]!(ARRATiyES 
 
 OP 
 
 SOME PASSAGES IN THE 
 
 GREAT WAR WITH FRANCE, 
 
 FEOM 1799 TO 1810. 
 
 f 
 
 LIEUT,.GEN, SIB, HENEY BUNBUHY, K.C.B. 
 
 rOEMEELY QUAETEEMASTEB - GENEKAL TO THE AEMY IN TEE 
 MEDITEEEANEAN, 
 
 LONDON: 
 BICHAED BENTLEY, 
 \B\iW^tv in (BxtsinKVt} ta ^tv n^ajeiSts. 
 
 1854. 
 

 MiFFin 
 
 Pr.INTr.T) BT^lIARRISON AND SONS, 
 lOKDOJf C/.7£Ta'K omCE, ST. MAKTIN'3 LANK. 
 
^ UNIVERSITY y 
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 This Volume is composed of two Narratives of 
 transactions with which I had personal acquaint- 
 ance, and of the outlines of our Military History 
 in Europe during the years which connect the 
 periods of the narratives. 
 
 The Campaign of the British and Russian 
 armies in North Holland in the autumn of 1799 
 forms the subject of the first personal Narrative. 
 It is no more than a slight sketch of a great, but 
 unfortunate, undertaking. I was then a very 
 young man ; but as one of the aides-de-camp of 
 His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, I 
 enjoyed opportunities of seeing and hearing much 
 that was unknown to the officers in general of 
 my own age. There is no good account of this 
 campaign, which was projected on a great scale, 
 and from which great results had been anticipated. 
 
 1 "^^^7:^ 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 In the absence of better and more ample informa- 
 tion as to the disastrous expedition of 1799, the 
 present account is submitted to the public. 
 
 The second Narrative relates to the military 
 and diplomatic measures pursued by England on 
 the shores of the Mediterranean from the spring 
 of 1805 to the close of 1810. Of these transac- 
 tions I can venture to speak with more authority, 
 because I was then at the head of the Quarter- 
 master-General's Department, and enjoyed the 
 confidence of successive Commanders of the army. 
 It is with regret that I have felt m3^self obHged 
 to speak severely, and to condemn some passages 
 in the conduct of two or three brave men, whose 
 reputation has been cherished by their country- 
 men ; but I could not tell my tale truly, nor 
 could I show the causes of our failures, without 
 unveiling the weaknesses of these individuals. 
 
 The two Narratives were written many years 
 ago ; and a few copies of each were privately 
 printed in 1849 and 1851. The connecting out- 
 lines of our military operations have been written 
 more recently ; and I feel it incumbent on me to 
 express my regret that I have not been able to 
 give a more satisfactory account of the Egyptian 
 campaign in 1 801. Brilliant and important as that 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 brief service was^ there are scarcely any docu- 
 ments, of importance to be found which come 
 from high authority. The first Commander, Sir 
 E-alph Abercromby, was mortally wounded only 
 thirteen days after the landing of his army ; and 
 all the correspondence and papers of Lord Hutch- 
 inson, who succeeded to the command, are sup- 
 posed to have been lost at sea on their way to 
 England. I had gathered some facts from con- 
 versations with military friends in past days, and 
 particularly with Sir John Moore ; and for matters 
 of detail I have had recourse to the two pon- 
 derous quartos published in 1802 by Sir Kobert 
 Wilson and Major Walsh. 
 
 For the account which this Volume contains 
 of the Court of Naples and Palermo I offer no 
 apology. That Court was too bad to be repre- 
 sented worse ; but there was in it some con- 
 sciousness of its want of faith towards the King- 
 dom which was protecting by its forces those 
 degraded Sovereigns, and lavishing on them vast 
 sums of money, which were shamefully misapplied. 
 One instance of the anxiety of the Court that the 
 whole truth should not reach the ears of the 
 British Ministers may be here mentioned. I 
 came to England on my private affairs in 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 the autumn of 1809. Just as the packet was 
 sailing from Messina, a messenger from Palermo 
 was put on board. Shortly after my arrival in 
 London, I was surprised by a visit from the 
 Prince Castelcicala, the SiciUan Ambassador, who 
 had received instructions to tender for my accepts 
 ance the Order of Saint Ferdinand, or Saint 
 something. The offer was declined with the 
 courtesy which was due to the character of Castel- 
 cicala; but with unaltered sentiments as to his 
 Sovereigns and the Court of Palermo. It hap- 
 pened that a few weeks afterwards I was ap- 
 pointed Under-Secretary of State for the War 
 Department ; and I continued to hold that Office 
 till it was abolished in 1816. 
 
 HENRY EDWARD BUNBURY. 
 
 Barton Hall, 
 
 June^ 185 i. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 We have been so long accustomed to measure the 
 efficiency and conduct of British troops bj the stan- 
 dard of that noble armj which fought and conquered 
 in the Spanish Peninsula, that men of the present 
 generation can hardly form an idea of what the 
 military forces of England really were when the great 
 war broke out in 1793. Our army was lax in its 
 discipline, entirely without system, and very weak in 
 numbers. Each Colonel of a regiment managed it 
 according to his own notions, or neglected it altoge- 
 ther. There was no uniformity of drill or movement ; 
 professional pride w^as rare ; professional knowledge 
 still more so. Never was a kingdom less prepared 
 for a stern and arduous conflict ; and this fact may be 
 fairly taken as a proof that Mr. Pitt had entertained 
 no design of engaging in a war with France. 
 
 However, in the autumn of 1792 a sudden and 
 
Vlll INTRODUCTION. " 
 
 fearful alarm had gathered over England. The events 
 in Paris during the months of August and September 
 had excited horror, and had aroused antipathy to- 
 wards the French, while the increased audacity of 
 revolutionary factions in Great Britain inspired a 
 dread of immediate rebellion. The Republican armies 
 of France had conquered the Austrian Low Countries, 
 and were menacing our Allies in Holland. Our 
 merchants were alarmed for their commerce ; our 
 landowners were anticipating invasion or revolution. 
 There arose a general cry for measures calculated to 
 meet the perils of the time. 
 
 In December, 1792, the militia of England was 
 embodied, and additional recruits were ordered to be 
 enlisted for the regular service, but to an amount far 
 from adequate to the greatness of the occasion. The 
 British Government still hoped to evade hostilities, 
 and was content to remain in a defensive position. 
 All doubts, however, were soon terminated. In 
 February, 1793, the French declared war against 
 Great Britain and Holland, and they followed up 
 their declaration by the immediate invasion of the 
 latter country. Their general, Dumourier, broke into 
 Holland in February at the head of not more than 
 13,000 men. But he knew how totally the Dutch 
 were unprepared, and how generally they were dis- 
 inclined to resist his attack. Their military means 
 
INTKODUCTION. IX 
 
 ^vere contemptible ; their fortresses were unprovided, 
 and thej were deprived of one of the chief means of 
 defending Holland bj the severitj of the winter. 
 Dumourier reckoned on the effects of his audacity 
 and promptitude ; on the ease with which his cannon 
 could pass the frozen waters ; and on the disaffection 
 which was borne bj a large proportion of the people 
 to the Stadtholder^s government. Within a fortnight 
 the French made themselves masters of Breda^ Klun- 
 dert, and Gertrujdenburg ; nor did thej encounter 
 any serious resistance till they attacked Wilhelmstadt. 
 Here a brave old soldier, Count Botzlaer, was in 
 command. He infused spirit into his little garrison, 
 and he brought the enemy to a stand. 
 
 In the mean time, the English Ministers were 
 trying, with the miserable means at their command, 
 to afford some assistance to the House of Orange. 
 About 1700 of the Foot Guards, with a few scores of 
 artillerymen, were all that could be mustered for this 
 service in the first days of the crisis. But of proper 
 vessels to transport them across the sea there were 
 none. The troops were huddled on the 25th of 
 February on board of such empty colliers as could be 
 found in the Thames, and by great good fortune 
 they reached the coast of Holland without loss. 
 
 General Gerard Lake, with his brigade of Guards, 
 brought ample strength to the garrison of Dort, and 
 
X INTRODUCTION. 
 
 English gun-boats gathered in the waters of Wilhelm- 
 stadt. Here, then, were the colours of Britain first 
 waved in defiance of Republican France, and thus 
 began the Great War. 
 
 Duinourier found himself baffled in the audacious 
 hope of penetrating rapidly to Amsterdam. He 
 at once retraced his steps, and fell back to Antwerp. 
 In spite of the celerity both of his advance and his 
 retreat he yet returned too late. The centre of his 
 army had been engaged unsuccessfully in the siege of 
 Maestricht. His right wing had been posted near 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. It was attacked on the 8th of 
 March by the Austrians, who, slow and cautious as 
 they were, had yet been encouraged by the exposed 
 position of this part of Dumourier's army, to risk a 
 battle. The French were completely defeated, the 
 siege of Maestricht was immediately raised, and 
 Dumourier arrived just in time to effect his junction 
 with the retreating portion of his army. He rallied 
 them, and restored some order and confidence ; and 
 strove by a series of obstinate, though partial actions, 
 to arrest the march of the Austrians. But his struggle 
 was vain : on the 1 8th of March he was defeated in 
 a general engagement at Neerwinden ; his soldiers 
 were utterly disheartened, and the wave of war was 
 rolled back to the frontier of France. 
 
 It is no part of my design to write a history of 
 
INTRODUCTION. XI 
 
 the war. But I wish to sketch, however slightly, the 
 first services of our British troops in Europe, and to 
 shew the inefficiency to which our military means had 
 been brought through the neglect of our Government 
 during ten years of peace. The results may be 
 painful to contemplate, but they afford a lesson which 
 ought not to be forgotten. 
 
 When Dumourier quitted Antwerp, Lake advanced 
 with his brigade of Guards to that city, and he there 
 met three weak battalions of the line, which arrived 
 from England under the command of Ralph Aber- 
 cromby . The whole (barely mustering altogether 
 3000 rank and file) moved onwards to Bruges and 
 Ghent, while large bodies of Hanoverians and Hes- 
 sians in British pay were arriving successively in the 
 same neighbourhood. Thus was formed an army of 
 about 17,000 men, which was placed under the com- 
 mand of the Duke of York. Six or seven squad- 
 rons of Light Dragoons and some Artillery arrived 
 from England in May, and the columns then moved 
 forward to co-operate with the Austrians on the 
 frontier. But such was the condition of the British 
 infantry at this time, that two of Abercromby's 
 regiments were left behind, as being unfit to appear 
 in the presence of an enemy ! 
 
 As the British and Hanoverian troops were involved 
 in the disasters which fell upon the allied army in 
 
Xll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the campaigns of 1793 and 1794, a popular outcry 
 was raised in England against the Duke of York. 
 Men were ready to attribute our failures to his 
 unfitness for command, and even our Ministers ap- 
 peared to assent tacitly to a judgment which served 
 to throw upon the shoulders of his Royal Highness 
 much of the blame which ought to have rested on 
 themselves. Theirs was the fatal plan of besieging 
 Dunkirk ; theirs the shame of its failure.* Insisting 
 on this selfish project, they drew off not only the 
 Duke of York's force, but some 13,000 subsidized 
 Austrians likewise, from the great army of the Allies, 
 which had been up to that time successful in its 
 operations, and was pressing with an overpowering 
 strength upon the defeated and disheartened enemy. 
 With this fatal separation of the armies began the 
 tide of disaster which swept the Allies, within twelve 
 months, beyond the Rhine. 
 
 After our defeats near Dunkirk, the troops of 
 several nations which composed the Duke of York's 
 
 * Our Government had promised to the Duke the co-operation 
 of a squadron, which should attack and bombard Dunkirk 
 from seaward, while he assaulted the time-worn fortifications 
 from the land side. Admiral Macbride was lying with this 
 squadron in the Downs ; but so far was the Duke from meeting 
 any assistance from the navy, that his lines, during the fort- 
 night which he spent before the town, were exposed to a can- 
 nonnadc from half-a-dozen gun-boats and Dunkirk privateers ! 
 Lord Chatham was then at the head of our Admiralty. 
 
INTRODUCTION. Xlll 
 
 corps d'armee recovered bj a circuitous march their 
 connexion with the main army, under the Prince of 
 Saxe Ooburg. They bore their parts handsomely in 
 the actions which fell to their share in the latter part 
 of 1793, and the spring of the succeeding year. 
 Indeed there was no lack of gallantry whenever our 
 handfuls of British troops were allowed opportunities 
 of closing with the enemy. The Guards, under 
 General Lake, at Lincelles ; the Fifteenth Light 
 Dragoons at Villars-en-Oauchie ; the weak brigade 
 (Fourteenth, Thirty-seventh, and Fifty- third Regi^ 
 ments) led by General Fox at Pont-a-chin, afforded 
 brilliant examples of their national valour. But it 
 must be remembered that the Duke of York never 
 had more than 3000 British infantry and about 700 
 Light Dragoons during the year 1793 * In 1794 he 
 had many squadrons of our horsemen, but little more 
 infantry, though by this time there had been large 
 and efficient forces at the disposal of our Ministers. 
 They preferred sending a great proportion of their 
 troops to encounter the yellow fever in the West 
 Indies, and keeping another body at home to threaten 
 
 * In the first moments of alarm after the failure at Dunkirk 
 our Government sent three regiments of infantry to Ostend, 
 and said they would have sent more but that they had no 
 transports ! However, within a month the three regiments 
 were recalled and despatched to the West Indies ! 
 
XIV INTRODUCTION. 
 
 an invasion of Brittany, which was never carried into 
 effect. 
 
 The main strength of the Duke of York's division 
 lay in the Hanoverians, and good and brave troops 
 they were ; but repeated actions soon wore down 
 their numbers. It should be remembered also that 
 the Duke never held an independent command, with 
 the exception of the unhappy attempt on Dunkirk. 
 Before and after that lamentable project of the British 
 cabinet his Royal Highness was subordinate to 
 the Prince of Saxe Ooburg. Of the latter it seems 
 necessary to say a few words. Affable and courteous 
 in his manners, this Commander-in-Chief of the allied 
 armies was popular with his troops, and made him- 
 self agreeable for the time to those who were engaged 
 to obey his orders ; but this Prince possessed few 
 of the qualities necessary for the chief of a great 
 army. Slow and cautious to an extreme, he never 
 knew how to follow up success, or to rally under 
 defeat. It would have been less mischievous if he 
 had been merely a bad General, but the weakness of 
 his character led him to subserviency. In 1794, he 
 became the tool of an Austrian faction, of which the 
 minister Thugut was the chief This Thugut had 
 risen gradually from a low position till he had ac- 
 quired a great influence over the young Emperor 
 Francis. He worked slowly and cautiously, but ho 
 
INTRODUCTION. Xt 
 
 worked siiccessfullj, in bringing about a complete 
 change in the policy of Austria. Instead of attempt- 
 ing to maintain the imperial sovereignty in the Low 
 Countries, Thugut had woven in his dark mind a 
 scheme by which the empire might gain advantages 
 at the expense both of unsuspecting friends, and of 
 the allies who were lavishing their money and shed- 
 ding their blood in support of what they yet believed 
 to be the views and interests of the cabinet of Vienna. 
 The provinces which now form the kingdom of Bel- 
 gium were to be gradually abandoned to the French, 
 in the base hope that, with their connivance, Austria 
 might rob her German neighbours of an equivalent 
 territory. While the contingeut forces, commanded 
 by the Duke of York and the Prince of Orange, were 
 still fighting by the side of the Austrians, the mea- 
 sures by which the interests of England and of Hol- 
 land were to be sacrificed, were carried silently into 
 efl^ect. 
 
 The consequences soon became apparent. The 
 Duke of York^s corps, now reduced to 13,000 or 
 14,000 men, had been detached from the Austrians 
 under the pretext that he was to cover the country 
 between Tournay and Ghent. In the latter days of 
 June, 1794, his Royal Highness suddenly found him- 
 self in a very critical position, without support or 
 connexion on either hand. The Austrians were in 
 
XVI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 full retreat from the Sambre, and heavy columns of 
 French were pressing forward on every side. Even 
 with Ostend the Duke's communications were inter- 
 cepted, though just at this time there arrived at that 
 port 7000 British infantry under the command of 
 Lord Moira. The French were in possession of Cour- 
 trai, and were pointing towards Ghent. The Duke, 
 abandoned by the Austrians, had no course left but 
 to make a rapid and difficult retreat between the 
 advancing columns of the enemy, and endeavour to 
 reach the Scheldt. He accomplished his object, after 
 having been joined by Lord Moira with 5000 of his 
 men. This General, who had been sent from England 
 to secure Ostend, had found on his arrival that the 
 position of the Duke of York's little army was ex- 
 tremely dangerous. With great promptitude and much 
 skilly Lord Moira passed to the northward of Ghent 
 before the enemy arrived there in force; and he effected 
 his junction with the Hanoverians and the British in 
 the neighbourhood of Alost. 
 
 The treachery of the Austrian ministers had been 
 equalled, if not surpassed, by those of Prussia. Ac- 
 cording to a treaty ratified by the cabinets of London 
 and Berlin, there ought to have been by this time an 
 army of 62,000 subsidized Prussian soldiers on the 
 Meuse or the Scheldt, for the defence of Holland. 
 The Prussian ministers had received 300,000/., in 
 
INTRODUCTION. XVU 
 
 advance, but they sent not one soldier. The chance 
 of doing more than save the British and Hanoverian 
 army seemed to be nearly at an end. The people of 
 Holland were known to be thoroughly disaffected ; 
 and their troops, and even most of their officers, were 
 unwilling to fight. Yet the English, having received 
 large reinforcements, still cherished a hope that posi- 
 tions on the Mouse and the Waal, flanked by the 
 Dutch fortresses and inundations, would retard the I 
 progress of the enemy, and that the winter would put 
 an end to the campaign. But the French, under 
 Pichegru, were not to be arrested in their victorious 
 career by waters or by winter. When the latter came, a 
 frost of unusual severity rendered the former passable 
 on every side ; while it inflicted dreadful sufferings 
 on our retreating and disheartened columns. Many 
 partial actions were fought without any heavy loss of 
 men on our side, but the numbers who perished from 
 hardships of every kind, and from the inefficiency of 
 our hospital establishments, were deplorably great ; 
 and seldom has an* army endured a more fearful trial 
 than that which struggled through the intense severity 
 of the winter of 1794-5, while making good its retreat 
 from the Waal to the Weser. 
 
 After this rough sketch of the disheartening service 
 on which the British troops were first employed, I 
 must trace some of the features which unhappily 
 
 b 
 
XVIU INTRODUCTION. 
 
 characterized our military men more than half a cen- 
 tury ago. I have already said that during the cam- 
 paigns of 1793 and '94, our officers and soldiers 
 distinguished themselves frequently in battle, but if 
 we are to consider the Duke of York's corps as an 
 army, it will be found to have been lamentably 
 defective. Every department of the Staff was more 
 or less deficient, particularly the Commissariat and 
 Medical branches. The regimental officers in those 
 days were, as well as their men, hard drinkers ; and 
 the latter, under a loose discipline, were much addicted 
 to marauding, and to acts of licentious violence, 
 which made them detested by the people of the coun- 
 try. Some of the cavalry, dashing fellows in a fight, 
 piqued themselves on being " rough and ready ; '' to 
 which might justly have been added " drunken and 
 disorderly." But most of the infantry, while under 
 the leading of Abercromby, Lake, and Fox, were kept 
 in better order. On the sad retreat, indeed, through 
 the Dutch provinces, and under the various miseries 
 to which our troops were then exposed, the discipline 
 of the whole gave way, and it was with great difficulty 
 that any subordination was preserved."^ 
 
 * The army was at this time commanded by the Hanoverian 
 General Walmoden, but the British troops were under the 
 immediate orders of General Harcourt. Lord Moira had re- 
 turned to England shortly after he had joined the Duke of 
 York ; and the latter had resigned his command in December, 
 apparently to meet the wishes of the British cabinet. 
 
INTRODUCTION. XIX 
 
 In the spring of 1795 the shattered remains of the 
 British troops returned to England. The results of 
 their campaign had been ill calculated to improve their 
 discipline, or to excite a military spirit in the country. 
 Nor had our arms acquired reputation on land in any 
 other quarter. In 1 793 a short attempt to defend 
 Toulon had ended in our expulsion, and a few regiments, 
 afterwards employed in Corsica, found no opportunities 
 of gaining distinction. So inefficient were the means 
 even in the naval service of England, that, small as 
 our army was, it was required to furnish battalions to 
 serve as marines on board our fleets. With the year 
 1794 began the fatal passion for carrying on the war 
 in every part of the West Indies, though the Bulam 
 fever was raging in all quarters. Multitudes of brave 
 men perished in this and the two succeeding years, 
 for the sake of grasping more sugar-islands, and par- 
 ticularly in the vain attempt to hold St. Domingo. 
 Our infantry and artillery were drained to the lowest 
 point, by the incessant demands of our War Minister 
 for fresh supplies of men to replace the victims of the 
 yellow fever. To the mania for prosecuting this ill- 
 omened service is to be ascribed, more than to any 
 other cause, the inefficiency of the British army during 
 several years.^^' Even those regiments which returned 
 
 * Some idea of tlie dreadful waste of men may be formed by 
 looking to the returns laid before Parliament. From these it 
 
 h 2 
 
XX INTRODUCTION. 
 
 from that fatal climate were long unfit for seryice: 
 thej consisted of feeble, worn-out invalids. Nor, 
 while sketching the condition and general character 
 of the British armj in those days, can I omit to 
 mention the manner in which (the ordinary recruiting 
 being found insufficient) men were obtained, in order to 
 fill up the enormous Yoid occasioned by the deaths in 
 the West Indies. It is useful to note this matter, because 
 it serves to account in part for the degraded state of 
 the service, and the odium which long attended it. 
 I will not dwell on the political jobs which charac- 
 terized the raising of many regiments in Ireland, 
 though I cannot forget that faith was often broken 
 with the men who had been thus enlisted. The 
 officers, having obtained their steps of rank, were 
 contented ; the nominal corps were reduced ; and 
 the men were drafted into regiments in India or 
 St. Domingo. But the most crying infamy was that 
 which resulted from the employment of crimps on a 
 very large scale. Our Government made contracts 
 with certain scoundrels (bearing the King's commis- 
 sion ! ) who engaged to furnish so many liundred men 
 each for such and such sums of money. The deeds of 
 
 appears that in the year 1794 there were "killed, or dead in the 
 'service,^'' 18,596 soldiers. And that in the two succeeding years 
 there were discharged, "on account of wounds or t;^r;«%," no 
 less than 40,639 men. 
 
INTRODUCTION. XXI 
 
 atrocity, to say nothing of the frauds, which attended 
 the working of this scheme, could hardly be credited 
 in the present times. They occasioned many serious 
 riots, and they spread the taint of disaffection to the 
 service. 
 
 There is little to be told of our military achieve- 
 ments during the years 1795 — 96^ and '97. The 
 Cape of Good Hope was captured, and Ceylon, and 
 some of the Indian spice-islands. These were valuable 
 acquisitions ; but still they required garrisons to retain 
 possession of them, as well as of the sugar-colonies 
 which we had taken from France ; and thus the 
 members of our regular British infantry were always 
 kept down to a lower level at home than the main 
 objects of the war demanded. One material im- 
 provement, however, is to be dated from this period : 
 an uniform system of drill and movement, both of the 
 cavalry and infantry, w^as introduced and carried into 
 effect. General David Dundas had the merit of having 
 compiled these regulations (which were mainly founded 
 on those of the Prussian army), and they were warmly 
 patronized by the Duke of York, who was now Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. The administration of our army 
 improved gradually in every respect ; and at the 
 same time the pay of the soldiers, which had been 
 shamefully low, was augmented. Camps of instruc- 
 tion were formed during the summers of several sue- 
 
XXll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 cessive years ; and an uniformit j of drill and of more- 
 ment was established throughout the serrice. 
 
 In Maj, 1798, Sir Home Pophani, commanding a 
 squadron on the coast of Flanders, unfortunately 
 imagined that it was desirable to destroy certain 
 sluice-gates near Ostend. He was a clever man, 
 and he persuaded our War Minister to send over 
 a brigade of picked troops under General Ooote for 
 this service. They landed; blew up the gates; and 
 then found that a heavy surf (no uncommon circum- 
 stance on those shores), made their re-embarkation 
 impracticable. These fine fellows, after fighting gal- 
 lantly against the great force which gathered from 
 every side to assail them, were obliged to lay down 
 their arms. It was in this way that, to use the happy 
 expression of Sheridan, we "nibbled at the rind of 
 France;" and in this way we wasted bit by bit the 
 sinews of our military strength. 
 
 Immediately after this attempt the rebellion in 
 Ireland broke out. The regular infantry in tliat 
 kingdom was weak in numbers; there were some 
 pretty good battalions of Fencibles ; and the Yeomanry 
 in arms were numerous and fierce ; but the majority 
 of the regiments of Irish Militia were not to be de- 
 pended on. The want of discipline in this army was 
 become notorious. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had 
 just succeeded to Lord Carhampton as Commander of 
 
INTKODUCTION. XXlil 
 
 the Forces, condemned in general orders (February, 
 1798,) the disgraceful licentiousness of the troops. 
 For this wise and honest attempt to check the abuses 
 which dishonoured the service, this gallant veteran 
 was immediately recalled by our Government. Some 
 notion of the conduct of the troops in Ireland may be 
 formed by the recollection that one regiment of heavy 
 Dragoons was broken up altogether; and that to ren- 
 der the stigma perpetual, its number has remained a 
 blank in the army-list. Another regiment of horse 
 ran away without striking a stroke in the action with 
 the French at Oastlebar, and had the credit of having 
 galloped thirty miles without a halt. The nature of 
 the warfare, and the manner in which the first part of 
 it was conducted, tended still further to injure the dis- 
 cipline of regiments and to demoralize both the men 
 and officers. 
 
 In giving this cursory sketch of the British military 
 service during the years which preceded 1799, my 
 object has been to afford some insight into the average 
 state of our array when the great enterprize of that 
 year was undertaken. A treaty was concluded 
 between the British Government and the Emperor 
 of Russia in June; the former engaging to furnish 
 13,000 men, and the latter 17,000, with the object 
 of expelling the French from the United Provinces. 
 It was agreed that this allied army should be placed 
 
 €^^^P^ 
 
 ©F Tl 
 
XXiy INTRODUCTION. 
 
 under the command of the Duke of York ; and it was 
 understood that the ulterior operations might not be 
 confined to the Dutch territory, but might effect an im- 
 portant diversion in favour of the Allies on the Upper 
 Rhine and in Switzerland. Both England and Russia 
 were so thoroughly in earnest, that both contributed 
 more than their respective quotas of troops. Each 
 sent to the war more than 18,000 soldiers. 
 
 EEEATA. 
 
 Pages 190 and 219, for Montenegrins read Suliotes. 
 
I 
 
TEXEL 
 
 ISLAND 
 
 2: 
 
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 HRLD'^O 
 
 C ALLA-XTZOOOr 
 
 PKTTEN a 
 
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 XNCKHrvSKN Q 
 
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 MinrDExo 
 
 of 
 
 KAvVRDEjr 
 
NAREATIVE 
 
 OP THE 
 
 I CAMPAIGN IN NOETH HOLLAND, 
 
 IN 1799. 
 
 The expedition under Sir Ralph Abercrombj, 
 "which may be considered as the advanced guard of 
 the Allied Army destined to act against the French 
 in Holland and the Low Countries, left the shores of 
 England on the 13th of August, 1799, escorted by 
 a strong squadron of ships of war, commanded by 
 Admiral Mitchell. The military force was composed 
 of the 
 
 1st Guards . . 
 
 Coldstream Ditto 
 
 3rd Ditto . . 
 
 2nd (Queen's) Reg, 
 
 27th 
 
 29th „ 
 
 85th 
 
 1st (Royal) 
 
 25th 
 
 49th „ 
 
 79th „ 
 
 92nd „ 
 
 23rd „ 
 
 55th „ 
 
 with Artillery, &c 
 a good quality. 
 
 2 Battalions 
 2 Battalions 
 
 ful 
 
 Maj.-Gen, D'Oyley 
 Maj.-Gen. Burrard 
 
 Major-Gen. Coote 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Moore 
 
 Col. Macdonald 
 
 y 10,000 fighting men, and of 
 
 '/ 
 
2 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 The orders which our Commanders had received 
 were in some degree discretionary. A landing on 
 the island of Goree was prescribed as the first object ; 
 and from thence it was proposed that the united 
 force of British and Russian troops should penetrate 
 into the heart of the Low Countries. 
 
 But the Helder was a point which the British 
 Government had much at heart, for the sake of cap- 
 turing the Dutch fleet in the Texel, and destroying 
 the naval magazines at that station. Although our 
 expedition put to sea at the most favourable season, 
 such was the stormy and perverse character of that 
 disastrous year, that the landing of the troops at the 
 mouths of the Scheldt and the Mouse was found to 
 be impracticable ; nor was it till the 21st of August 
 that our ships were able to approach the coast near 
 the entrance of the Texel. Preparations were made 
 for landing on the following day, but in vain, for our 
 fleet was again forced to sea by a gale of wind ; nor 
 was it till the 26th that it could return to the point 
 which our commanders had in view,, and the transports 
 could be anchored near the shore.* Although a heavy 
 surf was still breaking on the beach, the debarkation 
 of the troops began at daybreak on the 27th ; several 
 boats were swamped, and a few of our soldiers were 
 drowned. , . 
 
 As our fleet had been descried by the enemy six 
 
 * It appears that Abercromby and Mitchell had agreed 
 not to persevere in attempting to land at the Helder beyond 
 the 26th. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 3 
 
 days before, the Dutch General Daendels had gained 
 time to collect five or six thousand of infantry, with 
 some cavalry and artillery ; and these he kept con- 
 cealed among the sand-hills which skirt the shore. 
 Immediately in front of that line of beach which the 
 British had selected for their landing, these '' Dunes '' 
 recede a little, but they close in and become bolder 
 and more steep towards Oallantzoog which lay upon 
 our right ; and here the enemy held the main body of 
 his troops, ready to plunge upon our extreme flank if 
 we should attempt to mo^e forward towards the 
 Helder town. To the landing of the British soldiers, 
 though it was rendered slow by the violence of the 
 surf, no direct opposition was ofiered ; but, as soon as 
 six of our battalions (the brigades under Ooote and 
 Macdonald) were ashore and formed, and they began 
 to move forward, they were assailed by a heavy fire, 
 and a vigorous attack on their right flank.* Forced 
 to change their front, and make head against the 
 superior force of the enemy on the side of Oallantzoog, 
 our troops were at the same time cramped and con- 
 fused by the narrowness of their ground ; the strip of 
 beach not allowing of a front of more than one 
 battalion in that direction. 
 
 The enemy from the crests of the sand-dunes 
 kept up a constant and destructive fire, while he was 
 
 * Sir J. Pulteney led them. He was thought to have 
 pushed on rather too hastily, and too far, so as to have got his 
 division engaged under disadvantages with the enemy's main 
 body, and with cavalry and guns. 
 
 B 2 
 
4 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 himself sheltered by their folds from the guns of the 
 British shipping. None of our field artillery was yet 
 landed, and for some hours our brave infantry, though 
 reinforced by D'Oyley's brigade of guards, had to 
 maintain a trying struggle ; but they would not give 
 ground ; and they fought so hard that they fairly 
 wore out the enemy.* Towards the evening the 
 Dutch gave up the contest, and retreated some five or 
 six miles to a position between the Alkmaar canal 
 and the sea. The loss of the enemy in killed or 
 wounded was probably small ; but the disadvantages 
 under which the invaders fought necessarily exposed 
 the three brigades which were engaged to a serious 
 loss of men ; and a large proportion of the superior 
 officers of the stafl" fell under the aim of the Dutch 
 riflemen. Two Lieut. -Colonels and about fifty men 
 were killed on the spot ; and Lieut.-General Sir 
 James Pulteney, five field officers, and nearly 400 
 others were wounded. 
 
 The debarkation of troops, guns, and supplies was 
 completed without further difficulty ; and Moore's and 
 Burrard's brigades were prepared to move forward at 
 daybreak on the 28th. Near the Helder point stands 
 the village of that name. It was, at the time I am 
 speaking of, partially fortified, having heavy batteries 
 towards the sea, commanding the channel of the Texel 
 
 * Some parts of Moore's brigade were on shore early ; and 
 when a good proportion had been landed and got into order, he 
 advanced towards Helder town, from whence riflemen came out 
 and skirmished with his advanced parties. 
 
CAMPiiGN IX FORTH HOLLAND. 5 
 
 and the deep water within it ; but on the land side 
 the works were imperfect and neglected. In this place 
 the enemy kept a motley garrison (to the amount of 
 1,800 or 2,000 men of one sort or other) up to the 
 evening of the 27th ; but, as soon as the issue of the 
 fight on the beach was decided, they prepared to 
 withdraw, spiked the guns in the batteries, and, when 
 darkness fell, they retreated silently across the marshes 
 and along the shores of the Zuyder Zee. At the same 
 time the Dutch squadron, which had been lying in the 
 Texel channel, dropped inward as far as their draught 
 of water would allow. In the morning of the 28th, 
 Moore took possession of the Helder, with the naval 
 arsenal and storehouses, well filled with ordnance of 
 all descriptions ; and the same evening there arrived 
 from England two strong brigades of infantry (young 
 troops) ; and these were quickly followed by the 11th 
 Light Dragoons. But it was not till the morning of 
 the 30 th that Admiral Mitchell was able (as the 
 Dutch had removed the buoys and landmarks) to lead 
 his squadron through the shoals and narrows of the 
 Texel channel, and to approach the enemy's fleet. A 
 summons to hoist the Orange flag and surrender the 
 ships to the Stadtholder, under the protection of 
 England, speedily produced the desired efiect. Seven 
 ships of the line, three of 50 guns, and several 
 frigates were given up without firing a single shot ; 
 though their Admiral* vapoured, and declared that he 
 
 * This was Story : the same man who deserted the brave 
 De Winter, and ran away from the battle of Camperdown in 1797. 
 
b NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 and his officers were deserted bj their cowardly crews, 
 who refused to fight. Howeyer this might be, here 
 was the English object of the expedition achieved ; 
 the Dutch fleet, arsenal, and stores were in our posses- 
 sion. Happy would it have been if our Ministers or 
 Generals had not set our army to the task of fighting 
 its way to Amsterdam through the long defile of 
 North Holland. 
 
 On the 1st of September, Sir Ralph Abercromby, 
 leaving two battalions of the young troops at the 
 Helder, for the protection and escorc of stores and 
 supplies, marched onward with about 12,000 men, 
 and took up a very strong position, having its right 
 at Petten on the German Ocean, and its left at the 
 Oude Sluys on the Zuyder Zee ; with the cross 
 canal of the Zuype along his front, and the great 
 canal which leads from near the Helder to Alk- 
 maar, passing through his centre. Before and behind 
 his line stretched wide extents of low meadows and 
 cultivated lands, well drained by wide and deep 
 ditches communicating with various canals. At the 
 salient angle of the position stands the village of 
 Krabbendam ; and here the high road from Amster- 
 dam and Alkmaar, running alongside the great canal, 
 entered the line occupied by the British. Another 
 road, from the side of Hoorn, entered near the village 
 of St. Martin : and the great dyke which bounded 
 the Zuype, and formed as it were the rampart of our 
 defence, was also accessible here and there by means 
 of minor dykes which abut upon it. The most impor- 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NOETH HOLLAND. 7 
 
 tant of these latter approaches was at a point between 
 Krabbendam and Petten ; and the defence of this 
 part of the line was intrusted to the two brigades of 
 guards. In the village of Krabbendam were posted 
 the two battalions of the 20th regiment. Moore's 
 brigade extended from thence to St. Martins, which 
 village was held bj Colonel Brent Spencer with the 
 40th regiment belonging to General Don's brigade. 
 The six battalions under Ooote and Macdonald, and 
 the 11th light dragoons were cantoned in rear of the 
 centre, and at hand to support any part of the line 
 which might be seriously attacked.* 
 
 Sir Ralph Abercromby knew that the Duke of 
 York and more British troops were following, and 
 that a Russian army was on the sea : therefore he 
 waited quietly in the strong position he had taken up. 
 The enemy knew as much, and were therefore eager 
 to attack before the great mass of the Allies should 
 be gathered and prepared to act. Large bodies both of 
 French and Dutch troops had come up ; and General 
 Brune had taken the command of the Republican 
 army. He lost no time ; he held the British troops 
 cheap ; nor was he deterred by the strength of the 
 position they occupied. On came the enemy in three 
 columns at break of day on the 10th of September. 
 Their left led by Vandamme consisted entirely of 
 
 * I have been thus diffuse in describing the position of the 
 Zuype; because it has always appeared to me that the chief 
 questions touching the conduct of the campaign hinged on this 
 very important line of defence. 
 
8 NARKATIVE OP THE 
 
 French troops, and poured impetuously along the 
 djke, which I have mentioned as being defended bj 
 the English guards. At the same time the centre of 
 the Republicans, under Dumonceau, advanced "with 
 equal rapidity along the high road, and assailed the 
 village of Krabbendam with headlong fury. Their 
 right column, composed of Dutch troops and com- 
 manded by Daendels, attacked St. Martin's, but with 
 less perseverance ; and perhaps this was designed 
 rather to draw our attention to that side, and weaken 
 our defence at Krabbendam. Rushing forward with- 
 out any cover, the column under Yandamme made 
 their assault, and persevered in it with reckless bra- 
 very : but they had not a chance of success : they 
 were mown down by the steady fire of Burrard's 
 brigade of guards and his field pieces ; and after 
 sufi*ering an enormous loss of men, they doggedly 
 drew ofi" to their previous quarters. Nor was the 
 attack on Krabbendam less marked by valour : the 
 Republicans penetrated into the village, and in spite 
 of the destructive fire from the houses, they fought 
 hand to hand with our troops. But the 20th was ^ 
 regiment that never would be beaten ; and their com- 
 mander. Colonel George Smyth,-^^ was an officer of 
 first-rate ability. To him Sir Ralph Abercromby had 
 specially assigned the defence of this important post, 
 and worthily did he discharge his trust. Although 
 
 * This excellent officer died, unfortunately for our service 
 just at the beginning of the Spanish war, before he had attained 
 the rank of a General Officer. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN KORTH HOLLAND. 9 
 
 three-fourtlis of the two battalions of the 20th were 
 volunteers recently received from the Militia, they 
 had already been imbued with the spirit of the old 
 regiment ; and so gallantly did they maintain their 
 post, that there was no need of moving up the brigades 
 in reserve to their support. Dumonceau relinquished 
 his attack and retreated ; but Colonel Macdonald 
 issuing from the lines quickened his movement, and 
 increased his loss, capturing a gun, pontoons, and a 
 good many men. Daendels, whose troops had been 
 less compromised, drew off from before St. Martin 
 with little loss : but the number of killed and wounded 
 in the other two columns of the enemy was very great, 
 probably more than a thousand men. On the side of 
 the English only thirty-seven were killed : General 
 Moore was slightly wounded, Colonel Smyth severely ; 
 six other officers of the 20th, and four of different 
 regiments, with about 150 soldiers were likewise 
 wounded. 
 
 This action of the 10th of September, was of much 
 importance. It confirmed the confidence of the British 
 troops in themselves and their commanders ; and it 
 proved how easily the position of the Zuype might be 
 held by 12,000 or 14,000 men. On this day little had 
 been done to strengthen it by artificial means ; no heavy 
 guns had been brought up, nor any redoubts con- 
 structed. Musquetry and a few field-pieces had been 
 found amply sufficient to render futile the most des- 
 perate assaults of the enemy. Though his attempt was 
 
10 NAREATIVE OF THE 
 
 rash, it was made with a reckless bravery which served 
 only to swell the slaughter of his men. 
 
 Such was the posture of our affairs when the Duk6 
 of York arrived to assume the command of the Allied 
 Army. He landed at the Helder on the evening of 
 the 13th, and had the satisfaction of meeting there 
 the first division of the Russian army under their 
 General-in-Chief D'Hermann. Reinforcements from 
 England, light cavalry, artillery, and the young re- 
 giments recruited from the Militia, continued to pour 
 in daily. Within the week, the second division of 
 Russians had arrived. Altogether, there was a great 
 army,'"' and all things looked smilingly, except the 
 weather. The Duke's head- quarters being fixed at 
 Schagen Brug, the new-comers moved up in quick suc- 
 cession ; and all the villages from the Helder to the 
 Zuype were crowded with troops ; the post of honour, 
 on the right, being conceded to the Russians. 
 
 Whatever might have been the notions instilled 
 into the British Government with respect to the 
 political feelings of tlie Dutch, certainly there had 
 appeared in North Holland nothing (except among 
 the crews of their ships of war) to favour the idea 
 that the people would assist us in restoring the 
 House of Orange. The Dutch troops had fought 
 
 * About 18,000 British, and 12,000 Russians. Of the former 
 about three-fifths might be accounted good troops, the rest raw 
 militia-men, unacquainted with their officers. The 15th Light 
 Dragoons joined the army after the battle of the 19th Septem- 
 ber, and likewise 3,000 or 4,000 Russian infantry, with 300 
 Cossacks. 
 
CAMPAIGN m NORTH HOLLAND. 11 
 
 against us with great bravery ; nor, though they 
 had been beaten, was the desertion from their ranks 
 considerable. The farmers and others within our 
 lines lounged about with their pipes in their mouths, 
 as silent and sullen spectators of an unpleasant dis- 
 turbance. They were willing enough to sell us their 
 cattle, and let us their boats at good prices, but 
 otherwise they appeared passive and gloomy. The 
 Hereditary Prince of Orange had arrived early ; had 
 hoisted his flag, had been joined by six or eight young 
 men of family, who had made their escape from 
 different provinces, and he was busying himself in 
 endeavouring to form a regiment of his countrymen out 
 of the deserters and prisoners. But it was sufficiently 
 clear that, however odious the French domination 
 might be in the provinces on the other side of the 
 Zuyder Zee, there was little goodwill towards us in 
 North Holland. If the Allies were to make their 
 direct way to Amsterdam, it must be done by sheer 
 fighting ; and the enemy was every day receiving 
 reinforcements, and fortifying his successive lines of 
 defence. 
 
 Such being the state of things it was resolved at a 
 Council of War (for all operations were to be directed 
 by a Council of War)^ to move forward without delay, 
 and make a general attack upon the enemy's position 
 on the 1 9th of September. Now this position, imme- 
 diately in our front, was very short, very strong, and 
 held by above 20,000 men, of whom two-thirds were 
 
 * See page 43. 
 
12 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 French. Their right, composed of the Dutch troops 
 under Daendels, was strongly intrenched at Oudt 
 Carspel, on the high causeway along which ran the 
 great road to Alkmaar ; their left was massed in and 
 about the little town of Bergen, lying at the foot of 
 the dunes (sandhills), and surrounded by thickets, 
 inclosures, and woodlands. 
 
 Between Oudt Oarspel and Bergen stretches an 
 expanse of low meadows, reclaimed fen, intersected by 
 numerous ditches, broad, deep, and full of water. 
 Two or three small villages intervene, in which the 
 French were strongly posted, with abundance of 
 artillery, and the approaches rendered more difficult 
 by abattis, palissades, &c. The dunes between Bergen 
 and the sea present a formidable barrier of defence, 
 from two to four miles wide, some hundreds of feet 
 iu height, and broken and twisted in the most irregu- 
 lar forms, like huge waves in an ocean stirred by 
 tempests. Along their crests, and overhanging the 
 road from Petten to Bergen, were posted the advanced 
 guards and light detachments of the French, overlook- 
 ing our lines, and flanking the route by which the 
 Russians were to advance. 
 
 The object of the Allies was to arrive at Amster- 
 dam ; and the first step towards this object was the 
 driving of the enemy from his position in our front 
 This was to be accomplished either by forcing our 
 direct way through Bergen, Egmont, and Alkmaar ; or 
 by seizing Iloorn, which lay in advance of our left, and 
 pushing forward from thence a powerful column, 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 13 
 
 whicli should turn all the redoubts and works along 
 the great canal, and thus enable the centre of the 
 British to march straight upon Alkmaar, and there 
 join the former column. In this case, the right of the 
 Allied Army should have been held back, watching 
 the left wing of tlie French, and ready to fall upon its 
 flank and rear, if it should march from Bergen and 
 Egmont to the relief of the divisions defending Alk- 
 maar. By our following this second plan of opera- 
 tions it is probable that the enemy would have been 
 obliged to fall back at once to the well-known position 
 of Beverwyk. 
 
 It was the business of the Allies, therefore, either 
 to bring the whole weight of their numerical superi- 
 ority to bear upon the enemy in our front, or to keep 
 him occupied by demonstrations and false attacks 
 while a column strong enough to take care of itself, 
 say 14,000 men, should march upon Hoorn, and from 
 thence upon Alkmaar or Purmerend. But it was not 
 to be forgotten that the movements of such a column 
 from our left required a considerable time : for Hoorn 
 was at the distance of fourteen or fifteen miles from 
 our lines,* and there were thirteen more from Hoorn 
 to Alkmaar, while the latter town was scarcely eight 
 miles from the front of our position. 
 
 However, the Council of War resolved on the 
 adoption of a plan which afforded our army neither 
 the advantage of superior numbers, nor that of the 
 
 * Moore's strong brigade was nearer to Hoorn, having been 
 sent on the Hth to occupy villages in front of our left. 
 
14 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 time necessary for the eflPect of a movement on the 
 side of Hoorn. It was determined that Sir Ralph 
 Abercrombj should be detached in that direction with 
 about 10,000 British, but he was not to begin his 
 march till dusk on the 18th, and at day break on the 
 19th, the Russians and the remainder of the British 
 army were to assault the positions of the enemy in 
 their front. Our right was to march straight upon 
 Bergen, our left along the high road to Alkmaar, and 
 an intermediate column, which we may call our centre, 
 was to move across the low meadows I have described, 
 connecting the two former, and ready to support either 
 the one or the other, as occasion might require. Some 
 detachments were left at the principal posts in our 
 lines with the artillery ; and there marched forth 
 (exclusive of Abercromby's column) nearly 20,000 
 men, to attack an army fully equal in numbers, and, 
 as I have shown, very strongly posted. 
 
 Before the day broke, our right column poured 
 impetuously forth. It consisted of twelve battalions 
 of Russians, followed by Manners's brigade of English 
 Militia-men, and the 7th Light Dragoons. They 
 were led by General D'Hermann, a brave and willing 
 soldier, but possessing few of the higher qualities of a 
 commander. Advancing along the road which runs 
 at the foot of the sand-hills, the Russians pushed 
 forward in one solid mass, overturning everything 
 that stood in their way, storming the village of 
 Schorel and other posts without a halt, regardless of 
 the great loss of men they suffered, nor paying atten- 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 15 
 
 tion to the course taken bj the enemies whom they 
 
 dislodged. On, on, on to Bergen ! In this reckless 
 
 fashion, D'Hermann forced his way, in a surprisingly 
 
 short time, to the enemy's entrenchments, and the 
 
 outskirts of the town ; but the road behind him was 
 
 strewed with his dead and wounded ; the rear of his 
 
 Russians were straggling after plunder in the villages ; 
 
 and his column arrived at its main object, jaded and 
 
 in sad confusion. Still on, on ! the fearless mass 
 
 burst into the midst of the French, and for a few 
 
 minutes they were masters of Bergen. If there had 
 
 been a reserve, fresh and in good order, the battle 
 
 was won. But there was nothing but the one mass 
 
 of confused men. Such people were not to expect 
 
 victory over the active and intelligent Frenchmen on 
 
 their own ground. Besides the enemy's reserve in 
 
 Bergen itself, all those who had been driven before 
 
 the Russians, all who had been pushed out of the 
 
 villages, had thrown themselves into the sand-hills, 
 
 and were now swarming above the right flank and 
 
 rear of D'Hermann's entangled column. Exposed to 
 
 a tremendous fire crossing from every angle, the 
 
 Russians were unable to do more ; they fell into 
 
 hopeless confusion ; Generals D'Hermann and Tchit- 
 
 chagoff were made prisoners ; and the mass rolled 
 
 back along the road by which they had advanced. 
 
 Still these Russians defended themselves desperately 
 
 against their pursuers; and they reached and got 
 
 through the village of Schorel, though it was already 
 
 enveloped in flames by their own plunderers. Here 
 
16 NARRATIVE OP THE 
 
 the enemy was checked for some time by Manners's 
 brigade, supported by successive detachments from 
 General Dundas's column ; and the Russians, whose 
 ammunition was spent, were enabled to withdraw 
 within the lines. 
 
 In the meantime David Dundas, with the centre 
 column,"^'^ which was intended to clear the low meadow 
 coijntry between the road to Bergen on its right, and 
 that to Alkmaar on its left, advanced as soon as there 
 was sufficient daylight to cross the wet ditches (by 
 means of flying bridges) and attacked Walmenhuysen, 
 a village occupied by the French with a considerable 
 body of troops and many guns. This post was car- 
 ried in a very good style, the 1st Guards forcing it at 
 one extremity, while Sedmoratzky, with three bat- 
 talions of Russians, entered at the other. It soon, 
 however, became necessary for General Dundas to 
 detach a part of his troops to cover the left flank of 
 D'Hermann's column ; and two battalions to support 
 and cover that under Sir Jas. Pulteney. Advancing 
 with the remainder, Dundas made himself master of 
 Schoreldam ; and he maintained this post till the final 
 retreat of the right column from Schorel, obliged him 
 likewise to retire within the lines. 
 
 The third column under Sir James Pulteney, was 
 composed of Coote's brigade, Don's four battalions of 
 
 * This column was composed of the two brigades of Guards, 
 and Prince William's brigade of Militiamen supported by three 
 battalions of Russians and two squadrons of the 11th Light 
 Dragoons. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 17 
 
 militiamen, and two squadrons of the 11th Light 
 Dragoons. Thej advanced at daybreak along the 
 high causeway leading to Alkmaar, flanked by the 
 great canal on their right, and confined on the other 
 side by a low stripe of mud and a broad wet ditch. 
 Along the canal three gun-boats, each carrying a 
 12-pound carronade, manned by seamen under the 
 command of Sir Home Popham, kept pace with the 
 head of the column. The posts occupied by the 
 Dutch troops under Daendels at the head of the 
 Lange Dyke, proved to be very strong, and their 
 artillery swept the causeway and canal with destruc- 
 tive effect. Owing to the nature of the ground it 
 was very difficult for the British to extend their front, 
 or to advance with rapidity. Their loss of men 
 became considerable, and the Militia brigade (except- 
 ing the 40th Regiment under Brent Spencer) fell into 
 much confusion. However, their straggling condition 
 was observed by General Dundas, who had advanced 
 more prosperously on their right, and he detached the 
 3rd Guards and another battalion to their help. A 
 rush was made at the Dutch intrenchments ; their 
 batteries wxre carried; and their troops driven 
 through Oudt Carspel and along the causeway to 
 within a short distance of Alkmaar. But by this 
 time the irremediable rout of the Russian column 
 made it necessary for Sir James Pulteney to halt ; 
 and in the evening he received orders to retire imme- 
 diately within the lines of the Zuype. He brought 
 back a great many prisoners, but was obliged to 
 
 
 
18 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 leave the enemy's guns in the intrenchments he had 
 carried. 
 
 The enemy had followed up the retreat of our 
 troops with great activity and boldness, and the 
 French now shewed themselves in such numbers oppo- 
 site to the right of our position, and to the village of 
 Krabbendam, that we began to feel apprehensions of 
 their making attacks on the lines, which (under the 
 actual circumstances) might be dangerous. A great 
 part of our army was in sad confusion. Of the Rus- 
 sians there remained only three battalions under 
 Sedmoratzky in a condition to fight. The rest of 
 their troops had dispersed, officers as well as men, as 
 soon as they got within their lines. No attempt was 
 made to supply them with ammunition, to keep a 
 company together, or even to plant a sentinel. Some 
 of the newly formed Militia regiments of the English 
 were in great disorder ; a large proportion of their 
 officers had fallen ; and the men were panic-stricken 
 by this result of their first encounter with an enemy. 
 Pulteney's division was far in advance, and Aber- 
 cromby's still further on the left. There remained 
 little to trust to but our artillery and D'Oyley's 
 brigade of Guards, which having been severely en- 
 gaged, was arriving, much jaded, and with but little 
 ammunition.* However, means were found to make 
 
 * I cannot help recounting here an anecdote which serves to 
 illustrate the unyielding spirit of the English soldier. As the 
 shots of the French who were following our rear-guard came 
 thicker and closer, the Duke of York grew uneasy about the post 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 19 
 
 a show at the heads of the dykes, and the enemy's 
 troops, after some skirmishing, contented themselves 
 
 of Krabbendam, and he sent me off to find any of our troops 
 which might have entered our lines near that point, and to 
 direct them to return and occupy the village. Krabbendam 
 touched the lines on the outer side ; and through it ran the high 
 road from Alkmaar to the Helder. The holding of this little 
 place was essential to the security of our position ; and nine 
 days before the enemy had exposed himself to a great loss 
 of men in desperate attempts to take it from Sir Ralph 
 Abercromby. But such was the discomfiture, and such the 
 want of good handling of the troops during this retreat of the 
 19 th September, that battalion after battalion passed through 
 the village and entered the lines, without finding any general 
 ofiicer to give an order or a thought to the important object of 
 keeping hold of Krabbendam. I rode till, at a short distance 
 within the lines, I found one of the battalions of the 1st 
 Guards, under the command of Colonel Maitland, resting on 
 their arms in column on the muddy road. I delivered the 
 Duke's orders to the Colonel, and begged he would not lose a 
 moment in returning with me to Krabbendam, for the French 
 were close at hand. He told me that his battalion was tired 
 out; that they had been hotly engaged many hours, had 
 lost a large proportion of officers and men, and that their 
 ammunition was nearly spent. I insisted; and urged the 
 danger, and the fatal consequences which might ensue. Maitland 
 (a brave officer, who was mortally wounded afterwards in the 
 battle of the 6th October) still demurred. He assured me that 
 his men were quite worn out ; and he appeared to have lost the 
 powers of his mind under fatigue of body and anxiety. At this 
 moment a grenadier, lifting his chin from the muzzle of the 
 musket on which he was leaning, said in a loud and steady 
 voice, " Give us some more cartridges, and we will see what can 
 be done." The officers who were anxiously clustering about us at 
 the head of the column, caught up the prompter's word. 
 Maitland cried, "Shoulder arms!" They marched for Krab- 
 bendam ; and I galloped to find and bring to them a supply of 
 ammunition. 
 
 c 2 
 
20 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 with having beaten us, and withdrew to their former 
 positions. 
 
 It is necessary now to see what was done by the 
 10 or 11,000 British troops detached under the com- 
 mand of Sir Ralph Abercromby. In obedience to 
 the orders of the Council of War, he collected his 
 column, consisting of Moore's, Lord Chatham's, Lord 
 Cavan's, and Macdonald's brigades ; this last being 
 doubled in number by the addition of one battalion 
 of grenadiers and one of light infantry, taken from 
 the strongest of the Militia regiments. Two squad- 
 rons of the 18th Light Dragoons accompanied this 
 column. After six o'clock in the evening of the 18th 
 of September, they began their march under a heavy 
 rain, which continued all the night. It had been 
 expected that Sir Ralph should arrive at Hoorn by 
 midnight ; and that after giving his troops three or 
 four hours' rest, he should prosecute his march on 
 Alkmaar. If this design could have been carried out 
 the positions of the enemy would have been turned : 
 but even then, a sufficient time had not been allowed; 
 for if Abercromby 's column had appeared near Alk- 
 maar at so early an hour as nine in the morning of 
 the 19th, it would still have been too late to have 
 decided the retreat of the French before they had 
 routed the Russians at Bergen. But see what took 
 place. Sir Ralph's 10,000 men, with their cannon, 
 had to march in a pitch-dark night, and under torrents 
 of rain, along one narrow paved causeway, flanked on 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 21 
 
 both sides bj low stripes of deep mud, which were 
 confined only by broad ditches filled to the brim. 
 We did not arrive at the gates of Hoorn till between 
 three and four o'clock in the morning, and then there 
 was some delay in entering.* Our men had been 
 
 * There happened this night one of those instances of unac- 
 countable panic among brave troops which sometimes defeat in 
 the strangest manner the plans of the best generals. In the 
 present case it was attended by no mishap ; but I feel far from 
 sure, that if there had been 500 dashing fellows ready to rush 
 recklessly out of the portals of Hoorn, they might not have 
 dispersed our 11,000 men. The accident was this. At the head 
 of our column marched a squadron of the 18th Light Dragoons 
 under their young Colonel, the gallant Charles Stewart (the 
 late Marquis of Londonderry) : they were followed by two six- 
 pounders, and these by the 23rd and 55th Regiments, (hard- 
 biting soldiers) who formed what was caUed the reserve, com- 
 manded by Colonel Macdonald. When the advanced party 
 arrived at the very gate of Hoorn, without being fired at or 
 challenged, some staff officers (I being one) who had been sent to 
 the front by Abercromby, knocked for admittance. No answer 
 was returned; the knocking was repeated, and a loud hail to the 
 gatekeeper was given. In the meantime the wearied infantry 
 had gTounded their arms, and stood leaning beneath the pelting 
 rain, and more than half asleep, on their muskets. At length 
 a sentinel was roused from his slumbera : he peeped over the 
 gate, and dimly discerning a crowd of horsemen, he shouted an 
 alarm : the guard waked up, and hastened noisily to draw more 
 bolts and chains, while their drum was beaten to awaken the 
 Burghers. Our officers cried loudly, " Open your gates, or they 
 shall be blown down by our cannons ! " and to enforce the effect 
 of this threat, the dragoons were ordered to open to the right 
 and left, so as to let the two guns be run up to the front. Instead 
 of giving the word of command quietly, the leading officer 
 shouted, "Back, back, make way for the guns!" — "Back, 
 back," was loudly repeated by the dragoon officers. Our jaded 
 infantry were roused from their unconscious slumbers by the 
 sudden clatter of the horses on the pavement, the rattling of 
 
22 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 under arms twelve hours : they were dead tired ; nor 
 could thej have been fit to resume their march much 
 before mid-daj. But before mid-day the main body 
 of the Allies was beaten out of the field. Sir Ralph 
 Abercromby dispatched me at an early hour, to 
 apprize the Duke of York of the state of affairs on 
 the side of Hoorn ; but though I was well mounted, 
 and took short cuts across the marshes, I did not join 
 his Royal Highness till the Russians were in full 
 retreat, and Dundas was beginning to fall back. 
 Another aide-de-camp was dispatched immediately 
 to recall Abercromby personally, as his advice was 
 required without delay ; and to order that his column 
 should retread their steps, and resume their quarters 
 within the lines of the Zuype.* 
 
 This disastrous day cost the British army above 
 50 officers and 1,000 men ; and the loss of the 
 Russians was probably not less than 2,500 ; while on 
 the other hand the enemy suffered much less in killed 
 and wounded, though he left nearly 2000 Dutch 
 
 the cannon wheels, and this unhappy cry of " back, back." 
 In an instant the 23rd and 55th broke like a flock of sheep, 
 plunging into the deep mud at the sides of the causeway, and 
 dreaming for some minutes that they had been surprised and 
 charged by a sortie of cavalry ! The confusion was stopped 
 in time ; the Dutchmen opened their gates ; and the reserve 
 recovered their senses and their ranks. Heartily ashamed 
 of themselves they were, for there were no braver fellows in 
 our army. 
 
 * It was the opinion of Greneral Moore and others, that 
 Abercromby' s column ought to have been directed to profit 
 by Pulteney's success, and to have co-operated with him in 
 attacking Alkmaar, instead of being withdrawn to the Lines. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 23 
 
 prisoners in our hands. Nor was this the worst. 
 From this day there was a want of confidence and of 
 cordiality between the Allies. D'Hermann, who 
 remained a prisoner in the hands of the French, was 
 probably a bad general, but he was a brave, zea- 
 lous and straightforward fellow. His successor in 
 the command of the Russians, General D'Essen, with- 
 out possessing more military abilities, was false, in- 
 triguing, and ill-disposed towards the British. On 
 the other hand, the Duke of York took up a violent 
 contempt, as well as dislike, of the Russians. He 
 ridiculed them at his table, and talked of them dis- 
 paragingly, and too loudly. 
 
 After the battle, no change was adopted as to the 
 general plan of the campaign. Preparations were 
 made for another general attack on the positions of 
 the enemy, who were daily receiving reinforcements. 
 But the inclemency of the weather checked the Duke's 
 desire to advance ; nor was it till the 2nd of October 
 that our army marched forth again to try the fortune 
 of another battle. This time it was determined to 
 make the principal efibrt along the sea-shore, and the 
 high sand-hills by which the shore is bounded. To 
 Sir Ralph Abercromby was assigned this arduous 
 service. His column was composed of Moore's 
 brigade, D'Oy ley's two battalions of the 1st Guards. 
 Macdonald's reserve (four battalions), to which were 
 attached 300 Russian Yagers, Lord Cavan's brigade, 
 nine squadrons under Lord Paget, and one troop of 
 horse artillery, besides a few field-pieces. Sir Ralph 
 
24 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 was to make his way to Egmont-op-Zee, od, or rather 
 in rear of, the enemy's extreme left. 
 
 The plan of operations was complicated ; and 
 considering that these involved and intricate move- 
 ments were to be executed by raw troops, in a country 
 where the communications were difficult and uncertain, 
 it is not surprising that many blunders and disap- 
 pointments ensued. The general scheme, however, 
 appears to have been to advance in a sort of echelon 
 from the right ; our left (under Sir James Pulteney^) 
 being refused, and only serving to menace the strong 
 posts of the French on the high road to Alkmaar, so 
 as to keep the enemy in check on that side. The 
 Russians (who had been reinforced by the arrival of 
 3 or 4,000 more infantry and 200 Cossacks) were to 
 move, as in the former action, along the road through 
 Schorel, at the foot of the sand-hills ; but this time 
 the English were (by a flanking movement from the 
 right) to dislodge the enemy on the road, and to clear 
 the way for our growling Allies. General Dundas's 
 column t had multifarious duties assigned to it. It 
 was (after opening the route for the Russians) to take 
 care of both its own flanks ; it was to attack Schorel- 
 dam ; and it was, if it could, to maintain a commu- 
 nication across the wide chain of sand-hills, with 
 
 * Twelve battalions (Militia) ; two battalions Russians ; two 
 squadrons of 18th Dragoons; seven gun-boats. 
 
 f Burrard's two battalions of Guards ; Coote's four batta- 
 lions ; Lord Chatham's four (Militia); one squadron 11th 
 Dragoons. 
 
?1TY 
 CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 25 
 
 Colonel Macdonald, whose business it was to cover 
 the flank of Sir Ralph Abercromby's column, — with- 
 out losing sight of Sir J. Pulteney on the Alkmaar 
 road and canal. 
 
 As the march of our right column under Aber- 
 crombj was to be along the sea-shore, and it there- 
 fore depended on the state of the tide, the moyement 
 did not commence till after 6 a.m., when Macdonald 
 started from Petten, drove back the French outposts, 
 and cleared the first sand-hills. Ooote (though be- 
 longing to another column) followed him, and turn- 
 ing to the left over the sand-hills, forced the enemy's 
 parties on the Schorel road to retire. Abercromby's 
 column pursued its course along the beach ; and the 
 Russians moved along their allotted route under the 
 left flank of the hills. 
 
 The story of D'Essen's column may be very shortly 
 told. They advanced doggedly, at first without 
 meeting resistance, drove the enemy easily out of 
 Schorel, and then forming between that village and 
 Schoreldam (which was carried by Burrard's brigade), 
 they there passed the rest of the day in interchanging 
 cannon-shots with the French batteries at Bergen and 
 in the meadows towards the Koe Dyck. Abercromby 
 had reckoned on his protege, Colonel Macdonald, for 
 the security of his left flank during the march along 
 the beach. The latter was to have hung on the sea- 
 ward side of the sand-hills, clearing the flank, and at 
 hand to receive support, if necessary. But Macdonald 
 was a very wild warrior. On first entering the hills. 
 
26 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 he met with small parties, afterwards with larger, of 
 the enemj ; he got excited, followed them up, met 
 with more, entangled himself in the waves of these 
 great sand-downs (which are from two to four miles 
 wide), had a battle to himself, and so completely lost 
 sight of Sir Ralph's column which he did not rejoin 
 till dark. 
 
 But the French were especially careful of the sand- 
 hills. There they were in great numbers, though such 
 was the strange nature of the ground that their 
 parties appeared to be scattered and ill-connected, as 
 our people likewise were. The French were, however, 
 more practised soldiers, and more alert and intelli- 
 gent in turning to account every little wave on this 
 great sand sea ; and they not only furnished plenty 
 of work for Ooote and Macdonald, but they slipped 
 between these brigades and Abercromby, and harassed 
 the left flank of his column severely throughout 
 his march. Having lost Macdonald, Sir Ralph was 
 obliged to weaken and retard the march of his column 
 by detaching the 25th and 79th regiments into the 
 Dunes to protect the left of his main body while 
 moving along the beach. General Moore found it 
 necessary to direct this essential service in person. 
 Delayed by continual skirmishes, and more than once 
 by serious conflicts, which obliged him to call up the 
 Royals and 49 th to his support, Moore fought his way 
 (though he had been wounded early) till his weary 
 troops arrived at the end of several hours in front of 
 a ridge of sand hills within two miles of Egmont. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 27 
 
 Here the enemy stood in great strength, and the 
 beach was occupied by their cavalry and artillery. 
 The left of Moore's brigade was much entangled in 
 the broken ground ; and had not been able to keep 
 abreast with the 25 th, which was on their right, and 
 was toiling gallantly forward. On this regiment the 
 French poured ^down from their position ; their num- 
 bers were great, and their fire became destructive. 
 Three companies of the 92nd mounted hastily from 
 the beach to the assistance of the 25th, but the storm 
 of shot they encountered before they could recover 
 breath or make good their footing, broke and scat- 
 tered them. Moore was struck down by a ball 
 through his face, and the 25 th were overpowered. 
 But the rest of the 92nd came up on their right, the 
 other three regiments of the brigade closed as fast as 
 they could upon the left, and after a desperate 
 struggle, the French were driven back to the position 
 from whence they had made this furious sally. 
 
 A dark October day was nearly spent. The 
 progress of Abercromby's column had been extremely 
 slow, regulated as it was of necessity by that of the 
 brigade which was fighting its way in the sand hills. 
 Of the rest of the army the General could see nothing, 
 and heard but very seldom. Two battalions of the 
 Guards, and four of the Militia regiments were all the 
 Infantry in a condition to renew the contest, which 
 remained at Sir Ralph's command f nor were there 
 
 * The five battalions which Moore had commanded were 
 spent with fatigue, and they had suffered very severely ; 
 
28 NARRATIVE OP THE 
 
 any troops in his rear on which he might fall back if 
 repulsed. The French were strong in numbers and 
 strongly posted. To have attacked them, situated as 
 Abercromby was, would have been too desperate an 
 experiment. Just as the day closed, the action 
 apparently at an end, our Light Dragoons on the 
 beach were dismounted to rest their horses, when 
 suddenly down came two squadrons of Chasseurs-a- 
 cheval, at full speed, and were upon and among the 
 Horse Artillery, who were in front of the column, 
 before they were discovered. They hoped by this 
 act of dashing gallantry to have carried off some of 
 the guns ; but luckily there was a group of ten or 
 twelve officers chatting together close by (amongst 
 them were Lord Paget, Colonel Erskine, and Sir 
 Robert Wilson), and these, followed by half-a-dozen 
 Serjeants and others, who happened to be still on 
 horseback, plunged at once into the midst of the 
 French, and fought so furiously that the Dragoons 
 gained time to run together and mount, and then 
 the thing was over. Most of the Chasseurs, were 
 killed or taken. Immediately after this skirmish, the 
 lost Macdonald rejoined Sir Ralph, with his four 
 jaded and diminished battalions. In the hard service 
 of this day's struggle, the loss had fallen most heavily 
 on Moore's gallant brigade ; he was himself severely 
 
 44 officers and more than 600 of their men having been killed 
 or wounded. Among the latter were the Marquis of Huntly 
 and Alan Cameron, the Colonels of the 92nd and 79th High- 
 landers. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 29 
 
 wounded in two places, and the brave old Abercromby 
 felt as though he had lost his right hand.^ 
 
 General Dunda,s executed the difficult part allotted 
 to him in the complex manoeuvres of this day with 
 great judgment and coolness, though thwarted and 
 embarrassed bj a variety of cross occurrences. One 
 of his brigades (Burrard's 2nd of Guards) had got 
 possession of Schoreldam, but as the Russians were 
 not inclined to advance any further, Burrard could 
 do no more than maintain the post he had won. In 
 the afternoon, therefore, there remained for the im- 
 portant object of dislodging the enemy from Bergen, 
 •and the Koe Dyck, only Coote's and Lord Chat- 
 ham's brigades, instead of the whole of Dundas's 
 division, and the 10,000 Russians under D'Essen. 
 Ooote's four battalions had a tedious and difficult 
 work upon their hands, in fighting their way through 
 the sand-hills, at times in connection with Macdonald's 
 people, but latterly with Lord Chatham's brigade of 
 Militia. David Dundas, taking these two in hand, 
 when he found the Russians would not stir, manoeuvred 
 the French out of the sand-hills up to Bergen in a 
 very handsome and scientific style ; and he finally 
 took post on the ridge overhanging that town, though 
 the enemy made some fierce sallies, in which they 
 were repulsed by the 85th and the 27th Regiments. 
 
 Sir James Pulteney had little more to do than 
 make a show on the enemy's right, and by appearing 
 
 * Sir Kalph had two horses killed under him in this day's 
 fight. 
 
30 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 to threaten Oudt Oarspel, to prevent their detaching 
 troops to the assistance of tliose about Bergen. By 
 daybreak on the 3rd, the Dutch under Daendels 
 had evacuated Oudt Oarspel, retreating on Alkmaar, 
 from whence they soon afterwards pursued their 
 march to unite with the French under Generals Brune 
 and Vandamme, who withdrew slowly and sullenly 
 from Egmont and Bergen. Our troops advanced so 
 far as to take up positions beyond the Egmonts, 
 Op-Zee, and Op-te-Hoof, and Alkmaar ; and the head- 
 quarters were fixed in the latter place, a handsome 
 and flourishing town. 
 
 The Allies claimed this as a victory ; but in truth 
 it was little more than a drawn battle, and its results 
 were more injurious to us than to the enemy. We had 
 lost 2,000 men, and the heaviest losses had fallen on 
 our best regiments. Our enemies were neither broken 
 nor discouraged. Brune fell back, because he had 
 positions in his rear still stronger than those on which 
 he had already fought and staggered us ; and a rein- 
 forcement of 4 or 5000 French were in full march to 
 join him. He threw up works along the short and 
 formidable line of Beyerwyck, and he fortified Purme- 
 rend, on the east side of the Ye, inundating the 
 country near it. 
 
 But the intervening country between Egmont and 
 Beverwyck was still so strong, and afforded such great 
 advantages to troops acting on the defensive, that 
 Brune was not at all disposed to give it up without a 
 farther struggle. He continued, therefore, to occupy 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 31 
 
 Limmen, Ackersloot, and other villages, with a large 
 proportion of his army. 
 
 On the other hand, the Allies over -rated the ad- 
 vantage of occupying Alkmaar : they fancied that 
 the French were beaten, and witli thoughts intent on 
 the celebrated position of Beverwyck, were anxious to 
 arrive there, and to make their attack before the enemy 
 could have time to complete and arm the works on 
 which he was known to be employed.* On Sunday, 
 the 6th of October, therefore, our advanced posts on 
 the right were ordered to move forward, to occupy 
 some of the villages in front, and force the enemy's 
 detachments to fall back upon the position where it 
 was assumed that he would make his stand. Our army 
 was to follow the next morning. But we had mis- 
 taken the intentions of our antagonists, as well as the 
 numbers immediately in our front, and the strength 
 of the ground. At first, the troops that were pushed 
 forward met with but little difficulty in their task, and 
 were allowed to occupy some of the villages and posts 
 allotted to them after sharp skirmishing. But at an 
 important point near Baccum, the advanced guard of 
 the Russian column was checked by an unexpected and 
 severe resistance. Finding the enemy too strong for 
 him, the commander sent back for reinforcements ; 
 regiment after regiment arrived, till seven Russian 
 
 * Yet our right wing tinder Abercromby, which was in 
 front of Egmont, remained two days without connection with 
 our left at Alkmaar. The Russians at length moved up, and 
 occupied the intermediate villages. 
 
32 NARRATIVE OP THE 
 
 battalions were hotly engaged, and still thej found the 
 growing strength of the enemy overpowering them 
 more and more. The French arriving rapidly, became 
 the attacking instead of the defending party. Sir 
 Ralph Abercromby, seeing how things were going, 
 moved up to the support of the Russians ; but the 
 enemy's whole force was in motion. By degrees, the 
 fighting, instead of being confined to Baccum, grew 
 hot in every village and post along the line. The 
 brigades of Dundas's division, as well as those under 
 Abercromby, were drawn successively into severe 
 action, and the Duke of York in Alkmaar was wonder- 
 ing what had fallen out, and what had become of his 
 army. Though the rain poured down in torrents, the 
 musketry was incessant, aide-de-camp after aide-de- 
 camp was sent forth to make out what were the causes 
 and objects of this off-hand engagement, and I was 
 carried up and perched on the top of the tall steeple 
 of Alkmaar, ■^''' with a spying-glass, to try to ascertain 
 for the Duke what was the direction, and where were 
 the main points of the fight. But all was confusion, 
 and in fact the troops were intermingled : they had 
 been brought irregularly into action, without any defi- 
 nite plan on either side : engaging wherever they 
 happened to meet with an enemy, and advancing or 
 retreating in various directions as the one or the other 
 party prove the stronger. The country itself was 
 
 * I was crippled by a rheumatic seizure, having slept in a 
 pool of water on the night of the 2nd, was unable to mount on 
 horseback, and had been caiTied to Alkmaar in a boat. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 33 
 
 extremely intricate, and the thick rain and the heavy 
 smoke dwelling on the coppice-woods, and inclosures 
 of the villages, made it impossible to distinguish any 
 thing clearly. This obstinate and bloody fighting 
 ceased only with the day. At nightfall, the French 
 drew back, and left our troops in possession of the line 
 of posts for which we had unwittingly involved our- 
 selves in this fierce and fruitless contest. The loss of 
 the Allies was not less than 2,500 men, of whom 
 about 700 were prisoners f' that of the enemy was 
 heavier than it had been in the former battles, and 
 between 400 and 500 of the French were taken. The 
 only gleam of brilliancy through this dark thunder- 
 storm, was a charge of five companies of the guards, 
 under Colonel Olephane, into the village of Ackersloot, 
 from which they drove two battalions of French, killing 
 many, and taking 200 prisoners. 
 
 In the last eighteen days, three stubborn and 
 bloody battles had been fought. This action of the 
 6th October crushed every lingering hope of success. 
 Our best troops were disheartened ; our officers had 
 lost all confidence ; the Russians were angry, sullen, 
 and scarcely to be counted as allies : again the line 
 of posts, rather than position, in which our army was 
 somewhat confusedly huddled, was by no means satis- 
 factory ; and we might now expect that the French, 
 encouraged by the results of this last trial of strength, 
 and reinforced by 4000 or 5000 troops from the inte- 
 
 * General Hutchinson wounded ; three Lieut.-Colouels 
 killed ; two taken. 
 
34 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 rior of the Low Countries, would assume the offensive, 
 and attack instead of standing on their defence. As 
 no reasonable hope could be entertained of our pene- 
 trating even as far as Haerlem, it became clearly 
 preferable that the Allied troops should re-occupy 
 their former strong position of the Zuype, rather than 
 remain useless and exposed about Alkmaar ; and if 
 the retreat was necessary, the sooner it was carried 
 into effect the better. The Council of War was una- 
 nimous in these opinions ; and our jaded, drenched, 
 and dispirited army was withdrawn in silence and un- 
 molested within its former lines. The weather had 
 continued, with few and brief intervals, to be dread- 
 fully bad ; torrents of rain, attended by storms of 
 wind. The roads were become almost impassable ; 
 but as the enemy had not discerned, or at least had 
 not molested our retreat, this circumstance became 
 favourable to the Allies when they set themselves 
 down as the defenders of a position. It may, how- 
 ever, be easily conceived that the Allied forces under 
 the command of PI.R.H. the Duke of York were not 
 in an enviable condition. Everybody was out of 
 humour, and out of heart. Only three weeks before, 
 there had marched forth from these same lines an 
 army numbering 35,000 men, confident in their 
 strength, and sanguine in their expectations of driving 
 everything before them, at least as far as Beverwyck. 
 In that position, indeed, the enemy was expected to 
 offer a desperate resistance ; but it was supposed that 
 we should arrive there by the 24th of September, 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 35 
 
 fresh and flushed with previous success. Nor did any 
 man allow himself to doubt that such troops as those 
 of Sir R. Abercrombj's division had proved them- 
 selves to be, and with our new and "invincible'' 
 Allies, the Russians, we could fail to carry the line of 
 Beverwyck ; and then on such a day we were to be 
 at Haerlem, and in so many more at Amsterdam. 
 Alas ! what a change after three weeks of rain and 
 untoward fighting ! Here were the troops in their 
 old lines, minus nearly 10,000 of the bravest men and 
 officers, fatally convinced that they could not make 
 their way forwards, though still numerous ; pent up 
 in a narrow corner of a dismal country, which afforded 
 very insufficient quarters for the troops, and the great 
 number of sick and wounded men ; and of which the 
 cattle were already eaten up. As to the mere ques- 
 tion of defence against the French, there was little to 
 be feared. The position of our army was extremely 
 strong, particularly while the ditches along the front 
 remained unfrozen ; and we could command any 
 quantity of ordnance from the Holder and the fleet 
 for the arming of batteries ; the only apprehension 
 entertained sprung from our observing the gross 
 negligence of the Russian sentinels and outposts on 
 the right ; and if the sharp Frenchmen had risked a 
 dash in this quarter, during the long nights, the safety 
 of the whole might have been compromised. 
 
 The news which arrived about this time tended to 
 depress the minds of men still more. All the bril- 
 liant prospects of the war in Italy and Switzerland 
 
 D 2 . 
 
36 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 had been overclouded ; the army of Korsakoff had 
 been destroyed by Massena ; and the wrecks of the 
 conquering Souvaroff's had, though struggling despe- 
 rately to the last, been forced back beyond the Upper 
 Rhine. To our Russians, this disastrous intelligence 
 afforded fresh food for discontent ; they regarded 
 their countrymen (and not without reason) as having 
 been deserted and sacrificed by the Austrian Govern- 
 ment ; and the bitter fancy that they themselves had 
 been deserted by the British on the 19 th of September, 
 became more deeply rooted in their minds. 
 
 The situation of our army was certainly dismal 
 enough, aggravated as it was by the increasing severity 
 of the season, which was already passing into a pre- 
 mature winter. There were reasons in abundance for 
 the most serious consideration, and the most decided 
 measures ; but yet it is startling to think that the 
 measure which was immediately adopted by generals still 
 at the head of more than 25,000 men, was Capitulation, 
 The allied forces had re-entered the lines of the Zuype 
 on the 8th and 9th of October. By the 18th, a 
 convention was signed, on the part of the Allies, by 
 Major-General Knox (a very intelligent officer, to 
 whom this duty was intrusted), after negotiations and 
 pourparlers with General Brune, which consumed only 
 three days.* The Duke engaged to evacuate Holland 
 
 * From the French oflSicers with whom we had intercourse 
 durinf; these few days, we heard of the arrival of Buonaparte 
 from Egypt. The enthusiasm with which they announced tliis 
 event was very remarkable. Though Napoleon had come 
 alone, bringing nothing to Finance but the powers of his mind 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 37 
 
 entirely by the 30th of November ; to restore the 
 fortifications of the H elder, with all the guns, &c. ; to 
 abstain from cutting dykes, or making inundations ; 
 and to pledge himself that the British Government 
 should send back to France 8,000 of the prisoners of 
 war then in England. 
 
 Little more remains to be told of this gloomy 
 story, except that the storms of that terrible year 
 continued to be such that it was found barely possible 
 to carry off the last of our troops before the time 
 prescribed in the capitulation ; and that in the mean- 
 while several transports and some ships of war were 
 lost, and a great many of our soldiers and sailors were 
 drowned. Sir James Pulteney remained to the last 
 to see the terms of the treaty carried into effect. The 
 Russians were quartered for the winter in Jersey and 
 Guernsey, and our own troops were distributed in 
 various quarters in England to recover their health, 
 their spirits, and their discipline. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS AND INQUIRIES. 
 
 In reviewing the short campaign in North Holland, 
 we have to consider it under tw^o heads. 1st. That 
 wherein the design and plans were interwoven with 
 
 and the influence of his name, yet already did the French 
 armies hail his advent as the certain presage of victory. 
 
3^8 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 political objects ; and 2iicl, with relation only to the 
 military conduct of the undertaking. 
 
 The expedition to Holland in 1799 was, if not 
 conceived, yet principally managed, by Mr. Dundas, 
 who was then the Secretary of State for War and 
 Colonies. When it became certain that the Emperor 
 Paul was determined to send his armies against the 
 French, and that Austria would renew the war, the 
 English Cabinet grew desirous of taking an active part, 
 and employing troops as well as money. But as there 
 were not within the kingdom more than 10 or 12,000 
 infantry (composing battalions of sufficient strength 
 and discipline) which could be spared for foreign ser- 
 vice, a resolution was taken to complete the skeleton 
 regiments of the army (the unhappy remnants of war 
 and yellow fever in the West Indies) by volunteers 
 from the Militia. An Act of Parliament was passed 
 for this purpose in the month of July ; and during 
 August the militiamen, allured by extravagant boun- 
 ties, were drunk and rolling riotously into the ranks of 
 various regiments of the line. Many thousands of 
 stout fellows were obtained by this measure ; but for 
 the time they ceased to be well drilled orderly soldiers 
 of our Militia regiments, without becoming men on 
 whom their new officers could rely for the regular ser- 
 vice. So numerous were the volunteers that many 
 regiments, which in August could hardly muster one 
 or two hundred wasted old soldiers, found itself 2,000 
 strong ; healthy, athletic young men, and well drilled, 
 as far as mere drilling could go. But these men were 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 39 
 
 hardly sobered from the riotous jollity of their volun- 
 teering ; their minds were unsettled ; to them their 
 new officers and serjeants were utter strangers ; every 
 thing was new and bewildering. In this condition 
 they were hurried down to the sea-side, packed into 
 transports, and sent off in a tempestuous season to 
 engage immediately with the French armies in one of 
 the most difficult countries in wliich war can be waged. 
 These raw soldiers did not even bear the uniforms of 
 the regiments whose colours they were expected to 
 
 defend, and whose honour they were to uphold. There 
 
 • 
 had not even been time enough to provide clothing for 
 
 them. When the men were ranked in the 5t]i, or the 
 17th, or 35th, or others of these new swollen regi- 
 ments, there they stood in the respective garbs of the 
 various corps of Militia from which they had been 
 drawn. If only three months had been gained for 
 them to know something of their officers and serjeants, 
 and the ways of the regiment into which they had 
 entered, the men would probably have done their duty 
 well ; but such was not the case, and one cannot be 
 surprised that, with the exception of the 20 th and 
 the 40 til regiments, these suddenly created battalions 
 proved unfit to meet a brave and skilful enemy. 
 
 At the same time that our Ministers adopted such 
 a mode of forming an army for immediate service, 
 they engaged the Russian Emperor to send 17,000 
 of his troops by sea to co-operate with us in an attack 
 on the Low Countries. The crazy Czar was at this 
 time at the highest pitch of his ardour for crushing 
 
40 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 French democracy. He was eager to send his Musco- 
 vites everywhere and anywhere, provided that other 
 Governments (and the English in particular) would 
 bear a large share of the expenses necessary to bring 
 his armies into conflict with those of France. Paul 
 seems never to have doubted of the superiority of his 
 rude soldiers over those of Western Europe. He 
 expected his Russians to conquer, if they found the 
 opportunity to fight, as a matter of course. And the 
 wonderful success of his first four-and- twenty thou- 
 sand men, who descended into Italy under Souvarofi*,* 
 served to confirm and exaggerate this expectation. In 
 a mind ill-poised by nature, and thus excited by an 
 overweening confidence, the disasters which subse- 
 quently fell upon the Russian armies were likely to 
 produce, and did produce a fearful, revulsion. The 
 utter defeat of Korsakoff, the consequent distresses 
 of Souvaroff, and the disappointments and discon- 
 tents of the army which joined the English in North 
 
 * Souvaroff was a leader quite out of and above the 
 ordinary rules of military criticism. There might be some 
 madness in him, or he might affect more than there was. His 
 behaviour might be quoted as extravagant or even ridiculous ; 
 but he was a great Captain, if his recklessness as to the lives of 
 his soldiers be kept out of the question. He possessed the art 
 of winning and preserving the enthusiastic devotion of his 
 soldiers. His energy was as inexhaustible as it was audacious. 
 He taught his followers to trample, as he did himself, on every 
 difficulty in their way. Obstacles only provoked him to strike 
 out new resources; and wild and irregular as he was, he 
 possessed in a remarkable degree that int\iitive sagacity in the 
 hour of battle which is one of the highest qualities of military 
 genius. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 41 
 
 Holland, fixed in the mind of Paul the madman's 
 common persuasion that he was betrayed, insulted, 
 and ill-treated by his Allies. 
 
 But to return to the British Ministry and Mr. 
 Dundas's plan of campaign. The additional troops 
 could not be obtained from the Militia, nor could the 
 Russians be brought from the Baltic before September ; 
 but the war was hot in Italy, and on the Upper 
 Rhine ; and our Cabinet was anxious to be bearing a 
 part. There seems to have been a magnetical attrac- 
 tion for English expeditions to Holland ; and in 1799 
 the Prince of Orange and his mother (for the old 
 Stadtholder was little better than a cypher) were full 
 of a growing confidence as to a reaction of opinions 
 among the Dutch, and as to their impatience of French 
 control. They belieyed that a large majority of the 
 people were desirous that the former order of things, 
 including their trade, should be revived ; and the 
 House of Orange flattered itself, that because the 
 Dutch desired to see them again at the Hague, and 
 the French removed from the country, they would rise 
 in arms to bring these matters to bear. It is the old, 
 incurable error of exiled potentates. There was un- 
 doubtedly in the Seven Provinces a party favourable 
 to the restoration of the House of Orange, and a 
 much larger proportion of the inhabitants desirous to 
 get rid of the French, and to see the independence 
 of their country re-established.* It was particularly 
 
 * It may be doubted whether the Dutch would have taken 
 arms in any part of the Union. If anywhere it would have 
 
42 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 in that peninsula which we chose for our campaign, 
 that the dislike to the Stadtholder was the strongest, 
 and the animosity to the French had been least ex- 
 cited. In North Holland the people were of the old 
 republican character; and in 1799 they preferred the 
 French as being republicans and as enemies of the 
 House of Orange, to the English who hoisted the 
 yellow flag, and circulated proclamations on behalf of 
 the Stadtholder. We found scarcely a friend in the 
 country : a very few Dutch gentlemen came into our 
 army, but they made their way to us from distant 
 quarters. It was fancied that the Batavian troops 
 (as they were then called^ would not fight ; but we 
 found to our cost that their battalions under Daendels 
 fought as hard as the French under Brune and Van- 
 damme. Discouragement met us on every side; and 
 after the unfortunate battle of the 19 th of September (of 
 which more hereafter), the game of the Allies was lost. 
 It may be a doubtful question whether the erroneous 
 choice of the line of operations (for fatally erroneous it 
 was) ought to be charged altogether against the British 
 Cabinet, or whether it might be partly ascribed to the 
 British generals. But here it is necessary, and but just, 
 to set down what was, and to whom was entrusted, the 
 command of the Allied forces. The English Govern- 
 ment having resolved to compose a great army, and 
 to employ it in an invasion of the Low Countries, 
 
 been iii the provinces of Groningen and Friesland. There was 
 to be found the greatest strength of the Orange jjai-ty ; while 
 that of the Independents lay in the great cities. 
 
CAMPAIGN m NORTH HOLLAND. 43 
 
 placed the supreme command, ostensibly, in the hands 
 of the Duke of York. There might be plausible 
 motives for this appointment ; it might obviate diffi- 
 culties, and be satisfactory to the Emperor of Russia; 
 it certainly was gratifying to George the Third ; 
 agreeable to the House of Orange, with whom the 
 Duke was intimately connected ; and he was himself 
 anxious to prove his zeal in the situation he held as 
 Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. But the 
 Cabinet (that is, Messrs. Pitt and Dundas) seem to 
 have entertained strong misgivings of the fitness of 
 their own appointment, for they clogged it with in- 
 structions that on every occasion of importance, his 
 Royal Highness should convene a Council of War; 
 and they prescribed that such Council should be com- 
 posed of the Duke, Lieut.-Generals Sir Ralph Aber- 
 cromby, David Dundas, James Murray Pulteney, the 
 Russian Commander, and Major-General Lord Chat- 
 ham. This nobleman was at the time a member of 
 the British Cabinet, a very gentleman-like man, and a 
 sensible man ; but he was excessively indolent, and 
 had no military experience whatever. With this 
 Council rested the decision on all questions of grave 
 importance. To this Council, rather than to the 
 Duke of York alone, should be ascribed whatever 
 blame may be justly attached to the plans of opera- 
 tions, or of giving battle, the advance or retreat of the 
 army, or finally of the capitulation. But much as I 
 loved the Duke personally, much as I felt many good 
 
44 NARRATIVE OP THE 
 
 and amiable qualities in his character, much as I owe 
 to him of gratitude for long kindness to myself,. I 
 cannot but acknowledge that he was not qualified to 
 be even the ostensible head of a great army on 
 arduous service. At home, he administered the busi- 
 ness of our military establishments sedulously, zea- 
 lously, clearly, and impartially ; but he possessed 
 none of the higher qualities which influence the fate 
 of a campaign, or turn the fortune of a battle. He was 
 of a cool courage ; he w^ould have stood all day to be 
 shot at ; but he had no active bravery. With a very fair 
 understanding, he had little quickness of apprehension, 
 still less of sagacity in penetrating designs, or forming 
 large views : painstaking, yet devoid of resources, and 
 easily disheartened by difl&culties. Even his good 
 nature and kind temper were injurious ; for it too 
 often happened that he could not bring himself to say 
 No, when he ought to have said No. To these defects 
 must be added habits of indulgence, and a looseness 
 of talking, after dinner, about individuals, which made 
 him enemies, and which in this unfortunate campaign 
 probably excited, or inflamed the rancour of the 
 Russian Generals. 
 
 Of the Lieuten ant-Generals who were associated 
 to the control of our military operation. Sir Ralph 
 Abercromby stood foremost. It ought to be unne- 
 cessary to speak in praise of such a man ; but even 
 in this book-making age, when we are overridden 
 with biographical memoirs, there has appeared no 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLT.AND. 45 
 
 biography of the good and gallant Abercrombj. When 
 Mr. Dimdas selected him to lead, and sent him forward 
 in command of what was the muscle and sinew of our 
 army, there were but two faults to be found with the 
 selection. The General was a little too old for hard 
 service, and he was extremely near-sighted. Allowing 
 for these defects of nature, Abercromby was a noble 
 chieftain. Mild in manner, resolute in mind, frank, 
 unassuming, just, inflexible in what he deemed to be 
 right, valiant as the Oid, liberal and loyal as the 
 pro west of black Edward's knights. An honest, fear- 
 less, straightforward man ; and withal sagacious and 
 well-skilled in his business as a soldier. As he looked 
 out from under his thick, shaggy-eyebrows, he gave 
 one the idea of a very good-natured lion, and he was 
 respected and beloved by all who served under his 
 command. 
 
