavalry 
 of the King of Naples, and the reserve artillery to 
 advance to the support of Friant's division. Ro- 
 guet's division of the young guard, was likewise 
 sent to form a second line in the rear of Friant's 
 division ; Mr. de Segur says not a word of this. 
 The Emperor himself ordered the movement ; it 
 did not occur to any one to advise him, or to offer 
 to carry it into effect ; Napoleon commanded ; all 
 obeyed him. 
 
 The author says, that, during the whole of this 
 day, the Emperor was seen sitting down, or walking 
 about leisurely — at a distance from the battle ; and 
 he forgets that he alludes, two pages before, to 
 spent balls that fell close to him. He says that 
 he gave signs of melancholy resignation — that he
 
 202 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 shewed a dead calm " a sluggish mildness ; that 
 " some fancied they traced in it that dejection, of 
 " which violent sensations are generally the fore- 
 " runners." The author should tell us why were 
 those violent sensations experienced by the Em- 
 peror previously to the battle, which could have 
 reduced him to such a state. Others imagined that 
 he had already become indifferent to every thing, 
 even to the emotion of battles. Many remarked 
 that the calm constancy and sang-froid which is 
 displayed by great men on these great occasions, 
 turn in the course of time to phlegm and to heaviness, 
 when age has worn out their springs. 
 
 Must we always repeat that Napoleon was then 
 in the prime of life, and in the enjoyment of a vi- 
 gorous constitution ? Can the marechal-des-logis 
 be in earnest, when he makes such assertions, 
 which would lead one to suppose that the Emperor 
 was bereft of all moral and physical strength, and 
 had subsided into a total absence of sensibility and 
 moral feeling ? Have not the generals, the offi- 
 cers who approached Napoleon, the chiefs and 
 soldiers of his guard, seen him such as he really 
 was ? Independently of those eye-witnesses, do 
 not the facts sufficiently attest for him ? It is 
 well known that, so early as two o'clock in the 
 morning of the 6th, the Emperor had visited all 
 the corps of his army, spoken to all the generals, 
 reconnoitred and studied the enemy's position, in 
 its most minute details, as well as the exact nature 
 of the ground upon which the battle was to be
 
 CHAPTER X. 203 
 
 fought. The 6th was employed in this manner ; 
 it was only in the night that he pointed out the 
 mode in which the Russian army was to be at- 
 tacked. After dispatching all his orders to the 
 several corps, he slept for less than two hours, in 
 the night from the 6th to the 7th, which was al- 
 most wholly taken up in receiving reports, and in 
 issuing directions. On the 7th, he was mounted 
 before five in the morning, and in advance of the 
 redoubt of Schwardino, a central position from 
 whence he might observe all the events of the 
 battle. He had in his rear the reserve (his old 
 guard.) It was in full uniform according to his 
 orders, and ranged in columns by battalions, at 
 the distance of sixty paces ; this led the enemy to 
 estimate it at double its real numbers. The young 
 guard was in advance. He thus kept his select 
 corps at hand, to avail himself of them according 
 to circumstance, if, notwithstanding all his ar- 
 rangements, victory should remain doubtful. 
 
 In this position the Emperor was in front of the 
 projecting point of the enemy's line, which formed 
 a kind of triangle opposite our own ; from thence 
 he could fly to the support of our left wing, or of 
 our right, and be prepared for an attack upon the 
 enemy's centre. 
 
 In an army of upwards of one hundred thousand 
 men, it is impossible for a commander-in-chief 
 to follow every movement from right to left with 
 strict precision. Such an army is therefore divid- 
 ed into corps, which are also subdivided into
 
 204 BOOK VII. 
 
 divisions and brigades ; each division is organized 
 in such a manner as to carry on isolated manoeu- 
 vres, and to suffice to itself ; the commander-in- 
 chief is the soul of that army. Each commander 
 of corps is to carry into effect the prescribed ar- 
 rangements, in the way which is most adapted to 
 his position and to local circumstances. It is not 
 indispensable to the unity of action, that the 
 commander-in-chief should see and execute every 
 thing, or that the generals under his orders should 
 be his mere instruments. If this were the case, 
 an army ought never to exceed six thousand men ; 
 and even then, as it is optional with the various 
 commanders to effect such movements as the 
 events may call for, the general-in-chief would be 
 exposed to the consequences of the errors they 
 might commit. It would be strange indeed to ex- 
 pect, that the chief of an army of one hundred 
 thousand men should constantly have his whole 
 line in view, and be independent of the generals 
 under his orders. 
 
 In a battle, he is, on the contrary, dependent 
 upon all. For the original order may be modified 
 and even altered, according to circumstances, by 
 every officer, from the general down to the chief 
 of battalion or the captain of artillery, who does 
 not stand in need of directions to arrange his 
 pieces, to spread them over a greater extent of 
 ground, or to advance a few steps in order to take 
 up a position. We may even assert that every 
 one commands in a battle, even to the verv cor-
 
 CHAPTER X. 205 
 
 poral, who remains detached with some riflemen 
 upon a bridge or in some narrow pass. It would 
 be the height of absurdity to understand war in 
 another manner, and to suppose that so many 
 thousand men are mere machines, set in motion 
 by the chief in its most trifling details. The 
 general-in-chief, as we have already stated, points 
 out the spirit of the battle, he hovers about in all 
 directions, and keeps his reserves at hand in order 
 to apply a remedy to unforeseen events ; there is a 
 defect of unity and of action, when he pretends to 
 undertake too much. 
 
 Mr. de Segur, who represents the Emperor as 
 fallen into a state of torpor in the position which 
 he had taken, ought to recollect, if, however, he 
 was there, that it was from this central position 
 that Napoleon sent orders to Prince Poniatowski 
 to commence the attack ; that Marshal Davoust, 
 having been slightly wounded, came here to in- 
 form him of the hesitation with which his own at- 
 tack was made, when the Emperor, dissatisfied, 
 sent him back to resume the command of his 
 corps ; that when the vigorous co-operation of 
 Marshal Ney secured to us the three redoubts of 
 the Russian left wing, and when Napoleon saw 
 that the enemy withdrew many troops from his 
 right to direct them towards Semenowskoi', it was 
 from this position that he dispatched orders to 
 general Friant to seize upon the village, and in- 
 formed him that he would send the whole of the 
 reserve artillery to his support.
 
 206 BOOK VII. 
 
 Whilst the Emperor was issuing these orders 
 upon his right, the cossacks and the cavalry had 
 made an irruption upon our left, beyond Boro- 
 dino ; he therefore sent in that direction the le- 
 gion of the Vistula, under Claparede, which he 
 kept in reserve with his guard. Subsequently, 
 when he heard that the enemy was bearing vigor- 
 ously upon our right, and that the attack of the 
 Poles had received a check, he sent orders to Ju- 
 not's corps to proceed to the right of Davoust, 
 in order to establish a communication between 
 him and the Polish corps. With the view of re- 
 placing the Westphalian troops of Junot, which 
 occupied a position in the rear of Marshal Ney, 
 he sent Roguet's division of the guard in that di- 
 rection. Lastly, when he learned that the enemy's 
 attack upon our right had been defeated, and that 
 our artillery made a dreadful havoc amongst those 
 masses, it was from the same central position that 
 he dispatched orders to the King of Naples to 
 make a grand charge with his cavalry, wheeling 
 round his left wing. Whilst these movements 
 were taking place, he sent directions to Prince 
 Eugene to renew his attack, and to carry the 
 main redoubt. The execution of these several or- 
 ders produced the results which the Emperor had 
 anticipated from them ; the victory was decided 
 in our favor. 
 
 This narrative sufficiently explains the motives 
 that determined Napoleon to remain in the posi- 
 tion which he had selected, and not to change it,
 
 CHAPTER X. 207 
 
 without very powerful reasons. Accordingly, no 
 sooner was the first line of the enemy broken in 
 by the capture of the centre redoubt, than Napo- 
 leon was seen surveying- in person our whole line 
 of battle, and directing the new arrangements to 
 be adopted. What would have been the conse- 
 quence if the Emperor had repaired to the right, 
 towards the Polish corps, whilst an attack was 
 making upon our left, or if he had proceeded to 
 Borodino, when our extreme right was outflanked 
 by the enemy? 
 
 This brief statement will enable the reader to 
 decide why the Emperor remained in his position, 
 during the execution of the orders he had issued. 
 We repeat it, he had a reserve at hand to meet 
 any unforeseen event. It ought not to have 
 charged, since the victory was not doubtful for a 
 moment. All military men are agreed upon this 
 principle, that, in a battle, the main reserve ought 
 not to be engaged, unless in a case of absolute 
 necessity, or in other words, unless to avoid a de- 
 feat. It was from an ignorance of this principle 
 that General Melas, on the point of conquering at 
 Marengo, lost his army and the whole of Italy. 
 Deeming that the victory was certain, he ordered 
 his reserve to charge with the view of rendering 
 it more decisive. Desaix's division arrived ; the 
 hostile army was unable to rally ; it was entirely 
 destroyed ! 
 
 We might adduce more signal instances in proof 
 of the truth of this observation, if it stood in need
 
 208 BOOK VII. 
 
 of demonstration. Napoleon had powerful mo- 
 tives besides, for adhering to this supreme law of 
 war. With an enemy before him, who had his 
 own capital at his back, and every facility for re- 
 ceiving reinforcements, being himself at a distance 
 of eight hundred leagues from home, what might 
 not have happened, had the battle been renewed 
 on the following day, as Kutusoff had intended it? 
 The French troops, notwithstanding their victory, 
 and perhaps on account of it, might have been 
 driven back. A fresh corps of twenty thousand 
 picked men might have been sufficient to gain the 
 day. 
 
 What would be proved, however, by those ex- 
 citations which were not wanting to him P Nothing 
 else than that the Emperer had sufficient strength 
 of mind to excuse them, to set them down at their 
 real value, and to have a proper sense of what his 
 duty, as commander-in-chief, imposed upon him. 
 
 Mr. de Segur supposes that the movement 
 which occasioned the advance of our right wing, 
 when it wheeled upon the centre, was effected as 
 if by chance, and without the Emperor's know- 
 ledge. We are not aware who can have given 
 him this information. The movement was en- 
 joined by the general plan of the battle, and took 
 place in consequence of Napoleon's direction to 
 the King of Naples. 
 
 In this manner, about mid-day, the whole of 
 
 the French right wing, Ney, Davoust, and 
 (t Murat. .. .presented themselves on the bail- 
 
 ee
 
 CHAPTER X. 209 
 
 " opened flank of the remainder of the hostile 
 " army, of which they could see the whole in- 
 " terior, the reserves which were abandoned, and 
 " even the retreat." 
 
 The left wing- of the Russians, after it had fail- 
 ed in ali its attempts in the direction of the vil- 
 lage of Semenowskoi, was forced, by the vigorous 
 charge of the cavalry of the King of Naples, to 
 retreat upon its second position. Its left was in 
 advance of Psarewo ; its right joined the corps of 
 Doctorof in the rear of Gorki, and in front it was 
 supported by the main redoubt. This position 
 was still sufficiently strong. Our historian asserts 
 that this was the moment of the battle when 
 Belliard came to request of the Emperor that his 
 guard might bear upon that point. But this 
 General cannot have said, " that there was still a 
 " ravine and a thin copse separating us from the 
 " road to Mojaisk, which presented a confused 
 " crowd of flying and wounded soldiers, and of 
 " carriages in full retreat." For, as we have just 
 stated, the Russian line, which covered this road, 
 was still formidable. " The Emperor hesitates, 
 doubts ; orders Belliard to go and look again." 
 The zeal of this General would appear to have 
 obscured his sight on the first occasion ; for he 
 soon returns to announce that the enemy is pre- 
 paring to defend himself. Nevertheless, he per- 
 sists in his request to be allowed the assistance of 
 the guard, otherwise it will require a second battle 
 to terminate the first. 
 
 P
 
 210 BOOK VII. 
 
 The part which Mr. de Segur has assigned to 
 General Belliard does not at all suit him. It 
 might be that of a giddy man, but by no means of 
 a prudent General. This is clearly proved by the 
 expressions attributed to Marshal Bessieres and 
 to the Emperor. The Marshal reminds Napo- 
 leon, " that the reinforcements are at a great 
 " distance ; that Europe is between him and 
 " France, that it was necessary to preserve, at 
 k{ least, that handful of soldiers, who still remain 
 " to answer for its safety." And Napoleon adds : 
 " that nothing is yet sufficiently unravelled ; that 
 " before lie could order his reserves to charge, 
 " he wishes to see clearer upon his chess-board." 
 It is worthy of observation that Mr. de Segur 
 himself admits this to have been the moment when 
 " Prince Eugene's efforts were found unavailing 
 against the main redoubt. Napoleon's reply, there- 
 fore, is a victorious refutation of that species of 
 reproach which the author levels at him, for re- 
 fusing to allow his guard to proceed to the attack. 
 If Belliard, on his return back to the King of 
 Naples and to Ney, had reported to them the Em- 
 peror's words, they would have bad no difficulty 
 in understanding him. But the author supposes, 
 on the contrary, that Belliard informed them of 
 his having found Napoleon '? seated in the same 
 place, with a suffering and dejected air, his fea- 
 tures sunk, his look sullen, giving his orders in 
 " a languid manner, in the midst of those dread- 
 I* ful warlike sounds, to which he appears an en- 

 
 CHAPTER X. 211 
 
 i 
 
 " tire stranger." What connexion was there be- 
 tween those rash suppositions, and the clear 
 reasons given by the Emperor to General Belliard ? 
 All this, however, is intended to introduce a brutal 
 tirade, which he ascribes to Marshal Ney, in the 
 following words : " What keeps the Emperor in 
 " the rear of the army ? Since he will no longer 
 f make war in person, since he is no longer a 
 
 " general let him return to the Tuileries, and 
 
 " leave us to act the part of generals in his stead." 
 Marshal Ney's hastiness of character did not so far 
 beguile his judgment as to make him forget that 
 of which he was so intimately persuaded ; namely, 
 that the fate of himself, of the army, of the expe- 
 dition, and of France, depended upon the Em- 
 peror. We have, moroever, had many opportuni- 
 ties 01* seeing Marshal Ney during the battle, and 
 the zeal and devotedness which he displayed in 
 executing the orders and instructions of the Em- 
 peror, have satisfied us that it never occurred to 
 his mind to pass a censure upon them. 
 
 It is not enough, however, that Napoleon *s ge- 
 nerals should condemn his military operations ; 
 his intendant and secretary of state must likewise 
 attempt to correct them. He is warned by both 
 that the moment for ordering the guard to charge 
 had now come. If Mr. de Segur wanted to esta- 
 blish the correctness of his idea, that the physical 
 and intellectual faculties of the Emperor were im- 
 paired, he could not have invented a clearer proof 
 of it. Napoleon is, therefore, reduced to the con- 
 
 p2
 
 212 BOOK VII. 
 
 dition of being warned by his intendant and his 
 secretary of state, that the moment is arrived for 
 advancing his reserve!!. . . .All this, however, is 
 untrue, and it could not be otherwise. Messieurs 
 Daru and Dumas would never have dared to sug- 
 gest to so great a captain any military movement. 
 The strangest circumstance in this statement is, 
 that Mr. de Segur, notwithstanding his title of a 
 general officer, should seem to share in the opinion, 
 that the guard ought to have been directed to charge; 
 and should, at the same time, ascribe to the Em- 
 peror this unanswerable reason for not allowing 
 it to charge : If there should be another battle to- 
 morrow, where is my army} 
 
 Considering our distance from France, the im- 
 perial guard was like a fortified town, under shel- 
 ter of which the army might at all times have ral- 
 lied. Mr. de Segur, who wrote after the events 
 had occurred, should have reflected, that if the 
 guard had been brought into action at the battle 
 of the Moskwa, the French army, of which it con- 
 stantly formed the nucleus, and supported the 
 courage during the retreat, would have had every 
 difficulty to recross the Niemen. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 In this chapter the author returns to the com^ 
 mencement of the battle, and to the first operations
 
 CHAPTER XI. 213 
 
 of Prince Eugene. He represents his attack as 
 partial and incoherent in its character. " Besides, 
 " he says, it ought not to have been made so pre- 
 " cipitately . , . .the battle having been arranged to 
 " begin by the right wing, and to wheel on the 
 " left." Since our officer of the palace will sur- 
 feit us by reiterating- this assertion, in order to 
 undervalue the merit of the Emperor, we will re- 
 peat here what we have already stated : 1st, that 
 the engagement began from the batteries of the 
 right under General Sorbier, who was directed to 
 support Marshal Davoust's attack against the 
 enemy's left ; 2dly, that the Emperor dispatched 
 to Prince Eugene the order to attack Borodino, 
 with the view of drawing the enemy's attention to 
 that quarter ; 3dly, that Napoleon perceiving that 
 the enemy withdrew the whole of Baggowouth's 
 corps from his right to his left wing, and appre- 
 hending that Ney and Davoust might not be in 
 sufficient strength to resist, ordered Prince Eu- 
 gene to make a brisk attack upon the centre re- 
 doubt of the enemy, so as to prevent his bringing 
 all his forces to bear upon our right. 
 
 Mr. de Segur, however, in the various chapters 
 of his work, which relate to this battle, describes 
 partial movements, without presenting to us its 
 general features. Since he is so fond of minute 
 details, he ought to have given the name of the. 
 brave general, who, on the first attack of the re- 
 doubt, penetrated into it and was made prisoner, 
 after being coveted with wounds. It is true that 
 general Bonnami is a Frenchman.
 
 214 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 Further on he informs us, that the viceroy, who 
 was not able to carry the redoubt on this first at- 
 tack, sent to communicate to the Emperor the 
 critical position in which he was placed, and to ask 
 for some assistance, that of the guard no doubt. 
 So that Marshal Ney solicits the assistance of the 
 guard on the right, and Prince Eugene on the 
 left ; the Emperor refuses to send it to either 
 point, and yet Mr. de Segur appears to hold him 
 blameable for it. These facts alone are suffi- 
 cient to prove how much Napoleon was justified 
 in keeping back his guard to the last extremity. 
 It is false, however, that he refused assistance to 
 Prince Eugene, when he stood in need of it, since 
 he sent to him the legion of the Vistula, which 
 formed a part of his reserve. 
 
 " The day was far advanced ; our ammunition 
 " was exhausted ; the battle terminated. It was 
 ' then only that the Emperor mounted his horse, 
 " though not without difficulty, and rode slowly 
 " along the heights of Semen owskoi." This is 
 altogether incorrect. The Emperor proceeded to 
 that village as soon as it fell into our power. He 
 sent for general Friant who had taken possession 
 of it. Upon hearing that, notwithstanding a 
 wound he had received, he was still at the head of 
 his division, Napoleon said, with a smile, in the 
 presence of his soldiers : In that case I have no 
 uneasiness ; let us leave him to himself. When, 
 however, he discovered shortly afterwards, the 
 considerable forces with which the enemy was pre- 
 paring to attack Semenowskoi, he posted the
 
 CHAPTER XI. 215 
 
 forty-eighth, the thirty-third, and a Spanish re- 
 giment, upon the elevation in the rear of the vil- 
 lage ; he directed that the thirty-third should form 
 into a square on the site of Semenowskoi, with 
 the fifteenth regiment upon its left. From that 
 position also, he ordered Marshal Ney to bring 
 together the divisions Compans and Desaix, and 
 to outflank the enemy's left. After giving these 
 instructions, the Emperor hastened to the centre 
 of the army, and sent orders to Prince Eugene to 
 make a vigorous attack upon the main redoubt. 
 
 As to the ammunition being exhausted, this 
 is an equally unfounded assertion ; ammunition 
 was at no time wanting. The French artillery fired 
 upwards of ninety-one thousand shots in that 
 battle. But in proportion as this enormous quan- 
 tity of ammunition was consumed, it was replaced 
 by the activity of General Neigre, who directed 
 the park of artillery, and by the well concerted 
 measures of General Lariboisiere. Two more 
 battles might have been fought without resort- 
 ing to the depots which were stationed at Smo- 
 lensko. 
 
 The Emperor confided to the young guard the 
 duty of retaining possession of the field of battle. 
 The enemy might receive reinforcements during 
 the night ; Napoleon made every necessary ar- 
 rangement for supporting this corps in case of 
 need. The battle having ceased in every direc- 
 tion, he proceeded to the rear of the redoubt of 
 Schwardino, where his tents had been pitched,
 
 2H) BOOK VII. 
 
 for tiie purpose of dispatching his orders to the 
 several commanders of the army. It was in 
 this place no doubt that Mr. de Segur again got 
 sight of him. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The scene opens in the Emperor's tent. Instead 
 of representing him engaged in issuing orders, 
 Mr. de Segur supposes him to be a " prey to 
 " bodily dejection and to great mental anguish. 
 " In his army, in his very tent, the victory is 
 " gloomy, isolated, and uncheered by flattery ! 
 u The persons whom he has summoned,* Dumas 
 " and Daru, listen to him, and say nothing. 
 " But their attitude, their downcast eyes, their 
 " silence spoke more eloquently than words." 
 
 Pending the battle, it behoved Messieurs Du- 
 mas and Daru to remain silent ; they are made 
 by the author to speak. After the battle, the 
 Emperor summons them to his tent in order to 
 ascertain what measures thev have taken for the 
 proper attendance upon the wounded, for the 
 service of the moveable hospitals, for providing 
 
 * Assuredly those gentlemen do not accept the designation of 
 flatterers, with which Mr. de Segur has honored them.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 217 
 
 the transport and other objects requisite for the 
 army. This was speaking to them of their du- 
 ties; and they remain silent! In the preceding- 
 chapter, Mr. Daru is made by Mr. de Segur to 
 add his advice to that of others, for a charge 
 of the guard. All military men, even at the pre- 
 sent day, are agreed as to the uselessness and 
 the danger of such a resolution ; but as the 
 author ascribes the advice to an administrator, 
 we must not be surprised that the latter should 
 give evidence of his defective knowledge of mi- 
 litary tactics. Our marechal-des-logis now intro- 
 duces a new adviser, who cannot plead the same 
 excuse ; this is Murat. He comes to ask for 
 some cavalry of the guard. " The enemy's army, 
 " said he, is passing the Moskwa in great haste 
 " and in disorder ; he wishes to surprise and destroy 
 " it." This is tantamount to accusing the king 
 of Naples of ignorance of the localities, and of 
 the enemy's position. Had Mr. de Segur taken 
 the trouble to glance at a map, even a plain 
 post-road map, he would have found that the 
 Russian army, which was retreating upon Mojaisk, 
 ought not to cross the Moskwa on its march in 
 .that direction. Had he read the reports of the 
 enemy's generals, he would have found that, ac- 
 cordingly, it had not crossed the river ; that, on 
 the contrary,, it had passed the night upon that 
 portion of the field of battle which had remained 
 in its possession, its right resting upon the eleva- 
 tion of Gorki, and flanked beyond that elevation
 
 218 BOOR VII. 
 
 by a division of light infantry and by cossacks, 
 and its left upon the woods in the rear of Se- 
 menowskoi. 
 
 The author discovers at last, " that, at such a 
 " distance, the Emperor had judged it indispens- 
 " able to preserve a select and devoted body of 
 " men." These are powerful motives ; but Mr, 
 de Segur is, no doubt, one of those who, as he 
 says, were not satisfied with them. For he raises, 
 as if by way of support to himself, a concert of 
 murmurings and lamentations at the manner in 
 which the battle has been conducted. Murat says, 
 " that he had not recognized the genius of Napo- 
 " leon." Eugene, " that he would not account 
 " for the indecision shewn by his adopted father ; 
 ff Ney was singularly obstinate in recommending 
 " a retreat." We have often wondered by what 
 means our officer of the palace could have learned 
 what the Emperor, the Princes, and the marshals 
 said to each other. His positiou with the army 
 was of a nature to make it unlikely that he was 
 their confident. We entertain the same degree 
 of incredulity with regard to the expressions he 
 attributes to the king of Naples and to prince 
 Eugene. With respect to those which are ascribed 
 to Ney, we know what reliance to place upon 
 them. We are far from believing that the mar- 
 shal ever uttered them ; but the source from 
 which they are drawn is not unknown to us : the 
 Gazette of St. Pctersburgh supplied them ; the 
 editor of it was much less acquainted with the
 
 it 
 (( 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 219 
 
 marshal than Mr. de Segur. It was an object 
 with the editor to establish that the battle was 
 attended with doubtful results for us ; and he 
 proved it by supposing that the retreat was re- 
 commended by one of the most daring of our 
 generals. Was this the authority upon which 
 Mr. de Segur had relied ? 
 
 The Emperor could only estimate the extent 
 
 of his victory by the number of the dead ; the 
 " ground was strewed, to such a degree, with 
 " Frenchmen, extended prostrate on the redoubts, 
 " that they rather appeared to belong to them 
 " than to those who remained standing. There 
 " seemed to be upon the field of battle, more con- 
 " querors killed than conquerors surviving." 
 
 It is worthy of remark that our officer of the 
 palace, who shews a deplorable anxiety to exagge- 
 rate our losses, and who might almost be fancied 
 searching every corner of the field of battle in 
 order to rake up the most trifling details, who 
 watches upon the countenances of our officers and 
 our soldiers, the secret of their inward sensations, 
 in order to give them his own interpretation, and 
 to clothe them in the gloomy colours of his ima- 
 gination, does not say a word of the losses and 
 the consternation of the Russians ! If he had 
 contented himself with quoting their own reports, 
 he would have made it known that they admitted 
 a loss of nearly Jifty thousand men, killed or 
 wounded ; that more than twenty thousand of their
 
 220 BOOK VII. 
 
 wounded were on the road to Moscow.* The 
 number of Frenchmen found killed in the re- 
 doubts, was very trifling, in comparison with that 
 of the Russians; and this may easily be conceived ; 
 if we reflect that what Mr. de Segur constantly 
 call redoubts, were arrows or redans. The Russi- 
 ans, placed behind the epaulment, maintained their 
 position until our soldiers rushed in on all sides, 
 and destroyed them with the bayonet. But those 
 works, which were all open at the gorge, being 
 once in our power, offered us no shelter from the 
 enemy's firing. No troops therefore remained 
 within them ; they were all placed on the sides, 
 or in the rear of the demi-bastions. 
 
 We dwell upon this circumstance merely to 
 show that the author describes what he has not 
 seen. Had he gone over the field of battle, he 
 would not have said that there appeared to be more 
 conquerors killed than conquerors surviving. Our 
 loss was not one-third of that of the Russians. 
 Mr. de Segur, who has in store a collection of 
 hideous pictures, does not fail to exhibit one in 
 this place ; it is the spectacle presented by the 
 field of battle. Among other tales got up to 
 frighten children, he mentions a Russian soldier, 
 who lived many days in the carcase of a horse, 
 
 * See Boutourlin, vol. i. page 349. In page 116 of the se- 
 cond volume, he says, that Kutusoff was engaged at Tarantino 
 in reorganizing the corps which had escaped the slaughter of 
 Borodino.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 221 
 
 which a shell had opened, and of which he gnaw- 
 ed the inside. He ought to gave given us the 
 size of the soldier and the dimensions of the 
 horse. 
 
 " From seven to eight hundred prisoners, and 
 " about twenty pieces of cannon were all the tro- 
 " phies of this incomplete victory." 
 
 If he had known that the flower, and, in point 
 of number, nearly half the Russian army had been 
 destroyed ; that Bagration and his best generals 
 had fallen, that the capture of Moscow was the 
 consequence of this victory, he could not have 
 asserted that the victor// was incomplete, however 
 familiarized he may be to inaccurate statements. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Murat now becomes the sport of the marechal- 
 des-logis of the palace. He appears to have caught 
 the Emperors complaint, of rejecting all the good 
 advices given to him. He orders a charge ; one 
 of his aids-de-camp points out to him that a deep 
 ravine lies between our cavalry and the enemy. 
 But Murat, more fiery than ever, insisted that they 
 should march ; that if there existed any obstacle, 
 they would discover it-, he then made use of taunting
 
 222 book vu. 
 
 expressions to urge them on. We must allow that 
 the French must have been a strange army, if the 
 Emperor and his generals were such as Mr. de 
 Segur is pleased to represent them. What he 
 says of our officers, that taunting expressions were 
 used, to urge them on to their duty, is so extraor- 
 dinary, that one might be inclined to believe that 
 our officer of the palace did not consider himself 
 a French officer. 
 
 The author, who is undeviating in his system, 
 describes the Emperor to us as moving forward at 
 a still slower pace than on the preceding day, and so 
 completely absent that he knows not where he is 
 going. He is fortunately warned that he is ad- 
 vancing into the very midst of the enemies ; he 
 then stops. 
 
 What we have hitherto seen is not enough. 
 The Russian autumn had triumphed over him. In 
 order to explain this thought, Mr. de Segur again 
 fancies a hurricane, which onlv existed in his own 
 brain, but which, according to him, struck Napo- 
 leon with sudden cold, and occasioned in him a 
 burning fever that dried up his blood and oppressed 
 his spirits. If all those who have approached the 
 Emperor, on the day of the battle, were dead, and 
 there remained no record of the events of that day, 
 our historian might talk to us of that oppression, 
 that burning fever, with his customary confidence 
 in the credulity of his readers. But when a great 
 number of persons, his secretaries, his medical 
 men, his officers are yet living, when they well
 
 CHAPTER XIU. 223 
 
 know that Napoleon's habitual state of body had 
 not changed, that he worked with his accustomed 
 ardor and fatigued many horses ; when they 
 can attest that it was only in the night from 
 the 7th to the 8th, that he was seized with a hoarse- 
 ness caused by the activity he displayed on the 
 eve and on the day of battle, how can Mr. de 
 Segur presume to affirm as facts, what so many 
 eye-witnesses are enabled to deny ? 
 
 Jf Our troops entered the town, some merely 
 " passing through it in pursuit of the enemy, 
 " others for the sake of plunder, and to obtain 
 " quarters." The author should have told us in 
 what ranks he marched ; was it in the first ranks ! 
 Although he has hitherto presented to our admi- 
 ration the great order preserved by the Russians 
 in their retreat, he is obliged here to confess, that 
 they had left an immense quantity of wounded in 
 the town, a circumstance which did not prevent 
 their setting it on fire. No doubt he has a ready 
 excuse for them: " Their humanity, he says, gave 
 " way to the desire of firing upon the first French- 
 " men they saw entering it." 
 
 The account which he gives of the noble feat 
 performed by the voltigeurs of the thirty-third, 
 inspires with a desire to know the name of the 
 brave officer who commanded them. But the 
 author does not mention it ; we will repair this 
 silence, by stating that his name was Callier ; that 
 he had under his orders the company of grena- 
 diers and the third of fusileers, Captain Sabatier^
 
 224 book vii. 
 
 forming' together, at most, a hundred men. Both 
 companies belonged to the first battalion of the 
 thirty-third, attached to Friant's division. 
 
 Notwithstanding Mr. de Segur's unintentional 
 admission of the number of their wounded, (a cir- 
 cumstance which does not prevent the Russians 
 from burning the town which contained those un- 
 happy wretches,) he goes back to his old system, 
 by asserting that, in the two succeeding days, 
 " There was found neither a human being nor any 
 u thing that would afford an indication of the 
 " Russian army." He appears to have forgotten 
 that all the villages, whether upon the road, or the 
 vicinity of it, were filled with wounded, and pre- 
 sented the sanguinary traces of that army. 
 
 The Emperor, as his proclamation had promised 
 it, intended to afford rest to his army at Moscow, 
 to repair the losses he had suffered, whether in the 
 action or on the road, and to restore his several 
 corps to their full complement. Rut as he is 
 taking measures forbringing down reinforcements 
 of men and of artillery, Mr. de Segur takes ad- 
 vantage of this circumstance to say, that his hopes 
 were diminished, and to talk of his distress. 
 
 Marshal Davoust, according to the author, 
 urges the Emperor to withdraw from Murat the 
 command of the advanced guard, and to bestow 
 it upon him ; and Mr. de Segur appears to blame 
 Napoleon for leaving that command to the King 
 of Naples, with whose bold and inexhaustible ar- 
 dor he was well acquainted. What more than a
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 225 
 
 bold and inexhaustible ardor can be wished for in 
 a general of advanced guard in pursuit of an 
 enemy's army? 
 
 " But Napoleon is informed that we are only at 
 " a distance of two days from Moscow. That 
 " great name, and the great hopes which he at- 
 " tached to it, revived all his strength ; on the 
 " 12th of September he was sufficiently recovered 
 " to set out in a carriage, and to rejoin his ad- 
 " vanced guard." 
 
 The author insinuates that the Emperor was in 
 an infirm state of health, which compelled him to 
 stop at Mojaisk. The hoarseness of voice he ex- 
 perienced on the 8th, is but a trifling accident 
 after such great fatigues. It is a most natural 
 occurrence after four nights passed in a bivouac ; 
 on the 4th near Gridnewa ; the 5th and 6th on 
 the heights of Borodino, and on the 7th, upon 
 the field of battle. This hoarseness, however, has 
 been the author's foundation for all the stories 
 he relates respecting the Emperor's ill health, for 
 which he prepares Us since the very opening of 
 the campaign, and upon which he proposes to 
 dilate until the expedition shall have been brought 
 to a close. He has himself asserted that, on the 
 8th, Napoleon went over the field of battle, be- 
 stowing his care upon the French and Russian 
 wounded ; a circumstance tending to prove that 
 his indisposition was not a serious one. Conse- 
 quently it was not the cause of his sojourning at 
 Mojaisk ; he was detained there by interests of 
 
 Q
 
 22(5 book vn. 
 
 the highest importance. At the issue of so sangui- 
 nary a battle, a general in chief has more than 
 one object to provide for, more than one order to 
 give. To call for an account of his losses, of the 
 resources in ammunition still left to him, a point 
 of so much consequence after so great a consump- 
 tion ; to collect supplies, to take measures for se- 
 curing the service of every branch in the military 
 administration, to procure intelligence of the 
 enemy, to ascertain his movements and arrange- 
 ments, especially when the reports of the advanced 
 guard and the interrogatories of the prisoners give 
 reason to suppose that he intends to fight another 
 battle;* such were the cares which engaged every 
 moment of Napoleon's attention; and assuredly 
 the vigilance of so active and so provident a mind 
 was not found wanting.-}- 
 
 * This was the case, since the enemy appeared inclined to 
 offer us battle in front of Moscow, of which the French army 
 was only at five days' journey. Then it was that the Emperor 
 wrote to the Duke of Belluno to direct the marching battalions 
 and squadrons, and the stragglers, towards Smolensko, in order 
 that, from thence, they might proceed on to Moscow. 
 
 •J- Amongst the numerous orders which the Emperor dispatch- 
 ed from Mojaisk, the following letter, written with his own 
 hand, immediately upon his arrival at that head-quarter, 
 proves that the illness which Mr. de Segur supposes to have 
 preyed upon him, had no influence over his mental faculties. 
 
 For the Majoi^-General. 
 " Cause the town to be reconnoitred, and trace a redoubt 
 which will turn the defile. — Cause two bridges to be thrown over 
 the Moskwa. — Write to Prince Eugene that he may proceed to
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 227 
 
 As soon as the Emperor received the report of 
 General Lariboisiere,, which stated that the greater 
 part of the ammunition consumed at the battle of 
 the Moskwa, had been replaced by the supply he 
 had ordered down from the intermediate parks of 
 artillery, he left Mojaisk to draw nearer to his ad- 
 vanced guard, and to be in a position to act, 
 should the enemy attempt to fight a battle. It 
 might be supposed from Mr. de Segur's state- 
 ment, that Napoleon stood in need of being 
 transported in a carriage. Never was this con- 
 quering hero more strangely misrepresented. 
 What can be the object of a supposition which 
 falls to the ground before the irrefragable testi- 
 mony of tacts and of individuals ? Is the author 
 candid in his error ; or is he, unconsciously, the 
 echo of hatred and of prejudice ? The reader 
 may judge for himself. 
 
 Ronza, and have bridges constructed at Serguiewo, collect 
 quantities of cattle and supplies, and obtain intelligence. — Write 
 to the Prince of Eckmiihl to have Borisow occupied, and to ga- 
 ther provisions and information. — To the Duke of Elchingen, to 
 come to-morrow with his corps to Mojaisk. — Leave the Duke 
 of Abrantes tokeep the field of battle. — Mojaisk, 8th September, 
 
 ma." 
 
 y2
 
 228 
 
 BOOK VIII 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The author takes us back to Wilna in order to 
 call to our mind that Napoleon was the aggressor, 
 and that Alexander was taken by surprise in that 
 city, amidst his preparations for defence. Will he 
 allow us to remind him also, that all the prepara- 
 tions of Russia were made ; that her army was 
 assembled on her extreme frontier ; and that the 
 Emperor Alexander was already at his head quar- 
 ters at Wilna, when Napoleon had not yet quitted 
 Paris, as he still made attempts to negotiate a re- 
 conciliation, of which he ought to have abandoned 
 every hope. 
 
 Mr. de Segur afterwards carries us to Drissa 
 with Alexander. He tells us that " it was here 
 " he first consented to receive an English agent, 
 " so important did he deem it to appear, until the 
 " last moment, faithful to his engagements with 
 " France." 
 
 In the first place, to be and to appear are not 
 synonymous terms ; in the next, it seems to us 
 natural enough to suppose that, ere the Russian 
 cabinet could have decided upon receiving a Bri-
 
 CHAPTER I. 229 
 
 tish agent, its intercourse with the English cabinet 
 must have been some time established. We wil- 
 lingly distinguish the Emperor Alexander from 
 his cabinet. Who does not know, that upwards 
 of a year previous to the breaking out of the war, 
 the agents of England exercised an influence in 
 Russia, which was not unconnected with subse- 
 quent events ?* " So much is certain, adds Mr. 
 " de Segur, that, at Paris, after the success of the 
 " campaign, the Emperor Alexander affirmed to 
 " Count Daru, upon his honor, that, notwith- 
 standing the accusations of Napoleon, this was 
 his first infraction of the treaty of Tilsit." If 
 we admit that Russian policy does not take into 
 account any of its acts, except such as were sub- 
 sequent to hostilities, we must believe that asser- 
 tion. Is the author, however, in earnest, when 
 he relates those details? Did not his duty, as an 
 historian, impose upon him the obligation of re- 
 placing facts in their true light, and of adding to 
 his narrative some reflections, of which he is on 
 other occasions so unsparing. 
 
 
 * A praiseworthy author, Mr. de Montveran, in his Histoire 
 critique et raisonnee de la situation de VAngleterre, pub- 
 lished in 1820, and written in a spirit unfavorable to Napoleon's 
 system, expresses himself as follows: Russia was roused, either 
 by the agents of England near the Russian nobility of the anti- 
 gallican party. . . .or by her negotiators near the person of the 
 Emperor Alexander, whose exertions, since the spring of 1811, 
 although carried on in secret, were as successful as they were 
 
 unremitting.
 
 
 230 BOOK VIII. 
 
 Our officer of the palace glances rapidly at the 
 opinions which the enemies of the Emperor Alex- 
 ander entertain of this prince as a military man ; 
 but he dilates, with satisfaction, upon his political 
 measures. " It is admitted," he says, " that they 
 " were singularly adapted to places and to men." 
 Mr. de Segur might have mentioned, amongst 
 those measures, " the addresses which he allowed 
 Barclay to issue, and which were designed to 
 corrupt the French soldiers and their allies." 
 " It appears, in fact, that, in the political means 
 " which he employed, there was a very striking 
 " gradation of energy." This is his proof: "In 
 " the recently acquired portion of Lithuania, every 
 " thing had been spared in the retreat. ... In an- 
 " cient Lithuania. . . .the inhabitants were hurried 
 " away with all they could carry with them .... 
 " But in Russia Proper . . . every thing that could 
 " not be removed had been destroyed." 
 
 The inhabitants of Russia Proper must have felt 
 very grateful for a predilection which was evinced 
 by such humane acts ; but qui aime bien, chdtie 
 bien.* 
 
 The author then takes us to Moscow. He tells 
 us, that the gift of one peasant in ten, which the 
 nobility of Moscow offered simultaneously and 
 without deliberation, " was attributed to a state of 
 submission, and caused the principal nobles to 
 murmur, that, with respect to the merchants, 
 
 « 
 
 * Who loves well, chastises well. — French proverb.
 
 CHAPTER II. 231 
 
 (( 
 
 " whose fanatical enthusiasm, when the insults 
 
 1 heaped upon the Emperor Napoleon were read 
 
 to them, is represented by him in hideous colors, 
 
 it was necessary to have recourse to constraint, 
 
 " in order to obtain from them the assistance they 
 
 " had promised with so much patriotism." 
 
 These circumstances supply him with a reflec- 
 tion, it might almost be added a maxim, which it 
 is a pity he should never have applied to the 
 French army and to its chief, namely that " de- 
 rails are of little consequence. .. that every 
 " thing in the world suffers from too close an ob- 
 •' servation ; that, in short, nations ought to be 
 " judged in a mass, and according to results." 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 We now enter upon the details of what was tak- 
 ing place at Moscow before the arrival of the 
 French army. The governor, Count Rostopchin, 
 promises, in a proclamation, to march to the de- 
 fence of Moscow with one hundred thousand men 
 and a hundred pieces of cannon ; but as soon as he 
 is informed of the approach of the French, he 
 disappears after setting fire to the city, which he is 
 commissioned to defend and to protect from in- 
 jury. The author exhibits Count Rostopchin as 
 one of the greatest men of modern times. 
 
 In the first place he is the noble descendant of
 
 232 book viii. 
 
 one of the greatest Asiatic conquerors. The scaf- 
 folding raised by our marechal-des-logis of the 
 palace gives way, when it is known that Count 
 Rostopchin is the son of a steward of Count Orloff, 
 uncle to the historian of that name. His fortune 
 began under the Emperor Paul, whose confidence 
 he enjoyed before that prince came to succeed to 
 the throne ; he was successively entrusted by him 
 with the seals of the war department, and placed 
 in the ministry for foreign affairs. He was after- 
 wards created a count, as well as his father, and 
 honored with the great order of Russia. The 
 family alliance existing between Mr. de Segur and 
 him, explains the anxiety with which that writer 
 endeavors to extol the nobility of his extraction. 
 
 The resolution of Count Rostopchin was no 
 doubt dreadful, and unprecedented since the days 
 of barbarism. It was admirable, says a French- 
 man ; it was atrocious rejoins all Europe, and, 
 with her the Russians themselves. It will assuredly 
 secure immortality to its author, but it will be the 
 immortality of Erostratus. Passions still exalt 
 that action at the present day ; but the very ob- 
 ject at which it aimed cannot ennoble it. It is a 
 crime with which history will reproach his memory, 
 " A subject determines the fate of the nation, 
 " without the countenance of his sovereign ; ap~ 
 " pointed, by his very station, to protect a nume- 
 " rous assemblage of people, he sacrifices them : he 
 " conceives his plan without an effort, executes 
 " it without hesitation, and remains calm and
 
 CHAPTER II. 233 
 
 satisfied." This impassibility, this self-satisfac- 
 tion, which our officer of the palace admires, is 
 sickening to the soul. 
 
 Instead of resorting" to dramatic forms, and to 
 the deception of the romancer, in order to lead the 
 judgment of contemporaries astray upon that hor- 
 rible event, he should have said, that there was 
 found a man who felt a thirst of acquiring cele- 
 brity at any price ; who combined a savage energy 
 with an inexorable ambition ; who made himself 
 the instrument of a cabinet well skilled in the art 
 of seducing, of a cabinet accustomed to sacrifice 
 friends or foes to its interests, without feeling any 
 scruple as to the means to be employed ; that 
 such a man was bold enough to brave the disa- 
 vowal of his sovereign, and was sufficiently daring 
 to take upon himself the responsibility of such a 
 horrible catastrophe. 
 
 Since Mr. deSegur boasts of the sacrifice which 
 Count Rostpochin made of one of his palaces, it 
 might well be asked whether all have been ruined 
 in that calamity; whether pretended sacrifices made 
 with a display of ostentation, were not repaired 
 even before they had been accomplished; whether, 
 in short, in that great conflagration, the gold 
 of England had not insured some of the pro- 
 perties. 
 
 Who has revealed to our author that Napoleon 
 would have availed himself of the revolutionary 
 army in Russia ? The Emperor himself replied to 
 that imputation in his speech to the senate on the
 
 
 34 BOOK VIII. 
 
 20th of December, 1812. "The war which I 
 " maintain with Russia is a political war. I 
 might have armed against her the greater part 
 of her population by proclaiming the freedom of 
 " her slaves. This was requested of ine by a great 
 " number of villages ; but when I came to know 
 " the state of moral degradation of that numerous 
 " class of the Russian nation, I refused to adopt a 
 " measure which would consign so many fami- 
 " lies to death and to the most horrible tortures." 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The pretended historian of the grand army relates 
 " that a vulture entangled itself in the chains 
 " which supported the cross of the principal 
 " church, and was held suspended by them." 
 Does he partake of the credulity of the people of 
 Moscow ? At day-break this bird was found tied 
 to the belfry. It does not require much sagacity 
 to guess that this presage was prepared in the 
 night by the governor, whose inventive genius 
 has put many other juggles into practice. 
 
 This observation may be applied to a much 
 more mischievous act. " Rostopchin caused 
 " the most wretched amongst the French priso- 
 " ners to be exhibited to the people, who grew
 
 CHAPTER III. 235 
 
 " bolder at this exhibition of weakness before 
 " them." In order to increase their wretchedness, 
 he had them ill-used, stripped, and deprived of 
 food du ring thirty-six hours, and in this condition 
 had them paraded through the city like wild 
 beasts, holding them up to the derision and to 
 the blows of the populace. He then had them 
 sent to a bagnio, where the greater part perished 
 of misery and hunger. We have seen many of 
 these ill-fated men, who survived this disgraceful 
 treatment, giving to the Emperor an account of 
 it, on his entrance into Moscow. We were com- 
 missioned to provide them with clothes and pro- 
 visions. How great is the difference between this 
 conduct of the governor of Moscow towards un- 
 fortunate warriors, and that which was observed 
 towards the numerous Russian prisoners who 
 passed through Paris and other French cities in 
 1814 ! The commandants of towns supplied them 
 with provisions, bestowed on them every care, 
 and were even sparing of humiliations to them. 
 
 In the statement presented by Mr. de Segur of 
 the Russian army in the position at Fili, which he 
 estimates at ninety-one thousand men, the remains 
 of a hundred and twenty-one thousand men, who 
 were present at the battle of the Moskwa, he rates 
 the loss of the Russians in that battle, at only thirty 
 thousand men ; whereas Colonel Boutourlin, aid- 
 de-camp of the Emperor of Russia (who wrote 
 under his master's dictate, and upon the notes and 
 reports furnished by the Russian staff) estimates
 
 236 book viii. 
 
 the loss at fifty thousand men. Mr. de Segur, 
 therefore, makes a gratuitous allowance of twenty 
 thousand men to the Russian army. By way of 
 compensation, however, he states the loss of the 
 French army at forty thousand men, whilst it is 
 acknowledged to have been considerably below 
 that of the Russians, whose masses remained for 
 so long a time exposed to the fire of four hundred 
 pieces of cannon, placed upon elevated ground, 
 and skillfully directed by the generals of ar- 
 tillerv, Sorbier, Foucher, Pernetti, an Anthouard. 
 
 The author says, that upon hearing of Kutosoff's 
 intention to abandon the city, Rostopchin devotes 
 himself. The devotedness of Count Rostopchin 
 may well be called in question ; for when he 
 caused Moscow to be set on fire, his own resi- 
 dence was spared. 
 
 Mr. de Segur keeps out of view the horrid 
 seene which closed the day on which Moscow was 
 evacuated. When Rostopchin caused the prison 
 to be thrown open, a Russian, accused of being a 
 traitor, was dragged from the crowd, and brought 
 before him. u He was the son of a tradesman, 
 " and had been apprehended in the act of excit- 
 " ing the people to revolt." 
 
 The tradesman's son had not been apprehended 
 in the act of exciting the people to revolt ; he had 
 done no more than translate a French bulletin. 
 His father, who is represented in the character of 
 an ancient Roman, did not curse his son ; we know, 
 on the contrary* that he cursed the man who de-
 
 CHAPTER III. 237 
 
 prived a father of him. The unfortunate youth 
 was not levelled to the ground by an ill-directed 
 sabre cut ; he received the first blow from the go- 
 vernor himself, who then gave him up to the fury 
 of the populace.* Rostopchin, who had declared, 
 in his address to the people of Moscow, that " the 
 " tribunals were closed, that there was no occa- 
 " sion for them in order to try the guilty," loses 
 no time in giving that dreadful example of arbi- 
 trary conduct, by causing a wretch to be mas- 
 sacred without trial, and of his own private au- 
 thority. He goes beyond this ; he is the first 
 
 * The above detail was given to us by an eye-witness. 
 
 The following is the account given of that event by the Abbe 
 Surugues, an emigrant priest, and curate of the parish of St. 
 Louis in Moscow, in a letter he addressed to Father Bouvet. 
 a Jesuit, which was published in England and in Russia. 
 
 " The governor summoned before him Mr. Vereachaghin, the 
 '* son of a Russian tradesman, who was convicted of translating 
 " a proclamation of Napoleon, which announced his proximate 
 " approach to Moscow. The governor-general, ordered the un- 
 " fortunate man to advance in the midst of the dragoons of the 
 " Russian police : ' Wretch, unworthy of thy country,' he said, 
 " ' thou hast dared to betray it and to dishonor thy family ; thy 
 " crime is above the ordinary punishments of the knout and of 
 " banishment to Siberia; I deliver thee up to all the vengeance 
 " of the people thou hast betrayed. Strike at the traitor, and 
 " let him expire under your blows.' The unfortunate man ex- 
 " pires under the sabres and bayonets of the surrounding multi- 
 " tude. His feet are bound with a long cord, and his body, co- 
 ** vered with blood, is dragged through the streets amidst the 
 " outrages of the populace, &c."
 
 ■*"> 
 
 238 book viii. 
 
 to strike him, and gives him up to infuriated men 
 in order to instruct the people to take justice into 
 their own hands, and to bathe themselves in 
 blood. What are we to say of the other co-ope- 
 rators of Rostopchin ! What a noble retinue was 
 formed about him by that filthy and disgusting 
 horde of galley slaves and malefactors whom he 
 styles the sons of Russia ! Such instruments 
 were well selected for so monstrous an undertak- 
 ing ! ! 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Were it not known that Mr. de Segur's work 
 has only been written to create an effect, that the 
 ideas with which it swarms have only sprung up 
 after ten years had passed over the events, and that 
 all that has since happened, has had a tendency to 
 alter their course ; the sententious reflections, the 
 poetical images, the studied sensibility of feeling, 
 which are spread over this chapter, would be suf- 
 ficient to establish the truth of the assertion. The 
 thoughts, the sentiments, which he attributes to 
 the army, never entered into our minds. The of- 
 ficer of the palace speaks of our debasement. 
 Why should we have felt debased ; we have not 
 been so after our disastrous retreat ; could we be 
 debased when we were conquerors, and had that
 
 
 CHAPTER V. 239 
 
 further conquest before us, which was the price 
 of our labours and of our courage ? The senti- 
 ments which inspired every soldier, at this time, 
 were those of glory and the consciousness of the 
 esteem, which even our enemies did not refuse us. 
 Debasement falls to the share of cowardice and 
 of treachery. 
 
 " Murat," says the author, " was for a moment 
 tempted to believe, that he might himself be- 
 come a new Mazeppa." What ! the sovereign 
 of one of the finest and richest countries in Europe, 
 could have envied the part of an obscure chief of 
 a few hordes of cossacks ! This is indeed too 
 much ! Mr. de Segur may have hitherto ascribed 
 words and actions to his personages quite in con- 
 tradiction with their character and position. But 
 the latter is rather a too far-fetched poetical li- 
 cence. 
 
 The tendency to be satirical again leads our 
 historian astray, when he says, " that one of the 
 " Emperor's officers, determined to minister to his 
 " gratification, drove before his horse five or six 
 " vagabonds with whom he had fallen in, fancy- 
 " ing that he was bringing a deputation to him." 
 These were merchants and other citizens of 
 Moscow, who, seeing the town deserted and given 
 up by its governor to disorder, and to the plun- 
 dering of malefactors, came to implore the pro- 
 tection and generosity of the conqueror. What 
 other motive than the desire of pleasing the Em- 
 peror could have decided Mr. de Segur to solicit
 
 240 book vni. 
 
 the favor of accompanying the expedition to Rus- 
 sia, and of being entrusted with functions entirely 
 at variance with his rank in the array, and with 
 the military profession? We, who have never 
 served Napoleon except in a military capacity, 
 are enabled to certify that all the soldiers of the 
 French army felt an eagerness to please their 
 chief, and to prove their devotedness to him. 
 The same wish animated those who had not their 
 daily table and daily quarters provided for them, 
 who were constantly exposed to privations, to 
 balls and shots, and who said to Napoleon, in the 
 heat of the battle of the Moskwa : Be not uneasy ; 
 thy soldiers h.ave promised to conquer ; and Conquer 
 they will. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Military men who read the pretended History of 
 the Grand Army, cannot refrain from a smile " at 
 that secret shuddering of the French cavalry, as 
 they listened to the trampling of the horses, 
 when they entered Moscow." So it is of that 
 melancholy, and of those vague dreams which the 
 author attributes to our soldiers. He transfers 
 to the French army his own sensations. There is 
 only wanting to this picture that of the night-mare 
 
 ■ c 
 it
 
 CHAPTER VI. 241 
 
 with which the soldiers must have been affected, 
 when they were resting at the bivouac. If the 
 army, however, had been troubled with such vi- 
 sions, conld it have conquered at the battle of the 
 Woskwa? 
 
 " The barbarous and savage token of national 
 " hatred" towards us, which the author supposes 
 to have been left behind by Rostopchin, proceeded 
 from galley-slaves, whose patriotism had been 
 borrowed from casks of brandy which were dis- 
 tributed to them. It is, no doubt, because Count 
 Rostopchin had adopted them, by the name of 
 sons of Russia, that they are designated in this 
 place, as representatives of the nation. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 " Napoleon did not enter Moscow till after dark." 
 Though the assertion respecting this nocturnal 
 entrance be of little importance, we animadvert 
 upon it, because it is not founded on fact, and 
 because the author seems to delight in exhibiting 
 the Emperor as introducing himself every where 
 by stealth, and under favor of darkness. This 
 tends, no doubt, to heighten a picture ; truth, 
 however, should not be sacrificed to fiction. The 
 King of Naples crossed the bridge of the Moskwa 
 
 R
 
 242 book viii. 
 
 at mid-day, at the head of the cavalry and of the 
 advanced guard. About two o'clock Marshal 
 Lefebvre entered Moscow with a division of the 
 guard. It was at this moment that Napoleon 
 established himself at an inn of the suburb of 
 Dorogomilow ; the fire had not yet broke out in 
 the city. Only one house, at the Bazar, had 
 been burned. The Emperor repaired to the 
 Kremlin on the 15th, at six o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Upon an occurrence so simple in itself, the 
 author exercises his imagination ; he improves 
 upon, magnifies, and disfigures it, deducing con- 
 sequences out of it which only apply to his 
 manner of viewing objects. An officer, exhausted 
 with fatigue, is awakened from his sleep by the 
 light of the fire ; he first enquires whether the 
 corps to which he belongs is free from danger ; 
 and when he has satisfied himself of the fact, he 
 again composes himself to sleep, and leaves it to 
 others to attend to what concerns them. Here- 
 upon, Mr. de Segur makes the following reflection : 
 11 Such was the unconcern produced by the mul- 
 Ci tiplicity of events and of misfortunes, so blunted 
 c ' were the feelings, such was the selfishness arising 
 " from excessive suffering and fatigue, that each 
 " one was left with only just strength and feeling 
 " enough to attend to his personal service and 
 " preservation." 
 
 Assuredly, if Mr. de Segur, whose functions 
 were limited to the service of the palace, had been 
 sent for, he would have excused himself, without
 
 chapter vr. 243 
 
 incurring* the blame of indifference or egotism. 
 
 Why should not this be the case of the officer he 
 
 alludes to ? 
 
 " The Kremlin contained a magazine of gun- 
 
 " powder." 
 
 The Kremlin contained no such magazine. 
 Every thing in the arsenal, indicated the precipi- 
 tancy with which it had been evacuated by the 
 Russians. Tow, projectiles, broken caissons, were 
 strewed about the court. In the halls, we found 
 forty thousand muskets, (of English, Austrian, 
 and Russian manufacture,) about a hundred 
 pieces of cannon, quantities of lances and sabres, 
 and a considerable number of trophies taken from 
 the Turks ; but no gunpowder could be disco- 
 vered : there was none within the precincts of the 
 Kremlin. The extensive magazines which we 
 seized upon, were situated in isolated buildings at 
 the gate of the Germans, on the outside of the 
 city. They contained four hundred thousand 
 pounds of gunpowder, and upwards of a million of 
 pounds of saltpetre. Rostopchin had forgotten 
 to destroy them ! 
 
 . " The guards asleep and carelessly posted, had 
 " suffered a whole park of artillery to draw up 
 *\ under the windows of Napoleon." The author 
 constantly seeks to represent the French army as 
 an ill-organized horde. Because the imperial 
 guard, which was quartered in the Kremlin was 
 accompanied by its artillery, Mr. de Segur tells us 
 that this artillery had remained there through the 
 
 r2
 
 244 book vnr. 
 
 negligence of the guards who had fallen asleep. To 
 attack in this manner a picked body of men, so 
 famed for its good order and its habits of service, 
 indicates nothing less than a passion for tarnishing 
 a reputation well earned. 
 
 Various quarters of the city, which were at a 
 distance from the Kremlin, were set on fire. To- 
 wards four o'clock in the morning, one of the Em- 
 peror's officers caused him to be awakened, in 
 order to communicate the intelligence to him ; 
 this prince had thrown himself upon his bed, only 
 a few moments before, after dictating orders to 
 various corps of the army, and attending to busi- 
 ness with his secretaries. It is inconceivable how 
 Mr. de Segur, who should have been better ac- 
 quainted with the interior service of the palace 2 
 always represents Napoleon to us as fearing to be 
 disturbed from his rest. He ought to know that 
 the lowest officers did not hesitate to wake him, 
 when they had a report to submit. The aid-de- 
 camp upon duty, who would have taken upon 
 himself to abstain from apprising him of any offi- 
 cer'sarrival, would have been severely reprimanded. 
 The author should recollect what took place at 
 Gloubokoe, when the aid-de camp upon duty de- 
 layed announcing to Napoleon the arrival of an 
 officer from the King of Naples. 
 
