r REESE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. JUN 14 1893 ^eceive-ii successions No. INDIAN FINANCE INDIAN FINANCE. THREE ESSAYS, (Republished from the " Nineteenth Century,") WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND APPENDIX. BY HENRY FAWCETT, M.P., FELLOW OF TRINITY HALL, AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE. /^- /L ^ UI'MXY ^^/fORNiA. Z^ MACMILLAN AND CO. 1880. The li'ujht of Translation ami Re production is Reserved. LONDON : R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS, BREAD STREET HILL, B.C. PREFACE. THE three Essays which form the chief contents of this volume were published last year in the Nineteenth Century, and I wish to express my best thanks to my friend, Mr. James Knowles, the Editor of that Eeview, for his kind courtesy in permitting their republication. In some introduc- tory remarks I have endeavoured to show the importance of placing the present system of financial control on a different basis. Although it is generally supposed that the entire control over the expenditure of the revenues of India was vested in the Council of the Secretary of State by the Government of India Act of 1858, yet by an Act which was passed in 1869 the tenure of the office of the Members of Council was materially modified, and the discussion which took p]ace when this Act was passing through Parliament plainly shows that the law had been left in a vi PREFACE. state of such extreme uncertainty by the Act of 1858 as to make inquiry into the entire subject by a Parliamentary Committee urgently necessary. In a short Appendix to the last Essay, attention is directed to some important Amendments which, within the last few weeks, the Government of India have proposed to introduce into the Trades Licence-Tax, and some remarks are made on the intention which was at the same time expressed to relinquish the Famine Fund. As I have always felt that Indian questions should as far as possible be discussed free from any party bias, I hope it will be found that none of the remarks contained in this volume have in any way been influenced by a feeling of political partisanship. I desire to say how much I am indebted in the preparation of this book to my wife, who has revised the volume as it was passing through the press, and to my secretary, Mr. F. J. Dryhurst, who has acted as my amanuensis, and who has carefully verified the statistics which have been quoted from official and other documents. HENRY FAWCETT. CAMBRIDGE, January 21, 1880. CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 1 THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA 17 THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879 73 THE NEW DEPARTURE IN INDIAN FINANCE 114 APPENDIX (THE AMENDMENT OF THE LICENCE-TAX, AND THE RELINQUISHMENT OF THE FAMINE FUND) 170 INDIAN FINANCE INTRODUCTORY KEMARKS. IT is now generally recognised that no public ques- tion is of more urgent importance than the reform of Indian finance, and I have decided to republish the three essays contained in this volume, in the hope that they may possibly render some assistance in showing what is the true character of the financial condition of India, and what are the measures which it will be necessary to adopt to place her finances on a sound and satisfactory basis. In the first Essay, which was published in February last year, I endeavoured to describe the most salient features of the actual financial condition of India. Particular attention was directed in this essay to the erroneous conclusions which are frequently arrived at with regard to the amount of the real revenue which is available to meet the ordinary expenses of govern- 2 INDIAN FINANCE. [INTRO. ment. By arranging the various items of revenue and expenditure under different classes, and by care- fully distinguishing the net from the gross receipts, it was shown that the real revenue of India is less than 40,000, OOO/. 1 With a comparatively stationary revenue of this amount, a rapidly-increasing expendi- ture had to be met. All available sources of taxation had been so nearly exhausted that large loans had each year to be raised to meet the deficits which were regularly accruing. Constant borrowing had consequently become the normal condition of Indian finance, and her indebtedness was rapidly and steadily growing. The budget for 1879-80, which was in- troduced at Calcutta soon after this Essay was pub- lished, strikingly corroborated the conclusions which were thus sought to be established. During this year the finances of India were prejudicially affected by various adverse circumstances. The cost of the Afghan war had to be met ; an increasing loss by exchange, produced by the depreciation in the value of silver, put a severe strain upon her resources ; various public works, which involved a heavy outlay, had already been sanctioned ; the diminished revenue returns yielded in certain districts showed that in some parts of the country the effects of the recent famines were still severely felt ; and the financial 1 See table, p. 21. INTRO.] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 3 situation was further aggravated by an increase in the military and other branches of expenditure. From the budget arrangements of the year it at once became evident that all the worst anticipations as to the financial exigencies of India were to receive a practical corroboration. In the second Essay, which was published in May, soon after these arrangements were made known, it was shown that the Govern- ment, from the measures which they proposed, apparently thought that India was so entirely with- out any financial reserve, and that all the sources of fresh taxation were so exhausted, that no effort could be made to obtain additional revenue. Con- sequently the whole of the exceptional expenditure could only be met by borrowing. The loan opera- tions of the year were to be on so extended a scale that the critical state of Indian finance was at onca disclosed, and on all sides the gravity of the situa- tion was at length fully recognised. A loan of 3,500,0002. was to be raised in India; 2,000,0002. was to be advanced by England to India, free of interest, towards the expenses of the Afghan war ; and soon after the budget was introduced at Calcutta, it was announced that the Government would ask Parliament for authority to borrow 10,000,0002. in England. But serious as was the state of things disclosed by these exceptionally large borrowing B 2 4 INDIAN FINANCE [INTRO. operations, the outlook for the future became far worse when it was seen that in the midst of this embarrassment the Government of India were sur- rounded by influences which compelled them, in the administration of her finances, to sacrifice her in- terests to the interests of England. Simultaneously with the announcement of the large loan operations which were about to be undertaken, it was stated that the revenue of India, which was admitted to be in- adequate to meet the cost of government, was not to be maintained, but that 200,OOOZ. of this revenue was to be sacrificed by a partial repeal of the cotton duties. It need scarcely be remarked that nothing can be more indefensible than to reduce taxes when there is a deficit, and when, consequently, every shilling of the taxation remitted necessitates a corresponding addition to the debt. When the Indian budget was considered in Par- liament (May 22, 1879), the Government made no attempt to conceal the extreme gravity of the financial situation. It was unreservedly admitted that as the revenue could not be added to by in- creased taxation, a reduction of expenditure became a matter of imperative necessity. In the last of the three Essays in this volume, which was published in October, I have endeavoured to show that this recognition by the Government of the true state of INTRO.] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 5 Indian finance, and the promises with which it was accompanied of carrying out in every department a policy of the most rigorous economy, are so important that they may be regarded as constituting a new epoch in Indian finance. It is not too much to say that unless a policy of retrenchment is resolutely persisted in, nothing can prevent India being involved in the most serious financial embarrassment. All experience shows* that any Government which attempts to carry out a policy of retrenchment will have to encounter many most formidable difficulties, and in surmount- ing these difficulties they may fairly claim all the assistance which public opinion can afford. It will, I believe, be found that in order perma- nently to place the finances of India on a sound basis it will be necessary to effect some important changes in her present system of financial adminis- tration. It will now be generally admitted that when the Government of India was transferred from the Com- pany to the Crown, many safeguards for economy were swept away, and the substitutes which took their place have proved to be comparatively ineffective. It was perhaps impossible at the time the transfer took place to foresee many of the defects of the new system of government which was then introduced. As, however, more than twenty years have now elapsed since the commencement of this new system 6 INDIAN FINANCE. [INTRO. of administration, the time has, I think, arrived when great good would be likely to result if the Act of 1858, by which the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown was effected, and the amending Acts which have been subsequently passed, were subjected to a careful parliamentary inquiry. Among the many reasons that may be urged in favour of such an inquiry, it may be men- tioned that the experience of the past has shown that it is in the highest degree desirable that Indian affairs should be periodically investigated. In the days of the Company such an investigation was insured a*t regular intervals, because the Charter of the Company, from which it derived its authority, was only granted for twenty years, and each renewal of the Charter was invariably preceded by a parlia- mentary inquiry. The three Committees which were thus appointed before the Charter was renewed in 1813, in 1833, and in 1853, collected information, the importance of which can hardly be over- estimated. This was so fully recognised at the time when the Committees were appointed that many of the most eminent members of the House served upon them. The Committee which preceded the renewal of the Charter in 1813 first sat in 1808, and con- tinued its sittings until 1812. During this time it made five reports. Among those who served on this INTRO.] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 7 Committee may be mentioned Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Wilberforce, Mr. Dundas, Mr. Charles Grant, the Duke of Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley), and Sir Eobert Peel. The next Committee was appointed in January, 1832, and consisted of no less than forty-eight members, among whom were Mr. Baring, Sir James Mackintosh, Mr. Labouchere, Lord Cavendish, Mr. Villiers, Mr. O'Connell, Mr. Hume, Mr. Warburton, Viscount Morpeth, Mr. Sheil, Mr. E. Lytton Bulwer, Mr. Charles Grant, and Mr. Eobert Grant. The Com- mittee which preceded the last renewal of the Charter was appointed in November, 1852, and concluded its inquiry at the end of the session of 1853. The Committee consisted of thirty members ; the late Mr. Thomas Baring was its chairman; and among those who served on the Committee were Mr. Disraeli, Lord John Russell, Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, Sir W. Molesworth, Mr. Cobden, Mr. Hume, Mr. Macaulay, Lord Stanley, and Lord Palmerston. If the questions which these various Committees had to investigate were at the time considered to be so important as to make it desirable to enlist the services of the most eminent members of the House, I think it can without difficulty be shown that there are now many subjects connected with the govern- ment of India which not less urgently demand a 8 INDIAN FINANCE. [INTRO. most careful and thorough parliamentary inquiry. Although there may be much difference of opinion as to what principles should regulate the government of India, there can, I believe, be no difference of opinion that those principles, when once determined, ought to be embodied in precise and intelligible legislation. As already stated, the government of India is at the present time mainly controlled by the Act which was passed in 1858, and this Act is so obscurely worded that in attempting to interpret some of its most important provisions, the highest authorities have arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions. This will be at once seen by reference to a remarkable debate which took place in the House of Lords in 1869. In that year the Duke of Argyll, who was then Secretary of State for India, introduced a Bill which effected an important change in the tenure by which the members of the Council of the Secre- tary of State had hitherto held their offices. By the Act of 1858 the members of Council were to hold their offices on the same permanent tenure as an English judge. It was apparently thought that as to them was to be entrusted the duty of controlling expenditure, it was essential that their position should be made as independent as possible. Soon after the Duke of Argyll became Secretary of State it was evident that he held a different view from that which INTRO.] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 9 had been held by some of his predecessors, as to the functions which ought to be exercised by the Council. Considering that they were rather a consultative than a controlling body, he, with the object of securing the advice of those who had recently returned from India with fresh experience, effected a fundamental change in the tenure of the office. By the Bill to which reference has already been made the indepen- dent position of a member of Council was to a great extent weakened. He was no longer to be the holder of a permanent office, but was, in the first instance, to be appointed only for ten years, and at the end of this period he might be re-appointed by the Secretary of State for five years. As the character of the office was thus greatly changed, it almost necessarily hap- pened that in the discussions which took place on the Bill the powers which could be exercised by the Council had to be considered. Directly, however, an attempt was made to define these powers it appeared that the highest authorities entertained entirely opposite opinions. Thus, the Duke of Argyll, in order to bring out with distinctness the absolute divergence in the views as to the functions of the Council held by himself and by Lord Salisbury, who had recently been Secretary of State, quoted the following passage from a speech Lord Salisbury had lately made : 10 INDIAN FINANCE. [INTRO. " In reference to every question in which expendi- ture is involved that is to say, as you well know, in reference to every question of every kind, because I believe there is hardly any question in which expenditure is not involved, directly or indirectly the Indian Council have the power of absolute and conclusive veto by a bare majority over the decision of the Secretary of State." Lord Salisbury, challenged to prove the accuracy of this opinion, re-affirmed it in the most positive manner, and said that he arrived at this interpreta- tion of the Act of 1858 after consulting the very highest legal authority, who, as subsequently ap- peared, was Lord Cairns. On the other hand, the Duke of Argyll maintained that in arriving at exactly the opposite opinion he was supported by the Law Officers of the Crown. As the discussion proceeded this extraordinary conflict of authority became, if possible, still more marked. Lord Hatherley, who at the time was Lord Chancellor, supported the opinion that had been expressed by the Duke of Argyll as to the functions of the Council, and said Lord Cairns "appeared to give a meaning to the words of the Act which they could not bear in any sound legal construction." Com- menting on these differences of opinion, Lord Salis- bury maintained that it was imperatively necessary, INTRO.] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 11 where such vast interests were at stake, that the law should be unmistakably clear, and said that " about the doubtfulness of the law there could be no doubt whatever. When the Lord Chancellor said a thing was black, and two ex- Chancellors said it was white, there must be some doubt about the law." A striking example of the consequences that may be produced by leaving the law in such a state of uncertainty is afforded by an event which has recently happened, Lord Salisbury and Lord Cairns, having, as has just been shown, expressed a decided opinion that "in reference to every question in which expenditure is involved .... the Indian Council have the power of absolute and conclusive veto by a bare majority over the decision of the Secretary of State," are members of a Cabinet which adopted a " forward " frontier policy in India, involving an expenditure, of millions, not only without the con- sent of the Council being obtained, but without the matter being brought within their cognizance. There is apparently the same difficulty in inter- preting other provisions of the Act of 1858 which are not less important than those which refer to the members of the Council of the Secretary of State. This has lately been shown in a striking manner by the controversy which arose out of the remission of the cotton duties. A majority of the 12 INDIAN FINANCE. [INTRO. members of Council of the Viceroy were opposed to the reduction of these duties, and it has been main- tained on high legal authority that under these circumstances the Viceroy, in overruling the majority of his Council, put a very strained interpretation on the legal power conferred upon him. The legal member of the Council of the Viceroy may be con- sidered the highest legal authority in India, and the present holder of that office, Mr. Whitley Stokes, referring to the course taken by the Viceroy with regard to the reduction of the Cotton Duties, used the following words : " The proposed exemption of cotton goods, if made by a mere executive order, will thus resemble what lawyers call a fraud on the power; and there is, unfortunately, no Court of Equity to relieve the people of India against it." 1 After what has just been stated, it cannot be necessary to multiply instances to show that the law which now regulates the Government of India is in a state of chaotic confusion. It cannot be right that there should be the widest divergence of opinion between the highest official authorities both in India and in England as to the powers which can or ought to be exercised by those who hold most influential 1 See " Copy of Dissents recorded by Members of the Council of the Governor-General of India regarding the late Reduction of the Cotton Duties in that Country," presented to Parliament in May, 1879. INTRO.] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 13 positions in the Government of India. When the Act of 1858 was passed it was intended to vest the chief financial control in the Councils of the Secretary of State and of the Viceroy. Before the abolition of the Company this control was in a great degree exercised by the Directors and by the Court of Proprietors. It invariably happened that several Directors of the East India Company were in Parlia- ment, and the Company was thus able to exert great influence, both on English public opinion and on the English Government. If it was thought that with regard to any question in which the interests of England and India came into conflict, India was unfairly treated, the influence which was possessed by the Company both within and without the walls of Parliament was sure to be vigorously exerted on behalf of India. Under the present system, how- ever, it is a mere matter of chance whether any one will be found in Parliament specially to watch over the interests of India. It is perfectly well known that seldom has any measure been passed which was more disliked by the people of India than the recent reduction of the cotton duties. Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, a member of the Council of the Viceroy, speaking with official responsibility, has said : " There can be no doubt that the people of India attribute the action which has been taken by Her 14 INDIAN FINANCE. [INTRO. Majesty's Government in this matter to the influences which have been brought to bear upon it by persons interested in the English cotton trade, or, in other words, by the manufacturers of Lancashire." He adds : "It is very undesirable that an impression should exist which, if it were well founded, would go far to justify the forebodings of those who deprecated the transfer of the direct government of India from the East India Company to the Crown on the ground that India would be sacrificed to the exigencies of political parties in Parliament. For many years after that transfer took place the propriety, and indeed the necessity, of treating Indian questions, and especially questions connected with the internal administration of India, as a thing apart from parliamentary politics, was recognised by both the great parties in the state. By a tacit but well- understood compact, India was ex- cluded from the arena of party politics in the House of Commons. Now, for the first time, there is a prevalent belief that this understanding has been departed from. A measure seriously affecting the finances of India has been, and is being, pressed upon Parliament by a powerful section of the English mercantile community, and the general opinion is that that pressure has so far produced an effect that at a juncture of the gravest financial difficulty and anxiety the Govern- ment of India has been impelled to incur a sacrifice of revenue which the most ordinary considerations of financial prudence should have led it to retain, with the certainty that the present concession will only INTRO.] INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 15 encourage further pressure, until the whole of the particular branch of the state revenue which has been the subject of attack shall have been abandoned." 1 So impossible does it appear to be to interpose with any effect on behalf of India, if the wishes of her people have to be weighed against the support of a certain section of English voters, that when the action that had been taken in reference to the cotton duties was called in question in the House of Com- mons, the protest had to be made by a mere handful of members. When considering in the following pages the causes which have made the present financial condition of India so unsatisfactory, numerous instances are adduced which, I believe, conclusively show that there is little hope of effecting any real and permanent im- provement in her finances, unless some more adequate financial control is provided than that which is fur- nished by the present system of administration. As previously stated, the two bodies in whom this control was chiefly vested have, through the uncertainty of the law and other circumstances, been gradually deprived of much of the power which it was supposed they could exercise. If a Viceroy in a period of severe financial pressure can sacrifice an important branch of revenue in direct opposition to the wishes of a 1 See Parliamentary paper just referred to. 16 INDIAN FINANCE. [INTRODUCTORY. majority of his Council ; if a Secretary of State can decide upon a policy which will involve the outlay of millions, and free himself, not only from the control, but from the criticism of his Council by availing himself of the undefined powers which are vested in him of placing the despatch which orders the expendi- ture in the secret department it is at once obvious that the control which these two Councils can exercise is most inadequate. Few problems in government can be more difficult than to devise the best means by which this control can be supplied. It is a problem which can only be properly solved after the most careful inquiry, which will enable due con- sideration to be given to the opinions of those who can speak with the greatest authority and experience. Although therefore it would now be premature to attempt to indicate the changes which should be introduced into the Government of India, no one, I think, can deny that events are every day happening which show that the reform of her administration is a matter of such urgent importance that an inquiry as to the best means of effecting it ought to be one of the first subjects to engage the attention of the new Parliament. I. THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 1 As there seems to be every probability that during the next few months an unusual amount of public attention will be directed to Indian affairs, I think the present may be regarded as a suitable time to consider the financial condition of that country. With the view of treating the subject with as much clearness as possible, it will be desirable in the first instance to ascertain what is the real revenue of India. Much of the complexity which so often confuses dis- cussions on Indian finance arises from the want of any definite understanding as to the sense in which certain terms are employed. From the last financial statement of the Indian Finance Minister, it appears that he estimates the real revenue of India at between 37,000,000?. and 39,000,000?. ; whereas a short time afterwards the revenue was officially stated at more than 63,000,000?. This great disparity of course arises from the gross revenue being referred to in the one case and the net revenue in the other. It has not unfrequently been said, in discussions on Indian 1 February, 1879. C 18 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. finance, that it cannot be of any moment whether the revenue is estimated at its gross or its net amount ; it is, after all, simply a matter of account. In one sense this, no doubt, is true ; but there will be no difficulty in showing that it is of the first importance to give as much prominence as possible to the net, as distinguished from the gross, revenue of India. Few things have done so much harm to Indian finance in the past, or may cause greater embarrass- ment in the future, than an exaggerated idea as to the revenue which the Indian Government has to spend. Although there is much in the present financial con- dition of India to cause serious apprehension, yet there is one circumstance connected with it which may fairly be regarded as a most hopeful omen for the future. Until quite lately, Indi^^as looked upon as an extremely wealthy country, and there was no project, however costly, that India was not supposed to be rich enough to pay for. Now, however, juster ideas of the resources of the country and of the condi- tion of the people prevail. The recurrence of famines, and other circumstances which have caused more attention to be directed to Indian questions, have at length led the English public to take firm hold of the fact that India is an extremely poor country, and that the great mass of her people are in such a state of impoverishment that the Government will have to contend with exceptional difficulties if it i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 19 becomes necessary to procure increased revenue by additional taxation. It is not more true of an' indi- vidual than it is of a nation -that, if it is desirable to check all extravagance, and secure rigid economy, the amount of the income which is available for expen- diture should not be over-estimated. It is often said that if a man comes into possession of an encumbered estate, the mere amount of the mortgages and other debts upon the property does not form an accurate measure of the real extent of his embarrassments, for he has constantly to contend with the difficulty of possessing an income so much less than its nominal amount. Having perhaps ten thousand a year to spend, he is regarded by the world as the possessor of twice as much, and is expected every hour of his life to live accordingly. The position of India is not dis- similar to this. Year after year the Government of India has been living beyond its means. Deficits have been repeatedly recurring, and debt has been steadily and surely accumulated. Nothing, therefore, can be of greater importance, and nothing can be more likely to bring about a better state of things, than to ascertain what is the real amount of the revenue which the Indian Government has at the present time to spend. On official authority l it was stated when the Indian 1 See speech of Mr. Stanhope, the Under-Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons, August 13, 1878, Hansard, vol. ccxlii. c 2 20 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. Budget was discussed in the House of Commons, that the revenue of India in 1876-77 was 55,995,785?, in 1877-78 58,635,472?., and the revenue for 1878-79 was estimated at 63,195,000?. Without desiring to question the correctness of these figures as mere state- ments of account, I believe it can be easily proved that they are calculated to produce the most mis- chievous and misleading conclusions as to the true position of Indian finance. In the first place they would seem to show that the revenue of India, which is almost stationary, is rapidly increasing ; and in the second place a most exaggerated opinion is likely to be formed of the resources of the Indian Government. If the items of revenue and expenditure for any year are examined, it will be at once seen that the large foregoing totals of revenue are arrived at by estimating gross instead of net revenue, and by including amongst the receipts many items which really do not represent revenue, but expenditure. Thus the following is an official statement of the ordinary revenue and expen- diture for the year 18 76-77. l In making a com- parison between revenue and expenditure, I think it is fairer to select this year, because since the year 1876-77 the finances of India have been seriously disturbed by the large expenditure caused by the famine in Southern India and by the cost of the 1 See Finance and Revenue Accounts, printed as a Parliamentary paper, No. 176, May 16, 1878. I.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 21 Afghan war. In the following table all the items of receipt and expenditure are included which are con- tained in the official return. I have, however, with a view of exhibiting the accounts in the simplest possible manner, arranged the items of receipt under three classes. In the first class all those receipts are in- cluded which represent real revenue. The second class embraces those receipts which are exceeded in amount by the expenditure necessary to obtain them, and must therefore be regarded as items of expendi- ture rather than as sources of revenue. In the third class various items of expenditure are included, against which, as a set-off, there are no corresponding receipts. ORDINARY KEVENUE AND EXPENDITURE, 1876-77. CLASS I. Gross Receipts. Expenditure. Net Revenue. It&TYLS of IiCCC t i/f)tt ivjlicll, ))TOdliCB Revenue. Land 1 Q 8^7 1 f\9 2K(\A fil 1 1*7 OKO K.A1 Opium .... . . JL y, o*> / , J. t)j 9,122,460 ,OU4,Dli 2 841 647 I/, DO/, 041 6980 81 ^ Salt 6 304 658 488 480 , ^OU, O.LO 50-1 a -\ 70 Excise on Spirits and Drugs 2, 523, 045 obOO, TtoV/ 90,693 , OlD, I/O 2,432,352 Customs 2,483,345 194 230 O OQQ 11^ Stamps 2,838,628 Qfi 9fifi ^u, ^O7, Jl JLv 2749 ^fi9 Forest 598,687 yo, zuu 436 181 ^ / ttZ . 'JDZ Mint 258,' 854 130*601 1989^ Provincial contributions . . 45,894 45,' 89 4 /Adjusting receipts from Pro- vincial Governments (pro- J vincial deficits) .... 159,568 | Adjusting receipts to Pro- vincial Governments (pro- \ vincial surpluses) . . . Miscellaneous . . 411,335 153,726 249 622 5,842 1 fil 71 ^ 1U 1 j / 1O 44,603,626 7,186,057 37,417,569 Net Revenue . . ... 37,417,569 22 INDIAN FINANCE. Brought forward CLASS II. Gross Receipts. 44,603,626 Expenditure. Net Revenue. 7,186,057 37,417,569 Items of receipt which, being balanced by a larger expen- diture, do not represent re- venue, but outlay. Post-Office 794,328 859,783 Telegraph ; 341,227 473,127 /Gain by exchange on trans- ! J actions with London . j 505,129 ^ Loss by exchange on trans \ actions with London . 2,181,611 Law, Justice, and Police 854,105 5,433,853 Education 105,516 730,013 [Tributes and contributions 694,934 / Allowances and assignments ^ under treaties and engage- l ments . ... 1,672,543 ( Receipts in aid| of superan- nuation, retired, and com- I x passionate allowances . . j 607,242 Superannuation, retired, and compassionate allowances . 1,798,569 Army. 925,473 15,792,112 Marine 233,179 699,584 Receipts for interest ... 536,281 Payment for interest on per- x manent and floating debt . . 4,512,722 Payment for interest on ser- [ vice funds, &c 394,514 Public works 198,371 3,519,668 CLASS III. Items of expenditure to which there are no corresponding items of receipt. Administration ... 1,474,095 Minor departments ... ... 320,138 Ecclesiastical ... 163, ! Medical ... 596,887 Stationery and printing . . ... 443,776 Political agencies . . . . i ... 505,228 Civil, furlough, and absentee allowances ... 235,990 Refunds and drawbacks . . ... 291,106 Famine relief i ... 2,145,431 TOTALS 50,399,411 51,430,673 I 37>417,,569 I I.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 23 From these figures certain conclusions can be drawn, which may be regarded as of fundamental importance in forming a correct opinion as to the actual position of Indian finance. It thus appears, and it is a fact which cannot be kept too prominently in view, that the entire revenue of India, with the exception of 504,208?., is derived from the six following sources : land, opium, salt, excise, customs, and stamps. The various other items of revenue mentioned in the accounts cannot be fairly considered as sources of revenue. They do not in fact produce revenue ; but, on the contrary, should be regarded as causes of expenditure. Thus the revenue of 794,328?. from the Post Office requires an expenditure of 859,783?. to obtain it. A receipt of 341,227?. from the telegraph is more than balanced by an expenditure of 473,127?. But if any further illustration were needed to show that no accurate idea can be formed of the real revenue of India by adding together all the items of receipt which are now included in the statement annually published of revenue and expenditure, it is only necessary to refer to the items of receipt which have been arranged under Class II. Amongst these there is one of 505,129?. described as "gain by exchange." When it is remembered that in this very year India had to bear a most serious loss from exchange, amounting to no less than 2,181,611?., it is evident 24 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. that, if any good could result from augmenting her nominal revenue, 2,000,000?. might be added to each side of the account, and the gain by exchange might be represented as 2,500,000?. * But unless the subject is confused by unnecessary complications, nothing can be more easy than to arrive at correct conclusions with regard to the amount of the real revenue of India. It has been already stated that the revenue, with the exception of the sum of 504,208?., is derived from land, opium, salt, excise, customs, and stamps, and if, as has been done in the above table, the cost of collecting each of these items of revenue is deducted from their gross amount, the real revenue of India is shown to be only 37,417,569?. The conclusion which has been just arrived at as to the amount of 1 It is sometimes said that no harm can result from exhibiting the Indian revenue at its gross instead of its net amount, because the same course is adopted with regard to the English revenue and expenditure. There is, however, such a fundamental difference between the position of English and Indian finance, that a mode of exhibiting revenue which may be perfectly suited to the one country is altogether unsuited to the other. Thus the difference between the gross and net revenue of England is much smaller than the difference between the gross and net revenue of India. In 1877 the gross revenue of England was 78,565,036?., and its net revenue was not less than 68,000,0002. Many of the items of receipt which in India are balanced by a larger corresponding expenditure represent in England important sources of revenue. Thus, the Post Office, as has been shown, causes to India a loss of about 65,000/., while it yields in England a net revenue of more than 2,000,000 L, after allowing for the cost of the packet service. i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 25 the real revenue of India is fully confirmed by the Indian Finance Minister, Sir John Strachey, who, about twelve months since, estimated the net ordinary expenditure of India at between 3 7, 000, 000 1. and 38,000, 000?., and said that the ordinary revenue is only just sufficient to meet it. It may perhaps be thought that I have laid too much stress on the importance of keeping steadily in view the distinction between the gross and net revenue of India ; but it can scarcely be denied that, if exces- sive expenditure is bringing embarrassment upon the finances of a country, nothing is more essential to secure strict economy than, as far as possible, to discourage any exaggerated estimate being formed of the actual amount of such a country's revenue. Thus, as one illustration, it may be mentioned that the military expenditure of India is estimated by Sir John Strachey at more than 17,000,000?. a year. Such an expenditure would be sufficiently serious if it were defrayed out of a revenue which was, as the Indian revenue has been represented to be, rapidly increasing from 56,000,000?. to 63,000,000?. ; but how incalculably more serious must such an expendi- ture be, and how much more likely is it that retrench- ment will be demanded as an imperative necessity, when it appears that this enormous charge of more than 17,000,000?. a year has to be met, not out of an 26 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. increasing revenue of 63,000,000?., but out of an almost stationary revenue of about 38, 000, 000 . In the statement that has been given of the receipts and expenditure for the year 1876-1877, it was shown that the ordinary revenue fell short of the ordinary expenditure by about 1,000,000^. As it may be thought that this year was an exceptional one, it will be desirable again to refer to the financial statement of Sir J. Strachey ; for nothing can be more explicit than the opinion he expresses that the normal condition of Indian finance is one in which the ordinary revenue is barely sufficient to meet the ordinary expenditure. Thus he says : " A careful examination of the accounts of the seven years ending on the 31st of March, 1876, a period long enough to illustrate fairly the state of our finances, made it plain not only that we had, when I spoke, made no proper provision for the cost of famines, but that we possessed no true surplus of revenue over expenditure to cover the many con- tingencies to which a great country is exposed." 