 David Dundas was next in rank. He likewise 
 w^as an aged man, but very different in manner and 
 character from Abercromby, though he, too, w^as a 
 brave, careful, and well-skilled soldier. General 
 Dundas had raised himself into notice but a few 
 years before this time, by having formed a system 
 for the British army (compiled and digested from the 
 Prussian Code of Tactics), both for the infantry and 
 cavalry. This work had been eagerly adopted by the 
 Duke of York as Oommander-in-Ohief, and had become 
 the universal manual in our service. The system was, 
 in the main, good, and founded on right principles, 
 though the book w^as ill-written, and led the large 
 
46 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 class of stupid officers into strange blunders.* But 
 an uniform system had been grievously needed, for no 
 two regiments, before these regulations were promul- 
 gated, moved in unison. Dundas was a tall, spare 
 man, crabbed and austere ; dry in his looks and 
 demeanour. He had made his way from a poor con- 
 dition (he told me himself that he walked from Edin- 
 burgh to London, to enter himself as a " Fireworker" 
 in the Artillery) ; and there were peculiarities in his 
 habits and style, which excited some ridicule amongst 
 young officers. But though it appeared a little out of 
 fashion, there was " much care and valour in that 
 Scotchman.''^ 
 
 The third of our Lieutenant-Generals was Sir 
 James Murray Pulteney, and a very odd man he was. 
 In point of natural abilities he was of a high rank. 
 He had seen a great deal of the world, as well as of 
 military service ; he had read much and variously, 
 and possessed a great fund of knowledge, and con- 
 siderable science. Remarkably good-tempered, cool, 
 unpretending, utterly indiiferent to danger or to 
 hardships— what was it that hindered him from becom- 
 
 * I remember one evening in the winter of 1804, during 
 the Shorncliff camp, I was at Sir John Moore's lodgings at 
 Sandgate ; nobody there but General Dundas, Moore, and 
 myself : the two Generals talking, naturally at that time, on 
 military matters. Dundas had his feet on the fender, and was 
 cowering over the fire. Says Moore, "That book of yours, 
 General, has done a great deal of good, and would be of great 
 value if it were not for those damned eighteen manoeuvres." 
 " Why, — ay," says Sir David, slowly, " ay, people don't 
 understand what was meant. Blockheads don't understand !" 
 
CAMPAIGN m NOETH HOI.LAND. 47 
 
 ing a commander of the first order 1 Just this : Sir 
 James was dreamy, and he liked better to amuse his 
 mind with doubts and varied trials of a problem, than 
 to end it bj a decision. His view of a subject was, 
 nine times out of ten, right ; but he had no confidence 
 in his own opinion, and he lazily surrendered his 
 better judgment on matters which demanded action. 
 Pulteney had awkward manners ; received officers 
 uncouthly ; did not know, or seem to care, how to 
 put them at their ease ; and till one came to know 
 him in intimacy, as I did a few years afterwards, the 
 kindness of his nature, the extent of his knowledge, 
 and the largeness of his views remained hidden under 
 a grotesque""'" and somewhat repulsive exterior. 
 
 Such were the British members of the Duke of 
 York's Council. Of the Russian Commanders little 
 could be known. D'Hermann was made prisoner 
 within a week ; and his successor, D'Essen, held him- 
 self as much aloof as possible from the Duke's Coun- 
 cil and society. 
 
 It requires no ghost to tell the reader that this 
 was not the wisest way of providing for the command 
 of 40,000 men, transported in this stormy season into 
 an enemy's country, which was known to be particu- 
 larly strong in defensive positions, and where they 
 
 * On the day of landing in Holland, Sir James was shot 
 through one of his arms. He walked away to the surgeon, 
 chuckling and mumbling (as was his wont), " Well, now I have 
 been shot through both legs and both arms." And mightily 
 amused he appeared to be, at having thus made up the parti 
 quarre. 
 
48 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 would have to grapple with the seasoned soldiers and 
 practised officers of France. 
 
 We may suppose that the foremost object in 
 selecting the Helder as a point of attack was the 
 capture of the Dutch fleet, and the destruction of 
 their stores. Well, this was effected bj Sir Ralph 
 Abercrombj's successful landing, and secured by his 
 action of the 10th of September. The easy defeat 
 of the enemy, on the latter day, proved that the 
 position of the Zuype Sluys could be held against any 
 force the enemy could collect, particularly if redoubts 
 were constructed, and armed with heavy guns, which, 
 however, w^as not the case when Abercromby was 
 attacked on the 10th of September. Then comes 
 the question, whether it would not have been wise 
 to fortify this position ; and leaving therein a couple 
 of thousand of old soldiers (say Ooote's brigade), 
 marines and seamen from the fleet, 7,000 or 8.000 of 
 the Militia regiments, and a Russian brigade, to have 
 crossed the Zuyder Zee with the remainder of the 
 army, and taken our line of operations on the Yssel. 
 We were completely masters of the sea, and had at 
 our command large naval means. We could have 
 transported to the neighbourhood of Zwoll 10,000 
 or 12,000 British troops, and as many Russians.* 
 We had reason to expect that we should receive in 
 that quarter the friendly assistance of the inhabitants. 
 
 * It was still in the power of the British Government to 
 have reinforced this army with a large body of cavalry, and . 
 at least one brigade of infantry from England. 
 
CAMPAIGN m NORTH HOLLAND. 49 
 
 This line of operations threatened either Arnheim, or 
 Utrecht and Amsterdam. The alarm in this last city 
 would have been increased by the approach of our 
 flotilla. The French could not have remained about 
 Alkmaar, and have engaged in attacks on the strong 
 line of the Zuype Sluys, while the most important 
 places in the Netherlands were exposed to danger. 
 If they did remain there, so much the better for us : 
 our main army would have had an easy game before 
 them, assuming that the object of the expedition was 
 to distress the enemy, to alarm him for the safety of 
 the Low Countries generally,* and to work a diversion 
 in favour of the Allies on the Upper Rhine. If the 
 French abandoned North Holland, and marched to 
 cover Amsterdam and Utrecht, then the British troops 
 left in the Zuype might have been brought across to 
 rejoin the main army, leaving only 3,000 men or so 
 to fortify, and (in co-operation with our fleet) to secure 
 the Holder Point. In this case we might have had 
 35,000 soldiers on the Yssel (and these soldiers who 
 had not yet been cowed or checked) with friendly 
 provinces around us, and Hanover at our back. The 
 game would have been very different from that which 
 was attempted : it had a larger scope, and must have 
 carried a larger influence. Whether it would have 
 been attended with decisive success may fairly be 
 doubted, after the disasters which the Allies brought 
 on themselves in Switzerland ; but on these one could 
 
 * There had been a serious insurrection against the French 
 the year before, on the Lower Rhine and the Maes. 
 
50 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 not calculate ; nor could our army have been easily 
 reduced to the sad necessity of a capitulation. 
 
 This scheme is one of the alternatives which have 
 always suggested themselves to my mind as preferable 
 to the attempt to penetrate by the road of Alkmaar 
 and Haerlem to Amsterdam ; and as it was mixed 
 up with political considerations of great importance at 
 that time, I speak of it as one which might have been 
 suggested, or ought to have been weighed, by the 
 British Government. 
 
 But to turn in the second place to an inquiry into 
 what was done, and into what might have been done, 
 by the commanders of the army from the time it was 
 assembled within the lines of the Zuype. 
 
 The most unaccountable mistake, the great mili- 
 tary blunder (which drew after it all the subsequent 
 misfortunes), was the plan of attack upon the 19th 
 of September. A resolution having been taken to 
 bring the enemy to battle, our best General and 
 10,000 or 12,000 of our best troops were detached to 
 Hoorn late in the evening of the 18th; and before 
 daybreak in the morning the rest of the Allies com- 
 menced their attack on the enemy in their front. 
 Abercromby's column never fired a shot, or saw, or 
 attracted the notice of the enemy ; while the Russians 
 and General Dundas's division were beaten back into 
 their lines before mid-day. It was clearly intended 
 that Abercromby should march straight from Hoorn 
 to Alkmaar, while the rest of the forces were engaging 
 and pressing the enemy along his front ; and if suffi- 
 
CAMPAIGN m NORTH HOLLAND. 51 
 
 cient time had been allowed, the results of the 
 manoeuvre, turning the enemy in rear of his right, 
 and throwing him up into a heap on the one road on 
 his left, might have been brilliant. But the calcula- 
 tions were fatally erroneous. The line of Hoorn was 
 probably the easiest, although the longest, way of 
 approaching Alkmaar : it turned the enemy's actual 
 position ; and there would have been no danger in 
 sending 20,000 men by that route instead of 12,000. 
 The French were not in force sufficient to put our 
 lines in any peril. What occurred* when Aber- 
 cromby arrived at the gates of Hoorn, proved how 
 completely the enemy was taken by surprise on that 
 side, and how little he was prepared to offer a strong 
 resistance on the road from thence to Alkmaar. The 
 movements of the army should have been regulated 
 by the progress of the left column ; and have been 
 confined to engaging and menacing the different 
 points of the enemy's positions, till it was certain that 
 Abercromby was in march from Hoorn, and gaining 
 a line which compromised the safety of the French 
 army. If our antagonists had drawn off a large part 
 of their troops from Bergen and the Koe I)yk to make 
 head against this unexpected attack on their right, the 
 Russians and General Dundas would have easily 
 beaten their left. The strength of the enemy's posi- 
 
 * We found in Hoorn little more of military means than 
 the burgher guard. The town councillors and the commandant 
 were asleep in their beds, and the sentinels were asleep at the 
 gates. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 tion consisted not only in the difficulty of approach 
 to each point separately, but in the shortness of their 
 line altogether. By advancing from the side of 
 Hoorn, we should have forced him to extend, and 
 thereby weaken his position. On neither flank could 
 he have remained strong enough to resist our superior 
 masses ; and if he had been forced and followed up 
 on either extremity, he would have found a retreat 
 very difficult. 
 
 It may be objected, that as Abercromby's wearied 
 troops did not arrive at Hoorn at the hour designed, 
 and would not have been able to resume their march 
 before 11 or 12 o'clock on the 19th, the army would 
 not have had sufficient daylight before them to ad- 
 vance, and fight, and win, and follow up a victory. 
 This may be true, but why, when it was known that 
 this unfortunate delay in .the movement of the left 
 column had taken place, why not defer the battle till 
 the next day 1 Why leave the French all the advan- 
 tages which their short and compact position afforded 
 to their inferior numbers, and attack them there with- 
 out our left hand, and that hand a more efficient one 
 than the right ? 
 
 If we had gained a decided victory on the 19th 
 of September, we might have advanced at once to the 
 front of the Beverwyk position. The Allies 30,000 
 strong and full of confidence : the enemy at that time 
 not more than 20,000, disordered by defeat, and 
 having as yet no defensive works constructed or 
 armed along that important line. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 53 
 
 The battle at Beverwjck might have been fought 
 by the 23rd of September ; and our army might have 
 got out of the narrow and difficult province of North 
 Holland before the day (October 2nd) when they had 
 to struggle through the doubtful and disheartening 
 battle of Bgmont. 
 
 Before we quit altogether the subject of our mili- 
 tary operations in 1799, it may be worth while to 
 give some farther consideration to the landing of Sir 
 Ralph Abercromby's troops on the 27th of August. 
 It is the first instance in modern times in which an 
 invading army has successfully eflfected a landing in 
 the face of an enemy prepared to receive the attack, 
 and having at hand field-artillery and cavalry, as well 
 as a considerable force of regular infantry. That such 
 an operation is fraught with difficulty and danger no 
 military man will doubt, although in the present in- 
 stance, as well as in that upon the coast of Egypt in 
 1801, the venture was crowned with success. On both 
 of these occasions the leading division of the troops 
 made good their footing ; and were able to cover the 
 debarkation of the rest of the forces, with the artillery, 
 stores, and all that was required to render these 
 armies efficient for farther service. But this problem, 
 attempted as yet by the British only, became one of 
 the deepest interest when, in the years 1803, 4, and 
 5, Napoleon was preparing his gigantic means, and 
 
54 NARRATIVE OF THE 
 
 raaturing his plans for the subjugation of England. 
 The subject altogether is one which demands a sepa- 
 rate and extended inquiry : it is one which ought to 
 be studied not only by our military men, but by nayal 
 officers also, and even by the statesmen of England. 
 On this problem of debarking a large army in the face 
 of opposing troops there has hung in our own time the 
 fate of London, if not that of Great Britain : and 
 though such a state of circumstances and chances may 
 never rise again, at least on so vast a scale as that 
 which the genius of Napoleon had dared to contemplate, 
 still the question must be one of great importance to 
 Britain in time of war. I repeat, therefore, that it is 
 worth our while to pay some attention to this in- 
 stance of the landing of our army in North Holland 
 in 1799. 
 
 The season was stormy : the coast was shoal and 
 dangerous. On the other hand we had the undisputed 
 mastery at sea ; nor were we cramped as to time, 
 otherwise than by the weather and the state of the 
 tide. Vice- Admiral Mitchell with a strong squadron 
 of frigates and small two-deckers drawing little water* 
 was able to anchor near enough to the shore to pro- 
 tect the transports, and throw a storm of shot upon 
 the beach, while the boats, heavy with soldiers, were 
 rowing to their landing place. But the only boats 
 were those of the men-of-war, ill calculated for such a 
 service, and incapable of conveying more than 3,000 
 
 * Admiral Duncan was in the offing with the heavier 
 men-of-war. 
 
I 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN NORTH HOLLAND. 55 
 
 men at a time. To the officers of our navj this kind 
 of operation was entirely new ; nor did they under- 
 stand the details, or feel the importance of arrange- 
 ment on which military order and military success 
 must greatly depend. Thus parts of regiments were 
 conveyed to the shore, while parts were left behind. 
 Battalions were intermixed ; and companies had to 
 find their proper places after they had landed, and 
 were under the fire of the enemy. The soldiers had 
 to wade and scramble out of the surf as well as they 
 could, and look out for their comrades, and run to 
 their stations in the line which was growing slowly 
 into shape along the beach. Fortunately General 
 Daendels chose to keep his men sheltered from the fire 
 of the ships, and to cling to the strong post he had 
 taken near Oallantsoog. If he had rushed headlong 
 on the flank of our first division of troops during the 
 confusion of landing, he might have inflicted a great 
 loss on the British, and perhaps routed these leading 
 brigades. There was time enough to have done the 
 work before the guards could get ashore : and it was 
 long before the rest of Abercromby's little army were 
 able to land. It is true that the Dutch might have 
 lost a good many men from the fire of our ships, but 
 it was their business to be quick in their rush ; and to 
 have mingled their superior numbers so completely 
 with the British soldiers, that the men-of-war would 
 not have ventured to direct their shots against the 
 confused mass of friends and foes. But Daendels 
 either did not see the chance, or he felt his troops 
 
56 CAMPAIGN IN HOLLAND. 
 
 unequal to such a trial. He allowed our forces to 
 land and form without hinderance : fought a merely 
 soldier's fight, though gallantly, in the strong post he 
 had chosen ; and was at length beaten out of it by 
 the growing numbers and unyielding bravery of his 
 assailants. 
 
 But Abercromby had seen with alarm the confu- 
 sion and danger which attended the debarkation of his 
 10,000 soldiers ; and it was probably the impression 
 made upon his mind on this occasion which led him 
 to form and mature that admirable plan by which, 
 eighteen months afterwards, his army was landed on 
 the shores of Aboukir in complete order of battle. 
 
MILITARY PEEPAEATIONS, 
 
 1800. 
 
 After our evacuation of Holland in Noyember 
 1799, General Brune received orders to march imme- 
 diately with the greater part of his army to the 
 Lower Loire, where the insurgent Ohouans were 
 growing too strong for the republican forces. It was 
 a severe march in so inclement a season; but the 
 circumstances were urgent, and Brune arrived at 
 Angers by the 20th of January, 1800. 
 
 The Ohouans, elated by some considerable suc- 
 cesses,* were indulging hopes that the Russians, now 
 quartered in our Channel Islands, were coming, backed 
 by a British army, to their support. No movement, 
 however, was made by the Allies ; the royalist chiefs 
 in La Vendee treated with Bonaparte; and Brune 
 acting with great promptitude and vigour, crushed the 
 insurgents of Brittany so eflfectually, that the last of 
 their bands laid down their arms before the end of 
 February. 
 
 * They had overrun large districts, and had taken Mans 
 and other towns; nay, in October, the Ohouans had surprised 
 the great city of Nantes, and they were masters of it for several 
 hours. 
 
58 MILITAEY PREPAKATIONS, 
 
 It may be doubted whether it was desirable that 
 a warfare of so low and cruel a cliaracter as that 
 which had been waged by these Chouans should have 
 been prolonged. They appear as a degenerate class 
 when compared with the noble people of La Vendee; 
 yet it is not improbable that if these wild bands of 
 Brittany had been able to make head a few months 
 longer, the smothered fire in Poitou would have again 
 blazed out, and a wide-spread insurrection would have 
 crippled the power of the French republic for aggres- 
 sive purposes. If such might have been the case, the 
 failure of the Duke of York's army to retain such a 
 hold on the Low Countries, as would have kept Brune 
 and his troops employed in that quarter, must be re- 
 garded as fatal in its effects on the issue of the war.* 
 The prompt destruction of the Chouans, afforded to 
 Bonaparte the time and the means he required for the 
 formation of that army, with which, he crossed the 
 Alps and overthrew the Austrian s at Marengo. 
 
 The British troops which returned from Holland 
 were quartered for the winter chiefly in the south and 
 east of England. Many of the regiments were very 
 sickly ; and a few months of rest and good manage- 
 ment were requisite to restore the efficiency of all, and 
 
 * Brune has been censured by some of his countrymen for 
 granting any terms of capitulation to the Allied army. K he 
 had not, the results would have proved very dangerous to the 
 Consular Government. Nor could he have forced the lines of 
 the Zuype, unless through the grossest negligence on the part of 
 the Russians, or the treachery of their commander. Napoleon 
 was contented with Brune's campaign, and made liim a marshal 
 for it. 
 
1800. 59 
 
 particularly to improve the discipline of those corps 
 which had received large proportions of militiamen. 
 It was a dismal winter in this country. There had 
 been two successive years of the worst weather ima- 
 ginable. The harvest of 17.99 had been miserably 
 deficient; and the distress throughout the kingdom 
 was terrible. There appeared no symptoms of a re- 
 newal on our part of offensive warfare; yet as early 
 as December, 1799, there was a great project under 
 the consideration of our Government. This plan had 
 been conceived and submitted to our war minister by 
 General Sir Charles Stuart, who had taken Minorca in 
 
 1798, and was at this time commander of the forces 
 in the Mediterranean. He asked that 15,000 men 
 might be sent from England; the least efficient of 
 which should be placed in garrison at Gibraltar and 
 Minorca, and should set at liberty the old regiments 
 which were stationed there. He might thus have 
 formed an efficient and seasoned army, with which he 
 proposed to act against the enemy, on the coast 
 between Toulon and Genoa; while the exiled General 
 De Willot, a man of talent and energy, undertook to 
 raise an insurrection in the neighbourhood of Marseilles. 
 
 It will be remembered that when, in December, 
 
 1 799, Napoleon Bonaparte became the ruler of France, 
 under the title of First Consul, he had found the 
 armies of the republic greatly reduced in numbers. 
 That army in particular, which still held possession of 
 Genoa and the Western Riviera, was dispirited by its 
 late defeats, and was languishing under severe priva- 
 
60 MILITARY PREPARATIONS, 
 
 tions and mortal diseases. It mustered in the gross 
 about 38,000 men,'"' including a dismal proportion of 
 sick. It stretched along the coast of the Mediterra- 
 nean, from the banks of the Var to beyond Genoa. 
 Not only had the French to maintain possession of 
 this great city and its extensive line of outworks, but 
 they had also to defend the various passes of the 
 Appenines to the Maritime Alps, along a line of more 
 than 150 miles. To secure the passage of the Var, 
 and the mountain roads which lead from Piedmont 
 upon Oneglia and Savona, was an object of import- 
 ance scarcely inferior to that of making good the 
 defence of Genoa. On the northern side of the 
 Appenines, from Ooni to Piacenza, there lay more 
 than 80,000 Austrian s, well supplied and ready to 
 commence hostilities with the opening spring, exclusive 
 of nearly 20,000 men who formed the garrisons of 
 fortresses in Lombardy and Piedmont. To the com- 
 mander of this Imperial army, the foremost object 
 ought to have been, that of crushing the enemy's 
 troops in the Genoese territory before they could be 
 reinforced. 
 
 The First Consul was prepared to meet the 
 Austrians in Germany with equal numbers ; but he 
 felt great difficulties with regard to his Italian army, 
 weak as it was, devoid of resources, and exposed to be 
 overpowered by a very superior enemy. It was then 
 
 * The officers, Serjeants, and drummers are included in the 
 French returns. Deducting these, there would remain about 
 34,000 rank and file. 
 
1800. ~ 61 
 
 that Bonaparte formed his gigantic plan of crossing 
 the Alps with 60,000 men, bj routes which were con- 
 sidered impassable for cannon. But time was required 
 to collect and equip such an armj; and the more be- 
 cause the greatest art and caution were indispensable 
 to elude observation, and baffle suspicion as to his 
 design. In the mean time, it was to be feared that 
 his 88,000 men, who were scattered from Nice to 
 Genoa, and who believed themselves to be abandoned 
 by their Government,''' might fail to oppose to the 
 
 * Tlie story of this army as given by French writers deserves 
 attention, and affords a lesson to military men. In January, 
 1800, it still mustered more than 50,000 men including officers 
 and Serjeants. Ten thousand recruits joined them before 
 March. Yet so great was the mortality in the hospitals, and 
 so unexampled the amount of desertions (many officers being 
 included under the latter head), that when Massena arrived 
 there remained only 38,000 men. Of these a great proportion 
 were sick and they were in urgent want of clothes, shoes, 
 money, and supplies of every kind (see Thiebault and others). 
 
 The right wing of the French (their head-quarters being in 
 Genoa) extended from Porto Fino to Savona; and it could 
 bring about 11,000 rank and file into the field, after providing 
 scantily for the forts and posts which it was necessary to main- 
 tain. 
 
 The left wing, under the immediate command of Genera. 
 Suchet, held the Maritime Alps, and the line of coast from 
 Oneglia to the Var. It was less sickly than the troops on the 
 right; and it could probably have produced as many fighting 
 men in the field as the former, exclusive of between 3,000 to 
 4,000, who were detached to guard the Mont Gen^vre and the 
 Mont Cenis. But Suchet had to maintain a precarious com- 
 munication from Oneglia, with Soult's division which lay about 
 Savona ; and he had to make strong provision for the passes on 
 the side of Coni and Mondovi, where the Austrians were in 
 considerable force. 
 
62 MILITARY PREPARATIONS, 
 
 Austrians, such a resistance as should afford time for 
 the arrival of the Chief Oonsurs army in Italy. Bona- 
 parte, therefore, selected Massena, as the fittest of his 
 lieutenants to revive the confidence of the troops, and 
 to maintain a desperate struggle to the last for the 
 city of Genoa, and the passes of the mountains. 
 "Well did Massena fulfil the objects of his great com- 
 mander ; but it would not be difficult to shew, that if 
 Sir Charles Stuart's plan had been promptly and 
 rigorously carried into execution, the campaign would 
 probably have been attended with results very diffe- 
 rent from those which actually ensued. 
 
 It is not presumptuous to say, now that we know 
 what British soldiers are capable of, that such a body 
 of troops would have marred the glory of Massena's 
 sorties, and have probably occasioned the surrender 
 of the city a month earlier than it actually took place. 
 The consequences of such a difference in time are 
 beyond calculation. Old Melas would have had 
 20,000 more men in hand when Napoleon crossed 
 the St. Bernard : the battles of Montebello and Ma- 
 rengo would have been fought (if fought at all) under 
 very different chances, and " Flodden had been Ban- 
 nockburn ! " 
 
 Observe what Napoleon wrote at St. Helena, with 
 regard to the army in Liguria : " La cavalerie, les 
 charrois perirent de misere ; les maladies contagieuses 
 et la desertion dcsorganiserent I'armce. Enfin le mal 
 empira au point que des corps entiers, tambour bat- 
 tant, drapeau d^ploye, abandonnerent leur position, et 
 
1800. 63 
 
 repasserent le Var/' (See Memoires ecrits a Ste. 
 Helene, tome 1, p. 157). 
 
 But to return to the dismal facts : our ministers 
 having for the moment exhausted the military strength 
 of the kingdom by the expedition to Holland, seemed 
 to relapse into their old condition of not knowing 
 what to do. Instead of anticipating events, they fol- 
 lowed them, and followed them by movements so 
 tardy, that these became useless. Though masters of 
 the Mediterranean Sea, they were blind to the 
 importance of aiding the operations of Austria on 
 its northern shore. 
 
 It was very much a question of time. If the 
 British army had been collected, as Stuart required 
 and hoped, before the end of March, it might have 
 arrived on the enemy's coast at nearly the same time 
 as when the Austrians opened their campaign. On 
 the 5th and 6th of April, their columns, 50,000 or 
 60,000 strong, attacked the French posts in the passes 
 of the Appenines, from the mountains to the eastward 
 of Genoa, to those which rise on the west of Finale. 
 Hard fighting and alternate successes protracted a 
 series of conflicts, which lasted through fifteen days ; 
 and this space of time (precious to the designs of 
 Napoleon) was gained to the French, before the supe- 
 rior numbers of the Austrians prevailed so far, after 
 an enormous loss of men, as to force back the whole 
 of the enemy's right wing within the lines of Genoa. 
 
 But for the argument I have in hand, it is of par- 
 ticular importance to observe what was done by the 
 
64 MILITARY PREPARATIONS, 
 
 left wing of the French under General Suchet. He 
 had moved rapidly up, with all his disposable troops 
 to the mountains near Finale ; and between the 6th 
 and 12th of April, he was engaged in a series of hard 
 and bloody actions with the right of the Austrian 
 army commanded by General Elsnitz. Suchet was 
 finally worsted ; his communications with Massena 
 were lost, and he was obliged to fall back to a position 
 near Albenga. There he held his ground till the be- 
 ginning of May, when Melas, having shut up Massena 
 within the walls of Genoa, came in person with a 
 portion of his army to this quarter. Suchet was 
 imable to withstand such superior forces. He was 
 beaten from post to post, and finally driven across the 
 Var, with a heavy loss of men."^''' 
 
 But Melas had carried away too large a part of 
 the troops which had driven the French into Genoa. 
 Imagining that Massena was completely crippled, and 
 
 * General Melas appears to have been in person, at Nice, so 
 late as the 18th of May. On that day, he hurried off with a 
 part of his army, in consequence of the appearance of Napoleon's 
 vanguard in the valley of Aosta. Melas left Elsnitz with 1 8,000 
 men to attempt to force the passage of the Var, in the face of 
 Suchet's batteries. Two attempts were made, and were repulsed 
 with heavy loss, and Elsnitz then drew off with his diminished 
 and disheartened troops to rejoin his commander in Alexandria. 
 See what Lord William Bentinck, who was with Melas writes to 
 Lord Grenville on the 15th of June : — 
 
 (Extract) : — " I am sorry to say that General Elsnitz*s corps, 
 which was composed of the Grenadiers and the finest regiments 
 in the army, arrived in the most deplorable condition. That 
 General had received orders to proceed by forced marches, and 
 to effect a junction at any rate. His men had already suffered 
 
1800. 65 
 
 unequal to resume offensive movements, the Austrian 
 commander left such a force to maintain the blockade 
 as proved to be inadequate to the service. These 
 troops were repeatedly beaten, and thej suffered very 
 great losses from the frequent and furious sorties of 
 the republicans. 
 
 Now, if Stuart had landed near Nice or Yenti- 
 miglia during these operations, Suchet's corps must 
 have been destroyed. It would have been unnecessary 
 for Melas to march to the support of Elsnitz. The 
 successes which Massena obtained over that portion of 
 the Austrians, which vv^as left under General Ott 
 round Genoa, would have been prevented by the very 
 superior numbers of the beleaguers. Genoa would pro- 
 bably have been taken a month earlier, and at all events 
 the Austrians might have had 15,000 or 20,000 more 
 men, and in better condition, in the field of Marengo. 
 
 But it is high time after this long digression, to 
 return to the proper subject of my narrative, the actual 
 
 very much from want of provisions and other hardships. He 
 was pursued in his retreat by General Suchet, who had with 
 him about 7,000 men. There was an action at Ponte di Nava, 
 in which the French failed ; and it will appear hardly credible 
 when I tell your Lordship, that the Austrians lost in this 
 retreat, from fatigue only, near 5,000 men." Even after the 
 battle of Marengo was actually begun, Melas was so much 
 alarmed at the approach of Suchet, that he detached 2,200 of his 
 cavalry, whom he could very ill spare, to observe and retard 
 the march of this hostile corps. Now, if 10,000 British had 
 landed at Savona or Oneglia, even so late as the first week in 
 June, Suchet must have desisted from his pursuit of Elsnitz, 
 SLvd Melas would have had a very superior force of cavalry in 
 the field of Marengo. 
 
66 MILITARY PREPAKATIONS. 
 
 employment of the British troops by the British Go- 
 yernment. My object in digressing has been to show 
 the importance of the plan proposed by Sir Charles 
 Stuart, and the results which might have been reason- 
 ably expected from it. This masterly design appears 
 to have been approved and adopted in the first 
 instance by Mr. Dundas ; and early in February, 
 Stuart invited General Moore, and others to serve 
 under his command. But there had been much re- 
 missness during the winter, in restoring the discipline 
 and efficiency of the regiments which had returned 
 from Holland. But little exertion was made : pre- 
 cious time was lost ; and when the month of March 
 arrived, it was announced that only 10,000 men could 
 be furnished, instead of the 15,000 which Stuart had 
 required and expected. And now the members of 
 the Cabinet changed their minds, or Mr. Dundas was 
 out-voted ; it was notified to the General that he should 
 have only 5,000 men from England for the Mediter- 
 ranean service, and ministers determined to send the 
 rest of the troops which remained at their disposal 
 to Portugal. Sir Charles Stuart was a man of high 
 abilities, but of a hot temper and hauglity bearing. 
 He considered himself to have been deceived and 
 unworthily treated ; he threw up his command, and 
 the services of one of the ablest of our Generals were 
 lost to the country."'^ 
 
 * Sir Charles Stuart was the youngest son of tlie celebrated 
 Earl of Bute, and was father of the late Lord Stuart of Rothsay. 
 He died in May, 1801. 
 
1800. 67 
 
 The transports, on board of which were embarked 
 the 5,000 men under General Pigott, were kept lin- 
 gering at their anchorage till the end of April, when 
 thej were at last ordered to sail for Minorca. In the 
 mean time the idea of sending troops to Portugal had 
 been abandoned; and Sir Ralph Abercromby was 
 invited to take the command of the army in the Medi- 
 terranean; but it was not till the 13th of May that he 
 was dispatched in a frigate, accompanied by Generals 
 Hutchinson and Moore. 
 
 They arrived at Port Mahon on the 22nd of June; 
 and there Sir Ralph found letters from Lord Keith, 
 who commanded our fleet off Genoa, pressing the 
 General most urgently to bring his troops without 
 delay to that place. So effectual had been the pre- 
 parations made by the Governor of Minorca, General 
 Fox, that eight battalions, with artillery, &c., were 
 embarked the next morning and sailed under Aber- 
 cromby's command for Genoa. But it was too late ! 
 Our ministers had wasted in doubts and idle crotchets 
 the three months, within which the Austrians might 
 have been effectually succoured. The battle of Ma- 
 rengo had been fought; and when Sir Ralph arrived 
 off Genoa, he found the city and port once more in the 
 possession of the victorious French. The British fleet 
 had sailed away to Leghorn; and to that port Aber- 
 cromby repaired with his 5,000 or 6,000 men. Here 
 he was beset by the Queen of Naples, who was stay- 
 ing at Leghorn ; attended not only by her own minis- 
 ters, but likewise by Lord Nelson and Sir William 
 
 F 2 • 
 
68 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 
 
 Hamilton. By all was Sir Ralph importuned to bring 
 his troops ashore and engage himself in the renewal of 
 the war in Italy. The General's decision was taken 
 immediately. He distrusted their view of affairs ; he 
 felt the deep responsibility of acting without instruc- 
 tions from the British Government ; and he refused at 
 once to commit his little army in the prosecution of 
 schemes propounded by the Queen of Naples. Order- 
 ing Moore to return to Minorca with the troops, Sir 
 Ralph sailed for Malta, to observe the state of the 
 blockade of La Valetta, and satisfy himself as to 
 the probabilities of reducing the enemy's garrison to 
 surrender. 
 
 The people of Malta had risen against the French 
 in the autumn of 1799, and English ships of war had 
 immediately blockaded the port. While Nelson re- 
 mained in the command of our fleet in that sea, he was 
 boiling over with eagerness to accomplish the reduc- 
 tion of that important place. In a letter from him to 
 the Governor of Minorca, begging for military assist- 
 ance, there is this characteristic passage: "God forbid 
 that we should be obliged to give up the idea of taking 
 La Valetta! Only the thought of it almost breaks my 
 heart !"* It was not, however, till March 1800 that 
 two British regiments (the 30th and 89th) were sent 
 to assist the Maltese in maintaining an effectual 
 blockade of the fortress. Such was the state of 
 affairs when Sir Ralph Abercromby visited the island. 
 
 * Lord Nelson to the General in Command at Minorca, 
 November 12th, 1799. 
 
1800. 69 
 
 He stayed but a few days; and immediatelj on his 
 return to Minorca, he despatched Major-General Pigott 
 with two battalions of the 35th regiment to strengthen 
 the investment of La Valetta; which fortress was 
 surrendered bj capitulation on the 5th of September 
 following. 
 
 Upon Sir Ralph's arrival at Port Mahon, on the 
 3rd of August, he found a large accession to the 
 strength of his army. More than 4,000 men had 
 arrived from the English Channel, after having been 
 present at certain "nibblings^'on the enemy's coast, of 
 which I will speak presently. But the General found, 
 also, despatches from Lord Keith, forwarding solicita- 
 tions from General Melas (backed by those of Lord 
 William Bentinck), that the forces under Aber- 
 cromby's command might be landed at Leghorn 
 There had appeared in several parts of Tuscany a 
 strong disposition to rise in arms against the French;* 
 
 * Although Abercromby, uninformed as to the views of his 
 Government, was unwilling to engage his army in an Italian 
 campaign, the plan suggested by the Austrians was by no means 
 unreasonable, nor was it unsafe for the British division. It was 
 proposed to give us possession of the port and fortress of Leg- 
 horn. The Neapolitan army, strong in numbers though bad in 
 quality, was lying at Rome and ready to advance to Florence. 
 The Austrians were in possession of Ancona. The Tuscan 
 peasantry did rise in arms, and they were thoroughly in earnest. 
 In large bodies, under the general direction of an Austrian 
 officer, they swarmed in the Apennines from the borders of 
 Lucca to those of Arezzo. The French army, now under the 
 command of General Brune, was confronted by equal numbers 
 of Austrians, who held the strong position of the Mincio. 
 Between these chief actors the truce which had commenced 
 
70 MILITARY , PREPARATIONS. 
 
 and it was considered bj the Austrian General that a 
 body of 10,000 British troops, supporting insurrec- 
 tionary masses in the mountains between Florence and 
 Bologna, would greatly improve the position which his 
 army then occupied along the Mincio, from Peschiera 
 to the Po. Sir Ralph, however, having no instructions 
 from home, and distrusting the accounts received from 
 Italy, resolved to wait for further orders. He merely 
 despatched General Hope to the Austrian head- 
 
 with the capitulation of Alessandria, had been renewed from 
 time to time; and in the autumn of 1800 the French growing 
 uneasy at the prospect of affairs in Tuscany, took advantage of 
 this suspension of arms with Austria. The right wing of 
 Brune's army suddenly crossed the Apennines, and marched in 
 three columns upon Leghorn, Florence, and Arezzo. Of the 
 two first of these towns the French made themselves masters 
 without firing a shot, for there were no troops to defend them ; 
 and in the port of Leghorn they captured about fifty sail of 
 British merchant vessels. On the side of Arezzo, however, the 
 third column encountered a desperate resistance; it suffered 
 much loss, and was for a time discomfited. The Aretines and 
 the men of the mountains fought hard, but they were finally 
 subdued by the arrival of the other French division from 
 Florence. Now, if the British had been in possession of Leg- 
 horn, which they had the means of strengthening so that it 
 could not have been taken unless by a regular siege, it is suflSici- 
 ently clear that the enemy could not have risked this irruption 
 into Tuscany ; the Neapolitan army would have been brought 
 up to Florence, threatening Bologna, and communicating with 
 the Austrians on the Mincio. General Brune's operations would 
 have been paralysed. It is true that the fate of the war was 
 decided at the close of the year by the victory of Hohenlinden : 
 but one coidd not foresee that the Imperialists were to be 
 utterly routed in Germany ; and, therefore, I hold the opinion 
 that the solicitations made by General Melas and Lord William 
 Bentinck, in August 1800, were justly grounded and well 
 considered. 
 
1800. 71 
 
 quarters to communicate with Melas, and to furnish 
 information as to the true state of affairs in that 
 quarter. 
 
 In the mean time Abercrombj, seconded by the 
 activity of General Moore, who enjoyed his fullest 
 confidence, applied himself earnestly to improvements 
 in the discipline and fitness for the field of the army 
 which was now assembled under his orders in Minorca, 
 There were no less than twenty-two battalions of 
 infantry, mustering on an average about 650 rank 
 and file each, with several companies of artillery; but 
 of horsemen there were only about fifty of the 11th 
 Light Dragoons. Thus wore away the month of August, 
 when, just at its close, arrived Major-General Crad- 
 dock, bringing despatches from England which called 
 Sir Ralph Abercromby to service in another quarter. 
 
 Before I proceed to speak of the lamentable expe- 
 dition to Cadiz, it may be worth while to look back 
 and inquire what our ministers had been doing since 
 the spring with those military means which they had 
 refused to Sir Charles Stuart. I have already men- 
 tioned that 5000 of the soldiers which had been pro- 
 mised to him were withdrawn, under the plea that 
 they were wanted to support the King of Portugal 
 against a rumoured invasion of Spaniards. But it was 
 very soon found that there was no intention on the 
 part of Spain to invade the neighbouring kingdom; 
 and before the end of June our Government was at a 
 loss to know what to do with the said 5,000 men, and 
 twice as many more, who were by this time fit for 
 
72 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 
 
 service.^ La Vendee had been long pacified bj the 
 wise policy which Bonaparte had pursued, and by the 
 crushing of the Ohouans in the preceding February; 
 yet, now Sir Edward Pellew was ordered to attack 
 the forts in Quiberon Bay, and a division of our 
 troops was sent to make an attempt on Belleisle. As 
 soon as they had arrived and were able to reconnoitre 
 that fortress, they found that Belleisle was a great 
 deal too strong to be meddled with ; the British 
 sailed away unharming and unharmed ; and most of the 
 regiments proceeded under Colonel Lord Dalhousie, to 
 Minorca. 
 
 The next experiment of our ministers was directed 
 against Ferrol. There might be a better excuse for 
 this attempt, because there were ships of war in the 
 harbour, and a naval establishment of much import- 
 ance. In its result, however, this essay proved as 
 abortive as that at Belleisle, and in a certain degree it 
 was worse, because it brought some discredit on the arms 
 of England ; the forces employed, both naval and 
 military, were large. The troops, under the command of 
 Sir James Murray Pulteney, landed near Ferrol, drove 
 the Spaniards, after a sharp skirmish or two, within 
 the walls, and occupied the heights which overlook the 
 
 * Whenever our ministers found that they had a large 
 body of troops at their disposal they shewed symptoms of 
 wanting to do something ; but they never were prepared before- 
 hand, and they seldom looked to the main objects of the contest 
 in which they were engaged. Over and over again they missed 
 the proper time for acting vigorously, and mistook the scene on 
 which the power of England might have been brought to l)ear 
 with effect on the fortune of the war. 
 
1800. 73 
 
 fortress. That the place might have been carried by 
 a coup de main, was the general opinion of our naval 
 men on the spot, and such likewise was the opinion of 
 many of the officers of the army. But Pulteney, or 
 those about him, thought otherwise : he judged that 
 Ferrol could not be taken without a regular siege, and 
 such a loss of time as would enable the armies of Spain 
 to come to its relief/''' The troops were reimbarked, 
 and they sailed away from Ferrol, grumbling against 
 their commander, and stung by the violent taunts of 
 their naval brethren. 
 
 Unhappy as these attempts had been, unfairly as 
 our troops had been tried, they were yet doomed to 
 encounter a disappointment on a larger scale. Sir 
 James Pulteney, with augmented forces^ was ordered 
 to repair to the Bay of Gibraltar, and to that place of 
 rendezvous was Abercromby directed with more than 
 10,000 men from Minorca. He arrived there on the 
 14th of September, but it was not till the 20th that 
 
 * It ought to be recorded, injustice to Sir James Pulteney's 
 memory, that Sir John Moore reconnoitered Ferrol from the 
 same heights, in December 1804, and came to the same con- 
 clusion. At the latter period, the British Government had 
 resumed the idea of striking at Ferrol, and capturing or destroy- 
 ing the strong squadron, which then lay ready for sea, in the har- 
 bour. Moore was sent in a frigate that he might judge on the 
 spot of the probabilities of success. He landed with two or 
 three officers of the navy, under the pretext of shooting ; but, 
 while upon the hill making his observations, he was descried 
 by a Spanish outpost, and the General had a hard run for his 
 life, before he could reach the boat. Sir John told me he saw 
 enough to convince him that Ferrol could not be carried by a 
 coup de main. 
 
74 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 
 
 Piiltenej joined them, and the united fleets of trans- 
 port anchored in Tetuan Bay. In the mean time Sir 
 Ralph had learned that the yellow fever, in its most 
 fatal form, was raging in and about Cadiz, the place 
 which he had secret orders to attack. The General 
 was disposed, in consequence, to suspend his opera- 
 tions against that unliappy town ; to repair with his 
 great army to the Tagus, and to wait there till fresh 
 instnictions could be received from England. The 
 admiral however, Lord Keith, put a different inter- 
 pretation on the orders which had been received from 
 our Government. He considered them to be peremp- 
 tory, particularly as to an attack on the Oaraccas, and 
 the capture or destruction of the Spanish ships. 
 Under these circumstances. Sir Ralpli Abercromby 
 acquiesced, though reluctantly, in the prosecution of 
 the enterprise. 
 
 A week was consumed in watering the great arma" 
 ment at Tetuan, and then came contrary winds and 
 calms which delayed its progress, so that it was 
 late on the 4th of October (just the season of 
 equinoctial gales) before the fleet anchored off Cadiz. 
 A great force it was which menaced this city in the 
 hour of its distress. The army under the command 
 of the wise and gallant Abercromby, mustered nearly 
 22,000 rank and file (exclusive of the sick), and filled 
 more than 120 sail of troop ships and transports. 
 There, too, rode a brave and powerful squadron of 
 men-of-war, under the orders of Lord Keith. 
 
 Up to this time, the leaders of our expedition had 
 
1800. 76 
 
 obtained little or no intelligence as to the state of 
 preparation in wliicli the Spaniards might be found ; it 
 was only known that an attack upon Cadiz had been 
 expected there for some time past. It was now ascer- 
 tained from fishermen and others, that there were about 
 8,000 troops in the Isle of Leon, a brigade of infantry 
 at St. Mary's, and one of cavalry at Rota; it was stated 
 likewise, that the fever was raging with unabated fury ; 
 that the daily mortality, in the town of Cadiz alone, 
 exceeded two hundred persons ; that it prevailed in 
 all the villages around, and was equally fatal among 
 the troops. There could be no reason to hope that 
 the British army, if it should be landed, could escape 
 the effects of the pestilence. Still Abercromby felt, 
 dragged thither as he was by the construction which 
 Lord Keith chose to put upon the orders of our Govern- 
 ment, that the honour of his army was at stake ; and 
 he prepared his troops to disembark. 
 
 The brigade of guards, and the regiments under 
 ^General Moore's immediate command (which were 
 called " the Reserve"), received orders to take the 
 lead, and effect the first landing near Rota. But 
 this vanguard could not have much exceeded 4,000 
 men ; and a considerable time must, at all events, 
 have elapsed before they could have been joined by a 
 second division. Sir Ralph, therefore, felt it incum- 
 bent upon him to obtain from the Admiral a distinct 
 and sufficient assurance, that the succeeding debarka- 
 tions of his army, with its artillery and indispensable 
 supplies, could be effected with certainty, and a con- 
 
76 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 
 
 stant communication with the fleet maintained. If 
 the navy could afford him this guarantee, the General 
 "was ready to land ; nor did he feel any doubt of his 
 being able to efi'ect the main purpose of the expedition 
 by the destruction of the Spanish arsenals ; but his 
 orders from home enjoined that he was to make the 
 attack only if he was satisfied that his army could be 
 safely re-embarked. 
 
 To this direct question, Lord Keith was found 
 very reluctant to afford a direct answer. Forced, 
 however, to come to the point, he admitted that the 
 opinions of the naval officers who were best acquainted 
 with the coast were not in favour of the under- 
 taking; that if a south-west wind should set in, the 
 fleet could not remain at its present anchorage; that 
 communication with the army could not then be pre- 
 served; and that if the weather should become foul 
 and blow hard, the transports would be in danger of 
 being driven ashore. Though Abercromby had gene- 
 rously offered to share with Lord Keith the responsi- 
 bility of making the attempt, or of abandoning it, the 
 Admiral would neither take upon himself to answer 
 for the safe landing of the whole of the army, nor for 
 its re-embarkation, nor for the safety of the transports; 
 while at the same time, his Lordship carefully eluded 
 the invitation to bear his share in the responsibility of 
 abandoning the euterprize. 
 
 It would have been the extreme of rashness if 
 Abercromby had persisted in attempting to land his 
 brave army under such circumstances. Lord Keith 
 
1800. 75r 
 
 continued coldly and cautiously to decline giving any 
 assurance that the several divisions of the troops could 
 be set on shore in succession ; or, that if the whole 
 could be disembarked, a communication between the 
 army and the fleet could be secured. At the same 
 time, his Lordship would not let slip a syllable which 
 might imply an assent on his part to the relinquish- 
 ment of the attempt upon the Spanish ships and 
 arsenals. Thus ungenerously treated by his colleague, 
 Sir Ralph Abercromby was driven to the necessity of 
 relying on his own judgment, and forced to take upon 
 himself the responsibility of abandoning this ill-con- 
 sidered enterprise. 
 
 Three things are sufficiently evident with regard 
 to this attempt on Cadiz, or rather on the Spanish fleet 
 and arsenals. 1st. That the British ministers brought 
 together a mass of twenty or twenty-five thousand 
 soldiers for a great undertaking, witJiout having in- 
 formed themselves whether their landing could be 
 safely made, and their re-embarkation be secured. 
 2ndly. That a very dangerous season of the year was 
 chosen for these delicate operations, which are always 
 attended with more or less of risk on an enemy's coast, 
 and when time may run short.'"" 3rdly. That Lord 
 
 * It may be noted that the number of troops which were 
 selected to make the first landing, could hardly have exceeded 
 4,500 men, including officers and Serjeants. The General would 
 of course have thrown ashore, to meet an expected enemy, as 
 large a force as he could. It is pretty evident, therefore, that 
 the boats of the fleet were sufficient only to carry the above 
 number, which was less than one-fifth of the gross aggregate of 
 
78 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 
 
 Keith might have informed himself as well (if he did 
 Dot) with respect to the safety of the anchorage off 
 the baj of Cadiz, while he was lying at Gibraltar, as 
 when he brought the fleet of transports to that in- 
 secure station. Admiral Bickerton, and the other 
 officers who knew the coast, were with him from the 
 first, and his Lordship's conduct in persuading Aber- 
 cromby to proceed in ignorance of the real liabilities 
 was as inexcusable as his personal evasions were un- 
 generous. 
 
 However, here was an end of this grand expedi- 
 tion; and the armies which had been brought together 
 from the east and the west again parted company. 
 Nearly one half of the regiments, composed mainly of 
 soldiers enlisted for service in Europe only, repaired 
 under the command of Sir James Pulteney, to Lisbon; 
 while the rest, under Abercromby, proceeded up the 
 Mediterranean. Sir Ralph was already in possession 
 of the views of the British Government with regard to 
 Egypt. He touched at Gibraltar, Minorca, and Malta, 
 
 the army. Ministers, if they had thought at all on the subject, 
 must have expected that there would be Spanish troops to 
 resist the landing ; but they had made no provision of addi- 
 tional boats of light draught of water, or of a construction 
 proper for the service. Four thousand men might have been 
 beaten and sacrificed, before a second division of troops could 
 have come to their support ; when if 8,000 could have been set 
 on shore at the same time, they might have been sufficient to 
 make good their footing. The landing in Holland, in the pre- 
 ceding year, had been made under the like disadvantages, owing 
 to the same neglect, or ignorance, of what such a service re- 
 quires. 
 
1800. 79 
 
 for the sake of exchanging some few of his battalions 
 for others, and of obtaining, as far as the means of 
 those garrisons could afford them, supplies of ammuni- 
 tion, and of hospital and commissariat stores. At 
 Malta, indeed, he remained some weeks, completing 
 the preparations of his army, expecting further in- 
 structions, as well as reinforcements, including cavalry, 
 from England, and endeayouring to obtain information 
 as to the strength and circumstances of the enemy 
 whom he was about to assail. 
 
 The considerations which determined the British 
 Government to attempt the expulsion of the French 
 from Egypt, were of the greatest weight; insomuch, 
 that we cannot but wonder when we come to view the 
 insufficiency of the means employed, and the slackness 
 manifested in strengthening our army for this service. 
 
 From the time when Napoleon Bonaparte suc- 
 ceeded in establishing the dominion of France upon 
 the Nile, England had looked with jealousy, and some 
 apprehension, to the danger which might eventually 
 threaten our possessions in India, if a powerful and 
 enterprising enemy should remain in the possession of 
 Egypt. Very difiPerent was our position in Hindostan 
 at the commencement of the present century, from 
 that which we now enjoy — the fierce Mahrattas stood 
 in unbroken strength — a mere rumour of invasion, 
 either by Sikhs or by Affghans, struck deep alarm 
 into our council at Calcutta. To the southward an 
 arduous and costly campaign had been but recently 
 concluded by the conquest of Mysore ; nor were tran- 
 
80 MILITARY PREPARATIONS. 
 
 quillity and undisputed government established as 
 yet in the provinces, which now form parts of the 
 Presidency of Madras. 
 
 In Europe another consideration failed not to 
 excite some apprehension in the minds of British 
 statesmen. If the French should retain a long and 
 undisputed possession of Egypt, it was but too proba- 
 ble that they might acquire a dangerous influence at 
 Constantinople. Still stronger were the grounds for 
 uneasiness when Paul, the hot-brained Czar, broke 
 wrathfully from his alliance with England, and ap- 
 peared likely to accept the proferred friendship of 
 Napoleon Bonaparte. Such an union might have been 
 based on mutual guarantees, of the Danubian provinces 
 to Russia, and of Egypt to France. 
 
 But there was yet another and a more urgent 
 motive for desiring to expel the French from Egypt, 
 and to press forward the attempt without loss of time. 
 England had lost all her Allies ; and she was at the 
 close of 1800 exposed to the hostility of every naval 
 power in Europe. Napoleon was suddenly making the 
 greatest elSbrts to equip the fleets of France, and Spain, 
 and Holland. Calculating on our being obliged to 
 keep a strong fleet in tlie Baltic, to make head against 
 the Northern Powers, he was sanguine and strong in 
 the hope that he should acquire a naval superiority in 
 the Mediterranean. At the same time he forced us to 
 provide largely for the defence of our own shores, bj 
 preparations which threatened descents on England 
 and on Ireland. The British people had come to 
 
1800. 81 
 
 desire peace, and to feel that a peace was necessary. 
 Our ministers, while acquiescing reluctantly in this 
 conviction, were anxious that they should be in a posi- 
 tion to negotiate on strong and advantageous grounds. 
 The greatest difficulty they foresaw was that presented 
 by the Chief Consul's known determination to main- 
 tain the possession of Egypt. To remove the French 
 from thence had become the great and most pressing 
 object of British policy. In the giving and taking, in 
 the balance of the status quo, Egypt would be the 
 most important point in a negotiation for peace. 
 Yet scarcely a year had elapsed since the Cabinet 
 of London had refused to ratify a treaty,'"' by which 
 General Kleber, then commander-in-chief of the French 
 armies in that country, had engaged to give up the 
 fortresses, and evacuate Egypt altogether. It is true 
 that the relative positions of France and England had 
 been greatly altered in the interval. France had now 
 
 * It is not to be denied that Sir Sidney Smith, with a cha->> 
 racteristic confidence, had opened and concluded the Treaty of 
 El Arish, without having received any powers to negotiate, 
 either from the British Government, or from our Ambassador at 
 Constantinople. Yet as his proceedings, however iiTegular, had 
 been successful, and had secured a result of great importance to 
 England, we wonder at first sight at the refusal of our ministers 
 to confirm the convention. Yet it is to be recollected that in 
 December, 1799, the plan suggested by Sir Charles Sewtart was 
 in the contemplation of our Cabinet ; and that Bonaparte 
 scarcely steadied in his place of power, was labouring with 
 difficulty to collect troops in sufficient numbers to make head 
 against the lately-victorious Austrians. To have brought to 
 Toulon at this crisis an army of French veterans, would have 
 been no less than a betrayal of our ally, and the destruction of 
 the views which were then entertained by our Government. 
 
 G 
 
82 MILITARY PREPARATIONS 
 
 no enemy to combat but England ; and England was 
 now without an ally, save that crumbling image of 
 Ottoman greatness which still stood, though tottering, 
 at Constantinople. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that the British 
 Government resolved on attempting, in conjunction 
 with such aid as the Turks could or would afford, to 
 expel the French from Egypt. We had wasted the 
 whole of the year 1800, though we had 25,000 soldiers 
 ready for service, and fleets which ruled on every sea. 
 We had failed to assist the Austrians, or to save 
 Genoa. We had retired with discredit from before 
 Ferrol and Cadiz ; and now, at the eleventh hour, our 
 ministers sent Abercromby with 1 5,000 men to invade 
 a country, of which all the fortresses and harbours 
 were in the possession of a French army, mustering 
 not less than 28,000 veteran soldiers. 
 
 It had happened unfortunately that despatches 
 from General Kleber, and letters from the officers of 
 his army to their friends in France, had been taken at 
 sea by an English cruizer. Both the official and the 
 private letters were couched in the most desponding 
 tone, and conveyed so gloomy and fallacious a view of 
 the condition of the French army that our ministers 
 readily gave credence to accounts which gratified their 
 wishes, and encouraged their hopes. Under this delu- 
 sion, and without searching further as to the facts, 
 they framed the expedition to Egypt, believing that 
 there remained for its defence not more than 15,000 
 or 16,000 sickly and discontented troops. 
 
CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT. 83 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 IN 1801. 
 
 The British army was ready to sail from Malta 
 early in December, 1800; but it was detained by 
 adverse winds till the 20th, when the first division got 
 under weigh and steered for the coast of Oaramania. 
 The second division put to sea on the following day. 
 
 Before he quitted Malta, Sir Ralph Abercromby 
 had sketched out a general plan of operations, admit- 
 ting an alternative which he might be compelled by 
 circumstances to adopt. To gain possession of Alex- 
 andria was his first and preferable object. The best 
 information he had been able to collect represented 
 the French garrison to be insufficient in numbers for 
 the defence of the extensive fortifications; and the 
 works themselves had been, it was stated, neglected, 
 and were incomplete.^ 
 
 If Alexandria could be taken, its importance was 
 hardly to be overrated. It afibrded the only harbour 
 
 * Such proved in the sequel to have been really the case. 
 It was not till after the landing of the British, that the 
 French exerted themselves to repair and strengthen the out- 
 works of Alexandria. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 on the coast of Kgypt. The French army in that 
 country would be at once cut off from the chance of 
 receiving succour from France. To the English it 
 would present a secure base for their further opera- 
 tions, and a certain line of communication with Malta 
 and England. On the other hand, it was feared that 
 as the port of Alexandria had been very loosely 
 watched for some time past, the enemy might have 
 recently obtained supplies and reinforcements by sea. 
 It was also asserted with confidence that the stormy 
 weather, which prevailed usually from November till 
 April, must render the landing of an army on the 
 open coast of Egypt a very hazardous enterprise. 
 
 Then, if it should be found impracticable to effect 
 a landing in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, the 
 only alternative would be to disembark the troops 
 in the roadstead of Damietta, where there was some 
 partial shelter for shipping, and where less opposition 
 was to be expected from the enemy. If such should 
 be the course which he might find himself obliged to 
 take. Sir Ralph proposed to lead his army up the 
 Nile; and making Damietta the base of his opera- 
 tions, to act against the French forces which occupied 
 Cairo ; * while the Turks, who were understood to be 
 assembling at Jaffa with the intention of advancing to 
 
 * It must be borne in mind that the general had been or- 
 dered on this expedition with very erroneous information as to 
 the strength of the enemy's army in Egypt. Our ministers be- 
 lieved that in the whole of Egy])t there did not remain more 
 than 9000 French troops, with 4000 or 5000 auxiliaries, Greeks 
 and Copts. 
 
IN 1801. 85 
 
 Salahieh, should pursue their march towards the great 
 citj, in co-operation with the English, and in con- 
 formity with their movements. Abercrombj was 
 willing to entertain good hopes of success in this 
 direction, because he had been led to expect that 
 a strong body of troops from India might be landed 
 at Suez in the spring of 1801, and his own movement 
 upon Cairo would facilitate their junction. Still the 
 General preferred the attempt upon Alexandria, if the 
 weather should allow his troops to make good their 
 landing near that place, and jet preserve their com- 
 munication w4th the shipping. Though the naval 
 officers in general took an unfavourable view of these 
 questions, Captain Hallowell, and one or two others 
 who were well acquainted with the coast and with the 
 climate, considered the chances of effecting a successful 
 debarkation to be far from improbable. 
 
 It was with these varying impressions on his mind 
 that Abercromby proceeded to the place which had 
 been chosen for the assembling of all his troops; for 
 the preparing of his soldiers for action ; and for pro- 
 curing horses and other means of which he was as yet 
 destitute. His two divisions of infantry were re- 
 united in the Bay of Marmorice, on the 2nd of 
 January, 1801. This bay, or rather the Gulf of 
 Makri, of which it forms a part, is situated on the 
 southern face of Asia Minor; and here the General 
 proposed to remain a short time, during which he 
 might concert measures with the Turkish commanders, 
 procure horses for the service of his artillery, as well as 
 
86 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 for the remounting of the dragoons who were expected 
 from England, and hire vessels for their conveyance to 
 the coast of Egjpt. 
 
 Immediately after Sir Ralph's arrival at Mar- 
 morice, he despatched General Moore on a mission to 
 the Grand Vizier, who was at the head of a Turkish 
 army encamped near Jaffa. His first object was to 
 obtain some knowledge of the real strength and effici- 
 ency of the Ottoman forces. In the next place Moore 
 was to endeavour, if he should find the Turks to be 
 equal to the enterprise, to concert measures with the 
 Vizier, and to bring him into an engagement for a 
 plan of co-operation against Cairo; the British ad- 
 vancing from Damietta, and the Turks from Salahieh. 
 This scheme was now proposed, because Sir Ralph had 
 recently been led to entertain less sanguine hopes than 
 before of succeeding in an attack with his small 
 army on Alexandria. Some late reports magnified the 
 strength of this place. Others asserted, that no drink- 
 able water was to be found along the shores on either 
 side of the town. The naval men represented the pro- 
 bability that their ships might be blown off the coast 
 after landing the troops : and the English officers, who 
 were attendant on the Turkish army, had found that 
 the Grand Vizier would decline to attempt a diversion 
 on the side of Cairo, unless the British should be 
 sufficiently near to afford him support. 
 
 General Moore's business therefore was, in the 
 main, to ascertain whether the force of our ally was 
 really such as to render his co-operation effective in 
 
IN 1801. Sy 
 
 the projected march upon Cairo ; to assure the Vizier 
 of our firm purpose to support him, and even to take 
 the initiative in the movements against the French. 
 He was at the same time to try to secure a supply of 
 at least one thousand horses for our own dragoons ; 
 and the aid of some Turkish cavalry who might be 
 attached to the British column. Every exertion was 
 to be used to obtain good intelligence as to the 
 strength and resources of the enemy ; and if the pro- 
 posed plan should be adopted by the Allies, then 
 means should be devised to mislead the French and 
 make them believe that the attack of the English 
 would be directed against Alexandria. 
 
 Up to this time General Koehler, an able officer in 
 the British service, had been employed as our military 
 agent at the head-quarters of the Grand Vizier ; but 
 upon Moore's arrival at Jaffa he found that Koehler 
 had died a few days before. The loss of his influence 
 and acquaintance with Turkish afi*airs, and particularly 
 with the state of that army, was unfortunate ; but Major 
 HoUoway and other officers of our Engineers or Artil- 
 lery, who had been attached with about thirty gunners 
 to General Koehler's mission, remained in the camp : 
 and Moore was introduced to the Reis Effendi, and 
 afterwards to the Vizier himself. The conversations 
 which ensued were carried on in the most friendly spirit, 
 and the dull old chieftain gave an easy assent to Sir 
 R. Abercromby's proposals ; but he knew nothing of 
 the numbers or means of the French, and little of his 
 own. Moore, however, ascertained that this nominal 
 
88 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 army consisted of some 14,000 or 15,000 men ; one 
 half of them being horsemen, and all thoroughly 
 *' Irregulars :'' that they had a good many pieces of 
 cannon ; but a scanty supply of provisions for their 
 men, and none for their horses, wherewith to undertake 
 the march across the Desert : that the plague was in the 
 camp, and numbers of men were dying every day ; but 
 there was no exertion, no forethought, no intelligence. 
 General Moore rejoined his Commander on the 
 20th of January, bringing this account of our allies, 
 and these impressions of their worthlessness. Sir 
 Ralph saw at once, that it would be unsafe to engage 
 his army in operations which might render it in a great 
 measure dependent on a mass of semi-barbarians, igno- 
 rant of the rules of civilized w^arfare, and little able to 
 take care even of themselves. He had received no intelli- 
 gence of the troops expected from India, and he deter- 
 mined without hesitation to resume his former design 
 of directing his attempt upon Alexandria. A sort of 
 council of war was summoned, at which certain officers 
 of the navy as well as of the army were present. 
 General Abercromby informed them of his intentions, 
 and explained his motives ; but he desired, before the 
 final resolution should be taken, to receive satisfactory 
 information from the officers of the navy on the follow- 
 ing points : 1st. Can the anchorage in the Bay of 
 Aboukir be depended on for the fleet of transports 1 
 2nd. Will the navy be able to put on shore not only 
 the troops, but likewise the ammunition, provisions, 
 and even the water necessary for the array during two 
 
m 1801. 89 
 
 or three weeks, as well as the ordnance which would be 
 required for the siege of Alexandria "? To these ques- 
 tions Captain Hallowell and Sir Sidney Smith (as being 
 the officers best acquainted with the coast) returned 
 favourable answers. The former, more particularly, 
 declared that he felt no doubt of its being in the power 
 of the fleet, when anchored in the Bay of Aboukir, to 
 land everything that would be required for the troops, 
 and to convey further supplies by means of boats, 
 which might move abreast of the army as it advanced. 
 The result of this conference was a determination 
 to attempt a landing in the Bay of Aboukir. Yet 
 Abercromby, and those in his confidence, had ere this 
 found reason to apprehend that the strength of the 
 enemy was far more formidable than he had been 
 taught to expect ; and that the French could bring 
 into the field superior numbers of fighting men, with 
 all the advantages of a veteran cavalry, and a well- 
 appointed artillery. By this time the British army 
 had been joined by the dismounted dragoons of the 
 12th and 26th Regiments. Still it was necessary to 
 remain at Marmorice, not only to procure horses for the 
 cavaliy* and mules for the carriage of stores, but like- 
 wise to collect, from Rhodes and other places, vessels 
 for the transport of these animals. In the meanwhile 
 
 * It was but slowly that horses were procured from the 
 interior of the country. However at last about 400 were got 
 for the dragoons, and a sufficient number to draw eight or ten 
 field-pieces. Out of nearly 1000 horses, which were sent by the 
 Yizier at General Moore's solicitation, three-fourths were re- 
 jected as utterly unserviceable. 
 
90 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 rehearsals were raade of a landing in the face of an 
 €nemj ; and this practice proved to have been of much 
 advantage when the hour of performance came. An 
 admirable paper of instructions* to be observed in the 
 actual debarkation of the troops, was drawn up by Sir 
 Ralph Abercrombj and Colonel Anstruther, in con- 
 junction with the naval commanders, and a rigid ad- 
 herence to these instructions was enjoined on the su- 
 perior officers of both services. To this pre-arrange- 
 ment, and to the excellence of the plan itself, may be 
 ascribed in a great measure the perfect order and the 
 quick success with which the landing of the army was 
 eflPected on the 8 th of March. 
 
 During this unavoidable delay, two large French 
 frigates escaped our cruizers, and carried into Alexan- 
 dria 800 soldiers, besides artillery and military stores 
 of which the garrison was in great need. At length, 
 on the 18th of February, our army was ready to quit 
 the Bay of Marmorice ; but a foul wind detained the 
 fleet till the 22nd, when the whole (about 180 vessels) 
 made sail, and on the 1st of March the leading frigate 
 got sight of the land near Alexandria. The weather was 
 unsettled and squally ; the sea rough, and unfit for any 
 attempt to disembark. It seemed therefore desirable 
 to keep our great armament out of the enemy's sight; 
 but Lord Keith led on the fleet till our people could dis- 
 tinguish the colours of vessels in the harbour, and our 
 wide array was fullj exposed to the observation of the 
 French. After laying-to till dusk the fleet made sail 
 
 * See Appendix, A and B. 
 
IN 1801. 91 
 
 to seaward, and on the next morning thej entered the 
 Baj of Aboukir. The signal was hoisted for the 
 troops to prepare to land ; and the chief command of 
 the boats, and the direction of the debarkation, were 
 confided to Captain Cochrane. The weather however 
 continued to be boisterous and unfavourable; and, as 
 landing was impracticable. Sir Ralph, taking with him 
 General Moore and some officers of the staff, ran along 
 the coast in a cutter, to examine the beach more 
 closely. They saw that sand-hills, which were gene- 
 rally of a trifling height, rose irregularly from the 
 shore, sprinkled here and there with clumps of date or 
 palm trees. From distance to distance there were 
 small groups of tents between the Castle of Aboukir 
 and the mouth of Lake Maadieh. Some working 
 parties appeared to be busy on the sand-hills ; and 
 two or three of the enemy's gun-boats were lying at 
 anchor close to the shore. On the general's return in 
 the afternoon,'"' orders were issued for the reserve and 
 the brigade of guards to be ready to step into the 
 boats at four o'clock the next morning. 
 
 When sailing from Marmorice, Sir Ralph Aber- 
 cromby had sent forward Major McKerras and Major 
 Fletcher of the Engineers, in a gun -boat, to reconnoitre 
 the coast about the Bay of Aboukir ; but it was now 
 
 * At this very moment, one of the enemy's armed vessels, 
 coming out of Alexandria, ran through the lines of our fleet, 
 and anchored with impunity under the Castle of Aboukir, in a 
 position to rake the beach on which we had determined to at- 
 tempt the landing ! Lord Keith's only observation was, that he 
 could not spare a vessel to go after her ! 
 
92 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 found that these officers had ventured too closely in, 
 and had been cut off by a superior vessel. Major 
 McKerras had been killed, and Fletcher, with the gun - 
 boat, taken. This loss of our two most experienced 
 Engineers proved in the sequel to have been a very 
 unfortunate circumstance. 
 
 For three days there blew a gale of wind from the 
 north-west which put any attempt to land out of the 
 question. On the 7th of March the weather began 
 to be more moderate, and Abercromby sent General 
 Moore and Colonel Anstruther, the Quartermaster- 
 General, to examine the little Bay of Aboukir moje 
 closely, and to ascertain whether the enemy had 
 thrown up any works since his visit on the 2nd. The 
 space on which it w^ould be necessary to make the 
 landing, was found to be about a mile in extent. To 
 the right (of the assailants) there rose a steep and high 
 sand-hill, the seaward face of which was partially 
 flanked by the guns of the Castle of Aboukir. The 
 ground along the curve of the bay, rising in banks from 
 the beach, appeared to be everywhere favourable to the 
 enemy, as he could keep his troops concealed and shel- 
 tered though close to the water's edge. On the left 
 the sand-hills were broken, irregular, and dotted with 
 clumps of trees. The picquets of the enemy stretched 
 along the w^hole extent, and individuals, probably offi- 
 cers upon the watch, wxre pacing to and fro ; but there 
 were no signs of batteries or of new works. 
 
 The wind had shifted to the southward and the sea 
 had abated. The general determined to make his 
 
IN 1801. 9^ 
 
 landing the next morning ; but as the infantry were 
 all on board of the large troop-ships,"^'*" which were an- 
 chored six or seven miles from the shore, much time 
 was required and much arrangement necessary for the 
 proper performance of the service. In the evening of 
 the 7th two of our lighter vessels of war changed their 
 stations, and anchored as near to the shore as they could 
 conveniently lie. One of these vessels served to mark 
 the right of the intended attack ; and alongside these 
 two vessels all the boats, containing the leading divi- 
 sion of the army, were ordered to assemble in the dark- 
 ness of the night. It had been found that the boats 
 altogether were capable of conveying a greater number 
 of men than the guards and the reserve could muster. 
 The 54th Regiment, belonging to Coote's brigade, was 
 therefore added to those which had been held in readi- 
 ness under the former order. At the same time (the 
 evening) the rest of the troops were removed from the 
 large ships into others of a lighter draught of water, 
 that they might be the more quickly landed in support 
 of the first division, when the latter should be on shore, 
 and the boats should be at liberty to return for a second 
 debarkation. 
 
 At two in the morning of the memorable 8 th of 
 March, 1801, the troops, which had been chosen to 
 strike the first blow upon the sands of Egypt, stepped 
 into the boats. Soon after daylight nearly all had 
 
 * The " troop ships" then in use were for the most part old 
 two-deckers, sixty-fours or fifties, without their lower deck guns. 
 It was a badly arranged service, and equally disagreeable to the 
 officers of the army and the navy, who were always quarrelling. 
 
94f CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 reached the vessels which had been placed as the 
 rallying points ; but much time was consumed in dis- 
 entangling the boats, and arranging them according to 
 the line of battle of the army, so that when they 
 touched the beach each brigade, battalion, and com- 
 pany might be in its proper place. The reserve, led 
 by Sir John Moore, Hildebrand Oakes, and Brent 
 Spencer, formed the right ; and their division of boats 
 was under the immediate command of Captain Coch- 
 rane.* Alongside the vessel on the left were mar- 
 shalled the two battalions of the Guards, under General 
 Ludlow, and the detachment belonging to Coote's bri- 
 gade. It was 8 o'clock, a.m., before the line of boats 
 pulled on abreast, and in steady order, towards the 
 shore, and till that time the enemy had lain in silence 
 observing our movements ; but as soon as our boats 
 came within their reach, fifteen pieces of cannon opened 
 upon them with round shot, though the enemy's fire was 
 somewhat disturbed and confused by that of several 
 English gun-boats which had been thrown in advance 
 of our line. So closely were our soldiers packed in 
 the boats that they could not move, and indeed the 
 strictest orders had been given that they sliould sit 
 perfectly still. The seamen pulled steadily onward, 
 the pace of each boat being regulated by that on the 
 extreme right. In this calm order on they came, till 
 
 * Captain Cochrane had the command of the whole of the 
 boats employed on this service. Under him Sir Sidney Smith 
 had the particular charge of the launches which conveyed the 
 artillery, and lie afterwards commanded the seamen who were 
 landed to assist the army. 
 
IN 1801. 95 
 
 thej were within reach of grape shot, and then the 
 fire became terribly severe and destructive. Some boats 
 were sunk, and many of our men ^vere killed or 
 wounded as they sate motionless and helpless under 
 the storm of shot, to which both seamen and soldiers 
 answered occasionally by loud hurrahs ! 
 
 When still nearer, the musketry of the French 
 was poured in, quick and sharp, and our men were 
 falling fast ; but at length the boats upon the right 
 felt the ground. Out sprang our hard-tried soldiers, 
 each man was in his place, and wdth Moore and 
 Spencer at their head, the 23rd and 28th Regiments,'"' 
 and the four flank companies of the 40th, breasted 
 the steep sand-hill. Without firing a shot, they rushed 
 at one burst to the summit of the ridge, driving head- 
 long before them two battalions of the enemy and 
 capturing four pieces of field artillery. After reining 
 in his men, that they might recover breath, Moore 
 opened their fire upon the French who were retreating 
 rapidly across a little patch of plain ground, and then 
 again he pushed forward, again driving the foe before 
 him, till he occupied some rising ground which afforded 
 a favourable position. There Moore halted till he could 
 learn what had happened on his left. 
 
 That wing of the reserve which had been entrusted 
 to the guidance of Brigadier Oakes, touched the beach 
 a few minutes after their comrades, whose exploit has 
 been just described. The 42nd Regiment was the 
 
 * The 28th seems to have been kept back in support of the 
 rush made by the others. 
 
96 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 first on shore, and the 58th a few minutes afterwards; 
 the ground in their front was of a more gentle slope 
 than that upon the right, and here the French stood 
 prepared, not with infantry only, but with some troops 
 of cavalry. The enemy attacked at once, but the 
 admirable order in which the 42nd had been landed, 
 enabled them to repulse the assault by their heavy 
 fire ; and as the French drew back, Oakes, leading on 
 this regiment, followed by the 58th, attacked in his 
 turn, and driving the enemy over the sand hills, cap- 
 tured three of their guns. 
 
 Farther to the left the Coldstream and 3rd Guards 
 ought, according to the plan prescribed, to have pro- 
 longed the line beyond Oakes' brigade, but the boats 
 which carried them and the 54th Regiment fell into 
 confusion. These battalions were consequently hur- 
 ried into the shoal water, intermingled and disordered, 
 and as their difficulty was observed by the enemy, the 
 Guards were charged by the French cavalry before 
 they could form their line. However, the attack was 
 bravely repulsed, and General Ludlow soon got his 
 brigade into its proper place — to the left of Oakes 
 and the reserve.* 
 
 Here then was the problem, of landing 5,000 or 
 
 6,000 men in the face of an enemy prepared to meet 
 
 them, satisfactorily solved. But the British had 
 
 * In the severe service of this day the loss of the British 
 was as follows : Army, 4 officers, 4 Serjeants, and 94 rank and 
 file killed : 1 officer, 1 Serjeant, and 32 rank and file missing : 
 26 officers, 34 Serjeants, and 455 men wounded. Navy, 2 
 officers and 49 seamen killed : 12 officers and 115 men wounded. 
 
IN 1801. 97 
 
 neither horsemen nor artillery on shore, and our 
 gallant infantry were unable to follow up their victory 
 and inflict a heavier loss on their beaten enemy. The 
 behaviour of our troops in this arduous service was 
 above all praise ; the patience with which they bore the 
 storm of shot while confined to their boats ; the alacrity 
 with which they leapt ashore and instantly formed 
 their lines; these things were unparalleled, and are even 
 more worthy of our remembrance than the gallantry 
 with which our troops overthrew the French on every 
 point, when the British foot was on the shore. Still 
 it ought not to be forgotten that the storming of the 
 steep sandhill on the right, by Moore's brigade, was 
 long a theme of especial admiration in the army. 
 
 While the fight was going on, the boats returned 
 to fetch the remainder of our infantry, and the whole 
 of them were landed in the course of the afternoon, 
 with some field pieces, and a few horses.* In the 
 evening the army moved forward some two or three 
 miles, leaving a detachment to blockade the castle of 
 Aboukir.f 
 
 Early on the morning of the 9th of March, General 
 
 Moore and Colonel Anstruther, (Quartermaster-Ge- 
 
 * The horses of the army had been embarked on board the 
 vessels hired from the Greek islands. None of these kept up 
 with our fleet, but they came straggling into Aboukir from the 
 10th to the 14th of March. 
 
 t The Commandant of this fort refused to admit, and even 
 fired on a flag of truce which accompanied a summons to sur- 
 render. It was found necessary to land heavy guns from the 
 fleet on the 13th, and to batter the old walls, but the castle was 
 not surrendered till the 18th. 
 
9S\ CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 neral), went forth to reconnoitre, (escorted by the 
 92nd Regiment, the Oorsican Rangers, and a few dra- 
 goons, whose horses had arrived. Thej found the 
 country to be of sand, the surface irregular, and in 
 most parts sprinkled with palm and date trees. At 
 the end of three or four miles, the two chiefs, who 
 had pushed on so far with the dragoons only, fell in 
 with a strong party of the enemy's cavalry, and were 
 compelled to return. But they observed that about 
 two miles in advance of the actual bivouac of our 
 army, the ground was much narrowed between the 
 sea and Lake Maadieh ; and as it offered an advan- 
 tageous position, the reserve was ordered to occupy 
 it that evening. The next morning, the 10th, Moore 
 again went out to renew and extend his obseiTations ; 
 but he was soon met by the advanced guard of a large 
 body of cavalry escorting French generals who were 
 likewise engaged in reconnoitring. A skirmish ensued 
 in which our Oorsicans lost a few men. 
 
 During three days, the advance of the English 
 was delayed by the difficulty which was found in 
 landing provisions and ammunition : the wind was high 
 and the surf dangerous. On the 12th, the army 
 moved forward in columns; and as they approached 
 the screen formed by the enemy's horsemen, the latter 
 retired gradually, till the British came in sight of some 
 large bodies of the French infantry who appeared, at 
 first, to be advancing as if to battle.'' Sir Ralph then 
 
 * The enemy had been reinforced by the aiTival, on the 10th 
 of March, of four battalions and some squadrons of cavahy, 
 from the upper country. 
 
IN 1801. 99 
 
 gave the order to form lines, and so perfect had been 
 the order preserved upon the march, though the 
 columns had filed through trees and bushes, and 
 amongst scattered ruins, that when they deployed 
 there was scarcely any correction required. However, 
 the enemy came no nearer, but his infantry was seen 
 to occupy a range of heights bounding a comparative 
 plain, on the opposite side of which stood the British. 
 The distance between the two armies was about one 
 mile and a half. Both lay upon their arms during 
 the night; but on our side, the 90th and 92nd Regi- 
 ments were ordered out and placed under the temporary 
 command of General Moore, who was specially 
 charged with the duty of protecting our bivouac 
 against a surprise. He divided the two battalions 
 into six bodies, placed at intervals sufficient to cover 
 the whole front of our army ; and each of these bodies 
 threw forward one third of its numbers, to form a 
 connected and watchful chain, which was relieved at 
 the end of each hour by one of the remaining thirds. 
 Thus passed tlie night in silence : the enemy was 
 close, but he made no attack. Under the circum- 
 stances of our army, and the expectation that General 
 Menou would come down from Cairo, an immediate 
 battle was earnestly desired by the British Commander. 
 He determined that his army should move forward, 
 and assail the heights on which the French were posted. 
 At six A.M., on the 13th of March, the whole marched 
 onward in three columns. That on the right con- 
 sisted of the reserve, with a few horsemen, under 
 
 H 2 
 
100 CAMPAIGN m EGYPT 
 
 Moore. The central column was composed of the 
 brigades commanded by Oraddock and Coote, the 
 guards being kept a little behind them as a support- 
 ing body. On the left marched the three brigades, 
 (Cavan's, Doyle's, and Stuart's) which in the order of 
 battle were intended to form the second line. Some- 
 what in advance of the central column marched the 
 9Gth Regiment, and the left was led in like manner 
 by the 92nd.^^ 
 
 Sir Ralph's plan was to turn the enemy's right, 
 and to attack his position on that flank. However, 
 as our columns approached, the French came down 
 from their heights, while their guns opened on the 
 British, and gathering rapidly to their right they fell 
 with their cavalry, supported by masses of infantry, 
 on the 90th and 92nd. These two regiments bore 
 themselves nobly, repulsing their fierce assailants and 
 maintaining their ground, though they suffered very 
 severely before the columns which they headed could 
 deploy and render them effectual support.f The 
 action now became more general ; Oraddock and 
 Ooote advancing rapidly in line, while Moore's re- 
 serve remained in column, and covered the right 
 
 * The 90th was foUowed by Oaddock ; the 92nd by Lord 
 Cavan. 
 
 t The 90th (under Rowland Hill) was particidarly distin- 
 guished. The French cavalry, led by Latour Manbourg, who 
 was wounded, charged desperately on this regiment ; and some 
 of them were bayoneted in the ranks of the 90 th. 
 
 The 92nd suffered equally from the grape shot of the French 
 guns, and the musketry of a large body of infantry. 
 
IK 1801. 101 
 
 tiauk of our army. Forced back by the lire aud 
 onward movement of the British, the French drew off 
 in haste, under the protection of their artillery which 
 played with severe effect upon our troops : but these 
 good soldiers never lost their order ; their movements 
 were executed with the regularity of a field-day at 
 home. At length, the reserve arrived at a large mass 
 of ruined buildings, standing on a rising ground and 
 overlooking a plain, across which the French were 
 retreating hurriedly. Moore observed that he had 
 somewhat out-marched the left of the army, and that 
 if our troops should continue to advance over the 
 plain, they would come under the range of heavy guns 
 planted on the fortified heights beyond it. He, there- 
 fore, halted his people, and Oraddock, whose brigade 
 was next to the reserve, did the same, expecting that 
 when the left came up, the whole would be halted to 
 breathe the men and to gain time for reconnoitring 
 the position of the enemy, which appeared to be 
 formidable. But the brigades upon the left pursued 
 their march without stopping ; and the right wing 
 then conformed of course to the movement. Thus the 
 whole advanced to the middle of the plain where they 
 became exposed to a heavy cannonade from the French 
 batteries on the heights in front. Here our troops 
 were ordered to halt, and Abercromby called Generals 
 Hutchinson and Moore to a consultation. It was 
 resolved that the plan which Sir Ralph had enter- 
 tained from the first should be pursued : that the right 
 of the enemy's position should be turned and assaulted, 
 
102 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 and that at the same time the left of the French should 
 be attacked in front. With this view, Hutchinson 
 was directed to lead forward the three brigades of 
 the second line, and marching over the dried mud 
 along the borders of the Lake Mareotis till he should 
 have gained the enemy's flank, to array his battalions 
 and storm the heights upon that side. Moore was 
 ordered to wait till Hutchinson had reached his ground 
 and was opening his attack. Then the reserve was 
 to push rapidly along the sea shore, supported by the 
 brigade of Guards, and to fall upon the left of the 
 French line. Coote and Oraddock, with 800 dragoons 
 in their rear (one-half of whom were without horses), 
 were to remain stationary, ready to support either of 
 the wings, or to repel any sortie of the enemy. But 
 Hutchinson had a considerable distance to traverse, 
 some difficulties of ground, and some little opposition 
 to overcome f' and when he arrived on the ground 
 from which his attack was to be made, he found the 
 enemy's position to be so strong that he determined to 
 send a report of his observations to Sir R. Aber- 
 cromby, and to wait for his further instructions. f 
 The Commander-in-chief despatched the Adjutant- 
 
 * Dilloa's regiment distinguished itself by caxrying a redoubt 
 with the bayonet ; and the handful of men composing the 44th, 
 likewise carried with the bayonet a bridge which the French 
 attempted to defend. 
 
 t The heights were defended by a powerful artillery, and if 
 carried, they again appeared to lie under the heavy guns of the 
 French forts ; nor had our troops any tools for intrenching 
 
 themselves. 
 

 ^>^ 
 
 
 r<i^\ 
 
 /. 
 
 v^. V 
 
 ^^ 
 
 -^ 
 
 ■^ 
 
 '^3 
 
 '<^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^^ 
 
 -^ 
 
 4- 
 
IN 1801. 103 
 
 General Hope to examine the ground, and judge of 
 circumstances, and he soon afterwards followed in 
 person ; but while these things were going on, some 
 hours passed away, during which our army was ex- 
 posed to a continual cannonade and suffered heavy 
 losses. The French had recovered their spirits and 
 repaired their first disorder. They reinforced their 
 left, which was to have been attacked by the reserve: 
 and Sir Ralph at length relinquished his intention of 
 forcing the enemy to a decisive battle. Our brave 
 troops w^ere withdrawn from the plain; and with 
 feelings of bitter disappointment, but in perfect order, 
 they retired to the position on which Moore had pro- 
 posed to halt in the morning. The loss of officers and 
 men had been very great. Including all ranks, 1,300 
 had fallen in this unprofitable, though honourable 
 conflict.'"' 
 
 The British army now took up the position be- 
 tween the sea and Lake Maadieh, in which was fought 
 a few days later, the memorable battle of the 21st of 
 March. The ground was elevated and pretty strong 
 upon the right, where stood the remains of ancient 
 buildings, overlooking the beach and in advance of the 
 rest of the army. Here lay the reserve under Moore 
 and Oakes. Separated by a little valley from this pro- 
 jecting flank, there rose a large sandhill which was 
 
 * It is not improbable that the failure of the intended attack, 
 and the great loss sustained by our troops on the 13th of March, 
 were owing in some measure to physical defects under which 
 both Abercromby and Hutchinson laboured. The eye-sight of 
 both the one and the other was extremely imperfect. 
 
104 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 occupied by the Guards and by Ooote's brigade. The 
 position on the left, where Oraddock was posted with 
 four battalions, was naturally weak, having an open 
 plain in front and the dry bed of the Lake Mareotis ; 
 but it was somewhat retired, and partially covered on 
 its riglit by the sandhill on which Ooote's brigade was 
 posted. Altogether our position was en echelon from 
 the right. Lord Oavan, Doyle, Stuart, and the dra- 
 goons, formed a second line. To strengthen the front, 
 and more particularly the left of our army, working 
 parties were set to throw up redoubts and fleches; 
 and orders were given for the landing of heavy cannon 
 with the intention of arming these works. From 
 being the assailants, the British were suddenly assum- 
 ing a defensive posture. After the action of the 13th, 
 our officers were allowed to land their light baggage ; 
 for nearly a week they had no other clothes than what 
 they carried on their backs. Good water had been 
 found by digging (at the suggestion of Sir Sidney 
 Smith), wherever date trees were growing; but there 
 was much distress amongst the troops from a want of 
 fuel ; the fresh-cut trees proving of little use for this 
 purpose. 
 
 In the mean time, the General was unable to gain 
 any trustworthy intelligence. No deserters came in ; 
 and the Arabs told lies. All that Abercromby knew 
 was, that the French had fought him on the 13th with 
 5,000 or 6,000 men ; that the position they occupied 
 in his front, at the distance of a mile and a half, was 
 strong, and defended by a force of artillery greatly 
 
IN 1801. 105 
 
 superior to his own. That if he could succeed in 
 carrying it, tliere still remained the siege of Alexan- 
 dria to be undertaken, with the prospect of having 
 another army, from Cairo and Upper Egypt, upon his 
 flank and rear. He knew also that nearly two thou- 
 sand of his brave soldiers had already died in battle, 
 or had been disabled by wounds. Our prospects 
 began to wear a gloomy colouring. There were 
 rumours, though uncertain, of the approach of Menou 
 with an army from Cairo; and Abercromby felt poig- 
 nantly that he had been sent on this great enterprize 
 with deceptive information and insufficient numbers. 
 
 An unfortunate aifair of cavalry, which occurred 
 on the 18th of March, had helped to vex the spirit 
 both of the General and the army. A small body of 
 the enemy's horsemen were observed in the afternoon, 
 to be reconnoitring the left of our position. In the 
 rear of that flank, lay our two regiments of dragoons, 
 portions of which had just received their Turkish 
 horses. General Finch was absent at the time; and 
 Colonel Archdall of the 12th, impatient of affront, 
 hastily mounted some 80 or 100 men, and galloped 
 forth to drive away the enemy. He was met gallantly 
 by the French hussars, and the two parties charged 
 through each other. Before the British could rein in 
 their half-broken steeds, and turn back upon their 
 adversaries, they came under the fire of a company of 
 grenadiers who were lying in ambush behind some 
 ruins, for the express purpose of supporting their own 
 
106 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 horsemen. Many of our men and horses fell; and 
 before the party could get into order, the hussars had 
 rallied, and were upon them from the other side. It 
 was with difficulty that our dispersed dragoons made 
 good their flight to the lines, leaving about thirty pri- 
 soners, and several dead. Archdall, whose rash gal- 
 lantry had provoked this skirmish, lost an arm. On 
 the other hand, the castle of Aboukir was surrendered 
 on the 18th of March, and the Queen's regiment 
 rejoined the army. 
 
 On the 20th of March, Sir Ralph confided to the 
 few whose opinions he valued, the resolution he had 
 taken to make one more attempt to carry the position 
 occupied by the French, though he was still uncertain 
 whether the forts Cretin and Oaffiarelli, might not 
 completely command it with their guns ; or whether, 
 on the other hand, the capture of these forts might not 
 be facilitated by our gaining possession of the first line 
 of heights. It was the General's plan to bring up his 
 heavy artillery and intrenching tools as speedily as 
 possible ; as soon as they arrived, to push forward 
 his guns in the night-time; and, when at day-break 
 they opened their fire upon the French lines, to assault 
 at the same time both the flanks of the enemy. If the 
 attempt should fail, Sir Ralph proposed that his army 
 should retire to its present position, and should hold 
 this, strengthened as it would be by the heavy guns, 
 while other lines of works farther to the rear should be 
 rapidly formed and armed. On these in succession 
 
IN 1801. 107 
 
 the troops should fall back ; till their re-embarkation 
 might be covered bj the last of the lines of redoubts, 
 the castle of Aboukir, and the fire of the fleet. 
 
 Such were the dismal prospects which presented 
 themselves at this time to the mind of the brave old 
 Abercrombj; but from such difficulties and dangers 
 the British army was happily delivered by the rash 
 presumption of the enemy. On the very day when 
 the General disclosed his plans to those who enjoyed 
 his entire confidence, Menou had entered Alexandria 
 with nearly 6,000 of his best troops; which, added to 
 those who lay in front of the British army, gave the 
 French general a force of about eleven thousand 
 veteran soldiers disposable for battle. He determined 
 on attacking the invaders without delay. 
 
 Up to this time the only change which had been 
 made in the position of our army was, that Lord 
 Oavan's brigade had been placed somewhat enpotence, 
 so as to cover the left of the British line from any 
 attack which might be made by the enemy from the 
 isthmus between the Lakes Maadieh and Mareotis, 
 (the latter being partially practicable for troops). 
 Generals Stuart, Doyle, and Finch remained with 
 seven battalions, and the dismounted dragoons, as a 
 second line. Along the front of the army (which lay 
 en echelon from the right), several slight works had 
 been hastily thrown up and were armed with the field 
 pieces, and with two iron 24-pounders which had just 
 arrived. One of these redoubts, open to the rear, was 
 formed somewhat in advance of the great ruins (called 
 
 V^ OF THE 
 
108 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 bj tlie French *'leOamp des Remains/') where lay the 
 regiments of the reserve. From this work, a flanking 
 though distant fire might be poured along the front of 
 the height on which the guards were encamped : while 
 two batteries in the centre commanded the plain in 
 their own front, and flanked that of Oraddock's brigade 
 upon the left. The latter was further protected by a 
 pretty large redoubt, and two redans. 
 
 During the night of the 20th of March, all re- 
 mained as quiet as usual; and Moore, who happened 
 to be the general-officer of the day, was just giving the 
 order for withdrawing the picquets at daybreak, when 
 some musquetry was heard on the extreme left of the 
 line. Moore's impression at the moment was, that it 
 was only a false alarm ; but he was riding to ascertain 
 the cause, when a rattling fire burst out upon the 
 right. " This is the true attack," cried the General, 
 and he spurred back to his own corps. The picquets 
 were all falling back before the rapid approach of the 
 enemy's columns, which could be dimly discerned 
 through the darkness. But the British troops were 
 already under arms,* and repairing to their allotted 
 posts. When Moore arrived at the redoubt on the right, 
 he found the 28th Regiment, under Colonel Edward 
 Paget, already hotly engaged, though hardly able to 
 see their assailants, the smoke and flashes rendering 
 the darkness of the hour still more perplexing. The 
 shouts of the French soldiers, and the rattling of their 
 
 * It was a standing order that every regiment should be 
 formed and at its post, an hour before daybreak. 
 
m 1801. 109 
 
 drums, were heard above the volleying musquetrj. 
 The ejffects of their fire were felt both from the front 
 and from the sea-side. Paget was struck down bj a 
 shot in the neck. Moore's horse was wounded, and 
 the general was for some time on foot. But his plan 
 for the defence of " the Roman Camp'' had been con- 
 certed beforehand with Brigadier Oakes, who now 
 brought up one wing of the 42nd to cover the left 
 flank of the 28th Regiment. The ruins were manned 
 bj the 58th Regiment, whose fire was poured upon 
 the beach to the right of the redoubt. Moore des- 
 patched orders that the 23rd and the flank companies 
 of the 40th should support the 58th, and that the 
 remaining wing of the 42nd should join that which 
 was already in front. 
 