 It was on the 16th, that the fire approached so 
 near to the Kremlin, as to endanger its safety. 
 At mid-day the fire communicated to the stables 
 of the palace, and to a tower adjoining the arse-
 
 CHAPTER VI. 245 
 
 nal. A few sparks even fell into the court of the 
 arsenal, upon some tow that had been used for the 
 Russian caissons ; the caissons of our artillery 
 were there. The danger was imminent ; the Em- 
 peror, being informed of it, repaired to the spot. 
 The ground, upon which our caissons were laid, 
 was covered with burning tow. The Emperor 
 entered the arsenal, at the moment when General 
 Lariboisiere was giving orders to have them re- 
 moved. The gunners and soldiers of the guard, 
 uneasy at finding Napoleon exposing himself to so 
 great a danger, increased it by their own anxiety. 
 They seized between their arms the burning tow, 
 in-order to carry it out of the court yards. Gene- 
 ral Lariboisiere then requested the Emperor to 
 keep away, and shewed him the gunners who were 
 bewildered by his presence. The prince then re- 
 turned to the palace. After his departure, this 
 fire, which might have been attended with fatal 
 consequences, was soon extinguished. 
 
 This occurrence took place in the morning, and 
 was not the reason of Napoleon's quitting the 
 Kremlin ; the danger appeared, on the contrary, 
 to keep him there. Already Prince Eugene, Mar- 
 shals Lefebvre and Bessieres had requested him 
 to leave that residence ; they were unable to suc- 
 ceed. An officer* having informed him that the 
 flames surrounded the Kremlin on all sides, he 
 
 * The orderly officer Gourgiiud.
 
 246 book viii. 
 
 desired him to accompany the Prince of Neuf- 
 chatel to an elevated terrace of the palace, in 
 order to verify the fact. The impetuosity and 
 violence of the wind, and the rarefaction of the 
 air, brought on by the ardor of the flames, occa- 
 sioned a dreadful hurricane ; the Prince of Neuf- 
 chatel and the officer were on the point of being 
 blown away. Although they confirmed to the 
 Emperor that every thing round the Kremlin was 
 on fire, this prince, inured to all kinds of danger, 
 was hesitating to withdraw himself from this 
 peril, when the Prince of Neufchatel made the 
 following observation to him : " Sire, if the 
 " enemy should attack the corps of the army 
 " which are stationed outside of Moscow, your 
 " Majesty has no means of communicating with 
 " them." 
 
 Determined upon quitting the Kremlin, Napo- 
 leon sent Mr. de Mortemart, one of his orderly 
 officers, to discover through the burning city, a 
 passage that might lead as far as the fourth corps 
 to which he was desirous to repair. He soon re- 
 turns to say, " That the flames had not allowed 
 " him to make his way through." Shortly after- 
 wards, another officer announces that the passage 
 was getting free from obstruction. The Emperor 
 then called for his horses and quitted the Kremlin, 
 leaving for its protection only a battalion of his 
 guard.
 
 247 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 " We were encircled by an ocean of flames, which 
 " blocked up all the gates of the citadel, and frus- 
 " trated the first attempts thatwere made to depart. 
 " After some search, we discovered a postern gate, 
 " leading through rocks, to the Moskwa. It was 
 by this narrow passage that Napoleon, his offi- 
 cers, and his guard, succeeded in escaping from 
 " the Kremlin. — A single narrow win ding street, 
 " presented itself completely on fire, and appeared 
 " rather as the entrance than as the outlet of this 
 " hell ; the Emperor rushed on foot, and without 
 " hesitation, into this dangerous passage. — We 
 " stepped on a ground of fire, beneath a fiery sky, 
 " and between two walls of fire, etc. etc. etc." 
 
 An ocean of flames did not block up all the 
 gates of the citadel, and could not have done so. 
 There was a wide esplanade beyond the ditch ; 
 and no necessity, therefore, to explore an issue. 
 The Emperor withdrew himself, by one of the 
 great gates of the Kremlin, accompanied by his 
 officers, as was the case on his entrance, and not 
 by a road practiced through rocks. He alighted 
 at the quay of the Moskwa, where he mounted his 
 horse. He was preceded by one of the agents of 
 the police of Moscow, who acted as his guide. 
 
 «
 
 248 book viii. 
 
 We followed for some time the banks of the river, 
 and took up our quarters, the wooden buildings of 
 which were entirely consumed by the flames. 
 
 Although we accompanied Napoleon during 
 the entire of this march, we did not witness the 
 splendid horrors described by Mr. de Segur. In 
 traversing Moscow, we stepped upon ashes, it is 
 true ; but not under Jiery vaults. Perhaps we 
 had not taken the most direct road; but it is un- 
 true that the Emperor ran any danger in the course 
 the march. It is equally untrue that our guide 
 stopped in a state of uncertainty and agitation, or 
 that the Emperor was indebted for his life to some 
 marauders of the first corps. There is as little 
 correctness in the report of that affecting meeting 
 of Marshal Davoust, who desired to be carried back 
 to the raging fire, in order to rescue Napoleon or 
 perish with him. Mr. de Segur, besides, enables 
 his reader to appreciate the truth of his narrative, 
 by the marvellous circumstance, which he relates 
 of a convoy of gunpowder defiling through the fire. 
 The conflagration had lasted thirty-six hours : 
 where is there an officer so deprived of reason as 
 to expose a convoy of gunpowder to an infallible 
 explosion, by making it traverse the city, when it 
 could be directed to proceed by the outskirts ? 
 
 In his numerous descriptions of marches and of 
 battles, the marechal-des-logis of the palace has 
 not found a single opportunity to allude to the 
 excellent order of march of those immense co- 
 lumns of artillery, which, in spite of every dif-
 
 CHAPTER VII. 249 
 
 ficulty, were always in readiness to mow down the 
 Russian battalions, and which were led on by 
 chiefs who could so well combine with courage in 
 battles that foresight so essential for ensuring a 
 victory with all its attendant results. He might 
 at least have abstained from making an untrue 
 assertion, to the prejudice of that picked body 
 of men. 
 
 " The effort he had made to reach Moscow had 
 " exhausted all his means of warfare." 
 
 It is easy to perceive that the author is not well 
 versed in military matters. If by means of war- 
 fare he alludes to the personnel of the army, we 
 will reply to him, that the French army, which 
 had been joined by Pino's division, by the Bava- 
 rian cavalry of General Pressing, and by several 
 detachments, was nearly as strong in numbers as 
 before the battle of the Moskwa. With respect to 
 the materiel (the artillery), the intermediate parks 
 which General Lariboisiere had stationed in eche- 
 lons between Mojaisk and Smolensko, had already 
 replaced, in a great measure, the ammunition 
 which had been consumed.* 
 
 * la a letter from the Major-general, written by the Empe- 
 ror's order to Marshal Bessieres, and dated from Moscow the 
 27th of September, 1812, which relates to the military events 
 that had occurred hefore the arrival at Moscow, we read the fol- 
 lowing passage : " By retiring in the direction of Moscow, Ku- 
 " tusoffdid what he ought to have done ; he intrenched himself 
 " in several fine positions, and endeavored to make ns believe
 
 250 BOOK VII. 
 
 The Emperor had remained at Petrowsky from 
 the 16th at night, until the 18th in the morning-, 
 when he returned to the Kremlin. Mr. de Segur 
 would have it be believed that it was during this 
 interval of forty hours thai he determined upon 
 the course he should adopt, without even waiting 
 for the reports concerning KutusofFs march, and 
 for an answer to the letter i( confided to the care 
 " of a superior officer of the enemy, who had just 
 " been found in the great hospital." After hav- 
 ing informed us that, during his short stay at the 
 castle of Petrowsky, Napoleon remained undecid- 
 ed, bewildered with astonishment, the author adds : 
 " He declares his intention to inarch upon St. Pe- 
 " tersburgh. This conquest is already marked out 
 " on his maps, hitherto so prophetic. Orders are 
 " even issued to the different corps to hold them- 
 " selves in readiness." Let us not, however, en- 
 tertain any alarm ; his decision is only a feint. All 
 this is merely intended to sound his most confiden- 
 tial ministers; Berthier and Bessieres soon con- 
 vinced him, etc. 
 
 " that, before we couldjenter Moscow, a second battle would 
 " have to be fought. This measure was so judicious, that if 
 " the statement furnished by Lariboisiere, who commands the 
 *' artillery, had shewn twenty thousand gunshots less than it ac- 
 " tually exhibited, the Emperor would have stopped, although 
 " the field of battle was one of the finest we ever saw, because 
 " it is impossible to carry redoubts without artillery and abund- 
 •«• ance of ammunition."
 
 CHAPTER VII. 251 
 
 We have often seen Napoleon reasoning with 
 his officers and his ministers, and endeavoring to 
 carry his own conviction to their minds ; we had 
 not yet seen him attempting to impose upon their 
 credulity, and forming the part of a juggler in 
 their presence. Mr. de Segur introduces this as 
 a variation. 
 
 The writer supposes that the Emperor was ap- 
 prised of Kutusoff's march upon Kalouga, during 
 his stay at Petrowsky ; he only learned it on his 
 return to the Kremlin. Historical truth is not 
 what Mr. de Segur is in search of ; it is indiffe- 
 rent to him, provided he can display his false rea- 
 sonings. 
 
 " He had so fully calculated on concluding 
 " a peace at Moscow, that he had provided no 
 " winter quarters in Lithuania." What is become 
 then of those stores as immense a$ the enterprise. 
 What is become of the magazines and fortifica- 
 tions of Wilna, Minsk, Witepsk, Smolensko, etc.? 
 The marechal-des-logis of the palace ought to ex- 
 plain to us what he means when he states that no 
 winter quarters were provided in Lithuania. 
 
 Napoleon " determines, therefore, to return to 
 " the Kremlin, which a battalion of his guard had 
 unfortunately preserved." Why does the author say 
 unfortunately preserved, since, a few lines above 
 this, he admits that eight days must elapse before 
 Napoleon could receive Alexander's reply, and 
 rally, and re-organize his army, etc. ? But 
 Mr. de Segur was, perhaps, better quartered at
 
 252 book vii. 
 
 Petrowsky than in the Kremlin ; is this his reason 
 for wishing that the latter place had been burned 
 down ? As he assigns no grounds for his regret, 
 we cannot imagine any other. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The return of the Emperor to the Kremlin supplies 
 Mr. deSegur with a crowd of hideous descriptions 
 of our bivouacs, and of what is going forward in 
 the interior of the city. 
 
 We do not know why he has concealed from his 
 readers those facts to which oar very enemies have 
 given publicity. " Napoleon's first care, when he 
 " re-entered the Kremlin, was directed to the 
 if relief of the unfortunate people of every class. 
 " He ordered magistrates to be appointed, who 
 " were to make known all such persons as were 
 " without shelter or means of support. He caused 
 " houses of refuge to be thrown open for the re- 
 " ception of those whose houses had been burned* 
 and promised to have them provided with ra- 
 tions. He repaired to the foundling hospital, 
 " which had escaped the conflagration, sent for 
 " the director of it, General Toutolmin, called for 
 " an account of the establishment, prevailed upon 
 
 (C
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 253 
 
 " him to make his report to the Empress-mother, 
 " and dispatched it by an estafet; this report re- 
 " mained unanswered. 
 
 " Napoleon then gave his attention to the hos- 
 " pitals, many of which had been preserved from 
 " the fire. But what was his surprise when told 
 " that those establishments were in absolute want 
 " of articles of immediate necessity, without me- 
 " dical men, without remedies, without attend- 
 " ance ; that a great number of dead had been 
 " found in them ; that out of upwards of ten thous- 
 " and wounded who had recently arrived from 
 " the army, one half had perished for want of as- 
 iC sistance ; that the remainder were struggling 
 " between privation and death ! An order was im- 
 " mediately issued to all the surgeons of the 
 " French army, to establish an administration for 
 " the relief of all kinds of complaints, to distri- 
 " bute the sick in suitable places, and to make 
 " accurate reports of the condition of these miser- 
 " able beings." 
 
 u On the other hand, Marshal Mortier, Governor 
 " General of the city, and general of division 
 " Count Milhaut, the military commandant, re- 
 " ceived orders to organize a municipality, and 
 " an administration of police, for the purpose of 
 " restoring order to the city, and of procuring for 
 " it the means of subsistence, etc. etc." 
 
 These details of which we acknowledge the 
 correctness, with the exception of the number of 
 Russian wounded, which instead of being ten
 
 254 book viii. 
 
 thousand, exceeded twenty-five thousand,* are 
 extracted from the letter of Abbe Surrugues, 
 already adverted to. 
 
 The same Abbe* Surrugues, curate of St. Louis, 
 in Moscow, says, in another part of his letter : 
 ■t Napoleon ordered that fifty thousand rubles 
 "should be placed at the disposal of the magi - 
 " strates entrusted with the care of those who were 
 " in a state of indigence. According to the par- 
 " tition made, each individual was allowed ninety 
 ce rubles ; but the difficulty of transporting so 
 " heavy a coin having been attended with a trouble 
 " and delay incompatible with the precipitate 
 departure of the French, that distribution 
 proved almost ineffectual, etc. etc." 
 Is it with the view of adopting a celebrated 
 maxim, Which one of Beaumarchais' characters is 
 made to utter, that Mr. de Segur begins by ac- 
 cusing the flower of our army, and even our offi- 
 cers, with hurrying on to the work of plunder, and 
 then endeavors to excuse them, by saying, " that 
 they were not impelled by covetousness ; that 
 one hand washed the other, and that they had 
 paid for every thing by the danger they had in- 
 " curred." 
 
 Is not this defence worse than the accusation ? 
 Why does he vilify his countrymen in so gratuit- 
 
 
 (( 
 a 
 
 * It is true that upwards one-half of those twenty-five thou- 
 sand Russian wounded perished in the flames, in consequence 
 of the measure adopted by Rostopchin.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 255 
 
 ous a manner? May not this severity towards 
 them, have been suggested to the author by the 
 remembrance of the act of a certain personage, 
 who, being an amateur of India shawls and cloths, 
 introduced himself into the cellar of a merchant in 
 the bazar, by an aperture made in the roof? From 
 that cellar he handed to the soldiers the articles 
 which he drew out of it. The latter, deeming that 
 the articles were as much their property as his own, 
 disappeared altogether with them, leaving in the 
 cave the individual in question, who had been led 
 to it by his own cupidity. And yet this amateur- 
 plunderer, had not for excuse the consideration 
 that the one hand washed the other, and that he 
 had paid for every thing by the danger he had in- 
 curred. For he was not called upon to incur any ; 
 the only risk, to our knowledge, which he ran 
 during this campaign, was that of remaining al- 
 together in the cellar. 
 
 There is, however, a very great difference be- 
 tween plundering, and seizing upon provisions: 
 It can well be understood that Mr. de Segur, who 
 had, twice a day, his cover laid on the table of 
 service, at the Emperor's residence, should never 
 have had occasion to go in search of provisions. 
 But that he should deem it amiss that some needy 
 officers of regiments, who do not possess that ad- 
 vantage, seeing a house or a store in flames, should 
 seize upon a few bottles of wine and some provi- 
 sions, that he should consider this in the light of 
 plunder, is an abuse of words, and an unfeeling- 
 ness which no expressions can well qualify.
 
 256 book vm. 
 
 The author ought to have said without disguise 
 or oratorical evasions, that the species of warfare 
 adopted in the present day, being carried on with 
 immense armies, whose prompt and rapid move- 
 ments will sometimes bring together two hundred 
 thousand men on the same day, it has become 
 quite impossible to subsist the troops by means of 
 regular distributions ; that foreign armies have 
 experienced it in Germany and in France, where 
 they carried on a system of marauding and plun- 
 der at the same time ; that the essential object is 
 to prevent any injury being inflicted upon the in- 
 habitants ; that, in this respect, no troops in Eu- 
 rope have displayed more humanity than the 
 French ; that the complaints of rape or murder 
 were almost unknown in countries occupied by 
 our soldiers, and that foreign troops, on the con- 
 trary, and especially the Russians, have been re- 
 proached with committing those excesses in near- 
 ly every village through which they passed, even 
 in Germany, amongst their own allies. And yet 
 this is the Russian army, which Mr. de Segur de- 
 scribes to us as having reached the summit of true 
 glory ; whilst he constantly draws the reader's at- 
 tention to the plunder committed by our unfortu- 
 nate soldiers, who carried off the bacon and flour 
 which they stood in need of.* 
 
 * In the letter of Abbe Surrugues, curate of the parish of St. 
 Louis in Moscow, which has been already mentioned, are the 
 following passages, concerning the plunder of that city. The
 
 CHAPTER XI n. *257 
 
 i( People, however, have expressed too much 
 " wonder," he says, " at the virtues as well as the 
 
 testimony of this emigrant priest is the less to be suspected, as 
 he is an enemy of Napoleon. 
 
 " Meanwhile the mob broke open the doors, and forced its way 
 "to the cellars of the shops which were threatened with the 
 "fire. Sugar, coffee, tea, soon became objects of plunder ; 
 " then hides, skins, stuffs, and every article of luxury. The 
 " soldier who, at first, had only been a quiet spectator of the 
 " scene, soon took an active part in it; the stores of flour were 
 " plundered; all the cellars overflowed with wine and brandy, 
 " &c. No sooner, in fact, was it established beyond a doubt 
 " that the setting fire to the city was a hostile measure resorted 
 " to by the Russian government, than plunder became an act of 
 " unavoidable reprisals on the part of the enemy. 
 
 " It has been remarked that the populace of Moscow played 
 " the most conspicuous part in the plunder ; they pointed out to 
 " the French soldiers the most concealed cellars, in order to 
 " have a share of the booty ; they introduced the cossacks 
 " into private houses on the departure of the French ; and 
 " the peasantry of the vicinity of Moscow, who came to take a 
 " part in the plunder, carried away and concealed whatever 
 " they could lay hold of. 
 
 " It is worthy of observation, that the plunder, which origin- 
 " ated in necessity, was kept up and encouraged by unfaithful 
 " housekeepers, the greater number of whom betrayed their 
 " masters, and pointed out the Klodowoie and the hidden 
 " cellars in order to divide the plunder ; and after the depar- 
 " ture of the French, the populace of Moscow and its vicinity 
 " left permanent traces of its insatiable avidity. 
 
 " The French, thanks to the safeguard which had been 
 
 " allowed us upon their arrival, respected our establishment. 
 
 ' It had remained undisturbed until the entrance of the cossacks
 
 258 book vni. 
 
 " vices of the French army ; they were the virtues 
 " and the vices of the moment ... the former were 
 " less praiseworthy, the latter less reprehensible, 
 " having been enjoined, as it were, by the force 
 u of example and by circumstances." 
 
 As neither virtues nor vices can be conventional, 
 as they exist at all times, this reflection seems to 
 cast a fresh imputation against the renown of the 
 French army. 
 
 " who preceded them, and who remained unchecked by any 
 " authority. I consider myself fortunate, in having lost only 
 " a few articles of plate, some bottles of wine, provisions of 
 " sugar, &c. 
 
 " Thanks be to God, the church of St. Louis escaped the 
 " plunder, but it could not escape a visit from the cossacks on 
 " their return. 
 
 " The unfortunate people, who had suffered from the plunder, 
 " proceeded to the residence of the Emperor Napoleon at 
 " Petrowski in order to solicit his protection ; he appeared to 
 " compassionate their distress, and promised that he would take 
 " means to afford a remedy to it. Upwards of four hundred 
 " amongst them were received with no less zeal than generosity 
 " in the dwelling of Zapatof at the Red-gate, and found there 
 " not only a safe asylum, but likewise every attention and 
 " means of sustenance. 
 
 " Many repaired to the hotel of Count Razomowski, which 
 " was occupied by the King of Naples, who received them 
 " with every mark of humanity ; he ordered them some assist- 
 " ance, which, however, proved very inadequate to the wants 
 " of so many people."
 
 259 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 When Kutusof abandoned Moscow, he took the 
 road to Kolomna. On the loth September, the 
 Russian army halted at Janki, four or five leagues 
 from Moscow ; on the 16th it crossed the Moskwa 
 at Borowskoe. Kutusof now determined to take 
 up, on the flank of the line of operations of the 
 French army, an offensive position against the 
 communications of that army, which would, at 
 the same time, enable him to cover Kalouga and 
 the southern provinces of Russia. As the posi- 
 tion of Tarontino, behind the Nara, procured 
 him the advantage of intersecting the centre road 
 from Moscow to Kalouga, and of proceeding to 
 the other two high roads which pass by Zerpou- 
 chow and Malojaroslawetz, he selected that posi- 
 tion as a halting place for the Russian army. 
 
 The King of Naples had at first imagined, that 
 the enemy was retreating upon the Occa ; but as 
 soon as he discovered the real movement of the 
 Russian army, he followed it in the new direction 
 which it had taken. 
 
 Some military men have felt surprised that 
 Kutusof, if he had not the intention of offering 
 battle a second time, before abandoning Moscow 
 to its fate, should have retired upon that capital, 
 
 s 2
 
 260 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 
 for the purpose of taking from thence the road to 
 Kalouga, a movement he might have made in a 
 direct line and with so much facility from Mo- 
 jaisk. It appears that the loss of the battle of 
 the Moskwa completel deranged, by its conse- 
 quences, the plans of the Russian general, and 
 that, outflanked on his right by the Polish troops, 
 he had no hopes of effecting a flank movement, 
 except by interposing the Moskwa, beyond Mos- 
 cow, between his army and the enemy. 
 
 Mr. de Segur gives no details of the military 
 movements ; he prefers confining himself to de- 
 scriptions, which he has probably borrowed from 
 the Russians, or taken from his own imagination, 
 as he has done in the greater part of his work. 
 He supposes that the Russian soldiers heard the 
 murmuring of the flames, at a distance of seven or 
 eight leagues. He says, that one might " see the 
 " fire of their sombre and threatening looks re- 
 " sponding to the flames which they considered 
 as our work. It already betrayed that feroci- 
 ous revenge which was rankling in their hearts, 
 " which spread throughout the empire, and to 
 " which so many fell victims." Two pages farther 
 on we read, on the subject of the same Russians, 
 these phrases, which seem to convey a contradic- 
 tion : " They have since claimed nothing, even in 
 " the enemy's capital which they preserved. Their 
 " renown has therefore remained great and un- 
 " sullied." 
 
 Their sacrifice was complete, without reserve, 

 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 261 
 
 " without tardy regrets." And yet we have just 
 seen that it was the work of one man. How did 
 he carry it into effect? By concealing- from the 
 inhabitants his mischievous plan ; by resorting to 
 the most violent threats to compel them to aban- 
 don their city ; by throwing the prisons open, and 
 letting the malefactors loose ; by placing torches 
 in their hands ; by removing- from the city every 
 means of stopping the conflagration. It was so 
 far from being an act of patriotism on the part of 
 the Russians, that the inhabitants who remained 
 at Moscow joined their endeavors to ours, for 
 the purpose of arresting the progress of the 
 flames. * A complete sacrifice is that which was 
 
 * " At this time the fire was consuming the lower part of the 
 " Patrowska, and all the shops situated at the bottom of the 
 " bridge of the Marshals. The flames, blown by the wind, 
 " threatened to extend beyond the bridge, devour all the shops 
 ** on the other side, and re-ascend towards the Loubianka ; 
 " already the inhabitants of that quarter, with their bundles 
 " upon their backs, seemed prepared for this last sacrifice 
 " All was consternation in the church of St. Louis ; the unfor- 
 " tunate people who had taken shelter within its boundaries, 
 " with their bundles in their hands and resigned to their fate, 
 " had called upon me to give them absolution. I requested they 
 " would delay a little longer, and that I should inform them 
 " when the moment arrived. Instantly I proceeded to the scene 
 " of danger ; I reached it covered with sparks and burning frag- 
 " ments. Nothing short of an interposition from Heaven could 
 " save us ; it inspired a company of grenadiers stationed on 
 " this spot, with the courage to provide themselves with buckets, 
 " and water the roofs of the houses the most exposed ; and they
 
 262 book vm. 
 
 presented by the town of Saguntum, whose inha- 
 bitants, after throwing their wives, their children, 
 and their treasures into the flames, rushed in after 
 them ; such an action justly claims our admira- 
 tion. But a set of vagabonds who set fire to a 
 city in which they possess nothing, and do so at 
 the call of an individual who is so much execrated 
 by his countrymen, that for many years he dares 
 not make his appearance amongst them. Such a 
 set can only inspire one with horror. 
 
 They have since claimed nothing, 6fc. Have 
 they not had their share of the thousand millions 
 imposed upon France ? 
 
 Their fame has remained great and unsullied ; 
 they have known true glory. Does true glory con- 
 sist in massacring the prisoners, in exposing them 
 naked upon the snow, to a death attended with 
 the most agonizing sufferings? Does it consist 
 in plundering, in ravishing our women, burning 
 our villages, as they have done in the whole of 
 Champany ? Let the author inquire of the inha- 
 bitants of the eastern provinces, what they think 
 of that great and unsullied renown, and of the true 
 
 " did so with such a degree of activity, that they prevented the 
 " fire from making any further inroads. This measure saved 
 " the whole quarter, the only one in the city that remained un- 
 ** injured; it comprises all the upper part of the bridge of the 
 " Marshals, the Rojestkuka, the two Lubianka, the post office, 
 " the bank, the Tchistiprout, and the extremity of the Patrowska 
 " situated between the two ramparts, and also the Maraceca." — 
 ( Extract from Abbe Surrugue's letter. J
 
 CHAPTER IX. 263 
 
 glory of the Russians ; he will see what answer 
 they will give him. 
 
 Mr. de Segur praises the act of Count Rostop- 
 chin, who sets fire to his country house, and de- 
 clares that he does so, " in order that it might 
 K not be polluted by the presence of the French." 
 
 What is good taste in a Frenchman to repeat 
 expressions so grossly insulting ? the subsequent 
 conduct of Mr Rostopchin has not corresponded 
 with his words ; for shortly afterwards he was 
 found to come in the midst of those Frenchmen, 
 and marrying his daughter to one of them.* 
 
 We will ask of the author, who constitutes 
 himself the apologist of Mr. Rostopchin, to in- 
 form us whether this Russian Count did not feel 
 himself compelled to burn his country-house, 
 under the apprehension that he might incur the 
 reproach of having personally lost nothing in that 
 great disaster, of which he made himself the in- 
 strument ? 
 
 Our officer of the palace is astonished that, af- 
 ter the lapse of eleven days, Napoleon should still 
 be in Moscow, and losing the time which he ought 
 to have gained. It was natural to hope that the 
 Russian army, having been almost annihilated at 
 the battle of the Moskwa, the Emperor Alexander 
 would make peace at Moscow. This capital 
 having been destroyed by fire, Alexander might 
 
 * The Nephew of Count Philip de Segnr.
 
 264 book viii. 
 
 fear that Napoleon, after paralyzing Kutusoff's 
 army by one of those decisive manoeuvres which 
 were so familiar to him, might make a rapid 
 movement upon St. Petersburgh. All the intelli- 
 gence received from that city communicated the 
 apprehensions entertained of such a movement 
 Already the public archives were embarked, and 
 the French were expected to arrive. We may be 
 allowed to think, that if Alexander had been left 
 to himself, he would not have incurred those dan- 
 gers, but would have signed a peace. He was 
 prevented by the high Russian nobility, and by 
 the English envoys, who mixed up with seduction 
 the remembrance of a sanguinary catastrophe. 
 With this object in view those heralds of perpetual 
 war had made the governor of Moscow their in- 
 strument for burning that capital, being desirous 
 by its destruction to inflame the national hatred, 
 to deprive us of that pledge when the moment for 
 negotiating should arrive, and oppose a powerful 
 obstacle to peace. The flattering opinion which 
 Napoleon had entertained at Tilsit and at Erfurt 
 of the personal character and sentiments of the 
 Russian Emperor, justifies the hope he might have 
 entertained that this sovereign would treat all 
 odious insinuations with contempt, and rather 
 listen to the true interests of his country, than to 
 considerations which were purely of a personal 
 nature. 
 
 Whilst Napoleon waited for this reply from 
 Alexander, his whole attention was given to pro-
 
 CHAPTER IX. 265 
 
 cure repose to his army, to repair the losses of 
 every kind which it had suffered, to organize the 
 hospitals, to administer relief to its wounded, and 
 to collect the provisions of all kinds that were 
 scattered about the city. His solicitude was not 
 even confined to his troops. It was extended to 
 the unfortunate inhabitants of Moscow, who had 
 remained in that city. He used every means to 
 improve their distressing condition. The Russian 
 wounded, who were in the hospitals and in the 
 houses which had escaped the fire, were treated 
 as our own. His care extended to the service of 
 religion ; he ordered that the churches which had 
 been spared should be opened ; sent for the popes 
 and curates who were dispersed, and gave a fresh 
 example of his respect for the sentiments of the 
 people towards their sovereign, by inviting them 
 to pray for Alexander.* 
 
 * " Historical truth requires us to observe in this place, that 
 " the constituted authorities, so far from opposing the free ex- 
 " ercise of the national form of worship, gave orders to have a 
 " search made for their popes, who were compelled to resume 
 " their functions. Some were discovered, but under different 
 " pretexts they refused to perform their office. Many no doubt 
 " had a fair motive, since their church had been burned ; others 
 " were offered every requisite assistance to enable them to re- 
 " sume the exercise of their ministry ; but whether it proceeded 
 " from fear, or from any other motive, it was found impossible 
 " to persuade above three or four of them in the course of three 
 " weeks. 
 
 " Only one pope of my neighbourhood consulted me as to
 
 266 book viii. 
 
 In this place the author again ascribes speeches 
 to many personages, with the view, no doubt of 
 establishing their reputation for frankness, cou- 
 rage, and especially foresight. Napoleon was de- 
 sirous of sending a negotiator to Alexander ; 
 but the Duke of Vicenza, more susceptible of obsti- 
 nacy than of being a flatterer , refused. Can those 
 who are acquainted with the Duke of Vicenza, 
 give credit to such an assertion ? They know 
 that he was sufficiently impressed with a due 
 sense of his duties and of his own dignity not to 
 refuse the missions which the Emperor was 
 pleased to confide to him, and that if he wished to 
 refuse any, it would not assuredly have been a 
 mission, the object of which was to prevent the 
 further effusion of blood. To be enabled to form 
 a proper estimate of all those rude conversations, 
 
 " whether he might resume his functions; he was a stranger to 
 " Moscow, and chaplain of the regiment of knights-guards ; he 
 " was surprised by the French on the departure of the Russian 
 " army ; I earnestly urged him to it. He obtained from the 
 " commandant of the city the requisite safeguard to perform his 
 " office with becoming decency ; and the people came in crowds 
 " to the only church opened for his form of worship. This pope 
 " had been made to apprehend, that he would be compelled to 
 " pray for Napoleon, and not for Alexander- He was assured 
 ** in my presence, that he had not to alter a single word in his 
 " liturgy, and might continue to pray for his lawful sovereign. 
 " He performed his office as usual, and sang the Te Deum ; it 
 " was on the anniversary of the coronation of Alexander." 
 ( Extract from Abbe Snri'ugue's Letters. J
 
 CHAPTER X. 267 
 
 those indications of pride without an object, that 
 absence of all becoming conduct, we appeal to 
 those who have seen Napoleon descending from 
 the throne, and placed in the power of his ene- 
 mies. Where is the individual who, even at St. 
 Helena, would have dared to act in that manner 
 towards him ? 
 
 The Emperor's last words to Lauriston were: 
 " I wish for peace ; I want peace ; I must abso- 
 " lutely have peace ; only save my honor." 
 
 The Emperor desired peace, since he had en- 
 tered into the war against his own inclination. 
 He may have expressed to General Lauriston a 
 desire to that effect ; but never used the words 
 save my honor, since the French honor was in no 
 way compromised ; the proof of this is, that not- 
 withstanding our disasters, it has remained un- 
 tainted. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 In informing his readers of the arrival of General 
 Lauriston at Alexander's head-quarters, Mr. de 
 Segur exhibits that negotiator as delighted to 
 break off a negotiation which he disapproved. If 
 this had been the case, General Lauriston would 
 have soon discovered that the Russians only
 
 *J68 BOOK VIII. 
 
 wanted to gain time, and had no intention what- 
 ever to make peace. His correspondence, how- 
 ever, contributed as much as that of the King of 
 Naples, to keep up the hopes of the Emperor. If 
 we are to believe the author, Napoleon and the 
 King of Naples alone entertained an illusion, 
 which General Lauriston ought to have removed. 
 
 " Murat, tired of battles, regretting his throne, 
 " since his hopes of a better one had vanished, 
 " suffered himself to be charmed, seduced, and 
 " deceived." 
 
 What does the author mean by that hope of a 
 better throne which Murat had entertained? 
 Does he allude to Poland ? But Murat never 
 dreamed of exchanging the rich kingdom of Naples 
 against the deserts of Sannatia, and no such ques- 
 tion had ever been agitated. If the kingdom of 
 Poland had been re-established, Prince Poniatow- 
 ski, and not Murat, would have reigned at War- 
 saw. 
 
 The same Murat who no longer hopes for a 
 belter throne than that of Naples, is represented a 
 little further on, as flattered with the idea of being 
 King of the Cossacks. 
 
 A battery of artillery, belonging to an Italian 
 division, was attacked upon the road by partisans 
 who threw this convoy into confusion, and blew 
 up some caissons ; they could succeed, however, 
 in carrying away the cannon. On this occasion, 
 the author asperses the character of the officer, by 
 imputing cowardice to him. The truth is, that
 
 
 CHAPTER X. '269 
 
 from the inquiries which the Emperor caused to 
 be instituted, this officer proved to have been 
 rather unfortunate than guilty ; the matter ended 
 there. 
 
 Who -can credit the enthusiasm which Mr. de 
 Segur attributes to Russian recruits ? " Not one 
 
 failed to obey the national appeal ; all Russia 
 
 rose in a mass ; mothers, it was said, wept for 
 " joy on learning that their sons had been selected 
 " for militia-men ; they hastened to acquaint them 
 " with the glorious intelligence, and even returned 
 " in their company to see them marked with the 
 " sign of the crusaders, and hear them cry, 'Tis 
 " the will of God !" 
 
 Such is the condition of the serf, that the state 
 ofa Russian soldier, however wretched, appears 
 happiness to him. And yet since the disasters 
 suffered by Alexander's armies, the terror and dis- 
 couragement which the French armies had created 
 were so great that the recruits would no longer 
 march. In order to compel them to rejoin the 
 camp at Tarontino, they were tied in couples, and 
 led on by Cossacks, who struck them with the staff 
 of their lances. Had Mr. de Segur consulted the 
 French officers, prisoners of war, who had been 
 carried to the rear of the Russian army, he would 
 have learnt the above facts. 
 
 The author, whose imagination is always in the 
 clouds, and who has already given to us, as an 
 omen, the history of a vulture caught in the chains 
 of a steeple, presents to us, as an inauspicious fore-
 
 270 BOOK VIII. 
 
 boding, " Those crowds of ill-omened birds who 
 u seem as if they meant to defend the cross of the 
 " Great Ivan." Ivan's tower was the highest in 
 the city ; it was therefore quite natural that it 
 should afford an asylum to a great number of ra- 
 vens, especially after the conflagration which had 
 destroyed nearly every steeple, 
 
 The author will have it that this omen made a 
 strong impression upon the mind of the Emperor, 
 which he pretends to have been accessible to every 
 kind of presentiment ; " In vain he tries to discover 
 " his star in a brilliant sun, and to make others 
 " recognize it,* this offered no diversion to his 
 " mind. To the sullen silence of inanimate Mos- 
 " cow, was superadded the still more sullen si- 
 " lence of Alexander. It was not the faint sound 
 " of the footsteps of our soldiers wandering in that 
 " vast sepulchre, that could rouse our Emperor 
 " from his reverie. 
 
 " His nights in particular become irksome to 
 " him. He passes part of them with Count Darn.*' 
 Count Daru will be but little flattered by that 
 approximation, however involuntarily made. 
 
 We will not follow the author in those conver- 
 sations ; it is easy to perceive that they have been 
 made up after the events. 
 
 * A star in the Sun — this is extraordinary indeed !
 
 271 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Undeviating in his system, Mr. de Segur repre- 
 sents the Emperor to us as pleased in creating- to 
 himself an illusion on the state of his affairs 
 " catching at every thing to keep up his hopes, 
 " when all at once the first snows fell, and dis- 
 ' J pelled all illusions." The Emperor's illusions did 
 not fall with the snow. Having considered that he 
 had not left undone any thing that his duty re- 
 quired of him, in order to obtain a peace, that 
 the hopes which the reports of Murat and Lauris- 
 ton had created did not turn to reality, and that 
 there remained to him only one month of fine 
 weather for acting, he determined to draw nearer 
 to his reinforcements. The author makes it a re- 
 proach to Napoleon that he would not leave a part 
 of his artillery in Moscow. The army round that 
 city mustered, at the time of departure, six hun- 
 dred pieces of mounted cannon, with a complete 
 supply of every thing. The artillery horses had 
 been reinforced by the horses of the pontoon car- 
 riages, which had been left at the Kremlin. It never 
 could, therefore, have entered the Emperor's mind 
 to abandon to the Russians a part of his artillery;
 
 k 27'2 book vin. 
 
 this would have been a loss so much the more 
 serious to him, as he expected that a fresh battle 
 would be fought. But Mr. de Segur is on 
 the look out for every opportunity of exhibiting 
 Napoleon rather as a man deprived of his facul- 
 ties, than as a skillful general. 
 
 " In this desert country, he says the Emperor 
 " gave orders for the purchase of twenty thousand 
 " horses." 
 
 A multitude of persons belonging to the army 
 had a much greater number of horses than the 
 regulations allowed to them. The Emperor's 
 order was directed to the purchase of this excess, 
 with the view of turning it over to the artillery and 
 to the military transport. 
 
 Napoleon is exhibited to us such as he was at 
 
 Wilna, Witepsk, and at Smolensko, surrounded 
 
 by disapproving looks : " To Count Daru he 
 " frankly reveals his intentions." He informs 
 
 him of his plan of crushing Kutusoff, and march- 
 ing upon Smolensko. But Count Daru " who had 
 w hitherto been of this opinion, now tells him that 
 " it is too late ; that the Russian army is restored to 
 " its former strength .... that the moment his 
 " troops should turn their faces towards Fiance, 
 " they would perish in detail, etc. What then is 
 " to be done exclaimed the Emperor ?" 
 
 The situation of Napoleon, reduced to take ad- 
 vice from a civil administrator on the military 
 movements to be adopted, is nothing more than 
 singular; the exclamation what then is to be
 
 CHAPTER XI. 273 
 
 done P proceeding from a man whose greatness 
 and power we have all witnessed, must excite our 
 compassion. Fortunately the marechal-des-logis 
 of the palace comes to his assistance, by means of 
 an advice which Count Daru is made to administer 
 to him. This lion-like advice was as follows : 
 •' To remain here, to make of Moscow a vast in- 
 cf trenched camp, and winter in it. He would 
 " answer for it that neither bread nor salt should 
 u be wanting." The Emperor might have placed 
 reliance upon this, if from the very opening of 
 the campaign, the exertions of the administration 
 had succeeded in supplying the army. 
 
 " Foraging on a large scale would supply the 
 " rest." The author who so opportunely suggests 
 these words to Count Daru, forgets the expressions 
 he used in the preceding page. " Napoleon de- 
 " sires that forage for two months shall be pro- 
 " vided, on a tract where the most distant and 
 " dangerous excursions were not sufficient for 
 " the passing day. Those poor horses, therefore, 
 would have run great risk of dying of hunger ; 
 but we must not feel any uneasiness respecting 
 our cavalry. " Such of the horses as it will not 
 " be possible to feed, may, according to Mr. 
 cf Daru, be salted down. In this manner we may 
 " wait the return of spring, when our reinforce- 
 " ments and all Lithuania in arms will come to 
 " our relief, etc. 
 
 In attributing this language to so enlightened 
 a man, the author ought to have told us what 
 
 T
 
 274 book vin. 
 
 were the advantages which this counsellor dis- 
 covered in the Emperor's remaining at Moscow, 
 rather than returning to Smolensko and Witepsk, 
 where he might enter into winter quarters, and 
 prepare himself for a new campaign. Our author 
 no doubt forgets that Kutusoff's army, which was 
 daily increasing, would have become in spring 
 much more powerful in numbers than it was at 
 present, whilst our own army, blockaded in 
 Moscow, and reduced to its own limited resources, 
 would have witnessed the daily loss of the horses 
 belonging to its carriages and to its cavalry. If 
 to these military considerations we add others of 
 a political nature which are obvious to all, will it 
 not be evident that there is not one word of truth 
 in that pretended conversation. 
 
 Whilst Mr. de Segur describes the Emperor 
 " struggling amidst the dreadful scorn of men 
 " and elements which was gathering round him, 
 " passing his days in discussing the merits of some 
 " new verses, or the regulations for the Comedie. 
 u Frangaise at Paris, prolonging his meals with 
 the view of stifling thought, passing whole hours 
 in a reclined posture as if in a state of torpor, 
 with a novel in his hand, &,c." at the same time 
 that he exhibits him in so unfavorable a light, 
 and displays so many proofs of the disregard 
 in which he holds him, he presents to us 
 " Kutusoffas gaining all that time which we were 
 '■ losing. . . neglecting no advantage. . . at once 
 " bold and crafty, slowly preparing an impetuous 

 
 CHAPTER XI. 275 
 
 " warfare, kc Rostopchin, receiving daily 
 
 " reports from Moscow, just as before its cap- 
 " tare, &c." 
 
 This description exhibits to our view a new 
 feature of the author's impartiality, and the same 
 spirit which presided at the scenes in the interior 
 of Napoleon's palace in Paris, at Wilna, and at 
 Witepsk. 
 
 An armistice had been agreed upon with the 
 Russians ever since General Lauriston's journey. 
 Mr. de Segur has described at great length the 
 good understanding that subsisted between the 
 advanced posts of the two armies, and which he 
 attributes to the excessive confidence of the 
 King of Naples. Now, however, as if to screen 
 the Russians from the reproach of bad faith, 
 which they incurred by their unexpected attack 
 upon Winkowo, he pretends that Murat declared 
 to Miloradowitch that the armistice was at an end ; 
 this assertion is wholly unfounded. 
 
 The marechal-des-logis of the palace likewise 
 supposes that Murat caused the Emperor to be 
 informed " that a woody country on his left might 
 " favor attempts against his flank and rear, that 
 " his first line backed by a ravine, might be forc- 
 ed into it ; that in short the position he occu- 
 •' pies is full of danger, and renders a retrograde 
 " movement necessary. But Napoleon will not 
 " consent to it ;" and the motive which the author 
 assigns for the refusal is that this Prince " dreaded 
 
 t2 
 
 a
 
 276 book vin. 
 
 above all the appearance of receding ; he preferred 
 risking everything." 
 
 We are under the necessity of saying in this 
 place that Mr. de Segur is mistaken, when he 
 wishes to persuade that Napoleon whilst at Mos- 
 cow, and at a distance of twenty leagues from 
 Murat, gave him minute directions respecting the 
 position of his troops. The Emperor had quite a 
 different notion of war ; he issued a general order, 
 as we have repeatedly observed, and left the de- 
 tails of its execution to the person to whom that 
 order was directed. 
 
 This Prince had recommended to the King of 
 Naples to watch the Russian camp, and to select 
 the most convenient position for the purpose, 
 without crossing the Nara ; but he had not pre- 
 scribed the particular arrangements,* which could 
 
 * The following letter comes in support of what we assert ; 
 it shows that the King of Naples was at liberty to quit Winkowo, 
 and to retire upon Woronowo, if he apprehended an attack. 
 
 The Prince of Nenfchatel and Wagratn, to His Majesty the 
 
 King of Naples. 
 Moscow, the 13th October, 1812, 2 o'clock in the morning- 
 
 *' From your reports to the Emperor, and the information 
 transmitted to him respecting the enemy, His Majesty considers 
 that Woronowo is an excellent and a compact position, that it 
 may be defended by infantry which would easily cover the 
 cavalry. Should you agree with him in this opinion, you are 
 authorized to take up that position. 
 
 " The Emperor has this night sent off his horses, and after 
 to-morrow you will be joined by the army, for the purpose of
 
 chapter xr. 277 
 
 only be determined by local circumstances. If 
 Murat had upon his left a woody country, he 
 was to clear the ground for himself in that direc- 
 tion ; if a ravine was in the rear of his position, 
 he was to take up a better one. Is our historian 
 unacquainted with those first elements of military 
 science, or does he wish to make it a reproach to 
 the Emperor that Murat was taken by surprise in 
 his position at Winkowo ? The latter conjecture 
 
 attacking and driving 1 away the enemy. The army will re- 
 quire three days to come up with you ; you will, therefore, have 
 to maintain your ground for four or five days ; and should you 
 fear an attack from the enemy, or that the nature of things may 
 render it impossible for you to avoid a continuation of the losses 
 which you have suffered during the last eight days, you have 
 the resource left to jou of taking up the position of Woronowo. 
 All the vehicles which you sent are loaded with provisions ; those 
 that have arrived this night will likewise proceed to-morrow, 
 &c. &c." 
 
 In another letter, from the Prince of Neufchatel to the King 
 of Naples, dated Moscow the 14th October, 1812, at 10 o'clock 
 at night, there is found the following passage : — " Cause the 
 pass which is to lead you to Mojaisk to be properly reconnoit- 
 red, in order that, if you should be compelled to retreat before 
 the enemy, you may be well acquainted with that road. The 
 Emperor apprehends that your baggage, your park of artillery, 
 and the greater part of your infantry, might file off unknown to 
 the enemy. 
 
 '* Is it true that in repassing the defile of Worouowo, your 
 cavalry might be covered by your infantry, and in a less fati- 
 guing position than its present one in the plain, which compels 
 it to be always on the qui-vive ? In any case it is of importance 
 that your trcops be provided with many days' provisions. There 
 are at Moscow one thousand quintals of flour, and an abundance 
 of brandy at your disposal, Sec."
 
 278 book vm. 
 
 appears the more likely as in the following page, 
 he tells us that " young Berenger hastens to us 
 " with the intelligence that Murat's first line had 
 " been surprised and overthrown, his left turned 
 " by favor of the woods, his flank attacked, etc." ; 
 in short, all his anticipations are realized. 
 
 Our officer of the palace should have told us 
 that the Russian general, availing himself of our 
 confidence in his word, re-commenced hostilities 
 on a sudden, in the hopes of destroying our ad- 
 vanced guard ; but that this plan was defeated by 
 the valor of the King of Naples and of the troops 
 under his orders. The enemy's loss was greater 
 than our own. If we lost Generals Fischer and 
 Dery, whose names are not mentioned by Mr. de 
 Segur, the Russians lost Generals Baggowouth 
 and Muller. Beningsen, who appears to have 
 been the promoter of this breach, afforded, by 
 his conduct, a fresh proof that he was better 
 versed in the revolutions of a palace, than in mili- 
 tary operations. 
 
 What a strange opinion foreigners would enter- 
 tain of the officers who approached the Emperor, 
 upon reading, " that no one dared to inform him 
 " that the guns were firing in the direction of 
 " Winkowo ; some kept back from incredulity or 
 '* doubt, others from love of ease, hesitating to 
 " provoke a terrible signal, or apprehensive of 
 " being sent to ascertain the correctness of the 
 " assertion, or of exposing themselves to a fati- 
 
 guing excursion.
 
 CHAPTER XI. 279 
 
 " At these tidings, Napoleon recovered the fire 
 " of his early years.*' 
 
 The Emperor, who, according to Mr. de Segur 
 is worn out at forty-three years of age, whilst 
 Kutusoff at eighty possesses all the energy of youth, 
 had not waited for this event to order the retreat, 
 or to emerge from the apathy into which the au- 
 thor has thrown him. 
 
 In the appendix will be found many letters 
 written by the Emperor during his stay at Mos- 
 cow. An estimate may be formed of his activity 
 and foresight by those documents, which are 
 but a very small proportion of the multitude 
 of orders he issued on military matters in that 
 space of time. They will establish that Napoleon 
 did not wait the attack of Winkowo to organize 
 and reinforce his army, to secure his communica- 
 tions, to complete the number of horses required 
 for his artillery, to increase his supply of ammu- 
 nition (by means of the powder found at Moscow, 
 close to the gate of the Germans, and the shot 
 picked up from the field of battle) to send away 
 his wounded, and all useless objects, and to pre- 
 pare himself for undertaking active operations on 
 any point he might think proper. We say nothing 
 of the couriers who were daily dispatched to Paris, 
 with his instructions upon every branch of inter- 
 nal administration, upon politics, finances, war, 
 & c.&c. 
 
 In one page, " the division of Claparede sets 
 ' out for Mojaisk ;" in the next, we are told that
 
 280 BOOK VIII. 
 
 " Claparede and Latour-Maubourg have cleared 
 " the defile of Spaskaplia." We will ask the au- 
 thor how Claparede's division could be, on the 
 same day, in two places distant upwards of twenty 
 leagues from each other. But in a work which 
 swarms with so many important errors, inaccura- 
 cies similar to the above should not arrest our at- 
 tention.
 
 281 
 
 BOOK IX- 
 
 (f 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Emperor himself presents, in this chapter, 
 the motives of his stay at Moscow. " He was 
 
 obliged to allow time, to the soldiers to recruit 
 
 their strength, and to the wounded collected in 
 " Moscow, Mojaisk, and Kolotskoi, to move off 
 " towards Smolensko." But, as if the author 
 found it impossible to make the Emperor utter in 
 succession two rational expressions, he hastens to 
 add, that Napoleon, pointing to a still serene ski/, 
 asked his officers, if " in that brilliant sun, they 
 did not recognize his star? 
 
 That metaphor of a star in the sun is a great 
 favorite with Mr. de Segur ; it is often to be 
 found in his work. In general he endeavors to 
 persuade, that Napoleon placed a childish reliance 
 upon his star, and was pleased in expressing it ; 
 this is quite absurd. A man like Napoleon might 
 calculate upon his genius, his talents, his deep 
 meditations ; but he believed in his star just as 
 much as Caesar believed in the sacred chickens. 
 
 All antecedent chapters have exhibited this great 
 captain to us as plunged into a state of heaviness
 
 it 
 
 a 
 
 282 b o.o k ix. 
 
 and torpor ; and yet the author says : " Napoleon 
 " who entered Moscow with ninety thousand 
 " fighting men, and twenty thousand sick and 
 a wounded, quitted it with upwards of one hun- 
 " dred thousand combatants. He left there no 
 more than twelve hundred sick. His stay* there- 
 fore, notwithstanding daily losses, had enabled 
 him to afford rest to his infantry, to complete 
 " his ammunition, to augment his forces by ten 
 " thousand men, and to promote the recovery or 
 " the retreat of a great proportion of his wounded, 
 " etc." 
 
 In the midst of a long description of the equi- 
 pages and the train of the army, on its departure 
 from Moscow, the author displays the gigantic 
 cross of Ivan the Great. 
 
 This cross, which stood on the top of the tower 
 of Ivan Waliki, was thirty feet in height, and 
 made of wood covered over with very thin sheets 
 of gilt silver. In the attempt to carry it off, the 
 sappers entrusted with the operation let it fall to 
 the ground ; it was dashed in a thousand peiecs. 
 The sheets of silver were set apart, and the wood 
 thrown away. A small cross of pure gold, about 
 ten inches in height, was found fixed in the centre 
 of the great one. The former alone was preserved, 
 and carried off with the treasure of the army. We 
 then have the gigantic cross of Mr. de Segur 
 dwindling to ten inches ! Many of his assertions 
 might be reduced in a similar proportion. 
 
 Following this cross we see long-bearikd Rus-
 
 CHAPTER I. 283 
 
 sian peasants carrying or driving along our booty, 
 of which they constituted a part: In saying- that 
 those peasants were a part of our booty, does the 
 officer of the palace wish to insinuate that they 
 were led on as slaves, and so justify the infamies 
 committed by the Russians upon the unfortunate 
 French who remained in the hospitals of Moscow, 
 and were recommended to their humanity,* It 
 is untrue that any peasant was reduced to capti- 
 vity ; some followed us to make money, others to 
 
 * General Guillaume de Vaudoncourt, in his Memoir es pour 
 servir a VHistoire dela Guerre, entre la France et la Russieen 
 1812, a work superior to all those which have hitherto been pub- 
 lished respecting this campaign, as much by the acknowledged 
 talents of the author, as by the correctness of the facts, relates 
 (page 252) " Thatonthe 23d Oct., the Russian General Ilowaiki 
 " entered Moscow, that he there found, iu the three remaining 
 " hospitals, about fourteen hundred Russian sick or wounded, 
 " and six hundred and fifty French sick or wounded, who were 
 " in too weak a state to be removed with their comrades. 
 " Nevertheless a part of the latter were thrown upon cars for 
 " the purpose of being dragged to Twer, but they all perished 
 " of cold and want, or were assassinated by the peasants in 
 " whose charge they were placed, and who murdered them in 
 " order to obtain possession of their clothes. The rest were 
 " left in the hospitals with the French surgeons who had re- 
 " mained to take care of them; but they were neither provided 
 " with food nor medicines." 
 
 General Guillaume de Vaudoncourt having been taken pri- 
 soner during the retreat, was enabled to collect many docu- 
 ments and details of the highest interest, a circumstance which 
 has occasioned a demand for his work by all those who desire 
 to form a just idea of the events of that war.
 
 284 book ix. 
 
 collect what might be abandoned upon the road, 
 others in short as hired servants. 
 
 The author has consumed four pages in describ- 
 ing the retreat from Moscow, and bestows only a 
 few lines on the skilful movement by which the 
 Emperor deceived the enemy, when he turned his 
 position of Tarontino, and took the direction to 
 Kalouga and Malo-Jaroslavetz. 
 
 CHAFrER II. 
 
 Arrived on the 23d at Borowsk, the Emperor 
 learned at night that the Viceroy had caused Ma- 
 lo-Jaroslavetz to be occupied ; " But," says Mr. 
 de Segur, " he slumbered upon success, instead 
 " of following it up." He seems thereby to blame 
 Napoleon for not moving on at once to Malo-Ja- 
 roslavetz. But this prince having been informed 
 that a Russian corps under Doctoroffwas march- 
 ing upon his left, and had reached Aristowo, 
 would not have been justified in proceeding in the 
 direction of Malo-Jaroslavetz, until he was satis- 
 fied that the forces marching upon Borowsk were 
 not the whole of the Russian army. What mo- 
 tive, besides, had the Emperor for marching 
 upon Malo-Jaroslavetz, which; according to Mr.
 
 CHAPTER II. 285 
 
 de Segur, Delzon's division had found deserted ? 
 That phrase : the Emperor slumbered upon success, 
 instead, of following it up, is therefore without 
 meaning. 
 
 The criticism of the officer of the palace pro- 
 ceeds from his omissions to consult the maps ; for, 
 speaking of Malo-Jaroslavetz, he says : " That 
 " was the only point at which Kutnsoff could in- 
 " tercept the new road to Kalouga." And yet at 
 Borowsk we incurred the same danger. 
 
 The author had said that our misfortunes 
 were occasioned by our stay at Witepsk, then by 
 our march upon Moscow, lastly, by our stay in 
 this capital. Now, on the occasion of the whole 
 day sacrificed to the passage of the Nara and its 
 morass, he adds : " Be this as it may, we may date 
 " all our calamities from that delay." 
 
 An officer comes from Prince Eugene to an- 
 nounce to the Emperor that Malo-Jaroslavetz 
 having been occupied only by two battalions, the 
 enemy came at day-break to attack it, and had 
 forced back the weak body of troops that defended 
 it. He adds that the Viceroy is marching to the 
 support of Delzon's. division Mr. de Segur then 
 says that the whole army of Kutusof was hasten- 
 ing up, that already his columns were placing 
 themselves across the old road to Kalouga, which 
 was free on the preceding day, and which we 
 might then have occupied and marched over, 
 but which Kutusof would hencefor ward have it in 
 his power to defend at every step.
 
 286 book ix. 
 
 The assertion of our murkhal-des-lovis of the 
 palace is intended to justify the reproach he has 
 antecedently thrown upon Napoleon, for his slow- 
 ness in moving towards Malo-Jaroslavetz. We 
 have already stated the reasons which prevented 
 the Emperor from proceeding at once to that 
 place, before the enemy should have reached it. We 
 shall add, that from the instructions given to the 
 Viceroy, he was to occupy Malo-Jaroslavetz with 
 a strong force, and instead of two battations only, 
 the whole of Delzon's division ought to have been 
 stationed there. As soon as Napoleon learned 
 the attack of the Russians upon that point, he 
 sent one of his officers* to Prince Eugene, to or- 
 der him to maintain himself in Malo-Jaroslavetz. 
 He informed him that he was marching to his sup- 
 port, and enjoined him to secure that town by 
 strong batteries on the right and left of it. The 
 Emperor had consequently foreseen every thing, 
 and done all that was necessary. 
 
 Mr. de Segur coolly relates the loss experienced 
 by the fourth corps in the person of General Del- 
 zons. The intrepity of that general, and the af- 
 fecting death of his brother, might have supplied 
 the historian of the grand army with some ex- 
 pressions of regret and of esteem for such brave 
 men. The Russian generals, and Koulnief 
 amongst others, have obtained the tribute of his 
 
 * The orderly officer Gourgaud.
 
 CHAPTER II. 287 
 
 praises ; it is painful to observe that lie neglects 
 to render the same justice to French general offi- 
 cers. 
 
 According to his custom, the author, whilst ex- 
 aggerating our forces, diminishes those of the 
 enemy. The three French and Italian divisions 
 which conquered at Malo-Jaroslavetz, under 
 Prince Eugene's orders, did not exceed sixteen 
 thousand men. The Russian army, composed 
 of sixteen divisions, had twenty thousand men in 
 the field. Our loss was about three thousand 
 men ; that of the enemy was about eight thou- 
 sand. This was one of the most glorious engage- 
 ments fought by the French and Italian troops, 
 considering the great disproportion of numbers. 
 The author seems to reproach the Emperor with 
 it, when he says, " that so sanguinary a conflict 
 might have been avoided." Had he reflected, 
 however, upon the subject, he would have under- 
 stood, that owing to the position of the enemy, 
 and the bad state of the roads, it was impossible 
 that our march from Moscow to this point could 
 be effected with greater rapidity. The army could 
 not all advance in a body ; it marched therefore 
 in echelons. 
 
 " The several corps of the army had remained 
 " out of reach of each other." A proof of the 
 contrary is, that the corps of Marshal Davoust 
 which marched in the rear of that of the viceroy, 
 arrived at Malo-Jarosiavetz in the morning of the
 
 288 book xi. 
 
 24th., and that the Emperor himself arrived there 
 about noon of the same day.* 
 
 If the author had made himself acquainted with 
 the marches of the army at Marengo, at Wilna, at 
 Echmuhl, he would have discovered that the 
 marches of Malo Jaroslavetz had been directed by 
 the same man and the same genius. 
 
 CHAFfER III. 
 
