9^^ / ^f Cbe ^torp of rf)c illations CARTHAGE THE STORY OF THE NATIONS. A SERIES OF POPULAR HISTORIES. 3- 4- 5- 6. 7- 8. 9- TO. I I. 1 2. IS- M- 'S- i6. 17- i8. 19. 20. 23- 24. 25- 26. 2/. 28. 29. 31- 33- 34' Rome. By Arthur Oilman, M.A. The Jews. By Prof. J. K. Hosmer. Germany. By Rev. S. BAKhNG- GouLD, M.A. Carthage. By Prof. Alfred J. Church. Alexander's Empire. By Prof. J. P. Mahaffy. The Moors in Spain. By Stanley Lank-Plhilf-;. Ancient Egypt. By Prof. George KAWLINbON. Hungary. By Prof. Arminius Vambeky. The Saracens. By Arthur Gn.- MAN, M.A. Ireland. By the Hon. Emily Lawless. Chaldea. By ZiiNaideA. Ragozin. The Goths. By Henry Bradley. Assyria. By Zenaide A. Rago- zin. Turkey. By Stanley Lane-Poole. Holland. By Prof. J. K. Thokold Rogers. Mediaeval France. By Gustave Masson. Persia. By S. G. W. Benjamin. Phoenicia. By Prof. G. Raw linson. Media. By Zenaiue A. Ragozin. The Hansa Towns. By Helen Zimmern. Early Britain. By I'rof. Alfred J. Church. The Barbary Corsairs. By Stanley Lane-Pooi.k. Russia. By W. R. Morfhi., M.A. The Jews under the Romans. By W. JJ. Morrison. Scotland. By John Mackintosh, J.L.I). Switzerland. By Mrs Lina Hue; and R. Stead. Mexico. By Susan Hale. Portugal. By H. Morse Stephens. The Normans. By Sarah Orne J EWic 1 r. The Byzantine Empire. I!y C. W. C. Oman. Sicily : Phoenician, Greek and Roman. By lli<; late Prof. K. A. F R !•: !•: M A N . The Tuscan Republics. By Bella Duffy. Poland. By W. R. Morfill, M.A. Parthia. I'y Brof. Ghor<;e Rawi.inson. 35- 36. 37. 39- 40, 41- 42. 43- 44. 45- 46. 47- 48. 49- 5°- 51- 52- 53- 54- 55- 56. 57- 58. 59. f^o. 61. 62. 63- 64. 65. The Australian Commonwealth. By Greville Tre(;arthen. Spain. By H. E. Watts. Japan. By David Murray, Ph.D. South Africa. By George M. Theal. Venice. By Alethka Wiel. The Crusades. By T. A. Archer and C. 1>. Kingsford. Vedic India. By Z. A. Rac^ozin. The West Indies and the Span- ish Main. By James Rodway. Bohemia. By C. Edmund Maurice. The Balkans. By W. Miller, M.A. Canada. By Sir J. G. Bourinot, LL.D. British India. By R. W. Frazer, LL.D. Modern France. By Andr6 Le F!oN. The Franks. By Lewis Sergeani . Austria. By -Sidney Whitman. Modern England. Before the Re- form lUll. By Justin McCarthy. China. By Prof. R. K. Douglas. Modern England. From the Reform Bill to the Accession of Edward VII. By Justin McCarthy. Modern Spain. By Martin A. S. Hume. Modern Italy. By Pietro Orsi. Norway. By H. H. Boyesen. Wales. By O. M. Iu)wands. Mediaival Rome. By W. Miller, M.A. The Papal Monarchy. By William Bakkv, D.D. Mediaival India under Moham- medan Rule. By Stanley By Prof T. W. I5y Lanf-Poolic. Buddhist India. Riiys-Davids. Parliamentary I'.iiwAKi) Jenks Mediiuval England. 1!a ri-.soN. The Coming of Parliament. L. Ci'H 11, Jane. The Story of Greece. From the K.'irliest Times to a.u. 14. By K. S. SnucKiiui«;ii. The Story of the Roman Empire (m.c. 29 to A.I). 476). By 11. StUAKP JoNE-i. England. ., M.A. !y Marv By London: T. FISHER UNWIN, Adki iiii Terrace, W.C. VOTIVE BAS-KI'.I.IEl' 1() I'KKSlil'UuM;. CARTHAGE OR TME EMPIRE OF AFRICA BY ALFRED J. CHURCH, M.A. PROKESbOK Ol'- LAll.V l.\ LMVERSITY COLLEGE, LOXDO.N, AUTHOR OF "SIORIES ER05I HOMER," ETC., ETC. 11777/ THE COLLABORATION OF ARTHUR GILMAX, M.A. NlNl 11 IMI'RESSION LON DON T. i'^ I s 1 1 r: R U N W I N I .\1)EL1'111 I'l^RRACE NEW YORK: G. W I'UrNAM'S SONS Ninth fiiifi'cssion '9 '4 Copyrii^ht by T. Fisher Uiiwiii, 1892 {For Great Britain) Copyright by G. P. Putnani's Sons, 1892 {For the United States of America) 9RI c>c^7^l^2^^g PREFACE. It is difficult to tell the story of Carthage, because one has to tell it without sympathy, and from the standpoint of her enemies. It is a great advantage, on the other hand, that the materials are of a manage- able amount, and that a fairly complete narrative may be given within a moderate compass. I have made it a rule to go to the original authori- ties. At the same time I have to express my obliga- tions to several modern works, to the geographical treatises of Heeren, the histories of Grote, Arnold and Mommsen, Mr. Bosworth Smith's admirable " Car- thage and the Carthaginians," and the learned and exhaustive " History of Art in Phoenicia and its Dependencies," by Messieurs Georges Perrot and Charles Chipiez, as translated and edited by Mr. Walter Armstrong. To this last I am indebted for most of the illustrations of this book. I have had much help also from Mr. W. W, Capes' edition of " I.ivy " xxi., xxii. X PREFACE. I have not thought it necessary to discuss the critical questions which have been raised about the DuiHan column (p. 135). The inscription, as it at present exists, may be supposed to bear a general, though not a faithful, resemblance to the original. A. C. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. B.C. Carthage founded by Dido . . ..... 850 The Campaigns of Malchus ....... 550 The Battle of Alalia 536 First Treaty with Rome . 509 First Battle of Himera 480 Second Treaty with Rome ....... 440 Hannibal invades Sicily ........ 410 Third Treaty with Rome ....... 405 Capture of Agrigentum ........ 406 Treaty between Carthage and Dionysius .... 405 Renewal of the War ......... 397 Siege of Syracuse by Himilco ....... 396 Return of Himilco to Africa . 396 Mago invades Sicily ........ 393 Treaty of Peace with Dionysius ...... 392 Renewal of the War 383 Dionysius attacks Carthage ....... 368 Death of Dionysius ...,-... 367 The Conspiracy of Hanno ....... 340 The Battle of Crimessus ........ 339 Death of Timoleon ......... 337 Agathocles defeated at Himera ...... 310 He transfers the War to Africa ....... 310 He returns to Sicily ........ 307 Pyrrhus invades Sicily ....... 278 He leaves Sicily ......... 276 Beginning of First Punic War ....... 264 Defeat of the Carthaginian Fleet by Duilius at Mylae . 260 Victory of Regulus at Ecnomus ....... 256 Xll CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. Landing of Regulus in Africa .... Defeat of Regulus by Xantippus .... The Siege of Lilybreum begun .... Defeat of the Roman Fleet under Claudius at Drepanum Hamilcar Barca comes into Sicily .... Death of Hannibal ...... Defeat of Carthaginian Fleet by Catulus at iEgusa Conclusion of First Punic War .... War of the Mercenaries Hamilcar Barca invades Spain .... Death of Hamilcar Assassination of Hasdrubal .... Capture of Saguntum by Hannibal and Commencement Punic War Battles of Ticinus and Trebia .... Battle of Trasumennus ..... Battle of Cannae Hannibal winters in Capua .... Roman Conquest of Syracuse .... Hannibal takes Tarentum .... Defeat and Death of the Scipios in Spain . Hannibal marches on Rome — Fall of Capua . Publius Scipio goes to Spain .... He captures New Carthage .... Death of Marcellus ...... Hasdrubal enters Italy His defeat at Metaurus ..... Scipio sails to Africa ..... Hannibal returns to Carthage .... Defeat at Zama ...... End of Second Punic War .... Death of Hannibal ..... Roman Embassy at Carthage .... The Third Punic War begins Fall of Carthage 241 of Second B.C 256 255 249 249 247 247 241 241 -236 236 229 221 218 218 217 216 215 212 212 211 211 210 209 208 207 207 204 203 202 201 ^S3 174 149 146 PROVINCIAE CARTHACINIENSIBUS III f^ »*»!» 3S'» *,J» P^LIGUSTICUS SINUS fWh TYRHHENUM 'RNUS \ #f OPS,CA\mI ^-^ INFERNUM MARE SARDO -'^ PANORMUS ACR/KOAS CCLfl, Caitdos Cossyrn 'NCAPOLIS Meliia HADHUMETTUM LEFT IS Acercinl. ^^ y.,, CYRBNB. ^^. MACHLYES ClNDANA^j^fl^c/^^ PSYLL/ London: T. Fisher Unwin, Paternoster Square, E.G. CONTENTS. PART 1. LEGEND AND EARLY HISTORY. I. The Legknd of Dido ..... The building of Carthage, 5— Dido and Aineas, 7. 3-8 II. The Growth of Carthage 9-18 The Tyrian traders, 11 — Malchus and Mago, 13 — Treaties Willi Rome, 15 — Carthaginian possessions, 17. PART II. CARTHAGE AND (JRKECK I. Hamh.car and Hanniijai, . . . 21-34 llamilcar's army, 25 — The fate of Hamilcnr, 27 — Hannilal before Selinus, 29 — Attack on Ilimcra, 31 — Hannibal's venge- ance, 3J. XIV CONTENTS. PAGE II. Carthage and Dionvsius (406-405) . . 35-45 Siege of Ai;rigentum, 37 — Execution of the generals, 39 — Agrigentum evacuated, 41 — Gela abandoned, 43 — The plague at Carthage, 45. III. Carthage and Dioxysius (397) . . . 46-63 Siege of Motya, 47 — Muiya assaulted, 49— Ilnnilco's ad- vance, 51 — Battle of Catana, 53 — Siege of Syracuse, 55 — Plague in Ilimilco's camp, 57 — Hiniilco's escape, 59 — Carthage saved, 63. IV. TtiK Last Struggi.k with Dionvsius . 64-69 Mago defeated, 65 — Defeat of Dionysius, 67— The end of the war, 69. V. Carthage and Timoi.eon .... 70-74 Timolcon declares war against Carthage, 71 — liattle of the Criniessus, 73. VI. Carthage and Agathoclls .... 75-91 Agathocles in extremities, 77 — Agatlmcles invades Africa, 81 — Revolt of lioniiicar, t>5 — Pyrrhus, tiy — Pyirlius leaves Sicily, 91. P^A'7 III. THE INTEKNAL HISroRY 01- CARTIIACiK. I. Carthaginian DiscovEKiius .... 95-101 Along the African Coast, 97- (iorillas, 99— A siiange tale, loi. CONTENTS. XV CAGt II. The Con'stitutkw and Religion of Carthage 102 i 14 Magistrates of Carthage, 103 — Estates of the reahii 111 Carthage, 105 — Justice and religion, 109 — Carthaginian Deities, 113. III. The Revenue and Trade of CAKitfAGE . 115 125 Carthaginian Mines, 117 — Trade, 119 — Ivory and precious stones, 121 — Art and literature, 123 — Wealtli and luxury, 125 p.'t/^r IV. CARTHAGE AND ROM!-:. I. The War in Sicilv and on the Sea . 129-140 The Romans gain Messana, 131 — Capture of Agrigenluin, 133 — Battle of Mylae, 137 — Battle of Eciiuiiius, 139. II. The Invasion of Africa .... 141-151 Defeat of Ilamilcar, 143 — Xantippus, 145 — Defeat of Regulus, 147 — Horace on Regulus, 149 — Revenge for Regulus, 151. III. In Sicily Again . . ... 152-165 Roman Losses at sea, 153 — Roman disasters, 157 — The Romans gain Kryx, 159 — 1 lasdrubal's successes, 161 — Battle of /Agates Island, 163 — Conclusion of War, 16;. Xvi CUMTENTS. TAGB IV. Carthage and her Mercenaries . . 166-177 Revolt of the mercenaries, 167 — Siege of Utica. 171 — Massacre of prisoners, 175 — End of war with mercenaries, 177. Carthage and Spain 178-184 Hamilcar in Spain, 179 — Hannibal, 181 — Siege of Sagun- turn, iSj. VI. From ihe Ebro to Italy .... 185-194 Passage of the Rhone, 187 — Route over the Alps, 1S9 — Rocks split with vinegar, 193. VTI. The First Campaign in Italy . . . 195-205 Scipio retires to the Tiebia, 199 — Semj^ronius eager to fight, 201— The Carthaginians victorious, 205. VIII Trasumknnus ...... 206-211 Lake Trasumennus, 207 — Slaughter o' 'he Romans, 209 — Hannibal's policy, 211. IX. Fabius and his Tactics . . .212-217 Hannibal a master of stratagem, 213 — Fabius and Minu- cius, 215 — Varro and Paulhis in command, 217. CONTENTS. XVll PAGE X. Cann^ ....... 218-224 Hannibal's army, 219 — The struggle, 221 — Will he match on Rome ? 223. XT. After CANNiE ...... 225-231 Mago at Carthage, 227 — Hannibal's prospects, 229— Taren- turn gained, 231. XH. The Turn of the Tide .... 23: Attempted relief of Capua, 233— Capua lost to Hannibal, 235 — Carihage loses Sicily, 237 — Roman successes in Spain, 239 — Death of tlie Scipios, 241 — Capture of New Carthage, 243. XHI. The Last Chance of Victory . . 245-252 The death of Marccllus, 247 — Nero's gieat march, 249 — Ode from Horace, 251. XIV. The Last Struggle 253-264 Scipio and Syphax, 257 — Hannibal recalled, 259 -Zania, 2O1 — Terms of peace, 263. XV. Hannibal in Exile . - . , , 265-271 Hannibal with Antiochus, 267 llnnnibal in Ditliynia, 269 — Character of Hannibal, 271. XV 111 CONTENTS. XVI. Thr Beginning of thf. End . . . 272-279 Cato's hostility to Carthage, 273 — Africanus the Younger, 275 — Expedition against Carthage, 277 — War declared, 279. X\II. The Siege and Fat.l of Carthage . . 2S0-301 The walls of Carlliage, 2S1 — The Romans lose their ally Masi- nissa, 2S5 — Scipio in command, 2S9— Attack on the Me- gara, 293— Engagements between the fleets, 295 — Fighting in the ciiy, 297— Successors of Carihage, 301. Index . 303 ^ D Z < z < a. s'V Of Spain, which was afterwards to form an important portion of the Empire, for the present we hear nothing. l8 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. While Carthage was thus busy extending and strengthening its dominions, it narrowly escaped a great danger from what was then the most powerful empire in the world. In the year 525 Cambyses, the second king of Persia, conquered Egypt, a task which he seems to have accomplished with great ease. He then looked about for other countries into which he might carry his arms. The great cities of Cyrene and Barca, lying about five hundred miles to the west of the mouths of the Nile, submitted to him. He thought that he might push his conquests still further in the same direction and make Carthage itself a tributary. But a distance of two thousand miles and more was too much for his army, and the conquest would have to be made by his fleet. Here he met with an obstacle which he could not overcome. The fleet consisted for the most part of Phoenician ships, and the Phoenicians refused to take part in the expe- dition. "We are bound," said they, "to the Cartha- ginians by solemn oaths. They are, too, our children; and it would be wicked in us to make war against them." The Great King was obliged to be content with this answer and to give up his scheme. PART II. CARTHAGE AND GREECE. I.— Hamilcar and Hannibal. II.— Carthage and Dionysius (406-405). III.— Carthage and Dionysius (397). IV.— The Last Struggle with Dionysius. v.— Carthage and Timoleon. vr.— Carthage, Aoathoci.es and Pyrrhus Here our chief authority is Diodorus Siculus, a Greek writer who " flourished " about the beginning of our era. He was a native of Sicily, and in his Universal History, or " Historical Library," as he seems to have called it himself, wrote an account of the world from the earliest time down to his own day. With this work he took much pains, travelling over many of the countries of which he intended to write the history, and collecting the works of authors who had treated the same subjects before him. Much of his History is lost, but the ten books from the eleventh to the twentieth have been recovered. As he was naturally very much interested in the affairs of his own island, he seems to have taken special pains with this part of his work, which includes the one hundred and seventy-five years from the beginning of the second Persian war {4S0) down to the year 305. He had before him the best authorities, as, for instance, 'rimajus, who wrote the History of Sicily from the earliest times down to 264 (he himself died in 256, at the age of ninety-six) ; but he had not much judgment in using his materials. Still, his book is of very great value for this portion of our story. Fragments, too, of the lost books that followed the twentieth have been preserved. Justin also tells us something about this time, so that, on the whole, we have plenty of authorities. HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL. Stctt^Y would naturally be the place in which Car- thage would first seek to establish a foreign dominion. At its nearest point :t was not more than fifty miles distant ; its soil was fertile, its climate temperate ; it was rich in several valuable articles of commerce. We have seen that, in the treaty which was made with Rome about the end of the sixth century B.C., the Carthaginians claimed part of the island as their own. It is probable that this part was then less than it had been. For more than two hundred years the Greeks had been spreading their settlements over the country ; and the Greeks were the great rivals of the Phoenicians. If they were not as keen traders — and trade was certainly held in less estimation in Athens, and even in Corinth, than it was in Tyre and Carthage — they were as bold and skilful as sailors, and far more ready than their rivals to fight for what they had got or for what they wanted. The earliest Gieck colony in Sicily was Naxos, on the cast coast, founded by settlers from Eubcx-a in 735. Other Greek cities sought room for their surplus population in the same field ; and some of the colonies founded fresh settle- ments of their own. The latest of them was Agri- 2a THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. £^entum on the south coast, which owed its origin to Gela, itself a colony of Cretans and Rhodians. As the Greeks thus spread westward the Carthaginians retired before them, till their dominions were probably reduced to little more than a few trading ports on the western coast of the island. As long, indeed, as they could trade with the new comers they seemed to be satisfied. They kept up, for the most part, friendly relations with their rivals, allowing even the right of inter- marriage to some at least of their cities. But in point of fact they were only waiting their opportunity, and the opportunity came when the Persians invaded Greece for the second time. Some historians tell us that it was agreed by the two powers that a combined effort should be made, that, while Persia was attacking the mother-country of Greece, Carthage should attack its important colonies in Sicily. Others insist that there is no proof of any such agree- ment having been made. It is not easy to see what proof we could expect to find. But there is nothing, 1 think, improbable about it. The Phoenician admirals in the service of the Great King who had refused to obey Cambyses when he ordered them to sail against their kinsmen in Carthage, may very well have managed a matter of this kind. Anyhow it is clear that Carthage knew that the opportunity had come, and eagerly seized it. One of the family of Mago, Hamilcar by name, was appointed commander-in- chief. He set sail from Carthage with a force which, when it had been joined by auxiliaries gathered from Sicily and elsewhere, amounted, it is said, to three hundred thousand men. There would have been even -4^ riICi:\ILlAN SAUCOl'llAGUS l-'OUNU AT SULUNIK (siriLV). hamilcar's army. 25 more had not the squadron which conveyed the chariots and the cavalry been lost in a storm. The number is probably exaggerated — the numbers in ancient history are seldom trustworthy — but we may take as genuine the list of the nations from which the army was recruited. The land-force consisted, we hear, of Phoenicians, Libyans, Sardinians, Corsicans Iberians, Ligyes, and Helisyki. The first four names need little explanation. The Phoenicians were native Carthaginians and men of kindred race from the mother- country of Phoenicia, from Cyprus, and from other settlements on the Mediterranean shore. Sardinia, we know from its mention in the treaty of 509, belonged to Carthage ; Corsica had probably been since acquired. The Iberians were Spaniards, over whose country Carthage was gaining some influence. The Ligyes were the Ligurians from the north- west of the Italian peninsula ;' the Helisyki may have been Volscians, neighbours of Rome on the south-east and for some time its most formidable enemies. Hamilcar reached Panormus (now Palermo) in safety with the main body of his fleet. " The war is over," he is reported to have said, thinking that only the chances of the sea could have saved Sicily from such an army as his. At Panormus he gave his army three days' rest, and repaired his ships. Then he marched on Himera. There he dragged his ships on shore, and made a deep ditch and a rampart of wood to protectthem. His forces he divided between two camps. The crews o^ his fleet occupied one, his soldiers the ' Tlie luodcrn I'icdniont. 26 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. other. The two covered the whole of the west side of the city. A force from the city which encountered his advance guard was driven in, and Theron, the tyrant of Agrigentum, who had been appointed to take command of the garrison by Gelon of Syracuse, the most powerful monarch in the island, sent off in hot haste for help to his chief Gelon had everything ready, and marched at once with an army far greater than any other Greek state could then have raised, fifty thousand infantry and five thousand horse. After thoroughly fortifying the camp which he had pitched near the city, he sent out his cavalry to attack the foraging parties of the Carthaginians. These suffered a signal defeat ; and the people of Himera now grew so confident that they actually threw open the gateways which, in their determination to make a desperate resistance, they had at first bricked up. The conclusive battle was not long delayed, and Gelon is said to have won it by the help of a curious stratagem. His scouts had intercepted a letter from the people of Selinus to Hamilcar, in which there was a promise that they would send on a day named a force of cavalry to his assistance. Gelon instructed some of his own horsemen to play the part of the cavalry of Selinus. They were to make their way into the naval camp of the Carthaginians, and then to turn against their supposed allies. A signal was agreed upon which they were to show when they were ready to act. Gelon's scouts were posted on the hills to watch for it, and to communicate it to the main body of his army in the plain. The fight was long THE FATE OF HAMILCAR 27 and bloody ; it lasted from sunrise to sunset, but the Carthaginians had lost heart, and the Greeks were confident of victory. No quarter was given, and by night, one hundred and fifty thousand men (it must surely be an impossible number! ) had fallen. The rest fled to the hills, and were there compelled by want of water to surrender to the people of Agrigentum. Of the fate of Hamilcar nothing was ever certainly known. Some said that he had been slain by the pretended allies from Selinus ; others that, being busy with a great sacrifice at which the fire was piled high to consume the victims whole, and seeing that the fortune of the day was going against him, he threw himself into the flames and disappeared. His body was never found, but the Greeks erected a monument to his memory on the field of battle; and the Cartha- ginians, though never accustomed to be even commonly just to their beaten generals, paid him, after his death, honours which it became a custom to renew year by year. The rest of the story is curiously tragic. Twenty ships had been kept by Hamilcar to be used as might be wanted, when the rest of the fleet was drawn up. These and these only escaped out of the three thou- sand vessels of war and commerce, which Hasdrubal had brought with him. But even these did not get safe home. They were overtaken by a storm, and one little boat carried to Carthage the dismal news that their great army had perished.' The city was over- ' Note how a similar story is told of tlu- rLiurn of Xerxes from Greece, after his defeat in the Persian War. According to Herodotus (on excellent authority, as he was born in 484, i.e. four years before the war) Xerxes returned by land with a considerable part of his army ; neverthe- less the Roman poet Juvenal writes — 28 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. whelmed with dismay and grief. An embassy was at once sent to Gelon to beg for peace. Peace was granted, but on hard conditions. Carthage was to pay a ransom of two thousand talents, to build two chapels in memory of the event, and, one writer tells us, to abolish the hideous practice of human sacrifices. If this last condition was ever agreed to, it was certainly not kept. It has been said, and one would like to believe, that the great battle of Himera, by which the Greek colonies in Sicily were relieved from the pressing fear of Carthage, was fought on the very same day on which the Persians were defeated at Salamis. Carthage could not have been long in recovering from this loss, for we find her able soon afterwards to dictate a treaty to Rome, but she did not meddle with Sicilian affairs for many years. But in 410 a Sicilian town, Egesta, invited her aid against their neighbours of Selinus.^ Both towns were near the Carthaginian settlements ; and it was possible that these might suffer, if Selinus, which was said to be the aggressor, were allowed to become too powerful. But probably the desire to avenge the defeat of seventy years before was the chief reason why Car- thage promised the help that was asked. It so happened, too, that Hannibal, grandson of the Hamil- " Througli shoals of dead, o'er billows rod with gore, A single ship the beaten monarch bore." Rut then Juvenal wished to point the moral of " the vanity of human wishes." ' Curiously enough it was a quarrel between these same two towns that had been the immediate cause of the disastrous expedition of Athens against f^yracuse. HANNIBAL BEFORE SELINUS. 2g car who had perished at Himera, was the senior of the two first magistrates of the city. He had been brought up in exile — for Gisco, his father, had been banished after the defeat of Himera — and at this very city of SeHnus. " He was by nature," says the historian, " a hater of the Greeks," and he did all he could to persuade his countrymen to undertake the war. After some negotiations which came to nothing, Hannibal sent a force of 5,000 Africans and 800 Italian mercenaries to Sicily. The army of Selinus, which was busy plundering the territory of their enemies, was surprised, and lost a thousand men and all the booty which it had collected. Selinus now sent to Syracuse to beg for help, and Egesta, on her part, made a fresh appeal to Carthage. This appeal was answered in a way that took the Sicilians by surprise. Hannibal had collected a great force of Spaniards and Africans. This he carried to Sicily in a fleet of as many as 1,500 transports, escorted by sixty ships of war. It numbered, according to the smallest estimate, 100,000 men, and was furnished with an abundance of all the engines used for sieges. The general lost no time. Without a day's delay he marched upon Selinus, invested it, and at once began the assault. Six towers of wood were brought up against the walls ; battering-rams headed with iron were driven against them, while a multitude of archers and slingcrs showered arrows and stones upon their defenders. The fortifications had been allowed, during a long period of peace, to fall out of repair ; and the Italian mercenaries were not long in forcing their 30 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. way in. These were driven out again with great loss, and for a time the assault was suspended. The besieged sent their swiftest horsemen to beg for instant help from Syracuse, Gela, and Agrigentum. It was promised, but while it was being prepared Hannibal was pressing his attack with the utmost fury. A great part of the wall was thrown down by the battering-rams ; but the people of Selinus still fought with the courage of despair. For nine days and nights the struggle went on, every street, almost every house, being fiercely contested. At last the numbers of the barbarians overpowered resistance. Between two and three thousand of the armed men escaped ; about twice as many of both sexes were made prisoners ; the rest were massacred. As many as sixteen thousand bodies are said to have been counted. At the very time when Selinus was taken, the advance guard of the Syracusan army reached Agri- gentum. They tried to make terms with the con- querors. An embassy was sent to Hannibal, begging him to ransom the prisoners and respect the temples of the gods. Hannibal replied, "The men of Selinus have not been able to keep their freedom, and must make trial of slavery. As for the gods, they have left Selinus, being wroth with its inhabitants." To a second embassy, headed by a citizen who had always been on friendly terms with Carthage, he made a gentler answer. The survivors might return, dwell in their city and till their lands, paying tribute to Carthage. The walls were razed to the ground, and according to some accounts, the whole city was de- ATTACK ON HIM ERA. 31 stroyed. To this day the ruins of the temples show the marks of the crowbars by which the columns were overthrown. But Selinus was not the real object of Hannibal's expedition. That was to be found elsewhere, at Himera, where, seventy years before, his grandfather had perished. To Himera, accordingly (it lay on the opposite, ie. the north coast, of the island) he marched without delay. Forty thousand troops he posted at some distance from the city, probably to deal with any relieving force from the other Greek cities. With the rest of his army, now increased by twenty thou- sand auxiliaries from the native Sicilians, he sur- rounded the walls. He did not intend, however, to wait for the slow operation of a blockade, but attacked the town as fiercely as he had attacked Selinus. The walls were battered and undermined, and more than one breach was made in them. At first he was repulsed. The people of Himera fought with all the courage of their race, and they had the help of four thousand soldiers from Syracuse and elsewhere. The Carthaginians were driven back, and the breaches repaired. This success emboldened them to attack the besiegers. Leaving a sufficient force to guard the walls, they sallied forth, and fell on the hostile lines. Taken by surprise, the Carthaginians gave way. Their very numbers were against them, for they were too closely thronged to be able to act, and suffered almost more, says the historian, from each other than from the enemy. The assailants, who numbered about ten thousand, were roused to do their best by the thought 32 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. of their helpless kinsfolk, women and children and old men, who were watching them from the walls. At first it seemed as if Himera was to be another Marathon. As many as six thousand of the besiegers (to take the smallest and most reasonable computation) were slain. But the pursuit was pushed too far. Hannibal brought down his army of reserve from the hills on which it had been posted, and fell upon the victorious Greeks. A fierce fight ensued, but the people of Himera and their allies were overpowered. The main body of them retreated into the city, but three thousand were unwilling or unable to leave the field, and, after performing prodigies of valour, perished where they stood. At this crisis came twenty-five Syracusan ships of war, which had been taking part in the war then being carried on between Athens and Sparta. At first the besieged were full of hope. It was rumoured that, besides the ships, the Syracusans were coming to their help with a levy e?t masse. But then came a most disquieting report. Hannibal was filling, it was said, his own ships with the picked troops of his army, and intended to fall upon Syracuse when that city should be stripped of its able-bodied men. The Syracusan commander dared not stay at Himera in the face of this alarm. The ships of war must, he said, sail home at once. But they would take as many of the helpless population of Himera as they could hold. The offer was accepted ; for dreadful as it was thus to leave their homes, it was the only hope of escape that the poor creatures had. The ships were filled till they could hold no more. Then the cannibal's vengeance. 