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Psychological Monographs 
 
 Vol. X April 1909 
 
 No. 2 Whole No. 41 
 
 THE 
 
 Psychological Review 
 
 EDITED BY 
 J. MARK BALDWIN HOWARD C. WARREN 
 
 Johns Hopkins University Princeton University 
 
 AND 
 
 CHARLES H. JUDD 
 
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 {Editor of the Psychological Monographs) 
 
 The Social Will 
 
 BY 
 
 Edwin Andrew Hayden 
 
 Dissertation presented to the University faculty of the University of 
 Michigan for the degree of doctor of philosophy 
 
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 OF J 
 
^4-' 
 
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 ^4V<^^vi#C 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The following thesis has grown out of general studies in soci- 
 ology and psychology which I prosecuted under the direction of 
 Professor Cooley and Professor Pillsbury. So far as anything 
 new is offered in the thesis, I may say it consists in this: that 
 the processes rather than the products of collective mental activ- 
 ity have been kept systematically in mind. Suggestion and 
 imitation have received very little attention, in the belief that 
 they contain practically nothing beyond what was alread)^ a 
 matter of common possession in the doctrines of association 
 and apperception. I believe that the conception of a social 
 personality as a collective total organized out of mental systems 
 that interact in definite ways, is of more fundamental significance. 
 
 193380 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter I — The Social Consciousness. 
 
 Section i. Spencer's distinction between animal and social groups in respect 
 to parentage and cooperation, merely biological. 
 
 S. 2. Reciprocity of thought and feeling the matter of social importance. 
 
 S. 3. Two kinds of communities, the instinctive and the social. The nature 
 of instinctive communities most clearly revealed by the life of insect families. 
 Some other animal groups present a transitional stage. 
 
 S. 4 and 5. The human mind the only truly social mind. 
 
 S. 6. Language a social necessity. It is the most delicate instrument for the 
 communication of thought and feeling. 
 
 S. 7. The content of the cultured mind, i. e., the ideas with which it is 
 stocked, largely social in their nature. Illustrations of this fact furnished by 
 different subjects of study. 
 
 S. 8. Mental development culminates in two universes of fact and feeling: 
 the objective, relating to the physical order; and the subjective, relating to the 
 personal order. These two are somewhat confused in the mythologic mind. 
 
 Chapter II — The Social Personality. 
 
 S. I. Two fundamental processes in the social mind, desire and belief. Dif- 
 ference between reactions of animals and purposive control. 
 
 S. 2. Conditions under which desire arises. 
 
 S. 3. Theoretical desires arise in connection with mythologic thought. 
 
 S. 4. But for the most part knowledge is at first subordinated to practical 
 needs. This is true of the average mind of even an advanced social order. 
 Mental division of labor assigns the task of thinking to a select few. 
 
 S. 5. Personal ideas play a considerable part in directing the activity of the 
 imagination. 
 
 S. 6. The specific content of desire is a matter of history. 
 
 S. 7. The psychological nature of belief. Emotion in belief: case of Knox 
 and Loyola. 
 
 S. 8. World of sensible experience the ultimate universe of reality. Asso- 
 ciation changes the memories of history at times into unrealities. 
 
 S. 9. Native attitude of the mind one of belief. Faith necessary to the men- 
 tal health of a people. Beliefs are outgrown. Social development tends to make 
 the sphere of desire and belief coincident. 
 
 S. 10. Desire and belief systematically coordinated through the activity of 
 the will. 
 
 S. II. Psychological nature of the collective will. 
 
 S. 12. Collective deliberation a possibility, though less controlled than that 
 of the individual mind. The state expresses a collective will. Bryce quoted on 
 the work of the state. 
 
 \ 
 
11 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 S. 13. Psychological nature of the ends of the state. Voluntary control in 
 private associations. 
 
 S. 14. The concept of social personality. The social disposition. 
 
 S. 15. Habit in collective volition. The development of the individual will 
 a process of infoldment of the social will. 
 
 S. 16. Conditions under which ephemeral beliefs arise. 
 
 Chapter III — The Systematization of Belief. 
 
 S. I. Primitive beliefs grow by association. 
 
 S. 2a. Mental systems are in part implicit in the social mind. Conditions 
 for the unfoldment of the social mind. 
 
 S. 2b. Beliefs are organized into a few fundamental systems, which are 
 united in the self. 
 
 S. 3. Two types of mental systems: associative and apperceptive, both fig- 
 uring in the historical development of thought. 
 
 S. 4. Nature of apperceptive systems. Relation of apperception to inven- 
 tion and imitation. Illustration from the history of the theory of natural selection. 
 
 S. 5. The spread of ideas through the social medium. 
 
 S. 6. Recency. 
 
 S. 7. Intensity and vividness. 
 
 S. 8. Joint Activity. 
 
 S. 9. Repetition, condition the vigor of mental systems. 
 
 S. 10. Interrelation. 
 
 S. II. Two classes of cognitive systems, conceptual and perceptual. Theii 
 interaction in the development of knowledge. 
 
 S. 12. Systems of social concepts. All conceptual systems modified by sub- 
 stitution and combination. 
 
 S. 13. Concepts may at times be formulated with more logical precision 
 than the existing state of facts warrants. 
 
 S. 14. Resistance to the spread of ideas. Mental conflict in the social and 
 individual mind. Conflict settled by discussion or force. 
 
 S. 15. Conditions of mental systems that cause conflict. 
 
 S. 16. Solution of conflict by force. 
 
 S. 17a. Conflict in the social mind marks a period of history. 
 
 S. 17b. Conflict causes social thought to return on itself. 
 
 S. 18. Sometimes a permanent division of opinion is the outcome of mental 
 strife. 
 
 S. 19. Mental conflict necessary to self-consciousness. 
 
 S. 20. Sentiments cannot be bodily transferred from one culture to another. 
 
 Chapter IV — ^The Consciousness of Moral Right. 
 
 S. I. The interaction of individual minds takes place with varying degrees 
 of intimacy in respect to the self. 
 
 S. 2. When the interaction lies within some cognitive system, consciousness 
 of self is reduced to a minimum. 
 
 S. 3. Some desires are connected with ideal universes. Moral desire is desire 
 for an ideal self, and must be united with belief in order to have any practical 
 effect on consciousness. 
 
 S. 4. The universe of the ideal self is social. The ideal self is imagined as 
 achieving its career under the special historic conditions of the social order. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. ill 
 
 S. 5. The relation of the self to others in the moral universe. Inclusive 
 social ideals possess higher moral worth. 
 
 S. 6. Moral evil considered as a condition of mental conflict. 
 
 S. 7. Various forms of the aberration of the moral will. 
 
 S. 8. Fragmentary character of the immoral life. 
 
 S. 9. Variations of the social ideal limited by heredity and use. 
 
 S. 10. The social utility of ideals. 
 
 S. iia. Nature of the social ideal. Collective ethics usually inferior in value 
 to individual. 
 
 S. lib. The higher form of collective ethics means more comprehensive 
 apperceptive control in the social mind. 
 
 S. 12. Springs of moral action kept healthy only by effort. 
 
 S. 13. The primary moral feelings attach most firmly to the ascendant per- 
 sonal universe of the individual. The will of the family group and the will of 
 the state grow out of the tribal will. 
 
 S. 14. Ceremony of adoption extends the sphere of moral obligation. 
 
 S. 15. The special morality of social groups. 
 
 S. 16. Moral values changed by historical experiences. 
 
 S. 17. Principles of morality stand in vital relation to the mental and moral 
 health of the individual and social will. 
 
 Chapter V — ^The Consciousness of Legal Right. 
 
 ^S. I. The social will lacks the unity of the individual will, but is motived by 
 more numerous and more comprehensive ends. It aims at ends of general 
 validity, as seen, for instance, in what it effectuates through the instrumentality 
 of the law. 
 
 ^S. 2. The social will reacts upon the individual negatively in the way of 
 restraint exercised through the medium of the law. Effect of punishment. The 
 social will also reacts in a more positive fashion through the direct encouragement 
 and assistance which it gives the individual. 
 
 S. 3. Personality of the judge in relation to the application of the law. Judi- 
 cial opinion a collaboration. 
 
 S. 4. Consciousness of the law varies in the different social groups. Most 
 completely organized about group interests. Vigorous enforcement of the law 
 strengthens the feeling of legal right. 
 
 S- 5,6,7,8. Conditions that determine the vigor of the feeling of legal right. 
 
 S. 9. Enforcement of a right by the state increases the general stability of 
 rights. 
 
 S. 10. Mental conflict an important condition in the development of the 
 consciousness of legal right. 
 
 S. II. Extent to which the individual feels the law as a constraint 
 
 S. 12. The atomistic view of political relations looks upon the state as the 
 mechanical opposite of the individual. 
 
 S. 13. Desire for freedom is preeminently a social desire. 
 
 S. 14. Social institutions define the feeling of right. Relation of custom to 
 the feeling of legal right. Habits of private life an important element in the 
 matter of public control. 
 
 S. 15. Consciousness of a common weal varies considerably in the history 
 of culture. The higher forms of civic idealism. 
 
IV TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 S. i6. Reality of a national ideal. It exists interconnected with other motives 
 of inferior moral worth in the historic process which has organized the social 
 will in the state. 
 
 S. 17. The state immanent in the reciprocal relations existing between the 
 individuals of a social order. 
 
 Chapter VI — The Social Will as Expressed in the State: the Theory 
 OF Sovereignty in its Psychological Bearings. 
 
 S. I. Social psychology in political philosophy. 
 
 S. 2. Two psychologic facts basic to an understanding of the subject — 
 the reality of the individual and the reality of the social will. 
 
 S. 3. Sovereignty in the usual sense in which the term is employed presup- 
 poses a well developed social consciousness. 
 
 S. 4. Sometimes a partial or group will becomes ascendant. Mental effects 
 of despotic authority. 
 
 S. 5. Ascendancy more organic in some instances, as in the supremacy of 
 British rule in India. 
 
 S. 6. Highest organic contact possible when the law-making power is native. 
 
 S. 7. In times of social confusion, there is no social will, and sovereignty in 
 the sense of power exercised according to standards of right exists only in a 
 limited way. 
 
 S. 8. The mode of determining the membership of the governing body is 
 only indirectly related to individual freedom. Essential requirement is that the 
 governing body should be responsive to the needs of the people. 
 
 S. 9. A close interdependence exists between political and other social insti- 
 tutions. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 
 
 BY 
 
 Edwin Andrew Hayden. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 1. In discussing the phenomena which distinguish social 
 groups from others, Mr. Spencer writes of insect communities as 
 follows : " . . . . though insects exhibit a kind of evolution much 
 higher than merely organic — though the aggregates they form 
 simulate social aggregates in sundry ways; yet they are not true 
 social aggregates. For each of them is in reality a large family. 
 It is not a union among like individuals independent of one 
 another in parentage and approximately equal in capacities; but 
 it is a union among the offspring of one mother, carried on, in 
 some cases for a single generation, and in some cases for more; 
 and from this community of parentage arises the possibility of 
 unlike classes having unlike structures and consequent unlike func- 
 tions. Instead of being allied to the specialization which arises 
 in a society, properly so-called, the specialization which arises in 
 one of these large and complicated insect families is allied to 
 that which arises between the sexes. Instead of two kinds of 
 individuals descending from the same parents, there are several 
 kinds of individuals descending from the same parents; and 
 instead of a simple cooperation between two differentiated indi- 
 viduals in the rearing of offspring, there is an involved coopera- 
 tion among sundry differentiated classes of individuals in the 
 rearing of offspring.''^ 
 
 2. Spencer has in the foregoing indicated some distinctions 
 of fundamental importance, especially in the idea that insect 
 groups are more like an expanded family than a society strictly 
 
 ^ Principles of Sociology, vol. i, pp. 5-6. 
 
EDWIN ANDREW HAY DEN, 
 
 so-called. Wundt has expressed the same idea more forcibly by 
 saying that the so-called ** animal states" are "sexual commu- 
 nities, in which the social impulse that unites the individuals, as 
 well as the common protective impulse, are modifications of 
 the reproduction impulse."^ But the fact that in most commu- 
 nities differentiation of function is based upon a thoroughgoing 
 differentiation of structure, so that individuals performing unlike 
 services are physically unlike, possesses no more than a biolog- 
 ical significance. The important thing, so far as these and 
 other animal groups are taken to be the precursors of real soci- 
 eties, is the way in which the individual comes to share in the 
 group life — ^to what extent the group life modifies his life and 
 how far the group life is plastic; that is, how far it is capable of 
 change through the organization of its own economy. Defining 
 society as an organized total of thought, feeling and volition, we 
 find only human groups to be truly social; so that we cannot 
 take mere reciprocity of services, as is likely to be done in a nar- 
 row economic view, to be the measure of social development. ^ 
 We do not count the slaves of Athens an integral part of the 
 Athenian society, but rather look upon them as the physical or 
 economic background of the small group of free citizens, among 
 whom there went on an active exchange of thought and feeling. 
 A society is animated by a common consciousness of historic 
 events, of traditions religious, political and industrial; and it is 
 chiefly in so far as economic relations modify these contents of 
 the social mind that exchange of services is a matter of impor- 
 tance to the sociologist. So long as foreign merchants at Rome 
 were mere traders with the Roman people, they did not consti- 
 tute an integral part of Roman society; but when through the 
 business relations created, and more particularly through other 
 relations arising from the marriages which they contracted with 
 Roman citizens, it became necessary for the courts of Rome to 
 deal with cases between the stranger and the citizen, and thus to 
 gradually develop a system of legal rules defining their rights, 
 there was going on a process of assimilation, changing something 
 which was in its inception merely economic, into something to 
 
 ^ Outlines of Psychology, 2d ed., p. 311. 
 ' See Tarde: Laws of Imitation , p. 64. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 3 
 
 a degree social.^ The foreigner was then beginning to share 
 something of the desires, thoughts, and feehngs of the citizen. 
 Reciprocity of thought, of feehng, of desire, of motive to action, 
 rather than reciprocity of service is the real index of social rela-i, 
 tions. 
 
 3. In respect to the mental characters displayed, communi- 
 ties may be divided into tv^o widely contrasted types, the instinc- 
 tive and the social. Insect communities are the best examples 
 of instinctive groups, while a modern state, as a highly organ- 
 ized purposive association, is the best example of the social. 
 The mentality of an individual in an instinctive group is largely 
 predetermined at birth. The individual inherits a reflex ner- 
 vous mechanism in which a perfected correlation exists between 
 certain sensory stimuli and certain movements essential to its 
 welfare. Many naturalists are inclined to regard the instinctive 
 acts of wasps, bees and ants as pure mechanical reflexes, the 
 most successful attempt to show this being probably that of 
 Bethe.2 If this view is true the only psychical attributes which 
 can be attributed to these animals are, in accordance with the 
 usual postulates of physiological psychology, a certain amount 
 of sensation and feeling due to the sensory stimulation, either 
 from external objects or from the movements themselves. Use 
 does not seem to modify to any appreciable extent the acts of 
 these individuals : so that the particular act is performed about 
 as well the first time as ever and then only in response to imme- 
 diate excitation. Whenever the excitation occurs, the response 
 follows, no matter if the present conditions under which it occurs 
 involve collateral results of a detrimental nature. It is a matter 
 of frequent occurrence that the same instinct is found in various 
 degrees of perfection among allied species; and this fact with 
 other evidence, strongly supports the view that slow mutations 
 do occur in the mental constitution of instinctive groups. This 
 change is brought about by the selection of inborn variations, 
 and not through the transmission of habits, which latter means 
 some capacity for learning on the part of the individual. Nat- 
 
 ' For a brief account of the Roman Law of the Nations, above referred to, 
 see Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, p. 570 fF. 
 ^ Pfliiger's Archiv. f. Physiol., vol. 70. 
 
EDWIN ANDREW HAYDEN. 
 
 ural selection at once reconciles the apparent contradiction of 
 individual rigidity and specific plasticity in a thoroughly satis- 
 factory manner. 
 
 4. When we pass to other animals, we do not find instincts 
 so highly speciaHzed nor so mature at birth. Habit steps in to 
 perfect the instinct; that is to say, repetition improves the inher- 
 ited coordination between stimulus and movement. In conse- 
 quence of this less perfect inborn connection, instincts are in 
 these cases both more adaptable and transitory. It is a well 
 known fact that the instincts of many wild animals are some-<^^^ 
 what modified by domestication and further, in the absence of 
 proper conditions to excite the instinctive act, the instinct may 
 die out. The gain in having instincts vague and general lies in 
 the accommodation to circumstances which is thus secured: the 
 loss lies in the lack of definiteness and precision of coordination. 
 To the extent that instinct is highly specialized, is the mental 
 life of the individual limited to processes directly connected with 
 the instinct. This limitation is especially evident in the case of 
 animals whose life shows an organization of mental processes 
 standing in immediate relation to two dominant instincts — the 
 sexual and the alimentative.^ It is doubtful, however, whether, 
 even in the case of animals which profit most by their experi- 
 ences, free ideas or representations are to any extent present; 
 and if present, they are probably aroused chiefly "on the spur 
 of the immediate practical advantage,"^ i. e., upon peripheral 
 stimulation. Such associations as animals do form seem to be 
 chiefly between sense impressions and impulses to activity. 
 Representations of various sorts are peculiarly a human posses- 
 sion. In the form of memory images of either the remote or 
 resident sensations of an act, they appear at a certain level of 
 mental development as a matter of utility to control action in 
 some cases as peripheral stimulation had done before. "With 
 the rise of language, experience became conventionalized, 
 and set rules replaced the less reliable images. These still per- 
 sist, however, (i) where arrangement and previsions do not per- 
 
 * See Wundt: Human and Animal Psychology^ sees. 23, 24, 27 and 28. 
 ^ See monograph by Thorndike on Animal Intelligence. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 5 
 
 mit linguistic statement, and (2) as phantasy images."^ Briefly, 
 the processes of the mental life of animals do not extend much 
 beyond what Wundt terms passive apperception, and at best, 
 there can be but faint glimmerings of the mental processes 
 which we know in the human mind as understanding and imagi- 
 nation. 
 
 5. In the foregoing description of the animal mind, much 
 has, by implication, been said of the human or social mind. It 
 is not a mind in which there exist reason and instinct as parallel 
 psychic processes: it is a mind in which instinct still remains as' 
 impulses or tendencies to action which are perfected by training, 
 and which are controlled by a coordinated adaptation of means 
 to ends. Rationality, in other words, consists, to a large degree, 
 in the harmonious synthesis of the perfected impulses in a uni- 
 fied life of thought, feeling and action. But purposive control, 
 exercised through a knowledge of results, exists in all degrees 
 of perfection; so that we must take the difference between the 
 social and the sub-social to be one of degree rather than of 
 quality. Instinctive communities like those of ants and bees, 
 have, in one respect, the necessary basis for the development of 
 a social consciousness, viz, a continuous group-life, which 
 some of the higher species of solitary habits, like the gorilla, do 
 not possess. It is only in human groups that we find both requi- 
 sites to a collective consciousness, viz, continuity of the group 
 life and plasticity of the individual mind. Here the individual 
 mind gets a content and organization through its contact with 
 other minds; in fact in consequence of the rudimentary state of 
 its instincts, such contact and control is necessary to the perfec- 
 tion of its powers. The function of an organized social life in 
 the development of the individual mind is to furnish a definite 
 and continuous set of impressions and to organize these into 
 fundamental mental systems. In the case of unstable groups 
 like the Fuegians, the group life is too discontinuous, too inter- 
 mittent to permit the individual's mind to come in contact with 
 impressions sufficiently definite and varied for the organization 
 of a complex mentality. The most that we can expect in cases 
 
 ^ Bcntley, The Memory Image, American Journal Psychology^ vol. xi, no. I, 
 P- 25. 
 
6 EDWIN ANDREW HAT DEN. 
 
 where individual capacities are not much ampHfied by social 
 discipline beyond what they are at birth, is an acuteness of sense 
 discrimination, — a conclusion which the facts of comparative 
 human psychology support.^ I have intentionally used the 
 phrase, "acuteness of sense discrimination," rather than the 
 words used by Burton in writing of the Bedouins, viz, a "high 
 organization of the perceptive faculties,"^ for the reason that 
 perception, in a high degree of organization, implies appercep- 
 tive activities which only a social state can make possible. A 
 developed world of sense implies something more than the mere 
 capacity to discriminate impressions : it implies further the power 
 to compare them, and thus to discern deeper unity than the mere 
 contiguity of space or time. So far as thinking goes, the uncul- 
 tivated mind is content with the reproduction of concrete indi- 
 vidual experiences, and is unconcerned with the causal relations 
 of phenomena the perception of which requires much analysis 
 and abstraction. Hence in the classification of the objects of 
 experience such a mind seizes upon the obvious and superficial 
 attributes. The scientific mind, however, by the aid of delicate 
 instruments, which have been perfected by the combined thought 
 and effort of many generations, amplifies its powers of sensible 
 discrimination infinitely beyond those of the savage, and by 
 means of the capacity of analysis and abstraction which arises 
 in the social order, coordinates the impressions of sense into an 
 orderly world of cause and effect. In other words, the social 
 life has given him an apperceptive basis for the interpretation 
 of sensations, and this basis becomes more and more the condi- 
 tion of the way in which he perceives the external world. ^ This 
 fact has well been developed by Professor Dewey* in the follow- 
 ing passage: "Every higher analytic stage influences immedi- 
 ately the lower process, rendering it more definite. It is synthet- 
 ically combined with it. Every process of reasoning expands a 
 judgment; every judgment enlarges a concept; every concept 
 adds new meaning to a percept. As we universalize, we also 
 
 * See Spencer: Principles of Sociology ^ vol. i, ch. vii. 
 
 ' Quoted by Spencer, op. cit., p. 78. 
 
 ^ See Pearson's Grammar of Science^ ch. v, sec. II. 
 
 ^ Psychology, ch. ix, Intuition. Consult the entire chapter. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 
 
 see the particular more in the light of the universal, and thus 
 make it more significant and more definite. . . . The 
 more the element of reasoning is involved, the more does the 
 percept mean, or tell us of the object. There is a complete 
 implication of every stage of self-development in every other. 
 The scale from perception to systematization looks at the devel- 
 opment as an analytic process of growing universality; the scale 
 from systematization back, looks at it as a synthetic process of 
 growing definiteness. As a matter of actual psychological fact, 
 there is no separation of ascending and descending movement, 
 but every concrete act of mind is an act both of perception and 
 reasoning, and each because of and through the other." In 
 brief, stimulation arouses in the cultivated mind apperceptive 
 processes by means of which external objects are cognized in 
 their general relations, but it arouses in the savage mind only 
 discrete existences. The necessity therefore of social life for the 
 full realization of the capacities of the mind, even in the domain 
 of sensation, is abundantly evident; and still more so when we 
 come to the higher phases of mental life and the more delicate 
 and subtle feelings and emotions. These latter arise only in 
 some social situation, involving the relation of self to others, and 
 presuppose some highly developed means of communication. 
 This we have in language. 
 