 Our officer of the palace commences this chapter 
 by an error, which though of little consequence, 
 deserves to be animadverted upon. He hints that „ 
 during the battle the Emperor was to the right of 
 the high road, at the bottom of a ravine, close to the 
 rivulet and village of Ghorodinia. During the 
 whole of the battle the Emperor stood upon the 
 causeway leading to the bridge of Malo-Jaros- 
 
 * The Emperor quitted Borowsk at an early hour ; he was 
 breakfasting at two leagues from that town, on the road, with 
 the King of Naples, the Prince of Neufchatel, and General Lau- 
 riston, when the firing was heard. He instantly mounted his 
 horse, and by twelve o'clock had reached an elevation opposite 
 Malo-Jaroslavetz, above the Louja, on the left of the road, and 
 admirably situated for the purpose of observing the enemy's 
 movements.
 
 CHAPTER III. 280 
 
 lavetz, from whence he saw the action, and could 
 issue his orders. From that point he ordered 
 Gerard's division to cross the Louja, on a second 
 bridge* which he had caused to be constructed 
 above the one already in existence, to proceed to 
 the right of Malo-Jaroslavetz, and to extend his 
 right to the woods of Terentiewa. He also sent 
 Compans' division to the left of Malo-Jaroslavetz. 
 He attempted in person to erect a battery on the 
 left bank of the Louja, for the purpose of afford- 
 ing support to the right of General Gerard from 
 one bank to the other. 
 
 He did not return until night to the house 
 which Mr. de Segur finds " an old, weather beaten, 
 " filthy, wooden hut, parted off into two rooms by 
 cloth." What we find most accurate in the His- 
 tory of the Grand Army, are the details respecting 
 the interior of the quarters occupied by the Em- 
 peror. We will not contradict the author on this 
 point, but will simply observe that Napoleon 
 did not return to the hut until after the engage- 
 ment. 
 
 Marshal Bessieres whom Napoleon has com- 
 missioned to reconnoitre the position of theenemy, 
 returns to tell him "that it is unassailable. 
 " Heavens, exclaims the Emperor, clasping his 
 " hands, are you sure you are right ? Is it really 
 " so ? Can you answer font r" Bessieres repeats 
 
 * This bridge was constructed by means of buttresses. 
 
 D
 
 290 * BOOK IX. 
 
 " his assertion : he affirms that three hundred 
 f< grenadiers there would be sufficient to keep in 
 " check a whole army." 
 
 That theatrical grief, those clasped hands ap- 
 pealing to heaven, form a striking contrast with 
 the real character of Napoleon. The author de- 
 parts, more particularly in this place, from the rule 
 prescribed to historians as well as to poets, of mak- 
 ing their personages act and speak according to 
 their received character. The author will have 
 read in some account that the position of Malo- 
 Jaroslavetz was difficult to force for the purpose 
 of gaining the road to Kalouga ; and without con- 
 sidering that already, on the eve of the engage- 
 ment, we were masters of the bridge and of the 
 town, in which the strength of the position con- 
 sisted, he makes Marshal Bessieres say that the 
 position taken by the Russians beyond the town 
 is unassailable, and that three hundred grenadiers 
 would there be sufficient to keep in check a whole 
 army. This assertion evidently proves that the 
 author has not even seen Malo-Jaroslavetz. Three 
 hundred grenadiers can oppose no obstacles to 
 an army, except in an almost inaccessible defile; 
 the real defile consisted in the bridge and the 
 town ; and we were in possession of both. The 
 position of the Russians was so assailable, that, 
 on the very night after the action, Kutusoff re- 
 treated with his army nearly the distance of a 
 league, to take up a position behind the small 
 river of Korigea.
 
 ft 
 
 (1 
 
 a 
 
 CHAPTER III. 291 
 
 Who then can have seen Napoleon, after that 
 pretended report of Bessieres, " crossing his arms 
 " with a look of consternation, hanging down his 
 " head, and remaining as if overwhelmed with the 
 " deepest dejection ? " Who can have heard him 
 say " that his army was victorious, and himself 
 conquered ; that his route is intercepted, his 
 manoeuvre thwarted ; that KutusofF, an old man, 
 a scythian, had been before hand with him ? 
 " that his fortune had not failed him, but he had 
 " been wanting to his fortune ?" Those fine say- 
 ings, like so many others, are related only by Mr. 
 de Segur ; and yet it is not probable that he was 
 a party to the conversation between Marshal 
 Bessieres and the Emperor. 
 
 Napoleon having Malo-Jaroslavetz in his power, 
 nothing prevented his marching upon Kalouga, 
 by forcing his way through KutusofFs army. On 
 the other hand, if he wished to avoid a battle, 
 what prevented his diverting KutusofF before 
 Malo-Jaroslavetz, and directing the rest of his 
 army to Kalouga through Kremskoe and Medka ? 
 This movement was even commenced, since, ac- 
 cording to Mr. de Segur himself, the corps of 
 Poniatowski had been sent to Kremskoe. We 
 may, therefore, assert it ; that stupor and conster- 
 nation into which he throws the Emperor, " that 
 " feverish restlessness, that cruel night, dur- 
 " ing which he lies down, rises again, calls inces- 
 " santly, etc." scenes so faithfully re-produced 
 from those of Witepsk, and of Moscow, have ori- 
 
 u2
 
 292 BOOK IX. 
 
 ginated in the mind of the author, who so delights 
 in conceptions of this nature. He may have often 
 heard that Napoleon rose in the night ; he found 
 this very remarkable, when nothing was more 
 common to him. If he had had a better know- 
 ledge of what took place at the Emperor's quar- 
 ters, he would have learned that, when the army 
 was performing any operations, it was the con- 
 stant practice of this prince to rise every night, 
 from midnight to two o'clock in the morning, be- 
 ing the hour for the arrival of the reports, which 
 the generals dispatched to him at the close of the 
 day. But Mr. de Segur, whose nights were undis- 
 turbed, may not have known what took place 
 during his sleep. 
 
 Towards five in the morning, an orderly officer* 
 arrived, whom he had directed to pass the night 
 at the advanced posts, in order to render to him 
 an account of what might be ascertained of the 
 movements of the enemy. He informed the Em- 
 peror that the Russians seemed to occupy very 
 nearly the same position as on the preceding day; 
 but that, on the right, General Gerard and him- 
 self had heard the trampling of cavalry moving 
 in that direction, and supposed to be proceeding 
 to Medyh. 
 
 Napoleon then successively summoned to his 
 presence the King of Naples, Marshal Bessieres, 
 and Count de Lobau ; and said to them : " It ap- 
 
 * Mr, Gourgand.
 
 CHAPTER III. 293 
 
 " pears that the enemy remain firm, and that we 
 " shall have a battle. In the situation in which 
 ■* the army stands, is it advantageous to give or 
 " to avoid it ?" Bessieres and Murat had no 
 doubt of our conquering Kutusoff's militias ; for, 
 they said, the Russian army was destroyed at the 
 Moskwa. But a battle would disorganize the 
 army ; the cavalry, as well as the artillery horses, 
 had suffered much from bad provender ; the new 
 losses we should incur in horses could not be re- 
 paired ; our wounded would be for ever lost to us ; 
 our marching upon Kalouga was a hazardous en- 
 terprise in this state of things ; what was best to 
 be done, according to them, was to retire upon 
 Smolensko. The Emperor, after a short discus- 
 sion, came up to Count de Lobau, and said : 
 " Well, Mouton, what is your opinion ?" " Sire, 
 " rny opinion is, that we ought to retire upon the 
 " Niemen, by the road which is shortest and best 
 " known, through Mojaisk, and as soon as pos- 
 " sible." This he repeated at various times. Na- 
 poleon's resolution appeared shaken, but he said 
 he would go and see the field of battle, before 
 taking any decision ; and he called for his horses. 
 Mr. de Segur's account of the cries of the cos- 
 sacks, when they attacked the Emperor, is full of 
 inaccuracies. As soon as this prince discovered 
 thecossacks, who were charging the canteen car- 
 riers upon the road, he passed to the left and said : 
 Quick, my squadrons of service forward. But the 
 squadrons of service were not so soon mounted
 
 294 book ix. 
 
 as Napoleon. Three troops of his escort had alone 
 followed him, one of chasseurs, one of lancers, and 
 one of dragoons. These troops rapidly pushed 
 forward, and their presence kept the cossacks in 
 check. It is untrue, that they approached the 
 Emperor so closely, that one of them struck Ge- 
 neral Rapp's horse in the chest with his lance. 
 It is equally so, that this officer seized Napoleon's 
 horse by the bridle. Some staff and orderly offi- 
 cers of the Prince of Neufchatel joined the three 
 troops on service, whilst the Emperor retired 
 towards the squadrons of the guard, which were 
 descried at a distance. 
 
 It was in the skirmish which the chasseurs of the 
 guard and the Polish troops had with the cos- 
 sacks, and at the moment of the arrival of the 
 horse grenadiers, that Mr. Lecoulteux, after 
 having killed a Russian horseman and taken his 
 lance, was wounded by a sabre cut across the 
 body, which was inflicted by a horse grenadier of 
 the guard, who mistook him for a cossack, because 
 a green great coat concealed his dress. It is 
 untrue, that the cossacks carried their audacity 
 even to insolence ; neither were they seen retiring at 
 a slow pace across the interval between our squadrons, 
 and coolly reloading their arms ; three weak troops 
 were sufficient to upset them. This is so true, 
 that they hastened to ford the Louja, which our 
 cavalry crossed immediately after, in pursuit of 
 them. The orderly officers Athalin, Lauriston, 
 Chabrillant, Montaigu, Tintigniers, and others,
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 
 295 
 
 were present with us at this encounter. They, as 
 well as Mr. Lecoulteux, who was severely wound- 
 ed, can vouch for the truth of our assertion. Mr. 
 de Segur was probably at Gorodinia, and will 
 have given this account, as he has done so many 
 others, upon hearsay. 
 
 He concludes, by saying : " All this furnished 
 " matter for reflection." What is likely to have 
 the same effect, is the manner in which the above 
 facts, and so many others, have been presented to 
 view. 
 
 How can the author say that the Emperor- . . . 
 " remained for half an hour struck with astonish- 
 " ment, that the enemy had dared to attack him 
 " on the very day after a victory, and that he 
 " should have been obliged to fly ?" What is 
 there so astonishing in a sudden attack upon the 
 head-quarters by some light cavalry? The vic- 
 tory of Wagram was, assuredly, a brilliant one ; 
 and at night the Emperor was compelled, by a 
 rush of cavalry, to take shelter in the midst of his 
 guard, which he caused to form into a square. 
 Many examples might be quoted of such unex- 
 pected encounters. 
 
 Mr. de Segur presents us with a horrid picture 
 of the field of battle of Malo-Jaroslavetz. Does 
 he imagine that wars are carried on without the 
 loss of men ? From his description of a field of 
 battle, we might fancy we heard a citizen of Paris 
 who happened to be suddenly transported to one.
 
 296 book ix. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 " Can you ever forget, comrades, the fatal field 
 " which put a stop to the conquest of the world, 
 " where the victories of twenty years were blast - 
 " ed, where the great edifice of our fortune began 
 " to totter to its foundation ?" 
 
 The present chapter opens in this elevated 
 strain. An observation sudden lv occurs to the 
 mind ; which is, that if the brave veterans of the 
 grand army have lost every thing, there are per- 
 sons whose fortunes have suffered but little injury, 
 and who are on the road to new preferments. 
 
 According to Mr. de Segur, Napoleon is placed 
 " between the two armies, his steps and his eyes 
 " wandering from south to west, along the roads 
 " to Kalouga and Medyn, both which are closed 
 tf against him. On that to Kalouga, are Ku- 
 " tusoff and his army." But upon the road to 
 Medyn Ave do not discover any impediment. Our 
 marechal-des-logis of the palace says, indeed, 
 that Platoff is there with his cossacks ; but, how- 
 ever indifferent may be the opinion he entertains 
 of the French army, he cannot suppose that the 
 cossacks would be any obstacle to it. It is true 
 that, by his account, they have just been traversing 
 through the army. Matters did not occur as it is
 
 CHAPTER IV. 297 
 
 here represented. We have already observed in 
 the preceding chapter, that they forded the Louga 
 on our right flank, and plundered several canteen 
 carriers upon the road ; but finding themselves 
 charged by some troops of the guard, they fled 
 back in all haste by the way they came. 
 
 The author does not tell us that the Emperor 
 remained the whole day upon the field of battle, 
 before he decided upon adopting the advice of his 
 generals, who recommended a retreat direct to 
 Smolensko. The time which he passed upon the 
 field of Malo-Jaroslavetz, the difficulty he had in 
 leaving it, give reason to suppose his having fore- 
 seen that the Russian army, frightened at the issue 
 of the engagement on the preceding day, was 
 beating a retreat. The unanimous opinion, how- 
 ever was, that the Russians wanted to offer battle ; 
 and this was the strongest argument used by 
 Murat, Davoust, and others, to persuade him to 
 regain the road to Mojaisk. 
 
 Instead of mentioning that the Emperor went 
 out to reconnoitre, Mr. de Segur brings him back 
 to Gorodinia, where he supposes that a council 
 was held which never had any existence. He 
 attributes speeches, in his own way, to Murat, 
 Marshal Davoust, Bessieres, Berthier, Eugene, 
 etc., and makes them deliberate on the subject of 
 the retreat ; whereas Napoleon, before he left the 
 field of Malo-Jaroslavetz, had already communi- 
 cated his arrangements for the direction which 
 each corps was to follow in its march. But these
 
 298 book ix. 
 
 conversations furnish to Mr. de Segur an oppor- 
 tunity for making Bessieres say that, even in the 
 guard, enthusiasm would be wanting ; as if it were 
 not acknowledged, even by our enemies, that this 
 celebrated corps was never found wanting to its 
 reputation, under the most trying circumstances, 
 and that the sentiments of honor, courage, and 
 devotedness which inspired it, only ceased with 
 its existence. Marshal Bessieres knew that corps 
 too well, he was too proud of commanding it, ever 
 to have said that its enthusiasm would be wanting. 
 
 As a sequel to all those conversations, and to 
 the quarrels which they occasion, the author finds 
 nothing more appropriate than to represent the 
 Emperor as losing " the use of his senses." He 
 takes care to add, that " those who assisted him 
 " have asserted that the report of another warm 
 " affair with the cossacks at Barowsk, a few 
 " leagues in the rear of the army, was the last 
 " shock which induced him finally to adopt this 
 " fatal resolution." 
 
 Such testimony, from valets-de-chambre, must 
 singularly flatter the cossacks ; they must be very 
 proud of the part which the author ascribes to 
 them.
 
 299 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 " It was after the great effort had been made, 
 u namely, that of Malo-Jaroslavetz, and when 
 " nothing remained to be done but to march, that 
 " he retired." Here then Mr. de Segur agrees 
 with us in contradicting the opinion he put into 
 the mouth of Marshal Bessieres, " That the posi- 
 " tion of the Russians was unassailable, and that 
 " three hundred grenadiers would have been 
 " capable of arresting the progress of a whole 
 " army. "Similar contradictions are to be found 
 in every part of the work. 
 
 We have already observed in the foregoing 
 chapter, that the Emperor's intention was again 
 to give battle to the Russian army. For being 
 secure of a victory, he might have proceeded to 
 Smolensko by the way of Kalouga, Medyn, or 
 Mojai'sk, without fear of being pursued. 
 
 Notwithstanding the assertions of Mr. de Segur, 
 we must here repeat that it was only in compliance 
 with the entreaties of his principal generals that 
 he relinquished the idea of coming to an engage- 
 ment. One of the motives which most powerfully 
 influenced his decision, was his anxiety as to the 
 fate of those who might be wounded in the affair,
 
 300 BOOK IX. 
 
 and whom he would have been under the neces- 
 sity of abandoning. 
 
 The Emperor himself had judged correctly: the 
 Russian army was retiring. But when all the 
 generals are of a contrary opinion to that of the 
 general-in-chief, success is rendered uncertain. 
 Napoleon frequently yielded to the opinions of 
 others with a facility which he has afterwards re- 
 gretted. He has been heard to say, with respect 
 to circumstances of greater importance, but un- 
 necessary to be related here, that he should have 
 avoided great reverses, especially during the latter 
 part of his career, if he had been guided entirely 
 by his own judgment. 
 
 There is something beyond simplicity in the 
 supposition that a " couple of skirmishes with the 
 " cossacks had disgusted the Emperor." Such a 
 remark is unworthy of serious refutation. 
 
 " From that moment he saw nothing but Paris, 
 " just as when leaving Paris he had nothing in 
 " view but Moscow." The desire of again seeing 
 Paris had no influence upon his determination. 
 By beating the Russians and occupying Moscow, 
 he had attained the first object of the war ; having 
 however failed to obtain the second, which was 
 peace, prudence and his duty dictated to him to 
 join the rest of his army and his magazines, in 
 order to take up winter quarters, and place him- 
 self in a situation to renew the campaign in the 
 following spring. If our troops had not been 
 overtaken by a winter, whose severity and pre-
 
 CHAPTER V. 301 
 
 mature commencement baffled all anticipation, 
 they would have arrived unhurt at their quarters. 
 
 On quitting Moscow the Emperor had no inten- 
 tion of stationing himself behind the Beresina, 
 because the several corps of Macdonald, Saint- 
 Cyr, and Oudinot, on the left, and those of Schwar- 
 zenberg, Reynier, and Dombrowsky on the right, 
 were to keep back Wittgenstein, Essen, Titcha- 
 kofF, and Tormasoff, who were opposed to them. 
 It was only on his arrival at Smolensko that 
 he determined to proceed to the Beresina, hav- 
 ing learned that the numerous reinforcements 
 which had joined Wittgenstein had obliged Saint- 
 Cyr to abandon the Dwina, and that the tardiness 
 of Schwarzenberg had given Titchakoff an oppor 
 tunity of gaining several marches upon him in the 
 direction of Minsk. If his orders had been exe- 
 cuted, notwithstanding even the want of prompti- 
 tude on the part of Schwarzenberg, our magazines 
 at Minsk, Wilna, and Borizow would have re- 
 mained in safety, under cover of the divisions of 
 Dombrowsky and Loison, of the reinforcements at 
 Wilna, and of the second corps. Being thus 
 secure of a passage across the Beresina at Bori- 
 sow, the army might have taken up a position 
 behind that river. 
 
 How could a Frenchman write that "the French 
 " army marched with downcast looks, as if 
 l{ ashamed and humiliated," when a single corps of 
 that army, consisting of only sixteen thousand 
 men, had been sufficient to beat the Russian
 
 302 BOOK IX. 
 
 army ; which, as Mr, de Segur expresses it, re- 
 treated as if routed. To have made such a state- 
 ment is to have been wanting both in exactness 
 and in dignity. 
 
 As to the criticisms he offers upon the Empe- 
 ror's plan of the campaign, it is to be regretted 
 that he did not communicate to him at the time, 
 that which he now lays before his readers. Napo- 
 leon in his distress would doubtlessly have been 
 happy to find a saviour in the marechal-des-logis of 
 his palace. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Marshal Mortier, left at the Kremlin with eight 
 thousand men, was regarded as sacrificed : the 
 " other officers, his old companions in glory, 
 " quitted him with tears in their eyes, etc." 
 
 The Emperor quited the Kremlin on the morn- 
 ing of the 19th of October, leaving orders for 
 Marshal Mortier to evacuate it on the '23d. And 
 as that prince took the road to Kalouga, and 
 directed his march against the army of Kutusoff, 
 Marshal Mortier did not consider himself sacri- 
 ficed by remaining in the citadel. Its fortifica- 
 ions had been augmented by works which had
 
 CHAPTER VI. 303 
 
 occupied twenty days, and were sufficient to en- 
 able it to maintain a protracted defence by a divi- 
 sion of the young guard; and Mortier had nothing 
 to fear beyond the attacks of the cossacks of 
 Wintzingerode and the Russian peasantry. Where 
 did Mr. de Segur learn that these cossacks pre- 
 ceded ten thousand Russians ? And what does he 
 mean by the four days of Marshal Mortier's resist- 
 ance at the Kremlin, where no attack was made ? 
 A circumstance which is sufficient to prove that the 
 garrison of this citadel had not even been recon 
 noitered by the enemy, is that when Wintzingerode 
 and his aid-de-camp presented themselves there 
 and were taken, they were accompanied by merely 
 a few horsemen. Besides, General Wintzingerode 
 had no Russian infantry with him. How could 
 the cossacks with their lances think of attacking 
 the Kremlin, the high and thick walls of which 
 would alone have sufficed to keep them off even 
 supposing no garrison to have been stationed 
 there ? 
 
 The terms of reproach in which Napoleon ad- 
 dressed M. de Winzingerode, when that officer 
 was brought as a prisoner before him, are exactly 
 related. But, with respect to the distinction 
 drawn by the Emperor between a Russian fighting 
 for his country and a foreigner disposing of his 
 services for hire, Mr. de Segur remarks, " that 
 '' there was calculation even in his anger." 
 
 As to the defence which he has just put into 
 the mouth of M. de Wintzingerode "that Alex-
 
 304 BOOK IX. 
 
 " anderwas his benefactor and that of his family; 
 " that all he possessed, he had derived from him, 
 u etc.;" the reply was noble and just ; such senti- 
 ments do honor to those who entertain them. It 
 is to be regretted that the author should not him- 
 self have felt the propriety of them. 
 
 The Emperor, who is always represented to us 
 as a man whose faculties were declining, and who 
 had lost all energy, exhibits nevertheless on this 
 occasion a spirit which, it would seem, should 
 have been sufficient to silence the disapprovers at 
 his head-quarters. These gentlemen, however, dis- 
 cover in the just reproaches applied to M. de Wint- 
 zingerode, " a spirit of violence which displeases 
 (' them, and eagerly flock round the captive gene 
 " ral to re-assure and console him." What proba- 
 bility of truth is there in this statement ? I appeal 
 to the author. That the Emperor's expressions of 
 just resentment should have displeased him, we 
 are bound to believe, since he states the fact. 
 But that he and his friends should have mani- 
 fested their displeasure by an affected incivility 
 towards their chief, is what we may be permitted 
 to doubt. It may be very well to say so at the 
 present day ; but the local color* of the affair is 
 not visible. 
 
 ♦This is a technical expression which requires to be explained. 
 " Local color" is a term used by painters to denote the real co- 
 lor of an object when exposed to the light, as distinguished from 
 that which it may assume when in shade, &c. The author pro-
 
 305 
 
 CHAFFER VII. 
 
 The author, who has set his palette with none, 
 but the darkest colors, to paint the history of this 
 memorable expedition, is already presenting- us 
 by anticipation with an account of the calamities 
 occasioned by the intensity of the cold. Let him 
 repress his impatience ; he will have no want of 
 striking pictures ; let him not be in haste to in- 
 form us that the winter overtook the army three 
 days after it had quitted Moscow. Until the 6th 
 November, that is to say, during sixteen or seven- 
 teen days, the weather continued fine, and the 
 cold much less severe than it had been during 
 some months of the campaigns of Prussia and Po- 
 land, or even in Spain (in the mountains of Cas- 
 tile), during the winter campaign in which the 
 Emperor was personally engaged in 1808. 
 
 Mr. de Segur gives as a positive fact, the report 
 brought by a Russian prisoner on the 28th Octo- 
 ber, that the whole of the enemy's army was 
 
 bably means to intimate that the truth is not to be discovered in 
 this instance, through the disguise with which Mr. de Segur has 
 invested it. Translator. 
 
 X
 
 'M)G BOOK IX. 
 
 marching*, by way of Medyn, upon Wiazma ; and 
 he adds, that " the Emperor yielding to the im- 
 " pulse of the moment, disregarded the informa- 
 " tion." 
 
 Notwithstanding the geographical knowledge 
 which the author ascribes to this soldier, it was 
 impossible he should bring such a piece of intelli- 
 gence to the Emperor : for on that day Kutusoff 
 himself had no idea of advancing upon Wiazma, 
 as we shall proceed to shew by his marches. 
 
 After the battle of Malo Jaroslavetz, Kutusoff 
 retreated upon the road to Kalouga, and halted on 
 the 26th at Gonzarewo. The movement made 
 by Poniatowski in the direction of Kremskoe, 
 having led the Russian general to fear that Napo- 
 leon would proceed by way of Medyn to Kalouga, 
 he marched with his army to Polotnianoizavod, 
 upon the road from Kalouga to Medyn. Milora- 
 dowich, although he had been informed that the 
 French had quitted Malo- Jaroslavetz, fearing 
 lest he should find them already at Medyn, made 
 at Adamskoe a movement towards the rear, and 
 stationed himself between that town and the posi- 
 tion occupied by Kutusoff. Kutusoff was, therefore, 
 at Polotnianoizavod on the 28th ; he even remained 
 there whilst Napoleon was at Oupenskoe, in the 
 direction of Mojaisk ; that is to say, at a distance 
 of twenty leagues off. He had made that move- 
 ment under the impression that Napoleon was 
 marching upon Kalouga by way of Medyn. The 
 Russian soldier, therefore, even had he been the
 
 CHAPTER VII. 307 
 
 intimate confidant of Kutusoff, and even suppos- 
 ing him to have traversed a distance of twenty 
 leagues in the twinkling of an eye, could not have 
 informed Napoleon on the 28th, that the Russian 
 army was marching upon Wiazma. Moreover, 
 Kutusoff having learned on the 29th that the 
 French army had retired towards Mojaisk, deter- 
 mined to follow it in its retreat, which he believed 
 to be in the direction of Witepsk, by way of Wo- 
 lokolamsk, Zoultzow, Beloi, and Sou raj ; and on 
 the 29th, therefore, he advanced in two columns, 
 and passed the night at Adamskoe, in the rear of 
 Medyn. On the following day, the 30th, he 
 reached Kremskoe ; and it was not till then that 
 he became acquainted with the real direction of 
 the retreat of the French army. 
 
 We have entered into this detail of marches in 
 order to prove substantially to Mr. de Segur how 
 much he is mistaken, since, at the time when he 
 introduces his Russian soldier, Kutusoff was under 
 the impression that the French army was proceed- 
 ing through Medyn to Kalouga ; in consequence 
 of which impression he manoeuvred to avoid being 
 cut off from the latter town. 
 
 The statement afterwards made by the author, 
 that Davoust sent this soldier to circulate the re- 
 port he had brought, in order to revenge himself 
 upon the Emperor for not following his advice, is 
 unworthy of the character of that marshal. What 
 can be the meaning of this eternal anxiety to de- 
 
 x 2
 
 308 B O OK IX. 
 
 tract from the merit of both the Emperor and his 
 generals ? 
 
 The metaphor of " the weather, which had not 
 " been admitted to his councils, and which seem- 
 ed to be revenging itself for the slight, etc." is a 
 play upon words, worthy of the Pre'cieases ridi- 
 cules* 
 
 It is not to be believed that there was no bridge 
 over the Kolocza at the period when the army was 
 returning. For all the escorts of artillery, etc. 
 proceeding to Moscow went that way ; there was 
 at the abbey of Kolostkoi an establishment of ar- 
 tillery, and the eight corps was stationed at Mo- 
 jaisk. This supposed deficiency nevertheless af- 
 fords the author an opportunity of censuring the 
 Prince of Neufchatel, whose long experience and 
 intimate acquaintance with the details of a large 
 army cannot however be questioned. Mr. de 
 Segur gives us to understand that " there was no 
 "general system, no common link, nothing to 
 " bind all the different corps together." Even 
 admitting, however, that the bridge in question 
 had not been repaired, the blame should fall upon 
 the eighth corps : but that corps deserves no such 
 blame ; the bridge existed. The great park of ar- 
 
 * The heroines of a well-known comedy, by Moliere, emi- 
 nently distinguished for their ignorance, affectation, and pe- 
 dantry. 
 
 Translator.
 
 (( 
 (t 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 309 
 
 tillery of the army, in order not to incumber the 
 passage of the defile, was directed to pass to the 
 right of Borodino, by means of a bridge con- 
 structed for that purpose. 
 
 " After having passed the Kolocza," says Mr. 
 de Segur, " we were marching absorbed in 
 " thought, when several of us, raising our eyes, 
 "uttered a sudden exclamation. .. .The cry of 
 this is the field of the great battle/ formed a 
 long and melancholy murmur." This proves 
 evidently that the author did not examine the 
 field of battle. He supposes it to have taken 
 place on the left bank of the Kolocza, whereas 
 the great redoubt, the three other redoubts taken 
 by Ney and Davoust, the village of Semenowskoi, 
 taken by Friant, in short, all that he has himself 
 mentioned is to be found on the right bank. 
 
 If the reasoning of the officer of the palace rela- 
 tive to the battle of the Moskwa, and the conversa- 
 tions he has reported, had not sufficiently demon- 
 strated that he never witnessed what he relates, 
 we might find a further proof of that fact in the 
 romantic description he gives of the field of battle 
 on our return. But we are far from envying 
 the gratification he derives from supposing upon 
 his road " thirty thousand carcases half devour- 
 " ed," which were not there. If the traveller he 
 speaks of should ever take him for a guide, he 
 will run a great risk of being misled.
 
 3 10 BOOK IX. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The author is unable to repress his desire to re- 
 peat to us a story, which he has not even the merit 
 of having invented ; it belongs exclusively to Mr. 
 Labaume. It is that of a French soldier, whose 
 legs had been shattered during the battle, and who 
 lived for fifty days in the carcass of a horse. In 
 giving an account of the engagement, our writer 
 had already related a similar occurrence, with 
 only this difference, that the first soldier was a 
 Russian, and the second a Frenchman. Will the 
 author's imagination never be tired of exhibiting 
 such disgusting pictures ! 
 
 All the wounded had been collected on the 
 evening of the day of battle, and on the days im- 
 mediately following. The eighth corps was 
 left at its position of Mojaisk for that pur- 
 pose. It may be confidently asserted, that every 
 thing left upon the field was carried away, not 
 excepting even the balls. The general of artillery 
 collected upwards of twenty thousand of them, 
 to be again used as ammunition. 
 
 M. de Segur's description of the hospital at 
 Kolotskoi seems to convey a censure upon the 
 purveyors of the army. Innumerable orders were 
 issued from Moscow ; and it was especially to the
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 31 1 
 
 care to be bestowed upon the wounded, that the 
 indefatigable attention of the Emperor was di- 
 rected. The artillery constantly provided for the 
 utmost of its consumption, and far from being 
 in want of ammunition, the army was obliged, 
 during its retreat, to sacrifice a part of what it 
 had. And could it be more difficult for the pur- 
 veying department to provide medicines and dres- 
 sings for the wounded, than for the artillery to 
 secure the necessary supply of ammunition ? On 
 quitting Moscow, the Emperor expressly ordered, 
 that all carriages without distinction, his 
 own included, should be appropriated to the 
 conveyance of the wounded. It was in conformity 
 with the same principle, that in Egypt, on the re- 
 turn from the expedition to Syria, after having 
 appropriated all the horses to the removal of 
 the wounded, he was to be seen on foot himself, 
 in the midst of the sands of the desert, having 
 surrendered his own horse to a wounded man. 
 
 The author mentions that M an atrocious act 
 " was committed by the canteen-carriers, who 
 " threw the wounded, who had been placed in 
 " their carts, into ditches. One only survived.' 
 This statement is greatly exaggerated. It is true 
 that a few despicable fellows of this description 
 from motives of cupidity stained themselves with 
 this crime : but it was no sooner committed than 
 repressed, and severe threats prevented its repe- 
 tition. 
 
 To relieve the reader's mind from the painful
 
 .'>12 BOOK IX, 
 
 emotions excited by the mention of such an act of 
 barbarity, the officer of the palace might have 
 adduced numerous examples of that active hu- 
 manity which generally characterises Frenchmen, 
 and which was abundantly exercised during this 
 melancholy affair. The greater part of the wound- 
 ed, who, agreeably to the orders of the Emperor, 
 had been placed in his own carriages and those of 
 the army, were saved. Among them was M. de 
 Beauveau, a lieutenant of carabiniers, who was 
 accommodated in one of the imperial carriages, 
 and owed his life to that circumstance. 
 
 The facts relative to the bodies of some Russian 
 prisoners found lying on the road, are related 
 with similar inexactitude. The following is what 
 occurred: the Emperor, at the head of his staff, 
 was proceeding along the right side of the high 
 road of Smolensko. Having observed the bodies 
 of two or three Russian soldiers lying not far from 
 the road, he called the orderly officer,* who was 
 just before him, and directed him to go and see 
 what they were. That officer returned and in- 
 formed him that they were Russians. The Em- 
 peror appeared much astonished, and said : What ? 
 Russians in our front! The orderly officer replied : 
 4k Sire, I am informed, that the Spaniards and 
 " Portuguese in charge of the prisoners, have shot 
 " several of them who refused to march. Napo- 
 
 * M, (Jourguud.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 313 
 
 leon's countenance became severe : " What ?" 
 said he eagerly, " do they massacre the prisoners? 
 " Berthier, what does this mean ?" Berthier re- 
 plied, that he was ignorant of the circumstance, 
 but would immediately enquire into it. An 'en- 
 quiry was accordingly made; when the Spaniards 
 pretended that the column of prisoners having 
 found some brandy in a cart that had been aban- 
 doned on the road, had drunk too freely of it, 
 and that several of them becoming intoxicated, 
 had attempted to disarm the escort, who had 
 therefore been compelled to fire upon them. Pro- 
 per measures were taken to prevent the recurrence 
 of such irregularities. 
 
 Napoleon preserved a melancholy silence; 
 but on the following day the murders had ceas- 
 ed." What can we understand from this, but 
 that the Emperor either instigated or connived at 
 these murders ? Such a gratuitous outrage upon 
 the elevated character of Napoleon, can excite no 
 feeling but indignation. Policy alone would have 
 dictated to him not to tolerate such cruelties; since 
 the Russians were in a situation to make reprisals, 
 and to much greater advantage. 
 
 The author pretends, " that it was found suffi- 
 " cient to suffer those unfortunate men to die of 
 " hunger;" and adds, a few lines farther on: 
 " but what was to be done ?" What actually was 
 done. The Russian prisoners, as well as our own 
 troops, subsisted, for the most part, upon the 
 flesh of horses. f * Cruelty was practised from ne- 

 
 314 
 
 BOOK JX. 
 
 " cessity." Cruelty was not practised ; and there 
 was no necessity for it. Three or four thousand 
 disarmed Russians, whether at liberty or prison- 
 ers, could not render the circumstances under 
 which we were placed either worse or better. The 
 prisoners dropped off successively in the rear, and 
 joined their countrymen. 
 
 " During a halt in a frozen field, strewed with 
 " the vestiges of both armies, Napoleon endea- 
 " voured to relieve himself from the insupportable 
 " responsibility of having occasioned such exten- 
 " sive calamities ; consigning the author of the 
 " war, which he had really dreaded, to the detes- 
 " tation of the whole world ... The Duke of Vi- 
 cenza, with perhaps somewhat too much of im- 
 patience, became irritated : he gave signs of 
 " displeasure and incredulity, and abruptly broke 
 " off the irksome conversation," 
 
 It is a painful task to have to animadvert per- 
 petually on this unaccountable mania for exhibit- 
 ing in a false light, sentiments which could not 
 but be natural to Napoleon in the situation in 
 which he was placed, and which in fact did him 
 honor. A man must be unhappily organised who 
 can suppose perversity carried to the extreme of 
 putting forth a deliberate misrepresentation under 
 the semblance of sensibility. No : the responsi- 
 bility for calamities which had not yet occurred 
 at the period of which the author speaks, rests not 
 upon Napoleon. " This war, which he had in fact 
 " dreaded," (why not say he had sought to avoid 

 
 CHAPTER vin. 345 
 
 it?) cannot be imputed to him: The Duke of 
 Vicenza, who is always chosen as a principal per- 
 former in these preposterous scenes, which have 
 existed only in the imagination of the author, 
 would certainly disavow the part in them which 
 Mr. de Segur has represented him as performing. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Emperor stops at Wiazma to wait for Marshal 
 Davoust, who executes his movement too tardily 
 Mr. de Segur makes the Marshal, on being re- 
 proached on this account by the corps under 
 Prince Eugene reply, that " his horror of confu- 
 " sion induced him to methodise his flight." 
 
 Marshal Davoust cannot have made use of this 
 expression : the French army never fled before 
 the Russians. From Moscow it might have ad- 
 vanced to St. Petersburgh, a movement which it 
 is to be presumed the author would not have de- 
 nominated a flight. The Emperor preferred how- 
 ever, proceeding to Smolensko, to pass the winter 
 in Lithuania. This march, voluntarily performed 
 by Napoleon, cannot be called a, flight. It was 
 not the Russians he sought to avoid, but the win- 
 ter in the heart of Russia. 
 
 Mr. de Segur's taste for metaphor leads him to
 
 316 
 
 BOOK IX. 
 
 say that " in the marsh of Czarewo-Zaimicze, the 
 " sound of the enemy's drums mingled itself with 
 " the voice of Davoust." This cannot have oc- 
 curred, since Marshal Davoust was followed on 
 that road by only a few cossacks, all the infantry 
 there, (that under General Paschewitz,) arriving 
 at Gjatz only during the night. That of the ad- 
 vanced guard of General Miloradowitch, march- 
 ing upon our right flank, in like manner arrived 
 only during the night at the heights of Czarewo- 
 Zaimicze. 
 
 The author concludes this chapter with a flat- 
 tering portrait of the Russian General Milora- 
 dowitch, and prepares us for his brilliant feats of 
 arms. But in the very next chapter at the battle 
 of Wiasma, the General himself refutes the 
 pompous panegyrics bestowed upon him by the 
 historian of the grand army. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 " On the 3d November, Prince Eugene was pro- 
 " ceeding towards Wiasma, whither his artillery 
 " and equipage had preceded him, when the dawn 
 " of day discovered to him his retreat in danger of 
 " being intercepted on the left by an army ; be- 
 " hind him his rear-guard cut off, and on the right,
 
 CHAPTER X. 317 
 
 (t 
 
 u 
 
 the plain covered with stragglers and vehicles 
 
 fleeing before the enemy's lances." 
 
 It is untrue that the corps of the viceroy had 
 its rear-guard cut off. His corps was followed 
 immediately by that of the Prince of Eckmiihl, of 
 which the division under Gerard formed the rear- 
 guard. The communication between these two 
 corps was always open. The author supposes the 
 artillery of the viceroy to have been at Wiasma : 
 this is also incorrect ; it was merely the equipage 
 of the prince that was there. He was incapable 
 of committing such a fault as to march without 
 his artillery. 
 
 The narrative of the battle of Wiasma, so glori- 
 ous for the troops of Marshal Davoust and of 
 Prince Eugene, is strangely distorted : it is evi- 
 dent that the marechal-des-logis of the palace did 
 not comprehend it. The following is a statement 
 of the facts as they occurred. 
 
 When Prince Eugene, as he was proceeding 
 towards Wiasma, followed by the corps under Da- 
 voust, perceived that the enemy, advancing on the 
 left, intended to intercept his communication 
 with the high road near that town, he apprized 
 the marshal of the circumstance, and concerted 
 with him the movement proper to be made. The 
 Prince's corps formed itself into a column to the 
 right of the high road, (looking towards Wiasma); 
 one of its divisions remaining on the left of the 
 road, and facing the enemy, who was advancing 
 on that side. Davoust's corps continued to ad-
 
 318 BOOK IX. 
 
 vance towards Wiazma. The division under Corn- 
 pans forming the head of the column, after having 
 overthrown the Russian troops that obstructed 
 its advance, passed the ravine of Pruditcha ; and 
 immediately turning to the left, placed itself in 
 order of battle behind that ravine, covering the 
 town. The Italian division, stationed to the left 
 of the road, kept back the enemy during this 
 movement. When Compans had formed a line 
 behind the ravine, together with the other divi- 
 sions of the first corps, the Italian division and 
 the rest of the vice-roy's corps passed the ravine 
 in their turn, and took up their station to the 
 left of the first corps, covering Wiazma in like 
 manner. Established in this position, our troops, 
 whom the enemy had hoped to overthrow close to 
 the town, repelled all his attacks, and killed great 
 numbers of his men. 
 
 " Eugene and Davoust heard the sound of an- 
 " other battle to the right of their rear. They 
 " concluded it to be the remainder of the Russian 
 " army coiningdown upon Wiazma, by the road of 
 64 Jucknow ; the entrance by which road was de- 
 " fended by Ney. . . . The noise of this engage- 
 " ment to the rear of their own, and threatening 
 " their retreat, gave them some uneasiness, etc." 
 
 This statement is a further proof that the author 
 does not even remember the scene of action. 
 Otherwise he would know that Eugene and Da- 
 voust, from the position which they occupied, 
 could see perfectly every movement of the enemy
 
 CHAPTER X. 319 
 
 opposed to Marshal Ney, and that they had no- 
 thing to fear in that quarter. The viceroy's corps 
 glided off during the night, through Wiazma, 
 covered in its turn by that of Marshal Davoust. 
 The division under Compans did not traverse 
 Wiazma, but passed on the outside of the town, 
 over the bridge which had been constructed there. 
 
 The French army was not, at this epoch, in 
 such a state of disorder and demoralization as the 
 French historian wishes to make us believe : the 
 best proof of which is, that the two corps of Eu- 
 gene and Davoust overthrew the twenty-five thou- 
 sand Russians who endeavoured to obstruct their 
 passage, and who were commanded by the General 
 Miloradowitch, whom M. de Segur extolled so 
 immoderately in the preceding chapter. 
 
 " KutusofF remained inactive and indifferent, 
 " although within hearing of the battle." The 
 English commissioner " vainly endeavoured to 
 " excite him into action, he even called him a 
 " traitor ; but nothing could move him." Among 
 several reasons which the author assigns for the 
 inaction of this temporiser, as he himself calls him, 
 he has forgotten to mention the recollection of 
 the battle of Malo-Jaroslavetz, in which three di- 
 visions of French troops repulsed his whole army. 
 
 He says : " the Russians had already penetrated 
 " into the town (Wiazma), when Davoust was en- 
 " deavouring in his turn to enter it." It might 
 have been useful that he should explain how the 
 Russians obtained entrance to the town, between
 
 •320 BOOK IX. 
 
 the viceroy's corps and that of Marshal Davoust, 
 which joined in their inarch ; and how they occa- 
 sioned the skirmish he alludes to. But Mr. de 
 Segur does not hold himself bound to substantiate 
 what he asserts. Beneath his pen our losses have 
 become greater while those of the Russians are 
 not noticed 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Our officer of the palace, who has long indulged 
 himself in describing, by anticipation, the horrors 
 of the winter, says here, that " on the 6th No- 
 " vember, the heavens declared themselves." It 
 is indeed from that fatal day, but only from that 
 day, that we must date the commencement of that 
 premature winter, which baffled all calculation, 
 and overwhelmed thearmy with such accumulated 
 evils. Three days more, and our troops would 
 have arrived unhurt at Smolensko, where nume- 
 rous magazines would have furnished them the 
 supplies of which they stood in need, and have 
 enabled them to renew their operations with in- 
 creased vigor. 
 
 The author adds : " Trophies, glory, all those 
 " advantages, to the acquirement of which every 
 " thing had been sacrificed, became burthen- 
 
 " some." 
 
 The French in their distress did not hesitate to
 
 CHAPTER XII. 321 
 
 sacrifice vain trophies ; but they never found 
 their glory burthensome. It may have become 
 irksome to certain epauletted courtiers, who 
 would have preferred the dust of the gallery of 
 Saint Cloud to that of the field ; but it never sat 
 heavily upon those who had truly deserved it. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The author has said, in one instance, that Na- 
 poleon was obliged to fly ; in another, " that it 
 " was a novel sight to behold Napoleon compelled 
 " to yield and to fly;" and lastly, that Napoleon 
 " felt ashamed of appearing to fly." 
 
 Most assuredly the Emperor was not insensible 
 to the disasters of his army. Nevertheless, was 
 it possible he should experience the feeling of 
 shame, at a moment when his army, enfeebled as 
 it was, though still strong by his presence, had 
 just proved to the enemy, that it was yet able to 
 command respect. Mr. de Segur confounds 
 shame with the grief of a noble mind conflicting 
 with adversity. 
 
 " He found there (at Dorogobouje) the hand- 
 mills which had been ordered for the expedition." 
 
 During the time he was at Moscow, Napoleon, 
 always provident, had directed the artillery to 
 construct some of these mills. The workmen of
 
 322 book ix. 
 
 that corps had completed several ; of which the 
 guard made use. Those which M. de Segur 
 speaks of had been ordered by the intendant- 
 general of the army. Their tardy arrival shews 
 how well-timed were the measures of the depart- 
 ment under the direction of that officer. 
 
 The intelligence of the skirmish with Mallet, 
 brought to the Emperor by a courier, serves as a 
 pretext for some sinister reflections by the author, 
 who exaggerates and distorts every occurrence, 
 only to draw from it the most unfavorable in- 
 ferences. 
 
 The ill-grounded confidence with which Mallet 
 had got up his conspiracy, the disproportion be- 
 tween the smallness of his means and the audacity 
 of the attempt, could not but strike the Emperor. 
 But what made the strongest impression upon his 
 mind was not only the want of foresight, of pre- 
 sence of mind, and of resolution on the part of 
 the heads of the police, but the too evident proof 
 that the monarchical principle, as applied to his 
 dynasty, had taken such feeble root, that some 
 of his principal functionaries, upon the news of 
 the Emperor's death, had forgotten that, upon the 
 demise of the sovereign, there was another ready 
 to succeed him. It was also the deplorable levity 
 with which, without waiting for his commands, 
 several officers had been executed ; whom false 
 appearances had misled, and who, at the bottom 
 of their hearts, had not conceived they were com- 
 mitting any crime. From the first moment that
 
 CHAPTER XII. 323 
 
 the intelligence reached him, the Emperor was 
 heard to give utterance to these painful, senti- 
 ments. 
 
 An aid-de-camp of Marshal Ney came to an- 
 nounce to Napoleon, that that officer had been 
 obliged to abandon Dorogobouje, and that he had 
 " been compelled to retire precipitately beyond 
 " the Dnieper." 
 
 On the very day when the Emperor had stop- 
 ped at Mikalewska (the 6th), Marshal Ney had 
 directed the rear-guard to take up a position be- 
 yond the Osma, near Gorki. It was on the 7th 
 that the Russian general Miloradowitch attacked 
 the rear-guard in the neighbourhood of that river, 
 and pursued it as far as Dorogobouje. There 
 Marshal Ney kept his ground and repulsed all the 
 attacks of the enemy ; who, finding himself una- 
 ble to displace him, brought the division of Prince 
 Eugene of Wurtemberg to bear upon his right : 
 this movement induced the marshal to abandon 
 Dorogobouje and proceed towards the Ougea, 
 where the enemy followed him only with a few 
 cossacks. Miloradowitch, after the spirited re- 
 sistance he had encountered at Dorogobouje, 
 shaped his course to the left, towards the grand 
 army of Kutusof. How then could Marshal Ney 
 send word to the Emperor that he was retiring 
 beyond the Dnieper P Dorogobouje is situated 
 upon the left bank of that river ; so that, in order 
 to retreat precipitately beyond the Dnieper, Mar- 
 thai Ney must have passed over to the right bank; 
 
 y 2
 
 324 book ix. 
 
 which he did nut. Prince Eugene's corps alone 
 went over to that side. The Dnieper intersects 
 the road from Dorogobouje to Smolensko at Solo- 
 niewo ; and the head-quarters of the Emperor 
 were established on the same day (the 7th), in the 
 neighbourhood of that place. Now, it is not true 
 that, on that day, Marshal Ney's corps arrived at 
 that point. As we have already mentioned, that 
 officer retired towards the Ougea. Instead of 
 making statements and supporting them by re- 
 flections calculated only to mislead the judgment 
 of his readers, Mr. de Segur should have given us 
 some details of this affair, and of the gallant resist- 
 ance made by Ney in Dorogobonje to the superior 
 force by which he was assailed. 
 
 The aid-de-camp of Marshal Ney was sent, says 
 Mr. de Segur, to inform the Emperor " of the 
 " disorder into which the corps that preceded 
 " him had fallen; to tell him, that, after a tremen- 
 " dous night, in which snow, wind, and famine 
 <; had driven the greater part of his men from the 
 " fires, the dawn of day had brought with it the 
 " tempest, the enemy, etc. etc." 
 
 If the mission of this aid-de-carnp had no other 
 object than to apprize the Emperor of the disor- 
 dered state of the army, and to make fruitless re- 
 flections upon the subject, it was, at the least, use- 
 less ; and Mr. de Segur might have spared him- 
 self the trouble of presenting us on the occasion 
 with two more pages of his remarks, and of in- 
 forming us that " the eagle no longer protected,
 
 CHAPTER XII. 325 
 
 "but destroyed." Napoleon was but too well 
 aware of our misfortunes : if, however, the officer 
 dispatched to him was commissioned to point out 
 any method of alleviating them, the author ought 
 not to have omitted stating it. 
 
 Why does he not mention that, at Dorogobouje, 
 the general commanding the artillery, suggested 
 to the Emperor to send to Smolensko for some 
 fresh horses of the train, to meet us on the way ? 
 Napoleon immediately approved of the measure, 
 the execution of which proved highly serviceable. 
 Orders were also sent for provisions to be brought 
 to meet us in like manner. 
 
 " Napoleon felt that there was now nothing to 
 " be done but to sacrifice the army part by part, 
 " beginning by the extremities to save the head." 
 
 " As for Ney, he perceived that a victim was 
 
 " necessary, and that the lot had fallen upon him : 
 " he devoted himself, etc." 
 
 The Emperor never had an idea of sacrificing 
 any part of the army : he sufficiently proved that 
 his solicitude extended to every portion of it. 
 Moreover, the cold was as destructive to the head 
 as to the extremities. The Prince of Eckmuhl had 
 commanded the rear-guard as far as Wiazma. It 
 was relieved by Marshal Ney who was far from 
 considering himself as a destined victim, merely 
 because he was intrusted with the duty of pro- 
 tecting the march. Such a reflection may be 
 considered as an insult to the memory of the mar- 
 shal. It was indispensable that some one should
 
 a 
 
 (i 
 
 a 
 
 326 liooK ix. 
 
 take the command of the rear-guard ; and cer- 
 tainly none could be better fitted for such a trust 
 than Marshal Ney. These assertions completely 
 fall to the ground ; the more especially as from 
 the time it quitted Dorogobouje, the rear-guard 
 was only followed by cossacks, and not by the 
 enemy's infantry. 
 
 " In the meantime the advance of the Russians 
 " was favored by a wood, and by the carriages we 
 had abandoned : from thence they were enabled 
 " to fire successfully upon Ney's men. Half of 
 the latter, whose frozen muskets disabled 
 their benumbed hands, became discouraged : 
 they loosed their hold: availing themselves of the 
 " precedent afforded by their weakness on the pre- 
 " ceding day — fleeing, because they had fled, etc." 
 These reflections are quite inappropriate, since, 
 as we have already mentioned, there was no Rus- 
 sian infantry upon this road. If the author had 
 only once visited the rear-guard, he would have 
 known that the cossacks fled before a few armed 
 men, and confined their attacks to the attendants 
 and other unarmed individuals. Marshal Ney 
 often amused himself by retarding the advance of 
 this light cavalry by placing across the road a 
 caisson with a long lighted train attached to it. 
 The cossacks seeing smoke issue from it, would 
 not venture to approach until the explosion had 
 taken place, and it was some time before this 
 could occur. When has the author known our 
 troops to be seeking pretexts for njiight P They
 
 it 
 
 a 
 a 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 327 
 
 might be extenuated by fatigue and cold ; but 
 pusillanimous, never. Their firmness in adversity 
 has tended as much to shed a lustre over this re- 
 treat, as their valor has contributed to immorta- 
 lize our glorious campaigns. 
 
 Such a thought as that " Marshal Ney exposed 
 " his life just as when he was neither a husband 
 " nor a father ; neither rich, powerful, nor of dis- 
 tinguished reputation ; in short, as if he had 
 yet every thing to gain, when in fact, he had 
 every thing to lose," never entered that officer's 
 mind. On no occasion, whether in the fields of 
 Fleurus, or those of the Moskwa,did such conside- 
 rations make him hesitate to place himself in the 
 midst of danger ? With such privileged souls as 
 his, every thing is to be lost when honor is endan- 
 gered ; and every thing is to be gained when new 
 glory may be acquired. 
 
 Mr. de Segur says that " his officers, amongst 
 " whom he himself observed Fezenzac, seconded 
 " him very ably," whilst he was defending him- 
 self in a palisadoed house. If Mr. de Segur was 
 anxious to mention Colonel Fezenzac, he might 
 have chosen a better occasion for so doing than 
 that of a despicable attack of cossacks, whom a 
 few musket-shots were sufficient to repulse. 
 
 Be it admitted, however, that in this chapter 
 the mind reposes for a moment, consoled for the 
 injustice and disapprobation heaped upon the 
 French army and its officers, by perceiving that 
 one of its most illustrious generals has found grace
 
 328 u o o k ix. 
 
 in the sight of the officer of the palace, who freely 
 praises his heroism. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 The calamity which befel the army of Italy on 
 crossing" the Wop, a stream that was but a rivulet 
 when the army first passed it, but which had be- 
 come a river at the time of its return, is painted in 
 glowing colors. It is described w-ith all that su- 
 perfluity of afflicting details, which characterises 
 the style of our writer ; but the narrative of it is 
 accompanied by very little praise of the courage 
 and constancy of our unfortunate troops, who, 
 reduced to such an extremity, that the efforts of 
 the enemy were as nothing in the catalogue of 
 their difficulties, continued to resist with perse- 
 verance the incessantly recurring obstacles op- 
 posed to them by a murderous sky and a land 
 covered with ice. 
 
 " Thecofsacks stripped the prisoners they made, 
 " collected them into parties, and then, striking 
 " them with the staves of their lances compelled 
 u them to march naked over the snow." 
 
 These cruelties exercised upon our unfortunate 
 prisoners, together with others mentioned by the 
 author in a prior page, where he observes that
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 329 
 
 
 they met with nothing but cossacks and an 
 
 armed population who surrounded, wounded, 
 " and stripped them, and then with shouts of fero- 
 " cious laughter left them to expire naked upon 
 " the snow, etc.," completely falsify the eulogium 
 he has elsewhere bestowed upon the magnanimity 
 of the Russians. We are far from believing that 
 it was by order of the generals or other authori- 
 ties that these atrocities were committed ; but 
 why were they tolerated? And how can Mr. de 
 Segur reconcile such barbarities with the assertion 
 " that they alone were acquainted with true glory, 
 "and that their renown continued great and un- 
 " sullied r 
 
 " The officers endeavored in vain to repulse 
 " the soldiers, who suffered themselves to be struck 
 " without complaining, etc." 
 
 Our officers set their men an example of volun- 
 tary privation, and did not strike them. Notwith- 
 standing all that our historian has said, they 
 would have blushed to shut themselves up in 
 houses and refuse all access to them, whilst the 
 troops were bivouacking upon the snow. If any 
 selfish beings existed, regardless to such a degree 
 as this of the sufferings of their comrades, they 
 were certainly not to be found among the number 
 of those holding a command in the army. 
 
 " There was a moment when this unfortunate 
 u army had sunk into the situation of a shapeless 
 " multitude, a vile tumultuous mass fit only to 
 " overwhelm itself."
 
 (( 
 cc 
 
 (( 
 
 330 BOOK IX. 
 
 Never was Prince Eugene's army in the state of 
 disorganization which the author describes. It 
 fully proved at Krasnoi, that it was neither a vile 
 tumultuous mass, nor a shapeless multitude. The 
 division under Broussier, which formed the rear- 
 guard, was still accompanied by its two batteries 
 of artillery well organized. 
 
 " Prince Eugene succeeded however in saving 
 " his rear-guard. It was while returning with it 
 
 to Smolensko, that the stragglers of his corps 
 
 had been thrown back upon the corps under 
 
 Ney." 
 
 When the advanced guard of the fourth corps 
 reached Smolensko, Prince Eugene left in its po- 
 sition the division commanded by Broussier with 
 the Bavarian cavalry, to keep back the cossacks. 
 That division was not exposed to any danger by 
 this measure : the cossacks took care not to at- 
 t ack it seriously. As for what our author says 
 about the stragglers of Prince Eugene's corps hav- 
 ing been thrown back upon that of Ney, the thing 
 was impossible. The road from Doukhowtchina 
 to Smolensko which Prince Eugene was following, 
 entered Smolensko behind the position occupied 
 by^Marshal Ney on the road from Dorogobouje ; 
 so that Prince Eugene's stragglers could not be 
 driven upon the troops of Marshal Ney, which 
 covered them in that direction. 
 
 " The Colonel of the fourth regiment, young 
 " Fezenzac, succeeded in re-animating his men 
 " nearly disabled by the cold."
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 331 
 
 That officer had probably no occasion to use 
 much eloquence to induce the brave fourth to 
 inarch against the cossacks ; for, as we are com- 
 pelled to repeat, this road was followed by none 
 but the enemy's light cavalry. The circumstance 
 was by no means of sufficient solemnity to call 
 forth the remarks as to the " superiority of the 
 " sentiments of the mind over the sensations of 
 " the body." This superiority is moreover com- 
 mon to all who think and act nobly, without dis- 
 tinction of rank. It was doubtlessly by mistake 
 that the common-place principle of morality was 
 introduced here. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 M. le marechal-des-logis, after drawing a dis- 
 tressing picture of the confusion prevailing among 
 some unarmed soldiers, whom the governor of 
 Smolensko refused to admit into that town before 
 the entry of the various organized corps, says 
 that, on the arrival of the guard, " they loaded it 
 ■- with imprecations. Were they then always to 
 " be sacrificed to that privileged class, that idle 
 " ornament which no longer took the lead but at 
 " reviews, at festivals, and above all, at distribu- 
 11 tions of any kind ?" 
 
 If it were yet to be proved that our officer of
 
 332 book ix. 
 
 the palace has no correct notions relative to the 
 armies by the side of which he has sometimes 
 marched, what better evidence of the fact could 
 be desired than the opinion which he ascribes to 
 the stragglers following our different corps, con- 
 cerning the imperial guard t According to him, 
 this celebrated guard, which alone often consti- 
 tuted an army ; whose mere presence at the 
 greatest battles insured victory ; whose exertions, 
 when necessary, never left doubtful the event of 
 a contest, in which it preferred dying to surren- 
 dering, was an idle ornament ! a toy which Na- 
 poleon paraded about from one end of Europe to 
 the other ! Our historian ought to have let us 
 know at what reviews, or festivals it took a part 
 since quitting Moscow. This class, privileged 
 only in respect of its courage and discipline, was 
 the core, the very life of the army. What could 
 be more natural than to take all the possible 
 means of preserving it ? 
 