35 Syracusan general marched out of the town in such haste, we are told, that he did not even stop to bury his own dead. Many of the inhabitants who could not be received on board the ships accompanied him on his march, preferring this to waiting for the return of the fleet ; for this was to come back and carry off the rest of the population. it was well for them that they did so. The next day the Carthaginians renewed the assault. The besieged were sadly reduced in numbers and weary, for after the battle of the day before they had spent the night in arms upon the walls. Still they held out. All that day the battle was kept up. On the morrow the ships came back, but at the very moment of their coming in sight a great part of the wall was broken down by the battering-rams, and the Spaniards in Han- nibal's army rushed in. A general massacre followed, and was continued till Hannibal issued strict orders that all that remained were to betaken alive. It was no feeling of mercy that prompted these orders. The women and children were divided among the con- querors ; the men were taken to the spot where Hamilcar had been last seen alive, and there to the number of three thousand cruelly slaughtered, an expiatory sacrifice to the spirit of the dead. Himera itself was utterly destroyed. The walls and houses were razed to the ground ; the temples were first plundered and then burnt. The rest of the Greek cities in Sicily must have trembled lest the fate which had fallen on Selinus and Himera should overtake themselves. Ikit for the time, at least, their fears were relieved. Hannibal 4 34 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE had done what he came to do, had avenged the defeat of Himera, the death of his grandfather, and his father's exile, and he v/as satisfied. He sent the native SiciHans who had joined him to their homes, dismissed many of his mercenaries, and, after leaving sufficient force to hold the territory which he had occupied, carried the rest of his army to Carthage. He brought with him much spoil and many trophies, and his countrymen received him with the highest honours. He had won in a few weeks' time victories that surpassed all that had ever been gained by Carthafje before. IT. CARTHAGE AND DIONYSIUS (406 405). Hannibal's success in Sicily had encouraged the Carthaginians to hope that the whole island might yet be theirs. They resolved on making anoth(ir expedition, and appointed Hannibal to the chief command. At first he declined the office, pleading his advanced age, but consented to act when Himilco son of Hanno, a kinsman of his own, was joined with him in the command. The two generals sent envoys to treat with the chiefs in Spain and the Balearic Islands ; they went themselves to enlist troops among the African tribes and in the various Phoenician settlements along the coast. Mercenaries were also hired from other countries, and especially from Italy. The Italians in Hannibal's former army, thinking themselves badly treated by the general, had taken service with Syracuse, and were, as their late general knew, a very formidable force. At last in 406 — four years, />., after the first expedition — the invading force set sail. They numbered, on the lowest calculation, 120,000; one writer puts them down at nearly three times as many. They were carried across in more than a thousand transports ; and these again were convoyed by a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships 36 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. of war. The Greeks, taught by experience, were resolved not to be behindhand this time with their preparations for resistance. Forty Carthaginian ships had been sent on in advance to Sicily. Against these the Syracusans sent a squadron of equal strength. The two fleets met near the famous promontory of Eryx. After a long struggle the Greeks were victorious, and sank fifteen of the enemy's ships, the rest retiring to the African coast. Hannibal, hearing of the reverse, sailed out with fifty fresh ships. Before this new force the Syracuse squadron retired. It was now evident that the invasion could not be prevented. SIEGE OF AGRIGENTUM, 37 All that remained was to make the best possible preparations for resisting it. Syracuse sent embassies begging for help to the Greeks in Italy and to Sparta, as well as to all the communities of the same race in the island. The city which felt itself most in danger was Agrigentum, the richest and most populous place in the island after Syracuse, and, indeed, scarcely inferior to that. The Agrigentines lost no time in preparing for defence. They engaged Dexippus, a Spartan, who was then at Gela with a body of 1,500 soldiers, and they also hired the Campanian mer- cenaries, eight hundred in number, who in the former invasion had served under Hannibal. It was in May, 406, when the great Carthaginian host appeared before their walls. Hannibal began by offering condi- tions of peace. He proposed an active alliance ; if this did not please the Agrigentines, it would be enough if they would be friendly to Carthage, but take neither side in the war which she was preparing to wage. The Agrigentines, unwilling to desert the cause of their countrymen, refused both offers. Then the siege began. The town had a very strong position, which had been carefully improved. It was built on a range of hills, rising in some places to the height of more than a thousand feet. On the slope of these hills a wall had been built, or, in some places, hewn out of the solid rock. Only one place was practicable for an assault. Against this the Cartha- ginian generals brought up their engines, especially two towers, from which they attacked the defending force upon the walls. The fighting lasted throughout the day without any result ; at night the besieged 38 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. sallied forth and burnt the enemy's engines. Hanni- bal then determined to use the stones of the tombs — which, as usual, were outside the walls — to build mounds from which he might renew the attack. The most splendid of these tombs was the sepulchre of Theron, who had reigned in Agrigentum some eighty years before, and had borne a part in repelling the first Carthaginian invasion. While the men were busy in pulling it down it was struck with lightning. A religious panic followed. The sentinels declared that they were haunted by the spectres of the dead whose graves had been violated. A pestilence broke out in the camp. Great numbers died, and among them Hannibal himself, and the prophets declared that the gods were thus sharing their wrath at the impiety which had been committed. Himilco ordered that no more tombs should be pulled down. As an expiation of what had been done, he sacrificed a child to Saturn or Moloch, and threw a number of animals into the sea as an offering to Neptune. Meantime he pressed on the siege, damming up one of the rivers by which three sides of the town were surrounded. While he was thus engaged the relieving force arrived ; it comprised auxiliaries from Magna Graecia^ and from most of the Greek cities in the island. The general's name was Daphnaus, and he had with him thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. A squadron of thirty ships of war sailed along the coast, keeping pace with the army. Himilco sent against them his Spanish and Italian troops. A battle was ' The name commonly given to the collection of Greek colonies in Southern Italy. Sec " The Story of Rome," page 39. Execution of the genehals. ^g fouc^ht on the western bank of the Himera, and was obstinately contested. In the end the Greeks were victorious, routing the enemy with the loss of six thousand men. The whole force indeed might, it was thought, have been destroyed but for the caution of Daphnffius. Remembering how the men of Himera had been attacked and slaughtered in just such a moment of victory, he held back his men from pursuit. The same fear that Himilco, who of course had vast forces in reserve, might take them at a disadvantage, kept the Agrigentine generals from sallying forth upon the fugitives as they hurried past the walls. When the relieving force had entered the city, there was naturally much talk among the soldiers about the events of the day. Some loudly accused the generals of cowardice ; others even declared that they had been bribed. The populace rushed to the market-place and held a public assembly, be- fore which the Agrigentine generals were put upon their trial. Menes of Camarina, one of the leaders of the relieving force, was the chief accuser. The furious people would not listen to any defence from the accused. Four out of the five were seized and stoned to death ; the fifth was pardoned on account of his youth. At first Daphn;eus thought of attacking the Car- thaginian camp ; but the place was too strongly fortified, and he contented himself with scouring the roads with his cavalry and cutting off the supplies. The distress soon became very great ; many died of starvation, and the mercenaries crowded round llimilco's tent, clamouring for their rations, and dc- \t> THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. daring that unless they were satisfied they would take service with the enemy. The general had just heard that the Syracusans were tak-ing a convoy of CARTHAGINIAN I'LATTER-SILVEK. provisions by sea to Agrigentum, His only hope of relief was in getting hold of this. He entreated the mutineers to wait for a few days, givingthem meanwhile as pledges the costly drinking-cups and plate of th(? AGRIGENTUM EVACUATED. 4I Carthaginian officers. The Syracusan fleet had no expectation of being attacked, as Himilco had never attempted to claim command of the sea. They were taken by surprise and completely defeated. Eight of the ships of war were sunk, the others chased to the shore, and the whole of the convoy captured. This event changed the whole aspect of affairs. It was Agrigentum that was now in distress. Before long the Italian mercenaries in the city departed. They alleged that their time of service had expired ; but it was said that Dexippus, their commander, had been bribed by the besiegers to tell them that there was no food in the city, and that they would find more profitable service elsewhere. That there was no food was too true ; for when the generals came to examine the stores, they found that there was nothing to be done but at once to abandon the city. That very night the plan was carried out. Guarded by the troops from the pursuit of the Carthaginians, the whole population of Agrigentum, with the exception of some who could not and others who would not leave their homes, crowded the road that led eastward to Gela. At dawn Himilco entered the city. It was one of the richest cities in Greece, and from its foun- dation three hundred years before it had never had an enemy within its walls. The houses were full of pictures and statues, of rich furniture, of gold and silver plate. The treasuries of the temple were rich with the offerings of many generations of worshippers. Himilco spared nothing. Everything that was valu- able, sacred property as well as profane, was carried 42 THE STORY OF CARTHAGP.. off.^ The richest citizen of Agrigentum, unwilling to leave his native country, had taken refuge in the shrine of Athene. When he found that its sacredness would not protect him, he set it on fire and perished in the ruins. Himilco, who took the city just about mid-winter (i.e., eight months after his first landing in the island), occupied it till the spring of the following year. When he was ready to take the field again, he levelled the houses to the ground and defaced the temples. This done he marched against Gela, ravaged the country, which indeed there was no attempt to defend, and then assailed the city. Gela was for the time left to its own resources ; it was neither so well placed nor so strongly fortified as Agrigentum. Still it held out bravely, the women, who had refused to be sent away to a place of safety, being conspicuous by their courage. Meanwhile Dionysius, the Syracusan commander,^ had collected a relieving force numbering, to take ■ The most precious possession — indeed, the only one mentioned Ly name — seems to liave been the famous " Bull " of the tyrant Phalaiis, which dated back to about a century and a half before. The Bull had been made by Perillus, a native worker in brass, as an instrument of torture (victims were enclosed in it and roasted alive)- The artist is said to have been the first who sufifered in it. This may be a fable ; and, indeed, the story is told of more than one inventor of instru- ments of cruelty, as, for instance, of Dr. Guillotine, contriver of the machine which bears his name. But the existence of Phalaris and his cruelty, and his use of this particular engine of torture, seem to be historical facts, for they are alluded to by Pmdar, who was not much later in point of time. We shall hear of the Bull again. ^ This was the famous tyrant, the first of the name, lie had taken advantage of the discredit brought on his rivals by the Carthaginian victories to establish himself in supreme power at Syracuse. GEL A ABANDONED. 43 the lowest estimate, thirty thousand infantry and a thousand cavahy, and accompanied by fifty decked vessels. With this he marched to the help of Gela, and pitching his camp between the Carthaginians and the sea, endeavoured to cut off their supplies. After twenty days' skirmishing, in which little good was effected, he determined to make an attempt upon the camp. The assault was to be delivered simul- taneously from three places — from the sea, from the western side of the city, and from that part of the wall which was especially threatened by the siege engines. The sea-front of the camp was the weakest ; and here the attack, which was not expected, was successful for a time, and, but for the failure of the other movements, would probably have decided the day. The division that was to operate on the west was too late, for by the time it came into action the fight at the sea-front was over. That which was told off to attack the siege-works, and was commanded by Dionysius himself, never came into action at all. Nothing now remained but to leave Gela to the same fate which had overtaken Agrigentum and Himera — to abandon it to the fury of the enemy. This was done the same night, Himilco having been put off his guard by a request from Dionysius that he would grant a truce the following day for the burial of the dead. All that had strength for the journey left the city. Camarina was evacuated in the same way. Both cities were plundered and destroyed. It now seemed as if the whole of Sicily were within 44 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. the grasp of Cartilage. The only first-rate town that remained to be conquered was Syracuse. We are inclined to ask, " Why did not Himilco march upon Syracuse after the fall of Gela and Camarina ?" just as we shall be inclined to ask hereafter, " Why did not Hannibal march upon Rome after Cannae ? " Doubtless he remembered that, a few years before, the most powerful expedition ever sent forth by a Greek state had been destroyed before the walls of this same city. It must have been difficult, too, to feed and pay so vast an army. But probably his strongest reason was the second breaking out of the plague. It had raged in his camp through the summer of the year before ; and now that the hot weather had returned it probably ^ broke out again. Anyhow we know that when he returned to Carthage he had lost half his army by sickness. Whatever the cause, he sent unasked to Syracuse envoys to treat for peace. Dionysius was only too glad to listen, and a treaty was concluded on these terms : — 1. Carthage was to keep her old settlements, and those of the Sicanian tribes. 2. Selinus, Agrigentum, Ilimcra, Gcla, and Cam- arina, might be reoccupied by such of their old in- habitants as survived. But they were to be unwalled, and were to pay tribute to Carthage. 3. Leontini, Mcssana, and the Sikel tribes, were to be independent. 4. Syracuse was to be under the rule of Dionysius. ' r say " probably " because the fact is not exjiressly stated by the historian (Diodorus Siculus), ihoiigli it is strongly implied. THE PLAGUE AT CARTHAGE. 45 5. Prisoners and ships taken by either party were to be restored. Successful as the campaign had been it ended in disaster to Carthage. The army carried back the plague with it. Carthage and the neighbouring dis- tricts caught the infection, and multitudes perished. III. CARTHAGE AND DIONYSIUS (397). We have seen that the rule of Dionysius, in Syracuse was one of the articles of the treaty of 405. Such foreign support, of course, did not tend to make him popular, and as soon as he felt himself strong enough, he threw it off. In 397 he called an assembly of the Syracusans, whom he was then doing his best to conciliate, and proposed war against Carthage. "Just now," he said, " Carthage is weakened by the plague ; but she has designs against us which she will carry out on the first opportunity. We had better deal with her before she has recovered her strength." The people greatly approved the proposal ; all the more because Dionysius allowed them to plunder the property of Carthaginian citizens who where residing in Syracuse, and the ships of Carthaginian merchants that happened to be in harbour. News of what had been done spread over the island, and produced something like a massacre. Carthage had used her victory cruelly, and her misdeeds were now remembered against her. Carthaginian rule was oppressive, espe- cially in the amount of tribute which was exacted ; and Carthaginian liabits and ways of life seem to have been particularly offensive to the taste of the Greeks. The SIEGE OF MOTYA. 47 result was a rising in the Greek cities which had been made tributary by the last treaty. Most of the Car- thaginian residents perished. The example of the Greeks was soon followed by the native Sicilians, and in a very few days the dominions of Carthage in the island were reduced to her strongholds on the western coast. All this happened before war had been formally declared. This declaration Dionysius did not omit to make. He sent envoys to Carthage with a message : if she would restore freedom to the Greek cities of Sicily she might have peace ; otherwise she must pre- pare for war. For war Carthage was but ill prepared. The losses of the last campaign, and of the pestilence which had brought it to an end, had been terrible. Still it was impossible to accept the condition which had been offered, and the government prepared to resist. Of money, at least, they had an unfailing supply, and with money they could always purchase men. Some members of the council were at once sent off with large sums to hire mercenaries in Europe. Dionysius, probably without waiting for the return of his envoys, marched to the west of the island. His object of attack was Motya, the chief harbour and arsenal of Carthage in Sicily. He was joined on his way by the whole force of all the Greek cities, and his army numbered eighty thousand infantry and upwards of three thousand cavalry, while he had a fleet of two hundred ships co-operating with him. Motya was strongly situated on an island divided from the main- land by a channel six furlongs broad. This channel 48 TUB STORY OF CARTHAGE. was ordinarily crossed by a mole. But the mole could be removed in time of necessity, and this was at once done. Dionysius, after reconnoitring the place in company with his engineers, set about a siege. The harbour and all the shore were blockaded, and the channel, or at least part of the channel, was filled up, so that the engines might be brought up to the walls of the city. On the other hand, Himilco, who had been put in command of the Carthaginian force, was 1 IIK WALL Ol' Moli A. not idle. He sent ten ships from Carthage to Syra- cuse itself, and destroyed much of the shipping in the harbour. He then made a more formidable attack on the besieging force at Motya. Taking command in person of a squadron of a hundred ships he crossed by nignt from Carthage to Selinus, and sailing thence along the coast appeared at daybreak off Motya, sank or burnt the blockading squadron, and made his way into the harbour. The Greek ships were drawn upon MOTYA ASSAULTED. 49 land, and Dionysius did not venture to launch them. The harbour was too narrow for him to use his numbers with advantage. But he constructed a road of planks across a neck of land which divided the harbour from the sea, and made his men drag his ships along this. When Himilco endeavoured to interrupt the work he was driven off with showers of missiles from the Syra- cusan force on land, and by the arrows discharged by the catapults. Catapults were a new invention at the time, and probably caused something of the con- sternation which is felt by savages at the first sight of firearms. Himilco, whose fleet was only half as strong as that opposed to him, did not venture to give battle, but returned to Carthage. The attempt at relief having thus failed, Dionysius pushed the siege vigorously. The walls were battered with the rams, while the catapults, with a constant discharge of arrows, drove the garrison from the walls. Towers were wheeled up against the fortifications. They had six stories, each of them filled with men, and were as high as the houses of the town. The people of Motya, on the other hand, defended them- selves vigorously. They raised great masts with yard- arms, from which men, protected from the missiles of the besiegers by breastworks, threw ignited torches and bundles of flax steeped in pitch on the engines that were being used against the walls. Some of these were set on fire, and the assailants had to turn their attention to extinguishing the flames. Still the attack went on, and before long the rams made a breach in the wall. A fierce battle followed. The Greeks burned to avenre the cruelties that had been done to their 50 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. countrymen ; the Phoenicians, who could hope for no mercy, and who had no way of escape open to them either by sea or land, resisted with the courage ol despair. When they had to give up the walls, they made barriers across the streets, and defended every liouse as if it had been a fort. The Greeks brought their siege-towers into the streets, and from them made their way into the upper stories of the houses. Still the people of Motya did not lose courage, but fought with a resolution which reminds us of the Jews when they defended Jerusalem against the Romans under Titus. The Greeks suffered heavily in this street fighting. Their opponents were utterly reckless of their lives, and they knew the place where they were fighting. At last a stratagem succeeded where force had failed. For several days the Greeks had retired from the conflict as evening approached, the signal for retreat being given by a trumpet, and the people of the town came to regard this as the regular course of things. But one night Dionysius sent a picked force to renew the attack after dark. This detachment established themselves in some of the houses before the besieged were aware of what had happened ; the rest of the army poured across the channel now filled up, and Motya was taken. One of the horrible massacres which make these wars so terrible followed. Dionysius tried in vain to stop it, not so much from any feeling of mercy, as because prisoners might be sold for slaves, and would bring in considerable sums of money. The soldiers paying no heed to his orders, he made proclamation that such of the inhabitants as still survived should take shelter in HIMILCO'S ADVANCE, 5I the temples. This was effectual. The soldiers then began to plunder. This Dionysius did not attempt to hinder. Wishing to encourage his men for the campaign which lay before them, he gave up to them all the booty in the town. To the leader of the party which had surprised the town he made a present of about ;^400, and was liberal in his gifts to all who had distinguished themselves. Carthage meanwhile had been preparing a formid- able force with which to re-establish her dominion in Sicily. It amounted to one hundred thousand men, taking again, as being the most probable, the smallest estimate. Thirty thousand more joined it after it had landed in Sicily. Himilco was appointed to the command. Aware that Dionysius had his spies in Carthage, he gave to the captain of each transport sealed orders directing them to sail to Panormus. They were attacked on their way by a Syracusan squadron, which sank fifty of their number, and with them five thousand men and two hundred chariots. Himilco then came out with his war-ships, and the Syracusans retired. The Carthaginian general marched along the coast to Motya, and recovered it without any difficulty. Dionysius did not venture to attack him, but retired to Syracuse. Himilco now conceived a very bold scheme, nothing less than to make his way to Messana, in the extreme north-east of the island. It had an admirable harbour, capable of holding all his ships, which numbered more than six hundred. It was near the mainland of Italy, from which he hoped to draw fresh forces, and it commanded the approach from 52 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. Greece. He marched along the north coast, his fleet accompanying him, and pitched his camp at Pelorum, ^he extreme north-eastern point of Sicily, which was about twelve miles from the city. The Messanians were struck with terror. Their walls were out of repair ; they had no allies at hand, and part of their own military force was absent at Syracuse. The first thing was to send away the women and children and the most precious of their possessions. Then tlicy prepared for defence. Some were encouraged by remembering an old oracle, " The sons of Carthage shall bear water in the streets of Messana," which they took to mean that there should be Carthaginian slaves in their city. They sent a military force to the spot where Himilco was encamped, with instructions to resist any attempt to occupy the country. Himilco at once sent a squadron of two hundred ships to attack the town, which would now, he reckoned, be almost stripped of defenders. An opportune north wind carried the ships rapidly to their destination — more rapidly than the Messanian soldiers could follow them. Himilco's hopes were fulfilled. His ships landed the troops which they carried. These made their way into the city through the spaces in the walls, and the place was captured almost without a struggle. Some of the Messanians fell in a vain attempt at resistance; many took refuge in the neigh- bouring forts; two hundred and more had recourse to the desperate expedient of swimming the strait be- tween their city and Italy. Fift\' succeeded in the attempt. Iliinilco, after trying in vain to capture the forts, marched on Syracuse, llATTLE OF CAT AN A. 53 His first object was the city of Catana, which lay on the southern slopes of Mount yEtna. His original plan was to march his army along the coast, with the fleet keeping pace with it. But this plan could not be carried out. A severe eruption of yEtna took place at the very time of his march, and the stream of lava which poured down the eastern or sea- ward slopes of the mountain made it necessary for him to make a circuitous march round the western side. Dionysius at once took advantage of this division of the Carthaginian forces, resolving to attack the fleet while it was unsupported by the neighbourhood of the army. He marched with his own army along the sea-coast nearly as far as Catana, while Leptines, the Syracusan admiral, sailed alongside with the fleet. Mago, who was in command of the Carthaginian ships, felt at first no little dismay at the sight of the combined force which was coming to meet him. He had, however, no alternative but to fight ; and indeed his fleet was a very powerful one, numbering, along with the transport ships, which were furnished with brazen beaks for purposes of attack, as many as five hundred ships. The Syracusan admiral, who probably bore the character of being too adventurous, had been strictly ordered by Dionysius to keep his fleet in close order, and on no account to break the line. It wa.^i only thus that lie could hope to hold his own against the superior numbers of the enemy. These orders he disregarded. Picking out thirty of his fastest sailers, he advanced far ahead of the rest of the fleet, and boldly attacked the Carthaginians. At first he 5[ THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. was successful, sinking many of his antagonists But the numbers which were brought up against him were overwhehning. It became more and more difficult to manoeuvre ; at close quarters, when it was possible for the enemy to board, one ship, Iiowcver skilfully commanded, was not much better than another. Before long Leptincs was glad to escape to the open sea with such of the ships as were left to him. The rest of his fleet, who had thus lost the leadership of their admiral, and who came on in disorder, made but little resistance to the enemy. More than a hundred ships were taken or destroyed. Nor was the near neighbourhood of the army on shore of much service to those who tried to escape from the wrecks. The Carthaginians had manned a number of boats which intercepted the I'ugitives, and slaughtered them in the water before the eyes and within the hearing of their countrymen. .Vlore than twenty thousand men are said to have been lost by the Greeks in this battle. Dionysius was strongly urged to meet Himilco at once before the news of the disaster to the fleet had become known through Sicily. At first he was in- clined to follow the advice. But more cautious counsels prevailed, and he retreated on Syracuse. This was probably a mistake. Not only did he disgust many of his allies, but he lost an opportunity of inflicting a great blow on the enemy. Immediately after the battle bad weather came on, and the Cartha- ginian fleet could not keep the sea. Mad the Greek army still occupied their position on the shore they might have inflicted immense damage on their SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. 