 Let us now turn to the plan of attack, by which 
 the French proposed to drive the leopards into the 
 sea. The division* commanded by General Lanusse, 
 an experienced and valiant leader, was to surprize and 
 carry by assault the Roman Camp, following up its 
 defenders without respite, and gaining ground so as to 
 fall upon the right flank and rear of the British centre, 
 while cavalry should pursue and complete the disper- 
 sion of our right wing. On the right of Lanusse, but 
 a little retired, marched the division of General Ram- 
 pon. It was his task to attack the British centre, as 
 soon as Lanusse should have obtained any advantage. 
 
 * This division consisted of Silly's and Valentin's brigades, 
 strengthened by companies of grenadiers drawn from other 
 regiments. Altogether about 3,000 men. 
 
110 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 Ranipon again was to be supported on his right bj 
 Regnier, who was at the head of the strongest division 
 of the French army (nearly 3,500 infantry). This 
 general was to give the signal for battle by despatch- 
 ing, before day-break, 100 of the Dromedary corps, 
 supported by 300 dragoons, who were to make a 
 feigned attack on the extreme left of the English posts. 
 In effect they surprised the redan on the isthmus, 
 making our soldiers at that outpost prisoners; and it 
 was the fire of this party which was first heard by our 
 officers, and excited for a short time a belief that the 
 French were directing their attack against our left 
 flank. But this demonstration was only to serve as a 
 signal for the advance of Lanusse ; and Regnier's real 
 part was to occupy the attention of the left wing of 
 the British; to deter them from moving to support 
 their right ; and finally to co-operate with Rampon 
 in forcing our centre. There the French hoped, that 
 the whole of their army, wheeling round to their right, 
 would drive the British, in a heap, and in helpless 
 confusion, to the waters of Lake Maadieh. 
 
 This plan of attack bears the marks of a grand 
 conception, and shows nothing of the incapacity with 
 which Menou has been charged. It might have suc- 
 ceeded against inferior infantry, and the French had 
 been used to deal with the Austrian soldiers, such as 
 they w^ere in 1796 and 1797. But the column under 
 Lanusse was not of strength sufficient for the task 
 assigned to it. The enemy well knew tliat the height 
 crowned by the Roman ruins was the strongest post 
 
m 1801. Ill 
 
 in the British line, though thej did not know that it 
 
 was manned bj our best troops under our best officers. 
 
 We have left the 28 th Regiment hotlj engaged in 
 
 their redoubt; the 58th in the ruins supported bj the 
 
 23rd, and the flank companies of the 40th; and one 
 
 wing of the 42nd just arriving, followed bj the other 
 
 half of the battalion, to cover the left flank of the 
 
 28th. At this moment, a close column of the French 
 
 was discerned through the twilight, pushing on in 
 
 silence, and already in rear of the 42nd. General 
 
 Moore ran to the right wing of this regiment, faced it 
 
 about, and charging instantly upon the enemy drove 
 
 them headlong into the ruins, where they were met by 
 
 the 23rd and 40th, and the whole of them were killed 
 
 or taken. Leading back the men of the 42nd, and 
 
 rejoining the other companies, Moore encountered 
 
 another body of French. These were driven back 
 
 after a short conflict, but the general received a shot 
 
 in his leg, and the regiment pursuing its advantage 
 
 hastily, was charged and overthrown by a desperate 
 
 onset of the enemy's cavalry. Though broken, the 
 
 Highlanders, as they regained their legs, plied their 
 
 muskets individually and so coolly, that they struck 
 
 down many men and horses, while the 40th from the 
 
 ruins poured a destructive fire on the flank of the 
 
 enemy's squadrons. The French, however, led by 
 
 Generals Roize and Boussart, still galloped furiously 
 
 onwards. Their ranks were disordered while plunging 
 
 among the camp kitchens and tents of our reserve, 
 
 and hardly had they extricated themselves from these 
 
112 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 difficulties, when they were met by General John 
 Stuart with his foreign brigade ; and destructive volleys 
 completed the overthrow, we might almost say the 
 destruction, of this great body of French cavalry. 
 Stuart then moved up to the front, and bore an arduous 
 and highly honourable part in the final overthrow of 
 Lanusse's column in this quarter. The fight still 
 raged around the posts occupied by the 28th and 
 58th Regiments. The former had occasionally been 
 engaged at the same time to their front and to their 
 rear. Their ammunition and that of their assailants, 
 was exhausted ;"''" the French and the 28th pelted each 
 other with stones ; but the fierce energy of the repub- 
 licans was relaxing, though they would not retreat; 
 two of their generals had fallen, and their loss of men 
 had been enormous. When the British received at 
 length a supply of ammunition, and their field-pieces 
 re-opened their fire, the enemy drew sullenly ofi* from 
 the field of slaughter. 
 
 But I have spoken as yet, only of the desperate 
 assaults which were made by the division under 
 Lanusse, and by the French cavalry upon our right: 
 it is high time to describe the movements of the enemy 
 in other quarters. As soon as he saw that Lanusse 
 was hotly engaged, and just as the day was breaking, 
 
 * Our field-pieces were useless likewise, for more than an 
 hour, from the total fiilure of ammunition. On the other hand, 
 since the morning light had enabled our gun vessels, which 
 were anchored along the shore, to distinguish friends from foes, 
 their fire had driven the French from tlie beach, and forced 
 them to confine their attack to the landward side of our redoubt. 
 
IN 1801. 113 
 
 General Rampon attacked the centre of our position, 
 occupied bj the English guards. Driving in our skir- 
 mishers, he first attempted to assault the front, but the 
 volleys which he received were so well directed and 
 deadly, that after a bloody contest he drew back, and 
 manoeuvring to his right, he endeavoured to turn the 
 left flank of the Guards. But here again, the enemy 
 failed to make any impression. General Ludlow 
 threw back some companies of the 3rd Regiment to 
 receive the attack, while a part of Coote's brigade met 
 the French column in front. Completely baffled and 
 disheartened. General Rampon drew off his division 
 after suffering a considerable loss. 
 
 While these conflicts were going on, General Reg- 
 nier, with the strongest portion of the French army 
 under his command, remained almost motionless. The 
 left of the British army was in his front, and the left 
 was much the weakest part of our position ; yet 
 Regnier, after detaching a part of his division to the 
 aid of Rampon, kept back his main body, without 
 engaging further than in a cannonade, till the division 
 of Lanusse and the cavalry had been nearly destroyed, 
 and Rampon had been defeated. The battle had 
 begun about 4 o'clock in the morning ; soon after nine ^ 
 the French retreated to their former position on the 
 heights. 
 
 Thus ended the battle of the 21st of March, 1801. 
 It was a fair trial of strength and valour between the 
 soldiers of England and France, and great valour was 
 shown on both sides ; in numbers they were nearly 
 
 I 
 
114 CAMPAIGN IN EGTPT 
 
 equal. The French were older soldiers, more prac- 
 tised in their business, and familiar with victory. The 
 British had some advantage in their position, though 
 this advantage was impaired bj the darkness of the 
 hour at which the enemy made his attack. Had it 
 not been for the provident order that every battalion 
 should be under arms and at its post an hour before 
 daybreak, some part or other of our line might have 
 been taken by surprise ; but all were on the alert, 
 and the cool intrepidity of the 28th and 58th Regi- 
 ments baffled the furious and protracted assault of the 
 confidant republicans. Never were the discipline 
 and determined valour of the British infantry more 
 signally displayed than on the shores of Egypt."^ 
 
 At the time when the French cavalry broke 
 through the 42nd Highlanders, Sir Ralph Abercromby 
 was caught in the storm of charging horsemen. For 
 a moment he was in the hands of one of the dragoons, 
 whose thrust the old general had parried, still re- 
 ceiving a severe contusion from the hilt of the sword ; 
 
 * The losses of the British in this hard-fought battle, were 
 11 officers and 233 men killed, and about 1,160 wounded, 
 amongst whom we have to reckon General Moore, Brigadiers 
 Oakes and Hope, and Sir Sidney Smith. The loss of the enemy 
 was very great, more than 1,000 of their men were buried by 
 our soldiers, and about 900 (of whom 700 were wounded) were 
 made prisoners. Two pieces of cannon and a standard, bearing 
 the glorious inscription of Lodi and other victories in Italy, 
 were captured. Generals Lanusse, Roize, and Baudot were 
 among the slain. Silly, Boussart, and other officers of high rank 
 were wounded. It seems probable that the total loss of the 
 French was more than 3,000 men. 
 
IN 1801. 115 
 
 but the Frenchman was shot by a soldier of the 42nd, 
 and Sir Ralph was enabled to extricate himself from 
 the confusion. Till the defeat of the French army 
 was accomplished, the noble veteran concealed from 
 every one that he had received a ball in his thigh 
 early in the action ; but when his victory was no 
 longer doubtful, the general allowed the wound to be 
 examined. Exhausted by pain and loss of blood, he was 
 borne to the beach, and conveyed to Lord Keith's ship, and 
 there he died in the night of the 28th of March. I have 
 elsewhere sketched the striking lines of Abercromby's 
 character. Wherever he had served, and his had been 
 a long career, he had been respected and beloved. 
 There was an absence of selfishness in Abercromby, a 
 liberality of feeling, and an independence of spirit which 
 entitled him to the highest respect as a gentleman ; 
 while his justice, his intrepidity, and experience as- 
 sured to him, as a commander, the attachment and 
 confidence of his troops. To fall in the moment of 
 victory, and to know when dying that his victory was 
 complete, was what the gallant veteran himself would 
 have desired ; but on the officers and soldiers who had 
 toiled, and bled, and conquered under his leading, the 
 tidings of his death fell like a chilling cloud. AVith 
 their grief for Abercromby there came mingled a 
 painful doubt and apprehension as to the future. The 
 command of the army devolved on the senior Major- 
 General, Hutchinson, and Hutchinson was hardly 
 known by any but the ofiicers of the stafi*, and by 
 those imperfectly. His manners, his reserved habits, 
 
 I 2 
 
116 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 and his personal appearance, had created a prejudice 
 against him, and his only recommendation was that 
 he had accompanied Abercrombj as a friend and 
 volunteer to Holland in 1799; that Sir Ralph was 
 believed to have set a high value on his opinion, and 
 had asked and obtained his appointment as second in 
 command on the Egyptian expedition. 
 
 But whatever might be the temper of the army, 
 there was work to be done which admitted of no delay. 
 There remained a powerful garrison in Alexandria, 
 though Menou had already detached 1,200 infantry and 
 300 horsemen to Rahmanieh, with the object of main- 
 taining the command of the Nile, and of securing his 
 communications with Cairo. It was notorious that 
 large reinforcements from France were expected by 
 the enemy. The French troops at Cairo, strengthened 
 by those which had been recalled from Upper Egypt, were 
 considered to be more than a match for the disorderly 
 mass of Turks under the Grand Vizier; and of the 
 British forces from India, whose co-operation had been 
 promised to our generals, no tidings whatever had 
 been received. 
 
 Immediately after the death of Abercromby, Gene- 
 ral Hutchinson set himself sedulously to the work of 
 fortifying the front of the British position. Ammu- 
 nition and heavy guns had by this time been brought 
 up in abundance, and strong redoubts, with connect- 
 ing lines, were rapidly completed. The first object of 
 the English commander was to isolate Alexandria, 
 and to render efiectual a blockade of that extensive 
 
IN 1801. 117 
 
 place and its numerous garrison bj a comparatively 
 small body of troops. He saw that if he could effect 
 this purpose, he might carry a part of his little army 
 to the Lower Nile, gain possession of Rosetta, and 
 perhaps of Rahmanieh, and thus secure the resources 
 of a fertile country, till the arrival of reinforcements 
 from England might enable him to act against the 
 enemy on a larger scale. But with the view of iso- 
 lating Alexandria more completely, and cutting its 
 garrison off from all communication with Cairo, unless 
 by the long and difficult circuit of the desert, Hutchin- 
 son determined on letting the waters of the sea into 
 the vast basin of mud and sand, which had been in 
 former days the bed of the Lake Mareotis. The level 
 of this ancient basin was considerably lower than that 
 of the Lake of Aboukir (or Maadieh), which commu- 
 nicated with the Mediterranean ; and it was separated 
 from the latter lake only by a narrow strip of earth, 
 little more than sufficient to uphold the masonry 
 of the canal, which parting from the Nile at Rah- 
 manieh, brought the water of the great river to 
 the people of Alexandria. On the 12th and 13th of 
 April, this isthmus was cut through by the British, 
 and the salt waters poured impetuously through the 
 opening. In a short time a little sea was formed, the 
 area of which was estimated at more than twelve hun- 
 dred square miles, and by the beginning of May the 
 waters attained their natural level. Numerous gun 
 boats, British and Turkish, passed into this new field 
 of action, and while they secured a communication 
 
118 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 between our line and the Arabs to the westward, 
 thej confined and rendered difficult that which the 
 beleaguered garrison had hitherto enjoyed. 
 
 While these works were in progress, and the British 
 position was growing stronger day by day, Hutchinson 
 was detaching successive bodies of troops toward 
 Rosetta. The first of these columns, commanded by 
 Colonel Brent Spencer, consisted of little more than 
 1,000 British infantry ; but it was accompanied by 
 about 4,000 Turks, who had arrived at Aboukir by 
 sea, after the battle of the 21st of March. As they 
 drew near to Rosetta, the French evacuated that town, 
 crossing over to the right bank of the Nile, but leaving 
 between 200 and 300 men to defend the fort of St. 
 Julien, which was situated at the mouth of the river 
 and commanded its principal channel. To reduce 
 this place, which was of great importance with a view 
 to our obtaining a naval superiority on the Nile, 
 Spencer detached the Queen's Regiment under Lord 
 Dalhousie, and the greater part of the Turks, while 
 the fort was attacked at the same time by the allied 
 flotilla and some ships of war. With the remainder 
 of his corps, Spencer took up a strong position at 
 El Ilamed, where he was joined by the Royal, 18th, 
 and 90th Regiments ; and where he lay watching the 
 French, who were now collecting troops from various 
 quarters at El Aft, a few miles higher up the river. 
 Fort St. Julien was defended gallantly, but it was 
 obliged to surrender on the 19th of April, and a 
 strong division of English gun-boats, under Captain 
 
m 1801. 119 
 
 Stevenson, together with a Turkish flotilla, ascended 
 the Nile and came into co-operation with the army 
 which was assembling at El Hamed. 
 
 As soon as the re-creation of the Lake Mareotis 
 had deprived General Menou of the power of acting 
 against us offensively, otherwise than by assaulting the 
 fortified front of the British position, Hutchinson 
 despatched Generals Craddock and Doyle with six 
 more battalions to El Hamed ; and he followed in 
 person, after committing to General Eyre Ooote the 
 command of that moiety of the army which was 
 intended to make good the blockade of Alexandria. 
 But it is curious to observe, when such mighty inte- 
 rests were at stake, and both France and England 
 were sensible of their urgent importance, how small 
 was the military force which our generals could com- 
 mand at the crisis of the contest for Egypt. It is 
 true that in the actions which had been fought, more 
 than 3,000 of our soldiers had been killed or wounded; 
 but four months had passed since the expedition had 
 sailed from Malta, and, with the exception of the 
 dismounted dragoons, who joined in Oaramania, no 
 troops had arrived from England to repair the losses 
 or improve the means of our army. At the end of 
 April, General Ooote was left to confine Menou within 
 the walls of Alexandria with barely 6,000 infantry, 
 (of whom 1,600 were foreigners,) 200 horsemen, and 
 250 gunners. 
 
 The column which was assembled at El Hamed 
 
120 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 and with which General Hutchinson proposed to act 
 against the French upon the Nile, mustered no more 
 than 4,300 infantry,''' 300 dragoons, and about 100 
 artillerymen ; but of horses to drag our few field- 
 pieces there was a perplexing deficiency. A Turkish 
 corps of nearly equal numbers was ready to accom- 
 pany or follow the British column ; but the total want 
 of military order amongst these allies of ours, and 
 the pretensions of the Oapitan Pasha, who commanded 
 them, occasioned frequent embarrassments. 
 
 The enemy had now gathered in strength on the 
 left bank of the river, and held a position at El Aft, 
 between El Hamed and Rahmanieh. It appeared to 
 be the intention of the French general to give battle; 
 and Hutchinson resolved to afford him the opportunity. 
 Having considered the advantages of acting upon both 
 the banks of the Nile, and thus enabling the flotilla of 
 gun-boats, English and Turkish, to ascend the stream 
 and co-operate with the army, our commander de- 
 tached the 89th Regiment and twenty dragoons across 
 the river. Twelve hundred Albanians were sent over 
 at the same time; and the whole were placed under 
 the command of Colonel Richard Stewart. His in- 
 structions were to cling to the right bank of the Nile, 
 driving away any parties of the enemy which might 
 otherwise molest and impede the flotilla; and to 
 
 * The weakness of what were called " regiments," may be 
 shown by stating that, to make up these 4,300 rank and file, 
 there were at El Hamed twelve of such regiments, and four 
 companies of the 40th. 
 
in 1801. 121 
 
 co-operate with the main body of the army as oppor- 
 tunities might present themselves. 
 
 On the 5th of May, Hutchinson commenced his 
 march towards El Aft; but on that and the following 
 day he made very short journeys, because the Turks 
 professed that they expected the immediate arrival of 
 some thousands of their cavalry ; and the general felt 
 that in horsemen, as well as in artillery, his little army 
 was very inferior to that of the French. While upon 
 his march he was overtaken, on the 7th, by this 
 desired body of cavalry ; and it was found to consist 
 of about six hundred wild Syrians, on horseback, 
 indeed, but without any sort of discipline. However, 
 the French commander was not disposed to risk an 
 action at El Aft, and he drew off in the night of the 6th 
 of May, directing his retreat on Rahmanieh. 
 
 The force which had been drawn together by 
 the enemy, and which was under the command of 
 Generals Lagrange, Valentin, and Morand, was com- 
 posed of three demi-brigades [of infantry and two 
 regiments of cavalry detached from Alexandria, and 
 of troops which had been withdrawn from Rosetta 
 and other posts. It was not doubted that so strong 
 and so important a position as that of Rahmanieh 
 would be stoutly defended by a corps which mustered 
 nearly 4,300 veteran soldiers, including 800 good 
 cavalry, and a very superior artillery. 
 
 As the enemy retreated from El Aft the British and 
 Turkish columns followed on his track. Early on the 
 9 th of May, they drew near to the French position, 
 
122 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 and Hutchinson prepared for the expected battle. At 
 his desire the main body of the Turks advanced slowly 
 along the bank of the Nile, their wild horsemen gal- 
 loping forward and skirmishing far in front. But the 
 British troops were held apart; and leaving a wide 
 interval between themselves and their allies, they 
 moved across the open country to the right, sending 
 out their dragoons and some sharpshooters to feel for 
 the enemy in the village of Daoud, which lies scattered 
 on both the banks of the Great Canal. 
 
 On the opposite side of the Nile, Colonel Stewart 
 had moved onward, keeping his little column nearly 
 abreast of the main army; and, though Lagrange 
 threw two or three hundred men across the river to 
 dispute the occupation of a village which faced the 
 harbour of Rahmanieh, Stewart was able, after a short 
 skirmish, to establish his people behind the bank of 
 the Nile. The river is here so narrow that even mus- 
 quetry told with effect on the mouth of the little port, 
 in which a large number of djermes, including several 
 gun-vessels, were lying at anchor. By-and-bye Cap- 
 tain Stevenson's flotilla worked its way up the stream 
 and engaged the French batteries ; while heavy cannon 
 were landed on the right bank to arm those which 
 Stewart's men were set to construct, and which were 
 completed during the night of the 9th. 
 
 But the importance of this position of Rahmanieh 
 must be explained. It is here that the road from 
 Cairo is divided into two branches; one of which 
 pursues its course down the river to Rosetta, while 
 
IN 1801. 123 
 
 the other, bearing to the westward, forms the only road 
 of communication with Alexandria. From Rahmanieh, 
 likewise, the Grand Canal, which had conveyed to the 
 same town the waters of the Nile, takes its departure ; 
 and the port, formed by some islands in the river, 
 served as the entrepot for military as well as com- 
 mercial purposes between Cairo and the coast. Here 
 too was a small fort, and something of an intrenched 
 camp. Moreover, it was a matter of no light con- 
 sideration, that if we could obtain a strong hold of 
 Rahmanieh, we should not only deprive our enemy of 
 the advantages of its position, but we should acquire 
 the command of the resources of a fertile country for 
 the supply of the British troops at Aboukir, as well 
 as of those in the valley of the Nile. 
 
 When these things are considered, it appears un- 
 accountable that General Lagrange should have made 
 so very feeble an attempt to hold his ground. The 
 .9th of May passed ojQf in cannonades and slight 
 skirmishes. There were indeed some showy evolutions 
 performed by the French cavalry, but they ended in 
 nothing. On the other hand, Hutchinson relied con- 
 fidently on the effect that must be produced by 
 Stewart's batteries, when they should be able to open 
 their fire, as the certain means of driving the enemy's 
 troops from the bank of the Nile ; but he was appre- 
 hensive that, when dislodged, they might direct their 
 retreat upon Alexandria, and that Coote's position 
 might be thus endangered. The general, therefore, 
 manoeuvred to his right as far as he could venture to 
 
124 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 move without losing the power of affording succour to 
 the Turks in case thej should be charged bj the 
 French infantry. Towards the close of the day, 
 indeed, such succour was suddenly required ; and 
 Doyle's brigade was detached in haste to check the 
 enemy's attack on our allies. When a dark night 
 closed in, our columns remained in a disjointed and 
 somewhat confused position. The loss of the British 
 in killed or wounded had been very trifling; but it 
 was expected that sharper service would attend the 
 coming day, and long before the dawn our troops 
 were arrayed in order of battle. By the first gleam of 
 light, however, a white flag was seen to be floating on 
 the fort of Ramanieh; and the first sounds which were 
 heard came from the guns of our flotilla playing, far up 
 the Nile, on the rear of the retreating enemy. La- 
 grange had evacuated Ramanieh in the deep silence of 
 the night ; and he was marching with the utmost 
 rapidity in the direction of Cairo. His sick and 
 wounded were left in the little fort under the protec- 
 tion of an officer and a few men who surrendered with- 
 out resistance ; and the number of prisoners made on 
 this day''^ was swelled by an odd accident. An aide- 
 de-camp, bringing despatches from Menou and escorted 
 by fifty dragoons, had made his way through the 
 desert, and had arrived to within a short distance of 
 
 * On this same 10th of May there arrived at Aboukir the 
 first reinforcement from England. The 1st battalion of the 
 27th Regiment and detachments for others. Altogether nearly 
 1200 men. 
 
IN 1801. 125 
 
 Ramanieh, imagining that the English army was still 
 far distant. Attacked in the early morning by a body 
 of Arabs, who shot the aide-de-camp and three or four 
 of his men, the party were growing suspicious and 
 apprehensive, when suddenly they fell in with about 
 thirty of our 12th Light Dragoons going out to water 
 their horses. Without any attempt at resistance or 
 escape the French surrendered. 
 
 We were now masters of the important position of 
 Ramanieh : and now came the question, what further 
 course was to be pursued towards the expulsion of the 
 French from Egypt 1 When Hutchinson set forward 
 from El Hamed he had flattered himself that, with the 
 aid of the Turks, he might be able to prosecute his 
 march to Cairo; and he was the more anxious to take 
 this course because there were vague reports that the 
 long expected army from India had arrived at Suez. 
 Besides the five or six thousand Turks who accom- 
 panied his column, he knew that the tumultuary host 
 under the Grand Vizier was advancing from Salahieh 
 across the Eastern Desert : and Hutchinson was also 
 in secret negotiation with the Mamelukes in Upper 
 Egypt.^ 
 
 * The strength of the Mamelukes had been very much 
 weakened since the time when they valiantly but vainly resisted 
 the invasion of Bonaparte ; and they were divided by the feuds 
 which had arisen between the two most powerful of their Beys, 
 Mourad and Ibrahim. After the battle of Heliopolis in the 
 spring of 1800, the former of these chieftains made his submis- 
 sion to General Kleber, and having vowed fideUty and engaged 
 to pay a small tribute, Mourad had been allowed to settle with 
 his followers in the Desert between the Nile and the Red Sea. 
 
126 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 But the progress of our array had been slow; the 
 heat of the season was making itself felt severely, and 
 the British soldiers were growing sickly. No confir- 
 mation of the rumour that the Indian army had 
 reached the shores of Egypt met Hutchinson at Ka- 
 ra anieh, and he hesitated. He doubted whether it 
 would be prudent to pursue his march up the Nile 
 further than might be necessary to deter Lagrange 
 from taking up a new position, where he might retain 
 the power of crossing the Delta and falling on the 
 flank of the Grand Vizier. Our General even des- 
 patched an officer to this chieftain, recommending that 
 he should retire to Salahieh and remain there for the 
 present ; but the Ottoman grandee having set his 
 wild array in motion was unable to stop it. The 
 Turks had been told that they were to march to 
 
 On the other hand, Ibrahim and some of the minor Beys roamed 
 about the eastward Desert, preserving their independence; dis- 
 trusting the Turks, yet acting cautiously in co-operation with 
 the Grand Vizier against the French. Kleber and his successors 
 appear to have kept up a constant communication with Mourad 
 Bey, and to have relied on his fidelity to their standards up to 
 the time of his death, which occurred while Hutchinson was on 
 his march. Osman Bey, who succeeded to Mourad's authority, 
 joined the British at Terraneh on the 29th of May, with about 
 1200 superb horsemen. The truth j^robably is, that both 
 Mourad and Osman, who had felt the effect of the French arms, 
 were waiting to see which of the two Christian armies might 
 prove the stronger before they committed themselves by joining 
 either : and in the mean time they made separate professions of 
 friendship to each of the belligerents. The Mamelukes dis- 
 trusted the Turkish chieftains more than the Christians, and 
 this made them reluctant to join the British, while the Capitan 
 Pasha was in our company. 
 
IN 1801. 12'7 
 
 Cairo, and take it, and make a great booty ; and 
 onward tliej continued to roll. 
 
 Hence arose new difficulties, and considerations 
 which outweighed the objections that Hutchinson 
 had recently entertained against the advance of his 
 column. He felt particularly the importance of reaching 
 a point upon the Nile, from whence he might be able, 
 by a rapid march across the Delta, to gain possession 
 of Belbeis. Our General feared that Belliard, who 
 was in command at Cairo, would issue forth as soon 
 as he should be strengthened by the arrival of La- 
 grange's division, and would crush the disorderly 
 multitude of Ottomans.'"' At Belbeis the British 
 would be in a position to prevent such a disaster; 
 and there was another consideration which rendered 
 the possession of that town an object of further im- 
 portance. It was in that neighbourhood only that a 
 sufficient supply of camels could be procured for the 
 service of the Indian army which was expected to 
 arrive at Suez. 
 
 Hutchinson took finally the resolution to march 
 onward. But when he announced his intention to his 
 principal officers, a storm of opposition, swelling almost 
 into a mutinous cabal, arose in the camp. The 
 opinions of the leading dissentients were made public 
 with indecent passion. To attempt to march to Cairo 
 
 * The rapidity with which Lagrange performed this inarch 
 was surprising. In spite of the sirocco wind and the excessive 
 heat, this column arrived at Cairo in the night of the 13th of 
 May; the distance between Ramanieh and the capital being 
 more than 80 miles. 
 
128 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 with SO small a force, and during the hot season, must 
 be attended with the destruction of the troops. There 
 were no magazines or hospitals — the plague was around 
 them — eyen if thej should reach Cairo, thej had no 
 means of besieging the citadel; and their numbers 
 were utterly inadequate to cope with the united 
 divisions of Belliard and Lagrange. The dissentients 
 insisted on the necessity of pursuing that policy which 
 Hutchinson himself had entertained for some days, 
 that of leading back the British column to Aboukir, 
 leaving only a strong detachment at Rahmanieh. But 
 it seems probable, that the opponents of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief did not openly avow what was in all 
 likelihood the secret motive of their opposition, their 
 personal dislike and their want of confidence in him. 
 At this time the General had no man of rank near 
 him, with whom he had been on terms of intimacy, or 
 in whom he had been accustomed to confide. Moore 
 was the officer on whose judgment he usually relied ; 
 but Moore had been confined since the battle of the 
 21st of March, by the effects of his wound, and he 
 had not yet rejoined the army."^ 
 
 It may not be superfluous, and it may serve to 
 
 throw some light on this stormy crisis, if I sketch the 
 
 • 
 * In truth this cabal had become little less than a mutiny 
 on the part of ojficers holding the highest ranks under General 
 Hutchinson. They had written to both Coote and Moore, 
 inviting their concurrence in a plan which tended virtually, if 
 not absolutely to deprive Hutchinson of the command of the 
 army ; and their mad project was defeated mainly by the stem 
 and uncompromising answer which they received from Moore. 
 
IN 1801. 129 
 
 character of the British commander. John Hely 
 Hutchinson, brother of Lord Donoughmore, was at this 
 time about forty-four years of age, but he appeared to 
 be much older. Harsh features jaundiced by ill- 
 health, extreme short-sightedness, a stooping body, a 
 slouching gait, and an utter neglect of his dress, pre- 
 sented in him a figure at variance with every idea 
 that one forms of a soldier. Shunning general society, 
 abstracted, reserved, slovenly, and indolent, with un- 
 gracious manners, and a violent temper, the General 
 was little calculated to gain the confidence, or win the 
 afiections of those who had fallen suddenly under his 
 command. Yet was Hutchinson a man of no ordinary 
 mark. He was a good scholar; he had read much and 
 profitably ; his understanding was strong, his informa- 
 tion extensive. Nor had he neglected to study the 
 theory of his profession. On military subjects his 
 views were large; and his personal bravery was un- 
 questioned. 
 
 Having fully satisfied himself that the course which 
 he had finally resolved to pursue was the fittest and 
 the best under the actual circumstances, General 
 Hutchinson no longer doubted. He disregarded the 
 remonstrances by which he was assailed, and he per- 
 sisted in his determination to advance. He ordered 
 two more of the regiments at Aboukir to join his 
 column on the Nile ; and with them was to come that 
 staunch and trustworthy soldier. Hildebrand Oakes, 
 whose wound was now nearly healed. 
 
 On the 11th of May, the army resumed its march 
 
 K 
 
130 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 to the southward ; and early the next morning intelli- 
 gence reached the General that there had arrived at 
 Suez, not the Indian expedition, but a single man-of- 
 war bearing Admiral Blankett's flag, and bringing only 
 two companies of the 86th Regiment, and a few 
 artillerymen. From Cairo also, there came certain 
 information that General Belliard had marched out 
 with the greater part of his troops to meet and attack 
 the Grand Vizier. Hutchinson immediately dispatched 
 ofl&cers to this chieftain, intreating him to avoid an 
 action, and to fall back deliberately as the French 
 advanced. It was clear that the enemy would not 
 venture to push on to any great distance from Cairo, 
 now that the allied forces on the Nile were drawing 
 near to the capital. On the 14th, our main column 
 arrived at Shabour, on the left bank of the great 
 river; while Colonel Stewart, advancing along the 
 canal of Menouf, fell in with a number of boats laden 
 with ordnance and military supplies, escorted by one 
 hundred and fifty French soldiers. They were on 
 their way from Cairo to Rahmanieh, (the guns and 
 stores being intended for the fortification of that 
 place), and they were in ignorance of Lagrange's un- 
 expected retreat. After a sharp skirmish with the 
 Turks and Arabs, by whom they were first assailed, 
 these people laid down their arms on the arrival and 
 summons of the British commander. 
 
 Tlie march of our main army was retarded by the 
 prevalence of a fierce sirocco wind, which enfeebled 
 the troops, and prevented the flotilla from making 
 
IN 1801. 131 
 
 way against the current of the Nile, and Hutchinson 
 did not arrive at Algara till the 16th of May. The 
 Oapitan Pachk halted and pitched his tents about a 
 league in rear of the British camp. Early the next 
 morning, there came spurring in Arab after Arab with 
 the strange intelligence, that a considerable body of 
 French troops had appeared in the Desert to our right 
 and rear. Two officers, escorted by the Arabs, were 
 instantly despatched to reconnoitre; and they were 
 followed by General Doyle with 250 dragoons, while 
 his own brigade of infantry was ordered to march, 
 with two guns, to his support. At the end of about 
 seven miles within the Desert, the enemy was des- 
 cried, massed and prepared for defence. It was 
 evident that the French were much too strong for our 
 dragoons; and our infantry was far behind. The 
 enemy might retire, and take his route through the 
 Desert, either for Cairo or Alexandria, with little risk 
 of being pursued. In this dilemma, a stratagem 
 suggested by Major (afterwards Sir Robert) Wilson, 
 was adopted with success. Galloping forwards and 
 waving a white handkerchief, he summoned the French 
 commander to capitulate, "as the allied army was at 
 hand." This overture was indignantly and fiercely 
 rejected by Colonel Cavalier; but it was observed 
 that his soldiers appeared to be unsteady, pressing 
 forward and listening with an eager interest for the 
 result of the parley. 
 
 Scarcely had Wilson rejoined General Doyle, when 
 he was overtaken by a French officer, requesting him 
 
 K 2 
 
132 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 to return. The conference was resumed, and was of 
 short duration. The conditions proposed by the 
 French commander were accepted by Doyle, and 
 gladly ratified by Hutchinson. It was no trifling an 
 advantage to have weakened the enemy by the capture 
 of so large a detachment of his best troops.* Five 
 hundred and seventy men, including officers, laid down 
 their arms at the British head-quarters, on condition 
 that they should be sent to France, and their private 
 property be respected. This corps, commanded by 
 Colonel Cavalier, had been sent out of Alexandria, 
 with 550 camels, to collect supplies for the garrison. 
 It was composed of two or three troops of dragoons, 
 some companies of infantry, one hundred and twenty 
 of the Dromedary corps, (the picked men of the army,) 
 and one light gun. They had hoped to gather a suf- 
 ficiency of provisions and forage in the valleys about 
 Damanhour; but in this hope they were disappointed. 
 The villages were deserted; no ripe grain could be 
 found. Colonel Cavalier then took the resolution of 
 pushing on to Cairo, where the supplies of which 
 Alexandria was in need might be procured. With 
 this view he entered the Desert and marched rapidly 
 along its eastern border. Supposing the English army 
 
 * There had been no engagement between the armies (ex- 
 cepting the slight skirmishes near Rahmanieh) since the battle 
 of the 21st of March. Yet in this interval, no less than 1,540 
 of the French were made prisoners; viz., at Rosetta, 260 ; at 
 Rahmanieh, IGO; on the canal of Menouf, 150; Colonel Cava- 
 lier's detachment, 570; and about 400, who were captured at 
 sea while endeavouring to escape from Damietta and £1 Esbeh. 
 
IN 1801. 133 
 
 to be still at Ralimanieh, and prevented from gaining 
 better intelligence bj the Arab horsemen who hovered 
 about his column, the French commander pursued his 
 course till he imagined that he had passed bejond the 
 danger of encountering the Allies. He then turned 
 towards the valley of the Nile, along which he in- 
 tended to prosecute his march to Cairo; but on the 
 17th of May, Cavalier was disagreeably surprised by 
 the sudden appearance of the British dragoons. 
 
 It seems clear that after the battle of the 21st of 
 March, the French soldiery had lost their wonted con- 
 fidence. There had been bitter feuds among the 
 superior officers of their army; and a cabal, headed 
 by General Regnier, was carrying on a dangerous 
 opposition to the policy and measures of Menou. 
 These dissensions spread widely through the troops; 
 but as long as they held the hope of crowning their 
 former glories by the destruction of the British army, 
 they fought with all the valour and activity which had 
 distinguished these veterans in the campaigns of Italy. 
 But the results of the actions near Alexandria had 
 discouraged them. The French, who were made pri- 
 soners, frankly told their captors that they had never 
 before experienced such hard fighting. They imagined 
 the British to be much stronger in numbers than they 
 really were ; and a despair of success in Egypt, and 
 an anxious desire to return to France, gained ground 
 in all the ranks of the army. A great proportion 
 both of officers and men were ripe for capitulations, by 
 which they might be restored to their native country. 
 
134 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 Colonel Cavalier's detacliments laid down their 
 arms on the 17th of May; and before the evening 
 closed thej were on board of djerines, and wending 
 their way towards Rosetta. Nor was this auspicious 
 day to end without further and more exciting en- 
 couragement to the growing hopes of the British 
 commander. Tidings, the more welcome because thej 
 were wholly unexpected, arrived from the camp of the 
 Grand Vizier. General Belliard, with four or five 
 thousand infantry, nearly a thousand cavalry, and 
 twenty-four pieces of cannon, liad met the Turks, and 
 had effected nothing ! Instead of routing the dis- 
 orderly host of Moslems, which Hutchinson had anti- 
 cipated with dread, the French commander had turned 
 back and retreated rapidly to Cairo, after a protracted 
 cannonade and some sharp skirmishing. 
 
 It has been already mentioned that the Vizier 
 had been unable to control his headstrong bands. 
 They had pushed onward rapidly, without any regard 
 to the slow progress of the British up the Nile, and 
 by the 15 th of May, their foremost horsemen were 
 within a day's march of Cairo. On that day, Bel- 
 liard went forth with between 5,000 and 6,000 soldiers, 
 and a powerful artillery. He hoped to surprise the 
 Ottomans on their march, and to destroy, or at least 
 disable, their army before the English should draw so 
 near as to imperil the garrison of Cairo. If he should 
 not succeed, his movement was to be called " a recon- 
 naissance," but if he should effect his purpose it would 
 be hailed as a grand stroke of strategy. At day- 
 
i>T 1801. 135 
 
 break on the 16tli, Belliard fell in with the van of 
 the Turkish host, far in advance of its main body. 
 The French attacked at once, but keeping all their 
 infantry in squares, on account of the great number 
 of the Turkish horse, they suffered some loss from 
 the fire of guns pointed by the handful of English 
 artillerymen. As the French advanced, pourlxig in 
 a brisk fire from their field-pieces, the Ottoman foot 
 fell back, but their cavalry spreading to the right 
 and left, kept caracoling round, and threatening the 
 flanks and rear of the assailant. In this way six or 
 seven hours were spent without any effectual stroke, 
 and though the Vizier had arrived with the rest of his 
 forces, the Turks pursued the same wary course of 
 action. Belliard's troops were fatigued, and he became 
 apprehensive that the cloud of horsemen, whom he saw 
 far away to his right and rear, might push on to the 
 gates of Cairo and excite an insurrection of the popu- 
 lace in that great city. Despairing of being able 
 to force the Turks into a decisive engagement, the 
 French general determined to retrace his steps. He 
 retreated with great celerity, but in such good order 
 that his pursuers could make no impression on 
 his columns ; and on the next day Belliard re-entered 
 Cairo. 
 
 The apprehensions which had hitherto weighed on 
 the mind of Hutchinson were now dispelled. There 
 was no longer any doubt or difficulty as to securing a 
 communication, and perhaps some concert, between 
 his army and that of the Grand Vizier. Knowing 
 
136 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 that Admiral Blankett's ship had reached Suez, our 
 General naturally hoped from day to day that 
 he should receive tidings of the arrival at the same 
 port of the long-expected army from India. A 
 march of a few days might bring this army, sup- 
 posed to be 8,000 strong, into communication with 
 the left flank of the Turkish troops, while Hut- 
 chinson should connect the nu)vements of his column 
 with their right. But great numbers of camels were 
 deemed to be indispensable for the passage of the 
 Indian army across the Desert. The General, therefore, 
 despatched officers to Belbeis to purchase these animals 
 and forward them to Suez. At the same time he sent 
 Major Montresor to the latter place, with instructions 
 to expedite the arrangements, necessary for the march 
 of the troops arriving from India ; and to concert 
 with their commander a general plan of co-operation. 
 *In order to afford time for the completion of these 
 measures, Hutchinson determined to remain several 
 days at Al Gam, which is situated near the con- 
 fluence of the Menouf branch with the great western 
 stream of the Nile. From hence he corresponded 
 with the Vizier, and he succeeded in persuading this 
 chieftain to move to his right, and thereby to put 
 his army in more ready connection with the British 
 column, instead of risking any partial attempt upon 
 Cairo. The Ottoman troops accordingly encamped 
 about Ben er Ilasset and Ber Shoum, and Colonel 
 Stewart's detachment, reinforced by the 30th Regi- 
 ment, took up an intermediate position, which secured 
 
m 1801. 137 
 
 a communication between our head-quarters and those 
 of the Vizier. 
 
 It was not till the 1st of June that Hutchinson 
 resumed his march, and he proceeded with the more 
 caution because he had now received intelligence that 
 the Indian expedition had been unable to make its 
 way up the Red Sea ; the fleet had been dispersed, 
 and the ships were dropping a few at a time into the 
 Bay of Oosseir. All hope of the early co-operation 
 of this army was thus extinguished, but the 200 men 
 who had arrived at Suez in the Admiral's ship, were 
 invited to cross the Desert and join Colonel Stewart ; 
 while the main body of the British force was strength- 
 ened by the arrival of Brigadier Oakes with the 28th 
 and 42nd Regiments, 120 gunners, and 60 dragoons. 
 There had, however, arisen fresh causes for uneasiness : 
 Admiral Gantheaume's squadron,'''' bringing a large 
 body of French troops, was known to be on the coast 
 to the westward of Alexandria, and one of his cor- 
 vettes had actually entered that port. Ooote's division 
 of our army was so much reduced by ophthalmia and 
 other diseases, that there remained scarcely 4,000 
 rank and file capable of defending the lines. Nor 
 was Hutchinson's own column less sickly ; nearly 
 1,000 of his men had been sent down the Nile to 
 hospitals in the rear, and for several days his troops 
 were sufi'ering much from a scarcity of provisions. 
 The grumblings and remonstrances of the frondeurs 
 
 * See Appendix D. 
 
138 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 were again heard in the camp, and the march was 
 resumed under gloomy forebodings. 
 
 However, as the British cohimn advanced, it came, 
 on the 3rd of June, into communication with Osman 
 Bej at the head 1,200 Mamelukes, a brilliant body of 
 horsemen, far superior in every respect to the best of 
 the Turks. But Osman looked on the Capitan Pach^ 
 with deep mistrust and aversion ; nor would he bring 
 his people into close connection with the allied column. 
 He treated personally with Hutchinson, and his Mame- 
 lukes moved abreast of the British division, but at a 
 distance of four or five miles to the right, so that, in 
 case of treachery, they could plunge at once into the 
 Desert and disappear. But the time was not yet 
 come when the Turkish commanders might safely, and 
 with a prospect of success, allow a symptom to appear 
 of the hatred which their government bore to the 
 Beys, and the designs which were contemplated for 
 their destruction. The Capitan Pacha received the 
 Mameluke chiefs with all the courtesy and dissimu- 
 lation in which the Orientals are masters of art ; and 
 the British officers imagined that he was sincere. 
 
 Within a few days General Hutchinson was re- 
 lieved from his worst apprehensions, by the intelli- 
 gence that Gantheaume, after having brought his 
 squadron to anchor on the coast (about 150 leagues 
 to the westward of Alexandria), had suddenly cut his 
 cables and disappeared. In the meanwhile, the com- 
 bined armies continuing to advance, thougli slowly, 
 towards Cairo, and on the 15th of June, Hutchinson 
 
IN 1801. 139 
 
 despatched to General Belliard an invitation to 
 capitulate. This overture was at once rejected with 
 that air of confident defiance, which French officers 
 in a dilemma rarely fail to assume. But by the 2 1st 
 of June the allied troops had gathered closely round 
 the capital of Egypt. On the right bank of the Nile, 
 the Grand Vizier and Colonel Stewart were threaten- 
 ing to assault the wide-extended walls of Cairo ; while 
 Hutchinson and the Capitan Pacha had invested Gizeh 
 on the left bank, and were throwing up batteries 
 which might bear upon the bridge that connected this 
 town with the greater city. On this side the outposts 
 of the enemy had been driven in with ease, and chiefly 
 by the Mamelukes, who distinguished themselves by 
 their impetuous valour. 
 
 "Within the beleaguered city councils of war were 
 called by General Belliard. The chief engineer'"' de- 
 clared the enormous extent of the old walls to be 
 indefensible against such numbers as it was imagined 
 that the allies could muster, and though Lagrange 
 and one or two others went through the form of pro- 
 testing against a capitulation, yet on the morning of 
 the 22nd of June, a French officer appeared at our 
 outposts, with a request that an English general might 
 be appointed to enter into a conference as to terms, 
 and that hostilities might in the meanwhile be sus- 
 
 * The journal of this officer, Brigadier D'Hautpoul, is an- 
 nexed to General Regnier's Memoirs of the Campaigns in Egypt, 
 and forms the most trustworthy and valuable part of the 
 book. 
 
140 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 pended. Readily accepting this invitation, Hutchin- 
 son empowered Brigadier John Hope"^" to meet the 
 negotiators on the part of the enemy and to settle 
 the terms for the surrender of Cairo. An armistice of 
 forty-eight hours was granted, and during this time 
 the only difficulty which occurred was that of keeping 
 the thoughtless and insubordinate soldiers of the 
 Vizier from committing themselves by rash attempts 
 to make their way into the city. The terms of capi- 
 tulation were very promptly arranged, for both parties 
 had the same object in view. With the great majority 
 of the French, the prevalent desire was that of returning 
 to France ; and Hutchinson well knew that the British 
 ministers aimed above all things at the expulsion of 
 the enemy's forces from Egypt before the conditions 
 of peace between England and the Consular Govern- 
 ment should come under serious discussion. The 
 Turks indeed may have felt that they were disap- 
 pointed in their hopes of vengeance and plunder, but 
 their chieftains consented to sign the capitulation, 
 though the terms appeared to be more than usually 
 favourable to the enemy.f Yet there was prudence 
 and sound policy in granting these terms ; the num- 
 bers of the French within the walls of Cairo were 
 found to be even greater than had been apprehended. 
 Of one description or another, of military men there 
 were nearly 13,000, exclusive of civilians, and women 
 
 * General Moore, and Hope, the Adjutant-Greneral, had 
 rejoined the army only two days before. 
 
 t See Appendix E. 
 
m 1801. 141 
 
 and children. Though there were many in the hos- 
 pitals, they could have brought more than 8,000 
 effective soldiers into the field, besides having several 
 hundreds of invalids who were able to do duty in 
 garrison. On the other hand, the English General 
 could have barely mustered 4,000 rank and file for 
 battle on the left bank of the river. 
 
 It was not till the 10th of July that the French 
 evacuated Cairo, passing over to Gizeh, where they 
 remained till the morning of the 15th, employed in 
 embarking their sick, and women, and baggage, on the 
 Nile.'^' During this interval the Vizier's troops entered 
 the great city, and were guilty of many acts of plun- 
 der and violence, particularly towards such of the 
 inhabitants as were suspected of having been in any 
 degree on friendly terms with the French. 
 
 At this time both Hutchinson and Oraddock were 
 so seriously ill that the command of our troops de- 
 volved upon Moore. With him rested the arrange- 
 ments for the march to Rosetta, and the personal 
 
 * Let me not leave unnoticed an act at this time, which 
 was highly honourable to the French, and which marked their 
 devotion to the memory of their former Commander, General 
 Kleber. This distinguished chief had been assassinated by a 
 fanatic in the preceding year. Though the army had been 
 rent by dissensions, and the policy of Kleber had been strikingly 
 opposed to that which was upheld by JSTapoleon, now holding 
 unfettered sway at Paris, the troops insisted on carrying to 
 France, and investing with all the honours in their power, the 
 body of Kleber. His remains were embarked on the Nile 
 under prolonged salutes from the guns of his countrymen, re- 
 echoed by those of the British army. 
 
142 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 direction of a very delicate and doubtful service. 
 Here were 8,000 French soldiers in complete military 
 array, carrying their arms and ammunition, their 
 cavalry well mounted, their field-pieces fully horsed, 
 to be escorted 200 miles by about 3,500 British,'" the 
 Capitan Pacha's division of Turks, and 200 or 300 
 Mamelukes. But the plan and its details, as framed 
 by Moore, were admirable, and they were carried into 
 effect with perfect success. On the 1.5th of July the 
 march began. First went the wild horsemen of Syria, 
 followed by the more orderly foot-soldiers of the 
 Capitan Pachk : next, but with a long interval, marched 
 the French infantry with their guns, their cavalry 
 moving abreast, but on the left flank and farther from 
 the river. After another interval, came the British 
 column led by Moore ; and our dragoons and the 
 detachment of Mamelukes formed a rear guard. A 
 great fleet of djermes carrying the sick, the bag- 
 gage, &c., and escorted by our gun vessels, dropt slowly 
 down the Nile, so as to keep up a constant commu- 
 nication with the French and English columns. During 
 a march of several days there arose not a difficulty or 
 disagreement of any sort. Our late enemies were in 
 high good humour and in the gayest spirits. At the 
 halting places, the English and French would mingle 
 in companionship, and laugh, and discuss as well as 
 they could, their battles and their fortunes. After a 
 short rest at Rosetta, to give time for the preparation 
 
 * 500 of our men remained at Gizeh for the protection of 
 
 the sick Generals. 
 
m 1801. 143 
 
 of transports iu the Bay of Aboiikir, General Bel- 
 liard's army, with all its followers, and even most of 
 then' horses, were embarked between the 31st of July 
 and the 7th of August ; and they were escorted by 
 British men of war to the ports of France. 
 
 In the capitulation of Cairo a clause had been 
 inserted, under which General Menou and the garrison 
 of Alexandria were empowered to avail themselves of 
 the same favourable conditions ; but Menou doggedly 
 refused to profit by this opening. It remained, there- 
 fore, for the British Commander to conclude the labour 
 of the campaign by the reduction of this city. 
 
 The strength and means of the British army had 
 by this time been very greatly augmented. In the 
 first half of July there had arrived from England, or 
 Minorca, eight battalions of infantry, besides 300 men 
 of the guards, and the 22nd Dragoons (without 
 horses). This gave to the General, now Sir John 
 Hutchinson, a disposable force of 16,000 men ; and 
 he had certain advices of the arrival at Keneh, on the 
 Upper Nile, of about 5,000 of the Indian army under 
 David Baird. Whatever might be the operations 
 necessary for the reduction of Alexandria, they could 
 now be carried on without fear of interruption. The 
 garrison might be strong, but there were no other 
 French troops in Egypt. 
 
 Before I enter upon a narrative of this siege, it 
 may not be superfluous to give some account of the 
 expedition from India to which I have just now 
 alluded. It had been planned upon a large scale. 
 
144 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 The 10th, 80th, 86th, and 88th Regiments, with 
 three battalions of volunteer Sepojs, and ample 
 detachments of artillerymen, sailed from the ports of 
 India/'' They were to be joined on their passage by 
 the 61st Regiment, a troop of the 8th Light Dragoons, 
 and one of Horse Artillery from the Cape of Good 
 Hope. The battalions were strong in numbers ; and 
 if the whole had arrived at their destination, this army 
 would have mustered nearly 8,000 rank and file. 
 But the navigation of the Red Sea, always difficult, 
 was almost unknown to the English in those days : 
 the dangers were many and more were the appre- 
 hensions. Even before the fleet reached the straits 
 of Bab-el-mandel it was partially dispersed ; some of 
 the smaller vessels were lost, and many of the trans- 
 ports, buffeted by the northerly winds, gave up the 
 struggle and returned to India. Within the Red Sea 
 the dispersion seems to have been complete ; Admiral 
 Blankett made his way to Suez, as we have seen, with 
 his single ship of the line ; but his Commodore, Sir 
 Home Popham, gathering several of the troop-ships 
 around him, was unable to advance beyond the latitude 
 of Cosseir. After beating about for several days, and 
 picking up some more of the straggling transports, 
 Sir Home anchored in the Bay of Cosseir on the 1 7th 
 of May. 
 
 During the next three weeks there continued to 
 drop in, by one or two at a time, a good many of the 
 
 * They brought with them bullocks trained to drag the guns 
 and ammunition carts. 
 
m 1801. 145 
 
 missing vessels; but it was not till the 21st of June 
 that General Baird, having procured camels from the 
 Arabs, and having gathered together about 5200 of 
 his men, was able to commence his march across the 
 Desert from Cosseir to Keneh. The heat was intense : 
 along the line of march to the Nile few wells were met 
 with, and those afforded but scanty supplies of water. 
 On this account it was necessary that the troops should 
 move in small bodies and on successive days. Notwith- 
 standing every precaution, the suffering of the soldiers 
 was severe; but it was observed that the British bore 
 the trial better than the natives of India. Twelve of 
 our men were stricken dead by the sun; and many of 
 the horses and camels perished. The march, estimated 
 at about 130 miles, was performed by the different 
 bodies of troops in twelve, fourteen, or fifteen days; 
 and early in July, Baird* had the satisfaction of 
 seeing his little army re -assembled at Keneh, on the 
 Upper Nile. Immediate exertions were made to 
 collect boats; but it was long before a sufficient 
 number could be obtained; and the troops dropped 
 down the river to Cairo in successive detachments. 
 Having again collected his forces at the Grand City, 
 Baird prosecuted his voyage down the Nile, in obedi- 
 ence to the orders of Hutchinson; and he took up his 
 quarters at and near to Rosetta at the end of August. 
 This division of troops arrived in a high state of 
 discipline ; but the men were sickly in consequence of 
 
 * Montresor was the second in command, and that excellent 
 offic^ Samuel Auchmuty the Adjutant-General. 
 
146 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 their having been so much exposed to the sun during 
 the hot season; and of the 80th, 86th, and 88th 
 Regiments large portions had , been driven back to 
 India. It had been expected bj the British Ministers 
 that their 8000 men would have arrived at Suez earlj 
 in April, in time to bear an important part in the 
 war of Egypt. But the calculations of our Govern- 
 ment had been formed under too sanguine a view of 
 the circumstances. Thej had not made allowance for 
 the difficulties of procuring and equipping proper 
 vessels for the transport of so large an army; or for 
 those which were to be expected on a voyage in seas 
 which were little known. Thus, Baird, with but two- 
 thirds of his army, only reached the field of action 
 when the result of the campaign was no longer 
 doubtful. 
 
 Of the French army, which consisted of not less 
 than 27,000 soldiers when Sir Ralph Abercromby 
 landed in Egypt, there remained now only the garrison 
 of Alexandria; numerous indeed, but disheartened and 
 out of humour. General Menou had seized, and driven 
 to sea his second in command (Regnier), and some 
 other officers whom he considered to be the leaders of 
 the cabal against his authority ; but much of the sour 
 leaven remained in the mass, though its working was 
 kept out of sight. As far, however, as declarations and 
 outward show could go, it appeared to be the fixed 
 determination of M6nou to defend this last stronghold 
 of Egypt to the utmost extremity. The French lines 
 upon the heights opposite to the Britisli position had 
 
IN 1801. 147 
 
 been diligently strengthened, as well as the forts in the 
 rear ; and the power of heavy artillery which might be 
 brought to bear on this side, as well as the natural 
 difficulties of the ground, appeared to render an attack 
 from the eastward impracticable, or at least too dan-, 
 gerous. 
 
 By the beginning of August Sir John Hutchinson 
 had been brought down the Nile, and carried to tho 
 flag-ship in the Bay of Aboukir; but he was yet, for 
 several days, too ill to assume the personal command 
 of his army. On the 1 5th he arrived in the camp ; 
 and in the evening of the next day he detached about 
 four thousand men, under General Eyre Coote, to com^ 
 mence operations against the western face of Alexan^ 
 dria. Embarking at night-fall these troops, escorted 
 by gun-boats, passed up the Lake Mareotis in the 
 darkness, and they landed the next morning on the 
 shore where the isthmus is widest, five or six miles to 
 the westward of the city walls and opposite to the 
 promontory which juts to the northward, and termi- 
 nates close to some little islands, on one of which 
 stood the fort of Marabout. The landing was efi'ected 
 without opposition ; but, as Hutchinson deemed it not 
 improbable that Menou might detach a part of his 
 forces to fall upon Ooote before he might be prepared 
 for battle, a show of attack from the eastward was 
 made early in the morning of the 1 7th. 
 
 There were two little hills in advance of the French 
 lines : one, to which our officers had given the name of 
 the " Green Hill," stood in front of the enemy's right; 
 
 L 2 
 
148 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 the other, called the "Knoll/' was iu advance of 
 his left ; and on each of these was a French out- 
 post. The British troops were drawn out as if for 
 battle, and Moore was directed to lead the reserve 
 against the last-mentioned height, while Craddock's 
 brigade attacked the "Green Hill." Both these posts 
 were occupied without difficulty; but the Generals 
 found that their men became exposed to a dangerous fire 
 from the French batteries, and thej withdrew their 
 columns out of the range of shot. Craddock, however, 
 left a part of the 30th Regiment (about one hundred 
 and eighty men) lying on the " Green Hill ; " and the 
 enemy, observing this detachment, fancied that they 
 could cut it off. The 75th demi-brigade made a rapid 
 sortie from their lines; but the gallant companies of 
 the 30th, instead of shrinking back before twice their 
 numbers, gathered together, and rushing on their 
 assailants with the bayonet broke and chased them 
 back, killing some and taking several prisoners. 
 
 In the meanwhile General Coote had completed 
 the landing of his division and of several field pieces. 
 In the evening (l7th of August) he advanced about 
 two miles in the direction of Alexandria, and took up 
 a strong position amongst ancient quarries, where the 
 isthmus becomes very narrow. At the same time he 
 detached the 54th Regiment to blockade the little fort 
 of Marabout, and to cover the formation of batteries 
 against it. The reduction of this place was necessary, 
 because its guns commanded the entrance into the old 
 port of Alexandria, and it was of importance that our 
 
m 1801. 149 
 
 vessels of war* should be enabled to come in and co- 
 operate with the left of Ooote's division, while the gun- 
 boats in Lake Mareotis acted on his right. At day- 
 break on the 19th, two twelve-pounders and two 8-inch 
 howitzers opened their fire on the fort and tower of 
 Marabout, and on three French gun -boats lying under 
 its walls. The latter were soon disposed of; two of 
 the boats were sunk, and the third was forced to fly to 
 Alexandria. But it was found that the masonry of 
 Marabout was not to be breached by twelve-pounders. 
 Heavier guns were required; and during the 19th and 
 20th of August two 2 4 -pounders were dragged by 
 men, with great labour, across the widest part of the 
 isthmus. A battery had been prepared for their 
 reception at the extreme point, which is separated by 
 a very narrow channel from the islet occupied by the 
 fort of Marabout. At day-break on the 21st the guns 
 opened their fire; at noon the signal tower fell crash- 
 ing to the ground; and before evening the whole fort 
 was in ruins. Even then the gallant Frenchman, who 
 held the command, surrendered with reluctance, having 
 lost 25 out of his 195 soldiers. 
 
 Sloops of war and gun vessels now entered the 
 harbour, and Ooote prepared to move forward, and 
 attack the enemy's troops in a position which they 
 had taken up in advance of Alexandria; and which 
 would have been extremely strong if both its flanks 
 had not been exposed to a cannonade from our ship- 
 
 * The shallowness of the old port allowed only vessels of a 
 light draught of water to enter. 
 
150 CAMPAIGN m EGYPT 
 
 ping on one side and the flotilla on the other. Still 
 the French seemed disposed to fight on the short and 
 strong ridge which thej occupied, amongst scattered 
 ruins, defended bj seven pieces of heavy ordnance, 
 and a large proportion of field-artillery. 
 
 On the evening of the 22nd, Coote marched to the 
 attack in three columns, led by Lord Cavan, and 
 Generals Ludlow and Finch. A screen of sharp- 
 shooters and field'pieces covered their front. The 
 flotilla on Lake Mareotis and the gun-vessels on the 
 old port moved forward on both flanks. As our 
 troops drew nigh the French fired heavily, but with 
 no proportionate efifect, while the shot from the vessels 
 on either side crossed thickly, and partially raked the 
 very narrow ridge on which the enemy's line was 
 posted. Its elevation, and the ruins of ancient tombs 
 and temples, which afibrded much shelter, saved his 
 troops from heavy loss. But the British columns 
 pressed steadily and sternly forward, and the French 
 commander. General Eppler, gave up the contest. 
 His troops retired in good order, checking his pursuers 
 occasionally by a heavy fire; and he re-entered the 
 lines of Alexandria after losing a good many men 
 and his seven 18-pounders. In this affair only three 
 of the British soldiers were killed, and forty 
 wounded. 
 
 After the action had ceased Coote continued to 
 advance ; and he took up a new position so close to 
 the works of Alexandria, as to be within a long range 
 of the Fort des Bains. At the same time parties of 
 
IN 1801. 151 
 
 seamen and otliers were employed on the toilsome 
 task of dragging up heavy ordnance with which the 
 fortifications might be battered; but this was a very 
 laborious work among the quarries, and catacombs, 
 and ruins of the ancient city, nor was it till the 25 th, 
 that these heavy guns could be brought into their 
 places. In the mean time, Sir John Hutchinson 
 despatched Colonel Brent Spencer with four battalions 
 of British, a body of Albanians, and some Mamelukes, 
 to strengthen Ooote's division. They embarked on 
 the Lake Mareotis before daylight on the 23rd, and 
 in order to draw ofi* the attention of the French, 
 another feigned attack was made from the eastward. 
 Scattered companies crawled silently up the heights 
 in the dark till they were near the enemy's lines. 
 Then at a signal from the rear, they opened a rattling 
 fire along the extensive front. The scheme was suc- 
 cessful ; the French manned their works in haste, and 
 kept up for a long time a tremendous but harmless 
 cannonade from all their batteries. 
 
 Coote had now more than six thousand efi*ective 
 men under his command, and he lay close to the 
 enemy's works; but his advanced position was at- 
 tended with one serious inconvenience. No water 
 was to be procured from the dry sand-rocks on which 
 his troops were posted. The wells from which it was 
 necessary to fetch it were nearly four miles to the 
 rear. On the other hand, the occupation of the 
 western isthmus by the British had finally cut ofi* the 
 supplies of sheep and other things which the Arabs, 
 
152 CAMPAIGN m EGYPT 
 
 though thej detested the French, had not till then 
 ceased to bring to the garrison, and for which they 
 were very amply paid by Menou.* 
 
 Near as Ooote's position was to the Fort des Bains, 
 there was still an outpost held by the enemy which 
 was likely to embarrass our operations against that 
 work. Early in the night of the 25th of August, the 
 1st battalion of the 20th Regiment, under that admi- 
 rable officer Colonel George Smith, marched silently 
 forth with unloaded muskets; they turned the left of 
 the French redoubt, and rushing in with the bayonet 
 they captured or killed the whole of its defenders 
 (about one hundred men). At the same time a 
 picquet, opposite the left of our line, was surprised and 
 dispersed with loss by a party of the 26th Dragoons. 
 Irritated by the success of this exploit, a strong 
 column of the enemy, issuing from the city under 
 cover of a cannonade, attempted to drive the 20th 
 from the post they had so gallantly mastered; but 
 the attack was repelled with ease. 
 
 The posture of the French garrison had now be- 
 come extremely irksome. The soldiers had lost all 
 confidence ; and though they still possessed magazines 
 of grain, they had no other meat than horseflesh, and 
 even that supply was scanty. The blockade both by 
 
 * It may not be amiss to mention, as it serves to mark one 
 of the difficulties of this campaign in Egypt, that Hutchinson 
 had found it impossible to procure sufficient forage even for his 
 small proportion of cavalry. He had been obliged to send to 
 Rosetta two regiments of dragoons, and all the camels and other 
 beasts of burden in his camp. 
 
IN 1801. 153 
 
 land and sea was so close and stringent, that there 
 remained no hope of relief. Their lines upon the 
 eastern heights were so extensive, as to require the 
 constant presence of two-thirds of their eflfective 
 soldiers. If thej abandoned any part, Hutchinson 
 was ready to break in with 10,000 men. On the 
 west, Ooote acting on a narrow front, was close to the 
 forts which alone protected the city on that side; and 
 he was busily employed in forming batteries and 
 arming them with 24-pounders. General Menou felt 
 that his game was lost, and in the evening of the 26th 
 of August, he sent out a flag of truce with a letter, in 
 which he asked for a suspension of arms preparatory 
 to a capitulation. On the 30th the terms which came 
 under discussion were adjusted and signed; and on 
 the 3rd of September, the British troops took posses- 
 sion of the lines and the outworks of Alexandria. 
 
 The terms of capitulation were nearly the same as 
 those which had been granted to the garrison of Cairo. 
 If Hutchinson had chosen to insist on harder conditions 
 and an absolute surrender, the French could not have 
 held out many days ; but they would have fought despe- 
 rately; and much blood might have been spilled for 
 what was become merely a point of military vanity. 
 The English general knew that the war was at an end 
 on the continent of Europe, and that negotiations for 
 peace between our Government and that of France 
 were under discussion. That our armies should be 
 known to hold undisputed possession of Egypt was an 
 object of the highest importance, nor ought a day to 
 
154 CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT 
 
 be lost in conveying information of this fact to the 
 British cabinet. Tlierefore, Sir John Hutchinson 
 assented without hesitation to the proposal, that 
 General Menou, with all his troops and followers, 
 should be embarked immediately in English transports 
 and be landed in the ports of France. 
 
 Thus ended the campaign of the British army in 
 Egypt; a campaign of which the importance can 
 hardly be OYcr-rated. Not only did the result remove 
 the greatest difficulty in the way of peace, and dissi- 
 pate the fears of England with regard to India, but 
 the success which crowned our arms on the shores of 
 ^gypt had further consequences. It revived confi- 
 dence and an honourable pride in our military service. 
 The British nation, exulting in the proved valour and 
 the triumphs of their army, felt once more that they 
 might rely upon their officers and soldiers as securely 
 as they had long relied upon their seamen. The high 
 character of the British army shone brightly forth 
 after the clouds which had hung heavily over it. The 
 miserable warfare in America, the capitulations of 
 Saratoga and York-town, and the more recent disas- 
 ters of our troops in Flanders and in Holland, had 
 fixed a deep distrust in the public mind of our 
 military men. It was believed that our commanders, 
 nay even that our officers and soldiers were degene- 
 rate, and unequal to cope in battle with the conquerors 
 of Italy and Germany. The trial which had now 
 been made under great disadvantages first dispelled 
 itjiis prejudice. Our service regained its ancient 
 
IN 1801. 155 
 
 standing in the estimation of the British people. 
 Their confidence was kept alive by the brilliant little 
 afikir of Maida after the renewal of the war; and was 
 confirmed, I trust irrevocablj, bj the great actions 
 and victorious career of Wellington. 
 
CAMPAIGN OP 1801. 157 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CAMPAiaN IN EOYPT. 
 1801. 
 
 Appendix A. 
 
 Instructions for tJie Captains (of the Navy) commanding divisions ^ 
 on landing the Troops. 
 
 When the troops are to be landed by the boats of the fleet, 
 great care should be had that they are kept at a proper distance , 
 from each other, at least fifty feet; and when the situation of 
 the place will admit of it, they are to dress or take their re- 
 spective stations from the right; otherwise, from the centre or 
 left, as may be convenient, or as shall be previously appointed. 
 
 On no account must the boats crowd upon each other, nor 
 are they to break the line, either by getting too much ahead 
 or astern. 
 
 No boats are to come into the first line except the flat 
 boats, and the launches having the artillery on board, these 
 last towed by cutters. The second line is to be composed of 
 cutters only, to attend upon the flat boats, that they may 
 afford immediate relief should any boat require it, in which . 
 case they are to proceed directly, without waiting for orders, to 
 give the necessary aid. The third line is to be composed of the 
 cutters that tow the launches; and the boats belonging to each 
 ship will keep in the wake of their respective flat boats. 
 
 To distinguish the boats having on board the grenadier 
 company of each regiment, they will carry the pamp colours of 
 
158 CAMPAIGN OF 1801. 
 
 that regiment, and the other boats are to form to the left, until 
 the regiment is completed, taking care that the companies are 
 embarked on board the boats in the order they should be in 
 when landed; and the captains commanding the divisions will 
 consult with the commanding officer of the troops, and fix on 
 the best method to obtain this object without confusion. 
 
 "When the troops are to land, a situation will be pointed 
 out upon the shore, where either the right or left will proceed 
 to; if from the right the boats from the left must observe open 
 order, that the right wing may not be too much crowded to- 
 gether; and the boats to the right will pay like attention, when 
 the left is the point from which they are to form. 
 
 Upon no account must any flat boat be nearer to another 
 than fifty feet, and this will afibrd sufficient space for the cut- 
 ters and launches in the rear to land between the flat boats, 
 agreeable to the regimental order of the troops they have on 
 board. 
 
 The flat boats are always to drop their grapnel from their 
 stem at a proper distance from the shore, that they may haul 
 off" the moment the troops are landed. 
 
 It may often be necessary that the flat boats should pull 
 quick round into an opposite direction, either for retreat or any 
 other cause, in which case it is of the utmost consequence that 
 they should do so together, and in one direction. Strict atten- 
 tion must therefore be paid to the signal that will be made 
 upon that occasion; and if no signal is made, they are always 
 to pull to starboard. 
 
 The captains commanding the dififerent divisions will repeat 
 all the signals made by the commanding officer of the disem- 
 barkation; and each captain should have a rowing boat attend- 
 ing him, with a careful officer to carry his orders to the boats of 
 his division. 
 
 In order that the flat boats may observe the signals as soon 
 as made, a musket will be fired from the commanding officer's 
 boat, which is to be repeated by the captains of the other 
 divisions. Each boat having the signal flags on board, must be 
 provided with stretchers, that the flags may be seen, should the 
 weather be calm; and all signals will be made at a flag staff", in 
 the centre of the boat. 
 
APPENDIX. 159 
 
 The officers commanding tlie boats must take particular 
 care that none of the troops stand up, as on many occasions it 
 may endanger the safety of the boat. 
 
 Each flat boat must be provided with four or five breakers, 
 or small casks of water, that immediate relief may be given that 
 troops upon their landing should they require it. 
 
 When the first landing is completed, the boats (when 
 ordered) will proceed to those ships having ensigns at their 
 fore-top-gallant-masthead; afterwards to those having their 
 ensigns at the mizen, until all the troops are on shore. 
 
 When the second landing takes place, the captains will 
 proceed with their division of boats to particular ships, that the 
 regiments may be landed in a collective body; and this is to be 
 observed until all the troops are on shore. 
 
 The launches that landed the artillery, will proceed to such 
 ordnance ship as will be pointed out, to land the light artillery 
 and stores. Should this service not be requisite, they will assist 
 in disembarking the troops agreeable to the last instructions. 
 
 The captains of the diff'erent divisions will deliver copies of 
 these and all other instructions to the lieutenants under their 
 orders; and they wiU give others to the midshipmen command- 
 ing the flat boats. 
 
 No person belonging to the boats to quit them upon landing, 
 unless by the particular order of the commanding officer of the 
 division. 
 
 Dated on board His Majesty's ship AjaXj 24th January, 
 1801. 
 
 Appendix B. 
 
 Boctracts from the General Orders of the Army. 
 
 Marmorice, Febraaiy 16th, 1801. 
 When the troops are ordered to land, the men are to be 
 put into the flat boats as expeditiously as possible, but without 
 hurry or disorder; they are to sit down in the boats, and in 
 rowing to the shore the strictest silence is to be observed; the 
 troops are positively ordered not to load till formed on the 
 
1-60 CAMPAIGN OP 1801. 
 
 beach ; the formation is to be effected as soon as possible, the 
 men are to fall in, in line, opposite to where they land; nor is 
 any individual or body of men, in conceiving themselves dis- 
 placed, to attempt to regain their situation by closing to either 
 flank, till ordered so to do by the general officer on whom they 
 depend, or the senior officer present on the spot. 
 
 The troops are to land with sixty rounds of ammunition 
 and two spare flints per man; the ammunition which cannot be 
 contained in the pouches to be carefully put in the packs. 
 Three days' bread, and three days' pork ready cooked, is to be 
 carried by officers and men. The same quantity is to be landed 
 for the troops; it is not, however, to be delivered out but 
 carried in kegs, and put under charge of the quartermaster of 
 each regiment, with a party sufficient for the purpose; each 
 man will carry his canteen filled with water. 
 
 Three days' barley will be carried for the horses of the 
 cavalry, and of the staff and field officers. 
 
 The staff and field officers must provide themselves with 
 forage sacks previous to the fleet sailing from this. 
 
 The men will carry their intrenching tools, and the propor- 
 tion of necessaries specified in the orders 15th August last, 
 viz. : two shirts, one pair of shoes, two pair of socks or stock- 
 ings, neatly made up in their packs or knapsacks; their camp 
 kettles and blankets. Eegiments having both blankets and 
 great-coats, will leave the latter on board. 
 
 It is absolutely necessary that the officers should bring on 
 shore in the first instance, such articles only as they can carry 
 themselves. Officers' servants are not only on all occasions of 
 service to be present under arms with the corps to which they 
 belong; they are to carry no more than any other soldier, and 
 are to mount all picquets and guards with their masters. The 
 smallest number of batmen possible will be permitted; mounted 
 officers alone are entitled to them. 
 
 The music, drummers, and men least fit for actual service, 
 are to be selected for all regimental duties, not purely military; 
 and officers commanding corps will be held strictly responsible 
 for their being at all times, and every situation, in the most 
 effective state. 
 
 A proportion of the general hospital staff must be attached 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 161 
 
 in the first instance to each brigade, and will be allowed such 
 orderHes as are absolutely necessary from the brigade. Regi- 
 mental surgeons are to be allowed one orderly each, to carry 
 the field case of instruments. 
 
 The spare arms, tents, and horse appointments of the dis- 
 mounted cavalry, and every article of spare baggage, are to be 
 left in charge of a careful non-commissioned officer on board of 
 each ship. 
 
 Appendix 0. 
 
 
 TUEN OF THE AeMT TJlTDEa 
 ON THE MOEiaNO OF THE 
 
 SiE Ealph AbEECEOMBTj 
 7th of Maech, 1801. . 
 
 Major- General Ludlow. 
 Coldstream G-uards . 
 3rd do. 
 
 
 Bank and file 
 present fit for duty. 
 
 766 
 812 
 
 Major- General Coote. 
 
 1st Eegiment (Royals) 
 54th (2 Battalions) 
 92nd 
 
 
 626 
 974 
 529 
 
 Major- General CradocTc. 
 90th . ' 
 8th 
 13th 
 18th 
 
 
 727 
 439 
 561 
 411 
 
 Major-General Lord Cavan. 
 50th 
 79th 
 
 
 477 
 604 
 
 Brigadier Doyle. 
 
 2nd (Queen's) 
 
 30th 
 
 44th 
 
 89th 
 
 
 530 
 412 
 263 
 378 
 
 Carried over 
 
 8509 
 
 
 
 M 
 
162 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF 1801, 
 
 Brought forward 
 Brigadier Stuart, 
 
 Stuart's Eegiment . 
 DeEoll's do. 
 
 8509 
 
 929 
 528 
 
 Dillon's do. 
 
 530 
 
 jReserve. — Major- General Moore, JBrigadi 
 23rd 
 
 er Oakes. 
 457 
 
 28th 
 
 587 
 
 42nd 
 
 754 
 
 58th 
 
 469 
 
 40th (Flank Companies) 
 Corsican Eangers . 
 Staff Corps . 
 
 250 
 
 209 
 
 82 
 
 Brigadier Finch. 
 
 11th Light Dragoons (one troop) 
 12th do. 
 
 53 
 
 474 
 
 26th do. 
 
 369 
 
 Hompesch's Hussars 
 
 138 
 
 Artillerymen 
 
 627 
 
 
 14,965 
 
 Appendix D. 
 
 
 The attempts made hy this Admiral Gantheaume to carry 
 succour to his countrymen in Egypt present a series of 
 mishaps which were not very creditable to the naval service of 
 Prance. As soon as the Chief Consul had triumphantly 
 imposed peace upon Austria, he applied himself earnestly to 
 the object of strengthening his army in Egypt. Great exer- 
 tions were made in all the ports of Erance with the view of 
 obtaining, at least a temporary superiority in the Mediter- 
 ranean. Elects, squadrons, fast-sailing frigates, all means of 
 conveying troops and supplies by which the permanent pos- 
 session of Egypt might be made sure ; the first squadron which 
 put to sea was that under the command of Gantheaume. 
 
 He escaped out of Brest in a heavy gale of wind, towards 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF 
 
 APPENDIX. 163 
 
 the end of January, 1801, with seven sail of the line and two 
 frigates, all picked ships, and having eSOOO or 4000 soldiers on 
 board. He passed Gibraltar, and hugged the shore of Africa ; 
 Lord Keith's fleet was at Marmorice. Sir John "Warren, 
 with four sail of the line, was in Port Mahon. One of 
 G-antheaume's frigates retarded the march of his squadron ; he 
 steered to the northward in order to protect her passage to 
 Toulon ; but catching a distant sight of Warren, who had come 
 out with his four ships, the French Admiral took alarm and 
 ran with his whole squadron into Toulon. 
 
 "While Gantheaume was on his passage, two frigates 
 (Justice and JEgyptienne) sailed from Toulon with 400 troops, 
 ordnance stores, &c., and got safe into Alexandria. Two 
 others {Begeneree and Africaine) carrying 600 soldiers started 
 from Eochefort. The former reached her destination, but the 
 Africaine was taken near Gibraltar by the FTioehe, after an 
 action in which two French generals and more than 200 of the 
 troops, exclusive of a great proportion of the crew, were killed 
 or wounded. 
 
 Gantheaume did not get clear of Toulon by the 22nd of 
 March : his squadron refitted and strengthened by the addition 
 of more frigates ; it carried about 4000 soldiers. Off" Sardinia 
 two of his large ships ran foul of each other ; both were greatly 
 damaged, and the Admiral made the best of his way back to 
 Toulon, re-entering that harbour on the 5th of April. On the 
 25th he put once more to sea, but before he had passed Sicily 
 a malignant fever was raging in his crowded ships, and Gan- 
 theaume deemed it best to send back to Toulon three ships 
 of the line with 2000 sick soldiers. "With the remainder he 
 worked his way circuitously to Dema, a roadstead on the north 
 coast of Africa, nearly 400 miles to the westward of Alexan- 
 dria. It had been imagined that troops might march from 
 hence, over burning sands, and amidst tribes of wild Arabs. 
 But the first attempt of the French boats to approach the 
 shore was met by musquet shots and unequivocal signs of 
 hostility. While the Admiral and the General were pausing 
 and full of doubts, some sails were seen in the offing ; Gan- 
 theaume fancied they must be English men-of-war ; he cut his 
 cables, and under crowded sail returned to Toulon. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 CAMPAIGN IN 1801. 
 
 In the meanwhile, the Chief Consul was making great 
 exertions to collect eighteen or twenty sail of the line at Cadiz, 
 which might run up the Mediterranean, take on board the 
 French army, which was lying in readiness about Brindisi and 
 Otranto, and land it in Egypt. But this scheme was thwarted, 
 retarded, and finally rendered vain by their two actions with 
 Admiral Saumarez's squadron. 
 
 Appendix E. 
 
 Convention for the evacuation of Egypt by the Erench and 
 auxiliary troops, under the command of the General of 
 Division Belliard, concluded between Brigadier- General 
 Hope on the part of the Commander-in-Chief of the British 
 army in Egypt ; Osman Bey on the part of his Highness 
 the Grand Vizier, and Isaac Bey on the part of his High- 
 ness the Capitan Pacha ; the citizens Donzelot General of 
 Brigade, Morand General of Brigade, and Tarayre Chief of 
 Brigade, on the part of the General of Division Belliard, 
 commanding a body of Erench and auxiliary troops. 
 
 The Commissioners above named having met and conferred, 
 after the exchange of their respective powers, have agreed upon 
 the following articles : 
 
 Art. 1. The Erench forces of every description, and the 
 auxiliary troops, under the command of the General of Divi- 
 sion Belliard, shall evacuate the city of Cairo, the citadel, the 
 forts of Boulac, Gizeh, and all that part of Egypt which they 
 now occupy. 
 
 2. The Erench and auxiliary troops shall retire by land to 
 Bosetfca, proceeding by the left bank of the Nile, with their arms, 
 baggage, field-artillery, and ammunition, to be there embarked and 
 conveyed to the Erench ports of the Mediterranean, with their 
 arms, artillery, baggage, and effects, at the expense of the allied 
 powers. The embarkation of the said Erench and auxiliary 
 troops shall take place as soon as possible, but at the latest 
 within fifteen days from the date of the ratification of the 
 present convention. It is also agreed, that the said troops 
 
APPENDIX. 165 
 
 shall be conveyed to the French ports above mentioned by the 
 most direct and expeditious route. 
 
 3. From the date of the signature and ratification of the 
 present convention, hostilities shall cease on both sides. The 
 
 fort of , and the gate of the Pyramids, of the town of 
 
 Gizeh, shall be delivered up to the allied army. The line of 
 advanced posts of the armies respectively shall be fixed by 
 commissioners named for this purpose, and the most positive 
 orders shall be given that these shall not be encroached upon, 
 in order to avoid all disputes ; and if any shall arise they are 
 to be determined in an amicable manner. 
 
 4. Twelve days after the ratification of the present con- 
 vention, the city of Cairo, the citadel, the forts and the town 
 of Boulac, shall be evacuated by the French and auxiliary 
 troops, who will retire to Ibrahim Bey, (?) the isle of Ehoda 
 and its dependencies, the forts of Foucroy and Gizeh, from 
 whence they shall depart as soon as possible, and at the latest 
 in five days, to proceed to the points of embarkation. The 
 generals commanding the British and Ottoman armies conse- 
 quently engage that means shall be furnished, at their charge, 
 for conveying the French and auxiliary troops as soon as 
 possible from Grizeh. 
 
 5. The march and encampment of the French and auxiliary 
 troops shall be regulated by the generals of the respective 
 armies, or by the officers named by each party ; but it is clearly 
 understood, that, according to this article, the days of march 
 and of encampment shall be fixed by the generals of the com- 
 bined armies, and consequently the said French and auxiliary 
 troops shall be accompanied on their march by English and 
 Turkish commissaries, instructed to furnish the necessary 
 provisions during the continuance of their route. 
 
 6. The baggage, ammunition, and other articles, transported 
 by water, shall be escorted by French detachments, and by 
 armed boats belonging to the allied powers. 
 
 7. The French and auxiliary troops shaU be subsisted from 
 the period of their departure from Gizeh to the time of their 
 embarkation, conformably to the regulations of the French army; 
 and from the day of their embarkation to that of their landing 
 in France, agreeably to the naval regulations of England. 
 
166 CAMPAIGN IN 1801. 
 
 8. The military and naval commanders of the British and 
 Turkish forces shall provide vessels for conveying to the French 
 ports of the Mediterranean the French and auxiliary troops, as 
 well as all French and other persons employed in the service 
 of the army. Everything relative to this point, as well as in 
 regard to subsistence, shall be regulated by commissaries 
 named for this purpose by the General of Division Belliard, 
 and by the naval and military Commanders-in-Chief of the 
 allied forces, as soon as the present convention shall be 
 ratified. These commissioners shall proceed to E/Osetta or 
 Aboukir, in order to make every necessary preparation for the 
 embarkation. 
 
 9. The allied powers shall provide four vessels (or more if 
 possible) fitted for the conveyance of horses, water casks, and 
 forage sufficient for the voyage. 
 
 10. The French and auxiliary troops will be provided with 
 a sufficient convoy for their safe return to France. After the 
 embarkation of the French troops, the allied powers pledge 
 themselves, that to the period of their arrival on the continent 
 of the French republic they shall not be molested ; and on his 
 part the General of Division Belliard, and the troops under his 
 command, engage that no act of hostility shall be by them 
 committed, during the said period, against the fleet or terri- 
 tories of His Britannic Majesty, of the Sublime Porte, or of 
 their allies. The vessels employed in conveying and escorting 
 the said troops, or other French subjects, shall not touch at 
 any other than a French port, except in cases of absolute neces- 
 sity. The Commanders of the British, Ottoman, and French 
 troops, enter reciprocally into the like engagements, during 
 the period that the French troops remain in Egypt, from the 
 ratification of the present convention to the moment of their 
 embarkation. The General of Division Belliard, commanding 
 the French and auxiliary troops, on the part of his government, 
 engages that the vessels employed for their conveyance and 
 protection shall not be detained in the French ports after the 
 disembarkation of the troops ; and that their commanders shall 
 be at liberty to purchase at their own expense, the provisions 
 which may be necessary for enabling them to return. General 
 Belliard also engages on the part of his government, that the 
 
APPENDIX. 167 
 
 said vessels shall not be molested on their return to the ports 
 of the allied powers, provided they do not attempt, or are made 
 subservient to any military operation. 
 
 11. All the administrations, the members of the commission 
 of arts and sciences, and in short every person attached to the 
 French army, shall enjoy the same advantages as the military. 
 All the members of the said administration, and of the commis- 
 sion of arts and sciences, shall also carry with them not only 
 the papers relative to their mission, but also their private 
 papers, as well as all other articles which have reference 
 thereto. 
 
 12. All inhabitants of Egypt, of whatever nation they may 
 be, who wish to follow the French troops, shall be at liberty so 
 to do; nor shall their families after their departure, be molested, 
 or their goods confiscated. 
 
 13. No inhabitant of Egypt of whatever religion, who may 
 wish to follow the French troops, shall suffer either in person 
 or property, on account of the connection he may have entered 
 into with the French during their continuance in Egypt, pro- 
 vided he conforms to the laws of the country. 
 
 14. The sick who cannot bear removal shall be placed in 
 an hospital, and attended by French medical and other attend- 
 ants until their recovery, when they shall be sent to France on 
 the same conditions as the troops. The commanders of the 
 allied armies engage to provide all the articles that may appear 
 really necessary for this hospital; the advances to be made on 
 this account shall be repaid by the French government. 
 
 15. At the period when the towns and forts mentioned in 
 the present convention shall be delivered up, commissaries 
 shall be named for receiving the ordnance, ammunition, maga- 
 zines, papers, archives, plans, and other public effects, which 
 the French shall leave in possession of the allied powers. 
 
 16. A vessel shall be provided as soon as possible by the 
 naval commanders of the allied powers, in order to convey to 
 Toulon an officer and a commissioner, charged with the con- 
 veyance of the present convention to the French government. 
 
 17. Every difficulty or dispute that may arise respecting 
 the execution of the present convention, shall be determined 
 in an amicable manner by commissioners named on each part. 
 
168 CAMPAIGN IN 1801. 
 
 18. Immediately after the ratification of the present con- 
 vention, all the English or Ottoman prisoners at Cairo shall be 
 set at liberty, and the commanders-in-chief of the allied powers 
 shall, in like manner, release the French prisoners in their 
 respective camps. 
 
 19. Officers of rank from the English army, from his High- 
 ness the Supreme Yizier, and from his Highness the Capitan 
 Pacha, shall be exchanged for a like number of French officers 
 of equal rank, to serve as hostages for the execution of the 
 present treaty. As soon as the French troops shall be landed 
 in the ports of France, the hostages shall be reciprocally 
 released. 
 
 20. The present convention shall be carried and communi- 
 cated by a French officer to General Menou, at Alexandria; 
 and he shall be at liberty to accept it for the French and 
 auxiliary forces (both naval and military) which may be with 
 him at the above-mentioned place, provided his acceptance of 
 it shall be notified to the general commanding the English 
 troops before Alexandria, within ten days from the date of the 
 communication being made to him. 
 
 21. The present convention shall be ratified by the com- 
 manders-in-chief of the respective armies within twenty-four 
 hours after the signature thereof. 
 
 Signed in quadruplicate, at the place of conference between 
 the two armies, the 17th of June, 1801, or of the siege of 
 Saffar, 1216, or the 8th Messidor, 9th year of the French 
 Kepublic. 
 
 (Signed) J. Hope, Brigadier-General. 
 
 OsMAN Bey. 
 Isaac Bey. 
 
 DoNZELOT, General de Brigade. 
 Taeaybe, Chef de Brigade. 
 Approved and ratified the present convention at Cairo, the 
 9th Messidor, ninth year of the French Republic. 
 
 (Signed) Belliaed, General de Division. 
 
MILITARY TEANSACTIONS 
 
 IN 
 
 THE MEDITEEEANEAN, 
 
 1805—1810. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The doubtful peace which had been patched up 
 at Amiens was of brief continuance. On the 27th of 
 March, 1802, the definitive treaty of peace had been 
 signed. On the 8th of March, 1803, a message from 
 the King announced to the British Parliament that 
 we must prepare for war. 
 
 At this time the military means of England were 
 at a Yery low ebb. The old militia, which had been 
 nine years under arms, had been disbanded, as well as 
 the fencible regiments of cavalry and infantry. Of 
 regular troops there were, including the Guards, nearly 
 40,000 foot and 12,000 horsemen scattered over 
 Great Britain, Ireland, and the Channel Islands."' 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 In Great Britain 8,800 .. 
 
 . . 19,500 
 
 Ireland .. .. 3,200 .. 
 
 .. 16,500 
 
 Channel Islands . . 
 
 . . 3,700 
 
 (Exclusive of Artillery.) 
 
170 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 The strength of this infantry, however, was rather 
 nominal than real. Many battalions of the line were 
 mere skeletons, a large proportion of their scanty 
 numbers consisting of worn-out men recently brought 
 home from the East and West Indies. Several of 
 these battalions could not have mustered 400 men 
 each, including raw recruits. Most of the strong and 
 efficient regiments were in Ireland, nor could they be 
 spared from thence. Our cavalry, however, was pretty 
 strong in numbers and of a good quality. 
 
 The first measure adopted by the British Govern- 
 ment was to call out the militia ; and as the officers 
 and Serjeants were nearly the same as in the regiments 
 which had been embodied during the first period of 
 the war, and a large proportion of the men likewise, 
 a short time sufficed to restore this branch of the 
 service to its former efficiency.'"^ 
 
 The Army of Reserve Bill (the boldest military 
 measure that any British minister had ever ventured 
 to propose) supplied within two months 22,200 
 recruits.t A large proportion of these men volun- 
 teered for general service in regiments of the line. 
 
 * Militia, June 1st, 1803. 
 (Rank and File.) 
 
 Great Britain 40,270 
 
 Ireland 12,370 
 
 t The act for levying the army of reserve was passed July 
 6fch, 1803. By the 1st of September there had been raised 
 22,200 men; and before the 1st of May, 1804, 37,000, exclusive 
 of about 8,500 who had died, or deserted, or were rejected. It 
 is to be observed that the act was not successful in Ireland. 
 Out of the 22,200 men as above stated, only 1500 were furnished 
 by Ireland. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 1 71 
 
 Our skeleton battalions were filled up ; and their 
 progress in discipline was rapid under officers and 
 Serjeants who had seen service. Camps of instruction 
 were formed in Essex, Kent, and Sussex. Of these the 
 most important was that stationed near Hjthe (Shorn- 
 cliffe Camp), where the 4th, 43rd, 52nd, and 95th 
 (rifles), together with two strong regiments of militia, 
 were placed under the command of Sir John Moore. 
 The 14 th Light Dragoons and a large proportion of 
 artillery were attached to this camp; of which I maj 
 speak more fully hereafter, because the new system 
 of drill and movement which was here introduced by 
 Moore became the model for our infantry, and laid 
 the foundation of that superiority which it afterwards 
 evinced in the arduous campaigns of the Spanish 
 Peninsula. 
 
 In the meantime Napoleon Bonaparte had loudly 
 proclaimed his determination to conquer peace in 
 London — in other words, to subjugate Great Britain. 
 To this task he applied himself with characteristic 
 energy.'"' Through the summer and autumn of 1803, 
 
 * " La guerre entre la France et la Grande Bretagne avait 
 dt6, de 1792 a 1801, la lutte du principe democratique centre le 
 principe aristocrat ique. Sans cesser d'avoir ce caractere, elle 
 allait devenir sous Napoleon, la lutte d'un element centre un 
 autre element, avec bien plus de difficulte pour nous que pour 
 les Anglais; car le continent entier, par haine de la revolution 
 Fran9aise, par jalousie de notre puissance, devait haVr la France 
 beaucoup plus que les neutres ne detestaient I'Angleterre. Avec 
 son regard per^ant le Premier Consul aper9ut bientot la portee 
 de cette guerre, et il prit sa resolution sans hesiter. II forma le 
 l)rojet de franchir le d^troit de Calais avec une armee, et de 
 terminer dans. Londres meme la rivalitc des deux nations. On 
 
172 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 every river and port from Ushant to the Texel, was 
 ringing with the clink of hammers, and the din of 
 multitudes employed in building the greatest flotilla 
 that ever darkened the sea. Napoleon hoped at first 
 that he should be able to make his attack at some 
 time in the winter of 1803-4, and such were the 
 exertions used that nearly one thousand of his vessels 
 were collected at Boulogne before the end of December. 
 Without speaking in detail of the French armies 
 which lay in readiness to embark, or of the fleets 
 which were in preparation to transport them to the 
 shores of England, I cannot but touch on the enormous 
 expenses which such an enterprise demanded. It was 
 not merely the cost of building and fitting out the 
 flotilla. Various establishments on a gigantic scale 
 were found to be indispensable at and near Boulogne. 
 Great basins too were to be excavated there, and at 
 Staples, Ambleteuse, and Wimereux for the reception 
 of the vessels. Forts also were to be constructed and 
 with great difficulty, in the sea, for the protection of 
 the outer roadsteads. To prepare in time for this vast 
 expenditure was Napoleon's first care in 1803; and 
 one of the means he adopted for this chance of con- 
 quering England, w^as the sale of Louisiana to the 
 United States of America for eighty millions of francs. 
 
 va le voir pendant trois ann^es cons^cutives appliquant toutes 
 ses facultes a cette prodigieuse entreprise, et demeurant calme, 
 confiant, heureux m^me, tant il 6tait plein d'esperance en pre- 
 sence d'une tentative qui devait le conduire ou a etre le maitre 
 absolu du monde, ou a s'engloutir, lui, son arm6e, sa gloire, au 
 fond de rOc6an." — Thiers' Cons, et Emp. Livre 17. 
 