 The description given by the author of the dis- 
 ordered state of our troops at Smolensko, is virtu- 
 ally nothing but a censure upon the furnishing 
 department. " Napoleon calculated upon a fort- 
 " night's supply of provisions and forage for an 
 " army of a hundred thousand men ; there was 
 " not found however the half of it, even in flour, 
 " rice, and spirits ; meat was altogether want- 
 
 " ing." 
 
 The Emperor was justified in calculating upon 
 extensive resources at Smolensko, since on quit-
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 333 
 
 ting that town for Moscow (the 24th August), he 
 had given all the necessary orders for providing 
 them. He expressed the greatest discontent at 
 the non-fulfilment of those orders. " The fur- 
 " nisher only saved his life," according to Mr. de 
 Segur, "by prostrating himself long upon his 
 " knees. Perhaps, however, the reasons he as- 
 " signed availed him more than his supplica- 
 " tions." 
 
 Our writer is here alluding to one of the princi- 
 pals of the departments for supplying meat, who, 
 according to his accounts, purported to have sent 
 forward to meet us nearly a thousand head of 
 cattle, whereas in fact, he had sent none. The 
 reports made to the Emperor on this subject made 
 himacquainted with the fact that this man had sold 
 the cattle to some Jews, who had forwarded them 
 to the Russians ; in consequence of which Napo- 
 leon directed that he should be tried by a court- 
 martial. Assuredly it was neither his reasons nor 
 his supplications, that saved him. The author 
 would not allege so many grounds for excusing 
 this unworthy agent, if he had been acquainted 
 with these facts. 
 
 Duringthe three months which had elapsed since 
 the Emperor quitted Smolensko, it would have 
 been easy to collect there a supply of provisions ; 
 which might have been drawn not only from the 
 immense magazines established in the rear, but 
 from the resources presented by the country. 
 Lithuania had not been ravaged : it was favo-
 
 334 book ix. 
 
 rably disposed towards us, and none of the ene- 
 my's corps had remained in it. On his departure 
 from Moscow, Napoleon had, therefore, every 
 reason to calculate upon finding considerable 
 supplies at Smolensko. Messrs. Daru and Ma- 
 thieu Dumas were of the same opinion. 
 
 " After all, he was irritable from a natural 
 " necessity : he had not been deceived as to the 
 " want now experienced." 
 
 The Emperor finding his army in want of pro- 
 visions through the non-execution of his orders, of 
 course, expressed his dissatisfaction with warmth. 
 He was not irritable from natural necessity : he 
 even forgot to punish. 
 
 "The genius of Napoleon, by attempting to 
 **' rise superior to time, climate, and distances, 
 " had, as it were, lost itself in space." 
 
 How are we to reconcile this opinion with that 
 expressed nearly at the beginning of the first vo- 
 lume : " Admitting even that the rapidity of the 
 " expedition was an instance of temerity, it would 
 " still have been probably crowned with success, 
 " if the premature decline of his health had not 
 " deprived the physical powers of that great man 
 " of the vigor, which his mind retained." And 
 with that at a subsequent page. " This enter- 
 " prise was necessary to the completion of a great 
 " design nearly accomplished : the object of it 
 " was not unattainable, the means of success were 
 " sufficient. ..." 
 
 He had committed all " to the chance of a first
 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 335 
 
 " movement by Alexander." We have already 
 refuted this accusation of levity and inconsistency 
 with which the author pursues the memory of 
 Napoleon. He inarched upon Smolensk o and 
 Moscow, to beat the Russian army and force Alex- 
 ander to conclude a peace. 
 
 " He was still the same man as in Egypt, at 
 Marengo, Ulm, Essling." How often has he en- 
 deavored in the course of his work to prove, by 
 distorted or unfounded statements, that Napoleon 
 was but " the shadow of himself ; that age (forty- 
 * three years), weighed him down, etc. etc. ?" In 
 short, has he not said, " Where were now these 
 rapid and decisive movements which distin- 
 guished him at Marengo, Ulm, and Eck- 
 " miilh ?" It was Fernand Cortez ; it was the 
 " Macedonian burning his vessels, and above all 
 " things desiring, in opposition to his soldiers, to 
 " penetrate into unknown Asia." 
 
 This comparison is difficult to explain. Inde- 
 pendently of the resolution which such a deter- 
 mination implies in a man already bereft of it, 
 " who no longer possesses that character of spi- 
 " rited and ever varying decision, rapid as the cir- 
 " cumstances calling it forth." What similitude 
 is there between the situation of Napoleon and 
 that of the conqueror of Asia ? If, after crossing 
 the Niemen, he had broken his line of commu- 
 nication, and abandoned his rear, to shew his army 
 that it must depend upon its own resources, the 
 analogy might have some foundation. Then,
 
 336 book ix. 
 
 what are we to understand by the Macedonian 
 burning his vessels? Alexander never burned his 
 vessels. When, after conquering nearly the whole 
 of Asia Mi nor, he quitted the coast, and set out from 
 Milet to prosecute his expedition, his fleet becom- 
 ing useless to him, he sent it back, and employed 
 it in subduing the Pontus and the neighbouring 
 countries. But why should we be surprised that 
 Mr. de Segur is ignorant of the history of Alex- 
 ander, when he shews himself to be so imperfectly 
 acquainted with that of Napoleon's campaigns ? 
 Before venturing to speak of such splendid mili- 
 tary combinations, the marechal-des-logis of the 
 palace should have taken the pains to read and 
 study the accounts of them. 
 
 The history of the grand army is nothing more 
 than a rhetorical display by one whose vague and 
 gloomy imagination delights in exhibiting pic- 
 tures of which the coloring is almost always false. 
 The facts are never approached with candor and 
 simplicity ; the reflections are unnaturally subti- 
 lized or contradictory. In short, the greatest de- 
 ficiency in the History of the Grand Army is that 
 of historical truth.
 
 337 
 
 BOOK X. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 tt 
 
 a 
 tt 
 
 On the same day, at the same hour, all Russia 
 H had recommenced acting upon the offensive. 
 
 The general plan of the Russians had suddenly 
 
 developed itself, etc." 
 
 This general plan of the Russians, suddenly 
 developing itself on the sa^ie day and at the same 
 hour, is a very pretty supposition at an epoch so 
 long subsequent to the event as the present. But 
 at the period alluded to, Kutusoff was solely oc- 
 cupied in defending himself and reorganizing his 
 forces. 
 
 On the 18th October, "at the very moment 
 " when the artillery of Kutusoff had just destroy- 
 " ed. Napoleon's illusions of glory and of peace, 
 * c Wittgenstein, at a distance of a hundred leagues 
 c< behind his left, precipitated himself upon Po- 
 w lotsk ; Titchakoff behind his right .... the one 
 " advancing from the north, the other from the 
 " south, had both endeavored to unite their forces 
 " towards Borisow. It was the most difficult 
 " passage of our retreat, and these two armies of 
 
 z
 
 338 book x. 
 
 " the enemy had nearly reached it, whilst twelve 
 " days' march, the winter, famine, and the grand 
 " Russian army still separated Napoleon from it." 
 
 Judging by the author's statement, we should 
 conclude that the attack of KutusofF at Winkowo, 
 had convinced the Emperor that all hopes of 
 peace was at an end ; and yet the orders given by 
 that prince* on the 5th, 6th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 
 and 15 th of October, shew that he had already 
 given orders for evacuating Moscow and proceed- 
 ing to Smolensko. 
 
 Mr. de Segur's assertion relative to Wittgen- 
 
 * 5th October. Napoleon writes to the Major-General on 
 the subj ect of removing the wounded who were at Mojaisk, at 
 the abbey of Kolotskoi and at Gjat. 
 
 6th October. Napoleon writes to the Major-General to direct 
 that Junot may remove all the wounded to Wiasma, and that 
 Barag-uey d'Hilliers may forward those at Wiasma to Smolensko ; 
 desiring further that, in eight days from that time, not a wounded 
 man should be remaining at Rouza, at the Abbey, at Mojaisk, 
 or at Gjat. 
 
 6th October. Napoleon writes to the Major-General direct- 
 ing that no troops whatever shall go beyond Gjat or Mojaisk. 
 
 10th October. Napoleon writes to the Major-General de- 
 siring him to give orders that the detachments of infantry, ca- 
 valry and artillery may remain at Smolensko. 
 
 lSth October. Letter from the Major-General to the King 
 of Naples, announcing to him that the army is about to march 
 from Moscow to join him, and repulse Kutusoff. 
 
 15th October. The Emperor orders the first, third, and 
 fourth corps of the guard, to hold themselves in readiness for 
 marching.
 
 chapter r. 339 
 
 stein and Titchakoff is equally erroneous. Tit- 
 chakoff was, on the 18th October, at Brezecz-Li- 
 towski, upon the Bug. On the same day Witt- 
 genstein was attacking- Polosk. The distance 
 from Polosk to Borisow is five days' march, and 
 from Brezecz to the same place (Borisow) it must 
 be at least twelve days' inarch. So that these two 
 generals, whom Mr. de Segur represents as close 
 in the neighbourhood of each other, were seven- 
 teen days' march asunder. It is clear, that the 
 marechal-des-logis of the palace wrote this passage 
 without consulting a map. How could he sup- 
 pose that Kutusoff, who was stationed on the 
 road to Kalouga, separated the French army 
 from Borisow? This is not all ; on the same day, 
 the 18th October, on which Titchakoff and Witt- 
 genstein are supposed to be in contact, Titchakoff 
 was being beaten by Regnier, while endeavoring 
 to march to Warsaw ; and it was not till the 20th 
 October that he returned to his position at Bre- 
 zecz. It was only on the 28 th, after having left 
 twenty-eight thousand men under the command 
 of Sacken, whom he directed to watch the mo- 
 tions of Schwarzenberg, and mask his movement 
 towards Minsk, that he set out for that town, 
 where the head of his column arrived on the 16th 
 November. Prince Schwarzenberg had just been 
 reinforced by Duruttes division, which made the 
 force under his command amount in all to about 
 fifty thousand men. Titchakoff left Minsk on the 
 19th for Borisow, of which place he obtained 
 
 z2
 
 
 340 BOOK X. 
 
 possession on the 21st ; and on the 23d he order- 
 ed Lambert's division to cross the river, in order 
 to obtain intelligence of Wittgenstein. This di- 
 vision encountered Oudinot's corps, by which it 
 was repulsed and compelled to return towards the 
 right bank of the Beresina. So that more than a 
 month after the epoch, at which M. de Segur re- 
 presents the two corps of Wittgenstein and Tit- 
 chakoffasin contact, they were still disunited. 
 Marshal Saint-Cyr had occupied, since the 18th 
 August, an intrenched camp before Polosk. 
 " This camp shews with what facility the army 
 might have wintered on the frontiers of Lithu- 
 ania." The author highly praises the good con- 
 struction of the barracks of our soldiery: " they 
 " were handsome military villages, well entrench- 
 " ed, and sheltered both from the winter and from 
 " the enemy." 
 
 Immediately afterwards he informs us, that, for 
 two months past, the French had been losinggreat 
 numbers of men by going in search of provisions ; 
 . " that they were continually betrayed by the pea- 
 " santry, and even by their guides." He then 
 adds : " These checks, joined with want and 
 " disease, had diminished the force under Saint- 
 " Cyr by one-half. The Bavarians were reduced 
 " from twenty-two thousand men to four thou- 
 " sand, etc." 
 
 What becomes then of the facility with which 
 they might have wintered, if we had already sus- 
 tained such losses ? And as if the contradiction
 
 CHAPTER II. 341 
 
 were not sufficiently striking-, he adds in the next 
 page : " These works were so far from being- com- 
 " plete, that they served, not so much to cover 
 " their defenders, as to shew them the position 
 " where they were to maintain themselves." 
 
 What becomes then of the " handsome military 
 " villages, well intrenched ?" It would seem as if 
 their fortifications had suddenly become reduced 
 to simple picquets, for marking- out the station the 
 troops were to defend. The facility of wintering- 
 was therefore not so great as the author appears 
 to have supposed. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 How are we to reconcile these passages: u Witt- 
 " genstein repulsed, Steinheil beaten, ten thou- 
 " sand Russians, and six generals placed hors d*. 
 " combat. ..." with " the pride and joy prevailing 
 " in the enemy's camp," whilst in our's " all was 
 
 " melancholy and destitution." Melancholy \ 
 
 from what cause ? Was it on account of having 
 beaten the Russians ? or because of quitting a 
 country where want and disease prevailed, to enter 
 one that abounded in every kind of provisions 
 and forage ? Has the author then forgotten that, 
 upon thearrival of the second corps at theBeresina,
 
 342 book x. 
 
 the troops had provisions in abundance, and a 
 reserve of cattle following them ? 
 
 Mr. deSegur gives a singular description of the 
 retreat of Marshal Saint- Cyr; he states that it 
 " was effected by all the roads leading to Smo- 
 " liany." The motive for this retrogade march 
 was, according to him, to be better supplied with 
 provisions, and to march more freely and con- 
 nectedly. The motive of obtaining provisions was 
 good enough, provided the enemy was not pur- 
 suing ; but the plan of separating themselves in 
 order to march connectedly, appears difficult to 
 comprehend. 
 
 Marshal Saint-Cyr having retired towards the 
 corps of Marshal Victor, which was thirty thou- 
 sand strong, and marching to his right on its way 
 from Smolensko ; and not being much pressed by 
 the Russians, whom he had just beaten, was 
 enabled to pursue his march without molestation. 
 And in point of fact he received no check but 
 upon a column of his left. 
 
 The author describes the Emperor at Mika- 
 lewska, as receiving nothing but accounts of his 
 disasters. " His countenance remains the same , 
 " he changes none of his habits, nor any thing in 
 " the form of his orders. Any one would have 
 " supposed from reading them, that he still com- 
 " manded several armies." 
 
 The different corps of the army were still in 
 their original state of organization ; composed of 
 divisions, brigades, and regiments. The losses
 
 CHAPTER II. 343 
 
 sustained on the way had certainly much dimi- 
 nished their numbers ; but that was by no means 
 a reason for not issuing orders to them in the 
 usual form, since their organization remained un- 
 changed. Nay, more ; on the occasion of passing 
 the Beresina, the Emperor made no change in the 
 denominations of the various corps of his army : 
 and he was in every point of view right in so doing. 
 For the enemy being informed by the orders of the 
 day which he intercepted, by the prisoners he 
 made, and from all the sources of information 
 which he possessed, that the army retained the 
 same number of corps, and the same organization 
 as when it entered upon the campaign, never be- 
 lieved the extensive losses we had sustained, but 
 always supposed us stronger than we really were. 
 If, on the contrary, several corps had been con- 
 densed into one or two, our weakness would 
 thereby have become known to the enemy, at the 
 same time that it would have had the effect of 
 putting every thing into confusion. 
 
 " As for Baraguey d'Hilliers, whom another 
 u officer has just accused, he is summoned to at- 
 " tend ; and having been deprived of his distinc- 
 " tions, set out for Berlin ; where he will antici- 
 " cipate the judgment to be passed upon it, by 
 " dying of grief." 
 
 General Baraguey d'Hilliers had been entrusted 
 with the command of a division forming at Smo- 
 lensko ; and had cantoned his troops upon the 
 road from Smolensko to Elnia. The approach of
 
 344 book x. 
 
 the Russian army in that direction ought to have 
 induced him to consolidate his division, which he 
 however omitted to do. On the 9th November, 
 one of his brigades was attacked by three chiefs of 
 Russian partisans, and although it consisted of 
 sixteen hundred men, of which five hundred were 
 cavalry, it surrendered and laid down its arms. 
 The remainder of the division retreated in all 
 haste towards Smolensko. Some French depots/ 
 the most considerable of which was at Klemen- 
 stiewo, were also taken by the enemy. The greater 
 part of the artillery horses, stationed within a con- 
 siderable circuit of the environs, were likewise 
 carried off by the cossacks. The Emperor ex- 
 pressed to General Baraguey d'Hilliers, the dis- 
 satisfaction he felt at his having so injudiciously 
 scattered all his forces. He deprived him of his 
 command, and sent him to Berlin. It is, how- 
 ever, not true, that he was deprived of his distinc- 
 tions; he was to be tried? In the case of a general 
 so thoroughly sensible of the principles of honor, 
 and so good a Frenchman as General Baraguey 
 d'Hilliers, the misfortune of having deserved to 
 be put upon his trial, may certainly have had a 
 fatal influence upon the already infirm state of his 
 health* 
 
 * la a letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to General Char- 
 pentier, governor of Smolensko, dated Wiazma, the 1st No- 
 *< mber 1812, in which he gives him an account of the move- 
 ments of the army, directs him to apprise the governors of
 
 CHAPTER II. 354 
 
 Independently of the irreparable losses, both of 
 men and horses, which we had sustained in con- 
 sequence of the injudicious conduct of general 
 Baraguey d'Hilliers, the Emperor was much dis- 
 tressed on learning that a French corps of eleven 
 hundred infantry and five hundred cavalry, had 
 laid down its arms before a body of partisans. 
 Only a few days before, Marshal Ney, in order to 
 shew his soldiers how little those troops of cos- 
 sacks were to be feared, had ordered a captain of 
 grenadiers to select fifty men, to go and set fire to 
 a village situated at the distance of half a league 
 from the road, then to retire in the direction of 
 another village Which he pointed out to him, and 
 rejoin him after the exploit. " You will be," said 
 he, " surrounded by five or six hundred cossacks, 
 
 or more; but be firm : not one of you has any 
 " thing to fear from them." The officer imme- 
 diately proceeds to comply minutely with this 
 order ; in doing which he presently finds himself 
 surrounded and annoyed by a thousand or twelve 
 hundred cossacks. The Russian commander in 
 vain causes one half of his followers to dismount : 
 
 Mohiloff and Minsk thereof, prescribes new measures to be 
 adopted by the supply department, and requires to be informed 
 of the state of all the magazines, subsistence and ammunition at 
 Smolensko, will be found the following sentence : " Make 
 " General Baraguey d'Hilliers acquainted with the movement 
 " of the army, etc. / have already intimated that that Ge- 
 neral should he careful not to commit himself: repeat to 
 him, from me, that opinion." — (See Appendix.) 
 
 cc
 
 346 book x. 
 
 He cannot succeed in securing any of this handful 
 of brave men. Marshal Ney then dispatches half 
 a battalion to the assistance of these fifty grena- 
 diers ; who together with their officer, rejoin the 
 column untouched. 
 
 With respect to the reflections which Mr. de 
 Segur, who is continually reverting to the past, 
 in order to complain of the present, attributes to 
 the troops on the subject of the thirty-four days of 
 inactivity at Moscow, and the want of care in pro- 
 viding for their various wants ; is it not obvious 
 that they indicate a desire on his part of censuring 
 the Emperor ? During his stay at Moscow, his 
 utmost care was bestowed upon his army. On 
 quitting that city his solicitude was especially 
 directed towards the accommodation of the 
 wounded : all the carriages, including his own, 
 were appropriated to their reception. The orders 
 given to the different commanders of corps, re- 
 . quired that they should carry provisions with them 
 for twenty days, which appeared sufficient for the 
 purpose of reaching Smolensko before the frost. 
 Troops and depots of provisions were to be sta- 
 tioned at Wiazma and Dorogobouje. The author, 
 therefore, accuses Napoleon of improvidence un- 
 justly. All our misfortunes arose from the seve- 
 rity of the cold, and from the circumstance of the 
 Emperor's orders not being duly complied with. 
 (See the Emperor's letters, in the Appendix.) 
 
 Mr. de Segur concludes these long reflections by 
 saying that from Moscow ' 'it would, at all events,
 
 CHAPTER II. 347 
 
 " have been necessary to return ; and nothing had 
 " been prepared, even for a pacific return." What ! 
 if peace had been concluded, we should have 
 been unable to obtain provisions, and retire upon 
 our line of demarcation ! we should have been 
 destitute of resources ! Would not even the 
 Russians themselves have had an interest in se- 
 curing them to us ? 
 
 The Emperor hoped to find at Smolensko fresh 
 troops, horses, and considerable magazines. Al- 
 though his expectations were not entirely realized, 
 Smolensko offered us some valuable resources. 
 Flour was distributed to the troops ; in fact a 
 general issue was made of whatever the magazines 
 afforded. The Emperor had originally intended 
 to preserve that town, and to take up positions 
 near the Dwina and the Boristhenes. Having 
 learned that Admiral Titchakoff was advancing 
 towards Minsk, and that the reiterated orders he 
 had sent to Victor, to drive back Wittgenstein 
 beyond the Dwina had not been complied with, 
 he determined upon retiring behind the Beresina. 
 The author seems to reproach Napoleon with 
 having remained five days at Smolensko ; and yet 
 those five days were employed in the very most 
 advantageous manner possible for the army. The 
 long inarch from Moscow, which it had just per- 
 formed without stopping, had occasioned a great 
 number of stragglers to remain on the way. It 
 was hoped that a halt of a few days would afford 
 the greater part of them an opportunity of coming
 
 348 book x/ 
 
 in. Besides which, all the corps did not reach 
 Smolensk© at the same time as the Emperor, and 
 it was necessary to await the arrival of the whole 
 before renewing 1 the march. 
 
 It is easy to conceive that M. de Segur, who 
 had no knowledge of the plans of the Emperor, 
 should have imagined that he was wasting time 
 at pleasure. It is easy to conceive also, that 
 among the wise of whom he has frequently spoken, 
 and in whose number he is doubtless included, 
 there might be some who would have been dis- 
 posed to retire in all haste to Wilna, and even 
 beyond the Niemen or the Vistula, happen what 
 might to the rest of the army. The marechal- 
 des-logis of the palace is here, as elsewhere, the 
 organ of the discontented, whose vaporings he 
 has recorded. 
 
 " It was known that Ney had received orders 
 " to arrive at Smolensko as late as possible ; and 
 " that Eugene had been directed to pass two days 
 " at Doukhoutchina." Napoleon's letter to the 
 Major-General, which we subjoin, disproves the 
 statement relative to Ney * As for Eugene, he 
 
 * Napoleon to the Major-General, 
 
 Semlewo, 3d November, 1812. 
 My cousin, write to the DukeofElchingen, directing, that as 
 soon as he shall have assumed the command of the rear-guard, 
 he will cause the army to move forward as quickly as possible ; 
 for we are thus consuming the remainder of the fine weather 
 without marching. The Prince of Eckmuhl is detaining the 
 Viceroy and Prince Poniatowski for every charge of cossacks 
 that he perceives. Hereupon, Sec. &c.
 
 CHAPTER FT. 349 
 
 crossed the Wop on the 9th, arrived on the 10th 
 at Donkhoutchina ; and remained there , on the 
 11th, to get his troops into order and give them 
 a little rest: it was not till the 13th that he 
 reached Smolensko. 
 
 Among other reflections attributed by the au- 
 thor to the French soldiery, is the following : 
 " Could the Emperor be ignorant of the satisfac- 
 " tion experienced by the Russians, when, three 
 f* months before, he stumbled so unfortunately 
 " over Smolensko, instead of continuing his 
 *' march to the right towards Elnia, where he 
 " would have cut off the communication between 
 
 " the enemy's army and his capital ? At the 
 
 " present day. . . .will these Russians imitate his 
 " blunder, by which they profited ?" 
 
 Who would believe that a writer, bearing the 
 title of general, had made such 4 a reflection ! What 
 then ! ought the Emperor to have omitted to take 
 Smolensko, and leaving that place in the power 
 of the enemy, in his rear, to march upon Moscow ! 
 Peace could not be expected till the Russian array 
 should be beaten and the capital taken. The 
 whole plan of the Emperor rested upon this basis. 
 Smolensko is with reason regarded as the key to 
 Moscow, since he who is master of Smolensko 
 can advance to Moscow without danger, by com- 
 mencing from that point his line of operations. 
 If the author's idea be correct, why do the Rus- 
 sians, in all their accounts, speak of the conster- 
 nation and gloom which the taking of that im-
 
 350 BOOK X, 
 
 portant place by the French occasioned in all 
 Russia ? * The circumstances attending our re- 
 treat were totally different. When the Emperor 
 was marching to Moscow it was proper he should 
 occupy Smolensko ; when retiring upon the Bere- 
 sina, he could not retain that place. Kutusoff 
 would not have done well to lose his time in at- 
 tacking it ; it was his duty to endeavor to join 
 the army of Titchakoff as speedily as possible, in 
 order to cut off our retreat. He was in his own 
 country ; and had therefore nothing to apprehend 
 for his rear. 
 
 " Did not the circumstance of Augereau and 
 " his brigade being carried off upon that road, 
 " sufficiently inform him in this respect ?" General 
 Augereau and his brigade were taken, not by 
 Kutusoff, but by the Russian partisans Denisof, 
 Dawidof and Seslavin, who united their forces 
 for that purpose. 
 
 The author supposes that the Emperor remained 
 at Smolensko, for the pleasure " of dating for five 
 cc days from that town, and thereby giving to a 
 " forced and precipitate retreat, the appearance 
 
 * " The loss of Smolensko spread terror throughout the in- 
 " terior of the empire. If Napoleon had had it in his power 
 " to push forward a corps to Moscow before the Russian army 
 '* was in a condition to sustain a general battle, the consterna- 
 *' tion would have been at its height, and the nation, in despair, 
 " would perhaps have regretted the sacrifices it had made to its 
 " independence." — (Boutourlin, vol. 1, page 304. J
 
 CHAPTER II. 351 
 
 cc 
 
 of a slow and glorious one." Here again the 
 feeling of those who were anxious to guard them- 
 selves from danger, and escape from privations as 
 speedily as possible, and at any price, is conspi- 
 cuous. We must repeat, that the Emperor re- 
 mained at Smolensko no longer than was neces- 
 sary to collect his scattered followers, to remove 
 his sick and wounded, * to avail himself of the 
 resources of the place, and to avoid being routed 
 instead of retreating ; as he might have been said 
 to be, had he marched continually without stop- 
 ping. One proof that these five days were not 
 lost to the army, is that after quitting Smolensko, 
 it again shewed, by the engagement at Krasnoi, 
 that it had not degenerated ; and that, from the 
 time of the occurrence of those engagements, Ku- 
 tusofF no longer ventured to attempt intercepting 
 its retreat, or even to follow it too closely. 
 
 The author attributes these reflections upon our 
 stay at Smolensko, to some of Napoleon's officers. 
 He adds, that they were made " in private, for 
 " their devotedness to him had yet two years 
 ie longer to continue." This avowal is tolerably 
 ingenuous. What then ! The devotedness of the 
 Emperor's officers was to continue only so long as 
 
 * On the 7th November, there were in the hospitals at Smo- 
 lensko, three thousand six hundred and seventy-eight sick, of 
 whom two hundred and two were Russians ; on the 8th, nine 
 hundred were sent forward towards Orcha, and the rest of them 
 were removed during- the time we remained in the town.
 
 352 book x. 
 
 lie should have benefits, honors, and gold to lavish 
 upon them ! ! Notwithstanding- the praises be- 
 stowed upon Messrs. This and That, w r e doubt 
 whether they will feel flattered by the opinion M. 
 de Segur entertains of their attachment. 
 
 At the conclusion of aneulogium upon General 
 Latour-Maubourg, the author remarks that: " He 
 cc constantly advanced in the same order and at 
 " the same measured pace, through the midst of 
 " unbounded confusion ; and nevertheless, to the 
 " honor of the age, he arrived as rapidly, as high, 
 " and as soon as the rest." 
 
 It is not easy to perceive what the honor of the 
 age 1 to do with the advancement of M. Latour- 
 Maubourg-. One of the Emperor's fixed princi- 
 ples was to reward merit wherever he found it. 
 Strict justice requires it to be admitted that he 
 has constantly acted upon that principle ; and re- 
 quires also that the whole honor of so doing should 
 be ascribed to himself. 
 
 According to the statement of the officer of the 
 palace, the French army, originally a hundred 
 thousand strong, had been reduced in twenty-five 
 days to thirty-six thousand ; and this slender resi- 
 due was encumbered with sixty thousand fol- 
 lowers without arms : which statement would 
 imply that the whole number of killed, wounded, 
 and missing, since the departure from Moscow 
 did not exceed four thousand. 
 
 These relics of the different corps of our army 
 . . . ." KutusofF was about to put successively to
 
 CHAPTER II. 353 
 
 w the sword." There is something- revolting in 
 this expression, as proceeding from a Frenchman. 
 Assuredly, if our soldiers were put to the sword 
 by KutusofF, the Russians were put to the sword 
 by oar army ; and so effectually, that they were 
 no more heard of. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 On quitting Smolensko with his army, the Em- 
 peror was obliged to make it advance in successive 
 echelons, in order to avoid the confusion and in- 
 cumbrance of the artillery, the carriages, and the 
 followers. On the 13th, he ordered the division 
 commanded by Claparede to march, with the trea- 
 sure and baggage; on the 14th, he set out himself, 
 accompanied by his guard, leaving at Smolensko 
 the corps of Davoust and Ney, which were mutu- 
 ally to support each other, and to evacuate the 
 town on the 16th, after having blown up the forti- 
 fications. 
 
 Napoleon arrived at Koritnia, where he passed 
 the night. On the following day, Miloradowitch, 
 at the head of twenty thousand men, did not ven- 
 ture to attempt intercepting his advance, but con- 
 tented himself with sending a few shots after him. 
 The Emperor reached Krasnoi, where " The mere 
 " appearance of Sebastiani and of the grenadiers 
 
 2 A
 
 354 book x. 
 
 
 
 who preceded him, was sufficient to repel the 
 enemy's infantry." It was on the 14th that the 
 division under Claparede, on arriving; at Krasnoi, 
 drove back Ojarowski's flying corps, which was 
 endeavoring; to establish itself there. The impe- 
 rial guard, accompanying the Emperor, had not 
 suffered, the enemy not having ventured to attack 
 it. " But," says our author, " the Russians, from 
 " their eminences, saw all the interior of the 
 army, its deformities, its weaknesses, its most 
 discreditable parts ; in short, all that is com- 
 monly concealed with the greatest care." 
 The guard marched in perfect order ; and for 
 these deformities, these discreditable parts, it seems 
 that Miloradowitch was fearful of seeing them too 
 closely, since he did not dare to oppose their ad- 
 vance. Mr. de Segur, who has favored us with 
 so brilliant a portrait of this general, whom he 
 compares to Murat, finds himself thus forced to 
 falsify, by facts, the praises he has lavished upon 
 him. " After the guard had passed, he took cou- 
 " rage, condensed his forces, and coming down 
 " from his heights, established himself strongly 
 " with twenty thousand men across the high road. 
 " By this movement he separated Eugene, Da- 
 " voust, and Ney, from the Emperor, and cut off 
 " these three commanders from the road to Eu- 
 " rope." Mr. de Segur is so far carried away by 
 his imagination, that he forgets that the scene oc- 
 curred in Lithuania !
 
 355 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Prince Eugene, who, with his corps, had passed 
 the night of the 15th near Koritnia, was at the 
 distance of three leagues from Krasnoi, when the 
 stragglers, who were marching before him, were 
 attacked by the cossacks of Miloradowitch. 
 These men, for the most part unarmed, formed 
 themselves into a body, repulsed the attack, and 
 retired upon the corps of which they formed a 
 part. 
 
 Eugene perceiving that Miloradowitch was de- 
 sirous of arresting his progress, placed the Italian 
 guard to the right of the road, the divisions under 
 Phelippon and Broussier to the left, and the third 
 division in the rear. In this position, although 
 he had only a few pieces of cannon remaining, he 
 vigorously repulsed all the attacks of Milorado- 
 with. During the whole of the engagement the 
 Prince had manoeuvred so as to threaten the ene- 
 my's right ; at night, perceiving that he had con- 
 siderably reinforced himself on that side, he put 
 his army in motion, and passed behind the ene- 
 my's left. By this movement he went round the 
 corps opposed to him, and, in the course of the 
 night, joined the young guard which was beyond 
 Krasnoi. 
 
 2a2
 
 356 book x. 
 
 Our historian describes these movements very 
 diffusely ; and encumbers his narrative with ill- 
 timed reflections, which serve but to render it ob- 
 scure. What is the meaning of "those battalions 
 " of the enemy flanking both sides of the road," 
 along which the numerous followers were pro- 
 ceeding to join Eugene, and which, " either from 
 " a feeling of admiration or of pity, call to our 
 " men, and beseech them to surrender ?" We 
 shall not accept this sentiment of supposed admi- 
 ration, because it is ungracious to appropriate 
 praise and adulation to oneself ; and we cannot 
 but decidedly reject the expression of pity. It is, 
 however, a sentiment completely in harmony with 
 the idea of the furcce caudin<E, beneath which, ac- 
 cording to the marechal-des-logis, Kutusoff com- 
 pelled us to pass. He should simply have said, 
 without hyperbole or boasting, that the recollec- 
 tion of Malo-Jaroslavetz, and the appearance of 
 our brave soldiery intimidated their enemies. 
 The author himself has observed shortly after- 
 wards with respect to the Russians, that " Vic- 
 " tory was new to them, that even having it at 
 " their command, they knew not how to profit by 
 " it ; but postponed till the morrow the comple- 
 " tion of the affair."
 
 357 
 
 CHAFfER V. 
 
 Napoleon having- reached Krasnoi on the 15 th, 
 and being informed that the Russian army was in 
 the environs, and that Ojarowski's corps, stati- 
 oned in the town, threatened the left of the road, 
 was determined to prove to the Russians, by a 
 nocturnal attack, that the French army, notwith- 
 standing the disasters which had befallen it, was 
 still animated by the same courage. For this 
 purpose he directed General Roguet, with his 
 division of the young guard, to go that same night 
 and attack the corps of Ojarowski. His instruc- 
 tions were to charge the Russians at the point of 
 the bayonet without firing. This expedition pro- 
 duced the result which the Emperor expected : 
 the Russians being taken by surprise, lost great 
 numbers. The most important effect, however, 
 of this gallant attack, was the circumspection 
 with which it inspired Kutusoff : he immediately 
 countermanded the movement he had directed to 
 be made by Tormasof s corps, with a view to in- 
 tercept our progress from Krasnoi to Liadi. Such 
 splendid achievements, shedding a lustre over our 
 misfortunes, which we owed to nothing but the
 
 358 BOOK X. 
 
 inclemency of the season, ought to have exalted 
 the imagination of a French writer. 
 
 The reflections ascribed by the author to Kutu- 
 soff, relative to the slowness of the motions of our 
 army, are degrading to it : he describes it as im- 
 prisoned beneath the lash of a cossack, who 
 " chastises it the moment it seeks to quit the 
 track marked out for it." 
 
 The observations he attributes to Wilson, 
 namely, that the cossacks were heard to say "it was 
 " a shame to suffer those skeletons thus to leave 
 " their grave," is equally extravagant. Kutusoff 
 declined attacking the French army because the 
 real Russian army had been defeated on the 
 Moskwa ; and because with that which he had 
 re-organized he had been beaten both at Malo- 
 Jaroslavetz and at Wiazma, although his forces 
 were five times as considerable as those of the 
 French. He knew that, though there might be 
 in the French army a few desponding soldiers 
 marching isolatedly, the courage of the rest aug- 
 mented as their numbers decreased ; and that 
 Napoleon was at their head. That an English- 
 man should not have felt this, or not have ex- 
 pressed it, is easily conceived ; but a Frenchman ! 
 On quitting Smolensko the Emperor had di- 
 rected Ney to form the rear-guard. That mar- 
 shal was not to quit the town till the 16th, after 
 blowing up all the fortifications : the Prince of 
 Eckmuhl was ordered to support him . On the 1 6th, 
 at a very early hour of the morning, Davoust hav-
 
 CHAPTER V. 359 
 
 ing left one division under Marshal Ney, com- 
 menced marching with the other four. During 
 the day, after having apprised Ney of the engage- 
 ment by Prince Eugene, he continued his march 
 towards Krasnoi. Marshal Ney conceiving that 
 there could be nothing between him and Napoleon 
 but cossacks, did not think it necessary to march 
 till the 17th. The position which Miloradowitch 
 had taken up, on the road from Smolensko to 
 Krasnoi, during the night between the 16th and 
 17th, consequently separated these two corps. It 
 became, at the same time,known at Krasnoi, that 
 the Russians, whose movement upon Dobre* had 
 been stopped by the attack made upon them by 
 General Roguet, were preparing to retake that 
 place. Napoleon's situation was critical. On 
 the one hand he saw his retreat on the point of 
 being cut off, and on the other, if he were to retire, 
 two of his corps abandoned. He summoned Ber- 
 thier, Mortier, Lefebvre, and Bessieres, and told 
 them it was necessary to prepare for attacking 
 the enemy on the following morning. Those mar- 
 shals merely replied by pointing out the situations 
 of their respective corps. " No matter," answered 
 Napoleon ; " we must, without hesitation march 
 " to the assistance of Davoust and Ney ;" and ac- 
 cordingly, at day-break he put himself at the head 
 of his guard to proceed against the enemy. This 
 intrepid movement of the Emperor, who, with a 
 handful of men, marched against the whole of the 
 Russian forces, had its due effect. Miloradowitch
 
 360 BOOK X. 
 
 quitted his position on the road, and receding to- 
 wards the centre of the Russian army, left a free 
 passage for the corps of Marshal Davoust, which 
 therefore joined Napoleon. 
 
 This chapter, with the exception of a few pas- 
 sages which we have been obliged to notice, is in 
 general written with a spirit of impartiality, of 
 which one cannot but regret the absence in the 
 other parts of the work. The army and its com- 
 mander are here less disfigured than usually. 
 Setting aside a few blemishes in the way of ill- 
 judged comparisons and ill-timed reflections, the 
 heroic attitude of Napoleon, and the grandeur and 
 dignity of his decisions, are faithfully depicted. 
 How could the author, after describing this splen- 
 did movement, suffer to remain in his work the 
 odious imputation which occurs at a prior page of 
 it, where we read that " Napoleon felt that there 
 " was nothing now to be done but to sacrifice the 
 " army part by part, beginning by the extremi- 
 " ties, to save the head." How could he fail to 
 perceive that he was himself triumphantly refuting 
 the reproaches on the score of torpor, caducity, 
 indecision, and insensibility, with which he has 
 loaded him.
 
 361 
 
 CHAFfER VI. 
 
 " There it was," (at the head-quarters at Liadi,) 
 " that all the papers, which Napoleon had collected 
 " for the purpose of writing the history of his life, 
 " were consumed : for such was his intention when 
 he entered upon this fatal war." 
 
 There is something ridiculous in supposing that 
 the Emperor, on entering upon the war, carried 
 ivith him all his papers in order to write the history 
 of his life, as if he had expected to find himself in 
 Russia in a state of undisturbed repose. That 
 prince had no occasion to burn a single paper re- 
 lative to his history, because he brought none 
 with him. What does the author mean, besides, 
 by these collected papers? Napoleon had no 
 need of taking such a precaution, since the acts 
 of his life are everywhere recorded. He had 
 caused entries to be made in registers, of his cor- 
 respondence as general-in-chief of the armies of 
 Italy and of Egypt, and these registers never 
 quitted his archives. His intention was to take 
 advantage of the state of repose in which he ex- 
 pected to be left by the general pacification, in or- 
 dertowriteacomplete history of his campaigns and 
 of his reign ; and if he could have had the benefit 
 of those valuable materials at St. Helena, he would
 
 362 book x. 
 
 have been better able to raise an imperishable 
 monument to the glory of the French arms. 
 
 The marechal-des-logis of the palace allows no 
 opportunity to escape him of repeating that it 
 was part of the plan of the Emperor to stop at the 
 Borysthenes. How can he imagine that, when 
 quitting Paris, he had conceived the project of 
 stopping upon the confines of Lithuania? His 
 object was to secure by conquest that peace which 
 he could not otherwise obtain : but he could at- 
 tain this object only by destroying the Russian 
 armies. If his military combinations had all suc- 
 ceeded, that peace might have been obtained even 
 in Lithuania ; but then he would not have re- 
 mained there for the pleasure of writing an ac- 
 count of his campaigns. Events having however 
 had another issue, he could not, in the month of 
 July, stop to take up cantonments. Already ar- 
 rived upon the Dwina, he had four months re- 
 maining for action. He decided to march against 
 Moscow, under the conviction that Russia would 
 not surrender that city without a battle : and it 
 was upon that battle that his hopes of peace were 
 founded. But before he commenced the under- 
 taking, he left the several corps of Macdonald, 
 Saint-Cyr, and Oudinot, upon the Dwina; and 
 upon the frontiers of Volhinia, those of Schwar- 
 zenberg, Reynier, and Dombrowski, to keep the 
 Russian armies in check, at the same time that 
 other considerable corps, those of Victor and 
 Augereau, were organising in his rear ; the one to
 
 CHAPTER VI. 363 
 
 advance and form his reserve, and the other to in- 
 sure his communication as far as the Rhine. Al- 
 ready master of Smolensko about the middle of 
 August, he advanced to Moscow, which was only 
 ten day's march distant from the former town. 
 The battle he had wished for took place, and the 
 Russian army was partly annihilated. The occu- 
 pation of Moscow was the result: everything pro- 
 mised peace. But this would have been too inju- 
 rious to England, and the burning of Moscow was 
 resolved on ; a sacrifice which cost that power 
 nothing, but was more prejudicial to Russia than 
 the most disadvantageous peace could possibly 
 have been. To insure the success of so monstrous 
 an undertaking, England placed herself between 
 Alexander and Napoleon, and beneath a Russian 
 mask put in motion the springs of her crafty sys- 
 tem of politics to entangle Alexander, and pre- 
 dispose him against every attempt at negotiation. 
 Just as in Turkey she had, by disseminating cor- 
 ruption and falsehood, imposed upon the Divan, 
 and placed the Sultan under the necessity of sub- 
 scribing to the peace.
 
 364 book x. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Mr. de Segur represents the Emperor, on his ar- 
 rival at Orcha, as uncertain as to the route he 
 should take : and he makes him hold a council on 
 this point, in which GeneralJomini figures. It is 
 proper to notice that this General did not occupy 
 in the army a post that could entitle him to a 
 place in the council. He was at this epoch merely 
 commandant of the little town of Orcha. If Na- 
 poleon applied to him for information, it was 
 merely in virtue of his office, and in order to as- 
 certain the resources of the place. Our historian 
 attributes to the Emperor a plan, in order to 
 bring forward General Jomini as combating it. 
 Napoleon never " expressed an intention of aban- 
 doning his line of operations upon Minsk, of 
 joining the Dukes of Belluno and Reggio, of 
 overthrowing Wittgenstein, and of regaining 
 Wilna by passing round the Beresina at its 
 " source." 
 
 If he had conceived such a project, and had de- 
 sired the opinion of General Jomini upon it, that 
 officer should have added to the reasons he is made 
 to urge against it, that if such a manoeuvre were 
 to be made, Titehakoff would reach Wilna from 
 
 a 
 
 (C
 
 CHAPTER VII. 365 
 
 Minsk long before the French army could arrive 
 there. But the Emperor's orders dated Doubrowna 
 the 18th and 19th November 1812, are quite suffi- 
 cient to make the whole affair both of the project 
 and the council fall to the ground. 
 
 By his letter of the 18th, to the Major-General, 
 he orders as follows : " Write to the governor of 
 " Minsk to inform him that I shall be at Orcha to- 
 " morrow : Apprise him that I have ordered the 
 " second corps, with a division of cuirassiers, and a 
 i(r hundred pieces of cannon, under the command o^ 
 " the Duke of Reggio., to proceed in all haste, and 
 " in a straight line to Borisow, to secure that im- 
 " portant point, and thence to march upon Minsk. 
 " In the mean time General Dombrowski will pro- 
 u ceed to that place with his division, and observe 
 '' the movements of the corps now at Minsk. Re- 
 " commend him to send native agents to the Duke 
 " of Bassano and Prince Schwarzenberg, and to 
 " write to you frequently." 
 
 By a letter of the following day, at three in the 
 morning, the Prince of Neufchatel wrote to the 
 Duke of Belluno : " The Emperor will arrive at 
 (i noon this day at Orcha : it will be necessary 
 " M. Le marechal, that the position you may take 
 " up should be nearer to Borisow, Wilna, and 
 " Orcha, than the enemy's army. Endeavor to 
 " mask the movement of the Duke of Reggio, and 
 " ]to make it appear, on the contrary, that the 
 Emperor is advancing upon General Wittgen- 
 stein : a manoeuvre which will appear sufficiently 

 
 366 book x. 
 
 
 probable. His Majesty's intention is to march 
 upon Minsk, and when that place shall have 
 " been occupied, to follow the direction of the 
 " Beresina, etc." 
 
 In this pretended council, Mr. de Segur makes 
 Jomini play a somewhat ridiculous part. " It was 
 " on that occasion," he observes, " that he declar- 
 " ed himself aware of the existence of a road to the 
 " right of the town (Borisow), raised upon wooden 
 " bridges over the Lithuanian marshes." Accord- 
 ing to him, this was the only road by which the 
 army could proceed to Wilna, by way of Zembin 
 and Molodezno. This discovery would not have 
 required any very great topographical knowledge 
 on the part of General Jomini, since the road is 
 laid down in all the maps, and the Polish officers 
 of the Emperor's staff were acquainted with it. 
 The baggage-masters of the second corps returned 
 by that road from Wilna. 
 
 Assisted by this brief expose, it will be easy 
 for the reader to appreciate the details with which 
 M. de Segur continues his narrative : and he will 
 readily believe that General Dode had no diffi- 
 culty in dissuading the Emperor from a manoeuvre, 
 which, as we have just seen, he never had con- 
 templated. 
 
 M. de Segur has fallen into another error, with 
 respect to the order he supposes to have been 
 given " to General Eble, to proceed with eight 
 
 companies of sappers and pontoneers, to secure 
 
 a passage over the Beresina ; and to Jomini to 
 
 it 
 it
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 367 
 
 " act as his guide.". The Emperor was at Orcha 
 on the 19th ; and the bridge of Borisow was not 
 taken by the enemy till the evening" of the 21st. 
 Moreover it was not from Orcha, as stated by the 
 author, but from Bobr, and on the 24th, that 
 the Emperor directed General Eble to march. 
 
 The officer of the palace is again wrong in stat- 
 ing that, at Orcha, the disordered condition of 
 the army became aggravated. On the contrary, 
 the magazines in that town furnished the means 
 of making some issues to the troops. The intense 
 cold which had distressed us from the time of 
 quitting Smolensko, having been succeeded by a 
 thaw, the bivouacs became supportable. The 
 artillery was still numerous, notwithstanding all 
 the author has said. A park of artillery, which 
 was established there, served to replace a great 
 part of our ammunition ; and five complete bat- 
 teries were distributed to those corps of the army 
 which stood most in need of them. The garrison 
 of the town, as well as the Polish cavalry, which 
 had been cantoned in its environs, joined the 
 army. M. de Segur himself says, that " shelter 
 " and the issue of supplies effected what menaces 
 " had been insufficient to accomplish : the follow- 
 " ershad rallied, etc. etc."
 
 368 
 
 BOOK X. 
 
 CHAPTERS VIII & IX. 
 
 cc 
 
 The obvious intention of the marechal-des-logis 
 of the palace, in writing these two chapters, in 
 which he gives an account of the events which 
 occurred to Marshal Ney, after his separation 
 from the army, events eminently glorious for the 
 memory of that illustrious officer, interdicts the 
 critical reflections which several passages of that 
 episode suggest. We shall merely notice this 
 observation : " So completely did Marshal Ney 
 possess the true constitution of a great man, — a 
 strong mind in a robust body, — and that vigor- 
 " ous health without which no man can be a hero!" 
 A multitude of examples might be adduced to dis- 
 prove this opinion. It is the effeminacy of the 
 mind which incapicitates the body : a strongly 
 constituted mind, to which dangers serve but to 
 impart increased energy, supports a frail envelope. 
 Ney was a being of this privileged description : 
 even though he should have possessed a feeble 
 body, he would still have been a hero. 
 
 It is to be regretted that M. de Segur has not 
 furnished more details of the brilliant engagement 
 sustained by Marshal Ney at the head of the third
 
 CHAPTERS VIII AND IX. 369 
 
 corps and of the division under Ricard. * Why 
 has he not mentioned that impetuous attack by 
 the 15th light infantry, the 33d, and 48th, who 
 destroyed the Russian line as many as three times, 
 notwithstanding the tremendous fire of more than 
 50 pieces of ordnance ? Why does he not speak 
 of those two brave companies of sappers and 
 miners, commanded by Colonel Bouvier, who 
 perished in that affair ? Why does he say nothing 
 of Generals Dufour and Barbanegre, of Colonel 
 Pelet of the 48th, and of many other officers, who, 
 desirous of surpassing their own soldiers in bra 
 very, fell with them to the cry of viue V Empereur, 
 vive la France! Why does he omit to notice, that 
 it was Colonel Pelet, who, disfigured as he was 
 with blood, induced Marshal Ney to cross the 
 Dnieper to his right, instead of proceeding to 
 Mohilow, on his left, as the Marshal had at first 
 intended ? 
 
 The author should have informed his readers, 
 that the Emperor, on quitting Doubrowna, left 
 instructions with Marshal Davoust, who com- 
 manded the rear-guard, to remain in that town 
 as long as possible, under the impression that 
 Ney might direct his course that way, along the 
 right bank of the Dnieper. So, indeed, occurred 
 
 * After General Friant was wounded, General Ricard com- 
 manded his division, which had been detached from the first 
 corps, and placed under the orders of Marshal Ney, at Smo- 
 lensky 
 
 2b
 
 • 170 BOOK X. 
 
 the fact ; for only a few moments after Davoust's 
 departure, which took place somewhat too prompt- 
 ly, Marshal Ney presented himself before Dou- 
 browna : but the bridge had been destroyed. M. 
 de Segur, who is generally so lavish of detail, 
 leaves much to be desired with respect to the 
 satisfaction expressed by the Emperor, on being 
 informed of the re-appearance of his brave com- 
 panion in arms. That Prince was at Barania, 
 dining with Marshal Lefebvre, when an orderly 
 officer *, whom he had left at Orcha, to distribute 
 the artillery among the different corps of the 
 army, announced to him that some Polish officers 
 had just arrived in the town, and had applied for 
 assistance on the part of Marshal Ney, who was 
 at a few leagues distance. The Emperor immedi- 
 ately rose, and seizing the officer by both arms, 
 ejaculated, with the liveliest emotion : " Is that 
 " really true ? are you sure of it ?" The officer 
 having assured him that he was certain of the 
 fact, that he had accompanied Prince Eugene, 
 who, with his corps, was marching to meet the 
 Marshal ; having, in short, succeeded in convinc- 
 ing the Emperor of the truth of his report, his 
 Majesty exclaimed : " I have two hundred mil- 
 " lions in my cellars at the Tuileries, and I would 
 " have given them all to ensure Ney's safety." 
 
 * M. Gourgaud.
 
 371 
 
 BOOK XL 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 H In this manner the army had, for the third and 
 " last time, re-crossed the Dnieper, a river half 
 " Russian, half Lithuanian, but of Muscovite 
 " origin. 
 
 We shall say nothing about the Muscovite origin 
 of the Dnieper. The question of ascertaining the 
 priority of existence either of Moscow or the 
 Dnieper might be worthy of occupying the sittings 
 of a burlesque academy ; it would form a com 
 panion to the famous question, as to which of the 
 hen or the egg first came into existence. 
 
 The author says, that " the army marched on 
 
 "the 22d from Orcha towards Borisow 
 
 e< through melted snow, and a deep and soft 
 " mud. The weaker men were drowned in it." 
 
 It is a strange abuse of an hyperbole, to say 
 that the mud was so deep that many persons might 
 be drowned in it. No doubt it continued thaw- 
 ing when we left Orcha : but the progress of the 
 thaw was slow. No part of the road was broken 
 in ; its surface of ice and snow was alone covered 
 with water and mud; the frost returned in the 
 night from the 22d to the 23d. 
 
 2b2
 
 it 
 
 a 
 
 372 BOOK XI. 
 
 The author again brings forward his reflections 
 upon the conduct of Napoleon during this cam- 
 paign ; they do not, however, receive more weight 
 or more credit, because they are ascribed to the 
 chiefs of the army. Some are made to say, that 
 " just as Charles XII had brought his army into 
 " the Ukraine, so had Napoleon led his own to 
 
 perish at Moscow ;" others, that " the hope of 
 
 terminating the war in one campaign had been 
 " well-founded ; that, when he pushed his line of 
 " operations .as far as Moscow, Napoleon had 
 " given to so lengthened a column a sufficiently 
 " broad and solid basis." But one of the principal 
 objections with the latter is, that " the first suc- 
 " cesses of Marshal Ney, on the field of battle of 
 " the Moskwa, had not been followed up." 
 
 We have already demonstrated how unfounded 
 was this reproach from M. de Segur to the Em- 
 peror, on the subject of the battle of the Moskwa. 
 We again repeat, that the battle of the Moskwa 
 had all the success which could have been expect- 
 ed ; it was immediately followed by the capture of 
 Moscow ; and peace ought to have been the result 
 of it. The flower of the Russian army perished 
 in that battle ; the Russians admit a loss of fifty 
 thousand men. On what occasion besides, sub- 
 sequently to that battle, did the Russian army 
 display the same character of vigor ; was it at 
 Malo-Jaroslavetz, where it was defeated by three 
 
 French and Italian divisions? Was it at Wiazma, 
 where Miloradowitch was completely routed by
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 373 
 
 our rear-guard ? Was it at Krasnoi, where Kutu- 
 soff,with a hundred thousand Russians, was driven 
 back by Napoleon at the head of fifteen thousand 
 men ? Assuredly, if the latter Russian army had 
 been the same that fought so valiantly in the 
 fields of the Moskwa, we should not have achieved 
 such results. How can our officer of the palace, 
 who describes the French army as entirely disor- 
 ganized, with the exception of the guard, which 
 was its nucleus, presume to blame Napoleon for 
 not ordering this select corps to charge on the 
 occasion of that battle ! The importance of the 
 guard in a retreat, is the best reply that can be 
 given to him. If our army, notwithstanding all 
 the disasters with which it was overwhelmed, was 
 enabled to retire from Russia with all its glory, 
 we are consequently indebted for it to the fore- 
 sight of the Emperor. 
 
 The best proof that the reflections ascribed by 
 Mr. de Segur to our generals were written after 
 the event, is that they are ill-timed. They were 
 not such as could have then been made by the 
 chiefs of the army, who were fully acquainted 
 with the orders and recommendations given by 
 the Emperor, and with the measures which he 
 adopted previously to his arrival at Moscow, and 
 during his stay in that city. They well knew how 
 usefully his time was engaged there, and what 
 were the objects which had exercised the faculties 
 of his acti ve and discerning genius. The im pression 
 created by those salutary arrangements was yet
 
 374 BOOK XI. 
 
 quite recent ; but no trace of it was left in the 
 author's mind. He considers nothing but the re- 
 sult. An historian ought to view matters under 
 a different aspect ; he ought to go back to the 
 times and places; bring every thing into account; 
 interrogate the past, in order not to omit any cir- 
 cumstance that may throw a light upon his narra- 
 tive. The detailed and very exaggerated state- 
 ment he gives of our losses, would lead to sup- 
 pose that he has presented a summary of circum- 
 stantial reports made by the various corps of the 
 army, which could only have been known several 
 months afterwards. How could the army be at 
 that time acquainted with them. It is a fresh proof, 
 in addition to so many others, of the credit due to 
 all those fine speeches. The case is the same with 
 respect to the marches and movements of Schwar- 
 zenberg's troops, which the army is made by M. de 
 Segur to relate with such minute particulars, 
 though they could not have been known until long 
 subsequently to that period. 
 
 The reproaches which he makes to Napoleon 
 " of having left to the Duke of Bassano the direc- 
 " tion of military affairs," are devoid of any foun- 
 dation. The Duke of Bassano was at Wilna with 
 his chancellerie and the diplomatic body, which 
 could not follow the army. He there transacted 
 the business of his department, and exercised like- 
 wise the chief influence over the government of 
 the country. The orders for the military move- 
 ments did not pass through his hands ; they were
 
 CHAPTER I. 375 
 
 always addressed, in a direct maimer, by the 
 Prince of Neufchatel to those generals who were 
 not within that sphere of action to which the Em- 
 peror gave an immediate impulse. If the Duke 
 of Bassano was sometimes apprized of them, it 
 was, that he might be informed of the state of af- 
 fairs, and when the occasion required it, take such 
 measures as unforeseen circumstances might call 
 for. But his intercourse with the heads of the 
 corps stationed upon the Bug and the Dwina, 
 was generally limited to his transmitting to them 
 the information which he received from head- 
 quarters. The well-known activity of this minis- 
 ter leaves no doubt as to the regularity of those 
 communications. But we are not aware whether, 
 at the same time that he was urging Prince 
 Schwarzenberg to accelerate his march and to 
 move forward, he may not have endeavored to 
 avoid creating in him a discouragement which 
 would probably have had the effect of detaining 
 upon the frontiers an ally who was already too 
 little inclined to proceed any distance from it. 
 
 Is it the wish of the Marechal-des-logis of the 
 palace, who constitutes himself in this place 
 the interpreter of the opinion of the army 
 respecting the Austrian general, to exculpate him 
 by making him say that he received contradictory 
 orders, which it was not in his power to carry into 
 effect, and that the Duke of Bassano commu- 
 nicated false intelligence to him ? If these were 
 the only reasons alleged by Prince Schwarzen-
 
 .'376 book xi. 
 
 berg in reply to the serious reproach of having, 
 with the view to cover Warsaw, abandoned his 
 line of operations upon Minsk, which held our 
 magazines, and was in our line of retreat, poste- 
 rity will pronounce upon the merits of such a jus- 
 tification. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The instructions transmitted by Napoleon from 
 Moscow to Marshal Victor on the 6th October, 
 " supposed a brisk attack on the part of Wittgen- 
 " stein or of Titchakoff. They recommended to 
 " Victor to keep in the vicinity of Polosk and of 
 " Minsk ; to have near the person of Schwarzen- 
 u berg a prudent, discreet, and intelligent officer ; 
 " to keep up a regular correspondence with 
 " Minsk, and to send other agents in various di- 
 " rections." 
 
 Those instructions were intended to prevent the 
 disaster consequent upon the capture of Minsk. 
 The author blames the Emperor for not renewing 
 them. " His deputy appeared," he says, " to 
 have forgotten them." And in order to justify 
 the latter, he adds : " In short, when the Empe- 
 ror learned at Dombrowna the loss of Minsk, 
 
 tc
 
 CHAPTER II. 377 
 
 " he did not consider Borisow to be in such press- 
 " ing danger, since, when he crossed the Orcha 
 " on the following day, he caused all his pontoon 
 u equipages to be burned." 
 
 The Emperor no sooner heard of the capture of 
 Minsk, than he ordered the second corps, together 
 with a division of cuirassiers and a hundred pieces 
 of cannon, to march rapidly upon Borisow, whi- 
 ther Dombrowski's division was proceeding, and 
 from thence upon Minsk, as is established by the 
 letter which we have already quoted. 
 