55 opponents. As it was, Himilco came up with liis army in time to assist his fleet. His own ships, and those which had been captured from the Greeks, were drawn up on the shore and repaired. The men had some days given them for rest and refreshment ; and he then marched on to Syracuse. Before starting for this last stage he sent envoys to the httle town of yEtna, where the Italian mercenaries of Dionysius were strongly posted, inviting these troops to change side and take service with himself They were strongly inclined to do so, but could not. They had given hostages to their master, and their best troops were actually serving in his army. They were thus compelled to refuse the offer, and Himilco was obliged to leave them in his rear. On arriving at Syracuse his first step was to make a great demonstration of force. He sailed into the Great I^arbour with all his fleet. There were more than two hundred ships of war, which he had adorned with the spoils of those captured off Catana, and nearly two thousand others of all kinds and sizes. The harbour, though measuring more than a mile and a half one way and two miles and a half the other, was absolutely crowded with them. The army is said to have numbered three hundred thousand ; but this is doubtless an exaggeration. Altogether the display of force was overwhelming, and the Syracusans did not venture to show themselves outside either their harbour or their walls. The Carthaginian general prepared to blockade the city, building three forts, which he stored with wine and other provisions. His merchants were sent at 50 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. the same time to Sardinia and Africa to fetch new supplies. Dionysius, on the other hand, sent to Greece and Southern Italy in the hope of collecting a force of volunteers and mercenaries. The tide of success now began to turn against Carthage. One of Himilco's corn-ships was approach- ing his camp when five of the Syracusan ships sallied forth from the Inner Harbour and captured it. The Carthaginians sent out a squadron of forty ships to drive off the assailants. On this the Syracusans manned their whole fleet, attacked the hostile squadron, sink- ing twenty-four out of the forty, and capturing the admiral's ship. They then paraded their force in front of the Carthaginian position, and challenged the invaders to a general engagement. The challenge was not accepted. And now, for the third time, pestilence, the old ally of the Greeks, appeared to help them. Himilco had shown himself as careless of the religious feelings, not only of his foes, but also of his friends, as his prede- cessors had done. He had broken down the tombs outside the city to get materials for his forts, and he had robbed such temples as, being without the line of fortifications, had fallen into his hands. One specially rich and famous shrine had been thus treated, that of Demeter and Persephone.' It was to this impiety that the disasters were generally attributed ; but the natural causes at work were sufficient to account for them. An enormous force was crowded together. It was the most unhealthy season of the year ; and the heat of the summer, that was now coming to an ' Ceres nml Proserijinc. PLAGUE IN niMILCO's CAMP. 57 end, had been unusually great. The plague that now broke out in the army seems, from the description that the historian gives of it, to have been much of the same type as the disease now known by that name. It began with swellings, and ended, after a most painful illness of five or six days, almost inva- riably in death. The danger or the fear of infection prevented due attention to the sick, or even the burial of the dead. We are told that as many as one hun- dred and fifty thousand corpses at one time lay rotting on the ground. The marvel is, if this or any- thing like this be true, not that so many died, but that so many survived. The Syracusans did not fail to take advantage of the distress of the invaders. Dionysius planned a simultaneous attack by sea and land. Leptincs, with a Spartan officer, was put in command of a squadron of eighty ships, and Dionysius himself directed the movements of the troops. He marched out of the city at night, and delivered an unexpected attack about daybreak on the landward side of the Cartha- ginian camp. At first he suffered a reverse ; but this he had fully planned, for it enabled him to get rid of a body of disaffected mercenaries. Put in tne front, and deserted by the troops which should have sup- ported them, they were cut to pieces by tlic Cartha- ginians. But when Dionysius advanced in force, these, in their turn, were driven back, and one of the forts was captured. Meanwhile the Syracusan ships attacked on the other side. The Carthaginian ships were but ill manned, a great part of their crews having doubtless perished in the plague. Anyhow they suf- 58 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. fered a crushing defeat, and the army, weak itself, and distracted by the assailants on the other side, could give them no very effectual help. Many of the ships were deserted. To these the Greeks set fire. The flames spread from vessel to vessel till nearly the whole of the fleet, both war-ships and mercliantmen, was in a blaze. They even spread to the camp, which itself was, at least in part, consumed. In short, the victory of the Syracusans was complete, and Dionysius encamped that night near the temple of Zeus, in which Himilco had lately had his head- quarters. Reduced to these straits, the Carthaginian general resolved to open communications with Dionysius personally, and without the knowledge of the people of Syracuse. He offered three hundred talents if he would allow him to remove to Africa what was left of his army. Dionysius replied that it would be quite impossible to conduct so extensive an operation as the removal of the whole of the army without excit- ing the suspicion of the people. But Himilco himself and the Carthaginian officers would be allowed to escape. He was not anxious to push the Cartha- ginians to extremities. Their friendship might be useful to him on some future occasion, for his own power was not very firmly established, and he had more than one proof of late that there was a strong party at work in Syracuse to overthrow it. Himilco accepted these terms. It was arranged that he and the other native Carthaginians should depart secretly on the fourth night following, and Dionysius led back his army to the city. The money was duly sent, and HTMILCO'S ESCAPE. 59 at the time appointed, Himilco, with his officers and friends, and such of his troops as belonged to Car- thage, embarked. They filled, it is said, forty ships of war. Their escape did not pass unnoticed. News of what was going on was taken to Dionysius. As he seemed to be tardy in his movements, the Corinthian ships that were in harbour acted for themselves, pur- sued the fugitives, and captured some of the worst sailers in the squadron. The army that was thus shamefully abandoned by its general fared, perhaps, better than might have been expected. The native Sikels at once left the camp, and thus anticipating the attack of the Syra- cusans, reached their homes for the most part in safety. The Spaniards offered such a bold front to their enemies, that Dionysius was glad to take them into his own service. The rest of the army surren- dered, and were sold as slaves. Himilco did not long escape the punishment which was due to his treachery and cowardice. All Carthage was plunged into mourning by the terrible disaster which had happened. Every house, every temple, was closed ; all rites of worship were stopped, and private business was suspended. The city crowded to meet the ships which were bringing back Himilco and his followers, and inquired the fate of friends and relatives. When the whole truth was known, a cry of wailing went up from the crowd. The general himself landed from his ship clad in the meanest garb. Stretching his hands to the sky, he bewailed aloud the disasters which had fallen on himself and on his country. The only consolation which he could 6o THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. offer was that he had been conquered not by the enemy, but by the will of heaven. At the same time he publicly confessed his own impiety, and took the blame of what had happened on himself After visitiuL^ every temple in the city with this confession on his lips, he went to his own house, blocked up his doors, and, refusing admission even to his own chil- dren, starved himself to death. The misfortunes of Carthage were not yet at an end. She had seemed to be on the point of subduing all Sicily, and indeed only one city remained to be taken ; and within a few months she had to fight for her own existence. Her African allies and subjects, with whom she seems to have been exceedingly un- popular, rose by one consent against her. An army numbering one hundred and twenty thousand was soon raised. They made their headquarters at Tunes, and for a while, so superior was their strength, kept the Carthaginians within their walls. For a time the city was in despair. Besides the visible dangers that threatened, the people dreaded the anger of heaven. Their general had grievously insulted the gods of Greece. lie had made a dwelling-house of one temple at Syracuse, and had robbed another. The govern- ment at once set itself to calm these fears. The offended gods, especially Demeter and Persej)honc, who had never before been worshipped in Carthage, were propitiated by sacrifices in Greek fashion, which the handsomest youths of Greek race that could be found were appointed to perform. This done, they applied themselves to the business of defending the city. And indeed the danger was soun over. The v^iiivi. i.As KKi.ii.i' i'> ri-,i;si';i'i|iiNi':. CARTHAGE SAVED. 63 hosts that threatened them were nothing more than irregular levies, who could not agree among them- selves, and who had no leaders worthy of the name. Provisions soon failed them, for they had no ships, whereas the Carthaginians had command of the sea, and could import as much food as they wanted from Sardinia. Nor was it only in this way that their vast wealth served them. They used it also to buy off some of their most formidable enemies. In the course of a {e\v months the great Libyan army broke up, and Carthage was safe. IV. THE LAST STRUGGLK WITH DIONYSIUS. The power of Carthage was now limited to a small region in the western part of the island. But she was not content to remain within these borders ; and she seized the first opportunity of seeking to extend them. Dionysius had set himself to reduce the native tribes — always hostile to the Greeks, and always ready to swell the forces of an invader. The Sikels (there were two tribes of the natives, Sikels and Sikanians) had established a new settlement at Tau- romenium. Dionysius did his utmost to capture this place, but was repulsed with much loss, and was him- self wounded. Some of the Greek cities now threw off their allegiance ; and the Sikels generally rose against him. The general in command of the Car- thaginian districts — Mago by name — who had been doing his best to make himself popular among sub- jects and neighbours, at once took the field, and ventured to march as far eastward as Messana. Dionysius encountered him on his way back, and after a fierce battle defeated him, Mago losing as many as 8000 in the struggle. Carthage, however, was now beginning to recover her strength ; and was resolved to make another effort to regain, at least, part of the MAGO DEFEATED. 65 island. She drew from her usual recruiting grounds — Africa, Sardinia, and Italy — a force of 80,000 men, and sent it into Sicily, with Mago again in command. Mago marched through the country of the native tribes, calling them all to take up arms against Dionysius, but failed with one at least of the most powerful chiefs. Receiving this check he halted. Meanwhile, Dionysius had collected a force of 20,000 ; with this he marched against the invaders, and making common cause with the Sikel chiefs, soon reduced them to extremities. The battle which Mago wished to force on him, and which some of his own followers desired, he declined. The Carthaginians, encamped as they were in their enemies' country, found their supplies fall short, and were obliged to sue for peace. It was granted ; but one of the condi- tions was that the Sikels, valuable allies in past time to Carthage, should now be subjects of Syracuse. So far the war ended in a distinct loss to the Phoenician power. The next war seems to have been ^^lovoked by Dionysius. His position at Syracuse was now firmly established, and his power had steadily increased. He was now desirous to consolidate it by finally expelling his remaining rivals from the island. The dependencies of Carthage were, as usual, disaffected. Dionysius listened to their complaints, encouraged them to revolt, and received them into alliance with himself Carthage sent embassies to complain oi these proceedings, and receiving no redress, resolved upon war. Foreseeing tliat it would be a formidable undertaking, they made more than ordinary prepara- 6 66 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. tions. Besides hiring, as usual, a large force of mer- cenaries, they also raised a body of troops of their own citizens, a most uncommon circumstance, and indicating their sense that it was a critical time to which they had come. The war seems to have been carried on — why and how we do not very clearly know — both in Italy and Sicily. Of the operations in Italy we know little or nothing. In Sicily two great battles were fought. The first was at Cabala. In this Dionysius inflicted a severe defeat on his opponents, killing, it is said, more than 10,000, and taking as many as 5,000 prisoners. The survivors were com- pelled to take refuge on a height where there was no supply of water. Mago, the general, had fallen in the engagement. The Carthaginians began ne- gotiations for peace. Dionysius replied that he would grant it only on these conditions, that they should evacuate all the towns in Sicily, and should pay an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The terms seemed harsh beyond endurance ; but it was necessary to temporize. The generals in command replied that they were not competent to make so important a treaty on their own authority, especially as the surrender of Carthaginian towns was con- cerned. They must refer the matter to the autho- rities at home, and they begged for a few days' truce. This Dionysius readily granted. Meanwhile the Car- thaginians prepared for resistance. They gave a magnificent funeral to the remains of Mago, and appointed his son, a mere youth in years but singu- larly able and brave, to take the command. Every hour of the time was spent in drilling the troops and DEFEAT OF DIONYSIUS. 67 making them ready to renew the war. When the truce expired, they marched out of their camp and offered battle to Dionysius. The engagement took place at Cronium, and ended in disaster to the Greeks. Dionysius commanded one wing, and his brother Lcptines, of whom we have heard as admiral of the Syracusan fleet more, than once before, led the other. Dionysius, who had the best troops of the army under him, was for a time successful ; Leptines was de- feated and slain. When his death became known throughout the army there was a general panic. The Carthaginians gave no quarter, and by the time that the darkness put an end to the pursuit, 14,000 Greeks, it is said, had perished. The Carthaginians, however, did not pursu. Phoenician, tribes whom the Israelites drove out of Palestine; and ipecial care was taken to forbid this parlicula\ no THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. dreadful practices caused the Greeks to identify him with Chronos or Saturn, who, in their own mythology, was said to have devoured his own children. Next in honour to Moloch was Melcart, the tutelary deity of Carthage, as he was of its mother-city. Tyre P^^- -u/- '■'r^ #- A STELE TO TAN IT. To the Greeks he was known as Hercules. His kind of rite. So we read in Lev. xviii. 21, *' Tliou shalt not let thy seed pass through the fire to Moloch." In spite of this prohibition the practice gained ground among the Israelites. Solomon built a temple to Moloch; and the refornicr Josiali "defiled the Valley of Ilinnom that no man miglit make his son or his daughter pass through the fire to Moloch. * VOTIVE sriiLE TO TANIT I'KOM CAR III ACE., CARTHAGINIAN DEITIES. ii3 splendid temple at Tyre was one of the most famous in the world. Missions with gifts and offerings seem to have been regularly sent to it from Carthage. Neither there nor elsewhere does the god seem to have been represented in human form. Herodotus, who describes the Tyrian temple as an eye-witness, says nothing of any image, but describes, among the many rich offerings with which it was adorned, two pillars, one of pure gold, the other of emerald, shining with great brilliancy at night.' VOTIVK STELES FROM CARTHAGR. A sea-god, whom the Greeks naturally identified with their own Poseidon, and the Romans with Nep- tune, was worshipped at Carthage. He was the same probably as Dagon, the fish - god, whom we know to have been worshipped in the cities of the Philis- tines. Ashtaroth, the Greek form of whose name was Astarte, corresponded to Aphrodite or Venus. Her Carthaginian name was Tanit. Of another Carthaginian deity, known to the Greeks as Triton, • This was probably of green glass, which had long before been manufactured in Egypt, and was lighted from within. 114 ^^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE. we cannot recover the native name. As the Greek Triton was a god of the sea, possibly this was only another form of Dagon. We do not hear of any separate order of priests ; but we find kings and generals offering sacrifice — sometimes, as in the case of Hasdrubal at Himera,' while battle was actually going on. ' See p. 27 III. THE REVENUE AND TRADE OF CARTHAGE. The revenue of Carthage came from various sources which may be mentioned in order. I. Tribute from subject or dependent countries. The Phoenician towns on the coast of Africa, both those which were older than Carthage and those which had been founded from it, paid tribute in money. CARTHAGINIAN COIN. Leptis, for instance, in the rich district of the Lesser Syrtis, is said to have paid as much as a talent per dicm.^ The tribes of the interior paid their tribute in kind, those who were settled and employed in culti- vating the ground furnishing corn, the wandering tribes such articles as dates, wild-beast skins, gold, ' This would amount to ;^89,968 15s., or nearly $450,00<> it6 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. precious stones, etc. The foreign possessions of the empire also paid in kind. Part of the stores which they thus furnished was laid up in the provinces CARTHAGINIAN COIN (ELECTRUM). themselves for the use of the army, and part was sent to Carthage. The amount of these contributions is not stated anywhere ; but it seems to have varied with CARTHAGINIAN COIN (SILVER). the needs of the government, and sometimes to have amounted to as much as a half of the whole produce. 2. Customs duties are mentioned in the treaties be- tween Carthage and Rome ; and the regulations about CARTHAGINIAN MINES. llj them arc precise. In the treaties with the Etrurians, of which we hear from Aristotle, we learn that it was provided what articles might and what might not be imported. Hannibal, when in power at Carthage after the end of the Second Punic War, introduced a great reform into the management of the customs, which we learn from this passage to have been levied on goods imported both by land and by sea ; and is said, by putting a stop to dishonest practices, to have improved the revenue so much, that it was no longer necessary to tax individuals. That these duties were heavy, we may learn from the fact that smuggling went on between the Greek towns in the district round Cyrene and the towns dependent on Carthage. 3. Mines. Carthage possessed mines in Spain and Corsica. The richest of these were in the neighbour- hood of New Carthage. In Polybius' time (204-122 B.C.), when they were worked by the Romans, they produced about ^2,000 per day. They are said to have been discovered by a certain Aletes, who was supposed to have done so much for his country by this discovery, that a temple was dedicated to him at New Carthage. We must not suppose, however, that all the mines (Diodorus says that all the mines known in his time were first worked by the Carthaginians) belonged to the State. Many of them were worked by individual citizens to their great profit. The power- ful Barca family is said to have derived from their mines much of the wealth by which they were enabled to become so powerful, and Hannibal is specially mentioned as receiving a large income from inines. Probably the State was the owner of some, and re- Il8 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. ceived a royalty (or sum proportionate to the quan- tity of metal raised) from the others. The Commerce of Carthage may be conveniently considered under its two great branches — the trade ivith Africa, and the trade with Europe. I. The trade with Africa. This was carried on with the barbarous tribes of the inland country that could be reached by caravans, and of the sea-coast. Of both we hear something from Herodotus, the writer who furnishes us with most of our knowledge about these parts of the ancient world. His story about the dealings with the tribes of the sea-coast runs thus. " There is a certain country in Africa outside the columns of Hercules. When the Carthaginians come hither, they unlade their goods and set them in order by the side of the sea. This done, they embark on their ships again and make a smoke. And the people of the country, seeing the smoke, come down to the sea, and put gold beside the goods and depart to a distance. Then the Carthaginians come forth from their ships and look ; and if it seem to them that the gold is of equal value with the goods, they take it and depart ; but if it seem not equal, then they return to their ships and sit still. Then the barbarians come and add other gold to that which they put before, until they persuade the Carthaginians. And neither do any wrong to the other ; for the one touch not the gold till it be made equal in value to the goods, and the others touch not the goods before the sellers have received the gold." ^ The Caravan routes are ' Heeren quotes from Captain Lynn's " Narrative " a curiously similar account. " In Soudan, beyonil the desert, in the countries abound- TRADE. Iig described in a very interesting passage. The starting- point is Thebes in Upper Egypt, where Herodotus probably got his information ; and the route, in which the stations — always places where water can be found — are given with much detail, extend to the Straits of Gibraltar in the west, and Fezzan, and probably still more inland places, in the south. The goods v/ith which the Carthaginian merchants traded with the African tribes were doubtless such as those which civilized nations have always used in their dealings with savages. Cheap finery, gaudily coloured cloths, and arms of inferior quality, would probably be their staple. Salt, too, would be an important article. Many of the inland tribes can only get this necessary of life by importation, and the Carthaginians would doubtless find it worth their while to bring it, not necessarily from the sea, but from places on the route where, according to Herodotus, it could be found in large quantities. The articles which they would receive in exchange for their goods are easily enumerated. In the first place comes, as we have seen, gold. Carthage seems to have had always at hand an abundant supply of the precious metal for use, whether as money or as plate. Next to gold would come slaves. Even then the negro race was the victim of the cruel system which has not )-ct quite been rooted out of the world, ing in gold, tliere dwells nn invisible nation, who are said to trade only by night. Those who come to traffic for their gold, lay their merchan- dise in heaps and retire. In the morning they find a terlain (|uantity of gold-dust placed against every heap, which if they think suHicient, they leave the goods ; if nut, ihcy let both remain until mure uf the precious ore is added." 120 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. though no Christian nation, at least ostensibly, prac- tises it. The ancients, indeed, had other slaves besides negroes. It was a horrible feature of the slavery of these times that, through the practice of selling, for private or public gain, prisoners of war and the inhabitants of captured towns, men and women of every race were reduced to bondage, and thus the slave might be as well born and as well educated as his master.! But these slaves were sure to be discon- tented, and very likely, therefore, to be dangerous, and the more gentle and docile negro soon came to be prized. Fashion, too, favoured the quaint appearance of the race, so curiously contrasted with the fair com- plexion and chiselled features of the Greek. Thus in Menander (342-291 B.C.), as he is represented to us by Terence, we find a soldier saying to his lady-love, " Did you ever find my good will to you halt ? When you said you wanted a handmaid from Ethiopia, did not I give up all my business, and find one for you ? " Ivory must have been another article of Cartha- ginian trade, though we hear little about it. The Greeks used it extensively in art, making some of their most magnificent statues partly of it and partly of gold ;* and it seems to have been employed in early ' One Latin writer draws a distinction between slaves that were *' learned " and that " had a smattering of learning." All the early schoolmasters at liome, almost without exception, had been slaves. The elder Cato made a profit of taking in nol)le Roman boys to be taught by an educated slave of his own, * The great statues of Phidias, viz., of Zeus at Olympia, of Here at Argos, and of Athene at Athens, were made of these two materials, and therefore called chryselephantine. IVORY AND PRECIOUS STONES. 121 times at Rome for the chairs of state used by the higher magistrates. We do not precisely know where this ivory came from first. Virgil speaks of the sub- stance as coming from India, and the elder Pliny says that the luxury of his times had exhausted all the sources of supply except those of the farthest East. We may be certain, however, that in the flourishing days of Carthage her traders dealt largely in this article, which indeed is found of the largest size and finest quality in Africa. The elephant is still found VOTIVE STELE KROM CARTHAGE. over the whole of that continent south of the Sahara, except where it has been driven away by the neigh- bourhood of man. The Carthaginians had domesti- cated it, a thing which has never since been done by any African race. Precious stones seem to have been another article which the savages gave in exchange for the goods they coveted. The carbuncle, in particular, came in such abundance from Carthage into the markets of Europe that it was called the " Carthaginian Stone." Perhaps T22 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. we may add dafes to the list of articles obtained from the interior. The European trade dealt, of course, partly with the things already mentioned, and partly with other articles for which the Carthaginian merchants acted as carriers, so to speak, from one part of the Mediter- ranean to another, Lipara, and the other volcanic islands near the southern extremity of Italy, pro- duced resin ; Agrigentum, and possibly other cities of Sicily, traded in sulphur brought down from the region of Etna ; wine was produced in many of the Mediterranean countries. Wax and honey were the staple goods of Corsica. Corsican slaves, too, were highly valued. The iron of Elba, the fruit and the cattle of the Balearic islands, and, to go further, the tin and copper of Britain, and even amber from tlie Baltic, were articles of Carthaginian commerce. Trade was carried on not only with the dwellers on the coast, but with inland tribes. Thus goods were transported across Spain to the interior of Gaul, the jealousy of Massilia (Marseilles) not permitting the Carthaginians to have any trading stations on the southern coast of that country. While we are writing of trade, we must not omit to mention a curious statement about what has been called the " leather money " of Carthage. The work from which it comes bears the name of ^schines, a disciple of Socrates. It is certainly not of his time, but it is probably ancient. " The Carthaginians," says this author, whoever he may have been, " make use of the following kind of money : in a small piece of leather a substance is wrapped of the size of a ART AND LITERATURE. 123 piece of four drachmae (about 3s.) ; but what this substance is no one knows except the maker. After this it is sealed and issued for circulation ; and he who possesses the most of this is regarded as having the most money, and as being the wealthiest man. But if any one among us had ever so much, he would be no richer than if he possessed a quantity of pebbles." This unknown sub- stance was probably an alloy of metal, of which the ingredients were a State secret ; and the seal was a State mark. We have, in fact, here a kind of clumsy bank- note. Of Carthaginian art and litera- ture there is little to be said. The genius of the Phoenicians did not lead them to distinguish them- selves in either way. As for art, whatever grace is to be found in the scanty remains that are left to us of Carthaginian civilization, is clearly due to Greek influence. The coins, for instance, that arc figured on pp. 115, 116, are evi- dently the work of Greek artists. About Carthaginian literature we cannot speak so positively. That there were libraries in the city .M- \t K^.^N ,N ^.\ 11' ' 11 ■///',! ">i^. 