SOIL 
 .L46 
 
Um\^ ttg. lar 
 
 OR 
 
 Judicial Answers 
 to Saloon Arguments 
 
 By 
 
 LEMUEL D, LILLY 
 Attorney, Columbus, Ohio 
 
 ^ 
 
A Book of Facts 
 
 Anti-Saloon League Year Book 
 
 This volume is a real encyclopaedia of Facts and Figures 
 relating to the Liquor Problem. 
 
 IT IS A WORK OF REFERENCE 
 
 For the minister, teacher, student, campaigner and oth- 
 ers interested in the temperance reform. 
 
 256 PAGES OF VALUABLE DATA 
 
 Containing seventy "wet" and ''dry" maps; a chronology 
 of the anti-liquor movement in America from 1642 to 1910; 
 reports of conditions in every state; facts and figures from 
 the reports of the United States Commissioner of Internal 
 Revenue; general Political, Economic and Historical As- 
 pects of the Problem. 
 
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 Send orders to any state headquarters of the Anti-Saloon 
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Bench vs. Bar 
 
 OR 
 
 Judicial Answers 
 to Saloon Arguments 
 
 By 
 
 LEMUEL D. LILLY 
 
 Attorney, Cdlumbus, Ohio 
 
 Westerville, Ohio 
 
 The American Issue Publishing Company 
 
 1910 
 

 U" 
 
THE PURPOSES OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The purposes of government are nowhere more clearly set 
 out than in the preamble to the National Constitution. These 
 purposes are: to form a more perfect union, establish justice, 
 insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
 promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty 
 to ourselves and our posterity. 
 
 The union has been perfected, justice 'has been established, 
 domestic tranquility is insured, the common defense is pro- 
 vided for, and we are engaged today in the task of promoting the 
 general welfare and securing the blessings of liberty to our- 
 selves and our posterity. 
 
 The promotion of the general welfare is something that 
 cannot be accomplished in a day or any fixed time; it is a work 
 that is continuing in its nature. It involves the development of 
 public character, and public character can only be advanced by 
 5I0W degrees and persistent work. The public welfare can be 
 promoted in no better way than by the protection and advance- 
 ment of public morals. 
 
 Gladstone's maxim was that it is the duty of government to 
 make it as easy as possible to do right and as hard as possible to 
 do wrong. 
 
 In all the essentials of patriotism, Washington still remains 
 our first American. In his farewell address he said: "Morality 
 is a necessary spring of popular government, * * * * "Of 
 all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, 
 religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would 
 that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to 
 subvert these great pillars of human happiness." 
 
 In a republic where the people govern themselves, intelli- 
 gence and morality are the two corner stones of the temple of 
 liberty — intelligence enough to comprehend the issues of state 
 when they are presented, and moral character enough to do the 
 right thing when the public welfare calls for our services. 
 
 The immoral man does not help manage the government; 
 the government must help manage 'him. Anything which less- 
 ens the disposition or ability of a man to govern himself, less- 
 ens his disposition and ability to help govern others. Every 
 
 3 
 
citizen, who for any oaiise-cannot, or will not, govern himself, 
 is a crumbli^jj s^>ne in tl-ie -temple of liberty. The immoral man 
 is, therefore, an element of wecikness in a republic, and any 
 business or institution which produces the immoral man is an 
 enemy of the state. 
 
 The constitution of Ohio recognizes these moral truths as 
 fundamental by the following provisions, viz: "Religion, moral- 
 ity and knowledge, being essential to good government, it 
 shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws 
 to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoy- 
 ment of its own mode of public worship, and to encourage 
 schools and the means of instruction," Art. i, Sec. 7. 
 
 LEGISLATURE HAS FULLEST AUTHORITY TO PRO- 
 MOTE GENERAL WELFARE. 
 
 These moral principles are not* mere fancies for patriotic 
 holidays. They are the most necessary elements of every day 
 conduct. Both the federal and the state courts have given their 
 fullest sanction to all laws which promote the general welfare. 
 
 The general welfare consists of many different things. 
 \Vithout attempting to enumerate all the elements of the public 
 welfare, it will be sufficient for this discussion to say, that the 
 general welfare includes the public safety, public health, public 
 comfort, public morals, public convenience and general pros- 
 perity. These objects are attained in the administration of the 
 g-overnment by the application of the police powers of the 
 states. 
 
 The police power is the power of promoting the general 
 welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and 
 property. An act of government comes within the police power 
 of the state, if it aims to secure and promote the general wel- 
 fare, even though it acts by restraint and compulsion. 
 
 The public welfare is promoted by improving the social and 
 economic conditions affecting the community at large, with the 
 view of securing the greatest good to the greatest number. 
 Some people think they have expressed the whole truth when 
 they proclaim that government rests upon the consent of the 
 governed. This declaration is a great truth but in these days 
 of a great political awakening men are giving appropriate em- 
 p'hasis to another truth equally vital, that government rests 
 upon the necessity of putting even inherent rights under such 
 control as is essential to their preservation. To this end every 
 mdividual, every sovereign citizen, must submit to such re- 
 
straints in the exercise of his liberty or the use of his property 
 as may be required to remove or reduce the dai^ger of the 
 abuse of those rights by those Who are careless or unscrupu- 
 lous. 
 
 The police power may be exercised for the protection of 
 society from crime, for the preservation of safety and health 
 and for the promotion of public morals. Government has a 
 right to promote public morals because immorality has no right 
 to existence or toleration, and because vice impairs the strength 
 of the community and spreads evil example and tends to cor- 
 rupt others. 
 
 The foregoing statement of the police power is supported 
 by a multitude of judicial opinions. A few citations are appro- 
 priate. 
 
 In the case of Booth v. People, i86 111. 43, 78 Am. St. Rep. 
 229,231, the Supreme Court of Illinois says: "The state in- 
 herently possesses, and the general assembly may lawfully 
 exercise, such power of restraint upon private rights as may be 
 'Ound to be necessary and appropriate to promote the health, 
 comfort, safety and welfare of society. This power is known as 
 the police power of the state. In the exercise of this power, 
 the general assembly may, by valid enactments — i.e., "due pro- 
 cess of law" — prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety 
 and welfare of society, even though the prohibition invade the 
 right of liberty or property of an individual." 
 
 The New York Court of Appeals, in the matter of Jacobs, 
 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 641, says of the police power: 
 "That power is very broad and comprehensive, and is exercised 
 to promote the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society. 
 Its exercise in extreme cases is frequently justified by the 
 maxim salus populi suprema lex est. Under it the conduct of 
 an individual and the use of property may be regulated so as 
 to interfere, to some extent, with the freedom of the one and 
 the enjoyment of the other; and in cases of great emergency 
 engendering overruling necessity, property may be taken or 
 destroyed without compensation, and without what is commonly 
 called due process of law." 
 
 In Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 84, Shaw, Chief 
 Justice of Massachusetts, says that the "police power was 
 vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain 
 and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, 
 statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not 
 repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the 
 
cood and welfare of the Commonwealth and of the subjects of 
 the same." 
 
 In the case of Board of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, 74 S. W. Rep. 
 ']Z2, the Kentucky Court of Appeals says: "All courts agree 
 that the police power of the state extends to all regulations af- 
 fecting the lives, limbs, health, comfort, good order, morals, 
 peace and safety of society, and hence may be exercised on 
 many subjects and in numerous ways." 
 
 These principles, in various forms of expression, but always 
 with the same general meaning, have been recognized by the 
 Courts of every state in the Union. There are no exceptions. 
 The principle could not be more clearly stated by multiplying 
 quotations from the opinions of the Courts. 
 
 However, some clearer understanding of the general princi- 
 ples may be had by reference to a few concrete illustrations of 
 the exercise of the power in various cases. The police power 
 has been exercised to prevent fraud. People v. Wagner, (Mich.) 
 24 Am. St. Rep. 141; to protect public health, (Ga.) Morris v. 
 Columbus, 66 Am. St. Rep. 243; to prohibit persons coming from 
 a place infected with contagious disease {J2 Am. St. Rep. 458); 
 to compel compulsory vaccination, State v. Hay, (N. C.) ^^ Am. 
 St. Rep. 691; to restrain the manufacture and sale of oleomar- 
 gerine, Butler v. Chambers, (Minn.) i Am. St. Rep. 638; to regu- 
 late the sale of lard substances and of food prepared there- 
 from, State V. Aslesen, (Minn.) ^f^ Am. St. Rep. 620; to prescribe 
 sanitary regulations for dairymen and other milk dealers. State 
 V. Broadbelt, (Md.) yz Am. St. Rep. 201; to require a railroad 
 company to give signals at highway crossings, Ry. Co. v. Slater, 
 (111.) 16 Am. St. Rep. 242; to prohibit any person from using 
 any building for a stable for more than four horses, unless li- 
 censed to do so, Newton v. Joyce, (Mass.) 55 Am. St. Rep. 385; 
 to regulate the keeping of dogs, Griggs v. Macon, (Ga.) 68 Am. 
 St. Rep. 134; to require that water be furnished in sufficient 
 quantities in tenement houses. Health Department v. Rector, 
 (N. Y.) 45 Am. St. Rep. 579; to punish habitual drunkenness, 
 St. Joseph v. Harris, 59 Mo. App. 122; t© regulate the sale of 
 intoxicating liquors. Miller v. State, 3 O. S. 486; to prohibit base 
 ball on Sunday, State v. Powell, 58 O. S. 324. 
 
 These decisions from the State Courts have the fullest 
 sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States. That court 
 has said time after time that the several states have a right 
 to protect the public health and the public morals. 
 
 The court has said: Power to protect the general welfare 
 is not limited. (N. O. Gaas Light Co. v. La. Light Co., 6 Sup. 
 
Ct. Rep. 262,) * * * * The police power "extends to all matters 
 affecting the public health or the public morals." (Stone v. 
 Mississippi, loi U. S. 814.) In sustaining the Kansas Prohibi- 
 tion statute in 1887, the Court said: "Everything prejudicial to 
 the health or morals of a city may be removed," (Mugler v. 
 Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.) "Whatever is contrary to public policy 
 or inimical to the public interests is subject to the police power 
 of the state." (L. & N. Ry. Co., v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677.) 
 The police power "May be lawfully resorted to for the purpose 
 of preserving the public health, safety, or morals, or the 
 abatement of public nuisances." (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 
 366.) 
 
 Perhaps the strongest statement of the doctrine to be found 
 any where is in the case of Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, where 
 the United States Supreme Court thus proclaims it: "The ex- 
 tent and limits of what is known as the police power have been 
 a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly 
 every state in the union. It is universally conceded to include 
 everything essential to the public safety, health and morals, 
 and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary pro- 
 ceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Un- 
 der this power it has been held that the state may 
 order the destruction of a house falling to decay or 
 otherwise endangering the lives of passersby; the demolition 
 of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of 
 diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome 
 food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regula- 
 tion of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of 
 interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable 
 trades to certain localities; the compulsory vaccination of child- 
 ren; the confinement of the insane or those afflicted with con- 
 tagious diseases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars and habitual 
 drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses 
 of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places 
 where intoxicating liquors are sold." 
 
 POWER TO PROTECT PUBLIC MORALS IS INHERENT. 
 
 The right of the state to protect itself against crime and 
 misery is a law of nature, enjoyed by society before constitu- 
 tions were ever adopted, and is as fundamental as the right of 
 Felf-defense in the individual. 
 
 In Tredway v. Riley, 32 Nebr. 495, the Supreme Court of 
 Nebraska quotes as good law the language of Mr. Justice Mc 
 
Lean in the License cases, 5 How. 589, where he says the police 
 power "is a power essential to self-preservation, and exists, 
 necessarily, in every organized community. It is, indeed, the 
 law of nature, and is possessed by man in his individual capac- 
 ity." 
 