 6. The so-called language of animals can scarcely be called 
 a language, for signs discharge no further function than arous- 
 ing certain responses through a connection, largely inborn, 
 between certain sensations and certain movements. Gesture 
 language, which is so extensively employed by savages that have 
 a scanty vocabulary of articulate speech, can become a true 
 language, i. e., an expressive one, because it has in itself the 
 possibility of becoming an instrument in some degree of con- 
 ceptual thought. Gesture can express concepts of a low degree 
 of generality, i. e., "universals comprehending particular objects 
 as their subordinate elements; but they can only to a very limited 
 extent fix attention on universals having as their subordinate 
 elements other universals."* It is only in speech, however, 
 
 ^ Stout: Analytical Psychology, vol. ii, p. 226. 
 
EDWIN ANDREW HAT DEN. 
 
 either oral or written, that we find an instrument of expression 
 capable of responding to the complex needs of the civilized mind. 
 It is unnecessary here to enter into the psychology of thought 
 and language farther than to remark that words come to have 
 significance through contiguous association with the various 
 apperceptive systems of the mind. What I desire to do is to 
 specify a little more carefully how speech functions as a social 
 process. First of all, conventional language is a system of signs 
 of "extreme flexibility, ''^ to borrow Kuelpe's term. Composed 
 of a few articulate elements, it is capable of combining these into 
 an indefinite number of word complexes that can express all 
 varieties of objects, qualities and conditions. Linguistic inven- 
 tion, which at certain stages of social culture, is as much an 
 impulse or desire as other kinds of social invention, forms in 
 accordance with the general laws of the language new words 
 and phrases which are readily assimilated with the old stock. 
 In this way language soon becomes an instrument perfectly 
 subservient to the will of man. Being a temporal rather than a 
 spatial complex, it is more adequate to deal with the continuity 
 of our mental hfe than other forms of expressions, such as paint- 
 ing and sculpture. A statue may portray a single emotion or 
 situation in a manner that surpasses verbal description; but in 
 the complex relations of life, where time relations are important 
 elements, and where for practical volition it is necessary that 
 mental systems should be unfolded in their details, language is 
 alone adequate to the task. Again, language fixes permanently 
 our systems of conceptual thoughts. I do not mean by this that 
 concepts do not change with the progress of civilization, but 
 rather verbal description enables us to understand a conceptual 
 system, no matter how long since it may have been expressed. 
 We have no trouble in understanding Newton's views on the 
 nature of light, although the corpuscular theory is no longer 
 held. Provided we have had the requisite experience and have 
 competent powers of understanding, we can, by saturating our- 
 selves with his writings, organize in our own minds to a consid- 
 erable degree, the apperceptive systems acting in his, and thus 
 come to understand something of the nature of his achievements. 
 
 ^ Outlines of Psychologyy p. 14. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 
 
 
 Language thus makes possible the transmission of acquired \ 
 knowledge from one generation to the next; and in this way the j 
 cooperation of individual minds extends in point of time far ( 
 beyond the allotted span of life. 
 
 ! 7. Thus the cultured mind bears in its type or quality unmis- \ 
 takable evidence of its social origin; and it is equally true that I 
 its contents, or in other words, the ideas with which it is stocked, / 
 are but individual totals interconnected in a collective mental / 
 process. Not only does the child's hereditary equipment in the 
 way of instincts and capacities imply a social history, but the 
 discipline which transforms this heritage into a reality is social 
 to the last degree. The pedagogical romanticism which holds 
 that the human mind can be developed by the indiscriminate 
 and fortuitous play of physical forces upon the senses is a delu- 
 sion from top to bottom. The child's earliest experiences with 
 physical things is under the guidance of persons, and so habitual 
 is the association of persons with things that he at first views 
 physical objects almost entirely from the standpoint of social 
 utilities. It is a long time before he is able to make complete 
 abstraction of the personal element in the way in which it is 
 done in such objective sciences as chemistry and physics. A 
 horse for instance does not mean an object of certain anatomical 
 and physiological characteristics, but something on which he 
 can ride, which his father owns, etc. His attitude is rather that 
 of primitive man in the stage of mythologic thought. The sav- 
 age reads into nature his own thoughts and feelings, and sees in 
 natural forces personalities of various kinds. So predominant 
 in fact is the personal bias in the savage theory of things that 
 it has been given the significant title of "personalism." And 
 the general features of this mode of thought are found to be so 
 uniform among people in a certain grade of mental develop- 
 ment, even in the entire absence of historic contact, that the 
 tendency of the human mind to think in personal terms must be 
 classed as one of its fundamental traits. So the child, in recap- 
 itulating the broad features of race history, shows the same 
 tendency toward a personal view of things. The whole system 
 of education through which he passes is largely a procedure 
 clarifying the relations which the immediate social facts, viz. 
 
10 EDWIN ANDREW HAT DEN. 
 
 personal ideas, sustain to each other or to things. Aside from 
 a few theorems respecting the combination of numbers, arith- 
 metic is a quantitative exploitation of social relations in the busi- 
 ness world. Historically it is an evolution from a primitive 
 concrete social arithmetic which existed long before any theory 
 of pure number was thought of. Geography, too, is a social 
 discipline, being in fact the study of the earth as modified by 
 human action. And of course history in the political sense of 
 the term is preeminently a study of social relations and activi- 
 ties. The personal element, however much crowded into the 
 marginal regions of consciousness, remains an inseparable part 
 of the totality of conditions which make possible a study of 
 natural forces. In fact, the psychologist whose province of 
 study is the human personality in all phases of its manifestation, 
 is not dealing with an experience different as a manifold from 
 that which the physicist studies. The difference lies in the 
 point of view. The physicist makes abstraction of the personal 
 variation or event, or better treats it as a constant factor, by 
 giving the limits of error to his results, whereas the law of per- 
 sonal variation is precisely the thing of interest to the psychol- 
 ogist. 
 
 8. In the period of mythologic thought, the consciousness of 
 the individual self is beginning to emerge, as is evident in the 
 fact that primitive man projects his own thoughts and feelings 
 into the process of nature. Although he is for the most part 
 unaware of the fact of projection, yet the image of self, thus 
 reflected in nature, serves with tribal experience, as a nucleus 
 around which the feeling of self clusters. There is now felt a 
 kinship for nature which is wanting in the latter stages of scien- 
 tific thought. As soon as scientific investigation begins to dis- 
 cover regularity in the flow of natural events, the personalities 
 of nature are metamorphosed into natural processes, entirely 
 unconscious in themselves, and totally objective to the human 
 mind — processes which may thus become a matter of universal 
 apperception. But even then the personal feeling for nature 
 still remains in the religious and poetic consciousness, which 
 feels in the unity of nature the presence of an immanent reason. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE SOCIAL PERSONALITY. 
 
 A. Desire. 
 
 Tarde has analyzed the mental Hfe of society into two funda- 
 mental processes, desire and belief.^ I have accepted this analy- 
 sis as probably the most rational one in the present state of the 
 analytical psychology of the social mind. 
 
 I. Reaction, or movement in response to external stimula- 
 tion, is shown by all systems of energy. With some the stimu- 
 lation, although very slight, results in the immediate disintegra- 
 tion of the system; with others the stimulation produces a 
 temporary change in the configuration of the system, after which 
 the system regains its former condition. In the words of mechan- 
 ics, the first are said to be unstable, the second, stable systems 
 of energy. Living aggregates are the most complex specimens 
 of the second kind. We see both plants and animals going 
 through a coordinated series of activities which from the out- 
 side, seem to be under the guidance of some purpose or end. 
 Examined more closely, however, most of these activities are 
 found to lack the one essential feature of purposive control, 
 which is this : responding to new situations by an activity that 
 is due to an internal development and organization of impres- 
 sions. If an adaptation has been developed to an external ele- 
 ment A, which uniformly in the history of the species has been 
 associated with B and C, both harmless to the organism; and if 
 A is now connected in a concrete total consisting of D and E, 
 both harmful to the organism, but for which no inhibitive adjust- 
 ment exists, then the reaction to A will occur with the same 
 certainty as before, with perhaps death as a consequence, owing 
 to the harmful results coming from D and E. A survey of all 
 the facts relating to activity of this sort precludes the supposition 
 
 ^ The Laws of Imitation, New York: Henry Holt and Company, p. 145. 
 
12 EDWIN ANDREW HAT DEN. 
 
 that it has anything in it analogous to what we know in ourselves 
 as purposive or voluntary control. We describe behavior of 
 this sort in a negative way by saying that it is unleari\ed or 
 native; or, in other words, that it is the immediate expression 
 of the inherited constitution. It is the most widespread and 
 basic form of behavior in the animal kingdom. But in the 
 higher vertebrates, as has been already noted, these instinctive, 
 or native connections, are changed in the course of the individu- 
 ual's life, such modification being especially pronounced in the 
 case of man, with whom instinctive actions produce experiences 
 which, organized into memories, result in forming an idea of 
 the end or object toward which the striving is directed. 
 
 2. An impeded activity manifests itself in consciousness as 
 a longing or craving — a feeling of unrest, which, when processes 
 of attention and knowledge are developed, sets going a series of 
 mental changes that terminate in removing the feeling from 
 consciousness. These feelings are parts of an interconnected 
 process of ideational and affective elements which form a total with 
 clearly distinguished features. Such interconnection changes 
 the vague feeling into a definite one, conscious of the means of 
 satisfaction, that is, into a desire. The attachment of the feel- 
 ing to a specific ideational content marks the rise of voluntary 
 control. In the course of time a definite means of attaining the 
 object which satisfies a desire is selected. With this selection 
 comes the repetition of a definite set of experiences to which the 
 feeling adheres. The desire stretches over all the component 
 parts of the process of realization, and thus includes a represen- 
 tation of the means as well as of the end. In fact the means as 
 something existing apart from the end is an abstraction. In so 
 far as any part of the process of realization is unforeseen the 
 desire is vague and ill-defined. Conversely, to the extent that 
 any part of the process of realization becomes better defined is 
 the desire less impulsive. As the organization of experience 
 goes on a desire whose satisfaction involves the willing of a 
 complex act is likely to split up into a number of reciprocally 
 limiting and hence more specific desires, forming a system in 
 which there exist various degrees of subordination and ascend- 
 ency. Anything that arrests the process of realization at any 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 1 3 
 
 particular point, emphasizes that part and tends to disengage 
 it from the total activity, and raise it to the status of an inde- 
 pendent voHtion. The detachment of a partial volition is also 
 facilitated by its functioning as a component of several volitional 
 processes. Again the particular experiences connected with a 
 partial volition may be a source of satisfaction in themselves, 
 independent of their connection in a more comprehensive proc- 
 ess. The ideal representation of this satisfaction is equivalent 
 to the formation of a new desire. The ascendency which a 
 desire may attain is limited in two ways: ist, by the relation of 
 the desire to the self, as being a member of the individual's 
 entire system of desires; and 2d, by the fact that the volitional 
 process through which a desire is realized, tends to become 
 automatic. Perfect coincidence between the appearance of a 
 want and its means of satisfaction would to a large extent do 
 away with that ideal representation which is the very essence 
 of desire. The only thing that will keep a periodic desire, 
 receiving full satisfaction from passing to the marginal regions 
 of attention, is some change of the circumstances in which it 
 recurs. Such change means a modification of the desire, so 
 that complete satisfaction is no longer obtained. The desire is 
 then again able to command the attention, and lead to the devis- 
 ing of new means of satisfaction. 
 
 3. Purely practical desires are far from constituting the 
 entire system of desires even in the case of primitive man. Spe- 
 cific desires of a non-utilitarian character soon appear in con- 
 nection with mythological systems. As soon as the mental 
 progress of a people has reached a point where wants are to 
 some extent anticipated, the mental life begins to expand beyond 
 the immediate present, and the imagination on the basis of 
 certain social experiences constructs an ideal world, where 
 desires quite remote from economic wants receive satisfaction. 
 In mythological systems, as is well known, we have a blending 
 of science, religion and philosophy, not only as regards the con- 
 cepts, but also the desires and beliefs peculiar to each. Out of 
 this complex the more intellectual desires of science and philos- 
 ophy detach themselves and culminate in the pure love of knowl- 
 edge for its own sake, while the other desires less directly con- 
 
14 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 nected to the order of sensible experience, become interconnected 
 in a separate system of moral and religious desire. 
 
 4. Knowledge, however, remains for a long time subordinated 
 to practical ends, that is, it remains imbedded in volitional 
 processes that aim to effect some change in the world of things. 
 The development of perception and images of memory is the 
 psychic side of a process which has for its other side the defini- 
 tion of motor activity. The attainment of an object of desire, 
 as already pointed out, necessitates the ideal representation of a 
 series of partial acts, and the more detailed such construction 
 the more perfect the satisfaction of the desire. Thus the selec- 
 tion of the best means of attaining a given end involves an in- 
 creasing amount of intellectual activity as experience expands. 
 Hence it happens that the apperceptive activities of relating and 
 comparing, of analyzing the mental aggregates formed by asso- 
 ciation out of the cognitive elements of motor experiences, may 
 arise in the course of practical activities. But deliberation on 
 the choice of means postpones the satisfaction by the amount of 
 time which it occupies, and thus conflicts in one way with the 
 realization of desire. The checking of a motor tendency weak- 
 ens it so that deliberation may be protracted to a point where 
 it defeats its own purpose. This antagonism between thinking 
 and doing is a matter of common observation. The practical 
 man seldom takes interest in theoretical questions, rarely engag- 
 es in mental activities that have no aim beyond affecting some 
 change in the world of ideas. It is by means of the social hered- 
 ity that a reconciliation of this conflict is secured. Individual 
 wills enter into a more comprehensive psychic process, the social 
 will, by which interconnection society is enabled to attain it sends 
 by a mental division of labor. In this way activities may be 
 going on simultaneously in the social mind that would be some- 
 what incompatible in the individual mind. Mental activity of 
 a theoretical sort is limited to one social group, and practical 
 endeavor to another. The final expression of some epoch-mak- 
 ing conception is invariably the work of some thinkers of trans- 
 cendent genius. Once the idea becomes articulate it spreads 
 through the social medium, and after its incorporation into the 
 fabric of social thought, it becomes a source of common desire. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 1 5 
 
 5. While we can speak with truth of the interaction of indi- 
 vidual wills in a higher or collective will, we should not forget 
 that the individual will is part of a concrete personality, and that 
 these personalities interact more or less in their entirety. Out 
 of this interaction arise the personal ideas and feelings which in 
 the period of primitive culture enter into the apperception of 
 the external world. Personal ideas and feelings are gradually 
 detached from the objective ideas and their related feelings, 
 because of the difference in the relation in which the two sets 
 stand to the will. This detachment does not extinguish the 
 system of personal ideas and feelings, for they continue to exist 
 in a world of their own, the world of social relations. The 
 separation between these worlds, however, is never complete, 
 for as a matter of history the two have ever interacted. Though 
 the universe of personal ideas and feelings ceases, in the course 
 of time, to influence immediate sensible experience, yet in the 
 larger and broader aspects of life, where religious faith finds 
 play, it ever remains of sovereign importance. When sensible 
 experience comes to check or suppress the fundamental impulses 
 of man, the will transforms the elements of social experience 
 into "an existence that fully corresponds to the wishes and 
 requirements of the human mind,"* forming the universe of 
 moral and religious belief. 
 
 6. The specific content which desire assumes, is a matter of 
 national history. Says Tarde: "Every organic want is experi- 
 enced in the characteristic form which has been sanctioned by 
 surrounding example. The social environment, in defining and 
 actualizing this form has, in truth, appropriated it. Even desires 
 for nutrition and reproduction have been transformed, so to 
 speak, into national products. Sexual desire is changed into a 
 desire to be married according to the diff^erent religious rites of 
 different localities. Desire for food is expressed in one place as a 
 desire for a certain kind of bread or meat; in another, for a cer- 
 tain kind of grain or vegetable."^ Desires are thus refined by 
 the social experience coming from the volitions which they them- 
 selves create. It may be said with Tarde that the means of 
 
 ^ Wundt, EthicSy vol. i, p. 59. 
 ^ Laws of Imitation^ p. 44. 
 
1 6 EDWIN ANDREW HAYDEN. 
 
 satisfaction in a measure create the desire, for in defining and 
 particularizing it, they Hmit the lines along which volition moves 
 in its effort to satisfy the desire. This statement seems to be 
 contradicted by the fact that the means do not aWays lie in the 
 order of sensible experience. But in answer to this, it should 
 be noted, that desires attaching to a universe which the indi- 
 vidual regards as imaginary, are, as a rule, rather evanescent, 
 arising in connection with complex modes in the cognitive syn- 
 thesis of social experience, and further that imaginary creations 
 bear a close resemblance to the objects of sensible experience 
 so far as conditions of space, time and the general qualities of 
 human nature are concerned. Persistent desires, however, fail 
 to receive full satisfaction in the imaginary creation of the indi- 
 vidual, for there remains beneath all an abiding sense of the 
 unreality from which there is no escape, except in those cases 
 where the imaginary creation has been produced by the trans- 
 formation of historical experience and has thus acquired the 
 status of a belief. 
 
 B. Belief. 
 
 7. Another mode of consciousness in which the ideational 
 and affective compounds of experience are connected, is belief. 
 The representation of the satisfaction of desire involves a series 
 of specific affirmations which are not detached judgments but 
 interdependent parts of a total process connecting means and 
 end. Such interconnection is belief. Belief involves knowledge, 
 but is not identical with it, for we have perfectly clear and dis- 
 tinct ideas about many things that we disbelieve, as on the other 
 hand we believe some things of which our conceptions are by 
 no means the clearest. The multitudinous creations of fancy 
 recorded in the literature of the world, are things that do not 
 arouse in us the sense or feeling of reality. A cognition in order 
 to become a belief, must have some "fringe of consciousness'' 
 added to it. It must be able to evoke in the mind an emotional 
 color in addition to the feelings of meaning and relationship 
 which, though evanescent, form the staple of the cognitive 
 consciousness. Belief stands in intimate relation to the self on 
 the affective side, and to the objective world on the cognitive 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 1 7 
 
 side. Things which are a matter of common consent, being 
 acted upon from day to day as habit, are usually not regarded 
 in the light of behef, because the feeling of assurance, or the 
 "emotion of conviction,'' as it has been called by Bagehot, is 
 absent.^ When, however, some obstruction to our practical or 
 theoretical endeavor arises, leading to the postponement of 
 gratification, the mind is confronted with a situation in response 
 to which the feeling of the reality or unreality of some particular 
 thing emerges. Deep conviction is associated with strong feel- 
 ings. When such conviction is challenged the whole self recoils : 
 " Men in these intense states of mind have altered all history," 
 writes Bagehot, "changed for better or worse the creeds of 
 myriads, and desolated or redeemed provinces and ages. Nor 
 is this intensity a sign of truth, for it is precisely strongest in 
 those points in which men differ most from each other. John 
 Knox felt it in his anti-Catholicism; Ignatius Loyola in his anti- 
 Protestantism; and both, I suppose, felt it as much as it was 
 possible to feel it."^ Both Knox and Loyola were one with the 
 cause for which they stood; the emotion of conviction assumed 
 a fanatical ascendency because of the intense self-feeling involved, 
 the belief in both cases commanding the whole resources of the 
 will. The rationality of a belief as measured by the criteria 
 of reality set up by science, is in general a matter of subordinate 
 importance, as the social function of belief is to organize the 
 fundamental desires of humanity, and to do this a belief must 
 possess strong affective elements. Religious and moral, and in 
 some instances political beliefs, possess these characteristics. 
 8. It may be said in a general way that the world of sensible 
 experience is taken commonly to be the ultimate universe of 
 reality. This attitude of strong conviction toward the reality 
 of the external world, arises, as Stout has clearly shown,^ from 
 the Hmitations which are imposed from without upon the 
 activity of the will. We find ourselves unable to manipulate 
 the objects of perception just to suit our fancy; in the effort to 
 do so the feeling of their reality clearly emerges. So too, when 
 
 ^ Literary Studies y The Emotion of Conviction. 
 ' Analytical Psychology^ vol. ii, pp. 239-243. 
 
1 8 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 we run across some stubborn fact of experience which blocks 
 all our processes of thought and refuses to be explained away, 
 we become painfully aware of the frailty of our ideal creations. 
 Thus thought combinations in proportion to the facility with 
 which they can voluntarily be altered lose the moments of 
 reality. It is especially for this reason that the mind is usually 
 alive to the unreality of the images of the imagination. In other 
 cases where the alteration has occurred independent of the will 
 as a matter of mere association or assimilation the mind is likely 
 to accept the modifications as real. The illusions due to preper- 
 ception are examples of this sort. Frequent repetition of a 
 thing makes us strongly disposed to believe in its reality: the 
 more often a psychic process is recollected, the less is the effort 
 necessary to restore it, so that while it is becoming more firmly 
 fixed in the memory, the mental experiences connected with 
 its invention are being forgotten. The fictitious idea, when 
 thus freed from all such associations, may find lodgment among 
 the true memories, and thus seem to the individual to refer to 
 some part of his past life. Association has brought the idea 
 within the circle of remembered sensible experience. The rate 
 at which the transformation of the contents of memory goes on 
 has much to do with the extent to which the feeling of unreality 
 is aroused by a fictitious idea. Frequently the memories of 
 history become changed in the course of centuries into unreali- 
 ties rivalling the boldest creations of fiction; yet so gradual has 
 been the change, that the mutations have escaped detection. 
 Such alteration of the memories of history frequently serves the 
 high purpose of allowing greater scope to the sway of social 
 ideals. In the period of mythologic thought sensible experience 
 does not conflict with monstrous beliefs in ghosts, demons, and 
 other supernatural agents, for the reason that nature then mir- 
 rors the capricious impulses of the savage, but as soon as per- 
 ceptions are brought under some concept of order, these beliefs 
 or those into which they are changed, are likely to be held valid, 
 not of the present order of things, but of some past or future 
 state of existence. If, however, such beliefs still remain potent 
 in their influence on human conduct, it is through the fact that 
 they still retain a stable connection with some system of sensible 
 experience. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 1 9 
 
 9. The native attitude of the mind toward its thought com- 
 binations is one of behef, an attitude which is checked through 
 painful experience. A successful issue, whether a matter of 
 accident or not, confirms the belief, and a few successful trials, 
 when disproof is difficult, are sufficient to firmly implant the 
 belief in the mind of the race. Something of this pristine faith 
 is necessary to the mental health of a people. Though many 
 of the cosmological beliefs of primitive man have disappeared 
 with the rise of science, yet no void has been left, for the reason 
 that science has brought to light innumerable uniformities in 
 natural phenomena. In fact, science has increased the sum 
 of faith in the objective order, and at the same time has expanded 
 the sphere of religious feeling. It is only when the impersonal 
 attitude of science is assumed toward all the departments of life 
 that human faith, which finds its most adequate expression in 
 religious faith, is on the way to extinction. The skepticism 
 which is present in a decadent civilization, is the result not so 
 much of its science and philosophy, as the moral disorder of the 
 social life, which makes the individual mind the theater of dis- 
 cordant and distracting impulses. Individual or social faith is 
 but an expression of life, after all. An harmonious, expansive 
 life has an abounding faith in the essential truth and goodness 
 of the world, while a life tormented by conflicting passions 
 accepts the same order with misgiving and doubt. ^ But at the 
 same time faith reacts upon life to expand or contract it. A 
 people outgrows some of its beliefs, just as an individual does. 
 Many beliefs which at one time in the history of a culture were 
 real organizing forces, come later to be obstacles to progress. The 
 belief in the divine right of kings, by the halo with which it 
 surrounded the regal head and the obedience it inspired, was a 
 powerful cementing political force in the more unenlightened 
 periods of social development, but the conception was certainly 
 obstructive in French history at the time of Louis XIV, when 
 impulses of democracy were beginning to express themselves 
 that were later lashed into the fury of the Revolution by the 
 stubborn resistance which they encountered. So monasticism, 
 though it did noble service in bringing hope and consolation to 
 
 ^ See Paulsen: A System of EthicSy p. 421 fF; also James: Varieties of Religious 
 Experience, p. 41. 
 