INTEODUCTION. . 173 
 
 Thus the passionate desire of Napoleon to plant his 
 conquering eagles on the ruins of London has served 
 to make the United States one of the mightiest 
 nations of the earth ! 
 
 Urgent affairs,* however, called the Chief Consul 
 to Paris, and engrossed his attention during several 
 months. This afforded to the English more time; 
 and our preparations for defence were carried on with 
 much activity, if not with the happiest judgment. 
 Batteries were multiplied along the coasts. One 
 fortified camp was formed at Dover; two others near 
 Chatham and Chelmsford: and large bodies of troops 
 were quartered or encamped in Essex, Kent, and 
 Sussex. But the most remarkable feature of the time 
 Was the flame which burst forth and spread its light 
 over the whole of Britain. It was not merely the 
 flame of patriotism, or of indignation at the bare idea 
 that England should lie at the proud feet of a con- 
 queror; it appeared to be fed and rendered intense by 
 a passionate hatred of Napoleon personally. There 
 had suddenly blazed up in the breasts of millions a 
 fierce, unenquiring, unappeasable detestation of the 
 individual. The Prime Minister (Addington) called 
 for bodies of volunteers to aid in defeating Bonaparte ; 
 and before the end of Autumn 1803, 342,000 men 
 had enrolled themselves, were provided with arms, and 
 were devoting their leisure hours to military exercises. 
 
 * The conspiracy of G-eorges Cadoudal and Pichegru, fol- 
 lowed by the execution of the Duke d'Enghien, and its conse- 
 quences. 
 
174 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 Still our preparations were only in their infancy; 
 and if Napoleon could have crossed the Channel in 
 the winter 1803-4, as he first designed, our means 
 to meet his yeteran troops would have been found 
 utterly unfit for battle, though the determination of 
 the British people not to be conquered, and the un- 
 yielding temper of our stout old King, would have 
 prevailed, though after long sufl'ering and incalculable 
 losses. 
 
 In 1804 we were better prepared. Our regiments 
 of the line were strong, and more fit for the field; 
 our militia well disciplined, and the volunteer corps 
 tolerably familiar with the use of arms.'''^ 
 
 There had not, however, been any interruption 
 during Napoleon's absence from the coast of the pre- 
 parations for his great enterprise. These had become 
 in the meanwhile more extensive, and were better 
 matured; and before the end of July, 1804, the self- 
 made emperor appeared at Boulogne to resume and 
 prosecute his mighty undertaking.! 
 
 * Gross return of Forces in Great Britain, Sept., 1804 : 
 
 Guards and regular Infantry 75,000 
 
 Regular Cavalry 12,000 
 
 Militia 80,000 
 
 Volunteers (including Yeomanry Cavalry) . . 343,000 
 
 Total 510,000 
 
 Exclusive of Artillery, <kc. 
 t " Napoleon avait resold d'ex6cuter dans un bref d^lai sa 
 grande entreprise. II voulait franchir le d^troit vers le mois de 
 JuUiet ou d'Aout 1804; et si les incr^dules qui ont dout4 de 
 son projet pouvaient lire sa correspondance intime avec le 
 Ministre de la Marine, la multitude infinie de ses ordres, la 
 
INTKODUCTIOX. 175 
 
 At this time there were encamped and ready for 
 embarkation on board of the flotilla 110,000 soldiers 
 of the finest description. Thej composed the three 
 Corps d'Armee commanded by Davoust, Soult, and 
 Ney; an advanced guard of six or eight thousand 
 picked grenadiers under Lasnes, the Imperial Guards, 
 and four divisions of cavalry (chiefly dragoons). Four 
 hundred pieces of field-artillery, and a battering train, 
 were attached to this formidable army, which at first 
 extended from Bruges to Montreuil ; but was, later in 
 the season, compressed within camps in the immediate 
 vicinity of Boulogne, and the smaller basins which had 
 been formed near to that town. But this was not all. 
 From sixteen to eighteen thousand men under Augereau 
 were assembled at Brest, and ready to step on board 
 the ships of war at that port;* and another Corps 
 d'Armee of about the same strength was prepared 
 to embark in the Dutch fleet which was lying in the 
 Texel. Altogether there were 150,000 soldiers (the 
 very soldiers who four months later were trium- 
 phant at Austerlitz) ready for the invasion of this 
 kingdom. 
 
 secrete confidence de ses esp^rances a I'Archichancelier Cam- 
 bac^res, ils ne conserveraient aucune incertitude sur la r6alit6 
 de cette resolution extraordinaire." — Thiers^ Cons, et Emp. 
 JAvre 20. 
 
 * This expedition was to be directed to Lough Swilly, or 
 such other part of the north of Ireland as it could reach in 
 safety. If it were foiled in that quarter, it was to push on for 
 the coast of Scotland. Such was the first design; but it was 
 changed when Napoleon decided finally on uniting all his 
 squadrons in the narrow sea. 
 
176 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 It would far exceed the limits of an introductory 
 chapter were I to enter into particulars as to the 
 preparations and yarious plans of Napoleon, between 
 the spring of 1803 and the autumn of 1805, or of the 
 chances of his success or failure in crossing the Channel 
 at different periods ; neither can I enter into a detail 
 of the measures adopted in Great Britain to resist the 
 invasion with which she was threatened. That the 
 Emperor of the French was thoroughly in earnest can 
 no longer be doubted. It is also pretty evident, that 
 it was his design to land upon that part of the coast 
 of England which lies nearest to Boulogne, that part 
 which stretches from the cliffs of Dover to the borders 
 of Sussex. The landing of the enemy must have been 
 made good in face of the numerous batteries which 
 lined our shores, and of about eighteen strong bat- 
 talions of infantry (two-thirds of them militia), and 
 twenty squadrons of cavalry which lay close at hand."* 
 But carriages and fish-carts would have brought several 
 thousands from the rear within a very few hours ; and 
 of volunteers and yeomanry there would have been 
 considerable numbers. 
 
 Sir David Dundas held the chief command in Kent 
 and Sussex. It was his intention, if he should be 
 beaten on the shore, to withdraw his troops, not in the 
 direction of London, but throwing back his right and 
 centre to retreat upon the intrenched camp at Dover. 
 
 * The numbers of the infantry may be taken at fully 12,000 
 rank and file, the cavalry at about 2 SCO sabres. About fifty 
 pieces of field-artillery would have been present. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 177 
 
 In that strong position lie could have brought the 
 enemj to bay, and gained time for the gathering of 
 the strength of Britain around the metropolis/''" Or, if 
 the general had found that Napoleon disregarded him, 
 and was marching straight upon London, then Dundas 
 would have sallied forth and pressed close upon the 
 rear and right flank of the enemy's columns. The 
 direct road from Canterbury and the passage of the 
 Lower Med way were barred by the intrenched camp 
 at Chatham. The French must have taken their routes 
 by Maidstone, Tunbridge, &c., through a more difficult 
 country, where their columns would have been delayed 
 by the breaking up of the roads. 
 
 Sir James Pulteney commanded in Sussex ; Sir 
 James Craig in Essex. With the help of carriages 
 the former would have reached the great chain of 
 chalk hills before the enemy ; or he might have 
 brought 10,000 men to bear on their left flank while 
 it was embarrassed by the difficulties of the way 
 through the Weald of Kent : Craig would have crossed 
 the Thames from Tilbury, or have hastened directly to 
 London. 
 
 It would have been madness in the British to have 
 risked a general battle in the field, even in such tempt- 
 ing positions as the chalk hills ofi*er. Our troops were 
 not then of a quality to meet and frustrate the 
 
 * During 1803 and 1804 I was employed on the staff of the 
 Quartermaster-General's Department in Kent and Sussex ; and 
 in the latter year I was the senior officer, and had the good 
 fortune to enjoy much of the confidence ot Sir D. Dundas and 
 Sir John Moore. 
 
 N 
 
178 MILITARY TPAKSACTIONS. 
 
 manoeuvres of such an army as that which Napoleon 
 would have led to the attack. We needed every 
 advantage which numbers and position could afford. 
 It was in London itself, or rather along the skirts of 
 Greenwich, Southwark, and Lambeth, that it was our 
 business to fight the great battle to the uttermost, day 
 after day, and night after night; bringing to the relief 
 of every post fresh combatants as they arrived in quick 
 succession from all parts of the kingdom. What 
 mattered the burning of some hundreds of houses, 
 when compared with the mighty stake which was at 
 issue ! Our best reliance was upon the numbers and 
 the enduring courage of Englishmen ; upon the resolu- 
 tion of millions to vanquish tens of thousands.* 
 
 May my readers pardon me for this discussion of 
 what might have happened in days which have long 
 passed ! But it was the question which agitated the 
 whole people of Great Britain, and engrossed the 
 attention of her statesmen during two anxious years. 
 During those years the British army weis growing into 
 strength as to numbers, and efficiency as to discipline. 
 At the close of 1804 there were in the United 
 Kingdom nearly 105,000 rank and file of regular 
 
 * In taking this review of the great invasion with which 
 we were threatened, I have purposely omitted all mention of 
 the dangers which the enemy's flotilla would have had to 
 encounter, if our navy had been able to assail it during its 
 passage. I have assumed that Napoleon's latest and most 
 masterly combination had been successfully accomplished; that 
 his different squadrons had been brought together in the Channel, 
 and that his fifty ships of the line were for some days masters 
 of the narrow sea. 
 
INTRODUCTION. P79 
 
 troops, including 16,000 cavalrj, but exclusive of 
 artillery. "^^ 
 
 The apprehension of invasion continued through 
 the winter of 1804, and with a greater cause to believe 
 it close at hand ; though bj this time John Bull was 
 beginning to be sick of hearing the oft-repeated crj 
 that the wolf was coming, to grumble at not being 
 invaded, and to be weary of his volunteer duties. 
 Our statesmen, indeed, still viewed the position of 
 affairs with much anxiety. Mr. Pitt, who was now 
 again Prime Minister, gave his personal attention to 
 measures of defence, and he adopted the expensive but 
 effective plan of fortifying our southern and eastern 
 coasts by towers, armed with heavy cannon and built 
 at short distances. 
 
 However, a prospect of relief was beginning to 
 dawn. The chance of a new war upon the Continent, 
 which might call off Napoleon from his great design, 
 was becoming every month more probable. For some 
 time past there had been symptoms of ill-will and 
 bickerings between Napoleon and the Czar. The 
 timid policy of Austria began, though covertly, to 
 incline towards an alliance with Russia. The British 
 Government threw into the scale large promises of 
 money; and at the beginning of 1805 our Cabinet felt 
 
 * The administratioD of the army under the Duke of York 
 was excellent. His Royal Highness was himself indefatigable, 
 energetic, and just, and he had able assistants in his Adju- 
 tant and Quartermaster-Generals, HaiTy Calvert and Robert 
 Brownrigg. 
 
 N 2 
 
180 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 themselves secure that both the imperial courts would 
 send their armies into the field. 
 
 It was in compliance with the desires and plans 
 of Russia that Mr. Pitt prepared the expedition to 
 the Mediterranean, of which the following narrative 
 gives some account. 
 
MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 IN 1805 AND 1810. 
 
 Early in the year 1805, the British Government 
 resolved on sending to the Mediterranean some young 
 battalions, which might form a sufficient garrison for 
 Malta, and render the old regiments on that station 
 "(about 7000 men) disposable for active service. 
 There were at this time objects of importance in 
 present view, and prospects opening into wider con- 
 sequences. 
 
 The Emperor of Russia was connecting himself 
 with England ; and it appeared probable that Austria 
 Avould soon come to ally herself with both in opposi- 
 tion to France. In the meantime there had arisen 
 apprehensions of an event, which might have been 
 attended with a dangerous influence on British inte- 
 rest in the Mediterranean. A part of the kingdom of 
 Naples was occupied by a French army, which kept 
 that state under subjection, and strong fears were 
 entertained that our enemy would extend his views to 
 Sicily, and oblige the helpless Court to admit French 
 garrisons into the fortresses and harbour-towns of that 
 important island. This object might be efibcted either 
 by open force, or attained by means of a treaty ex- 
 ' torted from the wretched Government of Naples, The 
 
182 MILITAEY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 various contingencies involved many questions of great 
 nicety in politics; and on this account the British 
 Cabinet resolved, though the number of troops to be 
 sent out of England was small, to employ on this 
 occasion an officer of high rank and tried judgment. 
 They selected for the service Lieut.-General Sir James 
 Craig, appointing him to the command of all our 
 troops in the Mediterranean, except the garrison of 
 Gibraltar. Four battalions of Infantry (about 3400 
 men) ; two more which were to be left at Gibraltar; 
 300 Light Dragoons (without their horses); and 
 a large proportion of Artillery composed this ex- 
 pedition. 
 
 Sir James Craig was a man who had made his way 
 by varied and meritorious services to a high position 
 in our army. He had improved a naturally quick and 
 clear understanding by study, and he had a practical 
 and intimate acquaintance with every branch of his 
 profession. In person he was very short, broad and 
 muscular, a pocket Hercules, but with sharp neat 
 features as if chiselled in ivory. Not popular, for he 
 was hot, peremptory, and pompous: yet extremely 
 beloved by those whom he allowed to live in intimacy 
 with him ; clever, generous to a fault, and a warm 
 and unflinching friend to those he liked. But at this 
 time Sir James was broken in health, and it was only 
 the hope that the climate of the Mediterranean might 
 restore his strength which allowed of his being em- 
 ployed on active service. My friend, James Campbell 
 was appointed to be the Adjutant-General, and I was 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 183 
 
 placed at the head of the Quartermaster-Generars 
 department. We were both entire strangers to Craig, 
 and his manner to us at first was not engaging or 
 conciliatory ; but when he came to find we were dis- 
 posed to do our duties actiyelj and carefully, he 
 warmed to us by degrees ; and in the latter and more 
 difficult times of his command I found Sir James Craig 
 one of the kindest men I have ever had to transact 
 business with ; and one on whose just and honourable 
 feelings I could always place an entire reliance. 
 
 Earl Camden was the Secretary of State for War 
 and Colonies. His instructions, dated March 28 th, 
 1805, directed our General to proceed to Malta, 
 "unless in the progress of the voyage extraordinary 
 circumstances should make it necessary to alter his 
 course." 
 
 "It being of the utmost importance that Sicily 
 should not fall into the hands of the French, the pro- 
 tection of that island was to be considered as the 
 principal object of the expedition." On his arrival at 
 Malta the General was to be mainly guided by the 
 advices he should receive from Hugh Elliot, our 
 Minister at Naples, who had instructions to attend 
 particularly to two contingencies ; the first, being that 
 under which the co-operation of the British forces 
 should be required by him, with the concurrence of 
 the King of Naples; the second contingency was one 
 in which our active interference might become neces- 
 sary without such concurrence. In the former case 
 the General was instructed to afi'ord every assistance 
 
184 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 to secure Sicily for the King. But in the second case, 
 if the gOYemment of Naples should be brought to shut 
 its ports against British ships, or if the French should 
 attack the island, or be certainly known to be prepar- 
 ing forces for such an invasion, then Sir James Craig 
 was to use his utmost exertions, in concert with Lord 
 Nelson, for the defence of Sicily against the enemy. 
 Such was the substance of the General's public instruc- 
 tions; but they were accompanied by others marked 
 *'most secret/' By the latter Sir James Craig's atten- 
 tion was called to two further cases; "first, that of an 
 attack being made by the French upon Naples, and 
 his being called upon by Mr. Elliot, or the Russian 
 Commander, to assist in defending the Neapolitan 
 dominions. Secondly, the case of the French force 
 being driven from Naples by the Russian army, or 
 withdrawn with a view to counteract the movements 
 of the armies which may be acting against France in 
 the north of Italy." *' In either case," says Lord 
 Camden, *4f you should receive any application from 
 Mr. Elliot, or from the Austrian or Russian Comman- 
 ders, previously to your receiving further instructions 
 from me, and it should appear to your judgment that 
 by co-operating with your force on the continent of 
 Italy, you can materially contribute to the safety of 
 the dominions of the King of Naples, and forward the 
 objects of the campaign which may there be opened, 
 His Majesty authorizes you to concert with the Gene- 
 ral of his allies as to the most effectual manner of pro- 
 moting that important end; and if it appears to you 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 185 
 
 that this object can be most effectually promoted by 
 joining your force with that of the Emperor of Russia, 
 you are to put yourself under the command of General 
 Lacy, &c." "But," adds Lord Camden, "although 
 His Majesty feels the most anxious desire to co-operate 
 with his allies, as far as his limited force in the 
 Mediterranean will enable him, yet there are other 
 objects to which the force which you command may 
 be advantageously disposable; which makes it impor- 
 tant that it should not be engaged in such distant 
 operations as may prevent you from being able to 
 withdraw it under certain circumstances, and to detach 
 it upon other services." 
 
 These "other services" were explained, in a sup- 
 plemental despatch, to be the occupation of Alex- 
 andria, if the French should turn their views to the 
 East; or the protection of Sardinia, if that island 
 should appear to be in danger. 
 
 The different and unconnected objects to which Sir 
 James Craig's attention was thus directed, afford us 
 ample evidence that the views of our Cabinet were 
 based on no principle, or sound plan of operations. 
 Yet these were not all: a subsequent despatch''" in- 
 structed the general to gather information from Gene- 
 ral Fox, the Lieut.-Governor of Gibraltar, with respect 
 to Minorca, and the feasibility of capturing that 
 island. As the amount of disposable forces which Sir 
 James might have at his command after his arrival at 
 Malta could not exceed six or seven thousand men, it 
 
 * June 8th, 1805 (secret and confidential). 
 
186 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 was evident that if any one of these multifarious 
 instructions was carried into effect, there would remain 
 no means of attending to the others.'"' 
 
 Our troops were embarked before the end of March* 
 but it was not till the 19th April, that we put to sea, 
 in company with a fleet of several hundred ships 
 bound to the East and West Indies and America, con- 
 voyed by many men-of-war. It was a noble sight ! 
 But we soon parted from the great body of the fleet, 
 and pursued our own course under the protection of 
 the Queen and the Dragon. Our passage across the 
 Bay of Biscay was rough, but only two of the tran- 
 sports parted company; and on the eighth day we 
 made Cape Finisterre, where we fell in with a frigate, 
 sent from the Tagus to give warning to all British 
 ships that the enemy's fleet from Toulon had come 
 through the straits of Gibraltar. But Admiral Sir 
 John Orde, though he had dispatched this intelligence 
 to our Minister at Lisbon, had omitted altogether to 
 state what he proposed to do, or where his squadron 
 was likely to be found. In consequence of this alarm, 
 we kept close along the coast of Portugal ; and having 
 
 * Although the despatch, which will be found in the Appen" 
 dix (Viscount Castlereagh to General Fox, fjwst secret, 19th 
 July, 1805), bore relation exclusively to Gibraltar, and had no 
 influence over the movements of Sir James Ci-aig's army, yet 
 the subject and intelligence it conveys are so curious, and shew- 
 so strongly the opinion which was entertained of the Spanish 
 government at that time, that I cannot refrain from inserting 
 it. See Appendix A. (The original letter is in my posses- 
 sion). 
 
m THE MEDITERRAKEAK. 187 
 
 received further and unsatisfactory reports, our gene- 
 ral, and Admiral Knight who commanded the convoy, 
 came, though reluctantly, to the resolution of running 
 into the Tagus for present security. 
 
 Although self-preservation imposed this measure, 
 it was on political grounds highly objectionable. The 
 Court of Portugal was preserving with great difficulty 
 its humble neutrality : it felt that Napoleon was seeking 
 occasion to pick a quarrel; and the presence of an 
 English army in the port of Lisbon might but too pro- 
 bably afford the pretext he desired. Every possible 
 precaution therefore was taken by the general to mark 
 his respect for the neutrality of Portugal. Not a man 
 or officer was allowed to go on shore during the few 
 days we remained under the walls of Lisbon ; nor would 
 Sir James Craig himself pay his respects to the Prince 
 Regent. But at the same time the apprehension that 
 the enemy's fleet might enter the Tagus, rendered some 
 precautions necessary, and the commanding engineer 
 and I were sent to reconnoitre the forts. Our troops 
 were in a trap; and it was clear that if the French 
 appeared, and the Portuguese refused to protect us, 
 we could be saved only by some desperate enterprise. 
 Sir James Craig resolved, if such a necessity should 
 arise, to surprise or storm Fort St. Julian with his 
 5000 men.* Secret arrangements were made to have 
 all the boats and troops in constant readiness, and a 
 plan of assault was drawn out. Happily we were not 
 
 * This fort commands the main channel of the Tagus below 
 Lisbon, 
 
188 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 driven to this extremity : certain accounts arrived that 
 the enemy's fleet had gone from Cadiz, and was not 
 in our neighbourhood. On the 10th of May we again 
 put to sea, and the next evening we found Lord 
 Nelson's squadron lying-to off Cape St. Vincent. The 
 great Admiral had just arrived from Gibraltar bay; 
 he waited only to have a conversation with Sir James 
 Craig and Admiral Knight ; and he then bore up with 
 his ten sail of the line to search for the enemy in the 
 West Indies. "^^ 
 
 We anchored at Gibraltar on the 13th; and 
 the next day a brig-of-war arrived with orders that 
 the expedition should remain where it was, in ex- 
 pectation of events. It was now known in England 
 that the enemy's fleet, with troops on board, had 
 steered for the West Indies; and if they had remained 
 there we probably should have proceeded to the same 
 quarter. Our stay at Gibraltar was protracted till the 
 end of June ; and circumstances made it uneasy. The 
 Spaniards at Carthagena were getting six sail of the 
 line ready for sea : Admiral Bickerton felt it necessary 
 
 * The energy with which Nelson pursued the superior fleet of 
 the enemy to the West Indies, and chased them out of the West 
 Indies, appeared to us in those days to be admirable, evincing 
 the highest judgment, as well as decision of purpose. Yet we 
 know now that our great Admiral was, in fact, following the plan 
 chalked out for him by Napoleon. To lead our squadron on 
 wild-goose chases to the Caribbean or other distant seas, in 
 search of French fleets, which were sent purposely to tempt but 
 to evade pursuit, and to return and unite in the British Channel, 
 was the most masterly feature of the Emperor's combinations 
 for the conquest of England. 
 
m'THE MEDITERRANEAIT. 189 
 
 to take all his line-of-battle ships (four) to watch that 
 port ; and our fleet of transports was left in the road- 
 stead of Gibraltar without better protection than a 
 brig-of-war and two or three gun-boats. There were 
 no quarters for our troops on shore ; and as the rock 
 was in quarantine on account of the fatal fever which 
 had lately carried off a great proportion of the garrison 
 and inhabitants, scarcely any fresh proyisions could be 
 obtained, even from Barbary. : 
 
 However indolent the Spaniards may be, the help- 
 lessness of our crowded transports could not fail to 
 attract their attention ; and they quickly fitted some 
 forty heavy gun and mortar boats to pound us at our 
 anchorage. Fire rafts also were in preparation ; and 
 these overt signs of hostility determined Sir James to 
 send the transports out of the bay, and to keep them 
 cruizing between the east side of the rock and the 
 Barbary shore, while the general and his staff re- 
 mained at Gibraltar. 
 
 At length, on the 22nd June, orders arrived 
 from England for our departure ; and a few days 
 afterwards Sir Richard Bickerton returned with his 
 squadron to see us in safety past Carthagena. Gladly 
 did we renew our voyage: our men were in high 
 health; the weather was beautiful as we sailed along 
 the shores of Africa, under convoy (after parting 
 from the Admiral) of the Lively, Sea-Horse, Ambus- 
 cade, and Merlin : and we anchored in the hot port of 
 La Valetta on the 18th of July. The health of Sir 
 James Craig, which had appeared to be very precarious 
 while we were at Gibraltar, improved rapidly during 
 
190 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 tliis latter part of our voyage ; and at Malta he seemed 
 to recover all his strength and spirits. From his first 
 landing he set to work indefatigablj, inspecting regi- 
 ments and departments every morning at 4 o'clock^ 
 writing despatches and transacting business all day, 
 giving great dinners every evening, and receiving the 
 officers of his army with a profuse hospitality. 
 
 The Russian troops, which were at this time 
 stationed in Corfu and the neighbouring islands, 
 amounted to about 15,000 regulars and 2000 wild 
 Montenegrins. They were under the immediate com- 
 mand of Lieut.-General D'Anrep, a good officer and 
 a sensible man ; but he was secretly subordinate to 
 old General Lacy, who was residing at Naples under 
 the pretext of bad health, but prepared by the orders 
 of his Sovereign to take the chief command of both 
 Russians and English, whenever the time might come 
 for their being put in motion. Lacy was a curious 
 example of the way in which the great powers of the 
 Continent were accustomed to select their generals for 
 even the most important commands. He had been, 
 no doubt, a brave and meritorious officer : but he was 
 now between seventy and eighty years of age, and he 
 shewed no trace of ever having been a man of talent 
 or information. The son of an Irishman, and brought 
 up in an Irish convent, he spoke the English language 
 (though he had never visited the shores of Erin) with 
 the strongest brogue I ever heard, and with peculia- 
 rities that I had never met with except in the Teagues 
 of our old comedies. At the councils of war held at 
 Naples six months afterwards, he used to bring hia 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN". 191 
 
 nightcap in his pocket, put it on and go to sleep while 
 others discussed the business. But the old gentleman 
 was simple, kind-hearted, and (to use his own phrase) 
 " always for fighting." His high rank in the Russian 
 army was clearly the motive for employing him, as 
 it placed him above any English or Neapolitan com- 
 mander; and his Emperor had attached to Lacy, as 
 chief of his staff, a certain General Oppermann, who 
 was to suggest everything, and really direct every- 
 thing. This was a clever fellow, but he seemed to be 
 an intriguer, and he left an impression on one's mind 
 of his being not too honest. 
 
 Hugh Elliot (brother of the first Lord Minto) was 
 at this time our Minister at Naples. He was a man 
 of no common talent and address ; agreeable, subtle, 
 and bold ; of long experience in diplomacy, but apt, 
 as clever men in that profession too often are, to be 
 over-refined in his schemes, and to entangle himself in 
 curious webs of his own weaving. His judgment was 
 not equal to the acuteness of his observation ; and his 
 temper made him presumptuously sanguine at one 
 moment, and unreasonably desponding at another. 
 Elliot was in high favour with the Queen, who managed 
 everything at Naples : but his penetration and know- 
 ledge of the world were frequently foiled by the dark 
 dexterity and unprincipled manoeuvres of that bold 
 bad woman. 
 
 On Sir James Craig's arrival at Malta, he found 
 that the Governor, Sir Alexander Ball, had been for 
 some time in communication with Mr. Elliot, and that 
 
192 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 the latter had received official enquiries from General 
 Lacy, so early as the 10th of May, with regard to the 
 number of British troops which would be ready to 
 co-operate with the Russians on the continent of 
 Italy, and as to the shipping which could be engaged 
 at Malta and fitted at the expense of England for the 
 transporting of the Imperial troops from Corfu. These 
 questions it was not in Mr. Elliot's power to answer, 
 for he had received no instructions from England 
 touching such arrangements. But in the meantime 
 Napoleon, after having assumed the iron crown of 
 Italy, had found that the Court of Naples was hesi^ 
 tating and endeavouring to avoid the recognition of his 
 new title. With his customary abruptness he addressed 
 the Neapolitan envoys at Milan in the roughest and 
 most imperious language,^'' declaring that if the recog- 
 nition of his title as King of Italy were not sent to 
 Bologna before he should arrive in that city, he would 
 take possession of Naples and strip King Ferdinand 
 of all his territories. The affrighted Court imme- 
 diately communicated their dispatches to the English 
 Minister and the Russian General; and the latter 
 declared without hesitation that there were no military 
 means in readiness for the support of his Sicilian 
 Majesty ; adding his advice that, in order to avoid a 
 commencement of hostilities, the King should submit 
 to the necessity of circumstances. 
 
 At this time aFrench army of 14,000or 15,000 men 
 
 ^ * Mr. Elliot) to Sir Alex. Ball, 17th June, 1805. . 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 193 
 
 under the command of General St. Ojr was occupying 
 the provinces of Naples bordering on the Adriatic. 
 The J were ready to gather for action at the first signal 
 from the Emperor, and a few days would have brought 
 them from La Puglia to the capital, where there were 
 no means of resistance. The Neapolitan troops, 
 always of a bad quality, were reduced to insignificance 
 in point of numbers : eight or nine thousand spiritless 
 men, under the leading of wretched officers, were the 
 utmost that could have been collected to oppose the 
 veterans of France. King Ferdinand laid his humblo 
 recognition at the feet of Napoleon ; and St. Cyr's 
 troops remained quietly in their cantonments, con- 
 suming at their leisure the resources of the submissive 
 kingdom. 
 
 The tenour of the information obtained by Sir 
 James Craig on his arrival at Malta, the gathering of 
 the Austrian armies with a view to operations in the 
 north of Italy, and the expected arrival of 10,000 
 more Russian troops at Corfu, determined the General 
 to lose no time in hiring and fitting out a great num- 
 ber of vessels as transports for our Allies, while he 
 prepared his own division of British for embarkation. 
 He despatched a vessel to Naples, and received on her 
 return letters from Mr. Elliot, which apprized him that 
 the Emperor Alexander had put an end to his nego- 
 tiations with France ; that Russian armies were 
 marching to the support of Austria, and that the 
 forces of the latter empire were assembling in great 
 numbers in the Tyrol and Venetian States. But 
 
 o 
 
194 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 these letters afforded no information as to the plains 
 of the Allied powers, nor any knowledge of the inten- 
 tions of England or the wishes of Austria. With 
 regard to Naples,* Mr. Elliot mentioned that Napo- 
 leon was continuing to menace that gOYernment ; that 
 General d'Hedouville was expected to arrive from 
 Paris with powers to exact a more absolute submission, 
 and probably to require the cession of the principal 
 fortresses. At the same time Mr. Elliot had learned, 
 through Count Kaunitz, the Austrian Ambassador at 
 Naples, that the Count had been made the medium of 
 conveying to the Queen, Caroline, Napoleon^s threat 
 that if she did not retire immediately to the Austrian 
 dominions, he would send an armament from Toulon 
 to take possession of Naples. This threat was evi- 
 dently designed to work on her Majesty's nerves ; but 
 Queen Caroline's nerves were much stronger than her 
 principles. However, the very menace of sending 
 forth a squadron from Toulon, at a time when we 
 had no line-of-battle ships in that quarter, was well 
 calculated to make the English cautious in their 
 movements. 
 
 Nearly at the same time as the receipt of these 
 advices from Naples, the officer whom Sir James Craig 
 had despatched to Corfu on his first arrival, returned. 
 The information which he brought confirmed the 
 fact that there were barely 10,000 Russians dis- 
 posable for offensive operations ; but General d'Anrep 
 
 * Mr. Elliot to Sir James Craig, 4th August, 1805. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 1.95 
 
 professed to expect from day to day the arrival of 
 12,000 more from the Black Sea ; and he announced 
 in his letters that he should embark with between 
 twenty and twenty-five thousand troops for Naples. 
 Our General was informed, however, at the same time 
 that though the Russian Commanders in general were 
 courteous in their communications, there prevailed 
 amongthe inferior officers, and even the soldiers, a strong 
 feeling of ill-will to the British."^ In his despatch of 
 the 1 6th August to Lord Camden, Craig attributes this 
 aversion to the arts exercised by the French during 
 the peace, when great numbers of Russians were 
 visitors at Paris : but there can be little doubt that 
 it took its origin in the circumstances of our un- 
 happy campaign in North Holland in the autumn of 
 1799. 
 
 It is worthy of note that though the British 
 Ministry had collected a considerable body of troops 
 at Malta, and had pointed out all sorts of active 
 operations to their commander, they had neglected 
 to provide any adequate supplies of ammunition.f 
 Sir James Craig found the ordnance magazines at 
 Malta to be miserably deficient in powder and flints 
 (in case of a protracted campaign), and he was obliged 
 to urge the Secretary of State to send out an imme- 
 diate supply, asking at the same time for a regiment 
 of cavalry. The latter demand obtained no attention ; 
 
 * General d'Anrep was believed to share in this dislike. 
 t Sir James Craig to Earl Camden, August 16th, 1805. 
 
 o 2 
 
196 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 though for service in Italy, or even for the defence of 
 Sicily, cavalry were much needed. 
 
 But when Sir James Craig addressed his despatch 
 of the 1 6th August to Lord Camden, he had received 
 General Lacy's plan of a proposed campaign, drawn 
 out by his superintendant Oppermann, and dated 
 Naples, 3rd August.* This plan is a military curi^ 
 osity, and is deserving of record. It must be borne 
 in mind that the Russians, whether they were to pro- 
 duce 25,000 men or only half that number, were to 
 start from Corfu, — the English, 7000, were to proceed 
 from Malta. Now, says tlie Imperial commander, my 
 Russians shall come round to the bay of Naples ; land 
 there, and push forward some twenty or twenty-four 
 miles, so as to cover the Terra di Lavoro and the 
 capital against the enemy, who are quartered to the 
 amount of 13,000 or 14,000 men in the provinces of Bari 
 and Otranto. At the same time you. General Craig, 
 shall land with your 7000 English on the coast to the 
 southward of Taranto. You will, of course, draw all 
 the attention of the enemy upon you, but he will not 
 dare to march and attack you for fear of being cut off 
 by me and my Russians ; and so they will retreat ; 
 and then you and I will join and follow them up ! 
 And this was the way in which the Moscovites formed 
 plans of campaign in the year 1805 ! It needed but 
 a few words of answer from Sir James Craig to demon- 
 strate the utter absurdity of such a scheme ; and when 
 
 * General Lacy to Sir James Craig. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 197 
 
 old Lacj received the reply, he laughed and said sotto 
 voce to Mr. Elliot, "T thought it would never do ! '' 
 It was plain enough that Oppermann's object was to 
 monopolize all the resources of the capital and the 
 richest provinces for the Russians ; and to leave the 
 English to take their chance ; and a miserable chance 
 it would have been. If the plan of a double landing 
 (objectionable as it was in a military point of view) 
 had been made in good faith, the parts of the per-- 
 formers should have been reversed : the passage from 
 Corfu to Taranto was very short ; that from Malta 
 to Naples was straight and easy. But there was 
 treachery, as well as professional ignorance, in the 
 proposition. 
 
 On the receipt of Sir James Craig's answer,* in the 
 reasoning whereof honest old Lacy fully concurred, 
 General Oppermann was obliged to acquiesce in the 
 proposal that the Allied forces should proceed together 
 to one point of disembarkation ; and the immediate 
 neighbourhood of Naples was determined on. 
 
 The want of mules and horses for the artillery and 
 baggage was foreseen with anxiety by Craig, as well 
 as the insufficiency of his cavalry ; he used every 
 exertion, but he procured very few animals from Sicily 
 and Sardinia. The transports prepared for the Rus- 
 sian troops were sent to Corfu, and the bay of Agosta 
 was chosen as the place where the two armaments 
 should unite ; but their invasion of Naples was to 
 
 * Sir James Craig to Visct. Castlereagh, Sept. 27th. 
 
198 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 await the commencement of war by the Austrians. 
 In the meantime, however, news came that five or six 
 thousand French had arrived to reinforce St. Cjr ; 
 and fears were excited that he would anticipate the 
 movements of the Allies, and would occupy Naples 
 and its neighbourhood with his army, which was now 
 supposed to amount to 20,000 men. 
 
 At the same moment the Neapolitan Government 
 signed the secret convention with Russia which had 
 been long prepared ; but still Lacy waited for the 
 actual commencement of hostilities on the part of 
 Austria, before he should bring his troops to Italy. 
 Of this ruinous delay Mr. Elliot complains bitterly in 
 a letter to Craig, dated the 21st Sept. : he says that 
 St. Oyr has received his reinforcements, and is in a 
 condition to seize on Naples in a few days, while the 
 Allied forces could not arrive in less than six weeks ; 
 and would even then be incapable of moving from the 
 want of horses and mules. At the same time the 
 French set afloat a report, which served to increase the 
 alarm, that the combined fleets of France and Spain 
 had sailed from Cadiz, with troops on board destined 
 for the invasion of the Two Sicilies. And thou^jh 
 King Ferdinand had ratified his treaty with Russia on 
 the 11th Sept., on the 21st his aflfrighted Ministers 
 were despatching to Paris an humble oflfer to observe 
 a perfect neutrality, if Napoleon would be pleased to 
 withdraw his forces from the kingdom of Naples. 
 
 It appears most strange that neither these minis- 
 ters, nor their general the Count de Damas (who, 
 
IN THE MEDITEKRANBAN. 199 
 
 though he was of little worth as a military com- 
 mander, was a Frenchman of some quickness and 
 knowledge of the world), nor the Russians should have 
 seen that Napoleon must be anxious to disembarrass 
 himself of Naples, as soon as war with Austria should 
 be inevitable, and that St. Ojr's army must be re- 
 called to the north of Italy on the firing of the first 
 shot. M. Alquier, the French Minister of Naples, 
 and General St. Oyr, were well aware that the 
 Russians at Corfu, and the English at Malta, were in 
 readiness to embark. So long as the French troops 
 were kept together in La Puglia, commanding the 
 roads through the Abruzzi, their retreat towards 
 Upper Italy was secure ; but if St. Oyr had marched 
 to Naples, and had been delayed, or had got into any 
 entanglement on that side, he might have lost the 
 opportunity of drawing ofi*, and of leading his 20,000 
 men to the Adige. 
 
 Napoleon perhaps knew that the Neapolitan Court 
 had signed a treaty with Russia; but at least he was 
 well aware of their hostile disposition and treacherous 
 nature. He had exacted a treaty of neutrality between 
 the French empire and the Kingdom of Naples, from 
 the Marquis de Gallo at Paris; and he instructed 
 M. Alquier to force the wretched King Ferdinand to 
 accept and ratify it, at the moment when the fears of 
 the Court were excited to the utmost pitch by the 
 manoeuvre of sending reinforcements to St. Cyr, and 
 the reports of the sailing of fleets from Cadiz. With 
 a cowardice which could be equalled only by the 
 
200 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 treachery of this action, the Neapolitan GoYernment 
 delivered a formal ratification of the treaty to M. 
 Alqiiier;'''' and at the same moment placed in the 
 hands of the Russian Minister a written declaration 
 that this convention with France had been extorted 
 from them by threats; that they were resolved not to 
 adhere to it, and that they called on the Russians and 
 English to fulfil their engagement to repair to Naples, 
 as though no such transaction with the French Govern- 
 ment had taken place. In communicating this grave 
 intelligence to Sir James Craig, the Russian General 
 made no comment whatever; expressed no doubt or 
 hesitation as to the propriety of landing in the king- 
 dom; but simply directed that the fleets should sail, 
 and that when united they should make the best of 
 their way to the bay of Naples. At the same time 
 General Lacy mentioned, that immediately on the 
 ratification of the convention between Napoleon and 
 King Ferdinand, St. Oyr's army had broken up from 
 their cantonments, and were in full march through the 
 Abruzzi for Upper Italy. 
 
 In the perfidious transaction which I have just 
 related the chief actors were Queen Caroline and M. 
 de TatitschefF, the Czar's Minister at Naples. It was 
 concealed as much as possible from Mr. Elliot; that 
 gentleman had been no party to the proceedings, and 
 he learnt them officially only after the consummation. 
 He likewise, in writing to Sir J. Craig on the 16th 
 
 * General Lacy to Sir James Craig, -^ Oct. 1805; and Mr. 
 Elliot to the same, 16th Oct. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRAKEAN. 201 
 
 Oct., confined himself to a dry communication of what 
 had been done bj the Government of Naples. In his 
 own mind Elliot felt as strongly as Craig did, when 
 the latter received these despatches, that the conduct 
 of the Court had been equally foolish and perfidious. 
 The evacuation of the territory by the French, the 
 relief from the burden and domination of their troops, 
 and the security of breathing-time afforded by the 
 treaty of neutrality, were all that Naples had at first 
 professed to seek, and all that she could desire except 
 revenge — *'For revenge" (to use the beautiful language 
 of Mr. Hallam) " she threw away the pearl of great 
 price." Dealing perfidiously both with enemies and 
 friends, regardless of her subjects, and blind to the 
 true interests of her husband's crown, Queen Caroline 
 provoked and richly merited the fate which was im- 
 pending. Only four days after she and the Russian 
 Minister had summoned the allied troops to Naples, 
 in contempt of the faith she had pledged one fortnight 
 before, the capitulation of Ulm was signed, and the 
 principal army of Austria was in captivity. 
 
 The feelings of Sir James Craig, when he received 
 in the last days of October, the letters of General 
 Lacy and Mr. Elliot, deserve to be recorded in his 
 own words; and I have given in the Appendix, his 
 separate despatch on this subject.* He viewed the 
 convention of the Neapolitan court with Napoleon as 
 pusillanimous and unnecessary; but he considered 
 
 * Sir James Craig to Visct. Castlereagh, 9th Dec. 1805. 
 See Appendix B. 
 
202 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 their secret protest and disavowal as an act of such 
 disgraceful perfidy, as would have justified him in 
 withdrawing his troops, and refusing to enter the 
 dominions of Naples, if he had not been already com- 
 mitted by his having placed himself under General 
 Lacy's command. The orders to sail were come, the 
 Russians were actually at sea, and their safety might 
 be compromised if the English refused to act. Craig, 
 therefore, with deep reluctance embarked his English- 
 men, and put to sea on the 3rd of November. 
 
 Our force consisted of 300 Light Dragoons, with- 
 out horses, nearly 500 Artillerymen, and 4670 British, 
 and about 1900 foreign infantry. Our fleet joined 
 the Russians, under Admiral Greig and General 
 d'Anrep, off Cape Passaro. But the weather proved 
 unfavourable; we were tacking ten days within sight 
 of Malta; weathered the west end of Sicily with 
 difficulty ; and at last anchored in the bay of Naples, 
 on the 20th of November. According to the orders 
 of General Lacy, the Russian troops (about 13,000 
 men, including 1500 Montenegrins) were disembarked 
 close to the capital; the English at Oastellamare, 
 from whence they proceeded to cantonments in the 
 neighbouring villages. 
 
 The first intelligence which met our General on 
 his landing, was that of the surrender of Mack's army 
 at Ulm, and the consequent retreat of the Archduke 
 Charles from Upper Italy. But this disastrous news 
 was carefully concealed from the public and from the 
 troops. Our quarters were sufficiently convenient, the 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN-. 203 
 
 people ciyil and compliant ; but Sir James Oraig was 
 struck from the first with the utter indifference with 
 which the Neapolitans, both in the town and country, 
 appeared to regard the arrival of the allies. It seemed 
 that thej cared not a jot whether we came or not; 
 and that their comparison between us and the French 
 was probably much akin to that of the Turkish Pacha, 
 when he spoke of a dog and a hog. Our first cares 
 and greatest exertions were used to procure mules and 
 horses; of the latter, Mr. Elliot had already managed 
 to collect a couple of hundred for our dragoons ; and 
 as fast as the means of carrying our baggage* were 
 afibrded to us by the feeble Government, we prepared 
 our brigades to march towards the frontier. The first 
 of our columns moved forward on the 9 th of December, 
 and were followed in succession by the rest of the 
 British troops, along the high road through Capua, 
 towards Mola di Gaeta. 
 
 In framing his scheme for the occupation of a line 
 along the northern frontier. General Lacy had deter- 
 mined that the 7000 Neapolitans, under the Count 
 de Damas, should occupy the mountains of the Abruzzi, 
 having in their rear the fortress of Pescara (in which 
 a large depot of artillery and stores had been rashly 
 accumulated); that the Russians should hold the 
 
 * Craig had issued strict orders for the purpose of regulatiDg 
 and limiting the baggage of his army. The commanding officer 
 of one of our regiments managed, however, to smuggle several 
 dozens of choice Madeira, for his own use, into one of the wag- 
 gons. The General found it out, seized the wine on the march, 
 and turned it over to the use of our hospital. 
 
204; MILITARY TRANSACWONS" 
 
 centre of the line with their head-quarters at Sulmona ; 
 and that the British should form the left wing, occu- 
 pying Sessa, and other towns and villages, on the 
 southern side of the Lower Garigliano; with an 
 advanced corps (the Corsican Rangers under Colonel 
 Lowe) in the defiles of Itri and Fondi. The winter 
 was remarkably severe; and it is a curious fact that 
 more than one Russian was frozen to death in the 
 kingdom of Naples ! 
 
 The strong fortress of Gaeta, on our extreme left, 
 was held by a Neapolitan garrison, commanded by 
 one of the princes of Hesse Philipstadt, and in his 
 hands it was safe. Sir James Craig, in his anxiety 
 to secure a hold upon the sea, and ignorant as yet of 
 the Prince's character, made some overtures to his 
 highness, with a view of introducing a portion of the 
 Pritish troops into the garrison ; but the proposal was 
 very roughly rejected by the brave, though eccentric 
 German. 
 
 In ordinary times our position would not have 
 been bad; the screen of our 30,000 men would have 
 availed to cover the assembling and the forming of a 
 second army, and of the popular masses which the 
 worn out Government pretended and attempted to 
 excite. The Russians, too, always professed to be 
 expecting the arrival of large reinforcements from the 
 Black Sea. But in the meantime, our 20,000 fighting 
 troops (Russians and Englisli) were thrown out of 
 action ; they were null and of no effect, for the general 
 purposes of the Coalition. Unnecessarily and in- 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAIT. 203 
 
 juriously late as the movements of the troops had 
 been, still, if General Lacy had given orders on the 
 16th October (when he knew that the neutrality of 
 Naples was secured), that both d'Anrep and Craig 
 should have proceeded direct to Venice or Trieste, the 
 issue of that great campaign of Austerlitz might have 
 been different. Massena could not have pressed close 
 on the Archduke Charles, as he did, with his whole 
 army ; a large part of it at least must have turned 
 upon us, and the Archduke might then either have 
 struck back and crushed the divided enemy, or have 
 united his forces with those of the two Emperors in 
 Moravia. 
 
 But to return from what might have been done to 
 what was actually done. We were placed on the 
 defensive, with no enemy (except the garrison of 
 Ancona) nearer to us than the Po. Our fate was to 
 be decided by what might turn out in Austria. 
 
 In the meantime, it may be worth while to record 
 that it was not till long after our arrival in Naples, 
 that intelligence was received there of the battle of 
 Trafalgar, fought on the 21st of October. A rumour 
 of such an event first arose in the capital, after a 
 private letter had been received there by a brother of 
 the Spanish Admiral Gravina; but the results were 
 glanced at very obscurely. 
 
 The Queen alone believed at once that Nelson was 
 killed. " If he had fought and survived,^^ said she, 
 *' I am sure he would have written to me or have 
 : despatched the news." Fully seven weeks elapsed 
 
206 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 before the certain intelligence of this great victory 
 reached from Gibraltar to Naples. No British squa- 
 dron came to the coasts of Italy ; and with one ship of 
 the line (the Excellent, of 74 guns), three or four 
 frigates, and a small force of Russian ships, we hardly 
 felt ourselves secure, that attacks on Naples or Sicily, 
 might not be ventured upon by the men-of-war which 
 the enemy still possessed in Toulon. 
 
 One of the many embarrassing circumstances in our 
 position was the want of intelligence; there were no 
 packets to the Mediterranean in those days ; and after 
 the first disasters of the Austrians, the communication 
 with England through Germany was cut off. We 
 obtained no certain knowledge of events ; all we learnt 
 came through the bulletins of Napoleon, or such garbled 
 and doubtful versions as the Court of Naples or the 
 Russian Minister allowed us to receive. Though Sir 
 James Craig had been instructed to consider the 
 operations of the Anglo-Russian forces in Lower Italy, 
 as mainly designed to assist the operations of the 
 Austrians on the Adige, we had never been put into 
 communication with Vienna, or with the Archduke 
 Charles. Everything came filtered through the sus- 
 picious channels of Russian diplomacy. It would 
 seem, that while St. Cyr's army remained in the king- 
 dom of Naples, the Austrians approved of our, I mean 
 the 20,000 Russians and English, acting in that 
 distant quarter; as they probably hoped that we 
 should engross the attention of this portion of the 
 French forces, and so far give relief to the Archduke's 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 207 
 
 flank. But when, after a most unaccountable delay, 
 Prince Charles came to be informed of the real state 
 of affairs at Naples, he wrote on the 22nd of Novem- 
 ber, to General Lacj, urging him to sail immediately 
 with all his forces, to land at Venice, and throw him- 
 self on the rear of Massena's army. This despatch,* 
 however, did not arrive (or at least it was not imparted 
 to Craig) before the 13th of December, when the allied 
 troops were already spread along the frontier, and the 
 time for useful action in that quarter had passed away. 
 It is not to be disguised, that there were many 
 circumstances in the conduct of the Russians at 
 this period calculated to excite a belief that they 
 were playing falsely with their allies, Austrians 
 as well as English. From among other things, I 
 may select one instance of a very suspicious com- 
 plexion ; M. de Tatitscheff (after the notable intrigue 
 I have related, when the King of Naples signed 
 the convention of neutrality with France, and at the 
 same moment furnished M. de Tatitscheff with a 
 formal disavowal) wrote an account of this transaction 
 to the Czar's Ambassador, who was then at Potsdam, 
 but he made use of a cypher which the latter was, or 
 pretended to be, unable to make out ; and by this 
 means Austria was kept in ignorance of a most im- 
 portant event at the very crisis of her fate. 
 
 The French bulletins brought to Naples after the 
 
 middle of December the astounding news of the battle 
 
 of Austerlitz, and of the armistice to which the 
 
 * Sir James Craig to Viscount Castlereagh, Dec. 14th, 1805. 
 
208 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS " 
 
 Emperor of Austria had been reduced to submit ; but 
 no instructions came to General Lacj or M. de 
 TatitschefF, nor any certain information as to a sus- 
 pension of arms generally between Franco and Russia."^' 
 It was known, however, that French forces were 
 already moving towards Bologna, and that Napoleon, 
 relieved from all hinderance on the side of Austria, had 
 publicly declared his resolution to drive the Bourbon 
 dynasty from Naples, and take possession of the kingdom. 
 The position of our little, ill-connected army 
 (" joined, not matched''), now became extremely 
 critical. We could look for no help from without, 
 nor for any diversion in our favour. We were 
 almost destitute of cavalry ; so few were the horses 
 provided by the Neapolitan Government, that we 
 had been obliged to leave a considerable part of 
 our field guns at Oastellamare. The Russian infantry, 
 though they had encountered no fatigues, were so 
 sickly, that they could scarcely have produced more 
 than 8000 regular firelocks in the field.f The Nea- 
 politans had swelled their numbers only by raw 
 recruits, who were sure to set the example of flight on 
 the firing of the first sliot ; and this motley army of 
 allies, each distrustful of the others, was scattered 
 across Italy from Pescara to Gaeta. That there was 
 no time to be lost in taking a decision as to our 
 attempting, or not, to defend the frontier, became still 
 
 * Sir James Craig to Viscount Castlereagh, Dec. 31st, 1805. 
 t General Lacy himself told us that every one of his batta- 
 lions had more sick than the whole of the British division. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 209 
 
 more evident a verj few days after the first alarm, when 
 intelligence arrived that French columns'"' were already 
 on their march from the Lower Po and La Romagna, 
 to the amount of between thirty and thirty-five thou- 
 sand men. Sir James Craig had been from the first 
 clearly of opinion, that the idea of defending these 
 extensive frontiers, with such means as the allies pos- 
 sessed, was vain and dangerous ; that we must be 
 defeated, and that both the Russians and the English 
 might be cut off from their transports, and unable to 
 effect their re-embarkation ; but he declared that if 
 General Lacy should determine on maintaining his 
 position, the British would not abandon him, but 
 would uphold the honour of the allied arms to the 
 last extremity. 
 
 In the meantime the court of Naples was tossed 
 to and fro by fear and rage : they shewed themselves, 
 as they always did, as presumptuous as they were 
 helpless. The Queen insisted on defending the 
 advanced positions ; and her friend M. de Tatitscheff, 
 pronounced an opinion that the Russian troops ought 
 to wait for direct instructions from their Emperor. 
 But fortunately, General Lacy and Oppermann were 
 just at this crisis returning from a military examina- 
 tion of the frontier : they had found it to be much 
 less strong than they had expected, and they hesi- 
 tated not to concur with Craig in the opinion that the 
 allied troops ought to fall back before the enemy 
 came near, and while such movements could be made 
 * The same to the same, January 2nd, 1806. 
 
 P 
 
210 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 without disorder. An official declaration of tho 
 sentiments entertained bj both the Russian and 
 English commanders as to the necessity of this mear* 
 sure was signed bj them and presented to King 
 Ferdinand, and his Majesty was invited to issue corre* 
 spending orders to his own forces. The Court alter* 
 nately stormed, and upbraided, and entreated ; but the 
 military necessity was manifest to all men of cool 
 judgment, and the retreat of the army was ordered. 
 
 Next came the question where the retreat should 
 fetop.* Craig had always in his mind the original 
 instructions he had received to secure Sicily ;t but ho 
 could not venture to avow this object to the Nea- 
 politans or the Russians; neither could he hint at 
 another apprehension, that our imperial allies, having nO 
 resources in their ships, nor money, nor credit, would 
 in case of a protracted warfare pillage the country 
 for their own subsistence, and thus convert the pea- 
 santry into enemies ! Sir James, therefore, was 
 desirous to embark at once, when the weather should 
 be favourable, and not run the risk of having to per^ 
 form this difficult operation in the face of an enemy. 
 On the other hand the Russians, who had brought us 
 into the scrape, seemed to be completely at a loss as 
 to what they might or ought to do. They did not 
 dare to take a decisive course without having direct 
 orders from their Emperor. lie had sent them into 
 the kingdom of Naples, and his pleasure only could 
 
 * Sir James Craig to Viscount Castlereagh, Feb. 11th, 1806. 
 t Appendix C. 
 
IN THE MEDITERKANEAN. 211 
 
 release them. Queen Caroline of course worked with 
 all her machinery to fortify the wavering councils 
 of the Russian Generals, and Sir James Craig still 
 declared that though he entirely disapproved, as a 
 military man, of the proposed attempt to resist the 
 great armies which were now at the enemy's com- 
 mand, he would share the fate of the General under 
 whose orders he had been placed. 
 
 At a council of war held at Naples on the 4th of 
 January, it was resolved, in conformity with a plan 
 proposed by General Oppermann, that the allied 
 armies should retire on the advance of the French to 
 the mountains of the Principato, and defend the two 
 Calabrias. The only dissentients were Sir James Craig 
 and Brigadier Campbell. Major-General Stuart and I 
 concurred with the Russians ; and I have not a doubt 
 now that I was wrong in my opinion. But I was a 
 young man eager for active service, and ignorant of the 
 important objects which were involved in securing Sicily 
 from the French before it was too late. However, our 
 resolutions were but an idle waste of time. When they 
 were communicated to the Court, the answer was not 
 simply dissentient : it was a storm of invectives against 
 the plan and its proposers. The Queen would hear 
 of nothing short of a desperate resistance, which 
 might cover the capital to the last extremity : and 
 old Lacy, who was now alive to the dangers of his 
 position, was reduced to the utmost perplexity. From 
 this he was happily relieved on the 7th of January, 
 by the arrival of a letter from the Emperor Alexander 
 
 P 2 
 
212 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 (dated as far back as the 7th of December), directing 
 the General to take immediate steps for the safety of 
 his Russian troops, and to embark them for Corfu. 
 
 No time was lost ; the columns were put in mo- 
 tion ; the English for Oasteliamare, and the Russians 
 for Naples. Our division began its embarkation on 
 the 14th of January, and sailed on the 19th. On the 
 22nd the British troops under Sir James Craig were 
 anchored in the harbour of Messina. 
 
 Here begins a new chapter in the history of our 
 proceedings in the Mediterranean. Nine months had 
 passed since our departure from England, and we had 
 at last reached the place which had been originally 
 our main object. But our position at Messina was 
 singular. We anchored under the guns of the fortress, 
 in our transports crowded with troops, as the friends 
 and allies of the King of Sicily. But the King of 
 Sicily (or rather those who guided the old man) was 
 at the moment furiously exasperated against us ; nor 
 was there any immediate probability of his assent- 
 ing to our landing in the island. The Governor of 
 Messina, without being a clever man, was a cunning 
 old Tuscan who had seen a good deal of the world, 
 and knew somewhat of England and Englishmen. He 
 was very civil ; allowed us just what he could not 
 refuse to allies ; threw every impediment in our way 
 that he could without giving open offence ; and soon 
 taught us to see that Governor Guillichini was very 
 much afraid that the landing of an English army at Mes- 
 sina might deprive him of the profits of his government 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 213 
 
 without rendering him compensation. During four long 
 weeks did our transports lie iu the harbour of Messina, 
 without leave for either man or officer to go ashore 
 (save and except Major-General Stuart and myself). 
 
 The patched up health of Sir James Craig had 
 broken down under the anxieties of the late events, 
 and he remained on board his ship in a very pre- 
 carious state, but still preserving a clear mind and 
 the resolution to fulfil his difficult duties."'^ His 
 task had become more arduous because Mr. Elliot, 
 either seduced by the Court of Naples, or possessed 
 by some vain fancy that he could baffle the French 
 by diplomacy, had protested against our repairing to 
 the ports of Sicily, and had even undertaken for the 
 Queen the management of a negotiation with the 
 approaching enemy. It was in vain that Craig in- 
 sisted on the evident fact that the weak and unprin- 
 cipled Court held nothing at its command, wherewith 
 it might redeem itself from the vengeance of Napo- 
 leon, save only the admission of French garrisons into 
 Sicily, and the exclusion of English ships from all 
 their ports ; that the bad faith and selfishness of the 
 Neapolitan Government were become notorious ; and 
 that if the British armament returned to Malta, it 
 would probably be unable to retrace its steps, or to 
 receive a summons for assistance, till after the enemy 
 should have got possession of Messina and Syracuse. 
 Mr. Elliot persisted obstinately in his wild scheme of 
 
 * Sir James Craig to Viscount Castlereagh, Feb. 11th, 1806. 
 (Appendix D.) 
 
214 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 negotiation : but Sir James Craig took on himself 
 the responsibility of acting in opposition to our 
 Minister's remonstrances ; and with a wise and bold 
 foresight he had brought his 7000 men to the harbour 
 of Messina. A very few days sufficed to disperse the 
 fine dreams of Mr. Elliot and Queen Caroline. The 
 French marched on, refusing sternly to listen to any 
 overtures from a Government which was doomed to 
 extinction. King Ferdinand took refuge in affright 
 on board his only line-of-battle ship, with such of his 
 property as could be gathered in the tumult and con- 
 fusion of the moment ; and his troops abandoning the 
 Abruzzi crossed La Puglia by forced marches and 
 sought shelter in the mountains of Calabria. 
 
 Now came the Palinodia ; now came expressions 
 of pleasure that Sir James Craig had not quitted 
 Messina ; and though the Court were still reluctant 
 to give us possession of the citadel, they ordered Guil- 
 lichini to afford us all those accommodations which 
 we had long needed, but which had been hitherto 
 withheld. The fugitive monarch sailed for Palermo ; 
 and as soon as his arrival there was known, Sir John 
 Stuurt was despatched by Craig to offer compliments 
 and so forth, and to solicit permission that the British 
 troops might be landed for the better security of 
 Sicily, and might be intrusted with the defence of the 
 fortresses of Messina and Milazzo, the points most 
 immediately exposed to attack from the enemy.* 
 
 * It ought to be recorded tliat during all these movements, 
 from our first sailing from M lita, there had never been an 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANBAK. 816 
 
 When Ferdinand hurried away from Naples, his 
 more venturous Queen remained ; still boiling with 
 rage against the allies, and particularly the English, 
 (wiiom she seized every occasion of stigmatizing by 
 the most insane abuse), and wildly cherishing the 
 fancy that she might yet gain time, arrest the march 
 of the enemy, and save her capital by other sacrifices. 
 She despatched the Duke di San Teodoro to RoniQ 
 with powers to offer to the French General the pos- 
 session of Gaeta, provided he would halt on the north 
 side of the Garigliano, and there await the result of her 
 further negotiations with Napoleon at Paris/"* Joseph 
 Bonaparte received the offer with coldness ; his ad- 
 vanced guard was already at Terracina, but his artillery 
 was not yet brought up, nor were his columns connected 
 and ready to enter the kingdom. He knew also that 
 the English had halted at Messina, and that little 
 chance remained of his being enabled by negotiation 
 to gain possession of Sicily. Joseph therefore dis- 
 missed San Teodoro with a brief intimation that he 
 would grant an armistice of forty days, provided his 
 troops were put in immediate possession of the for- 
 tress of Capua. Now Capua is within one day's 
 march of Naples, and Queen Caroline did not care 
 
 English squadron in these seas. One 74 specially appropriated 
 by Lord Nelson to the King of Naples' service, and three frigates 
 as convoy for our large fleet of transports, formed our only 
 naval protection : though the enemy had still several men-of-war 
 in Toulon and Carthagena. 
 
 * Brigadier Campbell to Sir James Craig, Feb. 1, 1806 
 Campbell had been left at Naples to watch and report. 
 
216 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 to trust herself to such near neighbourhood. At the 
 same time she received from General Acton, the 
 King's particular friend, wlio had accompanied Ferdi- 
 nand to Palermo, a letter of reproachful remonstrance 
 on account of the intemperate and vindictive language 
 she had notoriously held regarding the English, their 
 only remaining allies and the only hopes of their 
 salvation. She began to waver, but still returned to 
 her negotiations. San Teodoro was again despatched 
 to Joseph Bonaparte's head-quarters, while Cardinal 
 Ruffo was on his way to Paris. Thus did the wretched 
 woman cling to her intrigues through alternate days 
 of nervous hope and deep despair, till the will of 
 Napoleon was notified, not to her but to his brother. 
 The mandate admitted of no mistake. An uncon- 
 ditional surrender of the whole kingdom was all that 
 was demanded."^ The French troops crossed the 
 frontier on the 9th of February : on the 1 1 th the 
 Queen embarked, and sailed for Palermo. The regi- 
 ments of guards accompanied her ; but the troops of 
 the line had already marched towards Calabria, and 
 the hereditary prince, attended by the Count de 
 Damas, now hastened to the same quarter. 
 
 In the great city of Naples there was no sort of 
 commotion during these events ; the people of all 
 classes seemed to be completely passive or indifferent. 
 On the one hand they disliked and despised their old 
 Government; on the other, they had no friendly 
 feeling towards the French. On the day when the 
 * Brigadier Camjibeirs Journal 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 21? 
 
 Queen departed, and tlie functions of Government 
 were abdicated, the courts of law were open, and 
 business was carried on as though there were nothing 
 the matter. The interregnum was very short : the 
 French columns pushed forward without a halt ; 
 received the surrender of Capua without firing a 
 shot ; and took unopposed possession of Naples and 
 its castles. The fortress of Gaeta alone rejected the 
 summons of the invaders, and opened its guns on 
 some troops which made an audacious attempt upon 
 an outwork. 
 
 During these occurrences our troops remained on 
 shipboard, religiously respecting the sovereignty of 
 King Ferdinand at Messina, though the people of that 
 town and its neighbourhood took care that we should 
 not be ignorant of their eager desire for our landing. 
 At length when all the false hopes which the Court 
 had raised to mislead itself had been completely 
 dissipated, the tardy invitation came to Sir James 
 Craig to disembark, and a reluctant authority to 
 occupy the citadel of Messina. The British troops 
 were landed on the 1 7th February, and every exertion 
 was immediately made to put the fortress into a con- 
 dition to resist the enemy. 
 
 It may not be amiss to record what became of our 
 Russian Allies, because Sir James Craig had been 
 originally placed under the orders of their General- 
 *n-chief When the resolution to embark the two 
 armies and evacuate the kingdom of Naples was 
 finally determined, Lacy, in taking a last leave of the 
 
218 MILITARY TEANS ACTIONS 
 
 English chief,* had communicated to him the Em» 
 peror's commands that he (Lacj) should conduct his 
 10,000 or 12,000 men to Corfu; and after leaving strong 
 garrisons in the Seven Islands, should repair with thq 
 surplus to Odessa as soon as the season permitted it. 
 Nothing was said regarding Sicily ; but the Russians 
 sailing from Naples after us, passed and spoke our 
 armament while anchored in the harbour of Messina. 
 General Lacj proceeded to fulfil his orders ; and the 
 troops which he left at Corfu were found, in the next 
 year, acting in a way not very consistent with an unity 
 of views and interests in confederate nations. 
 
 Before I lose sight of the Russians altogether, I 
 will make some few remarks on the troops in whose 
 companionship we had been engaged. I had seen 
 something of a Russian army in 1799 ; but I found 
 that even six years had made a surprising difference, 
 at least in the appearance of their soldiers. Those 
 who served with us in Holland were exactly the stiff, 
 hard, wooden machines which we have reason to figure 
 to ourselves as the Russians of the seven years' war. 
 Their dress and equipments seemed to have remained 
 unaltered ; they waddled slowly forward to the tap- 
 tap of their monotonous drums ; and if they were 
 
 * When our Imperial Allies came to embark, they discovered 
 that they had no provisions for their voyage to Corfu nor money 
 to buy any. They held indeed an order of credit from Peters- 
 burgh for £40,000 ; but no banker at Naples would cash it. 
 They could not have escaped, if Sir James Craig had not run the 
 risk of supplying them with biscuit, and lending them £25,000. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 219 
 
 beaten they waddled slowly back again, without ap- 
 pearing in either case to feel a sense of danger, or of 
 the expediency of taking ultra tap-tap steps to better 
 their condition. But I must do their troops, in 1805, 
 the justice to say that in appearance at least, and in 
 movements at a review, they had made a surprising 
 progress ; they were now well armed and equipped, 
 and had very much the outward character of good 
 German soldiers. They were regular and firm in their 
 movements, but they were still slow ; and their regi- 
 mental officers appeared to be very deficient in intelli- 
 gence and activity. Even some of their Major-Gene- 
 rals were little better than semi-barbarians, ignorant, 
 sensual, selfish, and perhaps venal. The Montenegrins 
 whom they brought with them, for the eventual benefit 
 of Italy in case of an active campaign, were the wildest 
 of the mountain clans of Albania. Their very gait 
 told their tale : it was the noiseless creeping of a cat 
 in search of prey : their long steps gave forth no 
 sound ; their eyes, though lighted by no passion, were 
 incessantly moving, and marking all things before and 
 behind and on e^ery side. A sort of coarse shirt 
 belted round their waist, with a capote of the skins of 
 sheep or goats formed their dress : and a long gun and 
 a stout knife their arms. They could have done little 
 harm to the French, but they would have been deadly 
 protectors to the Italians. In most respects I believe 
 that the Russian infantry is now-a-days but little 
 different from those who came to Naples in 180.5 ; 
 and brave as the soldiers may be, I cannot regard 
 
220 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 their armies as very formidable out of their own 
 country, or in a protracted campaign. Their hospitals 
 and commissariat were and are deplorably bad : they 
 are always in want of money, nor ever have they 
 credit. Without the means of raising money, and 
 without good hospitals and an effective commissariat, a 
 great army cannot long keep the field. 
 
 But to return to our own concerns. We are on 
 shore ; we have possession of the citadel, as well as of 
 the town of Messina, and are pushing our posts right 
 and left along the coasts. We find the people gene- 
 rally enthusiastic in their welcome of the English ; 
 the priests and monks (reverend folks of great weight) 
 among tlie foremost ; the nobles glad to have anybody 
 to protect them, but somewhat jealous lest the wealth 
 of the English should cast them into the shade. When 
 we first landed we were taught to look with a suspi- 
 cious eye on the few merchants of the place : they, we 
 were told, were secretly attached to the French. Now 
 these were the cleverest and best educated people of 
 Messina ; and I came to know some of them well. 
 They certainly were thoroughly disaffected to the 
 Neapolitan Government, than which (particularly as it 
 bore on Sicily) there could hardly be a worse. They 
 desired the coming of the French, not from any 
 affection to Frenchmen or to Napoleon, but because 
 they longed for better laws, and relief from capricious 
 tyranny. They believed also that the immense power 
 of France would ensure to them protection and a 
 durable government ; and at first they considered the 
 
m THE MEDITEERANEAK. 221 
 
 English only as birds of passage, there to-day, but 
 likely to fly before the storm to-morrow. As time 
 wore on and the British force increased, and our deter- 
 mination and power to defend Sicily became more 
 manifest, while at the same time we checked the 
 arbitrary oppression of the Government, these men 
 gradually warmed to us, and would have become most 
 heartily ours, if we had taken the island to ourselves. 
 
 But a little time had elapsed after our landing 
 before the Hereditary Prince and Monsieur de Damas 
 (the former the nominal, the latter the real commander 
 of the forces sent by Queen Caroline to defend the 
 Calabrias when she left Naples) came flying to the 
 Straits of Messina, and were brought across by our 
 transports. These illustrious personages had taken post 
 with some 6000 or 7000 regular troops (Neapolitan 
 troops) near Oampo Tenese or Lagonegro, and had 
 been told to expect, and possibly did foolishly expect, 
 that the *' patriotic" people of the Calabrias would 
 rush to arms and join them in a mass. As it turned 
 out the Calabrese did not stir ; but the French came ; 
 in no great numbers indeed, but sufficient for the pur- 
 pose. At the first fire the Neapolitan troops dispersed 
 in all directions, and the Prince fled as fast as he 
 could towards Sicily. Which ran away first is uncer- 
 tain; but this is sure, that out of the 7000 fugitives 
 of all ranks, we did not find on the shore near Reggio 
 above one thousand (and those chiefly dragoons) to be 
 transported across the straits. The French followed 
 the chase gaily and rapidly, and by the 24th of 
 
222 MILITARY TRAITSACTIONS 
 
 March their posts and picquets were lining the straits 
 of Messina. 
 
 M. le Oomte de Damas, the Commander-in-Chief of 
 the ex-army of the ex-Government of Naples, had 
 been one of the foremost in the favour of Queen 
 Caroline, but he was disliked by the people, and 
 secretly even by the courtiers. He was a French 
 emigrant, who had belonged formerly to the coterie 
 which surrounded the unfortunate Marie Antoinette; 
 a man of pretension and address, but not of abilities ; 
 gallant and gay in the proud alcoves of royalty, but 
 without resources or judgment in difficulties. When 
 he crossed to Sicily as a fugitive General, without the 
 credit even of having made fight for half an hour, he 
 found no one to shew him countenance ; no attempt 
 on the part of his Royal Patroness to screen him. 
 M. de Damas was civilly thanked for his past services, 
 and dismissed from his employments. 
 
 This was the signal for the reinstatement of old 
 General (Sir John) Acton in the open favour of the 
 King ; and therewith the re-establishment of a certain 
 degree of British influence in the Court. Acton was 
 now far advanced in age ; neither much enlightened nor 
 energetic ; but he was a well-intentioned man, and as 
 straightforward as one could expect a man to be who 
 had been trained in the old Courts of Italy. He had 
 always possessed a great power over the mind of the 
 King, though he had often occasion to feel that he was 
 liable to be sacrificed at any moment by the cowardice 
 and selfish love of ease which mainly guided the actions 
 
m THE MEDITEERANEAK. 223 
 
 of his Royal Master. And here let me say, to give the 
 devil her due, that the public have been unjust in ascrib- 
 ing all the crimes and follies of the Neapolitan Court to 
 Queen Caroline ; for though Ferdinand did not equal 
 her in talents or in courage, he was quite her match 
 in falsehood and aptitude for treachery. If he had 
 been a mere noble of Naples with a plenty of game 
 to shoot, plenty of good things to eat and drink, and 
 a few toadeaters and buffoons on whom he could have 
 played off his jokes, he would have passed through life 
 with the credit of being a good-humoured comical 
 fellow, and a capital sportsman ; — there are such gen- 
 tlemen in other countries besides Naples ; but placed 
 upon a throne, and tried by difficult times, his igno- 
 rance, narrow-mindedness, cowardice, and treacherous 
 deceit, arose in dark relief from the cast. 
 
 When General Acton resumed an influence at 
 Palermo, he soon found that the stormy projects of 
 the Queen and the intrigues of the people about her* 
 were likely to perplex still farther the difficulty of 
 affairs, and perhaps to unsettle the resolutions taken 
 by the King. He therefore prevailed on Ferdinand 
 to pay a visit to Messina, attended by Acton himself 
 and Mr. Elliot ; the necessity of making immediate 
 provision against invasion affording a plausible pretext. 
 The Queen and all her cabal were left at Palermo. 
 
 * It is but just to record that the Frenchman who was spe- 
 cially attached to her person (in the post of lover), Monsieur 
 de St. Claire, was always considered to steer as clear of the 
 (Queen's political manoeuvres as he possibly could. 
 
224 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 King Ferdinand was received bj the Messinese with 
 grand illuminations, and fireworks, and pageants ; in 
 all which things the Sicilians are proficients. The 
 peasantry crowded into the town in their holiday 
 attire to gaze at their Sovereign for the first time : 
 they applauded the fireworks with gay vociferation, 
 but they raised no shout for their Re Ferdinando. 
 He was a queer mortal this tall gauky old King ! On 
 one of the days he spent at Messina, he happened to 
 be on a battery, just as some large boats in the French 
 service, laden with ordnance and stores, were trying to 
 steal along the Calabrian coast to Reggio. Some of 
 the Sicilian gun-boats were firing at them, and the 
 enemy, running field-pieces along the shore, were 
 endeavouring by a return of shots to protect their 
 vessels. I chanced to be standing beside his Majesty: 
 he was watching the skirmish on the opposite coast 
 with childish eagerness; at every shot he laughed 
 aloud, threw out his long bony limbs in strange gesti- 
 culations, and poured fourth voUies of bufibonery in 
 the Lazzaroni dialect. It never seemed to occur to 
 him that the people in the boats on both sides were 
 his subjects; and that the shots might strike ofi* their 
 heads or legs. No, it was a sight he had never wit- 
 nessed before, and he was himself in perfect safety. 
 
 Acton, and Elliot, and Craig, brought Ferdinand at 
 this time to issue certain proclamations to facilitate 
 the measures proposed by the English General for the 
 defence of the island, and an order for the assembling 
 of the Constitutional Militia ; which proclamation and 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 225 
 
 orders produced no effect whatever. But when Craig 
 came to inquire into details, and to inform himself as 
 to the means of defence, it appeared evident that the 
 Government possessed *' no means of defence ;'^ * that 
 there were no magazines, no ammunition, no artillery ; 
 that even the important fortresses of Syracuse and 
 Agosta were almost without garrisons, and entirely 
 destitute of ordnance and stores, in case of attack. 
 Of troops, there were nominally 8000, really about 
 6000 rank and file of all sorts (each bad of its sort), 
 in and about Palermo. And here were we, 7000 
 English and foreigners in our pay, undertaking to 
 defend the great island of Sicily against Napoleon ! 
 
 Among the many difficulties under which our sick 
 General had to labour, the want of communication 
 with England was not the least. Sir James Craig 
 had received no fresh instructions under these altered 
 circumstances, nor any sort of answer to his despatches 
 to Lord Castlereagh. It was not till he had been 
 compelled by extreme illness and exhaustion to resign 
 his command and sail for England, that his successor 
 received a despatch from Mr. Windham announcing 
 the accession to office of the *^ Talents" Ministry; 
 and conveying the King's full approbation of Sir 
 James' proceedings up to the 14th Dec. 1805, the 
 date of the latest letter which had reached England 
 when Windham wrote (3rd March, 1806). The Whig 
 Cabinet urged, more strongly than their predecessors, 
 the paramount importance of securing Sicily: and 
 * Sir James Craig to Viscount Castlereagh, Malta, April. 
 
 Q 
 
226 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 thej directed Lord CoUingwood to detach a squadron 
 for the express purpose of protecting this island and 
 co-operating with our army. Poor Craig had not the 
 satisfaction of knowing that his conduct under very 
 nice and trying circumstances had been approved by 
 our GoYernment before he arrived in England. Worn 
 down to extremity, he resigned the command of his 
 army to Major-General Stuart, and sailed with but 
 little prospect of surviving the passage to England. 
 He did, however, rally on the voyage, and he re- 
 covered so much of health as to exercise afterwards 
 the high duties of Governor-General of Canada.* 
 
 Before Sir James Craig quitted the army he 
 ordered the 81st regiment from Malta to strengthen 
 us; and we were all busily at work in quartering our 
 troops, acquiring a knowledge of the country, pro- 
 viding stores, and constructing works for the defence 
 of the straits. The town of Milazzo on the northern 
 coast, some four-and-twenty miles from Messina, was 
 occupied about the middle of March. The natural 
 strength of this little peninsula, and its roadstead 
 (though it has no harbour), rendered it a post of im- 
 portance; and it facilitated our communication with 
 the interior, with Palermo, and with the open sea. 
 Three or four line-of-battle ships under Sir Sidney 
 Smith (the hero of Acre) arrived at Palermo in con- 
 sequence of the late orders given to Lord Colling- 
 wood; and our prospects began to brighten. As we 
 extended our acquaintance with the neighbouring 
 * Sir James Craig died in January, 1812. 
 
1^ THE MEDITERRANEAN-. 2^7 
 
 country, we found CTery where good will, an evident 
 affection to the English name, and a strong desire that 
 we should remain, and take the lead in the country. 
 They did not mince the matter : they avowed their 
 detestation of the Neapolitans, but they would do 
 anything for the English. We began to form a little 
 flotilla for the better defence of the narrow seas : the 
 mariners of Sicily and the Lipari islands (the latter 
 the better hands) flocked in as volunteers for the ser- 
 vice ; but when they found General Stuart proposing 
 that his boats should carry the Neapolitan flag, the 
 men declined. "Up with your own flag !" they cried, 
 *^Viva il Re Giorgio"! ma pel Re Ferdinando, no, 
 no!'' Stuart found it necessary to give way: the 
 British Jack was hoisted, and our boats were manned 
 in two days. I had the direction of this appendage to 
 our army, which was much increased in 1809, when 
 Captain Reade of the 27th regiment was placed in 
 the immediate command. Two or three artillerymen 
 were put into every gun-boat, and four or ^yq soldiers 
 in each of the long fast rowing boats called scampa- 
 vias. This flotilla afterwards did good service; and 
 even in its very early days I had the pleasure of 
 seeing some of the boats manned by these Sicilians 
 and Lipariotes, who are lightly called cowards, lay 
 vessels, of superior bulk and carrying French soldiers, 
 on board, and capture them, and bring them away, in 
 the sight of both armies. "Viva il R^ Giorgio,'' 
 worked wonders. 
 
 Though I propose to give hereafter a more full 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 account of Sicily, as it was not till afterwards that I 
 enjoyed opportunities of visiting almost every part of 
 the island, still it may not be amiss to take a view of 
 our situation at this time, comparing it with that held 
 by our formidable enemy on the opposite continent. 
 
 The general form of Sicily is that of a huge tri- 
 angle; the worst form, therefore, for defence, inas- 
 much as it presents the greatest extent of coast in 
 proportion to its area. Of small bays and roadsteads, 
 and open beaches where troops may be landed in fine 
 weather, there is an abundance; but there are few 
 good harbours : indeed we might confine the list to 
 Messina, Trapani, Siracusa and Agosta. These are 
 all defended by pretty good fortresses ; but at the 
 time of which I write, Messina only was in the hands 
 of the English ; the other three were miserably manned, 
 and deficient in every thing necessary to sustain a 
 siege. 
 
 There were no roads in the island ; at least nothing 
 more than a few miles for the airings of the nobility 
 out of Palermo, Catania, Messina, and one or two 
 other large towns. Goods of all sorts were conveyed 
 to or from any distance in the interior on the backs 
 of mules. The tracks worn by the strings of these 
 animals were extremely bad, particularly in the moun- 
 tain districts, and communications were consequently 
 slow. The sea indeed was open to us; and boats and 
 boatmen were plentiful. Though the rugged neigh- 
 bourhood of Messina produces no corn or cattle, we 
 soon attracted ample supplies from Catania and the 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 229 
 
 southern coasts; and wine was but too abundant and 
 too cheap. For ammunition, guns, and salt provisions 
 we had to depend at first on Malta. Our numbers 
 were not great, but we were active; and though the 
 promises and proclamations of King Ferdinand failed 
 to produce any effect, we soon established ourselves 
 strongly and comfortably. 
 
 As no militia made their appearance, though the 
 people were evidently well disposed to give us aid. Sir 
 John Stuart solicited and obtained permission from 
 the Court to raise a corps of 500 men who were to be 
 officered chiefly by young nobles, and to form a bat- 
 talion for service in Sicily enjoying British pay, and 
 wearing the British uniform. This invitation brought 
 in men pretty quickly; but luckily very few officers. 
 Most of the latter retired in a short time from so 
 troublesome an occupation, and their places were filled 
 up by officers taken from the Oorsican Rangers and 
 other foreign corps. So here we were in May 1806 
 with nearly 7500 men, our left wing fortified at 
 Milazzo; and with outposts on our right stretching 
 towards Taormina; an active little flotilla scouring 
 the straits, and a few vessels of war at and near 
 Messina. 
 
 On the other side of the narrow channel. General 
 Reynier had established himself with a strong division 
 of French troops in Lower Calabria ; and he was using 
 every exertion to bring heavy guns and stores, from 
 Salerno on the one side and Taranto on the other, to 
 arm the coasts opposite to Sicily. But these weighty 
 
280 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 supplies could be conveyed only by boats stealing 
 along the shore; and their passage was precarious and 
 difficult on account of the English cruisers, even before 
 they had to encounter our flotilla. Sometimes, how- 
 ever, their cautious vessels evaded our vigilance; the 
 castle of Scilla was armed; and batteries began to 
 appear along the coast as far as Reggio* In the 
 letters of Paul Louis Courier amusing accounts will 
 be found of the high-mightiness and self-sufficiency of 
 Reynier at this time : he is depicted as assuming all 
 the consequential airs of a Vice-Roy of the two Cala- 
 brias ; looking to Sicily as a future prey, and to the 
 English as a little knot of impudent fellows who would 
 be scattered by the mere whiff and wind of his fell 
 sword. General Reynier, however, was an able officer, 
 and had good troops under him. In the upper province 
 was General Yerdier with another division, but a good 
 deal dispersed, and already embroiled with the moun- 
 taineers who were growing angry and taking to their 
 arms, f 
 
 Some 10,000 or 12,000 men were at and near to 
 Naples (where Joseph Bonaparte had established his 
 court), and one division was occupied in blockading the 
 garrison of Gaeta, and holding the communications with 
 their troops in the Abruzzi and La Puglia. Altogether 
 there were about 30,000 effective French soldiers in 
 the kingdom of Naples; and the people of the pro- 
 
 * Nearly all their heavy guns were brought by boats from 
 Taranto to Cotrone ; and thence were dragged across the isthmus 
 to Tropea or to Palmi. 
 
 t See letters of Paul Louis Courier. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 231 
 
 vinces in general were quiet; though robberies were 
 becoming more frequent, and there were rumours of 
 the gathering of bands in Calabria. These Oalabrese 
 (I mean the mountainers) are a savage and difficult 
 race to deal with. Amongst them are always some 
 who are, or who have been, banditti ; and these 
 fellows live undisguised among their fellow peasants, 
 and tell their tales of adventure, and become objects 
 of sympathy if pursued, and of admiration if success- 
 ful. If the mendicant friars come at any time, from 
 political or religious motives, to set their influence to 
 work, the Oalabrese are prompt to gather in armed 
 companies and to do their bidding. They are ready 
 enough to rob and ravage and murder; they will 
 massacre the stragglers or even cut off small outposts 
 of an enemy; sometimes they will defend themselves 
 pretty obstinately in a strong mountain village ("Cas- 
 tello") ; but they never have shewn courage when 
 attacked by regular troops, nor perseverance in keep- 
 ing together and sustaining a warfare in their moun- 
 tains. No reliance can be placed on their promises or 
 their intelligence ; and their leaders are generally the 
 most worthless scoundrels and the most savage ruffians 
 of their respective bands. At first the French 
 despised these fellows; but they soon found that 
 their couriers were intercepted, officers were murdered, 
 negligent parties through the country surprised, and 
 they came to dread the Oalabrese more than the evil 
 justified.* 
 
 * See P. L. Courier. 
 
232 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 The Court of Palermo, and the Queen in particular, 
 had emissaries soon in every province; sparing no 
 pains to stimulate the friars, and the leaders of bands 
 to gather the mountaineers and assail the French. The 
 English Admiral, who had arrived with a small squa- 
 dron to protect Sicily, was just the man that Queen 
 Caroline desired for the furtherance of her designs. 
 Sir Sidney Smith entered at once into her wild schemes 
 of raising the Calabrese; and without the slightest 
 communication with Sir John Stuart, our naval com- 
 mander was invested with unlimited authority on the 
 land (the southern provinces of Naples) as well as on 
 the sea. Sir Sidney was an enthusiast, always pant- 
 ing for distinction ; restlessly active, but desultory in 
 his views; extravagantly vain; daring, quicksighted, 
 and fertile in those resources which befit a partisan 
 leader; but he possessed no great depth of judgment, 
 nor any fixity of purpose, save that of persuading 
 mankind, as he was fully persuaded himself, that 
 Sidney Smith was the most brilliant of chevaliers.* 
 The coming of the Admiral, and the energy of his 
 first proceedings soon produced a wide effect; arms 
 and ammunition were conveyed into the mountains of 
 Calabria ; the smaller detachments of the enemy were 
 driven from the shores; and some of the strongest 
 points were armed and occupied by the insurgents 
 and parties of English marines and seamen. The 
 
 * Let me not in exposing this brave man's foibles omit to 
 add that he was kind-tempered, generous, and as agreeable as a 
 man can be supposed to be who is always talking of himself. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 233 
 
 Admiral spread his ships and small craft along the 
 coasts from Scjlla to the bay of Naples; he took the 
 island of Capri; threatened Salerno and Policastro; 
 scattered through the interior his proclamations as 
 "Commander-in-Chief on behalf of King Ferdinand/' 
 and the insurrection soon kindled throughout the 
 Basilicata and the two Calabrias; though the bands 
 acted in general with little concert or collective 
 strength. 
 
 Let us now turn our attention to the English 
 troops cantoned about Messina, and little noticed 
 either bj the Admiral or bj the Court of Palermo. 
 
 During the months of May and June 1806 the 
 intelligence which we received from all parts of Cala- 
 bria led us to the belief that the French had acted 
 rashly in pushing their troops so far to the southward ; 
 and that while they appeared to be threatening Sicily 
 from Reggio and the neighbouring coast, they were 
 really weak in numbers and exposed in their position. 
 Their line of communication with Naples was of a 
 dangerous extent; running through mountainous defiles, 
 and across the beds of torrents : the bridges few, the 
 roads very bad. All the accounts furnished by our 
 spies in Calabria, as well as those received directly 
 from the Court of Palermo, tended to persuade us that 
 the numbers of the enemy scattered over the Lower 
 Province did not exceed 5000 men under General 
 Eeynier; and that there might be nearly as many 
 more in Upper Calabria and the Basilicata commanded 
 by General Yerdier; but the latter was understood to 
 
234 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 be fully occupied by risings of the mountain peasantry 
 in such force that several of his detachments had been 
 cut ofi*; that his communications were interrupted; 
 and even his head-quarters at Cosenza threatened with 
 an attack. It was therefore reasonable to infer that 
 Verdier was not in a condition to afford assistance to 
 General Reynier. We knew likewise that Marshal 
 Massena, with the main body of the French army, was 
 now engaged by the siege of Gaeta, where the wild- 
 brained Prince of Hesse* was making an obstinate 
 resistance. In Lower Calabria, though the risings of 
 the peasantry had not become so formidable as in the 
 Upper Province, the detestation of the French was 
 described to us as being general (except in the large 
 towns) ; and already there were many little bands, 
 styling themselves Masse (though they proved to be in 
 reahty little better than knots of brigands), assembling 
 in the mountains, and harassing the small outposts 
 and the communications of Reynier's division. What 
 these "Masse" really were, we did not understand at 
 that time so well as we did afterwards, and they shall 
 be described more particularly in a future page. 
 
 Taking this view of our enemy's force and position, 
 and having at our disposal a fleet of good transports 
 
 * This Prince of Hesse Philipstadt was the best of the 
 Neapolitan Generals. Though dninken, and eccentric to the 
 very verge of insanity, he was faithful, active, and brave even 
 to rashness ; nor was he deficient in acuteness. While his eye 
 was on them his men did their duty, for they were more afraid 
 of him than of an enemy ; and his occasional buffoonery made 
 him a favourite with the soldiers of the South. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 235 
 
 and the complete command of the seas on both sides 
 of Calabria, it did not appear to be a very rash under- 
 taking to strike a sudden blow at Rejnier's little army, 
 believing as we did that, even if he abandoned all his 
 posts, he could not meet us with equal numbers in the 
 field. Sicily was to be considered as a great fortress, 
 of which our troops formed the garrison : a sudden 
 attack on the advanced division of the enemy was an 
 operation similar to a sortie. If we should be worsted, 
 we had little doubt of our being able to reimbark, and 
 return to our island. An undecided combat would 
 be more injurious to the enemy than to ourselves, for 
 the Oalabrians would gather against him from every 
 side, while utter ruin seemed to await the French if 
 they should be completely beaten in a fair fight. But 
 weighing the question on both sides, we came to 
 believe that if we could make good our landing with 
 5000 men in the Gulf of St. Eufemia, Reynier would 
 find it necessary to retreat to Oatanzaro ; that the 
 insurrection of both the provinces would then become 
 general, and that Massena would be obliged to abandon 
 the siege of Gaeta. 
 
 Our troops were at that time cantoned within 
 narrow bounds, — most of them in Messina and 
 Milazzo ; the rest in the neighbouring villages. They 
 were ready to step on board the transports, and as 
 the vessels were fully victualled, there was no necessity 
 for any preparation as to provisions. Sir John Stuart 
 having taken the resolution to make the attack, the 
 secret was well kept ; it was known only to his Mill- 
 
236 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 tarj Secretary (Captain de Sade) and myself; for at 
 that time I acted not only as Quartermaster-General, 
 but had the temporary superintendence of the Adju- 
 tant-General's department during the absence of Bri- 
 gadier James Campbell. We had not the means of 
 transporting many horses ; a few for the Staff and 
 Commanding Officers of regiments; 16 of the 20th 
 Light Dragoons, and horses for three field-pieces, toge- 
 ther with mules for a few mountain-guns and the 
 camp-kettles of battalions, were all we could manage 
 to convey. So at the same instant one afternoon we 
 laid the transports alongside the quays to ship our 
 guns and horses ; and we despatched orders to the 
 several corps which were chosen for the service to 
 march in the night and embark at daybreak. 
 
 The troops selected for this expedition were the 
 Light Infantry Brigade under Lieut. -Colonel Kempt, 
 composed of the Light Companies of the 20th, 27th 
 35th, 39th, 44th, 58th, 61st, 81st, and Watteville's 
 Regiment ; about 120 men (" Flankers"*) of the 35th, 
 and between two and three hundred of the Corsican 
 Rangers, mustering altogether about 1000 effective 
 
 * " Flankers." These were soldiers taken from the battalion 
 companies in each regiment, and placed under the command of 
 picked officers. They were trained to act as sharpshooters ; were 
 not told off in line with their battalions (except at reviews, 
 parades, &c.) and in the field were kept in rear of the flankg of 
 their respective battalions or brigades, ready to act either to front 
 or flank as occasion might require. This was a plan of Sir James 
 Craig's, and introduced at Malta in 1805. It was discontinued 
 when Sir John Moore took the command of the army. 
 