1 Of the many contingencies necessitating increased expenditure to which Sir John Strachey refers, it is 1 See speech of Sir John Strachey in bringing forward his proposals for the creation of a Famine Fund. Calcutta, December 28, 1877. This speech, which contains a most able review of the finances of India, was published in the session of 1878 as a Parliamentary paper. i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 27 only necessary here to mention two -War and Famine. At the time he spoke India was in a state of profound peace ; but within less than a twelvemonth a war has been undertaken which will throw upon her finances a charge, the amount of which it is impossible at the present time to calculate. For the other contingency famine, Sir John Strachey was at the time attempting to make some provision by imposing additional taxa- tion on the people of India. In view of the occurrence within twelve years of four serious famines in different parts of India, and of the fact that between 1873 and 1878 famines have thrown a charge upon the Indian revenues of no less than 16,000,000?., no other alter- native presents itself to the Indian Government than to treat famines, not as exceptional or acci- dental occurrences, but as calamities which are so certain to recur that provision should be made to meet them out of the ordinary revenue of the year. The amount that is required to provide an adequate fund for the relief of famines was estimated at 1,500,000?. a year. As the Government of India have repeatedly declared that they are fully sensible of the very serious consequences, both financial and political, that may be produced by adding to the taxation of India, it cannot be supposed that they would sanction additional taxation unless they were compelled to do so by urgent necessity. Nothing, 28 INDIAN FINANCE. [,. therefore, can more conclusively show that the ordinary revenue of India is only just sufficient to meet its ordinary expenditure, no margin being left to provide for those many contingencies which it is officially stated are certain to recur, than the fact that a careful financier like Sir John Strachey admitted that, in order to create the Famine Fund which he says is essential to place the finances of India on a sound basis, no other course was open to him than to provide this fund from new taxation. I shall subse- quently have occasion to describe the particular taxes which have been imposed with the object of creating this fund ; and fully admitting that the Indian Government would not wantonly or unnecessarily impose taxation which is exceptionally unjust and burdensome, nothing can more forcibly illustrate the gravity of the financial position of India at the present time than the circumstance that, amongst the new taxes which have recently been imposed, it has been thought requisite to levy what is virtually an income-tax of fivepence in the pound on incomes of no more than four shillings a week. But, before con- sidering the nature of the new taxation that has lately been imposed in India, and before showing to what straits the Indian Government will be reduced if in future years they should have to obtain addi- tional revenue to meet recurring deficits, it will be i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 29 desirable to make as careful an estimate as possible of tlie future prospects of the revenue and expenditure of that country. It must be evident that no question relating to Indian finance can be of more fundamental import- ance than to examine the chief items of her revenue and expenditure, with the object of ascertaining whether, if expenditure increases, it is likely to be met by a corresponding growth of revenue. If such an examination is made, I am afraid that no other conclusion can be arrived at, than that the out- look for the future is gloomy in the extreme. It will be shown that if India continues to be governed as she now is, and if no change is introduced into the administration of her finances, it is inevitable that any possible growth of her revenue will be altogether inadequate to meet the certain increase in her ex- penditure, and no other prospect will lie before her Government but augmented indebtedness and additional taxation. Reverting to the six sources from which the revenue of India is derived namely, land, opium, salt, excise, customs, and stamps I will, as briefly as possible, consider what is the probability of an increase in each separate head of revenue. With regard to the land revenue, from which nearly one- half of the entire net revenue of India is obtained* 30 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. it is scarcely necessary to remark that there cannot, from the manner in which the land revenue has been settled, be any material increase in its amount for a considerable number of years. Over a large portion of the most fertile districts of India, the land revenue is permanently settled ; the Government having commuted the land revenue for a fixed annual rent- charge to be paid in silver. Of the entire land revenue about one-fifth is derived from the perma- nently settled districts, and therefore, as far as this portion is concerned, it is incapable of any augmenta- tion. In the North- West Provinces, and in other parts of India, what are known as thirty years' settlements prevail. The amount of the land revenue, in these districts, is fixed for thirty years, and until the expiration of this period it is of course impossible that there can be any increased assessment. From time to time, as these thirty years' settlements fall in, the land can be reassessed ; but many who are most competent to express an opinion confidently assert that the agricultural classes in India, except in the pemanently settled districts, where an increase of the land revenue cannot be obtained, are not in a condition to bear a heavier assessment. Although there would thus appear to be no im- mediate probability of the amount derived from the land revenue being materially increased, there is i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 31 unfortunately no room whatever for doubt that the real value of this revenue has been within the last few years most seriously lessened. The land revenue is really a rent paid to the Indian Government in silver, and the amount of this silver rent is fixed, either permanently or for a defined period. A very considerable part of the expenditure of the Indian Government consists of payments which have to be made in gold. At least 17,000,0007., or about 45 per cent, of the entire net revenue of India, is expended in England in paying the interest on the Indian debt, in the purchase of stores, in salaries, pensions, &c., and this large and increasing outlay, known as the home charges, has to be made in gold. The Indian Government receives its revenue in silver, but has to find gold for the purpose of defraying 45 per cent, of its expenditure. Within the last few years there has been a most serious depreciation in the value of silver when compared with gold. Silver has fallen from GQd. to about 5Qd. an ounce : a sovereign, which o ' could formerly be purchased with four ounces of silver, can now only be purchased with five ounces. Consequently about 20 per cent, more silver is now required to pay the home charges than would be needed if there were no depreciation in the value of silver. The net land revenue is about equivalent in amount to the net home charges, and consequently, 32 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. if this revenue were appropriated to defray these charges, it would virtually be reduced in value at least 3,000,000?. a year, owing to the depreciation in the value of silver. With regard, therefore, to the future prospects of the land revenue, I think it may be concluded, first, that there is little probability of any immediate increase in its amount, and secondly, that the depreciation of silver seriously lessens the real value of this revenue. Next proceeding to consider the revenue derived from opium, there is no branch of Indian revenue which has lately shown so large an increase. It appears from an official paper which was laid before Parliament as recently as December, 1878, that the revenue from opium during the current financial year is likely to exceed the estimate by no less a sum than . ],240,000/. It has been stated that a part of this large increase is due to the Government, pressed by the necessity of finding funds for the Afghan war, having brought an unusually large quantity of opium into the market. But, whether this be so or not, I think it cannot be denied that no inconsiderable part of this increase in the revenue from opium must be due to a rise in the price of opium produced by the depreciation in the value of silver. For some time after the fall in the price of silver took place there appeared to be no movement in general prices in i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 33 India, Silver, in fact, had simply fallen in value in relation to gold. Now, however, there seems to be a depreciation in the general value of silver in India, and prices are beginning to rise ; for in the same official return in which an estimate is given of the large increase of revenue expected to be derived from opium, it is stated that on account of a rise in. the price of food, the army expenditure in India is esti- mated during the present financial year to exceed the _ estimate by 330,000/. As the Indian Government M]S C r opium in the open market, the amount of the opmin ^^ ^ revenue will, in the absence of any counteracting ci^ cumstances, increase with the rise in general prices. Although, therefore, there is this favourable circum- stance connected with the opium revenue, namely, that it is not prejudicially affected in the same way as the land revenue must be, by the depreciation in the value of silver, yet no prudent financier should ignore the fact that this revenue depends almost for its existence upon the action of the Chinese Govern- ment in admitting Indian opium to their ports, while they forbid the cultivation of opium in China. Much valuable information on the subject of the opium revenue is contained in the evidence given before the Parliamentary Committee on Indian Finance. Among the many witnesses who were examined on this question there is no one whose opinion is entitled D 34 INDIAN FINANCE. [r. to more consideration than Sir Eutherford Alcock, who had not only resided in China for twenty- five years, but who at the time was her Majesty's Minister in that country. In the evidence he gave before the Select Committee on Indian Finance (May 23, 1871), he expressed the opinion that the Chinese Government were seriously contemplating putting an end to the importation of opium, and allowing its cultivation without stint in China. I do not presume to express any opinion of my own on the extent to which the opium revenue is likely to be affected by any action that may be taken by the Government of China. My sole object in calling attention to the subject is to show that the most productive of all the sources of Indian revenue, next to land, may, in the opinion of some most competent judges, be seriously reduced in consequence of a fall- ing off in the Chinese demand for Indian opium ; and it therefore becomes the more essential that the finances of India should be administered with the utmost care and thrift. Next proceeding to consider the prospect of an increased revenue being obtained from salt, it will, I think, be admitted that, although a small increase of revenue may be derived from an increase of popu- lation, yet nothing could justify an attempt to obtain an additional revenue from salt by raising the rate i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 35 of the existing duties. The duty now imposed, amounting to no less than 2,000 per cent, on the prime cost of the article, cannot but be regarded as a most onerous impost, when it is remembered that salt is as much a necessary of life as the air we breathe or the water we drink. It seems, moreover, that taxation on salt has reached that point when it produces a most serious effect in checking consump- tion. This is particularly the case in the poorest parts of India, such as Madras. This was felt so strongly by the late Lord Hobart, the able Governor of that Presidency, that he declared that nothing would induce him to be a consenting party to an increase of the salt duty. At the time Lord Hobart made that declaration, the duty levied on salt in Madras was one rupee, thirteen annas per maund. Within the last twelvemonth, the salt duty has been raised in Madras and Bombay from one rupee, thirteen annas to two rupees, eight annas. This increase of nearly 40 per cent, in the duty, has been defended as a part of a scheme for the equalisation of the salt duties throughout India. If, however, the equalisa- tion of duties is an object of so much importance as to justify a large addition to the duty being imposed on the people of Madras and Bombay at the very moment when they were recovering from the ravages of a terrible famine, it at once becomes evident that D 2 36 INDIAN FINANCE. ' [i. the duties cannot be raised in India without departing from this policy of equalisation ; for I believe it will be admitted that nothing could justify the raising of the salt duty in Madras and Bombay beyond the point to which it has recently been advanced. With regard to the last three branches of revenue excise, customs, and stamps little need be said. The present aggregate net revenue obtained from customs and excise does not amount to more than 5,000, OOO/. a year ; and the policy of the Government in recent years has been rather to diminish than to increase these duties. Moreover, one of the most important items in the receipt from customs, namely, that derived from the import duty now imposed on cotton goods, must be regarded as existing on a somewhat precarious tenure. The repeal of this duty has been earnestly demanded by the cotton -manu- facturing interest in England ; and the Government entered into an undertaking that the duty should be repealed as soon as the financial condition of India permitted. It is somewhat difficult to define the exact interpretation to be given to this promise ; but it is evident that its fulfilment will be persistently, and possibly successfully, urged. For when it was recently affirmed on the authority of the Secretary of State that India possessed a balance from which the expenses of the Afghan war could be defrayed, ].] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 37 it was immediately said by the manufacturing interest in Lancashire that if such a balance really existed its appropriation had been beforehand pledged to the repeal of the import duty on cotton goods. As, therefore, this important item of receipt in the customs duties of India will be liable to constant attack from persons possessing great power and political influence in England, and as there is no new excise duty which it has been suggested could be imposed, I think no other conclusion can be arrived at than that not only is there little chance of obtaining additional revenue from customs and excise, but, on the contrary, the Indian Government may, in face of the promises they have made about the cotton duties, find it difficult to maintain the revenue which they now receive. In reference to stamps, it is only necessary to remark that if it were practicable to obtain additional revenue from this source, stamps would certainly not have escaped the watchful eye of the Indian finan- ciers, who, when last year they were creating a famine fund, were apparently so hard pressed that, as previously stated, they were compelled to subject to direct taxation incomes of only four shillings a week. This brief review of the general prospect of the Indian revenue is, I think, sufficient to show not 38 INDIAN FINANCE. [i only that this revenue is comparatively stationary in amount, but that as the revenue is received in silver, and a large part of it has to be devoted to making payments in gold, the real value of this revenue has been, and may continue to be, most seriously diminished by the depreciation of silver. This conclusion as to the inelasticity of the Indian revenue is strongly confirmed by the extremely slow growth of the revenue during the past ten years, from 1868 to 1877. This particular period is selected for comparison because the figures are to be found in the latest number which has been published of the Statistical Abstract of British India. It appears from the table already given that four- fifths of the entire net revenue of India is derived from land, opium, and salt ; and the inelastic character of the Indian revenue is at once shown if the average yield of these three sources of revenue, from 1868 to 1872, is compared with their average yield from 1873 to 1877. Net Land Revenue . . . Net Opium ,, .... Net Salt .... TOTALS .... Average during five years, from 1868 to 1872. Average during five years, from 1873 to 1877. 