20 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 minds distracted by the confusion and disorder following the 
 fall of Rome, was too narrow for the new life of the Renaissance. 
 In a similar way the political and economic conceptions had to 
 expand in order to compass the new social vitality in European 
 life produced by the discovery of the possibilities of the New 
 World. 
 
 The tendency of social development is to make the sphere of 
 desire and belief coincident. Every desire which remains unsat- 
 isfied, that is, detached from the affirmation of the means of 
 satisfaction, soon dies, as, on the other hand, no belief acquires 
 a permanent social ascendancy, which is not intimately con- 
 nected with the needs of humanity. 
 
 C. Desire and Belief in Relation to the Will. 
 
 10. Desire and belief are brought into systematic coordina- 
 tion through the activity of the will. Many desires and the 
 corresponding beliefs are different phases of the same total 
 psychic process in which impulsive acts become purposive 
 through the effects of memory. Other desires and beliefs are 
 independent of each other in origin except in so far as they have 
 a general connection in the same will or personality, and are 
 brought into coordination through apperception. It is in the 
 activity of the will that consciousness alters its contents in a 
 definite direction. Out of the ideational and affective experi- 
 ence connected with such control arises the notion and feeling 
 of self. As a result, desire and belief, through their intercon- 
 nection in volitional processes, stand in intimate relation to the 
 self. The universe of desire represents "recognition in feeling 
 of the distinction between the actual and the unreaHzed self,"^ 
 while the universe of belief stands for the habitual attitude of the 
 self in affirming or denying the possibiHty of realizing desires. 
 The unification of desire and belief through the activity of the 
 theoretical or practical will, is eminently a social process. Those 
 phases of experience which are not directly modified by the will 
 form a total which the mind regards as independent of itself : while 
 
 ^ Dewey: Psychology, p. 364. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 21 
 
 the Other phases subject to volitional control, form the contrasting 
 total of the self. Now in the early history of civilization, the separ- 
 ation of self and object is imperfect both in thought and feeling: 
 the increased cooperation of individual wills which comes with 
 social experience widens the sphere of sensible experience on the 
 one hand and on the other the sphere of internal experience con- 
 nected with self-activity. The final result is th at complete detach- 
 ment in thought and feeling of the self from the manifold of 
 perceptual experience, which is seen in its best estate in the 
 scientific consciousness. Out of the internal experience develops 
 not an isolated personality, but a consciousness of a plurality of 
 like selves, sharing a common life of thought, feeling and action. 
 II. The external expression of the social will is the activity 
 of social life. Individual wills are linked in associations of vari- 
 ous degrees of complexity, each association having interests, 
 desires and beliefs, in a word, a life peculiar to itself. Within 
 each group of individual wills are to be found common motives 
 to volition, with the result that group ends are achieved in a 
 more or less rational way. Individual wills are not, however, 
 of equal importance in the organization of motives. Within 
 certain limits the statement is true that the greater the number 
 of individual wills interacting the less deliberative, the less 
 rational, the resulting action. The final expression of a great 
 conception is as a rule the work of a few minds; the organization 
 of this into a social impulse is partly the work of suggestion and 
 partly of choice. Some writers, like Le Bon, seem to imply that 
 a collective mind really exists only at the moment when a group 
 of individual minds are simultaneously affecting each other as 
 in a crowd. We do not restrict the individual will to the complex 
 of ideas and feelings that happen to be above the threshold of 
 attention at a particular instant: and in an analogous way, there 
 seems to be no good reason for restricting the social will to the 
 sum of ideas and feelings appearing simultaneously in a group 
 of interacting minds. 
 
 12. While impassioned discussion upsets for the time being 
 all rational deliberation, nevertheless more temperate discussion 
 enables the individual to get glimpses of new and important 
 aspects of a subject which will assist him in the calm of his 
 
22 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 .'private moments to reach a more satisfactory solution of the 
 problem. While social deliberation does not attain the degree 
 of rationality and control which the processes of thought in a 
 highly endowed individual mind possess, yet it is far from 
 receiving justice at the hands of the theory of suggestion.^ The 
 most transcendent genius is connected through a graduated 
 series of capacities to the average mediocrity, so that the organi- 
 zation of public opinion is by no means a process consisting 
 first of all in the invention of an idea by one supreme mind, and 
 the subsequent incorporation of this idea in other minds by mere 
 association. Frequently the acceptance of an idea appears to 
 be automatic, when in reality the acceptance of the idea marks 
 the completion of a mental process whose development involved 
 complex apperceptive activities. Still it remains true that col- 
 lective thinking is in general less controlled than individual 
 thinking. An idea which has been perfected in one mind can- 
 not be communicated in its final form to another mind; the 
 second mind must repeat to some extent the process of develop- 
 ment which the idea underwent in the first mind, and in so 
 doing gives some play to association to bring in irrelevant ideas. 
 Today natural selection is a datum in reasoning on biological 
 matters; yet a quarter of a century nearly passed before the 
 idea became appercipient in the collective mind of biologists. 
 So far as the net gain in positive knowledge is concerned, much 
 of the thinking and feeling of that period was sheer waste of 
 mental energy. The collective thinking of society would be far 
 less efficient than that of a single mind, were it not that a multi- 
 pHcity of cooperating minds permits a division of mental labor. 
 This division extends to all phases of the collective mental life. 
 Society has as its disposal a vast fund of knowledge which it 
 turns to account through various associations, each of which has 
 more or less clearly defined aims and within the limits of these 
 aims a will of its own. That is to say, the various associations 
 have a range of motives outside of which choice cannot be made 
 without its prescribed character being violated. But with one 
 exception, the state, the range of motives is far from being 
 
 ^ See Baldwin: Social and Ethical Interpretations, ch. vi, Sec. 5. Also Gid- 
 dings: Principles of Sociology, ed. of 1896. 150 fF. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 23 
 
 exhaustive. The social will expressed in the state is free in the 
 sense that the only limit to the range of motives v^hich actuate 
 it is its own psychic constitution, and in the further sense that 
 it is capable of making a rational choice of motives. That the 
 social will exerts a directive force is unmistakable. The state 
 has made notable achievement in the domain of education, 
 industry and politics : and the part which it is destined to play 
 in the future gives fair promise of being greater than in the past. 
 Mr. James Bryce puts the matter fairly when he says : 
 
 " Modern civilization, in becoming more complex and refined, 
 has become more exacting. It discerns more benefits which 
 the organized power o/ government can secure, and grows more 
 anxious to attain them. Men live fast, and are impatient of the 
 slow working of natural laws. The triumphs of physical sci- 
 ence have enlarged their desires for comfort, and have shown 
 them how many things may be accomplished by the application 
 of collective skill and large funds which are beyond the reach 
 of individual effort."^ 
 
 13. The ends of the state are thus more comprehensive than 
 those of any other association; while the autonomy of its will 
 and the indefinite range of its motives give it a unique psychic 
 character. The state reflects upon its past and plans for remote 
 future ends. It has one supreme end, the welfare of society, 
 which it strives to attain through a series of particular volitions, 
 in which it evaluates, to some degree, its motives according to 
 the mode in which they modify its character. The voluntary 
 control exercised by associations within the state is chiefly pru- 
 dential; the choice of motives being largely made from the 
 standpoint of interest or advantage. These associations seldom 
 scrutinize their motives from a moral point of view; such 
 evaluation as they do make, is limited to those negative cases 
 in which some question arises as to the prescribed (legal) limits 
 of their authority. The individual will may be subordinated^' 
 to a number of partial or group-wills; but as a rule there is one 
 particular group-will in which this subordination is completest^ 
 This corresponds to the dominant universe of the individual 
 
 * American Commonwealth ^ 3d ed., vol. ii, p. 539. 
 
EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 mind. But to each social group to which the individual sus- 
 tains organic relations there is a related universe of desire and 
 belief, forming a small social world within itself. When the 
 individual will comes into relation with the total will of society, 
 the point of contact is in some one of these particular universes; 
 or, in other words, the contact is not between individuals as 
 members of society in its entirety, but between individuals as 
 members of the same or different particular groups. At the 
 same time the desires and volitions of the various social groups 
 are subordinated to a still higher psychic unity, the personality 
 of society. 
 
 14. That the concept of a social personality stands for a 
 reality is evident from a variety of considerations. If we take 
 an historic survey of the mental life of a people, we invariably 
 find in the existing fabric of its civilization elements coming 
 from a remote past. Its religious, moral and political beliefs 
 have resulted from the combined thought, feeling and action of 
 many generations. Thus a civilization is a psychic synthesis of 
 the past experiences of a society. While the civilizations of the 
 earth have many broad traits in common, yet each has a content 
 and organization peculiar to itself, forming a genius or tempera- 
 ment that binds into a delicate unity the most diverse products 
 of its activity. These differences of national genius are not 
 things of a day merely, but characterize a nation throughout its 
 growth and decay. The social mind has a character or dispo- 
 sition as truly as the individual mind, founded upon certain 
 fundamental desires and beliefs and correlative modes of action. 
 They are the elements which give stability to the psychic life 
 of society. They are of course rooted in the habits of the indi- 
 vidual personality. A certain way of thinking and acting spreads 
 through a community; repeated again and again, it becomes 
 a mechanized process whose unfoldment is more or less indepen- 
 dent of attention. The mechanization of the original attentive 
 process has been effected through social discipline, and for this 
 reason there is an interconnection of individual dispositions in 
 a wider mechanism which we may fitly term the social disposi- 
 tion. But these mechanized processes possess something higher 
 than a merely vital or biological significance, even in the stage 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 25 
 
 of complete formation, because as Stout remarks, they "may 
 enter as component parts into a total process which as a whole 
 is very far from being automatic. The inverse of this is seen in 
 habits of thinking and willing. Here a comprehensive habitual 
 tendency realizes itself on special occasions by means of special 
 processes which are not habitual."^ Hence it is that social habit 
 is never a closed automatic series functioning independently of 
 the will, and that custom, the external expression of the social 
 disposition, never sinks to the level of instinctive control. 
 
 15. The extent to which habitual tendencies enter into the 
 volitional acts of a community varies with the stage of civiliza- 
 tion. The despotism of custom in the period of primitive cul- 
 ture is a notorious fact. Habit then forms the chief ingredient 
 of motives, while at the same time the range of individual 
 variation in habit is narrow. Contiguous adhesion plays an 
 important part in the unfoldment of volitional processes. In 
 this stage of mental development the individual will does not 
 organize experiences into complex apperceptive systems, and 
 thus return to modify the social will in a serious way. With the 
 growth of civilization, the range of variation in habit is increased; 
 habits are multiplied, but at the same time, as already noted, 
 they function in processes having a degree of conscious control. 
 The development of the social will involves at the same time 
 the differentiation of the individual will; so that in a state of 
 advanced culture, the individual will functions in some ways 
 as a tendency more or less complete in itself. Here the indi- 
 vidual will has certain ends and purposes which are purely 
 personal, as in particular interests relating to private property. 
 As a complex social environment requires the readaptation of 
 volitional processes to new circumstances, some component 
 parts whose unfoldment was previously more or less automatic, 
 now demand attention, and in consequence become to some 
 extent independent volitions, so that in this way a continuous 
 enlargement as well as particularization of the universe of 
 motives goes on. The individualization is not to be conceived, 
 however, as the segregation of some particular will from the 
 whole social will, but as the infoldment of the social will, out 
 
 ^ Analytical Psychology, vol. i, p. 262. 
 
26 EDWIN ANDREW HAT DEN, 
 
 of which arises a number of reciprocally limiting and partial 
 wills, externally manifest in the corresponding lives of the social 
 groups concerned. The extent to which the infoldment modifies 
 preexisting social habits varies with the different social groups 
 and with the habits themselves. Some groups retain more than 
 others the character of the primordial society, while some habits 
 are but slightly modified in any of the social groups. The 
 latter are the basis of the national culture, forming the stable 
 elements of the social personality which enable it to withstand 
 the profound shocks of political revolutions. 
 
 1 6. When the growth of civilization has reached a stage in 
 I which the individual will is enabled to organize social experi- 
 ences in a manner peculiar to itself, volitions may then speedily 
 mature in a single mind and spread to the other minds of the 
 community. Such volitions are in relation to the entire history 
 of a culture somewhat ephemeral. They are produced by a 
 mental activity which, to a considerable extent, operates inde- 
 pendently ofthe apperceptive control exercised bythe permanent 
 beliefs of the race. They gain a temporary ascendency owing 
 to the action of highly special and accidental causes; but they 
 do not persist for any length of time, not because they lack 
 cohesion of parts, but because springing up at various parts of 
 the social medium, they act as mutually inhibiting motives in 
 the social mind. A general condition which favors the appear- 
 ance of these transitory beliefs is a skepticism resulting from 
 the weakening of old beliefs. In a period of social anarchy, the 
 times are rife, owing to the excited condition ofthe public mind, 
 with a multitude of beliefs, "which appear first here and then 
 there, only to disappear, until the advent of some clear formula 
 or some suitable mechanism which throws all the others into the 
 background and which serves thenceforward as the fixed basis 
 for future improvements and developments."^ We have here 
 an instance of the general law of apperception that when for 
 any reason the systematic control exercised by any mental sys- 
 tem is temporarily suspended, the forces of association may 
 come into play to fill the mind with a multitude of disconnected 
 ideas until some new system supervenes. These unstable beliefs 
 
 *Tarde: op. cit.y p. 14F. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 27 
 
 function as more or less independent units. If they have strong 
 affective components, they act with great vigor and energy, 
 and thus set going external events that destroy the condition of 
 their existence. They are thus Hkely to pass into action at once 
 though a long course of action is out of the question. We have 
 a record of their work in the violent, turbulent periods of history. 
 But extreme mobility of opinion is possible only as the terminal 
 phase in the mental evolution of a people, in which the founda- 
 tions for a civilization and a national culture have been laid 
 in the ground-work of a few fixed beliefs. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF BELIEF. 
 
 I. In the early history of the social mind the apperceptive 
 control is relatively simple, association or contiguous adhesion 
 being the chief form of the interconnection of psychic processes. 
 The lax interdependence of associative systems makes it possible 
 for somewhat contradictory beliefs to be held. The absence of 
 unifying principles of experience permits an indefinite extension 
 of associative systems through mere accretion; so that v^e find 
 in the history of the human mind a period whose most salient 
 feature is the accumulation rather than the systematization of 
 belief. There is, however, an evident limit to the extension of 
 belief, notwithstanding a freedom from apperceptive restraint, 
 viz., the uninventiveness of the primitive mind. There is too 
 much solidarity of the individual and social will in the early 
 stages of civilization for the former to elaborate social experi- 
 ences in a fashion peculiar to itself; but the very conditions 
 which free the individual will at the same time extend the sphere 
 of apperceptive control. The creations of the developed indi- 
 vidual will are notably more numerous and at the same time 
 more coherent than those of the primitive will. Early inventions 
 are largely modifications of memory contents; later inventions 
 are a combination of the elements of experience under the 
 motive of a purpose or end. The latter involve a more detailed 
 analysis of experience and a more comprehensive and systematic 
 synthesis of its elements. 
 
 2. (a) The mental systems into which historic experiences 
 are organized, are never in the social consciousness in their 
 fullness at one time. A system is able to exert an influence on 
 the stream of consciousness without the necessity of its parts 
 being explicit, i. e., it may act as a total tendency from the fact 
 that there is a common trend in all its parts. Much of the social 
 control existing before the collective mind has reached a high 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 29 
 
 degree of self-consciousness, is in mental systems, the funda- 
 mental unities of which in the ordinary run of things remain 
 largely implicit. But when new conditions confront society, 
 the likelihood exists that the various parts of a mental system 
 are not excited with equal force owing to the unusual modes of 
 stimulation, and as a result some, perhaps all, of the parts become 
 explicit. Times of profound political 'disturbances are preemi- 
 nently the periods in the history of a nation when social dispo- 
 sitions are unfolded through the excitation of their components. 
 The unfoldment may at times be violent, but even then the 
 fundamental beliefs of the race come in to give a more or less 
 definite trend to the outburst. 
 
 2. {h) The systematization of belief means in its individual 
 aspect the specialization of the universe of intercourse. As the 
 interaction of mental systems becomes more definite in the indi- 
 vidual mind, so the interaction of individual minds becomes cor- 
 respondingly more controlled. The fundamental systems into 
 which social experience becomes in the course of time organized, 
 display certain special tendencies which they did not have in 
 earlier times, although they remain interconnected in the gen- 
 eral mental fabric of the civilization. Thus in the modern 
 secular state, we find changes in political ideas spreading 
 through society without involving to any serious extent the 
 religious beliefs; while in the old Hebrew theocracy, religious 
 ideas were so closely interwoven with political, that the utter- 
 ances of the prophets as the acknowledged oracles of God, 
 seriously modified at times the affairs of state. To each of these 
 fundamental systems of belief corresponds a conative tendency 
 of the social will. The transference of an idea or mental element 
 from one mental system to another frequently occurs in the 
 history of a culture. Men's views of the world and life change: 
 which means not so much that the facts of common experience 
 are different as that the mental systems into which they are 
 incorporated are different. But a belief cannot function in two 
 distinct mental systems at the same time. The aesthetic attitude 
 toward an impression is incompatible at the time of its existence 
 with the scientific. Social beliefs are coordinated through their 
 interconnection in the social personality; but when this coordi- 
 
30 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 nation is disturbed, the ascendency and isolated action of one 
 system ensues. Under such circumstances the belief is likely 
 to incite acts which the interconnection of the belief had pre- 
 viously inhibited. In this way social indignation acting inde- 
 pendent of legal sentiment may result in the avenging of wrong 
 through mob-violence; so, too, religious zeal, freed from other 
 social emotions, may result in a fanaticism that counts its 
 victims by the score. On the other hand the union of indepen- 
 dent systems restricts each in a manner corresponding with the 
 principle of combination, as we see in the modification of the 
 political ideas and institutions of a state when it is united with 
 others in an empire. 
 
 3. There are two widely contrasted types of mental sys- 
 tems. In one the unfoldment depends upon contiguous adhe- 
 sion, i. e., a given fact emerges into consciousness largely through 
 its dependence upon the immediately preceding facts. In the 
 other there is a central principle of control : a part emerges not 
 because of its relation to the preceding part alone, but to all 
 other parts of the system as well. Where there is such solidar- 
 ity in the interaction of the individual wills that any one of 
 them but slightly changes the collective activity, such changes 
 as do occur in the social mind are largely associative. Associa- 
 tional changes stretch over psychic processes ranging from 
 sense-perceptions to the interconnection of mental objects in a 
 temporal process. Modification of sense perceptions have an 
 indirect interest to the social psychologist in the fact that the 
 sensory product may be combined along with other ideas through 
 memory in a belief. Thus illusions acquire special significance 
 if they become incorporated in a mythological system. Of direct 
 importance are the changes occurring in a temporal succession 
 of ideas. One of the factors at work is the natural efFacement 
 which mental objects undergo through the failure of memory. 
 Details are forgotten, only certain features remaining permanent 
 mental possessions. The permanence of an impression depends 
 not only upon certain qualities of its own, but upon a group of 
 highly variable subjective conditions. As a result there is an 
 uneven fading in the contents of a memory process, with the 
 result that reproduction is always an imperfect reinstatement 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 3 1 
 
 of the experience. An associative system may thus break up 
 passively through internal dissolution into its component parts, 
 v^hich then become attached again through association to other 
 systems. A similar phenomenon is observed in the social mind. 
 Distinct streams of thought become confluent in the course of 
 history when the circumstances of their origin are forgotten. 
 A striking historic personality serves as a center of attraction for 
 myths and legends derived from independent sources. Another 
 source of unconscious modification is found in the role which 
 associative systems frequently play in being parts of a more 
 comprehensive system which as a whole is apperceptive. We 
 may take in illustration of this what Wundt calls "the change 
 of purpose in custom."^ Speaking of the funeral feast he says: 
 "In its earliest form the funeral feast is a sacrificial feast. 
 Primitive man offers sacrifices to the gods at every important 
 occasion of his life, and will certainly make an offering at the 
 burial of a kinsman. In part he desires to obtain the divine 
 favor for his dead, but in part — and this is probably the more 
 ancient idea of the two — the dead man is himself an object of 
 worship. ... A second motive, which came into oper- 
 ation at a later date, but may gradually have ousted the original 
 worship of the dead, lies in the symbolic meaning of a feast 
 eaten in common. The common enjoyment of meat and drink 
 is for primitive man a religious symbol of brotherhood; more 
 especially if the feast have anything of solemnity about it, if it 
 be sanctioned, so to speak, by the presence of the gods. 
 It is this final form of the funeral feast whose traces have been 
 longest preserved. With its passage from a sensible to a sym- 
 bolic meaning it has gradually lost its religious reference. The 
 funeral feast, that is, becomes simply a commemorative feast, 
 at which mention is made in conversation and discourse of the 
 virtues of the dead." The changes in the feelings and ideas 
 which were associated with the given custom are unintentional 
 modifications brought about by the confluence of mental sys- 
 tems. The funeral feast and the commemorative feast were alike 
 in this respect, that in both there was the enjoyment of meat 
 and drink in common; and in consequence of this likeness it 
 
 ^ Ethicsy vol. i, p. 139 ff. 
 
32 EDWIN ANDREW HAYDEN. 
 
 was but natural that the funeral feast should attract to itself 
 the feelings and sentiments associated with the commemorative 
 feast. 
 