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IN THE MEDITERRANEAN-. 237 
 
 rank and file. The Grenadier battalion and 1st bat- 
 talion of the 27th regiment under Brigadier-General 
 Cole. The 2nd battalion of the 78th, and the 1st of 
 the 81st regiment under Brigadier-General Acland ; 
 and the 1st battalion of the 58th, and the regiment 
 De Watteville (Swiss), under Colonel Oswald. The 
 battalion companies of the 20th regiment under their 
 excellent Colonel, Robert Ross, were embarked, but 
 were left as a detachment to threaten Reggio and 
 Scilla, and to prevent or delay the assembling of the 
 enemy's forces, by alarming him at various points 
 along the coast. Colonel Ross's orders were to follow 
 the fleet as soon as he might consider these purposes 
 accomplished. 
 
 We sailed without delay under convoy of the 
 Apollo frigate and two other vessels of war, and 
 anchored in the Bay of St. Eufemia, on the evening 
 of the 30th of June. There was a small picquet of 
 French troops on the shore, which retired immediately 
 into the woods ; and two armed Calabrese, rowing off 
 to our ships, assured us that there were very few of 
 the enemy in that neighbourhood. Orders were imme- 
 diately issued for the landing of our troops at day- 
 light ; but as a heavy transport which carried Colonel 
 Kempt and most of his Light Infantry had not arrived, 
 Colonel Oswald w^as appointed to lead the debarkation 
 with seven flank Companies and the Corsican Rangers. 
 No enemy appeared on the beach ; and the boats, 
 after having landed this first division near a tower 
 called the Bastione di Malta, returned for a second 
 
238 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 cargo. As the latter approached the shore, Oswald 
 moved forward in the direction of St. Eufemia (a 
 village standing about a mile from the point of de- 
 barkation), pushing his scouring parties through the 
 trees and wild underwood which spread along their 
 front and on the right. His advanced people had 
 proceeded but a little way, when they were assailed by 
 a brisk fire from the thickets, and a company of the 
 Corsican Rangers were charged and driven in by a 
 superior body of the enemy, who was in his turn 
 checked and forced back by the advance of our grena- 
 diers. The enemy retired skirmishing through the 
 wood, till Colonel Oswald seeing that the second land- 
 ing of our troops was effected, pushed rapidly forward 
 and charged the enemy on both flanks with so happy 
 a combination as not only to put him to rout, but to 
 make about eighty men and two Captains, prisoners, 
 besides a good many who were left dead. It was 
 remarkable that a sergeant of Light Infantry was the 
 only man hurt on our side. The enemy proved to 
 have been three or four hundred Poles, with a few 
 French, collected hastily by Colonel Grabinski on the 
 appearance of the English fleet. They suffered 
 severely from his temerity, and his want of judgment 
 in risking a contest in the wood, after having missed 
 the true opportunity of doing us mischief while our 
 troops were struggling through the surf. 
 
 In the course of the next morning, July 1st, all the 
 troops were landed, with six guns, and ten mountain 
 pieces which were to be carried on the backs of mules. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 239 
 
 The engineers were set to work to form lines of 
 defence with sand-bags round the old tower near 
 which we landed, with a view to protect our re-em- 
 barkation in case of disaster. In the meantime the 
 main body of our troops advanced inland, to St. Eufe- 
 mia, and San Biaggio, and some as far as the little 
 town of Nicastro. 
 
 The country hereabouts is tangled with olive- 
 grounds, and thick brushwood of so great an extent 
 and so intricate a nature as to afford no secure posi- 
 tions for such a small army as ours. But the necessity 
 we were under of landing our horses and mules, as 
 well as provisions, reserve-ammunition, &c., prevented 
 our leaving this neighbourhood during the 2nd and 
 3rd of July, for a heavy surf prevailed upon the beach 
 and rendered the business slow and dangerous. 
 
 During these two days we were joined by about 
 200 straggling Oalabrese, provided for the most part 
 with fire-arms; but they were rufi&ans of the lowest 
 description. 
 
 On the morning of the 3rd we received positive 
 information that General Reynier had pitched his 
 camp, or rather his bivouac, near the shallow river 
 Lamato and below San Pietro di Maida : that he had 
 a considerable number of troops with him, but was 
 waiting for the arrival of those who had been quar- 
 tered at Reggio and other distant parts. The accounts 
 of his actual strength were contradictory ; some rating 
 it at 6000 men, while others asserted that it did not 
 exceed 3000. 
 
240 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 In the afternoon of this day Sir John Stuart, 
 attended by some staff officers, and taking a company 
 of grenadiers as an escort, reconnoitred the enemy's 
 position from a rising ground directly opposite, which 
 commanded a tolerable view of the plains of Maida. 
 The French camp appeared to be very strong to its 
 front, and on its right ; but it seemed (as we after- 
 wards found it) liable to be turned upon its left. The 
 General likewise reconnoitred the outskirts of the ex- 
 tensive woods of St. Eufemia, and gave orders for the 
 posting of the troops so as to be prepared for the 
 march of the next morning, as well as for security 
 during the night. It was a singular circumstance that 
 at the very time when Sir John Stuart was examining 
 the French position, General Reynier, escorted by 
 forty chasseurs a chcTal, was within the edges of the 
 same wood, engaged in a reconnoissance of the British 
 positions. The two commanders crossed each other's 
 track more than once, and missed meeting only by a 
 few minutes. 
 
 In consequence of the observations made this 
 evening, an order was issued for the marcli of the 
 troops at daylight on the morning of the 4th, with 
 the declared purpose of attacking the enemy's camp. 
 Four companies of Watteville's regiment under that 
 good Swiss officer, Major Fischer, with a detachment 
 of artillerymen, and three out of our six fieldpieces, 
 were left to secure the tower and our entrenchments 
 on the beach. 
 
 As soon as the day dawned we commenced our 
 
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IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 241 
 
 march, with 4795 rank and file, a great majority of 
 whom had never seen an enemy. The 27thL was the 
 only battalion of old soldiers : the flank companies of 
 the 20th, 27th, 35th, and 61st also were hard-biting 
 fellows of long standing; but the 58th, 78th, and 81st 
 were young regiments, and the six companies of Wat- 
 teville's regiment were partly Swiss, partly enlisted 
 prisoners or deserters ; and as fate would have it there 
 lay in Reynier's camp a Swiss battalion, commanded 
 by a cousin and namesake of our worthy Louis de 
 Watte ville. The object of our advance was to gain 
 the left of the French position which was clearly their 
 weak point ; for to say the truth we gave little lieed 
 to the reports which stated the enemy to be stronger 
 in numbers than ourselves. Our course, therefore, ran 
 along the shingly shore and some marshy pastures 
 which bordered it : our progress was slow and there 
 was a considerable difficulty in bringing on even Our 
 three field guns. 
 
 The Calabrian sun arose in its full strength of July, 
 and our men began to be jaded* before they reached 
 the open ground near the mouth of the Lamato. A 
 detachment of the enemy's light cavalry retired as we 
 drew near ; and just as our two columns opened into 
 the lower part of the plain of Maida, we descried the 
 French army filing by its right from the position in 
 which it had bivouacked on the high ground and de- 
 scending into the upper portion of the same plain. 
 
 * Particularly the grenadiers, who had come from Nicastro 
 and had been marching all night. 
 
242 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Still this movement did not serve to decide the ques- 
 tion whether Rejnier meant to fight or to retire. If 
 the latter were his intention, this was the best ma- 
 noeuvre ; for he thus came into the direct road to 
 Catanzaro, and even on a shorter line than our own 
 to Nicastro : nor could we see enough of his columns 
 to form a judgment as to his numbers. But looking, 
 as the French General must have looked, at the chances 
 of the approaching conflict, everything appeared in 
 his favour. His army had the advantage in numbers 
 as well as in the seasoning and experience of war; he 
 had 300 cavalry, we had none. The point which he 
 occupied gave him the choice of a retreat, if a retreat 
 could be necessary, either to the eastern coasts, or the 
 Upper Provinces ; and if he should defeat the P^nglish, 
 and what Frenchman in that army doubted it! we 
 should be forced to retread our harassed way through 
 the shingle and the marsh, while one of his columns 
 might hasten along the hard road and anticipate us at 
 the tower. But we, fortunately, entertained none of 
 these views. Wc saw the enemy drawing off from the 
 strong grounds, and as our own troops disentangled 
 themselves in succession from the marshes and cop- 
 pices, they were formed in order for battle, and ad- 
 vanced in the direction to which the movement of the 
 French appeared to point. The shallow stream of the 
 Lamato, bordered with thickets, ran upon our right ; 
 the plain, gradually widening, was in our front ; and 
 on the left there extended broken and irregular patches 
 of coarse grass and bushes and coppicewood. Our 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 2i3 
 
 advance was made in an echelon of brigades, the right, 
 Kempt's* Light Infantry, taking the lead. Next came 
 Acland's brigade ; then Cole's ; and Oswald with his 
 thirteen companies (58th and Watteville's) followed 
 in rear of the centre as a reserve. 
 
 For some time we saw nothing of the enemy, ex- 
 cepting their cavalry, which manoeuvred across our 
 front, raising a great dust which served to screen their 
 infantry, and three pieces of horse-artillery whose fire 
 did little injury, and was returned with interest by our 
 own three guns under Lieut.-Colonel Lemoine and Cap- 
 tain Pym. As our right drew nigh to the steep and 
 woody bank on the left side of the Lamato, where the 
 French huts were standing, Colonel Kempt detached the 
 Corsican Rangers across the stream to scour the thickets 
 and secure him from ambuscades on his flank, sending 
 at the same time the light company of the 20th as a 
 support. Scarcely had the Corsicans entered the wood 
 when they were met by a brisk fire, followed by the 
 headlong charge of about 200 French, and were 
 driven in such confusion upon the 20th that this com- 
 pany was hard put to it to keep its ground ; its Cap- 
 tain, McLean, was killed, and if the men had not been 
 of sterling stuff the company nmst have been broken. 
 The fire for some minutes was very sharp, and the 
 parties were close to each other ; but Kempt instantly 
 detached Major Robertson across the stream with the 
 flankers of the 35th, and matters were speedily righted. 
 The French retreated in confusion ; the Corsicans 
 
 * Now General Sir James Kempt, G.C.B. 
 
 E 2 
 
244 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 rallied and pursued them, and the men of the 20th 
 and 35th rejoined the right of their brigade. 
 
 While this skirmish was going on, our little army 
 was advancing very gradually up the plain, but as yet 
 nothing was distinguishable beyond the thick dust of 
 the French cavalry, who made repeated feints of 
 charging on one or other of our brigades. The 
 extreme heat of the morning also produced a sort of 
 mirage in the low grounds, which served further to 
 perplex our sight, and we still inclined to the belief 
 that Reynier was retiring up the valley, and covering 
 his march by the display of his horsemen, and by the 
 little ambuscade on the hill. Suddenly, however, the 
 enemy's cavalry moved rapidly away beyond the front 
 of our extreme left ; and as their dust cleared off, we 
 saw the French infantry formed for attack and march- 
 ing rapidly upon us. We saw at the same time that 
 the enemy outnumbered us considerably; their for- 
 mation as well as ours was oblique, the enemy's left 
 and our right being each in advance. Their 1' 
 Leg^re (three battalions) led on by General Compare, 
 and supported by a regiment of Poles, advanced in 
 line upon the brigade of British Light Infantry ; which 
 likewise continued to move onward. A crashing fire 
 of musquetry soon opened on both sides, but it was too 
 hot to last at so short a distance, and the fire of the 
 English was so deadly, that General Compare spurred 
 to the front of his men, and shouting " En avant, en 
 avant!" he led them to the charge with the bayonet. 
 As they drew nigh, their ranks disordered by the fatal 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 245 
 
 fire of the British, Kempt gave the word, and his 800 
 Light Infantry (for we must not reckon the Oorsican 
 Rangers for much in this part of the da/s work), 
 pressed eagerly forward to close with their antagonists. 
 But the two lines were not parallel; the light com- 
 panies of the 20th and 35th encountered ihe extreme 
 left of the French, but the rest of the enemy's brigade 
 broke before their bayonets crossed. They had, how- 
 ever, come too close to escape; it was a headlong rout; 
 General Compere fell badly wounded within our ranks, 
 and his superb brigade (I may use the term, for never 
 did I see a finer, or more soldierlike body of men), 
 were utterly dispersed with a fearful slaughter, which 
 was continued over a long extent of plain, and the 
 lower falls of the hill of Maida. 
 
 On the right, but farther back as if en echelon of 
 the I'* Legere, the 42nd regiment of the French was 
 advancing more deliberately towards Acland's brigade; 
 but the sudden overthrow of the battalions on their 
 left, and the rapid pursuit of our light infantry stopped 
 their advance, and seemed to alarm them for the safety 
 of their flank. After some firing, in which they were 
 well supported by their artillery, the 42nd retreated 
 a considerable distance, and then formed again in 
 such a position, as either to support Reynier's right 
 wing, or to cover his left and rear, in case of Kempt's 
 Light Brigade turning upon them instead of pursuing 
 the fugitives. Acland pressed forward with the 78th 
 and 81st (both young regiments), but being threatened 
 by the enemy's cavalry, his men got into some disorder, 
 
246 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 and suffered loss while attempting to form squares 
 under tlie French guns. In the meanwhile, General 
 Cole's brigade (seven companies of grenadiers and 
 eight of the 27th Regiment)^ had been brought to a 
 stand bj the superior numbers of the enemy's right 
 wing.*"' Besides the musketry on their front, these 
 brave soldiers were galled -bv numbers of sharpshooters 
 scattered through the low clumps of brushwood on 
 their left, and were perplexed by the stubble in which 
 they stood, having been set on fire by the enemy's 
 shells. But they bore themselves gallantly; the left 
 wing of the 27th was thrown back to answer the fire 
 of the tirailleurs, and to receive any charge which 
 might be made by the enemy's cavalry; and Oswald's 
 reserve moving up, to fill the gap which now existed 
 between Cole and Acland, the balance was pretty well 
 restored. Yet we found great difficulty in bringing up 
 the necessary supplies of musket ammunition; the 
 enemy's troops were well posted and fresher than our 
 men ; the heat was tremendous ; and the result of the 
 day seemed yet far from certain, when as I was riding 
 along the rear of Cole's brigade, anxiously watching 
 the French sharpshooters, who were stealing farther 
 and fiirther round his left, and were backed by their 
 horsemen, one of my assistants came galloping to me 
 from the beach, with the welcome tidings that the 
 20th Regiment had landed, and was coming through 
 the brushwood at double quick time. I rode instantly 
 to meet tlicm, and explained to Ross how matters 
 • 23 Leg^rc, 3™" battaUons; Swiss 1 battalion. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 247 
 
 stood. He caught the spirit of the affair in au 
 instant, pressed onward, drove the swarm of sharp- 
 shooters before him ; gave the French cavahy such a 
 volley, as sent them off in confusion to the rear; and 
 passing beyond the left of Cole's brigade, wheeled the 
 20th to their right, and opened a shattering fire on 
 the enemy's battalions. The effect was decisive; 
 Reynier was completely taken by surprise at the 
 apparition of this fresh assailant; he made but a short 
 and feeble effort to maintain his ground ; but he drew 
 off his troops skilfully, falling back on his 4 2nd Regi- 
 ment, and covering his retreat by sharpshooters and 
 by his chasseurs a cheval and horse-artillery. If we 
 had then a couple of hundred of good cavalry, we 
 might probably have destroyed the enemy's army; 
 but we could do little more with our jaded infantry. 
 Our columns continued to advance upon the enemy 
 till he abandoned the plain of Maida, and retreated 
 rapidly up the valley (beneath the town of that name) 
 through which runs the road to Catanzaro. 
 
 When the left wing of General Reynier's army had 
 been routed in the early part of the fight, a great pro- 
 portion of the fugitives had fled across the Lamato, 
 and over the hills on the lower fall of which their 
 troops had been bivouacked. In this direction they 
 were pursued by Kempt and his gallant brigade, who 
 allowed them no time to recover their communications 
 with the rest of their army. But in following the 
 French thus dispersed and streaming along the slopes 
 of the hill of Maida, our light infantry likewise were 
 
248 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 drawn to a considerable distance beyond the rest of 
 the British troops, and could bear no part in the later 
 struggle of the day. Kempt's forward position, how- 
 ever, overhanging the valley, made it the more neces- 
 sary for Reynier to accelerate his retreat, since a 
 retreat in this direction had become unavoidable. 
 The rapid movement of his column was watched, and 
 followed for some time on a parallel line by our Light 
 Brigade, but Colonel Kempt kept his men well together, 
 anxious to recover his communications with our main 
 body^ and to receive orders from Sir John Stuart. 
 y^ But where was Sir John Stuart \ and what great 
 part did he play in this brilliant action ? In truth he 
 seemed to be rather a spectator than a person much, 
 or the person most, interested in the result of the con- 
 flict. He formed no plan ; declared no intention, and 
 scarcely did he trouble himself to give an order. 
 Perfectly regardless of personal danger, he was can- 
 tering about, indulging himself in little pleasantries, 
 as was his wont; and he launched forth with particular 
 glee when a Sicilian Marquis, whom he had brought 
 with him as an extra aide-de-camp, betook himself to 
 shelter from fire behind a haystack. But after the 
 charge of Kempt's light infantry, and the utter rout of 
 the French left wing, a change came over the spirit of 
 Sir John Stuart. Still he dawdled about, breaking 
 into passionate exclamations, " Begad, I never saw 
 anything so glorious as this ! There was nothing in 
 Egypt to equal it ! It's the finest thing I ever wit- 
 nessed." From that moment he was an altered man. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 249 
 
 and full of visions of coming greatness. As I found 
 that I could get no orders from him, I made it mj 
 business to go round to the leaders of our several 
 brigades, to give them what information I could, and 
 trj to supply their wants. ^^ 
 
 The action, though sharp, had not been of long 
 duration, and bj mid-day our soldiers were resting on 
 their arms, gasping with heat and thirst, and watching 
 through the dust, with disappointed eyes, the rapid 
 retreat of the French column. Our ammunition was 
 nearly spent; there was no water for the men, save on 
 the right, and every step we might make in advance 
 led us farther away from our supplies of ^^^yj sort. 
 Reference was made to Sir John Stuart, and he then 
 gave orders that the army, except the Light Infantry 
 Brigade, which was, as we have seen, far away on the 
 hills of Maida, should return to the beach for repose, 
 and food, and supplies of ammunition. 
 
 When we returned to the beach, we found that 
 Sir Sidney Smith had arrived during the action, and 
 his flag-ship was anchored abreast of our bivouac. 
 He came ashore to compliment the General (though 
 there was no great love between them), and as he 
 pressed Sir John to sleep on board the Pompee, the 
 General, taking me and his aides-de-camp, went off in 
 the evening. But in the meantime, we were amused 
 with an alerte attended by laughable circumstances. 
 A permission had been given, that the men of each 
 brigade in turn might refresh themselves by bathing in 
 the sea, the rest lying by their arms. While the 
 
250 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Grenadiers and Enniskillens were in the water, a staff 
 officer came galloping in from the front, crying aloud 
 that the enemy's cavalry were coming down ! In a 
 moment the troops sprang to their arms and formed ; 
 and Cole's brawny brigade rushing out of the sea, and 
 throwing their belts over their shoulders, grasped their 
 muskets and drew up in line, without attempting to 
 assume an article of clothing. The alarm was utterly 
 groundless; a great dust and an imperfect view of a 
 herd of scampering buffaloes, had conjured up a vision 
 of French chasseurs in this noodle of an officer, one of 
 my assistants. 
 
 The Admiral paid Sir John Stuart every honour, 
 and shewed us great hospitality; but he was so good 
 as to tell us that he had expected we should be 
 defeated, and had determined to run the Apollo 
 frigate ashore, with her broadside to the beach, in 
 order to cover our flight. He treated us as was his 
 usual custom, to the whole history of the siege of 
 Acre, not omitting that remarkable circumstance, that 
 when there happened a short intermission of fire 
 during several weeks, everybody jumped up in con- 
 sternation, exclaiming, *' What can be the matter !" 
 '^I'he two chiefs held little or no conversation on 
 ulterior measures, but Sir Sidney closed the evening 
 by taking one of the many shawls with which his cabin 
 was hung, and instructing Sir John in the art of 
 wreatliing it, and putting on the turban after the 
 fashion of tlie most refined Turkish ladies. 
 
 At daybreak next morning we relanded ; and our 
 
m THE MEDITERRATs'EAl?. 251 
 
 Golumns marclied to the little town of Maida, situate 
 on a high hill above the plain. Here Sir John Stuart 
 set himself seriously down on the 5th of July to write 
 his despatches to England, referring all persons and 
 all business to me. In the meantime, Colonel Kempt 
 had advanced some distance along the hills, and 
 detached the light company of the 20th* to follow 
 the track of the enemy, and gather information. It 
 pressed forward, expecting that our army was advanc- 
 ing in the same direction, and it overtook the rear of 
 the French column, which was marching in great con- 
 fusion, but discovering to his mortification, at the end 
 of the second day, that he was entirely without 
 support, Oapt. Colbourne found it necessary to fall 
 back on his battalion. During forty-eight hours our 
 troops remained kicking their heels and eating grapes 
 about Maida, while the General was absorbed in his 
 compositions. lie issued a general order of compli- 
 ments and thanks, but he could not finish his despatch 
 to the Secretary of State to his mind, nor could he 
 give his consideration to the farther movements of the 
 army. At length in the evening of the 7th, he 
 resolved to go back to Sicilj, and Colonel Osw^ald's 
 brigade was pushed in advance on the road to Mon- 
 teleone. The rest of the troops followed the next 
 morning, and I recollect being much amused while we 
 were passing through a wood of mulberry trees, and 
 
 * Ca[)t. Colbouriie (the late General Lord Seaton) had taken 
 the command of this Company in consequence of Captain 
 McLean's death. 
 
252 MILITARY TKANSACTIONS 
 
 picking the fruit for breakfast, at hearing a private of 
 the 27th chaunting in a sarcastic tone, 
 
 " The King of France with thirty thousand men 
 Marched up the hill, and then marched down again." 
 
 The small body of Polish troops, which Rejnier 
 had left for the protection of his hospitals and maga- 
 zines at Monteleone, surrendered without resistance; 
 and we here captured a great number of sick and 
 followers, as well as provisions, forage, &c. At Mon- 
 teleone, Sir John Stuart again applied himself to the 
 important business of writing his despatches. The 
 aide-de-camp who was to bear them had been held in 
 constant readiness for four days, and so had the brig 
 which was to convey them to England; but the hero 
 of Maida was still unable to tell his story or round his 
 phrases completely to his satisfaction ; and in fact the 
 letter which was published in the London Gazette was 
 not finished till we reached the straits of Messina, a 
 fortnight after the battle. 
 
 Let us now look back to the action itself, and to 
 the movements which were made, and those which 
 might have been made. The behaviour of our troops 
 was remarkably good, and excepting a momentary 
 confusion in Acland's two young regiments for which 
 the soldiers were less to be blamed than the com- 
 manding officers of the two battalions, nothing went 
 amiss. The men were cool and ready, and their fire 
 was deadly. Colonel Haviland Smith commanding 
 the 27th, and Colonel O'Callaghan commanding the 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 253 
 
 grenadiers, and their Brigadier, Lowrj Cole, who after- 
 wards won an abundance of laurels in the great 
 campaigns in Spain, shewed themselves to be worthy 
 leaders of such gallant corps ; but the most brilliant 
 parts on this little stage were acted by Colonels Kempt 
 and Ross :""' to them the glory of the fight at Maida 
 is chiefly due. But it was a luchy battle in every 
 respect, not neglecting to remember the smallness of 
 our loss,t engaged as we were in a fair plain with a 
 superior force of Napoleon's old soldiers. We had 
 about 5300 men in the field, the enemy considerably 
 more than 6000 ; I have unfortunately lost the French 
 returns of their strength, which fell into my hands, 
 and were in my possession many years. Including 
 the Poles at Monteleone and other places, but exclu- 
 sive of the troops left at Scilla and Reggio, Reynier 
 had under his command 7300 men ; and I believe he 
 had in the action about 6300, including nearly 300 
 cavalry, an arm in which we were entirely deficient. 
 The French ought to have beaten us ; and General 
 Reynier certainly handled his troops and opened the 
 action in a masterly manner. But they were too 
 confident ; and when General Compere's brigade, 
 
 * Robert Ross of Ross Trevor, afterwards killed when in 
 command of our little army near Baltimore : and General Sir 
 James Kempt, G.C.B. 
 
 t Capt. Maclean, 3 sergeants and 41 men killed ; Majors 
 Paulett, Hammell, and David Stuart, 7 other officers, 8 Ser- 
 jeants, and 263 men wounded. On the other side the number 
 of the French slain on the field was extraordinarily great. More 
 than 500 of their bodies were buried ; three-fourths of them 
 belonging to the 1st Legere. 
 
254 MILTTAliY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 rushing at our light infantry, encountered a mur-- 
 derous fire which shattered his centre, and an eager- 
 ness to meet him with the bayonet which his troops 
 had probably never experienced before, a panic seized 
 them, and his three battalions fled in utter confusion 
 when it was too late to escape the slaughter, carrying 
 away their 2nd line of Poles in their flight. This 
 early overthrow of Reynier's left wing put an end to 
 his hope of destroying us, but still left him a fair 
 chance of making it a drawn battle on his right, and 
 of maintaining a hold on the country. This prospect 
 again was frustrated by the happy accident of the 
 landing of our 20th Regiment, and their rapid and 
 unexpected attack on the right of the French line. 
 Reynier then, beaten back in the direction which his 
 left wing had taken in its flight, made his retreat at 
 once by the road towards Catanzaro. It was in many 
 respects the most favourable line for him to cover his 
 disheartened column by his cavalry and guns ; he had 
 less to fear from the insurgent Oalabrese, and if the 
 English should follow, every hour led them farther 
 from their ships and their means of supply. 
 
 We might perhaps have pursued our beaten enemy 
 a little more actively than we did. The 20th Regiment 
 was fresh, and might have been pushed forward to sup- 
 port the light infantry ; and by pressing on the rear 
 of the French, more prisoners might have been taken 
 in the next twenty-four hours. But Reynier marched 
 rapidly, and kept his soldiers pretty well togetlier ; 
 nor could we have destroyed his army without bring- 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 255 
 
 ing up all our troops, and forcing liim to another 
 battle. The first object of the English was secured ; 
 we were now sure of clearing Lower Calabria of the 
 enemj, and our communication was open, bj Nicastro, 
 with the insurgents in the Upper Provinces. It 
 remains to be considered whether the victory we had 
 obtained might not have been turned to better account, 
 and made the groundwork of important operations. 
 
 In any case, we ought to have occupied the hut- 
 camp of the French after the battle instead of return- 
 ing to the beach. While provisions and ammunition 
 were coming to us from the shipping, Oswald's brigade 
 might have been detached to capture the enemy's 
 stores and hospitals at Monteleone, and to organize 
 the insurrection, which would have effectually isolated 
 the French garrisons in Reggio and Scilla. Nicastro 
 might have been occupied by the four companies of 
 Watteville's regiment which bad been left at St. 
 Eufemia, and patrols from thence would have been 
 sufficient to rouse all the mountaineers between 
 Cosenza and Catanzaro. 
 
 But though General Verdier was blockaded in the 
 upper province, and Reynier's disheartened troops were 
 for the moment powerless, still it seems to me doubt- 
 ful whether we could have done much good by marching 
 by the direct road through Upper Calabria with our 
 whole force, although this force might have been con- 
 siderably increased by our bringing, as we then might, 
 200 or 300 of the 20th Light Dragoons and perhaps 
 as many Neapolitan cavalry from Sicily, and the rest. 
 
256 ■ MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 of the 85th Regiment, 500 good soldiers.'^ The 
 nature of the country, and the want of means of 
 transport would have rendered our march slow ; and 
 though we might have cut off detachments, and in- 
 jured our enemy a good deal, I think that his main 
 bodies would have made good their retreat on Naples, 
 though after much suffering. But there was a larger 
 field of operation open to our commanders by sea and 
 land ; and here it becomes necessary to take a review 
 of the positions and circumstances in which the French 
 forces were placed in southern Italy. 
 
 When the victory of Austerlitz, and the signature 
 of preliminaries with Austria and Russia, set Napo- 
 leon at liberty to wreak his vengeance on the perfi- 
 dious Court of Naples, he lost no time. Within a 
 week the conqueror proclaimed that the Bourbon 
 Dynasty had ceased to reign at Naples. He ordered 
 Marshal Massena to assemble a large army on the 
 Lower Po ; and to march without delay through the 
 Roman States. His numbers were announced as 
 40,000 men ; but it is pretty certain that little more 
 than 30,000 crossed the Neapolitan frontier. For- 
 midable as such a force might be while connected, it 
 was not sufficient for the occupation of a kingdom 
 nearly 300 miles long, in great part mountainous, 
 its communications difficult, and presenting on three 
 sides an immense extent of sea-coast exposed to the 
 insults of the English squadrons. The vast and tur- 
 
 * Four battalions of infantry, 2400 strong, arrived at 
 Messina from England just after the battle. 
 
IN TPIE MKDITERRANEAN. 257 
 
 bulent population of a capital open to attacks from 
 the sea, required the constant presence of a strong 
 body of French troops ; and the important fortress of 
 Gaeta, where the Prince of Hesse commanded, bade 
 defiance to the enemy, though all the other fortified 
 places of the kingdom had surrendered without 
 resistance.'"' 
 
 At first the French (after making an unsuccessful 
 dash at an outwork) contented themselves with a 
 blockade of Gaeta on its land front only, for its com- 
 munication with the sea remained perfectly free up 
 to the time of its surrender. But when Reynier had 
 overcome Calabria, and afi*airs appeared to be quiet 
 and secure in the capital, Massena in person under- 
 took the siege of Gaeta. It was a difficult operation 
 on account of the narrowness of the front of attack, 
 and the hardness of the bare rock along which the 
 besiegers had to labour. On the other hand, as their 
 front was narrow and their flanks secure, they did 
 not require a large army to support their works. The 
 Neapolitan garrison was composed probably of the 
 same description of troops as those who fled in the 
 field at the first fire of an enemy ; but they had here 
 at their head a German Prince who knew them well, 
 ruled them with a rod of steel, and by his familiar 
 buff'oonery, and his daring example, mastered their 
 fears, their afi'ection, and their admiration. The 
 Prince of Hesse put one in mind of the wild captains 
 of free corps in the days of the Mansfeldts and Chris- 
 * Except the Httle fort of Oivitella del Tronto. 
 
'258 MILITARY TKANSACTIONS 
 
 tian of Brunswick. He appeared half crazy ; he was 
 dissolute and regardless of rules ; but he was unspar- 
 ingly active and unconquerably brave. Under his 
 command the defence of Gaeta was protracted for 
 months ; and the losses and sufferings of the French 
 liad been great before the English made their sortie 
 from Sicily. But the fortress was by this time reduced 
 to difficulties. 
 
 Now if our Admiral had sailed immediately after 
 the action at Maida, and our General had sent 
 with the squadron a thousand of our soldiers and 
 the news of our victory, it is more than probable 
 that Gaeta would not have been taken that year. 
 And if Sir John Stuart^ after making sure of Monte- 
 leone, and leaving Oswald to sweep the Lower Pro- 
 vince, had re-embarked on board his transports, and 
 proceeded along the coast to threaten Policastro and 
 Salerno, the French must have hurried out of the 
 Oalabrias and the Basilicata to gather round the 
 capital. What in fact was the course they followed ? 
 General Verdier, harassed by the insurgents, alarmed 
 at the intelligence of an English landing, and fearful 
 of being cut off, abandoned Cosenza, and led his 
 diminished and disheartened troops by forced marches 
 an hundred miles to the northward ; while Reynier 
 encumbered by the numbers of his wounded men, and 
 anxious to repair the spirit and order of his beaten 
 army, lingered several days at Catanzaro. At length 
 finding that Verdier had gone off, and that the insur- 
 gents were growing every day more numerous and 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 259 
 
 more daring, Rejnier resumed his retreat with dismal 
 prospects. His short line bj Oosenza being cut off, 
 he was forced to follow the windings of the sea-coast. 
 At Cotrone he left his sick and wounded" and every 
 incumbrance ; and with less than 4000 men he pushed 
 onward with extreme rapidity. At Strongoli, and 
 again at Ooregliano, the Oalabrese had the boldness 
 to resist his march ; but both villages were carried by 
 storm and burned, and a fearful slaughter was made 
 of the inhabitants ; and on the 4th of August General 
 Reynier arrived with the wrecks of his little army 
 at Cassano. There at length he halted, knowing 
 reinforcements from Naples were at hand, and finding 
 that the EngUsh had not followed up their enterprise. 
 
 Gaeta had fallen, and Massena was coming in 
 person with 6000 men to rally the remains of Yer- 
 dier's and Reynier's divisions, and to put down the 
 insurrection in Upper Calabria. The game was over, 
 because Gaeta had fallen ; and my belief is that if our 
 Admiral and our General, instead of talking on the 
 evening of the 4th of July of the siege of Acre, and 
 Turkish ladies and Greek girls, had concerted and 
 acted immediately on a vigorous plan of operations, 
 the results might have marked our victory at Maida 
 as a feat productive of an important change in the 
 great war of European nations. 
 
 It was not till the 18th of July that Gaeta was 
 surrendered to the French, in consequence of the 
 
 * Where they were captured a few days afterwards by a 
 little expedition from Messina. - 
 
 s 2 
 
260 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS* 
 
 Prince of Hesse having been very severely wounded. 
 If Sir Sidney Smith had arrived tliere by the 14tli or 
 15th, he would have been in time to save the for- 
 tress ; and he had ten or eleven days in hand for 
 this short passage. It is hardly possible that calms 
 should have retarded ships of war so long a time, even 
 in a Neapolitan July. 
 
 To turn next to what the British General might 
 have done. Before quitting Monteleone he might 
 have summoned 600 of the Neapolitan dragoons, 
 and 4000 of their infantry to take his place in that 
 position. His call would have been answered with 
 the greatest alacrity. Although the British troops 
 with which our Commander would have re-embarked 
 would have been now reduced to less than 3000 men, 
 the show of transports would have been as great as 
 before : and so completely were the communications 
 of the French Generals cut oiF by the insurrection 
 around them, that they could not have known what 
 number of soldiers the fleet was carrying. A threat 
 therefore of landing near Policastro and occupying 
 the strong positions on the only high road (which 
 runs within a very few miles of that Gulf) would have 
 had the effect of turning Rcynier's line of retreat. 
 Instead of finding rest and safety at Oassano, he 
 would have been forced to pursue his weary way, 
 harassed by the Calabrese, along the coast of the 
 Adriatic towards Taranto or La Puglia ; while Ver- 
 dier, with little more than a thousand men, must have 
 continued his flight to Salerno. 
 
IN THE MEDITERCxiNEAN. 261 
 
 ^ Now, still assuming that Gaeta had been saved, 
 the prospect would have been darkening apace over 
 the French in Naples. Sir John Stuart's next ap- 
 pearance might have been at Capri, or better still 
 at Ischia, which he might have taken with as much 
 ease at this time as he afterwards did in 1809. The 
 capital would have been in a ferment : the strength 
 of the English expedition, and the extent of tlie insur- 
 rection would have been exaggerated ; all the hot 
 passions of the south would have been at work. The 
 distant detachments of the French, necessary though 
 the J were to controul the provinces and levj supplies, 
 must have been called in for the security of the capi- 
 tal and the rich Terra di Lavoro. Then the Abruzzi, 
 the Basilicata, the Principato, would have followed 
 the example of Calabria ; the revolt would have 
 become universal : and it would have been the more 
 formidable, since the prestige of French invincibility 
 had been destroyed at Maida. And what under such 
 circumstances, would Marshal Massena have done T 
 Could he have ventured to persist in the siege of 
 Gaeta with a British squadron in the bay, and a 
 thousand British soldiers added to the garrison 1 
 Could he risk all on this hazard, when his communi- 
 cation with Naples by sea was cut off, and that by 
 land must now require detachments for its security ? 
 So long as Massena's army was detained before Gaeta, 
 its influence over the public mind at Naples was 
 inconsiderable ; and if he raised the siege of Gaeta 
 and marched to the neighbourhood of the capital, 
 
262 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 assuredly he would have efFectuallj controlled the 
 populace, and might have bidden defiance to the 
 landing of the British ; but he could not have removed 
 their squadron from the bay, nor their troops from 
 the islands ; and while we were there, no ease could 
 be felt by King Joseph. The French army would 
 have been pinned down to that vicinity, and though 
 they might have kept outposts as far as Sessa and 
 Benevento, and Salerno, they could not have pre- 
 vented the insurgents from blockading their garrisons 
 in the Abruzzi and La Puglia ; nor the English from 
 insulting and alarming the French posts from Salerno 
 to Gaeta. We had the means too of heightening the 
 uneasiness of the enemy, by the show of our receiving 
 successive reinforcements ; for, in fact, the British 
 army numbered 13,000 men before the end of 
 August, and three months later, between 17,000 and 
 18,000. 
 
 But it will be asked, what substantial good was to 
 be produced by our threats? What influence could 
 they have had on the fortunes of the war 1 Would 
 not French reinforcements have poured in from the 
 north of Italy to frustrate our puny attempts on 
 Naples 1 Now it did so happen at that time, though 
 we knew it not, that considerable reinforcements 
 could not have been spared to Massena. Our com- 
 manders were ignorant of the state of political affairs; 
 they knew indeed that Russia was again at war with 
 France ; but they did not know that Prussia, and even 
 Spain, were on the eve of breaking into open hostility. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 263 
 
 Successes m Italy, and the spreading of revolts against 
 the French might have had a great effect on the coun-^ 
 cils of Austria, particularly a few months later, when 
 Napoleon withdrew his army to the Vistula after the 
 sanguinary battles of Pultusk and Golymin, or retired 
 from the destructive conflict of Eylau. 
 
 But this long speculation on what might have 
 been made to result from the defeat of the French at 
 Maida, rests on this postulate^ the relief of Gaeta; 
 and to this object neither Sir Sidney Smith nor Sir 
 John Stuart chose to apply themselves. The Admiral 
 had no mind to go to a place where he would have 
 been only on an equality with the Prince of Hesse. 
 Sir Sidney had run headlong into the snares of Queen 
 Caroline at Palermo ; had been loaded with flattery ; 
 had vowed himself her champion, and had received 
 from her a commission as "Commander-in-Chief by 
 sea and land in the Galabrias.'' He was in close 
 correspondence with all the scoundrels who called 
 themselves *'Capitani delle Masse,^' and his ships were 
 thronged with brigands seeking arms and ammunition, 
 which were employed more frequently in murdering 
 and plundering the peaceful inhabitants of towns than 
 in resisting the French. On the other hand, Sir John 
 Stuart was extremely jealous of Sir Sidney's favour 
 and his pretensions to command; and consequently 
 was anxious for an early separation. The two chiefs 
 parted therefore without a word of consultation, but 
 with mutual compliments and confirmed aversion. 
 The Admiral drawlino; along the Calabrian coast, and 
 
264 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 helping tlie insurgents to attack the few isolated towns 
 and castles from which some unfortunate French 
 soldiers had been unable to escape; and the General 
 hastening through the Lower Province to exhibit his 
 laurels in Sicilj. 
 
 After gathering in the detachments which Rejnier 
 had left in Tropea and Reggio, there remained only 
 the rock-castle of Scilla, with a gallant little Governor, 
 who was determined to give us all the trouble he 
 could. "^^^ We plied him sharply from 12-pounders and 
 howitzer batteries, and the practice of our artillery 
 was excellent; but we could make no impression on 
 the solid old walls. After losing a few days, during 
 which the greater part of our troops passed over to 
 Messina, we were obliged to bring up 24-pounders and 
 open a breaching battery at a very short distance. 
 The castle then surrendered. 
 
 Viewing our expedition in the light of a sortie 
 from Sicily, nothing could have been more successful. 
 The enemy had been driven out of Lower Calabria : 
 he had been defeated in fair fight under such circum- 
 stances as reversed the previous belief of the Italians 
 and Sicilians, and taught them to consider the British 
 soldiers to be superior to tlie French. This in itself 
 was no trifling gain. All the stores and guns and 
 boats which our enemy had been collecting with a 
 
 * After parting from Stuart, Sir Sidney Smith, instead of 
 hastening to Gaeta, and without saying a word on the subject 
 to the General, sailed to the southward and made a dash at 
 Scilla. He was beaten oif, and he then disappeared altogether! 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 265 
 
 view to his establishment in Calabria, and for the 
 future invasion of Sicily, had fallen into our hands. 
 Five hundred of the best of the enemy's troops had 
 been slain in battle, and between two and three 
 thousand more were prisoners. These results had 
 been obtained with little loss of life on our part ; and 
 a confidence had revived in our officers and soldiers 
 which increased in an immeasurable degree the moral 
 strength of our little army. But before we reached 
 tlie straits of Messina the fatal effects of exposure to 
 the pestilential air, which prevails during summer and 
 autumn on the shores of St. Eufemia, began to appear 
 amongst our troops; and every regiment that had 
 been employed on the expedition suffered severely 
 from intermittent fevers for several months. 
 
 Sir John Stuart's command of the army was 
 gilded by fortune; but it was of short continuance. 
 When he returned to the straits of Messina he found 
 there General Fox, sent by the Whig Government to 
 assume the chief command in the Mediterranean, and 
 bringing intelligence that large bodies of troops were 
 following, and moreover, Lieuten ant-General Sir John 
 Moore. To have an officer of superior rank appointed 
 to the command in chief was no more than Stuart had 
 expected, and he would have been well content, dazzled 
 as he was by his sudden glory, to have served as second 
 to General Fox : but the coming of Moore, who was 
 senior in rank and far superior in reputation, was a 
 bitter pill, which the recent conqueror could not 
 stomach. He made up his mind to return to Eng- 
 land ; but in the meantime General Fox did all that 
 
266 MILITARY TEANSACTIONS 
 
 was in his power to soothe his disappointment and 
 uphold his temporary importance. Stuart was in- 
 vested with the command of the troops in Calabria, 
 where two or three of our battalions were left, rein- 
 forced bj Neapolitan cavalry and some of their best 
 infantry under Baron Acton, the brother of the minis- 
 ter, and in everything that was to be done on that 
 side of the straits, General Fox solicited the opinion 
 and endeavoured to meet the wishes of Stuart. The 
 78th regiment was despatched in transports, escorted 
 by the Amphion frigate, commanded by that admirable 
 officer, William Hoste, to attack Ootrone. Ootrone 
 and other places on the eastern coast were taken, and 
 considerable numbers of wounded and sick Frenchmen 
 were made prisoners. A few days afterwards, the 
 58th and 81st regiments, under Brigadier Acland's 
 orders, were sent by sea to threaten the coasts near 
 Salerno, and communicate with Colonel Lowe, who 
 held possession of Capri with five companies of his 
 Corsicans and a few artillerymen. But Gacta had 
 fallen in the meantime; the Neapolitan who suc- 
 ceeded the Prince of Hesse in the command of the 
 fortress surrendered it instantly. Massena's army was 
 set at liberty to cover Naples, and re-open the com- 
 munications with the wrecks of Reynicr's and Verdier's 
 divisions.^^ The opportunity of doing more had been 
 lost ; and the British forces were again concentrated 
 
 * The Frenchi returned to Cosenza as early as the middle of 
 August. P. L. Courier gives us sketches of their modes of pro- 
 ceeding, and those of the Calabrese in letters dated Scigliano, 
 21st August, and Mileto, 10th September. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 267 
 
 in the north-eastern angle of Sicily, with British 
 detachments in and about Scilla and Reggio; and 
 Baron Acton with his Neapolitans at Monteleone, sup- 
 porting the bands of Calabrese insurgents. 
 
 Sir John Moore arrived at Messina in the begin- 
 ning of August, and took his place ostensibly as second 
 in command of our army. He enjoyed General Fox's 
 entire confidence; and as the latter was infirm in 
 health and incapable of much exertion, it was clearly 
 the intention of the British Government that the 
 active command of our troops should be entrusted to 
 Moore, whose reputation stood higher than that of 
 any other officer in the service. Shortly after Sir 
 John's arrival he proposed to visit the coast of Naples 
 up to Capri, that he might obtain a personal acquaint- 
 ance with the state of aff'airs, and some knowledge of 
 the localities. The Apollo frigate was placed at his 
 disposal; and as I had an attack of malaria fever 
 which made a change of air desirable, Moore took me 
 with him. 
 
 The only circumstance which makes this cruise of 
 a fortnight worthy of record is an anecdote touching 
 Sir Sidney Smith. We fell in with his fine ship, the 
 Pompee, of eighty-four guns, in the bay of Poli- 
 castro, crippled and torn by shot. These shot had 
 been received the day before from an old watch 
 tower, on which one gun was mounted. The story 
 told by the officers of the Pompee was this : Sir 
 Sidney coasting along, as was his wont, having the 
 Hydra, and another frigate in company, and looking 
 
268 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 out for brigands to receive his muskets and his orders," 
 espied a French flag flying on this tower of ancient 
 days. He simply gave orders that the ships should 
 run in and drive the enemy out of their little fortress 
 by cannon shot; and these orders given, the Admiral 
 went quietly to his cabin to write his letters. The 
 Pompee drew near and opened her fire; the one gun 
 then responded; the broadsides of the man-of-war 
 were returned for half an hour by this solitary but 
 unerring gun ; at length the Captain found it necessary 
 to interrupt the Admiral's correspondence by inform- 
 ing him that Lieut. Slessor, and a midshipman, and 
 several men were killed, many more wounded, and 
 the ship seriously damaged. Sir Sidney looked sur- 
 prised, but gave orders that the boats sliould be 
 lowered, and the marines sent ashore to reduce these 
 obstinate Frenchmen. As soon as the boats touched 
 the beach, some thirty Oorsicans ran from the tower 
 to meet them, waving a white handkerchief, and telling 
 the officer that they had been longing to desert to the 
 British, but as the ship fired at them instead of invit- 
 ing them to surrender, they had no choice but to use 
 their gun to the best of their ability. We went on 
 our way, leaving the Pomp^e's crew employed in re- 
 pairing her damages, and in burying the poor fellows 
 whose lives had been thus idly thrown away. Moore 
 viewed the coasts, gathered information from the com- 
 mandant of Capri, and ordered Acland with his two 
 battalions back to Messina. 
 
 As soon as Gaeta had surrendered, columns ot 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 26^ 
 
 French troops marched rapidly into the Principato; 
 and the broken divisions of Rejnier and Verdier 
 having concentrated in Upper Calabria, they began to 
 resume oflfensive movements. The disorderly bands of 
 mountaineers who had drawn together in large masses, 
 were scattered by the first advance of the French bat- 
 talions, and a panic spread like wildfire even through 
 the lower province. Instead of being prompted by 
 the rumour of an advancing enemy to unite their bands 
 and occupy the passes, or rally on the Neapolitans at 
 Monteleone, the captains of the masse seized the 
 moment of confusion to set ofi" in all directions to 
 plunder the towns and villages, confident in their 
 numbers and in the arms lavished on them by the 
 British admiral; confident, I say, that they might 
 now indulge their lust for plunder and outrage without 
 resistance on the part of their unhappy fellow-country- 
 men. I might quote proofs from many documents in 
 my possession, but the following extract from an 
 official report made by a staff officer (now Sir Richard 
 Church) dated August 28th, will be sufficient to shew 
 what these people were whom Queen Caroline cherished 
 as the props of her crown, and whom Sir Sidney Smith 
 was proud to reckon under his command. 
 
 "I found the town (Nicastro) in the most dreadful 
 state of confusion and dismay from a massacre and 
 pillage by the Masse. Half an hour previous to my 
 arrival, two of the inhabitants had been murdered in 
 the streets; and the Syndic, Governor, and many 
 others had been repeatedly fired at. Froni these 
 
270 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 circumstances, and at the urgent solicitations of the 
 inhabitants, I conceived it my most particular duty 
 to remain, and if possible restore order. 
 
 " During the whole day parties continued to arrive 
 until they amounted to above eleven hundred : they 
 were immediately supplied with rations of every 
 description. Towards evening they suddenly attacked 
 the house of Don Giuseppe Nicotera, with the avowed 
 intention of massacreing their whole family and pil- 
 laging the house. I am happy to state before they 
 had found any of the family or carried- away anything 
 of consequence, I arrived at the house, and from the 
 steady conduct of the detachment of cavalry, as also 
 by making use of threats and persuasion, I succeeded 
 in forcing them out of the house, and immediately 
 ordered their chiefs out of the town to take post 
 towards Scigliano, with which order the greatest part 
 complied ; a number still remained, and I thought it 
 necessary to patrol the whole of the night." "^ 
 
 Together with the chief command of the army, the 
 appointment of Ambassador to the Court of Palermo 
 had been conferred on General Fox by his brother, 
 who was desirous that, under the circumstances of the 
 island, there should be an unity of power in British 
 hands. It was now become necessary that the General 
 should present himself to their Sicilian Majesties, and 
 he made over the command of the army pro tempore 
 to Sir John Moore. Stuart immediately applied for 
 
 * See also in the Appendix a letter from Sir J. Stuart 
 himself to General Fox, dated Palmi, 26th August. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN". 271 
 
 and obtained leave to retire to Malta, until he could 
 find an opportunity of returning to England. These 
 two men had served together in Egypt, and a mutual 
 dislike was the result of their acquaintance. Every 
 quality in Moore was real, solid, and unbending; in 
 Stuart all was flighty and superficial, though there 
 was a good deal of original cleverness. The former 
 was penetrating, reflecting, and, though his manner 
 was singularly agreeable to those whom he liked, to 
 those whom he did not hold in esteem his bearing was 
 severe; while Stuart was vain, frivolous, and sarcastic. 
 It may be remembered that in the battle of the 21st 
 March, 1801, near Alexandria, the desperate onset of 
 the French burst full upon the reserve of the British 
 army under Moore's command. The 42nd Regiment 
 was broken by the headlong charge of the enemy's 
 cavalry, and the 28 th and 58 th only maintained their 
 posts by dint of the most obstinate and valiant exer- 
 tions against superior numbers. In rear of the reserve 
 was Stuart with three foreign regiments: he brought 
 them up gallantly to the rescue ; and the enemy, . 
 already shattered and wavering amidst the unflinching 
 gallantry of Moore's battalions, was overpowered by 
 this second line. A very large share of the honour of 
 that day's victory was justly awarded to General 
 Moore ; but Stuart always fancied himself aggrieved, 
 and he cherished the belief that he and his foreigners 
 won the battle of Alexandria. Moore, therefore, was 
 the man of whom he was particularly jealous, and. 
 with whom he could not bear to serve. However, 
 
272 MILlTAllY TKANSACTIONS 
 
 these two Generals had an amicable interview before 
 Sir Jolm Stuart embarked for Malta, and I give 
 this extract from a letter which Moore wrote at the 
 time to General Fox,'^''' both as it regards Stuart, 
 and still more Sir Sidney Smith and the state of 
 Calabria. 
 
 "I have had a long conversation with Sir J. Stuart: 
 he was particularly reasonable, and I really believe that 
 he expressed nothing but what he thought at the 
 moment. I do not, however, expect that he will ever 
 for any continuance, be very consistent on the subject 
 of the Oalabrias. Amongst the inclosures you will 
 find a letter from Sir Sidney Smith, with a copy of 
 the letter which I mentioned to you I had seen when on. 
 board the ' Pompee.' It is with his usual impudence 
 that he pretends to hope that my progress along shore 
 has in any respect led me to think with him, when he 
 knows how strongly I have expressed the reverse. 
 The knowledge I acquired in my tour leads me to 
 regret that he has, as he says, neglected other business 
 in order to attend to the affairs of the inhabitants on 
 the coast ; for amongst them I think he has only been 
 active in mischief. Sir Sidney may perhaps have 
 painted in his imagination a people brave and hardy, 
 intelligent and capable of defending their mountains 
 against an enemy. But they must be animated and 
 united by some common sentiment that is praise- 
 worthy. They must not be the dastardly dregs of 
 the Calabrese, led by assassins to plunder and mui'der 
 
 * Sir John Moore to General Fox, Sept. 5th, 1806. 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 273 
 
 every person who is decent and respectable in the 
 country." 
 
 In the beginning of September the French began 
 to push their patrols towards Monteleone, and they 
 made a show of attacking Baron Acton. As the 
 latter found that he could not place the least reliance 
 on the Calabrese, and the English would not advance 
 from the straits, he gave way before the first demon- 
 stration of the enemy, and fell back to the towns upon 
 the coast, where the British still held the castle of 
 Scilla, and a few other posts of observation. The 
 French, however, would not yet venture to take their 
 quarters in the lower extremity of Calabria, close to 
 an Euglish army nearly twice as strong as that which 
 had recently taught them so severe a lesson. They 
 had no magazines or heavy guns, and Reynier, who 
 was again in the chief command, was content to fix 
 his head-quarters at Mileto, pushing outposts towards 
 Pal mi. Being unmolested by the British, he employed 
 his leisure in dispersing the bands of Calabrese, 
 executing a great many who fell into his hands, and 
 reducing the country as far as it was occupied by his 
 troops, into a still subjection. 
 
 Thus the armies on both sides remained for some 
 months;* our own improving its means of defence, 
 and placing garrisons in Catania, Agosta, and Syra- 
 cuse ; while the French were waiting for reinforcements 
 
 * Excepting that Baron Acton's Neapolitans were recalled 
 to Palermo in November, leaving only a garrison in the castle 
 of Reggio. 
 
 T 
 
274 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 and ordnance, preparatory to the siege of Scilla, and 
 the re-occupation of the whole coast of Lower Calabria. 
 In the latter part of August, General Fox received 
 advice that preliminaries of peace between France and 
 Russia had been actually signed at Paris; nor was it 
 till nearly two months afterwards that he learnt from 
 Corfu that the Emperor Alexander had refused to 
 ratify the treaty, and that war was likely to be 
 renewed. During this interval, therefore, our General 
 conceived that England was standing alone and un- 
 supported in her resistance to Napoleon, and that 
 there w^as no object to be answered by diversions or 
 attempts upon the continent. But before December, 
 4000 very fine infantry joined his army from England, 
 despatched apparently by our Government, for the 
 purpose of rendering the British forces in Sicily equal 
 to undertake active operations ; and though no direct 
 instructions arrived, some preparations were made in 
 anticipation of expected orders; our transports were 
 kept in constant readiness, and four or five thousand 
 of our best troops, under General Edward Paget, were 
 hutted on the beach at Milazzo. Our army at this 
 time mustered more than 17,000 men,"^^ but we were 
 lamentably deficient in cavalry. 
 
 As the political schemes of the Court of Palermo, 
 and in some measures our own military plans were 
 influenced by the turns and chances of the great 
 struggle between the armies of France and Russia, it 
 may be convenient here to take a brief review of the 
 * Seo Appendix. 
 
* IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 275 
 
 course of war in the north of Europe. In the middle 
 of October, 1806, the Prussian monarchy had been 
 shattered to fragments by the battle of Jena and its 
 immediate results. The activity and unchecked success 
 with which Napoleon followed up his victory were 
 unparalleled in the history of modern warfare. In 
 less than a month he was master of the wide countries, 
 and many of the strongest fortresses, between the Elbe 
 and the Oder. His victorious columns poured on to 
 the eastward; and the Russian army which was march- 
 ing to the support of the King of Prussia, encountered 
 the leading divisions of the French at a short distance 
 from the Vistula. 
 
 The Moscovites were by no means prepared to 
 arrest the mighty force of the enemy. They re- 
 treated in order to unite themselves with their columns 
 arriving from the rear ; and the French entered 
 the capital of Poland on the 28th of November. 
 Napoleon, who had remained some time in Berlin, 
 rejoined his army at Warsaw about the middle of 
 December, and resumed offensive operations a few 
 days afterwards. The Russian armies were now col- 
 lected, and strong in numbers and confidence. A 
 series of obstinate and bloody conflicts took place 
 between the 23rd and 27th of December; there was 
 a fearful loss of men on both sides ; and the rigour of 
 the season was alike injurious to the invaders and 
 their opponents. While the Russians retired towards 
 the Niemen, the French drew back to Warsaw and the 
 borders of the Vistula ; and both parties were glad for 
 
 T 2 
 
276 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 a time to find rest in winter-quarters. However, the 
 ministers of the Czar at foreign courts seized on these 
 specious circumstances, and thej trumpeted forth in 
 the south and west of Europe that Napoleon's mighty 
 army had been repulsed, nay, defeated at Pultusk, and 
 the foremost to beliere the tale were the infatuated 
 soyereigns and Court of Palermo. 
 
 Even before these accounts arrived, on the bare 
 knowledge of the fact that the Emperor Alexander 
 had refused to ratify the preliminaries of peace, the 
 Sicilian Government became clamorous for an attack 
 upon the enemy. Sir John Acton had been, before 
 this time, wormed out of his post as Prime Minister, 
 by the intrigues of Queen Caroline and her faction. 
 The Marquis di Circello was at the head of the 
 Government ; and all the schemes of his royal mistress 
 were in full activity. Most urgently and importunately 
 did she press our Minister at Palermo, and our General 
 at Messina, to engage at once in an attack on the 
 French at Naples ; or if not on Naples itself, at least 
 on the Calabrias ; and Circello insisted the more 
 vehemently, " because,'^ said he,"^' " a balanced state of 
 the struggle in Poland may induce the two emperors 
 to agree upon a peace, for their allies as well as them- 
 selves, on the basis of idi-possidetis!' f 
 
 Just at this moment Mr. Drummond arrived from 
 England to take his post as the British Minister at 
 Palermo, and bringing the latest instructions from the 
 
 * Mr. A'Court to General Fox, Dec. ISth, 1806. 
 t Mr. Drummond to the same, Dec. 18th. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN". 277 
 
 Cabinet of St. James's. He wrote immediately to 
 General Fox, describing the fever in which he found 
 the Sicilian Court, and their impatience for an expe- 
 dition. But Mr. Drummond, at the same time, con- 
 sidering this to be a question which ought to be 
 decided bj the opinion and on the responsibility of 
 the English Commander, begged to be made acquainted 
 with General Fox's sentiments, and his views of the 
 subject. Now General Fox, and still more strongly 
 Sir John Moore, were averse from engaging in any 
 expedition without orders from home ; and they were 
 particularly disinclined to commit their troops or 
 connect themselves with the projects of her Sicilian 
 Majesty. They were fully convinced that she was not 
 only rash, but that she was utterly false, if not 
 treacherous. They were resolved to keep a firm hold 
 of Sicily ; and not to risk the British army in enter- 
 prises of doubtful success without authority from their 
 own Government. It was determined therefore that 
 Sir John Moore should repair to Palermo; that he 
 should explain to Mr. Drummond very fully thq views 
 and opinions of the generals on the actual state of 
 affairs ; and try at least to fix the judgment of our 
 Minister, if he could not succeed in satisfying the 
 Sicilian Court. 
 
 Sir John's interview with the ambassador was 
 apparently productive of all the effect which had been 
 hoped : Mr. Drummond ^ declared himself to be com- 
 pletely convinced that the generals were right in their 
 * Rt. Hon. W. Drummond to General Fox, Jan. 2nd, 1807. 
 
278 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 opinion, that the time was not fit for an invasion of 
 Naples; and he inveighed loudlj against the Queen's 
 party, the actual ministers, their ruinous policy, and 
 their anti-English feelings. Such continued to be the 
 opinions of Mr. Drummond till after Sir Sidney Smith 
 had been removed from Palermo, by his being ordered 
 to proceed with Admiral Duckworth to the Dar- 
 danelles; and the ambassador's letters during that 
 interval not only shew his concurrence with our 
 mihtary commanders, but they mark in the strongest 
 characters his opinions of the Queen and her cabal, 
 including most particularly Sir Sidney Smith, who was 
 at that time the cherished confidant and first favourite 
 of her Majesty.* 
 
 That Caroline detested the English there can be 
 no doubt ; that she urged the Emperor of Russia, as 
 Mr. Drummond states, to send to Sicily a large army 
 which might set aside the British influence, is highly 
 probable; but that so early as January, 1807, the 
 Queen could be endeavouring to open secret negotia- 
 tions with Napoleon, almost staggers belief. Yet the 
 fact that she was engaged in such an attempt, through 
 the medium of the Spanish Court, appeared to be 
 afterwards confirmed by advices which General Fox 
 received from Spain by way of Gibraltar. The Queen 
 had only one bait to offer to Napoleon ; only one con- 
 dition which could tempt the great conqueror to incline 
 his ear to this degraded woman. This only bait was 
 
 * See Appendix K for Mr. Drummond's letters of the 23rd 
 and 27th Jan. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 279 
 
 Sicilj, with its fortresses and harbours, and the sacri- 
 fice of the English armj. " Give me back, sire, my 
 beloved Naples, and I will not only be jour most 
 faithful vassal henceforth and for ever, but I will 
 betray into your hands the fortified ports of Sicily 
 with their English garrisons V^ However, if such 
 overtures were made, they were of no efiect. The 
 British army remained tranquil on the eastern coast 
 from Syracuse to Milazzo ; our generals on very bad 
 terms with the Court of Palermo, and thwarted and 
 impeded by the Neapolitan authorities, as much as the 
 latter dared to let their ill-will appear. But these 
 annoyances became more sensible when our ambassa- 
 dor, within a month after the departure of Sir Sidney 
 Smith, whom he detested, suddenly renounced all his 
 former opinions, adopted the views and policy of 
 Circello, and threw the weight of his official character 
 into the scale in favour of the court and in opposition 
 to Generals Fox and Moore. 
 
 In the meantime orders had been received which 
 very materially changed and impaired our military 
 position. Before the* close of January, despatches 
 arrived from England, conveying to General Fox the 
 information that our Government proposed to act 
 ofi'ensively against Turkey, if the Porte should not at 
 once accept the terms which were to be dictated by 
 our Ambassador ; that an English squadron was to 
 appear immediately before Constantinople ; and that 
 5000 troops were to be held in readiness at Messina 
 to proceed directly to Alexandria, in case the Turks 
 
280 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 should reject our terms and resist our squadron. 
 These surprising orders appear to have been con- 
 nected in the minds of the British Cabinet with the 
 war in Poland ; and it becomes necessary to resume, 
 but briefly, our notice of the war between France and 
 Russia. 
 
 So early as August 1806, two months before the 
 commencement of hostilities with Russia, Napoleon 
 had despatched General Sebastiani as his ambassador 
 to the Porte. Foreseeing the likelihood of a severe 
 struggle when the Czar should come to the support of 
 the Prussian monarch, the French Emperor instructed 
 his military diplomatist to prepare the minds of the 
 Turks, and animate them to throw off the weight of 
 Russian ascendancy. He was to point out the happy 
 opportunity, which would be afforded by a war between 
 Napoleon and Alexander, of recovering the ancient 
 dominion of the Sultan over Moldavia and Wallachia ; 
 and to dispel their dread of the Russian arms by the 
 promise of ample support, and the assurance of an 
 intimate and perpetual alliance with France. Sebas- 
 tiani performed his part ably and successfully. The 
 sluggish Turks began in September to shew towards 
 Russia symptoms of restiveness ; nor were they moved 
 by the advice or remonstrances of the English ambas- 
 sador, who saw and strove to check the growth of 
 French influence. Under such circumstances the game 
 of Russia clearly was to soothe, to gain time, to avoid 
 any measures which might provoke the Turks into 
 actual hostilities, at a moment when it was of vital 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 281 
 
 importance that all the forces of the Czar should be 
 concentrated in Poland. Instead of this, without an 
 attempt to conciliate, or turn to account the national 
 inertness of the Mussulmen, the Russians adopted the 
 most irritating measures. As soon as thej found a 
 firm opposition at the Porte, thej marched 40,000 
 men into Moldavia. An army of this strength might 
 have turned the tide of war on the Vistula or the 
 Narew, where the Czar was about to encounter the 
 veteran armies of France with inferior numbers. But 
 Alexander bore not in mind the old maxim of the 
 Romans, to deal with one enemy at a time, and to 
 wait for the prosperous issue of one contest before 
 engaging in another. Napoleon was coming to the 
 attack with 130,000 troops inured to war, and familiar 
 with victory. At this moment the Czar detached 
 40,000 of his soldiers to Turkey, and moreover he 
 kept a considerable force fighting with the Persians in 
 Georgia ! 
 
 However, the confidence of the Russians in their 
 strength was not without misgivings ; and they pressed 
 the Cabinet of London to make diversions in their 
 favour by sea and land. It was impossible at that 
 season of the year for England to send fleets or armies 
 to the Baltic; nor were operations at the mouths of 
 the Elbe or the Weser practicable since the downfall 
 of Prussia ; but the south of Europe was open to us. 
 And here it is necessary to advert to an important 
 part of Napoleon's combinations for the conduct of 
 his campaign. Having wrung from the reluctant Court 
 
282 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 of Austria the full possession of Dalmatia, and seized 
 upon Ragusa ;* he was forming in that quarter a large 
 army under Marmont, destined to cross the Northern 
 Provinces of Turkey, and act in conjunction with the 
 Mussulmen against the south of Russia. In Upper 
 Italy there remained but few French troops : in the 
 kingdom of Naples hardly more than twenty-fiye 
 thousand, including Neapolitans, scattered through its 
 wide extent. It was an object of the highest impor- 
 tance to arrest the movement of Mai-mont's army : it 
 was the most effectual diversion England could make 
 for the relief of her Russian ally. If our Government 
 had sent to Sicily in November seven or eight thousand 
 of the infantry, and a couple of thousand of the dra- 
 goons who were idle at home, we should have been 
 strong enough for the purpose. The landing of twenty 
 or twenty-four thousand British troops in the north of 
 Italy, or even at Leghorn, would have compelled Mar- 
 mont to detach a large proportion of his army to meet 
 our invasion. 
 
 I speak not here of the chances which presented 
 themselves of successes in Italy, nor of the effect 
 which such successes would have had on the still 
 wavering councils of Austria. I speak only of the 
 object which Russia had at heart, that of relieving her 
 in some degree from the pressure of the war. Another 
 
 * There had been a good deal of fighting in the preceding 
 spring for the possession of the Bocche di Cattaro ; but the 
 French had in the end expelled the Russians, and reduced the 
 Montenegrins to subjection. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 283 
 
 mode appeared to be this : That twenty sail of the 
 line, instead of seven,* and with 10,000 troops on 
 board, should have been despatched direct to Constan- 
 tinople, and by the most energetic measures, coupled 
 with the offer of the most liberal terms, have half 
 awed half persuaded the Porte into an instant peace. 
 This alternative might possibly have succeeded ; and 
 our 10,000 men and their transports were ready at 
 Messina. But instead of affording a prompt support 
 to our ally, by acting vigorously in either the one or 
 other direction, our Cabinet came to the miserable 
 determination of sending five or six men-of-war, 
 without soldiers, to the Dardanelles ; and 5000 
 soldiers, without a fleet, to occupy the town of Alex- 
 andria ! To make the matter worse, and our plans 
 more objectionable, our allies, the Russians, were par- 
 ticularly jealous of England's supposed designs on 
 Egypt, and were sure to view our seizing on Alex- 
 andria with a suspicious and angry eye.f 
 
 * It appears from Lord CoUingwood's correspondence, that 
 the British Government ordered only jive ships to the Darda- 
 nelles ; Lord CoUingwood took upon himself to add two 
 more. 
 
 t The Kussian Minister, M. d'ltalinski, had come about this 
 time to Malta. Why he came there was never declared. But 
 Mr. Drummond says in a note to General Fox, " If you could 
 order one of the transports to run over to Malta, I could obtain 
 correct information from M. d'ltalinski concerning the state of 
 negotiations with the Porte. It is a subject on which d'ltalinski 
 would not enter fully with Sir J. Duckworth or perhaps with any 
 person except myself You are aware of the jealousy which 
 exists, and that the Russians by no means wish us to interfere. 
 They will be very sorry to see us in possession of Alexandria. 
 
284 MILITARY TKANSACTIONS 
 
 Still the British Government, in a spirit of sliort- 
 sighted and petty selfishness, gave orders that 5000 
 men should be detached from their army in Sicily to 
 seize and occupy the town of Alexandria ; " not to 
 conquer Egypt." It was clear that this measure 
 could not draw off a single soldier from the French or 
 Turkish armies employed against the Russians, while 
 it rendered the British army too weak to enter on a 
 serious enterprise on either side of Italy, and thus 
 served to dispel any apprehensions which the enemy 
 might have felt with regard to that country. 
 
 The state of Egypt was at this time unsettled and 
 full of trouble. The Pacha, Mehemet Ali, was silently 
 weaving those plans by which he afterwards worked 
 his way to an independent sovereignty. The Mame- 
 lukes, though much reduced in power, still held toge- 
 ther, and kept their ground in the Upper Province. 
 They watched the Pacha with dread as well as jea- 
 lousy ; while in his breast were carefully hidden the 
 designs for their destruction, which he at last accom- 
 plished by the deepest and most cruel treachery. Acts 
 of open hostility indeed were occurring from time to 
 time ; but they wore the character rather of those 
 passing outbreaks of savage suspicion, which are com- 
 mon amongst the nations of the East, than of a 
 declared and lasting war. Both the Mamelukes and 
 
 Still Italinski would not withhold his opinions from me, because 
 our habits of intimacy, with many important communications 
 which we have mutually made to each other, have inspired both 
 with confidence." 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 285 
 
 the Pacha were objects of distrust to the Porte, and all 
 the three were intriguing secretly, each against the 
 other two. But the spirit of intrigue was not con- 
 fined to Mussulmen ; both the French and the English 
 Consuls at Alexandria had been for a long time busily 
 at work, and of course in opposite directions. And 
 the latter gentleman bore so large a part in drawing 
 the British expedition to Egypt, and in the measures 
 which brought disaster and disgrace on our arms, 
 that I cannot avoid making some mention of his pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 Major Missett, our Oonsul-General, had resided 
 some years in Egypt, and being a man of a busy and 
 inquiring turn of mind, he had taken an active part 
 in the politics, and had connected himself with one of 
 the contending factions, of the country. Clever, vain, 
 and impatient, he had long been engaged in schemes 
 for re-establishing a British interest. He reckoned on 
 the Arabs as sure supporters ; he had carried on a 
 secret correspondence with the Beys, and thought he 
 had secured the alliance of the Mamelukes. But 
 Major Missett was a cripple ; he was unable to go 
 forth from Alexandria and see things with his own 
 eyes. He could only listen to the reports of his own 
 emissaries or correspondents, but his sanguine nature 
 prompted him to believe that a handful of British 
 troops would suffice to extinguish the influence of 
 France, and crush the rising power of Mehemet Ali. 
 In this spirit our Consul- General urged upon 
 ministers the ease and importance of seizing on 
 
286 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Alexandria, and in an evil hour thej listened to his 
 counsel. 
 
 The commanders of our expedition were specially 
 instructed to consult Major Missett, and be guided by 
 his experience of Egyptian affairs in all proceedings 
 which were not purely military. But our Goyernment 
 appears to have been left in ignorance of the fact, that 
 the immediate neighbourhood of Alexandria afforded 
 no supply of provisions;* and equally so of the num- 
 bers and warlike character of the Albanian soldiers 
 whom the Pacha had been collecting and training with 
 great diligence. It was lightly imagined not only that 
 Alexandria could be taken without difficulty, but that 
 the possession of this city would be of itself sufficient 
 to render the British General the arbiter of Egyptian 
 factions, and the virtual ruler to whom they would all 
 turn their eyes for advice and guidance. Thus the 
 Secretary of State instructs General Fox : " In choos- 
 ing an officer to command this expedition, attention 
 must be paid not only to his military talents, but to 
 those qualities which may best suit him for a civil or 
 political trust of considerable importance, which the 
 service in which he is to be engaged must from its 
 nature involve him. His interference in those party 
 dissensions which generally agitate Egypt, or in those 
 
 * It seems strange that ministers should have been content to 
 rest in ignorance of at least the physical resources of Alexandria; 
 for hardly five years had passed since it was evacuated by a 
 British army, and there were many men within call who could 
 have afforded them ample information on the subject. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 287 
 
 contests for power which are generally maintained 
 amongst the Beys, will probably be unavoidable ; 
 and the precise line, which it will be proper for him 
 to take in the exercise of such interference would be 
 difficult at this time to point out."'"' 
 
 It was probably in consideration of his concilia- 
 tory temper, and his frank and engaging manners, 
 that General McKenzie Eraser was selected for the 
 command of the expedition to Alexandria. He was 
 a fine specimen of an open, generous, honourable 
 Highland chieftain. A man of very good plain sense, 
 but one who had never studied the higher branches, 
 either of politics or of military science. Every one 
 in the army loved McKenzie Eraser, but no one deemed 
 him qualified for a separate and difficult command. 
 If the special instructions of our Cabinet were inter- 
 preted so as to indicate Eraser as the properest person 
 to play the part of mediator in Egypt, it became the 
 more essential that his second in command should be 
 an officer well qualified to lead the troops, and form 
 just opinions on military questions. But unfortunately 
 the Major-General who was appointed to this post was 
 one who had been merely a brave, hardworking, regi- 
 mental officer. As such he had been patronized by 
 
 * Here is an instance of the cruel positions in whicli our com-, 
 manders and governors are too often placed. They are engaged 
 by the orders of their Government in transactions of a doubtful 
 issue. Their instructions are couched in general or ambiguous 
 terms. Distinct explanations are avoided, and this because 
 British Ministers are afraid of being called to account in Parlia- 
 ment, if the consequences do not prove satisfactory. 
 
288 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Sir John Moore ; but on this ill-fated expedition he 
 shewed how totally devoid he was of military talents. 
 Fortunately for himself he expiated his blunders by 
 dying gallantly in battle. 
 
 A body of troops,* to the amount directed by the 
 British Government, was prepared for embarkation 
 early in February, 1807; and held in readiness to 
 proceed as soon as advice should be received of the 
 issue of our attempts at Constantinople. The fleet of 
 transports sailed from Messina on the 6th of March; 
 and the enemy's troops in Calabria instantly fell back, 
 apparently with the intention of concentrating their 
 forces between the gulfs of St. Eufemia and Squilace ; 
 but having soon ascertained that the British expedi- 
 tion had proceeded to the eastward, the French not 
 only returned to their former posts, but they pushed 
 forward a body of troops with the hope of surprising 
 Reggio. There, however, the Neapolitan General 
 Tschudi had some pretty good regiments, and the 
 enemy found it prudent to remain at a distance. 
 
 No smile of fortune cheered this unhappy expe- 
 dition to Egypt. From its outset its prospects were 
 crossed by untoward accidents. In the night after 
 sailing from Messina, thirty- three sail of transports 
 with the Apollo frigate parted company, and the 
 General (on board the Tigre of 84 guns), with little 
 
 * 20th Light Dragoons, 70; Artiller}^, (fee, 180; 31st Regi- 
 ment, 35th ditto, (two battalions,) 78th ditto, 2nd battalion, 
 2,970; De RoH'a regiment, Chasseurs Britanniques, Sicilian 
 volunteers, 2,030. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 289 
 
 more than 2000 soldiers in sixteen transports arrived 
 off Alexandria on the 1 6th of March. Thej anchored 
 on the coast to the westward of the port ; but though 
 the Turkish garrisoA of tliat extensive town did not 
 consist of more than 250 soldiers, the Governor feared 
 not to shut his gates against invaders who presented 
 so paltry a show of strength. However, a letter from 
 the British consul pressed General Fraser most 
 urgently to land without loss of time, and risk a 
 sudden stroke before the Albanians could arrive from 
 Rosetta. He stated that the population of the town 
 were in favour of the English ; and that the Governor 
 was wavering between his dread of an insurrection, 
 and the remaining influence of M. Drovetti, the French 
 consul, who had despatched couriers to summon the 
 Albanians to Alexandria. Fraser was much puzzled. 
 He felt that the force at his immediate command was 
 insufficient to overcome resistance, if a stout resistance 
 should be offered; and the heavy surf and scarcity of 
 boats, made it difficult to carry ashore even the small 
 number of troops which had arrived. However, he 
 thought it his duty to make the trial; and in the 
 evening of the 1 7th, a few hundreds of our men were 
 landed by the exertions of that admirable seaman, 
 Captain Hallowell. In the course of the next morn-' 
 ing some more companies were brought ashore; but 
 the total number of soldiers hardly exceeded 1000, 
 when the debarkation was arrested by the increasing 
 violence of the surf. 
 
 Still urged by the importunities of Major Missett, 
 
t90 MILITARY TRANSACTIOl^rS 
 
 Fraser moTed towards the town in the erening of 
 the 18th. Some old redoubts and lines from which 
 the Turks fired upon our column from some old guns, 
 were carried with verj little los^ or difficulty; and 
 the British drew near to the gate of Pompej. But 
 the gate was barricaded, and the Turkish soldiers 
 plied their muskets from the walls. No sign of out- 
 break amongst the inhabitants gaye encouragement to 
 our attempt; and the General determined prudently 
 to march round the citj, and occupy the isthmus 
 between the lakes and the sea, placing troops in the 
 old castle of Aboukir, and on the cut between the 
 lakes of Maadieh and Mareotis. Fraser thus barred 
 the two narrow routes by which alone the Albanians 
 could arriye from Rosetta or from Cairo; and he 
 secured time for the arrival and landing of the rest of 
 his little army. Early on the 20th, the Apollo, with 
 most of the missing transports, anchored in the bay of 
 Aboukir ; Duckworth's fleet arrived from the Darda- 
 nelles; and in the course of that day the Turkish 
 Governor surrendered Alexandria by capitulation. 
 
 Here then was the specific object of the expedition 
 accomplished; and here instantly began the difficulties 
 of our General. Only two days after he had taken 
 possession of Alexandria, he was astounded by an 
 official representation from the Consul-general, that 
 the city was on the verge of famine ; that there was 
 barely enough of grain within the walls for the sub- 
 sistence of the people during the next ten days ; and 
 that at the end of the ten days the native population 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 291 
 
 must be starved, and the British garrison must be 
 reduced to live upon the salt provisions brought bj 
 the transports. Major Missett stated that Alexandria 
 was entirely dependent for food upon the country 
 about Rosetta and Rahmanieh ; wheat and rice being 
 imported from the former, and bullocks, sheep, and 
 barley from the latter. He, therefore, urged and 
 implored General Fraser to send forth troops without 
 loss of time, and to seize and continue to hold the two 
 places above-mentioned. 
 
 Now if Alexandria was thus entirely dependent 
 on the upper country for the means of feeding its 
 inhabitants from day to day, or week to week. Major 
 Missett (who had resided there for years) must have 
 been as fully cognizant of the fact, before he urged 
 upon our Government the expediency of sending au 
 army to garrison the town, as he was after the army 
 had arrived. Yet there are no traces of his having 
 mentioned this dependence; and the consequent ne- 
 cessity of attacking, conquering, and continuing to 
 hold two towns at the distance of thirty and forty 
 miles from the British head-quarters. The Secretary 
 of State appears to have been completely ignorant of 
 such a necessity, for his instructions are limited to 
 " merely the capture of Alexandria f and to this 
 single point, therefore, were the orders confined which 
 Fraser had received from the Commander of the 
 Forces in Sicily.'"' 
 
 * Experience proved, after all, that this necessity did not 
 exist. "We never got possession of either Rahmanieh or Rosetta, ' 
 
 U 2 
 
292 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 The poor General was sorely perplexed. He felt 
 that his instructions did not authorize him to do more 
 than occupy the city. The words " not to conquer 
 Egypt/' appeared to forbid his advancing into the 
 country and engaging in hostilities. On the other 
 hand, the Consul-general, to whom he was specially 
 ordered to have recourse for advice and information, 
 and to whose long experience in Egyptian affairs there 
 was no authority to oppose, called upon him in the 
 strongest terms to send troops to Rosetta without a 
 moment's pause, on pain of seeing the people of 
 Alexandria plunged into all the horrors of famine. 
 Major Missett represented at the same time that the 
 defences of Rosetta w^ere contemptible, and the Alba- 
 nians a merely savage rabble, few in numbers and 
 quite incapable of resisting a British brigade. 
 
 "We cannot wonder at General Eraser's having 
 given way to this official importunity, backed by 
 such strong assertions. He ordered two battalions 
 (the 31st Regiment and the Chasseurs Britanniques) 
 accompanied by some field artillery, and commanded 
 by Brigadier Robert Meade, to march directly upon 
 Rosetta : but unfortunately with this little detachment 
 was also sent Eraser's second in command Major- 
 General Wauchope. No opposition was encountered 
 on the march; our troops reached and occupied the 
 
 yet the British continued to hold Alexandria for six months; 
 without the occurrence of any distress or difficulty about pro- 
 visions. The fact was that Major Missett was indulging in 
 grand schemes, and trying to draw his countrymen on to the 
 conquest of Egypt. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 293 
 
 heights of Aboumandour, which overlook the town 
 of Rosetta. All was still; the walls appeared to 
 stand without defenders, and the gates remained open. 
 But no person came forth to meet the British; no 
 information was received as to the state of affairs 
 within the town; nothing was known of the numbers 
 or temper of the Albanians, or of their means of 
 resistance; there might be two, or two hundred, or 
 two thousand of them. All was dark and silent, and 
 doubtful. Yet then, without reconnoitring the place, 
 or feeling his way, or making attempts to obtain in- 
 telligence. General Wauchope quietly led his ill-fated 
 colunm into the narrow, gloomy, and intricate lanes 
 of Rosetta. They were allowed to enter; and when 
 thoroughly entangled and hemmed in by the lofty 
 buildings, they were assailed by a storm of fire from 
 every quarter, from the house-tops, and every cranny 
 and opening in every house. Our soldiers could make 
 no return, for no enemy met their eyes. Ail that 
 they could see were the quick flashes of the fire-arms ; 
 and our brave men fell fast and helpless under the 
 death-shot. Wauchope was slain outright; Meade 
 very badly wounded in the head; and an instant 
 retreat beyond the gates became the only possible 
 chance of saving the whole body from destruction. 
 It is highly honourable to the character of the 
 regiments which were suddenly involved in such a 
 confusion of slaughter, that they preserved their order, 
 made their retreat to the hills in a soldier-like man- 
 ner, under Lieut. -Colonel Bruce, and even carried off 
 
294 MILITAEY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 their wounded. The Albanians rushed after them in 
 pursuit, but were unable to do more than cut oflP a few 
 unfortunate stragglers. 
 
 This ill-managed and disastrous affair was attended 
 with the loss of four officers and 181 men killed, and 
 nineteen officers and 263 men wounded. The shat- 
 tered, but not disgraced, survivors of Meade's brigade 
 were led back to Alexandria in the first days of April; 
 and General Fraser began to feel very strongly, how 
 insufficient was the number of troops at his disposal, 
 if instead of merely forming the ganison of one town 
 it was necessary that large detachments should be sent 
 forth to occupy two others; and not only to occupy - 
 them, but to win them first from an enemy who, it was 
 now too clear, was disposed and able to make a stout 
 resistance. But the delusion as to the necessity of 
 possessing Rosetta still prevailed ; it was again urged 
 in the strongest manner by Major Missett, backed by 
 the chief magistrate of Alexandria. An impending, 
 immediate famine was dinned into the ears of General 
 Fraser, and he (with tlie concurrence of the English 
 Admiral, who was now with a squadron on the coast) 
 resolved to send a second and a stronger corps to 
 reduce Rosetta. 
 
 The troops selected for this service amounted to 
 2500 men,"^' more than half of the numbers which 
 remained in Alexandria. They were placed under 
 
 * 20th Light Dragoons, artillerymen, 35th Kegiment (1st 
 battalion), 78th Kegiment (2ncl battalion), battalion of Light 
 Infantry, regiment De Roll, detachment of seamen. 
 
IN THE MEDITERKAlsrEA.lJr. 295 
 
 the command of Brigadier-Generals William Stewart 
 and John Oswald; and thej carried with them a large 
 proportion of artillery and engineer's stores, which 
 were now seen to be necessary for battering the walls 
 of Rosetta. The march of an army in the sands of 
 Egypt is slow work. On the 3rd of April, the British 
 reached only the wells of Aboukir; the 4th was spent 
 in landing heavy guns and stores, passing the ciit3 
 between the lakes and the sea, and pushing the 
 advanced guard (about 500 men, commanded by 
 Lieut.-Oolonel Macleod) to the village of Edko; tha 
 main body arrived there the next day. 
 
 It w^as now found that the Albanians, besides 
 holding the town of Rosetta, had a strong detachment 
 posted at El Hamed, a village about five miles above 
 Rosetta, and standing on the neck of land between the 
 Nile and Lake Edko. General Stewart deemed it 
 essential to seize and hold this position for the security 
 of the right flank and rear of his little army, while it 
 was engaged in the attack upon Rosetta. He, there- 
 fore, detached Macleod's corps against El Hamed, and 
 the enemy's troops (chiefly cavalry) gave way after 
 merely the show of a skirmish. On the 7th, Macleod 
 was relieved by nearly 300 of Roll's regiment under 
 Major Vogelsang, and the important post of El Hamed 
 was intrusted to his keeping. With the rest of his 
 troops Stewart advanced to Rosetta, driving in the 
 enemy's skirmishers, and lodging his men securely in 
 the sand-hills close to the walls. Mortars and car- 
 ronades were brought into play in the course of the 
 
296 MILITARY TEANSACTIONS 
 
 next three or four days ; but as the British force was 
 insufficient to invest more than a small portion of the 
 town-walls, the enemy made frequent sorties against 
 our left, and they skirmished boldly, though with little 
 or no effect. From the numerous loopholes in the walls, 
 the Albanians kept up a constant fire of musketry ; but 
 our troops were well covered and suffered little loss. 
 On the other hand, the enemy seemed to regard our 
 shot and shells with great indifference ; they fired upon 
 our flags of truce, and they hanged a poor Arab who 
 had been induced by a large reward to carry a sum- 
 mons into the town. In this manner, ten or twelve 
 unsatisfactory days wore away, enlivened only by a 
 gallant and well managed exploit of a detachment of 
 the 78th Regiment in the night of the 16th. Major 
 Macdonnel, with 250 of his Highlanders, assisted by 
 40 seamen, crossed the river silently in the darkness; 
 and having made a circuit, he completely surprised a 
 body of Albanians in a battery, which had been par- 
 ticularly annoying to the right flank of our lines He 
 dispersed their soldiers, actually fired several rounds 
 from their own cannon into the town, destroyed the 
 battery, brought away the guns and camels, and re- 
 crosscd the Nile with hardly any loss. 
 
 But it is time to advert to circumstances, or rather 
 to the false information and false hopes, by which 
 General Fraser had been misled, and Stewart was 
 misguided. The Consul (perhaps deceived by his 
 correspondents, or by his own emissaries; had assured 
 the General that the Mamelukes, evading the forces of 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 297 
 
 the Pacha, were in full march to unite with the British 
 in this attack upon Rosetta. Stewart had set out 
 with this expectation — he continued to cherish it : he 
 persevered in the attack under this deception ; and he 
 looked anxiously from day to day for the arrival of 
 these allies at El Hamed.''^ At that point, however, 
 instead of relief and support, he was destined to receive 
 a fatal blow. 
 
 While the British batteries were firing in vain at 
 the old walls of Rosetta on the west side of the Nile, 
 the Albanians had been receiving reinforcements from 
 Damietta and other places to the eastward. A con- 
 siderable body of their cavalry had been observed to 
 draw together on the right bank of the river opposite 
 to El Hamed, where it will be remembered a detach- 
 ment of 300 of our foreign troops was posted under 
 Major Vogelsang. His business was to watch the 
 isthmus between Lake Edko and the Nile, an extent 
 of not less than two miles, or two and a half when the 
 waters of the lake were low, as they were at this time. 
 Athwart this neck of land there ran a canal, such as 
 is in use in Egypt, but differing so materially from 
 
 * The Beys had without doubt been eager to encourage 
 Major Missett's scheme of bringing a British army to Alexan- 
 dria. They were delighted to hear of its arrival, and promised 
 all that our sanguine Consul could desire. They trusted that 
 the English invasion would oblige their enemy, Mehemet Ali, 
 to move from Cairo to the coast, and thus leave the grand city 
 exposed to their attacks. Cairo was their object. But the 
 Pacha was too strong, and proved himself too skilful and too 
 rapid in his movements, to yield to the Mamelukes either time 
 or opportunity to effect their purpose. 
 
298 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 what we are accustomed to call a "canal,** as to re- 
 quire some explanation. 
 
 The design of this water-course, as of very many 
 others in Lower Egypt, is to receire and convey, for 
 the purposes of irrigation, &c. the superabundant water 
 of the Nile at the season of its periodical overflow. At 
 other times of the year the bed of the watercourse is 
 dry; but on either hand rises a great embankment, 
 massive and high. In the present instance, the canal 
 of El Hamed served to lead the overflowing waters of 
 the river into Lake Edko; but its lofty dykes, begin- 
 ning on the margin of the Nile, did not stretch com- 
 pletely across the isthmus. Between their western 
 extremity and the Lake in the dry season a sandy 
 plain remained, about half a mile wide, which was 
 practicable for horsemen. As far as the line extended 
 this double embankment affbrded to our troops a 
 tolerably strong front, particularly against cavalry ; for 
 there were only two roadways through the dykes ; one 
 nearly in the centre, opposite the village of El Hamed 
 (which was in advance and was occupied by a com- 
 pany of our Swiss), and the other close upon the bank 
 of the river. Both of these roads were held by Major 
 Vogelsang's soldiers,"^ with a gun on each. 
 
 On the 19th of April the Turkish cavalry, which 
 had gathered on the right bank of the Nile, crossed 
 the river above El Hamed ; and advancing from Dibeh 
 
 * De Roll's regiment had been originally Swiss : but from 
 time to time it had been renewed and augmented with foreigners 
 of various kinds — many of them prisoners or deserters. 
 
IK THE MEDITERRANEAN. 299' 
 
 they made an attempt on tlie left of Vogelsang's posts. 
 The attack was feeble and was easily repelled. At 
 the same time the garrison of Rosetta issued forth in 
 greater numbers than usual against the left of General 
 Stewart's lines : their assault was fierce, but it made 
 no impression on the 35th regiment, whose steady fire 
 drove them back with loss; and their retreat was 
 quickened by the charging of our handful of dragoons. 
 These offensive movements of the enemy rendered 
 Stewart uneasy for his people at El Hamed. On the 
 same evening, the 19 th, he detaclied the light com- 
 panies of the 35th and De Roll's, under Captain Tar- 
 leton, to strengthen Vogelsang; instructing him to 
 make an effort to oblige the Turkish horsemen to re- 
 cross the Nile. Tarleton made this attempt at day- 
 break on the 20th, but he found the enemy far too 
 strong for him, and he retired towards the canal. 
 Before however he had cleared the plain, and brought 
 his men into safety, he rashly divided the detachment 
 under his orders ; directing one hundred of De Roll's 
 upon the village of El Hamed, while he marched with 
 his own company to the post upon the Nile. This 
 imprudence brouglit on the first catastrophe. The 
 Turks galloped up with all their force, surrounded the 
 detachment of De Roll's in the open ground ; charged 
 from every side, and cut most of them down, with 
 little attempt at resistance on their part. A few 
 escaped into the village. 
 
 This serious intelligence reached General Stewai-t 
 by eleven o'clock, a.m. He instantly despatched 
 
300 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Colonel Macleod (with two companies of the 78th, one 
 of the 35th, a dozen dragoons, and a six-pounder) to 
 take the command at El Hamed. In the evening he 
 sent two more companies escorting provisions, ammu- 
 nition, and tools. On the first arrival of Macleod's 
 troops, the enemy's horse withdrew from the front of 
 our line, and retired up the plain towards Dibeh ; and 
 so little did the Colonel find cause for apprehension, 
 that before nightfall he reported to head-quarters that 
 his position was perfectly secure. He had posted 
 Captain Tarleton with three companies of British, and 
 his few dragoons, and a three-pounder at the western 
 extremity of the dyke, to watch the plain towards 
 Lake Edko; one company of Be RolFs in the village 
 of El Hamed ; another with a gun, at the gap in the 
 centre, under the orders of Major Mohr; and Major 
 Vogelsang with the remainder of De Roll's, and three 
 companies of British,* and a six-pounder upon the 
 border of the Nile on his left. 
 