 In State v. Aiken, 26 L. R. A. 352, the South Carolina Su- 
 preme Court says of the police power: "The origin of this pow- 
 er must be sought in the very purpose and frame work of 
 organized society. It is fundamental and essential to govern- 
 ment. It is a necessary and inherent attribute of sovereignty. 
 It antedates all laws, and may be described as the assumption 
 on which constitutions rest; for the state, whether we regard it 
 as an association of individuals or as a moral organism, must 
 have the right of self-protection, and the power to preserve its 
 own existence in safety and prosperity, else it could neither 
 fulfill the law of its being nor discharge its duties to the indi- 
 vidual. And to this end it is necessarily invested with power 
 to enact such measures as are adapted to secure its own author- 
 ity and peace, and preserve its constituent members safety, 
 health and morality." 
 
 The Supreme Court of Tennessee thus expresses the same 
 proposition: 
 
 "The first right of a state, as of a man, is self-protection, 
 and with the state that right involves the universally acknowl- 
 edged power and duty to enact and enforce all such laws, not 
 in plain conflict with some provision of the State or federal 
 constitution, as may rightly be deemed necessary or expedient 
 for the safety, health, morals, comfort and welfare of its peo- 
 ple." (Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn. 421, 'j^i Am. 
 St. Rep. 682.) 
 
 The United States Supreme Court is in full accord with these 
 state decisions. That Court has said: 
 
 "No legislature can bargain away the public health or 
 public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less 
 their servants. (Stone v. Mississippi, loi U. S. 814.) "No 
 corporation or individual can acquire any rights, by contract or 
 otherwise, which the government may not annul and take away, 
 if the exercise of such rights becomes detrimental to the public 
 health or the public morals." (Gas Light Co. v. La. Light Co., 
 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 262.) "This power legitimately exercised, can 
 neither be limited by contract, nor bartered away by legisla- 
 tion." (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366.) 
 
 8 
 
SOME OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 1. The constitution of Ohio says that morality and know- 
 ledge are essential to good government — not merely appropriate, 
 or helpful, but essential, 
 
 2. The right to protect public morals is inherent, is not 
 limited, and cannot be lost or taken away. Vested rights in 
 property and personal liberty of conduct may be restrained as 
 tar as the public welfare may require. No rights are of more 
 importance that the public welfare. 
 
 3. The people need not beg for the right to pass moral leg- 
 islation and secure the enforcement of laws for the protection 
 of public morals. They have always had that right and have 
 it now — the sacred right of self defense. No moral wrong in 
 politics can acquire any legal rights. Whatever attributes of 
 political power the wrong may manifest are usurpations. Vice 
 has no rights and should not be tolerated. 
 
 4. Public health and public morals are always linked to- 
 gether in these doctrines of the courts. The more important 
 part of the general welfare is public morals. We can ill afford 
 to do without intelligence, but an unlettered man may be honest 
 and therefore a safe citizen. A sick man may require much 
 care and be a burden to his friends and even to the public. He 
 may, nevertheless, be a harmless citizen. But the immoral man 
 is never a harmless or safe citizen. Therefore the paramount 
 duty of citizenship in a republic is to prevent the making of the 
 immoral man. 
 
 5. While this controversy is in part social and economic, 
 it is in still a wider sense patriotic. Government was not institut- 
 ed among men, and is not carried on, merely for the purposes 
 of building roads and streets, punishing crime and levying and 
 collecting taxes, but for the higher purpose of promoting the 
 
 -general welfare — spreading intelligence, protecting public health 
 and strengthening the moral character of our citizenship. This 
 is the new patriotism. Anything which destroys or injures pub- 
 lic morals is a traitor to the state. 
 
 PLACE OF THE SALOON IN SOCIETY AND GOVERN- 
 
 MENT. 
 
 Since intellectual and moral development are two essential 
 purposes of government, let us see w^here the saloon ranks 
 among social and political institutions. Let us compare it with 
 other influences and forces, to determine its effect upon the 
 public welfare. Let us apply the ordinary tests. 
 
I. Intelligence. 
 
 Intelligence is one of the essentials of citizenship. What 
 man ever gave even one year of his life to the best saloon in 
 the State, and came out at the end of the year with as high 
 intellectual ambitions as he had when he began? Does the saloon 
 run a night school to educate the heads of its patrons? Does 
 the young man who comes home late at night from that in- 
 stitution, come home with a deeper love of learning in his breast 
 and a determination to drink deep at the fountain of knowledge, 
 and make himself a scholar among men? You never yet saw a 
 saloon that produced such an effect upon the human mind, 
 and you have no sane reason to believe that you ever will. 
 Whatever intelligence the citizen may possess, he has acquired 
 in spite of the saloon, and not because of it. Therefore, the sa- 
 loon wholly fails to fulfill the intellectual requirements of citi- 
 zenship. 
 
 2. Morality. 
 
 Morality is another essential of citizenship. Let me ask 
 you, what man ever gave one year of his life to the best saloon 
 in the state, and came out at the end of the year with as high 
 moral aspirations as he had when he began? Does the saloon 
 run a Bible Class to elevate the morals of its patrons; does the 
 father who comes home from the saloon late at night, come 
 home with a warmer love in his breast for his family, and a 
 broader charity that would bring the whole world to the Master? 
 You never yet saw a saloon which produced such an effect upon 
 the human soul and you have no sane reason to believe that you 
 ever will. 
 
 These men, uncontrolled by principle, unhampered by con- 
 viction and impelled by their greed for gold, go blindly on de- 
 stroying the moral character of our people, apparently without 
 thinking that unless they are in some way prevented from con- 
 trolling public affairs, their own lives, liberty and property would 
 soon be destroyed by the very men whom their business has pro- 
 duced. The morality which they are every day destroying is 
 the great force which every day saves them from destruction. 
 The prevailing tendency of the saloon, and its attendant habits 
 and associations is to make the citizen less fitted to govern him- 
 self. Therefore the saloon utterly fails to meet the moral re- 
 quirements of citizenship. 
 
 3. Judicial Opinion of the Saloon. 
 The foregoing arguments may be called common place. We 
 have heard such arguments all our lives. They are such argu- 
 
 10 
 
ments as ministers and women advance. Some citizen who puts 
 business above patriotism and revenue above morals, may de- 
 mand more practical and less effeminate reasons. Without dis- 
 paraging these arguments against the saloon and without conced- 
 mg that any stronger and better reasons are needed, let us seek 
 another line of authority, not open to the criticism that it is fem- 
 inine or ministerial. 
 
 The Appellate Courts of the various states, and the Supreme 
 Court of the United States are not religious bodies, nor temper- 
 ance organizations, nor reform or agitation societies. They are 
 judicial tribunals engaged in the high vocation of settling ques- 
 tions w^hich other people have agitated. There is not a preacher, 
 nor a woman, nor a paid advocate nor a professional reformer on 
 any of these judicial tribunals. These judges are all lawyers. 
 Lawyers as a class are not fanatics on moral questions. Judges 
 are only lawyers elevated to the bench. The general character- 
 istic of judges is that they are conservative, rather than radical, 
 because they are constantly required to look backward for pre- 
 cedents for every forward step. Their decisions are not based on 
 dreams or prophecies of the future, but on the tested wisdom of 
 the past. 
 
 These courts and judges are not partisan advocates of any 
 cause, but pronounce their judgments under a solemn oath to 
 be impartial. As a class, they are men of good intelligence, com- 
 paring favorably with the intelligence of those engaged in the 
 liquor business, and their judicial declarations are entitled to 
 much respect. If we can justify this warfare against the saloon 
 on the doctrines of these courts, we are on safe and sane grounds. 
 
 (a.) Opinions of State Courts. 
 
 Let us, therefore, examine some of these judicial declara- 
 tions. 
 
 Nebraska. 
 "Laws regulating and prohibiting the manufacture and sale 
 of intoxicating liquors are regarded as police regulations, passed 
 for the prevention of idleness, drunkenness, pauperism and 
 crime." — Tredway v. Riley, 32 Neb. 495. 
 
 Maryland. 
 
 "The habit of drunkenness and the evils attendant upon it, 
 have always received a considerable degree of attention from 
 the law making power. And when we consider the poverty, mis- 
 ery, ruin and wretchedness which intoxication entails upon its 
 
 II 
 
unhappy victims, and the unspeakable woes which must be en- 
 dured by helpless and innocent beings dependent upon them, and 
 also the frequent crimes and disorders produced by the same 
 cause, we may measure in some degree the necessity for a leg- 
 islative remedy, if one can be found. Every consideration con- 
 nected with the public welfare imperatively demands it." — 
 Trageser v. Gray, 'jz Md. 250. 
 
 Kansas. 
 
 "Intoxicating liquor is the prolific cause of disease, misery^ 
 pauperism, vice and crime. Its power to weaken, corrupt, de- 
 bauch and slay human character and human life is not destroyed 
 or impaired because it may be susceptible of some innocent uses, 
 or may be used with propriety on some occasions. The healthy 
 morals, peace and safety of the community at large are still 
 threatened." — Durien v. State, 80 Pac. Rep. 987. State v. Durien. 
 
 South Carolina. 
 
 "Liquor, in its nature, is dangerous to the morals, good 
 order, health and safety of the people, and is not to be placed 
 upon the same footing with the ordinary commodities of life,, 
 such as corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, potatoes, etc." — State v. 
 Aiken, 26 L. R. A. 345. 
 
 Illinois. 
 
 "We presume no one would have the hardihood to contend 
 that the retail sale of intoxicating drinks does not tend, in a 
 large degree, to demoralize the community, to foster vice, pro- 
 duce crime and beggary, want and misery." — Schwuchow v. 
 Chicago, 68 111. 444. 
 
 Indiana. 
 "The evils which attend and inhere in the business of hand- 
 ling and selling intoxicating liquors are universally recog- 
 nized, and the danger therefrom to the peace and good order of 
 the community everywhere necessitates the exercise of the 
 police power." — Schmidt v. City, 80 N. E. dz'^- 
 
 Iowa. 
 
 "An enumeration of all the evils arising from the use of 
 intoxicating liquors need not be attempted. They are numerous 
 and affect the people collectively and individually. Idleness, 
 poverty, pauperism, crime, insanity, disease, and the destruc- 
 tion of human life, follow indulgence in the habit of using 
 intoxicating drinks. Millions of our fellow-countrymen are 
 
 12 
 
addicted to this habit, and of these, millions become drunkards. 
 Homes are broken up and domestic peace is destroyed by- 
 drunkenness. The prisons, almshouses, and institutions for the 
 care of orphans, insanity and affliction, are largely filled by the 
 vice. * * * * Thinking men of this day largely concur in 
 the opinion that the influence of the saloon, and the idleness and 
 vice of the multitude of its clientage, constitute the great peril 
 of American institutions. We think none will deny that nothing 
 but evil flows from this source." — Pearson v. International Dis- 
 tillery, 72 laa. 348. See Also Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165, 63 Am. 
 Dec. 491. 
 
 Ohio. 
 
 In Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 O. S. 568, the court says that the 
 traffic is "the acknowledged source of much of the crime and 
 pauperism of the state." 
 
 Michigan. 
 
 "The public evils of the intemperate use of ardent spirits, 
 which are the results of an unrestricted use of them, are denied 
 by none. The evil extends to all classes of society, and adheres 
 to our race with a pertinacity and fatality that would satisfy the 
 mind of the most skeptical that the evil at least, if not the 
 remedy proposed, was constitutional. It has long been the 
 subject of deep and anxious study, both with the philanthropist 
 and the statesman, by what means, if any, the evil could be 
 abated." — People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 256. 
 
 California. 
 
 The saloon business is "a business in itself dangerous to the 
 morals and good order of the city." — Foster v. Police Commis- 
 sioners, 102 Cal. 483. 
 
 Idaho. 
 
 "It is recognized and also is a well-known fact in history that 
 much evil results from the sale of intoxicating liquors. * * * * 
 The business of selling intoxicating liquors is not considered 
 as of equal dignity, respectability and necessity as that of the 
 grocery, dry-goods or clothing business or many other occu- 
 pations that might be mentioned, and from time immemorial its 
 prohibition or regulation has been held to be within legislative 
 power under what is known as police power." — State v. Callo- 
 way, II Idaho 719, 114 Am. St. Rep. 296. 
 