 The Emperor directed that the two pontoon 
 equipages at Orcha should be burned, in order 
 that the horses belonging- to them might be ap- 
 plied to the artillery which was in that town.In- 
 dependently of the difficulty of conducting the 
 pontoon equipages to Borisow, Napoleon could 
 not suppose, at this time, that, in spite of the in- 
 structions he had previously given to the Dukes 
 of Belluno and Reggio, the important point of 
 Borisow would so soon fall into the hands of the 
 enemy. He, therefore, preferred to carry away 
 cannon rather than heavy boats, which appeared 
 useless, and, being ill-secured, would have re- 
 mained upon the road. 
 
 The author now introduces a general of engi- 
 neers, who " questioned by Napoleon, declares 
 " that he sees no other safety than in breaking 
 " through Wittgenstein's army." As Mr de Se- 
 gurs does not give the name of that officer, he 
 probably ushers this new actor upon the boards,
 
 .'378 book xi. 
 
 a 
 
 a 
 it 
 
 in order to allege that this advice was given to the 
 Emperor. He forgets that, in a former page, he 
 made the general of engineers Dode reply toNapo- 
 leon, who had resolved upon going to defeat Witt- 
 genstein, in the direction of Smoliany, that Witt- 
 genstein's position was inaccessible. It is a pity 
 that General Rogniat did not make the campaign 
 of Russia : what important resource would not the 
 learned author of the Considerations sur l y Art de la 
 Guerre have afforded to Mr. de Segur, in all those 
 conversations which he has prepared after the 
 events ! 
 
 The Emperor points out, with his finger upon 
 the map, the course of the Beresina above Bo- 
 risow ; it is at that place that he wishes to cross 
 " the river ; but the (unknown) general represents 
 " to him that TitchakofT is on the right bank ; and 
 " the Emperor selects another point lower down 
 " than the first : then a third still nearer to the 
 " Dnieper. Finding then that he is approaching 
 " the country of the cossacks, he stops and ex- 
 " claims : Ah ! Pultawa indeed ! this is like 
 " Charles XII." 
 
 In order to give credit to this narrative, we 
 ought to suppose great absence of mind either in 
 Napoleon, or in the general of engineers who 
 communicated the anecdote to the author. Na- 
 poleon endeavored to find out a favorable point 
 for crossing the river, above or below Borisow, 
 and those of Beresina and Weselowo were the two 
 which were pointed out to him, it being always his
 
 CHAPTER II. 379 
 
 intention to march upon Minsk or upon Wilna. 
 According to the author, it would appear that, 
 Beresino, which is at the distance of a long march 
 fromBorisow, was not the point chosen, but another 
 much lower down. Now we can discover no 
 other than Bobruisk, a fortified town occupied by 
 the Russians ; this circumstance, combined with 
 the movement of Kutusoff's army upon the lower 
 Beresina, would not have afforded a facility to out- 
 crossing in that direction. That hypothesis is 
 already sufficiently inadmissible. But Mr. de 
 Segur is not contented with it, he makes the Em- 
 peror proceed as far as Pultawa, or more than one 
 hundred and twenty leagues from the point where 
 he actually was ; this is done no doubt to bring 
 about his comparing himself to Charles XII., with- 
 out considering that, in order to make the com- 
 parison, he has chosen two situations entirely dif- 
 ferent from each other. 
 
 With a view to justify such an exclamation on 
 the part of Napoleon, he adds, that this idea made 
 so strong an impression upon him, " that his 
 mind and even his health are affected by it, in a 
 still greater degree than at Malo-Jaroslavetz.' 
 He names as his witness, te a valet-de-chambre 
 " who was alone present at his distressing situa- 
 tion." No one perceived it, and the author gives 
 as a reason, " that the strength of man generally 
 " consists in concealing his weakness." So that 
 our Marechal-des-logis is never at a loss for facts 
 or for reasonings to justify his suppositions. But 
 
 (C
 
 380 BOOK XI. 
 
 as he was determined to write a history, and stood 
 in need of materials to compose it, he was com- 
 pelled to bear all the disadvantage of such a po- 
 sition. He found it necessary to go every where 
 in quest of notes. Each one furnished him with 
 a scrap, which he hastened to place upon record, 
 and to publish without attempting to ascertain 
 its correctness. 
 
 The conversation which he supposes to have 
 been held between Messieurs Duroc and Daru is 
 improbable. They could not, at that time, have 
 entertained the idea of the Emperor's being taken, 
 and becoming a state prisoner. It could only 
 have occurred to the author since 1815. How is 
 it possible to believe, that, with an army at com- 
 mand of fifty thousand men, and a numerous ar- 
 tillery, the Emperor could have dreamed of sur- 
 rendering himself? 
 
 The prince's actions, moreover, afford a suffi- 
 cient refutation of this chapter. The latter is a 
 work of the imagination ; the others bore the 
 stamp of reality. On the night of the 22d to the 
 23d November, he approves Oudinot's resolution 
 to march upon the enemy, and driving them into 
 the Beresina. If the Russians should succeed in 
 destroying the bridge of Borisow, he was to seize 
 upon a point to the right or to the left, and cause 
 redoubts and two bridges to be constructed imme- 
 diately. He directs, at the same moment, that the 
 artillery horses attached to any kind of vehicles 
 should be returned to the artillery and to the am-
 
 CHAPTER II. 381 
 
 munition caissons. When he hears, a few hours 
 afterwards, and during the same night of the 23d 
 November, that the enemy in their flight had 
 broken down the bridge of Borisow, he orders 
 the Major-General to write to Oudinot the follow- 
 ing letter : 
 
 " M. Le Due Reggio, I have just received your 
 " letter dated Naeza the 22d. The Duke of Bel- 
 " luno will arrive at Kolopenitchi this day. On 
 " the 24th he will move upon Baran. Endeavor 
 " to take possession of the ford of Weselowoas soon 
 as possible, and to have bridges, redoubts, and 
 abatis prepared for its defence. We may from 
 " thence return to the tete de pont of Borisow, 
 for the purpose of driving the enemy from it, 
 or else return towards Minsk, or lastly, as you 
 propose it, we might move upon Vileika by the 
 il road which you constructed, and found very 
 " serviceable." 
 
 We shall, however, close those observations, 
 by quoting a passage from the work of Colonel 
 Boutourlin, (page 362, vol. ii.) We therein find, 
 that a Russian does more justice to the Emperor 
 than is done to him by a Frenchman : " In this 
 ee . situation, however, the most perilous in which 
 " he (Napoleon) had ever been placed, this great 
 " Captain was not inferior to himself. Unde- 
 " pressed by the urgency of the danger, he dared 
 " to measure it with an eye of genius, and still 
 ci found resources there, where a less skilful, or 
 
 
 a 
 a 
 a
 
 38*2 book xr . 
 
 " less resolute General would not have suspected 
 " the existence of any." 
 
 « n 
 
 it 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The letter we have quoted at the end of the pre- 
 ceding chapter, gives no indication of an act of 
 despair on the part of the Emperor. He quietly 
 issues his orders for the passage of the Beresina ; 
 and yet the author says, that " since the 23d, 
 " Napoleon prepared for it, as for a desperate 
 act." In support of this assertion, he adds : 
 He caused the eagles of all the corps to be 
 " brought before him and burned." 
 
 This is an untrue assertion. If we suppose that 
 the Emperor entertained such an idea, it could 
 not be carried into effect ; those eagles were of 
 brass. How, besides, are we to suppose that, at 
 the moment when this Prince is ordering that the 
 scattered soldiers be picked up, and that muskets, 
 carbines, and ammunition, be distributed to them, 
 when, by the junction of the corps of Oudinot and 
 Victor with those which had come from Moscow, 
 he was still at the head of nearly fifty thousand 
 men and of a formidable artillery, how are we to 
 suppose that he should have adopted such a mea-
 
 CHAPTER III. 383 
 
 sure, which was only calculated to give the signal 
 for a general disorganization, and would have 
 been tantamount to exclaiming sauve qui pent ? 
 Napoleon, at the head of fifty thousand men, 
 might move in every direction ; and had even the 
 passage of the Beresina been found impracticable, 
 neither the Emperor nor the army would have 
 been lost. The author appears to have forgotten 
 the genius of our chief, the bravery of our soldiers, 
 and the battles of Malo- Jaroslavetz, Wiazma, and 
 Krasnoi. He, however, admits that, after passing 
 Smorgoni, the greater part of the colonels still 
 marched with some officers round their eagle. Mar- 
 shal Ney, in a letter to the Prince of Neufchatel, 
 dated the 2d December, announces that he has 
 sent on the eagles after the guard.* 
 
 * The Duke of Elchingen to the Prince of Neufchatel. 
 
 Bialtze, 2d December, 1812. 
 
 Monseigneur, I this moment received the letter your Serene 
 Highness has done me the honor of writing to me at one o'clock 
 this morning, in order to acquaint me that the Marshal Duke of 
 Belluno is ordered to form the rear-guard. I have collected in 
 this place whatever infantry remains of the second and fifth 
 corps, as well as the brigades of light cavalry under Generals 
 Castex and Corbineau, and General Doumerc's division of 
 cuirassiers. 
 
 I leave with the Duke of Belluno the cavalry, a battery of 
 four- 1 2 pounders and two howitzers. I march with the infan- 
 try in echelons in the rear, so as to be able to defend the bridges 
 and defiles ; for I cannot hope to form a reserve with the thou- 
 sand men that remain to me. 
 
 / have sent after the guard the skeletons of the troops of
 
 384 BOOK XI. 
 
 Mr. de Segur contents himself with quoting-, by 
 the way, the sacred battalion, which he states to 
 have consisted of about five hundred commanders. 
 He seems to have no other object in view, when 
 he notices this fact, than to shew the wretchedness 
 of our cavalry. And yet the devoted conduct of 
 those officers, who placed themselves in the ranks, 
 who tended their horses, and went out as vedettes, 
 etc. etc. was well worthy of being noticed. 
 
 The marechal-des-logis of the palace supposes 
 that the road from Tolaczin to Borisow crosses 
 through the forest of Minsk, whereas this forest is 
 situated in the government of Minsk, and on the 
 right bank of the Beresina. He likewise sup- 
 poses that " the French army glided hastily 
 
 along through those woods, when the cannon 
 
 of Wittgenstein was heard upon our right. 
 " Their threatening report," he says, <r made us 
 " accelerate our march." Such reflections should 
 have been left to Russian gazetteers. 
 
 After presenting a frightful picture of the 
 French army, which he causes to march before the 
 second and ninth corps ; " The second and ninth 
 " corps," he says, " were staggered at the sight 
 
 
 the third corps, together with the eagles. I think that my 
 presence in this place is not very necessary, and that I may, 
 without inconvenience, leave General Maison in the command. 
 
 I cannot afford to your Highness any intelligence derived 
 from the prisoners of war ; because those prisoners were imme- 
 diately sent to the imperial head-quarters. 1 am, &c.
 
 CHAPTER III. 385 
 
 " of so great a disaster. Disorder spread among 
 " them." The best reply to this accusation is to 
 be found in the conduct of those two corps, and 
 in the engagements which they fought on both 
 banks of the Beresina. 
 
 After so much verbosity and incoherent writing, 
 our author says that "no one doubted of vic- 
 " tory. . . . ; that the army felt itself overcome by 
 " nature only : the sight of its Emperor cheered 
 " it up again — . ; he was yet, then, to be found 
 " in the midst of his army, like hope in the human 
 " heart. . . . ; it appeared as if among so many 
 " evils, the greatest was that of giving him dis- 
 M pleasure, etc. etc." Such indeed were the real 
 sentiments of the army, as is described by Mr. de 
 Segur himself : truth must eventually prevail. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 When it was ascertained, by the return of Gene- 
 ral Corbineau, that the ford of Studzianka was 
 practicable, this point was fixed upon for the pas- 
 sage. Two others had been reconnoitred. The 
 question, therefore, was to deceive and to dis- 
 lodge the enemy. " As force could do nothing, 
 " recourse was had to stratagem." These expres- 
 
 2c
 
 386 book xi. 
 
 sions would lead one to believe that the author 
 does not know how a river may be crossed against 
 all opposition. Surely, with the powerful artillery 
 we had still at command (that of the guard was 
 yet entire), and protected as we were by the eleva- 
 tion of the bank which we occupied at Studzi- 
 anka, a few moments would have sufficed us to 
 beat down the Russian artillery on the opposite 
 bank ; the passage would have been equally ef- 
 fected, but with a loss which the Emperor was 
 desirous of avoiding. If he made a shew upon 
 several points, it was in order to compel Titcha- 
 koff to divide his forces, and to save from an at- 
 tack by the whole combined Russianarmy, the first 
 troops that would attempt to cross. 
 
 This passage would have commenced on the 24th, 
 if the bridge scaffoldings which Marshal Oudi- 
 not was to have established, and the construction 
 of which had been confided to the colonel of artil- 
 lery Lafont, had been properly made. Unfortu- 
 nately this important construction was carried on 
 with so much negligence, that General Eble* found 
 it necessary to have those scaffoldings burned, and 
 fresh ones made on the 25th. If we are to believe 
 Mr. de Segur, the Emperor had taken no precau- 
 tionary means for the establishment of bridges. 
 It was the Emperor, however, who, at Orcha, gave 
 orders for carrying away from the two pontoon 
 equipages that were in that town, all the tools, 
 forges, utensils, irons, coal, etc. that might be 
 found necessary for constructing bridges upon
 
 CHAPTER IV. 387 
 
 scaffolding's. All that materiel was extremely well 
 mounted. The pontoon equipages, as we have 
 already observed, had furnished horses at Orcha 
 for mounting- several batteries. General Eble" 
 had with him four companies of pontoniers, 
 amounting to four hundred men, who had all pre- 
 served their muskets. 
 
 They were not sappers but pontoniers, who 
 placed themselves in the water, notwithstanding 
 the flakes of ice which floated down the Beresina. 
 The sappers were only employed in the construc- 
 tion of the scaffoldings. 
 
 " On this occasion the winter showed itself 
 " more Russian than the Russians themselves ; the 
 " latter were wanting to their season, which was 
 " not wanting to them." We repeat what we 
 have already stated, that the Russians could not 
 have prevented our crossing, even if they had 
 been as Russian as the winter itself. A river, 
 which is a hundred and eight yards wide and only 
 six feet deep, is not an insurmountable obstacle 
 for an army that occupies the more elevated bank, 
 and is enabled to line it with a numerous artil- 
 lery. 
 
 2 c 2
 
 388 book xi. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Our officer of the palace said in the third chapter 
 that Napoleon, when making his arrangements 
 for crossing the Beresina, " had been preparing 
 " for it, as for a desperate act." He says in this 
 place that u when he quitted Borisow, he imagin- 
 " ed he was setting out for a desperate contest." 
 We have already, in chapters III and IV, given a 
 reply to this supposition. We shall not repeat 
 what we stated upon that subject. 
 
 The author says that " Napoleon rejected, as a 
 t( disgraceful course, as a cowardly flight," the 
 proposals to save his person, which he alleges to 
 have been made to him by the King of Naples. 
 First, it is very doubtful that the King of Naples 
 ever made to the Emperor a similar proposal. Mr. 
 de Segur however adds, " He was not at all dis- 
 " pleased with Murat, probably because that 
 prince had afforded him an opportunity of dis- 
 playing his firmness, etc. etc." This is not the 
 first time we have had occasion to notice that de- 
 plorable turn of mind, which leads the author to 
 neglect truth, and what bears the appearance of 
 it, in order to make a show of a knowledge of the 

 
 CHAPTER V. 389 
 
 human heart, superior to that of any other indi- 
 vidual, and to state what has been remarked by 
 no one but himself. Larochefoucault, in his book 
 of Maxims, has exhibited personal interest as the 
 main spring of human actiors. Mr. de Segur goes 
 farther ; he adds to it a brutal egotism, and a 
 spirit of injustice wholly gratuitous. In his pre- 
 sumption of having alone fathomed the Emperor, 
 of having surprised his secret however concealed 
 in the inmost recess of the heart, he seems to have 
 fancied him as a being mysterious, incomprehen- 
 sible, out of the pale of humanity, such as the ge- 
 nius of Lord Byron has described Manfred to us. 
 Napoleon displays a noble and generous senti- 
 ment ; the author's reflection discolors him. It 
 was natural for Napoleon to be beholden to Murat 
 for the intention ; but this would be too vulgar 
 a feeling ! According to Mr. de Segur, he is con- 
 tented not to be displeased with him, because his 
 vanity and egotism are consulted. The disposition 
 to torture in this manner the mind and the senti- 
 ments of his hero, is well worthy of observation. 
 
 " The Emperor impatient to take possession of 
 " the opposite bank, points it out to the bravest. 
 " The French aid-de-camp Jacqueminot, and the 
 " Lithuanian Count Predziecki were the first to 
 " plunge into the river, etc." 
 
 The author's constant object is to shew that 
 every thing in the French army was done without 
 order, and that, at the moment of crossing the 
 river, it thought itself quite lost ; but such was
 
 390 BOOK XI. 
 
 not the case. The Emperor had no occasion to 
 point out the bank to the bravest, whom it would 
 have been difficult to select without doing injury 
 to the rest. Besides, bravery can only be displayed 
 where danger is to be encountered ; and the only 
 one, in this circumstance, was that of passing a 
 river which had some floating ice upon it. Na- 
 poleon issued his orders ; and from the marshal 
 down to the armed soldier, all hastened to obey 
 them. A squadron (of Corbineau's brigade), each 
 man of which had a foot soldier behind him, was 
 the first to cross over, having been preceded by a 
 few marksmen. This squadron was shortly after 
 supported by part of the brigade, which formed 
 in order of battle on the right bank, for the pur- 
 pose of keeping off the cossacks, and of facilitat- 
 ing the works on the bridge. The Emperor like- 
 wise directed one of his officers* to swim across, 
 in order to reconnoitre if the ground on the oppo- 
 site bank would allow of artillery to pass without 
 the necessity of employing fascines. In the mean- 
 while some infantry was ferried over to the other 
 side upon rafts, for the purpose of removing the 
 briars which covered it, and of driving the cos- 
 sacks away. 
 
 Napoleon had ordered three bridges to be con- 
 structed, two by the artillery, and one by the 
 engineer corps. But the river having been found 
 
 * Mr Gourgaud.
 
 C H APT K R V. 391 
 
 wider than was supposed, General Chasseloup, 
 of the engineers, declared that he could not con- 
 struct that third bridge, and he gave back the sap- 
 pers to General Ebl6, at the same time with the 
 scaffolding which he had prepared for the occasion. 
 The upper bridge was completed at one o'clock 
 (the 26th); it was intended for the infantry. The 
 Emperor caused Oudinot's corps to pass immedi- 
 ately. The cavalry brigade of Castex was the 
 first to cross over ; it was followed by Albert's in- 
 fantry brigade, then by the rest of Legrand's di- 
 vision and by the whole of the second corps ; 
 those troops were full of ardor. Two pieces of 
 cannon also passed over upon the bridge. Mar- 
 shal Oudinot took up a position with his troops 
 on the road to Borisow, which covered the road 
 to Zembin. 
 
 The second bridge, at the distance of three 
 hundred yards from the first, and destined to take 
 the vehicles over, was completed at four o'clock. 
 The artillery of the second corps, that of the 
 guard, the grand park of artillery,* together with 
 that of the other corps of the army filed off in re- 
 gular succession. It often happened that the 
 scaffolding of this bridge, by entering deeper into 
 the mud of the river, caused interruptions in the 
 passage, and called for repairs ; but the brave 
 
 * The grand park, under the orders of General Neigre, con- 
 sisted of three hundred carriages, fifty of which were gun- 
 carriages.
 
 392 book xi. 
 
 pontoniers, cheered by the presence of the Em- 
 peror, and encouraged by General Elbe" and by 
 their officers (Messieurs Chapelle, Chapuis, Pey- 
 herinoff, Zabern, Delarue, etc. etc.*) overcame 
 every obstacle. Immersed into the icy water to 
 the very shoulders, they worked incessantly to 
 repair and keep up the bridges: a devotedness 
 truly heroical, and almost beyond the power of 
 humanity ! M. de Segur should have considered, 
 that an army which reckoned such soldiers in its 
 ranks, could not be conquered by the Russians. 
 
 He says that the Emperor, when he saw his 
 troops in possession of the opposite bank, ex- 
 claimed : " Behold my star again !" From the 
 moment that Napoleon was enabled to range his 
 cannon in battery, he might consider himself as 
 master of the opposite bank, since no Russian bat- 
 tery could have withstood our fire. Properly 
 speaking, the passage across presented no danger 
 except in case the corps of TitchakofFhad appeared 
 in strength, to prevent us from debouching from 
 the bridge, or of his merely destroying the nume- 
 rous bridges which are thrown over the marshes, 
 on the road to Zembin. Now, the battles we had 
 
 * We regret being unable to name all the officers, non-com- 
 missioned officers and pontoniers, who have deserved to be 
 held up to the gratitude of the army. Those intrepid soldiers 
 sacrificed their lives almost to a man, without boasting and 
 without hesitation, simply from a principle of honor, and from 
 a sense of duty.
 
 CHAPTER V. 393 
 
 fought since the Moskwa, and the brilliant charge 
 made by General Berkeim against Lambert's divi- 
 sion, belonging to the corps of Titchakoff, afforded 
 us the conviction that the Russians could not 
 succeed in detaining us. The Emperor could not, 
 therefore, have said: Behold my star again! 
 Where, besides, did the author hear this prince 
 speaking of his star ? If Napoleon had had any- 
 con fidence in it, he would have taken care not to 
 proclaim it so openly on every occasion. 
 
 The reflection which follows, appears to us a 
 contradiction. " For he was a believer in fa- 
 " tality ,like all conquerors, those men, who having 
 " had the largest accounts with fortune, well 
 " know what they owe to her, and who, more- 
 " over, having no intermediate power between 
 " themselves and heaven, feel that they are more 
 " immediately under its protection." If conquer- 
 ors do believe in fatality, they are superstitious. 
 If they acknowledge that they owe every thing to 
 chance or to fortune, they are materialists. If 
 they have no intermediate power between them- 
 selves and heaven, they must attribute every thing 
 to God. Now, they cannot be superstitious, ma- 
 terialists, and exceedingly religious, at one and 
 the same time. Thus, in the whole course of the 
 work contradictions alternately pass from facts 
 to reasonings.
 
 394 BOOK XI. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 " Napoleon felt pleased at proclaiming aloud the 
 " successes of Prince Schwarzenberg over Sacken, 
 " with the addition, that Schwarzenberg had im- 
 " mediately turned back upon Titchakoff and was 
 " coming to our assistance." 
 
 The Emperor imagined, that as soon as 
 Schwarzenberg should hear of Titchakoff *s move- 
 ment upon Minsk, he would hasten to follow him 
 in that direction. We shall not explain the slowness 
 shewed by that general at the time we speak of; 
 subsequent events have sufficiently accounted for 
 the causes which operated on the conduct of the 
 Austrians on that important occasion, the conse- 
 sequences of which so fatally influenced the mis- 
 fortunes of the army. 
 
 The marechal-des-logis of the palace insinuates, 
 that Titchakoff only quitted the Bug to come and 
 oppose our passing the Beresina. It was only 
 subsequently to the events, that it was supposed 
 his movement was made with that object in view. 
 The fact is, that Titchakoff marched towards 
 Minsk and the Beresina, in order to attempt a 
 junction with Wittgenstein. Consequently after 
 he had taken Borisow, he hastened to send Lam-
 
 CHAPTER VI. 395 
 
 bert's division across the Beresina, for the pur- 
 pose of meeting Wittgenstein. But that division 
 having been routed by Berkeim's brigade,*belong- 
 ing to the corps of Oudinot, this check on the one 
 hand, and on the other, the information commu- 
 nicated by Wittgenstein, and KutusofFs orders 
 which the admiral received at that moment, made 
 him resolve to descend the Beresina, and to draw 
 nearer to the grand Russian army. 
 
 Throughout the whole of this chapter, the au- 
 thor seems to have at heart to convince his readers 
 that the successful passage of the Beresina by the 
 French army, is owing to the hesitation which 
 Admiral Titchakoff shewed in his manoeuvres. 
 Without attempting to attack or defend the mili- 
 tary operations of that general, we shall confine 
 ourselves to stating, that if he had even taken up 
 a position opposite the point which the Emperor 
 had resolved to cross over, the passage would 
 still have been effected ; but the two armies would 
 have had to regret the loss of a great many 
 soldiers. 
 
 " Titchakoff might, on the following day, the 
 " 27th, have put to the rout, with his eighteen 
 " thousand men, the seven thousand soldiers of 
 " Oudinot and Dombrowski." 
 
 In order to reply to this assertion, we are 
 obliged to repeat what we have already stated, 
 that our artillery consisted of upwards of two 
 hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, well mounted. 
 The right bank had an uninterrupted command
 
 ;W6 BOOK XI. 
 
 over the left bank of the Beresina, at that point 
 where it is only a hundred and eight yards wide ; 
 our grape shot would have cleared all the ap- 
 proaches of that river, and the enemy's batteries 
 would have been under the necessity of keeping 
 out of the reach of our cannon, to avoid total des- 
 truction. The enemy, then, could no longer have 
 interrupted the construction of our bridges; and 
 under the fire of all our artillery, the army would 
 have ranged itself in order of battle beyond the 
 river, for the purpose of marching up from thence 
 to the enemy, if he had ventured upon a ma- 
 noeuvre similar to that which was attempted by 
 Vendome, to prevent Eugene's debouching from 
 his bridge at Cassano. In our situation it would 
 have been nothing more than an ordinary battle, 
 in which all the chances of success would have 
 been in our favor, because our army might have 
 deployed, and that independently of the quality 
 of our troops, and the enthusiasm which they de- 
 rived from existing circumstances, we should have 
 found ourselves superior to the Russians in num- 
 bers. Titchakoff would have had to fight not 
 only against the seven thousand soldier* o/Oudinot, 
 but also against the imperial guard, the corps of 
 Eugene, Ney, and Davoust, forming together a 
 mass of troops much more numerous than the 
 admiral's forces. 
 
 Now that the events are removed from us, it is 
 perhaps to be regretted that Titchakoff did not 
 manoeuvre in that manner. For, according to every
 
 OH APT EC VI. 397 
 
 probability, his army would have been destroyed 
 by ours ; and however great might have been our 
 losses, it would have been preferable for us to 
 perish there as conquering soldiers, than a few 
 days afterwards, from the intenseness of the cold. 
 The losses we suffered at the passage of the Be- 
 resina, are to be attributed to the negligence with 
 which the Emperor's orders for making the neces- 
 sary preparations to cross, were carried into 
 effect ; such as the construction of scaffoldings, 
 etc. We have already seen that the corps of Mar- 
 shal Oudinot, was in possession of the point at 
 which a passage was to be effected, two days be- 
 fore the Emperor's arrival, but that the scaffold- 
 ing had been prepared with such little care, that 
 it was found necessary to begin it again. But for 
 this circumstance, the passage would have taken 
 place twenty-four hours sooner, and without any 
 loss. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 On the 26th November, Marshal Victor regained 
 at Lochnitza, the road which the army had fol- 
 lowed on its return from Moscow : General Par- 
 touneaux was directed to form the rear-guard 
 with his division ; Victor occupied Borisow with
 
 398 BOOK XI. 
 
 his other two divisions. At four o'clock in the 
 morning of the 27th, this Marshal commenced his 
 march in order to reach Studzianka, where he took 
 up a position at an early hour. He was replaced 
 at Borisow by General Partouneaux. It were to 
 be wished that Mr. de Segur had made us ac- 
 quainted with the instructions left by Marshal 
 Victor with this general, and informed us at what 
 time he was to quit Borisow. He asserts that 
 Partouneaux " was preparing to quit it, when an 
 " order reached him from the Emperor himself, to 
 H remain there all night." This fact is not cor- 
 rectly laid down ; the Emperor did not send to 
 Partouneaux the order to pass the night at Bori- 
 sow. That General himself declares, that it was 
 brought to him by an officer from the Prince of 
 Neufchatel. But in such a case, the officer must 
 have brought a written order ; for those sent by 
 the major-general, were always of the latter des- 
 cription, when any other officers than his aids-de- 
 camp were the bearers of them. Besides, this 
 was not the usual course ; and nothing required 
 its being altered. If Napoleon had intended that 
 Partouneaux's division should remain at Borisow 
 during the night from the 27th to the 28th, he 
 would have directed the Prince of Neufchatel to 
 issue to Marshal Victor his instructions to that 
 effect ; or had he wished to convey a direct order 
 to General Partouneaux, he would have sent one 
 of his aids-de-cainp or orderly officers to him :
 
 CHAPTER VII. 399 
 
 whereas, the mission was not confided to any of 
 them. 
 
 " Napoleon no doubt imagined that he would 
 " thus direct upon Borisow the whole attention 
 H of the three Russian generals ; and that, by Par- 
 " touneaux's keeping- them engaged upon that 
 " point, he would be afforded sufficient time to 
 " effect the passage of his whole army." Our 
 historian does not supply the dates which we hare 
 quoted above. Had he so done, the reader would 
 readily perceive how unfounded was the pretended 
 motive for the stay of Partouneaux at Borisow. 
 During the 26th, in the night that followed it, and 
 on the 27th, nearly the whole French army had 
 crossed the Beresina, with the exception of the 
 corps of Marshal Victor. The occupation of Bo- 
 risow, during the night from the 27th to the 28th, 
 not only would, therefore, have been unnecessary, 
 but have endangered the retreat of his division. For 
 since this division was falling back on the 27th, 
 as we have just stated it, every result that was 
 expected from the presence of the French troops 
 at Borisow, had been actually obtained. 
 
 " A multitude of stragglers, by falling back 
 " upon Partouneaux, gave him the information 
 " that he was separated from the rest of the army ;" 
 this circumstance determined him to quit the 
 town and rejoin his corps. The enemy intercepts 
 his way ; Partouneaux attacks them, and is re- 
 pulsed. He refuses to surrender ; " he wishes to 
 " make a last effort, and to force an opening to
 
 400 BOOK X'. 
 
 " the bridges of Stndzianka ; but those men, lately 
 " so brave, now degraded by misery, basely des- 
 " troyed their arms." 
 
 General Partouneaux might reasonably have 
 hoped to compel the corps which was opposed to 
 him to open a passage ; for that corps was placed 
 between two fires. He would probably have suc- 
 ceeded in the attack, had he made it with the 
 whole of his division. It seems that a false report 
 led him to believe that the French army had 
 crossed the bridges and had burned them ; this 
 circumstance put an end to all his hopes. It is 
 untrue that his soldiers basely destroyed their arms, 
 as is proved by a letter from the general, in which 
 he bestows the highest encomiums upon them. 
 That letter is in our possession. 
 
 " He fancied himself abandoned, betrayed." 
 General Partouneaux believing that the bridges 
 had been burned, might well consider himself as 
 abandoned to his own resources, but he certainly 
 never could believe that Marshal Victor intended 
 to betray him to the enemies, and we have no fear 
 of being contradicted by that general, when we 
 affirm that he never thought himself betrayed. . . . 
 In the critical situation in which he was involved, 
 perhaps he might have taken better means to ex- 
 tricate himself. We shall not venture to make 
 any reflections upon this subject, persuaded as we 
 are, that, in the course he adopted, he thought he 
 was acting for the best. 
 
 " Of all that division, one single battalion es-
 
 a 
 a 
 et 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 40 1 
 
 " caped. It is said, that its commander turning 
 " round to his soldiers, enjoined them strictly to 
 " follow his own movements, and that he would 
 u kill the first man who should speak of surren- 
 dering. . . . He then quits the fatal road ; glides 
 along the banks of the river, follows all its wind- 
 ings, and protected by the fight in which his 
 " less fortunate companions were engaged, by the 
 " darkness, by the very obstacles of the ground, 
 " he files off in a dead silence, escapes from the 
 " enemy, and brings to Victor a confirmation of 
 " Partouneaux's defeat." 
 
 This narrative is incorrect. The battalion al- 
 luded to, belonged to the fifty-fifth regiment, and 
 was commanded by Mr. Joyeux. He had been 
 directed to destroy the bridges upon the Ska, and 
 to form the extreme rear-guard from Borisow. 
 Upon quitting that town, he followed the left road 
 which the army had taken, and along which the 
 covered waggons and the baggage were still 
 proceeding on their way, and arrived at Studzi- 
 anka unmolested, and bringing with him one can- 
 non and its caisson. The Emperor anxious that 
 Partouneaux's division should unite itself to the 
 other two divisions of Marshal Victor, in order to 
 cover Studzianka, sent one of his orderly officers* 
 to meet him. This officer found the battalion of 
 the fifty-fifth regiment upon the road. He in- 
 
 * Mr. Gourgaud. 
 2 D
 
 402 BOOK XF. 
 
 quired if Partouneaux's division was at a great 
 distance : " What ! Partouneaux's division," re- 
 plied the commandant of the battalion ; " it takes 
 " the lead of me ; I form its rear-guard." The 
 orderly officer having well satisfied himself that 
 there were none but Russian troops behind, re- 
 turned to the Emperor with the fatal intelligence. 
 This prince appeared to be much astonished at the 
 circumstance, which he was unable to account 
 for. The loss of Partouneaux's division sorely 
 affected him, as it was calculated to do, since, from 
 the very commencement of the campaign, it was 
 the only organized corps that had fallen into the 
 enemy's power. But it is untrue that he used the 
 word defection. That expression was not known 
 in the French army. As a fresh proof that Napo- 
 leon did not consider the misfortune which befel 
 Partouneaux's division as proceeding from defec- 
 tion, it may be stated that, in 1813, he appointed 
 three children of that general to places in the 
 public Lyceums. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Emperor, says Mr. de Segur, refused to order 
 the vehicles, which covered the left bank of the 
 Beresina, to be burned. That prince had no ur- 
 gent reasons for causing the baggage waggons re-
 
 CHAPTER Vlfl. 403 
 
 maining there to be burned : the only motive he 
 could have had, would have been to avoid leaving 
 any trophies to the enemy; but what miserable 
 trophies a number of baggage waggons would 
 make ! This was moreover a very unimportant 
 consideration, compared with the condition to 
 which the loss would have reduced numbers of 
 wounded, and of families who had followed the 
 French army on its departure from Moscow, and 
 who, even though they should fall into the hands 
 of the enemy, might still not be totally destitute. 
 Even in a military point of view, it was perhaps 
 advantageous to leave the approaches to the 
 bridge encumbered after the passage of the army 
 and its artillery ; since a new obstacle would thus 
 be thrown in the way of the enemy. The author 
 adds, that it was " from a leaning to the advice 
 " which flattered him most," (a remark as untrue 
 as it is puerile,) " and out of tenderness for the 
 " situation of so many men, with whose misfor- 
 " tunes he reproached himself." If this is an ac- 
 cusation directed against the authors of the war, 
 it does not affect the Emperor ; if against his con- 
 duct during the expedition, it is unjust and male- 
 volent. Is it with these pedantic dissertations, 
 and continual suppositions, that history should be 
 written ? 
 
 The estimate made by our writer of the Russian 
 and French troops engaged on the 28th, is far re- 
 moved from the truth. " Titchakoff with his 
 4 ' 27,000 Russians of the armv of the south, sal- 
 
 2d2
 
 404 BOOK XI. 
 
 " lied forth from Stakowa upon Oudinot, Ney, 
 ". and Dombrowski. These numbered in their 
 " ranks scarcely 8,000 men, supported by the old 
 '•' and young; guard, then consisting of 2,800 mus- 
 " kets, and 900 sabres." 
 
 Oudinot's corps, and the division under Dom- 
 biowski, comprised 9,300 men ; that of Marshal 
 Ney, 5,400. The infantry of the old guard, which 
 on leaving Smoiensko, consisted of 5,777 men, 
 still numbered 4,500 ; the young guard 2,200 ; 
 the cavalry of the guard 2,000 ; the dismounted 
 guard under the orders of Colonel (since General) 
 Dautancourt, 1,800 ; Marshal Victor's corps, re- 
 duced to the two divisions commanded by Daen- 
 dels and Girard comprised more than 1,100. 
 Making, together, with Eugene's and Davoust's 
 corps, and our numerous artillery, an army of 
 45,000 men completely equipped.; 
 
 " Among the losses of that day, that of young 
 " Noailles, an aid-de-camp to JBerthier, was re- 
 li marked : a ball killed him on the spot. He was 
 one of those meritorious, but too ardent officers, 
 who are prodigal of themselves, and who are 
 thought to be sufficiently recompensed by being- 
 employed." 
 
 M. de Noailles was undoubtedly an estimable 
 officer ; but why should be alone be selected for 
 praise, out of so many brave individuals who dis- 
 tinguished themselves upon this occasion ? The 
 author says not a word of General Legrand, who 
 was wounded and behaved with the greatest in
 
 CHAPTER VJII. 405 
 
 trepidity ; of General Maison, who equally dis- 
 tinguised himself; of General Candras who Avas 
 killed ; of Generals Merle, Grundler, and Ber- 
 keim ; of General Zajonczek, that Nestor of the 
 Polish army, whose leg was shot off; of the brave 
 Colonel Dubois of the 7th curassiers, who contri- 
 buted so much to the success of the affair. It is 
 true that those officers bear names which glory 
 alone has ennobled. Moreover, when facts are 
 stated, they sould be stated correctly. It is not 
 true, that M. de Noailles was killed by a ball. 
 He had come with an order to the 23d regiment of 
 chasseurs, and was speaking with Colonel Mar- 
 bot, who commanded that regiment, when the 
 Russian cavalry made a charge. The horse of 
 Alfred de Noailles fell ; and two cossacks were 
 seen to drag away that officer by the collar, strik- 
 ing him at the same time. The 23d made an at- 
 tempt to rescue him, which however was unsuc- 
 cessful ; and M. de Noailles, who has not since 
 been heard of, was probably massacred by the 
 barbarians. 
 
 In his account of this engagement, M. de Segur 
 has forgotten to notice the orders sent by the 
 Emperor to the division under Daendels, to re- 
 cross the Beresina, in order to assist Marshal 
 Victor, who, with only Girard's division, was 
 maintaining a most unequal conflict against the 
 efforts of Wittgenstein ; and this at the moment 
 when the Emperor and the troops which had 
 crossed the Beresina, were violently' attacked by
 
 406 pook xi. 
 
 the army of Moldavia. It is true that, by record- 
 ing such a fact, the author would himself have 
 again refuted that passage of his work, in which 
 he says, that " Napoleon felt that nothing was now 
 " to be done but to sacrifice the army successive- 
 " ly, part by part, beginning by the extremities, 
 " to save the head." 
 
 " Night fell before Wittgenstein's 40,000 Rus- 
 " sians could make any impression upon Belluno's 
 " 6,000 men. If, in the course of the whole cam- 
 paign, the Russians had furnished the historian 
 of the grand army with so glorious an incident as 
 that supplied by the soldiers of Victor, he would 
 undoubtedly have been less sparing of commenda- 
 tion. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 In this chapter the officer of the palace heaps 
 horrors upon horrors. It is true that, on the last 
 day of the passage, the vicinity of the bridges was 
 much encumbered ; but his description of the 
 scene is exaggerated beyond all measure. His 
 taste for hideous descriptions carries him away : 
 " The most fortunate gained the bridge, but had 
 to pass over heaps of half suffocated wounded, 
 women, and children, whom in their efforts they 
 " could not avoid trampling on !" There were in 
 the army a few cantinieres, and a very .small nitm- 

 
 CHAPTER IX. 4()7 
 
 ber of children. Several families having followed 
 us, on our return from Moscow, the number of 
 these became augmented. The idea of women 
 and children struggling with death seems to have 
 taken the fancv of more than one of the writers 
 who have described this campaign : Such afflict- 
 ing pictures are calculated to make a deep im- 
 pression upon the mind. But M. de Segur has 
 surpassed his predecessors, Labaume, Puib usque, 
 Kerporter, etc. He re-produces the image at. 
 every moment ; and in three pages mentions the 
 women and children four times ; as if their num- 
 bers had been immense, and instead of an army, 
 it had been a wandering horde of Tartars, drag- 
 ging their families about with them. 
 
 The night from the 28th to the 29th came but 
 to augment all these horrors. Its darkness did 
 not rob the enemy's cannon of their victims. 
 Contrasted with the snow, which covered all else, 
 the course of the river, and that black mass of 
 men, horses, and carriages, together with the 
 
 * clamors proceeding from it, enabled the Rus- 
 sian artillery-men to direct their fire. Towards 
 
 * nine in the evening the desolation was still fur- 
 " ther increased when Victor commenced his re- 
 " treat." 
 
 This fanciful description seems to have been de- 
 signed by M. de Segur as the finishing stroke to his 
 picture. During the nights of our passage, the 
 bridges remained entirely free. The mass of 
 stragglers who endeavored to pass during the 
 
 a 
 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 it 
 u
 
 408 BOOK XI. 
 
 day, retired at night to their bivouacs, which 
 neither orders nor entreaties could induce them 
 to quit. If the Russians had continued their fire 
 during- the night, these stragglers would have has- 
 tened to avail themselves of the free passage over the 
 bridges to cross the river : but the fact was not so. 
 On the 28th, the day of the glorious battle of the 
 ninth corps, the firing ceased on both sides, at about 
 five in the afternoon. At nine o'clock Marshal 
 Victor commenced his retreat, and by one in the 
 morning the whole corps, with its artillery, had 
 passed in perfect order, leaving on the left bank 
 only a small rear-guard. Nearly at the same 
 time, the two divisions of light artillery, command- 
 ed by Colonels Chopin and Serrurier, passed also. 
 During the whole of the night the enemy did not 
 fire a single shot. The author intimates as much 
 himself, by saying that " the multitude, benumbed 
 " by the cold, or too anxious about their baggage, 
 " refused to profit by this last night, by passing 
 " over to the opposite bank." Fie says, that, 
 " even the measure of setting fire to the waggons 
 " was found insufficient to induce those unfortu- 
 " nate beings to quit them." Assuredly, if the 
 Russians, as before observed, had sent a few balls 
 among these lethargic and improvident creatures, 
 the greater part of them would have crossed the 
 bridges. 
 
 If, as the Emperor had directed, the means of 
 constructing the bridge had been ready on the 
 24th, the troops might have passed in the course
 
 CHAPTER IX. 409 
 
 of that night and the following- day ; and on the 
 morning of the 27th, the entire French army 
 would have been on the right bank of the Beresina. 
 So that neither the loss of Partouneaux's division, 
 nor Wittgenstein's attack upon Studzianka would 
 have taken place : in a word, we should not have 
 had to deplore all the misfortunes which occurred. 
 
 This passage, which was effected, notwithstand- 
 ing all the obtacles opposed to us, was not, by 
 any means, so calamitous as several writers, who 
 take a pleasure in aggravating our misfortunes, 
 have represented it. Those who perished on the 
 occasion were not of the number of the comba- 
 tants ; only three pieces of cannon remained on 
 the other side of the river : in short, the number 
 of prisoners which the enemy picked up (even 
 taking the Russian statement) amounted to only 
 2,000 stragglers, sick, wounded, and travelling 
 furnishers.* At half after eight, on the morning 
 of the 29th, the bridge was fired ; and this was 
 not till an hour after some cossacks had approach- 
 ed it. 
 
 It will be satisfactory to our readers to be in- 
 formed of the opinion expressed by the Russian 
 historian, whom we have already quoted, relative 
 to the Emperor's conduct at the time of crossing 
 the Beresina. " Although surrounded on all 
 " sides, Napoleon did not lose his presence of 
 
 * See the Histoire de la Campagne de liussie, by Colonel 
 Boutourlin. Vol. s', page SSS.
 
 410 BOOK XI. 
 
 a 
 a 
 
 mind : but, by well-managed feints, deceived 
 the generals who were opposing him, gliding, 
 as it were, between the armies that were ready 
 "to fall upon him, he accomplished his passage 
 " at a well chosen point, where every local ad- 
 " vantage was in his favor. The bad condition of 
 " the bridges, which it was not in his power to 
 improve, was the only circumstance, that by 
 retarding the operation, rendered it perilous. 
 " The great losses experienced by the French, 
 " must not, therefore, be imputed to Napoleon ; 
 but solely to the unfortunate circumstances 
 under which his army was placed, and which it 
 " was impossible for him to avert." 
 And this is a Russian who speaks ! ! ! 
 
 
 
 CHAFrER X. 
 
 After giving a description of the road leading to 
 Zembin, across the marshes, over which there are 
 bridges of several hundred fathoms in length, the 
 Marechal-des-logis appears to regret that the Rus- 
 sians had not destroyed those bridges, and ex- 
 presses himself thus: " Inclosed within a narrow 
 space, between these marshes and the river, 
 without provisions, without shelter, in the midst 
 
 it
 
 CHAPTER X. 411 
 
 " of an intolerable hurricane, the grand army and 
 " its Emperor would have been compelled to sur- 
 " render without a struggle." 
 
 Even supposing that the bridges had been 
 burned, that to repair them had been impossible, 
 and that the marshes of Gaina, across which the 
 road passes, had not been sufficiently frozen to 
 sustain the weight of men and horses, the grand 
 army audits Emperor would still not have been com- 
 pelled to surrender without a struggle. The author 
 says truly that we were enclosed between the 
 marshes and the Beresina ; but he does not men- 
 tion that the third side of the triangle was occu- 
 pied by the Russians. How could a man, holding 
 the rank of general, conceive, that in such a 
 situation the grand army and its Emperor would 
 not have inarched against the Russians, and pass- 
 ing over them, have taken the road from Borisow 
 to Minsk ! ! After the exaggerating descriptions 
 which Mr. de Segur has given of the weakness of 
 the French army, the epithet grand applied on this 
 occasion has that about it which might seem ap- 
 propriate enough if found in a Russian newspaper, 
 but is disgusting as coming from a Frenchman. 
 
 In describing in his usual manner the passage 
 of the Beresina, our romantic author had forgot- 
 ten one of his favorite themes, the indispensable 
 hurricane : we, however, find it again here. This 
 hurricane consisted, in fact, of a little wind and 
 a few flakes of snow. As for the intensity of the
 
 412 BOOK XI. 
 
 cold it may be estimated by considering that the 
 Beresina was not frozen. 
 
 In speaking of iC a nobleman, of times long 
 " since passed, when gracefulness and brilliancy 
 u were all-prevalent," Mr. de Segur alludes to 
 the Comte de Narbonne. " That general officer 
 " at the age of sixty, " he observes, " was to be 
 " seen as soon as day -light appeared, seated upon 
 u a trunk of a tree, covered with snow, engaged 
 " with imperturbable gaity in the details of his 
 " toilette ; in the midst of the hurricane he caused 
 " his hair to be elegantly and gracefully curled, 
 " and carefully powdered, as if in defiance orcon- 
 " tempt of the accumulated calamities, and war- 
 " ring elements surrounding him." Mr. de Nar- 
 bonne, notwithstanding his age, went through the 
 Russian campaign with all the ardor and activity 
 of a young man. Is it in good taste on the part of 
 Mr. de Segur, to endeavor to attach ridicule to 
 that estimable officer, who always served France 
 and the Emperor with fidelity, and died atTorgau, 
 in charge of the defence and government of that 
 place ?
 
 413 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The only important object of this chapter is the 
 first intimation which Napoleon gave to Messrs. 
 Daru and Dnroc of his intention of setting out 
 immediately for Paris. His reasons were powerful 
 and unanswerable. Those which Mr. de Segur has 
 represented him as assigning, are not the princi- 
 pal : there are others which must have particu- 
 larly influenced his determination. A Russian 
 historian has comprehended them better than the 
 French general. " Napoleon/' he observes,* 
 was not only chief of the army he was about 
 to quit ; but since the destinies of the whole of 
 " France depended upon him, it is obvious that 
 " under the existing circumstances, his first duty 
 " was not so much to be present at the last mo- 
 " ments of the wreck of his army, as to watch 
 " over the safety of the great empire which he go- 
 " verned. And he could not better fulfil that 
 " duty than by proceeding to Paris in order to 
 " accelerate, by his presence, the organization of 
 
 * Boutourlin, Vol. ii. page 392. 

 
 414 BOOK XI. 
 
 " new armies, to supply the place of those he had 
 "just lost." 
 
 He gave the chief command to the King of Na- 
 ples, and entrusted the supply department to 
 Count Daru ; the Prince of Neufchatel remaining 
 Major-Gfoieral. Mr. de Segur relates that there 
 occurred between the Emperor and Berthier a pri- 
 vate and violent altercation, in which that old 
 companion in arms of Napoleon is made to act a 
 part by no means creditable to him : our writer 
 should have stated how he became acquainted with 
 the circumstance. It is true that a private conver- 
 sation took place between the Prince of Neufcha- 
 tel and the Emperor, who afterwards related it 
 himself. The subject in debate was the choice of 
 a commander-in-chief for the army. Napoleon 
 had determined to give the command to Eugene ; 
 but the Prince of Neufchatel insisted long in favor 
 of the King of Naples. His solicitations were 
 even distinguished by a degree of violence and 
 pertinacity, foreign to his natural character : and 
 he concluded by declaring, that if Prince Eugene 
 had the command of the army, he would not re- 
 main under his orders. We must pardon in that 
 veteran in French military glory, whom the Em- 
 peror had raised so high, and connected with roy- 
 alty by marrying him to a princess of one of the 
 most ancient reigning families of Germany, this 
 ill-founded repugnance to being placed under the 
 orders of an uncrowned commander. Mr. de Se- 
 gur probably heard of this long discussion, which
 
 CHAPTER XI. 415 
 
 took place in a room adjoining that occupied by 
 the officers of the household. He may have heard 
 vaguely that the Prince of Neufchatel had refused 
 to remain in the army ,• and such a circumstance 
 would be quite sufficient to induce him to give 
 free scope to his romantic imagination, and report 
 the private scene he has mentioned. It is the cha- 
 racteristic method of this author, and we may rea- 
 sonably conclude, that a great part of his work 
 has been composed in the same manner. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 This chapter contains an account of some facts 
 truly glorious for those of out troops which com- 
 posed the rear-guard under the command of Mar- 
 shal Ney and General Maison. Speaking of a 
 conflict which took place a little beyond Malo- 
 deczno, the author relates that the enemy finding 
 himself unable to overthrow the troops opposed 
 to him, directed a part of his forces " towards 
 " another entrance to that place ;" but that " by 
 " good fortune it happened that Victor, with 
 " about 4,000 men, the remains of the ninth 
 " corps, still occupied the village." It would be 
 extraordinary indeed, if Generals Ney and Maison, 
 who were making head against the enemy at a
 
 416 BOOK XI. 
 
 short distance before Malodeczno, with only a 
 few hundred men, had been ignorant that the 
 place was occupied by Victor with 4,000. Victor 
 was there with his corps by virtue of an order 
 from the Major-General* 
 
 This chapter concludes with a quarrel between 
 Marshals Victor and Ney, respecting the coin- 
 
 * The Prince of Nevfchatel and Wagram to the Duke of 
 
 Belluno- 
 Malodeczno, 4th December, 1812. 
 Four o'clock in the morning. 
 Mr. le due, continue your movement of retreat to-day, come 
 to the position of Malodeczno, and cause all the vehicles and 
 stragglers to pass on before you. The second corps, which 
 will protect this town until your arrival, is to take up a position 
 in the rear. Head-quarters will be stationed at Benitza, near 
 Markowo. We should have halted here, had it afforded us 
 provisions ; but the first magazines of any magnitude are at 
 Smorgoni ; bullocks, brandy, and biscuit, are collected there ; 
 let this be known to your stragglers, in order that they may 
 rally in the direction of those magazines. Should you have any 
 vehicles belonging to military equipages, send them on to Smor- 
 goni for provisions. Nevertheless, we shall endeavor to for- 
 ward you ten thousand rations of meat (in live cattle) , and of 
 biscuit ; this will enable you to maintain yourself at whatever 
 place you think proper, without apprehending that your troops 
 should disband. If the want of transport should prevent your 
 receiving those provisions in the course of to-morrow, you ought 
 to continue your movement until you have approached your 
 means of subsistence, which are at Smorgoni ; there you will 
 make a halt. Issue a proclamation for the purpose of rallying 
 the stragglers, and send them on to Smorgoni ; let a public no- 
 tice be read by an officer of your staff. 
 
 (Signed J Alexander.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 417 
 
 mand of the rear-guard. Mr. de Segur exhibits 
 Ney " breaking out into a violent passion, and 
 " the coolness of Victor remaining unruffled." 
 We do not well perceive the cause of the discus- 
 sions, since the Duke of Belluno's letter* to the 
 
 * The Duke of Belluno to the Major-General the Prince 
 ofNeufchatel and Wagram. 
 
 Bivouac, 5th December, 1812. 
 Four o'clock in the morning'. 
 
 Monseigneur, the action sustained by the rear- guard on the 
 4th is the last effort it was capable of making against the ene- 
 mies ; the troops of which it was composed are now so reduced 
 in numbers, and its remains are so wretched that I am com- 
 pelled to save them from the harassing pursuit of the enemy, 
 and to avoid every kind of engagement. The report which my 
 first aid-de-camp must have made to your Serene Highness, res- 
 pecting the state and condition of those trocps, is strictly cor- 
 rect. 
 
 The advanced guard of the corps in pursuit of us reached 
 Bienitza this day at the moment of our arrival there, notwith- 
 standing that we marched during the night, and that the bridges 
 of Malodeczno had been destroyed. It was eleven o'clock ; 
 had I attempted to defend myself at Bienitza, I would have had 
 to offer battle, or to sustain a fresh one under every disadvan- 
 tage, considering the disproportion between my forces and those 
 of the enemy. I have, consequently, adopted the only proper 
 course, that of continuing a retrograde movement, in order to 
 pass the night at a village two leagues distant from Bienitza, 
 and four leagues from Smorgoni. The enemy's vedettes and 
 our own are in sight of each other ; I shall probably be as 
 closely pursued to day as I was yesterday, and I think it pru- 
 dent that his Majesty should keep at some distance from us. 
 
 The stragglers are always close upon us, and in considerable 
 numbers. The habit they have contracted of only marching bv 
 
 2 E
 
 418 BOOK XI. 
 
 Major-General, shews that the rear-guard was 
 commanded by that marshal. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 This chapter presents some fresh reflections to us 
 concerning the sentiments of the army towards 
 the Emperor. Our officer of the palace says : It 
 is true that a seditious movement was out of the 
 question. This is a superfluous remark. Who 
 could have entertained the idea of sedition ? This 
 supposition was rendered impossible owing to the 
 reciprocity of sentiments which existed between 
 the army and its leader. 
 
 day affords an opportunity to the enemy of making many pri- 
 soners ; but whether it proceeds from indifference, or that he 
 mistakes their column for regular troops, he pursues them with 
 great caution ; I believe, however, that several were taken yes- 
 terday. 
 
 I propose to reach Smorgoni at nine o'clock this morning ; 
 and shall no doubt be under the necessity of passing the night 
 at a still greater distance, unless I fall in with some troops to 
 support us. Those of General de Wrede would be of essential 
 use in this emergency. I suppose the Emperor will have ordered 
 them to take our place, or to march in company with us. 
 
 I beg, Monseigneur, you will accept the assurance of my re- 
 spect. 
 
 (Signed) The Marshal Duke of Belluno.
 
 a 
 ft 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 419 
 
 The suppleness which Mr. de Segur attributes 
 to the Emperor towards the marshals whom " he 
 won over into an approbation of his plan of de- 
 parture, by flattery, by caresses, and by confi- 
 " dential effusions," is in opposition to Napoleon's 
 character. The determination he took was de- 
 sired by the whole army, and was made known to 
 its great satisfaction. It felt that upon him de- 
 pended the safety of all ; that it was possible to 
 lose armies, artillery, and whole provinces ;-but, 
 that in losing him every thing else was lost. The 
 avowal which he is supposed by our historian to 
 make to his officers, is more ridiculous still ; and 
 in what terms is he said to make it ? " Had I 
 been born to the throne, had I been a Bourbon, 
 it would have been easy for me not to have fal- 
 len into errors." These words could not admit 
 of any explanation. Would the author wish 
 thereby to suggest the idea that the Emperor un- 
 dertook the expedition to Russia merely with a 
 view to strengthen himself upon the throne of 
 France ? Does he wish to make Napoleon himself 
 point out the dangers and ill-luck that await 
 those who follow his fortunes, or attribute to him 
 a foreboding of the great catastrophe which 
 brought on his downfall ? In such a case, we 
 must confess that Mr. de Segur has the gift of 
 prophecying events after their occurrence. Where, 
 we ask, did he obtain those details r Is it 
 likely that a thought of ^hat nature should have 
 entered the Emperor's mind at such a moment ? 
 
 2 e 2 
 
 ec 
 tt 
 
 t(
 
 420 BOOK XI. 
 
 Is it possible he could have expressed it ? Why 
 was not his historian struck with the absurdity of 
 the idea ? The heart of Napoleon was torn at the 
 sight of the calamities befalling his army ; but no 
 one was better acquainted with the causes which 
 had produced them. It is difficult to understand 
 how an officer of the palace could have fallen into 
 so awkward a blunder, and have ascribed thoughts 
 and expressions to that Prince, which are in such 
 direct contradiction with his character and posi- 
 tion. 
 
 No one, however, can mistake the object of that 
 insinuation.
 
 421 
 
 BOOK XIII. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The opening of this book proves the incoherency 
 of the author's ideas. " I had reached the period 
 " of Napoleon's departure, and nattered myself 
 " that my task was at last completed." When, 
 however, he took up his pen, the events had gone 
 by, and the facts which were to afford matter for 
 his work were well known. Why was not his 
 plan laid down before hand ? 
 
 " I had announced myself as the historian of 
 " that great epoch, when we were hurled from 
 " the highest summit of glory to the deepest abyss 
 " of misfortune." The historian of that great epoch 
 has not fulfilled the task he imposed upon himself. 
 He is the self-constituted bard of our calamities 
 and disasters, but not of the exploits which mark- 
 ed that memorable expedition. When the author 
 says we were hurled from the highest summit of 
 glory, he does not convey his meaning. We feel 
 inclined to hope he meant to say the highest sum- 
 mit of prosperity . If that expedition was attended 
 with a disastrous result, it proved fruitful in traits
 
 a 
 
 ec 
 it 
 
 it 
 
 422 book xii. 
 
 of heroism and devoted ness, which have given to 
 the French army an imperishable splendor. The 
 soul sickens at all we have hitherto read ; and yet 
 Mr. de Segur announces that nothing remained for 
 him to retrace but the most frightful miseries. He 
 again addresses his comrades, and asks them. 
 Why should we not spare to you the pain of read- 
 ing them, and to myself, the sad effort of task- 
 ing a memory which has nothing left but ashes 
 to rake up, but disasters to reckon, and which 
 can no longer write but upon tombs ?" 
 Our task in this place becomes more painful ; 
 we now feel more than ever all the bitterness 
 which must attend the performance of our duty. 
 Why did not the historian give way to that happy 
 thought of ceasing the sad efforts of a memory 
 whicli must indeed have been tired at finding no- 
 thing but ashes to rake up ? We shall follow him, 
 however, to the last, in spite of our repugnance, 
 and what ought to discourage, will serve to assist 
 us on the way. 
 