 General Stewart, however, did not feel his mind at 
 ease ; and early in the night he visited Macleod's posts 
 in person, and gave him final orders. The spirit of 
 Stewart's instructions was this : if the enemy should 
 attack the position, it is to be maintained stoutly 
 while there appears a fair chance of success : but if 
 the Turkish force should prove to be too strong, the 
 
 * The British seem to have been separated and intermixed 
 with strange caprice. Thus Tarleton had the grenadiers of the 
 78th, and two companies of the 35th, away on the right : wliile 
 Vogelsang had one company of the 35th and two of the 78th 
 at the extreme left. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 301 
 
 British troops are to be drawn off from tlie left, and 
 then from the centre; and both are to move under 
 cover of the djke and join Tarleton's detachment on 
 the right. On that side the whole force (still amoun- 
 ting to nearly 700 men) are to be kept in a mass, 
 retreating along the shore of Lake Edko, holding on to 
 that support, and pointing tow^ards the rear of the 
 army before Rosetta."^^ 
 
 The General had indeed, when he delivered these 
 orders, made up his mind to relinquish the siege and 
 retire to Alexandria, if he should not find that the 
 Mamelukes were close at hand in the course of the 
 following day. He was now fully aware how false 
 had been the information of his Arab emissaries; and 
 how very little chance remained of reducing Rosetta 
 in the face of an enemy growing daily more numerous 
 and more enterprising. It was his design that his 
 main body retiring from Rosetta, and Macleod's corps 
 from El Hamed, should converge, and unite on the 
 north-eastern shore of Lake Edko; and from thence 
 continue their retreat in one body to Alexandria^ 
 But the General had already lingered twenty-four 
 hours too long. 
 
 In the night of the 20th a report was brought to 
 Colonel Macleod that a fleet of djerms was coming 
 down the Nile with troops ; but he disbelieved or dis- 
 
 * But Stewart himself found difficulty in returning to his 
 camp. Already had a part of the Moslem horsemen come round 
 the right of our position in the darkness : they were spreading 
 over the plain in the rear ; and the General owed his escape to 
 the speed of his charger. 
 
 ^ OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
302 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 regarded the story. Dajdiglit undeceiyed liim. More 
 tlmn eighty vessels were in sight; two of them square- 
 rigged and carrying heavy guns. A messenger was 
 despatched with the intelligence to Stewart, and the 
 man reached head-quarters : but this was the last 
 intercourse. The Turkish horsemen were scouring 
 the plain; no answer could be returned; no small 
 reinforcement could be sent with safety. The General 
 took his decision instantly. He broke up his camp : 
 packed his sick and wounded, and the best of his stores 
 on camels ; and he sent them off under escort of the 
 remaining companies of the 78th and De RolFs ; while 
 he kept up a hot fire from his carronades and mortars, 
 until the retreating column had gained some way to 
 the rear. Then destroying his heavy guns, under the 
 bold front presented by seven companies of "the brave 
 35th regiment,'' and three which remained of the light 
 battalion, he formed his rear guard of these troops and 
 some forty dragoons, and entrusted to Brigadier Oswald 
 the arduous duty of drawing them off in face of the 
 enemy, and of covering the retreat of the encumbered 
 column which had preceded them. The Albanians 
 and the Turkish horse sallied forth from every gate : 
 they surrounded Oswald and assailed him with great 
 audacity; while many of their horsemen pressed 
 forward to attack the other division of our little army. 
 Here they were constantly repulsed by the 78th and 
 De Roll's, who were formed in an oblong square around 
 the loaded camels. On the 35th the fight fell more 
 heavily, for the long fire-arms of the Albanians told 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 303 
 
 upon their ranks : but the steady and well-supported 
 fire of the battalion, the good service of our six-pound- 
 ers, and the flanking fire of the light companies, baffled 
 ^verj attempt to disorder the retreat. Not a man 
 was left in the enemy's hands. By one p.m. both the 
 columns arrived on the shores of Lake Edko ; and the 
 Moslemin at length desisted from their attacks. But 
 Stewart looked in vain along the lake for his detach- 
 ment under Macleod : neither they nor signs of them 
 appeared. It remains for me to relate what informa- 
 tion was afterwards gathered of their disasters. 
 
 When Macleod observed the approach of the 
 Turkish gun-boats, he felt that his exposed post on 
 the bank of the Nile could not be maintained. But 
 instead of following the ten our of his instructions to 
 draw off along the dyke to the right, and gain Lake 
 Edko, he ordered Major Vogelsang to march with his 
 four companies and the six-pounder to a sand-hill 
 about three-quarters of a mile in rear of the centre, 
 and there take post. While the Colonel rode away 
 himself to the right, with the view of bringing Captain 
 Tarleton's three companies to join Major Mohr's post 
 in the centre ; and as he passed the latter he directed 
 Mohr to withdraw the advanced company from the 
 village of El Hamed. All these movements appear to 
 have been made in a hasty and disorderly manner. 
 The brave soldiers under Tarleton w^ere hurried down 
 towards the gap ; but before they could arrive, large 
 bodies of the Moslem horse had galloped round, both 
 on the right hand and on the left, and the Albanians 
 
304 MILITIEY TRANSACTIOXS 
 
 had rushed into the abandoned village of El Ilamed, 
 and from thence had scrambled up the dykes and 
 opened their fire on De Roll's people under Major 
 Mohr. Macleod seems then to have halted Tarleton's 
 three companies, and formed them as two sides of a 
 triangle resting on the djke, and presenting an angle 
 to the plain, in apprehension of being charged by the 
 cavalry. But our men were here exposed to a destruc- 
 tive fire from the Albanians in their rear, and had to 
 struggle even for the crest of the dyke which had been 
 taken as their support : a great number were here 
 slain. ''^ Mohr's foreigners were at the same time in 
 sad confusion : and a hasty order being given by some 
 one that the whole should fall back on Major Vogel- 
 sang's post on the sand-hill, the attempt to fall into 
 column was made with such precipitation that the 
 companies became intermingled and fell into the 
 greatest disorder. The fire of the Albanians thickened 
 from the rear, the Turks charged furiously on both 
 the flanks, and only five or six of the British succeeded 
 in reaching the sand-hill. But this post afibrded no 
 safety; it was good for nothing. It just served to 
 prolong for a short time a hopeless resistance. Here 
 were 250 or 300 disheartened men, with a single gun, 
 surrounded by several thousands of fierce fellows 
 flushed with success. The rifles of the Albanians 
 thinned our ranks, and the gun they had captured was 
 brought up and opened on the square. On a sudden 
 Vogelsang exclaimed " Cease firing, cease firing ! " and 
 * Colonel Macleod was one of those who felL 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. ^05 
 
 he rushed out waving a white handkerchief; the firing 
 ceased, and the Turkish horse instantly charged from 
 every side, cut down the few wtio yet resisted, and 
 made prisoners of the remainder. 
 
 This is a sickening story, and it is useless to con- 
 ceal the fact that great censure fell at the time on the 
 field officers employed at El Hamed; nor was it unde- 
 served. To General Stewart no blame appears to be 
 due, unless it be for having listened with too credulous 
 
 .an ear to the false reports of the Arabs, and having 
 believed too long the tale of the coming of the Mame- 
 lukes. But his plan for the retreat of his detachment 
 
 : seems to have been judicious; and (although the 
 sudden arrival of 6000 foemen by water had not been 
 
 . foreseen) if the village of El Hamed, in advance of the 
 canal and flanking its dykes, had been maintained 
 obstinately, instead of its being relinquished without a 
 shot, there appears no reason to doubt that five or six 
 hundred brave men might have been brouo^ht toirether 
 on the right, and marching in a square with their two 
 
 . guns, might have traversed the short space which lay 
 between them and Lake Edko, in spite of the Turkish 
 troops unprovided with field artillery. On the 20th 
 
 , and 21st of April 36 officers and 780 men were lost 
 at El Hamed, and of these between four and five hun- 
 
 , dred were afterwards found to be prisoners, the great 
 
 ' majority of them wounded. 
 
 It is but doing justice to Mehemet Ali to say, that 
 he shewed much humanity, and even kindness, to the 
 officers and men who had fallen into his hands ; and 
 
 X 
 
S06 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 tliis \ras, I believe, the first occasion on wliicli a 
 ^J'urkisli commander treated his captives as prisoners 
 t)f war (according to the practice of civilized nations) 
 instead of making them slaves. A few of our men 
 indeed, had been hurried off in the first confusion by 
 individuals who concealed them in the country, and 
 held them as their own slaves, but even these were 
 gradually redeemed by the Pacha, and restored when 
 the British evacuated Egypt. 
 
 To return to General Stewart. Despairing of the 
 arrival even of fugitives from El Hamed, embarrassed 
 by his wounded men, and still threatened by the 
 Turkish horse, he pursued his retreat. He gathered 
 in the detachments and stores which had been posted 
 along his route, and arrived before Alexandria on the 
 24th of April. The troops had behaved uniformly 
 well when directed by William Stewart himself, or by 
 his able second, John Oswald, whose firmness and good 
 judgment were conspicuous on every occasion. With- 
 out taking into account the unhappy detachments at 
 El Hamed, the losses before Rosetta and during the 
 retreat, amounted to eleven men killed, and eight 
 officers and 161 men wounded. Such were the results 
 of this second attempt to avert an imaginary famine 
 from Alexandria. 
 
 General Eraser, however, was naturally thrown 
 into great alarm. lie had lost nearly one thousand of 
 his soldiers, and the remainder were disheartened by 
 defeats. He had scarcely 4000 men of all sorts left 
 to defend a very extensive line of ruinous or imperfect 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 307 
 
 works, for which the engineers reported at least 6000 
 to be necessary; and there was now an enemy's army, 
 flushed with success, within thirty miles of his position. 
 Moreover, the general was still undeceived with respect 
 to the means of feeding the population of Alexandria, 
 but his fears on this score were speedily reheved. 
 Immediately after Stewart's return, it was discovered 
 that there were large stores of rice in the town ! and 
 from this time, and thenceforward, the Arabs, invited 
 by good prices, brought provisions constantly and 
 plentifully to the markets of Alexandria. A reinforce- 
 iinent of 2000 British troops* under Major-General 
 .Sherbrooke, arrived speedily from Messina : and 
 instead of Fraser's being attacked by Mehemet Ali, 
 that chieftain despatched his dragoman (together with 
 ^Captain Delancey, one of his prisoners), to hold towards 
 the British General a friendly language, tending to 
 .overtures for an undisturbed evacuation of his country. 
 So matters rested till the September following, when 
 the British troops were withdrawn from Alexandria, 
 and the city was quietly restored to the Pacha, in 
 -conformity with the treaty negotiated by Sir Arthur 
 Paget at Constantinople. 
 
 We must now turn back to the main body of 
 the British army, which remained in Sicily, after the 
 departure of the troops detached to Egypt in the first 
 jdays of March, 1807. Exactly at the same time 
 a letter was received from General Benigsen, with the 
 Russian account of the battles of Pultusk and Goly- 
 * 21st and 62nd Regiments and detachments. 
 
 X 2 
 
308 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 min. Marshal Massena had been summoned bj Na* 
 poleon to Poland. French troops had, it was believed, 
 inarched from Naples to the north. The presumption 
 of the Court of Palermo was raised to the highest 
 pitch ; and the time appeared to be propitious for an 
 attempt on Italy ; but by this unhappy detachment, 
 the strength of the British army had been reduced to 
 11,000 men. Our generals were cautious: they were 
 without orders from home ; and they entertained the 
 deepest distrust of the sovereigns at Palermo. Our 
 minister at that court, Mr. Drummond, had by this 
 time adopted a line of conduct the reverse of what he 
 liad previously pursued. He had been brought over, 
 as I have already stated, to the queen's views by the 
 flattery and attentions which she lavished on him from 
 the moment that she lost her favourite, Sir Sidney 
 Smith. Drummond now threw his official weight into 
 the scale of the court; adopted all their prejudices 
 against the barons and the municipal rights of Sicily, 
 and he eagerly joined in importuning General Fox to 
 engage in an expedition against Naples.* 
 
 The refusal of our generals (I use the word "gene- 
 rals," because the advice of Sir John Moore mainly 
 guided the decisions of General Fox),t were grounded 
 on their ignorance of the intentions of His Majesty's 
 Ministers ; and the belief that their views were at 
 present directed towards the Levant rather than to 
 
 * Mr. Drummond to General Fox, March 19th and April 
 16th; and the Marchcse Circello to Di-ummoud, March 23. 
 t General Fox to Mr. Drummond, April 2nd, 1807. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 309 
 
 ihe shores of Italy; as well as on the conviction that 
 the strength of King Ferdinand's army was grossly 
 exaggerated, and that of the enemy in Naples as 
 grossly underrated. " No reliance/' says the general, 
 " can be placed on the troops of his Sicilian Majesty, 
 .organized and officered as they are at present; nor 
 could the temporary appointment to their command of 
 any individual (however great his own personal merit) 
 counteract the general abuses of the system, the par- 
 ticular influence of the queen's faction, and the evils 
 that would result from having every secret divulged, 
 and every plan betrayed/' The letter goes on to shew, 
 that after leaving garrisons in the fortresses, the 
 number of British troops which could be landed in the 
 kingdom of Naples must be greatly inferior to that 
 which the French could bring into the field. 
 
 Thus the British minister and the general went on 
 
 ibickering through several weeks, though Drummond so 
 
 ^far recanted his first assertions as to admit that 
 
 Ferdinand's army mustered altogether only 6500 
 
 men ; and that the enemy in Naples had 10,000 
 
 French, exclusive of Italians and foreigners. But an 
 
 accident happened at this time which diminished still 
 
 farther the British force in Sicily. A mutiny broke 
 
 out at Malta in a regiment which had been levied for 
 
 'the Fjnglish service by a Monsieur de Montjoye (under 
 
 Ithe assumed name of Count Froberg). Nearly a 
 
 •thousand foreigners, of all sorts, had been drawn 
 
 ■ together by the most criminal and disgraceful means. 
 
 Inveigled, crimped, pressed, deceived. Most of them 
 
310 MILITARY TRA>^SACTIOKff 
 
 were Greeks or ^ild Albanians. When broiiglit td 
 Malta, they were placed in a detached fort ; confined 
 there, and treated with a brutal severity. The savage 
 men burst into a mad revolt; they seized the fort, 
 hoisted Russian colours, and fired shot and shells upon 
 La Valetta. It became necessary to storm the fort. 
 The British regiments carried it by escalade; slew a 
 great number of its defenders, and overpowered tlie 
 rest, after they had made a desperate attempt to blow 
 up the magazine of powder. But so great was the 
 alarm created in Malta, that General Fox found it 
 •expedient to send an English battalion from Sicily to 
 'reinforce the garrison. 
 
 On the 28th of April, Mr. Drummond writes to 
 General Fox:* "I suppose you have heard of the 
 total change of ministers at home. How far this may 
 operate with respect to our position here, I know not. 
 I find the circumstance has given great pleasure to the 
 Court of Palermo." t This intelligence of the over- 
 
 * Mr. Drummond to General Fox, April 28, 1807. 
 
 t In this letter, Drummond takes a curious review of the 
 principal nobles of Sicily. In explanation of some attempt 
 which he professed to have made for the admission of Prince 
 . Belmonte into the Cabinet of Palermo, he writes : " But who is 
 there in the countiy, with the exception of Belmonte (of whom 
 I could not think favourably, from the many reports I had 
 heard), who could have been brought into the Government? Pan- 
 telleria is our avowed enemy. Cassaro is governed by Brissac; 
 General Acton is hated by the whole country; Butera is shallow 
 and without principles ; Sambuca is too old ; Trabea is a buf- 
 foon ; Tomasi is a man of low birth, and with great knowledge 
 is capable of playing any game, and therefore, if he could be 
 useful, he might be dangerous.** 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 311 
 
 throw of the Whig Cabinet, and the restoration to 
 power of a party which had opposed and censured the^ 
 foreign as well as the domestic policy of their pre^ 
 decessors, cast additional doubts over the minds of our 
 generals in Sicily. They looked for a prompt intima- 
 tion of the views which the new ministers might 
 entertain; and in the meantime they held their dis-^ 
 posable troops in readiness ; but they refused to en- 
 gage without orders in the wild plans which were now 
 ripening in the Councils of Palermo. It was known 
 there that the cautious Cabinet of Vienna had aft 
 length ventured to offer its mediation, not only aa 
 between France and Russia, but with the professed 
 object of restoring the peace of Europe. It was fully 
 believed that if Napoleon rejected this proposal, the 
 Austrians would seize the advantage which the posi- 
 tion of the belligerents in Poland presented, and would 
 throw 100,000 men on the rear of the French army. 
 The opportunity certainly was most tempting: but 
 the nerves of the Aulic Council were not equal to so 
 grand a stroke. The Russian Minister at Palermo, 
 M. Tatitscheff, pressed, with an importunity and in a, 
 tone of complaint which were hardly decorous, though 
 natural under the circumstances of his sovereign,^ that 
 the British troops from Sicily should be poured imme- 
 diately into the kingdom of Naples: and the queeu 
 took the desperate resolution of invading Calabria 
 even without the aid of the English. All the troops 
 she could muster were despatched under the command 
 
 * Mr. Dnimmond to General Fox, May 2nd, 1807, 
 
312^ MILITAEY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 of the Prince of Hesse to Reggio ; while at this very 
 time the people of Messina and the Val Demone, 
 goaded bj the exactions and oppressions of the Com- 
 missioners of Revenue, were deterred from insurrection 
 against their goyernment only bj the presence of the 
 British troops. At the same moment also arrived the 
 news of our disasters near Rosetta, and General Fox 
 found it necessary to detach 2000 more of his soldiers 
 to Egypt. Yet still the court persisted. The Prince 
 of Hesse was ordered to move forward. As he ad- 
 vanced, the enemy's detachments retired before him, 
 clearly with the purpose of drawing him to a distance 
 from the coast, till he reached Mileto. There he was 
 attacked by the French in the morning of the 28th of 
 May. His troops were routed, his guns were taken, 
 and the unhappy prince escaped from the field with a 
 few score of his dragoons. The masse as usual kept 
 aloof from the fight; and the behaviour of the Nea- 
 politan troops was dastardly, with the exception of 
 the Samnite regiment under General Nunziante, who 
 held their pursuers at bay, got into the mountain, and 
 made their retreat in pretty good order to Reggio. 
 
 The French, however, were not disposed to follow 
 the chase to the Straits of Messina. There were the 
 British ships and the British troops; and with a fair 
 wind they might reach the bay of St. Eufemia in 
 twenty-four hours, and repeat the lesson which had been 
 taught at Maida. Meanwhile, deceived by the falling 
 back of the enemy's outposts on the first advance of the 
 Prince of Hesse, the court, and Mr. Drummond, and 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANfiAN. 313' 
 
 M. TatitscheiF were in ecstasies. Thej fancied that 
 Calabria was re-conquered; and on the 29th of May 
 the Russian diplomate writes imperiously to press for 
 a decision on the part of "c?<9 Commandant en chef des 
 forces Britanniques/' " L'Empereur mon auguste 
 maitre avait prescrit a M. d'Alopeus d'insister aupres 
 de Yotre gouyernement afin que les forces de terre et 
 de mer Britanniques eussent ordre de soutenir les 
 operations sur Naples/'* 
 
 Now if the conquest of Naples had been a point 
 essential for the general objects of the allied powers, 
 it ought to have been undertaken three months earlier, 
 before 7000 of our men had been detached so unwisely 
 and uselessly to xilexandria. The attempt might have 
 been made in February with powerful means, and 
 would probably have been crowned with success. But 
 it seems to me doubtful whether success at Naples 
 would have been of much service to the Czar, or have 
 disconcerted the plans of Napoleon. It was in the 
 north of Italy that our blow ought to have been struck ; 
 and for this great purpose the Cabinet of St. James's 
 ought to have sent us additional troops in the winter* 
 The opportunity had been lost. Our army in Sicily, 
 now reduced to less than nine thousand men, could 
 hardly have sent forth so many as 5000 (after pro- 
 viding for the citadel of Messina and the other 
 fortresses) ; nor would it have been safe to detach 
 even this small number to any considerable distance. 
 
 However, the change of ministers at home did 
 ^' Mr. Drummond to General Fox, May 30th. 
 
314 MILITAKT TRANSACTIONS 
 
 produce a change of views with regard to military 
 operations. Not very immediately however, for it was 
 not till two months after Lord Oastlereagh had suc- 
 ceeded Mr. Windham in the direction of the War 
 Department, that he opened his views and addressed 
 his instructions to General Fox, nor were these 
 received till the end of June. They certainly evinced 
 more judicious views with regard to military opera- 
 tions, than had been shewn by the preceding ministry. 
 Lord Castlereagh's despatch is of so much importance, 
 that I have given it in the x\ppendix ;^ but he wrote 
 under impressions derived from false intelligence M'ith 
 regard to King Ferdinand's paltry forces ; and in 
 ignorance both of our having been obliged to detach 
 2000 more men to Egypt, and of the dispersion of 
 the Neapolitan troops in Calabria. The Secretary of 
 State holds out no hopes of his sending reinforce- 
 ments to the Mediterranean though he writes: — " The 
 strength and efficiency of the corps lately assembled 
 imder your orders, having been considerably reduced 
 by the detachment of the troops under the command 
 of General Fraser, it is impossible not to feel how 
 much the power of what remains in Sicily to under- 
 take offensive operations has been impaired.'' But 
 Lord Oastlereagh directs General Fox's immediate 
 attention to an invasion of Naples in conjunction with 
 King Ferdinand's army; and he imagines that the 
 united forces might be made up, for this purpose, to 
 
 * Lord Castlercagh to General Fox, May 21st, 1807.— Sea 
 Aj)pendix M. 
 
m THE MEDITEERAI^EAN. SI 5 
 
 20,000 men. He recommends that British garrisons 
 should be left in one or two of the strongest fortresses 
 in Sicily to secure our re-en try into the island, and 
 that General Fox should carry with him as large a 
 proportion as possible of the Neapolitan troops, on 
 account of " the jealousy which has appeared on more 
 than one occasion with respect to our position in 
 Sicily,'' or in plainer terms, to guard against treachery 
 on the part of the court. His Lordship considers such an 
 expedition under two points of view: 1st, as affording 
 a chance of re-establishing our royal ally permanently 
 in his kingdom of Naples: and 2ndly, as a military 
 operation by which the French army in the territory 
 t)f Naples might be destroyed, and a diversion might 
 be effected in favour of our northern allies, by our 
 drawing on the south of Italy the forces which the 
 •enemy was assembling in the Frioul and Dalmatia. 
 A discretionary latitude w^as, however, left by Lord 
 Castlereagh to the British commander Avith respect to 
 the time of action, to his information as to the strength 
 of the enemy, and a due consideration of the military 
 risk.^ 
 
 These instructions, this knowledge of the views 
 entertained by the Cabinet, could not have reached 
 our General at a more unpropitious moment ; but 
 their views thereon and their decisions were commu- 
 nicated to Mr. Drummond without delay. Lord 
 Castlereagh had supposed erroneously that the Nea- 
 politan troops were open to the inspection, and at the 
 * General Fox to Mr. Drummond, July 1st. 
 
316 .MILITARY TRAKSACTIONS 
 
 orders of General Fox ; and also that their numbers 
 were considerable. Neither the one nor other of 
 these assumptions was the case. The strength of the 
 British army had been reduced far below Lord Castle- 
 reagh's estimate. But still as the wishes of our 
 Government were now signilied, General Fox desires 
 Mr. Drummond to ascertain whether His Sicilian 
 Majesty will permit his troops to be inspected and 
 mustered by the British commander ; and will place 
 them effectually under his orders during a conjoint 
 expedition. The unity of command would be indis- 
 pensable. If these points be conceded, the Court 
 may be informed that General Fox will be ready to 
 co-operate with a view to offensive operations, reserv- 
 ing to himself a discretion as to the time, manner, 
 and expediency of acting. In point of fact there 
 could not at this time have been collected for an expe- 
 dition to Naples more than four or live thousand 
 Neapolitans, and little more than that number of 
 effective British soldiers. However, a permission 
 having been obtained from the Court to inspect their 
 troops, Sir John Moore was setting out for Palermo, 
 when on the lOth of July General Fox received 
 orders to resign the command of the army in the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 Moore, a man to whom every officer and soldier 
 looked up with an entire confidence, now assumed 
 the station which his military talents and his dis- 
 tinguished services had richly merited. But he came 
 to the command of our diminished forces just when 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 317 
 
 offensive enterprises on our part were rendered vain 
 by the events of the war in Poland. As jet indeed 
 the disasters of the Russian armies were unknown 
 in Sicily ; and Sir John Moore proceeded to Palermo, 
 in order to ascertain by personal inspection the real 
 strength and condition of the Neapolitan troops ; and 
 at the same time to try if, by conciliatory explanations 
 and arguments, he could bring the Court to grant 
 him, not the nominal, but the real command of their 
 forces ; with the power to reform abuses, remodel and 
 improve their system, and render their regiments 
 efficient for active service. 
 
 In the last letter addressed by Lord Castlereagh 
 to General Fox,'"' after our losses and difficulties in 
 Egypt had become known to the British Government, 
 instructions had been conveyed for the evacuation 
 of Alexandria. "It is obvious," says his lordship, 
 " that there is no other alternative but to make an 
 option between the evacuation of Egypt, or the aban- 
 donment of Sicily. It is impossible that both these 
 objects can be effectually maintained ; though both 
 might be lost, as well as the army itself, by impro- 
 vidently contending against the difficulties which the 
 pursuit of the former object presents.'' Before this 
 time ministers, however, had despatched Sir Arthur 
 Paget to Constantinople, to negotiate with the Turks, 
 and if possible to re-establish that peace which ought 
 never to have been broken. To this Ambassador it 
 appeared to be of great importance that the English 
 
 Lord Castlereagh to General Fox, 14th June. 
 
318 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 should not quit possession of Alexandria while he 
 was treating witli the Porte ; and in this opinion Lord 
 CoUingwood, who was now with his fleet in the Levant, 
 entirely concurred. " We are now the only respectable 
 power in Egypt,""'" thus writes the Admiral, "the 
 Pacha fearing us, the Beys courting us, and the Arabs 
 manifesting their attachment most unequivocally. To 
 shrink from it at this moment would be ruinous to 
 the negotiation/' Moved by the strong representa- 
 tions of the Ambassador and of our illustrious Admiral, 
 Sir John Moore determined to suspend the order for 
 withdrawing the British troops from Egypt, though 
 he felt very strongly that their absence crippled his 
 army for offensive movements. At this time we 
 mustered in Sicily about 9000 infantry, 400 artillery- 
 men, and 200 dragoons : but so sickly was the season 
 that out of these numbers nearly 1400 men were in 
 hospital. 
 
 The personal negotiations of our new commander 
 at Palermo were received by both the King and 
 Queen with civility and a show of friendliness ; but 
 while they allowed him to review their troops, they 
 evaded the chief and only important object, that of 
 conceding to him the effectual controul over their little 
 army, and the power of rendering it serviceable either 
 for an attempt on Naples, or for the defence of Sicily.f 
 
 * Lord CoUingwood to Sir John Moore, July 19th, 1807. 
 t For these transactions, and for Sir J. Moore's view of 
 Mr. Drummond's conduct, see the lettei's of the former of the 
 25th and 28th of July, and 19 th September, in the Aj^pendix, 
 N. O. and P 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 319 
 
 But Moore's attention was now directed earnestly to 
 the latter duty : for the defeat of the Russians at 
 Friedland, and the armistice of Tilsit were by this 
 time known at Palermo. He saw that England now 
 remained single-handed to contend against the colossal 
 power of Napoleon ; that the shores of Calabria, and 
 the Seven Islands, and the port of Toulon might be 
 within a few months swarming with French troops ; 
 while Sicily was without organization or national feeling. 
 -The people could not, the Court would not, adopt any 
 effectual measures for its defence. Upon the vigi- 
 lance of the British fleet and the energy of the British 
 troops rested the only chance of resisting the powerful 
 attacks which were now foreseen. The peasantry of 
 the island were warmly attached to the English ; but 
 they loathed their own government and were without 
 arms or leaders.^ The monks detested the French ; 
 the nobles dreaded them ; but the latter were men 
 generally deficient in talents, energy and spirit. In 
 the large towns there was much diversity of feeling ; 
 but for the greater part the more intelligent and 
 active-minded citizens bore so deep a hatred to their 
 Neapolitan sovereigns that they would have favoured 
 a French invasion, and afforded their help to rid 
 Sicily of the English, because the English did not rid 
 them of their oppressors. 
 
 Before I speak of the measures contemplated by 
 Sir John Moore for the defence of the island, it may 
 
 * A nominal militia had been enrolled some time before ; 
 but it was a name, and nothing more. 
 
320 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 not be deemed superfluous that I should give some 
 account of its condition, such as it was in 1807. As 
 Quartermaster-General of the army it had been my 
 duty to visit almost every part of Sicily ; and to make 
 myself acquainted with its resources, routes, and mili- 
 tary positions. Of tlie statistical details I give an 
 abstract in the Appendix ; confining myself at present 
 to the more important subjects of consideration. 
 
 Sicily, as I have before stated, may be regarded 
 rougldy as a vast triangle ; though there is in fact 
 ,a fourth, but short, face to the westward, from near 
 Mazzara to the Cape of San Vito. The extent of the 
 eastern side, from the Faro of Messina to the point 
 below Cape Passaro, may be set down as nearly 120 
 miles, or 170 as one follows the routes along the 
 coast. The southern, or south-western, front stretch- 
 ing from Cape Passaro to Mazzara may be reckoned 
 at about 160 miles in a straight line; the western 
 face at between 30 and 40 ; and the northern front 
 may be accounted as little less than 1 70 miles ; while 
 if we follow the windings and indentations of the 
 coast, the distance may be as much as 250. Upon 
 every side there are landing-places in abundance for 
 large boats ; but very few bays in which a fleet of 
 ships of war could ride in security for a length of 
 time. The gales rise suddenly, and the sea grows 
 quickly dangerous ; but storms are rare during the 
 four months of summer. On the eastern coast, tjle 
 ports of Messina, Agosta, and Syracuse are excellent 
 for line-of-battle ships ; and these places were in the 
 
IN THE MEDITEERANEAN-. 321 
 
 hands of the English. The fortifications were respect- 
 able and in good condition. Trapani, at the western 
 extremity of the island, was also a fortress ; but it 
 was garrisoned by Neapolitans, and its works were in 
 a neglected state. The harbour was small, difficult 
 of access, and of minor importance. Palermo itself, 
 a rich city with a population of 180,000 souls, stands 
 near upon the shore of a fine bay, wherein line-of- 
 battle ships have good anchorage, and safe in fair 
 weather ; but the bay lies open to the prevailing 
 winds from the northward. The city was walled, 
 but could not be considered as fortified ; and the 
 extensive shores of the bay were very imperfectly 
 defended by some detached forts and a few sea bat- 
 teries. The large gulf of San Vito, between Palermo 
 and Trapani, but more particularly the immediate 
 vicinity of the capital, were the points where a danger 
 of attack was most to be apprehended from Toulon, 
 or from Spain. The south side of Sicily was open 
 almost everywhere to a landing in fair weather, and 
 this was chiefly to be feared on the coast between 
 Terranova and Girgenti. 
 
 The French were masters of both the shores of the 
 Adriatic, and of the Seven Islands ; and from thence 
 a short run would bring them to this defenceless coast. 
 But their passage would be still shorter to Catania ; 
 and on the smooth beach between that city and the 
 little river Giarretta, a landing might easily be effected 
 in the calm season. Still more nearly was the north- 
 eastern angle of the island about to be threatened by 
 
 Y 
 
322 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 the large army wliich the French might now collect 
 without risk in Lower Calabria. In the narrowest 
 part the width of the straits of Messina is less than 
 two miles ; at Reggio five or six. If the danger of 
 invasion had been confined to the latter quarter only, 
 Sir John Moore's task would have been comparatively 
 easy. The preparations and movements of the enemy 
 could be observed ; our ships of war and an armed 
 flotilla were there to dispute the passage ; and in the 
 triangle of mountains comprehended within the citadel 
 of Messina, the fortified peninsula of Milazzo, and the 
 strong post of Taormina, our General might confi- 
 dently liope to baffle a French army very superior in 
 numbers to his own. But what was he to do if, while 
 lying with his five or six thousand British soldiers in 
 this extremity of the island, and watching some twenty 
 thousand on the opposite coast, he were to be startled 
 suddenly by the intelligence that an enemy's army 
 had landed on the southern coast, or had seized upon 
 Palermo "? it was in anticipation of such an event that 
 Moore framed bis plan of defence. He looked to 
 prolong the war, not only till the troops from Alex- 
 andria could arrive at Syracuse, but even till another 
 army might come to his assistance from England. 
 The fortresses of Messina, Agosta, and Syracuse, nay, 
 even Milazzo, could not be taken without beinor re«:u- 
 larly besieged. The French could be masters of the 
 sea only for a moment : the harbours remained in 
 English hands. Moore took the resolution, if the 
 enemy landed in the south, to march to a particular 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 323 
 
 point in the heart of Sicily, and to act from thence 
 according to the movements and strength of the 
 invaders. 
 
 On a huge hill in the centre of the island stands 
 Castro Giovanni, on the site of the ancient Enna. 
 The situation of this town is very remarkable : the 
 height on which it stands is so lofty, and its sides are 
 so abrupt and precipitous, that one would term it an 
 isolated mountain, did not the nature of the soil, and 
 the flatness of its top, degrade it into a gigantic 
 hill. It stands up from the centre of an elevated 
 plain, which is itself encircled by a range of heights 
 considerably inferior to the colossus which they 
 surround at a distance.* On my first visit to this 
 place I was seized with a fit of military enthusiasm ; 
 and in this strain I began my notes: "Oastro Gio- 
 vanni is to a soldier a miracle of nature. Her hand 
 has here formed a sort of entrenched camp which may 
 be deemed impregnable. So lofty and spacious as to 
 defy equally the effect of shot or shells. Commanding 
 a view of every movement which an enemy could make 
 upon any side. Abundantly supplied with fine water 
 which gushes from every face of the rock, and from 
 the very summit of the mountain. Girded in by a 
 belt of precipitous cliffs totally insurmountable, except 
 in a few spots where very little labour is required to 
 render them equally so : with a fine plain of consider- 
 
 * The hill of Castro Giovanni is, however, connected with 
 the mountains to the northward, but by a ridge of much infe- 
 rior height. 
 
 Y 2 
 
324 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 able extent upon the top : and such a quantity of 
 good land on the under falls and at the base of the 
 mountain, covered bj the range of guns, as would 
 suffice to feed a numerous garrison. Enjoying a salu- 
 brious air, and placed in the midst of a plentiful 
 Country/' 
 
 Such was the place which Sir John Moore deter- 
 mined to make the stronghold of the British army, 
 and the base of his operations, if an invading enemy 
 should elude our fleets. It was his intention to leave 
 sufficient garrisons in the fortresses on the coast, and 
 to march rapidly with the remainder of his troops, say 
 5000 men, to Castro Giovanni, where he might hope 
 to be joined very shortly by an equal number return- 
 ing from Egypt. To the same stronghold he would 
 have summoned whatever portions of the Neapolitan 
 troops might still hold together, and particularly the 
 cavalry. With ten or twelve thousand men our Gene- 
 ral could, from this grand position, have commanded 
 the resources of the most fertile districts in Sicily. 
 The ports of Syracuse and Agosta were within five or 
 six marches : a long time must pass before the French 
 could assemble such armies, or collect such means as 
 to reduce the fortresses, or venture to march into the 
 interior ; and if the British Government were serious 
 in their determination to defend Sicily, they would 
 have time enough lo send out forces equal to encounter 
 the enemy in the field, and squadrons to blockade the 
 coasts and prevent the arrival of reinforcements to the 
 first invaders. Here was the groundwork of a great 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 325 
 
 campaign to be undertaken for a great; object, and 
 with many circumstances which were strikingly favour- 
 able. 
 
 From the moment Sir John Moore returned from 
 Palermo to his head-quarters, he applied himself inde- 
 fatigably to the task of preparing his troops for the 
 sudden movement which might become necessary ; and 
 I annex* one of the general orders which he issued at 
 this time as a specimen of the system which Moore 
 pursued in the command of an army. Though few in 
 numbers, and deficient in cavalry, the force under his 
 orders was excellent in quality, and " confident against 
 the world in arms." But the peace of Tilsit, the 
 ostensible alliance of Russia with France, and the 
 humble submission of Austria, had left the mighty 
 genius and the mighty strength of Napoleon so com- 
 pletely free from embarrassment, that it seemed as if 
 he had only to say to his fleets and armies, " Go forth 
 and seize on Sicily," and that his will must be done. 
 Here were eight or ten thousand audacious English- 
 men, within two miles of one of the great conqueror's 
 vassal-kingdoms, pretending to resist his power ! The 
 40,000 men whom Marmont had collected round the 
 head of the Adriatic were now disposable; and besides 
 the French vessels at Venice there was in that sea a 
 squadron of Russian ships, which might be used for the 
 conveyance of soldiers, and which Lord Oollingwood 
 was watching with great jealousy. French men-of-war 
 and a large body of troops were ready at Toulon and 
 * Appendix Q. 
 
326 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Genoa; and Spanish ships prepared to join them from 
 Carthagena. Intercepted letters from Joseph Bona- 
 parte spoke quietly, as upon a matter of ordinary 
 business, of the number of French troops which would 
 be required to garrison Sicily ; ^ nor could there be a 
 doubt that within a month the enemy's forces would 
 be swarming in Calabria. 
 
 At this moment of peril, when the chance of our 
 being able to maintain our dangerous post appeared 
 to be more doubtful than ever, when Moore was 
 looking anxiously for reinforcements from England, 
 a despatch arrived from Lord Oastlereagh ordering 
 the General to sail for Gibraltar (where he was to 
 meet farther directions) with 7500 of our best troops, 
 as soon as the 5000 men under Fraser should have 
 arrived from Alexandria. The deep concern for the 
 safety of Sicily, which had been a primary object of 
 interest with successive administrations, seemed to have 
 vanished like the impression of a dream. While our 
 enemy was engaged elsewhere, and our army was 
 strong, we were left unemployed: when Napoleon 
 became free to act against us, and able to collect any 
 amount of force for the enterprise, our ablest com- 
 mander and the flower of our troops were suddenly 
 withdrawn . 
 
 I will not pause here to criticise the conduct of 
 military affairs while they were entrusted to tlic 
 management of Lord Oastlereagh. It will be no diffi- 
 
 * See Lord Collingwood's correspondence of September and 
 October, 1807. 
 
m THE MEDITERKANEAN. 327 
 
 cult matter hereafter to exhibit proofs that the mea- 
 sures of successive Cabinets from 1793 to 1811, wheu 
 the great views and the victorious career of Wellington 
 began to command deference and acquire authority, 
 were vague, crude, and devoid alike of military and 
 political sagacity. My present business is with their 
 proceedings, I cannot call it policy, in the Mediterranean. 
 I am quite aware that in the Autumn of 1807, 
 the knowledge which our ministers had acquired of the 
 secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, justified them in 
 anticipating Napoleon at Copenhagen and Lisbon. 
 The great law of self-preservation justified their seizure 
 of the fleets of Denmark and Portugal. But Sicily 
 was in imminent danger, and besides the objection to 
 the withdrawal of troops from thence at such a 
 moment, the length of the voyage to Lisbon, and the 
 uncertainty of the passage of a fleet of transports, 
 ought to have forbidden the idea of securing the 
 Portuguese capital by troops detached from Messina. 
 In fact, Sir John Moore did not arrive at Gibraltar 
 before the end of November, exactly at which time 
 Junot, with a French army, in a miserable condition, 
 was drawing nigh to the capital of Portugal.^ At 
 Gibraltar the General received his further orders to 
 proceed to Lisbon, where he was to be joined by 
 General Spencer with 8000 men from Ireland; and if 
 he found the objects of the British Government 
 
 * However, the object of the enemy's march had been frus- 
 trated, by the sailing of the Portuguese ships, with the Hoyal 
 Family, for Brazil. 
 
328 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 attained, with respect to the Portuguese fleet, he was 
 then not to return instantly for the defence of Sicily, 
 but to go on with his troops to England! and to 
 England he went. 
 
 General Eraser's troops, returning from Egypt, 
 arrived at Messina before the end of September; and 
 as the men made prisoners by Mehemet Ali had been 
 liberated, this division proved to be stronger in 
 numbers than had been expected. Sir John Moore 
 sailed a few days afterwards, carrying with him the 
 guards, 20th, 35th (2nd batt.), 52ud, 61st, 78th, and 
 Watteville's regiments. There remained for the de- 
 fence of Sicily about 6000 British infantry, 270 
 dragoons, 400 artillerymen, &c. and 2100 foreigners. 
 But the unexpected departure of their General with so 
 large a proportion of our best battalions, and the 
 apparent indifference of the British Government as to 
 the fate of Sicily, had cast a gloom over the spirits of 
 those who were left to defend the island. 
 
 To the command of these troops Sir John Moore 
 jiad appointed Major- General Slierbrooke, a man who 
 had won reputation by his gallantry in India, but who 
 was little known to the army at large. lie had come 
 to the Mcditen'anean the preceding year, and the 
 brigade he commanded winced a little under the 
 sharpness of his discipline, while they revenged tliem- 
 selves by comical stories of his rough sayings and 
 impetuous temper. But Sherbiooke was no ordinary 
 man; few officers could have discharged with better 
 judgment, none with more miwearied activity and zeal. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 329 
 
 the arduous duties which devolved upon him after 
 Moore's departure. He was an original A short, 
 square, hardj little man, with a countenance that told 
 at once the determined fortitude of his nature. 
 Without genius, without education, hot as pepper, and 
 rough in his language, but with a warm heart and 
 generous feelings; true, straightforward, scorning finesse 
 and craft and meanness, and giving vent to his detes- 
 tation with boiling eagerness, and in the plainest 
 terms. As an officer, full of energy, rousing others to 
 exertion, and indefatigable in his own person. 
 
 From the moment Sherbrooke assumed the com- 
 mand of our little armj, he applied himself to the 
 improvement of our means of defence. In Colonel 
 Brjce, the chief engineer, he found an able assistant; 
 forts and batteries were formed along the shore of the 
 straits ; roads of communication were opened ; the 
 fortresses were improved; the discipline of our troops 
 was confirmed by the personal attention of the General, 
 and the activity which prevailed in every quarter 
 revived the spirits and the confidence of our officers. 
 Nor was Sicily less cared for by the British admirals. 
 While Oollinojwood himself watched the x^driatic, his 
 wortliy Lieutenant, Thornborough, was in constant 
 observation of the enemy's squadrons in Toulon and 
 Oarthagena; but Lord Collingwood's sense of the 
 danger to which this noble island was left exposed 
 was already strong, and he was fully alive to the vices, 
 the follies, and the treacherous tendencies of the Court 
 of Palermo. It might be supposed that the, long- 
 
330 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 practised intriguers of that Court would have found it 
 no difficult matter to impose on so plain and down- 
 right a person as John Sherbrooke; that thej could 
 easily deceive and turn to their purposes a man who 
 had never had to do with courts or politics. On the 
 contrary, none of our successive commanders ever 
 baffled them so completely ! They could not compre- 
 hend a man who told them only what he wanted, and 
 what he thought, without caring whether they were 
 pleased or not. They were always imagining, and 
 perplexing themselves by attempts to discover some 
 hidden designs, or reserved opinions; while in Sher- 
 brooke's nature there was neither concealment nor 
 reserve. 
 
 But though the General found little difficulty in 
 his communications with Palermo, he could not feel 
 himself at ease with the Neapolitan authorities in 
 Messina. None of their troops were amongst us : but 
 there was the Governor of the place, a cunning old 
 rogue, who had seen much of the world, and leant 
 towards its rascalities. Nauseously civil, and thoroughly 
 false. Hating the English because they took the power 
 of his position out of his hands; fearing the French; 
 mistrusting his own Court; and watching for any turn 
 of the wheel which might be of advantage to Governor 
 Guillichini. Around him were some officials of the 
 lowest description; and a swarm of spies in the pay 
 of the Court, who passed backwards and forwards 
 between Calabria and Sicily, without a check or hin- 
 derance, many of them being as much in the service of 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 331 
 
 the French as of Queen Caroline. But there was 
 also in Messina an arsenal belonging to King Fer- 
 dinand, with guns and ordnance stores, and a division 
 of gun-boats; and this important establishment was 
 under the orders of a Neapolitan Colonel who was 
 strongly suspected of being in the paj of the enemj. 
 Of this man I shall have more to say by and bye. 
 
 Since the peace of Tilsit we had been looking for 
 the arrival of French armies in Calabria ; but to our 
 surprise their troops did not move forward and shew 
 themselves on the coast of the lower province before 
 the close of 1807. The plans of Napoleon were now 
 dilating to so vast a magnitude, that the acquisition of 
 Sicily sank into minor importance ; or at least was to 
 be postponed till mightier combinations were matured. 
 The great army which had conquered Russia and 
 dictated peace upon the Niemen, was still required in 
 the North to enforce that peace ; to set up the new 
 Duchy of Warsaw, and overawe the Cabinet of Vienna ; 
 to drain what was left in Prussia of its remaining; 
 resources. Another army was upon its march from 
 Bayonne, destined to seize on Portugal and form the 
 advanced guard of a greater expedition against Spain. 
 Of the 40,000 men assembled under Marmont at the 
 head of the Adriatic, a large part was now required to 
 carry into effect the secret agreement of Napoleon and 
 Alexander for the partition of Turkey. Albania, the 
 Morea, the Seven Islands, were to be occupied by the 
 French troops. Some time therefore elapsed before 
 reinforcements could be afforded to King Joseph; and 
 
332 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 without a great addition to his army, he could no 
 venture to extend his troops to the extremity of 
 Calabria, much less could he risk any attempt on Sicily. 
 At the end of the year, however, the enemy was known 
 to be gathering strength both in the upper and the 
 lower province; General Reynier, who again com- 
 manded in the latter, pushed forward his outposts 
 gradually, and before the close of January, 1808, the 
 eagles of Napoleon appeared once more upon the 
 shores opposite to Messina. 
 
 At this time the castle of Reggio was occupied by 
 a weak brigade of Neapolitans. It was contemptible 
 as a fortress; and their Government had done little 
 or nothing to improve its defences, in the year and a 
 half which had passed since the battle of Maida 
 restored it to their hands. Still it could not be taken 
 (unless through treachery or cowardice), by an enemy 
 unprovided with heavy artillery ; and the French had 
 none. 
 
 The castle of Scilla, though a very small place, 
 was of more importance. Perched on its peninsular 
 rock it barred the passage of boats along tlie coast ; 
 and while it remained in our hands, the enemy was 
 unable to form batteries, or hold their posts in secu- 
 rity along the straits of Messina. Scilla had been 
 occupied by the English from the time of its capture 
 in 1806; and since our prospects had grown dark, 
 much pains had been taken to render the little place 
 as strong as its position would admit, and to provide 
 for the eventual safety of the garrison. The castle 
 
m THE MEDITERRAN-EA^^r. 333 
 
 'Was commanded on the land side bj the rising slope 
 of the mountains; and in the same direction shelter 
 to sharpshooters was afforded, at a very short dis- 
 tance, by the stone houses of the town. But the old 
 masonry of the fort was not to be damaged unless 
 by heavy guns; whilst its own artillery swept the 
 beach, the town, and a considerable space around it. 
 Sherbrooke entrusted the defence of Scilla to a man 
 who was every inch a soldier, George Duncan Robert- 
 son, major of the 35th Regiment. The garrison was 
 composed of four companies detached from regiments 
 in Messina, with a large proportion of artillerymen; 
 and the engineers undertook to construct stairs from 
 the sea, which bathed the promontory, up to the 
 postern of the fort. With admirable skill they cut 
 steps in the living rock, and formed an easy communi- 
 cation (concealed and covered from an enemy's fire) 
 from the water to the gate of tlie castle. Constant 
 intercourse was thus secured, unless in stormy weather, 
 between Scilla and the Faro point; and supplies could 
 be thrown in when wanted, or wounded men removed. 
 As we knew that Reynier had no heavy guns, we felt 
 very little uneasiness when we saw liis troops gather- 
 ing in considerable numbers on the coast between 
 Reggio and Scilla, and more particularly near the 
 former town ; but w^e were soon taught what it was to 
 have allies. 
 
 On the 30th of January, 1808, in the early morn- 
 ing. General Sherbrooke and I were watching with 
 our glasses the movement of three or four of the 
 
.^34 MILITARY TRANSACTION'S 
 
 enemy's battalions, among the gardens and orange 
 orchards on the northerly skirts of Reggio. Presently 
 we observed the four Neapolitan gun-boats, which 
 belonged to Messina, pulling across the straits. Sher- 
 brooke's immediate inquiries at the arsenal were 
 answered by the message that the boats had been 
 ordered over to cannonade those Frenchmen who 
 were exposing themselves so close to the shore. And 
 surely enough the vessels began to fire when they 
 were still some two miles distant from the Oalabrian 
 coast. This did not arouse our suspicions, for such 
 was the common custom of the Neapolitans. But 
 they continued to push on, and to draw near to the 
 French, and such was by no means their custom. 
 Sherbrooke's worst apprehensions were excited ; " By 
 
 ," cried he, " they are going to desert ! Run, run 
 
 to Captain Handfield, and tell him to try to bring 
 
 these d d villains back." Captain Handfield was 
 
 the commander of the Delight brig-of-war, which was 
 lying moored to the quay of Messina. I ran and 
 found Handfield on deck. In an instant the mooring 
 chain was cast off, every sail let fall; in a few minutes 
 the Delight was stretching across the strait under a 
 cloud of canvas. But the " villains" had by this time 
 managed to run the gun-boats ashore under a long 
 line of stone walls lined by the French infantry. 
 The latter were going through the form of firing 
 volleys over the heads of the Neapolitan crews, and 
 these again, after discharging their guns, hauled down 
 their colours. By the time the Delight arrived near 
 
IN THE MEDITERRAITEAN. 335 
 
 enough to use her carronades, the French soldiers were 
 on board the gun-boats. The brig, owing to the 
 eagerness of her commander to get hold of these 
 vessels and drag them off, ran so close as to be ex- 
 posed to a deadly fire of musketry from the walls and 
 fences along the shore; poor Handfield, a most gallant 
 and active young seaman, was killed, and two-thirds 
 of his crew fell in a few minutes; the deck of the 
 Delight was cleared, and she ran ashore. Then the 
 French soldiers boarded, with the hopes of securing 
 the guns of the English brig, as well as those of the 
 Neapolitans. But by this time, the Bittern sloop-of- 
 war, which was cruising in the straits, had been 
 attracted to the scene of action. Her commander, 
 Captain Downes, stood in ; and now began a second 
 fight; the French striving to keep possession of the 
 unfortunate brig ; Downes endeavouring to drive them 
 away, and either to get her afloat or destroy her. 
 Short tacks and a heavy cannonade on the one side, a 
 blaze of musketry and lighter guns on the other. But 
 the soldiers on board the brig could not long with- 
 stand the shot of the sloop ; and after losing many 
 men they scrambled ashore. It was found impossible 
 to float the poor Delight, and she was burned. But 
 the French had secured the 2 4-pound ers brought by 
 the gun-boats ; and with these they were enabled to 
 arm a battery against the old Castle of Reggio. It 
 was unnecessary to do more ; the Neapolitan Governor 
 surrendered the next day. If he had stood a few 
 shots, and held out till the next morning, we should 
 
336 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 have had a fight ; for Sherbrooke had determined to 
 land in the night and fall upon Reynier. The relief 
 of Reggio would not have justified the risk ; but the 
 heavy guns were objects of vast importance under the 
 circumstances in which we were placed. To recover 
 or to destroy these 24 -pounders was our General's 
 aim. Without them the French could not reduce 
 Scilla, nor could they biing their boats along the coast, 
 and establish themselves upon the straits. 
 
 However, the mischief was done and was now 
 irremediable, thanks to the treachery of the Colonel- 
 commandant of the Neapolitan arsenal.'" Nor did 
 General Reynier lose any time after these means had 
 been placed in his hands. On the 2nd of February 
 he had taken possession of Reggio ; by the 4th the 
 serviceable guns from that castle, as well as the 24- 
 pounders from the boats had been transported to 
 Scilla, and brought under cover of the houses within 
 breaching distance ; other batteries were armed with 
 howitzers and field-pieces, and the fire of the whole 
 was concentrated upon the fort. Major Robertson 
 and his little garrison defended their post with admi- 
 rable intelligence and bravery ; but the match was 
 too unequal. The French made more than one effort 
 
 * Sherbrooke repaired to the arsenal after witnessing the 
 loss of the boats, and he apostrophised the commandant in 
 nearly these words : "I don't know what your Government 
 will do with you. You are not under my command, luckily for 
 you ; for if you were, by G — I would try you by a drum-head 
 court-martial, and hang you uj) within half-an-hour." And 
 Sherbrooke would assuredly have done so. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 337 
 
 to get round the foot of the rock, and cut off the 
 means of retreat afforded to the English by the steps 
 from the sea : but these attempts cost them dear ; 
 their detachments were driven back with heavy loss. 
 At length after the castle had been pounded during 
 thirteen days, its guns dismounted, and the wall facing 
 the town beaten into ruins, Robertson found it neces- 
 sary to evacuate the post which he had defended so 
 gallantly. Boats were collected silently in the night ; 
 all the wounded who could bear removal were carried 
 off; and company after company descending the steps 
 at the back of the rock embarked with little loss, the 
 rearmost sections keeping up a fire upon the enemy. 
 The brave garrison of Scilla rejoined their comrades 
 at Messina on the 18th of February, leaving a mere 
 Tuin to be occupied by the enemy. 
 
 The coasting communication was now open to the 
 French, open at least whenever their large boats could 
 evade the vigilance of the English cruisers. But the 
 enemy worked cautiously : his posts were established 
 along the shore from Salerno to Scilla, and armed 
 successively with heavy cannon. As opportunities 
 offered, his little convoys, bringing guns and supplies, 
 ran on from post to post till they reached their desti- 
 nations. In this way the French managed to establish 
 themselves solidly on the straits of Messina within a 
 few weeks, and to commence works under cover of 
 which flotillas might be collected for the invasion of 
 Sicily. On our side we laboured strenuously to 
 render our line of coast as strong as we could ; and 
 
338 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 our gun-vessels and armed boats were constantly on 
 the alert to intercept and damage those of the enemj. 
 From England we had advice of approaching rein- 
 forcements. This was good, but we were warned also 
 that a General was on his way to supersede Sher- 
 brooke ; and this was now considered by the army to 
 be a misfortune.^ 
 
 At the end of April 1808, Sir John Stuart arrived 
 
 * Before we part from Sherbrooke, let me record one trait 
 of his mode of administering justice, when martial law was in 
 force in Messina. Our soldiers could seldom resist the con- 
 stant temptation of cheap wine. In the wine-houses they were 
 riotous and quarrelsome, and apt to treat the Sicilian customers 
 'very rotighly. The consequence was, that several of our men 
 were stabbed; but it happened very rarely that the stabber 
 was seized on the spot, or could be identified. Every Sicilian 
 carried a long knife ; and it was become urgently necessary to 
 stop the deadly use they were making of tliis weapon. The 
 General issued a proclamation denouncing death to any one who 
 should assassinate a British soldier; and most assuredly it was his 
 intention to carry this menace into efiect. One morning it was 
 rej^orted to Sherbrooke that a soldier had been killed over 
 night, and that the assassin was taken on the spot. A drum- 
 head court-martial was ordered to assemble immediately, and a 
 gallows to be erected. But in the meantime the General 
 inquired personally into the circumstances. He found that the 
 di-unken soldier had assaulted a Sicilian who was sitting quietly 
 in a wine-house ; the latter, in his exasperation, had snatched 
 up a stool, and dealt such a blow as to fracture the aggressor's 
 skull. "Oh, oh!" said Sherbrooke, "this is quite another 
 affair !" Then turning to the trembling prisoner he said, " You 
 have killed one of my soldiers, my man ; but you have killed 
 him in hot blood, and in a fair fight which he provoked. You 
 had a right to resist ; and you did not use your knife ; if you 
 had, I would have hanged you. As it is, I set you free ; and 
 here is a piece of money to reward you for not having used your 
 knife." This example was not lost upon the Messinese. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 339 
 
 at Messina, with higher rank and enlarged powers, to 
 take the chief command on the theatre where his 
 laurels had been won two years before. He brought 
 as his second in command Lord Forbes, a very worthy 
 and good-natured gentleman, who had seen no service 
 but as a Captain in the footguards. Troops also 
 came to us in slow succession ; but not such troops as 
 ;had been carried away by Sir John Moore. 
 
 The return of Sir John Stuart, Count of Maida, 
 was hailed with delight by the Court of Palermo ; 
 and they evinced at once a readiness to communicate 
 cordially with him, which they had withheld from 
 Moore and Sherbrooke.* They even sent some hun- 
 dreds of their cavalry to the neighbourhood of Messina, 
 and placed them under Stuart's orders ; and the Queen 
 fondly hoped that she should prevail upon the Count 
 to risk a second attack upon the enemy's troops in 
 Calabria. But scarcely had Sir John established 
 himself in his command, when the scene and pros- 
 pects of the war suddenly changed. The Spanish 
 people had risen in their fury ; and from every part 
 of the Peninsula there came pouring in the news of 
 insurrections, and the arming of the principal cities 
 against the French. Cadiz and Carthagena were no 
 longer points from which any danger to Sicily was 
 to be apprehended. Before the end of July, Dupont's 
 
 * General Sherbrooke returned to England on being super- 
 seded in the command. He was afterwards at the head of 
 one of Lord Wellington's division at Talavera, and in Portugal; 
 and finally, Governor-General of Canada. 
 
 z 2 
 
340 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 army had surrendered to tlie Spaniards, and Moncey's 
 had been repulsed by the raw levies of Valencia. The 
 hasty ambition of Queen Caroline was inflamed, and 
 she turned all her schemes for the moment to the 
 object of getting one of her sons accepted as the 
 Regent of Spain. As for the British army in Sicily, 
 our eyes were straining towards the great held which 
 had opened to us thus surprisingly ; and we almost 
 forgot that the French forces in the kingdom of 
 Naples were growing stronger, and that their footing 
 in Calabria was becoming every day more solid, and 
 more dangerous to Sicily. On the other hand the 
 Russian fleet, which Lord CoUingwood had been long 
 watching with anxiety in the Adriatic, had by this 
 time passed out of the Mediterranean. We were 
 relieved both from the apprehension of Spanish ships 
 doing the bidding of Napoleon from the westward, 
 and of the Muscovites from the east. There remained 
 only a squadron of French men-of-war in Toulon, and 
 this was carefully observed by CoUingwood, who 
 always attended with great interest to the protection 
 of Sicily. He had been lying at Syracuse when the 
 French were attacking Scilla ; and foreseeing the 
 probability at that time of the enemy's making an 
 attempt upon the island, the Admiral begged the 
 Governor of Syracuse and its dependent district to 
 inform him what were the Sicilian means of defence 
 at his, the Governor's, disposal to resist invaders. 
 The answer was, " Of all sorts of men on the military 
 roll there are above 700, including artillery, invalids, 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 341 
 
 and militia. But thej are merely on the roll ; for 
 thej are unarmed, undisciplined, and without any 
 kind of pay. The only officers are two ensigns,''""' 
 Such was indeed the condition of Sicily on every side. 
 From 1805 to 1813 the defence of Sicily was made 
 good by the English fleet, the English army, and the 
 English money.f 
 
 At the end of May Lord Collingwood quitted 
 the waters of Sicily, in order to give his close atten- 
 tion to the more urgent concerns of Spain ; and we 
 were left nearly destitute of naval aid during several 
 months. Our army, though increased in numbers, was 
 in the summer of 1808 declining in what is called 
 now-a-days its morale. There w^as no longer the 
 hearty good- will and energy of which it bore the 
 stamp under Moore and Sherbrooke; and even the 
 officers of high rank were anxious to leave us. Three 
 of those who had commanded brigades at Maida, Cole, 
 Acland, and Kempt, had before this time returned to 
 England to seek employment in other fields and under 
 other commanders. There grew up grumblings and scoflPs 
 amongst our officers ; duties w^ere neglected ; and the 
 vessel floated along mainly through the former impetus 
 remorum. On his part. Sir John Stuart was uneasy 
 lest he sliould be ordered positively to transport his 
 
 * Lord Collingwood to Mr. Drummond, Feb. 6tli, 1808. 
 
 t "Why did you not keep Sicily at the peace ?" asked a 
 Prussian statesman of me in 1836, " Oh, why I suppose we had 
 jealous neighbours," said I. " Well, and have you not jealous 
 neighbours now ? " was his reply. 
 
342 MILITAllY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 troops to Spain, a theatre on which he had no inclina- 
 tion to appear;"^' and he seemed for a time disposed to 
 engage in some attempt on the coast of Italy. Pains 
 were taken to ascertain the positions of the enemy's 
 troops, and the condition of their fortresses. Trans- 
 ports were collected at Milazzo, ordnance embarked; 
 and horse-ships fitted up. We learned that five of the 
 French battalions had marched to Upper Italy, and 
 King Joseph's guards for Spain. But our disposable 
 force was small,t and we had no ships of war to assist 
 us ; though there were many circumstances in the 
 kingdom of Naples at that time to encourage us tb 
 make an attempt in that quarter. 
 
 Meanwhile we overlooked a change which was 
 frauglit with serious influence on our position and 
 prospects. The quiet and unpopular Joseph Bona- 
 parte [: had been summoned by his mighty brother td 
 Madrid, and in his stead the fiery and impetuouii 
 Murat was coming to fill the throne of Naples. On 
 his head was to rest the crown of Sicily, if he could 
 drive the British troops out of the island; and the 
 practised and sanguine warrior was not likely to 
 blench before the difficulties of the enterprise. 
 
 * Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Stuart, July 29th (condi- 
 tional). 
 
 t The season had been sickly beyond example: in the two 
 months of August and September, 200 of our men died of fevei*s, 
 and there were 2,700 in the hospitals. 
 
 J Colletta in his Storia di Napoli, draws admirable portraits 
 of King Joseph and King Joachim. It was the atrocious con- 
 duct of his police which rendered the former odious to the 
 Neapolitans. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRAXEAN. 343 
 
 In the meantime Sir John Stuart was desirous to 
 keep up some show of offensive designs, and he 
 resolved to increase the garrison of Oapri. This 
 little island had been held since 1806 bj the Corsican 
 Rangers under Colonel Lowe ; and our general now 
 detached the regiment of Malta to augment the garri- 
 son ; swelling its numbers, but bj no means improving 
 its quality. The Oorsicans, though there were some 
 amongst them who were hardly to be trusted, were on 
 the whole a brave and well-instructed body of men, 
 led by intelligent officers ; but the Maltese were of an 
 inferior caste ; a few of their officers indeed were 
 British, and their commander, Major Hammill, was a 
 gallant soldier. But it was an error to accumulate 
 foreigners, and particularly untried and mistrusted 
 men, at an outpost close to the head-quarters of an 
 enterprising enemy. Four companies of British with 
 some twelve-pounders, would have made Oapri secure ; 
 the 700 Maltese occasioned its loss. But in truth, 
 Capri was fancied to be so strong, or rather so difficult 
 of access, that it mattered little what description of 
 soldiers were to make a show along the cliffs, or fire 
 from behind rocks upon the landing-places. And our 
 general was unwilling to detach any of his English 
 infantry to a distance. 
 
 Murat had made his entry into Naples on the 6th 
 of September ; and on the 25th came his clever and 
 beautiful Queen, Caroline Bonaparte. Great rejoicings 
 and festive displays succeeded the arrival of the new 
 sovereigns; and while the thoughts of men in and 
 
344 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 and about the capital were diverted bj receptions, and 
 balls, and illuminations, and fireworks. King Joachim 
 was forming and maturing a plan for the surprise of 
 Capri. The sight of that rocky island, as it met his 
 view every morning from his palace windows, galled 
 his audacious spirit. There flew the British flag; and 
 through that point passed the secret correspondence of 
 the Court of Palermo with Naples.'"' Quietly and 
 without drawing observation, Murat provided and 
 armed his vessels; while he sent an able officer of 
 engineers (probably the historian Colletta) to hang 
 about Capri in a little fishing-boat, and to mark care- 
 fully where it might be possible to effect a landing. 
 The commandant of the island, Colonel Ijowe, was 
 completely without suspicion of any design to attack 
 him ; and he felt the more secure because there was an 
 English frigate of thirty-two guns cruising in the bay; 
 ■and no one admitted the idea that Neapolitan small 
 craft would ever venture to face the British pendant. 
 
 The small island of Capri is divided by nature 
 into two parts, and the only communication between 
 the two is by means of steps cut in the face of a pre- 
 cipice. On the western and south-western side the 
 volcanic rocks of Auacapri shoot up to a great height. 
 
 * This correspondence, which had subsisted since 1806 
 through Capri and Pouza, was of a very mysterious and doubt- 
 ful cliaracter. The Minister of Police at Naples had certainly 
 been a party to it at one time; and the probability is, that this 
 intercourse was of considerably more advantage to the French 
 than to the Queen, who was the directing correspondent at 
 Palermo, 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 345 
 
 The coast of this portion of the island is of the most 
 rugged nature : heaps of wild rocks, tumbled together 
 in confused masses, rise irregularly to cliffs of lava and 
 rude terraces, connected bj a steep slope with the top 
 of the vast cliffs which overhang Capri " proper." 
 Two narrow landing-places, and but two, are to be 
 found amongst the rocks of Anacapri; and these can 
 be approached by boats only in the calmest w^eather, 
 for the coast is open to the full swell of the Mediterra- 
 nean, and a tremendous surf breaks along the rocks 
 when there rises any wind. In Capri proper there are 
 two or three landing-places, one in the petty, narrow 
 port (as it is termed), immediately below the town ; 
 and another on a patch of beach, to the northward 
 called the "Marina.'' Both of these were commanded 
 and well watched, and the rest of the coast of Capri, 
 though less forbidding and less exposed to storms 
 than the other side of the island, was too rugged and 
 dangerous for the landing of troops. The little town 
 of Capri was surrounded by a thin wall, such as is 
 used not uncommonly for merely fiscal purposes. Here 
 Colonel Lowe had a few English artillerymen, and his 
 own regiment of Corsican Rangers; but he had de- 
 tached three companies, and the whole of the Maltese 
 battalion to Anacapri. 
 
 Murat,^^ after receiving the report of his engineer, 
 
 determined on making his attempt on the side of 
 
 Anacapri, despite the rocks and the danger of the sea, 
 
 and the greater advantage with which the British 
 
 * Col let ta, Storia di Napoli. 
 
846 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 frigate might engage them in the more open waters. 
 The King selected for his enterprise the flower of his 
 little army; three thousand grenadiers, chasseurs, and 
 voltigeurs ; and he entrusted the command to the 
 ablest of his generals, Lamarque. The show of attack 
 was to be directed bv the main bodies of the flotilla 
 against the Marina and the port of Capri, but a few 
 boats were to steal round, and if possible throw their 
 men ashore in the creeks, and on the rocks of Anacapri. 
 In the night of the 3rd of October the French 
 soldiers were embarked, and the expedition sailed, 
 chiefly from Naples, but a smaller division went forth 
 at the same time from Salerno. On the 4th Colonel 
 Lowe found to his surprise that his island was menaced 
 from every side by the enemy's vessels. There were 
 gun-boats, and armed feluccas, and two small brigs of 
 war, and a corvette; and where was His Britannic 
 Majesty's frigate, the Ambuscade! Instead of dashing 
 at the enemy, or hanging upon their skirts, or even 
 staying to observe their operations, and wait for 
 opportunities. Captain D'Urban sailed away for Ponza, 
 to apprise the Neapolitan squadron on that station 
 and any English ships he might meet, of the attack on 
 Capri, and to call them to the rescue.*"' This hinderance 
 to the enemy's design was thus unexpectedly removed ; 
 
 * In the following year Murat's flotilla, having then a 
 frigate of forty guns, a corvette, and two brigs, were attacked 
 off Baia by Captain Staines in the Cyane (a much smaller ship 
 than the Ambuscade), supported by one brig; and they were 
 closely engaged, thrashed, and driven with heavy loss and 
 disgrace into the very port of Naples. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. tiif 
 
 and the weather and the sea proved as favourable to 
 their objects as thej could have desired. They followed 
 their plan without deviation: thej cannonaded the' 
 landing-places in the lower portion of the island, while 
 Lamarque himself, with Colletta, and some hundreds 
 of voltigeurs and light infantry, pursued their way to 
 Anacapri. Unobserved by the Maltese garrison, the 
 leading boats crept silently into one of the little 
 creeks I have mentioned, and threw some eighty or a 
 hundred voltigeurs (with the general himself) upon the 
 rocks. These men scrambled quietly, and still un- 
 detected, up the cliffs ; and extending themselves 
 widely, they concealed and sheltered themselves 
 behind masses of rock, in order to cover the landing 
 of their comrades. 
 
 At last the purblind Maltese found out that an 
 enemy had landed, and they swarmed hastily to the 
 edge of the terrace above, and fired at the rock^ 
 behind which the French lay ensconced, and from 
 which the sharp-shooting of the latter told with effect 
 on the exposed line of red-coats. While this was 
 going on, four or five hundred more of the enemy had 
 made good their landing; and these soon climbed the 
 cliffs, and joined their adventurous general. Still it 
 was not an easy matter to scale the rest of this rugged 
 precipice in the face of an enemy : the position of th6 
 French was becoming critical ; the sea was rising, and 
 the approach of boats was interrupted by the surf. 
 Lamarque lay quiet during the rest of the day ; and 
 the night came to his rescue ; for it proved fine and 
 
348 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 calm, and a brilliant moon exposed the Maltese 
 sentinels, and watching-parties, to the shots of their 
 enemies lying darkly among the rocks. While this 
 sharp -shooting was carried on, the French General 
 formed the rest of his men in two loose columns, one 
 on each extremity of the line he occupied; and both 
 scrambled up, as rapidly as they could, to the rocky 
 terrace above. Appearing at once on the right and on 
 the left, pouring in their volleys, and charging, with 
 loud shouts and rattling drums, they encountered only 
 one random fire from the dismayed Maltese, who fled 
 in every direction. Major Hammill was killed, and 
 the rout was complete. The French rested on their 
 arms till day ; but during the night there occurred an 
 incident which is w^orth recording, because it shews 
 what may be done by presence of mind and an enter- 
 prising spirit. Three companies of the Corsican Ran- 
 gers, under Captain Church,'" had been detached to 
 Anacapri by Colonel Lowe. When the French scaled 
 the cliffs and routed the Maltese, these companies were 
 separately occupied in w^atching paths away upon the 
 flanks; nor do they appear to have been noticed by 
 the enemy. Two of them indeed drew ofi* through the 
 rocks and effected their retreat unobserved. But the 
 success of the French attack was painfully evident to 
 Captain Church, who soon found that the line of 
 retreat for his own company was interce])ted. But 
 
 * Now Sir Richard Church ; and, after the time of which I 
 write, well known in high commands both in the army of Naples 
 and that of Greece. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 849 
 
 finding, also, that the dark uniforms and brown barrels 
 of his Rangers had served to conceal them from notice, 
 he formed a daring plan, and acted upon it with 
 success. Having lain in silence till the moon went 
 down, he then led his Oorsicans amongst the rocks to 
 the rear of the enemy's position on the terrace, so as 
 to gain the line bj which thej had mounted from the 
 sea. Turning here, lie ascended the cliffs, and con- 
 ducted his men through the left of the enemy's line. 
 When challenged by the French sentinels, the Oorsican 
 officers answered that they had just landed from 
 Naples ; and that more of their men"^'" were below, try- 
 ing to get ashore. They were allowed to pass, unmo- 
 lested, through the slumbering enemy ; and Church, 
 making his way to the head of the steps down the 
 precipice (which the French had not yet discovered), 
 led his Rangers by that difficult, and in the darkness, 
 very dangerous, passage to Capri, without the loss of a 
 man. 
 
 When the sun rose, the enemy found that many 
 of the fugitive Maltese had taken refuge in their 
 barracks, a rude building which was called a fort ; and 
 here they laid down their arms on being summoned. 
 The French likewise discovered and occupied the steps 
 in the cliff. The weather continued as favourable as 
 possible for the assailants, nor did any men-of-war 
 make their appearance. In the course of the 5th of 
 
 * Murat had a regiment of Corsican sbarp-sliooters then in 
 his service; and their countrymen well knew their numbers and 
 designation. 
 
.350 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 October, the rest of the French troops made good 
 their landing at the same dangerous and difficult little 
 ,sipot where General Lamarque had so boldly thrown 
 himself on shore. Some field- artillery was likewise 
 , disembarked, with a small proportion of ammunition 
 .and provisions. All these things had to be hoisted 
 .up the rugged cliffs ; and, when thej had reached the 
 summit of Anacapri, to be lowered down the great 
 precipice to the level of Capri proper. In the mean- 
 while, the French troops invested the town, and 
 ^prepared batteries for the reception of their light 
 guns. A summons to Colonel Lowe to capitulate, was 
 answered by a refusal. By the 7th, the batteries, 
 armed with six or eight pounders, opened upon Capri: 
 ,the shot went through the slight wall of the town 
 without bringing it down ; there was much of sharp- 
 shooting on both sides ; but on the morning of the 7th, 
 English and Neapolitan vessels of war came in sight, 
 and the enemy's flotilla took refuge in Castellamare 
 ,and Naples. The fire from the ships annoyed and 
 interrupted the puny batteries of the French, and kept 
 fOpen the communication between the town and the 
 po^t. Here, then, was General Lamarque, with 3000 
 picked troops, a very few field-pieces, and a scanty 
 , supply of ammunition, cut off from communication, 
 , and without the hope of succour or the means of 
 retreat. He had to expect the arrival of English 
 troops from Sicily; and the only chance of saving his 
 division depended on his being able to reduce the 
 town of Capri garrisoned by 700 men, before a reliev- 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. ,S51 
 
 ing armj could arrive. But Lis means of attack were 
 ,very slender; his guns light; his supply of shot small. 
 To make a breach was Lamarque's object; but even 
 his eight-pounders sent their shot through the flimsy 
 -wall, making holes without shaking it; and he did 
 not care to draw too near, because the English had 
 four ship carronades, 32-pounders, though they did not 
 venture to fire very often, because the carriages were 
 Totten. 
 
 On the other hand. Colonel Lowe had managed to 
 despatch a boat in the night of the fourth, which 
 •threaded its way through the French flotilla, and 
 reached Messina. The town of Capri was a poor 
 ,place to defend, but Lowe was sure that every effort 
 would be made for his relief Every effort wa^^i made, 
 and without one hour's delay; but a fatality hung 
 over the whole of these occurrences. The singularly 
 calm weather which had enabled the enemy to land 
 on Anacapri, singular in the season of the equinox, 
 was suddenly followed by a succession of furious 
 storms. The transports which were despatched by 
 Sir John Stuart, as fast as each vessel could be got 
 ready, and without waiting for convoy, "^ were tossed 
 
 * The first transport which sailed, carried gunners, ordnance, 
 engineers, ofiicers, and tools ; for which Colonel Lowe had 
 written expressly. This vessel was not many leagues from 
 Capri, when she met the tempest. The commanding officer 
 was attacked by brain fever, brought on by extreme sea-sick- 
 ness. He insisted on their putting back to Messina ; and the 
 master obeyed. If she had kept the sea, the island would have 
 been saved. 
 
352 MILITARY TRANSACTIOirg 
 
 about for ten days without being able to reach Capri : 
 some of them were driven back to Sicily ; nor was it 
 till the night of the 17th of October, that a single 
 transport with 300 men arrived. But she came too 
 late : a capitulation had been signed a few hours be- 
 fore. Colonel Lowe (besieged during seven days) find- 
 ing his ammunition and provisions nearly exhausted, 
 fearing that his advice-boat had been intercepted, and 
 despairing of succour, had surrendered Capri, under 
 condition of withdrawing his garrison to Sicily. 
 
 Success is held to justify military enterprises ; but 
 the rashness of Murat's attempt on Capri is hardly to 
 loe justified by the result. It was only by the combi- 
 nation of the most improbable circumstances that 
 success was rendered possible; and a failure would 
 have been attended with the loss of a large body of 
 his best troops, whom the new King could ill have 
 spared. Let us just recall these improbable circum- 
 stances. It was very improbable that a British frigate 
 should quit her station, and allow an enemy's flotilla 
 to act without molestation, how and where they chose. 
 It was very improbable at that season that the weather 
 should continue so calm during three consecutive days 
 as to admit of the landing of 3000 men, with artillery 
 and stores, in the rude opening in the rocks of 
 Anacapri. It was improbable that a regiment wearing 
 the British uniform should fail to defend a cliff of the 
 most rugged description against an enemy inferior in 
 numbers. Nor was it probable that during ten days 
 it should have proved impracticable for English ship' 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 353 
 
 to make the passage from Sicily to Capri. However, 
 King Joachim did succeed, and great was his exulta- 
 tion. 
 
 Great, also, was the effect which this startling 
 blow produced in Sicily. A panic appeared to seize 
 on all classes; and an impression of the superiority of 
 the French arms, and of the new King's military 
 talents, fastened its hold on the minds of men, and 
 seriously weakened their confidence in the power of 
 the English to protect them. Capri was in reality of 
 little yalue : it merely afforded us the means of 
 hearing what the enemy was doing in Italy; but it 
 locked up one of our regiments, and there had been 
 times when we could ill spare 700 men from Sicily. 
 Still the loss of so strong a post threw discredit on 
 our arms, and awakened a distrust of our foreign 
 corps; while it removed from the eyes of the Neapo- 
 litans a perpetual memorandum of their impotence at 
 sea, and excited in them a high confidence in the 
 military skill and fortune of their new Sovereign. 
 Murat, indeed, exerted himself to the utmost to 
 become popular with all classes:'''" he undertook a 
 revisal and reform of the laws; he broke up the 
 inquisitorial and sanguinary system of police, which 
 -had rendered King Joseph particularly obnoxious; 
 and he applied his attention earnestly to the discharge 
 of the long arrears of pay which were due to his 
 troops. In this last object Joachim succeeded but 
 
 * CoUetta, Storia di Napoli, lib. 7. 
 
 2 A 
 
354 MILITARY TRANSACTIOIJS 
 
 partially : lie paid, indeed, a part of this heavy debt ; 
 and he bade his soldiers look to the spoils of Sicily for 
 the remainder. 
 
 After the taking of Capri, Murat pushed his troops 
 southwards in considerable numbers; and he used 
 active exertions to draw more service from the natives 
 of his dominions than his predecessor had done. 
 About 4000 picked Neapolitans were incorporated iu 
 his Guards and in French regiments; and two bat- 
 talions, to which he gave the name of Veliti, were 
 formed of young men of a higher class and more easy 
 circumstances, who had been exposed in the troubled 
 times to the persecution of the masse and brigands of 
 the provinces, and who were now inclined to take 
 service and revenge.''^ 
 
 In the month of November, the returns of King 
 Joachim's army shewed an aggregate force of between 
 forty and fifty thousand men, of whom twenty-three 
 thousand were French : and a large proportion of the 
 best troops, particularly French regiments, were now 
 gathering in the two Oalabrias. At the same time 
 Murat wisely revoked the decree of Joseph Bonaparte, 
 which had long held these provinces under martial 
 law, and which had kept them under a severe oppres- 
 sion, and in a state of constant irritation. All the 
 notorious leaders of the plundering bands had fled into 
 Sicily, and many hundreds of the Calabrese peasantry 
 
 * It was not till the end of 1809, that Murat ventured to 
 introduce the conscription; and from that measure we may 
 date the beginning of his unpopularity. 
 
IN THE MEDITEERANEAN. 355 
 
 who had committed themselves by taking arms against 
 the French had followed their example.* 
 
 Whether Murat entertained at this time any 
 serious design of attacking Sicily may be doubted; 
 but he made the show of assailing us, and we could 
 not forget that he was a venturous warrior. However, 
 this representative of Napoleon must have been aware 
 of the preparations for war in Austria, and of the 
 probability that a large proportion of his best troops 
 might be suddenly summoned to march northwards. 
 In fact, this call came upon Murat before the end of 
 December, and in the course of January, 1809, 4000 
 infantry and 1000 chasseurs-a-cheval (all French) had 
 moved towards Verona. f 
 
 On the side of the English there was a want of 
 early information, and a clashing between the condi- 
 tional orders from our Government at home^ and the 
 
 * Out of these starving fugitives the English General began, 
 towards the close of the winter, to form a corps of sharpshoot- 
 ers under British officers. But Sir John Stuart would not 
 admit any of the Capimasse (the fellows who had commanded 
 the insurgents in their own country) ; nor any men who were 
 suspected of having been concerned in murders or outrages. 
 Still they were a wild set at the beginning : nor was it till after 
 two or three of them had been hanged for plundering at Ischia, 
 that they were brought under good control. Their numbers 
 were afterwards much increased by recruits from Calabria, and 
 they became in the succeeding years an useful corps. 
 
 t On the other hand, conscripts arrived from France to 
 nearly the same amount as to numbers ; but in the month of 
 March the drain was renewed, and seven battalions of French 
 and two of Swiss marched for Upper Italy. These troops were 
 drawn from the Calabrias, where they had been, till March 
 thirteen or fourteen thousand of the enemy's best troops. 
 
 2a2 ■ 
 
356 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 inclination of our General. The British Cabinet had 
 been earnestly desirous that Sir John Stuart should 
 lead or detach troops to act- upon the coast of Catalo- 
 nia in the autumn of 1808; and Lord Colling wood, 
 who was attending anxiously to the course of affairs 
 in that quarter, supported the views of our Ministers 
 by his own opinions and suggestions. But Stuart was 
 still reluctant; and, unfortunately, the panic which 
 seized on the Sicilians after the loss of Capri, afforded 
 him very plausible grounds for the delay which he 
 desired. Now the month of November was the crisis 
 of the war in Catalonia. The French in that quarter 
 were neither strong nor confident. St. Cyr, who had 
 just been appointed to the command of their army, 
 foresaw the difiiculties which he was expected to 
 surmount. His great objects were to relieve Barcelona, 
 where provisions and powder were running short ; and 
 to lay foundations for the reduction of Gerona. But 
 to escort a vast convoy to Barcelona was no easy task ; 
 and St. Cyr found it necessary to commence operations 
 by laying siege to the fort of Rosas. With the impor- 
 tant aid of British seamen this place held out till the 
 beginning of December; and during an entire month 
 it would have been in the power of an English army 
 to have landed at Palamos or Arens del Mar, and 
 have manned the defiles which led on Barcelona, even 
 if the fame of their arrival had failed to raise the siege 
 of Rosas.* But it must be admitted that Sir J. Stuart 
 
 * Again in June 1809, the landing on the coast of a British 
 corps (of half the numbers whose time was idled away at Ischia) 
 
IN" THE MEDITERRANEAlSr. 357 
 
 •could not in prudence have ventured to detach at that 
 time more than five or six thousand men to so distant 
 an object. And it must be added, that he had not a 
 general officer above the rank of brigadier, to whom 
 such a service could have been entrusted with confi- 
 dence. 
 
 Before the French began to move towards the 
 north of Italj, Rear-admiral Martin had been detached, 
 with three line-of-battle ships to Palermo by Lord 
 Oollingwood, for the special purpose of aiding in the 
 defence of Sicily; and we no longer looked to the sea 
 with doubt and apprehension. 
 
 Though Murat had stamped his Government with 
 the impress of that prompt energy which appeared to 
 be his own characteristic; though every preparation 
 seemed to be in progress for an invasion of Sicily; 
 though boats were built and collected, seafaring men 
 enrolled, and columns of troops displayed upon the 
 coasts, still there were good grounds for believing that 
 there could be no real purpose of engaging the French 
 army in so serious an enterprise under the actual 
 circumstances of Europe. 
 
 Early in December the Court of Palermo had 
 received such advices from Vienna as left little doubt 
 of the resolution to renew the war, at which the Impe- 
 rial Cabinet had arrived; and in February Austrian 
 officers, duly accredited, passed Malta on their way to 
 
 must have produced very important effects, while the immortal 
 Alvarez was holding the French army at bay under the walls of 
 Grerona. 
 
358 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 London. But in the meantime, as tte panic, excited 
 bj the taking of Oapri, had not subsided amongst the 
 Sicilians two months afterwards, and the public feeling 
 in all the towns was as bad as possible, Sir John 
 Stuart was willing to try whether the King, or the 
 barons, or the people, could be brought bj British help 
 and encouragement, to make any serious exertion for 
 the defence of their island. 
 
 There had been a pompous scheme put forward by 
 the Court early in 1808 for the levy of a volunteer 
 army to the amount of 40,000 men. The real design 
 of this project was to throw dust into the eyes of the 
 British minister; and to buy the support of certain 
 influential barons, by giving them local patronage and 
 the means of jobbing. Of course no volunteers made 
 their appearance; and if they had, the Government 
 possessed neither the means of paying nor of arming 
 them. At this time then Sir John Stuart wrung from 
 the Court, though with great difiiculty, an order for 
 embodying two battalions of these supposed volun- 
 teers, one at Agosta, the other at Milazzo. Each 
 w^as to consist of about 500 men; and the English 
 General undertook to pay them and to supply them 
 with arms and accoutrements. Now let us see the 
 result of this experiment. Of the Agosta battalion 
 not a single man was produced ! But at Milazzo, by 
 crimping and all sorts of discreditable means, 380 men 
 were brought together. Such was their voluntary 
 ardour that the officers found it necessary to place 
 them immediately in confinement : and about ninety 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 359 
 
 of tliem being locked into a house, tliey tore off the 
 roof, and betook themselyes to the mountains. A few 
 days afterwards the Colonel found it expedient to' 
 discharge the remainder of his "volunteers f and thus 
 ended the only attempt to form a national army for 
 the defence of Sicily. 
 
 Thus then wore away the winter ; but in March, 
 1809, we knew with certainty that war between 
 France and Austria was close at hand. Not only was 
 a proportion of the enemy's best troops despatched to 
 the north, but his batteries along the shores of Cala- 
 bria were disarmed, and his gun-boats and transport 
 vessels were withdrawn to Naples. At the same 
 time Count de la Tour, a general officer in the Im- 
 perial service, arrived in Sicily, commissioned to make 
 known to the British commander the plans which 
 Austria had in view, with regard to the war in Italy, 
 and to solicit our active co-operation. It was designed 
 that the Archduke John should cross the Isonzo before 
 the middle of April, and march rapidly upon the 
 Adige : while a detachment embarking at the head of 
 the Adriatic, under the protection of the British 
 squadron in that quarter, should menace the coast 
 between Venice and Rimini, and act according to 
 circumstances. But the most remarkable part of the 
 information brought by the Count de la Tour was tliis ; 
 that Austria was in correspondence with the Patriotti 
 of Italy; and she professed her readiness to afford 
 them her aid not only in expelling the French, but in 
 setting up a constitutional and independent kingdom 1 
 
360 MILITARY TRAKSACTION& 
 
 The Emperor at the same time could not help recom- 
 mending that one of his archdukes should be the 
 constitutional and independent king. Whether such 
 a correspondence was serious and in good faith on 
 either part, and whether the scheme would have 
 ripened if the Austrian arms had been successful, can 
 never be known ; but it is certain that there was at 
 this time a fermenting spirit at work in all parts of 
 Italy, and a very general desire to be rid of their 
 French masters. 
 
 With regard to our own part in the plaj, it was 
 obviously our best policy (and such was the earnest 
 desire of Austria) that we should strike our blow as 
 nearly as possible at the time when our Imperial ally 
 should be making his main effort."'' But it was less 
 easy to decide as to place than as to time, hampered 
 as we were by the necessity of keeping a sure hold of 
 Sicily. The Austrians naturally desired that we 
 should come as near to their army as possible, so that 
 our movements might operate more immediately as a 
 diversion in their favour : but Murat had still nearly 
 30,000 men in the kingdom of Naples (though not 
 one half of them were French) ; and tliere was a weak 
 division, under General Miollis in the Roman States. 
 On our side there was a lamentably large proportion 
 of foreign soldiers, and as I have said before, a 
 lamentable lack of general officers in whose abilities 
 
 * The Memoir presented by Count de la Tour on the part 
 of the Austrian government, ended with these words: "Toute 
 diversion est utile; le moment presse; et c'est le dernier." 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 361 
 
 Of experience any confidence could be placed. Sir J. 
 Stuart could not have ventured to carry to the coast 
 of Tuscany at this time more than seven or eight 
 thousand men :^'' while, if he began his work nearer 
 home, he had the power of bringing to bear on King 
 Joachim some 12,000 of our own, and 6000 of the 
 Neapolitan troops. It seemed therefore to be our 
 best plan to strike quickly and sharply at the divisions 
 which Murat still kept of necessity in the provinces 
 distant from his capital; to reduce his strength, 
 damage his reputation, and cripple his means as much 
 as possible; and then to menace Naples itself; but, 
 without lingering there, to pass rapidly on and strike 
 a blow at Rome, or even farther to the north. We 
 might feel at our ease about Sicily, when all the 
 enemy's troops should have been rolled back upon 
 Naples and Gaeta. However, the main point was 
 promptitude in acting. Everything was ready on our 
 part : the transports were ready for sea, guns and 
 ammunition were on board, and our troops quartered 
 close to the places where they were to embark. But 
 our general could not make up his mind as to what 
 he would attempt, or how, or where, or when he 
 would try his fortune. The French held small garri- 
 
 * To these, perhaps, might have been added a couple of 
 thousand Sardinians (good troops) from Cagliari; but still these 
 would have been too few to raise and maintain a wide and last- 
 ing war, unless Leghorn could have been carried by a coup de 
 main ; and of this there seemed little probability. Still it is to 
 be noted that Lord Collingwood was desirous we should go to 
 the coast of Tuscany. 
 
362 MILITARY TRANSACTION-S 
 
 sons in the castles of Reggio and Scilla, and a chain 
 
 of posts up to Mileto and Monteleone, where they 
 
 trere believed to have three or four thousand men. 
 
 In Upper Calabria, the Principato and Basilicata they 
 
 had five or six thousand more, widely scattered to 
 
 keep down insurrections, but ready to march on the 
 
 first intelligence of our being in motion. Their 
 
 positions, however, were becoming uneasy; insurgents 
 
 were shewing themselves and gathering strength in the 
 
 Basilicata and Puglia; and others, quickened by the 
 
 exploits of our seamen along the coast of the Adriatic, 
 
 were up and daring in the march of Ancona,* and 
 
 across the Apennines even to Arezzo. Sir John 
 
 Stuart appeared at times disposed to strike at least at 
 
 the enemy in Calabria; but he could never make up 
 
 his mind. He dawdled and fretted in his quarters; 
 
 issued no orders, nor even looked at the troops. The 
 
 spirit of discontent and even of contempt, to which I 
 
 have before alluded, became every day more general 
 
 and more mischievous in the army. And thus passed 
 
 away in worse than idleness the important month of 
 
 April. Then we were roused from our sulky languor 
 
 by repeated salvoes from the cannon of Scilla and 
 
 Reggio ; and by the French accounts of their victories 
 
 at Eckmuhl and Ratisbon. 
 
 These events gave a new and a more dangerous 
 
 turn to the spirit by which very many of our ofiicers, 
 
 including some of the highest rank were infected. They 
 
 had persuaded tliemsclves already that Sir John Stuart 
 
 * Lord Collingwood to Admiral Sotheby, June 30, 1809. 
 
IK THiS MEDITERRANEAN. S6^ 
 
 1\^as incompetent for the command of an army on active 
 service; and now thej decided amongst themselves 
 that it would be madness to go forth on an expedition, 
 since our Allies had been defeated on the Danube. 
 
 But just before this period, Stuart had communi- 
 cated to Lord Collingwood a small design which he 
 had been nursing, of sailing to Ischia, taking possession 
 of that island, and from thence threatening the citj of 
 Naples. The Admiral answered frankly that he did 
 not see that such an expedition could answer any 
 useful purpose; but the General nevertheless did not 
 relinquish his little project, in which he was encouraged 
 by the Court of Palermo. The preparations for an 
 expedition therefore went forward, and the cabal grew 
 furious. The most unbecoming language was known 
 to be current, and at length Sir J. Stuart, who had 
 long avoided conversation w^ith his Adjutant-General, 
 James Campbell, or myself, suddenly sent for me. I 
 found him extremely agitated, and he poured forth his 
 complaints apparently with full confidence. He told 
 me that a general officer had come to him, seemingly 
 as the spokesman of several others, and had held to 
 him a language of remonstrance and censure so strong 
 and unbecoming, as to lead him to apprehend an open 
 resistance to his authority, and a disobedience of his 
 commands, if he should order the troops to embark ! 
 At Sir John's desire Campbell and I bestirred ourselves 
 to ascertain the extent of the mischief : and we soon 
 found out that though the spirit was bad, and the 
 
S64 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 language in common use was indefensible, tliere was 
 no danger of an open mutiny. Under the circum- 
 stances, however, the best thing to be done was to 
 disperse the caballers, to get the troops on board their 
 ships, and to sail away from Sicily. 
 