 13 
 
Colorado. 
 
 "These restraints are not like such as restrict the ordinary 
 avocations of life, which advance human happiness, or trade and 
 commerce — that neither produce immorality, suffering nor 
 want. This business is, on principle, within the police powers of 
 the state, and restrictions which may rightfully be imposed upon 
 it might be obnoxious as an illegal restraint of trade when ap- 
 plied to other pursuits." — Adams vs. Cronin, 29 Colo. 488. 
 
 (b.) United States Supreme Court. 
 
 The foregoing expressions by the State Courts are not only 
 approved, but impregnably fortified by the United States Su- 
 preme Court. 
 
 In the License cases, decided in 1847, 5 How. 504, 12 L. C. 
 Ed. 314, Justice Grier said: "It is not necessary for the sake of 
 justifying the State legislation now under consideration, to 
 array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism and crime, 
 which have their origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits." 
 
 In the case of Mugler v Kansas, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297, Mr. 
 Justice Harlan says: "We can not shut out of view the fact, 
 within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the public 
 morals, and the public safety, may be endangered by the gener- 
 al use of intoxicating drinks; nor the fact established by statis- 
 tics accessible to every one, that the idleness, disorder, pauper- 
 ism, and crime existing in the country, are, in some degree, at 
 least, traceable to this evil." 
 
 These cases all lead up to the case of Crowley v. Christen- 
 sen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Court Rep. 13, which is the most 
 crushing blow ever given to the liquor traffic by any judicial 
 tribunal. Among other things, the Court said: 
 
 "By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized 
 and Christian community, there are few sources of crime and 
 misery to society equal to the dram shop, where intoxicating 
 liquors, in small quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold 
 indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics 
 of every State show a greater amount of crime and misery at- 
 tributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail 
 liquor saloons than to any other source." * * * * There is no 
 inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by retail, 
 it is not a privilege of a citizen of the state or of a citizen of the 
 United States." 
 
 14 
 
SOME OBSERVATIONS UNDER THESE OPINIONS. 
 
 1. The liquor people complain bitterly of this language 
 of the Supreme Court, and charge that the Court never used 
 such language as that about any other business. This is true, 
 and there are the best of reasons for it. 
 
 The Court never used such language as that in regard to 
 a meat shop, for example, because no man ever went to a meat 
 shop and bought tenderloin steak until he got drunk and went 
 home and kicked his wife and children into the street. The 
 Court never used such language as that in regard to the dry 
 goods business, because no man ever bought silks and calicoes 
 for his family until he became a moral vagabond and went out 
 on the street on election day and sold his vote for fifty cents 
 or a few drinks of whiskey. 
 
 The Court applies such language only to such business as 
 injures public morals by destroying the character of our 
 citizens. 
 
 2. The strength and influence of these judicial opinions 
 consist substantially in the following facts: 
 
 (i) These judges are intelligent men. They know the ef- 
 fect of intoxicants upon men personally and collectively. 
 
 (2) These judges are impartial. They not only have no 
 financial interest, as a rule, in the business under consideration, 
 but they are under a solemn oath to proclaim and enforce impar- 
 Hally the law of the land. 
 
 (3) These judges thus declare the law without any per- 
 sonal or selfish ends in view, although they know that by so do- 
 ing they are inviting the vindictive opposition of the liquor 
 vote. They do not render these opinions for the love of making 
 political enemies, but out of a high regard for the public wel- 
 fare, regardless of the political enemies they may make. 
 
 (4) These opinions are grounded in the truth, as intelli- 
 gent men know the truth today. These declarations express the 
 concurrence of opinion of every civilized and Christian commun- 
 ity. 
 
 (5) The principles of intelligence and morality upon which 
 these opinions are founded, are the very essentials of govern- 
 ment. A free people must be moral enough to be honest and 
 just. 
 
 (6) By the deliberate edicts of these high courts of sover- 
 eign states, and by the crushing denunciation of the highest 
 court in Christendom, the common saloon of today is declared 
 to be a source of crime and misery to society. These judicial 
 opinions are a part of the common law of the nation. 
 
 15 
 
When a liquor manufacturer or dealer denounces these opin- 
 ions as unwarranted by the facts, or as over-severe in their 
 moral tests, and assumes to advise as to What is best for the 
 public welfare, you must remember that there are at least two 
 strong presumptions against him. 
 
 (i) There is the presumption of self-interest, because 
 many of them have large fortunes invested in the business, and 
 many others make their bread and butter out of the business. 
 Such interest as that is apt to color testimony. They may be 
 swearing, but they are not under oath, and absolute verity does 
 not attach to their declarations. 
 
 (2) There is the presumption of moral disregard for the 
 manner in which they make money, because they know, and in 
 all their defensive arguments admit, that the liquor business is 
 not uplifting. The ablest advocate of the liquor cause never 
 advances any plea for its continuance which claims for the 
 traffic any positive moral good, or which rises above expediency, 
 or the alleged vested rights of a moral wrong, and neither ex- 
 pediency nor any of these so-called vested rights is essential 
 or fundamental to the public welfare. The public welfare is 
 better promoted by their absence than by their presence. 
 
 These high judicial authorities ought at least to be per- 
 suasive to the average citizen seeking guidance on a serious 
 subject of public importance. The average liquor dealer, whole- 
 sale or retail, in devotion to the public welfare, does not rank 
 with our appellate courts. Any citizen honestly vexed with 
 questions or doubts in regard to a proper policy toward sources 
 of crime and misery ought not to hesitate to follow the opinions 
 of our courts rather than to follow the opinions of our saloon- 
 keepers. 
 
 4. Organized Political Power. 
 
 The liquor business is also an organized political power, 
 dictating policies as far as possible. The brewers have their 
 State Association. The retail dealers have their State Liquor 
 League, and all branches of the liquor trade are represented 
 in the Personal Liberty League. The Brewers Association, 
 the Liquor League, and Liberty League may have some laud- 
 able purposes, but if so, those purposes are seldom manifest 
 to the public. And every manifestation of any good purpose 
 always has a selfish end. 
 
 The published purposes of the Ohio Liquor League are 
 thus stated in their constitution: 
 
 16 
 
"It shall make all possible effort to get into its folds all 
 of the respectable liquor dealers of the State of Ohio. Its object 
 shall be mutual protection. It will protect its members against 
 unjust persecution as far as possible. It will strive to place in 
 public office men who are known to be fair and liberal minded." 
 
 Note their three fold object: To get the respectable deal- 
 ers together, to protect its members against unjust persecution 
 and to place in office fair and liberal minded men. 
 
 Their respectable saloonkeepers will be hard to find, since 
 the United States Supreme Court has said of the best of them, 
 that their places of business are sources of crime and misery to 
 society. Respectability cannot accrue merely from a collection 
 of these sources of crime and misery. 
 
 When their constitution says they are organized to protect 
 themselves against unjust persecution they mean that the 
 Liquor League is organized to defend its members against 
 all prosecutions for violation of law. And when they proclaim 
 that they will strive to place fair and liberal minded men in 
 office, they mean that they will put in office men who will not 
 enact new laws against them, nor enforce the laws which we 
 already have. 
 
 The purposes of the Personal Liberty League are thus 
 stated: "We declare our opposition to men and meas!ires that 
 favor sumptuary or restrictive legislation which encroaches 
 upon or curtails the personal liberties of our people." 
 
 In language such as the above, the Ohio organizauons 
 declare their political purposes. The purposes of the liquor 
 combinations in other states are essentially the same, though 
 the avenues of their activities may vary under different cir- 
 cumstances and local conditions. 
 
 But the essential purposes of these liquor organizations 
 and their activities in politics may be reduced to three heads, 
 viz: 
 
 1. To prevent legislation for the protection of public 
 morals. 
 
 2. To defeat men for executive offices who will enforce the 
 law against them. 
 
 3. To carry local option and other elections in favor of the 
 saloons. 
 
 Moral reform is not the main purpose of these organiza- 
 tions, only a mere incident. Reform was not thought of, until 
 they, were convinced by the flashes of lightning and the crash 
 of thunder that a storm was raging. Now the National Brew- 
 ers Association and some of the State Brewers Associations, 
 
 17 
 
and the Model License League have declared in somewhat sim- 
 ilar language that they are in favor of making the liquor busi- 
 ness more respectable and in some instances the brewers have 
 caused, or co-operated in causing, some dive keepers to be ar- 
 rested. These occasional efforts at decency should be given 
 their full value. The chief purpose in them, however, is to cut 
 off the worst part of their own business in order that the peo- 
 ple may not so soon become entirely disgusted with the best 
 part of it. These dives, however, are the necessary and legiti- 
 mate end of any business which is, at its best, a source of crime 
 and misery to society. The brewers cannot clean up much 
 without cutting down their profits and you need not expect 
 them to interfere perceptibly with their own 'income. They 
 certainly will not destroy their own business. They 
 may be found willing to clean the teeth of the mad-dog that 
 his rabid bite may not produce the quickest possible death, but 
 they will never assist in killing the dog. 
 
 The brewers rush into this reform of shutting up the dives 
 with about as much enthusiasm and soul hunger as you would 
 manifest in going to the hospital to have a diseased leg cut off. 
 You would do that only when convinced that the operation was 
 necessary to save life. The brewers have about reached that 
 Ftage of desperation. 
 
 But do not brewers and liquor dealers often contribute to 
 local hospitals and other charities? Grant it, and give full 
 credit for all they do. Do they by these gifts, justify the public 
 sanction of their sources of crime and misery? Do they do as 
 much good by their charities as they do harm by their sources 
 of crime and misery? Until the good at least equals the bad, 
 the weight of the argument is against them. It does not profit 
 to sanction so much evil that a little good may come. Besides, 
 if they devoted their personal energies and business careers to 
 some other and harmless line of business they could have as 
 much money for charities and not get it out of sources of crime 
 and misery. 
 
 The latest organization of the liquor forces is under the 
 name of the Personal Liberty League. The Liberty League is 
 a sort of a trust, or combination, of the other liquor organiza- 
 tions of the country. It does the same work formerly done by 
 the Brewers* Association, and the Liquor League. It is the old 
 fee under a new name. The Brewers' Association and Liquor 
 League lost so many battles of late years that a new alignment 
 became necessary. 
 
 In adopting this new name, they showed their common dis- 
 
 i8 
 
regard for sacred things. Liberty has meant more than property 
 and life to many a loyal patriot, for both property and life have 
 been freely given on many a red battlefield that liberty might 
 live. The tree of liberty has ever been watered by the blood 
 of patriots. Liberty always hath charms for any people, slave 
 or free. So the liquor advocates laid their unholy hands upon 
 that sacred word and sought to stampede the people to their 
 standard on an appeal for liberty. Thus, like the hypocrite in 
 Pollok's "Course of Time,' they 
 
 "Stole the livery of the court of Heaven 
 To serve the devil in; in virtue's guise 
 Devoured the widow's house and orphan's bread." 
 
 To have such institutions as saloons in the State is bad 
 enough; to have them organized for political purposes is infin- 
 itely worse. A horse thief, or a wife beater, arouses your horror 
 when you encounter them, one at a time, but suppose all the 
 horse thieves in the State should organize a horse thief's league 
 for their mutual protection, and to elect fair and liberal minded 
 men to office. 
 
 Suppose all the wife beaters of the State should organize 
 a wife beater's association which should attempt to manipulate 
 politics so as to protect all who exercise the personal liberty 
 of beating their wives. Suppose now those two organizations, 
 on being complained of, should propose to pay the government 
 a fixed sum as a tax for the privilege of doing business: An 
 outraged public sentiment would make short work of both 
 organizations. 
 
 These liquor organizations never support a candidate for 
 office who, in their opinion, will enforce the liquor laws that we 
 already have, or who will pass new and stronger ones. They 
 are fighting that their sources of crime and misery may be left 
 undisturbed. They care nothing for the public welfare, or they 
 would voluntarily retire from a business Which is a source 
 of crime and misery — from a business which is everywhere det- 
 rimental to public morals. They at all times refuse to promote 
 the general welfare by protecting public morals and declare by 
 their conduct that they think it better to protect the saloons, 
 these sources of crime and misery, than it is to protect our 
 homes and our churches, the hope and life of this nation. 
 