17,991,951 6,720,672 5,466,370 18,526,451 6,388,555 5,735,936 30,178,993 30,650,942 i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 39 It will be extremely important to keep these con- clusions as to the inelasticity of the Indian revenue steadily in mind when considering, as I now propose to do, the prospects of Indian expenditure. It will not be necessary to examine all the detailed items of this expenditure, for I believe it will be perfectly possible to obtain data from which a correct opinion on the subject can be formed, by directing attention to the four chief branches of expenditure namely, military expenditure, cost of administration, loss by exchange, and interest on loans for the general purposes of government, as well as for public works. No subject connected with Indian finance demands such prompt and anxious attention as the enormous and increasing burden which is thrown upon India by her military expenditure. I have already referred to the fact that, even in a time of peace, the cost of the army to India is upwards of 17,000,000?. a year, 45 per cent, of her entire net revenue of 37,500,000?. being thus absorbed. It seems more- . over that no limit can be placed to the extent to which India may not be exhausted by this drain on her resources. In the financial statement of 1878, allusion was made to the significant fact that the cost of the army being at that time more than 17,000,000?., had increased by "upwards of 40 INDIAN FINANCE. [t. 1, -000,000 J. since 1875-76, and that a large part of this increase was in the expenditure recorded in the home accounts." But serious as seemed to be the danger, at the time when these words were spoken, that India was gradually having thrown upon her a military expenditure which with her stationary revenue she would be absolutely powerless to bear, yet how indefinitely has this danger been increased by the events of the last few months. I shall carefully abstain from saying a single word on the Afghan war which is not most strictly relevant to the subject now under discussion. It is, however, of the utmost importance to the future of India that the consequences involved in carrying out what is known as a " forward " frontier policy should be considered in their financial as well as in their military aspects. It would not be more unreason- able to decide what is the best house for a particular individual to live in, without having any regard to his income, than it is, on a mere consideration of military tactics, to determine to advance the frontier of India, without .first ascertaining the expenditure which such an advance would necessitate. It is particularly worthy of remark that those who have been foremost in advocating a " forward " frontier policy in India have apparently ignored any con- sideration of its cost. The long and able statements I.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 41 of Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Bartle Frere, and Lord Napier of Magdala, contain scarcely a single refer- ence to the financial aspects of the policy which they advocate. On the other hand, nothing can be more precise than the declarations of many of those most competent to express an opinion on the question, that the frontier could not be advanced without causing a most serious permanent addition to the military expenditure of India. Lord Lawrence, speaking of such an advance as is now contemplated, declared that it would " paralyse the finances of India." This was not simply his individual opinion. It has been often said that no Governor-General was ever surrounded by abler men than those who constituted the Council of the Viceroy in 1867, and the despatch which contains this remarkable declaration was signed not only by Lord Lawrence, but by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir W. H. Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst), Sir H. S. Maine, Mr. G. N; Taylor, Mr. W. N. Massey, Sir Henry Durand, and Mr. G. U. Yule. This despatch, moreover, was addressed to Sir Stafford Northcote, who was then Secretary of State for India, and its conclusions were accepted by him and the Government of which he was a member. In view of these facts I think it may be fairly asked, if the expenditure necessary to carry out a particular policy would have paralysed 42 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. the finances of India in 1867, what single circum- stance can be pointed to which would show that such an expenditure would produce less serious con- sequences at the present time ? No one can pretend to say that India's financial condition is more flourish- ing now than it was then. Since 1867 she has had to bear the severe strain of successive famines ; and in 1867 there seemed to be no probability that her finances would be crippled by that depreciation of silver which has been said by one who spoke with the authority of a Finance Minister " to cast a grave shadow on the future of Indian finance." 1 In case it may be objected that these opinions of Lord Lawrence and his Council were expressed before the publication of the memorandum of Sir Henry Eawlinson, who throughout has been the most influential advocate of a "forward" policy, it may be well to point out that after this memorandum had been submitted to all the highest authorities in India, there is not a single word to be found in any of the minutes which they wrote upon it, which can be interpreted as the expression of a more favourable opinion of the financial results which would be produced by advancing the frontier into Afghanistan. Thus Sir R. H. Davies, the Lieutenant- Go vernor of the Punjaub, says : "Sir H. Rawlin son's 1 See speech of Sir W. Muir at Calcutta, April 10, 1876. i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 43 proposals would again plunge us into the ever-shifting sands of Central Asian intrigue at a cost which we cannot afford." Sir Eichard Temple, who has filled many influential positions in India, says : " Under Providence we are trustees for the public funds of India, and we are responsible for the careful applica- tion of them. When there are so many objects of certain usefulness and necessity within India itself on which to spend this money, it is a grave thing to expend such money in foreign regions on objects of doubtful expediency." l The very evil which Sir K. Temple thus anticipated has actually come to pass ; for as Governor of Bombay he has himself been obliged, under the financial pressure caused by the military expenditure in Afghanistan, to per- emptorily order that all public works, nay, even all repairs except those which are absolutely necessary, should be stopped in that Presidency. In order to obtain as distinct an idea as possible of the consequences which may be produced on the financial condition of India by carrying out this " forward " frontier policy, it will be desirable to refer to some estimates which have been made of its cost by those most competent to form an opinion. The late Lord Sandhurst, who was scarcely less distin- guished as a financier than as a soldier, writing in 1 See Afghan Papers, 1878. 44 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. 1875, declared that the occupation of the advanced positions which it is proposed should be held beyond our present frontier, would require an addition to the strength both of the European and native army in India which would permanently increase her military expenditure by more than 3,000, OOOZ. a year. One of the very highest of Indian military authorities, Sir Henry Norman-, has lately declared that if the advance were confined simply to the occupation of Koorrum, Jellalabad or Daka, and Candahar, at least thirteen or fourteen thousand additional troops would be re- quired, one-third of whom would have to be British, and that their cost would be 1, 000, 000 Z. per annum ; this sum, moreover, is independent of the large amount that would have to be expended on fortifications and other military works, and also in subsidising the hill tribes. It is, however, scarcely necessary to refer even to such high authorities as those just quoted. It can no longer be regarded as a matter of surmise that the frontier policy, which is now being pursued in India, will make a most serious permanent addition to her military expenditure. Less than a month had elapsed from the time our troops had crossed the frontier when it was announced that it had been decided to increase the native army by 15,000 men, or about 12 per cent. There is no point connected with the government of India on which there is greater ].] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA.^ r \ 45 V C unanimity of opinion than that it would not be prudent to add to the number of the native army without proportionately increasing the strength of the European army. An increase of 12 per cent, in the European and native army will certainly involve a cost of not less than 1,5 00, 000 . a year. It would therefore appear that two powerful agencies will be brought simultaneously into operation most seriously to augment the military expenditure of India, In the first place, as Sir John Strachey has pointed out, the army, from administrative causes, is becoming more costly in proportion to its numbers ; and, in the second place, the policy which is now being pursued is necessitating a very material addition to the strength of the army. The extremely grave con- sequences involved in such an increase of military expenditure will be shown when considering whether, in the present financial condition of India, there is any probability that such new charges can be met, without imposing taxes intolerably burdensome to the people, or accumulating an indebtedness which will augment the taxation that will ultimately have to be imposed. Passing on to consider the second of the four chief branches of expenditure namely, the general cost of administration the evidence which was given before the Parliamentary Committee on Indian Finance 46 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. affords almost innumerable examples of the striking manner in which the various items which compose this general cost of administration have increased during the last twenty years. A most valuable table was furnished to the Committee by Mr. Gay, the Deputy Comptroller-General of the Finances, in which a comparison is made between the cost of administra- tion in 1871 and 1856, two years before the abolition of the East India Company. From this table it appears that the cost of the government of India, ex- cluding expenditure on the army and public works, has increased during the period referred to from 14,964,8672. to 23,27l,OS2Z. 1 There is scarcely a single item in which there has not been a marked augmentation, and this growth has continued up to the present time. Thus, taking a few instances : 1856-57. 1870-71. Superannuation, retired, and compassionate allowances 424,930 655,969 Stationery and printing .... 128,197 233,675 Medical services 175,714 523,486 I believe it can be shown that a part at least of the large increase in the general cost of administration is undoubtedly due to a want of adequate economy ; but without, for the moment, inquiring what portion of this increase of expenditure could have been 1 See Appendix to Report of Committee on East Indian Finance, 1872, p. 518. i.j THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 47 prevented if India, since the abolition of the East India Company, had been governed with less extravagance, it is obvious that the greater the extent to which this additional outlay has arisen from causes the operation of which cannot be controlled, the more serious is the prospect for the future. If money has been wasted in the past, the continuance of this waste can be pre- vented ; but a remedy cannot be so easily applied if the cost of a particular department becomes greater in consequence, for instance, of a rise in prices. The very detailed evidence which was given before the Indian Finance Committee by Mr. Harrison, Comp- troller-General of India, leaves no room for doubt that a not inconsiderable portion of the increase in the cost of administration between 1856 and 1871 was due to a rise in general prices. There was during this period, and especially at the time of the American Civil War, a very large influx of silver into India. A portion of this silver was sent to purchase cotton at extremely high prices ; and another portion repre- sented capital which was raised in England and sent to India for the construction of railways and other works. At the present time there seem to be indica- tions that the financial position of India may be prejudicially affected by a rise in general prices consequent on a depreciation in the value of silver. Allusion has already been made to the fact that as 48 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. recently as December, 1878, an official paper was published from which it appears that the military expenditure of the present year will be greater than its estimated amount by 330,000/., which is described as " compensation for high price of food." It is evident that if there is a rise in general prices there is scarcely a single department, the cost of which may not, sooner or later, very materially increase. It is not, however, necessary here to pursue the subject further, because the extent to which general prices in India may be affected by the depreciation of silver can be more appropriately considered when discussing the third of the four branches of expenditure namely, that which arises from loss by exchange. In the current financial year the loss by exchange was estimated, when the budget was brought forward, at no less than 3,000,OOOZ. ; but, large as this sum is, the Government, in a revised estimate issued within the last few weeks, calculate that it will be exceeded by 500,000/. In 1876-7 the loss by ex- change, as appears from the table already given, was 1,676,482Z. In 1874-75 the loss by exchange was only about 500,000?. A few years previous to this the loss was so trifling as scarcely to be worth notice ; and in 1870 the amount which was gained by ex- change exceeded, by a few thousand pounds, the amount lost. These figures show, with striking i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 49 distinctness, with what remarkable rapidity this item in Indian expenditure has assumed its present serious proportions. Whether it is more likely that this charge on the Indian revenues will in future years diminish or increase, depends upon so many un- certain conditions that it would not be prudent to make a confident prediction on the subject. The loss by exchange, as previously explained, is primarily due to a depreciation in the value of silver, and one of the chief causes of this depreciation is the large additional supply of silver yielded by the Nevada mines in recent years. In 1875 the aggregate pro- duction of silver throughout the world is estimated to have been about 15,000,000^, more than half of this amount, 8,000,000/. being obtained from the American mines. Twenty years previously namely, between 1852 and 1862 the average annual pro- duction was only from 8,000,OOOZ. to 9,000,0002., and at that time no appreciable quantity came from the United States. Simultaneously with this large in- crease in the supply of silver many circumstances occurred which greatly diminished the demand for silver. Silver was demonetised in Germany; and Germany consequently not only ceased to require the large amount of silver which she had previously used for coinage, but a great portion of the silver in circulation was withdrawn and sold by the German E 50 INDIAN FINANCE. [i Government. Another circumstance which has pro- duced a very important effect in diminishing the demand for silver is the great increase in recent years in the Indian home charges. The value of the products exported from India has always been much in excess of the value of those imported. Until quite lately the balance was liquidated by trans- mitting silver to India. In some years the silver thus sent amounted to more than 10,000,000/. Such a transmission of silver constituted one of the chief sources of the demand for silver, and was indeed one of the most important factors in maintaining its value. Each addition, however, that is made to the home charges diminishes pro tanto this demand for silver. An English merchant, for instance, who has purchased a hundred thousand pounds' worth of Indian produce, instead of sending silver to India to pay for it, purchases bills from the Indian Govern- ment in England, drawn upon the Indian Govern- ment in Calcutta, and the amount of bills which the Government has to sell in England increases, of course, with each increase in the home charges. It is, I think, made sufficiently clear from this brief review of the various circumstances which have pro- duced a depreciation in the value of silver, and a consequent loss by exchange to the Indian Govern- ment, that the value of silver depends upon various i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 51 causes, some of which may be regarded as entirely beyond the power of any Government to control. Thus the value of silver will be to a very consider- able extent determined by the future yield of the American mines. It is impossible to foresee whether the future productiveness of these mines will increase or diminish, and it may of course happen that silver mines may be discovered in other parts of the world. It has, however, been shown that a powerful effect is being exerted at the present time in depreciating the value of silver by the large amount of bills which have to be sold by the Indian Government in Eng- land to provide for the home charges. The amount of the home charges has increased to a most serious extent in recent years. Nothing, moreover, can avert a still further increase, if the expenditure is permitted so habitually to exceed the revenue that money has to be borrowed to make good the deficit. The loans being chiefly raised in England, it is obvious that the interest on these loans represents so much more which has to be transmitted from India to England, or, in other words, so much added to the home charges. It is important to direct particular attention to the influence exerted by each increase in the home charges in adding to the loss by exchange which India has to bear, since under any