124 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. when it was taken by the Romans, we know for certain, as we also know that the conquerors were not sufficiently aware of their value to keep them for themselves, but allowed them to be dispersed among the African princes. But whether these libra- ries contained a native Carthaginian literature, or were furnished with the production of Greek genius, we do not know. Of one Carthaginian work, in- deed, we know something. We have its subject, the name of its author, and, it may also be said, its opening sentence. It was a book on agriculture, VOTIVE STELE (BUU.). written by one Mago, and it began, it is said, with the remark that he who would make his farm prosper should sell his town-house. So high a reputation had it obtained, that when Carthage was taken, the Roman Senate appointed a committee to look after its translation into Latin. It was after- wards translated into Greek. Roman writers made much use of it, and Cicero speaks of it as the standard work on its subject. Of the domestic life of the Carthaginians we know almost nothing. Where there is great wealth there WEALTH AND LUXURY. ^25 is sure to be great luxury. Of this we get, indeed, a few hints from the historians. We have seen, for instance, how, when one of the Carthaginian generals were pressed for arrears of pay by his mer- cenaries, he was able to give them security in the rich gold and silver drmking-cups which belonged to the Carthaginians on his staff. And Athenaius, a great collector of gossip on all such matters, tells us that Dionysius sold a splendid robe to a Carthaginian millionaire for a hundred and twenty talents — the almost incredible sum of nearly thirty thousand pounds. And it seems to have been also true that in Carthage, as elsewhere, " where wealth accumulates men decay." Political and military talent she could always command, but she trusted more and more to her mercenaries, to those " silver spears " which are sure, sooner or later, to break in the day of need. PART IV. CARTHAGE AND ROME Fur the First and Second Punic Wars our cliief authorities are I'ljlybius and Livy. The first was a Grceii, and a great friend of the younger Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage. He was piesent at the capture of that city, but unfortunately the part of his work which relates that event, and the history of the Third Punic War generally, is lost. For the First Punic War, which is the chief subject of the introductory chapters of his work, and for the Second, he is our best authority, so far as he goes. Here, again, unfortunately, much is lost ; indeed, we have no complete book after the fifth, and this takes us a little farther than the battle of Cannae. Consider- able extracts have, however, been preserved of the lost books, among them one containing a description of the battle of Zama. Polybius was an admirable historian, painstaking and just in the highest degree. Livy (Titus Livius) lived in the last days of the Roman Republic and the first of the Empire, since he was born B.C. 59, the very time of the first Triumvirate, and died in the fourth year of Tiberius. He wrote a history of Rome in one hundred and forty-two books, of which thirty-five only sur- vive. Happily the ten books, twenty-one to thirty, which give a detailed account of the Second Punic War from the beginning to the end, have been preserved, and epitomes of the lost books exist, from which we get some valuable information about the First and Third wars. Livy is a great writer ; some excellent judges have even said that his style is the very best to be found among prose writers ancient or modern. It is certainly full of vigour and beauty; but Livy is not a great historian. He was very careless, never taking the pains, so far as we can learn, to visit the scenes of the events which he describes, though they must often have been within his reach, or attempting to realize them to himself. For the Third Punic War our chief authority is Appian, a native of Alexandria, who wrote there, in Greek, a Roman history, in which he treated the affairs of every country separately. \ I. TTIE WAR IX SICILY AND ON THE SEA. We have heard more than once of Campanians among the mercenaries who were accustomed to fight both for Greece and for Carthage in the Sicih'an wars. They seem to have been particularly unscrupulous, for they would change sides when changing sides seemed likely to give them better pay or better prospects of victory. And this habit of theirs agrees with the bad account we get of them in other ways. These Campanians let out their swords for hire, not so much because they were poor (as did the Arca- dians in ancient times, and the Swiss and Scotch in modern Europe), as because they liked the life of a soldier of fortune. They were the youth of a disso- lute people,^ and, not able to find the career they liked at home, where they would have had to deal with the Romans, they sought it abroad, and, as we have seen, especially in Sicily, We shall not be surprised, therefore, to find some of these Campanians behaving in a most cruel and unscrupulous way to one of the Greek cities. After the death of Agathocles, who, • Capua, the chief city of Campania, had a very bad reputation In this way. lO 130 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. tyrant as he was, was a man of energy, affairs in SiciJy had fallen into a state of great confusion. Among other causes of trouble was a corps of Cam- panian mercenaries, who had been ii> the service of the tyrant, and who, after his death, asserted their independence, and set up in the trade of brigands. They seized the city of Messana, slew or drove out the citizens, and divided among themselves everything that they possessed. For a time the Mamertines, or " Servants of Mars " ^ (for this was the name that the robbers had assumed), prospered greatly, spreading their power over the neighbouring portion of the island. Then came a check. Syracuse had again fallen into the hands of an able ruler, one Hiero, of whom we shall often hear again. Hiero reduced the Mamertines to great straits, and they looked about in despair for some one who could help them. There were two parties among them, one favouring Carthage, the other Rome. At first the latter pre- vailed. An embassy was sent, offering submission and begging for help. The request perplexed the Romans not a little. It was quite a new thing for them to look beyond the limits of Italy. There they were now supreme ; but they dreaded undertaking conquests outside it. And to grant this request would of course embroil them with Carthage. On the other hand, Carthage would become a dangerous enemy if it were allowed to possess itself of Messana. It would only have to conquer Syracuse to make itself master of Sicily. The Senate debated the question more than once without coming to any decision. ' " Mamcrs " is an Italian form of " Mars." THE ROMANS GAIN MESSANA. I3I Besides their fear of a new enterprise, they had, we may hope, some scruple about taking to themselves such very discreditable allies. From the Senate the matter was referred to the people, and the people felt neither the fear nor the scruple, but resolved that help should be sent, and that the Mamertines should be received as allies. Meanwhile the other party at Messana had been busy. They applied for help to Carthage ; and Car- thage at once sent it. A peace was made with Hiero, who was besieging the city. A fleet sailed into the harbour, and a body of troops under Hanno occu- pied the citadel. When the Romans, who were under the command of Appius Claudius, one of the Consuls of the year, arrived, they found themselves anticipated. Unfortunately for Carthage, both the officers in charge of the fleet and Hanno were wanting in foresight or resolution. The former was seized at a meeting of the citizens to which he had gone in the hope of keeping the peace ; the latter consented to give up the citadel if he were permitted to withdraw with his garrison. Then the Romans became masters of Messana without having to strike a single blow for it. The Carthaginians were not disposed to accept this state of things. Hanno they crucified as having shown in his conduct neither courage nor good judg- ment. Then, in concert with Hiero, they closely in- vested the city. Claudius attempted to make terms ; he was even willing to depart, if the Mamertines might be allowed to remain. When these terms were rejected he resolved to act. He marched out of 132 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. the city and offered battle. Hiero accepted it, but after a long fight was driven back into his camp. The next day he returned to Syracuse. Appius followed up his victory, attacking and routing the Carthaginian army, which immediately raised the siege of the city. The next year a larger army was sent ; Hiero, who had the sagacity to see with whom the victory was most likely to be, submitted to Rome, becoming one of its most constant and useful allies. Many other cities, both Sicilian and Carthaginian, followed this example. Carthage, on the other hand, increased her forces in the island, making Agrigentum the base of her operations and the place in which her military stores were kept. The next year the Romans besieged Agrigentum. and kept the garrison closely within the walls. After a blockade which lasted five months, Hannibal, one of the Suffetes, who was in command, found himself sorely pressed by famine, and sent urgent entreaties to Carthage for help. In answer to these requests, a con- siderable body of troops, with a number of elephants, was sent to Sicily. Hanno, who commanded the Carthaginian army in the field, was rendered superior in force to the Romans by this reinforcement. He cut off their supplies and reduced them to great straits. Indeed, but for the help of Hiero they could not have held out. Hanno now thought it time to attack the enemy. He sent on his African light- horse in advance, with orders to provoke the Roman cavalry to an engagement, and by retiring before them to draw them within reach of his whole army. The stratagem succeeded. The Romans sallied furiously CAPTURE OF AGRIGENTUM. I33 •^ from their camp, drove the Africans before them, and then, finding themselves in presence of Hanno's army, were themselves driven back. For two months the two armies lay quiet, with a space of about a mile between them. Meanwhile the famine in the city grew worse, and Hannibal, by fire signals from the city (for the Carthaginians seem to have had some system of telegraphing), and by mes- sengers, made his colleague aware that he could hold out no longer. The Romans were scarcely less in need, so that both parties were eager to fight. The battle that followed was long and obstinate. At last the Carthaginian mercenaries, who composed the front line, gave way, fell back upon the elephants behind them, and threw the whole army into disorder. Only a small part of the troops escaped. But Hannibal with the garrison of Agrigentum was more fortunate. Seeing that the Romans, rejoicing in their victory, were guarding their lines very carelessly, he made his way through undiscovered. The next day the Romans marched into Agrigentum, where they found abun- dance of spoil and many prisoners of war. After this success the Romans began to think that then it was within their power to make themselves masters of the island. But the great obstacle was that Carthage was still mistress of the sea, and that even their own coasts were not safe from the ravages of her fleet. If their hope was to be fulfilled they mu.st have a fleet of their own. Ships of course they had, for the treaties ' with Carthage, made hundreds of years before, had set limits beyond which they ' See pp. 14-16. 134 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE. should not go ; possibly they had ships of war ; but they had nothing which they could match against the great five-banked vessels of the enemy. Fortunately one of these came into their possession, stranded by a storm or in an attack made upon their transports. This they used as a model for their shipbuilders. In the course of a few weeks, a hundred five-banked and twenty three-banked vessels were built — of green wood, it is said, and not likely to last, but still sufficient for their purpose. The first attempt of the new force was not fortu- nate. A squadron of seventeen ships was taken at Lipara, with one of the consuls, who was in command. But the Carthaginians soon found that the Romans were quite as formidable by sea as by land. Their admiral, Hannibal, who was reconnoitring with fifty ships, fell in unexpectedly with a superior force of the Romans, lost the greater part of his flicet, and barely escaped himself. Still, the greater experience of their seamen would have given them the advantage but for the device by which their enemies contrived to make a sea-fight very much like a fight on dry land. Every Roman ship was filled with a boarding apparatus. It was like a gangway, eighteen feet long and four feet broad, and was attached to a pillar of wood set up by the bowsprit, from which it was dropped when the two ships came in contact. The further end was furnished with a sharpened bar of iron, which was driven by the force of the fall into the enemy's deck, and held it fast. If the ships were laid broadside to broadside, the boarders jumped from all parts of their own ship on to that of the enemy ; if prow only DUn.IAN COLUMN. BATTLE OF MYLJE. I37 touched prow, they went two and two along the gangway. The new apparatus was soon brought into use. Hannibal (the same commander who had escaped from Agrigentum) encountered the Roman Consul Duilius, and despising his enemy, bore down upon him without taking the trouble to form his fleet in order. The front ships, as soon as they came near the Romans, were grappled by the new machines, and the boarding parties poured in from the Roman ves- sels. The Carthaginians were taken by surprise and overpowered, and lost all the thirty ships that com- posed the van. The rest of the fleet fared little better. Whenever they tried to approach, the grappling-irons hung over them. In the end they fled with the loss of fifty more ships ; Hannibal escaping in an open boat. This battle of Mylae was one of the turning points of the long struggle between the two powers. Car- thage had ruled the sea for centuries, and now it was beaten by a foe who had first taken to it only a few months before.^ It is needless to give all the details of the long struggle that followed. Hannibal met with his end in the year of his defeat at Mylae. He had sailed to Sardinia, and was there surprised by the Roman fleet, losing many of his ships. As usual he escaped, but this time in vain. He was seized by the survivors and crucifiod. ■ Duilius received liigli Iionours at Rome, a trinnipli, n column mlorncil with the beaks of the captured vessels, and the singular privilege of being accompanied by a torch-bearer and a flute player when he was coming lumic from dinner at night. 138 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. The next two years the war dragged on in Sicily without any decisive event, though the advantage was for the most part with Rome. But in 256 a great battle was fought. The Roman Government, weary of these tedious campaigns, resolved to carry the war into Africa, and attack their enemy at home. With this end in view they collected a fleet of as many as three hundred and thirty decked ships. On these they embarked their best troops. Each vessel had a crew of three hundred seamen, and carried a complement of one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Cartha- ginian force was still larger, numbering three hundred and fifty ships, and one hundred and fifty thousand men. The two fleets met at Ecnomus, a promontory of the southern coast of Sicily. The Roman fleet was formed in the shape of a triangle, with the apex or point towards the enemy. At this point were the two huge ships, each rowed by six banks of oars, in which sailed the two Roman Consuls — Atilius Regulus, of whom we shall hear again, and Manlius. Each side of this triangle was made up of a squadron ; a third squadron, which held the transports containing the cavalry in tow, formed the base ; and there was yet a fourth, a reserve, ranged in one long line so as to cover both flanks of the squadrons before them. The Carthaginians adopted very different tactics. They arranged their ships in what may be called open order, extending their line from the shore far out to sea with the view of surrounding the enemy. The shore squadron, or left wing, was under the command of Hamilcar ; the rest of the fleet was led by the BATTLE OF ECNOMUS. I39 Hanno whose army had been defeated before Agri- gentum. The Roman fleet began the attack. Seeing that the enemy had but a weak Hne of single ships, they bore down upon the centre, Hamilcar had foreseen this, and had given orders to his officers to retreat as soon as the attack should be made. This was done, and with the expected result. The Romans eagerly pursued the flying enemy ; their order of battle was broken, the two squadrons in advance being separated from the third (that which had the transports in tow) and from the reserve. Then the retreating Carthaginians turned upon their pursuers. An obstinate fight followed ; the Carthaginians had the advantage in seamanship and in the speed of their ships. But do what they might, they hardly dared to come to close quarters. The Roman ships were fitted with the dreaded grappling and boarding machines. If these were once brought into use the battle had to be fought by the soldiers, and there was no chance of standing against the soldiers of Rome. While this struggle was going on, another com- menced in the rear of the Roman fleet. Hanno bore down with his ships upon the reserve squadron and threw it into confusion. And then began a third, the left or in-shorc wing of the Carthaginian fleet attacking the squadron which had the transports attached to it. ]5ut the Roman superiority was maintained everywhere. At close quarters the Car- thaginians could not hold their own, and though here and there they might sink a ship by a sudden skilful charge, to close quarters they were bound 140 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. sooner or later to come. Hamilcar was the first to retreat ; then Hanno, who had been pressing hard on the transport squadron and the reserve, was attacked 'jn his turn and forced to fly. Thus the Romans won the second great naval victory. Twenty-six of their ships had been sunk, but none were taken. The Car- thaginians lost about a hundred, as many as sixty- four having been captured with all their crews. Those that escaped were scattered in all directions, and there was now nothing to prevent the Romans from invading Africa. II. THE INVASION OF AFRICA. HanNO hastened home with the news of the disaster of Ecnomus (though home, as we have seen, was not the place to which a defeated Carthaginian general would naturally desire to go), and bade his country- men prepare for defence. But Carthage was, now as ever, almost helpless when attacked in her own do- minions. Her subjects were always disaffected and ready to rebel ; and even her own colonies were not permitted to protect themselves with walls. No resistance could be offered to the invaders, who found the country much the same as Agathocles had found it fifty years before, a singularly rich and perfectly defenceless region. They collected a rich booty, part of which consisted of as many as twenty thousand slaves. It is possible that if, instead of busying them- selves with plunder, they had advanced on Carthage at once, they might have finished the war at a single blow. If this had ever been possible, it certainly ceased to be so when an order came from the Senate at Rome that one of the consuls was to remain in Africa with such forces as might be necessary to finish the war, 142 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. while the other was to return home with the rest of the expedition, Regukis was left accordingly with fifteen thousand infantry and six hundred horse and a squadron of forty ships ; the rest of the force, with the vast booty that had been collected, Manlius put on shipboard and carried back to Italy. RESERVOIRS OF CARTHAGE. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were doing their best to strengthen their force. They appointed two new generals, and sent for a third from Sicily, who at once came back, bringing with him between five and six thousand men. It seems strange that the Romans, who must now have been masters of the sea, made DEFEAT OF HAMILCAR. 143 no attempt to interrupt him. On his arrival the Carthaginians resolved to take the offensive. The wealthy citizens could not bear to see their estates plundered and their country houses burnt to the {ground, and resolved to risk a battle. What might have been the result if they had had skilful generals is doubtful ; but, unfortunately, skilful generals could not be found. Hamilcar and his colleagues marched out of the city and took up their position upon a hill. As their strength was in cavalry and elephants they CROSS SECTION OF CISTERN WALL. FROM DAUX. ought, of course, to have remained on level ground, where both these could have been brought into use. The Roman general, whose military ability was great, saw his advantage. Half the enemy's force was useless in the position which he was occupying, and in that position he resolved to attack him. He ordered a simultaneous advance against both sides of the hill on which the Carthaginian camp was pitched. The cavalry and the elephants were, as he had foreseen, quite useless ; and though some of the 144 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. mercenaries stood firm against the first charge, these too gave way when they were taken in the rear. The Romans won a decided victory, though they were too weak in cavalry to inflict much loss upon the enemy in his retreat. The next day they advanced and took up a position at Tunes, a town which, as we have seen, was not more than five miles from Carthage. The Carthaginians were in despair. Both their fleet and their army had suffered terrible defeats, and their subjects and allies were in rebellion — the Afri- cans ravaging the territory of their late masters even more mercilessly than did the Romans. In fact they had nothing left to them but the city itself; and this, crowded with the multitude of fugitives that had fled into it from all the country round about, was threat- ened with famine. Affairs were in this condition when envoys arrived from Regulus, who was afraid that his year of office might expire before the war was finished, offering to treat for peace. Envoys were at once sent from Carthage ; but they could do nothing. The Roman general, probably aware that the Senate at home would not sanction any great concessions, demanded terms which it was impossible to grant. The Carthaginian government felt that they could not be more entirely humiliated by absolute conquest, and they broke off' the negotiation, resolving to resist to the last. Then came one of those singular turns of fortune of which history is so full. The pride of the Roman general was " the pride that goeth before a fall." The Carthaginians had not hesitated to use their almost XANTIPPUS. 145 boundless wealth in hiring mercenaries from abroad, and now there came to Africa a body of these troops in command of one of those soldiers of fortune who have had the luck to have great opportunities and to make good use of them. Xantippus came from the best school of soldiers in the world — Sparta. It was a Spartan who had turned the tide when Athens seemed likely to conquer Syracuse; and another Spartan was to do the same service for Carthage against Rome. Xantippus heard the story of the late battle ; he saw the strength of the Carthaginian forces, the numbers of their cavalry and of their elephants, and he came to the conclusion — a conclu- sion which he did not hesitate to announce to his friends — that their disasters had been due, not to the inferiority of their army, but to the unskilfulness of the generals. The Senate sent for him. Introduced into the council-chamber, he set forth the causes ol the late defeat, and the strategy which ought to be pursued in the future, with such clearness as to convince his hearers. The generals were displaced, and the " care of the army was committed " to the Spartan. Every one hoped much from the change, and Xantippus soon began to show himself equal to his task. Even in drilling the troops — and this he began to do at once — his skill was so manifestly superior to ihat of his colleagues, that the soldiers began to feel the utmost confidence in him. They loudly asked that they might be led against the enemy, and that the general who was to lead them should be Xantippus. The other generals offered to give up their commands 146 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. to their comrade ; and the army, which numbered twelve thousand foot and four thousand horse, and which was accompanied by the enormous number of a hundred elephants,^ was led out against the enemy. Xantippus arranged the elephants in a single line in front. Behind these he placed what Polybius calls " the Carthaginian phalanx." Probably the desperate condition of the country had brought a force of native Carthaginians into the field. On the right wing were posted the heavy-armed mercenaries. With them were ranged also some of the light-armed troops and of the cavalry. The left wing was made up entirely of the two latter kinds of troops. Regulus, on the other hand, when he saw that the Carthaginians were bent on fighting, arranged his line of battle with the special view of holding his ground against the elephants, which his men greatly feared. The light-armed troops were, as usual, posted in front ; but behind them stood the legions in un- usually deep and close order. The cavalry were posted as usual on the wings. These tactics were well contrived to resist the elephants, but laid the army, with its narrow front, open to the flank attacks of the powerful Carthaginian cavalry. Xantippus began the battle by a forward movement of his elephants against the Roman centre. His cavalry charged at the same time on either wing. The Roman horse, five hundred only against four thousand — ■ It is not easy to imagine liow a city wlilcli was threatened v;ilh famine could support a hundred elephants, each of which must have required a daily ration of at least half a hundredweight of food, some of it at least nvnilalile for human consumption. DEFEAT OF REGULUS. I47 if these numbers are right — was speedily overpowered. The Roman left wing at first fared better. Charging fiercely, with not the less zeal because they were not called to encounter the dreaded elephants, they fell on the heavy-armed mercenaries, routed them, and pur- sued them as far as their camp. The centre, too, held its own for a time. The front ranks, indeed, were trampled down in heaps by the elephants, but the main body, with its deep, close files, stood firm. But they had to face about to resist attacks in front, on the sides, and in the rear. One part, after driving back the elephants, was met by the phalanx of native Carthaginians, which was fresh and unbroken, and indeed had not been in action at all ; another had to resist the furious charges of the cavalry ; nor were there any reserves to be brought up. The greater part of the army fell where they stood : some crushed by the elephants, others struck down by the javelins showered on them by the nimble African horsemen, some slain in more equal conflict with the Carthaginian heavy-armed. The few that sought safety in flight died but with less honour. The way to the fortified post which they held upon the sea-coast (it was called Aspis or Clypea from its resemblance to a shield) was over a flat and open country ; the cavalry and the elephants pursued the fugitives, and few reached the fort. A solid body of two thousand men, however, which had broken through the mercenaries, was able to make good its retreat to Aspis. Five hundred prisoners were taken, among them the Consul Regulus. All the rest of the army, scarcely less than twelve thousand in number, perished on the field or in the 148 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. flight. The great historian,^ from whom I have taken this account, concludes his narrative of the campaign with reflections on the changes of fortune which bring men down in the course of a day from the heights of prosperity to the depths of misery, and on the marvellous results which the genius of a single man can effect ; but he says nothing either here or after- wards of the romantic story of the fate of the prisoner Regulus. We are not certain to what year it belongs — we are not even sure that it is true at all ; on the other hand, it is too famous, too noble in its meaning and moral, to be omitted. I may therefore tell it now where it will fitly close the career of one of the great soliers of Rome, the simple, frugal men who were called from the plough to command the armies of the rcpublic.2 I do not know that the story can be better told than in Horace's noble ode, perhaps the very noblest that he ever wrote. Regulus, we may say, by way of preface, after being kept in prison at Carthage for several years, was sent to Rome to negotiate a peace, under the promise to return if he failed. Among the terms which he was to offer was that of a ransoming ' Polybius. ' The story was told in later times that Recjulus was sowing his fields when the messenger came willi the tidings of his election to tlie consul- ship ; and the agnomen (a sort of second surname) of Scriiutus was said to have been given to the family from this circumstance. Among the future heroes of his race whom ^neas sees is in his Elysiau fields is " Serranus o'er his furrow bowed." It is cruel to have to say that the first Regulus that bore the name of Serranus was the son of the hero ; and still worse to be told that the proper spelling of the word is " .Saranus," and that it probably comes from Saranum, an insignificant town of Umbria. HORACE ON REGULUS. I49 or exchanging of prisoners. When brought into the Senate, which at first he refused to enter as being now a mere Carthaginian slave, he strongly advised his countrymen. At the same time he gave his voice against peace generally. With warning voice of stern rebuke Thus Regulus the Senate shook : He saw prophetic, in far days to come, The heart-corrupt, and future doom of Rome. " These eyes," he cried, "these eyes have seen Unblooded swords from warriors torn. And Roman standards nailed in scorn On Punic shrines obscene ; Have seen the hands of free-born men Wrenched back ; th' unbarred, unguarded ga'L, And fields our war laid desolate By Romans tilled again. " What ! will the gold-enfranchised slave Return more loyal and more brave ? Ye heap but loss on crime ! The wool that Cretan dyes distain Can ne'er its virgin hue regain ; And valour fallen and disgraced Revives not in a coward breast Its energy sublime. *' The stag released from hunter's toils From the dread sight of man recoils, Is he more brave than when of old He ranged his forest free ? Behold In him your soldier 1 He has knelt To faithless foes ; he, too, has felt The knotted cord : and crouched beneath Fear, not of shame, but death. " He sued for peace 'ho' vowed to war ; Will such men, girt in arms once more Dash headlong on the Punic shore ? No I they will buy their craven lives With Punic scoin and Punic gyves. t5« TUB STORY OP' CARTHAGk. O mighty Carthage, rearing high Thy fame upon our infamy, A city eye, an empire built On Roman ruins, Roman guilt ? " From the chaste kiss, and wild embrace Of wife and babes, he turned his face, A man self-doomed to die. Then bent his manly brow, in scorn, Resolved, relentless, sad but stern, To earth, all silently ; Till counsel never heard before Had nerved each wavering Senator ; — Till flushed each cheek with patriot shame, And surging rose the loud acclaim ; — Then, from his weeping friends, in haste. To exile and to death he passed. Me knew the tortures that Barbaric hate Mad stored for him. Exulting in his fate, With kindly hand he waved away The crowds that strove his course to stay. He passed from all, as when in days of yore, His judgment given, thro' client throngs he pressed In glad Venafrian fields to seek his rest. Or Greek Tarentum on th' Ionian shore.' What is the truth about the " tortures of barbaric hate " we cannot say. The Romans had a horrible story of how the hero on his return was cruelly put to death. But then they were never scrupulous about the truth when they were writing of their enemies ; and about Carthage and its doings they were, we have leason to believe, particularly apt to exaggerate and even to invent. On the other hand, the Carthaginians showed no mercy to their own generals when these ' I have availed myself of a translation by Sir Stephen De Vere. fHell and Sons. 1SS5.) REVENGE EOR REGULUS. 