 Not only do these liquor organizations care nothing for the 
 public welfare, but they have no party principles. One year 
 they are Democrats, the next year Republicans. Their party 
 
 19 
 
affiliations are never determined by political issues but by im- 
 moral considerations. In the same election, they support one 
 party in one county and the other parly in the adjoining county. 
 They always give their support to the candidate who favors 
 their sources of crime and misery, or who seems least likely to 
 enforce the law against them. Their influence is always on the 
 side of bad political morals. No man ever ran for office on a 
 platform of common decency and law enforcement, who did 
 not incur their organized opposition. They are always a thorn 
 in the flesh to every man, who would seek office on honorable 
 moral grounds, and nothing will so effectually break the power 
 of the saloon in politics as for all patriotic men of all parties 
 to join hands and put them all out of business. 
 
 Further Specifications Not Necessary. 
 
 These fundamental arguments against the saloon might be 
 amplified in detail by showing the amount of crime, the amount 
 of pauperism, the amount of insanity which can fairly be attri- 
 buted to the saloon business. To that might be added be- 
 wildering statistics as to the millions of money annually wasted 
 by drinkers and the millions more expended by the public in 
 the work of law enforcement and charity. 
 
 A detailed discussion of these matters might be profitable, 
 but for the purposes of this argument it will not be necessary 
 to go into detail. Statistics are a fruitful source of controversy. 
 It ,is an old adage that figures will not lie, but many a lie has 
 been told with figures, and there is so much of indisputable 
 argument ready at hand against the traffic, that we need not 
 argue points on which disputes might arise. 
 
 All rnust admit that a material amount of crime and misery 
 and pauperism and insanity flow from the traffic, that a material 
 amount of money is thus wasted by the drinking part of our 
 population and that a material amount is spent by the govern- 
 ment in law enforcement and charity, that would not be thus 
 wasted and expended except as a result of the traffic. This is 
 sufficient to justify our attack on the saloon business. A mater- 
 ial amount of crime and misery is more than any man has a 
 right to ask us to stand. Whether the traffic causes all that 
 some people charge against it or not, yet any crime, and any 
 misery, are more than the public is bound to bear. A source of 
 crime and misery can have no right to an existence, even for 
 a day, or to any material extent. 
 
 In the case of Mugler v. Kansas, already cited, the Unitcvi 
 
 ao 
 
States Supreme Court said it was not necessary for the sake 
 of justifying the Kansas Prohibition law, to array the appalling 
 statistics of misery, pauperism and crime which have their ori- 
 gin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits, and that the public 
 health, public morals and public safety may be endangered by 
 the general use of liquors, and that idleness, pauperism and 
 crime are, in some degree at least, traceable to this evil. The 
 court does not ask how much idleness, pauperism and crime can 
 be traced to this evil, nor fix the percentage of disease, pauper- 
 ism and crime that must be proved against the traffic before 
 prohibitory laws will be justified. If idleness, disorder, pauper- 
 ism and crime are in some material degree traceable to this evil, 
 that is a sufficient warrant for the public to defend itself against 
 such sources of injury. 
 
 Conclusions. 
 
 In the light of these principles and facts, what is the place 
 of the saloon in society and government? Where should you 
 class an institution that discourages intellectual development? 
 Where should you class an institution that nibbles away by 
 stealth the morals of its patrons? Where would you class a 
 great commercial enterprise which is branded by the highest 
 court of the land as a source of crime and misery? Where 
 would you class an organized political power that never stood 
 for a moral proposition in the history of the state and nation? 
 
 The Mayor of Milwaukee and Chairman Dickey of the Pro- 
 hibition Party held a couple of joint debates a few months ago 
 to discuss the question whether it was right to prohibit the 
 sale of intoxicating liquors. Any man ought to be able to ans- 
 wer that question who has mental capacity to decide whether 
 it is right to shut up a source of crime and misery. 
 
 DEFENSES BY THE SALOON. 
 
 Let us now, in the light of these principles of government 
 and under these ideals of the public welfare, examine the more 
 common defenses put forth by the saloon and its friends. 
 
 I. Personal Liberty. 
 
 One argument put forth by the liquor advocate is that 
 prohibition interferes with their personal liberty. 
 
 What do they mean by these two words "personal liberty?'* 
 When the words- are used by liquor dealers or manufacturers, 
 
 21 
 
they may mean that we have no right to interfere with their 
 business, regardless of its effect upon the general welfare. That 
 proposition will be discussed under a subsequent subdivision of 
 this argument. 
 
 When the words "personal liberty" are used by the individ- 
 ual dealer or by some one in his behalf, they mean that the in- 
 dividual claims the right to drink when, where and what he 
 pleases, and as much as he pleases, and that saloons should be 
 permitted to run for his personal convenience and the gratifi- 
 ration of his desire to drink. His demand is that we should 
 leave the saloon undisturbed, regardless of the effect upon the 
 public welfare. 
 
 This proposition of the liquor people receives but scant 
 consideration in rural communities and among native born 
 American people, but in our large cities and among people of 
 foreign birth or with foreign blood, the situation is materially 
 different. And since our hardest battles are yet to be fought 
 and since these battles will of necessity take place in these big 
 cities and among our citizens of foreign birth and extraction, a 
 careful examination of the proposition is expedient. 
 
 As an introductory observation il may be stated that we are 
 not in this agitation seeking to deprive a man of his beverage 
 privileges in his own home nor to interfere with his personal 
 liberty to keep liquor at home, provided his home does not be- 
 come a place of public resort. We are striking primarily at the 
 open public saloon as a social and political evil, but if, as an 
 incident to closing up these sources of crime and misery, it 
 becomes inconvenient for the drinking citizen to keep his liquor 
 in his home, he must submit to that light affliction for the pub- 
 lic good. 
 
 As an answer to the merits of the controversy, we claim 
 that these advocates of personal liberty have a mistaken notion 
 of the legitimate scope of personal liberty as defined by the 
 statutes and the court decisions in this country. A few ex- 
 tracts from judicial opinions will show how much personal lib- 
 erty a citizen really has. 
 
 Blackstone's definition of personal liberty, as quoted by 
 Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases, 3rd Sup. Ct. Rep. 42, 
 is as follows: 
 
 "Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of 
 changing situation, of removing one's person to whatever place 
 one's own inclination may direct, without restraint, unless by 
 'hie course of law/* 
 
 The Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case of Pinkerton 
 
 22 
 
vs. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 18 Am. St. Rep. 473, defines the phrase 
 as follows: 
 
 "Personal liberty * * * * consists of the right of locomo- 
 tion — to go where one pleases and when — and to do that which 
 may lead to one's business or pleasure — only so far restrained 
 as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare 
 of all other citizens." 
 
 In the case of Board of Excise vs. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657, decided 
 in 1866, several defendants appealed from a conviction for selling 
 liquor without a license, claiming that the law was invalid. The 
 court said: 
 
 "Is it not an absurd proposition, that such a law by its own 
 mere force deprives any person of his liberty or property, within 
 the meaning of the constitution, or that it infringes upon either 
 of these secured private rights? 
 
 "Yet this is the only ground its violators can occupy to raise any 
 question as to its validity. They are restrained of no liberty, ex- 
 cept that of violating the law by engaging in a forbidden traffic; 
 and the assumption is not even plausible that the act works a de- 
 privation of property to any one within the meaning of the consti- 
 tutional restrictions upon legislative authority. * * * * The neces- 
 sary powers of the legislature over all subjects of internal police, 
 being part of the general grant of legislative power given by the 
 constitution, cannot be sold, given away or relinquished. Irrevocable 
 grants of property and franchise may be made, if they do not impair 
 the supreme authority to make laws for the right government of 
 the state, but no one legislature can curtail the power of its suc- 
 cessors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of 
 police." 
 
 The Ohio Supreme Court, in the case of Palmer vs. Tingle, 55 
 O. S. 441, defines liberty as follows: 
 
 "The word 'liberty' as used in the first section of the Bill of 
 Rights, does not mean a mere freedom from physical restraint or 
 state of slavery, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to be 
 free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been en- 
 dowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are 
 necessary for the common welfare" 
 
 The same Court in the case of State vs. Powell, 58 O. S. 344, 
 says : 
 
 "Liberty, as understood in this Country, is not license, but lib- 
 erty regulated by law. The personal liberty of every man is sub- 
 ject to such reasonable regulations as, in the wisdom of the legisla- 
 ture, are regarded as necessary to promote, not only the peace and 
 good order of society, but its well-being." 
 
 23 
 
In the case of State vs. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 91 Am. St. 
 Rep. 939, the Wisconsin Supreme Court says: 
 
 "The very existence of government renders imperative a 
 power to restrain the individual to some extent. This is called, 
 'the police power.' * * * * gy j-j^g constitution is granted the 
 police power — the power to restrain the individual of some measure 
 of his liberty of action and of his property ; but this goes no further 
 than to authorize the enactment of laws necessary to a reasonable 
 protection of the safety and welfare of the general community, and 
 not depriving the individual of liberty in the constitutional sense. 
 
 * * * * Absolute freedom in one is necessarily subversive of 
 liberty for those with whom he comes in contact, unless such 
 others be strong enough to resist and curtail his will. 
 
 "The police power of the State is co-extensive with self-pro- 
 tection, and is not inaptly termed the law of over-ruling necessity. 
 It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state 
 which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, 
 and welfare of society. It is said to be limited only by the legisla- 
 tive discretion, provided its acts do not go beyond the great prin- 
 ciple of securing the public safety." 
 
 In the case of Kentucky Board of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, 74 
 S. W. 732, the Kentucky Court of Appeals cites with approval the 
 language of Mr. Justice Field in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 
 89, to the effect that liberty is not license to act according to one*s 
 own will — "It is, then, liberty regulated by law." 
 
 In United States v. Hudson, 65 Fed. Rep. 74, the U. S. Dist 
 Court for Arkansas, by Parker, J., says: 
 
 "All the liberty we know anything about under this govern- 
 ment is liberty regulated by law. Everything else is licentiousness, 
 because it gives to each person the right to trample upon the 
 rights of all others." 
 
 In the case of McLean v. Arkansas, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208, Mr. 
 Justice Day thus limits the liberty of the citizen: 
 
 "The liberty secured by the constitution of the United States 
 to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute 
 right in each person to be at all times, and in all circumstances, 
 wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to 
 which every person is necessarily subject for the common good." 
 
 "It is, then, the established doctrine of this court that liberty 
 
 ♦ * * * is subject to restrictions passed by the legislative branch 
 of the government in the exercise of its powers to protect the 
 safety, health and welfare of the people." 
 
 In Butchers* Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., iii U. S. 746, 
 Field, J., says: 
 
 24 
 
That among the inalienable rights as proclaimed in the Dec- 
 laration of Independence, "is the right of men to pursue any lawful 
 business or vocation in any manner not inconsistent with the equal 
 rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop 
 their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment. The 
 common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and 
 pursuits which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed 
 in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore be free 
 in this country to all alike upon the same conditions." 
 
 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 427, the Court said, by Mr. Justice Peckham: 
 
 "The liberty mentioned in that (fourteenth) amendment 
 means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere 
 physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term 
 is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the en- 
 joyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful 
 ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by 
 any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for 
 that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, 
 necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful con- 
 clusion the purposes above mentioned." 
 
 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 361, Harlan 
 J., says: 
 
 "The liberty secured by the constitution of the United States 
 to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute 
 right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, 
 wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to 
 which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. 
 On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to 
 its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law 
 unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. 
 Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle 
 which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, 
 whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the 
 injury which may be done to others. This Court has more than 
 once recognized it as a fundamental principle that 'persons and 
 property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in 
 order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the 
 ^tate ' " 
 
 In Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 89, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 13 the U. S. Sup. Court said: "The possession and enjoyment of 
 all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be 
 deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the 
 safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community. 
 