 4. In apperception the changes produced in consciousness 
 take place in a state of attention according to some motive 
 which controls and preconditions the change. Society adjusts 
 itself to new conditions by the conscious adaptation of old stores 
 of knowledge. The adaptation is generally effected first at one 
 center and then spreads throughout the social medium. Social 
 theory which finds in the interaction of individual minds the 
 essential phenomena of hypnotism only, is inclined to draw a 
 radical distinction between the mental processes going on at the 
 social center where the adaptation is first effected and the men- 
 tal processes going on at the centers which repeat this adapta- 
 tion. The first have been dignified by the name of invention 
 while the latter have been forced to acknowledge the impeach- 
 ment of mediocrity in the name of imitation. Now the dis- 
 tinction is of profound importance for a theory of social progress 
 which is directly concerned with mental products, but is of less 
 importance for social psychology, which aims to study the 
 interconnection of individual mental processes in collective men- 
 tal processes. Invention marks the termination of an apper- 
 ceptive process in which a determinate psychic compound, 
 image or conception is produced. In imitation an image is 
 communicated to the mind in a more or less completed form. 
 Through whatever medium the communication occurs we have 
 contiguous association between the verbal symbols and mental 
 systems, by means of which certain mental systems are brought 
 into conjunction that would have forever remained isolated in 
 that particular mind. In this way association can be of material 
 assistance in producing favorable conditions for an apperceptive 
 action between two mental systems: but its action can extend 
 to nothing beyond bringing the two systems together in con- 
 sciousness, and exciting the partial system upon which apper- 
 ceptive interaction depends. If the mental systems are relatively 
 simple, the apperception is of the ordinary degree of complexity; 
 so that to superficial observation nothing seems to be involved 
 beyond the mere lodgment of a communicated idea in the par- 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 33 
 
 ticular mind. Now in invention the same two features of asso- 
 ciation and apperception are at work, though not in the same 
 relative proportion. In invention the conjunction of mental 
 systems is less externally determined by social suggestion, while 
 the interaction is likely to be more prolonged and persistent. 
 Invention implies more comprehensive mental systems and more 
 sustained attentional control. But there is no case of invention 
 in which social contact, or what this amounts to, psychologically 
 speaking, viz, association, has not played an important part. 
 The history of the theory of natural selection sheds considerable 
 light upon the psychology of invention. I take the following 
 short account from Morgan '} "Charles Darwin and Dr. Alfred 
 Russell Wallace both reached the conception of Natural Selec- 
 tion on reading Malthus*s work on Population. Both had 
 acquired a system of knowledge concerning the relationships of 
 animals and plants. In both the net results were constantly in 
 mind. As they ranged in thought over the system, now one 
 and now another factor was in the focus of attention, with a 
 rearrangement of the other factors around it. They read 
 Malthus. Unless some factor in the Malthusian universe of 
 discourse coincided or was congruous with some factor in the 
 universe of biological thought, the two could not come into fruit- 
 ful relation. But there was a mediating factor common to both 
 — over-production of offspring. There were other features 
 sufficiently congruent to enable the Malthusian discussion to 
 throw light on the problems of biology. Hence arose the 
 suggestion ... of Natural Selection through the elimi- 
 nation of the unfit.'' Here social suggestion communicated 
 to the minds of the two distinguished naturalists a mental system, 
 which was combined in an apperceptive way with the systems 
 of biologic relationships already formed, into a more compre- 
 hensive system the fundamental unity of which was the concept 
 of natural selection. But the same mental processes are involved 
 in the humbler achievements of everyday life. 
 
 5. Owing to the interconnection of individual wills in a 
 wider volitional process, it happens that a change, originating 
 in an individual mind, spreads through the social medium in 
 
 ^ Psychology for Teachers, p. 87, new ed. 
 
34 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 some determinate fashion. A change in a given mental system 
 spreads to other mental systems in the order of the degree of 
 relatedness of the latter to the former. In so far as the mental 
 systems are more thoroughly organized in the minds of respec- 
 tively different social groups, we have, corresponding to the 
 order of psychic excitation, an order in the modification of the 
 ^life of social groups. Social changes begin as changes in the 
 idesires and beliefs of a certain group, followed by like mental 
 changes in the groups whose interests are most closely identified 
 with those of the first. But to the extent that other desires and 
 beliefs happen at the time to be ascendant in the minds of the 
 other social groups, the disturbance originating in the mind of 
 the first group meets a corresponding resistance to its spread. 
 The excitation is in its earlier stages of a general nature and 
 becomes more specific as the infoldment proceeds. Accordingly 
 we find deep social changes beginning as vague mental tenden- 
 cies, which are nothing more than feelings of unrest and dis- 
 satisfaction with some existing institution, and which continue 
 for some time in this merely negative attitude of protest. Later 
 a plan emerges that seeks to remove the cause of dissatisfaction 
 by substituting some other arrangement that will realize the 
 needs in this direction in a better manner. The plan becomes 
 a motive to a series of volitions that may have profound and 
 revolutionary changes as a consequence. The earlier phases 
 of such social movements involve the excitation of some universe 
 of belief in its entirety, with a corresponding indefiniteness in 
 the reaction of the social will. The component systems of the 
 particular universe are all equally aroused, so that none of them 
 can become appercipient in preference to another; but later on 
 one of these gains some ascendency, and events now take a 
 definite turn, owing to the resulting univocal nature of the 
 motives to social volition. The period of incubation of a social 
 movement is thus one in which component mental systems of 
 some universe of beliefs are struggling each against the other 
 to become explicit in the public mind. The issue depends upon 
 a variety of conditions, which lie partly in the mode or cir- 
 cumstances of stimulation and partly in the nature of the 
 mental system itself. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 
 
 35 
 
 6. The recency of its activity conditions the ascendancy of 
 a mental system. A system out of use is undergoing continual 
 decay. Soon the parts begin to function independent of each 
 other, and to restore the system to its former degree of efficiency 
 requires a process of recollection that is discursive in a degree 
 proportionate to the time during which the system has been 
 dormant. A mental system that has been in recent action may 
 function more efficiently than one v^hich has been out of use for 
 some time although, in the event of continued disuse, it would 
 soon fall into a greater degree of incoherence than the later 
 system. Besides reproduction of an incoherent system gener- 
 ally brings in through association irrelevant ideas that delay 
 the apperceptive activity of the system. At times these are 
 incorporated within the system, as already noted in the case 
 where memory images become changed into images of the imag- 
 ination. An interesting example of how recency conditions 
 the efficiency of a mental system is given in the memory of the 
 late seismic disturbances. The news of the South American 
 earthquake brought to mind in even considerable detail, the 
 facts of the California disturbance, but only vaguely those of 
 the Charleston. 
 
 7. Intensity and vividness of the elements of a mental sys- 
 tem are important conditions of its strength. It is chiefly on 
 account of the intensity and vividness of its elements that the 
 world of sensible experience is taken to be the ultimate universe 
 of reality and that the creations of fancy never command belief 
 until they find lodgment in the memory series. Intense and 
 vivid experiences such as are incident to political revolutions 
 are more deeply engraved on the social memory, although the 
 latter have been repeated many times. Ihering advances the 
 proposition, in opposition to the Savigny-Puchta theory, that 
 all great legal principles have been established by what he calls 
 the "struggle for right." Undoubtedly the intensity of the 
 experiences incident to a struggle in which some legal principle 
 is born, is an important factor in helping to maintain the asser- 
 tion of the right involved, before it has crystaUized into a social 
 sentiment. Le Bon has well described the eflFect which startHng 
 events produce on the public mind: "A hundred petty crimes 
 
36 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 or petty accidents will not strike the imagination of crowds in 
 the least, whereas a single great crime or a single great accident will 
 profoundly impress them, even though the results be infinitely 
 less disastrous than those of the hundred small accidents put 
 together. . . . The probable loss of a transatlantic 
 steamer that was supposed, in the absence of news, to have gone 
 down in mid-ocean, profoundly impressed the imagination of a 
 crowd for a whole week. Yet official statistics show that 850 
 sailing vessels and 203 steamers were lost in the year 1894 alone. 
 The crowd was never for a moment concerned with these suc- 
 cessive losses, much more important though they were as far 
 as regards the destruction of life and property, than the loss of 
 the Atlantic liner in question could possibly have been."^ 
 
 8. The support which a mental system can command from 
 the other systems with which it is connected, is of material 
 assistance in the maintenance of its ascendency. Now we have 
 already seen how association may bring into relation two mental 
 systems that might otherwise remain disconnected; and if such 
 conjunction occurs when the mind is especially active, the two 
 will probably unite in a more comprehensive system whose 
 total energy is greater than that of either. Under such condi- 
 tions a given mental system, with its associate, in their joint 
 activity, can effectually oust from consciousness another system, 
 although considered in itself it may have less inner stability 
 than its rival. What is called the social opportuneness of an 
 idea or invention, depends upon such associative conjunction. 
 An idea that is harmonious with the general set of the public 
 mind, rallies to its support a whole mental array, while another 
 idea, equally meritorious but lacking such support, fails to 
 command general attention. Not that the mental systems are 
 wanting which under other circumstances would yield the latter 
 support, but that for the time being, they are prevented from 
 acting. With a change of ideas in the public mind, the defeated 
 invention may later gain a speedy acceptance. The great 
 leaders of mankind have well understood these facts, and before 
 trying to put their plans into execution, have either waited till 
 times became ripe through the natural course of events, or have 
 
 ^ LeBon, The Crowd^ pp. 78-79, London, 1900. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 37 
 
 sought by direct instruction to develop in the public mind, 
 mental systems that would support their plans. 
 
 9. The most important factor in institutional heredity is 
 none of those above discussed, but another, viz, repetition — 
 unceasing repetition with, of course, full command of attention. 
 The groundwork of a civilization is a few fixed beliefs which 
 have been thoroughly wrought into the mental constitution of 
 a people by incessant repetition. The stress which has been laid 
 upon imitation as one of the most fundamental facts of social 
 life, does but enforce in particular words the importance of 
 repetition in giving stability to the ideas, concepts and beliefs 
 of a race. Society maintains a vast disciplinary agency whose) 
 sole purpose is to instill into the minds of the young the funda- 
 mental facts and values of its culture as data upon which imme- 
 diate action is demanded. In this routine of the common, oft- 
 repeated experiences, lies all that is most vital to the welfare of 
 a people. Art has largely drawn its themes from the realms of 
 common experience and in this fact lies its suggestiveness. 
 The experiences repeated from the earliest years of childhood, 
 organize into mental systems that require a minimum of stimu- 
 lation to arouse them; they form a delicate consensus in the 
 way of a sensitivity to the genius of one's civilization which a 
 foreigner never fully acquires. 
 
 10. The degree to which feelings of relationship interpene- 
 trate a mental system, has much to do indetermining its strength. 
 In a highly organized system, each part reflects and supports 
 the other; so that one part is never in the focus of attention 
 without there being an excitation to some extent of the others. 
 Owing to the reciprocal action going on between the parts, the 
 system is kept from dissolving and in readiness to function as 
 a unit. A series held together by mere contiguous adhesion 
 has no more strength as a total system than the weakest bond 
 existing between any two members; nor does the increase in 
 strength in the connection between any two members improve 
 that between the others. On the other hand, in a system which 
 is a manifold of numerous relations, it is impossible to modify the 
 connection of any two parts without involving the others to an 
 extent proportionate to the number of inner relations. The 
 
38 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 best examples of these systems are those expressing quantita- 
 tive relations as mathematical demonstrations, mathematical 
 theories of physical phenomena, etc. The theories of mathe- 
 matical physics may fall or stand with a single fact, there being 
 at times a delicate dependence upon quantitative relations 
 within very small limits of error. The corpuscular theory of 
 light gives an admirable general explanation of refraction, but 
 fails when quantitative relations (the index of refraction), are 
 taken into account. 
 
 II. In general we may divide mental systems into two dis- 
 tinct classes so far as their cognitive elements are concerned, 
 the group of perceptual data constituting the so-called Tacts' 
 of a science, and the system of concepts by means of which the 
 mind apprehends the facts. The concepts are in reality the 
 laws or principles of the particular science. Now the progress 
 of science means not only the multiplication and more exact 
 determination of perceptual data, but the extension and deeper 
 organization of theory as well. While the theories of a science 
 are conditioned by its data, theory returns to condition the 
 discovery of new facts; for as science develops, the discovery 
 of new data is less a matter of accident, and more a matter of 
 rational procedure based upon existing knowledge. Notwith- 
 standing the intimate relation between fact and theory, their 
 elaboration represents partially independent historic movements: 
 that is to say, the accumulation of facts may go on for a consid- 
 erable length of time before any need of the revision of hypothe- 
 sis or theory is felt, just as a further improvement of a theory 
 is possible with reference to the sphere of existing fact. Both 
 the sphere of fact and theory become more coherent with the 
 progress of science. A fact before it is admitted as a datum 
 in the body of existing knowledge must be repeatedly verified; 
 while a theory before it can gain an ascendancy, must submit 
 to critical experimentation devised for the specific purpose of 
 testing the theory. 
 
 12. Conceptual systems are not however limited to branches 
 of knowledge with which the idea of science is especially con- 
 nected. We find the great fund of social knowledge, religious, 
 political, economic, arranged in more or less articulate schemes. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 39 
 
 based upon some principle or concept. Experience combines 
 into systematic totals long before the plan of combination 
 becomes explicit in the public mind. In such cases the uni- 
 versal elements of experience do not exist apart from the 
 concrete totals whose plan of combination they determine. 
 What is termed practical sagacity or wisdom consists of mental 
 systems organized in this way. Later the universal elements 
 are disengaged from their concrete embodiments and are explic- 
 itly stated in rules. We find for instance in the universality 
 of custom the operation of general factors or tendencies but 
 dimly comprehended, which emerge later in special moral 
 precepts of the practical understanding and again in more 
 fundamental principles of ethical science in the way of certain 
 norms. In the sphere of industrial activities, at times new 
 practices spread through the social medium by the imita- 
 tion of a particular model, and in this way certain general fac- 
 tors are at work, causing concrete elements to combine into 
 similar wholes. Later these universal factors become explicit in a 
 new concept as in the caseof the capital concept in modern times. 
 While the multipHcation of concrete social acts goes on with the 
 growth of civilization and the increase of population, the num- 
 ber of distinct universal principles serving for the organization 
 of experience, does not exceed a certain small number. This 
 universaHzing activity of the mind corresponds to what is, objec- 
 tively considered, the discovery of laws of greater generality. 
 In truth, within any sphere of fact already a matter of social 
 acquisition, the growth of culture means the replacing through 
 combination and substitution of empirical formulae by a smaller 
 number of laws possessing a correspondingly higher generality. 
 Progress in the evolution of conceptual systems is partly a 
 matter of combination and partly a matter of substitution. 
 Many theories which have appeared in the history of science 
 are mutually exclusive; others have resulted from the synthesis 
 of empirical generalizations that have covered partial phases of 
 a group of phenomena; still others have resulted from a more 
 precise quantitative statement or detailed application of an idea 
 already developed in its general features. The later part of the 
 history of events that led up to the discovery of the Newtonian 
 
40 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 theory of gravitation well illustrates the progress of generaliza- 
 tion through the combination of preceding hypotheses; while 
 progress through substitution is seen in the replacement of the 
 corpuscular theory by the wave theory of light. Substitution 
 then occurs in the case of theories covering the same range of 
 phenomena; combination occurs where theories formulating the 
 order in the component parts of a system, are united in one 
 more general theory valid for the whole system. 
 
 13. Conceptual systems comprehending special determina- 
 tions and having numerous inter-relations, are difficult to dis- 
 place for the reason that the mutual excitation of parts multi- 
 plies the amount of mental energy available at any particular 
 
 /moment. But too high articulateness is at times a source of 
 weakness. No theory ever does full justice to the facts, which 
 must be pruned here and expanded there to fit into the ideal 
 limits of a formula. It thus may happen that a theory is expressed 
 with too much mathematical exactness, and gains so great an 
 ascendancy over the mind because of its logical symmetry 
 that really significant facts are ignored or transformed by such 
 prepossession. The mental system, because of its completeness 
 resists modification, and like a group of physical particles under 
 high internal stress may fly to pieces when exposed to the re- 
 peated shocks which the progress of discovery causes. A lower 
 degree of articulateness at times insures a higher degree of 
 of vitality, because room is aflForded for growth and expansion. 
 Nothing enforces this point better than the inductive philosophy 
 associated with the name of Darwin. Stated with circumspec- 
 tion and a manifest desire to do full justice to all the facts con- 
 cerned, it never aimed at finalities but only tendencies highly 
 probable, with the result that it has quietly assimilated the 
 facts gathered in so many lines during the last half-century. So, 
 too, in Roman and English law, we have two instances of legal 
 systems whose universal fitness for defining the rights of man, 
 has been due in a considerable measure to the absence of a 
 certain degree of logical refinement. 
 
 14. The spread of an idea through the social medium is 
 ichecked by indiff^erence or opposition. Where there is lacking 
 |the mental system with which an idea has some points in con- 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 4 1 
 
 tact, it fails to command the attention. Scientific conceptions 
 which formulate highly specialized experience, do not enjoy a 
 currency beyond a small social group, for the reason that in the 
 minds of the generality, the mental systems are wanting which 
 can incorporate the idea. Owing to the superficial contact the 
 mental processes aroused by the idea are very transitory. In 
 the case of opposition, however, the idea stimulates the mind 
 to vigorous action, in calling forth mental systems which have 
 elements that resist the incorporation of the belief into the 
 context of social thought. The various conditions affecting the 
 stability of social groups are so numerous and in their joint 
 action so complex that we find as a matter of history that very 
 few beliefs are uniformly organized in the individual minds of 
 society, but rather that corresponding to the external division 
 of labor in social activity, there is an internal division of thought 
 and feeling, making the social mind a complex of different com- 
 ponent mental systems. As a result an idea encounters in its 
 spread through the social medium a resistance varying with! 
 the stability of the social groups which antagonize it. In all 
 minds some struggle goes on before the idea is assimilated: in 
 some the assimilation is comparatively speedy; in others some-' 
 what tardy. If the mental conflict terminates in each mind in 
 practically the same way, in the incorporation or rejection of 
 the idea, the struggle has been an individual affair. The trans- 
 mission of an idea under these circumstances is like the onward 
 movement of a wave in a homogeneous medium : as the wave 
 retains throughout the same form, so each mind repeats the 
 apperceptive activity. What we have here is the repetition of 
 an individual process forming a total process of nearly identical 
 parts. The total process corresponds to an aggregate idea of 
 the individual mind. It is only in rare cases, however, that 
 the transformation of social belief is accomplished by the quiet 
 spread of an idea from one individual mind to another. Such 
 peaceful solution occurs only with matters of obvious utility, 
 where sentiment, habit and prejudice are of minor importance. 
 Conflicts involving beliefs deeply rooted in social history, which 
 because of their fitness to express the fundamental needs of 
 humanity, have strong affective components, are of a more 
 
42 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 bitter and violent nature. In proportion as an idea involves 
 emotional interests, it is destined to encounter somewhere in its 
 course firm and obstinate resistance. As soon as there is a divi- 
 sion in society between those who oppose the idea and those 
 who affirm it, the seat of conflict has passed from the individual 
 to the social mind. In the minds of one party to the conflict 
 the idea has been incorporated into the dominant universe of 
 belief; in the minds of the other, the idea has aroused an antago- 
 nistic mental system. Now mental conflicts of a social nature 
 I may be settled in either of two ways : by discussion or by force. 
 Solution by discussion occurs under a variety of forms, depend- 
 ing in part upon the particular nature of the conflict or opposi- 
 tion. The opposition may arise from ignorance. In this case 
 the mental systems which can assimilate the idea, are wanting 
 or imperfectly formed. The idea is suflEiciently grasped to touch 
 some universe of belief, but owing to its vagueness it discharges 
 no further function than arousing and keeping ascendant the 
 particular belief. If the belief has strong affective components 
 it leads to practical endeavors that resist the spread of the idea. 
 The removal of the conflict is a matter of education. The 
 idea must be presented as a mental system in the process of 
 unfoldment, like a scientific exposition or judicial opinion, — 
 not as a total : for the component parts, representing a less com- 
 plex mental synthesis than the whole idea, are more readily 
 assimilated, and their interconnection in a belief follows, once 
 they are firmly established. The mental systems on which the 
 assimilation of the idea depends vary all the way from mere 
 aggregates of general experience to organic combination of 
 concepts in still higher universals. 
 
 15. The conflict may arise from the indeterminateness of 
 the mental systems engaged, as between two rival theories that 
 derive equal support from the rather meager data. The dis- 
 covery of some pertinent fact puts an end to the struggle by 
 suppressing one theory and confirming the other. Such contests 
 are not likely to be spirited in an age of speculative caution 
 when the scientific ideal of suspended judgment on matters not 
 yet adequately investigated is being realized, though in the 
 early history of science, when superstition formed the staple of 
 
^ OF THE \ 
 
 UNIVERSITY ) 
 
 OF J 
 
 TB.E SOCIAL WILL. 43 
 
 its pretences, disputation rather than investigation was the 
 rule. 
 
 Other conflicts occur between mental systems through their 
 connection with other systems which are antagonistic. The 
 conflicts of moral precepts in particular cases are frequently of 
 this sort. Moral conviction, for instance, may lead to refusal 
 of a gift of money intended for some worthy end, if it comes 
 from a fortune dishonestly accumulated. There is no conflict 
 of a moral nature between the desire to use money for a worthy 
 end and the desire to be honest. The conflict in the present 
 instance arises from the peculiar concrete circumstances under 
 which the two desires are conjoined. The removal of the con- 
 flict in a way that suppresses neither desire, is by setting them 
 free from this particular conjunction and uniting them again as 
 parts of other concrete systems. 
 
 16. Free discussion, however, is a mode of solution success- 
 ful with only a portion of the public issues. Disputes which 
 involve matters deeply connected with social welfare, are sub- 
 ject to legal control, being decided by a body constituted for that? 
 purpose. The psychology of prestige and obedience explains 
 the mental processes leading to the solution of these conflicts. 
 Lastly the conflict may attain such a degree of intensity through 
 the feehng engendered that a peaceful solution is impossible 
 and nothing short of an armed struggle can remove the division in 
 the public mind. We have here the intrusion of a physical factor 
 in the domain of psychological causation. The victorious idea 
 in this more than in the preceding case gains an ascendancy 
 through external constraint; and though not becoming an integ- 
 ral part of the mental life of the defeated party, does yet secure 
 an outward conformity. The opinions and sentiments which 
 only violence could suppress, are still secretly cherished; but 
 they weaken as time changes the outward conformity into 
 second nature. The consciousness of force owes its strength 
 to the objective circumstances of its excitation : it does not rep- 
 resent an apperceptive synthesis, and hence does not reflect the 
 inner constitution of the personality. 
 
 17. {a) A conflict of any social importance marks a stage] 
 in the collective mental life clearly separated from what precedes ' 
 
44 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 and from what follows. In its external aspects, it forms a 
 turning point in the history of nations. Even when the idea 
 fails to be incorporated in the minds of one party to the conflict, 
 society being reconciled to a permanent division of opinion, the 
 conflict has not left the mental systems in the minds of that 
 party in their former condition, for the points of contrariety 
 have been emphasized and rendered more suggestible. In sub- 
 sequent issues in which this belief is again concerned, either 
 by itself or as a part of a more comprehensive movement, the 
 heightened suggestibility of the points of conflict is destined to 
 play a part in the trend of social thought. 
 