 From the situation in which the army found 
 itself placed, owing to the departure of the Em- 
 peror, it could not but feel the immense vacuum 
 which was left after him. Possibly, however, the 
 misfortunes which occurred after that event might 
 not have happened, had there been less anxiety 
 to reach Wilna, and had the marches been short- 
 ened. The disorganization of the several corps of 
 the army was owing to those inarches, performed 
 as they were, at a time when the cold had consi-
 
 ft 
 
 i< 
 a 
 (( 
 
 CHAPTER I. 423 
 
 derably increased, for it had reached twenty-eight 
 degrees in intensity. 
 
 " Most of the colonels of the army, who had 
 " hitherto raised our admiration as we beheld 
 them marching with four or five officers or sol- 
 diers, and preserving their order of battle, took 
 no longer any council but of themselves ; each 
 ' one considered that he was entrusted with his 
 own safety. . . .The cry of sauve qui pent became 
 almost universally prevalent." 
 The dreadful situation of the army cannot be an 
 excuse to the author for casting an imputation 
 upon the colonels, who, during the campaign, had 
 so many moral, as well as physical sufferings to 
 undergo, and these of a much more painful nature 
 than what fell to the share of a general who had 
 nothing more than a civil duty to perform in the 
 Emperor's household. It would have been but 
 justice to say, that Marshal Ney, who had in the 
 rear-guard some troops entirely composed of 
 colonels and superior officers, having seen many 
 of them carried off by a grape shot, considered 
 that their services would be purchased at much 
 too dear a rate, by the injury which their loss 
 would inflict upon the future prospects of the 
 army. He deemed it preferable, and with good 
 reason, that the army should reckon a few hun- 
 dred men less at that moment, and that its future 
 recomposition should be secured, by saving from the 
 effects of their devoted zeal those colonels, superior 
 officers, and others, who being left without sol-
 
 424 BOOK XTI. 
 
 diets, still persisted in remaining in the rear, for 
 the purpose of fighting the enemy. He, there- 
 fore, commanded all the officers who were without 
 soldiers under them, to withdraw and repair to 
 the Niemen. He even sent away some serjeant- 
 majors, and quarter-masters ; and would only re- 
 tain in the troops that were left, such a number of 
 officers and non-commissioned officers as were in 
 proportion to the numbers of the soldiers. Mr. 
 deSegurhad bestowed praise upon one colonel 
 only ; he throws blame upon the whole body. 
 We are willing to believe him ignorant of Mar- 
 shal Ney's order ; but where a doubt existed, he 
 should have passed the subject by unnoticed. 
 We have so many occasions to point out errors 
 and omissions in his work, which arose out of his 
 ignorance of facts, that we ought not to be sur- 
 prised at the last he affords us. But where there 
 is a want of correct information, there is also te- 
 merity in undertaking to write a history. 
 
 Anarchy and disorder are described with similar 
 exaggeration. There is no doubt that striking 
 traits of egotism were displayed, such as were to 
 be expected in the midst of those heavy calami- 
 ties ; but numberless acts of generosity and de- 
 votedness might also be recorded. Friends and 
 comrades have divided with each other their linen 
 and their wretched food ; soldiers have carried 
 their orflicers, servants their masters; General 
 Legrand was borne by his grenadiers; General 
 Zayonczek was saved by his soldiers ; young
 
 CHAPTER II. 425 
 
 Sainte-Croix,* who suffered amputation at Mo- 
 jaisk, was also saved by some friends upon his re- 
 turn ; Colonel Marin (belonging to the artillery of 
 the guard,) was carried by his cannoneers, etc. 
 etc. Why present none but hideous sights to our 
 view ? Did the author dread to miss the aim he 
 appears to have had in view, if he allowed us to 
 see the better side of the picture ? 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The progress of the French army towards Wilna, 
 affords a subject for new scenes, in which our 
 marechal-des-logis of the palace does not slacken 
 his endeavors to improve upon the horrors of the 
 preceding chapters. And yet the condition of the 
 army was sufficiently deplorable to have induced 
 the author to resign the sad satisfaction of height- 
 ening the picture of it. " Soldiers were seen 
 " madly rushing to the furnaces, gnashing their 
 " teeth with a demon-like laugh, and throwing 
 " themselves into the fires, where they perished in 
 " the most horrible convulsions. Their famished 
 " companions looked undismayed upon them ; 
 
 * Brother of the general of that Dame.
 
 426 book xfi. 
 
 " there were even some who drew out their bodies 
 " disfigured and broiled by the flames, etc." The 
 pen recoils from tracing what remains of this pas- 
 sage. The most remarkable effect produced by 
 that extremity of misfortune was, that although 
 nothing was done to avoid death, none sought a 
 voluntary one. Cannibalism was wanting to com- 
 plete the picture. Did Mr. de Segur ever witness 
 one of these pretended acts ? From whom does he 
 derive his information ? But he knows that the 
 generality of readers are pleased with whatever is 
 extravagant, extraordinary, and horrible at the 
 same time ; and he takes advantage of it. To 
 this secret, may perhaps be ascribed the success of 
 his work. 
 
 Could we expect, after such narratives, that he 
 would present us with a cold dissertation upon the 
 vanity of prognostics, or would quote " predic- 
 " tions which announced an invasion of the Tar- 
 " tars as far as the banks of the Seine ?" and re- 
 peat the story of the pretended " storm that 
 " marked our entrance upon the Russian ter- 
 " ritory?" How can he venture to impose in this 
 manner upon the feelings and the credulity of his 
 readers !
 
 427 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The disorder that occurred at Wilna cannot be 
 imputed to the Emperor. Upon his departure 
 from the army (at Smorgoni on the 5th Decem- 
 ber) he had every reason to hope that the re-in- 
 forcements in men which it was receiving, as well 
 as the abundance of supplies at Smorgoni, Och- 
 miana, and Wilna, would enable the several corps 
 to re-organize themselves. Under this impression, 
 he wrote to the Major-General the following 
 orders, dated from Bienitza the 5th December : 
 
 " My cousin, enclosed I transmit instructions 
 to you for the re- organization of the army ; the 
 King of Naples will make every modification in 
 them which circumstances may require. Never- 
 theless, I think it necessary to organize at once 
 the Lithuanians at Kowno, the fifth corps at 
 Warsaw, the Bavarians at Grodno, the eighth 
 corps at Olita, the small depots at Merecz and 
 Olita, and to send the dismounted cavalry to 
 Warsaw and Koenigsberg, as well as the soldiers 
 of the train and of the military equipages, who 
 have not any horses. All the cavalry remounts 
 must be sent otf after to-morrow from Wilna to 
 Koenigsberg, and the diplomatic agents to War- 
 saw ; all wounded generals and officers must also
 
 428 book xji. 
 
 be sent on to Warsaw and Kcenigsberg, and they 
 must be given to understand the necessity that 
 Wilna should be left disencumbered, and that 
 quarters should be provided in that city for the 
 active part of the army. It is said that the trea- 
 sure of the army is of considerable amount ; give 
 orders that a part of it be transmitted to Warsaw 
 and Kcenigsberg, where it is wanted. All this 
 will disencumber Wilna. Every order, in short, 
 that has that tendency ought to be issued to-mor- 
 row, for many reasons render this course neces- 
 sary. 
 
 "Instruction. — Rally the army at Wilna, keep 
 possession of that city, and take up winter quar- 
 ters, the Austriaus upon the Niemen, covering 
 Breze, Grodno and Warsaw, the army at Wilna 
 and at Kowno. In case the hostile army should 
 march, and that it should not be possible to re- 
 sist on the other side of the Niemen, the right is 
 to cover Warsaw, and if possible Grodno ; the 
 remainder of the army is to keep in a line behind 
 the Niemen, retaining Kowno as a tete-de-pont : 
 have large supplies of flour collected at Kcenigs- 
 berg, Dantzig, Warsaw, and Thorn ; order every 
 thing to be evacuated between Wilna and Kowno, 
 so that the army may have its movements unfet- 
 tered ; whatever is of most value is to be sent on 
 to Dantzig." 
 
 There was at Wilna a supply of four millions of 
 rations of bread, three millions six hundred thou- 
 sand rations of meat, nine millions of rations of
 
 CHAPTER III. 429 
 
 wine and brandy, considerable magazines of vege- 
 tables and forage, of clothing, harness, and 
 equipments, thirty four thousand muskets, and 
 an arsenal well provided with ammunition of 
 every kind. It will therefore be seen how un- 
 founded is the reproach of want of foresight, 
 which our marechal-des-logis of the palace so often 
 casts upon the Emperor. According to him, " no 
 " chief dared to order the distribution of provi- 
 " sions to those who presented themselves." That 
 accusation attaches to the heads of the military 
 administration. They were, perhaps, in hopes 
 that by making distributions only in the regular 
 forms, they would compel stragglers to rally ; but 
 this proved an unfortunate course. 
 
 The author presents a revolting picture of the 
 hospitals at Wilna. It is, nevertheless, a fact, 
 that owing to the care of Doctors Desgenettes and 
 Marie de Saint-Ursin, the numerous hospitals of 
 that city had been placed in as good a condition 
 as possible ; but at the moment of the disorder 
 created by the obstructions at Wilna, the admi- 
 nistration could no longer act. Mr. de Segur has 
 exhibited to us an extraordinary state of things, 
 as the consequence of a neglect that never existed. 
 His prejudices could not give way, when so fair 
 a field was open to them. 
 
 " At last the exertions of several commanders, 
 " such as Eugene and Davoust, the compassion 
 " of the Lithuanians, and the avarice of the Jews, 
 
 opened some places of refuge." 
 
 a
 
 430 book xri. 
 
 Officers had been stationed at the gates of 
 Wilna, to point out to the soldiers of the various 
 corps, the convents and other buildings in which 
 they were to be quartered, and where they might 
 have rallied and received the distribution of sup- 
 plies. But the soldiers preferred scattering them- 
 selves over the town, and going into private 
 houses. 
 
 In pursuance of the orders which the Emperor 
 had sent from Zelitska to General de Wrede, this 
 general had moved from VileTka to Slobkchowska. 
 On the 8th of December, the King of Naples di- 
 rected him to repair to Ruckowi with his Bavarian 
 troops, amounting to two thousand and some 
 hundred men, in order to relieve the Duke of 
 Belluno, who had hitherto formed the rear-guard, 
 and to place himself under the orders of Marshal 
 Ney, to whom this command was again confided. 
 The Bavarian general, after being attacked in the 
 latter position, by the corps of cossacks who pre- 
 ceeded the Russian advanced guard, and who 
 were provided with a few light field-pieces, was 
 thrown back upon Wilna ; this occasioned a great 
 disorder among the stragglers, canteen carriers, 
 etc. The alarm was sounded ; but the cossacks 
 would not have dared, on that day, to enter a 
 town which still contained some organized in- 
 fantry. General de Wrede, accompanied by 
 sixty light horsemen, proceeded to Ney's quarters. 
 After ranging his troops in order of battle before 
 his door, he went to the Marshal's apartment,
 
 (( 
 it 
 
 CHAPTER III. 431 
 
 with his sword yet in hand : " Mr. le Marshal," 
 he said to him, " the enemy is close after me. I 
 
 come with my sixty horsemen to offer to lead you 
 
 in safety to the road to Kowno." Ney was lean- 
 ing- against the chimney. He coolly took de 
 Wrede by the hand to a window giving upon the 
 street, and shewing him the excess of the disorder, 
 and the unarmed men who were hurried along 
 in their flight, he said : kf Mr. le General, do you 
 " think that a marshal of the empire can mix with 
 such a rabble ? The Bavarian General stood 
 amazed for a moment ; he then objected to Ney 
 that if he remained any longer in Wilna, he ran 
 the risk of falling into the enemy's hands; the 
 Marshal replied ; " No, no, General, fear no- 
 " thing for me ; I have here fifty French grena- 
 " diers about me ; and all the cossacks in the 
 " world shall not dislodge me before eight o'clock 
 " to-morrow morning. 
 
 " Wilna might have been defended for twenty- 
 " four hours longer, and many men might have 
 " been saved." 
 
 It might, with ease, have held out several days. 
 The cold had exercised nearly as great a havoc in 
 the Russian as in the French army. The Russians 
 advanced very slowly. The garrison of Wilna 
 and the imperial guard might have defended the 
 town against any attempt from the cossacks. 
 Although the orders given by the Emperor, to 
 place it in a condition to resist any serious at- 
 tack, had not been fully carried into effect, some
 
 432 book xii. 
 
 pallisades had been raised. Had Wilna held out 
 for twenty-four hours longer, it would have been 
 easy, by means of distributions of all kinds to 
 stragglers, to rally a considerable number of 
 them ; and if the place was to be evacuated at a 
 later period, this might have been effected in 
 good order. It is bitterly to be regretted, that 
 when an important crisis occurs, the Emperor 
 cannot be at once at the head of his troops and in 
 Paris. After the passage of the Beresina, the 
 army having then reached its magazines and re- 
 inforcements, Napoleon thought the moment was 
 a favorable one for returning to France. If the 
 instructions which he left on his departure had 
 been followed, the disasters which befel us when 
 he was gone, would not have occurred. They 
 were, in a great measure, occasioned by the 
 eagerness to reach Wilna in all haste. It was 
 not sufficiently considered that those continual 
 marches and the dreadful rigor of the cold, 
 could only have the effect of completing the disor- 
 ganization of the army. 
 
 " In this city as well as at Moscow, Napoleon 
 " had given no regular order for the retreat." 
 
 At Wilna as well as at Moscow, Napoleon had 
 prescribed all the measures which circumstances 
 called for. From the moment that the communi- 
 cations between Wilna and the army had been 
 restored, he had been indefatigable in issuing 
 orders for the collection of provisions, and for 
 sending on to that city all the baggage at Smor-
 
 (( 
 tt 
 
 CHAPTER III. 433 
 
 goni and at Ochuriana, which was useless to the 
 army on its< march.* The letter from the Em- 
 peror to the Major-General, dated Bienitza, 5th 
 December, 1812, which we have already quoted, 
 prescribed various measures to be adopted as well 
 for the re-organization of the army, as for the re- 
 moving to Wilna every thing that was unneces- 
 sary to the action of the army. It terminates in 
 these words : " In short, every order that has the 
 tendency to disembarrass Wilna, ought to be 
 issued to-morrow ; for many reasons render 
 " this course necessary." 
 
 It is inconceivable that in spite of such irrefra- 
 gable proofs, Mr. de Segur persists to the end in 
 his system of throwing obloquy. For he must 
 have satisfied himself by the letters we are quot- 
 ing, that had the Emperor's orders been carried 
 into effect, (as they ought to have been, since no 
 
 * See the Appendix. 
 
 1st — Letter from the Prince of Neufchatel to Prince Eugene, 
 dated Staiki the 2d December. 
 
 2dly — Letter from the same to the same, dated Selitza, 2d De- 
 cember. 
 
 Sdly — Letter from the same to General de Wrede,*Sd Decem- 
 ber. 
 
 4thly — Letter from the same to General Dalbignac, Malo- 
 detchzno, 3d Decemher. 
 
 6thly — Letter from the same to the Duke of Belluno, Malo- 
 detchzno, 4th December. 
 
 6thly — Letter from the same to Count de Ureptowicze, dated 
 at Malodetchzno. 
 
 2 F
 
 434 book xn. 
 
 obstacle stood in the way) that enormous obstruc- 
 tion of vehicles, covered waggons, and baggage, 
 would not have taken place. 
 
 Speaking of the defile of Ponari, the author says : 
 " Here it was that money, honor, every re- 
 u mains of discipline and of strength, were com- 
 
 " pletely lost One of the covered waggons of 
 
 " treasure, which burst open of itself, became the 
 " signal ; every one rushed upon them." 
 
 The real fact is as follows : — on the eve of the 
 day in question, a director of the letter-post office 
 presented himself to Marshal Ney at Wilna, and 
 informed him that, for want of horses, he had been 
 compelled to abandon his covered waggon which 
 contained a considerable sum of money belong- 
 ing to the government. The marshal inquired if, 
 at least, before he abandoned the waggon, he dis- 
 tributed the money among the wretched soldiers 
 who covered the road. On that officer's replying in 
 the negative, Ney expressed his regret that those 
 funds should have been left for the enemy's use. As 
 themarshal was leaving Wilna with the rear-guard 
 on the following day, and had arrived at the bot- 
 tom of the hill of Ponari, he saw a long file of ve- 
 hicles and covered treasury waggons, whose 
 march was interrupted. Deeming it impossible to 
 save them, because the enemy was close at our 
 heels, he ordered the waggons to be opened, and 
 their contents to be distributed to all who wished 
 to carry them away ; his order was obeyed. This 
 dispersion of the treasure was no doubt to be re-
 
 CHAPTER III. 435 
 
 gretted ; but circumstances called for it. Would 
 Mr. de Segur have preferred that the Russians 
 had become possessed of it ; and was it to be made 
 the ground of an accusation against the honor of 
 the army. 
 
 " On the most exposed part of the hill, an offi- 
 " cer of the Emperor, Colonel Count de Turenne, 
 " kept the cossacks in check, and in defiance 
 " of their cries of rage and of their fire, he distri- 
 " buted, before their eyes, the private treasure of 
 Napoleon to the guards within his reach. These 
 brave men, fighting with one hand, and collect- 
 ing the spoils of their leader with the other, 
 " succeeded in saving them. Long afterwards, 
 when they were out of all danger, each man 
 faithfully restored the depot which had been con- 
 " fided to him ; not a single piece of money was 
 « lost." 
 
 It may well be conceived that our Marechal- 
 des-logis of the palace felt anxious to praise one of 
 his colleagues,* the chamberlain Count de Tu- 
 renne, master of the wardrobe to Napoleon ; but 
 how happens it that the fertility of his imagination 
 has not supplied him with something more flatter- 
 ing for Mr. de Turenne, than a representation of 
 him giving away the various articles belonging to 
 
 * The four civil officers of the Emperor's household who were 
 with the army, and under the orders of the Grand-marshal were, 
 Messieurs de Segur, Marechal-des-logis of the palace, Canou- 
 ville, ditto, Turenne, chamberlain, master of the wardrobe ; 
 Beausset, prefect of the palace. 
 
 2 f 2 
 
 
 ce
 
 436 
 
 BOOK XII. 
 
 the Emperor's toilette,* whilst the rear-guard, 
 under the orders of Marshal Ney, was sparing- him 
 the trouble of keeping the cossacks in check ? 
 
 This anecdote, however, at the same time that 
 it is entertaining to the reader, affords him, in the 
 midst of such accumulated disasters, one consola- 
 tion, which is, that after passing the defile of Po- 
 nari, no further accident befel those brave soldiers 
 of the guard. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The mode of retreat adopted by Ney was not such 
 as the author represents it. He supposes that 
 the marshal made his troops march by night, and 
 fight during the day. If that illustrious warrior 
 had adopted so pernicious a mode of marching, it is 
 quite clear that none of the troops could have re- 
 sisted its effects, especially when it is recollected 
 that there were but few regular distributions of 
 provisions, and that it was only during the time 
 of bivouacking that an attempt was made to pro- 
 cure them. 
 
 * These were no doubt what the author calls the spoils of 
 their leader. The Emperor had no private treasure ; that which 
 was distributed at the hill of Ponari was the treasure of the 
 army.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 437 
 
 The gloomy reflections which our officer of the 
 palace attributes to the army, after the passage of 
 the Niemen, when they cast a parting glance upon 
 that river, form a recapitulation of our misfortunes, 
 presented in a small frame, in order to give the 
 greater effect. He adds, that " Two kings, one 
 " prince, eight marshals, followed by a few offi- 
 " cers, generals walking on foot, and scattered 
 " about without attendance ; lastly, a few hun- 
 " dred men of the old guard, with arms yet in 
 " their hands, formed the remains of the army ; 
 " they alone represented it." 
 
 That brief analysis is distinguished by his habi- 
 tual spirit of exaggeration, and warmth of expres- 
 sion. The following is the true estimate of the 
 French army, as it was drawn up at that period : 
 
 Troops that, recrossed the Niemen at 
 
 Kowno, about the ] 5th Debember 36,000 men 
 
 Tenth corps 30,000 
 
 Polish corps, under the orders of 
 
 Prince Poniatowski* 20,000 
 
 Seventh corps, Saxons and French- 
 men, under General Reynier 15,000 
 
 Austrian corps 26,000 
 
 127,000 men 
 
 * Prince Pouiatowski arrived at Warsaw on the 25th Decem- 
 ber, and brought back with his corps thirty pieces of cannon. 
 [Munuscrit dc 1813, par le Baron Fain, Vol. i. page SO.)
 
 438 book xn. 
 
 Each regiment had a tolerably correct know- 
 ledge of the number of men who were killed, 
 wounded, or in hospital ; they had none respect- 
 ing those who died of cold ; but there existed 
 some information regarding such as were supposed 
 to be prisoners of war. Why, since 1814, has no 
 mention been made of the number of men who re- 
 turned, and who were said to have been so gene- 
 rously restored by Alexander. Not only some are 
 known to return at this very day, but many have 
 remained in various governments of Russia. Mr. 
 de Segur abstains from accompanying the picture 
 of our misfortunes with these motives for our con- 
 solation. 
 
 With respect to the guard, at the period of its 
 re-uniting (the 15th December,) at Werballen, 
 where it remained on the 16th, it was still very 
 effective, especially in men. In the cavalry, the 
 regiment of polish light horse reckoned alone a 
 complement of four hundred and twelve men, and 
 upwards of two hundred horses, all very good and 
 serviceable, besides sick and wounded soldiers. 
 A great proportion of the men of this regiment 
 having lost their horses, had proceeded, during 
 the retreat, across the forests of Lithuania, and in 
 the direction of Warsaw, where they arrived under 
 the protection afforded them, as much by the in- 
 habitants of the country, as by their knowledge of 
 its language. 
 
 This chapter closes with a well-merited eulo- 
 gium upon Marshal Ney, who displayed in that
 
 CHAPTER V. 439 
 
 memorable campaign, all those traits of heroism 
 which are inspired by strength of mind, and by 
 devoted zeal ; and who never abandoned the con- 
 test until he was left without the means of con- 
 tinuing it. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 When the army reached Gumbinnen, three days 
 journey from the Niemen, the Russians relaxed 
 their march. Their distress fell little short of our 
 own, and when they found us placed beyond the 
 reach of hunger and cold, they became more pru- 
 dent ; this circumstance enabled the king of 
 Naples to afford repose to the troops. 
 
 Mr. de Segur, on the subject of a council held 
 at Gumbinnen by that monarch, puts into his 
 mouth some expressions which, he says, were the 
 Jirst symptoms of his defection. He represents 
 him as tC provoked that the Emperor left him the 
 responsibility of the retreat, and vexed with 
 himself for having always rejected the proposals 
 of the English." To these inconsiderate ex- 
 pressions, Davoust replies with no less warmth 
 than sound argument. The author adds : "Murat 
 " remained disconcerted. He felt himself guilty. 
 " In this manner was stifled the first spark of a 

 
 440 BOOK XII. 
 
 a 
 tc 
 
 C( 
 
 treachery which at a later period was to effect 
 
 the ruin of France. History mentions the fact 
 
 with regret, since repentance and misfortune 
 
 have kept pace with the crime." 
 
 It must unhappily be admitted, that the King 
 of Naples was not equal to the circumstances, or 
 to the mission confided to him, on the occasion of 
 the Emperor's departure : few men possess the 
 gift of being great, alike in prosperity and in 
 trouble. Ever since the commencement of his 
 military career, Napoleon had suffered no real 
 check ; no opportunity had therefore been offered 
 to him, as would have been the case had his for- 
 tune been more diversified, of discovering amongst 
 his generals some of those gifted beings who ex- 
 pand in adversity, as in their proper element. 
 This prince was therefore reduced to study the 
 character of his officers, merely under the alter- 
 nate varieties of his success; Murat's conduct 
 had always been irreproachable ; it required the 
 workings of extraordinary events, to exhibit him 
 in other colours. 
 
 Every thing considered, his defection is not 
 more unaccountable than the many that succeeded 
 each other in 1814, from March until the middle 
 of April ; and with all his penetration, the Em- 
 peror could not foresee so much blindness. 
 
 Napoleon had done every thing which it is in- 
 cumbent upon a sovereign to do, in order to rivet 
 the affection of those who are in his service. He 
 had bound them to his fortune by the two most
 
 CHAPTER V. 441 
 
 powerful ties, interest and self-love. No prince, 
 no government, could ever hold out advantages 
 to them that would be equivalent to those which 
 they derived from the Emperor's bounty. 
 
 Napoleon, however, was too deeply read in 
 history, not to be well aware of the fate that 
 awaits unfortunate princes. He knew that in 
 modern nations there exists a mass of individuals 
 strong in influence, and solely attentive to their 
 riches, their convenience, and their pleasures ; 
 that they are unequal to a lasting display of con- 
 stancy to misfortune, and of sacrifices too irksome 
 for them ; that their attachment to a government 
 is always in proportion to the advantages it affords 
 them. It was therefore no matter of surprise to 
 him, after his reverses, that such a mass should 
 have kept away ; and transferred its homage to 
 the new power by which his own was superseded. 
 
 But what he could not have expected was, that 
 men who boasted of the generosity of their opi- 
 nions, who laid much stress upon their spirit of 
 independence, and who pretended to have alone 
 upheld the national sentiment, should make his 
 person, his actions, and his government, the object 
 of their calumnious attacks. 
 
 Let the mighty shade of Napoleon be consoled ! 
 whilst ungrateful beings assail his memory, in the 
 midst of the very palaces he has bestowed, justice 
 is rendered to him by the people, who during his 
 reign supported nearly the entire burthen of taxes 
 and of the conscription ; that people venerates his
 
 442 book xii. 
 
 memory, and in the retirement of their humble 
 dwellings, they extol the glory of his name. 
 
 CHAPTERS VI, VII, VIII, and IX. 
 
 The chapters VI., VII., VIII., and IX., embrace 
 the narrative of Marshal Macdonald's campaign, 
 and of General Yorck's treachery. The author 
 takes us back to the month of August. He passes 
 high encomiums upon the Prussian troops, who 
 fought in earnest. Not so their chief who, ac- 
 cording to the author, had higher views. On this 
 subject he draws a grammatical distinction be- 
 tween defection and treachery. The reader will 
 decide by what name should be qualified the con- 
 duct of an allied general, who being in command 
 of the rear-guard of the army, avails himself of his 
 position, in order to conclude an armistice with 
 the enemy, without any participation in it by 
 the commander-in-chief, who secretly draws 
 away the remainder of the Prussian troops, " who 
 * escapes from Tilsit in silence, and by favor of 
 " the night ;" and who thus, in the very presence 
 of the enemy, deserts the French corps of which 
 he formed the main strength. The opinion enter- 
 tained of General Yorck's conduct by the French 
 historian, will not be sanctioned by those who
 
 CHAPTERS VI, VII, VIII, AND IX. 443 
 
 place honor before every other consideration. 
 The peculiar features of that conduct, which ap- 
 pear to him to lessen the odium attaching to it, 
 might be pleaded in excuse for whoever thought 
 that obligations entered into are no longer bind- 
 ing, from the moment that they are found bur- 
 thensome, and may be shaken off at pleasure, pro- 
 vided appearances are not violated. We have too 
 high an opinion of the noble sentiments which are 
 hereditary in Mr. de Segur's family, to believe 
 that, upon due reflection, he would have hesitated 
 to stigmatize an action which morality disavows. 
 We are the more justified in this belief, as he him- 
 self says, (chapter XI.,) " the blood of six hun- 
 " dred Frenchmen, Bavarians, and Poles, who 
 " remained on the fields of battle of Labiau and 
 " Tente accuses the Prussians for not having pro- 
 " vided, by an additional article, for the safe re- 
 " treat of the leader they were deserting." 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 " Thus suddenly fell our left wing. . . .Our right 
 " wing detached itself from us insensibly, and 
 " with the formalities required by its political po- 
 " sition. On the 10th December, Schwarzenberg
 
 
 444 book xii. 
 
 " was at Slonim, successively sending advanced 
 " guards in the direction of Minsk, Nowogrodeck, 
 " and Bielitza. He was still persuaded that the 
 Russians were beaten, and fleeing before Napo- 
 leon, when he was informed, at one and the same 
 " moment, of the Emperor's departure, and of the 
 " destruction of the grand army, but in so vague 
 " a manner, that he was for some time without 
 " adopting any decided course." 
 
 Prince Schwarzenberg did not learn the Em- 
 peror's departure in a vague manner ; it was com- 
 municated to him in as official a way as possible, 
 by his secretary, Baron Sturmer, who was then 
 upon a mission at Wilna, and was sent to him 
 with the news. Mr. de Segur must have enter- 
 tained a strong conviction of the good faith of the 
 Austrian general, when he believed that being on 
 the 10th December at Slonim, with an advanced 
 guard in the direction of Minsk, this general could 
 be ignorant that twenty-five days before that time, 
 namely, on the 16th of November, Minsk had 
 fallen into the possession of the Russians, and our 
 retreat was obstructed in that quarter. He adds, 
 that, " in his embarrassment, he addressed him- 
 " self to the French ambassador at Warsaw, who 
 " authorized him not to sacrifice another man." 
 Thus without inquiring into the propriety or the 
 motives of the application made by Prince Schwar- 
 zenberg to the French minister, the author seems 
 to have at heart to exonerate him from everv im- 
 putation.
 
 a 
 
 c: 
 (t 
 
 ee 
 
 it 
 
 t{ 
 
 CHAPTER X. 445 
 
 He says, however, soon afterwards, that " as 
 the interests of the Russians agreed with those 
 of the Austrians, there was very soon a mutual 
 understanding-." This is so true, that about 
 the 21st December, as is related by Mr. de Segur 
 himself, " An order from Alexander suspended all 
 hostilities in the direction of Schwarzenberg's 
 retreat; an armistice was concluded, to which 
 " Murat gave his approbation. The two generals 
 were to manoeuvre in presence of each other, 
 the Russian upon the offensive, the Austrian upon 
 the defensive, but without coming to blows." 
 These evolutions were nothing more than a 
 parade, a contest of mutual politeness and atten- 
 tion, which was confined to the Russians and 
 Austrians only. " For the corps of General Reg- 
 nier, which formed a part of Schwarzenberg's 
 army, was not included in the arrangement." 
 War was still kept up against that corps, now 
 reduced by this defection to ten thousand men, as 
 it had been against Macdonald, after the depar- 
 ture of the Prussians. But, continues our officer 
 of the palace quite unmoved, " Schwarzenberg 
 " persevered in his loyalty — he covered the front 
 
 " of the French line, and preserved it If after- 
 
 " wards, Regnier was overtaken and surprised at 
 " Kalitch, it was in consequence of his halting too 
 " long to protect the flight of some Polish depots." 
 These quotations afford a fresh proof of the sense 
 of justice which influences the author. How 
 often have we been under the painful necessity of 
 
 it
 
 446 book xir. 
 
 regretting, during the course of our observations 
 upon his work, that of all that fund of partiality 
 which he exhibits, no portion should have been 
 bestowed upon the French army. 
 
 After these faithful statements of the conduct 
 of the Prussians and Austrians, he presents us 
 with an account of the horrors committed by the 
 inhabitants of Koenigsberg upon our unfortunate 
 wounded soldiers, and a frightful description of 
 the convent of Saint Basil at Wilna, where the 
 Russians allowed our prisoners to die of hunger 
 and privation, in the midst of an abundance 
 which was afforded by the supplies of provisions 
 we had left behind. But in the narrative which 
 is presented by the French writer, those horrors 
 serve to display the humanity, however tardy, of 
 the Russian Emperor and his brother, who arrive 
 thirteen days afterwards to apply a remedy for 
 them.
 
 447 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 a 
 
 The author says, that " the rallying of the 
 army upon the Vistula had proved delusive in 
 " its effects : that on the 22d January, the old 
 " guard numbered at most. . 500 fighting men.* 
 The young guard, .... 
 
 The first corps, 1,800 
 
 The second corps, 1,000 
 The third corps, 1,600 
 
 The fourth corps, 1,700 
 
 6,600 men. 
 
 " Even the greater part of those soldiers, the 
 " remains of 600,000 men, could with difficulty 
 w handle their arms." 
 
 We have already presented a statement of the 
 strength of the army on its departure from Kowno. 
 Mr. de Segur had estimated it at 445,000 men 
 upon its taking the field ; in another place he ap- 
 
 * A detailed statement, now before us, of the five infantry 
 regiments of the old guard, brings the number of men doing 
 duty on the 20th December 1812, to 1471 men. On the 15th 
 January, the young guard was directed to proceed from Posen 
 to the Rhine, for the purpose of being re-organized, and the 
 old guard returned to Paris.
 
 448 
 
 BOOK XII. 
 
 proaches nearer to the truth when he carried it to 
 400,000; he now supposes it to be 600,000 men. 
 In the remains to which he alludes he omits to 
 include the 5th corps, consisting of 20,000 men 
 and thirty pieces of cannon, which had arrived 
 at Warsaw ever since the 25th December ; he 
 likewise omits the sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth 
 corps, and the Austrian corps of Prince Schwar- 
 zenberg. He says in the following page : " The 
 " troops of Macdonald and Heudelet's division 
 " were kept united. All these remains were has- 
 " tily brought together at Dantzig ; 35,000 sol- 
 " diers of seventeen different nations were shut up 
 " in that city." 
 
 The author in this manner contradicts himself. 
 Why then does he exhibit to us 6,600 men as the 
 remains of 600,000, unless to lead us into error, 
 and to swell our losses which are already so im- 
 mense? Was it then out of these 6,600 men 
 that Dantzig was garrisoned with 35,000 ? Did 
 they also supply the 6,000 men to Thorn, the 
 8,000 to Modlin, the 4,000 to Zamosc, etc. etc. ? 
 
 " Alexander stopped the progress of his troops 
 at Kalitch, etc." Mr. de Segur, who exaggerates 
 so much the losses of the French army, ought to 
 have told us what the Russians had suffered. 
 
 Kutusoffs army, which at the battle of Kras- 
 noi was 100,000 strong, was reduced to 35,000 
 men on the evacuation of Wilna by the French. 
 The Russians had scarcely taken possession of that 
 city, when they filled its hospitals with 18,000
 
 CHAPTER XI. 449 
 
 sick, the greater part disabled by the severity of 
 the cold. 
 
 The author of a notice respecting the campaign 
 of 1813, published at Weimar in the German lan- 
 guage in the year 1814, estimates at 20,000 men 
 the number of Russian troops that might, up to 
 that time, have reached Prussia, and at 30,000 
 the numbers that were collecting at Kalitch, 
 where the Emperor of Russia held his head-quar- 
 ters. After giving an explanation of the ground 
 occupied by the different Russian corps, he adds : 
 " It is quite clear from this statement, that, had 
 " it not been for the adhesion of Prussia, Russia 
 " could not, for a moment, have followed up her 
 et successes, but would have been compelled to 
 " confine her operations to the limits of the 
 " Vistula." 
 
 Sir Robert Wilson says, in his Picture of the Rus- 
 sian power, that the army of Alexander exhibited, 
 at this period, several companies without a private 
 soldier, and a great number of battalions which 
 did not number fifty men. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The conclusion which is drawn by our Marechal- 
 des-logis is, that " the star of the north eclipsed 
 " the star of Napoleon — that the human race in- 
 " clinesits course towards the south ; that it turns 
 
 2g
 
 450 BOOK XII. 
 
 f its back to the north. . . . that this grand course 
 " of mankind cannot be inverted with impunity : 
 " that the Russian armies have been seen upon 
 " the Elbe, and shortly afterwards in Italy ; that 
 " they came to reconnoitre the country, and will 
 " come at a later period to establish themselves in 
 " it. . . and that the invasion of the south by the 
 " north, which was renewed by Catherine II will 
 " yet be continued." 
 
 We have here an assertion formally laid down, 
 and supported by specious arguments, although 
 expressed in occasionally whimsical terms. 
 
 The author, then addressing those whom he styles 
 his comrades, says to them : " Whatever may have 
 f ' been the motive of our expedition, it was of im- 
 " portance to Europe, inasmuch as its object was 
 " to wrest Poland from the grasp of Russia, and 
 " as its result would have been to ward off the 
 " danger of a new invasion from the men of the 
 north, to weaken the impetuosity of that tor- 
 rent, and to raise a fresh obstacle to its progress." 
 Here we have again Mr. de Segur caught in 
 the fact ; he is himself found to demonstrate the 
 necessity of the expedition. It would be asking 
 too much of him that he should assign the real 
 motive of the war. 
 
 He adds in conclusion : *' What a man, and 
 " what circumstances combined together to ensure 
 " the success of so mighty an undertaking." Here 
 again breaks out the admission, that the enterprise 

 
 CHAPTER XII. 451 
 
 was well timed, and that the Emperor was the man 
 to ensure the success of it. 
 
 Thus it is that the author, who, throughout his 
 work, took a delight in exhibiting the expedition 
 to Russia as an unjust aggression, originating in 
 Napoleon's personal ambition, disavows in these 
 few words the assertions he had made, and justi- 
 fies the necessity, the object, the occasion, of that 
 memorable undertaking. But of what conse- 
 quence is this tardy retractation r Of what avail 
 are empty praises which appear to escape him 
 merely for the purpose of acquitting his con- 
 science of the injustice of the reproaches by which 
 he has attempted to blacken the character of that 
 great man ! Was it worth while to exhibit Na- 
 poleon to us fallen from his wonted character, a 
 prey to a debasing weakness, deprived of all mo- 
 ral and physical energy, to have sickened the rea- 
 der's heart by paintings full of horror, which are 
 scattered over a thousand pages, and all this in 
 order to return to the point from which he should 
 have started — to the truth ? 
 
 He concludes in these words : "Comrades, my 
 " task is now at an end. It now remains for you to 
 " bear testimony to the correctness of the pic- 
 " tu re. Its colors, will no doubt, appear pale to 
 " your eyes and to your hearts, which are yet full 
 " of those mighty recollections." 
 
 The veterans of the grand army will not admit 
 that to be a true picture which has so strangely
 
 452 book xn. 
 
 disfigured their illustrious chief, their sentiments, 
 their constancy, and their victories. 
 
 How can the author believe that his colors will 
 appear pale, when " his memory," as he says it 
 himself, " has nothing left but ashes to rake up, 
 " but disasters to record, and can no longer write 
 " but upon tombs ? 
 
 With him we may say, our task, as far as it de- 
 pended upon us, is completed ; it was a painful 
 one. We have not undertaken to point out in 
 detail the errors and mis-statements which swarm 
 through the work ; this would have led us be- 
 yond the limits we had prescribed to ourselves. 
 We have not noticed all those passages which 
 clearly shew that Mr. de Segur had no other ob- 
 ject than to flatter the passions of the moment in 
 which his work was written, passions that are 
 daily giving way. We would have been detained 
 at every page ; would it not, besides, be calum- 
 niating the government to suppose that a work 
 which lowers the pride of our arms, and is so little 
 flattering to foreigners, should prove a title to 
 military favors ? 
 
 We have seldom held up to notice the whimsi- 
 cal style of Mr. de Segur, who will fortunately 
 find no one to tread in his steps ; our object was 
 of too elevated a nature to allow of our being de- 
 tained by mere trifles. It matters little to us that 
 he should have pretentions to academical laurels ; 
 we had at heart, not to avenge the memory of
 
 CHAPTER XII. 453 
 
 a great man who stands in need of no defence, 
 whose fame is far above the reach of any attack, 
 but to render homage to the truth, to call in facts, 
 records, and men, as witnesses against a writer, 
 who, yielding to the wanderings of a disturbed 
 imagination, and speculating upon the cravings 
 which the present generation has contracted for 
 strong emotions, has, in a work of two volumes, 
 which is either a romance, a poem, or a melo- 
 drame, trampled upon genius, courage, and mis- 
 fortune, upon all that commands the respect of ele- 
 vated minds. May the soldiers of Napoleon, may 
 the friends of French glory, appreciate the feelings 
 which guided our pen, and be not wholly indif- 
 ferent to our efforts ! 
 
 END OF THE 
 CRITICAL EXAMINATION.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ORDERS OF THE EMPEROR, &c. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Thorn, 4th June, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that, when you 
 gave him the order to provide himself with twenly days provisions, 
 you meant it to be done in a regular way, and without foraging 
 the country ; that the conduct of the Wurtemberg troops has spread 
 sorrow and desolation in Poland; that it is high lime it should be 
 checked ; that he is to mention in the order of the day, the dis- 
 pleasure of his Majesty against the Wurtembergers, and to take 
 the speediest measures to prevent any devastation of the country ; 
 otherwise, we shall find ourselves in the same position as in 
 Portugal. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Wilna, 2d. July, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, send back that aid-de-camp of the viceroy, and 
 let the viceroy know, that, being without intelligence, though 
 aware before hand of the general movement, it was ridiculous in 
 him to remain stationary at Piloni ; that since he knew of the 
 cossacks being in the direction of Stoklitzi, he might have sent 
 his light cavalry forward to scour the country, obtain intelligence 
 and approach Wilna; that the news given to him by General 
 
 R , of there being thirty or forty thousand Russians 
 
 upon his left, is devoid of common sense ; that General R 
 
 pretends having mentioned that they were upon his right ; that 
 in this case, they are the hussars who were seen in the direc- 
 tion of Stoklitzi ; that all these delays very much thwart the 
 Emperor ; that the finest opportunities are, in consequence, 
 allowed to pass without being made available ; and that all the 
 fatigues of the fourth corps are rendered useless accordingly. 
 
 Write to General R , that I am surprised he is still at 
 
 Ismory ; that he must have lost his senses not to have continued 
 his march towards Wilna ; that if his artillery had occasioned 
 him some delay, he might have left with it a guard of a hundred 
 to a hundred and fifty men ; that he gave the viceroy information 
 of there being thirty or forty thousand Russians upon the left ; 
 that this absurd news has influenced the viceroy's operations. — 
 Enquire of him why he ventured to give such intelligence, and 
 order him to answer yon without delay ? 
 
 a
 
 2 ORDERS 
 
 Write lo (he viceroy that I instructed him on the 28th, to move 
 to the right, to push on strong parties of cavalry towards Olita, 
 in order to learn what is going on there, to approach Wilna with 
 the fourth corps, and to keep upon his right, that is lo say, 
 between the Niemen and Wilna, the sixth corps, which will send 
 detachments in the direction of Merecz and Olkeniki, so that he 
 may form his junction with the King of Westphalia. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Wilna, 5th July, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the King of Westphalia, that I only 
 received this day his dispatch of the 3d July, whilst his letters 
 of the 4th came to me yesterday. You will inform him, that 1 
 am exceedingly dissatisfied at his not having sent all the light 
 troops under the orders of Prince Poniatowski, in pursuit of 
 Bagration, for the purpose of harassing his corps and retarding 
 its march ; that, when he arrived on the 30th at Grodno, he 
 ought instantly to have attacked the enemy, and closely pursued 
 them. You will tell him that it is impossible to manoeuvre worse 
 than he has done; that General Heynier and even the eighth 
 corps were of no use in those operations ; that Prince Poniatowski 
 ought to have been made to march in pursuit of the enemy with 
 all his disposable troops ; that, in consequence of having departed 
 from every rule and from his instructions, he enables Bagration 
 to effect his retreat without precipitation ; that if Bagration left 
 Wolkowisk on the 30th, he may arrive at Minsk on the 7th, and 
 what matters it that the King should be there in person on the 
 10th, since Bagration will have had four days start of him ? Tell 
 bim that if Prince Poniatowski had had but one division, he 
 ought lo have sent him ; but that every thing leads to suppose he 
 might have sent forward the whole corps. He could not run any 
 risk, since Bagration has no time to fight or to manoeuvre, and 
 only seeks to gain ground, well aware that he is intercepted by 
 the manoeuvres which I am now directing; that the Prince of 
 Eckmiihl is at this moment with his corps in advance of Volojin, 
 but will not be strong enough to detain Bagration, since the latter 
 is interrupted by no obstacle. Desire the King, therefore, to 
 give orders immediately to Prince Poniatowski to set off with 
 his cavalry and all his disposable troops in pursuit of Bagration. — 
 You will tell him that all the fruits of my manoeuvres and the finest 
 opportunity everoffered in a war, have disappeared in consequence 
 of that strange forgelfulness of the first notions of warfare. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major- General. 
 
 Wilua, 7th July, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, communicate to the King of Westphalia, by a letter 
 in cyphers, the Prince of Eckmuhl's position of yesterday the 
 6th. You will frame the letter from the keys hereunto annexed.
 
 O F T HE i: M P i: R O R. J 
 
 Renew the order to him to hasten his march ; tell him that the 
 intelligence he affords respecting 1 Bag-ration, is so imperfect, that 
 it perplexes us; that if he knows the road he has taken, he ought 
 to inform us of it. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Wilna, 7th July, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, the guard is under orders to march ; its movements 
 commences on the 9th, and is to continue on the 10th, and 11th. 
 It is necessary that the pontoon train, the engineers, the artillery, 
 and all that are on the move, should take six days provisions, at 
 therate of half a ration's allowance, and a sufficient supply of meat, 
 for three quarters of a pound or one pound for each man. It is 
 therefore indispensable, that, on the 10th, there be ninety thou- 
 sand rations of bread for distribution to the guard, which the 
 men are to carry on theirbacks, and which will secure their means 
 of subsistence for six days, and three hundred quintals of rice, in 
 order to distribute a pound of rice to each man ; the guard will, 
 in this manner, be supplied with provisions for ten days ; that, on 
 the 1 1th and 12th, two convoys of bread, of thirty thousand rations 
 each, should leave Wilna and follow the movement of the guard : 
 thiswi'l be a further supply of bread to them for four days; lastly, 
 that, on the 9th, 10th, and 1 1th, convoys of bread should depart, 
 loaded upon the vehicles belonging to head-quarters, upon auxi- 
 liary vehicles, upon those which replace the vehicles of the ninth, 
 tenth, and second battalions, upon those of the eleventh battalion 
 aud such others as may yet arrive ; so that on the 10th, and 11th, 
 four thousand quintals of flour will have proceeded to follow the 
 guard; this will be equivalent to three hundred and sixty-thousand 
 rations of bread, or ten day's provisions for the guard and for head- 
 quarters ; these, added to the ten days' provisions which the guard 
 will havecarried away with them, form a supply of bread for twenty 
 days. Ifthearmyshouldnotmarch, otherconvoys will arrive; andif 
 it should march, it will find resources in the towns ; but I cannot 
 be at ease unless the guard and the head-quarters be provided with 
 twenty days' provisions, since the guard is the last to march, and 
 ought to give the example of good discipline. In this account are 
 not included biscuit, brandy, &c, which are deposited in the forty 
 caissons belonging to head-quarters, and are a resource available 
 in a case of emergency. As it appears that some biscuit has 
 arrived, let it be ascertained that it is in proper condition, and 
 give directions that the caissons of head-quarters be filled with 
 it, as this is a more advantageous course, in case of unforeseen 
 accidents. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major General. 
 
 Wilna, 9th July, 1S12. 
 
 My cousin, consider as of non-effect the last letter I wrote to 
 you for the Duke of Tarentum, and substitute the following in its 
 place. a 2
 
 4 ORDERS 
 
 " The Duke of Reggio has received orders to move upon 
 " Solok, the Duke of Elchingen upon Kozatschizna ; the King of 
 " Naples is at Widzy. The enemy appears to concentrate him- 
 " self at Dunaburg. The Prince of Eckmiihl has arrived at 
 " Minsk. The hetman Platoff with his cossacks, and the corps 
 " of Bagiation who wanted to proceed in the direction of that 
 " town, have been cut off from it ; they are now marching upon 
 " Bobruisk. The King of Westphalia is in pursuit of them, and 
 M had reached Mir yesterday. The viceroy is marching towards 
 " the upper Dwina ; the guards and head-quarters are to leave 
 «• this place in a few days. It is the intention of the Emperor 
 ** to march upon Moscow and St. Petersburg!), and by so doing, 
 »' compel the army, which is at Dunaburg, to re-ascend, and 
 •• set the whole of Courland and of Livonia free. 
 
 " The garrison of Riga, under the command of General Essen, 
 " whose army-corps has been disunited, consists of thirty-three 
 " battalions, of from two to three hundred men each, all recruits 
 •« made in the present year, and undeserving of any attention. It 
 ** is probable that, as soon as the fortress will be threatened, a 
 " division will proceed from Dunaburg to its relief; for, accord- 
 M ing to the information we possess, the garrison, as at present 
 '* composed, is inadequate to its defence. The Emperor cannot 
 H give you any positive order, but merely general instructions, 
 " because thedistance at which you are stationed is already too 
 *' great, and will now become greater still. Move upon Jacobstadt 
 " and Fredricksladt, and there threaten to cross the Dwina; this 
 A " movement will have the advantage of compelling the Russian 
 " army at Dunaburg to send a detachment to the right bank in 
 " order to cover the two points at which a passage might be 
 " effected," &c. &c. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Wilna, II th July, 1812. 
 
 My cousiu, reply to the King of Westphalia that you received 
 with astonishment his letter of the 9th July, at two o'clock in the 
 afternoon ; that the order of the 30th is a positive one ; that it 
 is couched in these terms : You are to move upon Minsk ; 
 General Reynier will move upon Nieswj, without however 
 neglecting to cover Warsaw. This means that General Rey- 
 nier's first object ought to be to cover Warsaw, the second to 
 move in the direction of Nieswj, provided the enemy should 
 withdraw all his troops from Volhynia, and there should be no- 
 thing more to apprehend for the grand-dutchy. But, as every 
 thing tends to prove that the enemy has left two divisions in 
 Volhynia, it is, therefore, proper that General Reynier should not 
 lose sight of his chief object, that of covering Warsaw. You 
 will accordingly stop his movement at Slonim ; the Prince of 
 Schwarzenberg will pass before him in order to move first upon 
 Nieswj and next upon the Dwina.
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 5 
 
 Let Geueral Reynier send forward parties to Pinsk, and place 
 himself in echelons, so as to fall upon the flanks of whatever 
 troops might attempt to debouch upon Warsaw. In that posi- 
 tion he will make a retrograde movement upon Warsaw, should 
 that country be threatened ; but so long as the enemy may know 
 him to be prepared to debouch from Pinsk, and to have his corps 
 ready to fall upon their flanks, and that they will have, moreover, 
 to apprehend our entrance into Volhynia, it will be out of their 
 power to march upon the territory of Warsaw ; and shonld they 
 do so, it would not be with impunity. General Reynier must 
 also send back to Praga the regiment which was intended for 
 the garrison of that place, and was improperly withdrawn from 
 it. General Reynier's position in the rear is, therefore, a useful 
 one. 
 
 His Majesty does not wonder you should not understand that 
 instructions given at the distance of a hundred leagues should 
 be of opposite tendencies, which future events are to clear up ; 
 what the Emperor complains of is that instead of studying those 
 instructions, you make no account of them. It is not at all ne- 
 cessary to be stationed upon the Bug, in order to cover War- 
 saw; if this were the case, as the first object of General Regnier 
 is to cover the dutchy, he should have left troops upon the 
 Bug, when he learned that the enemy had retained two divisions 
 in Volhynia. But as you were not apprised of what Bagration 
 had left in Volhynia, as you were ignorant of the number of 
 divisions he had with him, as you did not even pursue him, and 
 as he was enabled to make his retreat as quietly as if he had 
 no one in his rear, all this being in direct contradiction to the 
 practice in war, it is not extraordinary that every thing else 
 should bear the same stamp. General Reynier is, therefore, at 
 liberty, according to the forces ihe enemy may have left in 
 Volhynia, either to return to Brezesc, or to remain at Slonim, 
 and to send detachments towards Pinsk. But the chief object is, 
 that, until the enemy will have withdrawn their troops out of 
 Volhynia, he should have a corps of observation prepared to cover 
 Warsaw, and to fall upon any troops which might, from Volhynia, 
 threaten the dutchy or the rear of the army. 
 
 Order General Reynier to write immediately to the Major- 
 General, and to afford all the intelligence which he possesses. It 
 is His Majesty's desire that General Reynier, and not Prince 
 Schwarzenberg, should remain in observation, and march upon 
 the grand-dutchy in case of need ; many reasons have influenced 
 this decision. The King will make known to Prince Schwarzen- 
 berg that I wish him to move upon Nieswj, if Warsaw should not 
 be in any imminent danger. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Gluboko£, 20th July, 1812. 
 My cousin, write to the Prince of Eckmiihl that I cannot be
 
 I ) ORDERS 
 
 pleased with his conduct towards the King of Westphalia ; that 
 I had given him the command only in the event of the junction 
 taking place, and of both armies being on the field of battle, 
 when a commander-in-chief became necessary ; that instead of 
 this, he made known those instructions before the junction had 
 taken place, and when their only communication was by a few 
 out-posts ; that, after he had so done, and learned that the King of 
 Westphalia had retired, he ought to have retained the command, 
 and issued orders to Prince Poniatowski: that I no longer know 
 at this time how my right is going on ; that I gave him a proof of 
 the high confidence 1 had in him, and do not think he has made 
 an appropriate use of it ; that, since he had taken the command, 
 he ought to have kept it ; but that he would have done better not 
 to have taken it, since he had not formed a junction with the 
 King ; that now I am at a distance, 1 am ignorant of what passes 
 on my right ; that my affairs suffer accordingly, whereas if he 
 had written to Prince Poniatowski that the King having resigned 
 the command, he would direct the Prince's movements, my ar- 
 rangements would not have been affected. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Glwbokoe, 22d July, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, reply to General Reynier, that 1 authorize his not 
 sending that regiment to Praga, and approve of the position in 
 which he has stationed it. Let him know that the Duke of 
 Belluno with the 9lh corps, thirty thousand strong, and nearly all 
 Frenchmen, will be at Marienberg; and that, should circumstances 
 be urgent, and the dutchy of Warsaw be seriously threatened, 
 whilst he, General Reynier, would be defending the intrenched 
 camp of Praga and Modlin, he was to write to the Duke of 
 Belluno, and acquaint him with the emergency ; this would en- 
 able the Duke to come to bis assistance. You will add that the 
 war has taken such a turn as to enable us already to threaten 
 St. Petersburgh and Moscow, and that, therefore, it is not pro- 
 bable the enemy should dream of offensive operations with any 
 imposing forces ; though it has been imagined that ten or twelve 
 thousand men, belonging to troops of third battalions, which are 
 good for nothing in line, might be sent with one or two regiments 
 of cavalry to threaten the dutchy. The enemy will never be so 
 mad as to detach upon Warsaw fifteen or twenty thousand men 
 of good troops, whilst St. Petersburg and Moscow are so closely 
 threatened. It is possible, besides, that in a short time I may 
 carry the war into Volhynia ; he would form part of that corps. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Witepsk, 2d August, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, send au officer to inform Prince Schwarzenberg 
 that 1 place the seventh corps under his orders, that he is to rally
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 7 
 
 that corps, march against Torrnasof and Kamenskoi, offer them 
 battle, and follow them every where until he shall have succeeded 
 in overcoming' them. Acquaint General Reynier that I have 
 given to Prince Schwarzenberg the chief command over the two 
 corps united. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-Generul. 
 
 Witepsk, 3d August, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, it is proper you should dispatch, before six o'clock 
 this morning, an intelligent and trust worthy Polish officer to 
 Prince Schwarzenberg with the duplicate of the letter you wrote 
 to him by your aid-de-camp Flahaut ; acquaint him that, in con- 
 formity with the intention manifested by the Emperor of Austria, 
 I had intended to summon his corps to act under my immediate 
 orders ; that I had deemed the corps of General Reynier sufficient 
 to keep the troops of Volhynia in check, as I had proposed 
 sending a considerable body of Polish troops into Volhynia by 
 the way of Mozyr so soon as the corps of Prince Schwarzenberg 
 would have fallen into the line. But that since an imposing force 
 of the enemy has been before hand with us, and General Reynier 
 has allowed himself to be taken unawares, it is my wish that the 
 Prince should march to repel the enemy, and prevent his laying 
 waste that portion of the territory ; that as General Reynier is 
 chiefly in want of cavalry, the Prince's cavalry may take the 
 start of him ; that I wish him to leave at Nieswj about a thousand 
 cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and one brigade, in all four 
 thousand men, so as to form a body of reserve, commanded by a 
 general of brigade, which may act according to circumstances ; 
 that it is optional with him to raise this reserve to seven or eight 
 thousand men, if he found itinhis power todo so without any incon- 
 venience, that Torrnasof has one division at Mozyr, and probably 
 two divisions under his orders ; that the latter can only consist of 
 third battalions, like the divisions in (Jourland, which have been 
 so easily defeated hy the Prussians ; that two hundred itaiian 
 cavalry of the viceroy's corps have likewise met four of those bat- 
 talions and overthrown them at the first charge ; that, in the general 
 organization of the Russian army, we were aware that Torrnasof 
 was to have the twenty-seventh, a new division, in which consist- 
 ed his real strength ; but that I believe this twenty-seventh divi- 
 sion was unable to join him, and he will probably, in that case, 
 have retained the ninth or fifteenth division ; that it is necessary 
 he should take every means of correctly ascertaining what are the 
 enemy's divisions in Volhynia ; that we believe Bagration has 
 crossed the Borysthenes with six divisions ; that, in such a case, 
 there would remain in Volhynia one division at most, independent- 
 ly of Torrnasof 's third battalions; that 1 therefore wish him to 
 make a rapid march, attack and overthrow Kamenskoi and Tor- 
 rnasof, and carry the war into Volhynia ; that, on the other hand, 
 the events that will occur, and the precise intelligence he may ob-
 
 8 ORDERS 
 
 tain of the number of the enemy's regular divisious in Volhynia, 
 will enable me to make him acquainted with my ulterior inten- 
 tions. 
 
 P. S. Let the general of brigade which he may leave at Nieswj, 
 be instructed to correspond with head-quarters and with the 
 general commanding at Minsk, for the purpose of communicating 
 intelligence. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major -General. 
 
 Witepsk, 12th Aug. 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Castigliune that you do not 
 understand him, when he says that he has not a single cavalry 
 soldier, since he has at command a fine Saxon regiment of seven 
 hundred men, whenever he may stand in need of it, though it is 
 at present doing duty as a guard to the King of Saxony ; that he 
 has a regiment of dragoons at Hanover, which is now of eight 
 hundred men, and will soon be double that number ; that, as for 
 expeditions of sixty thousand men, this is quite absurd ; that the 
 English and the Russians have something else to think of besides 
 making descents ; that Sweden, if she makes any attempt, will 
 attack Norway; that, in any case, the latter power cannot venture 
 more than fifteen thousand men ; that it is proper, however, he 
 should proceed to inspect the coast, pass the troops in review, aud 
 personally reconnoitre the ground. 
 