 25 
 
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted 
 license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from 
 restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the 
 same right by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law." 
 
 Under these principles the U. S. Supreme Court 25 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358 upheld a statute of Massachusetts, which 
 required the inhabitants of a city or town to be vacci- 
 )iated when, in the opinion of the Board of Health, vac- 
 cination was necessary for the public health or the public 
 safety. The Court further says : "Upon the principle of 
 self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right 
 to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens 
 the safety of the members." * * * "j^ ^^s the duty, of the 
 constituted authorities primarily to keep in view the welfare, com- 
 fort and safety of the many, and not permit the interests of the 
 many to.be subordinated to the wishes or convenience of the few." 
 
 In the Kansas Prohibition cases in 1887, the brewers' attorneys 
 argued that, having erected a plant suitable only for the making of 
 beer, the owner had the personal right to manufacture and sell for 
 beverage purposes. The court met the argument fairly in this 
 language: "And so, if in the judgment of the legislature, the 
 manufacture of intoxicating liquors for the maker's own use as a 
 beverage, would tend to cripple, if it did not defeat, the efforts to 
 guard the community against the evils attending the excessive use 
 of such liquors, it is not for the courts, upon their views as to what 
 is best and safest for the community, to disregard the legislative 
 determination of that question. So far from such regulation 
 having no relation to the general end sought to be accomplished, 
 the entire scheme of prohibition, as embodied in the constitution and 
 laws of Kansas, might fail, if the right of each citizen to manufac- 
 ture intoxicating liquors f6r his own use as a beverage were recog- 
 nized. Such a right does not inhere in citizenship. Nor can it be 
 said that government interferes with or impairs any one's constitu- 
 tional rights of liberty or of property, when it determines that the 
 manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks, for general or indi- 
 vidual use, as a beverage, are, or may become, hurtful to society, 
 and constitute, therefore, a business in which no one may lawfully 
 engage. Those rights are best secured, in our government, by the 
 observance, upon the part of all, of such regulations as are es- 
 tablished by competent authority to promote the common good. 
 No one may rightfully do that which the law-making power, upon 
 reasonable grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the general wel- 
 fare." Mugler V. Kansas, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297. 
 
 26 
 
In the case of Crowley vs. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Su- 
 preme Court Reporter 13, the U. S. Supreme Court says: 
 
 "It is urged that as the Hquors are used as a beverage and the 
 injury following them, if taken in excess, is voluntarily inflicted and 
 is confined to the party offending, their sales should be withcut 
 restrictions, the contention being, that what a man shall drink 
 equally with what he shall eat is not properly a matter for legisla- 
 tion. There is in this position an assumption of fact which does 
 not exist — that when the liquors are taken in excess, the injuries 
 are confined to the party offending. The injury, it is true, first 
 falls upon him in his health, which the habit undermines; in his 
 morals, which it weakens, and in self-abasement, which it creates. 
 But, as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property and 
 general demoralization, it affects those who are immediately con- 
 nected with and dependent upon him." 
 
 The one man who had the greatest degree of personal liberty 
 was Adam, and he lost his soon after the Lord made Eve. Since 
 then each succeeding generation has enjoyed less and less of this 
 alleged divine attribute of human life. 
 
 The weakness of their whole argument consists in the fact 
 that they are insisting upon the liberty to violate the law, to over- 
 ride the will of the majority, and to injure the public welfare. But 
 no man has any divine right to get drunk. Even though a man may 
 not abuse the use of liquor himself, he has no right to have a 
 saloon maintained where other people may, and do, indulge to 
 excess and which becomes a source of crime and misery to society. 
 Every one of these definitions of liberty, expressly declares that 
 the citizen must submit to all such restraints as are necessary and 
 expedient for the public welfare. 
 
 The gambling laws illustrate this fundamental principle. The 
 reasonableness of laws against gambling is never questioned. Such 
 laws are not regarded as restraints upon personal liberty. 
 
 The evils of gambling consist (i) in the danger of impoverish- 
 ment through reckless risk; (2) the demoralizing effect of gain 
 without work; (3) the habit of relying upon chance instead of 
 labor as a means of acquiring property. 
 
 The man who chafes under the so-called paternalism of liquor 
 laws, does not seem to remember that they operate upon the same 
 elements in human nature as the gambling laws. These gambling 
 laws protect the individual from temptation and loss from his own 
 acts — acts, too, which do not affect any other person's liberty of 
 action. The conduct of the gambler affects him and those who are 
 dependent upon him. The danger of impoverishment through 
 gambling risks is no greater nor more likely to result disastrously 
 
 27 
 
than the danger of impoverishment through the spending of your 
 money in a saloon. The demoralizing effect of making money with- 
 out work is no worse than the demoralizing effect of loafing about 
 a saloon. The habit of relying upon chance instead of labor as a 
 means of acquiring property is no worse than the habit of the sa- 
 loon loafer to abandon all effort to acquire property and to rely 
 upon his wife to pay the rent and make a living for him over the 
 wash tub. 
 
 The government does have a right to protect, against his own 
 acts, the citizen who will not protect or restrain himself. If the 
 government may exercise such restraint in regard to gambling, 
 why may it not do so in the case of other bad habits and practices? 
 The control of the liquor traffic protects the community from 
 crime and the burdens of pauperism. To do these things is a right 
 of self-protection which cannot be contested. The control of the 
 liquor traffic also protects many men from their own weaknesses, 
 resulting in drunkenness and a wasteful expenditure of their own 
 time and money. This right cannot be contested. And, finally, 
 the control of the liquor traffic gives the majority the right to 
 impose upon the minority the sentiments of the majority as to 
 what is right and best for the public welfare. 
 
 The Court recognizes two effects of liquor when taken in ex- 
 cess, one personal, one social. Liquor, when taken in excess, un- 
 dermines health, weakens morals and creates self-abasement. 
 These effects are confined to the drinker himself. But it also 
 leads to neglect of business, waste of property and general de- 
 moralization. These effects reach those who are immediately con- 
 nected with and dependent upon the drinker. 
 
 The Court further recognizes the doctrine necessarily implied 
 in the language above quoted, that a man has no personal liberty 
 to disgrace, debase and bring to want those who are dependent 
 . upon him. He has a personal right to bring up his children to a 
 useful and virtuous life, but he has no personal right to disgrace 
 them nor to so spend his substance as to make them a charge upon 
 the public. 
 
 The advocate of personal liberty bases his argument on the 
 proposition that his drinking is purely a personal matter, and does 
 not concern the public, but the anti-saloon advocate bases his 
 argument on the proposition that total abstinence is justified by 
 the effect of liquor upon those who drink it, and the Courts hold 
 that regulation and prohibition of the liquor traffic are justified by 
 the effect of liquor upon those who do not drink it. Those who 
 do not drink are a part of society and have rights which cannot be 
 lost nor taken away. 
 
 28 
 
The advocate of personal liberty is out of harmony with our 
 political institutions and sets at naught the sacred traditions of the 
 majority rule. Anti-j.aloon laws are not thrust upon the citizen 
 by the arbitrary will C'f some despotic tyrant or absolute monarch, 
 but by the will of the 'iiajority evidenced by the act of an elective 
 General Assembly or by the direct vote of the people. When 
 people acting thus in a constitutional manner, adopt measures to 
 protect public morals, it is not becoming in a dissatisfied minority 
 to complain that their personal liberty is invaded. They ignore 
 the relation which a citizen sustains to society and to those who are 
 dependent upon him. 
 
 A minority residing in any political unit, and enjoying the 
 general protection afforded by an organized local government, 
 should not be permitted to defy the will of its constituted authorities, 
 acting in good faith for all, under the legislative sanction of the 
 state. If such be the privilege of a minority, then a like privilege 
 would belong to each individual of the community and the spec- 
 tacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire 
 population being subordinated to the notion of a single individual. 
 It is not an element of liberty secured by the constitution of the 
 United States that one person, or a minority of persons, residing 
 in any community, and enjoying the benefits of its local govern- 
 ment, should have the power thus to dominate the majority when 
 supported in their action by the authority of the state. 
 
 President Lincoln, in his first inaugural address, in well chosen 
 words, stated the necessity for majority rule as follows, viz : "A 
 majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, 
 and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular 
 opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free 
 people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to 
 despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a 
 permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting 
 the majoritv principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all 
 that is left.' 
 
 In ordci ^o make their argument hold good, these advocates of 
 piersonal liberty must make it appear that the physical and moral 
 welfare of the c/;izen is not a sufficient warrant for interference 
 by the Goverr.inent ; that injury to the social welfare is not ade- 
 quate ground on which to interfere with his so-called rights, and 
 that every man has a right to decide for himself how far he will 
 indulge in the vice of drink. 
 
 Thesj advocates of personal liberty in maintaining such propo- 
 sitions deliberately shut their eyes against the laws and decisions 
 of every State in the Union. Every state has recognized the right 
 
 29 
 
to restrain or prohibit the liquor traffic. This recognizes the right 
 of the government to protect the physical and moral welfare of the 
 citizen and to promote the social welfare of the people as a whole 
 and to decide that no man may indulge in the vice of drink to such 
 an extent that he becomes intoxicated. 
 
 Another false argument on this subject is that if the right 
 be recognized to regulate or prohibit what a man shall drink, there 
 is nothing to prevent the government from regulating what a man 
 shall eat. This argument, however, cannot be seriously proposed. 
 It is advanced, not for the purpose of convincing anybody, but in 
 the hope that the indifferent may be confused. There is nothing 
 which we eat that destroys intelligence and morality and is a 
 source of crime and misery to society, and is an organized power 
 for corruption in politics, such as liquor. And if, in the triumphs 
 of science in future years, someone should invent a whiskey dough- 
 nut or a beer pretzel which contained in concentration,' the in- 
 toxicating force of whiskey or beer, and the eating of such 
 doughnuts and pretzels should produce the same amount of 
 crime and misery and injury to society that whiskey and beer 
 now produce, then the Government would have the same right to 
 regulate, restrain or prohibit the traffic in these whiskey dough- 
 nuto and beer pretzels, as it now exercises in the regulation, re- 
 straint and prohibition of whiskey and beer. But so long as what 
 we eat does not become a source of crime and misery to society, 
 there is no reason why the Government should interfere with our 
 eating, and so long as the preservation of society does not demand 
 it, no law will be enacted regulating what we shall eat. 
 
 Oftentimes the man who prates loudest about his personal 
 liberty, is the man who has a wife and half a dozen children. The 
 wife and children know that if he is permitted to gratify his appe- 
 tite, it means hunger and misery to them. Shall the Government 
 regard only the appetite of the one and disregard the needs of the 
 other six or seven, and perhaps make them a public charge, that 
 the one may enjoy his personal liberty? So when the sot com- 
 plains that you are about to interfere with his personal liberty to 
 be a sot, I would have you remember also the personal liberty of 
 his wife, and children, and that getting drunk is not an inherent 
 attribute of liberty. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that personal liberty is no more sacred 
 than private property. The personal right to one's liberty is no 
 greater than the personal right to one's property. Personal liberty 
 when used for gambling purposes, for example, is no more sacred 
 than personal property, when used for gambling, purposes. No 
 man has, as a matter of law, any personal right to be immoral, or 
 
to conduct an immoral business, when his immoral conduct or 
 business injures others. When a man begins to do things which 
 injure others, his personal liberty ends. Personal liberty of the in- 
 dividual cannot prevail against the public welfare. 
 
 II. Deprives Laborers of Their Bread. 
 
 Another objection much like the personal liberty proposition, 
 is that if we vote the saloons out and prohibit the manufacture of 
 liquor, we deprive many people, bartenders and brewery em- 
 ployees, of their means of making a living. They argue that it is 
 inhuman to deprive these employees of their bread and butter. 
 
 This charge against us is a serious one, if true, and without 
 justification. But it is not true in fact, because we do not, by 
 voting a county or state "dry," deprive any man of his bread and 
 butter. The most that can be charged against us is, that a few 
 men may have to change their methods of getting their bread and 
 butter, by changing their employment. This change is justified by 
 the good results achieved. 
 