 1 7. (b) A conflict causes social thought to return upon itself. 
 Without some object to arrest the flow of thought, mental life 
 would move on under the inhibitions and reinforcements com- 
 ing from the play of the forces of association. Opposition 
 causes a backward movement of the social mind to the earlier 
 phases of the struggle; and on this follow mental processes work- 
 ing toward a removal of the conflict, either in the way of the 
 repetition of the mental history of the conflict, or along lines 
 outside of the historic development of the conflict. Much more 
 in the social than in the individual mind is a mental conflict 
 likely to extend to related mental systems; so that along with 
 the fundamental issue usually go many collateral ones. 
 
 18. At times the deadlock in the social mind is relieved as 
 noted above, not by an apperceptive activity, but by a modera- 
 tion of the ardor of the strife, which permits a division of public 
 opinion on the matter at issue. What differences of opinion 
 are tolerated, depends upon what society regards as essential to 
 its welfare. A theocracy punishes blasphemy as the gravest 
 of oflTenses, because it feels the religious faith of its people to 
 be the strongest social bond. Intolerance arises from the ascend- 
 ancy of an idea which has considerable internal strength but 
 which is under no systematic control through an interconnec- 
 tion with other ideas in a more comprehensive mental process. 
 Not until the idea encounters resistance so that its immediate 
 command of the will is checked, does the intolerance abate to 
 any extent. Mental conflict raises the status of an idea above 
 that of a mere impulse to action, by bringing it into connection 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 45 
 
 with Other ideas, and thus marks the beginning of rational, 
 apperceptive control. Then the mental changes are manifest 
 on the social side in the weakening of the authority of custom. 
 " As far as it goes, the mere putting up ofa subject to discussion, . . . 
 is a clear admission that that subject is in no degree settled by 
 established rule, and that men are free to choose in it. It is an 
 admission too that there is no sacred authority — no one trans- 
 cendent and divinely appointed man whom in that matter the com- 
 munity is bound to obey."* 
 
 19. In mental conflict the mind becomes aware of its own 
 activity. In customs and usages are embodied unities of expe- 
 rience which the social mind does not clearly apprehend, though 
 they exert a control on social thought through the felt similarity 
 of one individual case to another. When some particular cir- 
 cumstance arises which because of its novelty, does not readily 
 assimilate with existing customs or usages, mental conflict 
 ensues, resulting in the synthesis of concrete social experiences 
 into higher systems. It is here that emerge the general princi- 
 ples of experiences, moral, political, religious and utilitarian. 
 
 Now there are certain general limitations connected with 
 apperceptive action that should be noted. History is irrevers- 
 ible. It is absolutely impossible to restore any past social 
 epoch. The outward arrangements and appointments may be 
 much the same, but the inner sentiments and feelings which 
 clustered around the old regime, and which are the really vital ele- 
 ments, are gone forever. The experiences which have come 
 with the intervening years, have produced a new background 
 in the social mind. 
 
 20. Sentiments and ideas which express what is distinctive ( 
 in the mental life of a people, cannot be bodily transferred from 
 one culture to another. They must be transfigured into har- 
 mony with the national genius, if they are to be anything more \ 
 than floating ideas or mere facts of memory. Hence a belief \ 
 which represents a long social growth, cannot be assimilated by ' 
 a foreign civilization in its subtler and more transitive phases. 
 Scientific and mathematical conceptions are the least subject to 
 national limitations, for the reason that they relate to a domain 
 
 * Bagehot, Physics and Politics , p. 161. 
 
46 EDWIN ANDREW HAY DEN. 
 
 of experience which is apprehended by the least variable of 
 human faculties, that of sensible cognition; but the delicate 
 sentiments of social life which find their most adequate expres- 
 sion in the great works of poetic genius, are in a considerable 
 degree the exclusive property of the particular culture. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF MORAL RIGHT. 
 
 I. The interaction of individual minds takes place with 
 varying degrees of intimacy in relation to the self. As already 
 pointed out, experience organizes in the individual personality 
 into tv^o v^ridely contrasted universes, the physical or impersonal 
 and the social or personal. The feelings which in concrete men- 
 tal experience, are attached to these two universes, differ widely 
 in their nature. The attitude of the self toward experience 
 regarded in the mere light of fact, is one of disinterestedness. 
 All facts then stand upon the same level so far as their value for 
 the self is concerned : and if the self does exercise any selective 
 preference, it is on account of the feeling which arises from the 
 relation of one fact to another as members of a conceptual sys- 
 tem. We have examples of these impersonal feelings of rela- 
 tionship in the feeling of harmony which arises when some 
 conception dawns upon the mind that injects order and system 
 into a mass of disconnected facts; in the feeling of scientific 
 curiosity which impels the mind to seek further knowledge along 
 some particular line, as well as in the feeling of wonder in the 
 presence of something that contravenes the usual order of expe- 
 rience. The two attitudes are mutually exclusive, though alter- 
 nation between them, at times even somewhat rapid, is in the 
 general run of things possible. 
 
 2. When in the contact of one mind with another the point 
 of orientation in the universe of intercourse lies almost exclu- 
 sively within some cognitive system, the consciousness of self 
 both in the way of idea and feeHng, shrinks to a minimum. As 
 the collective mental activity moves within the domain of proc- 
 esses of knowledge, ideas and feelings of relationship form the 
 content of the psychic material communicated. The plane of 
 communication may vary all the way from the bare excitation 
 of mental images up to elaborate interaction of conceptual sys- 
 
48 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 terns. In these cases the mental contact is at points on the 
 universal side of experience, sharable by all individual minds. 
 But even here that particular center of mental energy v^hich we 
 call the self is to some extent excited, since the impersonal 
 feelings which color the given ideational processes, represent 
 the reaction of the self as a totality, without involving an unfold- 
 ment of its parts. If under conditions of mental conflict an 
 unfoldment of the parts of the mental system which constitutes 
 the self becomes necessary, self-consciousness becomes explicit : 
 the idea of self in its relation to other selves together with the 
 various related feelings, comes into full view. Moral situations 
 in particular are favorable to the evolution of the consciousness 
 of self. 
 
 3. So long as mental life is such as arises in connection with 
 responses to present stimulation, it stands on a plane of organi- 
 zation no higher than that of animal want; mental changes are 
 then merely an incident in the mutations of experience resulting 
 from variations in the objective order itself. When, however 
 the reinstatement of former experience is possible from central 
 excitation, under any form that will lead to the same practical 
 result as did the original sense stimulation, animal want is pass- 
 ing into a higher mental organization of desire. And later 
 desire becomes still farther removed from immediate practical 
 volition when the reflective analysis of experience and the com- 
 bination of the resulting elements into products similar to per- 
 ceptual realities, take place. Desire then arises in connection 
 with ideal universes. Many of these universes remain merely 
 floating systems of the mind, in more or less complete detach- 
 ment from a group of habits necessary to volition; others are 
 brought into intimate relation with the will, and come thus to 
 exert a direct influence on the turn which the pursuit of practical 
 ends is likely to take. Now among these ideal universes is one 
 of particular importance in the change which brings in the 
 relation of the self to others : viz, that universe in which some 
 type of personality is imagined and desired. The self is here 
 viewed with respect to its inner organization, as composed of 
 certain dominant desires and motives in partial abstraction of 
 the external conditions which surround the self, whether these 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 49 
 
 circumstances are a matter of hereditary accident or produced 
 by the will of the individual himself. It is not meant by this 
 that the self sets the circumstances of its volitions over against 
 itself as a mechanical opposite, but rather that it sees ramifying 
 through the material changes which its volitions effect, a certain 
 type of personality, the actual or realized self. If some other 
 type of personality is preferred to that which the practical 
 activities of the self reveal, to that which is really immanent in 
 volition, a division exists in the personality on account of the 
 presence of an unsatisfied desire in the form of an ethical ideal. 
 Moral progress consists in the successive incorporation of such 
 ideals into the universe of practical desire as they arise in the! 
 course of individual development. In other words, the mental 
 universe in which some type of the self is imagined, must, in 
 order to be an ethical ideal, command that practical assent of the 
 mind which has already been discussed under the title of belief. 
 4. The universe of the ideal self is social in the sense that it 
 does not contemplate an isolated self, but a self united by defi- 
 nite ties to other like personalities — ties which reflect very 
 clearly the relations obtaining in the existing social order. The 
 extent, however, to which the ideal universe is likely to deviate 
 from the actual social world, varies considerably in the historyl 
 of culture. Where there is great solidarity of the individual and 
 the social will — ^where, in other words, the mental life of society 
 is made up largely of processes of association, the deviation is 
 slight. The social will constrains the individual will into a 
 narrow conformity to a type, since individual and social aims 
 are not clearly distinguished. The moral character consists 
 largely of certain fixed habits of thought and action with their 
 related feelings, being thus a will developed out of responses 
 to concrete moral situations in which personal example has 
 served largely as the guide. The morality of such an age is not 
 a morality of reflection that comprehends broad humanitarian 
 ends: it is tribal and sectional, yet withal a mechanism that 
 responds with wonderful delicacy to the demands of that par- 
 ticular social life, serving besides as the indispensable basis of 
 further moral growth. When the individual will comes to func- 
 tion in some degree as an independent volitional process, as it 
 
50 EDWIN ANDREW HAT DEN. 
 
 does with the appearance of imagination, understanding and 
 reason, the universe of self-consciousness, as already noted, 
 includes as one of its ideational elements, the conception of an 
 ideal self. To the extent that this representation is an integral 
 part of that universe: that is, to the extent that it receives the 
 support of self-feeling and its affiliated mechanism of well- 
 formed habits, does it become a force in the transformation of 
 social life. Conduct is then motived by an end more or less 
 clearly conceived, which serves as a unifying principle of mental 
 life — unifying not merely in the logical sense of securing con- 
 sistency within some group of ideas or concepts, but in the far 
 deeper psychological sense of permanently satisfying the most 
 urgent and fundamental desires of man. The moral conscious- 
 ness at this stage of its development presupposes a complex 
 social life in which there is considerable multiformity of experi- 
 ence. Out of a reflective analysis of the complex social expe- 
 rience, through which the individual is enabled to apprehend 
 the universal elements of his civilization, grows the ideal self — 
 ideal, and yet imagined as achieving its career under the 
 special historic conditions of the social order in which the indi- 
 vidual exists. The ideal self has, however, become a far more 
 complex and fluid creation than was its predecessor of primi- 
 tive times. 
 
 5. The social universe, actual and ideal, within which the 
 realized and ideal self exists — the realized self in the practical 
 conations of the mind and the ideal self in the imaginary uni- 
 verse of unsatisfied social desires — is the universe of moral 
 consciousness. The ideational content of this universe is not 
 its distinguishing trait although the general proposition is 
 true that the ultimate psychologic fact of the moral conscious- 
 ness is a personal idea. Moral action, in other words, is not 
 action defined by a particular physical content, but action defined 
 by the attitude of the self. The self here reacts to other selves 
 as concrete totals rather than as individualized aspects of the 
 general processes of social life. The self is truly moral so far 
 as the welfare and experience of other personalities is included 
 within its universe of practical motives. Whatever in the way 
 of mental cultivation, material possessions and other externals 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 5 1 
 
 contributes to the efficiency of the self in willing and helping 
 to realize the welfare of others, comes thus to have a moral 
 significance. So far as the ends of the self include the welfare 
 of others merely as an incident, the plane of behavior sinks to 
 the level of prudential conduct; so far as the injury to others is 
 object of direct or indirect volition conduct becomes immoral. 
 In matters of merely prudential content the agent accepts other 
 personalities as a psychologic fact and makes abstraction of all 
 thought whether his relation to them makes for the attainment 
 of the ideal in their lives. Conduct solicitous of the welfare of 
 others is felt to possess, because of its psychic inclusiveness, the 
 higher moral worth, securing as it does in the long run, greater 
 breadth, richness and stability of individual life. It is in con- 
 duct based on the perception of an ideal that the self is most 
 frequently thrown into the condition of mental conflict; and yet 
 notwithstanding the pain and worry incident to this, the appear- 
 ance of inclusive ideals as motives to volition is felt to mark a 
 higher stage of moral development for the reason that the expe- 
 rience out of which the ideal is abstracted and which the ideal 
 returns to illumine and unify, has then a deeper social signifi- 
 cance. The relation between the individual and the social will, 
 which heretofore had existed in concrete in particular volitions, 
 now becomes a definite object of cognition, enabling the indi- 
 vidual to enter sympathetically into hopes, sorrows, ambitions, 
 and disappointments of others. Aside from its foundation in 
 a mechanism of firmly rooted habits, the moral will is largely a 
 matter of the sympathetic imaginations. A Hfe guided by ration- 
 ally perceived motives is likely to be more stable and harmonious 
 than one based upon immediate feeling; for in the latter case the 
 consciousness of the unity of the self with the other is in the 
 form of an isolated impulse with a corresponding lack of apper- 
 ceptive control. The outcome then depends upon the adapta- 
 tion of a preformed mechanism of native and acquired dispo- 
 sition to the particular situation. 
 
 6. Moral evil is essentially a condition of affairs in which 
 individual and social life is narrow, restricted, unstable and 
 inharmonious. It implies a condition of mental conflict, — a 
 conflict, however, in which mental systems instead of uniting 
 
52 EDWIN ANDREW HAYDEN. 
 
 into higher and more comprehensive groups, are dissolving into 
 minor and fragmentary ones. Mental conflict, as we have 
 already seen, is the fundamental condition of psychic develop- 
 ment. It becomes more pronounced — not necessarily more tur- 
 bulent or violent — as the complexity of the social personality 
 increases. The partial wills through which the desires of social 
 groups express themselves, are not of equal importance in the 
 determination of the total will of society: so that it frequently 
 happens that the will of a particular social group encroaches 
 upon the wills of other groups, and in various ways makes its 
 own interests ascendant in the collective mind. In proportion 
 as these interests are simply group interests, the ascendancy 
 has the efi^ect of shrinking the general volume of social life, and 
 thus perverts the course of moral progress, except in those early 
 stages of social growth when the most important condition of 
 mental development is the formation of definite habits of obedi- 
 ence to some authority. At times the ascendancy of a partial will 
 means the dominance of an ideal capable of serving as the basis 
 of more comprehensive social organization, and although im- 
 posed by force upon the antagonistic social groups, lifts them to a 
 higher plane of social life if they are capable of assimilating the 
 ideal. Conflict of this sort is evidence of an overflowing vitality, 
 struggling to embody itself in new forms. On the other hand 
 the conflict may grow out of the dissolution of social bonds that 
 have previously restrained and coordinated the activities of the 
 various social groups. Thus freed from subordination in any 
 collective activity, the impulses of each group begin to assert 
 themselves in a turbulent fashion, with much energy, perhaps, 
 but with the energy coming from the dissolution of an unstable 
 system. 
 
 7. Aberrations of the individual will which are a reflex of 
 social disorder, must be carefully distmguished from the immoral 
 tendencies of the individual will that are private. The indi- 
 vidual caught in the maelstrom of social revolution, will give 
 his sanction to deeds of violence which in times of ordinary 
 peace and security he would blush to think of. The usual 
 balance within the universe of motives has been upset by objec- 
 tive conditions. But even in times of social unity and concord. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 53 
 
 there is a considerable number of individual wills which stand 
 out in more or less conflict with the social will. Under these 
 circumstances we have order and uniformity in the peripheral 
 stimulations that the individual mind receives, along with a lack 
 of harmony of thought and feeling. The conflict evidently 
 results from some peculiarity in the inner constitution of the 
 individual mind. In some cases the aberrant will is system- 
 atically controlled by a universe of motive which the social will 
 unreservedly seeks to inhibit. This universe may be of con- 
 siderable complexity, so far as mere intellectual relations are 
 concerned, but in respect to personal relations and feelings it is 
 poverty stricken. The purposes of the self are more or less coher- 
 ent, conflicting, however, with the ends which society deems 
 vital to its welfare. In other cases the individual will does not 
 come into systematic conflict with the social will, and yet may 
 considerably disturb the moral consciousness of the community. 
 A will of this type is not actuated by a permanent universe of 
 immoral motives — in fact it may possess a considerable wealth 
 of social feeling: its deficiency lies in its impulsiveness. Irritat- 
 ing circumstances seriously disturb the mental balance, setting 
 free an isolated impulse that does violence to the objective moral 
 order. In a final category may be put those cases of delinquency 
 which result from a general weakness of the mental organization. 
 They do not come into contact with the deeper currents of 
 social life to any serious extent; the resistance which they oflFer 
 to the disciplinary agents of society is of a negative kind, con- 
 sisting in a failure to return to the social fund any contribution 
 for the energy which society expends in their care and main- 
 tenance. 
 
 8. Thus the immoral life reflects but a fragment of the social 
 life or reflects it in an irregular and riotous manner. In moral 
 crises through which the individual mind may pass, there is 
 profound emotional disturbance; and yet in spite of this, numer- 
 ous mental systems are excited whose mutual restraint prevents 
 precipitate action. In the excitement of crime there is lacking 
 such reciprocal inhibitory action : the emotional disturbance runs 
 a serial course in which oftentimes a successive accumulation 
 goes on terminating in a violent outburst of passion that accom- 
 
54 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 plishes the act willed in such a horrible fashion as to surprise 
 the agent himself. 
 
 9. Returning to the consideration of the ethical ideal as a 
 variant of realized conceptions of conduct, we naturally encoun- 
 ter the question, What limit exists to the deviation of the ideal 
 from the practical morality of the times ? What is there to guar- 
 antee that the ideal which a nation sets before itself is something 
 more than a chimera, perhaps luring it on to ruin and destruc- 
 tion ? There is no a priori guarantee, although there are some 
 conditions which help to predetermine the variability of ideals, 
 or what amounts to the same thing, to make extreme forms 
 relatively infrequent. In the first place, as explained above, 
 the ethical ideal is a psychologic fact resulting from the normal 
 workings of the human mind upon personal and social data. 
 Any new moral principle or precept, or more inclusive applica- 
 tion of some old principle, is first of all conceived by some mind 
 of superior moral insight. The personality of the moral seer is 
 an outgrowth of the common social life both in the way of 
 hereditary equipment and acquired content: so that its idealiz- 
 ing activities are constrained to move within a definite circle of 
 experience. Man's physical heredity guarantees on the average 
 a native disposition adapted to a social economy, so that response 
 to social situations is possible long before any intellectual appre- 
 hension of social relations is reached. Instinct finds expression 
 in conscious processes in the form of desire, first in connection 
 with purely practical acts concerned with vital ends, then in 
 connection with apperceptive processes that aim at the removal 
 of some conflict in the world of things, and still later at the 
 removal of conflict within the world of ideas. But even in the 
 universe of abstract relations, the desires of our common human- 
 ity come in to direct the imagination and the understanding in the 
 construction of an ideal through which these desires are to 
 receive ampler satisfaction. The moral reason views existing 
 imperfections in their relation to an infinite process of devel- 
 opment, and in this way satisfies in part the desire for harmony 
 and order in the objective moral world. But it does not rest 
 content with merely doing this. Though the intellectual proc- 
 esses excited by conflict in the universe of ideal desires are 
 
TIJE ASOCIAL WILL. 55 
 
 in some measure independent of practical volition, the primitive 
 tendency of the mind toward action never completely disappears. 
 The moral v^ill is preeminently a practical will, striving after 
 something more fundamental than consistency of ideation — 
 striving in fact after a consistency co-extensive with the person- 
 ality in its thought, feeling and action. Again, an ideal far 
 removed from the existing moral sentiment of the community, 
 although it is a logical development of that, cannot command a 
 passionate devotion from the people because of its lack of apper- 
 ceptive contact with the social mind. The impractical moral 
 ideal thus fails to find serious lodgment in the public mind, not 
 only because it fails as a postulate of the practical will to unify 
 the desires already ascendant in a more satisfactory manner 
 than at present, but also because its pursuit involves too much 
 pain and effort. The ideal must fit into the preformed mechan- 
 ism of the social disposition and be able to organize the practical 
 interests of life. There is continually going on a selection of 
 ideals, and even at times a selection of the idealist. Preoccu- 
 pation with ideal interests, to the neglect of vital conditions, 
 brings into play the forces of physical selection. Competition 
 between races with the resulting selection maintains a certain 
 harmony between the national ideal and the national character. 
 If the practical activities excited by the ideal are uniformly 
 unsuccessful, the ideal soon loses its ascendancy. The Roman 
 ideal of universal empire feeds on the success of Roman arms. 
 
 10. The utility of an ideal lies not alone in the harmony and 
 consistency of life which it makes possible, but also in the hope 
 and courage and through them the vigor of life which it inspires. 
 One of the peculiar traits of moral feeling is the permanent 
 satisfaction which it brings the individual, no matter what the 
 external accidents of his career may be. The finely constituted 
 moral nature feels that, no matter what obstacles have prevented 
 it from achieving a career rich in material content, it has still 
 nobly fulfilled its destiny in the world by putting forth every 
 effort to live the moral law as it conceived the same. 
 
 11. (a) The individual cherishes an ideal not only of him- 
 self but of the social order of which he is a part. The interaction 
 of these common desires of individual minds forms a collective 
 
56 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 process that is a social ideal. The social ideal is generally much 
 vaguer in its lineaments than the individual ideal, yet is frequently 
 a powerful stimulus to action because of the social emotion which 
 stands back of it. In the social ideal the collective mind expres- 
 ses as clearly as it can the desires which it has in regard to its 
 own constitution. The social ideal is generally most clearly 
 understood by the ruling class, who are the chief organs in the 
 selection of means and ends in the actual historic process in 
 which the ideal strives to embody itself. But almost every 
 individual consciousness feels to some extent national senti- 
 ments, no matter how lowly its organization may be. History, 
 literature, myth, folk-lore, in short, all tradition relating to the 
 deeper emotional interests, bring the ideal into more or less 
 clear expression in the individual mind. We may thus speak 
 with propriety of a national ideal so far as there exists in indi- 
 vidual minds a common motive to volitions that aim at realizing 
 a particular type of social personality. Usually the social person- 
 ality moves on a much lower ethical plane than the more exalted 
 individual wills. Nations, in their dealings with each other, 
 have been actuated largely by prudential motives, for the 
 reason that the national safety has been regarded as of supreme 
 value. The broader sympathy which has followed from com- 
 mercial intercourse and the ascendancy of a religion preaching 
 the brotherhood of man, has mitigated somewhat this national 
 egoism. We get evidence of a movement toward a higher plane 
 of collective ethics in some matters of international concern in 
 the idea that the lives of all nations have a moral worth in part 
 relative to a collective process that embraces all humanity. 
 