1=11 were unsuccessful ; and it is very probable that they showed as little to an enemy, especially when he had done them such damage and had treated them as haughtily as had Regulus. But there is at least equal authority for a story not less horrible which is told against the Romans them- selves, or rather against a Roman woman. The Senate handed over two noble Carthaginians to the wife of Regulus as hostages for the safety of her hus- band. When she heard of his death she ordered her servants to fasten the two prisoners in a cask, and to keep them without bread and water. After five days one of them died. The savage creature kept the living shut up with the dead, giving him now a little bread and water that his torments might be prolonged. But the servants themselves rebelled against these horrible doings, and informed the Tribunes of the people of what was going on. By them the poor wretch was rescued ; and the people would not allow nim to be ill-treated any more. in. IN SICILY AGAIN. The Romans still retained their superiority at sea. It is, indeed, a very strange thing that the Cartha- ginians, though they had been sailors, and adven- turous sailors too, for centuries, should have been beaten almost at once on their own element by a people that had had little or nothing to do with it.' But so it was. News of the disaster that had hap- pened to the army of Regulus was brought to Rome, and a fleet was sent to carry off the garrison of Clypea, which, it was said, still held out against the enemy. It met and defeated the fleet of Carthage, taking, we are told, as many as one hundred and fourteen vessels out of a total of two hundred, and carried the troops. But though the Romans seem to have fought as well by sea as by land, still they were not sailors. We shall hear several times in the course ' The fleet o( Rome must have been, to a great extent, manned by the Italian allies. Indeed, down to just a late period the seamen em- ployed in it were called socii navalcs, "naval allies." Polybius, to show the ignorance of the Romans in these matters, has a curious story of how the crews of the ships first built during the war were taught to row by practising on dry land. The practising, one imagines, would not go very far in teaching them. ROMAN LOSSES AT SEA. I53 of the next few years of terrible losses by shipwreck, losses which we know to have been increased, if not caused, by the obstinacy and ignorance of the officers in command. So it seems to have been in the case of the relieving fleet. The pilots warned the consuls that the south coast of Sicily was dangerous, but warned in vain. The result was a calamity of wb.ich Polybius, a sober and sensible writer, says that " his- tory can scarcely afford another example of so great and general a disaster." Out of four hundred and sixty-four vessels little more than a sixth part escaped. The Carthaginians were proportionately encouraged, and, fitting up a new fleet and levying another army, resolved to have another struggle for Sicily. In the first campaign, indeed, they lost Panormus, but in those that followed they had a clear advantage. Again the weather helped them. The Romans lost another fleet, and for a time gave up all hope of being masters of the sea, contenting themselves with keep- ing only so many vessels afloat as were wanted to carry supplies to their army. In the field, too, Car- thage more than held her own. The havoc which the elephants had wrought in the army of Rcgulus had not been forgotten, and the Roman armies did not venture to offer battle in any place where the ground was suitable for the action of these formidable crea- tures. It was not till they found out that it was easy to make them as dangerous to their friends as they could be to their foes that they dared to face them. One of the Carthaginian generals was rash enough to use the animals in attacking a town. The archers showered arrows upon them from the walls till, 154 ^^£ STORY OF CARTHAGE. driven to madness by their wounds, they turned round and broke down their own ranks. Many fell into the hands of the Romans on this occasion. A still greater gain was that they were no longer feared. And now began one of the most obstinate sieges recorded in history. Lilybaeum was a strongly fortified town near the Cape of the same name. Its wall was unusually high, and its ditch unusually deep, while the harbour could be approached only by a channel through shallow lakes which stretched between it and the sea. The Romans began by attacking a fort on the south-western wall, and battered down six of the towers upon the wall. Himilco, who was in com- mand of the garrison, was unceasing in his efforts, re- pairing the breaches, digging countermines, and watch- ing continually for a chance of setting fire to the Roman works. And he averted a worse danger in the threatened treachery of the mercenaries. The leaders of these troops were actually in treaty with the Romans, when Himilco heard of what was going on, and contrived to break it off A few days after- wards came help from Carthage. No news of the garrison at Lilybaeum had reached the city, and it was feared that they were in distress. A fleet of fifty ships was hastily fitted out and despatched to Sicily, with a relieving force of ten thousand men on board. The admiral in command waited for a favourable wind, and then, with all his ships ready for action, sailed straight into the harbour, the Romans being so surprised by their boldness that they did not attempt to oppose. Himilco, encouraged by this reinforcement, resolved STEI.E AT LILYU/EUM. ROMAN DISASTERS. 157 to attack the besiegers. Sallying forth with nearly his whole force, he fell on the Roman works ; but he just missed his object : his troops were on the point of setting fire to the engines and towers when he found that they were suffering heavier loss than he could afford, and withdrew them. But a few weeks afterwards he succeeded. The works had been injured by a violent gale, and some of the mercenaries saw in the confusion thus caused an opportunity for destroying them. Himilco approved their scheme. These bands sallied from the gate and set fire to three different places. The Romans were taken by sur- prise ; and the wind blew such volumes of smoke into their faces that they could see and do nothing. In the end everything was destroyed, the towers being burnt to the ground, and the metal heads of the rams melted. After this loss they gave up all hopes oi taking the place by storm, and resolved to trust to a blockade. Meanwhile the Carthaginian fleet lay at Drepanum ; and this the new consuls who came into office in the year 249 resolved to attack. Publius Claudius, who was in command, managed to reach Drepanum unobserved. Adherbal, the Carthaginian admiral, was taken by surprise, but did not lose courage. He manned his ships at once, and sailing out of the harbour by the opposite side to that by which the Romans were entering, formed his line on the open sea outside. Claudius had to recall his ships ; such as had entered the harbour came into collision in backing out with those that followed them, and there was great con- fusion. Still the captains ranged them as well as they T5'^ THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. could along the shore, with their prows turned towards the enemy. But they had lost the choice of ground ; the Carthaginians had the open sea and plenty of room to manoeuvre. They could retreat when they were hard pressed, and turn again when the oppor- tunity occurred. When the Roman vessels ventured to advance they were attacked in front, on the side, and in rear. But a Roman ship that was in diffi- culties had nothing behind it but the shore. If it retired, it either grounded in the shallows or was actually stranded. Nor was this disadvantage of place counterbalanced by any superiority in the build of the ships or in seamanship. The ships were clumsy, the seamen unskilful. In the end Claudius suffered a crushing defeat. He made his own escape with thirty ships ; but all the rest, nearly a hundred in number, were captured. The crews, too, were taken prisoners, excepting a few who beached their ships and jumped ashore. Junius, the other consul, was even more un- fortunate. He had a hundred and twenty ships of war, with which he had to convey a fleet of eight hundred transports. The Carthaginian admiral forced him to cast anchor on a lee-shore (near Camarina), where there was no harbour within reach When it came on to blow the blockading squadron put out to sea, and doubling Cape Pachynus escaped the worst of the storm. The Roman fleet had not time, or perhaps was not wise enough, to follow them. Anyhow, it was completely destroyed. " Scarcely a plank remained entire," says the historian. As a few days before most of the ships in the harbour of THE ROMANS GAIN ERYX. 159 Lilyba^um had been burnt, Rome was now without a fleet. Still, the siege of Lilybaeum was pushed on. The blockading army had now most of Sicily to draw upon for stores, and was well supplied, while the town could be provisioned from the sea. Though the COIN : THE TEMI'LE AND KAMTAKTS OK ERVX. Romans gained possession by surprise of the strong post of Eryx, the second highest mountain in Sicily the war for some time dragged on without much advantage to cither side. And now appeared upon the scene one of the few PTe?.t men that Carthage produced. Ilamilcar, sur- l6o THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. named Barca.^ was a very young man when he was appointed to the command of the Carthaginian fleet and army. But he had already made himself a name, and he soon showed that he was fit for his post. He established himself in a strong place in the north-west of the island, between Panormus and Drepanum. It was a lofty rock called Hercta (now Pellegrind), and seems to have united every kind of advantage. It was so difficult of approach from the land that it could be defended by a very small force. There was some productive land in the neighbourhood. The climate was cool and healthy ; and there was a deep and spacious harbour. In this place, though the Roman forces held all the neighbourhood, he maintained himself for three years. His fleet — for Rome had given up for the present the attempt to command the sea — ravaged the southern coasts of Italy, and helped to furnish him with supplies. On land he kept his enemies engaged by perpetual surprises and strata- gems. He won, indeed, no great victory over them, but he kept them from doing an3-thing else, and the siege of Lilybaeum made no progress. So anxious were the Romans to drive him out of this stronghold, that they at one time assembled as many as forty thousand men to carry on their attacks upon him. All, however, was in vain, and it was of his own free will that at the end of three years he took up another position. This was Eryx, the capture of which by the Romans has been mentioned above. He put his army on board the fleet, and suddenly carried it to the place which he had fi.xed upon, and though the • See page 1 1 . HASDRUBAL'S SUCCESSES. i6i enemy still held the fort upon the top of the hills, got possession of the town. Here he maintained himself for two years, getting little help, it would seem, from home, for one of his chief difficulties was with his mercenaries, who were clamouring for the PIILENICIAN WALL AT KKYX. pay which he could not give them, and whom he was obliged to put off with promises. Still the Romans could make no impression on him, and of course made no advance in the siege of the Carthaginian fortresses. 19 l62 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. If Hamilcar could have been everywhere the war might have had a different result, or, in any case, might have been prolonged still more than it was. But he could not be sure that his lieutenants would be as able as himself. In 241 Rome made a great POSTERN IN THE WALL OF EKYX. effort to recover her supremacy at sea. The public treasury was exhausted, as it might well be after nearlyfiveand twenty years of war, but private citizens came forward to supply what was wanting. Some of the richest undertook to build each a ship ; ot BATTLE OF AGATES ISLAND. 163 two or three of smaller means would join together. Thus a fleet of two hundred five-banked vessels were got together, and these of the very best construction. With this Lutatius Catulus, the consul, sailed to Sicily. The Carthaginians seem to have been unprepared, not expecting indeed that the enemy, who had aban- doned the sea for several years, should now seek to recover the command of it. Catulus was therefore able to possess himself unopposed of the harbours of Lilybaium and Drepanum. He pressed the siege of the latter place with much vigour, and meanwhile kept his crews busy with training and exercise, till he made them expert and ready. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, prepared to act. The plan of Hanno, who was in command of the fleet, was this. To take stores for the supply of Hamilcar's army at Eryx, and, after landing these, to take on board some of the best troops and liamilcar himself, who alone was equal to an army ; and thus engage the Romans. It was the object of the Romans, on the other hand, to force an action before this could be done. Catulus accordingly put some of his best troops on board his ships and sailed to .^gusa, an island opposite Lilybaium. Hanno was at Hiera, another island, a little further out to sea. The whole front was known by the name of the ./Agates (a word that has probably something to do with the Greek word for a goat). Catulus intended to give battle at once. Then, when the day for action came, he began to doubt. The wind was stormy, and was blowing from the west, and so would help the movements of the enemy and hinder his own. On 164 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. the other hand, there was much to be lost by delay. At present the Carthaginian ships were burdened with the stores which they were carrying. If he did not engage them at once they would rid themselves of these, would take on board some first-rate troops trom the army at Eryx, and, above all, would have the presence of the dreaded Hamilcar himself. These thoughts made him resolve on battle. The Carthaginians were already on their way eastward when he put out to sea. His crews, become strong and dexterous by practice, got their ships between the enemy and the point for which he was making, and, ranged in a single line, prepared to receive them. The conflict was short and decisive. Hanno's ships were encumbered with stores ; his crews were un- skilled, for the fleet had been neglected, and the troops on board were nothing better than raw levies. In all these points the Romans were superior ; they had nothing on board but what was wanted for the battle ; their rowers were well trained, and their fighting men of the best quality. At the very first meeting they showed their superiority. Fifty of the Carthaginian ships were sunk and seventy more taken with all their crews ; the rest were saved by a sudden change of the wind to the east which took them back to their anchorage at Hiera. The battle of the yEgates Islands brought the war to an end. Carthage could no longer provision her army in Sicily, and felt that it was useless to prolong the struggle. Accordingly, Hamilcar was empowered to make peace. The Romans were ready enough to meet him, for they too were exhausted by the long CONCLUSION OF WAk. 165 .struggles, and after some negotiations a treaty was made. The chief condition was that Carthage was to give up all her positions in Sicily, and engage to leave the island alone for the future. She had had a hold on the island for at least four centuries, and for nearly two had cherished hopes of winning it. Sometimes she had been very near their accomplish- ment. Now they had to be finally given up. This was undoubtedly a great blow. We may call it the first great step downward. A war indemnity of nearly ^800,000 was imposed. But Hamilcar was resolved to save his honour. The Romans demanded that the troops at Eryx should surrender. This demand he resolutely refused, and it was given up. They marched out with all the honours of war and were carried back to Carthage ; and so, after a duration of four and twenty years^ the First Punic War came to an end. '^^^^^ IV. CARTHAGE AND HER MERCENARIES. We have seen more than once that Carthage had much trouble with her mercenary troops. This trouble now came upon her again, and in a worse form than ever. The fact was that five and twenty years of war had exhausted even her vast wealth, and she could not meet her engagements with the soldiers whom she had hired. These, on the other hand, were more powerful than they had ever been before. They were not troops hired for a campaign, and discharged after a few months' service, but a standing army trained by a long war to know each other and to act together ; and many of them had been taught the art of war by a great soldier, Hamilcar Barca. As soon as peace was concluded, Gesco, Governor of Lilyba^um, had begun sending the mercenaries to Carthage in small detachments. He hoped that as they came they would be paid off and dismissed to their homes. Had this been done, all would have oeen well. But the government either would not or could not find the money. Shipload after shipload of the men arrived till the city was full of them. After a while, so troublesome and disorderly were they, they were collected in a camp outside the walls, kEVOLT OF THE MERCENARIES. 16/ and left there svith nothing to do but talk over their grievances and plot mischief. When at last the money, or part of the money, was forthcoming, it was too late. The troops had found leaders, and the interest of these leaders was not peace but war. One of them was a certain Spendius, a runaway slave from Campania, who dreaded, ot course, that when everything was settled he might be sent back to his master, that is to torture and death. He is said to have been a man of enormous strength, and brave even to rashness. The other was a free- born African, of the name of Matho. He had been a ringleader in all the disturbances that had taken place since the return of the mercenaries, and he dreaded the vengeance of his employers. Matho found his fellow Africans ready to listen to him ; and there was probably much truth in what he said. "The Carthaginians," he told his comrades, "are going to send to their homes the troops belonging to other nations ; when you are left alone they will make you feel their anger." A pretext for open revolt was soon found. Gesco, who had been sent to settle with the troops, handed over the arrears of pay, but put off the question of allowances for corn, horses, etc., to another time. At this proposal there were loud cries of discontent, and in a few minutes a noisy crowd of troops was assembled. Spendius and Matho harangued the assembly, and were received with shouts of ap- plause. Any one else that attempted to speak was killed. " Kill," says the historian, was the only word that every one in this motley crowd, gathered from almost every country of Western Europe, could under- l68 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. stand. The two speakers were chosen generals. Gesco and his staff were seized, fettered, and thrown into prison. There was now open war between Car- thage and her mercenaries. The African towns at once joined the rebels. They were always discontented with their masters, and this discontent had now reached its height. The neces- sities of Carthage during the war just ended had compelled her to increase the taxes of her depen- dencies, and to exact these taxes to the uttermost farthing. The rent in kind paid by the cultivators of the soil had been raised to a half of the pro- duce, and the tribute paid by the towns had been doubled ; and any default in payment had been cruelly punished. So fierce was the wrath raised by this oppression that the very women brought their orna- ments — and her ornaments were no small part of an African woman's wealth — and threw them into the common stock. From these and other soiu'ces, Spendius and Matho received so much money that they settled all the claims of the troops, and had still abundance of means for carrying on the war. Two towns only. Hippo and Utica, remained loyal. These were at once besieged. The mercenaries had three armies in the field. One was before Hippo, another before Utica ; the third held an entrenched camp at Tunes. Carthage was thus cut off from all communication by land with Africa : but she still retained command of the sea. The Carthaginian commander-in-chief, Hanno,^ ' This Hanno seems somehow to have got the title of " The Great," but to have done very little to deserve it. -J u ■A L. ■p -J vt> 3b 41, PLAN OK HARBOUR AT UTICA. 'mjA \ SIEGE OF UTTCA. tyt marched against the rebel force that was besieging Utica. He had as many as a hundred elephants with him. These broke through the entrenchments of the rebel camp, and the mercenaries fled in con- fusion. Hanno, accustomed to have to do with half savage enemies, who, once defeated, could not easily be rallied, thought that the victory was won, and, while he was amusing himself in Utica, allowed his troops to be as idle and as careless as they pleased. Hut the enemy were soldiers trained by Hamilcar Barca, and accustomed to retreat and rally, if need was, more than once in the same day. They rallied now, and seeing that the Carthaginian camp was left unguarded, attacked it, and got possession of a quantity of stores, and, among them, of some artillery which Hanno had sent for out of the city. The conduct of the war was now committed to Hamilcar. The strength of his force was a corps of ten thousand native Carthaginians, Besides these he had a body of mercenaries, a number of deserters from the enemy, and seventy elephants. His first operation was to relieve Utica. The chief difficulty was to break the blockade which the rebel general Matho had established round Carthage. The hills at the land end of the isthmus on which the city stood were held in force by the rebels ; as was the only bridge over the river Macar. But Hamilcar had noticed that a certain wind brought up such quanti- ties of sand to the bar of the Macar as to make it easily fordablc. Taking advantage of this, he marched his army across the river by night, and, to the sur- prise of both friends and enemies, appeared in the 172 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. morninf^ on the other side, and hastened to attack the rear of the rebel force that was guarding the bridge. A strong detachment from the besiegers of Utica advanced to support their comrades. Hamilcar was marching with his elephants in front, his light-armed troops behind them, and his heavy-armed in the rear. On coming in sight of the enemy, he changed this disposition. Spendius mistook the movement for a flight, and ordered a charge. The rebels found the heavy troops quietly waiting to receive them, while the cavalry and the elephants fell upon their flanks. They were soon broken. Six thousand were slain upon the field of battle, and two thousand taken prisoners. Hamilcar had broken the blockade ; but Hippo and Utica were still besieged, and the rebels were still in force at Tunes. His success, however, had a good effect on the African tribes. One of the chief Numidian princes came into his camp with a force of two thousand men, and Hamilcar felt himself strong enough again to offer battle. The fight that ensued was long and obstinate. At last the Carthaginians prevailed, chiefly by the help of the elephants. Ten thousand rebels were killed, and four thousand taken prisoners. To these latter Hamilcar, with a wise mercy, offered liberal terms. They might take service with Car- thage, or they might go home. But if they were found in arms again, they must expect no further mercy. The rebel generals were dismayed when they heard of this politic act. Their only plan was to commit their followers to deeds which could not be pardoned. 2 iAjtarti- Ttutath) ^^emple de Saittrnx IMoloch) "S^T^tU fer^ rtrit»i and nov; lU\ by Polyhius. Nothing was more com- mon among the ancients than the march by night witli lanterns ; and when the Roman outposts saw the lights between themselves and the unoccupied district, they thought that the Carthaginians were forcing their way, and quickly advanced towards the supposed danger to shui the road against the enemy " (Lecture Ixxiv.). FABIUS AND MINUCIUS. 215 The effect of Hannibal's escape was twofold. Not only did he get out of a difficult position, carrying the greater part of his plunder with him, but he made it very hard for Fabius to carry out his policy of delay. This policy of course had many enemies. The allies, who saw their country ravaged without being able to strike a blow for it, were furious ; and the wealthy Romans, whose estates were suffering in the same way, were loud in their complaints. And Hannibal's cunning plan of leaving Fabius' estates untouched, while all the neighbourhood was plun- dered, increased their anger. This change of feeling soon became evident. Fabius had to go to Rome on business for a time, and left his army in the charge of Minucius, Master of the Horse (this was the title of the Dictator's second-in-command), with strict orders not to fight. Minucius did fight, and won something like a little victory. When news of his success came to Rome, the opponents of Fabius persuaded the people to divide the army, and give the command of one half to the Dictator, and of the other to the Master of the Horse. There were now two Roman armies encamped about a mile apart. Hannibal, who knew what had happened, immediately took advantage of the situation. Minucius, if he wished to satisfy his friends was bound to fight, and Hannibal soon gave him what looked like a favourable opportunity. He occu- pied some rising ground between his own camp and that of the Romans with what looked like a small force. The Romans hastened to dislodge it. But there were five thousand men in ambush, who, when 2l6 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. the fighting had been going on for some time, fell upon the Roman rear. This gave way, and another great disaster would have been the result, had not Fabius, who was on the watch, led out his troops, and changed the fortunes of the day. After all no great harm was done ; and there was this good result, that Minucius confessed his error, and gave up his com- mand. The rest of the year passed without any further disasters, except that the Consul Servilius, landing on the coast of Africa, and ravaging the country, was attacked by the Carthaginians, and lost a thousand men. Hannibal spent the winter at Geronium, in the north of Apulia. It was a mountainous country ; and it was close to the sea. (This part of Apulia, indeed, is like an elbow projecting out into the Adriatic.) He had ample supplies, and he was in communication with Carthage. Probably new troops were sent to him. Anyhow, when the next year came (216) he was stronger than ever. It was late in the spring when he took the field. His first movement was to march round the Roman army, which had been watching him during the winter, and to seize a great magazine of stores which the enemy had collected. It was still his policy to provoke them to fight a battle, and this successful movement helped him. The Romans had gathered a great force, but found it difficult to feed it. They were afraid, too, lest they should lose their allies, if they allowed Hannibal to march up and down through Italy and plunder as he pleased. And the party of fighting had had a great success at the elections. C. Terentius Varro, a man VARRO AND PAULLUS IN COMMAND. 