 We have a right to object even to the way people get their 
 bread and butter, if the business engaged in, or the methods used 
 by them to get their own bread and butter, take bread and butter 
 out of the mouths of others. 
 
 That is exactly the charge made against the saloon business. 
 The Supreme Court recognizes the fact that liquor drinking in- 
 jures health, weakens morals, leads to neglect of business, waste 
 of property and general demoralization, and affects those who are 
 immediately connected with and dependent upon the drinker. The 
 pickpocket, the burglar or the horse thief, may argue that they 
 have chosen these methods of getting their bread and butter, and 
 have no other means of getting a living, but we make short work 
 of their arguments. No man ever had any right to build up a 
 fortune for himself on the misfortunes of others. A man's right 
 to make money is subject to the right of society to make men. It 
 is high time that we announced these doctrines and taught them to 
 the people. 
 
 The right, inherent in the people, to protect public morals, 
 gives us the right to make a man change his employment when that 
 employment becomes detrimental to public morals. A citizen has 
 no more right to do an injury to society by his means of personal 
 employment, than he has by the use of his private property, and 
 we have already seen that a man may not so use his property as 
 to injure another. The words of the United States Supreme 
 Court exactly cover the case in point; "If the public safety or 
 
 31 
 
the public morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture 
 or traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from pro- 
 viding for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience v^^hich 
 individuals or corporations may suffer." 
 
 In the case of State v. Gray, 6i Conn. 46, the Supreme Court 
 of that state said: "Nor does the constitution recognize that a 
 man shall have t*he inviolate right to a means of livelihood the 
 exercise of which will deprive others of their means of livelihood, 
 and bring shame, disgrace and ruin upon the community. Such a 
 contention is not to be tolerated." 
 
 These men can find other employment, equally remunerative 
 and far more honorable to themselves and more useful to the 
 community. They can find some business which will not destroy 
 the moral character of their patrons. We must remember that 
 there is bread and butter on both sides of the proposition. On one 
 side is the saloonkeeper and perhaps one or two bartenders and 
 their families. On the other hand are the hundreds of drinkers 
 and their families, and two or three are not entitled to your sympa- 
 thy as against the welfare of the hundreds of others, most of whom 
 are helpless sufferers, as long as we permit the saloons to run. 
 
 If we continue to tolerate the saloon, many more people will 
 be deprived of bread and butter than will be supplied with bread 
 and butter. Therefore, on the basis of the greatest good to the 
 greatest number, we are justified in closing up the saloon. You 
 have a right to protect public morals, no matter what happens to 
 the people who purposely or negligently block the way. 
 
 From the despairing wail of the "wets," you would expect to 
 see armies of former saloon and liquor employes tramping the 
 streets of every "dry" city and thronging the highways of every 
 "dry" state, begging for work or for bread. To be compelled to 
 beg for bread is pitiable, but to be compelled to beg for work is 
 infinitely horrible. No such direful calamity ever befell any 
 people, as the direct or indirect result of voting out the saloons. 
 Experience is usually wiser than mere prediction. The certainties 
 of experience are a safer guide than unfulfilled prophecies of 
 disaster. Any inconvenience to these men is only an incident, and 
 not the main purpose of the law, and such inconvenience is only 
 temporary, and no county or state in the whole Union can be 
 cited in proof of their claim that bread and butter are not as 
 plentiful in "dry" territory as in "wet." 
 
 Progress in things material as distinguished from things 
 moral, has often deprived men of their bread and butter as ef- 
 fectually as prohibition deprives these saloon employes of their 
 bread and butter. Labor saving machinery has put more men 
 
 32 
 
out of a job — out of harmless employment — than prohibition ever 
 did. Take one illustration: 
 
 When I was a boy a railroad was constructed near my home. 
 They cut through a hill and filled up an adjoining valley. An 
 army of Irishmen with picks and shovels and mules and carts dug 
 the dirt out of the cut and dumped it on the fill. A few years 
 ago the railroad company wanted to straighten the road through 
 the hill and raise the fill. They made a new cut. Instead of the 
 old army of Irishmen, the company brought a modern steam shovel 
 or two, a locomotive and a train of flat cars. With a few move- 
 ments of the shovel they loaded the cars and then hauled the 
 dirt to the fill. There they attached the locomotive to a giant plow 
 or scraper and in a few moments more the whole train was un- 
 loaded, and that old army of Irishmen were deprived of their 
 Taread and butter as effectually as any bartender or saloon employee 
 is deprived of his. 
 
 If men must yield their personal liberty to material progress 
 to such an extent that they must seek some other way of getting 
 their bread and butter, then for a stronger reason, moral progress 
 may make an equal demand for the benefit of the public welfare. 
 In deciding how a citizen may earn his bread and butter, the 
 greatest good to the greatest number is still the controlling principle. 
 
 III. Rights of Property. 
 
 Another objection is that if you vote the saloons out, the 
 saloon fixtures will become useless and unsaleable, and the money 
 invested in the manufacture of liquors will become unprofitable, 
 and thus the retailers and manufacturers will be deprived of their 
 property without compensation or due process of law. 
 
 A sufficient answer to this objection is that the United States 
 Supreme Court has already decided the point in favor of the "drys." 
 It is fundamental that no person shall be deprived of his property 
 without due process of law. The liquor advocates always lay 
 great emphasis upon this proposition. But it is equally funda- 
 mental that all property is held under the implied obligation that 
 the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community. This 
 proposition, the liquor advocates always overlook. 
 
 In the case of Menken vs. City of Atlanta, y^ Ga. 677 and 678, 
 the Supreme Court of that State passed upon a local option law 
 enacted by the Georgia Legislature. A party had complained that 
 \\s brewery was rendered unproductive by the enforcement of the 
 local option law and claimed that his property had been damaged 
 vfithin the meaning of the State Constitution. In commenting 
 pon this case, the Supreme Court said: 
 
 33 
 
"There has been no physical interference with the brewery, no 
 trespass or tort upon it, no change in its physical surroundings, 
 or in the means of ingress and egress. It is as sound and com- 
 plete in every respect and as fit for enjoyment, use and disposition, 
 with this law in force, as it would be without it. No doubt its 
 value is greatly impaired, and impairment of value is often the 
 essence of legal damages. No doubt, too, that the impaired value 
 of this property is a remote consequence of the law, and that 
 were the law repealed, the value would be re-instated as it was 
 before. But while to lessen the value of property by changing 
 its physical condition, or by subjecting it directly to new physical 
 conditions of a hurtful character is to damage it, to reduce its 
 value indirectly and incidentally by the casual effects of a law 
 passed for a wholly different subject, is not to damaage it within 
 any legal or constitutional sense of the term. Rarely, perhaps, 
 does any new law which acts with vigor upon commerce, local or 
 general, fail to impair the value of more or less property. Surely 
 the damage clause in our new constitution was not intended to 
 make the state or the legislature an insurer against all shrinkage 
 of values that might result from the passage of laws intended for 
 the public good. Can it be seriously thought that the State must 
 literally pay its way to the establishment of a sound and whole- 
 some system of interior police and public order? 
 
 "The local option law rests in no degree upon the power of 
 eminent domain. It does not contemplate either the taking or the 
 damaging of anything. It is an exercise of the police power of 
 this commonwealth, pure and simple. The incidental effects upon 
 the value of this brewery and its fixtures result not from any in- 
 terference with the property, but solely from the inability of the 
 owners to adjust their old business to the new law. These effects, 
 if they can be called damage at all, are damnum absque injuria. 
 The law does not take or damage the property of these owners 
 for the public use, but only prevents them, to a certain limited ex- 
 tent, from taking or damaging the public for their use. This is 
 their real grievance, and for that they have no remedy. Where 
 business and law conflict, it is the business that must give way, 
 not the law." 
 
 In the State of Ohio, the Constitution contains a provision 
 which forbids the licensing of the traffic, but authorizes the legisla- 
 ture to provide by law against the evils resulting from the traffic. 
 
 In the case of Adler vs. Whitbeck, 44 O. S. 574, the Supreme 
 Court of Ohio declared that the provision of the Constitution 
 above recited "has stood since its adoption as a perpetual admoni- 
 tion to all persons engaging in this traffic, that in doing so, they 
 
 34 
 
place their property invested in the business, subject to the power 
 of the General Assembly to provide against the evils resulting 
 from the traffic." 
 
 In the case of State vs. Calloway, ii Idaho 719, 114 American 
 State Reports, 295, the Supreme Court of Idaho, says: 
 
 "Prohibition of the use of property for purposes that are 
 declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health, morals, 
 or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed 
 a taking or an appropriation of the property for public benefit or 
 without due process of law. The above principles are amply sup- 
 ported by reason and by a long line of decisions. The business 
 of manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquors is one that his- 
 tory and experience show requires legislative restraint and super- 
 vision, and even if the manufacturers have erected large plants 
 for the manufacture of such liquors in any State, the Legislature 
 of such State may enact a prohibition law and make it unlawful to 
 manufacture such liquor." 
 
 This question was raised in the Kansas Prohibition cases and 
 every phase of it was pressed hard upon the Court. United States 
 Senator Vest of Missouri, who represented some of the brewers, 
 argued that the Kansas prohibition law deprived the brewers di- 
 rectly and absolutely of their property, without due process of 
 law; that by the enactment of this statute the property was re- 
 duced in value by the direct prohibition of the real and primary 
 use; that to destroy the right to manufacture beer for a beverage 
 is to deprive the owner of his property, although he is left the 
 right to manufacture it for other purposes, since that is the 
 ordinary, usual, and principal use of beer, and that this is an 
 attempt not merely to legislate for the future but an attempt to 
 destroy vested rights by legislative enactment without compensa- 
 tion, and without due process of law. 
 
 Joseph H. Choate, counsel for certain other brewers involved 
 in the same case, argued that the Kansas law deprived his clients 
 of their liberty and property, and abridged their privileges and im- 
 munities as citizens of the United States; that at the time of the 
 passage of the act complained of, it was one of the fundamental 
 rights of his clients as citizens, to manufacture beer, and to use 
 their brewery for that purpose; that the State could only restrain 
 this right by virtue of the police power, which could only be ex- 
 ercised to the extent reasonable and necessary for the preservation 
 and promotion of the morals and health of the people ; that this 
 law goes further than that and destroys their property without 
 compensation. 
 
 The Court met these arguments in a full discussion of all the 
 
 35 
 
principles involved. The argument of the Court ought not to be 
 abridged or condensed. The language of the Court is as follows: 
 
 "Upon this ground, if we do not misapprehend the position of 
 defendants, it is contended that, as the primary and principal use 
 of beer is as a beverage; as their respective breweries were 
 erected when it was lawful to engage in the manufacture of beer 
 for every purpose; as such establishments will become of no 
 value as property, or, at least, will be materially diminished in 
 value, if not employed in the manufacture of beer for every 
 purpose — the prohibition upon their being so employed is, in effect, 
 a taking of property for public use without compensation, and de- 
 priving the citizen of his property without due process of law. 
 In other words, although the State, in the exercise of her police 
 powers, may lawfully prohibit the manufacture and sale, within 
 her limits, of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage, legisla- 
 tion having that object in view cannot be enforced against those 
 who, at the time, happen to own property, the chief value of 
 which consists in its fitness for such manufacturing purposes, 
 unless compensation is first made for the diminution in the value 
 of their property, resulting from such prohibitory enactments. 
 