 1 1 . (b) A higher form of collective ethics means more com- 
 prehensive apperceptive control in the social mind. Moral con- 
 flict involves the mutual restraint as well as the mutual assistance 
 of mental systems which are components of the personality. 
 In a healthy condition of public morals, when rights are carefully 
 protected through the strict and impartial enforcement of the 
 law, the desires and volitions of the various social groups are 
 harmoniously combined in the social will. There is a full and 
 complete synthesis of the claims and interests of the various 
 groups according to accepted standards of right. On the other 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 57 
 
 hand when there is a systematic violation of the rights of any 
 class, we have a partial and incomplete synthesis of mental proc- 
 esses in the social mind, due to the suppression of the desires 
 and volitions of the social group. The suppressed volitions 
 assert themselves as soon as the restraint is withdrawn, causing 
 a renewal of the mental conflict. In such periods of public 
 disorder, motives of the social will do not restrain each other 
 but add their energy one to another along the line of violence 
 and confusion. 
 
 12. The moral springs of action are kept in a healthy 
 condition only by effort. The social will in its effort to restrain 
 the individual will into harmony with itself, strengthens the 
 habits on which its character is founded and invigorates its emo- 
 tional life. All social institutions rest upon conflict in the 
 processes of the social mind, since through conflict the social 
 will is spurred on to constant endeavor, and thus escapes the 
 penalty of idleness, — extinction and decay. The resistance of 
 the physical gives us our industrial economy: of ignorance, our 
 educational economy: of evil, our moral economy. I speak of 
 these as economy: for running through them is the law of rational 
 effort which aims at a maximum of achievement for a given 
 expenditure. 
 
 13. The primary ethical feelings of love, friendship, duty, 
 obligation, attach most firmly to the ascendant personal universe 
 of the individual. What particular group of persons shall con- 
 stitute the personnel of this universe, depends upon the factors 
 which determine the strength of mental systems. In the early 
 stages of social growth, the ascendancy lies in the tribal asso- 
 ciation. Other forms of association like the family are too 
 unstable to furnish a definite set of experiences that will organ- 
 ize into a permanent universe of personal or social relations. 
 The tribal union is the instrument most concerned in the preser- 
 vation of social life in the early struggle for existence; and 
 round it are associated the most vivid, most intense and most 
 frequent of social experiences. The result is that the conscious- 
 ness of tribal ends forms the most stable mental system in the 
 individual mind, attracting to itself the moral feelings that are 
 the first to appear in social progress. Further mental develop- 
 
58 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 ment of the social personality brings changes tending in two 
 directions: one which is intensive, permeated by the intense 
 feeling of natural affection, resulting in the partial will of the 
 family group; the other extensive, embracing a multitude of 
 personalities within its scope, the will of the state. The will of 
 the family group is the first form which appears in that process 
 of infoldment in the social will that gives us ultimately an indi- 
 vidual will which has ends of its own, and which enables the 
 social will to find self-conscious expression. The collective 
 result of this process of infoldment is a rational social will 
 declaring itself through the agency of the state. Corresponding 
 to these two wills of the family and the state, are two systems of 
 moral motives in the individual mind, differing somewhat in 
 their constitution. In the sphere of family relations the most 
 fundamental motive is the feeling of natural affection, the tend- 
 ency of which is toward a complete obliteration of individual 
 and group interests, as separable factors, while in the sphere of 
 civic relations the sentiment of law, or the feeling of legal right, 
 is the basic motive — a motive of the understanding in which 
 more or less complete abstraction is made of the concrete deter- 
 minations of personality, and the individual is viewed simply 
 as the subject of certain rights and reciprocal duties. 
 
 14. Certain ceremonies, in particular the ceremony of adop- 
 tion, helped to extend the rigid limits which custom imposed 
 on the morality of primitive times. It is but natural that the 
 stranger should be practically without rights according to the 
 standards of primitive morality, for the reason that the savage 
 sees the individual only in the light of tribal ends, and so excludes 
 the stranger from the scope of social feeling. The thought of the 
 stranger as the member of some unknown or hostile tribe arouses 
 in the mind of the savage a real mental conflict, just as soon as 
 the feelings of common humanity begin to prompt him to extend 
 to the stranger the privileges of his family or clan. The device 
 of adoption according to the primitive way of thinking changes 
 the personality of the stranger in a manner satisfying to the 
 demands of tribal safety, and creates between the stranger and 
 the savage a system of reciprocal rights and duties sustained by 
 the common impulses which the tribal will aroused in their 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 59 
 
 minds. Adoption extends the sphere of obligation without 
 impairing the strength of the feeling, since the ceremony itself 
 is a solemn affair by which the sanction of the tribal gods is 
 obtained for a more intimate personal relation. It makes the 
 limits of social feeling more elastic, but could evidently work 
 only little change in the mental disposition of the tribe, founded 
 as it is upon rigid customs. Far more powerful for change is 
 the contact brought about by war or commerce; especially if 
 political union under a single head is the result, provided the 
 two cultures are equally virile, or nearly enough so, in order 
 that one may not completely extinguish the other. With the 
 thorough intermixture of the two races, goes on a corresponding 
 incorporation of their cultures, resulting in a more complex 
 civilization, and a greater openness to foreign influences. The 
 individual moral universe has been both broadened and deep- 
 ened : the virtues common to the two cultures have now a w^ider 
 social validity, while each culture has contributed some virtues 
 peculiar to itself. 
 
 15. Besides the rules of conduct valid for the entire social 
 order, there are special rules valid only within some particular 
 social group. This necessarily results from the fact that social 
 groups have desires and sentiments of their own. Certain vir- 
 tues are more fundamental to the life of one group than they are 
 to another. The differentiation in class morality is for obvious 
 reasons pronounced when social classes are rigidly separated 
 from each other by hereditary lines. The desire of the superior 
 caste to maintain their ascendancy leads to the adoption of 
 elaborate ceremonials and usages which make the difference in 
 rank plain to the eye and so accustom all to the thought of 
 rank as a just and necessary principle of social organization. 
 Moral respectability lies chiefly in meeting the ceremonial exac- 
 tions of one's caste. A socialization of caste morality begins 
 when an interchange of thought and feeling between the differ- 
 ent castes sets in. The movement of ideas is more rapid from 
 above downward, as the intellectual fermentation in the upper 
 social ranks is the more vigorous; but in compensation there is 
 a slower and more massive flow of social feeling upward from 
 the heart of the multitude which suffuses the whole social life. 
 
6o EDWIN ANDREW HAY DEN. 
 
 The combined result is a system of national virtues that serve 
 as a groundwork for the more special virtues of the various 
 social classes. 
 
 1 6. A social life of manifold activities, characterized by a 
 rapid interchange of ideas, is governed less by habit and more 
 by a consensus of motive resulting from an openness to sugges- 
 tions and impressions along numerous lines. Such openness is 
 due to the increased range of individual experience which makes 
 possible the elaboration of mental systems of varied content. 
 The resulting increase in the breadth of sympathy leads to a 
 change in moral values. The past no longer commands the 
 obedience and loyalty that it once did, for its sanctions lose 
 something of their former force, owing to a growing dispo- 
 sition to accept the institutions of the past for what they are 
 worth as contributing much or little toward realizing the domi- 
 nant ideals of the present. While the individual will has now 
 vastly extended its realm of social relation, it has been to some 
 extent forced to make abstraction of those details of personality 
 which were formerly the chief source of inspiration and strength. 
 Though the old feelings which clustered around the narrow but 
 deep personal experience of family life have been somewhat 
 weakened by the change, in their stead have come others which 
 may even more constrain the individual will to self-sacrifice. 
 The individual mind is assailed by an indefinitely larger num- 
 ber of impressions, and so far as these have a common tend- 
 ency they organize in a cumulative way into motives of con- 
 siderable strength. But the relaxing of the bonds of traditionary 
 constraint which results from the openness of the individual 
 mind to social impressions of numerous orders, makes possible 
 a great number of ideas which may be operative in determining 
 the activity of the imagination to the construction of a corre- 
 sponding number of ideals. Some confusion then results in the 
 matter of moral values. This invariably happens in the opening 
 up of new lines of social endeavor. It becomes at times under 
 such conditions difficult to subsume all the concrete acts of 
 practical conduct under the old moral principles. The diffi- 
 culty continues until through the mutual inhibition of antago- 
 nistic motives and the rational synthesis of harmonious incen- 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 6 1 
 
 tives, the will is supplied with some definite moral concept that 
 sobers and tempers the imagination. Once that confusion exists 
 as to moral values within a particular domain of social life 
 egoism asserts itself in the more vigorous natures and causes 
 self-deception in regard to the moral quality of actual achieve- 
 ment. When some conception emerges capable of harmonizing 
 some of the new practices with the great body of accumulated 
 moral precepts, the accidental and the transient, which are 
 essentially the immoral complications in the situation, disappear 
 and the social mind goes back in thought and feeling to the 
 permanent ends which are the indispensable basis of all devel- 
 opment. 
 
 17. The principles of morality thus seem to stand in vital 
 relation to the mental health of the individual and social will. 
 Certain disturbances of feeling are symptomatic of mental dis- 
 order: melancholia, for instance, indicates the severance of the 
 natural relation between feeling and action: the mind becomes 
 suspicious of itself, suspecting the sincerity of its own motives; 
 minutely attentive to its feelings in themselves for no ulterior 
 reason. In the excitement of mania, on the other hand, the 
 mental life expands: projects enter the mind with astonishing 
 rapidity, in utter disregard of physical possibility or of moral 
 obligation. But out of the fury nothing permanent emerges, 
 for the very violence of the emotive processes suspends the apper- 
 ceptive activity necessary to efficient mental work. Contrast 
 with these two conditions that of a mind sound in its moral 
 constitution. In the latter we see a general hopefulness, faith, 
 respect for self and others urging the will on to systematic and 
 controlled endeavor. Much the same may be said of the social 
 mind. Faith in itself, hopefulness of the future, reverence for 
 the past, a sentiment of honor and of law — these in moderation 
 are the indispensable conditions of high efficiency in the social 
 will. Wide-spread corruption, especially if it occurs with a 
 general state of social apathy and indifference, is an unmistak- 
 able sign of social decay. These conditions are of course reflected 
 in the individual life; but such demoralization of individual life 
 differs both in its origin and in its nature from personal degen- 
 eracy. The former is due to a lack of proper discipHne from 
 
62 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 the social medium; the latter to an internal derangement of the 
 personality resting on an impaired physical heredity. But there 
 are some cases where the two merge imperceptibly into each 
 other: many succumb to temptation in times of profound social 
 disorder and excitement who under less exacting conditions 
 would round out a career of decency and respectability. There 
 may be no impairment in the abstract conceptions of right, 
 duty, law, justice, but the blunted moral feelings cause an 
 impairment of the practical moral judgment, so that the moral 
 identity of concrete acts that belong to the same moral category 
 is not perceived. Moral conceptions become detached from 
 moral attitudes and form a sort of floating mental system. 
 Moral feeling "is a function of organization,'' writes Maudsley, 
 "and is essentially dependent upon the integrity of that part of 
 the nervous system which ministers to its manifestations as is 
 any other display of mental function. Its sanction is given to 
 such actions as are conducive to the well-being and the progress 
 of the race, and its prohibitions fall upon such actions as would, 
 if freely indulged in, lead to degeneration if not extinction of 
 mankind." Moral feeling then is the most sensitive index of 
 the mental integrity of the individual who has received a thor- 
 ough training in a social environment enforcing rigorous stand- 
 ards of conduct. A delusion may seize a community and lead 
 to official acts that violate all canons of justice and mercy, as 
 did the witchcraft delusion at Salem; but seizures of this sort 
 are usually ephemeral, as history testifies. They do not excite 
 the apprehension that a delusion of the individual mind does, 
 because they are largely a matter of the intellect, aroused by 
 external excitation, while a delusion of the individual mind 
 exists in spite of the innumerable impressions of the social envi- 
 ronment which tend to inhibit it. With this goes a derangement 
 of the aff'ective life which does not accompany a belief merely 
 erroneous. But in spite of these exceptions, the general proposi- 
 tion remains that the immoral life both public and private is the 
 life of disorder, confusion, violence and weakness. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF LEGAL RIGHT. 
 
 I. The social will, in its composite organization, lacks the 
 unity of the individual will in action, though motived by more 
 numerous and more comprehensive ends. As a mental system 
 it is composed of minor groups that can function in far greater 
 independence of each other than is the case with the contents 
 of the individual will. The affective processes are likewise 
 much more delicately balanced in the individual personality 
 than in the social personality. We find, for instance, a frenzy 
 of excitement spreading through a community which in the 
 case of the individual would indicate grave mental disorder in 
 the way of systematic mania. An emotion in spreading through 
 the social medium undergoes considerable mutation as it spreads 
 from one social stratum to another and even from one individual 
 to another within the same social stratum. Take the instance 
 of a piece of legislation which affects certain property rights. 
 The social classes who possess no property view the matter with 
 comparative indifference, while the particular group whose inter- 
 ests are threatened oppose in anger and indignation the pro- 
 posed legislation. The emotive attitude of the individual mind 
 toward a situation is for the moment unitary, but emotive pro- 
 cesses in the social mind may at a particular moment possess 
 all shades and variations. Now we have seen that the moral 
 consciousness is essentially the personal, the personaHty in 
 some form or other being the end of action. It is then evident 
 that the very condition for moral contact in its higher aspects, 
 is an intimacy of individual contact by which each comes to 
 have detailed knowledge of the personality of the other. As the 
 sphere of contact widens, the finer and more delicate adjust- 
 ments of friendship cease, partly because of a lack of intimate 
 knowledge of other people, and partly because of the absence of 
 certain emotive processes, instinctive in their nature, which 
 
64 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN, 
 
 the bare notion of social relations would not excite to any extent. 
 Intimacy sometimes arises from a community of interests, as in 
 the case of certain voluntary associations; but this is generally 
 feeble in comparison with that which arises out of the instinctive 
 needs of humanity. Still more attenuated is the personal feeling 
 when we pass to economic organization, where men enter into 
 coordinated activities largely from a desire for certain physical 
 objects capable of satisfying human want. The contact there 
 is reduced down to a sphere of ideas relating to physical proc- 
 esses. In so far, however, as in any of these spheres of contact, 
 the personality of the agent comes in as a conscious factor or 
 condition, rights and duties are created. Obligation attaches 
 to the contract between the employer and the laborer, as to the 
 rate of wages, hours of work, etc., not because of the laborer's 
 position in the industrial organization as an economic force, 
 but because in and through the terms of the contract ramifies 
 the personality of each. Now it is evident that an emotion 
 which arises from intimate personal knowledge and relation can 
 never be a motive to the social will in the full sense of the term. 
 In order to rise to the level of social motivation, an idea must 
 arouse those mental systems which are organized with approxi- 
 mate equality in each individual mind. The social will, in so 
 far as it is truly social, aims at ends valid for the whole social 
 organization, and never makes the individual as such the direct 
 object of volition, or, in other wordsy the personality of the indi- 
 vidual comes in merely as an incident in the pursuance of gen- 
 eral ends. The juristic personality is merely an abstract concep- 
 tion, a construct of the understanding and reason, and is a conven- 
 ient fiction by means of which legal relations are systematically 
 thought of. Thus the law specifies certain mental qualifications 
 necessary for testamentary competency, and in doing so takes 
 account of certain well-known facts of human nature : but even 
 in the judicial application of the law, where the law comes in 
 contact with the concrete personality, the history of that person- 
 ality is a matter of concern only in so far as it helps to determine 
 whether the given individual possesses the specified soundness 
 of mind. The law is interested in maintaining some and sup- 
 pressing other systems of personal relationship more than it is 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 65 
 
 in the instrument of these relationships, the concrete personality, 
 although it is constrained to operate through the latter in doing 
 so. This, of course, is the ideal of what the law should be, 
 rather than the practice which actually obtains, though it is a 
 psychologic fact like any other ideal. 
 
 2. The first way in which the social will acts upon the indi- 
 vidual will is in the way of restraint, through the mechanism 
 of the law. It arises out of conflict between individual wills 
 which disturbs the consciousness of right of the community 
 and especially the consciousness of right as organized in the 
 government. The psychologic difference between the conscious- 
 ness of law as it exists in the mind of the community and in the 
 mind of the government may be expressed by saying that in the 
 first case it has more of the nature of a sentiment and in the 
 second more that of volition. The fundamental condition for 
 this inhibitive reaction of the social will is the externalization 
 of the idea in the individual mind in the form of some act, since 
 this is the only way in which an idea in the individual mind can 
 set going a collective process. The reaction of the social will 
 has a double effect: one on the individual will and the other on 
 the social will itself. The individual will has the consciousness 
 of its guilt brought before it, and at the same time through the 
 special discipline to which it is subjected, may undergo an 
 educative process that leads to the formation of a character as 
 harmonious, at least, to the social will as the condition of per- 
 sonal liberty demands. In other words, the excesses of the 
 individual will are brought within the Hmits of tolerance of the 
 social will. The crime conflicts with the consciousness of law 
 in the public mind. If the crime goes unpunished, there is a 
 blunting of the feeling of legal right. As soon as a community 
 habituates itself to letting crimes go unpunished, the feeHng of 
 hostility which the infraction of right arouses, weakens, as no 
 feeling remains intact which becomes permanently disjoined 
 from the corresponding act. Punishment maintains the integ- 
 rity of the feeling of right in the social mind, because it furnishes 
 a definite channel for the expression of the feeling and thus avoids 
 the paralyzing effect of what would be otherwise a mere emotional 
 fermentation, besides emphasizing the concept of the right. 
 
66 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 The social will also comes into contact with the individual will 
 in a more positive fashion, performing functions that are more 
 creative than those of mere inhibitive supervision. The social 
 will as organized in the state sets before itself certain specific 
 ends that aim at realizing a certain type of social personality. 
 The state appears as an undertaker in various enterprises 
 whose magnitude is so great and the return for which is so 
 remote and imperceptible that private associations are not dis- 
 posed to assume the risk. The most powerful motive in private 
 association, outside of religious impulse, is the economic one. 
 As economic value rests upon scarcity, implying limitations in 
 the powers of production, there are many things desirable 
 because of their social utility whose pursuit cannot be brought 
 within the scope of this motive. Many lines of endeavor which 
 from the standpoint of immediate economic return, appear 
 insane and delusive, like the chemical tinkering of the alchem- 
 ists, do yield in the course of centuries enormous returns on the 
 energy invested. Back of all economic activity must be a senti- 
 ment of patriotism, of religion and of kinship. A high indus- 
 trial economy comes only after centuries of effort during which 
 an intense race spirit and consciousness has been fabricated. 
 An ardent race feeling is an absolute necessity for survival in 
 the struggle for existence going on among competing social 
 groups. Let a nation lose faith in itself; let it become indifferent 
 to its own past achievements, and view without emotion the 
 sacrifices of its martyrs and heroes; let mutual trust and confi- 
 dence, sympathy and virtue pass away and its doom is sealed. 
 A national song or hymn, a work of great poetic genius — in 
 short, art in all its varied forms gives articulate expression to 
 the deepest hopes and aspirations of a people and so converts 
 a vague emotional tendency into a social volition that molds 
 the national life and raises the plane of collective endeavor both 
 in the way of its spiritual and material achievements. In the 
 encouragement, direction and control of the social agencies 
 making for the higher life — even in some cases directly super- 
 vising them — the state appears as the most efficient instrument 
 of the social will. 
 
 3. The contrast between the legal and the moral in regard 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 6/ 
 
 to personal relations, pointed out in the opening paragraph of 
 this chapter, calls for further consideration. We may speak of 
 the impersonal character of certain social relations, not in the 
 sense that they are relations holding of impersonal, i. e., phys- 
 ical things, but in the sense that the universe of intercourse 
 between the minds concerned is a mental system in which 
 abstraction is made of the specific determinations of personality. 
 When a judge, for example, renders a decision in strict accord 
 with the merits of the case, as we say, he is treating the matter 
 in a way as objective as a scientist does the facts of nature. His 
 personality is simply the instrument through which the social 
 will expresses itself in respect to the point in question. Of course 
 self-feeling may be present but not in the way of prejudice 
 against or sympathy for the party to the case: it is present in 
 connection with the ideal he has of himself as the impartial 
 administrator of the law. But in accordance with the fact that 
 any mental system shares in some degree the unity of the per- 
 sonality, there is reflected into the decision to some extent the 
 personal bias of the judge, either unconsciously through the 
 limitation of habit and temperament, or consciously with a 
 knowledge that such is the case. The result is dependent upon 
 the special circumstances. In the case of the intended depart- 
 ure from the strict demands of the law, if it is done from preju- 
 dice, passion, hatred, and other egoistic motives of no moral 
 worth, positive mischief is the probable result; if the departure 
 is made from a consideration of the higher moral ends of social 
 welfare, and if no injustice is done thereby to any particular 
 person, undisputed gain follows in the way of making the law 
 as a whole a more efficient instrument of social progress. The 
 unintended modification of the law goes on through judicial 
 interpretation. The law at best can only deal with classes of 
 acts, with only very general reference to the material conditions 
 of the act : so that acts are continually occuring which diff'er so 
 much in their material circumstances from anything previously 
 coming under judicial cognizance, that the highest legal insight 
 is demanded in dealing with them. Right here is an oppor- 
 tunity for the development of professional and technical 
 opinion through the collaboration of decisions that grow 
 
68 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 and expand in the course of time to such an extent that a new 
 right has been created. In this collaboration of judicial opinion 
 are acting also those general social influences modifying the 
 spirit of the entire legal system. But it is the manifest ideal of 
 justice to reduce the personal factor to a minimum, and to do 
 this certain checks and balances are introduced in the judicial 
 machinery. In some cases appeal is permitted; in other cases 
 the verdict is a collective decision of a court consisting of sev- 
 eral judges. A collective verdict is held to minimize personal 
 bias by broadening the view of the case through the interchange 
 of judicial opinion and the cancellation of irrational or chance 
 factors. The law should correspond with the general sentiment 
 of justice in the community, though it frequently happens that 
 a law securing a fair average of justice in former times no 
 longer expresses in many of its details the existing social senti- 
 ment. Judicial interpretation plays an important part in main- 
 taining the vitality of the law by a process of slow but continuous 
 adjustment to social changes. The legal sentiment of a com- 
 munity is in a healthy condition when it does not consist of the 
 mere motive to preserve the legal system, but of a willingness 
 to obey it because it is felt to be the most important objective 
 condition in the moral progress of mankind. 
 