217 of the people, after loudly proclaiming that the nobles were prolonging the war for their own purposes, had been chosen Consul by an immense majority. It was resolved to fight, but not to do so till the newly-levied legions should have joined the army of the year before. This was done about the beginning of June ; and the whole army, now numbering about ninety thousand men, marched in pursuit of Hannibal, who was gathering in the early harvests on the sea- board of Apulia. The two consuls (Varro's colleague was a noble, .^milius Paullus by name) had command on alternate days, ^milius, an experienced soldier, was doubtful of the result of a battle, and anxious to put it off. Varro, on the other hand, was confident and eager, and on his first day of command brought matters to a crisis by taking up a position between Hannibal and the sea. X. CANN^. The great battle was still delayed for a few days But when Hannibal's cavalry cut off the Roman watering -parties from the river, and left the army without water at the very height of an Italian summer, the impatience of the soldiers could not be restrained. On the morning of the ist of August,^ Varro, who that day was in command, hoisted on his tent the red flag as a signal of battle. He then ordered the army to cross the river Aufidus, and to draw up their lines on the right bank. Hannibal at once took up the challenge, and fording the stream at two places, drew up his army opposite to the enemy. "His army was but half as large ; if he should be defeated his doom was certain ; but he was confident and cheerful. Plutarch tells us a story — one of the very (ew which show us something of the man rather than of the general — of his behaviour on the morning of the battle. He seems to have been one of the soldiers whosc- spirits rise in danger, and who become cheerful, and even gay, when others are most serious. " One of his chief officers, Cisco by name, said to him : ' I am ' The Roman reckoning was six or seven weeks in advance of the real year, and tiic time was really aljout midsummer. HANNIBAL'S ARMY. 219 astonished at the numbers of the enemy.' Hannibal smiled and said : * Yes, Gisco ; but there is something more wonderful still' * What is that ? ' said he. ' That though there are so many of them, not one of them is called Gisco.' The answer was so unexpected that everybody laughed." And he goes on to tell us that the Carthaginians were mightily encouraged to see this confident temper in their chief. The Aufidus, bending first to the south, and then again, after flowing nearly eastward for a short dis- tance, to the north, makes a loop. This loop was occupied by Hannibal's army. The left wing con- sisted of eight thousand heavy cavalry, Spaniards and Gauls. Hasdrubal (who must not be confounded with Hannibal's brother of the same name) was in command. They had the river on their left flank and on their right. Behind them was one half of the African infantry. " One might have thought them a Roman army," says Livy, " for Hannibal had armed them with the spoils of Trebia and Trasumennus." Next in the line, but somewhat in advance so as to be about on a level with the heavy cavalry, were posted the Spanish and Gallic infantry, with their companies alternately arranged, and under the imme- diate command of Hannibal himself and his brother Mago. These troops were still armed in their native fashion. The Spaniards wore white linen tunics, dazzlingly bright, and edged with purple. Their chief weapon was the sword which they used, of a short and handy size, and with which they were accustomed to thrust rather than strike. Nevertheless it was fitted for a blow, for it had, of course, an edge. The 220 TlIK STORY OF CARTHAGE. Gauls were naked from the hips upwards. They used very long swords, without a point. Both had oblong shields, and both seemed to the Romans and Italians, whose stature seldom exceeded the average height of men, to be almost giants in size. Still further to the rieht, but thrown back somewhat so as to be on a level with their countrymen on the left wing, stood the other half of the African infantry. And then on the extreme right wing of the whole army, were the African light horsemen under the command of Mago. These, to use the military phrase, " rested upon nothing ;" that is, they had nothing to support their right flank. There were but two thousand of them, for they had had some of the hardest of the fighting since the army had entered Italy ; but they were con- fident of victory. The whole army numbered fifty thousand, but ten thousand had been detached to guard the camp. The right wing of the enemy con- sisted of the Roman horse, who thus fronted the heavy cavalry of Carthage ; next to these came the infantry of the legions, more than seventy thousand strong, yet drawn up in so dense an array — in column, in fact, rather than in line — that they did not overlap the far smaller force of their adversaries. On the left wing were posted the cavalry of the allies. It was here that Varro commanded. Paullus was on the right of the army. The whole force numbered about eighty thousand, allowing for the detachment which had been told off to guard the camp. Their faces were turned to the south. This was a great disad- vantage to them, not so much on account of the glare of the sun, for it was yet early in the day, but because THE STRUGGLE. 221 the hot wind, which the country people called Vul- turnus, rolled such clouds of dust in their faces that they could scarcely see what lay before them. The battle began as usual with the skirmishers. Here the Carthaginians had the advantage. The slingers from the Balearic islands ^ were more expert and effective than any of the Roman light-armed troops. The showers of stones which they sent among the legions did much damage, wounding severely, among others, the Consul Paullus. Then the heavy-armed cavalry of Carthage charged the Roman horse that was ranged over against them. The Romans were some of the bravest and best born of their nation ; but they were inferior in numbers, in the weight of men and horses, and in their equip- ment. They wore no cuirasses ; their shields were weak ; their spears were easily broken. Probably they had no special skill in cavalry tactics ; had they possessed it, there was no opportunity of showing it, for there was no room to manoeuvre. It was a fierce hand-to-hand fight ; many of the Spaniards and Gauls leapt to the ground, and dragged their opponents from their horses. In the centre of the field where the Roman legions met the Gallic and Spanish infantry, Hannibal seemed for a time to be less successful. He had advanced these troops considerably beyond the rest of his line. When charged by the heavy columns of the enemy they were forced to fall back. The Romans pressed ' Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica. Tlie reader must not be tempted by the plausible derivation from the Greek fiuWo) (ballo), to throw or Strike. The name seems to have been derived from some form of Baal. 222 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. on in a dense and unmanageable mass. And in what seemed the moment of victory they found themselves assailed on both flanks and in the rear. On either side the two bodies of African infantry, who had hitherto taken no part in the battle, fell upon them. Almost at the same time came Hasdrubal with his heavy horsemen. After routing the Roman cavalry of the right wing, he had charged that of the allies upon the left. These had been already thrown into confusion by the stealthy attack of five hundred Africans, who had pretended to surrender, but came up in the critical moment and hamstrung their horses. Hasdrubal completed their rout, and leaving the Africans to pursue the fugitives, charged the rear of the Roman infantry. These were now surrounded on all sides, for the Gauls and Spaniards in their front had rallied, and checked their advance. Upon this helpless mass the Carthaginians used their swords till they were fairly weary of slaying. How many men lay dead upon the field when darkness came on it is impossible to say. Polybius gives the numbei at seventy thousand, and he is probably a bettei authority than Livy, who reduces it to fifty thousand. Among them were one of the consuls, the ex-consul Servilius, twenty-one military tribunes (officers of a rank about equal to that of a colonel), and eighty members of the Senate. Varro had fled from the field with seventy horsemen. Hannibal's loss was something under six thousand. The question was, " What was he to do ? " He had destroyed the enemy's army, for even the force left to guard the camps had surrendered, and the"e WILL HE MARCH ON ROME ? 223 was no other army in the field. Most of his officers, while they crowded round to congratulate him, advised him to give himself and his army some rest. Maharbal, who was in chief command of the cavalry, thought otherwise. " Do you know," he said, " what you have done by this day's victory? I will tell you. Four days hence you shall be supping in the Capitol of Rome. Let me go on in front with my cavalry. They must know that I have come before they know that I am coming." Hannibal was not so sanguine. He praised Maharbal's zeal, but must take time to consider so grave a matter. Then Maharbal broke out : " I see that the gods do not give all their gifts to one man. Hannibal, you have the secret of victory, but not the secret of using it." It will never be decided whether Hannibal, with his cautious policy, or the bold Maharbal was in the right. But one is disposed to believe that so skilful a general, one, too, who was not wanting in boldness (for what could be bolder than this whole march into Italy ?), knew what could and what could not be done better than anybody else. He could not hope to succeed unless the allies of Rome deserted her, and he had to wait and see whether this would happen. Till he was sure of it he could not, we may well believe, afford to risk an advance. One defeat would have been fatal to him. It would have been almost as fatal to sit down in vain before the walls of Rome. But, however this may be, it is certain that the op- portunity, if it was an opportunity, never came back to him. He did indeed come near to Rome, as I shall have to tell hereafter, but this was a feint rather 224 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. than a serious attack. That midsummer day in the year 216 saw the highest point which the fortunes of Carthage ever reached. Then only, if even then, she might have been the mistress of the world. XI. AFTER CANN/E. The victory of Cannae had great results, though it did not make Hannibal feel strong enough to strike a blow at Rome, First and foremost among these results was the alliance of Capua, the second city in Italy. The Capuans, indeed, were not all of one mind in the matter. It was the people that favoured Carthage ; the nobles were for the most part inclined to Rome, It was a noble, however, and one who was married to a lady of the great Roman house of Claudius, that took the lead in this movement. The people rose against the Senate, stripped it of its power, massacred a number of Roman citizens who were sojourning in the town, and sent envoys to invite Hannibal to their city. He was of course delighted to come ; Capua, which had more than thirty thousand soldiers of her own, was almost as great a gain as the victory at Cannae. He was near to being assassinated, indeed, on the night of his entering the city, for the son of his entertainer had resolved to stab him at the dinner-table. The next day he was present at a meeting of the Senate. He was full of promises ; he undertook that Capua should thereafter be the capital of Italy. Meanwhile lie i6 226 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. demanded that a leading citizen who had been specially active on the Roman side should be given up to him. The man was arrested, and was sent by Hannibal to Carthage. The greater part of Central and Southern Italy followed the example of Capua. All the Samnites, with the exception of a single tribe, revolted from Rome ; so did Lucania and Bruttii, and so did many of the Greek cities in the south, the chief among them being Crotona. These cities had passed the height of their prosperity, but they were still populous and powerful towns. It was only the extraordinary tenacity and courage of Rome that enabled her to hold out. The Senate never lost its courage, and, after the first panic was over, the people were ready to stand by their rulers to the last. When Varro, whose rashness and folly had almost ruined his country, returned to Rome, the Senate went out to meet him, and publicly thanked him that he "had not despaired of the commonwealth." As he was of the opposite party in politics, this was a way of saying that all Romans, whatever their way of thinking, must join together to made the best of everything. Nothing that could be done to raise an army was neglected. Bands of brigands were induced to enlist by promises of pardon for past offences ; even slaves were recruited. As many as eight thou- sand soldiers were gained in this way. But when a proposal came from Hannibal that the prisoners of CannE should be ransomed, the horsemen at £17, the infantry at ;!^io each, the offer was refused. By great exertions an army was raised, and put under MAGO AT CARTHAGE. 22/ the command of Marcellus, who was probably the best soldier that Rome possessed at the time. Hannibal had sent his brother Mago to Carthage from the battle-field of Cannae. Introduced into the Senate, he gave a glowing account of what had been done, of the four victories which had been gained, of the two hundred thousand men that had been slain, the fifty thousand that had been taken prisoners. As a practical proof of the truth of his story, he poured out on the floor of the Senate-house a peck of gold rings which had been taken, he said, from Roman soldiers that had been slain in battle. It was only the horsemen, indeed only the upper class of the horsemen, he explained, that were accustomed to wear them. But the practical conclusion of his speech was a demand for help. " The nearer the prospect," he said, " of finishing the war, the more you are bound to support your general. He is fighting far away from home. Pay is wanted for troops ; provisions are hard to obtain. And though he has won great victories, he has not won them without some loss. He asks, therefore, for help in men, money, and stores." The war-party was delighted. One of them turned to Hanno, leader of the opposite faction, and asked him, " Does Hanno still repent of having made war on Rome?" "Yes," replied Hanno, "I still repent, and shall do so till I see peace made again. Your invincible general makes as great demands upon you as if he had been beaten. And as for his prospects for the future, has any Latin city joined him .'* Has a single man of the thirty-five tribes of Rome deserted to him ? ' 228 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. To these questions Mago could only answer " No ! '' Hanno asked again, " Has Rome said a word about peace?" Mago could only answer that it had not. Then said Hanno, " We are as far off from the end of the war as we were when Hannibal crossed into Italy. I vote that no help should be sent to prolong a war which can have no good end," This protest, of course, was useless. The Senate resolved to send four thousand African troops, forty elephants, and a sum of money. And Mago was to go into Spain and raise 20,000 troops to fill up the gaps in the armies there and in Italy. As a matter of fact little was done ; at this crisis the Carthaginian government showed but little energy, and Hannibal was left, for the most part, to help himself. The winter of 216-5 he and his army spent in Capua. Ever since he had started from New Carthage, more than two years before, his men had lived in tents, satisfied with the hard discipline and scanty fare of the camp. Doubtless, they had lost something of their vigour by the time that they took the field again ; but there were other and weightier reasons why Hannibal's great plans should end in failure than that his army was spoilt by the luxury of a winter in Capua. In the next year little was done. Hannibal gained some small successes, and met with some small losses. His chief venture had been the siege of Nola, which, after Capua, was the chief city of Campania. In this he failed, owing chiefly to the skill and energy of Mar- cellus. To have let a year pass without making a decided advance was in fact to fall back. Still his Cannibal's prospects. 22^ prospects in some directions had improved. At Syracuse the wise old King Hiero, who had continued to be loyal to Rome, without making an enemy of Carthage, was dead. Hieronymus, his grandson and successor, was a foolish youth, who thought he could do better for himself by joining what seemed to be the winning side. He offered his help to Carthage, asking as the price the supremacy over the whole of Sicily. Philip, King of Macedon, again, seemed ready to join an alliance against Rome. Little advantage, however, was gained in this way. Of what happened to Hieronymus I shall soon have to speak. Philip's action was delayed, first by the accident of his envoys falling into the hands of the Romans as they were on their way back from Hannibal's camp, and afterwards by causes which we have no means of explaining. Anyhow, at the time when his help would have been most valuable to Hannibal and most damaging to Rome, he did nothing. On the other hand, Carthage suffered a great loss in the complete conquest by their enemies of the island of Sardinia, which had again fallen into their hands. On the whole, at the end of 215 Hannibal, though he had received no serious check in the field, was in a much worse position than he had been in at the beginning. The next year also (214) had much the same result. Hannibal made an attempt to seize Tarentum, bul failed. There were in this town, as elsewhere, a Carthaginian and a Roman party. The latter got to know what their opponents were planning, and took such precautions, that when Hannibal appeared before 230 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. the walls of the city he found it prepared for defence ; and after vainly lingering in the neighbourhood for a lew days, was obliged to depart. In another part of Southern Italy he suffered a serious loss. Hanno, one of his lieutenants, had raised a force of twenty thousand Lucanians. This was defeated at Beneventum by the Roman general Gracchus, who was in command of an army of slaves. Hanno's Lucanian infantry either perished on the field of battle, or dispersed to their own homes ; but he escaped himself with about a thousand African cavalry. The next great event of the war — its exact date is uncertain — was a great gain to Hannibal. The friends of Carthage in Tarentum, though overpowered for the moment, had never given up their plans ; and now they found an opportunity for carrying them out. The city had sent hostages to Rome. These had attempted to escape, had been captured, and executed. This act of cruelty roused their fellow-citizens to fury ; communications were at once opened with Hannibal, and the ringleaders of the plot were not, as might have been supposed, popular leaders, but nobles — relatives, it is probable, of the unfortunate hostages. Hannibal marched towards the town with a picked force of ten thousand men, and halted a few miles off, while his friends within the city completed their preparations. One party was told off to deal with the governor, a Roman of the house of Livius. He had been giving a banquet to some of the citizens ; the con- spirators paid him a visit after it was over, laughed and joked with him, and finally left him in such a state that they had nothing to fear from his watchful- TARENTUM GAINED. 23 1 ness. Another party had arranged to admit Hannibal himself by a gate which opened out of the quarter of the tombs, which in Tarentum — we might almost say alone among Greek cities — were within the walls. A fire signal was given by Hannibal and answered by the conspirators. The latter fell upon the guards of the gate, and Hannibal was at hand outside to support them. A third party was busy at another of the gates. They had been accustomed for several days to go out on what seemed to be hunting parties, to return late at night, to talk over their sport with the guard, and to give them some of the game. On this occasion they brought back with them a particularly fine wild boar. While the animal was actually in the passage of the gate, and the sentry was busy admiring it, thirty African soldiers, who had been stealthily approaching, rushed up, cut the man down, and, securing the gate, let in a large body of their com- rades. The city of Tarentum was taken, but the citadel was hastily secured by the Roman garrison. The Tarentines were not harmed. It was sufficient if any citizen wrote over his door, "This is aTarentine's house." But all the dwellings in which Romans had been quartered were given up to plunder. XTI. THE TURN OF THE TIDE. From Trebia to Cannae the tide of success rose with Hannibal. For three years or thereabouts after Cannae it may be said to have remained at its height. His gains and losses about balanced each other. This, of course, really meant that his chances of victory were growing less, for his was an enterprise to which delay, even without defeat, was fatal. In 212 the tide manifestly turned. The Romans felt themselves strong enough to besiege Capua. The city was already in distress for want of food , for with the Roman armies so near the rich Campanian plains could not be cultivated. And Hannibal's first attempt to provision it failed. A second succeeded ; but shortly after the place was regularly invested. Three Roman armies sat down before it, and then drew a complete line round it with a strong rampart and ditch, and with forts at intervals. The townspeople were not strong enough to make sallies with effect, and all that they could do was to send messenger after messenger to Hannibal, begging earnestly for help, if he did not wish to see them perish. Early in the year 211 — that is, after the siege had lasted some months — he made a determined effort to relieve the ATTEMPTED RELIEF OF CAPUA. 233 city. He marched rapidly with a picked force from Tarentum, where the citadel was still holding out against him, and took up a position on Mount Tifata, a hill which overlooked the city. He had contrived to warn the Capuans of his coming, arranging that they should make a sortie from their walls while he was attacking one of the camps of the besiegers. The sortie was easily repulsed ; Hannibal's attack seemed at one time likely to succeed, but ended in failure. His elephants — he had thirty-three of these animals with him — forced their way into the Roman camp, and made great havoc with the tents, while they caused a stampede among the horses. In the midst of the confusion voices were heard bidding the Romans make the best of their way to the hills. The camp, they said, was lost, and each man must save himself The speakers used the Latin tongue, and spoke in the name of the consuls ; but they were really Hannibal's men. This was one of the tricks with which this great general was always so ready Ingenious as it was, it does not seem to have had much effect. Then he tried his last resource. He would march on Rome itself With forces so large engaged in this siege, the city could have but few to defend it. It was possible that by a sudden movement he might get within the walls ; in any case it was likely that a part of the investing force would be withdrawn for the protection of the capital. The Capuans were informed of what he was intending to do, and en- couraged to hold out. He made his way through the rich wine-producing region of Northern Campania, 234 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE. ravaging the country as he went. At Fregellae he found the bridge over the Liris broken down, and lost some time in consequence. Crossing into Latium, he passed through the town of Anagnia to Mount Algidus. After a vain attempt to seize Tusculum, he continued his march northwards, and pitched his camp at a distance of eight miles from Rome. Fulvius, the proconsul, had made his way meanwhile from Capua with a force of fifteen thousand men. Marching through a friendly country, and finding all that he wanted supplied by the towns through which he passed, he had been able to outstrip the Cartha- ginian army. Nevertheless the terror in the city was great. The women crowded to the temples, and, with their long hair unbound, threw themselves before the images of the gods and implored their protection. The next day Hannibal advanced still nearer to the walls. He pitched his camp on the bank of the Anio, at the third milestone from Rome ; and then, taking with him a force of two thousand cavalry, rode up and reconnoitred the southern wall of the city. On the morrow he crossed the Anio with his whole army, and offered battle. But no engagement was fought. Livy tells us a story of how, that day and the next, so fierce a storm of rain came on that neither army could keep the field, the weather clearing immediately when they returned to camp ; and how Hannibal exclaimed, *' Once I wanted the will to take this city, and now I want the fortune." We arc told that he was greatly discouraged by two proofs of the indif- ference with which the Romans regarded his presence. Soldiers, he heard, were being actually sent away CAPUA LOST TO HANNIBAL. 235 from the city to reinforce the armies in Spain ; and the very land on which he had pitched his camp had easily found a purchaser. By way of retort to this last affront — for so he is said to have regarded it — he ordered the bankers* shops round the Roman market- place to be put up to auction. But he found that his move had failed, and marchecl back to Campania, and from thence to the extreme south of Italy. Capua, thus left to itself, could do nothing but sur- render. Of its punishment by Rome it is needless to speak in detail. The nobles were executed ; the rest of the population sold into slavery. In a play that was acted at Rome some twenty years afterwards we find a brutal jest on their cruel fate. " There," says one of the characters, speaking of some unhealthy spot, " even a Syrian — and the Syrians are the toughest of slaves — cannot live six months." " Nay," says the other, " the Campanians have learnt by this time to bear more than the Syrians." The next year (210) passed with little incident, as far as Italy was concerned (I shall speak of Sicily and Spain hereafter). The Romans had never been able to vanquish Hannibal in the open field ; they scarcely even ventured to meet him. He had shown that he could march from one end of Italy to the other with- out hindrance, and that he could send his plundering parties up to the very walls of Rome ; but he had not been able to save the great city which had come over to him ; and there was small temptation to any other to join him. Not only was Capua a great actual loss to him, but the fact that it had fallen in spite of all his efforts to relieve it was a terrible blow to his rcputa- 236 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. tion. For all his skill as a general — and that showed itself more and more as the war went on — he was clearly wanting in power. In Sicily, the course of events went against the cause of Carthage. Hicronymus, the foolish youth who had succeeded the wise old Hiero at Syracuse, had been murdered after a reign of thirteen months by an assassin who professed to be acting in the interests of Rome. A series of dreadful acts of cruelty followed. Here also, as elsewhere, the popular party favoured Carthage, while the aristocrats were inclined to Rome, and there was a fierce struggle between them. In the end the former triumphed, and Syracuse became the ally of Carthage. As such it was besieged by the forces of Rome, Appius Claudius commanding the army and Marcellus the fleet. The narrative of the siege does not fall within the scope of this book. The story of how the defence was prolonged by the engineering skill of Archimedes is full of interest, but it may be found elsewhere. The efforts which Carthage made to save her new ally were fruitless. A large army, indeed, was col- lected under Himilco, and this was reinforced from various Sicilian cities, which had been enraged by the savage cruelty which the Romans had shown in their treatment of such places as fell into their hands. But the Roman lines could not be broken ; and when Himilco encamped outside them, intending, it is probable, to blockade them as they were blockading the city, a pestilence broke out among his troops. So fearful were its ravages that the army was literally destroyed. The fleet under Bomilcar did no more. CARTHAGE LOSES SICILY'. 237 It did not even make an attempt at relieving the city. Though it numbered as many as a hundred and thirty vessels of war, it declined an engagement with the Romans, and instead of attempting to enter the harbour of Syracuse, sailed away to Tarentum. In 212 Syracuse was taken by Marcellus. Hannibal, however, was not willing to give up the island as lost. He sent one Mutines, a Liby- Phoeni- cian, or half-caste Carthaginian, to take command of the forces ; and Mutines, fixing his headquarters at Agrigentum, carried on for many months a guerilla warfare. Unfortunately his appointment had caused great annoyance to the pure-blood Carthaginian officers in the island, especially to Hanno, who was the commander-in-chief. Hanno at last suspended him, and handed over the command to his own son. The loyalty of Mutines did not stand firm under such pro- vocation, and the Numidians who comprised his force were furious at his disgrace. Communications were at once opened with Laevinus, the Roman general. A force was sent to Agrigentum ; the Numidians cut down the guards of one of the city gates, threw it open, and admitted the Roman soldiers. Hanno, who had come to the place probably to make arrangements for the change of commanders, saw that something had taken place, and, supposing that it was nothing more than some riotous proceedings of the Numidians, went down to restore order. He discovered the truth just in time to save himself by flight. Laevinus exe- cuted the principal citizens of Agrigentum, and sold the rest of the population as slaves. Of the sixty- six Sicilian towns that had taken the side of Carthage, 238 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. six were taken by force of arms and twenty were be- trayed ; the remainder capitulated. Before the end of 210 Sicily was finally lost. In Spain affairs had not reached the same point, but they were tending the same way. Hannibal had left, we have seen, his brother Hasdrubal in command, and the war was carried on for several years with varying success between him and the two brothers, Cna^us and Publius Scipio. Cna^us Scipio had been left in Spain in temporary command when Publius left the country to face Hannibal in Italy, and he gained some con- siderable successes, if Livy's account is to be trusted. We cannot help noticing, however, that the Roman generals are again and again credited with great victories which mostly are found to lead to nothing. Unfortunately we have no other accounts to fall back upon, and we can only tell the story as it is told to us, and believe whatever seems credible. In 218 Cnaeus Scipio fought a battle with Hanno, who had been left in command of the country between the Ebro and the Pyrenees,'^ vanquished and took him prisoner, and almost annihilated his army. The soldiers found a great prize in his camp, for Hannibal had left with him the heavy baggage which he could not carry across the Alps. Hasdrubal moved to help his colleague, but finding himself too late, re-crossed the Ebro. The next year, after wintering at Tarraco, Cnaeus defeated the Carthaginian fleet off the mouth of the Ebro. Shortly afterwards he was joined by his brother Publius ; and the two generals continued to act together for several years. Their first step was to march to Saguntum. The hostages given to the ROMAN SUCCESSES IN SPAIN. 