 The fleet which issued forth from the anchorage 
 of Milazzo made a splendid show. It was a great 
 armada. Innumerable vessels of all descriptions, con- 
 voyed by three ships of the line, and some frigates 
 and brigs of war, covered the blue sea from the Lipari 
 Islands to the coast of Calabria. Nearly 13,000 
 soldiers were embarked in the transports;'"' and in 
 outward seeming we might have vied with the proudest 
 armaments which had carried the standards of England 
 to fields of glory. But our General had done with 
 fields of glory. 
 
 The movement of the fleet began on the 11th 
 June, but the wind was light and unfavourable, and 
 darkness fell before the whole of the vessels had cleared 
 the bay. Early in the morning of the 12th the tran- 
 sports which had on board six companies of the lOtli 
 regiment and the Chasseurs Britanniques, parted 
 company, and passed through the Faro of Messina, 
 
 * For a detail of our troops, see the Appendix. We carried 
 1000 mounted dragoons, and above 400 artillerymen; 5200 
 British infantry, 3600 Germans and Swiss, 1000 of our Corsicans 
 and Calabrese, and General Nunziante's brigade of Neapolitan 
 infantry, by no means bad soldiers, and led by a brave and 
 earnest officer. "We had good commanders of brigades; Oswald, 
 Lumley, Airy, Honstedt, Hinubw, 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAK. . 365 
 
 according to a plan whicli had been previously con- 
 certed for an attack on the castle of Scilla.* Large boats 
 having heavy ordnance and engineer's stores on board 
 were lying ready at Messina, and a part of the 21st 
 regiment were prepared to join in this attempt, which 
 was placed under the command of Colonel Haviland 
 Smith. To what took place in this quarter I will 
 return, after narrating the progress of the grand expe- 
 dition. But it may be convenient to mention here 
 what were the calculations of our commander with 
 regard to the enemy's troops which remained in Cala- 
 bria. It was known that General Partonneaux was 
 still about Monteleone with four or five thousand men, 
 and some civic guards. But Stuart expected too confi- 
 dently that when his armament should be seen passing 
 slowly along the coast of Calabria, the French would 
 immediately draw to the northward from a fear of 
 being cut ofi*. This, however, did not happen. Par- 
 
 * The first purpose of this detachment was to afford greater 
 security to Messina in case the French should make a dash at 
 the town. Afterwards, it was to dismantle the enemy's batte- 
 ries, and attack Scilla. So perfectly confident was Stuart of 
 the success of this episode, that in making his report to the 
 Secretaiy of State a fortnight afterwards, he says, "our appear- 
 ance on the coast of Calabria had the effect of inducing the body 
 of the enemy stationed in that province to abandon, for the 
 purpose of immediate concentration, the greater part of their 
 posts along the shore; when those upon the line opposite 
 Messina were seized and disarmed by a corps under Lieut.- 
 Golonel Smith, who had been detached." &c. (Sir John Stuart 
 to Yiscount Castlereagh, Ischia, July 5th, 1809.) Before Sir 
 John wrote this official despatch. Smith had been obliged to fly 
 to Messina. 
 
365 MILITARY TRAl^SACTIONS 
 
 tonneaux held his ground, and we went on our way in 
 ignorance; for though we held communication with 
 the. coast, the masse, who were again appearing in 
 armed bands, always deceived us as to the number^ 
 and stations of the enemy. 
 
 If it was Sir John Stuart's desire only to make a 
 grand display, the weather certainly favoured him to 
 the utmost. Day after day we floated on the still 
 blue sea, with scarcely a breeze to help us on our way, 
 Oif Amantea our great fleet was joined by nearly a, 
 hundred more vessels, bringing Prince Leopold, and 
 all the troops that could be sent forth from Palermo ; 
 the whole under the command of General Bourcard. 
 This officer immediately received Sir John Stuart's 
 instructions to make a show of landing near Policastro, 
 while the English expedition should proceed as directly 
 as the calms and variable breezes would permit, to the 
 Bay of Naples. But it was not till late on the 
 thirteenth day that we came to anchor between Ischia 
 and the mainland behind Baia. It was, indeed, high 
 time ; for our horses were beginning to suffer severely 
 from the heat of the crowded vessels, and the lack of 
 water, which was nearly exhausted. Without loss of 
 time we reconnoitred the places of landing on Procida 
 as well as Ischia ; and we found the appearance of the 
 batteries more formidable than we had expected. 
 However, there was now no choice, and orders were 
 issued for a debarkation at daybreak on the eastern 
 side of Ischia. 
 
 After midnight the launches of our transports, 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 367 
 
 haying on board two battalions of light infantry, the 
 81st regiment, and the Corsican Rangers, assembled 
 under the stern of H.M.S. Spartiate, 74 guns, the 
 captain of which, Sir Francis Laforej, was appointed 
 to lead and regulate the process of landing. The 
 troops were under the command of Major-General 
 Mac Farlane and Brigadier Lumlej. The Warrior, 
 74, the Success frigate, and a swarm of English and 
 Sicilian gun-boats were prepared to engage the enemy's 
 batteries, and cover the approach of the troops; but 
 the collecting and setting in order of the boats during 
 the darkness, the heaviness of the launches, "^^ and the 
 want of power in the skijQTs selected to tow them, 
 occasioned so much delay that when the day broke on 
 the 25th of June, the flotilla was still nearly a league 
 from the shore. However, the men-of-war and gun-boats 
 set to their work as soon as there was sufficient light 
 to engage the batteries. The enemy made but a poor 
 return, and his fire was shortly silenced. Our light 
 infantry landed, and scrambling up the rocky banks 
 they encountered as paltry a resistance as that which 
 had been ofi'ered by the batteries. Though the enemy 
 went off precipitately they left about one hundred and 
 eighty prisoners in Lumley's hands, while on our part 
 not a man was hurt. The landing of two brigades 
 
 * Although the British army in the Mediterranean had been 
 from the first destined to various services, all involving the 
 chance of debarking in face of an enemy, no flat-bottomed, boats, 
 or light craft fit for such services, had been provided by our 
 successive governments. No expedition of troops by sea ought 
 to be without such boats. 
 
368 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 was effected without farther impediment; and a 
 summons was sent in the evening to General Colonna, 
 who held command in the castle of Ischia. On his 
 refusing to capitulate, we took measures immediately 
 to bring some heavy guns on shore. But in the mean- 
 time, the moment our landing in Ischia was secured, a 
 summons had been despatched to the Governor of 
 Procida, requiring his surrender. On the preceding 
 evening King Joachim had come in person to the 
 Punta di Miseno, and had made a strenuous effort to 
 throw a reinforcement into Procida. About 130 men 
 got across in the night, but nearly as many more were 
 intercepted and captured on their way; and amongst 
 these prisoners was included very fortunately the Colonel 
 whom Murat had sent to assume the command of the 
 citadel. This fort was so strong that it might have 
 given us a good deal of trouble, if it had been defended 
 with resolution; but the garrison was weak and ill 
 composed; and the actual Governor was a wretched 
 old Neapolitan, who knew nothing of war, and felt 
 nothing of duty. Some shots from the Oyane and a 
 few shells from the mortar-boats had already frightened 
 him out of his wits, and he was ready to surrender the 
 moment our summons was presented. Some of his 
 officers however demurred; and while the hesitation 
 lasted, the soldiers mutinied, "^^ broke open the stores. 
 
 * The garrison consisted of about 500 men, partly invalids, 
 but principally composed of the regiment of Isembourg, a corps 
 formed out of foreign deserters and prisoners of war, Russians, 
 Sclavonians, and what not. 
 
[ m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 369 
 
 maddened themselves with brandy, and were on the 
 point of committing every sort of atrocity, when 
 General Oswald determined to arrest the mischief by 
 landing his grenadiers without waiting for a capitula- 
 tion. He entered the fort, disarmed the mutineers, 
 and saved the officers from having their throats cut. 
 In the meantime, however, so alert had the people of 
 Procida been, when the magazines were thrown open, 
 fc that we found scarcely any provisions left, out of the 
 f stores for 1500 men which Murat had deposited 
 therein. Thus, in less than twenty-four hours were 
 the British in possession of both the islands, excepting 
 the old castle of Ischia. 
 
 The night of the 25th of June, however, did not 
 pass in quiet. Our shipping had been anchored 
 between the islands and the main land, but nearer to 
 the latter, from which they were distant less than a 
 league. They stretched nearly two miles to the 
 northward, and parallel to that part of the coast, 
 which, skirted by swamps and thickets, is called the 
 Fusaro. The passage between Baia and Procida was 
 watched by the Cyane sloop of war, and several of our 
 gun-boats. The line-of-battle ships were lying under 
 the high land of Ischia ; and the vessels opposite to the 
 Fusaro were almost entirely transports. At three in 
 the morning of the 26 th, I was roused by a Neapolitan 
 boatman, who told me that he had discerned nearly 
 thirty of the enemy's gun-boats stealing between our 
 transports and the shore, and holding a course towards 
 Cape Miseno. The intelligence was strange, but it was 
 
 2 B 
 
370 MILITAEY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 true. Murat had worked successfully to form a power- 
 ful flotilla. But when threatened by an invasion from 
 Sicily, and uncertain as to the point where we might 
 strike our blow, he sent one-half of his vessels to Gaeta 
 to strengthen the means of that fortress, about which 
 he seems to have felt much jealousy. But when we 
 pounced unexpectedly on Ischia and Procida, and our 
 designs appeared to point at the capital itself, the 
 warrior-king became anxious to recover the help of the 
 stout gun-vessels of which he had unwarily deprived 
 himself. The position of our great fleet seemed to cut 
 them ofi* from Naples; they could have no chance of 
 making the passage in the day-time ; and the nights 
 were at their shortest. No attempt, however, was too 
 hazardous for the spirit of Joachim Murat. He ordered 
 his flotilla to start from Gaeta, where no English 
 cruiser was then stationed, to creep close along the 
 shore, and passing within the British shipping in 
 perfect silence, to double, if possible, the Cape of 
 Miseno;"^'^ while the calm which always prevailed 
 towards day-break, would prevent our ships of war 
 from working. In the night the King came in person 
 to the sea- coast, with reinforcements for his batteries, 
 and light artillery to work along the beach. 
 
 As soon as I had heard the fisherman's story, the 
 alarm was raised. The Volage tried in vain to get 
 tinder way: there was not a breath of air. Only six 
 light gun-boats, belonging to our flotilla, were at hand; 
 
 * The island and batteries of Procida were still in the 
 enemy's hands when these orders were given. 
 
IK THE MEDITERRANEAN. 37l 
 
 but these commanded by Lieutenant Cameron, of the 
 21st Regiment, pushed for the shore. The first break 
 of dawn shewed us thirtj-four of the enem/s vessels, 
 which had already passed the body of our fleet, and 
 were pulling vigorously for the Cape. Notwithstand- 
 ing this disparity of force Cameron closed with them 
 at once ; and he fastened on them with so determined 
 a valour and so much success, as to give time to 
 Captain Read of the 27th to come up with the main 
 body of our own, and the Sicilian gun-boats; while a 
 faint breeze rising, enabled the Cyane, of 24, and the 
 Espoir, of 16 guns, to cross the enemy's van. A 
 battery near the Cape, which endeavoured to protect 
 them, was silenced by the fire of the Cyane ; and some 
 of the rearmost of the enemy's vessels having run on 
 shore under another battery, protected by a consider- 
 able number of French infantry, a very satisfactory 
 interlude was played in the sight of our fleet, and 
 probably within ken of Murat himself. One company 
 of the King's German Legion, a party of marines, and 
 30 or 40 of the Calabrese free corps, pushed ofi* to the 
 shore ; they charged and routed the enemy's infantry, 
 killing a good many, and capturing an officer and 
 thirty-six men ; while our seamen destroyed the vessels. 
 The result of this morning's action was the capture 
 of twenty-four of King Joachim's gun-boats, and the 
 destruction of five. Five others managed to scramble 
 round the point, and they found shelter under the 
 forts of Baia, though torn by the shot of the Cyane 
 and Bspoir. On our side the loss of men was trifling; 
 
 2b2 
 
372 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 but we had to lament the death of Cameron, a young 
 officer attached to my department, whose conspicuous 
 gallantry in this day's service excited the admiration 
 both of our navy and army. 
 
 There remained no other work for us on the island 
 than the reduction of the castle of Ischia. This 
 picturesque old fortress is perched upon a rock washed 
 by the sea on every side, save where a very narrow 
 isthmus connects it with the mainland. General 
 Colonna had a garrison of nearly 300 men, amongst 
 whom were some well-trained gunners : they made 
 good shots ; and the first they fired, though plunging, 
 sent one of our gun-boats to the bottom. But the 
 castle was commanded by the lower falls of the 
 mountain opposite to it; and though our antagonist 
 gave our people the trouble of cutting a road, and 
 dragging some 24 -pounders up the hill, he was obliged 
 to surrender his fort on the 30 th of June. 
 
 Thus then at the end of six days there remained 
 nothing farther to be done, as far as Ischia and 
 Procida were concerned. Our feats had served to 
 throw Naples into hot water, which had indeed been 
 raised to boiling heat on the 27th, when an audacious 
 attack was made by that gallant officer Thomas 
 Staines, commanding the Oyane of 24 guns, assisted 
 by the Espoir brig, on a large frigate, a corvette, and 
 ten gun-boats, which were endeavouring to escape 
 from Baia to Naples. The enemy kept close along 
 the shore, ^deriving support from the coast-batteries, 
 and finally from the castles of the capital itself, till 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 373 
 
 the action ended at the molehead of Naples. In sight 
 of the numbers who clustered on the sides of the hills 
 and on the house-tops, in sight of Murat himself, who 
 came raging into the batteries to excite the gunners, in 
 despite of the thunder from the forts, Thomas Staines 
 tore this 40-gun frigate so terribly, that in fear of 
 being boarded, she at last cut the cable she had 
 dropped, and staggered within the harbour. The fever 
 which this action aroused in the city of Naples was 
 such as to awaken in the mind of King Joachim the 
 dread of a sudden insurrection ; and he adopted imme- 
 diately the severest measures to prevent or put down 
 such an attempt. On our part we had to lament that 
 our valiant countryman, who had given to the French 
 and Neapolitans such a specimen of what English 
 sailors are capable, that Staines should have been so 
 severely wounded as to deprive our navy of his services 
 for a long time. 
 
 Before I return to a consideration of what our 
 army might have been expected to attempt after the 
 reduction of the islands, it is necessary that I should 
 give some account of what had been passing in Cala- 
 bria, and almost within sight of Messina. It will be 
 remembered that Colonel Smith had been detached 
 first to cover our head-quarters in Sicily against any 
 possible insult on the part of the French, and 
 secondly, after having waited a few days to afford 
 time for General Partonneaux to march away from 
 Lower Calabria (as it was presumed he would), to 
 destroy the enemy's batteries along the straits, and 
 
374 MILITARY TEANS ACTIONS 
 
 finally to lay siege to Scilla. Smith proceeded to act 
 according to his instructions. The dismantling of the 
 batteries on the beach was easy enough, for the French 
 had left nothing there but a few old iron guns. The 
 information respecting Partonneaux was false or vague 
 as usual. It was believed that his division, or most of 
 them, had marched towards Naples; and Smith invested 
 the castle of Scilla. He had six companies of the 10th, 
 eight of the 21st regiment, and some of Watte ville's ; 
 in all about 1300 bayonets, exclusive of the artillery. 
 Heavy guns had been held ready, and were promptly 
 landed and dragged up the hill to batter the old fort. 
 But Colonel Smith did not feel himself quite at his 
 ease with regard to the enemy, who was supposed to 
 have left the province; and he therefore detached 
 two companies of the 21st regiment under Captains 
 Hunter and Mc Kay to Palmi, about fifteen miles 
 distant, with orders to keep a sharp look out (with the 
 help of the Calabrese) on the road towards Monteleone. 
 Trusting to this watch upon the enemy, Smith applied 
 himself to the siege of Scilla. In the followiug night 
 the picquet of the 21st in advance of Palmi was 
 surprised, and Captain McKay badly wounded, and 
 made prisoner with his men, by the advanced guard of 
 Partonneaux's division, which broke without halting 
 into the town, killed Captain Hunter and some of his 
 people, and captured nearly the whole of the detach- 
 ment. The French followed the chase, in the eager 
 hope of catching Smith still before the walls of Scilla : 
 but he luckily received news of the disaster just in 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 375 
 
 time to throw all his men into boats, and to repass 
 the straits, abandoning the guns and stores which had 
 been brought over for the siege. Haviland Smith 
 was a good officer, and no blame was attached to him 
 on account of this failure. He went to his work under 
 the impression, conveyed bj Sir John Stuart's orders, 
 that the French troops would be drawn away from 
 Lower Calabria by the operations of our army ; nor 
 was he responsible for the falsehood of the intelli- 
 gence received afterwards at Messina, where Generals 
 McKenzie and White were in command. But scarcely 
 had Partonneaux driven the English from the Oalabrian 
 shore, when he received orders to abandon the province 
 altogether, and to hasten with every man that could 
 bear arms to the support of the war around the 
 capital. The castle of Scilla, in which a fine train 
 of heavy brass artillery had been collected for the 
 invasion of Sicily, was blown up by the French ; the 
 guns were cast into the sea ; the most valuable stores 
 destroyed; and General Partonneaux set ofi* upon 
 his long march, carrying with him the late garrison of 
 Scilla. 
 
 But we must now return to Ischia. There we 
 were with 13,000 or 14,000 eating men (including 
 officers and followers) and some 1500 horses and 
 mules, upon a small island, extremely beautiful, but 
 yielding none of those supplies which an army requires, 
 excepting wine. Even of good water there was a 
 scarcity. In a few days the inconvenience was 
 increased by the arrival of Prince Leopold with his 
 
376 MILITARY TKANSACTIONS 
 
 part of the expedition. They had threatened Poli- 
 castro, and Agropoli, and finally Sorrento, and then 
 they came to take up their quarters on the western 
 side of Ischia, as we occupied the east and the north; 
 and beds of lava have possession of the south. As 
 neighbours we were very disagreeable and troublesome 
 to Murat. The swarming populace of Naples and its 
 vicinity were in a ferment, and were kept down only 
 by the severest vigilance and rigour. The principal 
 places in the city were closed by barricades, and 
 defended by strong posts of soldiery, and through the 
 streets patrols were pacing their rounds night and day. 
 King Joachim called in his troops from every distant 
 quarter, though flashes of insurrection were gleaming 
 in several of his provinces. He summoned Partonneaux, 
 as we have seen, from Sciila, and he recalled from 
 Rome, by forced marches, some battalions which he 
 had recently sent thither for purposes to which I must 
 presently allude. Always in active exertion, encourag- 
 ing his soldiery, daunting the disaifected by a display 
 of his own intrepidity, and longing impatiently for the 
 landing of the English army, still Murat must have felt 
 his position very embarrassing while the great war 
 remained undecided in Austria. JN"or were his appre- 
 hensions of risings and conspiracies in his capital 
 without a cause. Shortly after we had settled our- 
 selves in Ischia, there came over two gentlemen who 
 solicited an interview with our General, announcing 
 themselves as accredited delegates from the " Patriotti" 
 of Italy. Sir John Stuart would not even admit them 
 
IK THE MEDITERRANEAN. 377 
 
 to his presence. He turned them over to me that I 
 might hear and dismiss them, and report the conversa- 
 tion to him. Nothing could appear more fair, straight- 
 forward, and explicit, than the language these two 
 gentlemen held to me. It was to this purport : " We 
 are Neapolitans; and we come here more particularly 
 on the part of the Patriotti of this kingdom, bj whom 
 we are authorized to treat : but we act in concert with 
 similar associations which exist all over Italy. We 
 are sent to ask what are the intentions of the British 
 General in bringing his army to the Bay of Naples. 
 If it be simply to drive the French out of the country, 
 we will aid him to the utmost of our power ; and our 
 power is great. We wish to get rid of the French, 
 and to make our country independent. But if you 
 come with the view of replacing Ferdinand and his 
 Queen on the throne of Naples, we will to a man take 
 arms with the French and fight against you. We will 
 never trust King Ferdinand again, nor ever suffer 
 Caroline to set her foot on these shores. To the 
 hereditary prince we should not feel the same objec- 
 tions, provided he should come without his parents or 
 their ministers, and would take his place as a limited 
 sovereign in a freely constituted state.'^ 
 
 But to this overture Sir John Stuart declined to 
 make any reply whatever; and as the delegates saw 
 that Prince Leopold was on the island, they could put 
 no other construction on our General's silence and 
 lack of courtesy than that his object was to replace 
 King Ferdinand on his throne. Yet strangely enough, 
 
378 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 almost at the same time, Sir John Stuart, taking 
 just umbrage at some acts of oppression and assumption 
 of authority at Ischia on the part of Prince Leopold 
 and his people, put a stop to them with a rough hand, 
 and a very decisive tone. A change appeared to have 
 come over the spirit of the Count of Maida, who had 
 hitherto been a zealous defender and encomiast of the 
 royal personages at Palermo. On the 3rd of July, 
 there being many people at his dinner-table, he broke 
 out into this tirade : " As for the king, his cause is 
 desperate; he has lost one kingdom, and he must lose 
 the other. There is no alternative for England but to 
 take Sicily for herself, or to abandon it altogether," 
 The guests were probably of the same opinion, but 
 they could only wonder in respectful acquiescence. I 
 wondered more than any of them, because I had been 
 in the way of hearing Sir John's sentiments a long 
 time, and in more privacy. 
 
 But I must return to our military position and its 
 relationship to the general concerns of the war. Though 
 we had merely set ourselves down in the islands of the 
 Bay of Naples, yet even this late show of activity 
 seems to have excited alarm in the French comman- 
 ders in Italy. Napoleon had ivssued his decree, from 
 Vienna, on the 17th of May, for the dethronement of 
 the Pope, and the annexation of the Papal dominions 
 to the French empire. General Miollis had in conse- 
 quence assumed the government in the name of his 
 master; but Pius VII. had been allowed to remain 
 unmolested in the Quirinal palace. The French forces 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 379 
 
 in the Roman territory were few, and, as I have 
 before stated, some battalions which had been des- 
 patched by Murat to their support, were recalled in 
 haste on our appearing in the Bay of Naples. On the 
 6th of July MioUis suddenly attacked the Quirinal, 
 seized the person of the Pope, and hurried him off 
 with the utmost rapidity to the Alps. The effect of 
 this sacrilegious violence on the minds of the Italians 
 was universal; and if, instead of eating grapes at 
 Ischia, we had struck in at that moment on the coasts 
 of Rome or Tuscany, the landing of a British army 
 might have been productive of a serious influence on 
 the results of the general war. Napoleon had been 
 defeated at Aspern on the 23rd of May ; he won the 
 hard fought battle of Wagram on the 6th of July. 
 But the Austrians were worsted only, not crushed; 
 they did not yield to peace till October, and in August 
 the war was raging. in the Tyrol. If Italy had been 
 roused by the landing of the British, Austria would 
 have fought it out; though one must confess that she 
 had little reason to rely on England when she looked 
 at our tardy, ill-designed, and worse-conducted expe- 
 dition to the Scheldt. 
 
 I pressed Sir John Stuart to attack either Oivita 
 Vecchia or Leghorn, or at least to try what might be 
 the effect of a demonstration on the northern coast of 
 Italy. But the General would not stir. 
 
 Now came from General Mc Kenzie the accounts 
 of Smith's failure at Scilla, and of the panic which had 
 in consequence seized on the people of Messina. Sir 
 
380 MILITARY THANSACTIONS 
 
 John Stuart immediately ordered Nunziante's brigade 
 and a regiment of cayalrj to return, and help to allay 
 the alarm, though it was known that Partonneaux and 
 his Frenchmen had quitted Lower Calabria. Two 
 days afterwards he directed that Airey's brigade 
 should likewise return to Messina; and though he 
 countermanded this order the following morning, it 
 became quite clear that our General was resolved to 
 confine his campaign to the reduction of Ischia and 
 Procida. Therefore, as I had come on the expedition 
 with a leave to return to England, on urgent family 
 affairs, in my pocket, I now begged permission to avail 
 myself of the Commander-in-Chiefs leave. I went 
 down in a boat to Messina in order to catch the 
 packet; and two days after my arrival at my old 
 quarters, I was surprised by the appearance of Sir 
 John Stuart and his whole army ; for he did not even 
 leave a battalion to occupy the fort of Procida and so 
 assist our navy in the blockade of Naples. 
 
 The immediate cause or apology for this sudden 
 abandonment of places which our General had imagined 
 to be objects worthy of the great armament he had 
 put forth for their reduction, was the receipt of a letter 
 from Lord Collingwood, containing the following para- 
 graphs : ** Ever since the movement of the army from 
 Sicily, there appears to have been a particular degree 
 of activity at Toulon. They have a fleet of twelve 
 sail of the line, seven frigates, and many smaller vessels, 
 lying at the outer part of the harbour, where they 
 never lay before, as if ready for a start." " There is 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 381 
 
 no destination so likely for them as to succour Murat, 
 and counteract jour measures. I do not think they 
 would come out to fight the English squadron, which 
 is ten sail of the line and a frigate ; but they are strong 
 enough not to require much caution to avoid it. In 
 weather when I can keep close olF the port, I do not 
 think they will move; but ten days since we had a 
 gale from the N.W. which drove the fleet almost half 
 way to Minorca ; and had they been ready then, they 
 might have sailed, and probably have been near Naples 
 before I could have known that they were out of port. 
 This may happen again, and most likely will. It is a 
 circumstance over which we can have no controul ; but 
 it is for consideration whether the ships and transports 
 are so secured at their anchorage at Ischia as not to 
 be endangered by such a fleet, if enabled to make a 
 sudden attack. But there are other objects for the 
 enemy, not of less consideration. Why in such a case 
 may they not go to Palermo 1 and if they did, what 
 is there to resist them V 
 
 This liability to the attack of a superior fleet on a 
 small squadron, with a very large convoy, at anchor in 
 an exposed roadstead, had existed from the moment 
 when it became apparent to Murat that we held no 
 designs of active hostility, but were merely making a 
 parade of menacing his capital. There was a tele- 
 graphic communication between Naples and Toulon. 
 If we had been sailing along the coast of Italy, the 
 French fleet might have been at fault ; but when our 
 two hundred transports were fast at anchor, and our 
 
382 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 troops were cantoned in Ischia, the enemy could hardly 
 miss his mark if he could make his escape from Lord 
 CoUingwood. 
 
 Thus ended the expedition from Sicily in the year 
 1809. It cost England a very large sum of money, 
 and no little reputation. Here also ends my personal 
 acquaintance with military transactions in the Mediter- 
 ranean. But the interest which I continued to feel in 
 the affairs of that part of Europe, my constant corre- 
 spondence with well-informed officers and others in 
 Sicily, and the position which I came to hold as Under- 
 Secretary of State for the War Department, have 
 enabled me to add an account, though more succinct, 
 of what occurred there in 1810.* 
 
 * I finish with 1810, because at the close of that year Lord 
 William Bentinck was sent to take the command of the army in 
 Sicily; and from that time there began a totally different course 
 of policy in that island. The protecting authority of England 
 was vindicated; the intrigues of Queen Caroline were crushed 
 with a strong hand; and by degrees the ancient constitution 
 of Sicily was restored for a time, though it was again over- 
 thrown by the treachery of the perjured King, after the general 
 peace. 
 
IK THE MEDITERRANEAN 383 
 
 Before Sir John Stuart led his army to the bay of 
 Naples, Lord Oollingwood, while throwing cold water 
 on the General's project, had suggested the expediency 
 of seizing on the Ionian Islands, which had fallen into 
 the hands of the French in 1806. The reduction of 
 these islands promised to give to England an influen- 
 tial command over the Adriatic on the one side, and 
 the eastern sea on the other. After the return of our 
 army to Sicily, the Admiral renewed his proposal that 
 a conjoint expedition should be directed to this 
 quarter; and Stuart reluctantly acquiesced.^ Sixteen 
 hundred of the troops were embarked under Brigadier 
 Oswald; and Captain Spranger of the Warrior, 74, 
 commanded the little squadron. They sailed from 
 Messina on the 23rd September ; and, after a slight 
 resistance which cost a very few lives, the islands of 
 Zante, Oefalonia, Ithaca, and Oerigo were surrendered 
 to the British arms. This part of the service was 
 completed between the 2nd and the 11th of October. 
 The enemy's works and garrison in Sta. Maura were 
 found to be too strong for the small expedition which 
 had been detached from Sicily ; and the attack upon 
 that island was postponed. As for the fortress of 
 Corfu, well manned and amply provided, it was not 
 to be meddled with till an army could be spared for 
 
 * See Lord Colling wood's Correspondence, Oct. 30th, 1809. 
 
384 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 its reduction, or till a close and constant blockade 
 might work out this end bj starving the garrison. 
 One great good, however, was obtained bj what had 
 been already done, besides the advantage of ports and 
 supplies for the English squadrons in those seas, — we 
 had found warm friends in the islanders; a people 
 hating the French, and earnestly desirous to assist us 
 in driving them out. 
 
 The long armistice between France and Austria 
 which had followed the battles of Wagram and Znaim 
 was at length terminated by the treaty of peace signed 
 at Vienna on the 1 4th of October, the miserable issue 
 of the British expedition to the Scheldt having pro- 
 bably extinguished the last hopes of the Imperial 
 Cabinet.* It was not till this treaty was concluded 
 that the French legions broke up from the frontiers of 
 Hungary and Bohemia; and while a great proportion 
 set forward on their long march for Spain, many 
 thousands took their route for Italy ; but their van 
 did not arrive at Naples before March 1810. 
 
 In the meantime the Court of Palermo had 
 engaged busily in intrigues, the object of which was to 
 squeeze more money out of the impoverished people 
 of Sicily. They were to be cajoled and deceived by 
 the adoption of a measure which bore the outward 
 
 * It ought to be recorded, to the credit of the Duke of 
 York's judgment, that he protested strongly against this expe- 
 dition. It was Lord Castlereagh's own project; and the whole 
 of the shame should be divided between him and Lord 
 Chatham. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 385 
 
 semblance of liberality. The constitutional parliament 
 of Sicily was summoned to assemble, as of yore, in its 
 three estates of Barons, Ecclesiastics, and that which 
 ought to have been the Commons of the realm, but 
 was in effect quite another thing. This third chamber 
 was composed of persons nominated by the corpora- 
 tions of certain large towns, and domains under the 
 influence of the Crown. Amongst these men Medici, 
 the minister of finance, had been busy beforehand, 
 and with complete success. It was not doubted that 
 the patronage of Government, and the influence of the 
 Archbishop would secure the Ecclesiastics; and thus, 
 feeling confident of commanding majorities in two of 
 the chambers, the Court did not fear the resistance 
 which it expected to encounter from the Barons. 
 Still it was considered prudent to try whether the 
 latter might not be softened by an affectation of 
 deference and candour. Four of the principal gran- 
 dees, Butera, Cassaro, Trabbia, and Belmonte, were 
 invited to meet the King's ministers before the assem- 
 bling of the Parliament, and to form with them a 
 committee which should investigate the state of the 
 national finances, and make inquiry into their past 
 administratiouc Prince Butera, the first Baron of 
 Sicily, was rough without being honest; and he 
 returned this singular answer to the invitation: 
 "Neither I, nor my forefathers have ever known how 
 to manage our own affairs as to money, and therefore 
 I am not capable of serving his Majesty in this 
 
 2c 
 
S86 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 matter/' Cassaro and Trabbia declined to act; and 
 Prince Belmonte alone offered to attend, but condition- 
 ally. He required, 1st, that sufficient time should be 
 allowed for the inyestigation : 2ndlj, that there should 
 be good faith and sincerity in exhibiting the real 
 deficit, and the extent of the claims : and, 3rdly, that 
 all the departments of Government should furnish 
 whatever information might be required for the fulfil- 
 ment of the duty. These conditions involved a scrutiny 
 too rigid to suit the purposes of the Queen and her 
 Ministers ; and the scheme of a committee was laid 
 aside. The Parliament met. The third chamber at 
 once voted taxes to the amount of 666,000 ounces, 
 and presented their vote for the concurrence of the 
 Barons. Butera, who had hitherto passed himself off 
 as a patriot, supported the proposition; but only four 
 of his order adhered to him. The mass of the Barons 
 rejected it; and they sent some of their number, with 
 Prince Belmonte at their head, to explain their views 
 to the Ecclesiastics. These reverend members of the 
 church had been fully prepared by the influence of 
 their Archbishop to grant all that the Government 
 required; but the eloquence of Belmonte, and the 
 proofs which he adduced of the state of the finances, 
 produced a sudden conversion. The majority of the 
 Ecclesiastics came over to the views entertained by the 
 Barons ; and to the dismay of the Archbishop and the 
 discomfiture of the Court, the Parliament granted but 
 a slight addition to the taxes, modifying at the 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 387 
 
 same time some of those which were already in 
 existence.* 
 
 The disappointment and the rage of the Queen 
 were excessive. She had no money left to carry on 
 her schemes in Calabria, or to complete the equipment 
 of an expedition of 3000 men which she had been 
 preparing to send into that province under Moliterno. 
 With Sir John Stuart she had been on very bad terms 
 since the return of the British army from Ischia: but 
 when the Sicilian Parliament was about to meet, her 
 Majesty bethought herself that it might be of some 
 advantage to her that the Court should appear at least 
 to be on a friendly footing with the English General, 
 and she graciously and urgently invited him to 
 Palermo. Sir John, however, would not go : and in 
 his despatches to Lord Liverpool, written in February, f 
 he expresses a marked distrust of the designs of the 
 Court of Palermo, as well as his dissatisfaction at their 
 conduct. We find in them nearly the same sentiments, 
 and the same grounds of complaint and suspicion, as 
 in the letters written by General Fox in 1807; and 
 with Stuart these opinions must have been the slow 
 growth of experience, for all his predilections had been 
 on the other side. To an urgent appeal for pecuniary 
 assistance, on account of the extreme distress of the 
 
 * These details were fumislied to me by a Sicilian Abbot of 
 note and good abilities, with whom I long kept up a friendly 
 correspondence. After this time he obtained a place in the 
 esteem and confidence of Lord William Bentinck. 
 
 t Letters of the 6th, 8th, and 9th February, 1810. 
 
 2c2 
 
388 MILITARY TEANSACTIONS 
 
 Government, Sir John answers that he is not at liberty 
 to divert the funds of the English army to any other 
 purpose. lie states to Lord Amherst, (then Minister 
 Plenipotentiary at Palermo) that his presence at the 
 Court could be of service only for military purposes ; 
 and as they allowed him no control or influence over 
 their troops, his attendance under the actual circum- 
 stances would be useless. But to Lord Collingwood 
 he adds this ground for his mistrust: "The Queen and 
 the Minister have recently held the language that Sicily 
 would not be attacked; and if attacked our naval 
 superiority was a sufficient defence/' 
 
 In the month of March a remarkable chan<]:e 
 suddenly appeared in the tone and in the spirits 
 of Queen Caroline. Ever since the Peace of Vienna 
 she had been depressed and seemingly desperate : now 
 Napoleon's marriage with Maria Louisa being de- 
 clared, and certain despatches having been received 
 by the Court of Palermo from the ambassador RufFo, 
 the Queen came forth as if inspired with new hopes, 
 and intent upon new projects. She no longer con- 
 fined herself to saying that naval protection was 
 sufficient for the defence of Sicily ; but she added 
 that the British army was useless and burthen some. 
 There arose the strongest suspicion that her Majesty 
 had opened, througli the Austrians, a secret commu- 
 nication with Napoleon. Without any assignable 
 object she began to fit out a number of transports as 
 for an expedition ; and she endeavoured to withdraw 
 from the straits of Messina the gun-boats, which were 
 
IN THE MEDITEBllANEAN. 389 
 
 of great importance to the English for the defence of 
 that narrow channel. A courier with despatches for 
 the Queen passed from Calabria to Messina in the 
 night, without its being made known to the British 
 General. The messenger, when detected, professed 
 himself to be an Austrian coming from Vienna: it 
 turned out that he was a Neapolitan ; and that he 
 had been detained some weeks at Naples, probably 
 to afford time for a communication between Murat 
 and Napoleon.'"' At all events, there was sufficient 
 evidence that a correspondence with the Court of 
 Palermo was carried on with the knowledge and con- 
 nivance of the enemy .f And this was at the very 
 moment when 6000 French troops having arrived at 
 
 * Sir J. Stuart to Lord Liverpool, May 23. Also Colonel 
 Coffin and the Abbate B. C. to Colonel Bunbury, April, 1810. 
 
 + CoUetta, in the seventh book of his History of Naples, 
 alludes more than once to the secret correspondence which had 
 as it was believed, grown up between Na^poleon and Queen 
 Caroline, the grandmother of his young wife. It is pretty 
 clear that Colletta gave credit to the report, and it must be 
 borne in mind that he filled a high ministerial office under King 
 Joachim ; but he believed that even his royal master was kept 
 in ignorance of the secret designs of the Emperor, and the 
 machinations of his new correspondent. It appears to have 
 been the belief of the historian that Napoleon had gladly seized 
 upon some overture made to him by Caroline on his marriage, 
 and had encouraged her to engage in dark schemes for the 
 destruction of the English, or for their expulsion from Sicily. 
 That this faithless and unscrupulous woman had promised to 
 raise the islanders against their defenders when Murat should 
 be ready for the invasion ; a promise which she was, happily, 
 unable to effect. But as, according to Colletta, Napoleon did 
 not choose to trust Murat with the whole of his secret designs, 
 the fiery warrior was made to play the part of an unconscious 
 
390 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Naples, and many more being on their march from 
 the north of Italy, Murat was despatching division 
 after division into Calabria, and was making the 
 greatest exertions to collect vessels for the invasion 
 of Sicily. The belief amongst the English and the 
 best-informed Sicilians was general, that the Queen 
 was collecting transports and gun-boats expressly for 
 the service of our enemy. At Palermo, and in the 
 great towns, disaffection was rapidly gathering head : 
 and sullen murmurs against the English, stigmatizing 
 them as men who were asleep, and who took no heed 
 
 puppet in these transactions. With this view the Emperor 
 placed the main body of the French troops, which he had sent 
 to aid his brother-in-law in the Sicilian expedition, under the 
 special control of General Grenier. To this General the secret 
 was confided ; and to him was also given a discretionary autho- 
 rity (to be produced, if necessary) to grant or to withhold, 
 according to circumstances, the co-operation of the French 
 divisions. Grenier was believed to have instructions to wait 
 until the promised risings of the Sicilians might have embar- 
 rassed the British army, and might render the invasion less 
 hazardous. It is to these causes that CoUetta attributes the 
 failure of Murat to pass the straits with his army on the 18th 
 of September, when a diversion had been made by 1600 troops 
 under General Cavaignac on the coast to the southward of 
 Messina. Grenier, says the historian, refused to allow his 
 French divisions to embark. If this be so, one cannot wonder 
 that Murat should have posted off immediately to Naples, 
 boiling with disgust and rage. It may not be immaterial to 
 note, that a letter from Napoleon to Queen Caroline had heen 
 intercepted in Spain, and was published at Cadiz in June. 
 Though this letter contained nothing material, it proved the 
 fact of there being a correspondence, and this correspondence 
 not carried on by a direct course, but through some secret 
 channels in Spain. 
 
IN THE MEDITERllANEAN. 391 
 
 to tlie condition of the country, gave evidence that 
 the Sicilians were losing their last hopes. 
 
 Before the French army in Calabria had been 
 greatly reinforced, Sir John Stuart had detached a 
 few of his troops, with an ample proportion of artil- 
 lery and engineer's stores to Zante; and Brigadier 
 Oswald, with a small squadron commanded by Cap- 
 tain EjTC, proceeded immediately to attack the 
 fortress of Santa Maura. The troops employed on 
 this service w^ere the 35th Regiment, De Roll's, and 
 the Corsican Rangers, with detachments of the Royal 
 Marines, and of the Calabrese and Greek sharp- 
 shooters. Captain Thackeray was the chief engineer, 
 and Captain Williamson commanded the artillery. 
 
 The position of this fortress, on a long narrow 
 isthmus of sand, renders it difficult of approach. The 
 castle was well supplied : it contained casemates amply 
 sufficient for the garrison ; and it was defended by 
 General Camus with about 800 men. The strength 
 of the place and the difficulties of the undertaking 
 were found to be greater than had been anticipated ; 
 but the operations of the assailants were conducted 
 with skill and vigour ; the outworks were carried in 
 succession, and with the greatest gallantry, by assault ; 
 and heavy batteries having been brought to bear upon 
 the fortress during nine days, the French General 
 surrendered on the 16th of April. This service cost 
 the British about 160 men, including a remarkably 
 large proportion of officers.''* 
 
 * The conquest of Santa Maura brought the English into a 
 
392 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 The despatches from Sir John Stuart during the 
 months of March and April, ISIO,"^^ dwell strongly 
 on the grounds he finds for distrusting the intentions 
 of the Court of Palermo, and even those of the Sici- 
 lian troops ; though he feels that if the latter were 
 placed under his command, and were paid and fed by 
 him, they might be turned to account in defending 
 the island. In the meantime, says the General, 
 columns of French troops are arriving at Naples ; 
 large bodies are moving down to Calabria ; and a law 
 of conscription has been issued by Murat, and is 
 already coming into effect. A few days afterwards 
 Sir John transmits intelligence received by him from 
 the coasts of the Adriatic and from Calabria, serving 
 to shew the great scale on which preparations were 
 being made for the invasion of Sicily, and the active 
 energy with which they were pushed forward.f He 
 repeats and dwells upon his suspicion of the persons 
 who possess full influence at the Court of Palermo, 
 and he represents the utter inefficiency of their marine, 
 of their army of 7000 starving and discontented men, 
 and their imaginary militia, to render any help to 
 the British in the event of an attack from the enemy, 
 even if the Government were sincerely desirous to 
 afford it. Under these trying circumstances, Sir John 
 Stuart had received orders from Lord Liverpool to 
 
 close communication with that celebrated savage, Ali Pacha of 
 Jannina. 
 
 * Sir J. Stuart to the Earl of Liverpool, March 24th, and 
 Apiil 18t}:. 
 
 T The same to the same, April 27th, and May 1st. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 393 
 
 send four battalions to Gibraltar, upon their being 
 relieved bj a smaller number of sickly soldiers from 
 England. Deeply impressed with a sense of the 
 present dangers, and the responsibility of his position, 
 the General had resolved to detain, for the present, 
 not only the troops which he was required to detach, 
 but those likewise which were announced as being on 
 their way to relieve them. 
 
 • The British Government had by this time engaged 
 themselves deeply in the war of the Spanish penin- 
 sula. Though there were doubts and misgivings 
 amongst them as to the soundness of Lord Welling- 
 ton's undertaking to defend Portugal against the 
 power of France, yet he was just entering on the 
 immortal campaign of 1810, and our ministers were 
 anxious to strengthen his army by all the troops they 
 could collect from every quarter. It was for this 
 purpose that they called for four battalions from 
 Sicily and Malta, forgetting, in their anxiety for 
 Portugal, the interests of England in the former 
 country, and even the dangerous circumstances in 
 which Stuart's army was actually placed. With less 
 than 14,000 men,^ nearly one half of whom were 
 foreigners, he had to garrison four fortified places, 
 and to make head with the remainder against Murat, 
 who was about to assemble 20,000 or 30,000 French 
 on the Straits of Messina. Whether it was wise in 
 the British Government, now that Austria was 
 crushed, and Russia still in alliance with Napoleon, 
 * About 2000 being now detached to the Ionian Islands. 
 
394 MILITAllY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 to attempt the defence of both Sicily and Portugal, 
 may perhaps be doubted, though the issue has appeared 
 to justify the resolution. The military means of 
 England had been crippled by the consequences of 
 the expedition to the Scheldt. Of that noble army 
 which was sent to sicken in the marshes of Walcheren, 
 few were the battalions which recovered from the 
 feyer sufficiently to be fit for service in the following 
 year ; and when Wellington was urging upon the 
 attention of ministers the vast importance of collecting 
 as large a force as possible at Lisbon, there were but 
 few regular regiments in England capable of taking 
 the field. Lord Liverpool therefore reiterated his 
 order to Stuart to detach the four battalions ; and 
 great was the anger of our Cabinet when the General 
 again declined to yield obedience. Yet, considering 
 the circumstances in which his army was placed, ''^ it 
 would be unjust to censure him, or to cavil at his 
 declaring that if the numbers of the British were to 
 be farther reduced, and the means of calling forth 
 and directing the resources of Sicily were still with- 
 held, the confidence of the people in the British would 
 be chilled, and he could not consent to hold himself 
 responsible for the result. In fact the preparations 
 of Murat appeared in the month of June to be nearly 
 ripe for his attack upon Sicily ; and very formidable 
 these preparations were. From 20,000 to 25,000 
 French were massed at the extremity of Lower Ca- 
 labria, and many more were behind them. Large 
 * Sir John Stuart to the Earl of Liverpool, June 9th, 1810. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 395 
 
 boats, many of tliem carrying guns, were being gathered 
 in great numbers, and making their way from post to 
 post till they reached their rendezvous, under cover 
 of the numerous batteries which now lined the shore 
 from Palmi to Reggio. But the enemy was not always 
 allowed to carry forward these preparations with 
 impunity : the gallantry and success by which one 
 action in particular was attended, make it deserving 
 of record. A part of our army-flotilla, commanded 
 by Captain Read of the 27th Regiment, (the late Sir 
 Thomas Read, and Consul at Tunis), attacked a large 
 convoy coming from Naples, which was resting under 
 the shelter of batteries between Bagnara and Palmi. 
 Eight of the enemy's gun-boats were sunk, and three 
 others, together with eleven vessels laden with field- 
 artillery, ammunition and stores, were captured and 
 carried into Messina.*^'^ However, it was calculated 
 that by the beginning of July nearly 500 of these 
 large boats were assembled on the shores of Lower 
 Calabria, and they were held in constant readiness to 
 cross the straits. Murat had arrived in person, and 
 with that love of pompous display which belonged to 
 his character, he pitched a magnificent pavilion, and a 
 gigantic standard on the brow of the point of Pezzo, 
 overlooking the whole of the channel, and full in the 
 
 * Another of tlie enemy's convoys was intercepted by 
 Captain Waldegrave of H. M. frigate, Thames, with two brigs 
 of war in company, on the 25th of July ; when twelve gun- 
 boats, and thirty-one transport vessels, were taken or destroyed 
 after an action gallantly fought by the British marines and the 
 crews of the boats led on by Captain Prescott. 
 
896 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 view of every British post from Messina to the Faro. 
 Close behind this gaudj abode of the warrior-king 
 were grouped the huts of the thousands which formed 
 the flower of his army. There could be no doubt 
 that the fixed determination of that valiant chieftain 
 was, to quit his position only when he should step 
 on board his barge, and lead his forces to the hostile 
 shore. 
 
 By this time, however, the aspect of that shore 
 was greatly changed. The engineers and staff officers 
 of the British army had not been idle, however careless 
 and indifferent their General might appear. A chain 
 of heavy batteries connected the Faro point with the 
 fortress of Messina; and these were supported by 
 fortified posts and barracks. A squadron of four sail 
 of the line, and three brigs of war were anchored 
 along the coast, and covered those parts of the beach 
 which were most exposed to attack, while our flotilla, 
 now mustering nearly one hundred boats, since the 
 Neapolitans had been taken into British pay, lay 
 clustered round the Faro, ready to be let slip upon the 
 flank and rear of the enemy's armada. The peasantry 
 of the Val Demone displayed a hearty good will 
 towards the English, and an anxious desire to render 
 all the assistance in their power. They came down 
 by hundreds, with their long spades (zappe) to the 
 shore, shouting, "Viva '1 R^ Giorgio!'' and proflfcring 
 their voluntary labour in throwing up works of defence. 
 Two strong regiments, the 31st and 39tli, were brought 
 from Malta to increase the strength of the British line : 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 397 
 
 and not a day passed without a skirmish more or less 
 brisk between the opposing flotillas. And thus stood 
 the English and French in battle array, army against 
 army, on either side of a strait so narrow that every 
 movement of the smallest body of troops could be 
 observed by their opponents; individuals could be 
 recognised by means of spying glasses; and the heavy 
 guns from Murat's batteries sent plunging shot over 
 the British works. But while the opposing hosts lay 
 in this close proximity, and the enemy's attempt to 
 pass was expected every night, the Court of Palermo 
 gave no sign of care or alarm.* "The Court makes 
 no efibrt, sends no succour, takes no notice, and laughs 
 at Lord Amherst. Ferdinando 4 to. goes a tunny- 
 fishing, and his wife continues her usual pranks ; pro- 
 nounced by her own subjects, and convicted in my 
 mind, of acting in concert with Murat for our expul- 
 sion.'' Every mark of attachment to the English 
 became distasteful to the Court; the zeal shewn by 
 the peasantry drew forth expressions of reprobation ; 
 and when the wealthier classes in Messina tendered 
 the^use of their horses to drag the British guns, the 
 Governor was instructed to interfere, and if possible 
 prevent the accomplishment of this service, f 
 
 This state of things continued with little variation 
 through nearly three months. Even the fearless Murat 
 hesitated to lead his five hundred boats and 20,000 
 
 * The Adjutant-General to Colonel Bunbury, 12tli July, 
 
 1810. 
 
 t L'Abbate B.C. to Colonel Bunbury, August, 1810. 
 
398 MILITARY TRAi^S ACTIONS 
 
 men across the narrow channel, when every day shewed 
 him the formidable and still improving means of 
 resistance which he must overcome or perish. Nor, 
 whatever might have been the treacherous designs of 
 the Sicilian Government, did there appear in the 
 Sicilian people the slightest falling off in their attach- 
 ment to the English. 
 
 During this time Lord Amherst, in obedience to 
 his orders from home, pressed the Court of Palermo 
 strongly to place their troops under the command of 
 the British General, who would in that case have taken 
 care that they should be regularly paid, and sufficiently 
 fed. As our minister became more than usually 
 urgent in the matter, the Queen and Circello, puzzled 
 to evade the demand of the English Cabinet, hit upon 
 the notable expedient of making King Ferdinand 
 declare himself Generalissimo of all his forces by sea 
 and land. The excessive absurdity of this manoeuvre 
 did not excite ridicule alone ; it aroused a very angry 
 spirit in the Palermitans, and even in so calm a man 
 as Lord Amherst.^ In warm terms our Ambassador 
 expressed his indignation at this unworthy subterfuge, 
 and announced officially his intention of representiug 
 the measure in this light to the British Government. 
 It was believed that the Court adopted this poor 
 expedient merely from the fear of offending the 
 Emperor Napoleon ; and to the same motiye had been 
 attributed a prior evasion, contemptible in itself, but 
 
 * The Adjutant-General, and the Abbate B.C to Colonel 
 Bunbury, August, 1810. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAK. 399 
 
 adding strength to the general impression which was 
 entertained as to the perfidy of the Court. Lord 
 Amherst's remonstrances had wrung from Ferdinand 
 the promise of a Proclamation, calling on the people 
 of Sicily to aid the English in repelling the expected 
 invasion. A short address to this effect was at length 
 drawn up, and a copy was placed in the hands of our 
 Ambassador; but it was not placarded or circulated 
 through the island as a royal proclamation ; nor did 
 the paper exhibit to the public the signature either of 
 the King or any of his ministers. And at the very 
 time when the Court entered on this course of perfidy, 
 and of underhand hostility to the English, the Cabinet 
 of St. James's had granted to Ferdinand an additional 
 subsidy of £100,000 a year. 
 
 But to return to the theatre where some 14,000 
 of our troops lay watching and wishing for the attack 
 with which they had been so long threatened. The 
 autumn was come, and the season was not distant 
 when our ships of war would no longer be able to hold 
 their anchorage along the shore without great risk. 
 More than one experiment had satisfied our naval 
 officers that the enemy's boats, even where they lay 
 clustered in great masses on the beach, could not be 
 destroyed, covered as they were by numerous batteries 
 and guns of the heaviest calibre. Our army was 
 beginning to look forward with some uneasiness to the 
 chances which the dark nights of winter might afibrd 
 to the superior numbers of the enemy, led by such 
 Generals as Murat, Grenier, Lamarque, Partonneaux, 
 
400 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS- 
 
 Cavaignac, &c. But the foe was become still more 
 impatient of the long delay. In the night of the 17th 
 of September, two battalions of Corsicans and four of 
 Neapolitans (reckoned at 3500 men), commanded by 
 General Cavaignac, crossed the wider part of the straits, 
 and reached the Sicilian shore about seven miles to 
 the southward of Messina. This movement seems to 
 have been intended as a diversion ; for when the day 
 broke the enemy's troops were seen to be embarking 
 in their boats at Scilla and round the Punta del 
 Pezzo ; and Cavaignac's object, though very early and 
 rudely interrupted, appeared clearly to have "been the 
 gaining of the mountain ridge, from whence he might 
 have come down on the rear of our army while it 
 should be engaged in front by the main body of the 
 French. But the diversion failed. General Campbell, 
 the adjutant-general, had galloped to the south on the 
 first rumour of the approach of boats, and assumed 
 the command of the British troops in that quarter. 
 He found the enemy landing from their vessels : the 
 two battalions of Corsicans, indeed, were already on 
 shore; and one of these had pushed forward imme- 
 diately up the ridge in their front, which rises to the 
 mountain chain of Dinnamare. The beach where the 
 disembarkation was taking place lay between Mili and 
 San Placido, two posts occupied by our troops. 
 Between the invaders and- Messina stood the 21st 
 regiment, commanded by Colonel Frederick Adam, 
 with two six-pounders ; and a part of the 3rd battalion 
 of the German Legion, with two companies of Riflemen, 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 401 
 
 were coming fast to his support. On the other side 
 of the enemy, hastening from San Placido, were the 
 light companies of our foreign regiments, about 400 
 men, commanded by Colonel Fischer, who had already 
 opened his fire on the boats, while he detached a part 
 of his little corps to flank and harass the enemy's 
 battalioQ on the hill. The day was breaking, and it 
 displayed to CampbelFs view the whole state of the 
 affair. He immediately sent parties to secure the 
 rugged paths through the mountains; keeping the 
 21st and a part of the Germans in hand for a decisive 
 stroke. The bells clanged forth from every little 
 village; and the peasants grasping whatever weapons 
 they could find, were clustering on every height, 
 shouting, " Viva 1 Re' Giorgio !" and exhibiting by 
 their gestures the fiercest hostility to the invaders. 
 The Oorsicans upon the hill halted as if waiting for 
 support; while upon the beach Oavaignac's main body, 
 galled by the sharp fire of Fischer's light infantry upon 
 their left, and threatened by Adam's position on their 
 right, began to fall into some confusion. Their rear- 
 most battalion seemed to be unwilling to quit their 
 boats ; and Campbell, observing their hesitation, ordered 
 Adam to push forward with his guns and his column 
 of eight or nine hundred men. Weak was the resis- 
 tance off*ered to this attack. Crowds of the enemy's 
 soldiers scrambled back to their boats, and the boats 
 put off" from the shore in hurried confusion, leaving a 
 mob of more than 200 men to throw down their arms 
 and cry for quarter. There remained the battalion of 
 
 2d 
 
402 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Corsicans on the heights, their retreat to the sea cut 
 off bj the position which Colonel Adam had now- 
 taken. Tliej were summoned to surrender, and for a 
 moment thej demurred; but the 21st drew near 
 prepared to charge with the bayonet, while Fischer's 
 light infantry approached on the other side. There 
 remained little time for hesitation, and the Corsicans 
 laid down their arms and their colours. A French 
 colonel, a chef de Tetat-major, one of General Cavaig- 
 nac's aides-de-camp, forty other officers, and above 
 eight hundred men, were made prisoners on the shore : 
 a good many more were captured in four of the 
 enemy's small vessels which were intercepted in their 
 retreat by Captain Robinson of the Royal Marines, 
 who pushed out from Messina with some of the fast 
 row-boats belonging to the army flotilla. But it 
 happened, unfortunately, that all our ships of war and 
 all our large gun-boats were at anchor at their stations 
 near the Faro.* The loss of the enemy in killed, 
 wounded, or drowned was considerable ; while, on the 
 part of the British, only three men were hurt ! 
 
 While this afiair was going on to the southward of 
 Messina, the main army of King Joachim was em- 
 barking leisurely under the eyes of our forces, in their 
 vast flotilla which stretched from tlie Punta del Pezzo to 
 Scilla; and on our side every battalion was at its 
 post, and every artilleryman at his gun. Some hours 
 wore away ; the enemy discovered no sign of Oavaig- 
 
 * See General Campbell's letter to Colonel Bunbury, in the 
 Appendix. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 403 
 
 nac's having gained the mountains in the rear of the 
 British line, and, according to the authority of Colletta, 
 General Grenier refused to allow the French divisions 
 which were subject to his particular control to risk 
 the attack. Before the evening closed the whole of 
 the enemy's troops had returned to their huts. 
 
 Such was the poor conclusion of Murat's boastings 
 and of the great preparations he had made for the 
 conquest of Sicily. A very few days afterwards he 
 set off for Naples, leaving orders for the gradual with- 
 drawal of his army, and the return of his flotilla by 
 divisions, seizing from time to time the best oppor- 
 tunities which might present themselves of eluding the 
 British cruisers. By the middle of October there 
 remained not more than 8000 of the enemy's troops 
 under General Lamarque, who were busily employed 
 in erecting barracks, and fortifying a position on the 
 heights behind Scilla; but as their train of siege- 
 artillery was left in this fortress, and as many troops 
 remained in the two Oalabrias, Sir John Stuart 
 continued to hold the belief that it was Murat's 
 intention to return and to renew his attempt. The 
 flotillas of the enemy were more fortunate on their 
 retreat than could have been expected: only one of 
 their divisions met with a serious disaster, when a 
 squadron of British frigates and brigs of war, under 
 Captain Ayscough, destroyed between flfty and sixty 
 of the transport vessels, and two large gun-boats. All 
 the rest of Joachim's great armada reached Salerno or 
 Naples in safety. 
 
 2d2 
 
404 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 The prospect of an immediate invasion was at an 
 end: and now the Court of Palermo despatched 
 General Fardella, the chief of their staff, to propose to 
 Sir John Stuart measures of co-operation, and plans of 
 future defence."^^ But even now, the principal sugges- 
 tion was fraught with the most insidious designs. The 
 Court proposed that twelve battalions, picked out of 
 what were called the "Volunteers" of the kingdom, 
 should be embodied, drawn away from their respective 
 homes, and placed under Stuart's command. This 
 would have excited a ferment of dissatisfaction 
 throughout the island ; and the belief that it was done 
 in compliance with the wishes of the British General, 
 would have drawn upon him a large share of the 
 obloquy. Sir John had the good sense to withhold 
 his assent; and in writing to Lord Liverpool the 
 General recapitulated his views of the danger which 
 was still to be apprehended from a French invasion, 
 and of the suspicious conduct of tlie Court of Palermo. f 
 He represents, that when he was appointed to the 
 command of the army in Sicily, he had been led to 
 expect he should have a control over the military 
 resources of the country, and over the application of 
 the British subsidy. He is still of opinion, that if he 
 were invested with such a controlling authority, and 
 were strengthened by a small addition of British troops, 
 the defence of Sicily might be made good ; but under 
 
 * Sir J. Stuart to the Earl of Liver]oool, 25th October; and 
 the Abbate B.C. to Colonel Bunbury, 26th October, 1810. 
 t Sir J. Stuart to the Earl of Liverpool, Oct. 23rd, 1810. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 405 
 
 tbe actual circumstances of his position, he must feel 
 it his duty to resign the command of the army. 
 
 This intimation was perfectly acceptable to the 
 Cabinet of St. James's. They had been for some time 
 past desirous to confide the British force in Sicily to 
 otlier hands, and to unite the military with the diplo- 
 matic authority ; so as to insure a sufficient control over 
 the mistrusted Court of Palermo, and to attach the 
 people of the island more effectually to the common 
 cause. After the comparative fitness of several General 
 Officers had been considered, our Government decided 
 on appointing Lord William Bentinck to this high and 
 arduous post. Nor could they have pitched upon a 
 man of greater zeal, of purer motives, or of more 
 untiring energy. But it is not the purpose of my 
 present narrative to treat of the measures pursued by 
 that thoroughly honest and inflexible public ofiicer, 
 during the three years in which he exercised and 
 rendered effectual the British influence in Sicily. 
 
 Before I close my account of transactions in the 
 Mediterranean, it may not be thought irrelevant to 
 make some mention of the detestable cruelties which 
 .were exercised in the two provinces of Calabria, after 
 Murat had broken up his army of invasion. He 
 probably had returned to Naples in a very bad 
 humour; and, on the other hand, the exactions of his 
 troops had reduced the people of those provinces to 
 severe distress. The consequence, usual with the 
 iCalabrese, was tliat many of tlie starving villagers 
 betook themselves to the mountains, and resumed 
 
406 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 those practices of robbery and violence which had been 
 suppressed during the preceding year. Small parties 
 of these brigands were already infesting the highways, 
 and skulking in the ravines and thickets, while the 
 French army were still lowering over the straits of 
 Messina, and Colletta gives us one anecdote which 
 regarded Murat personally, and afforded him an oppor- 
 tunity of displaying his magnanimity as an individual, 
 though it might have been the offspring of a gratified 
 vanity. One day while the King was riding near 
 Palmi, he met some of his gendarmes bringing a 
 prisoner in their custody. " Who is this 1 " asked the 
 monarch. The captive answered for himself: "I am 
 a brigand, but I deserve pardon from you. Yesterday, 
 as your majesty was climbing the mountain behind 
 Scilla, I was lying hid behind an old building, and I 
 could have shot you. I had a mind to do so, and I 
 levelled my gun ; but your bearing was so grand and 
 royal, that it made me desist. Oh, if I had killed the 
 king yesterday, I should not have been a prisoner and 
 on my way to death this morning.'' "^^ Murat directed 
 that the fellow should be released immediately. It 
 would have been better for his fame and for his 
 conscience if he had allowed his clemency to take a 
 wider range, and had restricted the powers and 
 modified the conduct of the French General whom he 
 selected, on his return to Naples, for the express 
 purpose of extirpating the brigands. 
 
 It is with disgust that I enter on a recital of the 
 * Colletta, Storia di Napob', lib. vii. 27. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 407 
 
 atrocities which ensued ; but while great and generous 
 actions ought to be kept in remembrance as examples 
 and stimulants to future generations, so on the other 
 hand it is the duty of every writer, however humble, 
 to record those crimes of public men which brand their 
 characters with shame, and merit the abhorrence of 
 mankind. Perchance some future historian may turn 
 to this little narrative for particular facts; and the 
 course adopted and pursued by the French in the two 
 Calabrias during the winter of 1810 and the spring 
 of 1811, is too closely connected with the subject on 
 which I have been writing to be passed by without 
 notice. 
 
 I have already said that Murat returned from his 
 abortive attempt on Sicily in a very bad humour. He 
 turned his vindictive spirit on the brigands and starving 
 insurgents of the two Calabrias. The man upon whom 
 he pitched as the fittest instrument of his severity 
 was General Manhes, a name which will be long re- 
 membered in those countries with horror and detes- 
 tation. During several months the letters which I 
 received from my correspondents in Sicily alhided 
 more or less to the unexampled cruelty with which 
 this Manhes was persecuting the wretched Oalabrese. 
 But we have more direct and unexceptionable evidence. 
 Pietro Oolletta, a man of high character and talents : 
 himself a Neapolitan, and Minister of War under 
 Murat, gives us the following account of the course 
 pursued under the authority, though possibly without 
 the knowledge, as to particulars, of his royal master. 
 
408 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 "Joachim, since he saw that the brigands were 
 capable of committing all sorts of crimes, gave orders 
 that a General should be invested with supreme 
 power over all matters, whether military or civil, for 
 the destruction of brigandage in the Oalabrias. General 
 Manhes, who was selected for this service, passed the 
 month of October in making his preparations ; waiting 
 till the fruits and even the leaves should have withered, 
 as the one yielded to the brigands the means of subsis- 
 tence, and the other afforded hiding-places. Then he 
 opened his plan. In every district the names of the 
 persons considered to be * banditti' were published, and 
 the citizens were called upon to slay them or make 
 them prisoners. All men capable of bearing arms 
 were summoned to take their weapons and go forth 
 upon this service. Death was proclaimed as the 
 punishment of any sort of correspondence with the 
 brigands, without pardon, even between a wife and her 
 husband, or a mother and her son. The unoffending 
 father was to take arms against his outlawed sons, and 
 brothers against brothers. The sheep and goats were 
 to be brought in from the country and kept in certain 
 places under watch. The cultivation of the fields was 
 suspended; or where exceptions were allowed, the 
 carrying out of any sort of food was forbidden. 
 Soldiers and gendarmes were stationed in every town 
 and village, not so much for tlie purpose of follov.'ing 
 up the brigands, as for that of keeping a severe and 
 vigilant watch over the inhabitants. 
 
 " Throughout the vast extent of the Oalabrias there 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 409 
 
 began at the same moment one universal hunt after the 
 outlaws. So fearfully severe did those ordinances ap- 
 pear, that men imagined at first they were issued only 
 for the purpose of striking terror : but incredulity very 
 quickly vanished before the facts which were spread by 
 report or published by the General himself. Eleven 
 persons of the town of Stilo, women and children (for 
 the men were out in search of brigands) going forth to 
 gather the olives at a farm at some distance, carried in 
 their pockets a little bread, that they might refresh their 
 strength at mid-day after the labour of the morning. 
 Encountered by the gendarmes who were on the watch 
 under the orders of Lieutenant Gambacorta, thesa 
 poor wretches were stopped, searched, and being found 
 to have these scraps of food on their persons, they 
 were all put to death upon the spot. I will not relate 
 the miserable tale which was told of what one of these 
 women said and did in the vain hope of saving, not 
 herself, but her boy of twelve years old. In a wood 
 near Cosenza, a peasant hoary with age was seen 
 giving some food to a young man lean with hunger, 
 but armed. This was a fugitive brigand; the other 
 was his father. Both were seized, condemned and 
 executed in the public square of Ooseuza; and in 
 order to render the punishment of the old man the 
 more painful, he was made to be present at the 
 execution of his son, before he was allowed to die 
 himself. In the woods of San Biaggio, a woman who 
 was flying with her outlawed husband gave birth to an 
 infant. The little creature was a clog upon their 
 
410 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 flight, and its cries might betray their hiding places. 
 The mother, therefore, carried it in the night time to a 
 house in the town of Nicastro; awakened a friend, 
 confided the child to her care, and hurried back to the 
 woods. This occurrence came to be known the next 
 day; and General Manh^s, though he spared the 
 infant, ordered that the nurse who had shewed this 
 compassion to her friend should be put to death. 
 And here I pause, for my mind cannot bear to continue 
 the narration of other deeds, which proved that the 
 dreadful threats of Manhes were followed up by a 
 fulfilment, certain, inflexible, and even exceeding the 
 menaces themselves. Great was the horror which 
 spread through all classes of the people ; such indeed, 
 that the dearest ties of nature and of society seemed 
 to be cast loose. Relations and friends denounced by 
 their friends and kindred, persecuted, slain ; men, as 
 in earthquakes, shipwreck, or pestilence, caring for 
 themselves alone, and regardless of the rest of human 
 kind. The morals of the people sank lower and lower 
 amidst such deeds and such examples ; and the subse- 
 quent rebellions, the public miseries, and the exercise 
 of tyranny, sprang from this source. The brigandage 
 increased, but it was extinguislied. This excess of 
 violence was of short duration: all tlie Calabrese, 
 whether the persecuted or the persecuting, acted as 
 desperate men ; and as the outlaws were by far the 
 inferior in numbers, engaged in a bad cause, scattered, 
 betrayed, they were crushed. So that out of three 
 thousand, whose names appeared on the list of pro- 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN". 411 
 
 scription in the beginning of November, not even one 
 remained at the close of the year. Many were killed 
 in fight, many were executed, many perished by 
 hunger, some escaped into Sicily, and a few remained 
 after these trials of fortune alive, but immured in 
 dungeons." 
 
 Such deeds could not be done, such cruelties could 
 not be practised even under the mask of justice, with- 
 out producing a revulsion in the minds of men. No 
 necessity of circumstances could be adduced at this 
 time as a plea for the extermination of thousands of 
 men, women, and children. The Neapolitans, who 
 had been accustomed to view the savage mountaineers 
 of Calabria with aversion, came now to regard them 
 with pity. Murat, who had been looked up to with 
 hope, and even with some affection by the middle 
 classes of his kingdom, became now an object of dread; 
 and he, and the French in general, shared in the 
 abhorrence which Manhes and other individuals had 
 inspired. The French had driven from Naples a set 
 of corrupt and contemned tyrants; they had intro- 
 duced a better system and administration of law ; in 
 several respects they had bettered the condition of the 
 people ; and they were for a time welcome in the land. 
 But their insulting airs as conquerors, their arbitrary 
 exercise of power, and above all the introduction of a 
 military conscription, had already tended to alienate 
 
412 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS. 
 
 the minds of tlie Neapolitans from French dominion. 
 The atrocities committed bj Manhes, under the autho- 
 rity of King Joachim, filled the measure of discontent ; 
 but impatient as thej had become of the yoke, they 
 were unable to shake it off. Military strength and 
 suspicious vigilance kept them down. But from this 
 time the provinces, and even the great towns of Naples, 
 became at heart thoroughly hostile to the domination 
 of France. A similar aversion, though not quickened 
 by similar cruelties, had already spread through the 
 people of Rome and Tuscany; and the Italians yet 
 live who have from that time taught their children to 
 dread and deprecate the interference of the French in 
 the interests of Italy. 
 
P A P E E S 
 
 REFERRED TO IN 
 
 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 m 
 THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
 
 A. Lord Castlereagh's letter, " most secret," regarding Gib- 
 
 raltar, . . : . . loth July, 1805. 
 
 B. Sir James Craig to Lord Castlereagh, 9th Dec, 1805. 
 
 C. The same to the same, . . . 11th Feb., 1806. 
 
 11th Feb., 1806. 
 
 6th July, 1806. 
 
 24th Aug., 1806. 
 
 26th Aug., 1806. 
 
 D. The same to the same, 
 
 E. General Orders, 
 r. Sir John Moore to General Fox, 
 G. Sir J. Stuart to General Fox, . 
 H. Extracts from the Letters of Paul Louis Courier, 
 
 Aug. and Sept., 1806. 
 K. Mr. Drummond to General Fox, . 27th Jan., 1807. 
 L. Intercepted Letters from King Joseph to Napoleon, and to 
 his wife, t-hen Queen of Naples, . April, 1807. 
 
 M. Lord Castlereagh to General Fox (secret), 21st May, 1807. 
 N. Sir John Moore to General Fox, . 25th July, 1807. 
 O. The same to the same, . . . 28th July, 1807. 
 P. The same to the same, . . . 19th Sept., 1807. 
 Q. Instructions for General Officers . 21st Sept., 1807. 
 E. Eeturns of the British Forces in Sicily at different periods, 
 
 1805 to 1809. 
 S. Extracts from private letters to Colonel Bunbury, 
 
 March to October, 1810. 
 
414 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Appendix A. 
 
 Most Secret. Downing Street, 19th July, 1805. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I THINK it right to apprize you that secret information has 
 been received that every effort will be made by the Prince of 
 Peace for the recovery of Gibraltar to Spain by force, by sur- 
 prize, or by treachery. 
 
 An agent, whom he meant to employ, has recently had seve- 
 ral interview^ with him at Aranjuez. The Prince gave him a 
 paper, signed by himself, promising half the property of the 
 Portress to such of the garrison as would join in betraying the 
 place, and a gratuity of £ 100,000 to those who should effect its 
 surrender. An agent was to go to Gibraltar with this proposal, 
 who was to correspond with the General commanding at Cadiz. 
 A scheme of taking off the garrison of Gibraltar and the chief 
 officers by poison was mentioned ; another was to take advan- 
 tage of a great festival to get the garrison as much intoxicated 
 as; possible, when a party was to spike the guns of the chief 
 batteries, and an attempt to be taade for surprising the town. 
 The Prince of Peace said that he had a person in his pay whilst 
 General Sir T. Trigge was in the garrison ; and he mentioned 
 that the attempt of which you gave an account in January last 
 was true. 
 
 The information adds that a very large force was prepared 
 against Gibraltar, and that General Moreau was employed by 
 the Spaniards. 
 
 You will preserve entire secresy as to the channel through 
 which this information comes, and as to the point of an agent 
 having been appointed to carry offers to Gibraltar, lest such 
 particulars being public might affect the channel of intelh'gence; 
 but you will make use of this notice for the purpose of increas- 
 ing vigilance, watching the disposition of the garrison, and the 
 appearance of suspicious strangers, or the conduct of suspected 
 
 residents. 
 
 I am. Sir, 
 
 Tour most obedient and humble servant, 
 
 (Signed) CASTLEEEAGH. 
 
 The Right Honourable and Honourable 
 General Fox, &c. &c. &c. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 415 
 
 Appendix B. 
 
 From General Sir James Craig to Viscount Castlereagh, 
 I Naples, 9th December, 1805. 
 
 Mt LoRi), 
 
 I HA YE thought it more proper to reserve for a separate 
 communication the observations that I might have to offer to 
 your Lordship on the subject of our situation here ; as arising, 
 in the first instance, from the step which his Sicilian Majesty 
 has thought it expedient to adopt, in signing a treaty of neu- 
 trality with France, under a declaration delivered at the same 
 moment to the Bussian Minister, that he considered it extorted 
 by force, and consequently no ways obligatory on him, but, on 
 the contrary, that it was his intention to adhere to his prior 
 treaty with Russia; and in the next, from the unforeseen, 
 and, as they appear to me, equally unaccountable events that 
 have taken place in Germany, and the consequent evacuation of 
 the North of Italy, by the army of the Archduke Charles. 
 
 Of the first of these events I had no notice till after I had 
 received General Lacy's requisition to repair to this place; 
 and, until the period when the arrival of the Eussian fleet at 
 Syracuse, for the purpose of forming a junction with us, was in 
 hourly expectation. I beg to be perfectly understood as not 
 meaning to convey the slightest complaint or reflection on Mr. 
 Elliot, when I add that the notice he sent me of this event was 
 unaccompanied with any detail or comment of any sort that 
 might have assisted me in forming a judgment as to the natiu'e 
 of the transaction ; for the fact was, he was not officially in- 
 formed on the subject, and was totally unconcerned in the 
 business ; and in order to set this part of the subject in as clear 
 a light as possible to your Lordship, I beg to inclose an extract 
 of the letter from that gentleman to which I aUude. His 
 sentiments on this subject perfectly concur with mine. Thus 
 circumstanced, it was still a matter of serious reflection to me. 
 It was impossible that any instructions that his Majesty had 
 thought proper to give me for the guidance of my conduct, 
 coidd advert to a circumstance that could not be foreseen, and 
 I certainly felt myself left in a great measure to the exercise 
 
416 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 of that discretion on whicli, on other points, liis Majesty had 
 thought proper to pLice reliance. I felt a very great repug- 
 nance to stand forth either as directing the public operations 
 of my country on this occasion, or even in my individual capa- 
 city, as the supporter of what in its outline, and under the 
 circumstances of a total ignorance of its detail, could not but 
 appear an act of perfidy ; and had the transaction stood simply 
 on its own bottom, unaccompanied with any other consideration 
 than the consequences which might arise from it to the Grovern- 
 ment with whom it originated, I should not have hesitated to 
 have declined giving my support or protection to it. Under 
 the present situation, however, I was not to stop at that con- 
 sideration only ; his Majesty had thought proper to enter into 
 an alliance with Kussia, and I was enjoined to co-operate with 
 the army of his Imperial Majesty ; it was by the General of 
 that army that I was called on to proceed here, I had all along 
 during my communication with that Greneral, for the space of 
 three months, given him to understand that I should acquiesce 
 in his requisition to join him ; and I of course must be aware 
 that in any arrangement he had made for his future opera- 
 tions, he must have relied on that junction : that junction must 
 even be of the more importance to him now that a considerable 
 part of the reinforcements which he had expected from the 
 Black Sea had not arrived, and a failure in it might go to the 
 length of the ruin of his army. A strict adherence to my en- 
 gagement with the Kussian General appeared, therefore, to me 
 my first and greatest duty. I viewed it as a call on national 
 honour, of more weight than the abstaining from abetting an act 
 that I could not approve, but which, in the loose morality of the 
 present times, might, perhaps, find many defenders. Upon a 
 more serious reflection, it appeared to me, even that without 
 subjecting myself to the imputation of an unworthy equivoca- 
 tion, I might consider myself as acting totally independent of 
 the objectionable transaction on the part of the Court of Naples. 
 I appeared, and in fact came here, as the ally of Bussia ; and if 
 the operations of that ally, to whose assistance I came, carried 
 him into a country which, from a previous transaction of its 
 Government, had placed itself in a particular situation with 
 respect to the enemy, I do not feel that it became any consi- 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 417 
 
 deration of mine, or that I was at liberty, from that circum- 
 stance, to refuse performing my engagements to his Majesty's 
 ally. 
 
 Since my arrival here no circumstance whatever has occur- 
 red to call for any official declaration of my sentiments on this 
 business ; and it has not appeared to me necessary that I should 
 voluntarily enter into any unavailing discussion now, in which 
 it would be scarcely practicable to avoid offending the Court of 
 Naples: in my general conversation, however, I have never 
 hesitated to express my opinion. I have always considered the 
 Treaty as unnecessary ; but being made, it ought not to have 
 been broken. My sentiments are, I believe, perfectly under- 
 stood ; and I know that G-eneral Lacy individually concurs in 
 them, though he submits to the act of the Minister of his Court. 
 I leave your Lordship to judge of the astonishment with 
 which I heard the very confused accounts that were given me 
 on my landing of the fate of the Austrian army in Germany. 
 Its immediate consequence in the retreat of the Archduke 
 Charles was of course the cirumstance that, as affecting us the 
 most, became the object of our principal attention. The 
 French, who had marched out of this kingdom, and who seemed 
 to have no other view but that of joining Massena as rapidly as 
 possible, were immediately stopped, (though part of it has since 
 proceeded), and about 4000 men remain in Ancona. I do not 
 know that there is at this moment any thing else between us 
 and the Po — at least any thing of any consequence. Massena 
 and the gross of the Erench army appear at present to be em- 
 ployed in following the Archduke, and our latest accounts from 
 Upper Italy are, that the Viceroy, Eugene Beauharnois, is col- 
 lecting a corps of 30,000 men at Bologna, for the avowed pur- 
 pose of coming this way. 
 
 There is no disadvantage under which we labour that affects 
 us so materially, as that of the want of communication. The 
 consequence necessarily being that we get no intelligence or 
 account of either the progress of the war or the negotiations 
 that may be going on, but those that the French choose to cir- 
 culate ; and on these I am not inclined to place the reliance 
 that a great many people do. However that may be, until 
 we receive further instructions arising out of the new system 
 
 2 E 
 
418 MILITARY TKANSACTIONS 
 
 that must probably be adopted on account of the change of 
 situation from the destruction of the Austrian army, it must be 
 on the intelligence that we do get, such as it is, that we can 
 alone take our resolutions. 
 
 It is obvious that Massena can have no difficulty in detach- 
 ing what may be necessary to render the Viceroy's army formi- 
 dable as to numbers. The frontiers of this kingdom are indeed 
 represented as strong ; and your Lordship is in possession of 
 the strength of the army we shall have to defend them. This 
 is certainly inadequate, and the Neapolitan part of it is still to 
 be raised ; and when raised can for the campaign be considered 
 in no other light than recruits, on whom certainly very little 
 reliance is to be placed. In short, my Lord, I have little hesi- 
 tation in giving my opinion that if France chooses to take the 
 present opportunity of becoming masters of the kingdom of 
 Naples, it will not be in our power to prevent it ; nor could WQ 
 expect to protract our resistance so long as to enable us to 
 receive the reinforcements that would be necessary to secure it 
 from them. My present advice to General Lacy has therefore 
 been to take up the cantonments we propose to occupy, and 
 there wait for either instructions from our respective Govern- 
 ments, or at least a more perfect knowledge of what is going 
 on in other parts of the world with which our own fate is inti- 
 mately connected. In the mean time, to be prepared for every 
 possible event, we keep our transports here. 
 
 I do not enter more at large on this part of my subject, be-, 
 cause at present we really are too little acquainted with it to 
 be able to reason soundly on it. We do not precisely know 
 where Massena is. The Lively frigate, however, is to sail in a 
 few days, which wiU furnish me with another opportunity of 
 addressing your Lordship, when I hope to do it more fully. 
 I have the honour to be, my Lord, 
 Tour Lordship's most obedient humble servant, 
 
 (Signed) J. II. CRAIG. 
 
 Right Honourable Lord Viscount 
 Castlereagh, &c. &c. &c. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 419 
 
 Appendix C. 
 
 From General Sir James Craig to Viscount Castlereagli. 
 
 Messina Harbour, 11th Feb., 1806. 
 
 Mtt Loed, 
 
 My despatch, No. 22, by the Jalouse, was a very short one, 
 and was not written under circumstances that would admit of 
 my entering into any of those details with respect to ou 
 evacuating the kingdom of Naples, which I am aware are requi- 
 site for his Majesty's information on a subject which is likely 
 to be attended with important consequences. I was under the 
 necessity of deferring these for a future opportunity. 
 
 So early as by the first despatch which I had the honour of 
 addressing your Lordship after our landing in Naples, your 
 Lordship will have perceived that under the then existing 
 circumstances of the first defeats of the Austrian armies and 
 the consequent movements of the Archduke Charles, I began 
 to entertain great doubts of the possibility of our defending the 
 kingdom of Naples ; and nothing had certainly occurred that 
 could tend in any degree to weaken this opinion, when I found 
 myself called upon to apply it under a more detailed considera- 
 tion of the circumstances of our situation, as they arose from 
 the intelligence we had received that the French army ap- 
 pointed to act against us was actually on its march. 
 
 I have already in my despatch of the 2nd of January, 
 informed your Lordship of the meeting that took place at 
 General Lacy's Head- Quarters the preceding day, and though 
 I have mentioned the result of the meeting, as well as that 
 which I foresaw likely to take place in consequence, I had not, 
 however, the time that would have been necessary for me to 
 enter into the motives and reasonings which guided our opi- 
 nions, particularly those on w^hich my own were founded, and 
 for which I am the more immediately accountable to his 
 Majesty. 
 
 It was very clear that Massena, left at full liberty, had it 
 in his power now to detach against us any force that he might 
 deem adequate to the object he had in view ; and if that which 
 originally destined for the purpose was found unequal to it, no 
 
 2 E 2 
 
420 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 reason could be found to exist why he should not either from 
 his own army or from any of the other resources which Franco 
 so eminently possesses, increase it to any further magnitude 
 that might be necessary to insure his success. "We, on the 
 other hand, with numbers that were ill calculated for the de- 
 fence of so extensive a frontier, found ourselves besides, from 
 accidental causes, so hampered and embarrassed with difficulties 
 with respect to movement, as greatly to detract from the real 
 efficiency of that force, such as it was. We were still short by 
 600 horses of the number that had been promised us by the 
 Court of Naples, so that after leaving a considerable portion of 
 our Artillery behind us at Castel-a-Mare, that which accompa- 
 nied the line to our cantonments was still but ill supphed and 
 little capable of movement, and as to camp equipage, or officers' 
 baggage, we had no means of transporting either. The Eus- 
 sians were pretty much in the same situation, excepting that 
 their deficiency of horses did not exceed 300 ; and as to the 
 Neapolitans they had literally nothing ; but in their march to 
 their position had relied entirely on the resources of the coun- 
 try, pressing mules and asses for their service the whole way, 
 and leaving the roads covered with the carcases of those that 
 perished under the severity of ill usage. But even these wants 
 and difficulties, great as they were, were still of inferior consi- 
 deration to those which arose from our deficiency in cavalry. 
 Nothing could prevent the enemy from bringing what number 
 he thought proper, and this, in a country great part of which is 
 extremely well adapted to that arm, would have given a decisive 
 turn against us; defeat would have been certain ruin to us, 
 while success would have been nugatory from our inability of 
 pursuing it. 
 
 Obliged to abandon the frontier which General Lacy sup- 
 ported by the opinion of General Oppermann, his Quarter- 
 master General, declared to be indefensible, no other position 
 which was within our means of attaining presented itself, but 
 one which, though not a position of strength to compensate for 
 deficiency in numbers, covers in some degree the entry into the 
 plain on which Naples is situated. This, all things considered, 
 seemed the most advantageous spot on wliicli we could have 
 made a stand ; and liDwever superior in numbers he may be, 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 421 
 
 there were still no grounds for despairing of our repidsing the 
 enemy's attack in it ; but it did not appear that we should gain 
 much by doing so : covered by his numerous cavalry, he would 
 have retired without our daring to pursue him, and renewing 
 his attacks day after day, it was more than probable that he 
 would have found one fortunate in the end; or, if not, he 
 might have awaited quietly till he brought down further rein- 
 forcements, of whose march we might have remained ignorant, 
 till we saw them in their line. "While we on our parts had no 
 succour to look for, and what was of more consequence, had no 
 point on which we could retire ; retreat was to us impossible, 
 for though the transports were at hand to receive us, yet an 
 embarkation in the face of an enemy is a bad resource. Our 
 transports too were particularly unfavourably situated for hasty 
 embarkation, which was scarcely practicable, and under certain 
 winds, which are precisely those that most prevail at this season 
 of the year, we might have remained eight or ten days under 
 the enemy's fire, without a possibility of getting away from it. 
 
 With respect to the Neapolitan army, or the internal re- 
 sources to be drawn from the armed population of the country. 
 General Lacy laid but little stress on either. The former con- 
 sisted of about 7000 men ; I rather think that after the arrival 
 of two regiments that were drawn from Sicily it might some- 
 what exceed that number. Yov your Lordship will observe that 
 its real strength was never ascertained ; nothing being less to 
 be relied on than a Neapolitan return, and no possibility of 
 personal inspection having ever existed. But when we deduct 
 from this number what must necessarily have been left for the 
 guard of the Eoyal Family, and for the security of the forts of 
 Naples, with the G-arrison of Gaeta, I do not imagine they 
 could have brought above 4000 into the field. 
 
 This army it is to be observed had been ordered to be in- 
 creased by an addition of 30,000 men ; and of these it was said 
 that about half were actually assembled. But only a small por- 
 tion of that half had even joined the regiments to which they 
 were appointed, so that the whole were in fact recruits of the 
 rawest and most untrained description. 
 
 Upon the levy en masse both General Lacy and General 
 Oppermann seemed to place no sort of reliance. They had very 
 
422 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 lately visited a considerable tract of country, and their report 
 as to the state and disposition of the people was most unfavour- 
 able. I had no opportunity of forming a judgment on my own 
 inspection, but the accounts I had received from the inquiriea 
 I had made, did not lead me to expect that they would turn 
 out with the alacrity which the Court seemed to expect they 
 would shew. Indeed they had already manifested a consider- 
 able degree of backwardness in the only part in which they had 
 been called upon to embody themselves. 
 
 All these considerations which I have presented to your 
 Lordship's view were general, and I believe operated upon the 
 minds of all ; but with respect to myself, I felt the force of 
 others which concerned the interests of Great Britain only. I 
 considered the defence of Sicily as an object of considerable 
 more importance than that of Naples could be ; and I was loth 
 to hazard the means of securing the former in what we seemed 
 all to be convinced must be an unavailing attempt to insure 
 the latter. If we failed in Naples nothing could save Sicily. 
 Whereas, by giving up the former, and transporting the army 
 to that island, we at least secured that which appeared to me 
 by far the most important object of the two. I could not, 
 therefore, but be exceedingly desirous not to hazard the corps 
 1 commanded, where I considered its destruction as so probable, 
 and for an inferior stake to that which might soon be at issue 
 with so much better founded hopes of success. 
 
 These were the considerations, my Lord, which guided the 
 opinion which I gave from the first of its becoming a subject of 
 discussion. I always, however, took care to mark as strongly 
 as language could do so, that it was only an opinion, which, 
 feeling as I did, I thought myself bound to give frankly and 
 without disguise ; at the same time, I desired it to be perfectly 
 understood, that if General Lacy thought otherwise, and chose 
 to undertake the defence of the kingdom of Naples, the troops 
 under my command were at his orders, and perfectly ready to 
 take their share of the task on whatever point he might direct. 
 
 To this opinion I have always added another, which was, 
 that if a re-embarkation of the combined armies was once 
 resolved on, no time should be lost in carrying it into effect. 
 This I insisted on the more because I saw that the subject was 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 4213 
 
 little understood, and the dangers of an embarkation in the face 
 of an enemy not so apparent as conld have been wished, at the 
 same time that the local disadvantages of the situation in which 
 our part of the transports lay, increased to us in a tenfold degree 
 the danger that might have arisen from delay. 
 
 Under these circumstances I thought myself warranted in 
 stating to your Lordship, as I did in my despatch, No. 21, the 
 great probability that I foresaw of our ultimately coming to the 
 resolution of evacuating the kingdom. A subsequent meeting, 
 however, having taken place two days after at Naples, by 
 G-eneral Lacy's desire, at which, in addition to Sir John Stuart,' 
 General Campbell and Colonel Bunbury attended, another pro- 
 posal was there made and acceded to. 
 
 It was here proposed that we should retire into Calabria, 
 and taking advantage of the natural strength of the country, 
 defend ourselves there, for the chance of a more favourable turn 
 of affairs; or, what I confess appeared to be still more to me 
 the object, till the arrival of orders or instructions from the 
 Emperor of Russia, without which it seemed now to be doubt- 
 ful with the officers of that army whether it would be justifiable 
 to take any decisive step. At this meeting it was my misfor- 
 tune to differ entirely from the whole of the officers assembled, 
 except Brigadier- General Campbell ; for as by this measure we 
 left the capital and all the richer provinces of the kingdom en- 
 tirely uncovered and at the mercy of the enemy, I could not, I 
 confess, see any possible motives that could induce us to run 
 the still greater hazard of it, than those which would have at- 
 tended our meeting the enemy on the frontier. As it was im- 
 possible to form any magazine or depot, we should have starved 
 in a week's time. I found, indeed, that a reliance was placed 
 on a constant supply by sea of flour or bread from our trans- 
 ports, by means of a small port in the Gulf of Policastro, which 
 is the only one that exists in the whole tract between Eheggio 
 and Salerno, at the entrance of the Gulf of Naples ; while 
 Messina was the nearest port in which our transports could 
 have remained. There was confessedly no road to this harbour, 
 the communication with which for the last five miles was only 
 by a track up a strong steep mountain practicable only for 
 mules. I could not but give my opinion upon the danger at 
 
424 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 any rate of relying upon such a communication for the supply 
 of an army ; but besides this, having accidentally had occasion 
 to make enquiry as to what harbours there might be on the 
 coast of Calabria, though without any view to the present ques- 
 tion, I thought I recollected this one having been mentioned 
 to me as fit only for the very small craft of the country. 
 However I was not sufficiently certain to feel myself competent 
 to combat the assurances that every enquiry had been made 
 from able pilots, and that though small it was sufficient in other 
 respects for the proposed purpose. At my desire, therefore, 
 Captain D' Urban was despatched the next morning in the 
 Ambuscade, to examine into this point, which would have been 
 of no small importance to us ; and on his return he reported the 
 harbour to be totally unfit for the purpose for which it was 
 proposed to employ it; unsafe, and capable at most of receiving 
 two transports, which must lie at the point liable to go ashore 
 every moment that the wind was a little stronger than usual. 
 
 With regard to the Calabrians, their attachment or willing- 
 ness to give any effectual assistance was, I knew, extremely 
 doubtful ; but I felt also, although I did not well know how to 
 bring it forward in argument, that there existed a circumstance 
 which would probably very materially affect our situation with 
 regard to them, whatever might be their original disposition. 
 Although we had found a communication with our ships, the 
 fact was, the Russians had no provisions in their ships, neither 
 had they any money nor credit by which they could have pro- 
 cured it. The consequence would have been that they would 
 Tiave supplied themselves ; in three days time not ji Calabrian 
 would have come near us, and in six, I should have expected to 
 have found them in arms, cutting off all our small parties with- 
 out distinction to whom they belonged, and instead of giving 
 us help acting against us. 
 