 "This interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is inadmis- 
 sible. It cannot be supposed that the States intended, by adopting 
 that amendment, to impose restraints upon the exercise of their 
 powers for the protection of the safety, health, or morals of the 
 community. In respect to contracts, the obligations of which are 
 protected against hostile State legislation, this Court, in Union Co. 
 V. Landing Co., iii U. S., 751, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 652, said that the 
 State could not, by any contract, limit the exercise of her power 
 to the prejudice of the public health and the public morals. So, 
 in Stone v. Mississippi, loi U. S., 816, where the constitution was 
 invoked against the repeal by the state of a charter, granted to a 
 private corporation, to conduct a lottery, and for which that cor- 
 poration paid to the State a valuable consideration in money, the 
 Court said: *No legislature can bargain away the public health 
 or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much 
 less their servants. * * * Government is organized with a view 
 to their preservation and cannot divest itself of the power to pro- 
 vide for them.' Again, in Gas Light Co. v. Light Co., 115 U. S., 650, 
 672, 6 Sup. Ct. Rp., 252: The constitutional prohibition upon 
 State laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not restrict 
 the power of the State to protect the public health, the public 
 morals, or the public safety, as the one or the other may be in- 
 volved in the execution of such contracts. Rights and privileges 
 arising from contracts with a State are subject to regulations for 
 
 36 
 
the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the 
 public safety, in the same sense, and to the same extent, as are 
 all contracts and all property, whether owned by natural persons 
 or corporations/ 
 
 " *The principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
 or property without due process of law was embodied, in sub- 
 stance, in the constitutions of nearly all, if not all, of the States 
 at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment; and it 
 has never been regarded as incompatible with the principle, equally 
 vital, because essential to the peace and safety of society, that all 
 property in this country is held under the implied obligation that 
 the owner*s use of it shall not be injurious to the community. 
 Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 32.' " 
 
 And the court, speaking directly of the breweries which were, 
 or might be rendered unprofitable by the enforcement of the pro- 
 hibition law, continued thus: "As already stated, the present case 
 must be governed by principles that do not involve the power of 
 eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be 
 taken for public use without compensation. A prohibition simply 
 upon the use of property for purposes that are declared by valid 
 legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the 
 community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an 
 appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation 
 does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property 
 for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is 
 only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain 
 forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. Nor can 
 legislation of that character come within the fourteenth amend- 
 ment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is not 
 to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being, 
 but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of 
 his liberty and property, without due process of the law. The power 
 which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of 
 their property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or 
 the safety of the public, is not, and, consistently with the existence 
 and safety of organized society, cannot be, burdened with the 
 condition that the State must compensate such individual owners 
 for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being 
 permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon 
 the community. The exercise of the police power by the destruc- 
 tion of the property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohi- 
 bition of its use, in a particular way, whereby its value becomes 
 depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, 
 or from depriving a person of his property without due process 
 
 37 
 
of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, 
 unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner. It is 
 true, when the defendants in these cases purchased or erected their 
 breweries, the laws of the State did not forbid the manufacture of 
 intoxicating liquors. But the State did not thereby give any as- 
 surance, or come under obligation, that its legislation upon the 
 subject would remain unchanged. Indeed, as was said in Stone v. 
 Mississippi, loi U. S., 814, the supervision of the public health and 
 the public morals is a governmental power, ^continuing in its 
 nature* and *to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the mo- 
 ment may require;' and that, *for this purpose the largest legisla- 
 tive discretion is allowed and the discretion cannot be parted with 
 any more than the power itself.* So in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 
 97 U. S., 32: *If the public safety or the public morals require the 
 discontinuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the legis- 
 lature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by 
 any incidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may 
 suffer.' " 
 
 No State is under any contract with its citizens, either express 
 or implied, to refrain from passing laws for the purpose of secur- 
 ing the public health or of preserving public morals, no matter 
 haw large a class the passage of such laws may embarrass or bank- 
 rupt. And no State will refrain from the passage of such protec- 
 tive laws unless it is in the hands of unprincipled men. "Rights 
 and privileges arising from contracts with the State are subject 
 to regulations for the protection of the public health, the public 
 morals and the public safety." Gas Co. v. Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 
 6. Sup. Ct. Rep., 262. 
 
 The exercise of legislative power by the States in securing the 
 public safety, health and morals, does not conflict with any provision 
 of the national constitution. "The governmental power of self- 
 protection cannot be contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights 
 granted, nor the use of property, be withdrawn from the implied 
 liability to governmental regulation in particulars essential to the 
 preservation of the community from injury." 
 
 New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Town of Bristol, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 440. 
 
 No matter how long, nor how profitably, these liquor manu- 
 facturers and dealers may have used their property for such 
 purposes, they cannot, by such use, even under the permission of 
 the state, acquire any rights, which subsequent legislatures cannot 
 annul if the public health or morals will be promoted thereby. 
 "One legislature cannot so limit the discretion of its successors that 
 
 38 
 
they may not enact such laws as are necessary to protect the public 
 health or the public morals." 
 
 N. O. Gas Light Co. v. La. Light Co., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 262. 
 
 "The truth is, that the exercise of the police power often 
 works pecuniary injury, but the settled rule of this court is that the 
 mere fact of pecuniary injury does not warrant the overthrow of 
 legislation of a police character." * * * * "Each individual 
 holds his property subject to the ordinary and reasonable exercise 
 of the police power, and the fact that its exercise may in a particular 
 case work pecuniary injury was adjudged insufficient to stay the 
 legislative action." 
 
 L'Hote v. New Orleans, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 792. 
 
 In the case of Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 
 U. S. 659, a fertilizer plant had been constructed under the 
 authority of the State legislature outside the then limits of the city 
 of Chicago, and where there was no population. In the course of 
 years the village of Hyde Park grew up around the works of the 
 company and passed an ordinance to suppress these works. The 
 United States Supreme Court held the ordinance valid. "Although 
 there was a charter right to maintain these works, and although 
 when established they were located in a territory in which there 
 was no population, yet when the population had gathered around 
 them, the police power of the state was held sufficient to stop their 
 existence, and that without compensation to the owner. The pe- 
 cuniary injury which directly resulted to the company from the 
 stoppage of its works was held no bar to the police power of the 
 State." 
 
 L*Hote v. New Orleans, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 792. 
 
 Therefore, in the light of these authorities, let not your heart 
 be troubled, neither let it be afraid, when the liquor dealer com- 
 plains that his property is being taken from him without compensa- 
 tion or due process of law. He is not deprived of his property at 
 all, but is only prevented from using it to the public injury. He 
 IS not entitled to any sympathy on that ground. No man has any 
 right to ask your sympathy against any law, which merely pre- 
 vents him from injuring public morals. If men will persist in 
 investing their money in a business which, because of its injury 
 to public morals, may be prohibited by law, they have nobody to 
 blame but themselves and they have no right to your sympathy 
 against statutes so necessary to the public welfare. It is our 
 moral, as well as our patriotic duty to give our active, positive 
 support to every law which promotes the public welfare by protect- 
 ing public morals. 
 
 39 
 
IV. Must Have the Revenue. 
 
 Still another objection by the liquor advocate is that we cannot 
 get along without the saloon revenue. The Philadelphia Liquor 
 Dealers* Association not long ago expressed the objection in the 
 following words: "If it were not for the revenues that the sa- 
 loons of this country are now paying the Government, heaven 
 only knows what would become of the tax payer. The millions 
 of dollars we pour annually into the National and State treasuries- 
 help to lower the tax rates and virtually support the communities. 
 To eliminate the saloon would be to undermine the foundations of 
 the country's revenues." 
 
 It is refreshing to see the breezy replies to this declaration^ 
 made by two great secular papers. 
 
 The Philadelphia North American, thus makes reply, viz: 
 
 "This statement is at once an insolence and an untruth. The 
 sanctuaries of this nation are not built upon pillars made of kegs 
 and barrels. Something besides bottles stands between America 
 and bankruptcy. * * ♦ * But they forfeit the privilege of 
 tolerant treatment when they make the statement quoted. They 
 had no right to make it. Because it is untrue, because they know 
 it is untrue, because it is an offensive untruth to every enlightened 
 citizen; because it is a palpable and vicious attempt to deceive 
 those of the people who are unacquainted with the real economic^ 
 political and industrial conditions of the country." 
 
 The Indianapolis News makes its rejoinder as follows, viz : 
 
 ''One thing is certain; this saloon question will in no wise be 
 settled on the money basis. It is beyond question that any sug- 
 gestion of revenue will count only as an irritant; for the change 
 that seems certain to be wrought in the liquor business by the wave 
 of reform that is sweeping the country will be for moral reasons. 
 The saloons will be restricted and in many cases abolished for 
 moral, not material reasons. They may cease to exist outside of 
 large cities, and the whole traffic may come to be done under con- 
 ditions that will align it with the traffic in poisons and high ex- 
 plosives" 
 
 In the trial of the "License Cases" in 1847, the saloon advocates 
 put the same argument up to the United States Supreme Court; 
 they claimed that to prohibit the traffic in the States interferes 
 with the right of the national government to collect its revenue. 
 The temperance forces then argued that a diminution in the con- 
 sumption of liquor does not necessarily reduce the amount of 
 revenue, because a sober people will accumulate more wealth than 
 will people who spend their money for drink, and such an accumula- 
 
 40 
 
tion in the increase of property will add to the revenue in other 
 forms, so that there will be an increase rather than a decrease. 
 
 The Court supported and confirmed this argument by the fol- 
 lowing comment: "The diminution of the revenue arising from 
 this exercise of local power (meaning the police power) would be 
 more than repaid by the beneficial results. By preserving as far 
 as possible, the health, the safety and moral energies of society, 
 its prosperity is advanced." And Justice Grier, in his part of the 
 opinion, said: "If a loss of revenue should accrue to the United 
 States from a diminished consumption of ardent spirits, she will 
 be the gainer a thousand fold in the health, wealth and happiness 
 of her people." 
 
 With patriotic citizens searching for the truth, these declara- 
 tions of the Supreme Court ought to be quite as persuasive as the 
 pronouncement of the Philadelphia Liquor Dealer's Association. 
 
 Another answer to this revenue argument is that several 
 states and literally hundreds of counties in various parts of this 
 nation have voted out the saloons, and have not suffered any 
 irreparable injury to the public revenues, in consequence of such 
 action. If the foundation of our revenues would be undermined 
 by voting out the saloons, then in some of these states, and some 
 of these counties, there would be at least some intimation of col- j, 
 lapse, but you have yet to hear of the first county or state that has ' 
 not been able to support its institutions and maintain its financial 
 honor, after the saloons have been put out. 
 
 Another answer to this argument is that when the saloons are 
 put out, we will not need so much revenue. In all the large cities 
 the police force and the expense of police courts, the expense of 
 the county criminal courts, the support of jails and infirmaries 
 and the demands of public charity, would be so reduced that the 
 expenses of them could be easily met by other means. 
 
 Still another answer is that new sources of revenue will make 
 up a further part of that now derived from the saloon. When a 
 saloon 'is put out some legitimate business will come in and pay 
 the regular and ordinary tax and thus make up some more of the 
 lost revenue. 
 
 The men who patronize the saloon will, after it is driven out, 
 spend less money for drink and more for food and clothing, thus 
 increasing legitimate trade in those lines. 
 
 General business will be increased and pay more taxes. A non- 
 drinking community will lay up more money than a drinking com- 
 munity, and tangible taxable property will be then increased by 
 saving among those who formerly spent their money for drink. 
 
 Any disturbance of public revenues from putting out the sa- 
 
 41 
 
loons could be only temporary at most. A policy of government 
 which preserves the moral and material forces of the people 
 cannot, for that reason, prove disastrous. No man ever ruined his 
 business by throwing off a bad habit. Our saloons are the bad 
 habitJ of our municipalities. It will no more hurt our cities to lay 
 aside a bad habit than it will the individual to lay aside a bad habit. 
 
 The grunting, complaining condition of some of our cities is 
 well illustrated by a man who was getting over a big drunk. Such 
 a man feels exceedingly groggy and depressed, and will often de- 
 clare that he cannot live unless he can get something more to 
 drink. Such dreadful prophesies, however, never come true, and 
 experience has shown that after liquor is taken away from them, 
 they will come to themselves and be more vigorous and healthy than 
 they were while they were drunk. The writer knew one man who 
 used to sobei* up by drinking essence of peppermint. He thought 
 it indispensable that he must have something like that for his 
 stomach and nerves. 
 