circumstances it E 2 52 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. would be a cause for apprehension to see a con- stantly augmenting proportion of the revenue of a country not spent in the country itself; but this circumstance becomes more serious when it can be shown that this expenditure of the revenues of India out of India exerts a direct influence in depreciating the value of silver, and in thus lessening the value of all that large part of the Indian revenue which, either permanently or temporarily, is received in the form of a fixed payment made in silver. With regard to the fourth and last branch of expenditure to which I have called attention namely, the interest on loans it is manifest that this subject is closely connected in many of its aspects with the question which has just been considered. The largest portion of the money which has been borrowed in recent years by the Indian Government has been obtained by loans raised in England ; and the additional amount which has to be provided to meet the interest on these loans represents so much added to the home charges. In 1856 the sum annually required to pay the interest on the Indian Debt was 2,190,000?., in 1870-71 it was 3,200,000/., and in 1876-77 it was 4,350,000?. From these figures it appears that in twenty years the annual charge for interest on the Indian Debt increased by about 100 per cent. Nothing can be more certain than that, i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 53 in the present financial condition of India, this in- debtedness must continue steadily to increase. The figures which have already been quoted, conclusively show that the ordinary revenue of India is only barely sufficient to meet the ordinary expenditure, and that consequently, in the words of one who speaks with official authority, every fresh contingency and every new charge involve some addition to the debt of India. Thus, within the last few years, 16, 000,000^ has been spent in famine relief, and nearly the whole of this amount has been obtained by loans, the interest on which involves an annual charge of about 700, OOO/. Money, however, is not borrowed by the Indian Government simply to meet such charges as these ; it has for some time been their settled policy to borrow each year not less than 4, 000, 000 /. for the construction of railways and works of irrigation. . The public works, which are thus constructed out of borrowed money, are no doubt undertaken by the Indian Government with the idea that they will be reproductive, or, in other words, that they will yield a net revenue sufficient to pay the interest on the capital expended. The experience of the past, however, proves that, although it is intended that these public works should be re- productive in the sense just described, yet, regarding the transaction simply as a financial one, the money 54 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. thus spent is really embarked in a most speculative and uncertain investment. Lord Salisbury, speak- ing at Manchester in January 1875, when he was Secretary of State for India, said : " The difficulties which surround the question of irrigation are very great. We can scarcely yet be said to have had one genuine instance of financial success. The irrigating projects that have been carried out, if they have had for their basis the former works of native rulers, have in many instances been a financial success ; but then of course that favourable appearance of the account has been ob- tained by not charging the former expenditure of the native ruler. In those cases where we have begun the projects of irrigation for ourselves we have not reached, I believe, in any one instance, the desired result of a clean balance-sheet." Although I think that Lord Salisbury, in making this sweeping assertion about the unsatisfactory financial results of these irrigation works, somewhat overstated the case, yet it is impossible for any one to deny the absolute correctness of the conclusion which has been officially arrived at, that on the 9,000,000/. which has been spent in recent years on schemes of irrigation in Bengal, the return which is yielded is only ^ per cent. 1 When it is remembered 1 See Speech of Lord G. Hamilton, when Under-Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons, January, 1878. Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii. p. 331. i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. fi5 that every one of these particular works, at the time it was undertaken, was regarded as reproductive, nothing more need be said to show that, however useful or desirable public works may be in India, it is more than probable that they will not yield a return sufficient to meet the interest on the capital ex- pended ; and consequently there will be a deficit which will represent another item of expenditure, another charge upon the revenues of India. It therefore appears that at the present time the indebtedness of India must almost inevitably con- tinue to be augmented by two distinct causes. In the first place, as there is no surplus of ordinary revenue beyond ordinary expenditure, every such contingency as war or famine is certain to lead to the debt being increased ; and, secondly, so long as the present policy is continued of constructing public works out of borrowed money, the loans which are raised for these works represent constant additions to the debt of India. Many other branches of Indian expenditure might be referred to, besides those to which attention has been here directed. I think, however, enough has been said on the subject of revenue and expenditure to establish the following conclusions with regard to the financial position of India : 1. The revenue is characterised by great inelasticity. 56 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. 2. The expenditure has increased in a marked manner in recent years, partly from the general increase in the cost of administration, and partly from a depreciation in the value of silver. 3. The military expenditure is excessive, absorbing 45 per cent, of the entire net revenue of the country ; and this expenditure is likely to be greatly augmented if the frontier of India is advanced, as now seems to be contemplated. 4. A comparatively stationary revenue having to meet an increasing expenditure, it will be necessary sooner or later to add to the taxation of India. If a deficit is temporarily met by borrowing, the money which will have to be provided to pay the interest on the loan must ultimately increase the deficit, which will have to be met by increased taxation. 5. There has already been a most serious increase in the indebtedness of India, amounting in twenty years to 100 per cent. Such being the present condition of Indian finance, scarcely another word need be said to show that if some fundamental change is not promptly introduced, if expenditure is not rigorously curtailed, it will be absolutely impossible to avoid the necessity of im- posing on the people of India a large amount ol additional taxation. In order adequately to appre- ciate the grave consequences which may be produced I.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 57 by an increase of taxation in India, it is essential to bear in mind that the question cannot be regarded as if it were simply a financial one. Between Eng- land and India, in matters of taxation, there is a fundamental difference. If some contingency should occur in England which would render it necessary to obtain . 5,000,000?. by additional taxation, it is perfectty well known how easily the money could be provided. More than 5,000,000?. could be raised by adding twopence in the pound to the income- tax, and by slightly increasing the duty on some article of general consumption, such as tea or spirits. But in India, if it became necessary to raise, not 5,000,000?., but even a smaller sum, say 3,000,000?., by additional taxation, it will scarcely be denied that taxes might have to be imposed which would be regarded by the people as so burdensome as to create a most serious amount of discontent. When ex- amining in detail the present sources of revenue, I believe it was clearly proved that they present so little prospect of increase that, if additional revenue has to be obtained, it will be absolutely necessary to have recourse to some new forms of taxation. The truth of this conclusion is corroborated in a most striking manner by the recent action of the Indian Government. In order to obtain the comparatively trifling sum of 750,000?., the Government came to 58 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. the conclusion, as already stated, that no better course was open to them than to impose a trades licence tax of fivepence in the pound upon all trade incomes, even on those as small as 4=s. a week. As the Government of India must have been fully aware of the discontent which such a tax would inevitably cause, it may be fairly concluded that they would never have sanctioned it, if they could have dis- covered any less unsatisfactory way of obtaining the money required. But if the trades licence tax was regarded, a twelvemonth since, as the best mode of obtaining additional revenue, one of two things must occur if it becomes necessary still further to add to taxation in order to provide for the increasing ex- penditure which is now taking place either the rate of the licence tax must be advanced, or some tax which the Government considered, a twelvemonth since, still more objectionable must be resorted to. It is already rumoured that the income-tax will again be imposed ; and although this tax has often been supported on the ground that it will reach a wealthy class who are least heavily taxed, yet nothing can be more unwise than to ignore the very serious dis- advantages associated with the levying of such a tax in India. It was unequivocally condemned by three successive Indian Finance Ministers. The practical objections to the tax, as distinguished from the i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 59 theoretical arguments that may be adduced in its favour, have been stated with remarkable clearness by Mr. Laing, who for many years served in India as Finance Minister. He has said that he regarded the income-tax as " about as bad and obnoxious a mode of raising revenue as it is possible to imagine in a country like India .... I think that for an Oriental country, and with the Eastern habit of mind, any tax which imposes inquisition into individual means is attended with innumerable evils which are little felt in a country like England." And he further expressed an opinion that, in consequence of the impossibility of preventing abuses connected with the assessment of the tax in a country like India, "for every rupee that comes into the Treasury, two rupees are extorted from the population that have to pay the tax." Probably, however, one of the most weighty objec- tions that can be urged against the imposition of an income-tax in India is that a great machinery of assessment, which it has been shown is liable to the gravest abuse, is brought into active operation over the length and breadth of the country, in order to realise a very trifling financial result. When this tax was last levied in India, it was at the rate of two- pence-halfpenny in the pound, and the net revenue realised was little more than 500,000?. From an income-tax of twopence-halfpenny in the pound in 60 INDIAN FINANCE. [r. England about 5,000,000/. would be obtained, and many small incomes which would be exempted in England would certainly be assessed in India. No fact can bring out with more striking distinctness the remarkable contrast between the wealth of England and the poverty of India. India contains a popula- tion more than seven times as great as that of England, and yet a tax which in England produces 5,000,000/. yields little more than 500,000.1 in India. The amount, therefore, which can be raised by any form of direct taxation in India is, in consequence of the general poverty of the country, extremely small ; and the amount which can be raised by indirect taxa- tion may be regarded as having already nearly reached its utmost possible limits. Nothing more than a very trifling amount can ever be raised by imposing taxes on luxuries which are consumed by the few. The in- direct taxes which are really productive are those which are imposed on articles of general consump- tion. In India the mass of the people are so poor that they use no article which can be taxed except salt, and the taxation on salt has already reached that extreme point when any increase of duty would seriously diminish consumption. Lord Lawrence, in the evidence he gave before the Indian Finance Com- mittee in 1873, had his attention specially directed to the question of obtaining additional revenue by j.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF IND. C increased taxation in India. It will be admitted that, from his long official experience, am from his intimate knowledge of the habits and feelings of the Indian people, no one could speak on such a subject with greater authority than Lord Lawrence, and he unhesitatingly said : " I am not prepared to mention any new sources of revenue which I think it would be politic to make use of. Succession duties, and the tobacco-tax, and so forth, have been constantly talked of; but we went into the subject very carefully, and came to the conclusion, almost unanimously, that it was unwise to introduce such taxes." As since this evidence was given, the suggestion has from time to time been revived that a tobacco duty should be imposed in India, it is desirable to refer to the reasons that were urged against it by Lord Lawrence. He showed that, in order to levy it, it would be necessary either to increase the assessment on the land on which it was grown and this would be interpreted as an augmentation of the land revenue or to levy an excise duty on tobacco. As tobacco is freely grown in all the native states whose boundaries are conter- minous with our own territories, it would become requisite, in order to prevent the importation of tobacco from these states, to establish customs lines extending over thousands of miles. As, moreover, 1 See Report of Committee on East India Finance, 1873, p. 330. 62 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. tobacco is often grown by the Indian people for their own use, it would in all probability be found essential, in order to prevent the evasion of the duty, to make the growth of tobacco a Government monopoly. Scarcely any arrangement that could be adopted would be regarded as more harassing by the people of India. The opinion of other high author- ities against a tobacco duty might be quoted. Thus Sir Donald McLeod, who was for many years Lieu- tenant-Grovernor of the Punjaub, and who was admitted to be one of the ablest financial adminis- trators India ever produced, objected to the tax, and when examined before the Finance Committee directed its attention to an elaborate minute that had been prepared condemnatory of a tobacco duty, by Mr. (now Sir John) Strachey. Unless it can be shown that the description which has been here given of the financial condition of India is inaccurate, I think it must be admitted that the subject is one which should cause the gravest anxiety. But it will probably be said : If the finances of India are in so critical a condition, can nothing be done I Can no effort be made to avert impending embarrass- ment ? Of all the things connected with the financial administration of India that require to be done, nothing is so essential as the immediate recognition of the fact that India has hitherto been governed on i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 63 far too costly a scale. Her position is like that of a landowner who has been living beyond his income. Each year some new mortgage has to be raised to make good the deficiency ; and as the interest on these successive mortgages accumulates, and as there is no reduction but rather an increase in the scale of his expenditure, his estate steadily becomes more burdened with debt. To add to his difficulties, he has borrowed large sums of money to carry out various improvements ; and, however desirable these improvements may be, many of them do not pay the interest on the capital expended. If, under such cir- cumstances as these, a practical man of business were called in to advise what ought to be done, it is obvious that he would insist above all things that expenditure should be reduced. He would probably soon discover that which is usually the case when a man lives beyond his means, that in all directions too much money had been spent. There would be no chance of placing the estate in a secure position, unless its owner were prepared by rigorous retrenchment to bring his expenditure well within his income. Mortgages might then be gradually reduced, and when a surplus had been secured many improvements might be carried out which could not prudently be undertaken when there was a risk that they would burden the property with a still heavier load of debt. The remedy which G4 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. would have to be applied under the circumstances just described not inaccurately represents what is neces- sary to be done in order to place the finances of India in a sound position. For some years the Indian Government has been living beyond its means. In almost every direction too much money has been spent ; and those who have been responsible for this expenditure seem too often to have forgotten that India, instead of being one of the wealthiest, is one of the poorest countries in the world. Page after page might be filled with instances of reckless extrava- gance. At one time a private irrigation company with a capital of a million, the lOOl. shares of which are unsaleable at the nominal quotation of 601., is bought by the Indian Government at par, and in addition a large bonus is given to be distributed among the officials of the company. At another time 175,0001. is expended in building and furnishing a country house for the Governor of Bombay. It is no exaggeration to say that it would not be one half so mischievous to permit a million of English money to be spent in building a mansion for an English minister. It is quite within recent years that the Public "Works Department has assumed its present large proportions. No care apparently has been taken to adjust the supply of highly paid European officers in this de- partment to the demand, and it is now admitted i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 65 that there is a complete block in the higher grades of the