239 Carthaginian government by the Spanish tribes were kept in the citadel of this town ; the Scipios contrived to get possession of them by the treachery of the officer who had the charge of them. They sent them back to their friends, and of course gained great popularity throughout Spain by the act. In the following year (216) they are said to have defeated Hasdrubal on the banks of the Ebro so completely that he fled from the field of battle with but a few followers. In 215 they relieved Illiturgis, which Hasdrubal and two other Carthaginian generals were besieging. The Romans, we read, had but sixteen thousand men under arms, the Carthaginians sixty thousand ; but the result of the battle was a complete victory. The Romans killed more than their own number, captured three thousand men, nearly a thousand horses (Livy is careful not to overstate the number), sixty standards^ and seven elephants. Moving on to Intibilis the Scipios fought another battle, killed thirteen thousand of the enemy, captured two thousand, two and forty standards, and nine elephants. The result of these brilliant victories was that nearly all Spain came over to the Roman side. So we read, but find that for all this it was necessary to win two more great victories in the following year (214). We may be sure, however, that during these years and the two following years (213, 212) the balance of success inclined to the Roman side. And this supe- riority became more evident when Hasdrubal Barca had to be recalled to Africa, where the Numidian king Syphax had declared war against Carthage. The Scipios had sent envoys to him, promising him 240 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. immediate help and future reward if he would perse- vere in his hostility. One of the envoys remained behind to assist in drilling his new levies. The Car- thaginians found an ally in King Gala, Syphax's neighbour and rival. King Gala had a son, Masinissa, a youth of but seventeen years, but of extraordinary capacity. Young as he was, he was put in command of his father's army and of the Carthaginian troops which served with it, and defeated Syphax so com- pletely that the war was ended by a single battle. We shall hear of Masinissa again. Hasdrudal was now able to return to Spain. He took with him large reinforcements, two lieutenants, another Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and Mago, the youngest brother of Hannibal, and Masinissa. After this the fortune of war changed. The Scipios had made a great effort to complete the conquest of Spain, raising a native force of twenty thousand to act together with their own troops. In view of the fact that three Carthaginian armies were now in the field, they determined to divide their own forces, Publius with two-thirds of the army was to act against Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco, Cnaeus against Hasdrubal Barca. Publius, hearing that his opponents were likely to have their strength largely increased by native allies, resolved to attack them at once. He was himself attacked on his march by the African light horsemen under Masinissa, and when he faced about to receive their charge, found the Carthaginians assailing his rear. He was himself killed early in the day, and after his death his troops soon took to flight. Few however, could escape when the pursuers were the DEATH OF THE SCIPIOS. 24I light African horsemen, and an infantry that was almost as fleet of foot. The camp, however, with its garrison was still safe. Cnaeus did not long survive his brother. His native allies had been bribed to leave him ; and he now found himself in the presence of the united forces oi the three Carthaginian generals. He drew his forces together on some rising ground that was near. The place was incapable of being defended. The ascent was easy. There was no timber for a rampart ; no earth with which the soldiers could make an entrenchment. All that could be done was to make a poor defence out of the pack-saddles of the horses and mules and the baggage. This was almost immediately broken down. Many of the soldiers made their escape to the camp of the other army ; but the general perished. He had survived his brother only twenty-nine days. Lucius Marcius, the officer left in command of the camp, contrived to keep together what was left of the Roman forces, and even to inflict some losses on the enemy. His command was taken over by Claudius Nero, who was sent from Rome for that purpose, but who seems to have effected but little good. Livy tells a strange story of how Hasdrubal was surrounded ; how he promised to evacuate Spain ; how he amused the Roman general by conferences about the terms of agreement, and in the meanwhile contrived to get his army out of their dangerous situation, so that Nero, when the negotiations were broken off, found nothing but an empty camp. The death of the two Scipios seems to have happened in the year 211. The next year the son of Publius, whom we hav« 17 242 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. seen saving his father's life at the battle of the Ticinus, came into Spain as commander-in-chief. It was an office which no one had desired to hold, for when the election was held at Rome not a single candidate presented himself. At last the young Scipio came forward. He was not twenty-four years old, and therefore below the legal age for even the lowest office ; but the people received him with applause. His high reputation, the beauty of his person, and his charm of manner, spoke for him. When he pro- mised that he would conquer not only Spain, but Carthage itself, what would have seemed in any other man but a foolish boast was received with delight, and he was unanimously chosen. He began his campaign by a great achievement — the capture of New Carthage, the capital of the Car- thaginian province. A night march brought him up to the walls of the city before any one knew that he had even arrived in Spain. With the keen eye of a great general he spied the weak spot in the defences, a place where the sea came up to the wall. Taking advantage of an unusually low tide — for he seems to have had the curious good fortune which goes to make a great general — he led his men through the water, ivhich was barely up to their knees, and found his way into the city. Mago, who was in command, retreated into the citadel ; but, finding it impossible to hold out, surrendered himself and his garrison in the course of a few hours. Within four days after coming into this province, Scipio had thus justified his appointment by capturing the Carthaginian capital. It will be convenient if we take this opportunity of finishing CAPTURE OF NEW CARTHAGE. 243 the story of the Carthaginian rule in Spain, though it will carry us beyond the time up to which we have followed the course of events elsewhere. During the remainder of the year which he had begun by the capture of New Carthage Scipio re- mained quiet, but was busy in preparing for future action. He made friends of the Spanish chiefs. This was a business which he could do better than any other man, for no one could withstand the singular charm of his manner. When he took the field in the following year (209) the natives joined him in large numbers. In the course of this campaign he fought a great battle with Hasdrubal Barca. He is said to have defeated him, but as he did not hinder him from carrying out his great plan (of which I shall have to speak hereafter) of marching into Italy to the help of Hannibal, the defeat was evidently not serious. The next year passed with few incidents, but in 207 a decisive defeat of the Carthaginian armies at Silpia made Scipio master of nearly the whole of Spain. Only Gadcs was left to Carthage, Scipio had not forgotten his promise that he would conquer not only Spain but Carthage also. One part of it was now nearly fulfilled, and he now saw a chance of fulfilling the other. He crossed over with only a couple of war-ships to Africa, and presented himself at the court of King Syphax, His object was to persuade the king to desert Carthage, and enter into alliance with Rome, Curiously enough Hasdrubal Cisco had come on a similar errand. The two opponents spent several days together, and conversed, we arc told, in a most kindly fashion. The king 244 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE. seems to have made promises to both. He was greatly charmed with Scipio, and even promised to make the aUiance which he desired. But he was still more charmed with Sophonisba, the lovely daughter of Hasdrubal. She became his wife, and under her influence he remained faithful to Carthage. Things had not gone well in Spain during Scipio's absence. Mago, who was still at Gades, induced some of the Spanish tribes to revolt against Rome. These had to be again subdued. When this was done, Scipio himself fell ill. During his illness a part of the Roman army broke out into open mutiny. Their pay was in arrear, and Scipio's strict discipline forbad them to make it up by plundering the natives of the country. But when the general was sufficiently recovered to be able to deal with them in person, he contrived to bring them back to their duty. The Carthaginian cause in Spain was now lost. Mago, the brother of Hannibal, transported what forces remained to him into Liguria, and Gades surrendered to the Romans. This was in the year 205. XIII. THE LAST CHANCE OF VICTORY. In Italy Hannibal still remained unvanquishcd in the field, though his hopes were gradually growing less. Early in the year 210 he won at Herdonia in Western Apulia a victory which may almost be reckoned with those that had made his early cam- paigns so famous. Cnaeus Fulvius, who had been Consul the year before, had made a sudden march on the town. It was one of those that had revolted after the defeat at Cannae, and he understood it to be badly guarded. He was the bolder because he be- lieved Hannibal to be in the extreme south of Italy. But Hannibal had heard everything from his spies, and was there to meet him. Fulvius, as might be expected, was out-gcncrallcd. His army was unskil- fully posted, and could not resist the attacks which were directed against it from several points at once. The end was a complete rout. Even the Roman camp was taken. Fulvius himself fell in the battle, and the Roman loss was estimated by some at eleven, by others at seven thousand. It was evidently a great disaster. Nothing like an army was left ; only some scattered fugitives made their way to Marccllus in Samnium. It was from Marccllus, not from any 246 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. officer who had been present at Herdonia, that the Senate received a despatch describhig what had happened. During the rest of the campaign but Httle hap- pened, though Marcellus is said to have fought a drawn battle with Hannibal, which was claimed as a victory when the next day he found that the enemy had decamped. The following year (209) was one of disaster to Hannibal, for he lost the second of the great gains which he had secured in Italy, the city of Tarentum. It was betrayed to the Romans by the commander of the Bruttian garrison which Hannibal had placed in it. The veteran soldier Fabius, now in his eightieth year and consul for the fifth time, had the great delight of finishing his many campaigns by this piece of good fortune. A happy jest which the old man is said to have uttered on the occasion has been recorded. Livius, when his carelessness had lost the city, had taken refuge in the citadel. The citadel had never passed out of the hands of the Romans, and this fact of course made the recovery of the town somewhat more easy. Livius was disposed to get some credit for himself out of this circum- stance. "You may thank me," he said, " Ouintus Fabius, for having been able to recover Tarentum." "Quite so," replied Fabius, "for if you had not lost it, I never should have recovered it." Hannibal had heard of the advance of the Romans, and had hastened by forced marches to save the city. He was too late. He pitched his camp close by, and after a few days returned to his headquarters at Mctapontum. He made an attempt to entrap Fabius. who might, he THE DEATH OF MARCELLUS. 247 thought, be tempted, after his success at Tarentum, into making a similar attempt on Metapontum. A forged letter, purporting to come from some of the principal citizens, was conveyed to him, offering to betray the place into his hands. The old Roman is said to have been deceived, but to have been deterred from making the attempt by some unfavourable signs in the sacrifices. Notwithstanding this loss, Hannibal seems to have held his own during the rest of the campaign. Livy tells us, indeed, that Marcellus fought three battles with him, and that after being beaten in the first, he drew the second, and won the third. But as it was made a complaint against him after- wards that he had kept his troops for the greater part of the year within the walls of Venusia, and had allowed the enemy to plunder the country at his pleasure, we may well doubt whether any victory was won. Rome was now showing great signs of exhaustion, for twelve out of the thirty Latin cities refused to furnish any further supplies ; and the Etrurians were beginning to waver in their fidelity. The next year (208) is chiefly marked by the death of Marcellus. Chosen consul for the sixth time, he marched with his colleague Crispinus to act against Hannibal. He was never content, we are told, except when he was engaged with the great Carthaginian leader himself The two consuls had ridden out of the camp with an escort of two hundred cavalry, some of them Etrurians, who had been compelled to serve to ensure the fidelity of their cities. Some African horsemen under cover of a wood which was between 248 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. the two camps, crept unobserved to the rear of the Roman party, and then charged them from behind. The Etrurians fled ; the rest of the escort, who were Latins, were overpowered. Marcellus was killed on the spot ; Crispinus was wounded so seriously that he died not long afterwards. Hannibal gave honourable burial to the body of his brave opponent. And now came one of the critical years of the war. Hasdrubal, of whose departure from Spain I have spoken before, was now in Italy. He had found little difficulty in crossing the Alps ; the native tribes had learnt that no harm was intended to them, and probably received some consideration for their neutrality. And some of the engineering works which Hannibal had constructed were doubtless still in existence. Anyhow, Hasdrubal made his appear- ance in Italy before the Romans, and even, it would seem, before his brother expected him. Rome made a great effort to meet this new danger. She had lost some of her best generals. Marcellus was dead, and Fabius was too old for active service. Livius, an old soldier who had distinguished himself twelve years before, but had since been living in retirement, and Claudius Nero were chosen consuls, and fifteen legions were raised to form their armies. Livius was sent to act against Hasdrubal ; Nero watched the army of Hannibal. And now we come to one of the boldest and most skilful achievements in the history of Roman war. A despatch from Hasdrubal to his brother, announc- ing his intention of joining him, fell into the hands of some Roman scouts and was brought to Nero. It NERO'S GREAT MARCH. 249 was written in the Carthaginian language, but there were, of course, prisoners in the camp who could read it to the consul. He conceived at once a bold design. He would take his best troops, join his colleague by forced marches, and crush Hasdrubal before he could effect the junction with his brother. The force which he selected numbered seven thousand men. Even they were not at first let into the secret. They were to surprise a garrison at Lucania, he told them. It was only when they were well on their way that he discovered his real design. He reached the camp of Livius in safety, and it was agreed be- tween the two consuls that battle should be given at once. But the keen eyes of Hasdrubal had discovered what had happened. The Romans seemed more numerous than before ; his scouts noticed that of the watering-parties which went down to the river some were more sunburnt than the rest. Finally it was observed that the clarion was sounded twice in the camp, showing that both consuls were present. He resolved to avoid, if he could, an engagement, and left his camp during the night. But when he attempted to march southward his difficulties began. His native guide escaped, and he could not find the ford over the river Metaurus, which lay in his route. He thus lost the start which he had gained by his stealthy departure, and the Romans came up with him. He had begun to fortify a camp, but seeing the enemy advance prepared to give battle. He put his elephants in front. The Gauls, recent levies whom he could not trust, he posted on his left, protecting 250 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. them as much as he could by the elephants. His own place was on the right wing. Here he had his Spanish infantry, veteran soldiers whom he had often led to victory. The left wing of the Romans which was opposed to him was led by the Consul Livius. Here the struggle was long and obstinate. The elephants at first did good service to their side. Afterwards, maddened by the wounds which they received, they trampled down friend and foe alike. After a while, Nero, repeating the same tactics which had made him leave his own weakened army facing Hannibal to help his colleague, withdrew some of the troops from the Roman right wing, and charged the flank of the enemy. The Spaniards could not resist this new attack. The Gauls, who had broke«a into the stores of wine and had drunk to excess, were cut down where they stood, or lay helpless on the ground. The rout was complete. Hasdrubal would not survive so terrible a defeat. He set spurs to his horse, charged the Roman line, and fell fighting with the courage that became the son of Hamilcar and brother of Hannibal. The loss of the Carthaginians is said to have been 56,000. This is a manifest exag- geration, for Hasdrubal could not have had so many in his army. Whatever were the numbers, it was a decisive victory. There could now be no doubt that Rome, not Carthage, was to be the conqueror of the Second Punic War. I may conclude this chapter by quoting part of the splendid ode in which Horace, singing the praises of another Nero,^ dwells on the achievement of his great ancestor. ' Tiberius Claudius Nero, afterwards the Emperor Tiberius. ODE FROM HORACE. 25 1 What thou, Rome, dost the Neros owe, Let dark Metaurus river say, And Hasdrubal, thy vanquished foe, And that auspicious day Wliich through the scattered gloom broke forth with smiling ray. When joy again to Latium came, Nor longer through her towns at ease The fatal Lybian swept, like flame Among the forest trees, Or Eurus' headlong gust across Sicilian seas. Thenceforth, for with success they toiled, Rome's yotith in vigour waxed amain. And temples, ravaged and despoiled By Punic hordes profane. Upraised within their shrines beheld their gods again. Till spoke forth Hannibal at length : " Like stags, of ravening wolves the prey, Why rush to grapple with their strength, From whom to steal away Our loftiest triumph is, they leave for us to-day ? " That race, inflexible as brave, From Ilium quenched in flames who bore. Across the wild Etruscan wave, Their babes, their grandsires hoar, And all their sacred things to the Ansonian shore ; " Like oak, by sturdy axes lopped Of all its boughs, which once the brakes Of shaggy Algidus o'ertoppcd, Its loss its glory makes, And from the very steel fresh strength and spirit takes " Not Hydra, cleft through all its trunk, With frcslier vigour waxed to spread. Till even Alcides' spirit shrunk ; Nor yet hath Colchis dread. Or Echionean Tlicbcs more fatal monster bred. 253 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. " In ocean plunge it, and more bright II rises ; scatter it, and lo ! Its unscathed victors it will smite With direful overthrow, And Rome's proud dames shall tell of many a routed foe. *' No messenger in boastful pride Shall I to Carthage send again ; Our every hope it died, it died. When Hasdrubal was slain. And with his fall our name's all-conquering star did wane." ' Nero returned in haste to his army, and ordered the head of Hasdrubal to be thrown in front of the Carthaginian outposts. It was carried to Hannibal, and recognized by him. " I see," he said, " the doom of Carthage." The next day he retreated into the extreme south of Italy. * I have borrowed the version of Sir Theodore Martin. XIV THE LAST STRUGGLE. For more than three years after the fatal day of Metaurus, Hannibal maintained himself in Italy. It was only the extreme south of the peninsula, the mountainous country of Bruttii, that he held ; and even here, though the Roman generals were con- tent to leave him alone, knowing well how formidable he still was in the field, he was obliged to draw his defences within still narrowing limits. His head- quarters were at Crotona. Near this place he built an altar to Juno, and placed on it a tablet with an inscription in Carthaginian and Greek, giving a sum- mary of his campaigns in Italy, with the number of battles won, towns taken, and enemies slain. Livy bestows hearty praise on his conduct at this time. " I know not," he says, " whether the man was more ad- mirable in prosperity or in adversity. For thirteen years, far away from home, he waged war, and waged it not with an army of his own countrymen, but with a miscellaneous crowd gathered from all nations — men who had neither laws, nor customs, nor language in common, with different dress, different arms, dif- ferent worship, I may say, different gods. And yet he kept them together by so close a tic that they 254 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE. never quarrelled among themselves or mutinied against him, and this though he was often without money for their pay. Even after Hasdrubal's death, when he had nothing but a corner of Italy left to him, his camp was as quiet as ever." Hannibal was of course unwilling finally to give up the great scheme of his life. He hoped against hope that something might yet happen, which would give him a chance of carrying it out. Rome had other enemies besides Carthage who might yet be united against her. There was Antiochus in Syria, and Philip in Macedonia. He lived to see them both engaged in war with Rome, and both conquered. If he could only have given them something of his own foresight, and united them against the common enemy, he might even yet have succeeded in his great scheme. But want of wisdom, or want of energy, or want of courage, made them hold back, and the opportunity was lost. One effort, indeed, was made to help him. His youngest brother Mago, seeing that nothing could be done in Spain, landed with all the forces that he could raise, and with what were sent him from home, in Liguria. On his way he possessed himself of the island now called Minorca, where Port Mahon (Mago's Harbour) still preserves the memory of his visit. He had some success in rallying the Gauls to his stan- dard, but he accomplished nothing of importance. So far as his object was to make a diversion in favour of Hannibal, he failed. In 204 Scipio crossed over from Sicily to Africa. His first movements were not very successful. He SCIPIO AND SYPHAX. 257 began the siege of Utica, but was compelled to raise it, and to retire to a strong position on the sea-coast, where he was protected by the united strength of his fleet and his army. Here he wintered, and early the following year began again active operations. He had two armies opposed to him — that of Carthage, commanded by Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and that of King Syphax. In his own camp was Masinissa, who, though he had lost his kingdom, and indeed had barely escaped with his life, was without doubt a very valuable counsellor and ally. King Syphax had conceived the hope that he might be able to act as mediator between Rome and Car- thage. He now proposed a peace, in which the chief condition was that Hannibal should evacuate Italy and Scipio Africa. Scipio answered that these were terms which could not be accepted, but gave him to understand that he was ready to listen to other pro- posals. Envoys went backwards and forwards be- tween the two camps. On the part of the king there was, it would seem, a genuine belief that peace might be made ; Scipio's envoys were really nothing else than so many spies. He was waiting for the oppor- tunity of carrying out a scheme which had possibly been invented by himself, or, as is more probable, suggested by Masinissa. This scheme was to set fire to the camps of the two hostile armies. These camps consisted of huts which would readily burn, and the chief thing wanted was to put the enemy completely off his guard. Scipio can scarcely be acquitted of something like treachery in this affair. There was virtually a truce between him and Syphax. While 18 258 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. negotiations for peace were going on, the king naturally supposed himself to be safe from attack. When all his preparations were complete, Scipio divided his army into two. With half he was himself to attack the Carthaginian camp ; the other half he put under the command of his friend Laelius, who was assisted by Masinissa. The two armies marched out of the camp at night, and Laelius and Masinissa advanced to the camp of Syphax. While the former of these two remained in reserve, the latter under- took the work of setting the camp on fire. The scheme succeeded perfectly. " The camp seemed framed," says Polybius, who doubtless heard the story from Laelius himself, " for the very purpose of being set on fire." The flames spread rapidly ; and no one had any suspicion but that the fire had hap- pened by accident. Some perished in their tents ; many were trampled to death in the confusion ; and nearly all who contrived to escape out of the camp were cut down by the Romans. At first the Carthaginians in the neighbouring camp thought, as their allies had thought, that the fire was accidental. Some of them ran to help ; others stood gazing at the sight. None had any notion that the enemy was at hand ; they were therefore actually unarmed when the Romans fell upon them. In a few minutes the second camp was in the same con- dition as the first. Hasdrubal, with a small body of cavalry, escaped ; Syphax also contrived to save him- self, but the two armies were virtually destroyed. Syphax had thought of reconciling himself to Rome ; but his wife Sophonisba prevailed upon him to give HANNIBAL RECALLED. 259 them up. He raised another army, which was soon joined by Hasdrubal, who had also contrived to get together a new force, among them being four thou- sand mercenaries from Spain. A battle followed, in which Scipio was again victorious. There was now only one course left to Carthage, and that was to recall Hannibal and Mago. Mago, who had been defeated by the Roman forces just before this summons reached him, set sail with what was left of his army, but died of his wounds before he reached home. Hannibal received the com- mand to return with indignation and grief. Livy gives — we know not on what authority — the very words in which, " gnashing his teeth and groaning, and scarcely able to restrain his tears," he answered the envoys of the Carthaginian Senate. " They call me back at last in plain words ; but they have long since implicitly called me by refusing me reinforcements and money. Hannibal has been conquered, not by the Roman people, which he has defeated and routed a hundred times, but by the jealousy of the Senate of Carthage. It will not be Scipio that will exult in the disgrace of my return so much as Hanno, who, having no other means of overthrowing the power of my family, has done it by the ruin of his own country." Hanno, it will be remembered, was the leader of the peace-party. Wrathful, however, as he was, he made no delay in obeying the summons. He had his ships, indeed, ready prepared for this service. " Seldom," says Livy, "has an exile left his country with a sadder heart than was Hannibal's when he departed from the land of his enemies. Again and again he 26o THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. looked back on the shores which he was leaving, and cursed himself that he had not led his soldiers dripping with the blood of Cannae to Rome itself. ' Scipio,' he said, ' has ventured to attack Carthage ; but I wasted my time at Casilinum and Cumae and Nola.'" When the news of his departure reached Rome, a public thanksgiving was ordered. The veteran sol- dier Fabius had bestowed upon him the unexampled honour of a wreath of oak leaves, given, not as was commonly the case, for having saved the life of a citizen, but for having saved his country, A few months afterwards he died, in extreme old age, having been spared to see the dearest wish of his heart, Italy freed from the invader. Hannibal's movements after his landing in Africa — from which he had been absent more than thirty years — are not easily followed. Indeed the whole history of this time is somewhat obscure. We hear of a truce between Carthage and Rome, which the former treacherously violated ; of favourable terms of peace offered by Scipio, and of a fruitless interview between the two rival generals ; but it is difficult to make out of our authorities a clear and consistent account. I shall pass on at once to the great battle which brought the Second Punic War to an end. Of this we have full details. It was fought at Zama, on October 19th according to some authors, according to others in the spring.