 4. The consciousness of law varies in its organization in the 
 minds of the various social groups. It is most sensitively con- 
 stituted with respect to those rights the maintenance of which 
 is most necessary to the ends and purposes of the group life, as 
 determined by the psychological conditions governing the 
 strength and stability of mental systems. Out of the experiences 
 which enter into the composition of the dominant universe in 
 the mind of the group, imagination develops an ideal which the 
 group seeks to impose upon its members — the ideal through 
 which the group-conscience declares itself: nonconformity to 
 which on the part of the individual will calls forth the reaction 
 of the group will, sometimes in the way of personal disapproval, 
 at other times in the way of compulsion exercised through the 
 channels of the law. It is in those fundamental points round 
 which the self-feeling of the group flows, that the individual is 
 likely to have the clearest consciousness of right as defended 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 69 
 
 and protected by the law. The consciousness of legal right, if 
 it really figures as a motive to the will, is something more 
 than a mere system of abstract concepts of the rights and duties 
 enforced by the law: back of these must be the self-feeling which 
 arises when something is felt to be an important condition of 
 the welfare of the self. It is especially on the side of feeling that 
 the vigorous enforcement of the law strengthens the conscious- 
 ness of legal right. If officials are derelict in their sworn duty, 
 allowing an open violation of the law, the injury done extends 
 far beyond the incidents of the particular case; the feeling and 
 respect for all law is weakened in the public mind. Not only 
 is the strict enforcement of the law in those cases in which the 
 state takes the initiative in punishing, of fundamental impor- 
 tance in keeping alive the feeling for the law in the public mind, 
 but perhaps equally important is the action of the individual 
 in asserting his right in cases where the state leaves the enforce- 
 ment of the right optional with the individual. Where the indi- 
 vidual puts forth his own effort to assert the supremacy of the 
 law, although it may be from a purely egoistic motive to pain 
 his assailant or recover material damages, and not for the sake 
 of the law itself, still his own consciousness of law is strengthened 
 and through his example that of others. In fact the failure to 
 assert the right impairs to some extent the moral vigor of the 
 individual concerned, for his self-feeling has been aroused with- 
 out issuing into appropriate action. The willingness to abandon 
 one's own right, even if the law views it with indifference, is 
 incompatible with that sturdy and manly sense of justice and 
 of law demanded of every citizen of a democracy. A virile 
 sense of right in the minds of the great mass of people is the / 
 best safeguard against the prostitution of public interests by 
 corrupt officials, for it makes demands of them in the way of 
 rectitude and honesty that a timid spirit, hesitating to demand 
 its dues, does not. 
 
 5. The energy with which the feeling is aroused in a conflict 
 of right, depends upon the conditions governing the interaction 
 of mental systems. The invasion of a legal right is a special 
 instance of conflict in the social mind. Some act is committed 
 which cannot be incorporated with the system of rights main- 
 
70 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 tained by the law: the act is an objective fact, a system of per- 
 ceptual relations, which arouses into full or partial activity the 
 system of ideas and feelings constituting the consciousness of 
 the right. Within certain limits the consciousness of legal right 
 is strong in proportion to the frequency with which the law is 
 invoked to resist the invasion of rights. Where the legal insti- 
 tutions have been developed largely as the result of national 
 effort, the nation is likely to have a healthy sense of justice. 
 Nothing confirms this proposition better than the history of 
 legal development in England, in particular that of the common 
 law which is a vast body of rights developed through judicial 
 decisions determining particular concrete rights. A people 
 which has much to do with the creation of its own laws, has its 
 consciousness of the fundamental principles of moral right and 
 justice largely bound up with the consciousness of law. A class 
 which has never made use of the law as a means of its material 
 or moral welfare, has no conception, much less a feeling of right. 
 The rights which it does have, are due largely to the good will 
 and conscience of the ruling classes. Rights which have been 
 thus conferred, and not won by effort, do not rest upon habits 
 of action firmly rooted in the personality of the class whose 
 welfare they sustain. Aggression does not call forth a moral 
 reaction in the form of disturbed feeling of right, but only the 
 response of animal hostility. Too much litigation may, however, 
 impair the consciousness of right. The enforcement of rights 
 through the agency of the law is a rough and harsh process; and 
 in the pain and irritation which is necessarily incident, the moral 
 feeling for the law is frequently lost in the feeling of revenge or 
 animosity. As soon as the law is severed in thought and feeling 
 from the consciousness of moral right, it may degenerate simply 
 into an instrument serving no purpose but to vex and harass 
 an enemy. 
 
 ( 6. The vividness and intensity of the experiences connected 
 with the establishing of a right, are important factors. That 
 which has been acquired at much cost and sacrifice, usually 
 stands in intimate relation to self-feeling, and has thus strong 
 affective elements back of it, helping to maintain its ascendancy. 
 A right gained through profound social disturbances is firmly 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 7 1 
 
 implanted in the memory and affection of the people : they feel 
 that they have put into it so much of their very life and being 
 that it is an integral part of themselves. A whole array of power- 
 ful sentiments and emotions — family affection, patriotism, reli- 
 gious feeling — is brought to the support of a right acquired at 
 the cost of the nation's blood and treasure. 
 
 7. The comprehensiveness of the interest involved affects 
 the stability of a right. A right which ramifies through the whole 
 social structure, will call forth proportional resistance to any 
 disturbance. If the given right is enjoyed by all social classes, 
 it is a motive to the whole will of society, and as such can com- 
 mand more energy to resist its invasion than only a particular 
 right. The zeal with which a people rush to the defense of the 
 national honor when assailed by a foreign power, shows the 
 strength of motives which are supported by a tide of emotion 
 surging through the entire current of social life. 
 
 8. A right derives strength from its interconnection with 
 other rights in a system of rights. Custom makes for self-con- 
 sciousness in a community in that it expresses a usage known 
 to be valid for the whole community, but the custom precedes 
 and does not follow as the result of a clearly conceived idea in 
 the social mind. When, however, specific declarations of the 
 social will exist in the form of statutory enactments, society has 
 arrived at a very clearly defined idea of the various ends of its 
 own existence, which form a relatively coherent system. There 
 emerges the consciousness of a system of law, over and above the 
 concrete laws which form its content. The idea of the legal 
 system comes to be a motive and leads to efforts looking to the 
 maintenance of the legal order itself. A law then acquires a 
 force as being the member of a system, beyond that which 
 comes from defending some particular right. 
 
 9. Where the enforcement of the right is a matter of option 
 with the individual, there is a likelihood that he will look at the 
 right and the consequences which flow from its invasion, largely 
 from the standpoint of his own private interests, ignoring the 
 wider social results in the way of the reflex influence of the 
 enforcement of a particular right upon the consciousness of 
 right in the mind of the community. So long as the enforcement 
 
72 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 of the right is left to the individual himself, it is subject to all 
 the caprices of individual temperament: personal feelings like 
 revenge, anger, jealousy, fear, come in to operate independent 
 of impersonal standards. There will consequently be irregu- 
 larity, excess, deficiency of action in the enforcement of the right. 
 The first step toward increasing the security of the right, con- 
 sists in surrounding the penalty which the injured party may 
 exact with certain limitations; here the violence and excess of 
 the individual will is checked by the social will which declares 
 itself through the particular rules. The volition in which the 
 individual exacts vengeance, comes to include social motives 
 that subject the emotive elements of the volition to some 
 restraint. The right of punishment is first felt in the history 
 of legal development as largely an individual matter. The 
 socialization of the primitive power exercised by the individual 
 / in avenging his own wrongs reaches its final stage when the 
 j right of punishment is taken entirely out of the hands of the 
 ' individual and vested in some regularly constituted authority 
 which represents the community in the case. The changes which 
 have occurred in the meantime in the individual and public 
 consciousness of right, are numerous. In a general way moral 
 conceptions have become more clearly defined in the social 
 mind : the social mind has reached some consciousness of itself 
 as a moral entity, in both idea and feeling, as is attested by the 
 fact that its own will is now authoritative in the punishment 
 of crime; while the individual now views crime from a wider 
 social standpoint, seeing that conceptions of certain social stand- 
 ards, apprehended as valid for all minds, now enter into the 
 composition of his idea of crime. Further, the state in making 
 general provision in an authorized agency for the punishment 
 of crime has been actuated by motives of general validity, and 
 not by feelings and ideas arising out of a particular case. Thus 
 the state has provided in the personality of its agents a psychic 
 device for the judging of crime which makes accidental feelings 
 and ideas, such as arise in the mind of the injured person, as 
 little determinative as possible. Of course feeling is necessary 
 in any volition, whether public or private; but it is a very impor- 
 tant matter for legal development whether such feeling be objec- 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 73 
 
 tive, relating to the mechanism of social acts, or subjective, 
 relating to the personality of the individual in relative detach- 
 ment from the social v^hole. 
 
 10. Mental conflict has played a considerable part in the 
 development of legal right. Those rights for which society 
 maintains an elaborate protective agency, are evidently vital to 
 institutions and relations v^hich society regards of fundamental 
 importance. The value which the social will attaches to them, 
 is measured by the vigor of the resistance it offers to the invasion 
 of them. In the domain of legal right the social disposition is 
 receiving articulate expression in certain specific declarations of 
 the social will. The mass of social experience which is here in 
 function is so great that the resulting mental inertia resists 
 change. Old legal rights are thus imbedded in psychic mechan- 
 isms of considerable stability. Many of the most fundamental 
 rights have been secured only by revolutionary means, that is, 
 by profound disturbances in the social personality in which not 
 only have old habits been broken up but new conceptions of 
 social and political values have emerged. But the mental con- 
 flict involved in the creation of legal rights, is seen not only in 
 those more profound psychic movements which involve more or 
 less the whole social will, but also in those more limited mental 
 processes in which the will of the individual or group is con- 
 cerned. Legal rights which are judicial affirmations of pre- 
 existing customs and usages, have arisen in these minor conflicts 
 of the individual or group will. The experiences of effort and 
 struggle, which accompany the mental conflict, act as powerful 
 motives to maintain the right during the first stages of its ascend- 
 ancy. As the assertion of the right becomes more and more a 
 matter of habit, these experiences lapse from memory, and 
 leave the right a rule whose origin is no longer felt. In the 
 absence of direct historic instruction to the contrary, the indi- 
 vidual born into an old social order in which thorough harmony 
 existed between the legal institutions and the national character, 
 would be ignorant of the nature of the real process by which 
 the idea of a legal right rises to the status of volition in the 
 public mind. 
 
 II. The extent to which the individual feels the law as a 
 
74 EDWIN ANDREW HAYDEN. 
 
 constraint depends upon the degree to which it restricts the 
 spontaneous flow of thought in his own mind. If a strong desire 
 arises in his mind that runs counter to the law, his processes of 
 thought are blocked, and the idea of the law as an objective 
 condition of conduct comes into full consciousness. While the 
 psychological nature of these conflicts is much the same as that 
 of any other conflict, the moral significance of the conflict varies 
 considerably. 
 
 ^ 12. The atomistic way of conceiving social relations looks 
 /iipon the state largely as a coercive agency standing over in 
 somewhat mechanical opposition to the individual. The power 
 of compulsory subordination which the state possesses is of 
 course one of the fundamental incidents of its constitution, but 
 to emphasize this aspect of state function to the exclusion of 
 others, shows a serious lack of insight into the mental nature of 
 society. Civil institutions are from such a standpoint merely 
 artificial arrangements which men can enter into as freely and 
 dissolve as freely as they do a business corporation or any other 
 purposive association. Those processes in the mind of the 
 individual in which he thinks, feels and wills the part of a 
 citizen, are, however, possible only because his mind and the 
 other minds of the particular political order, interact in a col- 
 lective mental process that extends backward through many 
 centuries. The same historic development which has given 
 legal and political institutions and relations, has created the 
 citizen as the subject of legal and political rights, with his love 
 of liberty and his sentiment of law. It is only in a social order 
 that a personality can exist, i. e., a psychic entity in which the 
 consciousness of its own being is a motive; and of course there 
 is implied in all this corresponding institutions that maintain 
 objective conditions that render this motive effective. 
 
 13. In the desire for freedom the individual does not view 
 himself as isolated from others, but as a member of a mental com- 
 munity in which a certain range of free determination of indi- 
 vidual volition is secured through a system of reciprocal rights 
 and duties. The practice of freedom must to some extent 
 precede the desire for freedom. An animal is sometimes said 
 to "desire its freedom" through a courtesy of speech that has 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 75 
 
 no strict regard for psychologic fact; but in the light of the 
 discussion of desire given in a previous chapter, it is evident 
 that the motive impelling the animal to escape its confines is a 
 feeling of unpleasantness resulting from impeded action. A/ 
 social desire like the desire for civic freedom can arise in the>^!l_ 
 individual mind only as the result of its interaction with other /*^ 
 minds in which the same desire is simultaneously developed,) 
 and thus presupposes certain social practices and experiences 
 out of which the mind can elaborate it. The routine of social 
 experience necessary to the development of definite and fixed 
 legal and political concepts implies objectively modes of conduct 
 generally obtaining in the social order, and corresponding 
 rights with a regularly constituted agency to enforce them. The 
 common consciousness of right means, therefore, a general har- 
 mony between the volitions of the individual will and those of 
 the social will, though at times conflict at some points of contact 
 occurs. 
 
 14. The particular institutions through which the feeling of 
 right expresses itself, define and make real the feeling by con- 
 necting it with definite forms of activity. The individual, so 
 far as he is aware of the authority which by common consent 
 is vested in these institutions, has a conception of a common end 
 which is being furthered by their enforcement, and must on the 
 whole regard them as equally indispensable to his own well- 
 being, though at particular times he may be blind to the truth 
 on account of some conflict with certain of his inclinations. To 
 the extent that such is the case obedience to the existing stand- 
 ards of right is a matter of free determination of the individual 
 will and not of constraint by a motive externally determined 
 and deriving but little support from the apperceptive activities 
 of the mind. The beginning of the consciousness of legal right) 
 as a moral condition of man's existence, is obedience to the\ 
 social standards of right expressed in custom. The social prepa- 
 ration which the discipline of custom makes for the higher 
 morality of duty, consists in forming habits that inhibit some 
 desires and in connection with these, a consciousness of a com- 
 mon welfare. A considerable portion of the motives which 
 make for obedience to law, consists of habits formed with refer- 
 
76 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 ence to concrete situations arising in the various private asso- 
 ciations of which the individual is a member. It is here because 
 of the more simple character of the social relations, that the 
 fact of a common life is most clearly conceived and strongly felt. 
 The opinion that the individual in passing from the life of the 
 simple social groups to the life of the larger group of a political 
 society, is completely bisected in his personality by the ascend- 
 ancy of an entirely new set of motives, is at variance with all 
 the laws of psychic causation. Undoubtedly a man in his func- 
 tion of a political subject is actuated by motives different in 
 some respects from those dominant in his mind in other spheres 
 of association; but still a considerable amount of psychic mate- 
 rial in the way of habit and idea is carried over from private 
 lines of social endeavor to public ones. Participation in the 
 common life of private associations, tends to develop a conscious- 
 ness of a collective well-being and a willingness to subordinate 
 in some degree individual preferences and inclinations to the 
 will of others, which will stand one in good stead in his civic 
 relations. 
 
 15. The organization of the consciousness of a common 
 well-being varies considerably in the history of culture. In the 
 early periods of social development when the social will comes 
 to expression in the individual consciousness chiefly in the form 
 of impulsive motives, the collective is felt rather than clearly 
 apprehended by the intellect. Historic effects have been organ- 
 ized in the social mind in habits and simple ideational systems 
 in which only the most obvious relations of cause and effect are 
 conceived. Any social movement is understood only through 
 the changes it produces in the concrete relations of one indi- 
 vidual to another. In the emotional excitement which at times 
 sweeps through the social order, the individual passes through 
 experiences of unusual intensity and is borne onward by a 
 stream of life which he is powerless to resist. But up to this 
 point the consciousness of a common life is a psychological, 
 not an ethical fact. The individual is moved to action by 
 motives externally excited, or by those which spring directly 
 out of the character or disposition and form a system of practi- 
 cal tendencies of the will. It has in it no ideal of a common 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 77 
 
 good. A somewhat higher stage is reached, not only so far as 
 the intellectual apprehension of social relations but in a more 
 important way so far as moral development is concerned, when 
 the particular relations through which the individual appre- 
 hends his connection with the social whole, are thought of as 
 a common good in which he and others share in realizing some 
 ideal of self. Whenever the law steps in to protect the individual 
 from the invasion of these rights, he has direct demonstrable 
 experience of the law as a practical condition of the moral order. 
 Indeed the firm connection between the idea of the law and voli- 
 tions operating within the practical relations of life is the neces- 
 sary element in any effective consciousness of legal right, no 
 matter what the individual's theoretical insight into the law as 
 a social factor may be; and it is really the absence of such asso- 
 ciation that in part makes possible the criminal mind. A weak 
 mental connection between the idea of the law and practical 
 volition indicates that the law is not fulfilling its true mission 
 in the social order : it indicates some serious lack of harmony 
 between the national character and the legal institutions. This 
 is the case when partial or group interests become ascendant 
 and use the law with all its accumulated energy to constrain 
 the social will into harmony with their demands; or when a 
 nation imposes its own laws upon a subject people without any 
 regard to native law or custom; or again when in the moral decay 
 of a nation, insincerity and apathy have seized a people, and 
 there is wanting the zeal and energy to enforce a system of laws 
 adapted to a sturdy and resolute character. Provided there is 
 widespread peace and security in the enjoyment of the ordinary 
 private rights of business and the other common relations of 
 life, considerable harmony between the legal institutions and 
 the social disposition may exist, with but little of that higher 
 ideahsm in the consciousness of law that makes the individual 
 take an active and watchful interest in the law as the most effi- 
 cient means of attaining the ends of collective welfare. He 
 looks upon the state much as he does a business partnership, 
 giving it his hearty support because he feels it as a practical 
 necessity. Perhaps the higher civic idealism is not attainable 
 in a social order where there is a sharp separation in thought 
 
78 EDWIN ANDREW HAT DEN. 
 
 and practice between political and legal rights. However ineffi- 
 cient in some, perhaps many respects, democracy may be as a 
 form of political organization, there is in it the possibility of the 
 average person rising to a higher moral plane in his conception 
 and feeling for the law than in a political order where the task 
 of legislation and administration is the work of an hereditary 
 class. 
 
 1 6. The consciousness of collective ends and existence 
 becomes more precise in its ideational contents not only through 
 the knowledge practically acquired through state affairs, but 
 from many theoretical disciplines like history, political science 
 and sociology. When to all this knowledge from whatever 
 source obtained, is added feeling strong enough to raise the 
 entire mental system to the status of a volition, a certain ideal of 
 national existence has emerged that is to be a practical force in 
 social life. And as the political organization is the medium 
 through which social organization is most authoritatively ex- 
 pressed, this ideal is most intimately associated both in thought 
 and deed with the activities of the state. This statement 
 must not be taken to mean that the ideal of collective ends has 
 been the sole motive or force acting to organize the social will 
 in the state, for as a matter of history other motives of inferior 
 moral worth have cooperated with it. The national ideal exists 
 imbedded in fact in a complex of experiences relating to indi- 
 vidual as well as social ends; but the fact of importance is that 
 the ideal exists, whatever may be its connections with other 
 mental states, and so makes to the extent of its ascendancy the 
 political order a moral one as well. No state would rest secure 
 even upon that higher form of selfishness, in which the individual 
 looks at things from the social point of view on account of pru- 
 dential motives. Egoism of itself tends to shrink the social 
 horizon and obscure in the individual mind conditions and rela- 
 tions that are necessary to the realization of his own ambition. 
 The calculation of purely personal advantage weakens the 
 strength and spontaneity of action which social life in so many 
 of its circumstances demands. A certain interest for the social 
 life in and of itself is a necessary condition for that enlarged 
 grasp of social relations without which a career successful in 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. yg 
 
 merely external achievement is possible. A motive aroused 
 solely by external constraint, i. e., one which excites an act 
 not because of its general harmony with the constitution of the 
 personality but because of its strength, could not be relied upon 
 to render uniform support to the interests of the state; for as 
 soon as the external circumstances which excited it pass away, 
 the feeling and desires which represent the organized tenden- 
 cies of the self are sure to assert themselves. It is precisely at 
 times when the political order needs the most defense that a 
 motive of this sort could be least relied upon. Mere restraint 
 could never create a personality as an organized system of 
 thought, feeling and volition; and to the extent that any insti- 
 tution rests upon coercion, is the mental life back of it narrow 
 and impoverished. Coercion is justified at times simply because 
 the repetition of a thing, even when done under compulsion, 
 forms a corresponding habit that may later function as a part 
 of a process which in its totality is free and rational. Despotism 
 for this reason has a sanction in the ethics of political develop- 
 ment. 
 
 1 7. Thus the state is not to be conceived as something over 
 and above the humanity which manifests itself through social 
 institutions. It is a collective phenomenon of a certain char- 
 acter existing in and through the reciprocal relations which the 
 members of society sustain to each other. Society as organized 
 in the state differs from society as organized in other forms in 
 the ends of its existence and the mode of attaining such ends. 
 The supreme compulsory power which is an incident of the 
 constitution of the state, derives social significance from the 
 fact that it is compulsion exercised according to law, maintain- 
 ing a system of rights which are necessary to a collective life. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE SOCIAL WILL AS EXPRESSED IN THE STATE! THE THEORY 
 OF SOVEREIGNTY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL BEARINGS. 
 
 1. The attribute which the state possesses, of being in cer- 
 tain cases the mo^t authoritative expression of the social will, 
 is generally spoken of by writers on political science as that of 
 sovereignty. It is particularly in this field of social phenomena 
 that political science and social psychology have much of their 
 data in common. For this reason, no doubt, political writers 
 have been prone to express their views on the authority of the 
 state in psychological terms. In fact, in the writings of some 
 authors we find a more or less clearly conceived psychological 
 theory of the state. But on the whole the history of the theory of 
 sovereignty reveals much confusion and vagueness, largely on 
 account of an inadequate social psychology. 
 
 2. There are two facts of social psychology which are basic 
 to an understanding of this subject: one is the reality of the 
 individual will and the other is the reality of the social will. 
 An attempt has been made in the preceding pages to show that 
 the reciprocal interaction of individual minds in a community 
 is a collective process having certain definite features; that 
 only in virtue of such interaction is it possible for the individual 
 mind to come to even a slight realization of its own powers; but 
 that although so far as its total history is concerned, continuous 
 social contact is implied, there is yet an apperceptive organi- 
 zation of experience which renders it relatively independent of 
 immediate stimulation. Now there are some things in the 
 interaction of individual minds which lead to nothing very defi- 
 nite along the line of conduct, such as vague sentiments and 
 various forms of emotional excitement. So long as such is the 
 case the public mind is in a state of confusion which continues 
 until in the process of interaction some individual mind is reached 
 in which are aroused apperceptive activities that issue in a clear 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL 8l 
 
 idea or concept, and in this way convert a vague emotional 
 tendency into a volitional process that is social in its scope. In 
 other words an individual personality is necessary to give artic- 
 ulate expression to social processes of thought and feeling before 
 any definite resolution of conflicts in the social mind is possible. 
 Once that a specific conception emerges at a point in the social 
 medium, provided it satisfies existing mental conditions, it is 
 forthwith incorporated by some system in the social mind. This 
 ** particularizing" function of the individual personality, to use 
 a term of Professor Baldwin's, seems to be the truth in the con- 
 tention of certain writers that sovereignty resides always in a 
 determinate body of persons; and so far as this is the case, they 
 have shown deeper insight into the constitution of society than 
 others who hold to an extreme universalism that does away once 
 for all with all individual determination.^ But it is possible 
 to conceive the independence of this particular body of persons 
 in too absolute a manner. Atomism in psychology and ethics 
 leads readily to atomism in political philosophy, in accordance 
 with which sovereignty is likely to be thought of too much as 
 physical coercion, commanding obedience through the motive 
 of fear with but little regard to the real needs of human nature 
 which a political order satisfies. The particular personality 
 through which social desire comes to articulate utterance, is an 
 outgrowth of the social life and can be considered as the source 
 of authority only in the relative sense that it makes an individual 
 contribution to a social tendency by converting the latter into 
 a more or less clearly defined movement. 
 