service. Employment cannot be found for many who are drawing large salaries from Indian revenues, and it is acknowledged that many are simply holding on to become eligible for pensions. But it is not simply that money has been thus recklessly squandered. It is just the same with a nation as it is with an indi- vidual. Whether or not a particular outlay can be justified depends upon the amount of income out of which it has to be made. Nothing, for instance, may be more appropriate than for a man with 4,OOOZ. a year to live in a house the rent of which is 400/. But if his income is only 1,OOOZ., to live in such a house would be an act of reckless folly. It is no use to dilate upon the advantages which a man would derive from keeping a carriage. If he cannot afford a car- riage, he must submit to the discomfort of a cab. Without an hour's delay the fact should be recognised that India is not in a position to pay for various services- which she receives at their present rate of remuneration. A most important saving might be effected by more largely employing natives in posi- tions which are now filled by highly paid Europeans, and from such a change political as well as financial advantages would result. A single example .will show the great economy which might thus be effected. Mr. Eendel, Consulting Engineer of the East Indian 66 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. Bail way Company and of the Government Bail ways, stated in his evidence before the Public Works Committee in 1878 that three years ago not a single native engine-driver was employed in India ; that on one railway, the East Indian, 150 are now employed, and that the saving thus effected is 15,OOOZ. a year. Mr. Bendel added that the European is paid at least ten times as much as the native driver, and "the native does a lot more work he works longer hours and gives less trouble. We are entirely satisfied with the native drivers." It is, however, scarcely necessary to remark, after what has been said about the present and prospective cost of the Indian army, that excessive military ex- penditure has done more than anything else to create the present financial embarrassment. It is particu- larly to be borne in mind that the great increase in this branch of expenditure has not been brought about by its being necessary for India to maintain a larger army. A few years after the abolition of the East India Company, what is known as the army amalga- mation scheme was carried out in direct opposition to the advice of the most experienced Indian statesmen. India was thus, as it were, bound hand and foot to our own costly system of army administration, with- out any regard apparently being had to the fact that various schemes of military organisation, which may I.] : THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 67 be perfectly suited to a country so wealthy as England, may be altogether unsuited to a country so poor as India. A single example will show to what an extent the pecuniary interests of India may, under the pre- sent system, be sacrificed. When, a few years since, the plan of short service was introduced, it was solely considered as an English question, and not a thought was apparently given to the effect it would have upon India. It need scarcely be said that a more costly scheme for India could hardly have been devised. The shorter the term of service the greater must be the charge for transport ; and the men, after they have completed a short term of service, are a reserve ready at hand for England, but many thousands of miles away from India. I cannot do more on this occasion than thus incidentally allude to the question of army organisation, with the view of showing that, in order to reduce the military expenditure of India, it is not necessary to diminish the numerical strength of the Indian army. It is, however, not to be for- gotten that most distinguished Indian statesmen have declared that it would be far better to incur whatever risks may be involved in the reduction of the Indian army, than to face the danger which is certain to arise from an increase of taxation in India. No man could be less likely than Lord Canning inconsiderately to recommend a reduction in the Indian army, for he F 2 68 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. was Viceroy during the troublous days of the Mutiny ; and yet Lord Canning unhesitatingly affirmed, and the opinion has subsequently been endorsed by Lord Northbrook, that if it were a question between impos- ing new and irritating taxes in India, such as the income-tax, " danger for danger, he (Lord Canning) would prefer to reduce the army." It is well known that an equally strong opinion as to the peril of adding to the taxation of India was expressed by Lord Mayo, a Viceroy who was alike distinguished for prudence, courage, and common sense, He had the sagacity to see that taxation in India could not be regarded as simply a financial question, but that it involved poli- tical consequences of the gravest moment. In a passage which has been often quoted, he said that it was almost impossible to exaggerate the discontent which was produced among all classes in India, both European and native, by the " constant increase of taxation which had for years been going on." Deaf to these warnings, instead of anything effectual having been done to arrest the growth of taxation, the financial position of India now is far more unsatisfactory than it was in Lord Mayo's time. Not only has there been an increase of Imperial taxation new and irritating taxes, such as the licence tax, have been imposed but in recent years the country has been enveloped in a network of local taxation. Lord Northbrook, in i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 69 August, 1878, in presenting an important petition from India in the House of Lords, endorsed the state- ment that " within the last seven years, in Bengal alone, there has been an increase of about a million, and for the whole of India more than three millions, per annum by provincial taxation." When such opinions as these have been expressed by those who must be regarded as the very highest authorities on all questions affecting the government of India, it is not too much to say that the very exist- ence of our rule in India may be gravely imperilled unless the finances of that country are placed in a more satisfactory position. The English people should awaken to the fact that the question is one which vitally concerns themselves as well as the people of India. There is scarcely any event which would bring greater discredit and greater misfortune on England than for the Indian Government to be forced to say : " Our financial exigencies are such that it is impossible to pay our way without coming to England for pecuniary aid." A burden might thus be cast upon English taxpayers which they would find hard to bear, and the consequences to India would be still more disastrous; for from the hour in which she was obliged to seek subventions from England, her virtual insolvency would be proclaimed. Before it is too late, England should resolve that 70 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. such a contingency should be averted. Hitherto, it has unfortunately too frequently happened that the influence of England has been exerted not to save, but to spend, the money of the Indian people. The well-known saying of one who held a high official position is only too true, that " Indian finance has again and again been sacrificed to the exigencies of English estimates." No one can reasonably desire that the English Parliament should perpetually meddle in the details of Indian administration. It should, however, never be forgotten that when the East India Company was abolished, the English people became directly responsible for the govern- ment of India. It cannot, I think, be denied that this responsibility has been so imperfectly discharged, that in many respects the new system of government compares unfavourably with the old. Figures have already been quoted to show to what a remarkable extent the cost of administration has increased since the East India Company was abolished. There was at that time an independent control of expenditure which now seems to be almost entirely wanting. It was, no doubt, intended, when the government of India by the Act of 1858 was transferred from the Company to the Crown, that the Council of the Secretary of State should exercise the same control over Indian expenditure, as had formerly been i.] THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF INDIA. 71 exercised by the Directors of the Company and by the Court of Proprietors. But gradually the influence and control of the Council have been so completely whittled away that it is now openly declared by a Secretary of State that he can spend the revenues of India, beyond her frontiers, without obtaining the consent, or even bringing the subject under the notice, of his Council. Whether or not the power thus claimed is really conferred upon him by the Act of 1858, and by Acts which have subse- quently been passed, raises questions which I can- not attempt to enter upon here. The whole subject, however, of the inadequacy of the control now exercised on the expenditure of the revenues of India, is one that urgently demands the most careful in- vestigation. Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the present state of things. When the Secretary of State desires to avoid responsibility, he can shelter himself behind his Council ; when he desires to act, untrammelled by their control and unhampered by their advice, he can ignore them as completely as if they did not exist. 1 In attempting to direct attention to the present financial condition of India, I am chiefly desirous 1 The inadequacy of the control exercised over the financial adminis- tration of India by the Act of 1858, and the Acts subsequently passed, has been referred to in the Introduction to this volume. 72 INDIAN FINANCE. [i. to show how important are the issues involved, and how urgently the subject demands prompt considera- tion. Englishmen of all political parties are alike anxious that no misfortune should befall our Indian Empire. Opinions may differ as to the importance to be attributed to certain dangers with which she is sometimes said to be threatened ; but no one can deny the reality of the peril which will be brought upon her by financial embarrassment ; and the day, I believe, is not far distant when, with common consent, it will be said that those are the wisest governors of India who act steadily upon the maxim of a great statesman, that " finance is the key of England's position in India." II. THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 1 IN the previous Essay, I endeavoured to describe the financial condition of India, and I hope to be able in the following remarks to show the additional light which has been thrown on the present financial condition of that country by the budget which has been lately introduced at Calcutta, and by the financial arrangements which it is proposed to carry out both in England and India during the present year. The simple announcement that an exception- ally large addition to the indebtedness of India is to be accompanied not by an increase, but by a remission of taxation, is sufficient to show the extreme gravity of the financial situation in India. During the current year it is proposed to raise a 4j per cent, loan of 3,500,000/. 2 in India; the 1 May, 1879. 2 The amount of the loan to be raised in India is 5,000,0007., and not, as here represented, 3,500,000?. It appears, however, from the budget statement for 1879-80, recently issued at Calcutta (see para- graph 268), that about 1,500,0002. of the 5,000,0007. which it is proposed to borrow is "needed to discharge, on the 1st of May next, the untransferred portion of the 5-| per cent, loan," and, 74 INDIAN FINANCE. [IT. Government have already announced their intention to introduce into the House of Commons a Bill which will authorise the Indian authorities to borrow 10,000,000^ in England ; and 2,000,000/. is to be advanced, free of interest, by England to India, as a contribution towards the expenses of the Afghan war. It therefore appears that in a single year it is proposed either to borrow, or to take authority to borrow, no less a sum than 15,500,000?., an amount which represents more than one-tenth of the entire national debt of India. If it were possible to obtain additional revenue by fresh taxation, no one can suppose that the Indian Government would be so improvident as to sanction proposals which will cause such a large addition to be made to Indian indebtedness, without making any attempt to supply, by increased taxation, a portion of the deficit which has to be met. It may, therefore, be concluded that, in the opinion of the Indian Government, the extreme limit of taxation has now been reached in that therefore, the "net amount thus called for is only 3,500,OOOZ." I am so anxious not to overstate the financial exigencies of India, that I accept this conclusion, although it is important to bear in mind, as appears from the same paragraph of the budget statement, that the necessity of raising a still larger loan to meet this year's heavy deficit has only been avoided by resorting to the temporary expedient of providing 1,200,000. "from the public balances." 1 This amount, after a strong remonstrance from the House of Commons, was eventually reduced to 5,000,000^. ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 75 country, and that, unless expenditure can be reduced, there is no margin from which to make any provision for such contingencies as war and famine, which we are officially told are certain to recur. Constant borrowing must consequently be regarded as the normal condition of Indian finance. Although it may be thought that nothing can exceed the seriousness of the state of things thus disclosed, the outlook for the future becomes even much worse when it is seen that, in the midst of this embarrassment, the Indian Government are surrounded with influences that compel them to surrender a portion of the revenue, which they themselves admit is altogether inadequate to satisfy the demands now made upon it. The import duties on cotton goods are, during the present year, to be partly remitted, at a cost to the Indian revenue of about 150,000^., which next year will be increased to 20 0,0 00 1. No one for a moment will even pre- tend to say that, in the present state of Indian finance, the idea would have been entertained of remitting these duties if the finances of India were administered in the interest of that country alone. The partial remission of these duties has been defended on the ground that they are protective in their character, and that it is wrong for free-trade England to sanction, in any form, the continuance 76 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. of a protective duty. It is not, I believe, difficult to show that these duties are much less protective than is ordinarily supposed. It is important to bear in mind that in the Bombay mills, which are said to enjoy protection at the expense of Lancashire, the manufacture is almost entirely confined to the coarser sorts of cotton goods, upon which, when imported, no duty is imposed. But even if it is admitted that the import duties on cotton goods are as protective as they are alleged to be by the representatives of the manufacturing interest in England, it would be necessary, in order to justify the repeal of these duties, to show either that India could spare the revenue which they yield, or that it could be obtained in some other less objectionable form. When it is remembered that not a single year passes without a most serious addition being made to the indebtedness of India, it at once becomes evident that, as India has no surplus, she cannot surrender a single shilling of revenue without an equivalent amount being added to her debt. As long, therefore, as the state of Indian finance is such that she not only has no surplus, but has annually to borrow in order to make good a heavy deficit, it is impossible to justify any remission of taxation, unless the sacrifice of revenue which such a remission involves is to be compensated for from some other ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 77 source. No one, so far as I am aware, has suggested new taxation, by which it would be practicable to obtain the revenue which is yielded by these cotton duties. In considering questions of taxation nothing can be more unwise than to conclude that that particular tax must be the best which is most in accord with the principles of economic science. The tastes, the habits, and the wishes of the people on whom the tax is to be imposed ought to be most carefully considered, and I believe it will not be denied that of all the taxes which are levied in India, there are none to which the people of that country feel so little objection as the import duties on cotton goods. It is, moreover, particularly worthy of remark, that the repeal of these duties must certainly tend to create greater inequality in the incidence of taxation in India. It will be generally admitted that, owing to the difficulty of imposing taxes which reach the wealthy classes, an unduly large part of the revenue of India is contributed by those who are extremely poor. As the cotton duties are now almost entirely imposed on the finer sorts of goods, which are chiefly consumed by the rich, it is obvious that the repeal of these duties would reduce the amount of taxation paid by the wealthy, and would consequently still further increase the inequality in the taxation borne by the poor. 78 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. It is sometimes urged that the real objections to these duties are not adequately understood by the people of India, and that they fail to appreciate the loss that is caused to them by their continuance. But precisely the same remark holds true with regard to every country in which a protectionist tariff is main- tained. The people of Canada, for instance, appear to be altogether insensible to the injury which they are about to inflict upon themselves, by the more onerous protective duties with which they seem determined to fetter their commerce. But even if India could afford the sacrifice of revenue which is involved in the reduction of the cotton duties, it is of the first importance most carefully to inquire whether there are not other taxes in India which could with greater advantage be reduced. It is now universally acknowledged, that no circumstance connected with the financial condition of India is so serious as the