 The country into which it was proposed we should retire is 
 very strong; and as to the mere circumstances of our being 
 able to defend ourselves there, it offered such facilities that 
 I imagine there could not have been much difficulty in it; 
 although of all the nations of Europe the Eussians are the least 
 adapted to war in a mountainous country. Eetreat, however, 
 Bhould Buch become necessary, was scarcely practicable; for 
 
IN THE MEDITERKANEAN. 425 
 
 about 90 miles there is a very good road, but beyond that there 
 is no communication but by a track passable only by mules, 
 over mountains and across watercourses and valleys, in such 
 manner that at the first step we must have abandoned artillery, 
 stores, sick, in short, every thing that could not be carried on 
 the backs of the animals for 200 miles more. 
 
 However, the other ofiicers present, seeing these circum- 
 stances in another point of view, or not giving to them the same 
 weight that I did, General Lacy declared his determination to 
 embrace the proposal, and to march immediately into Calabria. 
 I again took the opportunity to assure him that whatever might 
 be my opinion as to the expediency of the measure, he woidd 
 hear no more of it from me, but that my sole object would now 
 be to use my best endeavours to carry it into effect according 
 to the directions I might receive from him : and I the very next 
 morning began the previous arrangements for that purpose. 
 These were, however, soon rendered unnecessary, by the Court 
 having given their decided negative to the measure, which could 
 be of no possible use to them. The paper in which their oppo- 
 sition to this proposal was announced, was never communicated 
 to me. General Lacy only told me that it was conceived in 
 such terms of indiscreet invective, that he had returned it, and 
 had not kept any copy. 
 
 General Lacy then determined to concentrate his canton- 
 ments behind the Yolturno, preparatory to our embarking, as 
 the country beyond that river is a plain most favourable to 
 cavalry, in which we were so weak. Some variation in our in- 
 telligence relative to the numbers and movements of the 
 Trench, and a desire, as far as was found possible, to accord to 
 the wishes of the Court, induced him, however, afterwards to 
 come to the resolution of suspending the (?), and of waiting in 
 the position I have formerly mentioned, till these were more 
 precisely ascertained. Precisely at this moment, viz. the 7th 
 January, and while General Oppermann was with me at my 
 head-quarters, conversing on the subject. General Lacy received 
 a despatch from the Emperor of Russia, dated the 7th of De- 
 cember, detailing the unfortunate battle of Austerlitz, and 
 directing him to provide for the security of the corps under his 
 command by immediately retiring to Corfu. As this order was . 
 
426 MILITARY TIIANSACTIOKS 
 
 precise, and left nothing to his discretion, the Greneral did not 
 consider himself any longer at liberty to delay embarking be- 
 yond the time that would be indispensably requisite to do so ; 
 and having, therefore, sent for me, to communicate this order 
 to me, the necessary arrangements were made ; and, as we had 
 by far the longest march, it was agreed that we should com- 
 mence the movement on the 10th. The head of our column 
 arrived at Castel-a-Mare on the 13th, and having embarked 
 every thing, we were able to put to sea on the 19th. 
 
 "While the embarkation was going on, Mr. Elliot and Cap- 
 tain Sotheron, having come over to Castel-a-Mare (previous to 
 which I wrote the letter to Mr. Elliot, a copy of which your 
 Lordship will find enclosed, as also a letter from that gentle- 
 man to me, and of my answer, as they passed during the march), 
 among other conversation, assured me that they had good 
 grounds for saying that the Eussians could not possibly embark 
 under ten or twelve days, as it would require at least that time 
 to get their vessels ready, and supplied with provisions. It 
 may be necessary to observe to your Lordship, that during our 
 march General Lacy had written to me, to propose to me to 
 halt for a few days : a copy of this letter I do myself the honour 
 to enclose. It so happened that it was not delivered to me till 
 the following day ; when, being sent to me, it was put into my 
 hands in the General's presence. I made no hesitation in con- 
 curring with his desire, but I submitted to his consideration 
 the very great inconvenience to which it would subject me. 
 The General immediately acquiesced in the force of my repre- 
 sentation, and seeming to me to lay as little stress on any suc- 
 cess to be expected from negotiation as I confess I did myself, 
 be desired me to continue my march. The next day I thought 
 it right to answer his letter, a copy of which I also enclose. 
 
 I certainly at the time considered this as of very little im- 
 portance, and as an occurrence only between General Lacy and 
 me ; nor should I probably have mentioned it to your Lordship, 
 had it not been, to my great surprise, that I have since found 
 that it has been represented as a refusal on my part to support 
 the Eussians. I did not, indeed, know that this malignant turn 
 had been given to it, till after the follomng circumstance had 
 taken place, completely to refute the imputation. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 427 
 
 This halt that had been proposed went, as your Lordship 
 will observe, no further than for three or four days, as, by the 
 postscript in the General's letter, which was written in his own 
 hand, he says he shall be ready to embark on the 16th ; but the 
 accounts given by Mr. Elliot and Captain Sotheron, extending 
 the period of their detention on shore to ten or twelve days^ 
 which might even be prolonged, from the same impediment of 
 bad weather, the situation of the Eussians appeared to me to 
 be more serious, and very far from being free from danger. I 
 therefore immediately suspended our embarkation, which was 
 then begun ; and proceeded myself to head-quarters, where, 
 acquainting the General with what I had heard, I added that I 
 came again to put myself under his orders (for he had given up 
 the chief command of both us and the Neapolitans immediately 
 on our beginning our march), and that if he thought it neces- 
 sary, I would immediately disembark what was on board, and 
 either march towards him to support him, or remain in constant 
 readiness to do so whenever he thought proper to call for us, as 
 he might think best. The General expressed himself in warm 
 terms of acknowledgment, but assured me that he did not see 
 the slightest necessity for my delaying our embarkation a 
 moment, the possible consequence of which he was well aware 
 of; — that no consideration should make him defer his, and that 
 he proposed beginning the day after the following. His em- 
 barkation actually commenced on the 17th. 
 
 I have now, my Lord, given your Lordship every circum- 
 stance of detail relative to this event, which I am aware of, as 
 being necessary to convey to his Majesty every possible degree 
 of information, in its military point of view, that I think his 
 Majesty would wish to be in possession of. The clamour of the 
 Court of Naples has been great, and in the style of invective 
 which has been assumed, I shall not be surprised if much mis- 
 representation has taken place. On the other hand, though I 
 owe every acknowledgment to General Lacy, whose candour, 
 frankness, and honour, have been shown on every occasion, yet 
 I cannot extend the same to the Minister of the Russian Court. 
 From him I am sure no steps will be omitted that may be. 
 wanting to represent circumstances as he may think necessary 
 to his own views ; unfortunately, too, from the situation in which 
 
428 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 General Lacy was placed, all our military communications with 
 the Court were made through him ; so that I ascribe not a little 
 of the violence of the latter to the light in which he has placed 
 circumstances to them. His Majesty wiU, I am sure, do us the 
 justice to believe that it was not without sentiments of extreme 
 regret, and under every feeling becoming soldiers, that we found 
 ourselves thus compelled to abandon the field to the enemy, al- 
 though from causes with which we had no concern. The respon- 
 sibility of it however I take entirely on myself, and therefore have 
 been anxious to detail the grounds on which I have proceeded. 
 Until the arrival of the orders for the Eussians retiring, I held 
 myself bound, by every sentiment of duty and of honour, to 
 co-operate with them; and nothing should have been wanting 
 on my part to do so. After that period, and from the moment 
 that General Lacy had given up the chief command, the line of 
 conduct to be pursued regarded ourselves only; and I could 
 have under consideration no other motives but those of protec- 
 tion to his Neapolitan Majesty's dominions, and the safety of 
 my own army. Could I have seen the slightest grounds for any 
 hopes of success in the former, — had there appeared in the 
 Court any of that energy that was necessary to meet the peril 
 of the moment, or in the people of that public spirit and attach- 
 ment to the Government, that could lead to an expectation of 
 exertion on their part — ^had there been the smallest trace of a 
 spirited nobility, generously devoting themselves to the safety 
 of their prince and country, — however unavailing I might have 
 considered all these as likely to be in the end, against a force 
 that would be increased so infinitely beyond what they could 
 have resisted, I should, nevertheless, have trusted to the indul- 
 gence of his Majesty and of my country if I had so imminently 
 hazarded the troops under my command, by sharing all the 
 dangers of the attempt with them. Of their cheerful concur- 
 rence I have not the smallest doubt. 
 
 But, my Lord, the prospect that presented itself to our view 
 was widely different from this picture ; different in every res- 
 pect ; nor would it, under these circumstances, have been an 
 object of other than serious consideration to me that their army 
 is commanded by an emigrant French officer. I have no reason 
 to doubt the individual honour or fidelity of that officer; but 
 
IN THE MEDITERHANEAN. 429 
 
 there are few or none of these gentlemen who do not pant after 
 an opportunity to return to their country, and more particularly 
 just now when they seem anxious to partake of the sort of 
 splendour that it enjoys from the late successes that have at- 
 tended its armies. The permission to do so must be purchased 
 by some great service ; and I confess I could not feel very se- 
 cure while depending so much on a temptation so strong. 
 
 I have the honour to be, my Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant, 
 
 J. H. CEAia, General. 
 The Right Hon. Viscount Castlereagh, 
 &c. &c. &c. 
 
 P.S. — I have written this long letter, my Lord, under such 
 circumstances of ill health as will I am sure plead my excuse 
 for any inaccuracies that may have occurred in it. Nothing 
 indeed but my anxiety that His Majesty should receive every 
 information on the subject could have enabled me to support 
 the exertion. On reperusing it I find I have nowhere adverted 
 to the numbers of the enemy. 
 
 Our original intelligence made them from 32,000 to 35,000 
 men ; the latest accounts, however, and those on which I most 
 depend, made those who were actually arrived in cantonments 
 in the vicinity of E-ome 22,000 ; and the division at Ancona 
 not being in those cantonments, as it was probably meant to 
 advance along the Adriatic to keep the Neapolitans in check, 
 is not included ; it amounted to near 4000 men. To these is to 
 be added a second line which was always alluded to in all our 
 accounts as being on its march, and which Mr. Jackson ex- 
 pressly mentions to be composed of three divisions of Massena's 
 army. Tliese were greatly impeded in their progress by bad 
 weather and the difficulties of the roads ; and the troops about 
 Home halted a considerable time for them. They are stated by 
 several concurring accounts at 16,000 men, and it is scarcely 
 possible to suppose them less. The total of these something 
 exceeds 40,000 men. 
 
 J. H. C. 
 
430 MILITARY TKANSACTIONS 
 
 Appendix D. 
 
 From General Sir James Craig to Viscount CastlereagTi, 
 
 Messina Harbour, 11th Feb., 1806. 
 
 Mt Lord, 
 
 Upon our leaving Naples, the measures to be pursued for 
 securing the Island of Sicily from falling into the hands of the 
 enemy became of course the object of my most serious conside- 
 ration ; and I was the more anxious on the subject because it 
 was obvious that the French having turned their views to the 
 possession of his Sicilian Majesty's dominions would not omit 
 any effort for obtaining possession of that part of them which 
 are not only so valuable in themselves, but in which they know 
 we are so much interested. I therefore could not but consider 
 the danger as imminent, and the expediency of guarding against 
 it as great. These will certainly increase in proportion as the 
 enemy succeed in establishing themselves in the kingdom of 
 Naples, and particularly in Calabria ; but as they must be well 
 aware that we should not be wanting in our exertions for the 
 security of that point to which these more immediately lead — 
 I mean the citadel of Messina — the anticipating us in the pos- 
 session of that fortress must be an advantage not likely to 
 escape them. Four or five thousand men slipped down the 
 coast in the small vessels of the country were quite sufficient 
 for the purpose, and the little preparation necessary for such an 
 undertaking, at a time when all Italy was full of troops in 
 movement, might have been made at Genoa, Leghorn, or Civita 
 Yecchia, unknown to us at Naples. Unfortunately too, just at 
 that period we received accounts of Lord Collingwood having 
 again quitted the Mediterranean, and being cruizing off Cadiz ; 
 80 that these seas were left entirely open to the enemy, and 
 there seemed nothing to prevent his coming in greater strength 
 from Toulon or Genoa. 
 
 Under these circumstances a direct movement to Messina 
 was the most obvious measure of security that could offer itself, 
 and, in fact, the only certain one that could be pursued. I, 
 however, knew too well the jealousy of the Court of Naples on 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 431 
 
 this head to propose it at once ; but I wrote to Mr. Elliot a 
 letter to be laid before his Sicilian Majesty, offering in general 
 terms my assistance for the protection of the Island of Sicily. 
 
 As a difference of opinion had existed between Mr. Elliot 
 and me on the subject of my coming to Sicily, I have thought 
 it best for your Lordship's information, as well as in justice to 
 that gentleman, to enclose to your Lordship copies of all the 
 letters that have passed between us upon it. I trust that those 
 letters written upon the spur of the occasion will convey to 
 your Lordship every information that may enable your Lordship 
 to form a proper judgment of what has passed. 
 
 When I left Naples my intention was to have gone to 
 Agosta, there to wait till a more determined state of affaira 
 might point out a decisive line of conduct for me ; but upon a 
 more serious reflection of the extreme importance of this point, 
 and in the unwillingness to run any possible hazard as to its 
 safety, I afterwards determined to come to an anchor here, 
 though not to land, and we have now been here since the 22nd 
 ult. I have not permitted any soldier to go on shore, and but 
 a very few of the principal officers. I have not landed myself. 
 
 I lament that there should have existed any difference of 
 opinion between Mr. Elliot and me. His advice has always been, 
 of great weight with me ; but upon the present occasion we have 
 unfortunately seen the subject under points of view so widely 
 different from each other, that it was impossible for me to act 
 upon his while I remained unconvinced of the falsity of my own. 
 It has appeared to me that Mr. Elliot is too much inclined to 
 place a confidence in the sincerity of the Court, that I have found 
 myself obliged to deny to it. I am free to confess to your 
 Lordship that I place no reliance on it ; constituted as it is, it is 
 impossible that I should do so ; and I will acknowledge that 
 under the conviction of the extreme importance to the interesta 
 of Great Britain that Sicily should be in any other hands than, 
 those of France, I have been not a little actuated in my present 
 conduct by a belief that it is as well to guard against the want 
 of good faith in our friends as against the open projects of our 
 enemies. If the importance which I attach to the possession 
 of Sicily was felt by his Majesty's Government when my in- 
 structions were framed, how much more must it appear in that 
 
432 MILITAEY TBANSACTIONS 
 
 light now, and how much more will it justify strong measures 
 under the present circumstances, when the cession of Venice, 
 and all its ancient possessions, by Austria, has given to France 
 such an immediate and ready access to the Levant. The addi- 
 tion of Sicily would completely shut us out from that part of 
 the world ; but neither will the limits of a despatch admit, nor, 
 writing to your Lordship, is it at all necessary, that I should 
 enter into the incalculable evils of such an event. 
 
 Mr. Elliot very early embraced the idea of negotiating 
 with the French, which he wished the Court to permit him to 
 undertake, and towards which I believe he did take some steps, 
 though without committing himself to any precise proposal. I 
 confess I saw no great prospect of any success in his endea- 
 vours ; but in a negotiation conducted by him there could bo 
 no danger, and therefore I only waited with anxiety for the 
 results ; but when the Court itself began a negotiation, at a 
 moment when, without the means of defence, an irritated (and 
 I am sorry to add in this instance not unjustly irritated) and 
 vindictive enemy was within three marches of its frontier, and 
 when it had nothing of its own to offer, the case was widely 
 altered ; it carried suspicion in every line of its progress. At 
 whose expense but at ours could it expect to purchase the ad- 
 vantages it sought by a treaty. The object was to save Naples, 
 if not to the present possessor of the throne, at least to the 
 hereditary prince ; and to accomplish this I have no doubt that 
 both that kingdom and this island would have been placed un- 
 der French influence ; their ports immediately shut against us ; 
 Malta in a manner blockaded ; and indeed their Government in 
 hostility to us. 
 
 But the truth is, my Lord, I never could form an idea of 
 the possibility of any treaty taking place under the present 
 circumstances. Bonaparte evidently seizes the opportunity of 
 manifesting by a public display of his greatness, that justice of 
 which he at this moment so loudly and insolently boasts ; and 
 while he on the one hand affects to reward those who have 
 adhered to him, he on the other greedily lays hold of the occa- 
 sion of punishing what he holds up as an act of perfidy in 
 a faithless government. This is a gratification to his arro- 
 gance and vanity that I am persuaded no consideration would 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN". 433 
 
 induce him to forego, even if it were not attended with the 
 advantage of another kingdom in his family. I should apo- 
 logize to your Lordship for detaining you with all this specu- 
 lative reasoning, but I am in hopes your Lordship will excuse 
 it, as it is on it in a great measure that I ground the opposition 
 that I have hitherto made to the King's wishes of retiring to 
 Malta ; for however convinced I may be of the great conse- 
 quence to us of the security of this place, yet if I could see 
 any real probability of a treaty taking place by which their 
 dominions might be preserved to the present Royal Family, 
 and if I had assurances from Mr. Elliot that he was satisfied 
 that such a treaty would not be productive of all the conse- 
 quences I have alluded to, I believe I should be answering 
 His Majesty's intentions, if I did not interpose any impedi- 
 ment by any further opposition to what is considered as so 
 essential to its completion. 
 
 The last accounts I have from Naples are by Mr. Elliot's 
 letter of the 3rd, by which your Lordship will perceive that I 
 am given to hope that the citadel at this place will be put into 
 my hands in the course of a few days. General Campbell 
 writes me at the same time : " In the meantime I am authorized 
 " to say that all parties here are now well satisfied you are at 
 " Messina ; and, though not authorized to say it, I have little 
 "reason to doubt they would be equally well satisfied you 
 " should be in possession of the citadel." This letter from him 
 was of the 1st instant. The King being landed at Palermo, I 
 have sent Sir John Stuart there to pay my compliments to his 
 Majesty on his safe arrival, and accompanying my letter to Sir 
 John Acton with a copy of Mr. Elliot's of the 3rd, which must 
 probably be of a later date by two or three days than any thing 
 they could have received from Naples. I have proposed to his 
 Majesty to permit us to land and take possession of those 
 points that are necessary for the defence of these parts of his 
 dominions. There has not yet been sufficient time for me to 
 hear of Sir John's arrival at Palermo. 
 
 Your Lordship will observe by the enclosed series of letters 
 that the Court of Naples is impressed with the idea of its being 
 my intention to land here without their concurrence, or rather 
 in direct opposition to it ; and Mr. Elliot seems to have adopted 
 
 2 F 
 
434 MILITARY TRAKSACTIONS 
 
 the same notion. It is certain that in conversation with 
 Mr. Elliot I did once mention that, as a measure to which it 
 was not impossible I might feel myself obliged to have recourse ; 
 but nothing further to my recollection ever passed, and I am 
 positive no communication with the Court of any sort from me 
 was ever calculated in any shape to countenance the idea of 
 such being my intention. However, as I have perceived that 
 its existence among them has rather a tendency to forward my 
 views than otherwise, I have never noticed it, as I should in 
 that case be obliged to deny it. The truth is that under the 
 present circumstances I never had such an intention, our being 
 in the harbour as we are answers every purpose of security to 
 it; and it has been solely my intention to remain here till their 
 situation was finally decided on, by which to guide my future 
 conduct. 
 
 I am happy to add that, from every information I am able 
 to procure, the attachment of the inhabitants of this island to- 
 wards us remains unshaken. I am assured that there are none 
 but a part of the nobility and a few principal merchants who 
 are supposed to be in any ways inimical to us. The clergy are 
 very generally in our favour, and as to the inhabitants of thi^ 
 place they are clamorous for our landing. 
 I have the honour to be, my Lord, 
 
 Tour Lordship's most obedient humble Servant, 
 J. H. CEAia, General 
 The Right Hon. Lord Viscount Castlereagh, 
 &c. &c. &c. 
 
 Appendix E. 
 
 Plains of Maida, 6th July, 1806. 
 Parole Messina, 
 
 Major-General Stuart finds himself incapable of ex- 
 pressing to the troops the sentiments excited in him by their 
 brave and intrepid conduct in the late action of the 4th, in 
 which they gained so signal a triumph over a boasting and 
 insolent enemy. Their distinguished behaviour on this memo- 
 rable day will endear them in the breasts of their grateful 
 countrymen — it will ensure to them the applause of their 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 435 
 
 approving sovereign, and will add another immortal wreath to 
 the laurels of the British army. 
 
 The light brigade under Lieut- Col. Kempt, who led the 
 attack, and who charged and broke the enemy's favourite 1st 
 light corps, displayed a combined instance of gallantry and 
 discipline, of which military records have furnished but few 
 examples. 
 
 The 78th and 81st Eegiments, which formed the brigade of 
 Brigadier- Greneral Acland, shared the first and severest part of 
 the action, with the light infantry, whom they were ordered to 
 support. The gallantry and good conduct of the Brigadier- 
 General in fulfilling this duty, were most nobly seconded by 
 the brave regiments under his orders. 
 
 The battalion of Grenadiers, and the 27th Eegiment, under 
 the orders of Brigadier- General Cole, made a firm and intrepid 
 resistance against a superior force ; and a manoeuvre of the 
 27th Eegiment, in throwing back a wing to receive the enemy's 
 cavalry, was the strongest token of the excellent discipline of 
 that corps. 
 
 The 58th and "Watteville's regiment, which formed the 
 brigade under the orders of Colonel Oswald, and which were 
 brought up as a second line, sustained the advanced columns 
 with the greatest spirit and intrepidity. 
 
 The conduct of Lieut.-Col. Eoss in throwing the 20th Eegi- 
 ment into the wood on the enemy's flank, while the latter 
 were attempting to turn our left, was a prompt display of 
 gallantry and judgment to which the army was most critically 
 indebted. 
 
 The Artillery was well provided and most effectually served^ 
 under the direction of Major Lemoine, commander of that 
 corps. 
 
 From the various public departments of the army, and 
 especially so from Lieut.- Colonel Bunbury, Deputy Quarter- 
 master-General, Sir J. Stuart has to acknowledge the most 
 marked and able assistance, not only during the continuance 
 of the action itself, but in all the arrangements preparatory to 
 its commencement. 
 
 No language that the Major- General could adopt would 
 bear any proportion to the feelings with which he recurs to all 
 
 2 F 2 
 
436 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 the circumstances of this great, this signal day, to offer the 
 expression of his own humble thanks on so memorable an 
 occasion, would be presumptuous. 
 
 The army will receive the only acknowledgments that are 
 adequate to their deeds, in the approbation of their Sovereign, 
 and their country ; and every soldier whom the General has 
 now the honour of addressing, will have an equal right with 
 himself to make the boast hereafter, that he bore a part in the 
 the glorious battle of Maida. 
 
 Appendix F. 
 
 From Lieut. -General Sir John Moore, addressed to 
 General Fox. 
 
 24th of August, 1806. 
 Memorandum. 
 
 The annexed is a copy of the letter I left with Sir Sidney 
 after the conversation I had with him ; but it will be necessary 
 for you to express your sentiments much more decidedly if 
 you wish him to discontinue his interference in Calabria, 
 where in his imagination he is directing the operation of 
 armies, but where in reality he is only encouraging murder 
 and rapine, and keeping up amongst that unhappy people, 
 whom we have no intention to support, a spirit of revolt which 
 will bring upon them the more severe vengeance of the Trench 
 government. As long as Sir Sidney liad money he distributed 
 it profusely ; and now, with as little judgment, he is distri- 
 buting arms, ammunition, and provisions. Transports are 
 employed all along the coast with orders to receive and victual 
 all the men, women, and children who apply to them ; to re- 
 land them in Calabria, or carry them to whatever part of Sicily 
 they direct. Tou will judge, in some degree, by Sir Sidney's 
 orders to Captain Fellowes, of the style he has adopted. 
 
 It will be necessary for you to send him a list of the trans- 
 ports, stating names and number, which you wish to be left at 
 Messina subject to your call. 
 
ik the meditereanean. 437 
 
 Appendix G. 
 
 Palmi, 26th of August, 1806. 
 
 Mt dear Sie, 
 
 I transmit for your perusal the enclosed letters from 
 Colonel Philippis, Preside of the province of Lower Calabria, 
 by which you will find into what a scene of anarchy and con- 
 fusion the whole population has been thrown by the conduct 
 of the chiefs of the Masse, by whose dastardly flight from 
 before the enemy the perpetrators of rapine have been brought 
 into the interior, and every appearance of government dissolved. 
 It is the attack of the poor, the worthless, the needy, against 
 the better class of society. 
 
 "Wherever the smallest party of our troops appear, tran- 
 quillity is restored. I reached this place last night with a 
 subaltern's party and twenty men, at a moment that a nume- 
 rous horde of brigands consisting of near 800 men were entering 
 the town, with a demand of rations, &c.; and an universal 
 pillage was expected by the terrified inhabitants. I sent to 
 direct the chief of these brigands to retire with his people, and 
 to call upon me alone this morning ; to which he was perfectly 
 obedient. I have desired him to abstain from entering the 
 towns, and immediately to repair to and put himself under the 
 orders of Colonel Cancellieri, who has been appointed by the 
 King to the chief command of all these disorderly ruffians. 
 
 It is unfortunate that the people have no confidence in 
 their own national troops, otherwise a disposition of men might 
 be made for all the purposes of police : a few detachments at 
 principal places by means of patroles would easily control the 
 whole country. 
 
 I have exhorted the better class of people to establish 
 themselves in civic guards; and to an institution of this 
 nature, which I made at this place the last time I passed, has 
 its peace been hitherto owing, amidst the general confusion 
 around it. But last night its position was certainly critical. 
 I remain, with great regard and respect, 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 Tour faithful and obliged servant, 
 (Signed) J. STUAET. 
 
 To General the Rt. Hon. H. E. Fox, 
 &c. &c. 
 
438 military transactions 
 
 Appendix H. 
 
 ^cdractfrom the Letters ofFaul Louis Courier, 
 " Cassano, le 12 Aout, 1806. 
 " Cbacun apres le d6 vous montre comment il faUait jouer. 
 S'il n'eut pas attaqu^ il n'y aurait qu'un cri — ' Quoi, voir 
 les Anglais, et ne pas tomber sur eux ! ' — L'aventure* est 
 facheuse pour le pauvre Keynier. NuUe part on se bat ; les 
 regards sont sur nous. Avec nos bonnes troupes, et a forces 
 %ales, etre defaits en si peu de minutes ! Cela ne s'est point 
 vu depuis la revolution !" 
 
 " Scigliano, le 21 Aout, 1806. 
 "Or ecoutez, vous qui dites que nous ne faisons rien. 
 Nous pendimes un Capucin a San Griovanni in Fiore, et une 
 vingtaine de pauvres diables qui avaient plus la mine de Char- 
 bonniers que d'autre chose. Le Capucin, homme d'esprit, 
 parla fort bien a Eeynier. Iteynier lui disait, *Vous avez 
 preche centre nous.' II s'en defendit; ses raisons me 
 paraissaient assez bonnes. Nous voyant partis en gens qui 
 ne devaient pas revenir, il avait preche pour ceux a qui nous 
 cedions la place. Pouvait il faire autrement ? Mais si on lea 
 ecoutait on ne pendrait personne. Ici nous n*avons pu pendre 
 qu'un pere et son jBls, que Ton prit endormis dans un fosse. 
 Monseigneur excusera : il ne s'est trouve que cela. Pas une 
 ame dans la ville ; tout se sauve, et dans les maisons il n'est 
 reste que des chats. 
 
 " Nous rencontrons, par-ci par-la, des bandes qui n'osent 
 pas memo tenir le sommet des montagnes. Leur plus grand 
 audace fut a Cosenza, ou TAnglaisf les amena. II les fit venir 
 jusqu'a la porte du c6t^ de Scigliano, et ils y resterent toute 
 une nuit sans quo personne dedans s'en doutat. S'ils fussent 
 entres tout bonnement (car de gardes aux portes, ah ! oui, 
 c'est bien nous qui pensons a cela!) ils prenaient au lit 
 Moaseigneurle Marechal avec la femme du Major. L' Anglais 
 fut tue la. Le matin nous autres desconfits, qui venions de 
 Cassano, traversant Cosenza nous sortimcs par cette porte a 
 
 * The assumed name of one of the Chiefs of th« Masse, 
 t Battle of Maida. 
 
IN THE MEDITEREANEAN. 439 
 
 la pointe du jour, et les trouvames la dans les vignes. II 
 s'etait avance lui; mais sa canaille I'abandonna. Je le vis 
 environne. II jetasonepeeencriant" Prisonnier." Mais on le 
 tua. J'en fus faclie ; j'aurais voulu lui rendre unpeu les bons 
 traitemens que j'ai re9us de ses compatriotes. C'etait un 
 bel homme, equipe magnifiquement. On le depouilla dans 
 un clin d'oeil; il avait de I'or beaucoup. Nous allons a la 
 Mantea^'— &c." 
 
 '*Mileto, le 10 Sept., 1806. 
 
 " A M. LE G]^NEEAL MOSSEL, 
 
 *' J'ai re^u, mon G-eneral, la chemise dont vous me faites 
 present. Dieu vous la rende, mon General, en ce monde-ci, ou 
 dans I'autre. Jamais cbarite ne fut mieux placee que celle-la. 
 Je ne suis pas pourtant tout nu ; j'ai meme une chemise sur 
 moi, a laquelle il manque, a vrai dire, le devant et le derriere, 
 et voici comment. On me la fit d'une toile a sac, que j'eue au 
 pillage d'un village ; et c'est la encore une chose a vous expli- 
 quer. Je vis un soldat qui emportait une piece de toile. Sans 
 m'informer s'il I'avait eu par heritage ou autrement, je lui 
 donnai I'ecu, et je devins proprietaire de la toile, autant qu'on 
 pent I'etre d'un effet vole. On en glosa : mais le pis fut que 
 ma chemise faite et mise sur mon maigre corps par une lingere 
 suivant I'armee, il fut question de la faire entrer dans ma 
 culotte, la chemise s'entend, et ce fut la que nous echouames 
 moi et ma lingere. La pauvre fille s'y empioya, et je la 
 secondai de mon mieux ; mais rien n'y fit : il n'y eut force ni 
 adresse qui put reduire cette etoffe a occuper autour de moi un 
 espace raisonnable. Je ne vous dis pas, mon General, tout ce 
 que j'eus a souffrir de ces tentatives, maigre I'attention et les 
 soins de ma femme de chambre, on ne put pas plus experte a 
 pareil service. Enfin necessite, mere de I'industrie, nous 
 suggera I'idee de retrancher de la chemise tout ce qui refusait 
 de loger dans mon pantalon, c'est-a-direle devant etle derriere, 
 et de coudre la ceinture au corps meme de la chemise, opera- 
 tion qu'executa ma bonne couturiere avec une adresse mer- 
 
 * Amantea was a rugged little place upon the coast, and in communi- 
 cation with Sir S. Smith. The French were beaten off with loss in this 
 attempt ; but they took Amantea in the following January, 
 
440 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 veilleuse. II n'est sorte de calembourgs et de mauvaises 
 plaisanteries qu'on n'ait fait la-dessus ; et c'etait un sujet a ne 
 jamais s'epuiser, si votre generosite ne m'eut mis en etat de 
 faire desormais plus d'envieque de pitie. Je me moque a mon 
 tour des railleurs, dont aucun ne possede rien de comparable 
 au don que je re9ois de vous. II n'y avait que vous, mon 
 General, capable de cette bonne oeuvre dans toute I'armee ; car 
 outre que mes camarades sont pour la plupart aussi mal 
 equipes que moi, il passe aujourd'hui pour constant que je ne 
 puis rien garder ; I'experience ayant confirme que tout ce que 
 Ton me donne va aux brigands en droiture. Quand j'ecbappai 
 nu de Coregliano St. Vincent me vetit, et m'emplit une valise 
 de beaux et bons eflfets, qui me furent pris buit jours apres 
 sur les hauteurs de Nicastro. Le General Yerdier et son etat 
 major me firent une autre pacotille, que je ne portai pas plus 
 loin qui Ajello, ou je fus depouille pour la quatrieme fois. On 
 s'est done lasse de m'habiller et de me faire I'aumone : et on 
 croit generalement que mon destin est de mourir nu, comme je 
 suis ne. Avec toute cela on me traite si bien, le General Reynier 
 a pour moi tant de bonte, que je ne me repens point encore 
 d'avoir demande a faire cette campagne, oii je n'ai perdu apres 
 tout que mes clievaux, mon argent, mon domestique, mes 
 nippes, et celles de mes amis." 
 
 Appendix K. 
 
 (Private and Secret.) 
 
 Palermo, Jan, 23rd, 1807. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 
 The Ajax is just arrived here, and has brought de- 
 spatches of the greatest importance. Sir John Duckworth 
 will follow immediately. I tremble for his seeing * * * 
 before I have time to speak to him, as otherwise your most 
 secret orders will be no longer so. Things go on here as ill 
 as possible, but if I had one person out of the way I could 
 soon bring about an alteration. In the meantime as we are 
 going upon new enterprises it becomes absolutely neces- 
 sary to secure ourselves in Sicily. For this reason I am very 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 441 
 
 desirous of going to Messina with Sir John Duckworth to 
 combine with you and him the plans that it may be necessary 
 to adopt. I enclose Sir John's letter to me. 
 I have the honour to be, my dear Sir, 
 
 Tour most faithful humble Servant, 
 
 (Signed) W. DEUMMOND. 
 
 His Excellency the Rt. Hon. General Fox. 
 
 (Frivate.) 
 
 Palermo, Jan. 27tli, 1807. 
 Mt deae Sib, 
 
 I have delayed writing to you for these two days in 
 hopes of having some communication with Sir John Duck- 
 worth, who arrived off Palermo the day before yesterday with 
 the JRepulse and Windsor Castle in company. His anxiety to 
 proceed on his voyage induced him not to land, and I have 
 been obliged to correspond with him the best way I could. 
 Yesterday I sent Lord Burghersh (being confined myself with 
 a cold) on board the Boyal Greorge, and desired him to detail 
 my feelings and views to the Admiral, whom I wish much you 
 should see, as he passes by Messina. He seems not inclined 
 to give entire credit to the report of the war having broken out 
 between Russia and Turkey. In this he may be right, for we 
 have nothing oflBcial on the subject. Still, however, I am of 
 opinion he would do well to take troops with him, or at least 
 to have them follow him, when he goes up to the Dardanelles. 
 If this should be your opinion likewise, which is of much more 
 consequence than mine, it would be highly important to com- 
 municate with the Admiral before he arrives at Malta. In all 
 events I trust you will have time to write to him before he 
 quits that island. Now as to the number of troops to be sent 
 from Sicily, I think we ought to be extremely cautious. 
 The Court here will certainly be too happy to take any 
 advantage of our weakness. I have no doubt in my own 
 mind, though I cannot prove it, that the Queen and her 
 minions had applied to the Court of Petersburgh for a very 
 large force to be sent to Sicily ; and that since the diversion 
 occasioned by the Turkish war will occupy the E-ussians, they 
 have made propositions to Bonaparte. That they have been 
 
442 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 negotiating with him for some time is a thing of which I am 
 quite persuaded. I now have reason to believe that they are 
 corresponding with the French government through Spain. Of 
 this I have been informed by a respectable person here, who 
 has generally pretty accurate intelligence. The reason of this 
 detestable treachery arises partly from the abhorrence of the 
 Queen and her minions to everything English ; and partly 
 from the belief that France is stronger than England, and that 
 sooner or later France will become masters of Sicily. They 
 openly say, indeed, that we have not a sufficient force to pro- 
 tect the island. Under these circumstances you will judge 
 whether it may be prudent to detach a large force at present. 
 I rejoice to hear that reinforcements are coming out. Still, 
 however, we must remember the enemies with whom we have 
 to contend both without and within the island of Sicily. 
 
 It gives me great pleasure to announce to you the departure, 
 and I hope for ever, of a person* who has been acting a most 
 extraordinary part here. I have frankly spoken my opinion to 
 Sir John Duckworth about him. He continued his miserable 
 intrigues to the very last, and was closeted with St. Clair for 
 many hours the day previous to his departure. For all this he 
 is rewarded with the Order of Ferdinand. By accident or 
 design a letter was left on my table from the Queen containing 
 the following words : — 
 
 " Je regois la desagrSable nouvelle que Vinfernale intrigue et 
 cabale a provoque, quelquonque en sera le resultat, de loin ou 
 de preSf je serai toujours voire eternellement attachee et recon- 
 noissante amie (Signed) Charlotte. (With an ingenious device 
 by way of flourish, where a heart is represented in the midst of 
 flames), ce 23 Janvier, 1837." 
 
 It is easy to guess, though the cover and the direction are 
 wanting, to whom this tender and delicate epistle was addressed. 
 You, Sir John, Moore, and myself, are evidently understood to 
 be the authors and abettors of the infernal intrigue and cabal 
 against this naval Celadon. 
 
 There is another curious circumstance. The letters for you 
 were sent to me by Sir Sidney Smith. I wrote a short letter 
 to you, not to detain the messenger. Sir Sidney informed me 
 • Sir Sidney Smith. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 443 
 
 he had despatches of consequence, and kept my messenger 
 back for three hours. He then came himself, and sat down at 
 the table where all my papers were. He pulled a packet from 
 his pocket, and did me the favour to read one or two letters. 
 Impatient to send off my messenger I got up, and he followed 
 me out of the room. The next day I found the letter addressed 
 to Captain Cochet on my table. I cannot swear that it was not 
 among those sent to me, but I certainly read over all the 
 directions, and do not remember to have seen this. The cir- 
 cumstance appears the more extraordinary, that Sir Sidney 
 wrote instructions to Captain Cochet himself. 
 
 His conduct about Eaphael Silvestri is of a piece with all 
 the rest. He assured me he had never acted as Commander- 
 in-Chief of the forces of the King of Naples since he got a well 
 merited rebuke from the Admiralty; and yet here is his pass- 
 port with his almost royal titles, dated the 6th of November, 
 1806. 
 
 I think it so important that you should have this intelli- 
 gence that I shall close this letter without adverting to some 
 other things that might be otherwise interesting for you to 
 learn. 
 
 I have the honour to remain, my dear Sir, 
 
 Most faithfully yours, 
 (Signed) W. DRUMMOND. 
 
 To the Hon. and Rt. Hon. General Fox, 
 &c. &c. &c. 
 
 Appendix L. 
 
 The two following letters (intercepted) from King Joseph 
 afford evidence of the weakness of the French army in the 
 south of Italy, at the very time when our forces in Sicily were 
 reduced by the detaching of 5000 men to Alexandria, and were 
 thus rendered unable to take advantage of the opportunity 
 which presented itself. The first of these letters, addressed 
 to the Emperor, evinces the trembling submission with which 
 Napoleon's brother was content to act as a nominal King of 
 Naples. 
 
444 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Venosa, le 9 Avril, 1807. 
 SlEE, 
 
 Je re9ois les lettres de Y. M. du 20. Je suis afflige de 
 penser qu'Elle aura cru jusqu'au raoment qu'Elle recevra 
 cette lettre, que je me suis permis d'oter des regimens Eran9ais> 
 pour faire entrer dans ma garde, des cavaliers d'elite ou des 
 grenadiers. Je donne ina parole k V. M. que depuis la forma- 
 tion de ma garde, il y a aujourd'hui un an, temps ou j'ai connu 
 sa volonte, je ne me suis par permis de prendre un seul tam- 
 bour Eran9ais; et je m'en garderai bien, et par le respect que 
 je dois a ses ordres, et parceque je sens moi-meme la necessite 
 et la justesse des dispositions qu'Elle me present. 
 
 Je vais faire partir pour I'ltalie un regiment de cavalerie 
 Eran9aise, et un regiment de cavalerie Napolitaine. II ne me 
 restera alors qu'un regiment de cavalerie, et un d'infanterie. 
 Je n'ai pas d'autres troupes. Ainsi Y. M. voit qu'Elle s'est 
 trompee par les gens qui lui ecrivent que le General Dumas 
 me fait faire beaucoup de levees de regimens. Je remercie 
 Y. M. de vouloir bien me donner tons les ans cent conscripts. 
 
 Yoici le rapport que je re9ois de la Sicile. M. Antboine, 
 que Y. M. a toujours distingue m'ecrit la lettre ci-jointe. 
 Je suis avec respect, Sire, 
 
 De Y. M. le tresraffecti^ frere, 
 
 JOSEPH. 
 
 A Sa Majeste L'Empereur et Roi 
 a son Quartier General. 
 
 Venosa, le 9 Avril, 1807. 
 Je re9ois votre lettre du 31. Laborde sera le bienvenu: je 
 lerai ce qu'il desire. Le Gen. Macdonald ne doit pas s'attendre 
 a commander beaucoup de troupes. Je ne vois pas que je 
 puisse lui donner plus de 2 a 8 mille hommes. Ce n'etait pas 
 non plus pour cela que je I'avais demande. Le Marechal 
 
 Jourdan commande 5000 a Naples. Reynier * 
 
 Tout est en garnison. C'est pour cela que tant de Generaux 
 ont du partir. Je desire que vous ne cachiez rien de cela au 
 General Macdonald, pour qu'il ne se trouve pas abuse en 
 arrivant. Je me porte tres-bien. 
 
 • Illegible. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 445 
 
 Adieu, ma chere. II faut que se decide en homme, oui, 
 
 ou non. 
 
 JOSEPH. 
 
 A sa Majeste La Reine de Naples 
 & de Sicile a Paris. 
 
 Appendix M. 
 
 Downing Street, 21st May, 1807. 
 (Secret.') 
 
 Sib, 
 
 Tour letter of the 5th ult. has been received and laid 
 before the King. 
 
 Considering the little probability there now exists of any 
 further military operations being undertaken against the Turkish 
 Empire, and hoping that no occasion will arise for sending more 
 of our disposable force to Egypt, I am to convey to you instruc- 
 tions with respect to the troops at present stationed in Sicily, 
 and the more immediate objects to which they may be con- 
 sidered applicable. 
 
 The strength and efficiency of the corps lately assembled 
 under your orders having been considerably reduced by the 
 detachment of the troops under the command of Major-General 
 Eraser, to Egypt, it is impossible not to feel how much the 
 power of what remains in Sicily to undertake offensive opera- 
 tions has been impaired. As, however, an active exertion on 
 the continent of Italy, either directed against Naples or some 
 other point of that coast, may in the course of the ensuing 
 campaign be of the utmost importance to the cause of His 
 Majesty's allies, and as it is conceived that, consistently with a 
 due attention to the precautions hereafter to be stated, a force 
 of about 20,000 men, British and Neapolitans, may be made 
 applicable to such a purpose, it is the King's pleasure that you 
 do use every possible exertion, not only to prepare the British, 
 but the Neapolitan troops, for such an enterprise. And 
 although the quality of the latter is in all respects inferior to 
 what could be wished, yet as numbers are in themselves of 
 great importance, they must be encouraged, improved, and 
 made the most of, with a view to this important object. 
 
446 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 The strong desire that has always been evinced by the 
 Court of Palermo that an effort should be made for the re- 
 covery of Naples, will enable you, so far as their army can be 
 rendered effective, to prevail on them to take their full share 
 in such an operation ; and it certainly is desirable, for several 
 reasons, that the Neapolitan troops should be brought as much 
 forward, and employed as numerously as possible in any attempt 
 of this nature, and that the British troops should be under- 
 stood as co-operating rather than as prepared to take such an 
 enterprise chiefly on themselves. 
 
 From the jealousy which has appeared on more than one 
 occasion, with respect to our position in Sicily, it certainly 
 would be imprudent to carry the whole of the British army to 
 the continent of Italy, leaving the Neapolitan troops in force 
 in Sicily. In the event of such an expedition, it will there- 
 fore be expedient to leave a proportion of the Ejng's forces to 
 occupy one or two of the principal fortresses, so as secure the 
 re-entry of our troops into that island ; whilst it is desirable 
 that the Neapolitan troops should be employed as largely as 
 possible, not only as a pledge of the interest taken by the 
 Neapolitan Government in the success of the operations, but 
 also with a view to reserve the military power of the island 
 more completely in our hands. 
 
 The last despatches from Mr. Drummond gave us reason 
 to hope that an improved disposition has taken place in the 
 Government of Palermo. I trust that you will encourage and 
 profit by it as much as possible ; and as a means of doing so, 
 that you will intimate to that Court that you are instructed 
 to invite them to co-operate with you in making the most 
 active exertions with a view to offensive operations. 
 
 You may acquaint them that measures have been taken for 
 immediately replacing to the extent of 10,000 stand of arms 
 the loss they have lately sustained ; and that the King looks 
 to His Sicilian Majesty's troops for bearing a distinguished 
 share in any active operations which may be undertaken. 
 
 Under the uncertainty wliich prevailed with respect to the 
 turn affairs might take to the eastward, when Mr. Drummond's 
 proposition of sending a force against Naples was communi- 
 nicated to you, and considering the doubts you felt as to the 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 447 
 
 course of measures which the Government at home might, as 
 things then stood, wish to pursue, His Majesty entirely 
 approves of your having declined at that moment taking any 
 steps for carrying such a plan into execution. As there is 
 now, however, every reason to presume that the war with 
 Turkey is reduced, on our part, to one of mere blockade ; and 
 as we may indulge the hope that Egypt will not be suffered to 
 operate as any further drain upon our army, I am to impress 
 upon your mind the importance of every exertion in your 
 power being used to create the means of striking, under 
 favorable circumstances, a blow against the enemy's power in 
 Italy. 
 
 Much of the prudence of such an attempt must depend 
 upon the information you may receive at the moment, of the 
 precise state of the enemy's strength within the kingdom of 
 Naples, as well as the means he possesses of speedily receiving 
 reinforcements from the Trench forces which may be assembled 
 in the North of Italy, whether with a view to enter Turkey, 
 to watch Austria, or eventually to strengthen their army in 
 the north of Europe. 
 
 Should the campaign open advantageously in Poland on 
 the part of the Allies, and the French be weak in the north of 
 Italy, the recovery of Naples might be undertaken with some 
 hopes, if successful, of a permanent occupation being therein 
 maintained ; if, on the contrary, the Erench should be suc- 
 cessful in Poland, and the troops in the north of Italy and 
 Dalmatia be at liberty to turn themselves against the English 
 and Neapolitan troops, no reasonable hope could in that case 
 be entertained of holding Naples ; and the operation must then 
 be looked at, not as likely to lead to the re-establishment of 
 the Neapolitan Government, but as a diversion calculated to 
 draw off the enemy's forces and attention to a distant point. 
 
 In this case the advantage to be gained is certainly less 
 considerable, but by no means to be disregarded, if it can be 
 combined with a reasonable hope of destroying the Erench 
 corps stationed in the kingdom of Naples before it can be sup- 
 ported ; and also provided the attempt can be made without 
 incurring too much military risk. 
 
 Upon the whole, it is his Majesty's wish that you should 
 
448 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 put yourself in a situation to move with the utmost conjoint 
 force that can be assembled of the troops of the two powers, 
 consistent with the principles above stated ; so as to profit by 
 any opening which may present itself, either to make a useful 
 diversion in favour of our allies, or to re-establish his Sicilian 
 Majesty's power in the kingdom of Naples. 
 
 To your zeal and discretion his Majesty is graciously 
 pleased to confide the prosecution of these measures ; and you 
 may rely on receiving from me, not only every information 
 which I may conceive can be of use to guide your judgment, 
 but such explicit instructions, from time to time, as circum- 
 stances may point out, and as it may be possible to furnish 
 from home, with respect to measures necessarily requiring a 
 latitude being given to those intrusted with their execution. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 CASTLEEEAGH. 
 
 P.S. — Since the above despatch was written, intelligence 
 has been received that the greater proportion of Erench troops 
 assembled in the "Venetian territories and in Dalmatia have 
 been moved into Grermany. As this distribution of their force 
 must render them less strong with a view to the defence 
 of Naples, I think it right to call your attention to it, in order 
 that it may have such influence on your determination as the 
 facts may appear to justify ; of which it is reasonable to pre- 
 sume that you will be more accurately informed. C. 
 
 To General 
 The Rt. Hon. Henry Edward Fox, 
 &c. &c. &c. 
 
 Appendix N. 
 
 Sir John Moore to General Fox. 
 
 Palermo, 25th of July, 1807. 
 Mt DEAB GE]?rEllAL, 
 
 Yesterday I had my audience with the Queen. As I 
 wished to see her by myself, and to avoid all discussion with 
 Drummond on the subject of it, until it was over, I applied 
 to Sir John Acton to know what steps to take in order to see 
 her Majesty. He ofiered to write to her, which I accepted j 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN". 449 
 
 and she fixed yesterday at three o'clock. In the meantime 
 as this is not the country of secrecy, Drummond got hold of it. 
 He wrote to me, complaining that I had asked a secret audience 
 without the knowledge of him or Circello. I answered, that I 
 was sorry he had heard it from anybody but myself, as it was 
 my intention, the moment it was over, to have told him what 
 had passed, and my reason for applying for it through another 
 channel than him ; but, as it was, I must submit for a few 
 hours to be thought what I was not — a bit of an intriguant ; 
 that I had no doubt of clearing myself to his satisfaction when 
 I was at liberty to explain the truth. I went to the con- 
 ference. She received me as usual, most graciously, and 
 allowed me full time to make my speech, which I need not 
 repeat. She expressed herself satisfied, and she appeared to 
 be so ; and after more than half-an-hour's conversation, I 
 retired. What eff'ect this will have I know not, but I feel 
 easier after it, as I feel I have fully acquitted myself of my 
 part. Before I left her, she shewed me a letter from Drum- 
 mond, complaining of having granted me an audience without 
 his knowledge. I told her that the explanation I had had 
 was of a personal nature, with which Mr. Drummond had no 
 concern ; but, at any rate, in the station I held, I could not 
 consider myself in the light of an ordinary English subject 
 here, but had a right to ask an audience of her Majesty when 
 I thought proper, quite independent of Mr. Drummond. Erom 
 the Queen I drove to Drummond' s. Our conversation very 
 soon grew warm ; for he began by laying down the law about 
 himself as Minister, which I did not like. I, in the first place, 
 explained to him quietly enough my reasons for having acted 
 on this occasion without his knowledge ; that I probably should 
 never do so again, for I had no wish to disoblige him, and 
 should probably never have a motive for seeing any of the 
 Court or Cabinet on business with which he was not previously 
 acquainted : but I begged not to be considered as admitting 
 his law ; for should I command the forces, though probably 
 I might never exert it, I should consider myself at liberty to 
 communicate with their Majesties when and how I thought 
 proper. One thing led to another : at length he complained 
 of the manner I had spoken of him. He said there was nothing 
 
 2 a 
 
450 MILITAEY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 too contemptuous I had not expressed. I told him I had 
 always thought his conduct weak and pusillanimous, and had 
 always said so. He harped on this so long, that I at last told 
 him that we had not heard of his speaking very respectfully of 
 the generals. I then told him of his conduct before company, 
 on receiving a letter from you, declining the expedition to 
 Naples, as well as the general tone of conversation at his house, 
 which we had from Lord Burghersh and others, as well as his 
 having revealed a conversation which passed between himself, 
 you, and me ; and his having represented, as a proposal on our 
 part, that which was only mentioned in a passing manner 
 (I mean what I said — that the best thing which could be done, 
 was to send the Queen to Trieste). This was never proposed 
 to be adopted, either by you or me, but only mentioned; that 
 if possible to be done, it w^ould be the surest way to quiet 
 Sicily. He denied the exclamation on the receipt of your 
 letter, and also the having revealed the conversation to Lord 
 Burghersh ; this last he was, however, at last obliged) to allow. 
 After much heat, we parted quietly. He has written a letter 
 to you : when you compare it with what you know of the con- 
 tents of his letters to Leckie, you will know the credit to be 
 given to the assurances he now gives you. I am sorry, however, 
 that I was led into this scene : it was my wish to have avoided 
 all allusion to the past ; and as I wish, however much I despise 
 him, to continue upon good terms with him, I expressed 
 myself obliged towards him, and said I was sorry he was hurt 
 at my having seen the Queen without applying to him, but 
 that I meant him no sort of slight. He is furious against 
 Burghersh ; and I must beg of you to explain to his Lordship 
 that his name was drawn from me in the heat of argument, but 
 that of course I said nothing but what he had said to you and 
 to me. All this is very tiresome. 
 
 I have seen this morning the state of the troops for the 
 field, which amount, of all arms, to 4,400 non-commissioned 
 and privates only. On this subject I shall write to you more 
 fully in a day or two. 
 
 In the meantime, believe me. 
 
 My dear General, very faithfully, 
 (Signed) JOHN MOOEE. 
 
in the mediterranean. 451 
 
 Appendix 0. 
 
 Sir John Moore to General Fox. 
 
 Palermo, 28th of July, 1807. 
 Mt dear GrENEEAL, 
 
 I had the pleasure of yotir letters of the 24th and 25th, 
 with the inclosures. Mr. Drummond sent oif the niesseno:er 
 with the letters for Grirgenti yesterday afternoon, so I had but 
 little time to write. I wrote a private letter to Lord Castle- 
 reagh, that he might be a little in the current of affairs here ; 
 but I had not time, nor are things here sufficiently decided yet 
 to write fully. I saw, yesterday, the greater part of the infan- 
 try ; but the Prince Koyal, as Inspector-general, would be 
 present, which did not make me see the better. The men are 
 good, but, upon the whole, they resembled the London Volun- 
 teers, with rather less discipline, and without their zeal and 
 personal bravery. This day I see the reserve, which St. Clair 
 commands, and which is composed of the grenadiers and foreign 
 regiment ; to-morrow I see the cavalry ; and in the mean time, 
 I am getting returns of their whole military establishment. 
 "When this is done, I will bring them to a decision with respect 
 to the command; and shall also settle with respect to the 
 citadels of Syracuse and Messina, &c. ; and I should hope to 
 leave this the end of the week, and still to see you before you 
 embark. 
 
 I had the curiosity to ask Captain Eowley whether the 
 scene reported by Burghersh, M^hich passed before Tatischeff, on 
 the receipt of a despatch from you, was correct. He told me 
 it was, and that at all times his language was disrespectful. 
 This I tell you merely for your satisfaction and mine, but I 
 wish to quote no more ; therefore, unless you think it neces- 
 sary for Lord Burghersh' s peace of mind, do not name Eowley, 
 who was averse to speak. I was anxious to make him ; for, 
 though I was convinced that Drummond lied, I was curious to 
 ascertain it. You have not an idea of the solemn manner ic 
 which he denied the scene before Tatischeff, or of having ever 
 spoken disrespectfully. I have seldom met, in the character of 
 a gentleman, with a more mean or unprincipled fellow. Drum- 
 mond has told me that since he was at Messina, until the 
 
 2 G 2 
 
452 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 receipt of your letter respecting the command, he had never 
 seen the Queen, nor communicated with her; that he and 
 Circello worked alone with the King, and nothing was ever 
 communicated to the Queen. I have been told, from autliority 
 I think undoubted, that seldom a day has passed without 
 Drummond seeing or receiving notes from her ; that Circello, 
 nor no minister, ever dare present a paper, or make a proposal 
 to the King, without previously showing it to the Queen, and 
 receiving her approbation ; that Serrati alone did so, and she 
 has made Drummond an instrument to get him turned out, and 
 now laughs at him. In short, it is impossible to believe a 
 word he says. I shall write again in a day or two. Whatever 
 you wish me to do when you are gone, either for individuals or 
 otherwise, leave a memorandum, and it shall be done, as far as 
 depends on me. "Wherever you wish the 10th to be, either 
 here or at Malta, order them accordingly, and tell Oakes that 
 he may arrange. 
 
 Believe me always faithfully, 
 (Signed) JOHN MOOEE. 
 
 Admiral Thornborough gave me the letter which accom- 
 panies this. He sailed on a cruise off Toulon the night 
 before last. 
 
 Appendix P. 
 
 lExtract of a letter from Lieut. -General Sir John Moore to 
 General Fox. 
 
 *' Messina, 19th Sept., 1807. 
 
 "My mission to Palermo ended much as you expected; 
 they did not give me, nor ever intended to give me, any com- 
 mand over their troops ; and it is as well they did not, for I 
 could have done no earthly good, and might have got myself 
 into a scrape, unless I had got at the same time the command 
 of the Government. My journey was, however, so far of use 
 that I satisfied the King and Queen that you and I were not 
 Jacobins, of which we had been both accused ; and I believe it 
 did not pass unobserved that Drummond did not open his 
 mouth all the time I stayed. I send you enclosed copies 
 of a correspondence I had with Circello whilst at Palermo, 
 
IN THE MEDITERKANEAN. 453 
 
 because it is the only occurrence, since you left this, in which 
 your name, or the circumstances of your command, have been 
 brought forward. I know not why Circello chose to write at 
 all, unless it was to bring out his impertinence, for every thing 
 else had been settled at the conference, and did not require his 
 confirmation. Since my return from Palermo the Peace of 
 Tilsit has been promulgated, and I have been much occupied in 
 measures for defence. I did not expect to be interrupted by a 
 proposal at such a time to invade Italy ; but so it is ! You 
 were never more pressed than I was on this occasion. They 
 wanted the Admiral to convoy even the Sicilian troops ; for 
 they were told and believed the French had sent all their 
 soldiers to take possession of the Seven Islands, or to Upper 
 Italy. Drummond played, as usual, a double and a dirty 
 game ; luckily Thornborough is an excellent man ; he has had 
 an opportunity of seeing Drummond' s falseness, and has given 
 him up. He and I go on by ourselves, without troubling our- 
 selves with Drummond. We see plainly in case of attack we 
 have our own forces alone to depend on. We have not had a 
 line from either Lord Collingwood or Sir A. Paget since they 
 passed this, and the troops from Egypt are not arrived. I am 
 anxious for their arrival, for I believe nothing but the sickly 
 season prevents the French entering the Calabrias. Massena, 
 it is said, is upon his march with a large force; and when 
 threatened from Tarentum, Corfu, Calabria, Naples, Toulon, 
 &c., our situation, with a foolish government and a disaffected 
 people, will not be a quiet one." 
 
 Appendix Q. 
 
 Insteuctions poe G-eneeal Oeficees commanding 
 Beigades. 
 
 Head Quarters, Messina, Sep. 21st, 1807. 
 The General Orders of the 14th instant detail many par- 
 ticulars respecting regimental preparations for service, to 
 which a rigid adherence is expected. But there are other 
 subjects of previous consideration and arrangement, upon 
 which it is necessary that Greneral Officers should bestow their 
 
454 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 immediate attention, to enable them to bring the corps under 
 their command to the point of assembly for the army, furnished 
 with all that is necessary, yet encumbered with no superfluity. 
 
 A G-eneral Officer, leading his brigade to the common 
 rendezvous, or to such point as his instructions may direct, 
 is to consider it as if it were a complete and independent body, 
 for all the wants of which he himself must provide ; and he is 
 expected to bring it up well supplied and well-organized in all 
 its branches. He is not to rely upon the assistance he may 
 meet with when he 'joins other corps, but is to consider the 
 possibility of his being isolated. A perfect whole can only be 
 formed by an union of perfect parts. 
 
 To insure the requisite degree of preparation for the most 
 sudden calls of service, the minds of Greneral Officers must be 
 turned to every particular which such service may involve ; 
 and it is only by clear and early arrangement, and by ex- 
 planation to the corps under their command, that they can 
 expect to produce their brigades in that state from which alone 
 we can hope a fortunate result in the impending conflict. 
 "Without entering into the multiplicity of considerations which 
 will of course present themselves to every Greneral Officer, the 
 Commander of the Forces deems it necessary to explain his 
 wishes on a few general subjects. 
 
 Saggage. 
 It is expected that every regiment should be ready to 
 march at the shortest notice ; and as the men must not on any 
 account be fatigued at such a moment with carrying burthens, 
 it is necessary that as much of the heavy baggage as possible 
 should be constantly kept in the stores; and that officers, 
 when ordered to march, should employ Sicilians or other private 
 means in removing their own superfluities to the magazine. 
 The light baggage at out-quarters must not be suflered to 
 accumulate ; when the detached corps take the field, its sur- 
 plus may either be collected as pointed out in General Orders, 
 or if boats are at hand and such a measure appears preferable, 
 the magistrates may have been previously instructed to send it 
 by water to the nearest of our fortresses. 
 
 Sich. 
 A previous and clear arrangement must be made for the 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 455 
 
 well-being of the sick (which the corps may leave behind), 
 and instructions prepared for their guidance until they can be 
 transported to a place of security. The attendants left should 
 be as few as possible, and chosen from among those men least 
 equal to fatigue. 
 
 Frovisiojis. 
 
 Each Greneral Officer will make arrangements that the 
 troops when called upon to move may start with provisions for 
 three days and wine for one upon their persons. Beside this 
 it is desirable that a good stock in reserve should always accom- 
 pany the brigade. Oxen may at all times be driven with the 
 troops without delay or difficulty ; and whatever numbers the 
 contractor may have in possession, or can readily procure, 
 should be made to move with the column. As to other supplies 
 which must be carried upon mules, the Greneral Officer should 
 regulate the quantity he takes with him according to the 
 description of provisions and their plenty or scarcity in the 
 country through which he is about to move. Biscuit is always 
 a desirable article ; salt pork, when meat is likely to prove 
 scarce ; and even wine if it cannot be found upon the road. 
 The Commissary must be prepared to answer these calls, and 
 mules will be required in proportion to the quantity to be 
 carried. Economy should be observed in the use of this 
 reserve stock, which is never to be broken in upon when 
 provisions can be obtained in the country. 
 
 The comfort of a soldier on his march, and consequently his 
 ability to sustain it, depends in a great measure upon good 
 management with regard to his food. The Assistant Commis- 
 saries should (if possible) be in advance, that the troops may 
 find their fuel, as well as their provisions, ready and upon the 
 spot when they halt; and no opportunity of procuring oxen 
 should be lost, as though one brigade may be overstocked it 
 may find another corps in want. 
 
 Mules. 
 
 Every General Officer must accurately ascertain the 
 number of mules in his neighbourhood upon which he can 
 lay his hands at the shortest notice for all the wants of his 
 brigade. The Quartermaster- General will transmit the details 
 of the number of mules requisite for each corps, what con- 
 
456 MILITARY TRANSACTIOKS 
 
 ductors, &c. &c., as well as the rations and pay that will be 
 allowed them. It is advisable that, by arrangement with the 
 magistrate, each mule may start with two days' barley. In 
 this as well as in every other transaction with the Sicilian 
 people, pains must be taken to conciliate them to the utmost. 
 Gentleness and civility must be blended with the necessary 
 firmness. 
 
 Officers' Morses. 
 As it is probable that many regimental officers are pos- 
 sessed of horses which, according to the General Order of the 
 14th, they cannot be permitted to use, and of which they 
 would not be able to dispose at the moment, the Commander 
 of the Forces recommends that as far as these go they should 
 be applied as bat-horses for the light baggage of officers. 
 
 Ammunition JBoxes, 
 
 A proportion of boxes of musket ammunition will be 
 distributed to brigades as soon as possible, as a stock in 
 reserve. These are to be carried on mules; and another mule 
 is to be laden with the pioneers' and intrenching tools of the 
 brigade. 
 
 "When a detachment of Artillery is attached to the corps 
 the charge of these ammunition boxes and their mules should 
 be given to the officer commanding it; but if there is none, 
 the major of brigade (or other officer selected for that purpose) 
 must have the care of these, as well as of the mule carrying 
 tools. 
 
 The annexed papers will serve to shew the place of the 
 mules when the brigade is in column of march (under common 
 circumstances), and also when it has taken up its ground 
 for the night, as well as the general arrangement of the whole 
 corps; but there are of course many cases where it becomes 
 expedient to deviate from these orders of march and en- 
 campment, and when the General Officer must exercise his 
 own discretion. 
 
 Marclies. 
 The Commander of the Forces expects that a march shall 
 always be conducted in the most soldier-like manner, even 
 though the enemy may be distant. "Whenever the country 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 457 
 
 allows it, the corps are to marcli % divisions* never hy files of 
 any sort, except when it is ahsolutely impracticable to move upon a 
 larger front. 
 
 The column is to have its advanced and rear guards; and 
 where the description of the country makes it necessary flankers 
 should be thrown out. When the brigade halts for the night, 
 it must take up its position regularly, place its piquets, &c. &c. 
 This is evidently necessary when the enemy is within the pos- 
 sible reach of a forced march; but it is at all times useful, as 
 serving to instruct the men and officers, and tending to pre- 
 vent marauding and disorders of all kinds. The established 
 regulations of the army contain such excellent instructions on 
 the subject that the Commander of the Eorces deems it unneces- 
 sary to say more. 
 
 General Officers should previously accustom their brigades 
 to marches of all hinds that the readiest and least fatiguing 
 modes may be ascertained, and that both the soldier and the 
 officer may be familiar with all the preparatory arrangements. 
 
 Major of Brigade. 
 
 It is the Brigade Major's duty to see that the corps moves 
 off its ground with its baggage and every appendage in strict 
 conformity to the orders laid down. "While the General Officer 
 heads the column (marching at a very slow pace), the major of 
 brigade should remain halted, to see the rear fairly and pro- 
 perly in motion. It is then his business to proceed leisurely 
 to the front, attentively remarking and correcting errors as he 
 goes ; and at his arrival at the head of the brigade he will make 
 his report to the General Officer. 
 
 The fatigue of the soldier may be greatly diminished by 
 judicious arrangement beforehand, and by his being prepared 
 for all the occurrences of sudden and rapid movement. It is 
 therefore highly incumbent on General Officers to give their 
 
 * I drew up these instructions after having received the verbal orders of 
 Sir J. Moore. When I carried the draft to him for approval, he smiled when 
 he came to the words, "march by divisions." "What do you mean by 
 divisions ? ^' said the General. "Any complete part into which a brigade, 
 battalion or company may be told off," answered I. " Just so," replied 
 Sir John, "that's it; you are right; but half of the blockheads will not 
 understand what is meant by * divisions.' " 
 
458 
 
 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 earliest attention to these subjects, and to impress these prin- 
 ciples througli every branch of the corps under their command. 
 
 In short, the Commander of the Forces desires that the 
 minds of the General Officers should be attentively turned to 
 put every thing into such a state of preparation, that the 
 brigades may move from their cantonments at the shortest 
 possible notice, yet without hurry or confusion; and the whole 
 arranged in so soldier-like a manner, and so judiciously supplied 
 with what is necessary, and only this, that they may continue 
 their movements and maintain the field without distress as 
 long as the most arduous service may demand. 
 
 Head- Quarters, Messina, Sept. 21st, 1807. 
 
 Appendix R. 
 
 Bettjens oe the Beitish Aemt in the Mediteeeanean 
 (exclxjsiye oe the Gaeeison of Malta) at diffeeent 
 peeiods. 
 
 l^^. — Troops eniba/rhed for Naples, Nov. Ist., 1805. 
 
 Rank and File. 
 
 20th Light Dragoons 
 B. Artillery . . 
 B. Engineers 
 20th Begiment 
 
 27th 
 
 35th 
 
 58th 
 
 61st 
 
 Plank Companies of 39th, 
 Wattevnie's 
 Corsican Bangers . . 
 Chasseurs Britanniques 
 
 44th, and 81st 
 
 Total 
 
 307 
 469 
 14 
 714 
 939 
 932 
 848 
 753 
 480 
 641 
 709 
 562 
 
 7368 
 
 There was little alteration in the numbers till April, 1806, 
 when the 81st Begiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 78th 
 (Highland) Begiment joined the aj:my at Messinaj the two 
 mustered about 1370. 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
 
 459 
 
 2nd. — Armi/ on the Straits of Messina, Aug. Ist.^ 1806. 
 
 
 
 
 Rank and File 
 
 20th Light Dragoons 
 
 
 311 
 
 E. Artillery and Engineers 
 
 
 436 
 
 Grenadier Battalion 
 
 
 757 
 
 Light Infantry do . . 
 
 
 764 
 
 20th Eegiment 
 
 
 
 616 
 
 21st „ 
 
 
 
 609 
 
 ^. , rlst Battalion . 
 27't{2nd do .. 
 
 
 
 797 
 
 
 
 615 
 
 31st „ 
 
 
 
 776 
 
 , rlst Battalion . 
 ^^*M2nd do . 
 
 
 
 780 
 
 
 
 419 
 
 61st 
 
 
 
 609 
 
 Watteville's 
 
 
 
 629 
 
 Sicilian Volunteers . , 
 
 
 
 400 
 
 8518 
 
 ,77 
 
 etached. 
 
 58th Eegiment 706 
 
 78th „ (2nd Battalion) .. .. 757 
 
 81st „ 612 
 
 Corsican Eangers . 
 
 .. 
 
 • 
 
 656 
 
 Total .. 11,249 
 
 In the course of August De Eoll's regiment joined the 
 army, and the Chasseurs Britanniques rejoined, — thus adding 
 1516 Eank and File to the above. Memorandum. — A great 
 proportion of sick in the army at this time. 
 
 4ith. — Army in Sicily, December, 1st., 1806 
 
 . 
 
 20th Light Dragoons 
 
 287 
 
 E. Artillery, Engineers, &c. 
 
 736 
 
 rElank Battalion 
 
 725 
 
 1st GuardsJ 1st do. 
 
 919 
 
 1 3rd do. 
 
 915 
 
 Grenadier Battalion 
 
 763 
 
 Light Infantry do. 
 
 756 
 
 20th Eegiment 
 
 767 
 
460 
 
 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Rank and File. 
 
 21st Eegiment 608 
 
 fist Battalion 721 
 
 2^*^l2nd do 604 
 
 31st „ 773 
 
 fist Battalion 708 
 
 ^^*M2nd „ 458 
 
 62nd Eegiment 961 
 
 58th „ .• .... .. 698 
 
 61st „ 657 
 
 62nd „ 498 
 
 78th „ 965 
 
 81st „ .. ... .. .. 635 
 
 E. Staff Corps .. 44 
 
 De Eoll's Eegiment 658 
 
 Watteville's „ 891 
 
 Chasseurs Britanniques . . ., . . 867 
 
 Sicilian Volunteers 487 
 
 Detached. 
 
 Corsican Eangers (at Capri) 
 
 Total 
 
 16,831 
 
 728 
 . 17,559 
 
 Army in Sicily, \st July, 1807. 
 
 20th Light Dragoons 
 Artillerymen and Drivers . . 
 Engineers and Staff Corps 
 1st Eegiment of Guards (3 Batt"-) 
 20th Eegiment 
 
 27th 
 
 62nd „ 
 58th „ 
 61st „ 
 81st „ 
 "Watteville's do. 
 
 (1st Batt.) 
 
 Army in Sicily 
 
 209 
 
 594 
 
 54 
 
 2528 
 710 
 
 1040 
 957 
 896 
 875 
 908 
 861 
 
 9632 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 461 
 
 Rank and File 
 
 Corsican Bangers (at Capri) 
 
 700 
 
 Convalescents of absent Eegiments 
 
 334 
 
 Total 
 
 10,666 
 
 Gross numbers of Eank and Pile in Egypt 
 
 6,048 
 
 Expedition to the Bay of Naples, June, 1809. 
 
 
 Troops JEmlarhed. 
 
 
 |'20t}i Liglit Dragoons 
 
 300 
 
 Cavalry< Neapolitan do. 
 
 700 
 
 I Do. Horse Artillery- 
 
 120 
 
 Artillerymen, &c. (British) 
 
 400 
 
 Grenadiers (do) 
 
 900 
 
 Light Infantry (do) 
 
 900 
 
 Foreign do. (including 340 Calabrese) . . 
 
 700 
 
 27th Eegiment, 1st Battalion 
 
 720 
 
 44th „ 
 
 600 
 
 58th „ 
 
 700 
 
 62nd „ 
 
 650 
 
 81st „ .. .. : 
 
 700 
 
 German Legion (3rd, 4th, and 6th Batt.) 
 
 2070 
 
 Watteville's Eegiment 
 
 720 
 
 Chasseurs Britanniques 
 
 550 
 
 Corsican Eangers, including Calabrese at- 
 
 
 tached 
 
 730 
 
 Nunziante's Brigade of Neapolitan In- 
 
 
 fantry 
 
 1600 
 
 13,060 
 
 Colonel SmitVs Brigade, which retv/rned to the Straits of 
 Messina. 
 
 10th Eegiment (part) . . . . . . 570 
 
 27th do. (2nd Battalion) 620 
 
 Total embarked .. 14,250 
 
462 
 
 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 Zieft in tlie Garrisons of Sicily. 
 
 
 Rank and File 
 
 Artillery, &c. 
 
 300 
 
 Cavalry (Neapolitan) 
 
 300 
 
 loth Eegiment (part) 
 
 230 
 
 21st Eegiment 
 
 630 
 
 35tli (1st Battalion) 
 
 670 
 
 De Eoll's Eegiment 
 
 900 
 
 Dillon's Eegiment . . 
 
 500 
 
 Calabrese Eree Corps 
 
 400 
 
 3,930 
 Besides the convalescent and sick of the absent corps. 
 
 Appendix S. 
 
 Extracts from Private Letters written hy the Deputy Quarter- 
 master- General of the British army in Sicily, to Colonel JBun- 
 hury, Tinder Secretary of State for the War Department. — 
 March, et seq., 1810. 
 
 "That negotiations of a conciliatory description are on 
 foot between the two Imperial Courts and Ferdinand of Sicily, 
 the most sceptical no longer hesitate to admit. How then are 
 we situated here to meet such a combination at the present 
 juncture? Lord CoUingwood gone! our army in the hands 
 where you left them — the laughing-stock of the community, 
 the sneer of the lowest ensign in its ranks. Confidence and 
 respect quite gone away ; and nothing remaining but the good 
 conduct, submission, and discipline which was impressed upon 
 us by abler men." 
 
 " Public business of every kind lies over, and is neg- 
 lected. His troops he never saw, or knew much of; and now 
 he knows no more of them than the forces of the Chinese 
 Empire, &c., &c. ! " . . "The national name and character 
 suffers much by this parade of folly; and, humble as I am, 
 I feel ashamed of pulling an oar in the same boat with so silly 
 and trifling a steersman. I am positive I utter the sentiments 
 of every reflecting man in the army." 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 463 
 
 "With such leaders and such employments are we oc- 
 cupied, while treachery and designs inimical to the best 
 interests of the British Empire are openly entered into ! One 
 way or another, however, it must soon terminate; and that 
 crisis so long expected is now, and decidedly, most rapidly 
 approaching." " Queen Caroline has heau jeu amidst such a 
 tissue of folly and incapacity: she knows it, she says it, and she 
 profits by it. I almost fear any orders from home will come 
 too late to save this island : — we shall have a scramble for it, 
 however, to shew at least what we could have done had we been 
 better handled." 
 
 "Measures of vigour you will not expect from us — we 
 seem aware of our danger, but choose to blink at it, shutting 
 our eyes like children in the dark, lest we should see Eaw-head 
 and Bloody-bones ! The farce of Molitemo's expedition is still 
 allowed to go on; their gun-boats, &c., are all to be collected at 
 Palermo ; their troops will probably be embarked and landed 
 near Naples : their place on board the transports will be filled 
 with French troops ; and then, as well as all the shipping at 
 Naples, will return to take possession of the capital : while, 
 with a superiority of force in the island, we shall be unable to 
 move against them, and be shut up in our garrisons. We shall 
 then have * treachery ' loudly vociferated by our Ambassador, 
 our Admiral, and our General: while, "in fact, the Queen's 
 betraying us has only been a consequence of our betraying 
 ourselves, who would act with her as if she were all loyalty and 
 honour, instead of all villainy and deceit." 
 
 Extracts of JPrivate Letters from the Adjutant- General of the 
 Army m Sicily to Colonel Bunbury. 
 
 Messina, 12th July, 1810. 
 
 Tou will already have have heard of us through the foreign 
 journals and other channels ; and as how we are standing in 
 battle array ; army against army like the Israelites and Philis- 
 tines in the Book of Samuel. Murat's large pavilion tent is 
 pitched, his tricolour flag flying, and his eagles posted at the 
 ridge above the Punta di Pezzo. Campo in his rear ; a large 
 encampment surrounds him, and the plains of Melia are white 
 
464 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 with tents ; and the shore from Scilla to Pezzo and round that 
 point is studded with gun-boats and boats of debarkment. 
 I send you a rough sketch done by A' Court. You know both 
 sides of these narrows so well that it is needless for me to 
 expatiate. I send you also a detail of our force, and how 
 posted upon the front menaced by the enemy, from Faro to 
 Messina. Our sand-bag batteries haye sprung up like mush- 
 rooms, and present a very formidable aspect, with the intermediate 
 positions taken up by the ships of war ; and round the point 
 to Easocolmo are Canopus and Cumberland, with a portion of 
 the flotilla, to secure any diversion to that flank while we may 
 be engaged to the front. Melazzo is left with one battalion. 
 Everything else you will perceive has moved iu this direction ; 
 and as every day adds to our means of resistance, we can only 
 imagine Murat postpones his attack in the expectation of a 
 conjunct operation on the part of the Toulon fleet, who may 
 escape the vigilance of Sir Charles Cotton, and push out with 
 troops of debarkment, and throw themselves ashore on some of 
 the various defenceless points of the island. If so, our situa- 
 tion will be very critical. During all this time, the Court of 
 Palermo makes no effort, sends no succour, takes no notice, 
 laughs at Lord * * *. Ferdinand IV. goes a tunny-fishing ; and 
 his wife continues her usual pranks, and is pronounced by her 
 own subjects, and convicted in my mind, of acting in concert 
 with Murat for our expulsion. I believe the latter (indeed our 
 information states it) placed much reliance upon the popular 
 commotion and ferment his formidable display of force would 
 occasion ; but the peasantry of the country have shewn the 
 most favourable disposition towards us, and come in hundreds, 
 as many a& we want, with their zappas to the construction of 
 our works and batteries, vociferating "Viva Re Giorgio," — and 
 getting well paid for their labour. Eoads of communication 
 are made from Curcuracci heights to the telegraph hill above 
 the Faro, and also along the shore from the Grotto to St. 
 Agatha (avoiding the heavy sand), and all matters made and 
 making ready for a vigorous defence. 
 
 " Thus situated, I presume if we succeed in fending off the 
 foe, that Government will at length be induced to come to 
 some definitive resolution as to this island. To remain as we 
 
m THE MEDITEERANEAN. 465 
 
 have been for the last four years is discreditable to our name 
 and character ; and in the next place impossible for any length 
 of time longer. Our army is too respectable to be sacrificed, 
 though infinitely too few and inadequate to the defence of the 
 island, which we ought at once to abandon, if you do not mean 
 to sustain it and ameliorate its government. In short, you 
 must do so, or give up the matter at once. I need not dwell 
 upon this subject with you, my good friend, you know it, and 
 all the arguments that can be made use of full well already. 
 Meanwhile, if the matter was not so serious, here is fund for 
 amusement in abundance ; nor can I help being so for the soul 
 of me at the scenes I daily witness. "We have so many and 
 renowned commanders ! and there is so much good sense, good 
 system, and regularity amongst us, as would, under any other 
 circumstances, prove most diverting ! 
 
 " Our army is well, hearty, and full of spirits. XTnder 
 arms two hours before daylight, and remain so till we see our 
 way well across the channel. I am out every night down 
 towards Faro, as is everybody else ; and we sleep and refresh 
 early in the evening, early in the morning, or at some interval 
 of leisure through the day. The flotilla (I may say your 
 flotilla) has proved of essential use, and is much increased. 
 "We have also taken all the Sicilian gun-boats into our pay, as 
 they were starving, that is to say their crews — and Captain 
 Sturt, of the Termagant sloop of war, is nominated Commo- 
 dore, and appointed to direct its operations and services. 
 
 " I have just come from the flotilla office on the Marino, 
 where they have an excellent telescope, with which I have 
 been staring at Murat in front of his tent, surrounded by his 
 suite, with a spy-glass and a map or chart in his hand, looking 
 and gesticulating towards the Faro. A report is prevalent 
 of 8000 more troops, under Csesar Berthier, having reached 
 Monteleone." 
 
 "Messina, Aug. 19th, 1810. 
 
 " Strange to say, we still remain just as when I wrote to 
 you on the 27th of July. — Murat and ourselves staring at each 
 other across the straits. He no way diminished in force, 
 
 2 H 
 
466 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 barring deaths and desertions ; and we in no degree relaxed 
 in our vigilance or preparations to give him such a reception 
 as he has never yet met with in all his various and successful 
 military course. I believe he is well aware of it, and does not 
 know well what to do with us ; whether to put his established 
 fame to the issue of an attack, or to commit his kingly repu- 
 tation, as he certainly will do, if he retires and declines the 
 contest. He acted like a blockhead too in coming down and 
 making such a grand splash and display, without knowing his 
 ground better ; in which he was, I have no doubt, encouraged 
 and misled by the female fury at Palermo, who, judging of our 
 abilities from our leaders, gave him to understand we should 
 make a Cintra Convention with him on his mere appearance ; 
 and that the population would revolt at our backs, and quicken 
 our evacuation. In this, however, she has been wofully de- 
 ceived. Circumstances, and our quiet unshaken countenance 
 towards the enemy, have raised our name and character in the 
 estimation of the Sicilians. Instead of tumultuously assembling 
 against us, I am fully persuaded, and so are you also, I know, 
 that nought but our presence prevents them from driving forth 
 Caroline, as a demon of discord and tyranny, to live by the 
 alms of such of her relations as might afford her an asylun>. 
 And here's your friend Johnny, who because he has once 
 mounted to Curcuracci heights, ridden some half dozen times to 
 the Faro and Ganzirri, driven Madame * * * every other day 
 down to the Grotto in his tim whisTcey, and signed the money 
 Warrants for extra expenses — why Johnny thinks all that's 
 been done is his doing, and looks around him with a degree 
 of complacency and content which is really amusing, when to 
 my certain knowledge he is ignorant of the names of the corps, 
 their stations in the line, or their numbers for battle, between 
 this and Faro ; or the nature, number, or calibre of the cannon 
 on any one battery from Cape Pelorus to Scaletta. 
 
 " TVe have some part of every day occupied in a fight or 
 cannonade, which has at length become so familiar that the 
 porters on the Marino do not turn their eyes aside to witness 
 it. The shore from Scilla to Eeggio, more particularly about 
 Punta di Pezzo, is garnished with batteries, and the 36-pound 
 shot from each side reach at the narrows, and are thrown 
 
IN THE MEDITEERANEAN. 467 
 
 across daily. One of these same missile weapons kicked up 
 the dust round me and my horse about a week ago, as I was 
 looking about me near our mortar battery at Ganzirri about 
 gun-firing in the morning. They fire at everything that goes 
 through ; but as yet our men-of-war and transports have perse- 
 vered to run the risk and without loss. We have had three 
 or four soldiers killed, and as many wounded by the plunging 
 shot ; but they are fired at such elevations as to render their 
 efiect very uncertain ; ours has been principally directed at 
 their gun-boats, and boats of transport, as they lie along-shore ; 
 and our shells have appalled in no small degree the Neapolitan 
 mariners. 
 
 " You will learn by this mail that her fiend-like Majesty of 
 this isle, after having shifted, contrived, and evaded as long 
 as she could, has at length resorted to the bare-faced subter- 
 fuge of creating her weak helpmate the Generalissimo of his 
 own forces, seconded by his two august sons, and aided by 
 Bourcard ! The measure, as you may imagine, is laughed at 
 and reprobated, and has at length unsealed the drowsy ideas 
 of the hon homme Lord * * * * whom they neither respect 
 nor attend to, such has been the insipid timidity of his conduct. 
 Such a fellow as our old Commander, John Coape Sher- 
 brooke, K.B., is the only character to guide and govern so 
 corrupt and treacherous an ally, as we (not we but Murat) 
 have in Caroline. You remember a fellow named Casetti, 
 whom you and I hunted out here at one time, and who was 
 going back and forward between Ponza, Naples, Capri, and 
 Palermo. This same vagabond is the grand channel of inter- 
 course with the enemy. He is a captain of horse and captain 
 of marines now-a-days, and aide-de-camp to that worthy cha- 
 racter, Moliterno. As a mariner he has a small armed xebecque, 
 with which he goes back and forward between Palermo and 
 Naples with as much composure as if all Europe was in the 
 status quo ante helium ; what still is more extraordinary our 
 great authorities know this, and no notice is taken ! The State 
 of Denmark has many rotten symptoms about it, and we want 
 a complete weeding." 
 
 2 H 2 
 
468 MILITARY TEANSACTIONS 
 
 14th of September, 1819. 
 
 " After 52 days of a passage from Falmoutli to Sicily, 
 came at length the long-expected packet which we had looked 
 forward to for conveying hither certain and interesting intelli- 
 gence of the views and intentions of the British Cabinet 
 respecting this miserable isle. This bark, with two defective 
 rudders and no competent commander — this same packet 
 reached us yesterday ; and by her I have your note of the 
 20th of July. She brings to the British resident Minister at 
 the Court of Palermo not one public letter or document of any 
 kind ; and to the military chief she has brought one despatch 
 from Downing Street. 
 
 " No material alteration has taken place since I wrote 
 you last, on or about the 23rd of August ; the opposing hosts 
 are just as we then were ; and we are beginning to be very 
 tired of the incessant watchfulness, which, as the season draws 
 to a close, has become more laborious, and, during the dreary, 
 long, dark nights of winter must still be more so. We wish, 
 therefore, very sincerely, that the matter was settled some way 
 or another. Both armies have had their share of the malady 
 peculiar to the season ; but Murat, by many degrees, more 
 severely a sufferer than we are. The flotillas have daily skir- 
 mishes, and a few days past, we had an attack somewhat upon 
 a greater scale ; when the Warrior and Victorious went over, 
 in consequence of the enemy having made an assembly of 
 gun-boats, and other craft, under the protection of batteries in 
 front of Contessa, at Pentimele. You will better recollect it 
 as the country-house and long vineyard-wall, near to which 
 ' poor Handfield lost his brig and his life in February, 1808. 
 But what is the use of all this, if Government means to do 
 no more, or no less, in regard to Sicily. In time we must be 
 worn down by watching if you leave us to our fate, while our 
 enemy recruits his army and repairs his losses daily ; and it 
 has been found here, as it was in regard to Bonaparte's 
 flotilla at Boulogne, that the united efforts of the British navy 
 cannot counteract the assembling of boats, and the placing 
 them under the protection of heavy batteries, beyond the reach 
 of being destroyed by any fire our gun-boats or men-of-war 
 
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 469 
 
 can bring upon them. They make holes in the boats and they 
 knock about the batteries ; but these are repaired and in acti- 
 vity very soon again. Landing to burn the boats by main 
 force must be done, after beating Murat in the field; for 
 wheresoever he sees our maritime attack about to be directed, 
 he forthwith marches a considerable division of his troops and 
 artillery, who lie, perdue, in the vineyards and garden- walls 
 adjacent, ready to assail any debarkation that we may have in 
 agitation ; and we have not people enough to run the risk of 
 loss or of repulse, by venturing on such attacks. Any reverse 
 might have the most serious consequence in the minds and 
 upon the conduct of the frivolous and fickle people among 
 whom we are situated, tampered with, as we know them to be, 
 by the artful insinuations of French emissaries, and farther 
 discouraged in their natural good-will towards us by the open 
 and undisguised treachery of the Court of Palermo ; who, by 
 every means short of proclamation, are known to favour and 
 to promote the views of the enemy. 
 
 " Our disposition of troops remains as when I last wrote 
 you, and we have [covered, and are proceeding to cover our 
 corps nearly upon the ground whereon they were encamped. 
 As the season closes, I grow uneasy about our left flank 
 between Gisso and the Faro, Cape E-asocolmo, Arena Bianca, 
 Aqua di Ladrone, and all that long extent of practicable beach 
 from Melazzo to Cape Pelorus, where at present we have 
 nothing beyond a mere look-out ; nor have we aught to spare 
 to it from our immediate front of defence ; and as the nights 
 wax longer and darker, such fellows as Grenier, La Marque, or 
 Partonneaux may be disposed to make a conjunctive efibrt in 
 that direction, embarking either at Bagnara or the Bay of 
 Gioia, while Murat threatened or assailed in front," 
 
 " 19th of September. 
 
 " I could not possibly foresee when I wrote you the few 
 preceding lines of the 17th, that I should have to state to you 
 my having had a dust with our old acquaintance Cavaignac. 
 That I may not be repeatedly the hero of my own tale, I 
 enclose you the report upon it which I made to head-quarters 
 immediately after it occurred. It was my good fortune to 
 
470 MILITARY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 have early notice, which brought me betimes to the ground, 
 and I was also so lucky as to have settled the whole affair before 
 the troop Doree and all the generales and their attendants 
 sallied forth from the city, together with Dalrymple, Bene- 
 detto, La Rocca, and a long train of etceteras, not forgetting 
 old Danero in his carriage, with his couteau de chasse ready 
 drawn for action. You would have been amused to have seen 
 A' Court, De Freuller, and myself, with half-a-dozen men of 
 Pischer's light Corps, bringing the Corsican battalion down 
 from the hills to the beach, about 600 devilish able fellows, 
 fully armed and accoutred. They pretended to make a waver 
 about surrendering without terms ; but a glance at the bayonets 
 of Adam and his Fusileers on one side, and some companies of 
 Fischer's edging down and nearing them on another, soon 
 settled the matter ; for they would have been in upon them 
 with the steel in ten minutes longer ; so you see, Sir, I am the 
 little warrior of the day. 
 
 " A' Court is a treasure ; active, intelligent, self-possessed, 
 and forward. In short, I had proper stuif both behind me and 
 before me ; and if I had fortunately moved forward a little sooner, 
 I think I should have nabbed the General de Division himself. 
 It was unfortunate, too, that every man-of-war and cruiser we 
 had was in Messina harbour. It is to be regretted also that, 
 of our huge flotilla, not a single sail was out (our naval friends 
 have assumed its entire direction). The weather was fine — a 
 light working breeze — and not a boat of them ought to have 
 reached Calabria. As it was, some of our light scampavias, 
 under Bobinson of the Marines, pushed out and intercepted 
 four. I could learn nothing certain about the motive or plan 
 for this debarkment from the prisoners; they conceived it 
 must have been combined with an intended attack at the Faro, 
 or thereabouts ; but no such thing appeared to be in Murat's 
 contemplation, otherwise than by shewing some of his corps 
 embarking aboard their boats, and disembarking again — a cere- 
 monial of daily occurrence. These people that came to the 
 south had their camp-kettles with them, and certainly had in 
 view to stay and kill their own mutton, had they been per- 
 mitted. Notwithstanding they do everything but spit in hia 
 face, the Capo means to lay the colours of the Corsican bat- 
 
m THE MEDITERRANEAN. 471 
 
 tallon at the feet of his Sicilian Majesty. I think honest 
 George full as good a man, and much better entitled to this 
 trophy, and could not refrain from telling him so. 
 
 " If you could do me the favour to get me out of the scrape 
 altogether, before all matters go to the devil here, I should not 
 be sorry ; for, all men and things considered, our situation is 
 critical and perilous ; and infinitely too much, almost all, is 
 left to the chapter of accidents ; no system, no management, 
 no provision or preconcerted measures for very probable 
 
 " Messina, 20th October, 1810. 
 
 " You will have learnt, long ere this reaches you, of our 
 comparative state of tranquillity since the commencement of 
 the present month, our enemy having employed the last ten 
 days of September in breaking up his camp and establish- 
 ments opposite, and partially withdrawing his army. But 
 where that army is gone, and how disposed of, except it be 
 those in our immediate front, we remain in ignorance ; and 
 equally so (you will wonder, no doubt) are we whether his 
 gun-boats and armed craft have gone beyond Pizzo or Tropea. 
 We know there are about 8000 French, under Lamarque, 
 extending from Monteleone to Eeggio — Lamarque's own 
 quarters at St. Giovanni, over against us ; and that artillery 
 of siege and battery, with stores of every description for their 
 use, spare carriages, and "all appurtenances and means to 
 boot," are laid up in the castle of Scylla and the cathedral 
 church close to it. The foe is entrenching the position of 
 Piale, above Giovanni, where Murat displayed his pavilion and 
 tricolor for four months. He is likewise throwing up several 
 works of defence for the roads which lead up from the beach 
 opposite Faro to Melia; and upon Melia are two large, respect- 
 able, strong redoubts, with barracks inside, not yet finished, 
 but I can see them at work with my glass, fraising, stockading, 
 and all the rest of it. Upon the whole, you may take my word, 
 we shall have them back again in no distant period.'* 
 
 THE END. 
 
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