 3. The form of social control which writers on political 
 philosophy have in mind when speaking of sovereignty, is one 
 which comes rather late in the history of society. It presup- 
 poses a consciousness in which society has arrived at some recog- 
 nition of itself as a psychic entity, with defined concepts of 
 values in the various spheres of life, and some regularly consti- 
 tuted and authoritative means of putting into execution its pref- 
 erences. The volitional processes in which society declares its 
 will through the mechanism of the law, are complexes which in 
 their totality are consciously constituted with respect to par- 
 
 ^ The Austinians, e.g., in contrast to the French "Doctrinaires." 
 
82 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 ticular conflicts, yet contain parts which are automatic and 
 stable. Many of these automatic connections have had a long 
 social history, and were developed by association in the period 
 of the ascendancy of custom. These factors, which the usual 
 legal discussions overlook, are of fundamental importance in a 
 psychological analysis of the motives of political obedience. 
 
 4. It has frequently happened in the history of a people that 
 a partial social will — ^the will of some social group — became 
 ascendant in a universe of social relations and constrained the 
 great mass of individual wills through fear into certain unwel- 
 come modes of action. Such constraint, however, has usually 
 not extended to all departments of social life, but only to certain 
 external acts the performance of which left the deep undercur- 
 rent of social life undisturbed. The vast stream of social senti- 
 ment, desire, hope and ambition cannot be completely focalized 
 in any particular body of determinate persons. For this reason 
 despotisms even the most pronounced usually leave their sub- 
 jects free in the general course of events in their domestic and 
 religious life. Its constraint is felt chiefly in the levying of 
 tribute and impressing in the military service. In other spheres 
 the obedience of the people is due to sentiments and feelings of 
 a pervasive nature that reside rather in the consciousness of 
 society as a whole than in any one individual mind to the 
 exclusion of others. So far, however, as these sentiments and 
 feelings do come to clearer expression in some personalities than 
 in others, such personalities are centers of influence not because 
 of a power of compulsory subordination which they possess, but 
 because of their representative function in some association. 
 The influence which they wield may at times constrain indi- 
 vidual wills, relatively few in number, to acts that they would 
 not do of their own volition; but on the whole the influence 
 is possible simply because the people feel it to confirm and 
 strengthen their habitual sentiments and beliefs. Authority, 
 so far as it is despotic, i. e., so far as it merely represents the 
 will of a single person, or a class, and commands obedience 
 through compulsion — acts as a block to the flow of mental life 
 at the points of constraint, but the resulting mental conflict 
 does not lead to a healthy apperceptive activity in which mental 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 83 
 
 systems are united into a more comprehensive and unified sys- 
 tem, but simply to an arrest that means aversion. It is imma- 
 terial whether the despotism proceeds from a native or ahen 
 source, for the mental results are the same. Both attain their 
 ends by inciting the public mind to acts that do not flow freely 
 from its inner constitution. There is a suppression of sentiments 
 and feelings which under conditions of freedom would operate 
 to inhibit or perform certain acts. Extended to all departments 
 of life as a real principle of control, compulsory subordination 
 would ruin all creative mental activity on account of the 
 encroachment upon apperception by the habits of servility in 
 thought which are developed through mere compliance with 
 external authority. The body may become the mere passive 
 instrument of physical force, but the personality never, for the 
 very condition of its manifestation has been removed. 
 
 5. The ascendancy of the political power may be less coercive 
 and in more intimate contact with the social personality if it 
 exercises its will through the preformed disposition of society 
 which is mechanized in the ancient rights and customs. The 
 supremacy of English power in India furnishes an admirable 
 example of this more organic form of political and social contact. 
 According to Bryce,^ the English administrators in the time 
 of Clive and Warren Hastings, found in the native law, "First, 
 a large and elaborate system of Inheritance and Family Law. 
 . Secondly, a large mass of customs relating to the 
 occupation and use of land and of various rights concerned with 
 tillage and pasturage, including water-rights, rights of soil-accre- 
 tion on the banks of rivers, and forest rights Thirdly, 
 
 a body of customs, according to our ideas comparatively scanty 
 and undeveloped, but still important, relating to the transfer 
 and pledging of property, and to contracts, especially commer- 
 cial contracts Fourthly, certain penal rules drawn 
 
 from Musulman law and more or less enforced by Musulman 
 princes.'' *'In this state of facts the British officials took the 
 line which practical men, having their hands full of other work, 
 would naturally take, viz: the line of least resistance. They 
 
 ^ Studies in History and Jurisprudence^ p. 98. 
 
84 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 accepted and carried on what they found. Where there was 
 native law, they appHed it, Musulman law to Musulmans, 
 Hindu law to Hindus, and in the few places where they were to 
 be found, Parsi law to Parsis, Jain law to Jains. "^ Since that 
 time many acts have been passed codifying and amending the 
 native law, so that as a net result we have "the new stream of 
 united law which has its source in the codifying Acts ''2 and 
 "the various older streams of law, each representing a religion. " 
 Thus an ascendancy like that of British power in India, while 
 exercising but little direct coercion, really touches the life of the 
 subject people in a more vital manner than a military despotism 
 would. Instead of shrinking the mental life at the points of 
 contact by an inhibitive and contractile motive like fear, it really 
 amplifies it by giving greater stability and certainty to the flow 
 of native sentiment and feeling. English administration and 
 legislation has caused most changes in the native law in those 
 spheres where the native law was either meager or where because 
 of its peculiar nature it was comparatively flexible. The modi- 
 fication has been relatively superficial in those social relations 
 rooted in deep habits and strong sentiments. 
 
 6. In passing to cases where the law and the power that 
 enforces it are equally indigenous to the particular society; 
 where the law has had a slow and continuous growth through 
 trial and experiment in which the people themselves have played 
 an important role, we find the points of contact between the 
 legal institutions and the national character correspondingly 
 multiplied. There is here also a determinate person or body 
 of persons to whom in the first instance the making and enforc- 
 ing of laws is due; but here the ascendancy is due more than 
 in the other instances to the fact that the organized personality 
 of society finds on the whole an adequate expression of its will 
 through the instrumentality of such a body. Political power is 
 now a force that is concerned in the maintenance and protec- 
 tion of rights that meet general approval; in other words, with 
 the maintenance of general social conditions that are necessary 
 
 * Bryce, op. cit.y p. 99. 
 ^ Ihid., p. 105. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 85 
 
 to a certain freedom of volition. When a power of this sort 
 exists, which " prescribes forms and obhgations to all minor 
 purposive associations, and shapes the social composition,"^ it 
 may be fitly described as the organ of the social will, since it is 
 the medium through which habits and desires of the social mind 
 come to expression in an authoritative way, i. e., in a way that 
 commands the usual obedience of individual wills. 
 
 7. While the usual flow of social thought and feeHng comes 
 to regular and definite expression in the declarations of a deter- 
 minate body of persons, in time of serious disturbance it 
 frequently happens that no particular body of persons can be 
 pointed out as the one in which ultimate authority actually 
 resides. There is then no social will. Social volition has become 
 merely social emotion; and it would be as rational to apply the 
 term will to the ravings and fury of a madman as to the public 
 mind in a state of excitement. If there is any collective tend- 
 ency discernible in social thought and feeling, it arises from the 
 fact that some of the various motives competing in the public 
 mind through their massiveness and strength turn the tide of 
 social emotion in a particular direction. Under such conditions 
 there is no organized public sentiment and no particular will 
 through which the social will declares itself The usual motives 
 of obedience which at other times unite to produce a conscious- 
 ness of a commonweal, are out of function. The effect of such 
 a state of the public mind is seen objectively in the suspension 
 of private rights by which individual volition enjoys an amount 
 of freedom and encouragement otherwise impossible. Some 
 order emerges from this confusion when the points of conflict 
 become clearly defined, and society divides into two contending 
 parties, each having a degree of organization. There is now 
 no soveriegn power, for there is properly no social will in the 
 sense of an organized volitional process growing out of the 
 controlled interplay of individual minds. What we really have 
 is a division of the social personality with the mental processes 
 slightly organized about two competing centers. When society 
 is thus divided into two hostile camps, there is usually a con- 
 
 ^Giddings: Principles of Sociology y p. 174, ed. 1896. 
 
86 EDWIN ANDREW HATDEN. 
 
 siderable contraction in the volume of national life; for com- 
 merce and other pursuits are partially paralyzed. Within the 
 ranks of each party we see something of control and obedience: 
 each party has a leader, a definite body of persons to which 
 the rank and file render obedience — an obedience which at 
 times is far removed from servility, being inspired by a keen 
 sense of duty and a rational idea of common welfare and of the 
 interests at stake. But still it is true that private rights are 
 insecure under such conditions, even within the ranks of each 
 party, so that the individual is frequently compelled to do 
 things against his own inclinations, no matter how great may 
 be his general sympathy for the cause he defends. Fear comes 
 into the foreground of consciousness as one of the motives of 
 obedience at times of martial control. When the mental conflict 
 in the social mind is brought to an issue, the emotional excite- 
 ment abates, desire is again subordinated to rational control, 
 and a supreme social will once more emerges, having a definite 
 personal medium for the enforcement of its declarations. The 
 private rights, temporarily abridged, are restored, giving to the 
 individual will its former, and perhapts greater, range of free- 
 dom and activity. Now we have a personal agency exercising 
 supreme coercive power when necessary within the limits of a 
 system of public and private rights. But the authorized agency 
 of the state, viz: the government, has a personality in some 
 degree its own, and for this reason does not usually act as a 
 mere neutral medium of expression. Frequently its conduct is 
 dictated by egoistic and personal rather than legal and social 
 motives. Frequently too it acts as the molder of public opinion, 
 awakening the social consciousness to new matters of general 
 interest and importance so that the organ of sovereignty must 
 be looked upon as a social group having a will in a measure 
 peculiar to itself. It thus comes about that the sovereign power 
 may enforce laws which stand in conflict with the social will, 
 at variance with the general system of rights which guarantee 
 the individual freedom and protection in his ordinary pursuits. 
 8. The particular way in which the forces of social life select 
 the membership of the governing body, seems to stand in no 
 necessary relation to individual freedom — at best only remotely 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 87 
 
 SO. The opinion that a law in order to be an expression of the 
 social will must have the sanction of a majority ballot, rests 
 upon a superficial view of things. The arts of the demagogue 
 may so push private interests upon the attention of the public 
 that a majority opinion upon the matter in hand, as recorded 
 in a general ballot, does not express a rational volition, but 
 simply the desire of a crowd acting under suggestion; while the 
 decision of a select body, even if its membership is hereditary, 
 may more truly reflect the real will of society, in that it accords 
 faithfully with the spirit of the total system of public and private 
 rights obtaining under rational conditions. The essential thing 
 is that the governing body shall be responsive to the hopes, 
 sentiments and desires of the people as these organize them- 
 selves into definite and urgent opinions. That the governing 
 body may maintain its organic connection with the social order, 
 true to the mission it has of maintaining rights and enforcing 
 obligations, some surety beyond its condescension and good will 
 is necessary. There must be institutional limitations that act 
 as a powerful restraint upon the excesses of the will of the sov- 
 ereign power, making difficult any concerted action toward the 
 usurpation of authority and keeping the people in an attitude 
 defensive of their rights. Provided the individual has in certain 
 spheres of life that freedom of volition necessary to creative 
 mental activity, a people may rise to a considerable plane of 
 culture though the legislative and administrative functions of 
 the state are practically in the hands of an hereditary class. 
 Custom generally acts as a sufficient protection against the com- 
 plete abrogation of a right, but is a weak security against the 
 invasion of the right so far as isolated individuals are concerned. 
 But something more than this is imperative, if the state is tos 
 be an efficient association in realizing the moral possibilities of \ 
 man: rights must be so secure that the humblest citizen can ) 
 command the aid of the state in his defense with as little effort"^ 
 as the most influential. The modern system of representative ) 
 government by which the personnel of the law-making body is 
 in part directly determined by the choice of the people, hasi 
 much to commend it as a limitation to despotic authority. It' 
 is the most effective instrument yet devised for converting public 
 
EDWIN ANDREW HAYDEN. 
 
 opinion into a practical force in political control, besides being 
 a discipline of the highest order in training people into habits 
 of independence and self-reliance. 
 
 9. Between political and other social institutions history 
 reveals a delicate interdependence: universally societies having 
 a high mental organization as externally manifest in the crea- 
 tions of art, science, and industry, are states of corresponding 
 political development, guaranteeing rights and engaging in lines 
 of endeavor that make for the moral and spiritual perfection 
 of man. Then law is something more than a rule imposed by 
 an external authority; it is a system of rights collaborated by the 
 nation in the mental conflict that on the one hand gives a social 
 will capable of realizing certain collective aims and on the other 
 an individual will organizing social experiences in its own way. 
 The struggle has been more of a conflict between the partial 
 wills of antagonistic social groups than between individual 
 minds of the same social level. The cleavage in the struggle 
 has usually begun in the upper social ranks of superior initia- 
 tive, working an alignment on this side or that side of the point 
 at issue as it moved downward through the various strata of 
 social life. A vast upheaval from the social depths can occur 
 only in the relatively late stages of social history, when a vigor- 
 ous interchange of thought and feeling is going on among and 
 between social classes. Some great leader may then emerge 
 from the commons to voice their demands in tones that compel 
 an extension of their legal and political rights and make the 
 state still more the servant of the humble citizen in protecting 
 his now greater sphere of freedom from invasion. 
 
THE SOCIAL WILL. 89 
 
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 La logique sociale. 1895. 
 
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INDEX. 
 
 Adoption, ceremony of: extends the universe of moral feeling, 58. 
 
 Animals; mind of, 3-5; as systems of energy, 11. 
 
 Apperception: relation of, to invention, 32-34; to association, 30. 
 
 Art: a form of mental expression, 8. 
 
 Attention: see apperception, also mental systems. 
 
 Attitudes of the self toward experience: 47-49. 
 
 Bagehot: on emotion of conviction, 17; on authority and discussion, 45. 
 
 Baldwin: referred to, 22; on "particularizing" function of the individual mind, 
 81. 
 
 Belief or Beliefs: as a mental process, 16-20; differs from knowledge, 16; conflict 
 in, 17; in relation to the imagination, 17, 18; is a native attitude of mind, 
 19; effect on life and of life on it, 19; outgrown, 19; in relation to the will, 
 20-27; fixed, function of, 26; see also systematization of belief. 
 
 Bentley: on memory image, 4. 
 
 Bethe: on instinct, 3. 
 
 Bryce, James: quoted, 23, 83, 84; referred to, 3. 
 
 Caste-morality: nature of, 59. 
 
 Child: mind of, 9. 
 
 Civilized mind: nature of, 9. 
 
 Coercion: eflfects of, on mental life, 82, 83. 
 
 Commonweal: concept of, changes in course of history, 78-79. 
 
 Commercial Intercourse: in relation to social ideals, 59. 
 
 Consciousness: social, i-io. 
 
 Custom: " change of purpose in," 32; morality of, 75; relation to self-conscious- 
 ness, 71; protects rights, Sy. 
 
 Darwin: theory of natural selection, 33; circumspection of, 40. 
 
 Degeneracy: difference between individual and social, 62. 
 
 Deliberation: collective, 21-23. 
 
 Desire: nature of, 11-16; representation in, 13; theoretical, 13; conflict in, 14; 
 universe of, 15; modified by history, 15, 16; in relation to the will, 20-27. 
 
 Delusions: in social mind, not symptomatic of social decay, 62. 
 
 Economy: industrial, rests on national sentiment, 66. 
 
 Effort: law of, 57; see also conflict. 
 
 Egoism: in times of social disorder, 61; contractile nature of, 78. 
 
 Emotion: in the social mind, 63, 64. 
 
 Energy: systems of, 10. 
 
 Environment: social, as a source of mental impressions, 5. 
 
 Evil: moral, nature of, 51-53. 
 
 Experience: physical and psychological view of, 10. 
 
 Family: center of feeling, 57. 
 
 Faith: see belief. 
 
 Fear: as a motive in political control, 84. 
 
92 INDEX. 
 
 Feeling: impersonal, 47; ethical, social universes to which attached, 58; personal 
 in economic sphere, 64. 
 
 Freedom: desire for, a social desire, 74-75; relation of to government, 86-88. 
 
 Geography: a social discipline, 10. 
 
 Gesture-language, 7. 
 
 Giddings: referred to, 22; on state, 85. 
 
 Government: in relation to freedom, 86; responsive to public opinion; limits 
 to the function of, 86, 87. 
 
 Habit: in relation to instinct, 5; in social volition, 25, 26; in private association 
 transferred to public, 75, 76. 
 
 Heredity: in child; 9; limits the idealization of desire, 12; see also instinct. 
 
 Ideas: spread of, checked by indifference or opposition, 41. 
 
 Ideals: univers^ of, 48; in relation to belief, 49; moral, variation in, 54, 55; lim- 
 ited by heiredity, 54; ascendancy, conditioned by the set of the public mind, 
 55; sustained by practical activities, 55; of the social life, 55, 56; appercep- 
 tive control in, 56; national, interconnected with egoistic motives in devel- 
 opment of state, 78, 
 
 Ignorance: resists the spread of ideas, 42; gives a pedagogical economy, 57. 
 
 Imitation: psychological nature\of, 30-33. 
 
 Image: mental, genetic function of, 4. 
 
 Inhibition: in social mind, 28. 
 
 Instinct: nature of, 3. 
 
 Institutions: political, in relation to social development, 88. 
 
 Intermixtures of cultures : extends the universe of moral ideals, 59. 
 
 Intercourse: universe of, personal feeling in, 47, 48. 
 
 Interpretation: judicial, legislative function of, 68. 
 
 James, Professor: referred to, 19. 
 
 Judge: personality of, as a medium of law, 67. 
 
 Knox: Bagehot on temperament of, 17. 
 
 Language: function of, 6 fF. 
 
 Law: sentiment of, 63-79; as constraint of the individual by social will, 65; 
 crime conflicts with the consciousness of, 65; liberal construction of, 67; 
 should correspond with the general sentiment of justice, 68; consciousness 
 of, varies in the different social groups, 68; British in India, 83, 84; 
 struggle for, begins in the upper social ranks, 88. 
 
 Le Bon : on imagination of crowds, 35. 
 
 Life and faith, 19. 
 
 Louis XIV: reign of, 30. 
 
 Loyola: Bagehot on temperament of, 19. 
 
 Mania: moral feeling in, 61. 
 
 Maudsley: on moral feeling, 62. 
 
 MelanchoHa: moral feeling in, 61. 
 
 Memory: contents of, modified by history, 18. 
 
 Mental systems: unfoldment of, in social mind, 34; conditions of the vigor of, 
 35 J 38; two kinds, perceptual and conceptual, 38; development of, 39; 
 flexibility of, 40; conflict of, in social mind, 40-45; conflict of, in moral 
 right, 53; conflict of, in legal right, -J^, 74. 
 
 Morgan : on universe of discourse, 33. 
 
 Newton: corpuscular theory of light, 8,40; theory of gravitation, 39. 
 
INDEX 
 
 93 
 
 Nature: primitive idea of, 6. 
 
 Opposition: resists the spread of ideas, 41, 42; see also conflict. 
 
 Personalism, 9. 
 
 Personality: social, 11-27; i^^^^ of social, 55-58; juristic conception of, 64; divi- 
 sion of, suspends sovereignty, 85. 
 
 Punishment: moral effect of, 65; by state, 72. 
 
 Reaction to stimuH: by plants and animals, 11. 
 
 Representations: in animal mind, 4. 
 
 Right, legal: stability of, 35; assertion of, by individual, a moral necessity, 69; 
 energy of the feeling of, 69-71; security of, depends on the state, 71,72; 
 mental conflict in the development of, 73,74; moral, 47-62, see ideals. 
 
 Roman law: flexibility of, 40. 
 
 Savages: mind of, 6. 
 
 Selection: natural, 3,33; of social ideals, 54. 
 
 Self: attitudes of, toward experience, 47-49; ideal of, social, 49, 50; ethical, nature 
 of, 50-52. 
 
 Self-consciousness: in the mythologic mind, 10; in belief, 17; unfoldment of, 
 in moral conflict, 48. 
 
 State: social will expressed in, 23; Bryce on the work of the, 23; personality of, 
 23; as an undertaker of social enterprise, 66; ends of, 66; as a coercive 
 power, 74, 79; organized expression of humanity, 79. 
 
 Slaves: Athenian, 5. 
 
 Sovereignty: doctrine of, 80-88; reality of the individual will and of the social 
 will in the fact of, 80, 81 ; universalism in the theory of, 81; presupposes the 
 idea of law in the social mind, 81; as coercion, 82,83; as authority 
 exercised according to some standard of right, by an alien power, 83, 84; by 
 by a native power, 84; suspension of, 85, 86. 
 
 Spencer: on insect communities as expanded families, i; referred to, 6. 
 
 Stout: on habit, 25; on belief as a limitation of activity, 17. 
 
 Tarde: referred to, 1 1 ; on desire and environment, 15; on ephemeral beliefs, 26. 
 
 Thorndike: on free ideas in the animal mind, 4. 
 
 Toleration : in social strife, 44, 45. 
 
 Tribal group: as the primordial universe of ethical obligation, 57. 
 
 Values, moral: changed by openness of the mind to social suggestion, 60; confu- 
 sion of, in times of new endeavors, 61. 
 
 Vote, public: does not necessarily express the social will, 86-87. 
 
 Verdicts, judicial: checks in, 68. 
 
 Wallace, A, R.: natural selection, 33. 
 
 Will: belief and desire in relation to, 20-27; coordinates desire and belief in a 
 social process, 20-21; individual wills connected in a total will, 21; ration- 
 ality of, depends in part on the number interacting, 21; collective delib- 
 eration possible, 21-23; expressed in the state, 23, 24; habit in social, 25, 26; 
 lack of apperceptive control in, 26, 27; moral, in relation to the imagination, 
 51; in moral conflict, 52; aberration of individual, 52,53; aims at universal 
 ends, 100; social will constrains the individual through the law, 65; social 
 will encourages the individual through the law, 66. 
 
 Witchcraft: delusion at Salem, 62. 
 
 Wundt: on sexual communities, 2; on religious desire, 15; on change of purpose 
 in custom, 31. 
 
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