increased burden which is imposed upon her through the loss by exchange. It need scarcely be remarked that, in order to bring about a more favourable state of exchange, it is necessary either to increase the remittances which other countries have to make to India, or to diminish the remittances which India has to make abroad. If her export trade should increase, there will be a larger amount to remit to India. There will consequently be a greater demand for bills ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 79 on India, and the price of these bills will advance ; in other words, the exchange will become more favourable. At the present time an export duty is levied on rice and some other articles of Indian produce. If these export duties were repealed, the export trade of India might receive an important stimulus, and an influence would thus be brought into operation to diminish the loss by exchange which she now has to bear. The policy which is now being pursued by the Indian Government will produce an exactly opposite result. The reduction of the cotton duties will increase the im- ports into India. The amount, therefore, which India will have to remit to other countries will be propor- tionately increased ; the demand for bills on India will consequently be diminished; and thus, at the very time when the loss by exchange is causing a most severe strain upon the finances of India, the Indian Government adopts a policy which not only involves an indefensible sacrifice of revenue, but which directly tends to create a still more unfavourable exchange. Greatly as the remission of the cotton duties is, for the reasons just adduced, to be deprecated, there are other objections of a much more weighty kind to be urged against this needless sacrifice of revenue. The most prominent feature in the Indian Budget of 1878 was the formation of what was described as a famine fund. The present Finance Minister, Sir John 80 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. Strachey, came to the conclusion, after a careful and exhaustive review of the state of Indian finance, that, the ordinary revenue of that country being barely sufficient to meet its ordinary expenditure, there was no margin left from which any provision could be made for such contingencies as war and famine. During the past twelve years there have been four famines in India ; and since 1873 the famine in Bengal and the recent famine in Southern India have entailed an expenditure of 16,000,000?. As there was no margin of surplus revenue from which this large expenditure could be provided, the money had to be obtained by borrowing, and the debt of India has been proportionately increased. In order to prevent the recurrence of such a state of things, it would obviously be necessary, in years in which there were no famines, to secure a surplus that would enable a fund to be formed, from which the money required for the relief of famine could be provided. After calculating the amount of famine expenditure during the period above mentioned, Sir John Strachey came to the conclusion that, in order to establish a fund adequate for the purposes intended, it would be necessary to obtain an additional revenue of about 1,500,000?. a year. In order to provide this extra revenue, a licence tax of about 2 per cent, waa imposed, and this tax was made to reach those who IL] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 81 earned no more than four shillings a week. New cesses were levied in Bengal and other parts of India ; and although the salt tax was reduced in the parts of the country which paid these new cesses, an addi- tional revenue was raised from salt, and the people of Madras and Bombay, who were just recovering from the effects of a most terrible famine, found the salt duty increased by no less than 40 per cent. It was so generally admitted that, in the present condition of India, nothing but extreme necessity could justify this new taxation, that the Government lost no opportunity of declaring that the money which was to be obtained from this new and excep- tionally burdensome taxation, was to meet a national emergency, and that it should be scrupulously devoted to the relief of famine. Nothing could be more specific than the following declaration of the Viceroy : " The sole justification of the increased taxation which has just been imposed upon the people of India for the purpose of insuring their Empire against the worst calamities of future famine, so far as such an insurance can now be practically provided, is the pledge we have given that a sum not less than a million and a half sterling, which exceeds the amount of the additional contributions obtained from the people for this purpose, shall be annually applied to it. ... We have pledged ourselves not to spend one 82 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. rupee of the special resources thus created upon works of a different character." When the nature of the new taxation which was imposed upon the people of India is considered, a most ready assent must be given to the opinion thus expressed by the Viceroy, that the "sole justification" for the taxation was to be found in the purpose to which it was to be applied. The trades licence tax is an income tax in its most aggravated form, for it is an income tax from which every official and pro- fessional income is exempted. 1 doubt if the English people would consider the gravest emergency to justify the imposition of an income tax which would fall upon almost every artisan, and would leave un- touched the entire official class, all the officers in the army, and all professional men. The salt duty had, before its recent increase, been one of the heaviest imposts ever levied on a first necessary of life. And yet the starving millions of Madras and Bombay, when they were scarcely able to raise their heads from the terrible affliction that had visited them, were told that the salt duty was to be increased by 40 per cent. Under these circumstances it can be readily under- stood how necessary it was deemed by the Viceroy to endeavour to allay discontent, by giving the most distinct promises language could convey, that not " one rupee " of the money which was thus collected from ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 83 the poorest of the Indian people should be devoted to any other purpose than providing a fund which might relieve their future necessities. The new taxes have been collected, and not a shilling of the money which they yield has been devoted to the purposes to which they were pledged. A few months after the famine fund was called into nominal existence, the invasion of Afghanistan was undertaken, and the fund was absorbed in defraying the expenses of this military expedition. It will perhaps be said that the whole of the famine fund has not been devoted to this purpose, and that a portion of it is to be devoted to the partial remission of the cotton duties ; for if these famine taxes had not been imposed, the Indian Government would not have thought that they could possibly spare the 200,OOOZ. which the reduction of these duties will cost the revenue of India. But whatever conclusion may be adopted as to the precise manner in which the money which was intended to create a famine fund has been spent, there can be no question that not a fraction of the new taxation which was imposed for famine purposes has been devoted to this object. The pledge which was made to the Indian people has been alike broken, whether the money which they have been called upon to contribute has been expended for military purposes, or has been spent in enabling the Government in part G 2 84 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. to satisfy the demands which have been so persis- tently pressed upon them by the cotton-manufacturing interest in England. It may not improbably happen that, in discussions on Indian finance, the famine fund will be referred to as if it still had an existence. Financial complexity has apparently for some people a strange fascination ; and there are those who always seem to cling to the belief, that a considerable improvement can be effected in the finances both of a nation and of an individual by a dexterous arrangement of figures. Nothing can be more precise than the declarations which were made when the famine fund was established, that a part of the additional revenue yielded by the new taxation should be devoted to the reduction of debt; The reductions in the debt which would thus be effected in the years when there were no famines would, it was supposed, be equivalent to the addition that had to be made to the debt when famines had to be relieved ; and consequently, over a series of years, the relief of famine would involve no increase in the indebtedness of India. It is obvious that the whole of this arrangement at once falls to the ground when, as is the case during the present year, although there is no famine, the necessities of the Indian Government are such that, instead of the debt of India being diminished, it is proposed to make to that debt an ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 85 unprecedented^ large addition. It may be urged that India, in the present state of her finances, cannot possibly do without the additional revenue which is obtained from the taxes imposed for the creation of a famine fund. But if this be so, then it is far better at once to recognise the fact that these new taxes have o not been applied to the creation of a famine fund, but that they are required for the general purposes of the Indian Government ; and amongst these purposes it is particularly to be noted that the one which is considered of most pressing urgency is to reduce the import duties on cotton goods. Although the amount of revenue which will be lost through the reduction of the cotton duties is com- paratively small, yet it is almost impossible to over- estimate the importance of the principles involved in this particular financial measure. It at once suggests the inquiry, To what extent ought the interests of England to control the finances of India ? Not only, as has been already shown, have the most positive promises which the Viceroy made to the Indian people been disregarded, but I think it will scarcely be denied that a resolution which, at the instance of the Government, was unanimously passed by the House of Commons, has been entirely set aside. On the 10th of July, 1877, a motion was brought forward demanding the immediate repeal of the cotton duties. 86 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. The Government resisted it, on the ground that India could not at that time afford such a sacrifice of revenue ; and the truth of this was so generally recognised that, without one dissentient voice, it was affirmed that the repeal of these duties should be postponed until the financial condition of India became more satisfactory. Is it possible to point to one single circumstance, which would justify the con- clusion that the finances of India are in a more satisfactory state now than they were two years since, and that India can now afford a sacrifice of revenue which she could not afford then ? It is repeatedly said that the loss by exchange has done far more than anything else to cause embarrassment to Indian finance. In 1877 the loss by exchange was estimated at about 1,676,482Z. ; during the present year it is calculated that India will lose by exchange 3, 9 00, 000?. In 1877 the amount added to the debt of India was 6,380,000?. ; during the present year the Indian Government desires to borrow, or take authority to borrow, no less than 15,500,000?. It is, however, needless to multiply examples to show that if in 1877 India could not afford to sacrifice any existing source of revenue, she is in a far worse position to afford such a sacrifice at the present time. On all sides opinions are now expressed about the state of Indian finance, which only a short time since would have been it.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 87 v,- described as the idle forebodings of sensational alarmists. The following is a description of the budget of the present year by one who certainly cannot be regarded as a prejudiced critic of the Indian Government : "The Indian press and the public continue to discuss the Financial Statement, and all classes, both Euro- pean and native, show singular unanimity in condemn- ing it, all sides describing it as the most melancholy, the most disheartening, and the most un statesman- like ever issued by the Government since the budget system was introduced." 1 Although the opinion may be readily endorsed that nothing can be more unstatesmanlike than to sur- render revenue at the very time when an exceptionally large deficit has to be met by increased borrowing, yet I think it would be unfair to single out Sir John Strachey for special censure, and to assume that he, being Finance Minister, is solely responsible for the financial arrangements which he has had to propose. It is probably impossible for any one who is outside the Government properly to appreciate the difficulties with which the Finance Minister has had to contend. One of his predecessors in office not many years since bitterly complained of the " extent to which Indian 1 Times Calcutta correspondent, in the Times of the 24th of March, 1879. 88 INDIAN FINANCE. [11. finance was often sacrificed to the exigencies of English estimates ; " and, if there were no occasion for official reserve, the present remission of the duties on cotton goods would not improbably be referred to as an example of the " extent to which Indian finance has to be sacrificed to the exigencies of English " politics. Not only, therefore, would it be unfair to concentrate all the blame either upon Sir John Strachey or the authorities at Calcutta, but I think it would be unjust to hold the present Indian Govern- ment, whether at Calcutta or in London, solely responsible for the existing embarrassment in Indian finance. Some of the causes which have brought about embarrassment have no doubt been solely the creation of the present Government. They alone are respon- sible for the addition to the strength of the army, and the consequent increase* in military expenditure, which are said to be rendered necessary by the attempt to secure a more " scientific " frontier for our Indian empire. There are, however, many causes that have contributed to bring upon India her present financial difficulties, which came into operation long before the present Government took office. Thus it will be generally admitted that, in order to place the finances of India on a more satisfactory basis, it is above all things essential to reduce her present exces- sive military expenditure, which absorbs no less than ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 89 45 per cent, of her entire net revenue. Although this expenditure must be increased by the addition to the strength of the army to which reference has just been made, yet, in order to effect any important reduction in the cost of the Indian army, it will be necessary fundamentally to change the present military system, and to undo a great part of the work which was done when, under the auspices of Lord Palmerston's Government, and in spite of the remonstrances of every Indian statesman of experience, the army amalgamation scheme was carried out, and India was compulsorily made a partner in all the costly military arrangements of England. Next to military expendi- ture it will, I think, be acknowledged that there is no question which more urgently demands immediate attention than the large outlay on public works which has been continued for many years in India. It cannot, however, be said that the present Government is more responsible than its predecessors for the policy, which has proved financially so disastrous, of borrowing large sums of money each year for the construction of public works, which, though called at one time " reproductive," and at another time " remu- nerative/' seldom, as is now shown by official returns, repay even a small part of the interest on the capital expended. Then again, the present unfavourable exchange is due to many causes, some of which at 90 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. least are altogether beyond the control of the Indian Government As already explained, an unfavourable exchange is a necessary accompaniment of a deprecia- tion in the value of silver ; and the present great depreciation in the value of silver is partly due to the discovery of new silver mines in the United States, to a falling off in the demand for silver consequent on a demonetisation of silver by Germany, and to the restriction of the silver coinage in those countries which have joined what is known as the Latin Union. Although the present unfavourable state of the Indian exchange is no doubt in part to be attributed to the causes just mentioned, yet as the rate of exchange is intimately connected with the amount which India has to remit to England, each addition to the home charges must make the exchange more unfavourable ; and these home charges have been permitted to increase, not under one, but under successive Indian Governments. If for no other reason, I should think it particu- larly important fully to acknowledge that the present Government is not solely responsible for the existing condition of Indian finance, because I believe it is almost impossible to exaggerate the harm that may be done, if, in attempting to remedy the present state of things, the subject is approached in a spirit of political partisanship. It is scarcely necessary to ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 91 remark that when the financial condition of a country is such as that of India at the present time, it is impossible for her finances to be placed in a more satisfactory position unless a policy of rigorous re- trenchment is carried out with the most persistent determination. Any government that is prepared to do this is certain to have to bear a load of un- popularity. Expenditure cannot be curtailed, salaries cannot be reduced, and unnecessary offices abolished, without producing a great amount of discontent, and without bringing into active operation the keen oppo- sition of those who consider that they have a vested interest in the continuance of the present system. Far, therefore, from desiring in the slightest degree to add to the difficulties which have now to be en- countered by those who are responsible for the finances of India, no effort should be spared to give every possible assistance to any ministry that is willing at once to frankly recognise the fact that