 The cities of Ohio have been on a drunk for many years. It 
 is no wonder that some of them feel unnatural and disturbed when 
 they find themselves deprived of liquor, but if the people will simply 
 stand firm for only a few months until these cities have a chance 
 to become thoroughly sober, they will soon find out that they can 
 get along all right without the liquor revenue. 
 
 But even if the saloon revenue was not all made up by savings 
 and increases in other ways, it would be far better for the public 
 welfare to raise the revenue by the taxation of legitimate business. 
 It is incomparably better to pay tax in money than to pay it in 
 boys. 
 
 In the local option campaign at Steubenville, the children were 
 parading with flags and banners with appeals to vote "dry." The 
 liquor people sought to break up the parade by throwing handfuls 
 of pennies and nickels at the childreos* feet, hoping the little ones 
 would begin a scramble for the coins and stop marching. But the 
 little patriots marched right on and trampled the tainted money 
 under their feet. May the voting patriots of our State be as loyal 
 as these children ! But there are many voters, who, attracted by 
 the jingle of the pennies and nickels of taxes, are unable to keep 
 step with the march of these children. 
 
 Down in Athens County during the temperance campaign, one 
 farmer said he thought he would vote "wet" because the loss of 
 saloon revenue would raise his taxes. A neighbor asked him how 
 much he thought his taxes would be raised. He answered : "About 
 a dollar a year." This neighbor then asked what he would take to 
 vote "dry." With a show of indignation, he replied: "Do you 
 
 42 
 
think you can buy my vote?" His neighbor replied: "I do not 
 know, but from the way you were talking, you were about to vote 
 with the "wets" to save a dollar and I thought I might get you 
 pretty cheap." 
 
 The man, who, in order to save a dollar, votes to fasten upon 
 the community a source of crime and misery, has possibly not 
 stopped to reflect that, for that price and by that act, he is also be- 
 traying his country. 
 
 My final answer to the revenue argument is that the saloon is a 
 source of crime and misery to society, and no source of crime and 
 misery can be the foundation of our revenues. No continuous 
 injury to public morals can be compensated in money. This nation 
 cannot permanently endure, if it adopts any source of crime and 
 misery as a basis of its revenues. 
 
 Let us get back to our first principles. Morality is one of the 
 essentials of citizenship in a republic. The immoral man does not 
 help manage the government at all, and any institution which pro- 
 duces immoral men is an enemy of the State. 
 
 So long as we use the saloon as a source of revenue, we must 
 submit to the crime and misery produced by the saloon. Anything 
 which produces crime, produces immorality, because crime is only 
 immorality in action. 
 
 You now have your saloon revenue and propose to expend it 
 in the best way you can. But after you have done your best, there 
 is one thing which you cannot do, with saloon revenue. That one 
 thing is of more importance than all the other things which you 
 can do — you cannot, by the use of that revenue, reproduce what the 
 saloon destroys. The saloon destroys moral character. Money 
 cannot buy moral character You cannot, by the expenditure of 
 money, reproduce in the character of your citizens the moral values 
 that were destroyed by this source of crime and misery, out of 
 which you got the revenue into the treasury. So long as you trade 
 public morals for public money, the balance of trade is bound to be 
 against you. 
 
 The fatal fallacy in the whole revenue argument is the fact 
 that the revenue, when obtained, cannot pay for, nor restore, the 
 damage done in getting it. It is fatally wrong to try to enrich 
 our treasury by debauching our citizenship. We cannot perma- 
 nently endure a revenue system which destroys the moral character 
 of our people. It is like a man who would try to fatten a lion by 
 feeding him at the head end with raw meat cut from the flank of 
 the same lion. The lion might get two square meals that way, 
 but it would soon be apparent that the destructive processes were 
 far greater than the recuperation produced. The relief would be 
 
 * 43 
 
only temporary, while the injury would be permanent. The same 
 result will follow where we try to feed the body politic on self- 
 destroying saloon revenue. No man can long quench his own 
 thirst by drinking his own blood. That is what: the saloonkeeper 
 asks us to do when he asks us to trade the morals of our people 
 for revenue. 
 
 That man would be branded as insane who would burn down 
 his own house to get warm. He could in that way produce one 
 good fire, and warm himself once, but he at the same time would 
 destroy his shelter. After he had warmed himself once in this 
 manner, you would find him seated out of doors freezing to death 
 in the ashes of his own folly. He would destroy the very thing 
 which is necessary to his continued existence, and comfort, and 
 the nation can no more afford to consume the character of its 
 young men to get revenue, than a man can afford to burn down 
 his house to get warm. 
 
 The United States Government affords us a good illustration 
 of wise conduct in its last contest with yellow fever in New Orleans. 
 It not only buried the victims, and cared for the widows and 
 orphans, but it quarantined the disease itself. The saloonkeepers 
 and liquor dealers of this country will be very glad to have us 
 devote all of our energies to the correction of crime and the al- 
 leviation of misery, so long as we leave their sources of crime and 
 misery alone. But the source of crime and misery will never be 
 transformed by expending money and energy to relieve against its 
 evil results. We must quarantine the saloon itself, and thus dry 
 up the source of the crime and misery. 
 
 LIQUOR TRAFFIC INDEFENSIBLE. 
 
 No state constitution contains any inhibition against the pas- 
 sage of laws for the promotion of the general walfare, but many 
 laws passed for the supposed purpose of promoting the general 
 welfare are set aside by the Courts because of the manner in 
 which such laws are passed or because they come in conflict with 
 some constitutional requirement as to form, though the substance 
 of the act may be unobjectionable. It is sometimes found that 
 such statutes do not have a uniform operation, or make an un- 
 reasonable classification, but no Court has ever set aside any 
 statute for the reason that the statute was designed to promote 
 the general welfare. 
 
 On the other hand the Courts have always carefully scrutinized 
 police measures to see that they do not in any wise conflict with 
 any of the real rights and liberties of the people. 
 
 44 
 
In the matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, the New York Court of 
 Appeals says: 
 
 "Generally it is for the legislature to determine what laws and 
 regulations are needed to protect the public health and secure the 
 public comfort and safety, and while its measures are calculated, 
 intended, convenient and appropriate to accomplish these ends, the 
 exercise of its discretion is not subject to review by the Courts. 
 But they must have some relation to these ends. Under the mere 
 guise of police regulations, personal rights and private property 
 cannot be arbitrarily invaded, and the determination of the legisla- 
 ture is not final and conclusive. If it passes an act ostensibly for 
 the public health and thereby destroys or takes away the property 
 of a citizen, or interferes with his personal liberty, then it is for 
 the courts to scrutinize the act and see whether it really relates 
 to and is convenient and appropriate to promote the public health. 
 * * * * The courts must be able to see that it has at least in 
 fact some relation to the public health, that the public health is the 
 end actually aimed at, and that it is appropriate and adapted to 
 that end." 
 
 The same rule applies in Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court in 
 the case of Palmer v. Tingle, 55 O. S. 441, says: "The right and 
 liberty of contract is one of the inalienable rights of man, fully 
 secured and protected by our constitution, and it may be restrained 
 only in so far as it is necessary for the common welfare, and the 
 equal protection and benefit of the people. That such restraint of 
 the right and liberty of contract is for the common public welfare, 
 and equal protection and benefit of the people, must appear not 
 only to the general assembly, by force of popular clamor, or the 
 pressure of the lobby, but also to the courts, and it must be so clear 
 that a court of justice, in the calm deliberation of its judgment, 
 may be able to see that such restraint is for the common welfare, 
 and equal protection and benefit of the people." 
 
 In Ex parte Quarg, 149 Cal. 79, 117 Am. St. Rep. 117, the 
 Supreme Court of California said: 
 
 "The police power is broad in its scope, but it is subject to the 
 just limitation that it extends only to such measures as are reason- 
 able in their application and which tend in some appreciable degree 
 to promote, protect, or preserve the public health, morals, or safety, 
 or the general welfare. The prohibition of an act, which the court 
 can clearly see has no tendency to affect, injure, or endanger the 
 public in any of these particulars, and which is entirely innocent in 
 character, is an act beyond the pale of this limitation and is there- 
 fore not a legitimate exercise of police power." 
 
 With the courts thus guarding with jealous eye every actual or 
 
 45 
 
threatened encroachment upon the rights of liberty or property, it 
 is a significant fact that all courts everywhere, without exception, 
 have held that laws against the traffic in intoxicating liquors are 
 proper exercises of the police power. The ablest saloon defender 
 cannot point to a single court decision which says that the saloon 
 is a good thing for society. No court has ever declared that the 
 saloon added even an infinitesimal increment to the public health, 
 the public morals or the public welfare. Not all courts have 
 spoken with such emphasis as those quoted, but all have sustained 
 anti-saloon laws as a proper exercise of the police powers of the 
 state, and those that have made statements as to the character of 
 the saloon and its influence, have always declared the saloon to be 
 harmful, and not helpful. There is no other business claiming or 
 pretending to be necessary or legitimate, which is so completely 
 without a friend or advocate on the judicial tribunals of the land. 
 
 THE MAN WHO VOTES "WET." 
 
 If these arguments be sound, what is the real attitude toward 
 the public welfare of the man who votes "wet?" 
 
 He says by his vote that he will not promote the general wel- 
 fare by protecting public morals. 
 
 He says by his vote that he will not protect the intelligence 
 of our citizenship against the acknowledged evils of the liquor 
 traffic 
 
 He says by his vote that he thinks it is a better thing to pro- 
 tect these sources of crime and misery than it is to protect the 
 homes of our people. 
 
 He says by his vote that the crime and misery of the saloon 
 are, in his opinion, beneficial to society, or else he does an act 
 which he knows is injurious to the public welfare. 
 
 He says by his "wet" vote that these political clubs, which 
 afford ready material for the worst sort of corruption, are worthy 
 of the protection of a freeman's ballot. 
 
 If he is a legislator and votes against the enactment of whole- 
 some laws, which fairly promise to promote the general welfare or 
 votes to repeal such laws, he effectually denies to society the right 
 of self defense and self protection. Not to help society fight her 
 battles is bad enough, but to abandon society to the beast in politics 
 and to deprive society of the means of self defense, is the basest 
 of ingratitude and disloyalty. 
 
 Let us go back again to the words of Washington. He spoke 
 of religion and morality as indispensable supports of political 
 prosperity. He also said, "In vain would that man claim the 
 
 46 
 
tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great 
 pillars of human happiness/* 
 
 In these times of peace, there are no traitors armed with 
 muskets and arrayed in line of battle against the flag of their 
 country, but ignorance and immorality and the political power of 
 these organized sources of crime and misery are as grave perils 
 to the Republic in these times of peace as an army with banners 
 in time of war. That citizen effectually betrays his country today, 
 who purposely and with full knowledge, tries to place the gov- 
 ernment under the dominion of any source of crime and misery. 
 
 No citizen can rightfully claim the tribute of patriotism who 
 labors to corrupt the morals of our people, or engages in a busi- 
 ness which directly produces that result. And the citizen who 
 wilfully votes to maintain an institution that corrupts public morals 
 is no more loyal to his country than the corrupting institution which 
 he knowingly supports. 
 
 47 
 
Moral Law and Civil Law 
 
 Parts of the Same Thing 
 
 By 
 COL. ELI F. RITTER 
 of the Indianapolis Bar 
 
 Judge Noah Davis, of the New York Bar, says of this 
 great book: 
 
 "I have preached and tried to practice for many years 
 both on and off the bench the great truth so well ex- 
 pressed in your title, for nothing can be truer than that 
 Moral Law and Civil Law are 'parts of the same thing/ 
 Yet, I must say that in no book or paper, or published 
 document or judicial opinion have I seen that simple ax- 
 iom so well expressed, so clearly defined and so admirably 
 proved as in your book. The strength of your argument 
 lies in its clearness and simplicity, and no man can read it 
 without being convinced of its truth and soundness. The 
 strength of all human law lies in its morality, lacking that 
 it has no just element of force and is therefore no law. 
 Law commands what is right and forbids what is wrong, 
 and when it undertakes to declare that what is wrong is 
 right and lawful, the attempt fails and the right prevails." 
 
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