 The Major-General to Napoleon. 
 
 Smolensko, 21st August, 1812. 
 
 Sire, 
 I have the honor to inform your Majesty that although six 
 hundred men are employed at this moment in burying the dead, 
 this operation is far from being terminated ; with the view of 
 expediting it, it is almost indispensable that the Russian prison- 
 ers be set to work. 1 request your Majesty will allow the em- 
 ployment of two hundred of them, who may be formed into com- 
 panies with officers and non-commissioned officers, and so closely 
 watched as to prevent any of the prisoners from escaping. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Smolensko, 24th August, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, enclosed you will find an order for the intendant to 
 furnish Prince Schwarzenberg with a second advance of 500,000 
 francs. Communicate to the Prince the satisfaction 1 have felt 
 at the victory he obtained; let him know that, to-morrow, 1 march 
 upon the enemy, who appears to be taking up a position twenty 
 leagues from this place on the road to Moscow ; that 1 wish him 
 to manoeuvre in such a manner as to prevent the enemy's troops 
 in Volhyuia from marching upon me; that L recommend him to
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 
 
 
 
 keep them employed. Write to General Reynier to the same 
 effect. Acquaint Prince Schwarzenberg that 1 have requested of 
 the Emperor of Austria to sanction all the promotions, and to 
 grant rewards in his corps ; that I likewise propose to grant re- 
 wards upon the report he makes to me ; that I await his pro- 
 posals. Write to acquaint the Duke of Tarentum with what has 
 taken place, and that I am about to march. Write also to 
 General Saint-Cyr ; let him know that I await his proposals in 
 order to grant rewards to his corps ; that it appears from the 
 Russian bulletins that Wittgenstein has only two divisions, form- 
 ed out of reserve battalions which are merely composed of re- 
 cruits. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Dorogobouje, 26th August, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno to repair to Wilna, 
 for the purpose of seeing the Duke of Bassano, and of learning 
 the state of affairs ; that, after to-morrow, I shall be at Wiazma, 
 which is at the distance of five day's march from Moscow ; that 
 it is probable a battle will be fought, the result of which will lead 
 us to Moscow ; that, in this state of things, it is possible the com- 
 munications may be intercepted ; that some one must, therefore, 
 take the command in such a case, and act according to circumstan- 
 ces; thatlhave ordered the 129th regiment, the Ulyrian regiment, 
 the Westphalian regiment which was stationed at Koenigsberg,and 
 the two Saxon regiments, to take the direction of Minsk ; that I 
 have besides stationed between Minsk and Mohilow Dombrow- 
 ski's division, consisting of twelve battalions and of a brigade of 
 light cavalry ; that it is of importance his corps should approach 
 Wilna, and he should act according to circumstances, in order 
 that he may have it in his power t» protect Smolensko, Witepsk, 
 Mohilow, and Minsk; that Dombrowski's division must be in 
 sufficient strength to protect the communication of Minsk, by 
 Orcha, as far as Smolensko, since all it has to do is to keep in 
 check the Russian division of General Hoertel stationed at Mozyr, 
 and consisting of from five to six thousand men, recruits for the 
 greater part, against which, besides, Prince Schwarzenberg may 
 act; that the fresh reinforcements 1 send to Minsk may also face 
 every obstacle ; and in any case, the movement of the Duke of 
 Belluno upon Minsk and Orcha, and from thence upon Smo- 
 lensko, appears to me calculated to protect our entire rear; that 
 i have four thousand men in garrison at Witepsk, and as many at 
 Smolensko ; that the Duke of Belluno, by thus taking up a posi- 
 tion between the Dnieper aud the Dwina, will have an unmolested 
 communication with me, be enabled to receive my orders without 
 delay, and have it in his power to protect the communications of 
 Minsk and of Witepsk, as well as those from Smolensko to Mos- 
 cow ; that I suppose General Gouvion Saint-Cyr has a sufficient 
 force in the second and sixth corps to keep Wittgenstein in check
 
 10 ORDERS 
 
 and have nothing to apprehend ; that the Duke of Tarentum may 
 move upon Riga in order to invest the place ; lastly, that I order 
 the four marching half brigades, being a total of nine thousand 
 men, which formed part of Lagrange's division, to take the direc- 
 tion of Kowno ; that it would only be, therefore, in the event of 
 General Gouvion Saint-Cyr being defeated by Wittgenstein, and 
 compelled to recross the Dwina, that the Duke of Belluno ought, 
 in the first instance, to march to his relief; that, with this excep- 
 tion only, he must continue his march towards Smolensko. 
 
 The Prince of Nevf chalet and tVagram to the Duke of Belluno. 
 
 Slawkowo, 27th August, 
 Nine o'clock at night. 
 
 You have received orders to proceed from Kowno to Wilna ; 
 you are to march upon four columns; provide yourself at Kowno 
 with ten pounds of rice for each man, which the soldier will carry 
 in a bag ; and you will take care that he does not consume more 
 than one ounce a day ; you will also provide yourself with biscuit 
 for six days, independently of whatever may follow you in vehicles. 
 At Wilna you will take provisions as far as Minsk, at Minsk as 
 far as Boiisow, and at Borisow as far as Orcha. From Orcha to 
 Smolensko your corps must march by divisions, so as to perform 
 the distance in three days ; the cavalry may proceed in advance. 
 Take advantage of your being personally on the spot, in order to 
 collect as much provisions as possible upon the road to Wilna, 
 at Minsk and at Orcha. As the Emperor is marching to Mos- 
 cow, your corps cannot arrive too soon at Smolensko, in order to 
 keep up our communications and be as a corps of reserve to us. 
 
 His Majesty appoints you to the command of all the troops that 
 are in Lithuania, in the governments of Mohilow, Witepsk, and 
 Smolensko, in order that you may call upon them all, according as 
 circumstances may require, and with a view to the common object ; 
 that object is to keep up the grand communication between Wilna, 
 and head quarters through Minsk and Smolensko. The follow- 
 ing are the troops which you will have at command in Lithuania : 
 Dombrowski's division of seven or eight thousand men, which is 
 employed in manoeuvring between Mohilow, Minsk, and Bobruisk ; 
 four Ulyrian battalions, two battalions of the 129th with its field 
 pieces, two battalions of the 33d light infantry with its field 
 pieces ; two battalions of the 33d light infantry are proceeding 
 to Smolensko ; a battalion of that regiment remained at Minsk. 
 Renew to General Loison the order to send them off; this will 
 place at your disposal, with Dombrowski's division, about twenty 
 four battalions. Four marching half brigades, which formed 
 Lagrange's division, are at Kceuigsberg ; 1 have ordered them 
 to repair to Kowno, where these new levies are to remain in 
 reserve. 
 
 The Polish cavalry and infantry regiments of Lithuania, ac- 
 cording as they will be formed, will mount garrison at Wilna and
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 11 
 
 at olher points; there are many isolated battalions at Wilna and 
 at Minsk ; several detachments are on the roads of Gluboko£ and 
 Kamen ; as soon as they will be re-armed and pi>t in order, they 
 must be sent to Smolensko, with the exception of what belongs 
 to the tenth corps commanded by Macdonald, and to the second 
 and sixth corps. 
 
 The third battalions of the 4th, 7th, and 9th Polish regiments 
 are not to enter into line the moment of their arrival at Wilna; 
 you are to order them to proceed to Minsk, and mount garrison 
 there ; they are not to join Gerard's division until they have 
 been at the school of the battalion. The three third battalions of 
 the lesion of the Vistula are to arrive at Smolensko, which will 
 have a garrison of five to six thousand men ; Witepsk is to have 
 the same number. 
 
 You are to watch the fortress of Bobruisk until arrangements 
 can be made for taking possession of it. You are to secure the 
 communication from Wilna to Smolensko, which the enemy is 
 endeavoring to intercept with his troops which may succeed in 
 escaping from Schwarzenberg ; this is the principal object to b,e 
 attended to. You are to protect the communications between 
 Smolensko and head-quarters, if they should be interrupted, come 
 to the assistance of the army, if it should be found necessary, and 
 lastly you are to form its reserve. There is no apprehension of 
 its being threatened in the direction of the Dwina. The siege of 
 Riga will necessarily draw the attention of the enemy to the lower 
 Dwina. The forces under Saint-Cyr appear to be more than 
 sufficient to keep the enemy in check. This object, however, in 
 case of unforeseen events, ought to fix your attention. You are 
 also to protect the territories of Witepsk, Smolensko, and Mo- 
 hilow. We have five depots of cavalry, namely, Kowno, Merecz, 
 Minsk, Glubokoe, and Lepel. You will look to the formation of 
 marching squadrons. Give a general movement towards Smo- 
 lensko to whatever is in the rear of the army. You will march 
 to Minsk and Smolensko as soon as possible. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Wiazma, 30th August, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to General Dombrowski, that, considering 
 the bad condition of the fortress of Bobruisk, it might be advisable 
 for him to invest it with his infantry, aud that he should scour 
 with bis cavalry, the outlets of Pinsk and Mozyr ; he may obtain 
 resources from the country, and the governor of Minsk may furnish 
 him with troops for that operation. He may set fire to the town by 
 means of howitzers, and expedite its destruction, as it is entirely 
 of wooden construction. 
 
 Napo/eon to the Major-General. 
 
 Wiazma, 30th August, 1812. 
 My cousin, give directions to the King of Naples, to perforin
 
 12 ORDERS 
 
 to-morrow an ordinary march, in such manner, however, as to 
 find himself at the distance of eight or nine leagues from VViazma, 
 and be enabled to reach Gjat on the following day. It is proper 
 that, in case of events, the viceroy should have it in his power to 
 turn the right of the enemy, and Prince Poniatowski his left, and 
 that the three advanced guards be so near each other as to be able 
 to charge together, a manoeuvre which will naturally save the 
 effusion of blood, and prevent the enemy from offering any 
 resistance. 
 
 Give orders to the viceroy to follow the enemy upon the left, so 
 as to be able to turn the enemy's right, to come up with the King 
 of Naples, who is at the village of Koslowo, and who, to-morrow 
 the 31st, is to make a short march which will lead him to within 
 eight or nine leagues of Wiazma. Inform the viceroy, that it is 
 necessary, that with the whole of his cavalry, and a strong advanced 
 guard of infantry and artillery, he should turn the enemy's right, 
 and have his share of the firing, if any should take place ; that 
 this is the only way to lessen the effusion of blood, and to accele- 
 rate the retreat of the enemy. Give a similar order to Prince 
 Poniatowski with respect to the right ; he is to turn the enemy's 
 left. The Prince of Eckmuhl is to follow, so as to be a league in 
 the rear of the King of Naples; and the Duke of Elchingen two 
 leagues in the rear of the Prince of Eckmuhl. The Duke of 
 Treviso will march at ten in the morning towards Fedorowsko£, in 
 the rear of the Duke of Elchingen. The Duke of Abrantes will 
 repair to Wiazma, cross the bridges to the right of the town, and 
 take up a position one league in advance of it. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Gjat, 2d, September, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, the general staff is of no assistance to me, any more 
 than the provost Martial of the gendarmerie, the baggage master, 
 or the officers of the staff ; no one serves as he ought to do. 
 
 You have received my order of the day for the baggage ; take 
 care that ihe first baggage I order to be burned may not be that of 
 the general staff; if you have no baggage master, you ought to 
 appoint one ; let all the baggage proceed under his immediate 
 direction. It is impossible to see a worse order than that which 
 at present exists. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Gjat, 2d. September, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, order the King of Naples, the Prince of Eckmuhl, 
 the Viceroy, Prince Poniatowski, and the Duke of Elchingen to 
 repose themselves this day, to rally the troops, to have a call made 
 at three in the afternoon, and to communicate to me the precise 
 number of men who are to be present at the battle ; to have an 
 inspection made of the arms, cartridges, artillery, and moveable hos-
 
 OP THE EMPEROR. 13 
 
 pitals ; to inform the soldiers that the moment of a general battle is 
 drawing near, and that every preparation must be made for it. 
 
 It is necessary that before ten o'clock at night, I should be 
 furnished with statements of the number of infantry and cavalry, 
 the number of pieces of artillery, their calibre, the number of 
 shots to be fired, the number of cartridges for each soldier, the 
 number in the caissons, the number of covered waggons belonging 
 either to regiments, to divisions, or to corps of artillery, the num- 
 ber of surgeons, the number of articles that may be prepared for 
 dressing the wounds; these statesments will also shew the num- 
 ber of detached men who would not be present at the battle, if it 
 should take place to-morrow, but who might be made to join if it 
 only occurred in two or three days, by pointing out the place 
 where they are to be found, and the means to be adopted to that 
 effect. 
 
 These statements are to be made with the greatest care, since 
 their result is to guide me in my determination ; they are first to 
 comprise all the men present at the call, and next, all those who 
 are to be present at the battle. 
 
 You will also direct, that I be made acquainted with the num- 
 ber of horses unshod, and the time necessary to shoe the cavalry 
 horses, and have them placed iu a proper condition for battle. 
 
 The King of Naples may, if he thinks proper, alter his position 
 by moving his light cavalry and his small advanced guard for- 
 ward the distance of a few wersts ; Prince Poniatowski and the 
 Viceroy will make a similar alteration in theirs. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Mojaisk, 11th September, 1812. 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that the 8th West- 
 phalian regiment, the Saxon regiment of Low, that of Rechten, 
 the third marching regimeut of Infantry which was formed at 
 Kcenigsberg, the third battalions of the4th,7th, and9th, the Polish 
 regiments, the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th marching regiments of cavalry 
 mustallbesentontoSmolensko; that theenemy attacked at the very 
 heart, loses no more time atthe extremities; that he uses every exer- 
 tion to prevent our entering Moscow, and shows a determination 
 to omit no effort to drive us out of that city as soon as possible. 
 The movement must therefore be from Smolensko to Moscow, as 
 the numerous troops coming up, and those that are in the grand 
 dutchy of Lithuania are sufficient to protect our rear. It is like- 
 wise necessary that the Duke of Belluno be prepared with his 
 corps properly united, to march from Smolensko towards Moscow, 
 for the purpose of reinforcing the army in proportion as the 
 enemy may reinforce his own. Witepsk does not stand in need 
 of any thing; however small may be the number of troops there, 
 theenemy will leave that city unmolested; I shall, even withdraw 
 all the troops from it, 'so soon as my hospital will have been 
 removed. The Duke of Belluno must, therefore, forward every
 
 14 ORDERS 
 
 thing 1 , battalions, squadrons, artillery and stragglers to Smolensko, 
 in order to march from thence towards Moskow. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Suburb of Moscow, 15th September, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, order the Duke of Danlzig to repair with the young 
 guard to the Kremlin, where the police of that quarter will be 
 exclusively confined to his care. 
 
 General Durosntl will perform the functions of governor of 
 the city. 
 
 The King of Naples will cause the road from Kolomna to 
 Troitzka to be occupied by Prince Poniatowski and by his cavalry. 
 
 The viceroy will move his head quarters to the gate of St. 
 Petersburgh, and have the road occupied from, and including 
 Troitzka, to the road where he has taken positiou. 
 
 The Prince of Eckmiilh will intercept all the roads from that 
 occupied by the viceroy, to the road occupied by Prince Ponia- 
 towski. 
 
 The viceroy and the King of Naples will send strong recon- 
 noitring parties upon the road of St. Petersburgh and upon the 
 road taken by the enemy, for the purpose of collecting intelli- 
 gence and of picking up all stragglers. 
 
 Napoleon to General LariLoisiere. 
 
 Moscow, ISih September, 1812. 
 
 General Lariboisiere, I desire that the two companies of the 
 marines of the guard may be provided with six 12 pouuders and 
 two howitzers. You will take this cannon from the arsenal 
 of Moscow. The caissons are also to be had in that arsenal. 
 The horses and soldieis of the train will be taken among those 
 belonging to the caissons which you intended to send away. By 
 this means the reserve of the guard will have an augmentation of 
 sixteen pieces of cannon. It is likewise necessary to add to the 
 reserve of the Prince of Eckmuhl, eight pieces of cannon, six of 
 which are tobe 12 pounders, the rest howitzers; should it be found 
 necessary, you might have them worked by two Prussian com- 
 panies that follow the old guard. Sixteen pieces of cannon are 
 not sufficient for the Prince of Eckmuhl, who has a corps of five 
 divisions under his orders. — Draw up a report that will let me 
 know when the reserve of the guard will be as strong in number 
 as when it left Paris, and when all that has been dismounted at 
 Wilna, will have proceeded on its march. — There are in the 
 arsenal of Moscow two hundred small caissons ; I desire that 
 they may be applied to some use ; they may be rendered availa- 
 ble with greater rapidity in bad roads; those caissons may be 
 provided with cognats. Make me a general report respecting 
 my artillery, and respecting the means of repairing all losses. 
 It is my intention not to lose a single piece, but to keep up to
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. ].y 
 
 its full complement my organization, which is by no means too 
 • rong. In short, see if it would be possible to establish milk 
 
 at Moscow, for the purpose of making powder. 
 
 The Prince oj Neufchatel and Wagram to H. M. the King of 
 
 Naples. 5 J 
 
 Moscow, 22nd September, 1812. 
 
 Four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 Your aid-de-camp has just handed to the Emperor your letter 
 dated at five o'clock this morning. Enclosed^ you w fi nd » 
 second report from the Duke of Istria. The Emperor is in 
 anxious expectation of some positive intelligence. A party of 
 cossacks has made its appearance on the Smolensko roaJ P /tl 
 d.-stance of s,x or seven leagues from this place. They were about 
 
 ^^^t^^Tt a conv ? y of firteen — "Ss 
 
 were Dinned, his Majesty has just dictated to me the enclosed 
 etter for General Sebastian,. The Emperor has determined that 
 sentence of death shall be pronounced upon every officer who 
 should, without authority, hold any intercourse witlf the enem^ 
 advanced posts. His Majesty will not allow of any other cores! 
 pondence with enemies than by means of cannon and musket balls 
 repeat to you that his Majesty is extremely anxious to lea „ 
 what opinion he ,s to form of the enemy's movements. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Istria. 
 
 Moscow 22nd September, 1812. 
 
 Four o'clock in the afternoon, 
 
 f« l Se, i d 7l" a u P0 ! 1 fr ° m GeUeral Sebas tiani which had been 
 forwa-cled by the king, and from which it appears that the 
 enemy is continuing his movement upon Kolomna. The Kin* 
 of Naples was expected to arrive with his advanced guard • he 
 will have close y pursued the enemy • we, therefore, expect 
 ^receive in the night some intelligence of a positive nature 
 The Emperor desires you will hkewise send him information of 
 whatever you may have learned, and especially some news of 
 Prince Poniatovvski, and the reports he will make to you of what 
 he may have heard respecting the Russians. You will have 
 learned what took place on the road of Mojaisk ; but it wis 
 nothing more than a surprise of some fifteen caissons, in a village 
 by about forty cossacks who blew them up. The Emperor has 
 sent Major I etort with two hundred and fifty dragoons UDOn 
 the road of Mojaisk, where we passed the night. Major Letort 
 has orders to detain all the cavalry he may meet on i 2 
 this will raise his number to fifteen hundred or two thousand 
 men ; with this force he is to protect the road. The whole amiv 
 w prepared to move and the Emperor has resolved to die 
 the enemy behind the Oka. The intelligence from the king and
 
 jfl ORDERS 
 
 from yourself, which is expected in the night will fix his 
 detonation,' as to whether the army shall take the road to 
 Tula or that leading to Kolomna. Should we proceed on .the 
 road to Tula, the cavalry under your orders, that of the guard 
 the polish troops of Poniatowski, Frederick's division of infant. y 
 will,from the nature of your position, form the advanced guard. 
 But above all things send intelligence to us as soon as possible. 
 The prince of Neuchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Istria. 
 
 Moscow, 23d September, 1812, 
 
 Four o'clock in the morning. 
 I have submitted to the Rmperor your letter written at eleven 
 o'clock last ni^ht. In consequence of it, his Majesty waits for 
 frerinteigence previously to putting the army in motion. 
 P ince Poniatowski was to arrive at Podolsk at an early hour 
 vesterdav; if you are without news from him, it is owing to the 
 fnroadsoftheLssacks. The movements you have ordered your 
 cavalry to make, must infallibly procure us intelligence of the 
 Polih troops under prince Poniatowski. His Majesty is hkew.se 
 in expectatfon of the^eports the king of Naples will have sent to 
 him fast night, which cannot arrive from the advanced guard 
 before five or six in the morning. His Majesty approves o all 
 'hat you intended to do. Order the country about Desna .to be 
 scoured. The five or six hundred cossacks who infest d the 
 road to Mojaisk have done us a great deal of mischief, they 
 blew up fifteen caissons, and took prisoners two marching squa- 
 drons of cavalry, amounting to about two hundred horses : hose 
 squadrons belonged to a marching column under the orders o 
 General Lanusse°, who had imprudently moved them to . tail r ght 
 they next attempted to attack a larger convoy of artillery but 
 the firing drove them away. Major Letort, as I have already in- 
 formed ; u, proceeded yesterday to Prince Gallon's residence 
 upon the Mojaisk road, with two hundred cavalry. In conse- 
 quence of the information contained in your last letter, and that 
 which has been communicated by the king, his Majesty has just 
 dispatched General Saint-Snlpice, with all his dragoons to afford 
 assistance to Major Letort in case of need ; a measure which w.M 
 probably be superfluous, although it is not attended with any 
 Inconvenience ; for the marches you have ordered to be made m 
 the direction of Podolsk and of Desna, must have the effect ot 
 withdrawing the cossacks from the road to Mojaisk. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to H.M. the king of 
 
 Naples. 
 
 Moscow, 23d September, 1812, 
 
 Four o'clock in the morning. 
 Sire, the Emperor received your letter of the 22nd ^Ptenibei-, 
 at eight o'clock at night. He is in anxious expectation ot heann,,
 
 OF THE EMPEROR, 17 
 
 from you, and from the Duke of Istria. Private intelligence 
 leads us to believe that the enemy is no longer at Podolsk. Should 
 this be the case, Prince Poniatowski must have arrived there 
 last night, and your Majesty will know how to act. The Duke 
 of Istria, on his part, must reach Podolsk this day. We like- 
 wise learn from private information that the enemy would appear 
 to have evacuated Desna, and to be moving upon Serpuchow and 
 Kalouga. Your Majesty should have only one object in view, 
 that of resuming the pursuit of the enemy with your advanced 
 guard, &c. &c. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 23d. September, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write instantly to General Baraguay-d'Hilliersand 
 to the Duke of Abrantes at Smolensko, to acquaint them that 
 the cavalry and artillery composing each convoy, are to march 
 together, to bivouac in a square battalion round the convoy, and 
 not separate under any pretext whatever ; that the commandant of 
 the convoy is to bivouac in the centre of it ; that every com- 
 mandant failing to obey these directions, would be punished for 
 his neglect, and as being the guilty cause of the loss of the convoy. 
 Renew the orders, that no convoy should leave Smolensko un- 
 less it be commanded by a superior officer, and escorted by 
 cavalry and infantry, to the number of fifteen hundred men, 
 (exclusively of the soldiers belonging to the train, whether of the 
 artillery, the engineers, or^the military equipages) ; that I observe 
 with regret, that convoys have been sent on, whose escorts were 
 not of sufficient strength to protect them. In conformity with 
 what I have just enjoined, you will issue an order of the day, res- 
 pecting the plan upon which convoys are in future to bivouac; 
 send it to the commandant of the fifth and sixth convoys. Inde- 
 pendently of this order of the day, let me see the terms of the 
 ordinances respecting convoys and their escorts ; I think they are 
 very precise as to the manner in which convoys are to be guarded ; 
 in that case, those instructions ought to be re-printed, and posted 
 up at the offices of all commandants of towns, from Kowno to this 
 place. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 24th September, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, acknowledge the receipt of General Saint-Sulpice's 
 letter ; let him know that 1 attach great importance to his keep- 
 ing the road from Mojaisk to Moskow free and uninterrupted ; 
 and that I depend upon him for this object ; that he is to take 
 up his cantonments on the spot where he is at present, and put 
 himself in communication with the Duke of Abrantes who is now 
 at Mojaisk; that 1 recommend to him, when estafets shall pass, 
 to send patroles for their protection; that Colonel Letort is about 
 
 b
 
 IS ORDERS 
 
 to replace himself under his orders, and that he is at liberty to 
 retain him in echelons wherever he may think proper ; that the 
 occupation of Desna will probably keep off the enemy. 
 
 Recommend to him, especially, to station patroles for the pro- 
 tection of couriers. He should endeavor to ascertain whenever 
 there are any more detached cossacks, in order to pursue them. 
 I suppose he will have sent two or three hundred men to the spot 
 from whence the detachment belonging to General Lanusse was 
 carried off a few days ago ; if he has not, let him do so now. 
 Colonel Letort is to start this day or to-morrow morning ; his corps 
 will always be a patrol upon the road. 
 
 The Prince of Neuf chattel and Wagram to the Duke of Islria. 
 
 Moscow, 26th September, 1812. 
 
 His Majesty expected to receive news from the King of 
 Naples, previously to despatching your aid-de-camp ; we have 
 only received this instant the intelligence, that the king arrived 
 at five o'clock yesterday at Podolsk, where he formed a junction 
 with Prince Poniatowski. You will have heard this news ; and it 
 will have decided the enemy to evacuate Desna, which we suppose 
 to be at this moment in your possession. Place under the orders 
 of the king, the corps of Prince Poniatowski, and the third corps 
 of cavalry ; with respect to yourself, the Emperor desires you will 
 take up a position, as a corps of observation, with Colbert's 
 brigade, the light cavalry of the first corps, and the division of 
 infantry commanded by General Frederich, for the purpose of 
 marching to the assistance of the King of Naples, in case of need, 
 and of intercepting the roads which the enemy might take, in 
 order to bear down upon our line of observation, without the 
 knowledge of the King of Naples. Another corps of observation, 
 consisting of the dragoons of the guard, and a thousand infantry, 
 is at the castle of Prince Gallitzin, where the Emperor slept. — 
 General Guyot, with the chasseurs of the guard, two brigades of 
 light bavarian cavalry, Broussier's division of infantry, and sis 
 pieces cannon, is stationed half-way between Moscow and the 
 castle of Prince Gallitzin, in order to move in whatever direction 
 circumstances may call him. The cannonading you heard yester- 
 day morning upon your right, took place on the occasion of a 
 reconnoitring made by the dragoons of the guard ; it was ill- 
 directed by Major Martod, who has been either killed or taken 
 prisoner. Our loss, in this unlucky engagement, has been a few 
 dragoons killed or taken, the major, a captain, an adjutant-major, 
 and about twenty dragoons wounded ; we have also lost some 
 infantry. This ill-directed reconnoitring was surprised by three 
 thousaud of the enemy provided with cannon. Place yourself in 
 communication with the corps of observation, which is on the road 
 from Mojaisk to the castle of Prince Gallitzin, if you should see 
 no inconvenience in doing so; (I had particularly recommended 
 to General Saint-Sulpice not to expose the dragoons of the guard.)
 
 <» F T H E E M J* E R O R . I <) 
 
 The Emperor is giving directions to the King of Naples to pursue 
 the enemy, in order to drive him baek some distance from 
 Moscow, and to make him determine upon taking up his canton- 
 ments beyond the Oka. Keep up a constant correspondence with 
 the king, and give us information of every thing that may come 
 to your knowledge. The corps of observation under your orders 
 is of the highest importance, so long as we shall not have driven 
 away the enemy. 
 
 The Prince of Neuf chalet and Wagram to the Duke of Istria. 
 
 Moscow, 27th September, 1812. 
 
 Seven o'clock in the morning. 
 
 The Emperor has been displeased at your receiving at your 
 head-quarters the two flags of truce that were bearers of letters. 
 In future, you are not to admit any one by the advanced post ; 
 the letters which the prisoners may forward, are to be received by 
 the vedettes, and the bearers of them instantly dismissed. Every 
 parley with the enemy must turn to our disadvantage, and be 
 
 opened with some design, in that quarter which provokes it. 
 
 The Emperor thinks that the enemy's movement has had but one 
 object in view, that of covering Kalouga, and reaching at once the 
 road to Kiow, through which he hopes to receive his reinforce- 
 ments. The idea of marching upon Mojaisk, appears to his 
 majesty, to be nothing more than vain boasting ; the Emperor 
 says, that a victorious army would not deem itself to be in a moral 
 situation adequate to the attempt of such an operation ; how can 
 it be believed, that such a movement should really be contempla- 
 ted by a vanquished army, which has abandoned its finesl city ? 
 
 As to the enemy's movement of retreat upon Kalouga, after the 
 battle, it would evidently have, been an invitation to the French 
 army to march upon Moscow. But Kutusoffdid what he ought 
 to have done, when he retired by the way of Moscow ; he has 
 made indications of taking up several fine positions, and endea- 
 vored to make us believe that, before we could enter Moscow, 
 we would have to fight a second battle. This measure was so 
 judicious, that if the statement of Lariboisiere, the commander of 
 the artillery, had fallen short of what it did by twenty thousand 
 cannon shots, the Emperor would not have proceeded further, 
 although the field of battle presented one of the finest sights ever 
 beheld, since it is impossible to carry redoubts without artillery, 
 and an abundance of ammunition. 
 
 The Emperor finds it a ridiculous assertion in the flags of truce, 
 to say that they only lost a thousand officers in a battle where 
 the Russians have had forty general officers killed or wounded, 
 and forty or fifty thousand men of their best troops put hors de 
 combat. His Majesty observes, that the greater number of their 
 officers belong to Moscow, that all the particulars which have been 
 oblaiued express, that they evinced a wish to defend that capital ; 
 that their army, by not doing so, gave an indication of its 
 weakness. y 2
 
 l J0 ORDERS 
 
 As the advanced guard of our army has suffered itself to be im- 
 posed upon, by its having concluded a kind of armistice with the 
 advanced posts of the cossacks, it appears natural to his Majesty, 
 that the enemy should have pushed on his cavalry towards our left, 
 for the purpose of annoying us ; the road of Mojaisk might even 
 have been intercepted for a few days. The enemy's ambition 
 has not carried them so far ; they stationed cavalry upon every 
 part of the road, in order to be well guarded, and acquainted ill 
 time with our movemenls. 
 
 Should the enemy maintain their position upon the Pakhra, it 
 is the Emperor's intention to march up and offer them battle ; 
 but it is to be supposed they will not wait for him, and have 
 no other object in view than to ascertain if our whole army is 
 in front of them. The Emperor desires, in the first place, that 
 you retain the two flags of truce until the King of Naples shall 
 have crossed the Pakhra ; you will then send them on during 
 the night to the advanced posts of the King of Naples, through 
 which they are to return to their own army ; in the second 
 place, thai you receive no more flags of truce, but simply the 
 dispatches of which they may be the bearers ; the same form 
 to be observed in regard to the letters you may have to forward. 
 The Emperor's wish of saving his troops from fatigue induces 
 him to refrain from marching with his army in order to dislodge 
 the enemy ; give every one to understand that His Majesty has 
 reached their rear with his army. 
 
 Should you speak with flags of truce, it will be proper to 
 tell them it was the Emperor's anxious wish that their army 
 had marched upon Mojaisk, as it would then have been placed 
 between two armies. 
 
 Caution Generals Lahoussaye, Chastel and Girardin no longer 
 to bring from the out posts any officers or soldiers as flags of 
 truce, upon any account whatever; their letters only are to be 
 taken in, and they are to be informed that the replies will be 
 forwarded. 
 
 1 have already informed you that General St. Sulpice, was, 
 with the dragoons of the guard, at the castle of Prince Gallitzin ; 
 that General Guyot, with the chasseurs of the guard, six pieces 
 of artillery, two brigades of bavarian cavalry ; and Broussier's divi- 
 sion of the fourth corps, had taken up a position on the road to 
 Mojaisk, halfway between Moscow and the castle of Prince Galit- 
 zin. lam giving orders to the viceroy to send General Ornanowith 
 an additional force of five hundred cavalry and six pieces of 
 cannon, as a re-inforcement to the brigade of bavarian cavalry 
 which is at this moment with General Guyot, and to take the 
 command of it. 
 
 Should any uuforseen circumstances occur, you are authorised 
 to write to General Ornano and to General Broussier to advance 
 npon the old road from Moscow to Kalouga, in a line with you, 
 whether at Fedozino, or Szarapowo, with the cavalry, infantry 
 and artillery under their orders. As for General Guyot, his
 
 OF THE tMFEROR. Si 
 
 artillery, and the chasseurs of the guard, they must remain in 
 position on the Moscow road, half way to th*' castle of Prince 
 Gallitzin, without making any alteration in that position. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major -General. 
 
 Moscow, 27th September, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, General Baraguay-d'Hilliers is at liberty to dis- 
 pose of the polish regiment in any way he thinks proper; so 
 many detachments are coming up from the rear, that he must 
 have it in his power to give the peasantry a severe lesson. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchalel and fVagram to the King of Naples. 
 
 Moscow, 28th September, 1812. 
 
 Two o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 The Emperor has just received your letter, dated yesterday, the 
 27th, at nine o'clock at night. His Majesty has given orders, 
 that the army should be prepared to march during the night, as it 
 is already two o'clock, and too late, therefore, to move this day ; 
 the Emperor, besides, will receive intelligence from you, and from 
 the Duke of Istria before night ; and those dispatches will enable 
 him to decide, whether it be necessary to set the army in motion. 
 The Duke of Istria writes likewise, under date of yesterday, at 
 nine o'clock at night, from his head quarters, four wersts in 
 the rear of Gorki ; so that your Majesty cannot be turned by 
 the direction of Desna. Your Majesty must be sensible that your 
 dispatches are expected with impatience. The Duke of Istria, 
 says, that the enemy is likewise in front of him. General Lahous- 
 saye is at Batukinka, in the rear of Gorki. 
 
 The Prinee of N en f chat el to General Lariboisiere. 
 
 Moscow, 1st October, 1812. 
 
 The Emperor has just made the following dispositions, for the 
 armament and fortifications of the Kremlin. 
 
 Armament . 
 
 The twelve first pieces of cannon to be placed at the Kremlin, 
 are to be mounted there in the course of this day and to-morrow, 
 in the under-mentioned positions : 
 
 1 piece at the Tower, No. 2. 
 
 2 at the Tower, No. 4. 
 
 1 at the Tower, No. 8. 
 
 The above will arm the side next to the river, which is 700 
 yards long. 
 
 I piece at the Tower, No. 1. 
 
 2 at the Tower, No. 16. 
 
 1 at the Tower, No. 14.
 
 22 
 
 OUDEES 
 
 These will arm the opposite side, the length of which is 840 
 yards. 
 
 The other side of the trapezium is nearly 1,000 yards long. 
 It must receive 
 
 2 pieces at the Tower, No. 12. 
 
 1 at the Tower, No. 11. 
 
 1 at the Tower, No. 9. 
 
 These twelve howitzers, being 12, and 3 pounders, may direct 
 their fire upon the whole circuit of its precincts, and flank it 
 entirely. 
 
 Eighteen more pieces are destined to complete the armament of 
 the Kremlin ; you will point out the places where they ought to be 
 mounted. 
 
 Fortification. 
 
 The most important works to be entered upon at the Kremlin, 
 are : 
 
 1st, To demolish the building which rests against the Towers, 
 No. 1 and No. 2. 
 
 2dly, To open four out of the five gates, and surround them 
 with an intrenchment, so that the four gates may be rendered 
 available for the purpose of debouching and making sorties, and 
 protected at the same time against being forced by cannon balls, 
 by means of pallisadoes and mounds of earth raised before them. 
 
 3dly, To open several walls in the interior, to enable one to go 
 more rapidly round it. 
 
 4thly, To restore the lunettes H, K and L, to their original 
 state, by connecting them with the wall, and palisading them 
 properly, so as to admit of plenty of artillery. 
 
 5thly, To complete the fermeture, and establish a species of 
 covered ways, and small hurdles close to the inclosure, between 
 Tower 11 and Tower 8 in those places of the fortress which ap- 
 pear most deficient in strength. 
 
 Gthly, To demolish all the buildings round the Kremlin, those in 
 particular that are between Tower No. 14 and Tower No. 8, and 
 especially a mosque with many steeples. 
 
 lou are to conceit measures with the general of engineers for 
 carrying into effect the disposit ; ons ordered by the Emperor. 
 
 Napoleon to General Lariboisiere. 
 
 Moscow, 3d October, 1812. 
 
 Count Lariboisiere, I have been this day to visit the foundry; 
 I found there but little zeal or activity ; every intelligence obtain- 
 ed leads to suppose that the enemy had in this park a hundred 
 thousand balls ; and it is supposed that he threw them into the 
 water, which being but a pond, can easily be drained. Men 
 must, therefore, be set to work with all activity to dig a small 
 ditch which is necessary for that purpose, and to remove the 
 sunken iron. During the fortnight that we are here, only ten
 
 OF THE EMPEROR, 23 
 
 thousand cartouches for cannon balls have been made. I desire 
 that, dating from to-morrow, you will put that foundry on such a 
 footing as to cast every day six thousand cannon balls which 
 will be stored up in the Kremlin, according as they are made. 
 Independently of a supply and a half, which must be attached 
 to the corps of the army, there must be a reserve of half a supply 
 in readiness for marching, i was surprised at not finding a single 
 officer belonging to the park of artillery. I saw two hundred 
 small Russian caissons; I wish to know if you intend making 
 any use of them ; in the event of their not being made available 
 for the artillery, they might serve for the military transports. 
 Prince Poniatowski complains of having a hundred caissons too 
 many, his supply being greater than is necessary. I desire to be 
 informed how many pieces of cannon he has with him, and what 
 is the extent of his supply. It would appear to be his wish to 
 get rid of a hundred loaded caissons. I pray God to have you in 
 his holy keeping. 
 
 The Prince o/Neufchatel and Wagram to the King of Naples. 
 
 Moscow, 4th October, 1812, 
 half-past four in the morning- 
 
 His Majesty would have wished that the horses taken from the 
 vehicles in the train of the cavalry had been made use of for 
 drawing the caissons which have been abandoned, as there is a 
 greater need of artillery than of the vehicles that accompany the 
 troops. The Emperor has granted rewards to the fifth corps ; he 
 has observed with pleasure the good conduct shewn by the Polish 
 troops. His Majesty has received your letter of the 2d of Octo- 
 ber, at nine o'clock at night ; he is pleased to find that you have 
 occupied Woronowo. As you announce it to be your intention 
 to write on the 3d, in the morning, the Emperor waits for your 
 letter to answer you. His Majesty having determined to send 
 one of his aids-de-camp to the Russian commander-in-chief, he 
 desires you will order the chief of your staff to write to the 
 general commanding the enemy's advanced guard a letter worded 
 in the following terms : 
 
 " It being the intention of the Emperor to send one of his 
 " principal aids-de-camp to the commander-in-chief Kutusoff, it 
 *« is requested that it may be made known, on what day, and at 
 " what hour and place that General may be pleased to receive 
 '• him." This letter will be directed to the commandant of the 
 advanced guard, and he is to give an acknowledgment of having 
 received it. The Emperor, sire, of course leaves the selection of 
 the moment for adopting this step, entirely at your own option, 
 so that it may be made at a reasonable moment, and not have 
 the appearance of being dictated by circumstances. The aid-de- 
 camp whom His Majesty intends to send will probably arrive at 
 your head-quarters to-night.
 
 24 
 
 <) It D li R S 
 
 Napoleon to the Major -General. 
 
 Moscow, 5th October, 1812. 
 My cousin, the intendant General's statement appears to me 
 to be an erroneous one. I have a difficulty in believing that forty- 
 five days are required for withdrawing the wounded that are at 
 Mojaisk, at the convent, and at Gjatz ; for it occurs to me that 
 during those forty five days of inaction, part of them will be cur- 
 ed part will die, and there will be left only the residue to be 
 withdrawn, and experience proves that three months after a battle 
 no more than one-sixth of the wounded remain in this condition. 
 So that reckomng six thousand men, there would only remain one 
 thousand to be transported at the end of three months. It is my 
 intention to retain possession of my line of operations, and to at- 
 tend to the removal of the wounded, etc. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 6th October, 1812. 
 My cousin, acquaint the Duke of Belluno that I have not yet 
 given him any orders for the movement he is to perform, as it is 
 to depend upon the movement of the enemy ; that the Russian 
 army of Moldavia, forming three divisions, or twenty thousand 
 men, infantry, cavalry and artillery included, crossed the Dnieper 
 on the first days of September; that it maybe proceeding to 
 Moscow for the purpose of re-inforcing the army commanded by 
 General Kutusoff, or towards Volhynia to re-inforce Tormasoff's 
 *???« > . lhe arm y of General Kutusoff defeated at the battle 
 ot the Moskwa, is now marching towards Kalouga, which might 
 lead to suppose that it is in expectation of receiving reinforce- 
 ments from Moldavia by the road of Kiow ; that, in this hypo- 
 thesis, the Duke of Belluoo would receive orders to ioin the 
 grand army either by the road of Jelnia and Kalouga, or by any 
 other road ; that, if on the contrary ,.the twenty thousand men from 
 Moldavia had marched to the relief of Tormasoff, that reinforce- 
 ment would increase Tormasoff's army to forty thousand men : 
 but that our right, commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg, would 
 still be of equal strength, since, with the Austrians, Poles, and 
 Saxons, that Pnnce has about forty thousand men under his 
 orders ; that 1 have besides requested of the Emperor of Austria 
 to permit that the corps commanded by the Austrian General 
 Keuss at Lemberg should effect a movement, and that Prince 
 Schwarzenberg should receive a re-inforcement of ten thousand 
 men ; that, on the other hand, the Emperor Alexander is doing all 
 in his power to re-inforce the garrison of Riga and the corps of 
 Wittgenstein, ,n order to drive away Marshal Saint-Cyr from 
 Polo s k and the Duke of Tarentum from Riga and Dunaburg • 
 that letters just received from Prince Schwarzenberg, dated the 
 
 marrhr '" ™ t0 pr ° Ve that lhe ar,n y of Moldavia, instead of 
 marching upon Moscow, has proceeded to join Tormasoff's army
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 25 
 
 and re-inforced it ; that it is, therefore, necessary to know what 
 will take place ; that, in this state of things, I order the Duke of 
 Belluno to canton his army between Smolensko and Orsza, and 
 to keep up an exact correspondence, by every estafet, with the 
 Uuke of Bassano, in order that this minister may write to him 
 and give him all the news he may collect from the different 
 quarters; to send to General Schwarzenberg and General 
 Keynier, a prudent, discreet, and intelligent officer; who is to 
 learn from General Schwarzenberg what is going on, and from 
 General Reynier the true state of things ; to enter into a regular 
 correspondence With the Governor of Minsk ; and, lastly to send 
 agents in various directions to ascertain what occurrences take 
 place ; state to him that Gerard's division will be stationed to- 
 wards Orsza, where it will be at the distance of four or five marches 
 from Minsk, three marches from Witepsk, and four or five from 
 Polotsk ; that the other division, between Orsza and Smolensk™ 
 will be enabled rapidly to support him; and, lastly, that the third 
 division will be near Smolensko; that, by this means, his corps will 
 
 tl ?T SOme re P ose ' and ma y easil y subsist itself ; that it 
 ought to be stationed at the top of the road, in order to leave 
 uninterrupted the grand communication for the troops that are 
 arriving; that in this position, he will be at liberty to move 
 either towards Minsk or towards Wilna, should the centre of our 
 ^minunication and depots be threatened, or should Marshal 
 Sa.nt-Cyr be closely pressed at Polosk, or that he is to execute 
 the order he might receive to move on to Moscow by the road of 
 Jelnia and kalouga, in case the capture of Moscow and the new 
 aspect of affairs should have determined the enemy to reinforce 
 himself with a portion of the troops from Moldavia; that, in this 
 manner, the Duke of Belluno will form the general reserve n 
 order to proceed to the relief of Prince Schwarzenberg and cover 
 Minsk, or to the relief of Marshal Saint-Cyr and cove? Wilna or 
 lastly to advance upon Moscow for the purpose of re-inforcin/the 
 grand army ; that he has under his orders General Dombrolski 
 who commands a division of eight thousand infantry, an d twelve 
 hundred cavalry of Polish troops, which will bring his coro to 
 
 four wTh'i- thaUhe reSe,ve J bri ^ de * Wilna: consisting of 
 tour Westphahan regiments, and two battalions of Hesse Darm- 
 stadt, which are expected to arrive from Swedish Pomerania 
 toward, the end of this month, and eight pieces of cannon w II 
 likewise be under his orders ; lastly, that two new divisions arTt" 
 be united in the course of November, the one at Warsaw, which 
 is the thirty second division, to be increased by three battalions 
 from Wurtzburgh, and to continue to be commanded by General 
 Durutte ; the other at Kcenigsberg, being the thirty-fourth divi 
 sion which was stationed in Pomerania under the orders of 
 General Morand, and which being also increased by a few 
 battalions, will be commanded by General Loisou. That whether 
 theretore, it be necessary to march to the relief of Princ* 
 Schwarzenberg, or of Marshal Saint Cyr, the Duke of Be luiio 
 can always bring together a mass of forty thousand men • that!
 
 26 ORDERS 
 
 as the correspondence by estafet is free from delay, 1 shall always 
 have it in my power to issue my instructions ; and that it is only 
 in the event of Minsk or Wilna being threatened, that the Duke 
 of Belluno would put himself in motion, of his own accord, for 
 the purpose of covering those two grand depots of the army; that 
 the Duke of Belluno, having the command in chief over the whole 
 of Lithuania and over the Governors of Smolensko and of Wi- 
 tepsk, must, nevertheless, accelerate the march of the administra- 
 tion, and especially take effectual measures for enforcing due 
 obedience to the requisitions for corn and forage ; that there are 
 ovens at Mohilow, Osza, Rasasna, and Dnbrowna ; that he must 
 cause a great quantity of biscuit to be baked, and secure thirty 
 day's provisions for his corps, without drawing any thing from 
 the military transports, or from the convoys that might be pro- 
 ceeding to the army. The Duke of Belluno will also take care 
 to keep up a correspondence with Witepsk ; he is at liberty to 
 send troops to support that point, and to maintain himself in it. 
 He may proceed in person to Mohilow, Witepsk, and Smolensko, 
 for the purpose of examining the country, and of expediting the 
 march of the administration. If, by any accident, the communi- 
 cation with Moscow should happen to be intercepted, he would 
 take care to send some cavalry and infantry forward for the pur- 
 pose of re -opening it. 
 
 His head-quarters should be at Smolensko. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 6th October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, the Duke of Treviso solicits provisions for the 
 persons employed in the police ; he solicits them for the found- 
 lings, for the Russians who are in the hospitals, for the sick in- 
 habitants, &c. &c. ; all these are very fair requests ; but no one is 
 bound to do what is impossible. The Russian municipality 
 must form a Russian company which will go by detachments into 
 the villages, and take provisions by paying for them. The in- 
 tendant general will grant the money necessary for this purpose, 
 out of the funds I placed at his disposal. The municipality will 
 be provided in this place with stores which are to be destined for 
 the city, and provisioned in the manner already stated. This 
 company may take the name of company of police, and should 
 it succeed, three or four more may be formed on a similar plan, 
 which will go over the neighbourhood, and forward on to this 
 city, after paying for them, all that is necessary for the inhabi- 
 tants, and especially for the hospitals ; this is the only means of 
 meeting every want ; speak to Mr. Lesseps on the subject, and 
 let not a single moment be lost. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-Genera I. 
 
 Moscow, 6th October, 1812. 
 My cousin, as I have taken care that the Duke of Abrantes and
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 27 
 
 General Baraguay-d'Hilliers be provided with the requisite num- 
 ber of troops for keeping possession of the country, it is iny in- 
 tention that the object I had in view should be carried into effect. 
 You will commission the Duke of Abrantes, under his personal 
 responsibility, to remove the wounded to Wiazma, and General 
 Baraguay-d'Hilliers to forward them on to Smolensko. For this 
 purpose the Duke of Abrantes and General Baraguay-d'Hilliers 
 are to have the country scoured within a circumference of ten 
 leagues, and to collect a sufficient number of vehicles for effect- 
 ing those removals; it would be proper also to employ in this 
 service, as far as Mojai'sk, the military transports that might 
 arrive here, and that might not be loaded with clothing or with 
 articles for the hospitals, but merely with flour. The flour will be 
 applied to the use of the hospitals and to the soldier's daily allow- 
 ance, and the vehicles will perform a journey to assist in the 
 removals from Mojai'sk, Ruza, and the Abbey, as far as Wiazma. 
 The orders, therefore, for retaining the vehicles belonging to the 
 military equipages are only to be given to the Duke of Abrantes, 
 and to the adjutant commandant Simonin, who is in charge of the 
 Abbey; these officers will employ the vehicles as far as Wiazma; 
 and the vehicles will then return empty from Wiazma to Moscow. 
 Acquaint the intendant with these arrangements which modify 
 the orders he has issued. In short, happen what may, it is my 
 intention that there be not, in a week's time, a single wounded 
 at Ruza, at the Abbey, at Mojai'sk, or at Gjatz ; inform the 
 Generals that this is an object of the highest importance. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 6th October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that it is my intention 
 that, henceforth, the regiments formed of scattered men, whether 
 from Kcenigsberg or from Witepsk, be not employed in escorting 
 the convoys of artillery. Those convoys ought to be escorted by 
 battalions, or by parts of battalions properly organized. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 6th October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, make General Baraugay-d'Hilliers acquainted with 
 all the arrangements which concern the 9th corps, and with the 
 position he is to maintain. Let him know that I quite agree in 
 the propriety of his request, to have a large body of troops at 
 Wiazma, another at Gjatz, and a third at Dorogobouje; that I 
 give orders, in consequence, for detaining the troops which 
 are hereafter named ; that you will instruct the commandaut 
 of Gjatz not to let them pass Gjatz, and the Duke of Abrantes, 
 not to let them pass Mojai'sk, if the troops had not yet gone 
 beyond those points.
 
 28 ORDERS 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 10th October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, the road from Smolensko to Mojaisk beingexhausted, 
 it is proper you should write to General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, in 
 order that he may instruct the commandants of Dorogobuje, Gjatz, 
 Wiazma, Scc.to have two parallel roads reconnoitred at the distance 
 of two or three leagues from the right, where resources may be 
 found, so that the detachments coming by those roads, might 
 touch at the points of Dorogobouje, Wiazma, and Mojaisk, but 
 keep out of the main road for ihe purpose of seeking one where 
 villages might be found, and which would afford some shelter. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 10th October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, that it is my desire, 
 that upon the reception of the present order, the detachments of 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, of military equipages, the convoys 
 of artillery, clothing, &c, bedetained atSmolensko, so that nothing 
 more should arrive by the road of Wiazma and Mojaisk, which is 
 quite destroyed. The generals and the officers who are coming 
 to the army to do duty, are likewise to stop at Smolensko, with 
 the exception of those who are on special commissions. 
 
 There will be formed at Smolensko, a division of at least twelve 
 thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, to which are to be 
 added, five or six hundred caissons, military equipages, convoys 
 of clothing, and convoys of artillery, which are to have at least, 
 twelve pieces of cannon for the defence of that division, to be com- 
 manded by a general of division, three generals of infantry bri- 
 gades, and three generals or colonels of cavalry. This division, 
 sixteen or eighteen thousand strong, will take ten days provisions 
 at Smolensko, and hold itself in readiness to march, not by the old 
 road to Wiazma, which is broken up, but by a new one which 1 
 shall point out. 
 
 By this means, nothing more will arrive by the old road, nei- 
 ther convoys of artillery, of military equipages, or clothing, nor 
 any detachments of infantry or cavalry ; nothing but the estafets, 
 the dispatches of the army, some officers of the staff proceeding 
 upon service, and a few pressing objects, such as the five hundred 
 hand-mills that are on their way from Paris, the first convoy of 
 which must have reached Smolensko. This road will likewise be 
 open for moving the hospitals, and for the detachments which 
 proceed from the army to Smolensko ; but nothing from Smo- 
 lensko to Moscow shall pass that way. Order may thus be res- 
 tored upon that road, and 1 shall be free from the apprehension 
 that the detachments of infantry or of cavalry which are coming 
 to the army might suffer on the march. Every month a convoy 
 is to be despatched by the new road, for with the exception of 
 the spot which the enemy occupies, six thousand men may pass 
 in every direction.
 
 OF THE EMPEBOB, 29 
 
 Note down upon paper the strength of the first column, accord- 
 ing to the information you have received from Smolensko, and let 
 me know when you think it will be ready to move. I find already, 
 that there are 1st., the three marching half brigades, forming six 
 thousaud men ; 2dly, the fourth, fifth, and sixth marching regi- 
 ments of infantry, which were formed at Kcenigsberg, amounting 
 to about six thousand men ; 3dly, two battalions formed out 
 of men who were discharged from the hospitals at Witepsk, and 
 Smolensko, whose numbers may be estimated at two thousand. 
 
 Independently of the above, I shall see whether it be proper to 
 add to them the two battalions of the hundred and twenty-ninth, and 
 of the lllyrian regiment. The corps with the detachments of every 
 service which are to unite at Smolensko, must amount together, to 
 upwards of fifteen thousand infantry ; as to the cavalry, the ar- 
 tillery, and the military equipages, the details of them are not pre- 
 sent to my mind. There will be a sufficient number of generals of 
 division, and of generals of brigade to command that division. 
 
 General Baraguay-d'Hilliers does not appear to me to be in 
 his proper sphere of action at Wiazma ; send to that place, the 
 General of brigade Chariere, who was formerly colonel of the 
 fifty-seventh , and who being active and full of zeal, would be 
 adapted to that station; he will have at Gjatz a colonel or adjutant 
 commandant under his orders 
 
 You may direct General Baraguay-d'Hilliers to repair to Smo- 
 lensko, and take the command of the division which is forming in 
 that city. 
 
 Napoleon to General Lariboisiere. 
 
 Moscow, llth October, 1812. 
 
 General Lariboisiere, I desire that the thirteen companies of 
 artillery which are stationed at Erfurt, Magdeburg, Spandau, 
 Glogau, Custrim, Stettin, Stralsund, Thorn, Dantzig, Pillaw, and 
 Kowno, may join the army as soon as they have been replaced by 
 twenty one companies which I am ordering from the interior of 
 France ; by this means, you will have at command, those twenty 
 companies that are about to march, and the thirteen companies 
 that are in the fortresses, which you are to station in the following 
 manner : three companies with the guard ; one company with the 
 third corps; four companies with the thirty-second, and thirty 
 fourth divisions of infantry ; two companies with the twenty-eight 
 division, two with the reserved battery attached to the ninth corps ; 
 two companies to be sent to Wilna ; one to Minsk ; three to Smo- 
 lensko ; in all, eighteen companies. You will have a sufficient 
 number remaining for the general park of artillery, and for meet- 
 ing any unforeseen emergency. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wogram to the King of Naples, 
 
 Moscow, 13th November, 1812. 
 
 Two o'clock in the morning. 
 From your reports to the Emperor, and the information
 
 30 ORDERS 
 
 transmitted to him respecting the enemy, his Majesty considers 
 that Woronowo is an excellent, and compact position, that it 
 may be defended by infantry which would easily cover the cavalry. 
 Should you agree with him in this opinion, you are authorized to 
 take up that position. 
 
 The Emperor has this night sent off his horses, and after to- 
 morrow you will be joined by the army, for the purpose of attack- 
 ing and driving away the enemy. The army will require three 
 days to come up with you ; you will therefore have to maintain 
 your ground for four or five days ; and should you fear an attack 
 from the enemy, or that the nature of things may render it impos- 
 sible for you to avoid a continuation of the losses which you have 
 suffered during the last eight days, you have the resource left to 
 you, ot taking up the position of Woronowo. All the vehicles 
 which you sent, are loaded with provisions ; those that have ar- 
 rived this night, will likewise proceed to-morrow. The Emperor 
 is very anxious that matters could be so arranged as to prevent the 
 recurrence of similar losses to your corps. Might you not render 
 the chiefs of the corps responsible for it ? 
 
 The Prince of Neufehatel and Wagram to H. M. the King of 
 
 Naples. 
 
 Moscow, 14th October, 1812. 
 
 „, Ten o'clock at night. 
 
 Ihe Emperor has just received the letter you have written to 
 him at 12 o'clock this day ; the movement upon Borowsk appears 
 to the Emperor to be one of great difficulty, if the enemy should 
 be aware of it, because you would expose your right flank to him 
 during an entire day. Prince Poniatowski has sent this day a 
 hundred sick men in the direction of Moscow ; they will be sent 
 on to Mojai'sk. 
 
 As the Emperor is removing his wounded to Smolensko at the 
 same time that his Majesty is arming the Kremlin, so as to be 
 free from every obstacle in Moscow, you will forward to Mojai'sk 
 the sick and wounded, and every object that may embarass you, 
 by forming them into a couvoy. Cause the pass which is to lead' 
 you to Mojai'sk to be properly reconnoitred, in order that, if you 
 should be compelled to retreat before the enemy, you may be well 
 acquainted with that road. The Emperor apprehends that your 
 baggage, your park of artillery, and the greater part of your 
 infantry might file off unknown to the enemy. 
 
 Is it true that in repassing the defile of Woronowo, your ca- 
 valry might be covered by your infantry, and in a less fatiguing 
 position than its present one in this plain, which compels it to be 
 always on the qui-vi ve ? [n any case it is important thatyour troops 
 be provided with many days' provisions ; there are at Moscow one 
 thousand quintals of flour, and an abundance of brandy at your 
 disposal ; give directions that all the vehicles you can command 
 should come and take up the provisions. The Duke of Elchingen
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 3l 
 
 and part of the Viceroy's corps are not yet arrived; the Emperor, 
 besides, before he makes any movement, wishes to be satisfied 
 that there remains no obstruction whatever in Moscow. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 16th October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, renew to the Duke of Belluno the order for the ar- 
 tillery to send horses as far as Wiazma, for the purpose of removing 
 the caissons and carriages of artillery which are found to have 
 been abandoned along the road, and of taking them back to 
 Smolensko. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major -General. 
 