India has hitherto been far too expensively governed, and that consequently it is necessary at all hazards to reduce expenditure by adopting a policy of the strictest economy. The financial proposals embodied in the budget of the present year unfortunately afford scarcely any indication that the extreme gravity of the present financial situation is adequately appre- ciated either by the Government at Calcutta or by 92 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. the Secretary of State. With the single exception of a redaction of 1,000,000/. in the outlay on public works, it appears that no serious attempt is to be made to effect retrenchment in any other branch of expenditure. Enormous as have been the military charges during the last few years, there is only too much reason to fear that these charges are more likely to increase than to diminish. The Afghan war is estimated to cost 2,600,000/., and I believe those military and financial authorities, on whose judgment most reliance is to be placed, unanimously agree that this is far too low an estimate of cost. Moreover, it is to be remembered that when this estimate was made it was assumed that the war was virtually concluded, and that our occupation of territory would be confined within, comparatively speaking, very narrow limits. The Prime Minister, speak- ing in the House of Lords (13th of February, 1879), said: " Her Majesty's Government have the satisfaction of feeling that the object of their interference in Afghanistan has been completely accomplished. . . . We have secured the object for which the expedition was undertaken, and we have obtained that frontier which we hope and be- lieve will render our Empire invulnerable." There seems little chance that this confident expectation will be realised. As long as active operations have ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 187P. 93 to be undertaken, a heavy outlay must be incurred, and, far from the war having been concluded, scarcely a day elapses without the news of some movement in the field, and of skirmishes more or less important. The negotiations with Yakoob Khan do not appa- rently promise so speedy a termination of the war as was expected; for it is now (May, 1879) stated that the Viceroy and his advisers consider it to be not improbable that, in order to bring Yakoob Khan to terms, it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to occupy Cabul. If such an onward movement is undertaken, it is obvious that all estimates of the cost of the war which were based on the calculation that peace was near at hand, and that our occupation of territory would, as was said by the Prime Minister in his speech already quoted, be confined to re- taining possession of the " three highways which connect Afghanistan with India," will have to be entirely modified. An advance on Cabul might lead to a prolongation of the war, and might involve an expenditure so large that, in order to defray it, a very considerable portion of the 15, 500,000 1, which the Indian Government propose to take authority to borrow during the present year, would have to be- expended. It is therefore most important to bear in mind that, whatever may be the reasons which are put forward to justify the exceptionally large 94 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. borrowing powers the Indian Government seek to obtain, almost the entire proceeds of the loans which they desire to have authority to raise may have to be devoted to meet the expenses of continued military operations in Afghanistan. I desire, however, on the present occasion not to discuss the subject from this point of view, because I think it is very important carefully to consider the reasons which are adduced by the Government in support of their financial proposals. The reduction of the cotton duties having been already referred to, it will only be necessary to direct attention to the three different ways in which the Indian Government propose to borrow money during the present year. As already stated, a 4^ per cent, loan of 3,500,OOOZ. is to be raised in India. Parlia- ment is asked to give authority to the Indian Government to borrow 10,000, 000 /. in England, and 2, 000, 000 . is to be advanced, free of interest, by England to India, as a contribution towards the expenses of the Afghan war. Before the announce- ment was made that it was the intention of the Government to take authority to borrow the ex- ceptionally large amount of 10,000,000^. in England, it was supposed that the entire borrowing opera- tions of the year would be confined to raising a loan of 3,500,0002. in India. For some years past IT.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 95 successive Secretaries of State have agreed that it is most important, both on political and financial grounds, not to increase the obligations of India in England. In a despatch to the Government of India, in which Lord Salisbury reviewed the budget of 1874, he declared it to be indispensable that none but works which were likely to prove remunerative should be constructed from borrowed money, and he insisted, with the utmost emphasis, that the money required for their construction should be obtained by loans raised in India and not in England. No one ques- tioned the soundness of this policy, for the fact was beginning to be recognised that from political con- siderations it was not prudent to be constantly adding to the obligations incurred by India abroad. Upon financial grounds it was agreed to be equally im- portant not to increase the Indian debt in England, because each addition to this debt, by increasing the amount which India had to remit to England, tended to produce a more unfavourable rate of exchange. Jt is obvious that the principles which were thus to regulate the future financial administration of India have been completely set aside, when, in a single year, it is sought to obtain authority to borrow in England more than twice as much as it is proposed to borrow in India. So far as can be ascertained, the only reasons which are alleged in explanation of this 96 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. departure from the policy which was so distinctly enunciated by Lord Salisbury, are that it may be found difficult to borrow in India the whole amount required ; and, secondly, that it is necessary to raise a large loan in England, in order that the Govern- ment may have a reserve to fall back upon, and so be enabled to withhold their bills from the market when the exchange is unfavourable. It will at once be seen that it is impossible for the Government to put forward the first of these pleas, without virtually endorsing all the most unfavourable opinions that have been expressed with regard to the state of Indian finance. If it is difficult for the Government to borrow comparatively so small a sum as 3,500,OOOZ. from the people of India themselves, it is evident either that they are too poor to lend, or that they are unwilling to entrust their savings to the State. Again, it must be borne in mind that those who lend one year have probably so much less to lend the next year, and consequently, if it is now found difficult to borrow 3,500,OOOZ. in India, there will be still greater difficulty in borrowing a similar amount hereafter. Unless, therefore, something is immediately done to place the finances of India on a sounder basis, the deficits which will have to be annually met must necessarily, in an increasing proportion, be made good by loans raised in England. ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1870. 97 At the present time there appears unfortunately little ground for hope that there will be any diminution in the amount of the Indian deficits. As already stated, it appears that no attempt is to be made to carry out in any of the spending departments such a policy of rigorous economy as India urgently needs ; and, serious as is the loss which she now has to bear in consequence of an unfavourable exchange, I believe. it can be shown that it is only too probable that the financial proposals which are now brought forward will, if they are carried out, exercise a very material influence in making the exchange even more un- favourable than it now is. If 10,000,000^. is borrowed in England, the financial position of India may no doubt for a time be made to wear a somewhat improved appearance. But the improvement will be just as unreal as if an embarrassed landowner, in order to meet his pressing obligations, raised another mortgage on his estate. It cannot be too persistently pressed on those who have to administer Indian finance, that each addition which is made to the debt of India in England must increase the amount which has to be transmitted, in the form of interest, from India to England. If, therefore, by devoting the proceeds of a loan to meet the obligations of India in England, the amount of bills on India which the Secretary of State has to sell in London H 98 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. is diminished, the relief can only be temporary ; the loss by exchange is diminished this year only to be increased in future years. In defence of such a policy it is said, "something may happen." The Government at Calcutta seem to derive the greatest encouragement from the fact, that they have been informed that the Secretary of State and his council are taking the relative value of gold and silver into their consideration; and this is apparently regarded as such a hopeful omen for the future, that revenue is sacrificed at the very time when a great amount of additional indebtedness is being incurred. The relative value of gold and silver is determined by precisely the same laws as those which regulate the value of any other products. If, compared with gold, there is a large increase in the supply of silver, accompanied by a considerable falling off in the demand, a Secretary of State is just as powerless to arrest a depreciation in the value of silver as he is to stop the flow of the tide. It has sometimes been suggested that an Act of Parliament should be passed to fix the relative value of gold and silver, by declaring that so many rupees should be always worth a sovereign. Such a proposal is not less unreasonable than it would be to enact that, whatever the seasons might be, whether the harvest was good or bad, a sack of wheat should always exchange for ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 99 a ton of coal. Such tampering with values can produce no other result than, by creating confusion and spreading a feeling of distrust, to aggravate the evils which it is sought to remedy. If silver becomes depreciated, there is only one way of restoring its value, and that is by acting either on the supply or the demand. In consequence of the large amount of silver, variously estimated at from 15,000,OOOZ. to 20,000,000^., that has been accumulated in Germany since silver was demonetised in that country, the supply of silver which can now be brought into the market depends to a considerable extent upon the German Government. The in- fluence, however, which can thus be exerted upon the supply of silver must be regarded as temporary and accidental. The supply of silver is determined by precisely the same natural laws as those which regulate the supply of any other similar commodity. If new and more productive mines are discovered, the supply of silver will increase. If, however, the value of silver becomes depreciated, the profit obtained from existing mines will diminish, and the supply will consequently decrease. It, therefore, appears that it would be alike unwise and futile to make any attempt to regulate the supply of silver. So far as the supply of silver de- pends upon the action of the German Government, H 2 100 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. we have, obviously, no power to exercise any control. Whatever may be our wishes on the subject, Ger- many will treat the disposal of her silver as a purely commercial transaction, and will bring her silver into the market at whatever time she thinks she will be able to sell it to the most advantage. It seems only too probable that the first effect of the policy which the Indian Government now seem anxious to carry out, may be to enable Germany to dispose of a large portion of her silver at a better price than she is now able to obtain. As already stated, if an Indian loan of 10,000,OOOZ. is raised in England, the Government will be able for a time to withhold their council drafts from the market ; the rate of exchange will improve, and the price of silver will advance. Germany will not be slow to take advantage of this advance ; she will at once bring a large quantity of silver into the market ; the price of silver will again fall ; and the chief effect of the loan will have been to enable Germany to sell a portion of her silver on better terms, while India will be left to meet her increased obligations with the price of silver still further reduced, and the exchange made more unfavourable than before. Although, therefore, from the considerations just adduced, it appears to be of the first importance not ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 101 to attempt artificially to regulate the supply of silver, yet much can undoubtedly be done by Government action to affect the demand for silver, and con- sequently to influence its value ; and I believe it can be shown that the Indian Government can exert a special influence on the demand for silver. Allusion has already been made to the heavy duty, amounting in some instances to 10 per cent., that is imposed on so important an article of Indian export as rice. If the state of Indian finance permitted this duty to be repealed, the export trade of India might be considerably developed, and the extra amount which would be required to pay for the additional quantity of produce exported would proportionately increase the demand for silver. But this is by no means the only way in which the demand for silver may be influenced by the action of the Indian Govern- ment. With regard to various proposals which are from time to time brought forward to deal with the Indian currency, it may be remarked that they one and all labour under the fatal defect, that instead of increasing, they would materially diminish the demand for silver, and thus ultimately lower its value. It has, for instance, been suggested that a gold currency should take the place of silver in India, and that the amount of the silver coinage should be restricted. But if these measures were carried out, 102 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. it is evident that one of the largest of the existing sources of demand for silver would be to a great extent closed, and silver might become indefinitely more depreciated in value than it is even at the present time. As previously explained, the chief cause of the fall ing- off in the Indian demand for silver arises from the curtailment of her export trade, and from the constant increase in the amount which India has annually to remit for payments in England. The only legitimate method, therefore, which can be adopted to increase her demand for silver is to stimulate her export trade, and to diminish the amount of the home charges. Unfortunately, the course which is now being taken by the Indian Government, instead of diminishing, will seriously augment these home charges. If sanction is given to the proposal to raise a loan of 10,000,000/. in England, provision will have to be made to pay the interest on this loan ; an additional sum of at least 400,OOOZ. a year will consequently have to be trans- mitted from India to England, and the demand for silver will be lessened by this amount. Again, the 2,000,000/. which during the present year is to be advanced by England to India to assist her in defraying the expenses of the Afghan war will give her some temporary relief, but the relief can only be temporary ; it will add to her difficulties in the ii.] THE INDIAN BUDGET OF 1879. 103 future, because, as the money advanced is to be repaid in seven equal annual instalments, India will, during each of the next seven years, in addition to the other home charges, have to transmit about 300,000/. Such an arrangement only affords another example of the many that may be given to show that at the present time the difficulties of Indian finance, instead of being fairly faced, are merely being trifled with ; but it cannot be too distinctly stated that, however heavily and recklessly the future may be discounted, a day of reckoning must inevitably come. Unless all considerations of prudence are to be com- pletely set aside, it is evident that as the excessive amount of the home charges is embarrassing Indian finance by causing the serious loss by exchange, the greatest care should be taken, not only that another shilling should not be added to these charges, but that effectual measures should at once be adopted to diminish their amount. It is often stated that the home charges do not admit of any important reduction, because, to a great extent, they represent payments for liabilities which have already been incurred. Thus, it is said, the interest must be paid on money which has been borrowed, and faith cannot be broken with those who are entitled to pensions. No one, of course, can be so unreasonable as to suggest that a policy of 104 INDIAN FINANCE. [n. repudiation should be adopted, and that India should not meet the obligations which have been incurred on her behalf. Such considerations as these, however, do not in the slightest degree affect the importance of preventing in the future that which has happened in the past. Nothing can more conclusively show the peril involved in adding to the debt of India, than the fact that the interest which she has annually to pay on the debt already incurred imposes on her a burden which she finds it difficult to bear. The pensions and allowances which she has undertaken to grant must of course be paid ; but if these pensions and allow- ances throw upon her a charge altogether dispropor- tionate to her resources, an irresistible argument is at once supplied in favour of a fundamental change in the system. Taking the figures of the actual expen- diture in 1876-77, the latest year for which they are available, it appears that no less an amount than 2,800,000?. of the revenues of India has annually to be paid in England in pensions, and furlough, com- passionate, and absentee allowances. The real signi- ficance of this drain upon the resources of the country will be understood, when it is remembered that her entire net or available revenue is not more than 38,000,000?. The home charges for the