^ Scipio arranged his army ' Possibly the discrepancy may be partly accounted for by the de- rangement of the Roman calendar of this time. The months and the seasons were not by any means in accordance. ZAMA. 261 according to the usual Roman fashion, but did not fill up the intervals between the cohorts or companies,^ and he put more space than usual between the lines. His object was to lessen the danger from the ele- phants. Laelius with the Roman cavalry was posted on the left, Masinissa with the African horse on the right. The light-armed troops were placed in front, with orders to retire, if they found themselves hard pressed by the elephants, through the intervals be- tween the lines. Hannibal posted his elephants, of which he had eighty, in front. Behind these was a mixed multitude of mercenaries ; behind these, again, the native Car- thaginian troops, who now, in the extremity of danger, appear again in the field ; and in the third line the veterans whom he had brought with him from Italy. On the left wing he posted his African, on the right his Carthaginian cavalry. The battle was begun by the elephants. These creatures did at least as much harm to friends as to foes.2 They are said, indeed, to have caused so much confusion among the Carthaginian cavalry that Laelius was easily able to rout this part of the hostile army. In the centre of the two armies the day at first ivent in favour of Hannibal. His mercenaries, tried and skilful soldiers, were more than a match for the unpractised Romans. If they had been properly ' The intervals of the first line were usually filleil up in llie second, and those of the second in the third. ' Tlie trained animals had long since been used up. We hear, not long before tliis time, of one Ilauno being sent tu hunt for fresh ones. 262 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. supported by the second line they might have won the day. But the citizen-soldiers made no attempt to advance. It was only when they were attacked by the advancing Romans, and even, Polybius adds, by the mercenaries, now infuriated at being thus deserted, that they began to defend themselves. This they did with the greatest fury, striking indiscriminately at friend and foe. Hannibal's own force, which had closed its lines against the fugitives from the routed divisions, had still to be dealt with. Here the battle was long and obstinate. The combatants fell where they fought. But Laelius and Masinissa (for the Numidian prince had also been successful in his part of the field) returned from their pursuit of the Car- thaginian cavalry, and fell upon the rear of Hannibal's troops, and broke their lines. A general rout ensued. Hannibal made his way with a small body of cavalry to Adrumetum. Of the rest few escaped. Twenty thousand were killed on the field of battle ; as many more were taken prisoners. The Roman loss was fifteen hundred. " Such," says Polybius, " was the battle between Hannibal and Scipio ; the battle which gave to the Romans the sovereignty of the world." Hannibal collected about six thousand men, the remains of his army, and with this force made his way back to Carthage. The government had opened negotiations for peace, and their envoys had just returned, bringing back Scipio's terms. They were briefly these : I. Carthage was to retain its African possessions ; was to be independent ; was not to be compelled to receive a Roman garrison. TERMS OF PEACE. 263 2. All prisoners and deserters were to be surren- dered. 3. All ships of war, except ten, were to be given up, and all elephants. 4. Carthage should not make war on any state outside Africa ; nor on any within it, without leave first obtained from the Romans. 5. King Masinissa should have restored to him all that he or his ancestors had possessed. 6. The Roman army was to be provisioned and paid till peace was formally concluded. 7. An indemnity of ten thousand talents, and an annual tribute of two hundred, to be paid. 8. One hundred hostages, to be chosen by the Roman commander-in-chief, to be handed over as security. When these terms were recited in the Carthaginian Senate, a senator rose to speak. Hannibal laid hold of him, and dragged him down. The assembly received this act with angry shouts. " Pardon me," said Hannibal, "if my ignorance has led me to offend against any of your forms. I left my country at nine years of age, and returned to it at forty-five. The real cause of my offence was my care for our common country. It is astonishing to me that any Cartha- ginian who knows the truth should not be ready to worship his good fortune, when he finds Rome ready to deal with us so mercifully. Do not debate these conditions ; consent to them unanimously, and pray to all the gods that they may be ratified by the Roman Senate." Ratified they were, though not, it would seem, till the 264 THE STORY OP CARTHAGE. following year. We catch a glimpse of the old days before men had learnt the use of iron, when we read how the heralds went to Carthage carrying with them the knives of flint with which the animals offered in sacrifice were to be slain. The Carthaginians surren- dered all their ships of war, their elephants, the deserters who had come over to them, and as many as four thousand prisoners. The ships of one kind and another numbered five hundred. Scipio ordered them to be towed out to sea and burnt. " The sight of the flames was as terrrible," says Livy, " to the vanquished people as would have been that of their city on fire." When the indemnity came to be paid it was diffi- cult to find the money ; and there were loud murmurs in the Senate at the sacrifices which it would be necessary to make. One of the members complained to the House that Hannibal had been seen to laueh ; and this though he was really the cause of all their troubles. Then the great man spoke out. " If you could see my heart as easily as you can my face, you would know that my laughter comes not from a joyful heart, but from one almost maddened by trouble. And yet my laughter is not so unreasonable as your tears. You ought to have wept when our arms were taken from us and our ships were burnt. But no ; you were silent when you saw your country stripped ; but now you lament, as if this were the death-day of Carthage, because you have to furnish part of the tribute out of your private means. I fear me much that you will soon find that this is the least of the trouble you will have to bear." XV. HANNIBAL IN EXILE. It was true that, as the discontented senator had said, Hannibal had been the cause of the troubles of Carthage ; still he was too great a man to be any- where but in the first place ; and for some years he practically governed the State. He seems to have done this new work well. The Court of Judges at Carthage had usurped a power which did not belong to them. Every man's property, character, and life were at their disposal ; and they were unscrupulous in dealing with it. Hannibal set himself to bring about a change ; he carried the people with him ; the office of judge became annual, and it was filled up by election. It is a change that does not alto- gether commend itself to us ; but it was probably required by the peculiar condition of the country. Another reform concerned the public revenue. Hannibal made a searching inquiry into what came in, and what was spent, and he found that a very large proportion of the whole was embezzled. He stated these discoveries in a public assembly. The expenses of the country might be met, the tribute to Rome paid, and taxation nevertheless lightened, if only the revenue were honestly collected and honestly 266 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. spent. It was only too natural that these proceedings should make many enemies. And besides those who were furious at the loss of their unjust gains, there were doubtless some who were honestly afraid ot what Hannibal was aiming at. If he was making Carthage richer and more powerful, it was that he might plunge her again into a war with Rome. So, from one cause or the other, a strong party was raised against him. His enemies had, it is said, the meanness to accuse him to the Roman Government. He was planning, they said, a new war in concert with Antiochus, king of Syria. The Romans were on the point of war with this prince, and were ready to suspect their old enemy. An embassy was sent to Carthage, in spite of the opposition of Scipio, to demand that he should be given up. Ostensibly the object ot their invasion was to settle a dispute between Carthage and Masinissa. Hannibal knew the truth, and resolved to fly. To put his enemies off their guard, he showed no kind of alarm, but walked about in public as usual. But he took horse at night, reached the coast, and embarked in a ship which, in anticipation of such a need, he had kept in readiness, and sailed to Cercina (Kerkena). It was necessary to conceal the fact of his flight, and he gave out that he was going as ambassador to Tyre, But the harbour of the island happened to be full of merchant-ships, and the risk of discovery was great. He resolved accordingly to escape. The captains were invited to a great entertainment, and were asked to lend their sails and yards for the construction of a tent. The revel was long and late. Before it was HANNIBAL WITH ANTIOCHUS. 267 over Hannibal was gone, and the dismantled ships could not be made ready for several hours. From Cercina he sailed to Tyre, where he was received with great honours, and from Tyre again to the port of Antioch. Antiochus had left that place and was at Ephesus, and thither Hannibal followed him. Antiochus of Syria, fourth in descent from Selcucus, one of the Macedonian generals who had shared be- tween them the empire of Alexander, has somehow acquired the title of the " Great." He had little that was great about him except, perhaps, his ambition. His treatment of Hannibal, whether it was the result of weakness or of jealousy, was foolish in the extreme. He did not take his advice, and he would not employ him. His advice had been to act at once. Rome at this time (195 B.C.) had to deal with many enemies. The Gauls especially were giving her much trouble. If Antiochus could have made up his mind to attack her immediately, the result might have been different to what it was. As it was he lingered and delayed, and when at last, two years afterwards, he made up his mind to act, the opportunity was lost. In 192 he crossed over into Greece, and was defeated with heavy loss the following year at Thermopylae. Hannibal was not employed in this campaign. But he was sent to equip and to command a fleet. There was nothing strange in this variety of employment ; for then — and indeed the same has been the case till quite recent times — the same men would command fleets and armies indifferently, lie was attacked by a greatly superior fleet belonging to the island of Rhodes, then 268 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. a great naval power, and, though successful where he commanded in person, was defeated. In the same year (190) was fought the great battle of Magnesia. Whether Hannibal was present at it we do not know ; but an anecdote is told of him which belongs to this time. Antiochus had collected a great army — some sixty or seventy thousand in number — to do battle with the Romans. It had been gathered from the cities of Greece and from Western Asia, and their dress and armour was as splendid as it was various. The king looked with pride on the ranks glittering with gold and silver, " Will not this be enough for the Romans ? " he asked of Hannibal who was standing by his side. " Yes," said he, with a grim jest, " yes, enough even for them, though they are the greediest nation on the earth ! " But it was of the spoils, not of the fighting strength of the army, that he was speaking. The battle of Magnesia ended, as Hannibal had expected, in the utter defeat of the Syrian army. Antiochus was advised to sue for peace. Two years afterwards (188) it was granted to him, one of the conditions being that he should give to Rome such of her enemies as he had received at his court. He ac- cepted the condition, but gave his guest an opportunity of escaping. Various stories are told of Hannibal's movements after his flight from the court of Antiochus. Accord- ing to one account he sought refuge for a time in Crete. A story is told of him here which very likely is not true, but which shows the common belief in his ingenuity and readiness of resource. He suspected HANNIBAL IN BITHYNIA. 269 the Cretans of coveting the large treasure which he carried about with him. To deceive them he filled a number of wine-jars with lead, which had over it a thin covering of gold and silver. These he deposited with much ceremony in the presence of the chief men of the island in the temple of Diana. His real treasure meanwhile was hidden in some hollow brazen figures which were allowed to lie, apparently uncarcd for, in the porch of his house. From Crete he is said to have visited Armenia, and to have founded in that country the city of Artaxata. It is certain, however, that he spent the last years of his life with Prusias, king of Bithynia. Prusias was at war with Eumenes of Pergamus, a firm friend of Rome, and Hannibal willingly gave him his help. We need not believe the story which he tells us how he vanquished enemies in a sea-fight by filling a number of jars with venomous snakes and throwing them on board the hostile ships. For some years he was left unmolested in this refuge. But in 183 the Romans sent an embassy to Prusias to demand that he should be given up. The demand was one which the king did not feci able to resist, and he sent soldiers at once to seize him. Hannibal had always expected some such result. He knew that Rome could never forgive him for what he had done, and he did not trust his host. Indeed he must have known that a king of Bithynia could not refuse a request of the Romans if it was seriously made. The story of his end, ornamented as such stories commonly are, tells us how he made seven ways of getting out of his house, and that finding them all beset with soldiers, he called for the poison, 270 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. which was kept always ready for such an emergency, and drank it off. Some writers say that he carried the poison with him in a ring — the ring which Juvenal, when he uses the example of Hannibal to show the vanity of a soldier's ambition, describes as "the avenger of the day of Cannae." Livy gives us what profess to be his last words. " Let me free the Roman people from their long anxiety, since they think it tedious to wait for an old man's death. Flaminius [this was the Roman ambassador] will gain no great or famous victory over a helpless victim of treachery. As to the way in which the Roman character has changed, this day is proof enough. The grandfathers of these men sent to King Pyrrhus, when he had an army fighting against them in Italy, warn- ing him to beware of poison ; but they have sent an ambassador to suggest to Prusias the crime of murdering a guest," He was in his sixty-fourth or sixty-fifth year when he died. Of Hannibal's character, as of the history of his country, we have to judge from the narratives of enemies. His military skill is beyond all doubt. In that, it is probable, he has never been surpassed. His courage also was undoubted, though he is expressly praised for the discretion with which he avoided any needless exposure of his life. The testimony to the temperance of his habits is equally clear. The chief charges brought against him are treachery, cruelty, and avarice. From personal avarice he was certainly free, but a general who has to make war support itself, who has to feed, clothe, and pay a great army in a foreign country, with hut rare and scanty supplies CHARACTER OF HANNIBAL. 271 from home, cannot be scrupulous. About the charge of cruelty it is not easy to speak. What has been said about Hannibal's alleged avarice applies in a way to this other accusation. A general situated as was Hannibal could not but be stern and even merciless in his dealings with enemies. As to treachery, we know that "Punic faith" passed among the Romans into a proverb for dishonesty ; and " faithless" is the epithet, as we have seen, which Horace applies to the great general. But we find no special grounds for the charge, while we may certainly doubt whether the Roman generals showed such conspicuous good faith as to be in a good position for censuring others. There was no more honourable Roman than Scipio, but Scipio's treacherous attack on Syphax during the progress of the negotiations is at least as bad as any- thing that is charged against Hannibal. XVI. THE BEGINNING OF THE END. The death of Hannibal did not remove the sus- picion of Rome that Carthage might be plotting some mischief The conditions imposed upon her by the Peace of Hannibal (as the treaty made after the battle of Zama was called) had not permanently dis- abled her. She had lost her dominions but not her trade ; her war-ships had been destroyed, but not the ships of her commerce ; and she had always in her treasury the gold with which to hire new armies. Only twenty years had passed since the conclusion of the peace, when she offered to pay up at once the balance of the indemnity which was to have been spread over fifty years. The Romans preferred keep- ing this hold over their ancient enemies to receiving the money, but they were alarmed at this proof of how completely the wealth of Carthage was restored. Some ten years later, when war with Macedonia was threatening, news came to Rome that the envoys of the Macedonian king had been received at Carthage. Doubtless the envoys had been sent ; and it is prob- able that they found some powerful persons ready to listen to them — for there was still a war-party in Carthage — but there is no reason to believe that the CATO'S HOSTILITY TO CARTHAGE. 273 government had had any dealings with the enemies of Rome. There was one Roman statesmen by whom these suspicions were very strongly felt. This was Marcus Porcius Cato, commonly called the Elder Cato, to distinguish him from his great-grandson, Cato of Utica, the republican who killed himself sooner than live under the despotism of Caesar. Cato had served throughout the campaigns of the Second Punic War, and had not forgotten his experiences of that time. He had been sent to inquire into the causes of a war that had broken out between Carthage and King Masinissa, and he had been much struck by the proofs of wealth and power that he saw' during his visit, the crowded population of the city and territory, the well-appointed fleet, and the well-filled armouries. Returning to Rome, he related in the Senate what he had seen. " This people," he said, " is stronger than ever. They are practising war in Africa by way of pre- lude to war against you." As he spoke, he threw down from a fold in his robe a bunch of ripe figs. " The country that bears these," he cried, as the senators admired the beautiful fruit, " is but three days' jour- ney from here." One is not certain whether he meant that it was so near as to be dangerous, or that it could be easily reached. Anyhow, from that time he never ceased to take every opportunity that occurred of expressing his opinion in the Senate. Whatever the matter might be that was being voted upon, he added the words, " And I also think that Carthage ought to be blotted out." With equal pertinacity one of the Scipios (surnamcd Nasica, or " Scipio of the Pointed Nose), a near kinsman of the conqueror of Zama, 19 274 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE. added to every vote, " And I also think that Carthage ought to be left." Carthage had a dangerous enemy at home in King Masinissa. He had begun life, as we have seen, by serving with Hasdrubal Barca in Spain, had then changed sides, and fought on the side of the Romans at the battle of Zama. He had been handsomely rewarded for these services. His father's dominions had been restored to him, and to these had been added the greater part of the kingdom of Syphax. For more than fifty years he was continually engaged in enlarging his borders at the expense of Carthage, and he always felt that he could rely on the help, or at least the countenance, of the Romans. Carthage was forbidden to make war on her neighbours in Africa without the leave of Rome, and all that she could do in return for Masinissa's aggressions was to send to appeal to that power to protect her against the wrongs that she was compelled to suffer. More than once the Romans sent commissioners to inquire into her complaints. Once, indeed, possibly oftener, these commissioners decided against Masinissa, but they generally left the matter unsettled. Anyhow, the king went on with his encroachments, and generally contrived to keep what he had laid his hands upon. In 1 5 1 this quarrel broke out into open war. Masi- nissa had a party of his own in Carthage. The demo- cratic or war party expelled forty of itr, principal members, imposing at the same time an oath upon the people that they would never allow them to return. The exiles fled to the king and urged him to make war. He was willing enough, for he had his eye on a AFRICANUS THE YOUNGER. 275 town which he particularly coveted ; but he first sent one of his sons on an embassy to Carthage to demand redress. The prince was not admitted within the works, and was even attacked on his v/ay home. Masinissa then laid siege to the town. The Car- thaginians sent Hasdrubal, their commander-in-chief, against him. They were joined by two of the king's chief officers, who deserted, bringing with them as many as six thousand horse. In some slight engage- ments that followed Hasdrubal was victorious ; and the king made a feint of retreat, and drew Hasdrubal after him into a region where supplies could not easily be obtained. A battle soon followed. The old king — he was eighty-eight years of age — commanded in person, riding after the fashion of his country, without saddle or stirrup. No very decided result followed, but the king, on the whole, had the advantage. There was present that day, as spectator of the conflict, a young Roman who had much to do with the conclu- sion of the story of Carthage. To give him the full title which he bears in history, this was Publius Cornelius Scipio yEmilianus Africanus Minor. He was a son of a distinguished Roman general, ^milius Paullus, the conqueror of Pydna,^ and grandson ol the ^milius Paullus who fell at Cannae. He was adopted by the elder son of the Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Zama, whose weak health prevented him from taking any part in public affairs.^ He had ' Pydna was the great battle (fought in 169) liy which the .M.iccilonian kingdom was brouglu to an end. Sec "The Story of Rome," p. 163. ' The young reader may observe tliat he took the nnnies of tlie family into which he was adopted, adding to tht-m that uf !::;•: ov/n _!;nii, ohered from /limilius into /I'.mibaiius, according to the practice iii cas< of adoption. Z'jd THE STORY OF CARTHAGE. been serving with a Roman army in Spain, and had come to Masinissa for the purpose of purchasing elephants. He had privilege of seeing the battle from a hill that overlooked the plain, and afterwards said (we probably get the story from his friend Poly- bius) that, though he had been present at many battles, he had never been so much pleased. " I saw," said he, " one hundred and ten thousand men meet in combat. It was a sight such as two only have seen before me, Zeus from the top of Ida, and Poseidon from. Samothrace, in the Trojan war." Scipio undertook to arbitrate between the two parties. The Carthaginians offered to give up the country round Emporia, or the Markets (now Gabes and Terba), and to pay two hundred talents down and eight hundred more in instalments ; but when the king demanded also the surrender of the fugitives, the negotiations were broken off. Hasdrubal ought now to have taken up a position which it would have been possible for him to hold, but he neglected to do so. He expected another offer from Masinissa, and he also had hopes that the Romans would interfere in his favour. His delay was fatal to him. Famine, and the fever that always follows on famine, wasted his army. In the end he was obliged to accept the most humiliating terms. The exiles of Masinissa's party were to be taken back into the city ; the fugitives were to be surrendered ; an indemnity of five thou- sand talents was to be paid, and he and his soldiers were to pass through the hostile camp, unarmed and witli but a single garment apiece. The helpless fugitives were attacked by one of the kings sons d,\ fi.XFEDItlOl^ AGAINST CARTHAGE. Z^^ the head of a force of cavalry, and cruelly slaughtered. Only a very few, among whom was Hasdrubal him- self, returned to Carthage. But worse remained behind. The Carthaginian government condemned to death Hasdrubal and those who had been most active in promoting the war. But when the ambassadors whom they sent to Rome pleaded this proceeding as a ground for acquittal, they were asked, " Why did you not con- demn them before, not after the defeat } " To this there was no answer ; and the Roman Senate voted that the Carthaginian explanation was not sufficient. " Tell us," said the unhappy men, " what we must do ? " " You must satisfy the Roman People," was the ambiguous answer. When this was reported at Carthage, a second embassy was sent, imploring to be definitely told what they must do. These were dis- missed with the answer, "The Carthaginians know this already." Rome had accepted the pitiless counsel of Cato, and Carthage was to be blotted out. If there was any doubt, it was dismissed when envoys came from Utica offering the submission of that city. The consuls of the year, Manilius and Censorinus, were at once dispatched with a fleet and an army. Their secret instructions were that they were not to be satisfied till Carthage was destroyed. The forces which they commanded amounted to nearly a hundred thousand men. The expedition was popular ; for the piospccts of booty were great, and volunteers of all ranks thronged to take part in it. The news that the fleet had sailed was the first intimation that Carthage received that war had been declared. Zyli TIIK STORY OF CARTHAGE. The Carthaginian government still hoped that an absolute submission might save them. They sent another embassy to Rome with full powers to grant any terms that might be asked. The answer that they received was this: " If the Carthaginians will give three hundred hostages from their noblest families, and fulfil all other conditions within thirty days, they shall retain their independence and the possession of iheir territory." But secret instructions were also sent to the consuls that they were to abide, whatever might happen, by their first instructions. The hostages were sent, after a miserable scene of parting from their friends. But few believed that submission would be of any avail. And indeed it was soon seen to be useless. The consuls demanded that the arms in the city should be given up. The de- mand was accepted. Two hundred thousand weapons, more darts and javelins than could be counted, and two thousand catapults were given up. Then the consuls spoke again. " You must leave Carthage ; we have resolved to destroy this city. You may remove your furniture and property to some other place, but it must be not less than ten miles from the sea." And they added some reasons, which must have sounded like the cruellest mockery, why they should be con- tent with this decision. " You will be better away from the sea," they said in effect ; " it will only re- mind you of the greatness which you have lost. It is a dangerous element, which before this has raised to great prosperity and brought to utter ruin other countries besides yours. Agriculture is a far safer and more profitable employment. And," he added, WAR DECLARED. 279 " \\c are keeping our promise that Carthage should be independent. It is the men, not the walls and build- ings of the city, that constitute the real Carthage." ' The return of the envoys had been expected at Carthage with the utmost impatience. As they entered the gate of the city they were almost trampled to death by the crowd. At last they made their way into the Senate-house. Then they told their story, the people waiting in a dense throng out- side the doors of the chamber. When it was told, a loud cry of dismay and rage went up from the as- sembly ; and the people, hearing it, rushed in. A fearful scene of violence followed. Those who had advised the surrender of the hostages and of the arms were fiercely attacked. Some of them were even torn to pieces. The envoys themselves were not spared, though their only offence had been to bring bad news. Any un- lucky Italians, whom business had happened to detain in the city, fell victims to the popular fury. A few more wisely busied themselves with making such pre- parations for defence as were possible, for of course there was but one alternative now possible. Indeed the Senate declared war that same day. • It is difficult 10 l)L'licve that these abominable sophistries "cre ever really uttered. But we have good reason for su])posing that Appian, from whom we get the report of liie Consuls' speech, copied it from Poiyinus, an excellent authority. The historians of antiquity, however, had a passion for putting speeches into the mouths of (licir characters, an