 Moscow, 18th October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, inform the Duke of Treviso, that I march to-mor- 
 row morning with the army iu pursuit of the enemy ; that it is my 
 wish the Duke of Treviso should take up his residence in the 
 Kremlin, and should quarter in it the following troops ; 
 
 1st, Laborde's division; 2dly, General Charriere's brigade, 
 composed of four battalions of dismounted cavalry, making nearly 
 four thousand men; 31y, two companies of sappers; 4thly, one 
 company of artillery ; 5thly, the artillery of Laborde's division ; 
 lastly, a brigade of five hundred cavalry. With this force the 
 Duke of Treviso will be able to retain possession of the city ; but 
 this can onlv be effected by suitable precautions. The intendant 
 will leave one of his deputies in it, several commissaries of war, 
 and heads of offices. The general of engineers will leave a superior 
 officer in command of the corps ; the general of artillery, a supe- 
 rior officer, and several subaltern officers of artillery. The Duke 
 of Treviso will cause the works for the armament of the Kremlin 
 to be carried on with the greatest activity, and mount a battery 
 with the cannon that remains here ; he will have a small battery 
 constructed of earth on the terre-plein, and mount four field 
 pieces upon it, so as to batter the stone bridge with good effect; 
 he will establish a strong out-post in the convent of the Prince of 
 Eckmuhl, the position of which is important, because it commands 
 a bridge over the Moskwa. All the sick that are here will be 
 collected together at the foundling hospital; their number must 
 be from three to four hundred ; there should consequently be a 
 sufficient force to guard them. The brandy magazine near the 
 stone bridge must also be guarded by a strong detachment. The 
 Duke of Treviso will remove to the Kremlin all the stores that 
 are at too great a distance. The generals, the superior military 
 officers, the superior officers of administration who are here, will 
 take up their quarters in the Kremlin. The commandant of the 
 town, and the intendant may continue to lodge in the governor's 
 residence, and in the quarters occupied by the Duke of Treviso 
 near the Kremlin. The Duke of Treviso will see if it is neces-
 
 32 ORDERS 
 
 sary to have the convent of Marshal Ney guarded. It would he 
 useful to guard by an out-post the prison which the Viceroy has 
 fortified on the road to St. Petersburg^. As for the rest, he will 
 reduce the details of the service in such manner as he may think 
 proper, and will preserve in preference what may be nearest to the 
 Kremlin. 
 
 To-morrow, when the army shall have left the city, he will re- 
 quire the municipality to issue a proclamation for the purpose of 
 informing the inhabitants that the reports of an evacuation are 
 false; that the army is marching upon Kalouga, Tula and Briansk, 
 in order to take possession of those important points, and of the 
 manufactories of arms that are to be found there ; also for the 
 purpose of inducing the inhabitants to keep up the police, and 
 prevent any attempt at completing the ruin of the city. He will 
 cause the works of the Kremlin to commence to-morrow, and 
 attend to their being carried on with the greatest activity ; he will 
 have the city guarded by strong patroles, especially on the side of 
 the gates of Mojai'sk and Kalouga, in order to pick up all convoys 
 of marching regiments which might be on the road from Mojai'sk 
 to this place. Roguet's division will remain here to-morrow ; it 
 will proceed in the night, with the treasure and the intendant's 
 head-quarters under its escort. The Duke of Treviso will keep 
 up a severe police in the city ; he will cause every Russian sol- 
 dier to be shot who may be found in the streets ; he will accord- 
 ingly forbid all those who are in the hospitals from leaving them. 
 No small out-posts are to be established in any direction, in order 
 to avoid the ill-will of the peasantry and a surprise from the 
 cossacks. Lastly, the Duke of Treviso is to collect as great a 
 quantity of provisions as possible ; he will direct an abundance 
 of biscuits to be baked ; he will make sure of provisions, for one 
 month at least, in flour, potatoes, sauercrout, brandy, wine, &c. 
 He is to preserve those provisions for cases of emergency, by 
 causing all the mills to be set at work, so as to supply, if possi- 
 ble, his daily wants. Take care to furnish the Duke of Treviso 
 with a cypher, in order that the correspondence with him may be 
 secure and unrestrained. 
 
 Napoleon to General Lariboisiere. 
 
 18th October, 1812. 
 
 General Lariboisiere, I move my head-quarters this night to 
 the gate of Kalouga, where the whole army is going to bivouac. 
 I shall march in the course of to-morrow to follow up the enemy. 
 
 The Duke of Treviso remains in the city with ten thousand men, 
 and, in any case, he is 1o defend the Kremlin. It is, therefore, 
 necessary that to-morrow morning every caisson and vehicle be 
 collected at the Kremlin. I may possibly return to Moscow. 
 Nothing, therefore, that is valuable ought to be destroyed, such as 
 powder, cartridges for the infantry, cannon balls, lead for making 
 shots ; but the sulphur and saltpetre may be burned ; I have a
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 33 
 
 sufficient quantity of powder. The stables, or magazines that are 
 round the city may be burned. The Russian caissons and other 
 materials which cannot be removed to the Kremlin are to be burn- 
 ed to-morrow at eight o'clock in the morning, together with the 
 sulphur and the saltpetre. 
 
 The Duke of Treviso is in command at Moscow. A superior 
 officer of artillery must be left there with store-keepers, and like- 
 wise a company of artillery for the service of the picus, which 
 serves as a rampart, and four officers of artillery attached to the 
 Kremlin for that important duty. 
 
 It is necessary to have in the train of the army as great a num- 
 ber of caissons as possible. The 400 horses of the pontoon carri- 
 ages must, therefore, draw the caissons in our possession, and 
 follow the army. The grand head-quarters leave to-morrow 
 morning under the escort of a division of infantry. 
 
 Write to the Duke of Treviso to make him acquainted with the 
 colonel of artillery, the officers of artillery, and the company of 
 artillery whom you leave in the city, together with every particu- 
 lar relating to the artillery of the Kremlin. The company of 
 artillery will employ to-morrow aud the following - day in aug- 
 menting the defence of the Kremlin, loading the howitzers, shells, 
 and granadoes, and providing the means that may secure the de- 
 fence of that fortress. 
 
 The officers of artillery who have the charge of blowing up the 
 Kremlin when the proper time shall arrive, are to remain in the 
 Kremlin. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Krasno Pachra, 21st October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, acquaint the Duke of Treviso, that as soon as his 
 operation at Moscow is completed, that is to say on the 23d at 
 three o'clock in the morning, he is to commence his march, and 
 will arrive at Kubinskoe on the 24th ; that, instead of repairing 
 to Mojaisk from this point, he will have to take the road to 
 Wereia where he will arrive on the 25th. He will thus be in an 
 intermediate position between Mojaisk, where the Duke of 
 Abrantes is stationed, and Borowsk at which place the army is 
 to arrive; it will be proper for him to dispatch officers towards 
 Fominskoe, in order to give us intelligence of his march. He 
 will take with him the adjutant commandant Bourmont, the 
 Bavarian and Spanish troops that are at the residence of Gallit- 
 zin, the Westphalians of the first and second station ; he will 
 bring together all the Westphalians, and send these in the direc- 
 tion of Mojaisk. Should they not be in sufficient numbers, he 
 would order cavalry to protect their march. The Duke of 
 Treviso will give every requisite instruction to the Duke of 
 Abrantes concerning the evacuation of Moscow. It is necessary 
 he should write to us to-morrow the 22d, although no longer by 
 the road leading to Desna, but by that of Szarapowo and Fomin- 
 
 c
 
 34 ORDERS 
 
 skoe. On the 23d he will write to us by the road of Mojaisk. 
 The officer he may send will leave the road to Kubinskoe, and 
 proceed to Fominskoe, as the head-quarters will probably be at 
 Borowsk or at Fominskoe on the 23d. Whether the Duke of 
 Treviso should perform this movement to-morrow the 22d, at 
 three in the morning, or on the 23d, at the same hour, as I since 
 directed him to do, he is to adopt the same arrangements. By 
 this means the Duke of Treviso may be considered as the rear 
 guard of the army. 
 
 1 cannot too often recommend to him to employ the vehicles of 
 the young guard, and of the dismounted cavalry, as well as all 
 those that may be found, for the purpose of transporting the men 
 who still remain in hospital; the Romans bestowed civic crowns 
 upon those who saved the lives of their fellow citizens. The Duke 
 of Treviso will deserve as many as he may save soldiers ; tell him 
 that he must have them transported upon his horses and those of 
 all his officers ; that the Emperor did the same at St. Jean d'Acre ; 
 that he ought to carry this measure the more readily into effect, 
 as that convoy will no sooner rejoin the army, than they will be 
 provided with horses and vehicles which the consumption of pro- 
 visions will have rendered useless ; that the Emperor hopes he may 
 have to express his satisfaction to the Duke of Treviso for saving 
 five hundred of his men; that he must, as it is but just, com- 
 mence by the officers, then the subaltern officers, and give to 
 Frenchmen the preference ; let him call together all the generals 
 and officers under his orders, to impress them with the import- 
 ance of this measure, and with the claim they will have upon the 
 Emperor by saving the lives of five hundred men. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Fominskoe, 23d October, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to Prince Poniatowski, that ail the marching 
 regiments of infantry and cavalry, the batteries of artillery, and 
 other articles which the Duke of Abrantes is to send to Wereia 
 are to be under his orders, and when directed to move, he is to 
 leave nothing behind, but bring all with him, until he rejoins the 
 army. Let him know likewise that he is not to send his sick and 
 wounded towards Mojaisk, as this would obstruct the road which 
 is too much so already ; that it is better he should bring them with 
 him. 
 
 Write a letter to General Teste, who commands at Wiazma, 
 which you will forward by the officer you are dispatching to 
 Prince Poniatowski, who will send it to the Duke of Abrantes for 
 the purpose of its being transmitted. In this letter you will inform 
 General Teste of the Emperor's desire that General Evers, with 
 a column of three or four thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and 
 artillery, should proceed from Wiazma to lukhnow, eighteen 
 leagues from Wiazma, taking with him the marching regiments 
 which might be on their way to the army, and from thence push
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 35 
 
 his out-posts as far as the intersection of the roads at Znamenskoe. 
 The general will take with him the estafets that might have ar- 
 rived from Smolensko ; at each out-post, namely, Sosowa, Tro- 
 fimowa, and Andriewka, he will station detachments of a hun- 
 dred infantry, and a piquet of cavalry, under the orders of a town 
 commandant, who will fortify themselves in the houses, in order 
 to be protected from the cossacks and the peasantry. Order 
 General Teste to write to Smolensko for the purpose of communi- 
 cating that the army is marching upon Kalouga, and then to take 
 up his line of operations towards Ielnia. Give him directions to 
 detain all estafets that might pass on their way from Wiazma to 
 lukhnow, where it is probable that a junction will be speedily 
 effected, that is to say from the 25th to the 27th of this month. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Borowsk, the 24th October, 1S12. 
 
 Write a letter, in cyphers, to the Duke of Belluno, as he will 
 not receive it before the 26th, and will by that time have seen 
 General Nansouty. Let him know that, being always without 
 estafets, 1 am not acquainted with the latest position of affairs in 
 his quarter, or whether the events may have compelled him to 
 make any movement ; but, that should he not have made any, and 
 Gerard's division be still available, as well as the brigade of light 
 cavalry, I wish him to commence his march immediately with 
 his troops, to repair to Ieluia, and to push on from thence by the 
 road to Kalouga, in order to meet the army, and effect his junc- 
 tion with us. If he could start on the 26th, he might, on the 
 30th, be at the distance of five marches from Kalouga ; that 1 am 
 establishing my line of operations, at first through Wiazma, 
 lukhnow, and Znamenskoe, until we can have formed a junction 
 with him; that I should then establish him along the road from 
 Smolensko to Ielnia ; that in going, in this manner, over a space 
 of forty leagues, he must take care to organize that part of the 
 road by placing at each out-post a commandant, a detachment of a 
 hundred men, and a relay for an estafet ; that this must not, how- 
 ever, influence in any manner the decision he would have to take, 
 if any thing extraordinary should occur. 
 
 Write, without disguise, to the Duke of Belluno, that the army 
 is united at Borowsk ; that Moscow has been evacuated after the 
 Kremlin had been blown up, and that the army is marching upon 
 Kalouga ; that the province of Kalouga is one of the most abun- 
 dant in Russia, and that, in fact, we have here a great abundance 
 of every thing. 
 
 The Prince ofNeufchateland Wagram to General Charpentier. 
 
 Wiazma, 1st November, 1812. 
 The Emperor orders you to send an officer of your staff to 
 Marshal Saint-Cyr, and to the Duke of Belluno, to acquaint them 
 
 c2
 
 36 ORDERS 
 
 that the army which is, this day, 1st of November, at Wiazma, 
 will be at Dorogobouje on the third ; that we are impatient of 
 receiving news from them ; that his Majesty supposes the Duke of 
 Belluno will have already assumed the offensive and driven the 
 enemy from Polotzk. You will also send an officer to inform the 
 Governor of Mohilow, of the movement of the army ; you will add, 
 that this movement of the army is a voluntary one; that it is a 
 manoeuvring: movement intended to bring us a hundred leagues 
 nearer to thearmies that form our wings; that since we have quitted 
 the vicinity of Moscow, we know nothing more of the enemy, 
 than what is afforded to us by the appearance of a few cossacks. 
 Desire him, in my name, to send towards Smolensko, the great- 
 est possible quantity of provisions. 
 
 Inform, likewise, the Governor of Witepsk of the movements of 
 the army, and of the motives of them ; direct him to cause an 
 abundance of bread to be baked, because part of the army is to 
 draw its supplies from that place. Acquaint General Baraguay- 
 d'Hilliers with the movement of the army, &c. I have already 
 intimated, that that general should be careful not to commit 
 himself, repeat to him, from me, that opinion. 
 
 Inform the Governor of Minsk, that the army is manoeuvring 
 to come a hundred leagues nearer to its wings than it is at present, 
 and to approach Poland and a friendly country. Let me have at 
 Dorogobouje by to-morrow night, or the third in the morning, 
 a statement of all magazines of provisions, corn, flour, &c, 
 mounted and dismounted artillery, as well as ammunition of all 
 kinds at Smolensko. Communicate to me, in proportion as you 
 receive it, every information whether of a direct or indirect 
 nature, which you may obtain concerning the movements of the 
 Duke of Belluno, General Saint-Cyr, and Prince Schwarzenberg. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major- General. 
 
 Wiazma, 2d November. 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Reggio, that I have learned 
 with the liveliest satisfaction, that his wound was cured, and that 
 he was enabled to resume his duty ; that it is, therefore, my inten- 
 tion he should return to the second corps, and again, take the 
 command of it. 
 
 Inform the Duke of Belluno, that I learn the events of Polotzk, 
 and his march in that direction; that I hope he will have driven 
 baik Wittgenstein and recovered possession of Polotzk. Write 
 to him, in cyphers, that the army is on its march as 1 have already 
 apprized him of it ; that the winter would have been too long to 
 be passed at a distance from my flanks ; that I shall probably 
 move the right to the Dwina, and the left to the Boristhenes, 
 and that by this means, we shall come into contact with each 
 other.
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 37 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke o/Belluno. 
 
 Mikalewka, 6th November, 1812. 
 
 I have just laid before the Emperor your letter of the 2d of 
 November, which is brought to me this moment by an estafet. — 
 His Majesty is at a loss to understand why, having united your 
 troops to the second corps, you should not have vigorously taken 
 the offensive. By remaining in position in front of the enemy, 
 you have every thing to apprehend, owing to the superiority of 
 his light cavalry for cutting off our communications. The Empe- 
 ror orders you to march upon General Wittgenstein, and drive 
 him beyond the Dwina, retake Polotzk, and compel Wittgenstein 
 to abandon that bank of the river. The Emperor will be after to- 
 morrow at Smolensko ; announce to him a victory, which, with the 
 troops you have under your orders, cannot be doubtful. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Milkalewka, 7th November, 1812. 
 
 I have laid before the Emperor your letter of the 2d ; as the 
 army will have reached Smolensko to-morrow, it is requisite you 
 should manoeuvre ; — 1st, to drive the enemy beyond the Dwiua ; 
 2dly, to keep up aninterrupted communication with the Emperor, 
 and with the army. You feel the necessity aud importance of so 
 doing. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno. 
 
 Smolensko, 9th November, 1812. 
 
 Four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 I received at Smolensko your letter of the 4th, and submitted 
 it to the Emperor. His Majesty regrets to observe, that you 
 were uncertain of the march you ought to follow. This uncer- 
 tainty has already created much mischief. I informed you by 
 the adjutant commandant d'Albignac, that it was the Emperor's 
 intention you should march straight up to the enemy, in the 
 direction of Polotzk, and drive him beyond the Dwina. The 
 greater number of Wittgenstein's troops are militias, having only 
 six weeks training. His Majesty waits for intelligence. Let us 
 know what troops occupy Bezenkowiczi and Ula. You must 
 march upon the enemy without a moment's loss ; this is of the 
 highest importance. The chief instruction given to you, was to 
 defend Wilna and Minsk, which contain the stores of the army ; 
 this is an essential object. The Emperor finds two estafets want- 
 ing; this is perhaps occasioned by the retrogarde movement 
 which you made upon Senno, and which has left the whole coun- 
 try open to the enemy.
 
 38 ORDERS 
 
 The prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno. 
 
 Smolensko, 11th November, 1812. 
 
 The adjutant commandant d'Albignac, has brought to you the 
 Emperor's orders of the 7th; an officer of General Charpentier's 
 staffbrought you the duplicate of them on the 9th. Your aid-de- 
 camp, Colonel Chateau, arrives this very moment, and delivers to me 
 your letter of the 9th. His Majesty observes with satisfaction, 
 the advantages which your advanced guard has obtained over the 
 enemy in skirmishes at out-posts ; and upon your report, be has 
 appointed General Fournier, a general of division. This proof of 
 the Emperor's favor will enable him to merit fresh ones in the 
 battle which must immediately take place. His Majesty is about 
 to proceed to Orsza with a part of his army ; but this movement 
 can only be effected very slowly. The necessity for your attacking 
 Wittgenstein is therefore the more pressing ; should that general 
 have selected an advantageous field and position, which would make 
 it difficult for you to offer him battle, you may easily manoeuvre, 
 so as to cut off his retreat and his communications upon the 
 Dwina. You must be guided by this principle, that Wittgen- 
 stein cannot allow himself to be cut off from that river. The 
 Emperor has no doubt that, with the troops under your orders, 
 your movement will be successful ; it must be productive of the 
 most important result if it takes place immediately, and if the 
 Emperor is enabled to occupy Witepsk, and take up winter 
 quarters between that city, Orsza and Mohilow, and along the 
 Dwina towards Polotzk. The winter quarters thus established, 
 must secure to us a peace in the course of the winter, or pave the 
 way for undoubted success in the ensuing campaign, and expose 
 Saint Petersburg to evident danger. If, on the contrary, you 
 delay attacking Wittgenstein, General Kutusoff will have time to 
 form a junction with that officer towards Witepsk, and then it will 
 be impossible todislodge himfrom that position, except by agene- 
 ral engagement, which could not be fought this winter ; we should, 
 therefore, be obliged to take up winter quarters, and leave the 
 enemy in possession of the Dwina, and a part of Lithuania ; and ac- 
 cordingly, the enemy would, for the next campaign, be placed in 
 a better position tliau ourselves, in a military point of view. You 
 are sensible of how much consequence are those dispositions. 
 
 The grand French and Russian armies are tired ; they may by 
 their marches, obtain positions for themselves; but, neither the 
 one nor the other are in a condition to fight a great battle for the 
 occupation of a post. Your army, on the contrary, as well 
 as that of General Wittgestein, are under the obligation to 
 fight previously to taking up winter quarters ; the sooner the 
 better. Your victory will be complete, if you force Wittgens- 
 tein to re-cross the Dwina, and if a French corps can occupy 
 Witepsk. Should your corps be beaten, an improbable oc- 
 currence, owing to the composition of the corps of Witt- 
 genstein, which chiefly consists of recruits, his Majesty
 
 OF THE EMPEEOR. 39 
 
 would then determine upon taking up his winter quarters, in 
 consequence of such an event. Wittgenstein has every thing to 
 gain by retaining his position, and you every thing to lose by his 
 so doing. Communicate this letter to the Duke of Reggio, and 
 concert with him on the subject of giving battle, a measure of the 
 highest importance towards future operations. The Emperor has 
 every confidence in your attachment, your zeal, and your talents, 
 under circumstancesin which your successes over the enemy are of 
 such great importance for the winter quarters of the armies, and 
 in furtherance of the operations of the ensuing campaigns. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Smolensko, 14th November, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Elchingen, that I am proceeding 
 to Krasnoi ; that he must continue to form the rear-guard ; that 
 the Prince of Eckmiihl will support him ; that he must retain his 
 present position the whole of this day ; that to-morrow 15th, he 
 will take up the position of the convent and suburb, and on the 
 16th, blow up the town in his retreat, or will merely take a po- 
 sition at the tete-de-pont, so as not to blow up the town till the 
 17th, if every thing should not be prepared ; that he must concert 
 measures with the Prince of Eckmiihl ; recommend especially 
 to him, to cause the cannon and ammunition to be destroyed, and 
 to suffer as few stragglers as possible to remain behind him in the 
 place. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Prince of 
 
 Eckmiihl. 
 
 Smolensko, 14th November, 1812, 
 
 7 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 It is the wish of the Emperor that you should support the Duke 
 of Elchingen in the rear-guard retreat which he is at present 
 effecting. As the Viceroy is to proceed to Krasnoi to-morrow the 
 15th, your attention will be directed towards relieving and oc- 
 cupying those stations you may think proper, and which the 
 viceroy may have to evacuate. 
 
 The Emperor wishes you to fall back upon Krasnoi with your 
 corps and with that of the Duke of Elchingen, and commence 
 that movement upon the 16th or L7th. General Charpentier, with 
 his garrison, consisting of three third battalions of Polish troops, 
 and a regiment of cavalry, will abandon the town. 
 
 Before leaving Smolensko, you will blow up the towers of its 
 precincts, bysettiug fire to the mines already prepared; you will 
 order the destruction of the artillery stores, the caissons, mnskets and 
 whatever cannot be carried away. With respect to the cannon, 
 which it will not be possible to remove, the artillery will have 
 their trunnions sawed off, and the cannon afterwards buried. 
 Generals Chasseloup and Lariboisiere will remain here, to carry 
 the above dispositions into effect, each in what may concern him.
 
 40 ORDERS 
 
 You will take care to order patroles to do duty, for the purpose 
 of preventing any French stragglers from remaining here. You 
 will also attend to the object of leaving the smallest possible num- 
 ber of sick in the hospitals. 
 
 The Prince of Neufcftatel and Wagram to the Duke of 
 
 Abrantes. 
 
 Liady, 17th November, 1812, 
 
 Eight o'clock at night. 
 
 You are to continue your movement in such a manner as to pass 
 the night of to-morrow at Dubrowna, from whence you will send 
 me an officer to the point where the Emperor is to sleep, between 
 Liady and Dubrowna, to enable me to transmit orders to you ; 
 should you not, however, receive any, you are to continue your 
 march upon Orsza after to-morrow morning ; you will there take 
 up a position, have the bridge properly guarded, and assist in 
 establishing the greatest order in the town ; you will have rations 
 distributed in a regular manner to all the men of your corps who 
 may be present under arms ; you will detain all stragglers at 
 Dubrowna and at Orsza ; you will have them classed by corps, 
 and prevent every species of plunder, and all those excesses which 
 are committed by stragglers ; you will cause regular distributions 
 to be made to them, and if any of them should plunder or mis-be- 
 have, have them brought before a military commission and shot ; 
 the occasion calls for such examples. We are arriving upon a 
 line where the army is going to stop and to re-organize itself; 
 we must, therefore, economize our resources and means of sub- 
 sistence. Generals d' Alorma and Jomini are at Orsza ; their orders 
 are in conformity with the instructions 1 have given to you above. 
 Be pleased to attend to their execution ; the Emperor particularly 
 recommends this object to you. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Dubrowna, 18th November, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the governor of Minsk to inform him that I 
 shall be at Orsza to-morrow; apprize him that 1 have ordered 
 the second corps, with a division of cuirassiers and a hundred 
 pieces of cannon, under the command of the Duke of Reggio, to 
 proceed in all haste and in a straight line to Borisow, to secure 
 that important point, and thence to march upon Minsk. In the 
 meantime General Donibrowski will proceed to that place with 
 his division, and observe the movements of the corps now at 
 Minsk. Recommend him to send native agents to the Duke of 
 Bassano and Prince Schwarzenberg, and to write to you fre- 
 quently.
 
 OF THE EMPEROH. 41 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno. 
 
 Dubrowna, 19th November 1812, 
 
 Three o'clock in the morning. 
 
 By the Duke of Reggio's aid-de-camp I send the duplicate of 
 the orders 1 yesterday addressed to you by your aid-de camp. 
 
 The Emperor will arrive at noon this day at Orsza. It will be 
 necessary, M. le Marechal, that the position you may take up 
 should be nearer to Borisow, Wilna, and Orsza, than the enemy's 
 army. Endeavor to mask the movement of the Duke of Reggio's, 
 and to make it appear on the contrary that the Emperor is ad- 
 vancing upon General Wittgenstein, a manoeuvre which will ap- 
 pear sufficiently probable. His Majesty's intention is to march 
 upon Minsk, and when that place shall have been occupied, to 
 follow the direction of the Beresina. It is, therefore, possible 
 you may receive orders to proceed to Beresino, for the purpose of 
 covering Wilna, and of placing yourself in communication with the 
 sixth corps. Turn your mind to this movement, and let me know 
 your observations respecting it. 
 
 As soon as you have acquainted me with the condition of the 
 artillery, which you have it in your power to furnish to the other 
 corps, I shall send you instructions with regard to the point to 
 which the same may be forwarded. 1 had instructed General 
 Nansouty to send you a cypher; 1 suppose he will have left it 
 with the Duke of Bassano who may possibly have sent it to you ; 
 let me know whether you have received it, in order that I may in- 
 sert in the letters some words in cyphers, so as to prevent the 
 enemy from taking advantage of the letters, if they should chance 
 to fall into their hands. This is an indispensable measure, con- 
 sidering the multitude of cossacks who will be scattered in every 
 direction. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel to the Duke of Reggio. 
 
 Head-quarters near Kokhanow, 22d November, 1812, 
 Half-past two in the morning. 
 
 I receive your letter of the 21st ; his Majesty sees with pleasure 
 that you will reach Borisow this day ; the Emperor hopes that 
 the Governor General of Minsk will have felt the necessity of de- 
 fending the tete-de-pont which secures the passage. General 
 Dombrowski, who was to arrive on the 20th, will have placed that 
 important point beyond ali danger from an attack upon it. 
 
 It would be a great misfortune if the enemy had taken posses- 
 sion of the tete-de-pont and burned the bridge, so as to prevent the 
 passage across ; and much blame would attach to General Dom- 
 browski for giving to his division a wrong direction. It would be 
 necessary for you to ascertain on the spot whether the Beresina 
 can be crossed at some point, and in case this should be attended 
 with great difficulty, we should have to march towards Lepel. — 
 But the Emperor hopes that the Governor of Minsk will not
 
 42 ORDERS 
 
 have surrendered the tete-de-pont to the cavalry, and that General 
 Dombrowski and your own corps may have arrived in due suc- 
 cession. Leave some officers behind you, in echelons, in order 
 that the principal intelligence from Borisow may quickly come to 
 our hands. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Bobr, 23d November, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to the Duke of Belluno, who is to reach 
 Kolopeniczi to-night, and inform him that I am at Bobr, and the 
 Duke of Reffgio at Borisow ; that it is of importance he should 
 intercept the road to Lepel, on the side of Baran, as he intended it, 
 in order to be certain that Wittgenstein is not bringing any force 
 against the Duke of Reggio ; and that if he should do so, he 
 must be vigorously attacked ; that I trust he will have written to 
 me, and that one of his officers will reach me to-night ; that 1 shall 
 probably proceed to Borisow to-morrow ; that as soon as I have 
 received the officer he will not have failed sending to me, I shall 
 again write to him ; that our rear-guard has reached Toloczin. 
 
 The Prince of N eufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Bellunc. 
 
 Bobr, 23d November, 1812, 
 At four in the afternoon. 
 
 The Emperor has just arrived at Bobr. The Duke of Reggio 
 is in the direction of Borisow. It is of importance that you 
 should intercept the road to Lepel on the side of Baran as you 
 intended to do, in order to be certain that Wittgenstein does not 
 bring any force against Oudinot ; if he did, you are to make a 
 vigorous attack upon him. His Majesty hopes you will have 
 written, and that he will receive one of your officers this night. 
 It is probable the Emperor will leave this to-morrow for Borisow. 
 As soon as we shall have received the officer you will not have 
 failed sending to us, I shall write to yon, and again acquaint you 
 with his Majesty's wishes. Our rear-guard is at Toloczin. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to Lieutenant-General 
 
 Baron Eble. 
 
 Bobr, 24th November, 1812, 
 Half-past four in the morning. 
 
 The Emperor desires you will start before six o'clock, and 
 proceed in all haste to the Duke of Reggio's head-quarters at 
 Borisow, for the purpose of constructing several bridges upon the 
 Beresina for the passage of the army ; you are to divide into two 
 parties. If your men should not be in sufficient numbers to ex- 
 pedite the work, you will take all those who are best able to 
 keep up with you, so that you may arrive in the night, and 
 commence working at day-break to-morrow morning, and the
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 43 
 
 other party before mid-day. Be careful to leave workshops on 
 the road for repairing the bridges and the worst passages. I am 
 giving the same order to General Chasseloup; you will act in 
 concert with him and with the Duke of Reggio, respecting the 
 works to be carried on at the Beresina, which the army must un- 
 avoidably cross at latest to-morrow. 
 
 The Marshal Duke of Reggio to the Prince of Neufchatel and 
 
 Wagram. 
 
 Borisow, 24th November, 1812, 
 Half-past five in the morning. 
 
 Monseigneur, according to what I had the honor to communicate 
 to your serene highness, I sent to leconnoitre the ford of Studi- 
 ianka, which was occupied by the enemy, as you will perceive 
 from General Corbineau's report. 
 
 There are two more fords, the one at Stakow, one mile above 
 Borisow, the other at Ukholoda, two miles below that town. The 
 movements that were discovered last night upon the enemy's two 
 flanks were directed to the occupation of those points, which are 
 all guarded. 
 
 It has been found impossible to make reconnoitrings sufficient- 
 ly exact during the night to enable us to ascertain the most fa- 
 vorable point for throwing a bridge over ; I intend to manoeuvre 
 about the three points above mentioned, to try a passage, and 
 during the night to throw my bridge at that point 1 shall have 
 selected. 
 
 There are twenty thousand men in front of me, who will no 
 doubt move upon that point where I may attempt to effect a 
 passage ; I cannot, therefore, venture to answer for the success of 
 the undertaking, however determined I may be to use every en- 
 deavor towards it. 
 
 It appears from all the information obtained that the Russians 
 are well persuaded of the Emperor's intention to cross the Beresina 
 at this point ; that Langeron's advanced guard arrived yesterday, 
 and that the arrival of Titchagoff is likewise announced ; that Witt- 
 genstein has communicated his proximate junction ; that Prince 
 Schwarzenberg is in close pursuit of General Muller who com- 
 mands the three divisions which the enemy left in front of him, 
 and that this pursuit gives uneasiness to the Russians. It is 
 further added that the troops which were at first sent in the direc- 
 tion of Wilna have been recalled. 
 
 I am, Monseigneur, your serene highness' respectfully de- 
 voted, &c. 
 
 The Marshal Duke of Reggio to the Prince of Neufchatel and 
 
 Wagram. 
 
 Borisow, 24th November, 1812, 
 
 One o'clock P. M. 
 
 Monseigneur, I have fixed upon the point of Studianka, where I
 
 44 ORDERS 
 
 intend to effect a passage in the ensuing night; and to-morrow 
 morning 1 shall cause some feigned movements to he made at 
 Ukholoda and Stakow ; the enemy is also on the alert ; their troops 
 are in constant motion in front of us. They have even made a 
 semblance of bringing forward materials to restore the bridge of 
 Borisow ; but the movement which appears to have attracted their 
 most serious attention, is that which is taking place upon their 
 right in the direction of Beresino. I cause ihem to be closely 
 watched, and do not lose sight of them ; but we are all of opinion 
 that this movement, which is purposely made under our own eyes, is 
 intended to conceal some other project, and that it is proper 
 your highness should be apprised of it. 
 
 1 hope, however, to succeed in gaining the other bank to- 
 morrow, and in maintaining my ground in sufficient strength to 
 protect the passage of whatever his Majesty may think proper to 
 send after me ; but there cannot be any doubt that Wittgenstein 
 and Steinheil, who are on the look out, will do all in their power to 
 oppose us. I have sent some officers to the Duke of Belluno for 
 the purpose of obtaining information from him and of informing 
 him of my operations ; 1 have as Jet received no answer. I have 
 sent a detachment to him in the direction of Baran, to make him 
 acquainted with the manoeuvres which I propose to execute during 
 the night. 
 
 The Marshal Duke of Reg gin to the Prince of Neufchatcl and 
 
 Wagram. 
 
 Borisow, 24th November, 1812, 
 Three quarters past four in the afternoon. 
 
 Monseigneur, your serene highness will find, by the accom- 
 panying report from General Aubry, who was returning from 
 Studianka at the moment of my receiving the last dispatch, that 
 the passage of the Beresina is far from being unattended with 
 danger ; the enemy does not appear to be deceived by our ma- 
 noeuvres, and it is quite certain that the troops in front of the ford 
 are those commanded by Steinheil, which have come up by the 
 way of Beresinoj this explaius the enemy's movement jrf to-day 
 upon his right. A peasant employed yesterday as ajfljflde *° a 
 column of about six thousand Russians, which moved to their 
 left, and who effected his escape, has stated that the above column 
 made to-day an inverse movement ; but notwithstanding the ob- 
 stacles to be encountered by crossing at Studianka, I think we 
 might succeed in overcoming them, were I promptly supported ; 
 for, in the course of a. 'few hours, 1 may find myself placed be- 
 tween two hostile "forces. I had already ordered my movement, 
 and it was tp«.take place at six o'clock ; but this appears to me to 
 be of too serious a consequence not to delay and await his Majesty's 
 instructions, especially as they may reach me in time to enable me 
 to effect that movement during the night, since we are only at the 
 distance of three leagues from the point where the passage is to 
 take place.
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 45 
 
 I annex to this letter a hasty sketch of the reconnoitring made 
 at Ukholoda, a village which is situated two miles hence, on the 
 road of Beresino, and which I occupy for the present. 
 
 1 have caused the ford of Weselowo to be reconnoitred by a de- 
 tachment ; it has been found guarded by cavalry and infantry ; 
 this ford is at the distance of only one league above the ford of 
 Studianka. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Losnitza, 25th November, 1812, 
 
 One o'clock in the morning. 
 
 My cousin, dispatch in all haste your aid-de-camp Flahaut to 
 the Duke of Reggio ; desire him to reach the Duke's head-quar- 
 ters as soon as possible, and to hand to him the following letter : 
 
 " By your letter of the 24th, at five in the afternoon, you inform 
 " me that you apprehend you will stand in need of support in your 
 " attempt to cross the river. The Duke of Treviso will arrive at 
 *' Borisow early this day with two divisions of the guard. The 
 " Duke of Belluno had yesterday an engagement, which, judging 
 ** from the firing, must have lasted some time between Kolopeniezi 
 " and Baran. You will no doubt have had scaffoldings prepared 
 " for at least two or three bridges. General Eble must have 
 " reached Borisow. If you have not crossed over this night, it 
 " becomes important under present circumstances, that you should 
 " do so to-day." 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of Belluno. 
 
 Losnitza, 25th November, 1812. 
 Wff Five o'clock in the morning. 
 
 I have submitted to the Emperor your letter of the 24th. You 
 make no mention of the strong firing that began at half-past three 
 o'clock yesterday, and you also omit to state whether you have 
 seen any infantry. Your chief object is to prevent General 
 Wittgenstein from coming up with Oudinot, and you had always 
 received instructions to proceed in all haste to Baran, for the pur- 
 pose of intercepting the road to Lepel ; you have failed to do this, 
 so that General Steinhe.il has already joined Tormasoff's army, 
 and made us suspend our movement of crossing the Beresina, 
 which, in our present situation, it was so important for us to carry 
 at once into effect. You have, as you state, two divisions at the 
 distance of fifteen wrests from Kostritza ; march with them in all 
 haste, in order to arrive at Kostritza at an early hour ; reconnoitre 
 in every direction from Kostritza to Baran ; make a vigorous 
 attack upon whatever comes in your way. Open a communica- 
 tion with Oudinot, who is at Borisow, to which place the Emperor 
 is about to repair. It is necessary you should often dispatch 
 officers to make known several times a day the position you have 
 taken, and that you be enabled to pass the Beresina upon bridges
 
 46 ORDERS 
 
 which are on the point of being thrown over it, between the night 
 from the 25th to the 26th, with the Duke of Reggio, the impe- 
 rial guard, and your own corps ; that passage can no longer be 
 delayed. Your rear-guard being further removed, may continue to 
 cover the army, the rear-guard of which moves to day from Bobr, 
 in the direction of Nacza, and reach the bridge by a forced march ; 
 as soon as the passage shall have been opened, if General Four- 
 nif^ should meet with forces inferior to his own, he is to attack 
 them. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Warrant to the Duke of Belluno. 
 
 One league from Borisow, 25th November, 1812. 
 
 Two o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 I now receive your letter of the 25th, at ten in the morning. — 
 The Emperor is astonished at your having withdrawn the rear- 
 guard that covered the road from Bobr to Nacza, and entirely 
 abandoned the road from Lepel to Borisow. As you are on the 
 road of Losnitza, there is now no remedy for it ; this additional 
 embarrassment will be of serious inconvenience to your troops. — 
 It is to be regretted, as you were in front of the enemy, that you 
 did not give him a sound beating. If he is at your heels, and 
 should incommode you, fall upon him with your rear-guard and 
 with one of your divisions. Proceed to-morrow, before day light, 
 with two of your divisions, on your way to Borisow, and from 
 thence to the point at which you are to cross. 
 
 It would be very hazardous to evacuate Ratulicze, if the enemy 
 should be in front of you ; in such a case you must face about with 
 a number of divisions equal in strength to the enemy, and defeat 
 him ; were you to act otherwise, you would endanger the safety 
 of all the corps which are at Krupki. The Emperor perceives 
 that the enemy has offered you some fine opportunities of beating 
 him, and that you never knew how to take advantage of them. 1 
 renew to you the order from the Emperor to attack the enemy, if 
 he should be in sight of you ; this is of the highest importance, 
 if his position be such as to enable him to introduce himself into 
 the midst of our columns. The Emperor's head-quarters will be 
 at Borisow this night. The passage of the river is to take place 
 to-morrow morning. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Studianka, 27th November, 1812. 
 
 Half an hour after midnight. 
 My cousin, order the Marshal Duke of Elchingen to cross the 
 river with all the Polish troops, with what he has collected of the 
 third corps, and with Claparede's division which is to arrive at day- 
 break, and which I place under his command, and desire him 
 with those troops to support the Marshal Duke of Reggio, 
 should an attack be made upon him this morning.
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 47 
 
 As soon as the Duke of Belluno shall have arrived, he will also 
 march to the relief of the Duke of Reggio. I could wish to post- 
 pone the latter movement until the troops of the viceroy had ar- 
 rived here, for fear some of Wittgenstein's troops should make 
 their appearance on this side of the river. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Zaniwhi, 28th November, 1812. 
 
 Nine o'clock in the morning. 
 My cousin, give orders to General de Wrede, who is at Doks- 
 zitzi, to repair to Wileika, to collect provisions at that place, 
 take possession of the bridges, send out parties on the road to 
 Ilia, and on the old road to Minsk, and communicate at Smorgoni 
 with d'Albignac, the adjutant commandant of that place. This 
 letter is to be carried by the man who was sent to General de 
 Wrede (to be addressed to General Krasinski). Should it be deli- 
 vered in fifteen hours hence, he shall have areward of fifty napo- 
 leons, to be given to him the moment he returns to tell us that he 
 has done so. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchalel and Wagram to the Viceroy of Italy. 
 
 Selitzka, 3d December, 1812. 
 
 Half-past one in the morning. 
 
 Monseigneur, the Emperor desires you will send a Polish 
 officer to Dolhinow and to Dokszitzi, to meet General de Wrede, 
 and to acquaint him, that yesterday, 1st December, General 
 Wittgenstein was at Pleszeniczi ; that, on the 3d, we shall be at 
 Malodeczno ; that the order has been repeatedly sent to him to 
 place himself on our left. 
 
 As soon as your highness shall have communicated with the adju- 
 tant commandant d'Albignac, the Emperor desires you will inform 
 him of the situation of the troops under this adjutant commandant, 
 and direct him to forward to us, under a strong escort, the twenty 
 estafets which must be with him. You will recommend to him 
 to place troops at every out-post, in order that they may not be 
 thrown into a state of disorganization by the marauders ; and that 
 the service of estafets and communications with Wilna and Paris, 
 may be carried on with all rapidity. 
 
 The Emperor likewise wishes your highness to inform him if 
 the army might halt for a moment on the line of the Wilna 
 which returns upon itself in the direction of Wiezyn and Radosz- 
 kowiczi ; and if the adjutant commandant has any conyoys of 
 provisions with him ; it is known that there are some on the 
 march from Wilna. 
 
 During those few days of repose, the wounded, the dismounted 
 men of the cavalry, and the unnecessary baggage of the army 
 might be removed; all this, however, depends upon the possibility 
 of obtaining supplies.
 
 4S ORDERS 
 
 The Emperor desires me to ask your highness how many men 
 you have rallied, and if your regiments have been restored 
 to some kind of organization. 
 
 I send you an order for General Hogendorp, governor general of 
 Lithuania, and another for General Bourcier. L beg your high- 
 ness will dispatch an officer in all haste, as the bearer of them. — 
 You will direct him to use the utmost speed. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchalel and Wagram to the Viceroy of Italy. 
 
 Selitzka, 2d December, 1812. 
 
 Two o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Monseigneur, I laid before the Emperor your letter, dated on 
 the road to Malodeczno, the 2d instant. The Emperor wishes 
 you to send a strong advanced guard on the road to Minsk, in 
 order to ascertain what is going on in that quarter, and if there 
 are any news of the enemy. The Emperor hopes to find estafets 
 at Malodeczno, upon his arrival there. 
 
 His Majesty desires that your Highness will forward on to 
 Wilna, under the escort to be furnished by the troops of the 
 Adjutant Commandant d'Albignac, his heavy baggage, the trea- 
 sure, and all vehicles or waggons that convey the sick or 
 wounded. 
 
 Your Highness will likewise order the Duke of Abrantes, to 
 collect and proceed with all the men of the dismounted cavalry, 
 by common daily marches, and by the most direct road from 
 Malodeczno to Merecz, without going through Wilna. 
 
 As to the Polish troops, the Emperor also orders you to send 
 them on from Malodeczno, in the direction of Olita, without going 
 through Wilna. 
 
 Send agents to Minsk for the purpose of collecting intelligence. 
 To sum up all, relieve yourself of so much burden, by sending the 
 baggage and wounded men to Wilna, the dismounted men to 
 Mercez, and lastly, the Poles to Olita. 
 
 You are to canton your troops in the environs of Malodeczno; 
 the Prince of Eckmiihl will continue there with his own troops, 
 in order to rally them, and to take a moment's rest. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to General Count 
 
 de Wrede. 
 
 Selitzka, 3d December, 1812. 
 
 One o'clock in the morning. 
 
 General de Wrede, I just received your letter of the 2d. 
 Head-quarters will be to-night at Malodeczno, and will fall 
 back by degrees until they reach the place where regular distri- 
 butions may be made. The army suffers from its long privations. 
 
 Transmit a statement to me of the condition of your troops and 
 of your artillery. If you had it in your power to send us provi- 
 sions, bread, cattle, upon one of the points of the road, this
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 49 
 
 would be the greatest service you could possibly render us. We 
 have a great number of dismounted men ; let me know to what 
 service belong those horses you have to spare. Order your parks 
 of artillery, your moveable hospitals, provisions, cattle, and 
 stores to be transferred to Wilna. Let me also know the present 
 position of the Bavarian troops, and of the ten thousand recruits 
 which left Munich several months ago, in order that measures 
 may be taken for rallying- the whole upon one common centre. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Adjutant 
 Commandant Dalbignac. 
 
 Malodeczno,3d December, 1812. 
 
 Three o'clock in the morning. 
 The Emperor does not find your correspondence sufficiently 
 clear ; you do not furnish me with a statement of what composes 
 the convoys under your escort, nor do you state the kind of 
 vehicles ; I cannot, therefore, give you any orders. Send back 
 to Wilna all articles of clothing ; they shall be distributed in 
 that city. Send provisions forward to meet us at the post office, 
 half way on the road to Markowo, in order that they may be 
 distributed to the army on its passing by that place. See that 
 the stores of Smorgoni and Oszmiana are properly stocked. Let 
 the bullocks be sent to Wilna, to save them from being carried 
 away by the cossacks, reserving only what is necessary to the 
 army for two or three days' consumption. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to Count Kreptowictz. 
 
 Malodeczno, 4th December, 1812. 
 
 Four o'clock in the morning. 
 
 The Emperor desires you will take measures for sending to the 
 Duke of Belluno, out of the stores at Smorgoni, ten thousand 
 rations of biscuit, and as many to the Duke of Elchiugen who 
 commands the second and third corps. It is his Majesty's wish 
 that you should also send to each of these marshals, twenty thou- 
 sand rations of meat, and ten thousand rations of brandy. Use 
 every exertion to the end that those provisions may arrive as soon 
 as possible, to-morrow, if practicable, because the retrograde 
 movement will be stopped at the place where they may be 
 received. 
 
 It appears by information from Wilna, that there are at Smor- 
 goni sixty thousand rations of biscuit; twenty thousand are to be 
 distributed in the manner above stated ; thirty thousand will be 
 given to the guard who are to send for them to-day ; five thousand 
 to the Prince of Eckmiihl, and as many to the viceroy, each of 
 those corps is to receive a double issue of rations of meat (alive), 
 and the like of brandy. Three hundred and fifty thousand rations 
 of flour are collected at Smorgoni, and it is affirmed that the
 
 50 ORDERS 
 
 governmentofLithuaniahas adopted means for having a largequau- 
 tity of bread baked in that place. Should all these particulars be 
 correct, and the magazines of Oszmiana be equally well supplied, 
 the army will be rallied there, and receive a regular distribution 
 of meat, bread, and brandy. It is, therefore, necessary that you 
 should inform the Emperor, as soon as possible, of the actual 
 resources to be found in the magazines of Smorgoni and Oszmiana, 
 and furnish me' with a statement of them. 
 
 The Prince ofNeufchaiel and Wagram to Lieu tenant -General 
 Count Hogendorp, Governor of Lithuania. 
 
 Miedniki, 7th December, 1812, 
 Seven o'clock in the evening. 
 
 I am to apprize you that the imperial guard will reach Wilna 
 to-morrow. His Majesty would wish it to be provided with 
 cantonments in the suburb of Oszmiana ; the cavalry of the guard 
 is also to arrive to-morrow, and will take up temporary canton- 
 ments in the quarters it had formerly occupied. The corps of 
 the viceroy and of the Prince of Eckmiihl are to stop at Rukoni 
 to-morrow. We hope you have adopted measures for taking from 
 all stragglers and scattered men their cognats; let these men be 
 forthwith removed to the convents or quarters you may think pro- 
 per, for the purpose of being brought together according to the 
 corps to which they originally belonged. The city will require a 
 numerous patrole to prevent there being any stragglers in it. We 
 would wish to have a plan of the villages within a circumference of 
 two miles from Wilna, which might afford the resource of quarters 
 for the troops. The king concludes you do not lose a moment in 
 removing all our sick, and all the obstructions attendant upon 
 the administration of the army. The six millions (of francs) 
 which are at Wilna must be removed, two millions to Warsaw and 
 four to Kcenigsberg. With respect to the dismounted cavalry 
 men, they must be collected together in one spot, and sent off to 
 Kowno and Warsaw in troops of five hundred men. General 
 Bourcier will inform you of their numbers, and what particular 
 description of service is to be sent to each of those points. I 
 have already written to you to send off from Wilna to Kcenigs- 
 berg all the horses intended for the dismounted cavalry. Many 
 soldiers will apply to be admitted into the hospitals. You should 
 endeavour to remove them by degrees to Kowno. The quantity 
 of cognats and of small carts that are to be taken from the soldiers 
 upon entering the town, will furnish more means than are neces- 
 sary for the transport of the sick. Draw up for my information 
 exact and detailed statements of whatever is to be found at 
 Wilna.
 
 OF THE EMPEROR. 51 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to General Count de 
 
 Wrede. 
 
 Wilna, 8th December, 1812, 
 Five o'clock in the morning. 
 
 It is his Majesty's wish that, you should quit Stob-Chomska, 
 and proceed to Rukoni where you will receive orders from the 
 Duke of Elchingen, to whom his Majesty has confided the com- 
 mand of the rear-guard. You will be supported by the Duk"e of 
 Elchingen with the troops of the second and third corps. It is of 
 importance that you should reach Rukoni as soon as possible; 
 once arrived there, you will become our rear-guard. If we should 
 leave any stragglers behind, you will afford them protection, and 
 take care to have the country reconnoitred on your right and left, 
 to as great a distance as possible. The troops of the Duke of 
 Elchingen, which are to support you, will take up a position at 
 Niesmicza ; they will have the charge of covering and watching 
 the road to Rudomin. The viceroy and the Prince of Eckmuhl 
 are to stop to-night at Rukoni, and to leave it to-morrow morn- 
 ing ; the corps of the Duke of Belluno is to-day at Miedniki ; and 
 will also fall back upon Wilna to-morrow, leaving the duty of the 
 rear-guard to you. His Majesty relies upon your talents and 
 your zeal on this occasion where you have it in your power to 
 render essential services to the army. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of 
 
 Elchingen. 
 
 Wilna, 8th December, 1812, 
 Six o'clock in the evening. 
 
 His Majesty thinks proper to confide to you this very night the 
 command of the rear-guard of the army. You will have under 
 your orders the second and third corps and Loison's division which 
 is already in the rear, and also the Bavarian corps of seven or 
 eight thousand men under General de Wrede. 1 have ordered 
 this General to break up immediately from his position of Stob- 
 Chomska, and repair to Rukoni. I send you herewith a copy 
 of the instructions given to him. 1 have desired the Duke of 
 Belluno not to quit his position at Rukoni until General de Wrede 
 shall have arrived ; with the remainder of your troops you are 
 to take up the position of Niesmicza, and to cover the road of 
 Rudomin. 
 
 You will be pleased to issue to General de WreJe all the in- 
 structions you may think proper. You are sensible that the safety 
 of the army is in your hands; His Majesty reposes every confidence 
 in you, and requests you will communicate to him any intelligence 
 which the advanced guard may obtain respecting the various 
 movements of the enemy. Our attention will now be directed to 
 rallying the first, fourth, and ninth corps, as well as the guard, 
 for the purpose of affording assistance to you, if it should be 
 called for.
 
 52 ORDERS 
 
 The Prince of Neufckalel and fVagram to the Duke of 
 
 Elchingen. 
 
 Wilna, 9th December, 1812. 
 
 As General de Wrede has been forced in his positions, and 
 is at the gates of the town, and as Gratien's division* did not 
 afford you the means of supporting him and of driving back the 
 enemy, the King has removed his head-quarters to the gate of 
 Kowno, where he has collected the guard. His Majesty intends 
 to march at four o'clock to-morrow morning, with the imperial 
 guard, in order to reach Kowno as soon as possible, use his endea- 
 vours to rally the fugitives and stragglers, and take up a position 
 at that place. 
 
 It is the King's intention that you should continue to form the 
 rear-guard, and to protect the retreat, with the aid of de Wrede's 
 and Loison's divisions, and as many soldiers as you can rally and 
 add to those troops. Remove this night, if possible, the artillery 
 and whatever else can be withdrawn, especially the public treasure. 
 His Majesty wishes that some covered carts should be abandoned, 
 and their horses put to the vehicles that convey the treasure. 
 I direct General Ebl6 to blow up the caissons which we are com- 
 pelled to leave behind in the arsenal, and to destroy all the mus- 
 kets this night. Under present circumstances all that the King 
 can do is to proceed in haste to Kowno. 
 
 His Majesty leaves it optional with you to march, according as 
 circumstances may require it, and to do the best under this pain- 
 ful situation, when the bitterness of the cold has completed the 
 disorganization of the army. It will be necessary, as much as 
 possible, to set fire to all that we cannot carry away. Caution 
 General Hogendorp not to quit the town except when you are 
 evacuating it. The King authorises you, upon your departure, 
 to write to the general in command of the Russian troops, for 
 the purpose of recommending to him the sick we leave behind. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to Count Daru. 
 
 Wilna, 9th December, 1812. 
 
 The King has transferred his head-quarters to the gate of 
 Kowno. The Duke of Elchingen closes the retreat, and will 
 quit as late as possible to-morrow. Send off the treasure during 
 the night. 1 have authorized General Ebl£ to furnish artillery 
 horses, if they should be required. We must use every means for 
 saving the treasure ; let it be removed this night to the head- 
 quarters at the gate of Kowno, where we shall have it placed 
 under proper escort. 
 
 Give directions that provisions and clothing be distributed in 
 
 * The general of brigade Baron Gratien, replaced General 
 Loison who fell ill.
 
 OF THt EMPEROR, 53 
 
 abundance to all those who may ask for them, waving the slow 
 forms of administration in so doing, because the enemy's position 
 does not allow us to hope that we ean hold out at Wilna the whole 
 of to-morrow. Return back to head-quarters to-night, -and set 
 every thing in motion for removing to Kowno all that can possi- 
 bly be withdrawn. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagrum to the Prince 
 
 Schivarzenberg. 
 
 Wilna, 9th December, 1812. 
 
 The army is at present at Wilna; but every thing leads to be- 
 lieve that his Majesty will decide upon removing it across the 
 Niemen, so as to enable it to take up winter quarters along that 
 river. This movement will, consequently, impose upon you the 
 necessity of manoeuvring with your corps and with that of Reynier, 
 in order that your movements may harmonize with ours in the 
 new line we are about to form on the left bank of the Niemen. — 
 As it was the Emperor's wish that your own corps and the corps 
 of General Reynier should cover the Duchy of Warsaw, his 
 Majesty desires me to request you will manoeuvre in the direction 
 of Bialistock ; but his Majesty likewise desires me to state to 
 you, that your movement should be effected as slowly as possible, 
 unless the enemy's movements should compel you to act otherwise. 
 
 The army is about to march to Kowno, which it is intended to 
 defend as arete depont ; your reports are to be sent to us in that 
 direction : we wish to hear from you as often as possible. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of 
 
 Tarentum. 
 
 Wilna, 9th December, 1812. 
 
 The army is at this moment in Wilna and its vicinity. It is, 
 therefore, his Majesty's wish, that you should draw nearer to this 
 new line of operations, aud approach Tilsit, for the purpose of 
 covering Koenigsberg and Dantzig. But His Majesty likewise 
 desires me to state to you, that your movement should be effected 
 as slowly as possible, unless the enemy's movements should compel 
 you to act otherwise. 
 
 The army is about to march to Kowno, which it is intended to 
 defend as a the de-pont ; your reports are to be senttous in that 
 direction, we wish to hear from you as often as possible. 
 
 The Prince of Neufchatel and Wagram to the Duke of 
 
 Elchingen. 
 
 Kowno, 12th December, 1812. 
 
 At noon. 
 The King has received the verbal report you sent to him. His 
 Majesty heard with regret, that the enemy is so close in
 
 54 ORDERS 
 
 pursuit of you. I have just sent to you six pieces of artillery be- 
 longing to Loison's division ; we hope you may be able to oppose 
 a resistance at the defile of Rumsziki ; you are aware of what im- 
 portance it is that we should not be pent up in this place, where 
 we possess immense magazines. Under present circumstances 
 the King has considered that the first thing to be done, was to 
 order the removal of every thing we have at Kowno, and to 
 devote yesterday and to-day to that object ; we have here a t ele- 
 de poni, or a kind of intrenched camp, armed with twelve pieces 
 of artillery, where we shall be able to hold out until the enemy's 
 infantry should make its appearance in superior numbers. The 
 king has ordered the dismounted cavalry, the whole of the imperial 
 guard, both infantry and cavalry, and the first and fourth corps, to 
 provide themselves in this place with provisions for eight daySj, 
 and cross to the left bank of the Niemen. Twelve pieces of 
 mounted artillery, which were in the town, have been placed upon 
 the heights of the left bank. His Majesty intends that all the 
 troops belonging to the second and third corps, which will include 
 Loison's division, and the legion of the Vistula, both forming part 
 of the third corps, should remain at Kowno, for the purpose of 
 defending the approach to the tete de poni, and the town itself 
 which contains artillery, and quantities of ammunition, provisions, 
 and clothing. The King's head-quarters will probably be to- 
 morrow on the left bank, with the troops of the guard, and of 
 the first and fourth corps. 
 
 The King imagines that, in this position, he may give the cos- 
 sacks a lesson if they should press too closely ; His Majesty, 
 however, will wait for your reports, previously to his adopting 
 any resolution. Loison's division will find here whatever it may 
 stand in need of; it will then become an imposing force of in- 
 fantry to us. 
 
 Napoleon to the Major-General. 
 
 Moscow, 25th September, 1812. 
 
 My cousin, write to General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, thatl have 
 given orders to the intendant general, to send two hundred thou- 
 sand francs in rubles (at the rate of a paper ruble for each franc) ; 
 along the line of Mojai'sk, Gjatz, Wiazma, Dorogobouje and 
 Smoleusko, and thatl have authorised him to enter into contracts, 
 at each place, for the supplies of flour and meat, for the service 
 along the road ; that I do not find he has yet taken any step to- 
 wards organizing the government of Smolensko. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LONDON: 
 PRINTED BY G. SCHULZE, 13, POLAND STREET
 
 u 
 
 b 
 
 \1 
 
 J 
 
 Tf 
 
 P 
 
 f
 
 m 
 
 4 
 
 8JP? s 
 
 *fc I _-_ 3D 
 
 8V33I1 3H1 » 
 
 < 
 W 
 
 5ff 
 
 9 
 
 O MISdlAINn 3Wi » 
 
 f 
 
 E 
 
 • viNaodnva jo ° 
 
 ^ 
 
 s- : 
 
 B 
 
 * SANTA BARBARA <
 
 m 
 
 «j 
 
 00 
 
 i 
 
 • to Asvaan ihi o. 
 
 5fT 
 
 AilSlOAINn 31 
 
 5 W"t 
 
 0^ 
 
 f5 
 
 <» wiMiiQjiiva io j* . 
 
 © VW9JIV9 ViNVS o 
 
 Is 
 
 3 1205 00947 3537 
 
 tM£ UBRaSK OF 
 
 University of California 
 
 SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 
 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388 
 
 Return this material to the library 
 
 from which it was borrowed. 
 
 >• 
 
 3 
 
 ° SANT- 
 
 \ 
 
 < MIS